From ea2d89999c02498881d7d3c15aa1b83f2de44005 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Joe Wicentowski Date: Thu, 3 Mar 2016 13:03:53 -0500 Subject: [PATCH] 2015 Q4 volumes now available as full TEI --- volumes/frus1969-76v23.xml | 66633 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++ volumes/frus1969-76ve11p2.xml | 59364 ++++++++++++++++++++++++ volumes/frus1977-80v18.xml | 58520 +++++++++++++++++++++++ volumes/frus1977-80v20.xml | 59969 +++++++++++++++++++++++- volumes/frus1977-80v26.xml | 79961 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++- volumes/frus1981-88v13.xml | 56915 +++++++++++++++++++++++ 6 files changed, 381133 insertions(+), 229 deletions(-) create mode 100644 volumes/frus1969-76v23.xml create mode 100644 volumes/frus1969-76ve11p2.xml create mode 100644 volumes/frus1977-80v18.xml create mode 100644 volumes/frus1981-88v13.xml diff --git a/volumes/frus1969-76v23.xml b/volumes/frus1969-76v23.xml new file mode 100644 index 000000000..4e7589a4c --- /dev/null +++ b/volumes/frus1969-76v23.xml @@ -0,0 +1,66633 @@ + + + + + + Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume + XXIII, Arab-Israeli Dispute, 1969–1972 + Foreign Relations of the United States + 1969–1976 + Volume XXIII + Arab-Israeli Dispute, 1969–1972 + Steven Galpern + Adam M. Howard + + + + United States Government Printing Office + Washington + 2015 + frus1969-76v23 + + + +

Released in 2015 as printed book.

+ + + + + + + + + Foreign Relations of the United States + 1969–1976 + Volume XXIII + Arab-Israeli Dispute 1969–1972 + + Editor: Steven Galpern + General Editor: Adam M. Howard + + United States Government Printing Office + Washington + 2015 + DEPARTMENT OF STATE Office of the Historian Bureau of Public Affairs For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government + Printing Office Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512-1800; DC + area (202) 512-1800 Fax: (202) 512-2250 Mail: Stop IDCC, Washington, DC + 20402-0001 + +
+ + Preface +

The Foreign Relations of the United States series presents + the official documentary historical record of major foreign policy decisions and + significant diplomatic activity of the United States Government. The Historian + of the Department of State is charged with the responsibility for the + preparation of the Foreign Relations series. The staff of + the Office of the Historian, Bureau of Public Affairs, under the direction of + the General Editor of the Foreign Relations series, + plans, researches, compiles, and edits the volumes in the series. Secretary of + State Frank B. Kellogg first promulgated official regulations codifying specific + standards for the selection and editing of documents for the series on March 26, + 1925. These regulations, with minor modifications, guided the series through + 1991.

+

Public Law 102–138, the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, established a new + statutory charter for the preparation of the series which was signed by + President George H.W. Bush on October + 28, 1991. Section 198 of P.L. 102–138 added a new Title IV to the Department of + State’s Basic Authorities Act of 1956 (22 USC 4351, et seq.).

+

The statute requires that the Foreign Relations series be + a thorough, accurate, and reliable record of major United States foreign policy + decisions and significant United States diplomatic activity. The volumes of the + series should include all records needed to provide comprehensive documentation + of major foreign policy decisions and actions of the United States Government. + The statute also confirms the editing principles established by Secretary + Kellogg: the Foreign Relations series is guided by the + principles of historical objectivity and accuracy; records should not be altered + or deletions made without indicating in the published text that a deletion has + been made; the published record should omit no facts that were of major + importance in reaching a decision; and nothing should be omitted for the + purposes of concealing a defect in policy. The statute also requires that the + Foreign Relations series be published not more than + 30 years after the events recorded. The editors are convinced that this volume + meets all regulatory, statutory, and scholarly standards of selection and + editing.

+

Structure and Scope of the Foreign + Relations Series

+

This volume is part of a subseries of volumes of the Foreign + Relations series that documents the most important issues in the + foreign policy of the administrations of Richard M. + Nixon and Gerald R. Ford. This volume documents U.S. policy + toward the Arab-Israeli dispute between + January 1969 and December 1972. During his first term in office, President + Richard Nixon was confronted with + the challenges posed by the outcomes of the June 1967 Arab-Israeli War, most + notably Israel’s acquisition of territory from its Arab neighbors in the Sinai + Peninsula, the Gaza Strip, the Golan Heights, and the West Bank; lingering + hostilities between Israeli and Arab forces; the rise of the Palestine + Liberation Organization under Yasser Arafat; and growing Soviet influence in the + Arab states. Although this volume primarily traces the administration’s efforts + to broker an Egyptian-Israeli peace settlement while seeking to preserve a + precarious regional balance of power between the belligerents, it also covers + other aspects of U.S. bilateral relations with Israel, Egypt, Syria, Lebanon, + and Jordan, including nuclear matters and arms sales. It should be noted that, + because of the hour-by-hour nature of the decision-making among U.S. officials + during the September 1970 Jordan Crisis, this event is covered separately in + Foreign Relations, + 1969–1976, volume XXIV, Middle East Region and Arabian Peninsula, + 1969–1972; Jordan, September 1970. Moreover, to see how the Nixon + administration’s handling of the Arab-Israeli dispute fit in with its broader + Middle East policy, this volume should be read in conjunction with the other + Middle East compilations in the subseries. For documentation on the + administration’s broad view of the region, including regional defense, and its + political relations with Saudi Arabia and the countries of the Arabian + Peninsula, see ibid. The nexus of oil matters and the + Arab-Israeli dispute, including the Arab oil embargo of 1973, is covered in Foreign Relations, volume + XXXVI, Energy Crisis, 1969–1974. U.S. relations with Iran, with which + the Nixon administration developed close ties, are covered in Foreign Relations, + 1969–1976, volume E–4, Documents on Iran and Iraq, 1969–1972. + Substantial documentation on U.S.-Soviet discussions of a Middle East settlement + can also be found in Foreign + Relations, 1969–1976, volumes XII–XV, Soviet Union, January 1969–October 1970; + October 1970–October 1971; October 1971–May 1972; and June 1972–August 1974.

+

Focus of Research and Principles of Selection for Foreign Relations, Volume XXIII

+

The Foreign Relations series has documented U.S. policy + toward the Arab-Israeli dispute since the establishment of the State of Israel + in 1948. Until the Suez crisis in 1956, when Israel participated with Britain + and France in the tripartite invasion of Egypt, the series dealt with the + dispute in its “Near and Middle East” volumes as one among many regional issues + that concerned U.S. policymaking. Since then, the series has dedicated entire + volumes to the subject, focusing on U.S. efforts to manage crises, reduce the + level of violence in the region, and provide support to its allies, namely + Israel, Jordan, and Lebanon. This volume, which covers a majority of the period + between the Arab-Israeli wars of June 1967 + and October 1973, documents the first Nixon administration’s attempts to grapple + with the intractable issues that frustrated previous Presidents and their + staffs. In this case, however, Nixon and + his advisors had to contend with the most important consequence of Israel’s + overwhelming victory in the 1967 war: its acquisition of neighboring Arab + territory (including the Sinai Peninsula and the Gaza Strip from Egypt, the + Golan Heights from Syria, and the West Bank from Jordan). Although Nixon’s predecessor, Lyndon B. Johnson, certainly had to consider + this issue during the last year and a half of his administration, land questions + framed the policymaking environment from the moment Nixon took office and did so throughout his presidency. In + common with all recent Foreign Relations volumes, the + focus of the volume is devoted primarily to the policy formulation process + whereby the Nixon administration + addressed these challenges.

+

The administration’s efforts to persuade Israel and the front-line Arab states to + begin negotiations for a settlement—along the lines of the land-for-peace + framework established by U.N. Security Council + Resolution 242—occurred in a variety of arenas and were conducted by multiple + parts of the bureaucracy. However, over the course of this volume, a number of + salient themes are highlighted. The first is the bureaucratic balance of power + within the Nixon administration’s foreign policymaking apparatus. Somewhat + uncharacteristically for foreign policymaking in the Nixon years, responsibility for Middle East + policymaking initially resided largely with the Department of State. Indeed, the + administration’s first attempt to settle the simmering war of attrition between + Egypt and Israel was named for its chief advocate, Secretary of State William P. Rogers. Over time, however, the + influence of the White House and specifically that of the President’s Assistant + for National Security Affairs Henry A. + Kissinger over U.S. policy toward the Arab-Israeli dispute + continued to grow, reflecting the administration’s concerns over the balance of + power in the region following the collapse of the Rogers Plan. This influence exacerbated further the already + tense relations between Kissinger and + Rogers. By the end of Nixon’s first term, Kissinger had circumvented the Department of + State by opening a separate backchannel to Egypt in the hopes of breaking the + diplomatic stalemate.

+

The second theme highlighted by this volume is the extent to which the Nixon + administration viewed the Arab-Israeli dispute through the lens of the Cold War. + For Nixon and Kissinger, in particular, no settlement was + possible without taking into consideration the Soviet Union, whose influence—and + indeed, presence—in Egypt had spiked dramatically following Israel’s June 1967 + victory. Beginning in 1969, the U.S. worked directly with the Soviet Union to + bring Israel and Egypt to the negotiating table.

+ +

The first chapter of this volume predominantly concerns the Nixon + administration’s decision, early in 1969, to offer specific proposals for a + settlement between Egypt and Israel. In January and February, National Security + Study Memoranda (NSSM), the papers generated + in response to them, and the National Security Council (NSC) meetings that considered the issues raised by the papers + reveal the thinking that paved the way for the series of talks that occurred in + April and May between Assistant Secretary of State for Near East and South Asian + Affairs Joseph Sisco and Soviet + Ambassador to the United States Anatoliy + Dobrynin. In these discussions, Sisco unveiled, in piecemeal + fashion, a U.S. proposal for the framework of an Israeli-Egyptian accord to be + negotiated under the auspices of the Special Representative of the United + Nations Middle East Mission, Gunnar + Jarring, and co-sponsored by the United States and the Soviet + Union. The plan, delivered to the Soviet Union on October 28 and publicly + announced in Washington by Secretary of State Rogers on December 9, presented the specific outlines of a + settlement. As his memoranda to the President make clear, Kissinger doubted the usefulness of such an + approach, and, indeed, the chapter concludes with the Soviet Union rejecting the + “Rogers Plan” because it considered the document “one-sided” and “pro-Israel.” + The Israeli Government also rejected the plan—as it did a proposal for a + settlement between Israel and Jordan—because it believed that U.S. officials had + gone too far in appeasing the Arab states. Nixon and Kissinger + viewed the dispute between Egypt and Israel, in part, as a cold war proxy battle + in which the Soviet Union and the United States could use their influence over + their respective clients to achieve a settlement. However, the first chapter + reveals there were limits to the extent that the President and his National + Security Adviser were willing to push Israel to negotiate—a theme that persists + through the volume.

+

While the U.S.-Soviet talks that culminated in the Rogers Plan and its eventual + rejection provides the narrative thread that ties the first chapter together, + there are also other, smaller, sub-narratives. One underlying storyline is the + Nixon administration’s efforts, beginning with NSSM 40 in April 1969, to assess Israel’s nuclear program, in part + by trying to persuade the country to sign the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty + (NPT). By February 1970, after making no + headway in this effort beyond pressuring Israeli Ambassador Yitzhak Rabin into making the vague assurance + that Israel would not be the first country to “introduce” nuclear weapons in the + Middle East, Nixon and his advisors + dropped the issue altogether. The administration’s response to arms + requests—particularly by Israel and to a lesser extent Jordan—is also a + recurring theme, not only in this chapter but also in the rest of the volume. + Another narrative thread is that of U.S. participation in attempts to reach a + settlement between Israel and its neighbors in the U.N. context—that is, in the + Four Power discussions with Britain, France, and the Soviet Union, in which U.S. + Ambassador Charles Yost took part. The + chapter also refers to Jarring’s work on + behalf of the United Nations, and it documents the Nixon administration’s + contingency planning in response to Palestinian fedayeen-instigated crises in + Lebanon.

+

Chapter 2 focuses on the aftermath of the Rogers + Plan’s demise and the evolution of the process that led to the + Egyptian-Israeli cease-fire in August 1970. The February Washington Special + Actions Group (WSAG) meetings that considered + Soviet moves to strengthen Egyptian military defenses sets the tone of the + chapter, which finds the Nixon administration confronting balance-of-power + issues in the region, particularly as it weighed giving additional financial and + military assistance to Israel. Nixon’s + decision in March to defer Israeli aircraft requests greatly disappointed + Israeli officials, who responded with an intelligence briefing on the + participation of Soviet pilots in operational flights in Egypt—a new level of + Soviet involvement in that country’s air defenses. Consequently, in April, + Nixon sought a re-examination of + U.S. policy options in the Middle East, including possible political initiatives + and a reassessment of Israeli assistance requests, in light of the recent Soviet + activity in Egypt. At a June NSC meeting, + Director of Central Intelligence Richard + Helms confirmed that the Soviet Union was constructing + surface-to-air missile sites and manning them with Soviet personnel. This + prompted Nixon to approve steps recommended by Rogers in a June 9 memorandum to get Egypt and Israel to “stop + shooting” and “start talking,” resulting in a cease-fire accord on August 7—also + referred to as “the standstill agreement.” The transcript of an acrimonious + telephone conversation between Kissinger + and Rogers on the cusp of the + agreement’s announcement is one of the chapter’s most provocative documents, + laying bare the notoriously tense relationship between the President’s chief + foreign policy advisers.

+

As with the first chapter, other issues arise in chapter 2 that are not related + to its larger narrative. The June WSAG + meetings concerning a fedayeen uprising in Jordan foreshadowed the crisis that + the Nixon administration would confront the following September. Along with + Israeli arms requests, the administration also had to consider military requests + from Jordan and Lebanon. And, finally, the United States continued to + participate in the Four Power talks at the United Nations, where, after the + failure of U.S. settlement proposals in December 1969, a state of + paralysis—usually with the United States and the United Kingdom on one side and + France and the Soviet Union on the other—prevented the forum from producing + anything substantive.

+

Much of chapter 3 details U.S. efforts to monitor the cease-fire zone along the + Suez Canal and then to grapple with the violations that were discovered, + particularly the relocation of surface-to-air missile batteries within the zone. The violations prompted + diplomatic approaches to both Egypt and the Soviet Union as well as a request by + Nixon for two study memoranda: the + first to outline how the United States could support Israel against Soviet and + Egyptian missile defenses west of the Suez Canal; and a second to review U.S. + options in the Middle East before the resumption of any significant activity to + produce a diplomatic settlement. The President asked that the latter study take + into account violations of the standstill agreement as well as the major + Palestinian fedayeen uprising that occurred in Jordan that September and the + Soviet response to it. In the three months following the uprising—and primarily + in response to it—the administration considered policy options regarding the + Palestinians. It also made contact with Fatah, the Palestinian Liberation + Organization’s leading faction, through the CIA, and discussed providing further military assistance to both Israel + and Jordan. The second part of chapter 3 uses Presidential recordings to + document U.S. attempts to broker an interim settlement between Egypt and Israel, + as proposed by Sadat in a speech to Egypt’s National Assembly in February. The + administration’s efforts were hampered by what U.S. officials described as + Israel’s inadequate response to Ambassador Jarring’s attempts to restart talks between Egypt and Israel. + While Rogers advocated pressuring Israel + to be more conciliatory, Kissinger + believed that Israel would reject such an approach and virtually end any chance + of a negotiated agreement over the next year.

+

The fourth and final chapter documents the Department of State’s mission to + launch “proximity talks” between Egypt and Israel, while, unbeknownst to the + Department, Kissinger carried on a + secret back channel conversation with Hafez + Ismail in Egypt. Concurrently, the President and Kissinger + continued their dialogue with the Soviets, presenting to Chairman Leonid I. Brezhnev a new proposal for a Middle + East settlement during the Moscow summit in May 1972. For its part, the + Department of State pressed ahead with efforts to bring the Egyptians and + Israelis to the negotiating table, a plan the NSC and White House viewed as unimaginative, even + counterproductive. Other issues covered in the chapter include the + administration’s policy toward aircraft sales to Israel, Israeli clashes with + fedayeen based in Lebanon, the killing of Israeli athletes at the Munich + Olympics by members of the Palestinian group Black September, and Jordanian + involvement in achieving a post-peace settlement arrangement in the West + Bank.

+

Editorial Methodology

+

The documents are presented chronologically according to Washington time. + Memoranda of conversation are placed according to the time and date of the + conversation, rather than the date the memorandum was drafted.

+ +

Editorial treatment of the documents published in the Foreign Relations series + follows Office style guidelines, supplemented by guidance from the General + Editor and the chief technical editor. The source text is reproduced as exactly + as possible, including marginalia or other notations, which are described in the + footnotes. Texts are transcribed and printed according to accepted conventions + for the publication of historical documents in the limitations of modern + typography. A heading has been supplied by the editors for each document + included in the volume. Spelling, capitalization, and punctuation are retained + as found in the original text, except that obvious typographical errors are + silently corrected. Other mistakes and omissions in the documents are corrected + by bracketed insertions: a correction is set in italic type; an addition in + roman type. Words or phrases underlined in the source text are printed in + italics. Abbreviations and contractions are preserved as found in the original + text, and a list of abbreviations is included in the front matter of each + volume. In telegrams, the telegram number (including special designators such as + Secto) is printed at the start of the + text of the telegram.

+

Bracketed insertions are also used to indicate omitted text that deals with an + unrelated subject (in roman type) or that remains classified after + declassification review (in italic type). The amount and, where possible, the + nature of the material not declassified has been noted by indicating the number + of lines or pages of text that were omitted. Entire documents withheld for + declassification purposes have been accounted for and are listed by headings, + source notes, and number of pages not declassified in their chronological place. + All brackets that appear in the source text are so identified by footnotes. All + ellipses are in the original documents

+

The first footnote to each document indicates the source of the document, + original classification, distribution, and drafting information. This note also + provides the background of important documents and policies and indicates + whether the President or his major policy advisers read the document.

+

Editorial notes and additional annotation summarize pertinent material not + printed in the volume, indicate the location of additional documentary sources, + provide references to important related documents printed in other volumes, + describe key events, and provide summaries of and citations to public statements + that supplement and elucidate the printed documents. Information derived from + memoirs and other first-hand accounts has been used when appropriate to + supplement or explicate the official record. The numbers in the index refer to + document numbers rather than to page numbers.

+

Advisory Committee on Historical Diplomatic + Documentation

+

The Advisory Committee on Historical Diplomatic Documentation, established under + the Foreign Relations statute, reviews records, advises, and makes recommendations concerning the Foreign Relations series. + The Advisory Committee monitors the overall compilation and editorial process of + the series and advises on all aspects of the preparation and declassification of + the series. The Advisory Committee does not necessarily review the contents of + individual volumes in the series, but it makes recommendations on issues that + come to its attention and review volumes, as it deems necessary to fulfill its + advisory and statutory obligations.

+

Presidential Recordings and Materials Preservation Act + Review

+

Under the terms of the Presidential Recordings and Materials Preservation Act + (PRMPA) of 1974 (44 USC 2111 note), the National Archives and Records + Administration (NARA) has custody of the Nixon Presidential historical + materials. The requirements of the PRMPA and implementing regulations govern + access to the Nixon Presidential historical materials. The PRMPA and + implementing public access regulations require NARA to review for additional + restrictions in order to ensure the protection of the privacy rights of former + Nixon White House officials, since these officials were not given the + opportunity to separate their personal materials from public papers. Thus, the + PRMPA and implementing public access regulations require NARA formally to notify + the Nixon estate and former Nixon White House staff members that the agency is + scheduling for public release Nixon White House historical materials. The Nixon + estate and former White House staff members have 30 days to contest the release + of Nixon historical materials in which they were a participant or are mentioned. + Further, the PRMPA and implementing regulations require NARA to segregate and + return to the creator of files private and personal materials. All Foreign + Relations volumes that include materials from NARA’s Nixon Presidential + Materials Staff are processed and released in accordance with the PRMPA.

+

Nixon White House Tapes

+

Access to the Nixon White House tape + recordings is governed by the terms of the PRMPA and an access agreement with + the Office of Presidential Libraries of the National Archives and Records + Administration and the Nixon Estate. In February 1971, President Nixon initiated a voice activated taping + system in the Oval Office of the White House and, subsequently, in the + President’s office in the Executive Office Building, Camp David, the Cabinet + Room, and White House and Camp David telephones. The audiotapes include + conversations of President Nixon with his Assistant for National Security + Affairs, Henry Kissinger, other White + House aides, Secretary of State Rogers, other Cabinet officers, members of + Congress, and key foreign officials. The clarity of the voices on the tape + recordings is often very poor, but the editor has made every effort to verify the accuracy of the transcripts + produced here. Readers are advised that the tape recording is the official + document; the transcript represents an interpretation of that document. Through + the use of digital audio and other advances in technology, the Office of the + Historian has been able to enhance the tape recordings and over time produce + more accurate transcripts. The result is that some transcripts printed here may + differ from transcripts of the same conversations printed in previous Foreign Relations volumes. The most accurate transcripts + possible, however, cannot substitute for listening to the recordings. Readers + are urged to consult the recordings themselves for a full appreciation of those + aspects of the conversations that cannot be captured in a transcript, such as + the speakers’ inflections and emphases that may convey nuances of meaning, as + well as the larger context of the discussion.

+

Declassification Review

+

The Office of Information Programs and Services, Bureau of Administration, + conducted the declassification review for the Department of State of the + documents published in this volume. The review was conducted in accordance with + the standards set forth in Executive Order 12958 on Classified National Security + Information, as amended, and applicable laws.

+

The principle guiding declassification review is to release all information, + subject only to the current requirements of national security as embodied in law + and regulation. Declassification decisions entailed concurrence of the + appropriate geographic and functional bureaus in the Department of State, other + concerned agencies of the U.S. Government, and the appropriate foreign + governments regarding specific documents of those governments. The + declassification review of this volume, which began in 2006 and was completed in + 2013, resulted in the decision to withhold 0 documents in full, excise a + paragraph or more in 5 documents, and make minor excisions of less than a + paragraph in 25 documents.

+

The Office of the Historian is confident, on the basis of the research conducted + in preparing this volume and as a result of the declassification review process + described above, that the documentation and editorial notes presented here + provide an accurate and comprehensive—given limitations of space—account of the + Nixon administration’s policy toward the Arab-Israeli dispute from 1969 to + 1972.

+

Acknowledgments

+

The editor wishes to acknowledge the assistance of officials at the Nixon + Presidential Materials Project, located at the time of research at the National + Archives and Records Administration (Archives II), at College Park, Maryland. + The editor also wishes to acknowledge the Richard Nixon + Estate for allowing access to the Nixon presidential recordings and the Richard + Nixon Library & Birthplace for facilitating that access. Special thanks are + due to Scott Koch, formerly of the Historical Staff of the Central Intelligence + Agency, who was extremely helpful in arranging full access to the files of the + Central Intelligence Agency. John Haynes of the Library of Congress was + responsible for expediting access to the Kissinger Papers, including the + transcripts of Henry Kissinger’s + telephone conversations. The editor was able to use the Kissinger Papers, + including the transcripts of telephone conversations, with the kind permission + of Henry Kissinger. The editor would + like also to thank Sandra Meagher at the Department of Defense.

+

Steven Galpern collected documentation for this volume and selected and edited + it, under the supervision of Edward C. Keefer, the former General Editor of the + Foreign Relations series. Susan C. Weetman, Carl + Ashley, and Dean Weatherhead coordinated the declassification review. Keri E. + Lewis, Kristen Ahlberg, Margaret Ball, Aaron Marrs, and Mandy Chalou did the + copy and technical editing. Do Mi Stauber, Inc. prepared the index.

+ + Stephen P. Randolph, Ph.D. + + The Historian + + + Bureau of Public Affairs + + August 2015 + +
+ +
+ + Contents + + + Preface + III + + + Sources + XV + + + Abbreviations and Terms + XXV + + + Persons + XXIX + + + Arab-Israeli Dispute, 1969–1972 + + + The Rogers Plan + 1 + + + The Cease-Fire Agreement + 271 + + + The Interim Settlement Proposal + 554 + + + Proximity Talks and the Backchannel: Separate + Department of State and White House Negotiating Tracks + 915 + + + + + Index + 1095 + + + + +
+ +
+ Sources + + +

Sources for the Foreign Relations + Series

+

The Foreign Relations statute requires that the published + record in the Foreign Relations series include all + records needed to provide comprehensive documentation of major U.S. foreign + policy decisions and significant U.S. diplomatic activity. It further requires + that government agencies, departments, and other entities of the U.S. Government + engaged in foreign policy formulation, execution, or support cooperate with the + Department of State historians by providing full and complete access pertinent + to foreign policy decisions and actions and by providing copies of selected + records. Most of the sources consulted in preparation of this volume have been + declassified and are available for review at the National Archives and Records + Administration. A few collections, mostly relating to intelligence matters or + Henry Kissinger’s Papers at the + Manuscript Division of the Library of Congress, remain closed to the public. + They were available to the editors of this volume and the documents chosen for + publication have been declassified.

+

The editors of the Foreign Relations series have complete + access to all the retired records and papers of the Department of State: the + central files of the Department; the special decentralized files (“lot files”) + of the Department at the bureau, office, and division levels; the files of the + Department’s Executive Secretariat, which contain the records of international + conferences and high-level official visits, correspondence with foreign leaders + by the President and Secretary of State, and memoranda of conversations between + the President and Secretary of State and foreign officials; and the files of + overseas diplomatic posts. All the Department’s indexed central files through + December 1976 have been permanently transferred to the National Archives and + Records Administration at College Park, Maryland (Archives II). Many of the + Department’s decentralized office (or lot) files covering the 1969–1976 period, + which the National Archives deems worthy of permanent retention, have been + transferred or are in the process of being transferred from the Department’s + custody to Archives II.

+

The editors of the Foreign Relations series also have full + access to the papers of President Nixon and other White House foreign policy + records. Presidential papers maintained and preserved at the Presidential + libraries and previously at the Nixon Presidential Materials Project at Archives + II include some of the most significant foreign affairs-related documentation + from the Department of State and other Federal agencies including the National + Security Council, the Central Intelligence Agency, the Department of Defense, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Dr. + Henry Kissinger has approved access + to his papers at the Library of Congress.

+

Research for this volume was completed through special access to restricted + documents at the Nixon Presidential Materials Project, the Library of Congress, + and other agencies. While all the material printed in this volume has been + declassified, some of it is extracted from still-classified documents. The Nixon + Presidential Materials Staff is processing and declassifying many of the + documents used in this volume, but they might not be available in their entirety + at the time of publication.

+

Sources for Foreign Relations, + 1969–1976, Volume XXIII

+

In compiling this volume, the editor made extensive use of the Presidential + papers and other White House records at the Nixon Presidential Materials + Project. At the time of research, this collection was housed at the National + Archives and Records Administration (NARA) in College Park, Maryland, but has + subsequently been transferred to the Nixon Presidential Library and Museum in + Yorba Linda, California. Since the most important documents on the Arab-Israeli + dispute flowed to the President through his primary foreign policy advisor and + bureaucratic gatekeeper, Henry + Kissinger, this collection contains the richest and broadest spectrum + of material. Within the Nixon papers, the National Security Council (NSC) Files are the best source for documents that, + as a group, reveal how the administration conceived and executed policy.

+

The NSC Country Files for the Middle East were + invaluable in the preparation of this volume. They were the working files of the + NSC staff members responsible for analyzing + information for Kissinger on individual + Middle East countries, regional Middle East matters, and issues related to the + Arab-Israeli dispute. The files not only contain the material that NSC staff members sent to Kissinger, but also the + memoranda based on this material that he in turn sent to the President. They + also include memoranda from cabinet officials to the President—which Kissinger summarized and analyzed for + him—policy papers, and some of the most important Department of State telegrams. + Of the countries involved in the Arab-Israeli dispute, Israel was by far the + closest U.S. ally, and, as a result, its files are the most voluminous (7 + Hollinger boxes). On the Arab side of the equation, the relevant country files + include those for the United Arab Republic—renamed “Arab Republic of Egypt” in + 1971 (5 Hollinger boxes)—Jordan (5 Hollinger boxes), Lebanon (2 Hollinger + boxes), and Syria (1 Hollinger box). The small number of boxes for Lebanon + corresponds to Nixon administration’s diminished attention to the country, + except during moments of crisis, while the absence of material on Syria reflects the lack of U.S. representation + there from 1967–1974.

+

Given the inclination of President Nixon + and his advisers to view the Arab-Israeli dispute within the context of Cold + War, they worked directly with the Soviet Union to bring Israel and Egypt to the + negotiating table, particularly in 1969, through talks between Assistant + Secretary of State Joseph Sisco and + Soviet Ambassador Anatoliy Dobrynin. The + telegrams reporting those meetings, as well as other Soviet-related material on + the Middle East, are located in both the Soviet Country Files (16 Hollinger + boxes) and the general Middle East Country Files dedicated exclusively to + Arab-Israeli negotiations (11 Hollinger boxes). The latter group contains some + of the best Department of State telegrams and White House memoranda concerning + the repeated efforts to launch discussions between Israel and the Arab states, + as well as the administration’s attempts to reduce the level of violence in the + region. The more general Middle East Country Files, which focus on broader + regional issues (4 Hollinger boxes), were useful, although much less so than the + negotiations files.

+

For the minutes of meetings on the Middle East held by the NSC and its subgroups, the policy papers that + informed those meetings, the “Study Memoranda” from Kissinger that initiated the production of the papers, and the + “Decision Memoranda” that represented the culmination of the NSC policy-making process, the editor made + extensive use of the National Security Council Institutional (H-Files). It is + impossible to understand how the Nixon administration conceived and executed + policy regarding the Arab-Israeli dispute without reviewing this material (315 + Hollinger boxes, denoted by the letter “H” that precedes the box number, only a + small portion of which are related to the Middle East). Until recently, the + documents were under the custody of the NSC but + have now been transferred to the National Archives. The documents are divided + into minutes files and meeting files, with the former containing the minutes + from the meetings of the Senior and Special Review Groups (SRG), the Washington Special Actions Group (WSAG), and the National Security Council. Chaired + by Kissinger, the Special Review Group + on the Middle East was an interdepartmental body of sub-Cabinet-level + officials—including Richard Helms, the + Director of Central Intelligence, and Harold + Saunders, the member of the NSC + staff most responsible for the Middle East—that helped formulate Middle East + policy by producing and discussing papers on pressing issues. The WSAG, also chaired by Kissinger, consisted of representatives at the + undersecretary level from the Departments of State and Defense, the Central + Intelligence Agency (CIA), the Joint Chiefs of + Staff (JCS), and members of the NSC staff, and + handled contingency-planning for crises in the Middle East. Many of the papers, + the analytical summaries of the + papers, and the talking points for the meetings of both the SRG and the WSAG are contained in the meetings files. + Finally, National Security Study Memoranda (NSSM) and National Security Decision Memoranda (NSDM) concerning the Arab-Israeli dispute can be + located by finding their subject headings in the research guide, as can the + Middle East-related SRG and WSAG meeting files.

+

Harold Saunders was virtually Kissinger’s + shadow for Middle East issues on the NSC staff, + and, because he was a prodigious record-keeper, his files are both extensive and + useful. In fact, many of his memoranda to Kissinger were forwarded to the President with only the name in + the “From” column changed. The Saunders collection is divided into Middle East + Negotiations files (19 Hollinger boxes) and Chronological Files—the latter being + somewhat of a misnomer because the second half contains subject files subdivided + by country and other topics, including the Middle East, Israel, and the + individual Arab States. For administration policy toward the Arab-Israeli + dispute, however, the “Middle East Negotiations” material is the much better of + the two. It is separated into four major categories: 1) “June Initiative,” which + refers to the U.S. peace efforts in the summer of 1970; 2) “Four Power Talks,” + which refers to the U.N.-based discussions + between the Permanent Representatives of the United States, the Soviet Union, + Britain, and France; 3) “Jarring Talks,” which refers to efforts by U.N. Special Representative Gunnar Jarring to jump-start negotiations; and + 4) “U.S.-U.S.S.R. Talks.” While many of the telegrams, memoranda, and papers in + the Saunders Files can be found elsewhere in the NSC Files, this group remains enormously helpful to the researcher. + First, by examining the “Middle East Negotiations” documents in the order in + which they are organized, one can better see how administration policy evolved + over time. Second, these files do, in fact, contain material not found + elsewhere, especially the most relevant Department of State telegrams. Going + first to the Saunders Files—or the Country Files for that matter—to find these + telegrams, rather than to the Department of State Central Files at NARA (to be + discussed later), might seem counterintuitive. But given the sheer volume of + material in the Central Files, use of the Saunders files saves the researcher + both time and energy.

+

The next place to look for Arab-Israeli-related material within the NSC collection is the Kissinger Office Files. They + were maintained by Kissinger’s immediate staff and contain the essential record + of Kissinger’s 1972 backchannel correspondence with Egypt’s intelligence chief + through which he tried to organize secret, high-level talks between the United + States and Egypt. Important documents are also in the NSC Files, Agency Files, CIA, + particularly Helms’s memoranda to Kissinger. Finally, the NSC Files, Presidential Correspondence Files, + include letters between Nixon and the leaders of Israel, Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, and the Soviet Union, oftentimes + with the President’s handwritten signature.

+

There are three groups of records, two of which are unique to the Nixon + administration, that not only add color and life to the telegrams, memoranda, + and minutes of meetings but also serve as an essential backdrop to them by + helping to explain some of the motivations and behavior of key figures, such as + Nixon, Kissinger, and Secretary of State William Rogers. Transcripts of the Kissinger telephone + conversations, which were produced by a secretary listening in on the phone at + Kissinger’s office at the White House or transcribed from tape recordings from + his home telephone are in the Nixon Presidential Materials. They reveal + Kissinger’s unvarnished—and mostly negative—opinions of Department of State + maneuverings regarding policy toward the Arab-Israeli dispute. Within the White + House Special Files—outside of the NSC + collection—are the papers of the President’s Chief of Staff H.R. Haldeman, who, at the end of each day, + wrote, and then later dictated, a daily diary. The diary—available in CD form as + The Haldeman Diaries, the Multi-Media Edition and + published in an abridged book form by G. Putnam and Sons—contains blunt + observations of the tensions between Kissinger and Rogers, + showing how the nature of their relationship troubled Nixon because of the way in which it + interfered with the execution of policy. Nixon’s own views on the Kissinger-Rogers dynamic, as well as those regarding the Arab-Israeli + dispute, are on full display in the White House Presidential Recordings, which + begin in February 1971. Those that are transcribed or cited in this and other + Foreign Relations volumes comprise only a small + portion of what is available in the Nixon Presidential Materials, and, thus, + represent what the editors and the Nixon Tape team at the Office of the + Historian believe are the key recordings.

+

After the Nixon Presidential Materials, the compilation of this volume benefitted + most from the records of the Department of State. The large and well-trammeled + Record Group 59, Department of State Central Files at NARA, contain the most + complete record of communications to and from posts in the Middle East. While + documents related to the Arab-Israeli dispute are almost entirely in POL 27–14 + ARAB–ISR and POL 27–14 ARAB–ISR/UN, others can + be found in other POL and DEF files for Israel and the front-line Arab states. + The Department of State Lot File for the Office of Israel and Arab-Israel + Affairs, Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, contains copious + background information but little material on policy-making—with the exception + of two boxes of Middle East-related NSSMs, the contents of which are largely + unavailable to the public. The Rogers Lot File is filled with speeches, personal + correspondence, records of trips and state visits, statements before + congressional committees, and documents concerning the Secretary’s interactions with the media, while the Sisco Lot File + is helpful for material on the 1969 two-power talks and NSC Interdepartmental Group memoranda. Most documents of value in + the Department of State Lot Files are duplicated in the Nixon collection, and, + ultimately, the researcher will get a better sense of the Department’s role in + policy-making (or lack thereof) from Rogers all the way down to embassy + officials, through the NSC Files of the Nixon + Presidential Materials.

+

The records of the Department of Defense, the CIA, and Henry Kissinger—at + the Library of Congress—were useful to greater and lesser degrees for this + volume, but it should be noted they are closed to the public. The Department of + Defense files at the Washington National Records Center reveal how the views of + Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird ran contrary to the White House’s on U.S. + military support for Israel, but his perspective can also be gleaned from + Defense documents in the NSC Files. + Nonetheless, the details of weapons discussions—and the deals that emerged from + them—between Defense officials and their counterparts from other countries can + sometimes be found only in the Department’s own files. The CIA records, which are in Agency custody, contain + intelligence estimates and memoranda on various Middle East topics that helped + inform decision-making at the White House, and most of those documents are in + National Intelligence Council (NIC) Files. Helms’s memoranda to Kissinger and the President are in the Director of Central + Intelligence (DCI) files and the Executive + Registry, but, again, the most important memoranda and finished intelligence are + in the NSC Files of the Nixon records. Finally, + there are the Papers of Henry Kissinger at the Manuscript Division of the + Library of Congress, a collection available, by permission of Kissinger himself, to the staff at the Office + of the Historian for use in the Foreign Relations series. + Many of the documents here are duplicates of those in the Nixon Presidential + Materials, especially those in Kissinger’s Chronological and Geopolitical Files. But for minutes of + meetings missing from the Nixon NSC Files, the + Kissinger Top Secret (TS) Files were critical for filling in these gaps.

+

The following list identifies the particular files and collections used in the + preparation of this volume.

+ +

+ Unpublished Sources +

+ + + Department of State, Record Group 59, Files of the + Department of State + + + National Archives and Records Administration, + College Park, Maryland + + Central Files. Central files are + the general subject files for Department of State materials. + The 1969-1972 period includes two sets of materials + (1967–1969 and 1970–1973) organized by a subject-numeric + system. This system consists of seven broad categories: + Administration, Consular, Culture and Information, Economic, + Political and Defense, Science, and Social. In particular, + the Political (POL) and Defense (DEF) related files are + important to this Foreign Relations + volume. Within each of these divisions are subject + subcategories. For example, Political and Defense contains + four subtopics: POL (Politics), DEF (Defense), CSM + (Communism) and INT (Intelligence). Numerical subdivisions + further define the subtopics. The following represent the + most important central files utilized for this volume: + DEF 12 ISR + DEF 12–5 ISR + DEF 12–5 JORDAN + DEF 12–5 LEB + ORG 7 S AID [US] JORDAN + POL 7 UAR + POL 15–1 JORDAN + POL 23–8 LEB + POL 27–12 ARAB-ISR + POL 27–14 ARAB-ISR + POL IS–US/NIXON + POL LEB–US + + + + + + Lot Files + + Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs + Office Files of William + Rogers + Office Files of Joseph J. + Sisco + + + + + Lyndon B. Johnson Presidential + Library + Austin, Texas + + National Security File: + Middle East + + + + + + + + Nixon Presidential Materials, National Archives and + Records Administration + + + College Park, Maryland + + (Note: These files have been transferred to the Nixon Presidential + Library and Museum in Yorba Linda, California) + Kissinger Telephone Conversation Transcripts + NSC Files: + Agency Files + Country Files + Kissinger Office Files + + NSC Institutional Files (H-Files) + President’s Trip Files + Presidential Correspondence + Presidential Daily Briefings + Presidential/Kissinger Memcons + Saunders Files + Subject Files + VIP Visits + White House Special Files + + + + + White House Central Files: + The President’s Daily Diary + + + White House Tapes + + + + Henry A. Kissinger Papers + + + Library of Congress, Manuscripts Division, + Washington, DC + + Geopolitical File + + + + + + Department of Defense + + + Washington National Records Center + + Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) Files + International Security Affairs (ISA) Files + + + + + + National Security Council + + + Washington, DC + + Subject Files + + + + + + Central Intelligence Agency + + + Langley, VA + + Office of the Director of Central Intelligence + Files + Office of Executive Registry Files + + + + + +

+ Published Sources +

+ + Beattie, Kirk. Egypt During the Sadat Years. New + York: Palgrave, 2000. + Dobrynin, Anatoliy. In Confidence: Moscow’s Ambassador to America’s Six Cold + War Presidents. New York: Times Books, 1995. + Geyer, David C., and Douglas Selvage, eds. Soviet-American Relations: The Détente Years, 1969–1972. + Washington: Government Printing Office, 2007. + Haldeman, H.R. + The Haldeman Diaries: Inside the Nixon White House. + New York: Putnam, 1994. + ______. The Haldeman Diaries: Inside the Nixon White + House, Multimedia Edition + Kissinger, Henry A. + White House Years. Boston: Little, Brown and Company, + 1979. + Meir, Golda. My + Life. London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1075. + Rabin, Yitzhak. The Rabin Memoirs. Berkeley: University of California Press, + 1996. + Sadat, Anwar. In + Search of Identity: An Autobiography. New York: Harper and Row, + 1978. + + The New York Times + + United Nations. Yearbook of the United Nations, + 1969–1972. + United States. Department of State. Bulletin, + 1969–1972. + + ______. National Archives and Records Administration. The Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon Johnson, 1968-69. + Washington: Government Printing Office, 1970. + ______. National Archives and Records Administration. The Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Richard Nixon, 1969, 1970, 1971, + 1972. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1971–1974. + + The Washington Post + + + + +
+ +
+ + Abbreviations and Terms + + AF, Bureau of African + Affairs, Department of State + AF/N, Office of + Algeria, Libya, Morocco, Spanish Sahara, Tunisia, Sudan, Mauritania Affairs, + Bureau of African Affairs, Department of State + AMB, + Ambassador + ASU, Arab Socialist + Union, Egypt’s only political party + ASW, Anti-Submarine + Warfare + BG, Brigadier + General + CBU, Cluster + Bomb + CENTO, Central + Treaty Organization + CIA, Central + Intelligence Agency + CINCMEAFSA, + Commander in Chief Middle East/South Asia and Africa South of the + Sahara + CJCS, Chairman of + the Joint Chiefs of Staff + COMINT, + Communications Intelligence + DAO, Defense + Attaché’s Office + DCI, Director of + Central Intelligence + DCM, Deputy Chief of + Mission + Dept, Department of + State + DeptOff, + Department of State officer + DIA, Defense + Intelligence Agency + DOD, Department of + Defense + ECM, Electronic + Countermeasures + EDT, Eastern Daylight + Time + ELINT, Electronic + Intelligence + EmbOff, Embassy + Officer + EST, Eastern Standard + Time + EUR, Bureau of + European Affairs, Department of State + EUR/SOV, Office of + Soviet Union Affairs, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State + Exdis, Exclusive + Distribution + FBI, Federal Bureau + of Investigation + FBIS, Foreign + Broadcast Information Service + FMS, Foreign Military + Sales + FonMin, Foreign + Minister + FonOff, Foreign + Office/Foreign Official + FY, fiscal year + FYI, for your + information + GA, General + Assembly + Gen., General + GMT, Greenwich Mean + Time + GNP, Gross National + Product + + GOI, Government of + Israel + GOJ, Government of + Jordan + GOL, Government of + Lebanon + GUAR, Government of + the United Arab Republic + HAK, Henry A. + Kissinger + HHS, Harold H. + Saunders + IAEA, International + Atomic Energy Agency + IAF, Israeli Air + Force + IAI, Office of Israel + and Arab-Israeli Affairs, Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, + Department of State + ICRC, International + Committee of the Red Cross + IDAF, Israel Defense + Air Forces + IDF, Israel Defense + Forces + ILO, International + Labor Organization + INR, Bureau of + Intelligence and Research, Department of State + INR/DRR, + Directorate for Regional Research, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, + Department of State + INR/RNA/NE, + Office of Research and Analysis for Near East and South Asia, Near East + Division, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State + INR/RSE, Office of + Research and Analysis for USSR and Eastern Europe, Bureau of Intelligence + and Research, Department of State + IO, Bureau of + International Organization Affairs, Department of State + IO/UNP, Office of + United Nations Political Affairs, Bureau of International Organization + Affairs, Department of State + JAF, Jordanian Air + Force + JD, Jordanian + Dollar + MAP, Military + Assistance Program + ME, Middle East + Memcon, Memorandum + of Conversation + MIG, A.I. Mikoyan i + M.I. Gurevich (Soviet fighter aircraft named for aircraft designers Mikoyan + and Gurevich) + NATO, North Atlantic + Treaty Organization + NEA, Bureau of Near + Eastern and South Asian Affairs, Department of State + NEA/ARN, Office of + Lebanon, Jordan, Syrian Arab Republic, and Iraq Affairs, Bureau of Near + Eastern and South Asian Affairs, Department of State + NEA/ARP, Office of + Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Yemen, and Aden Affairs, Bureau of Near Eastern and + South Asian Affairs, Department of State + NEA/EGY, Office of + Egyptian Affairs, Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, Department + of State + NEA/IAI, Office of + Israel and Arab-Israeli Affairs, Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian + Affairs, Department of State + NEA/RA, Office of + Regional Affairs, Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, Department + of State + NEA/UAR, Office of + United Arab Republic Affairs, Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian + Affairs, Department of State + NPT, Nuclear + Non-Proliferation Treaty + NSC, National + Security Council + Nodis, No + Distribution (other than to persons indicated) + Noforn, No Foreign + Dissemination + + NSDM, National + Security Decision Memorandum + NSSM, National + Security Study Memorandum + OAU, Organization of + African Unity + OMB, Office of + Management and Budget + OSD, Office of the + Secretary of Defense + OSD/ISA, Office of the Secretary of + Defense for International Security Affairs. + PA, Bureau of Public + Affairs, Department of State + PFLP, Popular Front + for the Liberation of Palestine + PLO, Palestine + Liberation Organization + PM, Prime + Minister + PM/MAS, Office of + Military Assistance and Sales, Bureau of Poltico-Military Affairs, + Department of State + Reftel, reference + telegram + RES, + Resolution + RG, Record + Group + RN, Richard + Nixon + S, Office of the Secretary of State + SA–2, Surface-to-Air + Missile + SA–3, Surface-to-Air + Missile + S/S, Executive + Secretariat of the Department of State + SALT, Strategic Arms + Limitation Treaty + SAM, Surface-to-Air + Missile + SC, Security + Council + Secto, series + indicator for telegrams from the Secretary of State while away from + Washington + Septel, separate + telegram + SFRC, Senate Foreign + Relations Committee + SRG, Senior Review + Group + SSM, + Surface-to-Surface Missile + SYG, United Nations + Secretary General + Tosec, series + indicator for telegrams to the Secretary of State while away from + Washington + UAR, United Arab + Republic + UK, United + Kingdom + UN, United + Nations + UNDP, United Nations + Development Program + UNGA, United Nations + General Assembly + UNRWA, United + Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near + East + UNSC, United Nations + Security Council + USAF, United States + Air Force + USDAO, United + States Defense Attaché Office + USG, United States + Government + USINT, United + States Interests Section + USNATO, United + States Mission to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization + USSR, Union of + Soviet Socialist Republics + USUN, United States + Mission at the United Nations + WHO, World Health + Organization + WSAG, Washington + Special Actions Group + + + +
+ +
+ + Persons + + Agnew, Spiro + T., Vice President of the United States from January 20, + 1969, until October 10, 1973 + Allon, Yigal, + Deputy Prime Minister of Israel; Acting Prime Minister from February until + March 1969 + Arafat, + Yassir, Leader of Fatah and Chairman of the Executive + Committee of the Palestine Liberation Organization + Argov, Shlomo, + Minister of Israeli Embassy until August 1971 + Asad (Assad), Hafez + al-, President of Syria + Atherton, Alfred L., + Jr., Country Director, Office of Israel and + Arab-Israel Affairs, Bureau of Near East and South Asian Affairs, Departent + of State until March 1970; thereafter, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State + for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs + Bar-On, Lieutenant Colonel + Aryeh, Aide to Israeli Defense Minister Dayan + Barbour, + Walworth, U.S. Ambassador to Israel + Beam, Jacob + D., U.S. Ambassador to the Soviet Union from March + 1969 + Begin, + Menachem, leader, Herut Party + Behr, Colonel Robert + M., USAF, senior staff member, National Security + Council Operations Staff for Scientific Affairs from 1969 until 1971 + Bérard, + Armand, French Permanent Representative to the United + Nations until February 1970 + Bergus, Donald + C., Principal Officer of the U.S. Interests Section in + Cairo until February 1972 + Bitan, Moshe, + Assistant Director General, Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs + Brezhnev, Leonid + Ilyich, General Secretary of the Communist Party of + the Soviet Union + Brown, L. + Dean, U.S. Ambassador to Jordan from September + 1970 + Buffum, William + B., U.S. Deputy Permanent Representative to the United + Nations until September 1970; U.S. Ambassador to Lebanon from September + 1970 + Bunche, Ralph, + Under Secretary General of the United Nations until June 1971 + Bush, George + H.W., U.S. Permanent Representative to the United + Nations from February 1971 + Caradon, Lord (Hugh Mackintosh + Foot), British Permanent Representative to the + United Nations until 1970 + Celler, + Emanuel, Member, U.S. House of Representatives (D-New + York) until 1973; Dean of the U.S. House of Representatives + Cline, Ray + S., Director, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, + Department of State + Davies, Rodger + P., Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern + and South Asian Affairs + Davis, Jeanne + W., National Security Council Staff Secretary + Dayan, Moshe, + Defense Minister of Israel + De Gaulle, + Charles, President of France until April 1969 + De Palma, + Samuel, Assistant Secretary of State for International + Organizations Affairs from February 1969 until June 1973 + Dinitz, + Simcha, Special Assistant to Golda Meir + Dobrynin, Anatoliy + F., Soviet Ambassador to the United States + Dulles, John + Foster, Secretary of State from January 1953 until + April 1959 + + Eban, Abba, + Foreign Minister of Israel + Ehrlichman, + John, Assistant to the President for Domestic + Affairs + Eisenhower, Dwight + D., President of the United States from 1953 until + 1961 + Eliot, Theodore L., + Jr., Executive Secretary of the Department of State + from August 1969 + Elizur, + Michael, Director of North American Affairs and Acting + Assistant Director General, Israeli Minister of Foreign Affairs as of + 1970 + Fahmy, Ismail, + Egyptian Under Secretary of Foreign Affairs + Faisal ibn Abd al-Aziz al + Saud, King of Saudi Arabia + Fawzi, + Mahmoud, Foreign Affairs Assistant to Gamal Abdel + Nasser; Prime Minister of Egypt until January 1972 + Fawzi, General + Mohamed, Egyptian Minister of Defense from 1968 + until 1971 + Fulbright, J. + William, Senator (D-Arkansas); Chairman, Senate + Committee on Foreign Relations + Garment, + Leonard, Adviser to President Nixon on Jewish Affairs + Gazit, + Mordechai, Director General of the Israeli Prime + Minister’s Office under Golda Meir + Ghaleb, Mohammed + Murad, Egyptian Ambassador to Moscow until January + 1972; Foreign Minister of Egypt from February 1972 + Ghorbal, + Ashraf, Chief, Egyptian Interests Section, Foreign + Ministry of the United Arab Republic + Greene, Joseph N., + Jr., Principal Officer, U.S. Interests Section in + Cairo from February 1972 until July 1973 + Gromyko, Andrei + A., Soviet Foreign Minister + Gur, Major General + Mordechai, Military Attaché, Israeli Embassy in + Washington + Haig, General Alexander M., + Jr., Senior Military Adviser to the Assistant to the + President for National Security Affairs from January 1969 until June 1970; + Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs + Haldeman, + H.R., Assistant to the President; White House Chief of + Staff from January 1969 until April 1973 + Hassan bin Talal, + el-, Crown Prince of Jordan and younger brother of + King Hussein + Hassan Muhammed ibn Yusuf, + Mawlay al-, King of Morocco from 1961 + Heikal, Mohamed + Hasanayn, Editor and weekly columnist at Cairo daily + newspaper, Al Ahram; adviser to Gamal Abdel Nasser + and Anwar al-Sadat + Helms, Richard + M., Director of Central Intelligence, Central + Intelligence Agency from June 1966 until February 1973 + Helou, + Charles, President of Lebanon until September + 1970 + Herzog, General + Chaim, Special Assistant to Golda Meir + Hoskinson, Samuel + M., member, National Security Council Staff from + 1970 until 1972 + Hussein bin + Talal, King of Jordan from 1953 + Irwin, John N. + II, Under Secretary of State from September 1970 until + July 1972; thereafter, Deputy Secretary of State + Ismail, Hafez, + Egyptian Chief of Intelligence + Jackson, Henry M. + “Scoop”, Senator (D-Washington) + Jarring, Gunnar + V., Swedish Ambassador to the Soviet Union; detailed to + the United Nations to serve as Special Representative, United Nations Middle + East Mission + Johnson, Lyndon + B., President of the United States from 1963 until + 1969 + Johnson, U. + Alexis, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs + from February 1969 + + Karamessines, + Thomas, Deputy Director for Plans, Central + Intelligence Agency, until 1973 + Kennedy, David + M., Secretary of the Treasury from January 22, 1969, + until February 11, 1971 + Kennedy, Colonel Richard + T., member, National Security Council Staff + Kissinger, Henry + A., Assistant to the President for National Security + Affairs from 1969 + Knowles, Lieutenant General + Richard T., USA, Assistant to the Chairman of the + Joint Chiefs of Staff + Kosygin, Aleksei + N., Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the + Soviet Union + Laird, Melvin + R., Secretary of Defense from 1969 + Lincoln, General George + A., Director, Office of Emergency Preparedness, from + 1969 until 1973 + Malik, Yakov + A., Soviet Representative to the United Nations + McCloskey, Robert + J., Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Press + Relations and Ambassador at Large from 1969 + Meir, Golda, + Prime Minister of Israel from March 1969 + Mitchell, John + N., Attorney General of the United States + Moorer, Admiral Thomas + H., USN, Chief of Naval Operations until July 1970; + thereafter Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff + Narasimhan, + C.V., Deputy Secretary General of the United Nations; + Acting Administrator of the United Nations Development Program as of 1971; + Under Secretary General for Inter-Agency Affairs and Coordination from 1972 + until 1978; Chef de Cabinet to the Secretary General as of 1972 + Nasser, Gamal + Abdel, President of Egypt until September + 1970 + Newlin, Michael + H., Polit General in Jerusalem from 1975 until + 1980 + Nixon, Richard + M., President of the United States from January 20 1969 + until August 9, 1974 + Noyes, James + H., Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Near + Eastern, African, and Southern Asian Affairs from 1970 + Nutter, G. + Warren, Assistant Secretary of Defense for International + Security Affairs from March 1969 until January 1972 + Packard, + David, Deputy Secretary of Defense from January 1969 + until December 1971 + Pompidou, + Georges, President of France from June 1969 + Pranger, Robert + J., Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for the Near + East and South Asia, 1970; Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Policy + Plans and NSC Affairs, 1971 + Qadhafi (Qaddafi, Kaddafi), + Muammar al-, Chairman of the Libyan Revolutionary + Command Council and Commander in Chief of the Libyan Armed Forces + Rabin, Lieutenant General + Yitzhak, Israeli Ambassador to the United + States + Riad, Mahmoud, + Foreign Minister of Egypt until 1972 + Riad, + Mohammed, Counselor, Egyptian Foreign Ministry + Richardson, Elliot + L., Under Secretary of State until June 23, 1970; + thereafter, Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare + + Rifai, Abdel + Munim, Prime Minister of Jordan from March until August + 1969; Foreign Minister from August 1969 until June 1970; Prime Minister from + June until September 1970; thereafter Foreign Minister + Rifai, Zaid, + Secretary General of the Royal Court of Jordan; King Hussein’s private + secretary + Rogers, William + P., Secretary of State from January 1969 until September + 1973 + Rostow, Eugene + V., Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs until + February 1969 + Rush, Kenneth + W., Deputy Secretary of Defense from February 1972 until + January 1973 + Rusk, Dean, + Secretary of State until January 1969 + Sadat, Anwar + al-, President of Egypt from October 1970 + Saint George, Rear Admiral + William R., member, National Security Council Staff, + as of 1970 + Saunders, Harold + H., member, National Security Council Staff from + 1969 until 1971 + Seelye, Talcott + W., Country Director, Lebanon, Jordan, Syrian Arab + Republic, and Iraq, Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, + Department of State + Selden, Armistead I., + Jr., Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense + for International Security Affairs from 1970 until 1972 + Shakespeare, + Frank, Director, United States Information Agency, from + 1969 + Sharaf, Abdul + Hamid, Jordanian Ambassador to the United + States + Sisco, Joseph + J., Assistant Secretary of State for Near East and South + Asian Affairs from February 1969 + Sonnenfeldt, + Helmut, member, National Security Council Staff + Stackhouse, + Heywood, Country Director, Office of Israel and Arab + Israel Affairs, Department of State + Sterner, + Michael, Country Director, Office of United Arab + Republic Affairs, Department of State + Symmes, Harrison + M., U.S. Ambassador to Jordan until May 1970 + Tcherniakov, Yuri + N., Chargé d’Affaires, Soviet Embassy, + Washington + Tekoah, Yosef, + Israeli Representative to the United Nations + Thant, U, + Secretary General of the United Nations until December 1971 + Thornton, + Thomas, member, National Security Council Staff + Vinogradov, Vladimir + M., Deputy Foreign Minister of the Soviet Union + until 1970; thereafter Soviet Ambassador to Egypt + Waldheim, + Kurt, Secretary General of the United Nations from + December 1971 + Warnke, Paul, + Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs + Wheeler, General Earle + G., Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff until July + 1970 + Wiley, Marshall + W., Counselor, U.S. Interests Section, Cairo + Yariv, Major General + Aharon, Chief of the Intelligence Corps, Israeli + Defense Forces + Yost, Charles + W., U.S. Permanent Representative to the United Nations + from January 1969 until February 1971 + Zayyat, Mohamed Hassan + el-, Egyptian Representative to the United Nations + until February 1972; thereafter Foreign Minister + Zeigler, + Ronald, White House Press Secretary + Zurhellen, Joseph + O., Deputy Chief of Mission, U.S. Embassy in Tel + Aviv, until 1973 + +
+ + + +
+ + Arab-Israeli Dispute, 1969–1972 + +
+ The Rogers Plan +
+ 1. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in IsraelSource: Johnson Library, National + Security File, Middle East, Country File, Box 142, Israel, Cables + and Memos, Vol. XI, 12/68–1/69. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Atherton and approved by Rostow. Repeated to London, Paris, + Moscow, Amman, Cairo, and USUN. + Washington, January 2, 1969, 0259Z. +

11. Summary. Under Secretary Rostow January 1 handed Israeli Chargé + Argov copy of USSR peace Quote plan Unquote given + Secretary by Soviet Chargé December 30 (septel).A memorandum of conversation of Rusk’s December 30 meeting with + Soviet Chargé Uri Tcherniakov is in the National Archives, RG 59, + Central Files 1967–69, POL 27–12 ARAB–ISR. For an unofficial + translation of the Soviet “peace ‘plan’,” see Foreign + Relations, 1964–1968, volume XX, Arab-Israeli Dispute, + 1967–1968, Document 374. The same day, Tcherniakov also gave Robert + Ellsworth, an assistant to President-elect Nixon, two notes outlining a + Soviet plan for a political settlement in the Middle East. The notes + given to Ellsworth were almost identical to those Tcherniakov handed to Secretary of + State Dean Rusk. The + memorandum of conversation between Ellsworth and Tcherniakov and the Soviet notes + given Ellsworth are in the National Archives, Nixon Presidential + Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger + Office Files, Box 1, HAK + Administrative and Staff Files—Transition, Robert Ellsworth. + Rostow noted that this latest + Soviet approach, while reiterating many standard Soviet positions, also + contained significant innovations responsive to U.S. insistence on need + for agreement among parties to conflict. This could be important + development, and we believed it imperative to proceed from hypothesis + that Soviets wanted movement now toward Middle East settlement. + Rostow outlined for + Argov our preliminary + analysis of Soviet memorandum and tentative views on how we should + reply, emphasizing these not yet cleared within USG. This connection, Rostow assured Argov there would be no change in fundamentals of our + policy. We would stress to Soviets need for parties themselves to agree + on settlement and would cast reply in terms of what US and USSR + might jointly do to help Jarring. Rostow agreed to Argov’s request that US not repeat not reply to USSR until we had received GOI reaction to latest Soviet memorandum, + which Argov thought should be + available by end of week. End summary.

+

1. Under Secretary Rostow called + in Israeli Chargé Argov January 1 + to inform GOI of latest Soviet approach + on Middle East made by Soviet Chargé Tcherniakov to Secretary December 30. Rostow told Argov Tcherniakov had left + two papers: (A) A general statement of Soviet policy which contained + nothing new, and (B) new Quote plan Unquote for Middle East settlement. + Rostow gave Argov copy of latter document, noting + that Tcherniakov had said + Soviets did not repeat not plan publish it and that we desired it be + held in confidence. Argov assured + us there would be great care in handling information.

+

2. Tcherniakov had also made the + comment, which seemed particularly significant since this Soviet + approach followed Gromyko’s + Cairo visit, that USSR had reason to + hope the UAR would accept new Soviet + Quote plan Unquote if Israel did. In this connection, Rostow noted that we had report from + Cairo that UARG had Quote lost Unquote paragraph of its reply to + Secretary’s seven points about Egyptian will to peace which we expected + to receive shortly.On November 2, 1968, + Secretary Rusk presented to + Egyptian Foreign Minister Riad an eight-point peace proposal. Seven + points were written: 1) Israeli withdrawal from territory of UAR; 2) a formal termination of the + state of war; 3) Suez Canal open to all flagships; 4) Palestinian + refugees would have a choice of resettlement in 15 countries, + including Israel; 5) international presence at Sharm el-Sheikh; 6) a + general understanding about level of arms in area; 7) both UAR and Israel would be signatory to + document. The eighth point was provided orally: Egypt would not have + to accept the proposal until an agreement was worked out for the + other Arab states. See Foreign Relations, 1964–1968, volume XX, + Arab-Israeli Dispute, 1967–1968, Document 301.

+

3. Rostow said Tcherniakov had reported that similar + approaches were being made to British and French. French Chargé Leprette + had told Rostow yesterday that + Soviet approach had been made to French Ambassador in Moscow by + Semyanov, who had also made following points orally:

+

(A) If France considered conditions favorable for a four-power effort in + Middle East, this would find favorable echo within Soviet Government. + (Rostow noted in this + connection that Soviets had been consistently cool to idea of four-power + approach.)

+

(B) Soviets did not repeat not envisage imposition of solution on parties + in which latter had not participated.

+

(C) Reopening of Suez Canal no longer linked to settlement of refugee + problem.

+

(D) While avoiding direct reply to question of whether prior Israeli + withdrawal was precondition for negotiations, Semyanov said USSR + was seeking Quote preliminary + agreement of the parties on all of the elements of a final settlement + Unquote.

+

4. Turning to latest Soviet Quote plan Unquote, Rostow said we were preparing careful + analysis and had some preliminary views which we wanted to share with + GOI. While many points in Soviet + memorandum were repetitions of old positions and there were number of + internal contradictions, we saw following significant changes:

+

(A) Soviets were now speaking of need for Quote agreed Unquote plan by + means of contacts through Jarring at beginning of settlement process. Rostow said we interpreted this + language as Soviet response to our emphasis on concept of agreement + among parties. Semyanov’s language seems to characterize Soviet + conception of Quote plan Unquote as given in paper.

+

(B) This agreed plan, to be arrived at before any action is taken on the + ground, is to cover entire Quote package Unquote of issues dealt with in + November 1967 Security Council Resolution.UN Security Council Resolution + 242, adopted unanimously on November 22, 1967, was passed in the + wake of the Arab-Israeli war of 1967. The resolution established a + “land-for-peace” framework to resolve the Arab-Israeli dispute. For + the text of the resolution, see ibid., volume XIX, Arab-Israeli Crisis and + War, 1967, Document 542.

+

(C) New Soviet memorandum contains clear implication that border + rectifications are envisaged. This implication is contained in language + that Quote provisions shall also be agreed upon which concern secure and + recognized boundaries (with corresponding maps attached) Unquote. At + same time, Rostow noted, Soviets + have left themselves an out by including language from their September 4 + note about withdrawal to pre-June 5 lines.Dobrynin delivered the + note in a meeting with Rusk + and Deputy Under Secretary Bohlen. For a record of the meeting and a + translation of the note, see ibid., volume XX, Arab-Israeli Dispute, + 1967–1968, Document 245. “Pre-June 5 lines” refers to the + borders between Israel and its neighbors that existed before the + Arab-Israeli war of 1967.

+

(D) Soviets are no longer insisting that settlement process must begin + with Israeli declaration of readiness to start partial withdrawal by a + given date. Instead, Israel and Arab states are to issue declarations + simultaneously of Quote readiness to achieve peaceful settlement + Unquote.

+

(E) Soviets now describe purpose of agreement between parties as Quote + establishment of just and lasting peace Unquote and not repeat not + merely as Quote political settlement Unquote.

+

(F) Soviet memorandum appeared to suggest that settlement process could + begin without Syrian participation. In this connection, French Chargé + had reported that Soviet Ambassador in Cairo, in conversation with + French Ambassador, had said that if agreement reached between UAR and Israel then Syria would be obliged + to come along.

+ +

5. Rostow said that the timing of + this Soviet approach was of particular interest, coming as it did after + Gromyko’s Cairo visit and + after Israeli attack on Beirut airport to which Soviets, however, have + made no reference.Israeli commandos attacked + the Beirut International Airport on December 28, 1968, in reprisal + for an attack by Palestinian guerrillas on an Israeli commercial + aircraft in the airport at Athens. See ibid., Document 367. Gromyko visited Cairo in late + December 1968. Question arose of why Soviets wanted to move + now toward settlement without awaiting new U.S. administration. + Rostow said we believed we + must operate from hypothesis that Soviets wanted early movement toward + settlement, perhaps because of concern about risks of military blow-up + in area, and of situation they could not control. Soviets might also + hope for concessions from present administration but, if so, they would + be disappointed. While flexible and responsive, USG did not repeat not intend to abandon fundamental + principles and did not repeat not wish to negotiate details of + settlement with Soviets for parties.

+

6. Rostow said that our + preliminary and as yet uncleared ideas about how to reply to latest + Soviet approach were as follows: We would state that we were always + prepared to discuss with others how we might help Jarring Mission. We do not want to + take over negotiations from parties and would seek to cast our reply in + terms of advice that USG and USSR could give to Jarring. We might, for example, revert + to Jarring’s March 10 + formula,Swedish Ambassador Gunnar V. Jarring was the UN Secretary General’s Special + Representative to the United Nation’s Middle East Mission, a + position established by Security Council Resolution 242. Jarring’s formula stipulated that + the Governments of the United Arab Republic and Israel accept that + Resolution 242 provided the basis for settling their differences and + that they would send representatives to negotiations on peace on + that basis. seeking to persuade Soviets to join us in + advising Jarring to call a + meeting of the parties with revised Quote plan Unquote as agenda. While + Soviets have never replied to Rostow’s questions to Dobrynin on this point, they have never rejected the + idea.Presumably a reference to a luncheon + meeting between Rostow and + Dobrynin on November 8, + 1968, at which they discussed prospects for the Jarring Mission. (Telegram 269827 + to Tel Aviv, November 9, 1968; National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 27 + ARAB–ISR) Our purpose was to encourage movement on Jarring’s part, Rostow said, and we continued to + believe that Israel should take initiatives with Jarring in order to preempt + initiatives by others. Noting that Soviets appeared to be negotiating + for Nasser, Rostow said we would prefer to make + clear in our reply that we are not speaking for Israel, although we + would handle that point in the light of our consultation with GOI. In response to question from + Argov, Rostow said we were proceeding from + hypothesis that what Soviets told us was binding on Cairo.

+ +

7. Rostow concluded by saying + that we believed latest Soviet approach could represent important + development, and we were desirous of consulting with GOI in this matter.

+

8. Noting that Israeli Cabinet and Ambassador Rabin were now reviewing entire + situation with respect to Middle East settlement, Argov said that while he realized we + wished to reply soonest to Soviets, he asked that USG delay replying until we had received + Israeli reaction to latest Soviet approach. Rostow agreed if delay was no more than a few days. + While reserving further comment, Argov observed that on quick perusal memorandum appeared + to contain many old and unacceptable positions; e.g., with respect to + nature of final peace settlement. If further study revealed that there + had been movement on Soviet side, this demonstrated again that basic + rule of world politics was that when U.S. was firm, Soviets always + yielded in the end.

+ + + Rusk + + +
+ +
+ 2. Telegram From the Department of State to Certain Diplomatic + PostsSource: Johnson + Library, National Security File, Country File, Middle East, Box 147, + Jordan, Cables, Vol. V, 3/68–1/69. Secret; Priority; Exdis. Drafted by Arthur R. Day + (Deputy Director, Office of U.N. + Political Affairs), cleared by Atherton, and approved by Sisco. Sent to Amman, Cairo, Tel + Aviv, USUN, London, Paris, and + Moscow. + Washington, January 16, 1969, + 0204Z. +

7299. 1. Following is text our reply to recent Soviet approaches on + Middle East which Secretary gave Soviet Chargé, Wednesday, January 15. + Final version had been modified in minor respects to take account of + some but not all comments received from Israelis and British (French + comments not received at time final text prepared.)

+

2. Amman should give copies confidentially to GOJ. In doing so should note that it must be regarded as + reply to specific Soviet communications and not as broad and + comprehensive statement of US policy. (FYI The necessity to rebut and + get straight Soviet arguments and assertions inevitably gives the reply + a flavor which the Arabs may interpret as being unbalanced against them. + We should endeavor make context clear without being defensive about + text.) Amman should also emphasize US desire that US–USSR consultations + and exchanges regarding ME be carried on + in context of support for Jarring Mission and SC + November 22 Res. All our + efforts continue be directed to assisting Jarring in carrying out his mandate and are designed to + improve his chances for success.

+

3. We are providing copies to Israelis, British and French here.

+

4. Embassy Moscow should make copy available to Jarring.

+

5. Begin text: We have studied the communications + of the Soviet Government presented to Secretary Rusk on December 30.See footnote 2, Document + 1. These communications have been brought to the + attention of President Johnson who requests that this response of the US + Government be transmitted to Chairman Kosygin.

+

The United States Government has also studied the oral communication on + the ME presented to Under Secretary + Rostow by Minister Tcherniakov on December 19, 1968.The note from the Soviet Union, handed to + Rusk by Tcherniakov on December 19, 1968, + was a formal response to “recent statements made by American + officials in conversations with Soviet representatives in Washington + and New York regarding the problems of a Middle East settlement.” + For the text of the note, see Foreign Relations, 1964–1968, volume XX, + Arab-Israeli Dispute, 1967–1968, Document 354.

+

The US Government welcomes the desire of the Soviet Government to + cooperate with it in assisting Amb + Jarring in his efforts to + promote agreement on a peaceful and accepted settlement of the conflict + in the ME. The United States values the + continuing exchange of views with the Sov Govt concerning the ME, in particular since a continued impasse + contains dangers of violence that could threaten the state interests of + the United States.

+

The US Govt has noted certain constructive elements in the latest + communications from the Govt of the Soviet Union, particularly the + recognition reflected in those communications of the principle that a + settlement should be based upon agreement among the parties to establish + a just and lasting peace in the ME, in + accordance with the provisions and principles of the SC + Res of Nov 22, 1967.

+

The US Govt notes that certain other aspects of the Sov Govt’s + communications reiterate positions and opinions which do not accord with + US views on responsibility for the hostilities in June, 1967, and for + the impasse in the Jarring + Mission, and on the proper interpretation of the SC + Res. The US considers it important that + there be no misunderstanding with the Soviet Union on this vital + subject, and therefore offers the following comments:

+

1. The US regards it as a matter of the highest priority that the Soviet + Union, and US and other countries use their full influence to arrest the + dangerous increase in Arab terrorism in the area. Terrorism leads + inevitably to reprisal. The cycle of terrorism and reprisal, in the + judgement of the US, may + imperil the very possibility of reaching a peaceful settlement pursuant + to the SC + Res of Nov 22, 1967. Terrorist + activities supported or tolerated by some governments, and the reprisals + they provoke, constitute a most serious violation of the cease-fire + resolutions of the Security Council.

+

2. The Sov communications raise again the question of Israeli acceptance + of the Nov 22 Res and its readiness to + implement it. In the view of the US, Israel has accepted and agreed to + implement the Res by means of + agreement.

+

It seems evident that the Arabs interpret these terms differently from + the Israelis. In the view of the US, the parties should now pursue the + process of clarifying their positions on key substantive issues rather + than debating this point further. The US takes the plan given to us by + Min Tcherniakov on Dec 30 as an + indication of Sov agreement with this position.

+

3. The US Govt is glad to note that the Sov Govt considers that the + points made to FonMin Riad by Sect + Rusk contain constructive + considerations. It would like to emphasize, however, that all the points + made by the Secretary, including specifically that related to Israeli + withdrawal, were based on the assumption that withdrawal would be part + of a settlement agreed between the parties which brought a just and + lasting peace to the area. The US does not share the view, expressed in + the Sov communication, that the UAR + responded positively to Sect Rusk’s remarks.See footnote 3, Document 1. It had + expected that the UAR would be prepared + to move further in clarifying its position than it has so far been + willing to do. The US continues to hope that the Secretary’s statements + will ultimately have this result.

+

4. Both the Sov communications of Dec 19 and Dec 30 misconstrue the views + of the US on the significance of the Israeli reference to the armistice + agreements in FonMin + Eban’s statement to Amb Jarring of Nov 4.For a description of Jarring’s discussion with Eban, see Foreign + Relations, 1964–1968, volume XX, Arab-Israeli Dispute, + 1967–1968, Document 307. The armistice agreements + clearly specified that the armistice demarcation lines were not + definitive political boundaries but could be changed by agreement in the + transition from armistice to a condition of true peace. As the US + emphasized in its communication of Sept 29, 1968,Ibid., Document + 266. the heart of US policy since June 5, 1967 has + been that this transition must take place. This continues to be US + policy. At the same time, it has been and remains US policy, as Pres + Johnson said on Sept 10, 1968,In a speech that Johnson gave on the occasion + of the 125th Anniversary Meeting of B’nai B’rith. The list of guests + included Deputy Prime Minister of Israel Yigal Allon. (Public + Papers: Johnson, 1968–69, Book II, pp. 944–950) that + the secure and recognized boundaries required by the SC + Res of Nov 22, 1967, cannot and should + not reflect the weight of conquest. These principles are reflected in + the SC + Res which calls for the establishment + of a just and lasting peace but does not specify that the secure and + recognized boundaries to which Israeli forces would withdraw should be + identical with the lines held prior to June 5, 1967, or on any other + date. In the view of the US, the essential purpose of the Res is to accomplish this transition to a + condition of peace, and agreement between the parties on its elements, + and not return to the status quo ante. The US is convinced that + continuation of the fragile armistice of the last twenty years would be + a burden to world peace. The US cannot speak for Israel, but believes it + important to make its own views on this matter clear once more to the + Sov Govt.

+

5. In its communication of Dec 30, the Sov Govt states that inner qte the + fundamental problem End inner qte of a ME settlement is a withdrawal of Israeli forces from inner + quote the End inner qte Arab territories they occupy pursuant to the + cease-fire reses to the armistice demarcation lines of June 5, 1967. The + US does not regard this as a correct interpretation of the Res of Nov 22, 1967: That Res does not use the language employed in + the Soviet note. The Res, in the view + of the US, requires Israeli withdrawal Begin inner qte from territories + occupied in the recent conflict End inner qte to secure and recognized + boundaries, to be established by an agreement of the parties pursuant to + para 3 of the Res. We believe this is + the intendment of para 2 of the Sov plan given the US on Dec 30.

+

6. That plan seems in form to be an agreement to make an agreement—a + provisional agreement among the parties dealing with the issues + specified in the SC + Res of Nov 22, 1967. This provisional + agreement expressly calls for further consultations between the parties, + to be organized by Amb Jarring, + through which the definitive provisions of the final agreement required + by para 3 of the Res would be + reached.

+

The US finds the idea of a preliminary agreement or understanding between + the parties a useful one, which could make it possible for Amb + Jarring to hold productive + meetings with the parties, and assist them to reach agreement on a + definitive plan for fulfilling all the provisions of the SC + Res, and on an agreed time schedule for + carrying out such a plan. The US is of the view that the agreement + contemplated by the plan should comprise all aspects of the settlement + between Israel and each of its neighbors, as a Begin inner qte package + End inner qte, before any steps for implementing the settlement be + carried out.

+ +

7. The US has found certain problems of textual interpretation in + analyzing the Soviet draft plan. For example, para 2 speaks of agreed + provisions with regard to secure and recognized boundaries (with + corresponding maps attached), while para 4 contemplates withdrawal to + the armistice demarcation lines of June 5. Paragraph 2, again, + recognizes the possible utility of demilitarized zones, as mentioned in + the Res. But para 4 calls for the + introduction of Arab troops into territories from which Israel + withdraws. Para 4 mentions restoring the situation on the frontier + between Israel and the UAR which + existed in May, 1967. But that situation, in the view of the US, was the + proximate cause of the war. And the preamble of the Soviet plan calls + for a condition of peace, not of armistice. Para 4 also makes no mention + of freedom of navigation for Israeli vessels in the Suez Canal. Para 5 + suggests that Israeli troop withdrawal should be completed before the + obligations undertaken by the Arab governments become binding on the + latter. This procedure appears inconsistent with para 2 which recognizes + the principle of a Begin inner qte package End inner qte settlement, and + with the secondary introductory para which recognizes the need for + agreement on a plan for fulfillment of other provisions of the SC + Res at the same time as there is + agreement on a timetable and procedure for Israeli withdrawal.

+

8. The US is prepared to discuss the form in which the two governments + could embody their views on how to achieve a Begin inner qte package End + inner qte agreement among the parties, to be negotiated in detail not by + the Soviet Union and the United States, but by the parties, meeting with + Amb + Jarring.

+

9. The United States and the Soviet Union are agreed that while both + governments should do everything in their power to assist Amb + Jarring and the parties to reach + agreement, peace cannot be imposed by them, but should be established by + the agreement of the parties. The United States has no objection to an + agreed timetable for Israeli withdrawal, if such a timetable is made + part of the agreement of the parties. It considers that a timetable for + fulfilling the agreement of the parties should be one of the problems + taken up by Ambassador Jarring + with them.

+

The United States should, however, comment at this point on two problems + of security raised in the Soviet communications.

+

10. The Soviet statement of December 19 in paragraph 2, refers to the + United States comment of November 8 regarding Israeli territorial claims + respecting the UAR and adds the remark + that Israel has raised Qte the question about the necessity of + stationing her forces at Sharm-al-Sheikh. Unqte In the view of the + United States, the process of reaching agreement and achieving a + peaceful and accepted settlement, as provided in the November 22, 1967, + resolution, must involve negotiation of the means for carrying out all the elements of a settlement + as set forth in that resolution, including the guarantee of maritime + rights dealt with in paragraph 2 (a) of the resolution. It must be + clearly appreciated that the June, 1967, conflict was touched off by the + issue of rights of passage through the Straits of Tiran. Only the most + secure arrangements for the guarantee of these rights will make possible + the realization of our hopes for peace. The choice among possible means + of implementing paragraph 2(a) of the Security Council Resolution is for + the parties, working with Ambassador Jarring.

+

11. With respect to demilitarization of the Sinai, the eventual decision + on this point also will depend on the parties themselves. The United + States finds it difficult to believe, however, that the partial + demilitarization suggested by the Soviet Government would provide the + conditions of security necessary for the establishment of peace. The + 1967 war began as a direct result of events in Sinai, and activities in + this area had led to the outbreak of hostilities ten years earlier. It + is difficult to see, in the face of this history, how a lasting peace + can be based on only partial demilitarization of this sensitive + area.

+

12. The United States continues to believe that an understanding with + respect to armament levels and arms limitation is a vital aspect of the + quest for peace in the Middle East. It continues to regret Soviet policy + in this regard, and urges that the problem be viewed as an indispensable + element of the peaceful settlement of the Middle Eastern crisis. End text.

+ + + Rusk + + +
+ +
+ + 3. National Security Study Memorandum 2Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential + Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box + H–126, National Security Study Memoranda, Secret. + Washington, January + 21, 1969. + + TO + The Secretary of State + The Secretary of Defense + The Director of Central Intelligence + The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff + + + SUBJECT + Middle East Policy + +

The President has directed the preparation of two papers on Arab-Israel + problems for consideration by the NSC. + One paper should consider alternative US policy approaches aimed at + securing a Middle East settlement, including (1) direct Arab-Israeli + negotiations (2) U.S.-Soviet negotiations and (3) Four Power + negotiations.The February 1 paper, “The + Arab-Israeli Dispute: Principal US Options,” considered six policy + scenarios: 1) “Let forces in the area play themselves out, leaving + it mainly to the parties to work out a settlement if they can”; 2) + “More active US diplomatic support for a renewed effort by Jarring”; 3) “US–USSR negotiations + to help Jarring promote a + settlement”; 4) “Four-Power approach”; 5) “A unilateral US effort to + bring about a settlement”; and 6) “Settlement imposed by the major + powers.” (Ibid., Box H–020, National Security Council Meetings, + NSC Meeting Briefing by Joint + Staff: SIOP (Middle East Papers) 2/4/69) The paper should + also consider the possibility that no early settlement will be reached, + and US interests and policies in such a situation. The second paper + should consider alternative views of basic US interests in the area and + should include consideration of the issues listed in the + attachment.The January 24 paper, “Basic + US Interests in the Middle East,” examined the interests and + assumptions that underlay U.S. policy formulation in the Middle East + on the basis of six questions: “(1) How important are our interests + in that area? (2) How grave is the Soviet threat to these interests? + (3) To what extent does the expansion of Soviet influence in the + Middle East threaten NATO? (4) + What posture should the United States ideally adopt vis-à-vis the + conflicting states and groupings of states in the area? (5) What is + the present US position in the area? (6) How important is an early + Arab-Israel settlement to the preservation of our interests?” + (Ibid., Box H–126, National Security Study Memoranda, NSSM 2) According to an undated + summary prepared by Saunders, the January 24 paper was “highlighted by two + differing viewpoints”: 1) “A broad Arab-Israeli settlement is very + important and there is enough possibility of achieving it to make + its continued pursuit worthwhile”; and 2) “A broad settlement, + although desirable, is not possible in the near future.” (Ibid., Box + H–020, National Security Council Meetings, NSC Meeting Briefing by Joint Staff: SIOP (Middle East + Papers) 2/4/69) Saunders + sent the undated summary under cover of a January 28 memorandum to + Kissinger. (Ibid., Box + H–034, Senior Review Group Meetings, Review Group Middle East + 1/28/69)

+ +

The President has directed that the NSC + Interdepartmental Group for the Near East perform this study.

+

The first paper should be forwarded to the NSC Review Group by January 25, 1969. The second paper + should be forwarded to the NSC Review + Group by February 24, 1969.

+

+ Attachment +

+

1. What is the role of the Middle East today in U.S. global strategy? + What are the real U.S. interests there and how important are they?

+

2. What is the nature of the Soviet threat to the Middle East? How likely + is Soviet dominance or predominance? What forces will tend to limit + Soviet influence?

+

3. What is the precise nature of the Soviet threat to NATO via the Middle East?

+

4. What is the present state of the U.S. position in the Middle East? Is + it eroding drastically? Or is there a level of common interests shared + with some nations in the area which will prevent it from deteriorating + beyond a certain point? Is an early Arab-Israel settlement essential to + preserving the U.S. position?

+

5. In the light of answers to these questions, what is the most + appropriate U.S. posture toward the Middle East? What level and kinds of + involvement are appropriate in view of our interests and U.S. and Soviet + capabilities?

+
+ +
+ + 4. Minutes of a National Security Council MeetingSource: National Archives, Nixon + Presidential Materials, NSC Files, + NSC Institutional Files + (H-Files), Box H–109, NSC Meeting + Minutes, NSC Minutes, Originals + 1969. Top Secret. Drafted on May 1 by Saunders. All brackets are in the original except + those indicating text that remains classified. According to the + President’s Daily Diary, the meeting was held in the Cabinet Room + from 9:37 a.m. to 12:42 p.m. (Ibid., White House Central + Files) + Washington, February 1, 1969. + + PARTICIPANTS + The President + The Vice President + The Secretary of State, William P. + Rogers + The Secretary of Defense, Melvin R. + Laird + The Secretary of the Treasury, David + M. Kennedy + The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Earle G. Wheeler + The Director of Central Intelligence, Richard M. Helms + Under Secretary of State, Elliot L. + Richardson + State Department Counselor, Richard F. Pederson + US Ambassador to the UN, Charles Yost + Assistant Secretary of State, Joseph + J. Sisco + Former Assistant Secretary of State, Parker T. Hart + Deputy Assistant Secretary of State, Rodger P. Davies + Director, Office of Emergency Preparedness, General George A. Lincoln + Colonel Alexander + Haig + + Harold H. Saunders + + Dr. Henry A. + Kissinger + +

NSC Meeting on Middle East

+

Briefings

+

Helms: History of Arab-Jewish relations and the course of Arab + nationalism (disunity).

+

Fedayeen movement (Fatah, PLO, PFLP): adamantly + opposed to any solution other than the destruction of Israel. Their + influence makes it questionable whether any Arab government could reach + settlement with Israel. Current significance is that terrorism brings on + Israeli reprisals, which raise likelihood of broader conflict.

+

Military balance: Israelis will almost certainly + retain military superiority for next year or so. Superiority + qualitative—depends partly on pre-emptive strategy. Jericho missiles—10 + or so could be deployed 1970–1. Arabs’ 1967 losses just about made + up—assume USSR believes equipment sent + is about all Arabs can now absorb.

+

Soviet interests: + USSR has leapfrogged Northern Tier. + Soviet naval expansion—steadier, more effective than Khrushchev’s rather + opportunistic move to put missiles in Cuba.

+ +

Question:

+

President: You talk about USSR’s “measured, effective plan.” Does this + emanate from military strategy or something that just happens? Do they + have a meeting like ours here today, decide on policy and then execute + it? Or do they just muddle along?

+

Policy result of high-level decision—considered policy—or just + happen?

+

Helms: Highest level decision. + Considered policy.

+

Briefing (continued)

+

Helms: Soviet + peace plan. Acknowledge that peace is a package plan. Arabs + want imposed peace. These Arab objections main reason for Israeli + rejection of plan.

+

Arab attitudes toward U.S.: Growing hostility—see + us as backing Israel—Arab “gift for twisted analysis”—Arabs see even + those things we do for them as somehow directed against them.

+

US image good in Israel. But Israel has its own brand of reservation + about our inability to see the Arabs through Israeli eyes; tendency to + rely only on themselves.

+

JCS briefing:

+

1. Significance of Soviet fleet.

+

—Sharp increase in 1967 and 1968 [President assured himself that trend + was always low before 1963 and that present trend is new.]

+

—Primary concern: missile and torpedo threat.

+

—60 technicians at Mers-el-Kebir in Algeria.

+

—A “challenge” to US operations. Could affect future US decisions to + commit forces in the area.

+

2. Strategic implications for US of renewed conflict.

+

—Arab-Israeli balance.

+

[President: Looking at chart showing 2 bombers in Israeli air force asked + how Israel was able to take out Arab airfields with just 2 bombers. + General Wheeler answered: + “fighter-bombers.” President nodded quickly.]

+

Vice President: How do present air inventories compare with those of + June, 1967?

+

Wheeler: Qualitative differences + here and there but generally comparable.

+

Lincoln: How do Soviet advisors + operate in Units?

+

Wheeler: Strictly advisory. + Arabs xenophobic and not likely to submit to Soviet command.

+ +

Briefing (continued)

+

JCS: Imbalance in supersonic aircraft could be dangerous to Israel by + June 1969.

+

+ Strategic implications +

+

—US intervention capability. US contingency plan designed to drive a + wedge between opposing forces.

+

Questions

+

President: I understand your contingency plan is based on intelligence + estimate that local conflict main possibility.

+

I agree that US–USSR conflict remote, but what if one of Arab countries + where Soviet fleet present is attacked?

+

Wheeler: Contingency plan if + US–USSR—

+

President: What if a more limited Soviet involvement?

+

Kissinger: What if Israeli raid + on Aswan dam or Israeli city shelled by Soviet fleet?

+

President: Could you give some thought to that?

+

Wheeler: Possibilities we are + examining:

+

—US attack on Soviet bases in Siberia.

+

—Sink one Soviet ship in Mediterranean.

+

—Seize Soviet intelligence trawler.

+

President: Could you consider what we could do indirectly through the + Israelis?

+

Seems to me Soviet naval presence is primarily political. Therefore, we + must be prepared for a less-than-military contingency.

+

Wheeler: Primarily political. + But Soviet presence in ports puts a Soviet umbrella over those ports. In + a tenuous sense, fleet therefore does have military use.

+

Briefing continued

+

Described plan for introduction of US ground forces—initial force, + follow-on and on-call forces. Plan could be fulfilled but would degrade + strategic reserve.

+

Final arrival of on-call forces 39 days; 18 days for follow-on; 2–17 days + initial. Airlift.

+

Questions

+

President: Are we capable of repeating Lebanon-type operation?Reference is to Operation Blue Bat of July 1958, when + President Eisnhower sent 14,000 Marines to Beirut in response to a + request by Lebanon’s President Camille Chamoun. Chamoun asked for + the U.S. forces in response to the “Bastille Day” coup in Baghdad, + which toppled the pro-Western government in Iraq.

+ +

Wheeler: I believe so. Would + modify this plan.

+

President: Any military exercises politically useful?

+

Wheeler: Continuous US bilateral + and NATO exercise. NATO has just put together surveillance + unit to keep track of subs.

+

President: Are Sovs, Israelis, Arabs aware of these things?

+

Wheeler: Yes. This is one + purpose of exercises.

+

Laird: Sixth Fleet not as “ready” + as it should be in manning levels. Have to look at this as situation + heats up.

+

President: How is Malta being used?

+

Wheeler: NATO has returned small air surveillance + unit to Malta. Tenuous relationship of Malta to NATO via Secretary General, mainly to + keep Soviets out.

+

President: Is Sixth Fleet NATO-related?

+

Wheeler: US controlled in peace; + in war under NATO.

+

President: In a Lebanon-type situation, who controls Sixth Fleet?

+

Wheeler: “You do sir.”

+

President: Isn’t there significant British and French presence?

+

Wheeler: Significant French and + Italian presence. French navy in Mediterranean. Navy most cooperative + since French withdrawal till de + Gaulle blew whistle.

+

President: Could Italians and French block or compete with Soviet past + presence?

+

Wheeler: Mers-el-Kebir main + instance. Little opportunity for us to exercise influence.

+

French still have residual influence which, depending on de Gaulle, could be helpful. But + unlikely France could swing Algerians away from Soviet backing.

+

President: What has happened to French political influence?

+

Lincoln: What if USSR says its fleet will screen UAR coast?

+

Wheeler: Have to go ashore in + Israel.

+

President: Could we phase deployment?

+

Wheeler: Yes—move into Europe, + for instance.

+

Vice President: Could we involve NATO + instead of us?

+

Wheeler: We couldn’t involve + NATO. Only last few months that + NATO concerned about Soviet + presence.

+

President: NATO pathological on point + of involvement. For instance, may even be problem if Berlin, one of + their own cities, threatened.

+

Vice President: Is that true about political moves?

+

Wheeler: Not as true.

+ +

Kissinger: To what extent could + Soviet fleet be used as a hostage in Berlin crisis?

+

Wheeler: Yes.

+

President: I’m just thinking about symbolic acts.

+

Lincoln: If Israeli port + attacked, might be unclear who did it.

+

Wheeler: We have pretty fair + surveillance activity. We could identify—though not necessarily prove. + This political problem.

+

Briefing continued

+

JCS: Main military problem (Soviets would have same problems):

+

1.—Deployment routes and staging areas. Need Azores or equivalent.

+

—Transportation resources: would require “major revision of our worldwide + program.”

+

2. Would USSR intervene? Paratroops. + Two routes—Western over Yugoslavia.

+

Questions

+

President: If Sovs flew troops into Cairo or Damascus, what could we + do?

+

Wheeler: Fly into Crete, Italy, + Athens. Turkey not possible. Incirlik not usable in 1967. Malta airfield + not good enough. Greeks cooperative in 1967.

+

Briefing continued

+

JCS: [2½ lines not declassified]

+

By sealift using maritime fleet, could move 6–10 divisions from Baltic + (transit 13 days), 3–10 divisions from northern division (15 days), + Black Sea 6–10 divisions (3 days). They have exercised in small way in + Black Sea.

+

Impact of local conflict on US commitments. Cause problems in NATO somewhat like Czechoslovakia.

+

Question

+

Lincoln: Are Soviets + stockpiling?

+

Wheeler: Not in UAR but in Algeria there is equipment the + Algerians can’t possibly use.

+

President: In State briefing, could you include country-by-country + relations with us.

+

Briefing continued

+

Hart: In Turkey, attitude not pro-Arab but rather + pro-Israeli but Turkey focuses on Cyprus and that requires Arab votes. + Tend favor moderate Arab states. Want good relationship with Iraq, + because of Kurds. Trying to bind + Iraq quietly to Turkey (gas line). Relations with US basically good, + though strains.

+

President: Is this one area for patting on back—a + little preventive medicine? In terms of planning of visits, Turks and + others, let’s have meeting soon.

+

Hart: Yes, sir. We have strategic and intelligence installation. + Conditions of use—Turkish permission.

+

Morocco—Algerian tension. Never broke with us, + generally friendly relations. Get as much as it can from us. Some + influence on other Arab states.

+

Libya—Considerable US influence. Fears Nasser. US–UK bulwark against radicals.

+

President: Get in best team we can in terms of ambassadorial + appointments. “Get heavy weights in there.”

+

Algeria—If we renewed relations with.

+

President: What influence does TitoJosip Broz + Tito, President of Yugoslavia from 1945 to 1980. have? Could + he be helpful?

+

Hart: Mainly in UAR.

+

Sisco: Shift in his view since + Czechoslovakia.

+

President: I would be open to meeting with Tito if you recommend it.

+

Briefing continued

+

Hart: In principle, it would help with radical states—even + Iraq—marginally.

+

Sudan—broke relations but represented there. Would + be one of first to resume.

+

Lebanon—delicate democracy. Genesis based on fear + of Muslim majority around it.

+

Syria—unstable. Will be last to resume relations + with us.

+

Iraq—basic instability. Will not be quick to + resume relations unless regime changes.

+

Arab-Israeli—The main interests involved—Arab fear + of Israeli expansion and Israel wants formalized peace. Johnston and + Johnson missions.The Johnston Mission, led by + President Eisenhower’s + Special Representative Eric Johnston, was organized in October 1953 + to secure an agreement among Lebanon, Syria, Jordan, and Israel to + develop the Jordan River basin. The mission ended in October 1955, + when the Arab League rejected the project because it would benefit + Israel along with its Arab neighbors. The Johnson Mission, led by + Joseph Johnson, President Kennedy’s Special Representative to the + Palestine Conciliation Commission, was established in July 1962 to + help resolve the Palestinian refugee problem. Johnson formally + resigned from the mission on January 31, 1963.

+ +

In 1948, no Arab state lost any territory; it was + Palestinians who lost their homes.

+

Fedayeen riding groundswell of popularity.

+

In a way, Jordan and UAR have—by + accepting UN resolution—accepted + existence of Israel.

+

Jordan most committed to peace settlement but Hussein caught between radicals and need to get land + back.

+

If we resume relations with Arabs, that will strengthen moderates.

+

Questions

+

President: If we have a Lebanon-type situation in Jordan, what capability + would we have—if, for instance, we faced a fedayeen takeover in + Jordan?

+

Wheeler: “Could probably—of + course would have problems.” Problem: Israelis not basically interested + in survival of Hussein.

+

Hart: “I’m not sure they’ve made up their minds finally on this.” If + Jordan became a radical state, easier for Israel to move.

+

President: “That kind of thinking is a death wish. They must not be given + any encouragement.”

+

The political problem in the US—“we just can’t tote that.” Extremely + difficult for us to move in to save Israel.

+

Laird: What’s the possibility of + Israel-Jordan settlement?

+

Hart: Hard without UAR. Have to be + simultaneous movement.

+

Rogers: We don’t think Hussein could survive separate + settlement.

+

Laird: Hope Israel doesn’t + misinterpret mood in U.S.

+

Rogers: On basis my talk with + Rabin, “I don’t think they + misinterpret.”

+

President: Dayan says we should + have good relations with Arabs.

+

Lincoln: We should make clear to + Israel and its friends importance of Hussein.

+

President: Harder to explain to Israel’s friends in US.

+

Rabin-Dayan have fatalistic attitude—it will + blow and they’ll take care of it.

+

Wheeler: Rabin explained deep Israeli feelings + against Hussein—in 6-day war + Jordanians inflicted much heavier casualties.

+

Briefing continued

+

Hart: Israel suspicious of UAR + intentions.

+

Politics in Israel will reduce Israeli flexibility between now and + November.

+

Siege atmosphere in Israel. Don’t trade territory for political + agreements.

+ +

Status quo of today works against peace and even Israel’s long-term + security.

+

Settlement will require pressure on Israel—for arrangements that will + include well-policed demilitarization.

+

President: Guaranteed by whom?

+

Hart: UN sanctified.

+

Lincoln: Who pay for UN forces?

+

Hart: Senator JavitsJacob K. Javits + (R–NY). interest in refugee settlement.

+

Briefing continued

+

Hart: Have to be clear where Israeli and US coincide: We don’t want + Israel destroyed but don’t have stake in boundaries. Want lasting + settlement. Above all, want to avoid war with USSR.

+

In deciding how much pressure we apply on Israel, have to decide how + UAR can be brought along.

+

Important to develop maximum public understanding in US.

+

Sisco: Elements in our policy as + it evolved after June War:

+

—Commitment to territorial integrity.

+

—Nasser’s May 1967 blockade, he + was overturning post-Suez US arrangements.

+

—We wanted to try this time to achieve lasting peace.

+

—These combined in 5 principles of June 19, 1967.In a speech on June 19, 1967, President Johnson set + forth five principles for peace in the Middle East. For the text of + his speech, see Public Papers: Johnson, 1967, + Book I, pp. 630–634. See also Foreign Relations, 1964–1968, volume XIX, + Arab-Israeli Crisis and War, 1967, Document 308. + “Parties to conflict, parties to peace.” These incorporated in November + 22 resolution.

+

The equation: withdrawal in return for end of belligerency.

+

While resolution adopted unanimously, there was not unanimous + interpretations. We really passed these differences on to Jarring. Reflected in semantic + argument “accepting and implementing” the resolution.

+

Rogers: Rabin says Arabs are trying to “force + us into settlement short of peace.”

+

Sisco: July 1968, we got Israel + to soften stand on (1) direct negotiations as a precondition to + exchanging substance, (2) peace treaty.See + ibid., volume XX, Arab-Israeli + Dispute, 1967–1968, Document 213. Parties have been + exchanging views through Jarring. But Israel wants binding commitment on peace.

+

President: Israel insists on bilateral agreements. What is Israeli view + toward outside participation?

+ +

Sisco: Israel wants to be left + alone to deal with Hussein—and + the UAR.

+

Israel-Jordan exchanges. Allon + Plan as non-starter with Hussein.Conceived by Israeli + Foreign Minister Yigal Allon + in the wake of the Arab-Israeli war of 1967, the plan proposed that + Israel would relinquish political control of the West Bank to Jordan + in exchange for military control of a strip of land along the + eastern side of the Jordan River to secure the border between + them.

+

Israel nervous about big-power intervention. Last Soviet note—“a + five-legged horse that could move in any direction.”

+

We don’t honestly know what USSR + intends.

+

Shall we await Soviet reply or develop a plan of our own to discuss.

+

Whatever we put in, we have to be sure we can produce Israel.

+

Israel’s Cabinet divided—explains inability to decide on territorial + objectives. Arabs made it easy for Israelis to avoid decision. Election + will make flexibility difficult.

+

President: Javits or somebody mentioned USSR made propaganda hay. What’s the answer?

+

Sisco: Soviets have had a + propaganda ride. We didn’t refute publicly because we wanted to work out + our response without appearing to throw cold water.

+

Lincoln: Could Israel and Jordan + consider Allon Plan with UN force?

+

Sisco: May be feasible.

+

President: Israel says it wants peace via bilateral agreements. Yet in + intelligence we hear extremists so strong that Arab governments can’t + control them. Do sophisticated Israelis discount outside guarantees?

+

Rogers: Fedayeen raids not + significant now. Could be handled if contractual peace.

+

Israelis afraid we’ll be stampeded by tension. Say Russians are heating + up atmosphere to panic us. Russians won’t use nuclear weapons. Arabs + won’t start war. Sovs won’t intervene; they don’t have air cover over + this fleet. Rabin says: Don’t + make decisions because you think you’re on the brink of war. We’re not + going to take more territory. Permanent peace will be anti-Soviet.

+

President: When you come down to it, a peace that he (Rabin) negotiates with any of these + wobbly governments, isn’t a peace either with revolutionary movements + there.

+

“I can see the symbolism there; they want recognition.” But unless they + have some outside recognition.

+ +

Rogers: Israelis know they need + guarantees.

+

Sisco: Four-power proposal has to + be handled delicately. As proposed, it gives preference to Soviet plan + and downplays Jarring.The French proposal reads: “The French + Government considers that the Middle East crisis, far from easing as + desired, has become aggravated to such an extent that it is + necessary that the Security Council be enabled to face up to the + responsibilities devolving upon it under the charter. To that end, + the French Government proposes that the representatives of France, + the United States, the U.S.S.R., and the United Kingdom on the + Security Council meet at the end of January to seek, in conjunction + with the Secretary General of the United Nations, a means whereby + their governments could contribute to the establishment of a just + and lasting peace in the Middle East, specifically by defining the + terms of implementations of Council Resolution No. 242 of November + 22, 1967.” The rest of the note concerned the points on which + “exchanges of views could bear.” (Telegram 8744 to Paris, January + 17; National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–020, National + Security Council Meetings, NSC + Meeting Middle East 2/1/69) We see Jarring and UN as central. Sovs and French disagree. UK wavers but waiting to see what we’ll + do.

+

Response will be one of your Administration’s first moves. Jarring wants step by parties or + anything four powers can. We’re boxed in. Propose: informal, individual + consultations but they will quickly become more formal. Might nudge + Israelis, who are thinking of putting forward ideas through secret + channel toward Jordan.

+

President: What’s timing?

+

Rogers: I have a draft reply for + you to consider quickly.Sent as telegram + 19022, Document 7.

+

Kissinger: Review Group has not + seen proposal. Maybe 2-power approach better. This just one sub-choice + in one of three options.

+

President: I want to tie this into announcement of NPT.On + February 5, Nixon sent the + Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, which had been signed and opened + for signature on July 1, 1968, to the Senate requesting its advice + and consent to the treaty’s ratification. Get points with + de Gaulle.

+

UN thinks this a good move?

+

Yost: Yes, Arabs prefer.

+

Rogers: Pressure on both + sides.

+

President: Could Jarring make a + significant contribution?

+

Yost: Not going get to first base + by himself.

+

Yost: Hard keep Jarring and four-powers going same + time—but possible.

+

President: Four-powers with Jarring?

+

Yost: Jarring wants to stay independent.

+

President: Don’t like idea of saying “me too.” Propose variant method of + implementation.

+ +

Kissinger: Choice may be between + 2-power and 4-power not 4-power and nothing. May be Soviet talks be more + fruitful.

+

President: Does 4-power rule out 2-power?

+

Rogers: No. Make it clear 4-power + in framework of Jarring.

+

Yost: Maintain two-power element + in four-power.

+

President: The real powers are the US and USSR.

+

Rogers: How do we say that?

+

President: Different—what we say and what we do.

+

Sisco: USSR has made clear US–USSR dialogue the prime one despite + its acceptance of French proposal. Could have four sets of talks going + on at same time. Four-powers could do some marginal work.

+

President: “Trying to be devil’s advocate,” another element that appeals: + reassure our NATO allies. You feel we should go on all four lines?

+

Sisco: Yes.

+

Laird: Must move soon. High + expectancy of a US move because press aware that NSC discussing the issue.

+

President: We’ll make a move.

+

Lincoln: What about + Israelis?

+

President: Leave that to Secretary of State! (Laughter)

+

Yost: Israelis underestimate + Fedayeen movement.

+

Kissinger: Have to distinguish + between Israeli statements and what their situation is.

+

Israelis say they won’t settle for less than a real peace, but they must + know that isn’t possible. They must really be saying that they find it + hard to see how legal arrangement could increase their security. They + must know that most wars start between countries who recognize each + other and are at peace. The only peace arrangements that work are + settlements that (1) increase will of the parties to peace, or (2) + decrease ability to make war.

+

We haven’t systematically discussed options. Must know what we want if + we’re going to try to get.

+

President: Our ability to deliver Israelis gets down to what we will + do.

+

Richardson: Not only what we’ll + do but what we can do in de-escalating.

+

President: What will we do vis-à-vis the Russians? That’s the heart.

+

Yost: Italians go along with + Four-Power if in UN framework.

+

Lincoln: Have we gone into + guarantees?

+

Rogers: That’s down the road.

+

President: Have to get to that.

+ +

:s100/96 Kissinger: Why can’t we + go till Wednesday to review systematically?

+

President: Move Council up to Tuesday at 10:00 a.m.Tuesday, February 4.

+

What we have in mind:

+

—Respond affirmatively.

+

Kissinger: Distribute draft reply + to French note before Tuesday and meeting.

+
+ +
+ 5. Minutes of a National Security Council MeetingSource: National Archives, Nixon + Presidential Materials, NSC Files, + NSC Institutional Files + (H-Files), Box H–109, NSC Meeting + Minutes, NSC Minutes Originals + 1969. Top Secret. Drafted on May 1 by Saunders. All brackets are in the original. + According to the President’s Daily Diary, the meeting was held in + the Cabinet Room from 10:07 a.m. to 11:45 a.m. (Ibid., White House + Central Files) + Washington, February 4, 1969, 10 + a.m. + + PARTICIPANTS + The President + The Vice President + The Secretary of State, William P. + Rogers + The Secretary of Defense, Melvin R. + Laird + (For Joint Chiefs of Staff) General McConnell + Under Secretary of State, Elliot L. + Richardson + Director, Office of Emergency Preparedness, General George A. Lincoln + US Ambassador to the UN, Charles Yost + Dr. Henry A. + Kissinger + Colonel Alexander + Haig + + Harold H. Saunders + + The Director of Central Intelligence, Richard M. Helms (for part of the meeting) + +

President: Mentioned effective Kissinger paper on options;See footnote 2, Document 3. asked + Kissinger to distribute to + members of Council.

+

Kissinger: Presentation based on + talking points.

+

President: Is it accurate to say that 1967 war came without the + expectation or intention of any of parties?

+

Kissinger: Yes.

+ +

Yost: Agree.

+

Rogers: Rusk told him he concerned about repeat + because rumors similar to 1967 circulating again.

+

President: I ask because it relevant to contigency planning—shows + necessity for planning to consider unexpected. The more we can let our + minds—when we have the luxury of time—run to the unexpected.

+

Laird: Problem: We’re spending + time on procedure rather than on where we want to come out.

+

Our main purpose is to avoid war with USSR. Time coming when Israel will + announce it has 10 missiles on the line just when we delivering F–4s. If + we look at where we want to come out, we ought to begin putting some + pressure on Israeli government. We have to be in position of pressing + Israel but at same time promise to work with USSR to limit arms.

+

President: At end of meeting, talk about how to get plan for what we’re + after before negotiators sit down. Laird’s point well taken. We must know what we want + rather than saying we want whatever we can negotiate.

+

Yost: Agree. We may even want to + put part of it on the table.

+

President: We tend in government too often to think too much about how we + look in public.

+

Rogers: Procedures become + substance.

+

President: One substantive decision we make is that we are going to take + the initiative, which we haven’t done before. That’s a major decision. + But we want to negotiate on our terms—not other peoples’ terms.

+

An imposed settlement in the Mid-East—not in terms of the formality but + in terms of the skill of our negotiation—is what has to be done.

+

Laird: We have to think what’s + going to happen with Israel. Our overriding purpose to avoid war with + USSR. Israeli nuclear capability would increase risk.

+

Rogers: What makes you think + Israel will announce?

+

Lincoln: Even if they don’t, we + have a responsibility if we know. And USSR will know.

+

President: Henry, proceed. Talk about how we meld 2-power and 4-power, + “as frankly I feel we must do.”

+

Kissinger: Intimate relationship + among all these things. On overall settlement, I’ll concentrate on + 4-power and 2-power approaches. Other two options have little + support—let Jarring go by + himself or US mediation.

+ +

Spelled out pros and cons in February 3 memo, “The Middle East—Some + Policy Considerations.”Kissinger’s February 3 memorandum + explored the “arguments for and against seeking a general + settlement” immediately and considered “ways of trying for a general + settlement,” including the pros and cons of the Four- and Two-Power + approaches. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 651, Country Files, + Middle East, Middle East through December 1969)

+

Whichever way we go, we can still regulate the intensity via diplomatic + and public handling.

+

Kissinger then turned to + amerliorative steps in the absence of a settlement. Foremost is the + Israeli nuclear problem, which could draw USSR even more into the Mid-East with some form guarantee + for the Arabs.

+

Review Group has not addressed itself fully to these basic issues. Mainly + concentrated on negotiating options.

+

President: We’ve gone down the road on procedures because events have + moved us on.

+

French noteSee footnote + 9, Document 4.—have to respond. But poses a problem + with Israel’s friends.

+

How we set up this forum can be a major decision on substance.

+

We accept 4-power approach in principle but have bilateral discussions + first.

+

Most important to move talks along with Russians.

+

On my trip,Nixon traveled to Europe February 23-March 2. + four-power talks not high on agenda. But opportunity to use them to draw + de Gaulle toward us.

+

Need talking paper: What they might bring up and what we want.“The Points We Want to Leave in Europe,” February 19. + (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 442, President’s Trip + Files, President Nixon’s + Trip to Europe, February–March 1969 (2 of 2))

+

Handle letter in low-key way. Don’t announce, just acknowledge.

+

Rogers: State has never felt that + four-power should supersede two-power.

+

Yost: Soviet ambassador said we + must work closely.

+

President: “Don’t be in any hurry to have anything done on the four-power + front.”

+

“At UN go to the two-power forum. Start + talking with Soviets.”

+

Rogers: When Dobrynin comes back (around February + 7) may have instructions.

+

President: Harmful if we give impression that four-power forum where + things will be settled. Main value as umbrella. Lip service to dealing + with British and French.

+ +

Laird raised Israeli nuclear + question.

+

What are we going to guarantee Israel?

+

We have to face up to that question.

+

We have to tell Israelis what we’re prepared to do.

+

Richardson: Rabin says:

+

1. Israel disinterested in international guarantees.

+

2. If US and USSR provide guarantees, + this juxtaposes US and USSR in + Mid-East in a dangerous way.

+

President: I’d make that point if I were Rabin. But I’d bet if Mid-East fighting breaks out + again, there’s a 50 percent chance we’ll be dragged in.

+

It’s “not necessarily” true the USSR + will stay out, even if they should.

+

If Israel in danger and calls on us to do something.

+

Greater danger each time Mid-East fighting comes around. Greater in 1967 + than in 1956. Rabin doesn’t + take account of this. [“Rabin + reminds me of Radford.”]Admiral Arthur W. + Radford, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, + 1953–1957.

+

By the time we take this trip, be prepared to talk.

+

President: I have arranged that each week Presidents Eisenhower and Johnson to be + briefed.

+

Briefing on Mid-East contingency plans.

+

Purpose of plans: to deter and then to force hostile forces to + withdraw.

+

Soviets have capability to project force overseas as they did not five + years ago.

+

[Comment: President again, as February 1, seems to be groping to + understand Soviet intentions, degree of concertedness in decision + making.]

+

Kissinger: Question raised + whether we could repeat our approach to Cuban missile crisis.

+

President: This gets down to “mission Gerard SmithGerard C. Smith, Director of the Arms Control and + Disarmament Agency from 1969 until 1973 and Chief of the U.S. + Delegation to the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks. has.” + [ACDA]

+

President: In looking at military contingency plan stages, could State + prepare a comparable “diplomatic symphony” going at the same time.

+
+ +
+ + 6. National Security Study Memorandum 17Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential + Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box + H–135, National Security Study Memoranda. Secret; Exdis. A copy was sent to the + Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Director, Office of + Emergency Preparedness. + Washington, February 6, 1969. + + TO + The Secretary of State + The Secretary of Defense + The Director of Central Intelligence + + + SUBJECT + Further Studies on Middle East Policy + +

Following the NSC meeting of February 4 + on the Middle East,See Document 5. the President directed that the NSC Interdepartmental Group for Near East, + as a next step in developing a precise strategy, prepare the following + papers for early discussion in the NSC + Review Group and the NSC:

+

1. A description of an Arab-Israeli settlement which the US could support + and which, if achieved, would reduce the likelihood of further + Arab-Israeli hostilities. The following should also be included:

+

—Alternative terms of settlement where appropriate.

+

—Discussion of the respective contribution of the major alternatives + described to reducing likelihood of future hostilities.

+

—A judgment on the likely acceptability of terms to the parties.

+

2. A discussion of alternative forms of US and international guarantees + of a settlement and of Israeli security.

+

3. A plan of action which would relate the two-power and four-power + negotiating tracks to each other and to our most significant bilateral + relationships, including an estimate of chances of success and an + analysis of where we would be if this course of action failed.

+

4. A possible plan of action detailing ameliorative steps to be taken if + we judge that a general settlement is not possible now, including an + estimate of chances of success and an analysis of where we would be if + this course failed.The Review Group met on + February 18 to discuss the NSCIG/NEA paper, “Further Studies on + Middle East Policy.” The paper is in the National Archives, Nixon + Presidential Materials, NSC Files, + NSC Institutional Files + (H-Files), Box H–135, National Security Study Memoranda, NSSM 17. No minutes of the NSC Review Group meeting have been + found. A revised text of the paper is Document + 8.

+ +

These papers should be forwarded to the NSC Review Group by February 13. The paper on basic US + interests in the Middle East, requested in NSSM 2,See footnote 3, Document 3. should be forwarded at the + same time if possible.

+ + + Henry A. Kissinger + + +
+ +
+ 7. Telegram From the Department of State to Certain Diplomatic + PostsSource: National + Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1187, Saunders Files, Middle East + Negotiations Files, Middle East Settlement—Jarring Cables, 1969. + Confidential; Priority; Exdis. + Drafted by Betty J. Jones (IO/UNP); cleared in NEA/IAI, NEA/UAR, and EUR; and approved by Sisco. Sent to Amman, Beirut, + Jidda, London, Moscow, Paris, Rome, Tel Aviv, Cairo, and USUN. + Washington, February 6, 1969, + 0214Z. +

19022. Following for your information is full text of US reply to French + proposal for meeting of UN reps of Four + Powers on Middle East;See footnote 9, Document 4. given to + French Amb by Secy Feb 5:

+

Qte The United States Government has carefully considered the proposal of + the French Government of January 16, 1969, for a meeting of the United + Nations representatives of France, the USSR, the United Kingdom and the United States on the + Middle East.

+

The United States has a deep and abiding interest in the establishment of + an agreed peace in the Middle East which is in the interest of all + peoples in the area. We have supported fully the mission of Ambassador + Jarring to promote the + agreement called for in the SC + Resolution of November 22, 1967.

+

The United States is prepared in principle to consider favorably a + meeting of United Nations representatives of the four governments within + the framework of the Security Council to discuss ways and means to + assist Ambassador Jarring to + promote agreement between the parties in accordance with the Security + Council Resolution of November 22, 1967. To this end, the United States + suggests that there be prompt preliminary discussions, in the first + instance on a bilateral basis, in order to develop the measure of + understanding that would make an + early meeting of the representatives of the Four Powers a fruitful and + constructive complement to Ambassador Jarring’s mission. Unqte.Yost met French + Ambassador to the United Nations Armand + Bérard on February 12 to discuss establishing a + Four-Power framework. (Telegram 414 from USUN, February 13; National Archives, Nixon + Presidential Materials, NSC Files, + Box 648, Country Files, Middle East, Middle East + Negotiations)

+ + + Rogers + + +
+ +
+ 8. Paper Prepared by the Interdepartmental Group for Near East and + South AsiaSource: National + Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC + Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–135, National Security Study + Memoranda, NSSM 17. Secret; Exdis. In a February 20 memorandum + sent separately to Kissinger, Sisco + explained that this paper incorporated revisions that had been + agreed upon at the Review Group meeting on February 18. (Ibid.) No + minutes of the Review Group meeting have been found. + Washington, February 20, 1969. + + + NSCIG/NEA 692A (Revised) + + +

Further Studies on Middle East Policy

+

In two previous NSC meetingsSee Documents 4 and 5. several principal options were + considered:

+

A. Leaving the matter of a settlement of the Arab-Israeli dispute + exclusively to the parties and to Jarring; this option was rejected.

+

B. Adopting a more active policy to achieve a general settlement using + some combination of the following: (1) intensive US diplomatic efforts + with the parties and Jarring; + (2) possible US–USSR discussions to + develop some new principles of a settlement which Jarring would be asked to try out on + the parties; and (3) four-power discussions at the UN Permanent Representatives level.

+

C. Anticipating that a general settlement involving Israel, Jordan, and + the UAR is not likely now and + concentrating our efforts for the moment on certain high-priority objectives short of a + general settlement; a separate paper exploring this option is to be + submitted later.Not found.

+

In order to prepare further for the exploratory four-power discussions in + New York, the President’s talks in Europe and the eventual choice of + policy, this paper presents:

+

—the elements of an overall settlement the US could support;

+

—alternative means of guaranteeing such a settlement;

+

—two possible approaches for injecting our views of a settlement into + dialogue between the parties;

+

—the relation between Two Power and Four Power talks;

+

—the special question of dealing with Israel;

+

—objectives in the President’s European talks.

+

Elements of Overall Settlement

+

We have been considering possible basic elements of an overall settlement + intended to establish a permanent peace based on a binding agreement. + The details of any feasible settlement will have to be worked out in the + course of discussions. Whatever the eventual details, we see certain major principles as governing a settlement:

+

—The parties must somehow participate in the negotiation of terms. We do + not believe face-to-face negotiations are essential at the outset, + although we doubt the Israelis will agree to a settlement unless the + Arabs sit down with them at some point (presumably under Jarring’s auspices).

+

—The objective of negotiations is a binding agreement. We do not believe + a peace treaty per se is required; the essential purpose could be met by + signature of a common document by both sides, which could then be + endorsed by the Security Council. But we doubt that any form of + settlement is feasible, or desirable, unless it contains an element of + contract which the Arabs have hitherto firmly resisted.

+

—There must be withdrawal of forces to secure and recognized boundaries. + We believe if a settlement is to be achieved this will mean that Israel + will be required to withdraw its troops to the international boundary + with Egypt, and there must be a special arrangement for Gaza; in the + case of Jordan, it means Israeli evacuation of the West Bank except for + (a) the minor border rectifications that the two parties may agree upon, + and (b) Jerusalem which is a special problem.

+ +

—Certain critical areas will have to be demilitarized. We doubt that + Israel will agree to substantial withdrawal from the occupied + territories under arrangements which would permit their military + occupation by the other side.

+

—Jordan will have to have a role—and more than just a religious role—in + Jerusalem. But a settlement is unlikely unless the city remains united. + Israel will probably resist giving up any authority in the city, but we + do not believe the Arabs could accept any settlement which excluded the + Jordanians entirely from Arab Jerusalem.

+

—No overall settlement is conceivable without some arrangement on the + refugees. A refugee settlement is essential both for symbolic and + humanitarian reasons and to provide an alternative to the fedayeen + approach to recapture lost territory. Any refugee settlement must + include a choice of “repatriation” as well as compensation, although we + doubt that many of the refugees would opt to return to Israel. Israel + will probably resist but might ultimately accede to token repatriation + although it would require a veto over the number of refugees it accepts. + In any event, solution of the refugee problem will take a long time; the + parties will have to agree to a mechanism which can work on this key + issue for an extended period.

+

—Free navigation (in Suez as well as the Gulf of Aqaba) must include + ships of all flags. Israel will not accept less.

+

—Agreement on all elements of a settlement will be required before + implementation of any part of the settlement can begin.

+

International Guarantees

+

The feasibility of a settlement plan will depend in large part on the + guarantees of the settlement and of Israel’s security, and the degree to + which Israel considers them sufficient. Consideration of possible + alternative forms of guarantees proceeds from the premise that a + settlement plan will have to involve the participation of non-Middle + Eastern countries in its implementation and that guarantees of an + international character will be required. International assurances could + be reflected in Security Council endorsement of an agreed settlement, + making the settlement terms binding upon all members as Security Council + decisions. Additionally, the Four Powers could declare their support of + a Council resolution endorsing the settlement terms and committing the + Four Powers to consult, in the event of a breach or violation of the + settlement terms, on appropriate Four Power action either within or + outside the Security Council.

+

Collective international assurances alone, however, will not be + convincing to Israel. The only type of assurance it would have faith in + would be a unilateral guarantee from the United States. But it would not + be in our interest to offer a firm, formal guarantee of Israel’s security. We should avoid any + open-ended and uncontrollable commitment because it would subordinate + the United States to Israeli concepts of defense and security, and + because it would polarize the area between us and the USSR.

+

Short of a formal security guarantee, it is possible that some type of US + assurance could be worked out that would go at least part-way in meeting + Israel’s problem, and still be acceptable in terms of our own national + interests and Congressional concerns. We might, for example, make a + unilateral public statement in conjunction with a Security Council + endorsement or a Four Power collective declaration on a settlement plan, + not going beyond the sense or specific terms of the collective assurance + but noting that we would not necessarily consider ourselves precluded + from taking action consistent with the intent of that assurance merely + because of the failure of all the other parties to act thereunder. + Alternatively, a “sense of the Congress” resolution could underline our + national obligation under a collective international assurance.

+

Apart from a specific guarantee, and in the absence of any arms + limitation agreement with the USSR, we + could give Israel a firm commitment to provide it the military equipment + we believe needed to maintain a reasonable balance in the area. Such a + commitment could be helpful in getting Israel to accept elements of an + overall settlement.

+

Two Possible Approaches

+

Jarring is awaiting some further + guidance from the major powers, and they are presently considering ways + to assist him, including a Four Power procedural suggestion to him that + he renew his discussions with the parties and direct further inquiries + to them regarding substantive positions in order to elicit as + comprehensive a response as possible. Such a move will only help + Jarring keep afloat for a + relatively brief time, and he can be expected to renew his discussions + with the parties at a reasonably early date. However, if as is likely + there will be no significant narrowing of the gap at an early date + between the Arabs and the Israelis, pressures will build up for more + direct involvement in the substantive settlement by the major + powers.

+

Meanwhile the growing strength and importance of the Palestinian fedayeen + make their attitude toward a settlement increasingly relevant. How long, + in other words, will the assumption remain valid that Arab governments + can speak for the Palestinians who are not a party to the negotiations + but whose interests are deeply involved? It is uncertain, for example, + how long King Hussein can + maintain the necessary flexibility to enter into a settlement in the + face of fedayeen opposition. The role of the fedayeen underscores both + the urgency and the difficulty of achieving a settlement.

+ +

We have weighed two general approaches:

+

A. Development and + Submission by the United States of an Overall Arab-Israeli Settlement + Plan.

+

Although the elements of a settlement sketched out above might be the + basis for a reasonable compromise, it is not recommended that the United + States put forward any blueprint at this time. The gap between the two + parties is still too great, and it would be premature for us alone or in + concert with others to inject any far-reaching substantive plan into the + negotiations. The parties would declare various parts of it + unacceptable, and Israel would resist the entire concept of a plan drawn + up by third parties. The concessions required of Israel would be + substantial and seeking to achieve its concurrence, or at least + acquiescence, at this stage is likely to result in an early crisis + between us. We would be expected to produce Israel on such a plan, and + this is unlikely at this point. Its feasibility in the long run will + depend on whether we and the USSR are + prepared to influence the UAR and + Israel to this end and whether the principal parties can be moved in + this direction. Our consideration of possible elements of a settlement + plan is useful largely for internal purposes and to give us a clearer + picture as to what might be feasible near the end of the road. It is + intended as a yardstick to measure substantive proposals which the + USSR and France can be expected to + make in the weeks ahead and as a guide for the substantive views we may + wish to express on various elements of a Security Council + resolution.

+

B. Step-by-Step + Approach.

+

Another approach would be a step-by-step injection of specific + substantive views by the US on key parts of the settlement as + discussions proceed between the parties under Jarring’s auspices, possibly between + ourselves and the USSR, and perhaps + within the Four Power framework.

+

At the heart of the present impasse are two fundamental questions: (a) + whether the UAR is prepared to conclude + a binding agreement for a permanent peace in the Middle East; and (b) + whether Israel is prepared to withdraw from Arab territories occupied in + the 1967 war. It would therefore appear logical to attack first the two + issues of withdrawal and permanent peace based on agreement between the + parties.

+

There are several possible steps which might be considered, after the + President’s trip to Europe, and when we will have a clearer view of the + attitude of the other three major powers as elucidated in the + exploratory discussions being pursued by Ambassador Yost in New York. The following + diplomatic steps would be designed to help move the parties closer and + to facilitate Jarring’s efforts. + They involve a complicated but not infeasible complex of negotiations. + It would be appropriate for + decisions to be taken on one or more of the following courses of action + shortly after the President’s return from Europe.

+

First, on the occasion of the Eban visitEban visited the United + States in March. See Documents 13 and 14. to explore with him and to + encourage Israel to take two important steps with respect to the UAR part of the settlement:

+

(a) To submit to Jarring a new + document on implementation of the November 1967 Security Council + Resolution and on the UAR aspect of the + settlement. This document should indicate an Israeli willingness to + consider withdrawal of its forces from the present cease-fire lines to + the former international boundaries between the mandated territory of + Palestine and Egypt conditioned on achievement of + a satisfactory agreement on all other elements of the Security Council + Resolution, including a binding agreement to a permanent peace signed by + the UAR. Such a document would not + reduce Israel’s leverage since it does not contemplate any Israeli + withdrawal in the absence of a commitment by the UAR to a binding peace.

+

Such an Israeli statement is not likely to meet Nasser’s demands for total withdrawal, + but it would help keep Jarring + in play, would improve the Israeli position abroad, would put us in a + position to support it as a step forward, and buy more time for Israel + to pursue its private contacts to achieve peace with Jordan. It could + eventually lead to a process narrowing the gap between the UAR and Israel. A US discussion with + Israel at this critical juncture is also important because a strain in + our relations has developed in recent weeks. The strain results from our + recent support in the Security Council of the strong condemnation of + IsraelUN + Security Council Resolution 262, adopted unanimously on December 31, + 1968, condemned Israel for its attack on the Beirut International + Airport. (Yearbook of the United Nations, + 1968, pp. 236–237) and our dissociation from Israel + on the territorial aspect of the UAR + settlement. In this latter connection, Secretary Rusk on November 2 informed UAR Foreign Minister Riad that, within the + context of a binding peace agreement, we favor withdrawal of Israeli + forces from the UAR to the + international boundary line.See footnote 3, Document 1. Israel + believes this undermined its negotiating position.

+

(b) To renew and intensify its secret contacts with the Jordanians, + keeping Jarring and the United + States informed of their progress. In order to facilitate such talks, we + should encourage Israel to announce an easing of its policy regarding + displaced persons by allowing as many of the 350,000 who desire to + return to their West Bank camps and villages. We should also encourage + Israel to offer Jordan, in return for a binding commitment to peace + signed by the GOJ and as part of a + satisfactory agreement on all + elements of Resolution 242, specific territorial terms which could be + accepted by King Hussein—i.e., no + unilateral concessions of territory, reciprocity with respect to + territorial changes involved in adjusting the West Bank boundary, no + Israeli garrisons or settlements on the West Bank and a reasonable + compromise on Jerusalem which would give Jordan a meaningful rather than + a purely symbolic role in the Arab sector of the city. While such terms + could in the first instance be conveyed through the direct + Israeli-Jordanian channel, Israel should be urged to use the Jarring channel more substantively + than in the past if and when Jordan indicates a desire to do so. + Hussein would welcome + reaffirmation by the new Administration of the views expressed by the + Johnson Administration regarding a Jordanian settlement. It would be + psychologically advantageous to do this at an early date, even before + any visit of Hussein to this + country.

+

Second, we will wish to decide after the + President’s European trip whether to renew the US–USSR dialogue. If the decision is + affirmative, we could submit to the Soviets an American document + containing concrete proposals for settlement of the Israeli-UAR part of the overall settlement. + Because we would be expected by the Soviets to produce Israeli + concurrence, there should be a prior review of such a document with + Israel. These proposals might also be presented to the UK and France for their review in order to + keep them in the picture. They would also be discussed by us at an + appropriate stage with the UAR and + Jordan. Jarring and the UN should be kept in the center of the + public stage as much as possible. If sufficient common ground between + the US–USSR is achieved, the proposals + would be presented to Jarring to + try out on the parties.

+

Relation Between Two Power and Four Power + Talks

+

If we should decide to give primacy to the bilateral discussions between + ourselves and the Soviet Union, it raises the question of the relation + of such discussions to possible Four Power meetings. The posture we + adopted in our response to the French note provides a reasonable guide. + While concentrating our principal efforts on the US–USSR dialogue, it will prove necessary + and desirable to keep the French and the British abreast of these + discussions. In the first place, the Soviets can be expected to reveal + much of the contents of any discussions between us to the French whose + position is likely to be closer to the Soviets than to ours. Secondly, + the French themselves will be persistent in injecting themselves in the + substance. This should prove manageable if we maintain the posture that + any formal Four Power meetings, particularly on substance, must be + preceded by individual consultations whose purpose would be to develop + common ground. It is likely to be necessary therefore for the United + States to take a very firm stand with the French and resist frequent and + premature Four Power meetings on the substance before individual consultations have + developed areas of common understanding.

+

The US–USSR dialogue would reflect the + political realities of the situation in terms of power in the area and + potential to influence the parties. The Soviets will try to apply + pressure on us to induce Israel to be more forthcoming on withdrawal; we + in turn will want to put the pressure on the USSR to move the UAR + closer to a firm commitment to a permanent peace based on agreement + between the parties.

+

While the probability of success is not very great, the deteriorating + situation in the area requires such effort. The knowledge that such + efforts are being made is of psychological importance in the area, + regardless of the bleak prospects for success. The next several months + are particularly important for increased diplomatic efforts. As a + minimum, further explorations and testing of the Soviets will help + determine more precisely whether they and the UAR are genuinely interested in arriving at some form of + accommodation. At present, it appears that any accommodation which they + would be prepared to accept would fall short of the binding peace + settlement which Israel desires, and short even of the major principles + we believe must govern a settlement. We may have to make a judgment at + some point as to whether an accommodation which would be something more + than the old Armistice arrangements and something less than the + full-scale peace which Israel wants would represent a significant + improvement over an indefinite prolongation of the stalemate. This would + be a complex judgment to make, and we would have to take into account + the fact that the Middle East is a dynamic situation which will not + stand still. Our present assessment is that without progress towards a + settlement, or at least evidence of major efforts being made towards + this end, the situation will continue to deteriorate with the increased + risk of a general renewal of hostilities. On the other hand, an + inadequate settlement might not only fail to preserve peace but would + render Israel more vulnerable, through loss of the military advantage of + the occupied territories, if hostilities should recur.

+

How Much Leverage Do We Have with the + Israelis?

+

Whatever the reasonableness—in our eyes—of an overall settlement such as + we have in mind, we must face the fundamental truth that we will have + very serious difficulty in “selling” it to Israel. We may count it as + certain that any plan we could support as reasonable for both Israel and the Arabs will be viewed by + Israel as jeopardizing its security.

+

As we discuss a settlement with others, then, there will be increasing + strains in US-Israeli relations. Theoretically, we have a number of + important levers with Israel: (a) its realization that in an ultimate + sense Israel’s national + survival depends on the fundamental US concern for its security; (b) + Israel’s dependence on the United States for critical items of military + hardware; and (c) the importance to Israel’s economy of an unrestricted + flow of private capital donations and loans from the United States. It + is relevant to ask what effective, as opposed to theoretical, leverage + do we have? Israel realizes that the United States alone or in concert + with the other major powers would not use force to impose a settlement + on it. Moreover, in addition to the domestic political factors involved, + there is the more fundamental dilemma that United States pressure on + Israel to make concessions on the key issue of territory will be viewed + by Israel as a weakening of its capacity to safeguard its own security + against a hostile Arab world. It would not be in our interests to + contribute to a significant weakening of Israel’s defensive + capabilities, either through the relinquishment of territory or by + withholding US arms, in circumstances where the UAR has been unwilling to make a credible commitment on + peace. We and the Israelis are likely to differ on whether certain + territorial concessions would jeopardize Israeli security.

+

An additional factor limiting our effective leverage is the relative + fragility of the Israeli Government coalition. The Government might well + find itself unable to take a given course of action without bringing + about its own collapse. In fact, we may find that no reasonable solution + can be accepted by Israel before its November elections determine its + leadership. This analysis is not intended to indicate that our leverage + on Israel is not substantial; but rather that it is more limited than + would appear on the surface.

+

Explorations of the President During European + Trip

+

President Nixon will have an + opportunity during his European trip to discuss the Middle East fully + with the NATO countries and in + particular the UK, France, and Italy, + all of whom have a special interest. In general, since we are not + presently in a position to produce Israel on the specific key elements + of a settlement, the President’s discussions should be primarily + exploratory.

+

With the United Kingdom, whose policy is ambivalent, the President will + have an opportunity to impress on Wilson the importance we attach to its + position and the need to maintain a common front. The United Kingdom is + more anxious to open the Suez Canal than we are. Secondly, since + resuming relations with the UAR, it has + been carefully nurturing and seeking to improve its relations in the + Arab world. Third, the United Kingdom will be very tempted to accept a + limited accommodation even though it falls far short of the binding + peace which Israel insists upon. Maintaining a common position with the + United Kingdom will be difficult. If the President indicates our + intention to maintain a special close relationship with the United + Kingdom in our consultations on + Middle East matters, this should help somewhat to keep the United + Kingdom with us on substance.President + Nixon visited the United + Kingdom February 24–26. He met with British Prime Minister Harold + Wilson at the Prime Minister’s country residence Chequers on + February 24. See Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, volume XLI, Western + Europe; NATO, 1969–1972, Document 310.

+

De Gaulle will be more difficult. + The persistent thread that has run through France’s policy on the Middle + East since May 1967 has been its near obsession with seeking a great + power solution to the region’s problems and with proving to the world + that France is one of the great powers concerned. De Gaulle has consistently feared that + the US and the USSR, rather than the + Big Four, will develop the principal elements of a settlement and + encourage the parties through Jarring to make peace. We face therefore a very delicate + tactical situation in the future as we consider both the two power and + four power approach. It appears that the most feasible procedure may be + to give primacy to the US–USSR + dialogue, while at the same time continuing side talks with the UK and France. Willingness to commit + ourselves to the Four Power structure as the principal center for + discussion is not likely to have a decisive influence on the substantive + position of the French.

+

The French favor an imposed settlement, but do not seem to accept the + responsibilities and the implications of such an approach. Recent + pronouncements by De Gaulle in + support of the Arabs, in addition to the arms embargo, have destroyed in + Israel’s eyes any position of impartiality which the French may have + enjoyed in earlier days. The French position on substance indicates a + little more flexibility on the question of borders than in the past. + Foreign Minister Debre said on January 31 that evacuation of the + occupied territories, although the first step necessary towards + settlement, should be to safe and recognized frontiers. This seems to + imply rectification, delineation, and guarantees of the frontiers before + Israel withdraws to them.

+

The President’s discussions with De + Gaulle will afford an opportunity to probe the views of + the French Government on the specific elements of a settlement.Nixon + discussed the Middle East with de + Gaulle in the French President’s office in the Elysée + Palace in Paris on February 28. (Memorandum of conversation; + National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1023, + Presidential/HAK MemCons, + MemCons—The President and General DeGaulle) Our impression to + date has been that De Gaulle is + probably more interested in the way a settlement is arrived at than in + the substance. He sees the area being polarized, and himself as the + “depolarizer.” He does, however, have an interest in seeing to it that + the comparatively moderate regimes in Jordan and Lebanon and even the + UAR’s are not swept away in the + increasingly revolutionary atmosphere of the Arab lands.

+
+ +
+ + 9. Memorandum From President Nixon to Secretary of State Rogers and the President’s Assistant for National + Security Affairs (Kissinger)Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL + IS–US/NIXON. Confidential; Exdis. + A notation written in an unknown hand in the upper right-hand corner + indicates that Rogers saw + the memorandum. + Washington, February 22, 1969. +

I have noted in reading the papers prepared by the State Department and + by the Security Council Review Board on the Mideast,See, for example, Document + 8. references from time to time to “domestic political + considerations.”

+

The purpose of this memorandum is two fold:

+

(1) Under no circumstances will domestic political considerations have + any bearing on the decisions I make with regard to the Mideast.

+

(2) The only consideration which will affect my decision on this policy + will be the security interests of the United States.

+

In the future, I want no reference to domestic political considerations + to be included in any papers and I do not want the subject of domestic + political considerations to be brought up in discussions of this + subject.

+

Will you please circulate this memorandum among all those who are working + on this problem.

+ + RN + +
+ +
+ + 10. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense Laird to Secretary of State Rogers, the President’s Assistant for National Security + Affairs (Kissinger), and + Director of Central Intelligence HelmsSource: + Washington National Records Center, OSD Files: FRC 330–75–0103, Box 12, Israel. Top Secret. + All brackets are in the original except those indicating text that + remains classified. + Washington, February 27, 1969. + + SUBJECT + Stopping the Introduction of Nuclear Weapons Into the Middle + East + +

From all of the available intelligence and from the intensive + conversations here in Defense with Ambassador Rabin in the fall of 1968, [2 lines not declassified].Rabin was + in Washington in November 1968 to negotiate the purchase of Phantom + aircraft. As a condition to the purchase, Israel agreed that it + would not be the first nation to introduce nuclear weapons into the + Middle East. See Foreign Relations, 1964–1968, volume XX, Arab-Israeli + Dispute, 1967–1968, Documents 332 and 333. I do not believe + this coincides with the interests of the United States, and, in fact, + constitutes the single most dangerous phenomenon in an area dangerous + enough without nuclear weapons.

+

The problem is how to stop this development. If the Israelis complete the + development of a nuclear weapon within the next three to six + months—which is quite possible—we will be powerless to do more than + invoke sanctions, i.e., cease delivery of F–4s after the “introduction” + of nuclear weapons into the area. Such a negative course would not take + us very far. The Israelis would be unable and unwilling to reverse their + course. Moreover, their requirement for conventional strength would be + greater, not less, and the likelihood of our actually invoking the + sanctions would not be great in such circumstances. Furthermore, at any + time prior to such events, or certainly not long thereafter, we may well + be faced with public knowledge of the essential facts. So far these + facts have remained in the category of vague, unsubstantiated, and not + fully accepted rumors; but we are depending primarily on luck. Once the + public is made aware of the situation the Administration’s delicate task + will become even more difficult.

+ +

I believe we should meet very soon to consider how to proceed on this, + followed by an early meeting with the President.According to a follow-up memorandum from Laird to Rogers, Kissinger, and Helms, March 17, the four had not + yet met, nor had they met with Nixon. Laird + wrote, “Since February 27 I have seen additional evidence of + activity that would enhance Israel’s capability in [less than 1 line not declassified]. I refer + to the granting, last June and October, of export licenses for two + CDC 6400 computers and one IBM 360/65 computer for Israel. As + Dave Packard indicated in + his March 14, 1969, memorandum to the Secretary of State and the + Secretary of Commerce, we believe the CDC 6400, in particular, could + be a critical tool in [less than 1 line not + declassified].” Laird repeated his request for a meeting on the + issue, but it is unclear if the meeting occurred. (National + Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1236, Saunders Files, Middle East + Negotiations Files) Because of the sensitivity and complexity + of this issue, I suggest this not be dealt with through the regular + NSC machinery.

+ + + Melvin R. Laird + + +
+ +
+ 11. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security + Affairs (Kissinger) to President + NixonSource: National Archives, Nixon + Presidential Materials, NSC Files, + Box 651, Country Files, Middle East, Middle East through December + 1969. Secret; Exdis. Sent for + action. + Washington, March + 8, 1969. + + SUBJECT + Next Steps on the Middle East + +

Attached is Secretary Rogers’s + recommendation on how we might relate our talks with Eban to those with the Russians both + separately and together with the British and French.Rogers’s + March 7 memorandum to the President is attached but not + printed. I talked at length with Joe Sisco during its drafting and feel it comes out just + about where we want to be.In a telephone + conversation with Rogers at + 12:30 p.m. on March 7, Kissinger said that he had met with Sisco to discuss the Department’s + recommendation and thought what State had is “really first rate.” + Kissinger added that he + “really thinks this is the way to proceed. Secondly, bilateral talks + should be here rather than New York.” (National Archives, Nixon + Presidential Materials, Henry + Kissinger Telephone Conversation Transcripts, Box 1, + Chronological File)

+

The essence of the plan is, first, to give + Eban a detailed description, + some of it in writing, of our views on the principles that should govern + a settlement. (These are the + principles formulated for your European talks modified to reflect the + nuances in the diplomatic debates of the last twenty months. They are + attached to the Secretary’s memo.) While we will not give Eban a veto, we need to preserve the + atmosphere of consultation. We would then begin + point-by-point discussion with Dobrynin of our positions on the main items in the + UN resolution. Meanwhile, we shall + try to clarify further the French position, and Joe Sisco will be having talks with + his British counterpart on the nuts and bolts of possible guarantees, + forms of agreement and so on. After hearing Eban’s reaction to our general principles, we would + surface them in the four-power forum the week of March 17.

+

This seems to me the right way to proceed, provided everyone understands + that our broad initial objectives are to use these talks (a) to bring + the others as close as possible to our position and (b) to press on + them—especially the USSR—co-responsibility for achieving success or + sharing the blame for failure.

+

One final point should be called to your attention. If we achieve enough + common ground in all these talks to warrant going on, it is implicit in + the Secretary’s recommendation that we would present any formal + proposals through Jarring. The + reason for insisting on this approach is to fend off possible French and + Russian proposals that the big powers present proposals directly. That + would pin responsibility on us alone to deliver Israel, while keeping + Jarring in the middle would + tend to pin the main responsibility on the parties themselves.

+

Recommendation: That you approve this general + approach as a basis for the talking points to be written for the talks + you and Secretary Rogers will + have with Eban next week (March + 12–13) and for following through with the Russians, French and + British.The President initialed his + approval. Below his initials appears in an unknown hand: “3/10/69. + 1. Notified Hal Saunders. 2. + (ditto mark signifying repeat of “Notified”) SS that Pres. approved + memo as way for proceeding.”

+
+ +
+ 12. Editorial Note +

During the first two weeks of March 1969, UN Special Representative Gunnar Jarring left texts of questions with the Foreign + Ministers of the United Arab Republic, Jordan, Israel, and Lebanon, + designed to restart negotiations between them. Jarring introduced the questions with + this statement: “Security Council Resolution 242 (1967) sets out provisions and principles in + accordance with which a peaceful and accepted settlement of the Middle + East question should be achieved. Some of these provisions would impose + obligations on both sides, some on one side, and some on the other; it + has generally been accepted that they should be regarded as a whole. The + following questions designed to elicit the attitude of the parties + towards the provisions of the Security Council Resolution are based on + this assumption and are to be understood in the context that each + provision is regarded as part of a ‘package deal.’” (Telegram 903 from + Tel Aviv, March 11; National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, + NSC Files, Box 648, Country Files, + Middle East, Middle East Negotiations) The questions for Israel and + Jordan were sent in telegrams 903 from Tel Aviv, March 11, and 1361 from + Amman, March 20, respectively. (Ibid.) The questions for the United Arab + Republic are in telegram 558 from Cairo, March 8 (ibid., Box 634, + Country Files, Middle East, UAR, Vol. + I), and those for Lebanon in telegram 2425 from Beirut, March 21. + (Ibid., Box 1187, Saunders Files, Middle East Negotiations Files, Middle + East Settlement—Jarring + Cables)

+

At a March 20 meeting in Amman, Jordanian Foreign Minister Abdel Munim Rifai informed Ambassador + Harrison Symmes that “a + coordinated UAR/GOJ response had been developed in a series of lengthy + meetings that he had in Cairo” with UAR + Foreign Minister Mahmoud Riad. + While the responses would be “essentially positive and affirmative,” + Rifai said, the Governments + of Jordan and the United Arab Republic considered it vital that the + responses also be “accurate and cautious” to avoid giving away + “negotiating advantages.” (Telegram 1360 from Amman, March 20; ibid., + Box 648, Country Files, Middle East, Middle East Negotiations) Jarring received Jordan’s answers to + his questions on March 23. (Telegram 47456 to USUN, March 27; ibid., RG + 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 27 ARAB–ISR) Eban delivered Israel’s replies to Jarring at an April 2 meeting in + Jerusalem. In the letter accompanying the text of the responses, + Eban wrote: “I now enclose + specific replies in an affirmative spirit to the questions as + formulated. It is my understanding that on the basis of the answers + received from the three governments you propose to pursue further mutual + clarifications in an effort to promote agreement on all the matters at + issue in accordance with your mandate. We are ready to join in this + process at any appropriate place.” (Ibid., Nixon Presidential Materials, + NSC Files, Box 1187, Saunders + Files, Middle East Negotiations Files, Middle East Settlement—Jarring Cables)

+
+ +
+ + 13. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in + IsraelSource: National + Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 604, Country Files, Middle East, Israel, + Vol. I. Secret; Priority; Exdis. + Drafted by Atherton, cleared + in IO, and approved by Sisco. Repeated priority to Amman + and to London, Paris, Moscow, Cairo, USUN, Jidda, and Beirut. + Washington, March 13, 1969, 1732Z. +

38852. 1. Following is uncleared account of Secretary’s response to + Eban’s March 12 presentation + reported septel,Telegram 38981 to Tel Aviv, + March 13; ibid., Box 613, Country Files, Middle East, Jordan, Vol. + I. and of Eban + comments thereon. It is subject to change on review, FYI, Noforn.

+

2. After expressing condolences on Eshkol death and congratulations to + Mrs. Meir,Israeli Prime Minister Levi Eshkol suffered a fatal + heart attack on February 26. The Labor Party selected Meir as the “consensus candidate” + to suceed Eshkol rather than endure a fierce tug-of-war between + Defense Minister Moshe Dayan + and Deputy Prime Minister Yigal Allon for control of the party. “I honestly didn’t + want the responsibility, the awful stress of being Prime Minister,” + Meir wrote in her + autobiography. But “I had no choice. . . . It was enough that we had + a war with the Arabs on our hands; we could wait for that to end + before we embarked on a war of the Jews.” (Meir, My + Life, pp. 350–352) Secretary said new administration + fully aware of special US-Israeli relations which it has no intention of + changing.

+

3. Secretary continued that he agreed with much of what Eban had said and could assure + Eban there was no lessening + of US support for Israel’s objective of contractual settlement which is + lasting and fully protects Israel’s security.

+

4. US stands firmly on concept of agreement between parties. Our purpose + in Two Power and Four Power talks is to support Jarring efforts with parties, not + substitute for them.

+

5. Secretary said we do not think parties have made sufficient effort, + however, to get into substance of a settlement. We do not wish to argue + question of blame but want to move things along. We are not asking + Israel to make proposals which undermine its negotiating position but + feel we have obligation to help parties move toward permanent peace.

+

6. We hope Israel will be forthcoming in its replies to Jarring.See Document 12. We also hope Arabs + will say what they mean by peace. This is fundamental and we agree with + Eban’s analysis of the + concept of peace.

+

7. In urging Israel to be forthcoming, we mean we hope Israel will be + willing to specify boundaries to which it will withdraw. We will not suggest to anyone, however, that + Israel withdraw without receiving an Arab assurance on peace.

+

8. As concerns Israel’s position, we see territorial question as guts of + issue. We are convinced that agreement binding Arabs to peace, bulwarked + by arrangements for demilitarization and by international guarantees, + can more adequately insure Israel’s security than can continuation of + present unstable no-war, no-peace situation. On this point, Secretary + said, we and Israel may have differences. We sometimes have impression + Israel may think present situation is better than peace.

+

9. Secretary continued that now is time to make determined effort. We + view Security Council Resolution and Jarring Mission as proper focus for search for peace + settlement. We plan to move next week in bilateral and Four Power + contexts since we believe Jarring has reached impasse and that major powers can + now play helpful role.Sisco had his first substantive + talk with Dobrynin on March + 18 (see Document 15), and he spoke with + French Ambassador Charles Lucet and British Chargé d’Affaires Edward + Tompkins separately on March 20. (Telegram 43763 to Paris, March 21; + National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 614, Country Files, + Middle East, Jordan, Vol. III, and telegram 43764 to London, March + 21; ibid., Box 726, Country Files, Europe, United Kingdom, Vol. + I) We are making no conclusive judgments about Soviet and + French intentions and realize we must be skeptical, particularly re + Soviets, although latter may have their own reasons for wanting to move. + We hope Israel will give French their detailed views on French + proposals.On March 14, Ambassador + Sargent Shriver informed the Department that, since Nixon’s visit to Paris, “serious” + discussions about the Middle East had occurred at the highest levels + of the French Government. The previous day, Luc de la Barre de + Nanteuil, Chief of Levant Affairs at the French Foreign Ministry, + had told Shriver that France’s ideas on the Middle East would be put + into final form before the next Four-Power meeting on March 24. + (Telegram 3685 from Paris; ibid., Box 644, Country Files, Middle + East, General, Vol. I)

+

10. Secretary then handed Eban + copy of USG description of principles + which we feel should govern peace settlement and which we plan to submit + to other three powers next week.See Document 17. (Text will be made + available to posts after further discussion with Eban.) We would appreciate Israel’s + comments on these principles and could perhaps discuss them further next + day.

+

11. Elaborating on statement of principles, Secretary said we do not + favor imposed settlement and believe precise boundaries are for parties to work out. As we have + said before, however, we do not consider either Qte Allon Plan End qte or Israeli retention + of territory at Sharm al-Sheikh consistent with our principles.

+

12. Secretary continued that we would find it useful to hear how Israel + envisages relations with its neighbors following peace settlement. In + our view, type of relations existing between neighboring states that + have long lived in peace is unattainable in Middle East at this stage in + history. We think juridical peace, buttressed by international + guarantees, can be attained and could evolve into fully normal relations + Israel seeks. It also possible that quite different relations might + emerge between Israel and Jordan on one hand and between Israel and + UAR on other.

+

13. Eban responded that, with + respect to Secretary’s suggestions about giving Arabs GOI concept of boundaries, question is at + what stage this should be done. If Israel did so before Arabs reached + decision to make peace, latter would simply reject Israeli proposals. + Jarring himself has said + that Israel should not give Arabs a map. Secretary commented that agreed + boundaries must clearly be related to Israel’s security.

+

14. In response to Eban’s query re + status of document handed him by Secretary, latter said it was still + in-house document on which we want Israel’s comments. Eban replied that, while he had no + difficulty with our use of word Qte minimal End qte in discussing + boundary changes among ourselves, to give this formulation to others as + basis for discussions would erode US position further. On quick reading + of our principles, Eban said + several points caught his eye which would undermine Israel’s position. + Secretary agreed we could discuss principles paper further next + day.The paper that Rogers handed to Eban is not identified, but + presumably it was a version of the paper prepared for the Four-Power + talks, Document 17. According to the Israeli record of the March 13 + meeting, Eban’s response to + the paper was negative: “The idea that the U.S. should submit a + document of this kind to the other three powers or to anyone else is + profoundly shocking. I request formally and solemnly that this not + be done and I ask that this request be made known to the President.” + (Israel State Archive, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, + 4780/2)

+

15. Commenting on Secretary’s statement re continuation of status quo, + Eban said Israel by no means + considers present situation perfect; it is better, however, than to + withdraw from cease fire lines without peace. Israel agrees it should + not simply stand pat. US should not be too impatient, however. Status + quo can continue for some months without danger of hostilities.

+ +

16. Secretary referred to indications that Israel believes face-to-face + negotiations are necessary to make progress. We agree that direct + negotiations desirable but believe agreement could also be produced by + negotiations through Jarring + which parties could then commit themselves to. Eban replied that Israel agreed some + months ago to move from insistence on direct negotiations to a phased + approach. Decision re when to move from indirect to direct negotiations + could be made empirically but he could not see how peace could be + achieved without meetings between parties. Eban added that GOI had + even been prepared to give Jarring draft of what contractual agreement might look + like and might still do so later, but for present would stay with + Jarring’s question and + answer exercise.

+

17. Turning to French proposals, Eban said they were even further than Soviets from + concept of agreement. Sisco + noted that we had given French our preliminary comments and that French + were refining their proposals and had given us some elaboration previous + day. Sisco said we were aware of + French-Israeli discussions in Paris and knew that GOI was weighing question of giving French + substantive reactions. Eban + replied that Israel had pointed out certain fatal flaws in French + proposal which invalidated the rest.

+

18. Sisco made point that French + will develop their position with or without Israeli views. We believe + Israel can influence French position by making its substantive views + known, regardless of what it thinks about procedure French are + proposing.

+

19. In response to Ambassador Rabin’s query why USG + paying such attention to French, Secretary said we had made clear to + French that settlement must be a package and we would not agree on + phased approach. Was anything to be gained, however, by treating France + as enemy? Rabin said Qte France + is Israel’s enemy End qte. Eban + added that French are outside of European consensus re Middle East. + Dutch Government, for example, does not like our giving France the role + of representing Europe. In Israel’s view US will get more cooperation + from British. In response to Secretary’s questions whether he had talked + to British, Eban said he had seen + Prime Minister Wilson briefly in transiting London and would have longer + talk with him on return trip. Secretary noted that British seemed to + wish to stay close to USG.

+

20. Eban asked if our position was + that Four Power talks would take place only if and when bilateral talks + became convergent. Secretary said this was not quite our position. We + have said nothing is excluded but we want to have advance idea of what + will happen before moving to Four Power forum. We have also made clear + we will continue to consult with + Israel and others. Four Powers have agreed their talks will be low-key + and private. Eban expressed + skepticism, saying anything we give Soviets will appear in Cairo + press.

+ + + Rogers + + +
+ +
+ 14. Memorandum of ConversationSource: National Archives, Nixon Presidential + Materials, NSC Files, Box 604, + Country Files, Middle East, Israel, Vol. I. Secret; Nodis. Drafted + by Saunders on March 17. + According to the President’s Daily Diary, the meeting was held from + 3:06 to 3:50 p.m. (Ibid., White House Central Files) + Washington, March + 14, 1969. + + PARTICIPANTS + The President + + Joseph J. Sisco + + + Henry A. Kissinger + + Emil Mosbacher + + Harold H. Saunders + + + Abba Eban + + + Yitzhak Rabin + + + Shlomo Argov + + +

The President received Israeli Foreign Minister Eban in his office for fifty-five + minutes on Friday, March 14, 1969.

+

After an exchange of pleasantries and a picture-taking session, the + President explained his policy toward the four-power discussions on the + Middle East. He frankly admitted that he had been “dragging his feet.” + He referred to his press conference statementMade on March 4. The text of his statement is printed in Public Papers: Nixon, 1969, pp. 179–194. that the + US did not wish to enter a negotiating situation where the cards would + be stacked against us and added that his main purpose in the current + exploratory bilateral talks is to see how far we can go in drawing the + other three Governments closer to our position. The Soviets have been + refueling one group of protagonists in the Middle East, and the French + have been seeking a role as “spoilers.” In a situation of this kind, he + felt it was better to draw them into the process of trying to reach some + sort of accommodation than to “leave them in left field.” That said, the + President assured Mr. Eban that + we continue to support Ambassador Jarring but we felt we could usefully engage the other + three governments in discussion of what guarantees might be possible for + a settlement.

+ +

The President concluded this part of his explanation by asking Eban disarmingly, “Don’t you think we + ought to try?” He said he realized that some of Eban’s colleagues would argue that we + should stand aloof. The President said he would not question that + approach if we were dealing with stable governments and rational people. + But we are not dealing with such people, and we feel we have a clear + obligation to do what we reasonably can to make the situation less + dangerous. We are particularly concerned, of course, with avoiding a + clash with the Soviet Union.

+

The President assured Mr. Eban + that we have Israel’s interests at heart and that is why we have wanted + to consult with Israel’s representative this week before moving further + in the four-power forum. But, he said, “We need your help. Don’t make + our role impossible.”

+

Mr. Eban said that he had deeply + appreciated the opportunity for a frank exchange of views. He said he + felt that, after his three days of talks in Washington, our positions + were close enough for us to work harmoniously together. He said that he + had been asked at the Press Club whether he had noticed any distinct + erosion in the American position and he had answered that he saw none. + When he had been asked whether US and Israeli views were identical, he + had replied that the views of two free Governments are never likely to + be identical but that there can be enough harmony in the positions of + each for close cooperation.

+

The President acknowledged that there are differences of view and that + these differences are natural. “Just don’t hit us too hard,” he + said.

+

The President went on to emphasize that, although he had been accused of + many things, he had rarely been charged with being naive about Soviet + intentions. “I know what they are up to.” Having no illusions about the + possibility of reaching full agreement with the USSR, he still felt it desirable to talk + with the Soviets, keeping our guard up all the while, to see what common + ground we and they might reach.

+

Mr. Eban then said he wanted to + state his views on three subjects: the issue of war and peace, the + four-power discussions, and Jordan.

+

On the issue of striving toward peace, he said that negotiations must + continue; otherwise, a “war psychosis” would seize the people of the + area. However, he did not see the present situation as capable of + leading to a world conflagration because, first, the Arabs are in no + position to wage a war and they know it, and, second, the Soviets do not + want war. In a brief exchange on this point, the President pointed out + that, while the Soviets may want continuation of enough tension for them + to exploit, they had found out in 1967 that they are not capable of + controlling their Arab friends and must therefore not draw too fine a + line between the exploitable and the dangerous. Mr. Eban went on to say that the current + situation is difficult for Israelis—with the persistent border-shelling and the occasional + terrorist grenades—but it does not seriously threaten Israel. However + unpleasant it may be, the present situation is better than “the great + historic mistake” of retreating from present advantageous positions for + less than a peace which would assure the existence of Israel.

+

On the four-power talks, Mr. Eban + began by saying that only one of the four is really important for + Israel—the U.S. Differences do exist between our positions, but he felt + after his talks here this week that we have moved closer and they are + close enough to make cooperation possible. The President interjected + that it was important for us to engage in this process to give ourselves + “some running room with the moderate Arabs.” Mr. Eban nodded his understanding and went + on to comment individually on the positions of the USSR and France.

+

The Soviets, he believed, “want us out without peace.” Israel has a + “robust skepticism” about the Soviet position. The Soviets’ purpose is + to cement their position in the Arab world and to undercut the US + position as completely as possible.

+

The French position is “more tragic.” A great deal of emotion is involved + because the relationship has moved from a “romantic love affair” to a + love-hate situation. President de + Gaulle, he said, seemed incapable of anything but black + or white feelings. Mr. Eban + traced much of the current Israeli feeling toward President de Gaulle from his failure in May of + 1967 to “understand our peril.” Mr. Eban described how he had tried to convince de Gaulle on May 24, 1967, of the + threat which Israel faced.Recalling his + meeting with de Gaulle in + Paris at his office in the Elysée Palace, Eban wrote that he did not believe + that the French President took seriously the threat to Israel posed + by the withdrawal of UNEF from the Sinai Peninsula and the Egyptian + blockade of the Straits of Tiran. (Abba Eban: An + Autobiography, pp. 341–344) He said the Israeli man + in the street feels that, if de + Gaulle could not understand Israel’s plight in that + situation at a time when men in the street from Montevideo to Tokyo knew + that Israel’s very existence was threatened, Israelis could not trust + guarantees which depended on the French because they would have no + assurance that a French government would be any more likely in the + future to understand Israel’s peril than the French Government did in + May 1967.

+

The President said he believed that the French position could be moved. + He conceded that it would not be moved if the Middle East were the only + issue we were discussing, but there are other issues which are perhaps + even more important to France. The President did not say it in so many + words, but the clear implication was that he felt that the French desire + to participate with us in talks with the USSR would influence France to give on the Middle East. At + any rate, the President said, “Let us give it a whack.”

+ +

Mr. Eban returned to the question + of guarantees for a peace settlement. “If two of the four guarantors are + against us, why should we put our trust in guarantees?” Then he went on + to argue against “globalizing” the Middle Eastern conflict. He felt that + big-power guarantees would get the US “involved too early” in any + crisis. He used the analogy of Berlin to point out how the whole world + becomes involved by the smallest border incident which involves the US + and the USSR. The President nodded seriously that this was “an important + point.”

+

After an off-the-record discussion of Mr. Eban’s views of the possibilities of peace with Jordan, + the President said that King Hussein would be coming to the United States on a visit + in early AprilKing Hussein visited the United States + during the second week of April and met with President Nixon on April 8. See Document 19. and asked Mr. Eban what he felt we should say to the + King. Mr. Eban said that what we + tell him will be very important to the prospects of a settlement between + Israel and Jordan because Hussein + feels a need for international support. Mr. Eban suggested that we urge Hussein to enter serious negotiations with the Israelis + and to tell him of our feeling—“if you believe it”—that we thought it + possible for Jordan to win serious concessions from Israel if it + negotiated seriously.

+

In a brief aside to this part of the conversation, the President asked + Mr. Eban his views of the + situation in Cairo and whether or not we should resume relations. Mr. + Eban said he thought + Nasser’s internal situation + was shaky—perhaps even more so than Hussein’s. When the President stated his position as not + setting conditions on the resumption of relations with Egypt, Mr. + Eban said he felt this was + exactly right. When the President asked whether we should do more, Mr. + Eban said he felt that it + would look too much as if we were running after Nasser. When the President asked + directly whether Mr. Eban felt it + was in Israel’s interest for us to resume relations, Mr. Eban a couple of times avoided a direct + answer.

+

The meeting closed with another exchange of pleasantries and with + reiteration of a theme that the President struck throughout the + meeting—that we intend to proceed in close cooperation with Israel.

+ + + Harold H. Saunders + Saunders initialed “H.H.S.” above his typed + signature. + + +
+ +
+ + 15. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Soviet + UnionSource: National + Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 653, Country Files, Middle East, + Sisco Middle East Talks. + Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Atherton, cleared in EUR, and approved by Sisco. Repeated to Amman, Cairo, Tel Aviv, London, + Paris, and USUN. + Washington, March + 18, 1969, 0141Z. +

42154. Begin summary: Assistant Secretary + Sisco met with Ambassador + Dobrynin today to resume + US-Soviet Middle East talks.This was the + first of nine meetings between Sisco and Dobrynin, the last of which occurred on April 22. + Brief summaries of most of the conversations are in an April 18 + memorandum from Saunders to + Kissinger, which is + printed in Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, volume XII, Soviet + Union, January 1969–October 1970, Document 38. The + Soviets have brought a Middle East expert here from Moscow and clearly + intend to pursue this dialogue in a serious manner. Mr. Sisco suggested that as immediate + steps the Soviets parallel our efforts (a) to encourage scrupulous + observance by the parties of the ceasefire and (b) to urge the parties + to be responsive to Jarring’s + latest questions. He also stressed our belief that a UAR commitment to work for an agreed and + lasting peace is necessary to get a meaningful negotiating process + started. Dobrynin said the + USSR concurred in our view that + the terms of a settlement must be agreed to by the parties, must + constitute a package and should be worked out through Jarring. He argued, however, that + clarification of the Israeli position on boundaries would help elicit a + clear expression of the Arab position on peace. He also made the point + that, while there is no question of QUOTE imposing UNQUOTE a settlement, + agreed positions by the US and USSR + could constitute pressure on the parties.

+

Sisco told Dobrynin we hoped to present some + ideas on the substance of a settlement shortly in New York. Once that + decision was taken, we would make these ideas available to Dobrynin and hoped to get into further + specifics in our next meeting with him.At + the next meeting on March 24, Sisco gave Dobrynin the U.S. working paper that Yost presented in the Four-Power + forum the same day (see Document 17). + (Telegram 46143 to Moscow, March 25; National Archives, Nixon + Presidential Materials, NSC Files, + Box 653, Country Files, Middle East, Sisco Middle East Talks) + Dobrynin and Sisco agreed that their meetings + should continue at fairly frequent intervals on a quiet and informal but + businesslike basis. If the press learns of these talks, we will confirm + they are taking place but decline to discuss their substance. End summary

+

1. Asst. Secretary Sisco, NEA, + (accompanied by Atherton) met + with Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin + at Soviet Embassy March 18 to resume US-Soviet dialogue on Middle East. + Also present on Soviet side were V.V. Mikhailov, Counselor of Embassy, and A. Semiochkin, Chief of Near + East Dept. who had arrived from Moscow + previous evening.

+

2. In brief opening statement Dobrynin noted he had already had opportunity to convey + Soviet concern re Middle East situation to PresidentDobrynin met + with Nixon on February 17. + See Foreign + Relations, 1969–1976, volume XII, Soviet Union, January + 1969–October 1970, Document 14. and expressed hope + that current talks would be constructive and productive. Dobrynin noted that Soviet December 30 + plan provided both that Israel’s existence as independent state should + be guaranteed and that Arab territories occupied by Israel should be + liberated.See Document + 1. Soviets wished to take US views into account to + extent possible and had no objection to detailed discussion of all + issues although Soviet interest focused primarily on Israeli withdrawal. + Soviet plan did not contain answers to all questions and details should + be worked out with parties concerned. He hoped, however, that US and + USSR could agree on number of + specifics. Dobrynin emphasized + that Soviet plan calls for strong and lasting peace, not merely return + to armistice situation, and envisages utilization of Jarring Mission. He would welcome US + comments on Soviet plan and hoped to hear US ideas as well.

+

3. Sisco replied that we welcome + opportunity to resume discussions, noting that he and Dobrynin had previously agreed these + talks were of utmost importance and should be held quietly and in + businesslike atmosphere. Sisco + suggested and Dobrynin agreed + that, if press learned of talks, both sides would confirm they had taken + place but would make no comment on substance.

+

4. Sisco continued that we viewed + these discussions with Soviets and consultations in New York among four + powers as effort help Jarring + narrow gap between parties within framework of SC Resolution. We hoped to get down to specifics, and did + not preclude possibility that we might together produce informal QTE + pieces of paper UNQTE on ad referendum basis if we reach point where + common ideas emerge.

+

5. Sisco then suggested two + immediate steps for Soviet consideration: (a) that, in view recent + cease-fire violations in area, we counsel parties to scrupulously + respect cease fire resolutions in effort develop better climate for + negotiations; and (b) that Soviets encourage parties, as we have already + done with Israeli and Arab friends, to respond positively to Jarring’s latest questions.See Document 12. + This connection Sisco said we + were concerned about press reports that UAR Foreign Minister Riad had recently expressed doubts + about possibility of political settlement and had indicated that + military solution needed.

+ +

6. Sisco continued that he wanted + to stress following: goal of our efforts is just and lasting peace and + we welcome Soviet views that peace must replace armistice agreements. In + our view objective is a commitment to peace from all parties and + agreement between parties on the components of peace. We emphasize need + for agreement in belief that any lasting settlement must record parties + obligations to each other in contractual form—i.e., as obligations to + each other. Stated another way, we believe settlement must be + reciprocally binding. We also believe settlement must be QUOTE package + UNQUOTE in which there is agreement on all elements before any can be + implemented. We understand this is also Soviet view.

+

7. Re Sisco’s suggestions for + immediate steps, Dobrynin said + Soviets doing their best to help Jarring Mission and believe parties must work through + Jarring. Re need to defuse + situation in area, Dobrynin said + he generally agreed but had no authority to make specific undertaking on + this question which beyond scope of present talks. Fedayeen were fact of + life, opposed to many things which were happening in occupied + territories and inspired by desire to liberate those territories; and + activities would continue until settlement reached.

+

8. Dobrynin agreed that + settlement must be QUOTE binding UNQUOTE. Precise form (e.g., through + Security Council or a four powers) was up to parties and we could + discuss this aspect at a later stage. Soviets prepared discuss + informally several ways in which settlement could be recorded.

+

9. Dobrynin said Soviets agreed + on QUOTE package UNQUOTE concept; Soviet plan called for parties to + deposit their declarations on same day troop withdrawal begins. In + principle, therefore, he saw no difference between us on this point.

+

10. Turning to four-power discussions, Sisco said we expect Ambassador Yost will resume discussions on + bilateral basis this week, we have some concrete ideas to submit in New + York and, once we have decided to do so, these ideas will be passed to + Dobrynin here probably later + this week. Meanwhile we will examine points Dobrynin has made and hope to be able raise number of + specifics at next meeting, perhaps sometime this week.

+

11. Dobrynin then asked why + Israeli Foreign Minister Eban was + opposed to four-power talks. Sisco replied by saying he wanted to give Dobrynin some sense of what Eban had said.See Documents 13 and 14. In brief, Eban had stressed four points: (a) + Israel will withdraw only in context of peace, (b) peace must be in form + of binding contractual agreement, (c) settlement must be a package and + (d) secure and recognized borders must be different from Armistice Lines. Atherton added that, in clarifications + to us, Eban had cited three + factors which must govern determination of borders: (a) they must be + agreed between parties which as practical matter ruled out present cease + fire lines; (b) they must be based on Israel’s security needs and not on + historical or emotional consideration; and (c) they must preserve Jewish + character of state which rules out incorporation into Israel of Arab + population.

+

12. Sisco said he wanted to give + Dobrynin some idea of what + we mean by peace. We do not expect Arabs and Israelis suddenly to love + each other. To us peace does mean, however, liquidation of Arab-Israeli + conflict; transition from armistice situation to formal state of peace + as provided for in Armistice Agreements; and end of belligerent claims, + blockades and boycotts. In addition we do not accept views that Arab + governments have no responsibility for fedayeen. There could not be + peace if governments accept a settlement but fedayeen reject it.

+

13. Dobrynin replied that it + necessary to distinguish between two situations; (a) in absence of + settlement, he did not see how Arabs could be asked to give up efforts + to liberate occupied territories. (b) Once settlement agreed and + territorial dispute settled, there would be no basis for fedayeen to + continue.

+

14. Re Dobrynin’s question about + Israeli attitude toward four-power talks, Sisco said GOI has + reservations since it believes parties themselves must make the peace. + For our part we see discussions with Soviets and in four-power context + as assisting Jarring not as + mechanism for dictating or imposing settlement.

+

15. Dobrynin agreed, asking + whether Israelis really think four-power talks represent effort to + impose settlement. Such talks might constitute pressure, but question of + imposing settlement does not arise. Soviet plan speaks of agreed + settlement, which means settlement agreed to by Israel and Arabs. + Sisco said US-Soviet + recommendations would certainly carry weight. Despite Israeli + objections, we had told Israelis we intend to continue consultations + with other powers which we see as being in overall US interest. For US + and USSR, Sisco added, such interests go beyond Middle East. + Dobrynin agreed and said + Middle East appeared most promising area for US-Soviet agreement.

+

16. Sisco observed that we could + proceed in two ways: (a) we could seek common ground while disregarding + the parties and accomplish nothing; or (b) we could seek to bring the + parties along. We assume both sides will attempt to follow latter + course. Dobrynin commented that + he assumed that we would both want to brief QTE our friends UNQTE on our + talks but hoped certain delicate questions which might arise would be + held by the two of us.

+

17. Dobrynin asked whether we had + a clear idea of Israel’s position on recognized borders, noting that + Jarring had told Soviets in + Moscow they were not clear to + him. Sisco said that, if UAR would make clear commitment to seek + agreement on just and lasting peace, we had impression this would unlock + the door and make it possible to get at all specific issues covered by + Security Council Resolution, including withdrawal. Israeli willingness + to be specific on borders is linked to Arab willingness make binding + commitment to peace.

+

18. Dobrynin asked if this was + not a two-sided process. Sisco + agreed it was and suggested that, if UAR has difficulty indicating its position on peace through + Jarring, it might help if + UAR gave such indication to USSR. Dobrynin thought this would be difficult at present + though not ultimately. Problem was that Israel would only speak of QUOTE + secure and recognized borders UNQUOTE. Dobrynin noted that former Secretary Rusk and Under Secretary Rostow had said Israel seeks only + demilitarization but no territory from UAR and Syria and wants only some corrections in border + with Jordan. Without committing USG, + Soviets have explained these views in discussing their plan with Arabs, + but Israeli statements on territorial question continue to raise + questions. It would unlock door for Arabs if Israel would clarify its + position on territories. In such a case, Soviets could make + recommendations to Arabs about stating their position on peace. + Sisco agreed these were the + two fundamental questions; Israel is convinced that Arabs do not want + peace, and Arabs are convinced that Israel does not wish to return + territories. These positions reflect suspicions rooted in history of + problem but it should be possible with ingenuity to find way out of this + vicious circle.

+

19. Dobrynin asked if Israelis + had told USG what boundaries they + wanted, noting that he was not asking what they had told us but only + whether they had told us. Sisco + said Israelis have not indicated to us precisely what they have in mind; + they have shown us no maps. We believe Israel will not give precise + indication until convinced that Arabs are ready to work out agreement on + peace. Meanwhile their position is that boundaries should be final and + different from Armistice Lines. Dobrynin asked if we could indicate whether Israeli + position on boundaries is reasonable or unreasonable. Sisco said we have impression that, if + it were possible to get Arab commitment to peace, GOI territorial decisions would be + reasonable; this is only an impression Sisco repeated. We doubt that GOI has so far reached specific territorial decisions, + given reluctance of all governments to avoid QUOTE iffy UNQUOTE + decisions. Dobrynin said + situation was also QUOTE iffy UNQUOTE on Arab side since Arabs were + being asked to make decision on peace without knowing Israel’s + territorial demands. Problem would appear easier for Israel since it + must have idea of what it will want when Arabs say they want peace.

+

20. Sisco replied that two + situations were not equal. Israel would need to take concrete act of + withdrawal in return for Arab commitment on paper. Latter was also concrete act but not in + same category. Feeling is deep in Israel that Arab agreement on peace + represents act of recognition of Israel’s right to exist in peace and + security, which both we and Soviets accept. It can be argued that Arab + signature on piece of paper is less important than substance, but for + psychological and other reasons Israel attaches importance to formality + of recognition.

+

21. Dobrynin commented that + central point of Soviet proposal is that it is responsive to wishes of + both sides. Withdrawal would not begin until parties had deposited + documents recording agreement on all issues. In response to Sisco’s comment that this raised prior + question of what would be in those documents, Dobrynin said this would first have to + be clarified among the parties.

+ + + Rogers + + +
+ +
+ 16. National Security Study Memorandum 33Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential + Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box + H–141, National Security Study Memoranda. Secret. A copy was sent to + the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Director of the + United States Information Agency. + Washington, March + 21, 1969. + + TO + The Secretary of State + The Secretary of Defense + The Director of Central Intelligence + + + SUBJECT + Contingency Planning for the Middle East + +

The President has directed the preparation of studies for various + contingencies in the Middle East. As directed in the guidelines for + contingency planning these papers should include a careful orchestration + of political and military actions. These studies should be performed by + the Near East Interdepartmental Group and should be submitted to the + Review Group by the dates indicated below:

+

—Resumption of Arab-Israeli Hostilities. This + should examine possible U.S. actions in the event of renewed conflict in + the Middle East provoked by either the Arabs or Israel. It should assume + that the USSR + and the US do not become involved + to the extent of engaging in actual hostilities in support of either + side. (May 23, 1969)

+

—Jordan. This should explore the most likely + crises as a result of internal or external pressures. (April 4, + 1969)

+

—Possible US-Soviet Confrontation. This should + cover contingencies relating to accidental or deliberate direct Soviet + involvement in the Mideast which could lead toward US–USSR + confrontation. (April 25, 1969)

+ + + Henry A. Kissinger + + +
+ +
+ 17. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the United + NationsSource: National + Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 648, Country Files, Middle East, Middle + East Negotiations. Secret; Priority; Exdis. Drafted by Arthur R. Day (IO/UNP), cleared by + Sisco and De Palma, and approved by + De Palma. Repeated + Priority to Amman and to Jidda, Beirut, London, Kuwait, Moscow, + Paris, Tel Aviv, and Cairo. + Washington, March + 22, 1969, 0430Z. +

44729. Subject: Four-Power Consultations on ME.

+

1. Following is text of U.S. working paper to be given to other three + major powers (guidance septel):In telegram + 44730, March 22, the Department instructed the Ambassadors in + Jordan, Lebanon, and Saudi Arabia, and the U.S. Minister in Egypt, + to deliver copies of the U.S. working paper to their host + governments on March 24, at which time Yost would be presenting the paper in the Four-Power + meeting in New York scheduled for that day. The telegram also + provided oral comments for the U.S. representatives to deliver as + they distributed the working paper. (Ibid.)

+

Begin text: Views to be conveyed to Ambassador + Jarring and to the principal + parties on ways and means to achieve agreement in accordance with + Security Council Resolution 242 of November 22, 1967.

+

The following views are conveyed to Ambassador Jarring and to the principal parties + concerned with a view to helping promote agreement called for in + Security Council Resolution of November 22, 1967:

+

1. That the parties accept SC Resolution + 242 and state their willingness to implement it in all of its provisions + in accordance with paragraph 3 of the resolution.

+ +

2. There should be agreement between the parties on all elements of a + settlement before implementation of any part of the package begins.

+

3. That the parties agree to exchange substantive views indirectly under + the auspices of Ambassador Jarring, without prejudice to engaging in a more direct + process at an appropriate stage. We believe that it will not be possible + to reach a settlement without more direct Arab-Israeli contact at some + point.

+

4. The objective should be a just and lasting peace based on agreement + between the parties. The form of settlement must be contractually and + reciprocally binding and may involve international participation as part + of an overall guarantee of its terms.

+

5. A just and lasting peace will require withdrawal of Israeli forces to + secure and recognized boundaries in the context of peace arrived at by + agreement between the parties. The boundaries to be established under a + just and lasting peace are intimately related to important security + considerations for both sides: rectifications from pre-existing lines + should be confined to those required for mutual security and should not + reflect the weight of conquest. The question of Israeli withdrawal is + intimately linked with a contractual commitment to peace from the Arabs + and specific provisions for guarantees. Special arrangements should be + considered for Gaza.

+

6. Certain critical areas should be demilitarized.

+

7. Jordan should have a defined role—civil, economic and religious—in + Jerusalem which would remain a unified city. Arrangements would be made + to assure the interest of all religions.

+

8. An overall settlement must provide for solution of the refugee + problem. A refugee settlement should provide for the exercise of free + choice by the refugees between resettlement with compensation and + repatriation under conditions and controls acceptable to the two sides. + The parties should agree to a mechanism which can work on this problem + for an extended period.

+

9. Free navigation for the ships of all nations, including Israel, in the + Suez Canal as well as the Gulf of Aqaba must be assured. Special + arrangements will be required for Sharm al-Shaykh.

+ + + Rogers + + +
+ +
+ + 18. Telegram From the Department of State to Certain Diplomatic + PostsSource: National + Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 653, Country Files, Middle East, + Sisco Middle East Talks, + April-June (1969). Secret; Priority; Nodis. Drafted and approved by + Sisco. Sent to Moscow, + London, Paris, Amman, Tel Aviv, USUN, and Cairo. All brackets are in the original + except “[1967]”, “[to]”, and “[sic]”, added + for clarity. + Washington, April 3, 1969, 2353Z. +

51229. Sisco and Dobrynin had working lunch April 3 on + Middle East in which following principal points emerged:

+

1. Dobrynin said he wished to + state explicitly and categorically that Soviet Union wants peace in + Middle East not simply an armistice. In response to Sisco’s query, he did not elaborate on + content of peace nor did he give any indication of USSR willingness to press UAR to make a binding commitment on peace. + After expressing hope that we could make some progress, Sisco said there are some who believe + that the USSR is not interested in + real peace in Middle East. In support of this thesis is view that Soviet + influence has not been on wane in the area and that all-out Soviet + support for Arab cause is serving present Soviet interest. Sisco asked why should Soviets + therefore want peace in the area when it may believe that it has things + going for it? Dobrynin said this + was a fair question, and he would answer it in this way: (a) Soviet + Union does not like unstable situations. In Middle East, if another war + were to occur, it could cause difficulties between us and we would once + again have to be on the hot-line to see what the two of us could do. + Situation in Middle East is beginning to look like it did in months + before June [1967] war. Soviets think situation is too risky. (b) + Soviets want to make progress because bilateral discussions between US + and USSR on Middle East are first + serious talks between Soviet Government and new Administration. We + therefore believe it is important for progress to be made in the + interest of overall US–USSR relations. + Sisco took opportunity + underscore point he has made at previous meetings with Dobrynin; namely, that unless Soviets + can bring UAR around to make commitment + [to] peace with Israel on basis of a binding agreement, it will be most + difficult, if not impossible for US to influence Israelis to withdraw + its forces to secure and recognized borders.

+ +

2. Dobrynin, who was aware of + Secretary’s appointment with Fawzi this morning,Telegram 51470 to Cairo, April 4, reported Rogers’s April 3 meeting with + Fawzi at which the two discussed “general questions relating to + Arab-Israel settlement.” The Secretary “pointed out necessity of + UAR convincing rest of world it + prepared recognize and live in peace with Israel by saying so + explicitly.” Fawzi was “unwilling say so even privately but said + that UAR readiness recognize + Israel’s borders and renounce belligerency was sufficient proof of + peaceful intentions.” He added that if the United States “had some + formula to propose on question recognizing Israel which would be + short of formal, diplomatic recognition, UAR would be prepared to consider it.” While the + “withdrawal question was lost in shuffle,” Rogers affirmed that the U.S. + position on refugees “was consistent with UN resolutions on the subject, which “satisfied” Fawzi. + (Ibid., RG 59, Central Files + 1967–69, POL 7 UAR) asked if + anything emerged from this talk. Sisco said two principal topics touched upon: (a) UAR desire to have Four Powers move ahead; + and (b) indication that current UAR + reaction to US working paper not as negative as public statement by + Nasser on March 27.In his March 27 speech, Nasser criticized the U.S. working + paper and said that the Arabs would never agree to an “imposed + settlement” by the Four Powers. (New York + Times, March 28, 1969, p. 7) + Sisco said Fawzi found some good + elements in paper as well as others which he did not like.

+

3. Sisco said he had impression + that position of both sides had hardened somewhat, citing GOI Foreign Minister’s emphasis on direct + negotiations and peace treaty and Nasser’s emphasis on Khartoum formula, i.e., no + negotiations, no peace, no recognition.In a + resolution adopted by the Arab League heads of state at a meeting in + Khartoum August 29 to September 1, 1967, the heads of state “agreed + to unified efforts at international and diplomatic levels to + eliminate the consequences of aggression and to assure the + withdrawal of the aggressor forces of Israel from Arab lands, but + within the limits to which Arab states are committed: No peace with + Israel, no negotiation with Israel, no recognition of Israel and + maintenance of the rights of Palestinian people in their nation.” + (Ibid., September 2, 1967, p. 1) + Sisco said our impression of + Israeli position is that they flexible on question of form provided + undertakings are reciprocal and binding between parties. On + negotiations, we continue to believe that indirect method can be pursued + further but, we do not see a settlement being achieved unless Arabs at + some point agree to direct discussion. Sisco stressed direct discussion procedure was an + important element of Israeli thinking and reflected Arab recognition of + GOI right to live in peace and + security. Dobrynin agreed that + position of both sides had probably hardened. He feels that there is + some flexibility in form of settlement on Arab side, though he continues + to shy away from any indication that Arabs would be willing to assume + direct binding obligations to Israel. He continues to talk in terms of + declarations deposited with the Security Council and obligations in + relation to the Council and not between the parties.

+

4. Most interesting statement came from Dobrynin on the question of guarantees. He said plainly + USSR has no interest in + guarantees. If Eban does not want Soviet Union to join + in any guarantees, this is perfectly all right with them. He said + positive reference to guarantees which Soviets have made have largely + been in deference to US views. Soviets would be prepared to join in a + Security Council endorsement, but if Soviet involvement in political + guarantees gives Israelis any difficulty Soviets would not insist on + being included. As far as they are concerned, important guarantees are + practical arrangements on ground. In this connection, he expressed + interest in possible UN role in + Sharm-al-Sheik, Gaza, and in small demilitarized zone on both sides of + international boundary between Egypt and Israel. He continued express + very strong opposition to concept of demilitarization of entire + Sinai.

+

5. Dobrynin was at great pains to + explain that if the practical procedure for withdrawal which Soviets + have suggested in December 30th PlanSee Document 1. is not acceptable, they + are prepared to entertain alternative suggestions we might have.

+

6. Looking ahead, Dobrynin asked + how US and USSR could be most useful. + Sisco said speaking + personally, once we have explored in detail specific points in Security + Council resolution, we will want to take a look at Soviet position in + totality to determine whether and how much movement has been made and + where there are elements of agreement and disagreement. As we explored + this, Dobrynin said, based on + instructions from Moscow, he would be prepared to try to work out some + new QTE practical plan UNQTE based on our combined thoughts. He asked + Sisco what he meant when he + said he speaking personally. Sisco said this is his own line of thinking and that + whether we would want to try to put together a US/USSR QTE piece of paper UNQTE will depend + on whether there are sufficient areas of agreement between us to make + this a worthwhile exercise. Sisco expressed hope that this would be the case; but + when he said he was speaking personally he was indicating that no such + decision on a next step had been taken by the U.S. Government. This + judgment would be made after we had compared our respective positions on + all points. Dobrynin said his + instructions go beyond merely exploring, but include objective of + working out something with us. Sisco said that, too, is our objective. At same time + Sisco stressed that one of + things we will keep in foreground of our thinking on whether QTE + combined thoughts UNQTE should be developed will be whether such ideas + take sufficiently into account views of principal parties in area. If + there was a reasonable chance that a common piece of paper would be a + vehicle for helping to bring parties along, this might be worthwhile + endeavor. We attach great importance to US–USSR talks on ME. + Basically, this would mean USSR + capacity to bring Egyptians along, and we to influence Israelis. We are + not interested in a propaganda + exercise which would find us taking a position in disassociation from + parties in the area; that would not be helpful in promoting a + solution.

+

8 [sic]. Dobrynin asked if there had been any new development re + US resumption of relations with UAR, + making clear Soviets have no objections. Sisco said matter stands where it has been; our attitude + is positive and we ready to discuss when UAR is ready.

+ + + Rogers + + +
+ +
+ 19. Memorandum of ConversationSource: National Archives, Nixon Presidential + Materials, NSC Files, Box 928, VIP + Visits, Jordan—Visit of King Hussein, Vol. II. Secret; Nodis. The meeting took place in the Oval Office. King + Hussein made an official + visit to Washington April 8–10. + Washington, April 8, 1969, 10:30 + a.m. + + PARTICIPANTS + President Nixon + King Hussein I of + Jordan + + Henry A. Kissinger + + +

The meeting was very cordial. The President began the conversation by + expressing his great and high regard for the King and expressing his + appreciation for the moderation and wisdom that the King had shown. The + United States was interested in a just and fair settlement of the Middle + East crisis. To this end, the United States had engaged in a more active + diplomacy than the preceding Administration in the hope of having the + four powers formulate some proposal that the parties might find + reasonable. The President added that there were, of course, limits + beyond which one could not push the parties and the United States + recognized this.

+

The King replied that he had always attempted to be a force for + moderation in the area. He had made great progress in building up his + country for fifteen years and then the terrible tragedy of 1967 + destroyed this progress. Two-thirds of the population of his country + were now refugees. The situation was getting more and more desperate. If + there were no solution within six months, he was afraid the extremists + would gain the upper hand all over the Arab world. He appreciated the + President’s interest in a settlement, but it had to be just and + honorable. The Arabs had learned + that Israel’s right to exist was now unchallenged and they were prepared + to accept this. He also was in a position to say on behalf of Nasser that the Arabs were prepared to + sign any document with Israel except a formal peace treaty. But the + major problem was to get the Arabs somehow to sign. He had tried to be + moderate and reasonable with respect to Israel. But, unfortunately, the + Israelis had not formulated any concrete proposal that was + acceptable.

+

The President replied that the United States wanted a settlement which + both parties could accept so the suffering of all the people in the + Middle East would end. He asked the King whether he could formulate his + ideas on borders.

+

The King replied that the Security Council Resolution of 1967 was a good + starting point. He could speak for Nasser in expressing their sincere commitment to it. On + the various items in the Resolution the King said that the 1967 borders + should be re-established, but he recognized that some rectifications + might be necessary. He said that if the Israelis were less vague about + Gaza, these rectifications could be fairly substantial. The King added + that the problem of Jerusalem was very difficult. It was not his to + negotiate because it had been Arab for 1200 years and he held it in + trust. However, he stated if the Israelis recognized his right in + Jerusalem he was prepared to be very flexible in working out complete + arrangements and to turn Jerusalem into what it was meant to be: A place + of reconciliation for Arabs and Jews instead of a place of conflict. He + recognized Israel’s security concerns and was willing, in principle, to + consider demilitarized zones but there had to be a certain equivalence. + Israel, of course, would have free access through the Suez Canal and the + Gulf of Aqaba. He repeated that Nasser endorsed these proposals.

+

The President asked the King to be a little more specific about Nasser. The King said that he and + Nasser had always been at + opposite poles of the Arab world. However, in recent months their + policies had grown identical. Both were under the same pressures from + the extremists. Also, the oil producing countries subsidizing them were + getting restive. He added that Nasser was eager to re-establish diplomatic relations + with the United States.The United Arab + Republic formally broke diplomatic relations with the United States + on June 6, 1967, citing “US air support for Israel” during the + Arab-Israeli war. See Foreign Relations, 1964–1968, volume XIX, + Arab-Israeli Crisis and War, 1967, Document 178. + The President said this should be done but without conditions by either + side. The King said the conditions would present no difficulties.

+

The President then spoke of his hope for economic development of the area + and his desire to stay in close touch personally with the King.

+ +

At the end of the meeting the President invited the Jordanian Ambassador + and the Secretary General of the Royal Court to join the group. He + reiterated what he had said during the conversation, that he would ask + nothing of Jordan that might undermine the King’s position and also his + desire for the closest friendship between the two countries.Hussein met + with Rogers the next day, + and both expressed pessimism about the prospects for peace in the + Middle East, concluding that the situation had become “dangerous.” + Rogers noted, however, + that the United States believed that the Two- and Four-Power talks + offered some hope for progress. He also assured the King that the + United States did not agree that Israel should keep West Bank + territory, nor did it agree with Israel’s assessment that conditions + in the region were “not explosive.” (Telegram 54258 to Amman, April + 9; National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 928, VIP Visits, + Jordan—Visit of King Hussein, + Vol. II) Later that day, the King’s delegation met with Laird and other U.S. officials, + including Ambassador Symmes, + in the Secretary’s office at the Pentagon to discuss the possibility + of Jordan obtaining additional military equipment from the United + States—that is, arms beyond the package already approved but not yet + delivered to Amman. To the chagrin of the Jordanians, Symmes argued, and Laird agreed, that it was + “preferable” to “sign what [could] be signed” regarding the + previously approved package and “leave open the issue of additional + items for amendment of sales cases as required.” (Memorandum of + conversation, April 10; Washington National Records Center, ISA + Files: FRC 330–72A–6309, Box 21, Jordan)

+ + + Henry A. Kissinger + + +
+ +
+ 20. National Security Study Memorandum 40Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential + Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box + H–146, National Security Study Memoranda. Top Secret; Sensitive; + Nodis. A copy was sent to the + Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. + Washington, April + 11, 1969. + + TO + The Secretary of State + The Secretary of Defense + The Director of Central Intelligence + + + SUBJECT + Israeli Nuclear Weapons Program + +

The President has directed the preparation of a policy study on the + Israeli nuclear weapons program.

+ +

As a background for this study, a thorough intelligence study should be + provided, describing our best estimate of the current state and future + prospects of the Israeli program. The intelligence estimate should be + provided on a selected basis to the named individuals of the Ad Hoc + Committee of the Review Group and of the National Security Council + listed below.

+

The policy should (a) discuss as specifically as possible the + implications of Israel’s nuclear weapons program for U.S. objectives in + the Middle East, in arms limitation and in non-proliferation of nuclear + weapons, and (b) describe the principal policy alternatives for the U.S. + and the full range of possible U.S. actions in the situations we are + most likely to face. For instance, the paper might consider alternatives + (a) in the present situation, (b) in a situation where Israel is known + by us but not by the Arabs to have completed a nuclear device, and (c) + in a situation where Israel is known by us and by the Arabs to be ready + to deploy nuclear weapons. After analyzing alternatives, the paper may + state a viewpoint on a preferred course.

+

The President has directed that this study be prepared by an Ad Hoc Group + chaired by a representative of the Secretary of State and including + representatives of the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of the Joint + Chiefs of Staff, the Director of Central Intelligence and the Assistant + to the President for National Security Affairs.

+

The paper should be submitted by April 25, 1969, to an Ad Hoc Committee + of the NSC Review Group comprised of + Elliot L. Richardson, Under + Secretary of State; David + Packard, Deputy Secretary of Defense; Richard Helms, Director of Central + Intelligence; General Earle G. + Wheeler, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, and chaired by + the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs. The + special committee of the National Security Council will be comprised of + the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, the Director of + Central Intelligence and the Assistant to the President for National + Security Affairs.Because of the “sensitivity + of the subject,” this study was “not handled by the full NSC mechanism.” (Memorandum from + Atherton to Barbour, July 30; ibid., RG 59, Lot Files, Bureau of Near + Eastern and South Asian Affairs, Office of Israel and Arab-Israel + Affairs, 1951–1976, Box 27) See Document + 31.

+ + + Henry A. Kissinger + + +
+ +
+ + 21. Memorandum of ConversationSource: National Archives, Nixon Presidential + Materials, NSC Files, Box 635, + Country Files, Middle East, UAR, + Vol. II. Secret; Nodis. The + meeting took place in the Oval Office. Saunders drafted the memorandum on April + 15. + Washington, April 11, 1969, 3:15 + p.m. + + PARTICIPANTS + The President + + Henry A. Kissinger + + + Joseph Sisco + + Emil Mosbacher + + Harold H. Saunders + + Dr. Mahmoud Fawzi, Foreign + Affairs Assistant to President Nasser + Mohammad Riad, UAR Foreign + Ministry Official + Ashraf Ghorbal, UAR Minister in Washington + +

The President opened the meeting by commenting directly to the effect + that: We have before us the question of resuming relations. He guesses + it comes down to the question of who makes the first move.

+

The President then broadened his comments to the effect that the United + States regrets that it does not have formal relations with a larger + number of the Arab people.The UAR, Syria, Iraq, Algeria, and the + Yemen Arab Republic all severed diplomatic relations with the United + States during the Arab-Israeli war of 1967. He said what + troubles him most is the fact that our nation is cut off from these + people. The time comes when we must forget the recriminations of the + past and build a new relationship. This is also true among the peoples + of the area.

+

Dr. Fawzi responded that as long as there is no “implementation of the + UN Resolution” there “will be + difficulties.” He then went on to explain that the UAR’s principal concern is to provide + better lives for its people. How can the UAR get on with that job while its territory is occupied? + The UAR must spend 300 million pounds + yearly for arms, a serious drain from the resources available for + economic progress. The UAR government + hopes to widen and deepen our relations. This is not just a matter of + “sentiment,” but a matter of mutual interests.

+

The President agreed that vital interests are involved on both sides. He + felt that a new attitude was required on both sides and that nothing + could be gained from simply analyzing again and reiterating the + attitudes of the past. Speaking specifically of the Arab-Israeli + impasse, the President said that the practical problem is how we bridge + the gap between the two sides. We believe that it may be possible to + narrow that gap but that it will only be possible to bridge the gap if + the parties involved want to take serious steps toward each other. We + will do our part in an + affirmative way with full respect for the concerns of both sides. The + President felt that if our effort cannot be made the beginning of a new + relationship, we will have missed an opportunity.

+

Dr. Fawzi said the UAR recalls with deep + gratitude the US role in 1956–57.Reference + is to President Dwight D. + Eisenhower’s call for British, French, and Israeli + forces to withdraw from the Suez Canal Zone after their invasion in + October 1956, as well as the success of his administration in + compelling them to do so. The invasion was in response to the UAR’s nationalization of the Canal on + July 26, 1956. He felt frankly that this time the US is not + sufficiently exerting an influence comparable to its interests. He hoped + that time would show him to be wrong. The UAR is ready to entertain any suggestion for doing anything + it has not done that it might do.

+

The President asked whether Dr. Fawzi thought an Arab government could survive which + made peace with Israel. He recognized that there are practical political + problems in the UAR as in Israel—that + when governments try to solve these problems they face obstacles which + we all recognize.

+

Dr. Fawzi replied that, for the + UAR’s part, “we are taking the chance.” He said the UAR is ready to assume its responsibility + under the UN Security Council + Resolution, knowing full well that other Arab governments are not happy + with the resolution. Still the UAR is + going ahead.

+

Dr. Fawzi said that the UAR would like the US position to be more + clearly defined. Maybe the US does not find this exactly the right time + for revealing its position, and that is understandable. But nevertheless + the UAR would like to know precisely + where the US stands.

+

The UAR’s concept is that Israeli troops + must withdraw to June 4 lines. Although it is beyond the scope of the + resolution to discuss rectifications in the boundaries and this is more + an issue on the Israel-Jordan border, the UAR would not object to changes provided they are genuine + rectifications and not “annexations.”

+

The President said we are in a delicate position too. The US Government + could come out and say that such-and-such is the way to solve this + problem. But we believe this is a way not to get + the problem settled. The Arab Governments might not like our solution. + The Israelis might not like it.

+

The President conceded that the US has not done as much as it might have + until recently but we are going to make a more active effort. He asked + Mr. Sisco to comment on the + question of our being more specific.

+ +

Mr. Sisco said we had tried to be + “rather specific” in our recent papersSee, + for example, the working paper, Document + 17. although we have not formulated a blueprint of our + own. We believe that a peace settlement requires the full assent and + cooperation of both parties. We have tried to indicate a framework + within which the parties might find common ground. Our working paper + contains a “deliberate vagueness” because we are still working toward + that common ground and not trying to dictate it.

+

Dr. Fawzi reiterated that the + UAR hoped we would tell them our + position—not necessarily today but “assure us that your position does + not allow for the ‘acquisition of territory by force.’”

+

The President said that we have supported the UN Resolution which includes that language.

+

Mr. Sisco said that a good part + of the current problem is that the resolution is differently + interpreted. One reason it was unanimously passed was that it allowed + for differing interpretations. The UAR + believes it calls for withdrawal to pre-war boundaries. Israel points + out that it mentions only “secure and recognized boundaries” which it + argues must be negotiated between the parties.

+

The President said he did not believe that there will ever be a precise + statement that would satisfy either side. He did feel, however, that + with a new relationship between the Arab and American peoples and with a + new US administration, the UAR should + attach significance to the fact that we want a solution based on the + principles spelled out in the UN + Resolution.

+

Having all this in mind, the President said that we still have the very + delicate problem of the negotiations and how to bring about a solution + in accordance with those principles. This will require trust between the + parties. “We do not ask you to buy a pig in a poke.”

+

Dr. Fawzi said again that he understood the US might not wish to reveal + its precise position today or tomorrow, but he hoped that it would not + be delayed for long. Even more important, when it is revealed he hoped + it would be fair.

+

The President said quickly he could assure Dr. Fawzi of one thing—that our position + would be fair. The President realized that unless the solution were fair + to the people in the area it would not survive. All sides must accept + it.

+

Dr. Fawzi said that the UAR only wants the US to “use its friendly + and firm persuasion with all of us.” The UAR could not ask us to support a peace that would not be + good for Israel any more than it could ask us to support a peace that + would not be good for the Arabs. Forcing Israel on the Arab world would + not assure peace, but if the US tells the UAR that it will pursue further effort toward a fair + peace, the UAR will take this + seriously.

+

The President said that he would be presumptuous to get into the details + of the settlement himself. But he knew one thing—that no settlement in + history has lasted unless it is based not on sentiment but on the vital + interests of the parties involved and unless it has contained an element + of fairness to both sides. Perhaps sometimes a party outside the + conflict can be more objective than those involved about what is “fair.” + A lasting peace must have that self-enforcing quality that grows only + from the conviction that it was the fairest settlement possible under + the circumstances.

+

The President said that we are not tied to any preconceived notions about + the nature of the settlement. We have differences upon specific aspects + of it within our own house. The position which the President wants the + US to take is not to be on either side. We are, he said, only on the + side of peaceful settlement with justice.

+

Dr. Fawzi said, “That’s fair + enough for us.” The President in the preceding exchange had mentioned + the refugee problem, and Dr. Fawzi said he especially appreciated the President’s + concern for the refugees.

+

The President said he has a strong feeling about their problem. This is + not only a matter of great humanitarian concern, but he realized there + could not be a lasting peace unless an effective move was made to solve + that problem. If it is left unresolved it will be a poison in the + atmosphere that undermines the peace. But he emphasized that even + without that factor, we have a strong humanitarian concern for helping + these people.

+

Dr. Fawzi hoped that we would get + over this hump soon and not waste any more time.

+

The President noted that Dr. Fawzi + had earlier mentioned our efforts in 1956 but had been kind enough not + to mention the Aswan Dam.In response to + Nasser’s overtures to + the Soviet Union to provide arms to Egypt and fund the Aswan High + Dam project, the Eisenhower + administration withdrew its loan offer for the project in mid-July + 1956, provoking Egyptian nationalization of the Suez Canal the + following week.

+

Dr. Fawzi, with a twinkle in his + eye, said, “Well, it’s a nice day.”

+

The President felt that the Dam is a great human achievement and he + personally wished that we had played a part in it.

+

The President went on to say that the important job now is to build a + peace for a later day. There are many problems to be solved. He had told + King Hussein that this is one + area where the American people would, he felt, look with favor on being of assistance. There are lots + of things there to be done.

+

Dr. Fawzi said he had seen Mr. McNamara at the World Bank.Robert S. McNamara, Secretary of Defense, January + 1961-February 1968; President of the World Bank, April 1968-June + 1981. He had not asked Mr. McNamara for anything, but Mr. + McNamara himself had laid out the great potential for progress in the + UAR. Dr. Fawzi said there are “fantastic + possibilities”—oil in the Western Desert is almost as great as that in + Libya and there are possibilities for other development.

+

The President said that he shares Mr. McNamara’s dream for the future. + One of his greatest frustrations about the present situation is that it + does not allow us to get on with that future. If we are to do so, we + shall all have to take major steps. We shall all have to stick our necks + out but it will be worth it.

+

The President then walked Dr. Fawzi out to his car at the foot of the path behind the + Oval Office.

+ + + Harold H. Saunders + Printed from a copy that bears Saunders’s typed + signature. + + +
+ +
+ 22. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Soviet + Union and the Mission to the United NationsSource: National Archives, Nixon Presidential + Materials, NSC Files, Box 648, + Country Files, Middle East Negotiations. Secret; Priority; Nodis. Drafted by Walter B. Smith + (INR/RSE), cleared in EUR and IO, and approved by Sisco. Repeated Priority to Amman, London, Paris, + Tel Aviv, and Cairo. All brackets are in the original except “[sic]”, added for clarity. + Washington, + April 18, 1969, + 1725Z. +

59898. Subject: April 17 Sisco-Dobrynin + Meeting on Middle East.

+

Summary: + Dobrynin changed character April + 17 bilateral discussion of Middle East by dropping point-by-point review + of November 1967 resolution and presenting written replies under + instructions to several earlier US questions. Soviet replies, like + Dobrynin’s verbal + presentation made also under instructions, indicate decision which + Dobrynin said had been made + at highest level in Moscow to try accelerate pace of US-Soviet + deliberations on Middle East.

+

Three principal points emerged: (a) Moscow believes Sisco-Dobrynin talks have drawn US–USSR views QUOTE somewhat nearer UNQUOTE; (b) Moscow prepared to try to work out a + specific joint US-Soviet proposal in form of a QUOTE preliminary + agreement UNQUOTE; and (c) for first time, Soviets have suggested + possibility that agreement should be explicitly QUOTE between the + parties UNQUOTE and that it might be reflected in a single document of a + bilateral nature, rather than separate declarations. Latter shift could + be significant because if carried to its logical conclusion, could mean + a document signed by UAR and Israel and + another signed by Jordan and Israel.

+

Meaningfulness of Soviet shift on nature of peace agreement, however, is + still unclear in view of continued Soviet insistence on final act after + Israeli withdrawal, such as Security Council decision or signing of + multilateral document to put previously signed agreements in final + force. Dobrynin also continued + at this session to discount possibility any direct talks between parties + and insisted demilitarized zones would have to be on both sides of + border and in equal depth. End summary.

+

1. Sisco and Dobrynin held sixth regular session of + bilateral talks on Middle East April 17. Toon, Atherton, Smith, Mikhailov, and + Semyochkin present. Ambassador Dobrynin opened by presenting written responses under + instructions to six questions posed by US side March 24. (Note: US questions were given in writing to + Soviet Embassy after Sisco-Dobrynin + meeting March 24 in amplification of discussions during meeting.) + Dobrynin under instructions + then transmitted five written Soviet questions. Texts US questions, + Soviet replies and Soviet questions being sent septel.Telegram 59897 to Moscow, April 18, included the six + questions: “(a) Soviet note of December 30 refers to a ‘just peace + settlement.’ Does this mean the ‘just and lasting peace’ called for + by Resolution 242? How does Soviet Union define ‘peace’ between + Israel and the Arabs? In other words, what conditions would be + brought about by a just peace settlement? (b) Soviet note of + December 30 refers to ‘agreement’ and ‘agreed plan.’ Does Soviet + Union mean that such ‘agreement’ involves each side assuming + obligations directly to the other so that such obligations are + mutually binding between them? (c) Could USSR clarify procedure it has in mind? For example, + will documents deposited on day withdrawal begins reflect agreement + of the parties and how will that agreement be recorded? Why should a + document not be signed and be binding at beginning rather than end + of process, and implementation start only after signature? (d) What + specifically would be content of the multilateral document and what + is its contractual nature? (e) What is Soviet position regarding + demilitarized zones? What should be their location and size? What is + Soviet concept of demilitarization? (f) Parties are exchanging views + indirectly under Jarring’s + auspices. Does Soviet Union agree that at some appropriate stage it + will be necessary for parties to have direct talks before a final + peace agreement can be achieved? If so, at what stage would this + occur?”(Ibid., Box 725, Country Files, Europe, USSR, Sisco-Dobrynin Talks, Vol. I) Sisco also gave Dobrynin the U.S. working paper (see Document 17) at their March 24 meeting. + (Telegram 46143 to Moscow, March 25; National Archives, Nixon + Presidential Materials, NSC Files, + Box 654, Country Files, Middle East, Sisco Middle East Talks)

+

2. FYI: Soviet + replies which being studied by Dept + appear intended to suggest slight shifts in Soviet position. For + example, replies refer to need to + resolve all questions connected with complete cessation of state of war, + vaguely implying Soviet recognition such matters as blockades and + boycotts cannot be ignored. Replies contain first Soviet written + reference to QUOTE accord between parties, UNQUOTE although term used + (QUOTE dogovorennost UNQUOTE) does not necessarily mean a written + agreement. According to these Soviet replies, documents to be deposited + by parties with UN before withdrawal + under Soviet December 30 plan are to be signed by parties and may be + single document, implying possible signing by parties of same piece of + paper. (In aside to DeptOff after + meeting, Semyochkin volunteered significant comment that there actually + will have to be more than one document QUOTE because there will be + UAR-Israeli document and Jordanian-Israeli document UNQUOTE.) However, + hardening of Soviet explicit views on DMZs and direct talks also + revealed in replies. Replies state that (as did Malik at April 15 four power + meeting)The UN Permanent Representatives of the Four Powers were + meeting in New York. See Document + 23. DMZs must be of equal depth on both sides, and + also, that raising question of direct talks would only complicate + achieving settlement. End FYI.

+

3. After reading Soviet replies and Soviet questions, Dobrynin made following presentation + under instructions. Soviet and US sides agreed at last meeting that US + side would give Soviets in two or three weeks a draft of a preliminary + agreement. Soviets hope this document will take into account provisions + of Soviet plan as well as clarifications made by Soviets in course of + these meetings.See Document 28. In order to make Soviet position more + precise on some major issues of settlement, Soviet side giving today + written answers to six questions presented by US side March 24. Soviet + side would also like to express wish that this draft preliminary + agreement be balanced, that is, taking equally into consideration + interests of both parties to conflict and thus being not of one-sided + nature. In this case it could serve as basis for working out joint + preliminary agreement. It would also be advisable that draft of + preliminary agreement approach in its contents as much as possible the + final documents on a settlement, giving answers to such basic questions + as withdrawal, boundaries, demilitarized zones, and so on.

+

4. Careful study of US working paper of March 24 and analysis of the + exchange of views at past meetings allow Soviet side to conclude that + points of view of USSR and US QUOTE + have drawn somewhat nearer UNQUOTE concerning questions of ways and + means of implementing Security Council Resolution of November 22, 1967. + (Dobrynin stressed this a + governmental view.) At same time, Soviet side notes that some provisions + of US paper do not take equally into account interests of both sides to conflict, but reflect + stand of Israel. At last meeting Soviet and US sides came to + understanding in New York talks that SC + resolution should be carried out by sides to conflict in all its + provisions without any limitations. However, this was not clearly stated + in US working paper. Soviets hope it will be clearly stated in draft of + a preliminary agreement now being prepared by US side.

+

6. [sic] Soviet side wishes stress once more that + wording of Paragraph Five of the US paper, QUOTE a just and lasting + peace will require the withdrawal of Israeli forces to secure and + recognized boundaries, UNQUOTE is at variance with provisions of SC resolution, which called for QUOTE + withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from territories occupied in the + recent conflict, UNQUOTE that is, to the lines held before June 5, 1967. + Soviets consider that the issue of Israeli withdrawal to lines which + they held before June 5, 1967 is a question of principle, in accordance + with provisions of SC resolution on + inadmissibility of acquisition of territory by war. US working paper + mentions Israeli withdrawal, but it does not contain precise definition + concerning obligation to carry out this important element of a Middle + East settlement.

+

7. Sisco thanked Dobrynin for his remarks and Soviet + replies and said we shared Soviet Govt assessment that our views have + QUOTE drawn somewhat nearer. UNQUOTE.

+

8. Sisco said we will take into + account in any further document which we produce Soviet plan, US paper, + and clarifications that Dobrynin + had given in past meetings and at today’s session. We take seriously + Dobrynin statement that + interests and views of both sides must be taken into account. A + practical reality for achieving peace is that both parties have a veto + over situation. US and USSR cannot + help promote agreement unless whatever is put forward meets the minimum + requirements of both sides. We assume that neither side will be entirely + satisfied with substance of any settlement or any US-Soviet paper that + might be developed in future.

+

9. We understand fully and appreciate Soviet Govt’s emphasis on + withdrawal. We also understand need for specificity in this regard. For + same reason we have emphasized need for specificity on permanent peace + and a binding agreement between parties in which obligations are + undertaken directly one to the other. Obviously all provisions of SC resolution must be agreed on and carried + out. In our view, three principal prongs of a settlement are peace, + agreement, and withdrawal.

+

10. Sisco assured Dobrynin that if we are in a position + to suggest a further piece of paper at a later stage, USSR views expressed today and previously + would be taken into account. Sisco welcomed USSR + readiness to see if a joint provisional agreement can be drawn up. + Sisco suggested another + meeting next week at which time we would respond specifically to + questions posed. Sisco stressed + no final decisions have been + taken in the USG on whether further + piece of paper will be developed.

+

11. Dobrynin commented that + responses given at this meeting to Sisco reflected decision at highest level of Soviet + Government. Soviet comments had been carefully worded after governmental + decision had been taken.

+

12. At Dobrynin’s suggestion, it + was agreed to hold next meeting at 10:30 a.m., Tuesday, April 22.Most of the April 22 meeting, which was + reported in telegram 62563 to Moscow, April 23, was spent discussing + replies to Dobrynin’s + questions at the April 17 session. (National Archives, Nixon + Presidential Materials, NSC Files, + Box 725, Country Files, Europe, USSR, Sisco-Dobrynin Talks, Vol. I) In an April 23 memorandum to + Kissinger, Saunders described it as “probably + the least productive of the series,” primarily because Sisco and Dobrynin were waiting for the + United States to provide specific formulations that would help + resolve Arab-Israeli differences as well as for a decision on + whether or not the United States would pursue a joint U.S.-Soviet + paper. Saunders concluded: + “We have exhausted the Sisco-Dobrynin channel unless we can come up with + something more specific to say to the Soviets.” (Foreign + Relations, 1969–1976, volume XII, Soviet Union, January + 1969–October 1970, Tab K to Document 38)

+ + + Rogers + + +
+ +
+ 23. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department + of StateSource: National + Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 649, Country Files, Middle East, Middle + East Negotiations. Secret; Nodis. + New York, April 22, 1969, 2331Z. +

1181. Dept pass White House for the + President and the Secretary. After five meetings of the UN reps of our Four Powers on the Middle + East,The Four-Power meetings were held + in New York April 3, 8, 14, 17, and 21. it seems time to + submit a brief assessment of progress and prospects.

+

My judgment continues to be that all Four, including the Soviets, wish to + promote a package settlement leading to a durable peace in the Middle + East. While significant differences remain, it is not my impression that + any of them are irreconcilable as far as the Four themselves are + concerned. If the decision rested solely with them, they could probably + come to agreement rather rapidly. The problem is to formulate proposals which have a reasonable + prospect of being accepted by the parties. Even in this respect, + significant progress has been registered both in the Four Powers talks + and particularly in the US-Soviet bilaterals in Washington.

+

There seems to be agreement among the Four that (1) their aim is a just + and lasting peace, not another armistice, (2) their recommendations + should be based on the UN Security + Council Resolution of November 1967 and should be submitted to the + parties by Ambassador Jarring + for final negotiation and implementation, (3) all terms of settlement + would have to be agreed upon by the parties and not be imposed by the + Four, (4) all the terms are closely interconnected and would have to be + agreed as a package before any part could be implemented, (5) the terms + would have to be embodied in an internationally binding document or + documents which would commit the parties to each other and to the + international community and which would be comprehensive and + irrevocable, (6) the political independence and territorial + inviolability of all states in the area, including Israel, is recognized + and should be guaranteed in various ways by the international community, + (7) each state in the area is entitled to secure and recognized + boundaries which could be those of June 4, 1967, or could involve + rectification in the interest of mutual security accepted by both sides, + (the USSR has not yet formally agreed + to the rectification for security concept but seems likely to do so), + (8) Israeli forces should, when binding commitments to peace have been + undertaken, withdraw from occupied territories to the lines of June 1967 + or to new agreed lines, (9) freedom of navigation for Israel through the + Suez Canal and the Strait of Tiran should be guaranteed, (10) there + should be a final settlement of the refugee problem involving, in some + form acceptable to the parties, free choice for the refugees between + repatriation or resettlement with compensation, (11) there will probably + have to be demilitarized zones and some form of UN presence along some of the frontiers.

+

Major unresolved points are the following: (1) Rectifications in the June + 1967 boundaries: the British and French have emphasized that these + should be minor, the Soviets very minor. We have simply stressed that + they must be for mutual security and must be agreed, though in fact we + also feel there need be no changes in the Israeli-UAR line and that changes on the + Israel-Jordan line to the benefit of Israel might be compensated by the + transfer of Gaza to Jordan. (2) There has been no real discussion of + Jerusalem which all clearly feel might be the hardest problem to + resolve. (3) Demilitarized zones: the Israelis would probably wish the + whole West Bank and the whole Sinai demilitarized. The Soviets have + countered with the proposal the zones should be of equal extent on both + sides of the boundary. In fact, Jordan would probably agree to + demilitarization of the West Bank but there would have to be some compromise on Sinai. (4) UN presence: this has not been discussed in + depth but we see no major difficulties in agreeing on some such presence + and on its withdrawal being subject to SC approval. This would be particularly necessary at Sharm + el Sheik. (5) The means of limiting repatriation of refugees to Israel + to an acceptable number may present difficulties. (6) The character of + international guarantees has been only briefly touched on, but would + presumably be in the SC framework. (7) + The exact character of the document or documents embodying the agreed + package of binding commitments has not been spelled out, but I + anticipate no insuperable difficulties here.

+

Perhaps the major procedural obstacle to settlement is the Israeli + insistence on face-to-face negotiation. Though the Israelis have no + doubt conceived of this in some measure as a device to force Arab + concessions, it nevertheless has great and real psychological + significance for them. Unfortunately it appears to the Arabs as a means + of dramatizing their humiliation and imposing Israeli terms, and hence + has equal but negative psychological significance for them. It would be + a tragedy for the parties and an unacceptable hazard to world peace if a + settlement were permitted to break down over this essentially symbolic + issue.

+

In my view the US should work toward a final face-to-face negotiation at + the end of the road but until that time should leave Jarring discretion to stage manage as + he sees fit the necessary exchanges between the parties. For us to + insist on face-to-face negotiations now or in the next stage would + almost certainly be unsuccessful and would risk aborting on a + non-essential issue the whole effort at peacemaking in the Middle East + which this administration has so wisely undertaken. The security of + Israel is of great importance to us but this can be assured, if + agreement can be achieved, by the legal and substantive safeguards we + contemplate. Israel should not expect us to risk the serious US national + interests we have at stake in defense of a demand which is not essential + to their security, whatever its psychological significance may be.

+

A related but more substantive issue is how much of the package should be + worked out between the US and the USSR + or among the Four, and how much should be left to Jarring and the parties to settle. + This can be handled to some extent by ear but it would be my judgment, + on the basis of the past 18 months’ experience, that the parties are + unlikely to settle any of the really tough issues without more help than + Jarring can provide, and + that the Two and the Four Powers will have to remain seized of the + problem until it is settled.

+

I do not underestimate the difficulty of persuading the Israelis to + accept even what we would consider a just, durable and internationally + binding peace. I can only urge that we continue to formulate the terms + of such a peace in closest consultation with them and that we endeavor + persistently to convince them + and their friends in the US that such a settlement would offer them far + more security than has their present military posture.

+

I personally do not think that Hussein was exaggerating when he argued that the next + few months may offer the last chance for peace in the Middle East, at + least for a long time to come. The complexion of the Arab world, + particularly the states adjacent to Israel, is changing, the prolonged + occupation is producing not accommodation but rising passion, the youth + are being radicalized, the Palestinians are acquiring a deepened sense + of national identity and purpose. It may not be long, if there is no + settlement, before Hussein and + Nasser lose control of + events, are swept along or replaced, and radicals committed to a + solution far more dangerous to Israel take over. In that case war might + not come soon but it would be infinitely more difficult to avoid + eventually.

+ + + Yost + + +
+ +
+ 24. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security + Affairs (Kissinger) to President + NixonSource: National Archives, Nixon + Presidential Materials, NSC Files, + Box 613, Country Files, Middle East, Jordan, Vol. I. Secret; Nodis. Sent for action. Tabs A–C are + attached but not printed. All brackets are in the original except + those indicating text that remains classified. + Washington, April + 23, 1969. + + SUBJECT + Additional Arms for Hussein + +

You should be aware that Hussein, + before leaving the US, has made a final plea for the military equipment + he mentioned to you at his final meeting.See + footnote 3, Document 19. He + made this pitch to Yost in New + York and asked that it be passed to you so he can have an answer before + he returns to Amman next week (Tab A). Dick + Helms reports that one of his senior officers [less than 1 line not declassified] believes the + King is seriously concerned about getting this equipment in order to + convince his military that he is providing what they need to defend + themselves (Tab B).

+

At the same time, Ambassador Barbour in Tel Aviv points out the probable sharp + Israeli (and hence Congressional) reaction to the sale of artillery to Jordan. What bothers Israel + most today is the shelling of its settlements along the Jordan River + (Tab C).

+

Hussein has asked for three things + in addition to the package he has received: (a) 80 M–42 self-propelled + anti-aircraft guns; (b) 60 more 106 mm. recoilless rifles (55 are + already in the package); (c) 8″ Howitzers (he asked for 40 and got + none).

+

Secretaries Rogers and Laird are taking another look. + However, State’s recommendations to Rogers are:

+

—That Defense provide just 10 more of the AA guns since these have to + come out of our Vietnam inventory. The purpose of providing a token is + to prove that we are not refusing on political grounds.

+

—That Defense not sell additional recoilless rifles (although they could + be provided by taking them out of the Turkish program) because the + additional are for new units of the Jordan Army. The Jordanians had + previously undertaken to develop their forces at present levels to avoid + committing themselves to an excessive defense budget.

+

—That we not provide any more Howitzers because of the extreme Israeli + sensitivity.

+

Secretary Laird’s staff is + recommending about the same, though it is canvassing to develop a more + precise picture of the impact on our Vietnam program. They are used to + hard Jordanian bargaining and honestly feel they have gone a long way to + meet Hussein’s requirements, + especially those for early delivery of many of the items in his + package.

+

Ambassador Symmes feels the + present package is adequate.

+

The choice is a purely political one:

+

1. Stick to present package. Ambassador Symmes and Secretary Laird’s staff believe that we have + made a significant effort to produce this package and there is no + serious requirement to go beyond it. Besides, we reduce our credibility + by admitting that our past answers were not firm.

+

2. Make a token response—the 10 guns State is + recommending. The argument for this approach is to show that we + are not holding out on these items for political reasons, since + Hussein just does not believe + us when we say things are not available. It would make us appear + responsive while recognizing that what we do diplomatically is what will + really determine Hussein’s + course. [This is the State recommendation.]

+

3. A slightly larger token response. It is + possible to argue that 10 guns do not make much sense and that we should + add a few more plus some of the recoilless rifles to make a real show of + trying. [This would be my recommendation.]

+

4. Agree in principle to most of what he asked for but + delay delivery. We could say we will do what we can but caution + that we can make no promises on + delivery. The argument for this approach is that all Hussein really needs is to say we are + supporting him all the way. [Some in CIA favor this, but I doubt the wisdom of making + commitments we are not sure we can keep.]

+

Recommendation: I personally lean toward option 2. + Since this is the direction in which Secretaries Laird and Rogers are already heading. I propose to stand aside + unless you feel strongly otherwise.Nixon approved this + recommendation.

+
+ +
+ 25. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security + Affairs (Kissinger) to President + NixonSource: National Archives, Nixon + Presidential Materials, NSC Files, + Box 634, Country Files, Middle East, UAR, Vol. I. Secret; Exdis. Printed from an uninitialed copy. All brackets + are in the original. + Washington, April + 24, 1969. + + SUBJECT + Summary of Secretary Rogers’s Memo and the Issues It Raises for + Decision + +

As you consider Secretary Rogers’s recommendation that we now put forward specific + proposals on a UAR-Israel settlement,Rogers sent the + memorandum with his recommendation to Nixon on April 23. (Ibid., Box 644, Country Files, + Middle East, Middle East—General, Vol. I) you will want to + think about the possible pitfalls in this course:

+

—One argument underlying this proposal is that we will be charged with + undercutting the four-power talks if we do not advance specific + proposals now. But we may just as likely end up blocking four-power + accord later over specifics as we are to stymie progress now by refusing + to discuss specifics.

+

—Another assumption is that we will improve our position by advancing a + specific proposal. But any fair proposal will be equally unpalatable to + both the Arabs and Israelis, and we are likely to get most of the blame + from both sides. Even if we are able to maneuver the USSR into sharing the blame, we have to + assume that our influence with the Arabs will improve only after a + settlement and not through a settlement.

+ +

—A third assumption is that the best chance of winning Israeli + cooperation and generating movement toward a settlement is advancing a + draft UAR-Israel agreement that would have Israel accept less than its + current minimum position at the outset. But it is more likely that the + Israelis will reject our proposal outright and that we will be left with + a choice between (a) negotiating the terms of a settlement with the + USSR, France and UK knowing Israel will not consider them + and (b) being isolated from the other three because we hold out for + Israel’s maximum terms.

+

I do not advance these necessarily as arguments against proceeding. + However, they do highlight the dangers which you will wish to explore in + the NSC discussion. The following + analysis discusses these points in greater detail.

+

I. Summary of Secretary + Rogers’s Recommendation—The + Options

+

The Secretary’s memo judges that our efforts to help move the Near East + closer to an Arab-Israeli settlement have reached a point where we must + either become more specific about the substantive elements of a + settlement or accept an early impasse.

+

It poses a choice among three courses:

+

A. We can go on avoiding entirely putting forward specific substantive + positions because we do not believe we can persuade Israelis to reveal + their positions except to the Arabs in face-to-face negotiations. [This + would bring the US–USSR and four-power talks to an early impasse with us + taking the blame for failure and being further isolated with Israel. + Almost no one seems to argue following this course, but given the + dangers in putting forward a specific proposal, we ought to think twice + before abandoning this position.]

+

B. We can try to reach big-power agreement on the substance of a + settlement without limiting ourselves to what Israel will accept on the + theory that this would at least improve our position vis-à-vis the + Arabs. [This would cause a major blow-up with the Israelis without + bringing a settlement closer. But it can be argued that, if our chances + of winning Israeli-Arab agreement to specific proposals are slim, this + is the cheapest way of building a more defensible U.S. position to stand + on in the prolonged absence of a settlement.]

+

C. We can put forward specific proposals designed if possible to engage + Israeli and Arab Governments in negotiations but at a minimum to put us + in an improved and more defensible posture even if we fail. [This would + still cause a confrontation with the Israelis, though our position in + its effort to be fair would be equally unpalatable to both sides. If we + took positions that could be defended on their merits, we would stand + some chance of pressing the USSR to + support fair terms of bringing the Israelis along and of at least + stepping out of our role as Israel’s sole champion. But there are the dangers outlined above and + below.]

+

The memo recommends the third of these courses on grounds that we will + never know whether a settlement is possible until we can probe Soviet, + Egyptian and Israeli positions by putting to each a specific and + realistic proposition to accept, reject or bargain over. It appends a + proposal for a UAR-Israel agreement, saying that we may wish to follow + soon with a proposal for a Jordan-Israel agreement.

+

II. The First Issue—Whether + to Put Forward Specific U.S. Proposals

+

The first issue is whether we should put forward a provisional agreement + between the UAR and Israel that has + enough in it to encourage Israeli cooperation. We have until now taken + refuge behind our (Israel’s) demand that the Arabs renounce their + objective of destroying Israel and commit themselves to sign an + agreement directly with Israel before anyone will discuss the specifics + of a settlement. But now that the USSR + is getting increasingly specific and closer to meeting our (and + Israel’s) requirements, it is becoming more difficult to stand credibly + on our very general position.

+

The principal dangers in surfacing our own + proposal are:

+

—We could end up isolated in the four-power talks supporting Israeli + demands (direct negotiations as one evidence of a firm commitment to + live at peace) which no one else considers attainable, or even + reasonable. We could end up breaking up the peace negotiations over + “direct negotiations” and commitment to a vaguely defined “peace” which + everyone else regards as utopian. The Russians may very well be + maneuvering us cynically into just that position.

+

—We could end up, instead of improving our position in the Near East, + being blamed by both sides for undercutting peace efforts. The Israelis + will say we have undercut their negotiating position by doing the Arabs’ + negotiating for them. The Arabs will say the concessions we ask of them + just prove we support Israel’s unjust demands.

+

—The Israelis and their friends will accuse us of playing the Russian’s + game and saving Nasser from the + consequences of his own folly. They will say we have panicked and are + acting to save our worst enemy in the Mid-East who will just turn around + and resume his vigorously anti-U.S. policy.

+

—Although we say we are simply trying to get a UAR-Israel negotiation started, we will end up negotiating + most of the details ourselves. The best we are likely to get for Israel, + if that, is an Arab agreement to sign the final agreement in the + presence of Israeli representatives. That does not meet Israel’s desire + to bargain its territorial conquests into the best deal it can get + because we would end up taking away most of its leverage.

+ +

The major arguments for advancing a specific + proposal are:

+

—Neither the US–USSR nor the four-power + talks will go much farther unless we do. If we let them founder now, we + shall take full blame for the failure.

+

—We may have a better chance of moving the others toward our positions by + talking in terms of specifics than in terms of general principles as we + are now.

+

—We may even be able to maneuver the USSR into sharing some of the blame for unpalatable + proposals by putting them in the position of having to deliver Egyptian + concessions.

+

—We can improve our position provided we demonstrate that we are for a + fair settlement and maneuver ourselves into standing on defensible + positions.

+

—Just because we get specific does not mean we are compromising Israel’s + position or ours. The point is that we will not know Israel’s real + position—or Nasser’s—until we + put a specific proposition to them. And until we strip away their + bargaining positions and their covers for stalling, we risk basing our + own position on bogus—and therefore indefensible—issues.

+

Recommendation: That you approve our putting + forward a specific proposal on the terms of a settlement.

+

III. The Second + Issue—Whether to Consult Israel First

+

The second issue is whether we should try our proposal out on the + Israelis first or whether we should see how much Soviet consent we can + get before we take it to the Israelis.

+

The argument for going to the USSR first is mainly that we stand a better chance + of selling our proposal to Israel if we can say the USSR will deliver Arab consent.

+

The arguments for going to Israel first are:

+

—Our talks with Dobrynin give us + a pretty good feel for the Soviet position now.

+

—If the Israelis thought we were bargaining away their future with the + USSR, an already strained + U.S.-Israeli relationship could reach the point where constructive + discussion would no longer be possible.

+

—We must know before we take any proposal to the Russians what positions + are crucial to Israel and where we can negotiate.

+

—Consulting with Israel need not give Israel a veto.

+

—Consulting may force the Israeli Cabinet to take a precise position for + the first time.

+

—Unless we bring Israel along, we are not advancing the settlement + process.

+ +

Recommendation: That we consult with Israel first + but agree now that we will present our proposal to the Russians + regardless of Israel’s reaction (though we would ask State to give you + an analysis of Israel’s reaction before it proceeds further).

+

IV. The Third Issue—Whether + a Jordan or a UAR Settlement First

+

The third issue is whether—if we decide that the time has come to put + forward a specific proposal—the best chance of success lies in trying + specific proposals first on a UAR-Israel settlement, first on a + Jordan-Israel agreement or on both fronts simultaneously. [The + Secretary’s memo recommends UAR-Israel first but says it will be + appropriate to try something with Jordan and Israel soon.]

+

+ The arguments for the UAR-Israel approach first + are: +

+

—Territorially it is the easier.

+

—It is easier for Hussein to + follow Nasser than to + precede.

+

—Hussein is ready for peace and + the Israelis know it, so the real bottleneck to break is Nasser.

+

—We can involve the Russians in urging Arab concessions on this front. We + do not want to involve them on the Jordanian front. It is overloading + the circuit to try both approaches on Israel at once.

+

+ The arguments for the Jordan-Israel approach first + are: +

+

—Hussein is ready for peace and we + have little clear evidence that Nasser is, so let’s try for a breakthrough where it + seems possible.

+

—:s100/96 The Palestine problem is a Jordan-Israel not a UAR-Israel + problem.

+

—Any breakthrough might bring Nasser along. If it struck at the heart of the refugee + problem, it could change the complexion of the whole Palestine issue, + encourage the oil-rich moderates to back Hussein and press Nasser (whom they are subsidizing) to reach + agreement.

+

—We have influence in both Jordan and Israel but little on Nasser.

+

—We have an interest in Hussein’s + survival but little in Nasser’s.

+

+ The arguments for at least preparing both + simultaneously are: +

+

—Nasser is committed before the + other Arabs to not making peace ahead of Hussein. The two must go hand-in-hand.

+

—Both Nasser and the Russians + will quickly ask us whether the principle of full Israeli withdrawal + applies to the West Bank as well as to the Sinai.

+

—The Israelis might be less reluctant to accept full withdrawal in the + Sinai if they knew we did not intend to hold them to the same principle + on the West Bank.

+

—While it is important to bring Nasser along in order to win broad acceptance in the + Arab world, the support of the moderate Arabs for a settlement depends on what happens to + Jerusalem and the refugees. The moderates are our friends.

+

Recommendation: That you request a specific + proposal for a Jordan-Israel settlement with recommendations on phasing + the two approaches. They will be handled on quite different tracks, and + State will argue for going ahead with the UAR proposal since it is ready. But I believe you should + see where you are going on the Jordan front before we get too far down + the track with the UAR. This need not + lose us much time.

+

V. The Fourth Issue—Whether + the Terms Proposed Are Defensible

+

The final set of issues is whether the terms of a settlement outlined in + Secretary Rogers’ memo will + stand on their merits so that, simply by advancing them, we will put + ourselves in a more defensible position.

+

In general, the main measure of defensibility is + that we not get stuck holding out for a nebulous concept of “peace” or + for direct negotiations, except in exchange for a concrete Israeli + commitment to withdrawal. It is inherent in the situation that the + Israelis will be asked to do something concrete—withdraw their troops—in + return for paper commitments. But in attempting to elicit a + straight-forward Arab commitment to live at peace—with willingness to + talk directly with Israel as a sign of good faith—we must have an + equally straight-forward Israeli position on where its “secure and + recognized borders” will be. If we cannot get that Israeli commitment, + then we may wish to reconsider our holding out for direct talks, which + no one else accepts as necessary.

+

The proposal outlined in the Secretary’s memo would permit us to say: The + UAR will get Israel’s promise to + withdraw from the Sinai provided it agrees to meet under Ambassador + Jarring’s auspices to work + out an accord with Israel that would spell out the detailed forms and + conditions of peace. In other words, the UAR can have its territory back if it will signify its + readiness for peace by meeting with Israeli representatives. That seems + a defensible position provided the Israelis + assure us they will take a reasonable position in those talks by + agreeing to withdraw to what the Arabs will regard as reasonable + boundaries.

+

+ To take each of the specific issues in turn: +

+

A. Is it reasonable in this initial proposal to try to + commit the Israelis in advance of negotiations to full withdrawal + from the Sinai as a quid pro quo for drawing the UAR into direct talks under Jarring? Or should the proposal + contain a vaguer formulation of the commitment to withdraw?

+

The arguments for seeking commitment to full + withdrawal are:

+

—The UAR will not consider anything less + worth making concessions for, and it will regard us as simply playing + Israel’s game if we try to extract concessions for less.

+ +

—We are on solid ground saying that we do not believe Israel needs + territory in the Sinai and that its security there can be protected in + other ways.

+

+ The arguments for a vaguer commitment are: +

+

—The Israelis will probably refuse a firm commitment in advance because + (we believe) they want to bargain their withdrawal directly with the + UAR for a position at Sharm + al-Shaykh and a corridor to it. They may even be holding out for direct + talks because they believe the UAR will + refuse and leave them on the Suez Canal.

+

—The Israelis are most adamant on this point, and it is the issue on + which they are most likely to part company with us.

+

Recommendation: That we hold out for an Israeli + commitment to full withdrawal from the Sinai but that you request State + to come up with a reasonable plan for policing demilitarized zones and + guaranteeing free navigation through the Straits of Tiran and Suez + Canal.

+

B. Is it sensible for us to hold out for a UAR commitment to a direct meeting + with Israeli representatives under Jarring’s auspices? Or by wedding ourselves to + this point are we putting ourselves in the potentially untenable + position of arguing that direct negotiations are a sine qua non of + peace?

+

The arguments for doing this are:

+

—A direct meeting is a small price for retrieving the Sinai.

+

—It is not all that unreasonable to expect adversaries to sit down after + a war and work out peace terms.

+

—The Israelis, whether sensibly or not, seem to have made direct talks a + quid pro quo for revealing their terms for a settlement, though they may + also be using this as a cover for their failure to make governmental + decisions on the terms they will accept.

+

The arguments against are:

+

—Russians, French and probably the British will say that terms could be + worked out through third parties and ask whether it is reasonable to let + the whole peace effort founder over lack of a direct meeting.

+

—The Arabs are adamant in refusing talks. To them, such talks are a sign + of surrender, though there are some indications that they would be less + adamant if Israel were committed in advance to withdraw.

+

Recommendation: That we tell the Israelis we are + prepared to hold out for direct talks if they assure us by committing + themselves to withdraw that they will make the Egyptians a reasonable + offer in such a meeting.

+

C. Should we start out asking for the demilitarization + of the entire Sinai? Or should we start bargaining with the + Israelis for a smaller area such as the Russians propose?

+ +

The arguments for trying for full demilitarization + are:

+

—We should leave ourselves some bargaining room with the Russians.

+

—If we are going to ask the Israelis to pull all the way back to the + pre-war border, we must offer them maximum demilitarization in + return.

+

The argument against is that the Russians (and Egyptians) seem to be + firmly resisting large demilitarized zones, and we should begin + bargaining, with Israel at least, from a smaller base.

+

Recommendation: That we go to the Israelis with a + proposal for demilitarization of the entire Sinai but that we make clear + we regard this position as negotiable, if adequate alternative security + arrangements are proposed.

+

Conclusions: After working through this analysis, + I conclude that we should state explicitly for our own internal guidance + the following minimum objectives in this exercise:

+

A. To conduct our discussions with the Israelis so as to determine what + are genuine Israeli requirements—as contrasted to bargaining positions + and positions taken to cover unwillingness to take precise positions—so + that we may be certain we are taking our stand on meaningful issues.

+

B. To conduct our negotiations with the USSR so as to engage them in extracting concessions from + the UAR and to put them in a position + of sharing the blame for the unpalatable elements in any proposed + settlement.

+

C. To seek to develop a position in the four-power talks that will be + defensible enough that the governments who reject it and not we will be + blamed for any impasse that develops.

+
+ +
+ + 26. Minutes of a National Security Council MeetingSource: National Archives, Nixon + Presidential Materials, NSC Files, + NSC Institutional Files + (H-Files), Box H–109, NSC Meeting + Minutes, NSC Minutes Originals + 1969. Top Secret; Nodis. + According to the President’s Daily Diary, the meeting was held in + the Cabinet Room from 10:05 to 11:25 a.m. (Ibid., White House + Central Files) + Washington, April 25, 1969, + 10–11:15 a.m. + + PARTICIPANTS + The President + The Vice President + The Secretary of State, William P. + Rogers + The Secretary of Defense, Melvin R. + Laird + Chief of Staff, Army, General Westmoreland + Director, Office of Emergency Preparedness, General George A. Lincoln + US Ambassador to the UN, Charles Yost + The Director of Central Intelligence, Richard . Helms + Under Secretary of State, Elliot L. + Richardson + Assistant Secretary of State, Joseph + J. Sisco + Dr. Henry A. + Kissinger + Colonel Alexander + Haig + + Harold H. Saunders + + + Alfred L. Atherton + + +

President: Do we take a position.

+

Do we peddle it with Israel first?Reference is to the peace plan that Sisco presented to Dobrynin in piecemeal fashion + during the second week of May. See Document + 28. Israel sort of like South Vietnam. Difficult + make peace with Israel. Impossible to make peace without.

+

Do we go to UAR or Jordan first?

+

Rogers: I promised Eban we’d go to Israel first.Not further identified; presumably during + Rogers’s meetings with + Eban March 12 or 13. See + Document 13 and footnote 8 thereto.

+

President: I understand. It’s a lot better to try to bring the Israelis + along with us.

+

Rogers: Meetings with Jewish + leaders show they more rigid than Eban.

+

President: Eban reasonable but has + to represent his hawks.

+

Rogers: We’re discussing problem + in several ways:

+

—Four power talks. Yost will + talk.

+

—Soviet talks. Sisco will + report.

+

—Problem is how to mesh these.

+

President: What concerned me is Soviet requirement for equal-sized + DMZ’s.See Document + 23. Of course that could be bargaining + position.

+ +

Sisco: Soviets + are talking about peace and not patchwork, though we recognize + “peace” means different things. Soviets agree that whatever framework we + evolve will be presented to Jarring so won’t be “imposed.” Soviets agree all terms + must be agreed in advance. This different from French and step forward + in Soviet position.

+

Agree on some kind of international document. Soviets, if Eban objects to Soviet guarantee, say + they have no interest in being guarantor.

+

Dobrynin says he just deferring + to US. Soviets have no problem on free navigation.

+

President: Israeli position quite interesting. Back through the years, + Israeli attitude toward USSR ambivalent. + Eshkol and others tried to see USSR in + best possible light. Is there still division on this point?

+

Sisco: I have feeling still some + division but official position is much more categorical.

+

President: “Is this bargaining or belief?”

+

Sisco: Some bargaining.

+

Helms: Israelis want to in-gather + exiles so that is the one soft-spot in Israel’s position. Otherwise, + they take anti-Communist line for US benefit and see mainly the threat + of Soviet help for the Arabs.

+

Kissinger: Not so much + anti-Soviet as against Soviet support of Arabs. I don’t take Israeli + anti-Communism too seriously.

+

Sisco: Soviets push Israeli withdrawal to June 4 lines. We have stuck + to our general position. Dobrynin has been trying to divide us from Israelis. + Soviets do allow for minor border rectifications. Soviets want DMZ’s of + equal width. Soviets will object to Israeli requirement for positions at + Sharm al-Shaikh.

+

President: Asked for positions on map.

+

Lincoln: Would Israelis insist + on position at Sharm al-Shaikh if Sinai were demilitarized?

+

Rogers: Israel doesn’t trust + UN forces.

+

Sisco: UAR doesn’t like demilitarize whole Sinai. But maybe Aqaba + Gulf side of it. Refugees: repatriation and + compensation.

+

President: 50,000 go back?

+

Sisco: At most 100,000.

+

Rogers: Fawzi claims that if + refugees had choice only few would want to go back.

+

President: Hussein says same.

+

Why not combine the principle with that fact? People wouldn’t want to go + back to an unfriendly land.

+

Sisco: Arab governments could + push decision of refugees either way.

+ +

Yost: If offered opportunity for + resettlement.

+

President: US effort here if part of peace package, we should go very + far—not limited by budget. Poisonous element. We have to go further than + we have.

+

Yost: Agree. Main source of Arab + resentment for twenty years.

+

Sisco: We have told USSR there will have to be face-to-face negotiations at some point:

+

—Israelis feel it sine qua non of recognition.

+

—Practically necessary to hammer out details.

+

Russians say Arabs won’t buy it.

+

Generally, USSR wants limited + accommodation but whether they will pay price we don’t know.

+

President: Hussein wants peace. Does Nasser?

+

Sisco: Probably not or yes on his + own terms.

+

Yost: Yes, because of his + precarious position. We don’t know whether he will pay price.

+

President: Why does USSR want settlement?

+

Sisco: Limited settlement they + want would leave Soviets a free hand to support Arabs, but give them a + string to maintain control. Settlement does not preclude their pursuing + political objective. They want good relations with us.

+

Rogers: Strong feeling they are + very worried. Their prestige on the line. Hussein says Arabs will be clobbered, if war breaks out + again. They would lose all over Arab world.

+

Helms: Agree with both Rogers and Sisco.

+

President: Are Soviets using this for negotiating purposes?

+

Helms: Soviets have not done well + on communications of Mid-East. They could work better in less confused + situation. Even they do not profit from a situation “where fellows are + throwing bombs around.”

+

President: June war a help to USSR—influence in Mediterranean. There is their desire to cool + things with us—e.g., Korean crisis.Reference + is to Soviet actions in the aftermath of the North Korean attack on + a U.S. Navy EC–121 aircraft on April 14. Following the incident, the + Soviets dispatched vessels to the Sea of Japan to search for + possible survivors of the U.S. aircraft. See Foreign + Relations, 1969–1976, volume XII, Soviet Union, January + 1969–October 1970, Document 39. If there is a + chance of a break through, we should go ahead. But it all boils down to + who goes first, who sticks neck out.

+

Yost: Big areas of Arab soil + occupied but “big brother can’t do anything.” If Arabs start something, + Soviets will be called on to make good on their promises.

+ +

:s100/96 President: Could they be concerned about Israeli nuclear + capability?

+

No disagreement.

+

Kissinger: There will be enough + tensions between Arabs and Israelis after a settlement for USSR to exploit. They are asking us to + restore their client’s (Nasser’s) losses so he can go on with his pro-Soviet + policy.

+

Plan we are offering asks intangibles of the Arabs.

+

Our question is, whether it might not be in our interest as well as + theirs to have a settlement. One interest is not having them drawn into + a fight on Arab side.

+

Settlement which is painful to both sides and Soviets + sell to UAR would be in our + interest. From point of view of our overall relationship, we + want a settlement that is unpalatable to UAR and Soviets have paid the price of selling it. We don’t + want Soviet client to come out ahead of Hussein.

+

Richardson: This most concrete + subject we dealing with USSR on. It is + the best way of testing their intent.

+

President: USSR may need this more than we do. + While their position hard, our bargaining position may be better than we + think. They may be willing to go further than we think.

+

Rogers: Maybe we psychoanalyze + Soviets too much. They don’t have a clear policy. Let’s assume they + negotiating in the same spirit we are. They’re assuming, as we are, that + the other fellow is trying to get the most he can. Thing we have to do + is to get down to specifics.

+

On direct negotiations, Israel wants; US Jewish + community wants; Arabs don’t. Not necessary. In a divorce case, a lawyer + would get nowhere if he forced both parties to sit down and work things + out at the beginning. But if he works out a settlement that both sides + can discuss concretely, he can negotiate a solution.

+

Eventually necessary, but though the odds are probably against us, maybe + we can work something out.

+

Yost: Set of pressures on us—deterioration in area and what is likely to + happen to Hussein. If no + settlement, fedayeen get stronger, e.g., what happening in Lebanon + now.Clashes between the Lebanese army + and fedayeen and pro-fedayeen refugees and students beginning on + April 23 led to the resignation of Lebanon’s Prime Minister Rashid + Karame on April 25 and created a political crisis. (Intelligence + Note 309, April 24; National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 23–8 LEB and telegram + 3451 from Beirut, April 25; ibid., Nixon Presidential Materials, + NSC Files, Box 5, Presidential + Daily Briefings) President Charles + Helou, who imposed a state of emergency in Lebanon + until midnight on April 27, hoped to reconstitute a civilian + government under Karame, but Karame had said that he would not + participate in such a government unless it defined a policy toward + the fedayeen. (Telegram 3451 from Beirut, April 25, and telegram + 3512 from Beirut, April 28; ibid.) A proponent of taking a tough + stand against fedayeen operations from Lebanese territory, Helou failed to advance a policy + that garnered popular support and was unable to form a regular + cabinet. Instead, he established a caretaker government with Karame + as Premier-designate, who resigned six months later when the next + fedayeen-related crisis occurred. See footnote + 2, Document 60. Israelis making false analysis of + their security interests.

+ +

President: An overall settlement may take years. Is it + possible to “slice off any part of it?” I know Arabs and + Israelis both demand whole package. I feel some progress would help.

+

Sisco: (1) Agreement between + Arabs and Israelis on package idea. (2) The guts of this proposal are: + Israeli commitment to full withdrawal. Alternative: Israel withdraw to + “secure and recognized boundaries.” The dilemma is that if the + commitment is general, Arabs won’t buy. Why do we include everything in + this document? Finely balanced to leave Israelis leeway to negotiate. To + my mind, direct negotiations are important to + Israel.

+

Laird: It seems to me it is important to generalize that point. Israel is the + strong military power. USSR wants us + to deliver Israel and not deliver Arabs. Delivering Israel + difficult.

+

Rogers: We conscious of + delivering Israel. But our idea is to discuss paper + first with Israel.

+

President: Use specific, hard paragraph with Israel?

+

Rogers: Yes.

+

Sisco: We have not decided to go + ahead with Soviets before talking with Israel.

+

President: Where do we do this?

+

Sisco: In Israel, Barbour-Eban.

+

Rusk outlined eight-point position + with Riad.See footnote + 3, Document 1. We have never reaffirmed that + position. We have kept that option open.

+

President: If you take it to Eban—not Rabin—

+

Rogers: What I’d like to find out + whether UAR or + Jordan paper first?

+

President: Barbour must not leave Israelis under impression + they can do anything they want. While we’re for Israel, what + they hear from their friends in the US is not true. American people + oppose intervention. Barbour must + not give Eban a veto—he must give + Eban some sense of our + determination to go ahead and do what we can for a settlement. Israel + cannot count on us to be with it no matter what it does.

+

Richardson: A paper might emerge + which four powers think is pretty reasonable but both sides object + to.

+

President: Many believe we should have laid back and + let parties get together—simply because problem too difficult + to survive. But maybe this

+ +

is one area for concrete US–USSR agreement. I think we must assume the + leadership here—subtly. Any settlement will have to be imposed—without + calling it that. Overhanging this is US–USSR relations.

+

Yost: Absolutely right. Damaging + events in area. Will improve our position in whole Arab world.

+

President: Is there anything we can do for + Israel?

+

Yost: This paper gives Israel + much of what it wants.

+

President: On refugees, American commitment—“whatever it costs.”

+

On Israeli side?

+

Sisco: A number of small arms + requests.

+

Vice President: How about desalinization?

+

President: Too far away.

+

On both sides, just putting something on the plate. Refugees may be a + phony issue. But we must feel we think it’s worth a great deal to us to + bring parties along.

+

Yost: Israelis may not be able to + hold their own in fedayeen situation.

+

Lincoln: Wouldn’t controlling + fedayeen be one.

+

Laird: Soviets will take over + fedayeen and use them against pro-US Arab countries.

+

Sisco: Present conditions working + to advantage of USSR. Moderate governments will be toppling.

+

Rogers: We have to assume our + interest is to have a settlement.

+

Westmoreland: We have some leverage with Israelis. F–4s begin delivery in + September. A–4s, 40 of 100 delivered. Tank engines. Have asked for more + A–4s and now A–6s.

+

President: If a settlement, our interest to see that Israel continues to + maintain its edge.

+

Sisco: Jordanian side first? My own feeling is to proceed with what + we have here. Recommend against doing both at once with Israel. Address + after UAR—leave Israel-Jordan to secret + contacts.

+

President: Jordan before UAR?

+

Sisco: Go ahead with UAR. Then over 3–4 weeks talk about + Jordan.

+

Rogers: UAR plan is place to start.

+

Richardson: Jordan asking for + more weapons.

+

Rogers: Leave aside.

+

Yost: Follow with Jordan paper + soon. Interrelated.

+

President: OK.

+

Helms: US position eroded since + June war. Soviets want tension beneath surface. But unless they make + USSR run with us, we will give + USSR a second victory.

+ +

Rogers: We conscious of that.

+

President: June war netted out as great help to USSR.

+

Rogers: Greatest USSR victory would be radical takeover in + Jordan, UAR even Lebanon.

+

President: Got to go forward to build our strength back with + moderates.

+

Yost: As long as Israel in + occupation.

+
+ +
+ 27. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security + Affairs (Kissinger) to President + NixonSource: National Archives, Nixon + Presidential Materials, NSC Files, + Box 1170, Saunders Files, Middle East Negotiations Files, Middle + East Settlement—US–USSR Talks. Secret; Nodis. A stamped notation on + the memorandum indicates the President saw it. + Washington, May 3, + 1969. + + SUBJECT + Next Step in Our Mid-East Peace Effort—Revised Version + +

State has reflected on the April 25 NSC + discussion,See Document 26. heard your subsequent views and + consulted with Ambassador Barbour + in Tel Aviv. The result is the attached revisionAttached but not printed is a May 1 memorandum from + Rogers to Nixon. in the course they + proposed at the NSC.

+

The principal changes are:

+

1. We would not surface a complete American document on the terms of a + UAR-Israel settlement now. That would make too big a target for the + Israelis to shoot at. Instead, we would deal with the elements of the + package piece-meal.

+

2. We would not, therefore, have one big consultation with Israel before + giving our ideas to Dobrynin. + Instead, Sisco would try pieces + of our proposal out on Dobrynin + first, and then—hopefully after negotiating the best possible Soviet + response—he would bring Rabin + up to date. This would give us a chance of avoiding one sharp Israeli + reaction, while still keeping our promise to consult with them.

+ +

3. We would not initially commit ourselves to Israel’s full withdrawal + from the Sinai. Instead, we would start with a vaguer formulation on the + final border and see what price the USSR is willing to pay for a more precise commitment.

+

This seems to me to come much closer than the original proposalSee Document + 25. to meeting our objectives. It leaves the burden on + the USSR and UAR to make the first concession and defers a confrontation + with the Israelis until, if ever, we have serious Soviet-Arab + concessions from them to consider.

+

Recommendation

+

That you authorize me to tell Secretary Rogers you are willing to have him proceed on this + basis.Nixon approved this recommendation. Underneath + Nixon’s approval, + Jeanne Davis wrote: + “State (S/S—Walsh) notified 5/8, 10:30 am. JWD.”

+
+ +
+ 28. Editorial Note +

Assistant Secretary of State Joseph + Sisco met with Soviet Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin on May 6, 8, and 12, 1969, to + present—in a “piecemeal fashion”—elements of a “joint preliminary + document” that the United States and the Soviet Union could offer to the + United Arab Republic and Israel to use as the basis for a new round of + negotiations under Gunnar + Jarring. At the May 6 meeting, Sisco unveiled points 1, 2, 3, 6, and + 7 of the proposed document, which covered peace and the end of + belligerency, the obligations that both sides needed to undertake to + resolve future disputes peacefully, and the responsibility of the Arab + states to control Palestinian guerrillas. While Sisco invited comments and + contributions, both written and oral, Dobrynin said that he would wait for Moscow’s reaction + before he delivered the official Soviet response. He added that the + Soviet leadership would not offer much of substance until Sisco revealed the remainder of the + U.S. proposal. (Telegram 71012 to Moscow and USUN, May 7; National Archives, Nixon Presidential + Materials, NSC Files, Box 653, Country + Files, Middle East, Sisco Middle + East Talks) At their May 8 session, Sisco discussed points 8, 9, 11, 12, and 13, which dealt + with refugees, the parties’ acknowledgement of each other’s sovereignty, + the guarantees of each other’s territorial integrity, reciprocal + assurances on freedom of navigation, and implementation of the final accord. The Assistant Secretary + also stressed “several times” that the success or failure of their + efforts would “depend in large measure” on the Soviet Union’s + willingness to obtain concessions from the United Arab Republic. + (Telegram 72809 to Moscow and USUN, + May 8; ibid.) Sisco finished + unveiling the draft proposal on May 12, presenting points 4, 5, 10, and + the preamble, which covered some of the thorniest issues, including + boundaries, the status of Gaza, withdrawal, demilitarization, and the + inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war. (Telegram 75822 + to Moscow and USUN, May 13; ibid.)

+

Sisco and Dobrynin had two follow-up meetings on + May 19 and 21 to clarify what had been discussed previously. On May 19, + Dobrynin called on Sisco to ask how the United States + planned to handle the Jordanian aspect of an overall settlement, given + that their talks had focused only on the United Arab Republic. The + Assistant Secretary responded that the United States believed that + progress on the UAR side could have a + positive influence on the Jordanian side, understanding that + implementation of an agreement between Israel and the United Arab + Republic depended on an Israel’s reaching an agreement with Jordan. + Dobrynin also asked about + the Nixon administration’s + departure from positions taken by previous Secretary of State Dean Rusk in his meetings with Soviet + Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko. + Sisco replied that he would + have to review the record of the Rusk-Gromyko + conversation. (Telegram 79805 to Moscow, May 20; ibid.) Two days later, + Dobrynin raised the issue of + the Rusk-Gromyko dialogue again and said that + the current U.S. proposal “fell short” of what had been discussed in + 1968, including: 1) that Israel should withdraw to the internationally + recognized boundary between it and the United Arab Republic; 2) that + both sides of the border should be demilitarized—which meant that the + demilitarization of the Negev was a possibility, rather than the whole + of the Sinai alone; 3) that Sharm el-Sheikh would contain a UN presence, not an Israeli one; and 4) + that the signing procedure would involve Jarring taking the final agreement to one party and then + the other for signature. Sisco + remarked that after having quickly reviewed the record of Rusk-Gromyko conversation, he “found no deviation in + principle between ‘proposals’ currently discussed and ‘views,’ which may + have been discussed generally in various conversations.” He then + explained, point-by-point, why this was the case. They both agreed that + neither the United States nor the Soviet Union should be “caught in a + box” or “inhibited” by their “respective clients.” While Sisco pressed Dobrynin to elicit a response from + Moscow as soon as possible, Dobrynin said that “consultations would take time.” + (Telegram 80620 to Moscow; ibid.) The record of Gromyko’s meeting with Rusk on October 6, 1968, in New York is + printed in Foreign + Relations, + 1964–1968, volume XX, + Arab-Israeli Dispute, 1967–1968, Document 274.

+

A copy of the U.S. draft proposal is attached as Tab B to a memorandum + from Saunders to Kissinger, December 31. (National + Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, Box 710, Country Files, Europe, + USSR, Vol. VI) The final version + of the proposal, which Sisco + presented to Dobrynin in + Washington on October 28—and which became known as the Rogers Plan—is printed as Document 58.

+
+ +
+ 29. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in + IsraelSource: National + Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 653, Country Files, Middle East, + Sisco Middle East Talks. + Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Drafted by Sisco, cleared by De + Palma and Walsh, and approved by Rogers (per Walsh). + Washington, + May 10, 1969, 0018Z. +

73819. Ref: Tel Aviv 1735.In telegram 1735 + from Tel Aviv, May 9, the Embassy reported that Rabin had been instructed by his + government to request that the Sisco-Dobrynin talks be interrupted to permit Israel time + to prepare and send a letter to Nixon explaining its “negative views.” (Ibid., Box + 649, Country Files, Middle East, Middle East Negotiations) + For Ambassador from the Secretary.

+

1. Ambassador Rabin delivered to + Sisco morning May 9 message + from Eban referred to para 1 + reftel (text by septel).In + his message, Eban described + Sisco’s initial + formulations for a joint U.S.-Soviet document on the Arab-Israeli + dispute as a “retreat by the United States from the principle of a + binding reciprocal contractual agreement establishing peace.” He + also protested that the formulations would “prejudice Israel’s vital + interests” and argued that the United States should not formally + present them to the Soviet Union. (Telegram 73744 to Tel Aviv, May + 9; ibid., Box 653, Country Files, Middle East, Sisco Middle East Talks) Eban’s message was prompted by + Sisco’s May 7 briefing + of Yitzhak Rabin on his + meetings with Dobrynin. + (Telegram 71862 to Tel Aviv, May 8; ibid.) We believe interim + oral message to Eban might be + helpful to him and to other moderates before normal Sunday Cabinet + meeting at which time we assume possible communication from Prime + Minister to President will be considered. Purpose of this message is to + make clear our intention to continue our discussions in two and four + power context while at same time providing assurances we not intending + to give away any vital Israeli interests. In short, we believe Israelis + ought to hold their fire to give us an opportunity to do what we are + trying to do: to probe directly Soviet intentions as to whether they want peace in the area + and of equal importance whether they are willing to press Nasser to this end. As a major power, + and in light of conditions in the area which continue to deteriorate, we + have a responsibility in our own national interest to do everything in + our power to try to achieve peace in the Middle East. We feel strongly + that we would be abdicating our responsibility if we did not persevere + in our present efforts. It is self evident another renewal of + hostilities in the area carries risk of possible US–USSR confrontation. We are not saying + renewed general hostilities are imminent, but we believe early movement + toward peace is imperative if situation in area is not to develop in + direction which will make eventual hostilities unavoidable.

+

2. Following is the oral message from me to Eban:

+

QTE Ambassador Rabin has + delivered your message, and I have read Ambassador Barbour’s report requesting that + US–USSR talks be interrupted to + permit GOI time to prepare and send + letter to President explaining its views.

+

QTE We feel that your comments on specific language we have been + discussing with Dobrynin + reflects misunderstanding of the effort we are making. We do not accept + the view that our formulations indicate a retreat by the United States + from the principle of binding reciprocal contractual agreement + establishing peace and that they simply reflect the juridical doctrine + of the 1949 Armistice Agreements. Our formulations on a permanent peace, + based on a binding agreement between the parties, would require the + UAR to undertake positive + obligations which go far beyond the Armistice Agreements in the very + fundamental sense that they relate in specific terms to a state of + peace, not a state of armistice.

+

QTE We have made no conclusive judgment as to whether Soviets are + prepared to apply the necessary influence on Nasser which would meet both the + Israeli and the US requirements for a permanent peace. We are not asking + Israel at this juncture to agree to any of the formulations which we are + discussing with the Soviet Union. We have never expected and do not now + expect Israel to withdraw its forces except in the context of a binding + reciprocal contractual agreement establishing peace.

+

QTE. We are trying to find common ground on a framework which will afford + Ambassador Jarring an + opportunity to renew discussions with the principal parties concerned. + We are not trying to write a detailed blueprint because a number of + critical elements of a permanent peace can only be agreed to and worked + out by the parties themselves. In this connection, in our next meeting + with the Soviets on Monday, May + 12th,See Document + 28. we intend to submit a proposal making clear the + view which I expressed to the Foreign Minister during his Washington + trip that in our judgment no final peace is possible unless the UAR commits itself to enter into direct + negotiations at some stage with Israel.

+

QTE. We are probing the Soviets to see whether they are prepared to + support an unequivocal commitment to a reciprocally binding peace + through agreement between Israel and the UAR and are able to deliver the UAR on such a commitment. If they are not, it is important + both to your interests and to our own for us to know this.

+

QTE. One final point: Israel and the US enjoy a special relationship. We + cherish and attach great importance to this special relationship. We + appreciate fully that the vital interests of Israel are involved. The + reason we have made every effort to keep in step with Israel, to consult + you all the way along, and to invite your specific comments on a + day-by-day basis, is that we would like to move together towards a + permanent peace in the area. We believe that the record of the last + twenty years fully justifies greater faith in the constancy of our + support for Israel’s vital interests than present GOI criticism of our policy indicates. END + QUOTE.Barbour passed Rogers’s message to Eban during a meeting with him on May 10. (Telegram + 1745 from Tel Aviv, May 10; National Archives, Nixon Presidential + Materials, NSC Files, Box 604, + Country Files, Middle East, Israel, Vol. I)

+

3. Ambassador may use his own discretion in fortifying the above with + such arguments as he deems appropriate. He might also reiterate to + Eban with reference to para. + 1 of Eban’s message sent septel + that there is no USG “paper.” Our hope + is that the above interim reply will either deflect GOI from sending any high-level letter or + at a minimum help moderate its contents.

+ + + Rogers + + +
+ +
+ + 30. Telegram From the Embassy in Jordan to the Department of + StateSource: National + Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 619, Country Files, Middle East, Jordan + Nodis/Sandstorm. Secret; Nodis. + Amman, May + 28, 1969, 1059Z. +

2474. Department pass USUN, USINT + Cairo, Tel Aviv. Ref: Am-man 2464.Not + found. Subj: Direct Israeli-Jordanian Peace Negotiations.

+

Summary: + Zaid Rifai, on May 27, told us + that King Hussein would be + willing to send a Jordanian emissary to conduct direct negotiations with + the Israelis independently of UAR, provided that Israel assured Jordan + it was willing in principle to withdraw from most Jordanian territories, + including Arab Jerusalem. Rifai + claimed that Nasser would, if + necessary, give public blessing to Jordanian initiative. Rifai also indicated he probably would + be Jordanian negotiator. Rifai + said King still believed that Israeli leaders at bottom wanted a real + peace, their harsh public statements notwithstanding, and would be + willing to make the few concessions necessary for settlement with + Jordan. If not, US should compel them. Rifai said Jordanians did not expect Israeli invasion of + Irbid Heights. End summary.

+

1. During May 27 conversation with Embassy officer reported reftel, + Zaid Rifai, the King’s + private secretary and confidant, declared that King Hussein would be willing to send an + emissary to conduct direct, face-to-face negotiations with the Israelis + independently of UAR. Rifai then + went on to develop the theme that Nasser was completely dependent on Hussein to resolve the Palestinian and + Jerusalem elements of a general settlement. In fact, he said, Nasser was more sticky as regards + Jerusalem than was Hussein + himself, adding that Muslims generally, whether in Turkey or Indonesia, + held a stricter position as regards Jerusalem than did the Jordanians. + Nasser could do almost + anything except risk being accused of selling the Arab birthright in + Jerusalem or giving up on the refugees. Although Nasser was critically dependent on + Hussein, the reverse was not + true.

+

2. When EmbOff questioned whether + Nasser could be trusted not + to undercut Hussein, Zaid Rifai claimed that Jordanians + could secure a public blessing from Nasser in addition to the private go-ahead he had long + ago given. Rifai said that + concern about Nasser’s attitude + had never been critically important to Hussein, even in late June of 1967 when he had wanted to + enter negotiations. The real problem then, as now, was the absence of + satisfactory Israeli assurances that withdrawal from quote most unquote Jordanian territories, + including Arab Jerusalem, was acceptable in principle. Only with such + assurances or, alternatively, a USG + commitment that it would compel the Israelis to negotiate a settlement + within such a framework, could Hussein step forward (reftel). When EmbOff commented that Israel might not + be attracted to negotiations in which a major party, the UAR, was + absent, Rifai said that Israel + should be willing to take some chances for sake of peace.

+

3. He then added that Jordanians had been discouraged by the recent hard + Israeli line pursued by PriMin Meir. She was worse than Eshkol. Nevertheless, he said + Hussein sensed that at bottom + most Israelis wanted a real peace, faced with the prospect of unending + war with the Arabs—a prospect becoming more likely every day—the + Israelis would make quote the few concessions unquote that Hussein needed. It was this assumption + that continued to sustain the King’s hopes.

+

4. Warming to this theme, Rifai + said he personally was confident that the underlying common sense would + deter the Israelis from a military move against Jordan that would + foreclose for all time the prospects of a settlement. He said most top + Jordanians, with few exceptions, did not rpt not expect the often + predicted Israeli invasion of the Irbid Heights this summer. Although + they were prepared for it. If the unlikely occurred, however, Rifai said the Jordanians would put up + a much stiffer fight than the Israelis expected. It was possible, + Rifai admitted, that the + Israelis could badly hurt Jordan by means short of invasion, but, again, + he felt Israelis would not want to destroy for all time chances of a + settlement. He said he could promise that Jordan would hit back + effectively, destroying Eilat and the Israeli factories below the Dead + Sea, and shelling Beisan and Tiberias. He said he was now rpt now able + to take more initiatives and quote Israelis now know we are here + unquote.

+

5. Comment: Foregoing comments were generated + after Zaid Rifai had relayed + King’s views that Israeli-Jordanian aspects of settlement were much more + important than UAR-Israeli angles, and US–USSR discussions should not + ignore this fact. While Rifai has + taken similar line about direct GOJ–GOI negotiations in + past, on this occasion he strongly implied that active consideration + currently was being given to idea, and reinforced this impression by + frequently referring to himself as the probable Jordanian negotiator. In + our opinion, Rifai is reflecting + the King’s very considerable faith that the big power discussions are + going to produce a break-through. Interestingly, the same day, the + British DCM asked us whether we thought + the King’s optimism about the + big power talks had reached the point where he might consider risking a + confrontation with the fedayeen.

+ + + Symmes + + +
+ +
+ 31. Memorandum From the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Group on the Israeli + Nuclear Weapons Program (Davies) + to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) and Acting Secretary of + State RichardsonSource: Washington National Records + Center, OSD Files: FRC 330–75–0103, + Box 12, Israel. Top Secret; Nodis. Drafted on May 29 in the State and Defense + Departments. + Washington, undated. + + SUBJECT + Israeli Nuclear Weapons Program—Issues and Courses of + Action + +

Attached here is a policy study on the Israeli nuclear weapons program as + requested in NSSM 40.Attached but not printed is the study, which was + transmitted by John P. Walsh, Executive Secretary of the Department + of State, to Kissinger, + Laird, Helms, and Wheeler on May 30. NSSM 40 is Document 20.

+

The following major issues emerged during meetings of the Ad Hoc + Group.

+

1. Israel’s Nuclear + Capabilities and Intentions

+

[4½ lines not declassified]. We know that Israel + is in the process of deploying a nuclear-capable surface-to-surface + missile system (range of about 300 miles); there is circumstantial + evidence indicating Israel has acquired fissionable material; there are + unconfirmed reports that Israel has begun to construct nuclear weapons. + [2½ lines not declassified] Department of + State representatives believe more evidence is necessary [less than 1 line not declassified] and that + Israel [less than 1 line not declassified] is + aware that actual production and deployment of nuclear weapons could + place severe strains on US–Israel relations.

+

2. Israel’s Assurances on + Nuclear Weapons and Relation to Delivery of F–4 “Phantom” Aircraft to + Israel

+

Quite aside from the question of whether the U.S. should impose or + threaten to impose this sanction in an attempt to limit Israel’s nuclear + weapons program, we must + face the sensitive issue of carrying forward on deliveries [2 lines not declassified]. Providing an aircraft + which could serve as a nuclear delivery system [2 + lines not declassified] might have to be defended in Congress + and publicly.

+

Israel has committed to us that it will not be “the first to introduce + nuclear weapons into the area,” but there are grounds for believing that + Israel does not construe production of a weapon to constitute + “introduction.” During negotiations in November, 1968 for the sale of + the “Phantom” F–4 aircraft to Israel, Ambassador Rabin expressed the view that + introduction would require testing and making public the fact of + possession of a nuclear weapon.See Foreign + Relations, 1964–1968, volume XX, Arab-Israeli Dispute, + 1967–1968, Documents 306, 308, 309, 311, 317, 330, and 332. In accepting as + condition for the sale Israel’s reaffirmation that it would not be the + first to introduce nuclear weapons in the Middle East and agreement that + it would not use any aircraft supplied by the United States as a nuclear + weapons carrier, our reply stated:

+

“In this connection, I have made clear the position of the United States + Government that the physical possession and control of nuclear arms by a + Middle East power would be deemed to constitute the introduction of + nuclear weapons.”This paragraph is in a + letter from Assistant Secretary of Defense for International + Security Affairs Paul C. + Warnke to Rabin, November 27. See ibid., Document 333.

+

Inasmuch as our reply also made clear that we consider that “unusual and + compelling circumstances” requiring cancellation of the F–4 agreement + would exist in the event of “action inconsistent with your policy and + agreement as set forth in your letter,” the door was left open to + suspend or cancel the deliveries of the aircraft if Israel by our + definition “introduced” nuclear weapons into the area.

+

3. Will Raising this Issue + with Israel now Complement or Undercut our Diplomatic Effort to Achieve + an Arab-Israel Peace Settlement?

+

Since we are already having a crisis of confidence with Israel over our + peace efforts, will the renewal of the dialogue on the nuclear issue + cause the Israelis to dig in even harder on their peace terms? It can be + argued that the nuclear issue is overriding and that in any event a + settlement is unlikely. On the other hand, progress toward peace would + probably be the single most decisive factor making the nuclear issue + easier to handle.

+

In defining options, the NSSM 40 study + covers a range of pressures that the U.S. might apply to Israel—for any + purpose. If we choose to use the maximum option on the nuclear issue, we + may not have the necessary leverage left for helping along the peace + negotiations. We are proceeding + with our bilateral exchanges with the Soviets on the nature of a + settlement with the expectation that Israel will find the outcome + difficult but not impossible to accept and that some pressure will be + necessary to bring Israel into line. If there is a real possibility that + pressure will be needed, these would not differ substantially from those + in the study. Use of leverage on the NPT/nuclear issue may seriously + detract from our capability to influence Israel on the settlement issue. + On the other hand, if we decide to defer using pressure on the nuclear + question so as to preserve leverage on a possible peace settlement, we + must ask how long we are prepared to do this in the face of Israel’s + rapidly advancing program, and the knowledge that, the longer we put off + making Israel feel the seriousness of our purpose, the harder it will be + to arrest Israel’s program.

+

4. Should We Move Directly + into a Confrontation with Israel on the NPT/Nuclear Weapon Issue on the + basis of Supply of F–4s and other pending Arms Deliveries or Should we + Follow a Graduated Approach Relying Primarily on Political Suasion but + Maintaining the Flexibility to Move to more Coercive Policies if Israel + is Unresponsive

+

The Department of State believes that a policy of pressure has a + fundamental built-in contradiction and involves difficulties for the + U.S. that should be carefully examined. A threat to cut off Israel’s + supply of conventional arms could build military and psychological + pressures within Israel to move rapidly to the very sophisticated + weaponry we are trying to avoid. Moreover, to deny Israel arms needed + for its defense would be most difficult to justify in the face of + continuing Arab threats and commando attacks. Israel would see from the + outset that we would be under considerable pressures not to sustain this + position and we would have expended much leverage and good will + needlessly.

+

State believes that for the present we should continue the course of + using political argumentation, leaving implicit and for future decision + possible sanctions if Israel does not respond to our initial + representations and proceeds with its weapons program.J/PM differs with this view: see footnote on page 6. + [Footnote in the original. The reference is to footnote 6 + below.] Our actions on the nuclear issue should be timed so + as to complement or at least not undercut our diplomatic efforts to + achieve a peace settlement. Our objective would be Israeli signature of + the NPT with (a) the tacit + understanding that as long as Israel did not complete manufacture of + nuclear explosive devices, we would regard this as being within the + terms of the Treaty and, (b) a commitment that Israel would negotiate + the IAEA safeguards agreement, and (c) + an understanding that we will support the Israelis in a reasonable + interpretation of Article III consistent with the difference we have drawn between maintaining and exercising + the option to manufacture nuclear explosives, provided Israel assures us + it will not produce weapons and will consult with us to define this + concept in detail.

+

The Department of Defense (ISA and the Joint Staff) believes that + pressures can be applied by the threat to cut off conventional weapons + supply and assurances from Israel received with a reasonably good chance + (say 75%) of avoiding a public confrontation. Important groups in Israel + surely will want to avoid such a confrontation, and the military + certainly will not wish to exchange assured conventional weapons supply + from this highly preferred source for nuclear-armed missiles. Moreover, + it will be difficult, to put it mildly, for Israel publicly to challenge + our position on this issue—for our position can be easily and clearly + presented as acting in the U.S. interest without jeopardizing Israel’s + security. (This would not be the case if, for example, we attempted to + withhold arms supplies to achieve Israeli concessions to Arabs; our + position would be more difficult to defend and sustain publicly in that + instance.)

+

Defense believes that it is important, if we are to stop Israel from + going ahead with missiles and nuclear weapons, to demonstrate to the + Israelis the seriousness of our purpose so that Israel itself can see + the desirability of avoiding confrontation. Israel will surely not stop + its long range-nuclear weapons and missile program unless it is made to + feel that the United States is truly prepared to adopt policies which + would adversely effect Israel’s security with respect to more immediate + threats. Moreover, the speed with which Israel is proceeding dictates + that we must take steps very soon if we are to stop Israel’s nuclear and + missile activity before it’s publicly known.

+

Defense recognizes that we cannot obtain absolute guarantees that Israel + will forego strategic missiles and nuclear weapons over the long-run; we + can, however, make it more likely that missiles and nuclear weapons will + not be used by stopping their production now and by creating a political + obstacle—the necessity to renounce agreements and risk confrontation + with the United States—to their later use.

+

5. Should we Attempt to + Obtain Israeli Assurances that it will Halt its Strategic Missile as + well as Nuclear Weapons Program?

+

Defense believes that in addition to signature of the NPT and assurances of nuclear weapons + restraint, we should seek Israeli assurances that it will not produce, + further acquire, or deploy strategic missiles. They argue that since the + present Israeli “Jericho” missile is not militarily cost effective as a + means of delivering a high explosive warhead, the assumption will be + made that they are designed for nuclear warheads, and the practical + result may be the same whether or not the nuclear weapons actually + exist.

+ +

The Department of State, on the other hand, believes that getting the + Israelis to abandon their SSM program will be very difficult to achieve, + given the program’s already advanced stage. Trying to obtain assurances + on missiles would therefore seriously compound the difficulty of + obtaining assurances on what must be our main objective—the + non-production and non-deployment of nuclear weapons.

+

6. Courses of Action

+

A. The Department of State holds the following view:

+

1. A dialogue with Israel on the nuclear question can and should be + initiated immediately. We believe this will not affect adversely our + current efforts to achieve a peace settlement. We should move to + reaffirm our opposition to proliferation as soon as possible preferably + at the Ambassadorial level both here and in Jerusalem and underscore + that the U.S. Government considers it has a firm commitment in this + respect from Israel. We believe strongly that we should not at this + juncture link this approach to a suspension or slowing down of shipments + of conventional weapons to Israel.J/PM, + while in general agreement with the other formulations identified as + the State position in this paper, differs with NEA on this point. J/PM believes: a) + The implications of Israel’s possession of nuclear weapons are + serious enough for U.S. interests to warrant reminding the Israelis + at the outset of the terms of the Warnke letter, and informing them of the possibility + that we might not be able to carry through with deliveries of the + F–4 and other aircraft if Israel pursues its weapons program; b) + Unless this warning is conveyed, the Israelis are not likely to pay + much attention to our representations. [Footnote in the + original.] This possibility should be reviewed prior to + September in the light of Israel’s response and further intelligence on + the progress of Israel’s program.

+

2. At an early occasion a high-ranking U.S. official—preferably the + Secretary of State or Secretary of Defense—should make a public + statement on our global non-proliferation objectives and, in particular, + our hope that nuclear weapons can be kept out of sensitive areas such as + the Middle East. Such a statement should note Israel’s assurances to us + that it would not be the first to introduce nuclear weapons into the + area and urge Israel to sign the NPT.

+

B. The Department of Defense holds the following view:

+

1. There should be an early meeting with Ambassador Rabin of Israel for the purpose of + conveying to Israel (a) the seriousness with which the U.S. views + Israel’s missile and nuclear developments, and (b) specific U.S. demands + that Israel stop certain of its activities and give us assurances to + this effect.

+

2. The assurances we require from Israel are: (a) private assurances + (with inspection rights) that Israel will cease and desist from + development or acquisition of nuclear weapons and strategic missiles, + and (b) public assurances in the form of a NPT signature and ratification.

+ +

3. We should reiterate, on behalf of this Administration, that the + American definition of “introduction” applies (e.g., the State of Israel + will not physically possess nuclear weapons, including the components of + nuclear weapons that will explode).

+

4. Rabin should be called in by + the President, or by the Secretaries of State and Defense. Although the + negotiations with Israel will be especially difficult, they will be less + difficult if our demands for assurances are unequivocal and made at the + highest level.

+
+ +
+ 32. Telegram From the Embassy in Jordan to the Department of + StateSource: National + Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 619, Country Files, Middle East, Jordan + Nodis/Sandstorm. Secret; + Priority; Nodis; Sandstorm. + Amman, June 9, 1969, 0844Z. +

2710. Ref: Amman 2534, State 085782.In + telegram 2534 from Amman, May 31, Symmes reported that he had assured Rifai that he need not worry that + any details he had provided on secret contacts with Israel had been + improperly disclosed. “We had always kept this knowledge restricted + to very small [circle] within the US Govt.” (Ibid.) In telegram + 85782 to Amman, Tel Aviv, and USUN, May 28, Rogers informed Symmes that Hussein had instructed Rifai to give Sisco a full account of the secret contacts between + Jordan and Israel that had occurred over the previous year, writing: + “Rifai was very detailed + and what came out was that none of Israeli proposals are starters.” + (Ibid.) Subj: Jordanian-Israeli Contacts: Reiterated Need for + Active US Mediation. For Sisco + Personal from Ambassador.

+

1. On June 7, Zaid Rifai told me + he had been instructed to convey King Hussein’s deep concern that detailed information about + secret Jordanian-Israeli contacts which had been passed by Zaid to you + in TehranNot further identified, but see + Document 30. should be carefully + controlled in USG. Rifai said that he had passed this + highly sensitive information to you personally, on King’s authorization, + because King feared that Israeli might be misleading you and other + high-level USG officials as to true + state of affairs in these talks. Specifically, by going into details, he + wanted you to know that these contacts had made almost no progress + whatsoever.

+

2. Rifai said King was worried + lest this detailed information be treated in routine fashion, and might + be further distributed within USG. He + wondered particularly if US reps in Cairo and Tel Aviv would be informed. As he continued, it became + clear that what truly was bothering him was the possibility that the + names of the parties involved, the dates, the places of meetings, etc. + (referred to in para four of your message in State 85782) might have + more widely circulated within the USG.

+

3. I then assured Zaid that my reference to the qte quite full unqte + report I had received from you on the meeting had not included the + details such as those to which he was referring. I said you had simply + noted the fact that contacts had continued but had not resulted in + substantive progress. I emphasized that the meat of your report was + Rifai’s plea that the US + somehow intervene to break the logjam. Further explained in detail the + extraordinary precautions we have taken in regard to Sandstorm matters, + both in the Embassy and in the Department. I pointed out that we handled + the occasional messages exchanged between Israelis and Jordanians on + other matters with the same sensitivity. I added that the extent of my + personal knowledge of the contacts was confined almost exclusively to + what the King himself had told me; and I reminded Zaid that we had + carefully refrained from probing, even when such reference as qte the + Hamadiyah region unqte in the recent Meir-Hussein + exchangeThe exchanges occurred over a + three-day period, beginning with a May 29 letter from Meir to Hussein in which she raised the issue of what she + described as the “very serious deterioration” that had been taking + place on the cease-fire and frontier lines between Jordan and + Israel. (Telegram 2046 from Tel Aviv, May 30; ibid., Box 613, + Country Files, Middle East, Jordan, Vol. I) On May 31, Hussein replied: “I have received + your message of May 29, 1969, and I wish to assure you that all + possible measures are being taken as a result of my clear and + definite instructions to the chief of staff of our armed forces to + insure that Jordanian armed forces pay particular attention and a + maximum endeavor to insure that settlements in the north of the + valley as well as those by the Dead Sea works south the Dead Sea and + the works themselves as well as the Rilat area are not subjected to + firing from across the border or cease fire positions. The armed + forces will only return fire if subject to it and to its sources + only or otherwise if civilian targets are subjected to Israeli + fire.” (Telegram 2521 from Amman, May 31; ibid.) Meir concluded the exchange on June + 1, writing: “Tranquility on the borders and ceasefire lines and the + maintenance of the ceasefire arrangements will contribute to the + achievement of the permanent peace which is our common objective.” + (Telegram 2066 from Tel Aviv, June 1; ibid., Box 1237, Saunders + Files, Israel) had aroused understandable curiosity. Embassy + officer Draper, who had accompanied me to this meeting with Zaid, said + he had normally typed himself the messages to and from Israelis, for + example.

+

4. Rifai was clearly relieved and + indicated he was completely satisfied with my explanation. I told him + that he could assure King Hussein + that details of the special confidences that had been relayed to you had + gone no further, even to me. I stressed that we had always been + exceptionally careful not to compromise the King or Rifai in any way, and that our record + had been good in this respect. The important thing, I reiterated, was + that the Jordanian plea for US intervention in this matter had been communicated in a + thoroughly clear manner. It was being given the most serious + consideration and complete protection.

+

5. Rifai then redescribed the + Jordanian view that the moment was ripe for US intervention. He did not + think that the Israelis would budge without such pressure from the US, + which he said should include, if necessary, suspension of Phantom + deliveries, etc. He stressed that Jordan had done all it possibly could + to narrow the gap between their position and the Israeli, but it was as + wide as ever on Jerusalem and withdrawal generally. He claimed that the + Israelis were going right ahead with the Allon Plan.See footnote 8, Document 4 and Foreign + Relations, 1964–1968, volume XX, Arab-Israeli Dispute, + 1967–1968, Documents 186 and 213.

+

6. Rifai stressed again, + incidentally, that under no circumstances should Sandstorm matters be + discussed or even alluded to with GOJ + Ambassador Sharaf in Washington + or, for that matter, with anyone other than himself or King Hussein. Beyond Sandstorm, he noted + that exchanges with Israelis are not known by or discussed with anyone + outside the palace.

+ + + Symmes + + +
+ +
+ 33. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in + IsraelSource: National + Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 756, Presidential Correspondence + 1969–1974, Israel Prime Minister Golda + Meir, 1969. Secret; Nodis. Drafted on June 17 by Sterner; cleared by Atherton, Davies, and Saunders; and approved by + Sisco. + Washington, June + 19, 1969, 0151Z. +

99793. 1. Please deliver following letter from President to Prime + Minister Meir. QUOTE:

+

Dear Madam Prime Minister:

+

Thank you for your letter of May 14.In the + letter, which Rabin + delivered to Rogers on May + 14, Meir expressed her + displeasure with both the Two- and Four-Power talks, especially the + former. She wrote: “Our fears have been confirmed. They have been + made particularly acute by the latest document submitted to the + USSR.” She continued: “Instead of leaving the parties free to reach + their own unfettered agreements, the document under consideration + prejudices negotiations before they begin. It essentially + predetermines the results of the negotiations on the main matters at + issue, including the problems of boundaries, refugees and the nature + of peace, setting forth for agreement with the Soviet Union + positions which Israel is known to oppose.” (Ibid.) Meir was referring to the U.S. plan + discussed with Dobrynin in + May. See Document 28. I greatly + appreciate your trouble and care in setting before me your government’s + views on the difficult issue of + building toward peace in the Middle East. Your letter clearly conveys + the understandable depth of Israel’s conviction and feeling on this + subject.

+

I agree with much of what you say. To the extent that there may be + differences between us, I believe they derive from our necessarily + different perspectives and not from different understandings of + fundamental principles, on which I am convinced we are one.

+

To avoid any possible misunderstanding of our purposes, I am asking + Ambassador Barbour now to discuss + my thoughts with you. I would then hope that you might find it possible + to come to Washington next month for a fuller and more personal exchange + of views. Sincerely, Richard + Nixon UNQUOTE.

+

2. In presenting letter Ambassador should make following points orally on + behalf of President.

+

3. As President has indicated in his letter we are convinced US and + Israel do not differ on fundamental principles.

+

4. We believe that a lasting peace can only be achieved through mutual + agreement among the belligerents themselves. We had hoped that the + November 22, 1967, UN Security Council + resolution would get negotiations underway looking toward such + agreement. Had there been progress, we would have continued to stand + aside.

+

5. But clearly the Jarring + mission had reached an impasse. The problem is how to get negotiations + under way.

+

6. It is difficult for us to accept the thesis that the passage of time + alone would bring the UAR around to a + more amenable position. It seems vital to make another effort to get + negotiations started.

+

7. In entering the four-power and Soviet talks, it is not our intention + to take negotiations out of Israeli and Arab hands. Our purpose is to + test the USSR’s intentions and its + willingness and capacity to induce the UAR to enter into a real commitment to negotiate a peace + settlement. To do this, we are attempting in our talks with the USSR to reduce to writing the areas where + our views coincide. We see no way to move forward without going at least + this far.

+

8. The President fully understands your concern that Israel’s negotiating + position not be prejudiced. We will make every effort to see that our + talks do not have this effect.

+ +

9. We believe that it is essential, if negotiations are to begin, to + confirm for both sides that a realistic negotiation is possible. The + formulations we have given the Soviets are an effort to define the outer + limits of realistic negotiating positions on both sides.

+

10. We understand the emotions of your people and agree that imperfect + remedies cannot be a substitute for peace. At the same time, we hope + Israel recognizes that no peace or security is perfect.

+

11. To attain peace will require a spirit of compromise. You have + indicated your willingness to be forthcoming. We honestly do not know + whether the UAR and Soviets are or not, + and that is the purpose of our probe, even though we share your + skepticism.

+

12. We ask no more of Israel than that it accompany us on an exploration + of Soviet and UAR intentions.Barbour + presented Nixon’s letter to + Meir on June 19 and + reported on his conversation with her in telegram 2360 from Tel + Aviv, June 19. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, + NSC Files, Box 604, Country + Files, Middle East, Israel, Vol. II)

+

13. FYI. Dates on + which Mrs. Meir will be invited to visit US have been fixed for July + 17–18. Instructions on extending invitation follow.In telegram 100333 to Tel Aviv, June 19. (Ibid.) In + telegram 2351 from Tel Aviv, June 19, Barbour reported that Meir had “gladly accepted” Nixon’s invitation to visit the + United States, but that she could not do so July 17–18. The Prime + Minister explained that she had to stay in Israel during the days + leading up to the Labor Party convention, scheduled for July 20–22, + when “fundamental decisions” would be made. (Ibid.) + End FYI.

+ + + Rogers + + +
+ +
+ + 34. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rogers to President NixonSource: + National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 651, Country Files, + Middle East, Middle East (1969). Secret; Nodis. + Washington, June + 20, 1969. + + SUBJECT + Soviet Counterproposal on Arab-Israeli Dispute + +

The Soviets submitted to us on June 17 a written counterproposal (TAB + A)Attached but not printed at Tab A is + telegram 101232 to Tel Aviv, June 20. In telegram 99315 to Moscow, + June 18, the Embassy reported Tcherniakov’s presentation to Rogers and the Secretary’s + response, including the comment that the Soviet plan represented + “very little movement” and consisted “largely of recasting” of the + December 30 Soviet plan “plus some modifications given to Sisco orally by Dobrynin.” Tcherniakov also told Rogers that he had been instructed + to propose that the U.S.-Soviet talks be moved to Moscow. (Ibid., + Box 649, Country Files, Middle East, Middle East Negotiations) + Telegram 99315 is printed in Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, volume XII, + Soviet Union, January 1969–October 1970, Document + 58. and explanatory “oral comments” (TAB B)Attached but not printed at Tab B is the undated + “Oral Comments on ‘Basic Provisions’ of a Middle East + Settlement.” for a settlement of the Arab-Israeli dispute + following Foreign Minister Gromyko’s visit to Cairo.Gromyko visited Cairo + beginning on June 10. Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and + Research Thomas L. Hughes informed Secretary Rogers on June 11 that a Soviet + Embassy source in Washington had intimated that Gromyko’s visit to Cairo was + “connected with the Sisco-Dobrynin discussions on the Arab-Israeli settlement + problem and that it will enable the Soviets to make a new + presentation to the US in the near future. There is other good + evidence as well that this is the main purpose of Gromyko’s trip. Although the + evidence is sketchy regarding the extent of Moscow’s optimism, it + seems likely that Moscow in sending Gromyko was confident that the consultations would + produce a useful position which the Soviets could take in + Washington, and that the trip does not signify Soviet consternation + over a totally negative UAR + attitude toward further Soviet settlement talks with the West.” + (Ibid., Document 54) + It moves in our direction beyond previous Soviet positions by + introducing new elements and omitting certain objectionable points + contained in the December 30th Soviet plan, although a number of our + fundamental requirements are not met. A detailed analysis of the Soviet + plan is attached (TAB C).Attached but not + printed at Tab C is the undated “Detailed Analysis of the Soviet + Plan of June 17, 1969. For the December 30 plan, see Document 1.

+

The plan we submitted to the Soviets (TAB D)Attached but not printed at Tab D is the U.S. plan, which Sisco presented to Dobrynin in “piecemeal fashion” on + May 6, 8, and 12, as described in Document + 28. envisaged: (a) an acceptance of the principle + of withdrawal by Israel from the UAR to + a final border to be worked out by the parties, in exchange for (b) an + Arab commitment to a contractual peace and a willingness to negotiate + directly at some stage + under Jarring’s auspices. In our + plan the possibility was left open, but not made explicit, that the + final border between the UAR and Israel + would be the former international frontier which existed before the June + war, and the parties would themselves be expected to work out the + practical security arrangements in Sharm al-Shaykh and Gaza. Our whole + strategy was based on the assumption that if we could tie down both the + Soviets and the Arabs to a contractual and negotiated peace, we would + have some leverage with the Israelis to encourage them to withdraw from + UAR territory.

+

The new Soviet plan moves in this direction. Like our own, it is a + negotiating document. It adopts the concept of a reciprocally binding + agreement between the parties, as a package, and signed by the parties. + It is insufficiently explicit, and the Israelis will certainly think so, + on the binding commitment to a state of peace, and this is one matter on + which we feel we are in a position to press the Soviets further in + subsequent discussions. The Soviet plan also fails to accept our + proposal for direct negotiations under Jarring’s auspices, but interestingly enough, leaves + open this possibility. We feel that this point also can be pressed + further with the Soviets.

+

Our conclusion is there is sufficient in the Soviet document, perhaps + more implicitly than explicitly, for us to develop a further counter + document which would take into account some of the Soviet views.See footnote 4, Document + 39. I do not wish to give you the impression that + these are the only serious problems that remain. There are others as our + attached detailed analysis indicates. However, our judgment is that as a + minimum the Soviet reply reflects a desire to continue the dialogue with + us. This is consistent with the hints Ambassador Dobrynin has given to Assistant + Secretary Sisco that the Soviets + see value in discussions with us as an element of restraint in the + Middle East and as an important ingredient in overall US–USSR relations.

+

In addition, we feel there are other important reasons to continue the + Soviet-American dialogue: we have greater control in the bilateral + context than in the Four Power discussions; as long as we and the + Soviets continue consultations, the risk of a direct military + confrontation between us is diminished; a general renewal of hostilities + between the Arabs and the Israelis is less likely; the possibility is + enhanced that the present “no war, no peace” situation will not escalate + beyond the present pattern of incidents, retaliation, and controlled + tension.

+

We will undoubtedly have great difficulty with the Israelis since they + will take the most pessimistic interpretation of the Soviet reply and + contend that this confirms their strongly held judgment that neither the Soviets nor the UAR want the kind of peace they require. + They will make a further all-out effort to use this reply to get us to + kill the Two Power and the Four Power talks. We must resist this.

+

The latest Soviet plan contains a number of elements that are difficult + for the Arabs, and particularly for the Israelis. While it has major + deficiencies and no doubt will be unacceptable to Israel, it will appear + reasonable in many respects to others. For example, the substantial + UN role envisaged will be attractive + to many who feel that a continuing Israeli presence in the occupied + territories is expansionist and unrealistic. The public relations aspect + is another reason why we believe it is necessary for us to prepare a + counterproposal of our own.

+

The Soviets have also proposed that we move our talks to Moscow. You will + recall that we left this possibility open when we insisted at the outset + that the talks begin in Washington. Our tentative thinking is that + Assistant Secretary Sisco would + present any counterproposal, with full explanation of our approach, to + the Soviets in Moscow,Sisco visited Moscow July 14–18. + See Document 39. remain a very brief + period of time, and we would await their further reply and discuss it + either in Moscow or Washington or both, depending on the timing of + Dobrynin’s return.

+

We will be developing a counterproposal at an early date and will submit + it to you for your approval.

+ + + William P. Rogers + + +
+ +
+ + 35. Memorandum for the RecordSource: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–038, Senior + Review Group Meetings, Review Group NSSM 40—Israel 6/20/69. Top Secret; Nodis; Sensitive. Drafted by + Saunders on June 24. All + brackets are in the original except those indicating text that + remains classified. + Washington, June + 20, 1969. + + SUBJECT + NSC Ad Hoc Review Group Meeting, Friday, June 20, 1969, on NSSM 40—Israeli Nuclear ProgramDocument + 20. + + + PARTICIPANTS + Henry A. Kissinger, + Chairman + Elliot Richardson, Under + Secretary of State + David Packard, Deputy + Secretary of Defense + General Earle Wheeler, + Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff + Richard Helms, Director, + Central Intelligence + Rodger Davies, Deputy + Assistant Secretary of State + Harold H. Saunders, NSC Staff + +

[1 line not declassified] [text not + declassified] Dr. Kissinger suggested that the group might best get at the + problem by talking first about what we are trying to accomplish.

+

Mr. Richardson outlined the + following objectives:

+

1. We want to do what we can to prevent Israel from going further with + its nuclear weapons program—[1 line not + declassified].

+

2. We want to have a record of having tried to do this—for later use if + and when [less than 1 line not declassified].

+

3. We have another objective which could be affected by our pursuit of + the above two objectives—the diplomatic effort to achieve an + Arab-Israeli political settlement.

+

Commenting on the above objectives, Mr. Richardson stated that deployment of nuclear weapons in + the Middle East carries serious risks. Our main diplomatic effort since + January 20 has been predicated on concern over the risk of a US–USSR confrontation in the Middle East. + Knowledge by the Arabs [less than 1 line not + declassified] would seem to increase the likelihood of a local + confrontation—increasing possibility of eventual involvement of the US + and USSR.

+

General Wheeler interjected that + if the Israelis deploy their surface-to-surface missiles—[less than 1 line not declassified]—the Arabs + might well conclude that the Israelis have nuclear warheads on them. By + any rational military or + economic calculation, there is no justification [2 + lines not declassified]. When Dr. Kissinger asked how large a conventional warhead they + might carry, General Wheeler + said he was not sure but guessed it might be about 2000 lbs.—perhaps + about the size of the German V–2 rockets in 1945.

+

Dr. Kissinger responded that + there are two possible comments on General Wheeler’s points:

+

1. The Arabs just don’t think that precisely. Because they might not + calculate their own cost-benefit ratios that rationally, they would not + expect the Israelis to.

+

2. Even if they suspected strongly that the Israelis had nuclear + warheads, they might decide to live with that fact as long as it did not + become an announced fact of international life.

+

Dr. Kissinger continued that if + the Israelis did indeed have nuclear warheads we might have two possible + approaches to the problem:

+

1. to stop or reverse their deployment;

+

2. to keep the fact of their existence below the level of public + acknowledgment.

+

Mr. Richardson returned to his + discussion of the dangers of the existence of nuclear weapons in the + Middle East. He noted as the most likely Soviet response a Soviet + announcement that they were targeting a number of their own missiles on + Israel and that any use by Israel of nuclear weapons against the Arabs + could bring Soviet retaliation.

+

Mr. Richardson noted that he had + said to Ambassador Rabin and + General Yariv, the chief of + Israeli military intelligence, that the reason we could not agree to + their political strategy of standing pat in the current impasse is that + we see the situation deteriorating in ways that could lead to a + US-Soviet confrontation, as well as to the deterioration of the US + position elsewhere in the area. As part of his description of that + deterioration, Mr. Richardson + said he had described as one possibility the introduction of nuclear + weapons by Israel, and Soviet targeting of its own missiles on Israel + with the threat of a US-Soviet confrontation becoming consequently + worse. He said that neither Rabin nor Yariv + “batted an eye or made any effort to rebut.” If pushed they would + probably say they do [less than 1 line not + declassified] are only seeking a deterrent. In 1967 they saw + their conventional superiority fail as a deterrent, and he believed that + they had made up their minds then [less than 1 line + not declassified]. From the US viewpoint, Mr. Richardson concluded, the risk of a + US-Soviet confrontation is clearly raised [less than 1 + line not declassified].

+

Dr. Kissinger asked whether we + should push on this issue rather than for a political settlement. Mr. + Richardson replied that he + felt we should push on both, even though pressure on the nuclear issue + might marginally prejudice + diplomatic movement. However, he did not take this argument too + seriously. He felt that the Israelis will arrive at a political + settlement if it is in their interest—if it is not in their interest, as + they see it, they will not. The degree to which we irritate them will + not be a significant factor in their decision.

+

Mr. Packard asked whether it was + possible to get a political settlement without settling the nuclear + issue.

+

Dr. Kissinger replied to both of + the last two points with the following analysis: If we can ever get the + current debate over a settlement down to the reality of specific + borders, any conceivable geographical settlement would reduce Israel’s + security. What Israel may gain in goodwill and tentative Arab + willingness to live in peace, Israel will lose in conventional security. + [less than 1 line not declassified] they may + provide an added incentive for them to hold on to territory. It seems + axiomatic that a nation of three million people confronted by 100 + million with any technological capacity at all would not over an + historical period have a chance of surviving. But if there is any chance + at all, it would come from having the most advantageous possible lines + of defense. If the Israelis give up the conventional security which + advantageous borders provide, they might want nuclear weapons to offset + what they are giving up.

+

In short, Dr. Kissinger concluded + the curious point about nuclear weapons for the Israelis is that—despite + our interests in having them forego those weapons—we might find it + easier to persuade the Israelis to give up territory if we ease along + with them [1 line not declassified]. For a nation + like Israel, losing one conventional war is as bad as losing a nuclear + war. The disturbing feature in Israel’s present frame of mind is that + [less than 1 line not declassified].

+

Mr. Richardson concurred in Dr. + Kissinger’s analysis but + suggested that perhaps different time frames were involved. If Israel + held conventional superiority for ten years, [less + than 1 line not declassified]. Beyond ten years—or some such + period—Israel’s conventional margin of superiority might be eroded, but + it is very difficult to look that far into the future, because we do not + know what other factors will be introduced—on the non-proliferation and + other fronts.

+

Dr. Kissinger felt that the + Israelis do not want nuclear weapons just against the Arab nations per + se, but rather against the possibility of a defeat in conventional war. + Returning to Mr. Packard’s + question, Dr. Kissinger said it + is hard to imagine how we could work toward a settlement without + relating these two issues. The problem as Dr. Kissinger saw it is that the + relationship between these two issues might work in inverse proportion. + He repeated that the Israelis might [less than 1 line + not declassified] or vice versa, but he found it hard to + believe that they would give up both.

+ +

General Wheeler felt that it is + very important for the US to avoid any degree of [1 + line not declassified] the President should be in a position to + say that he tried everything possible [less than 1 + line not declassified]. General Wheeler had little doubt that the Israelis might analyze + the situation in the same way as Dr. Kissinger had. However, General Wheeler doubted that the Israelis + would have achieved any real addition to their security if the Soviets + respond as Mr. Richardson + suggested they might. In fact, in the short term, the Arabs might even + go to war to try to prevent Israel from achieving full nuclear + capability, while the Soviets “rattled their own rockets in the + background.” In short, [less than 1 line not + declassified] could trigger the very war they are trying to + avoid.

+

Mr. Packard stated that our + objective should be to [1½ lines not + declassified]. We would need some system of inspection to assure + Israeli compliance.

+

Dr. Kissinger asked, “Inspection + of what?” Mr. Packard responded + that we would have to “get in there and cover the country.”

+

General Wheeler returned to the + idea that we would have to be concerned with [3 lines + not declassified].

+

Dr. Kissinger asked whether we + might state our choice of objectives as the following:

+

1. That the Israelis not deploy missiles.

+

2. [less than 1 line not declassified].

+

3. Both of the above.

+

Dr. Kissinger asked how it would + ever be possible to monitor any assurances the Israelis might give. + General Wheeler said we could + do this only with very close inspection of Israel’s military facilities. + Dr. Kissinger recalled that he + had been shown in Israel how the Israelis had manufactured weapons right + under the eyes of the British when the British had all of the power to + inspect that comes from comprehensive police power.

+

General Wheeler returned to the + importance of avoiding the appearance of American complicity. If we were + inspecting—even if we were not inspecting the right things—we would have + made a better record for ourselves.

+

Dr. Kissinger said that we seemed + to have two choices:

+

1. We could raise the nuclear issue with the Israelis, make our case and + then stop.

+

2. Or we could link this issue to the question of a peace settlement, and + see if there is any trade-off between them in Israeli minds.

+

Dr. Kissinger asked what we are + talking about when we talk about applying pressure to persuade the + Israelis to [less than 1 line not declassified]. + General Wheeler responded that + we could withhold the remainder + of the A–4 Skyhawks and not begin delivery of the F–4 Phantom + aircraft.Sixty A–4s remained to be + delivered. The United States shipped the first four Phantoms on + September 5 and the second four on October 20. A total of 100 A–4 + Skyhawks and 50 F–4 Phantoms had been approved for sale to Israel. + See Foreign + Relations, 1964–1968, volume XX, Arab-Israeli Dispute, + 1967–1968, Document 333.

+

Mr. Richardson stated that it + might help at this point in the discussion to lay out some of the steps + we might take. These were described on pages 6 and 7 of the issues + paper.See Document + 31. Mr. Richardson then turned immediately to look at the + Defense Department proposal on page 7, rather than the State + Department’s proposal on page 6. Dr. Kissinger noted that Mr. Richardson seemed to be speaking more along the lines of + the Defense Department proposal, and Mr. Richardson smiled and said, “As usual, you have very + keen powers of discernment.”

+

Mr. Packard interjected it was + time for us to take a strong stand while we still have some leverage in + holding up the F–4s.

+

Dr. Kissinger said if we were to + hold up the F–4 deliveries we would have to do it quietly. Suppose we + did, he said. The Jewish community in the United States would run amok + and make a public confrontation. General Wheeler doubted that the Israelis would make it public + because they would not be in a very good position on the nuclear + issue.

+

Mr. Richardson suggested that, + instead of talking about the pressure we could apply, we ought to start + at the other end and think what we could ask the Israelis to do. If we + reached the stage of confrontation over delivery or non-delivery of the + aircraft, he felt that we would have failed.

+

He noted further that this was one case where getting the results we + wanted and making a record might be in conflict. He felt the question + was this: If we go and ask the Israelis to sign the NPT and halt the deployment of missiles + [less than 1 line not declassified] would + they agree if they knew we would refuse to deliver the aircraft?

+

Dr. Kissinger said that the + Israelis might just tell us to go to hell if they felt: (1) that they + could withstand whatever sanctions we might apply, or (2) if they + thought we would not apply those sanctions.

+

Dr. Kissinger asked whether + everybody agreed that we should at least call Israeli attention to the + extraordinary seriousness with which we viewed [less + than 1 line not declassified] and perhaps suggest that we might + not deliver the F–4s.

+

Mr. Richardson stated that we + should not imply that we would not deliver the aircraft unless we were + absolutely clear in our own minds in advance that we were prepared to + follow through on that threat.

+ +

Dr. Kissinger reiterated that at + a minimum the group seemed to agree that we should call Israel’s + attention to the seriousness we attach [less than 1 + line not declassified].

+

Dr. Kissinger went on to ask + whether we should seek from the Israelis the following:

+

1. that they not deploy missiles;

+

2. that they not announce [less than 1 line not + declassified];

+

3. that they not [less than 1 line not + declassified];

+

4. that they sign the NPT.

+

The tough question, he said, is whether we are prepared to impose + sanctions and, if so, what sanctions. He felt that withholding the F–4s + carried with it the disadvantage of maximum publicity.

+

Mr. Richardson pointed out that + the negotiations which concluded in the F–4 sale last November included + an exchange between Ambassador Rabin and Paul + Warnke to the effect that the Israelis promised not to be + the first to introduce nuclear weapons into the Middle East and the US + stated that, if Israel did, we would consider it grounds for cancelling + the contract.See Foreign + Relations, 1964–1968, volume XX, Arab-Israeli Dispute, + 1967–1968, Document 306.

+

Dr. Kissinger returned to the + problem of publicity which would be created by our withholding delivery + of the Phantom. This would probably bring out into the open [less than 1 line not declassified]. He emphasized + that, rather than domestic politics—he said the President was prepared + to take the pressure from the Jewish community—the real problem lies in + making a public issue out of [less than 1 line not + declassified].

+

Mr. Richardson said we were not + asking the Israelis to [less than 1 line not + declassified]. They were in a position where they could [less than 1 line not declassified]. If we are + just asking them to [1 line not declassified]. He + posed the question whether we could be satisfied with [1 line not declassified]. It might be that we could get + Israeli agreement [1½ lines not + declassified].

+

Mr. Packard felt that we would + need some way to enforce our agreement by inspection. General Wheeler said that it was one reason + why we wanted the Israelis not to deploy their missiles. It is easier + for us to monitor missile deployment. Mr. Packard said that we needed some way to monitor [less than 1 line not declassified] as well.

+

Dr. Kissinger asked, “How?” He + felt that Israeli ingenuity would make it impossible. He said he had had + occasion to study French efforts to inspect in Germany after World War I + and had concluded that if a country totally opposes you, you just have no chance of making + inspection work.

+

Mr. Richardson asked whether we + might want to settle for an inspection that we knew was inefficient + primarily for the purpose of making a record and washing our own hands + of responsibility, as much as we could.

+

Dr. Kissinger said that his main + concern was that our mere act of trying to do something might bring on + the consequences that we worst feared and most wanted to avoid. We all + agree that we should tell Israel that we take this development + gravely.

+

General Wheeler noted that if we + tried to inspect the Israeli program, we assumed responsibility before + the international community. If on the other hand, we pressed the + Israelis to sign the NPT, then inspection becomes the responsibility of + an international body.

+

General Wheeler added that our + objective should be to stop missile production—not just deployment—and + to have the missiles already produced stored. Dr. Kissinger agreed that it seemed + impossible to expect the Israelis to [less than 1 line + not declassified].

+

Dr. Kissinger continued that, + having isolated the proposal that we make some representation to the + Israelis, it is important now to decide what our next steps might be and + what steps are attainable and what the consequences of those steps might + be. Mr. Richardson said he would + restate where the group have come out as follows:

+

1. We need to distinguish between asking the Israelis [1 line not declassified] recognizing that “deployment” may be + an artificial proposition because the Israelis might [1½ lines not declassified].

+

2. We need to decide whether to pose some form of inspection other than + the inspection of future production facilities which would go with + signing of the NPT.

+

3. We need to decide whether to ask the Israelis to stop further missile + production and whether to ask them to dismantle what they have.

+

Dr. Kissinger asked whether we + could list what we might get without sanctions. He doubted that + bilateral inspection would be possible without some penalty or some + reward.

+

Dr. Kissinger asked if another + paper could be written that would include the following:The paper is attached to a June 26 memorandum from + Halperin and Saunders to + Kissinger. (National + Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC + Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–038, Senior Review Group + Meetings, Review Group NSSM + 40—Israel 6/20/69)

+

1. List a hierarchy of steps that we might ask the Israelis to take;

+

2. List a hierarchy of sanctions that we might apply.

+ +

3. Discuss the consequences of applying sanctions for each of the + following:

+

a. achieving our objective;

+

b. preventing escalation of the whole issue.

+

Mr. Richardson said there was one + more question—the level through which we should do these things. With + Prime Minister Meir coming,Meir + was in the United States from September 24 to October 6. the + question arises whether or not the President should do this. Dr. + Kissinger replied that, if + this development is as grave as we see it, it is hard to see how the + President could fail to involve himself.

+

In adjourning, Dr. Kissinger + suggested that a new paper be prepared by Mr. Davies and that the group meet a week + from June 20.The Review Group met on June + 26. A memorandum of the meeting is in the National Archives, RG 59, + Central Files 1967–69, DEF 12 ISR. It is published in National + Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 189, Document + 9.

+ + + Harold H. Saunders + + +
+ +
+ 36. Memorandum of ConversationSource: National Archives, Nixon Presidential + Materials, NSC Files, Box 604, + Country Files, Middle East, Israel, Vol. II. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Saunders on June 25. The + conversation occurred on the evening of June 20 at Sisco’s home. Saunders attached his record of + this conversation to a July 1 “eyes only” memorandum for Kissinger noting: “There are no + immediate operational conclusions to be drawn from this, except to + be wary of Eban’s vague + statements.” Saunders + explained that because of the “extremely personal nature of + Rabin’s talk,” he would + not distribute the memorandum “through the system.” + (Ibid.) + Washington, June + 20, 1969. + + PARTICIPANTS + Yitzhak Rabin, Ambassador + of Israel + + Harold H. Saunders + + +

Caution: The conversation recounted below was + labelled by Rabin as strictly + personal. Therefore, no distribution of this memcon should be made + beyond those with an immediate interest, and in no case, should + Rabin or any other Israeli + be confronted with the substance of the Ambassador’s remarks.

+ +

Background. As background to this conversation, + two points need to be made:

+

1. On May 13, while waiting with Rabin, Bitan and + Argov for Dr. Kissinger to see them,Memorandum of conversation, May 13. (Ibid.) I + had remarked in the course of our conversation that it was very + difficult for us to know exactly what Israel’s position on a territorial + settlement is. Ambassador Rabin + said he could not understand my remark since Foreign Minister Eban last November had told Secretary + Rusk very specifically that + Israel, in a settlement with the UAR, would require an Israeli position + at Sharm el-Sheikh and land access to it.See + Foreign + Relations, 1964–1968, volume XX, Arab-Israeli Dispute, + 1967–1968, Document 303. I recalled that comment + but noted that always when we had heard such remarks from Israeli + officials, they had been couched as “illustrative” rather than as firm + Israeli government positions. In fact, we had been repeatedly told right + up to the present that the Israeli Cabinet would not take a firm + position on a territorial settlement until the Arabs presented + themselves for direct negotiations. Prime Minister Eshkol, and other + Israeli officials quoting him, had repeatedly said that they would not + have a Cabinet crisis over a hypothesis.

+

2. On the afternoon of June 20, during the call of Rafael, Rabin and Argov on Dr. Kissinger,Memorandum of + conversation, June 20. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential + Materials, NSC Files, Box 1319, + Unfiled Material) Dr. Kissinger had commented that the time was coming when he + felt it would be to Israel’s advantage to state more precisely its + territorial requirements and to come out from behind the screen of + “sacramental words—‘just and lasting peace’ and ‘secure and recognized + boundaries.’” Ambassador Rabin + had taken exception to that remark, saying that Foreign Minister + Eban last November had told + Secretary Rusk specifically that + Israel required an Israeli position at Sharm el-Sheikh and land access + to it. When Dr. Kissinger asked + my reaction, Rabin stepped + right in and, smiling, told Dr. Kissinger that I would say that the remarks by Israeli + officials had been “illustrative.” I then went on to add that we had + repeatedly been told by Israeli officials that the Israeli Cabinet would + take no position until the Arabs sat down to negotiate with them. After + another comment by Dr. Kissinger, Rafael spoke up and said that the Israeli + government would not take a firm position until the Arabs sat down and + negotiated with them. Ambassador Rabin looked about as angry and disgusted as I have ever + seen him look.

+

Conversation. Walking downstairs beside Ambassador + Rabin after dinner at the + Siscos’ that evening, I asked Rabin whether he blamed me for being confused. When he + asked what I meant, I recalled that afternoon in Dr. Kissinger’s office when I had seen demonstrated right + before my eyes within about 75 seconds precisely the contradiction which + I had been talking about. He paused for a moment and then said, “No, I + don’t blame you for being confused.”

+

He said that when he had been in Israel he had, in his private + conversation with Prime Minister Meir, explained that the Israeli Government position is + not firmly understood in Washington. He recommended to her that she come + to Washington and explain to the President exactly what positions the + Israeli Cabinet has taken. He said he had told her that he did not + believe she would return home with any “political victory” but that she + did not badly need this and it was far more important that the President + of the United States understand clearly Israel’s position.

+

He then motioned me to a chair and proceeded to explain the Israeli + Cabinet decisions on this subject in the following general way:

+

When Eban had made his comment to + Rusk in November 1968 about + Israeli desire for a position in Sharm el-Sheikh and land access to it, + Eban was speaking from a firm + Cabinet decision. Recalling the Israeli scurrying to ready a position + vis-à-vis Jordan before the UNGA + session, I asked whether that decision had been made in August or + September. He said that it had been taken in December 1967. He added + that he, as then Chief of Staff, had not been told of the decision at + that time. He had only learned of it as he prepared in May 1968 to come + to Washington as Ambassador. He said he asked for and got the record of + the Cabinet meeting. When he had learned of it, he had told the General + Staff of the Israeli Defense Forces, and Prime Minister Eshkol had been + “very angry” at Rabin for + telling them. He had then gone to Dayan who had been surprised that the US had not been + told. Rabin then summarized the + position the Cabinet had taken on its four fronts as follows:

+

1. On the UAR front, the Cabinet had + made a definite decision to require an Israeli position at Sharm + el-Sheikh and land access to it.

+

2. On the West Bank, the Israelis had needed a position to ready for the + Jordanians and there was “an 80–85% consensus” in the Cabinet for the + Allon plan.See footnote 8, Document + 4. At one time, Dayan had suggested an alternative of fortifying the + heights, but no one pressed that plan now.

+

3. On Syria, the Cabinet had decided not to decide.

+

4. On Lebanon, there is no territorial issue.

+

I asked him whether he did not feel that the Israeli position on Sharm + el-Sheikh would rule out the peace settlement with the UAR. I said I + realized that the Israelis may judge that such a settlement is + impossible now anyway and that this would not disturb them.

+ +

He made two points in reply:

+

1. If the Egyptians unexpectedly show themselves to want peace, the + Cabinet could always revise its own decision.

+

2. More realistically, Rabin—emphasizing that he was speaking strictly + personally—said that responsible Israelis fully realize that peace can + not come about all at once. He therefore thought the objective was to + create a situation which would gradually reverse hostility and create a + situation in which Arabs and Israelis could learn to live together. He + thought, for instance, that it might be possible to agree that the + Israelis would occupy Sharm el-Sheikh for a period of five–ten years + with the possibility of review at the end of that period. If at that + time it appeared that there had been substantial progress toward living + together in peace, then the Israelis might as well decide that they + could return that position.

+

When I asked what evidence the Israelis would consider adequate + manifestation of Egyptian desire for peace, he repeated the familiar + position that Nasser’s + willingness to negotiate directly with the Israelis—“under Jarring, of course”—would be the first + step.

+

I said that if this were the case, I could not see why the Israelis + objected so strongly to our current diplomatic exercise if we were + simply trying to find out whether the Russians could deliver the + Egyptians for direct negotiations, and, what I felt was even more + important, deliver an Arab willingness to recognize the political + independence, the territorial integrity and inviolability of Israel and + renounce the use of force or threat of force against Israel. Rabin replied that these would be + very important for Israel, but that our document had not supplied that + kind of recognition for Israel.

+

He volunteered that when he had last been in Israel, he had been asked at + the Cabinet to explain U.S. intentions in this diplomatic exercise with + the Soviet Union. Rabin said + that he personally felt that the US without committing itself to the + principle of withdrawal, had been trying to probe how far the Soviet + Union and the UAR were willing to + commit themselves to peace.

+

I said we had developed our position in June 1967 on the + assumption—confirmed by Israeli statements—that Israel had no + territorial aspirations. Rabin + replied, “You were justified.”

+

Comments:

+

1. The nuance which is not clear is whether Rabin is referring to a firm but secret Cabinet decision + or to a consensus, such as Eban + refers to. While there may be a technical difference to cover Eban, Rabin’s blunt characterization may be more accurate in + describing the net effect of the Cabinet action.

+ +

2. Rabin himself noted that the + Cabinet could reverse itself, but he clearly sharply disagrees with the + Eban-Rafael formulation that + the Cabinet will make a decision only when the Arabs negotiate. Whatever + the technicality, Rabin states + firmly that the Cabinet has made up its mind as far as its UAR border is concerned, and Eban-Rafael continue to suggest that + the Cabinet has yet to commit itself. Rabin seems to believe that the “politicians”—to his + dismay—have misled us and feels strongly they should now state their + position forthrightly.

+

3. Going back to re-read the report of the November 3, 1968, Rusk-Eban conversation, I am struck by the careful way both + Eban and Rabin seem to be avoiding stating + that Israel wants permanent annexation of Sharm el-Sheikh. They seem to + be talking carefully about “a position” and not “sovereignty.”

+ + + Harold H. Saunders + Saunders initialed “H.H.S.” above his typed + signature. + + +
+ +
+ 37. Paper Prepared by the Ad Hoc Special Review Group on the Israeli + Nuclear Weapons ProgramSource: + Washington National Records Center, OSD Files: FRC 330–75–0103, Box 12, Israel. Top Secret; + Nodis. The paper is attached to a July 12 memorandum from NSC Staff Secretary Jeanne W. Davis to Rogers, Laird, Wheeler, Richardson, and Helms. All brackets are in the + original except those indicating text that remains classified. It + was supposed to serve as the basis of a July 16 meeting of the + special committee of the NSC, which the President cancelled after he + approved a July 19 memorandum that outlined guidance for Richardson and Packard in their meeting with + Rabin on the nuclear + weapons issue. See Documents 38 and 41. +

Washington, undated.

+

SCENARIO FOR DISCUSSIONS WITH ISRAELIS ON THEIR NUCLEAR + PROGRAM

+

A. US Objectives

+

1. Our objectives are to persuade Israel to:

+

a) Sign the NPT at an early date (by the + end of this year) and ratify it soon thereafter.

+

b) Reaffirm to the US in writing the assurance that Israel will not be + the first to introduce nuclear weapons into the Near East, specifying that “introduction” shall + mean possession of nuclear explosive devices.In presenting our requirements to the Israelis, we would not go + beyond this formulation. For our own internal purposes, we would + decide that [less than 1 line not + declassified]. [Footnote in the original.]

+

c) Give us assurances in writing that it will stop production and will + not deploy “Jericho” missiles or any other nuclear-capable strategic + missile.

+

2. Early signature and ratification of the NPT must be our minimum objective. The NPT provides the best basis for + international confidence in Israel’s intentions.

+

Bilateral assurances are equally important. They are also a desirable + adjunct to the NPT because of the time + factor. The Treaty does not enter into force until the three nuclear + signatories and 40 others sign and ratify (present score is one nuclear + and about 20 others) and this may take another six months to a year. + Even after the Treaty is in force it gives a signatory six months to + enter negotiations with the IAEA for a + safeguards arrangement, and it gives the signatory an additional 18 + months to conclude those negotiations. We need the bilateral assurances + to cover the interim and we should do our best to get them.

+

Israeli agreement to stop production and not to deploy strategic missiles + is important because the deployment of a delivery system that is + militarily cost effective only as a nuclear weapons carrier would + seriously vitiate confidence in Israel’s adherence to the NPT. We should therefore make a determined + effort, at least initially, to achieve this objective. However, if the + Israelis show a disposition to meet us on the nuclear issue but are + adamant on the Jericho missiles, we can drop back to a position of + insisting on non-deployment of missiles and an undertaking by the + Israelis to keep any further production secret.

+

B. Scenario

+

1. General Approach. The venue for our + negotiations with the Israelis should be kept in Washington. Ambassador + Barbour in Tel Aviv would be + kept informed in detail of the negotiations as they proceed and would be + asked to reinforce our representations to Rabin whenever this appeared desirable.

+

2. First Meeting. Ambassador Rabin would be asked to call upon + Under Secretaries Richardson and + Packard meeting jointly. The + Under Secretaries would say that in connection with Israel’s request to + advance the delivery date for the first Phantoms to August, we wish to + tie up loose ends left after the Warnke–Rabin + negotiations in October, 1968, + which led to our agreement to sell the aircraft.The negotiations occurred in November 1968. See Foreign + Relations, 1964–1968, volume XX, Arab-Israeli Dispute, + 1967–1968, Documents 306, 308, 309, 317, 330, and 333. Accordingly, we + would like to open discussions in Washington on Israel’s adherence to + the NPT and related questions + concerning Israel’s intentions with respect to nuclear weapons.

+

The Under Secretaries would stress the importance the US attaches to + Israel’s adherence to the NPT. Israel + told us last December it was studying the implications of adherence to + the NPT;See ibid., Documents 349 and 360. we would be + interested to hear what conclusions the GOI has reached. The Under Secretaries would also refer to + the Warnke-Rabin exchanges last November and say + we feel there are some unanswered questions concerning Israel’s + assurances to us on nuclear weapon forebearance. Specifically, we would + wish to have Israel’s confirmation that possession of nuclear weapons as well as testing and + deployment would constitute “introduction” of nuclear weapons. We would + also like to pursue the question of the purpose of Israel developing and + deploying a nuclear weapons delivery system—the “Jericho” missile—which + can only cast doubt on its nuclear assurances.

+

At the first meeting with Rabin + the US side would not explicitly link deliveries of the F–4s to the + Israeli response on the nuclear question, but our reference to the + request for early deliveries and the Warnke-Rabin + talks would clearly convey the direction of our thinking. Rabin’s tactic will probably be to + test how serious we are by refusing initially to go beyond the line + Israel has taken with us in past meetings: that the GOI has not made up its mind about the + NPT; that it has already given us assurances that it will not be the + first to introduce nuclear weapons into the area, and nothing further is + required. If he is unresponsive in this fashion, the Under Secretaries + would make clear their dissatisfaction and ask Rabin to call again in five or six + days time to continue the dialogue.

+

3. Second Meeting. If Rabin tries to stonewall us at the + second meeting the US side would tell him that Israel’s + uncommunicativeness on the nuclear question does not strike us as + consistent with the high level of cooperation which Israel expects of us + in support of its security. Israel’s [less than 1 line + not declassified] also impinges directly on US worldwide + security concerns and responsibilities. By the end of the meeting we + should lay before Rabin + precisely what we need, as outlined in section A above. We would make it + clear to Rabin that a lack of + response on Israel’s part raises a question regarding our ability to + continue meeting Israel’s arms requests.

+ +

4. Subsequent. Having presented our needs, we + would let the GOI formulate its + response in its own time, allowing the approaching date for delivery of + the F–4s to produce its own pressure on the GOI. Whenever and wherever the Israelis raised the subject + of the F–4s, the response would be that, given the terms of the sales + agreement and the uncertainties surrounding Israel’s nuclear intentions, + there are serious doubts about our ability to proceed with deliveries of + the F–4s so long as the matters under discussion with Under Secretaries + Richardson and Packard remain unresolved.

+

This would have the effect of turning down the Israeli request for + advancing delivery to August. However, no decision would be taken to + alter the scheduled September delivery of the F–4s until we get an + initial reading on Israeli attitudes and intentions.

+

5. Mrs. Meir’s + Visit. When Prime Minister Meir gets here the President and other senior US + officials would bear down on this subject, stressing that Israel’s + decisions in the [less than 1 line not + declassified] field have an important bearing on US security + and global interests, and reinforcing our objectives as they have + evolved in the meetings between Rabin and the Under Secretaries. The possibility should + also be kept in mind that Mrs. Meir may make a special appeal to the President, saying + that it is impossible for her government to sign the NPT or give us a bilateral commitment on + non-possession of nuclear weapons until after the elections in Israel + this October, and that in the meantime non-delivery of F–4s in September + would hurt the Labor Alignment’s chances. Our response to such an appeal + would have to be decided in the light of the way the earlier + negotiations had gone with the Israelis.

+

6. Public Confrontation. The USG would take no initiative to make this + a public issue. In the event that the Israelis maintain an unresponsive + line with us and show signs of going to Congress in an attempt to + undermine our position on deliveries of the F–4s, we should have ready a + range of actions that the Administration might take to counter this + move.

+
+ +
+ + 38. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security + Affairs (Kissinger) to President + NixonSource: National Archives, Nixon + Presidential Materials, NSC Files, + Box 337, Subject Files. Top Secret; Nodis; Sensitive. Sent for action. Tabs A–E are + attached. Tabs A and C–E are not printed. Tab B is printed as Document 37. All brackets are in the + original except those indicating text that remains + classified. + Washington, July + 19, 1969. + + SUBJECT + Israeli Nuclear Program + +

You will recall that you created a special group—because of the + sensitivity of the issue—to consider the status of the Israeli nuclear + program and our possible responses to it. We have met twice at the top + level (Packard, Richardson, Helms, Wheeler, Kissinger) to consider analyses drawn up by a small + working group under us.

+

The paper at Tab A is my summary of the situation as our group sees it + after reviewing the intelligence and of our discussion of the issues + which that situation raises. This is long, but I believe you will want + to read through it because this is a complex problem.

+

The Situation

+

[2 lines not declassified] We judge that the + introduction of nuclear weapons into the Near East would increase the + dangers in an already dangerous situation and therefore not be in our + interest.

+

Israel has 12 surface-to-surface missiles delivered from France. It has + set up a production line and plans by the end of 1970 to have a total + force of 24–30, ten of which are programmed for nuclear warheads.

+

When the Israelis signed the contract buying the Phantom aircraft last + November, they committed themselves “not to be the first to introduce nuclear weapons into the Near East.” + But it was plain from the discussion that they interpreted that to mean + they could possess nuclear weapons as long as they did not test, deploy, + or make them public. In signing the contract, we wrote Rabin saying that we believe mere + “possession” constitutes “introduction” and that Israel’s introduction + of nuclear weapons by our definition would be cause for us to cancel the + contract.

+

Delivery of the Phantoms is scheduled to begin in September. But some of + the aircraft will be ready at the factory in August, and the Israelis + have asked to begin taking delivery then.

+ +

What We Want

+

There was general agreement in our group that we must recognize one important distinction to begin with:

+

1. Israel’s secret possession of nuclear weapons would increase the + potential danger in the Middle East, and we do not desire complicity in + it.

+

2. In this case, public knowledge is almost as dangerous as possession + itself. This is what might spark a Soviet nuclear guarantee for the + Arabs, tighten the Soviet hold on the Arabs and increase the danger of + our involvement. Indeed, the Soviets might have an incentive not to + know.

+

What this means is that, while we might ideally like to halt actual + Israeli possession, what we really want at a minimum may be just to keep + Israeli possession from becoming an established international fact.

+

In our discussions, the following positions were taken:

+

1. Everyone agreed that, as a minimum, we want Israel to sign the NPT. This is not because signing will make + any difference in Israel’s actual nuclear program because Israel could + produce warheads clandestinely. Israel’s signature would, however, give + us a publicly feasible issue to raise with the Israeli government—a way + of opening the discussion. It would also publicly commit Israel not to + acquire nuclear weapons.

+

2. Everyone agreed that, in addition, we should try to get from Israel a + bilateral understanding on Israel’s nuclear intentions because the + NPT is not precise enough and + because the Phantom aircraft are potential nuclear weapons carriers.

+

3. Opinion was divided on the nature of the assurances we should seek and + on the tactics of seeking them:

+

—The JCS felt that if Israel’s program becomes + known, we should be in a position to say we did everything in our power + to prevent Israel from going nuclear. JCS felt that we should try to + stop Israel’s missile production and use the Phantoms as leverage.

+

—Defense felt that we could live with the + existence of Israeli nuclear weapons provided they were not deployed. + Defense agreed that we should try to stop missile production and that we + should use the Phantoms as leverage to get the assurances we want.

+

—State believed that we should try to keep Israel + from going any further with its nuclear weapons program—it may be so + close to completion that Israel would be willing—and make a record for + ourselves of having tried. State has joined in suggesting asking the + Israelis to halt production of the missiles. State would not threaten to + withhold the Phantoms in the first approach to the Israelis but would be + prepared to imply that threat if they were unresponsive to our first + approach.

+ +

At the end of our discussions, State, Defense, and JCS agreed to describe + a course of action which represented as nearly as possible the consensus + of our group. Despite the different shades of opinion expressed in our + discussions, the State, Defense and JCS members have concurred in the + paper at Tab B which proposes asking the Israelis to:

+

1. Sign the NPT at an early date (by the + end of this year) and ratify it soon thereafter.

+

2. Reaffirm to the US in writing the assurance that Israel will not be + the first to introduce nuclear weapons into the Near East, specifying + that “introduction” shall mean possession of nuclear explosive devices. + [For our own internal purposes, we would decide that we could tolerate + Israeli activity short of assembly of a completed nuclear device.]

+

3. Give us assurances in writing that it will stop production and will + not deploy “Jericho” missiles or any other nuclear-capable strategic + missile. [NOTE: I do not believe we can ask Israel not to produce + missiles. Israel is sovereign in this decision, and I do not see how we + can ask it not to produce a weapon just because we do not see it as an + effective weapon without nuclear warheads. We might persuade them not to + deploy what they produce on grounds that the rest of the world will + believe that the missiles must have nuclear warheads.]

+

This paper recommends approaching the Israelis in two steps:

+

1. First step. Richardson and + Packard call in Rabin and say that, in connection + with Israel’s request to advance the delivery date for the first + Phantoms to August, we want to tie up loose ends left by the exchange of + letters surrounding that contract (i.e., the difference over what would + constitute “introduction” of nuclear weapons). They would stress the + importance of Israel’s signature of the NPT and ask for Israel’s confirmation that “possession” of + nuclear weapons as well as testing and deployment would constitute + “introduction”. They would also say that Israel’s development and + deployment of missiles—a nuclear weapons delivery system—would cast + doubt on its nuclear assurances. They would not in this first meeting + explicitly link delivery of the Phantoms with Israel’s response.

+

2. Second step. If Rabin tried + to stonewall, Richardson and + Packard would state exactly + what we want and make clear that Israeli unresponsiveness would raise a + question about our ability to continue meeting Israel’s arms + request.

+

The Dilemma We Face

+

Our problem is that Israel will not take us seriously on the nuclear + issue unless they believe we are prepared to withhold something they + very much need—the Phantoms or, even more, their whole military supply + relationship with us.

+ +

On the other hand, if we withhold the Phantoms and they make this fact + public in the United States, enormous political pressure will be mounted + on us. We will be in an indefensible position if we cannot state why we + are withholding the planes. Yet if we explain our position publicly, we + will be the ones to make Israel’s possession of nuclear weapons public + with all the international consequences this entails.

+

The Options

+

In the end, we have these broad options:

+

1. Initiate discussion now and try to reach an understanding before + delivery of the Phantoms becomes an active issue in September.

+

2. Initiate discussion of the nuclear issue in September when Mrs. + Meir comes, letting delivery + of the Phantoms begin.

+

3. Initiate discussion of the issue in September and not let delivery + begin until we have a satisfactory response to our request for + assurances.

+

4. Not raise the issue.

+

I recommend the first.Nixon initialed his + approval of this option. I would propose that:

+

1. Richardson and Packard call in Rabin and go through the first step + as outlined in their paper—express our desire to tie up loose ends on + Israel’s nuclear assurances to us but not + explicitly link delivery of the Phantoms to their reply.

+

2. If Rabin’s reaction is + negative, I call Rabin in and + stress your concern that they sign the NPT, confirm that they will not + “introduce” (defined as “possess”) nuclear weapons, and agree not to + deploy their missiles.

+

3. We then take stock before committing ourselves on withholding the + Phantoms.

+

The rationale for this approach is that:

+

1. It raises the question with the Israelis before delivery of the + Phantoms becomes an active issue. We shall have to find an excuse for + not delivering in August, but the scheduled delivery would begin in + September. By raising the question now, we at least have a chance to + keep the Phantom delivery from becoming an issue.

+

2. By relating our discussion to the contract, it implies—without + committing us—that we are questioning the Phantom delivery and thereby + encourage the Israelis to take us seriously.

+

3. It maintains your control over the point at which we do or do not + introduce the threat of withholding the Phantoms.

+ +

I recommend that you read through the papers that follow before you + decide, because this is a complex issue. They are written to help you + work your way in more detail through the pros and cons of the major + issues (Tab A), to enable you to see how the consensus of the group + would play itself out in a course of action (Tab B), and to present to + you systematically the principal issues for decision (Tab C). The two + remaining papers are background: at Tab D, the exchange of letters + consummating the Phantom sale for your reference; at Tab E, the basic + working group papers that our group started from.

+
+ +
+ 39. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern + and South Asian Affairs (Sisco) + to President Nixon and Secretary + of State RogersSource: National Archives, Nixon + Presidential Materials, NSC Files, + Box 650, Country Files, Middle East, Middle East Negotiations. + Secret; Nodis. Sisco’s + memorandum is attached to a July 23 memorandum from Kissinger to Nixon, which is stamped: “The + President has seen.” Kissinger wrote that Sisco’s “most interesting reflections” were that: 1) + Soviet officials judged that they could “live with the present + situation in the Near East”; and 2) the United States could “get + through the next six weeks with the British and French,” but they + would “become restless” if no progress was made by the time the + UN General Assembly opened on + September 16. + Washington, + July 21, 1969. + + SUBJECT + Report on Moscow Talks on Middle East, July + 14–18, 1969 + +

From two meetings with Foreign Minister Gromyko and three sessions with a delegation headed by + Deputy Foreign Minister Vinogradov, I return with the following reflections and + judgments:The undated memorandum from + Kissinger to Nixon that approved Sisco’s trip to Moscow is printed + in Foreign + Relations, 1969–1976, volume XII, Soviet Union, January + 1969–October 1970, Document 63. See also ibid., Documents 67 and 69, for additional accounts of + Sisco’s discussions in + Moscow.

+

1. First, the Soviets want the bilaterals to continue + for both Middle East and overall US–USSR reasons. They are + using the talks at least in part as a demonstration to the Arabs that + their efforts to get Israel out of the occupied territories continue + unabated, and they see utility in them in discouraging or, failing that, + in insulating the escalation of violence in the area against major power + involvement. More broadly, it is clear from Gromyko’s remarks, they consider the bilateral talks as + responsive, in the context + of our overall relations, to the President’s desire to find areas of + agreement of mutual benefit and to move toward an era of negotiation, + not confrontation. From our point of view, the bilaterals are an element + of restraint in the area, they provide the means to keep the heat on the + Soviets, and are more manageable than the four power talks.

+

2. Second, the Soviets would like a political + settlement which would get the Israelis out of the occupied territories, + but more significantly, they gave no serious signs of + concern over the present status quo in the area and seemed prepared + to live with it as manageable. While attacking Israeli + “stubbornness,” they made no pronouncements that the area was moving + towards general war. Gromyko + continued to condition talks on Middle East conventional arms limitation + on prior Israeli withdrawal, and he did not even mention to me his July + 10 speech proposal of a Middle Eastern nuclear free zone which + presumably is intended to get at the Israeli nuclear option.The text of Gromyko’s speech is in The Current + Digest of the Soviet Press, vol. 21, August 6, 1969, pp. + 6–10. In a July 10 memorandum to Nixon, Kissinger described Gromyko’s language as “temperate and on the whole + positive as regards relations with the US . . . All told, in my + judgment, this speech leaves Soviet policy where it has been; but + the temperate tone on relations with us and, especially, on arms + talks will probably be cited—as the Soviets undoubtedly intended it + to be—by Administration opponents as justifying ‘restraint’ on our + part.” (Foreign + Relations, 1969–1976, volume XII, Soviet Union, January + 1969–October 1970, Document 65) DCI + Helms informed Rogers on July 14 that with regard + to the Middle East, Gromyko’s speech offered “nothing new, and stresses + again Moscow’s position that Israeli occupation of Arab territory is + the obstacle to a political settlement. Nevertheless, Gromyko does not indicate any + extreme concern about the Arab-Israeli situation and—unlike last + year—he does not threaten Israel with the consequences of failure to + fulfill the Security Council resolution of November, 1967. Moreover, + Gromyko notes that + Israeli withdrawal must be accompanied by Arab recognition of + Israel’s right to exist, thus publicly recording a recent change in + the Soviet position. Less authoritative spokesmen often continue to + support withdrawal as a unilateral first step toward a settlement.” + (Memorandum from Helms to + Rogers, July 14; ibid., + Document 66)

+

3. Third, they face something of a quandary about + how to handle the UAR since, to get a + settlement which will restore occupied Arab territory and bring greater + stability to the area thus reducing the risks to them of further Arab + military setbacks, they will need to press Nasser to take steps which could undermine him + politically. I found no evidence that the Soviets are + prepared to press Nasser on + the key points of peace and negotiations. I believe they have + concluded that Nasser must + continue to be their primary tool in the Middle East, that they must + continue to support him politically and materially (thus no present + interest in Middle East conventional arms limitation), and that they + believe Nasser is in more danger + of being ousted if he agrees to negotiate peace with Israel than in the + present no-peace-no-war circumstances. This is borne out by Syrian + President Atassi’s remarks to French Ambassador Seydoux in Moscow that the Soviets have taken a + decision not to press Nasser for + the time being to make concessions.

+

4. Fourth, their strategy will be to try to chip away + at the US position, using the four power mechanism, the UN corridors, and the public forum of the + UN Security Council and General + Assembly this fall to put pressure on us to press the Israelis to + withdraw, or at least to isolate us to the degree possible by portraying + American policy as pro-Israeli. They have already informed us of their + intention to pursue bilateral talks with the UK and France over the next few weeks.

+

In these circumstances, I believe our strategy and tactics for the next + two months should be:

+

First, play it cool. We have put forward a + proposal which will satisfy neither the Arabs nor the Israelis but which + protects Israel’s basic interests, our own negotiating position and the + fundamental principles we consider essential to any settlement.The U.S. counterproposal that Sisco presented in Moscow is in + telegram 3485 from Moscow, July 15. (National Archives, Nixon + Presidential Materials, NSC Files, + Box 649, Country Files, Middle East, Middle East + Negotiations) In brief, our counterproposal (a) adheres to + the concept that Israeli withdrawal must be in the context of a + contractual peace agreement arrived at by direct talks “at some + stage;”Nixon underlined point a. (b) would resolve + the refugee problem on the basis of equity to both sides; and (c) leaves + it to the parties to work out borders and practical security + arrangements.

+

We are in a sound public posture. Having presented a balanced + counterproposal in Moscow, we have put the ball in the Soviet court and + they are obviously uncomfortable about how to return it.

+

Second, we should insist on a specific and an overall + Soviet reaction to the proposal I left in Moscow and not permit + them to nibble at the edges on a piecemeal basis.Nixon + underlined this sentence and wrote “yes” in the margin. + Gromyko knows that greater + specificity by us on withdrawal requires greater specificity on peace and negotiations on + their part. They should fully understand what is fundamental to us and + where our negotiating position could be flexible if they are able to + deliver Nasser. Throughout I + tried to convey our sense of confidence that we speak from a position of + strength, and while we do not like the present situation in the area, we + can live with it if necessary rather than concede on fundamentals.

+

We got four signs of how the Soviets will play it over the coming + weeks:

+ +

1. They want to do more business on the Middle East in Moscow as a show + to the Arabs that we are going after them, not vice versa.Nixon + underlined this sentence. Just as the Israelis fear we will + make them sacrificial lambs for overall US–USSR reasons, so apparently + the Arabs needed assurance that Soviet concern over Communist China + would not tempt them to make concessions to us which the Arabs would + find extremely difficult to swallow. We should continue to insist that + Moscow not become the venue of our talks, but carry on our business with + minimal fanfare in both capitals as desirable and necessary.Nixon + underlined this sentence and wrote “good” in the margin.

+

2. Rather than exchanging further documents, they want to engage in a + process of point-by-point negotiation based on their June 17 draftSee Document + 34. and our counterproposal.Nixon + underlined most of this sentence. I agree we should avoid + further exchanges of documents. However, the procedure suggested by the + Soviets is premature at best, given the substantial gaps between our + positions. We should insist on a full response to our total + proposal.Nixon underlined this sentence and wrote “good” in + the margin.

+

3. They will try to concentrate their fire on withdrawal, + demilitarization, and borders while marking time on other points we + consider equally fundamental.Nixon underlined “fire on + withdrawal, demilitarization, and borders.” It should not be + difficult to avoid concentration on these aspects to the exclusion of + others.

+

4. They will try to get us to spell out specifically our views on a + Jordanian settlement, particularly on the territorial question, since + Nasser has linked this with + the UAR settlement. While this is no + doubt a real problem for Nasser, + the UAR-Jordanian linkage also relieves the UAR of making the tough decisions on peace and + negotiations.Nixon underlined the last phrase + of this sentence. In my response to Gromyko, I said that we agreed with + the basic concept that a package settlement must include both the UAR and Jordanian aspect, and possibly + even Syria if it ever changes its tune. I did not, therefore, preclude a + general discussion of the Jordanian aspect with the Soviets at some + later stage. However, I reserved our position by insisting on prior + progress on the UAR aspect of the + settlement before serious thought could be given to such a general + exchange.Nixon underlined most of this sentence. (I + got some intimation that the Soviets for the first time have become + aware of direct Israeli-Jordanian contacts and their desire to engage us + on this aspect not only meets Nasser’s requirements to delay difficult decisions but + could reflect some Soviet + concern over a separate settlement by Hussein, leaving Nasser to stew in his own juice.)Nixon + underlined “separate settlement by Hussein, leaving Nasser to stew in his own juice.”

+

Third, while the two power efforts go forward we should + continue close bilateral consultations with the UK and France. From my talks with + Stewart and Schumann, it is clear that they have acquiesced, however + reluctantly, to the major focus being on the US–USSR talks. However, + there are real difficulties ahead with them if, as is likely, no major + progress is made by early September. Stewart told me he is under + pressure to get the Suez Canal open, and he feels their interests in the + Arab states require a UK initiative in + the fall. Schumann, while less doctrinaire than ultra-Gaullist Debre, + shares the latter’s view that the Four Power mechanism is a useful + instrument for pursuing French interests and prestige in the Arab world. + I see no decisive change in French Middle East policy in the foreseeable + future vis-à-vis Israel, only a softened and surface change of + style.

+

On substance, the UK, and to a greater + extent the French, are more disposed to favor arrangements devised by + the major powers with prime reliance on a long time UN presence rather than the directly + negotiated peace and security arrangements which the Israelis are + insisting upon. There is considerable parallelism of UK, French, and USSR interests in the Arab world which will continue to + plague us in the days ahead. In my judgment we might + well begin to look for ways to disengage from the automatic + assumption being made by our allies on the longevity of the four + power talks. They should not become an end in themselves. When + the President agreed to four power talks it was in the framework of + prior progress in bilateral discussions. We have given the four power + talks a good try; for the foreseeable future we might + well return to the original conception of preconditioning further + formal four power meetings on progress in the bilateral context with + the UK, France and the + USSR.Nixon highlighted this sentence in the + margin.

+

Fourth, we have begun to lay the groundwork for + bilateral discussions between the numerous Foreign Ministers who + will be present during the opening two weeks of the UN General Assembly in the last + half of September. Israel will wish to mark time during the election + period which is likely to become more complicated. They will, at least + for the record, contend unjustifiably that the document we left in + Moscow last week is a further erosion. We can nevertheless demonstrate + clearly to the Israelis, even though they will not grant us this point, + that we have held firmly on fundamentals. In any event, it is salutary + for the Israelis to know our determination to act independently of them + when we judge this is necessary + in our own national interest. Moreover, the Moscow trip, as part of the + balancing act we are in, should help keep up Hussein’s morale in the short run.

+

The present Israeli position is unrealistic: they simply want Jarring to call the UAR to a meeting with them on the basis of + an oft-repeated promise they will be flexible in such talks. Jarring, whom I briefed in Stockholm, + responded favorably to my suggestion that he plan to be available during + the early days of the Assembly. However, he made clear he needs a common + document as a fresh substantive framework in order to renew his efforts + with the parties. After reading our latest proposal and comparing it + with the Soviet document of June 17, he said we are still far apart.

+

Fifth, we must, of course, remain ready to respond + affirmatively if the unexpected occurs: a genuine Soviet move in our + direction. At present, we and the Soviets are essentially + agreed on the principle that withdrawal can only take place in the + context of a contractual peace agreement. If the Soviets should in fact + move further toward our position, my own judgment is that neither the + form of a commitment to peace, nor navigation rights, nor refugees, nor + withdrawal and borders on the UAR side + of the settlement will become major sticking points. In addition to the + need for progress on the Jordanian side, the major substantive sticking + points are likely to relate to the kind of practical security + arrangements on the ground which should be part of the settlement. I do + not believe this aspect can be satisfactorily resolved by major powers + in either the bilateral or multilateral context. With this and related + problems in mind, I suggested to the Soviets that we should consider the + possibility that we will not succeed in reaching agreement on all issues + and that rather than permit our efforts to abort, we should develop a + common document for Jarring + recording agreement on as many points as possible and formulating points + on which we do not agree in neutral language not prejudging either + side’s position. They seem tempted. With such a document Jarring could renew his efforts with + the parties with continuing US and USSR support.

+

Sixth, we will want to keep in mind the forthcoming + visit of Prime Minister Meir + in late September which, if an unexpected narrowing of the + US–USSR gap should occur, could provide an opportunity + for a major effort with the Israelis. We are, as you know, + ahead of the Israelis in the substantive positions taken, even though we + have protected their vital interests and negotiating position. If the + Soviets should surprisingly decide to get out ahead of the UAR, or even + more surprising, should move Nasser forward on the fundamental elements of + settlement, the President will be faced with some hard decisions with + respect to US–Israeli relations and a peace settlement in the Middle + East.

+ +

Finally, from a public + relations point of view we should continue to portray our + efforts as a continuing process in pursuit of a permanent peace with the + Moscow interlude neither a breakthrough nor a + breakdown.Nixon circled “neither a + breakthrough nor a breakdown.” We need to continue to avoid + in present circumstances the twin dangers of stimulating unfounded + expectations or overdrawn characterizations of failure.

+

The above thoughts, of course, are not recommendations, which must await + the Soviet response to our counterproposal. However, they do reflect the + thrust of my present thinking in the light of the Moscow talks.

+

I will be joining the President for the last half of his trip,Nixon was in Southeast Asia, South Asia, and Romania + July 23–August 3. and I will be available if the President + desires to discuss the matter further. There will be considerable + interest in the Middle East in Delhi, Bucharest and London.

+ + + Joseph J. Sisco + + +
+ +
+ 40. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security + Affairs (Kissinger) to Acting + Secretary of State RichardsonSource: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 337, Subject Files. Top + Secret; Nodis; Sensitive. Drafted by Saunders. + Washington, July + 22, 1969. + + SUBJECT + U.S. Action in Regard to Israel: Nuclear Program + +

The President has reviewed the record of our discussions and the studies + produced in response to NSSM 40.See Document + 31. Prior to his departure,According to the President’s Daily Diary, President Nixon departed Andrews Air Force + Base aboard Air Force One at 10:05 p.m. on July 22. (National + Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Central Files) + The President was headed to the mid-Pacific to greet the Apollo XI + astronauts who were returning from the moon. the + President:

+ +

1. Approved the action described in paragraph B2 (“First Meeting”) of + your paper “Scenario for Discussions with Israelis on their Nuclear + Program”.Document 37.

+

2. Instructed that the discussion not be carried beyond that point until + he has reviewed the record of your conversations.

+

3. Specifically withheld authority to link explicitly at this stage the + delivery of conventional weapons to the Israeli response on the nuclear + question.

+

4. Instructed that you are the only official authorized at this stage to + discuss this subject with the Israelis, although the Under Secretary of + Defense should, of course, be present as you have suggested.

+

5. Requested a full report on your discussions.Printed from a copy that indicates Kissinger signed the + original.

+
+ +
+ 41. Memorandum of ConversationSource: National Archives, Nixon Presidential + Materials, NSC Files, Box 605, + Country Files, Middle East, Israel, Vol. III. Top Secret; Nodis. + Drafted by Atherton. An + unsigned covering memorandum from Richardson to Nixon was drafted by Atherton on July 31. (Ibid., RG 59, Lot Files, + Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, Office of Israel and + Arab-Israel Affairs, 1951–1976, Box 27) Sisco’s July 28 briefing memorandum with talking + points for Richardson is + ibid., Central Files 1967–69, DEF 12–1 ISR. It is published in + National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 189, Document 13. + Washington, July + 29, 1969. + + SUBJECT + Israel’s Nuclear Weapon and Strategic Missile Policy + + + PARTICIPANTS + Lieutenant General Yitzhak + Rabin, Ambassador of Israel + Shlomo Argov, Minister, + Embassy of Israel + Moshe Raviv, Counselor, Embassy of Israel + Elliot L. Richardson, The + Acting Secretary + David Packard, Deputy + Secretary of Defense + Alfred L. Atherton, Jr., + Country Director, Israel and Arab–Israel Affairs + +

Mr. Richardson said he was aware + of Ambassador Rabin’s + discussions last year with Assistant Secretary of Defense Warnke relating to the introduction of nuclear weapons in + the Middle East.See Foreign + Relations, 1964–1968, volume XX, Arab-Israeli Dispute, + 1967–1968, Documents 306, 308, 309, 317, and 330. In light of + subsequent progress toward ratification of the NPT, we believed it + useful to review the status of this question as it was left in the + exchange of letters between Rabin and Warnke + of November 22 and November 27, respectively, of last year,See ibid., Document 333 and footnote 2 thereto. which had brought out + differing US and Israeli interpretations of what was meant by + “introduce” nuclear weapons.

+

Rabin observed there were two + problems: (a) nuclear weapons in the Middle East and (b) the NPT. Warnke had not discussed the NPT. Which, he asked, was the subject of today’s talk?

+

Mr. Richardson said we saw the + two problems as inseparable. The NPT + question had moved forward since that time and we thought both questions + should be reviewed together. Mr. Richardson then read the following oral statement:

+

“We want to discuss today a subject of deep concern to the United + States—the possibility that nuclear weapons and nuclear weapons delivery + systems will be introduced into the Middle East.

+

“This would be a development the United States would regard not only as a + tragedy for the Middle East but as a direct threat to United States + national security. Our efforts to halt the spread of nuclear weapons + worldwide would be dealt a severe blow and the possible risk of + US-Soviet confrontation would be enhanced.

+

“For these reasons, Israel’s nuclear policy is a subject of great + importance to us. It transcends considerations of purely bilateral + significance to our two nations.

+

“We are aware of Israel’s assurances—made publicly at the highest level + of its government as well as to us privately—that Israel will not be the + first area state to introduce nuclear weapons into the Middle East. We + attach great weight to these assurances. But with the Nuclear + Non-Proliferation Treaty in existence, unilateral assurances are no + longer sufficient in themselves to give the world confidence that Israel + does not intend to manufacture nuclear weapons.

+

“We are particularly troubled by Israel’s continued delay in signing the + NPT because of Israel’s potential + for nuclear weapons production. Israel is not just another state that + for one reason or another is delaying its adherence to the Treaty. The + world knows that unlike most other states Israel has the technical + capability to build nuclear weapons. It knows that Israel has a 26 + megawatt nuclear reactor capable of producing fissionable material in + sufficient quantity to build bombs. It is also becoming aware that Israel has had developed + and is acquiring surface-to-surface missiles capable of carrying nuclear + warheads.

+

“Because of this proximity to the nuclear weapons threshold, Israel’s + attitude toward the NPT is being + closely watched by other small and medium-sized states who are waiting + to see whether nuclear weapons non-proliferation can be made to prevail + as a global principle.

+

“We therefore attach utmost importance to Israel’s early signature and + ratification of the NPT. Last December, + Prime Minister Eshkol wrote to President Johnson that Israel was + studying the implications of Israel’s adherence to the NPT.See ibid., + Document 349. We + would welcome the Ambassador’s comments concerning the conclusions the + Government of Israel has reached.

+

“Upon reviewing the Ambassador’s conversations with Assistant Secretary + Warnke last November, we were + struck by the evident difference between our two governments over what + constitutes “introduction” of nuclear weapons. The Ambassador expressed + the view, as we understand it, that a state could possess a nuclear + explosive device but so long as that device was “unadvertised” and + “untested” it could not be considered as having been “introduced”.

+

“The U.S. Government cannot accept this interpretation of “introduction,” + as was made clear in Secretary Warnke’s letter to the Ambassador concerning the F–4 + sale. We would like to have Israel’s assurance that when it says it will + not be the first to introduce nuclear weapons into the area it means + that it will not possess nuclear weapons.

+

“Israel has had developed and tested in France the so-called MD–620 or + “Jericho” strategic missile which is capable of carrying a nuclear + warhead. Some of the missiles remaining after tests are already in + Israel.

+

“We are disturbed at Israel’s acquisition of this missile because it + makes sense to us only as a nuclear weapons carrier. We recognize that + Israel claims that it can be used with other warheads; this is not, + however, the way the world will see it. Whatever assurances Israel + extends with respect to nuclear weapons will be seriously weakened by + deployment of strategic nuclear-capable missiles.

+

“For this reason, we hope Israel will agree not to produce or deploy the + Jericho missile. There is no sign of an active SSM program in any Arab + country and no sign of Soviet interest in providing any of their Arab + friends with assistance in either this or the nuclear weapons + field.”

+

Mr. Richardson summarized by + noting we were asking (a) for the Ambassador’s comments on the results + of the GOI’s study of the NPT + question, (b) for an assurance + that “non-introduction” means “non-possession” of nuclear weapons and + (c) for assurances about the production and deployment of the Jericho + missile.

+

Concerning the NPT, Ambassador Rabin said he could only repeat what Prime Minister + Eshkol had said in his December 4, 1968 letter to President + Johnson—namely that Israel was studying the question of NPT signature. There had been no change in + this respect in GOI policy. Rabin said the NPT had many aspects not directly related + to the real problems of the Middle East. He had received instructions + the previous day to the effect that Israel had not concluded its study + and he is not authorized to comment before that study is completed. + Deputy Secretary Packard asked if + he could estimate when that would be. Rabin noted that there had been a Cabinet change in + Israel and that the Government faced other issues which were more + pressing and more immediate.

+

On the question of introducing nuclear weapons, Rabin said parenthetically he + interpreted this as meaning introduction by Middle Eastern states, not + by major powers which have them there already. First, Rabin continued, he wanted to clarify + his November conversation with Warnke. When Warnke asked for an interpretation of “introduce” he + (Rabin) had said he was not + clear about the question and could not answer officially but would + appreciate hearing the US interpretation from Warnke. Emphasizing that he personally + had no knowledge of nuclear weapons, he had asked Warnke two questions: (a) Would + Warnke consider an untested + nuclear weapon to be an effective weapon? This would not be so in the + case of conventional weapons. (b) Would Warnke consider a weapon, which had not been advertised + and proven, to be a weapon that could be used? In asking these questions + Rabin said he was seeking + to learn the US interpretation; he was not representing the Israeli + position. On the basic question of nuclear weapons in the Middle East, + he could now only repeat his government’s position that it would not be + the first state in the Middle East to introduce such weapons.

+

Commenting on the Acting Secretary’s oral statement, Rabin said he wanted to make clear + that he was not accepting the US assumption that Israel has the + capability to build nuclear weapons. He could say neither that Israel + was capable nor that it was not. He wanted to note, however, that the US + has arrangements with Israel of a kind that do not even exist between + the US and its allies, and which demonstrate the extent to which Israel + has given us the opportunity to have a close look at what Israel is + doing in the nuclear field.

+

Mr. Richardson said that our + purpose in raising the interpretation of the word “introduce” was not to + reopen the Warnke-Rabin discussion but to note that the + question had been left last November with no meeting of minds. This had + been made specific when Warnke + had agreed to amend the last + line of his November 27 letter to Rabin to avoid any implication that Israel accepted the + US interpretation. We now want to move beyond that point and are seeking + Israel’s concurrence in our interpretation. As stated in Warnke’s letter, that interpretation is + that “The physical possession and control of nuclear arms by a Middle + Eastern power would be deemed to constitute the introduction of nuclear + weapons.” Concerning the NPT we are + anxious to learn more about Israel’s position. The risks inherent in + nuclear proliferation bring the NPT + into the foreground at this stage, given the movement toward signature + and ratification. We are discussing the matter with the Soviets, + Japanese and Germans, hence the timeliness of raising it with Israel + also.

+

Rabin commented that following + the President’s European trip, Mr. Nixon had said the US would not twist any arms about + signing the NPT, and understood the difficulties inherent in asking the + West Germans to sign just before their elections.Nixon made + these remarks in a press conference on March 4 after returning from + his European trip. See Public Papers: Nixon, 1969, pp. + 186–187. Mr. Richardson said he would not want to engage in a + semantic discussion. We have been discussing the matter with the Germans + and think we have reasonable assurances that they will sign after their + elections. We also think the Japanese will sign. Rabin replied that he was not saying + that Israel would not sign but he could not say it would.

+

Rabin noted that there had been + a recent US visit to DimonaA U.S. inspection + team visited the Dimona facility July 10–13. (Telegram 102256 to Tel + Aviv, June 21; National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, + NSC Files, Box 604, Country + Files, Middle East, Israel, Vol. II) and that everything + seemed to be working as agreed. The Acting Secretary said he would not + wish to record any complaints about the Dimona visit in this + conversation. Nevertheless, Dimona visits do not obviate our concern + about nuclear weapons, missiles and the NPT. In this connection there were additional + considerations to those he had already mentioned: (a) on the + proliferation problem, Israel’s position was pivotal for other + countries; (b) in terms of US national interests, serious consequences + were foreseeable if Israel introduced nuclear weapons. Specifically, the + Soviets would feel compelled to come to the assistance of the Arabs in + some way since the Arabs do not have a nuclear capability. Rabin repeated that Israel had given + us assurances about its nuclear intentions. Mr. Richardson replied that, speaking + bluntly, those assurances had been hedged. If “non-introduction” means + only that the weapons will not be tested and advertised, we are on the + brink of a serious situation. If “introduction” is defined in the + narrowest possible sense, meaning that all but minimal final steps will + have been taken, then the + situation is dangerous and potentially destabilizing. We see risks of a + US-Soviet confrontation in the existing Middle East situation. Those + risks would be increased radically if nuclear weapons were introduced; + hence we feel compelled to raise this subject. Stating that he + understood the Ambassador would need to consult his government, the + Acting Secretary said he wanted to underscore the seriousness with which + we view this matter. We would like to go beyond the point reached in the + Rabin-Warnke talks.

+

Rabin concluded that, although + the Israeli position is already well known, he would of course convey + Mr. Richardson’s comments to + Jerusalem.

+
+ +
+ 42. Telegram From the Embassy in Israel to the Department of + StateSource: National + Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 604, Country Files, Middle East, Israel, + Vol. II. Secret; Nodis. All brackets are in the original except + those indicating garbled text. + Tel Aviv, July 31, 1969, 1615Z. +

2941. Subj: Dimona Visit. Ref: State 124641.Not found.

+

Summary: Ambassador July 31 told Prime Minister + Meir that US team which + visited Dimona early July had not been able to make full examination and + requested further one-day visit next month. Mrs. Meir replied this impossible, since any + departure from established routine would require action by Cabinet and + Foreign Affairs Committee of Knesset, which was out of question in + period before elections.U.S. inspections of + Dimona, which began in January 1964 under President Johnson, + occurred roughly once per year. President Kennedy had insisted that + U.S. representatives be allowed to inspect Dimona biannually, but + neither he nor Johnson could persuade Prime Minister Eshkol to agree + to such a timetable. Before the visit in July, a U.S. team had not + inspected the facility since June 1968. (Telegram 36436 to Tel Aviv, + March 8; National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 604, Country Files, + Middle East, Israel, Vol. I)

+

1. In order present substance of reftel, Ambassador sought appointment + with Prime Minister Meir early + this week. Prime Minister could not arrange time until July 31 and + meeting was held this afternoon. DCM + accompanied Ambassador and DirGen PM’s office Yaakov Herzog and Asst + DirGen MFA Bitan also present. + Conversation took about one hour.

+ +

2. Amb began by reading from reftel at length. He noted especially that + he had been connected with visits for some years, knew GOI problems, but felt that fact visits + had become routine, perhaps too routine, had interfered with fundamental + purpose for which they had been established. He also pointed out matter + was one of substance, not hospitality, and team was pleased with cordial + personal reception. Mrs. Meir + said Israelis had also been well impressed by US team.

+

3. In reply to Amb’s presentation, Mrs. Meir said she had been in on this matter from beginning. + She had been at Ben Gurion’s house first time he had to make decision to + agree to visit,Documentation on U.S. + concerns about the Dimona facility and Israeli Prime Minister + Ben-Gurion’s agreement to U.S. inspections is in Foreign + Relations, 1961–1963, volume XVIII, Middle East, + 1962–1963. and she knew how difficult it had been + for him, first several visits had been made without knowledge rest of + Cabinet, until press leak in New York Times (Amb + interjected this had been from Israeli side) brought matter out and it + had to be taken up in Cabinet and Knesset Foreign Affairs Committee, + much to discomfiture of then Prime Minister, Eshkol. Since then Cabinet + and ForAff Comite have always known about visits. She could not say that + everyone had been extremely happy about visits, but what had enabled + them to go on was fact that govt action would have had to be taken to + stop them, and it had been possible to avoid this. This year US had + suggested that visit be somewhat earlier, in view of coming elections, + etc., but she had said no, let it go on on schedule, so that there will + be no variance from established procedure and so no opportunity for + basic decision to be called in question.

+

4. Now, Mrs. Meir went on, three + months before elections, she was asked to go before Cabinet and Foreign + Affairs Comite and raise this matter again. There have already been + eight visits, since 1961. US naturally has sent whom it chose, they have + looked, and nothing has been found. Is problem that they did not see + something that was not there? It would be absolutely impossible to go to + Cabinet on this now, to call in Foreign Affairs Comite, on eve of + elections. It was not reasonable to ask this.

+

5. Amb replied he knew these domestic problems were serious but he was + not sure that GOI realized how + seriously USG regards whole nuclear + question, not only with Israel but with whole world. Because of grave + dangers, there are those in US who feel we must be prepared to believe + the worst, in absence of contrary info, not only of Israel but of + anyone. Problem boils down to whether Israel feels it important to + disabuse doubters in this respect. As to previous visits, we had in each + case accepted GOI groundrules but as + record would show we had also been instructed each time to state that + visit had not gone as well as had been hoped. Prime Minister Eshkol had been asked by + President Kennedy for two-day visits every six months; Eshkol had not + given written acceptance but had said orally that President’s wishes + were acceptable, and this had been taken as GOI agreement. Now visits have become so rushed that it is + not possible for team to make report which would be in interests of + GOI and USG to allay doubts.

+

6. Mrs. Meir said that she + understood, but that it made [garble—her mad?]. A few weeks ago, USG had asked her to cooperate on question + of Jordan, and she had gone along. She had been anxious to go along, and + she did so. Since then, during July there had been 98 shelling incidents + from across Jordan border, some by Jordanian Army but most by Fatah. + King had promised there would be no shooting, including by Fatah. Now + Syrians have moved in six Russian 130 mm guns at Safi (just south of + Dead Sea) with a 27 km range. Israel is surrounded on south, east and + north. Iraqis and Saudi Arabians already in Jordan, and now Syrians have + moved in. She did not know what importance to accord Eastern Command, + but fact was Syrians were now there. Then there had been Nasser’s speech,On July 23, the 17th anniversary of the Egyptian + Revolution, Nasser delivered + a speech to the Arab Socialist Union in Cairo declaring that the + United Arab Republic was passing to “the stage of liberation with + Israel.” He added: “We have to fight and we shall fight for the + recovery of our lands . . . Israel is seeking to spread a sense of + despair, that whatever we do there is no hope we can recover our + rights. . . . Israel Must Be Defeated for the Good of Humanity.” + (New York Times, July 24, 1969, p. + 1) and Brezhnev had + sent him message saying USSR would + supply UAR with everything needed to + fight Israelis. But [garble—it?] is we (underline) who are the suspects + in US eyes. This made her terribly sad.

+

7. Amb rejoined he understood her position but in nuclear equation we + were talking about another world, completely different factors. It was + not same thing. Potential of nuclear weapons was such that we cannot + fail to regard them as separate business. This did not mean we did not + understand Israel’s need for conventional weapons. However, nuclear + weapons were something else, and this is why we negotiated NPT and hope our friends will sign it, as + some have. (Mrs. Meir interjected + at least Israel was in good company, but Amb [garble—retorted?] not in + such good company as those who signed.)

+

8. Prime Minister went on that everyone with any imagination could see + horror of nuclear weapons, whether as user or target of them. Israel’s + problem, however, was how to keep alive in face of conventional weapons, + to which every ounce of her energy and know how was devoted. She did not + say that US was not justified in doing all it could to see that these + horrible weapons should not be spread around world, but why Israel was + under suspicion was hard for her to understand.

+ +

9. Amb replied he did not say any suspicion of Israel was justified but + fact was that it existed and it was in interests US and Israel to remove + it. Mrs. Meir then said she did + not understand reference to statement US desired another visit to Dimona + to take place prior to her visit to Washington. Had King Hussein been told he should stop + shooting across border before coming to see President? Amb replied we + had never said we thought he could do this completely but we welcomed + his efforts to do it. Prime Minister rejoined if he cannot keep Syrians + out of his country then he is not ruler and there is no reason to accept + his word on anything. He has been invaded by three Arab countries and + does nothing about it. But he is the best there is in Jordan, Amb + interjected. She didn’t care who was there, Mrs. Meir said, if he can’t keep others out. + She had nothing against him personally, but either there was someone in + control who could be depended upon or there was nothing. Jordan was not + Israel, Amb replied, and she was applying Israeli standards to it. There + were many countries in world weak and shaky like Jordan.

+

10. Herzog then broke in that + there had been two specific messages from King that he would insure that + there was no firing. Amb rebutted we knew that would not work + completely, that he could not carry that out. Can’t he keep Syrians out, + Mrs. Meir asked? Either they have + come in against his will, and he should do something about it, or with + his permission. Next he will have Egyptians in Jordan. Herzog said this was first time + Syrians had managed to move in on Jordan, and first time since Six Day + War that they had even tried. Lebanon can keep Syrians out, Mrs. + Meir continued, but Jordan + can’t. She could understand it was more convenient for King Hussein to keep at peace with Syrians, + but not at Israel’s expense. Early this year, Herzog said, in Eshkol-Hussein exchange of messages, there had + been clear indication that area at south end Dead Sea and Aqaba-Eilat + were out of bounds. Safi (where Syrian guns alleged to be) is central to + military control of whole Dead Sea area. Hussein had shown he could control them now. Dead Sea + installations at Sedom, Prime Minister went on, represented investment + 400 million Israeli pounds. (And big US investment, too, Amb noted) One + shot at one of several vital points could put whole business out of + operation for long, long time, yet there they are at Safi. US ought to + have more things to do at such a time than search Israel for atomic + bombs.

+

11. Amb said matter had to be looked at on broader scale. GOI was making problem by being + mysterious. Visits had been set up for a purpose and had become so + restricted that purpose not being accomplished.

+

12. DCM then said Prime Minister’s + feeling that Israel was object of some unique suspicion on part of + USG was not justified. Most free + world countries active in nuclear research field had reactors, fuel or + other nuclear connections with US and in all such instances US insisted + on complete and continuous + safeguards that go far beyond one-day-once-a-year visit to Dimona. Mrs. + Meir countered that Dimona + had not been bought from US and not fueled by US, so US had no reason to + talk about safeguards on it. DCM + replied he was not talking about applying safeguards to Dimona, but + illustrating that suspicion was not unique against Israel but rather + that there was no ally or friend so close but what US applies safeguards + whenever it deals with them in nuclear field.

+

12. Herzog said that when Eshkol + first went to Cabinet and told them about Dimona visits, he based his + decision to carry on with visits on fact that commitment had already + been made by Ben Gurion. Mrs. Meir said that if matter were now coming up for first + time, she could not even consider asking Cabinet to concur in US visits + to Dimona. She was able to carry on only because Eshkol had done it, and + Eshkol had been able only because he could put it on Ben Gurion. If she had to go to Cabinet + and Foreign Affairs Comite on matter, there would be no change.

+

13. Amb said he understood Prime Minister’s problems but for final time + he would say that rather than consider problems she should consider + objective. Objective is to be able to have team produce airtight report + that will leave no ground for doubt. If this is not done, doubts will + remain. Prime Minister Meir + replied she was terribly sorry if things had to turn out that way, but + it was absolutely unthinkable, just impossible.

+

14. Comment: I pushed Prime Minister as hard as + possible on this, especially on theme, which seems to me heart of + matter, that purpose of visits is to establish to US satisfaction that + nuclear weapons material not being produced at Dimona and that there is + strong Israeli interest in seeing to it that this satisfaction is + obtained. Domestic political problems which she adduces are real, and I + imagine she is right in saying that this program continues only because, + in finely balanced Israeli Cabinet, no one has ability to get majority + decision to stop it. I would have preferred to separate out, in this + message, parts dealing with Jordanian ceasefire and King Hussein, but they have to stay in + because Dimona problem must be seen by US in context of overall + situation here. Those in Cabinet who opposed Mrs. Meir on giving GOJ chance to control fedayeen (and there certainly must + have been some) are same ones who would oppose relaxation on Dimona + visits and make political capital in election campaign out of any + discussion of this in Cabinet or committee. I therefore reluctantly + conclude that we have done all we can at this time, and that there is no + realistic possibility of another Dimona visit before Mrs. Meir’s visit to Washington or Israeli + elections in late October.

+ + + Barbour + + +
+ +
+ + 43. Letter From the Representative to the United Nations (Yost) to the President’s Assistant for + National Security Affairs (Kissinger)Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White + House Special Files, Subject Files, Box 5, Confidential Files + 1969–74. Secret & Personal. + New York, August + 11, 1969. + + Dear Henry: + +

I found your letter of July 22, in response to mine of July 9,On July 9, Yost wrote to Kissinger about his disappointment over the + instruction that Sisco await + further concessions before demonstrating any flexibility in his + discussions with Soviet representatives regarding an Arab-Israeli + settlement. In his July 22 reply, Kissinger wrote: “The Soviets and their clients bear + a substantial responsibility for bringing on the 1967 war, and they + lost it. The issue, therefore is: If there is to be a compromise + settlement rather than full acquiescence in their demands, should we + bear the onus for proposing the specific terms of the compromise or + should they? Is it not their job—rather than ours on their behalf—to + persuade the Israelis that they are ready to make peace? The other + question your letter leaves unanswered is this: While time may not + be working in our favor, will our loss from the passage of time + compare with the USSR’s?” (Both are ibid., NSC Files, Box 1170, Saunders Files, Middle East + Negotiations Files, Middle East Settlement—US–USSR Talks, July + 16–September 30, 1969) awaiting me on my return from Europe. + I should hope very much we might get together soon to discuss this + problem. Do you expect to be on the West Coast during most of the next + month or will you be in Washington?

+

At this time I shall only comment on the two points you make. I think the + difference in our approach may lie in the fact that you quite naturally + look on our Middle Eastern negotiations primarily as one of a number of + factors in our relations with the Soviets, while I am more concerned at + this juncture with their effect on our relations with the Arabs. This is + because, as long as we can prevent a direct military confrontation + between the Soviets and ourselves in this area—and I am sanguine that we + can—developments there will not be decisive in our relations with them. + Developments there over the next year could very easily, however, be + decisive in our relations with the Arabs, not only with the radicals but + also with the moderates from Saudi Arabia through Jordan and Lebanon to + Tunisia and Morocco.

+

If the conflict gradually sharpens over coming months—as it certainly + will without a settlement—and if our negotiating position continues to + be as one-sided as it has been—insisting on Arab acceptance of + legitimate Israeli desiderata without any apparent willingness on our + part to support legitimate Arab desiderata—, there are likely to be + three consequences. First, the sharpening conflict will move more and + more of the Arab + governments into the radical posture, and threaten the survival of some + that don’t move.

+

Second, the already badly impaired U.S. position in the area will be + further and heavily eroded. Third, more and more of the Arab governments + will turn to the Soviets, as the great power supporting them most firmly + and tangibly.

+

In answer to your specific question, I should therefore say that our loss + from the passage of time is likely to be much more serious than that of + the Soviets. Indeed the whole balance of power in the Arab world could + in a relatively short time shift to our disadvantage.

+

All of this is without regard to who started the Six Day War and who + should suffer for it. My own view is that the Israeli judgment of the + best way to maintain their security is sadly mistaken and that in the + long run, unless they change their policy, they will suffer more + decisively than the Arabs because they cannot afford to suffer as + much.

+

Of course it may well be that they are in no mood to be persuaded of this + at the present time, either by us or anyone else. All that I am urging + is that we work out rapidly with the Soviets, British and French the + main outlines of a fair and reasonable settlement—“a just and durable + peace”—and submit them to the parties through Jarring. This was the policy outlined + by the President at the first NSC + meeting I attended last winterSee Document 4. and I am still convinced + it is the right one.

+

I believe moreover that we could complete the negotiation of such an + outline with the other three within six weeks if we treated it as a + matter of utmost urgency—which I am convinced it is. Whether the parties + would thereafter accept it is quite another matter. But at the very + least we would have demonstrated our bona fides and our impartiality, + and thereby some of the dire consequences I fear flowing from the + maintenance of our present immobility would be avoided.On September 6, Yost wrote a memorandum to Nixon arguing the same point, + explaining that if U.S. efforts failed, “the United States would at + least have made clear to all concerned that it had joined in + presenting and supporting proposals which are fair to all, and its + responsibility for failure, if they were rejected would be + minimized.” He added: “The Soviets would not be, as they are now the + sole beneficiaries of the deepening crisis.” (National Archives, + Nixon Presidential Materials, Box 644, Country Files, Middle East, + Middle East—General, Vol. I)

+

Sincerely yours,

+ + + Charles W. Yost + Yost signed “Charlie” above his typed + signature. + + +
+ +
+ + 44. Memorandum for the Record

Source: + Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box TS–76, + Committees and Panels, Washington Special Actions Group, + July–August, 1969. Top Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only. All + brackets are in the original except those indicating text + omitted by the editors. At the July 2 WSAG meeting, Kissinger asked Johnson “to see what could be + done bureaucratically to set up a Middle East planning element.” + Johnson replied that he would “look into what has been done in + Middle East planning in the recent past and under the former + administration.” At the August 8 WSAG meeting, the group decided that a Middle East + scenario should be conceived “based on Arab attack of Israel, + with Soviet military assistance extending beyond the + now-existing border between the Arab States and Israel.” Minutes + of both meetings are ibid.

+

In National Security Decision Memorandum 19, July 3, Nixon directed that the + political-military contingency plans prepared by NSC Interdepartmental Groups be + forwarded to the Washington Special Actions Group. (Library of + Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CL–314, National Security + Memoranda) The WSAG was + created on May 16 when the President directed that the + Interdepartmental Coordinating Committee on Korea “be + constituted on a permanent basis in the event of future similar + crises worldwide.” Kissinger explained that Nixon “visualizes” that the + WSAG would “confine itself + to consideration of the policies and plans affecting crises.” + Furthermore, “implementation of policy decisions and + coordination of operations” would be “conducted through the + interagency Crisis Task Forces prescribed by the Under + Secretaries Committee under the authority of NSDM 8.” (Memorandum from + Kissinger to + Rogers, Laird, and Helms, May 16; ibid.) For + NSDM 8, dated March 21, + and Kissinger’s May 16 + memorandum, see Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, volume + II, Organization and Management of U.S. Foreign Policy, + 1969–1972, Documents 31 and 45.

 + San Clemente, California, August 25, 1969. + + SUBJECT + Washington Special Actions Group Meeting, San Clemente, August 25, + 1969 + + + PARTICIPANTS + Dr. Kissinger + + U. Alexis Johnson + + Admiral Nels Johnson + + G. Warren Nutter + + John H. Holdridge + + Thomas Karamessines + + +

[Omitted here is discussion of Korean contingency plans and contingency + plans for a Soviet attack on China.]

+

Middle East

+

1. It was agreed that an integrated paper was needed which would consider + what to do to deter the Soviets, moving up the various situations from + the least bad to the worst, noting that if deterral failed, then we + would help the Israelis, and after going after Soviet LOCs, to face the + decision of introducing US forces. The second draft of the papers would + go through these considerations in detail.

+ +

2. Dr. Kissinger felt that the + best thing to do might be to make the Soviets fight in the Middle East + rather than in Iran or Turkey. Admiral Johnson pointed out that our + biggest problem is where we operate from, most advanced bases would be + ruled out for one reason or another and we might have to fall back as + far as the Azores.

+

3. Mr. Holdridge left the meeting at this point with Mr. Karamessines in order to make a flight + back to Washington from Los Angeles.

+ + John H. Holdridge + +
+ +
+ 45. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security + Affairs (Kissinger) to President + NixonSource: National Archives, Nixon + Presidential Materials, NSC Files, + Box 634, Country Files, Middle East, UAR, Vol. I. Top Secret; Sensitive. Sent for + information. Both Nixon and + Kissinger were at the + Western White House in San Clemente. + San Clemente, California, August 28, 1969. + + SUBJECT + Memorandum from Secretary Laird on the Arab/Israeli conflict + +

Mel Laird sent me the attached + memo (Tab A)Attached but not printed at Tab + A is the August 22 memorandum in which Laird wrote: “The present situation in the Middle + East is of grave concern to the Department of Defense. Because of + the rather sizeable Middle Eastern involvement of the Department of + Defense in matters ranging from U.S. military bases to the sale of + arms, we are giving constant attention to the relationship of + military to political questions in this region, especially as these + matters relate to the Arabi-Israeli dispute. In this connection, I + am sending to you a short report, prepared by OSD/ISA, on the nature of the + Arab-Israeli conflict and Department of Defense interest in the + Middle East.” On the memorandum itself, Laird handwrote: “Henry, I do feel this report is + well done and wanted you to have it—Mel.” The undated report is + attached but not printed. on the Arab/Israeli conflict.

+

The most interesting section of the paper concerns military sales to + Israel (Section 5). In summary, it states that:

+

1. Further sales to Israel will almost certainly be seen as escalating + the arms race.

+

2. US-supplied equipment will be used in retaliatory strikes, including + strikes against civilian targets such as the East Ghor Canal.

+

3. The Israelis will accept no restrictions on the use of the equipment. + They have turned down some cluster bombs because we tried to restrict + their use.

+ +

4. The sale of sophisticated equipment carries the implied obligation to + continue supply regardless of the Israeli use of the equipment.

+

5. As we continue to supply nuclear capable equipment (Phantom jet + fighters) our leverage on the Israeli nuclear program decreases.

+
+ +
+ 46. Editorial Note +

On August 29, 1969, members of the Popular Front for the Liberation of + Palestine (PFLP) hijacked a TWA aircraft bound for Athens, Greece and + forced it to land in Damascus, Syria. While the Syrian Government + permitted TWA, an American-based + airline, to take most of the flight’s passengers and its crew on to + their final destinations and elsewhere, it detained six Israelis, who + remained in Damascus with the damaged aircraft and its captain. Because + Syria had severed diplomatic relations with the United States during the + Arab-Israeli war of 1967, the Department of State relied upon the + Government of Italy, which represented U.S. interests in Syria, and + other governments and international organizations to help resolve the + matter. (Department of State press statement, August 30; Department of + State Bulletin, September 15, 1969, page 246; + telegram 147543 to Tel Aviv, August 31, published in Foreign + Relations, 1969–1976, volume E–1, Documents on Global + Issues, 1969–1972, Document 12)

+

Assistant Secretary of State Joseph + Sisco asked Shlomo + Argov, Minister of the Israeli Embassy, if the Government + of Israel wanted to delay the delivery of the U.S. Phantoms, due to + arrive on September 5, because of the incendiary effect the shipment + might have in Syria and what that might mean for the hostages. The + Minister responded: “to raise this question with Jerusalem at this time + would be QTE like pouring high octane gasoline on a fire, UNQTE” and the + delivery proceeded as scheduled. (Telegram 147567 to Tel Aviv, September + 1; National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 604, Country Files, Middle + East, Israel, Vol. II)

+

Tensions between the Governments of the United States and Israel emerged + over the Israeli detainees when the Israeli press quoted Israeli Prime + Minister Golda Meir as saying + that “it was inconceivable that airline such as TWA would abandon passengers in Syria.” (Telegram 3336 from + Tel Aviv, August 31; ibid.) In response, Ambassador Walworth Barbour told Israeli + representatives to “keep matters in perspective and not get confused as + to who was committing crimes and who trying to help situation.” + (Telegram 3350 from Tel Aviv, September 1; ibid.) By September 2, U.S. efforts led to the + release of all but two male Israeli passengers, over whom negotiations + stalled, while the airplane’s captain remained in Damascus because + TWA and the Nixon administration feared the + repercussions of a bitter reaction from Israel to his release alone. + (Memorandum from Rogers to + Nixon, September 2; Foreign + Relations, 1969–1976, volume E–1, Documents on Global + Issues, 1969–1972, Document 15; telegram 3588 from Tel Aviv, + September 18; National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 604, Country Files, Middle + East, Israel, Vol. II)

+

Meanwhile, the International Committee of the Red Cross monitored the + condition of the hostages, assuring the U.S. Government that they were + being treated well, and the Nixon administration worked to keep Israel from taking + any action that might inflame the situation. As for the hijackers, they + were expected to be tried by the Syrian Government. (Memorandum from + Eliot to Kissinger, September 19, published in + Foreign + Relations, 1969–1976, volume E–1, Documents on Global + Issues, 1969–1972, Document 22)

+

On November 6, Director General of Israel’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, + Gideon Rafael, informed the Embassy in Tel Aviv that the Government of + Israel had decided to pursue an ICRC-engineered, three-cornered, POW exchange with the United + Arab Republic to obtain the release of the Israeli hostages. (Telegram + 4196 from Tel Aviv, November 6; ibid., Document 32) A “gratified” Department of State offered to + facilitate the exchange, which included the United Arab Republic’s + release of two Israeli pilots and Syria’s release of the two remaining + TWA passengers in return for + Israel’s release of one Egyptian pilot, 17 Egyptian POWs from the 1967 + war, the crews of two Egyptian fishing vessels captured in Israeli + waters, 11 Egyptian civilians kidnapped in raids, and two Syrian pilots + held by Israel. (Telegram 189503 to Tel Aviv, November 8; National + Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 605, Country Files, Middle East, Israel, + Vol. III; and telegram 194183 to Beirut, November 19; ibid., Box 620, + Country Files, Middle East, Lebanon, Vol. I)

+

By the third week of November, no action had been taken, and the deal + appeared to be in jeopardy when the Syrian Government raised the stakes, + demanding that 11 additional Syrians detained in Israel be released. + (Telegram 4348 from Tel Aviv, November 20, published in Foreign + Relations, 1969–1976, volume E–1, Documents on Global + Issues, 1969–1972, Document 33; telegram 4363 from Tel Aviv, + November 24; National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 605, Country Files, Middle + East, Israel, Vol. III) Israel’s delay in providing a written guarantee + to the ICRC at the end of November put + the deal further at risk, but everything fell into place on December 5, + when the hijacked TWA aircraft carrying + the two Israelis was allowed to leave, arriving in Athens at 3:35 p.m. local time. (Telegram + 199600 to Tel Aviv, November 28, telegram 4480 from Tel Aviv, December + 5, and telegram 5378 from Athens; all ibid.)

+
+ +
+ 47. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security + Affairs (Kissinger) to President + NixonSource: National Archives, Nixon + Presidential Materials, NSC Files, + Box 644, Country Files, Middle East, Middle East—General. Secret; + Nodis. Printed from an uninitialed copy. + Washington, September 10, 1969. + + SUBJECT + The Next Step in the Middle East—NSC Meeting Thursday, September + 11 + +

The following is an analysis of the major issues which may become + obscured amidst all of the negotiating detail you will hear at the + NSC meeting. In addition to giving + you the basis for a decision, this meeting will also provide guidance + for Secretary Rogers in his + first talks with Eban, Gromyko and the Arab foreign ministers + in New York. Joe Sisco will + propose that we tell Gromyko we + will take the position that Israel should return to the pre-war boundary + with Egypt provided + Gromyko can commit Nasser to direct negotiations with + Israel and firm arrangements for securing that border and Israel’s + passage through the Tiran Straits and the Suez Canal. Although you + approved the draft document which Joe has been negotiating from,See Documents 37 and + 39. you have never had an + opportunity to consider the details of an overall settlement.

+

As I see it, there are four major and one minor considerations:

+

1. The US cannot proceed on an Israel-UAR settlement alone. If we are + going to press for a settlement, it must include Jordan:

+

—We have a much greater interest in getting our friend Hussein’s territory back than Nasser’s because of Hussein’s moderate and pro-Western + position.

+

—The Soviets and Nasser would not + agree to a UAR-Israel settlement alone.

+

2. If the US is going to take a stand on the elements of a general + settlement, we must be prepared to press hard for their acceptance.

+ +

—If we just state our position without following up, we will have + alienated Israel and won little favor with the Arabs. They believe we + could move Israel if we wanted to, so they would regard any US position + as hypocritical if we did not stop backing Israel with arms. In other + words, proceeding along the line State proposes would involve a + commitment to Israel’s pre-war borders (with only minor modifications + except on the Syrian Heights) and the willingness + to stop the sale of arms if necessary. If we are not prepared to impose + a settlement, it will not happen.

+

—Israel will not be satisfied even if we win Nasser’s commitment to direct negotiations (the State + formula). Israel wants to bargain with Nasser for an Israeli position at Sharm al-Shaikh and + with Hussein for a position on + the West Bank. Only strong US pressure, if that, has a chance of moving + Israel away from that position.

+

3. If the US believes continuation of the present situation is dangerous + and erodes our position in the Mid-East but if we are not prepared to + try to impose a settlement, then we must consider whether there is + anything we can do in the absence of a settlement to make the situation + less dangerous for us. There are several possibilities, none too + bright:

+

—Try for some understanding with the USSR that would limit US–USSR engagement if there is + another Arab-Israeli clash.

+

—Take a strong US stand for a refugee settlement.

+

—Concentrate on a Palestine settlement, leaving aside the UAR and encouraging an agreement between + Israel and the West Bank Palestinians.

+

4. There is also the Israeli nuclear issue. You have authorized an + approach to the Israelis which was designed as a first step toward + getting their commitment not to deploy strategic missiles or nuclear + warheads.See Document + 38. State and Defense believe—though you have not + approved this—that we should cut off their arms supply if they do not + comply. Rabin stonewalled our + first approach, saying in effect that he expected this issue to be on + your agenda with Mrs. Meir and + that the Israeli government would be unlikely to make any decision + before its October 28 election. One of the consequences of pursuing an + Arab-Israel settlement that would require Israel to give up the security + provided by expanded borders is that we would probably have to relax on + the nuclear issue.

+

The minor issue is that your talks with Mrs. + Meir will take place + September 25–26. I do not see how we could take the step State proposes + with Gromyko before you talk + with her.

+ +

In short, I do not believe the State Department proposal—giving Gromyko our position on + boundaries—should be approved until we have studied its consequences and + are prepared to deal with them.

+

The argument in detail for and against stating a + precise US position on where the boundaries should be goes as + follows:

+

The argument for taking this step includes these + points:

+

1. If we continue on the present diplomatic track, we have almost no + chance of movement toward a negotiated settlement.

+

2. In the continued absence of a settlement, the moderates in the Middle + East will be under increasing pressure from the radicals. This does not + mean that moderate regimes such as those in Lebanon and Saudi Arabia + might be upset solely because of the Arab-Israeli impasse. It does mean, + however, that the continued impasse gives the radicals another issue on + which to stand in their efforts to weaken those moderate regimes. If the + impasse does not cause their downfall, it may speed it. Thus, the US + would have to look forward to a gradual erosion of friendly regimes and + a gradual broadening of the Soviet influence in the area.

+

3. The proposal being made perhaps does not even offer a 50–50 chance of + success. What it offers is (a) a further test of Soviet willingness to + press Nasser toward serious + negotiation and (b) in the process an opportunity for the US to state + its view on the terms of a fair Arab-Israeli settlement. As part of the + diplomatic move being proposed, it would be planned that our suggestion + be made known to the Arab regimes involved.

+

4. In addition to offering the only possible prospect in sight for a + breakthrough toward negotiations, we would be in a better position to + ride out the protracted absence of an Arab-Israeli settlement in the + broader Middle East if we were standing on our own statement of what the + terms of a fair settlement would be than we would be if we continued to + hold essentially to the Israeli position. To state no precise US + position and to maintain that the Middle Easterners themselves must work + out the terms of a settlement is to state an essentially Israeli + position. In fact, we are telling the Arabs and Israelis that we will + not put US influence on the bargaining scales and that we will leave the + Israelis free to put the full weight of their territorial conquest and + their military power in the scales on the negotiating table.

+

As I see them, the consequences of taking this + step would be as follows:

+

1. Stating a precise US position on the UAR alone and not on Jordan would put us in a position of + spending our influence to help Nasser while leaving our friend Hussein with a divided country. We must + decide what we are going to do on the Jordan front before we can decide whether to make this + move. The Jordan settlement is even more difficult territorially than + the Sinai. It would be very difficult to allow the Arabs back within 12 + miles of Tel Aviv and all but impossible for them to give the Arabs a + significant role in Jerusalem.

+

2. The Israelis would probably reject our proposition, even if we won + Nasser’s commitment to + negotiate face to face. The Israelis would argue that by depriving them + of their main bargaining counter—that is, by committing them in advance + of negotiation to withdraw to the pre-war UAR-Israel boundary—we have + made negotiations meaningless. They will ask: What is left for them to + negotiate?

+

3. Even if the Israelis were inclined to accept, the Arabs would probably + undercut the significance of their agreement to negotiate directly (a) + by claiming that they are just meeting to sign an already negotiated + document and (b) by taking positions that would deny Israel the security + arrangements that would make such a border tenable. We would then have + isolated Israel without contributing anything of our own toward a + settlement. We would thus have given the Arabs and Soviets what they + want—an isolated Israel—and all we would have gained in return is the + major political reaction in the US that the Israelis would have stirred + up.

+

4. Even if the Israelis and Arabs were inclined to accept, the Soviets + would still be in the driver’s seat. A lot would depend on what we + assess their motives to be. At the very least, they could take credit + for having extracted concessions from us. If they want to, they can + outbid us by pressing for total return of all conquered territory, + including the Syrian heights.

+

5. If our move failed to produce negotiation, we would gain little in + Arab goodwill. The Israelis want to bargain for the expansion of their + territory, and the Arabs refuse to accept peace on those conditions. The + problem for Israel is whether to withdraw and gamble on a settlement + with Arab governments that may not survive to fulfill their obligations + (which at best will be less than perfect even if fulfilled) or whether + to hold on to territory as the only means of guaranteeing their own + security. The only way, therefore, that we could make a negotiation + succeed is to press Israel hard to make its choice in favor of the + gamble on withdrawal with security arrangements. If we failed to exert + serious pressure on the Israelis—such as threatening to cut its supply + of arms or flow of financial support—the Arabs would immediately + question the credibility of the position we had stated on the terms of a + settlement.

+

In short, the principal risk of proceeding as State proposes is that we + would provoke a major domestic political storm—including increased + opposition on Vietnam and on defense—with only a very limited hope of + producing movement toward serious Arab-Israeli negotiations in return. Any Arab goodwill we + hoped for would be lost if we continued military supply to Israel.

+

Therefore, I conclude that our real choice is + between staying on our present course or making an all-out effort now to + press Israel to accept what we regard as reasonable terms of a + settlement. To make that decision, I believe you should ask State + for:

+

1. the precise terms of an Israel-UAR settlement, including those which + would provide reasonable security for Israel;

+

2. the terms of a Jordan-Israel settlement;

+

3. a position on Syria.

+

If you do not have those before authorizing a move, you will not have a + chance to see where the move might take us and you will have little + chance of keeping our negotiators within the limits of your policy.

+

The other dimension of this problem is how the Mid-East negotiations fit + into our broader relationship with the USSR. I believe the bargaining + advantage lies slightly on our side in that Nasser would lose in another war, although we must face + the general judgment that our position in the Mid-East gradually becomes + more difficult as the present impasse continues.

+

There are several possible ways to relate this with other issues on the + US–USSR agenda:

+

1. If we were going to press Israel to accept unpalatable measures, we + might expect the Soviets to press Nasser to accept some equally unpalatable terms.

+

2. If the terms are going to be harder for Israel than for the UAR to accept, then we might look to other + areas for compensating Soviet pressure on their clients such as the + North Vietnamese. Another possibility would be some sort of + understanding about the limits of Soviet imperialistic ambitions in the + Mid-East, Persian Gulf, Indian Ocean.

+

Whether the Soviets will respond depends heavily on how they view their + situation in the area. It is common for us to assume that time helps + them and hurts us, but there are enough disadvantages in this situation + and advantages in a settlement to give us some leverage. With a + settlement, they could pursue their interests without risk of war, get + their fleet into the Indian Ocean and still have enough tension points + like the Persian Gulf to exploit. The balance is fine enough however + that they might cooperate with us in pressing a reasonable proposal on + the Arabs. They apparently judge that pressing our present proposals + would cost them too much in Cairo. Given this delicate a balance and our + inability to press the Israelis beyond certain limits, it may be that on + this issue we are negotiating in a relatively narrow field.

+

I would recommend that you issue the following instructions in connection + with the meeting:

+ +

1. Nothing should be done until after Mrs. Meir’s visit. Secretary Rogers should be instructed privately to divide his + talks in New York into two phases—first, purely exploratory talks before + the Meir visit and then perhaps a + series of more specific talks afterwards when you have decided what our + course should be. (I know Joe + Sisco agrees with this.)

+

2. Well before the Meir visit, the + following should be submitted to you: detailed US positions on the terms + of Jordan-Israel and UAR-Israel, including adequate security provisions + for Israel, and a position on Syria.

+

3. CIA should provide an assessment of + the Soviet’s true attitude toward a settlement with Israel.

+
+ +
+ 48. Minutes of a National Security Council MeetingSource: National Archives, Nixon + Presidential Materials, NSC Files, + NSC Institutional Files + (H-Files), Box H–109, NSC Meeting + Minutes, NSC Minutes Originals + 1969. Top Secret; Nodis. All brackets are in the original except + those indicating text that remains classified. According to the + President’s Daily Diary, the meeting was held in the Cabinet Room + from 10:17 a.m. to 12:24 p.m. (Ibid., White House Central + Files) + Washington, September 11, 1969. +

MIDDLE EAST

+ + PARTICIPANTS + The President + The Secretary of State, William P. + Rogers + The Attorney General, John N. + Mitchell + The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Earle G. Wheeler + The Director of Central Intelligence, Richard . Helms + Dr. Henry A. + Kissinger + Under Secretary of State, Elliot L. + Richardson + Deputy Secretary of Defense, David + Packard + US Ambassador to the UN, Charles Yost + Assistant Secretary of State, Joseph + J. Sisco + Director, Office of Emergency Preparedness, General George A. Lincoln + Colonel Alexander + Haig + + Helmut Sonnenfeldt + + + Harold H. Saunders + + Alfred L. Atherton, Jr., + Department of State + Clinton Conger, CIA + + +

Helms: Arab-Israeli problem has + gotten steadily worse over last two years. Four-Power talks recessed + since early July in favor of US–USSR talks. USSR has probably told Nasser some compromise necessary. Al Aqsa Mosque burning + increased Arab frustration.On August 21, a + fire broke out in Jerusalem’s al Aqsa mosque, one of Islam’s holiest + sites. During the first two weeks of September, representatives of + Arab and non-Arab Muslim countries negotiated the text of a + resolution for the UN Security + Council that both condemned the arson and reiterated Israel’s + occupier status. On September 12, Pakistan introduced a resolution + that satisfied all of the Muslim countries. (Telegram 2885 from + USUN, September 5 and telegram + 3007 from USUN, September 12; + ibid.) Three days later, 11 members of the Security Council voted + for Resolution 271 and 4 abstained, the United States, Finland, + Colombia, and Paraguay. (Telegram 3031 from USUN, September 15; ibid.) The text + of the resolution, which reaffirmed the “established principle that + acquisition of territory by military conquest is inadmissible,” is + in Yearbook of the United Nations, 1969, pp. + 221. An official Israeli Commission of Inquiry concluded that the Al + Aqsa fire was the result of “malicious arson” and was a “grievous + insult to religious feeling of entire Moslem community.” (Telegram + 3658 from Tel Aviv, September 24; National Archives, Nixon + Presidential Materials, NSC Files, + NSC Institutional Files + (H-Files), Box H–109, NSC Meeting + Minutes, NSC Minutes Originals + 1969) Situation compels moderate Arabs to take a more active + military posture.

+

Israel has adopted “no budge” position. Israel’s attitude on borders + getting progressively harder. May reflect Meir-Dayan deal + to keep Dayan in Labor Party.

+

Intelligence estimate on military balance: Israeli superiority becoming + even more pronounced—Jericho missile, Phantom delivery, [less than 1 line not declassified]. Retaliatory + strikes doing Arabs more damage—deliberately. Raids these days are for + keeps—no prisoners.

+

On the Arab side, governing factor remains military incompetence. Some + progress being made—partly to compete with terrorists.

+

Palestinians have kept Lebanon without a government since April. Not a + military threat but getting “deep into the Israeli psyche.” Al Fatah + increasing operations but main focus on PFLP with about 500 members. + Terrorist position: no settlement until Israel driven into the sea. + Their position may make it impossible for some Arab leaders to reach + settlement.

+

Rogers: US–USSR talks have + concentrated on UAR-Israel settlement to make Jordan settlement + easier.

+

President: When we speak of Soviet client states, are we speaking of UAR, + Syria, Iraq. Israel-Jordan US clients. USSR does not have close contact with Jordan?

+

Rogers: Hussein doesn’t feel he is our client + now.

+

Sisco: USSR showing increased interest in getting into Jordanian + aspects of a settlement. US under increasing pressure from Hussein to involve itself in + Israel-Jordan settlement.

+ +

Rogers: When we talk about + face-to-face discussions, no problem with Jordan.

+

Sisco: I came away from Moscow + judging: Soviets want to continue dialogue with US for both Mid-East and + general reasons.Sisco was in Moscow for talks July 14–18. See Document 39. Question is how Soviets + view the area: If area undergoing increasing radicalization, does Moscow + view this as in USSR interest.

+

US–USSR agreement in talks on the following:

+

—Israel and UAR would sign same + agreement.

+

—Recognition of Israel’s right to exist.

+

—Freedom of passage through Tiran. On Suez, USSR has qualified by reference to Constantinople + Convention of 1888.This multilateral treaty + guaranteed the right of free passage through the Suez + Canal.

+

—Execution of agreement would await agreement on total package—UAR, + Israel and possible Jordan.

+

—We have agreed on the principle of demilitarization.

+

Soviet plan:

+

1. Israeli withdrawal 40 miles.

+

2. Opening Canal.

+

3. Israeli withdrawal to June 4 lines and Gaza Strip.

+

4. Demilitarization of Negev-Sinai border. Seem willing to accept only + token demilitarization on Israeli side.

+

5. Irrevocable UN force at Sharm + al-Shaikh.

+

Position US has taken:

+

1. Within context of agreement, Israeli withdrawal to “secure and + recognized border” to be defined by parties. We “do not exclude” pre-war + border.

+

2. Demilitarization of entire Sinai.

+

3. Options for Sharm al-Shaikh. Let parties negotiate. Kept open Israeli + presence.

+

4. Ultimately, sovereignty of Gaza would have to be determined by Jordan, + UAR, Israel.

+

President: To what extent does that reflect Israeli views.

+

Sisco: They have seen our + position. Israelis have opposed, but if they got this they would like + it.

+

Kissinger: What makes you think + they would like it? No evidence.

+

Sisco: Subjective judgment.

+

Rogers: When Israel really + opposes something, they “let us have it with 10 barrels,” but they + haven’t. I think Israel would be happy if they got this much.

+

President: British and French attitude?

+ +

Sisco: Total demilitarization + unrealistic, ought to be demilitarization on Israeli side. UN presence. French and British want to + improve their position with Arabs.

+

President: Israelis don’t trust UN.

+

Rogers: We’re going to be + isolated.

+

Sisco: Operational issue: + Rogers will be talking + Mid-East with 50 foreign ministers at UN. Question: Do we state our judgment that final border should + be pre-war UAR-Israel border, to be agreed in direct negotiations.

+

Israeli argument: You have given away our counter.

+

Counter argument: Erosion of US position.

+

Questions:

+

1. What would we get in return from USSR.

+

2. What from Arabs.

+

3. Israeli reaction.

+

Problem is whether we could produce the Israelis. Mrs. Meir will object.

+

Rogers: Say what is our proposal + on Tiran.

+

Sisco: We’ve let it open. UN presence logical, but Israelis won’t + buy.

+

Yost: Device would be UN couldn’t be withdrawn without UNSC + consent.

+

Richardson: No settlement if + Israelis stay at Sharm al-Shaikh. Israelis determined to stay.

+

President: “Do you fellows ever talk to the Israelis?”

+

Kissinger: Israelis want presence + at Sharm al-Shaikh with land access to it. If the Israelis accept + principle of full withdrawal, it would hurt them more in Jordan.

+

President: What does USSR want? Leave + it like it is?

+

Sisco: 1. They want to continue + talks as a deterrent in the Mid-East.

+

2. As long as they talk, this is a demonstration to Arabs that they are + trying to help.

+

3. Be responsive to Nixon “era of + negotiations.”

+

Rogers: They think they have + brought Arabs farther than we have brought Israelis.

+

President: Don’t Soviets know Arabs will be beaten in another war. “If + they get screwed again, they won’t have another GlassboroReference is to the Glassboro Summit between + President Johnson and Soviet Chairman Alexei Kosygin that took place + in Glassboro, New Jersey, in June 1967, following the 1967 + Arab-Israeli war. See Foreign Relations, 1964–1968, volume XIV, + Soviet Union, Documents 217, 218, 219, 220, 221, 222, 223, 224, 225, 226, 227, 228, 229, 230, 231, 232, 233, 234, 235, 236, 237, and 238. to bail them + out?”

+ +

Helms: They really want to get + down to Persian Gulf.

+

President: In 1967, Soviets looked unready to help Arabs. If this + happened again, Soviets don’t want to be in that position. Do they + really believe—given that fact—that they consider this worth a US–USSR + confrontation? Do they think this is about the best they can get now? + They want talks to continue, but a settlement?

+

Sisco: They want settlement on + own terms. Soviets want Nasser + as their own tool. They haven’t wanted to press him.

+

President: How is USSR doing in + Mid-East? Not bad—some weak reeds but still not bad.

+

Sisco: We have interest in stable + peace. Less clear USSR sees this as + its interest.

+

President: USSR can have influence + while situation simmers. Does anybody think US as its friend? June war a + tremendous victory for Israel and USSR. From their viewpoint why change + the situation. Does Moscow think they’re going to have confrontation + with US over Israel? “You know damn well we’re not and they know it.” Do + you think they want a deal?

+

Sisco: Not a deal that would cost + Moscow much.

+

President: We’re the honest brokers here.

+

Rogers: Could have a settlement + that would continue exploitable tension. Meanwhile, they have isolated + us from world community.

+

President: “Israel’s puppet.”

+

Richardson: One aspect in which + USSR might want real settlement. + Present situation continued strengthens fedayeen, weakens Nasser. Soviets less able to deliver + if fedayeen come out on top, Soviets less able to deliver Arab demands + which would then be not just return of territory but destruction of + Israel.

+

President: Agree but if fedayeen prevail, they too would keep situation + stirred up. Soviets have to have some reason to want to settle; what is + it?

+

Rogers: If war broke out again, + their clients would lose. Our hope is that they want to avoid a war.

+

Helms: USSR wants to open Canal to get into Persian Gulf.

+

Yost: On balance, USSR wants settlement but not going to + jeopardize their influence. They could even shift support to fedayeen + and try to ride that wave.

+

What concerns me is extent to which we are in trouble with moderate + Arabs. Soviets without lifting a finger are profiting. Formula asking + Arabs at outset to come to direct negotiations is a non-starter.

+

Situation is weakening moderate regimes and not increasing Israel’s + security. Even Moroccans and Tunisians getting worried about US + position—has not gone very far yet.

+ +

Kissinger: Soviets may have + interest in Israel-UAR settlement because continued occupation of Sinai + demonstrates USSR impotence. They want + naval access to Persian Gulf. Plenty of tension will remain. They may + see their opportunity in transitional regimes in Arabian Peninsula. I + can see Soviet gains from a settlement.

+

Problem of concentrating on UAR-Israel settlement is that our friend, + Hussein, comes off worse than + Nasser.

+

Sisco: We have not presented our + Jordan views to USSR. Gromyko + wants to talk about Jordan.

+

Kissinger: We haven’t told Israel + our views on Jordan?

+

Sisco: Yes.

+

President: More on flavor at UN?

+

Yost: We would improve our + position if we put forward fair terms.

+

Kissinger: If we propose and + Israelis refuse, do we then continue Phantom delivery? What do we gain + with Arabs then? We won’t be accused of hypocrisy?

+

Yost: Yes but better off than + now.

+

Richardson: We have to put both + sides in a position of being responsible for failure.

+

Kissinger: If we go this route, + don’t we have to bite the bullet and go all out for a settlement?

+

Richardson: We do have to face up + to situation.

+

Rogers: This proposal wouldn’t be + accepted by Arabs right away.

+

Sisco: Keep our proposal linked + to direct negotiations. That would force Soviets to deliver something + uncomfortable.

+

Yost: We could get to direct + negotiations but not as a sine qua non.

+

Sisco: Not sine qua non as start. + If the principle is there, that’s all we’re asking for.

+

President: Isn’t real Israeli position to “keep it like it is?”

+

Sisco: Agree. They’d like to see + us isolated with Israel.

+

President: Why are we having Mrs. Meir come here?Meir was in the United States from + September 24 to October 6.

+

Lincoln: US going to have to + think increasingly about airplanes.

+

President: We have these visits—Hussein thought we agreed he should have territory + back.See Document + 19. She just wants to talk to Jewish community—“she + doesn’t give one damn about us. I don’t know. I’ve never met her.” What + do we say to her? Keep our position “exploratory” until after she comes. + How can Rogers protect our + position.

+ +

Rogers: I suggest no decisions + this morning. I can stick on two issues in opening talks—peace and Arab + obligations and then direct negotiations. Say then we can’t go much + further if Arabs want to drive Israel into the sea.

+

Yost: Arabs could say: If we do + such and such, what will you do?

+

President: Those state visits are generally “a waste of time.” I’d like + to see us make a couple of specific points. Could we discuss specific + terms of Israeli settlements with UAR, Jordan and Syria. Doesn’t it make + sense for us to get down to specifics? We need some positions they ought + to accept.

+

I don’t want to save the face of the USSR; they aren’t trying to help us + anywhere. I don’t see why we should help them. That doesn’t mean all + their interests are different from ours. In developing our position, + let’s not give them a chance to claim credit for getting everything back + for the Arabs. Mistake to “allow them to look too good.”

+

Mitchell: Looking at our domestic + interest, if we took away negotiating base of Israelis, it would take + away base for your position on Vietnam and a lot of other issues.

+

Yost: Press reaction now saying + US should do more.

+

Mitchell: No question. But if we + undercut Israelis, “we’re going to catch hell all over this country.” + Look at long-term pull: what are we going to get out of the Arabs in the + long term?

+

Rogers: We have a lot of + interests there. Arabs think we won’t do anything unless Israel + agrees.

+

President: We have a curious thing politically. But in terms of votes, + that influences this Administration less than anything that has been + here. I got lowest percent of Jewish vote of any candidate, in US + history—8%. What we’re really talking about is history in Mid-East. + Problem is not votes.

+

Mitchell: Problem is how this + affects Vietnam.

+

Rogers: In this situation, if we + had a posture that seemed reasonable . . . we’re not going to win either + way.

+

Mitchell: Yes—I prefaced my + statement by saying “if we undercut their position.”

+

Yost: Our position in Israel’s + long-term interest.

+

President: Keep UN posture as low as + possible so as not to preclude serious discussion with Mrs. Meir.

+

We should know before she comes our position on:

+

1. UAR-Israel settlement

+

2. Jordan-Israel settlement

+

3. Syria-Israel settlement

+ +

Rogers: I’ll draw Gromyko out in first meeting. Second + meeting will be after Meir + visit.See Document + 53 for a summary of Rogers’s meetings with Gromyko in New York.

+

President: Let’s leave out Jewish community for a moment. Israel’s + position short range is unassailable, long range disastrous. I don’t + like just to sit here and go through the motions with Mrs. Meir. Don’t go ahead until we talk to + her.

+

Mitchell: Will Israeli position + change after election?

+

Kissinger: Not much. Physical + security is very attractive when all we offer in return are agreements + with regimes that may not survive. That is Israeli dilemma.

+

Yost: They don’t have security + now.

+

Kissinger: In a historical + perspective, no way 3 million people can survive in the midst of 60 + million hostile people unless they can change that hostility.

+

Richardson: Their future depends + on help. They can’t expect our help when our position deteriorates.

+

Kissinger: If any terms are fair, + we will have to impose them.

+

President: Yes, but let’s do it gradually.

+

On delivery of jets: Looking at “menacing Soviet naval building in the + area” and future Israeli difficulty in beating Arabs, I don’t think we + should leave the impression that—in the event of a protracted war—the US + will help.

+

If we determine that we want a settlement, we may have to cut off arms + supply. But Israel is just about tough enough to say, “So be it.” Masada + complex.

+

We must be better prepared for this talk than for any we’ve had so far. + Have an extended talk with Gromyko.

+

Rogers: We will give you a memo + in next three or four days.Not + found.

+

President: What about Congress?

+

Sisco: Balancing act. On whole, + reaction good because they think we’re trying while protecting Israeli + security. Jewish community relatively quiet.

+

President: Leaving aside the votes or Jewish community, American public + is pro-Israeli. Yet the US public would not support US intervention to + save Israel.

+

Rogers: Rabin says: Could handle USSR short of nuclear weapons or land + invasions.

+ +

President: Do we have a position on hijacking—international law, etc. + Very few of our allies help us. Airlines, other governments not facing + up to this sort of thing—Elbrick kidnapping.On September 4 in Rio de Janeiro, members of the + Revolutionary Movement 8th October kidnapped at gunpoint C. Burke + Elbrick, the Ambassador to Brazil. Elbrick was released after 78 + hours in exchange for 15 imprisoned leftists. We may have to + do something on our own.

+

Yost: Finns thinking about + bringing issue to UN.

+

President: Could I say something about general issue at UN? Worldwide problem of violent + methods.

+

Rogers: On the ambassador + kidnapping, have follow-up car.

+

President: Do it.

+

To Mitchell: We should have for + any state visitor federal legislation to keep demonstrators away. + Foreign governments go to great lengths when we visit to avoid + embarrassment.

+

Mitchell: There is legislation on + domestic demonstrations at White House and Capitol.

+

President: But foreign visitors. Under Bill of Rights, hard to + distinguish. Would you, John, assume responsibility to negotiate + arrangements with local police.

+
+ +
+ 49. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department + of StateSource: National + Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1170, Saunders Files, Middle East + Negotiations Files, Middle East Settlement—US–USSR Talks. Secret; + Priority; Nodis. Saunders + sent this telegram to Kissinger under cover of a September 19 memorandum. + (Foreign + Relations, 1969–1976, volume XII, Soviet Union, January + 1969–October 1970, Document 80) + New York, September 19, 1969, 0151Z. +

3084. Dept pass Amman, Cairo, Tel Aviv, + London, Paris, Moscow.

+

1. Sisco met with Dobrynin for three hours afternoon of + September 18. Discussion was in many respects frankest since bilateral + talks began and focused primarily on exploring and defining key Middle + East issues for + Secretary-Gromyko meeting + September 22. Following are summary impressions (detailed report by + septel):Telegram 3090 from USUN, September 19. (National + Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1170, Saunders Files, Middle East + Negotiations Files, Middle East Settlement—US–USSR Talks)

+

A. After Sisco pressed Dobrynin hard and in detail, we + believe Soviets are now largely ready to buy our language on commitment + to peace and non-belligerency (point 3 of US proposal)See footnote 4, Document + 39. with important exception of explicit Arab + commitment contained in this paragraph to control fedayeen. They will + probably press, however, for some consolidation of language contained in + points 3 and 12 of our July counterproposal.

+

B. On Arab commitment to eventual direct negotiations, Sisco described it in flexible terms. + He stressed need for Soviets to accept last preambular para of our + proposal. Dobrynin maintained + position stated by Gromyko in + Moscow—i.e., that this question difficult and should not be raised now. + While Dobrynin revealed no give + on direct negotiations, we have impression this is not closed question + with Soviets.

+

C. On refugees, Soviets also seem to be leaving room for maneuver with + respect to our proposal. Dobrynin specifically asked for indication of numbers US + has in mind for repatriation under annual quota.

+

D. On security arrangements, Sisco explained our attempt to keep all options open for + the parties themselves to work out in presence of Jarring. Sisco described present position of parties on security + arrangements for Sharm el-Shaikh as irreconcilable. While Dobrynin understood clearly our desire + for a neutral formulation which kept all options open, he categorically + rejected concept of Israeli presence at Sharm el-Shaikh and stood firmly + on Soviet proposal for UN presence. He + was more explicit than before, however, in emphasizing that Israeli-UAR + agreement could provide that UN force + could only be removed within specified time period with approval of + Security Council. He was flexible on time period that such force would + be expected to stay.

+

E. On withdrawal and boundaries, Dobrynin made lengthy plea for US to state explicitly + that there should be no changes in pre-June 5 UAR-Israeli line. He + argued that Soviets had impression this was real US position in any case + and US refusal say so explicitly only raised suspicions and made Soviet + job of getting UAR agreement on other + points more difficult.

+

2. After getting some flexibility from Dobrynin on peace commitment, Sisco reemphasized that we saw Arab + commitment to direct negotiations at some stage as key to further + movement, while making clear our formula is designed to give Jarring maximum flexibility in determining timing and how + negotiations conducted. Sisco + also stressed our view that Soviets must face up to need to get out in + front of Cairo, as we are out in front of Israelis, if our talks are to + progress. In this connection, he made point obliquely that he assumed + USSR would agree that bilateral + talks should continue as long as there is hope for progress, but talk + for sake of talk would not facilitate, but might impede future + settlement since parties might feel able to avoid facing up to their + responsibilities to make tough decisions required for a settlement. + Dobrynin agreed.

+

3. Brief review of situation on ground in Middle East, Sisco said we were counselling + restraint on both sides. Nevertheless, objective fact was that Israelis + would not be passive in face of UAR + war-of-attrition policy, and situation could get out of hand to UAR detriment if that policy not + changed.

+

4. Sisco and Dobrynin tentatively agreed to meet + again morning September 22, (Begin underline) inter alia (End underline) + for Sisco to provide further + responses to some of Semenov’s commentary to Ambassador Beam on our July counterproposal, + before Secretary-Gromyko + meeting.

+ + + Yost + + +
+ +
+ + 50. Memorandum of ConversationSource: National Archives, Nixon Presidential + Materials, NSC Files, Box 1170, + Saunders Files, Middle East Negotiation Files, Middle East + Settlement—US–USSR Talks. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Yost on September 23. All brackets are in the + original except those indicating text omitted by the editors. The + dinner meeting was held in the Secretary General’s suite at the + United Nations. + New York, September 20, 1969, 7:30 p.m. + + + SecDel/MC/2 + + + + SUBJECT + SYG Dinner for Four FonMins + and PermReps + + + PARTICIPANTS + U.S. + Secretary Rogers + Ambassador Yost + + Dr. Ralph Bunche + + FOREIGN + SYG Thant + Mr. Phillippe de Seynes + Mr. Leonid N. Kutakov + Mr. Andrew Stark + Mr. C.V. Narasimhan + FonMin Schumann + Ambassador Berard + + FonMin + Gromyko + + Ambassador Malik + FonMin Stewart + + Lord Caradon + + +

After dinner the SYG suggested there be a discussion of the Middle East. + He said the situation is deteriorating seriously. He referred to the + responsibilities of the Security Council and particularly the four + Permanent Members and asked what could be done.

+

Mr. Gromyko said that the key to + a solution was withdrawal of Israeli forces from all occupied territory. + On the other hand, all were agreed that a solution must be a package + embracing all parts of the Security Council resolution. Negotiations + should go forward in all fora, Two-Power, Four-Power, etc.

+

Secretary Rogers agreed that the + solution must be a package and that negotiations might go forward in all + fora. He suggested, however, that the Four await progress in current + talks between the Two, perhaps for another ten days or two weeks.

+

Stewart said duty to find a solution rests with the United Nations, the + Security Council and Permanent Members because the parties are so caught + up in mutual hate that they can’t make peace. Two-Power and Four-Power + negotiations can go on concurrently and each can be in touch with the + parties. Someone—whether 4, 3, 2 or 1—must define what the terms of the + resolution mean. All four must be impartial. The parties won’t like what they propose but might just + accept it as better than the present and prospective situation. If some + of the Four won’t accept what the Arabs won’t, and some won’t accept + what Israel won’t, no progress will be made. Let the US and USSR proceed for the moment with their + bilaterals but at some point the UK and + France must play a part. There has to be withdrawal and Israel has not + yet stated its position on this with sufficient clarity. But the Arabs + also must move away from their Khartoum position of no negotiations and + no peace treaty.See footnote 4, Document 18.

+

Schumann said he thought France had been right in proposing Four-Power + talks. There is no hope of direct negotiations taking place until an + outline of a settlement has been laid out. Bilaterals have been useful + and helped bridge the gap but within a reasonable time—say two weeks—the + Four should resume. The Four can speak more impartially, be no one’s + advocate but advocate for all. Direct negotiations can come after the + way has been paved. The Four should resume by mid-October.The Four Powers did not meet until December 2. See + Document 72.

+

Secretary Rogers agreed that the + Four might resume at that time but pointed out that the Two could also + continue, both proceeding simultaneously.

+

The SYG said it seemed clear there was no disagreement. The Two would + continue and the Four would resume about mid-October irrespective of + where the Two had got by that time.

+

He pointed out that the Arab replies to Jarring had superseded the Khartoum declaration.See Document + 12. They had recognized Israeli right to exist. He felt + Israel should agree to withdraw when the Arabs make a binding commitment + to secure and recognized boundaries and to the other provisions of the + Security Council Resolution.

+

He remarked that the world’s eyes are on the United Nations and + particularly on the Foreign Ministers and it would be reassuring if they + would this evening reiterate the substantive parts of the initial April + 3 statement of the Four Permanent Representatives.The statement issued at the conclusion of the first + meeting on April 3 reads in part: “The Four Powers are agreed that + the situation in the Middle East is serious and urgent and must not + be permitted to jeopardize international peace and security. They + have straight away entered into a discussion on matters of substance + and have started defining areas of agreement. There is a common + concern to make urgent progress. The Secretary General of the United + Nations will be kept fully informed. Active consultations will + continue. These consultations will be private and confidential. All + appropriate contacts with the parties primarily concerned will be + maintained.” (Department of State Bulletin, + April 21, 1969, p. 337) He read the statement and it was + briefly discussed.

+ +

Gromyko said all agree that the + resolution must be carried out. Seven or eight of its provisions have to + be more fully defined. Withdrawal will begin only after full agreement + is reached. There must be a durable peace. All states in the area must + exist as sovereign, independent states. These are the basic + principles.

+

It was agreed that a statement would be issued based on the April 3 + communiqué and reflecting these principles. The SYG suggested referring + to resumption of the Four-Power talks, but vaguer wording was preferred. + Copy of the statement as released to the press is attached.Attached but not printed. The statement in footnote 5 above was published in the New York Times on April 4.

+

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to the Middle East.]

+
+ +
+ 51. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security + Affairs (Kissinger) to President + NixonSource: National Archives, Nixon + Presidential Materials, NSC Files, + Box 644, Country Files, Middle East—General. Secret. Sent for + information. All brackets are in the original except those + indicating text that remains classified. Haig sent Kissinger’s memorandum back to him + on October 7 to alert him to comments that Nixon wrote on it. + Washington, September 25, 1969. + + SUBJECT + The Israeli Position [less than 1 line not + declassified] + +

[1 line not declassified] The Israelis have often + used this channel for revealing their real thinking. These are his main + points:

+

1. The Arabs are now waging a war of attrition. Israel’s present military + strategy is to show Nasser that + this will cost Egypt heavily. The latest raids have greatly damaged + Nasser’s personal + prestige.

+

2. The Israelis think that if they continue their present course of + military action, Nasser may well + fall. Nasser’s fall would open + the way for a new play of forces in the area.

+

3. If Nasser falls, his successor + will be less dangerous to Western interests because he will not have + Nasser’s personal charisma. + Moderate Arab leaders will be more free to make peace.

+ +

4. The USSR has exploited Arab + frustration with Israel’s and Egypt’s ambition to dominate the Arab + world by leading the attack on Israel. The present struggle is above all + an Egyptian-Russian struggle against Israel. Israel’s very existence + prevents total Soviet domination over the region.Nixon + highlighted this paragraph, underlined from “Egyptian-Russian + struggle” to the end of the paragraph, and wrote “correct” + underneath it.

+

5. The Soviet Union, therefore, can have no interest in a real + Arab-Israeli peace. With peace, the Arab states would divert their major + energies to economic and social development. Soviet capacity to compete + with the US in that field is small.

+

6. The Soviets hope that the war of attrition in the Mid-East will make + the US weary of the situation and ready to accept a compromise peace + formula.

+

7. The war of attrition makes heavy demands on Israel’s resources. Prime + Minister Meir will discuss + additional military and economic aid with you. The “identity of + interests between the US and Israel” justifies US material support for + Israel’s strategy.

+

Comment

+

This is a forthright statement of Israel’s strategy—change the overall + situation in the Mid-East by removing Nasser. It is also a clear example of Israel’s + assumption that our interests and Israel’s are identical. The + questionable points about this thesis are:

+

1. The [less than 1 line not declassified] himself + points out that the USSR profits from + tension and the US can outrun the USSR + in peaceful competition.

+

2. Therefore, for us to have an interest in supporting Israel’s strategy, + that strategy must promise peace.

+

3. It is not at all certain that Hussein will be any more able to make peace without + Nasser than with him. The + fedayeen or the radical governments of Syria and Iraq may prove just as + much of an inhibition as Nasser.

+

4. It seems more likely—and some Israelis admit this—that Israel’s + purpose is to surround itself with weak Arab governments so that it can + weather prolonged tension behind its present borders.At the bottom of the memorandum, Nixon wrote: “K—Can’t C.I.A. + handle Nasser?!”

+
+ +
+ + 52. Memorandum of ConversationSource: National Archives, Nixon Presidential + Materials, NSC Files, Box 1237, + Saunders Files, Chronological Files, Israel. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Saunders on September 30. The + meeting was held in the Cabinet Room of the White House. All + brackets are in the original. “Draft” is written at the top of the + first page. + Washington, September 25, 1969. + + PARTICIPANTS + Secretary Rogers + Dr. Henry A. + Kissinger + Assistant Secretary Sisco + Ambassador Walworth + Barbour + + Alfred L. Atherton, Jr. + + + Harold H. Saunders + + Ambassador Yitzhak + Rabin + Yaacov Herzog + + Moshe Bitan + + + Simcha Dinitz + + + Shlomo Argov + + +

While the President and Prime Minister Meir were talking in the President’s office, +

Nixon and Meir met from 10:47 a.m. to + 12:40 p.m. but no record of the meeting has been found. (Ibid., + White House Central Files, President’s Daily Diary) In her + memoirs, Meir recalled + that she presented Nixon + with a “shopping list” of military hardware, including a + “specific request” of 25 Phantoms and 80 Skyhawk jets. She also + asked Nixon for an + annual $200 million low interest loan for five years to help pay + for the planes Israel intended to buy. (Meir, My + Life, pp. 387–391) In a telephone conversation with + Kissinger at 5:20 + p.m. on September 27, Meir asked for—and received—confirmation that + the President put no conditions on his consideration of the + Israeli request for aircraft. (National Archives, Nixon + Presidential Materials, Henry + Kissinger Telephone Conversation Transcripts, Box + 2, Chronological File) Kissinger recounted that the President provided + Meir with a formula + that he would trade “hardware for software.” According to + Kissinger, “this + meant that [Nixon] would + be responsive to Israeli requests for armaments if Israel gave + us some latitude in negotiations, which he strongly implied he + would ensure would not amount to much. It would be too much to + claim that Mrs. Meir + agreed; more accurate to say she acquiesced in a formulation + whose meaning only the future would reveal.” (Kissinger, White House Years, pp. 370–371)

+

Nixon and Meir also discussed Israel’s + nuclear program and the channel of communication between their + two governments. In a November 6 memorandum to the President, + Kissinger wrote that + “As confirmed in your talk with Golda Meir . . . the NPT will be held in abeyance until after the + forthcoming elections, that the ‘introduction’ issues remain + somewhat ambiguous and that there will be no operational + deployment of nuclear capable missiles for at least three + years.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 605, Country Files, + Middle East, Israel, Vol. III). With regard to the channel of + communication between the United States and Israel, Rabin recalled that in his + talk with Meir, Nixon proposed that “the two + of them set up a line for direct communication, and at a further + meeting between them the exact channel was marked out: Kissinger, acting on behalf of + the President, would approach me, and I would transmit his + message directly to Golda’s personal assistant, Simcha Dinitz, in Jerusalem. + The prime minister would do the same in reverse. At the + president’s request, Golda approved the suggestion.” (Rabin, The + Rabin + Memoirs, p. 154)

their advisers held the + following discussion in the Cabinet Room.

+ +

Mr. Sisco initiated the + substantive part of the conversation by asking the Israeli party to + describe the procedures followed during the 1948–49 Arab-Israeli + Armistice discussions on Rhodes.The Rhodes + procedure was used by UN Acting + Mediator Ralph Bunche to + negotiate the Armistice Agreements signed on the island of Rhodes + that ended the first Arab-Israeli war of 1948–1949. The negotiations + involved separate meetings by Bunche with each delegation on substantive terms + until discussions reached an advanced stage, at which point joint + informal meetings were held. Ambassador Rabin described them as follows:

+

1. Both sides declared the purpose of the negotiations. In that case, the + purpose was to negotiate an armistice agreement.

+

2. There was an opening meeting with both delegations present. Ralph Bunche was elected as the + Chairman.

+

3. A series of meetings of three different kinds followed:

+

a. The mediator went from one group to the other. The UAR and Israeli delegations were quartered + in different rooms in the same hotel.

+

b. There were informal meetings between the heads of the UAR and the Israeli delegations which took + place with the mediator present and sometimes without.

+

c. There were formal meetings of both delegations together under the + Chairmanship of the mediator. Normally, these were to formalize + agreement where it had been reached.

+

Ambassador Rabin said he could + recall two or three of these meetings before the signing, although he + noted that he had had to leave Rhodes before the signing and therefore + might not recall any that took place in the final stage.

+

Secretary Rogers asked whether + that same procedure would meet Israel’s requirements. Ambassador + Rabin replied that it + would.

+

Secretary Rogers said that UAR Foreign Minister Riad had told him in + New York the previous day that the procedures followed at Rhodes would + be acceptable. Ambassador Rabin + noted that Riad had said, according to press reports, that he could + agree to talks along the Rhodes procedures after Israeli withdrawal. + Secretary Rogers noted that Riad + had said there should be some Israeli renunciation of expansionism. The + Secretary then went on to explain that Riad had reaffirmed to the + Secretary in the evening that he had indeed told the press that the + Rhodes procedures would be acceptable and that he had not denied this + later, even though he had said that he was not talking about “direct + negotiations.”

+

Mr. Sisco noted that, in the + light of Riad’s obvious difficulty in describing the Rhodes talks as + “direct negotiations,” there would be some advantage in avoiding public + comment about precisely what the formula at Rhodes was.

+ +

Ambassador Rabin stressed that + we should not think of the Rhodes formula just in terms of the + procedures followed to organize meetings. We should remember that the + negotiations began with a declaration of the purpose of the + negotiations. That declaration is all-important because the Arabs so far + have not declared it to be their purpose to make peace with Israel.

+

Dr. Kissinger asked why the + UN Security Council Resolution of + November 1967 would not give Israel an adequate statement of the purpose + of the negotiations. Ambassador Rabin replied that there are different interpretations + of the resolution.

+

Mr. Sisco noted that the document + he has been discussing with Ambassador DobryninSee footnote 4, Document 39. has a far + clearer statement of the purpose of the exercise than was made before + the Rhodes meetings. Secretary Rogers noted that another possibility was the brief + declaration which followed the meeting of the Ambassadors of the Four + Powers the previous Saturday night.See footnote 5, Document 50.

+

Ambassador Rabin noted that even + the word “peace” is subject to different definitions. The Russians + define it simply as an end to the state of war. The essence of the + Israeli requirement is that the Arabs say they are ready to make peace + with Israel.

+

Secretary Rogers said it was his + impression from the talks he had held in New York during the previous + days that all of the Arabs were ready to say that. The Israelis may + suspect that the Arabs do not mean it but the purpose of a negotiation + would be to determine how serious they are and what specific + arrangements they are ready to agree to.

+

Ambassador Rabin said he had no + evidence that, when the Arabs say they want peace, they mean they want + peace with Israel. They always talk about “peace + in the Middle East” and that is very different from “peace with Israel.” + Secretary Rogers asked who else + the Arabs would be making peace with “in the Middle East” and then said, + referring to Rabin’s comment + that the phrase “with Israel” is essential, “we can get them to say + that.”

+

Secretary Rogers then asked + whether it would be sufficient for Israel’s needs if the US could + persuade the Arabs to say it is ready to make “peace with Israel.” + Ambassador Rabin said + “fine.”

+

Mr. Sisco said that we could not + be absolutely sure what Foreign Minister Riad had meant by his + willingness to use the same procedures that had been used at Rhodes. We + will have to clarify this point and we cannot be certain until we have + just exactly what the Arabs have in mind.

+ +

[GAP: Note-taker called out]

+

Secretary Rogers assured + Ambassador Rabin that there is + no doubt in Gromyko’s mind that + any settlement will have to provide for execution of agreements on all + the issues involved. It is absolutely clear from their conversations, + that Gromyko understands what + the word “pack-age” means.

+

Ambassador Rabin cautioned that + we should not become too deeply involved simply in the mechanics of a + possible meeting and that we must keep in mind the fact that a + declaration of purpose was part of the Rhodes formula. The Secretary + said he hesitated to overstress this point. The Security Council + Resolution of November 1967 seemed to him a reasonable starting point. + If we start debating the purpose again, we will have to go back through + the whole argument over what the Security Council Resolution means. He + suggested that we not reopen that issue again but that we get on with + the business of figuring out what the parties need now. Apparently Riad + would like some sort of renunciation of “Israeli expansionism” and + undoubtedly he reads that as complete Israeli withdrawal. That is just + one example of the kind of issue we now have to face, but that is the + reason for having a negotiation—because there are such areas of + disagreement. Debating the purpose of the exercise will not necessarily + bring the discussion to the key substantive points, so it would be more + desirable to get on with the negotiation as soon as possible.

+

Dr. Herzog commented that if + indeed the Secretary is right and the Arabs do now seem more willing to + make peace with Israel, this means that time has not worked against + peace. He recalled the lengthy debates between us and the Israelis a + year ago over whose side time worked on and simply noted that, if what + the Secretary says is true, this is a commentary on that earlier debate + over strategy.

+

Secretary Rogers said that he + would not conclude that another two and one half years would improve the + situation further. He asked Dr. Herzog whether that was the conclusion he was + suggesting. Dr. Herzog replied + that he was not. He was simply noting that time had softened the + UAR.

+

Secretary Rogers acknowledged + that he did not intend to be over optimistic. There is no question that + the Egyptians see negotiations their way.

+

Dr. Herzog noted that the latest + spanner Nasser seemed to have + thrown into the works was the notion that Egypt could not speak for the + Palestinians. Secretary Rogers + noted that Riad had again thrown out the idea of Israel’s need to + expand. Ambassador Rabin said + he could not believe that the Egyptians really believed that point. All + they have to do is to look at the land area of Israel to see that Israel + has plenty of land now to expand into. The growth of the Israeli state + is not a matter of increasing + land areas but rather a question of developing industry and water + resources.

+

Mr. Sisco noted that he does not + believe the Arabs now have any quarrel with the notion of their + recognizing Israel. Ambassador Rabin questioned Mr. Sisco’s use of the word “recognition.” He noted that the + word had not been used in the Security Council Resolution.

+

Secretary Rogers said that when + he had gone to New York he had had doubts about the intentions of the + Soviet Union and the Arabs. After talking with both there,A summary of the Rogers-Gromyko talks in New York is printed as Document 53. + Rogers also met with + Meir on September 25 in + New York and explained to her that the United States shared Israel’s + doubts about the Soviet-UAR desire for peace. Furthermore, he + assured her that the United States was “not seeking to develop peace + terms for imposition on parties but only to reach agreement on as + many points as possible” so that the parties “could negotiate + remaining differences.” But he urged Israel to “drop insistence on + face-to-face negotiations at outset and enter negotiations on Rhodes + model” of indirect talks under Jarring that would lead to direct talks, if the Arab + states said publicly that they would make peace with Israel. + Meir responded that + Israel would consider such a suggestion “if and when [the Arab + states] made simple statement that they were prepared to sign peace + agreement with Israel.” (Telegram 163837 to Tel Aviv, September 26; + National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 604, Country Files, + Middle East, Israel, Vol. II) he said, “I think I’ve changed + my mind.” While the USSR and the + UAR may not be ready to make peace + entirely on Israel’s terms, he believed that they do seriously want a + solution. Gromyko had even + indicated that the Arabs have no other choice.

+

Mr. Sisco underscored the last + point by emphasizing that the one theme that comes through in all of the + conversations in New York is that there is no real alternative to make a + political agreement with Israel.

+

Secretary Rogers noted that + Gromyko, while fully + appreciating the hard Egyptian position, seemed to indicate some + flexibility in the Soviet position. He cited an exchange with Gromyko in which Gromyko had asked whether Secretary + Rogers felt a solution was + possible with complete Israeli withdrawal from the occupied territories. + When Secretary Rogers had + replied that he did not, Gromyko + had said only that he was disappointed. He felt that any such solution + would violate international law. Any solution not involving complete + Israeli withdrawal would be hard for the Egyptians to face. Secretary + Rogers had recalled that the + US and USSR had been allies in World + War II, and the political agreements ending that war had involved + territorial changes and that had not bothered Moscow. Gromyko had replied only that + “parallels don’t help.” Secretary Rogers concluded by noting that Gromyko was not arguing the substance + of the point—only the political implications.

+

Dr. Kissinger noted that he had + seen Gromyko for only five + minutes at the President’s reception in New York and Gromyko had singled out the Middle East as an area where the + Soviets want to make progress. He had only complained that “Joe Sisco was too tough.”

+

Dr. Herzog commented that the ups + and downs in Cairo have always perplexed Israel. Mr. Sisco noted that we are very cautious + about our interpretation of what goes on in Cairo. Ambassador Rabin said that there is no doubt + that the Egyptians are pressed and that the Russians are under + increasing pressure to show that they can get back Egypt’s conquered + territories. Mr. Bitan noted that + there is internal trouble in the UAR. He felt that one of the most + important objectives for the USSR is + to keep Nasser alive.

+

Secretary Rogers cautioned that + he did not want to leave the impression with the Israelis that Foreign + Minister Riad had said anything to suggest weakness in Egypt’s + negotiating stance. At the same time, he had very much taken the line + that Egypt has no other choice than to press for a political settlement. + Secretary Rogers noted that it + is always true in a negotiation that both sides are trying to get the + best deal they can but he did not feel that should deter negotiations. + Surely, the Israelis are smart enough to hold their own in a + negotiation.

+

Mr. Sisco turned attention to + Jordan, asking what sense the Israelis have of what is going on + there.

+

Dr. Herzog replied that the + King’s position is not as endangered as some people think. By any normal + measurement, the King should be in a terrible position with a + substantial portion of his territory occupied and with Iraqi, Syrian and + Saudi troops on his soil as well as Egyptian installations. Despite + this, there seems to be no desire by the fedayeen to overthrow the + regime. Moreover, the Israelis believe that Nasser has no desire to overthrow Hussein because he wants to keep alive + an Arab link to the US. The major elements of the army seem loyal to the + monarchy. Orders do not always get carried out but basically loyalty + seems to remain.

+

Dr. Herzog continued that he did + not feel Hussein had ever + received a complete go-ahead from Nasser to negotiate. The substantive limitations on + Nasser’s go-ahead had been + such as to be a practical red light. Given the pressures on Hussein over the last few months, + Hussein seems to have felt + that he had to move more on the Cairo axis. For this reason, any + separate settlement between Israel and Jordan seems remote—“for all + Hussein’s desire for + peace.”

+

Dr. Herzog summarized by saying + that the desire for peace remains, Hussein’s survival is not immediately endangered and the + attraction of a close relationship with Cairo is deeper than ever. There + is no evidence that Hussein is + balancing the US against the USSR. He is basically pro-Western and does + not seem to be turning to Moscow, despite occasional tactical threats to + us to do so.

+ +

Mr. Sisco noted that it was + interesting in Foreign Minister Riad’s speech that he spoke first about + Jordan and Jerusalem. Ambassador Rabin read this as a clear warning from Nasser to Jordan not to do anything to + move toward a separate settlement with Israel.

+

Dr. Herzog noted that Hussein probably felt he had made a + historic slip to let the fatah get as deeply entrenched in Jordan as + they are, though there was little Hussein could do about it now.

+

The conversation then drifted off to a number of specific items—the + current state of US efforts to arrange for delivery of the Phantoms by + other than USAF pilots; the latest US + efforts to persuade the Syrians to release the Israeli TWA passengers in Damascus; and then + general personal recollections of the US landings in Lebanon in + 1958.

+ + + Harold H. Saunders + Printed from a copy that bears his typed + signature. + + +
+ +
+ 53. Memorandum From Harold + Saunders of the National Security Council Staff to the + President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential + Materials, NSC Files, Box 650, + Country Files, Middle East, Middle East Negotiations, July 1–October + 1969. Secret; Nodis. Sent for information. A stamped notation on the + first page reads: “HAK has seen.” + Attached but not printed are telegrams 3324 from USUN, October 1, which reported + Rogers’s meeting with Gromyko that day, and telegram 3322 from USUN, October 1, which reported + Sisco’s meeting with + Dobrynin on September + 29. + Washington, October + 1, 1969. + + SUBJECT + US–USSR Middle East Negotiations in New York + +

Secretary Rogers and Gromyko failed to make progress toward + coming up with a common document during their final meeting in New York. + The Soviet strategy now appears to be to get a commitment to total + Israeli withdrawal from Sinai and Gaza to the pre-war lines in return + for their agreeing to Rhodes type negotiations (interpreted the Arab way)See Document 52 and footnote 3 thereto. A difference of + opinion arose between Egyptian and Israeli officials as to the + meaning of the “Rhodes formula,” with the former interpreting it as + indirect talks between the parties while the latter believed it + suggested preliminary indirect talks that eventually led to direct + ones. and peace after Israeli withdrawal has been completed + and without an explicit commitment to control the fedayeen. Secretary + Rogers does not believe that + this is a satisfactory deal and has therefore held basically to our + present position and did not put our fallback position on the table. The + talks will now shift back to Washington with Joe Sisco and Dobrynin picking them up again next + week.Sisco and Dobrynin did not meet until October 28. See Foreign + Relations, 1969–1976, volume XII, Soviet Union, January + 1969–October 1970, Document 98.

+

Summarized below is where we stand with the Soviets on the major points + after the negotiations in New York:

+

1. The Soviets will accept the Rhodes formula if + we will be more specific on the UAR border. + Secretary Rogers avoided being + more specific on the borders because of disagreement on a number of + other points in the package. On the Rhodes formula, the Secretary made + clear that we are not insisting on a joint meeting of the parties at the + outset and that it was advantageous not to be too precise on the details + so that both parties can justify it. Gromyko had a different set of facts than ours on the + Rhodes formula. While he started out by insisting that there should be + an understanding between us on what it means, he seemed to be pressing + this less after Secretary Rogers + had explained the advantages of ambiguity.

+

2. We and the Soviets agree on the principle of cessation of war and the + establishment of a state of peace. The Soviets, however, continue to + insist that a juridical state of peace can come only after all Israeli + withdrawals are completed. This is consistent with the longstanding Arab + view. The Israelis, on the other hand, refuse to withdraw an inch until + peace is established and all elements of the package in force.

+

3. The Soviets are still also insisting on a reference to the + Constantinople Convention with the language concerning freedom of + passage through the Suez Canal.

+

4. On Gaza, the Soviets want a clear-cut statement + of Arab sovereignty, total withdrawal of Israeli forces, the + establishment of a UN force, and + reinstitution of the UAR administration + that existed before the war. We stuck to our position that all options + on the ultimate status of Gaza must be kept open, leaving the concerned + parties to work out a solution.

+

5. A preliminary understanding has been reached by Joe Sisco and Dobrynin to drop any reference to refugees. The Soviets can not agree that the principle of choice to + refugees should be balanced by an annual quota.

+

6. The Soviets still hold the view that the UN force should be established in Sharm + el-Sheikh. Secretary Rogers maintained that practical security arrangements + in Sharm el-Sheikh, the establishment of demilitarized zones, and the + final disposition of Gaza must be negotiated with the parties on the + basis of the Rhodes formula.

+

7. We and the Soviets have been agreed for some time on Arab recognition + of Israel’s right to live in peace.

+

Conclusion: The long and short of this is that we + may move toward a much shorter document containing only the key + elements. That would leave the tough issues for negotiation, which would + suit Israel. Our work would be cut out for us, but we would at least be + working in a negotiating context.

+
+ +
+ + 54. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security + Affairs (Kissinger) to President + NixonSource: National Archives, Nixon + Presidential Materials, NSC Files, + Box 644, Country Files, Middle East, Middle East—General, Vol. II. + Top Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only. Drafted on October 1 by Kissinger and Haig. Printed from a copy that + indicates that Kissinger + initialed the original. A note at the top of the page reads: “Hand + carried to Ken Cole 10/2/69—Mid East.” + Washington, October + 2, 1969. + + SUBJECT + Middle East Situation + +

As you requested, I told Len + Garment to organize some Jewish Community protests + against the State Department’s attitude on the Middle East situation and + Len has promised to take prompt action. I informed him that we wish to + remain clear of the action he was taking.

+

I also talked to Rabin to tell + him that we had an interest in calmer Israeli relations with Jordan and + to confirm your understanding on the nuclear issue.

+
+ +
+ 55. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security + Affairs (Kissinger) to President + NixonSource: National Archives, Nixon + Presidential Materials, NSC Files, + Box 605, Country Files, Middle East, Israel, Vol. III. Top Secret; + Nodis; Sensitive. Sent for action. All brackets are in the + original. + Washington, October + 8, 1969. + + SUBJECT + Rabin’s Proposed + Assurances on Israeli Nuclear Policy + +

Ambassador Rabin has asked + whether the following replies to our queries about Israeli nuclear + policyReference is to Richardson and Packard’s meeting with Rabin on July 29. See Document 41. would be satisfactory: + (1) Israel will not become a “nuclear power”; (2) Israel will not deploy + strategic missiles, at least until 1972; (3) the new Israeli government + after the October 28 election will consider the NPT. Following are my analysis of the acceptability and my + recommendations on each of these points:

+

I. Israel will not become a + nuclear power.

+

A. Our July request. The Israelis had promised in + signing the Phantom contract “not to be the first to introduce nuclear + weapons into the Middle East.” Rabin had informally defined “introduce” to mean “not + test and not publicize.” Elliot + Richardson on July 29 asked him to accept our definition + of “not introduce” as “not possess.” The papers from which you worked in + authorizing Elliot’s approachDocument + 38. defined “possess” for our own internal purposes as + “Israeli activity short of assembly of a completed nuclear explosive + device.” In short, we tried to put ourselves in a position where we + could act as if we assumed the Israelis do not have completed weapons + while leaving to the Israelis’ conscience the stage short of completion + where they would stop.

+

B. Implications of the Israeli response. Instead + of accepting our words “not possess,” Rabin simply says they “prefer” to say they will “not + become a nuclear power.”

+

1. “Nuclear power.” Their phrase suggests the + NPT distinction between a + “nuclear-weapon State” and a “non-nuclear-weapon State.” But it is quite + possible they are simply proposing a suitably vague phrase that has no + previous record of discussion between us and hence no earlier effort at + precise definition.

+

2. In the context of the NPT, the concept “non-nuclear-weapon State” has the following meaning:

+ +

a. “. . . a nuclear-weapon State is one which has manufactured and + exploded a nuclear weapon or other nuclear explosive device prior to + January 1, 1967.”

+

b. “Each non-nuclear-weapon State. . . undertakes . . . not to + manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other explosive + devices. . . .”

+

c. The treaty leaves deliberately obscure the position of a nation like + Israel that might now already have manufactured but not exploded a + nuclear device. There is no history of extensive discussion of this + issue among the negotiators. Presumably each such nation is left to make + its own good-conscience definition of what constitutes “manufacture.” + Any such nation signing the treaty would presumably be declaring that it + is not retaining such devices, though the state of dismantling would + again be left to its own good-conscience judgment.

+

3. The reason for Rabin’s preference is not clear. When I asked + how a state could become a “nuclear power” without “possessing” nuclear + weapons, he simply said they “prefer” their formulation. I can only + guess that they are trying to break away from discussions last year in + which US Defense negotiators interpreted the Israeli assurance about not + introducing nuclear weapons to preclude the mere physical presence of + weapons. They may figure they are on better ground with a concept that + has some internationally recognized meaning but has been left + deliberately vague.

+

C. Acceptability of the Israeli formulation.

+

1. Any of these phrases is vague and leaves definition to the Israelis. + It is not practical for us to try to define them restrictively because + we could not determine Israeli adherence to our definition. What we have + to settle for, I believe, is an Israeli commitment that will prevent + Israeli nuclear weapons from becoming a known factor and further + complicating the Arab-Israeli situation.

+

2. Nevertheless, I am wary of accepting their phrase without some notion + of what they mean by it.

+

3. However, if we could tie their phrase to the NPT concept of remaining a “non-nuclear-weapon State,” we + would at least be working with an internationally accepted + concept—albeit one with its own calculated vagueness of definition.

+

4. The argument against giving up insistence on + our word “possess” would come from those who believe we should make a + maximum effort to keep Israel as far as possible from a real nuclear + capability. They might believe the word “possess” carried with it a more + restrictive meaning. However, this argument in my mind founders on two + points: the obvious Israeli unwillingness to confide the details of + their program—as far as I know—and our inability to enforce any + agreement we might theoretically reach.

+ +

D. Recommendation—That I reply to Rabin as follows: Since the Israeli + phrase “nuclear power” suggests the concepts of the NPT, you propose + that Israel assure us it will remain a “non-nuclear-weapon State,” + assuming the obligations of such a state as defined by Article II of the + NPT. [”. . . not to receive” and + “not to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other + nuclear explosive devices . . . .”] This would in effect ask the + Israelis to accept privately the key obligation of the NPT while allowing them more time to sort + out their position on more generally unpalatable aspects of the treaty + (e.g. safeguards and public renunciation of the nuclear option).Nixon + approved the recommendation.

+

II. Israel will not deploy + strategic missiles at least until 1972.

+

A. Our July request: Elliot said, “We hope Israel + will agree not to produce or deploy the Jericho missile.”

+

B. Implications of the Israeli response. I can + only guess Israeli motivation. These are possibilities:

+

1. Rabin’s offer not to deploy + finesses our request not to manufacture missiles. This would permit them + to run them off the production line and then to store them a few hours + from launch readiness rather than putting them on the launching + pads.

+

2. Although our intelligence suggests persuasively that the first + missiles should be coming off the production line this fall, it might be + that there is some complication in the production line or in the + availability of a militarily significant number of warheads that would + make the Israelis unready to deploy missiles until 1972 anyway.

+

3. More likely is the possibility that the Israelis estimate that their + military superiority—especially if the additional Skyhawks and Phantoms + they have requested are delivered in 1971—is almost certainly assured + through 1971. That would be quite consistent with our estimates, + although the Israelis present a more dangerous picture when making their + case for the additional aircraft. They may figure their sacrifice would + be marginal beside the risk of antagonizing the US and jeopardizing the + added equipment and aid they want.

+

C. Acceptability of the Israeli proposal.

+

1. There was general agreement during our special Review Group + discussions last July that our minimum requirement was for the Israelis + not to deploy their missiles.See Document 35. If they were deployed, + everyone would assume they had nuclear warheads because they are not + accurate enough to be worth their cost just to deliver high explosives. + It was my own conclusion that this was all we could expect the Israelis + to accept.

+ +

2. The argument against asking only for + non-deployment came from members of the group, who felt we ought to try + to stop manufacture as well if we were going to try to keep Israel as + far as possible from an actual nuclear weapons delivery capability.

+

3. If it is your view that we should not try to affect Israel’s actual + capability, then Rabin’s + proposal should be acceptable with one proviso—that your acceptance not + be read as assent to deployment in 1972. I do not believe they should be + given a blank check.

+

D. Recommendation—That I reply to Rabin as follows: The Israeli + proposal is acceptable provided Israel agrees to further discussion of + the subject in 1971 or prior to a decision to deploy missiles.Nixon + approved the recommendation.

+

III. The new Israeli + government will consider the NPT.

+

A. Our July request: Elliot said, “We therefore + attach utmost importance to Israel’s early signature and ratification of + the NPT . . . . We would welcome the + Ambassador’s comments on the conclusions the Government of Israel has + reached.”

+

B. Implications of the Israeli response.

+

1. Mrs. Meir may have made some + commitment to you privately that would give this statement + significance.

+

2. Interpreted in the light of similar Israeli statements in the past, + however, this sounds like a dodge. Prime Minister Eshkol assured + President Johnson last December that the Israeli government was studying + the implications of Israel’s adherence to the NPT.Prime Minister Eshkol sent + the letter to President Johnson on December 4, 1968, in response to + Johnson’s November 15 letter urging Israel to sign the + Nonproliferation Treaty. Eshkol wrote that Israel was still giving + careful consideration to the long-term security implications of the + treaty and would take into account the considerations advanced in + Johnson’s letter. See Foreign Relations, 1964–1968, volume XX, + Arab-Israeli Dispute, 1967–1968, Document 349.

+

3. There is no special reason to predict a change in post-election policy + because an Israeli Cabinet decision to sign and ratify the NPT would still run opposite to + predominant Israeli thinking on several counts:

+

a. The hard-liners want to hold their nuclear option over Arab heads at + least until there is a negotiated peace. They believe the Arabs would + interpret signature as a sign of weakness.

+

b. Israelis have the same qualms and political problems with + “surrendering” their nuclear option as any of other potential nuclear + powers.

+

c. Israel has serious reservations about accepting the international + safeguards the NPT requires.

+ +

C. Acceptability of the Israeli proposal. While + recognizing that Mrs. Meir cannot + commit a future government, this formulation strikes me as unacceptably + weak. It seems to me that signature of the NPT with its loopholes and escape clause would not + jeopardize Israel’s potential nuclear capability or diminish Arab + recognition of its conventional military superiority.

+

D. Recommendation—That I reply to Rabin as follows: You would prefer + Prime Minister Meir’s agreement + to make a vigorous personal effort to win Cabinet approval of Israel’s + signature and ratification of the NPT.Nixon approved the + recommendation.

+

One general recommendation: On an issue as complex + as this one, I believe you should reserve for yourself the opportunity + to have second thoughts. Therefore, I would propose prefacing my + approach to Rabin by saying (1) + that something along the lines of my counterproposals would seem closer + to what you had in mind and (2) if these were acceptable to the Israelis + you would take another look at them and give him a firm response. At + that point you might want me to find a way to get the views of the + special group that dealt with this subject last summer.No action on the recommendation is + indicated.

+

The record of Elliot Richardson’s + July 29 conversation with Rabin + is attached.

On instruction from the + Israeli Government, Rabin officially replied to the queries in a + meeting with Richardson + on October 15. The Israeli Ambassador said: “1. The Government + of Israel is in no position to make further clarifications about + the NPT until a new government + will be formed after the elections. The new government will + continue to study this problem, bearing in mind its importance + as expressed by the President during his talk with the Prime + Minister. 2. It is the view of the Government of Israel that + introduction means the transformation from a non-nuclear weapon + country into a nuclear weapon country. 3. As a result of the + French embargo and other factors there will be no operational + deployment of missiles in Israel for at least three years from + now.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), + Box H–146, National Security Study Memoranda)

+

On November 21, Sisco + sent a memorandum to Richardson in which he wrote: “NEA has carefully + considered the implications of the reworded Israeli statement + concerning Israel’s nuclear weapons intentions given you on + October 15 by Ambassador Rabin, and concludes that it represents a + continuation of the evasion which has characterized responses to + our previous approaches.” (Ibid., RG 59, Lot Files, Bureau of + Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, Office of Israel and + Arab-Israel Affairs, 1951–1976, Box 27) Richardson followed up with + Rabin on February + 13, 1970, asking him if the “new Israeli Government had reached + any decisions,” to which the Ambassador responded that he had + “nothing to add” to what he told Richardson in October. (Memorandum from + Richardson to + Nixon, February 18, + 1970; ibid.) On February 23, 1970, Rabin met with Kissinger to inform him that Israel had “no + intention to sign to NPT” and to warn that linking signature of + the NPT and arms sales to + Israel would be “extremely unfortunate.” (Memorandum of + conversation, February 23, 1970; ibid., Nixon Presidential + Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger + Office Files, Box 134, Rabin/Kissinger 1969–1970, Vol. I)

+
+ +
+ + 56. Minutes of a Washington Special Actions Group MeetingSource: Library of Congress, + Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box TS–76, Committees and Panels, + Washington Special Actions Group, October 1969. Top Secret; + Sensitive; Eyes Only. All brackets are in the original except those + indicating text omitted by the editors. The meeting took place in + the White House Situation Room. + Washington, October 21, + 1969, 3:28–5:12 p.m. + + SUBJECT + Berlin, Sino-Soviet Hostilities, and the Middle East + + + PARTICIPANTS + Henry A. + Kissinger—Chairman + + State + + + U. Alexis Johnson + + Martin Hillenbrand + William Cargo + + Rodger Davies + + + Defense + + + G. Warren Nutter + + + + CIA + + + + Thomas H. Karamessines + + + JCS + + Vice Admiral Nels C. Johnson + + NSC Staff + + + Harold H. Saunders + + + Helmut Sonnenfeldt + + William G. Hyland + Col. Robert M. + Behr + +

[Omitted here are the “Summary of Decisions,” discussion of Berlin, and + Sino-Soviet hostilities contingency planning.]

+

Kissinger opened discussion of + the Middle East paperSaunders summarized the paper, + which presented the contingencies for two scenarios, in a September + 17 memorandum to Kissinger. + The first scenario involved “an increase in tension followed by + overt and major involvement of Soviet military forces supporting + Arab forces seeking to oust Israel from the occupied territories and + to inflict a major defeat.” The United States would respond in four + phases: 1) “before open Soviet involvement, + diplomatic efforts to restore cease-fire and deter Soviet + involvement”; 2) “efforts to restore cease-fire fail, Israel is + being pushed back and Soviet personnel are involved; U.S. decides to + supply additional combat aircraft into + Israel”; 3) “Israel being pushed back; President determines + that it is necessary to halt the flow of Soviet + supplies and personnel to the Mid-East”; 4) “effort to + block Soviet lines of communication has failed; Israel is about to + be driven back beyond 1967 borders; President decides to intervene.” The second scenario posited “a + situation in which USSR naval + units have attacked Israeli targets and the U.S. decides on retaliatory action of some sort.” (National + Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC + Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–072, Washington Special Actions + Group Meetings, WSAG Mtg. 2/9/70 + USSR and Egypt) by + noting that it is conceptually good but confusing in format. He asked + for Saunders’s view of the + paper. Saunders agreed that it + is unwieldly and suggested there be developed a “basic issues” paper for + each scenario. He asked the Group if the drafters had chosen the most + useful scenarios. Secretary Johnson replied that the scenarios were the + ones agreed to by the WSAG at an earlier meetingSee Document 44. and + that he considered the paper to be on the right track.

+

Davies called attention to a + section of the paper that disturbed him. At one point in Scenario I + there is expressed a time-sequenced need for a “hunter-killer” submarine + force in the Mediterranean, yet the paper reveals that it may require + eight days to position the force. Kissinger said the submarine force was not the only + example of unreality. He noted also the long delays incident to the + positioning of ground forces, thus calling into question the basic + suitability of the tactic. He wondered whether these actions are + operationally sound. Another question relates to the requirement for + obtaining the force disposition and operations plans of U.S. allies in + the Mediterranean. Don’t we have these now? Admiral Johnson said force + dispositions are known but not operational plans.

+

Kissinger then inquired why + military alerting actions should be disguised. After considerable + discussion the decision of the Group was to use alerting actions as + signals of U.S. concern.

+

Admiral Johnson called for a discussion of base availability, which is a + severely limiting factor for U.S. operations in the Middle East. He + doubted, for instance, that Spain would be available. Davies agreed, but qualified his + agreement with the thought that Spain would become more tractable (as + would other friendly Mediterranean powers) if the Soviets became + actively involved. Admiral Johnson observed that the nature of the + Soviet involvement would be the determinant—if only logistic support + were involved allied reluctance to provide base support would remain + high; if direct military assistance were the case, the reluctance would + soon disappear. With regard to this ambivalence, he remarked that we + should continually remind our allies of the increasingly evident Soviet + naval activity throughout the Mediterranean.

+

Kissinger questioned the + likelihood that France would deliver Mirage fighters to Israel in the + event Israel’s existence became jeopardized. Davies replied that the French have + indicated they would consider releasing the fighters if a case for dire + military necessity could be made.

+

Kissinger concluded the meeting + with an observation that another “Lebanon operation”See footnote 2, Document + 4. is not possible. We will have neither the + operating bases nor the forewarning. Furthermore the balance of forces + in the area has been upset by increased Soviet naval presence. He asked + that the remainder of the Middle East paper be addressed at the next + meeting.

+ +

Before departing Secretary Johnson inquired whether the Nixon Administration had reviewed the + rules of engagement for the area. Admiral Johnson said that the only + review he knew of was concerned with Southeast Asia. He will look into + the matter and prepare a document on rules of engagement for WSAG review.

+

The Group adjourned at 5:12 P.M.

+
+ +
+ 57. Memorandum From Harold + Saunders of the National Security Council Staff to the + President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential + Materials, NSC Files, Box 1169, + Saunders Files, Middle East Negotiations Files, Middle East + Settlement—US–USSR Talks. Secret; Nodis. Sent for action. A typed + notation at the top of the page reads: “This is the version that + went to Joe Sisco 10/27/69.” + All brackets are in the original. + Washington, October + 22, 1969. + + SUBJECT + Where We Stand in the Mid-East + +

As you and the President ponder Secretary Rogers’s memo on Joe + Sisco’s proposed next step with Dobrynin,In an October 14 memorandum to the President, Rogers wrote that, “taking + advantage of the atmosphere created by the recent round of talks in + New York,” he intended to present the Soviet Union with a + UAR-Israeli settlement based on the following: “a) a binding + commitment to peace and specific obligations to maintain the peace; + b) acceptance of the principle of withdrawal of Israeli forces from + UAR territory to the pre-June 5 + lines conditioned on UAR + willingness to negotiate with Israel,” which would include + “practical security arrangements” in Sharm el-Sheikh and Gaza, + demilitarized zones and freedom of passage through the Strait of + Tiran and Suez Canal for all vessels, including Israel, and Israel’s + right to live in “secure and recognized boundaries.” Rogers concluded by saying that + “only an unabashed optimist can predict agreement between ourselves + and the USSR on the above + proposition, let alone agreement of the parties. However, it is + clearly in our interests to move to this position whether or not the + Soviets buy. It is a position that both sides will criticize, but + neither can really assail effectively.” (Ibid.) I would like + to throw out these thoughts. In some ways, I regard this as the most + important—though not the clearest—memo that I have written since January + 20. This is not because I believe that any one decision or any single + diplomatic move like this changes the course of history but because I + see a series of decisions being made almost tacitly that could.

+

I am not sure where the President’s thinking stands at this point, so + this may not be as pointed as it might be. However, the situation has + now reached a point where I + feel I owe you the reflections that follow even if they are somewhat + wide of the mark.

+

In short, I’d like to make two points:

+

1. US Mid-East policy is on the verge of shifting from the strategy of + the past twenty years—trying to maintain as broadly based a position as + possible—to one based centrally on Israel.

+

2. If I assume correctly that we do not want to make that shift, the main + issue we face is not just how to achieve a peace settlement but how to + avoid being forced into a change of policy that is not consistent with + US interests.

+

+ Our Present Policy +

+

For twenty years, the US has attempted to keep a foot in all camps in the + Mid-East. We developed our special friends in the moderates—Jordan, + Saudi Arabia, Lebanon, Iran, Libya, Tunisia, Morocco. We spent a good + deal of effort courting Nasser + for better or worse. We stood by Israel.

+

We have done this because we have interests in oil, encouraging moderate + political trends, trying to avoid an exclusive Soviet relationship with + the area’s chief troublemaker and keeping Israel afloat.

+

In following that policy, we rejected a strategy promoted by Israel’s + friends in the US. That strategy was built around the idea that Israel—a + “bastion of democracy”—was holding the Mid-East for the Free World + against encroaching Communism. We rejected it because it assumed that + friendly control of a certain plot of Mid-Eastern ground would some how + prevent Communist encroachment. We rejected it because we felt we had to + meet a political encroachment in political—not military—terms on the + ground where it was gaining. We elected to compete in Cairo, Beirut, + Amman, Baghdad. By 1967, we were still holding our own.

+

Now, however, we seem to be on the verge of adopting the strategy of + basing our Mid-East strategy exclusively on Israel. I doubt we are doing + this because the President wants to, although I don’t know. I assume we + are doing it because we cannot see a practical alternative—or because + the price of choosing the alternative seems too high.

+

Whatever the cause, the following steps which Israel and its friends are + pressing us to take would commit us to Israel in a way that we have + never before accepted:

+

—Helping Israel to acquire modern weapons and build up its own defense + industry to the extent of more than $3 billion in + purchases of military equipment and other equipment needed for defense + production over the next six years.

+

—Covering a foreign exchange gap of $1.2 billion + (included in the above) through financial assistance over the next five + years. [That’s the equivalent + of four years of development loans to India—given to a country with a + per capita GNP higher than + Italy’s.]

+

—Becoming Israel’s sole supplier of military + equipment. (France has stopped sending new end-items, and the + UK seems about to drop out.)

+

—Acquiescing in Israel’s possession of a nuclear + deterrent.

+

—Acquiescing in Israel’s redrawing its map or at least in Israel’s + strategy of sitting tight until peace comes.

+

I realize we have not taken all these steps yet. But the pressure is on, + and it would take persistent effort on our part not to slip into them as + the path of least resistance. If I assume correctly that we do not want + to go this route, then the main issue is to find a way to establish a + position independent of Israel with minimum damage to the President’s + policies across the board.

+

Finding a practical alternative to the course we are on is difficult. We + do not want to hurt Israel, and we recognize that Israel has a real + security problem with its unpredictable and none-too-trustworthy + neighbors. Even if we wanted to press Israel, it is not clear we would + succeed. If we tried, the domestic damage to the President’s program—and + his freedom of maneuver on Vietnam—could be extensive. The broad choices are:

+

1. Stop where we are, act as Israel’s lawyer and + underwrite Israel’s stand-fast strategy.

+

—The arguments for this are that it may best reflect our impotence in + breaking the current impasse and it would best assure support of + Israel’s friends in the US for the President’s policies.

+

—The argument against is that it would increasingly—and in the end + exclusively—tie the American position in the Middle East to Israel. This + would be a major shift from past US policy not consistent with the + present view of US interests. It would tie us to an Israeli strategy + which the President has described as “unassailable short range, + disastrous long range.”

+

2. State’s alternative would be to adopt a position we + regard as balanced and to see how far we can get with it without + forcing it on Israel.

+

—The argument for doing this is that we would at least be standing on a + position consistent with US interests, not just Israel’s. There may be + an outside chance over time of persuading somebody else to buy it, but + in any case it would put us in a position of not backing Israel + regardless of what it does.

+

—The argument against this is that it would carry the continuous risk of + angering the Israelis and their US friends while not entirely pleasing + the Arabs.

+

3. Adopt a balanced position and then by a + combined use of the carrot and stick—the promise of military support and + over $1.2 billion in financial help—to try to bring + Israel to a settlement.

+ +

—The argument for this is that only a settlement can create conditions + conducive to US interests. We have more leverage with Israel today than + at any time in the last decade.

+

—The strength of the argument against is in direct ratio to the scale of + the Israeli counterattack we estimate. It also depends on the extent of + the President’s promise to Mrs. Meir not to apply pressure.

+

Each of these approaches has serious disadvantages, so I see our job as + picking the least dangerous and then moving ahead with the best + safeguards we can build for ourselves at each step.

+

For me, the first course—stopping where we are—is ruled out because it is + potentially the most dangerous both to our interests and in building + over the long term a situation where the US and USSR would confront each other over + Israel. Stopping where we are would gradually put us in a position of + tying our Mid-East policy almost exclusively to Israel. (I am speaking + here of US Government policy; US oil interests might survive some time + beyond the USG as they are now in + Cairo.) Also, this would leave the US as Israel’s ultimate defender + against more than 60 million Soviet-backed enemies who, as you have + said, in any historical period must prevail unless the US is to defend + it.

+

Similarly, any abrupt move in the direction of the third course is + probably too dangerous for the President in the absense of a real Arab + peace proposal. I would leave open the option of relating our military + and economic help to peace moves, recognizing that it is too early to + consider this as an active choice. There’s no point in having a + confrontation over a mirage (no pun).

+

That leaves us with the problem of how to stake out an independent US + position while minimizing Israeli reaction. As I see it, the key to + avoiding the worst pitfalls lies in our taking a substantive position + that we can say does not hurt Israel.

+

The question is whether Joe’s formula provides that safeguard. What it + really does is put us on record as saying that we do not believe Israel + should keep any part of the Sinai provided the + UAR will negotiate satisfactory security arrangements for Sharm + al-Shaikh and the Sinai along with a final Arab government for Gaza. + This may weaken Israel’s negotiating position, but the US interest is in + Israel’s security, not its expansion. We would be opposing expansion provided security can be gained another way.

+

I see this as a necessary step if we are to move toward a position + consistent with US interests—and not move to a position tied exclusively + to Israel. I believe, too, that it is a defensible stand to take in this + country to say that we will support Israel’s security wholeheartedly but not + Israel’s expansion.

+
+ +
+ + 58. Paper Prepared in the Department of StateSource: National Archives, Nixon + Presidential Materials, NSC Files, + Box 650, Country Files, Middle East, Middle East Negotiations. + Secret. Attached to a November 16 memorandum from Rogers to Nixon. Sisco presented this paper, which + became known as the Rogers + Plan, to Dobrynin on October + 28. See Document 61. + Washington, undated. +

JOINT US–USSR WORKING PAPER

+

FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES

+

Israel and the UAR,

+

In consideration of their obligations under the Charter of the United + Nations,

+

Confirming their obligations under Security Council Resolution 242 of + November 22, 1967 and expressing their readiness to implement it in good + faith in all of its provisions,

+

Recognizing the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by means + of war,

+

Recognizing also the need to establish a just and lasting peace in the + Middle East under the terms of which each State in this area can live in + security,

+

Agree that their representatives under the auspices of Ambassador + Jarring will follow the + procedures the parties utilized at Rhodes in 1949See Document 52 and footnote 3 thereto. to work out + without delay, starting on the basis of the following provisions, a + final and reciprocally binding accord on ways of implementing Security + Council Resolution 242 of November 22, 1967 to establish a just and + lasting peace.

+

Point 1

+

The parties, in reaching a final accord (contained in a final document or + documents) on a package settlement on the basis of these Fundamental + Principles, would determine a timetable and procedures for withdrawal of + Israeli armed forces from UAR territory + occupied during the conflict of 1967 to boundaries to be delineated in + accordance with Point 3 as well as an agreed plan for interrelated + fulfillment of all other provisions of Security Council Resolution + 242.

+

Point 2

+

The state of war and belligerency between Israel and the UAR would be terminated and a formal state + of peace would be established between them, and both parties would refrain from acts inconsistent + with the state of peace and the cessation of the state of war.

+

In particular:

+

1. No aggressive action by the armed and other forces—land, sea, or + air—of either party would be undertaken or threatened against the people + or the armed forces of the other.

+

2. Both parties would undertake to do all in their power to ensure that + acts of hostility and belligerency whether by government agencies, + personnel, or private persons or organizations will not originate from + and are not committed from within their respective territory.

+

3. Both parties would refrain from intervening directly or indirectly in + each other’s domestic affairs for any political, economic, or other + reasons.

+

4. Both parties would confirm that in their relations with each other, + they will be guided by the principles contained in Article 2, paragraphs + 3 and 4 of the UN Charter.

+

Point 3

+

The parties would agree on the location of the secure and recognized + boundary between them, which would be shown on a map or maps approved by + the parties which would become part of the final accord. In the context + of peace, including inter alia agreement between the parties on the + establishment of demilitarized zones, on practical security arrangements + in the Sharm al-Shaykh area for guaranteeing freedom of navigation + through the Strait of Tiran, and on practical security arrangements and + final disposition of Gaza, the former international boundary between + Egypt and the mandated territory of Palestine would become the secure + and recognized boundary between Israel and the UAR.

+

Point 4

+

For the purpose of ensuring the territorial inviolability of the parties + and guaranteeing the security of the recognized boundary, the parties, + following the procedures set forth in the last preambular paragraph of + this document, would work out an agreement on:

+

(a) Zones to be demilitarized and procedures for ensuring their + demilitarization;

+

(b) Practical security arrangements in the Sharm al-Shaykh area to assure + freedom of navigation through the Strait of Tiran; and

+

(c) Practical security arrangements for and final disposition of + Gaza.

+

Point 5

+

The parties would agree and the Security Council would reaffirm:

+ +

(a) That the Strait of Tiran is an international waterway; and

+

(b) That the principle of free navigation for vessels of all countries, + including Israel, applies to the Strait of Tiran and the Gulf of + Aqaba.

+

Point 6

+

The UAR would affirm that, in its + exercise of sovereignty over the Suez Canal, the ships of all nations, + including Israel, will have the right of freedom of navigation without + discrimination or interference.

+

Point 7

+

The parties would agree to abide by the terms of a just settlement of the + refugee problem as agreed upon in the final accord between Jordan and + Israel, and to participate as Ambassador Jarring may deem desirable in working out the terms of + said settlement.

+

It would be understood that the accord between the UAR and Israel would be paralleled by an + accord between Jordan and Israel, which would include agreement on a + just solution of the refugee problem. Implementation of both accords + would begin only after agreement had been achieved on the entire + package.

+

Point 8

+

The UAR and Israel would mutually agree + to respect and acknowledge each other’s sovereignty, territorial + integrity, inviolability and political independence and each other’s + right to live in peace within secure and recognized borders free from + threats or acts of force.

+

Point 9

+

The final accord would be recorded in a document which is to be signed by + the parties and immediately deposited with the UN. After the parties have deposited such a document, the + Secretary General of the UN would be + requested by the parties immediately to inform the Security Council and + all UN Member States to that effect.

+

From the moment of deposit, the document would become binding on the + parties and irrevocable, and implementation and observance by the + parties of the provisions of the accord would begin. In the + implementation of the final accord, it would be understood by the + parties that their respective obligations would be reciprocal and + interdependent. The final accord would provide that a material breach of + that accord by one of the parties shall entitle the other to invoke the + breach as a ground for suspending its performance in whole or in part + until the breach shall be cured.

+

Point 10

+

Both parties would agree that the final accord would be submitted to the + Security Council for its endorsement.

+ +

It would be understood that France, the United Kingdom, the United States + and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics would submit and support an + appropriate Security Council resolution and pledge that they would + concert their future efforts to help the parties abide by all of the + provisions of the final accord or accords.

+
+ +
+ 59. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security + Affairs (Kissinger) to President + NixonSource: National Archives, Nixon + Presidential Materials, NSC Files, + Box 605, Country Files, Middle East, Israel, Vol. III. Secret; + Exdis. Sent for action. + Printed from a copy that indicates Kissinger signed the original. All brackets are in + the original except “[their?]”, added for + clarity. + Washington, October + 28, 1969. + + SUBJECT + Putting Israeli Request in Perspective + +

Mrs. Meir has left us with two + substantial requests—for 75 more jet aircraft (50 A–4s and 25 F–4s) and + for help in meeting a projected $1.2 billion balance of payments deficit + 1970–1974.

+

Although I believe you are sympathetic, you will need to know what is + involved before you make final decisions. There are budgetary + implications in the request for credit on the military sales, which go + far beyond the planes—some $500–600 million in total purchases per year + are projected for FY 70–74. There may + even be some need for legislation in responding to the request for + financial assistance. Israel probably even wants to go back on the AID + list, so we shall have to look at all our options.

+

To provide you with the necessary analysis of costs and options, I + propose setting up two NSC Ad Hoc + Groups to be run in a combined effort by my program analysis and + operations staffs with participation by the involved departments.

+

1. The first study would analyze for you Israel’s projected military + requirements and U.S. options in helping to meet those requirements.

+

2. The second would analyze Israel’s projected requirements for financial + help and U.S. options in responding.

+

When these studies are completed, Joe + Sisco’s Interdepartmental Group would prepare a policy + paper for you.

+ +

Finally, I would suggest telling the Israelis generally what our planned + timetable for response is—without committing you on the nature of the + response. If we can persuade them that we are not stalling but meeting + your [their?] legitimate needs and that our + timetable will not hurt them, I think we might keep them from turning on + the domestic pressure.

+

Recommendation

+

That you approve the above procedure as embodied in the two NSSMs + attached (Tab A and Tab B).Nixon initialed his approval on + November 6. The attached NSSMs were signed by Kissinger; see Documents 62 and 63. A single + NSC Ad Hoc Group was + established to consider Israeli assistance requests.

+
+ +
+ 60. Minutes of a Washington Special Actions Group MeetingSource: National Archives, Nixon + Presidential Materials, NSC Files, + NSC Institutional Files + (H-Files), Box H–114, Washington Special Actions Group, WSAG Minutes (Originals) 1969 and + 1970. Top Secret; Sensitive. All brackets are in the original except + “[sic]”, added for clarity. The meeting + was held in the White House Situation Room. + Washington, October 29, + 1969, 2:08–3:20 p.m. + + SUBJECT + Lebanon + + + PARTICIPANTS + Henry A. + Kissinger—Chairman + + State + + + U. Alexis Johnson + + + Rodger Davies + + + Defense + + + G. Warren Nutter + + + + CIA + + + + Thomas H. Karamessines + + + JCS + + Vice Admiral Nels C. Johnson + + NSC Staff + + + Harold H. Saunders + + Col. Robert M. + Behr + + +

SUMMARY OF DECISIONS

+

1. Incident to LebanonBeginning on October + 15, Lebanon experienced an upsurge of fedayeen activity against the + government, including pro-fedayeen military intervention by Syria, + which sparked the second major political crisis of the year. + (Memorandum from Rogers to + Nixon, October 23; + ibid., RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 23 LEB; telegram 8896 from + Beirut, October 25; ibid.) Prime Minister-designate Rashid Karame + resigned over the government’s inability to define a fedayeen + policy, and President Charles Helou struggled to form a viable cabinet. + (Department of State Intelligence Note 763, October 27; ibid., Nixon + Presidential Materials, NSC Files, + Box 620, Country Files, Middle East, Lebanon, Vol. I) and the + general Arab-Israeli problem, the WSAG + will develop for the President a paper on Libya which determines and + analyzes alternative pressures that can be brought to bear in an effort + to make the radical government more tractable.See Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, volume E–5, + Part 2, Documents on North Africa, 1969–1972, Document + 44.

+

2. President Helou will be queried + regarding Lebanese arms needs and will be advised of our willingness to + assist.

+

3. Preparations will be made to supply arms (on a covert basis) to the + Falange. Implementation will be withheld until the WSAG determines the action to be + necessary and in the U.S. interest.

+

3 [sic]. Interagency evacuation plans for Lebanon + will be deposited in the White House Situation Room.

+

4. Situations II, III and IV will be amended to include greater + specificity in military detail. Integrated political-military scenario + format will be followed.

+

5. The issue of Israeli versus U.S. intervention will be brought before + the NSC.See Document + 74.

+

The meeting began at 2:08 P.M.

+

Davies reported the military + situation in Lebanon as of early morning, October 29th. GOL regular forces have engaged the + fedayeen with considerable success. The only remaining major fedayeen + stronghold is in Tripoli. The Lebanese army has been heartened by these + operations. Kissinger inquired + about the unexpected effectiveness of the GOL forces. Davies + attributed their success to the strong leadership of the + mostly-Christian Officer Corps.

+

Kissinger reported his discussion + of Lebanon which he had had with the President shortly before the + meeting. The President wishes:

+

1. Formal consideration of a “tough option.”

+

2. Recognition of political trends in the Middle East which, if not + checked, will lead to the downfall of the remaining moderate regimes in + the area.

+ +

3. A determination and analysis of the pressures that can be brought + against Libya (e.g., reduced oil draw-down) to make the radical + government more tractable.

+

With regard to Point 1, above, the Group agreed that a “tough option” is + already contained in the Lebanon paperSaunders sent a summary + of the contingencies to Kissinger on October 27 prior to a November 24 + WSAG meeting (see Document 68). (National Archives, Nixon + Presidential Materials, NSC Files, + NSC Institutional Files + (H-Files), Box H–071, Washington Special Actions Group Meeting, + WSAG Mtg. 10/29/69 Lebanon) An + updated version of the contingency paper is + ibid.—specifically, the U.S. military intervention actions + described in Situations III and IV. More work needs to be done in + detailing these options.

+

After a brief discussion of Point 3 (Libya), the Group agreed that the + WSAG should develop a paper for + NSC consideration. State will chair + the interdepartmental working group.

+

Kissinger then turned to the + Lebanon paper, asking Secretary Johnson for his comments. Johnson + deferred to Davies for + introductory remarks.

+

Davies reviewed Situation I (a + two-part option consisting of providing arms overtly to the Lebanese + regular forces and/or covertly to the Falange). State, he said, sees + little short term benefit in providing arms to GOL. Even if the requested line items were made immediately + available, they would be insufficient to make much of a difference + militarily. The action would, however, constitute a morale booster for + Helou. Before discussing the + option of arms for the Falange irregulars, Davies observed that the descriptor “fascist” is perhaps + too harsh a term for these forces. They are more appropriately described + as militant, right-wing Christians. State’s view of this option is that + it should be done only under the circumstances of a collapse of the + GOL with ensuing confessional + strife—and then it should be done covertly.

+

Secretary Johnson asked about lead times. Karamessines outlined two methods of delivery:

+

1. The USG would intercede with a + private U.S. firm such as INTERARMCO that maintains stocks of arms in + Europe. The Falange would arrange for delivery without involving the + USG as transfer agent, but the U.S. + would pick up the tab for the arms. This could be done covertly.

+

2. Large scale air drops of arms and munitions to points specified by the + Falange (this probably could not be done without some risk of + exposure).

+ +

Kissinger returned to the first + option, that of supplying arms directly to the GOL. Would we do it covertly, and would there be financial + or political problems? Davies + said the assistance would be openly provided, but more to the point is + the apparent lack of urgency in doing it at all. The GOL doesn’t need the arms at this + juncture. Moreover, the option has to be viewed in the broader context + of the overall Arab-Israeli problem. Neither Muslims or Christians in + Lebanon can comfortably, at this point in time, accept arms which will + be used against the fedayeen to the benefit of the Israelis. Kissinger disagreed. If the U.S. + desire is to preserve a moderate government in Lebanon, we should be + prepared to send the arms necessary to keep the government in power. He + recommended, therefore, that we tell President Helou we are prepared within reason to + give him what he wants in the way of arms and to ask if financing will + be a problem. The Group agreed with this course of action. Davies was charged with preparing a + cable to Ambassador Porter requesting that he communicate with Helou.

+

Kissinger then outlined the steps + that should be taken by the WSAG + before arms are sent covertly to the Falange.

+

1. Define the conditions under which we would give covert assistance.

+

2. Coordinate with the 303 Committee.

+

3. Determine when the conditions for shipment have been met.

+

Nutter inquired why we should not + do it now. Secretary Johnson replied that the possibility of + embarrassing security leaks seemed to be the main drawback. Kissinger elaborated on the pros and + cons of the action saying that, on the one hand, provision of arms to + the Falange could make them overly adventuresome, but on the other hand, + withholding the arms could encourage the Muslims to greater militancy. + On the whole, the best option seems to be arms for GOL forces because they are controlled by + officers sympathetic to the Falange. What you have, in effect, is + support of the Falange by proxy, while retaining the option of covert + support should the GOL show signs of + imminent collapse. What we need to do is make the necessary logistic + arrangements now, but put a hold on the package until a decision is made + that the course of action is appropriate. The Group agreed. Karamessines advised that the airlift + would require four C–118s or their equivalents.

+

Nutter asked if the Russians are + supporting the fedayeen. Davies + replied affirmatively. The Soviets have strongly supported not only the + fedayeen but also the PFLP. At first the support was furnished by the + UAR, on a replenishment basis. Now the Soviets appear to be dealing + directly with the guerillas. Because this cannot but disturb Nasser, the Russians will have to play + it cool. Much depends on the outcome of the talks in Cairo.The + United Arab Republic offered to mediate the dispute between Lebanon + and the fedayeen, prompting representatives of the Lebanese + Government and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) to meet + in Cairo at the end of October to negotiate a peaceful resolution of + the confrontation. (INR + Intelligence Note 777, October 31; National Archives, RG 59, Central + Files 1967–69, POL 23 LEB; telegram 9012 from Beirut, October 29; + ibid.) While the two sides settled on general principles regarding + the relationship between the Government of Lebanon and the fedayeen, + the so-called “Cairo Agreement” of November 2 contained few details. + (Telegram 9178 from Beirut, November 4, and telegram 9582 from + Beirut, November 19; both ibid., Nixon Presidential Materials, + NSC Files, Box 620, Country + Files, Middle East, Lebanon, Vol. I) As far as our interests + are concerned, the results will inevitably be bad—it is merely a + question of how bad?

+

Davies then reviewed Situation + II, which has to do with evacuation of U.S. personnel from Lebanon. + There are, he reported, detailed interdepartmental plans covering this + contingency. Kissinger asked for + copies of the plans to be kept on file in the White House Situation + Room. He then asked about the current location of the forces that could + be employed should it become necessary to secure the airfield at Beirut + as a part of evacuation. Admiral Johnson advised that a Marine Battalion + Landing Team is located at Souda Bay in Crete, about 44 hours out of + Beirut. Kissinger wondered if + the Marines shouldn’t be moved closer. Secretary Johnson thought not. + The situation is not that grave.

+

Admiral Johnson noted an alternative possibility to the use of the + Marines. If military airlift from Europe is used, the aircraft could + transport a rifle company to Beirut. Secretary Johnson agreed, but + observed that such an action might be unnecessary because it is not + certain that we will be faced with a totally hostile population.

+

Kissinger asked that the military + aspects of Situation II be expanded to include greater detail on + required forces, their places of origin, and the timing incident to + their employment. He wondered, moreover, if we need a political scenario + to cover evacuation procedures. Davies said we should have no basing problems. Turkey, + for instance, would be amenable to staging operations provided + evacuation and not military involvement were guaranteed. Secretary + Johnson asked about the safety of Americans in other Arab countries. + Davies was confident that in + a purely evacuation scenario no difficulties would be encountered. The + case would be entirely different in the event of U.S. military + involvement.

+

Kissinger said the paper would be + improved by developing an integrated political-military scenario for + Situation II similar to the Korean paperSee + Foreign + Relations, 1969–1976, volume XIX, Part 1, Korea, + 1969–1972, Document 27. but not as extensively + detailed. All agreed it could and should be + done.

+ +

Davies outlined the principal + elements of Situation III—U.S. military intervention in response to + serious internal disorder in Lebanon. Karamessines cautioned the Group to be careful about the + definition of “internal,” reporting that the Lebanese had captured 150 + “fedayeen” prisoners who turned out to be Syrian regulars. Kissinger pondered the question of + whether the U.S. would ever commit forces if the Lebanese problem were + strictly internal. The consensus of the Group was generally negative, + but all agreed that planning for such an event is + an imperative. Kissinger asked + if the internal disorders in Lebanon could get completely out of hand. + Secretary Johnson said they could, and most assuredly would if + polarization developed along confessional lines. Kissinger indicated that, if + confessional strife developed, our action would be to support the + Falange. Saunders noted the + possibility of an “in-between” scenario, in which Lebanese internal + disorders increase alarmingly and Helou advises U.S. that without help his government is + doomed. This prompted Kissinger + to ask if Situation II and III could not be complementary, that is, + couldn’t “evacuation” provide a pretext for “intervention”? The Group + mulled over the question before concluding that after the period of time + required for evacuation had elapsed (roughly 48 hours), the continued + presence of U.S. troops would be a transparent ploy.

+

Kissinger requested additional + detail for Situation III in the form of greater specificity about + forces, timing, logistic support, airlift requirements, etc. Again, the + re-work should follow the style of earlier integrated political-military + scenarios developed for the WSAG but + not necessarily in the same detail. The important point which should + come through is a clearly revealed statement of actual military needs. + Secretary Johnson mentioned overflight rights and basing problems, + noting that WSAG Middle East + papersSee footnote + 2, Document 68. contain a useful treatment of these + problems. Kissinger inquired + about actual air corridors that would be available in the event of U.S. + intervention. The Group agreed that European overflight may not be + possible and that routing through the Straits of Gibralter may be the + only alternative. Kissinger said + that we must consider not only the problems in Lebanon but the + consequences of our actions in terms of their effects in other Arab + states. What other force commitments or evacuation efforts might be + required?

+

Davies remarked that Situation + IV—U.S. intervention in response to external aggression—would also + present very difficult problems. Secretary Johnson agreed saying there + is a great deal of fuzziness between Situations III and IV. In + actuality, there could be a combination of both. Kissinger asked what the Israelis + would be doing while all of this is going on. Davies remarked on the unfortunate + geographical situation. The + Lebanese Muslims and the fedayeen are located in the areas contiguous + with Israel, while the Lebanese Christians and the Falange are farther + to the north. If they concluded it necessary, the Israelis would strike + the territory in Lebanon occupied by the fedayeen. Nutter observed that the Israelis + would respond to a Syrian invasion of Lebanon by striking Damascus. + Admiral Johnson thought we should develop in Situation III and IV a + statement of likely Soviet responses. Although this point was not + pursued, the Group agreed that such considerations were absolutely + germane to the problem.

+

Kissinger said the Group should + work out intervention scenarios that will show the President the full + amplitude of the problem. There is, however, an issue even broader than + intervention. If the Israelis are likely to respond positively to a + deteriorating situation in Lebanon, why not let them do the job? If we + did this, given the unambiguous and seemingly irreversible decline of + the GOL, the Israelis might be able to + handle the problem while the U.S. attempts to hold off the USSR on the basis of non-intervention by + the superpowers. This is a matter, Kissinger said, that should be addressed by the NSC at an early date. He concluded the + meeting by asking for a revised paper on Lebanon by Tuesday, November + 4th.

+

Before the Group adjourned at 3:20 P.M. Admiral Johnson distributed a + paper on rules of engagementNot + found. (called for at the WSAG meeting on October 21, 1969).See Document + 56.

+
+ +
+ + 61. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassies in Jordan, + Saudi Arabia, and IsraelSource: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 653, Country Files, + Middle East, Sisco Middle + East Talks, October (1969). Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Drafted by + Atherton, cleared by + Sisco, and approved by + Richardson. Repeated + Priority to Beirut, Cairo, London, Paris, Moscow, and USUN. All brackets are in the + original except “[7]”, added for clarity. + Washington, October 29, 1969, + 1831Z. +

182922. 1. FYI: + In Sisco-Dobrynin meeting October 28 + (septel)Telegram 182821 to Moscow, + October 29. See Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, volume XII, Soviet + Union, January 1969–October 1970, Document 98. + Sisco gave Dobrynin our current position on + UAR-Israel boundary question as part of package involving (a) + withdrawal, (b) peace, and (c) neutral formulations on Sharm al-Shaykh, + demilitarized zones and Gaza with details to be worked out by parties in + Rhodes type negotiations.Document 58. + Sisco stressed this package + represented attempt on our part to find common language for joint + US-Soviet document and did not constitute elements of new US document. + Pending Soviet reaction, we do not want to get into discussion of + specific texts with parties. We have requested Soviets to inform us if + they plan to consult UAR, and we said we would similarily inform Soviets + if we decided to consult parties.

+

2. Question arises of how to handle this latest development in US-Soviet + talks with Arabs and Israelis. With UAR, we intend to call in Ghorbal about Thursday and fill him in + generally. Bergus’ further + recommendation on how much more we should tell UAR requested.

+

3. With Hussein and Faisal, we think it would help bolster + their confidence for us to give them private indication in general terms + of step we have taken. Would appreciate Ambassador Porter’s + recommendations re possibility of taking similar action with President + Helou.

+

4. With Israelis, we want to avoid this becoming major issue before we + have some indication of Soviet reaction. On other hand we feel our + credibility requires that we let Israelis know in general terms what we + are trying to accomplish with Soviets. End FYI.

+

5. For Amman and Jidda: Ambassador should pass + following to Hussein for his + strictly private and confidential information. Chargé should similarly + inform Saqqaf with request info be passed Faisal for his private information. QUOTE In meeting + with Ambassador Dobrynin October + 28, Assistant Secretary Sisco + made major effort to break deadlock on UAR-Israel aspect of a + settlement, which we consider key to overall settlement. To that end, he + told Dobrynin it is USG position that old international border between Palestine + and Egypt should be the secure and recognized boundary between Israel + and Egypt in the context of peace and of agreement worked out by parties + under Jarring’s auspices for + security arrangements at Sharm al-Shaykh, demilitarized zones, and + security arrangements for and final disposition of Gaza. We are passing + this message to their Majesties for their private information in view of + our close relationship with them and request that they do not share it + at this time with others. UNQUOTE.

+

6. For Tel Aviv: Ambassador should inform + Eban that in Sisco-Dobrynin meeting October 28, we continued effort to find + common formulations for inclusion in joint US-Soviet document we are + seeking to evolve. We have made clear to Soviets that USG will present no new document and that + we are now at stage of seeking joint formulations to express common + positions or neutral language where agreement not possible. We have also + made clear that purpose remains to help Jarring get negotiating process started between parties + under his auspices. General direction of our current efforts is away + from specificity to generalized formulations in most respects. We are + seeking to maximize areas for negotiation between parties and minimize + specificity and detail as Eban + indicated at breakfast meeting with Sisco in New York.Sisco’s October 2 meeting with + Eban was reported in + telegram 173876 to Tel Aviv, October 14. (National Archives, RG 59, + Central Files 1967–69, POL 27–14 ARAB–ISR) He should also be + aware that we are bearing fully in mind importance of how any document + is ultimately transmitted to Jarring, i.e., QUOTE for his guidance with parties + UNQUOTE or some other possible non-mandatory formulation. We are + standing on specific language on peace and on negotiations according to + Rhodes formula. As Sisco + foreshadowed to Eban in New York + October 2 and Under Secretary Richardson to Rabin October 15,See footnote 10, Document 55. we have + moved on a very contingent and tentative basis in direction of specific + language on Israel-UAR boundary question—i.e., toward reaffirmation of + QUOTE Rusk formula UNQUOTE of + November 1968.See Foreign + Relations, 1964–1968, volume XX, Arab-Israeli Dispute, + 1967–1968, Document 301. As Under Secretary made + clear to Rabin, we are seeking + quid pro quo from Soviets for restating what has in effect been US + position all along; such restatement on our part remains contingent upon + agreement of USSR to specific + commitment to peace and Rhodes type negotiations to work out practical + security arrangements and other details of settlement. We are passing + this information to Eban in + strictest confidence and ask that it be closely held. We are not asking + Israel at this time to react in any way, pending reaction of other side. + GOI position on this question has + been made abundantly clear to + us and we are not seeking its agreement. We will wish to discuss this + further with GOI after we receive + Soviet reaction.

+

6 [7]. For London and + Paris: We will brief UK and + French here and report by septels.

+ + + Rogers + + +
+ +
+ 62. National Security Study Memorandum 82Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential + Materials, NSC Files, Box 605, + Country Files, Middle East, Israel, Vol. III. Secret; + Sensitive. + Washington, November 6, 1969. + + TO + The Secretary of State + The Secretary of Defense + The Secretary of the Treasury + The Secretary of Commerce + The Secretary of Agriculture + The Director of the Bureau of the Budget + The President of the Export-Import Bank + The Administrator of AID + + + SUBJECT + U.S. Economic Assistance Policy Toward Israel + +

The President has directed that U.S. economic policy toward Israel be + evaluated. This study should examine:

+

—The amount of foreign exchange needed to meet Israel’s requirements over + the next five years.

+

—The availability of foreign exchange exclusive of external assistance to + finance Israel’s defense requirements.

+

—The alternative levels of U.S. economic assistance, if any, needed to + meet Israeli military and non-military objectives.

+

—The alternative means of financing U.S. economic assistance to + Israel.

+

This study shall be carried out by an NSC Ad Hoc Group chaired by a representative of the + Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs. Its other + members will be designated by the addressee agencies.

+ +

The study will be submitted by December 19 to the President’s Assistant + for National Security Affairs and will then be referred to the IG/NEA + for review.

+ + + Henry A. Kissinger + + +
+ +
+ 63. National Security Study Memorandum 81Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential + Materials, NSC Files, Box 605, + Country Files, Middle East, Israel, Vol. III. Secret; Sensitive. A + copy was sent to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of + Staff. + Washington, November 6, 1969. + + TO + The Secretary of State + The Secretary of Defense + The Director of Central Intelligence + The Director of the Bureau of the Budget + + + SUBJECT + U.S. Arms Transfer Policy Toward Israel + +

The President has directed that U.S. arms transfer policies toward Israel + be evaluated. This study should:

+

—Examine the balance of Arab/Israeli military capabilities given + alternative levels of U.S. and Soviet arms transfers over the next five + years.

+

—Analyze Israel’s force requirements to meet a variety of alternative + defense objectives, including a) deterrence through preemptive attack; + b) deterrence of Arab attack through superior force; and c) maintenance + of its independence if deterrence fails.

+

—Determine Israel’s technical and economic capacity to produce its arms + requirements.

+

—Formulate alternative U.S. arms transfer policies toward Israel, + including specific program levels over the next five years.

+

This study will be carried out by an NSC + Ad Hoc Group chaired by a representative of the Assistant to the + President for National Security Affairs. Its other members will be + designated by the addressee agencies.

+ +

The study will be submitted by December 12 to the President’s Assistant + for National Security Affairs and will then be referred to the IG/NEA + for review.

+ + + Henry A. Kissinger + + +
+ +
+ 64. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in + IsraelSource: National + Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 605, Country Files, Middle East, Israel, + Vol. III. Secret; Exdis. Drafted + by Sisco and Atherton, cleared in NEA/ARN, and + approved by Rogers. Repeated + to Amman, Beirut, Cairo, Jidda, London, Moscow, Paris, Jerusalem, + and USUN. + Washington, November 6, 1969, + 0055Z. +

187681. For Ambassador.

+

1. We believe reported agreement between Lebanese Government and + guerrilla leadershipSee footnote 6, Document 60. likely to + result as a minimum in some greater freedom of action for the fedayeen. + This, of course, carries with it risk that Israelis will feel obliged to + take early counter measures as warning to Lebanese Government and to + guerrillas themselves. We assume you will continue to counsel + restraint.

+

2. We doubt this will be sufficient, however, and believe more drastic + effort on our part may be necessary to persuade Israelis to adjust + themselves to new situation in Lebanon in ways designed avoid to extent + possible further political deterioration there. We have accordingly been + giving thought to what further we might say to Israelis with respect to + lessons to be drawn from current Lebanese crisis. In this connection, we + feel that events have borne out our somber predictions that Israeli + policy of large scale military retaliation against two remaining + moderate regimes, Jordan and Lebanon, while militarily successful, would + be in long run a political disaster. You will have noted that in + Richardson-Rabin conversation last Friday,October 31. No record was found. we + made point that we thought at the time that Beirut airport attackSee footnote 6, Document + 1. was a mistake and would be a real beginning of + political deterioration in Lebanon. Events since then have, in our + judgment, tended to confirm this conclusion. We do not disagree with + Rabin’s assertion to Under + Secretary that fedayeen would + have become increasing problem in Lebanon even in absence Beirut raid. + This misses point, however, that Beirut raid in our view gave fedayeen + boost and seriously hampered GOL’s + ability to cope politically with fedayeen problem when it subsequently + began assume major proportions.

+

3. We believe principal lessons to be drawn from current Lebanese crisis + are two-fold: (A) that U.S. must continue to make major efforts to try + to achieve a political settlement despite continued expressed opposition + of Israelis; and (B) that, as was indicated to Rabin, Israelis must do some hard + thinking and reassess their policy of the past months of quote + seven-fold unquote retaliation on Jordanian and Lebanese soil. It may be + that guerrilla movement has picked up such steam politically and + militarily that trend will not be reversible. We are struck by the fact, + however, that neither UAR nor Soviets + seem interested in pushing present crisis to ultimate challenge. We + feel, therefore, that there may still be room to maneuver in this + situation.

+

4. We would like to have any thoughts that you may have regarding the + above as well as your judgment regarding USG approach to GOI along + following lines:

+

A. For some time we have expressed grave doubts to GOI about wisdom of its policy of large + scale retaliation in response to fedayeen activities mounted from + Lebanon and Jordan. We believe that latest political crisis in Lebanon + has demonstrated that such policy can only contribute to political chain + reaction threatening very existence of moderate regimes and thereby over + long run US as well as Israeli interests.

+

B. Hard reality is that, in absence of political settlement, moderate + regimes have no alternative to tolerating certain level of fedayeen + activity from their territory if they are to survive. In our view, + agreement between Lebanese Government and fedayeen is irreversible and + only question is extent to which GOI + can counter and limit fedayeen activities, not whether it can prevent + them entirely.

+

C. In interest of preserving regimes with whom Israel can eventually make + peace when opportunity presents itself, we believe GOI must make fundamental reassessment of + its entire doctrine of how to deal with this problem as it relates to + Lebanon and Jordan. We urge Israelis in particular to reassess political + implications of their actions, giving greater weight to these than has + been case in past where they have tended to concentrate on military + success or failure of a given action.

+

D. We appreciate fully that Israel cannot remain passive and react in no + way to fedayeen attacks across its borders, particularly when they take + toll of innocent civilian lives. What we are urging, however, is that + Israelis adopt new doctrine based on premise they must live with certain + level of fedayeen attacks from Lebanon and Jordan and that, so far as + these 2 countries are concerned, they limit their military response first to defensive actions to + reduce infiltration and secondly to responding in kind and only in a + measured way. In other words, we urge that they adopt self-denying + doctrine to extent of avoiding escalating counter actions and cross + border initiatives in the form of air and commando strikes, which have + been successful militarily but have resulted in strengthening fedayeen + politically at expense of both Jordanian and Lebanese Governmental + leadership.

+

E. We think Israelis should make conscious revision of their retaliation + doctrine along foregoing lines and should so advise Hussein and Helou through contacts available to them, making clear + that while they understand that fedayeen activities cannot be stopped + completely and will have to be countered from time to time, they will + exercise extra measure of restraint so long as Hussein and Helou reciprocate by pursuing vigorously efforts to + limit fedayeen operations from their territory to maximum extent + possible.In telegram 4202 from Tel Aviv, + November 7, Barbour replied: + “Appreciate Department’s concern about the undesirable consequences + of Israeli military responses to fedayeen across ceasefire (or + armistice) line attacks. I believe however that a generalized + approach such as that suggested in reftel [telegram 187681 to Tel + Aviv] is not likely to have more effect than the continued + reiteration of counsels of restraint by us at all levels both here + and in Washington.” The Ambassador concluded: “In sum, I think it is + a misnomer to speak of general Israeli policy of retaliation or to + tailor our démarches to the GOI as + if such a policy did exist. Our approaches had better be particular + ones designed for the particular circumstances. For present, + therefore, I believe our best chance to promote Israeli restraint + will be for us to keep in close touch with GOI and exchange with them to fullest extent possible + information and opinions on situation in Lebanon.” (National + Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 604, Country Files, Middle East, Israel, + Vol. II)

+ + + Rogers + + +
+ +
+ + 65. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security + Affairs (Kissinger) to President + NixonSource: National Archives, Nixon + Presidential Materials, NSC Files, + Box 644, Country Files, Middle East, Middle East—General, Vol. II. + Confidential. Sent for information. + Washington, November 10, 1969. + + SUBJECT + New Soviet Doctrine on the Middle East + +

The recent official Soviet statementSonnenfeldt sent a memorandum about + the statement, which was released in Moscow on October 25, to + Kissinger on October 29. + (Ibid., Box 710, Country Files, Europe, USSR, Vol. VI) has disturbing implications + beyond the particular problem of Lebanon with which it ostensibly dealt. + It said:

+

“The firm belief is expressed in Soviet leading circles that not a single + foreign power should encroach on the sovereignty of Lebanon and its + right to settle its internal affairs and must not + interfere in matters within the competence of the Arab states + themselves.”

+

This is reminiscent of the Brezhnev doctrine of limited sovereignty for Eastern + Europe, which asserted that a threat to the security of a socialist + state was a “common” problem and a “concern” for all socialist + states.

+

In effect, the statement

+

—sets up the USSR as the arbiter of + what constitutes a matter within the sole “competence” of the Arab + states, and

+

—asserts the principle that the internal affairs of Lebanon or any other + country in the area should be decided by the “Arab states + themselves.”

+

One can be fairly certain that the Soviets will take credit for + forestalling a US intervention as the Soviet press is now claiming. And + there is no doubt that the Soviets have strengthened their hand in the + area by their maneuver.

+

Left unchallenged, the Soviet statement puts the USSR in the position of placing a + protective umbrella over radical Arab intervention in other Arab + states.Nixon underlined this sentence and wrote: “I agree. What is Sisco’s reaction & recommendation?”

+
+ +
+ + 66. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security + Affairs (Kissinger) to President + NixonSource: National Archives, Nixon + Presidential Materials, NSC Files, + Box 651, Country Files, Middle East, Middle East through December + 1969. Secret; Nodis. Sent for action. + Washington, November 11, 1969. + + SUBJECT + The Middle East—Where We Stand + +

As we wait for the Soviet response to Sisco’s latest formulation of our position on a + UAR-Israel settlement,See Documents 58 and 61. I + want to put down some general reflections on where we stand in the + Mid-East. When we have that response, it would be a logical time for + another NSC session to take stock.

+

The arguments for going ahead with the Sisco initiative were that:

+

—It is essential to the US position in the Mid-East to take a position + more consistent with US interests. We have been too much Israel’s + lawyer. As a result, we are on the verge of a major policy shift—by + force of circumstances, not by design. For twenty years, we have tried + to maintain a broadly based position in the area. Now we are looked on + as basing our position exclusively on Israel.

+

—The new formula would position us where we ought to beholding out for + Israel’s security but not for Israel’s expansion. Until now, we have seemed to be + holding out for Israel’s freedom to negotiate for major changes in its + borders.

+

—The overriding US interest is in a peace settlement. If the Soviets + responded positively, we might just have some chance of getting a + negotiation started. If they responded negatively, we would have a + clearer measure of their intent. The alternative was the certainty of a + continued impasse.

+

—While the Israelis would not like this move, we would still be in a + defensible position domestically as long as we held out for Israeli + security. Israel’s expansion is not one of our interests if security can + be provided otherwise. Israel’s long-term security depends in part on a + US position in the Mid-East to hold off the USSR, but Israel’s present strategy of standing fast is + creating conditions which hasten the erosion of our position.

+

My reservations on the Sisco + initiative are as follows:

+ +

—I am not sure that a diplomatic move like this can any longer affect the + deep-rooted forces at work in the area. It seems to me that the fedayeen + movements have now become an almost autonomous force which the moderate + governments will no longer be able to control. It has already become an + explicit point in the US–USSR negotiations that the UAR cannot (or will not) commit itself to + clamp down on the fedayeen. What I am saying is that (a) we should not + be overoptimistic about our ability to bring about a peace settlement + but (b) we should not allow ourselves to think that even a peace + settlement would set things right for us in the Mid-East. The fedayeen + would still be there working—if not to undercut the settlement—against + moderate interests.

+

—But even if continued Israeli occupation of Arab territory—and not the + fedayeen—is still the main cause of pressure on governments friendly to + US interests, I believe we are off on a wrong tangent in concentrating + on a UAR-Israel settlement. We have a much greater interest in Hussein than in Nasser and—what is even more + important—the real issues in resolving the Palestine problem are on the + Jordanian side. The West Bank is part of Palestine; there will be no + solution without a refugee settlement; the refugees are a Jordanian not + an Egyptian problem; Jerusalem is an issue for the entire Moslem world + but is part of a Jordan settlement. We have focused on a UAR settlement first on the theory that + Nasser’s agreement would + make Hussein’s easier, but I have + long felt that we should shift focus. While I hesitate to say this + because of the complications it raises, there will be no settlement + until Syria comes into the process. In essence, the roots of the 1967 + war lay in Syrian support for fedayeen attacks on Israel. There is no + reason not to expect that to continue.

+

—I am afraid the step we have taken, even if we make our position known, + will gain us little in the Arab world if we then go on supporting Israel + with arms and money after it rejects our position. At the same time, the + Israelis will dissociate themselves from it.

+

What we are doing, I fear, is helping to build a case for greater Arab + militancy—since we have backed slightly away from Israel—and making it + more likely that Israel will rely more heavily than ever on its military + strategy. We are doing too little to have a chance of success but enough + to divert indigenous forces from reaching their own decision.

+

+ I see three choices: +

+

1. Get out of the way and take no position (as Acheson recommended).In an October 27 meeting with Nixon at the White House, former + Secretary of State Dean Acheson recommended that the United States + “should not intervene either directly or by supplying military items + to such a conflict.” Acheson was “sure that the Government could + find ways of letting the Russians know that our purpose was not to + be involved and would be greatly facilitated by their adopting a + similar course.” He concluded by telling Nixon that he “saw the only hope + of being a willingness of both Arabs and Jews to accept a more + live-and-let-live policy as a result of a sharp and painful + experience.” (Memorandum of conversation with the President, October + 27; Yale University, Sterling Memorial Library, Acheson Papers, + Group 1087, Record Group IV, Box 68, Folder 173):s100/100

+ +

This would have the advantage of recognizing the situation as it is—that + peace is unlikely and the US is unable to force it—and disengaging from + responsibility for forces beyond US control.

+

The counter argument is that it may not be possible. First, the only way + to do this and preserve an independent position would be to take our + distance from Israel. In effect, a passive US policy favors Israel. We + would have to cease our support for Israel if we were really going to + dissociate ourselves. Second, we would be virtually disengaging and + leaving our friends—including large private US investors—and the field + to the USSR. Whether the US likes it or not, it is held responsible for + Israel’s existence. Whatever the US might do, it will be associated with + the Israeli issue as long as it persists.

+

2. We could pursue what we are doing now with whatever modifications the + evolving situation suggests.

+

The argument for doing this is that doing nothing leaves no likelihood of + a settlement, while our present course at least keeps alive the + possibility of constructing a diplomatic alternative to the present + military course. As in any other difficult negotiating situation, there + is something to be said for third-party efforts to give the contestants + an honorable way out. As long as the diplomacy is not completely + sterile, there is an argument for continuing to chip away at the + problem.

+

The arguments against are those I have noted above.

+

3. We could come down hard on Israel and try to squeeze her back to + pre-war borders if we once had a viable peace proposition with Arab + backing.

+

The first argument for is that there probably will be no peace settlement + without this kind of pressure in the end. The more basic argument is + that Israeli strategy and peace terms now are inconsistent with US + interests. We have come to the point where Israel would be content to + see US Mid-East policy tied exclusively to Israel, reversing twenty + years of US effort to maintain a broadly based policy. Israel is + following a strategy detrimental to our interest—and, as you have said, + to their own in the long run. Unless the US takes an independent stand, + its options in the Mid-East will be increasingly narrowed.

+

The argument against includes jeopardizing the headway we have made with + the Jewish community on Vietnam. But the principal question is whether the US could win in + this sort of confrontation. This is not only a matter of whether we + could follow through in any persistent application of pressure in the + face of strong domestic reaction. Success would depend on Nasser and Hussein standing by a reasonable position. It would not + be reasonable for us to try to force on the Israelis a settlement that + lacked a fair chance of providing security for Israel.

+

If we were going to try the third, I would consider trying it initially + at least as part of a global deal with the USSR on Vietnam.

+

The reasons why the Soviets might be interested are their inability to + get their friends’ land back, their own concern about radicalization of + the area and their interest in getting Suez open. While they may prefer + riding out the present situation a while longer to pressing Nasser hard, they are less than + completely comfortable and see serious risks for themselves.

+

There are two questions in this approach: (1) Do the Soviets feel they + are in a worse position in the Mid-East than the US is in the Mid-East? + (2) Do they feel they are in as difficult a position in the Mid-East as + the US is in Vietnam?

+

They would certainly like us to force Israel to give Nasser back his territory. On the + other hand, while they are in a difficult position as long as we refuse, + they can see US options continually narrowing in the area. The US + position is not improving relative to theirs. At the same time, they may + feel the US is far more seriously weakened by its involvement in Vietnam + than the USSR is in the Mid-East.

+

The alternative to a global deal with the USSR is a straight Mid-East deal in which we would press + Israel if Moscow pressed Nasser. + This, of course, is implicit in our current course. My reservation with + this, as I have said, is that we will end up pressing Israel on behalf + of the Soviet client when our interest is really in settling the + Palestine question—in contrast to the UAR-Israel geopolitical + contest—which is a Jordanian issue.

+

Recommendation: That as soon as we have had a + chance to evaluate Moscow’s reply to the Sisco formulation, an NSC meeting be scheduled to discuss where we stand and next + steps.Nixon approved the recommendation on November + 15.

+
+ +
+ + 67. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rogers to President NixonSource: + National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 650, Country Files, + Middle East, Middle East Negotiations. Secret; Nodis. + Washington, November 16, 1969. + + SUBJECT + Middle East Settlement Efforts + +

I want to review the current state of our efforts to achieve a Middle + East settlement, the immediate decisions we face, and the courses of + action for the future which we recommend for your approval.

+

Politically, the situation in the area has become more difficult for us + and our friends. While the Lebanese crisis has temporarily abated, the + basic aims of the Palestinian militants and of the Lebanese Government + remain incompatible and the situation is therefore extremely fragile. In + addition, the meeting of Arab Foreign and Defense Ministers,The Arab League’s Joint Defense Council met in Cairo + November 8–10. which has just ended, highlighted and gave + further emphasis to the strong anti-U.S. currents in the Arab world. It + also further crystallized Arab frustrations at the lack of progress + toward a political settlement, reflected the increasingly fatalistic + attitude that another war is inevitable and strengthened the hand of the + Palestinian militants and their supporters such as Syria. The summit + conference of Arab Chiefs of State now scheduled to open in Rabat + December 20The Arab League summit was held + in Rabat December 21–23. Sisco summarized the results of the summit in an + information memorandum to Rogers, January 6, 1970, printed in Foreign + Relations, 1969–1976, volume XXIV, Middle East Region + and Arabian Peninsula, 1969–1972; Jordan, September 1970, + Document 18. will give impetus to these trends if + they are not reversed, will lock the Arabs further into postures making + the chances for a peaceful settlement even slimmer and could bring a + formal Arab renunciation of peace efforts based on the November 22, 1967 + Security Council Resolution. In this atmosphere the remaining moderate + Arab governments feel increasingly beleaguered, the most dramatic + example being that Hussein has + put out strong feelers to the Soviets for meeting certain needs for + arms.

+

On the Israeli side, the Government of Israel has staked out its firm + opposition to the positions we have taken in the major power talks. This + opposition is likely to increase in the days ahead, and criticism from + the Jewish community in the U.S. is likely to grow, particularly if we + go much beyond our present position. In Israel, as the maneuvering for + the formation of a new Government goes forward, Prime Minister Meir is seeking to retain elbow room to negotiate a + settlement with the Arabs if Israel’s minimum condition is met—i.e., an + Arab willingness to sit down and negotiate peace with Israel.

+

In our bilateral talks with the Soviets, we have made a major effort to + reach agreement with them on a package framework for an Israeli-UAR + settlement based on the trade-off of: (a) an Israeli commitment to + withdraw to the former international frontier with Egypt; and (b) a + UAR commitment to peace, including + control of guerrilla activity, and to negotiate detailed security + arrangements and related matters with Israel according to the flexible + negotiating procedures followed by the parties at Rhodes in 1949.

+

While recognizing that prospects were slim, our objective has been to + achieve an agreed US-Soviet document along these lines that could be + turned over to the Four Powers and then to Ambassador Jarring to help him renew the dialogue + among the parties. It now appears that the reaction to our efforts on an + Israeli-UAR document will lead to further protracted discussion. The + initial UAR reaction is negative, + largely on the grounds that the document we have been developing with + the Soviets leaves the question of a Jordanian settlement (including + particularly the territorial aspects) untouched and requires the parties + themselves to work out such issues as Sharm al-Shaykh and Gaza instead + of providing a complete blueprint which would exclude Israel from any + say in these questions vital to its security. We expect that the Soviets + will neither accept nor reject our latest effort but rather will seek to + negotiate it into a document conforming more closely to what the UAR desires. The British are wobbly, and + the French are likely to be unhelpful.

+

This will give us great difficulties which arise largely because, as the + other major powers spell out the terms of a settlement, we will be + pressed to take positions on which we cannot produce Israel, given its + strong feeling that the settlement terms should be negotiated directly + between it and the Arabs.

+

Against the foregoing background, we face two urgent decisions:

+

1. Do we return to the Four Power forum or disengage; the British, French + and Soviets are pressing for an early resumption. The Soviets have + probably concluded we will go no further in the bilateral context than + our present proposals which are, in our judgment, balanced, fair to both + sides, and defensible to public opinion at home and abroad.

+

2. What to do about the Jordanian aspect of a settlement, which involves + not only many of the same issues as a UAR settlement but the more complicated questions of + refugees, Jerusalem and the West Bank border between Israel and Jordan + within the former Palestine mandate area where no recognized + international boundary has ever existed.

+ +

Four Power Talks: Do We Resume Or Do We + Disengage?

+

The signs are clear that the French will not stand with us. They are + willing to go beyond our position substantively for two principal + reasons: they properly assess the chances for a settlement as slim and + therefore want to be sure the positions they adopt will help to bolster + and bulwark their position primarily in the Arab world; and their + approach to achieving a settlement is different than ours. They lay + greater store than we do on the possibility of the weight of a Four + Power consensus on the parties, and more particularly its effect on + Israel. A failure to convince Israel would be our failure and not + theirs; therefore, they have a relatively free ride in the Four Power + context. The foregoing pressures also operate on the British, and their + firm support is not assured; they are inclined more than the French to + avoid a break with us.

+

There is a case to be made for the U.S. to refuse to agree to resumed + Four Power meetings as long as we and the Soviets remain unagreed on the + Israeli-UAR Joint Working Document (TAB A).Attached at Tab A is the “U.S.–USSR Joint Working Paper on + Israel-UAR Settlement.” It is printed as Document 58. + Submitting the joint US–USSR document without Soviet agreement will + inevitably invite U.K. and French whittling away and lead to digging + ourselves deeply into a substantive position on which there will be no + real hope of producing Israel. It can also be argued that while + Nasser’s reaction is + unpredictable, U.S. unwillingness to engage in Four Power talks would be + a clear signal that the Four Powers are unable to produce for him the + Israeli withdrawal from the occupied, territories. As long as there was + serious hope of a common US–USSR position, the Israeli argument that the + Four Power forum provided Nasser + an instrument to escape his responsibilities was open to serious doubt. + There is more substance to this argument today.

+

On the other hand, such a move would appear to the world that the U.S. + was giving up and, therefore, blocking further peace efforts; our + position in the Arab world would further deteriorate even to the point + where American lives and property could be put into jeopardy; the + pressures on Lebanon and Saudi Arabia would continue to increase; and + this would be a strong blow to King Hussein, whose continuing desire to make peace needs all + the moral and political support we can muster. In these circumstances, + we could expect that the December 20th Arab summit meeting would decide + formally to close the door on a political solution. I reluctantly + conclude therefore, with all of the difficulties that I foresee, that we + should agree to renewal of the Four Power meetings beginning on November + 21.

+ +

The question will immediately arise: what should the Four Powers focus + on? The Soviets will probably press for an across-the-board approach + dealing with the entire problem in all its aspects and especially with + the question of total Israeli withdrawal everywhere including Syria and + Jerusalem as well as Sinai and the West Bank. We cannot support such a + position because we could not produce Israel. From our viewpoint, one + possible counter to so unproductive an approach would be to table the + paper we have developed for an Israel-UAR settlement. We may want to + table it in the Four Power forum at some point, but I would not want to + do this unless the French and the British are first firmly tied down. We + have in mind the possibility of personal messages from you to Wilson and + Pompidou at an appropriate + stage. In the unlikely event the Soviets accept the bulk of the joint + US–USSR document, or if necessary to pin down the UK and French, there are only two + additional changes in the paper on an Israel-UAR settlement which we + should be prepared to make: (a) a cosmetic change in the paragraph + dealing with the Israeli-UAR border (Point 3) which would improve its + presentational form from the Arab point of view; and (b) an addition to + Point 4 to clarify that neither Israel nor the UAR would lay claim to Gaza.

+

These two changes will add to Israel’s concern over the proposed document + on an Israel-UAR settlement. They are, however, consistent with the + basic principles guiding our approach to a settlement and fully protect + Israel’s interests by providing for Israeli participation in negotiating + security arrangements on the ground. I do not believe we should go any + further than this in modifying our position on an Israel-UAR settlement + as reflected in the current U.S.–USSR Working Paper. Furthermore, I + believe we must make clear to the British and French that we will not + discuss that paper in the Four, and will reconsider the whole question + of our continued participation in that forum, unless they commit + themselves not to seek to whittle away our position, particularly as it + relates to the concept of neutral formulations for the parties to + negotiate: (a) practical security arrangements for Sharm al-Shaykh and + Gaza; and (b) areas to be demilitarized. If the Four Powers pronounce + themselves on these, what chance we have of producing Israel will be + doomed. Israel will say, with some validity, what is there left to + negotiate on the UAR-Israeli aspect? We will be pressed by the other + three to “impose” this on Israel; it is naive for Foreign Minister + Stewart to say that no nation can long refuse a solution agreed upon by + the Four Powers and backed by the weight of world opinion. No nation + other than Israel, that is. I doubt we can defend such a line here at + home without jeopardizing support from certain elements of public + opinion of our stance on Vietnam.

+

If we do not begin with a UAR-Israel settlement in the Four Power forum, + the alternative—and the one I recommend—is that we agree that the Four Powers resume and propose + that they consider the Israeli-Jordanian aspect of a settlement. The + British and French are anxious for us to join them in calling an early + meeting of the Four Powers, and we propose to use the leverage this + gives us to seek to line up as much of their support as possible in + advance for steering the Four Power talks in this direction.

+

Jordanian Part of Settlement

+

Neither the Soviets nor the Egyptians are likely to make final + commitments on the UAR-Israeli part of the settlement until they know + more about the shape of the Jordanian settlement. Hussein himself is very anxious for the + U.S. to become more directly involved on the Jordanian part. He does not + want, nor do we want, a Soviet broker. We believe, therefore, that in + the days ahead we should concentrate on this part of the settlement in + two ways: (a) Ambassador Yost + would engage in discussions on this aspect in the Four Power context; + (b) we will raise with Israel and Jordan at an early date whether they + would agree to the U.S. playing a singular middle man role between them + while the Four Power talks are going on to see whether there is some + common ground that can be developed between them.

+

We have given considerable thought to both the tactics and the substance + of the U.S. position on the Jordanian aspect in the Four Power forum. We + have concluded that tactically there is merit in letting the British and + French take the lead on the Jordanian aspect and for us to try to assume + a lower silhouette in the Four Power forum. Substantively we believe + Ambassador Yost should stay + within the confines of the document setting forth the framework for an + Israeli-Jordanian settlement which I sent you on October 10. I now + recommend that Ambassador Yost + be authorized to use this document (TAB B)Attached but not printed at Tab B is the paper “Fundamental + Principles for Israel-Jordan Settlement.” as guidance for the + position he would take in reacting to proposals by others in the Four + Power discussions; he would not table this paper and would ask for + further instructions on any proposals that go beyond it.

+

Policy Statement

+

While the foregoing moves are in train, we also want to take steps to get + the elements of our position on an overall Arab-Israeli settlement on + the public record in an effort to make clear that it is basically a + balanced position and not simply a carbon copy of Israeli views. Israel + is already criticizing our position publicly, and such an effort on our + part is not likely to come as a surprise to them even though they would + clearly prefer that we not make this effort. Such an effort will not + satisfy the Arab extremists, + but it will be difficult for either side or world opinion to criticize + objectively and will be of some help to our beleaguered friends in the + Arab world. I will be sending you shortly for your review the text of a + speech I propose to make very soon outlining the elements of our Middle + East policy.

+ + + William P. Rogers + Rogers initialed “WPR” above his typed + signature. + + +
+ +
+ 68. Minutes of a Washington Special Actions Group MeetingSource: National Archives, Nixon + Presidential Materials, NSC Files, + NSC Institutional Files + (H-Files), Box H–114, Washington Special Actions Group, WSAG Minutes (Originals) 1969 and + 1970. Top Secret; Sensitive. All brackets are in the original except + those indicating text omitted by the editors. The meeting was held + in the White House Situation Room. + Washington, November 24, + 1969, 3:03–5:18 p.m. + + SUBJECT + Libya and Lebanon + + + PARTICIPANTS + Henry A. + Kissinger—Chairman + + State + + + U. Alexis Johnson + + David Newsom (Libya only) + + Rodger Davies + + + Defense + + + G. Warren Nutter + + + + CIA + + + + Thomas H. Karamessines + + + JCS + + Vice Admiral Nels C. Johnson + + NSC Staff + + + Harold H. Saunders + + Col. Robert M. + Behr + Keith Guthrie + +

SUMMARY OF DECISIONS

+

[Omitted here are the decisions related to Libya.]

+ +

2. Lebanon

+

a. The following revisions are to be made in the Lebanon contingency + paper:The paper, November 17, is ibid., + Box H–071, Washington Special Actions Group Meetings, WSAG Mtg. 11/24/69 Libya and Lebanon. + A revised paper was not found.

+

(1) The analysis of base availability in the Eastern Mediterranean will + be given greater prominence. This analysis will be expanded to include + not only the extreme possibilities (all bases available vs. no bases + available) but also an intermediate contingency such as the availability + of a single base at Athens.

+

(2) A discussion will be included concerning the possible consequences + that U.S. military intervention in Lebanon may have in terms of violence + against U.S. communities in other Arab countries.

+

(3) The option of a naval and air blockade is to be deleted.

+

b. Presidential approval will be sought for the U.S. to offer to equip + the Lebanese Army with M–14 rifles.Not + found. If the President approves, details of price, quantity, + and funding will be worked out by the State and Defense Departments and + CIA. Also, if supply of M–14s to + the Lebanese Army is authorized, preparations to furnish arms to the + Falange will be discontinued.

+

c. The WSAG agreed that the U.S. should + not encourage an Israeli invasion of Lebanon.

+

[Omitted here is the discussion of Libya and Lebanon.]

+
+ +
+ + 69. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rogers to President NixonSource: + National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 613, Country Files, + Middle East, Jordan, Vol. II. Secret; Exdis. + Washington, November 26, 1969. + + SUBJECT + Possible Move By King Hussein To Acquire Soviet Arms + +

The following memorandum is a status report for information only and will + be followed in due course by a memorandum which contains recommendations + for action.Not found.

+

King Hussein of Jordan is awaiting + a Soviet reply to his recent query regarding the availability of Soviet + arms assistance.According to telegram 5294 + from Amman, November 1, Hussein confirmed for Ambassador Symmes that he had “asked for + Soviet assistance in furnishing Jordan with heavy, medium, and + anti-aircraft artillery,” and that the request was made “some time + ago.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 613, Country Files, + Middle East, Jordan, Vol. III) Telegram 438 from Amman, January 29, + 1970, reported a favorable response from the Soviet Union to + Jordan’s request as well as Hussein’s desire to refuse the Soviet offer if the + United States would “come through” with its own package in a timely + manner. The King emphasized the “urgency of a favorable US + response.” (Ibid., Box 614, Country Files, Middle East, Jordan, Vol. + III) The King is looking for anti-aircraft artillery and + field artillery, particularly the former in order that Jordan may better + cope with the quickening pace of Israeli air attacks. The King states + that he has turned to the Soviets because of our past inability to meet + his needs fully. In this connection, you will recall that when the King + was here in April we were unable to sell him everything he wanted + because of non-availability.See Documents 19 and 24.

+

The King tells us that even though he has sounded out the Soviets, he + would prefer to continue to buy American arms if they should become + available. As evidence of this the Jordanian Commander-in-Chief has + presented us with a list of arms requirements similar to that presented + to the Soviets. The King indicates that he might be prepared to settle + for less than the total amount of equipment requested. Our military + people in Amman confirm Jordan’s defensive need for most of the + equipment requested, particularly the anti-aircraft guns.

+

It is important to note that the King’s contemplated move toward the + Soviets is evidently intended to be an arms transaction only. The King + assures us that any such move would represent no shift whatsoever in + Jordanian policy. Jordan would continue to maintain close ties with the West and to seek a + peace settlement in accordance with the Security Council Resolution of + November 1967.

+

A check of our military stocks indicates that in order to meet the King’s + requirements we would have to make a decision to divert them from our + Army units. For planning purposes, the Defense Department is preparing a + report on the impact such a diversion would have on our forces.Not found. We are also in the process + of checking other free world sources.

+

A decision by the King to buy arms from the Soviets would cause problems + in that it: (a) could provoke a sharp Israeli response both militarily + and politically, and thus make our peace efforts that much more + difficult; (b) could make Israel even less responsive to our counsels of + restraint toward Jordan; (c) could be an irretrievable first step which, + despite the King’s best intentions, might lead eventually to a shift of + Jordanian policy in the direction of the Soviets; (d) could make it + difficult for us to obtain Congressional approval to continue existing + military and economic aid programs and thus could undermine the King’s + policy of maintaining close relations with the West; and (e) could be + interpreted as a blow to United States Government prestige and thus, in + a psychological sense, could strengthen the hands of the Arab radicals + while weakening the moderate regimes.

+

On the other hand, we are reluctant to contribute further to the arms + race in the Middle East. Also it might be argued that since we are + unlikely to achieve a peace settlement, the trend toward radicalization + in Jordan may well be ineluctable, i.e., the Hashemite regime in Jordan + will probably gradually have to develop closer relations with the USSR as time goes on if it is to survive + or at least to survive longer.

+

Our Ambassador in Amman has recommended that we should respond to this + new development with equanimity and should avoid giving the impression + of being in a hurry to preempt the Soviets. He suggests that we treat + the Jordanian request for more arms as a function of our annual review + of Jordanian arms requirements. In this connection, he recommends that + we send military representatives to Jordan to consult with the Jordanian + military for the purpose of developing a firm request for artillery that + we can consider. We are in the process of reviewing these proposals.

+

Even if we were to decide to sell the King more arms, we might not be + able to meet the King’s requirements sufficiently to preclude his going + to the Soviets. If he did go the Soviet route, we would have legal + problems. Our obligations under our present defense assistance agreement + with Jordan are conditioned upon Jordan’s secret undertaking “that it + will not purchase major items of military equipment, either ground or air, from other than United + States sources without United States approval.” We consider the + artillery requested from the Soviets to be in the category of major + items of military equipment and, accordingly, if purchased (rather than + given) without our approval, we would be legally justified in suspending + our defense assistance obligations to Jordan.

+

Penalizing the King in this manner could well be counter-productive, + however, in that it would probably weaken the constructive influence + which we would otherwise continue to exercise in Jordan. Therefore, in + circumstances in which the King turned to the Soviets we might wish to + consider ignoring Jordan’s breach of its arms agreement with us or, + conceivably, grant approval if it is requested. Any such decision on our + part would have to flow from the assumption that Jordan’s basic policy + orientation would remain unchanged and that United States Government + punitive action would tend to reverse this policy orientation.

+

I plan to be in touch with you further on this matter once we have + collected more information and have crystallized our views.

+ + + William P. Rogers + Rogers initialed “WPR” above his typed + signature. + + +
+ +
+ + 70. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rogers to :nl President NixonSource: + National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 650, Country Files, + Middle East, Middle East Negotiations. Secret; Nodis. Attached to a + November 28 memorandum from Haig to Saunders that reads: “To keep our bureaucratic + skirts clean, we ought to send an info memo to the President on + where the subject now stands, with the Secretary’s memorandum to him + tabbed in.” On Haig’s + memorandum, Saunders wrote + by hand: “This was later handled orally with President. No further + action.” + Washington, November 26, 1969. + + SUBJECT + Four Power Talks on the Middle East + +

In my memorandum of November 15th,Rogers’s memorandum of November 16 + is Document 67. I recommended that we agree to an early + resumption of the Four Power meetings on the Middle East. We have + reassessed this recommendation in light of the following developments: + (a) the temporizing Egyptian position of not responding substantively to + the latest formulations in the US–USSR talks on the grounds that they + are “incomplete” until positions on other aspects of the settlement are + clearer; (b) the absence of any concrete Soviet reaction to the latest + formulations; (c) the continued strong feelings of Hussein, Faisal and Helou + that the Four Power talks resume; (d) the scheduled Arab Summit Meeting + of December 20th at which Nasser + can be expected to make a major effort to mobilize all possible + resources on his behalf; and (e) Israel’s request of November 25 that we + refrain from resuming the Four Power talks and particularly from + discussing an Israeli-Jordanian settlement until Eban has an opportunity to discuss + their views with me on December 9.Eban did not meet with Rogers until December 16, after a + meeting that day with Kissinger. See Document 77 + and footnote 2 thereto. Richardson also discussed the + proposal for a Jordanian settlement and the Rogers Plan with Rabin on December 19; see Document 78.

+

Our conclusion continues to be that we resume the Four Power meetings + immediately, remaining available to continue the US–USSR bilateral talks + if and when the Soviets respond concretely to the October 28th working + paper formulations.Document 58. We + suggest the Four Power talks resume on December 2.

+

In brief, the reasons for this recommendation are: (a) If we decline to + resume the talks in New York, we will be taking on the onus for blocking + further peace efforts, our position in the Arab world will continue to + deteriorate even more rapidly, moderate Arab regimes will be further disillusioned and be more + vulnerable to radical pressure, and the risk will be greater that the + Arab summit will close the door to a political solution. (b) We have + been committed to Four Power talks since February, they were interrupted + in July at our initiative, and we agreed to their resumption in + principle in September. The British and French have been patient largely + because of our on-going efforts with the Soviet Union. In light of the + present impasse between the US and the USSR, we no longer have a strong argument against early + resumption of the Four. (c) The on-going Four Power meetings, even if + the Four cannot agree on recommendations to Jarring, will give us a further opportunity to help + improve our general position in the area. We would anticipate that the + Four Powers would focus in the first instance principally on the + Jordanian aspect and this would be welcomed by Hussein. We realize we will have to + exert great efforts to avoid the twin pitfalls of either being isolated + in the Four or being pressured to go along with a proposition on which + we could not produce Israel; but the disadvantages of blocking Four + Power talks are even greater.

+

We would also inform the Israelis that we are willing to talk about the + substance of the Jordanian-Israeli aspect of the settlement or any other + aspects of our Middle East policy either with Ambassador Rabin right away and/or with + Eban when he arrives in the + United States on the 9th of December. In order to assure them that we + will take into account fully their substantive views, we will indicate + our intention not to submit any substantive American proposals on the + Jordanian-Israeli aspect until I have had my conversation with Eban. Moreover, we will want also to + consult fully with Hussein who + has long been anxious for the United States to play a leading role on + the Jordanian-Israeli aspect along the lines of your discussions with + him in April.

+ + + William P. Rogers + Rogers initialed “WPR” above his typed + signature. + + +
+ +
+ + 71. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the United + NationsSource: National + Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 27–14 ARAB–ISR. Secret; + Priority; Exdis. Drafted by + Sisco, Atherton, and Betty J. Jones + (IO/UNP); cleared in IO; and + approved by Richardson. + Repeated to Amman, Beirut, Jidda, Kuwait, London, Moscow, Paris, Tel + Aviv, Cairo, and Bucharest. + Washington, December 2, 1969, + 0232Z. +

200463. Subject: Four Power Meeting on Middle East.

+

1. As you know from your conversations here, we have agreed to resume + Four Power talks on December 2 on understanding that: (a) We will not + wish to put forward any new proposals before Secretary has had + opportunity to consult with Eban + on Dec. 16;See footnote 3, Document 70. and (b) in first instance + focus will be on Jordanian aspect, pending receipt of a reply from + Soviets on UAR part of settlement. We + will also be consulting Jordanians fully before you get deeply into + substance.

+

2. We know you are fully aware of difficult situation we face in Four + Power context and our desire to avoid twin dangers of being committed to + formulations on which we cannot produce Israel or being isolated from + other three. Moreover, since initially you will be dealing primarily + with Jordanian aspect our position will be under particular scrutiny + from both our friends, Israel and Jordan. In general, we suggest you be + guided in Four Power talks by following:

+

(a) There are three key features to our position: negotiations, peace, and withdrawal. We believe major emphasis should be + on equating specific commitments to peace and withdrawal and on Rhodes + type negotiations between parties on detailed elements of a settlement, + including security arrangements, demilitarized zones, refugees and + Jerusalem.

+

(b) Every formulation on Jordanian aspect is inextricably bound with + UAR aspect. Therefore no + formulations should be accepted which go beyond or would have effect of + undermining October 28th UAR-Israeli working paper formulations,Document 58. on which we intend to + stand firm in belief that we could not produce Israel on anything going + beyond them.

+

(c) Throughout the exercise each proposal must be evaluated in terms of + whether it will be possible to produce the parties. In particular, since + we will be expected to produce Israel, you should make clear we consider + it essential to have regular consultations with Israelis and Arabs on + formulations as they are put forward. We realize French and to lesser extent British will be very + reluctant to proceed in this way, but we consider it important that in + event of failure to make progress as much onus as possible rest on the + parties rather than US.

+

(d) You should make major effort to keep formulations general; we + continue to feel that major powers cannot write blueprint and largest + possible area must remain for parties to negotiate on basis Rhodes + formula.

+

(e) While we agree fully with sense of urgency which UK in particular feels, you should bear in + mind our judgment that there will be no positive indications from Arabs + before December 20th Arab Summit.

+

(f) Finally, Dec. 2 and subsequent Four Power meetings provide + opportunity, which should be fully exploited, to develop pressure on + Soviets to respond to Oct. 28 formulations.The Soviets did not respond until December 23. See Document 80.

+

3. We agreeable to UK suggestion that + opening meeting deal with US and Soviet report on status of bilaterals. + (Guidance by septel).Not found. At + first meeting suggest you make clear that at least until we receive + Soviet response to document discussed at October 28 Sisco-Dobrynin meeting,See Document 61. we would expect UAR aspect of settlement to continue to be + dealt with in two-power context while four powers concentrate on + Jordanian aspect. How we play UAR + aspect after receiving Soviet response will depend in large measure on + nature of that response.

+

4. We anticipate that UK will plan to put + forward Israeli-Jordanian boundary language at early stage. We are now + reviewing UK formulation and will have + further comment for you on it.Not + found. Since we are expected to produce Israelis, we will be + consulting with British re consultations with Israelis on UK formulation or such alternative as we + may suggest and seeking Israeli reaction though not necessarily + approval. Our hope would be that this would put some pressure on GOI to be more forthcoming re Jordanian + aspect. At such time as British submit boundary language, we would want + you to table for inclusion in Jordanian-Israeli document language + calling for Rhodes-type negotiations and on peace taken from UAR-Israeli + document i.e., preamble and Point 2. All that is required is + substitution of word “Jordan” for “UAR” in appropriate places.

+

5. Your major problem is likely to be French desire to put forward much + more detailed proposals, particularly on UAR aspect, than we believe traffic will bear. We are + prepared to weigh in at any appropriate level in Paris as four power + discussions evolve.

+ +

6. Additional problem is that Soviets may well seek to generalize + discussions to deal with settlement in overall terms, along lines of + their December and June proposals.See Documents 1 and 34. If they do, suggest you make point that this is + retrogressive and raises question whether they more interested in making + propaganda or progress. We all recognize that settlement must cover all + Arab states who have accepted SC + Resolution before it can be put into effect—i.e., it must be horizontal + as well as vertical package, as Gromyko put it to Sisco in July.See Document 39. We all recognize also + that certain elements will be common to both UAR and Jordanian aspects. Discussions over past eight + months have made clear, however, that each aspect has its unique + problems as well, which must be dealt with on a country-by-country + basis. We see this as only responsible and businesslike way to + proceed.

+

7. We expect a propaganda statement by Soviets; you are requested to + rebut fully.

+ + + Rogers + + +
+ +
+ 72. Editorial Note +

The Four Powers resumed their discussions in New York on December 2, + 1969. At the first meeting, the four UN + Permanent Representatives issued a communiqué announcing the resumption + of the talks. (Department of State Bulletin, + December 29, 1969, page 630) Ambassadors Charles Yost, Yakov + Malik, and Lord + Caradon agreed on the urgency of providing + recommendations to UN Special + Representative Gunnar Jarring, + while Ambassador Armand Bérard + hoped that the U.S.-Soviet talks would produce an Israeli-UAR agreement + for the group’s review. Both Bérard and Malik + expressed concern over increasing hostilities in the Middle East, with + Malik blaming Israel for the + region’s instability. (Telegram 4391 from USUN, December 3; National Archives, RG 59, Central Files + 1967–69, POL 27–14 ARAB–ISR) Malik tabled draft language on the issues of Israeli + withdrawal, boundaries, and demilitarized zones, all of which were drawn + from the Soviet counterproposal presented to the United States on June + 17 (see Document 34).

+ +

At the end of the meeting, Yost + responded to Malik’s argument + that the Four Powers should strive to achieve a comprehensive agreement + between Israel and its Arab neighbors rather than consider one country + at a time by saying that Dobrynin, in his conversations with Sisco, had never objected to + discussing the United Arab Republic separately. Caradon and Bérard agreed with Yost that without a Soviet response to the October 28 + proposal from the United States (Document 58) the Four should begin + discussing the outlines of an Israel-Jordan settlement at the next + meeting. (Telegram 4390 from USUN, + December 3; National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 27–14 + ARAB–ISR)

+

At the December 6 session, Bérard, + Caradon, and especially + Yost again pressured + Malik for an early Soviet + reply to the U.S. proposal on a settlement between Israel and the UAR. + Meanwhile, Bérard said that he + expected to present concrete proposals for an Israel-Jordan agreement at + the next meeting, which would occur on December 9. (Telegram 4460 from + USUN, December 6; ibid.)

+
+ +
+ 73. Editorial Note +

On December 9, 1969, Secretary of State William Rogers delivered a speech to the Galaxy + Conference on Adult Education in Washington, in which he publicly + unveiled the Department of State’s plan for an Arab-Israeli peace + settlement that had been in the works with the Soviet Union since the + beginning of the Two-Power talks in March. Rogers declared that the United States had adopted a + “balanced and fair” policy in the Middle East consistent with UN Security Council Resolution 242. He + argued that the Arabs must accept a “permanent peace” with Israel based + on a “binding agreement” and maintained that any settlement between + Israel and the Arabs must contain a “just settlement” of the Palestinian + refugee question that took into consideration “the desires and + aspirations of the refugees and the legitimate concerns of the + governments in the area.” Regarding Jerusalem, Rogers stated that it should be a + “unified city within which there would no longer be restrictions on the + movement of persons and goods. There should be open access to the + unified city for persons of all faiths and nationalities.”

+

Perhaps the most important part of the speech, however, had to do with + the future borders between Israel and its Arab neighbors. Rogers put the United States firmly on + record as supporting Israel’s withdrawal from Arab territories occupied in the 1967 + Arab-Israeli war in exchange for security arrangements that would + include demilitarized zones. “We believe that while recognized political + boundaries must be established and agreed upon by the parties, any + change in the pre-existing lines should not reflect the weight of + conquest and should be confined to insubstantial alterations required + for mutual security. We do not support expansionism. We believe troops + must be withdrawn.” The full text of the speech is in the Department of + State Bulletin, January 5, 1970, pages 7–11. It + was also published in the New York Times, + December 10, 1969, page 8.

+

Although the details of the speech were largely a reflection of the + October 28 “Joint US–USSR Working Paper” (Document 58), and were known + to the Soviets, Egyptians, and Israelis, Rogers went forward with the speech at the urging of + Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs + Joseph Sisco. In a November + 6 memorandum to Rogers, + Sisco argued that “the + principal purpose of the speech would be to expose some of the + substantive positions that we have taken during the past months, which + are much more balanced than the impression the world has of them.” From + a public point of view, Sisco + added, “we have suffered in the area generally because we have not + revealed more of the substance, while the Soviets have pegged out the + most extreme position publicly—total withdrawal of Israeli forces from + all the occupied territories to the pre-June 5 lines. We can never hope + to beat this in the Arab world from a propaganda point of view, but + exposing more of our substantive positions, and in particular placing on + record our views on the question of withdrawal, should help to ease some + of the increasing pressures in the Arab world and take a little sting + out of the emotionalism.” Sisco + concluded by explaining to Rogers that “the speech is both necessary and desirable + whether or not the U.S. and the USSR + find common ground on a document.It will not satisfy the Arabs and will + draw some flak from Israel, but it cannot be objectively attacked from + either side. It gives us a solid basis to stand on for some time to + come.” (Memorandum from Sisco to + Rogers, November 6; National + Archives, RG 59, Records of Joseph J. + Sisco, Lot Files 74 D 131 and 76 D 251, Box 27, Two Power + Talks, 10/28/69 Démarche)

+

The following month, during a December 4 telephone conversation with the + President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs Henry Kissinger, Sisco again reiterated the need for + the speech. The transcript of their conversation reads in part:

+

“K said what is the advantage of giving it [the speech]? S said it’s + geared to upcoming summit meeting. S said it’s within the framework of + our present policy. K said assuming what the P doesn’t yet accept . . . + that we have to keep pushing negotiations. S said the speech goes down in whatever foreseeable + purpose we could have in the future. S said we haven’t said anything + substantive since March; we haven’t taken a balanced stand in the + discussions; we think it will bolster the Jordanians, Moroccans and + Libyans; it makes our position reasonably clear in circumstances where + we are not likely to get a political settlement.

+

“K said he is not at all sure from talking with the P that he believes we + are on the right track. K said the P wants to reserve judgment until the + NSC meeting. [See Document 74.] S said it’s a statement of policy + on what we’ve done. K said he has passed it on. S said he thought this + was based on the assumption that the NSC meeting would be today. K said the more he thought + about it he thought to make a major policy decision without the + Secretary of State present . . . If it were arms supply for Pakistan or + something . . .

+

“S said he has come to two conclusions: 1) we’ve got to operate on the + assumption that we are not going to get a consensus; 2) as long as we’re + not going to get a consensus, it’s better in the area having the + disagreement part of the overall disagreement in a four power context + rather than we being pushed into a corner where it’s 3 against 1 and we + can’t produce the Israelis. K said I don’t understand. S said he is + going to try to get this down on paper. S said on the Jordan aspect, we + ought to decide what the outer perimeter of what our views are on the + Jordan settlement: hope to maintain a toehold on Hussein; consistent with Jordanian + security. S said secondly, if Charlie + [Yost] is armed with that—can say that’s our + position—it’s unlikely to get a Russian agreement. If that’s the case we + can stand firm on the October 28 document. We can say we think it’s a + reasonable and fair proposal. We say these proposals stand; there’s no + purpose in talking further until a closer meeting of the minds can be + achieved. K said are you doing this as a formal proposal or personal. S + said he can’t do it as formal. S said he talked with Elliot [Richardson]. K said Elliot + agrees with you. K said do you mind if I show it to the President? S + said he’s only going to make it personal first; only going to give to + Elliot and K. S said what he would do for example: the assistant to the + King wants to talk with S—just a friendly chat on December 12; the + Secretary is going to talk to Eban on the 16th. S said it’s an opportunity to consult + generally along these lines. Say this is fair; as far as we are going to + go. It’s not the Russians playing lawyer for the Egyptians and we for + the Israelis. S said we’ve got to get something if we’re not going to + let Hussein go down the drain. K + said he’s just concerned about letting the Russians in on [omission in + the original]. S said the opening meeting of the four powers indicates + that they’ve pegged out their most extreme position; paper asked for + total withdrawal of Israeli forces from all occupied territory. K said + including Syria? S said yes, on Syria the President spoke to Golda Meir in a way that would make it tough. K said yes he + remembered.” (Transcript of telephone conversation; National Archives, + Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC + Files, Kissinger Telephone + Conversation Transcripts, Box 3, Chronological File)

+
+ +
+ 74. Minutes of a National Security Council MeetingSource: National Archives, Nixon + Presidential Materials, NSC Files, + NSC Institutional Files + (H-Files), Box H–109, NSC Meeting + Minutes, NSC Minutes Originals + 1969. Top Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Saunders. All brackets are in the + original. + Washington, December 10, 1969, 10 + a.m. +

The Middle East

+ + PARTICIPANTS + The President + The Vice President + The Secretary of State, William P. + Rogers + The Secretary of Defense, Melvin R. + Laird + The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Earle G. Wheeler + Director of Central Intelligence, Richard . Helms + Director, Office of Emergency Preparedness, General George A. Lincoln + Under Secretary of State, Elliot L. + Richardson + Ambassador Charles + Yost + Henry A. Kissinger, + Assistant to the President + Assistant Secretary Joseph J. + Sisco + Alfred L. Atherton, Jr., + Department of State + William Watts, NSC Staff + Harold H. Saunders, NSC Staff + Pat Conger, CIA + +

President: Let’s limit discussion to the Mid-East. It would be useful at + a later time to review Lebanese contingency planning—to know that the + U.S. has less flexibility today than in 1958.See footnote 2, Document 4. We + could not order today the kind of landings that had been mounted then. + Also, let’s put the Libyan issue aside until later and concentrate on + the Mid-East.

+

But first, let’s hear report from Secretaries Rogers and Laird on trip to Europe.Rogers led + the U.S. delegation to the Ministerial meeting of NATO in Brussels + December 3–5. Laird and + Secretary of the Treasury David M. + Kennedy, among others, accompanied him. [This + briefing followed and will be covered in Mr. Watts’ notes: “On Mid-East, + Schumann may be a bit of a problem.”]

+ +

Let’s turn to the Mid-East. In the last two weeks, the pressures to see + me on the Mid-East have been mounting. Oil people were in yesterday; the + Israeli group in Congress is ready to jump down our throats.

+

Helms: [Text will be + provided.]Not found.

+

Deterioration has continued. Chances for violence have increased:

+

—UAR forces remain impotent.

+

—Lebanese front opened.

+

—Hussein almost powerless to + control fedayeen. Almost an autonomous Palestinian state within + Jordan.

+

New Israeli cabinet will have to cope with new financial problem. Problem + arises from military purchases. With or without help, government will + have to control spending strictly. Electorate endorsed government + position on peace conditions. Only argument is over what exactly to do + with occupied territories—assimilate or not. Israeli settlements + increasing on Golan Heights, West Bank, north Sinai coast, Sharm + al-Shaykh. Military objectives: (1) deter UAR; (2) if possible, topple + Nasser. Israel could be + considering a penetration in force into the UAR; an Israeli attack + across canal could incur substantial casualties. We think Israelis feel + they can bring Nasser down.

+

Arab leaders know they cannot defeat Israel. They want outsiders to bail + them out. Attitude is one of “monumental frustration.” Ideal goal: make + Israelis consider whether better to return occupied territories rather + than go on sustaining casualties. Nasser’s November 6 speech—“mostly sound and fury";In his speech to the National Assembly, + Nasser rejected the + October 28 peace proposals and accused the United States of taking + the position of Israel, the UAR’s “enemy.” He also repeated Arab + demands for complete Israeli withdrawal from the occupied + territories. (New York Times, November 7, + 1969, p. 1) same may well be outcome of December 20 Arab + summit meeting.

+

Israel remains militarily superior. Soviets appear to be just about + replacing Arab losses.

+

Since September, violence has increased on all fronts but Lebanon. That + appears likely to become more active now. Israeli policy—community + responsibility—on West Bank a response to greater fedayeen activity. + Hussein looking for more + equipment.

+

Fedayeen movements (8,000 guerrillas) do not pose a serious military + threat but can be disruptive. Moscow may begin supplying fedayeen + directly. Shelepin statement October 20.Presumably a reference to a speech in Budapest by Aleksandr + Shelepin, a Politburo member, that expressed support for the + Palestinian guerrillas. (Ibid., October 30, 1969, p. A15)

+ +

President: Will Dr. Kissinger now + brief on the issues.

+

Dr. Kissinger: We have discussed + negotiating positions before in the NSC. What I want to do here is to + discuss some of the basic premises which underlie them, leaving + negotiating positions to the negotiators.

+

I would sum up the issues in the following way:

+

1. The first issue is whether it is possible to improve the U.S. position + in the Arab world by dissociating ourselves from Israel’s positions. If + so, how permanent would that improvement be? What does it mean to + dissociate ourselves?

+

—Those who favor dissociation argue that our problem in the moderate Arab + world is that we seem to be Israel’s lawyer.

+

—Others argue that the objective of the Arab radicals is to do away with + Israel, not just to do away with Israel’s conquests. A second issue is + not just our negotiating position but whether we are willing to see + sanctions imposed on Israel for not withdrawing.

+

2. A second issue is: Assuming we have decided to continue working for an + Arab-Israeli settlement no matter how hard to achieve, what is the best + strategy for achieving this? There are two schools of thought:

+

a. Let local forces assume responsibility for the terms of a settlement, + leaving to outsiders the problem of bringing the parties together and + guaranteeing those terms once agreed. (Our position right now is part + way between this and the second.)

+

—Those who favor this approach believe that the problem is probably + insoluble. The more we get into the issue, the more we will be pressed + to impose sanctions on Israel. Our most useful role is simply to try to + promote Rhodes-type talks.

+

—Those who oppose say that: This is the strategy tried from November 1967 + to January 1969, which we abandoned last February. This assumes that the + Arabs can contain their frustration and channel it into negotiations. It + also assumes that Israel can remain militarily superior and deter UAR attack.

+

b. Generate international pressures for the terms of a settlement.

+

—Those who favor this approach argue: We cannot just sit back. The Near + Easterners are too suspicious of each other to initiate negotiations + unless outsiders frame the terms of negotiation.

+

—Those who oppose feel that we might end up with the worst of everything. + International diplomatic action has raised Arab hopes too high without + being able to produce results and diverted the Arabs from coming to + terms with Israel. If international pressure is generated, the U.S. will + be expected to come up with all the ideas and impose terms unilaterally + on Israel.

+ +

3. The third issue: Assuming the U.S. has an interest in generating + whatever international pressure may be possible, how do we go about it? + We have two broad choices:

+

—Continue the present talks, try to achieve consensus on the terms of a + settlement and then press Israel to accept (the USSR pressing the UAR).

+

—Break off the talks now—or let them peter out—to cut our losses but also + to generate pressure on the USSR and + the Arabs to face up to the necessity to discuss reasonable terms.

+

I have already outlined the arguments for and against each of these.

+

4. The next issue is: If the U.S. wishes to continue negotiations what is + the best forum? The three options reviewed last February remain the + logical choices:See Document 5.

+

a. Four Power talks. We confront all the problems of whether we should be + specific about the terms of a settlement or stick to the broad + negotiating framework.

+

—Those who have argued for this course started with the fact that last + January–February the U.S. was under heavy international—and special + French—pressure to join in Four Power talks. There was strong sentiment + at that time for taking a more active role to see whether outsiders + could help the belligerents formulate at least a framework to get + negotiations started. If we reached consensus, it seemed desirable to + diffuse the onus.

+

—Those who have worried about these talks have argued that:

+

—This is the forum in which the U.S. is most likely to be pressed to move + away from a position that has any chance of acceptance in Israel.

+

—The other three disagree with us on procedure and substance.

+

—This brings the USSR into the Jordan + talks.

+

b. US–USSR talks have been confined to the UAR because the issues seemed more tractable, because a + UAR settlement would facilitate a + Jordan settlement and because we thought the USSR might press the UAR.

+

—Those who argued for entering these talks did so on three grounds:

+

(1) For global reasons, the U.S. had an interest in seeing whether it + could negotiate seriously on a range of important issues.

+

(2) The USSR’s persistent requests since September 1968 to talk about a + Mid-East settlement suggested that Moscow might be uncomfortable in the + Mid-East and might participate seriously in trying to work out a reasonable arrangement. + While we maintained a proper skepticism, it made sense to probe far + enough to see what was possible.

+

(3) The USSR should pay at least as + much of the price for a settlement as the U.S. in expanding its + influence with its clients.

+

—Those who opposed this course argued mainly that the USSR did not want a real peace; it simply + wanted to persuade us to press Israel to give back the territory of + Moscow’s clients. Since the USSR was + not likely to act seriously, it did not make sense to formalize the + USSR’s role in the Mid-East by giving it a place at the peace table.

+

c. U.S. mediation not heretofore explored in detail.

+

—Those who argued for felt in general that:

+

—The U.S. should exploit its exclusive ability to move Israel and not + share credit for a settlement, if any. The others only make our job more + difficult.

+

—Nasser really wanted peace but + that he could not say so publicly so he would welcome a private U.S. + mediation effort.

+

—It made no sense to involve the USSR + in any exchange on a Jordan-Israel settlement.

+

—Those who argued against argued that we have an interest in diffusing + responsibility.

+

President: It has been one of our assumptions in the U.S.–Soviet talks + that we could get the Soviet Union to help bring the UAR around. Mr. McCloy yesterday hit hard + on the following point: Nasser + tells him and other American businessmen that the Egyptians don’t want + to be exclusively in Soviet clutches. They would like the opportunity + for direct communication with the U.S.Nixon met with John J. + McCloy, David Rockefeller, and U.S. oil executives on December 8. + See Foreign + Relations, 1969–1976, volume XXXVI, Energy Crisis, + 1969–1974, Document 24.

+

The oil people all seem to feel that we are making a mistake not to have + a direct channel of communications with the Egyptians.

+

Secretary Rogers: We do have + direct channels of communication with the Egyptians. It is interesting + to note that when I sent my letter to Foreign Minister Riad,On November 8, Rogers wrote to Riad: “I am sending this brief + message to you in the spirit of the frank conversation which the two + of us had in New York. I felt that there was a good deal of + understanding between us during that talk, particularly regarding + the difficulties that both our Governments confront in the search + for peace in the Middle East. If all of us grasp present + opportunities, I am confident that progress can be made in the + interest of all of the peoples of the Middle East. I hope, too, that + it will be possible in the days ahead for better relations to evolve + between our two Governments. I urge therefore that your Government + give the draft US–USSR working paper the most careful and + sympathetic consideration. It represents a balanced effort to try to + meet the principal concerns on both sides.” (National Archives, + Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC + Files, Box 1186, Saunders Files, Middle East Negotiations Files, + Middle East—US–USSR Talks) Ambassador Dobrynin came in and told me that Foreign Minister Gromyko had been embarrassed by what I + had said in my letter. Riad had turned over a copy of my letter to + Gromyko. Here was an + opportunity given to the Egyptians to communicate with the U.S. and not + to involve the Russians, and the first thing they did was to turn over + the communication to the Russians. Also, we have a man in Cairo.

+

Mr. Sisco: We have had a + considerable degree of direct contact with the Egyptians all along. My + own feeling is that if we tried unilaterally to work out a plan with + them, they would reject it, accusing us of trying to drive a wedge + between them and Jordan.

+

The question is different on the Jordanian side. King Hussein wants us to be directly + involved.

+

Dr. Kissinger: To sum up, we have + three broad choices:

+

1. Let the talks peter out. Two sub-options:

+

—Stick to present position even if Israel rejects it.

+ +

Some argue that this is the course most likely to isolate us. It would + put us in a position where we would be pressed to continue military and + economic support for Israel while Israel rejects the U.S. concept of + what would constitute a fair settlement.

+

Others argue that this is the only position that would avoid a + confrontation with Israel. It would enable us to stand on a position we + regard as fair. We could blame failure on all sides and maintain that we + are only providing enough aid to maintain Israeli security.

+

—Stick to present position, pressing Israel to accept it.

+

Some argue that this would be the best possible position to be in if + possible short of a negotiated settlement. We would have produced + Israeli agreement to a position we regard as fair.

+

Others argue that since Israeli agreement is unlikely, this course is + really the same as the first with all its disadvantages. We might use a + good deal of influence with Israel—possibly eroding its position—and yet + not have produced an Arab offer of peace.

+

2. Press the talks to fruition.

+

—Achieve big-power consensus but not impose on Israel.

+

Some argue that it would improve our position with the Arabs just to take + a position closer to theirs than our present one. Also this would + diffuse responsibility.

+

Others argue that the Arabs would judge us not on our position but on + what we did with Israel. If we refused to press it on Israel—and it + would be more difficult than our present position to sell to Israel—we + would be called hypocritical.

+

—Achieve big-power consensus and try to impose it.

+

Some argue that this is the only way a settlement could be achieved + because imposition is necessary and it is essential to have at least the + USSR aboard for imposition on the + UAR.

+

Others argue that the process of achieving consensus would dilute the + substance of the consensus to the point where it would be all but + impossible to impose it on Israel.

+

3. Develop an untried combination of negotiations.

+

The choice among these must be made in the light of four conflicting U.S. + interests:

+

1. Arab-Israeli settlement. This may be unattainable.

+

2. Not worsening relations with the Arabs, hopefully improving them. U.S. + investment in oil is heavy and Western Europe and Japan depend on + Mid-East oil supply.

+

3. Israel’s survival. We are committed to Israel’s survival, though not + necessarily in its present expanded borders.

+

4. Avoiding a confrontation with the USSR. The Soviets would find it hard + to stand by and accept the humiliation of its clients again.

+

I have presented a list of perplexities—choices, not answers.

+

President: It seems to me as we look back over the 11 months since we + took office, this area is the one where we have gone backward, not + forward. I do not say this in any critical way, but I believe it is the + case.

+

—The Soviet position in the Mediterranean seems stronger.

+

—Our position with the moderate Arab states seems weaker.

+

—The danger of war seems greater.

+

I do not mean to say that we have not done all we could do.

+

I would like to ask Mr. Helms a + question. Just as an aside, I recall being briefed in the spring of 1967 + by Eugene Rostow before the June + war. He told me then, undoubtedly with the best will in the world, that + there would not be a war. I repeated this in some of my public comments + and then of course the war broke and my visits to all countries but + Morocco and Israel had to be cancelled. Now, I do not want to put Mr. + Helms on the spot and I will + not hold him to his answer to this question, but I would like to ask: + What do you think about the prospects for another war? Is the outbreak + of war likely?

+

Mr. Helms: The most likely trend + is a “continuing bleeding process.” I come down on the side that there + will not be a major conflict. I say this because I think the 1967 war + taught the UAR and the Soviets a lesson + in what not to do in creating a situation where Israel believes that its + survival is at stake.

+

President: You see nothing, then, that the UAR could do to give Israel the excuse I think it is + looking for to “bang them.”

+ +

Mr. Helms: Farther down the + track, if the moderates are driven into the radical camp, the Saudis, + for instance, might try to close the Straits of Tiran. But predicting + for the foreseeable future, I do not see this kind of development.

+

You may recall, Mr. President, that you asked me a similar question at + the dinner you held last spring for King Hussein. The scenario that I foresaw then seems to be + playing itself out—a steadily rising level of violence but not another + full-scale war.

+

President: The Soviet attitude in SALT + seems more responsible and more reasonable than could have been + predicted. This does not indicate that we have any easy bargain ahead of + us but it does indicate that there is a chance that the USSR wants to make a deal.

+

One could make the same sort of deduction about the recent moves with + Germany, although at the same time one could posit a Soviet objective + fragmenting the Western alliance.

+

On the Middle East, however, is it fair to say that Soviet interests can + only be served by tension. I know it is sometimes said that the Soviets + are uncomfortable in the present situation. But I sometimes have trouble + understanding why.

+

Mr. Helms: I think they want the + situation to stay the way it is.

+

Secretary Rogers: I am not so + sure of that. I believe they are quite concerned about the consequences + of the kind of explosion Israel could provoke.

+

Dr. Kissinger: The longer Israel + holds its conquered Arab territory, the longer the Soviets cannot + deliver what the Arabs want. As that time drags on, the Arabs must begin + to conclude that friendship with the Soviet Union is not very + helpful—that it led to two defeats, one of which the U.S. rescued the + Arabs from, and to continued impotence in regaining what they have + lost.

+

Secretary Rogers: The Soviets + have some of the same problems with the UAR that we have with Israel. They cannot just walk in to + Nasser’s office and gain his + acceptance of any proposition they may put to him. They must consider + the fact that the more radical Arab elements like the fedayeen are going + to blame the Soviets for not producing what the Arabs want.

+

President: Then it is possible to argue, is it not, that if we want the + Soviets to help, Israel is producing that result by scaring them. Why + should it not be our policy to let Israel scare them a little bit + more?

+

Secretary Rogers: I think our + position is pretty well spelled out now as a result of my speech last + night.See Document + 73. The position I elaborated on there is + thoroughly consistent with the UN + Security Council resolution.

+ +

President: I have one question about what we should be doing in the next + couple of weeks. At my meeting yesterday with Mr. McCloy and others, the + American businessmen there were very much concerned that the pressures + for a united Arab front at the Arab summit on December 20 would be too + great for our moderate friends to resist. They felt that we needed some + gesture before then in order to help the moderates. Is the Secretary’s + speech enough? They suggested that a Presidential emissary be sent to + some of the moderates before December 20.

+

Dr. Kissinger: I think the speech + does all that we can now do.

+

President: The speech will probably enrage Israel, but does it give the + moderate Arabs enough? Is there no other gesture that we should be + making?

+

Mr. Sisco: We have done three + things in relation to the summit:

+

—In advancing the October 28 formula with the USSR, we stated a position that is fair and balanced.See Documents 58 + and 61. This has not really been + rejected by the UAR. All the UAR has + said is that it wants to see what the Jordanian side of a settlement + would look like before passing its judgement.

+

—In the speech last night, Israel should find a good many things that it + likes. Israel will be critical,—but probably not enraged. Israel will + feel that the Secretary was too specific, but the Arabs will also object + that the Secretary did not call for total Israeli withdrawal from Arab + territory. It should be helpful to the moderates, although they will not + be able publicly to recognize it as such. Nasser at the summit wants to mobilize Arab opinion + behind him, and there is not much we can do to temper that process. But + intelligence indicates that some travel is taking place among the + moderates, and we do not believe the summit will lead to the dire + consequences that someone like David Rockefeller has projected—a break + in relations or extreme measures against our oil companies.

+

—With all the reservations that all of us have about the Four Power + talks, the fact that the talks have resumed leaves open the possibility + of a political settlement, and there will be pressures on the Arabs not + to foreclose that possibility.

+

The business people I have talked to have suggested an emissary. I must + say in all candor that many such emissaries have not been entirely + helpful. Any man who goes must be familiar with the nuts and bolts of + the dialogue. Nasser would use + such a visit to build himself up, and the moderates would not see this + as helpful. Anyone who went would not have much to add to what has + already been said unless he were able to take with him some new + concessions.

+ +

President: Forget about Nasser + for a moment. If we are interested to avoid a united Arab front, what + about sending someone to the moderates?

+

I know Elliot Richardson has to + leave soon. Perhaps we should hear his comments now.

+

Mr. Richardson: A good place to + start, Mr. President, is the evolution that you have traced since + January. It seems true that our situation relative to that of the USSR has deteriorated on balance in the + short run and that the Soviets have gained proportionately. Why is that + so? I see two reasons:

+

—Among the Four Powers, the U.S. is the only one capable of exerting + effective influence on Israel. So the U.S. is blamed for the continuing + impasse.

+

—This negotiation is possibly unique in that Israel puts a high premium + not only on the results of the negotiation but on the procedure by which + those results are achieved. They will make concrete concessions to get + from the Arabs a recognition that Arab willingness to sit down and talk + would signify.

+

So we cannot talk simply about the terms of a settlement in an + even-handed way. Israel doesn’t care how reasonable the terms are as + long as it does not have a part in their formulation.

+

It follows, therefore, that if we go farther down the track toward + specifying the terms of a settlement, it will be increasingly difficult + for the U.S. to deliver Israel. If we are brought along this route into + defining the details of a settlement, all eyes will turn to us to + deliver Israel and yet the very fact of our having specified the details + of a settlement would make it less likely that we could deliver + Israel.

+

If that is a fair analysis, the question is: How do we get out of this? I + conclude that it is highly important to break away from this trend + toward involving ourselves more and more in the details of a + settlement.

+

President: You say it is important to get out. Let me understand your + reasoning. Is it because you see this as a dead end street? Is it + because we would be making a deal and then not being able to deliver on + it?

+

Mr. Richardson: As Dr. Kissinger described the options, one + of them is to press the current talks to fruition. Within that option + there are two sub-options:

+

—We could press for a big-power consensus but then not impose it on + Israel. If that is the result, the U.S. will appear to the rest of the + world as unwilling to support the consensus because it refused to + deliver Israel.

+ +

—We would press for consensus and then try to impose it on Israel. The + result again would be failure to deliver Israel because we will have + gone into so much detail that we will not be able to persuade the + Israelis to accept the consensus.

+

My point is that any effort to get into the formulation of the details of + a settlement is a dead end street.

+

The question that I have posed: How to avoid that.

+

In answering that question, I would prefer to think not in terms of + letting present talks peter out or breaking them off. I would prefer to + focus attention on Israel’s requirements for negotiation of the specific + terms of a settlement among the parties. I would like to see us hammer + on the Rhodes formula talks as the only way to achieve a settlement. If + we could get the other three powers to agree that this is the only + reasonable route to a settlement, then if the parties will not get + together, or if they do get together and cannot agree, the onus for + failure is shifted to them.

+

What I am suggesting is that we should put ourselves in a position so + that, if there is no settlement, we will avoid to the extent we can the + question why the U.S. is not delivering Israel.

+

Another way of stating this issue is to say that the strategy we adopt as + we proceed in the Four Power talks boils down to the question of how + hard we resist British and French efforts to hammer out a detailed + position.

+

Secretary Rogers: This has been + and is our policy. It is the policy I announced in my speech last + night.

+

We should not delude ourselves. We are not forced to deliver Israel + simply because of our negotiating position. We have been in this + situation one way or another for 20 years. We are not going to escape + from that position simply by getting out of the talks. The question will + come up in the UN Security Council or in + some other forum. Getting out of the talks will not relieve us of that + problem.

+

I think perhaps we are putting too much emphasis on the forms here. Our + position has deteriorated because we are seen as the principal + supporters of Israel. We send planes and economic aid. Unless we want to + change that policy, our position is going to deteriorate.

+

I might say that I have never heard a discussion of the Middle East—and + you know, Mr. President, that I have sat through a lot of them beginning + in the mid-1950s—where it was not said that our position is worse now + than it was a little while ago.

+

As far as the Four Power talks are concerned, I do not know what we can + do except to have a fair policy and to stand by it. That is why I + believe we should emphasize Rhodes type talks.

+ +

But we are never going to escape from this problem unless we discontinue + our support for Israel.

+

Ambassador Yost: I would like to + endorse Secretary Rogers’ main + point. Our deteriorating position is inherent in the situation. Israel + is depending on us and is pursuing a policy that most of the world + considers unreasonable. Even if we pulled out of the talks, people would + still look to us to deliver Israel. We would, in fact, be even more + isolated than we are now, because we would have created the impression + that we do not care.

+

If the Four Power talks fail, the issue will be thrust into the UN Security Council. If that happens, we at + least want to be in a position where we, the British and French agree + and where we are not alone.

+

The British and French do not differ with our position on substance; they + differ on tactics.

+

If the U.S. puts forward a paper on a Jordan-Israel settlement analogous + to the paper that Mr. Sisco has + been discussing with Ambassador Dobrynin on a UAR-Israel settlement, there is a fair + chance that we might bring the French and British along. If we did, we + would have to exert pressure on Israel to get Israel to the table on + that basis, just as we would expect that the UAR would come to the table only under Soviet pressure.

+

I believe we should continue on this road.

+

President: I think it is a mistake to have the USSR messing around on a Jordan settlement. We should be + able to do anything that is necessary on that front. I just think that + side of the problem should be sorted out in a different way. I hope we + could stand as Jordan’s friend as much as we are Israel’s friend. We + cannot have it said that Jordan was saved by the USSR.

+

Secretary Rogers: That is one + thing to say, another to avoid. It is the situation—not the talks that + isolates us. The Soviets will go on championing Arab causes no matter + what the forum.

+

Ambassador Yost: Our position has + been that a settlement must be a package, so we have to talk at some + point about the Jordanian side of a settlement. At the same time, behind + the scenes, we can work closely by ourselves with the Jordanians and the + Israelis.

+

Mr. Sisco: I will be seeing + Zaid Rifai in London + tomorrow.

+

President: What will you talk about?

+

Mr. Sisco: I will do more + listening than talking. We have no position right now that we can be + concrete about. However, I will try to leave an impression about how far + it might be possible to go. In any case, the process of consultation is + important in itself.

+

President: Let’s be sure we understand that the Soviets should not be + involved on the Jordan front.

+ +

Secretary Laird: One of the + things that will be raised in any talks with Jordan is the military + shopping list.

+

Mr. Sisco: I doubt that we will + get into that. This particular individual is not concerned about that + problem.

+

President: A response to the Jordanians would be sensible as a parallel + to whatever we have to do with the Israelis.

+

Mr. Richardson: Have we had an + indication of the Soviet response to the Jordanian request for arms?

+

Mr. Sisco: No we have not + heard.

+

Mr. President, if I may, I would like to say a word about how I would + suggest proceeding.

+

I believe that we are limited in what we can achieve. I am skeptical that + we can achieve a Four Power consensus or common ground among the parties + in the area.

+

I do, however, have some thoughts about a way to proceed that might + ameliorate the situation.

+

We have put to the USSR our fundamental + position on a UAR-Israel settlement. It is my personal view that if we + ever get a Soviet-Arab agreement to that formulation, Israel would + accept it.

+

We now have drafted an analogous document on a Jordan-Israel + settlement.See footnote 5, Document 67.

+

It is my own feeling that this document should be given to Ambassador + Yost to submit early in the + Four Power talks. This would accomplish the following:

+

—It would demonstrate that we are taking the initiative on a Jordan + settlement and not leaving Jordan to the USSR.

+

—The position in that document is consistent with what Israel has said to + us in the past about its position on a Jordan settlement.

+

—In its emphasis on Rhodes type talks, it leaves the details of a + settlement to negotiation between the parties.

+

I believe it would help tactically to preempt the talks by putting our + position on the table early. If there is no Four Power consensus, then, + we will have pegged out a fair and balanced position.

+

One of the basic weaknesses in the U.S. position now is that Israel does + not accept our approach. Israel has taken the onus for failure to + achieve a settlement. I believe we should take the position that if + Israel could accept our position, we would be in a better position to + justify helping Israel. If Israel accepted our approach, the onus for + the continued impasse would shift partly to the other side.

+ +

President: You are talking now about the Jordan settlement?

+

Mr. Sisco: Yes. I would leave the + formula on the UAR-Israel settlement just as we last gave it to the + USSR. I would not budge an inch from that position.

+

Secretary Rogers: I might report + that our friends in NATO feel that Israel has not been forthcoming. We + are saddled with backing the party that, in their view, is responsible + for blocking success.

+

President: Coming back to Mr. Richardson’s point, how do you see us coming out of + these talks? If after we go through the procedure Mr. Sisco has outlined and we fail, how + can we disengage? Are you suggesting disengagement?

+

Mr. Richardson: My suggestion has + to be seen in the context of the options laid out in the paper Dr. + Kissinger has circulated and + from which he has briefed.The paper’s + options were included in a memorandum that Kissinger sent to Nixon the previous day regarding + Rogers’s recommendations + for a Four-Power talks strategy. (National Archives, Nixon + Presidential Materials, NSC Files, + Box 644, Country Files, Middle East, Middle East—General, Vol. II) A + copy of Rogers’s December 9 + memorandum to the President with his recommendations is also + attached to Kissinger’s + December 17 memorandum to the President, Document + 76. See also Document 70. + I addressed myself to the three choices which he laid out:

+

—Let the talks peter out.

+

—Press for a big-power consensus with two sub-options of either not + imposing it on Israel or of trying to impose it.

+

—Seeking a new combination of talks.

+

I do not believe we can undertake either of the last two.

+

We will proceed on the present course, and we will not succeed. Then we + will have to consider how we achieve a posture that we can stand on to + put ourselves in the best possible position.

+

I do not disagree with the desirability of continuing along the lines + that Mr. Sisco has outlined.

+

I would, however, argue against allowing the other three powers to make + our UAR document more specific. I + believe it is important to leave details to the parties. It is important + to keep the emphasis on Rhodes formula talks.

+

If we can do that, we would be in a fair position but not expected to + exert pressure to achieve a settlement. The onus for that would rest on + the parties.

+

Dr. Kissinger: I do not disagree + with that assessment. But I believe we must face the consequences of + that course.

+

—On the side of a UAR-Israel settlement, I agree that Israel might well + yield, but we will pay a price for making them accept that + formulation.

+ +

—On the Jordanian side, however, I see two prospects:

+

(1) The other three powers will go farther than we want and that will + make it more difficult to impose a settlement on Israel.

+

(2) I cannot see Israel accepting our provisions on the Jordanian + settlement.

+

I am concerned that putting forward a specific Jordan plan will slide us + down the slippery slope toward the difficult question: Are we willing to + proceed toward some form of pressure on Israel? If we are not, advancing + a specific proposal in the Four Power talks will buy us no more than two + or three weeks.

+

President: Do you agree?

+

Mr. Sisco: I agree that + provisions on a Jordanian settlement may be even more difficult for + Israel to accept than the provisions on a UAR settlement. But also, I doubt that the Arabs will + accept. Our proposal would fall far short of Arab expectations on + Jerusalem and on the refugee settlement.

+

I believe we should put ourselves in a posture that this is the framework + within which we believe the parties should get together.

+

The leverage we have with Israel is the following: As long as they appear + to be the main obstruction to peace, our job is more difficult in + supplying them with the economic and military help they need. We + recognize that we have to help Israel, but they have to help us if we + are going to be able to help them.

+

Mr. Richardson: We have to think + what we mean when we say that Israel will accept “it.” The proposal we + are talking about leaves all of the tough questions for negotiation + between the parties. Acceptance would involve acceptance of some + procedure for negotiation.

+

That is why the issue is whether or not we fill in the details of a + settlement. If we go down that road, it is dangerous because we are even + more exposed than now.

+

President: Secretary Laird knows + a lot about the domestic pressures on this issue. What do you think?

+

Secretary Laird: Exerting + pressure on Israel would make life politically difficult for us “for a + little while.” But I believe that Israel will go along—they do not have + anyone else to turn to. They have fewer friends in Europe and certainly + none in Eastern Europe or the Soviet Union. Israel is isolated and is + going to have to make some sort of settlement.

+

Vice President: I concur.

+

As I travel around, the heat from the supporters of Israel is couched in + general terms. There is a feeling in the community that supports Israel + of disenchantment with the Administration.

+ +

I do not see how we can fail to pay attention to the European feelings + that Secretary Rogers has + expressed.

+

President: Assume for the sake of discussion that there is no domestic + political pressure and that there is no moral question of continuing + support involved, would the U.S. foreign policy interests be served by + dumping Israel?

+

General Lincoln: I have thought + a lot about this. I would lean in the direction of dumping Israel but + keeping something there—something less than we have.

+

Secretary Rogers: What would be + left?

+

General Lincoln: Israel is now + the strongest power in the Middle East militarily—though not + economically except as supported by the U.S.

+

Israel’s being there has helped to make the Soviets a stronger influence + in the Middle East.

+

President: Looking at this from the Soviet viewpoint, if we save the + UAR’s bacon, the Soviets would gain by our act. In my view, Soviet-U.S. + relations are the overriding concern. Therefore, the overriding question + is: Who gains?

+

General Lincoln: If there were a + settlement and if the Arabs were no longer dependent on the Soviet + Union, they might be less hostile to the U.S. If some such miracle took + place, they might even be grateful for our role in helping to get their + territory back.

+

President: When we came into office, there was pleasure in Cairo because + I had not received a large number of Jewish votes and the Israelis knew + it. We will put that fact aside but we do have to note that the + situation has now changed and Israel sees us as their only hope—not + because of trust or affection—and the Arabs say that we have turned to + Israel’s support.

+

Politics aside, the talks in which we are engaged put up a facade of + reasonableness and trying.

+

But I am concerned that we avoid what Dr. Kissinger called “the slippery slope.”

+

I have a feeling that there isn’t a thing we can do about “that place.” I + think anything that we do will fail. But before we go into the specifics + of a settlement, if we are going to squeeze Israel, then I think we must + expect the Soviets to squeeze the UAR.

+

Vice President: Before we leave domestic political concerns, I think we + have not exploited through our own political avenues the possibility of + bringing Israel to realize that it must help us in Asia.

+

President: General Wheeler, what + do you think?

+

General Wheeler: I do not think + these proposals will be blessed with any desirable outcome. They are + doomed to failure. I do think, however, we must make the effort in order to achieve a more detached + position. We are regarded now as being Israel’s supporters and the prime + offenders against the Arab world. I am not optimistic.

+

Mr. Helms: Here, here!

+

Secretary Rogers: Each time we + have one of these meetings we all state the problem. Our relations with + the Arabs will continue to deteriorate. If we are going to change that, + we have to take positions that we would hate to take.

+

You, Mr. President, should realize, that we have done all we can think of + doing. It is sort of like the situation in Vietnam. What we do in the + Middle East probably will not work. But there is nothing anyone else can + think of doing.

+

Theoretically, we could stop talking to anyone but that is unrealistic. + The issue would end up back in the UN + Security Council, and we would have to deal with it there in a much less + advantageous forum.

+

President: I am not always one in favor of talking for the sake of + talking, and I am concerned about the “slippery slope” that Henry talks + about. But it is a point that if the talks break down we will have to + deal with this problem in a much more difficult situation.

+

Ambassador Yost: If they do break + down, it is important that we have the British and French with us + agreeing that they have broken down for reasonable causes.

+

Mr. Helms: At the risk of stating + the obvious, I think we must do what we can to bolster the spirit of the + Arab moderates.

+

President: With reference to the moderate Arabs, we should bolster their + spirits as we can—but without letting the Soviet Union take credit for + it.

+

Secretary Rogers: Secretary + Laird has given us some + additional wherewithal for bolstering the spirits of one moderate Arab + in agreeing to provide military equipment for Jordan.

+

President: Why not do this before December 20?

+

Secretary Laird: We have been + trying to wait for the Congress in order to be assured that we would + have the necessary appropriations.

+

President: What do you think, Henry?

+

Dr. Kissinger: I believe that you + should look at the Jordan package before it is presented in the Four + Power talks.

+

I agree that we should probably go ahead with the present talks in a + general way and not break the Four Power talks now.

+

We will have to face the problem, however, that we will be faced at some + point with the following argument: Whatever we do will require pressure + on Israel. If we do not get a consensus in the Four Power talks, we will + be told that the issue will be thrown into the Security Council and that we should therefore + attempt to press Israel to accept our position in order to go into the + Security Council in a better posture. If we do get a consensus, we will + be told that we must press Israel to accept the consensus in order to + avoid going into the UN Security Council + in the position of not having done all we could to enforce an + international consensus.

+

President: Henry has put his finger on the heart of the problem. Whether + we succeed or fail we face a question of pressing Israel. If we fail, we + will face the question of whether we should go on supporting Israel or + squeeze Israel to accept our position. If we succeed in the Four Power + talks, we will be faced with the question of what we are going to do to + make the Israelis accept the consensus.

+

The basic point is whether we are going to put the squeeze on Israel.

+

If we are going to have to do that, we ought to get as much as possible + in return for it. The Soviets should not come out ahead. The Arabs + played a substantial part in bringing on the war, and the Soviets should + pay some price for picking up the pieces.

+

Mr. Sisco: What the present + proposal does is simply to ask Israel to accept our formulation as the + basis of negotiations. It does not press Israel to withdraw as in 1957. + If we are going to disengage, I think we should do this after having + shifted the onus to the Arab side in order to justify our continuing + help for Israel.

+

I believe Secretary Rogers should + tell Foreign Minister Eban that + Israel must help the U.S. if the U.S. is to help Israel.

+

President: Eban needs to know that + world support is eroding.

+

The businessmen I talked to yesterday emphasized the importance of doing + something on the refugee question. Is there anything we can do?

+

Secretary Rogers: This was in the + speech I gave last night. I believe this is as far as we can go.

+

I would like to know what you mean by squeezing the USSR.

+

President: The question is what the UAR + pays for its role in bringing on the war. If the UAR comes out of a settlement whole and + gives only vague obligations to peace in return, the Soviets come out + looking good and Israel has little in return.

+

Secretary Rogers: That also cuts + the other way. The harder we squeeze the Arabs and the Soviets, the more + our position in the area deteriorates.

+

President: I am thinking mainly here of distinguishing between the UAR and Jordan. I think perhaps we might + squeeze Israel for a Jordan settlement.

+ +

Ambassador Yost: If the Arabs + undertook the commitments to peace that are in the document that Mr. + Sisco has been discussing + with Ambassador Dobrynin, the + UAR would have conceded what Israel + has sought for 20 years.

+

Mr. Richardson: The problem is + that the Arabs want territory and Israel wants a commitment to peace. If + Israel got what it wanted, it would have only intangibles.

+

Dr. Kissinger: If Israel got a + settlement this would simply bring Israel to the point where other + countries begin their foreign policy. In most instances in history, wars + have started between nations that have theretofore been at peace.

+ + + Harold H. Saunders + Printed from a copy that bears + Saunders’s typed + signature with an indication that he signed the original on + December 17. + + +
+ +
+ 75. Editorial Note +

The UN Permanent Representatives of the + Four Powers met on December 9, 1969, to discuss France’s proposals on + Jordan, which Ambassador Armand + Bérard introduced orally. Ambassador Charles Yost responded to the + presentation with the remark that the group should try to avoid giving + recommendations to UN Special + Representative Gunnar Jarring + that contained excessive detail for fear that they might hinder his + efforts. Bérard maintained that + they must decide upon a “‘delicate mixture’ between enough precision and + ‘substituting selves for parties’ in determining what guidelines to + provide Jarring.” (Telegram 4503 + from USUN, December 10; National + Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 27–14 ARAB–ISR) Ambassador + Yakov Malik tabled draft + language on the cessation of the state of war in the Middle East, which + represented a further unveiling of the June 17 Soviet counterproposal + that he had begun on December 2. (Telegram 4502 from USUN, December 10; ibid.)

+

The next meeting was held on December 12, at which time Bérard and Ambassador Lord Caradon praised the major policy + speech on the Middle East that Secretary Rogers had given three days earlier (see Document 73). Malik did not approve or criticize the speech but + believed that it would have “repercussions around the world.” He agreed + with Bérard that the Jarring Mission should possibly be + re-launched without providing + Jarring with full guidelines + on every issue. None of the four commented further on the French or + Soviet proposals presented at the previous meetings, nor did they + recommend anything new, but they all agreed once again on the importance + of re-establishing Jarring’s + mission. The session closed with the agreement that the Four Powers + would meet on December 18. (Telegram 4546 from USUN, December 13; National Archives, RG 59, Central Files + 1967–69, POL 27–14 ARAB–ISR)

+
+ +
+ 76. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security + Affairs (Kissinger) to President + NixonSource: Library of Congress, + Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CL–178, Geopolitical File, + ME, Chronological File. Secret; + Nodis. Sent for action. + Washington, December 17, 1969. + + SUBJECT + Whether to Present a Jordan Paper in Four Power Talks + +

I sent to you before last Wednesday’s NSC meeting Secretary Rogers’ memo proposing a strategy in the Four Power + talks (attached).Dated December 9; attached + but not printed. The NSC meeting + was held December 10. See Document + 74. This is essentially what you heard Assistant + Secretary Sisco describe at the + NSC. It was agreed there that you should have a close look at it before + we go ahead.

+

The Secretary proposes that our prime objective be “as much improvement + as possible in our overall position and image in the area against the + contingency that the Four Power talks reach an impasse and we conclude + it is desirable to disengage.” To accomplish that, he proposes that + we:

+

1. Stick to our present negotiating position—that outsiders should + concentrate on developing a framework within which the belligerents can + get together to negotiate and not try to spell out the details of a + settlement.

+

2. Advance in the Four Power talks a document on a Jordan-Israel + settlement parallel to the document on a UAR-Israel settlement that + Sisco and Dobrynin have been discussing.See Documents 58 and + 61.

+ +

3. After playing out this line, if it does not achieve consensus on our + terms, disengage from the Four Power talks and seek another device for + carrying forward the settlement effort.

+

The Presidential issue here is not the details of the document we would + put forward such as where the border should be (though these are + included with the Secretary’s memo). It is not clear whether the Arabs + agree that this would constitute a fair basis for negotiation. Their + judgment will depend in large part whether we are going to press Israel + to accept it and whether we are going to go on delivering military + assistance if Israel refuses.

+

The key issue, thus, is not how to handle negotiations but whether to + squeeze Israel. If we are willing to do so I see two courses of + action:

+

1. Condition our future military and economic assistance to Israel on + their acceptance of our position. This could be put positively as a + promise of future support over a period of five years or so rather than + as a threat. But whatever form the condition takes, the best situation + would be one in which we are dealing exclusively with Israel on the + basis of our position, not one diluted by the French, British or Soviets + who have nothing to contribute. If we bear the burden, we might as well + take whatever credit might come from success.

+

2. Offer a package deal to the USSR + through which we would agree to press Israel provided Moscow either + delivered Egyptian agreement on our proposals or provided significant + help on Vietnam.

+

If you are prepared to impose a settlement on Israel, I lean toward the + first course. The Israelis have asked us for massive aid. I shall have + for you within a week a thorough analysis of the implications of the + Israeli requests.See Document 79.

+

Once this issue is understood, the rest is tactics. I would be inclined + to let Ambassador Yost play out + the present course, but after that State should be prohibited from + taking any new initiatives.Yost introduced the U.S. proposal + for a Jordan-Israel settlement at the Four-Power meeting the + following day, December 18. See Document + 78. Rogers sent the + proposal to Nixon attached + to his November 16 memorandum, Document + 67. If we are willing to impose a settlement, we do not + need the Soviets’ pressures on the Jordanian side. If we are unwilling, + negotiations will only isolate us.

+

However, we should recognize: (1) we are leading into a confrontation + with Israel; the Jewish community reaction already to Secretary + Rogers’ speech is just an + indication of what may come; (2) if Israel were to conclude it is cut + off from its only remaining source of major outside support, the + likelihood that it will strike again to topple Nasser will increase.

+ +

Recommendation

+

That you authorize advancing this document on a Jordan-Israel settlement, + but prohibit any other Middle East initiatives until we have carefully + reviewed the courses of action open to us on the fundamental question of + our handling of Israel.Nixon approved the recommendation + on December 23.

+
+ +
+ 77. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security + Affairs (Kissinger) to President + NixonSource: National Archives, Nixon + Presidential Materials, NSC Files, + Box 605, Country Files, Middle East, Israel, Vol. III. Secret; + Nodis. Sent for information. All brackets are in the + original. + Washington, December 18, 1969. + + SUBJECT + My Talk with Foreign Minister Eban + +

Foreign Minister Eban came in to + see me the morning of December 16 before his afternoon talk with + Secretary Rogers.Reported in telegram 209262 to Tel Aviv, December + 18. (Ibid.) He said that Prime Minister Meir is disturbed by a “sharp + atmospheric change” since her visitThe Prime + Minister was in the United States September 24 to October 6. See + Document 52. evinced in the + resumption of Four Power talks,See Documents 72 and 75. the Secretary’s policy statementSee Document 73. and + the “cancellation” of the desalting project.On November 21, Saunders + asked Leonard Garment to + inform the Government of Israel that the November 20 “cancellation” + of the desalting project did not “close the door” on it. (Memorandum + from Saunders to Garment, November 21; National + Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1238, Saunders Files) For U.S. policy on + the desalting project, see Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, volume + XXIV, Middle East Region and Arabian Peninsula, 1969–1972; + Jordan, September 1970, Documents 4, 5, 9, 12, and 14. [I hope I laid this + last to rest by stressing that they had over-read our position on the + desalting project and that, to the contrary, you had just approved going + ahead with the test module.]

+

I assured him that there had been no change in attitude toward Israel and + that your objective remains the enhancement of Israel’s long-term + security. I explained exactly where we stand in our analysis of their substantial aid requests + and said we would be replying within a reasonable period.

+

Eban’s main concerns were:

+

1. Borders. By getting into the issue of where the + UAR-Israel border should be, he felt the US had hampered Israel’s + freedom to negotiate a position at Sharm al-Shaikh. I told him that it + might have been better if Israel had confided that objective to us a + long time ago because most of the US Government had long labored under + the misunderstanding that Israel put more stock in Arab recognition than + in territory. He conceded that it had taken time for Israeli thinking to + evolve but insisted that Israel must have a position at Sharm + al-Shaikh.

+

2. Tactics. He repeated several times the advice + to “let the other side sweat a little.” His main point seemed to be that + resumption of the Four Power talks let the USSR off the hook too soon and that we should have held up + resumption until Moscow had responded to the October 28 US position + paper.See Document + 58. While he objected to the US formulation, he + acted almost as if that were now taken for granted and that the US + should have been content to stand on it.

+

3. Jordan-Israel. He particularly did not like + involvement of the Soviets or the Four Powers in this aspect of a + settlement. I told him that we fully appreciated this concern and that + if they felt the US could be useful as a mediator we would much prefer + this role to either the US–USSR or the Four Power talks. He replied only + that the problem with Jordan was not communication but whether Hussein could make an agreement and + keep it.

+

4. US–USSR dialogue. He felt that we should limit + ourselves to (a) discussing how to prevent war (Soviet agreement to + non-intervention and maintenance of Israeli strength) and (b) bringing + the belligerents to the negotiating table. He repeated several times + that we should confine the big-power talks to the questions of how, + where and under what conditions the belligerents should begin + negotiation.

+

In short, he recalled his talk with you last MarchSee Document 14. and + your statement that we had to try consultations with other major powers + to see what could be achieved.An apparent + reference to Nixon’s March 4 + press conference, at which he said: “from the four-power conference + can come an absolute essential to any kind of peaceful settlement in + the Mideast, and that is a major-power guarantee of the settlement, + because we cannot expect the Nation of Israel or the other nations + in the area who think their major interests might be involved—we + cannot expect them to agree to a settlement unless they think there + is a better chance that it will be guaranteed in the future than has + been the case in the past. On this score, then, we think we have + made considerable progress during the past week. We are cautiously + hopeful that we can make more progress and move to the four-power + talks very soon.” (Public Papers: Nixon, 1969, p. + 185) With ten months of experience behind us, he

+ +

felt it was time to stand back from that experience to see what lessons + it taught. This sort of joint stock-taking was the purpose of his + visit.

+
+ +
+ 78. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in + IsraelSource: National + Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 650, Country Files, Middle East, Middle + East Negotiations. Secret; Priority; Nodis. Drafted by Atherton, cleared in U, and + approved by Sisco. Repeated + to Amman, Beirut, Cairo, Jidda, Kuwait, London, Moscow, Paris, and + USUN. + Washington, December 19, 1969, + 2013Z. +

210193. Subject: Under Secretary’s Meeting with Israeli Ambassador on US + Proposal in Four-Power Talks for Jordanian Settlement. Reference: State + 209946.Telegram 209946 to Tel Aviv, + December 19, authorized Barbour to provide the Government of Israel with the + text of the U.S. proposal on the fundamental principles of a + settlement between Israel and Jordan that Charles Yost presented in the + Four-Power meeting at the UN the + previous day. The telegram also included oral comments for the + Ambassador to make as he delivered the proposal to Israeli + representatives. (Ibid., Box 605, Country Files, Middle East, + Israel, Vol. III)

+

Following is based on uncleared memcon, Noforn and FYI, subject to revision upon review.

+

Summary: Following tabling in Four Powers + yesterday of our proposal for Jordanian aspect of an Arab-Israel + settlement,Reported in telegram 4583 + from USUN, December 19. (Ibid., RG + 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 27–14 ARAB–ISR) Under + Secretary Richardson called in + Israeli Ambassador Rabin to + hand him copy of proposal and to review for him its essential elements + and our reasons for tabling it. Under Secretary stressed that absence of + any indications of movement between Israel and Jordan in our talks with + Eban, and need to preempt + other initiatives, to strengthen Hussein and to dilute Soviet involvement all led us to + conclude that we had no alternative to moving ahead in Four Powers. + Under Secretary also emphasized that we believe our proposal fully + protects Israel’s security, its basic goal of peace and principle of + negotiations. Rabin’s reaction + was strongly negative. Without entering into detailed discussion prior + to referring our proposal and Under Secretary’s comments to his + Government, Rabin said he could + state that proposal would be “totally unacceptable” to Israel. End summary.

+ +

1. Under Secretary Richardson + provided Israeli Ambassador Rabin copy of US proposal on Jordanian aspect of + settlement afternoon Dec. 18 and conveyed to Rabin points in para. 2 reftel. + Minister Argov and Asst. Sec. + Sisco also participated.

+

2. After reading proposal, Rabin + said he saw two turning points in US approach to Arab-Israel settlement: + (a) decision to enter Four-Power talks in March, which undermines goal + of agreement between parties and which Israel opposed and continues to + oppose; and (b) Oct. 28 formulations on UARSee Document 58. aspect which + specifically defined secure and recognized boundary; Israel believes + this should be left to parties.

+

3. Re US-Jordanian proposal, Rabin said its submission to Four Powers had further + aggravated situation. There would be great concern and disappointment in + Israel that USG is discussing details + of Israel-Jordan settlement in Four Powers. He would refer document to + his government and was meanwhile not in position to discuss it in detail + but could say that it was “totally unacceptable.” Rabin added that he was sure our + proposal was prepared prior to Eban’s visitSee Document 77. and he could not + understand why it had not been shown to Eban before we submitted it in New York.

+

4. Under Secretary replied that we had not submitted document first to + Eban because discussion of + document between us would have obliged US and Israel to say that they + had consulted on document in advance. As things now stand, we can say + that document reflects our position and represents our best judgment on + how to reach settlement. Israel free to take its own position.

+

5. Re Rabin’s characterization + of turning points in US policy, Under Secretary said we have evolved a + position which we think is more secure today than when we started. We + now have position we can stand on. Israeli position, on other hand, is + not secure internationally. We think it a mistake that Israel will not + be more forthcoming about its terms for a settlement. We and Israel + therefore have difference of judgment. We want to support Israel’s + security but cannot confuse Israeli and US interests. We think Israel’s + security rests on its occupation of territory which it is not obliged to + give up except in conditions of peace and security.

+

6. Under Secretary continued that US wants a settlement but recognizes + there is substantial chance we may not get one. Meanwhile we are in + dynamic international situation affecting our overall position. Given + situation in Four-Power talks and our position generally, we think our + proposals, which are a blend of the general and the specific, offer best + chance of getting + negotiations started. Our objective is to keep Four Powers from turning + toward greater specificity on terms of settlement.

+

7. Rabin replied that failure to + reach Israel-Jordan settlement not due to lack of communications but to + fact that Jordan cannot be first Arab country to reach settlement. US + has created situation permitting Soviets to champion Jordanian + interests.

+

8. End result of US proposals, Rabin said, would be to undermine Israeli security. No + Israeli government will take position under which (a) Jerusalem would + not be under Israeli control except for special provisions for holy + places as explained by Eban and + (b) Jordan River would not be Israel’s security border.

+

9. Rabin reiterated that he not + in position to give detailed, authorized GOI reaction to US proposal. In any case, there no use in + doing so since US has now submitted proposal and is committed to it.

+

10. Sisco asked that Rabin specifically report to his + government that our proposal leaves question of control and sovereignty + over Jerusalem for Israel and Jordan to negotiate. Rabin said he would do so but + considered that our Jerusalem formulation represented further erosion of + US position. In May paper US had said that Jordan should have civic, + economic and religious role in Jerusalem.An + apparent reference to the U.S. working paper that Charles Yost presented to the Four + Powers in March. See Document 17. + Now we said both Israel and Jordan should have such role, thereby + putting Jordan and Israel on equal basis. Sisco reiterated that we had not addressed question of + sovereignty. Under Secretary asked whether our present formulation might + not be considered an improvement rather than an erosion since previously + we had not mentioned Israeli role. Rabin said it was definitely an erosion given fact that + larger part of Jerusalem had always belonged to Israel and all of + Jerusalem was now in Israeli hands.

+

11. During conversation Rabin + also focused briefly on two other points in US proposal: (a) Point 10 re + deposit of final accord with UN after + signature, and (b) addendum re Four Power action in Security Council in + support of settlement. Re (a), Rabin asked why emphasis is on action vis-à-vis UN rather than on agreement between + parties. Sisco stressed that + proposal calls for signature by parties and makes clear parties must + undertake obligations to each other; deposit with UN has added advantage of giving agreement + the aspect of a treaty. Re (b), Rabin asked what purpose is of language on Four Power + action in Security Council. He was told this was simply way of + expressing concept which has + always been inherent in major power discussion of settlement, of + associating Security Council with final settlement.In an interview in Jerusalem on December 22, + Meir expressed her anger + at both the U.S. proposal for an Israeli-Jordanian settlement and + the Rogers Plan. (New York Times, December 23, 1969, p. 1) + Earlier that day, the Knesset released a statement rejecting the + Rogers Plan, asserting + that the “proposals submitted by the US cannot but be construed by + the aggressive Arab rulers as an attempt to appease them, at + Israel’s espense.” For the full text of the statement, see Israel’s Foreign Policy: Historical + Documents, volumes 1–2, 1947–1974, Chapter XII, The War of + Attrition and the Cease Fire, Document 10.

+ + + Rogers + + +
+ +
+ 79. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security + Affairs (Kissinger) to President + NixonSource: National Archives, Nixon + Presidential Materials, NSC Files, + NSC Institutional Files + (H-Files), Box H–166, National Security Study Memoranda. Secret. + Sent for action. Kissinger’s + handwritten note to Haig on + the first page reads: “Al—Pres, Laird, and I decided to handle in the same group + that dealt with Israeli nuclear program, the all-purpose + undersecretaries group.” + Washington, December 23, 1969. + + SUBJECT + Where We Stand on Israeli Aid Requests + +

We have completed the analysis of Israel’s military and economic + assistance requests and our technically possible options in + response.In response to Documents 62 and + 63. We are now ready to move into the policy phase. In view + of your promise to Mrs. Meir to + give these requests sympathetic and prompt study, I want to check our + next step with you before I proceed.

+

Mrs. Meir left the U.S. on October + 6. CIA, DIA and State had already begun analysis of the + intelligence and economic data the Israelis gave us to explain their + requests. This included seeking clarification on some points through + normal working-level contacts.

+

Experience in the Johnson Administration with the first Phantom requests + apparently taught those involved that it is essential to get a fair + analysis of Israel’s requirements before turning + the bureaucracy loose on the issue of whether or not we should meet + those requirements. In order to avoid having that argument color the + basic analysis, I proposed + setting up an NSC Ad Hoc Group to + provide that analysis. You approved this procedure on November 6.

+

I now have in hand that Group’s paper.A + summary of a later draft of the paper is Document 93. It has + succeeded in rigorously avoiding policy questions. It has broken + significant new analytical ground in identifying our options on both the + military and economic questions. For the first time, a President will be + able to make his political decisions on Israeli aid requests with a + clear view of their military and economic consequences. It also + describes for the first time Israel’s substantial efforts to develop its + own capacity to produce jet planes and tanks by 1974, and this is where + the military and economic requests become closely interrelated.

+

The next step is to put the technically possible options identified in + this paper into political context. You will want a paper outlining your + political options and their consequences. The procedure for getting that + is what I wish to discuss here. There are two main choices:

+

1. Ask Assistant Secretary Sisco’s NSC + Interdepartmental Group to produce a paper on the political options and + send it up to the NSC through the usual machinery. Allowing time for the inevitable + debate in that group, for Review Group deliberation and for scheduling + in the NSC, it might be as late as March before we reached a + decision.

+

2. The alternative would be to ask Sisco to produce the paper with whatever + interdepartmental working participation is necessary but then to bring + his paper directly into the Review Group. This + would save one step in the bureaucratic process. The important + bureaucratic point here is to be sure each department involved has a + fair hearing for its viewpoint. Since they are all represented on the + Review Group, we should be able to accomplish this with a little care. + This should permit us to bring the issue into the NSC by early February.

+

I think it would be wiser to try for the earliest possible consideration. + You will want to be in a position to respond to Mrs. Meir as soon as possible. It is also + possible that some of the general budget decisions will have affected + the Skyhawk production line and make an early February decision + necessary if the Israelis are to add new requirements to the end of + their present line.

+

Recommendation: That we try for the earliest + possible consideration in the Review Group, by-passing the + Interdepartmental Group if I judge it necessary after talking with + Assistant Secretary Sisco.Nixon + approved this recommendation on December 29.

+
+ +
+ + 80. Telegram From the Department of State to Certain Diplomatic + PostsSource: National + Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1169, Saunders Files, Middle East + Negotiations Files, Middle East Settlement—US–USSR Talks. Secret; + Exdis. Drafted by Sisco and Atherton and approved by Sisco. Sent to Amman, Beirut, + Cairo, Jidda, Kuwait, Tel Aviv, London, Paris, Moscow, USUN, Bucharest, and + Rabat. + Washington, December 24, 1969, + 0043Z. +

211998. 1. Dobrynin conveyed + Soviet response to October 28 Middle Eastern formulations in meeting + with Secretary today at which Sisco also present.For the + October 28 proposal, see Document 58. A + report on this December 23 meeting between Dobrynin and Rogers was sent to the same + addresses in telegram 211994, December 24, printed in Foreign + Relations, 1969–1976, volume XII, Soviet Union, January + 1969–October 1970, Document 109. Response was in + form of oral commentary, text of which Dobrynin then left with us. On basis preliminary study, + reply, while indicating desire to continue both bilateral and + quadrilateral talks, is not constructive, and does not move matters + forward, and is retrogressive in some respects. It adheres closely to + positions taken in the Soviet June documentSee Document 34. and is + propagandistic in a number of respects.

+

2. Secretary made clear that US feels it has gone as far as it can in + October 28 UAR-Israeli document and December 18 Jordanian-Israeli + document.See footnote 2, Document 78. We indicated that careful + study will be given to Soviet reply and judgment will be made whether + reply justifies continuation of major power talks. Text of Soviet reply + will be sent septelTelegram 212662, December + 26, transmitted an official translation of the Soviet reply. + (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 711, Country Files, + Europe, USSR, Vol. VI) as + well as full report of Secretary’s conversation with Dobrynin. Soviet reply should be + tightly held, pending determination of how we wish to proceed. In reply + to press queries, we are merely acknowledging that reply received and + saying a) we are giving it careful study and b) preliminary review + indicates it is not constructive.

+

3. Principal points of Soviet reply are as follows:

+

A. US October 28 document is one-sided and pro-Israeli and Quote cannot + facilitate finding ways of settlement in the Middle East Unquote.

+

B. Soviets have backed off from Rhodes formula. Stress is on major powers + working out principles of settlement, and then in Soviet view Quote it + could be possible to find a proper form of intermediary activity for Ambassador Jarring, providing he will discuss + questions of settlement separately with each side . . . Unquote

+

C. Coupled with Dobrynin’s + supplementary remarks, reply makes clear Soviets favor more detailed + treatment of certain points though at same time Dobrynin indicated their desire to + find a Quote more neutral formula Unquote to express negotiating + procedure under Jarring.

+

D. It calls for specific statement on withdrawal from Gaza and says there + is no justification for Israeli participation in determining future of + Gaza.

+

E. It implies that Syria must be included in any major power + agreement.

+

F. While mentioning Quote a settlement which would ensure a lasting peace + in the Middle East rather than restore the situation of an unstable + armistice Unquote, it links in several places withdrawal of troops only + with Quote cessation of state of war Unquote. Nowhere does it talk in + terms of establishment of a binding peace between the parties and + nowhere is there positive reaction to specific elements in the October + 28 formulations designed to give content to peace, which are in fact + implicitly rejected.

+

G. It retains previous Soviet concept of DMZs on both sides of the + borders.

+

H. It once again stays with the June position that all that is required + to solve the refugee question is for Israel to fulfill previous UN resolutions. It is unresponsive on the + question of safeguards for Israel re the number of refugees to be + repatriated.

+

I. Soviets continue to insist that reference to the Constantinople + Convention of 1888 must be made in connection with freedom of navigation + in the Suez Canal.

+

J. Soviet reply does not, on other hand, include any reference to UN peacekeeping forces which were prominent + features of their June plan, though this concept seems implicit in + reference to need for major powers to development detailed proposals in + lieu of neutral formulations for parties to work out. In general, Soviet + reply strongly emphasizes major power role and virtually eliminates role + of parties in working out settlement.

+

K. Only bow in direction of October 28 formulations is statement that our + language on boundaries represents “certain progress,” coupled however + with caveat that any joint US-Soviet document must explicitly provide + for UAR sovereignty at Sharm + al-Shaykh.

+

L. Finally, Soviet reply asserts that October 28 proposal departs from + positions taken earlier by U.S., ignoring fact that this was done in effort develop neutral language + to overcome irreconcilable differences in our positions on such matters + as DMZs.

+ + + Rogers + + +
+ +
+ 81. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security + Affairs (Kissinger) to President + NixonSource: National Archives, Nixon + Presidential Materials, NSC Files, + Box 644, Country Files, Middle East, Middle East—General, Vol. II. + Secret; Nodis. + Washington, December 30, 1969. + + SUBJECT + Middle East + +

Attached are some interesting comments by Joe Sisco on the U.S. approach to the Middle East + Four-Power talks and on the domestic problem with the Jewish + community.Undated; attached but not + printed.

+

Concerning the U.S. position on Four-Power talks, Sisco feels:

+

—We now have put forward two documents covering both the UAR and the Jordanian aspects of the + settlement on which we must stand firm. Further + concessions might weaken the “safety catch of our position,” the + principle of negotiations between parties.

+

—Yost should be told he is not + authorized to go beyond the documents already submitted on UAR and Jordanian settlements.Nixon + underlined this recommendation and wrote “right” in the left-hand margin.

+

—Failure of the Four-Power talks is preferable to concessions that are + unacceptable to Israel.

+

Concerning the domestic problem, Sisco believes:

+

—Three little-known background facts might help in preventing our present + position from becoming a partisan issue, since they can help demonstrate + that our position on the Jordan-Israel side is basically the same as + that taken by the Johnson Administration.

+

1) In making a similar proposal to the U.A.R. on Israeli withdrawal, + Rusk went further than our + present position by favoring an international presence at Sharm + al-Shaykh. (It should be noted, however, that Rusk’s + offer was not, like ours, made to the Soviet Union. In Israel’s view, + Rusk’s offer had lapsed when + rejected by Egypt.)

+

2) GoldbergArthur J. Goldberg, U.S. Permanent + Representative to the United Nations until June 1968. assured + Hussein we would support + return of the West Bank with minor rectifications and we would use our + influence to obtain for Jordan a role in Jerusalem. These same + assurances have been reaffirmed by the Secretary of State during the + past year.

+

3) Israel indicated in July 1968 that a real peace settlement would + result in return of most of the West Bank.

+

—Unlike 1957, we are not asking Israel to withdraw under conditions which + others work out but only under safeguards which Israel considers + adequate.

+

—Much concern would be dispelled by an early and positive decision on the + assistance package.Nixon circled this sentence and + wrote: “K, I agree—Let’s discuss this with + Mel and Bill soon.”

+
+ +
+ +
+ + The Cease-Fire Agreement +
+ 82. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in + JordanSource: National + Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 797, Presidential Correspondence. + Secret; Priority; Nodis. Drafted on December 30, 1969, by Thomas J. + Scotes (NEA/ARN); cleared in NEA, NEA/ARN, NEA/IAI, and the White + House; and approved by Richardson and Sisco. Repeated Priority to London. + Washington, January 9, 1970, 2310Z. +

3992. Subject: Letter from President to King Hussein. Ref: London 10351.Telegram 10351 from London, December 29, 1969, transmitted a + message from King Hussein to + Nixon in which the King + sought to draw the President’s attention “to the recent and + currently deteriorating situation” in the Middle East. He attributed + the deterioration to the “very high limit” that “Israel’s + belligerency has reached,” citing air and artillery attacks against + Jordanian cities, villages, and “other civilian targets,” which he + described as the “one-sided war” that Israel was waging against his + country. (Ibid., Box 614, Country Files, Middle East, Jordan, Vol. + III)

+

1. Embassy requested deliver following oral message from President to + King Hussein:

+

2. QUOTE Your Majesty:

+

In response to your message, I want to assure you of our readiness to do + what we can to keep this situation from deteriorating and I have asked + Secretary Rogers to keep in + close touch with your government. We have over the past few months tried + to impress on all parties in the area the need for restraint. We realize + that your government is making great efforts to contain the situation. + In this connection, I have asked that the Israeli Government be informed + that you have repeated your strict orders that no shelling be permitted + across the Jordan River, whether by fedayeen or regular forces. As you + know, the Israelis have reported and have expressed deep concern over + shellings of their civilian settlements.

+

I appreciate your comment regarding the efforts we are making to achieve + peace and justice for the Near East. We believe a stable peace would be + in the interest of all concerned in the area.

+ +

As the New Year begins, may I extend to you my personal best wishes as + you endeavor to serve the cause of your people as well as that of world + peace.

+

Sincerely yours,

+

Richard Nixon END QUOTEIn telegram 145 from Amman, January 12, the + Embassy reported Symmes’s + delivery of Nixon’s message + to Rifai and Hussein, who thanked the Ambassador + but made no comments. (Ibid.)

+ + + Rogers + + +
+ +
+ 83. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the United + NationsSource: National + Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 27–14 ARAB–ISR. Secret; + Nodis. Drafted on January 9 by Sisco, cleared by De + Palma and Kissinger, and approved by Rogers. + Washington, January 13, 1970, + 0412Z. +

4992. Personal for Ambassador Yost from Secretary.

+

1. I am convinced that, as a result of position taken in December 9 + policy statementSee Document 73. and October 28 and December 18 + guideline documents,Document 58 and footnote 5, + Document 76. we are now in strongest possible + position to stand firmly. We have adopted a position which meets + legitimate concerns of both sides, and beyond which we cannot go in any + substantial way.

+

2. I appreciate tactical difficulties which confront you in Four Power + talks. I am sure you would agree that tactical difficulties that + confront us in Four Powers should not in any way cause us to alter + course laid down in October 28th and December 18th documents. It is now + up to Soviets and Nasser to + decide whether they wish to grasp opportunity which this U.S. position + affords.

+

3. I have given very considerable thought and have discussed with + President how we wish you to proceed in Four Power talks as you + personally renew your efforts on Tuesday.January 13. We note that our UK friends seem to + be all right for time being and are willing to stay with us on basis of + our documents at least until Wilson has had a talk with President later + this month.The President met with Harold + Wilson and others in both the Oval Office and the Cabinet Room on + January 27 and 28. See footnote 3, Document + 89. We note also continuing unwillingness of French + to stand with us and Soviet strategy has now become clear; namely, to + fall in with French proposalsSee Document 75. and thereby attempt to + chip away at U.S. position. We cannot agree with Soviet-French approach + which leads immediately to process of marrying various proposals.

+

4. Fact that at one time or another all of parties in area and major + powers have agreed to Rhodes formulaSee footnote 3, Document 52. provides + us with opportunity to prevent this risky Soviet-French gambit from + succeeding. At your Tuesday meeting, therefore, I wish you to make clear + and to insist that there be agreement in first instance on Rhodes + formula. You should make clear that our substantive views regarding + framework for Jarring’s guidance + are laid down in October 28th–December 18th documents, and we cannot + agree to any substantial alteration. We would like you also to get + across the idea that unless early agreement on Rhodes procedure and + specific elements of our peace language can be achieved, it is difficult + to see how progress can be made towards a Four Power consensus that will + start negotiating process between parties. Gromyko agreed to this proposal in his talks with me at + UN;See + Document 53. I do not believe we + should let Russians or Egyptians get off hook.

+

5. I realize that position you are being asked to take in Four Powers + causes some tactical difficulties; however, alternative is moving down + slippery slope which Soviet and French are pursuing which would very + soon face us with agreeing to propositions on which there is absolutely + no chance of getting Israeli acquiescence. Despite present strong + Israeli opposition, we do not preclude possibility Israel can be brought + to engage in Rhodes-type discussions on basis our two documents; + anything beyond this would be impossible for them.

+

6. If Four Powers are to reach an impasse, as is probable in our + judgment, it is better from point of view of our overall interests for + impasse to be on basis of forthcoming, constructive and positive + position that is reflected in October 28th, December 9th, and December + 18th US statements rather than in circumstances where other three had + reached near agreement on alternative proposal.At the Four-Power meeting on January 13, Yost made a “strong and lengthy + presentation” based on Rogers’s instructions. During the meeting, the + French Representative presented a nine-point plan to produce + guidelines to aid Jarring in + his effort to negotiate a settlement between Israel andEgypt and + Jordan. (Telegram 51 from USUN, + January 15; National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL + 27–14 ARAB–ISR)

+

7. I have cleared this message with President.

+ + + Rogers + + +
+ +
+ + 84. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in + IsraelSource: National + Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 605, Country Files, Middle East, Israel, + Vol. III. Secret; Nodis. Drafted on January 9 by Sisco and Atherton, cleared by Kissinger, and approved by + Rogers. Repeated to + USUN. + Washington, January 22, 1970, + 0224Z. +

10153. For Ambassador Barbour from + Secretary. Please deliver following oral message from me to Foreign + Minister Eban:

+

QUOTE 1. In the light of developments since our conversation of December + 16See footnote 2, + Document 77. I want to share my thoughts with you + on the current status of our proposals and our peace efforts as a + whole.

+

2. As you know, we have received an oral reply from the Soviet Union to + our formulations of October 28, a copy of which was provided to Minister + Argov here on December + 26.See footnote 5, + Document 80. We do not consider the Soviet answer + constructive or responsive. This will be communicated to the Soviet + Union officially at an early date.See Document 85. Nixon approved the communications to both Israel and + the Soviet Union on an undated memorandum from Kissinger. (National Archives, + Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC + Files, Box 644, Country Files, Middle East, Middle East—General, + Vol. II) I have asked that a copy of our reply be given to + Ambassador Rabin.

+

3. The substance of our proposals on both the UAR and Jordanian aspects of a Middle East settlement are + now widely known. We believe they fully protect Israel’s security + interests and negotiating position. I regret that your Government has + interpreted our proposals differently. I hope the Government of Israel + will come to appreciate in time the strength and inherent soundness of + our position for it reflects our common interests in a binding, + contractual peace between the parties. Our proposals are firmly rooted + in the principle of negotiations between the parties, on the need for + which we are in full agreement. They are also firmly rooted in Security + Council Resolution 242 which in our view sets the pre-conditions within + which negotiations should take place.

+

4. With regard to our diplomatic efforts, we have sought to keep your + Government fully advised of our position and the steps we were taking, + and to exchange views with you. Regarding in particular our recent + proposal on Jordan, I believed I had made clear to you on December 16 + that we would probably go ahead in the Four Power talks on the basis of + positions already well known to you, a step we had delayed until there had been opportunity to + exchange views with you. You should know that no decision had been taken + at the time of our talk, since I had hoped that you might be able to + give me some indication of progress on the Jordanian side which would + make our initiative unnecessary. I also raised with you, unfortunately + without success, the possibility of the United States singularly + undertaking a helpful role on the Jordanian-Israeli aspect of the + settlement. After assessing the views of the Israeli Government + following our talks on December 16, we concluded it was desirable to + move quickly in the Four Power meeting scheduled for December 18.See footnote 5, Document + 76.

+

5. We believe we can stand substantially on the proposals we have made. + They maintain the essential position that peace must be based on + agreement between the parties arrived at through negotiations. With + particular regard to the views on Ambassador Jarring’s Mission which Ambassador + Tekoah conveyed to Ambassador + Yost January 20,According to telegram 81 from USUN, January 20, Tekoah, reading from instructions + from his government, said: “We received Jarring on the basis of his mandate to promote + agreement and in view of the fact that his terms of reference did + not include anything prejudicial on such questions as refugees, + Jerusalem, the establishment of boundaries, etc. Consequently, + should he be provided with guidelines divergent from these + essentials, Israel’s consent given on the basis of his original + mandate will lapse.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files + 1970–73, POL 27–14 ARAB–ISR) I would hope that your + Government can see its way clear to maintaining its freedom of action + with respect to any negotiating opportunities that may arise in the + future and in particular that you will weigh carefully the suggestions I + made during our recent meeting with respect to Israel’s posture toward a + peace settlement.

+

6. I also hope this message will help clear up any misunderstandings + which have developed in recent days. The commitment of the United States + to Israel’s future is firm and steadfast. We are two friends with + parallel interests and should so appear in the eyes of the world. CLOSE + QUOTE

+ + + Rogers + + +
+ +
+ + 85. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Soviet + UnionSource: National + Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1186, Saunders Files, Middle East + Negotiations Files, Middle East Settlement—US–USSR Talks. Secret; + Exdis; Priority. Drafted by + Walter B. Smith (NEA/IAI), cleared in EUR/SOV, and approved by Sisco. Repeated to Amman, Cairo, Beirut, London, + Paris, Tel Aviv, USUN, Kuwait, + Jidda, Nicosia, Belgrade, Algiers, Khartoum, Rabat, Tripoli, and + Tunis. + Washington, January 23, 1970, + 0117Z. +

10865. Subject: US Reply to Soviet Statement of December 23 on Middle + East.See Document + 80.

+

1. Text of oral statement made on Jan 22 by Assistant Secretary Sisco to Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin follows. British, French, and + Israeli Embassies provided with Sisco’s oral statement January 22 (septels). Jordanian + Amb will be briefed Monday pm.

+

2. Begin text.

+

Oral reply to Soviet oral comment of December 23, 1969

+

The US Government has studied carefully the oral statement delivered by + Ambassador Dobrynin to the + Secretary of State on December 23, 1969.

+

As the Soviet Government is aware, the proposals we developed and + suggested to Soviet representatives over a period of many weeks, most + recently on October 28, 1969,See Document 61. were designed to provide + a framework for Ambassador Jarring’s guidance with respect to the UAR-Israeli + aspect of a settlement, to be paralleled by proposals for the + Jordanian-Israeli aspect which we subsequently submitted in the Four + Power talks in New York on December 18, 1969.See footnote 5, Document 76. The + formulations of October 28, in the form of a proposed joint US–USSR + working paper, drew upon elements of both the Soviet document of June + 17, 1969 and the US document of July 15, 1969 and were intended to + reflect common positions.Regarding the June + 17 and July 15 papers, see Document 34 and + footnote 4, Document 39, + respectively. As such, they represented a serious attempt on + our part to meet both Soviet and US views on certain fundamental issues. + We reject the Soviet allegation that our position as reflected in the + proposed October 28 joint US–USSR working paper is one-sided. It is a + fair and balanced document which meets the legitimate concerns of both + sides.

+

There is need for negotiations between the parties to begin promptly + under Jarring’s auspices. The + October 28 and December 18 documents deal with the key issues of pace, withdrawal and + negotiations to reach the agreement called for in the UN Security Council resolution of November + 1967. These two documents provide an equitable framework which would + enable Ambassador Jarring to + convene the parties immediately and get on with his task of promoting + the just and lasting peace called for by the Security Council + resolution. In this connection, the Soviet contention that the US has + now proposed to limit itself to “neutral formulas alone” is without + foundation.

+

The Soviet oral response of December 23 and the position being taken by + the Soviet representative in the Four Power talks on the + Jordanian-Israeli aspect are not constructive, are delaying the prompt + resumption of the Jarring + mission and have raised doubt in this government as to the Soviet desire + for a stable and durable peace in the Middle East. We see no significant + difference between the present Soviet position and the position stated + in the Soviet proposals of December 1968See + Document 1. and June 1969.

+

We do not believe it is useful to comment on every point in the Soviet + response of December 23 since the US position and the reasons for it + have been fully explained to Soviet representatives on many occasions in + the past. We do wish, however, to draw to the attention of the Soviet + Government the following:

+

We note that the Soviet Government no longer supports the provision for + negotiations between the parties under Ambassador Jarring’s auspices according to the + procedures the parties utilized at Rhodes in 1949. This retrogression in + the Soviet position is particularly regrettable, since the formulation + on this point contained in the October 28 wording was worked out jointly + by Asst. Secy. Sisco and + Ambassador Dobrynin following + the understanding reached by Secretary of State Rogers and Foreign Minister Gromyko during their talks at the + UN.See + Document 53. Resolution 242 + calls upon Ambassador Jarring to + promote agreement. In the context of the resolution this clearly means + agreement between the parties concerned which can only be achieved + through a process of negotiations—a view which the Soviet Government + indicated it shared in accepting on a contingent basis the Rhodes + negotiating procedure in the proposed October 28 joint document.

+

The Soviet response of December 23 misrepresents the US position on the + question of withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from UAR occupied territory, implying that our + position does not envisage such withdrawal when in fact our proposal + makes clear that withdrawal should be to the former international + boundary once the parties have agreed upon their commitments to a contractual peace and + have negotiated between them under Jarring’s auspices the practical arrangements to make + that peace secure.

+

The Soviet reply is completely unresponsive to our suggestions, on which + we have placed particular stress from the start, for language to give + specific content to the parties’ commitments to the just and lasting + peace. We note, in particular, that the Soviets have linked withdrawal + not with the establishment of peace between the parties but with + “cessation of the state of war.” The USSR will recall that the Security Council resolution is + very specific: its principal objective is the establishment of a just + and lasting peace between the parties. Does the Soviet Union agree with + the specific formulations on peace contained in the suggested October 28 + joint paper? A clear, and not evasive, response is required.

+

The US Government believes the Soviet Union should reconsider its views + in light of these observations. End text.

+ + + Rogers + + +
+ +
+ 86. Memorandum for the RecordSource: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–111, Senior + Review Group, SRG Minutes Originals + 1970. Top Secret. Drafted by Saunders. All brackets are in the + original. + Washington, January + 26, 1970. + + SUBJECT + Meeting of Special NSC Review + Group on Israeli Assistance Requests + + + PARTICIPANTS + + Henry A. Kissinger + + + Elliot Richardson + + + David Packard + + + Earle Wheeler + + + Richard Helms + + + Joseph Sisco + + + Harold Saunders + + Robert Munn + + +

Dr. Kissinger opened the meeting + by saying that he wanted to mention two factors in addition to those + highlighted in the papers“U.S. Options on + Assistance to Israel,” January 14. (Ibid., Box 605, Country Files, + Middle East, Israel, Vol. III) The second paper was not + indentified. that had been circulated:

+

—When the President had talked with Israeli Prime Minister Meir last September,See footnote 2, Document + 52. he had indicated without committing himself to + any specific numbers that, while the U.S. could not always be helpful on + “software,” we would help on “hardware.”

+

—In December when Ambassador Rabin had been in seeing Dr. Kissinger, the President had called + Dr. Kissinger to his office and, + learning that Rabin was there, + asked him to bring the Ambassador along. In the presence of Secretary + Laird, the President had + indicated that we would look at Israel’s assistance requests with a + sympathetic attitude.No record of Nixon’s meeting with Kissinger and Rabin on December 26, 1969, has + been found. A transcript of Nixon’s telephone conversation with Kissinger is in the National + Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Henry + Kissinger Telephone Conversation Transcripts, Box 3, + Chronological File. In his memoirs, Rabin recalled that he had requested an “urgent” + meeting with Kissinger to + deliver a “personal letter” from Prime Minister Meir to President Nixon. Rabin told Kissinger that “Mrs. Meir still continued to believe + that President Nixon was + Israel’s friend. But she did not understand how this friendship + could be reconciled with the recent American steps culminating in + the two documents on the Egyptian and Jordanian questions.” + Rabin then told + Kissinger: “Let me tell + you in complete frankness, you are making a bad mistake . . . In + taking discussion of a peace settlement out of the hands of the + parties and transferring it to the powers, you are fostering an + imposed solution that Israel will resist with all her might. I + personally shall do everything within the bounds of American law to + arouse public opinion against the administration’s moves!” Regarding + his impromptu meeting with Nixon, which was also attended by Secretary of + Defense Laird and Kissinger, Rabin wrote that the “strange + encounter” lasted no more than seven or eight minutes, and focused + heavily on pending Israeli arms requests. (Rabin, The + Rabin Memoirs, + pp. 161–163)

+

While the President did not specify any particular aid levels with either + Mrs. Meir or Ambassador Rabin and the group was not bound to + any particular level, it had to keep in mind this part of the + picture.

+

Mr. Richardson asked how Dr. + Kissinger conceived the + responsibilities of this group.

+

Dr. Kissinger said he thought the + group should put to the President a paper which covers the following + points:

+

—How the Israeli request bears on the President’s general approach to the + Middle East.

+

—The implications of various levels of assistance.

+

—If the group can come to a recommendation, it should give the President + one taking account of the above two points.

+ +

Mr. Richardson entered the + proviso that he was not sure that Secretary Rogers at this stage was prepared to enter into a joint + recommendation. He was sure the Secretary would want to have a hand in + the recommendation.

+

Dr. Kissinger asked whether that + meant that the Secretary would want an NSC meeting.

+

Mr. Sisco said that he thought + perhaps a smaller group would be adequate, especially if we ended up + taking a series of diffuse actions rather than an overall decision on + the total Israeli requests.

+

Mr. Richardson concurred that a + smaller meeting might be perfectly adequate; he was not talking about + the forum but simply about the fact that the Secretary would want to + have a hand in this.

+

Mr. Sisco felt that the Secretary + was prepared to look at a narrowed range of possibilities and would not + insist on reviewing the total range of options that had been laid out in + the papers.

+

Dr. Kissinger suggested that the + group see whether it could reduce the range of options to a narrow + list.

+

Mr. Packard said that he felt that + the papers had not properly covered all of the issues that need to go + into a decision. For instance, he did not feel that the paper adequately + discussed the question of whether we should try to get something from + the Israelis in return for our aid. Nor did he feel that broader U.S. + interests in the Middle East were adequately covered in the paper. He + was also concerned about the issue of building Israel’s capability and + about the nuclear question.

+

Dr. Kissinger suggested that + there are two aspects of Mr. Packard’s first point:

+

—The extent to which granting or withholding aid can be used to influence + future Israeli political decisions.

+

—Whether or not, having made an agreement to give some assistance, we + could hold up on delivery as a means of influencing later Israeli + decisions.

+

Mr. Sisco said that any linkage + between aid and political conditions could be done at whatever crucial + time might develop later. If hypothetically at some future point + Nasser appeared ready to + enter negotiations, we might want to use aid as leverage if we have kept + the option open by our present decisions. On the other hand, he is + convinced that the amount of leverage we have over Israel is not as + great as is sometimes thought.

+

Dr. Kissinger asked whether it + would be greater if we withheld aid now.

+ +

Mr. Sisco replied that this would + not be the case in the absence of a serious Arab proposal now.

+

Mr. Richardson asked what we + should do about the NPT.

+

Mr. Sisco replied that it would + be desirable to make a follow-up approach to the Israelis urging them to + sign. But he did not feel we should tie that approach to our aid + decision.

+ +

When Mr. Packard asked why not, + Mr. Sisco replied that he felt + what we decide to do on military assistance should be based on the + political and psychological requirements of the U.S.-Israeli + relationship. He felt that the signing of the NPT was not an issue which is crucial in governing Israeli + policy toward peace-making.

+

Mr. Packard pointed out that it + would help our position if we could be the government responsible for + producing an Israeli signature.

+

Mr. Richardson felt that the + hardest question was not the problem of what level of assistance to + provide Israel but how to handle this level in connection with other + things. There is a variety of other issues ranging from Israeli oil + drilling in the Gulf of Suez to Israeli relations with Lebanon and + Jordan.

+

Mr. Sisco said his difficulty + lies in the general question of tying aid to Israeli policy decisions. + He has no objection to pressing Israel at the same time we are making + our aid decisions, but he does not see how we could work out an + appropriate specific linkage.

+

Mr. Richardson said that going + ahead with positive decisions on Israel’s aid requests now would risk + our seeming to bluster about the NPT, missiles, drilling for oil in the + Gulf while not really appearing serious about any of these things.

+

Mr. Packard agreed that the + Israelis only listen to actions.

+

Mr. Richardson pointed out that + deliveries only come much later, and the Israelis will hear our words + now without thinking very much about the possibility of our exercising + future pressure by withholding deliveries.

+

In response to a question from Dr. Kissinger, Mr. Sisco said that he felt there are some things the U.S. + would want to do for Israel in any circumstance. Mr. Sisco said he would fall short of + taking a position of “sign or else.”

+

In response to Dr. Kissinger’s + question about his views, Mr. Helms said that he had not seen any disposition on the + part of the U.S. to stick to one of these linkages on previous + occasions.

+

Dr. Kissinger said he thought the + President would be inclined to do something. The President had not made + any linkage in talking to Mrs. Meir.

+

Mr. Richardson said there is a + whole range of ways of linking—from explicit linkage to simply dealing + with subjects concurrently with only implied linkage.

+

Mr. Packard noted that there are + some things that could be done that would not amount to major decisions + such as making up losses and helping with basic ordnance and spare + parts.

+

Dr. Kissinger asked whether, if + we use our leverage on the NPT, can we use it again on the terms of + peace.

+

Mr. Sisco replied that, since we + have limited leverage, he would prefer to reserve what we have for + later.

+

Mr. Richardson commented that we + could use the same thing more than once if we were willing to use it + first in connection with our decision and then later in connection with + delivery.

+

Mr. Richardson said that he + agreed with Mr. Packard on the + question of linkage and on the implications of developing Israeli + self-sufficiency. He felt that there was a third heading of issues that + needed to be discussed. This was the fact that we do not have enough + information on the economic side.

+

[At this point Dr. Kissinger was + called out.]

+

Mr. Packard pointed out that one + of the implications of helping Israel become self-sufficient in the + production of arms was that Israel would become an arms exporter.

+

Mr. Richardson noted the + advantages of self-sufficiency in that we would be less tagged as being + Israel’s supporter. What we are trying to do here, he said, is to square + a circle—we are trying to provide Israel with the means of survival but + the more visible we are in doing it the more we hurt our other interests + in the area.

+

Mr. Richardson, General Wheeler and Mr. Helms all noted the fact that the + analysis of Israel’s requests seemed to indicate that Israel’s needs + were not large. Mr. Sisco noted + that there were several things that could be decided on now like the + P.L. 480 request and the $119 million in additional military credit.

+

Mr. Richardson asked Mr. + Sisco how he would assess + the Israeli reaction to a U.S. policy of dribbling out our aid. Would + the Israelis get hysterical or would they stick with us through a + process of consultation that might lead to more aid.

+

[Dr. Kissinger returned.]

+

Mr. Sisco felt that it would be + desirable to give the Israelis an early signal that the pressure + campaign they have mounted against the Administration in favor of a big + assistance package makes it harder for the President to make a decision. + He reiterated his view of the desirable package as above plus replacing + Israeli losses of airplanes and committing ourselves to keep flowing the + less dramatic items now in the pipeline. Then he would opt for one of + the modest options as a hedge against some of the unpredictables in the + situation such as the possibility that the Mirage aircraft recently sold to Libya would end up in + the UAR.At the end of November 1969, France + reached a $400 million arms deal with Libya, agreeing to sell it 50 + Mirage jets and 200 heavy tanks, among other weapons. (New York Times, December 19, 1969, p. 1) See + also Foreign + Relations, 1969–1976, volume XLI, Western Europe; NATO, + 1969–1972, Documents 135, 136, and 137.

+

Mr. Packard asked how we would + handle the Jordanian side of this picture, and Mr. Sisco noted that a new squadron of + F–104s is under consideration for Jordan.See + Document 87.

+

Mr. Richardson asked what + assumption we should make about publicity on any decision. Would the + Israelis cooperate in keeping it secret? And would that be possible? If + possible, he felt that it would be in our interest to lower the + visibility of this decision. Mr. Richardson did not feel we could assume that Israel and + the U.S. shared the same interests.

+

Dr. Kissinger said that it was + clear to him that the Israelis did not want to withdraw.

+

Mr. Richardson felt that the + Israelis were split internally but as far as our role is concerned, we + have an interest in Israel’s saying that it would be willing to withdraw + from occupied territory if the Arabs would negotiate.

+

In response to Dr. Kissinger’s + question about his view, General Wheeler said that we ought to push the NPT urgently. He said, however, he did not + feel that we have any leverage to speak of in our arms supply. He + doubted that linking the NPT signature + to arms supply would have much effect. He would recommend pushing for + signature simply on its merits. As far as Israel’s armaments industry is + concerned, he felt the decision was a narrow one since the U.S. is + already indicted in Arab eyes as Israel’s main supporter.

+

Dr. Kissinger said he did not + feel that he understood the degree of self-sufficiency that Israel might + achieve. He noted the attraction of being able to say to Israel that + from “now on, it is your baby.”

+

General Wheeler said he + completely disagreed with Israel’s position on negotiations but he did + not feel we had enough leverage to change it.

+

Mr. Packard said that on the + question of developing Israel’s arms industry one issue is that we will + make Israel an exporter.

+

Dr. Kissinger asked why we care, + since somebody is going to sell arms to these people.

+

Mr. Richardson said he did not + object to selling arms but he felt that having more salesmen in the + business stimulated the acquisition of arms in the underdeveloped + countries unnecessarily.

+ +

[Dr. Kissinger was called + out.]

+

Mr. Richardson raised the + question of whether there was anything we could do to keep Israel from + achieving self-sufficiency in arms production.

+

Mr. Sisco said that he felt the + Israelis would absorb the costs of doing this in some way because of + their psychosis that they cannot rely on others.

+

Mr. Packard noted that withholding + financial support is the only way we could possibly control this. Mr. + Saunders pointed out there + was also the question of export licenses. Mr. Richardson said that before we talked + to the Israelis about this subject we should know on the whole whether + we want them to get into the production or not.

+

[Dr. Kissinger returned.]

+

Mr. Richardson suggested + reviewing for a moment. The papers that have been prepared are + excellent. Now we need a paper further developing the picture of how we + might proceed. It is difficult to extricate how we approach the Israelis + from the substance of our approach, but we need a paper with this focus. + Further, we need a fuller study of the implications of Israel’s own arms + production. Under the procedural heading, we have to consider how to + talk to the Israelis about where their economic figures come from and to + decide on steps for finding out how those figures were produced.

+

Mr. Packard said that we have to + be responsive to what the President has already said and to the + political facts of life. Perhaps in the short term we should do + something like what Mr. Sisco + underlined. This would not look as if we were pressuring Israel. Beyond + that, it is difficult to figure out what trade-offs we should try to + achieve but it is desirable. In short, we come down to a paper + describing our short-term moves and then one on those subjects requiring + more study.

+

Dr. Kissinger said that he saw + these questions:

+

—Whether we give any military assistance or not. He assumed that we would + give some.

+

—If so, at what level, what should we do in the short run to take the + pressure off and what should we do in the longer term? Then these same + two questions should be applied to the economic issues.

+

Mr. Packard raised a question of + whether we could do anything for Jordan to look more even-handed.

+

Mr. Sisco replied that we already + had programs in the works for Jordan, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia and + Kuwait.For Lebanon, see Document 98. For Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, + see Foreign + Relations, 1969–1976, volume XXIV, Middle East Region + and Arabian Peninsula, 1969–1972; Jordan, September 1970, + Documents 133 and 82, respectively.

+ +

Dr. Kissinger said he felt we + needed a paper on what is immediately feasible. Mr. Sisco interjected that the question is + how we go about proceeding with this package and what linkage we may + want to establish. Dr. Kissinger + said that we should put together a “stop-gap” package to give us + breathing space, expecting that this would not give us very much + leverage.

+

Mr. Richardson said he felt we + should establish whether we can go any further with our own economic + analysis without talking to the Israelis.

+

Dr. Kissinger said he felt we + needed a scenario on how to discuss our aid package with the Israelis, + including whatever linkage we decide to make.

+

Mr. Richardson said he felt we + needed to carry further our thinking about Israel’s self-sufficiency in + arms production. Dr. Kissinger + asked Mr. Saunders to expand the + pros and cons of Israeli self-sufficiency and to produce a paper + explaining more fully what is involved.

+

Mr. Packard raised the question of + whether now is the time to try another approach on arms limitation. Mr. + Sisco noted that the + President had authorized him to raise this subject with Gromyko in July.See Document 39. + Secretary Rogers had raised it + with Gromyko at the UN General Assembly,See Document 53. and + Sisco had mentioned it to + Dobrynin. There is no + problem in raising it again.

+

Dr. Kissinger said he felt sure + the President would endorse that.

+

Dr. Kissinger concluded the + meeting by saying that we would have a paper on interim steps within two + weeks.Three papers, “Responses to + Israel’s Arms and Economic Assistance Requests,” “Israel: + Development of Military Industries,” and “U.S. Arms Supply Policy + toward Israel: Options Paper,” a Defense options paper, were + discussed at the February 25 Special Review Group meeting. (National + Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC + Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–166, National Security Study + Memoranda; Washington National Records Center, OSD Files: FRC 330–76–0076, Box 8, + Israel) See Documents 93 and 94. Then the NSC might consider in early MarchThe NSC did not + meet on this issue. the larger issue of further aid to + Israel. The special Review Group might get together once more to review + these papers.

+ + + Harold H. Saunders + Saunders initialed “H.S.” above his typed + signature. + + +
+ +
+ + 87. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in + JordanSource: National + Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 614, Country Files, Middle East, Jordan, + Vol. III. Secret; Nodis; Immediate. Drafted by Seelye; cleared by Sisco and in OSD/ISA, NEA,NEA/RA, and PM; and + approved by Richardson. + Repeated to Tel Aviv. + Washington, January 30, 1970, + 2019Z. +

14726. Subject: Jordanian Request for Additional F–104s. Ref: State 5624, + Amman 265 and State 11160.Telegram 5624 to + Amman, January 14, transmitted the Department’s approval of the + Embassy’s suggestions of how to respond to Jordan’s request for + F–104 aircraft. In telegram 265 from Amman, January 19, the Embassy + reported a conversation between Symmes and + Rifai. during which the Foreign Minister asked if the + Department had replied to Jordan’s request for the aircraft. In + telegram 11160 to Amman, January 23, the Department responded with + the message: “This matter is receiving our urgent attention and we + plan to have a reply for you early next week.” (All ibid., RG 59, + Central Files 1970–73, DEF 12–5 JORDAN) Joint State-Defense + Message.

+

1. FYI We reluctant to sell Jordan additional + military aircraft because any such transaction contributes to escalation + arms race in Near East—at least in psychological sense—and because + current squadron of F–104 aircraft still not rpt not operational. We + recognize, however, that King Hussein has legitimate defense requirements and that + both internal and inter-Arab considerations require him to maintain a + ready military posture. Moreover, Soviet offerSee footnote 3, Document + 69. makes prompt positive US response essential. At + same time we shall continue to endeavor to restrain GOJ appetite for weapons and, as in the + past, meet only those needs we consider wholly justifiable. In case of + additional F–104 aircraft we have already agreed in principle to sell + additional squadron. Our tactics have been to delay sale as long as + possible, using argument that preferable hold up pending clarification + GOJ absorptive capacity. King’s + request we now carry out our undertaking (Amman 5460),In telegram 5460 from Amman, November 10, 1969, the + Embassy reported a message from + Rifai informing Symmes of Jordan’s decision to exercise its option + to purchase a second squadron of 18 F–104 aircraft. (National + Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 613, Country Files, Middle East, Jordan, + Vol. II) together with + Rifai follow-up (Amman 265), necessitates our now moving + ahead. We are, nevertheless, puzzled as to how GOJ intends to pay for aircraft, particularly in light of + fact GOJ plans purchase more artillery. + We definitely do not rpt not intend in any event to make FMS credit available for this transaction. + End FYI.

+

2. You therefore authorized to inform GOJ that we are agreeable to providing eight additional + F–104 aircraft in accordance following commitments:

+ +

A. In March 1968, when agreement for first squadron was signed,See Foreign Relations, 1964–1968, volume XX, + Arab-Israeli Dispute, 1967–1968, Documents 95, 107, and 111. we informed + GOJ that we would be prepared to + consider supply of second squadron at some future date.

+

B. On April 2, 1969, in response to King Hussein’s expression of desire to exercise GOJ option re acquiring second squadron, + Secretary Rogers informed + Hussein that USG agreed in principle to sell Jordan 18 + additional F–104 aircraft with delivery to be mutually agreed upon.See Document 24. A + record of Rogers’s response + to Hussein has not been + found.

+

3. You should make clear in context foregoing that we consider eight + F–104 aircraft requested to be part of option for second squadron and + not rpt not additional thereto. You may state that we are earmarking + eight F–104 aircraft for sale to Jordan and as soon as GOJ makes official request to us in + writing we will begin processing. Because of necessary modifications in + bringing aircraft up to latest standards we estimate lead time of + approximately one year between signing of letter and delivery of + aircraft. More precise info will be provided later. If appropriate at + this time, you may state that transaction will be strictly on cash + basis. You might also inquire as to how GOJ intends pay for aircraft in view other pressing + requirements. FYI Aircraft, which are models F–104 A and B, must be + reconfigured to take larger engine in order to conform with F–104 models + now on hand in Jordan. Current strike at GE plant may delay J–79 engine + production and further extend lead time. End FYI.

+ + + Rogers + + +
+ +
+ 88. Editorial Note +

In late January 1970, Israel began a campaign of bombing attacks and + commando strikes across the border into Egypt, including an attack on a + UAR army camp close to Cairo. On + January 28, the Department of State released a statement calling for + restoration of the cease-fire in the Middle East. (New + York Times, Janaury 29, 1970, page 8) On January 31, Chairman + of the Soviet Council of Ministers Alexei Kosygin sent President + Richard Nixon a letter + complaining that Israel had “resumed anew military actions against the + Arab states” that targeted both military installations and civilian + populations. He argued that Israeli leaders were “evidently proceeding from the assumption that the + US will go on supporting Israel,” regardless of its actions, and + cautioned that the violence would “only widen and deepen the conflict” + and “perpetuate tension in one of the most important areas of the + world.” Kosygin also warned that + if Israel “continues its adventurism,” the Soviet Union “would be forced + to see to it that the Arab states have means at their disposal” to + “rebuff” their “arrogant aggressor.” He concluded by suggesting that the + bilateral and Four-Power talks be energized to ensure the “speediest + withdrawal of Israeli forces from all the occupied Arab territories” and + asked that Nixon “appraise the + situation from the viewpoint of special responsibility for the + maintenance of peace which lies on our countries.” (Foreign + Relations, 1969–1976, volume XII, Soviet Union, January + 1969–October 1970, Document 121)

+

Secretary of State William Rogers + sent Nixon a suggested response + to Kosygin’s letter on February + 2, explaining that “a prompt reply would have the advantage of informing + Kosygin of the current + efforts we started on our own several days ago to help bring about + restoration of the UAR-Israeli cease fire.” (Ibid., Document 125) In his February 3 + covering memorandum to Rogers’s + suggested response, President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs + Henry Kissinger wrote to + Nixon that he agreed with + the Secretary that an early reply to Kosygin best served U.S. interests in that to “stand + back and let pressure on the UAR and + the USSR mount further” carried “an + element of risk” by putting pressure on the Soviet Union to “do + something visible to reverse the present trend.” He added that the “onus + for delay” should not be placed on the United States. (National + Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 340, Subject Files, Dobrynin/Kissinger) On February 4, Kissinger sent Nixon a memorandum that conveyed his further reflections + on Kosygin’s letter, which he + described as an “inept performance” and “disturbing,” intended + presumably to “get the Israelis to desist” as well as to “keep their + [Soviet] reputation as an effective protecting power of the Arabs + alive.” He concluded that it was “unlikely to produce a cease-fire, + except under conditions little short of humiliating for Nasser,” emphasizing again that it + only served to put further pressure on the Soviet Union “to make good on + their threat.” (Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, volume XII, Soviet Union, + January 1969–October 1970, Document 127)

+

Nixon responded to Kosygin on February 4: “For its part, + the United States intends to continue its efforts to promote a stable + peace between the parties in accordance with the UN Security Council Resolution of November 22, 1967 and to + encourage the scrupulous adherence by all concerned, not just one side, + to the cease-fire resolutions of the United Nations.” He added that + Kosygin’s “attempt to place + responsibility on one side” for the increasing level of violence in the + Middle East was “not + supported by the facts” and that “any implication that the United States + has been a party to or has encouraged violations of the cease-fire is + without foundation.” Regarding Kosygin’s threat “to see to it that the Arab states have + means at their disposal,” Nixon + wrote: “The United States has always opposed steps which could have the + effect of drawing the major powers more deeply into the Middle East + conflict,” but continued, “While preferring restraint, . . . the United + States is watching carefully the relative balance in the Middle East and + we will not hesitate to provide arms to friendly states as the need + arises.” The President also argued that the United States’ October 28 + and December 18, 1969, proposals met “the legitimate concerns of both + sides on all key questions, including withdrawal,” and provided + “reasonable guidelines” for Special Representative Gunnar Jarring to begin negotiations + under his auspices. (Ibid., Document + 126)

+

On February 6, Kissinger sent + Nixon a memorandum with + further background on the Kosygin letter. Kissinger concluded that “Brezhnev was obviously bitter about the Israeli raids, + and especially the accuracy of the strike on the house of the Soviet + advisers, which he implied was deliberate.” Kissinger added that “the Soviets seem to be responding + emotionally to the killing of Soviet advisers and out of frustration + over their inability to do much about the entire state of affairs. This, + of course, could have some ominous implications for future moves, since + as I noted in my earlier memorandum, the Middle East was a source of + internal tensions within the Soviet leadership at the time of the June + war. Brezhnev may be worried + that his own position is vulnerable to charges of softness, and the + letter could have been for the record to protect himself against any new + Kremlin debate over Middle East policy.” (Ibid., Document 128)

+
+ +
+ + 89. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security + Affairs (Kissinger) to President + NixonSource: National Archives, Nixon + Presidential Materials, NSC Files, + Box 650, Country Files, Middle East, Middle East Negotiations. + Secret. Sent for information. + Washington, February 6, 1970. + + SUBJECT + Status of the Four Power Talks + +

Since pressure is building for a new departure in the Four Power + talksThe UN Permanent Representatives of the Four Powers met on + January 23 and February 2, as reported in telegram 107 from USUN, January 24, and telegram 162 + from USUN, February 3. (Both + ibid., RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 27–14 ARAB–ISR) and + as an outgrowth of your talk with Prime Minister Wilson,President Nixon met with Prime Minister Wilson at the White + House January 27–28. Regarding Arab-Israeli issues, the President + stressed “the imperative need of sticking together on the Middle + East.” Wilson replied that it was not their position to “outflank” + the United States with concessions. “Britian may have to restate its + view in slightly different language, but since Israel has already + described the U.S. plan as a sellout, there’s no sense in going + further.” (Memorandum of conversations, January 27–28, 1970; Foreign + Relations, 1969–1976, volume XLI, Western Europe; NATO, + 1969–1972, Document 320) Kissinger discussed the Nixon–Wilson meeting in White + House Years, pp. 416–417. I thought you might find + useful a brief analysis of the situation.

+

The tactical situation is that we have stood firm + on our December 18 formulations for an Israel-Jordan settlement.See footnote 5, Document + 76. The British have given us strong support on all + of the major issues and have refrained from presenting any specific + ideas of their own. The pressure arises from the fact that the French, + who were earlier helpful in keeping the pressure on the Soviets to + respond to our proposals for an Israel-UAR settlement, have now tabled + their own proposals on the Jordan aspectSee + Document 75. and most recently + have launched an energetic effort to have the Four draft a paper + reflecting the “common ground” achieved in the talks. The Soviets, + having taken a flat stand against our positionSee Document 80. but + feeling some compulsion not to be completely negative, have moved almost + entirely to the original French proposals.Nixon underlined + “Soviets” and “have moved almost entirely to the original French + proposals” in this sentence. These are unacceptable to us + and, even more important, to the Israelis.

+

The major substantive issues which the Four have + concentrated on concern Israel’s withdrawal from the West Bank, + rectification of boundaries, the nature of the negotiations to be held + between the parties, the obligations of a binding peace and the Palestinian refugee problem. + Much of the recent discussion of these issues has been in working + meetings of the deputy permanent representatives rather than of the + permanent representatives themselves, and that may account for some of + the flexibility. Nevertheless, on the issues of withdrawal, boundaries + and refugees all four positions seem close enough to give hope that, if + everyone negotiated in good faith and with some flexibility, mutually + acceptable language might be found, though there are still some minor + differences to be resolved.

+

More important, however, the Soviets remain adamant on the two most + important issues for us—the obligations which each side would have to + assume in committing themselves to coexist peacefully and negotiating + procedures. Specifically:

+

Peace. We have made virtually no progress with the + Soviets on the commitments that would be undertaken in a state of peace. + The basic disagreement is on how specific the Four Powers should be in + spelling out the obligations that the parties would assume. The British + have supported our position that the obligations of peace, especially + regarding control of the fedayeen, must be specified. The Soviets, + reflecting the Arab desire not to be made responsible for future + fedayeen actions, continue to resist on the grounds that this is + unnecessary since the fedayeen will fade away after a peace settlement. + They show no inclination to take as much distance from the Arabs on this + key issue as we have taken from the Israelis on withdrawal and + boundaries. The French have recently tried to shift tactically in our + direction, but their proposal seems a non-starter.In telegram 162 from USUN, the Mission reported that the French + Representative advanced what he described as “new information on + peace,” focusing on the issue of Israeli withdrawal from territories + occupied during the 1967 war, in the hope of breaking the “deadlock” + in the Four-Power forum. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files + 1970–73, POL 27–14 ARAB–ISR) Their idea is that Israeli + withdrawal would come in two phases. The Arab armies would end + hostilities as withdrawal began, but the Arab governments would not + assume responsibility for controlling the fedayeen until the Israelis + had withdrawn part way. This in effect would legalize fedayeen attacks + while inhibiting Israeli retaliation.

+

Negotiating Procedures. The basic problem here is + to find a formula that leaves open the interpretation that there will be + direct contacts at some stage. For us this is a key issue since unless + the Israelis believe that there will be direct talks—preferably at the + beginning—there is no chance of getting any kind of negotiations + underway. For lack of anything better we are still pushing the Rhodes + formula. The Soviets have so far been most unhelpful on this issue, + refusing to consider it of substantive importance. The British have supported our position and the + French are searching—so far without success—for new language that + everyone can accept.

+

Conclusion. For all practical purposes the Four + Power talks are deadlocked on the most important issues—specifying the + obligations of peace and negotiating procedures. Our December 18 + proposals made substantial concessions to the Soviets on the issues that + they and the Arabs see as most important (Israeli withdrawal and + boundary rectification) but they have not budged on the issues most + vital to us and the Israelis. The British have provided useful support, + although if the impasse continues they will most likely feel compelled + to present their own ideas which could further complicate the situation. + The French appear to be moving closer to us on some questions, but their + tactic of searching for the common ground has provided the Soviets with + a convenient way to ignore our proposals by supporting French positions + rather than discussing ours.

+

The new front that presents itself is Jordan’s desire—with Nasser’s concurrence—to talk with us + directly about our documents. This could open the theoretical + possibility of trying to win Jordanian and Egyptian acceptance of our + formulations directly, although on balance it seems unlikely that + Nasser will feel able to go + along.

+

At Tab A I am attaching a State Department analysis which explains the + differences in the various positions point by point.Attached but not printed.

+
+ +
+ + 90. Minutes of a Washington Special Actions Group MeetingSource: National Archives, Nixon + Presidential Materials, NSC Files, + NSC Institutional Files + (H-Files), Box H–114, Washington Special Actions Group, WSAG Minutes (Originals) 1969 and + 1970. Secret; Nodis. All brackets are in the original except those + indicating text omitted by the editors. The meeting was held in the + White House Situation Room. + Washington, February 9, + 1970, 10:21–11:02 a.m. + + SUBJECT + Possible Soviet Moves in Egypt + + + PARTICIPATION + Chairman—Henry A. + Kissinger + + State + + Mr. Rodger Davies + + Defense + + Mr. Richard Ware + Mr. Robert Pranger + + JCS + + Lt. Gen. John W. Vogt + + + CIA + + + Mr. Thomas H. + Karamessines + + NSC Staff + + Mr. Harold Saunders + Col. Robert Behr + Mr. Keith Guthrie + +

SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS

+

1. A US position for dealing with possible Soviet moves in Egypt must be + ready within one week. The WSAG will + meet on the afternoon of Wednesday, February 11See Document 91. to + draw up an initial position and will meet again Monday, February 16This meeting did not take place. to + give the problem further consideration.

+

2. In connection with preparation of the US position the following papers + should be prepared:

+

a. Assistant Secretary Sisco + should submit on February 9 proposals for intensifying our diplomatic + efforts to bring about a cease fire and, in this context, to warn the + Soviets against further intervention in Egypt. These proposals should + take into account the possible usefulness of a renewed cease-fire effort + in dealing with public opinion pressures, staving off a further Israeli + request for aid, and placing the onus on the Soviets for escalating the + Arab-Israeli conflict.

+

b. For WSAG consideration at its + February 11 and 16 meetings the military situation in the Middle East + and the options open to the United States should be reviewed. This review should be + related to the existing contingency plans, particularly Tab H (action by + Soviet naval forces) and Tab D (responses to Soviet overt intervention + in renewed Arab-Israeli hostilities) of the WSAG contingency plan of October 1969.See Document 57 and footnote 2 thereto.

+

The analysis should take into account the overall power situation in the + Middle East and not just the Arab-Israeli dispute. State and CIA should coordinate in preparing this + aspect of the study.

+

c. The ad hoc Under Secretaries group is to meet Monday, February 16 to + consider the paper that has been prepared on aid to Israel.Summarized in Document 93. This paper must be + coordinated with current contingency planning and should discuss what + aid levels to Israel are appropriate in the light of foreseeable Soviet + moves. It should also consider tacit US Government facilitation of + Israeli military purchases in the US.

+

[Omitted here are the minutes, which are printed in Foreign + Relations, 1969–1976, volume XII, Soviet Union, January + 1969–October 1970, Document 130.]

+
+ +
+ + 91. Minutes of a Washington Special Actions Group MeetingSource: National Archives, Nixon + Presidential Materials, NSC Files, + NSC Institutional Files + (H-Files), Box H–114, Washington Special Actions Group, WSAG Minutes (Originals) 1969 and + 1970. Top Secret; Nodis. All brackets are in the original except + those indicating text omitted by the editors. The meeting was held + in the White House Situation Room. + Washington, February 11, + 1970, 4:25–5:27 p.m. + + SUBJECT + Possible Soviet Moves in Egypt + + + PARTICIPATION + Chairman—Henry A. + Kissinger + + State + + Mr. U. Alexis + Johnson + Mr. Rodger Davies + + Defense + + Mr. Richard Ware + Mr. Robert Pranger + + JCS + + Lt. Gen. John W. Vogt + + + CIA + + + Mr. Thomas H. + Karamessines + + NSC Staff + + Mr. Harold Saunders + Col. Robert Behr + Mr. Keith Guthrie + +

SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS

+

1. The WSAG working group paper should + be refined to categorize possible Soviet actions to strengthen Egyptian + defenses and identify US options in response.A paper entitled “Increased Soviet Involvement in UAR Military Effort—Contingencies and + Options,” was drafted by Saunders and Rodger + Davies for consideration by the WSAG working group. (Ibid.) In a + February 10 memorandum to Nixon, Kissinger informed the President of intelligence + reports that the Soviet Union was planning to give the UAR “some sort of ‘system’” to counter + Israeli air operations. (Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, volume XII, + Soviet Union, January 1969–October 1970, Document + 132) The paper should discuss the issues raised by + these options, make clear relative US and Soviet military capabilities + in the Middle East, and consider the impact which Soviet actions could + have on the overall balance in the Middle East.

+

2. An analysis should be prepared of what would be involved if the + Soviets were to install an effective air defense for Egypt. This should + include information on likely types of equipment, numbers of personnel, + lead time, and means of transporting to the UAR.

+

3. Existing Middle East contingency plans should be reviewed to determine + their applicability to the present situation.

+ +

4. CIA should prepare an analysis of + possible Soviet intent in diverting an intelligence collection ship to a + location south of Cyprus.

+

5. The WSAG will meet on February + 16This meeting did not occur. for + further consideration of Middle East contingency planning.

+

6. The results of the WSAG studies will + be made available to the Ad Hoc Group on aid to Israel. The Ad Hoc Group + will meet February 17 or 18The Special + NSC Review Group met on + February 25; see Document 94. to + consider pending proposals on supplying military equipment to Israel. It + will meet later to consider overall US strategy in dealing with the + Middle East situation.

+

7. Proposals on all available intelligence capabilities covering possible + Soviet moves in Egypt should be prepared for discussion by the 303 + Committee on February 17.The minutes of the + February 17 meeting of the 303 Committee, which coordinated covert + action, have not been found. The President changed the 303 + Committee’s name to the 40 Committee on February 17, when he signed + and issued National Security Decision Memorandum 40. (Foreign + Relations, 1969–1976, volume II, Organization and + Management of U.S. Foreign Policy, 1969–1972, Document + 203) The 40 Committee met on February 25, but did not discuss + Soviet moves in Egypt. (National Security Council Archives, Box + 1007, 40 Committee Meetings, Minutes, 1970, RMN) These + proposals should take into account possible means of improving Israeli + reconnaissance.

+

[Omitted here are the minutes, which are printed in Foreign + Relations, 1969–1976, volume XII, Soviet Union, + 1969–October 1970, Document 134.]

+
+ +
+ + 92. Telegram From the Embassy in Jordan to the Department of + StateSource: National + Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 614, Country Files, Middle East, Jordan, + Vol. III. Secret; Priority; Exdis. Repeated to Beirut, Cairo, Jidda, Tel Aviv, and + USUN. + Amman, February 12, 1970, 1645Z. +

677. Subject: Possible Arms for Israel.

+

1. I am certain the Dept is aware from + field reporting that the President’s Jan 30 statement regarding a + decision on arms for IsraelIn response to a + question on U.S. arms sales to the Middle East at his press + conference on January 30, the President said: “We are neither + pro-Arab nor pro-Israel. We are pro-peace. We are for security for + all the nations in that area. As we look at this situation, we will + consider the Israeli arms request based on the threats to them from + states in the area and we will honor those requests to the extent + that we see—we determine that they need additional arms in order to + meet that threat. That decision will be made within the next 30 + days.” A transcript of the entire press conference is printed in Public Papers: Nixon, 1970, pp. 36–44. has + stimulated renewed anti-American feeling and suspicion among the Arabs. + The Cairo communiquéIssued on February 9 at + the close of the conference of Arab “confrontation countries” in + Cairo, the communiqué in part criticized the United States, + proclaiming: “Israel would not have gone that far in her aggression + and recklessness with regard to all human values and principles and + would not have defied world public opinion and violated the United + Nations Charter and the United Nations resolution as she does, had + it not been for her constant reliance on United States support and + supplies of arms and aircraft and had it not been for the United + States’ allowing its citizens to serve in the Israeli armed forces + and for the United States’ political support in the international + field.” The complete text of a translation of the communiqué is + printed in the New York Times, February 10, + 1970, p. 3. was a mild version of the kinds of criticisms we + are hearing about US policy motives. To be sure, in an area of almost + entirely venal newspapers and state-controlled radio and TV, we can + discount much of what we see and hear in the local media. The manic + depressive and ephemeral qualities of Arab attitudes are also well + known.

+

2. Bearing the foregoing in mind, I wish to register my own conviction + that the Arab interpretations of the Jan 30 statement, as seen by them + against the background of the deep Israeli air penetrations into the + UAR, have brought about a new and significant dimension of bitterness + and suspicion within the Jordanian establishment. I would draw a sharp + distinction between these deep feelings on the part of the Jordanian + establishment and the reactions of the Arab communications media. Both + may be unrealistic and in some ways shortsighted, but I would emphasize + we have a real problem when our friends here reach the stage of + desperation about our policies that I now observe.

+

3. I want to be sure the Dept + understands what is bothering the Jordanians. As they see it, the USG is now holding a thirty-day deadline, + even a threat, over the + Arab head, and they are almost fatalistically convinced the end result + will be more Phantoms for Israel. Yet, the Jordanians stress, in this + same time-frame Israeli aircraft are bombing the outskirts of Cairo and + other places in the UAR with virtual + impunity, and with the barely veiled objective of bringing down + Nasser. The government + directing this apparently overwhelming military power occupies Arab + territories taken by outright “aggression” and launches its attacks from + those territories. This same government, in their view, has not only + refused to accept formally and unconditionally SC Resolution 242 but has also publicly and harshly + rejected US proposals for a peaceful settlement. The Jordanians thus + find it inconceivable that in such circumstances the USG could even consider supplying more + arms to Israel. They believe in effect our posture justifies an Israeli + policy of intransigence and implies approval of Israeli hopes of causing + Nasser’s fall.

+

4. Certainly the problem is not as simple as the Jordanians put it. In + fact, we have never hesitated in talks with Jordanian leaders emphasize + that the USG cannot stand aside to + watch the development of an arms imbalance that could lead anyone to + consider renewed general hostilities as an alternative to a peaceful + settlement. Nevertheless, given the Jordanian views I have summarized + above, I must emphasize that the chances of positive Jordanian (let + alone UAR) consideration of our settlement proposals become increasingly + dim. Moreover, I do not consider it at all unlikely that the Jordanians + might feel forced to reconsider the outstanding Soviet arms offerSee footnote 3, Document + 69. if we respond favorably to the Israeli arms + request. I am convinced we must find a way out of this situation of + distrust and suspicion if we are going to have any hope of pursuing + successfully our peace efforts.

+

5. I believe disclosure at this time of a US decision to supply Israel + with additional aircraft will risk ruining chances of playing out our + hand on peace. I am strongly attracted to a number of ideas for getting + around this problem, including the interesting proposal of Minister + Bergus (Cairo 260).Bergus + wrote: “Could not our decision on Israel request for more aircraft + be an assurance that we closely watching situation and if imbalance + actually develops we prepared release aircraft from Defense + Department’s own inventories on, say, sixty days’ notice?” (Telegram + 260 from Cairo, February 4; National Archives, Nixon Presidential + Materials, NSC Files, Box 635, + Country Files, Middle East, UAR, + Vol. III) We also have been giving further thought to the + implications for the US position in Jordan of a unilateral US arms + embargo. As soon as we can refine our ideas further, we will forward + some specific suggestions.

+ + + Symmes + + +
+ +
+ + 93. Paper Prepared by the National Security Council StaffSource: National Archives, Nixon + Presidential Materials, NSC Files, + NSC Institutional Files + (H-Files), Box H–043, Senior Review Group Meetings, Review Group + Israel 2/25/70. Top Secret; Nodis. All brackets are in the original. + For the titles of the papers on which this paper is based, see footnote 10, Document 86. + Washington, February 23, 1970. +

ANALYTICAL SUMMARY

+

ASSISTANCE TO ISRAEL: OPTIONS AND ISSUES

+

I. The Decisions To Be + Made

+

A. The context. Israel’s requests fall into two groups: + First, Israel seeks answer within U.S. FY 1970 on four major requests. Second, Israel has put these requests in the context of a + projected $1.2 billion balance of payments deficit, 1970–1974. Israel + has not made specific requests for the longer period but has implied + that U.S. support will be expected. The point relevant to the present + decision is that the objectives underlying the five-year projections + partly determine the size of this year’s financial requests.

+

B. The specific requests requiring decision this + year are for:

+

1. Agreement to sell 25 F–4 Phantom and 100 A–4 Skyhawk aircraft for delivery in + 1971–1972. Cost would be about $270 million, and the Israelis wish to + discuss credit.

+

2. $119 million in additional military sales + credit to finance that remaining portion of the 1968 Phantom + sale for which Israel originally contracted to pay cash.

+

3. $54 million in P.L. 480 purchases.

+

4. $50 million in AID loans.

+

5. Lesser requests for specific items are in + normal channels: 250 M–60 tanks; 20,000 bombs; 500 armored personnel + carriers; patrol boats; ground and air launched tactical missiles; + special status for access to excess U.S. military equipment from + vehicles to jet engines.

+

C. The implied longer range requests do not + require specific decision now. They do, however, require a decision to enter consultation with the Israelis on their + longer range projections. These projections include imports of + a magnitude much greater than U.S. analysts have been able to explain, + even taking into account high military imports, construction of a + domestic arms industry and enough civilian imports to maintain an 8% + economic growth rate. They also suggest a possible option of supporting + Israel’s own arms production as an alternative to direct U.S. supply. But before decisions + can be made, more data will be needed from Israel.

+

D. The following, therefore, are the operational + decisions to be made:

+

1. What decision are we going to make on this year’s Israeli requests? + And shall we enter consultations on the longer-range requests?

+

2. What are we going to tell the Israelis?

+

3. What position are we going to take publicly?

+

E. What follows is an effort to lay out:

+

1. the major military, economic and political considerations that bear on + this decision;

+

2. the major issues in making a decision on the aircraft requests;

+

3. the principal options for response to Israel; and

+

4. the main options in presenting our decision to Israel and + publicly.

+

II. The Setting for + Decision

+

The setting in which the Israeli requests are being considered has become + much more complicated in recent weeks. Intensive analysis of the + Arab-Israeli military balance and of Israel’s economic situation within + the U.S. Government since last September as well as recent intelligence + and diplomatic reporting indicate that these are the main elements of + that setting:

+

A. Military.

+

1. Our technical studies of the military balance show that, although + Israel is outnumbered 2–5:1 in the principal categories of equipment, + Israel can maintain clear military superiority + during 1971–1972—the period covered by its specific requests—with + little equipment beyond that now scheduled for delivery. This + is true because the effective military balance is not just determined by + amounts of equipment but by ability to use it. This point is best + illustrated by the fact that, while the Arabs outnumber Israel 681–224 + in jet aircraft, Israel outnumbers the Arabs 450–375 in numbers of + combat-qualified pilots to fly those aircraft. Since human training is + involved, that ratio will change only slowly.

+

2. These projections have not assumed direct Soviet + involvement—the only development that could have significant + effect on the present balance relatively soon. Deliberations of the + Washington Special Actions Group have concluded that the most likely + Soviet move would be direct involvement to improve the UAR’s air + defense. This could in time result in higher Israeli + aircraft losses if Israel continues its present raids into the Nile + Valley.

+

3. The conclusion from these studies has been that + there is no military need for committing ourselves at + this time to a higher level of Israeli air strength than it will + enjoy upon completion of deliveries under the present A–4 and F–4 contracts. If + Israel continues its present pattern of raids and if the Soviets improve + UAR air defenses, Israel might need replacement of some aircraft in 1970–1971 to + maintain its strength roughly at the level foreseen when the current + contracts were concluded.

+

4. This analysis suggests that, other than providing for possible + replacement of losses and unforeseen contingencies, our decision can be made primarily in the political + context.

+

B. Political.

+

1. Israel’s deep penetration raids on the Nile + Valley have not only dramatized Israel’s clear military superiority but + have generated heavy pressure on Nasser and then on the + Soviets to end those raids. The recent mistaken Israeli bombing + of a civilian factory with F–4 aircraft has charged the political + atmosphere and focussed attention on the U.S. decision.

+

2. The Kosygin + letterSee Document 88. tends to cast the U.S. decision + as a response to a Soviet challenge. This is the case not only + because the USSR has threatened to + supply the Arabs with additional arms but also because Moscow has failed + to respond to U.S. proposals for return to observance of the cease-fire, + arms limitation or a more positive response to U.S. peace proposals.

+

3. A number of Arab friends in Tunisia, Morocco, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, + Kuwait and Jordan have told us that a decision to supply additional + aircraft will virtually put an end to any diplomatic effort to achieve a + political settlement on the basis of the U.S. + peace proposals. If the U.S. in Arab eyes backs Israel’s current + strategy, the Arabs say they will not be able to regard U.S. peace + proposals as sincere.

+

4. Israel has also encouraged casting our decision in the context of a + response to a Soviet challenge. More than that, Israel has made the U.S. + decision on arms a test of U.S.-Israeli + relations.

+

5. In summary, two different sets of + considerations will affect our decision: The first relates to + Mid-Eastern issues—efforts to promote a peace settlement and U.S. + relations with Israel and the Arabs. The second relates to the political + implications of our decision to the U.S.-Soviet balance in the + Mid-East.

+

C. Economic

+

1. U.S. analysis of Israel’s balance of payments projections reveals a + very ambitious Israeli program of expenditures, + 1970–1974. In attempting to understand Israel’s planned + expenditures, U.S. analysts have determined that Israeli projections + include import of substantial amounts of military equipment; imports of enough equipment and + matériel to develop an Israeli arms industry so as to produce before + 1974 its own Mirage-type combat jet aircraft, tanks, armored personnel + carriers, artillery and naval patrol boats; increase of foreign exchange + reserves by $300 million; and civilian imports + sufficient to maintain an optimum economic growth rate of at least 8%. + After identifying all of these elements, U.S. analysts still find an unexplained requirement of some $900 million, + which together with the $300 million increase in reserves is about equivalent to the $1.1 billion in aid Israel is + seeking 1970–1974.

+

2. Israel’s foreign exchange reserves now are falling at the rate of $1 + million a day and, at this rate, would be almost totally exhausted by + the end of 1970. Israel’s recently proposed + budget for its 1970–1971 fiscal year which begins April 1 + indicates that its leaders do not intend to slow losses in foreign + exchange through an austerity program. Instead they are pushing ahead + with their programs of civilian and military expansion. Following a 12% + increase in real GNP in 1969, the new + budget projects a 9–9.5% GNP increase in 1970. This budget indicates that + Israel still is depending on record contributions from World Jewry and + substantial credit assistance from other governments, particularly the + U.S., to halt further deterioration in its foreign exchange reserves. + Israel’s projections assume some $200 million in + U.S. aid in 1970. If assistance from either the U.S. Government + or from World Jewry—and projections in this category seem highly + optimistic—fall short, Israel will have to slow the growth of its + economy below 9.5% and therefore reduce civilian imports or + substantially reduce military imports.

+

3. The conclusion from U.S. analysis has been that + Israel could meet most of its financial requirements from its own + resources without added U.S. aid if it were prepared to accept a lower + growth rate of, say, 6%. This would still permit Israel to achieve all + the other objectives described above, including developing its own arms + industry.

+

4. U.S. analysts are quick to point out that more + complete data are required from Israel on its plans for + 1971–1974 before the U.S. analysis can be treated as a basis for + definitive U.S. decisions. They have, therefore, recommended detailed + consultations with Israel on its economic projections before the U.S. + commits itself beyond U.S. FY 1970. + These consultations would also surface more information on Israel’s + plans for further developing its own arms industry to determine whether + supporting Israeli production would constitute an alternative to direct + supply by the U.S.

+

III. The Economic + Options

+

Since the U.S. response to Israel’s economic requests in FY 1970 has proved relatively + uncontroversial in the course of this review, it seems appropriate to + get this part of the problem out of the way before dealing with the much + more difficult decision on supply of aircraft.

+ +

A. The broad options can be judged against the + Israeli estimates that $200 million in additional capital imports will + be needed in 1970 and that this need will rise toward $300 million after + 1971. The main options fall into these general ranges:

+

1. Provide no further economic aid. The rationale + for this approach would be either to apply political pressure or to + press Israel to make its own decisions on economic priorities before + asking the U.S. taxpayer to support both “guns and butter” in + Israel.

+

2. Continue in the range of recent aid levels, $50–150 + million yearly. This would meet the political requirement of + doing something and provide assistance that could support close to an 8% + growth rate in Israel and military imports if the Israeli Government + took reasonable austerity measures.

+

3. Meet the full Israeli requests of about $200 million + in 1970. According to Israeli budget estimates just published, + this would support all planned military imports, an active program for + building its own arms industry and a 9.5% growth rate in 1970. This + budget includes no austerity measures.

+

B. Possible Elements of an Economic Package in U.S. + FY 1970. It is generally + agreed up through the level of the Special Review Group that one part of + the U.S. response to Israel’s requests should be these two points: (1) + the U.S. will need more data on Israel’s long-range plans before talking + about longer term assistance; therefore, (2) the U.S. would like to send + a small group of economic experts to Israel to consult. Short of that, + however, a package for this year can be put together from the following + elements:

+

1. $119 million additional military sales credit + to cover Israel’s remaining payments under the current F–4 Phantom + contract. This request could be met totally or in part as follows:

+

a. Promise the entire $119 million now. In + practice we would have to fund this from the appropriations of two + fiscal years—FY 1970 and FY 1971—and could not formally complete the + transaction until Congress passes the Foreign Military Sales Act + (probably mid-April). But enough money has been included in the + requested appropriation and could be promised now to meet Israel’s 1970 + needs.

+

b. Allocate $52 million now, withholding the + balance of $67 million. This balance is the amount Israel has on deposit + in France, and Defense questions whether the U.S. should pay the price + for the impasse created by France’s embargo.France imposed an arms embargo on Israel after the 1967 + war.

+

2. The $54 million P.L. 480 request could also be + met at one of three levels.

+ +

a. Approve the entire $54 million. The main + complication in this is that $22 million would involve feasible but + somewhat out-of-the-ordinary procedures for Agriculture (extending P.L. + 480 terms to what would normally be Israeli commercial purchases here + required by law) when Agriculture has not established the need. + Including the extra $22 million would force the overall P.L. 480 program + above our budget ceiling.

+

b. Approve the $32 million Israel originally + requested before seeking the special arrangement for the added $22 + million noted above. This would keep the program within the budget + ceiling.

+

c. Approve an intermediate level of say $40 + million. This could probably be worked out by adjustments + within the present budget ceiling.

+

C. In summary: Adding to the above $30 million in + this year’s military sales credit already committed under the 1968 + Phantom contract, these options would give us a range of $114–203 + million in economic assistance for U.S. FY 1970. This would be measured against projected Israeli + need of $200 million from the U.S. The question of AID assistance—not + possible under present AID criteria though legally possible—would be + deferred this year on grounds that conventional programs and possible + Israeli austerity measures should be exhausted before the U.S. considers + reversing AID criteria with an extensive legislative history.

+

IV. Arms Supply—The Issues + for Decision

+

A. U.S. interests. The central question to be + answered is: What decision will best serve the + long-term national interest of the U.S.? The main U.S. + interests in the Middle East are:

+

1. That this area not become the arena or the trigger + for a U.S.-Soviet confrontation. The most obvious course in + pursuit of this interest is to promote a solution of the Arab-Israeli + conflict, which threatens to draw in the U.S. and USSR. Failing a + settlement, the next course for the U.S. is to avoid steps which would + force deeper U.S. or Soviet involvement.

+

2. That this area not fall under Soviet + predominance. It seems unlikely that the USSR intends to move quickly to establish + the kind of influence it achieved in Eastern Europe after 1945. But + there is no question that the Soviet objective is to undercut U.S. + influence in the Middle East and to become the major outside influence. + While the Middle East itself is not literally vital to the U.S., it is + more nearly so to Western Europe, and the extension of Soviet + predominance into a new area would have global implications.

+

3. That Israel survive. The U.S. has rightly or + wrongly undertaken a non-legal national commitment to assure Israel’s + survival. In the military context, this commitment has taken the form of + assuring Israel’s capacity to defeat any possible Arab threat to its + existence. Israel’s ability to + defend itself is also important in avoiding direct U.S. involvement in a + Mid-Eastern war.

+

4. That the Arab nations continue to welcome an + American presence. This is relevant to the U.S. effort to + prevent Soviet predominance. But it is also related to protecting the + investments of private Americans as well as some $1.5 billion in + national income credited yearly to the U.S. balance of payments. + Finally, it is related to the obligation of the U.S. Government to + protect American citizens (well over 10,000) working and living in this + area.

+

B. The important question, therefore, is what effect a + decision to supply Israel with additional arms now would have on + each of these interests.

+

1. Given the analysis of the present military balance above (para. II. A, + page 3), it seems fair to conclude that the U.S. obligation to + contribute to Israel’s chances of survival could + be fulfilled without any commitment right now to increase further + Israel’s aircraft inventory. Therefore, the governing judgments in this + decision will be those related to the remaining U.S. interests in the + area. These are discussed in the following paragraphs.

+

2. Would a publicly declared decision within the next + few weeks to supply additional aircraft to Israel lessen the + likelihood of U.S.-Soviet confrontation in the Mid-East?

+

+ Pro. +

+

—Since a major Arab-Israeli clash is most likely when Israel feels + threatened, one could argue that a strong Israel is more likely to + calibrate its military pressure on the UAR so as to fall short of a level that would force the + USSR into open defense of the + UAR and pose to the U.S. the + question of direct response.

+

—While the Israeli leadership at present seems uninclined to reduce its + military pressure on the UAR (and + USSR), a positive decision would make it possible for the U.S. to urge + Israel to ease off its attacks at least on populated areas in the Nile + Valley. A negative decision or delay would decrease Israeli receptivity + to such an approach.

+

—The likelihood of U.S.-Soviet confrontation is increased when the USSR believes the U.S. lacks resolution. + The only way to encourage the USSR to + turn toward serious efforts to achieve a political settlement is to make + clear that Moscow can get what it wants—Nasser’s survival without undue Soviet involvement—only + by promoting a negotiated settlement.

+

—It is in the U.S. interest to be sure before the + USSR involves itself further that + Israel is promised the means to defend itself. It is potentially less + inflammatory for the U.S. to move now than for the U.S. to move in + direct response to an open Soviet move, even though the Soviets might + use the U.S. move as an excuse for its own.

+ +

+ Con. +

+

—A U.S. decision now, in the wake of Kosygin’s warningIn his + January 31 letter; see Document 88. + and Nasser’s pressure on Moscow, + could force a major change in the quality of the Soviet presence in the + Mid-East. It would force the USSR to + assume greater responsibility for the defense of the UAR.

+

—Open assumption by the USSR for UAR defense would face the U.S. with the + difficult question of whether to make a direct response of its own. Such + a response would change the Arab-Israeli conflict into a direct US–USSR + contest. To date, the U.S. and USSR + have been content to keep their contest for influence in the Mid-East on + the political level.

+

—Backing Israeli strategy whether we agree with it or not would represent + diminution of great power control over their role in the situation. The + Israeli strategy of bombing the Nile Valley, a strategy in which the + U.S. has little interest, has generated present pressure on the USSR to move more directly to the UAR’s + defense. If the U.S. moved to back that Israeli strategy, it would in + effect be joining a confrontation with the USSR on Israel’s terms. If each great power begins moving + in support of its client the likelihood is increased that either Arab or + Israeli acts could force them into moves vis-à-vis each other that + neither has an interest in taking.

+

—In short, the U.S. has no interest in seeing the USSR pressed so hard that it feels + compelled to escalate its own direct involvement. The most dangerous + situation that could be created is one in which the USSR feels it is faced with humiliation + and has no way out.

+

+ Summary of the Issue +

+

Recent Israeli bombing has forced Moscow closer to assuming + responsibility for UAR defense—a step + which could elevate the Arab-Israeli conflict to a U.S.-Soviet contest. + A U.S. decision which seems to back the Israeli strategy that achieves + this result would appear to enhance Israel’s voice in setting the terms + of the U.S.-Soviet contest. Yet U.S. firmness in the face of Soviet + pressure is important in deterring a confrontation.

+

3. Would a publicly declared decision in the next few + weeks to supply additional aircraft to Israel impede Soviet efforts + to achieve predominance in the Mid-East?

+

+ Pro. +

+

—Israeli power is a threat to Soviet prestige because it alone can + periodically defeat and weaken pro-Soviet governments. This is all the + U.S. has to depend on. Given the political forces at work in the Mid-East, it is unlikely that the + U.S. can win the more prominent Arab regimes from the radical camp. If + the U.S. cannot win them politically, the only alternative is to keep + them weak.

+

—Soviet prestige will gradually be eroded by Soviet inability to regain + the Arabs’ lost territories from Israel.

+

—As Soviet impotence is demonstrated, the Arabs will realize that the + U.S. is the power they have to deal with.

+

+ Con. +

+

—An open U.S. move would increase Soviet influence in the UAR. It would + almost certainly compel increased Soviet involvement in the UAR’s air + defense. To do anything effective, the USSR would have to involve its own technicians and maybe + even pilots in considerable numbers, perhaps 10–15,000. With an increase + of this magnitude would come greater Soviet influence, at least in the + UAR military and perhaps even over + political policy.

+

—If the USSR openly assumed + responsibility for UAR air defense, + this would be the first major extension of that kind of Soviet political + relationship in the Middle East and, except for Cuba, the first such + Soviet venture globally beyond the lines of 1948.

+

—If the USSR extended its protective + mantle over the UAR, this would increase pressure on the U.S. to stand + even more openly behind Israel. The USSR would then have maneuvered itself formally into the + position of the sole champion of the Arab cause, leaving even the + moderate regimes little choice of maintaining a close countering + relationship with the U.S.

+

+ Summary of the Issue. +

+

The basic fact of Israel’s military superiority strengthens the U.S. + bargaining position. However, excessive use of Israeli power could drive + the USSR into open assumption of + responsibility for UAR defense—a step + which would enhance the Soviet position in the Mid-East.

+

4. Will a publicly declared decision within the next + few weeks enhance or at least not worsen the U.S. position in the + Arab nations?

+

+ Pro. +

+

—The moderate Arab regimes have an interest in continuing their + relationship with the U.S. because a relationship with the USSR is incompatible.

+

—The Arabs respect power. Even though they may react emotionally to a + U.S. decision in the short term, they will in the long run recognize + that the U.S. (with Israel) is the only effective power in the area.

+ +

+ Con. +

+

—An open U.S. move would weaken U.S. relationships even with moderate + regimes. It would be conclusive proof even to Arab friends of the U.S. + that the U.S. will give Israel unlimited backing regardless of its + policy. This even closer U.S. identification with Israel would make it + more difficult for moderate regimes to sustain politically a close + relationship with the U.S. It would increase the pressure on them from + their own radicals.

+

—Senior U.S. diplomatic representatives in four Eastern Arab capitals + have reported their concern over the likelihood of Arab attacks on + American citizens (more than 10,000) and property if a decision to + supply more aircraft to Israel is announced.

+

+ Summary of the Issue +

+

The Arabs have talked themselves into a state of mind where they would + regard a U.S. announcement of further aircraft shipments to Israel now + as a sign of complete U.S. backing for present Israeli strategy. Yet the + U.S. cannot allow its decisions to be governed by Arab emotions.

+

V. Arms Supply—the Range of + Options

+

A. The broader context. U.S. technical analysis of + the Arab-Israeli military balance as it may evolve 1970–1974 has + identified the following general ranges of possible U.S. supply of + aircraft to Israel over the next five years:

+

1. 20 more Phantoms and up to 20 + more Skyhawks delivered by 1974 would be + necessary to meet Israel’s minimum security needs. This would enable + Israel to win another war like that in 1967 when it concentrated on + defeating one enemy at a time.

+

2. 20 more Phantoms and up to 45 more Skyhawks + delivered by 1974 would enable Israel to defeat a + coordinated attack by the UAR, Jordan, Syria and Iraq (which U.S. + intelligence now estimates as unlikely in any militarily effective + form).

+

3. 25 more Phantoms and 100 more Skyhawks + delivered by 1974 (Israel has requested them in + 1971–1972) would enable Israel to defeat an effectively coordinated + attack by 14 Arab states.

+

B. Options for the FY + 1970 decision. The Israeli request was for delivery in + 1971–1972. Israeli Ambassador Rabin has said Israel would regard anything meeting from + 60–100% of Israel’s requests as a positive U.S. response. The Israelis + have also been pressing Defense for a U.S. agreement to make up losses + from its present inventory of Phantoms and Skyhawks. Against that + background, the U.S. has the following choices in + making its present decision:

+ +

Option 1: Negative decision. A decision could be + made not to provide Israel with additional aircraft, at least this + year.

+

Option 2: Postponement of a decision. It could be + announced that, given Israel’s present clear superiority and the high + state of tension in the area, a decision is being postponed for the time + being. To meet possible contingencies, the USAF would prepare on a standby basis to provide aircraft + out of its inventory.

+

Option 3: A small number of aircraft for + replacement. If it is judged that Israel will have the power it + needs provided it maintains the aircraft level now envisioned when the + present Skyhawk and Phantom deliveries are completed later this year, + the U.S. could commit itself to maintain that level by replacing losses. + There are two possible variants for handling this + option:

+

a. Three-year replacement contract. Present + Skyhawk and Phantom contracts would be amended to include replacement up + to a specified number of Israeli losses (with Skyhawks replacing + Mirages). Based on 1969 losses, we would agree to reserve 8 Phantoms and 18 Skyhawks for replacement of losses + in 1969, 1970, 1971. We would agree to joint review of this + level if actual losses ran higher. We would make public only the + principle of controlled replacement.

+

b. Standby reserve for replacement. Without making + a contract now, we could make arrangements to earmark and have available + on an immediate standby basis for formal sale to Israel on short + notice.

+

Option 4: A three-year replacement contract as above + with added agreement in principle now to provide, subject to review + in early 1971, an additional squadron of 16 Phantoms. The + combination of these agreements would make a potential total of 24 Phantoms and 18 Skyhawks with Israel’s total + inventory being increased by 16 Phantoms. [A variation of this would be + to raise the number of Skyhawks slightly.]

+

Option 5: A one-time sale of 16 Phantoms and 24 + Skyhawks now. This would provide for anticipated losses as now + estimated and provide a modest increase in Israel’s inventory but would + not commit the U.S. for the future.

+

Option 6: Meet all of Israel’s requests for a + short-term period. Israel has requested 25 Phantoms and 100 + Skyhawks by the end of 1972. Therefore, a decision now for delivery of + about half that amount in 1971 should be regarded as positive. This + would mean another 15 Phantoms and 50–60 + Skyhawks.

+

C. The Argument. Rather than restate the arguments + made on the principal issues under IV above or risk redundancy by + arguing each of the options, it seems sensible to repeat here only the + main elements that bear on choice among these options:

+

1. The Israelis regard this decision as a test of this Administration’s + support for Israel. This makes it difficult to do nothing.

+ +

2. The USSR has warned against a + positive decision. It would be difficult to do nothing if that would + make the U.S. appear to have been intimidated.

+

3. The military balance right now does not require us to increase + Israel’s aircraft inventory, though it may make replacement of losses + desirable.

+

4. An open U.S. decision could force the USSR into assumption of responsibility for UAR air defense.

+

5. The Arabs will read a positive decision as U.S. support for Israel’s + raids in the Nile Valley.

+

D. What do we tell Israel? Any response to Israel + if it is to preserve a close U.S.-Israeli relationship must assure + Israel of U.S. intent to see that Israel retains its position of + military superiority as well as the economic base to support that + position. The key to making any response short of total acquiescence in + all of Israel’s requests politically acceptable to Israel will be that + assurance plus the promise of continuing + consultation on Israel’s needs. Within that framework, we will have to + tell Israel exactly what we intend to do. It has been possible in the + past to maintain the secrecy of exact numbers of aircraft.

+

E. What is said publicly will depend on the + decision. Two general options are available:

+

1. State that a decision has been made but there will be no detailed + comment.

+

2. Describe the general nature of the decision and emphasize continued + interest in arms limitation.

+

3. State vaguely what we intend to do with restatement of basic + objectives: meet military needs of friends, arms limitation, peace.

+

4. Let the thirty-day deadline pass without comment to allow pressure to + die down before dealing with the problem publicly.

+

F. Formula for public announcement. What is said + will depend on the decision. But for the sake of illustration, if the + decision were a relatively inconspicuous replacement of Israeli losses + plus a slight addition to inventory, the question would arise what + formula might be found that would make us appear firm and yet sensitive + to the situation. Such a formula might include points like the + following:

+

1. The U.S. will maintain the strength of its friends by whatever means + it considers appropriate [e.g., replacement of losses].

+

2. The U.S. does not believe that force alone can resolve the + Arab-Israeli conflict. Therefore, the U.S. will not fuel an arms race. + The U.S. will continue to act with restraint and to press other + suppliers to discuss arms limitation.

+

3. At the same time, the U.S. will renew its efforts to restore the + cease-fire and to help start negotiation of the terms of a peace + settlement.

+
+ +
+ + 94. Memorandum for the RecordSource: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–111, Senior + Review Group, SRG Minutes Originals + 1970. Top Secret. Drafted by Saunders on February 28. All brackets are in the + original. The meeting was held in the White House Situation + Room. + Washington, February 25, 1970. + + SUBJECT + Meeting of Special NSC Review + Group on Israeli Assistance Requests + + + PARTICIPANTS + + Henry A. Kissinger + + + Elliot Richardson + + + David Packard + + F.T. Unger + + Richard Helms + + + Joseph Sisco + + + Harold H. Saunders + + + Alfred L. Atherton, Jr. + + +

Dr. Kissinger opened the meeting + by saying that he felt that he should acquaint the Group with the + President’s views insofar as he knew them. He noted that Prime Minister + Meir would not have been + mistaken if she thought she had been promised something. Although Dr. + Kissinger had not been + present at all of the conversations, he had heard the President in + several ways indicate that though the U.S. might not be able to please + Israel on “software,” the U.S. would make it up to Israel on “hardware.” + As far as Dr. Kissinger knew, + the President had never talked specific numbers of airplanes or specific + levels of economic aid.

+

Mr. Packard asked whether the + President had said anything in that context that had indicated that the + U.S. would not require anything in return for any aid it might give.

+

Dr. Kissinger replied that we can + do anything we want. It would be logical for Mrs. Meir to assume, however, that the + trade-off had already been made in that the U.S. had gone ahead with its + unpalatable peace proposals.

+

Dr. Kissinger continued by + recalling that on December 26, 1969, Ambassador Rabin had been in his office when the + President had called for him.See footnote 2, Document 52. The + President had asked Dr. Kissinger to bring the Ambassador over briefly. + Secretary Laird had been + present. The President had said that he realized the Israelis were + unhappy but that the U.S. would make it up to Israel in hardware.

+ +

Dr. Kissinger, noting that he + would not cite various public statements by the President on the + question of arms supply, completed his list by noting to the group that + he had on February 18 sent to the President a compilation of the reports + from U.S. diplomatic posts in the Middle East describing their estimates + of Arab reaction to a sale of more planes to Israel. [Note: This was in + the daily brief of February 18.]President’s + Daily Brief, February 18. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential + Materials, NSC Files, Box 1, + President’s Daily Briefings) The President had written in the + margin, “We must do this regardless of political reaction.”

+

Dr. Kissinger concluded these + comments by saying that the Group should still state its views to the + President. But he wanted to note for the Group these previous + expressions of the Presidential viewpoint so that the Group could + operate realistically in the knowledge of what the President may feel is + a commitment, albeit vaguely defined.

+

Mr. Packard asked whether Dr. + Kissinger felt that what he + had said ruled out asking the Israelis for something in return for + whatever we give. Dr. Kissinger + replied in the negative.

+

Mr. Richardson said that he would + prefer to think of the question in terms of how little we can do and how + long the decision might be deferred. He also thought we should consider + what we could do by earmarking aircraft to be available to Israel in an + emergency as distinguished from making an announcement in the near + future about a new sale. He suggested that there may be ways of + delivering on our assurance of Israel’s basic security that would not + necessarily arouse a strong Arab reaction.

+

Mr. Richardson continued saying + that he did not feel that the U.S. ambassadors had exaggerated in + predicting a sharp Arab reaction. He had the same impression from + talking to Messrs. McCloy,John J. McCloy was + Chairman of the Advisory Committee on Disarmament and Arms + Control. Eugene BlackEugene Black + was Chairman of the Overseas Development Council, an international + policy research institution. and others who have recently + traveled in the area. He felt that Israel has no right to expect the + U.S. to destroy its position in the Middle East. Israel has no security + interest in doing this.

+

Mr. Richardson concluded by + noting the fact that we face a dilemma in that trying to find a formula + that would provide least visibility would make it difficult to extricate + concessions from the Israelis. By its very nature, the kind of package + that would provoke little Arab reaction would not be big enough to make + the Israelis willing to concede anything.

+ +

Mr. Packard emphasized that it + would be possible to take certain actions to assure that we could meet + any legitimate Israeli needs in an emergency. Mr. Richardson seconded this by noting + that a number of planes could be set aside in the United States for + delivery under certain circumstances.

+

Mr. Richardson noted that Mr. + Packard had asked whether it + would be consistent with the President’s commitments to attach + conditions to a sale. He said that he would pose a different question: + Would the President consider it within the range of what he had promised + if we were to work out an arrangement for meeting Israel’s basic needs + without actually promising now to deliver more aircraft.

+

Dr. Kissinger said that he did + not want to be in the position of interpreting the President’s views. He + would prefer to stop at simply having passed on those expressions of + Presidential viewpoint which he could pass on as things that the + President had actually said. However, if he had to guess, he would + suppose that the President would lean more toward the Richardson proposal than toward the + Packard proposal. [The + “Packard proposal” referred + to a paper that Mr. Packard had + circulated to the members shortly before the meeting.See footnote 10, Document + 86. Each member had a copy of it there. When Mr. + Packard had asked his + questions about attaching conditions to the sale, he had indicated that + such conditions would be those like the ones outlined in his + paper—restoring the cease-fire, signing the NPT, etc.]

+

Dr. Kissinger continued saying + that the Richardson position was + more easily defensible. The problem is that the closer one gets to + attaching conditions to a package, the larger the package needs to + be.

+

Dr. Kissinger continued by + summarizing as follows: There are two approaches to the decision. One is + to attach specific conditions. If this approach is taken, there are two + ways of doing it—attaching conditions to the agreement or attaching + conditions to the actual delivery. The second approach is that suggested + by Mr. Richardson which would + offer Israel basic assurance while permitting us to continue a dialogue + on the whole range of issues before us, not necessarily linking them to + sale of weapons.

+

Dr. Kissinger felt that Israel + would be so disappointed if the U.S. offered any of the smaller options + that attaching conditions would just be rubbing salt in an open + wound.

+

Dr. Kissinger summarized by + saying that the first decision before the President is whether to go the + Packard route of attaching + conditions to whatever package may be decided on or to go the Richardson route of trying to achieve low visibility but + without much prospect of attaching conditions.

+

Mr. Packard noted that the + Richardson route would be “a + little more troublesome” to handle in the U.S. It would be so refined + that it would be difficult to explain.

+

Dr. Kissinger said, “Suppose we + gave the full package that the Israelis had requested but attached + conditions, wouldn’t the Arabs regard the conditions as phony?” Mr. + Sisco said he was sure they + would regard the conditions as phony.

+

Dr. Kissinger asked whether it + was the judgment of the Group that if the U.S. were to meet Israel’s + complete requests, it would “blow the place apart.” He then asked each + member of the Group in turn for his judgment on this point, and each + member stated his unqualified judgment that such a decision would “blow + the place apart.” Mr. Sisco + noted that Ambassador Rabin, in + talking with Mr. Richardson, had + defined a positive U.S. response to the Israeli requests as meeting at + least 60% of them.

+

Mr. Richardson then turned to an + option described in detail in a memo of February 18 which he had + privately passed to Dr. Kissinger on February 20.The + memorandum is in the National Archives, Nixon Presidential + Materials, NSC Files, Box 605, + Country Files, Middle East, Israel, Vol. III. [This + memorandum entitled “Israel’s Requests for Arms and Economic + Assistance,” is a memorandum from Sisco to the Under Secretary and the Secretary and was + included in Dr. Kissinger’s + briefing book under the Tab “Sisco Memo.” The option to which Mr. Richardson here referred is Option 4–2 + which is described beginning on page 9 of that memo.] Mr. Richardson read from his paper + describing his option as follows: “Without making a contract now with + Israel, we could make arrangements to earmark and have available on an + immediate stand-by basis for formal sale to Israel on short notice a + number of aircraft for replacement purposes (1971–1972) perhaps a bit + above the present anticipated replacement need (e.g., 16 F–4s and 24 + A–4s, the latter to be used also to replace Mirages).” Mr. Richardson felt that this might be the + best way to deal with the problem.

+

Dr. Kissinger said that he + doubted that the President would feel that this would be enough to meet + his commitment.

+

Mr. Richardson said that he would + like to inject another element—somewhat along the lines of that + described in Mr. Packard’s + paper—which had come out of a meeting with Secretary Rogers that morning. This proposal is + that the President use the occasion of an announcement of his decision + to make a dramatic appeal for resolution of the Arab-Israeli problem. It + is hard to think of anything concrete that would offer something dramatically new to be + introduced into the situation. But the problem is that there is nowhere + near the public understanding of the Middle East problem which exists on + Vietnam. The Administration could make a pretty good public case on what + it has done to try to restore a cease-fire, what it has done to try to + begin negotiations, what it has done to assure Israel’s security, and + what it has done to try to achieve arms limitation. It might put the + Administration in a stronger position if the President were to make a + full TV speech explaining the elements of the problem.

+

Mr. Packard proposed that one + thing the President could do in this context would be to declare a + moratorium on decisions on new arms agreements to continue while the + U.S. made a dramatic new effort to achieve a peace settlement. [His + paper called for the U.S. virtually to undertake a unilateral mediation + effort.]

+

Mr. Sisco said he felt that a + unilateral self-denying decision is not a good idea. Following the + French jet deal with LibyaSee footnote 5, Document 86. and + following the President’s offer of three reasonable political options to + KosyginSee Document 88. + with no Russian response, the U.S. would appear to have given in to + unreasonable pressures if it then announced that it was not going to + make a positive decision.

+

Mr. Richardson felt that there + are two distinguishable elements in his proposal: First, there would be + a Presidential statement on the components of the problem. Second would + be the question of how to handle Israel’s requests. On the second, he + was inclined to be against a moratorium, but it would be possible to say + that a decision was being postponed for the moment and a definitive + response would depend on the response of others.

+

General Unger noted that such an approach would be compatible with the + President’s statement at his January 30 press conference when he said + that we would analyze the situation and make our decision in the light + of it.See footnote + 2, Document 92. Any Presidential statement now + could report the conclusions of such analysis, stating that Israel is in + no immediate danger.

+

Dr. Kissinger said that, as a + realistic matter, he doubted that the President could do that. He could + imagine the President slipping the 30 day deadline but he found it + difficult to visualize the President making a decision to do nothing + now.

+

Dr. Kissinger noted that + Congressman Celler had been in to + see the President a few days previously.Nixon met with + Congressman Emanuel Celler + (D–NY) on February 19 from 10:51 to 11:21 a.m. (National Archives, + Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Central Files, President’s + Daily Diary) If he had walked out thinking that the President would do something for + Israel, “he would not be lying.” In Dr. Kissinger’s view, the President has to do something for + Israel.

+

Dr. Kissinger felt that the + options have probably been narrowed by this discussion to “the two + Richardson packages” [the + one described above and a contract to replace Israeli aircraft losses up + to specified numbers, 1969–71—Option 4–1 on page 9 of the Sisco memorandum] plus one package a + little bit larger than either of those. In addition, the President would + have the choice of accepting the suggestion Secretary Rogers had made of a major + presentation to the American people.

+

Dr. Kissinger noted that one + reason the Administration had not put across its Mid-East policy is that + it does not have internally as clear a conception of its objectives as + it has evolved on Vietnam. A Presidential speech might be a good device + to focus on in this regard.

+

Mr. Sisco said that the next + paperThe paper is attached as Tab A to + the memorandum from Kissinger to Nixon, Document 95. + should include attachments on precisely what we tell Israel and what we + say publicly. Two courses could be presented: First, there is an + argument for a big Presidential announcement. Second, there is an + argument for the lowest key handling possible.

+

Mr. Helms noted that one of the + most difficult aspects of the problem is that the American public just + does not realize how much Israel has and how much Israel is already + getting. There is no understanding of the degree of Israeli wealth and + military superiority. Mr. Helms + read from a recent Agency memo on the new Israeli budgetThe intelligence memorandum, “Israel: Development + of Military Industries,” February 1970, is in the National Archives, + Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC + Files, NSC Institutional Files + (H-Files), Box H–043, Senior Review Group Meetings, Review Group + Israel 2/25/70. [included in Dr. Kissinger’s briefing book under the Tab “Israeli + Budget”] to note how well Israel is doing and how much it is doing with + still apparently a substantial economic cushion. Mr. Sisco noted that Israel was + undoubtedly stockpiling in all categories of equipment.

+

Dr. Kissinger, picking up this + discussion of Israeli economic performance, said that one of the most + interesting questions raised in his mind as he had read through the + material for the meeting was the Agency analysis of Israel’s ability to + develop its own independent arms industry. Dr. Kissinger asked why it is not in the + U.S. interest to help Israel develop such an industry.

+

Mr. Sisco noted that Israel is + well on its way. He said he felt it is in the U.S. interest since it is + the U.S. interest to help Israel preserve its security. Mr. Sisco said that he would encourage + Israeli development of this capacity.

+ +

Mr. Packard said that he would not + disagree if there were no other solution. But he would hate to see + Israel exporting arms. He would also hate to see Israel devoting so much + of its resources to this purpose.

+

Mr. Sisco said he worried about + that problem less in this case because the Israelis are relatively + sensible in sorting out their own economic priorities. This is not the + case of an underdeveloped country without much thought about its + rational economic planning.

+

Dr. Kissinger noted that Israel + might have just as much need for an armaments industry if it made peace + as it would if the war continued. If there were peace, Israel would + still have to be an armed camp. Israel would be no more secure than, + say, France was after the Franco-German peace treaty of 1871.

+

General Unger felt that the U.S. could give Israel licensing privileges + for the J–79 engine and that this would be better than giving them + completed planes.

+

Mr. Helms returned to the theme + that the public just does not understand how advanced Israel is in all + of these respects. Therefore, the pressure on the Administration to + provide arms is perhaps greater than it would be if the Administration + could openly make the case that Israel is in no danger.

+

Dr. Kissinger asked the tactical + question whether there was anything the Administration could do to get + through this election year.

+

Mr. Sisco said that an + announcement could be made along the following lines:

+

1. We have analyzed the situation carefully. In the foreseeable future, + we judge that Israel has enough to protect itself.

+

2. We have assured Israel that, if there is any development between now + and the end of the year which alters that assessment, we are prepared to + provide the necessary equipment.

+

3. We have decided to postpone any decision for additional aircraft on + the understanding that if there is any attrition replacements will be + provided.

+

4. For the foreseeable future, we will redouble our efforts in restoring + a cease-fire, pressing for a political settlement and attempting to + achieve arms limitation.

+

5. We will go ahead with the predominant elements in the economic + package.

+

Mr. Sisco summarized by saying + that this would tell the American people that Israel has what it needs + now. It would assure the American people and the Israelis that we will + not stand by and see the situation turn against Israel. It would be a + sign to the Soviets that we intend to act with restraint. It would, + however, leave the situation open for later U.S. decision if the + situation required.

+ +

Mr. Helms suggested that if we + were to go this route, we should “nail the Soviets to the wall” by + saying that our position would have to be reviewed if the Soviets sent + “one new weapon” to the UAR.

+

Dr. Kissinger said that we have + to move quickly now to a point where the President can look at his + choices. He felt that these consisted of the following:

+

1. A low option such as that described by Mr. Sisco. In connection with this we + could, of course, say privately that the pipeline of basic supply items + would continue to flow and that would amount to a lot of equipment.

+

2. The Richardson proposal for + having ready on a stand-by basis the aircraft Israel might need in an + emergency. Perhaps at this level the variant of signing a contract to + replace Israel’s losses could be considered.

+

3. A minimum package of aircraft now large enough to consider trying to + extract concessions.

+

One way of putting this decision into the larger context would be to try + now to look five years down the road to see what situations we would + like to avoid, to state a U.S. policy for this area.

+

Dr. Kissinger assumed that this + decision would have to go to the NSC.

+

Mr. Richardson suggested that the + analysis could distinguish among the following elements:

+

1. The various packages that might be possible.

+

2. What conditions or Israeli actions might be attached. These would + increase in ratio to the size of the package.

+

3. The possible contexts in which the President would make this decision + known, ranging from a quiet communication to the Israelis up to a + fifteen minute address to the nation on TV.

+

Mr. Richardson expressed his + preference for a minimum package with no conditions and a major + statement on policy.

+

Mr. Packard acknowledged that + whatever we do would provide the occasion at least for informal + discussions with the Israelis. Mr. Sisco said that it was not clear to him what concessions + Mr. Packard had in mind. Mr. + Packard cited the ending of + raids in the Nile Valley, signing the NPT, a more flexible position on + peace terms, ending oil drilling in the Gulf of Suez.

+

Mr. Sisco questioned how far we + could go in taxing the Israelis for continuing their raids. They have + already agreed to abide by a mutual cease-fire.

+

Mr. Richardson reflected that the + U.S. position in the Arab countries has deteriorated because the U.S. + has not wanted to exert pressure on Israel to do things it does not think Israel will do. From that + viewpoint, the conditions suggested would not be worth much to the Arabs + because they would not address the issues which the Arabs are most + concerned about. This is the route, Mr. Richardson said, by which he comes out to a minimal + package. He said he was not even sure he would lean on Israel to end the + deep penetration raids.

+

Dr. Kissinger said that it would + be necessary to have a paper quickly. The ingredients are now available. + He did not feel that it would be good procedure to try to define a + minimum package to which we could attach conditions. He was inclined to + feel that conditions would simply infuriate both sides.

+

Mr. Packard suggested that perhaps + the possible conditions could be delineated separately.

+

Dr. Kissinger said he could see + Mr. Richardson’s point on the + Israeli raids. At some point, it will become apparent that time is not + working for the Soviets. If they cannot get Arab territory back, the + Arabs may well come to us. That would be the time to lean on Israel. + However, we probably cannot calibrate that sequence of events + finely.

+

Mr. Sisco noted that it would be + important, whatever decision we make, for the President to get across + his assurance to Israel that we would not allow the balance to shift + against Israel. He felt it is also important that we not put ourselves + in a position where the Soviets can claim credit for having forced the + U.S. to back down.

+

Mr. Richardson suggested that if + the President made a statement, he would have to say that if the Soviets + escalate, all bets are off.

+

Mr. Sisco said he could have a + paper ready for a Tuesday (March 3) meeting.This meeting did not take place. The paper, + attached as Tab A to Document 95, is not printed.

+

Dr. Kissinger asked Mr. Saunders to collaborate on this + paper.

+

Dr. Kissinger asked what views + are on the economic issues. Mr. Sisco said that he had taken for granted the $30 million + in military credit already granted, the $119 million in additional + military credit which Israel had asked for, something like $40 million + in P.L. 480 sales, continuation of the pipeline of basic military + supplies and consultation with Israel on its projected economic + problems.

+

Dr. Kissinger said he was + inclined to see the merits of some sort of Presidential statement on TV + as the only way to pre-empt the inevitable domestic outburst on almost + any decision.

+

Mr. Richardson agreed that the + President has to pre-empt the domestic reaction.

+ +

Mr. Helms said that he had one + intelligence note which he would like to bring to the Group’s attention + before adjournment. He had a report to the effect that an Iraqi contact + had been told by an official of the Arab Socialist Union in Egypt that + the Soviet desk officer on Israeli affairs in the Communist Party of the + Soviet Union in Moscow had said that the Soviet Union judges that Israel + has five atomic bombs.

+

Dr. Kissinger said this was just + another indication that the Soviets are trying to keep the Arabs + edgy.

+ + + Harold H. Saunders + Saunders initialed “H.H.S.” above his typed + signature. + + +
+ +
+ 95. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security + Affairs (Kissinger) to President + NixonSource: National Archives, Nixon + Presidential Materials, NSC Files, + Box 606, Country Files, Middle East, Israel, Vol. IV. Top Secret; + Nodis. Sent for action. A handwritten comment in the upper + right-hand corner of the page reads: “Probably handed to the + President on Mar 6, 1970 at K.B. [Key Biscayne].” Tabs A and B, both + dated March 5, are attached but not printed. + Washington, undated. + + SUBJECT + Economic and Military Assistance to Israel + +

—At Tab A is a statement announcing your decision on the Israeli arms + request which has been worked up by a member of my staff with Joe Sisco.

+

—At Tab B is a game plan prepared by the Department of State for carrying + out your wish to postpone providing additional aircraft for Israel.

+

This will have profound consequences domestically and abroad. The + domestic implications are apparent. Abroad, the appearance of bowing to + Soviet pressure cannot be disposed of by simple denial. I have these + suggestions:

+

First, the announcement should be made by the + State Department, not the White House.Nixon wrote “OK” next + to this paragraph in the left-hand margin.

+ +

Second, it might be possible to make a minimal + response to Israel that would provoke a somewhat less sharp Israeli + reaction by some combination of the following:

+

1. The past Skyhawk and Phantom contracts could be amended without + fanfare to include U.S. agreement to replace actual Israeli aircraft + losses 1969–1971 up to a specific number. This number, based on the + actual rate of attrition in 1969, would be up to 8 Phantoms and 18–20 + Skyhawks (with Skyhawks replacing Mirages). This would essentially be a + U.S. commitment to maintain the level of Israeli superiority which would + exist at the end of present Phantom and Skyhawk shipments later this + year. But it would not be a decision to increase Israel’s aircraft + inventory.Nixon wrote “OK” next to this paragraph in the + left-hand margin.

+

2. As a variant of the above, without amending contracts, arrangements + could be made by Defense to have manufactured to Israel’s specifications + and earmarked a number of aircraft—for instance, 16 Phantoms and 24 + Skyhawks—for delivery on short notice should the situation require. + Israel could be told of this arrangement.Nixon wrote “no” next + to this paragraph in the left-hand margin.

+

3. A combination of these approaches would be possible—providing + replacements and at the same time creating a small additional reserve to + fall back on should the need arise.

+

4. Israel could be told that the normal pipeline of support equipment + will continue to flow and P.L. 480 sales (about $40 million) and + additional military sales credit ($119 million applied to the 1968 + Phantom contract) will be negotiated. Together with $30 million in + military credit committed under the 1968 Phantom contract, this would + make an economic package of $189 million, almost the complete $200 + million annual rate Israel has projected from U.S. aid.Nixon wrote + “OK” next to this paragraph in the left-hand margin.

+

Assistant Secretary Sisco agrees + privately that some combination of these steps should be taken.

+

I will be writing you a separate memo on our strategy in the Middle + EastSonnenfeldt prepared a memorandum for Kissinger to send to the President + on “Our Middle East Policy.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential + Materials, NSC Files, Box 652, + Country Files, Middle East, Middle East, Vol. I) which as you + know has been a matter of great concern to me.

+

If you approve going ahead with announcement of a program with some + combination of the above, the game plan recommended by Secretary + Rogers would include the + following steps:

+ +

1. Prior to the announcement:

+

—Brief Congressional leadership. (One possibility is a breakfast + meeting.)

+

—Brief Jewish leaders (via Leonard + Garment, Max Fisher).

+

—Instruct Ambassador Barbour to + inform Mrs. Meir. Follow up with + Ambassador Rabin here.

+

—Inform British and French just before announcement.

+

2. After the announcement:Nixon highlighted both points 1 + and 2 and wrote “OK” next to them.

+

—Call in Ambassador Dobrynin to + emphasize the need for a constructive Soviet response.

+

—Instruct our ambassadors in Arab capitals to seize the opportunity to + move toward a peace settlement.

+

RECOMMENDATIONS:Nixon did not initial + any of the recommendations.

+

With respect to the statement at Tab A:

+

Approve _____

+

Disapprove _____

+

With respect to aircraft deliveries for the Israelis:

+

Variant (1) would replace losses. (Up to 8 Phantoms and 18–20 + Skyhawks)

+

Variant (2) would earmark a certain number of aircraft for emergency + requirements. (16 Phantoms and 24 Skyhawks)

+

Variant (3) would be the combination of both (1) and (2).

+

I want:

+

(1) _____

+

(2) _____

+

(3) _____

+

With respect to economic aid package:

+

Approve _____

+

Disapprove _____

+ +

With respect to game plan (Tab B):

+

Approve _____

+

Disapprove _____

+
+ +
+ 96. Transcript of a Telephone Conversation Between President Nixon and the President’s Assistant + for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, Henry Kissinger Telephone + Conversation Transcripts, Box 4, Chronological File. No + classification marking. All brackets are in the original except + those indicating text omitted in the original and “[sic]”, added for clarity. + Washington, March 10, 1970, 10:40 + a.m. +

P: I can’t get into this Israeli thing. I have a (education) group + meeting coming up. I don’t quite understand State’s position and what we + favor here. I want economic assistance and taking care of their losses + and then the game plan—with increased Soviet movement we will move in + amount (dictated). What basically is different?

+

K: State sent over a transigient [sic] + statement.Likely a reference to the + Department’s plan, attached as Tab B to Kissinger’s memorandum to Nixon, Document + 95. Bill will agree after I work it over.

+

P: So the statement is put on guidance. We will provide economic + assistance up to 7 million dollars; and provide for lossesOf Phantom jet aircraft. but we’re not going + beyond that point.

+

K: There seems to be some discussion over who will make the announcement. + State thinks it’s going to be made over here.

+

P: They will make the announcement. That’s an order.

+

K: My concern is Jewish control of the press and Rabin’s request to see me with a + message from Meir. I should tell + Rabin that we will replace + their losses and let the good news come out of here and the bad news + from State.Kissinger met with Rabin on March 12. See Document + 99.

+ +

P: Call Rabin in Thursday and + tell him the good news—economic up to whatever it is.

+

K: Close to 8 mill. dollars.

+

P: Replace losses and Third, we will re-evaluate if there is a + change.

+

K: Sisco recommends that they + keep production at such a level we can get planes to them.

+

P: I recommended no on the memoSee footnote 4, Document 95. because I + didn’t want anything announced. I don’t want it to seem we are giving + the Israelis everything they want.

+

K: We have to get across to the Israelis that this is a tactical + move.

+

P: Tell Rogers that this is a + diplomatic move and I want them to use it as a move with the Soviets on + this.

+

K: If the Soviets stop moving arms, then we move right on this. We will + change if the Soviets keep sending arms.

+

P: This is not the time to do it. We have problems in this country, even + from those they think they have support from.

+

K: [omission in the original] Media will go for this even more. That’s my + concern.

+

P: Rabin couldn’t control them + against PompidouRoughly 10,000 demonstrators led by American Jewish + organizations jeered French President Georges Pompidou as he and his wife arrived in + Chicago for a dinner sponsored by the Chicago Council on Foreign + Relations. The demonstrators were protesting France’s decision not + to sell arms to Israel. (New York Times, + March 1, 1970, p. 9) Haldeman recorded in his diary on March 1 that + Nixon received news of + the protests from Protocol Chief Emil Mosbacher. “P[resident] + furious. Will announce cancellation of Israel arms tomorrow, wants + legislation to provide protection for foreign visitors, and he will + go to New York dinner tomorrow night to add an extra touch. Really + disturbed because Mrs. Pompidou has decided to go home tonight, wants to + try and stop her. So we swing into immediate action this afternoon + and have all the wheels grinding. Fun to have a crisis, if only a + little one.” (Haldeman Diaries: Multimedia Edition, + March, 1, 1970) and I’m not sure he can control the + intellectuals. Rabin should + know this is policy.

+

K: The danger is that if we kick them in the teeth they might start a + war.

+

P: We aren’t. We field the losses—put this in a peaceful context. We will + be of assistance there then put it to the Soviets. We are not going + along on a massive Israeli request. It would force the Soviets into a + massive reaction including men into the UAR.

+

K: They have held back and now we must see what they are doing.

+

P: You decide whether you want to tell Dobrynin.

+ +

K: I’m seeing him today on SALT.For the + memorandum of conversation of Kissinger’s March 10 meeting with Dobrynin, see Foreign + Relations, 1969–1976, volume XII, Soviet Union, January + 1969–October 1970, Document 140.

+

P: But I don’t think this soon. Let Rogers tell him. And State is to make the + announcement.

+

K: I will get that set this afternoon and they will make the announcement + Friday.

+

P: You prepare the papers. I will be tied up until [omission in the + original].

+

K: There’s another issue—My Lai. That general is going to find + disciplinary problems and I think you should stay out of that.Reference is to the U.S. attack on unarmed + Vietnamese civilians in the village of My Lai on March 16, 1968. + Following public disclosure of the killings by investigative + journalist Seymour M. Hersh in November 1969, Secretary of the Army + Stanley R. Resor and Army Chief of Staff General William C. + Westmoreland appointed Lieutenant General William R. Peers to + conduct a thorough review of the events. Peers concluded in a March + 17, 1970, report that a “tragedy of major proportions” occurred at + My Lai, which prompted action against 14 officers, including the + commanding officer of the American Division, Major General Samuel W. + Koster, by then Superintendent of West Point. The officers were + accused of dereliction of duty and supression of evidence. Platoon + commander Lt. William L. Calley was found guilty of murder but was + freed in 1974 after three years confinement at Fort Benning, + Georgia. The others were acquitted or never tried. (New York Times, April 9, 1984)

+

P: That should be done at the Laird level.

+
+ +
+ 97. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rogers to President NixonSource: + National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 652, Country Files, + Middle East, Middle East, Vol. I. Secret; Nodis. A copy was sent to + Haig. + Washington, March + 12, 1970. + + SUBJECT + Ambassador Dobrynin’s Call + on the Middle East + +

Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin called + on me yesterdayTelegram 36337 to Moscow, + March 12, reported their discussion. See Foreign + Relations, 1969–1976, volume XII, Soviet Union, January + 1969–October 1970, Document 141. at his request to + discuss the Middle East. He proposed a resumption of bilateral talksIn a March 10 meeting with Kissinger, Dobrynin told him “in confidence + that he had been instructed to call on Secretary Rogers” to offer the continuation + of bilateral discussions; see ibid., Document 140. Kissinger’s analysis of the Soviet + offer, sent to Nixon in a + memorandum of March 13, is ibid., Document 143. and indicated Soviet willingness to + consider a more precise formulation on peace provided that we would + indicate a willingness to consider their position that Sharm al-Shaikh + would return to UAR sovereignty, that + an irrevocable UN presence would be + stationed there to assure freedom of passage through the Gulf of Aqaba, + and that we would be willing to extend our proposal for withdrawal of + Israeli forces to include Gaza.

+

I responded that we would study both the suggestion to resume bilateral + discussions and the substantive Soviet proposals. I made it clear, + however, that if we should agree to resume bilateral talksBilateral talks resumed on March 25; see footnote 5, Document 105. there + would have to be an understanding of what the resumption of those talks + signifies. Our willingness to resume talks could not be interpreted to + mean an acceptance of the Soviet proposals or that we were willing to + make concessions going beyond our present position as reflected in the + October 28th and December 18th documents.Documents 58 and 78.

+

For the time being at least, we are limiting press comment merely to + confirming, in response to any inquiries, that Dobrynin called on me and that the + subject discussed was the Middle East.

+ + + William P. Rogers + Rogers initialed “WPR” above his typed + signature. + + +
+ +
+ + 98. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in + LebanonSource: National + Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 614, Country Files, Middle East, Jordan, + Vol. III. Secret; Exdis. Drafted + by Bryan H. Baas (NEA/ARN) and Seelye; cleared in NEA, NEA/RA, and PM/MAS; and + approved by Sisco. Repeated + to Amman, Jidda, London, Paris, Tel Aviv, and USUN. + Washington, March 12, 1970, 0149Z. +

36213. Subject: USG Assistance to + Lebanon. Ref: Beirut 1809.In telegram 1809 + from Beirut, March 6, Porter reported on his March 5 meeting with + Helou, which dealt + chiefly with the issue of fedayeen attacks and Israeli reprisals + across the Lebanese-Israeli border. (Ibid., RG 59, Central Files + 1970–73, POL 23–8 LEB)

+

1. We have read with interest report of Ambassador’s March 5 meeting with + President Helou (reftel). + Ambassador may assure Helou that + there is clear understanding in USG of + his dilemma regarding fedayeen. We fully appreciate constraints under + which Helou operates in dealing + with fedayeen and that GOL in no + position use large-scale force against fedayeen. We have said as much to + Israelis and have urged them to raise their level of tolerance. We will + indeed continue to Quote exercise our influence to be sure it (Israeli + attack) doesn’t start Unquote (last para reftel), but our ability to + restrain Israelis in face repeated fedayeen attacks is limited. We trust + that Lebanese army will continue do its best to prevent and, at minimum, + limit such attacks.

+

2. President’s comment (para six reftel) to effect USG Quote seemed reluctant Unquote to + provide Lebanon with arms suggests he may have overlooked our past + offers in this regard. While it is true that we have been unable provide + GOL with grant aid, we have + attempted be responsive as possible to GOL’s arms request. Might be useful to recapitulate what we + have undertaken to do on Lebanon’s behalf over past few years in + addition to routine sales: (A) In 1967 we offered sell Lebanon arms + package including 20 M–41 tanks. Sale was never concluded. (B) In + January 1969 we offered special airlift of military equipment which we + understood Lebanese needed urgently (State 7234). GOL unable accept offer. (C) In August + 1969 40 quarter ton trucks were expeditiously made available for sale to + army. (D) In November 1969 we authorized sale of 5,000 M–14 rifles to + GOL. This authorization required + highest level USG approval. GOL, however, decided against purchase + these weapons. (E) In December 1969 we provided price and availability + data on number items equipment including CH46F and CH47C helicopters, + 106mm recoilless rifles mounted on jeeps, 66mm rockets, M–14 and M–16 + rifles, M–55 quad 50AA, M42A1 40mm AA and spare parts for M–41 tanks. + (F) Pursuant to General Nujaim’s request, we are looking into availability M–41 tanks + and are preparing price and availability data on other items mentioned + Beirut 1372.

+

3. Foregoing not exhaustive list of offers USG has made but it could be cited as reminder to GOL that we have stood ready to meet + legitimate Lebanese military equipment requirements.

+

4. We hope also that President Helou is aware of special effort expended in arranging + our current P.L.–480 undertaking to Lebanon. We have succeeded in + initiating this program for Lebanon in view of over-riding political + considerations which Helou has + touched on in reftel.

+

5. We have noted Helou’s + suggestion (para 7 reftel) that the USG + make public statement designed to demonstrate support for GOL. We are sympathetic to this proposal, + but in view distortion by radical press of Sisco statement last October,Sisco’s statement that + the United States would view a threat to Lebanon’s integrity with + “greatest concern” was distributed on October 14, 1969, by USIA to + Lebanese newspapers. (New York Times, October + 15, 1969, p. 5) In telegram 180293 to Beirut, October 24, 1969, the + Department reported a conversation between Sisco and British Ambassador John + Freeman during which the Assistant Secretary said: “US official + statements have been grossly distorted in emotional atmosphere of + Middle East. He specifically noted how President’s use of word + ‘substantial’ in address to UNGA + had been twisted. Sisco’s + statement of our support for Lebanese independence and integrity + also being misinterpreted in some quarters. In this connection, + Sisco informed Freeman + our statement made at Helou’s + behest.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1239, Saunders Files, + Lebanon 1/20/69–10/27/69) In his address to the UN General Assembly on September 18, + 1969, Nixon declared: “We + seek a settlement [in the Middle East] based on respect for the + sovereign right of each nation in the area to exist within secure + and recognized boundries. We are convinced that peace cannot be + achieved on the basis of substantial alterations in the map of the + Middle East. And we are equally convinced that peace cannot be + achieved on the basis of anything less than a binding, irrevocable + commitment by the parties to live together in peace.” For the text + of his address, see Public Papers: Nixon, 1969, pp. + 724–731. we concerned that public statement at time of fast + breaking developments might again be counter productive. We therefore + concur with your judgment that we do nothing at moment (Beirut + 1876).In telegram 1876 from Beirut, + March 10, the Embassy reported how the Lebanese press covered + Porter’s meeting with Helou, + including a misleading story that the Ambassador “gave assurances + that Israel would not attack Lebanon.” (National Archives, RG 59, + Central Files 1970–73, POL LEB–US)

+ + + Rogers + + +
+ +
+ + 99. Memorandum of ConversationSource: National Archives, Nixon Presidential + Materials, NSC Files, Box 612, + Country Files, Middle East, Israeli Aid. Top Secret; Nodis. The + conversation was held in the East Wing of the White House in the + Military Aide’s office. Tabs A–D are attached but not + printed. + Washington, March 12, 1970, 11:15 + a.m. + + PARTICIPANTS + Dr. Henry Kissinger + Ambassador Yitzhak Rabin, + of Israel + Brig. General A.M. Haig, + Military Assistant to Dr. Kissinger + +

Dr. Kissinger opened the + discussion by referring to the exchange of notes between Soviet Premier + Kosygin and President + Nixon during the first week + of February.See Document + 88. He recalled the report he received several days + after the exchange of letters to the effect that the Soviets were + concerned that President Nixon + did not appreciate the seriousness of Premier Kosygin’s letter and that they were + contemplating the introduction of Soviet military personnel into the + UAR.See Foreign + Relations, 1969–1976, volume XII, Soviet Union, January + 1969–October 1970, Document 132. Dr. Kissinger stated that we had received + this report both through intelligence channels and as a result of + statements by junior Soviet Embassy personnel to a member of the U.S. + press corps. Dr. Kissinger + stated that as a result of these reports he called in Soviet Ambassador + Dobrynin and confronted him + with these reports, discounted the methods which the Soviets had + employed to circulate them, and strongly warned Ambassador Dobrynin that the United States would + view with the greatest concern the introduction of Soviet combat + personnel into the Middle East.For the + memorandum of conversation of Kissinger’s February 10 meeting with Dobrynin, see ibid., Document 131. The + U.S., he said, was choosing this method of communication with the + Soviets rather than making a formal declaration. At the same time we + want to make sure that the Soviet leaders would be under no illusion + about the possibility of grave consequences. (Dr. Kissinger showed Ambassador Rabin the summary sheet (Tab A) which + included the specific points he covered with Dobrynin.)

+

Dr. Kissinger continued that he + saw Ambassador Dobrynin again + this week on a routine matter involving the Strategic Arms Limitation + Talks, but that it was obvious that Dobrynin was primarily interested in discussing the + Middle East. During the meeting Ambassador Dobrynin read a prepared written reply to some points + that Dr. Kissinger had raised at their earlier + meeting. The statement in effect proposed a de facto cease-fire between + Israel and the UAR.For the memorandum of + conversation of Kissinger’s + March 10 meeting with Dobrynin, see ibid., Document 140. Dr. + Kissinger allowed Ambassador + Rabin to read the text of a + portion of the message read by Ambassador Dobrynin at this meeting, attached (Tab B).

+

Dr. Kissinger stated that the + White House shares the Israeli analysis of recent events in the Middle + East, but emphasized that these events confirm that some movement can + occur. Dr. Kissinger said it is + our judgment that the USSR made a + commitment to Nasser in January, + during his visit to Moscow,In a memorandum + to Nixon on February 1, + Kissinger wrote: “There + is a strong likelihood that Nasser made a secret visit to Moscow January 22–27.” + (Ibid., Document 123) Hyland + informed Kissinger on June + 8: “We have the hardest possible intelligence that the decisions + leading to the present situation were approved by Brezhnev on January 28–29, in the + wake of Nasser’s secret + visit to Moscow. The Soviets had no choice but to support Nasser, and strong moves were + obviously called for.” (Ibid., Document 163) and that during the next few months + this will be manifested by additional Soviet arms shipments to the UAR. + Dr. Kissinger added that it was + President Nixon’s view that a + U.S. decision to provide arms to Israel should be accomplished on the + basis of a response to stepped-up Soviet shipments and that while this + was the President’s view it was not necessarily shared by others in the + U.S. bureaucracy. He pointed out that with respect to assistance to + Israel the President hoped to break out immediate action from the longer + term action. In other words, to treat both separately.

+

Dr. Kissinger stated that he + could forsee no problems with respect to economic assistance to Israel + and showed Ambassador Rabin the + summary of proposed economic assistance (Tab C).

+

Concerning military hardware, Dr. Kissinger statedthat with respect to immediate action + the U.S. government would replace actual Israeli aircraft losses during + the period 1969–71, up to 8 Phantoms and 20 Sky Hawks. On the longer + term, the U.S. would supply the major part of the Israeli hardware + request if more significant USSR arms + shipments into the UAR take place. Dr. + Kissinger then handed + Ambassador Rabin a draft + Aide-Mémoire which affirmed this commitment (Tab D). Dr. Kissinger emphasized that we + considered that the phraseology of the Aide-Mémoire which reads “the + significant introduction of Soviet arms into the UAR as endangering the military balance” + to be negotiable language. It would be extended to include arms + shipments to other countries and from other sources. He then added that + the President recognizes his commitment to Prime Minister Meir and emphasized again that + President Nixon prefers to + furnish assistance to Israel in response to Soviet arms shipments to the + UAR, and confirmed the U.S. intention of amending the contract on the + Phantoms and providing for some + standby production capability if this can be done secretly. He + emphasized that the Aide-Mémoire was not written in diplomatic language + because it was prepared unilaterally in the White House and was not + being presented on a take-it-or-leave-it basis. Referring to the final + portions of the Aide-Mémoire, Dr. Kissinger stated that President Nixon is requesting also that the + Israeli government stop bombing the UAR, providing the UAR in turn ceases its military action + against Israel. He pointed out that the Aide-Mémoire restated President + Nixon’s commitment but added + the request for a de facto cease-fire. The Aide-Mémoire, Mr. Kissinger stated, would be signed by + President Nixon if it were + satisfactory to the Israeli Government.

+

Dr. Kissinger then turned to a + proposed U.S. public announcement concerning military assistance to + Israel. He stated that the language of this announcement went far beyond + the consensus of the U.S. bureaucracy on this issue. It will be made by + the Department of State sometime next weekThe announcement was made by Secretary Rogers on March 23. The text of the announcement and + the transcript of the news conference that followed are printed in + the Department of State Bulletin, April 13, + 1970, pp. 477–484. Nixon + discussed Rogers’s upcoming + statement in his press conference on March 21. See Public Papers: Nixon, + 1970, pp. 288–298. after it has been shown to + Ambassador Rabin by the + Secretary of State. It was our hope that the Israelis would agree to an + Aide-Mémoire along the lines of that being given to Ambassador Rabin prior to the public + announcement. Dr. Kissinger + again emphasized that the President hoped to be in a posture which would + enable him to respond tp the Israeli arms request as a result of + additional Soviet shipments and that this would facilitate his handling + of the issue both domestically and bureaucratically.

+

Ambassador Rabin expressed his + concern that the U.S. and the Israelis would share different opinions as + to whether or not the Soviets had in fact introduced a significant + amount of Soviet arms. He stated that the U.S. Government would + continually delay in accepting the justification for a decision to + proceed with shipments to Israel under the conditions proposed in the + Aide-Mémoire. He recounted his experience in recent months and the + difficulty he had with the U.S. intelligence community in arriving at an + agreed assessment on the level of Soviet arms supplies to Egypt. He + pointed out that, for example, since July 1969 Israeli intelligence + concluded that Egypt had received 130 planes and that the Arabs as a + whole had received 254 planes. The U.S. intelligence community did not + agree with this figure.

+

Dr. Kissinger stated that we + would check these figures and added that perhaps the Israelis would + prefer to establish a combined U.S.-Israeli framework for making these + assessments. Rabin replied that + no matter what is concluded the + Soviets will deny that they made such shipments.

+

Mr. Kissinger stated that recent + events had had a serious impact on the U.S. attitude on the subject and + that the Israelis’ friends here had done great damage to their + interests. Dr. Kissinger + recommended that the Israelis make some proposal on how we could arrive + at an agreed position on facts from which a decision could be made. He + asked that Ambassador Rabin + advise him before Tuesday (March 17) and expressed sympathy for the + Ambassador’s concerns.

+

Ambassador Rabin stated that + this morning Israel penetrated 60 miles west of the Canal and struck + some bunkers that appear to have been configured for SAM III weapons. They observed no missiles + but the bunkers which have been constructed by over 100 workers on an + urgent basis were definitely of a distinctive type. Dr. Kissinger noted that the Israelis had + hit a facility in the UAR containing + Soviet personnel and asked if this had been a deliberate strike. + Rabin replied that they + were aware that this was a main training center but inferred that the + strike was not specifically targeted against the Soviets although they + knew that many Soviet personnel had been killed and wounded. Rabin then stated that he believed + the Russian threat to introduce their armed forces into the UAR was a trick.

+

Referring to the Aide-Mémoire, Ambassador Rabin stated that he is convinced that President + Nixon is sincere but that he + felt the importance of this matter required that he speak to his Prime + Minister. It was agreed that Ambassador Rabin would fly to Israel tonight and return sometime + Sunday after consultations with Prime Minister Golda Meir.In his memoirs, Rabin + recalled that “the reaction in Jerusalem was indignant, and I + relayed that response to Kissinger upon my return.” (The + Rabin Memoirs, + p. 170) Then Dr. Kissinger and Ambassador Rabin would meet sometime Tuesday.March 17. See Document + 103. Dr. Kissinger asked Ambassador Rabin to inform Assistant Secretary Sisco this afternoon that he had been + called home. Rabin replied that + this would make some sense since speculation to this effect had already + been rampant in the Israeli press. Dr. Kissinger cautioned him that nothing of their + conversation should appear in the Israeli press as a result of his + visit, emphasizing that Ambassador Rabin had more information than anyone in the U.S. + Government with the exception of the President, himself, and General + Haig.

+

Dr. Kissinger emphasized that the + U.S. Aide-Mémoire was a unilateral document but that he believed the + following portions of it were negotiable:

+

1. The Israelis might elaborate on the conditions for determining a + disruption in the arms balance in the Middle East.

+ +

2. Some flexibility for the period of the undeclared cease-fire appears + possible.

+

Rabin replied that the main + problem with this sequence of events would be the reaction of the + Israeli Cabinet to the U.S. public announcement. Pressure would + immediately develop to incease military activity, not to stop it. Dr. + Kissinger cautioned that the + Israelis must have discipline on this issue and Rabin countered that this is a + problem of emotion, not logic. The U.S. public announcement will + encourage the Arabs. Experience has shown that the only way to cool them + down was the kind of military action which has been employed by Israel + recently. Dr. Kissinger stated + that from the viewpoint of Israeli security, if they can obtain a de + facto cease-fire which the other side breaks, no one here in the United + States would object to strong counter-action. Ambassador Rabin did not contest this logic and + added that if the Prime Minister could announce such a decision at the + Israeli Cabinet meeting on Sunday and if we held up briefly on our + public announcement this sequence might suceed. He pointed out that if + the Israeli Cabinet accepts the decision it would of course not be + announced publicly but merely implemented. Dr. Kissinger added that the Israelis + should inform us however. Ambassador Rabin then questioned whether or not the Soviets were + talking about deep penetration raids or all kinds of air raids against + the UAR. Dr. Kissinger stated + that he had asked Dobrynin the + same question and did not really get a reply. Rabin stated that they really worry + about the deep raids. Dr. Kissinger asked what the purpose of the shallow raids + was and Rabin replied that they + are designed to prevent any SAMs from being installed. He added that + since the Israelis have received the Phantom fighters they are able to + stand-off above the more dangerous ack-ack which is effective at lower + altitudes and deliver ordnance in relative safety. Dr. Kissinger asked Ambassador Rabin if the story about the two + Egyptian pilots who bailed out after one of their planes was hit by + their own SAM was correct. Ambassador + Rabin confirmed that this + was so and that it had occurred about six months ago, adding that + unfortunately the Israelis had done the same thing with a Hawk missile + which shot down an Israeli light aircraft. Dr. Kissinger stated that he felt the + President would be very interested in a cessation involving only deep + penetrations for a period of perhaps sixty or 45 days. The U.S. could + then tell the Soviets that Israel has demonstrated restraint and that + they in turn will have to prohibit the UAR from taking advantage of this by building additional + SAM sites. The U.S. would also warn + the Soviets that additional arms shipments to the UAR would trigger a new round in the arms + race. This in effect would tend to put the Soviets on the defensive.

+

Dr. Kissinger asked Ambassador + Rabin to develop the + proposed rules of engagement for a de facto cease-fire and recapped the + discussion with respect to + the coordination of the Aide-Mémoire with Prime Minister Meir. Ambassador Rabin then inquired about the nature + of the U.S. public announcement. Dr. Kissinger showed him a copy of the current version of + the announcement. After reading the announcement several times + Ambassador Rabin stated that it + made him very unhappy. Dr. Kissinger acknowledged that the U.S. recognized this but + that the document was actually far less negative than the versions + originally prepared within the bureaucracy, adding that the Aide-Mémoire + went way beyond anything recommended and that the President had prepared + it strictly on his own initiative. For this reason if it were + compromised the most serious consequences would develop. Ambassador + Rabin asked for a copy of + the proposed press announcement and Dr. Kissinger agreed to have one prepared for him this + afternoon which could be picked up by a messenger.

+

The meeting concluded at 12:25 p.m.

+
+ +
+ 100. Telegram From the Embassy in Lebanon to the Department of + StateSource: National + Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 621, Country Files, Middle East, + Lebanon, Vol. II. Secret; Exdis. + At the top of the page a handwritten notation in an unknown hand + reads: “A strong but valid message. I hope that Al Haig and Hal Saunders see this.” Attached + is a note from Haig to + Kissinger, March 16, + that reads: “Henry, The attached cable dealing with the Lebanese + situation suggests that we may have some problems which are minimal + to remedy.” + Beirut, March 13, 1970, 1410Z. +

1989. Ref: State 35651.In telegram 35651 to + Beirut, March 11, the Department informed the Embassy that it was + “looking into availability of M–41 tanks pursuant to General + Noujaim’s request” but asked that the Embassy “point out to Lebanese + that this tank was phased out of US Army approximately 15 years + ago.” “Thus,” the Department wrote, “all M–41s in US stocks are in + used condition and would need rehabilitation before they could be + sold,” which meant that delivery could take up to 18 months. (Ibid., + RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, DEF 12–5 LEB)

+

1. Last fall during the Lebanese-fedayeen warSee Document 61. this Embassy was + asked to suggest possible measures for assisting Lebanon. Today, almost + five months later, the U.S. has done nothing except to approve in + principle a small P.L.–480 program. The Lebanese request for arms + assistance and the similar recommendations of this Embassy have either + been turned down or are in bureaucratic limbo. Perhaps there are valid legal or practical + reasons for this inactivity, but the result is the same—inactivity.

+

2. There is either a serious misunderstanding between the Dept and myself on the urgency of the + situation in Lebanon or perhaps we have failed to make the point with + enough clarity. May I now state as clearly as I can that I think we are + in for real trouble in Lebanon within the next few months, if not + sooner.

+

I think it is almost inevitable that there will be a serious + confrontation between the Palestinians and the Lebanese. The alternative + will be that the Lebanese will cave in to the fedayeen. Equally + predictable result will then be a severe Israeli response. American + interests will suffer generally and specifically in this process, and we + cannot rule out violent action against our presence here.

+

3. The only instrument which might bring a measure of stability to the + internal situation in Lebanon is a strengthened army. The Lebanese took + a long time to make up their minds to tell us what kind of arms they + wanted. They were without a government and, when they formed one,See footnote 6, + Document 26. Pres Helou had to get rid of his incompetent CIC.Commander in Chief of the Lebanese Armed Forces, + General Emil Boustany. The new CIC, Noujaim,General Jean Noujaim replaced Boustany on January + 7. after carefully reviewing his needs and his country’s + finances, approached us on Feb 19 with a modest requirement for some + WWII tanks and AA machine guns—used equipment which the Lebanese hoped + would be on our surplus list, and therefore available for little or + nothing. The Lebanese, with an empty treasury, were forced to beg, but + their request was indeed modest, considering the threat which they are + trying urgently to meet.

+

4. To recapitulate from our earlier messages: (A) Helou wants to strengthen his army + now—for a fedayeen challenge which he thinks may occur no later than + May; (B) GOL cannot pay going prices, + even for reconditioned equipment; (C) GOL cannot at moment legally accept USG credits, even if we have them to + offer; (D) Lebanon has no chance to get subsidies from other Arab + states; (E) Helou desperately + wants to continue to get arms in West, to avoid accepting proferred + Soviet “gift.”

+

5. On March 12, we received USG’s first + response to GOL’s request. It said: (A) + 18 months delivery time for U.S.-owned M–41’s; (B) No other tanks + available from U.S. sources; (C) Lebanese might wish try buy their + M–41’s on open market from “Levy Bros”; (D) If they do, USG will tell them later whether or not we + will veto the purchase. There is no hope in this reply which I can use + to buck up Helou’s and Noujaim’s + morale.

+ +

6. I am led to conclude that the USG + cannot respond either to the urgent nature of the Lebanese request for + arms, or to the request for concessional prices. If this is the case, I + believe it is essential that I so frankly inform Pres Helou. At this point Helou is relying on the hope that a + friendly USG, whose interests he feels + are identical with his, will respond to his urgent pleas for help. (He + indeed has nowhere else to turn, unless he accepts the recent Soviet + offers.) We cannot, in all fairness, allow him to plan on false + premises. He must know where he stands and what his assets are or may + be, and make his decisions accordingly.

+

7. I do not want to appear to be tilting my lance in this message, but I + see no ray of hope in any of Dept’s + messages that USG is considering any + course of action that responds to Helou’s requests or to the realities of the problem. If + I am wrong, please tell me.

+

8. Also, valid as the facts may be, I cannot satisfy Helou, provide him solace, or assist in + easing the situation here by repeating the history of our past efforts + to help Lebanon (para 2, State 36213).See + Document 98. + Helou is just as aware as I of + the inadequacies and mistakes of his former CIC—the man who helped + create this sorry history. It was, after all, Helou who fired him, and perhaps above + all because he was aware of the facts which the Dept has enumerated, and which he and I + have often discussed in the past.On April + 6, Nixon sent a letter to + Helou in which he wrote: + “It remains a matter of deep concern to me and my government that + Lebanon’s stability and independence be preserved and that Lebanon + be enabled to pursue its democratic way of life without outside + interference. My government will continue to do what it can to + facilitate this objective. Many of the problems facing Lebanon today + are a direct result of the Arab Israel confrontation. Recognizing + this, we are vigorously pursuing our efforts to find a way of + achieving lasting peace in the Middle East.” (Telegram 49939 to + Beirut, April 6; National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, + NSC Files, Box 621, Country + Files, Middle East, Lebanon, Vol. II)

+ + Porter + +
+ +
+ + 101. Letter From President Nixon to Israeli Prime Minister MeirNational Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 606, Country Files, + Middle East, Israel, Vol. IV. No classification marking. The letter + is attached to a March 14 memorandum to Nixon, in which Kissinger wrote: “In view of Mrs. Meir’s direct personal appeal to + you on the aircraft decision, a personal response would seem + desirable in connection with our telling her of the decision. The + main purpose of such a note would not be to convey the details of + the decision or to argue the case but to reassure her that Israel is + not being cut off.” + Washington, undated. + + Dear Madame Prime Minister: + +

Ambassador Barbour will be + informing you of the results of our review of your government’s + financial and military needs, particularly with respect to aircraft, + which you and I discussed last September. He will also convey to you the + announcement on these matters which we shall be making shortly.See Document + 106.

+

I fully understand your deep sense of personal responsibility for the + security of your country and the survival of your people. I carry a + similar burden and can appreciate the sense of concern and urgency in + the message you sent me through Ambassador Rabin last week.Meir’s March 8 letter to Nixon was delivered to Kissinger by Ambassador Rabin during their meeting at the + White House on March 12 (see Document 99). + Meir wrote: “Lately some + rumors have reached me that your decision [on arms requests] may be + negative or at best postponed. I absolutely refuse to believe it . . + . To envisage such a blow to my people is more than the courage I + have to believe. If, God forbid, this were true, then we would feel + really forsaken. Our enemies, including the Russians, would, for the + first time, really believe that we are at their mercy . . . The + encouragement to the Arabs that we have been abandoned by our best + friend while their supplies pour in, spells not only a security + danger but a psychological shock for our people. The effect of this + shock cannot be overestimated . . . Mr. President, we are alone! + Again, I say to myself and to you, I do not believe it.” (National + Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 612, Country Files, Middle East, Israeli + Aid) To be isolated in the world and deprived of the means of + defense would indeed be tragic for your people, who have endured so much + and struggled so valiantly. The response we are conveying to you is + intended to make clear to the world that Israel is not alone.

+

I know you would have preferred a more definitive decision now on your + request for additional aircraft. Weighing all factors, I have concluded + that such a decision at this time would not serve the cause of peace in + the Middle East—the common goal which is essential to the long term + interests of both our countries. The achievement of this goal requires + both strength and restraint. I say this to emphasize the difference + between restraint and weakness.

+

Our present response takes into account that in the absence of peace, + Israel’s margin of safety and security must be maintained. The provision for maintaining + Israel’s strength in the face of attrition is designed to express our + continuing support for Israel’s security. This point will not, I am + convinced, be lost on any who may harbor hopes of reversing the military + balance in the area.

+

The relationship between our two countries is based in the final analysis + on mutual confidence in each other’s fundamental intentions. I want to + reaffirm to you that, for our part, these remain as steadfast and firm + as they have been during all the years of Israel’s nationhood.

+

Sincerely,Printed from an unsigned + copy.

+
+ +
+ 102. Memorandum From President Nixon to the President’s Assistant for National Security + Affairs (Kissinger)Source: National Archives, Nixon + Presidential Materials, NSC Files, + Box 652, Country Files, Middle East, Middle East, Vol. I. + Confidential. + Washington, March + 17, 1970. +

In your talk with RabinSee Document + 104. and also in your further talk with Mrs. Meir if you have it I think it is + important that you lay it on the line with regard to Israel’s interest + going far beyond the present conflict.

+

Israel is relying on the peace at any price Democrats, Mansfield, + Fulbright, Symington et al, + and on some Republicans like Goodell and ScottSenators Mike Mansfield (D–MT), J. William Fulbright (D–AR), + Stuart Symington (D–MO), Charles Goodell (R–NY), Hugh Scott, Jr. + (R–PA). to come through for them in the event we come to a + crunch, not just in aid but in case Israel is threatened directly by + Soviet power.

+

What they must realize is that these people are very weak reeds. They + will give Israel a lot of lip service but they are peace at any price + people. When the chips are down they will cut and run, not only as they + are presently cutting and running in Vietnam but also when any conflict + in the Mideast stares them straight in the face.

+

On the other hand, their real friends (to their great surprise) are + people like Goldwater, Buckley,Senator + Barry Goldwater (R–AZ) and William F. Buckley, nationally-syndicated + columnist and founder of National Review + magazine. + RN et al who are considered to be hawks on Vietnam but who in the + broader aspects are basically not cut and run people whether it is in + Vietnam, the Mideast, Korea or any place else in the world. They may be + concerned, for example, that Buckley wrote a column indicating + displeasure that the Jewish community demonstrated against Pompidou and didn’t demonstrate against + Kosygin. This, however, is + the most fundamental point of all. They must recognize that our + interests are basically pro-freedom and not just pro-Israel because of + the Jewish vote. We are for Israel because Israel + in our view is the only state in the Mideast which is pro freedom and an effective opponent to Soviet expansion. We + will oppose a cut and run policy either in Vietnam or Cuba or the + Mideast or NATO or any place else in the world. This is the kind of + friend that Israel needs and will continue to need, particularly when + the going gets very tough in the next five years.

+

It is time for Israel (and I don’t think it will do any good to suggest + this to the American Jewish community) to face up to the fact that their + only reliable friends are the hawks in this country—those that are hawks + in the best sense when it comes to Soviet expansionism any place in the + world, not just Soviet expansionism in the Mideast.

+

They think, for example, that in the event some move is made in the + Mideast that what really counts is to have Lindsay,John Lindsay, Mayor of New York City. + Goodell or Scott to come out for more arms to Israel. Lindsay, Goodell + and Scott can deliver only their own votes despite the fact that + Manny CellerCongressman Emanuel + Celler (D–NY). got 200 names on a + Congressional petition which was presented to me (incidentally, a very + stupid move on their part since it was so unnecessary and so obvious a + move).

+

What they must understand is that people like Goodell, Scott and Lindsay + have no character and that when the crunch comes they will cave. What + they must also realize is that people like RN, Buckley, Goldwater et al + will stand up for them when the crunch comes basically because we admire + them for their character and their strength and because we see in Israel + the only state in that part of the world which will not become an abject + tool of Soviet policy the moment the Soviet begins to flex its + missiles.

+

What all this adds up to is that Mrs. Meir, Rabin et + al must trust RN completely. He does not + want to see Israel go down the drain and makes an absolute commitment + that he will see to it that Israel always has “an edge.” On the other + hand, he must carry with him not just the Jewish constituency in New + York and Pennsylvania and California and possibly Illinois which voted + 95 percent against him, but he must carry with him the 60 percent of the American people who + are in what is called the silent majority and who must be depended upon + in the event that we have to take a strong stand against Soviet + expansionism in the Mideast. Only when the Israeli leaders realize this + fact are they going to have any kind of security which will be + reliable.

+

This is tough talk for them to hear because they read the Jewish press, + the New York Times, the Washington Post and also listen to the media and get the + impression that because they have so much clout with some of those + people that they will get their way. They must realize that that group + has lost its credibility with the American people and that they are not going to get their way with a majority of + Americans when the chips are really down.

+

In this connection, they must realize that one of their best friends also + is Agnew. Agnew will stand up and be counted in + the event there is a Soviet expansionist move in the Mideast. On the + other hand, he will not stand just as I will not stand for a double + standard. We are going to stand up in Vietnam and in NATO and in the + Mideast, but it is a question of all or none. This is it cold turkey and + it is time that our friends in Israel understood this.

+

We are going to be in power for at least the next three years and this is + going to be the policy of this country. Unless they understand it and + act as if they understood it beginning now they are down the tubes.

+
+ +
+ 103. Aide-Mémoire From President Nixon to the Government of IsraelSource: National Archives, Nixon + Presidential Materials, NSC Files, + Box 652, Country Files, Middle East, Middle East, Vol. I. No + classification marking. The aide-mémoire, originally prepared by + Nixon, was re-written by + Kissinger at 5 p.m. on + March 17 after a meeting with Rabin that morning (see Document + 104). Rabin saw a + draft of the aide-mémoire on March 12. See Document 99. + Washington, March + 17, 1970. +

Reaffirming the discussion of September 26, 1969 with Prime Minister + Golda Meir,Nixon and + Meir discussed arms for + Israel on September 25. See footnote 2, + Document 52. I hereby confirm that the United + States Government will continue its commitment to the military security + of Israel by the provision of hardware required to maintain the military + balance in the Middle East. We would construe any significant + introduction of Soviet or other + arms into the Middle East as endangering the military balance. In these + circumstances my Government would provide a substantial majority of the + military assistance requested by your Government. At the same time, I + want to reaffirm our intention to pursue a policy of seeking a + negotiated settlement of the situation in the Middle East. As I stated + on September 26, 1969, we expect the Government of Israel to adopt an + understanding attitude with respect to our efforts. Finally, I would + like to request that the Government of Israel terminate for a period of + 60 days its air and other attacks against the UAR providing a complete cease-fire is observed by the + other side and recognizing that there would be no official statements to + this effect by either side. Any relative disadvantage suffered by Israel + as a result of these restraints—for example, through the unimpeded + building up of SAM sites—will be taken + into account in replacement decisions for 1971.

+
+ +
+ 104. Editorial Note +

Over the course of the day on March 17, 1970, Assistant to the President + for National Security Affairs Henry + Kissinger and Israeli Ambassador Yitzhak Rabin held several + conversations to discuss future U.S. economic and military assistance to + Israel, a proposed cease-fire agreement between Israel and the UAR, and + the discovery of Soviet personnel and new air defense systems inside + Egypt.The first meeting took place at 10:15 a.m. and was held in the + library of the White House residence. According to the memorandum of + conversation, Rabin stated he + would like to review the Israeli estimate of the “entire situation” of + the Arab-Israeli conflict and reaffirmed that Kissinger was the only U.S. Government + official to whom this information was being given. Rabin continued:

+

“As a result of the continued violations of the cease-fire, Israel had + concluded that deep air attacks were the only way to prevent further + escalation and to control Nasser’s armed forces. Ambassador Rabin stated that the Israelis + consider that the Soviet and Egyptian problem is not the fact that Egypt + does not have a sufficient number of offensive aircraft or the equipment + necessary to develop an efficient air defense capability. Also, both + Egypt and the USSR recognize that the + problem involves the inability of the Egyptians to operate the + equipment.

+

“Ambassador Rabin continued that + all the Israeli air attacks with a single accidental exception had been + against Egyptian military targets and that these attacks had been + extremely effective and caused great turbulence in Egypt. For example, Egyptian pilots + have been sent to Syria to train, seven Egyptian Divisions along the + Canal were pulled back resulting in severe confusion and disruption of + Egypt’s overall training plans. As a result of this, Nasser visited Moscow during the end + of January to present the criticality of their situation to the Soviets. + Apparently, the Soviets tried to handle the problem through the release + of some public assurances and a decision to develop a more sophisticated + air defense capability for Egypt. This was evidenced by mid-January when + the Israelis noticed the beginning of 15 new air defense sites with + unique and elaborate facilities (Ambassador Rabin showed Dr. Kissinger a schematic drawing of the + T-type missile bunkers which were made of concrete and were 300 meters + in length, 60 meters in width and 5 meters in height).

+

“Ambassador Rabin continued that + initially the Israelis did not know what this new facility was and + suspected that it was a new ground-to-ground missile site. Subsequently, + they noticed the construction of a site in the area of the Aswan Dam and + concluded that it had to be air defense because of the remoteness of the + location. Since Israel concluded that these were new and sophisticated + air defense facilities, they determined to concentrate their air effort + against them in order to prevent their completion. Israel now believes + that the sites have been prepared for SA–3 missiles despite the fact + that the U.S. intelligence has described them as far more sophisticated + than the SA–3 sites that have been observed in East Germany. Initial + Egyptian reaction to the concentrated Israeli attacks was to bring their + conventional antiaircraft artillery back from the Canal to provide + greater protection in depth. They also tried to intercept with Egyptian + aircraft but after several losses declined further air combat. The + pattern of the new Egyptian sites appears to be designed to provide + maximum protection over the Canal itself. This permits in-depth + displacements since the SA–3 has a range of approximately 22 miles. Dr. + Kissinger commented that + this was a low-level missile. Ambassador Rabin confirmed this. Ambassador Rabin then concluded that if the + Egyptians succeed in emplacing an SA–3 missile system of this + sophistication, the Israelis will suffer an increase in both air losses + and human casualties.

+

“Ambassador Rabin continued that + because the Israeli attacks against the missile sites had been so + effective, the Egyptians decided to seek another solution—one which + might enable them to achieve a lull for two or three months, and one + which would enable them to complete the sites and then resume the war of + attrition. Rabin said they had + hard evidence from one highly reliable source that this plan had been + worked out with the Soviets over the period of 3 to 5 March and that it + had been decided that they would concede on two of their five points and + would permit the Soviets to start negotiations again within the two or + four-power framework. There other conditions would remain firm:

+ +

“1. Insistence on total withdrawal, including Jerusalem.

+

“2. No face-to-face negotiations with Israel.

+

“3. Solution to the refugee program on the basis of the 1948 United + Nations Resolution.

+

“Ambassador Rabin emphasized + that Prime Minister Meir had + concluded that this would be suicide for Israel. Mrs. Meir also expressed severe reservations + about the feasibility of an undeclared cease-fire under these conditions + for it would, in effect, permit Egypt to complete the sites and to gain + time without a public commitment. This would thereby preserve their + option to continue the war of attrition as soon as they considered + themselves properly postured. Israel had concluded that the Soviets’ + objective is to attain these temporary conditions for Egypt, thus + enabling Egypt to continue the war of attrition and also to deflect an + affirmative decision by the U.S. on the Israeli plane request. Further, + this strategy, Rabin added, + would permit the continued erosion of the U.S. position with respect to + Israel and the Middle East as a whole which had started with our more + recent declarations of October 28, 1969 and December 9, 1969. In view of + the preceding estimate, the President’s proposal with respect to both + the public statement and the private assurances on replacement aircraft + was a cause of major concern.

+

“Mrs. Meir sees great danger in + the U.S. position. The public statement would have incalculable impact + not only on the Middle East but elsewhere and she, therefore, was making + the following request:

+

“1. Modify the public announcement to make it more positive with the view + not towards committing the U.S. to providing more planes but to more + positively guarantee a preservation of current Israeli air + capability.

+

“2. Concerning the political language in the public announcement, some + insertion should be made reaffirming the U.S. determination to maintain + the balance of power in the Middle East . . .

+

“3. In addition, Ambassador Rabin stated that Prime Minister Meir asks that the U.S. reconsider its + position on the practical matter of providing replacement aircraft and + that we also provide some positive public expression in our public + statement.

+

“4. Finally, with respect to the cease-fire, Ambassador Rabin stated that Mrs. Meir had considered the issue in great + depth and had come to the conclusion that she could accept the + undeclared cease-fire under the conditions that there would be no public + statement and that it constituted a complete cessation of military + activity along the Canal.

+

“To implement the cease-fire, Mrs. Meir proposed the following conditions:

+ +

“1. Elimination of the 60 or 90 day restriction and substitute therefor a + period of 3 to 5 days in which Israel would refrain from in-depth air + attacks against Egypt. During this period, however, if the Egyptians + violated the cease-fire by rifle or artillery fire, for example, Israel + would respond in kind, i.e., with an identical response.

+

“—After the three or five day modified moratorium, if Egypt continued to + violate the cease-fire, then Israel would not feel constrained to + respond in like manner but would not be limited in their retaliation by + either type or distance of penetration.

+

“—Israel would require one day’s notice in order to implement the three + to five day moratorium.

+

“Dr. Kissinger asked what would + be Israel’s attitude if the Soviets and Egypt agree to these conditions + but in doing so continue to complete the SA–3 sites. Ambassador + Rabin replied that Israel + will have to accept this risk, providing they abide by the total + cease-fire.

+

“Ambassador Rabin then commented + that even though Golda Meir would + accept the foregoing conditions, she was actually furious that she was + being forced to do so but, on balance, considered that Israel could + accept these conditions in order to avoid higher costs. In accepting + these conditions, however, Mrs. Meir felt that the U.S. should double the number of + planes to be provided under the replacement formula, i.e., the U.S. + should agree to deliver up to 8 Phantoms and 20 Skyhawks by the end of + CY 1970 and that an identical number should be provided by the middle of + CY 71. Ambassador Rabin then + complained that U.S. calculations of attrition differ from Israel’s. He + pointed out the U.S. seems to consider only the loss of U.S.-provided + planes while, in fact, Israel must consider overall inventory, + regardless of source.”

+

After Rabin summarized Prime + Minister Meir’s position and + discussed further discrepancies in U.S. and Israeli intelligence + estimates, Kissinger explained + that the U.S. estimate of the cease-fire proposal, which was only known + to the President, General Haig, + and himself, was that it would help Israel by providing the United + States an additional leverage on the Soviets. He added that President + Nixon was “Israel’s best + friend,” and wanted to do “everything possible” to resolve the + situation.He then told Rabin:

+

“The President had asked him to assure the Ambassador that he would like + to satisfy the whole Israeli arms request . . . [and] stated that the + President was anxious to maintain Israel’s current advantage, that he + has given Dr. Kissinger full + power of attorney on this matter but that unfortunately the realities of + the situation prevent him from utilizing it. . . .

+

“Dr. Kissinger stated that he has + no intention of deceiving Israel, stating ‘it would be a simple matter + under these conditions to get Israel to accept the cease-fire on a + shallow promise but the U.S. has no interest in doing so.’” (National Archives, Nixon + Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box + 612, Country Files, Middle East, Israeli Aid)

+

In a memorandum to President Nixon the following day, March 18, Kissinger summarized Rabin’s position:

+

“At the first meeting at 10:15 a.m. he said Israel was accepting your + proposition [see Document 103] with the + following provisos:

+

“1. That the Egyptian ceasefire be total and not confined to air activity + and that your Aide-Mémoire be changed accordingly;

+

“2. That the public announcement of our decision state that we were + replacing Israeli losses;

+

“3. That we commit ourselves to 8 Phantoms and 20 Skyhawks to replace + Israeli losses this year and that a similar number would be required in + 1971, especially in light of the SA–3s becoming operational and + increasing the rate of attrition.” (Ibid., Box 652, Country Files, + Middle East, Middle East, Vol. I)

+

Kissinger saw Rabin again at 4 p.m. in the + afternoon of March 17. Rabin + handed Kissinger a piece of + paper that outlined the actions Israel was prepared to take under a + cease-fire and indicated that he would be prepared to sign this on + behalf of his government. Kissinger thereupon informed the Ambassador that the + United States Government could not change the announcement and would not + commit to a flat replacement figure. Rabin took the view that the combination of these + decisions “condemned Israel to the same haggling with respect to + replacements that they had already experienced with respect to new + planes; in short that our commitment was not a commitment.”Kissinger replied that he would + arrange an appointment with the President the next day to set his mind + at ease. (Ibid.)

+

Later that evening, Kissinger + discussed the Israeli arms request over the telephone with President + Nixon. A portion of their + conversation reads:

+

“P: On this Israeli thing, I think you should play it that this is a damn + good deal and we will play ours to the hilt and we want them to play + theirs. I will re-assure them.

+

“K: If they don’t get reassurances on the 8 [Phantoms] & 20 + [Skyhawks] they will kick over the whole deal.

+

“P: I will assure them of the 8 & 20.

+

“K: They don’t want to be in an endless negotiation. That’s my guess. I + put it to Rabin very strongly + after our talk at lunch and he seemed extremely disturbed.

+

“P: The 8 & 20—I will back it up to the bureaucracy. Let him play our + game. It’s very important.

+

“K: Right.” (Transcript of a telephone conversation between Nixon and Kissinger, March 17, 1970, 8:07 p.m.; ibid., Henry Kissinger Telephone Conversation + Transcripts Box 4, Chronological File)

+ +

Before President Nixon had the + opportunity to reassure the Israelis of the deal, however, the Defense + Intelligence Agency confirmed reports of Soviet SA–3 sites manned by + Soviet personnel in Egypt. Upon learning the news, Rabin called Kissinger at 10:10 p.m. to inform him + that he was cancelling the agreement:

+

“R: About 2 hours ago the DIA informed + our military attaché that they have got information that 10 sites of + SA–3, including a considerable number of Russian experts—that their + estimation will be 1500 experts and they are foreign, that is to say + Russian. We got this information from them two hours ago. In light of + this information, I feel that it’s my obligation to inform the Prime + Minister that we have this information and as a result that all that I + have told you will have changed.

+

“K: I understand.

+

“R: I am sorry but in light of such vital information I feel that it is + my duty to tell my government and it may decide to change it on the + basis of this information.

+

“K: When you saw the sites, what did you think?

+

“R: There’s a difference between thinking and knowing. Third, I am sure + that the U.S. Government should also re-consider this decision in light + of this information if its message to Congress is to be taken + seriously.I cannot find words to explain and to say what would be the + meaning and interpretation of the decision by your government in light + of the new development. As a result, I must await instructions from my + government and I would like as a result not to have the meeting + tomorrow.

+

“K: All right.

+

“R: I hope you understand.

+

“K: I understand.” (Transcript of a telephone conversation between + Kissinger and Rabin, March 17, 10:10 p.m.; + ibid.)

+

In his March 18 memorandum to Nixon summarizing the day’s events and offering his + assessment of the options now available to the President, Kissinger wrote:

+

“I believe that State’s inability to change the announcement and my + inability to guarantee a flat replacement figure convinced the Israelis + that they were getting nothing for the ceasefire except a written for an + oral promise. My views are as follows:

+

“1. The Israelis are getting desperate. Convinced that they have nothing + to lose, they may well attack. Indeed, had we followed the original + scenario and made the original announcement when it was scheduled last + week, the situation would probably be out of control.

+

“2. I would be remiss in my duty if I did not tell you that our course + involves the most serious dangers of a Middle East war and of a profound + misunderstanding by the Soviets.

+ +

“3. You have two choices:

+

“a. To proceed on our course and make the announcement but use the SA–3 + evidence to make a flat promise to Israel of 8 Phantoms and 20 Skyhawks + for each of the next two years in return for a ceasefire.

+

“b. To use the SA–3 evidence to order a complete restudy in the + bureaucracy of the issue of hardware to Israel coupled with an appeal to + the Soviets to stop the introduction of Soviet combat personnel into + Egypt. At this stage I lean toward the second.” (Ibid., NSC Files, Box 652, Country Files, Middle + East, Middle East, Vol. I)

+

While Nixon decided to defer any + commitment to provide Israel with additional aircraft (see Document 105), he nonetheless ordered a restudy + of the issue in National Security Study Memorandum 93 (Document 108) in + light of Israel’s evidence regarding Soviet-manned SA–3s in Egypt. He + also met with Rabin on March 18 + to discuss the arms request and Soviet involvement in the Middle East. + The meeting was held in the President’s private office in the Executive + Office Building. The President’s Daily Diary makes no mention of any + meeting with Rabin on March 18, + but Kissinger later prepared a + record of the conversation that reads as follows:

+

“The President said he wanted to see Rabin to tell him one thing—that the line of + communication to the President was via me [Kissinger]. He knew that the Israelis had legitimate + concerns about their security and that they had some doubts on whether + we would not nitpick them to death, if they felt their security was in + danger. He therefore wanted to tell Rabin to let Kissinger know if the balance of power was in danger. We + have great difficulty looking at the problem massively but if you put it + to us in an informal way, we will find our way to solve the + problem.Quite apart from helping Israel which means a lot to us, we + don’t want the power balance to change. Within our bureaucracy, there + are many who don’t agree. They think our real interests in the Middle + East lie with the Arabs but those others don’t have my power. I am aware + of the introduction of Soviet SA–3s and I hope you knock them out. You + can’t let them build up.

+

“Rabin said I know I am speaking + to the most powerful man of the most powerful country in the world. I + must tell you that the public announcement which you will make produces + great concern. It will give great encouragement to the Arabs because + they believe Israel has been left alone to defend itself by its oldest + friend. It will give great encouragement to the Soviets because it shows + them that they are free to do what they want and it will lead them into + greater intransigence towards the Arabs. It will have great consequence + for the other states in the Middle East, going as far as the Persian + Gulf who will draw the conclusion that you have been forced off your + course by the Soviets. We Israelis have no one to turn to except to you + the President of the United States. We believe in freedom and human + dignity and we will defend ourselves but we are only 2.5 million [people]. We would like to knock + out the SAMs but we now know that if we knock out the SAM sites we will face the Soviet Union + alone. I am in no position to disbelieve the President of the United + States but our survival is at stake and I am deeply worried.

+

“The President replied, when you see that the need exists, convey it to + us. What this means is what my letter [Document + 101] says.

+

“Rabin said the need exists now. + What is the balance of power in the world today? Egypt has 160 + supersonic planes. Syria has 100 supersonic planes. We have less than + 90. We are brave but we can’t be superhuman. We will do what I can but + the Arabs don’t need more arms. And as soon as they get greater + competence, we will be in mortal danger.

+

“The President [said] when you are in danger, let Kissinger know. We will get it done.” + (Record of conversation between President Nixon and Israeli Ambassador Rabin; National Archives, Nixon + Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box + 612, Country Files, Middle East, Israeli Aid)

+

In his memoirs, Rabin recalled + that during his conversation with Nixon, he (Rabin) launched into “an emotional charged speech about + the perils of a small nation fighting for her life.” Rabin added:

+

“Whenever the U.S. is believed to be reducing her support for Israel, the + Arabs revive their old hope of overcoming us by force. And the longer + the war of attrition goes on, the more the Soviets will flaunt their + insolence. They will interpret the United States’ decision on arms as a + sign of weakness. And if the Russians can station SAM–3s and man them with their own + technicians while America continues to deprive Israel of arms, they will + take it to mean they can go even further! Once again, Mr. President, I + appeal to you as the only man in whose sympathy and understand we have + trust: Give us the arms we need!

+

“I was a bit startled at myself—and all the more at the total silence + that ensued. Evidently my emotion had been infectious. The pause went on + for a minute or so—to me it seemed like an eternity—as the president sat + mute with his eyes averted. Finally he said, ‘Thank you for putting it + that way, Mr. Ambassador. I understand you, and I understand Israel’s + situation. You can be sure that you’ll get your arms. I only want to go + about it in a different way.’ He paused again, and when he continued + speaking I thought I could detect a strange glint in his eye. ‘Do you + have any more information about the SAM–3s? How do you feel about those missiles being manned by + the Russians? Have you considered attacking them?’

+

“Totally flabbergasted, I blurted out: ‘Attack the Russian?’ Strange, I + thought to myself, how complex are the motives of a great power. Was the + president suggesting that for fear that we would attack the Russian + missiles, with all the attendant risks, the United States would avoid strengthening Israel? Or + was it conceivable that he meant precisely the opposite? Could it be + that the president of the United States was intimating his interest in + our attacking the missiles and their Russian crews? And if he knew that + Israel intended to do so, would he provide us with all the planes we had + requested—and perhaps even more?

+

“The president did not reply further to my outburst, and, frankly, I + didn’t want him to elaborate on the subject. If he had said, ‘Yes, go + ahead and attack,’ it was doubtful that Israel would have been able or + willing to. If he said, ‘No, do not attack them under any + circumstances!’ and developments later made it imperative for Israel to + destroy the missiles, she would run the risk of defying the president of + the United States and disrupting relations with her strongest ally.” + (The Rabin Memoirs, pages 171–173)

+
+ +
+ 105. Telegram From the Department of State to Certain Diplomatic + PostsSource: National + Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 606, Country Files, Middle East, Israel, + Vol. IV. Secret; Priority; Nodis; Noforn Until Acted Upon. Drafted + on March 19 by William D. Brewer (NEA/ARP); cleared by Sisco and Kissinger and in AF, EUR, and NEA; and approved by Rogers. Sent to London, Paris, + Rome, Bonn, Jidda, Amman, Beirut, Kuwait, Rabat, Tunis, Tripoli, + Cairo, Algiers, and Khartoum. Repeated to Tel Aviv, Jerusalem, + Dhahran, Moscow, Belgrade, Bucharest, USUN, Ankara, Tehran, New Delhi, and + Rawalpindi. + Washington, March 21, 1970, 0050Z. +

41693. Subject: USG Decision on Israeli + Aircraft Request.

+

1. Septel forwards text announcement which Secretary plans make at press + conference noon, Monday, March 23 re Israeli aircraft request.The text of the statement and the transcript + of the news conference that followed are printed in the Department + of State Bulletin, April 13, 1970, pp. + 477–484. In essence, announcement says USG is deferring for now any commitment to + provide Israel additional aircraft, since (a) we have identified no + present military need, and (b) we believe restraint on part all + concerned is required if dangerous trend toward higher levels of + military confrontation is to be reversed and atmosphere created in which + opportunities for peaceful settlement can be more fruitfully explored. + At same time announcement makes clear that deferral of decision will be + reconsidered if action by Soviets or others upsets military balance or + if we believe political + developments warrant. Action addressees instructed inform host + government of this decision at highest possible level at or about noon + Washington time on March 23 and provide them copy of announcement. This + message being sent now to facilitate arranging appointments which should + be made for as close to noon Washington time on Monday as local + circumstances make feasible. Posts are to adhere strictly to this + guidance; if there are questions which you cannot answer, request you + report them without offering prior comments to Government to which you + are accredited.

+

2. For Arab Capitals: In conveying foregoing, you + should stress following:

+

(a) In taking this step, USG has taken + into account urgings our Arab friends. We see it as positive + contribution to improve atmosphere for progress towards peaceful + settlement Arab/Israeli impasse. Our decision reflects constant USG policy to do all we can to achieve + peace in Mideast in accordance with Security Council Resolution 242. It + was taken despite strong Israeli desire for positive decision now and + such recent developments as French Mirage deal with Libya. This in + itself should sufficiently demonstrate our determination do all we can + facilitate relaxation present tensions and progress towards peaceful + settlement.

+

(b) In USG view, only lasting security + for all parties to current dispute lies in peace, and we believe + restraint will contribute to that goal. In taking its decision, USG believes it is acting with restraint + and thus serving the cause of peace. But clapping cannot be done with + one hand. Others must also exercise restraint and show themselves + willing cooperate in genuine efforts resolve present impasse if + settlement is to be attained.

+

(c) On December 9, 1969, the Secretary of State outlined publicly our + views as to what framework for a settlement should look like.See Document 73. + Those views are spelled out in proposals submitted in major power talks, + which have been developed in consultation with the parties and other + interested states. So far, there has regrettably been little positive + reaction, particularly from Cairo. Our present decision reflects what + the Secretary then said—that our policy is balanced and fair. We + earnestly hope that those concerned will now take a constructive view of + principles we have set forth, which we think provide fair basis for + moving forward.

+

(d) Specifically, USG decision offers + Soviets and parties themselves major opportunity find alternatives to + further sterile military escalation. Arabs have not always taken + advantage of such constructive opportunities. There have been too many missed opportunities in past; + our arms decision offers a further opportunity. Now is time to examine + with renewed seriousness and sense of purpose all possible avenues to a + settlement. There will be no settlement without compromise on both + sides.

+

3. For Cairo and Amman: You should make a major + pitch for a positive reaction to October 28 and December 18 + proposals.See Documents 58 and 78. + Nasser remains key and cannot + get a settlement by standing aloof and uncommitted in relationship to + these proposals.

+

4. For Moscow: We will be calling in Dobrynin to put case to Soviets in + strongest possible terms that we expect corresponding restraint and + constructive effort on peace front from them.Rogers met + with Dobrynin on March 25, + as reported in telegram 44153 to Moscow, March 26. (National + Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 725, Country Files, Europe, USSR) The + text of Rogers’s oral + statement to Dobrynin was + transmitted in telegram 44154 to Moscow, March 28, printed in Foreign + Relations, 1969–1976, volume XII, Soviet Union, January + 1969–October 1970, Document 148. See also ibid., Document 151. You + should take no repeat no action in Moscow at this time.

+

5. For Western Eur Capitals: In conveying our + decision, you should inform host govts of pitch we are making in support + of it per paras 2 and 3 above and emphasize our conviction that USG restraint now provides Soviets and + UAR, in particular, with major opportunity for forward movement out of + present impasse. We hope host governments will support us on political + front in order to keep up pressure.

+

6. For all addressees: FYI. Press in Israel and UAR has already been speculating that no public US + commitment on aircraft can be expected but that secret commitments have + been or will be made. If this question comes up, you may say that we + have made no secret deal to provide additional aircraft to Israel. As + for future, we cannot say what we may do or how we may do it since this + depends on how military and political situation develops. End FYI.

+ + + Rogers + + +
+ +
+ + 106. Telegram From the Embassy in Israel to the Department of + StateSource: National + Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 612, Country Files, Middle East, Israeli + Aid. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. The telegram is attached to a March + 23 memorandum to Kissinger + in which Eliot wrote: “The + attached telegram from Tel Aviv sets forth the Israeli response to + our decision on aircraft and economic aid for Israel. In view of its + sensitivity I would be grateful if you would limit its distribution + in the White House to as few as possible.” + Tel Aviv, March 23, 1970, 1630Z. +

1502. Subj: Decision on Aircraft and Economic Aid for Israel. Ref: State + 41927.Dated March 23. (Ibid., RG 59, + Central Files 1970–73, POL ISR–US)

+

1. Ambassador, accompanied by DCM, + called on Prime Minister Meir at + 1030 a.m. March 23, handed her copy of text of Secretary’s announcement + on Israel’s military and economic requests (State 41924)Telegram 41924 to Tel Aviv, March 23, transmitted + the text of the Secretary’s announcement. (Ibid.) See footnote 2, Document 105. and + briefed her on President’s decision in accordance State 41921 and + previous.Telegram 41921 to Tel Aviv, + March 23, was a correction to telegram 41705 to Tel Aviv, March 21, + which provided guidance to Barbour on briefing Meir on the U.S. decision regarding military and + economic assistance to Israel. Rogers also briefed Rabin that morning in Washington, as reported in + telegram 42545 to Tel Aviv, March 24. (All in National Archives, + Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC + Files, Box 606, Country Files, Middle East, Israel, Vol. IV) + Mrs. Meir was accompanied by + Foreign Minister Eban, her + Special Assistants Herzog and + Dinitz and Acting Assistant + Director General MFA Elizur.Elizur + was also Director of North American Affairs, Israeli Ministry of + Foreign Affairs.

+

2. Mrs. Meir said that she valued + immensely President Nixon’s + personal message.Document 101. + Regarding final sentence of last additional point made by Ambassador, to + effect that for U.S. part confidence in Israel’s fundamental intentions + remain as steadfast and firm as they have during all the years of + Israel’s nationhood, she said that this was true on Israel’s part as + well for the U.S. She said that she would study announcement and + Ambassador’s presentation, but from having heard oral presentation she + could say that she would not lose sight of positive elements she had + heard. Facts that decision was held in abeyance, and was on interim + basis, and that U.S. would replace and add on aircraft were + fundamentally positive and she was glad to take note of them. On + economic aid, Finance Minister Sapir (whom she described as “split + personality”, meaning he wants both aircraft and to save money) would find this gratifying. It + was especially important that USG was + prepared to deal with long-term needs, and not only on one-year + basis.

+

3. On question of aircraft and balance of power, Mrs. Meir continued, there had been some + discussions between intelligence services and military concerning + considerable discrepancy between Israel’s estimates and those of U.S. + GOI convinced its figures right and + hopes this will rapidly be cleared up. She wished Israeli figures were + not right but this is not simply case of winning an argument. A week or + ten days ago she would only have said that she was “concerned about + rumors” regarding SA–3 missiles in Egypt, but now everyone knows that + they are there. Ambassador agreed evidence points in that direction. + Mrs. Meir said she was convinced + of it. With missiles come Soviet personnel and number of Russians in + Egypt is growing.

+

4. Question is, said Prime Minister, what elements are taken into account + in deciding balance of power. It cannot be denied SA–2 and SA–3 are + defensive. If we lose sight of other elements, we can say answer to + SA–3s is to keep out of Egypt and SA–3 will not then operate. But we + know this implies that Israeli men on Suez Canal are to be objects of + immense UAR artillery (and no one says + there is balance of power on artillery alone) and only way to overcome + this is to use aircraft in which Israel is superior not in numbers but + in men. In this context, SA–3 becomes a deadly weapon in that it + prevents Israel from using weapons in which it is superior. She was not + a military person but did not need to be to understand this. All of this + means that if Israel does not consent to sit and take a beating on + Canal, it will have to consider if it can afford to use planes and men. + This is extremely serious matter for Israel. This connection between + so-called defensive weapons and Israel’s use of planes should be + understood.

+

5. Mrs. Meir continued that there + was no doubt Kurdish agreement would make it possible for Iraq to send + more troops to Jordan.Signed March 11, the + agreement provided for Kurdish autonomy within Iraq, which allowed + the Iraqi Government to move troops elsewhere that had been fighting + Kurds in the northern part of the country. (New + York Times, March 13, 1970, p. 10) Ambassador + replied this might be true if agreement works. As friend of Kurds, Mrs. + Meir said, she hoped that it + would. One might even say, she went on, that at this moment Israel was + not in such a critical position, which is right. But when the month + comes when the last four Phantoms arrive, the end of this position is in + sight. Ambassador Barbour noted + USG was prepared to discuss further + aircraft on short notice if need arises. What Israel needs, Mrs. + Meir said, was certainty, but + it would appear that Israel still has long negotiations ahead. She + wanted to be able to infer that it means a lot to be told that USG will grant additional and replacement aircraft promptly. + Will it be possible, she asked, to come to agreement promptly that this + is the moment?

+

6. Ambassador said he would like to break in here to comment. It would + appear that we have sufficient contacts to be able continuously to + reassess situation and reconcile differences regarding facts. He did not + see need to open new channel for this purpose.

+

7. Prime Minister continued saying that one more element of situation, + not concerned with missiles or bombs but extremely important in Israel’s + situation, was mental attitude of Israel’s neighbors. Positive elements + of U.S. reply cannot be made public (Ambassador interjected positive + elements were in Secretary’s public announcement) and question is how + decision will be interpreted by Israel’s neighbors and USSR. They will + read, listen, and reach own conclusion: Israel is not getting planes + now. They will include word “now” but will not emphasize it. From radio, + TV and newspapers everyone will learn that Israel received negative + answer from only supplier available. This will certainly not put them in + mood that President, Secretary of State and Israelis want, to make even + a modest step towards peace or even cease-fire. This certainly not + intended by USG to be reaction but will + be.

+

8. Ambassador said this was question of assessment. U.S. would not rule + out Prime Minister’s assessment, but feels our decision puts Soviets and + Egypt on spot and if they do not make moves towards peace in reasonable + time we will know decision has not had political and psychological + effects we wanted.

+

9. Mrs. Meir said that what + Soviets were doing in Egypt they were doing in face of President’s + having taken time to appraise situation seriously. If Soviets had least + intention to take some kind of token step towards peace or cease-fire + they would have done so, but they have not. The audacity of what they + had been doing while President was weighing his decision! Certainly no + one can deny that this creates a new situation.

+

10. Question was, Ambassador said, what created this situation? Why did + Soviets bring in SA–3? Our feeling is that this was because Phantoms + were getting through in deep penetration raids. Sure, answered Mrs. + Meir, but why were deep + penetration raids necessary? Because of shooting on Canal!

+

There should not be any difference between US and Israel on this. GOI had given long consideration before + beginning raids but could not just see boys falling on Canal because + Israel did not have artillery. Egyptians want to stop Israel and to + prevent its self-defense. Israel is not trying to occupy Cairo and is + willing to stop when they stop. Let Nasser argue from a position of strength, say that he is + now ready to stop. But he will not do so. Delivery of SA–3s and US + decision against planes for Israel will just encourage him to go on. + What this does to Israeli + people, she said, she did not need to explain to Ambassador. She must + say something that is neither political nor military: she is sorry for + Israeli people for having to be disappointed in this way. This is a + burden they do not deserve. Israelis are literate people, they will read + and listen. What will remain to them will be negative answer from USG. Some will make a fair analysis of US + announcement, but negative aspects will stand out.

+

11. Ambassador replied it would be unfortunate if GOI does not play up positive factors, + especially that USG is prepared replace + attrition losses and provide additional aircraft if situation changes. + Mrs. Meir replied government + could not go to people and say there is nothing to worry about. She did + not want to be misunderstood, she appreciated that decision was only + being held in abeyance. However, it was too much to expect government to + say Quote never mind Unquote to people because she did not say this to + herself. If she had been asked two weeks ago, she would have been sure + decision was going to be positive. She had been sure because it was so + evident that Israel needs aircraft, and that Russians carrying out + anti-Israel propaganda more viciously than ever before.

+

12. What you are saying, Ambassador told Prime Minister, is that GOI would take agreement by USG to start negotiating now for 25 + Phantoms and 100 Skyhawks as more valuable for Israel’s security than + all the firm and broad commitments which USG says must be matter of confidence between governments. + Eban replied that affirmative + answer on aircraft would have caused increase in this mutual confidence. + What divides us, he said, is effect of Secretary’s statement: whether it + is enough for Arabs to know Israel will not get aircraft now, or whether + it would be better for them to know with certainty that Israel will get + them in future. USG has decided not to + give them this certainty. It is enormously important that they know + Israel’s capacity for future. As US doctrine itself holds, deterrence is + most important. What people think about future determines how they act + now. US decision has in effect been known for a week and one can test + response already. Soviet attitude in Four Power talks is almost an + insult to USG and GOI. Eban could not see what value US attaches to this + uncertainty.

+

13. US had had opportunity, Eban + continued, which it has passed over, to give Nasser and Russians clear picture that + no future attack on Israel can succeed. He could not see reason for not + giving both Israel and Arabs this certainty.

+

14. Ambassador told Mrs. Meir that + American Embassies in Moscow and Arab capitals would be making point + that we expect Soviets and UAR to react + productively to our decision and to make sure that they realize that + USG is not weakening its + position.

+ +

15. Referring to Ambassador’s remark concerning how GOI should treat announcement, Eban said that GOI would not be able to play up points like USG willingness to provide replacements + for lost aircraft. USG could do this + better (Embassy note: there has not been any public announcement of any + Phantom loss).

+

16. Mrs. Meir continued that + getting replacements presents a serious matter but it should also be + understood that something has happened in Egypt that changes situation + entirely. Ambassador replied that President recognizes that. Eban said he hoped reappraisal could + begin right away and Mrs. Meir + joined in to say that should be done Quote almost immediately + Unquote.

+

17. On economic matters, Ambassador said, we would envisage discussions + between experts here on long-term matters. If GOI agreed we could work out question of who and when. Mrs. + Meir said it was extremely + important that door had been left open on long-term economic aid.

+

18. Meeting concluded with Eban + saying that statement to be issued by GOI this evening after Secretary’s announcement would + include all elements that Prime Minister had indicated.Eban’s + statement on the evening of March 23 expressed “disappointment and + concern” and pointed to the “interim” nature of the U.S. position. + (New York Times, March 24, 1970, p. A12) + The next day, Rabin also + gave Rogers a talking paper, + which provided further detail on the official Israeli response to + the U.S. decision, as reported in telegram 42624 to Tel Aviv, March + 24. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 606, Country Files, + Middle East, Israel, Vol. IV) It would express disappointment + but also point out things to which Israel attaches importance. For own + good, Mrs. Meir concluded, GOI would not leave out any positive + element.

+

19. Comment: Meeting took place at rest home near + Jerusalem where Mrs. Meir is + spending brief period. Since elements of US decision anticipated by + GOI, there were no surprises in our + statement or presentation, but affirmative elements therein were well + received by Prime Minister. Principal point of difference remains, we + believe, that Israelis have no hope whatsoever that reasonable US + attitude will produce any forthcoming reaction from Arabs or Russians + but rather are strongly convinced that only complete certainty of + Israeli invulnerability will deter UAR + from false hopes of military victory. While Mrs. Meir was calm and unemotional during + meeting, it is clear that she feels deep disappointment that affirmative + decision on aircraft was not given at this time. We can expect early + Israeli request for reassessment of situation in light of discrepancies + revealed between US and Israeli estimates of present Arab military + strength and evidence of introduction of SA–3 missiles and Soviet + personnel to man them.

+ + + Barbour + + +
+ +
+ + 107. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the + Soviet UnionSource: National + Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1186, Saunders Files, Middle East + Negotiations Files, Middle East Settlement—US–USSR Talks. Secret; + Nodis. Drafted on April 1 by Sisco, cleared by Adolph Dubs (EUR/SOV), and + approved by Sisco. Repeated + to USUN. + Washington, April 2, 1970, 0115Z. +

47932. 1. At working lunch April 1, Dobrynin and Sisco agreed that in this first follow-up meeting after + Dobrynin’s session with + Secretary March 25See footnote 5, Document 105. it + would be well to examine as precisely as possible where we are and to + try to determine what possibilities of agreement were. Principal results + of meeting were:

+

(a) Soviets continue unwilling to join appeal to parties to restore + ceasefire, but propose as alternative that US and USSR work quietly with Cairo and Tel Aviv + to achieve an informal understanding on de facto ceasefire;

+

(b) Soviets continue adamant against arms limitation talks on ground + Arabs feel this would only result in freezing a military balance clearly + favorable to Israel;

+

(c) Soviets are willing to consider a formulation on peace along lines + proposed by US to include explicitly obligation that there be QUOTE a + cessation of war and establishment of peace UNQUOTE provided we are + willing to commit ourselves to total withdrawal. Dobrynin explicitly specified this + included Israeli withdrawal from Sharm al-Shaykh and Gaza, with latter + to be explicitly designated as an Arab territory.

+

(d) Soviets propose a slight variant of past USSR proposal on relationship between timing of withdrawal + of Israeli forces and entry into effect of peace obligations. Variant + was described by Dobrynin as + follows: (1) Once agreed document was deposited with UN, both sides would be obligated not to + take any actions contrary to agreement; (2) Withdrawal would proceed by + stages, and UN forces would be + introduced at the end of the first stage during which UAR personnel would be limited to clearing + Suez Canal rather than be introduced in area initially evacuated by + Israeli forces. (3) At the end of the first stage there would be a de + jure acceptance by UAR of both + cessation of war and the state of peace. (4) With the understanding that + the second stage of withdrawal would not be a long one (a month or two), + UN forces would occupy the + additional territories evacuated in that stage, and UAR forces would return to the Sinai with + a UN buffer retained between the opposing sides. Dobrynin refused to be drawn out on + the area of demilitarization or on whether UN buffer was to be on one side or on both sides of the + border.

+

(e) Dobrynin refused to agree to + the formulation on peace contained in Point 2 of the October 28th + documentDocument 58. but + insisted that the formulation USSR has + in mind is close to that of the US. When asked whether he agreed to US + formulation as it related to the fedayeen, he did not accept this + formulation but maintained Soviets had language in mind that might + approximate this.

+

(f) On the question of negotiations, Dobrynin said Soviets no longer can accept present + formulation on Rhodes formula, reiterating argument made previously that + interpretation given to it by the parties has made this + unacceptable.See footnote 2, Document 53. When pressed by Sisco for an alternative formula, + Dobrynin said something + roughly along the following lines: The parties will have contact between + themselves through Jarring with + the understanding he could use various forms.

+

(g) On Sharm al-Shaykh, Dobrynin + insisted that there be explicit reference to UN force, its removal being subject to major power veto, + and indicated willingness to suggest that UN Secretary General consult with the parties on question + of composition and command of that force. He categorically precluded any + Soviet troops being involved in such a UN force.

+

2. Sisco pressed Dobrynin on two procedural points + without success: (a) Sisco + suggested that while Dobrynin + exposition was useful and helpful in understanding Soviet position, best + vehicle for making progress would be for Dobrynin to offer specific new language as emendation to + October 28th document which we consider to be a joint US–USSR effort and + not solely an American product; and (b) Sisco suggested that in next session, which now set for + afternoon April 6,Sisco and Dobrynin met on April 6, as + reported in telegram 50459 to Moscow, April 8. (National Archives, + Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC + Files, Box 340, Subject Files, Dobrynin/Kissinger) For Saunders’s summary and analysis of the dialogue + among Dobrynin, Rogers, and Sisco during March and the first + week of April, see Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, volume XII, + Soviet Union, January 1969–October 1970, Document + 151. he and Dobrynin discuss all other points in order to be sure + that there are not other significant areas of disagreement. With respect + to first point, Dobrynin + insisted that he was under instructions to talk in terms of emendation + of the Soviet June 1969 paper.See Document 34. Re (b), Dobrynin refused to focus on these + other points unless and until US reacted to latest concrete Soviet + suggestions. Sisco pointed out + these gave rise to difficulties since (1) there were a number of points + of difference between June and October documents, (2) October document was based on a precise format in + which obligations were undertaken between parties in relationship to one + another, whereas Soviet June document was considerably less so, and (3) + Soviets were asking us to react and to make concession on concrete + points of particular interest to them in circumstances where US did not + even know whether common ground could be found on these decisive points + or just where we stood on other matters such as freedom of passage + through Suez Canal, Straits of Tiran, refugee question, etc.

+

3. During meeting, Sisco also + said he wished to raise one broad question which he thought more + fundamental than any other in determining whether common ground can be + achieved: Would Soviets be willing to agree to guidelines for Jarring based on assumption of other + than total withdrawal? Dobrynin + said he could not reply to this question and suggested he and Sisco concentrate on concrete points + they have been discussing.

+

Comment: Above exposition by Dobrynin represents no appreciable + advance in Soviet position.According to the + memorandum of conversation of Kissinger’s meeting with Dobrynin on April 7, the Soviet + Ambassador said that he “had come to the conclusion that talking to + Sisco was getting to be + a waste of time” and added that “it would be good if I [Kissinger] intervened.” See Foreign + Relations, 1969–1976, volume XII, January 1969–October + 1970, Document 150. It does contain appearance of + greater oral flexibility and a few additional enticements (e.g., timing + of peace, possible new formulation on negotiating procedures). Our + inclination is to continue efforts smoke Dobrynin out and press for written counter language from + Soviets, and, meanwhile, to show no signs of give in our position. Would + appreciate Ambassador Beam’s + comment on this tactic.

+ + + Rogers + + +
+ +
+ + 108. National Security Study Memorandum 93Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential + Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box + H–171, National Security Study Memoranda. Secret; Sensitive. A copy + was sent to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. + Washington, April + 13, 1970. + + TO + The Secretary of State + The Secretary of Defense + The Director of Central Intelligence + + + SUBJECT + The Arab-Israeli Military Balance + +

The President has directed that, as a follow-up to the study produced in + response to NSSM 81NSSM 81 is Document 63. For a summary of the study, + see Document 93. and in the light of + recent exchanges with Israeli intelligence representatives,Led by Major General Aaharon Yariv, Israeli intelligence officials met + with U.S. officials between April 5 and 9, including sessions with + Sisco and Saunders, to present Israel’s case + for further shipments of U.S. aircraft based, in part, on the + participation of Soviet pilots in operational flights in Egypt. + (Memorandum from Saunders to + Kissinger, April 6; + National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 606, Country Files, + Middle East, Israel, Vol. IV, and memorandum from Saunders to Kissinger, April 9; ibid., NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box + H–171, National Security Study Memoranda) Regarding the new level of + Soviet military involvement in the United Arab Republic, Meir wrote to Nixon on April 7: “It is + inevitable that these developments will before long become public + knowledge. I am convinced, however, that an extremely grave + situation would arise if the publication of this new phase in Soviet + involvement were not followed urgently and immediately by a clear + and vigorous American public reaction on the highest level of + authority.” (Ibid., Box 1155, Saunders Files, Middle East + Negotiations Files) further studies be prepared which will + provide the following:

+

—Present intelligence estimates of Israeli and Arab air order of battle. + The study should (1) identify U.S. and Israeli estimates and (2) where + there are significant differences explain the reasons for the + differences as specifically as possible.

+

—Present detailed intelligence assessments of the principal indicators of + Arab air capability. The study should (1) identify U.S. and Israeli + assessments and (2) where there are significant differences explain the + reasons for the differences insofar as possible.

+

—An assessment of the present effective Arab-Israeli military balance. + This study should present a refinement of the analysis in the NSSM 81 paper in the light of any + revision in estimates of quantitative and qualitative factors and in the + light of any improvement in analytical technique.

+ +

The NSC Ad Hoc Group created by NSSM 81 will be reactivated for the + purpose of assembling this study.See Document 112 and footnote 2 thereto. The study will be submitted by + May 15 to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs for + reference to the Special Review Group.The + Ad Hoc Special Review Group met on May 21 and May 28, the minutes of + which are printed as Documents 117 and 119.

+ + + Henry A. Kissinger + + +
+ +
+ 109. Telegram From the Embassy in Israel to the Department of + StateSource: National + Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 606, Country Files, Middle East, Israel, + Vol. IV. Secret; Priority; Nodis. + Tel Aviv, April 17, 1970, 1130Z. +

1976. For President and Secretary from Sisco.

+

1. A few impressions of my two-hour meeting with PM Golda MeirSisco visited Israeli + and Arab capitals April 8–24. He met with Meir on the afternoon of April 16. + The full report of their discussion is in telegram 1965 from Tel + Aviv, April 16. (Ibid.) and some related reflections on trip + so far may be of interest.

+

2. I found her disappointed over arms decision, but reflecting deep and + genuine confidence in President and affection for him and ready promptly + to proceed quietly and discreetly with US officials in future + discussions on basis small packages not large publicized shopping + bags.

+

3. In Cairo I found NasserSisco + met with Nasser on the + evening of April 12. The full report of their discussion is in + telegram 794 from Cairo, April 12. (Ibid., Box 635, Country Files, + Middle East, UAR, Vol. III) + resigned to reliance on Soviets and with a fixation on Quote Phantoms + Unquote. Equally, Mrs. Meir came + back time again to Quote additional aircraft Unquote pleading Quote give + us benefit of doubt Unquote as to our needs since for Israel Quote it is + to be or not to be Unquote.

+

4. As expected, neither in Cairo nor in Tel Aviv did I detect any + prospect of changes in their respective maximum positions or of their + moving toward acceptance of October and December proposals as basis for negotiations. + Although both continue say they seek peaceful settlement, chasm between + their respective positions remains wide for now at least. I can, + however, report one very modest gain here. After I explained at length + to Mrs. Meir the benefits that + would accrue to Israel from a systematic series of Israeli political + peace initiatives, Mrs. Meir is + now expected to appoint a small committee to develop such a program for + her consideration. There is, of course, no commitment that any of the + painful decisions which would result in a bit more flexibility in the + Israeli position will be taken, but this is a start.

+

5. Mrs. Meir and top officials are + greatly preoccupied with and concerned over increased Soviet direct + involvement in Egypt. Without being specific, she stressed the need for + the US to be Quote firm Unquote with the Soviets since otherwise the + Russians may be tempted to broaden even further the parameters of + brinksmanship in Middle East in belief we are so preoccupied with Viet + Nam we will not react. But there is every sign Israelis will be prudent + and selective militarily in Egypt, without however denying selves right + to continue deep penetration raids if they deem military situation makes + necessary. For time being, at least, they have no intention to hit + Russian-manned SA–3s in Cairo, West Alexandria or Aswan. They will, + however, maintain intensive air attacks near Suez Canal frontline + positions to prevent installation of either SA–2s or SA–3s.

+

6. Finally, I am grateful that the attacks on our installations in Amman + resulted in no loss or injuries to American lives. Since focus of + extreme PLP fedayeen attacks and demonstration used as their principal + thrust that Quote Sisco was + carrying political settlements in his bag, Unquote and since I had + nothing new to give to Hussein, I + cancelled.The American Cultural Center + and the Embassy in Amman were attacked on April 15 by Palestinian + demonstrators. Despite King Hussein’s assurances to Symmes that Sisco would be safe, Symmes recommended that the Assistant Secretary not + visit Jordan. He wrote: “I have not doubted Jordanian good + intentions with respect to assuring safety of the Sisco mission but I continue to + believe that there is a considerable gap between their good + intentions and the ability to control the actions of others.” + (Telegram 1630 from Amman, April 16; ibid., Box 614, Country Files, + Middle East, Jordan, Vol. IV) Zaid + Rifai informed Symmes that Hussein considered Sisco’s cancellation a “personal offense” and that + the Ambassador should be transferred to another post because he had + not encouraged the Assistant Secretary to visit Jordan. (Telegram + 1635 from Amman, April 16; ibid.) It was not worth risking + American lives in Amman; neither Symmes nor I had any confidence that Hussein would act resolutely. Symmes and I agreed that main goal of + fedayeen in their recent demonstrations was to make it impossible for + Hussein to continue his + dedication to idea of political settlement with Israel which they, of + course, reject. If Hussein is + unable to sustain a 24-hour visit of a US Assistant Secretary of State + and does not even feel himself strong enough to express publicly regret over these + unfortunate developments, it raises fundamental question of whether he + is a wasting asset. Hussein is + going to have to make up his mind whether he or fedayeen are running his + country. Recent events in Jordan require some sober thought by all of us + in the days ahead.

+

7. With all other Americans, we are praying for the safe return of our + astronauts.Reference is to the Apollo + 13 astronauts, Jim Lovell, Jack Swigert, and Fred Haise. While en + route to the moon beginning on April 11, an oxygen tank exploded + aboard their aircraft, forcing an immediate abort of the moon + landing mission. The astronauts returned to earth safely on April + 17.

+ + + Barbour + + +
+ +
+ 110. Memorandum of ConversationSource: National Archives, Nixon Presidential + Materials, NSC Files, Box 606, + Country Files, Middle East, Israel, Vol. IV. Secret. Sent for + information. Drafted by Saunders on April 25. The meeting was held in + Kissinger’s + office. + Washington, April 24, 1970, 6 p.m. + + PARTICIPANTS + Yitzak Rabin, Ambassador + of Israel + Shlomo Argov, Minister, + Israeli Embassy + Henry A. Kissinger, + Assistant to the President + Harold H. Saunders, NSC Staff + +

Ambassador Rabin began by saying + that, since April 18, there is a new phenomenon in the Middle East. + Soviet pilots have taken an active role by participating in the air + defense of Egypt.

+

In response to Dr. Kissinger’s + question, the Ambassador said that Israel estimates there are fifty + Soviet pilots involved; Israel does not know how many aircraft are + involved. They fly from three bases, two southwest of Cairo and one + (Djankialis) near Alexandria. The last has been involved in only two + incidents where planes were scrambled. Most of the activity has been + from the two southern bases.

+

Dr. Kissinger asked whether + Soviet pilots have engaged Israeli aircraft. The Ambassador replied, + “Almost,” on April 18 over the Nile. The Ambassador described the new + pattern of Soviet activity as follows: Soviet-piloted aircraft operate south of an east-west line + from Cairo to Suez. For the time being, they are not interfering with + Israeli attacks in the Suez Canal Sector. Israel does not yet know + whether they will expand their operations into that area.

+

Over the past week, the number of Soviet responses has grown rapidly. + Whenever Israeli planes approach, Soviet planes are scrambled. As a + normal thing, they have not tried to interfere directly with attacking + Israeli planes, even in one instance when Israeli planes were attacking + a target on the west shore of the Gulf of Suez south of the Cairo-Suez + line.

+

The corollary to this move in Egyptian actions has been greater + aggressiveness in Egyptian air attacks on Israeli positions in the + Sinai. Since the Egyptians feel that their hinterland is defended by + SA–3 missiles (there are now ten operational sites—four around + Alexandria, six around Cairo), they have mounted more sorties + themselves.

+

The Ambassador concluded his presentation by stating emphatically and + with some emotion that this is no longer a question of a UAR-Israeli + military balance. Now there is a new dimension. Israel wants more + planes.

+

Dr. Kissinger asked how many. + Rabin initially replied, + “at least as many as when the Prime Minister was here,” but Argov later called Saunders to ask that a correction in + the record be made to show the Ambassador’s reply as reading, “The + number submitted when General Yariv made his intelligence presentation here.”See footnote 3, + Document 108. In a meeting with Kissinger and Saunders on April 9, Yariv submitted charts that + showed past attrition rates of Israeli aircraft and forecasted + attrition rates for the next two years. He wanted replacements based + on the loss of 152 aircraft from 1967 to 1971. (Memorandum of + conversation, April 9; National Archives, Nixon Presidential + Materials, NSC Files, Box 606, + Country Files, Middle East, Israel, Vol. IV)

+

In the conversation that followed, there was a series of brief exchanges + between Dr. Kissinger and the + Ambassador with the following points made:

+

—The Ambassador asked how the U.S. would respond to this Soviet move. Dr. + Kissinger indicated that we + would have to look at this new intelligence and consider the new + elements in the situation, but “we will not tolerate their using + military force against you.”

+

—Rabin implied that the Soviet + decision was brought about by the U.S. decision not to provide Israel + with aircraft now.See Document 105. He also felt that perhaps the + Israeli decision not to attack Soviet-manned SA–3 positions in the Nile + Valley had contributed to the Soviet decision. The Soviets will fill a + vacuum whenever they feel one exists.

+ +

—Making clear that he was asking the question only to improve his own + understanding of Israeli thinking, Dr. Kissinger asked whether Israel would attack the bases + from which Soviet pilots are operating. Ambassador Rabin replied, “What would that do?” + The U.S. would come to Israel and urge it not to further involve the + Soviets. Assistant Secretary Sisco had made clear in JerusalemSee Document 109. + that the U.S. believes that SA–3 missiles are now in the UAR because of the Israeli deep + penetration raids. Dr. Kissinger + asked, “Is that wrong?” Rabin + said, “No. That is why there is no good reason for Israel to attack the + Soviet-manned air bases.”

+

—Rabin said that the Israelis + did not think the Soviets would feel “so much freedom to involve + themselves to back the Egyptian war of attrition.” Israel was on the + verge of forcing Nasser to + accept a cease-fire. Israel had not backed the Soviets against the wall; + Israel had given them a “political out” in the proposal to accept a + cease-fire.

+

The conversation concluded with Dr. Kissinger saying simply that he would of course report + the Ambassador’s approach to the President and we would review our + position.

+ + + Harold H. Saunders + Saunders initialed “H.H.S.” above his typed + signature. + + +
+ +
+ + 111. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the + Soviet Union and the Mission to the United NationsSource: National Archives, Nixon + Presidential Materials, NSC Files, + Box 712, Country Files, Europe, USSR, Vol. VIII. Secret; Priority; Nodis. Drafted on + April 29 by Atherton, + cleared by Sisco and + Richardson and in IO and EUR, and approved by Rogers. + Washington, May 1, 1970, 0302Z. +

65851. Ref: Moscow 2099 and 2114.In telegram + 2099 from Moscow, April 27, Beam reported his conversation with Vinogradov, whom he described as + “amiable and non-polemic.” Analyzing Vinogradov’s comments, Beam wrote: “I am not sanguine that the Soviets are + ready to make concessions at this time, since their propaganda + indicates they feel situation has stabilized following US arms + decision and SA–3 delivery. Nevertheless I think it worthwhile to + push them to produce the flexibility they have hinted at on peace + and negotiations.” (Ibid., Box 711, Country Files, Europe, USSR, Vol. VII) Telegram 2114 from + Moscow, April 27, reported the conversation in further detail; see + Foreign + Relations, 1969–1976, volume XII, Soviet Union, January + 1969–October 1970, Document 154.

+

1. Further direct involvement of Soviets with pilots flying operational + missions for UAR injects new element + into question of how we should proceed in bilateral talks on Middle East + with Soviets. Following are relevant considerations as we see them:

+

(A) Soviets, as you point out, seem unwilling or unable to make any + meaningful concessions on settlement proposals at this stage. As result + of steps they have taken to strengthen UAR air defenses and cautious Israeli reaction to date, + they probably feel they have bought some time in terms of their + relations with Nasser and of + stabilizing military situation. It would appear reasonable to assume + that they now want to see whether this development will have any effect + on US and Israeli positions and that they meanwhile feel under no + immediate pressure on diplomatic front.

+

(B) Sisco’s discussions in Middle + EastSee Document + 109. make it increasingly clear that two power + exercise in some ways plays into Soviet hands in Arab world, since + Soviets benefit not only from taking inflexible positions as protector + of Arab rights, but also from distorting and using against us positions + we take in bilateral talks in order to maintain firm negotiating stance + vis-à-vis USSR.

+

(C) Above considerations suggest it would be undesirable at this stage + for us to appear eager to increase pace or visibility of bilaterals. + Present publicity re Soviet pilots reenforces this conclusion,The Israeli Government issued a statement on + April 29 asserting the presence of Soviet pilots flying operational + missions in Egypt, concluding: “Israel will continue to defend + itself against all aggression which violates the ceasefire + arrangements and which aims at renewal of war in the area. In all + its struggles Israel drew strength from its unity and from the + justice of its cause. Israel will continue in its firm stand and in + its quest for true and lasting peace.” For the text of the + statement, see Israel’s Foreign Policy: Historical + Documents, volumes 1–2, 1947–1974, Chapter XII, The War of + Attrition and the Cease Fire, Document 14. It was also published in + the New York Times, April 30, 1970, p. + 8. since we would + not want to create impression either publicly or vis-à-vis Soviets that + we feel under pressure as result of this development to consider + negotiating changes in our position in absence of prior concrete + responses from Soviets on peace and negotiations language which we have + told them we expect.

+

(D) For above reasons as well as ones you cite, we agree it would not be + desirable for Sisco to go to + Moscow. Furthermore, we would not want to send NEA expert since this + could signal to Soviets that we are prepared to enter new phase in + bilateral talks. On other hand, we do not want to give impression we are + breaking off or suspending bilaterals. We believe we should, however, + make clear we continue to feel that next move is up to Soviets. We must + also make clear that their increasing military involvement is new factor + in situation which cannot help but influence our judgment re their + intentions on diplomatic front.

+

2. In light of foregoing considerations, you should seek early + appointment with Vinogradov to + make following points:

+

(A) We remain prepared to continue bilateral talks. We do not think, + however, that question of where they are conducted or by whom is main + issue at this time. So long as Dobrynin is away from Washington, you are available in + Moscow. We can also talk to Vorontsov as necessary.

+

(B) As we have repeatedly said, we consider position reflected in October + 28 and December 18 documents represent fair middle ground and are not + prepared to depart from principles contained therein.See Documents 58 and 78. While precise language in those + documents is not immutable, we need to know where Soviets agree with it + and where they do not. We particularly need to know if they accept + preambular language on negotiations plus language on peace commitments. + If they do not, then we need from them alternative language which we + could consider. Precise responses from Soviets on these points would + help us decide how we might most usefully proceed in bilaterals. We do + not rule out procedure Vinogradov suggests at appropriate stage. Sisco tried to get Dobrynin to in effect do this in last + two meetings by asking Dobrynin + whether there were any other points in October 28 document to which + Soviets objected. Sisco said it + important to know what remaining points of difference there might be. + Dobrynin refused to be drawn + out.See Document + 107. We are becoming increasingly concerned over + Dobrynin’s lack of authority + to go beyond a narrow brief. Meanwhile, so far as identifying points of + agreement and disagreement + is concerned, four power deputies in New York are now doing precisely + that, and position being taken by Soviets far from encouraging.

+

(C) You should also make clear we will not agree to go back to June 69 + document as basis.See Document 34. October 28 document is composite of + June 69 Soviet document and US July 69 documentSee footnote 4, Document + 39. and intended to reflect common positions. For + example, Soviets have teased us with saying “agree to total withdrawal + including Gaza and Jerusalem, and we will consider more detailed + language on peace.” We heard that several times before from Dobrynin without result. Now in four + power talks Soviets, even for description purposes alone, are not + willing to accept a British/French formulationThe British-French approach, as reported in + telegram 637 from USUN, April 8, + involved the Four Power Deputy Representatives producing a + memorandum for Jarring (see + Document 98) that developed “concrete + formulations, rather general in nature and designed to encompass + existing positions, of ‘common denominators’ on maximum points of + agreement reached to date with statement of points on which + disagreement remains included in separate section or sections.” + (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 27–14 + ARAB–ISR) The Soviet problems with this approach were reported in + telegram 677 from USUN, April 16. + (Ibid.) As of May 26, the Four-Power deputies had met 13 times + “pursuant to their mandate,” but had “not yet completed work,” and, + as a result, the Department concluded that absent a “major change in + Soviet attitude,” any report that the deputies produced would be + unlikely contain “anything very useful to Jarring attainable in foreseeable + future.” (Telegram 1050 from USUN, + May 26, and telegram 80274 to USUN, May 25; both ibid.) which falls short of our + present point 2 formulation in October 28 document. This causes us to + view with great doubt Soviet willingness to move towards us in a serious + way on points dealing with peace and negotiations. Either they accept + present formulation in October 28 document or provide us with + alternative language to consider.Beam met with Vinogradov on May 5, as reported + in telegram 2288 from Moscow, May 5, and made the points requested + by the Department, “sticking closely to Dept’s language.” The Deputy Foreign Minister responded + that Beam’s comments + “reflected great misinterpretation of events in ME” and that the + “warnings” in his statement were “unnecessary and not at all + justified.” He added that the blame that the United States had + placed on the Soviet Union and the Arab states for the “continuation + of unfortunate events” in the Middle East should be directed at the + “Israeli aggressor” which was “unwilling to withdraw troops, + implement SC res, or listen to any + proposal which would lead to peaceful settlement.” (Ibid., Nixon + Presidential Materials, NSC Files, + Box 712, Country Files, Europe, USSR, Vol. VIII)

+

(D) At same time we must make clear to Soviet Government that their + operational involvement in military role in UAR has injected new element into situation. Secretary + already stressed this point to Ambassador Dobrynin following introduction of SA–3s and Soviet + personnel.Rogers made this point to + Dobrynin during a + meeting on March 25. See footnote 5, Document + 105. Introduction of Soviet pilots flying + operational missions makes this + development even more serious and potentially dangerous. We hope Soviets + have not misinterpreted our restraint in deferring decision on more + aircraft for Israel.See Document 105. We regret they have + not matched our restraint. We want again to make clear that we will do + what is necessary to see that the military balance is not tipped against + Israel.

+

(E) We realize that Soviets say their military actions in UAR are purely defensive. In our view, + however, it is not possible to draw so clear a distinction between + defensive and offensive actions. Fact is that what Soviets are doing + facilitates more offensive UAR military + action. We consider recent Soviet steps as serious move constituting + deeper involvement and in direct opposition to USG efforts to promote peace settlement through limitation + on arms shipments to the area and through observance of ceasefire. Among + other things, they raise question whether Soviets have now reached limit + of their involvement. To avoid any miscalculation, we consider it + important to have an indication of Soviet intentions in this regard.

+ + + Rogers + + +
+ +
+ 112. Paper Prepared by the National Security Council StaffSource: National Archives, Nixon + Presidential Materials, NSC Files, + NSC Institutional Files + (H-Files), Box H–044, Senior Review Group Meetings, Review Group + Soviet Pilots in Egypt 5/8/70. Secret; Nodis. All brackets are in + the original. + Washington, May 7, + 1970. +

ANALYTICAL SUMMARY

+

DIPLOMATIC OPTIONS—ARAB-ISRAELI IMPASSE

+

Introductory note: A previous paper deals with how + the U.S. should respond to Soviet pilots in the UAR, particularly in + considering its response to Israel’s further aircraft requests.The paper, “Reassessment of Current + Arab-Israel Situation and Possible US Courses of Action,” undated, + as well as the other papers for the May 8 Review Group meeting, are + ibid. At the same time recent political developments, + including the Soviet initiative, make it necessary to reappraise overall + U.S. strategy toward the Arab-Israeli impasse. Diplomatic options were included in a general way + in the previous paper, but that viewed the problem mainly as one of U.S. + response to the USSR. The purpose of this paper is to focus on the + diplomatic options. [The State discussion papers under this memo + recommend one course of action. The purpose of this memo is to suggest a + wider framework of options.]

+

I. The Situation

+

A. Soviet assumption of a greater role in the defense + of Egypt—whatever its ultimate degree—has changed the + political-military balance. The U.S. (and Israeli) assumption + has been that the USSR might rather + press Nasser toward a more + reasonable negotiating position than risk greater Soviet military + commitment. What now seems clear is that the USSR would rather risk that commitment than press the Arabs + to give up territory in a settlement. What is not clear is how concrete + the USSR will press Nasser to be on measures to enforce a + settlement if he gets his territory back and the Palestinians get a fair + settlement.

+

B. Nasser has + posed the issue sharply to the U.S. in his appeal to President + Nixon:See Document + 115. Does the U.S. support enlargement of Israel’s + boundaries and denial of restitution to the Palestinians? Right + or wrong, he has now put the issue so that the Arabs must read provision + of further U.S. aid to Israel as an affirmative answer to that question. + In other words, it will become increasingly costly to negotiate from the + strength of Israel’s occupation of Arab territory without at the same + time making clear that we do not believe Israel should keep any of that + territory in a peace settlement. Nasser has put himself in a position to say that he has + offered to make peace with a Jewish state in Palestine but the U.S. in + return is not prepared to press Israel to withdraw. As the issue is now + posed, if the U.S. confronts the USSR + it will be over Israel’s enlarged boundaries, not over Israel’s + survival. It is in the Soviet interest to have the issue posed this way: + If the U.S. confronts the USSR, it + loses in the Arab world; if the U.S. tries to shift the issue, it makes + a negotiating concession.

+

C. Israel has posed the issue equally sharply: Will the + U.S. back down in the face of a Soviet threat by refusing to provide + Israel with the arms it needs? Israel is attempting to bargain + for enlargement of its borders. It has therefore refused to say that it + is prepared to withdraw from occupied territories as part of a + settlement. Israel has repudiated the U.S. suggestion that it move a + step at a time toward negotiation by accepting the principle of + withdrawal if the Arabs accept some concrete obligations involved in + making peace. The Israeli position is that Nasser will not make peace and that any sign of flexibility by Israel or the U.S. will + be read as backing down in the face of a Soviet threat.

+

D. The advent of the Palestinians as a + quasi-independent force with a veto over Jordanian—and perhaps + Lebanese—policy raises the question whether the Palestinian movement + can be dealt with still just as a refugee problem. To date, the + U.S. has assumed that their movement could be defused by (a) providing a + generous refugee settlement and (b) leaving it to King Hussein to provide the Palestinians + with whatever degree of autonomy after Israel withdraws from the West + Bank. So far, it has been unthinkable to consider a settlement directly + between Israel and the Palestinians (perhaps with U.S. involvement) + because (a) this would mean writing off King Hussein and (b) the Palestinian movement is still so + fragmented that it is difficult to know who might speak for it in a + negotiation. But now if the Palestinians hold the upper hand in Jordan, + we have to consider whether to try some sort of negotiation on this + front as a possible means of circumventing Nasser.

+

E. The major power talks have not worked, and the + option of a direct U.S. effort with Nasser is re-opened. + Nasser has said that he does not + wish to discuss the terms of a settlement directly with the U.S. But the + USSR has not pressed Nasser to change his position + materially, and Nasser knows the + U.S. alone—if anyone—has the influence to move Israel. Since Nasser has made an open appeal direct + to President Nixon, it is at + least an issue to be considered whether the U.S. should now go straight + to Nasser to try to reach an + understanding.

+

F. In the perspective of a year, the position of + governments friendly to the U.S. has worsened. Specifically: + The Libyan coup last September. The fedayeen position in Lebanon in + October; King Hussein’s + compromise with the fedayeen in February;On + February 12, King Hussein + reached an agreement with guerrilla representatives to rescind + security measures that the Palestinian commandos viewed as curbs on + their military strikes against Israel. (New York + Times, February 14, 1970, p. 5, and February 15, 1970, p. + 19) the plot against Faisal last fall. In each case, radical forces have + capitalized on the moderate regime’s relationship with the U.S. and the + U.S. position on Israel to the disadvantage of the regime.

+

II. Summary of State + Suggestion

+

For the sake of convenience, the course of action described in the + following paper for the purpose of discussion consists of the following + steps:

+

A. In response to Nasser’s peace + appeal propose to him that the UAR and + Israel:

+

1. subscribe formally and publicly to restoration of the ceasefire;

+ +

2. begin discussions under Jarring, according to whatever procedures he recommends + on the basis of statements by both sides that they accept the UN Resolution (242) and agree that the + purpose of the discussions is the establishment of peace between them, + recognition of Israel’s right to exist and the withdrawal of forces in + accordance with the resolution;

+

3. tell Nasser that, if he + accepts this proposition, we will undertake to obtain Israeli acceptance + and meanwhile will continue to defer a decision on additional aircraft + for Israel, limiting ourselves for now to replacement of Israeli + losses.

+

B. Tell Israel in advance that:

+

1. We are going to make such an approach to Nasser.

+

2. If Nasser is responsive, we + would expect a flexible and positive response from Israel. Failing that, + we would have to reconsider our position of standing firm on our October + and December documents and not negotiating more detailed proposals in + the Two and Four Power talks.

+

3. We expect Israel to refrain from resuming deep penetration raids.

+

4. As an interim measure, we are prepared immediately to amend present + contracts to provide replacement for present and projected aircraft + losses through 1970, thus assuring continuation of deliveries when those + already contracted are completed (perhaps 8 Phantoms and 18–20 + Skyhawks).

+

C. The tactical alternative within this option—not + mentioned in the State paper—would be to try to pin down an Israeli + position before going to Nasser.

+

III. The Range of + Diplomatic Options

+

A. Proceed within the framework established by the diplomatic moves of + 1969—Four Power and US–USSR talks and U.S. documents—to try to + re-establish the cease-fire and launch negotiations under Jarring.

+

+ Option 1: Major-power effort. Move in the Four Power + and U.S.-Soviet talks to fill in the gaps in our proposals on Sharm + al-Shaikh, Gaza, DMZ’s and UN forces + which are now left for the parties to negotiate. +

+

+ Pro. +

+

—Further Soviet military involvement in the UAR has sharply increased the dangers in the present + situation, and it is important to work out directly with the USSR just exactly what the Soviets will + settle for politically in limiting their military involvement.

+

—The U.S. must at least clarify its position on these points anyway to + the extent of leaving no doubt that we expect the Israelis to retain possession. While such a move + could look like a concession to Soviet pressure, it is a move that we + must make to base our position on the right issue—protecting Israel’s + survival not conquests—whatever we do.

+

+ Con. +

+

—This would look too much like giving in to Soviet pressure without a + compensating move from the Soviets on issues of interest to us.

+

—The Soviets have shown little apparent inclination to press the + Egyptians to make concessions, so we should regard the experiment to + enlist their help as having been unsuccessful and deal directly with + Nasser ourselves.

+

Option 2: Bilateral. Go directly to Israel and the UAR, + trying to persuade them to begin negotiations on the basis of the + U.S. October 28 document.See Document 58. In some respects the + arguments are simply the obverse of those above but the refinements are + these:

+

+ Pro. +

+

—The major-power talks have not produced results, so the U.S. should go + directly to the parties.

+

—The October 28 formulation represents as balanced a set of principles as + are likely to be put together as a prelude to negotiation. Apart from + wording, they combine the essentials for getting a negotiation + started—an Israeli commitment to withdraw and Arab agreement to specific + obligations for enforcing the peace.

+

+ Con. +

+

—The Israelis have already rejected this document, so tactically this + would make it unnecessarily difficult to bring them along.

+

—The U.S. documents have aroused enough suspicion on both sides that it + would be well to drop them.

+

Comment: The broad arguments for and against both + of these options include those that have been repeated for the past year + on whether the U.S. should try to work out with other major powers + semi-detailed guidelines for Jarring. Even though the second option above is a + partial break with this approach, the October 28 document is still the + product of it and therefore subject to many of its disadvantages, even + though the bilateral approach might overcome some of them.

+

B. Step aside from the 1969 tack and try to re-establish the cease-fire + launch negotiations by some simpler formula.

+ +

Option 3: UAR-Israel. Try to persuade Israel and the + UAR to re-establish the + cease-fire and to start negotiating indirectly on the basis of a + simple commitment by both sides that the purpose of the negotiation + is to establish a state of peace with Israel, based on recognizing + Israel’s existence and Israeli withdrawal. Ambassador Jarring tried—and nearly succeeded in + spring, 1968—to launch talks on the basis of a simple formula like this. + [This is the State suggestion described in II above. State factors in + the arms decision.]

+

+ Pro. +

+

—Some initiative is required to contain the dangers created by recent + Soviet moves. Taking this new tack would permit the U.S. to make a move + that does not require us to make concessions in the context of the + U.S.-Soviet discussions of the past year. It would also get away from + many of the suspicions.

+

—Nasser’s May Day appeal to + President Nixon has provided an + opening for a direct response.

+

—While this would require the Israelis to state their willingness to + withdraw if there is peace and start talking without an open Arab + commitment to direct negotiation, it would preserve a negotiating + process, on which Israel insists.

+

+ Con. +

+

—This seems unlikely to work unless it is possible to clarify precisely + beforehand that the Israelis will not try to bargain for major + territorial changes and that Nasser is willing to coexist peacefully with a Jewish + state and control the Palestinians. This approach does not really + clarify the calculated ambiguity on that point in the UN resolution. Unless the U.S. is willing + to come down hard on those points, the effort is a half-measure hardly + worth the effort.

+

—If the U.S. is going to do anything, it should go all the way and + attempt to work out an Israel-UAR agreement without leaving this to a + vague negotiating process that is bound to fail.

+

Option 4: Jordan-Israel. Try again to launch a + Jordan-Israel negotiation, this time seeking a way to involve the + Palestinians and thereby perhaps free Hussein of Nasser’s restraint.

+

+ Pro. +

+

—This course has been rejected previously mainly because it was judged, + apparently correctly, that Hussein could not negotiate a settlement on his own if + Nasser disagreed. Now, + however, the increased strength of the Palestinians at least raises the + question whether there is an opportunity for an Israeli settlement with + the Palestinians using Hussein as + a figurehead.

+ +

—If this were a possibility (and the Israelis would have to take the + lead), it might offer a way of circumventing Nasser and the Soviets. Nasser would have difficulty opposing + a settlement to which a substantial group of Palestinians agreed.

+

—The Palestinian movement must be taken into account if a settlement is + to be realistic.

+

+ Con. +

+

—The Palestinian movement is not sufficiently coherent yet to present a + united negotiating front. It may in time, but that time is not yet.

+

—Any premature move in the direction of the Palestinians risks building + them up without assurance that they can produce a unified position or + that such a position will be sufficiently moderate and constructive that + the Israelis can live with it.

+

C. By-pass Jarring and make a + unilateral effort at a settlement.

+

+ Option 5: Work out bilaterally with Nasser the arrangements for + enforcing a peace settlement that he would agree to provided the + U.S. could force Israel to withdraw then press this on Israel along + with a pledge of long-term economic and military assistance and + perhaps a U.S. security guarantee. +

+

+ Pro. +

+

—Only action this decisive, if any, is likely to produce a political + settlement. The alternative is accepting the deterioration in U.S.-Arab + relations and the U.S.-Soviet confrontation that are likely if present + trends take their course.

+

—Continued U.S. support for Israel can be sustained only if there is a + political settlement based on virtually complete withdrawal. The present + course of events is likely to lead to an Israeli-Soviet clash. The U.S. + does not have an interest in a confrontation with the USSR over Israel’s right to hold occupied + Arab territory. Therefore, unless Israel withdraws, any U.S. + Administration is unlikely to find domestic political support for + confronting the USSR in present + circumstances. The result will be an even more humiliating back-down in + the face of dramatic Soviet pressure than would be the case if the U.S. + made changes in its position now.

+

—Nasser has opened the door to + this kind of effort in his peace appeal to President Nixon.

+

+ Con. +

+

—The U.S. is unlikely to be able to bring enough pressure to bear on + Israel to make Israel withdraw to virtually pre-war borders. Whether + this is desirable or not, it just will not work.

+ +

—Nasser is unlikely to agree to + any terms in advance of an Israeli commitment to withdraw with + sufficient precision to permit us even to make a good case to the + Israelis.

+

—The threat of such a squeeze would create a national crisis in Israel + which could well lead to a decision for early pre-emptive military + action of some sort on grounds that success is more likely before the + Soviets are completely entrenched.

+

—Going to Nasser would look like + U.S. capitulation.

+

+ Option 6: Have a complete sorting out with Israel of + the extent of U.S. support against the Arabs and against the USSR, making clear that U.S. support + is contingent on withdrawal. On the basis of an Israeli commitment + to withdraw attempt to work out an Israel-UAR agreement with + Nasser. +

+

+ Pro. +

+

—A commitment of substantial U.S. support for the future coupled with a + clear understanding of its limits is the only way we could begin to + persuade Israel to cut back its present demands.

+

—Unless the U.S. begins thinking in these terms, it will be drawn into a + confrontation with the USSR by Israel + on the issue of protecting Israel’s conquests.

+

—Israel is expecting massive economic and military support from the U.S. + It is fairer to both Israel and the U.S. to reach an understanding now + than to let Israel proceed on what could prove false expectations.

+

—A substantial U.S. commitment to Israel in the context of withdrawal and + peace would be tolerable to the Arabs.

+

+ Con. +

+

—The Israelis will not withdraw under any circumstances. The U.S. will be + faced with the choice between backing down and sharply cutting back its + aid. This would be domestically unsupportable, especially in the present + atmosphere.

+

—The U.S. cannot in good conscience squeeze the Israelis until it has + confidence in Nasser’s + willingness to make peace and live up to his commitments.

+

—Putting this choice to the Israelis would create a national crisis that + could well result in a pre-emptive attack of some sort.

+
+ +
+ + 113. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security + Affairs (Kissinger) to President + NixonSource: National Archives, Nixon + Presidential Materials, NSC Files, + Box 614, Country Files, Middle East, Jordan, Vol. IV. Secret; Nodis. + Sent for action. Printed from an uninitialed copy. Attached to a + memorandum from Haig to + Saunders on May 12 + asking him to prepare a National Security Decision Memorandum + reflecting the President’s decision. The brackets are in the + original. + Washington, May 11, + 1970. + + SUBJECT + Arms Supply to Jordan + +

Background

+

At the time of King Hussein’s + talks with you last April,See Document 19. it was agreed to meet + some of Jordan’s more pressing military equipment needs. With your + approval, Secretary Rogers told + the King then that we would sell some ground equipment and a second + squadron of F–104 aircraft if requested, as had been agreed in + 1968.See footnote + 3, Document 19. As the package was finally worked + out, it contained less artillery than Jordan wanted.See Foreign Relations, 1964–1968, volume XX, + Arab-Israeli Dispute, 1967–1968, Documents 95, 107, and 111.

+

The question of artillery became active again last summer when Hussein asked the Soviets what they + might be able to supply him. They delayed for six months and then came + up with an offer to deliver 90% of everything the King wants this + year.See footnote + 3, Document 69. You may recall that this was + mentioned at the NSC meeting on + December 10 and you encouraged Secretary Laird to do what could be done before the Rabat Arab + summit conference.See Document 74. The Rabat summit conference was held + December 21–23, 1969. A U.S. military team went to Jordan and + put together a package designed to meet Jordan’s minimum needs.

+

The package which Secretary Rogers now recommends you approve [memo attached]Attached but not printed. The details of the + package are included in attachments to a memorandum that Warren Nutter sent to Laird on April 15. (Washington + National Records Center, OSD Files: + FRC 330–76–0067, Box 75, Jordan) In a telephone conversation on May + 1 at 11:25 a.m., Sisco told + Kissinger that the arms + package was “peanuts” compared to what the Soviet Union was “not + selling but giving” to Jordan. (National Archives, Nixon + Presidential Materials, NSC Files, + Henry Kissinger + Telephone Conversation Transcripts, Box 5, Chronological + File) consists of enough artillery to provide minimum support + for Jordan’s 9 infantry brigades and 1 armored division which are + presently deployed in defensive positions along a line in the heights + 3–5 miles from the Jordan River. Although the proposed U.S. package is not insignificant, the + Soviets have offered a more substantial package to Jordan. For example, + only medium range weapons are included, whereas the Soviet package + includes weapons with a range to reach Jerusalem. Fifteen million + dollars in sales credit have been earmarked from FY 1970 funds, and another $15 million could be made + available from FY 1971 funds if + necessary.

+

Issues

+

The first issue arises from the fact that one + purpose of this package would be to pre-empt a Soviet arms offer.

+

If we provide no artillery or a smaller package than the one proposed + (which has been considerably reduced below what Hussein requested), or if we delay + further giving Hussein an answer, + he will almost certainly go the Soviet route for arms. He could do so in + a matter of weeks or even days, if his special emissary who is arriving + in Washington Monday carries back a negative or temporizing response + from us.

+

If the Soviets take this first step toward establishing a foothold in + Jordan, it would probably be the irreversible beginning of a + reorientation of Jordan away from the U.S. toward Moscow. U.S. influence + would begin to decline, and over time the Soviets might achieve a + position in Jordan comparable to that which they have established in the + UAR.

+

The second issue is whether this package would + seriously affect the Jordan-Israel balance.

+

The proposal would provide a significant increase in Jordan’s artillery, + but there are some limits. It would not give the Jordanian army the + capability to cross the Jordan River against Israel, and the Jordanian + army would remain inadequate against the Israeli ground threat. The main + point, however, is that a safe military balance as the Israelis see it + includes the capability to mount a sharp decisive strike. Moreover, the + Israelis are less concerned about the Jordanian offensive threat than + they are about Jordan’s capability to conduct a war of attrition. The + proposed package would significantly enhance Jordan’s capability in this + respect.

+

The other side of this point is that while the Israelis would prefer no + weapons in Jordan, they have generally agreed that if Jordan is armed + Israel would prefer a U.S. to a Soviet military presence. Israel is + nervous about the Soviet role in the UAR, and may well see the + importance of keeping the Soviets out of Jordan. The choice for them is + between a smaller U.S. package and a larger Soviet one. But Tel Aviv + would in any case use whatever we do in Jordan as one further argument + in support of additional military assistance for Israel.

+

The third issue, closely related, is how Israel’s + view of the overall military balance will be affected if the Israelis + see some decrease in their ability to mount a pre-emptive strike in + Jordan as well as in the UAR. The problem is more acute with respect to the Israeli air balance with + the UAR. The combination of the new missile system (SA–3) provided by + the Soviets and more active participation of Soviet pilots in the UAR air force presents Israel with a + serious threat. Since the Israelis measure the balance of power, both on + the ground and in the air, in terms of a long war of attrition, the + cumulative impact of a shift on the Jordanian front coupled with + significantly increased Soviet aid to Egypt is likely to appear most + ominous to Israel.

+

The fourth issue is the question of domestic + reaction at a time when some segments of the public are already aroused + because of our action in Cambodia.The + United States began bombing North Vietnamese sanctuaries in Cambodia + in April. The degree of domestic criticism would depend to a + large extent on whether Israel is persuaded that U.S. aid to Jordan is + the lesser of two evils. But even if Israel could be convinced, pressure + would increase for a positive response to Tel Aviv’s requests for U.S. + assistance. The Israelis know we are discussing an arms package for + Jordan and would be informed of its magnitude.

+

Although the decision on the arms package could have been delayed at + least a week, State’s agreement to see King Hussein’s emissary on Monday has forced our hand and we + should be prepared to discuss the Jordanian request at that time.

+

Recommendation

+

On balance, I recommend that you approve the proposed arms package for + Jordan provided that you make it clear:

+

—That approval is based on the premise that it is an alternative which + will hinder Soviet entry into Jordan;

+

—That approval is linked with a decision on your part to provide + additional hardware support to meet the increased threat posed to Israel + by the combination of this action and substantially increased Soviet aid + to Egypt;

+

—That you require a recommendation as to the level of additional aid for + Israel by June 15, 1970.Nixon approved Kissinger’s recommendation, and + Kissinger sent it to + Rogers and Laird as NSDM 61, May 19, which reads: “The President has + approved the arms package for Jordan,” adding that “if Jordan + accepts this package, it does so with the understanding that it will + not accept Soviet arms” and “that this decision is linked with the + decision to provide additional equipment to Israel.” (National + Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC + Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–216, National Security Decision + Memoranda) But King Hussein + had already rejected the arms package, a decision that Zaid Rifai conveyed to Sisco on May 13. Hussein informed Rifai: “I could not justify to + myself or the Armed Forces, who are aware of our needs, accepting an + offer short of what the Untied States Armed Forces Team recommended + as the bare minimum required with total deliveries this year.” He + concluded: “In short if your list as stated is the final offer, + thanks but no thanks.” (Telegram 73228 to Amman, May 13; ibid., RG + 59, Central Files 1970–73, DEF 15–2 JORDAN)

+
+ +
+ + 114. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security + Affairs (Kissinger) to President + NixonSource: National Archives, Nixon + Presidential Materials, NSC Files, + Box 645, Country Files, Middle East, Middle East—General, Vol. III. + Secret; Nodis. Sent for information. A notation on the memorandum + indicates the President saw it. + Washington, May 12, + 1970. + + SUBJECT + Sisco Reflections After + Mid-East Trip + +

Secretary Rogers personally asked + that you receive Assistant Secretary Sisco’s characterization of the situation in the Near + East as he saw it during his recent trip and his reflections on some of + the basic assumptions we have been working from.Saunders + sent Sisco’s report of April + 28 to Kissinger on May 7. + (Ibid.) Sisco toured the + Middle East April 8–24. See Document + 109.

+

In short: Nasser believes he can + outwait the Israelis, and Mrs. Meir believes no peace is possible with Nasser. Neither side believes the + other has in good faith accepted the UN + resolution as the basis for a settlement.

+

Mr. Sisco in stating his + conclusions suggests that it is time to review certain of our working + premises:

+

1. Whereas we have assumed that major power talks might break the impasse + between the parties, they have not brought any of the parties to modify + their positions in any significant way.

+

2. Whereas we have assumed that the Soviets, in order to defuse the + situation and limit Soviet involvement in the UAR, might have an + interest in pressing Nasser to + adopt a more positive attitude toward negotiation, the Soviets to the + contrary have deepened their military commitment to him.

+

3. Whereas we have assumed Israel might in the end go along with a + properly guarded U.S. position, the Israelis have flatly rejected our + position while asking us to support theirs militarily and + economically.

+

4. Whereas we have assumed that the Palestinians can be dealt with in a + settlement purely as a refugee problem, they have become a + quasi-independent force with a veto over policy in Jordan and, soon, in + Lebanon.

+

Conclusion: Perhaps it is time to shift our + attention from the two-power and four-power exercises to direct action + vis-à-vis the principal actors—Israel, the Palestinians and the UAR. An + options paper is being prepared.A summary + of the paper is Document 116. The paper was discussed at a meeting + of the NSC Ad Hoc Special Review + Group on the Middle East on May 21; see Document + 117.

+
+ +
+ + 115. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security + Affairs (Kissinger) to President + NixonSource: National Archives, Nixon + Presidential Materials, NSC Files, + Box 636, Country Files, Middle East, UAR, Vol. IV. Secret. Sent for + information. + Washington, May 12, + 1970. + + SUBJECT + Nasser’s “Appeal” to You—A + New Diplomatic Initiative + +

As you know, Nasser inserted an + unusual open message to you into his annual May Day speech (Tab A).Attached but not printed at Tab A is an + extract of the speech. The first two-thirds of the speech was + a simplistic and dreary review of the last 23 years of the Arab-Israeli + problem. The last third of the speech was a direct “appeal” to you to + help restore peace in the Middle East, albeit on Egyptian terms. This + came a day after an interview with US News and World + Report in which Nasser + dwelt on his willingness to make peace with a Jewish state. (Tab B)Attached but not printed at Tab B is the + article in theMay 2 U.S. News and World + Report.

+

Nasser’s + “Appeal”

+

Nasser said specifically to you + that, despite all that has happened, he has not completely closed the + door to the U.S. He warned, however, that if the U.S. takes “another + step toward confirming Israel’s military superiority” it would “affect + all U.S. relations with the Arab nations for several decades and perhaps + for centuries.” Then he launched his “appeal” to you. He asked two + things:

+

—“If the United States wishes peace, it must order Israel to withdraw + from the occupied Arab territories.”

+

—If the U.S. does not have this capability, then he “requests” that the + U.S. “refrain from giving any new support to Israel as long as it + occupies Arab territories—be it political, military or economic + support.”

+

If the U.S. does neither, Nasser + said, “the Arabs must come to the inevitable conclusion that the U.S. + wants Israel to continue to occupy our territories so as to dictate the + terms of surrender. This—and I am still addressing myself to President + Nixon in a last attempt—will + not happen.”

+

This, Nasser continued, is “a + decisive moment in Arab-American relations” that will determine whether + “we will declare estrangement forever” or if “there will be a new + serious and definite start.” All this he was saying to you because “the + situation is delicate and because the consequences are extremely dangerous.” Yet “nothing + can prevent us from making another and final appeal for the sake of + peace in the Middle East.”

+

Diplomatic Initiatives

+

The Egyptians have followed up Nasser’s speech with diplomatic moves apparently + intended to emphasize that it is a serious initiative. The following day + UAR Foreign Minister Riad called in + the head of our Interests Section to tell him he hoped that we would + take the speech seriously as an appeal for peace rather than to + interpret it as propaganda or a threat. He said that Nasser hoped that you would respond in + a positive manner. Riad also told the British ambassador in Cairo the + same thing and asked specifically for British support. At the U.N., the + Egyptian ambassador has asked for U + Thant’s support and requested that he circulate the + speech as a U.N. document. The UAR is also sending special + representatives to the other Arab states to explain the statement that + the UAR desires a political solution + and to stress the seriousness of Nasser’s appeal to you. Cairo has asked African + governments to press the appeal with the U.S.

+

As if to complement this diplomatic offensive, Nasser just prior to his May Day + speech gave an interview to a correspondent of US News + and World Report in which he said, among other things, that the + UAR agreed to accept the existence + of a Jewish state in Palestine and would guarantee free Israeli passage + through both Suez and the Gulf of Aqaba. He emphasized his desire for + peace but made clear that it must be on the basis of complete Israeli + withdrawal. He has also unexpectedly volunteered another interview to an + American for use on National Educational Television.

+

What Does It Mean?

+

It seems clear that Nasser has + embarked on a peace offensive and is taking steps to project to the U.S. + the image of someone sincerely interested in a peaceful settlement. It + is not as clear, however, what are his intentions in doing this at this + time.

+

The most obvious explanation is that Nasser is trying to head off a hasty U.S. commitment to + provide more aircraft to Israel in the wake of the Israeli public + allegations that Soviet pilots are flying operational missions in the + UAR.See footnote + 4, Document 111. On the other hand, Nasser gave the impression that he + felt he was talking from a position of strength. Having stepped up his + military activities along the Canal and with Soviet help having + strengthened his air defense system, Nasser may think he is now in a stronger political + position to talk more openly about peace. He may even think that he can now put increasing military + and political pressure on the Israelis and on us. In any case, he might + feel in a better public posture to justify further military activity if + he can say the U.S. rejected his appeal for peace. Alternatively, we may + be seeing a genuine appeal from a man who feels he is increasingly + coming under the control of the Soviets but cannot begin to pull away + from their grasp until he can show some tangible progress toward + regaining the occupied territories.

+

Conclusion:

+

Nasser’s appeal comes at a time + when the increased Soviet commitment in Egypt as well as recent + developments in Jordan warrant a new overall look at our strategy in the + Mid-East. The staff work is being prepared for such a review.See Document + 116.

+
+ +
+ 116. Paper Prepared by the National Security Council StaffSource: National Archives, Nixon + Presidential Materials, NSC Files, + NSC Institutional Files + (H-Files), Box H–044, Senior Review Group Meetings, Review Group + Middle East 5/21/70. Secret; Nodis. The undated Department of State + paper that this paper summarizes, entitled “U.S. Policy Options in + the Middle East,” is attached. All brackets are in the + original. + Washington, May 20, + 1970. +

U.S. POLICY OPTIONS IN THE MIDDLE EAST

+

SUMMARY

+

I. The Issues

+

The basic issue is how to strengthen the US position vis-à-vis the + Soviets. Two broad strategies are possible.

+

A. Rely primarily on strengthening the military counterweights to the + Soviets and their clients, making Israel our military proxy in the area + but with at least the implication of U.S. readiness to back Israel more + directly if necessary.

+

B. Rely primarily on political efforts to strengthen the US position, + seeking to force an Arab-Israeli political settlement involving almost + total Israeli withdrawal in + return for Arab acceptance of a Jewish state in Palestine. This might + require a formal US defense commitment to Israel.

+

A choice on strategy has been sharpened by two recent developments: (1) + The new Soviet role in the air defense of the UAR (which has intensified pressure on us to provide more + aircraft to Israel; and (2) Nasser’s May Day “peace appeal”See Document 115. + (which relates to our relations with the Mid-East in regard to future + sales to Israel and our position on a peace settlement, especially on + withdrawal).

+

These developments require that we make early decisions on two + operational issues:

+

(1) What moves, if any, should we make with respect to a peace + settlement?

+

(2) How should we respond to Israel’s request for additional + aircraft?

+

Decisions on these issues will be determined by—or will determine—which + of the two broad strategies we pursue in dealing with the general Soviet + challenge in the area and will provide an answer to a third: How to + respond to Nasser’s peace + appeal.

+

II. The Political-Military + Framework—Basic Factors

+

(1) The parties disagree on interpreting the purpose of UN Security Council Resolution 242.

+

(2) The parties disagree on the propriety of “imposing” a settlement.

+

(3) A qualitatively new—and we assume irreversible—factor has entered the + situation: The Soviet commitment to the air defense of the UAR. A signal + to the Russians from the US might not only require additional aircraft + for Israel but also signs of our willingness to get involved on the + Israeli side. This prompts the question of whether we get involved to + defend the big Israel or the little one.

+

(4) Following Nasser’s peace + appeal, there is now the clear implication that if the US continues to + supply Israel militarily, there will be a sharp decline in our relations + with the Mid-East, presumably encouraged by Nasser. It is assumed that this would be an irreversible + deterioration in our ties with the area.

+

(5) The Israelis are now reading events in the Mid-East as a Soviet + challenge to the US which therefore would require a positive response to + Israel’s military requests. [We cannot be sure that such a positive + response would increase Israeli flexibility on a settlement or + ultimately avoid an Israeli-Soviet confrontation.]

+ +

Conclusions:

+

—There are two fixed factors in our relations with the Mid-East: (1) We + are committed to keeping Israel in existence and thus to keeping the + military balance in her favor. (2) We cannot abandon the Mid-East to the + Soviets without losing important US financial, economic and strategic + interests there. However, to provide Israel now with additional aircraft + would accelerate the movement of the Arab world into the Soviet + camp.

+

—An Arab-Israeli settlement would best resolve these conflicting factors. + In moving toward this, we could consider deferring decision on Israel’s + requests without endangering her security; we might give some ground to + the Soviets and the UAR on a political + settlement. These two moves would protect our overriding interests in + Israel’s existence and in maintaining a role in the Arab world.

+

—Our influence on both sides is limited: On the Israeli side, we supply + arms but are limited by the fact that we cannot allow the military + balance to shift against them. On the Arab side, there is a desire not + to see the US excluded from the area and the fact that Israeli + withdrawal cannot be achieved without US help.

+

—With these considerations in mind, the following policy options are open + to the US:

+

III. Policy Options

+

+ On a settlement: +

+

(1) Stand fast on present proposals, encourage cease-fire, seek + continuation of present Soviet-Israel military stand-off but prepare to + confront the USSR militarily (via + Israel in the first instance) through a prolonged conflict. [While this + is a non-compromising position for the U.S., it might lead to endless + escalation and not necessarily result in negotiations.]

+

(2) Take new initiatives to get negotiations started: (a) Get both sides + to accept our proposals [Both sides have rejected them; a + pre-negotiating process would be necessary, while withholding aircraft + in the interim.]; or (b) begin negotiations under Jarring using a simple formula: both + sides would agree to Resolution 242 and both sides would give assurances + to the other on its fulfillment (the Arabs would agree to live at peace + with Israel; the Israelis would say they were prepared to withdraw). + [This might be the inducement for both sides to enter negotiations; + however, it might involve continuing US pressure on Israel or encourage + the Arabs to stiffen their position.]

+

(3) Become more specific on our proposals in the two and four power + talks. [We would have trouble getting Israel to accept a detailed + settlement; without any movement toward a cease-fire, the war of + attrition would continue + and the pressure on us to provide additional aircraft would + intensify.]

+

(4) Abandon the Jarring Mission + and invite the parties to participate in the Four Power talks to work + out agreement on implementing Resolution 242. [This might be the way to + break the impasse; it might also isolate us with the Israeli + position.]

+

On Israel’s Aircraft Request [These options + correlate roughly with numbered options above.]

+

(1) Meet the full request. [Further escalation might increase the chances + for US involvement and decrease the chances for political settlement in + the near future.]

+

(2) Defer on the Phantoms, provided limited number of aircraft for + interceptor role (F–5s) and additional Hawk missiles. [This would + strengthen Israel’s air defense capability while limiting its forward + air strategy; however, introduction of the F–5 would confuse the Israeli + inventory and (though less than the F–4) be seen by the Arabs as a + significant strengthening of the IAF.]

+

(3) Defer on full requests and sell only add-ons (i.e. replacement of + losses or continuation of F–4 and A–4 deliveries for limited periods). + [If this were a secret deal, it would constitute indirect pressure by + the US on Israel to review its position; leaked, the US would appear to + have backed down under Soviet/UAR pressure and strains in US-Israeli + relations would not be relieved.]

+

(4) Defer on everything. [This would be the best atmosphere for new + political initiatives; however, adverse Israeli reaction might lead to + desperate military moves and give the impression that the US had backed + off under Soviet/UAR pressure.]

+
+ +
+ + 117. Memorandum for the RecordSource: National Archives, Nixon Presidential + Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box + H–111, Senior Review Group, SRG + Minutes Originals 1970. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Saunders. The meeting was held in + the White House Situation Room. + Washington, May 21, + 1970. + + SUBJECT + Meeting of the NSC Special Review + Group on the Middle East + + + PARTICIPANTS + Elliot Richardson—Under + Secretary of State + David Packard—Deputy + Secretary of Defense + Lt. General John McPherson—JCS + Richard Helms—Director, + CIA + Dr. Henry Kissinger + Joseph Sisco—Assistant + Secretary of State + Warren Nutter—Assistant + Secretary of Defense + A.L. Atherton, Jr.—Deputy + Assistant Secretary of State + Robert Pranger—Deputy + Assistant Secretary of Defense + Helmut Sonnenfeldt—NSC + Staff + Harold Saunders—NSC + Staff + +

Dr. Kissinger noted that this + review was triggered by the President’s commitment to Prime Minister + Meir and to Ambassador + Rabin that if the military + balance in the Middle East changed the US would supply aircraft to + Israel.See Document + 101. There are three questions:

+

1. Has the balance changed in such a way as to require stop-gap + measures?

+

2. What could be our long-range policy on military supply?

+

3. Where are we trying to go?

+

Mr. Packard felt that we should + get away from the question of aircraft for a moment and talk about the + larger problem of where we are trying to go.

+

Dr. Kissinger agreed that that + might be the case today except for one preliminary question: Is there + some need before the President sees Foreign Minister EbanSee + Document 118. to agree to make + a token commitment to Israel to supply 6–8 aircraft now to take the heat + off while we made more basic decisions.

+

Mr. Sisco said he felt that we + should try to find a course of action that: (a) does not look weak to + the USSR and does not provoke the USSR and (b) provides a minimal + reassurance to Israel. He felt that we needed to move simultaneously on + the political and military tracks. On the political front, he would + propose to Cairo a public declaration of ceasefire and commitment to + make peace with Israel in exchange for an Israeli commitment in + principle to withdraw. On the security front, we should inform Israel + secretly that we would supply additional aircraft for two more months + after the present deliveries run out—that is, in August and + September—and that we would earmark an additional number of Phantoms and + Skyhawks with the final decision to be made in the light of Israel’s + response to our diplomatic initiative. Meanwhile, we would respond + quickly on Israel’s basic logistical needs.

+

We would tell Nasser that we saw + this as a non-escalatory step.

+

Mr. Richardson acknowledged that + it would be difficult for the President to say that we are still + thinking about this problem. But the problem was to say anything about + the kinds of political steps we are thinking about until we have sorted + ourselves out. Therefore he thought the proper line to take with + Eban is to say that it is + important for the US and Israel to reach some consensus on where we are + going together.

+

Mr. Richardson continued that, + developing this line, we might say that the US has a number of interests + in the Middle East: maintaining the military balance because we will not + abandon Israel; not turning the Arabs over to Soviet domination; + preventing a continuing deterioration of the US position in the Middle + East.

+

He felt that we could not simply batten down the hatches and ride out the + present situation indefinitely. We have to have a settlement. There is + no other way of solving the problem.

+

Dr. Kissinger said that question + was still at issue.

+

Mr. Richardson replied that he + felt we need a settlement even if we have to squeeze Israel and even if + this looked like a concession to the USSR. We cannot stand an + extrapolation of present trends. A decision to provide large numbers of + new aircraft to Israel could blow up our position in the Middle + East.

+

As we look to other parts of the Middle East, Mr. Richardson noted, we see other Soviet + objectives such as the Persian Gulf. We have already concluded that + cooperation between the Shah and King Faisal is essential for stability in that area. For the + US to destroy its relationship with Saudi Arabia over additional + aircraft for Israel would upset any contribution we might make to + stability in the Gulf.

+

Mr. Richardson felt that if one + adds all this up, the President at least needs to signal to Foreign + Minister Eban that some movement + on Israel’s side—such as saying the word “withdrawal”—is essential to + our ability to help Israel.

+ +

Mr. Packard said he felt strongly + that we have to move toward a political settlement; we have to do this + now, or it will be too late. He said he did not feel that we could do + this with any delivery of aircraft to Israel in the next couple of + months. We could, however, assure Israel in general terms that we will + not allow it to become defenseless.

+

Dr. Kissinger asked Mr. Sisco whether he believed that verbal + assurances would do any good.

+

Mr. Sisco said that he disagreed + with Mr. Packard. He felt that + the proposal he was making would be a major concession to the Arabs and + therefore deliveries of aircraft to Israel were essential to balance + this.

+

Mr. Helms asked if we are + creeping over our original contract for 50 Phantoms.

+

Mr. Sisco replied that three + Phantoms had been lost, so three of the new planes could be justified as + “replacements.”

+

Dr. Kissinger did not see how we + could avoid publicity on this move. He did not see how we could expect + Egyptian acquiescence. Of course, the Egyptians will mind if its enemy + gets more weapons.

+

Mr. Sisco said he felt it was + possible to hope that we might persuade Israel to talk about accepting + the principle of withdrawal and beginning negotiations. In response to a + comment from Mr. Packard, he said + he did not believe we could realistically talk about symbolic Israeli + withdrawal until after a peace agreement had been signed.

+

Mr. Helms said he did not think + Israel wanted a cease-fire along the Suez Canal. That would simply give + the Egyptians and the Soviets a chance to move SA–3 sites up to the + Canal.

+

Mr. Sisco replied that any + agreement to cease-fire would have to be coupled with an agreement that + troops would observe a stand-still wherever they are.

+

Mr. Packard said he thought we + should be thinking about trying to open the Suez Canal.

+

Dr. Kissinger asked Mr. Sisco if, in accepting the principle + of withdrawal, Israel would be asked to include the Golan Heights.

+

Mr. Packard felt that all we could + do at this point would be to try to get negotiations started.

+

Mr. Richardson said the issue is: + What does “withdrawal” mean? We have emphasized the word “secure” in the + phrase “secure and recognized boundaries.” The purpose of the + negotiation is to determine what constitutes “secure”.

+

Dr. Kissinger said he felt we + needed a strategy. We had had a year and a half of gimmicks. What if + this proposal is not accepted?

+

Mr. Richardson agreed that we had + to keep considering our strategy.

+ +

Mr. Sisco said that this strategy + is different from past efforts in two ways. First, this by-passes the + major power talks of 1969. The strategy here is to go to both parties + direct. He felt that getting negotiations started is more important than + doing something like a symbolic withdrawal on the ground. Second, the + strategy of the past year has been to acquiesce in the Israeli strategy + of letting the Arabs come to Israel. Since the Israelis may be now + beginning to think that they need a settlement, it may make some sense + to try to get negotiations started by direct US intervention.

+

Dr. Kissinger said that Israel + may prefer to fight from its present boundaries. What are we going to do + about arms supply?

+

Mr. Richardson replied that he + would give Israel as much as the traffic would bear and a lot more if + Israel would go back to its pre-war boundaries.

+

Mr. Nutter asked whether we + should take Nasser’s peace + appealSee Document + 115. seriously.

+

Mr. Sisco replied that basically + it was an appeal for the miracle that Nasser has been hoping for—someone to press Israel to + withdraw completely from the territories it occupied in 1967. The more + important aspect of the “appeal” is the statement that in the absence of + Israeli withdrawal the US cannot continue to support Israel + economically, militarily or politically because Nasser had made this a test of US-Arab + relations. We could not ignore the aspects of a threat in this + statement.

+

Mr. Richardson said that his own + version of the scenario would go as follows: He would tell Israel that + we would extend existing contracts and earmark additional aircraft for + Israel but this must remain secret. It could remain secret only if Prime + Minister Meir were in a position + to say publicly simply that she is satisfied with contingency + arrangements that have been made. Then we would tell Nasser that he should not worry, we + have completed our review. We remain committed to maintain the military + balance. But the question of our ultimate response short of interim + steps is being held in abeyance. The question in this approach is + whether or not the Israelis are politically required to say that they + have assurances of additional aircraft.

+

Dr. Kissinger said he saw at + least two problems. The scenario seemed to be based on an assumption + that may not be true—that a settlement will resolve the Middle East + problem. One could assume that, if we respond to Nasser’s peace appeal by a diplomatic + initiative, then any later deliveries or prospect of deliveries would + evoke some kind of similar blackmail.

+ +

Dr. Kissinger noted also that + Israel may prefer to have its Armageddon now rather than wait until + later.

+

The problem, as he saw it, is that we had to find a way of saying nothing + to Eban that would foreclose the + Sisco option. He asked Mr. + Sisco to provide talking + points that do not commit us but do not foreclose the option. The other + question is what to say about the replacement of aircraft lost. To say + nothing may be impossible in the President’s judgment.

+

Mr. Sisco said that he felt that + his proposal would keep the lid on domestic Jewish community + reaction.

+

Dr. Kissinger said that one of + the assumptions that seems to underlie Mr. Sisco’s proposal was that the way to get a settlement is + to give Nasser what he + wants.

+

Dr. Kissinger continued by saying + that he felt it would be desirable to present to the NSC the assumptions and the courses of + action envisaged in the Sisco + policy and then in addition the assumptions and course of action in a + counter model.

+

Mr. Richardson said it was + important to get straight the fact that any public response to Israel’s + request would trigger a sharp Arab reaction.

+

Mr. Helms said that there is no + question that Mr. Richardson is + right.

+

Mr. Richardson said we could move + the whole Middle East to the Soviets in a matter of months.

+

Mr. Packard suggested that we try + to give Israel defensive equipment in the interim. There were other + types of aircraft that we might provide such as F104s or F5s.

+

Mr. Sisco said that this was to + suggest something that Israel has no interest in.

+

Dr. Kissinger said that this + might be possible in the context of a big long-term arms package, but it + hardly met the needs of the interim problem.

+

Mr. Sisco said he felt that + Israel has to think in terms of offensive weapons.

+

Mr. Packard said that, if they + only do this, they may not now have a feasible strategy.

+

Mr. Helms noted that if it + developed that the Soviets pushed their aircraft up to the Suez Canal + that could change the whole situation.

+

Mr. Packard said that is why we + have to move now.

+

Mr. Sisco said that it would be + important in any effort to achieve a cease-fire to include a stand-still + that would keep planes out of the Suez Canal area.

+ +

In concluding the meeting, Dr. Kissinger asked Mr. Sisco to send talking points for the President’s meeting + with Foreign Minister Eban. He + said he would try to arrange an NSC + meeting for the week after next which could discuss alternative + approaches.

+

Mr. Sisco asked whether we would + not need another meeting at this level.

+

Dr. Kissinger replied that there + would be another meeting the middle of the following week to discuss the + two alternative courses.

+

Mr. Richardson said that the line + he would suggest taking with Eban + would be as follows: We are both embarked on a bleak course in the + Middle East; the US and Israel must review its positions from the ground + up. The main question is how we can work out together a strategy that + will meet our separate interests.

+ + + Harold H. Saunders + Saunders initialed “H.S.” above his typed + signature. + + +
+ +
+ 118. Editorial Note +

On May 22, 1970, President Nixon + met with Israeli Foreign Minister Abba + Eban in the Oval Office from 11:31 a.m. to 12:19 p.m. + Also present were Assistant to the President for National Security + Affairs Henry Kissinger, + Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs + Joseph Sisco, Israeli + Ambassador Yitzhak Rabin, and + Israeli Minister Shlomo Argov. + (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Central + Files, President’s Daily Diary) According to a record of the + conversation prepared by Argov, + Nixon began the meeting by + expressing his “sorrow and condolences” over the attack on an Israeli + school bus earlier in the morning, describing the perpetrators as + “savages” who were “out of control.” Nixon then moved the discussion to the issue of arms + supplies and said: “The Prime Minister wrote me a letter some time ago + [see footnote 3, Document 101] and we have + very much in mind the Prime Minister’s concern. I spoke to Rogers about it and we have a clear + understanding of the matter. We have it under consideration and are + studying intensively the intelligence reports. We, and I personally, + will do what is necessary. The immediate thing is to get the ‘stuff’ + over there.” The important thing is the planes; and you will get them + without fanfare.”

+ +

After a further exchange with Eban + about the delivery of planes and tanks to Israel, Nixon asked about the Soviet Union’s + military involvement in the Sinai Peninsula. Rabin replied: “The situation facing + us was a very difficult one, the Russians had effectively driven us out + of Egypt. We stand on the Canal and will defend it no matter what. We + have to stand and the Russians are probing us to see if we will. They + are making an attempt to push us by introducing SA–II and SA–III + missiles in the area. We are anxious not to engage the Russians. + Therefore we are trying to prevent installation of these missiles by not + allowing them to complete any construction. We know that once they begin + to doubt our resolution to stand on the Canal they will try to push us + out. They have already tried to reach the Suez Canal twice. We should + make clear to them that here we stay. It is therefore essential to make + sure first of all that we have the tools to make them realize that we + mean it . . . They must know that if they come we will defend + ourselves.”

+

Nixon responded by telling + Rabin: “I told you before + to give it to them and to hit them as hard as you can. Every time I hear + that you go at them, penetrate into their territory, I am delighted. As + far as they are concerned, go ahead and hit them. The trouble is the + rest of the Arabs. I very strongly believe that you are right, they are + testing both you and us and we have to enable you to deter them. We can + also talk directly to the Russians. It has been some time since we did + so. They are testing us, no doubt, but we ought to play it so we don’t + lose everything (in M.E.).” He went on to say: “We want to help you + without hurting ourselves. The hell with oil! We can get it from + somewhere else. We have to retain the other decent people in the Middle + East.”

+

The President concluded the meeting with an appeal to the Israelis to + begin political discussions with the Arabs. “We can’t go down the road + of inevitable military escalation,” he said. “We have to have your + assurances on the political initiatives which we shall take. We have a + problem here in terms of public opinion which won’t accept just mindless + escalation.” He went on to say: “We have to show the efforts we are + making and we have to have your commitment. We are not conditioning + anything, we only need your assistance in order to overcome the + difficulties that may arise when we go to Congress for support and the + money . . . It isn’t a question of resources or Soviets. We need to work + on both fronts and have to show that we are doing so.” Nixon added that he knew that certain + people were describing Nasser’s + May 1 speech as “conciliatory” but commented, “Hell, no!” The fact + remains, Nixon explained, that + “there was the need to satisfy people’s sensitivities and public + opinion.” (Israel State Archive, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, + 6720/11)

+
+ +
+ + 119. Memorandum for the RecordSource: National Archives, Nixon Presidential + Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box + H–111, Senior Review Group, SRG + Minutes Originals 1970. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Saunders. The meeting was held in + the White House Situation Room. + Washington, May 28, + 1970. + + SUBJECT + Meeting of the NSC Special Review + Group on the Middle East + + + PARTICIPANTS + Under Secretary Elliot + Richardson + Deputy Secretary David + Packard + Director Richard + Helms + Dr. Henry A. + Kissinger + General Earle G. + Wheeler + General F.T. Unger + Assistant Secretary Joseph J. + Sisco + Assistant Secretary Warren + Nutter + Deputy Assistant Secretary Alfred L. + Atherton, Jr. + Deputy Assistant Secretary Robert + Pranger + + Harold H. Saunders + + +

Dr. Kissinger opened the meeting + by noting that the Group had before it a State Department paperFor a summary, see Document 116. outlining two basic strategies—one + for confronting the USSR and another + geared more to political initiatives. He noted that the two are not + exclusive. For instance, even if the second strategy were chosen, there + might be a problem of putting some restraints on the USSR or demonstrating to it that, if it + did not go along with a political strategy, it might have to face + unpleasant consequences. Continuing, Dr. Kissinger noted that in addition there is a short-term + problem of what interim response to give to Israel on its aircraft + requests while we develop a broader political strategy. The purpose of + the meeting was to formulate these strategies in such a way that they + could be put before an NSC + meeting.See Document 124.

+

At Dr. Kissinger’s request, Mr. + Sisco explained the + strategies outlined in the State Department Strategies paper. In + beginning to discuss Strategy 1—after outlining some of the assumptions + in the paper—he made two points: (a) We have to be keenly aware of the + political and economic costs of adopting this strategy; (b) this course + of action might move us closer faster to a confrontation with the + USSR.

+ +

Dr. Kissinger interrupted to ask + about the counter to that point, namely that this would be a way to + avoid confrontation with the USSR by + giving support to Israel and making clear that the Soviets could not + gain their ends by military action and by warning the Soviets clearly + early in the game that they would face us if they tried to press Israel + militarily. It is entirely possible, he said, that the second + strategy—attempting to break the political impasse and start + negotiations—would bring confrontation sooner by making the Israelis + feel desperate and under pressure to lash out.

+

Mr. Sisco replied that the + argument is not demonstrable either way. He felt that we would end up + with an amalgam of Strategies 1 and 2. For Strategy 2 to be effective, + it would have to be made credible by some elements of Strategy 1. If + Soviet brinksmanship were to succeed, the price of peace would be too + high for us.

+

Mr. Richardson pointed out that + we have to be careful not to kick out the window a chance for + negotiations at the outset. Waiting for the Arabs to get tired of Soviet + efforts to get their territory back—as would be the case under Strategy + 1—might take five-ten years.

+

Mr. Packard felt that we should + not speak of Soviet brinksmanship but of Israeli brinksmanship. He felt + the Soviets had no other recourse in the face of Israel’s deep + penetration raids except to come to Nasser’s defense.

+

Mr. Sisco replied that one’s view + on this point depends on where one begins. Nasser last year declared a war of attrition, and one + could just as well argue that Israel’s moves were a response to + Nasser’s provocation.

+

Dr. Kissinger said that, however + the USSR got there, their presence is + a geo-political fact of considerable consequences. Ten years ago almost + anybody would have considered this move a casus belli.

+

Mr. Sisco, responding again to + Mr. Packard, said he felt the + Soviets had gone farther than they need to have done. They could have + limited their moves to installing surface-to-air missiles.

+

Mr. Packard said that the trouble + with Strategy 1 was that it would preclude negotiations. Dr. Kissinger replied that it is not + axiomatic that the application of force does not provide a way to get to + negotiations. It is not absurd to think that the Arabs might lose hope + in the face of superior force and turn to negotiations.

+

Mr. Sisco said that he felt that + we should try Strategy 2. The likelihood of its working is not great. If + it fails, then we would have to consider elements of Strategy 1. He also + felt that we would have to consider breaking off the two power and the + Four Power talks because the longer they continue, the longer they + relieve Nasser of responsibility + for facing up to the necessity to come to terms with Israel.

+ +

Mr. Sisco felt further that we + have played the new Soviet decision in relatively low key. He felt that + our posture had reflected prudence—not weakness. He felt that we ought + to react both politically and militarily. The strategy outlined in the + State Department paper was a very restrained reaction.

+

Mr. Packard felt that we could + afford to be restrained while trying Strategy 2. We still have time to + return to Strategy 1 later on.

+

Mr. Sisco returned to Dr. + Kissinger’s earlier + point—that perhaps the application of force is the fastest way to reach + negotiations. He said he is not certain which is the faster road to + negotiations. We have been trying Strategy 2 for fifteen months and have + not succeeded.

+

Mr. Richardson noted that + Strategy 2 does not impose short-run costs. Dr. Kissinger said, “Except another war if + Israel is convinced that they are getting into a hopeless position.” Mr. + Richardson replied that this + would depend on convincing them that our diplomatic route was a route + worth trying.

+

Mr. Packard noted that if the + Soviets moved to the Suez Canal, then it would be a new ballgame. He + felt that now we still have a chance to “make a run for it.”

+

Dr. Kissinger said that in many + of the papers that had been written, the point had been made that the + military balance had not been significantly affected. He felt, however, + that any move that enhances the chances for a strategy of attrition is + Israel’s death warrant.

+

Mr. Richardson said that Israel + has two ways of achieving security: (1) achieving or maintaining a + military position including advantageous territorial lines; (2) a U.S. + commitment of some kind. He did not feel that the Soviets would be + impressed by arms deliveries to Israel as such. He felt that we should + consider what more to say to the Soviets and to Israel about the nature + of the U.S. commitment.

+

Dr. Kissinger said that he felt + that Israeli policy since 1967 had been disastrous. However, he could + understand their dilemma of being asked to trade physical security for + something highly problematical. He felt that even a U.S. commitment + would be highly doubtful given the current mood of the United + States.

+

Mr. Nutter asked how Israel could + maintain its superiority in the present situation. Dr. Kissinger replied that Israel would + strike out before it goes back to its pre-war boundaries. As they see + it, they are confronted by hostile Arabs and face a major almost + insoluble problem. The domestic dynamics of the Arab countries are + becoming incompatible with the existence of Israel.

+

Dr. Kissinger said he did not + feel that the negotiation Mr. Sisco had proposed in Strategy 2 was going to get off + the ground.

+ +

Dr. Kissinger noted again that + the presence of Soviet forces in the UAR is a geo-political fact of the greatest consequence. + The Soviet Union might be able to use its military position in the + UAR against the U.S. in the Eastern + Mediterranean. In any case, Israel would look around and see the Mirages + in Libya which would have to find their way to the UAR, new U.S. weapons + in Jordan, and they would see the noose tightening. Then they would + strike.

+

Mr. Richardson asked what + striking would do for Israel. In 1967 they could improve their + geographical position but not now.

+

Dr. Kissinger replied that they + might destroy the Arab forces in one of these countries.

+

Mr. Sisco said that territory + would not be their objective this time. But they would seek to destroy + the air power and the economic capacity of their enemy. He felt that an + extensive attack would permit them to come back to defend their present + lines better than they can now or could in an extended war of attrition. + They cannot take a strategy of attrition.

+

Mr. Nutter said he did not see + how any U.S. policy would deter Israel—even giving them airplanes.

+

Dr. Kissinger said he felt that + talking about a U.S. commitment to Israel was a waste of time. A defense + treaty with Israel would call on us to pay too high a political price in + the Arab countries. The Israelis would be “crazy” to believe that we + could make good on such a commitment. Mr. Sisco said that he was not even sure that the U.S. could + sign such a commitment given our present domestic mood.

+

Mr. Richardson said that we have + to communicate to the Soviets a more direct sense that we will oppose + them and we would by giving Israel more planes. Some of the moves + against the USSR might hurt us with + the Arabs. It seemed to him that the only way to get tough with the + Russians is to convey the idea that if they go too far the U.S. will + involve U.S. personnel.

+

Mr. Sisco said he did not feel + that threat could be made credible. If the USSR moves its pilots to the Suez Canal, U.S. action would + have to include a combination of political and military moves such as + the following: breaking off all Middle East negotiations; supplying + additional substantial assistance to Israel; setting up a mechanism for + continuous consultation with Israel in order to project an image of + military coordination; and discussion of overall U.S.-Israeli relations + in order to imply the possibility of a security treaty. The danger of + these moves is that they go down the polarization track and it is hard + to turn back. This becomes a confrontation of prestige by both the Great + Powers.

+

Mr. Nutter asked, “What do you + accomplish by this?”

+

Mr. Sisco said that the Arabs + might realize that they cannot get their territory back on a basis other + than negotiation. He felt that we would have to pursue Strategy 2 first but might + have to move into Strategy 1 at some time later.

+

Mr. Richardson said he wanted to + emphasize the fact that the only card the U.S. holds against the Soviet + Union is the risk of confrontation.

+

Dr. Kissinger asked Mr. Nutter what his strategy is. Mr. + Nutter replied that it seems + to have been ruled out that approaching the Arabs could launch + negotiations. He said he would move directly with the Egyptians and + Israelis to try to get a cease-fire in exchange for a partial Israeli + withdrawal from the Suez Canal. He did not feel that Strategy 2 in the + State Department paper offered enough of a change from past diplomatic + approaches.

+

Mr. Sisco replied emphatically + that Strategy 2 was quite different in that it proposes that the U.S. go + directly to the Arabs and to the Israelis, asking Israel to commit + itself to the principle of withdrawal and asking the Arabs to commit + themselves to negotiations of some sort and to peace.

+

Mr. Nutter asked, “In exchange + for eight airplanes?”

+

Dr. Kissinger said that the + President felt committed to provide additional aircraft to Israel. Mr. + Nutter asked whether the + President felt committed to respond with the F–4. If so, then the Group + was wasting its time.

+

Mr. Pranger noted that we could + promise Israel quick re-supply rather than giving them aircraft right + now. We could tell them that we are ready to earmark new production for + them in order to be able to supply them with emergency aircraft on short + notice.

+

Mr. Nutter said that he did not + feel that we could give Israel planes secretly. “Why do the Israelis + want planes unless others know they have them?”

+

General Wheeler, returning to an + earlier point, said that the primary risk in providing a security + guarantee for Israel is that it brings the U.S. back to Strategy 1 which + “has no attraction for me at all.”

+

Mr. Helms seconded General + Wheeler’s point by noting + that anyone who had lived through 1967 never wants to hear the word + “guarantee” again.

+

Mr. Packard asked Mr. Sisco just exactly what Strategy 2 + comprised. Mr. Sisco outlined + the strategy in detail as described in the State Department paper. He + said that it was very much the same as Mr. Nutter’s strategy until it came to the question of + whether or not to provide airplanes to Israel and the question of + whether to try for some sort of physical movement of forces in + withdrawal in the early stages of such a program. On the question of + planes, he felt there were two choices: (1) There is Mr. Nutter’s idea of earmarking planes but + not delivering them. (2) There was the possibility of continuing to + deliver planes under present + contracts for another two months, three each month. Since only 44 of an + original contract for 50 would be delivered this year, we could still + deliver 6 more without having anyone know that we had exceeded our + original plan since 6 Phantoms in a reconnaissance configuration are not + scheduled for delivery until 1971 anyway. On the point of partial + Israeli withdrawal, he did not feel that Israel would move an inch. He + was aware of Mr. Pranger’s + discussion with the Israeli defense attaché,Not further indentified. but he did not feel this was + Israeli policy. However, he did not want to debate that point since + anyone at the table could confirm it by picking up the phone and calling + Ambassador Rabin. If the + Israelis were willing to agree to it, we would all be very happy.

+

Mr. Richardson said he wanted to + introduce another element: How to make the conditions under which we + would be confronted if we went down the Strategy 1 route more tolerable. + Should we be holding out the prospect of a Palestine-Israel federation? + Should we be more forthcoming in our position on the status of + Jerusalem?

+

Dr. Kissinger noted that this is + the carrot in the policy, but we also need a stick. What will discourage + the Soviets is fear of confrontation with us. We have to have thought of + how to convey that idea to them. He felt that the only thing that would + make Strategy 2 work would be fear that if Strategy 2 fails, there is + something worse. We need to devise the maximum stick to introduce into + Strategy 2.

+

Someone asked what kinds of things we could do, and Mr. Sisco replied that one thing we should + not do is to cut back the Sixth Fleet.

+

Dr. Kissinger closed the meeting + by summarizing as follows:

+

1. He thought it was a fair consensus that Strategy 1 by itself was not + favored by the Group.

+

2. He felt that Strategy 2 represented a fair consensus except on the + question of aircraft deliveries. He felt the President should not be + asked to sign off on the question of whether to try for partial Israeli + withdrawal from the Suez Canal. If we could get that, it would be + desirable, but if we cannot then we would have to do something else. + This is more a question of feasibility than of policy.

+

3. There should be some analysis of where we go from here. If Strategy 2 + does not work, should we move to an effort to work out a Palestinian + solution or should we think more about how to make the “stick” more + credible.

+ + + Harold H. Saunders + Saunders initialed “H.H.S.” above his typed + signature. + + +
+ +
+ + 120. Memorandum of ConversationSource: National Archives, Nixon Presidential + Materials, NSC Files, Box 1159, + Saunders Files, Middle East Negotiations Files, Middle East + Settlement—US–USSR Talks. Secret; Nodis. Drafted on June 3 by Adolph + Dubs. The conversation took place in the Secretary’s office. The + memorandum is Part I of III; Parts II (NATO) and III (SALT) are + attached. All three parts are printed in Foreign + Relations, 1969–1976, volume XII, Soviet Union, January + 1969–October 1970, Document 159. Saunders summarized the meeting + for Kissinger in a June 8 + memorandum; see ibid., Document + 162. + Washington, June 2, 1970, 3 p.m. + + SUBJECT + Middle East + + + PARTICIPANTS + The Secretary + Assistant Secretary Sisco + Mr. Dubs, EUR/SOV + Ambassador Dobrynin + Yuli Vorontsov, Ministe-Counselor, Soviet Embassy + +

At the outset of the meeting, the Secretary asked about Dobrynin’s health. The Ambassador said + he felt good.

+

Dobrynin said he understood that + the meeting this afternoon would focus on the Middle East. Nevertheless, + he was prepared to discuss other matters, such as European affairs and + SALT, in the future at the Secretary’s convenience.

+

Dobrynin said that he had been + authorized during his recent consultation in Moscow to inform the U.S. + Government that he was prepared to continue discussions on the Middle + East with Mr. Sisco. He hoped + that mutual efforts would lead to a solution. The Soviet Government was + also interested in finding guidelines which Ambassador Jarring could use in the search for a + settlement on the Middle East.

+

Dobrynin then referred to his + conversations with Mr. Sisco + prior to the latter’s trip to the Middle East.See Document 107. On + Sisco’s trip to the + Middle East, see Documents 109 and 114. + Dobrynin noted that the U.S. + side had expressed an interest during those talks in obtaining more + detailed formulations on the nature of peace and the obligations which + the sides would undertake. At the same time, the Soviet side had + indicated an interest in more precise language from the U.S. on the + question of withdrawal and other matters. Dobrynin said he was instructed to present formulations + on the two points mentioned and that he hoped these points would meet + the wishes of the U.S. Dobrynin + then handed the Secretary two papers with the following + formulationsThe Soviet Union presented + these formulations at the June 24 Four-Power meeting. (Telegram 1315 + from USUN, June 25; National + Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 27–14 ARAB–ISR) + (NOTE: these actually are + extensions or modifications of points 3 and 11 of Section II of the + Soviet paper of June 17, 1969):See Document 34.

+

“Point 3, Section II

+

From the moment of deposit with the UN of + the concluding document or documents the parties shall refrain from acts + contradicting the cessation of the state of war and the establishment of + the state of peace, in accordance with paragraphs 10 and 11, with the + understanding that, juridically, cessation of the state of war and + establishment of the state of peace will begin at the same time of the + completion of the first stage of the withdrawal of Israeli troops from + the territories occupied during the conflict of 1967.”

+

“Point 11, Section IX

+

The Arab countries, parties to the settlement, and Israel mutually + agree

+

—to respect and recognize the sovereignty, territorial integrity, + inviolability and political independence of each other and their mutual + right to live in peace in secure and recognized borders without being + subjected to threats or use of force;

+

—to undertake everything that is necessary so that any military or + hostile acts, with the threat or use of force against the other side + will not originate from and are not committed from within their + respective territories;

+

—refrain from intervening directly or indirectly in each other’s domestic + affairs for any political, economic or other reasons.”

+

Dobrynin commented that these two + formulations along with others they had presented to Sisco previously would stand or fall + together. In any event, he expressed the hope that they would remain + confidential. The Soviet side looks forward toward movement from the + U.S.

+

Commenting that we would look at the two formulations carefully, the + Secretary then recalled his conversation with Dobrynin of March 25,See footnote 5, Document + 105. at which time he had noted that the U.S. found + the operational involvement of Soviet military personnel in the UAR defenses to be serious and potentially + dangerous. The Secretary noted that in reply Dobrynin had expressed the view that + Soviet actions were of a defensive nature and that Dobrynin had expressed the hope that + the U.S. would be of some assistance in getting the Israelis to desist + from deep-penetration raids. Since that conversation, the Secretary + noted Israel has halted the + deep-penetration raids and Israeli representatives have publicly stated + that Israel would observe a cease-fire. In addition, Prime Minister + Meir has publicly accepted, + during a speech in the Knesset, Security Council Resolution 242.The text of Meir’s May 26 speech to the Knesset is in Israel’s Foreign Policy: Historical + Documents, volumes 1–2: 1947–1974, Chapter XII, The War of + Attrition and the Cease Fire, Document 15. The Secretary said + that Israel’s position on deep-penetration raids was announced by + Israeli Defense Minister Dayan on + May 4. Subsequently, on May 26, Dayan went further by indicating that Israeli air + activity was being limited to an area 30 kilometers west of the Canal. + These moves on the part of Israel represented real progress, and we feel + that we have been helpful in this context by urging Israel to cease its + deep-penetration raids. Furthermore, in our view, Prime Minister + Meir’s acceptance of Security + Council Resolution 242 provides a basis for negotiations.

+

The Secretary then said that the U.S. remained deeply concerned over the + increased military involvement of the Soviet Union in the UAR. In view + of this concern he wished to convey a statement, the text of which would + be provided to the Ambassador after the meeting. The statement, which he + wished to convey to the Soviet Government, reads as follows:

+

“The USSR has indicated that Soviet + military activities in the UAR will + remain defensive. We want to make clear that we would not view the + introduction of Soviet personnel, by air or on the ground, in the Canal + combat zone as defensive since such action could only be in support of + the announced UAR policy of violating + the cease-fire resolutions of the Security Council. We believe that + introduction of Soviet military personnel into the delicate Suez Canal + combat zone could lead to serious escalation with unpredictable + consequences to which the U.S. could not remain indifferent. In this + connection, we believe, and I am sure you do, it is neither in the + interest of the Soviet Union nor the United States for the Middle East + to become an area of confrontation between us.”In his memoirs, Kissinger described this statement as + “extraordinary” since he believed that it gave the Soviet Union a + “blank check” by “acquiesc[ing] in the Soviet combat presence in + Egypt except in the immediate vicinity of the Suez Canal.” Kissinger also complained that + Rogers informed neither + him nor Nixon, at least as + far as he knew, that the Secretary was going to read such a + statement. (White House Years, pp. + 574–575)

+

The Secretary then noted that the Soviet Union had at one point indicated + an interest in a cease-fire in the area. The U.S. side would like to + renew discussions on this subject with Dobrynin as well as on the general matter of a Middle + East settlement. With respect to the continuation of the talks between + the Ambassador and Mr. Sisco, we + believe this very desirable. We + welcome the written formulations provided by the Ambassador and are + willing to resume bilateral discussions very soon.

+

Mr. Sisco noted that the U.S. + side would wish a bit of time to review the new formulations and to + consider them in the light of papers that had been exchanged + previously.

+

Dobrynin emphasized that the + formula on mutual obligations should be kept very confidential. He had + no particular problem regarding publicity surrounding meetings but did + hope that the substance of the proposals advanced during conversations + would not be revealed publicly. Dobrynin noted further that he had no objections to + having the fact revealed that new proposals were advanced, so long as + the substance was not disclosed. He warned that if the proposals were + leaked, the Soviets would not feel bound by them. Mr. Sisco suggested that any public + disclosure that new formulations had been advanced would only arouse + curiosity and could lead to unwarranted speculation. Mr. Sisco, therefore, suggested that + nothing be said publicly on this score. Dobrynin agreed.

+

The Secretary then asked Dobrynin + whether he could provide any clarification regarding the Soviet Union’s + intentions with respect to Soviet personnel and military equipment in + the UAR. Dobrynin replied that + he was not qualified to discuss “military details.” He referred to the + Dayan statements regarding + penetration raids and wondered whether these represented personal + comments or whether they were sanctioned by the Government of + Israel.

+

Alluding to the Secretary’s remarks, Dobrynin said that the only thing that has happened in + the Middle East is that deep-penetration into UAR air space and bombardment of heavily populated Egyptian + areas by Israel have ceased. This is the only thing which has really + changed in the Middle East. He added that the outlook for the Middle + East was not very hopeful if U.S. policy was aimed at maintaining + Israel’s military superiority and Israel’s policy of dealing from a + position of strength. If, on the other hand, the U.S. wants to find a + solution that would be fair to both Israel and the Arab countries, the + Soviet Union would be willing to cooperate. Frankly, Dobrynin said, maybe the situation now + is a little more equal in the military sense. Perhaps this provides a + good opportunity to advance toward a settlement. The Soviet Union feels + that the time may be ripe. Dobrynin stressed that the Soviet Union does not feel + that anything has happened in the way of a developing confrontation + between the Soviet Union and the U.S. He wanted to assure the Secretary + that the Soviet Union does not want such a confrontation, even though he + claimed that some forces in the world and pro-Zionist forces in the U.S. + would like this to happen. Dobrynin proceeded to repeat that nothing has changed + drastically in the situation, looking at it coolly and realistically. A + possibility for a peaceful settlement still exists, and there is no doubt from the Soviet side with + respect to not wanting a confrontation.

+

In reply to Dobrynin, the + Secretary said there should be no doubt that the U.S. wanted a fair and + equitable solution. Our formulations of December 9 indicated that.See Document + 73. These proposals were unacceptable to Israel, and + the UAR had not accepted the proposals + either. With respect to other comments by Dobrynin, the Secretary said that we felt strongly that + a shift in the military situation had taken place. It is conceivable + that the Arabs, having felt deeply humiliated in the past, may be in a + better frame of mind now. The basic question, however, is whether the + Soviet Union and the Arabs really want a peaceful settlement. We feel + that we should actively pursue a political solution. The Secretary + underlined that any additional actions by the Soviet Union, especially + toward the Suez Canal, could be highly explosive and that is why we felt + it necessary to make the statement that we did. We believe that the time + is ripe to work toward a peaceful settlement and we will work actively + toward this end. The Secretary said that he could not think of anything + that would be more helpful in improving the world atmosphere at the + moment than a peaceful settlement in the Middle East. He reminded + Dobrynin that Israel’s + actions and statements over the past weeks were not totally apart from + what we have done in urging Israel to be more flexible in its positions. + In addition to the statements and actions he had already referred to, + the Secretary cited Foreign Minister Eban’s comment that the world would be surprised at the + concessions that Israel would make once genuine negotiations got + underway. We have not seen anything similarly forthcoming from Nasser’s side, however. The Secretary + said that he hoped the Soviet Union would impress upon the Arabs the + importance of a settlement. Otherwise, it can be seen that the fedayeen + would become more and more a factor in the situation and unlikely to be + subject to the influence of others.

+

In response to Dobrynin’s + request, Mr. Sisco said his + office would provide Mr. Vorontsov with the text of the statement made + by the Secretary as well as information bearing on the statements of + Defense Minister Dayan and Prime + Minister Meir to which the + Secretary had referred.

+
+ +
+ + 121. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense Laird to President NixonSource: + National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 654, Country Files, + Middle East, Middle East—Recent Actions. Keep File Intact. Top + Secret; Eyes Only. All brackets are in the original except those + indicating text that remains classified. + Washington, June 5, + 1970. + + SUBJECT + Proposed US Peace Initiative in the Middle East + +

In my discussion with Dr. Kissinger at breakfast on 4 June, he suggested I provide + you with my views on the present Middle East crisis. The following + comments are provided in response to this suggestion, and for use in + connection with the NSC review + scheduled for next week.See Document 124.

+

The Department of Defense has participated fully and most urgently in the + recent review of Middle East policy, and specifically the question of + further aircraft for Israel. The crucial issue confronting us in this + review is how to resolve the conflict between our support for Israel, + and our desire both to preserve our own interest and influence in the + Arab world and to prevent the further spread of Soviet influence. The + fact of Israel’s creation, survival and growth has largely determined + political attitudes and shaped political strategy in the Middle East. + About it almost all other issues and events revolve, including the + relative influence and prestige of the United States and the Soviet + Union in the Middle East.

+

Our dilemma lies in the fact that the conflicting aspects of our policy + in the Middle East are fully reconcilable only during periods of + lessening tension. However, recent actions by the Soviets, the Arabs and + Israelis have served to raise rather than lower the level of tension and + hostilities. Both the UAR and Israel + have undertaken new military initiatives, and the Soviets have involved + their own forces to an unprecedented degree. In the present context of + increasing violence, the Israelis are pressing us for an enlarged + commitment, including some $2.5 billion in arms ($1.6 billion on credit) + over five years, and for firm US actions aimed at limiting the Soviet + role in the area. In effect, we are being asked to guarantee the + continued existence of Israel with whatever means and policies are + required, regardless of Israel’s own actions, and with the implicit + expectation that unilateral employment of US forces may be necessary at + some future time if there is no other alternative to ensure Israel’s survival. On the other + hand, the Arabs press us to abandon our special relationship with + Israel, and tell us that further escalation of our support to that + country will destroy the US position in the Arab world for the + foreseeable future. In these circumstances, the central question facing + us is whether it still is possible or desirable to pursue a policy based + on limited support of Israel, at the same time attempting the + preservation of our interests and influence in the Arab world. It is the + purpose of this memorandum to outline a number of considerations which + lead us to believe that we can in fact pursue such a policy, but to do + so successfully will be difficult and will require major new US + initiatives. To abandon this policy will mean compromising basic US + national security interests.

+

A Policy of New Initiatives and Limited + Commitment

+

This option is still open but requires US + initiatives. There is substantial evidence that both sides + still want peace, but find themselves so locked into public positions + that they cannot or will not undertake, on their own, the new peace + initiatives needed to break the stalemate. Instead, they attempt new and + escalatory military initiatives, and seek the support of the great + powers in doing so. The Soviets have demonstrated at least a degree of + restraint (their moves in the UAR + appear to result from Israeli actions), but are unwilling to advance + beyond the Arab position. Thus, if there is to be an escape from the + present vicious cycle of military action–military response, it is the US + which must provide it with new and meaningful peace initiatives. These + initiatives must emphasize the still substantial common interests of all + the parties, and take advantage of the private and more reasonable + positions of both the Arabs and Israelis. With the Soviets we must make + the most of our common interest in avoiding a nuclear confrontation and + preventing nuclear proliferation in the Middle East. We can and should + seek to enlist the support and assistance of the many other nations with + an interest in settlement.

+

This option also requires US restraint and Israeli + cooperation. We must not permit ourselves to be pressured into + actions which will weaken our initiatives. In particular, we must not + sell, at this time, additional attack aircraft to Israel. We are looking + for long-term solutions, and sleight of hand maneuvers to meet + short-term Israeli aircraft requests pose too great a risk to be + acceptable. In the long run they will become known, and their adverse + impact will be the greater for having been hidden. Further, Israel, + which already has a very substantial bombing superiority over its + combined Arab foes, has no immediate need for such aircraft: against the + Arabs they are unnecessary, and against the Soviets they would be + insufficient. For the most part, future Israeli aircraft requirements + can be met with air defense fighters, such as the F–5, the F–8, or the + F–104, all of which are available. In the interim, should an urgent need arise you will recall + that we do have contingency plans to provide attack aircraft promptly. + The Israelis have been reassured in this regard on several occasions, + and we are prepared to repeat these assurances as necessary. By the same + token, we must have Israeli cooperation in taking a major “first step + for peace”: it is the probability that we can get Israeli concessions + which makes our approach to the Arabs credible, and it is Israeli + agreement which must act to unstop the bottle. An Israeli concession in + the form of agreement to a phased and conditional withdrawal, would be + contingent on reciprocal Arab moves, but it is indispensable for any + forward movement.

+

Both indigenous and external powers must assume some + portion of the tasks necessary to success. There must be + movement by the UAR and Israel, + followed by other Arab powers, to stop their open warfare so that they + can prepare for peace. Moves on all sides should take place + simultaneously in order to avoid embarrassing situations where one party + must “lose face” by moving first. Also, public disclosure of detailed + plans should be kept at a bare minimum, since it is essential that old + rhetorical symbols be jettisoned for minimal gains instead of maximal + demands. The critical first step of a de facto cease-fire would be + followed by other phases:

+

—progressive demilitarization of the occupied territories, with + simultaneous efforts to control terrorist activities;

+

—reopening of the Suez Canal to all nations, special attention to points + of international sensitivity (Straits of Tiran, Jerusalem, nuclear + weapons) and formal peace negotiations as inducements for progressive + Israeli withdrawal under conditions of maximum security;

+

—UN action on the status of the West Bank + of the Jordan and the position of the Palestinians in international + society;

+

—Arab recognition of Israel, leading to a formal peace treaty.

+

—Soviet withdrawal of combat forces from the UAR.

+

During the de facto cease-fire phase, and thereafter, the US would work + through its own good offices in political/military channels; through + third countries (with minimum reliance on USSR); through interested and + reliable private individuals and groups; and through the UN. It may be necessary, for example, to + provide Israel with an arms package of APCs, tanks, and self-propelled + artillery to enhance its ability to react to UAR violations of the agreement.

+

A more detailed outline of a possible new approach will be made available + for consideration by the NSC. The critical decision does not depend on + details, however, but on a US determination to take the initiative, to + insist on Israeli cooperation, and to be fully flexible in our + approach.

+ +

Security Considerations

+

In evaluating the proposal for a new US initiative, it is of the greatest + importance that you consider the implications for our national security + of the alternatives. Realistically, the only alternatives are (a) to + make a full commitment to Israel, or (b) to continue to add to our + present commitment, in the hope that somehow complete polarization can + be avoided. The effects of these alternatives on our position in the + Arab world would be largely the same, and the chances are very great + that even if we sought to avoid it, we would shortly find ourselves + pushed into a full commitment posture. The implications of such a + posture are extremely serious.

+

First, we have concluded that there is no acceptable + military solution to the present impasse. This impasse has its + roots in a number of basic human problems, which are not susceptible of + military solution. Nothing we provide to Israel in the way of equipment + or financial support can enable that small country to prevent + casualties, to halt the war of attrition, to end terrorist activity, or + to assure perpetual control of a captive and restive Arab population. + The Arabs, even with defensive support by the Soviets, are incapable of + mounting more than harassing raids into Israeli-held territory. They can + inflict significant, but not decisive losses over time by attrition.

+

Second, the sale at this time of additional F–4s will + contribute to further Soviet success in the Arab world. The + F–4s have become the outstanding symbol of Israeli power, and their use + as attack bombers has come to be identified in Arab eyes with the US, + which has supplied these aircraft to Israel. We have an important + security interest in countering Soviet penetration in this vital area, + and the sale of additional attack aircraft at this time can only worsen + our own image and present the Soviets with new opportunities. The + consequences of the sale could, indeed, be made even worse should Israel + use these additional aircraft, as they have previous ones, for expanded + attack purposes. We have no assurance that provision of additional + attack aircraft to Israel at this time will act as a restraining + influence on their military strategy or moderate their political + stance.

+

Third, expanding our commitment to Israel, by promising + or implying that US forces would be used directly to support Israel + under any circumstances, is unacceptable. We cannot overstate + the importance of this reservation. Israel’s current military + development certainly includes a major effort [1½ + lines not declassified]. Israel has refused to sign the NPT, + despite repeated US efforts in that direction. [2½ + lines not declassified] This consideration reinforces our + strong conviction that there is inherent in the present Arab-Israeli + conflict a very real potential for a US-Soviet nuclear confrontation. We + consider it imperative that the US avoid such a confrontation, and avoid undertaking + any additional commitments to Israel which would increase that + danger.

+

Conclusions

+

Our basic interests require that we avoid nuclear war with the Soviets, + or a direct confrontation wherein the threat of nuclear war is possible. + A corollary interest is to prevent nuclear weapons from coming into the + hands of Middle Eastern states. Our interests also require that we + prevent the further spread of Soviet influence, and preserve and + strengthen the US position in the area vis-à-vis the Soviets. The + critical consideration is one of our basic national security and in our + considered judgment an expansion of US commitments to Israel, including + a decision to supply additional attack aircraft to Israel at this time, + would constitute a significant and dangerous threat to our security + interests.

+

The most sensible move, in my judgment, is to undertake new US + initiatives aimed at working toward achieving a phased peace in the + area. Should Israel cooperate, but not the Arabs, further aid to Israel + can be justified and Arab reaction attenuated, without enlarging our + commitment to Israel. Should the Arabs (specifically the UAR) be + agreeable, but not Israel, the Israelis would be put on notice that our + heretofore implicit guarantee of their security is contingent upon + Israeli actions being consistent with US national interests. If Soviet + reaction is not in favor, this would give us the opportunity to mobilize + world (and particularly European) opinion against them. It would also + lessen the adverse effects of further aid to Israel, and give us a lever + for use against the Soviets in the Arab world.

+

Recommendation

+

I recommend that this memorandum be considered as the basis for the + discussion at the NSC meeting on the + Middle East.

+

General Wheeler concurs with the + views expressed in this paper.

+ + + Melvin R. Laird + + +
+ +
+ 122. Editorial Note +

On the evening of June 8, 1970, Secretary of State William Rogers invited Soviet + Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin to + his home in the Washington suburbs for a “secret unofficial + conversation.” No U.S. record of the conversation has been found, but + according to a record of the conversation prepared by Dobrynin, and provided to the + Department of State by the + Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the conversation lasted nearly 3 + hours and focused primarily on the Middle East.A portion of the record + of the conversation follows:

+

“The Near East: This question took up the main + part of the conversation. Rogers + began the conversation by noting that, with the direct involvement of + President Nixon, they are now + completing a multi-faceted analysis of the current situation in the + region and the development of possible further steps for the USA in that + regard. Assuring that they ‘aim for peace and a lessening of tensions in + the existing dangerous Near-East conflict,’ and complaining about the + ‘excessive difficulty of problems,’ with which they meet now, in + developing a ‘reasonable course,’ Rogers said that in their opinion, the Soviet military + presence, in part in the UAR, would have very important effect on the + situation in the Near East.

+

“Rogers asked if the Soviet Union + is planning to increase its presence. This is not indifferent to us—now + and in the future—especially if Soviet pilots appear in the region of + the Suez Canal, the Secretary of State forcefully underlined.

+

“I said that such a formulation of the question is unclear to say the + least. If one follows the logic suggested by the Americans, then it + seems the Soviet Union is the main reason for the current dangerous and + tense situation in the Near East, although the whole world knows that + this is not the case. The Soviet military presence is just the + consequence of an openly aggressive course taken by Israel, supported by + the USA, directed at a continuation of the occupation of Arab lands, at + the undermining of disagreeable governments of Arab countries—victims of + Israeli aggression. The Soviet Union has given and will continue to give + aid to these Arab countries, but is not a supporter of any military + confrontation, does not follow any selfish goals, but aims at a just + peaceful settlement. Only recently the Secretary of State had been + provided additional proposals by the Soviet side [see Document 120] to which it had not received any + response. In general there is an impression that the American side is + not in a hurry to continue serious Soviet-American talks on peaceful + settlement, but prefers instead to look at further military aspects of + aid to Israel. This course can only intensify the situation, I told the + Secretary of State.

+

“Rogers started to advance a + thought that in Moscow, apparently, they don’t imagine what kind of + pressure the government of Golda + Meir is putting on them in connection with the appearance + of Soviet pilots in the UAR.The Israelis tell us, the Americans, that + these are not instructors, but military pilots ready to fight. The + Israeli pilots can tell immediately when Soviet pilots go into the air. + This is clear by the ‘pilots signature’ as well as the decisiveness with + which they intercept Israeli pilots when they cross over deep into the + territory of the UAR. The + Egyptian pilots never go directly into battle unless they have + significant advantage in numbers.

+

“I told Rogers that it is + unlikely that the point of our conversation is to discuss the Israelis’ + impressions. But from what he said regarding the Israeli flights deep into Egyptian territory, it then follows who + is the initiator of provocative acts. In connection with this it is + strange that the USA stands as a defender of such acts.

+

“Rogers started to justify + himself. He entered into a diffuse discussion of American ‘peaceful + efforts’ on settlement, starting with 1967, to show that the Nixon administration ‘always aims for + peace.’ Rogers’ statements had a + very unsystematic character, he jumped from one thought to another, not + really saying anything new.

+

“Keeping in mind Rogers’ well + known manner of speaking rather diffusely and not clearly enough, at the + end of the discussion I put before him a question in a direct form: + ‘What can I tell the Soviet government regarding the position of the USA + regarding a settlement in the Near East? What does it intend to do? Can + I get, in a more concrete form, an explanation of what he himself meant + when he, the Secretary of State, gave a television interview on Sunday, + June 7, when he said that the USA in the coming weeks will begin a new + diplomatic initiative?’ (Department of State Bulletin, June 29, 1970, pages 785–792)

+

“Rogers thought for some time. + Then he once again began to diffusely set forth the US position, + although in a more precise manner. However even here I had to ask him + specific questions. His statements, if one were to sum them up, amount + to the following:

+

“The Government of the USA is currently completing its assessment of the + general situation in the Near East. It is worried that, speaking + frankly, the current state of mind in the Israeli government where there + is a new intensification of the divide between ‘hawks’ and ‘doves.’ But + as part of pressure on the Soviet side, he, Rogers, can unofficially say that in Washington they are + afraid lest ‘hot heads’ in Tel Aviv decide to deliver a strong blow to + the Arab countries, first of all the UAR, ‘which would be a suicidal + step,’ at least from the point of view of future prospects, for Israel. + The situation is made more difficult by the fact that Golda Meir is completely convinced, + although this is not the case, especially under President Nixon, who came to power without the + Jewish vote and in fact despite it, that she can always force the + government of the USA, using the Jewish influence here, to follow and + support Israel regardless of what it does. Right now Golda Meir has also become convinced + that the Soviet Union has decided to go on the path of a military blow + to Israel, by participating directly in military activity, in part + through its flights. Because of this conviction the premier of Israel is + currently bombarding Nixon with + calls to give Israel ‘firm assurances’ that the USA will not leave it + ‘one-on-one against the Soviet + Union.’ It is in this context that Golda + Meir puts the question of selling Israel a new set of + American planes.

+

“The Government of the USA, Rogers went on to say, is currently, in a private + manner, putting serious pressure on the government of Israel, directly + warning against any reckless military activity. In Washington this is + based on a belief that this would cause an essential effect. But at the + same time the government of the USA would like to give Israel some new + assurances that it would ‘not leave it.’ Besides the public + announcements already made on this score by various American officials + and representatives, the Nixon + administration is looking at the question—precisely in connection with + this—of new deliveries of airplanes to Israel.

+

“Although it has in principle been decided beforehand that, towards the + goals outlined above, Israel will be given a promise to satisfy its + request, it has however not been decided to this day on what scale it + should be done and how such a decision should be made public.

+

“The main [issue] here—is the unwillingness of the administration to + further worsen its relations with the Arab world. This is the second + main direction, which the government of the USA is now strenuously + thinking.

+

“The third course being discussed in Washington is the question of how to + more quickly make the ‘Jarring + mechanism’ start working so that both sides could, finally, renew + contacts.

+

“Here, in connection with what was said by Rogers on the last question, one situation calls for + attention. Judging by his initial comments one gets the impression that + in the administration there is currently a discussion regarding possible + further actions within the framework of Soviet-American contacts, and + the following possibility: concentrate all efforts of American diplomacy + first of all on bringing the Arab world and Israel under Jarring’s aegis, possibly bypassing + bilateral talks for the time being or a further development of the + questions of settlement in the framework of talks—‘this could be + continued parallel to the resumption of the Jarring mission,’ the Secretary of State said. At the + same time one cannot exclude the possibility that the Americans are + hoping right now to convince Israel, in exchange for a deal on planes, + to take a more flexible position on questions of a peaceful settlement, + specifically: to more precisely announce about the readiness to accept + the Security Council resolution (Golda + Meir has already started making gestures in this + direction) and to agree for direct talks with the Arabs through + Jarring.

+

“In connection with this Rogers’ + comment that the overall situation in the Near East is such that it is + necessary to immediately resume Jarring’s mission ‘even before the General Assembly + session approaches’ is notable. In response to a question regarding what + sort of contacts, in the + Secretary’s opinion, would exist between the Arabs and Israel, Rogers immediately said ‘Not direct + ones, of course, but indirect, through Jarring—in one city, or maybe in one building—otherwise + the Arabs won’t go.’

+

“It is not impossible that the Americans are counting on convincing + Nasser to agree to a renewal + of the Jarring mission (it is + possible that this is implied by the ‘new American initiative’).

+

“Rogers also noted the + possibility that the ‘important question’ of a ceasefire could have a + more serious decision during Jarring’s mission, even as a temporary measure for the + time being, for the period of talks, as a good-will gesture by both + sides, which would have an ‘enormous psychological effect’ on the whole + territory of the Near East.

+

“To repeat—Rogers himself did not + divulge in any detail or precision the intentions of the American side + noted above. He also completely avoided specifying, what exactly is + meant when he speaks of an American initiative being proposed. However + his individual statements give a known basis for considering such a + course by the Americans possible.

+

“In connection with this it should be noted that when I asked him what he + thinks about the situation with our bilateral talks he did not give an + immediate clear answer. At first he said that the most important thing + is ‘launching the Jarring + mission,’ and the USSR and USA could + at the same time ‘continue parallel discussions, helping Jarring and the sides themselves.’ + Then, in connection with my question, he corrected himself, saying that + it seems that our two sides need to speed up the development of + recommendations to Jarring + which, however, do not necessarily have to have a very specific + character, but it is necessary to fix the primary principles on the more + important points of settlement. When I reminded him our strong point of + view on this score (in part, in our response to the previous American + plan ‘with neutral formulations’ on points of contention) he did not + enter into a discussion saying that ‘you and Sisco know the details better’ and all + of this can be discussed in greater detail when our discussions with + Sisco resume, which, + apparently, will be in the near future. In connection with this + Rogers avoided a detailed + discussion of the points regarding peaceful settlement, although we did + exchange opinions on the main points (the Secretary of State did not say + anything new, pointed out that they did not finish looking at all of the + related questions, including our latest position).

+

“The overall impression of the conversation with + Rogers regarding the Near + East amounts, in short, to the following. The Nixon government, for the first time + in many months, has started a serious review of its policy in the region + in light of events currently taking place there. It seems that the most + serious impulse for this was our military presence in the UAR, in the first place of Soviet + pilots and missiles. They are particularly worried about the lack of + clarity, for Washington, regarding our further intentions, whether we + will significantly increase our military presence in the UAR and whether Soviet pilots and missiles + will cover the Suez Canal zone where the likelihood of our collision + with Israelis would increase. The Americans would clearly like to + achieve some mutual understanding with us regarding whether we will move + right up to Suez. At the same time they have to resign themselves + quietly to our military presence and air defense of population centers + in the UAR deep in its territory.

+

“In a political sense the Nixon + administration, worried about developments in the general situation in + the Near East, which are unfavorable to the USA, judging by a host of + signs, would like to convince the Israeli government to take a more + flexible line. If the Americans are successful at this (the question of + supplying aircraft to Israel plays the role of a sort of exchange coin + here), then they have two paths open before them to a quick resumption + of the Jarring mission.

+

“One, within the framework of the current Soviet-American talks. The + second (attractive for Washington and, apparently, also being discussed + in the administration) is to try to ‘sell’ possible Israeli concessions, + if they are offered, directly to the Arabs, Nasser first and foremost, as a purely American + achievement. If the‘direct bridge’ with the Arabs (Nasser) does not work, then the center + of gravity will again be shifted to our bilateral discussions.

+

“It seems that related discussions in the White House (and talks with + Israel) are not yet finished. Therefore the Americans are currently + maintaining a known tactic of delaying concrete discussions, wishing at + the same time to keep open for itself a path to talks with us.

+

“I conducted the discussions with Rogers on Near Eastern affairs in a calm but firm manner + so that the Nixon administration + would not have any doubts that while we are not aiming for any military + confrontation, at the same time we will decisively defend the interests + of the Arab countries which are victims of aggression, and our interests + in the Near East in the framework of an overall peaceful settlement + which will be the only possible path to solving the current acute and + dangerous conflict situation in the region.” (Archive of Foreign Policy, + Russian Federation, f. 0129, op. 54, p. 405, d. 5, 1. 230–240)

+
+ +
+ + 123. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rogers to President NixonSource: + National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 645, Country Files, + Middle East, Middle East—General, Vol. IV. Secret; + Nodis. + Washington, June 9, + 1970. + + SUBJECT + Next Steps in the Middle East + +

We have conflicting objectives in the Middle East, the achievement of + which poses dilemmas for the US at this present juncture. Our purpose is + to find a course of action which: (a) stops the fighting on the + principal fronts, or at least reduces the likelihood of confrontation + between Israel and the USSR which + would increase the possibility of a more direct US-Soviet confrontation; + (b) offers a fresh and new approach to get negotiations started between + the parties; (c) provides Israel with sufficient assurance regarding + military assistance as an inducement towards military prudence and + political flexibility, without causing a major break with the + non-radical Arab regimes and jeopardizing the chances for success on the + political front; and (d) neither reflects weakness to nor provokes undue + escalation from Moscow.

+

To this end, the following courses of action are recommended as a “stop + shooting, start talking” American initiative.

+

1. Ceasefire. We would propose to Israel and the + UAR, and subsequently to as many other Arab frontline states as + possible, agreement on a publicly declared ceasefire for a limited + period from July 1 to September 15, the opening day of the UNGA, during which time major efforts + will be made to get the parties to start talks on a political solution. + Under such a ceasefire, Israel would continue to refrain from deep + penetration raids. The UAR (USSR) would + have to refrain from changing the military status quo (by emplacing SAMs + or any other new installations) in a 25-mile zone on either side of the + Suez Canal ceasefire line, and Israel would be required to observe a + standstill on new installations on the East Bank of the Canal. While + concentrating in the first instance on a UAR-Israeli aspect, we would + also seek to broaden the limited ceasefire to include other fronts as + well. However, the proposal described below to get talks started between + the parties under Jarring’s + auspices, while linked to the ceasefire, can stand on its own. If + Nasser agrees to get talks + started on the basis we are suggesting, we should not permit the + proposal to fall on the ground that the ceasefire has not been accepted. + We should make this very clear to the Israelis when our entire proposal + is explained.

+ +

2. Negotiations on a Political Solution. We would + make another attempt to start the negotiating process by means of a new, + fresh approach directly with the parties rather than through either the + two- or four-power mechanism. We would propose to Israel and the UAR (Jordan) that indirect negotiations + under Jarring’s auspices begin + promptly, in accordance with procedures determined by him, on the basis + of the following agreed framework: (a) that they both accept the UNSC + Resolution of November 1967 in all its parts and will seek to reach + agreement on ways of carrying it out; and (b) that the UAR (Jordan) accept the principle of a + just and lasting peace with Israel, including recognition on their part + of Israel’s right to exist and that Israel accept the principle of + withdrawal from occupied territories in accordance with the SC resolution of November 22, 1967.

+

3. Military Assistance for Israel. Your decision + in March to hold in abeyance Israel’s request for additional aircraft + was based on the judgment that Israel’s qualitative superiority + compensated amply for its numerical inferiority in planes. The direct + Soviet involvement in an operational role has injected a new qualitative + capacity and a reinforced quantitative capacity on the UAR side.

+

Our intelligence evaluations conclude that the new Soviet involvement has + affected the military balance, though how much presently and in the + future is not entirely clear. As a minimum, the Soviet presence has + reduced the Israeli qualitative superiority, which in turn connotes a + new Arab-Soviet ability to exhaust the Israelis through attrition. More + importantly, the Soviet presence probably has rendered Israel’s + preferred strategy of preemptive attacks too costly to be tolerable. If + the present standoff is maintained (i.e., Israel staying away from + UAR rear areas and the Soviets + keeping out of the Canal combat zone), the result will be to restrict + Israel’s freedom of action in the air without, however, losing its air + superiority over the Suez sector. If the Soviets decide to challenge the + Israelis in the Suez sector, Israel’s air power would be quickly worn + down. Our intelligence prediction is that Israel, faced with prolonged + attrition, would be forced either to abandon the Canal line or attempt + major preemptive strikes.

+

In short, the intelligence evaluations indicate that the weight of the + Soviet presence has already reduced the material and psychological + advantages previously enjoyed by the Israelis. Fundamentally, the + Arab-Israeli military balance now depends on Soviet actions and + decisions which have already created a situation in which Israel’s air + superiority could be rapidly neutralized.

+

In the light of the foregoing and your public and private statements + regarding possible additional assistance to Israel if a change in the + balance required, we recommend Israel be informed quietly and discreetly + of the following.

+ +

(a) By the end of June, 44 Phantoms of the 50 will have been delivered. + The other six, which are to be special reconnaissance models, have not + been promised for delivery until early 1971. We, therefore, will (1) + sell and deliver three additional Phantoms to Israel in July and three + in August bringing the total to 50 (which Soviet and UAR intelligence will interpret as + completion of the 1968 Phantom deal; only 88 Skyhawks have been + delivered of the 100 committed in past contracts. The 12 remaining will + be delivered over the next few months); (2) as replacements for past and + future projected losses, earmark four Phantoms per month and four + additional Skyhawks per month out of future production for delivery + starting in September through the end of the year. This would be subject + to review, only if negotiations between parties under Jarring’s auspices had started and + showed signs of success; and (3) make contingency plans for immediate + delivery of F–4s and A–4s to Israel out of USAF inventories if there should be a dramatic shift in the + balance.

+

(b) As part of your decision which I announced on March 23,See Document 106. + we would also inform Israel of our intention to continue to respond + affirmatively to other Israeli military requests in order to maintain + the logistic pipeline. We would respond affirmatively to most items in + their latest request—i.e., Hawk ground-to-air missiles, bombs, tanks, + radar, acceleration of spare parts deliveries for F–4s and A–4s.

+

(c) A low key announcement would be made which made clear: (1) that for + the next two months, during which we would make new efforts to launch a + “stop fighting, start talking” proposal, the deliveries of aircraft by + the U.S. to Israel would not bring them beyond levels committed on the + basis of past contracts (not over 50 Phantoms and 100 Skyhawks); and (2) + that we have made contingent provision for immediate delivery of + additional or replacement aircraft to Israel if the need arises. As a + condition, Israel must agree to affirm publicly that it is satisfied + with the contingent arrangements made by the U.S., otherwise there is + apt to be a strong reaction in the Congress. The announcement would be + made shortly after we have launched our political initiative through + diplomatic channels (see Scenario attached).The undated scenario is attached but not printed. We would + insist on full cooperation from Israel with respect to our political + proposal.

+

(d) We would inform Nasser that + we are limiting ourselves for the time being not to go beyond the 50 + Phantom and 100 Skyhawk level committed in the 1968 and 1966 contracts, + but that further deferral of sale of additional aircraft is only + feasible in circumstances of a ceasefire and his agreement to enter + discussions under Jarring on the + basis of the new American proposal.

+ +

4. U.S. Resolve Vis-à-Vis the USSR. One of our + most serious problems is to reflect resolve and firmness to the USSR. + The diplomatic efforts we have made with them, to underscore how + seriously and how potentially dangerous their decision is to commit + operational personnel in Egypt, have elicited no visible reaction or + clarifications from the Soviets. There are increasing signs that the + Soviets are prepared to live with and derive the political benefits from + turmoil in the Middle East, and that they are operating on the + assumption that they can press for unilateral political advantage while + we are heavily involved in Southeast Asia. We believe more must be done + privately in the area, and publicly over the coming weeks to reflect our + resolve to the USSR. I recommend that you direct Secretary Laird and me to make a high priority + study of this aspect immediately covering the whole range of our + relations with the USSR. Both political and contingent military steps + should be studied. What do we do if the Soviets challenge the Israelis + in the Suez area? All of us are agreed this means a “new ballgame,” but + precisely what are the options open to us? If Cairo and Moscow refuse to + accept our proposals for a ceasefire or for the start of negotiations + between the parties, what political and military steps should we take? + Should we break off the Two and Four Power talks rather than continue + giving the present impression that the door to a political solution is + still open? Should we slow down our efforts to achieve understandings on + certain bilateral matters? In addition to giving Israel more military + help, which in itself is unlikely to deter the Soviets, can we dramatize + efforts to make the Sixth Fleet more modern and effective, or can we fly + routine patrols between Sixth Fleet carriers and Israel? Are such steps + possible given the atmosphere on the Hill? How do we begin to educate + the American people that the Middle East is a principal test between the + US and USSR over the next few + years?

+

In the meantime, we are limited largely to diplomatic efforts which are + not apt to make much impact on the USSR.

+

Enclosed is a brief scenario and detailed instructions required to carry + out the recommendations contained in this paper.

+ + + William P. Rogers + + +
+ +
+ + 124. Memorandum for the RecordSource: National Archives, Nixon Presidential + Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), + H–109, NSC Meeting Minutes, NSC Minutes, Originals 1970. Top + Secret; Nodis. All brackets are in the original except those + indicating text that remains classified. The meeting was held in the + Cabinet Room from 9:36 to 11:24 a.m. (Ibid., White House Central + Files, President’s Daily Diary) + Washington, June + 10, 1970. + + SUBJECT + NSC Meeting, Wednesday, June 10, 1970—Middle East + + + PARTICIPANTS + The President + The Vice President + William P. Rogers, + Secretary of State + Elliot Richardson, Under + Secretary of State + David Packard, Deputy + Secretary of Defense + Admiral Thomas Moorer, + JCS + Attorney General John M. + Mitchell + Richard Helms, Director, + Central Intelligence Agency + General George A. + Lincoln, Director, OEP + Charles Yost, U.S. + Ambassador to the UN + Joseph Sisco, Assistant + Secretary of State + A.L. Atherton, Jr., Deputy + Assistant Secretary of State + [name not declassified], CIA + Alexander Haig, + NSC + Harold H. Saunders, + NSC + Henry A. Kissinger, + Assistant to the President + +

The President opened the meeting by noting that it would be the last + meeting for Under Secretary Richardson.On June 6, + Nixon nominated + Richardson Secretary of + the Department of Health, Education and Welfare. The post of Under + Secretary of State remained vacant until the Senate confirmed the + appointment of John N. Irwin + II on September 18. He then turned to Mr. + Helms for a briefing on the + situation in the Middle East.

+

Mr. Helms began by noting that + the new Soviet presence required careful evaluation. Israel retained + military superiority, but the elements of the Soviet presence are under + careful study.

+

The Soviets have 4–5 regiments of SA–3 missiles in the UAR and 3–5 squadrons of Soviet-piloted + MIG 21 aircraft.

+

The President interjected: “Are you stating that as a fact? Are we now + convinced?”

+

Mr. Helms replied that we feel no + doubt that these forces are there. The debate within the intelligence + community is over how they have been used. We have intelligence on the + forces themselves [2 lines not declassified]. On + the basis of intelligence from all these sources, the presence of the missiles and the pilots is + unquestioned. The big issue is how the Soviets intend to use them.

+

The President asked what the number of Russians in Egypt other than + diplomats is. Mr. Helms replied + that it is in the neighborhood of 10,000. It has doubled in the last six + months.

+

Mr. Helms continued, saying that + the Soviet forces are located mainly in the Nile valley. The Israelis + have confined their recent attacks to the area adjacent to the Suez + Canal. The question now is whether the Soviets will refrain from moving + their missiles and pilots into that area near the Canal and whether the + Israelis will refrain from challenging the Soviet pilots.

+

Intelligence confirms 13 sites of SA–3 missiles. These are manned by + 2600–3700 Soviet personnel. There are probably 6–7 other sites under + construction. These are located in the Nile Delta north of Cairo, west + of Cairo, south of Cairo in connection with a Soviet-manned airfield and + at Aswan. The Israelis have unconfirmed reports of SA–3 sites—but not + equipment—along the Canal.

+

This equipment arrived in March and April. Three squadrons of + Soviet-piloted aircraft are flying from three bases—15 aircraft in each + squadron with about 90 pilots by present count. The pilots arrived in + February and March. These were originally reported [1 + line not declassified].

+

As a rule, the Soviets stay clear of the Suez Canal. The one major + exception noted to date was on May 14, [less than 1 + line not declassified] a Soviet pilot had apparently pursued an + Israeli attack aircraft. Even in this instance, however, the intent to + engage cannot be confirmed. The MIG was unable to gain on the retreating + Israeli plane.

+

Israel has publicly stated that it would avoid the Nile valley but would + maintain supremacy over the Canal. Israel has said it would bomb + anything along the Canal. They have been bombing heavily bunkers they + maintain are being built to house equipment related to the SA–3 missile. + U.S. intelligence analysts are inclined to think that these sites are + for the SA–2 missile, but they have been so heavily bombed that we may + never know what they were intended for.

+

On the ground, the Israelis only have some 5–700 men along the Bar Lev + lineThe Bar-Lev Line, named for Israeli + Chief of Staff Haim Bar-Lev, was a chain of fortifications that + Israel built along the eastern coast of the Suez Canal after it + captured the Sinai Peninsula from Egypt during the 1967 war. + on their side of the Canal. There are some 93,000 Egyptians on the other + side of the Canal altogether. Dayan says that the main Israeli objective is to keep + these Egyptians from massing for a cross-Canal attack.

+ +

As far as the Arab-Israeli military balance is concerned, the UAR has some 210–250 aircraft in 20 + squadrons. But it does not have enough qualified pilots. Israel has 81 + supersonic aircraft and 121 subsonic aircraft and 500 jet pilots. + Israel’s superiority rests on pilot quality. We assume that Israeli + pilots are the equal of ours. Israel keeps 85% of its aircraft flying, + while the Egyptians keep only about 75% in the air. The Israelis are + able to mount 5 sorties per aircraft per day, while the Arabs can only + manage 2. Israeli aircraft have superior performance characteristics. + The addition of some Soviet pilots will improve the UAR ability to intercept Israeli attackers + if the Soviets engage. Soviet pilots are probably more capable than the + Egyptian pilots. But they lack combat experience.

+

The new factor in the situation is the potential for attrition of Israeli + aircraft in a prolonged contest with the Soviets. They could exhaust the + Israelis in both aircraft and pilots. Israel could at some point come to + consider losses intolerable. The present Israeli losses are somewhat + less than the annual traffic toll. In terms of economics or demography + Israel could stand such levels of losses. But Israel takes losses hard + and any level of losses creates a psychological factor on which the + Israeli level of tolerance is relatively low.

+

This is why Israeli strategy is based on the pre-emptive strike to keep + the enemy from bringing its numbers to bear against Israel. This + strategy now seems unworkable. It has for some time because of the + dispersal of Arab aircraft and the hardening of protective hangars on + Arab airfields. Now there is the additional factor that the presence of + Soviet pilots could bring on a U.S.-Soviet clash. With the strategy of + pre-emption perhaps lost to Israel, the Israelis have more reason than + ever to try to control the area along the Suez Canal. The Israelis + believe that unless they sustain their present level of attacks or + increase it, the Arabs will be so emboldened as to step up the war of + attrition.

+

Israel’s ability to maintain air superiority seems to depend on what the + Soviets do. The indicators of Soviet intention are the fact that one + Soviet pilot on May 14 did pursue an Israeli aircraft and the + photographs which indicate the possibility that the Soviets are moving + SA–3 missile sites up to the Canal. On the other hand, since May 14, + there has been no identified incidents of Soviet pilot pursuit. If the + Soviet pilots are ordered to keep their present pattern this situation + could go on for some time. If they move up to the Canal, Israel could be + quickly worn down. Even at that, the impact of such a Soviet move might + be more important psychologically than militarily.

+

At the least, the Soviet presence has probably already emboldened the + Arabs. At most, a situation has been created in which the balance could + be altered to Israel’s disadvantage. Again, the real effect on the + balance will depend on what the Soviets decide to do.

+ +

U.S. assistance to date is as follows: 40 Phantoms have been delivered + and 3 have been lost; 10 remain to be delivered. Eighty-eight Skyhawks + have been delivered with 12 remaining.

+

On the economic side, an earlier study of the Israeli economyNot found. revealed only U.S. confusion + about Israel’s projection of its economic needs. A recent team visit to + Israel, however, revealed that the Israelis are expecting to buy far + more in the way of military equipment than we had anticipated in last + fall’s study. They don’t necessarily plan to produce their own fighters + and tanks but they do plan to produce armed personnel carriers, jet + engines and naval patrol craft. In short, Israel’s economic needs depend + very much on whether or not there is a political settlement.

+

[1 paragraph (7 lines) not declassified]

+

The President asked how many Russians are in Syria. Mr. Helms said he did not know the exact + number but it was small.

+

[1 paragraph (3 lines) not declassified]

+

The President said that he wanted to be sure he understood one point: Is + it true that, since World War II, the Soviets have not lost any men in + non-Communist countries in combat situations? Mr. Helms replied that Soviet officers + have been lost in Egypt in the last year. They may also have lost a few + in Korea which we never identified—some Soviet pilots.

+

The President said this fact underscored for him the enormous + significance of this recent Soviet step. It involves Soviet personnel in + becoming casualties in a combat situation outside a Communist country. + To them, this poses a very serious problem. [2 lines + not declassified]

+

Mr. Helms replied [1½ lines not declassified]. The judgment which he + had described was not just a casual one.

+

The President asked what the Soviets say about the fact that they have + generally had a free ride for the last 25 years, using proxies to do + their work for them.

+

Secretary Rogers said the Soviets + do not talk about numbers of combat personnel. They do not deny or admit + that they have combat personnel or pilots in the UAR. They say that the + reason the Soviets are training Egyptian forces is that the Israeli deep + penetration raids in January made this necessary. Whatever the Soviets + are doing, the Soviets say has a purely defensive role. They say that + they have to back up Nasser. The + Secretary concluded that, as long as the deep penetration raids do not + continue, the present posture will probably be maintained.

+ +

The Vice President asked about the relationship of the SA–3 missile + system to the missile system that we have heard about recently as being + converted to an ABM. Mr. Helms + said that that was another system. The SA–3 is simply an extension of + the SA–2 system which is improved to handle low-flying aircraft. It is + designed to force the Israeli aircraft higher into the range where they + can be hit by SA–2s or by interceptors. The system the Vice President + was asking about is the SA–5.

+

Secretary Rogers said he did not + think the U.S. had any alternative to providing planes to Israel. It is + consistent with our policy that we have to continue to supply them. The + problem is how to do this.

+

Secretary Rogers continued that + this is a good time to try to get negotiations started. The parties have + never really negotiated with each other. This is a good time. Israel is + concerned about its future. Nasser is concerned about the Soviet presence. The + Soviets are possibly willing to help with a political settlement, though + maybe this possibility is remote. But for the first time the Soviets + seem to be talking in more serious terms.

+

The Secretary proposed that the U.S. use the next three months to try to + get negotiations started. He felt that we should continue to sell planes + to Israel at about the same rate as in the recent past. At the same time + we should make a major effort in New York under Ambassador Jarring to get negotiations started. + “We think there is a good chance Israel will go along now.” The + Secretary said his plan is to have a low-key announcement in about a + week.Rogers made the announcement at a news conference on + June 25. His statement and the question-and-answer session that + followed are printed in the Department of State Bulletin, July 13, 1970, pp. 25–33. He thought + there was a possibility to get negotiations started. Until we do, there + is no possibility of a settlement. He repeated that he felt the Israelis + and the Soviets are interested.

+

The President turned to Dr. Kissinger to brief on the issues involved.

+

Dr. Kissinger said he had + intended to draw together some of the issues which had been raised in + the Special Review Group meetings on this subject,See Documents 117 and + 119. but he would like to go + back a half a step to start with.

+

The immediate issue is aircraft for Israel. The State Department view has + been as Secretary Rogers + outlined it—that we should continue some shipments of aircraft to Israel + while we launch a diplomatic initiative.See + Document 123. The Defense + Department view has been that we should provide no planes now because + deliveries would inflame the Arab world.See + Document 121.

+ +

Dr. Kissinger continued that + discussion of some of the issues underlies any decision we may make on + aircraft. For instance, although the facts of Soviet intervention in the + UAR are pretty agreed, there are + different views of Soviet purpose and of the significance of the Soviet + move:

+

—One view is that the Soviet move is entirely defensive, that the Soviets + had no choice but to make this move in response to Israel’s deep + penetration raids and that the significance of the move is therefore + limited.

+

—Another view is that, whatever Soviet intentions are, we are confronted + with certain results. The Soviet move does free the UAR to be more belligerent. Even if there + is an Arab-Israeli settlement, if the Soviet forces remain in Egypt, the + UAR will feel stronger in whatever + adventures it decides to pursue. Britain did not want an empire; it + simply acquired one in the course of seeking coaling stations on the + commercial route to the Far East. The practical consequence of a Soviet + presence in the UAR is that it is a + major geopolitical fact with which we have to deal. The consequences + cannot be judged by Soviet intent.

+

Secretary Rogers asked what + difference it makes which view one takes. Dr. Kissinger replied that the view one + takes makes some difference on whether the USSR is confronted now or not. The President said there was + a question of whether the USSR should + be confronted on a broader front. Dr. Kissinger pointed out that even if the Arab-Israeli + dispute is settled, that still leaves a problem for the U.S. in that the + Soviet Union can work behind the radical Arabs in further eroding U.S. + influence in the area.

+

The President asked whether it is in the Soviet interest to see an + Arab-Israeli settlement. The USSR may + not want to see Israel “go down the tube.” It may well be that the + Soviets have an interest in having Israel there as a “burr under the + U.S. saddle.” The President said he questioned whether the Soviets have + an interest in a real settlement; he could understand their interest in + a truce or a cooling of the situation but had more question about a full + settlement. He felt that Dr. Kissinger’s point is relevant and that it is not right + for the US to look at what the Soviets are doing in the UAR as an isolated problem.

+

Secretary Rogers said he thought + everyone could agree to that.

+

Mr. Packard noted one Soviet + interest that had not been mentioned: The Soviets want the Suez Canal + open.

+

The President noted that if the UAR were + freed of pressure from Israel, it could concentrate on the Persian + Gulf.

+

Dr. Kissinger continued, saying + that he was not trying to argue a case but simply to report all the + views that had been discussed in the Review Group and to relate them to + the decisions before the NSC.

+ +

He noted that a number of views had been expressed about the + situation:

+

1. The Israeli view is that if Israel and the U.S. will only stand fast, + the USSR and the Arabs will decide to + negotiate. This means that the U.S. must give Israel all the equipment + it needs and make no concessions to the USSR. The consequence of this is + that it may be feasible for Israel, but U.S. and Israeli interests + diverge. Israel cannot pursue that strategy without U.S. support, but + U.S. support for that strategy has consequences which everyone agrees + the U.S. cannot accept.

+

2. A second view is that we should re-examine whether the U.S. can risk + any involvement in this area for any issue at all. It can be said about + this point of view that if we take the position that we have no interest + in the area, it would seem impossible to get the Soviets to back off + their course. Also, it would seem almost impossible to persuade Israel + to withdraw if we at the same time told the Israelis that they could not + count on the U.S. to take action in protecting Israel.

+

3. It is also argued that the U.S. should separate Israel conquests from + Israel existence and to try to convince Israel to gain security in more + restricted boundaries via Arab recognition and a U.S. commitment at + least to supply necessary military equipment.

+

In formulating a U.S. strategy it is necessary to bring into balance the + conflicting problems we face:

+

1. The Israeli quest for security. Military balance in the present + situation would lead to a war of attrition that Israel could not take. + For Israel to continue to exist, Israel requires some margin of military + superiority. The problem is to provide enough of a margin but not so + much as to permit them to ride out the present situation on the Canal + for an extended period.

+

2. On the Arab side, the U.S. has an interest in the moderate Arabs and + has to make sure that no settlement could strengthen the radical + Arabs.

+

The President indicated his understanding that Arabs and Israelis are + always going to hate each other—that we are talking about a political + settlement and not reconciliation. Dr. Kissinger noted that an Egypt protected by Soviet power + after a settlement would be strengthened in its efforts to produce + pressures in the Persian Gulf.

+

The President asked how the UAR is + getting along. Mr. Helms replied + that the UAR is totally dependent on + the subsidies from Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and Libya. The UAR is an economic mess. The UAR’s oil + income is not yet significant. Without subsidies, the UAR would be bankrupt.

+

Dr. Kissinger returned to the + thread of his briefing, noting that the third element that must be dealt + with in any strategy is the USSR. The normal pattern of Soviet activity is to begin with + a relatively modest step and then to inch forward testing the ground as + they go.

+

The President interjected by asking how the Soviets proceeded in Cuba. + The replies were vague, and Dr. Kissinger continued briefing.

+

Dr. Kissinger said that the + problem with the USSR is to convince + them that their present course has incalculable risks. But at the same + time we do not want to engage Soviet prestige and leave the Soviets no + escape. The choice for the U.S. is not whether to try for a settlement + or to confront the USSR. The choice is how to do both in order to + achieve a settlement.

+

Dr. Kissinger concluded by saying + that there is one other question: Whether it is conceivable to get an + Arab-Israeli settlement that is not imposed. It could be argued that it + is necessary to try to achieve understanding on both sides so that a + genuine accommodation can be reached. On the other hand, it is clear + that without some pressure no such agreement is likely to be reached. + The problem is not that the two sides fail to understand each other’s + interests but that they understand them too well. If this is true, then + it remains for outsiders to devise a situation in which there are + incentives for each side to accept imposed terms.

+

Secretary Rogers said he did not + feel this was a case of our doing one thing or the other. What we want + to do is to get the parties into a negotiating posture and then to force + them to accept a settlement. But to exert that kind of pressure behind + the scenes we have to begin negotiations. Then at that point we will + have to figure out whether, if we cannot get a settlement, we just + quit.

+

The President said there is no question that there will be no settlement + unless it is imposed. It is not useful for the U.S. to talk that way + publicly, but there should be no misunderstanding about this fact around + the NSC table. The question is whether + there is enough in a settlement for the USSR to participate in imposing it.

+

Secretary Rogers replied that the + UAR could not accept a settlement + without USSR support.

+

The President said that the U.S. would have to use a big stick with + Israel. In good conscience we cannot use that stick with Israel unless + we are as sure as we can be that the other side is going to do its part + in making a settlement stick.

+

The President asked whether Defense holds different views from those + expressed by State. Mr. Packard + replied that there is “general agreement” with State. Defense starts + from the premise that it is hard to see a military solution to this + problem in any context, whether it be the supply of arms to Israel or + U.S. confrontation of the Soviet Union. Defense takes the question a + step further and asks whether the U.S. would even be in a position to intervene. The Middle East + is an awkward place for the U.S. to operate militarily; there is a long + supply line and probably there would be little support from Europe. The + President said we would probably be supported by Greece.

+

Mr. Packard continued, saying that + in the final analysis we would have to rely on our nuclear power, and + that is the last thing we want to fall back on. Defense agrees that this + is the time to try to start negotiations and feels that it may be our + last chance. The main difference between the Defense viewpoint and + State’s is that Defense feels the U.S. ought to take a totally new + approach instead of going back to the UN + and Ambassador Jarring. We ought + to consider a direct approach to the UAR in the form perhaps of a Presidential envoy.

+

The President said he didn’t feel that the State proposal would rule that + out. Mr. Sisco said that the + State proposal does differ from old approaches in precisely the way that + Mr. Packard had mentioned. This + is not the old way. State is proposing going directly to the + parties.

+

Secretary Rogers said that we + cannot get away from the UN + resolution.UN Security Council Resolution 242.

+

Mr. Packard said he felt that we + should go straight to the UAR and find + out exactly what they want. The UAR and + the Soviets would benefit from having the Suez Canal open. Perhaps we + could use the Panama Canal as a lever. However that may be, there is + very likely a legitimate interest in the UAR in minimizing the Soviet presence. We are going to have + to impose a settlement and use leverage on Israel. We should therefore + try to develop a position which is in everybody’s interest. We are not + going to get much from Israel for a few airplanes; we are going to have + to lay down the law to Israel.

+

Mr. Packard concluded that Defense + is not too far from State’s general appreciation of the situation. + Whether to sell airplanes before or after approaching Israel for a + settlement is a matter of judgment. Defense simply believes that + progress in negotiations is so important that we should not do anything + to jeopardize it.

+

Mr. Sisco said that he wanted to + explain the State Department proposal on planes. By the end of June + under past contracts 44 Phantoms will be delivered. There are 6 others + covered by this contract which are not scheduled to be delivered until + 1971 because they are of a special reconnaissance configuration. That + means that we could deliver 3 planes in July and 3 in August without + going beyond the initial contract total of 50. Then, we could earmark 4 + Phantoms and 4 Skyhawks per month with delivery beginning in September + and continuing through December. We would assume that these deliveries + would be made unless negotiations are so successful that we conclude that delivery might + jeopardize them. We would take a decision now, however, on these + additional planes for delivery in September and only withhold delivery + in the unlikely event that delivery would be badly timed in relation to + negotiations.

+

Secretary Rogers said that these + aircraft would be referred to as “replacements.” Mr. Sisco said that by this definition + “replacement” means covering past losses, probable future losses and + obsolescence. The President wondered whether this would not be just + enough to irritate the Arabs and yet not enough to provide real stroke + with Israel. Mr. Sisco replied + that it is possible that even a minimal number of airplanes would cause + an explosion in the Arab countries if Nasser decides he wants an explosion. There is even a + greater possibility if the PFLP decides it wants an explosion. The + President asked what about Morocco, Jordan, Tunisia and Saudi Arabia. + Secretary Rogers replied that + they are braced for the U.S. decision to provide replacements. The + Russians also expect this. Such a move would not be escalatory. It would + be escalatory if we sold the whole 125 airplanes that the Israelis had + asked for.

+

The President asked what it was the 73 Senators had been pressing + for.On June 4, 73 U.S. Senators sent + a letter to Nixon asking him + to meet Israel’s request for additional aircraft. (New York Times, June 6, 1970, p. 22) Secretary + Rogers replied that they had + been pressing for the whole 125 beyond the replacement concept.

+

The Vice President said that he would like to move back a step and ask + whether we are certain that a settlement is in the U.S. interest. With + the Fedayeen and the Soviet abilities enhanced and the history of + insurgency as we have seen it, would Israel be able to cope with the + Palestinians? Secretary Rogers + replied that that would depend on the kind of settlement that comes + about. We do not have to decide this now because the settlement itself + is still remote.

+

Mr. Richardson said he agreed + that settlement would take a while. He felt that we need to address + ourselves to the question of what the U.S. can do to achieve a position + to keep the balance from shifting radically versus the U.S. and Israel + if agitators upset prospects for a settlement. We really do need some + position toward the Palestinians. We may have missed the boat earlier in + thinking only of the Palestinians as refugees. If we can take a posture + of some sympathy toward the Palestinians, we might ride out the + protracted absence of a settlement. On the other hand, if we move closer + to a settlement we might be able to get a better settlement for having taken the interests + of the Palestinians into account.

+

Mr. Richardson said that this is + really a question of whether we make public a sympathetic position on + such issues as a Jerusalem settlement and the formation of a Palestinian + state. This is a dimension of the problem that has not been sufficiently + addressed. It would also help us in the Muslim world outside the area of + conflict. For instance, the Indonesian Foreign Minister had said that + this would be very helpful in his part of the world; it might also be + helpful in Saudi Arabia.

+

Ambassador Yost said he was glad + that the Palestinian angle had been brought out.

+

Ambassador Yost continued, saying + he felt that we must push very hard for a settlement. He is not as + pessimistic as Secretary Rogers. + The only way of assuring Israeli security is a settlement. If the war of + attrition goes on, Israel will be in serious jeopardy. The situation in + Jordan and Lebanon will get worse.

+

While the UAR may be prepared to + recognize Israel, Ambassador Yost continued, the Palestinians may not be. We must be + in some way in a position to take account of their real interests.

+

Ambassador Yost felt that the + first increment of aircraft in the summer would be wise. He was + doubtful, however, about Mr. Sisco’s formulation for continuing shipments in the fall + unless negotiations are succeeding. It would seem that, under this + formula, Israel would have an incentive to make the negotiations + fail.

+

Secretary Rogers said that we + have done some thinking about the Palestinians. His last statement + included a sentence on them.Not + found. The real problem is how to deal with them. In Jordan, + they are against King Hussein, + and they have no leader who speaks for them.

+

The President said that one of the mistakes since 1948 has been failure + to give full attention to the refugee problem. He said he is aware of + all the arguments, but this is a terrific irritant. Secretary Rogers asked whether the President + felt that the 1956 decisionReference is + to President Dwight D. + Eisenhower’s decision to call for British, French, + and Israeli forces to withdraw from the Suez Canal Zone after their + invasion in October 1956. The invasion was in response to Egypt’s + nationalization of the Canal on July 26, 1956. was right. The + President replied, “No.” The problem with it was that it came at the + wrong time. The invasion of Egypt was badly executed by the British and + French, and the crisis in HungaryThe + Soviet invasion of Hungary in November 1956. was simultaneous + with it. The British and French did not need to be involved. Israel + could have done the job alone. In the United States the whole issue came + right at the end of an election campaign.

+

The President felt that the great tragedy of 1956 was that it finished + the British as a world power. The French really didn’t care, but the + British began their course of getting out of involvement all around the + world at that point. It is + not a healthy thing for the world for the U.S. to be the only major + power in Asia or the Middle East. The French are out of the Far East, + and the Dutch are out of Indonesia. Britain’s withdrawal is a great + tragedy. While French withdrawal did not make much difference, the + British have great brains and sophistication. To have them out of Asia + is a very sad situation. After the British election, it may be important + to try to keep them in Singapore.

+

Mr. Packard said he wished to + return to one detail about aircraft deliveries. It is one thing to say + that we are simply delivering 6 more airplanes within the total number + of aircraft originally contracted for. It is quite another if we + recognize that we are replacing 6 reconnaissance aircraft with 6 attack + aircraft. The Sisco proposal is + to increase Israeli attack capability when it does not need enhancement. + Mr. Sisco said that it is a + combination of replacement for 3 airplanes lost plus 3 new ones.

+

The President asked what the Israelis would think of this. Would they + think that it is nothing? Will we get another letter from the Senators? + Mr. Sisco said that they would + have to look carefully at the earmarking promised. He felt that the + domestic problem was containable if the Israelis would just say that the + earmarking arrangement is “satisfactory.”

+

Mr. Helms said he felt that it + was important to maintain the numbers of 50 Phantoms and 100 Skyhawks + that were known in the Arab world. If there were any way to stay within + those numbers we could possibly avoid an explosion in the Arab + world.

+

Mr. Richardson said he strongly + supported the general Sisco + approach. But in a short time we will know whether it will or will not + work. We should tell the Israelis that our interests and theirs do + coincide in the field of launching negotiations. If we cannot start a + negotiation both of our interests will suffer. The Israelis will face a + long war of attrition. Hopefully, the Israelis would see their interests + in cooperating. We should be able to explain to the Israelis that they + have an interest in playing this low-key and that it is contrary to + their interests to have a big announcement which would kill all chances + for negotiation.

+

Secretary Rogers said that the + Israelis do not have much hope of negotiations. He did not feel they + were going to be as reasonable as Mr. Richardson hoped.

+

The President asked whether this was enough to push the Israelis with. + Attorney General Mitchell said + that if we talked to the Israelis first this should take the heat out of + the domestic reaction. Mr. Sisco + said it would be important how we phrased our statement on + earmarking.

+

Mr. Sisco continued, saying that + we would be asking the Israelis to engage in indirect negotiations on + the basis of the UAR’s acknowledgement of Israel’s right to exist. We + would also be asking for Israeli acceptance of the principle of withdrawal. Secretary + Rogers said that we would be + asking two concessions from Israel—indirect negotiation and acceptance + of the principle of withdrawal. The President asked whether that could + be bought for 6 airplanes. Secretary Rogers said it would not be easy to persuade them.

+

General Lincoln said that he + simply wanted to report that the Western Europeans with whom he has had + contact are deeply concerned about Middle East oil supplies. The OECD is + actively discussing the problem.

+

The President said he would want to consider the State Department + proposal further. He said he realized that while people were hopeful + something could be done there was also a good deal of skepticism.

+

The President said he still came back to a basic point that militates + against a settlement: What is in it for the Soviets? The present + situation is costing them some money. They may be concerned about a + possible confrontation with the U.S. But if they look at that + proposition coldly, they know as well as we know around the NSC table that the likelihood of U.S. + action directly against them is “in doubt.” It did not use to be in + doubt. That was what the Lebanon invasion of 1958In response to Lebanese President Camille + Chamoun’s call for help to quash a rebellion against his government + that had widened into a civil war, President Eisenhower sent 14,000 U.S. troops + to Lebanon on July 15, 1958. The presence of U.S. forces helped to + resolve the crisis, which ended with the election of a compromise + candidate, General Fuad Chehab, as President on July 31, and the + troops were eventually withdrawn by October 25. was + about.

+

Again looking at the Soviets: they have made noises that they would like + to see a settlement. They have a muscle-bound bureaucracy and have + trouble seeing things in gradations. It may be that as far as the + Soviets are concerned our job is to get them to play a role in imposing + a settlement. The ingredient that is missing and has to be supplied in + some way is the incentive to them to play that role.

+

Secretary Rogers noted that the + Soviets are concerned about the Chinese and about the Fedayeen. Soviet + officials often allude to those problems. Nasser is concerned about what has happened in Jordan + and that he may be in some danger.

+

Ambassador Yost said that the + Soviets do not call the tune in Cairo. If a settlement in Arab interests + emerges, he did not believe that the Soviets could prevent it.

+

Mr. Sisco said that, while he + agreed about the Fedayeen and the Chinese, he put greater weight on what + the Soviets think of American will. The real leverage on the USSR is fear of a confrontation with the + U.S. We ought to be looking at the 6th Fleet to see whether it is projecting American power to the + maximum extent. His conclusion, he said, is that the Soviets feel now + that they can broaden the conflict. We are essentially up against a + Soviet political strategy, but at the end of the line they must feel + that they could run into a confrontation with the U.S.

+

Mr. Richardson indicated his + agreement. He felt that we need to find a way to use the only lever that + we really have—the Soviet fear of confrontation.

+

Mr. Packard said that this is a + matter of timing. He said we have to move ahead soon. We should avoid + moving planes. He liked the idea of having a pool of aircraft perhaps in + Texas as a reserve for Israel which would not be moved to Israel unless + the situation required.

+

The President concluded the meeting by saying that he would look at all + of this.

+
+ +
+ 125. Minutes of a Washington Special Actions Group MeetingSource: National Archives, Nixon + Presidential Materials, NSC Files, + NSC Institutional Files + (H-Files), Box H–114, Washington Special Actions Group, WSAG Minutes (Originals) 1969 and + 1970. Top Secret; Nodis. All brackets are in the original except + those indicating text omitted by the editors. The meeting was held + in the White House Situation Room. + Washington, June 11, 1970, + 2:53–3:40 p.m. + + SUBJECT + Jordan + + + PARTICIPATION + Chairman—Henry A. + Kissinger + + State + + Mr. U. Alexis + Johnson + Mr. Joseph J. Sisco + Amb. Harrison + Symmes + + Defense + + Mr. David Packard + Mr. Robert Pranger + + JCS + + Adm. Thomas H. + Moorer + Col. Marvin C. Kettlehut + + + CIA + + + Mr. Richard Helms + Mr. David Blee + + NSC Staff + + Mr. Harold Saunders + + Gen. + Alexander Haig + + Mr. D. Keith Guthrie + + +

SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS

+

The WSAG received a report of action + taken to evacuate American nationals from Jordan and agreed that first + priority should be given to arranging evacuation under the auspices of + the International Red Cross (ICRC). Admiral Moorer outlined planning for possible military + action to support an evacuation if the international effort fails or if + order in Amman breaks down completely. Two scenarios are to be drawn up + covering possible military action (1) to support an evacuation or (2) to + intervene in Jordan in response to a request from King Hussein for help against outside + intervention. The scenarios will specify troop requirements and the + likely duration of the military operations and will include a full + discussion of relevant political factors. The State Department will + submit immediately a memorandum listing steps taken and planned to + protect American citizens in Jordan.

+

[Omitted here are the minutes of the meeting.]

+
+ +
+ 126. Minutes of a Washington Special Actions Group MeetingSource: National Archives, Nixon + Presidential Materials, NSC Files, + NSC Institutional Files + (H-Files), Box H–114, Washington Special Actions Group, WSAG Meetings Minutes (Originals) + 1969 and 1970. Top Secret; Nodis. All brackets are in the original + except those indicating text omitted by the editors. The meeting was + held in the White House Situation Room. + Washington, June 12, 1970, + 2:35–2:50 p.m. + + SUBJECT + Jordan + + + PARTICIPATION + Chairman—Henry A. + Kissinger + + State + + + U. Alexis Johnson + + + Rodger Davies + + Amb. Harrison + Symmes + + Defense + + Richard A. Ware + Dennis J. Doolin + + JCS + + Adm. Thomas H. + Moorer + Brig. Gen. Jacob E. Glick + + + CIA + + + Gen. Robert E. Cushman, + Jr. + + Thomas Karamessines + + David Blee + + NSC Staff + + + Harold H. Saunders + + D. Keith Guthrie + + +

SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS

+

The WSAG received a status report on + the evacuation of U.S. and other foreign nationals from AmmanThe report has not been found. The contingency plan + for “Military-Supported Evacuation of U.S. Citizens from Jordan,” + undated, is ibid., Box H–075, Washington Special Actions Group + Meetings, WSAG Meeting Jordan and + Cambodia. and reviewed progress on contingency planning for + possible military action in Jordan. The contingency plan for military + action in response to a request from King Hussein for support against outside interventionThese contingencies were discussed at the + June 22 WSAG meeting; see Document 131. is to be completed no + later than June 17. The WSAG also + noted that there was a possibility that an evacuation from Beirut might + have to be undertaken and that there were existing WSAG-approved plans to cover this + contingency.A summary of the Lebanon + evacuation plan, June 11, is in the National Archives, Nixon + Presidential Materials, NSC Files, + NSC Institutional Files + (H-Files), Box H–075, Washington Special Actions Group Meetings, + WSAG Meeting Jordan + 6/11/70.

+

[Omitted here are the minutes of the meeting.]

+
+ +
+ 127. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security + Affairs (Kissinger) to President + NixonSource: National Archives, Nixon + Presidential Materials, NSC Files, + Box 645, Country Files, Middle East, Middle East—General, Vol. VI. + Secret; Nodis. + Washington, June + 16, 1970. + + SUBJECT + The Middle East + +

I have been generally restrained on Middle East issues for obvious + reasons. To date, I have confined myself to pointing out pitfalls of + recommended policies, making tactical suggestions, and on several + occasions helping to modify recommendations which I considered would + have had disastrous consequences. For example, if we had not at the last + moment altered the State Department approach of a flat turndown on + aircraft this past March, our announcement could have had serious + domestic effects, especially since it would have surfaced simultaneously with the disclosure + that the Soviets had just drastically escalated their role in Egypt’s + defense.For the March 23 announcement, + see Document 106.

+

Since the situation in the area continues to deteriorate and you are now + at still another important tactical crossroads, I believe I must + emphatically point out the dangers if we continue on our projected + course.

+

Our Policy to Date

+

We have three principal objectives in the Middle East:

+

—To prevent Soviet dominance in the area;

+

—To prevent the spread of Arab radicalism which could pose a threat to + Western interests;

+

—To honor the commitment we have to the survival of Israel.

+

On all three counts, we have seen our position eroded since January 1969. + The Soviets have greatly increased their influence in the region. The + moderate Arab states, and even the more radical ones, are increasingly + subject to Fedayeen pressures. The Fedayeen have become a powerful + separate force which may already make it impossible for the Arab + governments to accept or enforce any settlement that we could sell to + Israel. Israel is becoming increasingly desperate and sees her future + survival at stake, with its preemptive capability as its sole remaining + asset.

+

From the beginning, our policy has rested on some basic assumptions:

+

—That the root problem in the Middle East is the Arab/Israeli conflict + over territory;

+

—That once we settle this dispute by negotiation, the influence of the + radical Arabs will dwindle;

+

—That the Soviet influence in the Middle East can be seen largely in + terms of this conflict.

+

These basic assumptions are all open to question. Even if the Arab/ + Israeli territorial dispute is solved by negotiation, we will still face + the fundamental problems of thriving Arab radicalism and Soviet + influence.

+

Arab radicalism has five components: (1) the Israeli conquests of + territory; (2) the very existence of Israel; (3) social and economic + objectives; (4) opposition to Western interests; and (5) opposition to + Arab moderates. Only the first of these components would be affected by + a settlement. The others will remain, maintaining Arab radicalism as an + independent force. Israel will still be there for the radicals to + erase—it is precisely because for much of the Arab world the issue is + its existence, and not its + particular frontiers, that Israel has scant confidence in Arab promises + and sees little to gain in a settlement. The causes of social and + economic unrest will persist. Western oil and Arab moderates will be + prime targets. For example, the recent upheavals in Libya and the Sudan, + and the possible coming turmoil in Saudi Arabia are little related to + the Arab/Israeli question and would thus be little affected by a + settlement. In fact, an Egypt free of its Sinai obsession could then + focus on moderate Arab regimes.

+

Similarly, the expanding Soviet beachhead poses a growing challenge + irrespective of the Arab/Israeli dispute. One of our major problems is + that the Soviets may emerge as the strongest military power in the + region, directly responsible for the protection of Egypt. In fact, the + Soviets have much more to gain through a settlement than we—return of + the lands to the Arabs, the opening of the Canal for Soviet ships to + operate in the Persian Gulf and Red Sea, and the prospect of Arab + radicals freed for concentration against Western interests and Arab + moderates.

+

You inherited a very dangerous situation and faced a painful dilemma. In + this complex situation, we have gone down the single track of technical + negotiations on the specifics of a peace plan, always out-distanced by + events and without a clear strategic conception. Our policy has been + punctuated by tactical decisions under largely self-imposed time + deadlines. It has consisted of almost compulsive stabs at tactical + negotiating initiatives which have been just enough to sweep us up in a + negotiating process but not enough to bring about a fundamental change + in the situation.

+

While events have become more dangerous, we have paid a price with each + of the three major audiences. We have strained our relations with Israel + by moving further and further from her positions; she, in turn, has + increasingly relied on military moves to preserve her security. On the + other hand, we have not given enough to the Arabs, partially because of + our reliance on the formal aspect of the negotiating process. This has + made us fall between two stools. The fact of our intervening displeased + the Israelis and its formal nature infuriated the Arabs. Finally, our + whole approach with the Soviets has been uncertain: rather than making + it clear to them that their actions pose a direct threat to our interests, we have always made our + representations on Israel’s behalf. This was illustrated once again by + Secretary Rogers’ June 2 meeting + with Dobrynin where he told the + Soviets only to stay away from the Canal area, in effect acquiescing in + the massive Soviet presence already in Egypt.See Document + 120.

+ +

To understand where we are today, it is useful to recall briefly how we + got here. The following review includes first some of the decisions and + then some of the major concerns I expressed in memoranda at each of the + decision milestones. While I would not normally burden you with this + record, I do so in this case to emphasize that my concern is over the + fundamental philosophic approach of our Mideast policy rather than any + individual tactical decision.

+

Since January 1969, we have moved from a position of no direct + involvement in seeking a Middle East settlement, to exploratory talks + among the four powers looking toward a set of general principles, to + bilateral discussions with the Soviets and presenting of specific + Amer-ican proposals on the terms of UAR/Israel and Jordan/Israel border + agreements.

+

In February 1969, we decided to take the + initiative in finding a settlement, changing our previous policy of + letting the local forces play themselves out.See Document 8. We + entered into exploratory four-power talks to work toward a set of + general principles. At the time I emphasized the principal issue: + whether by going all out for a general settlement—which might be + impossible—we would cripple our ability to contain the conflict in the + absence of a settlement. We must be sure a settlement was possible before we began negotiating and using up our + political capital. Persuading Israel to accept any political arrangement + would require a combination of pressure and the enticement of sound U.S. + or international guarantees.

+

In April, we decided to present our positions on + specific terms of a UAR-Israel settlement other than borders. The + argument was made that the talks, which had concentrated on trying to + establish a framework for a UAR-Israel settlement, would reach an + impasse unless discussions could become more specific.See Documents 25 and 26.

+

At the time I highlighted certain pitfalls in putting forward specific + proposals. A proposal that Israel could accept could be countered by + more lenient proposals by the other powers which we would have to + oppose, and thus be charged with breaking up the talks. A fair proposal + would be equally unpalatable to the Arabs and Israelis and we were + likely to get the blame from both sides. A proposal that was less than + Israel’s minimum position would probably be rejected by her—leaving us + the choice of negotiating without Israeli assent or being isolated by + holding out for Israeli terms. The first course might tempt Israeli + preemption; the second would produce Arab frustrations directed against + the U.S.

+ +

In October, we put forward in the US–USSR talks + our position on the UAR-Israel borders,See + Document 58. which we had + considered our fallback until then. We were told that this would + emphasize to the Soviets that Israel could be pressed to withdraw only + if the UAR were pressed to accept + arrangements that Israel would regard as giving her security comparable + to the present ceasefire lines.

+

I doubted at the time that a diplomatic move could any longer affect the + deep-rooted forces at work in the area, especially the uncontrollable + Fedayeen. The Jordanian and Syrian aspects needed to be addressed along + with the UAR-Israel problem. The Arab world would not judge us by + proposals, only by results. I saw little gain for us in the Arab world + if we continued supplying arms and money to Israel after she rejected + our position. We were helping to build a case for greater Arab militancy + without getting close to a settlement. At the same time we were making + it more likely that Israel would rely more heavily than ever on its + military strategy. We were doing too little to have a chance of success + but enough to divert indigenous forces from reaching their own + decisions.

+

In December, we advanced a proposal on a + Jordan-Israel settlement in the four-power talks.See Document 78. + The real issue, I pointed out, was not these negotiating tactics but + whether we were willing to squeeze Israel. If you were prepared to + impose a settlement, I leaned toward conditioning future military and + economic deliveries to Israel on their acceptance of our position—we + should do so not by cutting off aid but by promising a generous aid + package regulating deliveries by Israel’s agreement to a negotiating + scenario. My concern was that we were heading for a confrontation with + Israel and the American Jewish Community and that if Israel thought it + were cut off from outside support, she was likely to strike again to + topple Nasser.

+

In March, as I mentioned earlier, we barely + avoided disastrous consequences by our last-minute sweetening of our + announcement denying Israel her basic request for aircraft.

+

If we continue this process, we will wind up being responsible for all + the formulas and principles of a Middle East settlement and all the + failures, with Israel hysterical, the Arabs belligerent and the USSR contemptuous.

+

Current Decision

+

You are now faced with yet another tactical decision on the Middle East + under time pressure from the bureaucracy.

+ +

Last fall I said that for us to formulate specific negotiating proposals + could bring Israeli escalation and push us to the edge of war. This is + exactly what has happened. Our October 28 and December 18 proposals were + accepted by no one. They emboldened the Arabs who stepped up their + border pressures. Israel began making deep penetration raids which, in + turn, caused Nasser to allow a + massive influx of Soviet personnel and influence. Israel’s preemptive + raids are now inhibited by Soviet pilots and air defenses; and she faces + the prospect of slow attrition.

+

I believe the proposal that the State Department has suggestedSee Document 123. at + this juncture would continue to take us down the same path and would not + produce a settlement. The State plan involves a limited commitment of + six Phantoms now, pending outcome of a new effort to get a ceasefire and + negotiations, coupled with a clearly implied promise of 16 Phantoms and + 16 Skyhawks to be shipped during the fall. (At Tab A is a detailed look + at the State scenario.)Attached but not + printed at Tab A is the undated scenario.

+

I don’t believe this combination of a minimal commitment at this time and + an ambivalent earmarking of additional planes for the future will work + to produce the ceasefire and settlement it seeks. In order to sell the + overall proposal to Israel, she would have to feel practically certain + that she will get the 32 additional planes. The Arabs, on the other + hand, would find the proposal palatable only if they were convinced that + Israel would not get more than the six planes. Unless there were a major + breakthrough by September, we are bound to disappoint one of the two + sides at the time.

+

Furthermore, we would send the wrong signals to each of our three + audiences. For Israel the aircraft earmarking suggestion will not induce + her to negotiate, whether or not she interprets it as a firm commitment. + If Israel does not believe that she will get the follow-on planes in the + fall, she will take our decision as giving her only six planes, or only + three more than was already promised her in March. It is absurd to think + that on this basis she would yield her total position on boundaries that + she has maintained for three years. The Israelis will not contemplate + withdrawals unless they are assured of the equipment necessary for their + security behind less defensible borders than they have now.

+

The State approach would have us force the Israelis back to the pre-war + borders while they get no further planes after the summer. They would be + asked to give up both elements of their security at the same time—their + territorial buffers and the prospect of more aircraft. As peace with more vulnerable frontiers + approached, their aircraft inventory would drop.

+

If, on the other hand, Israel believes that she will get the larger + aircraft package if negotiations are going badly, she will have no + incentive to make negotiations go well. She would prefer the planes to + the promise of a settlement which can only be negotiated at the expense + of the assets which the territories represent.

+

The ceasefire element in the package is another disincentive for Israel. + Once she has obtained a halt to all Arab military pressures, she can sit + securely on her captured territories, blunt negotiating progress and + look forward to 32 more planes.

+

The response of the Arabs turns on the position of + Nasser. His actions depend + on how decisive we are and how serious he thinks we are in squeezing + Israel back to her former borders, the one incentive for him to + negotiate. Nasser would + interpret our action as a halfway move. He would seriously doubt that we + could really press Israel to withdraw on the basis of six aircraft and + perhaps others later on. He would think that only a threat of a cut-off + or the promise of substantial support after withdrawal would be + sufficient to move Israel. For him, the prospect of Israel’s having six + more aircraft and staying along the Canal is more uninviting than + Israel’s getting a greater number of planes and withdrawing to her + former borders. He would be asked to negotiate more or less directly + with Israel in exchange for her commitment only to the “principle of + withdrawal,” not interpreted as complete withdrawal. Since he would have + no reason to think we would succeed in moving Israel back, Nasser will pursue his tactical moves + and the other Arabs will follow suit.

+

To the Soviets, the State Department proposal + would be a weak gesture in the face of their continued expansion of + influence. Our formula would be of too little military consequence and + too hesitant to convince them that we are prepared to match their + escalation in the area. They considered our March announcement + uncertain; they will read this one the same way. Moreover, this course + rests on direct U.S. approaches to the parties, principally Nasser, which the Soviets might read + as attempting to squeeze them out of Egypt as well as the + negotiations.

+

Thus, I believe that the State Department proposal will only serve to + accentuate present dangerous trends. Israel, particularly if she thinks + she is only getting the six aircraft, will border on hysteria, in light + of continuing American hesitation, growing Soviet involvement, and + increasing Arab pressures. We will face the likely radicalization of the + American Jewish community and the loss of their support—or at least + restraint—on our Southeast Asian policies. At best, the Arab reaction + will be to continue their + current policies. And the Soviets can only be induced to become more + bellicose and inch closer toward the Canal.

+

Even if we reach a settlement, we would have demonstrated that threats + against the United States and blackmail against our oil interests pay + off.

+

I should point out again that a settlement would hardly erase our + problems in the region. Arab radicalism is not just a product of the + Arab-Israeli impasse. It has its own ideological roots and will still be + present to attack Western interests after a settlement. The Suez Canal + will be opened for the Soviet fleet to operate in the Persian Gulf and + Egyptian forces will be free to move against friendly Arab states like + Saudi Arabia. Radical Arab nationalists will still be prone to attack + our oil interests.

+

If you choose to accept the State Department plan, the only palliatives + that I can suggest would be the following:

+

—Deliver the six aircraft plus replace the three that the Israelis have + lost, making for a total of nine through this summer.

+

—Make our commitment for the other 32 as clear as possible. The two-stage + formula of the State Department proposal is a tricky course to navigate + and could get us into trouble in September.

+

A More Promising Course

+

Rather than the State Department approach, I believe a more promising + course would be the one that I outlined as the third option in my June 9 + memorandum to you.The “third option” was + set forth in an attachment to a June 9 memorandum from Kissinger to Nixon, which discussed the Middle + East issues to be covered at the NSC meeting the next day. (National Archives, Nixon + Presidential Materials, NSC Files, + Box 645, Country Files, Middle East, Middle East—General, Vol. IV) + The memorandum is printed in Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, volume XII, + Soviet Union, January 1969–October 1970, Document + 65.

+

We would offer a larger number of aircraft to Israel (25 Phantoms and a + substantial number of its requested Skyhawks over 12 months) with the + thought of withholding delivery unless Israel cooperates in a diplomatic + approach. We would require Israel’s assurance that it would return + essentially to her prewar borders, in exchange for Arab commitments and + an enforceable peace. We would tell both the Soviets and Nasser that Soviet combat personnel + would have to be withdrawn after an agreement. We would go to Nasser and state that we would do + everything in our power to get Israel back to her former borders if he + will cooperate in the negotiations. We would make clear to Nasser that we are the only government + that can get Israel to withdraw and that he cannot expect us to squeeze + Israel and withhold aid at the same time. If he uses the provision of aircraft to Israel as the + pretext for encouraging attacks on American installations elsewhere, + then we will give the planes to Israel without pressing her to withdraw. + (A fuller description of this proposal is at Tab B.)Undated; attached but not printed.

+

This approach recognizes that the only way we can produce a settlement is + to combine great pressure on Israel to withdraw with great reassurance + that we will supply her the means for her security. We would combine the + sticks of diplomatic pressure and withholding aircraft deliveries with + the carrot of a large number of planes as a settlement is reached. The + Arabs themselves should understand that only + such reassurance to Israel will cause her to withdraw.

+

This could be a decisive move for all three of our audiences. It would + give Israel an incentive to negotiate while making clear that we will + not back a strategy which could lead to US–USSR confrontation. It would + show Nasser and the Arabs that + we are determined to move toward a settlement and give promise of + pressures on Israel to withdraw. And it would be a firm move versus the + Soviets who would see both that we are prepared to match their + escalation with a well-supplied Israel and we are ready to move toward + the escape hatch of a settlement acceptable to their Arab clients.

+

It thus could weave together the three essential strands of a Mideast + settlement. The large number of aircraft would meet Israeli security concerns (whereas State’s few planes would + aggravate these concerns)—she might then opt for negotiation. Our + decisive move and our clear commitment to pressure Israel would hold out + for the Arabs a good prospect of regaining their + territories (whereas the State proposal won’t + convince them we can move Israel)—they might agree to negotiations. And + our proposal would give the Soviets both a sense + of danger and an escape route which should give back to the Arabs their + territories (whereas the State scenario would seem indecisive to + them)—they might support negotiations.

+

There are, of course, serious risks in this course as in any other for + the Middle East. The promise of this large aircraft package for Israel + could hardly be kept secret for long. No matter how the deliveries are + conditioned on Israeli performance on withdrawal, a violent reaction in + the Arab world is conceivable. The Arabs might see our formula as merely + emboldening Israel and doubt our willingness to withhold delivery of the + planes if Israel does not move on withdrawals. We will face sticky + timing decisions on aircraft deliveries as negotiations proceed. + Engineering the removal of Soviet combat personnel from Egypt will be + especially difficult. And even if a settlement is achieved, we will be back to the 1967 situation, + with both sides militarily stronger and the Fedayeen a new disruptive + factor.

+

Despite these problems, I believe this course holds out better hope for a + settlement than the one proposed by State. It would, of course, have to + be carefully managed and I would envisage that we would go with our + proposal to Israel, the Soviets and Nasser in that order.

+

Conclusion

+

This approach, with all its inherent risks, is the most likely way to + halt a deteriorating situation. But it would require a disciplined + effort by us, bureaucratically as well as diplomatically. I frankly do + not believe that we have the kind of governmental framework necessary to + do the job. Shortly after our Cambodian experience, you would have to + override the recommendations of your top Cabinet advisers, and impose a + wholly different policy upon a very reluctant bureaucracy, which would + then be charged with implementing it.

+

The only alternative would be (1) to shift control of the negotiations + out of State to the White House, or (2) to let State go with its + approach, while I dealt with Dobrynin, telling him that we were just marking time. + Either of these alternatives, of course, raises tremendous problems.

+

There is the further factor that Secretary Rogers has almost certainly laid out the State + Department proposal to Dobrynin. + Joe Sisco, in his June 12 + talk with Dobrynin,In telegram 92515 to Amman, Beirut, Cairo, Jidda, + Kuwait, Tel Aviv, London, Moscow, Paris, USUN, Algiers, Khartoum, Rabat, Tunis, Tripoli, + Belgrade, Bucharest, Nicosia, Rome, and USNATO, June 12, the + Department reported Sisco’s + 1½-hour meeting with Dobrynin in Washington that day. (National Archives, + Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC + Files, Box 614, Country Files, Middle East, Jordan, Vol. IV) + further locked us in by indicating that our general strategy would + follow this line.

+

In these circumstances and given the existing bureaucratic framework, I + believe that you have little choice but to pursue the State Department + route,See Document 128. perhaps cutting the risks somewhat + with the modifications I have suggested.

+
+ +
+ + 128. National Security Decision Memorandum 66Source: National Archives, Nixon + Presidential Materials, NSC Files, + NSC Institutional Files + (H-Files), Box H–217, National Security Decision Memoranda. Secret; + Nodis; Exclusively Eyes Only. A copy was sent to the Chairman of the + Joint Chiefs of Staff. + Washington, June + 18, 1970. + + TO + The Secretary of State + The Secretary of Defense + + + SUBJECT + Next Steps in the Middle East + +

Based on discussion in the NSC meeting + of June 10,See Document + 124. the President has approved the steps + recommended in the Secretary of State’s memorandum of June 9,See Document 123. + subject to the following:

+

1. He wishes to increase the number of earmarked Phantoms for the months + of September and October from four to five.

+

2. He wishes to make clear that Israel should be informed that we are + making a commitment to deliver the earmarked planes starting in + September unless such deliveries at that time would seriously jeopardize + any ongoing negotiations between the parties which may be in process. It + is not contemplated that there would be a need for further internal + review at that time of the arms delivery question unless some new + dramatic development were to occur. Neither would there be need for a + further publicized request by Israel.

+

3. In addition, the President believes it is important that in the + discussions between Israeli representatives and our Pentagon officials + we respond both affirmatively and promptly to the ongoing requests which + Israel has made for various items of logistic support. These include the + items listed in your memorandum, i.e., Hawk ground-to-air missiles, + bombs, tanks, radar and acceleration of spare parts deliveries for F–4s + and A–4s.

+ + + Henry A. Kissinger + + +
+ +
+ + 129. Telegram From the Department of State to Certain Diplomatic + PostsSource: National + Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1155, Saunders Files, Middle East + Negotiations Files, U.S. Peace Initiative For the Middle East. + Secret; Priority; Noforn; Nodis. Drafted on June 17 by Atherton, cleared by Rogers in substance, and approved + by Sisco.Sent Priority to + Amman, Cairo, London, Moscow, Paris, USUN, Beirut, Jidda, Kuwait, Algiers, Rabat, Tunis, + Bonn, Tripoli, Khartoum, Ankara, Tehran, New Delhi, Rawalpindi, + Belgrade, Bucharest, Nicosia, Rome, Tel Aviv, Dhahran, and + Jerusalem. + Washington, June 19, 1970, 0134Z. +

96540. For Ambassador or Chief of Mission From the Secretary.

+

1. President has approved major new USG + initiative on M.E. ProblemSee Document 128. consisting of + following elements:

+

A. Approach directly to Israel, UAR and + Jordan designed to get negotiations started under Jarring’s auspices on basis of short + formula spelled out below. We would seek agreement on 90 day ceasefire + as part of this package but would not make it a sine qua non.

+

B. Approach to USSR designed (1) to + elicit its cooperation in foregoing proposal on understanding two power + talks would proceed in parallel once negotiations between parties were + launched, and (2) to make clear to Soviets that likely alternative is + heightened Israel-UAR military conflict with risk of US-Soviet + confrontation.

+

C. Approach to UK and France designed (1) + to reassure them we envisage utilizing four power talks on continuing + basis as mechanism for feeding ideas to Jarring to help keep parties negotiating once they have + started and (2) to elicit their support of our initiative with the + parties.

+

D. Briefing of U Thant and + Jarring on our + initiative.

+

E. Response to Israel’s request for military assistance designed (1) to + keep general logistical supply pipeline open, and (2) to reassure + Israelis that we have made contingency arrangements for quick delivery + of further F–4 and A–4 aircraft as replacements for attrition if + situation so requires, while (3) not delivering aircraft to Israel + beyond numbers committed in existing (1966 and 1968) contracts so long + as our efforts for political settlement are actively in train.

+

2. Political initiative we envisage will require, as precondition for + negotiations, concession by UAR on + principle of accepting and agreeing live in peace with Israel (and + perhaps on ceasefire), and by Israel on form of initial negotiating + procedures and principle of withdrawal. We recognize these are + concessions neither side has previously been prepared to make but think UAR, Jordan, Israel and + USSR may be sufficiently nervous + about risks of present military situation to give initiative along these + lines some chance of getting off the ground in present changed + circumstance.

+

3. Our proposed timing is (a) to inform Israelis in advance in detail of + our proposals but not ask their formal acceptance pending Arab and + Soviet reactions, (b) to approach UAR, Jordan, USSR, UK and French about + 24 hours later, and (c) to make general public announcement re our + political initiative and interim aircraft decision a few days after + that.Rogers made the announcement at a news conference on + June 25. His statement and the question-and-answer session that + followed are printed in the Department of State Bulletin, July 13, 1970, pp. 25–33.

+

4. To launch foregoing initiative, Ambassador Barbour will see Prime Minister Meir and I will see Ambassador + Rabin Friday, June 19.

+

5. Following FYI is summary of talking + points being used in presentation to Israelis:

+

A. Political and military situation in area has reached such critical + point that only new and intensive efforts, by those of us whose long + term interests require peaceful settlement, can have any hope of + reversing present trend toward long, costly and dead-end war of + attrition. Pressures are mounting on UAR and Jordan to abandon SC Resolution 242, which is only common framework for + peaceful settlement. Immediate implications for Lebanon, and longer term + implications for such other moderate governments as Saudi Arabia, + Kuwait, Morocco, and Tunisia, are dangerous in the extreme. At same + time, Soviet military involvement in UAR has injected qualitatively new and potentially + open-ended element into military balance.

+

B. Israel has asked us to make clear to Soviets that we will not tolerate + their conspiring in threat to Israeli security and existence. We have + made this clear, and will continue to do so. We will continue, of + course, to support Israel’s survival. There should be no doubts about + the constancy of our support in this regard.

+

C. However, it is also in our national interest to preserve US position + in moderate Arab world and in checking further Soviet gains in area as a + whole.

+

D. We therefore need a strong political as well as a firm military + strategy. Soviet thrust is as much political as military, and can only + be countered by comparable two-pronged approach by us.

+

E. On political side, there is urgent need to launch genuine negotiating + process between parties. The key to getting negotiating process started + is to test commitment of parties to principles of RES 242, and in particular (1) the UAR’s + commitment to the principle of acceptance of and peaceful coexistence + with Israel, and (2) Israel’s commitment to the principle of withdrawal, + both in accordance with the SC + Resolution.

+

F. Three recent developments offer an opportunity to test Nasser’s commitment to peace: (1) his + May 1 speechFor Kissinger’s description and + analysis of this speech, see Document + 115. which provides us an opening to put his intentions + directly to the test; (2) Nasser’s NET TV interview, including statement of + willingness to observe ceasefire for specified period; and (3) recent + indications in our bilateral talks with the SovietsRogers and + Dobrynin had most + recently met on June 8. See Document 122. + Kissinger and Dobrynin met on June 10. See Foreign + Relations, 1969–1976, volume XII, Soviet Union, January + 1969–October 1970, Document 168. that they are now + prepared to move toward our formulations on the specific obligations of + peace.

+

G. We therefore intend to approach Cairo (and Amman simultaneously) with + the proposal that Nasser (and + Hussein) subscribe to the + following formula, which would be in the form of a public report from + Jarring to the UNSYG, as the + basis for beginning negotiations—indirect in the first instance—under + Jarring’s auspices:

+

+ BEGIN TEXT. +

+

The UAR (Jordan) and Israel advise me + that they agree:

+

(a) that having accepted and indicated their willingness to carry out + Resolution 242 in all its parts, they will designate representatives to + discussions to be held under my auspices, according to such procedure + and at such places and times as I may recommend, taking into account as + appropriate each side’s preference as to method of procedure and + previous experience between the parties.

+

(b) that the purpose of the aforementioned discussions is to reach + agreement on the establishment of a just and lasting peace between them + based on (1) mutual acknowledgment by the UAR (Jordan) and Israel of each other’s sovereignty, + territorial integrity and political independence, and (2) Israeli + withdrawal from territories occupied in the 1967 conflict, both in + accordance with Resolution 242.

+

(c) that, to facilitate my task of promoting agreement as set forth in + Resolution 242, the parties will strictly observe, effective July 1 at + least until October 1, the ceasefire resolutions of the Security + Council. END TEXT.

+

H. Ceasefire to be effective would have to include understanding that (1) + both sides would stop all incursions and all firing, on the ground and + in the air, across the ceasefire lines, (2) UAR and USSR would + refrain from changing military status quo (by emplacing SAMs or other + new installations in an agreed zone west of Suez Canal ceasefire line), and (3) Israel would + observe similar standstill on new installations in similar zone east of + Canal.

+

I. We will simultaneously inform Jarring, U Thant, + the British and the French of this initiative with Nasser and Hussein. We will also seek to enlist support of Soviets + to influence Cairo. In doing so, we will tell Soviets (1) we see + continuing useful role for our joint efforts only in circumstances where + there is genuine negotiation in process between parties, and (2) + alternative to genuine Soviet cooperation is continuation of military + conflict in which not only will we assure maintenance of Israel’s + military strength, but also further Soviet military involvement risks + more direct confrontation with U.S.Rogers and Sisco met with Dobrynin on June 20 to present the + new peace initiative. See Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, volume XII, + Soviet Union, January 1969–October 1970, Document + 170.

+

J. Pending UAR response to foregoing + approach, we are not asking Israel to react. While we will press + Nasser hard on ceasefire, we + do not intend to make this a breaking point. However, if UAR responds positively to negotiating + aspect of our proposal (i.e., subparas (a) and (b) of above formula), we + will expect equally positive GOI + response. We recognize that this will require serious and difficult + political decision by GOI. We have + never concealed from GOI, however, that + we do not agree with its formula of “direct negotiations without + preconditions.” We have consistently held to view, which we understood + was also Israel’s position in June, 1967, that when Israel won war which + was thrust upon it in 1967, its overriding goal should be peace + substantially within its 1949–67 borders. Given risks GOI is asking us to undertake in its + interest in area, we believe political risks we are asking of GOI are reasonable—the more so since they + are based on solid assurance of our support for Israel’s survival.

+

K. On military side, we will continue to make our resolve clear to + Soviets. So far as military assistance to Israel is concerned, we will + continue to be responsive to Israel’s requests in keeping open the + normal logistical supply line for equipment, spare parts, expendable + supplies and production technology.

+

L. On aircraft, pending the outcome of these political initiatives, as an + interim measure we are prepared (a) to continue Phantom and Skyhawk + deliveries through summer up to but not beyond numbers provided for in + existing contracts, and (b) to work out contingency plans which put us + in position to deliver replacement aircraft rapidly to Israel if the + situation should require it.

+

M. We expect that Israel will continue to refrain from resuming deep + penetration raids over Egypt whether or not a ceasefire is achieved. We + expect Israel to damp down public discussion of the aircraft issue by making clear it is + prepared to enter into meaningful negotiations and that it is satisfied + with the contingency arrangements which have been made. We count on + Israel’s cooperation with respect to publicity and to our negotiating + proposals in the spirit of the request conveyed to FonMin + Eban during his recent + visit.See Document + 118.

+

N. It is essential to maintain a calm and restrained public atmosphere + while our negotiating initiatives are being tested. We, therefore, + intend to make a public statement along the following lines within the + next week. (FYI—In making following statement available to Israelis, + they should understand it is subject to change. END + FYI.)

+

+ BEGIN TEXT +

+

In view of the serious nature of developments in the Middle East in + recent weeks, we have undertaken a thorough review of all aspects of the + problem. We have concluded that the most immediate and compelling need + in the area is for the parties to stop fighting and start talking in + accordance with the resolutions of the UN Security Council. We are currently taking a number of + steps to this end.

+

We have also weighed carefully Israel’s most recent request for the sale + of additional aircraft. We have come to a judgment on this matter in + light of four principal considerations: (a) that the overriding + objective is fresh efforts to achieve a stable peace in the Middle East + through negotiations under Jarring’s auspices; (b) that US support of Israel’s + existence and security remains firm; (c) that there is an urgent need in + the area in the days ahead for prudence on the ground by all concerned; + (d) that the USSR has installed SA–3s + in the UAR and is operating them with + its own personnel, and its pilots are flying operational missions in the + UAR; and (e) that the United States strongly desires to maintain its + friendship with all countries in the area who desire our friendship.

+

In light of these considerations, we have decided that for the period of + time during which the efforts to get the parties to stop shooting and + start talking will be pursued, deliveries of aircraft to Israel will be + limited and not go beyond the total number contemplated under previous + contracts. At the same time, we have also made contingent arrangements + which will put us in a position in the future to provide Israel with + replacements of aircraft if the situation so requires. END TEXT.

+

O. We are informing Israel now of our moves in the straightforward spirit + we believe should characterize our relations. We cannot overstress the + importance we attach to discretion in this matter and to avoiding any + actions which could prejudice Nasser’s reaction. If Israel should take any action + jeopardizing our peace efforts, this will require a reassessment of our position re arms + assistance. There must be an opportunity for movement by both sides + without the glare of publicity. Pending Nasser’s reaction, we urge Mrs. Meir to hold it within the circle of + her closest advisers and particularly not to make it a matter for full + Cabinet consideration until we have had reactions from Cairo and Amman + and have had the opportunity for a further discussion with her.Barbour met with Meir and Eban + on June 19. He reported in telegram 3200 from Tel Aviv, June 19: + “Mrs. Meir’s reaction was + strongly adverse, on basis Israel was being asked to accept + weakening of IDF as price for + negotiations while U.A.R. would remain free to carry on war of + attrition, receive unlimited military supplies from U.S.S.R., and + continue negotiations indefinitely without concessions.” (National + Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 423, Backchannel) Rogers and Sisco also met with Rabin on June 19. Rabin took “vigorous exception to + our making supply of aircraft September–December (as he put it) + ‘subject to political developments.’” (Telegram 97690 to Tel Aviv, + June 20; ibid., Box 1155, Saunders Files, Middle East Negotiations + Files)

+

6. Foregoing is NOFORN for all addressees except Tel Aviv until + instructed otherwise.

+ + + Rogers + + +
+ +
+ 130. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in + IsraelSource: National + Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 756, Presidential Correspondence + 1969–1974, Israel Prime Minister Golda + Meir 1970. Secret; Flash; Nodis. Drafted and approved + by Sisco. + Washington, June + 20, 1970, 2185Z. +

97781. For Ambassador. Following is revised draft letter approved by the + President. You should deliver it promptly to Prime Minister Meir.Barbour reported that + the Israeli Foreign Ministry delivered the letter to Meir “first thing” in the morning, + June 21. (Telegram 3203 from Tel Aviv, June 21; ibid., Box 1155, + Saunders Files, Middle East Negotiations Files) Previous text + prepositioned with you can be drawn upon by you to make additional + points contained in it orally.Reference is + to Barbour’s talking points + regarding Nixon’s decision + on the supply of U.S. aircraft to Israel (see Document 129) which were contained in telegram 96573 to + Tel Aviv, June 19. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, + DEF 12–5 ISR)

+ +

QUOTE: Dear Madam Prime Minister:

+

Ambassador Barbour’s report of his + conversation with you yesterday reached me this morning.

+

From his report and that of Ambassador Rabin’s talk with Secretary Rogers,See footnote 8, Document 129. I am + concerned that you are interpreting our decision on aircraft as having + an element of conditionality prejudicial to Israel’s security needs. I + want to assure you categorically this is not the case. There is no + relationship in our decision between the question of negotiations and + the supply of aircraft. What we have said is simply that a situation + might arise where timing would be important to both of us in the course + of an effort designed to move the Middle East from a state of ever more + dangerous hostilities to a state of peace.

+

I can assure you that we in no way under-estimate the weight of your + concerns. I ask, however, that you study our decision and proposals with + deliberation and avoid taking any irreversible action. I would hope that + you could adopt a positive public posture toward our efforts. If that is + not possible, however, it is my hope that you will reserve judgment and + not respond until the other side has reacted. For Israel to take on the + onus for the failure of the new effort to get negotiations started + between the parties would be a major setback both for Israel and the + United States.Nixon received a reply from Meir on July 2. She thanked him + “warmly” for taking the time to send her a personal note, commenting + that it in itself was evidence that he appreciated how “vital” the + aircraft decision was to Israel and that he understood the “gravity” + of Israel’s situation. She continued: “But we are convinced that the + possibility of peace with our neighbors will not be furthered by a + weakened Israel. Therefore, we could not understand why any + developments in peace negotiations should affect the delivery of + aircraft to us. We, of course, all know that whatever negotiations + take place, the continuous supply of Russian arms, and probably + personnel, will not be affected. For this reason I particularly + welcome your assurance that there is no relationship between the + question of negotiations and the supply of aircraft, and I venture + to hope that the question of timing will not arise.” (National + Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 607, Country Files, Middle East, Israel, + Vol. V)

+

Sincerely,

+

Richard Nixon END QUOTE

+ + + Rogers + + +
+ +
+ + 131. Minutes of a Washington Special Actions Group MeetingSource: National Archives, Nixon + Presidential Materials, NSC Files, + NSC Institutional Files + (H-Files), Box H–114, Washington Special Actions Group, WSAG Minutes (Originals) 1969 and + 1970. Secret; Nodis. All brackets are in the original except those + indicating text omitted by the editors. The meeting was held in the + White House Situation Room. + Washington, June 22, 1970, + 3:10–4:04 p.m. + + SUBJECT + Middle East + + + PARTICIPATION + Chairman—Henry A. + Kissinger + + State + + Mr. U. Alexis + Johnson + Mr. Rodger Davies + + Defense + + Mr. G. Warren + Nutter + Mr. Robert Pranger + + JCS + + Adm. Thomas H. + Moorer + Col. Frank W. Rhea + + + CIA + + + Gen. Robert E. Cushman, + Jr. + Mr. Thomas + Karamessines + + NSC Staff + + Col. Richard T. + Kennedy + Mr. Harold Saunders + Mr. Keith Guthrie + +

SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS

+

The WSAG reviewed the status of + contingency planning for military-supported evacuation from Arab nations + and for military intervention in response to possible requests for + assistance from friendly Arab governments threatened with overthrow by + outside and/or indigenous forces. The objective is to be able to provide + the NSC a complete analysis of + alternatives and implications in the event the NSC is faced with a decision on whether to take military + action to meet a crisis in one or more Arab countries.

+

The WSAG Middle East Working Group will + prepare a study setting forth the pros and cons of military intervention + at the invitation of a friendly Arab government.The study, “U.S. Response to an Appeal for Support + by King Hussein of Jordan,” + undated, is ibid., Box H–078, Washington Special Actions Group + Meetings, WSAG Meeting Jordan + & Israel 6/22/70. The study will be a general one dealing + with all countries in which the United States might be asked to take + military action in support of friendly governments (including Lebanon, + Jordan, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia). However, the study will identify + special factors applicable only to individual countries. It should + specify what the US can reasonably expect to accomplish within a given + timeframe. The study will + be submitted for consideration at an early meeting of the Special Review + Group.The next Ad Hoc Special Review + Group meeting was held on July 9; see Document + 133.

+

For Libya and Kuwait the WSAG Middle + East Working Group will prepare a chronological listing of steps to be + taken and assignment of responsibilities for action in the event of a + crisis. In addition, the Working Group will insure that the contingency + plan for each country includes an annex specifying the number and + location of US nationals in that country. The JCS will prepare a listing + of various alternative routes for staging troops to the Middle East, + with information about the time factors involved.

+

The WSAG agreed that it would be + desirable to hold advance consultations with the UK to see if British bases on Cyprus might be available for + staging US troops. The State Department is to look further into the + possibility of consulting with the British.

+

In connection with possible use of Greek facilities, the WSAG agreed that it was important that + the studies and plans being prepared contain a full assessment of the + availability of Greek bases under various contingencies.

+

[Omitted here are the minutes.]

+
+ +
+ + 132. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of Defense for + International Security Affairs (Nutter) to the Deputy Secretary of Defense (Packard)Source: Washington National Records Center, OSD Files: FRC 330–76–0067, Box 73, + Israel. Secret. A stamped notation indicates that Packard saw it. + Washington, July 8, + 1970. + + SUBJECT + Israeli Arms Requests + +

We understand (from Hal Saunders + on the NSC staff) that Dr. Kissinger plans—as a result of a call + by Ambassador Rabin last + nightNo record of Rabin’s July 7 conversation with + Kissinger has been + found. In a July 8 memorandum to Laird, Moorer, and the Acting Secretary of State, Kissinger wrote that Rabin had requested an “urgent + appointment” with him (Kissinger) on the morning of July 8 to discuss + recent changes in the Middle East situation. The three most urgent + problems raised by Rabin + involved: “Assembly now and possible modification of A–4 aircraft to + reduce a three to four months leadtime in the event a decision is + made to proceed with the provision of additional aircraft to Israel + commencing in September 1970; provision of improved ordinance to + Israel; and provision of additional credit to Israel.” Kissinger added that “an + additional and perhaps more serious implication of the discussion + with Ambassador Rabin is + the possibility that the Israelis may initiate air strikes against + the SA–3 sites in the UAR which are + reportedly located 22 to 25 miles from the Suez Canal. Should these + attacks be undertaken and Soviet aircraft respond, this could have + the most grave implications for the U.S. government.” (National + Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 607, Country Files, Middle East, Israel, + Vol. V.) A memorandum of conversation between Kissinger and Rabin is ibid.—to raise + the subject of Israel’s “want” lists of military hardware. + Significantly, Ambassador Rabin + has again turned to the White House, despite our request to the Attaché + that these requests be handled through channels. The GOI is now beginning to make a practice of + threatening “to go to the White House” if we are slow in responding to + their requests.

+

Needless to say, it is highly irregular to handle military requests in an + Ambassador-to-White House channel, leaving out both State and Defense. + There are good reasons for following authorized channels: US decisions + on arms requests must take into account the political impact of the + sale, the military requirement to be met (and we do not simply take the + word of the customer), equipment availability, and overall military + impact of the sale. These judgments require expert knowledge and + professional judgment, which is available only in the DoD and State. For + NSC staff members (including Dr. + Kissinger) to make + commitments of US military assets, without consulting DoD and State is + dangerous, seriously degrades the role of both State and Defense, and + risks compromising US security by giving away secret information or + critical assets.

+ +

If this subject is raised, we recommend you respond by (1) noting that we + have received and are studying these requests, as a matter of urgency; + (2) that OSD is establishing a special + committee to review the ECM and + advanced weapons requests, and has already sent a team of experts to + Israel to assist in our review; (3) that the US response must be based + on careful State-Defense study, given the very serious security + implications involved, and (4) that you avoid any discussion of details + on particular items of equipment at this time (Mr. Pranger will be available to comment + on the individual items if this should be necessary).

+

On A–4s, you should know that we are staffing the A–4 “earmarking” + problem, and will have a detailed position by Friday. The simple fact + is, however, that we are not prepared to begin aircraft modification and + rehabilitation unless and until a contract has been signed, and the + Presidential decision on aircraft excluded such a contract until + September.

+

Finally, you should know that this insistence by Ambassador Rabin on “going to the White House” + has become a matter of the greatest concern both here and in State. The + basic rationale of these two departments is to provide the expertise + needed for just such matters as this, and if the NSC staff is to make all arms decisions, + our role ceases to exist. We consider it of the greatest importance that + DoD’s position not be compromised on this subject.On July 9, Nutter wrote in an attached note: “Since this memo + was written, the Secretary has spoken to Kissinger on the phone about some + of these problems. I still feel it is useful for you to have our + views before you in preparation for the meeting this afternoon.” + Reference is to the Ad Hoc Special Review Group meeting; see Document 133.

+ + + G Warren Nutter + + +
+ +
+ + 133. Minutes of an Ad Hoc Special Review Group MeetingSource: National Archives, Nixon + Presidential Materials, NSC Files, + NSC Institutional Files + (H-Files), Box H–111, Senior Review Group, SRG Minutes Originals 1970. Top Secret; Nodis. The + meeting was held in the White House Situation Room. + Washington, July 9, 1970, + 2:35–3:50 p.m. + + SUBJECT + The Middle East + + + PARTICIPATION + Chairman—Henry A. + Kissinger + + State + + + U. Alexis Johnson + + + Joseph Sisco + + + Alfred L. Atherton, Jr. + + + Defense + + + David Packard + + + G. Warren Nutter + + + Robert Pranger + + + + CIA + + + + Richard Helms + + + JCS + + Adm. Thomas H. + Moorer + + NSC Staff + + + Harold H. Saunders + + + Richard T. Kennedy + + + Jeanne W. Davis + + +

SUMMARY OF DECISIONS

+

It was agreed that:

+

a. State and Defense would clarify the question of the lists of equipment + for Israel approved by the PresidentNot + found. and delivery would proceed without delay;

+

b. the new list received by Defense from Amb. RabinThe + list is attached to a July 9 memorandum from Nutter to Laird. (Washington National + Records Center, OSD Files: FRC + 330–76–0076, Box 9, Middle East) would be circulated and + staffed for decision—by the President if necessary;

+

c. diplomatic and military scenarios would be preparedThe undated paper, “Possible Steps to Underline + U.S. Determination to Limit Further Soviet Military Involvement in + the Near East,” is in the National Archives, Nixon Presidential + Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box + H–046, Senior Review Group Meetings, Senior Review Group—Middle East + 7/9/70. for various possible responses to our + initiative;See Document 129.

+

d. Navy would be instructed to place a contract with McDonnell-Douglas + for the reconfiguration of the A–4s for Israel;

+

e. we should proceed with the Jordanians on delivery of the agreed arms + package,See Document 113. allowing the Jordanian team to come + to the US, signing the letters of intent and giving them delivery dates + for the F–104s.

+ +

f. the Special Review Group will meet next weekThe Ad Hoc Special Review Group met on July 20. + According to the “Summary of Decisions,” it was decided that: “The + WSAG contingency plans would + be updated; State and Defense would meet to consider Israel’s + financial problems with regard to arms deliveries; JCS would do a + scenario on putting together a sizeable package to augment our + forces in the Mediterranean.” The minutes of the meeting are in the + National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–111, Senior + Review Group, SRG Minutes Originals + 1970. to consider the diplomatic and military scenarios, + review contingency plans and sharpen the issues for a possible NSC meeting.

+

Mr. Kissinger suggested that the + group review the state of play in our diplomatic initiative; consider + what next steps might be appropriate; and possibly review contingency + preparations. It might also review the delivery schedule for the arms to + Jordan.

+

Mr. Sisco said we had received no + considered reply to our initiative, but that we might expect one in + about a week, after the Egyptians leave Moscow and have time to concert + with Jordan. It would be interesting to see if we get our response + direct from the Egyptians or through the Soviets or both. He and Mr. + Helms confirmed that + Nasser was still in Moscow + for medical treatment.Nasser was in Moscow June 29–July + 17. He saw two diplomatic possibilities: (1) an inconclusive + response amounting to a rejection; or (2) a response through which the + Soviets and Egyptians would attempt to push the US back into the + four-power context. He noted that they had consistently preferred to + handle the issue in the two or four-power framework rather than address + themselves to proposals to get the two parties talking.

+

Mr. Kissinger asked for Sisco’s definition of a flat + turndown—would this be a demand that we spell out the details of our + proposal before they would agree to talk?

+

Mr. Sisco said yes, or a + rephrasing of our proposal which could call for an Israeli withdrawal to + the pre-June 1967 lines. On the political level he saw two alternative + US responses: (1) that we fall in with the strategy and make substantive + countermoves in either the two or four-power framework, building on the + Soviet formulation involving a commitment to peace and a promise to deal + with the fedayeen; or (2) that we institute a pause, suspend our + participation in the two or four-power discussions for a period of time, + during which we could take some interim steps, with a view to a possible + political move in the context of the opening of the UN General Assembly in mid-September. + During the interim period we could consider: (1) whether to stick with + Israel militarily along the line of the decisions already taken; (2) + whether to increase our support of Israel quietly or publicly; or (3) + what steps, if any, we might take to give concrete meaning to the President’s words, both his + public statements and what we have been saying to the Soviets over the + past weeks. He thought we might be able to interpret such a response one + of two ways. If we interpret it as a turn-down, we could apply a certain + degree of shock treatment to prepare the way for a new effort. If we + interpret it as leaving the door open, we could continue to do what we + are doing with Israel and meanwhile decide what to do about the + Soviets.

+

Mr. Packard asked what we have + told the Egyptians.

+

Mr. Sisco replied that we have + given our political initiative in writing to the Egyptians and + Jordanians, and have informed the Russians, British and French. + Nasser was now considering + with the Soviets how to answer. He thought it unlikely that they would + “kick it out of the park,” both because they would be concerned about + the political repercussions and because they would be worried over + possible US and Israeli military moves.

+

Mr. Kissinger asked if it was + correct to say that, while we don’t expect them to accept our + initiative, they could fudge their response by demanding that unless we + move into the two or four-power context and there spell out the terms of + reference for Jarring, there + would be nothing to talk about.

+

Mr. Sisco added that they could + confirm their acceptance of the Security Council resolution, accept the + proposition of talks under Jarring, but claim that the basis for the mandate to + Jarring was insufficient. + They could say that we should continue the useful discussions in the two + or four-power groups and that they would cooperate, provided we spelled + out the mandate in more detail.

+

Mr. Kissinger asked how we could + refuse to talk in the two or four-power groups, particularly since they + would be accepting some of our proposals.

+

Mr. Sisco agreed it would be + hard.

+

Mr. Kissinger asked, if the + Egyptians handle their response skillfully, and the President wants to + administer some shock treatment, how would we go about it?

+

Mr. Sisco said we could take the + position that the US has put forward a proposal that they stop shooting + and start talking, which involves a minimal commitment from the other + side. Since they appear unwilling to move, we believe that a pause and a + reassessment of the situation are in order.

+

Mr. Johnson asked what if the response was more forthcoming. What would + Israel accept?

+

Mr. Sisco agreed that if we can + interpret the Egyptian answer as an acceptance, we would have to twist + Israel’s arm.

+ +

Mr. Kissinger asked what would + constitute a response that was not a flat acceptance but that we could + interpret as an acceptance.

+

Mr. Sisco replied that they could + say they are ready to start talks on the basis proposed by the US. + However, we must change our general statement on withdrawal to a + specific commitment of Israeli withdrawal to the pre-June 5 lines. He + reviewed the history of the language of the Security Council resolution + on Israeli withdrawal, saying that the language finally agreed on + allowed everyone to interpret its meaning in his own way. Accordingly, + the problem was turned over to Jarring, which everyone wanted, on the basis of two + varying interpretations of the meaning of the resolution.

+

Mr. Packard asked if we had an + adequate definition of cease-fire.

+

Mr. Sisco thought we did.

+

Mr. Kissinger noted that Israel + was arguing that a 90-day cease-fire would abrogate the various UN resolutions on the subject.

+

Mr. Sisco said that Israelis use + two arguments against a cease-fire: (1) that it might provide a cover + for increased or accelerated SAM + development; and (2) the specious argument that agreement to a 90-day + cease-fire would abrogate the UN + resolutions, which is not correct.

+

Mr. Kissinger agreed that Israel + could not say it would withdraw for 90 days then go back at the end of + 90 days.

+

Mr. Sisco commented that if we + received a flat rejection, our response should be stiff. We should get + out of the two or four-power talks for six weeks and continue our + military support of Israel.

+

Mr. Kissinger said in the case of + a modified rejection, we could play tough as described or we could + counter either by re-raising the question of a cease-fire or by going + back with a more detailed formulation. He asked what we get out of the + four-power talks? Are we not better off in two-power talks?

+

All agreed.

+

Mr. Sisco said we could keep the + four-power talks limping along in a meaningless dialogue if we wished + to, particularly if they were aware that something was going on in the + two-power talks. He said we would, of course, have trouble with the + French whose behaviour in the four-power talks he described as + shameful.

+

Mr. Kissinger said we always have + trouble with the French and attempting to butter them up has not helped. + He commented the difference between a modified acceptance and a modified + rejection was not so great.

+

Mr. Helms asked why we considered + some of the moves discussed to be tough. Tough on whom?

+

Mr. Sisco replied tough on the + Arabs, the Russians and the French. The Russians and the Arabs want to + continue the talks in the four-power context where they could put maximum pressure on the US. He said + Gromyko was advising his + people to take their time and wear the US down in these talks.

+

Mr. Helms said he had no + objection to calling off our participation in the talks but he didn’t + think it would help.

+

Mr. Sisco outlined an + illustrative scenario for a tough line. We could say, in view of the + rejection of our proposal, we see no possibility of progress in the + two-power or four-power talks. Therefore, we will give an X amount of + military assistance to Israel and, in addition, will take steps A and B. + Maintaining this posture for a while might create a climate in which the + other side would develop some flexibility on the political side. Of the + specific actions we might take, he suggested putting a US carrier into + the port of Haifa and giving the crew a three-day leave, or putting a + hunter-killer ASW group into the + Mediterranean.

+

Mr. Packard agreed it might come + to that.

+

Mr. Johnson commented that we should look further down the line and ask + then what?

+

Mr. Kissinger thought we should + consider ways to galvanize the negotiations. How we should play the + response to our initiative is a tactical problem. We should focus on + what the answer means. Does it mean Nasser is heading toward negotiations? Or does it mean + he is stalling to allow time for more Soviet support to come in. If the + former, we should go back to them. If the latter, it would be better to + convey some warning.

+

Mr. Sisco commented that we could + not disregard the Israeli reaction.

+

Mr. Kissinger asked if the + Israelis might get desperate and pull the trigger.

+

Mr. Sisco doubted this, saying + they could not reproduce the 6-day war in present conditions.

+

Mr. Packard thought we should do + anything we could to press on in the interim. He suggested we might hold + back on the supply of some arms to Israel.

+

Mr. Sisco said that was the wrong + target.

+

Mr. Packard thought such a move + would indicate to the Arabs that we were serious about a ceasefire. He + also thought proceeding with the package for Jordan would indicate that + we are serious. He considered it inconsistent, at least in the short + term, to build up Israel while we talk about a ceasefire.

+

Mr. Johnson said no one was suggesting additional aircraft deliveries to + Israel.

+

Mr. Packard replied that there was + a good deal “on the deck” and some delay would show some good faith to + the Arabs.

+ +

Mr. Sisco asked if Mr. Packard was suggesting that we reopen + the decision on the things we are now delivering to Israel, in a + situation where the Arab response to our initiative was not entirely + satisfactory and in the circumstances of a creeping increase in Soviet + involvement.

+

Mr. Packard said he was talking + about the list of Israeli requests they had received.

+

Dr. Kissinger said this was a + separate problem that had not yet been addressed. He asked if Mr. + Packard was suggesting + reopening the list of items that the President had already agreed to or + was referring to a new list.

+

(It was determined after some confusion that Mr. Packard was referring to a new list + delivered to Defense by Ambassador Rabin after his July 8 conversation with Dr. Kissinger,See footnote 2, Document 132. + which list had not yet been seen by the other agencies.)

+

Dr. Kissinger said he had + circulated the memorandum of his conversation with Rabin purely for information, with no + intention that it was to be considered as a directive of any kind.

+

Mr. Sisco reviewed the two + decisions that had been made: 1) the list of items approved by the + President in the context of the NSC + meeting some weeks ago;See Documents 124 and 128. and 2) the list of electronic equipment and + other items which had been approved by the President over the July 4 + weekend.

+

Mr. Pranger agreed that Defense + was now talking about a new list, not previously considered, but said he + had been in telephone touch with State on drones and some of the other + equipment on the new list. He noted that Israel had some $577 million in + debits since the decision on the jets and was moving toward $1 + billion.

+

Dr. Kissinger replied that we + could not discuss the issue on that basis. He reviewed the developments + of the July 4 weekend, saying the President’s original inclination had + been to replace all Israeli planes that had been shot down. He had + reconsidered and had approved the list of electronic equipment and other + items contained in the Defense Department cable sent to San Clemente on + Friday, July 3.The list is contained in + an undated memorandum from Nutter to Laird which bears the stamped notation: “Sec Def Has + Seen, July 6, 1970.” A note attached to the memorandum reads: + “Attached memo forwarded to White House West for BG Haig was received at 2026 hours + EDT, 3 July.” (Washington + National Records Center, OSD Files: + FRC 330–76–0076, Box 74, Israel) He said we could not reopen + the decisions on this list unless the Israelis did something + inconsistent with our peace approach.

+ +

Mr. Packard said he thought we + should look at the total amount of equipment to be delivered to Israel + in a given time period to be sure we aren’t doing the wrong thing.

+

Dr. Kissinger said any requests + received after the Presidential approvals must of course be looked at, + but nothing that had been approved can be held up.

+

Mr. Packard reiterated that he + thought we should look at the total list. Admiral Moorer added that we can’t decide on the list of + equipment until we decide what we want Israel to do: whether we want + them to continue to suffer attrition in the course of our diplomatic + initiative, or whether we want to stop the attrition so they can hold + their own.

+

Dr. Kissinger said he must + protect the President’s decisions. They must be carried out. Any new + list of requests should be staffed and considered on its merits. He said + the present list of deliveries had been approved on the basis that the + Israelis would not undertake further deep penetration. Nothing beyond + that had been approved.

+

Mr. Pranger and Mr. Nutter noted that there had been no + itemized list prepared in connection with the NSDM on the subject.See Document 128.

+

Dr. Kissinger said there had been + a clear Presidential understanding that we would hold back on the + aircraft but would meet the other requirements. The list considered at + the NSC meeting and the July 4 + electronic equipment list had been approved. Drones and any other items + on a new list had not been considered and were not approved.

+

Mr. Nutter reiterated that there + was no list of items attached to the NSDM, and Mr. Sisco + said he would provide one to the Defense Department.

+

Mr. Pranger acknowledged that + Defense had the list which had been circulated by State but said they + were not sure that the NSDM meant that + list. He said they have moved on the tanks and other items, but some of + the items, including Red Eyes, cause difficulties in Defense.

+

Dr. Kissinger reiterated the + President’s clear understanding that the non-aircraft items had been + approved and would be delivered. We cannot hold up delivery on items + already decided upon. If there is a new list, we will look at it. He + asked Mr. Sisco to straighten + out the confusion with Defense, and asked that the new list be + circulated and the items staffed. He said if there were items on the new + list which were duplicates of requests on other lists or which asked for + expansion or acceleration of delivery of previously approved items, we + should take these out and circulate them for consideration.

+ +

Mr. Packard reiterated his desire + for a review of the entire list, but agreed to get together with State + and straighten out any confusion.

+

Dr. Kissinger said in the event + we received a qualified acceptance of our proposal which required going + back to the two-power group with detailed guidance, should we not + prepare a diplomatic track for such a contingency.

+

Mr. Sisco said he was already + preparing counter-formulations in the context of two-power talks.

+

Dr. Kissinger asked what we might + do if we received a qualified or total rejection of our proposal with a + continued Soviet buildup.

+

Mr. Sisco replied that State had + been considering what signaling steps the US might take without any real + idea of what kinds of things would be feasible militarily.

+

Mr. Johnson added that, on the basis of previous contingency planning, + they could suggest either a carrier visit to the port of Haifa or some + increased ASW capability in the + Mediterranean. In the latter connection, there is a hunter-killer ASW group on the east coast which could be + in the Mediterranean in two weeks. This would be a strong demonstration + of our determination. He thought we should, however, consider the next + steps. A carrier visit to Haifa would result in the closing of all Arab + ports to the 6th Fleet but, as a practical matter, these ports were + already closed.

+

Dr. Kissinger asked what this + would achieve.

+

Mr. Johnson replied a show of force.

+

Dr. Kissinger asked about a + movement in the Eastern Mediterranean.

+

Mr. Johnson replied it would not be as good demonstrably.

+

Admiral Moorer commented that we + have moved into the Eastern Mediterranean in force before but we have + never entered an Israeli port. He noted we could move the hunter-killer + group with a Task Force. In response to Dr. Kissinger’s question, he said the Soviets would + undoubtedly read such a move as stepped-up readiness on our part.

+

Dr. Kissinger asked if we were + trying to confront the Soviets or put ourselves behind Israel. If we + were trying to confront the Soviets, there were other ways besides + support for Israel. He thought the hunter-killer ASW group was a better signal of increased + readiness than a port call at Haifa.

+

Admiral Moorer commented that + the Navy did not like to put a carrier into a port.

+

Dr. Kissinger remarked that the + Soviets would know of such a development before the Arabs did. He asked + the composition of the hunter-killer group.

+ +

Admiral Moorer replied that it + consisted of a helicopter carrier with a few fixed-wing aircraft, and + six destroyers. He said there were four such groups in existence.

+

Dr. Kissinger asked how far the + 6th Fleet is from the potential area of operation in the + Mediterranean.

+

Admiral Moorer replied two days, + commenting that they could move the group to the vicinity of Cyprus.

+

Mr. Packard asked if we could + increase our ASW activities from the + land.

+

Admiral Moorer replied we would + do this as a matter of course if we moved the carrier to the East.

+

Mr. Johnson remarked that this would not be as demonstrable as the + hunter-killer group.

+

Dr. Kissinger said we would need + another meeting of the Special Review Group next week by which time we + may know more about the responses to our initiative, to go through the + military and diplomatic scenario, we should sort out the possible + diplomatic responses in foreseeable contingencies. We could also sort + out possible military measures and what we would put into the two-power + or four-power context. We could also review the contingency plans + developed last year. He thought the NSC + would have to consider the strategic decision on how we might most + likely move to a political resolution, including how and when we would + need to the pressure the Israelis and how to put pressure on the Arabs. + Next week’s Special Review Group meeting could sharpen the issues.

+

Mr. Johnson asked about Rabin’s + three requests in his conversation with Dr. Kissinger.

+

Mr. Pranger said the A–4Es he is + requesting are being configured specifically to meet Israeli needs. + These aircraft are earmarked, but no contract has been let to + McDonnell-Douglas who will do the work, and the work cannot proceed + without a contract. He thought there would be a 3–4 month delay until + the aircraft were available.

+

Admiral Moorer said they could + accelerate the work as soon as they could sign a contract, but they had + no money for a contract and no authority to do more than earmark the + aircraft to be reconfigured.

+

Mr. Sisco reviewed the + President’s decision on aircraft which called for the delivery of 5 + Phantoms in September, 5 in October, and 4 in November and 4 in + December. It also called for the delivery of 4 A–4s in each of the four + months. This decision could be reopened only if we achieve a ceasefire, + or if talks are underway between the two parties under Jarring’s auspices and it was felt + that delivery of the aircraft would jeopardize the progress of the + talks. He said Defense should do whatever was necessary to deliver the + aircraft.

+ +

Mr. Pranger and Mr. Nutter said they had checked with + State and had not received the impression that they were to proceed on + the A–4s.

+

Dr. Kissinger asked if this had + been covered in the President’s letter to Mrs. Meir.See + Document 130.

+

Mr. Sisco replied only in a + general way, but it had been included in the NSDM that was sent to State and Defense.

+

Mr. Packard said they would + instruct Navy to place the contract.

+

Dr. Kissinger remarked that there + is nothing to prevent cancellation under the conditions noted by Mr. + Sisco.

+

Dr. Kissinger asked if Rabin had submitted to Defense the + request for improved air ordnance.

+

Admiral Moorer said it was + included in the new Israeli list.

+

Mr. Pranger said that a Defense + Review Committee composed of representatives of OSD and the services was processing the individual items on + the list.

+

Dr. Kissinger said, if the new + list raises controversial items, we should get them to the President + showing agency positions.

+

Mr. Pranger replied that many of + the technical items can be handled routinely in Defense.

+

Dr. Kissinger reiterated that his + circulation of the memorandum of his conversation with Rabin did not constitute a + Presidential instruction. He thought the Rabin visit was primarily to call the President’s + attention to Israel’s needs.

+

Mr. Pranger said the Defense + Department Review Committee was meeting on Friday. They would circulate + the new Israeli list, then circulate the committee’s proposals.

+

Dr. Kissinger asked Mr. Packard to separate out the new items + on the list and circulate them. He thought there might be some repeats + or a request for a speed-up of old items.

+

He asked if the group could turn to a discussion of Jordan.

+

He said the Jordanian arms package had been approved on the assumption + that it would strengthen the King and help maintain a moderate regime in + the country. If the radical element in Jordan should gain the upper + hand, we might find ourselves making significant arms shipments to a + radical regime. It was thought wise to get the judgment of this group as + to whether the original assumptions under which the arms package was + approved were still valid.

+

Mr. Packard said Defense had no + problem with proceeding with delivery of the material.

+ +

Mr. Sisco agreed with Mr. + Packard. He thought the + situation was a little more tenuous, but noted that the Army had + remained loyal to the King. The King was, however, in a weaker political + position, with a new Cabinet with a substantial Palestinian + representation. He thought, however, we should let the Jordanian team + come over and sign the letters of offer, continuing to emphasize to the + King that we are doing so on the assumption that he does not go to the + Russians as a source for additional arms. We could review the situation + carefully before actual deliveries take place. He noted that it would be + five months before deliveries commenced.

+

Mr. Helms agreed with Mr. + Sisco’s appraisal.

+

All others agreed.

+

Mr. Saunders asked if we could + now give delivery dates on the F–104s and it was agreed to do so.

+
+ +
+ 134. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security + Affairs (Kissinger) to President + NixonSource: National Archives, Nixon + Presidential Materials, NSC Files, + Box 646, Country Files, Middle East, Middle East—General, Vol. V. + Secret. Sent for information. Kissinger initialed this memorandum at the top + right-hand corner and wrote, “OBE.” Beneath the note the date July + 17, 1970, is stamped. + Washington, July + 15, 1970. + + SUBJECT + Middle East Problem + +

Having observed press speculationIn the week + before the date of this memorandum, the press speculated about a + division between the Department of State and the White House on + Middle East issues. On July 9, Kissinger sent a message to Rogers, while the Secretary was in + Japan, that begins: “In your absence, a mischievous press campaign + has developed which suggests a sharp policy disagreement between the + White House and the Department of State on the Middle East + initiative. I wanted you to know that from the White House + perspective, these allegations are completely without basis in + fact.” He also wrote: “I wish to assure you that the President and I + are completely behind the Middle East initiative which, as you know, + was the result of thoroughly coordinated State-White House action.” + (Telegram 109223 to Tokyo; ibid., Box 1155, Saunders Files, Middle + East Negotiations Files) over the two weeks since your + television interviewIn a July 1 televised + interview, Nixon addressed + the Middle East situation: “Now what should U.S. policy be? I’ll + summarize it in a word. One, our interest is peace and the integrity + of every country in the area. Two, we recognize that Israel is not + desirous of driving any of the other countries into the sea. The + other countries do want to drive Israel into the sea. Three, then, + once the balance of power shifts where Israel is weaker than its + neighbors, there will be a war. Therefore, it is in U.S. interests + to maintain the balance of power, and we will maintain that balance + of power. That is why as the Soviet Union moves in to support the + U.A.R., it makes it necessary for the United States to evaluate what + the Soviet Union does, and once that balance of power is upset, we + will do what is necessary to maintain Israel’s strength vis-à-vis + its neighbors, not because we want Israel to be in a position to + wage war—that is not it—but because that is what will deter its + neighbors from attacking it.” The complete transcript of the + interview is printed in Public Papers: Nixon, 1970, pp. + 543–559. and my San Clemente press backgrounders, you can best judge for yourself the + manner in which the bureaucracy is treating this issue. However, the + attached cable from Chargé Bergus in CairoTelegram + 1539 from Cairo, July 14, is attached but not printed. + suggests to what an absurd degree the lack of discipline has + reached.

+

In summary Bergus states:

+

—The U.S. may become a prisoner of a small power (Israel).

+

—The U.S. is unwittingly being buffeted toward a new confrontation with + the Soviet Union over a line which is to be established west of + Cairo.

+

—He is unconvinced that the Soviets are creeping west and infers that we + are being influenced by Israeli estimates.

+

—No major Ally will support us in the event of a confrontation with the + Soviets on this issue.

+

—We have placed the issue of confrontation in the hands of the Israelis + rather than controlling it ourselves.

+

The facts are:

+

(1) That the line to which Mr. Bergus refers is a line actually established by his own + Secretary of State during his June 2 meeting with Ambassador Dobrynin when he said: “The USSR has indicated that Soviet military + activities in the UAR will remain + defensive. We want to make clear that we would not view the introduction + of Soviet personnel, by air or on the ground, in the Canal combat zone + as defensive since such action could only be in support of the announced + UAR policy of violating the + ceasefire resolutions of the Security Council. We believe that + introduction of Soviet military personnel into the delicate Suez Canal + combat zone could lead to serious escalation with unpredictable + consequences to which we could not remain indifferent. In this + connection, we believe, and I am sure you do, it is neither in the + interest of the Soviet Union nor the United States for the Middle East + to become an area of confrontation between us.”See Document + 120.

+

(2) The reference by the Secretary to a “combat zone” was further defined + by the Secretary when at the same meeting he handed Ambassador Dobrynin a summary of Israeli press reports quoting + Dayan’s May 26 statement that + Israel was currently limiting itself to bombing up to 30 km inside + Egypt.

+

(3) Subsequently, the Israelis registered concern that the Secretary’s + statement and his use of the Dayan statements might mislead the Soviets into thinking + they could place installations right up to the 30 km line to take + advantage of expected Israeli forebearance. This the Soviets have + apparently done.

+

(4) Neither you nor I have made any public reference to the Soviets + moving forward.

+

(5) Mr. Bergus’ use of the word + “confrontation” is a direct challenge to you and your choice of phrases + at the West Coast press conference. It is inconceivable that a Chargé + would send such a message unless he felt he had at least tacit sympathy + at the highest levels within the Department of State.

+
+ +
+ 135. Editorial Note +

On July 16, 1970, Assistant to the President for National Security + Affairs Kissinger sent President + Nixon the records of his + three most recent conversations with Soviet Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin, which took place on June 23, + July 7, and July 9. The memoranda of conversation are printed in Foreign + Relations, 1969–1976, volume XII, Soviet Union, January + 1969–October 1970, Documents 171, 177, and 179. In a covering memorandum to + President Nixon, Kissinger offered some “highlights” of + the conversations:

+

“Change in Tone. On June 23, shortly after the + launching of our Middle East initiative, Ambassador Dobrynin was evasive and + uncooperative. In our July 7 and 9 conversations, after our ten days in + San Clemente, he presented a sharp contrast, being both conciliatory and + effusive about the Soviet desire to reach understandings.

+

“Middle East. + Dobrynin moved from his June 23 + statement that the Soviets were temporarily absolved of any + responsibility for a settlement because of our direct approach to the + regional parties to his July 7/9 underlining of Soviet anxiousness for a + settlement. He emphasized that the Soviets did not seek a confrontation + with us, that it was essential to come to an agreement and that he was + fully authorized to deal with me to conclude an agreement. He indicated, + although ambiguously, that the Soviets would consider withdrawing their + troops from Egypt once they knew what a political settlement would look + like. I bore down very hard on + the Soviet presence in the Mideast and, in response to a question, + acknowledged that it appeared we were on a collision course.” (National + Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 712, Country Files, Europe, USSR, Vol. VIII)

+

“Following Kissinger’s July 9 + conversation with Dobrynin, + Assistant Secretary of State Joseph + Sisco met with the Soviet Ambassador on July 13 to + discuss the recent cease-fire initiative proposed by Secretary Rogers on June 19 (see Document 129). Telegram 111425 to Moscow, July + 13, reporting the conversation is in the National Archives, Nixon + Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box + 490, President’s Trip Files, Dobrynin/Kissinger, 1970, Vol. 3. The same day, Sisco sent a memorandum to Kissinger informing him of some + “strictly personal” impressions he gave Dobrynin regarding the Soviet Union’s continued military + involvement in the UAR:

+

“I wrote a very brief telegram covering my last conversation with + Dobrynin. What is not + contained in the telegram is that I gave the Ambassador some personal + impressions—strictly personal—of the atmosphere which the continuing + increased Soviet military involvement in the UAR is creating which increases the risks of possible + confrontation with us. I said that it would be well for Dobrynin to reflect that the President + at the outset of his Administration had declared an era of negotiations. + For seventeen months we had negotiated in good faith, and we feel that + the Soviets have not come half the way; and that our restraint on the + military side has not been met by restraint but rather by a fundamental + decision on the part of the Soviet Union to involve its personnel in an + operational capacity. This is a most serious decision for the Soviets to + have taken, and our concern has increased not only because of the + creeping process in recent weeks, but also because of Soviet + unwillingness to tell us quietly and confidentially what their + intentions are and what the outer limits of their involvement may be as + they see it.

+

“I said I had watched our President for months and felt that he had + offered political proposal after political proposal, and political + option after political option in the context of the United States + exercising great restraint in the face of pressures for providing Israel + with substantial numbers of additional aircraft. I hoped that Dobrynin was not reporting to Moscow + that our involvement in Vietnam reflected any lack of resolve in the + Middle East. The President was a man of peace, a man who wanted a + negotiated settlement, but also a man of firmness and toughness, which + it would be well for the Soviet Union to take fully into account as it + develops Middle East policy. He would not be pushed around in the Middle + East or anywhere else. These were only personal judgments I was + expressing; but I would advise Dobrynin to take very, very seriously the words + expressed by the President some months ago that the United States would view with deep concern + any attempt by the Soviet Union to dominate the Middle East.

+

“Dobrynin responded critically to + the recent ‘tough talk’ which he said would not force the Soviet Union + to make decisions of the kind it would not wish to make. He remonstrated + several times that the emphasis on the Soviet role was creating a crisis + atmosphere, and that it was not making it easier for Moscow to take + constructive initiatives during the current discussions with Cairo. At + the same time, he was quick to say, these were personal remarks and we + would be receiving the replies to our political initiative at an early + date.” (Memorandum from Sisco to + Kissinger, July 13; ibid., + Box 340, Subject Files, Dobrynin/Kissinger) Sisco’s memorandum is printed in Foreign + Relations, 1969–1976, volume XII, Soviet Union, January + 1969–October 1970, Document 181.

+
+ +
+ 136. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in + IsraelSource: National + Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 654, Country Files, Middle East, Middle + East—Recent Actions. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Drafted and approved + by Sisco on July + 22. + Washington, July 23, 1970, 2020Z. +

118300. For Ambassador. Following is letter from President for Prime + Minister Meir. You should deliver + it promptly to Mrs. Meir. + Instructions follow septel.Telegram 118301 + to Tel Aviv, July 23. (Ibid., Box 607, Country Files, Middle East, + Israel, Vol. VI)

+

QUOTE:

+

Dear Madame Prime Minister:

+

I am writing to inform you that we have received the following oral + message from the Foreign Minister of the UAR:

+

INTERIOR QUOTE: The Government of the UAR accepts the proposal of Mr. Rogers contained in his message of + June 19.Rogers’s message to Mahmoud Riad is in telegram 96867 to Cairo, June 19. + (Ibid., Box 636, Country Files, Middle East, UAR, Vol. IV) We are ready to + subscribe to the statement as it is written in this message that is in + the form of a report from + Ambassador Jarring to the + Secretary General of the United Nations.The + UAR’s acceptance of the U.S. peace initiative (see Document 129) was reported in telegram 1614 + from Cairo, July 22. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential + Materials, NSC Files, Box 1155, + Saunders Files, Middle East Negotiations Files) END INTERIOR + QUOTE.

+

In our prior confidential discussions regarding this proposal, we asked + that the Government of Israel refrain from taking a public position + pending receipt of the Egyptian reply. As you know, we made this + suggestion in the belief that it would not have served our mutual + interests for Israel to have assumed the responsibility for rejecting a + proposal whose aim is to stop the fighting and to begin negotiations + under the auspices of Ambassador Jarring.

+

I am fully aware, Madame Prime Minister, of your Government’s strong + objections regarding this proposal. In light of the Egyptian acceptance, + I ask you and your government to review this matter in hopes that a + prompt affirmative reply from the Government of Israel will lead to an + early stop of hostilities and bloodshed on both sides and to serious + talks between the parties conducted by Ambassador Jarring within the framework of the + UN Security Council resolution of + November 22, 1967.Israel responded + positively to the U.S. peace initiative on August 4. See Document 140.

+

The Egyptians have informed us their acceptance is unconditional. On the + basis of additional views conveyed to us in writing by the UAR, we + expect that in the negotiations it will continue to press two principal + objectives: total Israeli withdrawal from the territories occupied in + the 1967 conflict to the pre-June 5 lines; and a refugee solution based + exclusively on the strict application of paragraph 11 of UN General Assembly resolution 194 + (III).Paragraph 11 of UN General Assembly Resolution 194, + adopted on December 11, 1948, called for the return of the refugees + to their homes and payment of compensation to those who did not wish + to return. It directed the UN + Conciliation Commission to facilitate the process. For more on the + resolution, see Foreign Relations, 1948, The Near East, South Asia, + and Africa, volume V, part 2, Document 806. I want + to assure you that we will not press Israel to accept the aforementioned + positions of the UAR. Our position on withdrawal is that the final + borders must be agreed between the parties by means of negotiations + under the aegis of Ambassador Jarring. Moreover, we will not press Israel to accept a + refugee solution which would alter fundamentally the Jewish character of + the state of Israel or jeopardize your security. We will also adhere + strictly and firmly to the fundamental principle that there must be a + peace agreement in which each of the parties undertakes reciprocal + obligations to the other and that no Israeli soldier should be withdrawn + from the occupied territories until a binding contractual peace + agreement satisfactory to you has been achieved.

+ +

Finally, and most important of all, I am sure that you noted my recent + public comments and nationally televised conference of July 1 in which I + made clear the strong and unequivocal support of the United States for + the state of Israel and its security.See + footnote 3, Document 134. + Furthermore, I want again to assure you, as I have previously done in + our personal talks, of my support for Israel’s existence and security + and my intention to continue to provide Israel with the necessary + assistance to assure that the balance of power will not be altered to + the detriment of Israel.

+

I hope, Madame Prime Minister, that you will receive my views in the + spirit of mutual friendship and interest that has characterized the + close relations between our two countries. I am certain, too, you will + appreciate the weight of responsibility which I bear to exhaust every + effort to achieve a stable and durable peace in the Middle East. I am + confident that together we can move towards that goal.Barbour + delivered the letter to Meir + on July 24 and then had a 1½-hour meeting with her and Eban, as reported in telegram 3931 + from Tel Aviv, July 24. According to Barbour, he told the Prime Minister that “he felt as + seriously as he had at any time in nine years” that he had dealt + with her that they “might now be on threshold of turning from + hostilities to negotiations.” Meir responded that she was certain that he did not + expect an immediate answer from her and proceeded to discuss her + concern over Soviet activity in Egypt. She also expressed “deep + appreciation” for the military equipment the United States had + supplied to Israel in the previous several weeks, and she wanted to + know if the flow of arms would stop once Israel accepted the U.S. + peace initiative. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, + NSC Files, Box 1155, Saunders + Files, Middle East Negotiations Files)

+

Sincerely,

+

+ Richard Nixon +

+

ENDQUOTE.

+ + + Rogers + + +
+ +
+ + 137. Telegram From the Department of State to Certain Diplomatic + PostsSource: National + Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1155, Saunders Files, Middle East + Negotiations Files, U.S. Peace Initiative For the Middle East Vol. + I. Secret; Priority; Nodis. Drafted and approved by Sisco. Sent to Amman, Beirut, + Cairo, Jidda, Tel Aviv, London, Moscow, Paris, and USUN. + Washington, July 23, 1970, 2236Z. +

118624. 1. Secretary, with Sisco + and Dubs present, saw Dobrynin + at latter’s initiative to receive following oral statement, text of + which left in writing by Dobrynin. Statement is Soviet acceptance of US peace + proposal.A memorandum of conversation + of this meeting is printed in Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, volume XII, + Soviet Union, January 1969–October 1970, Document + 184.

+

QTE The Soviet Union, as the Government of the United States is well + aware, from the very start of the Arab-Israeli conflict in the Middle + East has consistently sought a settlement of this conflict through + political means on the basis of the UN + Security Council Resolution of November 22, 1967. With this aim in mind + the Soviet Union repeatedly introduced proposals directed towards + practical implementation of this Resolution.The Soviet Union introduced its most recent formulations at the + Four-Power meeting on June 24. Dobrynin first introduced the text of these + formulations in confidence at a June 2 meeting with Rogers and Sisco; see Document 120.

+

QTE The U.S. Government declares now that it agrees to a resumption of + the mission of Ambassador Jarring, Special Representative of the UN Secretary General in the Middle East. It + is well known that the Soviet Government has always insisted on the + necessity of carrying out the mission entrusted with Ambassador + Jarring, that it put forward + appropriate proposals to this end and made efforts so that his mission + be effective enough.

+

QTE That is why the Soviet side not only holds no objections to this + effect but, on the contrary, it reiterates its position with regard to + the necessity of resumption by Ambassador Jarring of his mission. Positively evaluating the + possibilities in Ambassador Jarring’s mission, we are ready to go on making our + contribution in the future as well so that contacts between the sides + through Jarring which could be + resumed in the nearest future could produce positive results.

+

QTE As we know, the Governments of the UAR and Jordan have expressed their readiness to cease fire + for a definite period of time if Israel also takes upon herself the same + obligation. The Soviet Government’s attitude to this is positive.

+ +

QTE Undoubtedly, the success of Ambassador Jarring’s activities requires that both sides + unequivocally declare their readiness to implement the above mentioned + Resolution of the Security Council in all its parts. The Soviet side + hopes that the American side is being guided by the same motivations. + The Governments of the UAR and Jordan + have repeatedly stated and are confirming now that they are ready to + implement the Resolution in all its parts. Therefore it is necessary + that Israel should also clearly state her readiness to implement this + Resolution. Otherwise the sides would find themselves in an unequal + position: one of them does recognize the November Resolution of the + Security Council and expresses its readiness to implement it while the + other side ignores it.

+

QTE At the same time in the interests of success of Jarring’s mission it is important that + he should have a definite enough understanding as to the basis upon + which contacts should take place between the sides in search of ways to + implement the Resolution of the Security Council. For the success of + Jarring’s mission first of + all a direction is required on the main questions of settlement—the + withdrawal by Israel from the Arab territories occupied during the + conflict of 1967, including the question of secure and recognized + boundaries along the lines which existed prior to the conflict in June + 1967, and the simultaneous establishment of a just and stable peace in + the Middle East. The U.S. Government, on its part, has also repeatedly + emphasized the utmost importance of the above-mentioned questions. Both + of these questions are organically connected with each other and should + be considered jointly. Appropriate proposals to this effect have been + put forward by the Soviet Government in the course of Soviet-American + exchange of opinion on June 2 and also at the four-sided consultations + in New York. The American side has not given so far its reply to the + above mentioned proposals—neither in the course of bilateral exchange of + opinion nor at the four-sided consultations. Yet these proposals are in + complete conformity with the Security Council Resolution and the Soviet + Government is expecting a reply from the U.S. Government.

+

QTE Parallel to the resumption of activities by Jarring and the initiation through him + of contacts between the parties the four-sided consultations in New York + should be made more active to work out agreed guidelines for Jarring. The Soviet Government on its + part will be doing its best to facilitate it. END QTE.

+

2. After reading above QTE Oral Statement UNQTE Dobrynin made following additional + points:

+

A. USSR statement has been made in + expectation US will make necessary efforts towards achieving a just + political settlement of Middle East problem and will exert its influence + upon Israel.

+ +

B. Soviets have taken into consideration US clarifications that with + Jarring’s activities + resumed, US–USSR bilateral consultations on Middle East will continue + and US will show active and constructive approach both in Four and Two + Power talks.

+

2 [sic]. After thanking Dobrynin, Secretary recalled one of + important considerations in our proposal regarding ceasefire was that + each side would commit itself not to improve its military position. + Secretary said we assume that a military standstill as part of the + ceasefire is also acceptable to the Soviet Union. Dobrynin responded affirmatively + adding QTE Yes, of course UNQTE; it was his understanding that Foreign + Minister Riad’s statement to the Secretary covered this point.

+

3. Secretary asked whether Soviet side saw any objections to releasing + Arab response to our initiative.See footnote 4, Document 136. Jordan + accepted in a letter to Rogers on July 26, which was transmitted in telegram + 3533 from Amman, July 26. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential + Materials, NSC Files, Box 1155, + Saunders Files, Middle East Negotiations Files, U.S. Peace + Initiative For the Middle East Vol. I) + Dobrynin replied it was his + understanding that UAR did not intend + to publicize its response; in any event, he suggested this matter be + raised with the Egyptians. Secretary said it would be helpful from our + standpoint to make public simple UAR + acceptance of our proposal. He understood Dobrynin’s remarks to mean that publicizing response + would be acceptable to the USSR if + this matter could be worked out with the UAR. Dobrynin said that he did not + anticipate any objections from the Soviet side. Secretary added that US + would do its part in support of Jarring to bring about a settlement, and he indicated + our willingness to continue Two and Four Power talks. Secretary said + that he viewed Soviets response as indication USSR was interested in a peaceful settlement; such a + settlement would be in mutual US–USSR interest and in interest of world + community.

+

4. Dobrynin stressed USSR has no objections whatsoever to + having Jarring resume his + mission in few days. He wanted to be sure that US understood that + comment in Oral Statement referring to absence of US reply to Soviet + June 2nd proposals was not meant to be a Soviet precondition for + resumption of Jarring’s Mission. + Dobrynin asked whether US + Government had had any reply from Israel; Secretary indicated we would + inform Dobrynin as soon as we + could regarding this question.

+ + + Rogers + + +
+ +
+ + 138. Telegram From the Department of State to Certain Diplomatic + PostsSource: National + Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1155, Saunders Files, Middle East + Negotiations Files, U.S. Peace Initiative For the Middle East Vol. + I. Secret; Priority; Nodis. Drafted by Sisco, cleared in IO, and approved by Sisco. Sent to USUN, London, Paris, Cairo, Amman, Beirut, Nicosia, + Stockholm, Moscow, Jidda, and Tel Aviv. A note at the end of the + telegram indicates it was also sent to the White + House. + Washington, July 24, 1970, 2336Z. +

119651. Over the next 48 hours, our principal effort will be directed + toward securing Israeli acceptance of US peace proposal. On the + assumption that we can get all of the parties, we have been doing some + tentative planning as to how we would proceed in getting Jarring into play. Following are some + thoughts which we wish USUN to explore + with Bunche confidentially in + first instance. Other posts may wish comment.

+

1. While Jarring is acceptable to + both sides, we are concerned that he has up to now failed to exercise + any real initiative. If he does not grasp nettle and apply maximum + imagination in getting parties together and keeping dialogue rolling, + progress that we may have made could be irrevocably lost. Therefore, + wish you to explore with Bunche + desirability of getting Jarring + to take on intermediate level assistant who can help him in + negotiations, who would be imaginative in developing proposals, and who + would establish kind of relationship with Jarring that would nudge him along at key points. In + reviewing some possibilities, we believe best man would be Mr. Ilkka + Pastinen, Finnish Deputy Representative. Finns prepared to make him + available and he definitely our preference. Other possibilities are: + Robert Furlonger, former Minister of Australian Embassy in Washington, + now assigned Canberra, Geoffrey Murray, Canada, Thorsten Orn (Sweden), + Michael Cork (Australia), Jonkeer Von Ufford (Netherlands). In + discussing this matter with Bunche it is important that he understand we not be + faced with fait accompli with naming of an individual by SYG who in long + run would prove to be unhelpful in situation.

+

2. In this connection, Gromyko + statement to Beam just reported + signals possible fundamental difficulty.An + informal Embassy translation of the statement is printed in Foreign + Relations, 1969–1976, volume XII, Soviet Union, January + 1969–October 1970, Document 187. If Soviets have in + mind that Four Powers must meet and first develop detailed guidelines + before restarting Jarring, then + this is a condition which likely to delay start of any talks between + parties for indefinite period. You should make clear to Bunche, and we intend to make clear to Gromyko, that procedure we have in + mind, and we made this very clear to Dobrynin here in our previous discussions, is for + Jarring to start process + promptly upon receipt US proposal. For our part, we will insist that + Jarring process not await + further refinement of mandate by Four; talks should get started on basis + US proposal. Two and Four Power meetings could be pursued simultaneously + with Jarring talks. If any + difficulties arise with respect to prompt transmission of US proposal + (without any changes in text), we would be prepared to transmit this to + SYG on our own since it is an American proposal which presumably all of + the parties would have accepted.

+

3. There is a slight technical problem on which your views are requested. + Proposal is put in the form of a Jarring report to SYG. Given SYG’s sensitivities, we are + willing for it to be transmitted in any way he deems appropriate. + Important thing is that SYG then would put out Jarring report reflecting acceptance + of parties. Hope that UN would not get + itself involved, as it has in the past, with long independent checking + with parties. For this reason, we are suggesting to Egyptians that they + make available informally and promptly appropriate documents confirming + their acceptance of US proposal, to SYG.

+

4. Would hope also that any such SYG announcement would indicate that + parties had been invited to send representatives to meet with Jarring promptly at agreed site. We + understand that SYG and Jarring + have had in mind New York or Nicosia. We believe it would be desirable + for SYG to begin process now of checking what would be an acceptable + site for parties. On the whole, we would prefer Nicosia as conducive to + a more businesslike atmosphere and closer to area and more convenient + for representatives. We believe SYG and Jarring should urge that three governments send their + Foreign Ministers rather than to start talks at lower levels. Assuming + Israeli acceptance, we in turn intend to encourage Israelis to designate + Foreign Minister Eban.

+

5. Simultaneously with political talks on a settlement which Jarring would be conducting with the + parties, we envisage that SYG would ask UNTSO Chief of Staff to + establish contact with appropriate military liaison officials in the + area to work out details of limited ceasefire, including military + standstill. Originally our proposal provided for a July 1 beginning on + the ceasefire. Because of time needed to develop Moscow-Cairo response, + this date obviously out of the question. Believe objective should be + early August for beginning of fully agreed limited ceasefire, including + military standstill. We will wish to brief Thant and Jarring fully on the details of standstill as we have + communicated them to parties in the area and the other major powers. You + will wish to note in this connection that Dobrynin July 23 informed Secretary of acceptance of concept of standstill as part + of limited ceasefire; Bergus + believes that UAR has also + accepted.See Document 137 and footnote 4, + Document 136.

+

6. In short, what we have in mind are simultaneous talks on the political + side between parties under Jarring and on the military side with the Chief of Staff + directly involved with technical, military liaison representatives. + Reason why we believe tandem operation of this kind ought to be + conducted is that if any wrinkle should develop regarding ceasefire, + political talks under Jarring’s + auspices would be put in train. We wish to avoid a situation where all + of details of the ceasefire have to be buttoned down before the parties + get involved in a dialogue on the elements of a settlement; + establishment of a ceasefire and standstill should not be condition + precedent to starting political talks.

+

7. Believe you should suggest to Bunche that Jarring ought to be alerted as to the desirability of an + early trip to New York to be fully briefed.Buffum met with + Bunche on July 27 for a + “hair-down session” at which they discussed the future resumption of + the Jarring Mission. + Buffum expressed concern + that “Jarring seems so + worried about maintaining good relations with both sides that he may + be reluctant to show necessary forcefulness in moving negotiating + process ahead.” Bunche agreed + with “this analysis of Jarring’s character” and explained that he had + already spoken to U Thant, + “warning him” that if Jarring “[did] not succeed in this round, entire + problem will be dropped in SYG’s lap and instead of Jarring’s becoming expendable SYG + will become expendable.” (Telegram 1560 from USUN, July 27; National Archives, + Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC + Files, Box 1155, Saunders Files, Middle East Negotiations Files, + U.S. Peace Initiative For the Middle East Vol. I)

+

8. Above are all tentative, since we will be guided by views of + parties.

+

9. Fuller cable being sent on our further ideas.Not found.

+ + + Rogers + + +
+ +
+ + 139. Telegram From the Department of State to All Diplomatic + PostsSource: National + Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1155, Saunders Files, Middle East + Negotiations Files, June Initiative Vol. II, July 24–August 8, 1970. + Secret; Limdis. Drafted by Stephanie C. Perry (NEA/PRO) and approved + by Thomas D. Boyatt (NEA). + Washington, July 29, 1970, 1720Z. +

121689. Subject: US Initiative on Middle East.

+

1. Following is for posts’ information and guidance in confidential + discussions at Ambassador’s discretion with host governments.

+

2. We have now received positive replies to our initiative from UAR and Jordan.See footnote 4, Document + 136 and footnote 4, Document + 137. We expect Israeli reply shortlySee Document 140. + and are strongly urging that it be equally positive.

+

3. We do not underestimate difficulties that lie ahead. Neither side has + given any indication of real movement from substantive positions long + adhered to. Achievement of workable ceasefire poses highly complicated + problems. Radical Arab and fedayeen opposition to ceasefire and + resumption talks rapidly crystallizing. Military conflict unabated. + These imposing obstacles, however, should not obscure fundamental fact + that principal parties to dispute may now apparently be ready to give + diplomacy a chance and are not making prior acceptance of their + positions on terms and nature of settlement a precondition for beginning + negotiating process under Jarring.

+

4. If positive Israeli reply forthcoming we envisage following steps: we + will present our proposal formally in Four-Power meetingSee footnote 1, Document + 145. for quick transmittal by Four to SYG and + Ambassador Jarring. (When we + refer to US proposal we are referring to text of proposed Jarring to SYG report contained in + Secretary’s letter to UAR + FonMin Riad carried in Wireless File + MEF 59, July 22).The letter to Riad + containing the U.S. proposal (see Document + 129), dated June 19, was made available to the press by + the Department of State on July 22 and is printed in the Department + of State Bulletin, August 10, 1970, pp. + 178–179. The proposed report from Jarring to the UN + Secretary-General is in telegram 127711 to Tel Aviv, August 7. + (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 27–14 + ARAB–ISR) In the end, Secretary-General Thant sent a note on August 7 to the Security + Council stating that he and Jarring believed there was a reasonable basis to + reactivate the Jarring + Mission and that Jarring had + invited the parties to meet in New York on August 25. See Yearbook of the United Nations, 1970, pp + 253–254. See also Document 133. We believe our formula as + accepted by parties after careful deliberation should not rpt not be + subject to amendment on its way to Jarring. Our objective is to see parties engaged in negotiating process under + Jarring as soon as possible, + according to procedures and at time and place he recommends, so that + positive momentum so lately acquired will not be lost. At same time as + Jarring getting negotiation + process started, we would hope steps could be taken simultaneously to + arrange between parties details and modalities of ceasefire and + standstill on new military installations. We do not believe completion + of arrangements for a ceasefire and standstill in combat zones should be + a condition precedent for starting political talks. Keys to achievement + and maintenance of ceasefire are adherence to principle of military + standstill and readiness to accept effective, equitable verification + procedures.

+

5. Once negotiating process started, US intends continue play active role + directly with parties, and in Two-Power and Four-Power forums, providing + counsel and cooperating in efforts help Jarring Mission succeed.

+

6. Alternative to success of current diplomatic steps is further + deterioration of military situation in area. Given Soviet operational + involvement in UAR and our own + determination to prevent shift in area military balance, this could have + gravest implications not only for interests of states and peoples + directly involved but wider repercussions as well. It is therefore + incumbent on world community to lend support to current peace efforts, + which will require both sides to relax their maximum positions as + negotiations proceed if those efforts are to succeed. While we have + provided initial momentum, we see this as effort requiring widest + possible support and cooperation to which we will continue to contribute + our part.

+ + + Rogers + + +
+ +
+ + 140. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in + IsraelSource: National + Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1155, Saunders Files, Middle East + Negotiations Files, U.S. Peace Initiative For the Middle East Vol. + II. Secret; Priority; Nodis. Drafted on August 4 by Lissfelt + (NEA/IAI); cleared by Atherton, Stackhouse (NEA/IAI), and Eliot; and approved by Sisco. Repeated Priority to Amman, + Beirut, Cairo, Jidda, London, Moscow, USUN, and Paris. + Washington, August 4, 1970, 2009Z. +

125220. Subject: Israel Reply to US Peace Proposal.

+

1. Amb Rabin, accompanied by + Minister Argov and First Secy Ben + Aharon delivered GOI’s reply to US + peace proposal to Asst Secy Sisco August 4. (Text in Para 4 below.)

+

2. Sisco perused it quickly. + Rabin commented that USG now had got GOI to use word QUOTE withdrawal UNQUOTE. Rabin explained his understanding + that shortly would follow letters from FonMin + Eban to the Secretary and from PM + Meir to President.Meir’s + letter to Nixon has not been + found. Eban wrote to + Rogers on August 19 with + “a more detailed summary of our positions on some of the questions + mentioned in our August 4 communication.” Eban stated that Israel accepted + UN Security Council Resolution + 242 and would cooperate with the Jarring Mission so long as “the Four-Power Group + should not seek to prejudice the conduct of the mission by + submitting their own views on the matters at issue between the + parties.” Regarding future boundaries, Eban wrote that “Israeli forces will not be moved + from any of these cease-fire lines, until a binding, contractual + reciprocal peace agreement which we believe satisfactory to us has + been achieved.” Finally, addressing refugees, Eban stated that Israel “would make + a contribution in appropriate form, but refused to acknowledge “a + prior right of choice inherent in Arabs outside of Israel to enter + Israel. Our position is that the principle of sovereign equality of + States gives Israel the right and duty to determine its contribution + to this international and regional problem as a voluntary sovereign + act, taking full account of its security and national character.” + (Israel State Archives, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 6854/8) + Sisco noted that this means to + USG Israel’s acceptance. We have + informed UN of Israel’s acceptance and + Yost is in touch with + Tekoah about informing + Jarring of GOI detailed reply. Rabin did not react one way or + another to this latter observation.

+

3. Sisco said next steps relating + to principal elements of ceasefire/standstill are being worked on, and + hopefully will be drafted today. Before discussing our proposals with + UAR and Soviets, we want to check + them with GOI; we shall be sending them + to Amb Barbour. We have in mind + suggesting ceasefire take effect Friday, August 7. Rabin offered personal opinion Aug 7 + was too early, in light unresolved questions re supervision and + verification.

+

4. Text detailed reply addressed Secretary Rogers follows:

+ +

+ BEGIN TEXT +

+

4 August 1970

+

Dear Mr. Secretary:

+

I have the honour to inform you that my Government’s position on the + latest United States peace initiative is as follows:

+

Having considered President Nixon’s message of 24 July 1970, basing itself on its + contents and in strict adherence to its policy principles and + authoritative statements, the Government of Israel has decided to reply + affirmatively to the latest United States peace initiative, and to + inform the United States that it may convey to Ambassador Jarring that:

+

1) Israel is prepared in due time to designate a representative to + discussions to be held under Ambassador Jarring’s auspices with the UAR (Jordan), according to such procedure and at such + places and times as he may recommend, taking into account each side’s + attitude as to method of procedure and previous experience of + discussions between the parties.

+

2) Israel’s position in favor of a cease-fire on a basis of reciprocity + on all fronts, including the Egyptian front, in accordance with the + Security Council’s cease-fire resolution, remains unchanged. On the + basis of clarifications given by the United States Government, Israel is + prepared to reply affirmatively to the United States proposal for a + cease fire (for at least three months) on the Egyptian front.

+

3) The discussions under Ambassador Jarring’s auspices shall be held within the framework of + the Security Council Resolution (242) on the basis of the expression of + readiness by the parties to carry out the Security Council Resolution + (242) in all its parts, in order to achieve an agreed and binding + contractual peace agreement between the parties which will ensure:

+

a) Termination by Egypt (Jordan) and Israel of all claims or states of + belligerency and respect and acknowledgment of the sovereignty, + territorial integrity and political independence of each other and their + right to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries free from + threats or acts of force, each of the parties will be responsible within + its territory for the prevention of all hostile acts by regular military + forces or para-military forces, including irregular forces, against the + armed forces or against civilians living in the territory of the other + party.

+

b) Withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from territories occupied in the + 1967 conflict to secure, recognized and agreed boundaries to be + determined in the peace agreements.

+

4) Israel will participate in these discussions without any prior + conditions. Israel will not claim the prior acceptance by the other + party of her positions, as + Israel does not accept in advance the positions of the other parties as + communicated publicly or otherwise. Each party will be free to present + its proposals on the matters under discussion.

+

Please accept the assurances of my highest consideration.

+

Sincerely yours,

+

Y. Rabin, Lt. Gen. (Res.)

+

Ambassador END TEXT

+ + + Rogers + + +
+ +
+ 141. Transcript of a Telephone Conversation Between the President’s + Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) and the Assistant Secretary of State for Near + Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Sisco)Source: + National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Henry Kissinger Telephone + Conversation Transcripts, Box 6, Chronological File. No + classification marking. All brackets are in the original except + “[submit]”, added for clarity. + Washington, August 5, 1970, 3:40 + p.m. +

S: I am trying to get the cease-fire proposal into effect, but it’s very + complicated Henry.

+

K: I can imagine.

+

S: I just did a cable which I am going to take to the Secretary. It is a + definitive proposal for a cease-fire standstill.See footnote 7, Document + 142. We want to put it to the Israelis first. But I + am recommending to the Secretary that it be cleared with you. I would be + much more comfortable if it goes through you first.

+

K: Isn’t it a policy matter? So it has to be cleared with me?

+

S: Well I think it is. Secondly, I wanted to report to you where we stand + on the question of military assistance which Israel has requested. They + want as a matter of priority four things: 1) Helicopter standoff + equipment to help jam SAM electrical + equipment, 2) Shrikes, 3) CBUs (to + attack SAM sites), 4) Pods—electrical + equipment. I have had two good talks with Packard. He will, by tomorrow morning, see what is + possible to present to the Israelis. But there needs to be a discussion + with our Secretary of State and I think this is a matter of interest to + the White House as well. The Secretary believes that the over-riding + objective should be to get + the cease-fire working immediately. If there is any further delay there + may be incidents and also a loss of momentum. When the package is gotten + together the Secretary wants to know whether and how we should tell the + Israelis. Let me give you the Secretary’s thinking on this: If the + Israelis are the cause of any delay in the establishment of a + cease-fire, we shouldn’t provide the equipment. If, however, the + Egyptians cause a delay and in a manner which would improve their + situation, then we should study the whole thing further. In other words, + the Secretary wants to look at the existing situation before we go + ahead. Rabin has informed the + Pentagon (either on a tactical basis or under instructions, I don’t + know) that unless they get the four items and get the opportunity to hit + the SAM sites, there may be a delay on + the cease-fire. This is a form of pressure that didn’t go well with the + Secretary. We took the view that the compelling need is to get on with + the cease-fire and that it is just as much in the interest of the + Israelis to do so as the others involved, if not more so. But the + problem is that if you have a cease-fire and then the Israelis make a + dramatic attack, the other side will feel the need to restore the + balance and then you might as well not have a cease-fire.

+

K: If there is a cease-fire will they get the equipment?

+

S: Yes, the Secretary feels that we should give them the equipment and + Dave Packard agrees, if there + is a cease-fire.

+

K: So we can tell them that if there is a cease-fire they will get the + equipment?

+

S: Yes.

+

K: Do you agree with this?

+

S: Yes, generally. The Secretary and I agree that the overriding + consideration is to get the cease-fire as quickly as possible.

+

K: When these things are discussed where is Saunders? Do I have a man in there?

+

S: No the reason is that these discussions go on in the Pentagon. The + only discussion we’ve had with Packard are two brief telephone conversations. On this + organizational thing, I’ll be taking care of that once we get over the + hump on the cease-fire; it’s tough Henry.

+

K: How does the cease-fire look to you?

+

S: There’s a real hope. My only worry is that the Israelis will be + insistent about getting the equipment and hitting the SAM sites before it. One other thing + Rabin said to me and you + may hear it from him . . .

+

K: He’s coming over this afternoon.See Document 142.

+ +

S: I didn’t know that, but you should know one other thing he said + was—last night he said to me that his government would in the cease-fire + and standstill [submit] a political proposal for a rollback. I said that + would be knocked out by the other side and that it changes our proposal. + Then he said well at least give us the means immediately. I told him it + is being looked at and that within 48 hours there will be some kind of + judgment. But I would leave that very neutral; we’ll have to weigh these + considerations. Their argument is “Never mind a perfect package: if you + think we are wrong let us have the chance to prove it—just give us the + wherewithal.” But the problem is if this were to go it would take days + and we want the cease-fire in three or four days. I said there’s no way + which, by a major attack, you can get this balance when they’ve got + mobile SAMs; so the best thing for you to do is to get a cease-fire + right away.

+

K: Good, that’s the line I will take. You have been very helpful.

+

S: It’s been very difficult—but who thought it was going to be easy?

+

K: Without your eternal optimism we’d be dead.

+

S: We’ve got to pull this off for the President.

+
+ +
+ 142. Memorandum of ConversationSource: National Archives, Nixon Presidential + Materials, NSC Files, Box 1157, + Saunders Files, Middle East Negotiations Files, June Initiative + (Memos Only), June 9–September 1, 1970. Top Secret; Sensitive. The + meeting took place in the White House Map Room. + Washington, August 5, 1970, 5:30 + p.m. + + PARTICIPANTS + Ambassador Rabin + Minister Argov + Mr. Kissinger + General Haig + +

Ambassador Rabin opened the + meeting by stating that he wished to summarize events that had occurred + over the extended period since he had last talked to Dr. Kissinger. He stated that Israel had + decided to accept the U.S. initiative in the terms by which they had + responded formally to the + Department of State.See Document 140. Israel had decided to respond + positively, although with great skepticism and with the full realization + that their positive response would incur very real political and even + more serious military risks. Without President Nixon’s letter to Prime Minister + Golda Meir,See Document 136. + Israel’s reply would most certainly have been negative. Israel’s + skepticism is justified since the major issues of difference between + Israel and the Soviets and the Egyptians have still not been resolved by + the U.S. initiative and there is no indication of a willingness to + compromise, especially on the following issues:

+

1. Concerning the form of the talks on which Israel’s position is well + known, the U.S. has made no effort to ask for direct talks.

+

2. The Soviet/Egyptian and other Arab states’ demands for total + withdrawal are upheld under the U.S. plan.

+

3. A U.S. demand for the solution of the Palestinian refugee problem + under the formula of free choice, without any other preconditions is + called for.

+

On July 17, at the conclusion of Nasser’s Moscow visit, the USSR/Egyptian communiqué, + which was essentially negative on the major points at issue, was + released.Nasser was in Moscow June 29 through July 17. The + joint communiqué included this statement: “the two sides confirmed + their desire go on expanding and strengthening the sincere + cooperation between the United Arab Republic and the Soviet Union in + the political, economic and defense fields in the interests of the + peoples of both states.” In the document, the UAR and the Soviet Union placed sole + blame on Israel for the “continuing grave crisis situation,” which + they argued had resulted from the country’s “aggression against the + U.A.R. and other Arab states,” and proclaimed that “Israel would not + have been able to persist in this aggressive and expansionist policy + were it not for the continuing support it receives from the + imperialist circles and specifically the United States.” The + communiqué did not include a reply to the U.S. cease-fire proposal. + (Washington Post, July 18, 1970, p. A1) + In a memorandum to President Nixon, Kissinger noted that the communiqué gave “almost no + hint of conclusions reached and the U.S. initiative is not even + mentioned.” (Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, volume XII, Soviet + Union, January 1969–October 1970, Document 182) + Knowing this, the Israelis have great difficulty in seeing what can be + achieved through the initiative just launched by the U.S. In essence, + the USSR/Egyptian position has not changed. It is the same as it has + been within the two- and four-power forum for an extended period. The + other side has rejected even the U.S. position, not just the long + established Israeli positions.

+

Israel believes the Soviets accepted the U.S. initiative because their + creeping involvement in military operations brought a sharp U.S. + reaction as manifested by the President’s television interview.See footnote 3, + Document 134. The Soviets felt a crisis was + developing and they decided to try the diplomatic route in order to reduce tensions and to + project a better international image for the Soviet Union.

+

From the Israeli perspective, once the talks start, both sides will + present their positions to Jarring who will go from place to place without there + being direct contact between the parties concerned. He will learn that + there is no give and will then make a report to the Secretary General of + the United Nations. The situation will be the same as during the last + round of peace efforts.

+

Dr. Kissinger pointed out that + this time at least the world press was conveying that a new atmosphere + had developed.

+

Ambassador Rabin stated neither + of the parties most directly concerned will gain by the new round of + negotiations but only the Soviets. The most serious consequence that has + resulted from the U.S. initiative is that the Soviets have been able, + under the cover of the U.S. initiative, to take two fundamental military + steps:

+

1. On the night of June 29–30, they moved a system of ground-to-air + missiles to a line 40 to 60 kilometers from the Canal. Israel was + compelled to attack these sites, destroying between eight and ten, with + a loss of five airplanes. The Soviets then gave a positive response to + the U.S. initiative and at the same time realized that the Israelis were + still operating as far as 15 kilometers east of the Canal since the SA–2 + missiles were at the limit of their range in this defense configuration + and thus, Israel could still silence some of the Egyptian artillery + along the Canal.

+

2. On July 26 Soviet piloted MIG–21s attempted to intercept Israeli + aircraft, firing some seven air-to-air missiles.

+

On the 27th, they gave air-to-air cover to Egyptian strike aircraft + hitting Israeli emplacements on the East side of the Canal. In this + effort, Egyptian pilots operated east of the Canal, while Soviet cover + aircraft remained west of the Canal. In this action, the Israelis + pursued the Egyptian piloted MIGs some 80 kilometers west of the Canal. + The Soviet piloted MIGs could not intercept because of the low altitude + at which the Israeli fighters were operating. However, on the 30th of + July, Soviet piloted MIG aircraft did intercept Israeli fighters along + the Egyptian bank of the Gulf of Suez. During this engagement, the + Israelis shot down four Soviet piloted MIGs. It is Israel’s view that + the Commander of the Soviet Air Force traveled to the UAR, as a result + of these losses, to make an on-site decision as to what steps would be + taken next. It is Rabin’s + personal view that the Soviets have decided to avoid air-to-air combat + with Israel for the time being.

+

Dr. Kissinger asked for the + Israeli appraisal of the Soviet pilots’ capability. Ambassador Rabin replied that while they were + reported by Israeli pilots to be more aggressive than the Egyptians, + their skills were considered limited. The kills were accomplished by + U.S. air-to-air missiles + (Sparrows and Sidewinders). Subsequent to this action, on August 3, the + Soviets moved a missile ambush to within 15–20 kilometers of the Canal. + Israel estimates four sites were established—three SA–2s and one SA–3. + These sites provide the Soviets the ability to engage Israeli aircraft + some 15 to 20 kilometers east of the Canal. The next day this ambush + cost Israel one Phantom shot down and one damaged. As a result of the + second series of escalatory steps, Israel now faces a new and more + serious problem along the Canal.

+

With respect to the U.S. ceasefire proposal, it is the Israeli position + that it is unacceptable if the USSR is + allowed to put in place SA–2s and SA–3s closer than the 40–60 kilometer + limit that existed prior to the Israeli acceptance of the U.S. position + last Friday, July 31. If the missiles remain at their new locations, + Israel will retaliate: (1) by striking them as soon as possible or (2) + by hitting Egypt in areas where they are less immune to attacks.

+

Ambassador Rabin reported that + he had talked to Pentagon officials (Deputy Secretary of Defense + Packard and Mr. Pranger) and Assistant Secretary + Sisco at State about the + urgent need for additional military equipment.

+

Dr. Kissinger stated that he + understood that Israel could not use the Shrike missiles that they had + asked for earlier. Ambassador Rabin replied that if the U.S. will provide the missiles + we will all find out what their utility is. Ambassador Rabin stated that since his + negotiations on additional military equipment had begun, very little + beyond electronic equipment had been provided. Israel had recently + received approval for additional Phantom reconnaissance and + fighter/bomber aircraftIn a July 29 + memorandum from Nutter to + Laird, the Secretary + approved Israel’s purchase and the immediate delivery of two RF–4C + aircraft, also known as the Phantom II, on July 30. (Washington + National Records Center, OSD Files: + FRC 330–76–0076, Box 74, Israel) In an August 1 memorandum from + Nutter to Laird, Laird approved the sale of one + EC–97G ELINT reconnaissance + aircraft on August 3. (Ibid.) but had received no answer to + their request for drones and Shrike missiles and have been told instead + that the U.S. had not completed its studies. Ambassador Rabin emphasized that it is essential + that Israel have the necessary equipment needed to cope with the new + threat. For this reason, they have need of four specific items:

+

1. Standoff electronic jamming equipment for E and C band radars.

+

2. C band radar canisters in pods.

+

3. CBU bomblets, which Israel guarantees + will not be used against civilian targets.

+

4. Shrike missiles.

+

Dr. Kissinger then asked if we + were to deliver this equipment, would the Israelis use it against the + forward SAM sites before agreeing to the implementation of the + ceasefire. Ambassador Rabin + replied that Israel will not implement the ceasefire until they remove + the forward sites or the United States is able to bring the Soviets to + redeploy these sites to the 40 to 60 kilometers area. Ambassador + Rabin added that Israel has + not made public the Soviet escalation or the fact that they had + successfully shot down Soviet piloted MIG–21s, at the request of the + United States and in order not to engage the Soviets’ prestige. He + continued that Israel now needs the four items just mentioned or they + will be required to take action without this equipment. Ambassador + Rabin reported that he had + spoken to the Prime Minister and was informed that Israel would hit the + Egyptians in various forms and at various places in a manner convenient + to Israel.

+

Dr. Kissinger stated that he + would pass this information on to the President. Ambassador Rabin reiterated that Israel would + move with or without U.S. help, emphasizing that the new sites closer to + the Canal could be destroyed with less losses if the United States would + provide the equipment requested. Dr. Kissinger asked if Israel would agree to accept the + ceasefire if we made a commitment to provide the equipment but with + delivery still pending. Ambassador Rabin responded that this would serve no useful purpose + and that what was needed was to prevent a Soviet fait accompli in the + form of an air defense capability at the Canal itself and even beyond. + Ambassador Rabin stated that + Israel has seven divisions, 700 tanks and 1,000 guns just 50 kilometers + from the Canal and that the implications of this new Soviet-Egyptian + aerial capability were unacceptable.

+

Dr. Kissinger stated the U.S. + Government is most concerned that a ceasefire be obtained as soon as + possibleOn the morning of August 6, + Rogers sent a telegram + to the Embassy in Tel Aviv instructing the Ambassador to seek + immediately Israeli views on the precise terms of the cease-fire, + which were included in the telegram, so that the Department could + discuss them with the Soviet Union and the United Arab Republic. + (Telegram 126601 to Tel Aviv, August 6; National Archives, Nixon + Presidential Materials, NSC Files, + Box 655, Country Files, Middle East, Ceasefire Mideast Vol. + I) and asked whether Rabin had informed the Department of State that a + ceasefire is unacceptable in the light of new conditions. Ambassador + Rabin stated that he had + informed Assistant Secretary Sisco of this fact yesterday, August 4. At the same + time, Ambassador Rabin said he + wished to insure that the President and Dr. Kissinger had the Israeli position first hand, which is + that Israel will not accept a ceasefire until they have attacked the new + forward air defense system. Ambassador Rabin emphasized that Israel needed the four equipment + items to assist in this operation.

+

Dr. Kissinger asked Ambassador + Rabin to reiterate in + detail to General Haig the + specifics of the various escalatory Soviet moves after the U.S. launched + its peace initiative. He added that he considers this a personal communication from the Prime + Minister to the President and informed Ambassador Rabin that he would send copies of + the memcon of this discussion to the Departments of State and + Defense.

+

Ambassador Rabin then stated + that Israel had other problems which they hoped the United States would + express its view on. These include a response to Israel’s request for + additional credits and the means of getting the latest model A–4D + aircraft since Defense had not been responsive to his request in this + regard.

+

Dr. Kissinger then reiterated + that he would provide all concerned copies of the memcon of this + conversation. Ambassador Rabin + stated that the Department of State was aware of the content of this + conversation with the exception of the message that he had just gotten + from the Prime Minister with respect to Israeli attacks against Egypt + which would be conducted at a time and place of their own choosing.

+

Dr. Kissinger stated that while + he could not speak formally he was certain such a step at this time + would be considered contrary to the spirit of the U.S. peace + initiative.Later that evening, + Rabin repeated to + Sisco the gist of the + message that he had delivered to Kissinger, as reported in telegram 126614 to Tel + Aviv, August 6. (Ibid.)

+

Attached is a summaryAttached but not + printed. of the Soviet escalatory steps provided by + Ambassador Rabin to General + Haig following his meeting + with Dr. Kissinger.At 10:18 p.m. on August 5, Kissinger telephoned the President + to report that Rabin had + called him three hours after their meeting to withdraw Israel’s + conditions for accepting a cease-fire agreement, while still + reserving Israel’s right to “take out” the Soviet SAM sites in the United Arab Republic + “by direct or indirect means” before signing such an agreement. + Kissinger said that he + believed that Israeli officials were “approaching again a state of + extreme agitation” and added: “I would guess that the Israelis, if + they don’t hit tonight, will strike within the next 48 hours. + Rabin does not talk + idly. I think they have decided to move.” Nixon replied: “I would do that.” + (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Henry Kissinger Telephone + Conversation Transcripts, Box 6, Chronological File) Kissinger then telephoned + Rabin at 11:10 and + said: “May I make a suggestion? If you are planning to do something + I think it would be in everyone’s interests if the President did not + read about it in the newspapers first. If you could give us a few + hours warning.” Rabin + responded: “I would like to make it clear. I don’t know any + specifics.” (Ibid.)

+
+ +
+ 143. Editorial Note +

Late on August 5, 1970, strong disagreement emerged between the United + States and Israel over the operating text of the cease-fire agreement. The Israelis took + exception to the fact that Gunnar + Jarring, in his letter to UN Secretary General U + Thant announcing the acceptance by the parties of the + U.S. initiative, adhered strictly to the original text Secretary of + State William Rogers proposed on + June 19 (see Document 129), ignoring Israel’s + own letter of acceptance provided by Israeli Ambassador Yitzhak Rabin to Rogers on August 4 (see Document 140) and announced by Prime Minister + Golda Meir to the Israeli + Knesset the same day. Although the differences were minor, Rabin’s letter contained statements + not included in the original text, including the need for discussions to + take place “in order to achieve an agreed and binding contractual peace + agreement between the parties,” as well as Israel’s “right to live in + peace within secure and recognized boundaries free from threats or acts + of force.” Meir asked for a + private meeting with Ambassador to Israel Walworth Barbour on the evening of August 5 to discuss + the discrepancies. Following the meeting Barbour sent a report of his conversation with the Prime + Minister to the Department of State:

+

“She noted that language of Israeli reply as presented in Rabin’s letter to Secretary and + repeated in her speech to Knesset had been negotiated with her Cabinet + colleagues with extreme difficulty and that the wording contained + therein which constituted additions to the text of the original US + proposal was extremely important to one or more of the remaining + colleagues in her government. She said categorically that Israeli + endorsement of the original three paragraphs in US statement would + result in further departures from the government, including perhaps that + of herself and that for that reason US statement as such not acceptable. + She had no difficulty with the first paragaph nor the language on the + ceasefire but the additions to the second paragaph describing the + purposes of the contemplated discussions were absolutely essential . . . + My strenuous and I hope forceful argument that this language is all + included in the US initiative ‘in accordance with Resolution 242’ fell + on deaf ears.” (Telegram 4175 from Tel Aviv, August 5; National + Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1155, Saunders Files, Middle East + Negotiations Files, U.S. Peace Initiative For the Middle East Vol. + II)

+

The following day, August 6, when the text of the agreement still had not + been changed to meet Israeli requests, Meir instructed Rabin to deliver the following statement to Assistant + Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs Joseph Sisco:

+

“I have just spoken to the Prime Minister. She has instructed me to say + that she is dismayed over the latest development. She is shocked at the + behaviour of the United States placing before Israel a fait accompli. + The issue of the initiative has been completely overshadowed by the + manner you have acted. The Prime Minister has told me to tell you that + the conduct of the US Government is an insult to Israel—its Government and people. You have taken + upon yourselves to place words in the mouth of the Government of Israel + which we have never agreed to say. This attitude bears the mark of + dictation—not consultation. Your whole approach has the gravest + implications as to the relations between our two governments. Your + conduct seriously questions how we can embark on the process of + negotiation. My government will be meeting either tomorrow evening or + Sunday and I have been called to Jerusalem for urgent consultations. End + Statement.” (Israel State Archive, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, + 6854/8)

+

Sisco replied that he would + report the message to his superiors immediately, but felt that Meir’s characterization of the actions, + intent, and motivations of the U.S. Government was “unjustified.” He + hoped that after the passage of some time “a more considered and a more + balanced judgement in terms of what our actions have been over the weeks + will be reached.” (Ibid.) Still, Meir remained upset over the text of the cease-fire + agreement and telephoned Sisco + at the State Department on the evening of August 6 to discuss the + matter. No record of the conversation has been found. But Rabin, who listened in on the + telephone call in Sisco’s + office, recounted the conversation in his memoirs:

+

“Golda said that the United States had practically forged Israel’s + signature. No more and no less. Sisco was astounded: ‘What do you mean ‘forged’?

+

“‘You notified Jarring that we + had accepted the initiative before we accepted it!’ the prime minister + barked. ‘That’s what I mean by ‘forged.’ I reached an agreement with + Barbour, and the United + States now denies that agreement. You can’t formulate answers on our + behalf. We have our reservations about the text of Jarring’s letter . . .’

+

“Sisco was astonished by Golda’s + complaint: ‘You received the text of our initiative weeks ago. One page, + one paper—that’s the whole initiative. Did you accept it or didn’t + you?’

+

“Golda could not understand his exasperation. ‘What do you mean did we + accept the initiative? Do we have to accept your formulation? We have a + formulation of our own!’” (Rabin, The Rabin Memoirs, pages + 180–181)

+

Rabin described the “tragic” + telephone conversation between Meir and Sisco + as “a dialogue of the deaf.” Sisco, he wrote, “did not understand what the Israeli + formulation was. Golda did not understand why Sisco was getting tough.” Rabin telephoned Meir afer the “abortive conversation,” + at which time she instructed him to seek an immediate meeting with + Henry Kissinger to discuss + redrafting the text of the cease-fire agreement. “I can’t go back to the + cabinet with a formulation unlike the one it adopted,” she told + Rabin. (Ibid.)

+

Acting on his instructions, Rabin and Minister Shlomo + Argov met with Kissinger at the White House at 10 p.m. on August 6. + According to a memorandum of + conversation, Rabin opened by + saying that Prime Minister Meir + had personally asked him to come and see Kissinger and that she was concerned that “we were + approaching one of the most critical moments in United States-Israeli + relations as the result of some misunderstanding and that a serious + problem existed.” Meir believed + that the Israeli response to the U.S. peace initiative was clear in + regard to what was meant by its acceptance. Israel had accepted all of + the basic principles set forth in the text of the report which Jarring was to deliver to the + Secretary-General and provided Kissinger with the text that they wanted forwarded. + Kissinger stated that while + he had not been following all the details closely he was under the + impression from the cables that “all was in order,” and added that “it + was hard to explain why they objected to the Jarring report when there was no + substantive difference.”Kissinger said that “he just did not understand the + differences” and then asked Ambassador Rabin and Minister Argov to sit down with his secretary and dictate the + “specific operational instances” in which the texts differed. + (Memorandum of conversation, August 6; National Archives, Nixon + Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box + 654, Country Files, Middle East, Middle East—Recent Actions Keep File + Intact)

+

While Kissinger waited for the + Israelis to compose their response, he placed a telephone call to Deputy + Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs + Alfred L. Atherton. A + portion of the transcript of their conversation follows:

+

“K: Do you know about this Israeli blow up? . . .

+

“A: It came to a head this afternoon. It came in a phone call from Israel + this afternoon.

+

“K: I have them [Rabin and + Argov] in a separate room. I + have asked them to tell me the difference between the two versions. They + claim that the Jarring message + wasn’t to be surfaced.

+

“A: That’s not plausible. Their reply was understood in the same light as + from Riad and the Jordanians.

+

“K: They said their government will disintegrate if they do.

+

“A: That’s what Meir said.

+

“K: Do I get the President in?

+

“A: We are trying to get up some gimmicks which Jarring and U Thant can use . . .

+

“K: What happens now if the Egyptians accept tomorrow morning and the + Isrealis don’t? . . .

+

“A: If they get wind of the waffling it may blow up.” (Transcript of a + telephone conversation, August 6, 10:30 p.m.; ibid., Henry Kissinger Telephone Conversation + Transcripts, Box 6, Chronological File)

+ +

Kissinger returned to his meeting + with the Israelis, but after 15 minutes of consulting, Rabin and Argov informed Kissinger that they did not want to put the differences + down on paper because it might in some way “bind them.” Rabin stressed that the problem was + with the Cabinet. “The Cabinet has assumed that since there was no + reaction when their substitute text was submitted that it was accepted.” + Argov interjected that if the + Jarring text were made + public tomorrow the Prime Minster would have to stand up in the Knesset + and reject it. “In essence,” Argov said, “the Prime Minister wants to be safeguarded + by her substitute statement.” Kissinger replied that “the best Israel could achieve + would be a statement of its interpretation, but the U.S. would not + accept its interpretation.” Kissinger ended the meeting by saying that “this seemed + to be a lesser case than others they had made in the last couple of days + and lived with.” (Memorandum of conversation, August 6; ibid., Box 654, + Country Files, Middle East, Middle East—Recent Actions Keep File + Intact)

+

Following his meeting with the Israelis, Kissinger called Sisco to discuss the consequences of the disagreement + with the Israelis:

+

“K: What’s going to happen?

+

“S: I don’t know. Give me a couple of hours. I will think of something or + another formula. I want you, the Secy. and the President to know where + we stand. I will try in the morning. But I will be here. Let’s not give + up. It’s too close.

+

“K: What can I tell Rabin?

+

“S: I didn’t want to talk to Golda. They put her on to calling me because + they gave up with her and they thought I could convince her. They went + out of this office with their tails between their legs.

+

“K: I told them—do you want me to talk to the President? They said yes. I + said, I want to know, then, what’s wrong with the statement except that + you don’t like it . . .

+

“S: If the President calls me tomorrow morning and asks me to explain the + problem, I am not sure I can explain it easily. When two bright people + like Joseph Sisco and Henry + [Kissinger] cannot explain + the problem, maybe there’s no problem.

+

“K: We have to convince Golda + Meir.

+

“S: I failed. “ (Transcript of a telephone conversation, August 6, 11:30 + p.m.; ibid., Henry Kissinger + Telephone Conversation Transcripts, Box 6, Chronological File)

+

The next morning, Kissinger + informed Nixon over the + telephone of the previous day’s events, explaining that while the + Egyptians had accepted the cease-fire, the Israeli position had + come"unstuck “ again. He added:"It’s some shell game between Rabin and Sisco with both trying to sneak texts + past each other. It has to do with Jarring’s presentation to the Secretary General. Israel feels that the text we gave + Jarring constricts their + negotiating position. Anyway, both sides were not making their + differences explicit, hoping to sneak versions by each other. “ + (Transcript of a telephone conversation, August 7, 8:35 a.m.; ibid.)

+
+ +
+ 144. Transcript of a Telephone Conversation Between Secretary of State + Rogers and the President’s + Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Henry Kissinger Telephone + Conversation Transcripts, Box 6, Chronological File. No + classification marking. + Washington, August 7, 1970, 12:30 + p.m. +

R: I have had McCloskey go + inDepartment of State Spokesman + Robert J. McCloskey. + Reference is to the Department of State noon press briefing. + and he won’t refer to this.

+

K: We can’t do anything about it now anyway. What the President wants is + to give the announcement here and give the backgrounding to you.

+

R: What is the announcement? I understand “Godspeed” is in there.

+

K: We got the lines from you.

+

R: But if the thing falls through, which it might, and they had the + statement from the President he’d have egg on his face. I am willing to + take some risks, but I’m not sure the President should.

+

K: When should it be done?

+

R: Well, we said 12:00. It’s now 12:30. But if you announce it you are + going to get a million questions that can’t be answered.McCloskey + made the announcement at 1:45 p.m. EST in the name of the Secretary of State: “We have + just been informed by the Governments of the United Arab Republic + and Israel of their acceptance of the United States proposal for a + standstill ceasefire to come into effect at 2200 Greenwich Mean Time + today, Friday, August 7. We welcome this statesmanlike action taken + by the leaders of the governments concerned. We hope this important + decision will advance the prospects for a just and lasting peace in + the Middle East.” (Department of State Bulletin, August 31, 1970, p. 244)

+

K: The UAR hasn’t agreed to it yet.

+

R: We were going to say that there are rules, but we’re not releasing + them now. We may now have ruined the thing.

+ +

K: Not me because you haven’t been talking to me.

+

R: These things are operational and I think I should take the lead. This + meeting last nightReference is to Kissinger’s 10 p.m. meeting on + August 6 with Rabin and + Argov concerning the + cease-fire agreement. See Document + 143. screwed it up so badly . . .

+

K: Don’t be ridiculous.

+

R: I’m not being ridiculous.

+

K: You are being absurd. The thing was totally screwed up and everything + I did was checked with Sisco. He + said Mrs. Meir was about to + resign . . .

+

R: You either have somebody running the operation or you don’t.

+

K: If you have a complaint, talk to the President. I am sick and tired of + this. If he has a message for the President he isn’t going to give it to + you. I was at a dinner last night. I had an urgent call. I came back to + my office. As soon as I came in I called Sisco and Atherton for instructions.

+

R: He didn’t have a message for the President; he wanted to talk with + you. When you have an audience with him they think they have two ways to + play it. I don’t think it’s a good procedure. I am not saying you + shouldn’t be involved . . .

+

K: I don’t want to be involved. I said I noted what he said and they + would hear their answer from Sisco.

+

R: Well, you and I don’t see alike on these things. They need to have the + idea that when we are acting we act pursuant to the President. If they + have a feeling that there are two channels to the President they will + use them differently.

+

K: I didn’t take it to the President. He doesn’t even know about it + yet.

+

R: But they think you did. It would be helpful to me if, when all it is + is carrying out orders, you would not take part in the discussions. When + they have a message that’s different, but when they have a complaint + about something they did with us, you should refer them to me or + Sisco. I don’t think when + you have such a critical matter they should have a feeling that they + have got two ways to play it. They should think when we speak that we + speak for the President.

+

K: There is no separate channel. Every conversation I have had I have + sent you a memcon and I have checked every comment with Sisco and I have been told the fact + that I backed Sisco has + helped.

+

R: Why do you think they go to you?

+

K: To try to end run and get the President to overrule you.

+

R: That’s right.

+

K: But that has never happened.

+ +

R: But why give them the impression that it might.

+

K: I thought they were going to tell me that they had attacked the SAM sites across the Canal.

+

R: I’m not making any headway. I think this is operational—I don’t think + you should see these people. Anyway, let me know what the President + wants. When is RonWhite House Press + Secretary Ronald Ziegler. going to do it?

+

K: When we get word from you that we can.Referring to the disputes between Rogers and Kissinger over Middle East policy, Haldeman wrote that during a “long + talk” about the issue with the President, Nixon said that Kissinger was “too self-concerned + and inclined to overdramatize.” He also said that Kissinger was “overly concerned + about anything that affects Israel,” but that the larger problem was + that neither Rogers nor + Kissinger would “really + admit the other might be right.” (Haldeman Diaries: Multimedia + Edition, July 16, 1970) A month later, Haldeman wrote that Kissinger’s admitted paranoia + about “the State Department’s maneuvering” worried the President. + Nixon commented that it + “creates doubts about K[issinger]’s reliability on other + recommendations, and gets in the way of his doing his work.” He + added that Kissinger was + “basically jealous of any idea not his own, and he just can’t + swallow the apparent early success of the Middle East plan because + it is Rogers’. In fact, he’s + probably actually trying to make it fail for just this reason. Of + all people, he has to keep his mind clean and clear, and instead + he’s obsessed with these weird persecution delusions.” (Ibid., + August 17, 1970)

+
+ +
+ 145. Cease-Fire Agreement Between Israel and the United Arab + RepublicSource: National + Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1157, Saunders Files, Middle East + Negotiations Files, June Initiative (Memos Only), June 9–September + 1, 1970. Secret; Nodis. A notation at the bottom of the page reads: + “Copied from State Telegram 8/21/70.” This copy of the agreement is + attached to a memorandum from Hoskinson to Kissinger, August 21. On August 5, the + Representatives of the Four Powers agreed to send a message to + U Thant stating: “A) + agreement to text of US proposal and subscription to it by UAR, + Jordan and Israel; B) that circumstances are favorable for + resumption of Jarring + Mission and to this end work of Four becomes even more valuable; and + C) SYG should communicate these developments to SC members in a [note].” (Telegram 1603 + from USUN, August 6; ibid., Box + 654, Country Files, Middle East, Middle East—Recent Actions Keep + File Intact) For the Secretary-General’s note to the Security + Council, released on August 7, see footnote + 5, Document 139. On August 7 in Washington, Secretary + Rogers announced the + 90-day cease-fire,which was to take effect at midnight Israeli time + and last until November 5. The texts of his statement and statements + by Thant, Meir, and the UAR Foreign Ministry were published in + the New York Times, August 8, 1970, p. + 2. + Undated. +

A. Israel and the UAR will observe + cease-fire effective at 2200 GMT + Friday, August 7.

+ +

B. Both sides will stop all incursions and all firing, on the ground and + in the air, across the cease-fire line.

+

C. Both sides will refrain from changing the military status quo within + zones extending 50 kilometers to the east and the west of the cease-fire + line. Neither side will introduce or construct any new military + installations in these zones. Activities within the zones will be + limited to the maintenance of existing installations at their present + sites and positions and to the rotation and supply of forces presently + within the zones.

+

D. For purposes of verifying observance of the cease-fire, each side will + rely on its own national means, including reconnaissance aircraft, which + will be free to operate without interference up to 10 kilometers from + cease-fire line on its own side of that line.

+

E. Each side may avail itself as appropriate of all UN machinery in reporting alleged + violations to each other of the cease-fire and of the military + standstill.

+

F. Both sides will abide by the Geneva Convention of 1949 relative to the + treatment of prisoners of war and will accept the assistance of the + ICRC (International Committee of + the Red Cross) in carrying out their obligations under that + Convention.

+
+ +
+ 146. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassies in Turkey, + Greece, and ItalySource: + National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1155, Saunders Files, + Middle East Negotiations Files, June Initiative Vol. II, July + 24–August 8, 1970. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Drafted on August 7 by + Atherton, cleared in + draft in EUR, and approved by + Johnson. Repeated to Cairo, Tel Aviv, Moscow, and + London. + Washington, + August 8, 1970, + 0100Z. +

128496. Deliver Opening of Business Saturday, August 8.

+

FYI—In support of + UAR-Israeli ceasefire and military standstill, which USG has just successfully negotiated, we + have told Israelis we will provide high level aerial reconnaissance by + U–2 aircraft to supplement their surveillance of ceasefire zone west of + Suez Canal to help assure them military standstill being observed.In telegram 128782 to Tel Aviv, August 10, + the Department instructed Barbour to tell Israeli General Aaharon Yariv that the United + States assumed a “common GOI–US + intelligence objective” and wished to “work closely” with Israel on + the U–2 missions, also known as Operation Even-Steven. In support of + this objective, the United States would: 1) provide information on + each flight a minimum of four hours before launching; 2) provide the + times when the flights entered, turned-around in, and exited from + the Sinai; and 3) process photographs “as quickly as possible” and + make them available to a “designated representative” of the Israeli + Embassy in Washington. (Ibid., Box 1156, Saunders Files, Middle East + Negotiations Files, June Initiative Volume III, August 8–27, + 1970) Only a U–2 with oblique cameras can give coverage of entire ceasefire zone + without overflight of UAR. This will be discreet but not repeat not + covert activity.Shortly before the + cease-fire took effect, Rogers sent Bergus a telegram instructing him to tell Mohamed + Riad that they would have to expect that the U–2 flights would + eventually become public knowledge. The Secretary explained that, if + they did, the U.S. Government would make this statement: “The United + States, having taken the lead in proposing a standstill ceasefire + and in working out details of this agreement, feels an obligation to + assist in seeing that the terms of this agreement are fully carried + out. We are from time to time conducting high level reconnaissance + flights to help verify observance of the ceasefire. These flights + are entirely limited to the zone east of the Suez Canal ceasefire + line.” (Telegram 128247 to Cairo, August 7; ibid., Box 655, Country + Files, Middle East, Ceasefire Mideast Vol. I) Even though no + overflight of UAR involved, we have + advised UAR of our intention and we + shall shortly be advising Soviets. UAR + reaction was that they do not much like idea and will QUOTE ignore it + completely UNQUOTE. We take this as minimum Egyptians could say and + relatively positive in circumstances. We are now urgently in process of + arranging logistics of this operation, including specifically question + of where U–2 aircraft will be based. Two U–2s are proceeding to Western + European point tonight. END FYI.

+

1. At level Ambassador or Chargé deems likely to prove most effective, + Embassy should urgently approach host government asking for basing and + refueling facilities or, in event USAF + facility used, agreement for U–2 aircraft to be used for surveillance + from Israeli-controlled territory on east side Suez Canal. You may say + this is part of operation to supplement Israeli means of ensuring + against violations by UAR of ceasefire + and standstill agreement and is known to governments of UAR and Israel. If queried re UAR reaction you may draw on FYI section above. You may also say we + assume Soviets may want to do same for UAR. We view this as constructive + effort in support of current moves toward peace in Middle East, and as + operation with which we would hope other governments would be pleased to + be associated. We will, of course, seek avoid publicity but cannot + guarantee there will be no publicity, in which case we will acknowledge + activity while seeking to protect country providing base facility.

+

2. Since Greek facilities would be of particular use, request Ambassador + Tasca personally explain to GOG importance this project, which is + important adjunct to assuring both sides that neither being placed at + military disadvantage and contributing to atmosphere conducive to + successful negotiations.

+ +

3. We would hope to deploy to base selected not later than Sunday, August + 9.In cooperation with the British + Government, the U–2s were based in Cyprus. The first two flights, + which had not been coordinated with Israel, occurred on August 9 and + 10. General Yariv protested + these “surprises” and asked that future flights be postponed until + the two governments could complete the work necessary to coordinate + the missions. (Telegram 4285 from Tel Aviv, August 11; ibid., Box + 1156, Saunders Files, Middle East Negotiations Files, June + Initiative Vol. III, August 8–27, 1970)

+

4. FOR ANKARA: We would hope to use Incirlik.

+

5. FOR ATHENS: We would hope to use + Thessalonika.

+

6. FOR ROME: We would hope to use Aviano or + Sigonella.

+ + + Rogers + + +
+ +
+ 147. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in + IsraelSource: National + Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 655, Country Files, Middle East, + Ceasefire Mideast Vol. I. Secret; Immediate. Drafted on August 8 by + Atherton, cleared in + draft by Sisco, and approved + by Rogers. + Washington, August 9, 1970, 0157Z. +

128626. Deliver to Ambassador 0700 Sunday.

+

1. Please convey following message from Secretary to Prime Minister + Meir:

+

2. QUOTE I have been informed by Assistant Secretary Sisco of your telephone conversation + with him August 6 and of the feelings you expressed in the message + conveyed by Ambassador Rabin + the evening of August 7.See Document 143.

+

3. It is a matter of deep regret to me that any difficulty has arisen + between us since over the weeks and months we have been working so + closely together as good friends should. All of our efforts have been + devoted to the task of bringing about a secure ceasefire which we hope + will stop the needless bloodshed and of getting negotiations started + between you and your neighbors. We have pursued this difficult course in + the conviction that it offers the only hope of moving toward that secure + peace which is your highest aspiration as it is ours.

+ +

4. We shall remain firm in support of the principles we share. We are + determined to continue to move forward in a spirit of cooperation and + friendship to our common goal of a just and lasting peace. I want to + assure you, Madame Prime Minister, of my full respect and support. + UNQUOTE

+ + + Rogers + + +
+ +
+ 148. National Security Study Memorandum 98Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential + Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box + H–173, National Security Study Memoranda. Secret; Nodis. A copy was + sent to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. + Washington, August + 10, 1970. + + TO + The Secretary of State + The Secretary of Defense + The Director of Central Intelligence + + + SUBJECT + Further Review of Israeli Arms Requests + +

As a follow-on to the procedures for initial review of Israeli requests + for military equipment established by the Secretary of Defense, the + President has requested that a study be prepared quickly outlining the + principal Israeli strategies that could be supported against the Soviet + and Egyptian missile defense complex west of the Suez Canal, their + technical feasibility and their relation to political courses of + action.

+

This study should include a range of options such as the following:

+

—a major effort to destroy the defense installations west of the + Canal;

+

—a strategy for suppressing the effectiveness of the missile defense + system and freeing the airspace for attack on front-line positions;

+

—a strategy for using means other than air attack for suppressing + artillery fire and disrupting any effort to mass for attack on the west + bank;

+

—a program for erecting an Israeli air-defense system on the east side of + the Canal.

+ +

Each of the strategies outlined should be related to a specific list of + equipment required.

+

For the sake of comparison, a list of all current Israeli requests should + be provided with a rationale for those major items not included in one + of the packages.

+

Because of the close relationship between the provision of arms and U.S. + diplomatic strategy the NSC + Interdepartmental Group for Near East is charged with the preparation of + this study and with the formulation of policy options in responding to + Israeli requests. This and any following similar studies will + incorporate the technical conclusions of the task force established by + the Secretary of Defense.An analytical + summary of the study is Document 152.

+

This study should be forwarded for consideration in the NSC through the NSC Special Review Group no later than the opening of + business August 17.The Ad Hoc Special + Review Group meeting was held on August 19; see Document 153.

+ + + Henry A. Kissinger + + +
+ +
+ 149. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassies in Israel, + Egypt, and Jordan and the Mission to the United NationsSource: National Archives, Nixon + Presidential Materials, NSC Files, + Box 655, Country Files, Middle East, Ceasefire Mideast Vol. I. + Secret; Priority. Drafted on August 10 by Sisco; cleared by Atherton, Stackhouse, and Sterner; and approved by Sisco. Repeated to London, Paris, + and Moscow. + Washington, August 11, 1970, 0033Z. +

129334. 1. We realize Israelis do not appear to be in any mood at moment + to begin to discuss with us what their plans are once Jarring begins process of discussions + on substance.According to Barbour, Dayan notified him on the morning + of August 10 that Israel believed that the United Arab Republic had + violated the conditions of the cease-fire by moving military + equipment forward in the standstill zone as the cease-fire was going + into effect. (Telegram 4259 from Tel Aviv, August 10; ibid., Box + 1157, Saunders Files, Middle East Negotiations Files, June + Initiative (Memos Only), June 9–September 1, 1970) On the + other hand, it is important that after they have had a few days to cool + off, there be full consultations between us regarding upcoming + discussions between parties under Jarring’s auspices.

+ +

2. Our principal short-range objective is to try to encourage the two key + countries in the area—Israel and the UAR—to engage in serious + negotiations while they maintain the ceasefire. In our judgment, this + means that each must be encouraged to make sufficiently forthcoming + substantive proposals at outset so that a genuine negotiating engagement + takes place. From then on in, our objective should be to make it as + impossible as possible for the parties to disengage from negotiations. + All have some vested interest to make talks succeed.

+

3. We are struck with the fact that the QUOTE stop shooting and start + talking UNQUOTE proposal has had a wide measure of support among the + peoples of the area, both in Israel and the Arab world. This seems to + suggest that people may well be ahead of governments with respect to + their desire for a peaceful settlement. While we may still remain + skeptical in view of past disappointments with Nasser, we nevertheless feel that the + UAR has been forthcoming both on + question of ceasefire and talks over the past weeks and this attitude + must be tested in a serious way in concrete discussions under Jarring’s auspices. Insofar as Israel + is concerned, the grudging manner in which they have come along with our + proposal, and the Prime Minister’s continuing propensity for looking + backward rather than forward, is creating some doubt on whether, if + Jarring is able to engage + the parties in a serious negotiation, the present Israeli Government is + willing to face up to the hard and necessary decisions to achieve a + sensible and reasonable compromise. We say this in full appreciation + that GOI has had to take some painful + decisions and survive a governmental crisis in order to respond + positively to US initiative.Following + Israel’s acceptance of the U.S. peace initiative on August 4, Prime + Minister Meir’s Government of + National Unity broke up when six members of the Gahal faction, a + coalition group led by Menachem + Begin, withdrew in protest of the Cabinet’s decision + to participate in the cease-fire with the UAR and Jordan. (New York Times, + August 4, 1970, p. 9)

+

4. We realize it will be very difficult to convince Cairo and Jerusalem + of the need to begin thinking in terms of a settlement on a basis less + than their maximum positions. Over this next week, Jarring will sort out the problem of + time, place, and level of discussions. We will continue to press him to + take greater initiative in the discussions than he has in the past. + However, both Cairo and Jerusalem must be encouraged to put forward + concrete substantive proposals on which actual discussions can begin. + For example, if Israel were willing to put forth a proposal in + negotiations along the lines of the March 1969 US working paper,See Document + 17. this could be a good starting point. As for Cairo, + we realize their main thrust will be to get Jarring to draw up a QUOTE timetable for withdrawal + UNQUOTE. This might be feasible at later stage of discussions, but likely to abort Jarring’s efforts in early days if + UAR insists. Moreover, we hope that + we are over hurdle of UAR emphasis on + QUOTE acceptance of Security Council Resolution UNQUOTE which became the + standard answer in the early 1968 round between them when Israel began + to ask the other side some specific substantive questions. UAR should be encouraged to put forward + initially a fuller, concrete proposal with principles stated in US + proposal as main core.

+

5. Above are tentative thoughts on which Department would appreciate + prompt reaction of Tel Aviv, Cairo, Amman, and USUN. Pending receipt your reactions, no actions should be + taken.

+ + + Rogers + + +
+ +
+ 150. Minutes of an Ad Hoc Special Review Group MeetingSource: National Archives, Nixon + Presidential Materials, NSC Files, + NSC Institutional Files + (H-Files), Box H–111, Senior Review Group, SRG Minutes Originals 1970. Secret; Nodis. All brackets + are in the original except those indicating text omitted by the + editors. The meeting was held in the White House Situation + Room. + Washington, August 12, 1970, + 11:35 a.m.–12:25 p.m. + + SUBJECT + Middle East + + + PARTICIPATION + Chairman—Henry A. + Kissinger + + State + + + U. Alexis Johnson + + + Joseph J. Sisco + + + Alfred L. Atherton, Jr. + + + Defense + + + David Packard + + + Robert J.Pranger + + + + CIA + + + + Richard Helms + + David H. Blee + + JCS + + Adm. Thomas H. + Moorer + LTG Richard T. + Knowles + + NSC Staff + + + Harold H. Saunders + + + Jeanne W. Davis + + +

SUMMARY OF DECISIONS

+

It was decided:

+

1. to proceed with delivery of the weapons promised Israel before the + ceasefire as quickly as possible;

+ +

2. to undertake a study of the objectives of the equipment Israel is + requesting and what we are prepared to support;The Department of Defense study, “Options for U.S. + Arms Assistance to Israel,” in response to NSSM 98, is ibid., Box H–173, National Security Study + Memoranda. NSSM 98 is printed as + Document 148.

+

3. to consider any new Israeli requests in the framework of these + objectives, subjecting them to technical evaluation by Defense, + integrating the political factors in the IG and resolving any + differences in the Special Review Group, if necessary;

+

4. to investigate the possibility of linking military assistance for + Cambodia, and possibly Korea, with Israel in presentation to the + Congress;

+

5. State to prepare a rough scenario for the Jarring negotiations,The + options paper, “Next Steps on the Middle East,” is in the National + Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC + Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–047, Senior Review Group + Meetings, Senior Review Group—Middle East 8/12/70. if + possible before the President leaves for San Clemente;

+

6. to meet next weekSee Document 153. to consider the financial issues and + the question of the strategy we should be prepared to support for the + Israelis.

+

[Omitted here are the minutes of the meeting.]

+
+ +
+ 151. Memorandum of ConversationSource: National Archives, Nixon Presidential + Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger + Office Files, Box 134, Country Files, Middle East, Rabin-Kissinger. Top Secret; Sensitive; + Eyes Only. The conversation was held in the Map Room of the White + House. Rabin described his + August 17 meeting with President Nixon in The Rabin Memoirs, pp. + 184–185. + Washington, August 17, 1970, 9:05 + a.m. + + PARTICIPANTS + The President + Ambassador Rabin + (Israel) + General Alexander M. + Haig + +

After Ambassador Rabin and + General Haig were situated in + the Map Room, the President entered. Ambassador Rabin opened the meeting by stating + that he had been asked by Prime Minister Golda Meir to + convey a message to President Nixon in lieu of an immediate visit from her.In his memoirs, Rabin wrote that after Israeli intelligence + discovered Egyptian violations of the cease-fire agreement during + the second week of August, he asked Kissinger to arrange for a meeting between Meir and Nixon “for an overall discussion + of the post-ceasefire situation, but he put me off by claiming that + the time was “not ripe’ for such a meeting. A few days later, when I + pressed him again, he proposed that I meet with the President. I + felt uneasy about the idea, for I could not be regarded as a proxy + for the prime minister and I had grounds to assume that such a + substitution would thoroughly irritate Golda.” (Ibid., p. + 184) + Rabin continued by remarking + that Israel had only accepted the United States peace offer,See Document 140. + after having originally rejected it, because of the President’s personal + letter to Prime Minister Golda + Meir.See Document 136. He stated that Israel has expressed + a willingness to negotiate only because of this letter and did so with + the gravest doubt as to the wisdom of this course of action because of + both the military and the political risks involved for Israel.

+

Rabin stated that in Israel’s + view the key problem was the Soviet threat and that they had no + illusions with respect to Soviet motives. He added that in the case of + the Soviet Union Israel was convinced that Soviet acceptance of the US + proposalSee Document 137. was predicated not on the proposal + itself but rather on the strong threat made by President Nixon during his television interview + on the West Coast in early July.See footnote 3, Document 134.

+

Rabin then stated that since + accepting the US peace initiative Israel’s confidence had been badly + shaken by two events. The first was the political misunderstanding + involving the Jarring Report’s + submission to the United NationsSee Document 143. and the second was the + violation of the ceasefireby the Soviet Union and Egypt which, according + to Rabin, was confirmed by + positive evidence in the hands of the Israeli Government.Rabin told + Kissinger during an + August 15 meeting at the White House that “on the nights of 29 and + 30 July the Soviets and Egyptians had moved forward massively with + their ground-to-air missiles, and during the first half of August, + they had continued this movement from their earlier position of + 40–60 kilometers from the Canal.” He added that on the night of + August 7 and 8, there was additional movement of missiles toward the + Suez Canal. “Israel had both ComInt and photos,” he said. “The + Soviets and Egyptians deployed 14 sites forward.” (Memorandum of + conversation, August 15; National Archives, Nixon Presidential + Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger + Office Files, Box 134, Country Files, Middle East, Rabin-Kissinger) In an August 15 + memorandum to Rogers, + Sisco reported that U.S. + intelligence “clearly showed there was a buildup of SAM installations in an area 15 to 35 + kilometers west of the ceasefire line between the end of July and + August 10. The Israelis say this began in the hours before the + ceasefire went into effect (midnight August 7 Israeli time) and + continued at least through the next day. If the Israeli contention + as to timing is correct, this missile deployment would constitute a + violation of the standstill provision of the Israeli-UAR ceasefire + agreement.” Sisco added that + “because we lack a data base of our own for August 7, our evidence + on the question of timing (but not on the buildup itself) is and + will remain inconclusive. When evidence the Israelis have provided + us is taken into account, there is a reasonable presumption that a + violation occurred.” (Ibid., RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 27–14 + ARAB–ISR) See also footnote 2, Document + 149. + Rabin continued by asserting + that this ceasefire violation had fundamentally altered the military balance in the + Middle East because sufficient air-to-ground missiles had been moved + forward to permit the Soviets and the Egyptians to exact a severe toll + on Israeli aircraft which were conducting suppressive missions against + Egyptian artillery spread across the entire breadth of the Canal. + Rabin further stated that + there were some 1,000 artillery pieces backed up by seven Egyptian + divisions which could now be employed with the full cognizance that + ground-to-air defenses would render Israeli counter action + prohibitive.

+

Rabin then commented that Mrs. + Meir and the entire Israeli + Government were very unsettled by United States unwillingness to accept + the evidence offered by Israel establishing the fact that a ceasefire + violation had occurred. He also remarked that public statements + countering the Israeli assessment added further to the difficulties.

+

Ambassador Rabin continued by + asserting that the simple fact now existed that the military balance has + been substantially altered by the Soviet action in moving missile + defenses forward along the Canal. He stated that Israel was very + conscious of the Soviet action and had anticipated that it would occur. + Soviet objectives were obvious from the outset since they had started + creeping forward before the ceasefire was to take effect. Initially, + they established defenses along the rear areas of Egypt. The Soviets + then moved forward to the 50 kilometer line. Then, once the US peace + initiativewas announced and even for thetwo-day period after the + ceasefire, the Soviets proceeded to move the missiles forward to within + 10 to 15 kilometers from the Canal. Today 10 to 14 new sites existed + along the Canal itself. Rabin + insisted that they had proof positive of this infraction. Israel had + flown missions against these sites and reconnaissance missions every day + for 72 consecutive days and was in no doubt that an infraction had + occurred. He added that they also had communications and electronic + intelligence which confirmed the movement of missile battalions after + the ceasefire from Cairo itself.

+

Rabin continued by commenting + that whether one accepts that the movement was made before or after the + formal ceasefire, the intent of the Soviet Union was obvious and that + this, after all, was the only important fact. He stated that since the + military balance had been changed it was now a matter of how long it + would be before the Egyptians violated the ceasefire and how, therefore, + Israel would be able to counter the new threat. He added that Israel had + been prepared and willing to strike the forward missile complexes but when they had attempted to do + so, they found that the attrition on the attacking aircraft was very + high. It was therefore necessary for them to acquire some additional + technical means, electronic countermeasures and standoff shrike missiles + as well as CBU ordnance. Ambassador + Rabin also added that + having requested this from the United States, they had yet to receive + the assistance they had hoped for.

+

Rabin stated that he was + scheduled to meet with Defense officials today to ascertain whether or + not this equipment, especially the shrike missile, would be available. + President Nixon stated that he + had approved the delivery of shrike missiles some three weeks earlier + and asked General Haig the + reason for the delay. Ambassador Rabin interjected that the delays resulted from some + technical misunderstandings. General Haig agreed that this was correct and commented that + there was some question initially as to whether or not the shrike + missile could be delivered from the aircraft available to the Israelis. + The President instructed General Haig to insure that this matter was resolved + promptly.

+

President Nixon then stated that + Israel must understand that he too understood the Soviet motives, + perhaps better than Israel itself; we had launched our initiative with + no preconceived notions as to Soviet goodwill. On the other hand, he + commented, it was important that the initiative proceed and that a + conscious and overt effort be made by the United States at this time to + achieve peace in the Middle East. The President then remarked that + Rabin must be conscious of + the problem and the attitude existing in the United States at this time. + This was an attitude which affected not only the situation in the Middle + East but the conduct of US affairs in Southeast Asia, Cambodia and South + Vietnam. President Nixon told + Rabin that he must be + conscious of the difficulties caused by certain of our congressional + leaders such as Senator Fulbright, Senator McGovern and Senator Hatfield.Senator George S. McGovern (D–SD) and Senator + Mark O. Hatfield (R–OR).

+

The President continued by stating that the American people and indeed + the world at large were very much impressed by the progress made thus + far within the US peace initiative. The world was especially pleased + that both sides had agreed to a ceasefire. Thus, it was important that + we continue on with the negotiations. It was also important, the + President added, that no one attribute to Israel the fault for a + fracturing of the ceasefire. If the US peace initiative were to fail, + everyone should recognize who was at fault. Certainly he, the President, + hoped that it would be the other side and not Israel who must share the + blame.

+ +

The President then stated that he agreed fully with Ambassador Rabin’s assessment that the Soviet + Union was indeed the main cause of Middle East tensions and that if the + Soviet Union were removed from the situation Israel would certainly be + able to handle matters without difficulty. Ambassador Rabin reaffirmed that this was the + case. President Nixon commented + that he would not discuss this with even his closest advisors but that + he wanted it understood that he would raise the issue of Soviet + involvement through special channels. It was obvious to all that the + Soviet Union had problems of its own. Therefore, if there were to be a + Summit, as some have surmised, the departure of the Soviets from the + Middle East certainly would be the first item on the agenda of such a + meeting.

+

President Nixon then stated that + he would, of course, be willing and delighted to receive Prime Minister + Golda Meir but he did not + feel that now was the time for such a visit. A visit at this time would + be misunderstood since the peace effort had just gotten underway. He + hoped that the Prime Minister would recognize this fact and be willing + to come at a later date,Meir met with Nixon at the White House on + September 18. See Document 162. + perhaps in connection with the anniversary of the United Nations.

+

President Nixon also stated that + these were most difficult times for Israel and that it would be + necessary for Israel to demonstrate a maximum degree of self-restraint. + Certainly this was expected not only by the American people and the + Jewish community in America but by world public opinion as well. Before + we could anticipate acceptance of a violation of the ceasefire by Israel + or the rectification of whatever violations might have occurred thus + far, it was essential that public opinion be prepared for such a + problem.

+

Finally, the President noted that we have now taken steps to assure that + future violations are picked up without any equivocation and asked + Ambassador Rabin to furnish to + General Haig any intelligence + which Israel may develop that is not held by us and to raise any + additional question about military matters that may be disturbing the + Government of Israel. The President concluded the meeting by asking + Ambassador Rabin to keep + General Haig and Dr. Kissinger informed of any changes in + the military situation.

+
+ +
+ + 152. Paper Prepared by the National Security Council StaffSource: National Archives, Nixon + Presidential Materials, NSC Files, + NSC Institutional Files + (H-Files), Box H–047, Senior Review Group Meetings, Senior Review + Group—Military Assistance to Israel—Chile (97) 8/19/70. Secret; + Nodis. The paper prepared by the NSC Interdepartmental Group for the Near East, “U.S. + Arms Assistance to Israel: Military and Diplomatic Options,” + undated, which is summarized here, is attached. A cover memorandum + by Saunders is attached but + not printed. All brackets are in the original. + Washington, August + 18, 1970. +

ANALYTICAL SUMMARY

+

U.S. ARMS ASSISTANCE TO ISRAEL

+

Military and Diplomatic Options

+

I. What the Paper + Represents

+

The paper at the next tab [“IG Paper”] was written in the following + way:

+

—A Defense Department task force, which has been working with the Israeli + weapons problem for the past seven weeks, identified a series of Israeli + strategy options for defending the Suez cease-fire line.

+

—At Assistant Secretary Sisco’s + request, Hal Saunders put these + options in policy context in the cover memo at the next tab. This memo + (1) states the pros and cons of each military option, (2) identifies the + next steps in a military assistance scenario from now to November and + (3) makes a preliminary effort to relate those steps to the next steps + in the diplomatic scenario.

+

—Defense and State both made refinements and the full Defense studySee footnote 2, + Document 150. is attached to the policy paper.

+

—Sisco’s Interdepartmental Group + endorsed the paper Monday.August + 17.

+

II. A Preview of the + Decisions Required

+

It would be desirable to reach conclusions on a general + framework within which our military assistance relationship with + Israel can proceed. These conclusions can be reported to the + President for decision after the meeting since major dissent does not + seem likely. Three major points should be + addressed:

+

A. What range of Israeli military strategies for + defending the Suez cease-fire line is the U.S. prepared to support + if the cease-fire breaks down?

+

The options are ranged in the next section of this summary with a view to + setting aside those which seem infeasible or undesirable. This process of elimination leaves a + range of options which could be discussed with + the Israelis if we wish for political reasons to invite them into + consultations on strategy. They should be + discussed if any precise strategy is to be chosen because there are + questions which only the Israelis can answer.

+

B. Shall we invite Israeli military planners to consult + with us on a sensible equipment package within the range of + strategies the U.S. is prepared to support?

+

The basic answer is really stated above—YES. The issue is what limits to + place. Defense is wary of anything that smacks of formal joint planning + but would go along with some fairly detailed talks with Israeli military + officials on the reasoning behind the various options we have + identified. Sisco wants such + detailed talks as a means of bringing the Israelis to face the financial + and military realities of their present situation as well as to provide + the general assurance of cooperation the Israelis need. A decision is + required on the limits to be imposed on these talks.

+

C. How should this invitation be timed to relate to the + diplomatic scenario?

+

This is least clear because it is still uncertain how the diplomatic + scenario will play itself out. The invitation to discuss strategies + should be issued fairly soon so it is important to identify what we + should seek in connection with it since this is the main “carrot” we + will have to offer in the next few weeks.

+

III. The Military + Options

+

For the sake of simplifying, the options are grouped below to facilitate + the process of narrowing and focusing. For the same reason, they are + dealt with here in reverse order.

+

—The options are described fully in the attached + paper at pp. II:3–7. A small tab marked “Options” identifies these + pages.

+

—An equipment package for each option is in the + annex paper at a small tab marked “Packages.” You do not need to get + into the packages, but you may wish to take a quick look to see what is + involved.

+

—A full statement of pros and cons appears in + Section III of the IG paper at the next tab; it is marked with a tab, + “Pros and Cons.”

+

A. Options Most Quickly Set Aside

+

Alternative 6: Prepare for full-scale U.S. + intervention. This option is included by Defense “only to show + that beyond a certain point in the Israeli capabilities described below + U.S. involvement is probably the next step.”

+ +

Alternative 5: Provide a surge capability for + pre-emptive strikes against deep Egyptian targets as a possible + prelude to ground invasion. The Israeli need to administer a + serious blow is recognized, and some would make the argument that the + U.S. has an interest in showing the USSR’s vulnerability. But no + one-time Israeli strike seems likely to be decisive in the longer + perspective if the USSR is committed + to get Egyptian territory back, and the risk of Soviet retaliation would + be serious.

+

Alternative 4–B: Provide continuous forward + SAM-attrition capability. This was the Israeli strategy before + the cease-fire of seeking capability to attack the + missile sites themselves. It is the judgment of the Pentagon + task force that this is militarily infeasible for these reasons:

+

—The Soviet-UAR missile defense is denser, more sophisticated and better + manned than anything the USAF flew + against in North Vietnam, and the USAF + adopted a strategy of not attacking the sites but of trying to suppress + them while attacking other targets.

+

—The Soviet capacity to replace sites is probably greater than Israeli + capacity to destroy them.

+

—Israel probably cannot afford this strategy. Pentagon gaming suggests + this strategy would cost Israel $100 million a month. That would include + losses of 12 Phantoms and 16 Skyhawks a month.

+

NOTE: There is very little feeling in the Pentagon + that this is even a feasible strategy for Israel to consider. However, + the following question should be asked: Is this + strategy infeasible only because the U.S. is not prepared to supply + its most advanced munitions for stand-off pinpoint bombing? + [There are a few weapons specialists who feel that this strategy might + become feasible if the U.S. were prepared to give Israel such things as + laser bombs. The argument for using this technology would be to + demonstrate U.S. superiority.]

+

B. Options to be Most Seriously Argued

+

The strategies outlined below are not necessarily mutually exclusive, and + the answer may be some combination of them. However, there does seem to + be a special choice between 3–B and some combination of the rest. The + question is whether the Israelis need the capability to attack Egyptian + artillery sites badly enough to warrant the cost.

+

Alternative 3–B: Provide continuous gun-attrition + capability. This would—by heavy jamming—permit continuous + Israeli attacks on front-line artillery positions in a 5–10 mile zone + west of the Canal. The main argument for this approach is that the + Israelis have maintained they could not sustain the losses from Egyptian + artillery barrages. This is why they began their steady air raids in + July 1969. However, the Pentagon estimates this strategy might cost the + Israelis $70 million a month in munitions and lost aircraft alone. + Moreover, some in the Pentagon feel that Israel could hold its position on the Suez cease-fire line + with a much less costly strategy (see Alternatives 1 and 2 below).

+

Alternatives 3–A and 4–A: Provide a one-time surge + capability to silence guns (3–A) and forward SAM sites (4–A) on the west bank to + defeat a canal-crossing build-up. These two alternatives differ + more in numbers than in types of equipment. The equipment involved would + cost just under $15 million. These strategies by themselves would + probably not be sufficient because they do not provide means for coping + with day-to-day Egyptian firing across the Canal.

+

Alternatives 1 and 2: Provide additional equipment for + better air defense and for defeating an armored invasion into the + Sinai (2) and equipment for infiltration control (1). This + package would include more armor and anti-aircraft weapons to a one-time + total of about $95 million for the heavy equipment and another $15 + million for intelligence and anti-infiltration equipment. Some of the + tanks are already being provided.

+

NOTE: The question to be + asked about this alternative is whether the Israelis could stay + on the Canal without some capacity to bomb steadily across the Canal. + Some Pentagon answers are that the Israelis could further reduce the + number of men on the Canal and rely on sensors to identify raiding + parties. A mobile force could then be moved rapidly to meet any such + group. Others in the Pentagon, however, feel that some Israeli capacity + to bomb Egyptian gun positions across the Canal (Alternative 3–B above) + would remain necessary.

+

C. Issues in Devising a Combination of + Strategies

+

1. Minimum. If deep raids and continuous attacks + on the SAM’s are ruled out, Alternatives 1, 2 and 3–A—4–A would seem to + be a minimum. This would give the Israelis the capability to defend the + Sinai with insurance in a one-strike capability to defeat a build-up on + the west bank for a canal-crossing. This could all be done for about + $125 million.

+

2. The issue is whether Alternative 3–B—the + ability to bomb the gun positions continuously is necessary. This is + where costs mount—to $70 million a month in expendable items alone. The + decision depends on:

+

—Whether the Israelis feel they can give up cross-Canal bombing and

+

—Whether it is in the U.S. interest to let the USSR establish the fact that its defense of the UAR is invulnerable.

+

IV. The Central + Political-Military Issue

+

One of the central conclusions of the Pentagon study is that the military + situation across the Canal may finally have reached one of near + balance—or stand-off. The Egyptians still are unable to cross the Canal + without direct Soviet involvement. The Israelis are unable to fly across + the Canal steadily without + incurring expensive losses which only the U.S. can replace or to cross + the Canal in force without risking Soviet retaliation.

+

In some ways the situation has become more unstable because the Israelis + in increasing desperation may launch a ground attack against the Soviet + system.

+

In other ways, by strengthening Israel’s defensive position it is + possible to demonstrate to the USSR + that only its own direct involvement in a cross-canal attack will make + such a crossing possible. In other words, a stable, long-term stand-off + might still be possible if the Israelis could see their way clear to + adopt it.

+

+ The central military issue, therefore, is whether the + Israelis could and would be willing to adopt a strategy that would + not require them to cross the Canal on a regular basis. +

+

Ideally, the U.S. could have reason for wanting to see the continuing + ineffectiveness of the Soviet SAM + system demonstrated. However, a cost of $70 million monthly and up, may + outweigh any advantage.

+

However, only the Israelis can factor out the relative costs and + advantages in this choice. That is why consultation is necessary to + determine whether Alternative 3–B should be added to Alternatives 1, 2 + and 3–A—4–A.

+

V. Should We Consult With + Israel?

+

For the reason described in the last section—we do not know all the + factors involved in Israel’s selection of strategy—and for the sake of + giving Israel the reassurance of continuing consultation, consultation + on these strategy choices seems necessary:

+

—first, to establish with Israel that attacking the SAM sites (Alternative 4–B) is too + costly;

+

—second, to develop a combination of the remaining lesser options.

+

The main issue is to determine a format that would + avoid the over-commitment of formal joint planning and yet provide the + framework for necessary consultation. Defense should be asked for a + scenario.

+

VI. Diplomatic Scenario

+

Assistant Secretary Sisco should + be asked to discuss this in greater detail. However, in very general + terms, it seems helpful to consider the military assistance and + diplomatic scenarios in three phases:

+ +

A. Phase I—between now and late September when the foreign ministers + gather in New York.At the 25th session of + the UN General Assembly, which + convened on September 15.

+

1. The main military move would be to offer full + consultations on strategy.

+

2. The main diplomatic move would be to persuade + the Israelis to advance negotiable positions in the early stages of the + Jarring talks.

+

B. Phase II—mid-September to November 5 when the + cease-fire expires.

+

1. The main military move would be U.S. approval + for some combination of Israeli strategies for defending the Suez + cease-fire line if the cease-fire breaks down or expires. The first + deliveries of earmarked aircraft are also due in this period.

+

2. The main diplomatic move is difficult to + foresee. However, while we might try to avoid a major crunch with Israel + over withdrawal in this period, we will have to produce enough Israeli + movement to persuade the Arabs that it is worthwhile renewing the + cease-fire.

+

C. Phase III—after November 5.

+

1. The main military move would be approval of (a) + some $500 million in financial assistance and (b) a package that might + make Israeli withdrawal possible. [This should be the subject of the + next phase of in-house planning.]

+

2. The main diplomatic move—should we be so lucky—would be an effort to + gain Israeli acceptance of the final peace agreement.

+
+ +
+ + 153. Minutes of an Ad Hoc Special Review Group MeetingSource: National Archives, Nixon + Presidential Materials, NSC Files, + NSC Institutional Files + (H-Files), Box H–111, Senior Review Group, SRG Minutes Originals 1970. Secret; Nodis. All brackets + are in the original except those indicating text omitted by the + editors or that remains classified. The meeting was held in the + White House Situation Room. + Washington, August 19, 1970, + 4:10–5 p.m. + + SUBJECT + U.S. Military Assistance to Israel + + + PARTICIPANTS + Chairman—Henry A. + Kissinger + + State + + + Joseph J. Sisco + + Mr. Alfred L. + Atherton + + Defense + + + David Packard + + Brig. Gen. John W. Baer + + + CIA + + + + Richard Helms + + [name not declassified] + + JCS + + Adm. Thomas H. + Moorer + R. Adm. W.R. St. + George + + NSC Staff + + + Harold H. Saunders + + + Richard T. Kennedy + + + Jeanne W. Davis + + +

SUMMARY OF DECISIONS

+

1. Defense will put together a package to support a strategy which would + contain hostilities at the Canal (i.e., what Israel would need to + discourage Egyptian crossing of the Canal), with the costs + involved.Laird sent the study on the equipment package, + “Further Response to N.S.S.M. 98,” to Kissinger on August 29, writing in the covering + memorandum: “I recommend that N.S.S.M. 98 should be considered as a + standby U.S. EYES ONLY document for use in case the cease-fire + breaks down. As an alternative, I would recommend that any military + discussions with the Israelis be directed toward their defense + requirements following signature of a peace treaty and that in such + discussions we be as forthcoming as possible. With this in mind, I + have directed DOD planners, as a + matter of urgency, to consider equipment packages which might be + appropriate for Israel under the terms of a peace treaty calling for + withdrawal to roughly the pre-1967 boundaries.” (Ibid., NSC Files, Box 607, Country Files, + Middle East, Israel, Vol. VI)

+

2. We will meet informally with Israeli military officials to discuss + strategy;See Document 163. this is not to be considered as + “joint planning.”

+

3. State will prepare an analysis of what we could offer Israel in + exchange for their agreement to return to mutually-accepted + borders.The paper, “U.S. Arms + Assistance to Israel: Military and Diplomatic Options,” undated, is + in the National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–047, Senior + Review Group Meetings, Senior Review Group—Middle East + 8/12/70.

+

[Omitted here are the minutes of the meeting.]

+
+ +
+ + 154. Telegram From the Department of State to the Interests Section in + the United Arab Republic, the Embassy in Israel, and the White + HouseSource: National + Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1156, Saunders Files, Middle East + Negotiations Files, June Initiative Vol. III, August 8–27, 1970. + Secret; Priority; Nodis. Drafted by Sterner on August 24 and approved by Atherton. Repeated to Amman, + London, Moscow, Paris, and USUN. + Washington, August 25, 1970, 0058Z. +

138163. White House please pass San Clemente for Assistant Secretary + Sisco. Ref: Cairo 1911.In telegram 1911 from Cairo, August 24, the + Section reported Bergus’s + conversation with Foreign Minister Mahmoud Riad regarding U.S. accusations that the + United Arab Republic violated the cease-fire agreement with Israel. + (Ibid.) On August 19, the Department of State had released this + statement on the issue: “We have concluded that there was some + forward deployment of surface-to-air missiles into and within the + zone west of the Suez Canal around the time the ceasefire went into + effect; there is some evidence that this continued beyond the + ceasefire deadline, although our evidence of this is not conclusive. + With respect to additional information which the Israeli Government + has brought to our attention concerning possible violations of the + ceasefire, we will examine it and be in touch with Israel through + diplomatic channels. We do not now anticipate making further public + statements on this matter.” (Department of State Bulletin, September 7, 1970, p. 278)

+

1. FOR CAIRO. You should seek appointment as soon + as possible with Foreign Minister or if he is not available Muhammad + Riad to say that we have studied FonMin’s presentation to you and in reply we wish convey + following.

+

2. USG cannot agree with interpretation + that ceasefire/standstill agreementDocument + 145. permits relocation of missile batteries from one + location to another within ceasefire zone. This is explicitly precluded + by para C of agreement which stipulates inter alia: “Activities within + the zones will be limited to the maintenance of existing installations + at their present sites and positions and to + the rotation and supply of forces presently within the zones.” In light + of language just preceding it, word “rotation” cannot be taken to mean + relocation of missile batteries from one site to another. Beyond this + explicit language, it appears to us self-evident that movement of + missile sites from one position to another is inconsistent with concept + of military status quo. Unless there were some military advantage to be + gained, why would UAR want to move + missile batteries? Any forward movement within zone obviously confers + military advantage, but even lateral movement, possibly from site to + another more advantageous, could also be held to do so. USG must insist that paragraph C + explicitly does not permit relocation of missile batteries within zone + and that continued relocations by GUAR + will place whole ceasefire/standstill agreement in grave jeopardy.

+ +

3. “Rotation and supply of forces” in paragraph C of agreement clearly + refers to rotation and supply within levels and types existing at time + of ceasefire and cannot be construed to permit improvement or change in + military dispositions. This would rule out, for example, conversion of + dummy missile site into operational site, or replacement of SA–2 site + with SA–3 site.

+

4. We also have serious problem with FonMin’s assertion that provision for maintenance in + agreement would allow UAR to improve + “weak” installation or to repair “destroyed” installation. Status quo + means exactly what it says and precludes any action that improves + military position of either side over that obtaining at time + ceasefire/standstill went into effect. This precludes new construction + at existing sites as well as construction of new sites.

+

5. We welcome FonMin’s categorical + statement that UAR would not establish + any new installations or sites in zone and that it is not constructing + new sites. We hope that clarifications in preceding paragraphs which are + based on clear and precise language of agreement itself, will remove any + misunderstandings and that adherence to that agreement will enable us to + close this chapter and devote our full attention to talks now opening in + New York.

+

6. With respect to FonMin’s + allegations of Israeli violations of standstill, you may reiterate to + GUAR that we have already taken up + question overflights and GOI has + promised investigate and give us report. On other charges leveled by + FonMin, we will proceed + immediately to raise them with GOI. If + they turn out to be well-founded, we will take same serious view that we + have of UAR activity. We will inform + GUAR of results of our + inquiry.On August 26, Bergus wrote: “I conveyed + substance paras 2 through 6 of State 138163 to Mahmoud Riad at 1100 local this + morning. He promised to pass our views along to highest authority + soonest.” (Telegram 1927 from Cairo; National Archives, RG 59, + Central Files 1970–73, POL 27–14 ARAB–ISR) The next day, Bergus had another meeting with + Riad, at which the Foreign Minister assured him that his + presentation from the previous day “was before UAR military command where it was + receiving intensive study.” (Telegram 1940 from Cairo, August 27; + ibid.)

+

7. FOR TEL AVIV. You should tell GOI we have received response from UAR + FonMin to our approaches on + standstill violations. You should say that FonMin states categorically that UAR has not (sic) and will not introduce any new missiles + or construct any new sites within 50 kilometer zone. However, GUAR claims it has right under agreement + to relocate missile sites within 50 kilometer zone. USG does not agree and we are making this + clear in immediate return approach. We are also informing GUAR of our firm view re limitations + inherent in provisions for “maintenance” and “rotation of forces.” We + are saying this cannot include such activity as converting dummy site + into operational battery, or replacing SA–2 battery with SA–3.

+ +

8. You should also raise with GOI + UAR assertions of Israeli standstill + violations in para 5 reftel. You should say sooner we deal with these + charges and, hopefully, lay them to rest, more effectively we will be + able to urge points in preceding paras upon GUAR. Since we are not photographing Israeli side of + ceasefire line, we request that USDAO be allowed to visit precise + locations specified by GUAR to look + into GUAR charges.The Deputy Chief of Mission presented the points in + paragraphs 7 and 8 to Gazit + on August 26. He suggested that the information from the second of + the two paragraphs “be passed to military authorities for their + consideration and possible action.” (Telegram 4619 from Tel Aviv, + August 26; ibid., Box 1156, Saunders Files, Middle East Negotiations + Files, June Initiative Vol. III, August 8–27, 1970) On the evening + of August 28, Barbour met + with Meir, Eban, and other Israeli officials + at the Prime Minister’s invitation. She expressed her + dissatisfaction with the cease-fire agreement due to violations by + the United Arab Republic and asked the Ambassador what the U.S. + Government was doing to address the issue. Barbour replied that it was doing + everything it could “to get other side to live up to agreement,” but + Meir remained + pessimistic, confessing that she “could not see a rosy road ahead.” + (Telegram 4692 from Tel Aviv, August 29; ibid.)

+

9. FYI. We see no + useful purpose in prolonging debate about provision of military + equipment to Israel and prefer to let this matter rest on points you + made (para 13 reftel). If Riad presses this question, however, and you + feel you must respond, point you should get across is that we are + continuing to exercise restraint. It is unrealistic, however to expect + that moves or activities to gain military advantage can be one-sided. + This is essence of problem of escalation and is why we have so + consistently favored talks on arms limitation. END + FYI.

+ + Johnson + +
+ +
+ 155. Telegram From the Department of State to the White HouseSource: National Archives, + Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC + Files, Box 1156, Saunders Files, Middle East Negotiations Files, + June Initiative Vol. IV, August 28–November 15, 1970. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Robert Baraz + (INR/RSE) and cleared and approved by David Mark (INR/DRR). All + brackets are in the original except “[and]”, added for + clarity. + Washington, August 31, 1970, 2328Z. +

142479. White House pass San Clemente for Secretary Rogers and Assistant Secretary + Sisco. For Secretary + Rogers from Cline. Subject: INR + Briefing Note: “Middle East: + Soviets Seek Negotiating Advantage from Military Moves.”

+

1. Following is text of INR Intelligence + Brief analyzing current Soviet tactics in their missile build-up in the + Suez Canal ceasefire zone and considering possible political + implications. Sisco carried an + earlier version of this paper to San Clemente today.

+

Begin text: Moscow’s objection to U–2 + reconnaissance of the cease-fire is a significant development, not + because an aircraft might be shot down, but because of what the Soviet + statement of August 28 adds to a picture of deepening Soviet commitment + to pressure tactics in the peace negotiations.On August 28, Vinogradov called Beam to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and read an + oral statement in response to Beam’s August 8 approach regarding the U.S. + reconnaissance flights near the UAR-Israeli cease-fire line. In the + statement, the Soviet Union said that it expected the United States + to discontinue the reconnaissance flights and to take “full + responsibility for possible consequences of such flights” if they + did continue. (Telegram 4950 from Moscow, August 28; + ibid.)

+

Not interdiction but intimidation. In our view the oral statement to + Embassy Moscow signals no effort by the Soviets or the Egyptians to try + to shoot down a U–2. Moscow would appear to have nothing to gain from + such an action, which would seriously strain its relations with the US. + The Soviets could not expect to keep the US from finding out what was + happening in the UAR, even if a U–2 were shot down. (The only purpose to + be served by delaying American information would be in the event that a + sudden tactical move such as a cross Canal attack were contemplated, and + there is nothing to indicate that any such move is in prospect. Indeed, + there are good reasons against it at this time.)

+

The purpose of the Soviet statement appears, rather, to be an effort to + discourage the US from making an issue of ceasefire violations. Warnings + of “possible consequences” and “special surprises” which U–2s might + elicit, coupled with the argument that U–2 flights are not “national + means” and thus violate the American terms for its own ceasefire, seem + designed to persuade the US that all it can get by raising the matter of + ceasefire violations is acrimony from Moscow.

+

Timing may be significant. The timing of the belated protest against the + flights which Moscow had previously tolerated may be interpreted as no + more than a gesture of solidarity with the UAR, which objected to the + U–2s shortly after they were told that the U–2s had collected evidence + of violation of the standstill. There is some ground, however, to + support a hypothesis of a more immediate tactical purpose in the + protest.

+

Just before the Soviet oral statement, there were American press reports + of new techniques to be employed in the American reconnaissance effort. Even if Moscow was able + to sort out the technical inaccuracies in these stories, it would still + have been likely to see them as officially inspired. Moreover, on the + morning of the day before the oral statement, the Soviets would have + known of the flight, for the first time, of a double U–2 mission. Moscow + may have calculated that the US was preparing new disclosures about + continuing violations and made its statement in an effort to discourage + them.

+

Negotiations—having one’s cake. The oral statement made no reference to + the peace negotiations, for which Brezhnev’s speech of the same day expressed continued + support.In a nationally-televised + address on August 28, Brezhnev asked for “an honest observance” of the + cease-fire agreement, declaring: “It is our profound conviction that + an end to the conflict in the Middle East would meet the vital + interests of both the Arab countries and of Israel.” (New York Times, August 29, 1970, p. 1) + Moscow evidently hopes to enjoy both the prospect of success in the + negotiations and the tactical military advantages of having vitiated the + standstill provision of the ceasefire.

+

In accepting the peace initiative, the Soviets understood the purpose and + importance of the standstill provision. Whatever room for arguments over + details there may be, American diplomatic conversations even before the + peace initiative was launched, the terms of the initiative, and the + record of Israeli bombing in the Canal zone made it quite clear what the + overall purpose of the standstill idea was. Moscow evidently concluded + that it would be possible both to launch peace talks and to complete + earlier plans to strengthen air defenses in the Canal area.

+

Risks involved. Soviet behavior with regard to the ceasefire has been + something out of the ordinary in Moscow’s dealings with the US. The + Soviets have as a rule avoided putting themselves in a position where + they could be taxed with breaking their word. In deciding to concert + with the Egyptians to move the missiles forward, the Soviets evidently + decided that two kinds of risks were manageable. First was the possible + damage to relations with the US not only with respect to the Middle East + but also in terms of wider implications for other issues such as SALT and other disarmament topics. Second + was the chance that the Israelis—even in the face of American + opposition—might take matters into their own hands and attack the new + deployments.

+

Decision reflects attitude toward talks. That Moscow opted as it did + shows an extremely confident attitude about the strength of its position + in the peace talks. The Soviets evidently were prepared to jeopardize + the talks rather than forgo improvement of the Soviet-UAR military + position, but they must have thought the risk to be small. Presumably + they believe Washington to be bereft of satisfactory alternatives to the pursuit of its peace + efforts as long as Moscow continues to favor negotiations. The Soviets + evidently hoped that, if their maneuver worked, they might be able to + bring about a situation in which Israel, in a weakened psychological + position, would be obliged to continue the talks under increasingly + unfavorable circumstances.

+

If the August 28 oral statement was a reflection of Soviet concern that + the US was about to turn increased attention, unwanted by the USSR, to ceasefire violations, then its + thrust must have been an effort to deflect the US from that course and + to return the focus to the negotiations. The Soviets must also have + hoped that the experience would put political pressure on both Americans + [and] Israelis, by reminding the Americans that they must now press + Israel on to a settlement agreeable to Moscow and Cairo, and by + reminding the Israelis that they must cease their resistance to such an + outcome, since resuming the cross-Canal raids would be increasingly + costly to the Israeli air forces. End text.

+ + Samuels + +
+ +
+ 156. Editorial Note +

The National Security Council held a meeting, the minutes of which have + not been found, on September 1, 1970, from 10 to 11:47 a.m. at the + Western White House in San Clemente, California, which in part concerned + the Middle East. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White + House Central Files, President’s Daily Diary) On August 31, in + preparation for the meeting, Assistant Secretary of State for Near + Eastern and South Asian Affairs Joseph + Sisco sent Secretary of State William Rogers a paper outlining three + options for how the United States could proceed following the violations + of the August 7 cease-fire agreement for presentation at the NSC meeting. The options included:

+

“1. We can continue to support the ceasefire and + Jarring talks, pressing + the Soviets and UAR to stop their + violations but in effect acquiescing in them at the same time + pressing Israel to continue to observe the ceasefire. This + would be the first time we would be charging the Soviets directly with + ceasefire-standstill violations. The emphasis could be on stopping any + further violations rather than on a rollback. This would assuage the + Israelis somewhat, but would leave them dissatisfied to a substantial + degree. At a minimum, we would need to step up military supply to Israel + as compensation for what the Soviets and UAR are doing on the West Bank of the Canal. This would + probably mean that in addition to the scheduled delivery of the September-December F–4s + and A–4s, we would provide a considerably expanded anti-SAM package. + There is further risk that, by acquiescing in violations which improve + the UAR-Soviet military position, we will be increasingly on the + defensive as political talks progress in circumstances where our + credibility and influence with the Israelis will have been further + undermined. If a larger anti-SAM package is provided, it would have to + be on the same conditions as the previous package, that Israel would not + use the equipment to break the ceasefire. A suggested letter to + Gromyko carrying out this + option is attached.

+

“2. We could continue to support the ceasefire and urge + Israel to observe it but tell the Soviets we would support Israel in + suspending participation in the Jarring discussions until the UAR and Soviets removed the missiles + introduced during the ceasefire period and ceased all further + violations. The Soviets and UAR would probably react to this approach by stepping up + their military activities in the ceasefire zone, combined with a + campaign to put the blame on the US and Israel for suspending the peace + talks. Our principal leverage in seeking to forestall this would be to + tell the Soviets that we are prepared to charge them and the Egyptians + publicly with violating the ceasefire and to document our charges. It is + doubtful at best whether this would be enough to get them to back down, + and peace talks therefore would be at an indefinite impasse. + Furthermore, under this option, the risk would remain high that Israel + would strike militarily despite our urgings to the contrary.

+

“3. We could tell the Soviets that we will no longer + cooperate in pursuing the peace talks or in the continuation of the + ceasefire and would support Israel in a return to the military and + political situation pre-August 7 unless the violations are corrected + and no further violations occur. This would constitute a major + test of whether the Soviets attach as much importance as we do to the + success of the current settlement efforts. If they are prepared to see + those efforts break down rather than suspend their strategy of putting + increasing military pressure on Israel, it is perhaps better to find + this out sooner rather than later. If we choose this option, we must be + prepared to risk the collapse of our whole initiative. This is thus the + option of maximum risk. On the other hand, it is also the option under + which we have maximum leverage, since (a) we could make a good public + case of Soviet-UAR responsibility for the breakdown of the ceasefire and + (b) a return to the pre-August 7 situation and military risks which they + presumably accepted our initiative to avoid.” (Telegram 141836 to the + White House, August 31; National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, + POL 27–14 ARAB-ISR)

+

In an August 31 memorandum to the President, Henry Kissinger explained that, when discussion at the + NSC meeting turned to the Middle + East, “particular emphasis” would “be placed on future U.S. actions in the face of further + evidence of violations of the standstill cease-fire.” (Ibid., Nixon + Presidential Materials, NSC Files, + NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), + Box H–029, National Security Council Meetings, NSC Meeting—Middle East 9/1/70) Kissinger addressed the meeting in his + memoirs, writing that Nixon + “directed that a very strong protest be made in both Cairo and Moscow” + about UAR violations and that Israel + “be asked to send a representative to the Jarring talks in New York.” (White + House Years, page 591) According to Haldeman’s September 1 account of what + Nixon told him about the + NSC meeting, Kissinger and the President “went at + it pretty hard,” which Haldeman + wrote in the context of the “several long talks” that he and Nixon had that day about “the + K[issinger] problem.” Nixon told + Haldeman to speak with + Kissinger and Haig to “get K off of Middle East” + and have him “concentrate on Vietnam and Russia.” While Haldeman “got a little way with Al,” + he got “nowhere with Henry.” (Haldeman Diaries: Multimedia + Edition, September 1, 1970) Haldeman recorded in his diaries that “the K problem” + stemmed from his ongoing rivalry with Rogers. “He’s just obsessed with conviction Rogers is out to get him and to + sabotage all our systems and our foreign policy.” (Ibid., August 6, + 1970) Haldeman added that “K is + uptight about the Middle East and is imagining things . . . All this + really worries P[resident] because it creates doubt about K’s + reliability on other recommendations, and gets in the way of doing his + work. P realizes K’s basically jealous of any idea not his own, and he + just can’t swallow the apparent early success of the Middle East plan + because it is Rogers’s. In fact, + he’s probably actually trying to make it fail for just this reason.” + (Ibid., August 16 and 17, 1970)

+
+ +
+ 157. Telegram From the Department of State to the Interests Section in + the United Arab Republic, the Embassies in the Soviet Union and Israel, + and the Mission to the United NationsSource: National Archives, Nixon Presidential + Materials, NSC Files, Box 655, + Country Files, Middle East, Ceasefire Mideast Vol. I. Secret; + Immediate; Nodis. Drafted on September 2 by Sisco, Sterner, and Theodore A. Wahl (NEA/IAI); cleared in + INR, J, EUR, the White House, and the Defense + Department; and approved by Rogers. Repeated to London, Paris, Beirut, Jidda, + Kuwait, and Amman. + Washington, September 3, 1970, + 0309Z. +

144257. Watch Officer please convey this message to Chargé Tel Aviv no + later than 7 a.m. Tel Aviv time.

+ +

1. We now have completed a careful and systematic evaluation of all + evidence based on our own means and have concluded that since August 10 + (date on which we have reasonable base of evidence from which to + operate) there have been violations in the fifty kilometers zone west of + the Suez Canal, continuance of which likely to jeopardize + ceasefire-standstill and delay indefinitely talks between parties under + Jarring’s auspices. In these + circumstances, we have decided that a strong démarche must be made + immediately both to UAR and USSR to bring continuing violations to an + immediate halt.

+

2. Israelis are pressing us to insist on a rollback, which we in turn do + not feel is achievable. Nevertheless, in making approach to UAR and USSR we are putting it in terms of rectification of + situation, without indicating explicitly how, while at same time making + clear that principal objective is to get UAR to stop immediately any further violations.

+

3. We feel our approaches in Cairo and Moscow would be more effective if + for time being, no public confirmation of UAR ceasefire-standstill violations are made. However, in + view press reports already out confirming UAR violations, (Washington Post, New + York Times), and some editorializing that Administration is in + effect covering up violations it may be essential that some brief, low + key public statement be made in day or so. We will keep this under + active review.

+

+ For Tel Aviv: +

+

4. In private discussion Monday,August + 31. + Rabin told Sisco he felt that most helpful thing + US could do at this juncture would be to QUOTE clear the air with + Israelis UNQUOTE by telling them what our judgment is regarding their + charges of violations of the ceasefire-standstill, and what we proposed + to do about it. Rabin called + again early Wednesday a.m. September 2 to say he very anxious to get + results of San Clemente meeting,Presumably + the September 1 NSC meeting; see + Document 156. since if + Sisco could give indications + of US conclusions and steps being taken, it would be most helpful to PM + Meir in getting decision at + Thursday Cabinet meeting to send Tekoah back to New York and to proceed with talks.

+

5. Sisco is conveying following + to Rabin todaySisco and + Rabin met at 10 p.m. on + September 2. A report of the meeting is in telegram 144262 to Tel + Aviv, September 3. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, + NSC Files, Box 655, Country + Files, Mideast, Ceasefire Mideast Vol. I) which Chargé is + instructed similarly to convey to Foreign Minister Eban immediately:

+

A. We are satisfied based on all available evidence that UAR has committed since August 10 a number + of violations of ceasefire-standstill agreement. Violations have been of following character: (1) + There has been construction between August 10 and 27 that has increased + the total number of sites; (2) There have been a number of SA–2 sites + which on August 10 were unoccupied which since then have been occupied; + and (3) There has been some movement of equipment within the zone.

+

6. We view these continuing violations most seriously and President has + directed that a strong démarche and protest be made to both UAR and USSR with a view to securing immediate stoppage of + continuing violations. We will also press for a rectification of the + situation, but wish to repeat again candidly and honestly to Israelis + that our continuing judgment is we unlikely to be able to achieve a + rollback.

+

7. Our view regarding effect of these violations is that Israel has been + put to some disadvantage. We recognize that as a result of these + violations Israel’s air maneuverability has been restricted, though we + hope Israel will recognize that appreciable restriction had already + taken place prior to ceasefire when Israeli attempts to suppress certain + sites proved unduly costly. Our assessment continues to be that GOI can defeat any combination of Arab + forces, and that UAR not in position to + mount and maintain sustained attack across Canal permitting it to retake + part of Sinai.

+

8. In order to assure that Israel will not be at any serious disadvantage + in event ceasefire-standstill should break down, we are proceeding + expeditiously with delivery of anti-SAM package. Moreover, delivery of + five Phantoms in September will proceed. We will be in a position to + give GOI a specific delivery date in + September in next few days. We are ready to proceed on delivery of four + A–4’s in September as previously scheduled. However, our understanding + is that GOI prefers to have us make + modifications rather than take the four scheduled for delivery in + September unmodified. On this basis, two modified A–4’s would be + delivered by end of October or early November and five every thirty days + thereafter until sixteen are delivered. These deliveries, of course, + must continue to be kept in strictest confidence between us.

+

9. With adoption of Jackson + Amendment by Senate,Senator Henry M. Jackson (D–WA) inserted + an amendment into a Defense procurement bill, which passed the + Senate on September 1, authorizing an unlimited arms-buying credit + to Israel. (Washington Post, September 2, + 1970, p. A1) we hope to be able to proceed in firming up + details regarding GOI credit needs + without too much further delay as we foresee no serious difficulties in + House-Senate conference.

+

10. We feel approaches to UAR and USSR should be more effective if for at + least time being no public statement is made regarding our judgment that UAR is in violation of ceasefire-standstill. We urge GOI to cooperate to this end.

+

11. Finally, we hope that GOI will find + itself in a position to send Tekoah back to New York and to resume discussions under + Jarring’s auspices + immediately. We feel that such move is in GOI interest since talks are further way to test UAR intentions. In any event, if GOI view that UAR is not interested in proceeding in a serious way in + peace talks is confirmed, GOI + willingness to explore all possibilities under Jarring’s aegis would help place onus + on Cairo rather than on Tel Aviv.

+

12. We want GOI to know that any + hesitation on our part in making judgments re violations in days + immediately after ceasefire was based not on any doubts of our Israeli + friends but rather on our strong desire to draw conclusions based on our + own evidence. US hopes that any feelings that have developed that we + have doubted Israeli credibility can be made a thing of the past. It + only became clear after ceasefire that we were operating from a + different intelligence base. Now as a result of close cooperation in + surveillance, there is less possibility of any misunderstandings. It was + unfortunate, too, that any differences or misunderstandings have been + aired publicly. We continue to believe that both of us can work more + closely and more cooperatively by concerting together in first instance + through diplomatic channels. Finally, regardless of Israeli doubts, and + we can fully understand and appreciate difficulties that face Israelis + on the firing line, Israel can be assured that US is the one friend in + whom it can have continuing confidence. We cannot promise miracles; but + we can promise that we will do everything possible through diplomatic + channels to stop violations. If results are less than one would hope, we + are guarding against that by providing necessary wherewithal, as + indicated above.

+

13. We doing this, of course, on assumption Israel would not itself + unilaterally break ceasefire which we would view most seriously.Zurhellen met with Eban on September 3 at 9:45 a.m. to convey the + information in paragraphs 5A through 13. (Telegram 4801 from Tel + Aviv, September 3; National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, + NSC Files, Box 1156, Saunders + Files, Middle East Negotiations Files, June Initiative Vol. IV, + August 28–November 15, 1970) On September 6, Eban responded to the U.S. + presentations in an “oral paper” to Rogers, in which he said that Israel looked to the + United States “as the initiator of the ceasefire and the new stage + of the Jarring Mission to + use its full influence to secure the restoration of the position as + it was when the ceasefire came into force.” He also expressed + Israel’s appreciation for the Nixon administration’s expressed intention to + deliver an anti-SAM package and fighter jets to Israel. (Telegram + 147014 from Tel Aviv, September 9; ibid., Box 655, Country Files, + Middle East, Ceasefire Mideast Vol. I)

+

14. FOR CAIRO: You should immediately seek + appointment with Foreign Minister Riad to convey following message.

+ +

15. We have not yet received explanation from GUAR concerning specific missile-related activities raised + in our August 19 and August 22 approaches.See footnote 2, Document + 158.

+

16. In addition to violations raised on those occasions our evidence on + subsequent dates reveals following changes. We are presenting here + confirmed information and are leaving out number of sites at which there + are suspected activities but which so far have not been confirmed.

+

17. To recapitulate, following changes have occurred August 10 through + 27:

+ + + a.New SA–2 sites constructed: + 2 + + + b. SA–2 sites on which construction continued: + 6 + + + c. SA–2 sites occupied: + 12 + + + d. SA–2 battalions that have been field deployed: + 2 + + + e. SA–3 battalions that have been field deployed: + 2 + +
+

18. In presenting this information you should say this does not include + any of the activity claimed by Israel to have taken place August 7–10 + period.

+

19. You should tell Foreign Minister this pattern of activity is matter + of serious concern to USG. We must say + in all frankness that we are at loss to understand this activity which + is at such variance with role his government has played in our joint + effort to help Ambassador Jarring promote agreement between the parties on terms + of just and lasting peace in Middle East. What possible gain can there + be for UAR? GUAR has repeatedly urged + that Jarring talks get under way + as soon as possible, yet it is clear that principal impediment to this + very goal has become UAR’s continuing military activities in ceasefire + zone. UAR has invested much in success + of talks and now is in process of taking onus for jeopardizing both + ceasefire-standstill and talks.

+

20. You should say USG recognized, as we + are sure Foreign Minister did, grave risks inherent in continuation of + situation prevailing before ceasefire and beginning of Ambassador + Jarring’s present efforts. + Were the ceasefire to fail and those efforts to come to halt, risks + would be even greater than before because chances of again achieving + whatever has been accomplished in past month would be greatly reduced. + Government of United States would not be able to continue to support + Jarring discussions and + ceasefire, and would see no alternative but to return to conditions + prevailing before August 7, unless ceasefire-standstill is strictly + observed and continuing violations stopped immediately. These violations + greatly restrict our ability to play constructive role in support of + settlement since it was clearly understood that neither side would seek military advantage + of any kind in ceasefire-standstill zones while agreement was in effect. + Standstill means standstill.

+

21. You should tell Foreign Minister that you personally reported his + view that terms of agreement give UAR + right to move missile battalions from one location to another within + zone, so long as no new missiles are introduced into zone. Careful + reading of text of agreement makes it impossible for us to support such + interpretation. Indeed we think it obvious that such movements are + contrary to and in violation of military standstill. Moreover, UAR activity is contrary to his assurance + that UAR would not construct new sites + or introduce any new missiles in 50 km zone.

+

22. You should tell Foreign Minister that we are raising this serious + matter in confidence with him in earnest hope that appropriate action to + rectify situation will be taken promptly and we be given full assurance + that all violations will stop immediately. In this way, it would become + possible for all concerned to devote full attention to peacemaking + efforts currently in progress under Ambassador Jarring’s auspices.

+

23. If Riad raises question of UAR + charges of Israeli violations, you should say we have raised this with + Israeli Government and they assure us that their activity has been + limited entirely to maintenance. As we are now raising these matters of + violations with the UAR, we will continue doing same on Israeli + side.

+

24. If Foreign Minister again raises question US arms for Israel, you + should say US policy continues to be one of restraint. However, we + cannot disregard violations of ceasefire/standstill or continuing Soviet + supply of arms to the UAR.Telegram 1859 + from Cairo, August 20, reported Bergus’s August 19 conversation with Mahmoud Riad, during which the + latter said that he did not want to comment on Bergus’s presentation until he had + an opportunity to study it carefully. (National Archives, Nixon + Presidential Materials, NSC Files, + Box 1156, Saunders Files, Middle East Negotiations Files, June + Initiative Vol. III, August 8–27, 1970) Telegram 1889 from Cairo, + August 22, reported Bergus’s + second approach to Riad, a “firm presentation.” (Ibid., RG 59, + Central Files 1970–73, POL 27–14 ARAB–ISR)

+

25. FOR MOSCOW: You should transmit following oral + statement to highest possible level Soviet Foreign Ministry September + 3.

+

26. The US Government wishes to raise with the Soviet Government a matter + of deep concern. We now have incontrovertible evidence of continuing + significant changes in the disposition of missile installations in the + ceasefire zone west of the Suez Canal. Not only has there been + construction continuing on a number of missile sites, but also + construction of new sites where none existed at time of ceasefire. + Moreover, a number of SA–2 and SA–3 missiles have been installed since + the ceasefire went into effect. These are clearcut violations of + ceasefire-standstill + agreement; they are contrary to Brezhnev’s statement re need for honest observance of + agreement.See footnote 3, Document 155.

+

27. The US Government is at a loss to understand this activity, which is + at such variance with the role that the Soviet Government has played in + our joint effort to help Ambassador Jarring promote agreement between the parties on the + terms of a just and lasting peace in Middle East.

+

28. The US Government recognized, as undoubtedly the Soviet Government + did, the risks inherent in a continuation of the situation prevailing + before the ceasefire and the beginning of Ambassador Jarring’s present efforts. Were the + ceasefire to fail and those efforts to come to a halt, the risks would + be even greater than before because the chances of again achieving what + has been accomplished in the past month would be greatly reduced. The + UAR and USSR will have borne the onus for ending the ceasefire and + aborting the talks between parties.

+

29. The Government of the United States must make it clear to the Soviet + Government that it may no longer be able to continue to support the + Jarring discussions and the + ceasefire, unless the ceasefire-standstill is strictly observed and + continuing activity stopped immediately. These activities have already + seriously undermined our ability to play a constructive role in support + of a settlement since, as the USSR + knows, it was clearly understood that neither side would seek military + advantage of any kind in the ceasefire/standstill zones while the + agreement was in effect. Prompt rectification of this situation is + essential. Any continuation of these activities will place on the Soviet + Union and the UAR the responsibility + for a possible resumption of the fighting.

+

30. FYI. Although + not part of the above message, you should find way to get across + personal suggestion that most useful thing Soviets could do would be to + have several sites representing most clear-cut violations moved from + zone. We have no desire to take advantage of any such move in public but + would find great value in repairing damage to U.S. ability to bring + Israelis along in negotiation. In addition, try get across idea that + Soviet credibility in Washington also heavily involved in this issue. + END FYI.Beam carried out his instructions + on the late afternoon of September 3, making his oral presentation + to Vinogradov. Beam reported that the Deputy + Foreign Minister responded with a “lengthy, repetitive, and largely + unyielding reply,” but that he said his remarks were “preliminary in + nature” and that Beam’s + statement “would be studied.” (Telegram 5076 from Moscow, September + 3; National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1156, Saunders Files, + Middle East Negotiations Files, June Initiative Vol. IV, August + 28–November 15, 1970; printed in Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, volume + XII, Soviet Union, January 1969–October 1970, Document + 201)

+ +

31. FOR USUN: + You should inform Jarring as + follows:

+

A. We are satisfied on basis of our own evidence that there have been + numerous violations by UAR of + standstill-ceasefire agreement.

+

B. At same time, we are drawing Israelis attention to great emphasis we + place on getting negotiating process started. Accordingly, we are + strongly urging Israelis to instruct Tekoah to return forthwith to New York, we hope before + upcoming Labor Day weekend.Yost met with Jarring on the morning of + September 3, after which he wrote that the Special Representative + “expressed considerable doubt that, despite our urging, GOI would send Tekoah back to NY before Eban,” who had planned to come + later that month. If Israel did send him back, Jarring added, he doubted that + Tekoah “would be + authorized to do more than engage in probing action” until after + Eban’s arrival. (National + Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 27–14 + ARAB–ISR)

+ + Johnson + +
+ +
+ 158. Telegram From the Interests Section in the United Arab Republic + to the Department of StateSource: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1156, Saunders Files, + Middle East Negotiations Files, June Initiative Vol. IV, August + 28–November 15, 1970. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. A note at the end of + the telegram indicates it was passed to the White House. All + brackets are in the original except “[sure]”, added for + clarity. + Cairo, September 4, 1970, 1725Z. +

2017. 1. Here are first personal impressions of hour’s conversation + Wiley and I had with FonMin Riad tonight. Subsequent + telegrams report conversation in detail.Telegram 2018 from Cairo, September 4, reported that Riad stated + that the United Arab Republic was “entitled” to move surface-to-air + missiles “from one place to another inside the zone and to replace + these missiles with others from outside the zone.” Riad also said + that U.S. information that the United Arab Republic had violated the + cease-fire was incorrect, that it had not “introduced new missiles + to the specified zone” and “all existing missiles have been present + on the day the cease-fire came into effect.” He explained that + current UAR activities in the zone + represented “maintenance measures” that were “essential for the + safety and security of our personnel.” (Ibid.) Telegram 2019 from + Cairo, September 4, reported Bergus and Wiley’s conversation with Riad in detail. + (Ibid.)

+ +

2. FonMin almost totally repudiated + factual data I gave GUAR on September + 3.Telegram 2007 from Cairo, September + 3, reported Bergus’s + conversation with Riad after the former’s presentation. + (Ibid.) He associated Nasser and General Fawzi with this repudiation.

+

3. Egyptians extremely agitated by yesterday’s statement issued by + McCloskey.On September 3, McCloskey read this statement: “Our latest evidence + confirms that there have been violations of the cease-fire + standstill agreement. We are not going into details. We are taking + up this matter with both the U.A.R. and the U.S.S.R. through + diplomatic channels. We are continuing to watch the balance closely + and, as we have said previously, have no intention of permitting + Israel’s security to be adversely affected. In the meantime, we + believe it is of utmost importance that the talks between the + parties under Ambassador Jarring’s [U.N. Special Representative Gunnar Jarring] auspices proceed + forthwith.” (Department of State Bulletin, + September 21, 1970, p. 326; brackets are in the original) + FonMin said more than once that + McCloskey statement was + equal to a certificate authorizing Israelis to attack Egypt. FonMin recalled “collusion” of June 5, + 1967,Reference is to the belief among + Arab states that the United States provided air support to Israel + during the 1967 war. and said GUAR confidence in USG + which had recently risen to ten percent had now fallen back to zero.

+

4. I believe Egyptians have been severely shaken by this latest démarche. + Mohamed told me that President had been “preoccupied” all night with our + charges.

+

5. Egyptians probably felt only feasible alternative open to them was to + deny USG evidence as blandly as + possible. They did the best they could, which was not too good.

+

6. I believe Egyptians (and Russians) have an obsession over danger of + another surprise attack from Israel.On + September 5, Soviet officials in Moscow delivered an oral statement + to U.S. Embassy officials regarding what they believed was a pending + Israeli attack on Egypt: “According to information received by the + Soviet Government, the Israeli Air Force intends to carry out on + Sunday, September 6, bombings of a number of regions of the UAR in the zone of the Suez Canal + beyond the ceasefire line . . . The Soviet Government expects that + the Government of the USA will urgently undertake the necessary + steps to restrain Israel from the dangerous actions it is planning, + the entire responsibility for the consequences of which, under + whatever pretexts they might be carried, would fully fall on Israel + and the United States.” For the full text of the Soviet statement, + see Foreign + Relations, 1969–1976, volume XII, Soviet Union, January + 1969–October 1970, Document 202. There was + consistent note of fear in FonMin’s + presentation. My guess would be that they are now in final stages of + disposing their defenses in Canal Zone against this contingency.

+

7. This development imposes cruel necessity on us make some very crucial + decisions. I told FonMin that we + would not have taken serious step of transmitting to him detailed facts + of Egyptian violations unless we were [sure] of our ground. But let us + run another check even though we are certain our margin of error could + not be more than say 5 percent, + and go back to GUAR. Let us maintain + and intensify surveillance of UAR + territory, and let Egyptians know we doing so.

+

8. Above all, our overriding interest is peace in this area and it just + can’t be built without Egypt. UN + Res 242 and Jarring Mission are only feasible + bases for peace.

+ + + Bergus + + +
+ +
+ 159. Memorandum From Harold + Saunders and HoskinsonSamuelof the National Security Council Staff to + the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential + Materials, NSC Files, Box 656, + Country Files, Middle East, Mideast Ceasefire, Vol. II. Top Secret; + Sensitive. Sent for information. It was sent back to Saunders to answer Kissinger’s query; see footnote 2 below. All brackets are in + the original except those indicating text that remains + classified. + Washington, September 8, 1970. + + SUBJECT + Intelligence on Egyptian and Soviet Cease-Fire Violations + +

You may well have had enough of the numbers game on Egyptian and Soviet + violations of the military standstill. However, we have been making a + major effort to reduce this complex intelligence problem to some simple + propositions the policy-maker can work from without at the same time + losing sight of the limitations involved. The following analysis + includes the latest intelligence on the SAMs but it does not reveal the + response on the ground to our more recent démarches in Cairo and Moscow. + In other words, this memo brings the situation up to the day on which + those démarches were made and tries to bridge the gap between the + analysts’ problems and the policy-maker’s needs.

+

Intelligence Problems

+

First of all, it is important to note the limitations and problems + associated with our intelligence on possible cease-fire violations.

+

Photographic intelligence can tell us a great deal + but, despite all the technical sophistication that goes into this kind + of analysis, it is far from being a highly developed art and has some + important limitations. There are two main types of problems:

+ +

1. To cover adequately the Egyptian cease-fire zone it is necessary to + have photography taken with both high and low resolution cameras. The + low resolution photography is necessary to cover the whole area but it + can only identify the more general features of suspected SAM sites and usually not the more + specific details which reveal such important facts as status (i.e. + operational or not) and type of occupancy. High resolution photography + is therefore taken to make up for these inadequacies, but it covers a + much smaller area.

+

2. Most of our photography is low resolution and taken at a wide angle + from the U–2s. In addition to the resolution limitation, the obliqueness + of the U–2 coverage is another limitation since the farther away the + target is the less detail we are able to identify and even then not all + the area can be adequately covered in each flight. We can monitor most + developments fairly well up to about 10 miles from the canal but beyond + that the quality begins to taper off significantly. We have begun using + a new higher resolution camera with the U–2s but again this presents the + dilemma of being able to identify more detail but covering less area. + Many gaps can be at least partially filled by using a combination of + regular high and low resolution U–2 coverage supplemented by periodic + high and low resolution satellite coverage.

+

3. There are a variety of other technical problems. These include such + things as weather near the ground, upper atmospheric conditions, terrain + features and the condition of the film and its development. The human + analytical factor also plays a big role since many of these points are + highly debatable even for highly trained photo interpreters.

+

Our main source of information on the SAMs is photography, but [less than 1 line not declassified] also play a + role. So far, because of our [2 lines not + declassified]. This appears to stem as much from budgetary and + bureaucratic reasons as from the state of the art and an effort is being + made to increase somewhat [4 lines not + declassified]. As you know, however, [2½ + lines not declassified].

+

Conventional clandestinely collected intelligence + has so far played a very limited role in detecting possible Egyptian and + Soviet cease-fire violations. It could, however, at some future point + prove to be important for confirming evidence from other sources and for + revealing Egyptian motives and intentions.

+

There is one major gap in our intelligence which + prevents us from being able to document all the violations since the + cease-fire went in effect on August 7. As you know, we can not be sure + of what exactly happened within the Egyptian cease-fire zone in the week + or so before and in the two days immediately after the cease-fire went + into effect. We know that there was a substantial movement of SAMs + toward the canal during this period, but because of the periodicity of + our satellite missions we can not prove—even with the evidence supplied + by the Israelis—that there were + substantial violations. Therefore, for our own working purposes, we have + used the results of low resolution U–2 flights (August 9 and 11) plus + good quality low resolution satellite photography on August 10 to + establish a data base against which we can measure violations since + then.

+

What this adds up to is in substantive terms:

+

1. Our evidence is best in documenting construction of + new SAM sites. It is now + possible to say that there are some sites on ground where there was no + sign of activity at all before the ceasefire.In the margin, Kissinger wrote: “How many?”

+

2. It is harder to identify the status of completed + sites—whether they are occupied or unoccupied or whether they + are occupied by dummy, SA–2 or SA–3 equipment. This means, for instance, + that, even though we have recently discovered SA–3 equipment in several + SA–2 sites, we cannot say for sure that this equipment was not at these + sites on August 10.

+

3. It is even more difficult to document the net + increase of [less than 1 line not + declassified] SAM battalions + (particularly SA–2s). This means that it is so far not possible to prove + that the Egyptians have done more than rotating units within the + standstill zone without increasing their overall equipment strength, + although there are fairly good circumstantial indications they have done + more than this.

+

Intelligence Results

+

One major source of considerable confusion since we began trying to + identify Egyptian and Soviet violations of the military standstill has + been the difference between when we have discovered + possible violations and when they have actually occurred. This + arises essentially from the technical problem of differing quality and + type of photographic coverage and the delay required for careful + analysis and re-evaluation of information. Sometimes identification of + activity in high resolution photographs of a given site makes it + possible to look back at earlier low resolution photos and “see” + evidence of activity that had not been noted in the earlier photos. What + is most important for diplomatic purposes is when possible violations + actually occurred—not when we discovered them. Therefore what follows is + an effort to construct a “real time” analysis under the five main + categories that were used in making our presentation to the + Egyptians.Presumably Bergus’s presentation of “factual + data” on September 3. See Document 158 and + footnote 3 thereto. This + will be a “real time” picture of the situation the day we made that + presentation worked out from the photos taken that day:

+ +

1. SA–2 sites built before the ceasefire but not + occupied on August 10. Counting from August 10 (our reliable + data base), it appears that—through September 3—13 or 14 SA–2 missile + sites built before the cease-fire were occupied. Two of these sites, + however, were evacuated during this period so there has only been a net + increase of 11 or 12 pre-cease-fire sites occupied with SA–2 equipment. + We do not know how many of these occupied sites are truly [less than 1 line not declassified] and high + resolution photography of these sites have been inadequate to settle + that point. We also do not have sufficient [less than + 1 line not declassified] whether there has been a net addition + to the number of Egyptian SA–2 battalions within the cease-fire zone + since the military standstill went into effect, as would be necessary if + all the additionally occupied sites had become [less + than 1 line not declassified]. Our intelligence analysts, + however, based on their estimate of the amount of SA–2 equipment + presently visible within the cease-fire zone, believe that some of it + must have been brought in since August 10 since we do not know of any + storage depots for SA–2 equipment within the zone. It is conceded, of + course, that some of the newly occupied sites may, as the Egyptians + claim, be filled with equipment relocated from previously occupied sites + or from unidentified excess equipment stocks, but since only two + occupied sites have been evacuated such relocation cannot account for + the equipment visible at many of the 13 or 14 newly occupied SA–2 sites. + That is difficult to prove, however.

+

2. SA–2 sites which did not exist on August 10 and have + since been constructed and sites partly built by August 10 on which + significant construction has continued since. The Egyptians + have also been constructing and occupying new SA–2 sites within the + cease-fire zone. We have clear evidence of Egyptian construction work on + twelve SA–2 sites. Work began on six of these sites after August 10 + (four since August 27), and, although construction had begun on the + other six sites apparently before the cease-fire, they have been + finished or nearly finished since August 10. Three of these sites have + been occupied.

+

3. SA–2 battalions field deployed since August 10. + Two battalions have been field deployed.

+

4. SA–3 battalions field deployed since August 10. + As you know, the Soviets are also involved in possible cease-fire + violations. As of August 10 we were able to identify five Soviet-manned + and occupied SA–3 sites within the cease-fire zone. We suspect that some + or all of these may only have been occupied after the cease-fire went + into effect (on August 8 and 9) but we cannot prove this. In addition to + these suspected Soviet violations, we have evidence of the deployment of + two additional SA–3 units in what appears to be a field unit + configuration. Both of the deployments were completed after the + cease-fire (by August 18), although one of the deployments may have been + partially completed by August + 10 and we cannot be sure whether this was actually begun before the + cease-fire.

+

We have also identified four SA–3 units occupying SA–2 configured sites. + The SA–3 equipment was only discovered in high resolution photography in + late August and the sites were previously identified on the basis of low + resolution photography as occupied SA–2s. The SA–3 equipment may, + however, have been in the sites since the military standstill went into + effect. At least we cannot prove otherwise.

+

Standstill Violations

+

As you know, there are considerably different Egyptian (and by inference + Soviet) and Israeli/U.S. interpretations of the military standstill + provisions of the cease-fire agreement. The official UAR position is that they (and by + inference, the Soviet forces in Egypt too) are permitted to rotate and + relocate SAM missiles and equipment + from site to site, as well as complete the construction of sites where + work was initiated prior to the cease-fire. We and the Israelis do not + accept this loose interpretation of the terms of the cease-fire and our + views were clearly placed on the record shortly after the cease-fire in + both Cairo and Moscow. The Israelis, of course, have pinned us down to a + very strict interpretation of the standstill.

+

Most of the evidence of violations that we have acquired relates to the + area of difference between the Egyptian/Soviet and Israeli/U.S. + interpretations. In fact, in only six instances do we + have evidence of brand new post-August 10 construction starts, all + SA–2s. In addition, we have one instance of the field deployment + begun and completed since August 10 of an SA–3 unit—an apparent + Soviet violation. Presumably, this Egyptian and Soviet activity + would be a violation even by their definitions.

+

The case against the Egyptians and Soviets is much more impressive, of + course, when viewed from our strict interpretation of the cease-fire + agreement and based on circumstantial evidence. But we cannot prove all + of it sufficiently to make a strong case on the specifics in Cairo and + Moscow. All we can really use against the Egyptian and Soviets, even + using our interpretation of the cease-fire agreement, are the following + violations:

+

—The Egyptian construction of twelve SA–2 sites, three of which have been + occupied. Six of these are the sites started since the cease-fire (three + of which have also been occupied) which are violations even by the + Egyptian definition. The other six were all begun before the cease-fire + but construction had been stopped probably because of Israeli bombing. + The present construction on these sites involves substantial + improvements and clearly represents an Egyptian effort to take advantage + of the cease-fire.

+ +

—Both of the Soviet field deployments of SA–3 units can be proved to be + violations. As mentioned above, one is even a violation in + Egyptian/Soviet terms. The other unit appears to have been partially + deployed as of August 10 and then finished by August 18.

+

Conclusion

+

Our information ideally could be better, but it seems very clear that the + Soviets and Egyptians have continued to erect their missile complex + within the cease-fire zone along the Egyptian side of the Canal. This is + apparently a continuation, albeit at much less intensity, of the big + movement of the SAMs toward the Canal in the days immediately before the + cease-fire. We cannot document all of the moves precisely but we have a + very good idea, in gross terms, what has happened.

+

There are limitations to our intelligence but these are not likely to be + resolved by the information the Israelis pick up with their almost daily + overflights of the Egyptian cease-fire zone [less than + 1 line not declassified]. The people at DIA, who have worked most closely with the + Israelis, have found that their intelligence has not turned up anything + important that we have not identified ourselves. In fact, so far as we + can determine, we have discovered more possible violations than they + have, especially concerning the Soviet-manned SA–3s. Our photography is + more precise than theirs.

+

Because of the nature of this kind of intelligence, we can expect + continuing clarifications. This will be especially true when good + quality high resolution photography is acquired from satellite coverage. + This means that the numbers game will continue as we refine our + knowledge of what has happened. We know enough already, however, to be + reasonably confident in our protests to the Egyptians and Soviets. Our + main interest now is in their response on the ground to our démarches. + Intelligence on this aspect should be available later this week. U–2 + missions were flown on September 6 and 8 and together—all other things + being equal—these may provide us with our first good indications of how + the Egyptians and Soviets are reacting. Because of the limitations in + this kind of intelligence, it may—if there are more violations of + standstill—be a while before we can construct a case good enough to call + them on.

+
+ +
+ + 160. Minutes of an Ad Hoc Special Review Group MeetingSource: National Archives, Nixon + Presidential Materials, NSC Files, + NSC Institutional Files + (H-Files), Box H–111, Senior Review Group, SRG Minutes Originals 1970. Top Secret; Nodis. The + meeting was held in the White House Situation Room. + Washington, September 8, + 1970, 3:45–4:25 p.m. + + SUBJECT + Middle East + + + PARTICIPANTS + Chairman—Henry A. + Kissinger + + State + + + U. Alexis Johnson + + + Rodger P. Davies + + + Joseph J. Sisco + + + Defense + + + David Packard + + + Robert Pranger + + + + CIA + + + + Richard Helms + + + Thomas Karamessines + + David Blee + + JCS + + Adm. Thomas H. + Moorer + LTG John W. Vogt + Attorney General John N. + Mitchell + + NSC Staff + + + Harold H. Saunders + + Col. Richard T. + Kennedy + + Jeanne W. Davis + + +

SUMMARY OF DECISIONS

+

The Defense Department would:

+

1. provide a delivery schedule for the August 14 package of arms and + equipment for Israel;Israeli and U.S. + officials, including Rabin + and Packard, discussed the + details of the arms package at an August 14 meeting in the Deputy + Secretary’s office. (Washington National Records Center, ISA Files: + FRC 330–73A–1975, Box 20, Israel) The package was approved at the + August 12 SRG meeting; see Document 150. The delivery schedule was not + found. and

+

2. put together an additional package of equipment for Israel, in + response to the President’s request of September 4Not found. with a brief statement of what it + could accomplish, with the understanding that we may decide to recommend + against such a package.

+

Mr. Kissinger: Can we review the + non-hijacking aspects of the present situation,On September 6, members of the Popular Front for + the Liberation of Palestine hijacked the first of four aircraft; see + Document 161. particularly two + issues: (1) our choices with regard to various combinations of peace + talks and a standstill cease-fire; and (2) the President’s request, made + on Friday, that we prepare an immediate additional arms package for the + Israelis. He had wanted to proceed immediately with a new package on Friday, but I suggested we put + it through the SRG mechanism and get + the views of some of his other advisers. However, we do owe the + President a new package. We can put a negative recommendation on top of + it if we wish, but we will have to say what we could do if the President + should decide he wants to proceed with additional help to Israel.

+

Mr. Johnson: I assume this would be a larger package than the one already + in train.

+

Mr. Kissinger: This is not + completely clear. The President’s first reaction was to double the + number of aircraft. I suggested that this might not be the thing that + was needed and said we would see what kind of package would make sense + in the circumstances. We owe him a package, although we can say what we + like about the wisdom of it. We cannot not give + him a package. It might be wise to return to the question of what + strategy we are trying to implement rather than merely supply an + indiscriminate list of items. The strategy approach might be a good + vehicle in which to present the package and our recommendations to the + President. (to Sisco) what do + you think?

+

Mr. Sisco: The opening of the + GA will give us an opportunity to + talk to both the Egyptian and the Israeli Foreign Ministers. We have to + try to make the standstill effective. This will involve what amounts to + a renegotiation of the standstill cease-fire without characterizing it + as such. This renegotiation will have to contain some if not all of the + following elements: as a minimum, what the Israelis would consider at + least a partial roll-back of the missile advance.

+

Mr. Kissinger: What does the U–2 + photography this weekend show?

+

Mr. Sisco: It shows a tapering + off but continued construction at five sites.

+

Mr. Helms: We believe the total + number of sites has jumped from 106 to 111.

+

Mr. Saunders: But these + photographs were taken before our démarche of last Thursday.September 3; see Document + 158 and footnote 2 + thereto.

+

Mr. Helms: Yes, these are + Thursday’s photographs. We don’t yet have a read-out on this week’s + photos.

+

Mr. Johnson: Construction at additional sites doesn’t necessarily mean + additional missiles.

+

Mr. Helms: Let me give you the + exact language because there are so many qualifications. (Reading)

+ +

(We are getting the item so as to quote it exactly.)No quote was inserted in the minutes.

+

Mr. Mitchell: Do the Israelis + have this information?

+

Mr. Sisco: No.

+

Mr. Kissinger: Am I right in + reading this as a minimum increase of 13?

+

Mr. Helms: That is a fair + estimate, although we won’t know for certain until we see the results of + the latest photography.

+

Mr. Johnson: Is it fair to say that the September 3 photography showed, + in gross terms, a leveling off in activity?

+

Adm. Moorer: We are talking + about two different things. The Egyptians are talking about the number + of missiles. We are talking about the number of sites. We will never + agree on this basis. There is no question that they have increased their + capability although, in strict terms, they may not have actually + increased the number of missiles. They have certainly violated the + spirit of the agreement if not the letter.

+

Mr. Kissinger: Is it correct to + say that there has been an increase in occupied sites in a range between + 7 and 20, and probably between 13 and 20?

+

Mr. Helms: Yes.

+

Mr. Sisco: The Egyptians say they + have not brought in any additional missiles after the cease-fire began. + While they could have done it in the first few hours after the + cease-fire, it is possible that they already had some missiles somewhere + nearby, possibly in storage, or at least not in these positions. We are + in a bad position to disprove the Egyptian contention that they did not + bring any missiles into the zone after the cease-fire. There is no + question, however, that they have improved their position and increased + their capability.

+

Mr. Mitchell: Wasn’t this the + point of the agreement?

+

Mr. Kissinger: Under that + interpretation, they could be building 50 new sites. We have no way to + disprove their contention that they didn’t have to move them into the + zone.

+

Mr. Sisco: I see three elements + as a basis for renegotiation: (1) a partial roll-back of missiles; (2) a + new categorical assurance from the Egyptians that they have not and will + not introduce new missiles into the zone; (3) a commitment from the + Egyptians that there will not be any movement of missiles within the + zone.

+

The Chief of Israeli Intelligence, General Yariv, believes the Russians and Egyptians probably had + a definite plan to distribute these missiles throughout the area by a + creeping process. The cease-fire caught them on a short time fuse. You + recall they asked for a 24-hour delay. The Israelis believe they had not completed their plan and + needed a few more hours or days to put it into effect. Interestingly + enough, they do not consider that Nasser went into the agreement in bad faith. If there is + some roll-back and Nasser gives + the two assurances concerning introduction of new missiles and movement + of missiles within the zone, Nasser will probably ask for some assurance that the + missiles will not be clobbered by the Israelis in a surprise attack. The + US cannot guarantee the action of either side, but we can make it clear + that there must be an agreement on a standstill if we are to have an + agreement on a cease-fire. Both sides could then reaffirm their + agreement. At the risk of seeming too optimistic, I think this is + do-able over the next two weeks, since I am convinced no one wants the + situation to blow up.

+

Mr. Packard: I agree with this + reasoning.

+

Mr. Johnson: Dayan has invited + this kind of approach.

+

Mr. Sisco: Referring to the + proposed package on page 9 of the assistance paper,See footnote 4, Document + 153. we cannot give the Israelis full satisfaction + since we are not entirely sure what was there at the time of the + cease-fire. We could tell them, however, that while we can only get this + much of what they want, here is an additional arms package as + compensation. This package does not leave them at any disadvantage. It + is a very considerable compensation.

+

Mr. Packard: All evidence + indicates that the missile movement was underway before the cease-fire. + In present circumstances, the Israelis are better off now with the + August 14 arms package.

+

Mr. Kissinger: But we have sold + them that package three times.

+

Adm. Moorer: They should + realize, also, that even if the missiles are withdrawn, it only takes a + few hours to restore them.

+

Mr. Sisco: We must recognize, + however, that this is a serious internal political problem for the + Israelis.

+

Mr. Kissinger: Where does the + August 14 package stand? Are the items moving?

+

Mr. Packard: All items are + available within 90 days. They are moving.

+

Mr. Pranger: The contracts have + just been signed, but there have been no deliveries as yet.

+

Mr. Johnson: But we are going ahead on the September planes.

+

Mr. Pranger: We will begin + airshipping the material now that the contracts have been signed.

+ +

Mr. Kissinger: In July, the + President and the Secretary of State agreed to do something about + getting Shrikes to the Israelis.Not + found. During his recent conversation with Rabin, the President asked General + Haig to make sure that the + equipment moves.See Document 151.

+

Mr. Packard: There are some + problems, however—for example, they don’t have enough aircraft to + deliver the Shrikes.

+

Mr. Kissinger: Could you give us + a delivery schedule?

+

Mr. Mitchell: Have the Israelis + complained about deliveries?

+

Mr. Sisco: Yes.

+

Mr. Pranger: There was no Defense + Department commitment until the end of August.

+

Mr. Packard: We moved on the + package the week after my August 14 discussion with Rabin.

+

Mr. Kissinger: But the President + thinks he ordered it in early July. We do need a delivery schedule.

+

Mr. Packard: We are moving as fast + as possible. You can’t just pull these items off the shelf.

+

Mr. Kissinger: Can we get a + recommendation on any additional package? We can, of course, make a + negative recommendation.

+

Mr. Packard: This package (the one + attached to the Assistance paper in the book) might be enough. The + limiting factors are the numbers of CBU–24s and Shrikes. We have given + them 150 CBU–24s. Figuring conservatively, they may use four per site, + thus enabling them to take out some 37 sites. Do we want to give them + more CBUs? As many as would be required + to take out 100 sites? There is another alternative—to give them some + 175mm artillery which has a 32-kilometer range. This would give them + superiority in artillery across the Canal which they could use to + neutralize the nearer sites. Other than that, there isn’t much we can + do.

+

Mr. Mitchell: Do we know what + they have asked for?

+

Mr. Kissinger: Friday afternoon + the President asked me to call Secretary Laird and tell him to double the package for Israel. I + suggested he put the issue into this group.

+

Mr. Johnson: This could be a part of the philosophy to deter them from + further moves in the zone.

+

Mr. Kissinger: It would both + compensate Israel and warn the Egyptians that this is a losing game.

+ +

Mr. Johnson: If the Egyptians level off their activity, and the present + arms package leaves the Israelis in a favorable position, is there a + need for an additional package?

+

Mr. Kissinger: I am prepared to + put these considerations in a cover memorandum to the President, but we + do owe him a package.

+

Mr. Packard: I don’t think we want + to go all the way with Walleyes, etc. We could, however, double the + number of missile sites they could handle for about $2 million.

+

Mr. Sisco: This would be Option 1 + on page 5 of the paper. I had understood the number of weapons in the + anti-SAM package was minimal in their capacity to suppress missile + sites.

+

Mr. Saunders: They could suppress + from 6–10 sites.

+

Mr. Kissinger: What good are 6–10 + sites?

+

Mr. Packard: That package contains + enough ammunition for 35–70 sites, depending on how many are used per + site.

+

Mr. Kissinger: Do you mean 6–10 + sites at one time?

+

Mr. Packard: I mean the number of + sites that could be suppressed while you are attacking them. They + wouldn’t take on 100 sites at once. It would be 6–10 sites in one + successful mission.

+

Adm. Moorer: They would need + more for a continuous attrition operation.

+

Mr. Sisco: If they could take out + 6 on one mission, a capacity for one mission is not enough. How much + more would they have?

+

Mr. Packard: Assuming it takes 4 + CBUs per site, they would have + enough for 37 sites.

+

Mr. Pranger: The 6–10 figure was + used originally because the Israelis said they wanted a one-time + capability to suppress the sites around Ismailia. The number was decided on the basis of a + one-time strike on sites within the normal bombing range. Now the + Israelis do not think this is sufficient.

+

Mr. Packard: The current package + contains many more CBU’s than they + would need for one strike.

+

(Mr. Kissinger left the room)

+

Mr. Pranger: We were very + generous for a one-time strike. To double the amounts would give them + more than double the capacity.

+

Mr. Packard: That would be awfully + generous.

+

Mr. Johnson: We are talking about what they could do in one + operation.

+

Mr. Pranger: The figures taken + for the planning factor were well above what they would need for 6–10 + strikes.

+

Mr. Packard: (to Mr. Johnson) Let + me draw you a picture of the way they could use the elements in the + special equipment package and the way in which it would provide them with additional capability. (In + an across-the-table conversation with Mr. Johnson, Mr. Packard drew a diagram and described + the sequence of an attack. The description was too cryptic to follow + without the diagram.)

+

(Mr. Kissinger returned)

+

Mr. Packard: The number of sites + that could be suppressed is determined by the number of missions flown. + They don’t have enough planes to attack 100 sites at one time. If we + double the number of CBU’s and Shrikes, + that should be all they need.

+

Mr. Kissinger: Could we have a + package by tomorrow morning, with a brief statement of what it would + accomplish. We will then move it to the President.

+

Mr. Sisco: We should understand + the political and psychological aspects of this package—it would be + compensation to Israel in a situation where we cannot fulfill the + standstill requirement adequately from the Israeli point of view.

+

Mr. Kissinger: We should meet + again tomorrowThe Ad Hoc Special Review + Group did not meet on September 9. on this subject—we can + tack the discussion onto the next meeting of this group.

+
+ +
+ 161. Editorial Note +

On September 6, 1970, Israel announced it would withdraw from talks under + UN Special Representative Gunnar Jarring’s supervision due to + what an Israeli communiqué described as grave and continuing violations + of the cease-fire agreement. (Telegram 1845 from USUN, September 9; National Archives, + Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC + Files, Box 1156, Saunders Files, Middle East Negotiations Files, June + Initiative Vol. IV, August 28-November 15, 1970) Little more than two + weeks earlier, on August 24, Jarring had announced at the United Nations that the + Governments of Israel, Jordan, and the United Arab Republic had + appointed representatives for discussions that were intended to reach an + “agreement on the establishment of a just and lasting peace in the + Middle East.” (Telegram 1734 from USUN, August 24; ibid.) Israel’s September 8 communiqué + explained: “The strictest observance of the ceasefire-standstill + agreement is one of the central elements of the American peace + initiative and of the talks under the auspices of Amb Jarring. Therefore, so long as the + ceasefire-standstill agreement + is not observed in its entirety, and the original situation restored, + Israel will not be able to participate in these talks.”

+

In Jordan, the government and the fedayeen were approaching open + conflict. On September 2, Kissinger sent a memorandum to Nixon informing him that + “Fedayeen-controlled Palestine Liberation Army units attached to the + Iraqi Army, the Al Qadissiya Forces” had moved into Amman that day and + that regular Iraqi units had “moved into positions alongside Fedayeen + units.” Jordanian and fedayeen forces had already begun to exchange + fire, and the Embassies in Amman and Beirut reported that King Hussein was considering a declaration + of martial law. (Ibid., Box 615, Country Files, Jordan, Vol. V) The + crisis escalated September 6 to 9 when the Popular Front for the + Liberation of Palestine hijacked four airplanes and forced three of them + to land at Dawson’s Field, an airport 20 miles from King Hussein’s palace. By September 16, a + full-scale civil war was underway, attracting other regional actors, + including Syria, which positioned troops along its border for a possible + invasion of Jordan in defense of the Palestinian guerrillas, and Israel, + which was ready to support Hussein’s regime by force if necessary. The episode + ended on September 25 with the government’s suppression and dispersal of + the fedayeen, an event commonly referred to as “Black September” by + Palestinians and other Arabs. Extensive documentation on the Nixon administration’s response to the + Jordan crisis is printed in Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, volume XXIV, + Middle East Region and Arabian Peninsula, 1969–1972; Jordan, + September 1970.

+
+ +
+ + 162. Memorandum of ConversationSource: National Archives, Nixon Presidential + Materials, White House Special Files, President’s Office Files, Box + 82, Presidential Meetings. Top Secret; Sensitive. The meeting took + place in the Oval Office and lasted until 12:32 p.m. (Ibid., White + House Central Files, President’s Daily Diary) Nixon approved the meeting with + Meir on an August 18 + memorandum from Kissinger. + (Ibid., NSC Files, Box 607, Country + Files, Israel, Vol. VI) According to an August 17 memorandum from + Kissinger to Nixon, Meir was unwilling to begin negotiations on Middle + East peace until she met personally with the President and + established a “clear understanding” with him on “1) boundaries; 2) + future actions with respect to the Soviets; and 3) future U.S. arms + decisions.” Apparently, she told Rabin: “It is time for a moment of truth between our + governments.” (Ibid., White House Special Files, President’s Office + Files, Box 82, Presidential Meetings) Haldeman wrote that Kissinger “pled” with him to keep Rogers out of the meeting with + Meir “on grounds he’s + most hated man in Israel and would be a disaster.” Kissinger offered to “stay out” if + it meant that Rogers would + also not attend the meeting, and when Haldeman raised the issue with Nixon, “he agreed.” (Haldeman + Diaries, Multimedia Edition, September 10, + 1970) + Washington, September 18, 1970, 11 + a.m. + + PARTICIPANTS + + U.S. Side + + President Nixon + Assistant Secretary of State Joseph + Sisco + Brigadier General Alexander M. + Haig, Deputy Assistant to the President for National + Security Affairs + + Israeli Side + + Prime Minister Golda + Meir + Ambassador Rabin + Political Adviser Simcha + Dinitz + +

Following photographs, President Nixon opened the meeting by stating to the Prime + Minister that he was conscious of the difficulties that cease-fire + violations had caused Israel. He was not naive, he said, about Soviet + motives and actions with respect to the Middle East situation. He + pointed out that he had been following the Egyptian–Soviet violations + closely, and that when the violations first surfaced he had had General + Haig call Ambassador + Rabin from San Clemente to + inform him that the United States would, in response, increase the + military assistance package that we had provided to Israel to combat the + new missile threat.

+

The Prime Minister responded that, in her view, the U.S. response to the + Israeli reports of cease-fire cheating was slow, and our initial + acquiescence encouraged additional violations. Ambassador Rabin added that while the U.S. had + indicated that it would provide additional anti-SAM equipment, the U.S. + side had continually reduced the size of the aid package prepared in + response to Israeli requests. The package on SHRIKE missiles, for example, was cut + from the 100 requested down to 40, and the package on CBUs was also reduced.

+

The President then asked General Haig if this was true. General Haig replied that it was correct that + we arrived at a figure of 40 SHRIKE missiles, and that the new anti-SAM + package which the U.S. had decided to provide subsequent to the + cease-fire amounted essentially to a doubling of the first anti-SAM + package.

+

Ambassador Rabin stated that + this new package was still qualitatively and quantitatively inadequate, + especially since the Soviets had now introduced a new type of SAM–2 against which the current model of + the SHRIKE was ineffective. The Prime Minister added that Israel was + aware of a newer production model SHRIKE which would be more effective + and which they urgently required.

+

The President thereupon instructed General Haig to take immediate action to insure that the entire + issue was carefully reviewed on a priority basis jointly between the + Israelis and U.S. representatives, so that a more responsive package + could be developed.See Document 163.

+

Assistant Secretary Sisco + commented that the problem involved not only quantities of weapons, but + also the kinds of military assistance that should be given and the + strategy which Israel should adopt to best meet the changing threat.

+

The President then asked about the follow-on military requirements for + 1971. Both sides, he said, should work together to develop an + appropriate military program for Israel. He instructed General Haig to insure that this was done on + a priority basis.

+

After expressing Israel’s gratitude for all the assistance and support + which the United States has provided, the Prime Minister described the + circumstances under which Israel had accepted the U.S. initiative. The + Israeli Cabinet had been split on the acceptability of the U.S. + initiative, she noted. In fact, they had decided not to accept the + proposal because the U.S. initiative appeared to embrace the so-called + “Rogers Plan.” But after + this decision to reject the U.S. initiative was made, President + Nixon’s letter arrived + urging Israel to accept.See Document 136. On the basis of the + President’s letter, the Prime Minister was able to assemble a majority + of votes; only then did Israel accept the U.S. proposal. As a result of + these Cabinet deliberations, the six members of the Gahal Party resigned + from the Government. While this was not a critical event, in her view, + it was a reflection of the difficult internal situation she faced.

+

No sooner had Israel accepted the U.S. initiative, the Prime Minister + continued, than the other side undertook to violate the provisions of the cease-fire by the + forward movement of SAM missiles into + the cease-fire zone.

+

The Prime Minister then asked Ambassador Rabin to explain to President Nixon the specific violations which + Israel had uncovered. Ambassador Rabin spread three maps on the rug before the President. + Using the first of these, he pointed out the situation as Israeli + intelligence carried it on August 11. At this time, according to + Ambassador Rabin, there were + only six SA–2s and two SA–3s in the cease-fire zone. On the next map, + which depicted the situation six days later, he pointed out eight SA–2s. + Finally, turning to the third map, depicting the situation on September + 13, Ambassador Rabin pointed to + nine SA–2s within the 30 kilometer zone and 22 more SA–2s within the 50 + kilometer zone. He added that there were no additional SA–3s within the + 50 kilometer zone, three of which were within the 30 kilometer zone.

+

Ambassador Rabin stated there + were 129 sites now constructed within the cease-fire zone, of which 27 + contained units and 27 were dummy positions. The Prime Minister + explained that the Soviet-Egyptian tactics involved the constant + shifting of missiles between sites.

+

The Prime Minister then stated that there was strong opposition in Israel + to the so-called “Rogers Plan” + and the specific border changes which that plan visualized.

+

President Nixon replied that + there was no “Rogers Plan” as + such. Prime Minister Meir stated + that the real point of contention involved Israel’s borders. Israel + accepted the formulation that the President himself had stated when he + referred to a return to “defensible borders.” Anyone who had seen the + Golan Heights, she continued, could not expect Israel to relinquish them + to the Arabs. She stated that the real difficulty developed in Israel + when the preamble of the U.S. initiative was finalized. Israel’s + problems were not a result of the Arabs but due entirely to the Soviet + Union. Russia, she stated, was not concerned with the interests of + either the Arabs or the Israelis but only her own interests in expanding + Red influence in the Middle East. It was Soviet military equipment and + Soviet presence which had changed the situation. Egyptians cannot + operate SA–3 missiles. Soviet personnel were interspersed at all levels + of decision within the Egyptian military and Soviet pilots had been + active over the Canal. In fact, she stated, Israeli pilots had met the + Soviets in air-to-air combat, and while she was pleased with the outcome + of these engagements, Israel did not welcome confrontations with the + Soviet Union.

+

Ambassador Rabin added that the + Soviets had now provided new 8-inch type artillery with greater + destruction capability, as well as longer range 152mm guns. The missile + complex which had been installed during the cease-fire now extends beyond the East Bank, and + the military situation has been drastically changed.

+

The Prime Minister stated that the strategic situation had changed during + the period of the cease-fire. She mentioned that Defense Minister + Moshe Dayan, who so many + think of as a Hawk, had been at the East Bank several days ago and had + told her how wonderful it was to have the guns silenced. It was the + Soviet action that caused the problem and not a lack of Israeli + goodwill. While the Israelis favor peace in the area, they cannot accept + the situation as it now stands nor can they enter into negotiations with + a Russian pistol in the form of SAM + missiles at their head. The Prime Minister stated that the U.S. did not + seem to be as concerned as it should be about the violations, at least + initially, and that, in her opinion, the U.S. should now go to the + Soviets directly and demand an adjustment of the situation if the + negotiations are to continue.

+

President Nixon pointed out that + indeed we had already, quietly through diplomatic channels, made strong + démarches to the Soviets.See footnote 10, Document 157. He + wanted Mrs. Meir to understand + five principal points:

+

1. The United States Government is under no illusions as to Soviet intent + and involvement in the Middle East. He referred the Prime Minister to + his statements of September 17 in Chicago in which he clearly recognized + Soviet culpability.In his memoirs, + Kissinger recounted that + while speaking at an off-the-record meeting with the editors of the + Chicago Sun-Times on September 17, + Nixon stated that he + would respond to Soviet adventures along the Suez Canal. “We will + intervene if the situation is such that our intervention will make a + difference.” Kissinger + added: “It was too much to expect that such sensational news could + be kept off the record. The Sun-Times ran the + exact quote in an early edition. Though it was then withdrawn when + Ziegler insisted on the + off-the-record rule, this only heightened its foreign policy + impact.” (White House Years, pp. + 614–615)

+

2. The U.S. recognized that there had to be some rectification with + respect to the forward movement of the Egyptian-Soviet missiles.

+

3. He wished to reaffirm the U.S. intent not to permit the military + balance in the Middle East to be disturbed.

+

4. The U.S. was prepared to work jointly with Israel in developing an + appropriate military package for 1971 which would include aircraft and + other military equipment, whether it might be tanks or artillery or + whatever was appropriate for the strategy which Israel should adopt.

+

5. The U.S. recognized Israel’s economic problem and their need for + additional credits.

+

The President asked Assistant Secretary Sisco where this particular item stood. Assistant + Secretary Sisco replied that the + recent passage of the Jackson AmendmentSee footnote 5, Document + 157. would now enable the U.S. to come up with a + specific figure and program in Israel’s support. He expected to have an + overall dollar figure for the President’s approval very shortly.

+

In conclusion, the President stated that the Prime Minister can be + assured that all of Israel’s requirements would receive “sympathetic + consideration.” The President then asked Prime Minister Meir what Israel’s thinking was on the + Jordan situation,See Document 161. saying that he hoped Israel would do + nothing precipitously, since it was important that both the U.S. and + Israel do nothing which would make King Hussein’s position untenable in the Arab world.

+

The Prime Minister replied that Israel would not move precipitously with + respect to the Jordanian situation and preferred to have the King solve + the problem himself. Israel had no intention of breaking the cease-fire, + she said. The cease-fire would be adhered to by Israel unless it were + broken by the other side. She stated, however, that if the Egyptians and + Soviets started to move their artillery forward along the Canal under + the umbrella of their new missile defense, Israel would move—emphasizing + that she wanted the President to be completely apprised of Israel’s + intentions in this regard. Israel cannot talk now, however, she added; + the missile situation had to be corrected.

+

The President replied that this will take time and that Israel should be + willing to discuss the situation.

+

The Prime Minister stated that the border settlement as formulated by the + U.S. was most difficult. Defensible borders had to be the criteria. + However, negotiations cannot be conducted with a pistol at Israel’s + head, and negotiations can only be carried out by equals. This was not + true in view of the current Soviet involvement.

+

The President then asked the Prime Minister to remain with him briefly + while the remainder of the party proceeded through the West Portico. The + President and the Prime Minister remained in private conversation for + approximately 15 minutes.No record of this + private conversation has been found.

+
+ +
+ + 163. Memorandum From President Nixon to Secretary of State Rogers and Secretary of Defense LairdSource: Washington National Records Center, OSD Files: FRC 330–76–0076, Box 8, + Israel. Top Secret; Nodis. Copies were sent to Helms and Moorer. + Washington, September 23, 1970. + + SUBJECT + Follow-up Actions with Israel + +

As a follow-up to my conversation with Prime Minister Meir,See + Document 162. will you please + assure that discussions take place promptly with Israeli representatives + to develop (a) a suitable further package of military equipment to + offset the military advantages gained by the UAR in violations of the military standstill and (b) + recommendations for Israel’s longer term equipment needs in US FY 1971 and 1972. In these discussions, + sympathetic attention should be given to Israel’s requirements.See Document + 167.

+

A first set of discussions, to be held this week if at all possible under + the aegis of the Deputy Secretary of Defense, should be arranged to + develop an anti-missile package. The following should be covered in + these discussions:

+

1. The equipment provided to date for use against the surface-to-air + missile complex in the UAR should be + reviewed as to quantity and quality and possible additions should be + identified.

+

2. Complementary or alternative Israeli strategies for defending the Suez + cease-fire line until it is replaced with permanent borders should be + discussed (a) in relation to the anti-missile package and (b) with a + view to establishing a framework for determining what other additional + equipment Israel may need (e.g. artillery, aircraft, armor) over the + longer term.

+ +

A recommendation on this package with alternatives should be submitted by + October 2.See Document + 166. Although the contents may overlap, development + of this package should not delay immediate preparation of the + contingency package in connection with WSAG planning on the current Jordan crisis.

+

A subsequent meeting should be called to hear a presentation of Israel’s + longer term equipment requirements. The interagency group that has been + used for this purpose in the past, chaired by the Assistant Secretary of + State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, should be convened for + this presentation.

+

A recommendation on this package with alternatives should be submitted by + October 23.

+

Memoranda containing these recommendations should be forwarded through + the NSC Interdepartmental Group for + Near East to the Chairman, NSC Senior + Review Group by the dates specified.

+ + + Richard Nixon + + +
+ +
+ 164. National Security Study Memorandum 103Source: National Archives, Nixon + Presidential Materials, NSC Files, + NSC Institutional Files + (H-Files), Box H–175, National Security Study Memoranda. Secret; + Nodis. A copy was sent to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. + On November 13, Kissinger + issued NSSM 105, an addendum to + NSSM 103, which asked that a + paper be prepared on the status of the U.S. response to a list of + Israeli requests for economic assistance. (Library of Congress, + Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CL–316, National Security + Council, National Security Study Memoranda) + Washington, September 26, 1970. + + TO + The Secretary of State + The Secretary of Defense + The Director of Central Intelligence + + + SUBJECT + Future Options in the Middle East + +

The President has directed that a review of our options in the Middle + East be conducted quickly before resumption of any significant + diplomatic activity in connection with efforts to produce a diplomatic + settlement.

+

This review should take into account violations of the military + standstill agreement, recent developments in Jordan and Soviet + actions.

+

The President has directed that a memorandum containing the results of + this review be submitted to the Senior Review Group by October 8, 1970, + through the NSC–IG–Near East.An analytical + summary of the memorandum is Document 170. The Senior Review Group + and the Washington Special Actions Group met in a combined session + to discuss the Middle East on October 9; see Document 168.

+ + + Henry A. Kissinger + + +
+
+ +
+ + The Interim Settlement Proposal +
+ 165. Editorial Note +

United Arab Republic President Gamal Abdel + Nasser died of a heart attack on September 28, 1970, at + age 52. His Vice President, - + Sadat, immediately took over as interim ruler, and began + sending signals to U.S. officials that he wanted to improve U.S.–UAR + relations. During Nasser’s + funeral on October 1, Sadat met + privately with Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare Elliot Richardson, the highest-ranking + American official in attendance, and told him that under his direction + Egypt planned to become much more closely aligned to the West. (Telegram + 2262 from Cairo, October 3; National Archives, Nixon Presidential + Materials, NSC Files, Box 637, Country + Files, Middle East, UAR) Two days later, in a meeting with Donald Bergus, Chargé d’Affaires in + Cairo, Sadat reiterated that he + wanted a friendly relationship with Washington. Following his meeting + with Sadat, Bergus reported to the Department of + State that he “found it hard to believe that this was the same man who + had indulged in so much plain anti-American rabble-rousing in public + meetings throughout Egypt during the first six months of this year,” + adding that Sadat stressed his + and Egypt’s “feeling of friendship” for the United States (Beattie, Egypt During the Sadat Years, page 53)

+

Nixon administration officials + questioned whether Sadat would be + around long enough to see these promises through. On September 28, + Harold Saunders of the + National Security Council Staff wrote in a memorandum to Kissinger that while the + constitutional successor was Vice President Sadat, “it seems likely that some sort of collective + leadership would take over while potential leaders jockey for control.” + Even more likely, Saunders + added, was that “some other military leader would eventually assume the + real power since it seems unlikely that a purely civilian leader alone + could consolidate control.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential + Materials, NSC Files, Box 636, Country + Files, Middle East, UAR) On October 12, after the Egyptian National + Assembly officially nominated Sadat as President, Kissinger sent a memorandum to Nixon offering his assessment of the + new Egyptian President:

+

“Why Sadat?

+

“As a member of Nasser’s original + revolutionary group, and because Nasser named him Vice President in December 1969, + Sadat brings an aura of + legitimacy and continuity to the succession and to the presidency. He + lacks, however, Nasser’s + charisma and as a perennial figurehead in the government with a lackluster record of public + service he also lacks widespread respect and authority. Sadat’s greatest claim to leadership + would seem to rest on his extreme nationalism, his long record of loyal, + if unspectacular service to Nasser and to the apparent fact that he is acceptable to + both pro-Soviet and more moderate factions.

+

“Given Sadat’s character and + background it is unlikely that he achieved ASU endorsement on his own. He fits the general + qualifications acceptable to the senior military officers—that the new + president be a member of Nasser’s original revolutionary group—but there is no + evidence that he is the army’s man. We do not yet know who specifically + backed Sadat but it seems likely + that his selection rests upon the support of other influential Egyptian + political figures. There are indications that former Vice President and + Soviet supporter Ali Sabri may have figured heavily in Sadat’s selection as well as the + powerful Interior Minister Sharawi Jumah. They may have found Sadat’s selection the most convenient + way of blocking selection of a stronger rival like the more moderate + Zakaria Muhiedin. Others among the top leadership who may have played + important roles in the succession struggle include Nasser’s shadowy intelligence adviser + Sami Sharaf, propaganda chief + Haykal, War Minister Fawzi and + Foreign Minister Riad.

+

“Sadat’s + Supporters

+

“It is, of course, impossible to determine at this point specifically who + will ultimately hold the reins of power in Egypt. So far the military + appears to have remained on the sidelines in terms of actually running + the government, but it will exert considerable influence, if not a de + facto veto, on decisions directly affecting its interests. Sadat may turn out to be more than a + front man and as a probable compromise choice will still have some + important influence, but the men around him will undoubtedly be more + influential than those Nasser + kept around.” (Memorandum from Kissinger to Nixon, October 12; ibid.)

+

President Nixon sent Sadat a letter on October 14, writing: + “As a leader, President Nasser + did much to shape the destiny of his nation and the history of his era. + It is significant to us that in his final days, he looked toward the + prospects for peace as offered in the United States proposal for a + limited cease-fire and for talks between the parties to the Arab-Israeli + conflict. We are encouraged by that constructive choice and by your + assurances to Secretary Richardson that under your leadership, the United Arab + Republic will continue to pursue these goals. The achievement of those + goals is among the highest hopes of my country as well.” (Ibid., Box + 763, Presidential Correspondence 1969–1974, UAR President Anwar + Sadat, Vol. I)

+
+ +
+ + 166. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security + Affairs (Kissinger) to President + NixonSource: National Archives, Nixon + Presidential Materials, NSC Files, + NSC Institutional Files + (H-Files), Box H–219, National Security Decision Memoranda. Secret. + Sent for action. Tabs A–C are not attached. All brackets are in the + original. + Washington, October + 9, 1970. + + SUBJECT + Financial Assistance for Israel + +

You will recall from your talk with her that Prime Minister Meir has requested $500–600 million in + financial assistance.See Document 162. Ambassador Rabin has since written to Secretary + Laird [Tab C] pinpointing + that figure at $519 million in FY 1971 + (including $119 million that seems to be dying with the Foreign Military + Sales Act).The law, passed in 1968, + separated foreign military sales from the Foreign Assistance Act of + 1961.

+

In purely economic terms, there is room for some argument over whether + that much assistance from the U.S. is justified at a time when you are + making an extraordinary effort to hold our budget deficit down. The + Israeli economy continues to grow at a rate in excess of 12%, and the + corrective fiscal policy measures taken by the Israeli government have + been unsuccessful in coping with the widening foreign exchange gap. + Therefore, while the main Israeli financial problem is caused by defense + purchases, civilian imports continue unchecked.

+

On the political side, however, there is of course strong argument for + meeting a substantial portion of Israel’s requirement. The main point is + the need to maintain continuing support for Israel’s military position + if Israel is to be in a position of strength from which to + negotiate.

+

There have been two issues—the exact level of + assistance and the terms on which it should be offered.

+

There are two recommendations on the level of + assistance:

+

1. $400 million is the figure that can be fully + justified as covering all equipment the U.S. has committed to date. Mr. + Weinberger recommends this figure [Tab B]. He + feels that letting Israel pay cash for purchases beyond this level would + put the Administration in a position to argue with the Congress that + Israel would be tightening its own belt at the same time. Israel with + its 12% growth rate and rising civilian imports has not done this. If + more were needed for purchases later this year an additional + appropriation could be requested. The Treasury + Department concurs in recommending this $400 million option. In + terms of budgetary impact, this + option would produce an estimated $130 million increase in FY 1971 outlays.

+

2. $500 million is the figure recommended by + Secretary Rogers and concurred in by Secretary Laird + [Tab A].A copy of Rogers’s September 26 memorandum, + entitled “U.S. Financial Assistance to Israel,” is in the Washington + National Records Center, OSD Files: + FRC 330–76–0076, Box 8, Israel. Laird concurred on that memorandum. Their + arguments are:

+

—It will be better to cover all Israel’s probable needs for this year in + one appropriation request. The Israelis will see it as ungrudging + support. It is better to take the heat in the Arab world just once, and + now is as good a time as any with the UAR on the defensive as a result of standstill + violations.

+

—Israel will need the full $500 million and probably more. If the limit + is set at that figure now, we can insist that Israel cover the rest as + its austerity measure.

+

—This is the right time tactically to put this to the Congress.

+

The budgetary impact of this option would be to produce an estimated $150 + million in FY 1971 outlays.

+

There are two recommendations on the terms of + assistance:

+

1. 7½%, 20-year repayment, 5-year grace period. + The interest rate—essentially the same as offered under the Foreign + Military Sales Act—would avoid setting the precedent of a concessionary + rate for a country with a per capita GNP higher than Italy’s. The long repayment period and the + grace period would recognize Israel’s balance of payments problem. This + is Mr. Weinberger’s recommendation.

+

2. Provide the first $350 million at 3%, 5-year grace + period and 20-year repayment; provide the remaining $150 million at 7½% with 10-year repayment (Foreign + Military Sales Act terms). This is the recommendation of Secretaries Rogers and + Laird.

+

Whichever level and whatever terms you approve, the decision would be + communicated to the Congress as an appropriations request under the + Jackson Amendment to the + Defense Procurement Act.See footnote 5, Document 157. Since + this comes out of a different series of committees from the military + assistance appropriations, Secretary Rogers proposes moving this request before Congress + recesses for the pre-election period. It is important to Israel to have + this appropriation because some $200 million in payments fall due before + the end of the year.

+

Recommendation: That you authorize an + appropriations request for $500 million on the concessionary terms + recommended by Secretaries Rogers and Laird.Nixon approved the recommendation. + See Document 171.

+
+ +
+ + 167. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security + Affairs (Kissinger) to President + NixonSource: National Archives, Nixon + Presidential Materials, NSC Files, + NSC Institutional Files + (H-Files), Box H–219, National Security Decision Memoranda. Top + Secret; Nodis. Sent for action. All brackets are in the + original. + Washington, October + 9, 1970. + + SUBJECT + Anti-SAM Package for Israel + +

Following up your instructions,See Document 163. Mr. Packard, General Ryan and their + specialists met with the chief of Israel’s air force and General + Dayan’s deputy September + 28–30 to discuss the equipment Israel had requested for possible use + against the missile complex in the UAR.

+

The result of these discussions was the package described below (and in + detail in Mr. Packard’s memo at + Tab A).Packard’s October 3 memorandum to Nixon (Tab A) is attached but not + printed. Entitled “Follow-up Actions with Israel,” it recommended + that the United States furnish Israel with the most effective + equipment available and included a list of weapons that could and + should be provided and a list of those that could not and should not + be provided. The anti-missile equipment would total $55 + million. Four C–130 transport aircraft would add $20 million, and + reconnaissance drones—if technical arrangements could be worked + out—would add $15 million more.

+

Ambassador Rabin has expressed + general satisfaction with the package that Mr. Packard has recommended.In an October 5 memorandum to Kissinger, Haig wrote: “I have spoken to + Ambassador Rabin and got + the distinct impression that the Israelis are delighted with the + outcome, although they would like to have the two tankers mentioned + in Packard’s memorandum as + well as one or two other pieces of electronic gear. On balance, + however, it is obvious that the Defense response has been + forthcoming and constructive and one which should go a long way to + alleviate residual problems with Israel.” (National Archives, Nixon + Presidential Materials, NSC Files, + Box 608, Country Files, Middle East, Israel, Vol. VII) He + seems satisfied that where Israel was not given all it asked for it is + because the U.S. has legitimate requirements of its own that must be met + first or because equipment to provide the capability Israel requested is + still in the research and development stage.

+

Before you review the details, there is one broad issue that you will + want to be aware of. It is not an argument against approving the + package; it is a point which should be understood about its limits.

+

The judgment of most of our weapons specialists is that this + package—which includes almost all of our most sophisticated equipment—will not prevent losses + which would be significant to Israel’s limited supply of pilots and + planes and will therefore not enable the Israeli Air Force to attack + continuously across the Canal in the missile zone. These judgments have + been discussed openly with the Israelis. The Israelis discount them, + perhaps because they have not had experience with this equipment. There + remains the danger, therefore, that they may be drawn into attacks on + the basis of loss estimates which may be over-optimistic.

+

There is little more to do now than to note this problem. In the slightly + longer run, however, some limited research and development work could + produce an improved capability for our forces and theirs. Mr. Packard is exploring these + possibilities.

+

The Package

+

Mr. Packard has divided the list + of Israeli requests into the following categories in making his + recommendations:

+

1. Items which he recommends should be approved in + principle and provided in the full quantities requested by Israel or + (in a few instances) in the numbers available. [Tab B of Mr. + Packard’s memo.]

+

a. Those items for approval in the quantities + requested include cluster bombs, SHRIKES for use against the + old SA–2, WALLEYE munition providing pinpoint accuracy from standoff + position), a variety of bombs and mines, air-to-air missiles, some + jamming equipment.

+

b. Those items for approval in less than the quantities + requested include mainly four types of very sophisticated + jamming equipment. Mr. Packard + says that providing more than he recommends would delay equipping of + USAF aircraft. There is one other + item in this category—an advanced version of the SHRIKE usable against + the new SA–2. Mr. Packard says + providing more than recommended (20 of 100 requested) would draw U.S. + supply below an acceptable level.

+

2. Items requested which Mr. Packard recommends not be provided + for special reasons. These include:

+

a. Two kinds of bombs that could be launched from stand-off positions. + Mr. Packard has approved the + WALLEYE which has this capability but recommends against these two + principally because the USAF is short + of them in Southeast Asia.

+

b. An advanced SHRIKE for use against the newest SA–2. This is just now + entering the USAF inventory.

+

c. One new jammer which the USAF has + only in limited quantity represents our most advanced technology which + Defense recommends not be subjected to compromise.

+

d. REDEYE missiles. These are man-carried air defense missiles. Defense + is much concerned that our introducing them in Israel could induce the USSR to introduce their comparable weapon in Southeast Asia + against our helicopters. They also argue that Israel’s problem now is + not air defense.

+

e. RB–57 aircraft is not recommended because it would be too vulnerable + in the dense UAR/USSR missile complex.

+

3. Items on the Israeli list which are still in + research and development and not in production. Four jammers + fall in this category.

+

4. One item which is not recommended for political + reasons is the lease of 2 KC–97 L tankers for air-to-air + refueling. This would give Israel the capacity for extensive deep + penetration raids. It is not needed for raids in the Canal missile zone. + Defense recommends holding this request in abeyance for the time + being.

+

The above has been described in some detail to give you a concrete sense + of what has gone into this package. Most of those in State and Defense + and on my staff who have been involved—as well as Ambassador Rabin—feel this is a responsive + package that would serve the political purpose of compensating Israel + for the UAR gains as a result of the + standstill violations.

+

Political Considerations

+

In reviewing this package, you should be aware of these political points + in Mr. Packard’s cover + memorandum:

+

1. Mr. Packard says it was clear + in his discussions with the Israelis that the military representatives + at least do not favor beginning peace talks without a SAM rollback. The new UAR leadership seems unwilling to draw + back any of its missiles or to extend the cease-fire indefinitely + without some talks. If an impasse develops, Israel has made clear its + intention to attack all the missile sites across the Canal whether or + not the U.S. approves. Defense doubts Israel could succeed in forcing a + Soviet pullback and points out the danger of Soviet escalation. Mr. + Packard’s specialists + suggested other strategies but the Israelis were not overly + interested.

+

2. Mr. Packard recommends:

+

a. That the same conditions be attached to this as to the first + anti-missile package (i.e. Israel would not unilaterally break the + cease-fire with this equipment or use it beyond a 50 km. zone across the + Canal.)

+

b. That Israel agree to begin peace talks without a total missile + rollback.

+

The State Department agrees with Mr. Packard’s recommendations on the equipment package but + not with his recommendations for political conditions. State would not + recommend coupling this package with a request to Israel that it drop + its insistence on a missile rollback and agree to begin participation in + the Jarring talks. As State sees + it, the purpose of this package + is to fulfill our past assurance that we would do what we could to see + that Israel did not suffer a military disadvantage as a result of its + agreement to the cease-fire under the June peace initiative.

+

State earlier concurred in the condition that this equipment not be used + to break the cease-fire.

+

RecommendationsNixon approved all + three recommendations.

+

1. That you approve the equipment package Mr. Packard recommends as described above and in his memo + [Tab A].

+

2. That no new political conditions be attached and that the question of + conditions for beginning the talks be dealt with in the NSC system in the context of the review of + future options already ordered.

+

3. That earlier conditions on use of the equipment—not to be used in + breaking the cease-fire unilaterally and not to be used beyond the 50 + km. zone—be applied to this package.

+
+ +
+ + 168. Minutes of a Combined Senior Review Group and Washington Special + Actions Group MeetingSource: + National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–114, + Washington Special Actions Group, WASG Minutes (Originals) 1969 and + 1970. Top Secret; Nodis. The meeting was held in the White House + Situation Room. + Washington, October 9, 1970, + 2:40–3:10 p.m. + + SUBJECT + Jordan + + + PARTICIPANTS + Chairman—Henry A. + Kissinger + + State + + + U. Alexis Johnson + + + Talcott Seelye + + + Defense + + + David Packard + + + G. Warren Nutter + + + James H. Noyes + + + + CIA + + + Lt. Gen. Robert E. Cushman + David H. Blee + + JCS + + Gen. William Westmoreland + Lt. Gen. John Vogt + + NSC Staff + + Col. Richard + Kennedy + + Harold Saunders + + + Jeanne W. Davis + + +

SUMMARY OF DECISIONS

+

It was agreed to:

+

1. transfer responsibility for consideration of longer-term economic + assistance to the Under Secretaries Committee;NSC working group of Cabinet Under Secretaries that + produced studies for and made recommendations to the National + Security Council.

+

2. send a survey team to AmmanSee footnote 4, Document 191. to + discuss with the King the organization of his military forces, and + reexamine the two military assistance packages (the $40 million and $23 + million) in the light of these discussions;

+

3. instruct Ambassador BrownIn telegram 167542 to Amman, October 10. + (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 616, Country Files, + Middle East, Jordan, Vol. VI) to discuss with the King + certain financial questions particularly with regard to payment for + additional military assistance;

+

4. ask Brown for his + estimateNot found. of King’s + ability to preserve a peace settlement;

+ +

5. ask Brown to estimate the + longevity of the King in connection with the arms package and the impact + of the package on the preservation of a moderate government.

+

Mr. Kissinger: I thought we might + have a rundown on Jordan—where we go from here on. (to Gen. Cushman) Could you give us a report + on the situation?

+

Gen. Cushman: The King and the Army + appear to be ahead, at least for the short term. They have made a dent + in the Fedayeen capability to take over the Government, but not + necessarily in their capability for terrorist or guerrilla activities. + The Arab CommissionThe inter-Arab body that + oversaw adherence to the provisions of the Cairo Agreement that + ended the conflict between Jordan and the fedayeen at the end of + September. has had considerable success in getting the + Fedayeen out of the cities.

+

Mr. Kissinger: Is that a result + of the Commission’s talking or the weakness of the Fedayeen?

+

Gen. Cushman: Both.

+

Mr. Kissinger: If it is not a + result of Fedayeen weakness, why would they move out?

+

Mr. Seelye: Partly the effect of + the Arab meeting. Fatah is committed to the cease-fire because of the + Nasser mediation.A summit meeting of Arab leaders in Cairo, hosted + by Nasser, negotiated the + September 27 cease-fire that ended the Jordan crisis. See Foreign + Relations, 1969–1976, volume XXIV, Middle East Region + and Arabian Peninsula, 1969–1972; Jordan, September 1970, + Document 303, footnote 2, and Document 330.

+

Gen. Cushman: They are still operating + under the Nasser influence. + Also, Arafat gained recognition + by the Arab countries as the head of the Fedayeen movement. The more + radical Fedayeen, of course, will not like this. However, in the short + term, the King is in a better position than he was before the troubles. + There is some question of the loyalty of the Palestinians, given the + reports of high casualties, but we think they will probably cool + down.

+

Mr. Johnson: We are getting good stories from Amman that the casualties + were not as high as originally thought.

+

Mr. Kissinger: Do we have an + estimate?

+

Mr. Seelye: About 4500 all + together, with 500–1000 killed.

+

Mr. Kissinger: How many of these + were guerrillas?

+

Mr. Seelye: We don’t know; some + civilians got caught in between.

+

Mr. Kissinger: The artillery + can’t be very good since they were reported to be firing directly into + the refugee camps.

+

Gen. Cushman: But they were all dug + in.

+

Mr. Kissinger: They were + expecting it?

+ +

Mr. Seelye: Yes. Many of them had + evacuated in expectation of trouble.

+

Gen. Cushman: There is no complacency, + but the King is in a better position than when he started.

+

Mr. Johnson: We agree.

+

Mr. Kissinger: Is there any + estimate that the cease-fire might break down in the medium-term + future?

+

Mr. Seelye: Yes, I think there is + a good possibility that it will break down once the peace team leaves in + two or three weeks. It is particularly likely if the Fedayeen are not + withdrawn from all cities. They are still in two or three of the + northern cities.

+

Mr. Kissinger: What do they do + with them—put them in camps?

+

Mr. Seelye: Yes, the Jordanians + plan to deploy them to the west in camps.

+

Mr. Johnson: They would be sandwiched between Jordanian units.

+

Mr. Kissinger: How will they + react to this as an indefinite future?

+

Mr. Seelye: They won’t like + it.

+

Gen. Cushman: It is hard to say whether + the Fedayeen will turn their attention to Israel or will continue to + fight the Jordanian Army. The more radical elements may continue to + fight the Army.

+

Mr. Kissinger: Will they be + permitted to turn to Israel?

+

Gen. Cushman: That is part of the + agreement.

+

Mr. Packard: The key question is + whether there are any viable solutions to the Palestinian question.

+

Mr. Kissinger: I agree + absolutely—this is the key question. The President has issued a NSSM calling for a strategy paper.Document 164. For an analytical summary of + the paper, see Document 170. For an + analytical summary of the paper that deals entirely with the + Palestinian question, see Document 176. + For the Review Group meeting that considered the Palestinian + question, see Document 177.

+

Mr. Saunders: The IG is meeting + on this paper this afternoon.No record of + this meeting has been found.

+

Mr. Seelye: The King is now + talking in these terms.

+

Mr. Kissinger: The problem of the + Palestinian identity, and how to use it, must be addressed.

+

Mr. Packard: A lot of work has + been done on it, but it has not been brought into focus.

+

Mr. Johnson: We are doing that in this paper.

+

Mr. Kissinger: Is it our estimate + that the King is in a position to make an agreement which he can + enforce?

+ +

Mr. Seelye: We have passed the + buck to Ambassador Brown on that + and have asked for his estimate.

+

Gen. Cushman: We believe that for the + next month or so the King could defeat the Fedayeen if they resorted to + force to stop the cease-fire.

+

Mr. Kissinger: What if they + simply violate the cease-fire? Will the King be able to force his will + on the Fedayeen if, by doing so, he will be protecting Israel?

+

Gen. Cushman: Yes, over the next month + or two. Many Palestinians are fed up with the Fedayeen and will not + support them if they break the cease-fire.

+

Mr. Kissinger: I doubt if even + Joe Sisco can get an + agreement in a month.

+

Mr. Seelye: I think the King + might well continue on the path of negotiations if the “silent majority” + of Palestinians continue to support him. We had a definite indication + earlier that the majority of the Palestinians wanted a peace settlement. + It depends on how many of the Palestinians still favor a settlement.

+

Gen. Cushman: If the cease-fire holds + for a month or two, there is a question of the degree to which the + Fedayeen could rebuild their strength through help from Syria and + Iraq.

+

Mr. Kissinger: But aren’t they + being moved away from Syria and Iraq.

+

Mr. Seelye: Supposedly.

+

Mr. Kissinger: I saw a cable on + the trip that indicated the U.S. and the British were assessing the + situation differently.

+

Mr. Seelye: The British have + changed their original position. They are now talking in terms of the + King’s survival, even about the possibility of providing military + assistance, which they have never done before.

+

Mr. Johnson: (to Mr. Kissinger) I + think that is the result of your visit.Nixon and Kissinger met with Prime Minister + Edward Heath at Chequers in England on October 3. The record of + their conversation is printed in Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, volume + XLI, Western Europe; NATO, 1969–1972, Document + 329.

+

Mr. Kissinger: It was partly the + conversations with Home, but was also the fact that he was greatly + impressed by Hussein at Nasser’s funeral.

+

Gen. Cushman: Nasser, of course, was on the side of + the King in a peace settlement. The absence of Nasser now creates another unknown + factor.

+ +

Mr. Kissinger: We have also the + operational issues with regard to military assistance, relief, and + longer-term economic assistance. What is the military assistance + situation?

+

Mr. Packard: We have authorized 20 + airlift sorties of ammunition from their priority list. We have two + flights a day going into Dawson Field.An + airport in northern Jordan, 20 miles from King Hussein’s palace. We have + two problems when we consider the next step: what the Jordanians really + need, and how it will be paid for. We can work out the rest of + equipment, but the financing is another question. We are asking for $30 + million in the supplemental. We can sell for cash for 120 days and then + overlook non-payment for awhile, but not indefinitely. Someone should + talk to the King and find out what he can do in this regard.

+

Mr. Kissinger: We have two + separate packages: the $40 million artillery package plus an additional + $23 million for post-crisis assistance.

+

Mr. Packard: $3 million worth of + the $40 million package has already been shipped. The $22.8 million is a + new request.

+

Mr. Kissinger: Is this + essentially the contingency package we put together during the crisis + week?See Foreign + Relations, 1969–1976, volume XXIV, Middle East Region + and Arabian Peninsula, 1969–1972; Jordan, September 1970, + Document 303.

+

Mr. Saunders: It goes beyond + that. The contingency package is closer to the 20 airlift sorties of + ammunition.

+

Mr. Packard: The King wants more + mobility. He wants tanks and armored personnel carriers.

+

Gen. Westmoreland: The $23 million + package includes $8 million in ammunition, howitzers, trucks, 44 APC’s, + 26 tanks, and half a million in small arms, and $1 million in small arms + ammunition. We have no problems in supply. The more fundamental question + is whether this package provides for the type of force the King needs in + the present circumstances. In the $40 million package, he had asked for + 100 automated AA weapons and 248 artillery pieces. This is far more + artillery than he needs under present circumstances.

+

Mr. Packard: I think that we + should discuss this with the King before we make final deliveries on the + $40 million package in view of the change in circumstances.

+

Mr. Johnson: I agree.

+

Mr. Saunders: Only $3 million of + the $40 million package has been shipped.

+

Mr. Kissinger: Who put together + the $23 million package?

+ +

Mr. Seelye: The Jordanians + requested it in several batches through the Defense Attaché.

+

Gen. Westmoreland: There is a ship at + sea now with 12 8-inch howitzers and 155 tubes on board. We had planned + to send 155 SPC’s by water in November. Very little of the $40 million + package is enroute.

+

Mr. Kissinger: Are you suggesting + that we go ahead with the $23 million package and reexamine the $40 + million package?

+

Gen. Westmoreland: No, we should look at + both.

+

Mr. Kissinger: Would this be + acceptable to the King?

+

Gen. Westmoreland: The King has asked + for a survey team to look into his needs. He is having second thoughts + about the $40 million package.

+

Mr. Seelye: He was worried about + Israeli air raids when he asked for the $40 million package. Now he + wants equipment to make him more effective against the Fedayeen and + against Syria and Iraq.

+

Mr. Johnson: The King is taking a new look at the kind of force he needs. + Sending the survey team would be a logical next step. We also have to + talk to him on finances. The King could help out, given his strong + reserves position. If he could supply $11 million by January 1, this + would carry us until we can, hopefully, get a supplemental. This should + be feasible for the King. We have the draft telegrams instructing + Brown to offer the survey + team and to talk to the King on financing.

+

Mr. Packard: We could continue the + ammunition shipments which would give him some replenishment.

+

Mr. Kissinger: Is the survey team + necessary? Couldn’t we analyze the problem here and put together a + package just as well?

+

Gen. Westmoreland: I don’t think that + would be psychologically sound or practical. The Jordanian Army has good + officers. They would take exception to our telling them what they need + without consultation.

+

Mr. Kissinger: While we are + getting the answer from Ambassador Brown on the King’s ability to enforce peace, let’s also + get his estimate on the longevity of the King in connection with the + arms package. We don’t want to find ourselves arming the Fedayeen if + they should take over the Jordanian Army. While we are quite receptive + to the King’s request, our receptivity must be affected by an estimate + of his longevity. I understand, of course, that his longevity will be + affected by size and type of our assistance package.

+

Mr. Seelye: If the King goes, it + does not necessarily mean the Palestinians will take over.

+

Mr. Kissinger: When I referred to + the King I meant the moderate government structure.

+

On the relief operation, are we all agreed with the relief phase should + end toward the end of October? Otherwise, relief seems to be in good + shape.

+ +

All agreed.

+

Mr. Kissinger: What about + long-term economic assistance? (to Mr. Johnson) I would propose we shift + some of these operational items to the Under Secretaries Committee.

+

Mr. Johnson: The King’s long-term economic needs depend heavily on the + degree to which the Libyan and Kuwaiti subsidiesLibya, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia established a fund + in 1967 after the Arab-Israeli war to assist in the economic + recovery of the United Arab Republic and Jordan. Kuwait and Libya + suspended their annual subsidies to that fund in protest of the + Jordanian Army’s treatment of the fedayeen during the crisis in + September. are restored.

+

Mr. Seelye: The Libyans probably + will not restore their $25 million subsidy, but we hope the Kuwaiti will + restore their $40 million subsidy. The Saudi Arabian subsidy is still + okay.

+

Mr. Kissinger: If the Kuwaiti are + forthcoming, will there be a $25 million gap or have new gaps + developed?

+

Mr. Seelye: The existing + subsidies are based on a normal situation. The reconstruction period + will bring new needs. We are thinking about the IBRD and using some + PL–480 funds.

+

Mr. Kissinger: We need a coherent + program.

+

Mr. Seelye: We are working on + it.

+

Mr. Kissinger: This is not a + crisis situation and I think we should shift responsibility to the Under + Secretaries Committee. (to Mr. Saunders and Col. Kennedy) Let’s get a piece of paper which transfers + long-term economic assistance to the Under Secretaries Committee. We + will get the estimate from Brown + about the impact of the operation on the ability of a moderate Jordanian + government to preserve the peace; also an estimate of the impact of the + arms package on a moderate government. We should also send the telegrams + on the survey team and on the financial discussions with the King.

+

Mr. Johnson: We will get them out right away.

+
+ +
+ + 169. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security + Affairs (Kissinger) to President + NixonSource: National Archives, Nixon + Presidential Materials, NSC Files, + Box 656, Country Files, Middle East, Ceasefire Mideast Vol. II. + Secret; Nodis. Sent for action. + Washington, October + 11, 1970. + + SUBJECT + U.S. Position on Mid-East Standstill violations this week + +

I understand that the State Department is considering taking a position + in Secretary Rogers’ talks with + Eban,Rogers met + with Eban on October 13 for + about an hour. The Secretary asked Eban what kind of rectification of the cease-fire + violations he thought could be achieved since “total rectification + standstill violations did not seem possible.” Eban responded: “we will look at + what they suggest and then we will see,” adding that “what was + necessary was that US and Israel press for rectification.” Rogers also asked Eban whether he thought that Israel + should invest its energy in reaching a peace settlement with the + United Arab Republic or simply keep the cease-fire status quo while + waiting for “something to happen in long run.” Eban chose the latter but + “reiterated Israel wanted keep ceasefire, keep its options open, + clarify principles of settlement, and try not to go back and lose + ground.” (Telegram 169237 to Tel Aviv, October 14; ibid., Box 1156, + Saunders Files, Middle East Negotiations Files, June Initiative Vol. + IV, August 28–November 15, 1970) RiadOn October 15, Rogers met with Foreign Minister Mahmoud Riad for almost two hours + at the Waldorf-Astoria in New York, with other U.S. and UAR officials present. In response to + accusations of cease-fire violations, Riad said that “no one in his + country is prepared to remove any missiles from zone.” He added that + his government would even add missiles—what he described as + defensive weapons—to the area because it was within his country’s + right to defend itself. He also commented that he would “raise whole + question” in the UN General Assembly + “because for three years Arabs had been trying to get SC Resolution 242 implemented without + any success.” Rogers + described the conversation as “cordial and restrained,” with neither + side proposing solutions to overcome the cease-fire impasse. + (Telegram 2504 from USUN, October + 16; ibid.) According to telegram 2686 from USUN, October 24, Rogers and Riad met again on the morning of October + 23 for a follow-up discussion. (Ibid.) and GromykoRogers met with + Gromyko on October 16 + and discussed the Middle East for a “full hour, with no give on + either side.” The Soviet Foreign Minister argued that since the + Soviet Union was not party to the cease-fire agreement, it was not + responsible for violations. Rogers countered that the United States held the + Soviet Union responsible for the violations along with the United + Arab Republic because they “could not have taken place without + knowledge and complicity and probable participation of Soviet + Union.” In response to Gromyko’s proposal of “washing out + past difficulties,” that the cease-fire be extended for a + “limited period,” and that Jarring, bilateral, and Four Power + talks be resumed or continued, Rogers said that the United States could not move + forward “without some rectification of the + situation that has resulted from violations of the ceasefire + standstill.” (Telegram Secto 15, + October 16) Rogers and + Gromyko met again on + October 19, but ended the meeting with the Secretary’s conclusion + that no compromise between the United States and the Soviet Union + was possible at the time and that the next step was the Soviet-UAR + pursuit of the issue in the UN + General Assembly. (Telegram Secto + 33, October 19) Both telegrams are attached to an October 20 + memorandum from Kissinger to + Nixon summarizing the + meetings, printed in Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, volume + XIII, Soviet Union, October 1970–October 1971, Document + 19. this week + that would begin exploration of a plan for partial rectification of the + standstill violations in the UAR. Secretary Rogers has not agreed to this yet, but he sees Eban Tuesday morning and I felt you + should have a chance to make your views known before then.

+

The idea being discussed in State is that Secretary Rogers would explore (not propose) + with Eban and Riad the following + plan: The UAR would remove missiles + (but not raze sites) from a zone 20 kilometers west of the Suez Canal + cease-fire line but be allowed to redeploy them to sites elsewhere in + the 50 kilometer standstill zone. This would permit Israel some + rollback. (As of the last firm readout of photography there were 23 + operationally equipped SAM sites within + 25 kilometers of the Canal, 14 of them SA–3, at least half of the 23 + were within 20 kilometers of the Canal.) But it would also permit the + UAR to say that it had removed “not + one missile” from the standstill zone.

+

The argument being made for at least exploring an approach like this + tentatively is based on some reports that Israel would settle for a + face-saving way to put the standstill violations behind them and get on + with the talks. The argument further holds that this moment with the + foreign ministers in New York must be seized to get the talks started or + the cease-fire will gradually deteriorate and hostilities will begin + again at a much more sophisticated level with the USSR more heavily involved than ever. The + momentum gained over the summer will be completely lost.

+

The argument against this approach, however, seems compelling. The + central point is that it would put us—the aggrieved party—in the + position of seeking a way to cover up for the transgressors. The U.S. + would be suggesting a way to cover up Soviet and Egyptian violations of + their understanding with us on the standstill. As Aron and others + pointed out to me in Paris,Reference is + presumably to French philosopher Raymond Aron. No record of + Kissinger’s conversation + with Aron in Paris has been found. In a February 6 telephone + conversation with Milton Viorst, Kissinger said: “I think highly of Aron and he has + the best analytical mind I know.” (National Archives, Nixon + Presidential Materials, NSC Files, + Henry Kissinger + Telephone Conversation Transcripts, Box 4, Chronological + File) the hesitant way we dealt with the initial violations + in August probably gave the USSR an + unintended signal that the U.S. was prepared to close its eyes to + violations and, in effect, encouraged them to continue their expansion + of the missile complex. To try now to find a cover-up would be to repeat + that signal. It would also undercut the stronger position we have gained + in the Jordan crisis and by our further arms shipments to Israel.

+

The alternative to the above approach is to ask Riad and Gromyko—as well as Eban in a lower key—for their proposals + for getting the talks started now that part of the original basis for + them has been undercut. + Although there is room for doubt that either the UAR or Israel really wants talks under + present conditions, it is still possible to negotiate a new standstill + arrangement on which talks could be based.

+

The advantage of this approach is that it would leave the initiative in + the hands of those who broke the agreement or (though unlikely) in the + hands of the Israelis if they wanted talks badly enough to suggest their + own compromise. It would avoid our appearing to be looking for a + cover-up.

+

You will recall that, before departing on the Mediterranean trip, you + ordered that no new significant diplomatic steps be taken until we had a + chance to reassess the situation in the wake of the Jordan crisis and + the standstill violations.See Document 164. The trip, which included + visits to Italy, Yugoslavia, Spain, the United Kingdom, and Ireland, + lasted from September 27 to October 5. + Nasser’s death later made that + reassessment all the more necessary. It is in progress, and a Senior + Review Group is scheduled Thursday on this subject.See Document 172. + It would seem logical for Secretary Rogers to use his sessions Tuesday with Eban and Friday with Riad and Gromyko to hear their proposals for + getting talks started.

+

Recommendation: That you authorize me to inform + Secretary Rogers that in his + discussions this week on the Middle East standstill violations and + negotiations he should merely listen to the views of others and not put forward any U.S. suggestions pending + interdepartmental review of next measures.Nixon did not approve + Kissinger’s + recommendation but, rather, wrote: “This is too dogmatic—present our + views but not as a proposal—& listen to + theirs.”

+
+ +
+ + 170. Paper Prepared by the National Security Council StaffSource: National Archives, Nixon + Presidential Materials, NSC Files, + NSC Institutional Files + (H-Files), Box H–048, Senior Review Group Meetings, Senior Review + Group—Middle East (NSSM 103) 10/15/70. Secret; Nodis. The IG–NEA + paper on which this summary is based, “Middle East Policy Options” + (in response to NSSM 103), is + ibid., Box H–176, National Security Study Memoranda. All brackets + are in the original. NSSM 103 is + Document 164. + Washington, October + 14, 1970. +

ANALYTICAL SUMMARY

+

Mid-East Options

+

Introduction

+

The Interdepartmental Group paper at the next tab consists of three + parts:

+

—A good collection of thumbnail sketches of the policy + situation in the UAR, Jordan, Israel, the USSR and among the Palestinians. These do + not, however, analyze why each side has acted as it has toward the U.S. + peace initiative. This analytical summary attempts to fill that gap.

+

—The general options for extending the cease-fire + are described. These are summarized and elaborated below.

+

—The range of options for launching talks is + described with pros and cons. These are summarized and elaborated + below.

+

In short, the IG paper can serve as a framework for discussion, but you + will want to narrow the discussion very quickly to focus on central + issues. What should come from the meetingSee Document 172. is guidance for + a second paper laying out precise courses of action from which to + choose.

+

I. The Situation

+

A. The IG paper identifies these as the practical + problems the U.S. faces:

+

—at a minimum, how to keep the cease-fire going;

+

—beyond that or in combination with it, how to move the situation toward + negotiation. [In dealing with this question it concentrates more on the + diplomacy of dealing with conditions in the Near East than on the + broader global framework for any negotiations.]

+

B. The key questions to pin down in analyzing the + present positions of the parties seem to be these:

+

—Whose interests are served by continuation of the cease-fire?

+ +

—How have shifts in the military balance affected readiness for + negotiations? This is a question not only of the Israel-UAR balance but + of the US–USSR balance as affected by the wider US-Soviet relationship + and by US actions during the Jordan crisis.

+

—How have developments in Jordan affected prospects for an Israel-Jordan + settlement? What political process might be devised for drawing + responsible Palestinians into a settlement?

+

—Whose interests would be served by talks now?

+

C. Since the IG paper presents a static picture of the new Policy situation in the UAR, Israel, Jordan and + the USSR, a brief statement on each is + appended at the end of this summary.Not + printed. The important point is what conclusions are drawn + from that analysis. The following are stated as + hypotheses that need to be tested as a basis for policy + decisions:

+

—Both sides probably have an interest in extending the cease-fire beyond November 5 with these qualifications:

+

—Israel’s interest in the cease-fire will begin to run out when it + believes that the UAR is preparing + actively for resumption of offensive activity, either artillery attacks + or actual efforts to cross the Canal. Israelis know resumption of + attacks will be costly for them.

+

—The UAR’s interest will begin to run out when it feels that there is no + near prospect of negotiations and that the great powers are slipping + into a frame of mind that would permit the Suez cease-fire line to + solidify into an accepted fact of international life. The UAR’s military + preparations are less costly while there is a cease-fire.

+

—The standstill arrangement as conceived on August + 7 is probably dead. Another way of putting this is that the present + military situation in the Canal area is probably not reversible (except + for our additional assistance to Israel).

+

—The UAR makes little attempt to hide + what it has done (although it is trying to throw the responsibility on + the U.S. and Israel). The new government seems adamant on not removing a + single missile.

+

—Israel says the situation must be restored as of August 7, although + Eban hinted that Israel would + listen to proposals for getting the talks started.

+

—Given those postures, it would be surprising if either party volunteered + a compromise sufficient to get talks started on the basis of the U.S. + initiative as originally formulated. Yet the U.S. cannot be in a + position of sweeping Soviet/UAR violations under the rug and has + generally paralleled Israel’s insistence on rectification. The U.S. + would be interested in a + compromise solution but not at the expense of appearing to cover up + Soviet sins.

+

—King Hussein does not seem to have come out of the + September crisis with the ability by himself—i.e. without a political + process for involving the Palestinians—to commit Jordan to an + enforceable settlement with Israel.

+

—The UAR seems still tentatively willing to enter + talks on the terms suggested by the U.S. in + June and accepted by the UAR in + JulySee Documents + 127, 129, and 136. The June initiative led to the August + 7 agreement, Document 145. but on + the basis of the present military balance. Israel + remains reluctant to enter talks on any political basis—like the U.S. + formula of June–July—that would limit the range of discussions. Israel + may probe quietly the Palestinians, Hussein and the new leadership in Cairo to see whether + private unconditional talks are possible, but even that would cause + serious debate in Israel.

+

—The USSR seems unlikely to press the UAR or take any serious initiative to + alter its missile defense complex significantly for the sake of getting + talks started.

+

[You will not find all of these conclusions stated as such in the IG + paper. The statements that the standstill is dead and that King + Hussein alone is unable to + commit Jordan to go beyond what is said in the IG paper, although it + explicitly does not rule out the possibility of a separate Jordan-Israel + settlement if the terms are reasonable from Hussein’s viewpoint. The conclusions above on the UAR and Israeli attitudes toward talks and + on the Soviet position are consistent with views stated in the IG + paper.]

+

II. Options.

+

The IG paper deals separately with the questions of (a) how to arrange + extension of the cease-fire which expires November 5 and (b) what + actions, if any, to take with regard to peace talks. Two comments must + be made about this portion of the paper:

+

—The options in both sections are sweeping. More detailed courses of + action will be necessary for eventual decision. The broad options are + summarized below, but some suggestions for more specific courses are + also included [and identified as such].

+

—When it comes to defining precise courses of action, both the cease-fire + and the talks will probably have to be dealt with as parts of the same + course of action rather than separately. But for your convenience, this + summary follows the outline of the IG paper.

+ +

A. Options for extending the cease-fire.

+

The IG Paper identifies three broad options:

+

1. A unilateral U.S. initiative with Israel and + the UAR proposing extension of the + cease-fire.

+

—Pro. The U.S. should take no chance that the + cease-fire breaks down just because no one takes the lead in assuring + its renewal. The U.S. was the original negotiator and is probably the + only reliable re-negotiator.

+

—Con. We should not seek to do this too + elaborately. Both parties have already said they are willing at least to + avoid being the first to shoot.

+

2. An initiative by Jarring.

+

—Pro. This would keep Jarring engaged with the parties and give him an opening + to explore ways of getting the talks started.

+

—Con. + Jarring is too formal a + negotiator and might make the job more complicated than it really + is.

+

3. Extension by tacit agreement rather than by + explicit commitment.Above this sentence, + Kissinger wrote in the + margin: “Why not U.S.-Soviet?”

+

—Pro. Both sides have said they will not be the + first to shoot. The uncertainty thus introduced might cause the UAR to be a little more careful with its + forward deployments lest the Israelis attack, undeterred by any + agreement not to.

+

—Con. This is too risky. The parties probably will + not shoot, but so much is at stake that it is safer to be more + certain.

+

[The principal refinements of the above not included in + the IG paper include:

+

—Stimulating U Thant to note the + statements by both sides that they will not be the first to shoot and to + make a statement (after consultation) that these had been conveyed to + him as statements of policy.

+

—Try to use the UNGA resolution the + UAR may promote as a general + reaffirmation of the cease-fire. It is conceivable (though difficult to + achieve) that there might be a resolution that both the UAR and Israel could vote for.

+

—Couple renewal of the cease-fire with some of the efforts described + below to get talks started.

+

What is needed on this question is a more precise statement than in the + IG paper of several specific scenarios including extension of the + cease-fire as well as a posture on beginning talks.]

+ +

B. Options for furthering a settlement.

+

The IG paper lists six theoretically possible options. Two of these can + be laid aside: #2 in the IG paper is to press Israel to resume talks; #3 + in the IG paper is to resume two-power or four-power negotiations. A + third—suspending participation in the Four Power talks (#6 in the IG + paper)—is a tactical move that could be taken to reinforce other + possible moves described below.

+

Therefore, the main options are the four described below. The first three + of these appear in the IG paper; the fourth below, not included in the + IG paper, seems the area that ought to be explored if the hypotheses + stated in paragraph I C above are judged valid and a course of action is + to be built on them.

+

1. Partial rectification of standstill violations. + [This is option #1 on p. 13 of the IG paper.] This would be a course + like that discussed over the past weekend—enough missile rollback to + give symbolic satisfaction to Israel with enough redeployment in the + zone to save face for the UAR.

+

—Pro. If both sides really wanted talks to start, + they might be satisfied with such an approach.

+

—Con. While the U.S. should not stand in the way + if Israel wanted talks badly enough to accept such a proposal, that is + not the case. This would put the U.S. in the impossible position of + covering up Soviet violations.

+

2. Leave the UAR front + alone for a time and turn to a Jordan-Israel settlement, exploring + especially the “Palestinian option.” [This is option #4 on p. + 17 of the IG paper.] State should be asked to prepare + a paper on the Palestinian aspects of a settlement in any case. + The issue here is whether Nasser’s death and Hussein’s renewed determination offer opportunity for + movement on a Jordan settlement that might induce Egyptian movement over + time in fear of being left out.

+

—Pro. The Palestine question can only be settled + with the Palestinians. The UAR-Israel confrontation is a geopolitical + one of a different order. While Hussein might not be able to blaze a trail to the end on + his own, just the appearance of his starting could make the UAR somewhat more interested in + negotiating.

+

—Con. While this should be explored the + complications are such that only Hussein and the Israelis can set the pace. It is not an + option for the U.S. Hussein, in + any case, cannot go too far on his own—either ahead of the Egyptians or + ahead of the Palestinian guerrillas. He did not emerge strong enough + from the September crisis to move on his own, and he has not yet found a + way of bringing a significant number of Palestinians with him.

+ +

3. Mark time on all fronts while the dust settles on + the new situation; concentrate only on extending the cease-fire for + the time being. [This is option #5 on p. 19 of the IG paper.] + This would be an interim strategy, not precluding others later. It could + also, however, be prelude to return to the pre-1969 policy of letting + pressures build on the parties.

+

—Pro. This may be the only realistic choice given + the uncertainty of King Hussein’s + authority and the likely inability of the new Egyptian leadership to + make any of the decisions that would be essential to a serious + compromise.

+

—Con. This course risks that, as time passes, + radical forces in the area will begin to consolidate their forces and + the more moderate ones who took the risk of accepting the U.S. peace + initiative will be undercut. Also, the judgment made in February 1969 is + still valid—that it is too dangerous to let local forces play themselves + out without restraint.

+

4. Establish a new base—other than the U.S. June + initiative—for getting the Jarring talks started. [This is the option to + which analysis of the situation leads but which is not included in the + IG paper.] The standstill agreement has been killed, but there is an + inclination on both sides to continue the cease-fire. It might be + possible for both sides to refuse formal extension of the cease-fire + (thereby gaining the political advantage of dissociating themselves from + an agreement which did not work) but to say they will not be the first + to shoot. They would tacitly accept the new military situation—the + UAR buildup and Israel’s additional + assistance from the US. The question then is whether Israel would be + prepared to enter talks on this basis.

+

—Pro. Continuation of the cease-fire is more in + Israel’s interest than in the UAR’s since Israel has an interest in the + status-quo. Israeli opponents of talks could use UAR violation of the standstill as an + excuse for avoiding talks, but at the same time there would be the same + pressures to talk that existed in July and Israel would have received + some compensation (military package plus $500 million in financial + assistance) for the UAR buildup. The + UAR buildup is probably + irreversible, and Israel cannot forever use that as a reason for not + negotiating. The U.S. by decoupling the resumption of Jarring talks from the June initiative + would have withdrawn the incentives it offered the Arabs in June + (restraint on assistance to Israel) as the penalty for the standstill + violations. The political situation would have been restored to the more + general one existing before the U.S. initiative—the three-year effort to + get talks started—and Israel could say it remains ready to talk to + Jarring as it has for the + past three years.

+

—Con. Israel on balance would probably prefer not + to risk talks. There would not be enough positive in this proposal to + permit Israel to back away from its position that it would not talk + until the UAR rolled back its missiles. + It would be difficult to persuade Israelis that this is anything but a disguised effort to get + them into talks without a UAR + rollback.

+

This approach will be unpopular internally because it would declare the + June initiative at least half-dead. That, of course, does little more + than recognize the facts and start from where we are. It removes the + temptation to toy with ideas of partial rectification. It leaves us with + a cease-fire and tacitly with the replies of July to the U.S. political + formula.For the Israeli reply, see Document 140. The Israelis could + insist that theirs is nullified by breach of the standstill arrangement, + but that remains a question. More work would be required to flesh out + details since this is essentially a back-to-the-drawing-boards approach. + But it seems the only one that clears the air, recognizes the situation + as it is and could be a starting point for plotting several realistic + courses of action.

+
+ +
+ 171. National Security Decision Memorandum 87Source: National Archives, Nixon + Presidential Materials, NSC Files, + NSC Institutional Files + (H-Files), Box H–219, National Security Decision Memoranda. Secret; + Nodis. A copy was sent to the Director of the Office of Management + and Budget, the Director of Central Intelligence, and the Chairman + of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. + Washington, October + 15, 1970. + + TO + The Secretary of State + The Secretary of Defense + + + SUBJECT + Military and Financial Assistance to Israel + +

The Deputy Secretary of Defense on October 3 sent to the President a + memorandum entitled “Follow-up Actions with Israel.” The Secretary of + State with concurrence of the Secretary of Defense on September 26 sent + to the President a memorandum entitled “U.S. Financial Assistance to + Israel, FY 1971.”Kissinger + sent the memoranda to President Nixon in separate memoranda on October 9; see Documents 166 and 167.

+

In response to these memoranda, the President has made the following + decisions:

+ +

1. The list of military equipment at Tab B under the memorandum from the + Deputy Secretary of Defense is approved as described. This equipment + should be provided to Israel promptly. No political conditions are to be + attached; options for trying to launch Arab-Israeli negotiations will be + dealt with in the NSC system in + connection with NSSM 103.Document 164. The conditions on use of this + equipment applied to the August 14 equipment packageSee footnote 2, Document + 160. (i.e. Israel would not unilaterally break the + cease-fire using this equipment or use it beyond a 50 kilometer zone + across the Suez Canal) should also be applied to this package.

+

2. The substance of the recommendation for $500 million in financial + assistance to Israel in FY 1971 is + approved as described in the memorandum of the Secretary of State. The + timing of the presentation of this appropriations request to the + Congress is to be dealt with in a separate memorandumNot found. and is to be held until that + decision is made.

+ + + Henry A. Kissinger + + +
+ +
+ + 172. Minutes of a Combined Senior Review Group and Washington Special + Actions Group MeetingSource: + National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–111, Senior + Review Group, SRG Minutes Originals + 1970. Secret; Nodis. The meeting was held in the White House + Situation Room. + Washington, October 15, + 1970, 3:25–4:15 p.m. + + SUBJECT + Middle East + + + PARTICIPANTS + Chairman—Henry A. + Kissinger + + State + + + U. Alexis Johnson + + Roy Atherton + Arthur Hartman + + Defense + + + David Packard + + + G. Warren Nutter + + + James Noyes + + + + CIA + + + Lt. Gen. Robert Cushman + David H. Blee + + JCS + + Adm. Thomas Moorer + Adm. Mason B. Freeman + + NSC Staff + + + Harold Saunders + + Col. Richard + Kennedy + + Jeanne W. Davis + + +

SUMMARY OF DECISIONS

+

It was agreed that:

+

—a continuation of a de facto cease-fire would not be unfavorable;

+

—State should begin work on a new formula for getting talks started, not + necessarily linked to the June proposal or to the cease-fire;See Document + 175.

+

—the NSC Staff, in consultation with + State, should prepare a paper on a Palestinian solution with our + options, and the implications for Jordan and King Hussein.See Document 176.

+

Mr. Kissinger: We have three + areas for consideration: an assessment of the situation; possible + extension of the cease-fire; and how to move toward peace. This paper, + which is very good, identifies the practical problems of how to keep the + cease-fire going and how to move the situation toward negotiations.See Document + 170. How do we assess the situation in relation to the + stand-still violations and the events of the last few weeks? How have + these affected the cease-fire?

+ +

Mr. Johnson: The Secretary and Joe + Sisco are seeing Riad at 5:00 p.m. today and we will know + better after that conversation.See footnote 3, Document 169. We seem + now to be moving toward a de facto extension of the cease-fire which is + not entirely unfavorable. It gives us an indefinite situation rather + than the announced 90-day limitation. It seems easy to slide from the + stand-still into a de facto situation.

+

Mr. Kissinger: Is it our judgment + that neither side wants to resume hostilities?

+

Mr. Johnson: Yes.

+

Mr. Kissinger: This would take + off the inhibitions of a cease-fire but would not remove the political + restraints. From the Israeli point of view the most desirable situation + would be a cease-fire without talks.

+

Mr. Johnson: In his talks with the Secretary, Eban has indicated they would be quite content with + this.See footnote 2, Document 169.

+

Mr. Kissinger: Israel has come + out very well. A cease-fire without progress toward peace confirms their + situation. How long can the Arabs maintain a cease-fire under these + conditions?

+

Mr. Atherton: For some months, I + think.

+

Mr. Johnson: We haven’t detected any Egyptian desire to renew the + fighting—quite the opposite.

+

Mr. Packard: It is the + Palestinians or the Fedayeen who will start the trouble.

+

Mr. Kissinger: There are no + restraints on them—they are not affected by the cease-fire.

+

Mr. Johnson: We are all agreed that more work is needed on the + Palestinian question. We have these two interesting intelligence reports + this morning,Neither has been found. + indicating that the Fedayeen are setting up a Liberation Organization + comparable to the Algerian Liberation Organization and that they are + getting in shape to negotiate. Their program calls for recognition of + the existence of the State of Israel and creation of a Palestinian State + covering both banks of the Jordan.

+

A senior member of the Fatah has indicated that Fatah is forming a + national front similar to the Algerian Organization on the grounds that + the present Palestine Liberation Organization is unworkable. They plan + to call a conference after Ramadan (October 31–November 29) announcing + its formation.Palestinian guerrilla groups + met during the second week of December in an attempt to harmonize + their individual efforts to re-establish a Palestinian homeland in + area occupied by Israel. They formed a single secretariat to oversee + their movement and established a unified information office. (New York Times, December 13, 1970, p. + 12) Other Fedayeen groups will be asked to join and put themselves under Fatah orders. + This group would be the sole agent of the Palestinians and would + undertake contacts with other governments. The Lebanese have agreed to + recognize Fatah as their spokesman. Iraq is said to be the only country + which has not accepted the proposal. They see the emergence of a new + Palestinian State including the West Bank of the Jordan, Jerusalem, the + East Bank west of a line through the major cities, and the Gaza Strip. + Some areas would be demilitarized. They apparently do not seek the + elimination of Israel—only a reduction in its size.

+

Mr. Kissinger: What size?

+

Mr. Johnson: This is ambiguous. If this report is valid, it is the first + time a Palestinian organization has been willing to accept the existence + of the state of Israel and to organize itself for negotiations.

+

Mr. Atherton: This would leave + Israel with a lot of desert.

+

Mr. Kissinger: On the first + issue, is it our judgment that the cease-fire could best be extended in + a de facto manner?

+

Mr. Johnson: Not necessarily “best,” but the trend seems to be in that + direction and it is not necessarily unfavorable.

+

Mr. Atherton: Israel would not + agree to an extension of the cease-fire without rectification of the + missile movement. They would prefer to let it lapse and base its + observation on the UN resolution. The + Egyptians would agree to an extension of the cease-fire only on the + condition that the Israelis agree to resume the talks.

+

Mr. Johnson: Riad has said this explicitly. The reason for the Secretary + seeing him today was that Riad is speaking tomorrow morning in the + General Assembly and we expect he will introduce a resolution of some + kind. The Secretary had hoped to exert some influence. We expect Riad to + repeat the line that if there are no negotiations, there will be no + formal extension of the cease-fire.

+

Mr. Kissinger: Is it our view + that there is no need to request an extension of the cease-fire?

+

Mr. Johnson: We wouldn’t go that far—we don’t know enough.

+

Mr. Kissinger: Let’s leave the + tactics of extension of a cease-fire until after the Secretary has + spoken to Riad and Gromyko.See footnote 4, + Document 169. We can be prepared to let the + November 5 slip and move into a de facto extension.

+

The IG paper identifies three possible options for extending the + cease-fire: a unilateral US initiative, a Jarring initiative, and extension by tacit agreement. + Why not a US-Soviet initiative?

+

Mr. Atherton: That would raise + the question of the stand-still violations and would drive Israel up the + wall.

+ +

Mr. Kissinger: They would be up + the wall anyhow with extension of the cease-fire without rectification. + Adding the USSR to the initiative + would be no worse. I have been wondering what made the Soviets and + Egyptians violate the stand-still so crudely. Could it be that this was + a unilateral US initiative and they felt that we would have to take the + blame for what happened afterwards? It seemed so unreasonable. Anyone + could have predicted that the talks would deadlock. It would have made + sense for them to violate the stand-still during a deadlock. Why did + they move in at midnight on August 7? I could understand such movement + in the first week following the standstill, but why did it continue and + escalate?

+

Mr. Johnson: I agree. It looked for a while as though they were slowing + down, but it built back up again.

+

Admiral Moorer: I still think + they have just followed their original plan to set up a missile + pattern.

+

Mr. Kissinger: What if Israel had + continued bombing? How much would this have slowed them up?

+

Admiral Moorer: It would have + slowed them up but Israel would have suffered significant losses.

+

Mr. Packard: It is a lot more + effective for them to build additional sites than it is to move in + additional equipment. They can then move their missiles around.

+

Mr. Johnson: This is their formal position of course.

+

Mr. Kissinger: But we have + identified 30-odd entirely new sites with equipment.

+

Admiral Moorer: They argue that + the equipment was already in storage inside the stand-still zone.

+

Mr. Packard: And we can’t prove + that they brought in new equipment.

+

Mr. Johnson: The terms of the agreement were very explicit though.

+

Admiral Moorer: They claim they + didn’t move new missiles into the zone.

+

Mr. Johnson: The agreement didn’t refer to missiles—it referred to new + military installations.

+

Mr. Kissinger: The language of + the cease-fire agreement was explicit and the intent was obvious.

+

Mr. Johnson: And they had our additional explanation.Beam + discussed the cease-fire agreement with Gromyko on June 29 in an hour-long meeting; see Foreign + Relations, 1969–1976, volume XII, Soviet Union, January + 1969–October 1970, Document 187.

+ +

Mr. Kissinger: So you don’t think + a joint US-Soviet initiative would be good?

+

Mr. Atherton: No, I would have + reservations.

+

Mr. Packard: If we could get a de + facto cease-fire, we then might get some talks underway.

+

Admiral Moorer: Egypt can’t + organize itself to the point of initiating a break in the cease-fire at + this time.

+

Mr. Johnson: No, we see no signs of an Egyptian offensive.

+

Mr. Kissinger: On the main + problem of a strategy for furthering a settlement, the paper identifies + six options.

+

Mr. Johnson: We are on the fifth option today—marking time on all fronts. + We are in a holding action.

+

Mr. Kissinger: Leaving aside the + question of timing, we have option 1—partial rectification; option + 2—press Israel to talk without rectification; option 3—resume the + two-power or four-power talks; option 4—turn to a Palestine solution; + option 5—a holding action; and option 6—the opposite of option 3—suspend + US participation in four-power talks. I do not find these mutually + exclusive. We can still explore a Palestinian solution while some other + things are going on. One point has not been raised. The IG paper assumes + continuation of negotiations in the June frame-work. Is it conceivable + that we would say at some point that the June basis for an agreement had + been overtaken by events and we should look for a new basis and find a + new formula for getting talks started?

+

Mr. Johnson: We could move into that if we move into a de facto + cease-fire.

+

Mr. Kissinger: Should we rule out + doing something of this sort at an appropriate time after November + 5?

+

Mr. Johnson: No, not at all.

+

Mr. Packard: I think this is a + likely course.

+

Mr. Kissinger: What sort of + proposal could we make? Could we do some work on such a proposal? As + long as a settlement is linked to a cease-fire Israel will demand total + rectification which is absurd. What do we mean by partial rectification? + A 20-kilometer zone would be a phony. It would be too tight for Israel + and would just lead to endless discussion.

+

Mr. Saunders: At one time we + talked about 23 sites within 25 kilometers of the zone, with half of + them within 20 kilometers. This meant 15 sites occupied and + operational.

+

Mr. Atherton: We have 34 sites + now, with 25 occupied.

+

Mr. Kissinger: I am not opposed + to partial rectification but does it get us anywhere?

+ +

Admiral Moorer: The arguments + will never be settled.

+

Gen. Cushman: This just increases the + problems of verification.

+

Mr. Nutter: How about a proposal + to demilitarize 25 kilometers on both sides of the Canal.

+

Mr. Johnson: Why would Israel take that?

+

Mr. Kissinger: Israel killed the + idea of a 25-kilometer zone.

+

Mr. Nutter: We have indications + from the Israeli military that they might consider it.

+

Mr. Kissinger: I don’t believe + Israel would accept it.

+

Mr. Nutter: We have indications + that if there were an attack, Israel might withdraw its outposts anyway. + They might be willing to demilitarize now.

+

Mr. Johnson: If Egypt accepts that, the game’s over—they would have no + hope of getting back. This would open the Canal.

+

Mr. Nutter: That would depend on + what the Egyptians really want. They may want a way out.

+

Mr. Kissinger: I doubt Israel + would accept. They already have the stand-still zone. They would be + getting half of the present zone, and withdrawing as well.

+

Mr. Nutter: It would get the + missiles out.

+

Mr. Kissinger: But they shouldn’t + have been there in the first place. The stand-still was sold on the + basis of only 3 missile sites and none within 25 kilometers. Israel + doesn’t object to a cease-fire without negotiations. Why should Israel + pay a price to get negotiations started? They think they should be paid + a price. Their first price is rectification. If they are offered + rectification, they will find another price. They don’t see themselves + doing anything to get negotiations started. They are in the best + possible situation with a cease-fire and no negotiations.

+

Mr. Nutter: This would be one way + of getting a more satisfactory cease-fire.

+

Mr. Saunders: The Egyptians might + object even more than the Israelis.

+

Mr. Kissinger: The Egyptians + might take it as a way into negotiations, but Israel would have no + reason to take it. If rectification is dropped, we would need a new + basis for negotiations. What would be a new basis? Unconditional + negotiations?

+

Mr. Atherton: That would be + ideal. Or negotiations without necessarily being linked to the US + initiative.

+

(Mr. Packard left the meeting)

+

Mr. Atherton: If Israel were + released from the limited cease-fire, they would retain more military + flexibility, particularly if it were not linked to the Jarring mission or to the formal commitments under the + June proposal.

+

Mr. Saunders: We could start from + scratch. What incentive would Israel have to go into new talks unless + they really want talks? They couldn’t do it without a major fight within + Israel. Also, given Nasser’s + death and the situation in Jordan, they would have no one solid to talk + to.

+

Mr. Kissinger: One way to get to + this may be the de facto cease-fire. Would we then give up any linkage + between the cease-fire and negotiations, and then propose new + negotiations.

+

Mr. Atherton: Yes.

+

Mr. Kissinger: Tsarapkin took the + view that they had never agreed to any cease-fire therefore they + couldn’t violate it. We could claim that we were not linking + negotiations to a cease-fire. Would it be appropriate to advance that + theory at some point?

+

Mr. Saunders: After November + 5.

+

Mr. Kissinger: If we press for a + formal extension of the cease-fire, Israel will insist on rectification + and the Arabs will insist on talks. This is a prescription for an + impasse. If we continue a de facto cease-fire without a formal linkage, + we can propose talks on their merits. What would be wrong with that?

+

Mr. Saunders: What incentive + would Israel have to volunteer for this process?

+

Mr. Kissinger: Under this + procedure, the terms of reference would be defined by our side. Unless + something different emerges from the Secretary’s talk with Gromyko it may be in our interest to + play this in a low key. That is the Secretary’s inclination. We can + probably get a de facto extension of the cease-fire. Neither side would + resist particularly if the US and the Soviet both indicated they wanted + it extended.

+

Mr. Atherton: And we could, over + time, press toward talks.

+

Mr. Nutter: What will the + Egyptians be doing in the meantime?

+

Mr. Johnson: They will continue to strengthen their position.

+

Mr. Saunders: We have a month + before these pressures would become too great, given Ramadan and the + GA debate. We would be okay for a + month.

+

Mr. Kissinger: The advantage to + Israel would be that they would be released from the June formula. The + advantage to the Arabs would be that they would not have to agree to a + formal cease-fire. The pressures on Israel would be that if they don’t + agree to talk, they would give up their already waning international + support.

+

Mr. Atherton: They would also run + the risk that the shooting will start again.

+ +

Mr. Kissinger: Yes, the Arabs + cannot accept a permanent cease-fire. What about Option 1 (partial + rectification)?

+

Mr. Johnson: This is a non-starter. I assume the Secretary will take this + position this afternoon with Riad although he will make no specific + proposal.

+

Mr. Atherton: No, the Secretary + will say to Riad “you created this problem—what do you offer as a means + of solving it?” He will probe for any ideas.

+

Mr. Kissinger: Option 2 (pressing + Israel to begin talks without rectification) would be possible only + under conditions of a de facto cease-fire.

+

Mr. Johnson: I agree.

+

Mr. Kissinger: What about + resumption of the two-power or four-power negotiations?

+

Mr. Johnson: That would be a subsidiary development.

+

Mr. Kissinger: One thing which + has not been addressed is the Palestinian solution. Can we get a paper + indicating what we mean by this?

+

Mr. Johnson: We recognize the need for such a study.

+

Mr. Kissinger: Assuming we have a + de facto cease-fire, and assuming King Hussein and the Egyptians are not strong enough to make + a settlement—would the Palestinians be strong enough to make a + settlement?

+

Mr. Johnson: That implies the Palestinians would be willing to discuss a + settlement.

+

Mr. Atherton: We have three new + factors: the death of Nasser, + the alienation of the Palestinians from Hussein and the involvement of Tunisia and others in the + Palestinian problem in the context of the Arab conference.See footnote 7, Document + 168. They have become involved in this for the + first time; they are beginning to see it as a political problem, not an + abstraction.

+

Mr. Kissinger: What does their + identity as Palestinians entail? How would we establish contact with + them? What would be the implications? Would this be seen as a way of + scuttling Hussein?

+

Mr. Atherton: It would probably + lead to partition if not the disappearance of Jordan.

+

Mr. Kissinger: And that is what + we went to the brink to avoid.

+

Mr. Saunders: It’s not that + clear-cut. Israel may be happy to turn over the West Bank to this + group.

+

Mr. Kissinger: This group has the + minimum incentive to settle and the maximum potential to upset King + Hussein.

+ +

Mr. Atherton: The Palestinians + are in considerable confusion—they had lost their bearings. This may + crystallize their loyalty and sense of identity.

+

Mr. Saunders: They didn’t have + all that many collective bearings to lose—they were never clear as to + their objective.

+

Mr. Atherton: The Arabs would be + glad to accept part of Palestine at the expense of part of Jordan.

+

Mr. Kissinger: We need a + Palestinian paper with the options. (to Saunders) Let’s get on paper the tentative conclusions + of this discussion. We can wait until we hear the outcome of the + Secretary’s talks with Riad and Gromyko and then consult with State.

+
+ +
+ 173. Memorandum of ConversationSource: National Archives, Nixon Presidential + Materials, NSC Files, Box 71, + Kissinger Office Files, Country Files, Europe, U.S.S.R. Top Secret; + Sensitive. All brackets are in the original except those indicating + text omitted by the editors. The meeting took place in the Oval + Office. For the full text of the memorandum of conversation, see + Foreign + Relations, 1969–1976, volume XIII, Soviet Union, + October 1970–October 1971, Document 23. + Washington, October 22, + 1970, 11 a.m.–1:30 p.m. + + PARTICIPANTS + + US + + The President + William P. Rogers, + Secretary of State + Henry A. Kissinger, + Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs + William D. Krimer, Interpreter, Department of State + + USSR + + A.A. Gromyko, Soviet + Foreign Minister + A.F. Dobrynin, Soviet + Ambassador + Viktor Sukhodrev, Interpreter, Soviet Ministry of Foreign + Affairs + +

The President welcomed Foreign Minister Gromyko to Washington and said that he appreciated the + opportunity to have a talk with him. He had been informed that Mr. + Rogers and Mr. Gromyko had held useful conversations + in New York.See footnote 4, Document 169. It would be helpful if + today they could discuss the questions of the general relationship + between their two countries. The President said he was prepared to take + up any items that the Minister wanted to bring up. Specific problem + areas, in his view, which could + be usefully discussed concern the Middle East, the Berlin negotiations + between the Four Powers, SALT, a most important issue, Western + Hemisphere problems, specifically Cuba, and problems in Asia, + specifically Vietnam.

+

Mr. Gromyko suggested that each + problem be discussed in turn and as one was finished the next problem be + taken up. This procedure was agreeable to the President.

+

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to the Middle East.]

+

Middle East

+

Foreign Minister Gromyko said + that he had had a good exchange of views with Secretary Rogers in New York on the subject of + the Middle East. To restate the Soviet position briefly, the Soviets + were for peace in the Middle East. They would not like to see a new + military clash in this area. The independent existence of all states + needed to be assured and secured, and saying this, he included the + existence of Israel as a sovereign independent state. If someone ever + told the President that the Soviet Union had some other objective in the + Middle East, or if it was alleged that it had some idea of subverting + the independent existence of Israel, the President should not believe + any such allegations. What was required today was a withdrawal of + Israeli forces from the Arab territories they were occupying and a + formal, detailed agreement insuring a stable peace in this area. To + accomplish these purposes, the role of the two great powers was far from + being the least important. It was the Soviet position that peace in this + area should be secured by a most solemn act, if necessary involving the + participation of the UN Security + Council, an act stating that troops are to be withdrawn, that peace is + established, and that no one needs to be apprehensive for the security + of any of the independent states of the Middle East.

+

It would be good if some work could be performed in the direction of a + solution now. It was important that these efforts not be discontinued at + the present time. As to the Soviet view of what needed to be done now, + he had already told Secretary Rogers that the first thing required was a resumption of + the Jarring mission. Let there + be exchanges of views between the Israelis and the Arab states. Such + exchanges could certainly not be harmful to any of the parties involved. + Secondly, agreement must be reached on extending the ceasefire. The + present situation must be formalized in the form of an appropriate + agreement to the effect that firing between the sides will not be + resumed and this was to be without any preconditions. Attempts to impose + conditions on the extension of the ceasefire could only complicate the + situation. After all, a ceasefire was a ceasefire, meaning that the two + opposing sides had agreed not to shoot at each other.

+

Third, the bilateral contacts between the Soviet Union and the United + States on this question should perhaps be renewed. They had been suspended for some time now and + should be reactivated. It would be good to resume these contacts, and + not only from the point of view of attempting to facilitate a solution + for the Middle East. So far, the American side had not yet responded to + the Soviet proposal on the substance of the matter even though that + proposal had been submitted in response to the expressed wishes of the + American side.See Document 120. Fourth, Four Power consultations + should be continued. This would be a step creating more favorable + conditions for consideration of various possibilities to solve the + problem.

+

As for Israel, Mr. Gromyko said + that the Soviet Union was prepared to give the most solemn guarantees of + its existence.

+

Secretary Rogers said that he and + Mr. Gromyko had discussed this + question at some length in New York and seemed to agree on many aspects + of the problem, but differed on how to get started. He asked Mr. + Gromyko if, assuming that + agreement would be reached, the Soviet Union would be willing to + undertake peacekeeping activities together with the United States, + specifically whether the Soviet Union was prepared to send troops for + that purpose.

+

Mr. Gromyko inquired what the + Secretary meant by peacekeeping activities. In the Soviet proposal they + also mentioned the use of United Nations guarantees and personnel. He + had thought this discussion was procedural; peacekeeping should be kept + for substantive meetings. When would negotiations on substance begin, + however? In his view the matter was pressing and this should be the + first order of business. The four points he had just made were intended + as steps to be taken at the present time.

+

Secretary Rogers said that the + reason he had asked the question was that it affected the security of + the parties involved.

+

President Nixon remarked that + Israel no longer had any confidence in the ability of the United Nations + to keep the peace.

+

Mr. Gromyko replied that what he + was proposing was procedural in nature. These were the first steps to be + taken and he realized that they were procedural rather than substantive. + However, Secretary Rogers’ idea + was not excluded.

+

Secretary Rogers inquired what + steps the UAR intended to undertake in + regard to a UN resolution on the Middle + East.

+

Mr. Gromyko replied that they had + this idea because there had been no forward movement toward a solution + of the problem. Should the situation change, should the Jarring mission be resumed and the + ceasefire continued, he thought the Arab position might change as well. + Since he had not received an answer from the United States, he had not + as yet contacted the Arabs + in this regard. Secretary Rogers + remarked that Mr. Gromyko should + certainly be able to influence the Arabs.

+

President Nixon said that the + Secretary had reported to him the conversations he had held with Mr. + Gromyko about the Middle + East. He was aware of the concern Mr. Gromyko had expressed regarding what he believed were + misunderstandings which occurred at the time the ceasefire first went + into effect. He was aware of Mr. Gromyko’s position that (1) the Soviet Union had not + been a party to the ceasefire agreement, and (2) it was unfair to say + the Soviet Union had collaborated in violations of that agreement.This view was also expressed in a Soviet + “private note” for Nixon + that Dobrynin handed to + Kissinger in a meeting + with him on October 9. (Memorandum from Kissinger to Nixon, October 15; National Archives, Nixon + Presidential Materials, NSC Files, + Box 71, Kissinger Office Files, Country Files, Europe, U.S.S.R.) + Kissinger’s summary of + his four meetings with Dobrynin from September 25 to October 9 is printed + in Foreign + Relations, 1969–1976, volume XIII, Soviet Union, + October 1970–October 1971, Document 6. He did not + want to go into this question in detail, but as practical men we had to + recognize that a problem did indeed exist. In fact, this was our problem + with the Israelis and affected our ability to influence them.

+

Mr. Kissinger recapitulated the + procedural steps mentioned by Mr. Gromyko, namely, (1) resumption of the Jarring mission, (2) resumption of + bilateral contacts, and (3) resumption of Four Power contacts. He asked + whether they could be separated or whether Mr. Gromyko was proposing a package.

+

Secretary Rogers remarked that it + would be a mistake to go into bilateral and Four Power meetings prior to + reactivating the Jarring + mission. Mr. Gromyko agreed, but + added that purely bilateral contacts could take place at any time.

+

The President remarked that in the Middle East our respective interests + differed considerably and that it was logical for great powers to + compete with each other in this area. It was in the paramount interest + of both sides, however, to secure the peace in this area since we would + be very foolish to allow conflicts between minor powers to lead to a + collision between us.

+

Mr. Gromyko agreed that the + President was right and said we should stress what unites us rather than + what divides us.

+

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to the Middle East.]

+
+ +
+ + 174. Memorandum From Director of Central Intelligence Helms to the President’s Assistant for + National Security Affairs (Kissinger)Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–048, Senior + Review Group Meetings, Senior Review Group—Future Mid-East Options + 10/26/70. Secret; Sensitive. All brackets are in the original except + those indicating text that remains classified. + Washington, October + 23, 1970. + + SUBJECT + Fatah Request for Contact with U.S. + Officials + +

1. In the course of operations directed at the leadership of the + Palestinian guerrilla movement, this Agency has established clandestine + contact with a senior official of “Fatah”. Through other independent + assets we have confirmed his claim that he is [1 line + not declassified] one of the top Fatah leaders.

+

2. On 19 October 1970 this Fatah official, [1 line not + declassified] advised that, with the approval of Fatah leader + Yasir Arafat, Fatah proposed a + “confidential” meeting in the immediate future somewhere in Europe + between senior Fatah officials and one or more senior U.S. Government + officials. [name not declassified] listed six + items which Fatah wished to discuss, and asked that the U.S. side limit + itself to no more than ten principal policy or political matters which + it wished on the agenda. The six items set forth by Fatah are:

+

a. The U.S.G. position on the establishment of a Palestinian state on the + basis of the 1947 UN resolution on the + partition of Palestine.An October 20 CIA Intelligence Information Report + described the October 19 meetng with a Palestinian with access to + senior Fatah officials. He revealed that the U.S. position on the + creation of a Palestinian state as part of a broader Middle East + settlement, which the Department of State had announced on October + 15, was “well received” by those officials, including Yasir + Arafat. According to this + source, Fatah officials “noted that the Soviet Union has never + mentioned the possibility of creating a Palestinian state and, in + fact, has been against the establishment of such a state.” (Ibid., + Box 636, Country Files, Middle East, UAR) The statement about the + emergence of a Palestinian state was made by a Department of State + press officer on October 15. (New York Times, + October 16, 1970, p. 1) UN General + Assembly Resolution 181, adopted November 29, 1947, recommended a + plan to partition the territory of western Palestine between Arabs + and Jews with Jerusalem as an international city. The text of the + resolution is printed in the Yearbook of the + United Nations, 1947–1948, pp. 247–256.

+

b. The U.S.G. definition of the term “rights of the Palestinian people,” + which it has used on occasion in official statements.

+

c. The U.S.G. understanding of the term “Palestinian entity.”

+

d. The U.S.G. position vis-à-vis Jordan as it is presently constituted; + i.e., boundaries, etc.

+ +

e. Does the U.S.G. believe that King Husayn offers the best possibility + for normalizing the situation and creating stability in Jordan in the + future? On what basis?

+

f. Will the U.S.G. be prepared to give immediate, meaningful aid and + assistance on creation of a Palestinian State? How about prior to its + actual creation?

+

3. We believe that this request by Fatah is bona fide and that the + Palestinians who would attend such a meeting would represent the Fatah + leadership.

+

4. The contents of this memorandum have not been disseminated to any + other agency. I would appreciate guidance regarding any further + dissemination and also on the nature of the reply we should give to the + request for a meeting. We should give at least a tentative reply within + the next few days.No reply was found, and + no meeting was held. See Document + 180.

+ + + Richard Helms + Helms signed “Dick” above his typed + signature. + + +
+ +
+ 175. Paper Prepared by the National Security Council StaffSource: National Archives, Nixon + Presidential Materials, NSC Files, + NSC Institutional Files + (H-Files), Box H–048, Senior Review Group Meetings, Senior Review + Group—Future Mid-East Options 10/26/70. Secret; Nodis. All brackets + are in the original. The undated paper that this paper summarizes, + “Addendum to Middle East Policy Options Paper,” is attached. At an + October 26 NSC Senior Staff + meeting, Kissinger commented + that the paper was “loaded” and complained that “the option to carry + out the existing Presidential commitment was not included.” He + remarked further that the paper was “sloppy not only in its analysis + but in its statement of alternative remedies” and “wondered if would + not have been just as easy to draft a poor paper biased in one + direction as in another.” (Memorandum for the record, October 26; + Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CL–314, + NSC Meetings) + Washington, October + 24, 1970. +

ANALYTICAL SUMMARY

+

Mid-East Policy Options

+

Attached is a policy options paper which focuses more narrowly than that + considered at the last meetingSee Document 172. (at last tab, “NSSM + 103 Options Paper”)The paper is summarized in Document 170. on + the present situation. The main new element is the UAR request for General Assembly debate on + the Mid-East which begins October 26.

+

Recapitulation of Discussion at Last Meeting

+

Discussion at the SRG meeting October + 15, you will recall, seemed to lead to a consensus that there would be + some advantage in not negotiating an extension of + the cease-fire beyond November 5, but simply letting the date pass with + statements of intent from both sides not to resume the shooting. The + main points were:

+

—Israel probably would not agree to an extension of the cease-fire + without some rectification of the standstill violations. That is a + prescription for an impasse.

+

—If there were a de facto cease-fire without formal linkage to + negotiations, talks could be proposed on their own merits. Israel, at + least, would be willing to base its observance on the June 1967 + ceasefire resolutions.

+

—The advantage to Israel is that it would be released from the June + formula and would increase its military flexibility. The advantage to + the Arabs is that they would not have to agree to a formal + cease-fire.Kissinger wrote in the margin next to this sentence: + “How?” The danger is that the shooting would start again. The + Arabs cannot accept a permanent cease-fire.

+

The Immediate Problem—Strategy in the UNGA

+

It is not clear what the UAR’s objective is. In general, it probably + wants to apply pressure on the U.S. to get talks started right away + without rectification and would like to find a face-saving formula for + extending the cease-fire. But the UAR + does not appear to have thought through the kind of resolution it + wants.

+

There are some indications it wants a resolution limited to reaffirmation + of Resolution 242, a call for resumption of the Jarring talks and extension of the + ceasefire for a specified period. Pressures may mount, however, for + language on withdrawal or the Palestinians that goes beyond Resolution + 242. According to Mrs. Meir, + Israel would resist even the former if the breach in the standstill + agreement is permitted to stand.

+

The options paper outlines two possible broad strategies:

+

1. Work with others—particularly UAR and + USSR—in an effort to contain the UNGA + debate and produce a resolution which avoids undercutting the delicate + balance in Resolution 242.

+ +

Pro. This is probably the minimum foreseeable + outcome and could provide part of a basis for beginning talks as well as + continuing the ceasefire.

+

Con. We could not expect a resolution which + referred to the standstill violations. Without that, we would in voting + for such a resolution expose ourselves to Israeli and probably domestic + criticism for acquiescing in a Soviet-UAR breach of agreement. Moreover, + cooperating with the USSR in the wake + of the violations would weaken our position.

+

2. Adhere firmly to the position that any GA action must take account of the standstill violations + and the need for rectification.

+

Pro. This would put us in a position after the + debate to tell Israel we had made an all-out effort on the violations + but now it is time to put this effort behind us and get on with peace + talks.

+

Con. This could produce Arab counter-reaction and + a more pro-Arab resolution and also make it more difficult for us to get + off the rectification hook afterwards.Kissinger wrote in the + margin next to this paragraph: “How?”

+

Comment: Some combination of the above is probably + the most likely approach. The paper suggests, for example: Tell the + UAR and Soviets that we cannot go + along with a resolution that ignores the violations issue but if the + final outcome is a resolution or consensus that does not destroy the + balance of Resolution 242 we would engage ourselves to start the + Jarring talks. A variation + of this course might be to imply this but not promise it.

+

A harder alternative in this vein would be to make + clear to the USSR that the U.S. will + have nothing to do with launching negotiations if Resolution 242 is + undercut. We would offer nothing.

+

The real issue, however, would seem to be whether there + is any advantage in the UNGA in + having the U.S. peace initiative, laudable as it was, declared ended + or transformed to a new stage. This might be one way of + acknowledging the standstill violations.Kissinger wrote in the + margin next to this paragraph: “We could have neutral resolution + reaffirming all previous ones.”

+

The Problem of Getting Talks Started

+

The problem will be how to bring Israel along. It has painted itself into + a corner (perhaps deliberately) on the rectification issue.

+

Since the ceasefire/standstill will not be renewed in its present form + after November 5, a new phase of peacemaking will have begun.

+

One issue which the options paper hints at but + does not really address is: Is there any special + advantage in signaling the end of our peace initiative? The paper suggests + ending our U–2 flights. Although Secretary Rogers has dismissed the idea of announcing the end of + our initiative, that is also a possibility.

+

—Pro. While someone in Israel would have to take + the trouble to make this argument work, ending our peace initiative with + more aircraft, electronic equipment and $500 million in financial + assistance could permit Israel to say it is beginning talks on the basis + of its long term commitment to cooperate with Jarring. It might help if talks could + begin at the Foreign Minister level.

+

—Con. This would probably cost us Israel’s + commitment to the U.S. formula which was to have been the basis for + talks even if it worked. More important, though, it seems unlikely that + anyone in Israel would really want talks badly enough to want to make + this work.

+

The options paper ends at this point, saying it will be necessary to + explore these and other ways to persuade Israel to negotiate.

+

The issue stated above—exploring whether there is some + advantage in ending the 90-day period of the U.S. initiative in some + semi-formal way—needs to be further explored. We would not have + to declare it dead. We might simply declare it transformed. The points + in such a transfiguration might look something like the following:

+

—The U.S. launched an initiative in June to enable the belligerents to + “stop shooting and start talking.”

+

—Everyone has gained from the fact that the ceasefire has held.

+

—Part of the understanding reached during the first stage of that + initiative was that talks would be based on a military standstill. That + part of the agreement has been undercut. There have been two + consequences of this:

+

—Good faith for talks has been undercut.

+

—The military balance from which talks were to have started has been + changed.

+

—It remains urgent to get talks started. There seems to be no way of + repairing the damage done to good faith. That is history now. There are + ways of restoring the military balance, and these have been attended + to.

+

—The UN Security Council resolutions of + 1967 (ceasefire and settlement) are still the basis for talks.Reference is to UN Security Resolutions 233, which called for an + immediate cease-fire, and 242. We believe [and some + arrangements have been made] that the General Assembly debate should now + be followed by talks at the Foreign Minister level while the ministers + are in New York.

+
+ +
+ + 176. Paper Prepared by the National Security Council StaffSource: National Archives, Nixon + Presidential Materials, NSC Files, + NSC Institutional Files + (H-Files), Box H–048, Senior Review Group Meetings, Senior Review + Group—Future Mid-East Options 10/26/70. Secret; Nodis. The paper on + which this summary is based, “U.S. Policy Toward the Palestinians,” + October 22, is ibid. + Washington, October + 24, 1970. + +

ANALYTICAL SUMMARY

+

U.S. Policy Toward the Palestinians

+

The State paper begins (Pages 1–3) by explaining why we are now showing + renewed concern for the Palestinians—their + ability to affect chances for a settlement affects U.S. interest, + including a settlement and the stability of friendly Near Eastern + states.

+

The paper notes (pages 4–5) but does not describe in detail the idea of a “Palestinian entity”—ranging from local + autonomy on the West Bank or a Palestinian-dominated East Bank in the + absence of peace and from a new Palestinian West Bank state on the West + Bank or a Palestinian dominated Jordan (and maybe Gaza) in connection + with a peace settlement.

+

The paper describes (page 6) the problems of dealing + with the Palestinians—principally their uncertain leadership + and our lack of something precise to say to them.

+

It outlines but in this draft does not try to resolve (pages 7–9) several policy questions:

+

1. Do we still believe that Hussein is the force most likely to bring peace to the + Jordan-Israel front, or do we now believe that the Palestinians must be + given a stronger or perhaps dominant voice?

+

2. Is continued commitment to the integrity of Jordan as now constituted + an overriding U.S. interest, or are we prepared to expose Hussein and Jordan to considerable + danger as part of the price for dealing with the Palestinians?

+

3. Are we prepared to press Israel to help in the creation of a + Palestinian state?

+

4. Would a Palestinian state contribute to peace and stability or be + irredentist, militant and destabilizing?

+

5. Is there in fact a “moderate” Palestinian majority that can be + mobilized for a settlement?

+

The paper then notes (pages 10–12) a range of approaches which could be + followed separately or in combination. These begin from a base of continuing present policy of + working through Hussein but with + slight expansion of informal contacts with the Palestinians and move + toward trying to deal separately and officially with the Palestinians. + The range includes:

+

1. Try to involve Palestinians in the peacemaking process by expanding + Jarring’s mandate to include + contacts with Palestinians.

+

2. Encourage representatives of Palestinian organizations to become + actively engaged in functional UN + activities (UNRWA, UNDP, WHO, ILO) + relating to Palestinian interests.

+

3. Let Palestinians know the U.S. is interested in contact with + Palestinian leaders who could speak for Palestinian interests in an + international dialogue.

+

4. Same as 3 but achieved through Arab governments like Tunisia, Libya, + Morocco, Kuwait.

+

5. Choose a Palestinian leader or organization for direct contact.

+

6. Same as 5 with West Bank Palestinian leaders.

+

7. Make a public statement specifically recognizing the legitimate + aspirations of the Palestinian people.

+

Critique: This is really just an outline so far. + The point to emphasize in the next draft is discussion of how U.S. + interests would be affected by various Palestinian solutions. Until we + know where we want to go, the question of increased contacts does not + arise in any serious way.

+

You will receive separately a Saunders memo going into the issues in much greater + detail.Not found. At this + meeting, the purpose is to show interest in the basic issues to make + them the main focus for the next draft of the paper.

+
+ +
+ + 177. Minutes of a Senior Review Group MeetingSource: National Archives, Nixon + Presidential Materials, NSC Files, + NSC Institutional Files + (H-Files), Box H–111, Senior Review Group, SRG Minutes Originals 1970. Secret; Nodis. The meeting + was held in the White House Situation Room. All brackets are in the + original. + Washington, October 26, + 1970, 3:40–4:18 p.m. + + SUBJECT + Middle East (NSSM 103)See Document 164. + + + PARTICIPATION + Chairman—Henry A. + Kissinger + + State + + Mr. U. Alexis + Johnson + Mr. Joseph J. Sisco + Mr. Alfred L. + Atherton + + Defense + + Mr. David Packard + Mr. G. Warren + Nutter + Mr. James Noyes + + + CIA + + + Mr. Richard Helms + Mr. William Parmenter + + JCS + + + Gen. + Richard T. Knowles + + Adm. William St. + George + + NSC Staff + + Mr. Harold H. + Saunders + Col. Richard T. + Kennedy + Mr. D. Keith Guthrie + +

SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS

+

1. The State Department would provide before day’s end a draft resolution + for possible use in the UN General + Assembly.A U.S.-backed “Latin American” + draft resolution was rejected on November 4 by a roll-call vote of + 45 in favor, 49 against, with 27 abstentions. The text of the + resolution is printed in Department of State Bulletin, November 23, 1970, p. 663. The General Assembly + debate on the Middle East began on October 26.

+

2. The State Department will submit by October 30 a memorandum on the + prospects for the General Assembly debate on the Middle East, the kind + of resolution likely to emerge and the issues which the United States + will face in voting on a resolution.Not + found.

+

Dr. Kissinger: We have two + problems on the agenda today. We need to discuss our immediate tactics + in the UN General Assembly debate on the + Middle East and to consider how we might go about dealing with the + Palestinians. There is one other item I would like to discuss with only + the principals plus Joe + Sisco.

+

Mr. Johnson: (handing Dr. Kissinger a draft cable)Not + found. Here is the answer on tactics. The [NSSM 103] options + paperSee Document + 175. is considerably outdated.

+ +

Dr. Kissinger: What did Riad have + to say this morning?Speaking at the United + Nations on October 26, Egyptian Foreign Minister Mahmoud Riad accused Israel of + adopting a policy of territorial expansion since its establishment + as a state in 1948. He also said that the United States, by + providing Israel with weapons during its occupation of Arab + territory, had become an accomplice in Israel’s “aggression.” (New York Times, October 27, 1970, p. + 1)

+

Mr. Johnson: Perhaps it would be a good idea to have Joe [Sisco] give us a rundown on where we + stand on the whole question at the moment.

+

Mr. Sisco: As a result of the + consultations we have been conducting in New York during the last ten + days, two or three conclusions have become obvious. First, no possible + formula can be found to break the impasse on standstill violations. For + that reason we have not put forward any formula of our own. Second, it + is clear the Egyptians have decided they need a show. The show began + this morning in the form of the General Assembly debate. We have to look + toward a damage control operation in the General Assembly with the + objective of ending up in the best possible position to exert influence + after the debate—particularly on our Israeli friends. We have to realize + that we have little leverage on the outcome of the debate. To the extent + we adopt a reasonably helpful posture toward the Israelis during the + debate, this will give us a leg up in dealing with them afterward.

+

The Egyptians want a resolution extending the cease-fire for sixty days + and calling for the resumption of talks on the basis of the US + proposal—but without reference to rectification. They want to use the + debate to put pressure on the United States to write off the standstill + violations. They have linked the beginning of talks under Jarring’s auspices with the extension + of the ceasefire although the Al Ahram article + indicates there may be some softening of their position in this + regard.

+

Dr. Kissinger: What is the Al Ahram article?

+

Mr. Sisco: It indicates that the + linkage the Egyptians are making between starting the Jarring talks and extending the + ceasefire may not be as strong as had been indicated earlier.

+

If the General Assembly adopts a resolution along the lines the Egyptians + desire, then the U.A.R. will buy a ceasefire. The Israelis will refuse + to accept the resolution and ceasefire but will declare that they won’t + shoot first. Thus, there will be a sort of de facto ceasefire.

+

As to how to play the issue in the General Assembly, it appears that the + Africans and the Egyptians may introduce a more extreme resolution which + would undermine the 1967 Security Council resolution, include a number of pro-Arab + provisions, and be critical of the Israelis. Israel has asked us to put + forward another resolution as a counterpoise. This would be our maximum + position. It would provide for extension of the ceasefire, call for + resumption of talks on the basis of the US proposal, and say something + about rectification. I think it would be a good idea to go along with + the Israelis on this. It would put us in a good position later on to + deal with them.

+

Dr. Kissinger: They got in touch + with me yesterday. They said they wanted to resume talks on the basis of + all previous resolutions and the US peace proposal. I talked to the + Secretary [of State] about this.

+

Mr. Sisco: Our proposal does what + the Israelis desire.

+

Dr. Kissinger: Do you mean that + the Israelis don’t know their own desires? What they were saying to me + doesn’t indicate what they want?

+

Mr. Sisco: What I am saying is + that they may have phrased it differently when talking to you but that + our proposal is in line with what they want.

+

We need to do a paper for you on how we vote when we come out with the + expected resolution in the General Assembly.

+

Mr. Johnson: Are there not some signs that the Egyptians are amenable to + some modification of their resolution? They are anxious to have us along + on it.

+

Dr. Kissinger: If the final + resolution provides for a sixty-day ceasefire and resumption of the + Jarring talks but makes no + mention of rectification, we will have spent much of our capital with + the Israelis.

+

Mr. Sisco: That’s right. What we + will work for is a resolution that is absolutely neutral on the question + of rectification and violations. This would call for “all parties” to + cooperate in creating the conditions that would permit resumption of + talks.On November 4, the UN General Assembly adopted Resolution + 2628, “deploring the continued occupation of the Arab territories + since June 5, 1967.” It reaffirmed the principles of Security + Council Resolution 242 and urged the “speedy implementation” of that + resolution. It also called for the resumption of peace talks under + Jarring and recommended + that the cease-fire between Israel and the United Arab Republic be + extended for another three months. Among the 57 countries that voted + for the resolution were the front-line Arab states, some of the Arab + states of the Middle East and North Africa that did not border + Israel, the Soviet Union, and France. Among the 16 that voted + against it were the United States and Israel, while the United + Kingdom and 38 others abstained. States that did not register a vote + at all included Algeria, Iraq, Yemen, South Yemen, Kuwait, Saudi + Arabia, and Syria. The complete text of the resolution as well as + the list of countries present for the roll-call vote is printed in + Yearbook of the United Nations, 1970, p. + 261.

+

Dr. Kissinger: Is the General Assembly debate the place to + spend our capital with the Israelis? Would it not be better to try to + earn some capital there?

+

Mr. Sisco: I agree.

+

Dr. Kissinger: If forced to make + a choice, one could make a case for the proposition that the best way to + get Israel to resume negotiations is not to line up against them in the + General Assembly. Then we could put pressure on them to negotiate + afterwards.

+

Mr. Sisco: That is our + approach.

+

Mr. Packard: We have allowed the + Israelis to make more of the violations than is justified. We don’t + really know whether there are more missiles in the ceasefire zone than + there were on August 10. We know that a lot of sand has been bulldozed. + Besides, we have given the Israelis a great deal of equipment to help + them out.

+

We got in this box. I don’t know if we can back out now. But if we can + make the violations seem less troublesome, it would make things + easier.

+

Dr. Kissinger: Is it in fact true + that we don’t know that there are more missiles than before?

+

Mr. Packard: We can’t prove it + absolutely. There were 53 sites on August 10; I think there are 61 + today. However, we don’t know whether they actually brought in more + missiles.

+

Mr. Johnson: We know that there are missiles ready to fire that were not + there in August. As for SA–3s, there were five and there are now + twenty-one.

+

Mr. Packard: There is no doubt + there have been changes. But our data is not good enough to draw precise + conclusions.

+

Dr. Kissinger: (to Helms) This is a factual question. + What do you think about it?

+

Mr. Helms: Secretary Laird also mentioned this to me. We + are making a study of the balance of forces, but that will not really + answer the question, which is how many missiles were in the ceasefire + zone before but hidden under tarpaulins or buried in sand. We know that + there are now more missiles ready to fire.

+

Dr. Kissinger: We would be in a + weak position if we were to end up arguing with ourselves that something + which happened didn’t happen.

+

Mr. Packard: I am not saying there + were no violations. But we should take into account that Israel is now + better off as a result of the equipment we have provided them.

+

Dr. Kissinger: I can see how we + might come to the view that no matter what happened the talks will + resume. We should not say that because there were violations, the talks will end for all eternity. As + for the aid we have furnished Israel since the ceasefire, we would have + provided some of this in any event.

+

Mr. Sisco: What about the + psychological-political situation? We have to remember that an + understanding between the US and the USSR is involved, and also one with the U.A.R.

+

Mr. Packard: We don’t have to say + that there were no violations. We can say that the violations were not + significant enough to require rectification.

+

Dr. Kissinger: I think that might + be a dangerous thing to say. We are likely to end up trying to arrange a + settlement that involves having Israel give up territory in return for + promises by the US, the USSR, and the + Arabs. To the extent that the value of such promises is depreciated, we + are going to make such a settlement more difficult to attain.

+

I believe that everyone agrees it is desirable to resume the + negotiations. We have to consider how we are more likely to be able to + do so—by taking an anti-Israeli position in the General Assembly or by + avoiding doing so.

+

Mr. Packard: We could take a more + moderate position. We could say, “Yes, there have been violations, but + they can’t be rectified. Now we have to have an arrangement to insure + that there will be no violations in the future.”

+

Dr. Kissinger: What do you + mean—that we say, “You get one violation free?”

+

Mr. Packard: We could try to get + better inspection arrangements. We have got to set this up so that it + can be better verified.

+

Mr. Johnson: What do you propose to do?

+

Mr. Packard: We could try on-site + inspection.

+

Dr. Kissinger and Mr. Johnson: + What would that tell us that we don’t already know?

+

Mr. Johnson: What we have to do is build a bridge between the positions + of the two sides. Egypt refuses to extend the ceasefire unless the + Israelis start talks, and Israel says there can be no talks unless there + is rectification.

+

Mr. Packard: What do you mean by + rectification? If the Egyptians move back, then there would be some + reason for us to move back in terms of what we have supplied to the + Israelis.

+

Dr. Kissinger: The two things are + not equivalent. We never promised not to deliver equipment to + Israel.

+

Mr. Packard: Our position should + be that there have been violations and that we have to fix things so + that there are no more violations in the future.

+ +

Dr. Kissinger: There are two + separate questions. What do we say once negotiations are started again? + (That could be along the lines of what you have just been saying.) What + do we say publicly at this time in order to get through the General + Assembly debate? The issue is whether we can adopt a position in the + debate such that we do not adversely affect what happens afterward.

+

Mr. Johnson: The Israelis want us to say something about rectification, + but we are not proposing to do that. (to Packard) I don’t think our positions are too far + apart.

+

This draft cable states what we are proposing. It states that the parties + will exert their best efforts to generate conditions that will lead to a + resumption of negotiations.

+

Mr. Sisco: This is our first or + maximum position.

+

Dr. Kissinger: What do we retreat + to?

+

Mr. Sisco: To a formula that is + neutral on violations. It would avoid a direct call to resume + negotiations. This would be left till after the General Assembly + concludes its debate.

+

Dr. Kissinger: How does this + differ from your first position?

+

Mr. Sisco: Let’s not get into + this now. To do this you have got to read the precise language, and this + is not the place to discuss wording.

+

Dr. Kissinger: When in hell are + we going to get into it?

+

Mr. Sisco: This is not the right + place to work out the language.

+

Dr. Kissinger: Then what are we + talking about?

+

Mr. Sisco: It would be all right + to try to define the subject matter of our resolution, but we should not + seek to establish the precise language here.

+

Dr. Kissinger: But what do we + talk about then?

+

Mr. Johnson: The issue is our general position in the General Assembly + debate and whether we should try to build up some capital with Israel + during the debate.

+

Mr. Packard: We ought to consider + whether we should build up some capital with the rest of the world.

+

Mr. Johnson: The Israelis are the ones we have to bring to the table, and + the Israelis have no desire to go to the table.

+

Mr. Packard: They are making hay. + They are taking advantage of us.

+

Mr. Johnson: What do you propose that we do?

+

Mr. Packard: Just not come down so + hard in support of the Israeli position. We need to figure out where we + are going to come out on this.

+

Mr. Sisco: That is what we have + been doing. We want to get in a position to achieve what we want after + the debate.

+ +

Mr. Packard: Then let’s not talk + about building up capital with the Israelis. Instead, we should be + building up our capital with the rest of the world.

+

Mr. Johnson: What you want to end up with is not much different from what + we are seeking.

+

Mr. Packard: I think we should + soften our support for the Israelis.

+

Mr. Kissinger: We had a major + crisis in September. As long as I am going to be in this, we are not + going to slide into another crisis. We have to get the facts and make + sure that everyone is singing from the same sheet. What we do about it + is another matter, but we need an agreed statement on what has + happened.

+

Mr. Packard: The difficulty is + that we didn’t have a good enough data base to begin with.

+

Dr. Kissinger: We had some good + data during the first week.

+

Mr. Sisco: We should review the + US Government’s public record on this. The Secretary of State said in a + press conference that the violations are conclusive.At an October 9 press conference, Rogers responded to a question + about U.S. evidence regarding missiles in the cease-fire zone + saying: “Yes, we have evidence that they have moved missiles in. And + the evidence is conclusive that they have moved missiles in. When I + say ‘they,’ I mean there have been SA–3 sites constructed since the + day of the cease-fire, and we are convinced, I think beyond a doubt, + that the Soviet personnel are there to assist in the construction + and manning of those sites.” (Department of State Bulletin, October 26, 1970, p. 474)

+

Dr. Kissinger: He also said so + privately on a number of occasions.

+

Mr. Sisco: We have also said that + some rectification is required. The Secretary left the definition of + rectification ambiguous and referred only to “what the parties can agree + to.” That leaves open whether there should be total, partial, or no + rollback. The Secretary went further and stated that there had been + three kinds of violations. There were new sites where none had been + before. Positions previously initiated had been completed. Missile + equipment had been brought in, and there had been forward movement + within the ceasefire zone. That is the policy of the United States as + stated by the Secretary of State.

+

What Dave [Packard] is referring + to is that we stated on August 19 that in the period around the start of + the ceasefire something happened but our evidence on violations was not + conclusive.See footnote 2, Document 154.

+

Mr. Packard: What I am talking + about is what I saw last week—the change in sites from 53 to 61.

+

Mr. Johnson: The Secretary [of State] spent three hours going over the + data. He wouldn’t accept what Joe [Sisco], Dave [Packard], Dick [Helms], or Ray Cline said.

+ +

Mr. Packard: I am just saying that + we don’t know how serious the violations are.Rogers + telephoned Kissinger at + 12:16 p.m. on October 27 and said, “I was amazed to hear that the + Defense Department says that they are not sure that the missile + violations amounted to much,” to which Kissinger responded, “It’s outrageous.” Later in the + conversation Rogers + remarked: “If we have a story that leaks out that we don’t know what + we are talking about, it will kill us with the world,” and then + added that the President would “go through the roof.” (National + Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Henry + Kissinger Telephone Conversation Transcripts, Box 7, + Chronological File) Kissinger raised the issue with Laird in a telephone conversation + at “1:45 pm-ish,” noting that if Packard’s argument leaked, “it could be disastrous.” + Laird replied that there + was “no question of violations,” but that analysts could not prove, + based on aerial photos of the Sinai, that missiles had been moved + into the new sites that they had counted, and, thus, he had asked + for a paper accounting for any missile increases in the cease-fire + zone. (Ibid.) Kissinger + telephoned Rogers at 5:15 + p.m. to report his conversation with Laird and said that there was “no sense in arguing + with” the Defense Secretary and that “the only thing to do” was to + “get an agreed intelligence statement. And then have no one deviate + from the guidance.” Rogers + agreed. (Ibid.)

+

Dr. Kissinger: This is important + also in terms of our relations with the Soviet Union. They have to make + a big decision on how they are going to deal with us on the big + questions including the Middle East. They will have to choose between + adopting a hard line and waiting for us to shift our position, or making + some movement themselves in order to reach an agreement. I believe that + they are at least considering making a few concessions with a view to + seeking bilateral agreement rather than relying on unilateral + action.Kissinger and Dobrynin discussed negotiations on October 23. See + Foreign + Relations, 1969–1976, volume XIII, Soviet Union, + October 1970–October 1971, Document 29. However, if + we adopt the wrong posture on the ceasefire violations, they might + conclude that there is no need for them to make any shifts and that they + are home free.

+

Mr. Sisco: We have three options + in the General Assembly. We can agree to the Egyptian position. We can + hold to our position. Or we can try for something in between that + doesn’t prejudice our position that there have been violations and + doesn’t wash out the question of rectification. I believe that there is a two-thirds vote in favor of washing out + rectification. In the event it turns out that this is the case, we will + have to decide how we are to vote and that will be a very difficult + decision.

+

Dr. Kissinger: Can we have a + memorandum by Friday on this?

+

Mr. Sisco: We would like to see + how the debate evolves.

+

Dr. Kissinger: Even if we take an + extreme position in favor of rectification as a negotiating gambit, that + would not mean that we would take the same position after the General + Assembly debate is over. My guess is that as an ultimate position we + will wind up very close to where Dave [Packard] wants to + go, that is, trying to get the Israelis to negotiate without + rectification.

+

Mr. Sisco: The best way to get + there is not to say now that the violations are not important.

+

Dr. Kissinger: We have two + problems—the public record, and the effect on our relations with the + Soviets. There has been a considerable change from August to September + in the tenor of US-Soviet relations. We don’t want to bring the Soviets + back to their August mentality.

+

Mr. Packard: What I am saying is + that the data on the violations is somewhat imprecise. Over the last two + readings, the description of some missiles was changed from + “operational” to “probably operational”.

+

Dr. Kissinger: (to Helms) Can you give us a conclusive + reading?

+

Mr. Sisco: It is true that the + estimates do change.

+

Dr. Kissinger: We still have the + Palestinian paper to consider.See Document 176. However, I have a + matter that I want to discuss with only the principals.

+

(At this point the Senior Review Group went into restricted session with + only Mr. Kissinger, Mr. + Packard, Mr. Johnson, Mr. + Helms, Mr. Sisco, General Knowles, and Colonel Kennedy present.)No record of the meeting has been + found.

+
+ +
+ + 178. Minutes of a Senior Review Group MeetingSource: National Archives, Nixon + Presidential Materials, NSC Files, + NSC Institutional Files + (H-Files), Box H–111, Senior Review Group, SRG Minutes Originals 1970. Top Secret; Codeword. The + meeting was held in the White House Situation Room. + Washington, October 29, + 1970, 9:30–10:10 a.m. + + SUBJECT + Middle East + + + PARTICIPANTS + Chairman—Henry A. + Kissinger + + State + + + U. Alexis Johnson + + + Joseph J. Sisco + + + Alfred L. Atherton + + + Ray Cline + + + Defense + + + David Packard + + + Armistead I. Selden + + James S. Noyes + + + CIA + + + + Richard Helms + + + JCS + + Lt. Gen. + Richard Knowles + Lt. Gen. Donald Bennett + + NSC Staff + + Col. Richard + Kennedy + + Harold Saunders + + + Jeanne W. Davis + + +

SUMMARY OF DECISIONS

+

It was agreed to:

+

1. prepare a statement including:

+

. . . the difference between the number of occupied sites as of August 10 + and today;

+

. . . the difference between the number of operational sites on August 10 + and today;

+

. . . the differences between the number of SAM–3 sites on August 22 and today;

+

. . . a general statement on the degree to which the system has been + moved forward;

+

. . . our best judgment as to how the new equipment was probably + introduced.

+

2. circulate the statement for clearance

+

3. issue the statement for internal use only as an + agreed Government position to be followed by all concerned.No statement was found.

+ +

Mr. Kissinger: We want to look at + the missile situation in the standstill zone and get a government-wide + position in language which is not subject to Talmudic interpretation. + This is a factual matter. We need to get our intelligence into a + position where it guides and does not follow policy.

+

Mr. Helms read the briefing (text + attached),Attached but not + printed. referring to the bar graph and map.

+

Mr. Johnson: Is firing position a new term? Are these what we have been + referring to as sites?

+

Mr. Helms: Yes.

+

Mr. Kissinger: When you speak of + the forward deployment of the sites creating some threat to Israeli + aircraft operating on their side of the Canal, how far could the + missiles penetrate?

+

Mr. Helms: Ten to twelve + kilometers.

+

Mr. Kissinger: I have a paper + here which indicates that the maximum range of the SAM envelop east of the Canal had not + changed significantly since the cease-fire. What does that mean? Does it + mean that they could reach across the Canal before the cease-fire?

+

General Bennett: Yes.

+

Mr. Kissinger: How many missiles + could reach across and how deep could they penetrate?

+

General Bennett: We don’t really know.

+

Mr. Kissinger: If the envelop + itself hasn’t changed, then they must have shortened their range, if we + can now say that there is no significant change even though so many more + missiles are now in forward positions.

+

General Bennett: They had some on the Canal on August 7.

+

Mr. Packard: Also, the SAM–3 range is shorter than the SAM–2. The SAM–2 range is 30 miles and the SAM–3 is 12 miles.

+

Mr. Kissinger: I remember a + briefing by Ray Cline before the + cease-fire which indicated that the sites along the Canal were probably + not operational.

+

Mr. Packard: On August 22, they + had eight sites that could reach across the Canal.

+

Mr. Sisco: The Israelis told us + on August 8 that none could reach across the Canal.

+

General Bennett: (Showing a map to Mr. Kissinger) You can see the envelop and the precise + location of the sites better here.

+ +

Mr. Kissinger: In early August we + were told that these sites were not operational. However, if we are now + saying that the envelop had not significantly changed, we must assume + that they were operational.

+

General Bennett: What we are saying is that the Egyptians now have the + same capability in the area.

+

Mr. Cline: There is no question + that there are now many more missiles able to fire in the envelop so + that there has been a definite change in the intensity of the coverage. + What Mr. Kissinger remembers is + that the Israelis had told us they thought the missile sites along the + Canal were dummies since they had flown directly over them and had never + been fired upon. Also, the Israeli photos suggested that there were + eleven dummy sites in the forward zone. We carried these as occupied + sites, however.

+

Mr. Kissinger: If the envelop + hasn’t changed, the coverage within that envelop has intensified. Can we + all agree on this?

+

All agreed.

+

Mr. Packard: There is no question + that there are many new firing positions. However, we had only low + resolution photography before August 10, and this was not good enough to + fix the status with certainty. It was just not possible to tie these + things down with absolute certainty.

+

Mr. Kissinger: We have two + problems—what we tell ourselves and what we tell others. We must be sure + that we are telling ourselves the truth.

+

Mr. Cline: There were no SAM–3s operational in the zone before the + cease-fire. The interlocking of the SAM–2s and 3s in the zone has made it very tough.

+

Mr. Kissinger: Secretary + Rogers has made a statement + that the forward movement of the SAM–3s + was not considered by the U.S. to be a defensive move.See footnote 9, Document + 177. For a time the Soviets seem to have respected + this and were hugging the 30 kilometer line with their missiles. Now + their installations are well inside. They were, of course, not legally + bound by the Secretary’s statement.

+

Mr. Packard: (to Mr. Helms) You mentioned the arrival of + Soviet cargo ships in Alexandria. When did those ships come in?

+

Mr. Helms: Some time in August—I + can get you the precise date.

+

Mr. Packard: I think that is a + significant piece of information.

+

Mr. Kissinger: Does anyone + disagree with Mr. Helms’ + statement of the facts in his briefing?

+ +

General Bennett: We have a minor difference relating to the number of + sites on August 10. CIA uses a figure + of 97 with 53 of these equipped. We classify 3 of those 97 as field + deployed sites, and think the figure was really 94.

+

Mr. Sisco: Those 3 sites are + crystal clear in the photographs however.

+

Mr. Packard: How many were + occupied as of the cease-fire date?

+

General Bennett: As of August 10, we show 94 sites plus three field + sites, with 56 occupied. CIA shows 97 + sites with 53 occupied.

+

Mr. Cline: There is no + disagreement on the facts, but we are using slightly different + definitions of the categories.

+

Mr. Packard: There were 56 sites + occupied on the cease-fire date. Now there are 55 to 65 sites + occupied?

+

General Bennett: No, these are not in the same category. We are talking + about the occupied and operational sites. There are now 108 sites, + meaning sites with some missile-related equipment.

+

Mr. Sisco: We are relating 56 + occupied sites on the cease-fire date to 108 occupied sites now. We are + not relating 56 sites to 55 sites.

+

Mr. Packard: On August 10, there + were 56 sites occupied, but not necessarily operational? Now there are + 108 sites occupied?

+

General Bennett: We are all agreed on the 108 figure.

+

Mr. Packard: How many sites were + operational on August 10?

+

Mr. Johnson: 15 to 25.

+

Mr. Sisco: And it is now 55 to + 65.

+

General Bennett: We would go up to 69.

+

Mr. Kissinger: Am I correct that + there were no SAM–3 sites operational + on August 10 and that the largest increase has been in SAM–3 sites?

+

Mr. Packard: How hard is our + evidence that there were no SAM–3 sites + operational at the time of the cease-fire?

+

Mr. Cline: There were none + operational a few days before the cease-fire. There may have been some + units in place by August 10—possibly two. We tentatively identified five + SAM–3 sites on August 10 which were + occupied. As of now, there are 32 occupied SAM–3 sites. On August 10 somewhat less than those 5, + possibly 2, were operational.

+

Mr. Kissinger: I remember the + discussion at San Clemente as to how two operational sites could affect + the strategic balance.Reference is + presumably to the NSC meeting on + the Middle East at San Clemente on September 1. See Document 156.

+

Mr. Packard: What are our figures + on operational SAM–3’s now?

+ +

General Bennett: We say 15 to 31.

+

Mr. Helms: We are using 25 to + 30.

+

General Knowles: The lower + figure—the 15—are fully operational with 4 missiles to each site. The + higher level—the 31—are somewhat less fully equipped possibly with one + to three missiles. Fully equipped means that all essential elements are + in place—radar, at least one launcher, etc.

+

Mr. Helms: A more significant + time period might be from late August to late September, which was the + period of our better photography. In late August, there were two + operational SAM–3 units. In late + September, there were 25 to 30.

+

Mr. Sisco: It would be even more + significant if we went back to July.

+

General Bennett: As of July 28, there were five unoccupied SAM–3 sites but none were occupied.

+

Mr. Packard: What kind of missile + was involved in the shoot-down of the four Israeli aircraft?

+

General Bennett: Probably SAM–2s.

+

Mr. Kissinger: Have the SAM–3s ever brought one down?

+

Mr. Sisco: The Israelis think + there is a possibility that one was a SAM–3 but the other three were SAM–2s.

+

General Bennett: Both 2s and 3s were operational in the area at the + time.

+

Mr. Kissinger: The Secretary of + State has said publicly that there are sites in existence now where none + were before; that there is missile equipment in the sites where no such + equipment was before; and that there are operational missiles now in + sites where no missiles were before. Is that an accurate reflection of + the Secretary’s statement?

+

Mr. Sisco: The Secretary has said + four things: (1) there are a number of instances where there had been + nothing there and now new sites have been built; (2) there are a number + of instances where our photography at the time of the cease-fire showed + positions were in the process of construction, and these have now been + completed; (3) there were a number of positions which had no missile + equipment at the time of the cease-fire and now contain such equipment; + and (4) there has been a general forward movement of SAMs closer to the + Canal.

+

Mr. Kissinger: Does anyone + disagree with these statements of the Secretary’s?

+

No one disagreed.

+

Mr. Kissinger: You can tell from + the map that there has been an increase in SAM–3 sites. Also, the SAM–2 sites have increased and have been moved forward.

+

All agreed.

+ +

Mr. Irwin: In the meeting between + the Secretary and Riad in New YorkSee footnote 3, Document 169. Riad + used a date, acknowledging that after that date the Egyptians had gone + full-speed ahead. He claimed that Israel had already violated the + agreement and that the United States had said we were going to assist + Israel, and that, therefore, after that time the Egyptians had moved + ahead.

+

Mr. Sisco: Riad said this was + September 3.

+

Mr. Irwin: Do any of our figures + work between August 10 and September 3? Do we have a clear case of + violation even if we should accept Riad’s statement as being true?

+

Mr. Cline: Yes. Between August 10 + and August 27, three sites were built from scratch. By September 3, 14 + additional sites had been started. In other words, there were about 15 + sites built from scratch by September 3.

+

Mr. Kissinger: So we are talking + about an increase in operational sites of 50, which means 200–300 + missiles, assuming there are six missiles in a SAM–2 site and four in a SAM–3 site. Is it possible that they could have hidden + 200–300 missiles plus the necessary supporting equipment in the + standstill zone? We are agreed that no one saw them move, but could they + have been moved at night? Even if they had been hidden in the zone, + there would still be a violation of the cease-fire. Is this the only + unsettled issue?

+

Mr. Cline: We did not make the + question of movement part of our violation charge—we spoke only of new + sites. I believe the CIA evidence, some + of which is new, is fairly conclusive.

+

Mr. Sisco: We must distinguish + between what we think and what we said. Does anyone here doubt that some + missiles were moved into the zone after the cease-fire?

+

Mr. Packard: Have we carefully + examined all the pictures for evidence of any hiding place in the + zone?

+

Mr. Helms, Mr. Cline and General Bennett: Yes we + have.

+

Mr. Cline: I think the better + question is whether the Egyptian Army is up to moving that much + equipment in 48 hours.

+

Mr. Sisco: I think Riad’s talk + with the Secretary was significant. In the first place he said he was + out of town and that when he returned and read the agreement, he + considered it unfair. He claimed he would not have accepted the + agreement had he been in town. He also claimed they hadn’t violated the + agreement, but, even if they had, they had a right to do so to protect + themselves. I consider his statement that they had a right to violate the agreement as an indirect + acknowledgment that they did.

+

Mr. Kissinger: Let us get a + statement of our agreement which will include: (1) the difference + between the number of occupied sites as of August 10 and today; (2) the + difference between the number of operational sites on August 10 and + today; (3) the difference between the number of SAM–3 sites on August 22 and today; (4) a general statement + on the degree to which the system has been moved forward; (5) our best + judgment as to how the new equipment was probably introduced. This will + be used for internal guidance only. I see no reason to call Riad a liar + or to engage in any public confrontation with the Arabs. Let’s get this + statement drafted and I will circulate it to all of you to be sure that + it is an accurate reflection of your judgments. Then we can issue this + as a Government position and ask everyone to follow this line.

+
+ +
+ 179. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security + Affairs (Kissinger) to President + NixonSource: National Archives, Nixon + Presidential Materials, NSC Files, + Box 656, Country Files, Middle East, Ceasefire, Mideast Vol. I. Top + Secret; Sensitive. Sent for information. A notation on the + memorandum indicates the President saw it. + Washington, November 1, 1970. + + SUBJECT + Status of SAM Sites in the + Egyptian Standstill Zone + +

A new inter-agency task force under the chairmanship of CIA has been formed to improve the quality + and usefulness of intelligence reporting on the Egyptian-Soviet missile + complex within the Egyptian standstill zone. The first product of this + group is a graphic description of the development of the missile complex + accompanied by an explanatory narrative (attached).Attached but not printed is the October 21 “Status + of SAM Sites in the Egyptian + Standstill Zone.” Better quality photography and the gradual + development of improved and more sophisticated analytical techniques has + recently made it possible to refine our judgments on the operational + status of the “occupied” SAM sites. + This analysis will be updated as new information becomes available.

+ +

You may wish to study this memorandum yourself, but the following are a + few of what seem to be the more important points:

+

—The number of sites which probably were operationally equipped on + September 3 (17 to 23, including two sites with the Soviet-operated SA–3 + equipment) was close to the number estimated to be in the area + immediately after the cease-fire/standstill went in effect (15 to 25, + including up to five SA–3’s). As you know there was a big Soviet and + Egyptian push to move SAMs toward the Suez Canal in the weeks + immediately preceding the cease-fire/standstill agreement on August 7. + After the standstill went into effect and up to early September the rise + in the number of total sites was relatively small and was accomplished + largely through modifications and improvements in previously existing + facilities.

+

—There appears to have been a substantial increase in SAM site construction between late August + and mid-September as well as some increase in the number of operational + sites. It is especially important to note that Soviet-operated SA–3 + equipment accounted for most of the increase in operational sites during + this period.

+

—After mid-September the construction of new sites began to slow down and + level off, but if anything, the push to occupy and turn operational the + already constructed sites increased for awhile. Thus, for instance, + during the week of September 13–21 the number of operational SA–3 sites + doubled to a total of 28, while the comparable total of SA–2 sites + increased by one-fourth to 30.

+

—Since late September there appears to have been a general leveling off + of all missile-related activity in the standstill zone, but a longer + time period and more information is probably necessary before such a + judgment can be made with a high degree of confidence. As of early + October, however, the number of sites which were probably operational + had stabilized at around 58 to 61. Of these, it is estimated that + between 25 and 29 are the Soviet-operated SA–3s and the remainder are + SA–2s. Preliminary analysis of subsequent U–2 missions had not revealed + any new SAM sites up to October 18.

+

Several important conclusions seem possible from this analysis.

+

—In the first two weeks of the cease-fire period, the Egyptians seem to + have been doing about what they said they were doing—hardening sand + sites there before the cease-fire and maybe moving some missiles + around.

+

—The Soviets and Egyptians appear to have answered our strong protests on + September 3 against standstill violationsSee Document 157. with not only a + continuation of the activity we objected to but with an increase in both + the construction of new + sites and especially the deployment of equipment to turn them + operational.

+

—The Soviets cannot legitimately claim, as they are trying, that they are + uninvolved and not responsible for whatever happened in the standstill + zone. We know that the number of operational sites has more than doubled + since the cease-fire/standstill went into effect. The Soviets, of + course, supplied the equipment and the Egyptians would simply not have + been able to plan and execute such a massive buildup. Moreover, the + increase in Soviet-operated SA–3s is even more dramatic, with perhaps + half of the some 25–29 operational units having been introduced between + late August and mid-September, and the remainder since that time.

+

—It is too early to know for sure, but it is possible that the Soviets + and Egyptians are in the process of completing the buildup of the + missile complex. They have already constructed the densest and most + sophisticated barrier-air-defense system ever erected and there are + early indications that SAM-related activity is leveling off within the + standstill zone.

+
+ +
+ 180. Memorandum From Director of Central Intelligence Helms to the President’s Assistant for + National Security Affairs (Kissinger)Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–049, Senior + Review Group Meetings, Senior Review Group—Middle East 11–13–70. + Secret; Sensitive. All brackets are in the original except those + indicating text that remains classified. A copy was sent to the + Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs. + Washington, November 5, 1970. + + SUBJECT + Fatah Request for Contact with U.S. Officials + +

Further to my memorandum of 29 October 1970, concerning the Fatah request + for policy talks,Not found. Helms sent his first memorandum to + Kissinger on the subject + of Fatah’s request for contact with U.S. officials on October 23; + see Document 174. [2 lines not declassified]. He commented as + follows:

+

1) Although seriously disappointed by the U.S. Government’s failure to + send a representative [less than 1 line not + declassified] can understand and, in fact, objectively accept, our factual explanation + that a variety of practical factors prevented a speedy response to + Fatah’s proposal to establish a dialogue, but many other Fatah leaders + might not be able to do so. As a major world power and one with + important interests in the Middle East, the U.S. Government must be + prepared to go more than half way to understand and accommodate the + legitimate interests and even the “fixations” of the Palestinian + people.

+

2) Fatah is extremely aware of the imperative need, in the interest of + its survival, to keep its contact with the U.S. Government absolutely + secret. [name not declassified] noted that if his + own role in the current contact were ever to become known or widely + suspected, he would be branded as an “American Agent” and might even be + liquidated under such circumstances.

+

3) Fatah’s interest in honest, secret dialogue with the U.S. Government + at this time is the product of many considerations, such as: (A) Its + recognition that the United States is a key power factor in the area, + especially vis-à-vis Israel; (B) Its sensing, from recent statements by + senior U.S. Officials, that the U.S. Government has finally come to + realize that no lasting peaceful settlement is possible without the + consent and active participation of the Palestinian people and its + leadership (and Fatah is confident that it alone can provide that + leadership); (C) Fatah’s present readiness to accept the establishment + of a Palestine entity (and in fact to furnish the government of such an + entity) and the pragmatic necessity for this entity to live in peace + with and indeed to enter into cooperative relations with Israel; and, + (D) Its realistic recognition that to become viable economically, a + Palestine entity will require sizable foreign aid, especially from the + United States.

+

4) [name not declassified] argued that the U.S. + Government, in order to understand the milieu in which it must act + regarding the Palestinian problem, has to recognize as a practical + factor the emotional imperative of the younger Palestinian generation to + assert itself combatively, even at mortal cost. In effect, resistance + has finally restored the essential degree of national pride to the + younger Palestinian generation, and if this pride is not permitted to + channel itself into constructive effort (for example, within the context + of a Palestine entity), it will vent itself violently and destructively + against all foes, real or imagined.

+ + + Richard Helms + Helms signed “Dick” above his typed + signature. + + +
+ +
+ + 181. Paper Prepared by the National Security Council StaffSource: National Archives, Nixon + Presidential Materials, NSC Files, + NSC Institutional Files + (H-Files), Box H–049, Senior Review Group Meetings, Senior Review + Group—Middle East 11–13–70 (1 of 2). Secret; Nodis. All brackets are + in the original. + Washington, + November 9, 1970. +

ANALYTICAL SUMMARY

+

Options for Moving Toward a Mid-East Settlement

+

Introduction

+

Attached is Sisco’s paper, + “Middle East—Where Do We Go From Here?”Undated; attached but not printed. This suggests mainly + trying to develop a joint strategy with Israel for trying to get talks + started on the basis of some UAR + political concessions (e.g., agreement to a POW exchange or to Jarring talks at the Foreign Minister + level, which Israel wants). This considers none of the other options + which have been suggested. These are detailed below for the sake of + establishing a broader framework for discussion.

+

Inventory of Steps that Could Be Taken

+

Listed as major headings below are the broad options described in the IG + paper. Under them are noted the principal operational proposals related + to each one. These are proposals from all quarters; the IG paper does + not go into this much operational detail. They are included here as a + step toward looking at exactly what steps are available in the present + situation. The arguments on these options are deferred to the next + section of this summary.

+

1. We can make a specific proposal to the UAR and Soviets for rectification of + the standstill violations, and to Israel to resume talks under + Jarring once such + rectifications have taken place.

+

—We could suggest UAR redeployment of + missiles (without razing sites) outside a 20 km. zone next to the Canal + but within the 50 km. zone.

+

—There has been a proposal for mutual withdrawal of all forces on both + sides of the Canal to lines 25 km. back. This has sometimes been coupled + with a proposal to begin clearing the Canal.

+

2. We could press Israel to resume talks under + Jarring’s auspices + without rectification of the violations.

+ +

—We could take the line that any shifts in the military balance as a + result of the violations has been redressed by subsequent U.S. military + assistance to Israel. We could also mention:

+

—$500 million in military assistance.

+

—New aircraft and other military equipment for delivery in 1971.

+

—We could promise Israel that we would not press the U.S. formulations + put forward by Secretary Rogers + on December 9, 1969,See Document 73. and in the U.S.–USSR talks in any + negotiation that might begin.

+

—We could try to negotiate some new standstill agreement.

+

—Jarring could call for talks on + this subject just to get the parties engaged.

+

—The U.S. and USSR could attempt to + work out a new agreement.

+

—Jarring could be urged to issue + an invitation to talks at the Foreign Minister level (which Israel + wants) and we, in connection with new arms aid, could let Israel know + that we expected it to find a way to accept.

+

—We could try to get outside the Jarring framework and stimulate a call for a peace + conference. One suggestion has been to have this a meeting with the + permanent representatives of the UN + Security Council (the Four Powers under their formal UN hats).

+

3. We could resume active substantive negotiations in + the two and four power talks.

+

—While there is little pressure for this in U.S. councils, it could + perhaps be envisioned in connection with one of the steps listed above. + There is Malik’s informal + suggestion of talks on US–USSR guarantees (rather than on settlement + terms).Not further identified, but on + October 30, Malik addressed + the UN General Assembly and called + for the immediate resumption of Arab-Israeli peace talks. (New York Times, October 31, 1970, p. + 1)

+

4. While continuing to hold out for rectification and + against shifting the negotiations to the four powers, we could + explore a “Palestinian option”—i.e., the possibility of an + Israeli-Jordanian-Palestinian settlement. [The operational + suggestions for this option are dealt with more fully under the + analytical summary of the Palestinian background paper.See Document 182. + The thoughts below are in addition to those described there.]

+

—Jarring could be asked to invite + Jordanian and Israeli (and perhaps Palestinian) representatives to begin + talks on the foundation that the standstill violations do not apply to + Jordan.

+ +

—An economic program could be launched involving the Palestinians as a + possible prelude to their greater involvement in peace talks. For + example, there might be a refugee commission to begin arranging the + details of compensation; Israel might make an offer in this connection; + the U.S. might relate its economic rehabilitation program in Jordan to + phasing UNRWA functions into Jordanian and Palestinian hands.

+

5. While taking a number of interim steps and holding + out for rectification, we could in effect mark time on all fronts + with respect to a peace settlement until the forces set in motion by + recent events in the area have become clearer and the parties have + adjusted themselves to this new situation. This would + presumably require some steps that would permit the UAR to justify continuing the ceasefire + past the present extension.

+

—The U.S. or Jarring might start + circulation of working drafts of portions of a final settlement on their + own. This could be called preliminary work while the standstill was + being renegotiated, for instance.

+

—An effort could be made to arrange secret UAR-Israel contacts which + could then be merged into Jarring talks. This might be enough to encourage Israel + to find a formula for resuming talks under Jarring.

+

—Steps on the refugees described above could be taken with a possible + Israel offer of some controlled program for permitting those who left + the West Bank in 1967 to return to their homes. This might be + characterized in some way so as to relate it to eventual West Bank + freedom.

+

—Two power talks would be resumed to discuss U.S.-Soviet modalities for + avoiding confrontation rather than for an Arab-Israeli settlement.

+

—An Israeli withdrawal of occupation forces from the populated areas of + the West Bank (while maintaining security positions along the Jordan + River) if connected with other moves toward the Palestinians might + provide a sense of movement on that front. A related move would be + arrangement for freer flow of people and commerce, especially to + Jerusalem. Israel might even turn over to West Bank Muslim authority + control of the Islamic holy places.

+

Issues for Discussion

+

The above operational possibilities raise the issues below. The major + arguments presented in the IG paper for and against each option are + reflected below.

+

1. Should the U.S. press to get Jarring talks started soon? + The alternative is marking time either until the new situation in the + area is clearer or at least until Israel makes up its own mind to begin + talks as a means of keeping the ceasefire going.

+ +

Pro. The main argument for our pressing to start + talks now are (1) that the U.S. does have an interest in not completely + losing the momentum of the summer initiative and (2) that some movement + in peace talks is necessary if the UAR + is to continue the ceasefire after the present extension.UN General Assembly + Resolution 2628 extended the cease-fire for 3 months beginning on + November 6; see footnote 8, Document + 177. Behind these arguments is the feeling that we + should capitalize on the fluidity in the present situation in Cairo.

+

Con. The main longer term arguments for moving + more slowly are that neither Sadat nor Hussein + is now strong enough to deliver his country to a compromise settlement + and that the U.S. must allow some time to pass in order that the USSR and UAR can demonstrate their intention to be constructive. It + is difficult to imagine any other “rectification” of the situation + arising from the standstill violations. The more immediate argument for + standing back is that the Israelis must recognize that the UAR cannot continue the ceasefire + indefinitely without talks. It would be better for Israel to start talks + for its own reasons than for us to press.

+

2. If the U.S. chooses or is forced by circumstances to + mark time, are there realistic interim steps that could be taken + that would permit the ceasefire to continue?

+

Pro. A variety of steps is described in paragraphs + 3–5 of the previous section. A major argument for moving ahead with some + kind of Jordan-Israel talks, for instance, would be to ignore the UAR because of the standstill violations + and yet put pressure on them by moving ahead with talks that might + command some Palestinian support and therefore make it difficult for the + UAR to disrupt. One could even + argue that movement on the Palestinian front would hold greater promise + of success, if constructive, than immediate resumption of Jarring talks.

+

Con. Any interim steps except those that can pass + as an honest effort at negotiation will be regarded in the Arab + countries as stalling tactics. They would, in fact, run more parallel to + Israeli than to Arab interests.

+

3. If the U.S. decided to press for Jarring talks, should those talks + be the only focus of our efforts to achieve a settlement? The + alternative would be to let the talks proceed but to supplement them in + ways that may have more chance of success.

+

Pro. Both sides have accepted a basis for talks + after three years, and we cannot afford to throw that away. Eban has reconfirmed Israel’s + acceptance of that basis in the recent UNGA debate. Everybody seems to recognize that the + standstill provision of that agreement is dead. Time will take us past + the rectification problem, so there is no good reason for giving up what has been gained. We + can be as active as necessary behind the scenes.

+

Con. The passage of November 5 provides an opening + for unhooking us from the precise arrangements of the standstill + agreement. Some people would like to get rid of Jarring, and now might make a logical + time. While we do not want to throw away the advantages gained this + summer, it is not in the U.S. interest to have prospects for peace + completely tied to a process of formal talks that is likely to stall. We + need more strings to our bow, even if we choose to maintain the + Jarring framework as an + umbrella. Principally, the Palestinian-Jordanian-Israeli settlement is + so complex that Jarring is not + likely to make a dent in it. Therefore, it would make sense to tackle + this problem separately. If progress were made, it could be brought into + the Jarring framework if that + seemed useful, either for the sake of appearances or to bring a UAR arrangement into tandem.

+

One Conclusion

+

Without attempting to load the argument, it may be useful to state one + general conclusion from the above as a focus for further discussion:

+

+ The Jarring + talks by themselves do not seem likely to produce a settlement. + There are some crucial issues that will have to be dealt with + outside that framework. Two of these are: (1) the role of the U.S. + and USSR in guaranteeing a + settlement and (2) the role of the Palestinians. +

+

If one agrees with this proposition, then one might conclude that the + June initiative and the Jarring + talks are not sufficient by themselves—that they need the support of + complementary tracks. Specifically, it might be regarded as essential + now to:

+

—develop a complementary but separate negotiating strategy for an + Israel-Jordan settlement;

+

—develop a plan for movement on the refugee question in support of the + above;

+

—develop options for U.S.-Soviet, Four Power or other international + guarantees for a settlement.

+

What at root is questioned here is the viability of the + 18-month-old strategy of seeking a UAR settlement first and letting the Jordan-Israel + settlement follow. The fact is that Sadat is not likely to sign an agreement before the + Palestinians are satisfied. A UAR-Israel agreement on boundaries and + peace would not by themselves bring a settlement, though it might pave + the way. Besides, the U.S. should have more interest in getting a + settlement for Hussein than for + Sadat. Therefore, it seems + essential now to turn our attention to a Jordan-Israel settlement while + pursuing Jarring talks between + Israel and the UAR.

+
+ +
+ + 182. Paper Prepared by the National Security Council StaffSource: National Archives, Nixon + Presidential Materials, NSC Files, + NSC Institutional Files + (H-Files), Box H–049, Senior Review Group Meetings, Senior Review + Group—Middle East 11–13–70. Secret. All brackets are in the + original. + Washington, November 13, 1970. +

ANALYTICAL SUMMARY

+

Palestine Options

+

Introduction

+

At the next sub-tab are:

+

—A long State Department background paperAttached but not printed is the undated paper, “The Palestinian + Problem: Options in an Arab-Israeli Settlement.” on the + Palestinian problem—the principal options and the broad issues they + raise for U.S. policy and interests. It does not make recommendations. + Its purpose is to lay out the problem that has been overshadowing peace + efforts for two decades and has achieved a new prominence since June + 1967, and, as such, to serve as a basis for discussion of U.S. + policy.

+

—A short State Department paper [on top]Attached but not printed is the November 9 paper, “Palestinians: + Working Hypotheses and Recommendations for Action.” drawing + from the longer one certain working hypothesis and recommendations for + policy.

+

These papers in addition to the earlier Saunders memoThe + memorandum, “Analytical Summary: Palestinian Options,” November 6, + is in the National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–049, Senior + Review Group Meetings, Senior Review Group—Middle East + 11–13–70. comprise a first effort to put out on the table in + a policy context the problem of satisfying Palestinian aspirations in + the course of moving toward a Jordan-Israel settlement—which in this + context can be read as the final partition of Palestine. After going + back and forth over the issues, one finds it helpful to begin putting on + paper some general policy guidelines for testing in discussion. What + follows is an effort to put the judgments in the shorter State paper + into perspective for discussion.

+

A Prefatory Note: The Broader Policy Context

+

Elements of an Arab-Israeli settlement as the United States has + officially viewed them are embodied in Secretary Rogers’ speech of December 9, + 1969,See Document + 73. and in the document on an Israel-Jordan + settlement submitted in the + Four Power meeting of December 23.See Document 78. With regard to the + Palestinians, those formulations go only so far as to note the + grievances of the Palestinians and to promise their resolution in a + refugee settlement.

+

Much of the present discussion essentially contests the validity of that + approach toward the Palestinians as being comprehensive enough. It + raises the question of going beyond that stance and formulating a more + definitive posture in light of the rising tide of Palestinian + nationalism. In so doing, some key issues of the Palestinian problem + must be borne in mind. Detailed in the longer State paper and in the + Saunders memo, they are + briefly as follows:

+

—We do not have a clear picture of who really speaks for the 2.6 million + Palestinians. Do the fedayeen reflect the sentiments of the majority of + Palestinians or do they speak only for themselves? How real is the gap + between the thinking of West Bank notables and the fedayeen?

+

—We do not have a clear picture of what the Palestinians really want, + both with regard to the degree of political freedom they would desire + [what kind of entity] and with regard to their intentions in exercising + that freedom [do they want to destroy Israel].

+

—The U.S. must consider what would happen to King Hussein. It would seem that any + discussion of trying to meet legitimate Palestinian aspirations beyond + what is already envisaged would have implications for the future of the + Hashemite dynasty. How would U.S. interests be affected?

+

—What can realistically be expected of the Israelis? Even in the refugee + context, they are adamant against an influx of Palestinians which might + threaten their internal security. Beyond that, the Allon PlanSee footnote 8, Document 4. for a + settlement is an Israeli military strategy which, although it would + provide greater local autonomy for West Bank Palestinians, would make + any Palestinian entity essentially a captive of Israel. How would U.S. + interests be affected vis-à-vis Israel were we to move beyond our + present position on the Palestinian question?

+

—Finally, given the hostility surrounding the newly emerging Palestinian + movement, does the U.S. want to get involved in endorsing this kind of + resistance? Would this set a bad precedent for U.S. policy elsewhere? + Would it be as helpful to moderate Arab governments as they have been + suggesting? On the other hand, can we escape this new phenomenon in the + Arab world by sticking to our present policy which could be read as + ignoring Palestinian political aspirations?A handwritten note under this paragraph reads: “HAK comments: 1. Isn’t this the end of + Jordan? 2. The most anti-Israeli element.”

+ +

A Tentative Base for Policy

+

The most practical way to deal with the issues raised in the longer State + paper is to try to develop some working hypotheses from its discussion. + This is what the shorter State paper attempts to do. Since the shorter + State paper jumbles judgments together, the most economical + procedure—followed below—is to state a generalization with the State + Department position noted beneath it followed by comment.

+

+ You might use the following for talking points at the + SRG meeting:An unknown hand circled “talking + points.” +

+

1. A first generalization that seems to emerge from the + two papers is this: There is increasing evidence that the problem of + the Palestinians is no longer just a problem of refugee compensation + and resettlement. It is also a problem of providing a means for + the Palestinians to play a greater political role (a) in the process of + a settlement between Israel and Jordan and (b) in a governmental + structure thereafter, with the likely possibility being the West + Bank.

+

State’s shorter paper (page 1, paragraph #2) says: + “There appears to be a growing need to meet a Palestinian desire for + some sort of identifiable political personality. Such a personality + could be created in the form of a semi-autonomous unit, i.e. the West + Bank and Gaza linked to the East Bank and under the overall direction of + the central government in Amman.”

+

The Issues

+

+ Does everyone agree that the Palestinians can no + longer be treated as a refugee problem? +

+

There are two contradictory tendencies in the papers that have been + written:

+

—On the one hand, the case is made that nothing short of a seat at the + peace table and a semi-autonomous political unit alone can hope to meet + Palestinian aspirations. It is said that they will not be content again + to be treated just as refugees.

+

—On the other hand, the case is made that their aspirations can be met + only part way. Hussein can serve + as their spokesman and they can live under the direction of Amman.

+

A devil’s advocate might say it seems possible that once we start + avowedly seeking a distinct political role for the Palestinians, we will + turn loose something that cannot be stopped. Consider these + questions:

+

—Going beyond our present position and getting into devising a proper + political role for the Palestinians could take years. Do we want to delay a final Palestine + settlement for that if there is a chance of something sooner?

+

—Are we turning loose forces that will spell an end to the Hashemite + monarchy?

+

—Is it possible that there is nothing wrong with our present position + except that we have not made the most of it? Perhaps a dramatic offer on + a refugee settlement with appropriate political gloss could revitalize + chances of making our present political position tenable. Then we could + leave the political problem to Hussein.

+

The other side of the question is whether it is now possible to stop what + has already been turned loose.

+

—Is it fair to say that Hussein + cannot deliver Jordan to a peace settlement without Palestinian + participation?

+

—If Hussein’s days are numbered, + should not the U.S. come to terms early with the Palestinian + nationalists?

+

One possible conclusion is: The main U.S. interest + is in a Palestine settlement. The U.S. interest, therefore, dictates the + minimum moves necessary to assure Palestinian support for a settlement. + At this point—knowing as little as we do about Palestinian intentions—it + seems premature to talk about a separate Palestinian state. However, the + U.S. is far from having done all that might be done to meet Palestinian + concerns, even within this present limited policy constraints. The + question is how far the U.S. can go within limits imposed by other U.S. + interests.

+

2. A second generalization one might state is: Palestinian political aspirations might be met by + recognizing several different forms of Palestinian entity. It is too + soon for the U.S. to endorse or reject any.

+

State’s short paper (page 1, paragraph #1) + concludes: “The concept of a separate and distinct Palestinian state is + unrealistic to consider except in the context of a peace settlement and + unless a part of Jerusalem is included. Even then, since such a state + would presumably have to be limited to the West Bank and Gaza, it would + probably not be economically viable without the injection of large-scale + outside financial assistance. Its political viability is also doubtful, + since a large number of Palestinians would remain outside its borders + and it would tend to be dominated by a larger and more powerful Israel.” + State, therefore, concludes that a semi-autonomous unit on the West Bank + under Amman is the best way to articulate Palestinian nationalism.Kissinger highlighted this paragraph and wrote in + the right margin: “Part of Jerusalem.”

+

The issue is whether U.S. interests would be + served by the existence of some separate Palestinian entity as + contrasted to a Palestinian province under Hussein. The State + Department paper would limit the U.S. now to working with Hussein. Do we want to cross that + bridge now?

+

On the one hand, the most desirable government in + Jordan from the viewpoint of U.S. interests is the one that has the best + chance of delivering Jordan to a peace agreement with Israel and + enforcing it over time. This so far has been the main argument for + continuing to work through Hussein. The U.S. does not to date have convincing + evidence of Palestinian leadership that is (a) acceptable to most + Palestinians or (b) willing to make and enforce peace with Israel.A handwritten note next to this sentence + reads: “HAK comment: and on what + terms?”

+

On the other hand, there is reason for not putting + all our bets on Hussein. Both + Israelis and Arabs have said that there will be no Arab-Israeli + settlement until the Palestinians and Israelis come to terms with each + other. If they did in a way the Palestinian leadership seemed prepared + to enforce, it is difficult to argue that the U.S. would not find an + interest in such a settlement regardless of its implications for the + Hashemite monarchy.

+

One possible conclusion is: The U.S. interest is + less in the Palestinian or non-Palestinian complexion of the political + unit to Israel’s east than it is that its leadership effectively control + it and commit itself to peace with Israel. Therefore, while we may wish + to work through Hussein for the + time being, it seems premature to dismiss the idea of a separate + Palestinian state either on the West Bank or in all of Jordan. It might + be more sensible, in fact, for the U.S. to think in terms of how an + orderly evolution to Palestinian domination of Jordan could take + place.

+

3. A third generalization is: If + a separate Palestinian entity were to be established, the U.S. + interest in its boundaries would depend to a large extent on the + nature of its leadership.

+

State’s papers come out against any separate + entity and therefore do not express a preference for a particular + entity. State at most thinks in terms of a semi-autonomous West Bank + under Hussein.

+

The issue is that to think in terms of any + Palestinian entity is to think in terms of at least partitioning Jordan + and at most supplanting Jordan with Palestine.

+

If there were responsible Palestinian leadership, it would make more + economic sense to have both banks together. To be economically viable in + the near term both East and West banks must at least have access to each + other’s markets and to substantial earnings from tourism in Jerusalem as + well—which would require Israeli cooperation. This could be accomplished + by federation. The sharing of revenues might be difficult under any + arrangement that created more distinct political entities.

+ +

If Palestinian leadership were less responsible, there might be some + value in preserving a bedouin East Bank as an insulator between the + Palestinians and Iraq, Syria and Saudi Arabia. Also, two weaker units + might be more inclined to fall into Israel’s economic orbit and under + Israel’s protective military umbrella. This, of course, would depend on + Palestinian willingness (perhaps unlikely) to settle for such an + arrangement. Additionally, Israeli pre-eminence might create more + problems than now exist.

+

One possible conclusion is that it is too soon to + close the door on the idea that Jordan may one day become Palestine. The + nature of the Palestinian leadership is the key to what will serve U.S. + interests.

+

+ What seems desirable now are (a) reformulation of + these guidelines in light of SRG + discussion and (b) a scenario describing exactly how the U.S. might + go about increasing attention to the Palestinians without closing + the door on any future options. +

+

TALKING POINTS END HERE

+

The Real Choice for the U.S.

+

The overriding issue, therefore, would seem to + boil down to what degree the Palestinians might be + given a political role. The choice is between two broad + attitudes which the U.S. could assume:

+

Choice 1: Identifying the Palestinians as a + relevant political voice [which we have not done before], but operative + only through the established governments of + Israel and Jordan. Any promise of self-determination would be worked out + within that context. In this approach, we would press + Hussein to go as far + as he felt he could with the Palestinians.

+

This is the course recommended by the State + Department. The United States could pursue a course which would + attempt to enhance the Palestinian role within the existing framework of + Israel and Jordan governments. The departure from pre-existing policy + would be that the U.S. would publicly identify as favoring enhanced + Palestinian representation in peace negotiations, albeit within the + present Jarring context. Apart + from that, such a policy would really amount to encouragement of talk + both in Israel and in Jordan of folding the Palestinians more directly + into the peace efforts and of thinking about some measure of + self-determination for them after a settlement. Flowing from that are + State’s recommendations on tactics and on a possible semi-autonomous + unit for the Palestinians under Jordanian control.

+

Choice 2: Identifying the Palestinians as a + distinct and relevant political voice, perhaps operative through their + own representation in negotiations—or perhaps through Israel and + Jordan—but nevertheless deserving a separate political entity in the + final outcome. In this approach, we would stake out a position of our own in favor of a + Palestine entity and force Hussein toward it simply by stating it.

+

This alternative is one step beyond Choice 1. The + U.S. could pursue a course designed to identify the Palestinians as a + separate group which could speak for itself and could be granted some + separate entity. This would involve actions—contacts with Palestinians, + public endorsement of a separate state—meant to catalyze Palestinian + political organization. The departure from present policy is that we + would in effect be recognizing a new political entity. Instead of gently + prodding Hussein and the Israelis + to include the Palestinians, we would be forcing them.

+

These two postures must be viewed in their broadest sense. They seem to + reflect what would be the difference in the U.S. setting in motion + various actions: those that would confine the Palestinian political + problem to the present context—prodding Hussein and the Israelis to produce a more realistic + Palestinian voice—and those that would not confine the problem to the + present governmental structure but would aim for a distinct Palestinian + voice and entity—such as unilateral U.S. contacts or statements + vis-à-vis the fedayeen.

+

Picking Choice 1 above would not preclude moving to Choice 2 later, but + choosing Choice 2 now would prevent us from returning to Choice 1 later. + Operational proposals for the pursuit of both are elaborated in the + following section.

+

Current Operational Proposals

+

+ Choice 1—Enhance a Palestinian Role Within Existing + Framework +

+

This is the State Department framework with which I (Saunders) generally agree except that + no State Department proposal yet suggests a broad enough range of action + within this framework to make a realistic course of action.

+

1. Press Hussein + to a course that would involve some Palestinians in negotiations + with Israel. This would probably involve Hussein’s commitment to some more + precise arrangements for self-determination for the Palestinians after a + settlement—such as State’s view of a semi-autonomous unit. Coupled with + it might be a fairly dynamic program for shifting UNRWA functions to + combined Jordanian-Palestinian control. [The Under Secretaries Committee + should—but has not yet—addressed this last point.]

+

2. Press the Israelis—as the other proprietor of + Palestinians—into bringing the West Bankers, as potential + Palestinian leadership, into the settlement process. [State did + not include this.]

+

3. In general, look for ways in which the peace + initiative could be viewed as taking into account the legitimate + concerns of the Palestinians. State would include the U.S. + establishing its own contacts with the Palestinians, looking for ways to + bring them into the peace negotiations and becoming specific—in connection with discussion + of self-determination on the West Bank—on the need for a + Jordanian-Palestinian political status in Arab Jerusalem. [This last + point seems inconsistent with the State approach in that it would seem + to promise more to the Palestinians than can be delivered.]

+

Pro.

+

—On balance, this would be the best way of trying to do something for the + Palestinians without wrecking the established governments. Both Israel + and Jordan have talked about bringing the Palestinians closer to the + settlement process and about some future political voice for them. We + would not have to commit ourselves to a Palestinian entity or to one + Palestinian group but would rely on the long-established and better + known relations between Israel and its Palestinian population and Jordan + and its Palestinian population.

+

—We would not have to confront the issue of creating a new political + entity nor put ourselves in a position where we might be compromising + Jordan and Hussein. We do have a + heavy commitment to King Hussein. + Writing him off would have some effect in Saudi Arabia.

+

—Encouraging the Israelis to engage the West Bank leaders would + capitalize both on their interest in doing something for them and on the + relations that have built up between occupier and occupied. + Additionally, they have often been viewed as the natural nucleus of some + form of West Bank Palestinian leadership.

+

Con.

+

—The militant fedayeen would not be satisfied unless Hussein went a long way to reflect + their sentiments. If he did, Israel would object, and Hussein might jeopardize his own + control.

+

—The U.S. should not engage in any unilateral actions involving the + fedayeen if we are intent on keeping Israel-Jordan context alive. Such + action would amount to Choice 2 with all the implications of letting the + Palestinians establish an independent relationship with us. It would + undercut Hussein’s efforts. If + our strategy is to devote our energies to promoting the Israelis and + Jordanians to take the problem more seriously, them we should avoid + direct contact.

+

—Jerusalem is too sensitive and should be set aside. If there is anything + that will lose the Israelis, it is the issue of Jerusalem. To raise that + issue now would be to lose any momentum we might have toward bringing + the Palestinians into a settlement.

+

+ Choice 2—Encourage the Palestinians to Come Forward as + a Legitimate Party to the Dispute +

+

The long and short of this strategy would be that by creating the + political opportunity, we might stimulate political responsibility on + the part of the Palestinians + which has been so noticeably diffuse over the years. There are very few + advocates of this course in the government—many outside.

+

1. Make a U.S. statement that the Palestinians must + have a role in the settlement process and then wait to see what + Palestinian actions that provokes. [Unlike Choice 1, our public + declaration would make clear that the Palestinians would have their own + voice.]

+

2. Broaden official contacts with Palestinian + organizations.

+

3. Broaden Jarring’s mandate to include contacts with + Palestinians.

+

Pro.

+

—This would project the U.S. image as responsive to the Palestinians + without explicitly committing the U.S. to one solution or another, + although internally we would have made the decision to look for a + separate Palestinian political force. It would place some of the burden + on the Palestinians and might promote political jockeying within the + fedayeen movement leading towards the formulation of a representative + group to talk with us.

+

—It would permit us to learn more about the Palestinian movement + directly. This is the only way of finding out what they represent and + what they will really settle for. It could also win some Palestinian + cooperation with U.S. positions.

+

—It would probably improve our image with some of the Arab states.

+

—It would give us the option of favoring the moderate Palestinians as the + potential leadership.

+

Con.

+

—The U.S. has almost done this in Ambassador Yost’s speech to the General Assembly.On October 29, Yost addressed a plenary session of the UN General Assembly during the debate + on the Arab-Israeli dispute and said: “During this debate we have + heard quite a bit of discussion of the question of the Palestine + Arabs. The United States agrees with the conclusion of several + speakers that if any peace is going to come to the Middle East it + has to take into account the legitimate concerns and aspirations of + the Palestinians. We do not have, however, any preconceived ideas + about what form Palestinian participation in a settlement would + take. It is not now clear what peaceful goals Palestinians set for + themselves, who speaks for them, what their relationship is to + established Arab governments, or if there is any consensus on the + Palestinian role in a peaceful settlement. The answers to these + questions need to be clarified. We think this is primarily a matter + for the Palestinians themselves to work out in conjunction with + established Arab governments.” The entire address is printed in the + Department of State Bulletin, November 23, + 1970, pp. 656–661. There is not much advantage in more talk + until we see Palestinian leadership coalescing.

+ +

—If the U.S. were to take any of these actions, it might be difficult to + back off if we decided we could not work with the leadership that + emerged. If we entered an official relationship with them, not only + would we undercut whatever hopes we had for Israel and Jordan coming to + terms with them but also might find ourselves in the position of + in-fighting between the groups and of being denounced if we did not + produce what the militants were looking for.

+

—Any official contact, therefore, would play into their hands before the + U.S. is clear about the ultimate objectives of the Palestinian fedayeen + and before we can have any confidence that their success is in U.S. + interests.

+

—If the U.S. wants to set limits to the Palestinian role and to try to + relate it to Hussein for as long + as is reasonable, the last thing we want to do is to task an agent + beyond our control with relating them to the settlement.

+

—The Israelis would choke.

+

—Working with a national liberation movement would have precedents + elsewhere.

+

—This might mean the end of Hussein. We would have to make some serious judgments on + where our interests lie, unless we could insure that any contact we + would have with the fedayeen was only for informational purposes.

+

—Broadening the Jarring mandate + might disrupt the tenuous base on which it already rests. Israel might + withdraw even further.

+
+ +
+ + 183. Minutes of a Senior Review Group MeetingSource: National Archives, Nixon + Presidential Materials, NSC Files, + NSC Institutional Files + (H-Files), Box H–111, Senior Review Group, Meetings Minutes + Originals 1970. Top Secret; Codeword. All brackets are in the + original except those indicating text that remains classified. The + meeting was held in the White House Situation Room. + Washington, November 13, + 1970, 3:45–5:20 p.m. + + SUBJECT + Middle East + + + PARTICIPATION + Chairman—Henry A. + Kissinger + + State + + + U. Alexis Johnson + + + Joseph J. Sisco + + + Haywood Stackhouse + + + Thomas Thornton + + + Ray Cline + + + Defense + + + G. Warren Nutter + + + James H. Noyes + + + Armistead I. Selden + + Lt. Gen. Donald Bennett + + + CIA + + + + Richard Helms + + David H. Blee + + JCS + + Lt. Gen. + Richard Knowles + Rear Adm. William St. + George + + NSC Staff + + Col. Richard + Kennedy + + Harold Saunders + + + Jeanne W. Davis + + +

SUMMARY OF DECISIONS

+

It was agreed that:

+

1) Palestinian participation in a peace settlement in some form would be + important at some stage;

+

2) State would prepare a telegram of instruction for a discussion with + King Hussein on a possible + approach to the Palestinians;See Document 185.

+

3) after we had the King’s reaction, we would decide on the next + step;

+

4) Mr. Saunders and Mr. Sisco would prepare a new strategy + paper;Saunders’s analytical summary of the new strategy + papers on the Middle East is printed as Document 198.

+

5) The IG would put together a proposed aid package for Israel covering + the next two years, with a clear statement of the opposing State and + Defense views;See Document 194.

+ +

6) the statement on stand-still violations would be distributed to + agencies as an agreed statement of the factual situation;See Document 178. No + statement was found.

+

7) CIA would submit proposals for a + higher budget for satellite photography.Not + found.

+

Mr. Kissinger: We have three + problems to consider: The general Middle East situation including the + Palestine option, where we go from here, and the question of U–2 + flights, which I think are on the track now. I would like to spend ten + minutes on the intelligence problem since I intend to get an agreed + statement on this. Since this is a factual matter, it has to be possible + for us to get an agreed description of what we believe. Following the + Middle East discussion, we will have a report from Charlie Meyer on + Chile and then I have one item for the 40 Committee.

+

Let us go first to the Palestinian option. This is a very good State + Department paperSee Document 182. but it raises a number of basic + questions. Essentially, the question is what kind of Palestinian outcome + would be in our interest. This raises various issues which are probably + best explored in the State Department paper on Working Hypotheses and + Recommendations for a Palestinian Solution. I refer you to page 1, + paragraph 2 of this paper which, along with other statements in the + paper, makes it clear that Palestine can no longer be treated as a + refugee problem. I note, however, two contradictory tendencies in the + paper: (1) that nothing short of a seat at the peace table can meet + Palestinian aspirations; and (2) that these aspirations can probably be + met only part way and that this will probably have to be done through + King Hussein. I wonder whether it + is possible to stop part way. Once we recognize the fedayeen as a + semi-autonomous political entity are events still under our control? Can + we stop short of independence or political autonomy? Of course, we may + want that. But do we really believe that a semi-autonomous status can be + maintained?

+

Mr. Sisco: I recognize the risk + you cite, but I believe the prospect of its being manageable depends on + the manner in which it is done. If we work through Hussein, with the King taking the lead, + and leaving open further steps toward self-determination in an + unspecified future, I believe there is a hope and indeed a possibility + that it can be done in some limited form. If Hussein can make some proposal to the Palestinians, + saying “here’s the deal” and then organize it in some form, it may + stick. The situation, of course, will never be completely stable. The + option to break away from any kind of federation would always be there + for the fedayeen. Its success + would depend on Hussein’s + conditions, on the mutuality of interests between the East and West + Bank, on the degree of freedom of movement, etc. If there were freedom + of exchange leading to a degree of economic viability the two banks + might be better off together. The possibility of an overall Jordanian + state depends on whether Hussein + can take the lead and can deal with a fedayeen leadership that is able + to consider a limited approach. Such an agreement might stick for five + years, then who knows?

+

Mr. Kissinger: Would we ask + Hussein if he minds if we + deal with the fedayeen? This is like a wife asking her husband if he + minds if she commits adultery. Would our very asking of the question be + enough to shake Hussein’s + confidence?

+

Mr. Sisco: That depends on how we + ask the question. I agree there is some danger that the question itself + would be prejudicial. But I think we could put it to Hussein along the following lines: (1) + We have come to the conclusion, and we think you have too, that we must + take the Palestinians into account; (2) you have begun to put a + government together with some Palestinian representation; (3) you have + indicated that you are willing to give some self-determination once a + settlement has been reached. We must convince Hussein that any discussions with + Arafat or another fedayeen + leader would be in the context of complementary US efforts toward common + objectives. It would be a delicate operation. We don’t want to give + Hussein a veto, but if we do + not move in concert with the King, even an initial contact with the + fedayeen could be undermining.

+

Mr. Kissinger: Granted that we + believe a Palestinian entity is desirable and that we should talk to the + King, should we also talk to the Palestinians? Is the King likely to + take the position that how he arranges his country is his business? How + would he look on our political contact with the faction that led an + insurrection against him with its implication of a relationship to a + group which was subversive to his authority? Could we accept Joe’s + (Sisco) idea but without any + mention of talking to Arafat or + any other fedayeen representative?

+

Mr. Sisco: Unless we are ready to + go all out with the Palestinians, and to see the King go down the drain, + we should not contact Arafat if + the King is not sold on the idea that it is complementary to his own + actions.

+

Mr. Kissinger: I don’t know how + the Arabs react but I do think they can be pretty devious. Suppose the + King acquiesces in our suggestions but then draws his own conclusions as + to our real intent?

+

Mr. Johnson: We shouldn’t decide on talking with Arafat until we have talked with the + King.

+

Mr. Helms: I agree—we should take + one step at a time.

+ +

Mr. Sisco: Our next step should + be to talk to Hussein, keeping + under review the possibility of talking to Arafat.

+

Mr. Kissinger: Are we agreed then + that we should open the possibility of talking to Hussein about a Palestinian entity in + the context of a settlement?

+

Mr. Johnson: The entity could be either geographic or political.

+

Mr. Kissinger: By political, you + mean representation at the peace settlement?

+

Mr. Nutter: If consideration of a + Palestinian entity is important, we can’t possibly keep it away from the + King. We couldn’t proceed without his knowing about it.

+

Mr. Kissinger: Trying to proceed + without his knowledge would be the worst thing we could do unless we + should decide that we don’t care what happens. We could, of course, + conclude that the Palestinians have to be brought in but that we should + not play a dominant active role in bringing this about. This has been + our strategy up to now—we have left it to the Jordanians.

+

Mr. Nutter: This runs the risk + that it won’t come up otherwise.

+

Mr. Kissinger: One argument for a + particular Palestinian entity is that they are the best group to + guarantee a settlement involving the greatest number of Arabs. The + problems of the Egyptian border are easier than those of the Palestine + border. On the other hand, they are also the group which has the + greatest interest in the destruction of Israel since more of the + territory belongs to them than to any others.

+

Mr. Sisco: The Fedayeen have + adopted this posture. However, I think the Palestinians—not necessarily + the Fedayeen—can be brought around in the hope that there is light at + the end of the tunnel.

+

Mr. Noyes: I feel the same way. + Our sympathetic approach to the Palestinian problem could undercut + Fedayeen influence and could offer an opportunity for the more moderate + Palestinians.

+

Mr. Kissinger: What sort of + boundaries would the moderate Palestinians have in mind?

+

Mr. Sisco: The Arabs will + certainly think of a Palestinian entity as including some piece of what + was Arab Jerusalem. This is a very tough problem. We have revised our + paper in this regard, and will do a telegram on this for all of you to + look at.

+

Mr. Johnson: I think there is a growing sense of realism and a desire for + peace among the Palestinians.

+

Mr. Kissinger: Will Israel accept + the 1967 borders? Will the Palestinians accept the 1967 borders or will + they insist on the 1947 borders?

+

Mr. Sisco: We can’t operate on + the assumption of the ’47 borders—this would be no deal. It might be + possible, however, to develop some leadership on the basis of a Palestinian entity + based on the ’67 borders, minus Jerusalem. This would be a feasible + objective; indeed no other objective makes sense. We will have trouble + convincing Israel to go with the ’67 borders. They certainly wouldn’t + buy the ’47 borders.

+

Mr. Helms: I agree.

+

Mr. Kissinger: So we are agreed + to work for a Palestinian entity in some form.

+

Mr. Helms: Either political or + geographic.

+

General Knowles: I agree, + provided we take one step at a time, starting with an approach to King + Hussein. Of course, it would + be better if he suggested it.

+

Mr. Kissinger: May I sum up my + understanding of the situation. We are agreed that Palestinian + participation in a peace settlement in some form would be important at + some stage. We don’t have to decide now what that entity should be. It + might be the political participation of the Palestinians in the peace + negotiations. The first step would be to put the question to King + Hussein in the terms outlined + by Joe Sisco. We could ask for + his reaction and how we might be helpful. Depending on his reaction, we + could then consider the next step.

+

Mr. Sisco: There is one related + development. The new Jordanian government is giving some thought to the + refugee question. The King’s brother has asked us to set up a small + working group with them to see what might be done. This is the first + realistic indication that the Jordan Government is trying to organize + itself to get at the problem. Such a Jordanian initiative would fit in + with such a proposal.

+

Mr. Helms: I think we should go + ahead.

+

Mr. Kissinger: (to Mr. Sisco) You draft a telegram outlining + an approach to the King for us to look at. After we have an answer from + the King, we can decide on the next step.

+

(to Mr. Sisco) Will you sum up + where we stand diplomatically? Both the President and the Secretary have + said publicly that we want to try to get the negotiations started again. + I have the feeling that Israel is not fighting for rectification of the + standstill violations with the same intensity as before.

+

Mr. Sisco: The General Assembly + consideration of the question concluded with considerably less damage + than we had feared, due largely to our damage-control operation.The General Assembly debate on the Middle + East and especially the cease-fire violations took place in plenary + meetings from October 26 to November 4, culminating in the adoption + of Resolution 2628. See footnote 8, Document + 177. For a summary of the debate, see Yearbook of the United Nations, 1970, pp. 254–260. + In my judgment, the talks will start in a few weeks. I base this on + three factors: 1) the Israelis have now come to the conclusion that the time is + propitious to resume the talks; 2) they have concluded that + rectification of the standstill violations is not possible; and 3) the + statements by Moshe DayanOn November 6, Dayan announced that Israel no longer had to adhere + to commitments associated with the U.S. peace initiative. + reflect a change in the Israeli attitude.

+

Mr. Kissinger: I don’t believe + Dayan’s statements are as + unguided as they appear to be.

+

Mr. Sisco: I think they indicate + the general thrust of the Israeli Cabinet. The Secretary’s conversation + with Eban makes clear their + strategy.See footnote 2, Document 169. Their Parliamentary + debate opens Monday and will continue for several days. Following the + debate there will be further internal conversations. Then Israel will + come to us and say that they are prepared to get the talks started, and + they are grateful for our military assistance and our support in the + GA debate. They have submitted a + specific request for additional military assistance over the next 18 + months which is now being considered in the IG. It is a substantial + request, but there is evidence that the financial people in Israel have + gotten to the military on the request. I think they will make three + proposals: 1) that the US indicate that we are prepared to make a + positive response to their military assistance request; 2) that we do + what we can for them in terms of credit; and 3) that we give them some + assurances that we will give them reasonable freedom of movement.

+

Mr. Kissinger: After we give them + that assurance we can still regulate deliveries of the material.

+

Mr. Sisco: There is no question + that our leverage will be needed in the context of the negotiations and + the deliveries are our leverage. I believe, however, that we can get + further with the Israelis in the context of confidence than by + threatening to withhold their equipment.

+

Mr. Kissinger: (to Mr. Helms) What do you think of that?

+

Mr. Helms: I have no comment on + Joe’s presentation.

+

Mr. Kissinger: Do you agree on + the strategy?

+

Mr. Helms: I think it’s the only + one available to us.

+

Mr. Kissinger: We could say they + won’t get anything more from us until they start negotiations, then dole + it out to them two months at a time.

+

Mr. Helms: I think if we want to + get on with the talks, we should get on with everything.

+

Mr. Nutter: It amounts to 150 + planes.

+ +

Mr. Sisco: Fifty-four Phantoms + and 120 others, also certain supporting equipment and some other things + they have asked for such as personnel carriers, it amounts to $600 + [million] over the next 18 months. That is in addition to the current + $500 million request. This would take us to June 1972.

+

Mr. Helms: I didn’t understand + that this was in addition to the $500 million already requested.

+

Mr. Johnson: What if peace breaks out in the next 18 months.

+

Mr. Sisco: We will say we would + look at the situation.

+

Mr. Kissinger: Any new frontiers + might be more bearable to the Israelis if they have this package.

+

Mr. Sisco: The Arabs don’t care + about what equipment Israel gets if a settlement is achieved. The next + 18 months will be a no-peace situation; we can’t plan any other way.

+

Mr. Kissinger: So Joe (Sisco) believes we can get more from + the Israelis by confidence; and we can get more from the Russians by + convincing them that no matter what they pour in, they will not get a + military advantage. On the other hand, DOD believes that if we give Israel these weapons, they + will not have the incentive to negotiate, and we should keep them on + leaner rations with no long-term committment.

+

Mr. Nutter: Paying them $600 + million to get them to the table gives them a free hand. If the talks + bog down, what next?

+

Mr. Kissinger: We can regulate + deliveries.

+

Mr. Sisco: I meant a free hand in + the early stages of the talks. The US must play a pressure role at some + stage.

+

Mr. Kissinger: Neither side is in + a position domestically to make peace. They will both need pressure. + Could we make the term of the package a little longer? Having it end in + the middle of an election campaign is not an ideal situation.

+

Mr. Sisco: Would it help if we + stretched it from 18 to 24 months? I recognize that the IG meeting + exposed a gulf between the thinking of State and Defense; I understand + there are real problems.

+

Mr. Kissinger: I think the worst + possible way of giving aid is the way in which we have done it over the + last three months. By being forced to consider a new request every month + or so we ended by giving more than if we had agreed on a sizeable + package in April or in June.

+

Mr. Sisco: I agree. Let’s try to + put together a package for decision by the President that can carry us + for the next two years.

+

Mr. Kissinger: Yes. Let’s make it + possible for the President to say “I have done this and I won’t talk to + any other group about this question.” If we do it, we should do + something to tie the package to the negotiations so that we could use it + as leverage.

+ +

Mr. Sisco: We must make this + crystal clear to the Israelis.

+

Mr. Kissinger: Let’s get the + issue defined so as to get it to the President so we can then authorize + an integrated approach to the Israelis.

+

Mr. Nutter: It is very important + that we stretch the time to 24 months.

+

Mr. Johnson: That is reasonable.

+

Mr. Kissinger: I just invented + the 24 month period, but I would hate to see it end in June of 1972.

+

Mr. Sisco: This makes a lot of + sense.

+

Mr. Noyes: I will be discussing + this Wednesday with the second man in the Israeli Air Force.

+

Mr. Kissinger: Let’s get a + statement of the views from the IG.

+

Mr. Sisco: We will try to put + down the two approaches to the problem in the fairest possible way.

+

Mr. Kissinger: I would like to + raise a question on the strategy of the Jarring talks.

+

Mr. Sisco: We must be careful not + to fall into the Soviet trap. They are circulating in New York the idea + that we should start talking about guarantees. Any substantive + discussion in either the two-power or four-power forum before + negotiations between the two parties begin is a diversion and would be + bound to make the Israelis nervous. I have sent a cable to Yost indicating that we would have no + problem talking about guarantees at the right time.

+

Mr. Kissinger: Why is this Soviet + trap? Don’t they want to get the talks started?

+

Mr. Sisco: They want to get on + with the four-power discussions and mobilize the other powers to isolate + the U.S. The French position is even worse than it was before, and the + UK is very wishy-washy. Golda Meir’s talks in London were a + disaster.Meir met with British Prime Minister Edward Heath + and British Foreign Secretary Sir Alec Douglas-Home on November 4 + and 5. According to a November 4 record of their conversation, + Meir made a “plea” to + Heath to reject the “Arab” resolution in the UN General Assembly “deploring the continued occupation + of the Arab territories since June 5, 1967.” (Resolution 2628, + adopted November 4) Meir + insisted if the UN adopted the + resolution, “as far as Israel was concerned Security Council + Resolution 242 was dead, and Israel would have nothing more to do + with that resolution or with the Jarring Mission.” She also said she was “shocked” at + the Foreign Secretary’s recent Harrogate speech, objecting to his + reference to Israel’s future frontiers with the UAR, Jordan, and + Syria. Meir went on to + criticize the term “formal state of peace,” a Soviet term in her + view, and also the reference in the speech to the “political + aspirations of the Palestinians.” (The National Archives (United + Kingdom), PREM 15/540, The Middle East, 1970–1971) There has + been a marked deterioration in both the French and British positions, + which means even greater danger in the four-power context.

+ +

Mr. Kissinger: Even if the + discussions were on a subject the Israelis should like, it would set the + precedent of confronting them with four-power negotiations on the + subject.

+

Mr. Sisco: Let’s wait until talks + start between the two parties; then we could consider the strategy of + marking time in the four-power talks. We certainly should not renew the + U.S.-Soviet talks.

+

Mr. Kissinger: We must first + establish that the principal parties are talking.

+

Mr. Sisco: Jarring will certainly need help right + away. He will probably put together some formulation in two or three + weeks. We will all have to focus on this formulation; then we should + talk to the Russians about it in concrete terms.

+

Mr. Nutter: I agree. The first + talks should be between the Israelis and the Arabs.

+

Mr. Kissinger: Our June proposals + and much of our strategy since has been on the basis that a settlement + with Egypt was a pre-condition to a settlement with anyone else. Should + we look at this again? We are certainly not less interested in an + Egyptian settlement, but should we give equal priority to a Jordanian + settlement? The Soviets will get the credit for an Egyptian + settlement.

+

If it were possible to get a Jordanian settlement either before or at the + same time as an Egyptian settlement, it would mean that our friends—and + a more moderate regime—would be helped first. With the death of + Nasser, Jordan may not still + be that dependent on Egyptian approval. Should we give more emphasis to + the Jordanian part of the settlement?

+

Mr. Sisco: I don’t think + Hussein wants to get out in + front, even now. I think both settlements have to move together. + Jordanians would prefer that the principal focus in the talks be on + Egypt. In time, if the situation in Jordan continues to improve, we may + then give them equal treatment. For now, however, we should focus on + Egypt, although not exclusively. Jarring will certainly consider both.

+

Mr. Johnson: An Egyptian settlement is easier than a Jordanian + settlement.

+

Mr. Helms: That was our reason + for doing it this way in the first place.

+

Mr. Kissinger: (to Mr. Sisco) Joe will you and Hal Saunders work together on a paper + that ties this strategy together? We can then give it to the President + for information and decision. It should of course, be consistent with + what the President and the Secretary have said publicly. [1 line not declassified]

+

Mr. Johnson: [5½ lines not declassified]

+

Mr. Helms: [2½ + lines not declassified]

+ +

Mr. Sisco: [1 + line not declassified]

+

Mr. Kissinger: [1 line not declassified]

+

General Knowles: [1 line not declassified]

+

Mr. Kissinger: [1 line not declassified]

+

Mr. Helms: [3½ + lines not declassified]

+

Mr. Kissinger: [7 lines not declassified]

+

Mr. Helms: [2½ + lines not declassified]

+

(4:40 p.m.—Mr. Cline and General + Bennett joined the group)

+

Mr. Kissinger: Can we turn once + more to the question of standstill violations? If our principals are to + make meaningful judgments, based on our intelligence, we should be sure + that our intelligence reflects the facts and is not a tool to be used in + fighting the policy argument. I am trying to get a statement of the + standstill issues. It is now a moot point of course, but both the + President and the Secretary have made public statements. The paper left + the implication that a large number of missiles could have been hidden + in the zone before the violations occurred. The violations would have + been no less real, of course, since the agreement barred such placement. + Whether they were hidden or not is immaterial. In addition, we have the + situation where no one saw any missiles move in. We can’t prove that + they were moved in after or that they were not moved in before. You + can’t prove why something hasn’t happened. I have had some systems + analysis done on this. The amount of sand that would have to have been + moved to conceal the equipment for 45 SAM batteries would have left a hole big enough to put the + White House and the Executive Office Building in together. We saw no + such engineering equipment in the standstill zone. Also, we have checked + the cubic feet of all the hangars in the standstill zone and it is + simply not enough to hide 45 batteries. In addition, why would they have + hidden weapons in a standstill zone that didn’t exist when it was + permitted to do so, and take them out and put them in place when it was + prohibited? How can we explain the ships and the flatcars loaded with + SAM equipment? I have asked Mr. + Helms to do another memo, so + now we have two papers to consider; the joint statement on which all + were agreed, and a new CIA paper which + covers the question of where the missiles came from.The paper, “SAM Equipment in the Egyptian + Ceasefire Zone,” is in the National Archives, Nixon Presidential + Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box + H–049, Senior Review Group Meetings, Senior Review Group—Middle East + 11–13–70. Can we look at the new CIA paper. If we agree this is a fair statement, we will + send it out as an agreed position.

+

Mr. Sisco: (referring to the + CIA memorandum of November 12) I + think the first paragraph is very good. Also, with regard to point 5, I + think the evidence on the timing is even stronger. Riad told the + Secretary that he was out + of town when the agreement was presented and, when he returned and read + the agreement he thought it was unfair. He also indicated that they had + expected that the material would be turned over to Jarring and that they would negotiate + for three to four weeks.See footnote 3, Document 169. They + were surprised to be presented with an agreement the next day. They + obviously expected three or four weeks to give them an opportunity to do + what they wanted to do in the standstill zone.

+

Mr. Helms: Do we have this in + writing?

+

Mr. Sisco: If we don’t, I will + put it in writing.

+

Mr. Kissinger: The statement that + he would not have agreed to the agreement was in an outgoing cable, but + I have not seen in writing the statement about negotiating for three or + four weeks. (to General Bennett) Is this statement all right with + you?

+

General Bennett: We have tried to challenge it in every possible way and + I believe it is a logical presentation.

+

Mr. Kissinger: Is there any other + presentation of the issue? I want to be sure we have a fair statement of + the issues.

+

General Bennett: I agree with the statement in paragraph 1 that we have + found no evidence to support the claim that the SAM equipment was present in the zone before August 7.

+

Mr. Cline: I agree with the + CIA paper. It is true that we can’t + prove beyond any doubt that the missiles weren’t there. You can’t prove + a negative. But given all of the evidence, it defies reasonable + expectations. I am convinced that they carried out their original plan + over a period of several weeks.

+

General Knowles: How would this + paper be used?

+

Mr. Kissinger: We would circulate + it and say that this is an agreed estimate on the basis of which each + department will operate.

+

General Bennett: We might point out that the lower figures used in + discussing the number of SAM sites are + those which were fully operational. We should footnote this point.

+

Mr. Kissinger: Let’s do it and + distribute the paper.

+

Mr. Cline: I have one nitpick: In + paragraph two of the agreed statement [less than 1 + line not declassified] you speak of a net increase of 55 and + then mention two-thirds of the sites. Do you mean two-thirds of the + increase?

+

Mr. Helms: Yes.

+
+ +
+ + 184. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rogers to President NixonSource: + National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 631, Country Files, + Middle East, Syria, Vol. I. Secret. + Washington, November 19, 1970. + + SUBJECT + An Analysis of Latest Events in Syria + +

We should not attach undue importance to the recent power play in Syria + in which the military faction of the ruling Baath Party has apparently + forced the civilian wing of the Party into submission. While the + military group under Minister of Defense Hafiz el Asad has reportedly seized control of all + government institutions and has arrested the top leaders of the civilian + wing of the Party, including the leading party ideologue, Saleh al + Jadid, this could well be a temporary rupture between the two rival + factions who have been jockeying for position for several years.

+

From the standpoint of USG policy + interests, the emergence of the military faction as undisputed leaders + of Syria would be advantageous. This faction is more pragmatic and less + doctrinaire than the civilian wing. It is disposed to expand and improve + its relations with other countries and to rely less exclusively on the + Soviets for outside support. It favors relaxing the strict government + controls over the economy and has even talked about setting up a + Parliament and a Constitution. It would probably be willing to consider + seriously accepting the Security Council Resolution of November 22, 1967 + in certain circumstances.

+

However, the point is that the military faction will probably not remain + in undisputed control of the regime and will probably not be able—or + willing—to change Syrian policy in any major way. The reason for this is + that the military Baathists are to a great extent beholden to the + civilian wing since there are two overriding considerations which must + continue to influence their actions:

+

(1) their desire to perpetuate Baathist supremacy in Syria, and

+

(2) their desire to keep the Alawites in control of the Government.

+

Both the Baathists and the Alawites are a minority in Syria. The former + represent a tightly-knit, highly organized Arab socialist-nationalist + party which advocates the union of all Arab states under a socialist + system. While the Party has branches in all Arab countries, it has a + narrow power base in Syria. To maintain clearcut Baathist supremacy the two factions must stick + together or at least not oppose each other.

+

The Alawites, who represent 12 percent of the population and are a + splinter Moslem group, have long been the underdogs in Syria. Asad is an Alawite as is Saleh al + Jadid, his adversary. They and their Alawite compatriots in both + factions have used the Army and the Baathist Party apparatus as a + springboard to power. Accordingly, an irreparable split between the two + Party factions would weaken Alawite control and threaten their dominant + position in the regime.

+

Therefore, we do not expect any important foreign policy changes to flow + from the recent Syrian developments because if this happened the + civilian Party wing would probably be alienated from the military + faction and, as a result, both the Baath Party as a whole and the + Alawites who run it would probably suffer an eclipse. The one + modification in Syrian policy which might nevertheless evolve from the + current events is a more forthcoming Syrian posture toward other Arab + states as a substitute for Syria’s erstwhile isolation. This much + Asad might succeed in + achieving as a result of his power play without the risk of losing + Baathist civilian cooperation. He could sell this policy as a necessary + step toward seeking to fill the vacuum created by Nasser’s death.

+

It is too early to predict whether there will be a change in Syria’s + policy of support for the fedayeen and of opposition to the Jordan + Government. The military faction has been suspicious of Saiqa, the + fedayeen instrumentality of the Baath civilian wing, because of the fear + that Saiqa was being developed as a counterpoise to the Army. But this + does not necessarily mean the Asad group opposes fedayeen action per se or will seek + to place obstacles in the way of the fedayeen movement. Regarding + Jordan, we can probably assume that for a number of reasons, Syria will + be unlikely to intervene again for some time to come.

+ + + William P. Rogers + + +
+ +
+ + 185. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in + JordanSource: National + Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 616, Country Files, Middle East, Jordan. + Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Sisco; cleared by Kissinger, Johnson, and Helms; and approved by Rogers. All brackets are in the original except + those indicating text that remains classified. + Washington, November 20, 1970, + 1646Z. +

190308. Eyes Only for Ambassador.

+

1. We have recently made a thorough review of the Palestinian + questionSee Documents 182 and 183. + since the GOJ–fedayeen confrontation of + some weeks ago. In recent weeks, you undoubtedly have noted that various + U.S. spokesmen have made statements indicating our general sympathy for + the Palestinians.See footnote 2, Document 174 and footnote 12, Document 182. It is our belief that + it likely to be desirable that Palestinians at some appropriate stage + become participants in the negotiating process as well as partners in + any peace settlement if that peace settlement is to stick. We have noted + also that many Palestinians have focused on some form of entity. + Nevertheless, the present Palestinian leadership is fragmented and + divided, the question of who speaks for the Palestinians is no clearer + today than it has been in months past, and what the majority of the + Palestinians would consider a satisfactory resolution of the problem is + very unclear, to say the least. As a result of our review, we have + decided that for at least the time being, we should continue to operate + on the assumption that the Palestinian objective can best be met through + negotiations by the principal parties concerned (UAR and Jordan) with + Israel under the aegis of Ambassador JarringOn November 18, + U Thant announced through + his spokesman that, until the talks with Jarring could be resumed, there + was “little more” that the Special Representative could do at UN Headquarters in New York. As a + result, he was “well advised” to return to his post as Swedish + Ambassador to the Soviet Union in Moscow. (Telegram 3244 from USUN, November 18; National Archives, + Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC + Files, Box 1157, Saunders Files, Middle East Negotiations Files, + June Initiative Volume V) Jarring had confided in Yost that he had been “growing increasingly fed up + with his long and useless vigil in New York,” adding that Israel’s + refusal to even “call and talk with him” had “aggravated his + bitterness.” He characterized Meir’s November 16 Knesset speech (quoted at great + length in telegram 6323 from Tel Aviv, November 16; ibid.), in which + the Prime Minister declared that Israel would not return to talks + under Jarring until the + United Arab Republic rectified its cease-fire violations, as the + “last straw.” (Telegram 3184 from USUN, November 16; ibid.) in accordance with + Security Council Resolution 242.

+

2. At the same time we believe that increasing attention to the + Palestinian factor will be required since if we were to disregard it, + this would tend to dash hopes of those whom we believe hold moderate + views and could eventually be brought around to a policy of seeking a + political solution based on + coexistence with rather than destruction of the state of Israel.

+

3. There is an immediate operational question with which we must deal. + Through other channels a representative of Fatah whom we consider to be + bona fide, proposed recently on behalf of Arafat that a confidential meeting somewhere in Europe + be held between senior Fatah officials and one or more senior U.S. + Government officials. The Fatah official listed a number of items which + the Fatah wished to discuss with us. [1½ lines not + declassified] We made contact through other channels with this + individual, keeping the channel open but indicating that practical + factors prevented a speedy response to Fatah’s proposal to establish a + dialogue, and no such meeting has taken place.See Documents 174 and + 180.

+

4. We therefore request that you have a very confidential conversation + with King Hussein, purpose being + exchange assessments as to how he sees the Palestinian factor in the + future, how he intends to deal with it, and whether there are ways in + which we can be helpful. You should level with him and indicate that + Arafat has sought a direct + meeting for some of his colleagues with U.S. officials. You should + indicate to Hussein that we, of + course, have not agreed to any such meeting and that we would wish to + receive his views as to how we could be helpful, if at all, at this + juncture in dealing with the Palestinians. You should, of course, avoid + giving any impression that this approach to him reflects any loss of + confidence on our part in him or the leadership of his government.

+

5. We obviously do not want to do anything that would undermine King + Hussein and until we know how + Hussein plans to deal with + the Palestinians we do not wish to press the question of separate U.S. + contacts. If after hearing his reply, we decided contact would serve our + interest, we would propose your sounding him out at next discussion of + the subject. If he felt, for example, that contact at that juncture with + Fatah (we would if we went ahead have in mind some individual who was + not an official of the government in the first instance and who could be + disavowed if necessary) would undermine him and be unhelpful we + obviously would take this fully into account (without necessarily giving + him a veto over such a decision).

+

6. In short, we are asking you to undertake for the first time a serious + dialogue with King Hussein with + respect to the Palestinian factor which we are convinced must be taken + more fully into account in weeks and months ahead. Here are some things + which we think you can raise:

+

A. Are there ways for King Hussein + to make more explicit and to define in more detail for benefit of the + Palestinians his ideas regarding the future political role of the Palestinians? What are his views in + this regard?

+

B. Is there something more that we can do to demonstrate that the US has + very much in mind the interests of the Palestinians in any negotiation + and in any settlement?

+

C. If negotiations under Ambassador Jarring’s auspices get started, which we hope can be the + case in the next few weeks, does the King feel that it is desirable, and + at what stage, to bring in Palestinians in the negotiating process or + does he feel that taking such a step would tend to enhance one faction + as against another?

+

D. Most fundamentally, does he feel that the bulk of Palestinians in + Jordan in particular can be brought to the fundamental notion of a + political solution based on co-existence with Israel and how can we best + contribute to that particular process?

+

E. Does he feel that we should begin to broaden our contacts with + Palestinians in various capitals in the Arab world?

+

7. Above questions are only illustrative. They are intended to provide + you with some thoughts to explore, though there are obviously a good + many others. Principal purpose of this talk is to let the King know that + we have been approached, to give him confidence that we are consulting + him fully before making any decisions and to get him thinking more in + terms of what kind of a strategy has to be pursued vis-à-vis the + Palestinians, and what sort of a role we could play complementary to his + that would be helpful. He should know that we have not taken any + position re the idea of a Palestinian entity and we believe that this is + matter between King and the Palestinians. However, your talk with King + will offer you the opportunity to explore what precisely King may have + in mind when he says that in a post-settlement situation the West Bank + of Jordan would be given self-determination.In telegram 6712 from Amman, November 23, Brown reported that he had had an + “exploratory talk” with Hussein on the morning of November 22, during which + he broached the subject of the Palestinian question, as instructed + by the Department. Brown + described the discussion as “long and complicated,” reporting that + the King would have been “delighted” to find a Palestinian entity to + which he could turn. Hussein + also commented that he had “no real objection” to the United States + initiating limited and guarded contacts with Fatah representatives, + although he decided that he wanted to “think it through” and discuss + the matter again later. He mentioned that he knew that U.S. + officials were meeting with Palestinians in Amman and Beirut, had + “no objection” to it, and was interested to know what these + officials believed the Palestinians were thinking. The King also + wanted to see “Palestinianism” defined further, having not yet + decided when and if Palestinians should be brought into the + Jarring talks. Finally, + he said that he would be “expanding on his ideas for + self-determination” in the West Bank when he visited the United + States. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 616, Country Files, + Middle East, Jordan)

+ + + Rogers + + +
+ +
+ + 186. Memorandum From Director of Central Intelligence Helms to the President’s Assistant for + National Security Affairs (Kissinger)Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 208, Agency Files, + CIA. Secret; Sensitive. All + brackets are in the original except those indicating text that + remains classified. A copy was sent to the Under Secretary of State + for Political Affairs. + Washington, November 24, 1970. + + SUBJECT + Fatah Request for Contact with U.S. Officials + +

1. Further to my memorandum of 5 November 1970Document 180. concerning our contact [2 lines not declassified] in our most recent + meeting with [less than 1 line not declassified] + he reported that Fatah has now completed preliminary plans for the + creation of a Palestine State. According to [name not + declassified] Fatah Chief Yasir Arafat’s recent trip to Syria, Iraq, Saudi Arabia and + North Africa covered one purpose only: the creation of this Palestine + State.

+

2. [name not declassified] stated that all Arab + States with the exception of Jordan have now agreed on Arafat’s decision and method of + establishing a State of Palestine having full sovereignty and + independence, and to include the territories of the West Bank of Jordan, + the Gaza Strip—with unimpeded access between the West Bank and the Gaza + Strip—certain (unstated) portions of the East Bank of Jordan, and + internationalization of the Old City of Jerusalem. [name not declassified] said that Arafat “has this in his hand right now.” (Comment: + Earlier in CSDB–312/02905–70 dated 14 October 1970,Not found. we reported Fatah’s plans to + create a National Front, from which they envisage the emergence of a + Palestine State similar to the above, with the added specific notation + that the East Bank territory to be included in this State would be the + East Bank of Jordan west of the Ramtha-Amman-Ma’an line.)

+

3. According to [name not declassified] all Arab + States except Jordan have now accepted Fatah’s position as the only sure + way to bring lasting peace to the area. Fatah’s point to the Arab rulers + was simply that once all displaced Palestinians were in one place, the + other Arab States would no longer have to worry about Israeli + retaliation, and the Palestinians themselves would never venture attacks + against Israel because Israel could easily destroy them since the + Palestinians would possess no conventional military capability. [name not declassified] said that King Husayn was + now trying to set up an Arab Summit Conference to discuss a “Palestinian + Entity” but this will come to nothing because the issue is already settled: all Arab States + except Jordan have already agreed to Fatah’s plans for creating a + Palestinian State. [name not declassified] said + that Fatah had learned that King Husayn had received a “deputation” from + the West Bank, the members of which stated that they wanted to remain + with Jordan and that King Husayn would present this as “evidence” at his + proposed Arab Summit Conference. However, according to [name not declassified] such a presentation will + be meaningless as the issue has already been resolved.

+

4. Continuing, [name not declassified] said that + with the agreement of all Arab States (except Jordan) to the + establishment of this Palestine State, the key to the whole situation + now is the United States Government, and this is a matter of extreme + urgency. [name not declassified] asserted that + the USG and Fatah must sit down at a + senior level within the next week to ten days in order to review each + others’ positions “before it is too late.” Once the decision on creation + of a Palestinian State becomes open knowledge, either at the Arab Summit + or at a time of Fatah’s choosing, then the USG will be obliged to indicate its position openly + regarding annexation to the Palestine State of some regions of + present-day Jordan. It would be wise, [name not + declassified] said, to discuss the Fatah position now, so that + understanding could guide the actions of USG officials. [name not + declassified] said that if the USG tries to oppose annexation of those Jordanian + territories demanded by Fatah and agreed to by the other Arab States + (except Jordan), Fatah and the Arab States “would respond harshly.” + Speaking dramatically but not threateningly, [name not + declassified] said that if the USG tries to stop this, “we will look at each other through + a wall of flames.” [name not declassified] said + that the USG must understand the + absolute and utter frustration of the Palestinian people, and that while + he fully realized that Palestinian fighters would end up the ultimate + losers in a head-on confrontation with the United States on this + subject, the loss of life and property which could be avoided by a + simple and timely exchange of ideas between Fatah and the USG required that he present Fatah’s case + in the most vivid manner possible.In his + January 7, 1971, memorandum to Kissinger, Helms reported that the CIA had maintained “discreet contact” with [name not declassified] since November 24, + including a meeting with him on [text not + declassified]. At the meeting, [name not + declassified] asked that “the political attitude of the + U.S. Government toward the Palestinian movement be clarified before + any further meeting takes place, and that this clarification must be + in the form of an official agenda of topics to be discussed at this + next meeting.” Helms wrote: + “It is possible he means what he has said and that he will refuse + further meetings without the promise of some substantive discussion + of U.S. policy on the Palestine question. We shall endeavor, + however, to induce him to continue to maintain at least occasional + contact with us for ‘the informal exchange of views.’” (Central + Intelligence Agency, ODCI Files, Job 80B01086A)

+ + + Richard Helms + Helms signed “Dick” above his typed + signature. + + +
+ +
+ + 187. Letter From President Nixon to Israeli Prime Minister MeirSource: National Archives, Nixon Presidential + Materials, NSC Files, Box 756, + Presidential Correspondence 1969–1974, Israel Prime Minister + Golda Meir 1970. Secret; + Nodis. Copies were sent to Haig, Kennedy, Sonnenfeldt, and Saunders. Telegram 197609 to Tel Aviv, December 4, + instructed Barbour to deliver + the letter promptly to Meir. + (Ibid.) + Washington, December 3, 1970. + + Dear Madam Prime Minister: + +

Your letter of December 1, written in the spirit of the close friendship + and understanding which exists between us, our governments, and our + people, has been most helpful in clarifying your present views and + concerns.The letter, written on + November 29, was delivered to Sisco by Rabin on December 1. In it, Meir addressed Israel’s desire to: + 1) receive further arms shipments from the United States; 2) enter + into territorial negotiations without being tied to the proposals + that the United States advanced in the fall of 1969; 3) have the + United States “communicate to the Soviet Union the full weight of + its commitment to the survival and security of Israel;” and 4) + clarify the framework of the cease-fire agreement with “concrete + arrangements.” (Text in telegram 197609 to Tel Aviv, December 4; + ibid.)

+

I am responding to you immediately since I sense that you share our view + of the importance of resuming the Jarring talks at an early date. As you know, we believe + present circumstances are particularly favorable for this. There have + been profound changes in the Arab world since September, whose + implications can only be tested in negotiations. In addition, both our + governments have by our actions clearly demonstrated that the violation + of agreements is not without its political and military costs to those + who seek to win unilateral advantage in this way. It seems to me that a + move now by Israel into negotiations would be a move from a position of + strength and would be clearly perceived as such by others.

+

The concern of your government to maintain that position of strength as + the negotiating process goes forward is one which we fully understand + and appreciate in light of our own national experience in difficult + negotiating situations. I want to assure you, Madam Prime Minister, we + will be responsive to your needs and we will continue to take into full + account Soviet support—military, economic, and political—of the UAR as specific decisions are taken by + us.

+

With respect to your long-term military equipment needs, including + aircraft in particular, I believe the principle of a continuing military + supply relationship between our two governments has been firmly + established. Given the requirements of our own services and our many + obligations around the world, the process of working out in specific + terms what is possible in response to your long term requests will require additional time. I have + asked that your requests receive priority and sympathetic + consideration,Military assistance to + Israel was discussed at the December 3 Senior Review Group meeting + and then again at the January 11, 1971, Senior Review Group meeting; + see Documents 188 and 195. and the additional information recently + received from your representatives will help expedite our examination. + Meanwhile, I can assure you that the question is not whether we will + maintain the supply and financing relationship already established but + simply how to do so most rationally and effectively. The fact that, of + the total supplemental appropriation for military assistance worldwide + which I have requested from the Congress, almost one half is for + Israel,The President earmarked $500 + million for Israel in the $1.03 billion supplemental foreign aid + package that he sent to Congress on November 18. (New York Times, November 19, 1970, p. 11) For the text of + his message transmitting the proposal to Congress, see Public Papers: Nixon, 1970, pp. 1074–1079. should + leave no doubt about the importance we attach to your needs.

+

As for the course of the negotiations under Ambassador Jarring’s auspices, I want to + reiterate what I said to you in my message of July 23:See Document 136. + We will not press Israel to accept the positions of the UAR that there must be total Israeli + withdrawal from the territories occupied in the 1967 conflict to the + pre-June 5 lines or that there must be a refugee solution based + exclusively on the strict application of paragraph 11 of United Nations + General Assembly Resolution 194 (III).See + footnote 6, Document 136. + Our position on withdrawal is that the final borders must be agreed + between the parties by means of negotiations under the aegis of + Ambassador Jarring. Moreover, we + will not press Israel to accept a refugee solution which would alter + fundamentally the Jewish character of the State of Israel or jeopardize + your security. We will also adhere strictly and firmly to the + fundamental principle that there must be a peace agreement in which each + of the parties undertakes reciprocal obligations to the other and that + no Israeli soldier should be withdrawn from the occupied territories + until a binding contractual peace agreement satisfactory to you has been + achieved.

+

It is true, as you point out, that our perceptions differ as to what may + be possible in a final settlement. I believe our relationship is based + on such a degree of mutual respect and confidence, however, that it can + accommodate differences of judgment. The point I want to stress is that, + in our view, the primary focus of the Jarring talks must be on the negotiating positions of + the parties directly concerned. We believe those negotiations must be + given every reasonable opportunity to proceed without outside + interference. We will act in this spirit.

+ +

It follows from the foregoing that we could not be a party to an attempt + by the Security Council to substitute its judgment for that of the + parties with respect to the territorial and other detailed aspects of a + settlement.

+

You have also raised the question of what this government would do in the + event of direct Soviet military intervention should the UAR resume large scale hostilities against + Israel. The United States under a series of Administrations has made + clear in word and deed the importance it attaches to the security and + survival of Israel. I believe the Soviet Union fully understands this. + However, we will take an early occasion to make certain the Soviet Union + is under no misapprehension in this regard.

+

Finally, Madam Prime Minister, I want to thank you for suggesting that it + would be useful for us to exchange views with your Minister of Defense. + I personally look forward to meeting with General Dayan, as do Secretaries Rogers and Laird, when he comes to Washington + next week.See footnote 9, Document 188.

+

It is our desire and intention to stay in close consultation with you and + your government as the difficult process of negotiations under the aegis + of Ambassador Jarring goes + forward in the days and weeks ahead. As Secretary Rogers conveyed to Foreign Minister + Eban on my behalf,According to telegram 190011 to Tel Aviv, November + 19, Rogers conveyed the + President’s message during a 45-minute meeting with Eban in Washington on the afternoon + of November 18. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, + NSC Files, Box 1158, Saunders + Files, Middle East Negotiations Files, June Initiative (Memos + Only)) I hope the talks will begin promptly.After discussing the President’s letter at a + December 6 Cabinet meeting, Israel decided to defer its decision to + return to the Jarring talks + for two weeks. Israeli newspapers reported that the government would + probably participate in the talks in January, following further + “clarifications” between Israel and the United States. (Telegram + 6696 from Tel Aviv, December 7; ibid., Box 1157, Saunders Files, + Middle East Negotiations Files, June Initiative Volume V) Meir informed Barbour of the decision during a + meeting on December 7 at which she also “expressed appreciation for + spirit of friendship and understanding expressed in President’s + letter.” Regarding the Jarring talks, the Prime Minister stressed Israel’s + “need for assurance” that the United States would support Israel + during “sensitive points” of the negotiation process, given the + Soviet Union’s support of the United Arab Republic. Furthermore, + while she found Nixon’s + letter “reassuring in tone on military supplies,” she “needed to + know Israel would be receiving steady deliveries of Phantoms and + Skyhawks after January 1.” (Telegram 6726 from Tel Aviv, December 8; + ibid.) I cannot emphasize too strongly my conviction that the + present moment is one of opportunity in our continuing search for a + binding peace agreement based on reciprocal commitments between the + parties.

+

Sincerely,

+ + + Richard Nixon + + +
+ +
+ + 188. Minutes of a Senior Review Group MeetingSource: National Archives, Nixon + Presidential Materials, NSC Files, + NSC Institutional Files + (H-Files), Box H–111, Senior Review Group, Meeting Minutes Originals + 1970. Top Secret; Nodis. All brackets are in the original except + those indicating text that remains classified. The meeting was held + in the White House Situation Room. + Washington, December 3, + 1970, 11:30 a.m.–12:20 p.m. + + SUBJECT + Middle East + + + PARTICIPANTS + Chairman—Henry + Kissinger + + State + + + U. Alexis Johnson + + + Joseph J. Sisco + + + Alfred L. Atherton + + + Talcott Seelye + + + Defense + + + David Packard + + James S. Noyes + Gen. Devol Brett + + + CIA + + + + Thomas Karamessines + + David Blee + + JCS + + + Gen. + Richard Knowles + + Adm. William St. + George + + NSC Staff + + Col. Richard + Kennedy + + Harold Saunders + + + Jeanne W. Davis + + +

SUMMARY OF DECISIONS

+

. . . The options paper on military assistance to IsraelAn analytical summary of the paper is Document + 194. should include the tactical question of whether to offer + the package before or after the Arab-Israeli talks have started.

+

. . . The request for December 4 U–2 flights would be withdrawn; but, if + arrangements can be made for training flights and aircraft maintenance, + we should keep the U–2s on Cyprus, raising the matter with Prime + Minister Heath, if necessary.Nixon met with Heath on December + 17 and 18 one week after the administration had decided to withdraw + the U–2s from Cyprus, as reported in telegram 202028 to London, + December 11. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, + NSC Files, Box 1157, Saunders + Files, Middle East Negotiations Files, June Initiative Volume V) + Thus, the U–2 issue was not addressed in their conversations; see + Foreign + Relations, 1969–1976, volume XLI, Western Europe; NATO, + 1969–1972, Documents 334 and 335. [Text + not declassified]

+

. . . The package on military assistance to Jordan should be processed in + the same way as the Israeli package—i.e. an options paper to be + considered by the SRG and presented to + the President for decision.An analytical + summary of the paper is Document 191.

+ +

Mr. Kissinger: This was intended + to be a relatively brief meeting to bring ourselves up to date before + the decisions have to be made over the next few weeks. (to Mr. Sisco) Can you run down some of the + problems?

+

Military Assistance for Israel

+

Mr. Sisco: Our principal + objective is still to try to get the Israeli-Arab talks started. The + President has received a letter from Golda + MeirSee footnote 2, Document 187. + expressing two concerns: (1) the look of the future as it relates to US + military and financial support for Israel; and (2) some assurance that + they will be left free to take a reasonable approach to the + negotiations. They were, of course, deeply concerned over the US plan + developed in the October-December 1969 period, at least as it involved + the border with Egypt. We do not interpret this letter as laying down + conditions for resumption of the talks. It expresses Israeli concerns + and appears to be aimed at developing a general understanding between + the US and Israel. We believe it should receive a prompt reply so as to + give the Israeli Cabinet a chance to consider it at their meeting on + Sunday.See Document + 187. The Cabinet met on Sunday, December 6. + Secretary Rogers believes that + the reply should be somewhat general in nature, with no specific + commitment.

+

With regard to the work on our recommendations for providing Israel with + the equipment she has requested, the Defense Department has completed a + good technical options paper.An analytical + summary of the paper is Document 194. We are beginning to + look at it, and will put together two or three possibilities, taking the + political factors into account, for submission to the SRG. We can look + at these options and, hopefully over the next few weeks, shape them so + they can be presented to the President for decision. We believe we + should make no specific commitment to the Israelis prior to the + beginning of the talks. Following that, we should try to be reasonably + responsive.

+

Mr. Kissinger: I have a tactical + question. Let’s leave aside what we should do, assuming we should do + something for Israel and that whatever we do will give us trouble with + the Arabs. Would it be tactically better to give Israel something before + the talks commence and then present it as a quid pro quo for Israeli + agreement to enter the talks? If we give them equipment while the talks + are going on, we might be criticized for introducing an arms package + into the talks. Or, we might give Israel an excuse to say that, because + of the talks, she has an even greater need. I was troubled by the June + formula which had us telling the Israelis that if it appeared that the + talks were not getting anywhere, then we would give them arms. This would have given the + Israelis an incentive to stall in the talks. Tactically, wouldn’t it be + wiser to put ourselves in a position to claim that the arms package was + a way of getting them to talk?

+

Mr. Sisco: You can make a case + that a prior commitment would be an inducement. I’m aware that the kind + of general response, short of a commitment, we are suggesting may not do + the job. I think we should try, however.

+

Mr. Kissinger: The reply to Mrs. + Meir’s letter is a different + problem. If we reply in the way you suggest, do you think their response + will be to enter the talks?

+

Mr. Sisco: Not necessarily.

+

Mr. Packard: I am troubled by how + much we have had to do to get the Israelis to talk. We have already done + a good deal for them.

+

Mr. Kissinger: I agree. But if we + are going to give them arms anyway, wouldn’t it be tactically wise to + give them before the talks and then present the act as a quid pro quo + for their entering the talks, even if it was not. I’m worried about the + Arabs.

+

Mr. Sisco: I see your point, but + I think presenting the arms package during the talks would be manageable + because: 1) the Arabs are more concerned about the use of the arms than + about the fact that Israel is getting them; and 2) the arms package + could still be related to the stand-still violations and to the ongoing + effort by the USSR for Egypt. The + Arabs will be concerned but it will be manageable. If we can come up + with reasonable arms packages, somewhat extended in terms of time and + money, we would have established an ongoing military relationship with + Israel in a reasonably quiet way.

+

Mr. Johnson: This is based on the assumption that the Soviets will + continue to support Egypt. What the US is doing for Israel would be part + of the response to Soviet help for Egypt.

+

Mr. Sisco: Yes, although I don’t + entirely accept the Israeli theory of an open-ended relationship between + the USSR and Egypt.

+

Mr. Kissinger: Have there been + substantial Soviet deliveries?

+

Mr. Sisco: Not recently. There + were two periods of intensive supply in April and August of this + year.

+

Mr. Packard: We should also watch + what kinds of things the Russians are supplying Egypt. Are they + supplying air defense equipment or equipment which will enable them to + cross the Canal and mount an attack. We should consider what they are + getting as well as how much?

+

Mr. Johnson: If the Soviets put a ceiling on what they are supplying + Egypt, we would certainly take this into account.

+

Mr. Kissinger: We would have + to.

+ +

Mr. Sisco: A general response to + Mrs. Meir’s letter may not do the + job. However, I think the Israelis have made a decision to resume the + talks shortly before the Jarring + report is due on January 5. I don’t think the Israelis really expect an + explicit commitment from us. We should try to get the talks resumed + without a commitment. If we can’t, we may have to link our arms package + with the talks.

+

Mr. Packard: We should see how far + we can get with them before using the arms package.

+

Mr. Kissinger: This has nothing + to do with the Meir letter, since + we cannot include a commitment on military assistance in the President’s + reply. We are talking now about our general posture and whether to make + the material available before the talks or after they have started. This + is independent of the Israeli decision unless it becomes necessary to + use the arms package to get them to the talks.

+

Mr. Packard: There’s also the + question of how much we should give them. This will vary according to + what the Soviets do.

+

Mr. Sisco: We are putting + together an options paper on the variables, based on the very good + Defense paper. There are three options: do nothing; do something; and + give them everything they want over an extended period. Secretary + Rogers generally agrees with + a formula that would meet their requests in a substantial way, but + extend the response over some period of time.

+

Dayan + ProposalIn a November 22 Israeli + Cabinet meeting, Dayan + outlined a plan for a long-term cease-fire agreement with the United + Arab Republic based on a thinning out of forces along the Suez + Canal, but encountered strong opposition among the other Ministers. + (New York Times, November 23, 1970, p. 7) + Four days later, he discussed this idea, along with the equally + controversial notion that the United Arab Republic could be + encouraged to open the Suez Canal before a peace agreement was + reached, in an interview on Israeli television. (Ibid., November 27, + 1970, p. 9) One observer described the Defense Minister’s “thinking + out loud” over the last few weeks of November as “shattering the + political calm and seeming immobility of the Israeli government” and + sending “respected political commentators, diplomats, and even + Cabinet ministers scurrying around to figure out what he is up to.” + (Ibid., November 29, 1970, p. 196)

+

Mr. Kissinger: I have two + questions on the Dayan + visit.Dayan met with Nixon on December 11; see Document 190. He also met with Rogers and Laird that day, as reported in + telegram 202635 to Tel Aviv, December 13. (National Archives, Nixon + Presidential Materials, NSC Files, + Box 1158, Saunders Files, Middle East Negotiations Files, June + Initiative (Memos Only)) Do we believe the Israelis will + reach a decision before Dayan + returns.

+

Mr. Sisco: We’re not sure. They + may try to reach a decision at Sunday’s Cabinet meeting, before + Dayan returns. This is what + Golda should do. If a decision is postponed until after Dayan returns, he will get the credit + for it.

+ +

Mr. Kissinger: Assuming you would + get any credit for this in Israel.

+

Mr. Sisco: You would. I believe + Dayan’s statements are closer + to the pulse of Israeli sentiment than Golda’s. There is strong feeling + among the Israeli people that they must get on with the discussions. + Dayan’s statements are based + on a more accurate reading of Israeli public opinion than Golda’s + are.

+

Mr. Karamessines: [1 line not declassified]

+

Mr. Kissinger: I just don’t know. + Perhaps Dayan is positioning + himself to appear more reasonable—which brings me to my second question: + is Dayan saying that the + standstill has to be renegotiated in terms of his demilitarized zone + proposal?

+

Mr. Sisco: We must be very + careful about this. Mrs. Meir’s + letter indicated Dayan wants to + talk about a new agreement on a cease-fire, assuming adequate machinery + can be developed. The President must be very careful. He should say “yes + we will talk about this, but we believe the Israeli-Arab talks must + begin.” Otherwise, Israel will say they will sit tight until we can + achieve a new cease-fire agreement. And I am convinced that no new + cease-fire agreement can be negotiated. We will have to be completely + frank with Dayan—tell him that a + new standstill agreement is not possible. Dayan will suggest that a thinning out of forces on + either side of the Canal would be part of a cease-fire agreement. We + should reply that the idea is worth exploring, but it should be done in + the Israeli-Arab negotiations as part of a political settlement. It + should not be a condition for the negotiations.

+

Mr. Kissinger: Is Dayan serious about his proposal?

+

Mr. Sisco: Yes, but he has no + support in the Israeli Cabinet. Most Israelis feel very strongly that + there should be no movement from the cease-fire lines until a peace + settlement has been achieved. The Israelis have told Dayan that if he wants to discuss this + idea with anyone, to discuss it with the Americans. The Egyptians would + never agree to a thinning out of forces. They don’t mind Dayan’s discussing it with us, since + everyone is convinced that someone else will knock the idea out.

+

Mr. Kissinger: At one point, when + there was some press talk about a 30-mile demilitarized zone on either + side of the Canal, Don Bergus + came back with a telegram saying “make it 15 miles and you have a deal.” + This was presented as an alternate to a cease-fire, I believe.

+

Mr. Sisco: Egypt has already + taken a public position against this.

+

Mr. Kissinger: There are two + questions: 1) is it a good idea, and 2) what forum should be used? + State’s recommendation is not to tie Dayan’s proposal to the beginning of the negotiations. + If it is a good idea, it should be discussed in the Jarring talks. We don’t have to take a + position now. I can see where the idea might have some attraction for + the Russians if it opens + the Suez Canal. If it does not, I don’t see any attraction for + anyone.

+

Mr. Sisco: If Israel should pull + its forces back 20 or 30 kilometers, Allon says they would have to increase the strength of + their positions beyond the zone in Sinai, and that they could not do + this without partial mobilization.

+

Mr. Packard: They have no good + defensive line there now.

+

Mr. Kissinger: If neither Israel + nor Egypt wants this, it would be very hard for us to do anything about + it.

+

Mr. Sisco: Dayan should return from his talks in + the US saying he didn’t find much enthusiasm for the idea here.

+

Military Assistance for Israel

+

Mr. Kissinger: Could we review + the status of military assistance for Israel. You have completed your + technical studies. Then it goes through the IG, which makes its + recommendations to the SRG,The Senior + Review Group next held a meeting to discuss this issue on January + 11, 1971; see Document 195. + including the question of tactics as to whether to offer the package + before or after the talks have started assuming, of course, that the + talks have not already started.

+

[Omitted here is discussion of the U–2 flights that monitored the + cease-fire zone.]

+

Assistance for Jordan

+

Mr. Kissinger: May we now turn to + the question of assistance for Jordan.

+

Mr. Sisco: I think State and + Defense are generally together on the package. All we need is money.

+

Mr. Seelye: We are preparing a + joint memorandum to the President from the Secretaries of State and + Defense which will enable him to decide in principle, subject to the + availability of funds, on a package, along the lines the Jordanians have + requested and that our survey team agrees is sound for the new mission + of the Jordanian Army.The memorandum is + attached to and summarized in Document 191.

+

Mr. Kissinger: What is that new + mission?

+

Mr. Seelye: Before the civil war, + the King had thought more in terms of defense—anti-aircraft, etc. Now, + following the Syrian intervention, the King believes he needs a more + mobile force and his priorities have changed—in the direction of tanks, + for example. The problem is money, and this can’t be resolved before the + King comes here.Hussein met with Nixon on December 8. See Document 189. An attachment to the State-Defense memo + will indicate our thinking on what we might do in the next two years to + help in the financing. We have $30 million in MAP included in the supplemental. This is inadequate for + the package the King is talking about, which is around $186.6 million. + We could of course, pare this down, phase it over two or three years, + and subject it to annual review so that we are not providing equipment + at a time when it should not be provided. We could offer the King + something as a first slice while he is here, but he is talking about a + 6–9 month time frame.

+

Mr. Kissinger: Where is the money + coming from?

+

Mr. Seelye: We have the $30 + million in the supplemental. I believe we should consider reinstituting + our program of budgetary support to Jordan. Until 1967, we were + supplying $30 million annually in budgetary support. We discontinued it + because our general aid philosophy moved away from the idea of budgetary + support and because the Arab countries agreed to provide Jordan with + regular subsidies. We are still not completely satisfied that we have a + true picture of Jordan’s economic and financial situation and its needs. + In the next two weeks, we will sit down with Jordanian financial experts + to see what the situation is and what they could do to tighten their + belts. We will have a better idea of exactly what gap we have to plug + after we see how much Jordan can do.

+

Mr. Sisco: The President can tell + the King we will do the best we can for him but that we have a funding + problem.

+

Mr. Kissinger: We should put the + Jordan package through the same process as the Israeli package. We can + tell the King the same thing we are telling Mrs. Meir—a general expression of sympathy, + and we will see what we can do. Then we can put the requests through our + machinery and come up with a recommended package.

+

Mr. Noyes: The President is + committed publicly to make good Jordan’s losses.

+

Mr. Kissinger: That is no + problem. I am talking about the larger two or three year package which + should be put through the machinery.

+

Mr. Seelye: Jordan still needs + $9.8 million for replacement of their losses. They will tell us they + don’t have it.

+

Mr. Kissinger: Doesn’t that come + out of the $30 million?

+

Mr. Sisco: No, this is beyond + that.

+

General Knowles: They could + give up something out of the $30 million package.

+

Mr. Kissinger: There would be no + policy objection to taking it out of the $30 million.

+

Mr. Noyes: But the President + would be going back on his word.

+

Mr. Kissinger: Then find the + money.

+ +

Mr. Sisco: It may have to come + from some future increment. We could commit ourselves to X amount.

+

Mr. Kissinger: I agree. We will + tell the King he will get something. We can give him the $9 million + which he needs now. By the time the $30 million is being spent, we will + have a slice of the larger amount. We won’t have to face the issue.

+

General Knowles: By that time + we will be in a new fiscal year.

+

Mr. Seelye: The King wants the + equipment in 6–9 months time.

+

Mr. Kissinger: Where the money + comes from is our internal bookkeeping problem.

+

Mr. Noyes: The King was going to + give us cash for some of this but then his country blew up. We have + already spent some of the $30 million making up his losses.

+

Mr. Kissinger: There is no policy + issue here. Either find the $9 million or juggle the books.

+

Palestine

+

Mr. Sisco: We will have another + thorough discussion with the King on Palestine next week. We don’t need + anything more on this until after that discussion.

+

Mr. Karamessines: I would like to + call your attention to a series of reports over the last two or three + weeks, and particularly some in the last two or three days. Rifai is now acting as political + adviser to Fatah. There are indications that the Palestinians are + planning to announce formation of a Palestinian entity, independent of + the State of Jordan, and request the stationing of Iraqi troops. They + would take over the East Bank “by popular acclaim.” In other words, they + would kick the King out and take over. Fatah will initially denounce + formation of the entity, but once it is established, they will move in + and take control. We have summarized these reports and I wanted to focus + your attention on them. (Handed the attached summary paper around the + table.)“Summary of Significant + Reporting on Jordan,” undated, covers the period October 14–December + 2 and includes the subheadings: “I. Creation of a Palestine Entity,” + “II. Jordan-UAR Relations,” “III. Relations with Other Arab States: + Views on a Peaceful Middle East Solution and Khartoum Payments,” and + “IV. Iraqi Troops in Jordan.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential + Materials, NSC Files, Box 1260, + Saunders Files, Subject Files) You will note the King’s + suspicion of the UAR.

+

Mr. Kissinger: We will have a + separate meeting on the Palestinian question.The Senior Review Group discussed the Palestinian + question on December 17; see Document + 192.

+
+ +
+ + 189. Memorandum of ConversationSource: National Archives, Nixon Presidential + Materials, NSC Files, Box 616, + Country Files, Middle East, Jordan, Vol. VI. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Brown and approved by Sisco and Kissinger. The meeting took place + in the Oval Office from 11:06 to 11:48 a.m. (Ibid., White House + Central Files, President’s Daily Diary) The King was in Washington + December 8–10. Later in the day on December 8, he met with Laird. A memorandum of + conversation is in the Washington National Records Center, OSD Files: FRC 330–76–0067, Box 74, + Jordan. He met with Agnew on + December 10. A memorandum of conversation is in the National + Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 616, Country Files, Middle East, Jordan, + Vol. VI. + Washington, December 8, 1970, 11 + a.m. + + PARTICIPANTS + + Jordan + + His Majesty King Hussein Bin + Talal + His Excellency Abdul Hamid + Sharaf, Ambassador + His Excellency Zaid Rifai, + Ambassador to London + + United States + + The President + Mr. Henry Kissinger, + Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs + Mr. Joseph J. Sisco, + Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian + Affairs + Ambassador to Jordan, L. Dean + Brown + +

The President congratulated the King on the successful outcome to + Jordan’s grave problems of September. Central to the solution of the + Middle East’s problems is the survival of a strong and independent + Jordan. Jordan’s survival is, in turn, dependent on the King’s + survival.

+

The King thanked the President warmly, saying that Jordan could not have + gotten through its difficult days without the support and interest of + the United States. He and Jordan are proud of the close and excellent + relations between the two countries and two peoples. He stressed his + conviction that the U.S. and Jordan share the same views and principles. + Stresses and strains have increased in the Middle East since 1967. The + number of extremists has grown: There is greater disunity among the + Arabs as evidenced by the recent UN vote + when Arabs split seven-and-seven.Reference + is to General Assembly Resolution 2628; see footnote 8, Document 177. Extremism among the Arab + states seems to grow in relation to the distance from the problem. He + has feared that the Middle East is changing from one of Arab-Israeli + involvement to one of major power involvement. There are those in the + area who want to see that sort of confrontation. The situation in Jordan + has improved: the task now is to rebuild. Since 1967 Jordan has been + trying to find a just and lasting solution to the Middle East problem. + It is now trying to consolidate the unity of the country and to make + itself an area of stability. It + will not be easy. Jordan is the target of extremists, both from Arab and + Israeli quarters.

+

The President commented that Jordan is getting it from both sides. Jordan + really is in the middle.

+

The King went on to say that Jordan wants to play a constructive role. It + wants to build and get its young people back from abroad to take part in + this new effort. He had just visited Saudi Arabia and the UAR where he found many cross-currents on + the Palestine issue. The Cairo atmosphere is more relaxed: There is + decentralization of authority. For the first time he had heard differing + views as to what to do, but there was deep concern as to what would + happen when the cease-fire comes to an end. Egyptians are worried by the + lack of progress towards talks and wanted him to tell the President of + their fears. They say there could be disaster if nothing substantial is + initiated before the expiration of the 90-day period. The new government + is under greater pressure than that of Nasser and less sure of itself or its ability to meet + internal pressures. The Egyptians fear Israel will agree to talks just a + few days before the cease-fire ends and then procrastinate again. He + thinks this might lead to another explosion.

+

The King said in accordance with the commitment he made in Cairo, he + wanted to bring up another UAR idea + which had already been broached with the Soviets. Could there be + concentration now on guarantees? These could be worked out by US and + USSR or perhaps by the Big Four. + The guarantees essentially would be aimed at settling the question of + security once Security Council Resolution 242 was implemented. The + UAR had told him that peace + achieved this way could lead to disbandment of the UAR armed forces. He had committed himself + to bring this up. He was not prepared to move farther along this path + until he has further discussion with the Egyptians. He expects to see + them again soon. He believes, however, that there is no solution except + an imposed one. Jarring will + probably not get anywhere. In any case Resolution 242 is not clear to + all concerned.

+

The President replied that this is a very delicate problem. We want to + get the parties together and not separate them. Imposition requires + finding parties who are ready to have solutions imposed upon them. This + is just not the case. The US recognizes that Jordan’s security must be + adequate. We will look at what we can do as sympathetically as possible, + given the limitations we have. The President stated that he has already + asked Congress for funds to start this assistance.The President earmarked $30 million for Jordan in + the $1.03 billion supplemental foreign aid package that he sent to + Congress on November 18. See footnote 4, + Document 187. As for the cease-fire, its + continuation is in the interest of all. It would solve nothing to resume hostilities. People + in the area are tired of fighting. As for negotiations, candidly there + is no guarantee that if talks were to begin we would get the results we + hope for, but continuing as we are will get us nowhere.

+

The President said the King is surrounded by problems: Palestinians, + radical neighbors, and Israel. That he has survived is both a modern + miracle and a key to a solution. He then asked Mr. Sisco to talk about an imposed + settlement and solution.

+

Mr. Sisco said that we are trying + to get negotiations started and expect that this will happen by a + reasonably early date. Even if negotiations start, we do not intend to + stand aside. Jarring has no + divisions to back him up.

+

The President noted that Jarring + has no more than the Pope, maybe less. Mr. Sisco said we intend to be active in the context of the + Jarring talks. He cannot do + it alone. The President said this was correct.

+

Mr. Sisco said he would like to + discuss the question of guarantees and the role of the big powers, + noting that it is a problem for the U.S. and is delicate since it could + involve commitments.

+

The President said we have to think about this problem of guarantees and + in this connection, what those in the area think about them. Mr. + Sisco said the primary basis + of security has to be a peace agreement based on reciprocal commitments + between the parties. What the major powers then did would be + complementary and additive. If there is a peace agreement between those + involved, major powers could endorse them within the context of the + Security Council.

+

Ambassador Sharaf said he thought + that the King wants to see guarantees springing from Israeli withdrawal + from occupied Jordanian territories. The Arabs have played their part: + they have accepted Israel as a state and it is now Israel’s turn to + withdraw. The Arabs are ready to entertain any sort of international + guarantee which brings about withdrawal and peace. Jordan cannot just go + into talks with Jarring without + some sort of goal: that goal must be withdrawal and peace.

+

The President said he would be discussing the Israeli position with + Dayan on Friday.See Document 190. + To be fair, Israelis have a point when they say that written guarantees + are not enough. They need to have the ability to defend their security + if guarantees break down. The world has, indeed, changed since 1967. + Arab states are now ready to do what they were not prepared to do then. + They now accept Israel as an independent state with secure borders. We + want to look carefully at both sides and see where we can be helpful in + between. Israel cannot accept faith alone. Somewhere guarantees will need to be fitted + in. Jordan needs these too. It also has enemies in the area.

+

Mr. Sisco said that international + guarantees can provide an additional and complementary psychological + basis for confidence. In addition, there need to be commitments between + two sides and practical security agreements on the ground. He noted that + violations of the standstill have undermined the weight Israel would + attach to international guarantees.

+

The President said that we have to face up to the fact that Israel has + such views. Wars occur in peacetime and often between states which have + non-aggression pacts. De Gaulle + thought this way, believing that France needed a minimal ability to + defend itself; if there is no defense, treaties are meaningless. + Sophisticated government leaders always look to the future, asking what + next the government will do. Great powers may have a role as a result of + this.

+

Ambassador Rifai said he was + skeptical. He just does not know what the Israelis want. The King + interjected that maybe they do not either. Ambassador Rifai said the Israelis want peace but + as they see it and this will be at Jordan’s expense. Jordan paid the + price of defeat of 1967. It recognized Israel. Peace also has its price. + This is for Israel to pay and it requires withdrawal.

+

The President said this is preceptive thought: Defeat has a price and + peace has a price. The Government of Jordan is the most responsible + government in the area. We admire and respect the King for this. Jordan + has earned the right to survive. We will keep in mind the thoughts the + King has expressed.

+

The advisors then left and the President and the King had a brief private + talk.No record of the private talk has + been found. That evening, the President held a working dinner for + King Hussein in the State + Dining Room, attended by Rogers, Laird, Sisco, Kissinger, Helms, Moorer, + Shakespeare, Hannah, + Mosbacher, Brown, Atherton, Saunders, Seelye, and Jordanians including + Salah, Sharaf, and Zaid Rifai. They discussed Jordan’s + success in putting down the fedayeen uprising in September, the + Palestinian question, the Jarring talks, the possibilities presented by new + leadership in Cairo, and Soviet intentions in the Middle East, while + the King expressed particular concern over growing “extremism” in + the region. (Memorandum of conversation, December 8; National + Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 616, Country Files, Middle East, Jordan, + Vol. VI)

+
+ +
+ + 190. Memorandum of ConversationSource: National Archives, Nixon Presidential + Materials, NSC Files, Box 608, + Country Files, Middle East, Israel, Vol. VIII. Top Secret; + Sensitive. The meeting took place in the Oval Office. Printed from + an unsigned copy. + Washington, December 11, 1970, 3:30 + p.m. + + PARTICIPANTS + The President + Israeli Defense Minister Moshe + Dayan + Israeli Ambassador Rabin + Secretary of Defense Laird + General Haig + +

Following greetings, Defense Minister Dayan stated that he was giving a speech in New York + tomorrow which would be in an open forum and that he would like to have + the President’s permission to state to the members of the American + Jewish Community, who would be in the audience, that Prime Minister + Golda Meir had told him that + President Nixon had always been + true to his word and that he had given her many good words. The + President agreed.In his speech to the + United Jewish Appeal on December 12, Dayan asserted that while President Nixon “has kept every word” to + Israel concerning its military needs since his election, “we do not + want to find ourselves in a position where only the other parties + have military supplies, soldiers, and missiles.” He added: “We do + not want to sit down at a table with a gun being pointed at us.” + (New York Times, December 13, 1970, p. + 11)

+

The meeting was then delayed for press photography. Following the + departure of the press, President Nixon said that he had great admiration for the people + of Israel and had been tremendously impressed primarily by their spirit + during his visit to Israel in 1967.

+

Defense Minister Dayan stated that + it was conceivable that in the spring the Egyptians would be reinforced + by Soviet aircraft and would feel capable of trying to cross the Canal. + He wanted the President to know that Israeli forces would not turn their + back but would fight and that the spirit of Israel was still strong and + aggressive even if the Soviets provided air superiority to the UAR.

+

Defense Minister Dayan added that + the Israeli air battle of last summer with the SovietsRabin + described Israel’s July 30, 1970, air battle with the Soviets to + Kissinger; see Document 142. was a calculated + decision on the part of his government and one which was taken alone + without consultation with any other Government, with the full + realization of the implications of the engagement.

+

President Nixon stated that his + policy had been, from the outset, to counterbalance Soviet power in the + Middle East. He was confident that the Arabs alone would be no match for Israel’s + military. For this reason, it was his concern that the Soviets recognize + that the U.S. would guarantee Israel’s survival. He had followed this + policy since the first days of his Administration, both in public and in + private contacts with the Soviets.

+

The President added that U.S. actions during the Jordan crisis were + designed to demonstrate this point. The movement of the Sixth Fleet was + ordered to convey to the Soviet Union that the U.S. would not stand idly + by in this situation. The President also complimented the Israeli + Government for the readiness measures which they took and which were + also an operative factor in de-escalating the situation.

+

Secretary Laird added that it was + especially significant that Israel had moved in concert with Jordan and + enabled the King of Jordan to strip his border with Israel and + concentrate his forces against the Syrians.

+

The President noted that the magnificent performance of the Jordanian + armored forces was also a key factor. The President stated that it would + be difficult for him to foresee the Egyptians crossing the Canal alone + without suffering a catastrophe.

+

Minister Dayan stated that it + would be unlikely that the Egyptians would move unless they had a + guarantee of air superiority through the provision of large numbers of + Soviet aircraft but even in this instance he believed that Israeli armor + utilized properly in the desert would be ultimately decisive.

+

President Nixon stated that he + would never mislead the Prime Minister or the people of Israel. He + intended to be forthright and honest and make no promises that he would + not deliver or provide any assurances that he would not keep. He stated + that from time to time friends would disagree on particulars but that + the essence of international friendship was mutual trust. He trusted + Prime Minister Meir and + anticipated that she shared this trust in him.

+

The President added that it was quite evident to him that the American + people anticipated that Israel would move to the conference table under + the auspices of Jarring. He + pointed out that this was expected in light of the $500 million + assistance being provided by this government which he hoped would soon + be approved by the Congress.Congress passed + the supplemental foreign aid package on December 22. He + stated that it was important that the youth of Israel be permitted to + apply their great talents, ingenuity and industry to peaceful pursuits + and that for this reason the time was right to enter into the talks. He + pointed out further that Israel at this time could move with an air of + confidence since the military balance would be re-established through the current aid + package and since the overall international environment dictated such a + move. He emphasized that all responsible U.S. officials were of one mind + on this.

+

Defense Minister Dayan replied + that Israel wanted to negotiate and that last year one of the elements + of their Government resigned on this issueSee footnote 3, Document 149. + but the consensus was in favor of negotiation and it still is. He + pointed out, however, that the standstill violations posed a most + serious complication for Israel. To proceed now in the face of these + violations would be almost impossible. He added that if the U.S. could + make some commitment with respect to Israel’s future military needs, he + was confident that the talks could proceed, emphasizing however that he + was not authorized by his government to discuss these issues.

+

Minister Dayan stated that he was + concerned about the status of Israel’s air inventory since they had lost + 8 Phantoms and since the Prime Minister had requested in September a + flow of 6 Phantoms and 6 Skyhawks per month, starting in January of + 1971See Document + 162. but that no word had been received from the + U.S. side as to whether or not this request would be satisfied.

+

President Nixon asked Secretary + Laird and General Haig where this issue stood. General + Haig stated that the + Israeli arms request for 1971 was being considered at interdepartmental + level.The Senior Review Group next + considered military assistance to Israel at its meeting on January + 11, 1971; see Document 195. + Secretary Laird stated that it + would be very difficult for the U.S. to meet the request for aircraft + since it would be necessary for us to enter our own inventory to do so. + Production lines would take over a year to provide the aircraft directly + from the manufacturers.

+

Secretary Laird also pointed out + that Israel’s main requirement was for ground control equipment and that + the Department of Defense was working on a package to alleviate Israel’s + problem in this respect.

+

Minister Dayan again emphasized + that Israel’s air inventory was not adequate in the light of the heavy + weight of air assets controlled by the enemy. He knew that without some + U.S. commitments and a steady flow of replacement aircraft it would be + difficult to expect Israel to proceed with the talks under Jarring.

+

President Nixon stated that this + posed complex problems for us, that he was not familiar with the details + but that Israel must understand that the U.S., on occasion, could not + meet all of Israel’s requirements. Israel would have to rely on our + assurances and good faith which have never been found lacking.

+ +

Ambassador Rabin stated that + previous Israeli requests had sometimes run into great difficulty in + that decisions were made at the last minute and only after crises had + developed and, therefore, it was next to impossible for Israel to plan + properly and to train adequately for and maintain, as well as modify + surge shipments of equipment. It was therefore important for a steady + pipeline of material to be provided and with sufficient notification so + that past turbulence could be eliminated.

+

President Nixon restated that the + U.S. had no intention of permitting Israel to fall and that he + personally, with the full weight of this government, was fully committed + to its survival.

+

Meeting was adjourned at 4:45 p.m.

+
+ +
+ 191. Paper Prepared by the National Security Council StaffSource: National Archives, Nixon + Presidential Materials, NSC Files, + NSC Institutional Files + (H-Files), Box H–050, Senior Review Group Meetings, SRG Meeting—Jordan 12–17–70. Secret. + All brackets are in the original. + Washington, December 16, 1970. +

ANALYTICAL SUMMARY

+

MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO JORDAN

+

U.S. Options

+

The attached State Department draft memo (reviewed but not formally + cleared through Deputy Assistant Secretary Noyes in Defense)Attached + but not printed is the undated memorandum from Sisco to Kissinger. outlines as one + course of action these two steps:

+

—Approving in principle and subject to an annual US-Jordanian review the + provision over a three-year period of military equipment to Jordan as + recommended by the military survey team to facilitate the reorganization + of the Jordanian armed forces. The total value of this equipment would + amount to about $130 million roughly prorated over four years, FY71 through FY74.

+

—Replacing U.S.-manufactured equipment lost during the September civil + war and not covered in Secretary Laird’s letter of December 10Attached but not printed. [see previous + sub-tab].

+ +

If this course of action were approved, King Hussein would be informed now of the above.

+

Mr. Sisco in his covering memo to + you outlines two other possible courses:

+

—Stalling Hussein for the time + being by telling him that we are studying the survey team’s reportAccording to the December 7 report of the + Department of Defense Military Survey Team, the group went to Jordan + at the King’s request, after the fedayeen uprising in September, to + “assess Jordanian military needs resulting from a planned + reorganization of the Jordanian Arab Army, and to consider the + financial implications of that reorganization for the governments of + Jordan and the United States.” (Washington National Records Center, + ISA Files: FRC 330–73A–1975, Box 20, Jordan) urgently and + will discuss additional requirements in the near future.

+

—Telling Hussein that, because of + lack of funds, we cannot be responsive to his requests for more arms + beyond the Laird commitment + until we have obtained Congressional approval for financing.

+

These are tactical means for delaying a decision or a reply. They are not + real alternatives. The real alternative would be to decide that we are + not going to commit ourselves now to a three-year program for Jordan and + promise Hussein something less, + if anything at all. To promise something less, we would simply move down + the four increments recommended by the military survey team from the + full program to, say, the first full increment. (The Laird letter of December 10—the + “impact package” offered to Hussein—promised part of the survey team’s first + increment.)

+

In order to describe how selecting a smaller package would work, the + survey team’s options are laid out below.

+

The Survey Team’s Options

+

All options which the Survey Team developed contain two constant + components:

+

—$9.1 million in replenishment of battle losses.

+

—$30.7 million for the revised FY70 + artillery and air defense package. [This figure is down from the + original $42 million approved last spring.See Document 113. The revision + results from the fact that the proposed reorganization of the Jordanian + forces replaces some of the earlier requirements met in that package + with new ones.]

+

On top of that $39.8 million minimum, the team developed four + alternatives to the Jordanian request. These options, which build from a + minimum response up to the full Jordanian request (described below) can + be sketched as follows:

+ +

Alternative IV—$42.6 million: This is essentially + a package for providing equipment in the next 6–9 months to meet the + modernization needs of the Jordanian forces in being. [The major items + would be: 33 APC’s; 50 tanks; 40 self-propelled 155 mm. howitzers; + 15,000 M–16 rifles; 500 grenade launchers; 275 Sidewinder missiles, a + ground control radar, spares and ground equipment for the present F–104 + squadron. The Laird package of + December 10 provided some of these items: 57 APC’s; 14 M–60 A1 tanks; no + longer range guns but 42 106 mm. recoilless rifles; 16,000 M–16 rifles; + 500 grenade launchers; 80 machine guns (50 cal. and 30 cal.); promise of + a later answer on more tanks and on radar. The cost of the Laird package is about $26 + million.]

+

Alternative III—$81.5 million: This includes the + equipment under the above alternative and adds to the above the + equipment necessary to equip new units, particularly mechanized infantry + battalions and another brigade in the mechanized division. [In addition + to equipment under alternative IV, there would be 125 more APC’s; 50 + more tanks; 20 self-propelled 105 mm. howitzers.]

+

Alternative II—$117 million: This would add to + both of the above one squadron (24 aircraft) of close support/intercept + aircraft (the F–5).

+

Alternative I—$146.7 million: This represents a + paring down of the Jordanian request to represent a reasonable long + range capability objective for the Jordanian Armed Forces. The plan + would be to reach this goal in increments over a three to four year + period, starting with Alternative IV above as the first increment. + Incremental increases could follow periodic review of absorptive + capability, the threat and financial availabilities. [This would + involve, including the above increments, the following total of major + items: 288 APC’s; 100 tanks; 20 105 mm. self-propelled howitzers; 45,000 + M–16 rifles; 1500 grenade launchers; 24 F–5 aircraft; 2 C–130 + aircraft.]

+

The Jordanian Request—$186.6 million. In addition + to the equipment listed under Alternative I above, this list includes + among major items: 156 more APC’s; 50 more tanks; 20 more 105 mm. + self-propelled howitzers; 23,000 more rifles; and additional quantities + of ammunition.

+

The Issues

+

The provision of any equipment beyond that already committed presents two + key problems:

+

1. Financial. The supplemental appropriation if + passed by CongressSee footnote 4, Document 190. would + provide $30 million—just enough to cover a good part of the December 10 + package and replenishment of September. Jordan still needs another $30 + million (roughly the cost of last spring’s artillery package) in FY 71. This may require a special FY 71 supplemental bill for Jordan requesting a combination + of military assistance grant and supporting assistance. If this is not + possible, the President could approve under Section 506 of the Foreign + Assistance Act furnishing the equipment on a grant basis from Defense + stocks. [He would have to make a determination that such action is + “vital to the security of the U.S.” This would be subject to + reimbursement from subsequent military assistance appropriations.]

+

2. Political. With growing fedayeen thought about + taking over Jordan rather than destroying Israel, the longer term + commitment to Hussein would make + sense mainly if it is in the context of a major effort (a) to achieve an + Israel-Jordan settlement and (b) to settle the Palestinian problem by + working through Hussein. [This + issue is discussed in connection with the Palestinian option.]

+

The principal issue therefore is whether the U.S. + believes now is the time to make a major long-term commitment to + Hussein. The conclusion of the attached memo is that we should + make such a commitment—but in a very guarded way by subjecting it to + annual review. The approach recommended is to establish the framework of + a three-year program but to hold an annual review of Jordanian needs and + available financing.

+

The argument for this approach is that it has the + element of supporting the one element in Jordan that seems committed to + a settlement with Israel while still giving the U.S. an escape if the + situation in Jordan changes.

+

The argument against is that such a commitment + would take the U.S. one step closer to precluding any serious ties with + a Palestinian government in Jordan.

+
+ +
+ + 192. Minutes of a Senior Review Group MeetingSource: National Archives, Nixon + Presidential Materials, NSC Files, + NSC Institutional Files + (H-Files), Box H–111, Senior Review Group, SRG Minutes Originals 1970. Secret. All brackets are in + the original except “[Palestinian?]”, added + for clarity. The meeting was held in the White House Situation + Room. + Washington, December 17, + 1970, 3:15–3:55 p.m. + + SUBJECT + JORDAN + + + PARTICIPATION + Chairman—Henry A. + Kissinger + + State + + + Joseph J. Sisco + + + Talcott Seelye + + + Thomas Thornton + + William Lewis + + Defense + + + David Packard + + + G. Warren Nutter + + James S. Noyes + + + CIA + + + + Richard Helms + + David H. Blee + + JCS + + Adm. Thomas H. + Moorer + Rear Adm. William P. St. + George + + NSC + + + Harold H. Saunders + + + Jeanne W. Davis + + +

SUMMARY OF DECISIONS

+

It was agreed that the NSC staff, + working with State and Defense would prepare a compilation of all our + obligations to Jordan and the status of their implementation.The compilation took the form of a January 18, + 1971, memorandum from Rogers + to Nixon, “Recommendations + and Options Re Jordan Arms Requests,” plus annexes, which Kissinger forwarded to the + President on February 19. On March 1, Nixon initialed his approval of the recommendations. + National Security Decision Memorandum 100, issued by Kissinger to Rogers, Laird, and Helms on March 1, provided for + $141.8 million in arms to Jordan over the next three fiscal years, + plus $9.7 million to replenish battle losses. (Ibid., Box 616, + Country Files, Middle East, Jordan, Vol. VII)

+

Mr. Kissinger: We have two + problems today: the Palestinian options and the question of arms to + Jordan. The state of play of the Palestinian question is that we have + raised it with King Hussein who + said he would think it over. Were there any discussions of this when he + was here?See Document + 189.

+

Mr. Sisco: Only of a very general + nature. The Secretary told him that: 1) we had made no policy decision + favoring a separate Palestinian entity; 2) both we and, we believe, he + himself recognize that the Palestinians must be taken into account in any permanent settlement; and 3) + that we would do nothing to undermine the King—that we would take his + views into account and would work through him. I interpret this to mean + that we are keeping everything on ice. We will keep the door open + without pushing ahead.

+

Mr. Kissinger: Can we do + this?

+

Mr. Sisco: I hope so.

+

Mr. Helms: The disarray among the + Palestinians is even worse than when we talked about this earlier. It + makes all the more sense to move cautiously.

+

Mr. Kissinger: Apart from the + operational problem of what to do in response to Palestinian overtures, + the real problem from a policy point of view is whether or not we have + reached the point where we now consider that the Palestinian issue is no + longer a refugee problem.

+

Mr. Sisco: I think we have + reached this judgment. I think the King has also. We think we know what + the King is prepared to offer at the end of line: very considerable + autonomy to a Palestinian state or entity focussed primarily on the West + Bank and Gaza, provided it is done in association with Jordan, under the + umbrella of the Hashemite Kingdom, worked out in the context of the + state of Jordan rather than at the expense of Jordan.

+

Mr. Kissinger: Would this be a + totally independent Palestinian state?

+

Mr. Sisco: This is what Arafat wants—including probably + eventually part of the East Bank.

+

Mr. Packard: Dayan would concur in this.

+

Mr. Sisco: This is one time when + Jordan and Israel would be in agreement.

+

Mr. Packard: The problems arise in + trying to move from here to there.

+

Mr. Kissinger: If we agree that + such a state should be established at the end of the line, and that it + should be done through the King, aren’t we precluded from developing a + line on what we might do?

+

Mr. Sisco: We are committed to + doing it through him but we haven’t given him a veto.

+

Mr. Kissinger: If we have agreed + to work through him, we have given him a veto.

+

Mr. Sisco: Not necessarily. The + Secretary was very careful. He said we would be guided by his views but + stopped short of giving him a total veto.

+

Mr. Packard: We would have some + leverage.

+ +

Mr. Sisco: If a new development + should occur which would make it desirable for us to respond to a + Palestinian contact, we could go to the King and say “here’s what we + want to do.”

+

Mr. Kissinger: He could say + no.

+

Mr. Sisco: He could, but he + probably wouldn’t.

+

Mr. Kissinger: So you interpret + our commitment as merely to inform him first.

+

Mr. Sisco: No. We are committed + to genuine consultation, but without giving him a veto.

+

Mr. Kissinger: How can we go + about deciding for ourselves what is a desirable position for us to + take, rather than waiting for a tactical situation to develop to trigger + us into a decision on how to respond? Should we not decide what degree + of Palestinian entity is in our interest?

+

Mr. Packard: We need a more + specific idea of where we’re going.

+

Mr. Kissinger: (to Hal Saunders) What is the status of + the Palestinian paper?See Document 182. It is a good + paper.

+

Mr. Saunders: It has been + distributed to everyone here.

+

Mr. Sisco: We think the + discussion in that paper presents the most feasible and reasonable + objective: i.e., some form of Palestinian entity focused primarily on + the West Bank and Gaza, in association with the King, under the + Hashemite umbrella and in the framework of the Jordanian state. The + King’s views are similar to those in the paper. The question is how to + get there. Jordan and Israel will have to work out the various + alternatives in the course of negotiations. Our presumption is that + Israel would have to agree to a West Bank border approximating the 1967 + border.

+

Mr. Kissinger: Why do we have to + depend on that? They could state that, whatever border is finally + established, the West Bank could be automatically linked with Gaza.

+

Mr. Sisco: Theoretically yes. But + the only other theoretical possibility is the Allon LineSee footnote 8, Document + 4. which runs roughly along the Jordan River. I + can’t see setting up border posts on the Jordan River and still + approximate a Palestinian entity.

+

Mr. Packard: We should be careful + about being too specific on boundaries. Our objective is to get a + Palestinian state in association with the King. An independent state + separate from the King is not our objective.

+ +

Mr. Sisco: I agree.

+

Mr. Kissinger: Suppose the King + should accept the Allon Line? This is not our problem. It is part of the + negotiating scenario between the Palestinians and Jordan.

+

Mr. Sisco: This is why we like + the formulation “based on whatever border that can be agreed.”

+

Mr. Packard: We should look at all + the things that might give some flexibility on the borders.

+

Mr. Kissinger: The idea of + Jordanian [Palestinian?] sovereignty has its + intriguing aspects. From the Israeli point of view, a sovereign + Palestinian state would be the most worrisome. Also, the King might have + a greater interest in demilitarization of an autonomous West Bank than + of an independent West Bank. He could finesse the demilitarization + aspect through autonomy. This formula has many attractive features. The + only drawback is that it may not work.

+

Mr. Packard: Yes, but you can say + where you want to go and then try to get there.

+

Mr. Sisco: I think the next stage + of our discussion in this group should be on guarantees. We are + preparing papers on this which we will suggest be discussed in the + SRG.

+

Mr. Packard: What guarantees to + whom?

+

Mr. Sisco: On the whole peace + settlement.

+

Mr. Kissinger: If you’re talking + about the whole question of guarantees—US, Soviet, international—we + should be very sure of what we mean by guarantees.

+

Mr. Sisco: That is why I think it + should be discussed in this forum.

+

Mr. Kissinger: (to Hal Saunders) You wrote a very good + paper on this. Would you like to address any additional issues?

+

Mr. Saunders: Only that the + bridging question to the arms packages is how much we should put into + the Jordanian regime.

+

Mr. Kissinger: To summarize, the + basic Sisco formulation is for a + Palestinian entity, autonomous but linked to the Hashemite Kingdom under + general Jordanian jurisdiction, including Gaza, the West Bank and + whatever frontiers might be agreed. Are we agreed that this is + reasonable objective?

+

+ All agreed. +

+

Mr. Kissinger: So the question is + how to get there?

+

Mr. Sisco: One of the next papers + which should be addressed here is the overall strategy—how we should act + on the assumption that the talks get started in earnest after January 1. + We can talk about this on Monday,December 21. The next SRG meeting was held on January 11, + 1971; see Document 195. but we + would prefer a little more time so as to finish work on the papers.

+

Mr. Kissinger: We will keep in + touch on this. I see no particular sense in having a meeting on Monday + if the papers aren’t ready and we can probably delay it. We will talk to + you about it. If we are realistic in looking ahead, is it not probable + that an autonomous Palestine unit would become independent?

+

Mr. Sisco: Yes, in time. There + will certainly be heavy pressure in this direction. It is a calculated + risk that in four or five years it could go further. They might start + with the West Bank and Gaza, with an autonomous state linked to the + King. But unless the settlement is holding and things have improved + economically and they have got on with some development program, there + is the latent danger of Palestine irridentism with regard to the East + Bank. Any Palestine entity on the West Bank would have a flypaper + attraction to some people on the East Bank, although the bedouins and + the Palestinians on the East Bank as a whole are oriented toward + moderation. No one can guarantee this. We must consider whether or not + it is a good bet. Should we commit ourselves to the King on an arms + program over a two to three year period? My judgment is yes—that this is + the best alternative. The King is in a better position today than he was + X months ago. I think it is a good calculated risk, particularly if we + can get on with the settlement. A continued impasse would have a great + impact on the King. I think it desirable to make the commitment.

+

Mr. Packard: What would be wrong + with it? It certainly wouldn’t do any harm for the King to be + strong.

+

Mr. Kissinger: If we talk about + what might be wrong with it, let me be the devil’s advocate. What would + be the impact on the military balance in the Middle East? No matter what + we do, nothing seems to affect the military balance in the area.

+

Mr. Sisco: It wouldn’t upset the + military balance as long as we provide Israel with the wherewithal. When + Argov was told that Secretary + Laird had committed us to a + short-range provision of arms to Jordan and that we were looking at a + longer range commitment, he replied that that was interesting, that he + thought that was the right thing to do, and that Israel wanted to keep + the King as a neighbor. He said they understood that these arms might be + used against them, but they thought we had no alternative but to help + the King.

+

Mr. Helms: Also, with Nasser’s death, there is very little + strength in the area. We need to have someone strong who can hold his + own and make any agreement stick.

+ +

Mr. Kissinger: Another argument + is that the Palestinians are apt to be irridentist. If they take over + completely, which seems to be Arafat’s objective, we would be faced with an + irridentist Jordan, armed with the equipment we had provided.

+

Mr. Packard: Also, the King might + lose control of the Army to a radical group.

+

Mr. Kissinger: That is a third + possibility.

+

Mr. Sisco: The risk is there.

+

Mr. Kissinger: Are you all in + favor of the $120 million arm package?

+

Mr. Sisco: It is $130 million for + three years.

+

Mr. Seelye: Between $120 and $130 + million.

+

Mr. Sisco: This package reflects + a considerable amount of close careful coordination between State and + Defense and there is real unity of view. We operated on your expressed + conclusion that there was no real policy problem and that it was a + question of the availability of funds.

+

Mr. Kissinger: What is the + advantage of a three-year program over a year at a time?

+

Mr. Sisco: We would have an + annual review. The King is looking for some assurance. He is trying to + reorganize his Army so as to meet both the internal and external threat. + He wants a one-bite commitment to reorganize over an 18-month period. We + have three reasons for prefering the three-year program: 1) it gives a + general commitment in principle to the King and is reassuring and + psychologically beneficial; 2) the one year review permits a + reexamination of the program in the light of the existing situation; 3) + it cuts down the amount of money we would have to spend at one time. The + King has asked for $186 million over 18 months. We have proposed + $120–130 million over three years. It cuts the amount, provides for the + annual review, and gives the King a general psychological + commitment.

+

Mr. Kissinger: What exactly is he + getting from a military point of view? Are the prices realistic?

+

Mr. Packard: They are pretty + good.

+

Mr. Kissinger: What is he + getting?

+

Adm. Moorer: He is getting + increased mobility, an improved tank capability, and better internal + security equipment.

+

Mr. Kissinger: Is there a list of + weapons?

+

Mr. Sisco: Annex 2 of the + paper.The annex to the paper summarized + in Document 191.

+ +

Mr. Kissinger: How does this + compare with what he already has—in tanks, for example?

+

Mr. Packard: It upgrades his tank + capability. Also, it provides him with armored personnel carriers which + are particularly useful for internal security.

+

Mr. Kissinger: How many tanks + does he have now?

+

Mr. Noyes: About 100. Many of + them have gasoline engines, though.

+

Mr. Kissinger: So it doubles his + tank capacity.

+

Adm. Moorer: It gives him better + capability: longer range, better fire-control equipment, larger + guns.

+

Mr. Kissinger: How many tanks + does Israel have?

+

Mr. Sisco: About 1200.

+

Mr. Packard: We wouldn’t be giving + him a lot of tanks.

+

Adm. Moorer: But he could move + from Amman to the northern border without having to stop to refuel.

+

Mr. Kissinger: Would we have to + compensate Israel? They would know immediately.

+

Mr. Sisco: We will tell them what + we are doing. We told them about the $30 million package in Annex + I.“Survey Team’s Proposed USG Arms Package FY 71–FY 74,” undated; attached to the paper summarized in + Document 191. A copy is attached to Rogers’s January 11 memorandum to Nixon; see footnote 2 above. We won’t get any outcry.

+

Adm. Moorer: We needn’t worry + about the Israeli reaction.

+

Mr. Kissinger: This $30 million + is in addition to the $120 million?

+

Mr. Seelye: Not entirely. The + King asked for $186 million. We cut that to $140 plus $10 million for + replenishment of their losses, bringing it to $150 million. Secretary + Laird promised him a $30 + million package immediately. That brings it to $120 million.

+

Mr. Kissinger: We are giving them + $10 million to replace their losses? Is the $30 million on top of + this?

+

Mr. Seelye: No, some of the + replenishment is included in the $30 million.

+

Mr. Kissinger: How much?

+

Mr. Seelye: I can’t tell exactly. + The important thing is that we have cut his $186 million to $140 million + for FY 1971 equipment. If we add the $10 + million replenishment, subtract the Laird $30 million commitment, we arrive at $120 million + in addition to what we are already committed to send them.

+ +

Mr. Kissinger: Can’t we break + down the $30 million between replenishment and other equipment?

+

Mr. Noyes: We can, but not at the + moment. It is roughly 50–50.

+

Mr. Packard: For example, of the + 14 tanks, 11 are replacements.

+

Mr. Kissinger: The annual review + would give us some flexibility if there should be a dramatic change in + the situation.

+

Mr. Sisco: It also lets us + regulate deliveries.

+

Mr. Packard: And such things as + training.

+

Mr. Sisco: We would have to try + to do this with minimum American presence. The political repercussions + of a lot of Americans to do things on the ground would be very difficult + for the King.

+

Mr. Kissinger: How can we pay for + this?

+

Mr. Packard: It would come out of + next year’s budget. We are getting $30 million from the MAP supplemental.

+

Mr. Seelye: We need an additional + $30 million to finish off the requirements for FY 1971. We could go for an additional supplemental for + Jordan, a combination of MAP grant and + supporting assistance, or work through Section 506 of the Foreign + Assistance Act, taking the equipment from Defense stocks on a grant + basis. Or we could steal MAP assistance + from some other country. There is still another increment of the 1970 + package that we haven’t talked about yet. Much of this is already being + delivered and the King has paid us only $2 million.

+

Mr. Helms: We did a good piece + recently on the Jordan economy—it explains their predicament.

+

Mr. Sisco: We are trying to meet + a liquidity problem.

+

Mr. Kissinger: (to Hal Saunders) Will you put together a + paper on all our obligations to Jordan—what we are shipping under what + categories. The next step will be to get a proposal which we can + consider and then move forward to the President.

+
+ +
+ + 193. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the + Soviet UnionSource: National + Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 714, Country Files, Europe, U.S.S.R., + Vol. XI. Secret; Priority; Nodis. Drafted by Sisco, cleared by Armitage and + Atherton, and approved + by Sisco. Repeated Priority + to USUN and to Cairo, Tel Aviv, + Amman, and Nicosia. Kissinger wrote the following note on the telegram: + “Why didn’t we clear this? If Saunders can’t do it, we’ll get somebody who will. + HK.” + Washington, December 24, 1970, + 2046Z. +

209304. We suggest that you see Jarring and make following points:

+

1. We continue to expect a favorable decision from GOI to resume talks.On December 28, the Israeli Cabinet issued a + communiqué announcing Israel’s decision to resume participation in + the Jarring talks. It reads: + “The Government decided today that the present political and + military conditions enable and justify the termination of the + suspension of Israel’s participation in talks under the auspices of + Ambassador Jarring. The + Government decided to authorize the Minister for Foreign Affairs to + inform those concerned of the readiness of the Government of Israel + to resume its participation in the Jarring talks, in accordance with the basic + principles of the Government’s policy and on the basis of its + resolutions of 31 July and 4 August 1970, as approved by the + Knesset, concerning Israel’s affirmative reply to the American peace + initiative.” (Israel’s Foreign Policy: Historical + Documents, volumes 1–2, 1947–1974, Chapter XII, The War of + Attrition and the Cease Fire, Document 25) The Embassy transmitted + the text of the communiqué in telegram 7063 from Tel Aviv, December + 28. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, Box 1157, + Saunders Files, Middle East Negotiations Files, June Initiative Vol. + V) Our hope is that Jarring can get started early January.

+

2. We understand that he must prepare SYG report to SC. You should make clear to Jarring that in our view he should + resist the temptation to be critical in his report over the Israeli + delay to resume talks.Beam reported in telegram 7655 + from Moscow, December 23, that Jarring had “expressed disappointment that his + report will have to be negative toward Israel because of its + continued failure to respond” to him on the issue of resuming peace + talks. (Ibid., Box 714, Country Files, Europe, U.S.S.R., Vol. XI) + The Secretary-General’s report was released on January 4. For the + text, see Israel’s Foreign Policy: Historical + Documents, volumes 1–2, 1947–1974, Chapter XII, The War of + Attrition and the Cease Fire, Document 27. Such a judgment + would necessarily be taken as one-sided. While Jarring or the UN admittedly had no responsibility for negotiating + cease-fire/standstill, delay in resumption of the talks, regrettable as + we feel it is, cannot be unrelated to violations of the + cease-fire/standstill. We assume Jarring would not want to get into this, and therefore, + we urge him to submit briefest kind of report saying that he intends to + get on with job of negotiations between the parties.

+

3. You should explore with Jarring the desirability of an early move (if not + immediately at outset) on his part to have these talks resume at his + headquarters in Cyprus, at the Foreign Minister level. We believe this would constitute a much + more serious beginning than an exchange at the UN Representatives level.

+

4. We will want to discuss this idea further with him and will have some + concrete suggestions after his arrival in New York as to how we believe + he should proceed. You should say to him that we are prepared to play an + active role diplomatically in support of him. You should indicate to him + our feeling that we have reached the stage where he as the UN Representative will have to take + considerable initiative in assuring that there is a serious engagement + between the parties. This means formulating Qte contingent ideas Unqte, + trying them out on the parties, and insisting on specific reactions to + specific ideas. Under US June proposal Jarring has maximum latitude as to procedure he + employs.

+

5. He should know that we consider the commitments made by both sides in + the August 7th US proposal stand. This means (A) that UAR and Jordan are committed to the + principle of recognizing Israel’s right to exist as a state and to live + in peace within secure and recognized borders, and (B) that Israel has + committed itself to the principle of withdrawal in accordance with + Security Council Resolution 242.

+

6. He could start initially developing areas of agreement. We believe + much of the specific phraseology contained in October and December 1969 + US proposalsSee Documents 58 and 78. will + prove to be useful to Jarring. + For example, formulation on peace falls short of what Israelis want but + our judgment is that it would satisfy them. Equally, while peace + language goes slightly beyond where UAR + has been willing to go, we believe based on Soviet response of last + June,See Document + 34. that UAR would + buy peace formulation contained in those documents. Jordan has already + given positive indication to it. Also there should be no serious problem + re freedom of passage.

+

7. Jarring should know that we + intend to discuss the idea of guarantees in the Four Powers after his + talks begin.Yost read a statement in the January 18, 1971, + Four-Power meeting that addressed the issue of guarantees: “As I + have previously informed the other members of the group, the US + believes that it would be useful for the Four to discuss the general + question of supplementary guarantees. We strongly believe that the + question of guarantees cannot be a substitute for either serious + negotiations between the parties under Ambassador Jarring’s auspices or a binding, + contractual peace agreement containing reciprocal commitments + between the parties. I am authorized to inform you that we are + prepared to begin these discussions in the Four as soon as we are + satisfied that substantive talks under Ambassador Jarring will continue and that the + parties will concentrate upon these quiet, diplomatic efforts to + reach a settlement rather than resort to the Security Council or + other forms of public propaganda.” (Telegram 8169 to USUN, January 17; National Archives, + Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC + Files, Box 1158, Saunders Files, Middle East Negotiations Files, + Middle East Negotiations—Four Power Talks, August 13, 1970–November + 15, 1971) A summary of the meeting is in telegram 147 from USUN, January 19. (Ibid.) Our + objective in these talks will + be to provide qte a series of options unqte for Jarring to try out on the parties. We + are against the idea of a formulation which would appear to be a Four + Power imposed conclusion and judgment. None of the major powers is in a + position to foist upon any of the parties either practical security + arrangements or supplementary international guarantees which they might + not want.

+

8. You should indicate to Jarring + in clearest terms that we feel next six months are critical; that we are + sure he would agree with us that after the long period of waiting a + tremendous amount of imagination and initiative is going to be required + by him on the assumption that he is expendable if need be. Jarring will not misunderstand what we + mean by this. We know in the past Israelis have felt that Jarring’s putting forward ideas is + contrary to his mandate. We believe he must do this and it can be done + in such a way that it will avoid giving GOI valid grounds for saying that he is going beyond his + mandate by putting forward formal proposals. This is another reason for + establishing identifiable negotiating format by convening delegations on + Cyprus; since in such circumstances it would be much more difficult for + Israelis to explain suspending participation and their cooperation with + him that it would be if they could simply follow device of recalling + their UN PermRep for consultations.In telegram 7702 from Moscow, December 26, + the Embassy reported Beam’s + conversation with Jarring + that morning, during which the Special Representative said that he + would consider the Department’s recommendation that the Arab-Israeli + talks be quickly moved to Cyprus upon their resumption. Thinking + aloud, Jarring “enumerated” + the disadvantages and advantages of such a move: the disadvantages + being a lack of security and the possibility that the United Arab + Republic and Jordan would regard the change of venue as an “Israeli + maneuver to delay serious discussion and device to engage them in + direct talks” and the advantages being a “permanent negotiating + format” with special delegations and “minimal press interference.” + (Ibid., Box 714, Country Files, Europe, U.S.S.R., Vol. XI) Jarring opened indirect talks with + Israeli, Jordanian, and UAR + representatives in New York on January 5. (New + York Times, January 6, 1971, p. 1)

+

9. Anything you can elicit from Jarring on his talk with UAR Foreign Minister would obviously be helpful.

+ + + Rogers + + +
+ +
+ + 194. Paper Prepared by the National Security Council StaffSource: National Archives, Nixon + Presidential Materials, NSC Files, + NSC Institutional Files + (H-Files), Box H–050, Senior Review Group Meetings, SRG Meeting—Middle East 1–11–71. + Secret; Nodis. All brackets are in the original. + Washington, January + 8, 1971. +

ANALYTICAL SUMMARY

+

Strategy for Relating Assistance to Israel to Mid-East + Peace Negotiations

+

At the immediately following sub-tabs are two papers:The undated papers are attached but not + printed.

+

—The second (“Technical Options”) is a Defense Task Force study of the + technically feasible options in supplying aircraft to Israel.

+

—The first (“State Paper”) deals mainly with the considerations and + strategy in relating any decision on those options to negotiating + strategy.

+

What follows is a summary of (1) the technical options and considerations + (because they do provide some argument in selecting the options) and (2) + the political options in relating these to negotiations.

+

I. U.S. Supply Options

+

The Israelis have requested:

+

—54 F–4 Phantoms delivered at the rate of 3 per month January 1971 + through June 1972.

+

—120 A–4 Skyhawks as follows: 20 of the modified + A–4E (similar to the 16 now being diverted to + Israel) and 16 A–4M models to be diverted from + the initial production run of 44 aircraft ordered by the U.S. Marines. + Israel asks for delivery of these 36 planes in CY + 1971. The balance of 84 A–4Ms are + requested to be delivered as follows: 36 in 1972, 36 + in 1973, 12 in 1974.

+

The U.S. decision in December was to supply 12 + Phantoms and 20 A–4Es, thus reducing the above requests and the numbers + in the options below by those amounts. The options below are not reduced + because they still provide a sensible technical framework for + decision.

+

Phantoms

+

Technical considerations. Production time is + approximately 22 months, so any deliveries to Israel within the next 22 + months will require diversion + from presently planned production for the USAF or other buyers. There is also a long lead time on the + ground support equipment which is necessary if Israel plans to disperse + these aircraft to several bases. The USAF now has only 80% of its requirements.

+

+ Options. +

+

1. Provide the full number Israel has requested, + either on Israel’s schedule or over a longer period.

+

a. Provide 54 F–4 Phantoms by June 1972 (cost $243 million). All would + have to be diverted from the USAF and + other programs.

+

b. Provide 54 F–4 Phantoms over a 2½ year period + with delivery of four aircraft per quarter until the third quarter of CY + 1972, then 6–8 aircraft per quarter thereafter (cost $243 million). This + would soften the impact on the USAF + and ease the financial burden on Israel by lengthening the payment + period.

+

c. Provide 54 Phantoms from new procurement which would mean delivery + beginning in 22 months (cost $243 million).

+

2. Respond positively but with less than the 54 + Phantoms requested.

+

a. Provide 24 additional Phantoms at 4 per + quarter, January 1971–June 1972. This would be enough for attrition plus + a fourth squadron. (Cost: $108 million.)

+

b. Provide some variation of the above. Defense + suggests, for instance, 16 Phantoms financed by U.S. credit and 16 more + if Israel is willing to use $67 million impounded in France for the + Mirages.

+

c. Agree to replace promptly Israeli aircraft lost through attrition.

+

3. Disapprove the request for additional aircraft + but provide attrition aircraft.

+

Comment: The most promising area for discussion + seems to be 1–b above. This meets Israel’s overall need but allows for + some consideration of the needs of U.S. forces. Stretched over a longer + period, deliveries by the quarter might offer greater diplomatic + flexibility.

+

Skyhawks.

+

Technical considerations are more complex than + with the F–4 because of a shift in the models being produced.

+

The A–4E which Israel now has is no longer being + produced so providing this model requires taking planes from the U.S. + Navy as it replaces them and modifying them for Israel instead of + turning them over to Naval Reserve squadrons as now planned. Not turning + them over to the Reserve will require replacement of Reserve aircraft + with the more expensive ($1 million per plane) A–4M model. [The first + 100 Skyhawks sold to the Israelis were the A–4H. The last 16 now being + sent are the A–4E modified to be as close to the A–4H as possible.]

+ +

The A–4M is a brand new aircraft just entering + production. Adequate ground support equipment is not likely to become + available until after the production line has stabilized. Since the + first run is only 44 aircraft for the U.S. Marines, diversion to Israel + would delay deployment of this weapons system until after it had been + provided to Israeli forces. It costs $1.5 million versus $500,000 (plus + modification cost) for the A–4E.

+

+ Options +

+

1. Provide the full number requested, though + perhaps in some other combination of models or on some other + schedule.

+

a. Provide 20 A–4E (modified) and 100 A–4M as requested. (Cost: $254 million.)

+

b. Provide 66 A–4E at four per month from April + through December 1971 and three per month January through October 1972; + and 54 A–4M at three per month from November 1972 through April 1974. + This would meet Israel’s requests in terms of total number and delivery + time frame, though not in ratio between the models. However, it would + involve no disruption of A–4M programming and would be less expensive + because of the higher number of A–4Es. Additionally, the A–4M could be + configured identically to the A–4H models already in the Israeli + inventory. This course would, of course, require taking the A–4E from + Reserve squadrons with replacement at higher cost to the U.S.

+

c. Provide 20 A–4Es as requested and 12 A–4Ms at two per month starting + in July 1972. Provide up to 88 A–4Ms out of FY 72 and FY 73 + procurement.

+

2. Provide 72 A–4 aircraft—enough to replace all older French models on a + one-for-one basis. If this number were decided on, Israel would probably + want 20 A–4Es in 1971, 16 A–4Ms in 1971, and 36 A–4Ms in 1972. A number + of variations for scheduling would be possible.

+

3. Disapprove additional aircraft but agree to replace promptly with A–4Es any A–4s lost + through attrition. This would mean sale of perhaps 5 A–4Es per + year.

+

Comment: The range for discussion would seem to be + in the area of paragraph 1–b above—giving Israel a voice in deciding on + the trade-offs between model types and delivery schedules.

+

II. Political Options

+

The Sisco paper [next tab, “State + Paper”] presents four options with the arguments noted below:

+ +

+ Option 1: To say that, in present circumstances, + Israel’s needs have been generously met by our recent military + supply and financial commitments and that we will make no further + commitments unless and until Israel adopts positions and a + negotiating posture that accord with our own view of what would + constitute a reasonable and realistic approach to a settlement—i.e., + positions along the lines of our proposals of October and December + 1969.See Documents 58 and 78. +

+

The argument for this approach is that giving + anything more now than we already have would deprive us of leverage that + we will seriously need. This approach would be least abrasive in Arab + eyes.

+

The arguments against are that (a) this would + create a maximum sense of insecurity in Israel which would strengthen + the hand of the hardliners and (b) this would increase the likelihood + that most of Israel’s energies would be devoted to the military supply + question in an atmosphere of increasing tension. Past experience has + indicated that we end up giving more than we planned when we finally + give in.

+

+ Option 2: To commit ourselves now to meet Israel’s + long-term requests in substantial measure if not totally. +

+

The arguments for this approach are that (a) + Israel is more likely to be flexible when it feels secure and (b) this + would remove most bickering over arms from the U.S.-Israeli relationship + and from U.S. politics and permit total concentration on negotiation. We + are not likely to buy with a few aircraft Israeli concessions on issues + Israel regards as vital to its future. Having committed ourselves to + supply Israel’s needs, we could then put our diplomatic and military + support on the line for major changes in Israel’s position. A technical + argument for this approach is that it would make for a more orderly + supply program in the U.S. and minimize impact on U.S. forces.

+

One argument against is that the Israelis just do + not operate this way. They will take what we offer and give as little as + possible in return. Those who hold this position argue that the only way + to deal with Israelis is to bargain hard and to use leverage. Since + Israel itself has linked military supply to its return to the talks, we + should accept that linkage. Also, this would cause the sharpest Arab + reaction.

+

+ Option 3: To demand no specific quid pro quo for a + general commitment on the continuity of supply but keep Israel on a + relatively short leash by limiting future commitments to short-term + periods, e.g. for six months at a time. +

+

The argument for this approach is that it would + reduce the fears that option 1 would produce and yet preserve an element + of uncertainty in Israel about how long and in what degree it can + continue to rely on U.S. material support while persisting in policies that the U.S. considers + unsatisfactory.

+

The argument against this approach is that it + makes a period issue out of arms supply and makes it as likely as not + that we will have to deal with this in an atmosphere of tension. We have + in the past provided more under these circumstances than we would have + otherwise, and the process has been disruptive to our own force supply + patterns.

+

+ Option 4: To defer decision. +

+

The arguments for and against are essentially the arguments stated above + because deferring decision is essentially a decision against option 2, + leaving open the choice between options 1 and 3.

+
+ +
+ 195. Minutes of a Senior Review Group MeetingSource: National Archives, Nixon + Presidential Materials, NSC Files, + NSC Institutional Files + (H-Files), Box H–112, Senior Review Group, SRG Minutes (Originals) 1971. Secret. The meeting was + held in the White House Situation Room. + Washington, January 11, + 1971, 10:55–11:45 a.m. + + SUBJECT + Middle East Negotiations + + + PARTICIPANTS + Chairman—Henry A. + Kissinger + + State + + + John N. Irwin + + + Joseph Sisco + + + Alfred Atherton + + + Thomas Thornton + + + Defense + + + David Packard + + + Armistead Selden + + + James Noyes + + + JCS + + Lt. Gen. + R. Knowles + Adm. William St. + George + + + CIA + + + + Richard Helms + + David Blee + + NSC Staff + + + Harold Saunders + + Chester Crocker + + Jeanne W. Davis + + + +

SUMMARY OF DECISIONS

+

It was agreed that:

+

1. State will prepare a paper, in consultation with Defense, assuming the + negotiations will break down, assessing the military and political + situations, considering our political and military options, with some + idea of the type of settlement we might consider acceptable, and what we + mean by guarantees, with the pros and cons of various guarantee + schemes;For an analytical summary of + this paper, see Document 198.

+

2. the NSC staff will prepare a paper, + for Presidential decision, on the advantages and disadvantages of using + the Jackson Amendment for + provision of assistance to Israel as opposed to the normal foreign + military sales legislation;For the + Jackson Amendment, see + footnote 5, Document 157. The paper + was not found, but on January 28, the President directed Laird: “Pursuant to the authority + contained in the Supplemental Appropriation Act, 1971, I hereby + allocate from the appropriation for “Military credit sales to + Israel’ to the Secretary of Defense $500,000,000.00 to be expended + by said Secretary to finance the sale of defense articles and + services to Israel. I direct that the procedures for + interdepartmental consultation and coordination under the Foreign + Military Sales Act and Executive Order No. 11501, providing for + Administration of Foreign Military Sales, be followed in expending + the funds hereby allocated.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential + Materials, NSC Files, Box 608, + Country Files, Middle East, Israel, Vol. VIII)

+

3. subject to any questions Mr. Sisco might have, Defense could proceed to grant most of + the Israeli request for production assistance on a list of items;

+

4. Defense will examine alternative aircraft production plans so that our + ability to deliver aircraft to Israel will not be dictated by our + production capabilities.

+

(Before the meeting began, Mr. Noyes distributed the attached paper: Questions on U.S. Objectives and Strategy in Mid-East Peace + Negotiations)Attached but not + printed. The questions were: “Should other questions take priority + over deciding on further arms commitments to Israel? Would a + successful U.S. initiative for full diplomatic relations with UAR help de-polarize the atmosphere, + exert pressure on the Soviets, and lend credence to the + evenhandedness of the U.S. peace initiative? Would Israel perform + better during negotiations if she knows more precisely what the U.S. + expects? Should we attach conditions at the time of any further arms + commitments rather than rely solely on exerting pressure at some + future date?”

+

Mr. Kissinger: I thought we might + have a quick run-through of where we stand on various items. What about + our diplomatic situation?

+ +

Mr. Sisco: The Israelis put + forward some concrete suggestions to Jarring during his visit there.In telegram 147 from Tel Aviv, January 9, the + Embassy reported Jarring’s + 2½-hour conversation with Meir and Eban + the previous day, including the text of the proposal that Israel + handed to the Special Representative entitled “Essentials of Peace.” + (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1159, Saunders Files, + Middle East Negotiations Files, Middle East—Jarring Talks) Israel prepared + three versions of the proposal, addressed to the United Arab + Republic, Lebanon, and Jordan. (Telegram 152 from Tel Aviv, January + 10; ibid.) Jarring was in + Israel January 7–10. Their proposal outlines some of the + essential elements, from the Israeli point of view, of a peace + settlement. While it obviously falls short of where we would have to be + at the end of the line, it is a reasonable opening gambit. Jarring also judges the proposal to be + a reasonable beginning. He assured us late last evening that he is + approaching the proposal in a positive frame of mind. This is helpful, + since if he had decided that the proposal was insufficient—too little + and too late—it would have died there. He will put the proposal to the + Egyptians this afternoon. I am concerned about the Egyptian reaction. + The public statements from Cairo, particularly in the last ten days, + have been stronger than normal. Sadat could be digging himself into a hole that he would + have difficulty getting out of.

+

Mr. Kissinger: Why is he getting + himself into something that might be hard to get out of?

+

Mr. Sisco: I don’t know if he + wants to get out. Their recent public statements might reflect the fact + that the Egyptians do not feel themselves strong enough to get into the + give and take of negotiations. It raises the question of whether Egypt + can get itself in a position to enter negotiations or whether the + pressures are such that they would prefer an alternate route. Riad has + been talking to the British and French and today the Italians. They are + also sending other representatives to other capitals, particularly the + African capitals. This looks like they are preparing for a move into the + UN Security Council. The Egyptians + are emphasizing that either the Four Powers or the Security Council + should lay down an explicit view, calling for total Israeli withdrawal, + guarantees of a settlement, a solution of the Egyptian border question, + etc. If they are saying this privately, on top of their public + statements, I wonder what their reaction to the Israeli opening proposal + will be. We may be reaching a critical juncture. We may be confronted + with increased propaganda and maneuvering in the UN which will set us back.

+

Mr. Kissinger: Do I understand + correctly that Jarring is giving + the Israeli proposal to the Egyptians this afternoon, and they will + either reject it or offer a counter-proposal?

+

Mr. Sisco: Jarring will try to get a reaction + that will enable them to continue a dialogue. The Egyptians can reject + it as an instance of further Israeli delay and call for a Security Council meeting tomorrow. They + can come back with a counter-proposal. They can delay calling a SC meeting, but tell Jarring that the Israeli proposal is + not enough and that he should go back and get more. It is in our + interest to support Jarring in + putting a positive cast on the Israeli proposal. I am seeing the British + and French later today and will tell them that we think this is a + beginning. I will ask them to encourage Cairo to come back with a + counter-proposal so the negotiating process can continue.

+

Mr. Kissinger: How can the + negotiating process continue? Why is it not mathematically certain to + deadlock.

+

Mr. Sisco: The odds are certainly + very great that it will deadlock, but I would not say mathematically + certain. The odds are strongly against us. But we do have an Israeli + proposal in writing and we hope we can get something in writing from the + other side. If we assess the situation objectively, we have an Israel + which is basically reluctant to proceed with the negotiations. And we + have a situation in Cairo where the new group may think it is too weak + to come forward with a concrete proposal.

+

Mr. Kissinger: So what will + happen?

+

Mr. Sisco: I don’t think shooting + will resume on February 5 when the cease-fire expires. I think the + Egyptians will mobilize maximum pressure on us in the context of the + UN. The critical juncture will come + some time after the deadline—March or so. Resumption of Security Council + operations will not be helpful. It will provide Israel with a further + pretext (as did the General Assembly debate) for not participating + seriously, using the argument that they have put something forward and + the other side has not. If the Egyptians move to the UN, it will strengthen the Israeli argument + that Cairo is not seriously interested in negotiating and that this is + largely a propaganda exercise. This would raise some fundamental + questions on the long-range implications on the ground (how long can + violence and counter-violence be avoided?) and on the political side. + The thrust of the US position has been to try to get the parties to + negotiate. If this is not possible, we will have to make some judgement + as to who is primarily responsible. We will also have to consider + whether the time has come for the US to try to impose something in the + Four-Power context; or to decide that negotiations are not possible and + to disengage ourselves from the Four-Power context and from further US + efforts.

+

Mr. Kissinger: You are not now + thinking of anything in the Two-Power context?

+

Mr. Sisco: No. The Russian + willingness to do something in Cairo will be tested in the current + phase. While the US-Soviet alternative may be an option for us, we won’t + know until after this phase.

+ +

Mr. Kissinger: I just want to + avoid looking at this option with a six-hour deadline. How can we get + this possibility before this group for thorough, systematic + consideration? I think we are likely to be heading toward that choice. + Even if we should assume that Israel would be willing to go back to its + border with Egypt (which I don’t think will be true), we know they won’t + return to their old border with Jordan.

+

Mr. Sisco: We can prepare a paper + with Defense that makes the assumption that the negotiations will break + down and assesses the military situation on the Egyptian-Israeli front, + the diplomatic situation and our options on the political and military + side. I agree that it is about time to think about what to do if and + when the negotiations break down.

+

Mr. Kissinger: You will do the + paper?

+

Mr. Sisco: Yes.

+

Mr. Kissinger: It is probable + that the negotiations will deadlock. We need to know what the issues + are.

+

Mr. Packard: Shouldn’t we put some + effort into what we might consider acceptable? We should have some idea + of what we think.

+

Mr. Kissinger: I agree. (to Mr. + Sisco) Wasn’t there an + element of that in the papers you did a year ago?

+

Mr. Sisco: Yes.

+

Mr. Kissinger: Let’s look at it + again.

+

Mr. Packard: We’re talking about + pressure on Israel, but pressure to do what?

+

Mr. Sisco: Yes, we will consider + that in the context of the new paper.

+

Mr. Kissinger: In talking about + guarantees, I assume we mean what Israel would want as a quid pro quo + for withdrawal. But we have never had a systematic examination of the + pros and cons of the various guarantee schemes.

+

Mr. Packard: That’s a good idea. + These range all the way from a unilateral agreement to supply certain + equipment under certain contingencies to a formal alliance of some + sort.

+

Mr. Kissinger: Can we wrap all + this together? Not the immediate tactics of the negotiations, but what + happens when the negotiations deadlock; what sort of decisions we will + face, what we mean by guarantees. This is part of the question of what + settlement we might be willing to propose.

+

Mr. Irwin: We have had a long + discussion of guarantees. The question of a real political guarantee—an + alliance of some sort—has all sorts of problems.

+

Mr. Packard: Also, some other + alternatives might be more effective than the things we’ve talked + about.

+ +

Mr. Irwin: We might ask Dick + (Helms) how much farther the Soviets are willing to go in giving + military assistance to Egypt.

+

Mr. Helms: Quite far.

+

Mr. Packard: The Soviets could get + involved in two ways: in advance of an Israeli attack, or they could be + pulled in gradually in a war of attrition. I can see some advantage to + Israel to get it over with quickly, which might discourage a Soviet + response.

+

Mr. Kissinger: I agree we should + have a meeting on all these issues soon. At this meeting I merely wanted + to raise the issues of where we are going, the question of guarantees, + what sort of settlement we would consider reasonable, what we really + want if the thing takes a military course.

+

Mr. Irwin: Dave (Packard) makes a good point on the + possibility of a slow Soviet build up. Also, would the Soviets be + prepared to move in quickly on their side before we go in on the side of + Israel?

+

Mr. Kissinger: I didn’t + understand Dave to say that we would go in on the side of Israel.

+

Mr. Irwin: I didn’t mean that + that was what Dave said. However, if Israel believes that, with our + military support, they can move quickly, the Soviets might move more + quickly to keep us out. I didn’t mean to get into this abstraction.

+

Mr. Helms: It’s not all that + abstract.

+

Mr. Packard: We will have to think + about this ahead of time.

+

Mr. Kissinger: That raises the + question of the Israeli military requests.

+

Mr. Sisco: Before we go to that, + may I say a little more about guarantees based on our paper. We draw the + distinction between international guarantees and bilateral assurances. + We have established a general framework on this issue on the basis of + the President’s and the Secretary’s public statements. Assuming the + negotiations go on for a while, we have an immediate tactical question: + do we discuss the question of international guarantees in the Four-Power + context. I think yes. The Secretary has already indicated to the other + parties that such discussions would be useful. What are the elements + here?

+

First, on the political side, we have opted for the Israeli view that the + principal element of a guarantee is a peace agreement with reciprocal + obligations on both sides. Second, our October and December papers + indicated that the US would be willing to endorse such an agreement + within the meaning of the UN + resolution.See Documents 58 and 78. This + adds a political, psychological element, but is clearly of an additive + character. And third, the + willingness of the US to participate in a UN peacekeeping operation with other UN members. It would be helpful if the + Defense Department could look at this in the technical sense. State is + already looking at it from a political point of view, but it would be + helpful if Defense could look at what would be involved—how many people, + etc.

+

Mr. Kissinger: Have we examined + the relative advantages and disadvantages of a Four-Power force as + against a neutral force?

+

Mr. Sisco: Yes, we are examining + that in our political paper on the international guarantees. Also there + has to be a paper on what assurances the US can provide bilaterally. + What inducements can the US provide to persuade Israel to exchange some + territory for some international guarantees and bilateral assurances? + What sort of long-range military and financial commitment should we make + to Israel? There is also a wide range of assurances on the political + side of the US attitude in circumstances where Israel might be in + jeopardy, ranging from a formal alliance (which the President has set + aside) to simple assurance to consult.

+

Mr. Packard: We should also + consider what assurances might be justified in helping achieve a + Palestinian solution. Possible inducement to the Palestinians might be + an important key.

+

Mr. Sisco: That is a very sound + suggestion.

+

Mr. Irwin: And we should also + consider the effect of Four-Power vs. Two-Power involvement, including + the Israeli attitude toward having Soviet troops close to its + borders.

+

Mr. Kissinger: The guarantees + have to be something Israeli wants. We can’t ram both an unpalatable + settlement and unpalatable guarantees down their throats. What do we + want the guarantees to do? What do we want them to prevent? What forces + are most suitable to achieving our objectives? Let’s get some + preliminary work done on this and then have another meeting.See Document + 199.

+

On the question of arms supply, the President wants this issue out of the + way by summer for a sufficient period so as to avoid endless debate in + 1972. He wants it settled in 1971 for a period to go beyond 1972.

+

Mr. Sisco: That means that + between now and the end of June we must make a decision.

+

Mr. Kissinger: It is not in the + national interest to have an escalating debate next year on various + packages in which everyone is trying to outdo everyone else in an + election year. The President is not necessarily suggesting a high + package. He just wants it done by summer. I think this is in the + interest of a moderate policy.

+ +

Mr. Packard: We should be aware + that by not relying on the Jackson Amendment we have constrained our flexibility in + 1972.

+

Mr. Sisco: But we haven’t closed + any doors, have we?

+

Mr. Packard: By going the foreign + military sales route we avoided trouble with the committees. But the + Jackson Amendment would make + it possible for us to move more quickly with his support.

+

Mr. Kissinger: But if we used + largely the Jackson Amendment, + people will argue that we didn’t really need the money for Israel and + had tricked them into giving us the money for Cambodia.Reference is to the supplemental foreign aid + package that the White House sent to Capitol Hill on November 18, + 1970, and that Congress passed on December 22.

+

Mr. Packard: Yes, the argument was + that Israel would help carry the supplemental through. But there will be + some changes in the committees this year and we were just lucky in + getting it split away from Fulbright. We propose using both—some money for Israel + in FMS and some under the Jackson + Amendment.

+

Mr. Irwin: In earlier + discussions, Defense had suggested $300 million in Jackson money and $200 million in + FMS money. State thought we should + go the normal route since we would get into trouble with the Senate + Foreign Relations Committee. The White House, specifically OMB, took the position that it should all + be done in the normal framework of foreign military sales.

+

Mr. Kissinger: We can reopen this + question. Would this make the Jackson Amendment lapse completely?

+

Mr. Irwin: It is a question of + the attitude of Jackson versus + the attitude of the SFRC.

+

Mr. Packard: Jackson thinks we will be in worse + political trouble by not using his amendment than by using it.

+

Mr. Kissinger: This is a + political decision which the President should make.

+

Mr. Packard: I agree. If the + President hasn’t looked at it specifically, he should.

+

Mr. Kissinger: He hasn’t since + this hasn’t been a substantive issue.

+

Mr. Sisco: If we do go the + foreign military sales route, the door should be left open to go the + Jackson route.

+

Mr. Selden: Defense suggested + $300 million in the budget, with $100 tied to FMS and $200 tied to the Jackson Amendment.

+

Mr. Kissinger: I haven’t really + engaged myself in this issue.

+

Mr. Packard: If we get hung up on + the FMS bill, we may have to do + something in a hurry. This will be difficult without the Jackson + Amendment.

+ +

Mr. Irwin: If the President does + opt for the FMS route, what would + Jackson’s attitude be if we + have to go back to his amendment? Would he be annoyed?

+

Mr. Packard: Jackson says he doesn’t care + personally, but there is strong sentiment in the Senate for his + amendment. There are two sides to this, of course.

+

Mr. Irwin: I agree it is a + political question.

+

Mr. Kissinger: (to Hal Saunders) Will you do a paper on + this right away, with the pros and cons. Check it with State and Defense + and get it to San Clemente tomorrow.

+

Mr. Irwin: Our Congressional + Relations people think that if we go essentially the Jackson route, we will have difficult + problems in the Foreign Relations Committee, and possibly in the House + Foreign Affairs Committee if we give the impression of pulling away from + these committees. They also point out that the SFRC went 2–1 against + Fulbright for the + Administration on the supplemental.

+

Mr. Kissinger: Would we have the + money if we worked through Jackson?

+

Mr. Selden: We already have the + authorization.

+

Mr. Sisco: Will $300 million be + sufficient?

+

Mr. Packard: Probably not.

+

Mr. Selden: But we have an + open-ended authorization under the Jackson Amendment.

+

Mr. Kissinger: Would $100 million + be enough to keep the Jackson + Amendment alive?

+

Mr. Packard: Anything to give + recognition to the possibility of that route. It could even be a + statement that this amount might not be adequate and that we might + request additional appropriations under the authorization of the Jackson + Amendment.

+

Mr. Kissinger: That’s an + important element.

+

Mr. Packard: I would also like to + raise the Israeli request for production assistance on spare parts, etc. + We would like to go ahead on that. It seems a reasonable request.

+

Mr. Kissinger: Does anyone + oppose?

+

Mr. Sisco: Do we have a paper + that describes this process? This is a long outstanding request and I + agree in principle but I would like to see a paper. (Mr. Noyes gave Mr. Sisco and others the last two pages of + the Technical Options paper.)Summarized in + Document 194.

+ +

Mr. Packard: There are some things + on there that are very sensitive. They have asked for assistance on some + 200 items, and I think we can do most of the 200. Third-country sales by + Israel of these items would be prohibited.

+

Mr. Kissinger: Let’s say that you + could go ahead subject to any questions Joe (Sisco) might have in the next 48 + hours.

+

Mr. Sisco: It seems a sensible + thing to do.

+

Mr. Irwin: With regard to + furnishing aircraft to Israel, my concern is not for or against any + scheme of providing aircraft, but that we are sure we are not + denigrating our abilities to equip our own forces beyond what Defense + really thinks is wise.

+

Mr. Packard: The question of + aircraft availability should be a part of the long-range paper we will + be doing.

+

Mr. Kissinger: I agree it should + be part of that paper. The question is how to move this to a + decision.

+

Mr. Sisco: I think Jack + (Irwin) is raising a more + immediate question. We can say that we need not make a decision right + now. But Israel will counter with the argument that, if we do not decide + now, given our production priorities, what will happen in July? We can + see a reason to decide in the next four or five months. What does + Defense have to do with regard to production if we have to deliver these + planes? There are certain internal steps we should be taking to avoid + having to take these planes out of production for our own forces.

+

Mr. Packard: We will look at all + the alternatives.

+

Mr. Kissinger: I agree with Joe + (Sisco) that we should look + at this now so that we’re not precluded from taking a decision by + summer. We don’t want to commit ourselves to any program now, but we + want to be sure that we have all our options and that our hands are not + tied by our production capabilities. If it is to be done this year, we + should be in a position to give some assurances on military deliveries. + It might be important for us to be able to move fast. Let’s look at this + question, but in a way so Israel doesn’t get wind of it.

+

Mr. Packard: We’ll do our + best.

+

Mr. Irwin: There could be + circumstances where we might unduly draw down our own strength.

+

Mr. Packard: Some people will + think we are doing that whatever we do.

+
+ +
+ + 196. Telegram From the Department of State to the Interests Section in + the United Arab RepublicSource: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 636, Country Files, + Middle East, UAR, Vol. V. Secret; + Immediate; Nodis. Drafted by Rogers, Sisco, and Atherton and approved by Sisco. Repeated to Amman, Tel + Aviv, Beirut, USUN, London, Paris, + and Moscow. + Washington, January 14, 1971, + 2351Z. +

6930. 1. Please deliver the following written message from the Secretary + to FonMin Riad, stressing that this + is a private communication between them:

+

Quote

+

Dear Mr. Minister:

+

Reflecting on the present situation in the Middle East particularly in + the light of Mr. Bergus’ report + of his talk with you yesterday,The + Ambassador’s report of his 75-minute conversation with Riad on + January 13 is in telegram 64 from Cairo, January 14. (Ibid., Box + 637, Country Files, Middle East, UAR, Vol. VI) it occurred to me that if + circumstances only permitted it would be very worthwhile for us to sit + down for a thorough and frank discussion. As the next best thing, in the + spirit of the warm and personal relationship which has developed between + us, I am sending you this private message.

+

You indicated to Mr. Bergus, + after outlining your proposals, that you would welcome any thoughts that + I might have on an alternative course of action. I would like, + therefore, to respond to this thoughtful suggestion. In doing so, let me + again say that our only objective is to assist in any way we can in + bringing about a peace in the area that is permanent and to do this in a + way which is pursuant to and totally consistent with the Security + Council Resolution.

+

Let me start by saying that I am much concerned from what you said to Mr. + Bergus that at the very time + when negotiations under Ambassador Jarring’s auspices have finally begun and we may be on + the threshold of success that a situation is developing which would + result in failure. What do I mean by this? For the first time—and many + have worked long for this result—the Israeli Government has put forward + a proposal in indirect negotiations under Ambassador Jarring’s auspicesSee footnote 5, Document + 195. which is substantive in content and carefully + avoids setting up procedural roadblocks or difficulties. This is an + Israeli proposal which was not rpt not made known to us until after it + had been communicated to Ambassador Jarring. Obviously it does not contain—nor could you have expected—all you seek in + such an initial proposal. But it is a serious beginning. This judgment + is shared by Ambassador Jarring. + Indeed many of the points are within the framework of what we have + understood is UAR policy. Certainly it + could be the basis for a counterproposal by your government which could + lead to further meaningful substantive exchanges and this, of course, we + are pledged to support and facilitate.

+

Without presuming to advise you on how you should reply, I would only + suggest that it is important to look not only at what the Israeli + proposal says but at what it does not say as well. Viewed in this way, I + believe it will be apparent that nothing in the Israeli proposal + forecloses the position of your government on any aspect of a + settlement. In this connection, I wish to reaffirm to you that the U.S. + position remains that contained in the documents of October 28 and + December 18, 1969.See Documents 58 and 78.

+

A positive reply by the UAR would have + many advantages. It would be taken as directly responsive and reflective + of a serious intention to negotiate; a move to the Security Council on + the other hand will be taken as diversionary—and in fact would be + diversionary. It would offer further opportunity to focus in even more + specific terms in the immediate and more active next stage of the talks + on the key questions of withdrawal, borders, demilitarized zones, and + practical security arrangements. It would provide Ambassador Jarring the opportunity to make a + brief public report that serious talks were underway, that he believed + progress was being made and that the ceasefire should be renewed for an + additional period.

+

I fully understand your view that the ceasefire should not and must not + become a basis for an indefinite prolongation of the status quo. + However, I see no rpt no better way to move toward a peace settlement + which will change the status quo than for you to engage the Israeli + Government in a meaningful and substantive negotiating process. I am + convinced the opportunity now exists for such negotiations for the first + time since the June war. As you know under our initiative Ambassador + Jarring is given the + authority to hold discussions between the parties under his auspices + Innerquote according to such procedure and at such places and times as + he may recommend, taking into account as appropriate each side’s + preference as to method of procedure and previous experience between the + parties. End innerquote.The quotation is + from the U.S. initiative contained in Document 129. Thus, I + believe he has considerable freedom of action in formulating the next + stage of the negotiating process.

+ +

It would be a tragedy to miss this opportunity. As I understand it, your + idea of pressing for action by the Four Powers and the Security Council + was developed before Ambassador Jarring’s recent discussions with the Israeli + Government. I assume that you might have expected that the Israelis + would emphasize procedural matters in their talks with Ambassador + Jarring. In fact they have + not done so, and I firmly believe that to ignore this new factor in the + situation and to press for major power intervention or through the + Security Council would be a serious setback. Such a course could, in my + considered opinion, constitute a fatal blow to our own efforts to help + move the situation toward implementation of Security Council Resolution + 242.

+

I appreciate your wish to cooperate with us in the Security Council. I + fear, however, that with the best will in the world we would find + ourselves in disagreement because of factors inherent in the situation + which are well known to both of us. It is not merely a question of how a + Security Council debate is managed. The problem is more fundamental than + that, since we are persuaded that the whole concept of this approach is + the wrong way to go about helping Ambassador Jarring promote agreement between the + parties as he has been charged to do in Security Council Resolution 242. + Certainly there is nothing that could be said in a public forum that had + not been said hundreds of times before or since November 1967.

+

On the other hand, if negotiations can be pursued privately and quietly + under Ambassador Jarring’s + auspices, I believe we can look forward to the early development of a + situation in which not only can my government play an increasingly + helpful role but the Four Powers in concert can begin to make a + meaningful contribution with particular reference to the question of + guarantees and peacekeeping arrangements. I want to assure you that we + have noted the new emphasis of your policy on this key aspect of the + settlement, to which we also attach high importance.

+

I have set forth my thoughts, Mr. Minister, in the hope that we can see + the present situation in the same light and to persuade you of our + determination to move forward quickly along the course charted in the + proposal which we made and the late President Nasser so courageously accepted in + June.See footnote 4, Document 136. I cannot stress too + strongly my conviction that we are at perhaps the most critical and at + the same time hopeful point since the passage of Resolution 242—a point + where your government’s decisions will be a major factor in determining + whether 1971 is to be the year + in which a just and lasting settlement is achieved or the Middle East + set on the path toward a continuing and costly conflict.On the morning of January 15, Bergus, accompanied by Wiley, delivered the message to + Mohamed Riad, who said he would call the Foreign Minister at his + hotel in Aswan that afternoon to read the message to him. + Regardless, Riad said, the Foreign Minister would return to Cairo by + 2 p.m. the next day and would be able to give the text his full + attention at that time. (Telegram 81 from Cairo, January 15; + National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 27–14 + ARAB–ISR)

+

Sincerely,

+

+ William P. Rogers +

+

End quote.

+

2. For Amman: Would like your judgment as to + whether it will be helpful for you to draw upon the above as means to + encourage a positive Jordanian reaction to GOI paper. We hope GOJ + will see advantage in letting UAR take + lead in responding.In telegram 361 from + Amman, January 20, the Embassy reported that the Foreign Minister + was “completely in tune with Secretary’s thinking” that the time was + ripe for “quiet diplomacy.” (Ibid.)

+

3. For USUN: You + are authorized to show, but do not leave, above letter to Jarring so that he will know precisely + what it is we are telling the UAR and + will cooperate with us in his report near end of month.

+ + + Rogers + + +
+ +
+ + 197. Telegram From the Department of State to the Interests Section in + the United Arab RepublicSource: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 636, Country Files, + Middle East, UAR, Vol. V. Secret; + Exdis. Drafted by Sterner and W.B. Smitt II + (NEA/UAR); cleared by Sisco, + De Palma, and Kissinger; and approved by + Rogers. All brackets are + in the original except “[Asyut]”, added for + clarity. + Washington, January 21, 1971, + 2107Z. +

10839. Ref Cairo 2802.Telegram 2802 from + Cairo, December 28, 1970, contained Bergus’s recommendation that the United States + “respond fairly soon” to the oral message that Sadat had conveyed to Nixon on December 24, believing + that “it might be useful” for Nixon to “reply on the eve of the actual resumption + of the Jarring talks.” + (Ibid., Box 637, Country Files, Middle East, UAR, Vol. VI) After receiving no + indication of a response to Sadat’s message, Bergus wrote on January 19: “I urge Department take + another, and urgent, look at possibility President Nixon’s sending message to + Sadat along lines + suggested in my 2802 of December 28. I think Sadat’s anti-American noises have, + for the moment, abated to level where we can, with dignity, resume + dialog.” (Telegram 103 from Cairo; ibid.)

+

1. For two reasons we have felt short hiatus was desirable before + responding to Sadat’s talk with + you December 24.In his conversation with + Bergus, Sadat expressed how “deeply + touched” he had been by Nixon’s December 21 message to him, as conveyed to + him through Fawzi. He then proceeded to list the “many important + differences” between the United States and the United Arab Republic, + including the notion that the United States believed that the latter + wanted to “promote a confrontation between two superpowers in the + Middle East” and the idea that Egyptians should have behaved like + “defeated people” in the aftermath of the 1967 war. (Telegram 2798 + from Cairo, December 24, 1970; ibid. Nixon’s letter is discussed in Sadat, In Search + of Identity, pp. 277–278.) We do not want Sadat to place unreasonable + expectations upon summit dialogue as means of solving tough problems we + face. Second, we wish to underscore our unhappiness with Sadat’s own recent public statements + attacking U.S. While we are prepared to tolerate considerable + discrepancy between UAR’s public and private statements, Sadat overstepped mark in his ASU] [Asyut] + speeches.As reported in telegram 49 + from Cairo, January 11, and the New York + Times, January 12, 1971, p. 4, Sadat delivered a series of speeches in the early + part of January, at least two of which were given in the Middle Nile + town of Asyut. Bergus wrote + that Sadat criticized + Israeli-American propaganda for trying to portray the United Arab + Republic as refusing to accept continuation of the cease-fire after + February 5 and claiming that Sadat had “decided to declare war” on that day. + Sadat explained that he + had merely said that he would “not be bound” to the cease-fire after + February 5 and “would not renew it,” which he argued was “completely + different” from a declaration of war. (National Archives, Nixon + Presidential Materials, NSC Files, + Box 1159, Saunders Files, Middle East Negotiations Files, Middle + East—Jarring Talks + Edited) Because of the speeches, Sisco had told Kissinger that the Department was “holding off” on + providing a recommended message from Nixon to Sadat. Sisco + continued: “We didn’t like the President to have to send something + when this guy Sadat is + hitting us publicly.” (Transcript of a telephone conversation, + January 13, 12:07 p.m; ibid., Henry + Kissinger Telephone Conversation Transcripts, Box 3, + Chronological File) At same time, President is appreciative + of Sadat’s desire to open private + dialogue with him, and we do not believe we should close door on any channel which might improve US–UAR + relations and thus contribute to our efforts to achieve peace + settlement. Moreover, Riad’s oral reply to SecretaryAfter discussing Rogers’s letter with Sadat (see Document 196), + Riad replied to Bergus and + Wiley on January 19: + “Egypt and the United States have the same basic idea” regarding a + “peaceful settlement” based on Security Council Resolution 242. Riad + continued: “The Secretary thinks the Security Council is now + inappropriate and that we finally have a chance to achieve peace. + This means he must have something in his mind or must intend to do + something. The President and I have, therefore, decided that we can + postpone our decision to call for a Security Council meeting.” + According to Bergus, Riad + then said that the United Arab Republic could not extend the + cease-fire because, he remarked: “That can be done only on condition + that there is a serious move towards peace. We cannot allow an + indefinite continuation of the cease-fire. There is, however, a lot + of time. The big powers can do something in the next few weeks.” + (Telegram 109 from Cairo, January 19; National Archives, RG 59, + Central Files 1970–73, POL 27–14 ARAB–ISR) In a separate telegram + summarizing the meeting, Bergus wrote that the United Arab Republic hoped + that, before February 5, Israel would present a “new and substantive + response to Jarring” or that + the Four Powers would “intensify their efforts and issue public + statement covering points of substance.” (Telegram 108 from Cairo, + January 19; ibid.) set positive framework for President’s + reply.

+

2. At early and appropriate occasion you should answer Sadat orally along following lines:

+

A. President Nixon is pleased + that President Sadat has thought + it useful to communicate directly, personally, and so frankly with him. + The parties to the Arab-Israel dispute are now engaged in important and + complicated negotiations. The U.S. has pledged its willingness to give + such help as it can to the parties directly concerned. Moreover, we + believe there are other world problems as well as aspects of our + bilateral relations which might usefully be discussed at the highest + level between the two countries. We would like to assure President + Sadat that President + Nixon believes this channel + to be a useful augmentation of traditional diplomacy. We will give full + and earnest consideration to any messages that President Sadat may care to send him. We + appreciate President Sadat’s + readiness to do likewise and hope that the public tone and atmosphere of + our relations will make continuation of this dialogue possible. We think + it essential that the UAR understand + our goals and policies. Noting that President Sadat recently said on American + television that he was uncertain about what the U.S. wanted in the + Mid-East,Reference is presumably to an + interview with Sadat + conducted by James Reston of the New York + Times in Cairo on December 23, 1970. Sadat said, as reported by Reston: + “The U.S., believe it or not, I don’t know their stand up till now.” + (New York Times, December 28, 1970, p. + 1) we hope through exchanges such as this to make our views + clear.

+

B. President Sadat has spoken + frankly of the differences which separate our two govts. Such + differences do exist and are real. This does not alter the fact that we in the U.S. wish to see + a sovereign, stable, and developing Egypt living in peace in the area. + We recognize that other Arab countries feel deeply involved in Egypt’s + destiny, and that Egypt feels involved in the destiny of other Arab + states. We are impressed by the dignified and effective manner in which + the Egyptian people closed ranks after the sudden death of President + Nasser and, in accordance + with the constitutional process, chose new leadership. We are following + with sympathetic interest the efforts of President Sadat and his new govt to tackle the + problems affecting the daily lives of the citizens of the UAR. The U.S. + has cooperated with the UAR in economic + and social development in the past. The economies of our two nations are + supplementary in many respects, and we believe that there are many + helpful steps in the reconstruction of Egypt which we could take to our + mutual economic advantage.

+

C. Reconstruction requires peace. We believe that a just and lasting + peace is possible. It will not be easy. Resolving problems that have + been allowed to fester for over two decades is never easy. One of the + hardest things for any nation to do is to put aside the grievances of + the past and build for the future. But the promise of peace makes such + efforts essential.

+

D. Talks under Amb Jarring have + begun in a positive way. Secretary Rogers has recently written to FonMin Riad at length conveying our + views of the present situation, stressing his conviction, which + President Nixon shares, that the + opening of these talks presents a real opportunity to move toward a + settlement.See Document 196. It would be a tragedy, as Secretary + Rogers said in his letter, + to miss this opportunity. None of us can be sure of being able to + control the flow of events if the situation is allowed to return to + hostilities, as it almost certainly will at some point if there is not a + just and lasting peace settlement.

+

E. In one important respect President Sadat’s comments reflected a misunderstanding which + President Nixon hopes he can + dispel. The U.S. does not look upon Egyptians as a quote defeated people + unquote. The U.S. has great respect for the UAR—a civilization that has + been a force in the world for 5,000 years. (You should interject as your + personal comment that after carefully checking, Washington is unable to + find any statement by a Presidential adviser along the lines alleged by + Sadat.) Moreover, President + Nixon does not believe that + any peace settlement can be enduring if it is based on the humiliation + of one side. We do not believe Security Council Resolution 242 treats + either side as defeated, and that is why the U.S. supports it. It + provides the framework for a settlement that is honorable to both sides + and that ensures the essential + interests of both sides. We continue to give Resolution 242 our full + support and we stand by our past statements of what we believe is + entailed in that Resolution.

+

F. We do not underestimate the difficulties ahead. The critical factor is + the spirit which the parties themselves bring to the talks that are now + beginning. In a true negotiating atmosphere—one in which each side makes + a genuine effort to understand and deal with the concerns of the other + side—much can be accomplished. President Nixon wishes to assure President Sadat that the U.S. recognizes its + responsibilities if such conditions emerge.

+

G. At the same time, President Nixon hopes President Sadat will agree that after more than 20 years of + conflict the Arab side too has responsibilities. The Security Council + Resolution calls for a commitment to live at peace with Israel but + leaves much to be spelled out in terms of the practical arrangements + that will give assurance the peace will not break down. Given the + background of the past two decades, the U.S. believes it is only + reasonable for Israel to feel it has the right to hear from the Arab + states themselves as to what the specific elements of the peace will be. + President Nixon does not see how + this requirement can be construed by the Arab states as an attempt to + impose humiliating conditions upon them. To the contrary, it is a matter + of vital concern to both the Arab states and Israel, and is therefore + one of the proper subjects for the talks now in train under Amb + Jarring. We believe outside + powers can and will at the appropriate time play an important + supplementary role in helping the parties reach agreement, but we are + persuaded this cannot take the place of reciprocal undertakings worked + out by and binding on the parties themselves.

+

H. President Sadat expressed + concern that the US may misunderstand Egypt’s reasons for accepting + assistance from the USSR and may + underestimate the UAR’s independence of policy as well as the UAR’s + desire to have good relations with both the Soviet Union and the US. We + share his regret that the Mid-East problem has acquired a US-Soviet + aspect. We also share his hope that the UAR’s relations with the US can + improve. For us, the fact that the UAR + has close relations with the Soviets should not necessarily be an + impediment to concrete steps to improve US–UAR relations. At the same + time President Nixon hopes that + the global responsibilities of the U.S. will be taken into account in + Cairo; the United States cannot ignore what the Soviets do, anywhere in + the world.

+

I. In closing President Nixon + wishes to say he was heartened by President Nasser’s acceptance of our peace initiative last summer. + Despite later obstacles, we believed then and still believe that the US + and the UAR can work together for peace + on a basis of mutual interest and mutual understanding. Washington hopes + that Mr. Bergus can be in close touch with Minister Riad + to discuss the parties’ positions on various substantive issues as they + are tabled in the Jarring talks + in the coming weeks.Bergus presented Nixon’s oral message to Sadat on January 23, as reported in + telegram 145 from Cairo, January 23. Sadat first responded: “I believe President + Nixon’s message leaves + us exactly where we are.” He further remarked that the United States + was the “only power” that could “bring about a peaceful settlement” + and that it was “unrealistic to expect the parties to come together + in a negotiation.” Sadat + “would not sit alone at the same table with Israel as long as + Israeli occupation continued,” he said, explaining that he would + only negotiate with Israel “in the presence of the Big Four or the + Security Council.” Sadat + concluded with the comment that the United States Government should + not view his statements as a “final answer to President Nixon’s message” and affirmed that + the direct channel between the two of them “could be very useful.” + (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1160, Saunders Files, + Middle East Negotiations Files)

+ + + Rogers + + +
+ +
+ 198. Paper Prepared by the National Security Council StaffSource: National Archives, Nixon + Presidential Materials, NSC Files, + NSC Institutional Files + (H-Files), Box H–051, Senior Review Group Meetings, SRG Meeting—Middle East 1–25–71. + Secret; Nodis. All brackets are in the original. + Washington, January + 23, 1971. +

ANALYTICAL SUMMARY

+

Guarantees of an Arab-Israeli Settlement

+

The Papers

+

Three papers produced in an interdepartmental working group are at the + following tabs:Attached but not printed are + the three undated papers prepared by the NSC Interdepartmental Group for Near East + Affairs.

+

—“Guarantees Scenario.” This is a brief paper on + the present tactical situation explaining how commitment this week to + discuss the guarantees issue in the Four Power talks relates to + Jarring’s next step in + maintaining momentum in his talks and to the general effort to extend + the cease-fire.On January 23, the + Department sent an informational telegram to the Mission to the + United Nations outlining a “scenario” that it “envisaged pursuing + over the next two weeks or so,” including: 1) keeping the “principal + focus on negotiations between the parties”; 2) keeping “pressure on + Jarring” to maintain + momentum in his talks; 3) “joining in a Four Power announcement” + after U Thant issued his + report on Jarring’s recent + activities; and 4) sending Yost a draft of a Four-Power announcement as well as + “guidance regarding position to be taken on guarantees at subsequent + meetings.” (Telegram 12157 to USUN, January 23; ibid., Box 1160, Saunders Files, Middle + East Negotiations Files, Jarring Talks Edited, January 22–31, + 1971)

+ +

—“Issues.” This is a discussion of the more + important issues that must be looked at very carefully before the U.S. + becomes too heavily committed in any direction on participating in + guarantees. This is the paper you will want to concentrate on.

+

—“Guarantees.” This is a basic study of what kinds + of guarantees and inducements are possible. The summary below is enough + if you are pressed for time.

+

In the analytical summary below, the first and last of the papers above + are dealt with first since they describe what we are talking about. The + latter half of this summary deals with the issues raised.

+

Scenario

+

The situation is as you know it from your + discussions with Sisco at the + end of the week. These are the main elements [see tab marked “Guarantees + Scenario” for Sisco paper]:

+

—The UAR has dropped for the moment its plan to + call a UN Security Council meeting. Its + original intent was to urge the Security Council to take a position + favoring total Israeli withdrawal to spur Jarring’s effort to achieve a settlement and to give the + UAR an excuse to extend the + cease-fire on February 5. The UAR + suspended its plan on the assumption that Israel would be more + forthcoming on withdrawal, if the US planned some move or if the Four + Powers would increase their activity as pressure on Israel. The UAR has emphasized the importance to it of + big-power guarantees for a settlement.

+

—Jarring + is planning to make a report to U + Thant, possibly as early as Tuesday. The purpose of this + would be to consolidate progress to date, provide a basis for his next + round and indirectly give the UAR an + excuse for extending the cease-fire. Jarring does not at present plan himself to call for + extending the cease-fire, but U Thant appears ready to put a + cover note on Jarring’s report + doing so.

+

—The Israelis have not expressed themselves + formally on guarantees in the current talks, but their informal thoughts + are these: They hope we will not take the pressure off the UAR by giving it reason to believe that + the Four will do its work for it—that the UAR can substitute pressure by the Four on Israel for its + own negotiating concessions. The Israelis would also object to US–USSR + participation in a peacekeeping force (a) because that would put Soviet + troops on Israel’s borders and (b) the US and USSR would neutralize each other in a crisis by wanting to avoid nuclear + confrontation. The Israelis want minimal outside involvement in their + negotiations.

+

—The Four Powers are the scene of steady pressure + to discuss guarantees. The U.S. position for some time has been that the + U.S. would be prepared to discuss guarantees only when serious + negotiations between the parties were under way. On January 18, the U.S. + added the condition (uncleared here) that this discussion would take + place if the threat of an early Security Council meeting were + removed.See footnote 6, Document 193.

+

—In short, the pace is being set by Jarring’s plan to report Tuesday and + the scheduled meeting of the Four Wednesday.The January 27 Four-Power meeting “produced nothing, despite + somewhat pro-forma efforts by USSR + and France to obtain approval for different communiqués,” according + to Yost. (Telegram 240 from + USUN, January 28; National + Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 27–14, ARAB–ISR) + Sisco’s scenario, as you know, + is for the Four to respond to Jarring’s report by exhorting the parties to serious + negotiations, calling for a cease-fire extension and revealing that the + Four would discuss guarantees.

+

Options for Guarantees

+

The State Department paper with Defense contributions [see tab marked + “Guarantees”] examines the role that international guarantees and forces + or US assurances might play as an inducement to Israel to give up more + territory in a settlement than it now intends. This is thought of as + perhaps a margin of difference supplementing an Arab-Israeli agreement + in a situation where Israel is faced with a choice between (1) retention + of territory without peace and the virtually certain prospect of renewed + war and (2) a serious peace agreement involving no major retention of + territory.

+

The precise purpose of international guarantees is + the first of the issues discussed later in this summary. The State paper + describes the general purposes as:

+

—committing the major powers to desist from any inducement to the primary + signatories of an agreement to break their commitments;

+

—providing inducements for compliance and deterrents to violation;

+

—generalizing responsibility for observance of the agreement.

+

No single guarantee is likely to be persuasive to Israel. A realistic package would have to contain three + elements:

+

1. The various kinds of international guarantees + all consist of some kind of association of the international + community—particularly the major powers—with the settlement through the + UN Security Council (UNSC), probably including a commitment + to action if the agreement is broken:

+

—UNSC endorsement of the terms of a settlement under Chapter VI of the + UN Charter. Unanimous Council action + would imply that a significant breach of the settlement would lead to + international action to rectify the situation. [Chapter VI simply + authorizes the UNSC to involve itself and urge resolution of disputes by + peaceful means. This is essentially the UNSC’s diplomatic pressure + role.]

+

—UNSC endorsement under Chapter VII. This would simply imply that UNSC + action could include sanctions, including the use of military force.

+

—Four Power commitment to consult. This, comparable to the commitment in + connection with the NPT, would simply assure that the major powers would + not ignore a violation.

+

—Four Power commitment to call a UNSC meeting to discuss steps to be + taken if there is a breach of settlement.

+

2. Any of the above would have to be supplemented by arrangements on the ground. Two broad types are theoretically + possible: (a) a mission with strictly observer + functions; (b) a larger operation combining observer functions with a + real military capability. Specifically, these + are possible:

+

—Joint observer commissions of the parties with UN liaison. This would be most + acceptable to Israel, least acceptable to the Arabs and most feasible as + part of a broader arrangement (e.g. at Sharm el-Sheikh, possibly the + West Bank.).

+

—UN observer + commissions with or without liaison representatives of the + parties. The principal weakness would be lack of effective + follow-up in event of confirmed violations, as in the past. This is one + characteristic Israel has objected to in past UN observer forces. The question of composition raises + questions of U.S. and Soviet participation which are dealt with under + “issues” in the next section of this summary.

+

—Four Power peacekeeping force. This would combine + observer functions with a military capability to prevent attacks across + borders, through DMZ’s and at other key points by regular or irregular + forces. The advantage would be the four-power commitment to enforcement. + A major problem would be Israeli rejection of the stationing of Soviet + forces on Israeli borders or territory or U.S. disinterest in + introducing Soviet forces into Jordan. This would bring U.S. and Soviet + forces face to face.Kissinger placed two checkmarks + next to this paragraph.

+

—UN peacekeeping + force would have the same advantages in enforcement capability + as the above but without the disadvantages of the Soviet presence. The Israelis would not + put much faith in third-country contingents which did not commit the + U.S. and it might be difficult to find contingents willing to undertake + a potential combat role.

+

—Mixed arrangements. Different arrangements could + be used in different areas.

+

—Transitional administrative commission. + Constructing some such umbrella might provide an opportunity for Israel + to leave forces behind in some areas for a time as public security + forces over a period of perhaps five years. Since these would be mainly + in the present occupied territories, demilitarization and peacekeeping + forces could be kept away from Israeli territory for a time.

+

3. Unilateral US guarantees and commitments would + seem an indispensable part of any package. What Israel will really want + to know—especially if the US presses it to accept a settlement that + provides less than total security—is what the US will consider its + obligation to be if the peace agreements break down. Possible elements in a US commitment are:

+

—Continued military support. This is easy to + contemplate, but there could be a contradiction if and when the US and + USSR get down to discussing arms + limitation.

+

—Economic support.

+

—Mutual defense treaty. Although the Israelis + voice skepticism about the US ability to carry out such a commitment, it + is difficult to believe that Israel would thoroughly discount a formally + ratified US commitment to hold off the USSR. This might find little + support in the US today and would tend to formalize polarization of the + Mid-East.

+

—Bilateral defense consultation and planning on a + regular basis is something the Israelis have long wanted. This would, + for instance, set up a joint aircraft control system in case US carrier + aircraft were committed in Israeli skies.

+

—Congressional resolutions would strengthen any US + participation in UNSC guarantees or any executive reiteration of US + support for Israel.

+

Issues Raised

+

Choice among the above schemes raises the following key issues: [The + State paper at tab marked “Issues” discusses these issues by raising + questions. The arguments below cover essentially the same ground but in + declarative statements in pro-con format. The “tentative conclusions” + are Saunders’, formulated to + give you something to react to.]

+

1. What should be the function of a peacekeeping + force? Should it simply be an observer force, or should it have + a combat role using military force to prevent violations? The arguments for and + against a force with a military function are:

+

+ Pro. +

+

—This would seem more effective in providing security than an observer + force serving a trip-wire function.

+

—A main argument against UN forces in the + past has been that they are powerless observers with no capacity to + follow up violations with action that could deter future violations.

+

—It is possible to differentiate between a major military force and a + force with police capability. It is also conceivable that a larger force + would be desirable during withdrawal than after. Therefore, an argument + for a force with military capability during withdrawal need not be + extended to the period after withdrawal. A transitional period of some + duration might allow time for a new situation after peace to be + consolidated.

+

+ Con. +

+

—For Israel, the most significant deterrents to Arab breach of the + agreement will be Israeli freedom to use their own military forces and + assurance that the U.S. would respond to involvement of Soviet + forces.

+

—It is doubtful that any UN force could + stop a determined attacker, e.g. a surprise air attack.

+

—It is doubtful that governments could be found willing to commit forces + that could be caught between two superior forces.

+

—The U.S. would not want to endorse such a role for Soviet forces or be + involved (possibly against Israel) in that way itself.

+

—It seems unlikely that the Israelis would welcome a force most likely to + add to Arab military weight (since the Israelis would rely on their own + pre-emption rather than the UN force to + protect them).

+

—For Israel, the fact of significant US participation in a real crisis + involving the USSR is more important + than curbing local threats which they will insist on being in a position + to handle.

+

Some Tentative Conclusions:

+

—With one possible exception (Golan Heights) it would seem possible to + rely on demilitarized buffer zones to keep local forces apart. Observer + forces would be sufficient to verify absence of local forces.

+

—The threat of another war will not come from minor infractions but from + major mobilization. In that situation what would be important would be + the action to be taken by enforcing powers from outside.

+

—During withdrawal, some police force would seem necessary for a + transitional period.

+ +

2. and 3. Should Soviet forces be involved in a + peacekeeping force? Could the US expect straightforward Soviet + cooperation in a peacekeeping mission? Would not Soviet + participation legitimize permanent Soviet military presence? A + Four Power force would require Soviet participation. The arguments for and against Soviet participation are:

+

+ Pro. +

+

—Only the US and USSR have the military + capacity to stop the threatened outbreak of hostilities by force.

+

—If the Israelis trust any outsider at all, it will only be the U.S. If + the US is involved, the USSR must + be.

+

+ Con. +

+

—There would be a real possibility of paralysis of the operation through + US–USSR differences of view and Soviet veto of even minor decisions.

+

—Should a crisis arise on which the USSR and US held different views, it could be dangerous to + have US and Soviet forces in the field, although this might be minimized + by not having those forces next to each other.

+

—The Israelis would not trust the Soviets and say informally that they do + not want either the US or USSR.

+

—With the achievement of a settlement there would be a good possibility + of reduction in the Soviet military role. Participation in a UN force would legitimize this.

+

Some Tentative Conclusions:

+

—The dangers and disadvantages of Soviet involvement would seem to + outweigh the advantages. This would seem to rule out a Four Power + force.

+

—More important than a permanent peacekeeping force would be some + understanding on what international action could be taken in the event + of violation that threatened major hostilities.

+

4. Should the U.S. participate in a UN peacekeeping force?

+

+ Pro. +

+

—If Israel trusts any outsiders at all, the only presence that Israel + will regard as of any value is the American. Israel might consider this + as useful, not for the peacekeeping force itself, but as an indication + of US commitment to act if Israel is threatened.

+

+ Con. +

+

—If faced with a crisis provoked by the UAR backed by Soviet forces, the US could find itself in an + extremely risky situation from which it would be difficult to + withdraw.

+ +

—US participation would require Soviet participation, which Israel would + oppose.

+

—Since the force would be guaranteeing Arab borders, the US could end up + in open opposition to Israel.

+

—US domestic support for such involvement would be questionable.

+

Some tentative conclusions: The disadvantages of + US involvement would seem to outweigh the advantages. US assurance to + support Israel could be provided in other ways.

+

5. Can the problem of Israeli objection to UN forces be met? One purpose of + guarantees is to induce Israel to withdraw. Yet Israel has no faith in + UN forces and is firmly opposed to + the demilitarization or stationing of forces on its side of the border. + The Arabs insist on demilitarization on both sides of the borders. There + is precedent for UN observers and + control officers operating in Israel, so some token arrangement might be + worked out. There might be a way to avoid the problem altogether by + attaching international security forces to the administrative machinery + overseeing Israeli withdrawal and allowing it later to assume de facto + observer status in evacuated territory.

+

Some Tentative Overall Conclusions

+

These are Saunders’ propositions + set down solely for the sake of discussion:

+

1. The most practical point to start from is to discuss arrangements for + some sort of police force to operate during the transitional phase from + Israeli occupation to withdrawal. A medium-sized police force might over + time become a small quasi observer force.

+

2. Separation of local forces, e.g. by demilitarization of large areas + like the Sinai, is the best guarantee against accidental war. If there + is a major mobilization, it will take more than a small international + force of some kind. It will require major international action, if + anything. (1967 is an example. No normal UN force in the Sinai could have stopped the war once + Egyptian mobilization reached a point where Israel felt it necessary to + attack. Perhaps landing the 82nd Airborne Division might have had an + impact.) Therefore, what seems important is not so much the force on the + ground—except for minimal observation duties—but how the major powers + are committed to act in a crisis.

+
+ +
+ + 199. Minutes of a Senior Review Group MeetingSource: National Archives, Nixon + Presidential Materials, NSC Files, + NSC Institutional Files + (H-Files), Box H–112, Senior Review Group, SRG Minutes (Originals) 1971. Secret; Nodis. The + meeting was held in the White House Situation Room. + Washington, January 25, + 1971, 5:12–5:50 p.m. + + SUBJECT + Middle East + + + PARTICIPANTS + Chairman—Henry A. + Kissinger + + State + + + John N. Irwin + + + Joseph J. Sisco + + + Alfred L. Atherton + + + Thomas Thornton + + + Defense + + + David Packard + + + G. Warren Nutter + + James S. Noyes + + + CIA + + + + Richard Helms + + David H. Blee + + JCS + + Lt. Gen. + Richard Knowles + Adm. William St. + George + + NSC Staff + + + Harold Saunders + + + Jeanne W. Davis + + +

SUMMARY OF DECISIONS

+

It was agreed that:

+

—the Defense Department should proceed with its paper on defense + production schedules;The paper was + discussed at the next Senior Review Group meeting, held on February + 8; see Document 204.

+

—the State Department would prepare by Monday, February 1 a paper on + possible courses of action if the Jarring talks deadlock,For + an analytical summary, see Document + 202. and the SRG will + meet to discuss it on Wednesday or Thursday, February 3 or 4.

+

Mr. Kissinger: I thought we might + get together to let Joe (Sisco) + tell us where we stand.

+ +

Mr. Sisco: The negotiating + procedure has perhaps begun with the submission of individual papers by + Israel, Egypt and Jordan.For the Israeli + paper, “Essentials of Peace,” see footnote 5, + Document 195. The United Arab Republic’s paper, a response + to Israel’s, is in telegram 121 from USUN, January 15. (National Archives, Nixon + Presidential Materials, NSC Files, + Box 1159, Saunders Files, Middle East Negotiations Files, Middle + East—Jarring Talks + Edited) The text of the Jordanian paper, also a response to + Israel’s, in telegram 156 from USUN, January 19, was delivered to Jarring on January 18. + (Ibid.) The Israeli paper is substantive and related to + elements of the Security Council resolution. The Egyptian paper is + substantive also, but surrounded by polemics in its first version. + Jarring had the Egyptians + reshape their paper before giving it to the Israelis. Israel is expected + to put something further forward tomorrow.On January 27, Israel replied to the United Arab Republic’s paper, + which Jarring had conveyed + on the latter’s behalf on January 18. The text of the reply is in + telegram 237 from USUN, January + 27. Israel addressed the points raised by the United Arab Republic + in its paper, while commenting that it expected the United Arab + Republic to address “at an early stage” the points from the original + Israeli paper to which it did not refer. It dealt in various ways + with such phrases as “peace in the area,” “respect for and + acknowledgement of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and + political independence of every state in the area,” and the + “termination of all claims of belligerency,” and concluded by taking + umbrage with the use of the terms “Israeli aggression” and “policies + of territorial expansion.” (Ibid., Box 1160, Saunders Files, Middle + East Negotiations Files, Middle East—Jarring Talks Edited) Our objective now is to + get Jarring to submit a brief + report indicating a certain amount of progress. Hopefully, he can engage + the parties in the next stage, preferably at the Foreign Minister level, + but we think this is doubtful. Also, we would like to see the cease-fire + extended. We have preferred a formal extension, with statements by both + sides, hopefully for three months. Our choices, however, may be a formal + extension of the ceasefire of a shorter duration as against a de facto + extension wherein neither side resumes the shooting. Both Israeli and + Egypt have agreed there should be no resumption of the fighting. We may + be better off with a de facto extension, without a deadline. This would + avoid the recreation of a crisis every few weeks.

+

Mr. Kissinger: Which do you + prefer?

+

Mr. Sisco: Our preference has + been for the formal, three-month extension as being most satisfactory to + both sides and creating the most stable situation since both sides would + be on record. But, if the formal extension can only be achieved for a + shorter period—one month, for example—the de facto ceasefire might be + better. We have to play it by ear for the moment.

+

Regarding the papers that have been prepared for this meeting,Summarized in Document 198. we believe the + Four Powers should now begin to examine the question of international + guarantees. We have indicated informally to the Israelis that we + consider this a likely development and have asked informally for their reaction. We haven’t + presented a U.S. position, as such. We believe that if we can talk about + guarantees as supplemental to an actual agreement—not as a substitute + for negotiations but as a corollary—this would introduce a greater + degree of flexibility into the negotiating process. Our principal + problem is with the Israelis. We haven’t made any decision in favor of + any peacekeeping machinery. There has always been opposition to + international guarantees in lieu of a binding peace agreement, but in + this case the guarantees would be additive and supplementary.

+

Mr. Kissinger: What do you mean + by a binding peace agreement?

+

Mr. Sisco: That is a euphemistic + expression used instead of “peace treaty” in deference to Arab views. We + still need to have a further chat with the Israelis.

+

Mr. Kissinger: Before the Four + Power meeting?

+

Mr. Sisco: Yes, I hope to do it + tomorrow. If we can approach the subject in the Four Power meetingSee footnote 5, + Document 198. by sketching out the options for + consideration by the two parties, we will be less apt to get a strong + negative reaction from the Israelis. They will have reservations, of + course, but if our objective is to develop options for the negotiators + to consider, it might be okay. We would stress that the judgment of the + Four Powers would not be conclusive.

+

Mr. Kissinger: How can the + judgment of the Four Powers be anything other than conclusive if one of + the parties accepts it?

+

Mr. Sisco: That depends on what + the Four Power paperU.S., Soviet, and + French draft public statements were discussed at the February 4 + Four-Power meeting, but, because the four Representatives could not + reach a compromise, they decided not to make any statement at all. + According to Yost’s report + on the meeting, the Soviet and French Representatives viewed the + U.S. draft as “unacceptable” since it did not allow for a more + active Four-Power role in negotiations. Yost had said that the United States preferred not + to make a statement in the first place but could agree to a + “nonsubstantive endorsement” of U + Thant’s February 2 appeal to the parties to continue + indirect negotiations under the auspices of Jarring. In deference to the + United States, Crowe did not take a position on the differing + drafts, nor did he submit a British version. (Telegram 361 from + USUN, February 5; National + Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1158, Saunders Files, Middle East + Negotiations Files, Middle East—Jarring Talks Edited) On February 2, just before the + expiration of the cease-fire, U + Thant issued a statement that commented on Jarring’s activities since + Jarring’s report to the + Secretary-General on January 4 and urged the parties to continue the + indirect talks: “While recognizing that the resumed discussions are + still at an early stage and that much further clarification is + required, I find grounds for cautious optimism in the fact that the + parties have resumed the talks through Amb Jarring in a serious manner and + that there has been some progress in the definition of their + positions. Furthermore, the parties, who have already indicated + their willingness to carry out Res + 242 (1967), are now describing in greater detail their view of their + obligations under that resolution.” (Telegram 311 from USUN, February 2; ibid., RG 59, + Central Files 1970–73, POL 27–14 ARAB–ISR) says. We would + take the position that the principal element of guarantee is a binding peace agreement. + Political endorsement by the Four Powers in the Security Council should + be considered by the parties as additive. The parties should consider + some practical security arrangements to help keep the agreement. Here + are some alternative possibilities. We should not conclude that a + Four-Power peacekeeping force is the way to do it. We would put down a + series of alternatives for presentation to Jarring by the Four Powers for consideration by the + parties. They would be a series of options, not a conclusive judgment. + To answer Henry’s question, I think it is possible to have an expression + of views by the Four Powers without indicating a conclusive + judgment.

+

Mr. Kissinger: On the assumption + that some peacekeeping force will be required, we will be giving them + some possible alternatives. Suppose the Egyptians say they want a UN third-country force and the Israelis say + they don’t want any. What do we do then? When would we go to the Four + Powers?

+

Mr. Sisco: We should consult + Israel and await their reaction. We could go into the Four Powers near + the end of the month.

+

Mr. Kissinger: That means before + the end of the week. Would you go to the Israelis tomorrow and give them + 48 hours to react?

+

Mr. Sisco: I’d give them a few + days. The next Four Power meeting is Wednesday and we can temporize in + that meeting. There will be another meeting roughly a week hence.

+

Can we look at the headings of the Guarantees paper. On page 4, Section + III, the Four Powers would set down various alternatives. On page 10 is + one alternative that Israeli would probably buy—joint Observer + Commissions of the parties with UN + liaison. This is one of a half-dozen options, and we would leave it to + the parties to argue them out.

+

Mr. Kissinger: It would make a + difference what the forces are supposed to be controlling. If they are + to support a settlement with no demilitarized zones there would be one + set of problems. If there are demilitarized zones there is an entirely + different set of problems.

+

Mr. Sisco: The options must be + options that the parties will consider. Demilitarized zones are a key + question.

+

Mr. Kissinger: Are we for or + against demilitarized zones?

+

Mr. Sisco: In favor. We voted for + them in the November 1967 SC resolution. + We reaffirmed this in the Secretary’s and the President’s statements of + October and December 1969.See Documents 58 and 78. We have always held, however, that the location of + the zones would have to be approved by the parties. The Four Powers + would be presenting possible alternative ways to police the demilitarized zones which had + been approved by the parties.

+

Mr. Kissinger: But it’s just not + going to go that way. Everyone knows that the parties will deadlock—that + they won’t reach a settlement and won’t come to any conclusions. In + these circumstances, the Four Powers will be under increasing pressure + to be more specific. I have been trying to get this group to address the + real issues—to think about where we want to come out and develop a + strategy.

+

Mr. Packard: I agree.

+

Mr. Kissinger: This discussion + will get us through the next week. But, for example, suppose Egypt + agrees to demilitarize all of Sinai—or suppose there are fairly large + demilitarized zones only on the Arab side. Sinai would be a fairly + simple case. You wouldn’t need a large force and probably wouldn’t want + Four Power involvement. All they would need was to make sure there was + no mobilization. On the West Bank the problem would be more difficult + because of the fedayeen. If there were demilitarized zones on both + sides, assuming Israel would accept this, there would be a difficult + problem of supervision. It is very hard to separate the question of + guarantees from the nature of the settlement.

+

Mr. Sisco: You have just made an + eloquent plea for the kind of paper that is before you. We have done a + series of alternatives based on the likely situations, but they will + have to be negotiated by the parties. If they can agree on a settlement, + the nature of the agreement will probably make one of the six options + more feasible than the others.

+

Mr. Kissinger: If the parties can + agree, this is a piece of cake.

+

Mr. Sisco: We don’t think the + Four Powers can make any conclusive judgments. Israel won’t buy it. In + order to leave Israel and the Arabs with maximum flexibility, the most + we can do is present the range of alternative arrangements for the + parties to consider.

+

Mr. Packard: How useful is it to + talk about guarantees except to keep the talks going?

+

Mr. Irwin: That is the reason for + doing it.

+

Mr. Sisco: I agree. At some stage + the negotiations will reach an impasse. This paper is intended to keep + the talks going. The next paper we do will deal with what to do if the + talks deadlock: 1) disengage; 2) try to implement a Four Power + consensus; or 3) decide to go on our own with a new U.S. initiative. We + will do that paper, but the immediate task is to keep the talks alive. + We have to begin talking about guarantees in the Four Powers in a way + which will not prejudge the options if we reach an impasse.

+

Mr. Packard: That is most + important—to keep the talks going but not to foreclose the options.

+ +

Mr. Helms: We don’t know if a + Four-Power imposed settlement is the only solution if the talks + deadlock. Shouldn’t we start addressing the question of what a + settlement might actually be?

+

Mr. Kissinger: This is the point + I made at the last meeting.See Document 195. We need a general + strategy paper telling us where we think we’re going so the President + can look at it. Are there any arguments against that?

+

Mr. Sisco: I have no argument + against it. A paper of this kind is sensible and we are prepared to do + it and focus exclusively on it at the next meeting.

+

Mr. Kissinger: Suppose Israel + rejects violently any discussion of guarantees by the Four Powers on the + grounds that they won’t permit the Four to prejudge the negotiations. + Would we go ahead anyway?

+

Mr. Sisco: There will be some + measure of disagreement by Israel, but it is likely we would have to go + ahead. We would measure the Israeli reaction before making a + judgment.

+

Mr. Packard: It would help if we + had a better idea where we want to end up. We would have a better chance + of figuring out how to get there.

+

Mr. Kissinger: Are we proceeding + on the assumption that we want to get the Israeli aid request disposed + of so as not to be faced with this problem during 1972? We should be + shooting for July 1, 1971.

+

Mr. Irwin: The only question is + that of defense production schedules.

+

Mr. Packard: We may have to make a + tentative decision on the A–4s. The simplest thing to do would be to + permit the Israelis to talk to McDonnell-Douglas on contract details. + Alternatively, we might approve a small number, say 16, predicated on + keeping the production line going. Or, we could put in an order, + estimating what Israel needs, with the understanding that they would + have to forego other toys.

+

Mr. Kissinger: (to Packard) Let’s do a paper on how to + keep this option going.

+

Mr. Saunders: Defense is doing + that.

+

Mr. Sisco: The Israelis have + asked Dave (Packard) and me to + keep the options open.

+

Mr. Kissinger: Unilateral + American steps would be the most favorable to Israel and these may be + the only guarantees Israel is interested in. While there is some + advantage in vagueness in the Four Power talks, we should know where we’re going.

+

Mr. Irwin: This is sensible.

+

(5:45 p.m.—Mr. Irwin left the + meeting)

+ +

Mr. Kissinger: Are there any + guarantees not indicated in the paper that should be there? What do we + tell the Israelis?

+

Mr. Sisco: That our overall + objective is the same as theirs: to encourage negotiations and to do + nothing which would divert from the negotiations. We feel the kind of + discussion in the Four Powers we have in mind would be helpful to + Jarring in the negotiating + context. We would make it clear that we don’t see it as very useful + unless serious talks are in progress and the ceasefire is maintained. + Four Power discussion must not be substituted for the negotiating + process.

+

Mr. Kissinger: Will Israel take + this?

+

Mr. Sisco: No, we will have + problems. They will be concerned by the possibility of conclusive + judgments by the Four Powers or by substitution of the Four for the + negotiations. We are trying for a middle ground between the Israeli + position of no major power involvement at all and the Arab position of + total major power involvement to the exclusion of negotiations. We are + trying to carry water on both shoulders and I would welcome any + ideas.

+

Mr. Kissinger: There is no good + alternative now. We will schedule a meeting next week on a strategy and + the basic issues.

+

Mr. Sisco: Let’s not set a + meeting date until we have had the paper in hand for several days.

+

Mr. Kissinger: Give me a definite + date for the paper.

+

Mr. Sisco: You will have the + paper by Monday noon.February + 1.

+

Mr. Kissinger: All right; we + won’t schedule a meeting before Wednesday.

+

Mr. Packard: Let’s give more + thought to the specific outcome we want to see.

+

Mr. Sisco: That will be part of + this paper.

+

Mr. Kissinger: The paper will be + here Monday and we will meet again on Wednesday or Thursday. We all + recognize that these decisions are really fundamental and are some of + the most important the President will face.

+
+ +
+ + 200. Telegram From the Department of State to the Interests Section in + the United Arab RepublicSource: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 637, Country Files, + Middle East, UAR, Vol. VI. Secret; + Priority; Exdis. Drafted by + Sterner and Sisco, cleared by Atherton, and approved by + Rogers. Repeated + Priority to Amman and to Beirut, Tel Aviv, USUN, London, Moscow, and Paris. + Washington, January 27, 1971, + 0241Z. +

13921. For Bergus.

+

FYI. 1. We have + studied carefully your messages reporting on your conversations with + Sadat, FM Riad, and Mohammed Riad.See footnotes 2 and 7, + Document 196 and footnotes 3 and + 5, Document 197. On January 25, after + reflecting on a week of several high-level conversations with UAR officials, Bergus sent a telegram with some + conclusions regarding the United Arab Republic and the peace process. He + began by writing that the Egyptians were “mortally afraid of engaging in + any process which would be within our [the U.S.] concept of + negotiations,” which he believed represented a “culture block” between + the two countries. He argued that the United States had played all of + its “readily available cards with the Egyptians,” and that the only + person who had “the power to change the present situation” was Jarring, due to the United Arab + Republic’s fear of losing his “sympathy.” Bergus concluded that if Jarring were “willing to take bold risks on the basis of + his own expendability,” he might succeed in breaking what Bergus believed was an emerging + “impasse.” (Telegram 150 from Cairo, January 25; National Archives, + Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC + Files, Box 1160, Saunders Files, Middle East Negotiations Files, Middle + East—Jarring Talks Edited, + January 22–31, 1971) We are not surprised, but are deeply concerned over + present UAR approach. For months we + have worked long and hard to get negotiating process started. It has + begun, admittedly gingerly, preliminarily, haltingly. Parties seem to be + speaking in stutters. Nevertheless, a beginning has been made; this is + as much as could be expected.

+

2. But we are deeply concerned that UAR + may not have faced up to need for serious negotiations. As you say, + UAR is mortally afraid of engaging + in any process which would be within our concept of negotiations; but + without this central process our chances of influencing Israel are dim + indeed. We share also your judgment of unrealism of Riad’s belief that + Egypt’s best course is Quote to put pressure on us Unquote. Various + UAR reps have come to you every 48 + hours to have us produce commitment of total Israeli withdrawal to pre + June 5 lines even in circumstances where had it not been for Jarring’s sensible clean-up job, + polemical UAR paper might have resulted + in an immediate deadlock.See footnotes 4 and 5, Document 199.

+

3. UAR concept of negotiation seems to + be to pressure us to pressure Israel to give UAR what it wants: total Israeli withdrawal to pre-June 5 + lines. There seems increasing evidence that UAR concept of negotiations is of pro forma exchange while + Four Powers take on main task. + One side has committed itself to the principle of peace, and the other + side has committed itself to the principle of withdrawal; what is + required is that specific details of a peace agreement be hammered out + in serious discussions between the parties under Jarring’s auspices.

+

4. UAR notion that all that is required + is for SC Resolution to be implemented + is based on naive assumption that third party entities can do the job + for it, the Security Council, or the Four Powers laying down an ukase on + peace, withdrawal and guarantees. UAR + is apparently still unwilling to accept that best way in which US can + exercise quiet influence on Israel is within context of serious + negotiations between parties that we have spent a year producing. Four + Power imposition exercise would not be effective in producing Israel. We + continue to believe deeply that within the context of a serious exchange + between the parties, in which Jarring takes, as you suggest, greater initiative, we + can on a step-by-step and point-by-point basis best seek to develop kind + of flexibility on Israeli side which could in time lead to a peace + agreement along lines of the October/December 1969 documents.See Documents 58 and 78. We agree with Foreign Minister + Riad’s observation that we are not in fact too far apart on what we + consider to be a sensible settlement at end of line. But Riad must + understand that we cannot produce such a miracle by some preemptive + sweep of hand, that we are committed to the October–December 1969 + documents, that full cooperation and detailed participation of UAR is required in central negotiating + process if US is to play the kind of positive and constructive role it + is committed to in helping bring about a solution. Present UAR attitude seems to be that it has done + us a favor by not resorting to Security Council, by accepting US peace + initiative of last June, and by continuing ceasefire following General + Assembly consideration of the matter last December. This is not the + case; all of these steps were essential building blocks toward + settlement which UAR must realize it + needs more than us.

+

5. We know also that UAR feels that it + has already made principal concessions by recognizing Israel’s right to + exist. But fact of matter is that other side remains unconvinced that + UAR is serious about this as long + as it is unwilling to sit down (even indirectly) and to work out on a + bilateral basis specifics of peace commitment, final borders, + demilitarized zones, and practical security arrangements that would make + the difference between a real and a paper peace.

+

6. Finally, we wonder whether UAR has + entirely grasped that we are probably at most critical juncture in + peace-making effort since end of June war. If a genuine negotiating + process cannot be brought into train, our judgment is that further + efforts will not be possible for months if not the next year or two, that what would probably result in + such circumstances is another round in which the parties would bash at + each other, at minimum leaving question of political settlement in even + more elusive stage or deteriorating into something much worse.

+

7. We wanted share above thoughts and concerns with you as background to + oral message from FM Riad as given below which is obviously written in + more gentle, diplomatic tones. While we can appreciate sense of + frustration and impatience that UAR + feels, there is one point that we hope you will continue to stress: we + do not view negotiations as a device to perpetuate GOI occupation, but patient, step-by-step + negotiations are central in order to permit us to play kind of role + which could lead to a solution along the lines of the October/December + 1969 documents. We cannot play this role on the basis of falsely created + deadlines and under threats not to extend a cease-fire which is in + UAR interest. To summarize, the + simple fact is that there are 3 courses of action possible and only + three: 1) continue the status quo, 2) war or 3) negotiations leading to + peace. End FYI.

+

8. At earliest opportunity you should convey following oral message from + Secretary to Foreign Minister Riad either directly or through Muhammad + Riad.

+

9. At outset Secretary wishes to clarify report you have received + concerning his remarks to King Hussein.Reference is + presumably to remarks during the dinner for King Hussein on December 8; see footnote 5, Document 189. Purpose + of his conversation at that juncture was to illustrate need for both + sides to approach talks under Ambassador Jarring in a spirit of give and take. United States + views on peace, withdrawal, boundaries, security arrangements and all + other elements of settlement continue to be those expressed in + October–December 1969 documents and Secretary’s December 9 speech.See Document + 73.

+

10. We share your government’s desire for rapid progress toward a peace + settlement. We recognize that the status quo cannot and should not last + indefinitely. US does not consider that negotiations are a delay device + for perpetuating occupation of Arab territory. US is prepared to make an + all-out effort to help the parties reach a settlement this year. As + Secretary told Ambassador Zayyat + when he came to Washington recently, 1971 is a critical year because, + first, we sense that both sides are seriously interested for first time + in finding an alternative to war and present status quo, and second, + because if a peace settlement cannot be achieved this year there is not + likely to be as good an opportunity for many years to come.

+

11. At same time, we do not feel that progress can be made under + recurrent short deadlines. Positive US role can only be played in context of on-going, serious + negotiations between parties. This is essential for UAR to understand. With issues as complex + as ones parties face, and psychological attitudes of distrust so deeply + imbedded, progress is going to have to come step-by-step and obviously + this will take some time. We want the negotiations to proceed as rapidly + as serious dialogue between the parties on crucial issues will permit. + The pace cannot be forced artificially. Continuation of cease-fire is as + much in UAR interest as it is in + Israel’s, and it is more important to both than it is to United + States.

+

12. We believe your government’s decision not to call for a Security + Council meeting was wise, constructive, and in UAR interest. To have subjected the talks to public + discussions could only have been a setback. A start has now been made. + We have no desire to try to portray this small first step as more than + it is. On other hand, compared with steady drift toward increasingly + serious warfare that we witnessed in 1969 and first part of 1970, even + small steps, if they are in right direction, should be nurtured and + built upon.

+

13. It is our judgment that Israel has now made decision to negotiate + seriously in Jarring talks. Its + initial submission to Jarring + went directly to substance, did not raise procedural problems, and did + not contain polemics. We recognize, of course, that what parties have + said thus far in this initial exchange is not everything that other side + wants. But we believe progress can be made if both sides proceed + seriously to negotiate critical specifics. Such negotiations will not, + as your representatives have sometimes put it, qte leave the Arabs alone + with Israel unqte. The UAR is not alone + in negotiations; it is not negotiating from weakness. Major powers will + be following process closely and have a role to play in guaranteeing the + peace. Framework for a peace settlement is set forth in the Security + Council Resolution and has been further defined by discussions among the + powers. In our view that framework offers the Arabs a settlement that is + honorable.

+

14. We are aware of your government’s sensitivity on the subject of + negotiations. It was in deference to these views and only with a great + deal of effort that US succeeded in persuading Israel to drop its + insistence on face-to-face negotiations at the outset and proceed in + indirect negotiations under Ambassador Jarring. We had always assumed that once this hurdle was + overcome your government was willing to engage seriously in negotiations + under Jarring.

+

15. The Secretary does not see that the UARG need feel at a disadvantage + in the Jarring negotiations. + Both UAR and Israel have the military + strength to ensure their nation’s survival. On the other hand, neither + side has the military strength, nor is it likely to achieve this, to + impose its will on the other through military means. In our view this + not only testifies to need for negotiations but also confers fundamental + parity in a negotiating + situation. We have not given Israelis a veto over settlement; both sides + have an effective veto. Moreover, all the parties are agreed that the + final settlement must be a package deal. This means that in exploration + of what the elements of the package may be, neither side has committed + itself, neither side has lost or gained anything, until all the pieces + fall into place and are agreed upon by the parties in a final agreement. + Concerns of each side can be explored by the parties confidentially and + conditionally without prejudice to final position of each government + concerned.

+

16. Foreign Minister has asked where do matters stand? As Secretary wrote + recently to FonMin Riad,See Document 196. + if negotiations can be pursued privately and quietly under Ambassador + Jarring’s auspices, we + believe we can look forward to early development of situation in which + not only can USG play increasingly + helpful role but Four Powers in concert can begin to make meaningful + contribution on question of guarantees. Our judgment is that some + progress has already been made. We hope that Jarring will record progress made thus + far in a public report which will permit him in the next stage to + concentrate on specifics of peace, withdrawal, borders, and security + arrangements. We understand GOJ is + putting forward additional substantive ideas. We hope UAR will respond positively as we have + indicated.

+ + + Rogers + + +
+ +
+ 201. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in + JordanNational Archives, RG 59, Central + Files 1970–73, POL 27–14 ARAB–ISR. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Drafted and approved by + Sisco and cleared by + Saunders. Repeated + Priority to Kuwait, Jidda, Cairo, Tel Aviv, London, Paris, Moscow, + USUN, Beirut, Tunis, Tripoli, + Rabat, Algiers, Rome, Belgrade, Bucharest, The Hague, Brussels, and + USNATO. + Washington, January 30, 1971, + 2036Z. +

16548. For Ambassador Brown from + Sisco.

+

We request you see King Hussein + immediately and have a heart-to-heart talk with him regarding the + current situation, taking into account that we see every sign that the King is as concerned and + suspicious over present UAR policy and + course of action as we are.

+

1. You should tell King you have been instructed to see him immediately + because we need his wise counsel and advice and help. This is in the + nature of a candid and frank discussion between two close friends who + share common objectives and in the spirit of our recent talks in + Washington.See Document 189.

+

2. We are frankly puzzled and concerned as to present UAR policy which in our judgment could + court disaster. First, after months of arduous efforts on our part we + finally got the Israelis to do what the UAR asked us to do: to get a specific Israeli commitment + accepting the resolution, a commitment to the principle of withdrawal, + to indirect rather than direct negotiations, and a limited rather than + open-ended ceasefire. Secondly, the shooting stopped and the talks began + only to be broken off as a result of UAR-Soviet violations of the + ceasefire-standstill which to this day continue to be inexplicable to + us. In addition, contrary to our advice, the UAR embarked upon a General Assembly operation, in favor of + propaganda rather than private diplomacy, which further delayed the + resumption of talks and weakened our capacity to influence the Israelis. + Third, after weeks of further effort we convinced the Israelis to return + to talks despite the violations. We had no alternative, albeit + reluctantly, but to QUOTE help rectify the situation by additional + military assistance. UNQUOTE.

+

3. All of these efforts have finally brought the parties to a stage of + indirect discussions under Ambassador Jarring’s auspices. The substantive talks have started. + We do not claim any more; they only represent an initial beginning. But + it is unrealistic to have expected something more in the first stages. + The important point, which Cairo does not seem to realize, is that as a + result of developments of past few months there is genuine reassessment + of policy going on in Israel which active negotiations will further + encourage. We are persuaded that Israelis for first time have made + decision to negotiate seriously.

+

4. We are convinced, as is evidenced by the fact that the Israelis have + not thrown up any new procedural proposals and have directed their two + papers to the substance straight away without polemics and in terms that + do not foreclose any Arab position,See footnote 5, Document 195 and footnote 5, Document 199. that if + a serious proc-ess of negotiations can in fact proceed, free of threats + or use of force, flexibility will develop and the US will be in a + position to use its influence + to help bring about a settlement along the lines of the October–December + 1969 documents.See Documents 58 and 78. In + this connection, the King should know that we are standing firmly on the + positions about which the US and Jordan have had a very clear + understanding.

+

5. We are now coming very reluctantly to the view that after all of our + efforts, on the assumption that it was clearly understood that our + influence could only be played in the context of indirect negotiations + under the auspices of Ambassador Jarring, that the UAR + may not be serious about pursuing this process. Continuously in recent + weeks, her principal thrust seems to be in the direction of applying + pressure on us either by threatening use of force, a resort to the + public forum of the Security Council or a diversionary move to the Four + Powers. We cannot and will not exercise effective influence in this + context. We can exercise influence, as has been demonstrated in the + context of the June initiative of last year, while serious private + diplomacy and serious negotiations are going on between the parties. If + this process ensues, the Four simultaneously can get at question of + guarantees at appropriate early stage.

+

6. Moreover, there are signs that the UAR does not intend to formally extend the ceasefire but + rather will leave the matter in an ambiguous state. This is very + dangerous. We have had quiet and intensive discussions with the UAR in recent days and have made the point + that the ceasefire is as much in the UAR’s interest as it is in Israel’s + interest, let alone in that of the world community. We would appreciate + His Majesty’s assessment of current UAR + attitude on this coupled with the fact that we have noted in recent days + certain UAR actions which in our + judgment have been aimed directly at Jordan.

+

7. The US has only one interest in the area: to bring about a political + settlement that meets the legitimate concerns of both sides. The present + turmoil serves the interest of the Soviet Union not the US or Jordan, + and for this reason it is in our mutual interest to help bring an + immediate end to it. But we cannot do this if the UAR seems more intent upon relieving + itself of the hard decisions that negotiations require in hopes that + some third party entity, the Security Council or the Big Four or both, + can do the job for it. We do not believe this is in the UAR interest, and we feel that this course + could in the long run be injurious to our good, staunch, and courageous + friend King Hussein.

+

8. Thant and Jarring are ready to put out a report + on Monday noting that a bit of progress has been made in the opening + substantive exchanges.See footnote 8, + Document 199. + Thant also is prepared to call + for the extension of the ceasefire. We feel that this public report + creates the QUOTE new fact UNQUOTE which the UAR can use to justify both a continuation of the + substantive talks and the extension of the ceasefire for a reasonable + period, not a short, four week artificially created deadline. We hope + His Majesty by whatever means, by message or even a possible trip of his + own to Cairo, will try to influence our Egyptian friends to this end + since we are convinced it is in the UAR + interest and it will help create the conditions in which the US can play + the kind of positive and helpful role it wants to play in order to bring + about a just and lasting solution.

+

9. We realize the problem in Cairo in part is a lack of trust in us. We + note also some genuine anxiety and confusion. But the Arab-Israeli + dispute has proved intractable for twenty years. Little progress has + been made since the end of the June war. The UAR has much to gain by giving the US a reasonable + opportunity to try to help move things forward. Only the US can do this, + and we must do it in our own way. UAR + should realize that a solution cannot be brought about by some magic + wand in a period of a day or two. Only circumstances under which UAR can hope to arrive at settlement + within framework of SC Resolution and + along lines of our October and December papers is if they are willing to + proceed in manner which enables us to use our influence with Israel. + This has to be a step-by-step process, and the UAR must engage itself in the indirect negotiation process + under Jarring in a specific, + point-by-point way. Serious oral exchanges through Jarring are required to supplement + exchange of papers.

+

10. We appreciate fully, too, the UAR’s desire to have a categoric + commitment from Israel to total Israeli withdrawal to the pre-June 5 + lines. We believe the specifics of the GOI position on withdrawal and borders will come in genuine + negotiation process under Jarring’s auspices; otherwise it will not. We believe + that if the step-by-step negotiating process is pursued patiently, the + US is in a position to exercise its influence and to encourage Israel + towards a solution along the lines of the October-December 1969 + documents. We are not sure that the UAR + has grasped at what critical juncture matters presently stand. If this + opportunity which exists at the present time is lost primarily as a + result of UAR unwillingness to engage + seriously in the central process of indirect negotiations, it is likely + that the opportunity will be lost not just for a week or a month but for + a very indefinite period.

+

11. We hope you can prevail upon the King not only to weigh in with the + UAR to this end but also suggest + that he send a message to SYG encouraging the SYG to go ahead and issue + the kind of report that he is + tentatively planning for Monday. We feel Hussein’s quiet encouragement to the SYG in this regard + will be helpful.

+

12. You are also free to brief him on the substance of President + Nixon’s reply to King + Hassan.Brown met + with Hussein on January 31 to + discuss the issues raised by the Department. As a result, the King + “wrote out private, personal message” to Sadat that was supposed to have been sent that + evening. While the message did “not relate specifically” to the + Department’s concerns, which Hussein said that he shared, it was a “warning to + Sadat that Jordan + unwilling repeat mistakes of past (e.g., war) and that UAR had better re-examine its + position.” When the meeting ended, the King communicated his and the + Department’s joint concerns to Jordan’s Prime Minister, who began + working on his own letter to the United Arab Republic, which he + believed “should have some effect.” (Telegram 576 from Amman, + January 31; National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL + 27–14 ARAB–ISR) The exchange of letters between Nixon and King Hassan of Morocco presumably + concerned the recent visit of Robert Murphy to Morocco.

+ + + Rogers + + +
+ +
+ 202. Paper Prepared by the National Security Council StaffSource: National Archives, Nixon + Presidential Materials, NSC Files, + NSC Institutional Files + (H-Files), Box H–051, Senior Review Group Meetings, SRG Meeting—Middle East 2–8–71. + Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Saunders. All brackets are in the + original. + Washington, February 3, 1971. +

I. DIPLOMATIC OPTIONS IN THE FACE OF A NEGOTIATING + DEADLOCK

+

The Sisco-Atherton paper at the next tab—marked + “Diplomatic Options”Attached but not + printed is the February 1 paper entitled “Policy Options in Event of + Deadlock in the Jarring + Talks.”—is quite good, and you will want to read it through + yourself. Therefore, instead of reviewing the background with which you + are familiar, the following summary concentrates on those elements of + the paper which characterize the possible deadlock and spell out the + principal options with arguments for and against each.

+

+ The deadlock will have these two principal + elements: +

+

1. The UAR and Jordan, while having + accepted the general principle of ending belligerency and recognizing + Israel’s right to sovereign national existence, remain unwilling to + discuss in detail the obligations which they would accept in a peace settlement until + Israel first renounces any claims to territory beyond its 1949–1967 + borders.

+

2. Israel remains unwilling to discuss specific final borders until the + UAR and Jordan define those + obligations.

+

While progress must be made in both of these fronts if negotiations are + to continue, the territorial question seems the more intractable. [Saunders + comment. It would seem possible for Jarring (or the U.S.) to consolidate + positions in the current exchange of documents and past U.S. and Soviet + documents in order to reach agreement on the obligations of peace. If + the U.S. were to decide to press Israel to take a more specific position + on borders, tactically the first step might well be to take to Cairo a + consolidated statement on what obligations the UAR would assume in making “peace with Israel”—the + commitment Eban says would open + the door to discussion of refugees and borders—and press for a UAR agreement in return for a U.S. promise + to take the next step with Israel.]

+

The Sisco paper recalls that the + memos leading up to the U.S. peace initiative last June pointed out that + implicit in such an initiative was the willingness to bring Israel along + in the context of negotiations on an interpretation of the territorial + aspects of a settlement which approximated that of the USSR and the Arabs (Jerusalem being the + principal exception). The paper suggests that we may now be approaching + the point where it will be necessary to face up to that implication of + the strategy adopted in June. It concludes its introductory presentation + with the statement: “If the negotiations deadlock, the + basic issue will be the gap between the Arab and the Israeli + positions on the territorial aspects of a settlement.” The options + presented proceed from the assumption that the deadlock can only be + broken by eliminating the issue of territory and final borders + (Jerusalem and “insubstantial changes” excepted)—but not the issue + of the terms and conditions for withdrawal—from the agenda of issues + to be negotiated.

+

[Saunders + comment. This assumes, as I have commented above, that it + should be possible to get the UAR to + make the required commitments on its obligations. That is obviously + easier because, as we all know, they are paper commitments while the + Israeli concessions on borders would be concrete. State’s point, I + think, is not that the issue of borders is unrelated to the security + arrangements to be negotiated but that the negotiation, if it is to + bring the Arabs into it seriously, would have to move to the following + plane: If Israel is prepared to withdraw to essentially pre-war borders, + what security arrangements would be possible? In other words, if the + Arabs could feel they were negotiating the terms + and timing of withdrawal and not whether there + would be withdrawal, a realistic negotiation might be possible.

+

The point I will make in a comment below after summarizing Sisco’s options is that it may not be + able to persuade the Israelis all in one step to move the negotiations decisively to + that plane. To move Israel that far we would have to seek its commitment + now (as in Option 2 below) to withdraw essentially to pre-war borders. + If it is not possible for Israel to move that far all in one step, then + we must look for a shorter step, such as a partial withdrawal in return + for an interim Arab commitment to something less than total peace. There + are strong arguments against this—continued uncertainty and a built-in + deadline that would increase tension later. But it may be better than a + total breakdown in negotiations and the consequent increased likelihood + of resumed hostilities.]

+

The paper outlines two basic policy options: (1) + disengaging from an active role in pressing negotiations; (2) making a + serious effort to break the deadlock by trying to move Israel on the + territorial issue.

+

OPTION 1

+

We could decide to live with a deadlock and in effect disengage from the active role we have pursued in the past two + years in an effort to promote progress toward a settlement.

+

The disadvantages in this course would be:

+

—The Jarring talks would quickly + atrophy and soon be suspended.

+

—The cease-fire might well hold a bit longer, but the risk would + progressively increase that the UAR + would be compelled to resume the war of attrition with all of the + familiar dangers of escalation. The Soviets would be under pressure to + raise the level of their involvement.

+

—A stalemate in the peace talks and resumption of hostilities could + embolden the fedayeen to seek to recoup their losses, with an increased + threat to the regimes in Jordan and Lebanon.

+

—Tensions in U.S.-Arab relations would rise, especially if + American-supplied Israeli weaponry were being used again against Arab + territory. This would carry the risk of violence against American + installations.

+

There are three principal arguments for this + option:

+

—It would confront both Arabs and Israelis with the difficult choice + between renewed hostilities and modification of their positions on a + settlement. It might lead them to reassess their alternatives more + realistically. [Given the history of the Arab-Israeli conflict, however, + both sides without wanting war could well be unable to make the + concessions necessary to avoid it.]

+

—It would avoid the kind of serious U.S.-Israeli confrontation which + would result if we sought to move Israel toward the Arab (or even the + U.S.) position on territory. [Comment: In + Presidential decision-making terms, this is probably the more important + consideration, although Sisco + insisted on putting the above first.]

+ +

—It would avoid putting the U.S. in the position of pressing Israel to + accept a settlement in which it had no confidence. It would avoid a + situation in which, if the settlement broke down after U.S. insistence + that Israel accept it, the U.S. would have incurred serious moral + responsibility to uphold the settlement unilaterally.

+

OPTION 2

+

We could make a serious effort to break the + deadlock by steps designed to move Israel on the territorial + issue. This would involve pressing for Israeli + agreement that, with limited and specified exceptions, it will + withdraw to the pre-war line in return for contractual Arab + commitments to peace and agreed guarantees and peace-keeping + arrangements, including security arrangements at Sharm + al-Sheikh. The exceptions to total withdrawal would relate primarily to + the unfinished business of the partitions of Palestine—the status of + Jerusalem, the status of Gaza, and rectifications in the West Bank + armistice line as well as in the Golan Heights area of Syria if the + latter accepted Resolution 242. The paper identifies + two sub-options.

+

OPTION 2A

+

We could move in the Four Power talks to begin to work + out a detailed blueprint based on our 1969 documents.See Documents 58 and + 78. We would fill in the gaps in + those documents to the extent necessary to obtain agreement with respect + to guarantees of free navigation and borders, the DMZs and peace-keeping + forces, Gaza, the West Bank armistice line and Jerusalem. [Attached to + the State Department paper is a draft which illustrates the general + lines of the kind of position we might realistically aim for in this + process. This is an amalgam of the UAR-Israel and the Jordan-Israel U.S. + documents of October and December 1969 with a few more details than + before, but their main outlines are not changed. Mr. Sisco emphasizes this document is + strictly a working paper and not even intended by him as a final + product.]

+

The main argument made for this approach would be + that it would be most acceptable to the Arabs and most likely to elicit + the kind of Arab commitments on peace, navigation and refugees that + Israel has long sought.

+

The main argument against this approach would be + that it would be the most difficult of all on which to deliver Israel, + and yet failure to do so would leave us no better and probably worse off + in the area than we are now. A second major disadvantage would be that + we would be making a judgment, in opposition to Israel’s, that the final + settlement thus achieved would in fact be viable. If we pressed Israel + to accept such a settlement + against its will, we would assume a heavy responsibility to assure + Israel’s security if it broke down. [It must be remembered, however, + that we would be involved politically with Israel if any settlement broke down.] A side effect could be the end of + any hope of persuading Israel to renounce nuclear weaponry.

+

OPTION 2B

+

We could undertake steps on our own with Israel, the + Arabs, and Jarring to + generate a genuine give-and-take negotiation in the Jarring talks. The State + paper outlines three ways of going about this:

+

1. Press the UAR and + Jordan to make the first move by responding positively to the + document on “Essentials of Peace” put forward by Israel on January + 8.See footnote + 5, Document 195. [Sisco is even now—with the Israelis about to surface + another Jordan document—considering pressing Hussein to produce a document which includes the + commitments Eban wants. He would + urge Hussein to take the tack we + would like to see the UAR take. This + could produce Israeli engagement on the subjects of refugees and + Jerusalem.]

+

2. Press Israel to modify its position on the + territorial aspect of this settlement as a carrot to the Arabs to be + more forthcoming on peace and withdrawal. [This would seem the least + attractive course by itself until we get what Eban wants from the Arabs. One tactical + variant here is really to make up our minds to press Israel but go first + to the Arabs and use our decision to elicit what we need before going to + the Israelis.]

+

3. We could put to Israel and the UAR in + the first instance, and discuss with Jarring at the same time, a proposition analogous to our + June initiative. By this approach both sides would be + asked simultaneously to accept a formula in identical language + including these three components: (a) both sides would reaffirm their + acceptance of Resolution 242; (b) the UAR would accept Israel’s “essentials of peace” as a basis + for negotiating the detailed conditions for withdrawal; (c) Israel would + agree to accept the former international frontier as the final border + subject to negotiation of a package settlement.

+

The first of the preceding courses would be difficult to sell to the + Arabs and the second would be hard to sell to Israel. The third has the + difficulties inherent in both of the first two, particularly on the + Israeli side since it would cause the Israelis to face up to the main + territorial issue. It would have the advantages of simultaneity. It + would also leave the Israelis free to negotiate the timing and the + conditions for their complete withdrawal.

+ +

Saunders + Comment on Options 2A and 2B

+

Option 2A—going to the Four to negotiate a + blueprint—should be dropped. It is totally + unpalatable to the Israelis. If we want to go that route, it would have + more potential effect to go back to the US–USSR + channel. This option is not mentioned.

+

Option 2B raises the question of whether we should + try to get an Israeli commitment to near-total withdrawal now out of the + present negotiations. The three sub-variants are choices among tactics, + and realistically Sisco would + probably end up combining all three approaches if he detailed a + scenario.

+

The key question is whether we can now imagine any + presentation to Israel in which we would be in a reasonable position to + press Israel to accept near-total withdrawal. [If we were to make the + decision to go ahead on this course, I would recommend going to + Sadat first and getting as + much as possible from him.]

+

In terms of our decision-making, therefore, the next step, in my mind, is + to spell out in detail—in precise detail even with Congressional + consultation behind it—exactly what we would offer Israel in this + presentation, as well as what we would seek from Sadat.

+

As you see, I am suggesting that the time has come—if we are to choose + OPTION 2 rather than OPTION 1—for the U.S. to become the broker for a + final agreement. This would be done secretly in the first instance and + details could be negotiated under the Jarring umbrella. The end-product could be the third + tactical choice under OPTION 2B above, but it would + not be just another tactical move. [Your talking points lead up + to a proposal for putting together this package to look at.]

+

A second question is whether we can expect the + Israelis to take the full step to commitment to near-total withdrawal + all at one time. There has been enough talk about partial withdrawal + schemes from both Israelis (Dayan) and Egyptians (Amin) to make this worth talking + about. I do not necessarily advocate this as a first step, but I do + think it could offer a serious fallback. This is spelled out in greater + detail at the next tab which is marked “Third Option.”Attached but not printed is the February 3 + memorandum to Kissinger + outlining Saunders’s third + option, an “immediate fallback” position if the second option of + “pressing Israel to accept near-total withdrawal” was not + successful. This plan encompassed “partial withdrawal in return for + something less than full peace.”

+
+ +
+ + 203. Editorial Note +

On February 4, 1971, United Arab Republic President Anwar al-Sadat made a 45-minute speech + before the country’s National Assembly in which he extended the + cease-fire with Israel for 30 days and also proposed an interim + settlement that would pave the way for reopening the Suez Canal. (New York Times, February 5, 1971, page 3) + Regarding the cease-fire, he said: “We accept the appeal of the U.N. Secretary-General and decide to + refrain from opening fire for a period which we cannot make extend + beyond 30 days, ending on March 7. During this period, the + Secretary-General and the entire world community must insure that there + is genuine progress regarding the heart of the problem and not in its + outward manifestations.” While the announcement about the cease-fire’s + continuation was expected after Thant’s appeal, the proposal for reopening the Suez + Canal came as a surprise. The UAR + President declared: “During this period in which we will refrain from + opening fire, we demand that a partial withdrawal of Israeli forces on + the Eastern bank of the Suez Canal be realized as a first stage of a + timetable which will be prepared later to implement the other provisions + of the Security Council Resolution. If this is realized within this + period, we will be prepared to begin immediately to clear the Suez Canal + course and reopen it for international navigation to serve the world + economy.” (Foreign Broadcast Information Service 72, February 5; + National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1160, Saunders Files, + Middle East Negotiations Files, Middle East—Jarring Talks Edited and Indexed, February 1–7, + 1971)

+

Israeli Prime Minister Golda + Meir’s public reaction emphasized the “gravity and danger” of + Sadat’s proposal. In a + statement to the Knesset on February 9, she said, concerning a + cease-fire: “to my great regret I must state the grave truth: that the + announcement of abstention from shooting for not more than 30 days is + equivalent to a threat to renew the war on 7 March 1971. We are invited + to continue with talks in an eve-of-war atmosphere, in the shadow of an + ultimatum, and on the basis of the unrealistic claim that agreement can + be reached on such a complex subject in such a brief period.” As for + opening the Suez Canal, she said that Sadat’s “proposal, as presented in his speech, tries to + achieve a strategic advantage by the withdrawal of Israel’s forces + without actual progress towards peace. To me, it seems strange to + propose the withdrawal of our forces from the Canal outside a framework + of agreed arrangements for the absolute termination of the war.” For the + full text of her statement, see Israel’s Foreign + Policy: Historical Documents, volumes 1–2, 1947–1974, Chapter + XII, The War of Attrition and the Cease Fire, Document 29.

+
+ +
+ + 204. Minutes of a Senior Review Group MeetingSource: National Archives, Nixon + Presidential Materials, NSC Files, + NSC Institutional Files + (H-Files), Box H–112, Senior Review Group, SRG Minutes (Originals) 1971. Top Secret. The meeting + was held in the White House Situation Room. + Washington, February 8, + 1971, 5–5:18 p.m. + + SUBJECT + Middle East + + + PARTICIPATION + Chairman—Henry A. + Kissinger + + State + + + U. Alexis Johnson + + + Alfred L. Atherton + + + Thomas Thornton + + + Defense + + + David Packard + + + G. Warren Nutter + + James S. Noyes + + + CIA + + + + Richard Helms + + William Parmenter + + JCS + + Adm. Thomas H. + Moorer + Adm. William St. + George + + NSC Staff + + + Harold Saunders + + Col. Richard + Kennedy + + Jeanne W. Davis + + +

SUMMARY OF DECISIONS

+

It was agreed:

+

—that Israel should be allowed to commence negotiations for the sale of + 18 A–4s;

+

—that the State Department would prepare a paper on the combination of + pressures and promises that would be required to get Israel to withdraw + close to the 1967 borders.For an analytical + summary, see Document 207.

+

Amb. Johnson: We have a new message, as you know, and Joe Sisco is with the Secretary + discussing it. Rabin is coming + in at 5:45.During Rabin’s February 8 meeting at the + State Department, Sisco + informed the Israeli Ambassador that the United States had received + a message from Sadat + delivered by an “impeccable source” in the UAR Government. The source reported that Sadat was concerned at the “absence + of USG reaction” to his proposal on + partial withdrawal and the reopening of the Suez Canal. (See Document 203) The source added that + Sadat believed his + proposal “could take the danger out of this present situation” and + wanted to assure officials in Washington that “the proposal was not + a Cold War exercise. There was no Soviet pressure on him to make + this proposal.” Sadat asked + the United States to “exercise influence” on Israel to consider his + proposal, insisting that this was “a matter of substance.” Sisco asked Rabin that Israel provide a + “constructive, positive reaction” to Sadat’s proposal. (Telegram from Rabin to the Ministry of Foreign + Affairs, February 8; Israel State Archive, Ministry of Foreign + Affairs, 6810/8) This situation is moving so fast and in so many different directions that + these papersThe three papers were the + Department of State’s “Diplomatic Options” (see Document 202), Saunders’s “Partial Withdrawal Options,” and the + Department of Defense’s “U.S. Options in Preserving/Restoring + Ceasefire,” which are in the National Archives, Nixon Presidential + Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box + H–051, Senior Review Group Meetings, SRG Meeting—Middle East 2–8–71. are really + overtaken.

+

Mr. Kissinger: They are good + papers, but one problem is that this new overtureReference is to Sadat’s speech before the UAR National Assembly on February 4; see Document 203. may become the + dominant factor. The first option of disengagement seems purely + theoretical at this point. And the option of moving into the Four-Power + context also seems highly unrealistic.

+

Amb. Johnson: I agree.

+

Mr. Kissinger: This leaves us + with Option 2BReference is to Option 2B in + the Department of State paper summarized in Document 202. + which is basically what Jarring + is doing now.

+

Mr. Atherton: It’s really + 2B3.

+

Mr. Kissinger: (to Amb. Johnson) + Alex, what do you recommend? I hate to be in a position where we are + proceeding on purely tactical grounds without knowing what we want to + accomplish.

+

Mr. Packard: We have a different + situation here. There is no longer the solidarity among the Arabs that + formerly existed. We might try to get Israel to deal with the UAR and keep the issue related to Syria + completely separate. Also, the Jordanians have done a good job, and we + might try to isolate that aspect of the problem. We could try to move + with the UAR on the Canal first.

+

Amb. Johnson: You’re not suggesting we deal with Hussein ahead of the UAR?

+

Mr. Packard: No, we should move + first toward some pull-back to reopen the Canal. Let the Palestinian + issue sit for a while, then work on it independently. Also, the Golan + Heights problem is almost a separate issue.

+

Amb. Johnson: I agree. This is just about what we are doing.

+

Mr. Kissinger: I had intended to + steer this meeting in the direction of the paper which, as I read it, + sees the options as total Israeli withdrawal with a total Arab + commitment to full peace, or disengagement. Prior to the Sadat overture, I was going to ask if + it wouldn’t be better to try for partial Israeli withdrawal and a + partial Arab commitment. The Sadat speech gives us the opportunity to explore exactly + that.

+

(Mr. Kissinger was called from + the room)

+ +

Amb. Johnson: (to Mr. Packard) We + have no differences with you. The Sadat proposal gives us an opportunity. The Egyptians + really seem serious about this.

+

Mr. Atherton: It certainly needs + exploring, but we will have to look at the fine print.

+

(Mr. Kissinger returned)

+

Mr. Kissinger: What you want from + Rabin today is to keep + Israel from slamming the door?

+

Amb. Johnson: Yes.

+

Mr. Kissinger: I think any + formulation under Option 2 is doomed to failure. I’m sympathetic to what + we’re doing now which, of course, wasn’t available when the paper was + written. If we are agreed that this is the right strategy, let’s see + what develops. We might also reflect on what other partial schemes we + might see, now that the door is open.

+

We also have the paper on the aircraft issue.The attached paper presented options for meeting Israel’s + outstanding request for 100 A–4M Skyhawk jets and 42 F–4E Phantom + jets in such a way that minimized their procurement by Israel, + thereby giving the President flexibility in timing his decisions + without delaying their delivery.

+

Amb. Johnson: May I ask a question about this? (to Mr. Packard) Your paper indicates a need + for various amounts of money. Is there a problem of funding?

+

Mr. Packard: I don’t think so. We + can let Israel go ahead and negotiate the sale of 18 A–4s which would + keep the production line going. Israel will buy these planes.

+

Mr. Atherton: You propose to let + them negotiate for the sale of 18 of the 100 planes they have + requested—in other words, a partial go-ahead.

+

Mr. Packard: We can figure out the + funding. You may assume we can handle it.

+

Mr. Kissinger: (to Mr. Packard) You are recommending we agree + on 18?

+

Mr. Packard: Yes, I think we + should give Israel the go-ahead to start negotiations now. Essentially, + this is a commitment to let them buy A–4s.

+

Mr. Atherton: It still leaves + open the question of the other 82 A–4s.

+

Mr. Packard: Yes. We will need + another decision in 6 to 9 months to keep the line going.

+

Mr. Kissinger: We want to make + our decision by July anyhow. We certainly won’t turn down the whole + package.

+

Mr. Atherton: Why did you decide + on 18?

+ +

Mr. Packard: It was an arbitrary + number.

+

Mr. Noyes: That is one + squadron.

+

Mr. Packard: On the F–4s, we have + various alternatives in case of a crisis. We could divert them from our + own inventory, so it would be basically a problem of internal counting + in the Air Force. There is money in the ’72 budget for F–4s.

+

Mr. Kissinger: Are we all agreed + to let them go ahead on the 18 A–4s?

+

All agreed.

+

Mr. Packard: The F–4s are more of + an internal Air Force problem. We will initiate long lead-time + procurement and be prepared for the number of F–4s they will need.

+

Mr. Kissinger: Isn’t Jarring really going ahead with Option + 2B3?

+

Mr. Atherton: He is agonizing + over it.

+

Mr. Kissinger: Should we try to + get him to hold off?

+

Mr. Atherton: The two things + aren’t mutually exclusive. The danger in the partial approach is that + Israel may see it as taking pressure off them, while Sadat may have conceived it as a way of + putting pressure on Israel. If Jarring goes ahead with his proposal, the partial + approach might look good to the Israelis.

+

Mr. Kissinger: If Option 2B3 is + somewhere down the road anyway, what inducements or pressures would be + needed to get both sides, particularly the Israelis, to that point. The + negotiating process won’t do it.

+

Mr. Packard: We’d just have to + tell them.

+

Mr. Kissinger: When, and tell + them what? That we would continue to supply them? That we would give + them certain guarantees? Let’s have State do a scenario. When we reach + the point of making recommendations to Israel, what exactly would the + Secretary say to Eban.

+

Mr. Atherton: In other words, + write the talking points now.

+

Mr. Kissinger: Let’s lay out the + combination of promises and pressures that would be needed to get Israel + back close to the 1967 borders.

+

Mr. Packard: You don’t say how + close.

+

Mr. Kissinger: We can assume that + any settlement which is acceptable to the Arabs would push Israel back + further than they want to go. A partial withdrawal could happen without + or with very little American pressure. I’m thinking of the next phase—a + permanent settlement. What combination of pressures and promises would + that require?

+

Mr. Packard: That depends on what + we mean by a final solution. There are some other things that might be + viable. If there is a partial settlement and the UAR is happy, they might not be so worried + about Jordan. There might be a little flexibility and things wouldn’t + have to move so far so soon.

+ +

Mr. Atherton: At least not so + soon. It would certainly create a delay which would provide time for a + reappraisal.

+
+ +
+ 205. Telegram From the Embassy in Israel to the Department of + StateSource: National + Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1160, Saunders Files, Middle East + Negotiations Files, Middle East—Jarring Talks Edited and Indexed, February 12–18, + 1971. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Repeated Immediate to + Cairo. + Tel Aviv, February + 12, 1971, 1129Z. +

856. Department Pass USUN. Deliver to + Action Office Opening of Business.

+

1. Mrs. Meir and Eban called in Ambassador, accompanied + by DCM, morning February 12. Mrs. + Meir said she was shocked and + worried about Jarring + initiativeOn February 8, Jarring handed identical + aides-mémoire to Israeli and UAR + representatives in New York in which the Special Representative + sought to “make clear” his views on what he believed to be “the + necessary steps to be taken in order to achieve a peaceful and + accepted settlement in accordance with the provisions and principles + of Security Council Resolution 242 (1967), which the parties have + agreed to carry out in all its parts.” He continued: “I have come to + the conclusion that the only possibility of breaking the imminent + deadlock arising from the differing views of Israel and the United + Arab Republic as to the priority to be given to commitments and + undertaking—which seems to be the real cause for the present + immobility—is for me to seek from each side the parallel and + simultaneous commitments which seem to be inevitable prerequisites + of an eventual peace settlement between them.” (Ibid.) For the text + of Jarring’s aide-mémoire, + see Israel’s Foreign Policy: Historical + Documents, volumes 1–2, 1947–1974, Chapter XII, The War of + Attrition and the Cease Fire, Document 28. and deeply + concerned because she thought difficulty lay with State Department + rather than simply with Jarring. + As GOI had now learned from summary of + exchange of messages with UAR, USG had + reiterated its continued support for “Rogers plans” of 1969. Mrs. Meir felt this was contrary to assurances given her, + most recently in President’s message of December 4, 1970,Document 187. that USG would leave negotiations to parties and not intervene. + Moreover, while she did not know whether US–UAR messages had been made + available to Jarring by USG or Egyptians, or whether Jarring had consulted USG about his proposed initiative, it + seemed clear to her that he would never have taken initiative except for + knowledge that USG stood by 1969 plans + and that Egyptians were counting on that.

+

2. Ambassador took strong exception and pointed out USG had continuously reiterated to all + concerned that its policy remained as outlined in 1969 papers and we had given no commitment + either to change fundamental position or to refrain from stating that it + still valid. Pointed out we supported idea that negotiations must be + between parties but had not tied our hands or hidden belief that we + would continue to be of assistance to parties as negotiations proceeded. + Stated he did not know whether USG had + apprised Jarring of exchanges + with Egyptians or whether Jarring had consulted or informed anyone in advance of + his proposed paper to parties, but doubted that USG had had any foreknowledge. Called on Mrs. Meir to continue smoking out Egyptians + and not to make any negative reply to Jarring paper.

+

3. Mrs. Meir said GOI position was that it still awaiting + simple reply from UAR to simple + question of whether, under any circumstances, UAR prepared to make binding peace with Israel. In absence + such reply from UAR, she said, GOI + would not “take even one more step” and would not take any action on + Jarring paper.

+

4. Mrs. Meir also raised + discussion of guarantees and reiterated strong Israeli opposition.After reading Meir’s complaints regarding Jarring’s initiative, Yost wrote: “I am afraid that, if + we wish to preserve the negotiating process under Jarring as the main vehicle for a + ME political settlement, as the + GOI has so long desired, we + must speak urgently and very frankly indeed to Mrs. Meir and Eban. The conversation reported + reftel [telegram 877 from Tel Aviv; see footnote 5 below] reflects such a preoccupation with + their own grievances and such an absence of perception of the true + situation that I despair of keeping negotiations going more than few + more weeks unless there is a fundamental change in the GOI approach.” (Telegram 446 from + USUN, February 13; National + Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1160, Saunders Files, Middle East + Negotiations Files, Middle East—Jarring Talks Edited and Indexed, February 12–18, + 1971)

+

5. Details by septel.Telegram 877 from Tel + Aviv, February 12. (Ibid., RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 27–14 + ARAB–ISR)

+ + + Barbour + + +
+ +
+ + 206. Telegram From the Department of State to the Interests Section in + the United Arab RepublicSource: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1161, Saunders Files, + Middle East Negotiations Files, Jarring Talks Edited and Indexed, February 19–26, + 1971. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Sterner, cleared by Atherton and Stackhouse, and approved by Sisco. Repeated to Tel Aviv and + USUN. + Washington, February 20, 1971, + 2003Z. +

29195. 1. We believe Cairo is sophisticated enough in its knowledge of + Israeli political processes to realize that GOI is now faced with very difficult decisions which will + have serious domestic political repercussions.Reference is to the international expectation of an + Israeli response to Jarring’s February 8 aides-mémoire to Israel and the + United Arab Republic. (See footnote 2, + Document 205.) The United Arab Republic sent its reply to + Jarring on February 15, + the text of which is in telegram 328 from Cairo, accepting many of + the aide-mémoire’s key elements. (National Archives, Nixon + Presidential Materials, NSC Files, + Box 637, Country Files, Middle East, UAR, Vol. VI) Knowing this, UARG is probably + prepared give Israelis certain amount of time to come to their decision. + Nevertheless, it may at this point be useful to pass low-key message to + Egyptians to reassure them of significance we attach to UAR response to Jarring and of our continuing close + engagement in efforts to encourage Israel to come up with positive reply + that Jarring can build on.

+

2. You should therefore see Mohammed + Riad at early opportunity and give him following + message:

+

A. We have carefully studied UAR reply + to Jarring and consider it + serious move forward.On February 20 at + 10:07 a.m., Sisco telephoned + Kissinger and said: “I + want to give you my reading on this Egyptian proposal. It’s very + good and positive. That’s the first time I’ve ever said that. It + meets the principal Israeli private and public conditions that the + Egyptians are directly responsive to whether they are or are not + willing to make a peace agreement and it gets into specifics for the + first time in a clear-cut way. It’s the first serious intention to + get on with this thing. I think now the Israelis will have to face + the tough decisions.” (Ibid., Henry + Kissinger Telephone Conversation Transcripts, Box 4, + Chronological File) The UAR + Government released the text of its response on March 10; see Israel’s Foreign Policy: Historical + Documents, volumes 1–2: 1947–1974, Chapter XII, The War of + Attrition and the Cease Fire, Document 28. We believe it + merits very close and constructive consideration by Israel.

+

B. We are encouraged by recent indications that Israeli Government is + also viewing UAR response in this + light. Special Cabinet meeting was held February 18 to discuss UAR reply and regular Cabinet meeting on + Sunday, which Ambassador Rabin + has flown home to attend, will continue discussion.Rabin + wrote in his memoirs that during his short visit to Israel for + consultations, the Cabinet adopted a resolution expressing “a + favorable view” of the UAR + readiness to enter into “meaningful negotiations on all matters + connected with peace between the two countries.” (Rabin, The + Rabin Memoirs, + p. 193) + GOI is now faced with making very important decisions with major + domestic political implications involving reconsideration of policy + positions that will require basic Cabinet and parliamentary review. This + may take some time, but we believe it will be most productive in long + run if Israelis are given opportunity to sort out these issues they are + faced with according to their internal processes and without public + pressure.

+

C. We have made it clear to Israelis that USG considers UAR reply + serious forward step and that we have urged Israel to come forward with + positive and constructive reply that advances matters equally on their + side. As Sisco emphasized on + “Face the Nation” program last Sunday, USG considers that Jarring’s initiative is clearly within his mandate under + SC + Res 242 and that time has come for hard + decisions by all concerned.Expecting to + meet with Mohammed Riad on + February 22, Bergus was + instead received by Foreign Minister Mahmoud Riad, who wanted to know what the U.S. + Government’s next move would be, given what he described as Israel’s + “refusal” of Jarring’s + aide-mémoire by refusing to withdraw to the June 5 borders. + Bergus told him that he + “should be in no doubt as to the seriousness and value which we + attached to the UAR reply to + Jarring” and then + proceeded to read paragraphs 2A and 2C of the telegram. The + Ambassador concluded by telling Riad that he had “put an important + and serious matter” before the U.S. Government and Rogers and that he would + “communicate it to Washington as soon as possible.” He also said + that the U.S. Government would “not be interested in guaranteeing + peace agreement that was not inherently viable.” (Telegram 379 from + Cairo, February 22; National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, + NSC Files, Box 1161, Saunders + Files, Middle East Negotiations Files, Jarring Talks Edited and Indexed, February 19–26, + 1971)

+ + + Rogers + + +
+ +
+ + 207. Paper Prepared by the National Security Council StaffSource: National Archives, Nixon + Presidential Materials, NSC Files, + NSC Institutional Files + (H-Files), Box H–052, Senior Review Group Meetings, SRG Meeting—Middle East/Chile 2/25/71 + (1 of 2). Secret; Nodis. All brackets are in the + original. + Washington, February 22, 1971. +

ANALYTICAL SUMMARY

+

Options Vis-à-vis Israel

+

The Sisco + Paper

+

At the next tab is the Sisco + paper entitled, “Scenarios for Seeking to Obtain Modification of + Israel’s Position on Withdrawal and Borders.”Undated; attached but not printed. This is a + summary of that paper and its arguments plus Saunders’ discussion at the end of the + issues it omits.

+

+ You should read the Sisco paper in the following sequence: +

+

1. the first page and a half which sets the stage;

+

2. go to the last three lines on page 10 and read to the end because this + describes the probable political process in Israel;

+

3. then return to the middle of page 2 and begin reading the + scenarios.

+

The reason for this reading is that the three scenarios describe the + elements in three different postures toward Israel. They do not describe + a sequence of approaches to Israel. Hence it is more realistic to think + about them first as elements of a posture to be displayed in the course + of an ongoing political process in Israel. Then a second decision would + relate to the tactics of how this posture is revealed to Israel.

+

If our general posture toward Israel can be set, then we will have a + framework within which we can be flexible. We will get away from the + simplistic notion that we should cut off military supply if Israel does + not swallow the Jarring + formulaSee footnote 2, Document 205. all in one bite.

+

The Situation

+

The situation described in the paper has three familiar elements:

+

1. Israel is now faced with a Jarring memo which seeks Israeli commitment to withdraw + to the pre-war international boundary between the UAR and Israel, subject to agreement + between the two sides on security arrangements. [Text of Jarring memo is attached at end of + Sisco memo.]

+ +

2. No quick Israeli decision can be expected. Even if Israel made a + positive decision on this issue and negotiations continued, we would + still be faced with the problem of bringing Israel along on a whole + series of follow-on issues—Jerusalem, Gaza, West Bank boundary, refugee + repatriation, DMZs, peacekeeping arrangements (including at Sharm + al-Shaikh), to say nothing of the Golan Heights. We cannot “shoot our + wad” with Israel at the outset, yet there must be enough Israeli + movement to keep the peace talks going.

+

3. The proposals for partial withdrawal from the Suez cease-fire line + offer the prospect of buying needed time. In fact, Israel itself may + well attempt to shift the focus from the Jarring talks to this issue. An interim agreement, of + course, would not remove basic pressures for further Israeli + withdrawal.

+

Three Possible Approaches to Israel

+

The Sisco paper is written to + address a situation in which for the purpose of presentation it is + assumed that Israel seems about to reply negatively to the Jarring proposal and conventional + diplomatic representations show no signs of persuading the Israelis to + change their minds. The paper groups possible US postures (“scenarios”) + under three headings: inducive, inducive/coercive, and coercive. They + are elaborated as follows:

+

1. Inducive.

+

Reliance under this approach would fall primarily on diplomatic argument, + responsiveness to Israel’s present material and financial requirements + and readiness to commit the US to long-term support of Israel’s + security.

+

The US would tell Israel that if Israel agreed to the Jarring memo the US would take the + position that:

+

—The parties should now be given a free hand and reasonable opportunity + to come to grips themselves with security arrangements and DMZs.

+

—No option should be excluded from negotiation, including proposals for + demilitarizing the entire Sinai, including Israeli representatives in + any verification system, continued Israeli presence at Sharm al-Shaikh + in a manner not transferring sovereignty.

+

—The US would be prepared to include a US contingent in any force at + Sharm al-Shaikh and to insist that termination of that force should be + barred for a specified period (5–10 years).

+

—Supported Israeli passage through the Canal.

+

—Allowed return of refugees only in numbers satisfactory to Israel.

+ +

—Barred return of Gaza to UAR control + and introduction of any Arab military forces.

+

The US would continue military support on concessional financial terms + and offer to discuss with Israel possible executive and Congressional + declarations in support of Israel’s security, formalization of bilateral + defense consultations, contribution to refugee resettlement and to + conversion of the Israeli economy to peacetime lines.

+

The main argument for the inducive approach is + conviction that an Israel confident in itself and in US support is more + likely to be flexible than an Israel made uncertain by US efforts to + exert pressure. A case can be made that Israel’s acceptance of the US + initiative last summer was a partial demonstration of the effectiveness + of this approach, although the pressure generated by the Soviet military + presence played an important role. This approach is also attractive + because it would avoid a difficult confrontation with Israel.

+

The main argument against this approach is that it + is questionable whether mere inducement is sufficient to persuade Israel + to give up what it regards as central to its negotiating + position—freedom to trade one part of the Sinai for other parts it + regards essential to its security. The possible inefficacy of + inducements is compounded by the fact that we have already provided + substantial inducements for marginal Israeli moves that their effect + tends to be blunted. They may well feel, too, that they can get these + things from us whatever they do.

+

Comment: No single inducement—aircraft, financial + assistance, a diplomatic position—is likely to “buy” an Israeli change + of position on an issue Israel regards as literally vital to its + survival. However, the sum of these—the whole US-Israeli relationship—is + very important to Israel, and the US as a deterrent to Soviet attack on + Israel is vital. While this is connoted in the Sisco paper’s allusion to further US + executive and Congressional declarations in support, it seems to me the key question to be addressed with some degree of + decisiveness is what the US is now prepared to promise Israel in + regard to standing off Soviet collaboration in a future Arab + attack if a peace agreement is reached and then breaks + down.

+

There is an argument which states that if we are going to rely on + inducements to produce a major Israeli step, we have to make major + decisions now on our future security relationship with Israel. We may + not want ever to have a closer relationship, but if we are prepared to, + now may be the time for that decision—at least perhaps to explore a + tentative decision with key Congressional leaders. Otherwise we may be + asking too much from Israel for too little.

+

2. Inducive/Coercive.

+

Under this approach we would offer the positive undertakings described + above. But we would make clear to Israel that Israeli unwillingness to compromise would lead to US + re-examination of certain aspects of our relationship. The US would keep + the Congress informed of its view that the Israeli position is now the + major stumbling block to a settlement.

+

Specifically, the USG would brief + Congress and the press; solicit support from the US Jewish community; + slow down arms shipments and be unreceptive to new requests without + actually rejecting them; retain a public posture of basic support for + Israel’s security.

+

The main arguments for this approach are that it + would underscore the seriousness of the USG position in taking some domestic political risk and + raise questions in the Israeli mind as to whether US support can be + taken for granted regardless of Israel’s position. At the same time, it + avoids the risks of full confrontation.

+

The main arguments against this approach are: It + might strengthen the hands of the Israeli hawks by arousing latent fears + that ultimately Israel must stand alone. The Arabs might be encouraged + to greater belligerence if they thought the US was deserting Israel. The + Soviets might be encouraged to be more venturesome. Yet Israel might not + be intimidated at all.

+

Comment: It may be premature to think of open + confrontation with Israel or slowing down arms shipments as the State + Department paper proposes. The point might best be made by offering such + key inducements as a commitment vis-à-vis the USSR and then making clear that such support will not be + possible if Israel insists on holding territory because the likelihood + of breakdown in the agreement would be too great.

+

3. Coercive.

+

Under this approach all the elements of the inducive/coercive option + would be exhausted and then arms shipments would be halted or + drastically curtailed; discussion of arms and credits would be halted; + steps would be taken to halt the transfer of funds to Israel; the + President would explain these steps to the public.

+

Comment: It seems (a) too early in the game to + think in these terms and (b) unrealistic in any case to assume that the + US can virtually break the US-Israeli relationship.

+

The Issues

+

The Sisco paper ends at this + point. However, it seems worth continuing here to suggest that it is + important now to be as precise as we can be in our own minds about the + answers to these two questions:

+

—What is the most we are prepared to offer Israel concurrent with a peace + agreement as a bilateral assurance of US support for Israeli security? + The promise of continued military supply and financial assistance seems almost a foregone + conclusion. But can we promise that US forces will react directly if the + Arabs with the support of Soviet combat forces attack Israel? If so, + should we be prepared to formalize this in some sort of arrangement with + Senate concurrence?

+

—What is the farthest we are prepared to go in reducing US support for + Israel as a means of pressing Israel to accept an agreement that we + think would be viable?

+

When we think in these terms, it becomes apparent that the Sisco paper before us today is not + subtle enough or precise enough in addressing the key questions:

+

—a specific proposal to be made to Israel on the nature of the US-Israeli + security relationship that would exist if there is a peace agreement + with the pre-war Israel-UAR border;

+

—a specific proposal for (or against) participation of US forces in a + peacekeeping force;

+

—specific talking points to be used with Mrs. Meir in offering the above and in making clear that the + US offer vis-à-vis the USSR would not + be available if Israel retains territory.

+

[NOTE: All of the above is written in the context + of the Jarring negotiations. It + is fully recognized—as has been presented in other memos—that the + partial withdrawal proposal remains a means of avoiding total settlement + of the boundary issue all in one step now.]

+
+ +
+ + 208. Minutes of a Senior Review Group MeetingSource: National Archives, Nixon + Presidential Materials, NSC Files, + NSC Institutional Files + (H-Files), Box H–112, Senior Review Group, SRG Minutes (Originals) 1971. Secret; Nodis. The + meeting was held in the White House Situation Room. All brackets are + in the original except those indicating text omitted by the + editors. + Washington, February 25, + 1971, 2:36–3:50 p.m. + + SUBJECT + Middle East, Chile + + + PARTICIPATION + Chairman—Henry A. + Kissinger + + State + + Under Secretary John N. + Irwin + Mr. Joseph J. Sisco + Mr. Alfred L. + Atherton + Mr. Thomas Thornton + + Defense + + Mr. David Packard + Mr. Armistead I. + Selden + Mr. James S. Noyes + + + CIA + + + Mr. Richard Helms + Mr. David H. Blee + + JCS + + Adm. Thomas H. + Moorer + Adm. Elmo R. Zumwalt, Jr.* + R/Adm. Wm. R. St. + George + + NSC Staff + + Col. Richard T. + Kennedy + Mr. Harold H. + Saunders + Mr. Arnold Nachmanoff* + Mr. D. Keith Guthrie + *Present for Chile discussion only. + +

SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS

+

1. Strategy toward Israel. The IG/NEA will prepare + a scenario for a US strategy toward Israel in the event that the Israeli + reply to the Jarring proposal is + not sufficiently forthcoming on boundaries.See Document 214. The scenario + should set forth measures which the United States might use to move + Israel toward productive negotiations and should analyze the + consequences of each measure. The scenario should be focused on the + forthcoming three weeks and should outline anticipated developments + during that period.

+

[Omitted here is discussion of Chile.]

+

Middle East

+

Dr. Kissinger: (to Sisco) Can you sum up where you think + we stand right now in the Middle East? I want to be sure that the next + time I see Ambassador Rabin at + a dinner party I will know what is going on.

+ +

Mr. Sisco: We have been pursuing + three tracks. The first relates to the negotiations under Jarring’s auspices. You have all seen + the latest UAR reply to Jarring’s questions.See Document 206. + Jarring formulated on a + contingency basis the kind of peace commitments heretofore sought by + Israel and put to the Israelis the specific question whether Israel is + willing to withdraw from UAR territory + to the previous international boundary provided satisfactory + arrangements can be made on Sharm-al-Shaykh and demilitarized zones in + the Sinai. He made no mention of Gaza or of the principle of total + Israeli withdrawal to the pre-June 1967 lines.

+

The Egyptian response is the first serious indication that they will say + explicitly that they are willing to enter into a peace agreement with + Israel if there are satisfactory security arrangements. The Egyptians + have called on Israel to get out of both Sinai and Gaza.

+

The Israelis are considering the situation. They are having a cabinet + meeting Sunday.February 28.

+

Ambassador Rabin said he + expected that Israel would acknowledge privately and publicly that the + Egyptian position represents a step forward and would recognize the + principle of withdrawal to secure, recognized boundaries. He thought the + Israelis would express a willingness to negotiate but would + categorically bar total withdrawal to the armistice lines.Rabin met + with Sisco on February 23 to + discuss Israel’s imminent reply to Jarring’s aide-mémoire, as reported in telegram + 30820 to Tel Aviv, February 24. (National Archives, Nixon + Presidential Materials, NSC Files, + Box 1161, Saunders Files, Middle East Negotiations Files, Middle + East—Jarring Talks + Edited and Indexed, February 19–26, 1971) He also met with Rogers the following day to + discuss the matter further. (Telegram 31741 to Tel Aviv, February + 25; ibid.) According to the Israeli record of their conversation, + Rogers emphasized that + it is now time for the Israelis to “face up to the decisions” of + responding positively to Sadat’s overtures and to Jarring’s memorandum. “It is only + a matter of time before your hand will be disclosed. Sooner or later + you will have to face up to it,” he said. Rogers added that if Israel + responded negatively to Jarring’s memorandum “everyone will say that you did + it to evade a decision. If you say yes we are willing to withdraw + and now wish to negotiate, then you have said nothing new. They have + said a lot. Unless you indicate what you are speaking sbout you are + not saying anything. It is going to put us in a terrrible spot. We + feel very strongly your answer should be positive to Jarring. They will laugh us out of + the room in the Sec[urity] Council if you are only going to say that + which you have indicated. You must have a position of your own, not + just quote no unquote. We are concerned because we made progress. We + are most concerned because it all might be lost.” (Israel State + Archive, Previously Classified Material, 7021/4)

+

In our judgment this evades Jarring’s key point, which was to invite a clear Israeli + position on borders. All Israel will be doing is to come back with a + negative statement.

+ +

Dr. Kissinger: Let me make sure I + understand what you take to be the Israeli position. They are barring + total withdrawal to the 1967 boundaries but not withdrawal to one of the + 1967 borders. Their position is not inconsistent with withdrawal to the + previous boundary with Egypt. The Egyptian line per se is not + unacceptable.

+

Mr. Sisco: That’s what we don’t + know. Rabin was not very + explicit about this. I asked him if he was barring the 1967 boundaries + in every instance and he replied: “Yes, insofar as it relates to the + peoples we are fighting.” I then asked him: “If you don’t want the 1967 + line, then what is the line you want? This is what Jarring wants to know.” Rabin replied only that “we are + willing to negotiate.”

+

We have to recognize that the Israelis have serious internal political + problems. They can only agree on what they are against. They can’t even + define the concept of total withdrawal against which they are expressing + themselves. They are not able to put forward anything concrete or + formal. The Secretary made all the points I have mentioned, and we know + that Rabin sent back a further + strong message to Jerusalem.

+

Dr. Kissinger: Was he asking for + a change in their position?

+

Mr. Sisco: He was asking them to + be more precise. In his press briefing before leaving for Israel, he + said in effect that the only position for Israel is the Rogers position. However, we have to + remember that he is not Golda + Meir or Moshe + Dayan. Dayan’s + statement the other day is a very bad way to present the Israeli + position.According to the New York Times, at a private dinner, + Dayan said that “given + the choice between a peace treaty and an Israeli presence at Sharm + el Sheik to ensure passage through the Strait of Tiran, he would + prefer the presence at Sharm el Sheik.” (February 19, 1971, p. + 1)

+

The Israelis are on the defensive at the moment. Golda Meir told Wally Barbour the other + day that “if the Egyptians say they are in favor of a peace agreement, + Israel will have to face up to the territorial problem.”Meir and + Barbour met on February + 12, but the comments that Sisco ascribed to her were not included in the + record of that meeting; see Document + 205. The Israelis recognize that this is where there + are serious differences between Israel and the United States.

+

Dr. Kissinger: Maybe she did + [face up to the problem].

+

Mr. Sisco: We have never pressed + the Israelis on this. Now we can’t evade the border question. The other + side has met the principal Israeli concerns in the most explicit terms. + Now we are in great danger of losing what it has taken us one year to + put together: a cease-fire, continuation of the negotiations, and + exercise of control over the four-power talks. We are in for serious + difficulties unless we can bring the Israelis around. The moment of + truth has arrived. We are trying to get our points across to the Israelis. We are not trying to + draw the President in; we want to save him for the crucial time.

+

Dr. Kissinger: There will be a + briefing on the Middle East on the NSC + agenda tomorrow,See Document 209. but no decisions. At that meeting + you can tell the NSC members what might + be coming up soon.

+

Mr. Sisco: If there are positive + elements in the Israeli reply, we can emphasize these in an effort to + get things moving. But if the reply, as seems likely, is negative, there + is likely to be a Security Council meeting and there will be no + alternative but for the US to join with other Security Council members + in saying that the Israeli response is inadequate and that something + further is required from the Israelis. We will also be under increased + pressure in the four-power talks. We have taken the position that the + four powers should make no conclusive judgments until it is known + exactly what we are talking about.In + telegram 23650 to USUN, February + 11, the Department provided “broad guidelines for carrying out our + strategy in dealing with supplementary guarantees question in Four + Power talks.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, + NSC Files, Box 1158, Saunders + Files, Middle East Negotiations Files, Middle East Negotiations—Four + Power Talks, August 13, 1970–November 15, 1971) The other + three are willing to hold the line as long as there are serious + indications that negotiations will take place.

+

Dr. Kissinger: What do we want + from the Israelis?

+

Mr. Sisco: We want a reply to + Jarring that says “Yes, we + are willing to withdraw to the boundary you specified provided we are + satisfied on Sharm-al-Shaykh and demilitarized zones. We are sending our + foreign minister to negotiate.”

+

Mr. Irwin: It would be all right + even if they don’t go that far but just say that they will withdraw and + mention Sharm-al-Shaykh and the demilitarized zones. The point is that + they give some specifics.

+

Dr. Kissinger: I remember that + some Israeli (I think it was Rabin) told me once that they wanted a line straight + north from Sharm-al-Shaykh. Were they to say that, we would still be in + the Security Council wouldn’t we?

+

Mr. Sisco: We would at least for + the first time be moving on negotiations on the concrete question of + where the border is to be located. [Mr. Sisco indicated on a map the two possible alignments + mentioned by Israel for tracing the boundary north from + Sharm-al-Shaykh.]

+

Dr. Kissinger: Let’s take the + case where the Israelis say: “This is our notion of a line.” The + question then goes to the Security Council, and we vote that the Israeli + proposal is not satisfactory.

+

Mr. Sisco: We have got to see the + actual Israeli reply before discussing this.

+ +

Dr. Kissinger: But suppose the + Israelis make a conciliatory reply except on the question of + borders.

+

Mr. Sisco: That would not be + satisfactory.

+

Dr. Kissinger: This is getting us + to the position where the only acceptable Israeli reply is to accept the + 1967 borders. The Security Council would be judging the situation, and + we would be edging toward an imposed solution. Anything else [i.e., + besides the 1967 borders] will elicit a Security Council condemnation. + If things develop that way, we will have a hell of a time getting any + support.

+

If we feel we may have to support the Israelis, we have to consider what + is going to happen in the Security Council. If we vote against Israel in + the Security Council and a war starts and we have to support the + Israelis . . .

+

Mr. Sisco: First of all, the + Security Council is not about to get into precise judgments of that + sort. If Israel does not express itself concretely on the subject of + boundaries, our strategy in the Security Council should be to limit any + action to the general thrust of exhortation. Our position would still be + that it is still for the parties to sort out the dispute and that we + should not have the Security Council making a substantive judgment of + the situation. This would be a bad precedent for resolving other + elements of the dispute.

+

Dr. Kissinger: Isn’t that what is + going to happen?

+

Mr. Packard: You may have it + developing that way. The trouble is that we are awfully close to + attaining the goal we have been seeking if we can just go the distance + that remains. We will get more credit if we keep the matter in our ball + park rather than the Security Council. Besides, we will also have more + influence with the Israelis that way, and our relations with the Arabs + will be better.

+

Mr. Sisco: I recognize Henry’s + [Kissinger’s] point. + Anything substantive the Security Council says will be unacceptable to + the Israelis. Our position is that the best thing for the Security + Council to do is to encourage the negotiating process rather than itself + to make substantive judgments.

+

Mr. Irwin: There are several + possibilities. The Israelis may come back with the answer Joe [Sisco] says we want to have; that is, + they may match the forthcoming attitude of the Egyptians. From + everything we hear, we don’t expect that to happen. The Israelis may + also come back with a specific boundary proposal. This would be an + advance, and we could treat it as a negotiating position. We would then + be better able to withstand pressure in the Security Council.

+

Dr. Kissinger: The Israelis have + said they favor withdrawal to secure boundaries. That sort of a reply + won’t advance the negotiations much. If the negotiations blow up, the Egyptians will be under great + pressure to re-start the war.

+

Mr. Sisco: Our own judgment is + that in this kind of a situation the Soviets are + a restraining influence. The Egyptians are not likely to start shooting + in a serious sort of way.

+

If they move into the Security Council, they will not make an all-out + effort to direct the Security Council. This is a political process the + Egyptians will feel they need to pursue. One thing a Security Council + resolution might contain would be a call for an extension of the + ceasefire. It could note the Israeli position, as for continued + negotiations, and call for an extension of the ceasefire.

+

I mentioned earlier we were pursuing three tracks. The second is to + pursue the Suez Canal proposal further, and the third has to do with + four-power discussion of guarantees. The Suez Canal proposal could + provide a short-run show of progress. Sadat made this proposal over the objections of his + advisers. We have offered to provide assistance to both sides, and both + have indicated that they wanted us to serve as middleman. Sadat talked about opening the Canal, + and Golda Meir referred to + military deescalation in the canal area. We have a good idea what the + Israelis might bite on, but we have held back because of not wishing to + encourage the forces in Israel that prefer to go the partial route in + order to relieve pressure to face up to the boundaries problem.

+

There is going to have to be some public US dissociation from Israel if + the Israeli reply is negative.

+

Dr. Kissinger: But there will be + no short fuse on this.

+

Mr. Sisco: Yes, there will.

+

Dr. Kissinger: Joe [Sisco] has stated the issues well. The + question is how we are going to move the Israelis. The President is + going to have to take the heat on this. I think we are going to be + heading toward a greater or lesser confrontation with Israel. My + instinct says the Israelis are not going to accept the 1967 boundaries + easily.

+

Mr. Sisco: I agree regarding the + Egyptian front.

+

Dr. Kissinger: The question is + how we are going to get them there. We need to know what the + consequences of alternative forms of dissociation are. What if the war + does start again, the Israelis clobber the Egyptians, and the Russians + come in—not massively, but with active military forces?

+

Mr. Packard: We are faced with the + problem of getting the cattle through the gate. If we don’t do it now, + it will take three weeks. They are almost there.

+

Dr. Kissinger: The question is + how to do it and what the consequences will be.

+

Mr. Packard: I think we ought to + push pretty hard.

+ +

Dr. Kissinger: That is one + proposal we have had. We need to consider what measures will move the + Israelis. We had a paper here that set forth inducive and coercive + tracks.See Document 207.

+

Mr. Sisco: Yes, the questions + posed are addressed in this paper. However, it is premature to decide + these things now. The paper you asked for made the following + assumptions. It says: “The scenarios in this paper rest on the following + assumptions: (1) we have word from Jarring that the UAR + has accepted the terms of his Aide Mémoire without reservation as a + basis for continuing negotiations on the UAR-Israeli aspect of a + settlement, and (2) Israel has either declined to reply or indicated it + intends to reply negatively or with major reservations to the Jarring proposal.” The three tracks + are inducive, inducive-coercive, and coercive.

+

Dr. Kissinger: I have the + impression you favor Option 2—inducive-coercive.

+

Mr. Sisco: I have not opted for + any of them. We have got to proceed carefully on a step-by-step basis in + putting pressure on Israel. We want to keep the pressure as much as + possible in the private domain. We could make a major quiet effort after + the Security Council. There may have to be some public dissociation from + Israel. We have to say frankly if the Israeli position is not acceptable + in terms of our approach.

+

Mr. Packard: When do you expect an + answer?

+

Mr. Sisco: We had thought we + would have something tomorrow. But I think it will be delayed.

+

Dr. Kissinger: It will be a week + at the latest.

+

Mr. Sisco: Yes.

+

Mr. Packard: Have we ever said to + them that if they accept one of the lines, we won’t push on the others. + That is an approach that might help.

+

Mr. Sisco: We have spelled this + out in the Rogers proposal by + saying that we agree there should be a united Jerusalem and that there + should be “insubstantial” adjustments in the border along the Jordan + River.

+

Mr. Packard: What about the Golan + Heights?

+

Mr. Sisco: We have said nothing + because Syria is not involved in these negotiations. Syria does not + accept the Security Council resolution.

+

Mr. Kissinger: We are all agreed + that we will have to apply pressure of one sort or another. We need a + scenario showing how this is going to evolve so we are not asked to make + one decision after another—a + note now, a letter later, etc. The scenario should set forth the full + combination of pressures that might be used. For example, it might + include Dave Packard's proposal + that we indicate that acceptance of the pre-1967 Egyptian frontier would + not be a precedent for all other frontiers. We would ask the President + to consider a scenario that would spell out how we see things evolving + over two or three weeks. It would explain how we get the cattle through + the gate.

+

Mr. Helms: We have information + that the Israelis are already getting ready to respond to what they + think will be our position. They are collecting statements and quotes to + use. This is all the more reason why we should decide what we want to + do.

+

Mr. Kissinger: (to Irwin and Sisco) Would you have the IG put together a proposal + such as you have described covering the next three weeks? That way the + President will have an idea of the sort of decisions that might come up. + We will not have to develop our strategy one cable at a time.

+

Mr. Packard: But Joe (Sisco) is going to need some + flexibility.

+

Mr. Irwin: He will need a lot of + flexibility.

+

Mr. Kissinger: I have noted that + Joe doesn’t seem to feel restrained whenever he feels something should + be done. We could put in the document that it is always possible to make + new proposals.

+

Mr. Sisco: I think it is only + fair to say that many people are beginning to believe that the cupboard + is bare insofar as any new proposals are concerned.

+

Mr. Kissinger: We are coming to a + confrontation.

+

Mr. Sisco: We are arriving at the + point we have been aiming at for eighteen months.

+

Mr. Kissinger: This is all the + more reason for us to see how the situation is going to evolve. We never + had any illusions that Israel would go back of its own volition. We knew + that pressure would be needed. Can you get this paper prepared by next + week?

+

Mr. Irwin: The President is going + to be personally involved to a considerable extent.

+

[Omitted here is further discussion of Chile]

+
+ +
+ + 209. Memorandum of Conversation of a National Security Council + MeetingSource: National + Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC + Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–110, NSC Meeting Minutes, NSC Meetings Minutes Originals 1971 thru 6–20–74. + Secret. The meeting was held in the Cabinet Room of the White House. + According to the President’s Daily Diary, the meeting lasted from + 10:40 a.m. until 12:35 p.m. (Ibid., White House Central Files) A + tape recording of this meeting is ibid., White House Tapes, Cabinet + Room, Conversation No. 48–4. All brackets are in the + original. + Washington, February 26, 1971, 11:45 + a.m. + + PARTICIPANTS + President Nixon + Vice President Agnew + Secretary of State William P. + Rogers + Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird + Director of Central Intelligence Richard Helms + Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Thomas H. Moorer + Under Secretary of State John N. + Irwin II + Assistant to the President Henry A. + Kissinger + AmbassadorGeorge Bush, + U.S. Representative to the UN + Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs U. Alexis Johnson + Director, U.S. Information Agency, Frank Shakespeare + Joseph J. Sisco, Assistant + Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs + Alfred L. Atherton, Jr., + Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian + Affairs + General Alexander M. + Haig, Deputy Assistant to the President for National + Security Affairs + Harold H. Saunders, NSC Staff + Colonel Richard Kennedy, + NSC Staff + + + SUBJECT + National Security Council Meeting: The Middle East + +

[As the discussion turned from Laos to the Middle East, Mr. Sisco, Mr. Atherton and Mr. Saunders entered the room.]

+

The President: Perhaps the group should delay discussion of the Middle + East until later, because I have to go on to a 12:00 noon + appointment.

+

Laird: [leaning over to the + President]: The problem is we have to move quickly. The next few days + will be very important—if it gets into the Security Council. Perhaps the + subject should at least be discussed.

+

The President: All right. We’ll take a few minutes on the Middle East. + Joe, would you brief?

+ +

Mr. Sisco: The present situation + can be described as operating on three different tracks. The first two + can be dismissed very quickly; the third—the Jarring talks—is the most + important:

+

—In the Four Power talks, the supplementary guarantees are the issue. So + far we have been successful in keeping this from becoming very + substantive, but if there is not progress soon in the Jarring talks we will have our hands + full in containing this discussion further. The pressure from the + British, French, and Soviets will mount on us to proceed with a + substantive discussion with a view to producing Four-Power agreement on + guarantees for a settlement.

+

—On the proposal for partial withdrawal from the Suez cease-fire line, + there is unlikely to be movement in the short term until the UAR has a good look at the Israeli reply + to the current Jarring proposal. + State feels that President Sadat + is “somewhat desperate” to show progress toward Israeli withdrawal. + State feels that Sadat made the + proposal for partial withdrawal from the Suez Canal contrary to the + advice of a number of his advisors. This is an ongoing issue, but for + the moment it would seem to be in suspense pending clarification of the + state of the dialogue through Jarring.

+

—Both sides want us to play a middleman role.

+

Secretary Rogers: At the + moment—this week—we do not think we should tackle this subject. It is + something for discussion a little farther down the track. We do not mean + at all to rule it out. We are only saying that in this period of a few + days, the Jarring exchange is + center stage.

+

Mr. Sisco: The most important of + the three tracks is the exchange through Ambassador Jarring. In the four to six weeks + since the start of these exchanges in early January, the Israeli + positions were serious and the UAR + positions were polemical and did not lend themselves to real + negotiations. In the new phase which has begun recently, the UAR has now come forward with concrete + positions. It has said it would be willing to join in a peace agreement + with Israel. Prime Minister Meir + explicitly stated to Ambassador Barbour that if the U.S. could get a specific UAR commitment to make a peace agreement + with Israel, she would face up to the difficult issues raised by the + differences between the U.S. and Israeli views of what final borders + should be in a peace agreement.See footnote 7, Document 208.

+

It should be clearly understood what Ambassador Jarring has asked Israel to commit + itself to. The Israelis are “throwing up a smoke screen” by claiming + Jarring has proposed that + Israel commit itself to total withdrawal. Jarring has not asked that of Israel. He has asked that + the Israelis agree to withdraw to the international border with Egypt + provided there is + satisfactory agreement on demilitarized zones and on security + arrangements at Sharm el-Sheikh. Gaza is not mentioned at all.

+

The Israeli response to Jarring + will probably not answer this question directly. Israel will probably + welcome the UAR move, say it is ready + to negotiate, perhaps even suggest negotiation on subjects other than + borders and state that it will not return to the pre-1967 borders. The + Israeli cabinet is divided. It has only been able to agree on what it is + against. It has not been able to agree on a specific negotiating + position to advance as the next stage in the Jarring talks.

+

If this does turn out to be the Israeli response, Ambassador Jarring will have to say that it is + not responsive to his question. If this is Jarring’s judgment, this raises concern over the future + of the negotiations and the cease-fire. Even more important, a breakdown + in both would give the Soviets a handle for further inroads in the + area.

+

Secretary Rogers: We are at a + critical juncture. The UAR has accepted + all that Israel has said it wants. If the UAR had said in 1967 what it has now in effect said in + response to Jarring’s + memorandum, Israel would have been delighted. Now, however, Israel is + unwilling to make a decision of any kind. Israel is going to say simply + that it is ready to negotiate. That is not enough. They have to lay + their cards out now. I told Ambassador Rabin Wednesday that Israel has to say what its position + is.See footnote + 5, Document 208. The negotiation is already going + on. We will be in a difficult position if they do this.

+

The President: What do they want? We have provided the aircraft and the + financial assistance. What more are they asking for?

+

Secretary Rogers: They won’t make + up their minds. The Cabinet has discussed this subject and has been + unable to decide exactly what borders Israel should ask for in a peace + agreement. At the same time, the record shows that Foreign Minister + Eban in June 1967 told + Secretary Rusk in connection with + Israel’s views toward an Egyptian-Israeli settlement that Israel would + go back to the pre-war boundary if there was a security arrangement for + Sharm el-Sheikh, and that Israel did not seek territory, only security. + [The record which Mr. Sisco had + in hand to document this comment is attached.]Attachment not found; see Foreign + Relations, 1964–1968, volume XIX, Arab-Israeli Crisis + and War, 1967, Document 314. The U.S. cannot + support Israel in the UN Security + Council if, now that a negotiation has been launched, Israel refuses to + advance a negotiating position. This is where we stand today.

+

The President: Let me understand what you are saying about the second + track you describe. What is it you are saying about the scheme for opening the Suez Canal? I + had thought from the briefing papers I had read that perhaps this + offered an alternative for buying some time.

+

Secretary Rogers: All we are + saying is that, right now, it is not “talkable.” If we were to raise + this with the Egyptians as long as the Israelis had not replied + constructively to Ambassador Jarring, the Egyptians would regard the proposal as an + effort by the U.S. to help Israel evade answering Jarring’s questions. If, on the other + hand, the Israelis give Jarring + a reasonable reply, then it is quite possible for this course to be + discussed.

+

The President: In those circumstances, then, opening the Canal would be + regarded as a step in the negotiations—a step toward a final + settlement?

+

Secretary Rogers: Yes, if Israel + gives a positive answer to Jarring, we could say to the UAR that the continued negotiation of final positions on + borders, refugees, and the other issues is going to take time. For the + purpose of creating an appropriate atmosphere for those negotiations, a + partial withdrawal from the Canal might be a valuable interim step.

+

The President: If the Israelis are going to take the position you + predict, why do we provide arms, then? I have taken a strong position in + support of Israel—perhaps as strong as any President. I have assured + Mrs. Meir of my strong support + for the survival of Israel.See Document 136. She knows this. I have + taken a strong position with respect to the Soviet position in the + Middle East.

+

There is no denying that there is a political campaign coming in this + country in 1972. A number of politicians are already making it plain + that they will make political capital out of their support for Israel. + Senator Jackson is already + making noises of this kind.

+

We will provide arms, long-range agreements with Israel, and guarantees. + Also, as far as borders are concerned, I have said repeatedly that they + must be “defensible borders.”

+

But if any Israeli leader feels that Israel by + taking advantage of internal U.S. politics can have both arms and that + kind of support from the U.S. and then refuse to act—even to + discuss—then he is mistaken.

+

Secretary Rogers: I have no + confidence in the Soviets or in the UAR. I have a little respect for + King Hussein.An examination of the tape recording clearly + indicates that the statement was made by President Nixon, not Secretary Rogers. (National Archives, Nixon + Presidential Materials, White House Tapes, Cabinet Room, + Conversation No. 48–4)

+

There is just not going to be any American political pressure on this + score despite the fact that there is an American political campaign. “To + hell with that.”

+ +

Some people talk about imposing a settlement. We are not trying to impose + anything. But Israel just can’t say it won’t talk. Israel cannot count + on being able to evade talking because Congress says it would support + Israel and because I have said we would support Israel. They can’t say + they won’t talk.

+

We have got everything Israel wanted. Prime Minister Meir told Ambassador Barbour that if we got the UAR commitment to make a peace agreement + with Israel then Israel would face up to the tough question of borders. + Foreign Minister Eban in talking + with Secretary Rusk back in 1967 + said that Israel would withdraw to the old international border and did + not seek territory from Egypt if the UAR would commit itself to make peace with security. That + understanding was the basis for the U.S. position throughout 1967, and + that is why we voted for the 1967 UN + Security Council resolution.

+

The President: What is going to happen on March 6? I read in my briefings + and news summaries that the Arabs may break the cease-fire. Who will + start the shooting?

+

Mr. Sisco: I doubt the Arabs will + resume the shooting. But there would not be a formal cease-fire + framework.

+

Secretary Rogers: Neither is + likely, but you never know what will happen. Somebody might just start + shooting at any time.

+

The President: They can do crazy things. One other way something could + start is that the Arabs would “start huffing and puffing” and the + Israelis would strike back forcefully.

+

We will go all the way with Israel in maintaining the military balance in + its favor. But Israel has to know that if Israel starts a conflict where + it has been responsible for the breakdown in the peace talks, it cannot + count on U.S. support. I realize what the attitudes in Congress will be, + but Israeli leaders just have to understand this.

+

Secretary Laird: We have a few + more days before this issue gets into the public arena, for instance, in + the UN Security Council. When this gets + into the public arena, it will be much more difficult to handle.

+

The President: People don’t do things unless they are denied or given + what they want. What is it that the Israelis want? Arms?

+

Mr. Sisco: Our present arms + commitments will continue deliveries of aircraft through June. But you, + Mr. President, have not yet made the big decision on Israeli aircraft + requests for this year. I believe we should withhold this until we see + how the Israeli position develops.

+

The President: They know I will lean as far as I can in being generous + with them. But I cannot continue to say that Israel can have all it + wants and have them do nothing in return. This is highly confidential + information, but within this room this must be understood.

+ +

Ambassador Bush: The New York Times has had several understanding + editorials in recent days, suggesting that it is now time for the + Israelis to be more forthcoming.

+

Secretary Rogers: They’re + embarrassed.

+

The President: Henry put them up to that.

+

Secretary Rogers: We are not in a + bad position. We do not have to be apologetic about our position.

+

Ambassador Bush: That is what I + am saying. We might get a little less flak just because of the position + that The New York Times has taken.

+

Secretary Rogers: We are not + saying that we should decide now to withhold military equipment at the + moment. We should make no threats now.

+

The President: That’s right, we should use no clubs now. However, there + must be no assumption here that we will help Israel regardless of what + Israel does. We sure as hell will not.

+

Secretary Laird: Bill Rogers did a good job with Ambassador + Rabin the other day. He + made the point perfectly clear that it is time for Israel to take a + position without really making any threats.

+

Secretary Rogers: Rabin knows he does not have a good + position to argue.

+

The President: The Israelis seem to think they are in a pretty good + position. They assume that the U.S. will see them through regardless of + what they do. This is not true. But in this period we want to be very + careful about how we deal with them.

+

The main thing is the “dilatory tactic.” We want to get the cease-fire + extended.

+

Secretary Rogers: That is + certainly true, but we may be almost at the end of the line on what we + can achieve. We have delayed and delayed. The time is now coming where + we have to show some movement or it will be difficult for us to hold out + any longer.

+

[The meeting adjourned.]

+
+ +
+ 210. Editorial Note +

On February 27, 1971, President Richard + Nixon held a meeting with President’s Assistant for + National Security Affairs Henry + Kissinger from 9:47 to 11:57 a.m. in the Oval Office. At + 10:06 a.m., they were joined by Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird, Director of Central + Intelligence Richard Helms, + Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs Joseph Sisco, and President’s Deputy + Assistant for National Security Affairs Alexander Haig. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential + Materials, White House Central Files, President’s Daily Diary) Although + not listed in the Daily Diary, Secretary of State William Rogers is on a tape recording + of the conversation. One topic of discussion was how the United States + would approach Israel’s imminent response to UN Special Representative Gunnar Jarring’s most recent efforts to restart talks + between the parties. Referring to Israel in the private conversation + before the meeting began, Kissinger told the President: “At some point, there has + to be, there has to be some pressure on them. There’s, there’s no doubt + about that. But, it has to be done, it seems to me, as part of a, of a + scheme which avoids, on the one hand, giving them a veto over our action + and letting them drag us into, into their concerns. On the other, avoid + a situation where the Russians and Arabs think they can, think they can + get a big shot at them.” After Nixon said “Um-hmm,” Kissinger continued: “And that’s—those are the two + extremes between which we have to navigate this crisis.” Turning to + Sisco’s activities, + Kissinger said, “I happen to + like Sisco very much,” but + added: “He’s got to be reined in a little bit, because he’s so + impetuous, and he’s got such a tendency for tactics that he—that almost + everybody—I don’t know about the Arabs—but I know both Dobrynin and the Israelis have no + confidence in him. And—the Arabs I have no judgment on. But the major + thing is to get some game plan and then, and then carry it out.”

+

After the others arrived, the question of how to handle Israel continued + to dominate the discussion. Nixon asked if the United States had any “stroke” with + the Israelis and later described a hypothetical conversation with + Israeli officials in which the United States offered a long-term + military commitment if they would demonstrate flexibility in + negotiations. Rogers countered, + “I don’t want to do it now. I don’t think we’re at that stage,” adding + that Israel should first respond positively to Jarring’s overtures, to which + Nixon remarked: “You have to + give them some reason to do it, Bill.” Much later in the conversation, + Kissinger reaffirmed + Rogers’s point, reiterating + what he told Nixon privately: “I + think, Mr. President, the Israelis cannot simply ask for a blank check.” + Nixon agreed, and Kissinger added: “We have to be in a + position to say when they’re unreasonable.”

+

The group discussed using the Four Powers to pressure Israel if it did + not present something substantive to Jarring. Rogers + explained that such a prospect would be “very troublesome for Israel” + because the United States would “have to vote with the others” who would + demand that Israel respond to Jarring. “That is exactly what Israel does not want,” he + added. Laird commented that + Israel “ought to know that, that we’re going to have to go the + Four-Power route fairly soon.” Sisco + weighed the advantages and + disadvantages of going to either the Four Powers or the UN Security Council, neither of which he + considered good options. Regarding the Four Powers, the Assistant + Secretary presumed that France and the Soviet Union would “press” Israel + to “go well beyond the simple proposition” of reconsidering its original + response to Jarring. On the + other hand, he said, the Four Powers could “work out some communiqué + with less public debate.” As for the Security Council, he argued that it + offered little more than “an open debate with everybody shouting at one + another.” But he also believed that such a scenario would prove more + amenable to Israel because a stalemate in the Security Council would be + less troublesome than any kind of Four-Power action, given that the + latter was “the meat and potato group,” steeped in the fundamental + issues. Kissinger agreed, + arguing that Israel would “under all circumstances refuse whatever” the + Four Powers proposed.

+

On three separate occasions during the conversation, Nixon commented on territorial issues. + Referring to Israel he said, “Hell, they can have a strip down there if + they can work it out. They can have the West Bank; and they can have + Jerusalem; they can have the Golan Heights. I don’t know. I don’t know. + Whatever is that’s worked out. They just can’t take the position that + we’re just going to continue to wait and wait, delay and delay, just + assuming that American political forces will develop in their favor. + That’s the thing that I’m concerned about. I—you see, I don’t give—I + don’t go for the idea that you could just say, ‘Well, they agreed in ’67 + to do this and that. They’re gonna do what they did in pre-’67.’ That + will not happen. The word ‘secure’ has got to be expanded. That + definitely must happen now because of the Soviet presence.” Later he + said, “From a military standpoint, I concede the West Bank. I concede + Jerusalem for other reasons, and the rest.” And, finally, once again + referring to the Golan Heights, he said, “forget it,” Israel’s “got + that,” adding that “everybody thinks they ought to have the Golan + Heights, anyway,” and that “the Syrians won’t need anything.” The + meeting produced no major conclusions, but Rogers ended it with this remark regarding Israel: + “Could I say, Henry? Listen, we have told them this time and time again. + They know exactly.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, + White House Tapes, Oval Office, Conversation No. 459–2) The editors + transcribed the portions of the tape recording printed here specifically + for this volume.

+
+ +
+ + 211. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in + IsraelSource: National + Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 609, Country Files, Middle East, Israel, + Vol. IX. Secret; Priority; Nodis; Cedar. Drafted by Theodore A. Wahl + (NEA/IAI) and approved by Sisco. In a February 26 telegram, Rogers explained that the + “Nodis/Cedar” and “Nodis/Cedar Plus” classifications were created to + protect the “most sensitive traffic on the current peace + negotiations on the Middle East” and that they would “receive + extremely limited distribution in Washington within the Department + and the White House and to principal officers of other agencies + involved in NSC discussions of + subject matter.” Nodis/Cedar Plus messages would “be distributed + only to White House and within Department on strict need-to-know + basis” and that officials in Tel Aviv, Cairo, and New York should + give such telegrams “similarly restricted distribution.” (Telegram + 32414 to USUN, Tel Aviv, and + Cairo; ibid., RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 27–14 + ARAB–ISR) + Washington, February 27, 1971, + 0304Z. +

33688. Subj: Preliminary US Comment on Israeli Reply to Jarring.

+

Summary: + Sisco Feb 26 received from + Israeli Amb Rabin text of + Israel’s reply to Jarring (text + septel).Telegram 33689 to Tel Aviv, + February 27. (Ibid., Box 1161, Saunders Files, Middle East + Negotiations Files, Middle East—Jarring Talks Edited and Indexed, February 27–28, + 1971) The reply was handed to Jarring on February 26 and made public by the + Israeli Government on March 8. For the text, see Israel’s Foreign Policy: Historical Documents, volumes + 1–2, 1947–1974, Chapter XII, The War of Attrition and the Cease + Fire, Document 28. + Sisco gave personal and + preliminary comment that Israeli reply is inadequate and unresponsive to + the positive step taken by the UAR; that it does not address itself + specifically to question put by Jarring; that it will prejudice extension of cease-fire; + will stalemate negotiations; cause difficulties for US in Four-Power + talks; result in Security Council meeting in which US would find it + difficult to support Israel; and will facilitate Soviet expansion in + M.E. Sisco reviewed + accomplishments USG and Israel had + achieved during past year and then asked what USG and Israel can do further together to help GOI overcome reluctance to face needed + hard decisions on territory. Rabin repeated principal arguments he made to Secretary + Feb 24 (State 31741).The telegram is in the + National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 27–14 + ARAB–ISR. + End summary.

+

1. In call on Asst Secy Sisco + late afternoon Feb 26 Israeli Amb Rabin gave copy of Israeli paper earlier handed + Jarring in New York. Asked + if Rabin had comment to make, + Amb pointed out UAR had not given + precise, clear-cut response to Jarring paper and said that just as Israel does not + consider UAR position as precondition + for Israel, neither does Israel expect UAR to consider Israeli position as precondition. In his + view there are enough points for Jarring to continue discussions; there is no reason why meaningful talks between + parties should stop. As he had noted to Secretary, Israel wishes start + from lowest common denominator.

+

2. After reading Israeli paper, Sisco said its nature and contents do not come as any + surprise since Israel’s position was forecast clearly in earlier + meetings with both Sisco and + Secretary.See footnote 5, Document 208. He said text of Israeli + paper will be communicated promptly to Secretary and President, and we + will give GOI our considered judgment + later. Comments Sisco will now + make are preliminary and personal.

+

3. While he is in no position to commit President and Secretary, + Sisco continued, his + preliminary reaction will be against background of full review of + Israeli position at NSC meeting this + morning.See Document 209. What he will say will be more in + sorrow than in anger and will come from a friend who has believed very + deeply in Israel’s expressions of desire for peace. Israeli paper is, of + course, for Jarring, and we will + not seek to influence Jarring’s + judgment. However, he would be greatly surprised if Jarring’s views differed from what he + is about to say preliminarily.

+

4. Sisco then made following + points re Israeli paper:

+

A. Israeli reply in his view is inadequate and unresponsive to the + positive step taken by UAR. It does not address itself concretely and + specifically to question put in Jarring paper. In his question, Jarring did not seek commitment to + total withdrawal from all occupied territories to the pre-June 5 lines + but asked whether Israel would give commitment to withdraw to former + international boundary provided satisfactory arrangements are made for + establishing DMZs and practical security arrangements at Sharm + al-Sheikh.

+

B. Reply does not do what Prime Minister Meir indicated to Amb Barbour Israel prepared to do; i.e., if Egypt is willing + to sign a peace agreement, Israel would face up to the question of + territory.

+

C. Reply will come as deep disappointment to all concerned in US and + world generally. He expressed fear that Israel will be held responsible + for not having grasped this best opportunity for peace since creation of + state of Israel.

+

D. Sisco said he believed Israeli + action will set matters back seriously: it will jeopardize extension of + cease-fire; will stalemate negotiations and result in early meeting of + Security Council in which it very difficult to see how US could support + Israel.

+

E. He said reply will cause major difficulties in Four Power talks where + we have been able to manage situation satisfactorily from US and Israeli point of view as long as we + could demonstrate serious process of negotiations was in train.

+

F. More fundamentally, he noted, Israeli reply will provide Soviet Union + with precisely the instrument it needs to make further inroads in the + area contrary to interests of both US and Israel. We have tried to make + clear we consider our vital interests involved in the area and consider + our interests directly involved in Israeli response.

+

G. In our judgment Israeli reply will weaken forces in Cairo and Amman + favoring political solution. It will be broadly interpreted in the world + as evasion of Israel’s responsibility to face up to hard decisions now + needed.

+

5. Sisco then reviewed + developments of past year in which USG, + with Israeli cooperation, had made extraordinary efforts: we helped + bring about cease-fire, negotiations, commitment from UAR to recognize and make peace agreement + with Israel and to spell out specific reciprocal undertakings. + Furthermore for two years, in view of Israel’s reservations, no action + has been taken in Four Power talks to which Israel could take + exception.

+

6. Sisco continued he wished to + put serious question to Rabin + and GOI: what is it we and you together + can do to help Israeli Government get over its reluctance and face up to + hard decisions now required? Obviously there are differences between us + but we have important mutual interests. USG wants to help. We understand Israel’s need for security + and have said privately we would be willing put American boys under + UN umbrella in order to meet Israeli + concerns. This is most serious undertaking. Rabin should also note sentence in + President’s state of world message that US willing play a major role in + providing supplementary guarantees.Reference is to the part of Nixon’s “Second Annual Report to the Congress on + United States Foreign Policy,” delivered on February 25, in which he + said: “The lack of mutual confidence between Israel and the Arab + countries is so deep that supplementary major power guarantees could + add an element of assurance. Such guarantees, coupled in time with a + reduction of the armed strength of both sides, can give the + agreement permanence.” (Public Papers: Nixon, 1971, p. + 289) + Sisco repeated question what + more can we do to help Israel face up to what we consider is reality of + situation?

+

7. In response Rabin noted that + during past year Israel had agreed to accept most of US advice re + procedures and other matters. Rabin also reiterated GOI position as endorsed by President Nixon that question of defensible + boundaries should be negotiated between the parties. Israel has tried to + start such negotiations but cannot accept conditions demanded by + Egypt.

+

8. Sisco interjected to remind + Rabin of precise question + put by Jarring, and asked if + Israeli leaders are aware that we are not pressing them to commit themselves to total + withdrawal from all occupied territories to the pre-June 5, 1967 + lines.

+

9. Rabin then read from Egyptian + paper, pointing out that Egypt wants Israel to give commitment to + implement all conditions of Res 242 and + withdraw from all of Sinai and Gaza Strip. Rabin said Israel had not hidden from USG its firm position that it would not + accept as a condition Israeli withdrawal to former international + boundary.

+

10. Sisco recalled Secretary’s + comment that Israel’s position states what it is against and not what it + is willing to do on question of borders. Rabin responded this would come in give-and-take of real + negotiations.

+

11. Sisco reiterated USG fully appreciates difficulties GOI faces. We have great understanding and + sympathy for Israel and recognize there are differing views within + GOI. However, we feel time has come + for Israel to face up to decision which we consider inescapable. + Sisco continued that our + heart aches that for twenty years Israel has never known peace. If + present trend continues it will never know peace. Arab-Israel conflict + is history of lost opportunities. This is now a critical + opportunity.

+ + + Rogers + + +
+ +
+ 212. Transcript of a Telephone Conversation Between President + Nixon and the President’s + Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Henry Kissinger Telephone + Conversation Transcripts, Box 4, Chronological File. No + classification marking. All brackets are in the original except + those indicating text omitted by the editors. + Washington, February 28, 1971, 11:30 + a.m. +

K: State wants to send out a cableDocument + 213. which I believe will be the first step in a + confrontation with Israel.

+

P: Did you discuss it with Sisco?

+

K: Yes it has been discussed. We gave him some word changes designed to + soften it to the degree possible and they have accepted them, but the basic problem remains + one of strategy.On February 27 at 5:05 + p.m., Kissinger telephoned + Sisco about the cable, + which the Assistant Secretary had sent to the White House for + clearance earlier that day. Although he had not yet seen the + telegram, Kissinger remarked + that the Israelis “will not change their position.” Sisco replied: “In this cable I + have laid down a little scenario and I think we should go to both + Tel Aviv and Cairo and get their views over the weekend.” Kissinger answered: “I can give + you what Cairo will say. I could write the response. Look, I have no + overwhelming desire to get stuck with it,” and then later explained, + “What I am trying to get for the President is what comes + afterwards—where will we go. You know that the next tactical move + may lead next to six moves.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential + Materials, NSC Files, Henry Kissinger Telephone + Conversation Transcripts, Box 4, Chronological File) I am + afraid that time will force us to let them go but if we had known it was + developing this way earlier we could have perhaps worked bilaterally + with the Soviets and gotten a great deal more for what we are going to + have to do to Israel—perhaps even the Summit. Now it appears we will + have to go with the cable but we should try to slow State down.

+

P: How can we do that?

+

K: First, to soften the cable. Secondly, to avoid launching into the + four-power forum. Explore the issue with the Egyptians, thus buying some + time. And perhaps agree to go to the four-power in return for an + extension of the ceasefire by the Egyptians.

+

P: Stay on top of this Henry. Determine where we are going and check with + the Soviets. See what we can get from them.

+

K: At this point I think we are bound to get a brutal public + confrontation with Israel. If they cave we will pay a price for nothing. + I only wish we had moved with the Soviets and gotten something for + it.

+

P: Is this still possible?

+

K: In my private discussions they have certainly offered.During two meetings with Kissinger near the end of January, + Dobrynin stated that the + Soviet Union was prepared to make a “realistic agreement” on the + Middle East. Dobrynin asked + whether the President was prepared to resume bilateral talks on the + Middle East, insisting that the current Arab-Israeli negotiations + “aren’t going to go anywhere. They are at a deadlock. I hope you do + not think you can settle this without us or, even less, that you can + settle it against us.” (Memoranda of conversation, January 23 and + 28; Foreign + Relations, 1969–1976, volume XIII, Soviet Union, + October 1970–October 1971, Documents 103 and 105)

+

P: Should we let the cable go?

+

K: I am afraid our only alternative is to do that. But someone else + should be put in charge. It’s moving too fast this weekend. Laird and Rogers are locked together. Therefore, I think for now + it is best to let the cable go with the changes I have suggested to + State plus a bid to get something from the Egyptians. The important + thing is to slow the process down for now.

+ +

P: All right Henry. Clear the cable but tell Sisco I don’t wish this to move to a blow-up with + Israel. Tell him to delay and filibuster to the extent possible. We must + be in a position to see what we can get. We should not be polemic or + abrasive. It cannot be helpful at this time to put pressure on Israel. + Can you talk to Sisco in this + way?Kissinger called Sisco at noon on February 28 and told him that he + had just spoken with the President. He reported to him that + Nixon was willing to + approve the cable, but that he did not want “an all out + confrontation” with Israel, and that he wanted the Department of + State to “cool the tone a little bit.” Sisco replied: “That is just what we are trying to + do.” Kissinger eventually + made further suggestions regarding changes in the telegram’s + language—which Sisco did not + accept—prompting Kissinger + to remark: “This is a head on confrontation. Joe could you explain + one thing to me? You know this will lead to imposed settlement. + Let’s not kid ourselves.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential + Materials, NSC Files, Henry Kissinger Telephone + Conversation Transcripts, Box 4, Chronological File) When they spoke + again on the telephone at 3:26 that afternoon, Kissinger asked: “Why do we have + to put out this cable?” Sisco responded: “We want to preempt the Soviets, + control reactions and reassure Egyptians. I have sent the cable. I + can tell you that. I think it is the right move.” (Ibid.)

+

K: We have no personal problem, just one of temperament.

+

P: What about the Soviets?

+

K: I think we should watch the four-power process.

+

P: Then go to the Israelis, let them know my position on the Golan + Heights and assure them I will support them.Kissinger telephoned + Rabin at 3:20 p.m. on + February 28 and told him that the President had asked him to tell + him that: “he [Nixon] is + doing what he can to ameliorate the excesses of some of the things + that are being proposed to you. It is very difficult for him but any + reaction you should keep in mind this fact. I am not saying you will + particularly like the reaction.” Rabin replied: “I know. Jarring is going to talk this afternoon to Sadat. I do not know in what way + Jarring will present our + position to Sadat. I see no + need for you to take a position before you know what the Egyptians + are going to do. I may be completely off base but Egypt is looking + for a way out and we have given them a way to get out of it—I am not + convinced that they will turn this down. But the United States + should not make a statement before they do know what Egypt’s + reaction will be.” (Ibid.)

+

K: That is where yesterday’s meetingSee Document 210. was not exactly + candid. State has told the Jordanians the territorial changes will be + very minor. We will have to reverse this.

+

P: Obviously we will have to handle the Jordanians in order to get a + settlement.

+

K: The four-power process must be slowed down.

+

P: How?

+

K: I will talk to Sisco.

+

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to the Middle East.]

+ +

P: Going back to the Middle East, be sure and sit on this problem. Tell + Sisco to go slow and talk to + Dobrynin at the right + moment. Tell Sisco to buy time. + He should reassure the Israelis on the Heights and we will have to push + the King right to the brink. With the Egyptians we will have to put in + our weight against the Soviets. Get everyone talking this way. I am + convinced that State knows they are at a deadend. You tell Rabin I am watching. That I will not + hurt Israel. I am their friend. I will be the buffer for them. Tell them + about the Heights. Do not allow State to do anything precipitous.

+

K: Mutual confidence is the issue.

+

P: I will get them the arms but only if they are reasonable.

+
+ +
+ 213. Telegram From the Department of State to the Interests Section in + the United Arab Republic, the Mission to the United Nations, and the + Embassy in IsraelSource: + National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box + 129, Country Files, Middle East. Secret; Immediate; Nodis; Cedar. + Drafted by Sisco, cleared by + Kissinger, and approved + by Rogers. Repeated + Immediate to Amman and to Beirut, London, Moscow, and + Paris. + Washington, February 28, 1971, + 1738Z. +

33796. 1. You will have seen the Israeli reply and our preliminary + reaction that it is unresponsive and unsatisfactory.See Document 211. + Jarring’s reaction has been + equally negative, and he has asked the Israelis to reconsider their + reply, particularly para 4,Paragraph 4 + reads: “Withdrawal of Israel armed forces from the Israel-U.A.R. + cease-fire line to the secure, recognized and agreed boundaries to + be established in the peace agreement. Israel will not withdraw to + the pre-June 5, 1967 lines.” See footnote 2, + Document 211. since he feels Israelis have not + responded specifically to principal question put to them re borders. We + understand Jarring is holding + off giving the Israeli reply to the UAR + for the weekend pending Israeli reconsideration. He informed Israelis + that if he transmits Israeli reply to UAR in its present form this will create major impasse, + place in jeopardy his entire mission, and probably lead to an early + SC meeting. After a high-level + review here this morning, we called the Israelis and urged + reconsideration as requested by Jarring. Rabin + has made it clear that it is unlikely that any change in Israeli + position will be forthcoming at present time.

+ +

2. In light foregoing, our principal objective is to:

+

(A) Take such interim steps that might help in achieving an extension of + the cease-fire; and (B) keep UAR + reaction within manageable proportions while we continue efforts at a + subsequent stage to secure a more forthcoming Israeli position. Cairo + will undoubtedly need something in order to keep matters within + reasonable confines and provide rationale for extension of + cease-fire.

+

3. We have in mind the following scenario on which we request comments of + addressees soonest:

+

A. We have weighed relative utility of SC + and use of Four Powers and find choice between the two relatively evenly + balanced. On one hand even though Israelis will not like it, SC would probably give them less concern + than Four Powers since they would view Four Power communiqué as first + step towards imposed settlement. On other hand, SC debate would force parties to make statements which + would tend to rigidify their positions, particularly with Syria as + member of SC, and could lead to a longer + hiatus in Jarring Mission. While + we are sure French and Soviets will give us plenty of trouble in Four, + we feel that it may prove more manageable than SC if we go to UAR in + first instance and see whether we can develop agreement on parameters of + a possible Four Power statement. If we find that this is not possible, + we would have to fall back to SC and do + best we can in keeping resolution reasonable.

+

B. On the assumption GOI reply remains + as it is, Jarring can be + expected to give it to UAR on Monday. + We therefore would discuss with UAR on + Monday a possible short-term course which offers some hope of extending + the cease-fire and keeping open avenue of negotiations. Bergus would be instructed to convey + following oral message from Secretary to FM Riad some time on + Monday:

+

(1) We have examined Israeli reply and we find Israel has not responded + to specific critical question posed by Jarring on question of borders. We intend to discuss + this matter further with Israel.

+

(2) We feel that latest UAR position is + positive and regret that Israeli reply has not advanced matters. We feel + it is all important, however, if we are to proceed further and if our + on-going efforts are to be effective no precipitate action be taken by + UAR which could exacerbate + situation, increase tension and foreclose possibility of further + progress.

+

(3) We appreciate fully difficult position which Cairo finds itself in at + present time. We wish to discuss with them what we can do to help + maintain a reasonably favorable climate which will provide basis for an + extension of a cease-fire while our further efforts continue.

+ +

(4) We are prepared to support a Four Power statementAccording to Bush, U + Thant, Jarring, + the Soviet Union, and France had urged the Four Powers to meet as + early as March 1 or 2 to discuss and release a communiqué before the + Secretary General published his report on Jarring’s recent activity, but the + United States resisted, refusing to be “stampeded” into advancing + the meeting and thereby “take the lead away” from U Thant. (Telegram 627 from USUN, March 6; National Archives, + Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC + Files, Box 656, Country Files, Middle East, Middle East + Nodis/Cedar/Plus, Vol. I) The Four Powers eventually met to discuss + the communiqué on March 4, but the conversation stalled over the + Soviet Union’s refusal to include direct or indirect reference to an + extension of the cease-fire, as reported by Bush. (Telegram 616 from USUN, March 4; ibid.) They met again + on March 5 but made no further progress, prompting the Department to + write to the Mission: “We assume question of communiqué is dead. If + raised please indicate matter has been overtaken by events and US no + longer prepared to participate in any further effort to issue + communiqué.” (Telegram 40734 to USUN, March 11; ibid., Box 1158, Saunders Files, Middle + East Negotiations Files, Middle East Negotiations—Four Power + Talks) along the following lines as a follow up to a report + by Secretary General on the current state of Jarring’s efforts.The Secretary General submitted his report on March + 5, the conclusion of which began: “Ambassador Jarring has been very active over + the past month and some further progress has been made towards a + peaceful solution of the Middle East question. The problems to be + settled have been more clearly identified and on some there is + general agreement. I wish moreover to note with satisfaction the + positive reply given by the UAR to + Ambassador Jarring’s + initiative. However, the Israeli Government has so far not responded + to the request of Ambassador Jarring that it should give a commitment on + withdrawal to the international boundary of the United Arab + Republic. I therefore appeal to Israel to respond positively to + Ambassador Jarring’s + initiative.” He concluded with an “appeal to the parties to withhold + fire, to exercise military restraint and to maintain the quiet which + has prevailed in the area since August 1970.” (Telegram 614 from + USUN, March 4; ibid., Box 656, + Country Files, Middle East, Middle East Nodis/Cedar/Plus, Vol. + I) Statement follows:

+

The Permanent Representatives of France, the USSR, the U.S., and the U.K. met on March 4, 1971.

+

They noted with satisfaction the initiative undertaken on February 8 by + the Special Representative of the Secretary General, an initiative which + they consider to be fully in accord with his mission under Security + Council Resolution 242.

+

They reaffirmed their support for Security Council Resolution 242 and the + efforts of the Special Representative and expressed the view that the + parties should cooperate with and respond positively to him.

+

They welcomed the positive UAR reply to + the Special Representative and expressed the hope that Israel will soon + make a similar positive reply.

+

They agreed to continue their preliminary examination of various possible + supplementary guarantees. They expressed their willingness to play a + responsible and cooperative role in keeping the peace arrived at through + negotiation between the parties.

+

They expressed the hope that in order to facilitate the mission of the + Special Representative the parties will continue to withhold fire, exercise military restraint, and + maintain the quiet which has prevailed in the area since August 1970. + End statement.Bergus delivered Rogers’s oral message to Riad on March 1 and met + with him for 70 minutes. Much of their meeting was taken up by the + Foreign Minister’s “lengthy statement” in which he said that the + United States had to “face facts” regarding Israel’s commitment to + expansion rather than peace, as demonstrated by its “flat rejection + of withdrawal as a matter of principle” in its response to Jarring. He added that there was + “no doubt in Cairo and in all other world capitals” that if the + United States wanted to “persuade” Israel to withdraw from the Sinai + Peninsula for peace with the United Arab Republic it could “easily + be done.” Regarding Rogers’s + message, Riad remarked that “there was little new” in it, and, as + for the Four-Power communiqué that the United States was prepared to + support, he said that it was “not helpful.” Continuing, he told + Bergus that his + government could not “accept the proposition that it should extend + ceasefire and then wait and see what Israelis will do,” although he + clarified that “this did not necessarily mean Egyptians would start + shooting.” Finally, he concluded that he would “accept guarantees + only for June 4 borders, not rpt not for anything else” and reserved + the right to “withdraw his support for concept at some future time” + given the opposition he faced to the issue of guarantees. (Telegrams + 422 and 423 from Cairo, March 1; ibid., Kissinger Office Files, Box + 129, Country Files, Middle East)

+

4. If we can achieve common ground with UAR and others along above lines, we would wish to consider + whether time ripe to try out separate Suez Canal proposal within + framework of Sadat-Meir public statements.

+

5. In order to minimize any misunderstanding with Israelis, we would + inform them we believe above course best designed to provide basis for + extension of cease-fire and keep door open for further negotiations at + next stage.

+

6. We will undoubtedly be bombarded on Monday by press and are developing + appropriate press line. We are also planning on steps to begin to keep + key members of Congress fully informed.

+

7. Request addressees comments.Comments are + in telegram 1198 from Tel Aviv, February 28 (ibid., RG 59, Central + Files 1970–73, POL 27–14 ARAB–ISR); telegram 1070 from Amman, March + 1 (ibid., Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 129, Country + Files, Middle East—Nodis/Cedar/Plus); telegram 1613 from Beirut, + March 1 (ibid.); and telegram 1245 from Moscow, March 1 + (ibid.). No action should be taken with government to which + you accredited without further department instructions.

+ + + Rogers + + +
+ +
+ + 214. Paper Prepared by the National Security Council StaffSource: National Archives, Nixon + Presidential Materials, NSC Files, + Box 1161, Saunders Files, Middle East Negotiations Files, Jarring Talks Edited and Indexed, + March 1–4, 1971. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Saunders. All brackets are in the + original. + Washington, + March 2, 1971. +

OPTIONS IN BREAKING THE IMPASSE

+

The present situationReference is to the + general dismay, especially within the Department of State and the + United Nations and in the Middle East, to Israel’s response to + Jarring that it would + not withdraw to pre-June 5, 1967, borders. is well known to + you. There is no point in describing it.

+

For the purpose of focusing discussion on central issues, the two main issues are:

+

—what approach to make to Israel in the light of its response to + Jarring + and

+

—how to posture ourselves toward the USSR, not only in response to Kosygin’s letterIn his + February 26 letter to Nixon, + Kosygin wrote that over + the previous few weeks “one was getting the impression that in the + matter of political settlement in the Middle East a certain + breakthrough was about to emerge towards solution of that problem.” + He further commented that the breakthrough “was the result of a + constructive position of the United Arab Republic whose government + had displayed high responsibility” by taking a position conducive to + reaching an agreement. The Soviet Premier then expressed + disappointment over Israel’s “defiant statement declaring its + refusal to withdraw troops from the occupied territory of the UAR,” + given previous assurances from U.S. officials that the United States + “stood for the withdrawal of Israeli troops.” Thus, because of the + U.S. Government’s “more than adequate means of influence” over + Israeli policy, he concluded that it was “impossible even to imagine + that Israel could take such an obstructionist, bluntly expansionist + position if that were in contradiction to the true aims of American + policy.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 490, President’s Trip + Files, Dobrynin/Kissinger Vol. 4) For Kissinger’s summary and analysis + of the letter, see Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, volume + XIII, Soviet Union, October 1970–October 1971, Document + 130. but more fundamentally toward Soviet + involvement in the peacemaking process and the Soviet combat presence in + the UAR.

+

These issues are related in two ways:

+

—The Israelis will regard the Soviet strength that remains after any + settlement as the most serious threat to Israeli security.

+

—If the US is to get the Soviet combat presence removed from the UAR, + Israeli withdrawal from the Sinai is its principal bargaining card.

+

Below are discussed the principal options in dealing with each of these + issues and the arguments for and against them.

+ +

Possible Approaches to Israel

+

1. Comprehensive approach. In Rogers-Rabin and Barbour-Eban (or + Meir) talks, this US position + would be taken:

+

—The US position since 1967 has been based on the assumption that + Israel’s main objective has been security, not territory per se. The US + has held out for a loophole in Resolution 242 language—on withdrawal—to + “secure and recognized borders”—primarily because of Jerusalem, Golan + Heights and the need for some modifications in the Israel-Jordan lines. + But apart from special security arrangements in Gaza and at Sharm + al-Shaikh, the US never envisioned major territorial acquisition, and + this view was based on US-Israeli exchanges in June 1967.For example, see ibid., 1964–1968, volume XIX, Arab-Israeli + Crisis and War, 1967, Documents 227, 263, and 290.

+

—For a peace agreement built on that kind of map, the US would be + prepared to offer the following: assurance of long-term military supply + and financial support; US troops as part of a peacekeeping force at + Sharm al-Shaikh (as a substitute for Israeli forces); formal provision + for bilateral consultation on defense of Israel.

+

—The US asks Israel to take a position that will permit this kind of + settlement. The US recognizes that this will require a fundamental + change in Israeli government policy—a return to its policy of June 1967. + But in the interests of peace, the US asks Israel to make that change. + Once the change is made, the US is willing to work closely on a + diplomatic strategy for getting the best possible agreement in + return.

+

—The implication would be delicately left that if Israel did not make + that change in policy, the nature of continuing US support would be left + in doubt.

+

The arguments for this approach are:

+

—If we try to deal with the situation tactically, we will always come + back to the major obstacle that Israel is really negotiating for + territory.

+

—US policy since 1967 has been based on the assumption that, in return + for the right peace and security commitments, Israel would go back to + something approximating pre-war borders. If that is an erroneous + assumption, this should be clarified. A direct approach is the only way + to get this out into the open.

+

—A precise description of what the US is prepared to offer in the long + run could help increase the flexibility of the Israeli position, + especially if tacitly juxtaposed to the possibility that US support + might be minimized.

+ +

—The US has never believed that peace would be possible if Israel sought + territory. Allowing major border changes, even if they were possible, + would just sow the seeds of the next war.

+

—While a heart-to-heart talk of this kind could produce a major Israeli + confrontation, this may be the last good chance for peace in some + time.

+

The arguments against this approach are:

+

—This is too much for the Israelis to swallow all at once. We should do + everything possible to help the Israelis deal with this problem a step + at a time.

+

—If we lose this confrontation with the Israelis where are we? Can we + really afford to give the UAR and + USSR the satisfaction of seeing + Israel divided from its main source of support?

+

—Since the Israelis are unlikely to move all the way at once and are + likely to counter with some tactical move at best, we should start on a + tactical track and avoid a confrontation.

+

2. Tactical approach. The US could stop short of + asking Israel now to give up its aspiration to major border changes and + urge Israel to make some tactical move to advance negotiations another + step.

+

—Israel might tell Jarring that + it is prepared to take a specific position on borders and security + arrangements in the Sinai and will send Foreign Minister Eban to New York for this purpose. The + US might promise only that it would urge the UAR to respond by attempting to narrow any gap on security + arrangements. The US would reserve its present position on borders but + accept an Israeli strategy, for a time, of taking a hard stand on + borders to elicit the best possible UAR + position on security arrangements.

+

—It might also be possible in this connection to try to activate the + scheme for the partial withdrawal from the Suez Canal, although the + Arabs might reject that as diversionary.

+

—It might be possible to stretch out phasing of the implementation of a + settlement so that the Israelis would have some evidence of Arab + performance before they had to withdraw to borders that would be + difficult for them to agree on.

+

The arguments for this approach are:

+

—We must find a way to turn this into a step-by-step process for Israel. + If there is any chance at all of Israeli withdrawal, it is in a gradual + process over time in which the Arabs have a chance to persuade the + Israelis of their good faith.

+

—The Israelis themselves, even apart from their efforts to negotiate + border changes, must be working with some sort of strategy in mind for + getting the UAR to stop imposing short + cease-fire deadlines and for + trying to get the best possible trade for what territory they give up. + Rather than have a confrontation, we ought to tune ourselves to Israeli + tactics insofar as possible.

+

The arguments against this approach are:

+

—The Arabs would have great difficulty accepting either the idea of + negotiating with Eban for their + territory or of drawing out withdrawal over too long a period.

+

—The US would still be in a position of trying to build a settlement on + an unreal assumption (that Israel is prepared to pull back to pre-war + lines).

+

3. Compromising with Israeli strategy. It would be + possible to tell the Israelis that we want to work closely with them but + to do so we will have to know what their real objectives are. This + approach could lead in one or both of two directions:

+

—It could produce an essentially US-Israeli negotiation on the terms of a + settlement.

+

—It could lead to a change in the US position on the terms of a + settlement the US would support.

+

This is already being discussed in our own councils in the following way: + If we were to tell the Israelis that we will not hold them to near-total + withdrawal from the West Bank provided they accept the international + border with Egypt, that would amount to a fundamental change in + previously stated US policy.

+

The argument for this approach is that it may be + the only realistic way to move toward a settlement. It is possible that, + if we knew the full Israeli position, there are elements in the US + position that might reasonably be changed.

+

The argument against this approach is that the + weight of public positions taken—including the US position in voting for + Resolution 242—and the weight of what seems necessary for peace make it + very difficult to change the US position on the territorial + settlement.

+

Possible Stances Toward the USSR

+

1. Comprehensive approach. In responding to + Chairman Kosygin’s letter and in + a Rogers-Dobrynin conversation, the US would + make clear that the introduction of Soviet combat forces into the UAR has created a major obstacle to + Israeli withdrawal from the Sinai and that assurance on the withdrawal + of those combat forces is essential to a settlement. [The objective + would be to add whatever we were able to get to the list of inducements + offered to Israel.]

+

The general argument for some such approach is + that the USSR is taking a free + propaganda ride at the moment and should not be allowed to get + completely off the defensive. The fact remains that the Soviet combat presence in the area is + still the issue of paramount concern to us.

+

The argument for this specific approach now is that a strong US position + on this subject will be necessary providing Israel with maximum + inducement to cooperate with us.

+

The argument against such an approach is that it + implies that Israel might be persuaded to withdraw from all of the Sinai + if the Soviets made such a commitment. It is a toss-up which side is + less likely to take such a step, but it would be dangerous for the US to + put itself in a position of implying Israeli withdrawal before we know + whether it is possible.

+

2. Approach for the record. If it is going too far + at this stage to press for Soviet assurance on reduction of combat + forces, then a minimal approach—if this subject is to be dealt with at + all—would be to reply to Kosygin + noting the responsibility of the USSR + for complicating negotiations between the parties by introducing Soviet + combat forces.

+

The argument for this approach is that we should + at least begin building a record on this subject. It is important to us. + Several Presidential statements have mentioned it. It is time to + introduce it into the negotiations.

+

The argument against is that it will be difficult + enough to negotiate an Arab-Israeli settlement without introducing this + US-Soviet issue. It would be better to concentrate on a settlement and + let this follow.

+

3. Leave the issue aside. A third approach would + be to concentrate on an Egyptian-Israeli settlement in the conviction + that the Egyptians themselves will ease the Soviet combat forces out as + soon as possible after a settlement.

+

The argument for this approach is that an + Arab-Israeli settlement would permit the UAR to ease the Soviets out over time. The Egyptians + themselves are prepared to do this, but they need an Israeli settlement + first. That should be our overriding concern.

+

The argument against is that the Egyptians have + some gratitude for Soviet support and are unlikely to deprive the USSR of anything it really wants, e.g., + an air squadron for surveillance of the Sixth Fleet.

+
+ +
+ + 215. Telegram From the Department of State to the Interests Section in + the United Arab RepublicSource: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 656, Country Files, + Middle East, Middle East Nodis/Cedar/Plus, Vol. I. Secret; Flash; + Nodis; Cedar Plus. Repeated Priority to Tel Aviv and to USUN. + Washington, March 7, 1971, 0521Z. +

38131. For Bergus.

+

1. We request you see Heikal + promptly before Sadat makes his + speech on Sunday.In his March 7 speech, + which was broadcast over UAR radio + and television, Sadat + declared that he would not extend the cease-fire along the Suez + Canal, which would expire that evening. He said that the United Arab + Republic would nonetheless continue to participate in ongoing + diplomatic efforts to achieve a settlement with Israel. (New York Times, March 8, 1971, p. 1) + We feel that Sadat, as a result + of his trip to Moscow,According to telegram + 477 from Cairo, March 6, Sadat was in Moscow from March 1 to 2, where he had + “intensive talks with Soviet leaders.” (National Archives, Nixon + Presidential Materials, NSC Files, + Box 1161, Saunders Files, Middle East Negotiations Files, Middle + East—Jarring Talks + Edited and Indexed, March 5–11, 1971) has made up his mind in + concert with USSR to go ahead along + the lines indicated and nothing short of our being able to deliver a + categoric Israeli yes answer to the latest Jarring initiative would result in any change in his + position for the time being. We feel, however, that a brief interim + hand-holding sort of message might help in a very marginal sort of + way.

+

2. As we analyze the Sadat + letter,Sadat’s letter, written in response to Bergus’s presentation to Heikal on March 4 (as reported in + telegram 454 from Cairo, March 4; ibid., Kissinger Office Files, Box + 129, Country Files, Middle East, Middle East—Nodis/Cedar/Plus), was + handed to the Ambassador in Cairo shortly before midnight on March + 5. As instructed by Sisco in + telegram 36085 to Cairo, March 3, Bergus had relayed the message that the United + States intended to continue its efforts “to bring about a peaceful + settlement” in the Middle East but that the United Arab Republic + should understand that it would “take time for Israeli leadership + and the Israeli people to fully fathom and comprehend the + significance of the positive move” that it had made. (Ibid., Box + 1161, Saunders Files, Middle East Negotiations Files, Middle + East—Jarring Talks + Edited and Indexed, March 1–4, 1971) In his March 5 letter, + Sadat wrote that it was + shocking that the United States, “as it appeared to us from this + message, is waiting for the Israeli statesmen and the Israeli people + to understand our constructive stand, but they do not adequately + assess, we feel, the explosive psychological burden which our people + bear as a result of their territory’s continuing under the yoke of + occupation.” (Telegram 478 from Cairo, March 6; ibid., Box 656, + Country Files, Middle East, Middle East Nodis/Cedar/Plus, Vol. + I) we believe it is a manifestation of his present + ambivalence; regardless of his close ties to the Soviets, he does not + feel that the Soviets can produce Israeli withdrawal. On the other hand, + we have indicated to him that we are going to continue our efforts with + both sides to try to achieve progress, but he knows we have not been + able to produce Israel thus far and cannot be expected to produce + results on the basis of Sadat’s + self-created deadlines. His ambivalence is also reflected in tough talk on the one + hand and yet an almost plaintive plea to the U.S. indicating an + unwillingness to close any doors with us.

+

3. Though we obviously do not agree, we know reasoning behind UAR and USSR decision for a non-extension of the ceasefire. Foreign + Minister Riad has said time and time again that the only thing that will + work with the U.S. is pressure applied in circumstances where the + tensions are high and where U.S. fears renewal of hostilities. Sadat knows that general view of the + world, and in particular ours, has been that he has no desire to resume + the shooting. He undoubtedly realizes that threat to renew fighting over + past months has not been a very credible one, and posture of + non-extension is an attempt to recreate that as more credible option and + to concert with USSR on increased + pressure on U.S. in climate of a threat to open hostilities.

+

4. All of the above is by way of background, but we want you to have the + benefit of our thinking in this regard. We feel that you should see + Heikal immediately and make + the following points orally (do not leave any paper), which we hope will + as a minimum underscore to Sadat + our continuing desire to play a constructive role which he acknowledges + as a fact.

+

A. You should tell Heikal that + President Sadat’s message is + being given the most careful study and consideration. We appreciate + fully the sense of urgency which President Sadat feels since we recognize that the positive move + made by the UAR recently has provided a + new opportunity for progress. We regret, however, that President + Sadat will not find it + possible to extend the ceasefire, for we continue to feel that the + efforts to achieve a peaceful settlement can best go forward without + deadlines. In any event, we hope he would make his intention clear to + heed SYG’s appeal to Quote withhold fire, to exercise military + restraint, and to maintain the quiet which has prevailed in the area + since August 1970 Unquote.The quote is from + the Secretary General’s official report on Jarring’s activities. See footnote 5, Document 213. All the + broad support which the recent UAR move + has generated in the world would be dispelled if UAR resumes shooting.

+

B. We intend to continue our efforts with both sides to help achieve a + peace agreement because this is in our mutual interest.

+

C. You should point out that we are fully aware of the importance which + the UAR attaches to the question of + guarantees and for this reason we agreed to start talks in the Four and + to continue to develop our ideas in this regard.

+

D. Finally, we note that President Sadat has said that the door is open with respect to + Suez Canal proposal. You should first recall to Heikal that + on February 13 we conveyed an Israeli message to the UAR.The message, which was conveyed to Sisco by Rabin during a meeting at the + State Department on February 12, stated: “We are willing to discuss + with Egypt arrangements for the opening of the Canal, even as a + subject to be treated separately from other issues. The unknown + elements in Sadat’s proposal + are more than those specified, and we welcome the readiness of the + US as expressed by Mr. Sisco + in the conversation of February 8 that the US is ready to use its + good offices for a detailed clarification of the subject. We have + taken that President Sadat, + too, wishes to engage in a clarification process. USG is requested to transmit this, our + position to President Sadat.” + (Israel State Archive, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 5252/7) + We had hoped and expected a reply from the UAR and when no such further indications had come we had + thought UAR had lost interest. You + should tell Heikal that we + welcome indication that this avenue is still open and as a result we are + examining what may be possible in this regard and would also welcome + UAR views.Bergus met + with Heikal on the morning + of March 7 and delivered orally points A–D. When the Ambassador + recalled a previous remark by Mahmoud + Riad that the end of the cease-fire “did not + necessarily mean that GUAR would + stop shooting,” Heikal + responded that, while it “would not start shooting right away,” he + “doubted this position could be held for very long.” Heikal also said that, if + Nixon could give + Sadat a “firm pledge that + USG would support Jarring’s request that Israel + withdraw from Gaza and Sinai,” Nixon could prevent Sadat from being “increasingly isolated and overcome + by Egyptian hawks.” (Telegram 490 from Cairo, March 7; National + Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1161, Saunders Files, Middle East + Negotiations Files, Middle East Edited and Indexed, March 5–11, + 1971) In a follow-up telegram sent that afternoon, Bergus reported Sadat’s reaction, as presented by + Heikal, to the + Ambassador’s comments that morning: Sadat wanted the United States to know that “he + still considers his initiative on the Suez Canal to be valid,” that + it would “offer the necessary formula for the United Arab Republic, + the United States, “and others’ to move out of the present impasse,” + and that it would also be “a test of all three parties’ intentions.” + (Telegram 491 from Cairo, March 7; ibid.)

+ + + Rogers + + +
+ +
+ + 216. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security + Affairs (Kissinger) to President + NixonSource: National Archives, Nixon + Presidential Materials, NSC Files, + Kissinger Office Files, Box 129, Country Files, Middle East. Secret; + Nodis; Cedar. Sent for information. A stamped notation on the + memorandum indicates the President saw it. + Washington, + March 9, 1971. + + SUBJECT + State Department Game Plan on the Middle East + +

Here is the State Department’s game plan which we requested for trying to + break the Arab-Israeli impasse.According to + Haldeman, Kissinger and Haig called him on March 6 and 7, + respectively, “worried about the developing situation vis-à-vis + Rogers again.” He wrote + in his diary: “Apparently, he’s [Rogers] moving to take some unilateral action on the + Middle East that Henry feels would be disastrous, and that the + P[resident] has ordered covered by a senior review group which + Rogers is going to + bypass, apparently. Haig + suggested we try to outfox Rogers’ maneuver by putting a special meeting on + this right at the tail end of the NSC tomorrow, which I told him to go ahead and try to + set up.” (Haldeman Diaries: Multimedia Edition, March + 7, 1971)

+

The details of the proposal are in the attached summary. The essence of + the proposal is an approach to the Israelis asking them to make a + fundamental change in their policy to accept the 1969 US position on + boundaries in return for substantial and concrete assurances of + continuing US support.

+

The procedure for approaching the Israelis would be for Secretary + Rogers first to call in + Ambassador Rabin and for + Ambassador Barbour then to follow + up with a parallel presentation to Foreign Minister Eban. Neither you nor Prime Minister + Meir would be directly + involved at this first stage.

+

The advantages of this paper are:

+

—It is a game plan for one possible course of action which has often been + advocated. It enables you to see what an all-out effort to move Israel + would look like and to assess its chances of success.

+

—The proposed approach would let the Israelis know what the US is for, + not just what we are against. The Israelis seem unlikely to make + piecemeal concessions in the absence of understanding what Israel can + count on from the US in return. Getting all the cards on the table could + help them develop a total position that could be presented in Israel as + a package to assure Israel’s security and US support.

+

—It contains a substantial carrot in the form of security assurances the + US would offer Israel in a settlement. There is the implication of the + stick in the probability that we would not provide them if Israel failed + to change its policy as we + requested. However, the carrot is more prominent.

+

The disadvantages of this plan are:

+

—This procedure would result in a major approach to the Israelis that + they have almost no choice but to reject. It would ask them to accept US + positions which they have already rejected. You will recall the violent + Israeli reaction of January 1970 against the US positions of the + previous October and December.See Documents 58 and 78. For the Israeli reaction, see footnote 6, Document 84.

+

—The US-Israeli confrontation that would result would make achieving a + settlement even more difficult than it already is. It might provoke such + a negative Israeli reaction and stalemate in the Jarring talks that the ceasefire would + be jeopardized in a short time. If Israel remained adamant in resisting + the US approach, the US choice would be to back down or to show the + USSR/UAR that we were separating ourselves from Israel. Chances of + reducing the Soviet presence would be reduced.

+

—The implications of this approach are that the changes in the West Bank + border and in the Golan Heights border would be minimal.

+

An alternative to this approach would be to press + the partial withdrawal from the Suez Canal in order to buy time. This + might permit the Israelis to establish direct contact with the UAR, + which they want. This would give them a chance to test UAR intentions. Meanwhile, it would give + us a way of avoiding confrontation, restoring Israeli confidence in us + and then exploring with them quietly positions that might be negotiable + on some of the other issues.

+

I personally feel that a confrontation with Israel now would virtually + end chances of any negotiated Arab-Israeli arrangement for the next year + or so.At 5 p.m. on March 9, Rogers held a meeting in his + office with Laird, Sisco, Kissinger, Helms, and Moorer to discuss this issue. + Moorer drafted a + memorandum of the conversation, but because he arrived a half hour + late his record is incomplete. (National Archives, Nixon + Presidential Materials, NSC Files, + Box 647, Country Files, Middle East, Middle East (General)) In a + memorandum to the President, March 10, Kissinger wrote: “The meeting went just about as + expected. Secretary Rogers, + supported by Secretary Laird, pushed hard for its approval, with the full + realization that the scheme means a total confrontation with Israel. + This outcome was understood by all of the attendees.” (Ibid., + Kissinger Office Files, Box 129, Country Files, Middle East) On + March 8, Kissinger had told + Haldeman that he did not + want to attend the meeting “because if he ends up in agreement with + Rogers’ position, then + he and Rogers will confront + the P[resident] with a lack of options, and he’ll [Kissinger] have to go along even + if he has a different view.” Kissinger further explained that “if he disagrees + with Rogers, he’ll then be + in a position of having to force the P[resident], or try to, to his + position.” (Haldeman Diaries: Multimedia Edition, March + 8, 1971) I share the view expressed in the State Department + paper that we do not want to lose the opportunity of the present moment. I fear the approach to + Israel described in the game plan would produce the result no one here + wants.In a conversation with the + President in the Oval Office that afternoon, Kissinger told Nixon: “My view is that I just + can’t go on under these conditions. You will just lose control. And + the next issue is going to be as hard as this one, so I might as + well draw the line now.” He continued: “But the really basic point, + Mr. President, is that I feel that if a Presidential assistant, for + whatever reason, becomes himself such a controversial figure, and if + the bureaucracy continually challenges him even if he’s totally + right, I think then one should seriously consider leaving. This has + nothing to do with right or wrong, but I think the necessity of + Presidential assistants is that they have to speak for the President + without challenge.” Later he added: “And that doesn’t mean it’s + anybody’s fault. I understand Rogers’s view, and I know he’s got proud people at + State, and I have as much ego as anybody else, but I really believe + that it might be in the interest of everybody if we began to think + of a terminal date for my stay here.” (National Archives, Nixon + Presidential Materials, White House Tapes, Oval Office, Conversation + No. 464–17)

+

Whether or not this alternative could succeed would depend on whether it + is correct to judge that Sadat + can work with anything less than an Israeli commitment now to total + withdrawal. Given uncertainty on that point, the only way to find out is + to test his position by having a specific Israeli proposal put to him. + Given the certainty of Israeli reaction to a major effort to change + Israel’s position, such an approach to the UAR would seem a worthwhile risk.

+

+ Attachment +

+

SUMMARY

+

Following are the two main elements in the State Department proposal:

+

1. Israel would be urged to accept the following + positions:

+

—Sharm al-Shaikh. An Israeli presence at Sharm + al-Shaikh will be unacceptable to the UAR. Israel’s security concerns + there can be fully met by American military participation in a UN presence there. Termination of that + force should be barred for a specific period (e.g., five years) and + subject thereafter to approval of the Security Council. We would not + exclude using our veto to prevent such termination.

+

—Security arrangements and DMZ’s. The parties + should be given a free hand and a reasonable opportunity to come to + grips themselves in the Jarring + talks with the problems of security arrangements and DMZ’s. No + reasonable option should be excluded from discussion, including: + demilitarization of most of Sinai and inclusion of Israeli and UAR representatives under a UN umbrella in any system for verification. + An effective mechanism could be devised which would engage the major + powers and at the same time avoid placing Soviet forces on Israel’s + borders. We would envision an overall UN + peacekeeping mechanism with + both major and small powers represented in the headquarters but with + observer units on the ground along the UAR-Israeli border limited to + representatives of small powers (e.g., Dutch, Danes, Canadians). We + would support one of the following two alternatives on demilitarization: + (a) Israel would accept the presence of UN observers on its territory if Egypt accepts total or + almost total demilitarization of the Sinai; (b) if Egypt is willing to + accept only a more limited area of demilitarization on its side of the + border we would not press Israel to accept demilitarization or a UN force on its side.

+

—Gaza. Israel should have a voice in determining + the final disposition of Gaza which at a minimum would bar its return to + UAR control and the introduction of + any Arab military or para-military forces. It would be supervised by a + UN force made up of small powers. We + would favor Jordanian acquisition of Gaza but would not exclude an + interim UN administration.

+

—Freedom of Navigation. We would support the + absolute right of Israel in parity with other nations to freedom of + navigation through the Suez Canal and the Straits of Tiran.

+

—Refugees. A solution allowing for return of + refugees to Israel only in such numbers and at such rates as are + satisfactory to it. We would support an understanding that Israel would + be expected to accept no more than 100,000.

+

—West Bank. Anomalies in the border should be + corrected and considerations of local security and of administrative and + economic convenience should be taken into account in making + “insubstantial alterations.” Such alterations should be based on the + 1949 armistice lines and could not encompass retention of Israeli + positions on the Jordan River. The entire West Bank should be + demilitarized. The parties should be given reasonable opportunity to + work out security arrangements for verifying demilitarization and + controlling fedayeen activities on the West Bank, perhaps with joint + Jordanian-Israeli arrangements under some kind of UN umbrella. If that did not work out, we + would support a UN force consisting of + small power representatives with the same guarantees against termination + as in the case of the UAR border and + Sharm al-Shaikh.

+

—Jerusalem. The city should be united with free + access and movement within the city. There must be administrative + arrangements which will leave Israel in a position to assure that these + principles are not violated while giving Jordan a meaningful role in the + administration and economy of the Arab part of the city.

+

—Golan Heights. We would continue to hold that + there is no basis for taking up the question of a Syrian-Israeli + settlement in the absence of Syrian acceptance of Resolution 242. If the + Syrians did join the negotiations, we would support the principle that + in negotiations Israel has a + right to seek some alteration of the Syrian-Israeli boundary to assure + Israel a permanent position on the Golan Heights.

+

—Negotiating procedures. We would support + immediate escalation of negotiations to the foreign minister level.

+

2. If Israel were prepared to concur in these positions, the US would enter bilateral arrangements with Israel + as follows:

+

—Long-term arrangements to satisfy Israeli arms requirements under + generous financial terms within the context of any arms limitation + agreements to which Israel and its neighbors might subscribe. + Specifically: delivery beginning this July of the F–4 and A–4 aircraft + Israel has requested; $500 million in military sales credits in FY 1972; $500 million in credit and grant + in FY 1973.

+

—Further unilateral US declarations in support of Israel’s security by + both the Executive and the Congressional branches.

+

—Formalization of bilateral defense consultations against the contingency + that the peace settlement appears on the verge of breaking down. + Specifically: (a) a commitment formalized by exchange of letters between + the President and Prime Minister to consult on possible joint or + parallel action to be taken in the event Israeli security is + jeopardized; (b) a formal consultation arrangement between our military + representatives for the fullest possible exchange of intelligence + information on a continuing basis.

+

—Major US financial contribution to resettlement of refugees.

+

—A major US financial contribution to the conversion of the Israeli + economy to peace time lines and to regional development schemes.

+

—A US commitment to undertake diplomatic exchanges with the USSR to seek an understanding that a + final Arab-Israeli settlement would be paralleled by a US-Soviet + agreement not to base operational combat forces on the territory of + Israel or any neighboring Arab country. This would require that Soviet + air and ground operational units and personnel be withdrawn from the + UAR. This would not, however, be a precondition to a settlement along + the above lines.

+
+ +
+ + 217. Memorandum of ConversationSource: National Archives, Nixon Presidential + Materials, NSC Files, Box 656, + Country Files, Middle East, Middle East Nodis/Cedar/Plus, Vol. I. + Secret; Nodis; Cedar Plus. Drafted by Saunders on March 22. The meeting took place in + Kissinger’s office. All + brackets are in the original. + Washington, March 19, 1971, 12:50 + p.m. + + + PARTICIPANTS + Abba Eban, Foreign Minister + of Israel + Yitzhak Rabin, Ambassador + of Israel + David Rivlin, Secretary to the Foreign Minister + Shlomo Argov, Minister of + Israeli Embassy + Henry A. Kissinger, + Assistant to the President + Joseph J. Sisco, Assistant + Secretary of State + Harold H. Saunders, NSC Staff + +

After an exchange of pleasantries, Foreign Minister Eban said that the Prime Minister had + asked him to convey her respects both to Dr. Kissinger and to the President. He had + just concluded a talk with Secretary Rogers,Eban met with Rogers at 11 a.m. that morning for + an hour and 45 minutes. According to telegram 47428 to Tel Aviv, + March 20, the Secretary said that the United States and Israel + “differed on questions of emphasis and timing but not on basic + positions” and that “no agreement was acceptable” to the United + States that did not provide for “security for Israel in all of its + aspects, including Sharm el-Sheikh, Golan Heights, and West Bank.” + Rogers added that the + Nixon administration + recognized that it “could not force Israel to accept something + unacceptable from security standpoint.” It would not “press Israel,” + he said. (Ibid., Kissinger Office Files, Box 129, Country Files, + Middle East, Middle East—Nodis/Cedar/Plus) and he was sure + that Dr. Kissinger would be + receiving a full report on that, so he could be brief. His remarks are + concentrated on where we go from here. There are two problems: progress + in the Jarring mission and the + possibility of discussing a partial solution in connection with the + re-opening of the Suez Canal.

+

In connection with the Jarring + mission, the Foreign Minister had talked with Ambassador Jarring in New York.Eban met + separately with Jarring and + U Thant on March 18 to + discuss Israel’s position on withdrawal. (New York + Times, March 19, 1971, p. 1) He had made clear that + the Israeli position stands as stated in Israel’s February 26 memorandum + to the Ambassador.See Document 211. Israel felt that it was necessary to + state its position that way. Even with that statement of Israel’s + position, however, there are a number of things in Israel’s view that + Ambassador Jarring could do. For + instance, he could draft paragraphs on those issues on which there is + near harmony between the Egyptian and Israeli positions. Or, he could attempt to work from the + present statements of

+

Egyptian and Israeli positions on borders. Israel is prepared to detail + its position. Ambassador Jarring + could use such a device to begin a specific discussion on the border and + withdrawal issue.

+

The key to Israel’s position is that it cannot say that it will undertake + withdrawal of all of its troops to pre-war borders. There is one + specific sticking point—Sharm al-Shaikh, from which Israel cannot + withdraw.

+

Dr. Kissinger asked whether, in + the light of the Foreign Minister’s last comment, it is reasonable to + conclude that Israel means it wants Israeli forces at Sharm al-Shaikh + but would be willing to return to pre-war borders on all other + fronts.

+

The Foreign Minister replied that he could not go beyond his statement + about Sharm al-Shaikh. There are other issues, such as Israel’s role in + demilitarized zones, that remain to be specified. But Israel’s position + on Sharm al-Shaikh is already enough to preclude his saying that Israel + could accept return to pre-war borders.

+

Dr. Kissinger asked whether + Israel could say that it is prepared to go back to pre-war boundaries + everywhere except at Sharm al-Shaikh.

+

The Foreign Minister said that he would not be correct if he said that. + The Israeli position is not yet that concrete.

+

Dr. Kissinger asked the Foreign + Minister’s opinion on two propositions: (1) that Israel should tell the + US what its position is and (2) that Israel should tell Ambassador + Jarring something so that + there would exist an Israeli position on borders which he could use to + keep the negotiations alive.

+

The Foreign Minister said he had the impression that Ambassador Jarring is not interested in hearing + anything from Israel but acceptance of his memorandum seeking Israeli + agreement to withdraw to the international UAR-Israeli border. Jarring has certain suggestions that + Israel had put before him. One is that he try to have a concrete + discussion on the issue of withdrawal and boundaries.

+

Dr. Kissinger said he had never + understood whether Eban was + saying that Israel would not commit itself on withdrawal prior to + negotiations or whether Israel was saying that it would not ever commit + itself to withdrawal.

+

The Foreign Minister said that at the moment the first statement is + true—that Israel will not commit itself prior to negotiation. However, + later on if discussions begin, Sharm al-Shaikh will become a sticking + point. Also there will be other problems that will need to be + negotiated. But Sharm al-Shaikh is a “national sticking point.” Dr. + Kissinger asked whether this + was more of a sticking point than other possible issues. The Foreign + Minister said that Prime Minister Meir in her recent interviewReference is to a + March 12 interview that Meir + gave in her office in which she outlined her views on the borders + that should be established between Israel and its neighbors to + prevent another war between them. Specifically, she said that Israel + would not relinquish control of Sharm al-Sheikh, the Golan Heights, + and East Jerusalem; that the West Bank border would have to be + negotiated; and that Arab troops could not be free to cross the + Jordan River. (New York Times, March 13, + 1971, p. 1) had tried to indicate that there might be others, + but Sharm al-Shaikh is “on top of the list.” Many national interests + converge at that geographic point. For the moment however the principal + Israeli concern is that Israel be given freedom to negotiate.

+

Dr. Kissinger asked why it would + not be possible for Israel to tell Jarring that it is prepared to discuss anything except + Sharm al-Shaikh. Eban replied + that Israel had not said it refuses to discuss any issue. Mr. Sisco said that the difficulty is that + we need a concrete proposition from Israel for discussion. Ambassador + Rabin said that Israel has + stated a concrete proposition—that there be no withdrawal to pre-1967 + lines. Moreover, Israel cannot say that Sharm al-Shaikh alone solves all + of Israel’s border problems.

+

The Foreign Minister said that the long and short of it is that Israel, + at this point, cannot give a more concrete definition of its position + than it has already stated.

+

Dr. Kissinger asked whether an + Israeli proposal on re-opening the Suez Canal fell in that category. The + Foreign Minister replied that Israel has received the working paper + passed to Ambassador Rabin by + Mr. Sisco.In telegram 38126 to Tel Aviv, March 7, the + Department reported the March 6 conversation between Sisco and Rabin during which the Assistant + Secretary “informally outlined some preliminary ideas” on reopening + the Suez Canal in conjunction with a partial Israeli withdrawal from + the Sinai Peninsula. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential + Materials, NSC Files, Box 658, + Country Files, Middle East, Middle East Nodis/Cedar/Plus, Vol. + IV) Israel has decided not to reply with a critical analysis + of that paper but to develop a paper of its own. In response to Dr. + Kissinger’s question, the + Foreign Minister said the Israeli paper would be ready in another week + or ten days.See footnote 2, Document 224. The Israeli bureaucracy + was working on the subject. [At this point there was a brief and + partially humorous exchange on the nature of bureaucracies.] The Foreign + Minister concluded his comment on the forthcoming proposal in connection + with partial withdrawal from the canal by saying that Israel recognized + it had to keep discussions going. It had taken the Egyptians three years + to decide that they must make a “peace agreement with Israel.” It may + take Egypt more time to adjust to the notion of Israel in borders + different from those of 1967.On March 17, + Sadat informed Bergus that Egypt, Syria, and + Libya would form a federal state called the United Arab Republic, + with each country having its own President and administration, but + with “top-level coordination” occurring “in some way” among the + three. The upshot was that the former United Arab Republic would + once again officially be referred to as Egypt. (Telegram 588 from + Cairo, March 17; National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, + NSC Files, Box 1162, Saunders + Files, Middle East Negotiations Files, Middle East—Jarring Talks, April 1–20, + 1971)

+ +

Dr. Kissinger asked what about + the proposition that unless the Egyptians can show some progress, they + are likely to relapse into a renewal of hostilities?

+

The Foreign Minister said he did not see any evidence that President + Sadat was preparing to move + in that direction. The US had done a good job on the military balance, + and there are ways Ambassador Jarring can move forward. He hoped that concrete + discussion on the issue of borders could move on. He had made + suggestions to Ambassador Jarring which had been passed on to the Egyptians, but + there had been no reply yet. If the UAR + asked Israel to give greater precision to its position on borders, that + would be a legitimate question to which Israel would have to + respond.

+

Dr. Kissinger said he saw two + problems:

+

—at what point Israel becomes more concrete with the UAR;

+

—at what point Israel becomes more concrete with the US about its + position.

+

The Foreign Minister said that he was obliged to point out that Israeli + thinking, when concrete, will not coincide with the US positions of + 1969. Israel hoped that the US would be prepared to look at the Israeli + positions with understanding. However, Israel would develop them out of + its own convictions and recognizing “the full implications of + solitude.”

+

Dr. Kissinger said he was sure + that Secretary Rogers had told + the Foreign Minister that there is no disposition in Washington to force + a confrontation with Israel. It would be presumptuous for the US to give + Israel its answer on how to balance territory and security. It is + difficult to resolve the questions of what is the best mix between + physical safety and the moral, bilateral, international and legal + guarantees that may also provide some measure of security. We need to + discuss this mixture with Israel.

+

The Foreign Minister replied that Israel is clear about one fact—that the + moral, legal and other such arrangements cannot be a substitute for + territory. What disturbs Israelis now is the apparent view that + geography does not matter. In the Israeli view it is not the only issue, + but it is “one of the things that matter” and Sharm al-Shaikh “matters + very much.”

+

Mr. Sisco said that he wanted to + make clear that whatever the US has said on specific guarantees, it is + important to understand the framework within which the US has been talking. The press in recent days + has spoken as if guarantees would be a substitute for a peace agreement + or a substitute for Israel’s own means for self-defense. That is + incorrect. The US has always spoken about guarantees against the + background of an assumption that Israel’s own deterrent strength is of + central importance to any settlement. Nothing the US has ever said has + indicated that the US considers guarantees something that could be + provided in lieu of Israel’s own strength.

+

The Foreign Minister replied that strength consists of two elements: (1) + there are the elements of military strength itself and (2) there is the + question of where that strength is deployed. Dr. Kissinger added that there is also the + question of where the enemy deploys its strength, and that raised the + question of demilitarized zones.

+

Ambassador Rabin said that there + are three elements which Israel considers important:

+

—There is the peace agreement itself.

+

—Since a peace agreement can be broken, Israel wants the capacity to + defend itself in local conflict by itself. Israel does not expect + anybody to come to its defense in a local war. In this connection, on + the one side, Israel needs the US supply channel to remain open. On the + other, Israel needs defensible borders.

+

—Israel needs enough of a guarantee to protect it against the direct + involvement of Soviet forces.

+

Israel’s position is an exact exemplification of what is outlined in the + Nixon doctrine.See Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, volume I, + Foundations of Foreign Policy, 1969–1972, Documents 29 and 30. In summary, Israel + wants peace negotiated in the normal way, an Israeli ability to defend + itself and recognition of the fact that Israel is not the only country + that cannot defend itself against the Soviet Union.

+

The Foreign Minister endorsed the Ambassador’s comment on the importance + of US deterrents against the USSR.

+

Dr. Kissinger summarized his + understanding of Eban’s position + as follows:

+

—Israel is going to make a specific proposal on re-opening the Suez Canal + soon.

+

—Israel believes it has opened the door to discussion of the border issue + in the Jarring talks.

+

—Israel does not exclude the possibility of discussing its position with + the US.

+

The Foreign Minister said that Secretary Rogers has requested that Israel discuss its position + with the US, and this request will be taken seriously. In fact, however, + the Prime Minister has already opened discussion of this issue with the President and the + Secretary of State in September.See Document 162.

+

Mr. Sisco said that he did want + to inject one point in connection with a statement the Foreign Minister + had made earlier. The US judgment remains that the UAR will not make another step in the + Jarring talks until Israel + makes one. The Egyptians feel that they have laid their cards on the + table. We do not expect a UAR response + to the Israeli suggestion that detailed negotiations now begin on the + basis of positions as stated to date.

+

Foreign Minister Eban replied that + there is another option for Ambassador Jarring. He could put questions to Israel to “elicit our + position.”

+

Dr. Kissinger said that the US + would find it helpful if Israel would put forward a position that had a + reasonable chance of starting discussion. Mr. Sisco added that the US has never told + Israel it must say “yes” to Ambassador Jarring’s memorandum.

+

Dr. Kissinger said that he wished + to reiterate that the US is not steering this issue toward a + confrontation with Israel. The Foreign Minister replied that a + confrontation is certainly not in Israel’s interest. He added that in + accord with the desire not to move into a confrontation, it was + desirable that not only that bilateral steps be avoided but that an + international climate of confrontation not be created. This has a great + deal to do with how the US posture is reflected to others.Upon reviewing “detailed accounts” of Eban’s talks with Rogers and Bush, Bergus wrote to the Department + that the “most disturbing element” of the Foreign Minister’s + presentation was that Israel’s ‘tenacity’” had “paid off,” that + “time is on Israel’s side.” He continued that “such ‘tenacity’ was + to a large extent purchased by US at a considerable cost,” adding + that “thanks to Israel’s ‘tenacity,’ Soviets have made a quantum + jump insofar as their presence and influence in this area is + concerned.” Bergus later + remarked: “But what troubles us most about Eban’s thesis is that it does not + take into account the highly delicate situation which presently + exists in Egypt. Sadat has + placed a childlike trust in the United States. Perhaps he was + mistaken in doing so. It is our considered view that his future, and + the future of that diminishing little band of Egyptians who think + like he does is in increasing jeopardy.” The United States would + suffer the consequences, he concluded. (Telegram 629 from Cairo, + March 22; National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box + 129, Country Files, Middle East, Middle + East—Nodis/Cedar/Plus)

+ + + Harold H. Saunders + Saunders initialed “H.S.” above his typed + signature. + + +
+ +
+ + 218. Memorandum of ConversationSource: National Archives, Nixon Presidential + Materials, NSC Files, Box 656, + Country Files, Middle East, Middle East Nodis/Cedar/Plus, Vol. I. + Secret; Nodis; Cedar Plus. The conversation took place in Kissinger’s office. All brackets + are in the original. This memorandum is attached to a March 26 + memorandum that Saunders + sent to Kissinger both for + his approval and to notify him that, at his request, he sent a copy + “Eyes Only” to Sisco. + Kissinger initialed his + approval on it and wrote: “1) What’s the sense of approving it if it + has already gone to Sisco; + 2) Send copy to Rogers eyes + only. Never again send unedited copy out.” + Washington, March + 25, 1971. + + PARTICIPANTS + Ashraf Ghorbal, Head of + UAR Interests Section + Henry A. Kissinger, + Assistant to the President + Harold H. Saunders, NSC Staff + +

Dr. Ghorbal explained that he is + going to Paris for a meeting with Foreign Minister Riad and other + Egyptian chiefs of mission to discuss and assess the present situation. + He “wanted to go wiser and had come to seek wisdom.”

+

He said that he needed help in explaining the U.S. position. He cited his + visit to the UAR last August. In a + conversation with President Nasser and others, Nasser had made some nasty comments about the U.S. and + then had turned to Dr. Ghorbal + and said, “Forgive me.” Dr. Ghorbal said that he expected to be bombarded with + questions and similar comments in Paris and wanted the clearest possible + view of where the U.S. thinks the situation is going.

+

Dr. Kissinger said he was + familiar with Dr. Ghorbal’s talk + with Secretary RogersGhorbal met + with Rogers on March 24 for + a half hour. (Telegram 49891 to Cairo, March 25; ibid., Box 1162, + Saunders Files, Middle East Negotiations Files, Middle + East—Jarring Talks, + March 25–31, 1971) and he did not have much to add. One thing + he did wish to make clear was that there are not two U.S. foreign + policies. There is one policy “which we do jointly.” He said that no one + had to think that there are two strands of policy, with Secretary + Rogers following one and Dr. + Kissinger following another. + Dr. Kissinger said that he did + not involve himself deeply in day-to-day tactics, and much that has been + done in the Middle East has been tactical.

+

Dr. Kissinger said that a second + point he wished to make is that it is important to be realistic. The + U.S. would like an Arab-Israeli settlement. We believe that would be in + everybody’s interest. The President’s foreign policy message to + Congress—which after all had been drafted in the White House—reflects that + purpose.See footnote 6, Document 211. On the other hand, we + sometimes think that the UAR + over-estimates the ability of the U.S. to force a settlement in the + Middle East. For that reason, we find unhelpful the short deadlines that + have been imposed recently.

+

Dr. Kissinger hastened to add + that we recognize the UAR’s problem: the UAR does not wish the passage of time to turn the + occupation of territory which has historically belonged to it into + Israeli territory. The UAR has, + however, already opened a debate in Israel and between Israel and the US + on the nature of a final settlement. It should allow time for those + debates to work themselves out.

+

Dr. Kissinger said that looking + back, one of the sad things in his view was that, on the occasion of Dr. + Fawzi’s first visit here,See footnote 2, Document 18. the + opportunity to improve U.S.–UAR relationships was not seized then. We + approach the UAR on the basis of + wanting good relations with the Arab Nations. In the present situation, + we need to “reconcile our problems with Egyptian necessity.”

+

As an interim measure Dr. Kissinger continued that we hope that something might be + done in connection with President Sadat’s proposal for partial withdrawal from the Suez + Canal.See Document + 203. We recognize full well that this would have to + be an “interim” arrangement.

+

Dr. Ghorbal expressed appreciation + for Dr. Kissinger’s seeing him. + When Dr. Ghorbal recognized that + Dr. Kissinger has other + momentous problems on his desk, Dr. Kissinger replied that this is one of the biggest of + them.

+

Dr. Ghorbal said that he wanted to + stress that never has so much been invested by the UAR as in the past few weeks in getting a + settlement—in energy and in political risk. The UAR believes that Israel and the U.S.—particularly the + U.S.—must do the same. He hoped that the U.S. would not lose this + opportunity.

+

Dr. Kissinger said that Dr. + Ghorbal could be assured that + we are doing all we can. Dr. Ghorbal replied that he hoped the U.S. would grasp the + situation with energy commensurate with the opportunity.

+

Dr. Kissinger asked what + concretely Dr. Ghorbal had in + mind our doing. Dr. Ghorbal + replied that he is gratified to know that there are not two U.S. foreign + policies. He certainly understand the tactics of “not firing all your + guns at once.” But he felt that it is now time for the President to + stand up and reiterate what U.S. policy is. Dr. Kissinger asked what more the + President could do than he had said in his foreign policy message. Dr. + Ghorbal replied that there + are many who heard only the President’s short radio address and will not read the longer foreign + policy message itself.On the morning that + he transmitted his message to Congress, President Nixon delivered a radio address + summarizing the report. In the section on the Middle East, he + stated: “The policy of the United States will continue to be to + promote peace talks—not to try to impose a peace from the outside, + but to support the peace efforts of the parties in the region + themselves.” (Public Papers: Nixon, 1971, p. + 216) Therefore, there is need for clearer and fuller + exposition to the American people of what U.S. policy is.

+

Dr. Ghorbal said that the last + time President Nixon had + spoken,Reference is presumably to the + March 4 press conference at which Nixon responded to a question on the Middle East by + saying: “We, of course, will be there to see that the balance of + power is maintained in the Mideast—which we will continue to + do—because if that balance changes that could bring on war.” (Ibid., + p. 393) the Egyptians had been very disappointed. He spoke in + the old balance of power terms. That means to Israel and to the UAR that Israel can go on relying on a + continuous flow of arms and economic help regardless of what policy it + adopts.

+

Dr. Kissinger replied that the + President had said many things. On the one hand, Israel has to consider + what security it may achieve by military means and by territories. On + the other, if Israel returns to its pre-war frontiers, it will need + security perhaps even more.

+

Dr. Ghorbal noted that Israel + still has $300 million in the President’s budget. In other words, there + is no U.S. indication that Israel’s political stand would affect U.S. + support. [There followed a humorous exchange over whether the UAR would shift to U.S. equipment if we + offered it.]

+

Dr. Ghorbal said that a new UAR proposal on debt rescheduling had been + put to the U.S. He felt this to be a further sign of Egyptian good will. + Also, although there were a few things in the President’s state of the + world message that the UAR did not + like, the UAR had reacted positively + emphasizing those things which it had regarded as constructive.

+

Dr. Kissinger said that he wanted + to make clear his feeling—and the President feels the same way, he + said—that the UAR’s approach in recent weeks has been responsible. We + may differ on details of such issues as demilitarization. But the U.S. + cannot develop every last formula. The Egyptian attitude has been + constructive.

+

Dr. Ghorbal said that it was now + important to translate general policies into action. Dr. Kissinger replied that he had a purely + personal suggestion to make. It derived from his thought that sometimes + in seeking comprehensive agreements, we create deadlocks for ourselves. + He felt that it was sometimes possible to take a series of limited, + partial, interim steps thus providing steady progress toward an + objective but not creating the + deadlocks that result from trying to swallow the whole problem all at + once.

+

He said that the U.S. would continue to try to influence Israel to take + positions that could lead to a negotiation. He wondered whether there + were cases where the UAR could use its + ingenuity in making such proposals. It had already done so to some + extent in proposing partial withdrawal and opening the Canal.

+

Dr. Ghorbal asked whether there + were any other ideas. Dr. Kissinger mused for a moment on whether there was + anything in the Gulf of Aqaba and then turned to the question of why the + Israelis put such store in Sharm al-Shaikh. “Are there not other ways to + keep the Straits open?” he asked. Dr. Ghorbal agreed that the Israelis could defend the + opening to the Gulf of Aqaba in other ways just as there were ways other + than occupying Sharm al-Shaikh that the Gulf could be closed.

+

Dr. Ghorbal cautioned against + seeking “gimmicks” such as Israeli leasing of Sharm al-Shaikh. He felt + that a lot of time could be wasted in such talk and that it would end up + being an “exercise in futility.” Dr. Kissinger asked, “Because you won’t have it?” Dr. + Ghorbal replied, “Yes.” He + felt that if the Israelis insisted on staying at Sharm al-Shaikh that + would affect the whole atmosphere of negotiations. “How could the UAR trust Israel if it insists on staying + at Sharm al-Shaikh?” The only way to solve this problem is to have + non-Israeli and non-Egyptian forces there to enforce demilitarization. + Half way measures do not solve the problem; they are just issues for + talk.

+

Dr. Kissinger asked whether, + supposing the Israelis went back to the international border with the + UAR, the UAR would then insist on total + Israeli withdrawal on all other fronts. Dr. Ghorbal said that they would not be “more royalist than + King Hussein.” However, he felt + that the U.S. should not try to achieve an agreement which left Israeli + forces in Syria. That would just provide the seed for future wars.

+

Dr. Kissinger said he wanted to + summarize by saying that we are happy here that relations between us + have taken a turn for the better. He hopes that patience can be shown + for some more time. He felt that it was desirable for the moment to + concentrate on the subject at hand—a UAR-Israeli settlement.

+

Dr. Ghorbal said that of course + the Egyptians did not wish the Syrians to have a veto over a settlement. + If there was to be progress on the proposal for the Suez Canal, it + should contribute to a positive atmosphere for a settlement. If Israel + put at the end of its proposal the statement that it does not plan to + withdraw further, that then would kill the whole idea. There would be no + pressures left on Israel. “The mechanics of progress should not be + established with a veto at the end.” They must undertake that this would + be the first step toward a peace settlement.

+ +

Dr. Kissinger replied that the + U.S. position has always been that both sides should enter the + negotiations without pre-conditions. Dr. Ghorbal replied that Ambassador Jarring’s proposals to Israel and the + UAR had incorporated the U.S. + position. He felt the U.S. should press those positions. If the UAR were to receive a positive answer from + Israel to Jarring’s questions, + that would be the testimony the UAR + needs of U.S. intentions.

+

The conversation closed with the usual pleasantries and with Dr. + Kissinger’s making a general + comment that he hoped he would see Dr. Ghorbal sometime after his return.

+ + + Harold H. Saunders + Printed from a copy that bears this + typed signature. + + +
+ +
+ 219. Telegram From the Department of State to the Interests Section in + the United Arab RepublicSource: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 656, Country Files, + Middle East, Middle East Nodis/Cedar/Plus, Vol. I. Secret; Priority; + Nodis; Cedar. Drafted by Sterner and Sisco; cleared by Jon Howe, Sterner, and Atherton; and approved by + Rogers. A stamped + notation on the telegram reads: “Sent to San + Clemente.” + Washington, April 1, 1971, 0020Z. +

54323. Please deliver following message from President Nixon to President Sadat:

+

Quote: Dear Mr. President:

+

Thank you for your messages of March 5See + footnote 4, Document 215. + and 17.Sadat asked Bergus to meet with him on March 17 primarily to + convey to Nixon his reaction + to the news conference that Rogers held the previous day. A transcript of + Rogers’s news conference + is in the Department of State Bulletin, April + 5, 1971, pp. 478–486. He wanted the President to know that: 1) he + could not agree to the total demilitarization of the Sinai; and 2) + Egypt did not intend to annex Gaza but that there should be a vote + by its inhabitants to determine its future. He added that he + nonetheless “greatly appreciated all Rogers had said regarding borders.” Sadat also wanted to make two other + points to Nixon, “in an + absolutely personal message,” first complaining that his March 5 + comments to the President “had not been closely held” and then + informing him that his soldiers were getting restless as he awaited + Israeli action regarding his partial withdrawal proposal. (Telegram + 588 from Cairo, March 17; National Archives, Nixon Presidential + Materials, NSC Files, Box 1162, + Saunders Files, Middle East Negotiations Files, Jarring Talks—Middle East, March + 17–24, 1971) I deeply appreciate this thoughtful, personal + and candid presentation of your views.

+ +

I am keenly aware of the problems that you face and the steps you have + taken recently to help facilitate the negotiations currently being + pursued under Ambassador Jarring’s auspices. The steps you have taken with such + political skill have strengthened your nation’s international position + and moved your people closer to peace.

+

For its part the United States wants one thing: a just and lasting peace + agreement that meets the legitimate concerns of both sides and that both + sides can accept with honor, dignity, and confidence in their future + security. I am under no illusions, Mr. President, that the clouds of + suspicion that exist between the Arabs and the Israelis will be easily + dispelled. Both sides view the issues as fundamental. But I am struck + with the fact that some modest progress has been made during this past + year on which, hopefully, more progress can be built in the days + ahead.

+

There is an opportunity today which has not existed since the June war. + The political climate and the situation generally in the Middle East + have been evolving. I wish there were a better prescription than time, + but some time must be allowed for the changes which are occurring to be + fully understood by leaders and peoples who live in the area.

+

Moreover, we both know there is a political process involved, both in + Egypt and in Israel. Patience and determination will be required to + overcome the difficulties in a manner that best preserves public support + for the painful decisions which could eventually make a peace agreement + possible. From your own skillful management of your nation’s foreign + affairs, I believe you understand this point. For our part, I hope I + made it clear in my February 25th message to CongressSee footnote 6, Document + 211. that we intend to remain fully involved and to + help both sides move toward a peace agreement which could mean so much + for all peoples in the area and for my own country.

+

I welcome your reaffirmation of the proposal for a partial Israeli + withdrawal and the reopening of the Suez Canal. We have told the + Israelis that in our view your statement of February 5 on this matter + and that made by Prime Minister Golda + Meir on February 9That day, + Meir officially responded + to Sadat’s partial withdrawal + proposal in a policy speech before the Israeli Knesset, saying that + Israel was ready to discuss re-opening the Suez Canal in conjunction + with a mutual demilitarization of the Sinai. She reiterated the + point, however, that Israel would not withdraw its troops from the + Suez Canal zone until it reached a peace agreement with the United + Arab Republic. (New York Times, February 10, + 1971, p. 1) For the text of her February 9 statement, see Israel’s Foreign Policy: Historical + Documents, volumes 1–2, 1947–1974, Chapter XII, The War of + Attrition and the Cease Fire, Document 29. are worth careful + study. I hope that further explorations can proceed in the days + ahead.

+ +

I appreciate very much your confidence in alerting me to the developments + which you foresee and mentioned in your message of March 17. We will + also give careful consideration to the specific views you express on the + disposition of Gaza and the question of demilitarization.

+

Once again, Mr. President, I would like to thank you for bringing to my + personal attention your concerns at this stage of our peace settlement + efforts. I place high value on the direct communication we have + established in these messages and want to assure you that I reciprocate + the sincerity which they so clearly convey.

+

With my best personal wishes, sincerely, Richard Nixon Unquote.Bergus met with + Sadat on April 1 for 1½ + hours, beginning their discussion by reading Nixon’s message to him. In + response, Sadat asked + Bergus to convey his + thanks to the President, remarking that he was “pleased by its + warmth.” Later, he said that he realized that the U.S. Government + “needed time to bring the Israelis around” but added that “there + would be no progress along lines his initiative without real + pressure on Israelis from US.” Sadat believed that he also “needed time to change + mental attitudes in Egypt and in Arab world.” He declared that he + wanted to “make it clear” to Nixon that, in the meantime, “if Israel raided + Egyptian heartland, he would raid the interior of Israel.” At the + end of the conversation, Sadat commented that the “most dangerous idea being + floated by Israelis was Eban’s statement that ‘tenacity’ had paid off with + Egyptians and that Egyptians would soon be ready to cede territory.” + Egypt, Sadat concluded, + “would not kneel.” (Telegram 712 from Cairo, April 1; National + Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 656, Country Files, Middle East, Middle + East Nodis/Cedar/Plus, Vol. I)

+ + + Rogers + + +
+ +
+ 220. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in + JordanSource: National + Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 757, Presidential Correspondence + 1969–1974, Jordan King Hussein Corres. Confidential; Priority. Drafted by + Seelye and Lloyd W. + Sutherland (PA); cleared by Pickering, Hartman, and MacDonald (AID); + cleared in substance by Jeanne + Davis; and approved by Sisco. + Washington, April 6, 1971, 2058Z. +

57631. Subj: Letter from President to King Hussein. Please deliver following letter from President + Nixon to King Hussein.

+ +

Begin

+

Your Majesty:

+

Thank you very much for your letter of March 27In the letter, Hussein first thanked Nixon for his March 3 message to him and then + proceeded to raise the issue of Jordan’s economic and financial + difficulties, which he described as “the most pressing of all the + problems we are facing now.” He also addressed the discussions in + Washington between U.S. officials and a Jordanian delegation led by + Crown Prince Hassan during + the first week of March. This included the promise made by Sisco that the United States would + “do its best” to cover the Government of Jordan’s budget deficit, + calculated to be $30 million “above and beyond Saudi and Kuwaiti + subsidies” to Jordan. In the end, Hussein asked for Nixon’s “personal attention in expediting + Congressional consultations and Departmental negotiations, in order + to arrive at a firm commitment regarding United States assistance in + the present crisis.” (Ibid., Box 616, Country Files, Middle East, + Jordan, Vol. VII) which Ambassador Brown forwarded to me. I followed with + interest the talks my representatives had with Prince Hassan during his visit to Washington, + and I was pleased to hear that his visit was a pleasant and rewarding + one for all concerned.

+

The problems which you outlined in your letter are of great personal + concern to me. I recall our mutual efforts over past years to promote + the independence of Jordan’s economy and the strength of its political + structure.

+

I also recall the impressive growth Jordan was experiencing before the + June 1967 war and the great promise it held for the future. With the + situation now somewhat different, I can well appreciate that you have + your hands full endeavoring to meet your most immediate financial + problems.

+

I certainly want to be helpful, within the limits of resources available. + Therefore, in the light of your country’s acute financial situation, I + have decided to arrange for dols 15 million in supporting assistance + funds to be made available to Jordan in early July; and I have proposed + that an additional sum of dols 15 million in supporting assistance be + made available to Jordan at a later date during this calendar year on + the assumption it will be needed. This action is, of course, subject to + the usual Congressional appropriation process.In telegram 57630 to Amman, April 6, the Department + instructed the Embassy to make several additional points on behalf + of the United States regarding its aid package to Jordan, including: + “We do not rpt not presume to judge what GOJ’s priorities should be at this time, but we do + believe that Jordan’s case for future assistance will be enhanced to + the extent it demonstrates financial responsibility.” The + instruction continued: “We thus see it as incumbent on GOJ to take very painful measures to + cut back, reducing JAFP spending to + the JD 32.3 million level now + budgeted and ensuring that disbursements under the Quote development + Unquote budget are made strictly in accordance with priorities + assigned by GOJ.” + (Ibid.)

+

Both our countries will continue to face difficult choices among + competing demands for limited resources. Accordingly, I am sure we will + both wish to continue our useful dialogue on how these can best be used. In due time, I will + propose that our experts consult with yours to be sure that the steps + being taken to address your government’s financial problems are the most + effective possible.

+

With warm personal regards,

+

Sincerely,

+

+ Richard Nixon +

+

End quote

+ + + Rogers + + +
+ +
+ 221. Minutes of a Senior Review Group MeetingSource: National Archives, Nixon + Presidential Materials, NSC Files, + NSC Institutional Files + (H-Files), Box H–112, Senior Review Group, SRG Minutes (Originals) 1971. Secret. The meeting was + held in the White House Situation Room. + Washington, April 14, 1971, + 3:05–4 p.m. + + SUBJECT + Middle East Guarantees + + + PARTICIPATION + Chairman—Henry A. + Kissinger + + State + + + U. Alexis Johnson + + + Joseph Sisco + + + Alfred Atherton + + + Tom Thornton + + + Defense + + + David Packard + + James S. Noyes + + G. Warren Nutter + + + + CIA + + + + Richard Helms + + David Blee + + JCS + + + Gen. + Richard Knowles + + Adm. William St. + George + + NSC Staff + + Col. Richard + Kennedy + + Harold Saunders + + + Jeanne W. Davis + + +

SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS

+

It was agreed that a Working Group will be created, chaired by Joe Sisco, to spell out our position + on guarantees: some sense of priorities among possibilities, how the + machinery might function, etc. The Working Group will draw on the paper being prepared + by the JCS on the size and composition of a peacekeeping force.The Working Group paper was not found. + Admiral Moorer sent the + JCS ad hoc study group’s final report, “Middle East Peacekeeping + Forces,” to Laird on April + 29. In a covering memorandum, Moorer addressed the report’s key points, including: + 1) a peace agreement must satisfy the terms of the signatories, + should not be imposed by outside parties, and must establish borders + designated by physical and permanent markers; 2) “the establishment + of a UN force capable of deterring + or suppressing all possible threats to the peace is not feasible in + terms of contemporary international peacekeeping”; and 3) “any + UN observer/peacekeeping force + deployed to the Middle East preferably should be comprised of + neutral nation forces.” (Washington National Records Center, OSD Files: FRC 330–76–0197, Box + 70)

+

Mr. Kissinger: I’d like to review + the guarantees issue so we know where we are going. I have a number of + questions. Joe (Sisco), will you + sum up where we stand.

+

Mr. Sisco: As you know, we + circulated some papers in JanuarySisco’s group prepared several + papers in January and early February. See Documents 198, 202, and 207. which were designed to do two + things: first, to discuss the specifics of the options within the + Four-Power framework without making any choices.

+

Mr. Kissinger: They were damn + good papers. However, in SALT we gave + the Russians three choices of equal standing. They picked one, and we + said “wrong.” I don’t want to get into the same position here.

+

Mr. Sisco: The second purpose was + to provide a basis for discussion with the Israelis. Since that time, we + have started Four-Power discussions, which have been largely a holding + action. We haven’t tried to reach any decisions because we didn’t want + the Four Powers to get ahead of the situation. We have also had + preliminary discussions with the Israelis, whose reaction was “no sale” + on guarantees in any form. Israel is still stonewalling on putting + anything new into the context of the Jarring effort. In the light of this, I think we will + get a new approach from the Israelis. Rabin has made the point that it must be understood + between the two sides that, if the agreement is broken, Israel could + reoccupy the presently occupied areas. We believe that is reasonable, + and that it will be an element of any Israeli proposal. I think Mrs. + Meir will ask if we will + support them if they move back into the areas, and we will have to find + a way to respond affirmatively without giving her a blank check. I + suggest we see what they come up with on the Suez Canal and not talk + guarantees in the Jarring + context.

+

Mr. Kissinger: If they come up + with a tough position I assume we will talk about it, or would we + consider rejecting it?

+

Mr. Sisco: I believe any proposal + will be barely within the ball park. I suggest we transmit it in its + pristine form to the Egyptians. We should try to avoid getting into any negotiation + with the Israelis on their proposal before communicating it to the + Egyptians.

+

Mr. Kissinger: That’s a good + idea. Then we can see what to do with the Egyptian reply.

+

Mr. Sisco: We might even suggest + indirectly some counter-points to the Egyptians.

+

Mr. Kissinger: I think Joe’s + secret dream is to draft a cable taking three sides.

+

Mr. Sisco: I think the second + point is more difficult. If we decide to talk about guarantees to the + Israelis, is there any practical form of guarantee on the ground we + should opt for? I think not at this time. The Israelis say they will not + permit any Russians on their side of an international border. The + British have suggested a four-power force limited to the Suez Canal + area. From that, we might detach an American contingent and position it + in Sharm el Shaik under a UN umbrella. + This could be feasible if we could sell it to the Israelis. Egypt would + be hard put to turn it down. There’s really no necessity for anything in + the Sinai because there is no fedayeen problem there. If anyone crossed + the border, the international peace-keeping machinery would come into + play, backed by a strong Israel. I expect we will have to put a good + deal more into Israel in this event: approximately one-half billion more + in arms and one-half billion more credit. With that, Israel could take + care of anything in demilitarized Sinai. This would defeat the Israeli + argument that an international peace-keeping force is giving the Soviets + a greater presence in the area.

+

Mr. Kissinger: But Egypt wouldn’t + accept anything like this. Why all the emphasis on Sharm el Shaik? Is + this the only place the Gulf can be closed?

+

Mr. Atherton: It is very narrow + here.

+

Mr. Sisco: The third point, on + which we need a paper, is related to what US bilateral inducement we + might offer to the Israelis. I think we should look seriously at the + pros and cons of a bilateral treaty with Israel. I have strong + reservations about such a treaty, but Ambassador Barbour thinks one thing that might + induce Israel to talk about a settlement is a bilateral defense treaty + with the U.S.

+

Mr. Kissinger: Against whom? What + would we be promising to protect them against?

+

Mr. Sisco: We would be committing + ourselves to support them militarily and financially in the event of a + finding of aggression against Israel.

+

Mr. Kissinger: Couldn’t we do + that anyway without a treaty?

+

Mr. Sisco: Yes, in all kinds of + ways. A Presidential letter to Golda, for example, with a joint + resolution of the Congress to back it up. There are various gradations of formality. The weakness + of a formal treaty is that it tends to polarize the area. However, the + attitude of the Arab world today is much different than it was five or + ten years ago. It might be possible to achieve this alignment and reduce + the political repercussions of bipolarization. I’m not making a case for + a treaty but I do think we should look seriously at it.

+

Mr. Kissinger: It’s not to our + advantage to raise a specific formula for guarantees. But neither is it + to our advantage not to know what would be desirable. For internal + purposes, we should have some discussion of the possibilities raised in + the paper, establish some priorities among them and get a definition of + what we want them to do. Suppose someone asked us what we want in the + way of guarantees.

+

Mr. Sisco: There is simply no + acceptance of the principle of international guarantees by Israel. We + can choose our preferred form—in fact it would be a good thing to know + internally—but we would be better advised to retain all the options. Any + one of them, or a combination of them, would be satisfactory if it were + agreeable to Israel.

+

Mr. Kissinger: But whether or not + it is agreeable to Israel depends in part on the conviction with which + we present it to them. What is the hierarchy among the various + possibilities? They say they don’t want any of them, but this could be + part of their stonewalling tactic.

+

Mr. Sisco: I think it’s more + fundamental than that.

+

Mr. Kissinger: Assuming they get + their border, and assuming the rest of Sinai is left as a demilitarized + zone, how would it be policed?

+

Mr. Sisco: By Israel and Egypt. + They haven’t agreed to anything else. I don’t think this is tactical on + their part; I think it is fundamental. On the Jordanian side, I think + there is a good possibility of a joint Israel-Jordanian arrangement. The + King seems to be amenable. It is different on the Egyptian side. If you + asked me for a coordinated proposal, I could describe what, in + combination, would meet more of Israel’s concerns than any other. We can + be entirely flexible.

+

Mr. Kissinger: What they prefer, + of course, is to stay where they are. Whatever settlement is reached + won’t be their preference. We will have to become involved to get them + to give up anything. We’re already in conversation about guarantees in + the Four-Power meetings. How can we influence these talks if we don’t + know what we want?

+

Mr. Sisco: We don’t want any + guarantees chosen by the four powers. We want all guarantees open + because the option must be chosen by the parties to the dispute. Israel + would reject out of hand any proposal coming from the Four Powers. The + most we want from the four powers is a list of the options which would + not be too different from those listed in our paper. We may want to go + to Israel at some point with something concrete.

+ +

Mr. Kissinger: The paper contains + a good smorgsabord of ideas, but the implications of the various plans + are not fully elaborated. Are we clear that we want U.S. forces to be + involved?

+

Mr. Sisco: No. If Israel wants + U.S. forces, we would consider it.

+

Mr. Kissinger: Consider it + positively?

+

Mr. Sisco: Yes.

+

Mr. Kissinger: Do we want Soviet + forces?

+

Mr. Sisco: It’s not a question of + whether we want them. We already have an Egyptian proposal to Jarring that Sinai and Sharm el Shaik + should be policed by four-power forces.

+

Mr. Kissinger: Do we have any + idea of how these forces would operate?

+

Mr. Sisco: In a combination of + fixed positions with some mobility in between. We have had a good deal + of experience with this in a decade of the UN Emergency Force. They would have the right of + self-defense, but this would not be a Korea-type peace-keeping force. + They would be more in the observer category, with recourse to the + Security Council for reporting violations, and recourse to the parties + for discussions. They would have small arms and some helicopters. This + part is not the problem.

+

Mr. Kissinger: What do you think, + Dick (Helms)?

+

Mr. Helms: I think this has been + a first-class presentation of the problem but I don’t see what it gets + us. If we choose any one of these possibilities does it get us where we + want to go?

+

Mr. Johnson: We want Israel to accept one of them.

+

Mr. Helms: I see little chance of + Israel’s acceptance of any of them.

+

Mr. Kissinger: It would help if + they were more fully fleshed out.

+

Mr. Helms: I doubt it. I just + don’t think they would accept any of them.

+

Gen. + Knowles: The mechanical part + of the force is easy. It’s a question of its saleability. We are doing a + paper on this now.

+

Mr. Kissinger: The desirability + of various types of forces can become a problem if we don’t understand + what we’re getting into. Suppose there is a US force at Sharm el Shaik + and the Egyptians decide to put us out. Do we go to war?

+

Mr. Packard: I think it’s a good + idea to flesh out these possibilities. I agree with Dick (Helms) that it + won’t work, but we need to know what the problems are and how far we are + prepared to go. It may not be useful at this point, but there could be + some movement in a short period of time and we should be ready.

+

Mr. Kissinger: Is any settlement + possible? Be realistic.

+ +

Mr. Sisco: I don’t know. It will + certainly require maximum pressure on Israel.

+

Mr. Kissinger: If we wait until a + settlement is acceptable to Israel, we are wasting our time. I don’t + believe they will accept the old frontiers. I suggest we put together a + working group under Joe (Sisco) + to spell out our position on the guarantees a little more.

+

Mr. Packard: They should also take + a look at the paper the JCS is preparing.

+

Mr. Sisco: Yes, we will look at + that.

+

Mr. Packard: We can get the + general range of the types of guarantees that might be possible.

+

Mr. Sisco: The IG paper has that + general range.

+

Mr. Kissinger: But we need some + sense of priorities; how the peace-keeping machinery would function and + what we would be getting ourselves in for.

+

Mr. Helms: Are we going to have + American troops?

+

Mr. Kissinger: Suppose the + Egyptians started a war of national liberation? Are we prepared to fight + Egypt?

+

Mr. Helms: The scenario you’re + outlining is very close to what happened in 1967. There was a + peace-keeping force in the area; the Egyptians said “get out” and they + were out 24 hours later.

+

Mr. Sisco: This is a different + proposition. The Security Council would have to deny to Egypt the + unilateral right to terminate the force.

+

Mr. Kissinger: Suppose they + didn’t have the right, but they went individually to the Yugoslavs, the + Indians, the Canadians and said they wanted their forces out. Would they + have pulled out? I think the Yugoslavs and Indians would have.

+

Mr. Sisco: I agree this is a grey + area—whether a country has the right to terminate. The Yugoslavs and + Indians would probably have said they wouldn’t stay where they were not + wanted. I agree that U Thant + acted stupidly in not trying to buy time, but it might have happened + anyway. But in any Israel-Egyptian agreement, each country will reserve + the right to unilateral action if and when the other side breaks the + agreement. Also, any guarantee would have a clause calling for + consultation in the framework of the Security Council in the event of + agreement. This, of course, means absolutely nothing in this kind of + commitment.

+

Mr. Kissinger: If the situation + ever unfreezes, I don’t want the President hit with short deadlines and + faced with various complicated schemes. What is the JCS doing in its + paper?

+

Gen. + Knowles: We are taking a hard + look to see what size forces would be needed.

+ +

Mr. Kissinger: To do what: fight? + monitor? observe?

+

Gen. + Knowles: We believe it would + take approximately 11,000 observers for the whole area.

+

Mr. Kissinger: To observe + what?

+

Gen. + Knowles: Any hostile + activity.

+

Mr. Helms: There goes the + strategic reserve.

+

Mr. Kissinger: We will have to + step up withdrawals.

+

Gen. + Knowles: It would take 24,000 + to do the whole job. We’re talking about a UN force, not American forces. We would prefer American + forces be kept to the absolute minimum and used chiefly for support.

+

Mr. Kissinger: Are you speaking + only of an observer role?

+

Gen. + Knowles: Observe and report + any violations.

+

Mr. Kissinger: What would such + violations be?

+

Gen. + Knowles: Movement of hostile + forces, for example.

+

Mr. Kissinger: And they would + just report it.

+

Gen. + Knowles: Yes. Although they + should be able to protect themselves and to handle small forces.

+

Mr. Kissinger: The purpose of + such an observer force would be what? Once they report the facts, does + the other side take military action?

+

Gen. + Knowles: If a force crossed + the line, they would report the fact and the other side would take + appropriate action.

+

Mr. Johnson: What is appropriate action?

+

Gen. + Knowles: Repel them.

+

Mr. Johnson: There’s a sharp line between an observer-only force, able to + protect itself, and a force with a policing role.

+

Mr. Sisco: We will look at the + JCS paper. I should point out, though, that there is a fundamental + constitutional difference between the US and USSR going back to the Article 19Article 19 of the UN Charter reads: “A Member of the United Nations which + is in arrears in the payment of its financial contributions to the + Organization shall have no vote in the General Assembly if the + amount of its arrears equals or exceeds the amount of the + contributions due from it for the preceding two full years. The + General Assembly may, nevertheless, permit such a Member to vote if + it is satisfied that the failure to pay is due to conditions beyond + the control of the Member.” (Yearbook of the + United Nations, 1947–48, p. 989) issue. The Russians + want any international force to be subject to Security Council veto. + They would have the SC decide on + financing, composition, appointment of the commander, and policy + direction. Our approach in the UN for + the last 25 years, has been that the SC + authorizes the force, but the force reports to the Secretary General operating under a + SC mandate. The international field + commanders have to have flexibility within the mandate of the SC. The question rose again in the Article + 43Article 43 of the UN Charter reads: “1) All Members of + the United Nations, in order to contribute to the maintenance of + international peace and security, undertake to make available to the + Security Council, on its call and in accordance with a special + agreement or agreements, armed forces, assistance, and facilities, + including rights of passage, necessary for the purpose of + maintaining international peace and security. 2) Such agreement or + agreements shall govern the numbers and types of forces, their + degree of readiness and general location, and the nature of the + facilities and assistance to be provided. 3) The agreement or + agreements shall be negotiated as soon as possible on the initiative + of the Security Council. They shall be concluded between the + Security Council and Members or between the Security Council and + groups of Members and shall be subject to ratification by the + signatory states in accordance with their respective constitutional + processes.” (Ibid., p. 991) issue, over whether we and the + USSR would make forces available + to the SC as a permanent force. There + has been absolutely no progress to bridge the gap between the US and the + USSR on this issue.

+

Mr. Kissinger: All of this + reinforces my conviction that we need a check list of what the forces + can do and what problems they would face.

+

Gen. + Knowles: Our paper will be a + first cut at that.

+

Mr. Sisco: The question really is + reduced to whether we want an international peace-keeping force with the + US directly involved or not involved.

+

Mr. Kissinger: Yes, and the + relative merits of various kinds of peace-keeping forces. If it is going + to take a special effort to get it, let’s get something which improves + the situation. When will the JCS finish their study?

+

Gen. + Knowles: The draft will be + finished tomorrow, then it has to go to the Chiefs.

+

Mr. Kissinger: Let’s get it and + put it in the IG framework. How soon can you get your paper finished, + Joe (Sisco).

+

Mr. Sisco: Two weeks.

+
+ +
+ + 222. Conversation Between President Nixon and the President’s Assistant for National + Security Affairs (Kissinger)Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White + House Tapes, Oval Office, Conversation No. 483–4. No classification + marking. Haldeman was also + present during the conversation. The editors transcribed the tape + recording printed here specifically for this volume. Brackets + indicate unclear portions of the original recording or those that + remain classified, except “[Rogers]”, added for clarity. + Washington, April 20, 1971, + 10:13–10:25 a.m. +

Kissinger: [Rogers] asked you about going to the + Middle East?

+

Nixon: That’s right. He says he + has an invitation.In a telephone + conversation with Nixon on + April 19, Rogers said: “I’ve + been thinking for some time and have been asked by Israel, Egypt, + and Jordan to visit their countries. I would like to, at least, have + serious consideration given to it. I—So, what I’m calling about is + to see if you have any initial reaction that’s—that would be opposed + to it.” Near the end of the call, Nixon said: “If you think it’s a good idea, you go,” + later adding “I think it’s a very good thing to, sort of, put the + spotlight of attention out there, and if something can come out of + it, it’d be great.” Rogers + replied: “You know, something may come out of it.” Earlier in the + conversation, he had pointed out that no Secretary of State had been + to Egypt since Dulles went + in 1953. (Ibid., White House Telephone, Conversation No. 2–4) + I said, “Well [unclear]—

+

Kissinger: Well. It’s a mistake. + But—

+

Nixon: But why is it a + mistake?

+

Kissinger: Well, because he’s + going—I think we can handle it, Mr. President.

+

Nixon: No, my point is, my point + is, he’s going to Europe. And so he’s invited to the Mid-East.

+

Kissinger: Well, you see—

+

Nixon: I’m not urging him to + go.

+

Kissinger: No, I know you’re not. + But, they’re just never telling us the truth. We’ve been getting for two + months [1 second not declassified] that they’ve + been arranging this trip. We’ve been asking the State Department whether + they were. They never—I’ve talked to Dobrynin. [4 seconds not + declassified] They denied it. His going there is going to + accelerate the diplomatic process. Sisco is such a liar that they’re going to promise + everything to everybody. And there is going to be a deadlock.

+

Nixon: When he said to me though, + Henry was sent to this—I just talked to him very briefly before he went + to some meeting last night. He said he had invitations to go to three + countries: to Israel, to Jordan, to Egypt—to the UAR. And he said, “I + don’t want to be excited now.” And he said, “I want to turn it off. If + you want me to turn it off,” I said, “Fine. Fine. Turn it off.”

+ +

Kissinger: Well, the truth is + that he’s presenting—

+

Nixon: [unclear]

+

Kissinger: I know. But I want to + tell you what the truth is—because I can show it to you [2 seconds not declassified].

+

Nixon: No, no. I believe.

+

Kissinger: He has generated those + invitations.

+

Nixon: Sisco has or he has?

+

Kissinger: Sisco. No, Sisco. Sisco generated all these invitations.

+

Nixon: What do they think he’s + going to accomplish over there?

+

Kissinger: Well, what he thinks + he’ll accomplish is—

+

Nixon: A settlement?

+

Kissinger: —is a Suez settlement, + which he won’t get.In a conversation with + Nixon in the Oval Office + on April 22, Rogers said + that, during his trip, he would try to “get the parties to move + closer together on the Suez proposal.” He later added: “We don’t + want to be in the position of superseding Jarring. I’ve got to be careful + about that. I don’t want to be in the position of being a mediator + on Suez. On the other hand, we’re the only ones that can do it. + We’re the only ones who talk to both sides. So, what we’re—what I’m + saying, in effect, is that we’re playing the role of constructive + diplomacy.” After Nixon + said, “Um-hmm,” Rogers + continued: “We’re trying to encourage discussions; we aren’t going + to mediate; we aren’t twisting anybody’s arms. We’re, hopefully, + going to create a better feeling of understanding, discussing the + parts to see if there are possibilities of accommodation, but not + pushing it and not being the mediator. And I think that that + role—I’m going to say it—entails some risk.” (Ibid., Oval Office, + Conversation No. 486–7)

+

Nixon: Maybe we can get it before + he goes there.

+

Kissinger: Well, not before he + goes. I think the way you can get it is after he gets a deadlock, you + can step in.

+

Nixon: Well, [unclear]. Get the + goddamn thing settled. I mean, is there a way?

+

Kissinger: No. I think, you + see—

+

Nixon: See, I was prepared, based + on your conversation—Haig told + me to say if there’s a [unclear] let him go ahead and present the thing. + And once there’s deadlock, we break it.

+

Kissinger: That’s right.

+

Nixon: All right. Once there’s + gridlock, we break it. I’m willing to do it at any time.

+

Kissinger: Well they have + presented—

+

Nixon: You’ve got a way to get + the deal, I assume?

+

Kissinger: Well, no. No, no, you + can’t get the deal.

+

Nixon: You mean we got to wait + till the Israelis make—the Israelis made an offer?

+

Kissinger: The Israelis have made + an offer.

+

Nixon: [unclear]

+ +

Kissinger: You see, the only + reason the Israelis made an offer was because I told them they had to; + they wouldn’t have made it otherwise.

+

Nixon: Yeah.

+

Kissinger: Now, that offer is + unacceptable—

+

Nixon: Yeah.

+

Kissinger: —to the Egyptians. + Now—

+

Nixon: But it’s a good offer they + told me?

+

Kissinger: It’s a pretty good + offer. So there is going to be a deadlock, I think. And then—I mean the + record is clear, except for again one of these damn records, which we + can’t surface yet. That it’s entirely—

+

Nixon: Our initiative?

+

Kissinger: Our initiative. + Because, in fact, State told them they didn’t want it because the whole + thing [unclear].

+

Nixon: I know that, Bill told me + that he didn’t—that he says, “Let’s not talk about Suez until later.” I + said, “The Suez is all we can get.”

+

Kissinger: Suez is what you can + get now. And then—

+

Nixon: My goal is to get—

+

Kissinger: I think—well I think + even, if you ever authorized talks with Dobrynin on a realistic basis that the Israelis will + rather finally destroy than accept the Rogers Plan.

+

Nixon: My point is, why would he + want to go to Israel? I don’t think he’s going to get a good reception + there.

+

Kissinger: No, he’ll get a good + reception, but he’ll get no concession.

+

Nixon: Why would he get a good + reception?

+

Kissinger: Because—

+

Haldeman: It’s the United + States.

+

Kissinger: It’s the United + States.

+

Nixon: And they want to play to + him?

+

Kissinger: But they will, in my + judgment—he also wants to go to the Soviet Union and that must be turned + down.

+

Nixon: He didn’t mention that. + Oh, he can’t go to the Soviet Union.

+

Kissinger: That’s right.

+

Nixon: He cannot go there. No, + sir.

+

Kissinger: That’s right.

+

Nixon: Did he say that? Who did + he raise it with?

+

Kissinger: I think he raised it + with Dobrynin.

+

Nixon: Well, don’t worry. Nobody + is going to the Soviet Union.

+ +

Kissinger: And I wouldn’t be + surprised if Dobrynin brought an + invitation back with him from Gromyko.

+

Nixon: No. No. I will not allow + it.

+

Kissinger: But that, I think, you + should get. If you don’t go, no one should go.

+

Nixon: No, sir. We’re not going + to go.

+

Kissinger: But I think on the—but + what I think you should insist on before he goes is that we have an + NSC meeting in which he explains + exactly what he intends to say to everybody. And what he expects to get + out of it. He isn’t so dangerous because he doesn’t know exactly what + he’s saying. But Sisco, I’ve + concluded, is really a menace in that job. He’s so energetic and so + ruthless. We couldn’t—[4 seconds not + declassified] we wouldn’t know what’s going on.

+

Nixon: [6 + seconds not declassified]

+

Kissinger: [15 + seconds not declassified]

+

Nixon: How do you know about this + Soviet Union thing? Cause, Bob, has he ever mentioned going to the + Soviet Union to you?

+

Haldeman: Not since last + summer.

+

Kissinger: I know it—

+

Haldeman: He came up with this + [unclear]—

+

Kissinger: Well, he wrote a very + curious letter to Gromyko,See Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, volume + XXIV, Soviet Union, October 1970–October 1971, Document + 157. which he gave to Dobrynin, which was a pretty wide-open hint. He + didn’t—and secondly Dobrynin has + been making hints.

+

Nixon: He’s not going to the + Soviet Union, I’m sure. Nobody’s going to go.

+

Kissinger: Dobrynin is coming back tomorrow.

+

Nixon: No one can go.

+

Haldeman: He’s definitely + coming?

+

Nixon: Yeah.

+

Kissinger: Yeah. We found out at + the FBI session.

+

Nixon: Nobody not only is going, + Bob, if I don’t go, nobody else is going. We’re going to play it under + my consent.

+

Kissinger: That’s right.

+

Nixon: Tough son-of-a-bitch.

+

Kissinger: I don’t think we can + settle the Suez issue before he goes there. But we can sure as hell can + settle it. I told the Israelis that when you make a request to them, the + horsing around has got to stop. They’ve got to accept whatever you—

+ +

Nixon: And we won’t request + anything they shouldn’t accept?

+

Kissinger: That’s right.

+

Nixon: They know that.

+

Kissinger: And I think—whenever + you’re ready to have the deal with the Soviets, if we have a summit, I + think we have a good crack at getting the Israelis to be much more + flexible with us.

+

Nixon: I know that. Well, let’s + come to something else.

+
+ +
+ 223. Editorial Note +

On April 20, 1971, Israeli Deputy Prime Minister Yigal Allon held separate meetings in + Washington with Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs + Henry Kissinger and + Secretary of State William + Rogers. The main purpose of Allon’s visit was to “assess the temperature” with + respect to 1) a possible interim agreement providing for the opening of + the Suez Canal and the partial withdrawal of Israeli forces from the + East Bank of the Canal in Sinai; 2) the achievement of an overall + settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict; and 3) the U.S. attitude with + respect to future military and economic assistance to Israel.(Memorandum + from Kissinger to Nixon, April 26; National Archives, + Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC + Files, Box 999, Haig + Chronological Files, April 24–28, 1971) Allon held the first meeting with Kissinger at the Israeli Ambassador’s + residence beginning at 7:45 a.m. According to a record of the + conversation prepared by Israeli Minister Shlomo Argov, Allon presented the essence of the Israeli consensus on + a possible Canal agreement as follows:

+

“1. Israeli forces will withdraw at the most 7–12 kms from canal in order + to be able to act against possible Egyptian breach.

+

“2. Israel would receive safeguards for maintenance of its fortifications + along the canal.

+

“3. No Egyptian or Soviet forces to cross the canal.”

+

Allon said that while he had + confidence in U.S. interest in preventing a Soviet effort to take over + the area, the Israeli Government was less confident about its + performance in preventing a “salami tactics” takeover, which was why + Israel would want U.S. guarantees.

+

Kissinger responded by telling + Allon that the reasoning and + need for guarantees was beside the point. “The question is with whom you do it,” he said. “You have to + understand what you are up against. The situation you confronted in + December 1970, and which you confront today is that everybody in the U.S. Government wants to + impose a settlement on you at least along the Rogers lines. Get that into your + heads. You can get all the formal assurances from Sisco and they would be worthless. + Right now the need is to prevent war now that the Arabs think they may + have carte blanche for you . . . You Israelis don’t seem to understand + that you have only one single hope—the President. Everybody else wants + at least the Rogers Plan.If some of them could settle your problem on + the Biafra model—they would.” Allon then asked Kissinger if Israel was a “liability” in the eyes of the + State Department, to which Kissinger responded:

+

“Yes! Most of the Arabists are colonialists who remember the Arabs in + their pre-war image and long for those days again. And the State + Department is not the worst of the lot! You have today a totally united + Government against you. You have never been in such a position here + before. If you should be divided on your end then it will be impossible + to save you. You must talk to the U.S. with one + voice.I know that if the Soviets win big in the M.E. it will be + a disaster for the U.S. Others don’t understand this. Therefore at this + moment the question of 7–12 kilometers is irrelevant. The main thing is + to agree on a strategy. First thing to understand is the seriousness of + your position. Today at lunch you will be told many things. You are + considered the dove who will take care of delivering the [Prime + Minister] and ultimately of bringing about an acceptance of something + close to the Rogers Plan. They + say the same thing about your Ambassador. They say he was embarrassed to + present some of his Government’s positions and some of the papers he had + to submit on its behalf . . . The main thing is that you have to avoid + being maneuvered into a position in which you are totally in the wrong. + The ideal thing is for you to prove that if you are treated with + confidence you can be reasonable. The tricky pattern is to reach a + crisis point in which the White House has to come in, as was the case + during the Jordan crisis. At the end of February it was a matter of + barely two hours before a public condemnation of Israel by the U.S. was + announced. I got this reversed by convincing the President that we + should start an honest dialogue with Israel, so that she may tell us + what she really wants. A Suez deal is important because if you just stay + along the Suez war is inevitable, and I could not guarantee what we + could do.”

+

After a brief exchange on what the reaction in Cairo would be, the + discussion continued regarding what Israel’s strategy should be in the + negotiations with the United States and the Egyptians:

+

“Allon: Let us assume we agree to + a partial arrangement involving end of belligerence, partial withdrawal, + no Soviet-UAR crossing of canal etc., and State Department then tells us + it is unacceptable, can we then at least explain our position to the + President?

+ +

“Kissinger: The great illusion in + Israel is that you can always come over here to explain everything to + the President. This is not so. This is not the way to impress him. He is + not interested in your problems in the abstract, but only as to how they + may affect next year. What impresses him is the kind of pressure that + was brought to bear this February and last March. He was also impressed by your performance in Jordan. Two weeks + before the Jordan crisis I advised that war was on the way and we had + two options:

+

“1. To use American troops

+

“2. To use Israeli troops

+

“I recommended Israeli troops. The President was furious with me and + wrote on my memorandum to him: ‘No! These are pro-Jewish sympathies.’ He + would not talk to me. I flew to Chicago to try to explain things to him. + Then the crisis came and he asked me to get in touch with Rabin.

+

“Allon: What do we do now?

+

“Kissinger: You should aim at + having complete deadlock with us for two weeks or a month. Then + Rogers will come in and ask + for pressure on you. By then you should have your Jews organized + properly. Then I can come in and intervene, provided of course that you + have a fallback position that we can all agree on.

+

“Allon: Suppose we accept a + fallback position. What guarantees will you give us against the + Russians?

+

“Kissinger: On every big decision + he himself has made the President has stood firmly, e.g., Cambodia, + Laos, etc. He has not yet engaged himself on the M.E.—for obvious + reasons. If you can bring about a situation in which he becomes + personally involved then he will have a personal stake in it. In March, + 1970 your Ambassador came in and made an eloquent statement on the + dangers you were going to face (as a result of decision not to supply + planes). In July—after Soviet violations—I came in and reminded him of + this and he acted—issued a statement and ordered dispatch of Sidewinders + etc. We had to bomb the Pentagon to get them out of there.

+

“Allon: Isn’t the pressure already + on? Phantom deliveries have stopped. No answer to Rabin’s request. If we get a positive + answer it will be very important psychologically. It will give Israel a + feeling it is not being subjected to pressure. The President will + understand the importance of this.

+

“Kissinger: You will not get the + President to touch it before there is a real deadlock.

+

“Allon: Can’t you get in the + picture earlier than that?

+

“Kissinger: All I can say is that + without me you are dead!

+ +

“Rabin: Sisco said he may propose a letter + from President to P.M. supporting an overall settlement along lines he + described to me (international force along canal, Americans in Sharm, + billion dollar credits etc.) He expects it to be rejected by us.

+

“Kissinger: This is the first I + have heard of it. I think I can prevent this. My influence is that I + have always been right on the Middle East. The President is very good on + big strategic issues. He has no particular love for Jews. He does not + give a damn for Israel in the abstract. It interests him only within the + strategic context of the Middle East. He told me so. He has a good + conception of the strategic significance of the Middle East.

+

“Rogers will now be coming to the + area. You will find that Sisco + will promise you everything. They will want to come back with a triumph. + If Sisco gets into the dominant + position again then the implementation of anything he brings back will + be his as was the case in July of last year.

+

“Allon: What about a letter from + the President?

+

“Kissinger: If you get anything + through Barbour then it means + State Department, and then it does not mean a damn thing. Unless you get + it from the President directly, or through me, or unless I advise the + Ambassador (about its significance) then it does not mean a thing. If + you settle with Sisco on this + trip he will control things and you will never know the truth. There is + no way of telling what he is telling the Egyptians today.

+

“After the violations were obvious I still could not for three weeks + convince people of them and had to commission people to prepare all + kinds of studies to prove my point. (Kissinger gave various examples.) They kept saying the + missiles were already there. The President was all that time assailed by + the others. Now if he had given the assurances to + Rabin (instead of Sisco) then he would have felt that in + violating the standstill the Soviets had double-crossed him and would + have acted accordingly. Sisco + will agree to any verbal guarantee and will then work to prevent it. If + the President makes a deal with you he will watch it. He is tough.

+

“Allon: What can he give us?

+

“Kissinger: You must have the + right to move in case anybody crosses. You can get something against + Russians.

+

“Allon: Can he act as Commander in + Chief without Congress?

+

“Kissinger: Yes. You can get the + President to act if he is convinced that the Soviets are moving against + you for great power reasons. He will act provided you don’t alienate him + before.

+

“Allon: Is it illogical for the + President to accept notion of non-belligerence together with our + acceptance of continuation of Jarring?

+ +

“Kissinger: No question in my + mind that Sisco wants to play + the Jarring mission so as to + impose a settlement on you.

+

“Allon: How about + non-belligerence?

+

“Kissinger: I think you should + have a demilitarized zone on the canal and I would ask for it and be + totally unyielding on it. Otherwise what would keep the Egyptians from + crossing it. You have to get the President involved personally on this. + At the moment the State Department is acting semi-autonomously on + M.E.

+

“Allon: May I give you my personal + thinking on the territorial issue and get your reactions.

+

“1. Golan Heights: important to us not only because kibbutzim, but for + reasons of strategic defense for entire irrigation system of the Jordan + Valley. Some territorial compromise can be arranged there too. Part of + the Heights can be given back.

+

“2. Jordan: the main principle is not to annex areas that are heavily + populated, this should be part of the solution of the Palestine problem, + or may go back to Jordan in return for peace. The major point is to have + the changes where there are no Arabs.

+

“Kissinger: You want to annex + that?

+

“Allon: Yes. We shall hold on to + valley and first range of mountains and leave them a desert.

+

“Kissinger: If you could get that + will you go back to the old line with Egypt?

+

“Allon: Can you connect these?

+

“Kissinger: I believe that if a + complete breakdown takes place and a complete deadlock is brought about + then I can get the President with a proposal like this, but only if you + wish it. I shall not do anything and shall not be involved in any + settlement not acceptable to you. I have always believed that you could + not accept the old Egyptian line because it would set a precedent for + all the other sectors. If this gets into complete deadlock then it will + be necessary to talk to the President directly.

+

“Allon: We cannot go back to old + mandatory lines with Egypt. We must have an airfield west of Eilat, the + only place where we can have a field for long range operations. In + addition we must have Sharm, Gaza, and Rafah.

+

“Kissinger: How about giving Gaza + to Jordan in return for Allon + Plan?

+

“Allon: My position is that + Greater Gaza can be given to Hussein for the Jordan Valley provided he agrees to + peace and to considering Palestine refugee problem settled. We have to + have less than one third of Sinai, less than one third of West Bank and + Jerusalem united under Israeli + sovereignty, giving Jordanians special rights on their holy places + there.

+

“Kissinger: In my view we have to + agree first with the Soviets.

+

“Allon: But before that with + us.

+

“Kissinger: Exactly. Dobrynin is after me to do just that. + I won’t do it unless we have an understanding with you first. I will + never do it unless I spoke to you first. State Department cannot deliver + on this. The way to [get] purchase in Jordan is with concessions in + Sinai. I will not get involved unless you agree.

+

“Allon: Do you think this is a + good plan (workable)?

+

“Kissinger: It has a chance. No + problem with Golan. Sinai I have to think more. If you want to move on + this talk to me. You will face a major problem soon. You will be + confronted with a list of promises (by Sisco). Your policy must be to get them from the President. You are in mortal danger.

+

“Allon: Mortal?

+

“Kissinger: Yes, mortal. And + those who will make easy promises to you are only out to get the + Rogers Plan implemented.

+

“Allon: Our defense must be + viable. We want to be less dependent on you. We need your political + support and deterrence of Russians. Personally I think a bilateral + military pact with U.S. must be achieved.

+

“Kissinger: You will be crazy to + want that! It will explode enormous public debate. The Joint Chiefs will + fight it. It will only expose you to enormous pressure. You will not be + able to act when you have to. You will lose your freedom. A formal U.S. + guarantee is counter-productive. A pact is against your interests. Right + now your policy must be to resist Rogers. Be tough on Suez opening and if you are ready to + make any concessions make them only to the President and only to him.” + (Israel State Archive, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 9352/3)

+

Secretary of State Rogers and + Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs + Joseph Sisco held a meeting + at the State Department with Allon and Israeli Ambassador Yitzhak Rabin later in the day + beginning at 1:02 p.m. (Personal Papers of William P. Rogers, Appointment Books) Allon began the meeting by explaining + Israel’s reasons for opposing the interim Canal settlement and its + reluctance to cooperate with the Jarring mission. He said the Israelis were under the + impression that the opening of the Suez Canal did not serve U.S. + interests and therefore Israel did not wish to upset its strongest ally. + He also said that because the 1949 armistice lines were “indefensible + borders” Israel could not consider any proposal that envisioned a + withdrawal to those frontiers. Rogers, however, did not accept Allon’s answer, insisting that the + United States wanted more cooperation from Israel. “We don’t like your rejecting everything as + when your [Prime Minister] rejects this and then rejects that,” he said. + “You should have some regard for our interests. We do hope you will see + this is a time to work out peace. Because of Soviet involvement this has + become a major problem giving us the right to play a major role. We + don’t wish to be rejected . . . The PM’s territorial conception as + reported in the London Times and the Rogers Plan is not great. Assuming + demilitarization and security arrangements on Sharm and Gaza can be + worked out satisfactorily then there are no great differences between + us. You never insisted on annexation before and when you do so now you + talk to us as if you don’t want a settlement . . . By talking annexation + you are making it impossible for Sadat to negotiate.”

+

Allon then asked why Israel should + submit a proposal that the United States did not support when it would + just lead to a confrontation between officials in Washington and + Jerusalem. But Rogers insisted + that “the confrontation already exists.” The issue, he told Allon, is coming to the UN Security Council. “If you insist on + territorial changes we will vote against you. We took you at your word + when you said all you wanted was peace. We made presentations to Arabs + and others on their grounds and said that if peace is accomplished you + will not insist on annexation.” Rogers then added that the United States did not + understand why Israel’s response to Jarring’s February 8 aide-mémoire was in such “arrogant + adamant terms.” Israel has “created the impression that you were trying + to undermine his (Jarring’s) + mission. You could have answered positively . . . You could have said + ‘Yes provided we have a presence in Sharm el Sheikh, security for Gaza + and demilitarization of Sinai.’ The way you put it seemed a + retrogression. Every nation says this to the US.” Sisco agreed, adding “You are alone in + the world. You have no friends. Even the Dutch reject your position. You + haven’t got anybody. We want to support you but have other interests.” + (Telegram from Washington to the Israeli Foreign Ministry, April 20; + ibid., 5971/6)

+
+ +
+ + 224. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in + IsraelSource: National + Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1162, Saunders Files, Middle East + Negotiations Files, Middle East—Jarring Talks, April 21–30, 1971. Secret; Priority; + Nodis; Cedar Plus. Drafted by Sisco and Atherton, cleared by Haig, and approved by Rogers. Repeated Priority to Cairo and to USUN. + Washington, April 22, 1971, 0237Z. +

68413. Ref: Tel Aviv 2220.Telegram 2220 from + Tel Aviv, April 19, included the text of Israel’s proposal for + reopening the Suez Canal, which begins: “With a view to facilitating + the attainment of durable peace between Israel and the UAR, Israel + is prepared to consider entering into a special agreement with the + UAR for the opening of the Suez + Canal to international navigation, the observance of a cease-fire + without limitation of time and non-resumption of fighting, and the + stationing of the IDF at some + distance east of the Suez Canal.” What followed were 13 principles + that the Government of Israel believed the agreement had to contain. + (Ibid., Box 657, Country Files, Middle East, Middle East + Nodis/Cedar/Plus, Vol. II) Meir handed the proposal to Barbour in a meeting with him on + the afternoon of April 19, telling him that the proposal “should be + understood as a state of clarification between GOI and USG,” and that “there would be a need for negotiations + to work out details.” (Telegram 2221 from Tel Aviv, April 19; ibid., + Box 1162, Saunders Files, Middle East Negotiations Files, Middle + East—Jarring Talks, + April 1–20, 1971)

+

1. Following are our replies to points on which GOI seeks establish agreed position with USG. You are authorized to convey these to + GOI, leaving piece of paper to + assure textual accuracy. Paragraphs below refer to correspondingly + numbered sub-paragraphs of para B of Israeli document:

+

(1) We believe document contains elements which obviously will require + further clarification and adjustment during subsequent negotiations. + USG is prepared to pass points + contained in paragraph A, sub-paragraphs 1–13, of Israeli document to + UARG, to recommend that they be given serious consideration and to tell + UARG we are prepared to convey its reponse to GOI. We are certain GOI + will appreciate that, if we are to play role of constructive diplomacy + as both sides have asked us to do, we cannot be advocate for entirety of + the positions of either side. Of positions set forth in Israeli + document, some are obviously fundamental, others less so. We will, + however, emphasize to UAR that we + believe Israeli proposal offers positive basis for further discussions + and exploration and will urge they reply in positive spirit.

+

(2) The USG position remains as it was + stated in the communications cited (President Nixon’s letters to Prime Minister + Meir of July 23 and December 3, 1970,Documents 136 and 187. and clarifications + conveyed by Assistant Secretary Sisco to Ambassador Rabin July 27, 1970).When + Sisco met with Rabin on July 27, 1970, the + Israeli Ambassador asked him—on instructions from the Government of + Israel—to clarify the U.S. position on fundamental points regarding + a future peace agreement between Israel and its neighbors. (Telegram + 120681 to Tel Aviv, July 28, 1970; National Archives, Nixon + Presidential Materials, NSC Files, + Box 1155, Saunders Files, Middle East Negotiations Files, U.S. Peace + Initiative for the Middle East Vol. II)

+

(3) The US position remains as previously stated: Quote no Israeli + soldiers should be withdrawn from occupied territories until a binding + contractual peace agreement satisfactory to Israel has been achieved. + Unquote. We understand fully that Israeli willingness to pull back its + forces in accordance with an interim agreement does not create an added + obligation to make a further withdrawal in the absence of a peace + agreement, and we agree that no added commitment would be involved on + the part of Israel. If such agreement achieved, it would of course + provide basis for progress in Jarring talks.

+

(4) It follows from 3 above that we understand clearly that a pullback by + Israel in accordance with the interim agreement does not imply Israeli + willingness to future withdrawal to the international border or any + other line not agreed to in the course of the negotiations. Our view + regarding borders remains that Resolution 242 neither endorses or + excludes the pre-June 5, 1967 lines, in all or in part, as the lines to + which Israel will withdraw in accordance with the final agreement to be + reached under Ambassador Jarring’s auspices.

+

(5) We are not altogether clear just what Israel is aiming at in question + 5. We would be prepared to make clear to the Soviet Union the + seriousness of any violation under the terms of any agreement reached on + the Canal question, including any Soviet participation in or support of + such violations. Other ways and means to deter such moves by the Soviets + would depend on the actual circumstances of the situation at the + time.

+

(6) As we have said, the USG is prepared + to play constructive diplomatic role in assisting the UAR and Israel in reaching agreement on + the Canal question so long as both parties wish us to do so. As + previously indicated, we have no plans to involve Jarring or the Four in the + negotiations.

+

2. After conveying foregoing, you should make following additional points + orally.

+

A. We must take exception to the point made which suggests that USG has advocated opening of Suez Canal + and that GOI is responding to US wishes + in this regard. As records show, idea of interim agreement on opening of Canal was proposed by + President Sadat and responded to + by Prime Minister Meir in public + statements in early February.See Document 203. + USG advocates peace settlement on basis + of Resolution 242. We advocate any interim agreement between Israel and + UAR that would be step in that + direction and would help diminish risk of renewed hostilities. It is in + this context that we have said we would favor agreement between the two + sides which would result inter alia in reopening of Suez Canal.

+

B. USG believes Israeli proposal + provides basis for negotiating Canal agreement and is prepared to convey + it to UARG. In our private view, it contains some constructive elements + and some points which UAR will not be + able to accept. We have no intention, however, of pre-judging UAR reaction and we ready to communicate + Israeli document unchanged to UAR + promptly.On April 23, Barbour wrote that Gazit gave Zurhellen this statement: + “Regarding your paper yesterday containing responses to our document + of April 19, we shall see the Ambassador sometime next week for a + further discussion of the matter. We ask that you not rpt not + deliver any document to the UAR. We assume that the document is not + rpt not being transmitted to other parties.” (Telegram 2334 from Tel + Aviv; National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 27–14 + ARAB–ISR)

+ + + Rogers + + +
+ +
+ 225. Memorandum for the President’s File by the President’s Assistant + (Haldeman)Source: National Archives, Nixon + Presidential Materials, NSC Files, + Kissinger Office Files, Box 129, Country Files, Middle East. No + classification marking. “Top Secret” is handwritten in the upper + right-hand corner. All brackets are in the original except those + indicating text omitted by the editors. + Washington, April + 22, 1971. +

This meeting was held at the Secretary’s request to discuss matters + concerning his forthcoming trip to Europe and the Middle EastThe President and Rogers met from 3:32 to 4:35 p.m. (Ibid., White + House Central Files, President’s Daily Diary) A recording of the + conversation is ibid., White House Tapes, Oval Office, Conversation + No. 486–7. Rogers left + Washington on April 27; traveled to London, Ankara, Beirut, Amman, + Riyadh, Cairo, Jerusalem, and Rome; and returned on May 9. + and to review possible + questions that will arise at his press conference tomorrow morning.For the transcript of Rogers’s press conference on April + 23, see the Department of State Bulletin, May + 10, 1971, pp. 593–600.

+

[Omitted here is material unrelated to the Middle East.]

+

On the question of Israel, the Secretary made the point that the present + Israeli position is that they will continue to operate as they have + been; that is, to keep negotiating, talking, and maneuvering, but take + no action or arrive at no decision. The Secretary’s view is that Israel + should be urged continually to come to a settlement, that their position + is stronger now than it’s going to be in the future, and therefore it’s + to their advantage to settle now. The Egyptians have basically agreed to + give them all that they’ve demanded and there’s no reason for Israel to + continue to refuse to settle.

+

The Secretary then listed his other stops—Paris to touch base with the + French—then on to Turkey for the CENTO meetings. It was agreed that he should try to deal + with the dope problem while in Turkey and to make some publicity on this + since it would be of considerable domestic, political value to do + so.

+

Then on to Saudi Arabia, Jordan and Lebanon, from there to Egypt, then + Israel, then a courtesy stop in Italy on the way back.

+

There was considerable additional discussion of the Egypt-Israeli + question all to the same basic point outlined above. The President told + the Secretary to make it clear to Mrs. Meir that we will continue to maintain the balance and + that we do this in spite of the fact that we have no political support + from the American Jewish community.

+

The Secretary indicated that he feels Ambassador Rabin has a more realistic view than + the Israeli government and that it still may be possible to convince the + Israelis that continued resistance to a settlement will not serve their + own purposes. It was agreed that the Secretary should not push the + Israelis, but should make our position clear to them.

+

The President put the direct question to the Secretary as to whether he + felt there was any basis to the danger expressed by Attorney General + Mitchell and others recently + that the Israelis’ threat to go to war was a real one that should be of + major concern to us. The Secretary thought there was no such + possibility, that the Israelis have nothing to gain from going to war, + they have everything they want now and the Egyptians also have nothing + to gain from going to war. The Russians have given them full defensive + capability and back-up and assured them that they will help them to + defend themselves and they know that the Russians don’t want a war. So, + it’s to both parties’ interest to avoid war at this time and in the Secretary’s view, to the + Israelis’ interest to move to a settlement at this time, if only we can + persuade them to do so.

+

The Secretary made the point that he will urge progress by Israel but in + no way will he dictate anything to them. He will make sure that he stays + out of the negotiations and avoids getting into the role of a mediator. + He will emphasize even balance in all of his activities in Egypt vs. his + activities in Israel—spending two days in each and doing the same kinds + of things in each country.

+

He will keep the settlement idea out as a goal, recognizing that it will + take a year probably, before we can achieve it, but he will urge + something now on the part of Israel—such as a Suez settlement.

+

[Omitted here is material unrelated to the Middle East.]

+

At the conclusion the President asked the Secretary to send him a + personal, brief report each day from the important countries so that he + would be able to keep on top of the major matters covered by the + Secretary during the day. He explains the need for this arose from the + very high press interest that there will be in the Secretary’s tripIn an April 26 conversation with Ziegler, Nixon instructed him on how to + handle questions from the media about Rogers’s trip: “As the Secretary has indicated, you + should expect no dramatic breakthroughs in terms of agreement. But + the purpose of this trip is to keep the momentum going—to keep the + cease-fire going, to listen to both sides, to talk to both sides. + The President strongly [unclear]. Here again—that he’s + particularly—that this will be the Secretary’s first visit to + Israel. He’s glad that the Secretary will have a chance to visit + Israel, as the President has done. You can say that. He’s also very + glad the Secretary is going to Egypt. This is the first time in + history that a Secretary of State has visited a country which denies + it diplomatic relations. The President urged this. His goal—his + long-range goal—is to reestablish diplomatic relations with Egypt.” + (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Tapes, + Oval Office, Conversation No. 488–6) and the need to keep + Ron Ziegler fully posted and + coordinated from this end as well as the President’s desire to stay + current with developments as the Secretary’s trip progressed.

+
+ +
+ + 226. Telegram From the Embassy in Israel to the Department of + StateSource: National + Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1162, Saunders Files, Middle East + Negotiations Files, Middle East—Jarring Talks, April 21–30, 1971. Secret; Immediate; + Nodis: Cedar Plus. All brackets are in the original except “[with]”, + added for clarity. + Tel Aviv, April 30, 1971, 1220Z. +

2468. Dept Pass Ankara. For Sisco from Ambassador. Ref: Ankara + 3002.In telegram 3002 from Ankara to + Tel Aviv, April 29, Sisco + asked Barbour for his “full + assessment” of “GOI strategy at present time.” (Ibid., RG 59, + Central Files 1970–73, POL 27–14 ARAB–ISR)

+

1. I have, of course, been devoting a considerable part of my thinking + recently to an assessment of GOI + strategy at the present time and have not come up with any hard and fast + conclusion. As to their attitude with specific reference to the possible + opening of the Canal, I believe their concerns focus on two + considerations. (1) They are genuinely concerned that the Egyptians and + Soviets will take advantage of any Israeli withdrawal to cross the Canal + with military forces and that the Israelis will somehow be prevented + from countering such a move. They genuinely feel that their own security + will require that they not withdraw beyond a distance which they, the + Israelis, can publicly police. They are not rpt not interested in any + conceivable multilateral guarantee against such violation. Nor would any + prospect (which has not been specifically raised on either side but + which is presumably the objective of their probing for our support) of + unilateral American presence to deter the Egyptians and Soviets be + attractive either if it went no further than some kind of American + surveillance, etc. (2) They are concerned lest they withdraw and permit + clearance of the Canal but then are faced with some further Egyptian + demand such as the exclusion of Israeli shipping before the Canal is + actually opened. In this case, they see themselves arrayed against the + unanimous displeasure of all the world’s shipping nations.

+

2. Perhaps more fundamental to their thinking, however, is an underlying + divergence with US as to the effectiveness of various tactics in dealing + with the Egyptians and Soviets. Thus, while they recognize that + considerable progress has been made since last summer, particularly the + continued cessation of hostilities, and they appreciate an American role + in this, they attribute this progress more to Israel’s hard line than to + the various diplomatic maneuvers which have been going on. They don’t + exactly admit to this assessment but in their discussion or references + to the principal Egyptian concessions which have been made—(A) Nasser’s agreement to the ceasefire and (B) Sadat’s expression of willingness to + conclude a peace arrangement with Israel—the implication is clearly + present that they believe these were squeezed out of the Egyptians by + Israel’s adamancy.

+

3. The result is that in both channels the Israelis are reluctant to move + rapidly. Also, I think they still hope, and at least have not given up + on the prospect that, [with] these tactics they will somehow be able to + bring about the direct negotiating procedure by which they originally + put so much store. They do not wish to terminate the Jarring exercise but are happy to keep + it on a back burner with the thought that if triangular negotiation gets + complicated enough, Jarring + might persuade himself or be persuaded that his March 10, 1968 proposal, + involving unconditional talks under his auspices, should be revived as + the only way to break the impasse.

+

4. I appreciate the foregoing analysis is not rpt not very promising, but + I am afraid these conclusions are, to a considerable extent anyway, what + we are faced with.

+ + + Barbour + + +
+ +
+ 227. Editorial Note +

On May 6, 1971, Secretary of State William + Rogers and Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern + and South Asian Affairs Joseph + Sisco met with Egyptian President Anwar al-Sadat and Foreign Minister + Mahmoud Riad at Sadat’s home in Cairo. It was the first + meeting between a U.S. Secretary of State and an Egyptian President + since Secretary of State John Foster + Dulles visited President Gamal Abdel Nasser in May 1953, and the highest level of + contact between Egyptian and U.S. officials since Egypt broke diplomatic + relations with the United States during the 1967 Arab-Israeli war. + Rogers sent President + Nixon a brief report of his + meeting with Sadat in a May 7 + telegram from Tel Aviv:

+

“For President from Secretary.

+

“1. Quote Tell President Nixon + that I welcome you, Mr. Rogers, + with open mind and open heart Unquote, President Sadat said. Behind these words, which + opened my two and one half hour talk with him, at which only FonMin Riad and Sisco joined, is a decision taken by + Sadat with some risk to seek + a peace agreement by relying heavily on the US and an intention to try + to work out an interim Suez Canal settlement. He views a Suez settlement as a Quote test of peace + Unquote. Sadat also said some + things about the Soviet presence which I will report to you + personally.

+

“2. Throughout the visit, at all levels, there was warm cordiality + evident. Quote We disagree on a number of things, Unquote said the + Foreign Minister, Quote but we are not questioning your motives Unquote. + This represents a significant change in the psychological atmosphere + here. In ten different ways, as you can imagine, they said what is + needed is Quote more squeeze Unquote on the Israelis who in their + judgement have misled the U.S.; they contend that Israelis have + demonstrated anew in recent weeks their greater interest in territory + than peace.

+

“3. Sadat is intelligent, + forceful, sensitive, an emotional nationalist, deeply suspicious of the + Israelis, and a thoroughly political man. He is obviously attracted to + the idea of being the peacemaker and was at pains to say that I should + tell you that if he is given something to work with, he Quote has the + authority to make the decisions; he is in control Unquote. In this + connection, he gives my trip credit for forcing his hand to fire Ali + Sabri well before I arrived. He is supremely confident he can control + the other members of the Federation, including Qadafi, the young Libyan + leader whom he describes as a true patriot, but inexperienced. He is + adamant he cannot Quote give up one inch of territory Unquote.

+

“4. There were two concrete results: first, Sadat gave us enough to keep the negotiations alive on + an interim settlement, and there is a considerable amount of bargaining + ahead in the coming weeks and no immediate results should be expected. + He and Fawzi are both more + favorable to a Suez interim settlement than Foreign Minister Riad. + Second, on the bilateral side they were anxious to reflect improvement + in relations and to hold out hope rather than despair. This is the + reason we announced, with their approval, that we were increasing our + respective staffs by one in Washington and Cairo, that we would take + another look at debt rescheduling, and continue our consultations.

+

“5. On the physical side, Cairo shows the wear and tear of years of + neglect. People are very friendly with Americans, and the Soviets are + most inconspicuous. The war seems far away, people are busy doing their + thing, the streets are full of Egyptian-assembled Fiat cabs, and the + only reminder of hostility are a few non-descript soldiers carrying a + shoulder re [sic] walking guard in a relaxed + manner around the famous Liberation Bridge in the middle of the city.” + (Telegram 2660/Secto 127 from Tel + Aviv, May 7; National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 657, Country Files, Middle + East, Middle East Nodis/Cedar/Plus Vol. II)

+ +

When Rogers returned to + Washington after stops in Israel and Italy, he had two conversations at + the White House with President Nixon where he provided further details of his meeting + with Sadat. Both conversations + were recorded on the White House tapes. The first conversation took + place in the Oval Office on May 10 from 3:30 to 4:53 p.m. (Ibid., White + House Central Files, President’s Daily Diary) The editors transcribed + the portions of the conversations printed here specifically for this + volume.

+

Rogers: “[Sadat] started out by saying, ‘I know + what’s uppermost in your mind, and I want to talk about it at + once.That’s the Soviet Union.’ He said, ‘I don’t like the fact that we + have to depend on the Soviet Union as much as we do.I am a nationalist.I + want to remain a nationalist. I am an Arab. I have deep feelings.I have + all the weaknesses that we Arabs have.I love my country; I love the + land; it is ours.I don’t want to have to depend on anyone else.And, the + only reason I have is because we were humiliated and I had no place to + turn—we had no place to turn.’ But he said that ‘I hope that something + can result from the initiatives you’ve been taking.The position that I + took with Jarring is because I + would like to become much closer with the West.’ He said, ‘There’s no + reason why the Arabs should be closer aligned to the Soviet Union.’ He + said, ‘My people like the West better.We appreciate your values and our + association with the West—business opportunities.’ He said, ‘I like + American businessmen.’ He said, ‘My decision to respond as I did to + Jarring, my decision to say + that we would live with Israel in peace; that we would sign a peace + agreement; that we would not interfere with internal affairs etc., was + because I thought that would break the logjam; I thought that’s what the + West wanted. I thought that’s what the United Nations wanted.Now we find + that Israel won’t respond.’ He said, ‘I have the feeling that you are + the only nation who can do anything about it.Everybody else wants to do + it, but doesn’t have the ability.’ He said, ‘I realize too that you + can’t change overnight.’ He said, ‘You’ve sort of built a monument in + your relationship with Israel that can’t be affected quickly, but can be + changed over a period of time. And if you can do that, I’m prepared to + change our relationship with you.’ He said, ‘If we can work out some + interim settlements on the Suez, we’ll renew diplomatic relations with + you. Secondly, I think that others will too.’

+

“Well, we had a long talk and went into a few details, which he spelled + out what he would like.He would like to open the Suez; he would like a + withdrawal by Israel of some considerable distance—he didn’t mention the + distance, but he previously talked to some of us—some of his people + had—and he’s talking, by considerable distance, a number of + kilometers.But I think he’s willing to bargain on that.He wants Egyptian + troops to cross the Canal . . . it’s his land and he wants to move his troops. And I argued with + him that there’s no particular reason why they had to have any troops.It + would be unacceptable to Israel to permit large numbers of troops on an + interim basis because it would look as if he was trying to take military + advantage of the situation on an interim basis.”

+

Nixon: “How’d he react to + that?”

+

Rogers: “Well, it was negative at + first instance.”

+

Nixon: “But he’s open to it?”

+

Rogers: “Happened upon the + observer force—the peacekeeping force—whatever.He was quite flexible + about that. He said, ‘Any kind is satisfactory. I don’t care.’ I said, + ‘The United States couldn’t even fathom the thought of having Russian + presence across the Canal.’ And he said, ‘We wouldn’t want it either.’ + He said, ‘That’s not a big part; we wouldn’t expect that.’”

+

Nixon:"I don’t think they like + them.”

+

Rogers: “He said, ‘I’ll tell + you—you may not believe this but this is the truth: I have to pay for + everything. All—I pay for.I can’t afford it. It’s a drain on me.We + should be spending money for other—I pay for it in hard currency.’ He + said, ‘I pay for the salaries and expenses of the Russians who are + here—all of them.’ He said, ‘That’s very costly.’ He said, ‘I don’t like + that; I need the money for other things.’”

+

Nixon: “They’re so damn + poor.”

+

Rogers: “In the city it’s really + poor; it’s a sad looking city.”

+

Nixon: “It could be a very nice + city; so goddamn poor.”

+

Rogers: “He said he wanted to + have diplomatic relations with us; ‘we’d like to have diplomatic + relations with you. We can’t do it now.’ I said, ‘Why don’t we take some + steps to indicate that our relations are improving.’ He said, ‘Fine.’ + Interestingly, he said, ‘I want you know that I am the President; nobody + else;’ he said ‘I rule this country.’ He said, ‘There’s some doubt about + this. As long as I’m President, I can make decisions.’ But you come away + with the impression that he has made a commitment to peace. At least for + the short run.Which is going to be difficult for him to back away + from.In other words, he’s spent a good deal of political capital on + paving his step.And if something doesn’t happen, then he’s going to be + in a political dilemma because he’s not strong enough to start trouble + with Israel. He couldn’t carry out his threat. Although, I must say, he + didn’t make a threat. He never suggested anything in terms of time. He + never said this has to be done or else.He never said anything of that + kind. And you have a feeling that he knows his limitations in terms of + military strength—he’s just not prepared to renew hostilities. On the + other hand, he realizes the value of some success.And I gave him the + talk about what a great statesman he’d be if Suez was open.Pointing out that he would get the + credit throughout the world on it.

+

“So I think he would like to get a settlement on the Suez.He wants to be + sure that it’s phrased, and described, and explained in such a way that + it doesn’t seem as if he’s lost, he’s made a concession, that he’s given + up something.He wants to make it clear that he still expects a complete + withdrawal.And I think that that can be done. I don’t think that will be + a difficult problem, really.

+

“The impression that you get from Sadat, he is genuine, at least for the moment, in + wanting to improve his relations with the United States. And he is + willing to go much farther than any other Arab leader has ever gone in + stating what he’ll do with Israel.

+

“He said, “If the United States wants to do it itself, that’s fine with + me.’He said, “If you wanted to move troops in, that’s all right with + me.I have no interest in violating the security interests in anything + you want to do, in anything the United Nations wants to do, or anyone + else wants to do. It’s all right with me. All I want is my land back. I + don’t want anything else; I don’t want to bother Israel. I’ve made my + decision.I’ll live with them in peace.I’ll sign an agreement. I’ll do + all the things they’ve always said they’ve wanted.I just want my land + back.’” (Ibid., White House Tapes, Conversation No. 496–13)

+

Rogers returned to the White + House on May 19, where he met with the President in the Oval Office from + 9:05 to 10:14 a.m. (Ibid., White House Central Files, President’s Daily + Diary) Although most of their conversation focused on the pending + announcement of the recent ABM agreement and U.S.-Soviet relations, the + two began with a discussion of the Middle East, and in particular + Rogers’s May 6 meeting with + Sadat:

+

Rogers: “What we have done up to + this point, is to pursue a policy of trying to get the Arabs to have + some trust in us. They finally did. They finally accepted the + initiative. The only way that could ever be settled is to have the + United States play a part. Everything else was hopeless. The United + Nations had no chance. Jarring + had no chance [unclear].”

+

Nixon: “No one would.”

+

Rogers: “Now, we had no reason to + suspect that it would work out as well as it has to date, although this + is what we were trying to do. Now, Sadat is a very forceful man. He has a lot of strength. + He is nationalistic as the devil. He probably is untrustworthy, so I + don’t want you to think that I’m trusting him.”

+

Nixon: “Sure.”

+

Rogers: “But, he is [unclear]. He + has decided to—I’m convinced—to change his position. He is determined to + become closer to the West for economic and political reasons. He—he’s + got a hell of a situation there. He’s spending his money on his arms. He knows his people can’t + operate them; can’t fly the damn airplanes. He’s surrounded with + Russians—he doesn’t like that very much. Now, what I wanted to say to + you, and he told me this in private, and then he told Joe [Sisco] the same thing. And he didn’t + say it unequivocally; he said it as categorically as you possibly can. + And I haven’t briefed—I haven’t told anybody at the State Department, or + anywhere else—”

+

Nixon: “That’s right.”

+

Rogers: “—because it would be a + disaster if we did—”

+

Nixon: “Got out.”

+

Rogers: “He said, ‘I have to have + this current agreement. It’s important for me to have the new agreement. + You’re the only one who can help us get it—you, the United States. I + don’t like the presence of the Russians. I am a nationalist, but I had + no way of defending our country. We had no way of defending our country, + except to get Russian help. You wouldn’t give it to us; nobody else + would. It’s costing me a lot of money. I’m paying the salaries of the + Russians. I’m paying cash for the equipment I get.’ And, he said, ‘I + want to give you this promise: that, if we can work out an interim + settlement—and it’ll take me six months to open the Canal—I promise you, + I give you my personal assurance, that all the Russian ground troops + will be out of my country at the end of six months. I will keep the + Russian pilots to train my pilots, because that’s the only way my pilots + can learn to fly. But, insofar as the bulk of the Russians are + concerned, the ten or twelve thousand, they will all be out of Egypt in + six months if we can make a deal.’”

+

Nixon: “On, on, on Suez?”

+

Rogers: “On the interim + Suez.”

+

Nixon: “‘Interim’ means Suez, in + other words—?”

+

Rogers: “Suez [unclear].”

+

Nixon: “I see.”

+

Rogers: “The final peace + agreement is—”

+

Nixon: “The key to + [unclear]—”

+

Rogers: “—the whole ball of wax. + The interim is—we’re talking about the Suez Canal. Now—and I said, + ‘Well, Mr. President, you know, based on that, we may be able to work it + out.’ I said, ‘The complicating factor is the Russian—the presence of + the Russian troops. If you can assure us that they’ll be out in six + months, that makes our problem a lot easier.’ I said, ‘You tell us that + we shouldn’t be so pro-Israeli. We have to be supportive of Israel’s + position, because you got the Russians here, in large numbers.’ I said, + ‘For as much as we would like to be friendly as hell with you, we can’t + as long as you have this number of Russians here. You might as well + realize it.’ I said, ‘We have to supply Israel with arms as long as + you’ve got a large number of Russian troops in your country. On the other hand, once that is + not the case, once they’ve left—or, most of them have left—it’s a + different ballgame.’ Now, when Joe [Sisco] went back, he [Sadat] told him again, he said, ‘I told the Secretary, + as well as I’ll tell you: I give you my assurance; we’ll work it + out.’”

+

Nixon: “Um-hmm.”

+

Rogers: “Now, if that should be + done—and we have to take it obviously with, with a grain of salt—but, if + he stays in power, and he could do that—he could deliver. It would be + the greatest thing for, for you, Mr. President, and for the + administration, as possible. I mean, to get the Russians out of + Egypt—”

+

Nixon: “The important—the + important thing is to get the deal.”

+

Rogers: “It’s to get the deal . . + . And, and then, as we were leaving, I talked to him about it. He said + who would communicate with me: ‘Don’t do it through channels; get in + touch with Heikal,’ he said, ‘on + any personal thing.’”

+

Nixon: “Yeah.”

+

Rogers: “He is, he is relying + considerably upon Heikal’s + judgment, and Heikal’s really + friendly with the West . . . Obviously, [laughs] Sadat, at one point said to me—he took + me over to the side. We talked, just the two of us, for a while. He + said, ‘When this is over with, I’m going to make you pay for a lot of + this.’ And I said, ‘What are you talking about?’ ‘It’s just been done to + some of our towns.’ He says they were done along the Suez, done by your + planes. And he tells us, “You’re going to have to help me rebuild + those.’ In other words, it’s very significant that—”

+

Nixon: “Yeah. Yeah.”

+

Rogers: “To be thinking down the + road. He wasn’t—in other words—”

+

Nixon: “Yeah, yeah, yeah.”

+

Rogers: “—he was thinking about + tomorrow—”

+

Nixon: “It’s a very interesting + point, Bill. He wants economic assistance from us—”

+

Rogers: “Of course, of + course.”

+

Nixon: “And that’s, of course, + our big stroke in the Middle East, right—?”

+

Rogers: “Of course . . . I think + that it’s possible, if he stays in power, that we could make a + breakthrough here that will have tremendous importance.”

+

[Omitted here is conversation unrelated to Rogers’s meeting with Sadat.]

+ +

Rogers: “And I think that the + thing that I want to close with on this note is that—”

+

Nixon: “It’s the right time—”

+

Rogers: “—we are going to have to + squeeze—”

+

Nixon: “The Israelis.”

+

Rogers: “—the Israelis.”

+

Nixon: “Yeah.”

+

Rogers: “Sadat said—he’s, he’s a pretty clever + fellow—he said, ‘Mr. Secretary, I want you to know—’”

+

Nixon: “Um-hmm.”

+

Rogers: “‘—that I don’t expect + you to do too much all of a sudden.’ He said, ‘I know you can’t hit ’em; + you can’t make ’em do things.’ He said, ‘Just squeeze them!’ [laughter]” + (Ibid., White House Tapes, Oval Office, Conversation No. 501–4)

+
+ +
+ 228. Telegram From Secretary of State Rogers to the Department of StateSource: National Archives, Nixon + Presidential Materials, NSC Files, + Box 657, Country Files, Middle East, Middle East Nodis/Cedar/Plus, + Vol. II. Secret; Nodis; Cedar. All brackets are in the original + except those indicating garbled text and “[Egypt]”, added for + clarity. + Rome, May + 8, 1971, 1542Z. +

2935. Secto 147. Subj: Sec Visit + ME: Bilateral Conversation With + Prime Minister Meir May 6. + Following is uncleared memcon, FYI, and + subject to change upon review.

+

Begin summary: Secretary reviewed for Mrs. + Meir his impression of visits + to Arab capitals. Noted Saudi concern re Jerusalem, strength of + Jordanian regime but need for settlement if Hussein is to be able to hold out over long period, and + Lebanese sense of insecurity and need for better equipment for army. + Sadat gave impression of + being totally confident of his position and preoccupied with Egypt, had + stressed his decision to go for a peace agreement with Israel despite + criticism at home and in otherArab countries, but had been adamant that + he must get back all Egyptian territory. Sadat had made clear he viewed Suez agreement not as end + in itself but merely better way to reach an overall settlement; + Secretary had argued UAR should not + press for time limitation on + cease-fire in connection with Suez agreement. After making these points, + Secretary said he very much hoped GOI + would make clear its stand and take a position that would make a peace + agreement possible. USG feels time is + ripe for progress, and as Israel’s main supporter believes it has + legitimate right to ask GOI to make an + effort. Mrs. Meir said Sadat’s aim is not to make peace but to + get UAR territory back as first step + toward destruction of Israel. Prime Minister returned to this theme + repeatedly, with references to Heykal articles and Sadat speeches, claiming UAR wants to dictate terms of peace, not + negotiate. Secretary reiterated USG + support for negotiations through Jarring and strong hope that way be found soon to get + negotiations off dead center. Exchange was friendly throughout but frank + and lively. End summary.

+

1. Meeting convened at 5:15 p.m. at Prime Minister’s office and lasted + two and one-quarter hours. In attendance on Israeli side in addition + Prime Minister Meir were Deputy + PM Allon, FonMin + Eban, DefMin Dayan, Herzog and Dinitz + of PM’s office, and Gazit, + Elizur and Rivlin of FonMin. Accompanying Secretary were + Ambassador Barbour, Sisco, Pedersen, McCloskey, Atherton, DCM + Zurhellen and PolOff Korn.

+

2. Mrs. Meir welcomed the + Secretary and said she and her colleagues were anxious to listen. + Secretary said it might be helpful to talk about his impressions as + result of his visit to Arab countries. In Saudi Arabia he had gotten + impression of young, intelligent and dynamic officials in the + government. King Feisal’s main concern, as regards the Arab-Israeli + conflict, is Jerusalem, and also Palestinian problem. The King feels + that the character of Jerusalem is being changed. Secretary said he had + not gone deeply into this matter with King but had told him he would be + talking with Mrs. Meir and would + ask her views on the subject.For a report + on Rogers’s meeting with + King Faisal, see Foreign + Relations, 1969–1976, volume XXIV, Middle East Region + and Arabian Peninsula, 1969–1972; Jordan, September 1970, + Document 149. In Jordan, Secretary said, King + Hussein seems to be firmly in + control. He too is obviously concerned over Palestinian problem and + refugees. Secretary said he had flown with King Hussein from Dead Sea area along Jordan + Valley to area of tank battles with Syrians last September. He had not + visited refugee camps but he was impressed by the seriousness and the + human tragedy of the problem. Hussein’s general attitude regarding peace, Secretary + said, reflects recognition that he will have to make some territorial + adjustments to achieve it. Hussein does not talk about getting back every inch of + territory. King gives impression of feeling a little bit left out, since + he has not been involved in recent negotiations, and he welcomed + Secretary’s visit. He desperately hopes some progress can be achieved. + He does not want any Russian presence in Jordan and has rejected several Russian offers. Secretary + said USG is helping King Hussein and will continue to do so. + Hussein feels that he can + hold on for time being but there is concern that he may not be able to + survive over a long period unless a settlement is worked out.

+

3. Secretary said main problem in Lebanon is that government feels + insecure. There were some demonstrations though no violence during his + stay, and Secretary had been encouraged by response that his stop in the + street had aroused. However, government is very shaky and it is much + concerned over Israeli intentions toward Lebanon. Secretary said he had + told Lebanese leaders that any changes in Lebanese-Israeli borders would + be absolutely out of the question and he was certain Israel had no + intention of attacking Lebanon. Addressing Mrs. Meir, Secretary said he was sure she + would not take issue with anything he had said to Lebanese leaders in + this regard. Mrs. Meir said + Lebanese leadership would do best to worry about Fatah within their own + borders than about Israel. Secretary said problem is Lebanese Government + does not have military strength to deal with Fatah problem. Army is + small and weak, its equipment poor, and GOL is divided, and does not feel it has the ability to + deal with fedayeen problem. Deputy Prime Minister Allon said GOL has shown in past that it can do well in handling + fedayeen problem when it wants to. Secretary asked whether USG might be helpful to Lebanon by giving + it military equipment. Mrs. Meir + said there was a time when people talked about Hussein’s not being able to handle the + fedayeen but then he took them on and won. Secretary said it was not + correct to say it had been our view that Hussein was notcapable of confronting the fedayeen. + Sisco noted there had been + two or three occasions before September coup when King had told us he + thought he could and should confront fedayeen. But, Mrs. Meir said, Israel was told time and + again that it should understand the situation in Jordan and not expect + too much of the King. Secretary said the difference between Jordan and + Lebanon was that the King had a good army, but the Lebanese people are + divided along religious lines.

+

4. The Secretary said we had been thinking about question of USG providing arms to Lebanon. What would + be Israeli attitude? Mrs. Meir + said there is no problem between Israel and Lebanon from territorial + viewpoint. In 1948 Israel had occupied 40 Lebanese villages but gave + them back right away, and until the 1967 war the Israel-Lebanon border + “was an ideal border.” But after 1967 border area became a Fatah area. + Since then there has been shelling, shooting and mining, and Lebanese + themselves say there is no Lebanese Government presence in border area + even though territory is Lebanese. Lebanese Government reached agreement + with Fatah according to which Fatah could not shell Israel but was free to cross over into Israel. + This may be all right for the Lebanese but it is not all right for + Israel, Mrs. Meir said. It is + Lebanese territory and Lebanese Government must be responsible for + actions carried out from its territory. Mrs. Meir reiterated that Lebanon, however, “is the last + people we want a war with.” “There were good relations after 1948 and we + want good relations in the future.” Secretary said he thought USG would consider helping Lebanon by + providing military equipment. They are weak and need help. It is one + thing to implore them to take action against fedayeen, but quite another + thing if they do not have arms to do so. Secretary said we would + naturally want to make sure that any equipment provided Lebanese be used + only for internal security purposes. Mrs. Meir said if Lebanese do get [arms] from USG there must be assurances they will be + used responsibly. Eban added that + GOI had sent a statement to GOL through Jarring assuring it that Israel considers the present + border to be the permanent one.

+

5. With regard to Egypt Secretary said impression is Sadat is totally confident regarding + his own position. Sadat gives the + visitor impression that he is well along toward taking Nasser’s place. He is intelligent and + resourceful although he does have Arab characteristics of emotionalism. + Secretary said he and his party had been much impressed by the way + Sadat had talked about Egypt, + not about UAR, and with extent of Sadat concern for things Egyptian. Mrs. Meir interjected “We always called it + Egypt too”. Secretary saidSadat + definitely gives one the feeling that he is the leader. Sadat had told Secretary that he was + the President and could make decisions. He had already decided he wanted + a peace agreement even though a lot of people in Egypt and other Arab + countries criticized him for it. Sadat had said that in deciding on a peace agreement + with Israel he had taken the word straight form Mr. Eban’s remarks. He should have read on + further, Mrs. Meir commented. + Yes, Eban added on to what I said + about secure boundaries. Continuing Secretary said Sadat had said he was prepared to do + what Israel and US wanted, to make a peace agreement, and would accept + any kind of guarantees that anybody wanted to add. He said he did not + need these guarantees, but he would [garble] was that he could not give + up any of his territories. Sadat + had repeated time and again, Secretary said, that he was ready for + agreement with Israel, but could not under any circumstances give up + territory.

+

6. Secretary said Sadat had talked + very little about Gaza and not at all about Jerusalem problem. He had + said in effect that Gaza could be under Arab control, whether under + Jordanian or some other arrangement he did not care. He had talked to + Secretary about his problems with his military leaders regarding Suez + agreement issue, and had said that even his Foreign Minister had not + been in favor of an interim Suez agreement, but he had made the proposal + anyway. Secretary said Sadat + had asked about Israeli + position regarding a peace settlement, and Secretary had answered that + we had no information beyond what Israel gave to Jarring. We told Sadat, Secretary said, that Israel had + said that if Egypt would be ready for a peace agreement, Israel would + lay its cards on the table. Sadat + had said that time was passing and the situation will deteriorate if it + is not put to good use; he would have a problem and so would King + Hussein, so now was the best + time to work out a solution. Sadat had said he knew Soviet presence in Egypt was a + matter of concern to USG. He could + assure Secretary that he had not wanted Sovs in [Egypt].

+

7. Secretary said he had thought that perhaps Sadat had been thinking of Suez agreement as a half + settlement. As it turned out, however, this impression was incorrect. + Sadat made clear that he was + thinking about Suez agreement in terms of an overall settlement, with + Suez opening being merely a better way to reach an overall agreement. + Secretary said he had told Sadat + we thought there were four areas of general agreement (Secretary + cautioned he had made clear that what he was saying did not commit + Israel in any way): (1) Israel is willing to have Suez open (Secretary + commented parenthetically that as far as USG is concerned there are some advantages and some + disadvantages to having Canal open; on the whole it is a standoff); (2) + A withdrawal of some kind would be possible under proper conditions; (3) + This would be coupled with a ceasefire of some duration; (4)The + agreement would not be an end in itself. Secretary said Sadat had taken note of those points. + Sadat had talked about need + for his forces to cross Canal. Secretary said he and his colleagues had + argued against this. Sadat had + added that he did not want Russians to cross the Canal. We did not get + into specifics, Secretary said,but we also made the argument that if + UARG presses for big Israeli withdrawal it will be defeating its own + purposes, since that would make it look like a permanent agreement. + Secretary said he and his colleagues had argued that even a small + Israeli withdrawal would look like a major success for Sadat, and would be striking + demonstration of Israel’s acceptance of principle of withdrawal. It + would also signify that there could be agreement on larger issues as + well. Secretary said he and his colleagues had argued these points at + length. He could not tell what effect they had made on Sadat, though Sadat had listened intently. We said we + had no proposals and no pieces of paper, Secretary said, and he could + think of no more senseless procedure than putting down things on pieces + of paper and having people then reject them. Secretary said he had told + Sadat that we will be ready + to convey two sides ideas and to help, but first let us see if we can + reach some points of agreement before we start putting things on paper. + Sadat had said he accepted + that concept, would remain in touch with us, and would convey his + thoughts.

+ +

8. Secretary said he would tell Mrs. Meir same thing. If your government wants to convey + thoughts, we will pass them on. On a more general level, however, we + find ourselves in a difficult position because we have said we believe + that if Egypt would say it was prepared to make a peace agreement with + Israel and say that they recognized Israeli sovereignty and were ready + to live with it in peace, do all they could to prevent their territory + being used to attack Israel, then we thought a peace agreement might be + possible and believed Israel would be ready to state its terms. + Secretary said he was sure Mrs. Meir and her colleagues knew that Israeli Government had + lost support recently because of its stand; even a government as + friendly toward Israel as Turkey had expressed deep concern over the + Israeli stand. Israeli international support is deteriorating and Israel + and the USG are in the same boat. + Secretary said there was no need to do it right now, but he very much + hoped that GOI could make clear its + stand and take a position that would make a peace agreement possible. + Now is the time, Secretary said, and we will help. What would you like + us to do, Secretary asked? If you have doubts and think the other side + is not sincere, you are not committed until you sign, but it seems to us + that you would want to keep the momentum going. Secretary added that we + don’t care how this is done.

+

9. Sisco said he would like to + make one point. Why does US feel the time is now ripe? Why do we think + there is now a chance that might later be lost? Let’s look at the + conditions. Sisco said he + thought GOI agreed that Jordan is now + as secure a partner for peace as it likely to be. This could change in + the future but King Hussein is + now in control and wants a settlement; during September 1970 crisis + Israelis realized that if there were no King Hussein there would be no one to make peace with in + Jordan. Jordan is now in a position to make peace and run a reasonable + chance of having it stick. As regards UAR, Sisco said, we came away with impression that Sadat is a man who would like to try to + do business and feels able to do something at present but is not sure + what would happen in the circumstance of a continued impasse. Question + therefore is, Sisco said, what + does Israel expect and what does it want to see develop in these two + countries in the future. If you think things will be better in six, + twelve, or eighteen months, we would like to know, Sisco said, because our impression is + that the longer things continue stalemated the worse the situation + becomes. Please tell us if you think we are wrong in this estimate, + Sisco said. What are you + prepared to do, Secretary asked? The time is now ripe to make a + move.

+

10. Mrs. Meir said she would have + to “say something you may not like.” People say Sadat wants to make peace with Israel + and ask why it is that Israel does not agree. Mrs. Meir said that she could not forget + that last year, while at dinner in New York at Ambassador Tekoah’s, Dr. Bunche + had told her that if he were really an honest man, he would return his + Nobel Peace Prize. Dr. Bunche + said in 1949 he had been convinced that there would be a permanent peace + within a year, but it had not come. If Dr. Bunche remembers these things, Mrs. Meir said, how can we forget? We all + recall these things, Secretary said, and we all have our own emotional + reactions, but we must not allow them to get the best of us. When + Sadat says he wants peace, + Mrs. Meir resumed, all he wants + is to get his land back.But we must ask what happened four years ago + when all of a sudden Egypt prepared for war. Did Israel provoke Egypt? + Why after 1957 had there been war again in 1967? Israel had been happy + with the UN force, but then the + Egyptians threw it out. I can only say this, Mrs. Meir added, we have to learn from our + own experience. Many people came back from talks with Nasser and told us Nasser says he wants peace. Secretary + interjected that Nasser had + never said this in the way that Sadat had recently said it. Secretary recalled that + Israel had said that if Nasser + leaves the scene then it would be possible to make peace. Mrs. Meir said she had a collection of + things that Sadat had said after + he had quoted Eban about a peace + agreement. Sadat had described + how he pictures a final settlement, i.e. no more Jewish state. Heykal’s + articles (he is more than just a newspaperman you know, Mrs. Meir said) list the priorities: (1) get + Israel out of the occupied territories, (2) get them back to the 1947 + lines, and (3) then turn it into a mixed Moslem-Christian-Jewish state. + This is no secret; Sadat said the + same thing at the Fatah conference in Cairo.Reference is to the meeting of the Palestine National Council, a + body of the Palestine Liberation Organization, held in Cairo on + February 28. So which Sadat are we to believe?

+

11. Secretary recalled that when she had spoken to Ambassador Barbour, she had said that as soon as + Sadat says he will sign peace + Israel would lay out its position. We are prepared to do it now, Mrs. + Meir rejoined. Israel has + wanted peace for 20 years, and it wanted to negotiate for secure and + agreed borders. Egypt’s answer was the Khartoum formula.See footnote 4, Document + 18. We want negotiations, that is what Israel + wants, Mrs. Meir said. Jarring handed Israel and Egypt a + paper and asked for our commitment. Sadat had said he was prepared to sign on the condition + that Israel would withdraw to the pre-Six Day War lines. We won’t accept + that, Mrs. Meir said, but we are + prepared to go on with negotiations.

+

12. Mrs. Meir said it was not + correct to say that nobody knows what Israel wants in regard to a + settlement. She had set Israel’s position out in public and to the + USG. One, it is not coming down + from Golan (now there is a better regime in Syria, Mrs. Meir added, but she still must say + this); two, it is no secret that Israel must hold on to Sharm el-Sheikh and have a land + connection. It is not that we have not said these things, Mrs. Meir said, but you don’t accept them. + What about the rest, the Secretary asked? Mrs. Meir replied that she had told + Ambassador Barbour that Israel + did not want all of Sinai, not even half. How wide the area that Israel + will hold should be is a question for negotiations, but nobody can say + Israel wants all of Sinai. Mrs. Meir recalled her conversation with the Secretary in + Washington at which time the Secretary had asked if Israel wants + property, or perhaps only a 99-year lease. Her reply had been that she + would take the question to the government, but in any case there must be + Israeli control, not an international force.See Document 162. The United + States well knows what Israel wants, Mrs. Meir said. She was sorry to say, however, that there is + a disagreement between Israel and the United States. The disagreement, + however, is not because United States does not know what Israel wants. + There is nothing more unjust than the accusation that Israel wants + territory, Mrs. Meir said, but it + does want more defensible borders, borders that are in themselves a + deterrent. When the Syrians sit on Golan, we don’t feel secure. + Secretary said we agreed. Continuing, Mrs. Meir said when Natanya and Tel Aviv were within range of + Jordanian guns, Israel also did not feel secure. “We want borders which, + if attacked out of the blue, we can defend.”

+

13. Mrs. Meir said that Israel had + been called intransigent because it insisted on direct negotiations and + then it had accepted the U.S. initiative but, Mrs. Meir asked, what are these + negotiations? What is it when Egypt’s Ambassador to UN returns Israeli paper because it is + labeled a communication from Israel to UAR. Israel states its position, + but then UAR says that if that is the + case it doesn’t want to negotiate. Mrs. Meir said Israel feels that negotiations should now + proceed to point by point examination of issues in question. But there + is also the problem, Mrs. Meir + said, that when you tell me I must believe Sadat when he says peace, I must also believe him when + he says what kind of peace he intends.

+

14. Secretary said we know Israel says it wants control of Sharm + el-Sheikh, but GOI has never told us + where it would withdraw to if it did get Sharm el-Sheikh. We don’t know. + President asked me, Secretary said, and I couldn’t answer. Definitely + not the 1967 borders, Mrs. Meir + said. But USG has announced there must + be withdrawal to the 1967 borders, she added. Secretary said this was + not correct. What we had said was we thought that if satisfactory + arrangements could be reached regarding Sharm el-Sheikh and free + passage, demilitarization of Sinai and on Gaza, then we thought + agreement could be reached on basis of 1967 borders. But, Secretary + reiterated, we do not know where you will withdraw to. Secretary said we hoped that sometime + soon, perhaps not tonight or tomorrow, but sometime soon, we would like + to know. We are Israel’s principal supporter, we feel we do have a + legitimate right to know its position. We very much want negotiations to + be continued under Ambassador Jarring and hope that an honest and active effort will + be made in this direction. U.S. policy has been very adversely affected + by Middle East impasse, Secretary said. Israel tells us what it does not + want, but we need to know what it does want. Do you not want us to work + together and give you our support, Secretary asked? We are prepared to + consider any kind of guarantee that Israel thinks will help. Israel and + the U.S. are in the same boat, and we think that this is the time to + take risks for peace, though we realize that it is easier to do nothing. + If it turns out in the end that no agreement is possible, that there is + no chance for peace, then we will give it up.

+

15. Mrs. Meir said this grieved + her very much, and was unjust. There had been many unjust accusations + made against Israel. Israel refuses peace on dictated terms. Israel had + presented to us its ideas regarding opening of Canal, but Sadat had said there must be full + withdrawal. This Israel does not accept. Secretary said USG does not accept it either. But he + would like to ask if GOI really favors + opening of Suez Canal. When we got Israel’s response, we had impression + that Israel thought of it as a favor to us. But this is matter between + Israel and UAR; GUS is ready to help but is not a party. Sisco noted that we had said we were + ready to transmit Israel’s views. Mrs. Meir asked if Sadat would agree to an end of shooting in connection + with Canal agreement. No, Secretary said, for this would mean, for + Sadat, giving up everything. + Eban commented that Israel + had said in its paper that the line the IDF will hold is not to be considered the final line and + the special agreement will not affect other agreements which may be + reached in the future. Secretary said he did not believe that, in any + case, these were the major hurdles. It should be possible to work out + positions and language which will overcome the differences between the + two sides. Mrs. Meir said it + would be ridiculous for Israel to agree to withdrawal without having + gotten Egypt’s promise that there will be no more shooting, or to let + Egypt send its army across the Canal. Eban asked what was Sadat’s precise position regarding the ceasefire. + Secretary said Sadat wants a + specific time limit. Secretary said he had told Sadat it would be wiser not to do that, + not to create for himself artificial deadlines. Main thing is to have an + agreement. But Secretary added, if Israel says Sadat must foreswear shooting forever + in return for Suez opening, then there can be no agreement, since he + couldn’t do that.

+

16. Dayan asked whether Sadat had indicated his position + regarding other elements of a settlement, i.e. West Bank, and Golan. + Secretary said Sadat had not + raised these, he had always talked about Egypt. Sisco added that what struck us most was that Sadat had been so Egypt-oriented there + had been none of the old pan-Arab litany. Sadat is preoccupied with Egypt. Mrs. Meir asked rhetorically what people do + when they want to make peace. They sit down and talk, argue, but finally + reach agreement. But Sadat says + he wants peace only on his own conditions. He says no diplomatic + relations with Israel, but Israel can live another 100 years without an + Egyptian Ambassador. Problem is Sadat really wants no Israel at all. Mrs. Meir then quoted at length from a + speech by Sadat (apparently + Sadat speech to Palestine + Council late in February) calling for Palestinian rights, terming + Palestinians “the owners of the country” and saying that there must be + an end to the Zionist movement. Sisco interjected that in other Arab countries there is + a great concern that Egypt will abandon the Arab cause. Mrs. Meir said we only know what we hear and + read. But if we only went by public statements, Sisco said, there would never be any + hope for settling the Arab-Israel conflict. We have to be guided not by + public statements but by real negotiating positions, Sisco said.

+

17. Summing up, Secretary reiterated his strong hope that as a result of + his visit some way would be found to get off dead center. We think it is + in your own national interest, Secretary said; literally there is no + other nation that supports you. We hope that Israel will do something to + get negotiations going again. Maybe Jarring should try to get the parties together, Mrs. + Meir replied. The Secretary + answered we hope Israel will not fall back now on the face-to-face + argument. USG still holds to position + that there can be direct negotiations later, but to insist on that now + would kill any chances for agreement. In closing, Secretary reiterated + the hope that GOI would take steps to + get negotiations moving again. He noted that he had found atmosphere for + USG much improved in Arab countries + and Israel itself had always said that the more friends USG has in Arab world, the better things + would be for Israel. Resumption of negotiations would be of great + benefit to all.

+

18. Both sides agreed to continue talks at next meeting, scheduled for + afternoon May 7.See Document 229.

+ + + Rogers + + +
+ +
+ + 229. Editorial Note +

On May 7, 1971, Secretary of State William + Rogers met with Israeli Prime Minister Golda Meir in Tel Aviv at 4:45 p.m. + Also present from the United States were Ambassador Walworth Barbour, Assistant Secretary + of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs Joseph Sisco, Deputy Secretary of + State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs Alfred L. Atherton, and Assistant + Secretary of State for Public Affairs Robert McCloskey. Joining Meir on the Israeli side were Deputy Prime Minister + Yigal Allon, Defense Minister + Moshe Dayan, Foreign Minister + Abba Eban, Finance Minister + P. Sapir, Ambassador to the United States Yitzhak Rabin, Dr. Herzog, Simcha + Dinitz, and Mordechai + Gazit. No U.S. record of the meeting has been found, but + according to a May 12 memorandum of conversation between Rabin and Assistant to the President + for National Security Affairs Henry + Kissinger, the Israelis provided Kissinger with “verbatim” minutes of + the meeting, as well as the record of Sisco’s May 7 meeting with Dayan. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, + NSC Files, Box 997, Haig Chronological Files, Haig Memcons, Dec 1970–Dec 1971 (3 of + 3)) The Israeli minutes are ibid., Kissinger Office Files, Box 129, + Country Files, Middle East. The Israelis also prepared an abridged + record of Rogers’s May 7 meeting + with Meir in which they recorded + that the “talk concentrated almost exclusively on the interim + settlement.”Sisco emphasized + that Sadat was “serious on + interim agreement.” He said it was “a step towards that overall + settlement,” but that the door was “completely open to further + explanations on interim settlement.” Rogers added that he too believed Sadat wanted an interim settlement. “We + lose nothing by trying,” said Rogers. “Israel is in good position to take risks now. + Israel is much stronger than Egypt.” Rogers pointed out that Sadat felt an agreement on a Canal settlement would + accomplish a “political coup” and allow Sadat to overcome humiliation. “This would put him [in] + a frame of mind that he would not want to start war. He would have so + much credit politically that he would resist a war that would ruin + him.”

+

The conversation then turned to addressing a symbolic Egyptian military + presence on the east bank of the Suez Canal. Rogers acknowledged that if Sadat insisted on moving “a lot of + troops” across the Canal that would cast doubts on his intentions. “On + the other hand, a symbolic military presence is another matter.” + Meir replied that “military + personnel cannot be considered at all.” Rogers said that it did not make all that much + difference if it were small number of military personnel under U.S. + supervision. “If it is just a symbolic number, that is one thing, if it + is more that casts doubts on his intentions.” But Meir appeared more concerned about + whether, if the Egyptians crossed the Canal, they would bring Soviet + forces with them, asking Rogers + what the U.S. reaction would be + to that scenario. Rogers replied + that he had told Sadat the United + States would not consider Soviet presence on the east side of the + Canal.Rogers did not think + “it is possible to give answer about what we might do in the event if + things happen, but we would take it as a matter of very grave concern. + Soviet Union knows that. I do not see them playing that game,” he said. + “If they do we will have to face it. But I do not think they have that + in mind.” Rogers added that the + United States would have a “major problem” if it looked as if the + Soviets were going to move “in a big way to take countries in the + region.”

+

Sisco then asked for an + elaboration of the distance that Israel was prepared to withdraw its + forces from the Canal, emphasizing that “the broader the zone the better + the possibility of getting a satisfactory formulation of the cease-fire + from Israel’s point of view.” Dayan said that if Egyptians did not undertake not to + resume shooting, then Israeli forces would have to remain “very very + close” to the line. Dayan did not + rely on the United Nations keeping fortifications and certainly not + being behind the passes, which is more than 35 kilometers. Israel, + Dayan said, would accept a + 10-kilometer withdrawal from the Suez Canal, but “the matter is related + to an understanding not to resume fighting.” Dayan said he would not recommend a withdrawal at all if + the Egyptians did not undertake non-resumption of fighting and + non-crossing of the Canal. Sisco + replied that it therefore seemed possible to try for a 10-kilometer + withdrawal while the Canal is cleared and once the Canal opened to have + Israel “simultaneously” withdraw to the passes.Eban interjected that he would like + continued U.S. opposition to any idea of military crossing, symbolic or + non-symbolic, to which Sisco + replied that the Egyptians would then expect a much larger withdrawal + from the Israelis, somewhere in the vicinity of 35 kilometers.

+

After further discussion about the withdrawal, and not relating an + interim Canal agreement to Security Council Resolution 242, Prime + Minister Meir stated that “we are + prepared to move from the Canal, we do not want any more shooting. We do + not want military personnel to cross the Canal. If we have to face the + Egyptian army we would rather face them across the Canal.” Rogers replied that “this was the + first time that there had been a good talk on specifics. If U.S. can rub + it up so that it would look as if Sadat had been reasonably successful on the agreement, + he might do it.” With that in mind, Rogers asked Meir + about the possibility of having Sisco go back to Cairo to talk with Sadat to explain Israel’s position. + Meir agreed but emphasized + that the United States “had no authority to speak about withdrawal of + one mile. Government will not decide until it sees principles are + accepted and there are some arrangements. I do not care how you call it. + That we are assured that no more shooting, no crossing of Egyptian + military and some mechanism, a + small civilian group to see to it that Bar Lev Line is not destroyed. + And if we have U.S. assurance and Rogers had said so, that U.S. will support us that this + does not commit us to anything else. Sadat must know that you accept our position that this + [is] no commitment whatsoever.”

+

Before the meeting adjourned, Rogers asked Meir + if she thought the Canal agreement was a good idea.Meir replied: “This we think is a good + service of the U.S. government if they can do it.” (Main Points of Talk + Prime Minister with Rogers, May + 7; Israel State Archive, Previously Classified Material, 7038/9)

+
+ +
+ 230. Telegram From the Embassy in Italy to the Department of + StateSource: National + Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 657, Country Files, Middle East, Middle + East Nodis/Cedar/Plus Vol. II. Secret; Immediate; Nodis; + Cedar. + Rome, May + 8, 1971, 1147Z. +

2919. For the President from the Secretary.

+

1. I have completed the final phase of my Middle East trip—two days in + dynamic, creative, intense, worried, suspicious, querulous Israel. After + a first day’s round with Golda + Meir during which she stuck to familiar themes and + maintained an immovable steadfastness, we hit pay dirt in our last + session in a long, detailed and point-by-point discussion of the interim + settlement in which we were able to get some helpful Israeli flexibility + on certain key points.See Documents 228 and 229. It was an arduous process, but in the end we + got enough of what we wanted, and represented sufficient clarification + and elaboration that I am sending Joe + Sisco to report to SadatSisco met with Sadat on May 9; see Document 231. and to explore further + some of the remaining key points. I am satisfied that this trip has + accomplished its principal purposes: to show American interest and + leadership in the constant search for peace in the area; to maintain and + conceivably even enhance the pace of the peacemaking process + particularly with regard to an interim Canal agreement; and to add to + the more hopeful atmosphere slowly developing in the Middle East.

+ +

2. More concretely, the principal results of the trip seem to be these: + our relations with Faisal have + had a fresh input; friendly Jordanian-American relations have been + reinforced; Lebanon was given a badly needed reminder to adopt a more + positive posture with its people before its weakness produces its own + demise;Haig attached Rogers’s reports on his visits to Jordan and Lebanon + to a memorandum to the President on May 5. (National Archives, Nixon + Presidential Materials, NSC Files, + Box 1162, Saunders Files, Middle East Negotiations Files, Middle + East—Jarring Talks, May + 1–9, 1971) He did not include telegram 1052 from Cairo, May 5, in + which Rogers detailed his + 2½-hour meeting with King Hussein at al-Hummar Palace on May 3. (Ibid.) + we added a measure of confidence in our relations with Egypt; and we + reaffirmed our continuing interest in Israel’s security, while leaving + them with no doubt that our direct interests in the area can be affected + adversely unless they adopt a more flexible position on an overall and + interim peace settlement. We have finally begun to take the play away + from the Russians, and both sides—Arabs and Israelis—see the US as the + key—and this is as it should be. So long as we maintain our strength to + bulwark this kind of active US diplomacy, we ought to be able in time to + move from neutralizing Soviet influence to reversing that trend and at + least keep pace with them in the Persian Gulf and the Indian Ocean.

+

3. Back to Israel. It is clear that this is a divided government, and + decisions will come only with painful slowness. Mrs. Meir has great strength, but also great + weaknesses. Doubts were expressed that she is the leader who in the end + will make any fundamental settlement. She is showing understandable + strain, irritation, signs of weariness, and age, but more important, she + suffers psychologically from the Quote trauma of 1957 Unquote when as + Foreign Minister she announced Israeli withdrawal. She strongly prefers + arguing the past, has difficulty talking specifics, and has to be pushed + forward rather than lead her platoon of Ministers. Allon played a mixed role; Eban was quite silent. Only Dayan came out straightforwardly. His + approach to the interim settlement is similar to ours; he believes that + it must be conceived as a step towards the overall settlement and based + on a permanent ceasefire. He believes that once having left the Canal, + Israel should assume it will not return. In a previous detailed meeting + with Sisco,Sisco met + with Dayan on May 7 in Tel + Aviv. The minutes of their conversation are in the National + Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 129, Country + Files, Middle East, Middle East. Saunders summarized the “main points” that emerged + from the Sisco-Dayan meeting in a memorandum to + Kissinger on May 17, + concluding: “This conversation would seem to reinforce Sisco’s prior assumption that + peace is not likely to be made with Prime Minister Meir. Even Dayan, however, does not envision a + border settlement which Sadat + could, under present circumstances, accept in a final settlement.” + (Ibid., NSC Files, Box 1163, + Saunders Files, Middle East—Jarring Talks, May 19–31, 1971) he helped + break the ice, and this + flexibility to a degree got reflected grudgingly at my marathon three + hour session with Golda Meir.

+

4. On substance, the remaining difficult points which will over the + coming weeks determine whether we get an interim agreement are + these:

+

A. Length of ceasefire. Dayan + injected the positive concept that if unlimited or extended, the area of + Israeli withdrawal from the Suez can be greater.

+

B. Understandable hard-rock Israeli insistence that no UAR military force will move into the + evacuated territories. Sadat was + equally strong the other way. Israel is likely to accept a UAR civilian presence, and Dayan helped by keeping open + possibility of UAR police in symbolic + numbers. This point will be tough.

+

C. Supervision. Meir, aided by + Allon, has been suggesting + joint Egyptian-Israeli arrangements. This is not feasible. We made a + little headway in showing how an augmented UNTSO (UN Truce Supervisory Organization—which + could involve a few Americans) with a reinforced mandate deriving from + the agreement might be a satisfactory arrangement. There are a number of + other points of lesser significance which we believe are negotiable.

+

5. I have in mind also that if we are able to narrow the gap even further + in the next few weeks, the time will soon come when we will wish to tie + down the Russians with respect to the agreement as a whole and in + particular that Quote no Russian forces will come across the Canal + Unquote. I will have some other information for you on this at our + Monday meeting.Rogers met with Nixon to discuss his trip on May 10 in the Oval + Office from 3:30 to 4:53 p.m. For a transcript of the portions of + the conversation pertaining to Rogers’s May 6 meeting with Sadat, see Document 227.

+ + Martin + +
+ +
+ + 231. Telegram From the Interests Section in Egypt to the Department of + StateSource: National + Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1162, Saunders Files, Middle East + Negotiations Files, Middle East—Jarring Talks, May 1–9, 1971. Secret; Immediate; + Nodis; Cedar Plus. + Cairo, May + 9, 1971, 1746Z. +

1103. For Secretary from Sisco. I + will report separately on the previous one-hour talk with Foreign + Minister Riad and two-hour talks with President Sadat and Prime Minister Fawzi.Telegram 1107 from Cairo, May 9, contains Sisco’s reports of his previous + talks. (Ibid.) This is a report on my subsequent two-hour + meeting with Sadat alone.

+

1. It is apparent that you made a hit with Sadat.Rogers sent Sadat a note immediately after + leaving Egypt in which he wrote: “I want to tell you how deeply I + was impressed with what I heard and saw in your country, and in + particular the enlightened leadership you are providing.” (Telegram + 2675 from Tel Aviv, May 7; ibid., Box 657, Country Files, Middle + East, Middle East Nodis/Cedar/Plus Vol. II) He is full of + praise for you. He was very grateful that you sent me here so promptly + after your talks in Israel and that I gave him such a full report. For + once we have received what the Israelis will do, he said, not what they + will not do.

+

2. I gave him some of the byplay that we found and what we considered to + be Dayan’s positive role.See footnote 5, + Document 230. He said that he wants you to know + that he “prays to God in hopes that Dayan will become Prime Minister some day.” I can deal + with him, a strong man like him, said Sadat. Throughout the five-hour talk they paid more + attention to what Dayan’s views + are more than anybody else’s.

+

3. As you might expect, he laid great stress in several different ways on + two cardinal points: why he must have Egyptian troops across the Canal; + and why he needs a commitment to the international border in the context + of an overall political settlement. I handled these two hot potatoes + with great care. I gave him no encouragement, however, saying candidly + these were the two points which the other side laid the greatest stress + on. Nevertheless, I said, we would objectively explore all possibilities + as to elements of interim settlement, but I could not expect commitment + to international border.

+

4. He offered an alternative proposal “on his own” for US alone which he + said he wants the two of us to think about. His alternative is: a + limited number of UAR troops crossing + the Canal, with a specified limited amount and type of arms, with a wide + 50 kilometer buffer zone between the two sides, with limited arms on the Israeli side of the new + line. This has obvious difficulties, but I did not, of course, say + anything more than that we would look at all possibilities. I felt it + was more important psychologically to leave him with the impression that + we were trying to be helpful to him directly rather than express strong + doubts at this point. In connection with this proposal, I said in any + area evacuated the Israelis had laid great stress on Egyptian-Israeli + joint supervisory teams. Much to my surprise, he said this was not ruled + out, provided the proposal allowed some crossing of Egyptian troops + across the Canal and provided joint Egyptian-Israeli teams were under + the supervision “of Jarring,” + which I later had him to clarify to mean as under the umbrella of the + UN.

+

5. I once again told him that if our intelligence indicates that they are + receiving more arms from the Soviets, this would become a matter of + major importance in American public opinion, and that this would + increase the pressure on us to provide additional arms to Israel. He + said we should expect nothing new before May and June, but he did not go + beyond this. In connection with the ideas on the Russians which you + intend to convey to the President personally,See Document 227. + I just want to confirm to you that your interpretation of what he said + is absolutely correct. He reiterated this to me in plain language.

+

6. He went into great detail regarding his internal situation which added + some additional information to that which you conveyed to me as a result + of your private conversation with him. As you said, he is going to the + people, he is going to move politically in order to develop broad mass + support for himself in Egypt, including new elections to the Arab + Socialist Union from top to bottom since he says about 100 out of 150 + are against him. He also says that General Fawzi and the military are very negative and did not + favor his February proposal to Jarring and are against an interim settlement unless it + provides for some movement of Egyptian troops across the Suez Canal. He + was more critical of Foreign Minister Riad than any of his colleagues. I + regret to report to you that he says Riad does not want to do anything + to improve relations with the United States. He said it is not the case + of Riad being anti-American, but rather that over the last twenty years, + and particularly as a result of Riad’s role in connection with the + armistice arrangements, Riad feels himself to be vulnerable since he + made some genuine attempts to work out matters in the past and he has + been disappointed. For this reason Riad continues to be “hawkish” and + oppose him on the interim settlement. Sadat confirmed to me what Bergus had already learned from Heykal in the last 24 + hours: that Prime Minister Fawzi + will be playing a much more active role in the field of foreign affairs. + “You know Fawzi, Joe,” Sadat said, “and you know that he likes + Americans, he is flexible, and wants to do something. We will need about + two weeks to study the important report that you have given us here + today and then I intend to send Fawzi to Washington to give you my + answer.” In the meantime, he pleaded that we try to do something more + with the Israelis on the two cardinal points of concern.

+

7. In his campaign to develop broad support, he will meet tomorrow with + the Arab Socialist Union in order to arrange for elections. He then will + meet with the armed forces on Tuesday and Wednesday. He said he will + announce all of this on Thursday.May + 13.

+

8. He reconfirms that once the interim settlement is achieved, he will + resume diplomatic relations with the United States immediately. He want + you to tell President Nixon that + he wants his help in those circumstances to rebuild his country. In his + words, he wants room to breathe. He repeated his story in detail of the + reasons, with which you are fully familiar, as to why he decided to sack + Aly SabryAccording to telegram 990 from + Cairo, May 3, which reported on Sadat’s “delicate domestic situation,” Cairo was + “awash with stories about bitter arguments” between Sadat and Ali Sabri, the Egyptian + Vice President. Bergus + further commented: “Taken as a whole, this is a victory for the + “good guys’ in Egypt. It will, however increase Sadat’s need for some kind of + tangible movement towards peaceful settlement. Basic issue in + Sadat’s quarrel with + Sabri was not federation [with Syria and Libya] but Sabri’s + accusation that Sadat was + being diddled by the Americans. At same time, with Sadat’s greater dependence on + military support, his flexibility regarding interim settlement on + Suez Canal will be impaired.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential + Materials, NSC Files, Box 637, + Country Files, Middle East, UAR, + Vol. VI) before you arrived. He implied the same thing would + happen to Riad or alternatively he might be kicked upstairs. In any + event, he is going to rely on Prime Minister Fawzi primarily in foreign affairs.

+

9. He told me that inadvertently I had in one way been unhelpful to him. + He said that several of the things that I had reported to Ghorbal in the past several weeks had + come through the Foreign Office filter and reached him in a distorted + fashion. He said if there is anything that we want to get to him, and in + a straight way, that we should begin to tell Ghorbal less and have Bergus relay it to Heykal for Sadat. I said we would do this. + Sadat, at his initiative, + even after five hours of talks today, is sending Heykal to see me + tonight. I will report anything new that comes from this meeting.

+

10. I asked him once again to take a unilateral step and free the few + Israeli POW’s as a signal. He said he would consider it, but was + noncommittal.

+

11. I did not take up Eban’s + suggestion re their technical people getting together because of the + later Israeli overruling of him on this score.

+ +

12. There has been no criticism here from any quarter or level as to your + trip over international waters to see the Gulf and Sharm el Sheik.

+ + + Bergus + + +
+ +
+ 232. Conversation Among President Nixon, the President’s Assistant for Domestic Affairs + (Ehrlichman), and the + President’s Assistant (Haldeman)Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White + House Tapes, Oval Office, Conversation No. 496–16. No classification + marking. The editors transcribed the portions of the tape recording + printed here specifically for this volume. Brackets indicate unclear + portions of the recording or those omitted by the editors, except + “[laughs]”, “[Joseph]”, “[million dollar]”, and “[Admiral]”, added + for clarity. + Washington, May 10, 1971, + 5:25–6:15 p.m. +

Nixon: As long as we’ve got this + problem with the Rogers-Kissinger + thing, that—and I’ve said this before—you’ve got to allow me to see + Rogers alone, + particularly—and, in particular, when he reports on the Mideast problem. + And, because I didn’t, I didn’t realize that—I thought I was seeing him + alone and say that it’s my own schedule [unclear]. In case if Henry came + bouncing in, well, we’ll have to pretend that it’s—I mean, don’t, don’t + raise it with him, now.

+

Haldeman: I won’t raise it with + Henry.

+

[unclear exchange]

+

Nixon: Yeah, but he—but, but + with—when I see Rogers, I just + know that I could get a hell of a lot more done without Henry being + there. And there’s no problem not being there—

+

Haldeman: Yeah.

+

Nixon: It’s no use to having the + two sitting there. You know, they both irritate each other. And, so—and, + particularly, the Mideast, Bob [unclear] ‘cause Henry’s wrong on the + Mideast. I mean, he just happens to be wrong. He wants to sit tight and + do nothing ’cause of the elections in ’72, now. [laughs] Well, we ain’t + going to do it.

+

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to the Middle East.]

+

Nixon: But I don’t want, in case + Henry raises the Rogers-Mideast + thing, for you to give him any comfort on that. I just don’t want you to + do it, because the—

+ +

Haldeman: Well, I was planning, + pretty much, to sweetheart Henry tonight—

+

Nixon: Yeah.

+

Haldeman: —and say that our + own—

+

Nixon: Yeah—

+

Haldeman: —general stuff + that—

+

Nixon: Well, the, the main thing + is that on, on that, is that we, we simply cannot—I mean, Rogers is now working on the Mideast + thing. Somebody has to work on it. We cannot just continue to go down + the line with the Jews on that, and have no other friends in the world. + Now, that’s just the cold turkey about it. And, the—so, it’s a curious + thing, at the present, present time, in the whole world. The United + States, at the present time, is the only country that is supporting + Israel. There ain’t nobody else, now. None. None. Their vote in the + UN would be the United States + only.

+

Haldeman: Hmm.

+

Nixon: Now, goddammit, we just + can’t continue that way. The Israelis are sitting there, right now, on + this offer to open the Suez; just sitting tight, not doing a damn thing. + We’ve got to pressure ’em, and we’re going to. They—Bill said today + they’ve denied it—they said that, well, that their real thing is that + they all think we’re coming up to an election again, and they can sit + tight. And I said, “Never.” I said, “They pulled that in ’70,” and I + said, “Just forget it.” And, now, I want Henry to hear it. Now, Henry’s + arguments will be that, well, he’s worried about the fact that the, the + Jewish editorial writers and columnists in this country will be—will + be—if we’re nice to Israel, will be nicer to us on Vietnam. Who? Maybe + one: Joe Alsop. Who? The goddamn Jews are all against us. [Joseph] + Kraft—Syndicated newspaper columnists + Joseph Alsop and Joseph Kraft.

+

Haldeman: Well, what in the world + difference does it make what the columnists do to us, or Democrats—

+

Nixon: That’s right.

+

Haldeman: —on Vietnam anyway. + They just—

+

Nixon: It’s working out.

+

Haldeman: Vietnam is, is—

+

Ehrlichman: Yeah.

+

Nixon: We’re finished in Vietnam. + It’s gonna go. But, let me say that on Israel—

+

Haldeman: [unclear] and there it + is—

+

Nixon: —on Israel, my feelings + there just happen to be different. That’s, then, very different from + Henry’s. It’s the one thing he’s blind on. Now, he doesn’t—the Russian thing is brought + in, and that’s to ensure the Russian thing is in there. But, it’s a much + different game than that. He just—the United States just cannot continue + to sit in there supporting Israel alone against 100 million Arabs, + against the British, against the French. Forget the French, but the + British, for example—the Italians. There isn’t a goddamn government in + Europe that supports us on this, on the Israeli thing. You know that? + Not one! Now, why in the hell is that? And so, there, there must—we must + be doing something wrong. And they’re all doing it, because they think + that Muskie’s gone over to Israel, and Humphrey will be going to Israel, + and Teddy Kennedy’ll be going to Israel,Senators Edmund S. Muskie (D–ME), Hubert H. Humphrey (D–MN), and + Edward M. Kennedy (D–MA). and everybody else, and I have to + go along. Screw ’em. You know, ConnallySecretary of the Treasury John Connally. says, “Sometimes, + you’ve got to have an enemy.” Well, maybe it’ll be the Jews. And this is + cold turkey, now. That’s what—don’t let it be raised. If it’s raised, + just say, “Well, I don’t know anything about it.” Don’t let him—there’s + plenty of things wrong with Rogers. We know that. We know that he plays his own + game. But, on the other hand, on this particular issue, if—he is + squeezing the Israelis because I want him to. You know? Do you + understand, John? You see, that’s—he’s doing it because I want it + done.

+

Ehrlichman: Right.

+

Nixon: I’m just not—I, I will + not—I don’t buy Henry’s idea of, of just taking the Jewish line. I just + don’t buy it, and we’ve, we’ve, we’ve gone too far, I mean, on + everything. They’re out knocking, because they want $500 million more of + economic assistance—the Jews do. And they want, they want about another + hundred [million dollar] advance. [unclear] They expect us to give ’em + that and not do a goddamn thing about opening Suez or anything else. + They’re not going to get it.

+

Ehrlichman: Hmm.

+

Nixon: Now this is it. This is + it. And so, another thing, another reason you’ve got to keep Henry out + of it, is that when he gets involved in Israel, he is totally irrational + about anything else. We’ve just got to keep him—keep his mind on, on + Vietnam, Soviet-American relations, and China. And it’s really for his + own benefit. And so, I just—I know that, in here, we don’t usually get + into that. But, there’s plenty of things that—I don’t mind discussing + his relation with Rogers in + other ways, because Rogers is + involved in many other places. And the State Department is not to be + trusted, and I don’t trust them. But, on this one, we—we’ve just got to + realize that Henry is not the fellow that can call the turn. I mean, if, + if he would only realize it, we’d be a hell of a lot better off. That’s, that’s the way it is. Do + you want to weigh in? Do you have any difference on it?

+

Haldeman: No. I haven’t talked to + Henry at all, so it’s—

+

Nixon: Well, I don’t know what + he’ll have to say.

+

Haldeman: I don’t know what + his—

+

Nixon: Rogers, as a matter of fact, got—

+

[unclear exchange]

+

Nixon: —got quite a—as we would + expect, he got a very good reception over there. They’re all after + [unclear]. They want our support. [unclear] We got that Sino-Soviet + thing [unclear]. Otherwise [unclear].

+

Haldeman: He raise that at + all?

+

Nixon: No.

+

Haldeman: ’Cause, he, he + knew—

+

Nixon: No.

+

Haldeman: —when I talked to him + about it, then.

+

Nixon: No, that—

+

[unclear exchange]

+

Nixon: It’s—

+

Haldeman: —fully aware of what he + had done.

+

Nixon: It’s just too damn bad + that, too damn bad that you have, have a situation there with Rogers. I mean, he is—we need at the + State Department a Secretary of State that will, will, frankly, be + Secretary of State like Connally is Secretary of the Treasury. In other + words, tries to do what we want, and tries to play it [unclear]. + Rogers isn’t that way. On + other hand, I—I, I separate out this issue, because I know Henry’s wrong + on it. He takes the JavitsSenator Jacob K. + Javits (D–NY). line, and all the rest. He’ll say he doesn’t, + but if [unclear] what do you think the Israelis ought to do? I mean, he + won’t say another goddamn thing but what Mrs. Meir says. Nothing! Nothing. They—it’s + a strange thing. It’s a—but, I think if we—if any one of us were Jewish, + we’d do exactly the same thing. I never found a Jew that was rational + about Israel—never one. [Admiral] Lewis Strauss? Half-way, half-way. + But, put yourself in their position. And I understand it, I mean. But + just—but, on the other hand, we are just damned fools. That’s why + Johnson’s appointment of Goldberg to the UN was a terrible, terrible blunder. Send Goldberg up to + negotiate with the Jews and the Arabs at the UN? I mean, geez, he’s—he cannot—no Jew can see the Israeli + problem, except—just as no Irish, no Irishman can see the Northern + Ireland problem. You don’t put him in charge of that, do you?

+
+ +
+ + 233. Memorandum From President Nixon to Secretary of State RogersSource: + National Archives, RG 59, Office Files of William Rogers, Entry 5439, Lot + 73D443, Box 25, WPR-President Nixon. Top Secret; Eyes Only. Haldeman referred to this + memorandum in his diary when recording a conversation that he had + with Kissinger on June 1. He + wrote: “What really is bothering him [Kissinger] is he thinks Rogers is engaged in secret negotiations, that the + P[resident] knows about it and isn’t telling Henry. So he asked me + to ask the P what he sent to Rogers last week via military aide, which the P + mentioned to Rogers on the + phone while both Henry and I were in there, and also the direct + question: is Rogers + conducting a secret negotiation that K[issinger] doesn’t know about. + Henry says if he is, then he, Henry, will have to quit, that he + can’t tolerate something of that sort.” (Haldeman Diaries: Multimedia + Edition, June 1, 1971) + Washington, May 26, + 1971. +

Following up on our discussion a few days ago on the MideastRogers and + Nixon discussed the + Middle East during a meeting in the Oval Office on May 19 from 9:05 + to 10:14 a.m.For a transcript of the portions of the conversation + relating to the Middle East, see Document + 227. I would like to pass on to you a few + observations on our policy in that area which reflect not only my views + as to the current situation but also cover some episodes of the + past.

+

I have always supported the State of Israel, as a Congressman, Senator, + as Vice President, during the years I was out of office, and as + President. My support, however, has in no way been influenced by the + Jewish political lobby in the United States. On the contrary, I have + made it clear time and time and again to friends in the Jewish community + that under no circumstances would I take a position on aid to Israel + which I felt would be in conflict with the national security interests + of the United States.

+

I think as a result of the enormous influence of the Jewish lobby in the + United States—not only through its financial contributions to + Congressmen and Senators but even more because of its enormous influence + through the media—we have often subordinated U.S. security interests to + the interests of Israel.

+

There was one glaring exception for which we have to take responsibility + in the Eisenhower + Administration. In 1956, just before the election, we took a position + against the Israelis, British and French which brought an end to that + comic opera war.Nixon was Vice President at the + time of the invasion of the Suez Canal Zone. Clearly apart + from what effect this action may have had on the nations in the Mideast + it had a devastating effect on the British and French. From that time + on, they ceased to be major powers in the world and have simply lost + their stomach for playing a major role in world affairs. This was a + glaring error and at sometime in the future I will have to admit + publicly that the little part that I played in supporting it during the campaign was a mistake, + (although, of course, as you know, I had no other choice running as a + candidate for Vice President with no policy responsibilities.)

+

On the other side of the coin, the Aswan Dam decision by DullesReference is to Secretary of State John Foster Dulles’s decision, in response to + Egypt’s approach to the Soviet Union, to tell Egypt’s Foreign + Minister in July 1956 that the United States would no longer fund + the Aswan Dam project, prompting Nasser to nationalize the Canal at the end of the + month. was a mistake. Here again, in a moment of pique, he + infuriated Nasser and to a + certain extent may have contributed to the tragic events of 1956.

+

Except for the 1956 incident, however, United States’ policy has gone + overboard in support of the State of Israel against their neighbors. + Some of those decisions perhaps have been justified on humanitarian + grounds. After all, the Jews were horribly persecuted during World War + II and it was the responsibility of all decent people to go an extra + mile to rectify that blot on the conscience of mankind. But speaking in + humanitarian terms we have almost totally closed our eyes to the + terrible condition of Arab refugees. When I was on a brief African trip + in 1957 I stepped into this problem without knowing what a sensitive + nerve I would be hitting. I did not visit Israel or Egypt on that + occasion, but I reported when I returned that leaders in Morocco and + Tunisia, the most pro-Western of the Arab countries, had expressed + concern about the plight of the refugees. The whole Jewish community in + this country jumped down my throat and probably have never forgiven me + for mentioning the issue.

+

These historical references will put my present policy into perspective. + It can be summarized quite bluntly as follows:

+

1. The interests of the United States must be our only consideration in + the policy decisions we make with regard to the Mideast.

+

2. Under absolutely no circumstances are political considerations in this + country to affect any decisions I make. I say this not for what many + think is the very obvious reason that I get at most 8 to 10 percent of + the Jewish votes, but because the stakes for this Nation’s peace in the + future are too great for us to make decisions abroad based on the + political power of a small but very powerful and influential minority at + home.

+

3. There are times when the national security interests of the United + States will be served by siding with Israel. For example, where the + Soviet Union is obviously siding with Israel’s neighbors it serves our + interest to see that Israel is able to not only defend itself but to + deter further Soviet encroachments in the area. This is what has + influenced me in coming down hard on the side of Israel in maintaining + the balance of power in the + area at a time when Soviet influence in Egypt and other countries + surrounding Israel has been particularly strong.

+

4. On the other hand, where on analysis the question becomes primarily + one of the interests of Israel and the interest of Israel’s neighbors, + Egypt, Jordan et al, then we should have a totally even-handed policy. + As a matter of fact, the interest of the United States will be served in + this case by tilting the policy, if it is to be tilted at all, on the + side of 100 million Arabs rather than on the side of two million + Israelis. However, I believe that an even-handed policy is, on balance, + the best one for us to pursue as far as our own interests are + concerned.

+

5. It is quite apparent that the Israeli leaders have diddled us along + through the 1970 election and now are planning to follow the same + tactics through the 1972 elections. The statement in the memorandum from + the Quaker group that they were just waiting until after ’72 when they + got a Democratic Administration is a very good indication of what their + deepest feelings are. They will be expected to continue to say that they + consider RN to be their best friend, + that he is a great supporter of Israel, and we will have many + well-intentioned Republican supporters in the Jewish community, like Max + Fisher,An oil and real estate magnate + who advised Republican Presidents on the Middle East and Jewish + issues. who will be coming in and telling us that we’re going + to get 35 to 40 percent of the Jewish vote because of the confidence + Israeli leaders in their private conversations + have indicated in RN. This, of course, is all hogwash. They know that I + will put the interest of the United States first and they want somebody + in the Presidency who will put the interest of Israel first.

+

6. Under these circumstances, it is essential that no more aid programs + for Israel be approved until they agree to some kind of interim action + on Suez or some other issue. I shall be interested in what + recommendations you have in this respect. It is vitally important that + we all recognize that time is of the essence. In the month of June or + July at the latest the Israeli leaders must bite the bullet as to + whether they want more U.S. aid at the price of being reasonable on an + interim agreement or whether they want to go it alone.

+

7. You should put this proposition to them very hard in your + conversations. They will, of course, immediately assume that they can + come to me and get me to override you because of the political + considerations that will be coming up in 1972. They are already working + very hard on John Mitchell in + this respect. This memorandum is your assurance that while on the merits + I might reach a different conclusion on a recommendation that comes from + State on this problem I will never be influenced one iota by political + considerations.

+ +

In sum, I am convinced that unless we get some kind of a settlement now + with the Israelis on the Suez or some other issue, we aren’t going to + get any kind of settlement until after the ’72 elections. By that time, + even though the Israelis don’t think this can happen, the Soviet will + have had no other choice but to build up the armed strength of Israel’s + neighbors to the point that another Mideast war will be inevitable. As + far as Sadat is concerned, he + obviously does not want to have a Soviet presence in Egypt. On the other + hand, if his policy of conciliation fails, he will either have to go + along with a new program of accepting Soviet aid or lose his head, + either politically or physically.

+

I do not want you to report to me on the day-to-day negotiations you + undertake. Just keep me posted when a major decision has to be made. You + can also have in mind that by my being somewhat detached from the + negotiating procedure you will have me in a position where when the time + is ripe I may be able to be the “persuader” in getting Israel to accept + what is a reasonable settlement and one which is in the interest of the + United States.

+

Good luck!

+
+ +
+ 234. Telegram From the Department of State to the Interests Section in + EgyptSource: National + Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1163, Saunders Files, Middle East + Negotiations Files, Middle East—Jarring Talks, May 19–31, 1971. Secret; Priority; + Nodis; Cedar Plus. Drafted by Sisco, Sterner, and Atherton; cleared by Kissinger; and approved by Rogers. Repeated to Tel + Aviv. + Washington, May 27, 1971, 0038Z. +

92945. For Bergus. Ref: Cairo + 1245.In telegram 1245 from Cairo, May + 22, Bergus reported that in + his 45-minute meeting with Heikal “quite a lot” had happened since he had met + with him on the previous day, particularly that Sadat and Riad had had “some kind + of session” in which Mahmoud + Riad had “sworn fealty” to Sadat’s “partial settlement + policy.” Bergus also + believed that, based on Heikal’s remarks, the Soviet Union was “putting + heavy pressure on Egyptians to get interim settlement out of + exclusive American context.” At the end of their conversation, + Heikal assured him that + Sadat was “still very + interested” in the interim settlement. (Ibid.)

+

1. Sadat’s idea of your personally + delivering message from him to President and SecretaryHeikal + conveyed this idea to Bergus + on May 23 at 8 p.m. (Telegram 1246 from Cairo, May 24; ibid.) + poses something of a dilemma. On one hand, we do not want to appear to rebuff Sadat and want to make clear we always + look forward to receiving any personal message he wishes to send. Our + judgment, on which we would appreciate your comment, is that Sadat is playing for time and of course + we should do what we can to help in this regard. He may have concluded + that for the time being at least, he is too exposed to carry out + promptly his undertaking to send Fawzi with his reply to the specific + points conveyed to him by Sisco + on behalf of the Israelis.

+

On other hand, we have asked ourselves what sort of a message is + Sadat apt to send. On basis + Riad’s May 20 approach,Bergus met with Foreign Minister + Riad for an hour on May 20. In his abbreviated report on their + conversation, he wrote that the position paper the Foreign Minister + tried to hand him—and his subsequent remarks—“practically slam the + door on further discussion of interim agreement on the Suez Canal.” + Riad said that the Egyptian Government insisted on three conditions + to which Israel had to agree to continue a dialog on the issue: “A) + firm linkage between interim settlement and final settlement; B) + Israeli withdrawal east of the passes; C) six months’ ceasefire + during which Jarring will + draw up timetable.” (Telegram 1230 from Cairo, May 20; ibid.) A + detailed account of their meeting is in telegram 1231 from Cairo, + May 20. (Ibid.) our estimate is that he will: (A) Reiterate + his continuing interest in an interim Suez Canal agreement; (B) stress + the three key points of the UAR + position, namely, Egyptian troops across the Canal, a commitment of + total Israeli withdrawal to the international border, and a limited + ceasefire. Unless there is some flexibility on these points, more in the + spirit of how Sadat expressed + himself rather than Riad, their reiteration can only tend to lock + Sadat in, and it unlikely + that any response on our part would be helpful in moving on toward an + interim Suez Canal agreement. Having you carry such a message and seeing + the President would tend to polarize positions rather than maintain the + kind of constructive ambiguity which is important at this stage and + which in our judgment continues to offer some hope for reconciliation + based on picking up certain tentative exploratory thoughts expressed + both in Cairo and in Tel Aviv.

+

2. Our thinking on how to proceed is that we should neither react + directly to Riad démarche of May 20, which would only lead to fruitless + and argumentative debates, nor convey it in precise terms to Israelis + which would strengthen their inclination to stand pat for now. Rather, + we believe time has come for us to develop Quote common denominator + Unquote proposal that seeks to bridge gap between Egyptian and Israeli + positions on key issues and seek to move Israelis and Egyptians toward + middle ground. To begin this process, we will need further early + consultations with Israelis and meanwhile need to find ways to keep + dialogue going with Egyptians which will not lock them further into + positions on which there must clearly be some give if there is to be an + interim Canal agreement. If our estimate is correct that Sadat is seeking to delay sending Fawzi + to Washington at this time, we should also find way to help him in this regard, which + could take pressure off his idea of sending you back with message.

+

3. In light foregoing, you should convey following to Haikal:

+

A. We can understand that, in view developments since Sisco-Sadat meeting May 9,See + Document 231. + Sadat may feel time not + propitious to send Fawzi here, and President Sadat need feel no concern that we will misinterpret + delay.

+

B. President and Secretary look forward to receiving messages from + Sadat at any time in interest + of furthering objectives we both seek. They would prefer you not absent + yourself from Cairo at this delicate time in efforts work out interim + Canal agreement, when your presence on the spot is of great value to us. + Furthermore, such trip by you would inevitably be publicized and could + lead to unhelpful speculation. We think it better for now to keep + discussions in quiet diplomatic channels and therefore want to defer for + now decision on your return.

+

C. Sadat can be assured, however, + that any message he may send will get immediate attention of Secretary + and President, and that you can use special channels to assure it is + fully protected.

+

D. It would be helpful to have further, concrete Egyptian comments on + possible ways of taking into account in any interim settlement following + three ideas which Sisco conveyed + May 9 and which Riad’s comments May 20 did not address. In raising these + questions, it important that you prepare ground carefully so that UAR responses not take on rigidity of + FonMin Riad’s presentation. We + want door to remain open on these points and would prefer no concrete + response from UAR rather than + repetition of FonMin Riad’s + unhelpful and dogmatic approach.

+

(1) Need to make clear that Canal will not only be cleared but also + opened and operated for international navigation, including Israel’s + once clearance is completed.

+

(2) Need to express ceasefire in way which avoids explicit deadlines and + thus makes possible greater degree of withdrawal.

+

(3) Need to relate interim agreement to final settlement in way which + does not prejudge either side’s position on terms of final settlement + while at same time assuring that interim arrangements are in fact + transitional and temporary leading to full implementation of Security + Council Resolution 242.

+

4. We recognize, of course, that Sadat message may be more substantive than we anticipate + in para 1 above and could, for example, deal with such issues as his + relations with Soviets or diplomatic relations with us. We do not want to close door on Sadat’s idea of sending message with + you, but would want to have some advance idea of its nature before + reaching final decision and would also hope in such circumstances its + delivery could be handled in way (e.g., in connection your return on + leave) which avoided dramatic publicity and risk of awakening undue + expectations or speculation that could disrupt rather than help current + negotiating process we are seeking to carry forward on interim Canal + agreement.

+ + + Rogers + + +
+ +
+ 235. Editorial Note +

On May 27, 1971, after 3 days of secret negotiations, Egypt and the + Soviet Union signed a 15-year Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation. + Under the terms of the treaty, the two sides agreed to hold regular + consultations or in the event of an imminent threat to peace to + “immediately contact one another in the interests of removing the threat + that has developed or restoring the peace.” (Current + Digest of the Soviet Press, Volume XXIII, No. 21 (June 22, + 1971), pages 2–4) Before Secretary of State Rogers could report to President Nixon, Assistant Secretary of State + for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs Joseph Sisco called Assistant to the President for + National Security Affairs Henry + Kissinger at 11:10 a.m. on May 28 to provide his + preliminary analysis of the treaty:

+

“S: The first part’s obviously legal [omission in transcript] around + arrangements which are very political and psychologically true in the + area. It assures long-range support—political, economic and military + over next 15 years. Undoubtedly Soviet initiated due to the internal + events in Egypt and to keep them from making overtures to the U.S. I + think it will cause waves in other countries in which they hope the + influence without treaty will be increased.

+

“K: What do you mean?

+

“S: In countries like Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, etc. they may make overtures + to the United States if they do not have a treaty with the Soviet + Union.

+

“K: Loosen their ties.

+

“S: Yes. These are countries which are on our side of the fence anyway. + Now where this leaves Sadat. + Gives pledge that they will not be involved in the internal affairs and + any ex post facto changes made by Sadat are OK with the Russians. There is a firm + commitment to consultation with + the Egyptian Government. There is an overall packet on consultation. + From Sadat’s point of view it + eases his pressure on the military. The military is dependent on the + Soviets and if he has an agreement with the Soviets that solves the army + question. This will leave Sadat + with as much or as little influence as he had before.”

+

After assessing the impact on Israel, Sisco commented on the implications of the treaty for + Moscow: “We will see not so much change on substance—just manifest + procedurally because Russians want to be in if there is any settlement. + The Russians are saying to us that nothing will happen unless we get + in.” The two men then briefly discussed the element of surprise in + Soviet diplomacy:

+

“S: This thing looks like it is a Soviet draft. It has been concocted in + a hurry.

+

“K: It seems to have been happening often lately.

+

“S: We had no advance warning that this was coming. It could be we have + lousy intelligence or—

+

“K: It couldn’t be true!!

+

“S: Or the Russians drafted it and we knew nothing about it. There is no + such treaty in existence in other places. In quick capsule form this is + a political move to protect their major commitment in that area and they + are putting the rest of the world on notice that they plan to be there + for a good long time to come.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential + Materials, NSC Files, Henry Kissinger Telephone Conversation + Transcripts, Box 10, Chronological File)

+

Later that day, Nixon telephoned + Secretary of State Rogers to get + his assessment of the treaty. Rogers explained that the Soviets were trying to “make + it appear that they have not lost their position with Egypt. And this is + the only way they can think of to do it.They don’t want to discontinue + any support—they don’t want to threaten anything because that would + really make Sadat mad as hell.So + what they are doing is trying to figure out other ways to make it appear + that there has been no change in their relationship.” As far as + Sadat was concerned, + Rogers told Nixon that “he’s trying to play both + ends against the middle. And this is the way to do it. It didn’t say a + hell of a lot that they didn’t have informal treaties; they’ve got + several treaties now. So this is just window dressing, I’m quite + convinced of that.” (Ibid., White House Tapes, White House Telephone, + Conversation No. 3–166)

+

Rogers forwarded further analysis + that afternoon in a memorandum for the President drafted by Sisco. On May 31, Kissinger summarized for Nixon the main points not only of + Rogers’s memorandum but also + of the treaty itself. Kissinger, + however, offered an alternative analysis in his memorandum: “The + Egyptian army is dependent on Soviet support. In turn, Sadat is at the moment dependent on his + military for his base of power, + having purged the party and the bureaucracy. Rather than strengthening + Sadat’s flexibility with + respect to negotiating the Canal settlement, the treaty could give the + Soviet Union a veto over the future negotiations. Thus, whatever the + outcome of the negotiations—and after all the Soviets are the chief + beneficiaries of a Suez settlement—recent events may have enhanced + Soviet long-term influence. Certainly the Soviets are committed to + engage themselves as never before in case of resumption of hostilities.” + The President noted this passage and wrote the following instructions in + the margin: “K—We must not allow this to be a pretext for escalation of + arms to Israel. We should act only in response to incontrovertible + evidence of a Soviet military aid which we evaluate as significantly changing the balance of power.” (Ibid., NSC Files, Box 657, Country Files, Middle + East, Nodis/Cedar/Plus, Vol. II (2 of 3))

+

Egyptian President Sadat, + meanwhile, sought to reassure the United States about the Soviet role in + his country’s affairs. On the morning of May 29, Heikal conveyed this oral message from + Sadat:"A. President Sadat still considers himself committed + to the spirit and letter of what he said to Secretary Rogers during their recent meeting. B. + President Sadat’s initiative for + an interim arrangement remains valid. C. President Sadat continues to welcome the efforts + of the United States in assisting the parties in the effort to reach + agreement on an interim arrangement. D. The UAR–USSR treaty places no + restrictions whatsoever on the US–UAR dialog.“Regarding the treaty + between Egypt and the Soviet Union, Heikal said that he hoped the United States would not + exaggerate its importance and “should not be hesitant” to ask any + specific questions as to the “meaning or implications” of the treaty. + (Telegram 1311 from Cairo, May 29; ibid., Box 1163, Saunders Files, + Middle East Negotiations Files, Middle East—Jarring Talks, May 19–31, 1971)

+

When Bergus met with Sadat the next day, the Egyptian + President was “most anxious” that the Ambassador “personally deliver” + his message to Nixon and + Rogers.Sadat declared that he needed “this + indication that his lines to the United States remain open” and that + there was “some hope” for an interim settlement as he proceeded to + “reform the Arab Socialist Union and rebuild his internal position.” + (Telegram 1318 from Cairo, May 30; ibid.) In a June 3 memorandum, + Kissinger briefed Nixon on the main points of Sadat’s message. According to Kissinger, Sadat told Bergus that the Soviet-Egyptian treaty was “nothing new; + it merely set forth the shape of the existing relationship.” Kissinger also reported that Sadat promised that Soviet military + personnel would leave Egypt “as soon as the first phase agreement + (presumably Canal settlement) was reached.” After reading the + memorandum, Nixon approved the + Department’s instructions for Bergus to deliver Sadat’s message to Rogers in Lisbon (where he was attending a NATO + Ministerial meeting) but to + warn the Egyptians beforehand that any publicity “would be interpreted + by the American public as a Soviet effort” to pressure the United + States. (Ibid., Box 657, Country Files, Middle East, Nodis/Cedar/Plus, + Vol. II (2 of 3))

+
+ +
+ 236. Letter From President Nixon to King Hussein of JordanSource: National Archives, Nixon Presidential + Materials, NSC Files, Box 797, + Presidential Correspondence 1969–1974, Jordan—King Hussein. No classification + marking. + Washington, June 2, + 1971. + + Your Majesty: + +

I was pleased to hear from Secretary Rogers about the warm welcome he received in Jordan and + about the usefulness of his visit there and in other countries in that + part of the world.See footnote 4, Document 230. His + assessment of the results of his trip is encouraging and we are hopeful + that progress will be made in the months ahead. You can be sure that we + will have Jordanian concerns very much in mind as we do our part to help + achieve that goal.

+

As to our efforts to help achieve a peaceful settlement, we are + proceeding on the basis of the policy announced by the Secretary of + State on December 9, 1969See Document 73. and my own report to the + Congress on February 25 of this year.See + footnote 6, Document 211. I + know that you have had a full report of where matters stand with respect + to current discussions looking towards an interim Suez Canal + agreement.Sisco briefed + Rifai on May 18 and then briefed Sharaf the following day. + (Telegram 87901 to Amman, May 20; National Archives, Nixon + Presidential Materials, NSC Files, + Box 616, Country Files, Middle East, Jordan, Vol. VII; and telegram + 88358 to Amman, May 20; ibid., Box 1163, Saunders Files, Middle East + Negotiations Files, Middle East—Jarring Talks, May 10–18, 1971) Secretary + Rogers has reported to me + your view, with which we agree, that any interim settlement not become a + substitute for a final comprehensive agreement. He has also reported to + me fully your concern over developments in Jerusalem.Rogers + first reported Hussein’s + concerns about Jerusalem in telegram 3692 from Beirut, May 4, which + Haig forwarded to the + President on May 5; see footnote 4, Document + 230. I understand that you have been getting + reports on Secretary Rogers’ and + Assistant Secretary Sisco’s conversations with the + Israelis on this matter,In their May 18 + meeting with Rabin, + Rogers and Sisco made it clear that they + “tended to agree” with the Jordanian view of “de facto steps being + taken in Jerusalem by Israel which in their judgment prejudiced + overall settlement.” (Telegram 87261 to Tel Aviv, May 19; National + Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1163, Saunders Files, Middle East + Negotiations Files, Middle East—Jarring Talks, May 10–18, 1971) and I believe + it is important that we continue to exchange views in light of on-going + efforts to achieve an overall settlement of the dispute.

+

With regard to your letter of May 1,In his + letter, Hussein thanked + Nixon for arranging the + $30 million in assistance funds for Jordan. The King worried, + however, that, since Kuwait’s subsidy to Jordan looked “increasingly + unlikely to be resumed,” the $30 million promised by the United + States would no longer be enough to cover Jordan’s budget deficit of + that same amount. Thus, Hussein asked that the second half of the $30 + million not be made “contingent upon any conditions in the future,” + but rather that Jordan be given a “firm commitment” on the second + installment. (Telegram 2122 from Amman, May 1; ibid., RG 59, Central + Files 1970–73, ORG 7 S AID (US) JORDAN) I understand that the + subject of increasing and expediting financial assistance to Jordan was + discussed in your conversation with Secretary Rogers and that he explained our + difficulties in making available sooner the $15 million in supporting + assistance which we propose for disposition in July. As you know, on the + assumption that it will be needed, I have proposed that an additional + sum of $15 million in supporting assistance be made available to Jordan + at a later date this calendar year.

+

I share your concern with the continued non-resumption of the Kuwaiti + subsidy. We are prepared to follow up further efforts that you make to + bring about a renewal of this subsidy and we hope that this matter can + be resolved at an early date.

+

Please accept my assurance that my Government will continue to view + Jordan’s needs most sympathetically. We will continue to do our very + best to be as forthcoming as possible in providing necessary + assistance.Brown delivered the President’s message to Hussein on June 5 at noon, but + their conversation revolved around Israeli settlements in Jerusalem + and whether to take the issue to the UN Security Council. (Telegram 2662 from Amman, June 5; + ibid., Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1163, Saunders Files, Middle East + Negotiations Files, Middle East—Jarring Talks, June 1–18, 1971)

+

With best personal regards,

+

Sincerely,

+ + + Richard Nixon + + +
+ +
+ + 237. Telegram From the Department of State to the Interests Section in + EgyptSource: National + Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1163, Saunders Files, Middle East + Negotiations Files, Middle East—Jarring Talks, June 1–18, 1971. Secret; Flash; + Nodis; Cedar Plus. Drafted by Sisco; cleared by Rogers (in substance) and Saunders; and approved by + Sisco. Repeated Flash to + Lisbon for Secretary Rogers, + who was there June 3–4 attending a NATO Ministerial + meeting. + Washington, June 3, + 1971, 2308Z. +

98100. Tosec 77. For Bergus.

+

1. We appreciate having received your full report of your conversation + with Sadat.Bergus met + with Sadat on the evening of + May 30 and reported that the “main thing” that the Egyptian + President wanted to tell him was that “the issue of war or peace in + the Middle East was in the hands of the United States.” Sadat offered some specific ideas + for an interim settlement with Israel, which included Egypt’s + occupation, administration, and control of the Sinai “up to a line + east of the three passes” and a 50-kilometer “no-man’s land” between + Egyptian and Israeli forces that would be controlled by troops of + the United Nations or the Four Powers. He concluded by urging + Bergus to convey + personally the “letter and spirit” of the meeting to Nixon and Rogers. (Telegram 1321 from Cairo, + June 1; ibid.) It closely parallels what Sadat told to the SecretarySee Document 227. + and subsequently to SiscoSee Document + 231. both as to Sadat’s continuing interest in an interim Suez Canal + agreement as well as the substance of such an agreement. It tends to + confirm our judgment that both sides continue to remain interested in an + Canal agreement and both continue to look to us to pursue further its + role of quiet constructive diplomacy.

+

2. We are still some way from agreement, however, since there are a + number of fundamental points which may or may not prove reconcilable. In + view current situation as indicated above, and your confirmation that + Sadat is likely to play any + visit by you to Washington as an appeal to us to put the squeeze on + Israel, we feel that we should not fall in with this strategy. A trip by + you to Washington to make a direct report to the President is therefore + in our judgment premature. At the same time, we also feel it is in our + interest not to rebuff Sadat’s + reaffirmation of his desire to maintain and demonstrate continuance of + US–UAR dialogue, to have the US continue to play its quiet diplomatic + role in helping achieve an interim Suez Canal agreement over the coming + months, all of this regardless of the recently concluded treaty of + friendship between the USSR and the + UAR.See Document + 235.

+

3. We request therefore that you see Heykal immediately and make the + following points:

+ +

A. We continue to feel that the original plan of sending Fawzi to + Washington to convey specific UAR + reaction to detailed points we carried to Cairo from IsraelThe plan is discussed in Document 234. is + the most effective way to continue US–UAR dialogue and offers the best + hope and opportunity for further progress. We would be prepared to wait + to receive him at some appropriate later time. (Or alternatively, + Secretary Rogers would be + prepared to receive any UAR emissary in + next few days in Lisbon.)

+

B. If indications are, as we expect, that above not immediately feasible + and that Sadat attaches great + importance to a demonstration that he is keeping open his lines of + communication with us, you are authorized to indicate that you would be + prepared to carry any message which President Sadat may wish to convey by going + immediately to see Secretary Rogers in Lisbon.The + Department of State requested that the White House sanction this + approach, which Nixon + approved on a June 3 memorandum from Kissinger. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential + Materials, NSC Files, Box 657, + Country Files, Middle East, Middle East Nodis/Cedar/Plus, Vol. + II) You can inform Heykal that Secretary Rogers wishes to assure President + Sadat that any message from + him will receive prompt and careful consideration by USG.

+

4. You should inform Heykal that it would be your intention to put out + the following low-key announcement in Cairo: Quote I am leaving Cairo + for a short period. I will be reporting to Secretary Rogers in Lisbon on current + developments in UAR and on recent + discussions that I have held with UAR + officials. Unquote.

+

5. In this connection, you should stress to Heykal that we want President + Sadat to know we feel + strongly that the best way to proceed is to continue to keep discussions + in quiet diplomatic channels. We therefore do not plan to publicize the + fact that you will be carrying message from President Sadat and hope that UARG will not do + so. We want to explain frankly why we think such publicity could + complicate our efforts, particularly in the wake of a Soviet-UAR + treaty.Bergus met with Sadat and Mahmoud + Riad on June 4 at 8:30 p.m. Sadat said: “What I need is to know + the position of the USG. Is the US + going to back Israeli occupation of Egypt? Will the US give Israel + aid under the thesis of the ‘balance of power?’” After declaring + that he did “not accept the idea of the balance of power,” Sadat said that he was “ready for + peace” and handed Bergus a + paper containing his ideas for achieving it. As the meeting + concluded, Sadat reaffirmed + the importance of Israel’s withdrawal “from all repeat all Arab + territories” being a part of any future discussion of a 6-month + cease-fire extension. At the very end, Riad asked that Bergus tell Rogers that Egypt was “flexible,” + that it was “not putting everything in a corner.” Bergus also told Sadat that he would meet with the + Secretary on June 6 in Paris, where Rogers would be attending a meeting of the + Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development. (Telegram + 1364 from Cairo, June 4; ibid., Box 1163, Saunders Files, Middle + East Negotiations Files, Middle East—Jarring Talks, June 1–18, 1971)

+ +

6. We accept President Sadat’s + assurance conveyed to you through Heykal that the treaty places no + restrictions whatsoever on US–UAR dialogue. Sadat will have noted that we have kept our public + comment on treaty to a minimum. The fact is, however, that the Soviets + have been giving extensive publicity to treaty as a major new move which + Qte goes beyond normal relations between two countries Unqte and Qte + constitutes strong blow to plans of international imperialism Unqte. + (Moscow—Arab language broadcast May 25). Emphasis and interpretation + which Soviets are giving to treaty will make more difficult achievement + of an interim agreement and will strengthen position of those who doubt + Egyptian intentions. In saying this, we are not endorsing these views + but simply stating what is a political fact of life.

+

7. In these circumstances, American public would interpret any publicity + emanating from Cairo that Bergus + was carrying a special message to President Nixon as an effort by Soviets through the UAR to bring pressure on USG. Such publicity therefore could make + it more difficult for us to play a constructive role. Again we are not + endorsing such an interpretation, we are merely stating a fact with + which both of us must deal if our continuing dialogue is to be a useful + means to make further progress on an interim settlement.

+

8. Bergus should be very careful + not to indicate to Heykal or to press what his on-going plans will be + after Lisbon. This will be decided by Secretary Rogers after your conversation with + him in Lisbon. We would hope that Bergus would also be able to carry with him UAR point-by-point response to Israeli + points since you indicate in your Cairo 1320Dated June 1. (Ibid., RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 27–14 + ARAB–ISR) that Foreign Office is putting together paper which + sets forth UAR position on an interim + arrangement in what they consider to be a more positive manner than + previously. You should not, however, wait for this if it is not + ready.

+

9. We would suggest that Bergus + plan on leaving Cairo on Friday, June 4, or Saturday, June 5, and be + available to see Secretary in Lisbon.

+ + + Irwin + + +
+ +
+ + 238. Telegram From the Interests Section in Egypt to the Department of + StateSource: National + Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1163, Saunders Files, Middle East + Negotiations Files, Middle East—Jarring Talks, June 1–18, 1971. Secret; Immediate; + Nodis; Cedar Plus. All brackets are in the original except “[USG?]”, + added for clarity. + Cairo, June 10, 1971, 1300Z. +

1422. From Wiley to Sisco. Ref: State 101690.In telegram 101690 to Cairo, June 9, Sisco wrote to Wiley: “In my conversation with + Ghorbal yesterday he + continually referred to a Qte Bergus paper. Unqte I have just spoken with Don + Bergus since I have no + knowledge of any such paper. He tells me that this is probably a + paper emanating from the informal exchange between himself and + Mohammad Riad at Mohammad’s house May 23rd. In this conversation Don + reports he made some suggestions about how certain points might be + formulated in the UAR position. Don + reports he had some typed ideas on yellow paper and left it with + Mohammad Riad. He does not have a copy with him and therefore + requests you to get a copy of what was left with Mohammad and + transmit it immediately.” (Ibid., Box 657, Country Files, Middle + East, Middle East Nodis/Cedar/Plus, Vol. II)

+

1. When Mohammed Riad gave me copy + of paper left with him by Bergus + on May 23 (text sent septel),The paper + outlined the elements of an interim agreement for Israeli withdrawal + from the Sinai Peninsula. The most important provisions included: 1) + specific lines behind which Israel would withdraw its forces (east + of the passes); 2) a zone to be occupied and administered by UN-authorized observers; 3) a six-month + cease-fire; and 4) a mandate for Egypt to clear, open, and operate + the Suez Canal “for ships of all nations except for those nations + claiming or actually exercising belligerency against the UAR.” The + entire paper is in telegram 1419 from Cairo, June 10. (Ibid.) + he said he had some other points to raise with me concerning the paper. + FonMin Riad wished to know + whether we considered this document to be an official U.S. paper. + Mohammed said that he had considered Bergus paper as personal and unofficial until Bergus had asked for reply to his + paper through Heykal. In eyes of FonMin, by this action, Bergus converted his personal paper into official USG paper. Heykal then transmitted request + to the Presidency and reply was prepared and given to Bergus. FonMin wanted USG to + realize that the President’s speech on May 20On May 20, Sadat gave a speech before the Egyptian National + Assembly ostensibly to announce that subversive elements within the + government had been plotting a coup against him and to discuss what + he wanted in the preparation of a new constitution for the country. + In the address, he took the opportunity to raise the issue of his + Suez Canal proposal, comment on Secretary Rogers’s recent visit to the + Middle East, and criticize Israel, saying: “If they want peace, we + are for peace. As for the statements emanating from Israel, they + make no difference whatever. These are the statements which + Sisco conveyed. This is + because Israel continues to be enticed by victory and Nazism. The + Israelis continue to attempt to live past dreams and fantasies. All + this does not concern me. What concerns me is that the United States + should define its stand because we are now facing historical stands + that must be fully defined, it being a matter of war or peace.” + (FBIS 26, May 20; ibid., Box + 1163, Saunders Files, Middle East Negotiations Files, Middle + East—Jarring Talks, May + 19–31, 1971) and the communication handed to Bergus + on May 20See footnote 4, Document 234. were the official + statements of the UAR position. If + paper left by Bergus with Riad + on May 23 was not an official U.S. paper, there would have been no need + for additional reply from President. If USG still considers Bergus paper as personal and unofficial, UAR would have to reconsider its + reply.

+

2. Wiley asked why President’s + latest paper could not have been in response to informal discussions + between Bergus and UAR officials. Mohammed said that this was + hypothetical question since Bergus had, in fact, left written document and asked for + reply through Heykal. He did not know what the President would have done + under such hypothetical circumstances. It quite possible that President + would have seen no reason to add to his May 20 statements in absence of + official USG paper.

+

3. Mohammed also said that FonMin had + been disturbed over the publicity emanating from Paris after Bergus had met with Secretary. UAR Foreign Ministry had understood that + USG wished to conduct quiet + diplomacy and had been surprised to note news accounts stating that + Bergus had carried message + to Rogers.The New York Times reported + that Bergus and Rogers met in Paris on June 8, and + that Bergus had conveyed a + message from Sadat that + “slightly advanced the prospects for an interim agreement.” (June 9, + 1971, p. 14) + FonMin was particularly disturbed + over characterization of message as less rigid than previous UAR position. Mohammed then said that + Sulzberger article appearing in International + Herald-Tribune June 2The opinion + piece argued that while there was hope that Egypt and Israel might + achieve an interim settlement that summer, the agreement probably + would not be followed by a formal peace. (New York + Times, June 2, 1971,p. 41) was obviously based on + inside information and he was certain that the UAR had not given such information to any journalist.

+

4. Mohammed also said that FonMin had + been disturbed to find out that Rogers had discussed details of the paper with French + FonMin. As a result, GUAR had given paper to French, British, + and Soviet Ambassadors in Cairo. Until they learned that Secretary had + discussed subject with French FonMin, GUAR had told no one + about its position.

+

5. Comment: Above comments were no doubt based + partly on pique felt by FonMin over + extent to which Heykal has encroached on his official role. At same + time, believe FonMin understands + that using [USG?] must follow Sadat’s instructions on delicate matter of channels. + FonMin no doubt feels he also + has some legitimate grievances on publicity and that we should be aware + of his feelings. We have also been told by several journalists that the + FonMin had issued instructions + to the press to play down the Bergus-Secretary meetings. In fact, the meetings have + received only limited coverage in the UAR.

+ +

6. In my meeting with Mohammed I did not receive impression that UAR has any desire to withdraw its latest + paper or that concerns expressed above will jeopardize future efforts to + negotiate partial settlement. FonMin + apparently engaging in legalistic hairsplitting to preserve his own + amour-propre and to defend dignity of office of UAR Presidency.

+

7. I recommend we tell Mohammed that we have no objection to their + considering Bergus paper as + official paper if they wish to do so.On + June 12, Kissinger discussed + the issue of the Bergus + paper with Nixon in the Oval + Office and said: “Well, Mr. President, what they’ve done on the Suez + is just screw it up in such an unbelievable way by—I had it all set + so that after the deadlock you’d write a letter to Golda Meir, and she was going to + make some additional concessions to you, which we could have taken + to the Egyptians as proving you could get things out of the + Israelis. What I didn’t count on was the vanity of these people at + State. They went over to the Egyptians instead of presenting the + Israeli plan, and forcing them to react to that. They never + presented any plan and started dickering with the Egyptians on their + own. Then our Chargé in Cairo submitted a written plan—[Nixon interrupted and asked, + “Bergus?” and Kissinger affirmed that it was + Bergus] submitted a + written, unsigned plan, which the Egyptians have now adopted, which, + in effect, instead of an interim settlement, ties the interim + settlement to the Israelis withdrawing from all of Sinai, which they + have already rejected in February. The Israelis don’t know yet that + we’ve submitted this piece of paper. But as soon as that + surfaces—which it will, because the Egyptians have already proposed + it—we’ll be at the same deadlock as we were at the end of February. + And then, they’re going to come in here and ask you to cut off + economic and military aid to Israel.” (National Archives, Nixon + Presidential Materials, White House Tapes, Oval Office, Conversation + No. 518–3) Important thing is not whether paper was official + or unofficial but where we go from here in achieving partial withdrawal + and opening of Canal.In a meeting with + Rogers on June 29, + Rabin formally + responded to this incident with “surprise and astonishment that + action on crucial issue had been taken by US official without + approval his government and consultation with Israel.” Rogers responded that the United + States was “not sure of Israel’s purpose in making issue of case + which appears to have little substantive impact.” (Telegram 118212 + to Tel Aviv, July 1; ibid., NSC + Files, Box 1164, Saunders Files, Middle East Negotiations Files, + Middle East—Jarring Talks, + July 1–16, 1971)

+ + + Wiley + + +
+ +
+ + 239. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense Laird to :nl President NixonSource: + National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1164, Saunders Files, + Middle East Negotiations Files, Middle East—Jarring Talks, July 1–16, 1971. + Secret; Sensitive. The President did not receive this memorandum + until July 14, when Kissinger forwarded it to him with a memorandum + summarizing its contents. (Ibid.) + Washington, June + 21, 1971. + + SUBJECT + Middle East Arms Policy + +

The USG public policy of maintaining a + Middle East “military balance” should be altered, in my judgment, + because:

+

(1) The policy does not reflect as well as it should the two dominant + military realities of the current and prospective situation. First, + repeated studies by various DoD components confirm overwhelming Israeli + military superiority in relation to Arab forces. The level of military + hardware is not the dominant factor in the Arab-Israeli equation. The + Arabs already have more planes than pilots, and more advanced equipment + than they can handle. They do not have and are unlikely to get, even + with Soviet assistance, the leadership, morale, technical aptitude, and + individual motivation necessary to match the Israelis. This reality + highlights the second and more critical one: we must draw a distinction + between Arab forces on the one hand and Arab plus Soviet forces on the + other. It is unrealistic to talk of giving Israel enough equipment to + maintain a “balance” against present or prospective Soviet forces that + may be focused on the Middle East. This is a separate problem which must + not be confused with the Arab-Israeli arms balance issue, but instead + involves NATO, the Sixth Fleet, and global US security interests.

+

(2) The policy removes arms supply initiative in the Middle East from US + hands. Instead, the Soviets are enabled to increase their penetration of + Egypt at will. The Soviets retain a large degree of control over + Egyptian military capability because of Egyptian technical deficiency. + Therefore, introduction of new weapons almost automatically increases + the Soviet presence in Egypt without, however, increasing their risk of + losing control. With the USG committed + to a balancing response, increased polarization is assured. The USG, moreover, does not retain any degree + of control over Israeli capabilities and, for each new round of weapons, + the risk for the USG mounts.

+

(3) The policy has not achieved USG + Middle East objectives. New USG weapons + commitments to Israel have provoked greater Soviet penetration of Egypt. These same + commitments, which were designed to induce Israeli self-confidence + toward productive peace negotiations, have, instead, fostered the + over-confidence which translates into today’s rigid posture.

+

(4) The policy contradicts the heart of the USG peace initiative by committing us to underwriting + continued occupation of Arab territories rather than encouraging + withdrawal.

+

(5) The policy associates the USG + dangerously with Israeli weapons developments over which we have no + control. Specifically, Israeli production of highly sophisticated and + special-purpose weapons introduces a critical new factor in the Middle + East military equation which will reflect on the USG most disadvantageously if and when the + full story eventually surfaces.

+

(6) The policy does not lend itself to distinguishing between offensive + and defensive capabilities. The bulk of Soviet weapons introduced in the + recent past are defensive in character and do not directly enhance + Egyptian capability to threaten Israel’s survival. USG policy, however, has frequently + responded by providing Israel with more highly sophisticated, + offensively oriented fighter-bomber aircraft and other offensive + weaponryPackard met with Rabin on June 24 in the Pentagon to discuss the + continuation of aircraft deliveries to Israel, an extension of the + U.S.-Israeli data exchange agreement, and the purchase of surplus + weapons from Vietnam. When Rabin asked what Israel could “look forward to in + the way of sales,” Packard + responded that “he understood Israel’s problem” but could only say, + as he had previously, “if Israel could get the negotiations started” + the aircraft decisions would be “easier” to make. As of that + meeting, 12 of the 54 F–4s that Israel requested the year before had + been sold and delivered, and of the 120 A–4s that Israel had + requested, 20 had been or were being delivered and 18 were coming + from new production. (Memorandum of conversation, June 24; + Washington National Records Center, OSD Files: FRC 330–76–0197, Box 66, Israel) + which pose a direct threat to Egyptian survival.

+

Clearly, the time has come to change our policy. Israel is launching a + major public campaign for the additional USG aircraft commitments they have sought for some time. + Our response will be a prime tangible by which the Arab world will gauge + the sincerity of our spoken desires for an equitable peace + settlement.

+

I recommend that we substitute for our present “military balance” policy + a new policy which assures only an appropriate Israeli capability to + defend its legitimate borders against Arab attack.

+

Stress could increasingly be placed on defense of Israel per se, apart + from occupied territories. Larger questions of military balance as + related to NATO and USG-Soviet postures + would be dealt with as issues separated from the Arab-Israeli conflict. + This new policy would:

+ +

(1) Define USG interests in the Middle + East situation more sharply. Israel’s survival would remain important, + but would be seen in the context of overall US national interest, rather + than as an open-ended commitment.

+

(2) Enable the USG to decide privately, + and justify publicly, if necessary, which weapons to allow or not allow + as matters separate from the question of Israel’s survival.

+

(3) Introduce greater flexibility for our diplomatic efforts to move + Israel toward a more reasonable negotiating stance. Statements of USG interest in Israel’s defense could be + varied to include “defense of legitimate Israeli borders” if our + diplomacy required.

+

(4) Permit us to exclude further commitments of inflammatory offensive + weapons such as attack aircraft, thereby offering greater scope for + improvement of our relations with Egypt and the rest of the Arab world + and helping reduce opportunities for Soviet penetration.

+

(5) Place our judgments on justifiable military grounds that can be + supported privately, and even publicly, on a professional basis. This + would permit a more flexible response to the politicized campaign + already beginning on behalf of Israel’s security. Key members of + Congress could be briefed on the professional considerations behind our + policy, and any need to offset the Soviet strategic gains in the + Mediterranean would become the responsibility of the Sixth Fleet and + NATO rather than the Israeli armed forces.

+

The US cannot exert sufficient leverage in the Middle East as long as it + is locked rigidly into a false concept of military balance that robs the + US of the initiative and does not take into account the very real + differences between US and Israeli interests. The proposed policy would + gain for us the flexibility to support Israel on a more selective basis, + disassociating ourselves from political and military positions which are + not in the US national interests.On June + 30, the last day of the fiscal year, Nixon approved Kissinger’s recommendation that he endorse the + Department of State’s proposal that $50 million in surplus military + assistance funds be passed on to Israel as an add-on to the $500 + million already approved for that fiscal year. According to + Kissinger, the + Department of State argued: 1) “The additional money would help our + own services who have been bearing some of the financial burden for + last year’s exceptional shipments to Israel”; and 2) “This would + allay some of the Israeli nervousness that we are cutting off the + assistance tap entirely.” Kissinger himself added: “It seems desirable to make + use of this money rather than have it revert to the Treasury at the + end of the fiscal year. Applying it against the Israeli account + would, at the very least, allow increased flexibility in the FY 1972 appropriations even if more + than the present $300-million is not actually provided to Israel.” + (Memorandum from Kissinger + to Nixon, June 30; National + Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 609, Country Files, Middle East, Israel, + Vol. IX)

+ + + Melvin R. Laird + + +
+ +
+ + 240. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security + Affairs (Kissinger) to President + NixonSource: National Archives, Nixon + Presidential Materials, NSC Files, + Box 657, Country Files, Middle East, Middle East Nodis/Cedar/Plus, + Vol. III. Secret; Nodis; Cedar Plus. Sent for information; outside + system. A stamped notation on the memorandum indicates the President + saw it. + Washington, June + 23, 1971. + + SUBJECT + State of Play in Middle East + +

We are approaching a confrontation with Israel as the last presently + planned shipments of aircraft are made in June (Phantoms) and August + (Skyhawks) and as we try to work out next steps on an interim + settlement. The purpose of this memo is to review the main elements in + the situation.

+

To begin with, it is worth looking back for a moment at the purpose for which the idea of an interim settlement on + the Canal was originally developed. I broached the idea to Mrs. + Meir when she was here in + OctoberMeir visited New York in October 1970, along with 25 + other heads of state, to participate in the two-week celebration of + the 25th anniversary of the United Nations. She addressed the + General Assembly on October 21 with a detailed speech on Israeli + policy regarding negotiations with its Arab neighbors, declaring + that Israel would not participate in Jarring talks until the cease-fire with Egypt was + extended. (New York Times, October 22, 1970, + p. 1) On October 24, she attended a black-tie dinner hosted by + Nixon in the East Room + of the White House for the delegates who attended the UN celebrations in New York. (National + Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Central Files, + President’s Daily Diary) No record of Meir’s meeting with Kissinger has been found. as a possible + alternative focus for peacemaking given flat Israeli refusal to + negotiate a peace based on withdrawal to essentially pre-war borders. + The purpose of such an alternative was thought to be:

+

—to stabilize the Suez front and reduce the possibility of resumed + conflict;

+

—thereby to buy time for a prolonged process of reaching an overall + settlement;

+

—to permit the two sides to begin developing some confidence that they + can work out reasonable agreements together.

+

What has happened since January is that the original + concept of a Canal settlement—mutual pullback and thin-out + forces along the Canal to stabilize the front—has been + transformed into simply a withdrawal on the way to an overall + settlement along the lines of the “Rogers Plan.”

+

—Mrs. Meir initially resisted the + idea of interim movement, but Dayan appeared to see advantage in it as a means of + reducing UAR + ability to increase pressure on + Israel with a credible threat to renew hostilities. Both the Israelis + and Ambassador Dobrynin were + postured to see the Canal settlement as an alternative to the Jarring negotiations to buy time.

+

—The Egyptians picked up some of the comments Dayan made publicly on mutual pullback and put out + informal feelers to us in January. The idea was put as a “demand” for + partial Israeli withdrawal in Sadat’s February 4 speech.See Document 203. But it was not + until after Israel’s negative reply to JarringSee Document 211. that Sadat turned energetically to the Canal + alternative.

+

—In mid-April the Israelis developed a paper and showed it to me. At my + inquiry, they softened it a bit and presented it to the State + Department.See footnote 2, Document 224. In his memoirs, Kissinger asserts that Rabin showed him the proposed + paper in “mid-April before surfacing it at the State Department,” + and that he persuaded Rabin + to modify “some elements” of the Israeli proposal that would have + made the negotiation “a total non-starter.” (Kissinger, White + House Years, p. 1282) In Israeli eyes State seemed + more interested in talking about the Jarring negotiations than in the Canal proposal. In any + case, the Israelis asked for certain clarifications of the U.S. position + and these were still being discussed at the time of Secretary Rogers’ trip. The Israeli paper was + not passed to Cairo because Israel wanted to wait for our support. In + the meantime Sadat began + developing a UAR position calling for + Israeli withdrawal east of the passes.

+

—During and following the Secretary’s trip, both sides were drawn out on + their positions until we now have two quite different positions. Each + side’s position was described by Sisco in such a way as to lead the other to believe it + was more flexible than it really was. Also, each side was led to believe + it had a substantial measure of U.S. support. For example, Bergus passed typewritten notes to a + UAR official which became the basis + of the latest UAR position paper,See Document + 238. which stands far from what the Israelis could + accept. These notes were naturally interpreted by the Egyptians as an + official U.S. position on the Canal proposal. At the same time, Israel + was told that “the ball was in the UAR + court” and the next move was up to the Egyptians.

+

As a result, two sharply differing positions have + emerged, each with some appearance to its author of a considerable + measure of U.S. support:

+

—The UAR would extend its control east of the main + passes in the Sinai (40–60 miles east of the Canal); extend the + ceasefire six months with a + possibility of renewal; send UAR + military forces across the Canal; and state formally that this is the + first stage in a settlement along the lines of the “Rogers Plan.”

+

—Israel is thinking of a very small withdrawal + (perhaps 10, at most 40 miles) staying west of the key passes; insists + on an indefinite ceasefire; refuses to agree to UAR military forces crossing the Canal; and resists any + linkage between an interim Canal settlement and an overall peace + settlement.

+

The situation now contains these elements:

+

—In Egyptian eyes, the US seems to be supporting + them in negotiating for a line east of the passes. The latest UAR paper incorporating this position is + based on informal suggestions made by our man in Cairo.See footnote 4, Document + 234. The Egyptians have not been told that the + Israelis are not likely to accept their position, although they know it + would be hard for Israel to accept.

+

—In Israeli eyes, the Egyptian proposal for an + interim settlement almost equates to their idea now of a final + settlement. They will not accept it short of a peace settlement. They + took a position encouraged to think the US would support it and pave the + way for it. They will be furious if they find out that the Egyptian + position has been encouraged by some Americans.

+

—The Soviets interpreted the active US diplomacy + as an effort to displace them in Cairo.

+

—On the negotiating front, whereas the Canal proposal had been designed + to slow the pace and buy time, the pace of diplomacy since early May has + speeded it up and shown US anxiety for movement.

+

In short, we are in a position where both sides will be upset with us + when they find out that we have not supported their concept of an + interim settlement. On top of this, the Israelis assume we have begun to + put the squeeze on them by letting the aircraft pipeline run dry. We + have the choice of continuing shipments under their pressure or + continuing to delay to gain their agreement on an interim settlement + that will either be as hard for them to accept as an overall settlement + or close enough to the Israeli position to leave Sadat feeling cheated. Sadat has been told that no commitment + was made to Israel on aircraft during Secretary Rogers’ trip.

+

The strategy which State seems to be moving toward is (a) to create + concern in Israel that aircraft shipments will end temporarily and (b) + to try to move the UAR toward a + position that would permit us to try to split the difference between the + UAR and Israeli positions. The + strategy behind the initial + Canal settlement proposal on the other hand, was to convince the UAR to accept an interim settlement + because it recognized that it could not get complete withdrawal now. + Instead, the UAR has been encouraged to + think that it can get a substantial step to complete withdrawal now.

+

It seems likely now that we have lost the chance for an interim + settlement—unless its relationship to complete withdrawal can be + reduced, and that will now be hard for Sadat to accept. If we continue aircraft shipments, we + will seem to Sadat to have + reversed ourselves. If we do not, we will be in a period of + confrontation with Israel. Israel will then have a choice between (a) + waiting us out on the assumption that hostilities will resume in six + months or so and we will be forced to their side and (b) making a + diplomatic concession that, in their view, would just harden the + Egyptian/Soviet position.

+
+ +
+ 241. Memorandum From the President’s Deputy Assistant for National + Security Affairs (Haig) to + President NixonSource: National Archives, Nixon + Presidential Materials, NSC Files, + Box 657, Country Files, Middle East, Middle East Nodis/Cedar/Plus, + Vol. III. Secret; Nodis; Cedar. Sent for action; outside system. A + stamped notation on the memorandum indicates the President saw it. + All brackets are in the original. + Washington, July 2, + 1971. + + SUBJECT + New Suez Canal Initiative + +

Secretary Rogers has sent you a + memo [attached]Dated July 1; attached but + not printed. recommending that we undertake a “new effort” to + reconcile the serious differences which exist between Egypt and Israel + on an interim Suez Canal settlement.

+

The Secretary proposes a scenario in which we would seek to move first + the Israelis and then the Egyptians towards a middle ground position. + This would require a number of difficult concessions on each side since, + as the Secretary points out, there has been a further hardening of both + Egyptian and Israeli positions since his trip to the area. For the Israelis, it would at a minimum mean:

+ +

—Agreeing to a much greater withdrawal from the Canal than they now + envisage and giving up control of the key strategic passes, probably to + a U.N. force.

+

—Allowing at least a limited Egyptian force to cross the Canal.

+

—Accepting a formula that would in effect limit the cease-fire to a year + if there was no progress towards a final settlement.

+

For the Egyptians, it would at a minimum mean:

+

—Giving up the idea of linking the interim settlement to a final + settlement, with an Israeli commitment to total withdrawal.

+

—Agreeing to allow Israeli ships to pass through the Suez Canal after an + interim settlement.

+

—Giving up their hope for an explicit six-month cease-fire deadline.

+

—Agreeing to strict limitations on their future military presence in the + Sinai.

+

In terms of mechanics, Assistant Secretary Sisco would go to Israel around July 12 (he has already + informed the Israelis he would like to come for about a week for + “free-wheeling” discussions) and orally probe the Israeli position. He + would then report back to you and Secretary Rogers and a decision would be made on whether he should + continue on to Cairo. Meanwhile, we would conduct a holding operation + with President Sadat in Cairo and + make sure he is still interested.

+

The Secretary’s plan amounts to a fairly bold new initiative. But, by his + own admission, he does “not believe a complete bridging of the two sides + is now possible.” His real hope is that the gap can be “narrowed” some + and that, “at a minimum, we buy time,” and improve the chances for + something important coming out of the discussions he will be having with + the Egyptian and Israeli foreign ministers at the General Assembly in + the fall.

+

I think, and feel sure that Dr. Kissinger would agree, that we all need to give + Secretary Rogers’ proposed “new + effort” considerable thought. It raises many questions, most of which + boil down to whether or not we would be paying too high a price for too + small a chance of achieving anything substantial. The Secretary is right + when he says that the heart of the present impasse is Israel’s + unwillingness to be more forthcoming on the territorial aspect and that + there is “no possibility” of Israeli movement in this regard in the near + future. Yet this is the very heart of the problem, even of an interim + settlement. There is also, of course, the problem of raising + expectations without any real chance of being able to produce + substantial movement. We already have a serious credibility problem with + the Israelis and especially the Egyptians. If it increases much more, + our whole diplomatic posture in the Middle East could be seriously + undermined without anything to show for it.

+ +

Another question that needs to be very carefully explored is where this + new effort might lead us if we do go through with it. One likely result + is that we will move further from our “honest broker” role to become a + more active initiator of ideas and consequently with a much more exposed + and vulnerable position. This has important implications that need to be + thought out. Finally, I believe we should, above all, consider our + future initiatives with respect to the Middle East in the light of the + events which will occur during and just after Dr. Kissinger’s tripKissinger + left Washington on July 1 for his first, secret trip to Beijing. He + returned to the United States on July 13 and spent 2 days in San + Clemente reporting to President Nixon. when our longer term prospects with + respect to the Soviets and Asia will come into sharper focus.

+

Recommendation: That you authorize me to inform + Secretary Rogers that you wish + to hold up temporarily on this new initiative until we can consider it + in greater depth at a restricted NSC + meeting at San Clemente.See Document 243. There is no apparent + need for acting in great haste and it seems only prudent to approach + this important decision in an orderly manner.Nixon + initialed his approval. After a “long session” with Rogers, Helms, and Haig on the Middle East during a + July 6 flight to San Clemente, Nixon told Haldeman privately that “Rogers is basically right on some + of the points that he makes, particularly that we should appear to + be doing something rather than just letting the thing sit.” (Haldeman + Diaries: Multimedia Edition, July 6, 1971)

+
+ +
+ + 242. Telegram From the Interests Section in Egypt to the Department of + StateSource: National + Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 657, Country Files, Middle East, Middle + East Nodis/Cedar/Plus, Vol. III. Secret; Priority; Nodis; Cedar + Plus. + Cairo, July 7, 1971, 0950Z. +

1644. For Secretary and Sisco + from Sterner. Ref: Cairo + 1639.Telegram 1639 from Cairo, July 6, + reported the substance of Sterner and Bergus’s 90-minute conversation with Sadat that evening. They explained + that they wanted to meet with him to share the U.S. assessment of + the situation in the Middle East after having reviewed the results + of exchanges with both Egypt and Israel on an interim settlement. + They told him that they believed he took a “courageous and + statesmanlike step” with his positive reply to the Jarring initiative in February and + that the Israeli reply was “unsatisfactory.” That said, they thought + that the “best avenue for progress in immediate future was in + negotiations on an interim settlement” and that “the next order of + business should be to explore, in specific terms, how the + differences on an interim settlement could be narrowed.” They then + informed him that “Washington was actively considering how best to + carry out early, intensive discussions” with Israel, but before they + did so, Rogers wanted to + “touch base” with Sadat to + “make sure that premises on which we were proceeding were mutually + understood.” Sterner had been sent, they said, so that he could + “report fully to the Secretary on his return.” (Ibid.)

+

1. Atmosphere of our meeting with Sadat last night was genial and personally warm, but + below surface we could detect mood of exasperation and puzzlement as to + purpose of our mission. With effort, Sadat converted this into humorous treatment, but + tension and increasing suspicion that we are merely leading him on were + clearly there.

+

2. We nevertheless emerged with strong impression of a man who still + wants, and is still in a position to do business on an interim + agreement. When we paid him compliment on his reply to Jarring initiative, but then went on + to say that in terms of what was possible we thought we had to + concentrate on interim agreement, he nodded vigorously. At no point + during conversation did Sadat + even mention SC Resolution 242 or + Jarring Mission or otherwise + reflect any hardening on linkage of interim agreement to question of + borders in final settlement. Absence of any warning signals on this + leads us to think he fundamentally views purpose of interim agreement in + same manner we do—as device that defers judgments on shape of final + settlement but wins time for political processes to work on both sides. + I think Sadat could buy something + along the lines of formulation we have in mind on linkage of interim + agreement to on-going efforts achieve overall peace settlement.

+

3. Although somewhat impatient with the need to cover all this ground + again, when we explained value of his renewed assurances, he carefully + and unequivocally affirmed his previous position on each of points we + were instructed to raise. On important point about withdrawal of Soviet operational military + personnel he was again very explicit: they would be asked to leave upon + conclusion of an interim agreement. He made it clear he would not be + doing this as favor to U.S. but because he himself would like to see + them depart as soon as probability of renewed fighting appreciably + decreased.

+

4. Sadat sounded like a man who is + in control of his country and who had few immediate concerns about his + ability to stay there in foreseeable future. At one point, as he was + talking about May 13 arrests,Sadat announced on May 15 that more + than 100 people, including Minister of War Mohamed Fawzi and Minister of + Interior Sharay Jumaa, had been arrested for plotting a coup against + the government. (New York Times, May 16, + 1971, p. 1) he said “Nasser could afford to be compassionate; I can’t; I’m + going to be cruel and severe.”

+

5. We did not get much help when we raised problem of lines of + communication with UARG. He dismissed this with wave of hand saying once + areas of agreement are achieved with him orally Foreign Ministry could + be brought in at appropriate moment. It sounded as if he were talking + about briefing some third country. But he was definite in stating his + wish that we continue to use Heykal as channel to him. This obviously + leaves us with problem of continuing friction with Foreign Ministry. We + don’t see much to do about it except continue to do business as + President desires while conducting handholding operation with Ministry. + Perhaps Cabinet reshuffle expected this month will give us line-up in + Ministry that will make this whole arrangement easier.

+

6. One thing that struck us about Sadat’s comments was his barely disguised criticism of + Soviets for not giving him adequate arms to face Israel. His beef seemed + to be about quality rather than quantity. Implication was that he + thought Soviets had better stuff to give but were holding out on him, + whereas U.S. was giving Israel its first-line equipment.

+

7. I believe we impressed Sadat + when we said Washington saw first step of next phase of intensive + discussions as beginning in Israel, and that we were readying Sisco for this purpose. If we can show + him some palpable progress, even if it is modest, I think we can keep + him on this course through the summer and maintain his negotiating + flexibility. We have, however, just about exhausted handholding + potential in any further missions to Cairo or talks with him unless we + can show him some real substance.

+ + + Bergus + + +
+ +
+ 243. Memorandum for the RecordSource: National Archives, Nixon Presidential + Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box + H–110, NSC Meeting Minutes, NSC Minutes Originals 1971 thru + 6–20–74. Top Secret; Nodis. The meeting was held in the Conference + Room at San Clemente. According to the President’s Daily Diary, the + meeting was held from 10:57 a.m. to 12:06 p.m. (Ibid., White House + Central Files) All brackets are in the original except those + indicating text omitted by the editors. + San Clemente, July + 16, 1971. + + SUBJECT + NSC Meeting on the Middle East and South Asia + + + PARTICIPANTS + The President + Secretary of State, William + Rogers + Deputy Secretary of Defense, David + Packard + Admiral Thomas Moorer, + Chairman JCS + Richard Helms, Director of + Central Intelligence + U. Alexis Johnson, Under + Secretary of State + Henry A. Kissinger, + Assistant to the President + Brigadier General Alexander M. Haig, + Jr., Deputy Assistant to the President + Joseph J. Sisco, Assistant + Secretary of State + Harold H. Saunders, NSC Staff + + +

The President opened the meeting by pointing out that there are enormous + risks in the situation in South Asia for our China policy. There are + risks for the Indians and Pakistanis, too. He suggested that the + discussion begin with the Middle East and then turn to a briefer + discussion of South Asia. That is one problem that must be watched very + closely. The Indians are stirring it up. If they mess around on this + one, they will not find much sympathy here.

+

The President then asked Mr. Helms to brief on the situation in the Middle East. [The + substance of Mr. Helms’ briefing + is attached.]Attached but not + printed.

+

At the conclusion of Mr. Helms’ + briefing, Secretary Rogers said + that State had just gone through another extensive review of the + military balance in the Middle East with the Defense Department and + concluded that the balance still remains slightly in favor of the + Israelis. Mr. Sisco expanded on + this point by noting that the Israelis define the military balance as + one which gives them a margin of advantage. There is no question that it + is impossible to recreate the conditions of 1967 in which the Israelis + were able to win an overwhelming victory. Now, although the qualitative + advantage remains on Israel’s side, what the Russians have done to + improve Egyptian defenses is impressive. In assessing what equipment Israel needs, it is the old + question: How much is enough to deter?

+

Mr. Helms referred to the + statement by Senator Jackson + that the military balance had shifted.In + his July 14 statement arguing for an increase in the U.S. supply of + jets to Israel, Senator Jackson accused the Nixon administration of allowing the military + balance in the region to deteriorate by “degrading” the Israeli + defense capability, claiming that Egypt alone possessed half of the + 600 total military aircraft in the Middle East. (New York Times, July 15, 1971, p. 15) He pointed + out that Senator Jackson had + based his statement on the ratio between numbers of aircraft. That is + not the important thing. The important thing is the number of pilots. + Whereas the Israelis have three pilots for every plane, the Egyptians + have one pilot for every three planes.

+

Mr. Packard said that, in addition + to the aircraft balance, it must be remembered that the US has given + Israel the best electronics counter-measures equipment it has. While the + Egyptians have received new equipment from the Soviets, the Israelis are + significantly better than they were a year ago.

+

The President summarized by concluding that the margin is closer.

+

Mr. Packard said that the big + change had taken place when the Soviets moved missiles into the UAR. The + situation would never get back to the way it was before that + development.

+

The President asked Admiral + Moorer what he thought. The Admiral replied that if + Israel has to operate inside the UAR + missile envelope, its losses would naturally be greater than prior to + the existence of that envelope. Still, the Israelis enjoy qualitative + superiority over the UAR air force. The + Admiral noted that Israel is now producing its own Jericho + surface-to-surface missile. The Admiral noted that the new planes the + Soviets were providing to the Egyptians were suitable primarily for + air-to-air combat and the UAR ratio in + aircraft is superior, but the Israeli pilots are better. The Admiral + concluded by saying that photographs indicate that the UAR is making mock-ups to practice canal + crossings.

+

The President asked, “Where does that leave us?”

+

Secretary Rogers said that, as a + result of Mike Sterner’s + conversations with President Sadat,See Document 242. we believe President + Sadat wants the US to + continue playing a role in the negotiation of an interim canal + settlement. In addition, President Sadat sent word through the Saudi intelligence chief + that he still wants a Canal settlement. The Secretary proposed that Mr. + Sisco go to Israel to + attempt to narrow the gap between the Egyptian and Israeli positions on + an interim settlement.Sisco went to Israel from July 28 + to August 6. See Document 245. He + said that Israel would “favor” + a visit by Mr. Sisco. He hoped + that such a trip would permit a narrowing of the gap between now and + September when the UN General Assembly + will be the meeting point for a number of Foreign Ministers from the + area. Then, hopefully, there could be an agreement by the first of the + year.

+

The Secretary continued that Mr. Sisco would not be authorized to make commitments on + aircraft, but he would be authorized to discuss the Israeli view of + their requirements. He would report back to the President and then we + would see where we go next with the UAR.

+

The Secretary continued that President Sadat said that there is some flexibility in his + position. He also had said, with regard to the Soviets in the UAR, that + he is prepared to have the Soviets withdraw from the SAM sites, but he will continue to need + Soviet pilots to train his own pilots. As far as whether we should + resume discussions with the Russians is concerned, President Sadat has said that he has no objection + to our talking to the Russians “at the proper time.” The Secretary + concluded with the recommendation that Mr. Sisco go to Israel, try to narrow the gap and make no + commitments on aircraft.

+

The President reiterated the Secretary’s proposition that Mr. Sisco take the trip to Israel, return + and report to the President and then see whether to go on to deal + further with the UAR. He said that we did not want to get into a + position where we would trigger a confrontation for which we do not have + an answer.

+

The President went on, saying, “I have a thought.” This is July 16. The + Congress will be out of play for the best part of August. He interjected + that we are not going to have a policy governed by a domestic opinion, + but we do have “more running room” when Congress is out of session, + particularly on the aircraft question. Then he asked Mr. Sisco how long he thought the + discussion in Israel would take.

+

Mr. Sisco replied that he thought + about a week, but he could spend 10 days. He agreed that this is not the + time for a confrontation with the Israelis. That time will come, perhaps + in September when we know more precisely what kind of agreement might be + possible and what kind of concessions we might seek from Israel. Some of + the issues involved are:

+

—Are the Israelis willing to buy a symbolic Egyptian military presence in + a narrow strip east of the Suez Canal?

+

—Is a zone of Israeli withdrawal possible where the key passes to the + Sinai are neither in Egyptian nor in Israeli hands?

+

—Is it possible to achieve a relatively open-ended ceasefire?

+

—What can be done with regard to passage of Israeli ships through the + Suez Canal?

+ +

Mr. Sisco continued that we have + to be sympathetic—and to show sympathy—in meeting Israel’s concern about + arms. Still, it is difficult to respond to the Israeli requests without + destroying the one diplomatic thread still in play. However, we should + adopt a sympathetic posture on arms and on an interim settlement. Both + sides have put forward some interesting propositions.

+

The President recapitulated by confirming that Mr. Sisco’s thought was that Mrs. + Meir would talk about arms + and Mr. Sisco would talk about a + settlement.

+

The President then said that we had to put this into the context of the + “announcement last night” [that the President would visit Peking]. We do + not want to have a fight develop with the Israelis now. That would + overshadow the China announcement. So it is very important to schedule + the trip to Israel so that Mr. Sisco would still be talking when Congress gets out of + town.

+

The President said he knew how “this lobby” [Zionist] works. There is + George Meany;George Meany, President of the + AFL–CIO. there is the group in New York; there is Senator + Jackson; and Senator Muskie + has to get back on this issue since he is “hurting for money.” Israel + plays a shrewd, ruthless political game. They will egg on the + Presidential hopefuls as well as their usual friends (like Congressman + Celler). The President said + he saw this blowing up into strong Israeli pressure. The argument would + be that we are allowing the Russians to fish in troubled waters.

+

Turning to the USSR, the President said + that if one puts oneself in the Soviet position, one would be concerned + about US initiative toward China. The Soviets will be looking for places + to irritate the US. They may send some nuclear submarines back to + Cienfuegos.

+

The President said that, with regard to Mr. Sisco’s trip, he would like “a very low-profile.” Rather + than go out to Israel the first of the very next week, the President + suggested that Mr. Sisco go out + the following week and then stay there until Congress gets out of + town.

+

The President then said, “Don’t promise a damned thing. This is not going + to be a free ride this time. From now on it is quid pro quo.”

+

The President reiterated that the visit should be low profile, that Mr. + Sisco should be conciliatory + on the question of Israel’s arms needs, but on the other hand, firm + about the need for some diplomatic progress. Then Mr. Sisco would come back and report in + Washington. Then we would see whether he would go on to the UAR later in August. At that time we could + decide whether it was useful to do anything with the Russians. We have + been careful not to bring in the Soviets again, although the Russians + would like to play a role. We don’t know what kind of role they would like to play—whether + they would like to mess the situation up or what.

+

Mr. Sisco said that, looked at + from the Mid-East viewpoint, the advantage of the trip would be to keep + negotiations alive until mid-September when the UN General Assembly meets. We know what a reasonable + settlement on the Canal would look like. At that time—mid-September—in + the context of the Secretary’s bilateral talks with Foreign Ministers at + the UN, the US could make a major effort + to force a final interim settlement. But this would have to be done + carefully since Israel has said that it does not want the US and the + Russians making that settlement.

+

Secretary Rogers said that this + trip would be an effort to “keep the ball in play.” President Sadat wants the US to show it is still + active.

+

The President asked when we have to make the decision on arms for Israel. + Mr. Sisco replied that he would + be testifying before the Symington sub-committeeStuart Symington (D–MO), Chairman of the Senate + Foreign Relations Committee Subcommittee on Near Eastern and South + Asian Affairs. the following week and that he would simply + say that he had been authorized to discuss this issue in Israel. Mr. + Packard said that he felt the + decision should be put off another month or two. The President said that + August would be a good month for holding off.

+

Mr. Sisco said that we could do + this consistent with our diplomatic efforts. Domestic pressure might + build up, since the Israelis seem to have a case on the merits—that is, + the changing military balance.

+

Dr. Kissinger said that the + military balance shifts against Israel when the Israelis can no longer + win a war quickly. The Arabs do not have to defeat them; they just have + to engage Israel in a prolonged war of attrition.

+

Dr. Kissinger continued that we + have all agreed that at some point we would have to squeeze Israel. The + issue is whether we squeeze in making a commitment to provide aircraft + or at the time of delivery. If we squeeze in making the commitment, + Israel will look at everything in terms of on-going pressure.

+

Secretary Rogers said, “We can + wait a couple of months.”

+

The President said that for the UAR the + fact that Mr. Sisco was going to + Israel should be enough. He suggested that Mr. Sisco leave around July 26. Secretary + Rogers said that the trip + can be announced before President Sadat’s July 23 speech.The + Department of State announced Sisco’s trip on July 19. Sadat delivered the speech on July 23 at the opening + of the National Congress of the Arab Socialist Union. Bergus commented that the “most + dramatic aspect” of the Egyptian President’s remarks was their “lack + of drama.” He wrote: “Sadat + unveiled no new policies, set no new deadlines, raised no new issues + (and buried no old ones), essentially declared intention of + maintaining Egypt on course it has pursued since early months of + this year.” (Telegram 1853 from Cairo, July 24; National Archives, + Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC + Files, Box 1164, Saunders Files, Middle East Negotiations Files, + Middle East—Jarring Talks, + July 16–August 1, 1971) The President said Mr. Sisco + could tell the Symington + sub-committee on Monday and that would get the word around. He + acknowledged that there has to be an “appearance of motion.”

+

[Omitted here is discussion of South Asia printed in Foreign + Relations, 1969–1976, volume XI, South Asia Crisis, 1971, + Document 103.]

+ + + Harold H. Saunders + Printed from a copy that bears + Saunders’s typed + signature. + + +
+ +
+ 244. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in + IsraelSource: National + Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1164, Saunders Files, Middle East + Negotiations Files, Middle East—Jarring Talks, July 16–August 1, 1971. Secret; + Nodis; Cedar Plus. Drafted and approved by Sisco. Repeated to + Cairo. + Washington, July 21, 1971, 0105Z. +

131519. 1. At Rabin’s request, + Sisco had a long session + with him at lunch preparatory to Sisco’s trip to Israel next week. Principal purpose of + the lunch was for Sisco to seek + any advice that Rabin wished to + convey as to how best to handle the trip in our mutual interests.

+

2. Sisco made the following + principal points:

+

A. We reviewed the current situation in the Middle East with the + President and the Secretary at San ClementeSee Document 243. and Sisco has full authority to discuss + both the elements of an interim settlement and the question of + outstanding Israeli requests for arms.

+

B. Both the President and the Secretary will be interested to receive + full report from Sisco as to + what the current attitude of Israel is on the principal elements of an + interim settlement and their current assessment of the present balance + in the area.

+

C. Sisco is prepared to discuss + the question of arms fully and to consider carrying back with him + recommendations for top level consideration in the United States Government. His + approach will be sympathetic taking into account all factors, including + President’s commitment to maintain the balance. Arms question must also + be considered in context of fundamental importance which the United + States attaches to avoiding any action which will destroy its role in + trying to achieve an interim settlement. We believe interim settlement + required if deterioration to hostilities in 1972 is to be avoided.

+

D. Sisco would like to have + exchange of views on recent developments in the area, including the + Soviet role and impact politically and militarily of the Soviet-UAR + treaty.See Document + 235.

+

E. Sisco has had the benefit of a + full detailed Department of Defense intelligence briefing on the + question of Soviet arms supply to Egypt and Syria. He would benefit from + a similar detailed intelligence briefing from Israel as a preliminary + basis for our detailed talks on Israeli arms requests.

+

F. On the political side, while he assumes that the Prime Minister will + wish to meet with him at the outset for a general overall review, + Sisco hopes that + arrangements can be made for an in-depth exchange with relevant Minister + or Ministers or officials—quietly and deliberately—in which ideas on + interim settlement can be explored without either side feeling that it + is irrevocably committed. Sisco + indicated that he intended to fill in the Prime Minister in greater + detail and specificity on the current exchanges with Sadat.

+

G. Sisco will not be carrying a + detailed blueprint with him, but he will want to explore various + substantive ideas as to how the principal remaining difficulties can be + met and would be prepared, if it is appropriate, to try his hand + together with Israeli officials to put together certain formulations. + This would be without prejudice as to when and how any formulations + would be presented to the other side. In this connection, it would be + well if the in-depth discussion would attempt to make a common judgment + as to what the final elements of an interim settlement would look like; + and secondly, how the situation might be played tactically to arrive at + that point.

+

H. Finally, Sisco hopes that the + minimal amount will be said to the press of a substantive character by + either of us. What he would like have come out of the discussions + publicly is that we have had a detailed in-depth talk, that he would + report fully to his government, and on this basis the United States will + decide what further steps it is to take on an interim settlement and + with respect to the Israeli arms request. Sisco expressed hope that ways would be found to prevent + leaks; purpose is private, quiet diplomacy. Sisco intends to keep press contacts to an absolute minimum. Would hope that the + whole visit can be played in the lowest possible key. Finally, he would + hope that social engagements would be kept to an absolute minimum since + he would prefer this to be as much a working visit as possible.

+

3. Rabin said he is doing + everything possible to dampen down undue expectations on arms stimulated + by recent statement of Foreign Minister.Speaking before the Knesset on July 19, Eban appealed to the United States for more Phantom + aircraft, saying: “This need is most important and urgent in the + light of facts which have been revealed by authoritative American + sources that the Soviet Union has been supplying aerial weapons to + Egypt and Syria at a very accelerated tempo.” (New + York Times, July 20, 1971, p. 32) In response to + Sisco’s thought that he not + make any statement upon his arrival in Israel so as to keep matters in + lowest possible key, Rabin + demurred. He said this would be interpreted as US pouting over fact that + Israeli press in the last couple of weeks have expressed some doubts + regarding desirability of Sisco + trip at this time. Rabin + suggested that Sisco make brief + statement indicating he pleased to be in Israel, indicating his + intention to have in-depth discussions in a friendly and understanding + spirit on all aspects of Israeli-American relations and interim Suez + Canal agreement. Rabin thought + this was the right atmospheric note to strike. Rabin also said that it ought to be + possible to explore a number of the specific points of an interim + settlement as Sisco indicated he + wished, but he cautioned Sisco + not to put his queries in the form of a definitive US position. + Rabin said his advice would + be for Sisco to explain the + Israeli position on a given point, the Egyptian position on the same + point, and then express any judgment that Sisco might have as to what would be required to meet + the differences in the two respective positions. Sisco indicated that he had this kind + of an approach very much in mind. When Sisco indicated that he recently had the benefit of a + full, detailed Department of Defense intelligence briefing on the + military balance, Rabin + indicated GOI intention to give a + comparable briefing to Sisco + based on their own intelligence sources.

+

4. FYI: + Sisco told Rabin he expects talks to be + deliberate and detailed and expects to remain at least a week in Israel + and probably longer. Number of meetings a day should be very limited + (perhaps no more than one) and ample time allowed between meetings for + reflection by both sides on ideas expressed. End + FYI.

+

5. Rabin felt it important for + Ambassador Barbour to make all of + foregoing points to appropriate Israeli official since he will only + report it in briefer form orally on his return.

+ + + Rogers + + +
+ +
+ + 245. Telegram From the Embassy in Israel to the Department of + StateSource: National + Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1164, Saunders Files, Middle East + Negotiations Files, Middle East—Jarring Talks, August 1–16, 1971. Secret; Priority; + Nodis; Cedar Plus. + Tel Aviv, August 3, 1971, 0630Z. +

4626. For Secretary from Sisco.

+

1. My second session with Prime Minister Meir,In the first session, + which lasted three hours on the morning of July 30, Sisco told Meir that the United States + “attaches importance to achieving interim settlement along Suez + Canal by end of year,” and that it wanted to avoid a breakdown of + the cease-fire as a result of the impasse over the issue. He also + outlined Sadat’s attitudes on + key elements of an interim settlement—although Meir questioned the Egyptian + President’s “readiness or ability to assume more flexible position” + regarding it—and stressed that successfully working toward such an + agreement would “strengthen the forces for peace inside Egypt.” She + agreed to “explore ideas” with Sisco on a “noncommittal basis” to see whether + Israeli differences with Egypt could be reconciled. Finally, the + Assistant Secretary tried to reassure Meir on the question of aircraft deliveries, stating + that the United States did not link aircraft deliveries with + progress on the interim settlement. (Telegram 4587 from Tel Aviv, + July 31; ibid., RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 27–14 + ARAB–ISR) which lasted two and one-half hours, and at which + she was joined by Allon, + Dayan, Eban, Rabin, et al, also went reasonably well in that they + said neither yes nor no to any of the ideas I put forward to reconcile + presently existing differences on key elements of interim settlement. + Israelis listened without interruption to my detailed presentation and + at the end posed a number of questions for clarification, with caveat + that they might have further questions later, and that failure to + express any reservations re specific ideas I floated did not imply + consent but merely they wished to reflect.

+

2. Atmosphere once again was entirely businesslike, unemotional and + friendly. My impression is that we have given them serious food for + thought, that they recognize it as such, and that they will proceed with + great caution to avoid giving impression of knee jerk negative reaction. + Many of our ideas I put forward will in my judgement appeal to some + within the Israeli establishment and contribute to their internal debate + on this issue. They are now going into a deep skull session and Prime + Minister has asked me to meet with her again late Wednesday + afternoon.At their third meeting on + August 4, Meir pressed + Sisco on further + aircraft deliveries from the United States, given the + Soviet-Egyptian Treaty of Friendship and the “strengthening” Soviet + presence in Egypt. She complained that the United States was not + providing “adequate information” on what Egyptian officials were + telling their U.S. counterparts and asked that the United States + “refrain from putting forward proposals of its own.” She explained + that ideas that Sisco had + aired in Cairo, namely, certain cease-fire limitations and the + notion that Egypt could keep forces east of the Suez Canal, were + “contrary to fundamentals of Israeli position.” The extent of + withdrawal suggested by the United States for the second stage of a + two-stage withdrawal process was “fantastic,” Meir contended, adding that Israel + could not change its position and “current talks could not be + reported as reflecting Israeli agreement.” Sisco responded that the United + States was not hiding anything in its talks with Egyptian officials + and that his ideas regarding the interim agreement reflected what + Sadat had told him and + others. (Telegram 4725 from Tel Aviv, August 6; ibid., Nixon + Presidential Materials, NSC Files, + Box 1164, Saunders Files, Middle East Negotiations Files, Middle + East—Jarring Talks, + August 1–16, 1971) She personally wants to actively head up + their negotiating team.

+ +

3. As an aid to their discussion, I am forwarding to her an “oral + discussion minute” which tries to express in precise language the + “ideas” I presented at our meeting. You are fully familiar with how I + intend to express these. It is in my judgment encouraging that she is + ready to look at and weigh these ideas in precise form, without + commitment on either side. It was clear from what she said at the + meeting that she would find this useful since we were discussing a + considerable number of ideas which will require both subtle and precise + formulations. There are also first glimmers—and only glimmers—of + preparation of the public through the press for some flexibility on + their part, but not so much that they cannot pull back at any moment. + She has cancelled tomorrow’s Cabinet meeting so that she can discuss the + ideas in the first instance with the inner group which was at our + meeting.

+

4. She is very clear that no proposal is being made on our side and it is + an “oral discussion minute” that she is receiving. She understands that + all that I have been saying is strictly on an ad referendum basis. She + understands also that at this stage what we are trying to do is to have + a look at the kind of ideas that might have some chance of meeting + Israeli and Sadat’s principal + needs. I made clear that it does not mean that even if we come to a + mutual judgment regarding the ideas I expressed that we would + necessarily put all of them forward to the Egyptians in the next stage + and give away all the concessions that she would feel she had made in + order to make this possible. I get the impression that she is trying to + find a way to meet us at least part way within the presently approved + Knesset position rather than provoke a new crisis in the Cabinet. She of + course reiterated in the meeting that their April paperSee footnote 2, Document + 224. is “our bible.” Allon interjected with a smile, “Yes but it is likely to + become an Old Testament.” I took this to mean that some of the ideas + expressed would carry the GOI beyond + where they are at the present time. I am under no illusions about how + difficult it will be for them to move from their present common + denominator position. However, I shall continue my effort to get the + Prime Minister to agree to explore and come to an understanding with us + on the positions we feel we could reasonably put to Sadat, under the ground rule that the + outcome of the negotiating + process, if an interim agreement is arrived at, would be ad referendum + to the constitutional processes in Israel. I have also been doing a + little work on Allon because I + suspect—though I am not sure—that he is a little jealous of the leading + role played by Dayan on an + interim settlement.

+

5. My presentation was made in three parts: (A) Discussion of the kind of + bilateral consultations, intelligence exchange and military and economic + assistance arrangements as well as international positions we might + consider if an interim settlement achieved and to reassure Israel + against the contingency of violations, (reported more fully in + subsequent telegram); (B) Description of the concepts underlying our + approach to an interim agreement with emphasis on avoiding military + disadvantage to Israel and on the need to make an interim agreement as + irrevocable a process towards an overall settlement as possible; (C) A + point by point elaboration of the UAR-Israel positions and our own + tentative ideas re elements of an interim settlement. It was clear from + questions put to me by the Ministers present—and Mrs. Meir made this quite explicit—that + stickiest issue for Israel is likely to boil down to the question of a + UAR military presence of any kind + east of the Canal. Prime Minister Meir said “For us there are two cardinal points: no + fighting, no Egyptian troops across the Canal.” I have the feeling that + our formulation on the ceasefire could do the trick since they openly + acknowledged the problems that Sadat has not to appear to be buying a new indefinite + armistice arrangement. Surprisingly, they did not seem unduly shocked by + the idea that, in final stage of interim agreement, they might be + expected to pull back to the vicinity or east of the key Sinai passes. + They did not make major point of their right to use the Canal during the + interim agreement and seemed taken with the idea of Israeli and UAR representatives participating in an + augmented UNTSO supervisory arrangement. Finally I have the impression + they are somewhat intrigued with our concept of a two stage withdrawal, + whereby second and major stage would depend on Sadat’s performance in the first stage + in normalizing conditions in the Canal area and getting Canal back into + operation.

+

6. All of these impressions must necessarily remain tentative until we + hear their considered reaction at the next session. I expect hard + bargaining, including on the question of aircraft commitments which the + Israelis raised again today.

+

7. Before the above meeting took place, I asked for a meeting with the + Prime Minister alone to discuss the question of press leaks. I found her + most sympathetic and understanding and terribly distressed, as we were, + over a Maariv article that could not have been + written without some backgrounding on the part of Israelis present at + our first meeting. I am trying to put as complete a clamp on the contact + with the press as is possible. + We are saying absolutely nothing here beyond the agreed communiqués + issued at the end of each meeting. After we concluded our detailed + meeting today she called in her Ministers and laid down the law about + leaks.

+

8. I have surfaced with her the idea of our trying to arrange secret + talks between the UAR and Israel after + an interim settlement is achieved. I did this in order to show her that + there would be a new situation created after an interim settlement is + achieved with fresh opportunities to try to get Jarring unstuck from the present mud + he is in and to find other ways as well to get on with discussions on an + overall settlement. I will also at the appropriate time raise the + possibility with her of secret talks in New York or elsewhere in + September as a way to get things moving more rapidly on an interim + settlement. I do not want to do this until I have had their reaction to + our ideas and have been able to assess it.

+

9. Here are the ideas in brief which were discussed: I will send you text + of “oral discussion minute” in later telegram.The “Oral Discussion Minute” covered the ideas on + the interim agreement that Sisco and Meir discussed on August 2 and was transmitted in + telegram 4655 from Tel Aviv, August 3. (National Archives, Nixon + Presidential Materials, NSC Files, + Box 1164, Saunders Files, Middle East Negotiations Files, Middle + East—Jarring Talks, + August 1–16, 1971)

+

(A) Relation of interim to an overall settlement. I expressed + understanding of the Israeli view that Israeli withdrawal on an interim + agreement cannot be tied, as Sadat wishes, to total Israeli withdrawal to the June 5 + line as part of the overall settlement. I explained that as a minimum + what Sadat needs is a link + between an interim agreement and ongoing diplomatic efforts under + Jarring’s auspices towards + an overall agreement in accordance with SC Resolution of November 1967. I stressed that an interim + agreement would create a completely new situation, that Jarring would have to take this into + account, and he would have to see whether some new tack was possible. I + also said to Prime Minister Meir + that if an interim agreement was achieved, we would be prepared to give + thought to trying to get some secret talks going between the UAR and Israel. I gave this as an + illustration of possibilities created by a favorable atmosphere + resulting from an interim agreement. Her eyes lit up.

+

(B) Ceasefire. I indicated we understood and appreciated why a six month + ceasefire, even on a renewable basis, would be considered a short time + fuse for them. I also put to rest the idea of a permanent ceasefire, + pointing out no government would take on such a self denying ordinance + jeopardizing its sovereignty. After all, the Kellogg-Briand Pact of 1928 + certainly proved that legal eschewment of war is not the route. I suggested the possibility that + the ceasefire might be expressed in an “open ended” or “indefinite” not + “permanent” way along side two other but separate provisions in any + agreement: . . .

+

(A) An 18 month “mutual review” clause of the entire agreement, including + the stage of negotiations under Jarring’s auspices;

+

(B) A clause reserving the right of each to exercise their right of self + defense if a violation of the agreement occurred. The formula would get + around the problem which worried them that the UAR could at any given point, after Israeli withdrawal, + point to lack of progress in negotiations under Jarring and use this as a pretext to + break the agreement.

+

(C) Use of the Canal. While both Egypt and Israel have agreed that the + UAR should clear, open and operate + the Canal, Israel wants to be able to use the Canal as part of the + interim agreement whereas Sadat + would not have them use it until an overall settlement is achieved. I + came up with several ways to meet this difference which they are chewing + on: (A) UAR acknowledge in principle + Israel’s right to use the Canal, but Israel agree voluntarily not to + exercise the right until a final peace agreement is achieved; (B) UAR simply make an explicit commitment in + principle that Israel can use the Canal once an overall settlement is + reached; and (C) Israel’s merchant vessels and peace time cargoes + transiting the Canal as part of an interim arrangement, but its war + vessels unable to do so until a final peace agreement.

+

(D) Zone of withdrawal; nature of supervisory mechanism; Egyptian + presence east of the Canal. These three critical issues are so closely + linked they were handled together. The idea they are giving serious + thought to, after I surfaced it with them bit by bit, boiled down to + this two stage proposal: Stage I, Israel would withdraw 10 kilometers + from the Canal, in the meantime (6 months) the Canal would be cleared + and readied for operation; UNTSO would assure that the Bar Lev Line was + maintained during this initial period only and only Egyptian civilians + would be permitted east of the Canal. Stage II—after this six month test + on the ground, Israel would withdraw to a line “in the vicinity” of the + 3 key passes (30–50 kilometers from the Canal); an augmented UNTSO + operation with UAR and Israeli liaison + representatives included, would be responsible for establishment of + posts on the key passes which would leave them in the hands of neither + the UAR nor Israel; Egypt would be + permitted to occupy the vacated zone up to 10 kilometers with no more + than 750 men with rifles.

+

10. I know that this has been somewhat of a lengthy report but I was sure + that you would want all of the relevant details.

+

11. I spend tomorrow with the Israeli military getting a detailed + briefing on the military balance.

+ + + Barbour + + +
+ +
+ + 246. Telegram From the Interests Section in Egypt to the Department of + StateSource: National + Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1164, Saunders Files, Middle East + Negotiations Files, Middle East—Jarring Talks, August 1–16, 1971. Secret; Immediate; + Nodis; Cedar Plus. + Cairo, August 16, 1971, 1220Z. +

2048. For Secretary and Sisco + from Bergus.

+

1. State 149349In telegram 149349 to Cairo, + August 13, the Department instructed Bergus to seek an appointment with Sadat, or, if preferable, with + Heikal, to report orally + on Sisco’s talks in Israel + the previous week. Rogers + wrote: “We obviously want to be frank with Sadat so that he does not feel, as + Heikal indicated, that + we are trying to tranquilize him. On the other hand, he must + understand that Sisco trip + was part of on-going process to explore all possibilities of + flexibility on remaining key issues, that we did not seek new + commitments at this stage, and that this was another phase in + process of continuing discussions on this subject with Israelis in + weeks ahead. We assume that Sadat continues to prefer interim settlement to + other options open to him, and that in particular he wants to find a + way to avoid the military option if at all possible.” (Ibid.) + reached me at about 0900 this morning. I immediately got in touch with + Heykal, who was in Alexandria. He said he would advance his plans and + return to Cairo at once. Later in the morning, he asked me to meet him + at the Hilton at 1330 local. (Heykal family, like Bergus family, staying in Hilton + temporarily while major repairs being done on their respective + houses.)

+

2. When I met with Heykal he said what I was about to tell Egyptians + would affect their attitude far into the future. Egypt must re-evaluate + its stand prior to the Damascus meeting.Presidents Sadat, Asad, and Qadhafi met in Damascus August + 18–20. (New York Times, August 21, 1971, p. + 3) Soviets were putting very heavy pressure on Egyptians, + saying that U.S. was tempted to make Egypt a pawn in the game among + U.S., USSR and People’s China. Soviets + were still saying they had no objection to Egyptians continuing efforts + for interim settlement through USG, but + were warning Egyptians U.S. not acting in good faith but simply playing + for time. UAR Ambassador to Moscow + would shortly arrive in Cairo bearing just that message.

+

3. Heykal then said Sadat having + lengthy meeting with students today and had only 36 hours before leaving + for Damascus. He asked I give him highlights of message so he could lay + them before Sadat in effort + arrange meeting between me and Sadat. I said I was authorized do this but Secretary + hoped very strongly I could present these points to Sadat personally.

+

4. I then began giving highlights of talking points. Heykal took verbatim + notes until about half way through my presentation, when he dropped his pen and said it demeaned + him to listen to such points. This was kind of stuff I should be passing + to Mohammed Riad. I firmly + enjoined him to hear me out.

+

5. Upon conclusion of my presentation we had lengthy, always friendly, + never emotional, but very gutsy personal exchange. Heykal took line that + it would have been better if Sisco had admitted he had failed. What I had had to say + would not convince a child let alone Kaddafi, Assad or ASU Central Committee. I interposed that + latter were only people Egypt should really be worrying about.

+

6. Heykal said that if USG intended + proceed along these lines he personally wanted out of the interim + settlement business and would so request Sadat. I stressed U.S. intent to continue discussing our + ideas with Israelis and expression of our willingness unveil these ideas + to Sadat, if he wished, and carry + on exploratory discussions with Egyptians without requesting commitment + or immediate reaction. As friend of Egypt, I had racked my brain and + could not see for the life of me where Egypt had anything to lose by + entering into such discussions. We went on at it hot and heavy along + these lines for about 20 minutes.

+

7. Finally, Heykal promised me that he would pass highlights of my + presentation to Sadat as soon as + possible and urge that Sadat hear + what I had to say from my own lips. Heykal promised me that he would + volunteer no judgments or recommendations to Sadat so as to permit the President to make his own + decisions on these matters so vital to the future of Egypt.

+

8. Meeting with Sadat may take + place this evening.Bergus did not meet with Sadat that evening, but rather with + Heikal again at 1 p.m. + the next day. According to Bergus’s message to the Department, Heikal said that he had conveyed + Bergus’s oral + presentation from the day before to Sadat “without comment,” causing the Egyptian + President to be “very disappointed.” Sadat told Heikal that he hoped that the United States would + “send him something more reassuring” over the next two days, but + that he would understand if it was not in a position to do so. If + U.S. officials did not have another message for him, then he wanted + Bergus to make the same + presentation to Mohammed Riad + at the Foreign Office on August 21 that he had made to Heikal, to which Bergus commented: “Sadat well knows that putting + question of interim settlement back into hands of Mahmoud Riad’s FonOff means writing off this + particular exercise.” Sadat + further remarked that he wanted to be informed about the suggestions + that Sisco made to Israeli + officials earlier that month, but Bergus wrote that he hesitated to do so without the + prospect of being able to “deliver Israel on any one of them.” + (Telegram 2057 from Cairo, August 17; National Archives, Nixon + Presidential Materials, Box 1164, Saunders Files, Middle East + Negotiations Files, Middle East—Jarring Talks, August 1–16, 1971)

+ + + Bergus + + +
+ +
+ + 247. Editorial Note +

On September 15, 1971, delegations representing Jordan and the Palestine + Liberation Organization arrived in Jidda, Saudi Arabia, to negotiate an + agreement that would allow the fedayeen to live peacefully—and to some + degree autonomously—in Jordan. The two sides did not begin face-to-face + talks until September 20, after Saudi and Egyptian mediators, including + Saudi King Faisal, had narrowed + the gulf that existed between them on a variety of issues. (New York Times, September 21, 1971, page 2) A + major sticking point for the Jordanian delegation was the recommendation + that Jordan accept a small group of military supervisors on its soil to + arbitrate between the government and the fedayeen. (Telegram 3337 from + Jidda, September 20; National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, + NSC Files, Box 629, Country Files, + Middle East, Saudi Arabia) With matters still unsettled, Jordanian + representatives left the talks on September 24 for consultations in + Amman and never returned. The Palestinian delegation left for Beirut two + days later, where King Faisal, + on a state visit to Lebanon, met with Yasser + Arafat as part of a continuing joint Saudi-Egyptian + effort to reconcile differences between Jordan and the PLO. (New York Times, September 30, 1971, page 15) + According to U.S. intelligence sources, the Fatah wing of the PLO had + sent a group to Jidda with the “principal aim of sabotaging” the + discussions there, hoping to lay blame on Jordan for their failure, and + thus prompting Egypt and Saudi Arabia to take punitive action against + Jordan, information which the Embassy in Jidda had given to the + Jordanian delegation. (Telegram 3282 from Jidda, September 15; National + Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 629, Country Files, Middle East, Saudi + Arabia)

+
+ +
+ 248. Editorial Note +

On September 18, 1971, President Richard + Nixon, President’s Assistant for National Security + Affairs Henry Kissinger, and + Attorney General John Mitchell + discussed “some shooting going on along the Suez Canal” in the Oval + Office. According to Kissinger, + Israel shot down an Egyptian reconnaissance plane “by accident” earlier + in the week, not long after which Egypt shot down an Israeli plane + “thirty miles inside Israeli territory,” leading Israel to strike SAM sites in Egypt on the morning of + September 18. Nixon remarked + that he was “inclined to stay out” of the matter because he did not + think it would “do any good” to + get involved. He added, “And I don’t want to do anything that’s + impotent. So they’re fighting around a little. Let them fight a little. + They aren’t going to have a war about this, Henry. The Israelis aren’t + going to go to war—I mean a war isn’t going to come unless the Egyptians + start roaring in there.” Kissinger agreed, explaining that Israeli Ambassador + Yitzhak Rabin had called + him earlier that morning to tell him that “unless there’s a retaliation, + they won’t do any more.” When Mitchell asked if “the Palestinian raids on the Lebanese + border” were “any part of this,” Kissinger responded, “Not that we can tell. That’s + mostly caused by the fact that the fedayeen are getting pushed out of + Jordan,” to which he added, “The Jordan thing has worked out very + well.”

+

Next, they discussed the meetings that Secretary of State William Rogers intended to have with + Israeli, Egyptian, and Soviet officials in New York in September at the + session of the UN General Assembly. + Nixon said, “On the Mideast, + it appears that the main thing is to be sure to keep Bill in line.” + Kissinger worried that + Rogers would “pull some + spectacular that he isn’t telling anybody,” explaining that “the danger + we have in the Middle East is if we raise expectations.” Later, + Mitchell said, “On this + Middle East thing, Mr. President, I hope that Bill doesn’t foolishly + come down on our Israeli friends up there,” to which Nixon later responded, “I see no + reason to push it.” Kissinger + told them that he instructed AmbassadorGeorge Bush “to keep me informed about what’s going on + at the U.N.” When Nixon + remarked, “There’s no reason to push the Israelis out the window,” + Mitchell said that Israeli + Defense Minister Moshe Dayan sent + a message through an intermediary that Israel “would be perfectly happy” + with “a secret commitment on future deliveries of their Phantoms.” + Nixon agreed that “the best + thing, probably, is to have a secret deal. Frankly, I would rather have + it that way, than for them to raise hell with us in the Senate.” + Nixon later added, “Well, I + don’t want—well, the main thing is, John, I don’t want Rabin to know. We—this has to be + totally secretive. Because I don’t want him running to Rogers and the State Department and + then saying we blew the deal.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential + Materials, White House Tapes, Cabinet Room, Conversation No. 576–6) The + editor prepared this transcript of the tape recording specifically for + this volume.

+
+ +
+ + 249. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security + Affairs (Kissinger) to President + NixonSource: National Archives, Nixon + Presidential Materials, NSC Files, + Box 756, Presidential Correspondence 1969–1974, Israel Prime + Minister Golda Meir. Secret; + Nodis; Cedar Plus. Sent for information. A stamped notation on the + memorandum indicates the President saw it. + Washington, September 23, 1971. + + + SUBJECT + Letter from Mrs. Meir + +

The attached letter from Mrs. MeirDated September 17; + attached but not printed. reiterates interest in a limited + interim settlement and restates “grave concern” over the stoppage of + Phantom deliveries. On the interim settlement:

+

—For Israel, the main purposes of an interim agreement are “the + strengthening of the cease-fire, the disengagement of forces and the + creation of a better atmosphere for further negotiations, looking + towards a final peace settlement.”

+

—She repeats Israel’s positions: unlimited ceasefire; no Egyptian or + Soviet military forces across the Canal because it would “negate the + concept of disengagement;” no prejudice to final positions in a peace + agreement; Israeli ships through the Canal.

+

On aircraft, she notes the Soviet-Egyptian treaty,See Document 235. + the flow of Soviet arms and President Sadat’s urging that the US press Israel. She concludes + citing the danger that a hiatus in US shipments will weaken Israel’s + “deterrent posture” in Soviet and Egyptian eyes.

+

This letter highlights the issue that will face Secretary Rogers in his efforts at the UN to revive discussion of the interim + settlement. Aircraft shipments to Israel have been allowed to lapse on + the theory that this might cause the Israelis to modify their position. + Informally, the word comes back that there will be no modification until + Mrs. Meir and Gen. + Dayan are satisfied that aircraft + shipments are secured. Even then, of course, modifications would be in + keeping with Israel’s view of an interim settlement—that its purpose is + to freeze the present situation until the UAR is ready to accept boundary changes.

+

State Department this week is discussing two general options:

+

—One would be to allow the hiatus in shipments to go on a while longer. + The problem with this is that a time will probably come when the US will + be forced by circumstances to resume shipments. The situation at that time could be more + difficult if we appeared to be backing down in the face of Israeli + pressure, military action or diplomatic intransigence.

+

—The other would be to make a new aircraft commitment now with most + deliveries a year or more in the future at the end of present production + lines. The details would be adjustable to encourage Israeli + responsiveness. The problem with this is that it somewhat reduces the + pressure on Israel to modify its position.

+

Secretary Rogers has not yet + reached his own decision. Whichever the tactic, the objective would be + to induce just enough change in the Israeli position to revive + discussion with Egypt.

+

The problem with the interim settlement is that too much has been + attempted. The initial idea was simply a mutual thinning out on both + sides. From that it mushroomed to Sadat insisting on moving his forces to the key Sinai + passes. To achieve that, the US would have to press Israel almost as + hard as to get an overall settlement.

+

The main hope now, it would seem to me, would be to reduce Egyptian + expectations to a point where changes that might realistically be + expected in Israel’s position could produce an understanding. Because + official positions are tied to greater expectations, it may be that the + only way of achieving this—if it were possible at all—would be through + less official exchanges to see what might be possible.

+
+ +
+ 250. Editorial Note +

On September 25, 1971, the United Nations Security Council adopted + Resolution 298 regarding the status of Jerusalem by a vote of 14–0–1, + with Syria abstaining. It reaffirmed the Security Council’s two previous + resolutions on Jerusalem, 252 and 267, adopted in 1968 and 1969 + respectively, and deplored Israel’s failure to respect those resolutions + by taking legislative and administrative actions that changed the status + of the city. It also called on Israel to both stop and undo such + actions, including the expropriation of land and property and the + transfer of people. Finally, it requested that the Secretary General, in + consultation with the President of the Security Council, report on the + progress of the resolution’s implementation within at least 60 days. + (Yearbook of the United Nations, 1971, page + 187) Jordan had requested that the Security Council meet to discuss + Jerusalem two weeks earlier, prompting Israeli Ambassador Yitzhak Rabin to tell Assistant + Secretary of State Joseph Sisco + that Israel believed that the United States was “behind this Jordanian move” and that it would be + “the cause for bad blood in U.S.-Israeli relations.” (Memorandum from + Saunders to Kissinger, September 13; National + Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 647, Country Files, Middle East, Middle East + (General), Vol. 8)

+

In fact, the United States had worked since June 1971 to discourage + Jordan from taking the Jerusalem question to the Security Council, + fearing that any Security Council meeting on the issue could not be + confined to Jerusalem, “however strenuous” its “efforts to that end.” + (Telegram 114987 to Amman, June 25; ibid., Box 1163, Saunders Files, + Middle East Negotiations Files, Middle East—Jarring Talks, June 18–30, 1971) Having accepted that it + could not deter Jordan on the matter, U.S. officials decided to work + with Jordanian officials throughout July and August to craft the text of + a resolution that would be moderate enough for the United States to + support once it came up for a vote because, as Secretary of State + William Rogers wrote to + President Nixon: “The Israeli + policy on Jerusalem has continued with such disregard of Jordanian + sensibilities that our failure to give modest support to Hussein would have seriously + jeopardized our relations with him.” (Memorandum from Rogers to Nixon, September 16; ibid., Box 1165, Saunders Files, + Middle East Negotiations Files, Middle East—Jarring Talks, September 1–October 1, 1971) Key + instructions and commentary to the Mission to the United Nations + regarding a draft resolution are in telegrams 120507 to USUN, July 3, and 154569 to USUN and Amman, August 23. (Ibid., Box + 1164, Saunders Files, Middle East Negotiations Files, Middle + East—Jarring Talks, July + 1–16, 1971, and ibid., Box 1165, Saunders Files, Middle East + Negotiations Files, Middle East—Jarring Talks, August 16–September 1, 1971, + respectively)

+
+ +
+ + 251. Conversation Between President Nixon and Soviet Foreign Minister GromykoSource: National Archives, Nixon Presidential + Materials, White House Tapes, Oval Office, Conversation No. 580–20. + No classification marking. The editors transcribed the tape + recording printed here specifically for this volume. Brackets + indicate unclear portions of the original recording or those omitted + by the editors except “[for]”, “[of armaments]”, “[agreement]”, + “[United Nations]”, “[is]”, “[withdrawal]”, and “[be]”, added for + clarity. The conversation was conducted in English without + interpreters. According to the President’s Daily Diary, this + “one-on-one” meeting took place from 4:40 to 5 p.m. (Ibid., White + House Central Files) No written U.S. record of the conversation has + been found. Although neither was present, Kissinger and Dobrynin both described the + meeting in their respective memoirs. See White + House Years, pp. 838 and 1287, and In + Confidence, p. 234. Prior to the meeting, Kissinger sent Nixon a memorandum explaining that + Dobrynin had informed + him on September 20 that Gromyko had a “personal message from Brezhnev” that he would like to + deliver in private. “The Soviet leaders are proposing that this + issue be handled in the same framework as Berlin was, having + concluded that present efforts could not lead anywhere. They + recognized that we are stymied in our initiative. They in turn, with + their basic commitments to the Arabs, are under pressure to deliver + something for them sooner or later if they are to preserve their + influence.” (Memorandum from Kissinger to Nixon, September 28; Foreign + Relations, 1969–1976, volume XIII, Soviet Union, + October 1970–October 1971, Document 335) For a record of + Nixon and Gromyko’s conversation prior to + the private “one-on-one” meeting, which was attended by Rogers, Kissinger, and Dobrynin, see ibid., Document 337. + Washington, September 29, 1971. +

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to the Middle East.]

+

Gromyko: One thing on the Middle + East, I would like, if you had not mentioned it, I would mention it. I + wish to tell you privately, strictly privately—

+

Nixon: Yeah?

+

Gromyko: —two key points. + Frankly, some time ago, the United States Government, and you + personally—and I think a sufficient decision was made—expressed concern + how about delivery of armaments—

+

Nixon: To Egypt? Right?

+

Gromyko: Right.

+

Nixon: Fine.

+

Gromyko: We think it would be + possible to reach understanding, if some kind of framework is reached, + which would provide [for] withdrawal of Israeli troops from all occupied + territories. We would agree on the limitation, or if you wish, even on + stoppage—full stoppage of delivery [of armaments]—

+

Nixon: Hmm.

+

Gromyko: —in connection—even in + connection with understanding on the first stage—

+ +

Nixon: What to do here—

+

Gromyko: On the—

+

Nixon: Exactly. In terms of + the—

+

Gromyko: —even in connection with + the interim [agreement]—

+

Nixon: —interim. Right.

+

Gromyko: You agree.

+

Nixon: Right.

+

Gromyko: Even in connection, + provided that this is the—connected with the final, with the + withdrawal—

+

Nixon: Yeah.

+

Gromyko: —of—from all + territories, within a certain period of time. More than this, I would + like to tell you, also frankly, confidentially, both this point and then + the third one I discussed with Mr. + Brezhnev. So this is not the second point here. The + second point is this: some time ago, you expressed interest—oh, I don’t + know—in Egypt, about our presence there, our military—

+

Nixon: Yeah, yeah, yeah, + yeah.

+

Gromyko: —presence in Egypt.

+

Nixon: Yeah.

+

Gromyko: I do not know whether + you know precisely our position, or not, on our presence, but, in a + sense, we are present there. In a sense—

+

Nixon: Hm-hmm.

+

Gromyko: North of Cairo, certain + personnel, and certain forces—

+

Nixon: I see.

+

Gromyko: —and such presence, the + presence is agreed. We are ready, in connection with understanding, full + understanding, on the Middle East—

+

Nixon: Hm-hmm.

+

Gromyko: —we are ready to agree + not to have our military units there.

+

Nixon: Hm-hmm.

+

Gromyko: Not to have soldiers + based there—

+

Nixon: Not the civilian, I + understand.

+

Gromyko: Not precisely. Not to + have military units, you know, there—

+

Nixon: Not there.

+

Gromyko: We probably—we would + leave a limited number, a limited number of advisers for purely + advisory—

+

Nixon: Advisory purposes.

+ +

Gromyko: You know—

+

Nixon: Technical advisers.

+

Gromyko: —like you have in + Iran.

+

Nixon: Like we have in Cambodia + and the rest.

+

Gromyko: Yes, that is right.

+

Nixon: That’s right.

+

Gromyko: I said it’s for—

+

Nixon: I understand.

+

Gromyko: —for purely advisory + purposes.

+

Nixon: But not for—I see.

+

Gromyko: Hmm.

+

Nixon: Right. I understand.

+

Gromyko: Absolutely right. I know + that you—

+

Nixon: But these are matters that + I deal with.

+

Gromyko: Okay.

+

Nixon: Yes.

+

Gromyko: I know. You understand + very clearly.

+

Nixon: Yeah.

+

Gromyko: I would say limited, and + maybe very limited.

+

Nixon: I understand.

+

Gromyko: Maybe very.

+

Nixon: Well, those are matters + that could threaten—be discussed, if—but that has to be very + private.

+

Gromyko: And it would be very + private, very private—

+

Nixon: Right. Right. Right. The + Mideast is so tense—so touchy, politically, in this country—

+

Gromyko: All these—

+

Nixon: —it has to be private + here.

+

Gromyko: All these—

+

Nixon: Right.

+

Gromyko: —ideas, we did not put + into motion—

+

Nixon: Sure. Right. Right—

+

Gromyko: —with anybody. Never. + This is—

+

Nixon: Hm-hmm.

+

Gromyko: —new, and this is + principle.

+

Nixon: Hm-hmm.

+

Gromyko: And the third point, + whether you attach importance or not, but Israel always stresses + anything you don’t want to stress. It would be—we would be ready, even if this accord is + written on this basis, even in connection with the interim agreement, in + the third stage.

+

Nixon: Hm-hmm.

+

Gromyko: And we will be ready to + deal—to sign, if you wish, together with you, or with U.S. and other + powers, or with all other powers who are on the [United Nations] Seurity + Council. This initiative [is] possible in a document, if with + additional—

+

Nixon: Hm-hmm. Hm-hmm.

+

Gromyko: —agreement and + understanding on security for Israel—

+

Nixon: Sure.

+

Gromyko: —in connection with the + interim. With the interim—

+

Nixon: I see.

+

Gromyko: —provided that interim + is—

+

Nixon: All right.

+

Gromyko: —connected. [unclear] + and our own suggestion was that, well, when vis-à-vis the border or + finalization of the agreement, only some kind of decision—

+

Nixon: True.

+

Gromyko: —should be taken on + guarantees. But we are ready to discuss this idea in connection—we can + sign any agreement with guarantees in connection with the interim, + provided that the interim is linked with Israeli [withdrawal]. The + limitation of even—limitation, even stoppage [unclear]—

+

Nixon: Your arms?

+

Gromyko: Second—

+

Nixon: Present?

+

Gromyko: —not presence of any + Soviet units. Not—

+

Nixon: Sure.

+

Gromyko: —[unclear] heavy units, + intermediate military—

+

Nixon: Right.

+

Gromyko: —you could say.

+

Nixon: Sure.

+

Gromyko: Some of the limited—I + say this would [be] limited number of advisers for purely, purely, + purely advisory purposes.

+

Nixon: I understand.

+

[unclear exchange]

+

Gromyko: If you—

+

Nixon: Let us do a little—as I + say, we’ll do a private talking on this. And then, on this message that + Kissinger brings you + tomorrow on Vietnam, I think you’ll find very interesting. It could be + very—

+ +

Gromyko: Good.

+

Nixon: It could be very + important.

+

Gromyko: Very good.

+

Nixon: If we could get that out + of the way, you could see—and I don’t, we don’t want to ask you to do + anything that’s not in your interest—but if we get that out of the way, + it opens other doors. You see?

+

Gromyko: Good. I have to say—what + I told you about this Middle East, this is—

+

Nixon: Comes from—

+

Gromyko: —result of the + conversation personally with Brezhnev. And he wants me to say to you—

+

Nixon: Yeah.

+

Gromyko: So we are taking a + position.

+

Nixon: I understand.Following the meeting, Gromyko prepared a memorandum of his “one-on-one” + conversation with Nixon for + circulation to members and candidate members of the Politburo. + Regarding the Middle East, Gromyko wrote the following: “I said that above all, + clarity was needed with respect to the withdrawal of Israeli troops. + If the U.S. has serious intentions and is genuinely willing to + promote a settlement ‘on the basis of complete withdrawal of Israeli + troops from all occupied Arab territories,’ we would be willing to + give favorable consideration to the following issues: (1) limiting + or even stopping outside arms shipments to the countries of the + region once the situation has been fully resolved; (2) withdrawing + our actual ‘military units’ from the region, but ‘leaving military + advisers in the relevant countries’ who would have purely advisory + functions, like the military advisers the U.S. has in certain + countries, such as Iran; (3) the issue of political security + guarantees could even be resolved in connection with the first-stage + agreement, the so-called interim agreement, if it is linked to the + complete withdrawal of Israeli troops + from Arab territories within a specified period of + time. I again explained to Nixon that we are willing to reach agreement on the + aforementioned basis only if any agreement, including an interim + agreement, is linked to the ultimate total withdrawal of Israeli + troops, i.e. to thereby predetermine the final settlement. Without + the complete withdrawal of Israeli troops no settlement is + possible.” (See Soviet-American Relations, + 1969–1972, + Document 204, footnote 3)

+

[Omitted here is a brief, largely unclear exchange as Nixon and Gromyko evidently left the room.]

+
+ +
+ 252. Editorial Note +

On the evening of September 30, 1971, President’s Assistant for National + Security Affairs Henry Kissinger + met with Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei + Gromyko at the Soviet Embassy for two hours. First, + Kissinger wanted to ensure + that President Richard Nixon had + correctly understood what the + Foreign Minister had told him the previous afternoon regarding the + cessation in arms deliveries, the withdrawal of Soviet troops, and + Soviet participation in guarantee arrangements (see Document 251). After Gromyko had assured him that he had indeed made those + points, the two of them discussed the complications of trying to + establish a link between an interim and a final settlement. Kissinger said that there was “no + possibility of implementing a final agreement” before the Presidential + election, since “no American President could engage in the pressures + that might be necessary” to achieve it. But Kissinger suggested that they might be able to “get the + interim settlement out of the way” by the time of the Moscow Summit in + May, where he thought Nixon and + Brezhnev might privately + agree on the nature of an “ultimate settlement.” After Gromyko declared that their discussion + had been “very positive” Kissinger informed him that he was prepared to begin + talks with Dobrynin in three + weeks. (Foreign + Relations, 1969–1976, volume XIII, Soviet Union, October + 1970–October 1971, Document 344)

+
+ +
+ 253. Telegram From the Department of State to the Interests Section in + EgyptSource: National + Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1165, Saunders Files, Middle East + Negotiations Files, Middle East—Jarring Talks, September 1–October 1, 1971. Secret; + Priority; Nodis; Cedar Plus. Drafted by Sterner on September 29, + cleared by Atherton, and + approved by Sisco. Repeated + to Amman, Beirut, London, Moscow, Paris, Tel Aviv, and USUN. + Washington, September 30, 1971, 0140Z. +

179672. 1. As you will gather from septelTelegram 179673 to Cairo, September 29. (Ibid., Box 657, Country + Files, Middle East, Middle East Nodis/Cedar/Plus, Vol. III) + reporting conversation over lunch today between Secretary and Foreign + Minister Riad, discussion was frank, spirited, and at times even heated. + We think, however, overall effect will be beneficial. We believe it + helped clear air of some misunderstandings that have grown up between + ourselves and Egyptians in recent weeks. At bottom of Riad’s concern is + misgiving that we are thinking of interim arrangement which in fact + accords with what he believes to be Israeli concept—i.e., agreement + which has life of its own and provides prolonged opportunity for new + status quo without further movement toward final peace settlement. Riad + insisted that “interim + agreement” just another name for “armistice agreement.” Secretary + partially lifted veil on some of elements of our specific ideas which + should help to dispel these concerns. Point that seemed to make most + impression on Egyptians was that, while we do not think short ceasefire + extensions are realistic, we have very much in mind that interim + agreement should have some built-in time frame for ongoing negotiations + looking toward final settlement. Thus analogy with armistice agreements + is not rpt not correct.

+

2. Secretary deliberately took offensive with Riad in attempt to + undermine his negativism about interim agreement and get across reasons + why we think this is in interests of all—including Egypt. Nevertheless + fact emerged plainly that Riad remains almost implacably suspicious of + and opposed to interim idea. We think ground covered in today’s meeting + could be very helpful for Sadat + if reliable report of Secretary’s comments gets to him. We are concerned + that Riad’s negativism may cause him to distort and perhaps omit much of + what Secretary said. We think it would be good idea, therefore, for you + to make an appointment with Heikal as soon as possible to relay following points + which we attempted to get across today and which we consider very + important. You may supplement these as you see fit with points taken + from telegram reporting Secretary’s remarks.

+

3. Secretary was at pains today to try to get across to Riad that our + concept of interim agreement was not end in itself but practical + starting process toward final peace settlement. Egypt knows how we stand + on shape of final peace settlement. But Secretary made point that + unfortunately at this time, in our judgment, it is impossible to get + agreement between the parties on terms of final peace settlement. This + is why we have viewed President Sadat’s proposal for an interim agreement as an + imaginative and constructive step. It offers the opportunity to make + practical progress in a manner that is to the advantage of both sides + without requiring at this time that all the answers to a final peace + settlement be agreed upon.

+

4. Secretary and Foreign Minister spent some time today in discussion of + semantics as to what was meant by term “interim agreement.” Secretary + said we would continue to use this term because it was what most other + nations used and also because it seemed accurate. To us word “interim” + conveys exactly what we think we and Egyptians have in mind: Arrangement + of temporary nature leading to further stages of progress toward a final + peace settlement. Important thing in our view is not so much term by + which this proposition is known but rather certain basic principles + about it. These are: (1) that this is not a final agreement but rather + one looking toward final settlement; (2) under interim agreement neither + side can expect to achieve certain fundamental commitments that it + expects in final settlement.

+ +

5. Practical choice confronting Egypt and Israel at this juncture of + history is either to make practical step-by-step progress toward peace + settlement, or to continue clamoring for total solution according to + their desires which in our judgment will consign area to another decade + and more of bitter, wasteful impasse and perhaps bloody hostility. We + hope Secretary’s frank exposure today of realities as we see them will + help to get this message across to Egyptians.Bergus + conveyed the Department’s message to Heikal on September 30, meeting with him for 90 + minutes. Heikal said that he + would pass the information along to Sadat that evening but that he would not comment at + the time because “so many fundamental questions were involved.” + Bergus replied that he + understood and that he himself did not want to go beyond his + instructions “in such a vital matter as this.” (Telegram 2379 from + Cairo, September 30; ibid.)

+

6. As next step Secretary will see Eban in N.Y. MondayRogers and Eban met in New York at 5:30 p.m. + on October 4. Held in a “calm and relaxed atmosphere,” the meeting + was “devoted largely to reviewing present state of play on interim + Canal agreement.” Rogers + informed Eban that his recent + talks with Riad and Gromyko + “broke little new ground,” but that the Soviet Foreign Minister + expressed “great concern about risk of renewed fighting” in the + Middle East. He added that the United States believed that Sadat was still interested in an + interim settlement and supported U.S. efforts toward that end. He + also said that the United States considered the next two to three + months “vital” for achieving such an outcome and that he hoped that + both Egypt and Israel would “show greater flexibility” in the + process of doing so. Eban + responded by expressing Israel’s “readiness” to work for an interim + agreement on the “understanding that such agreement not attempt to + obtain for Arab side what Arabs cannot achieve in negotiations on + overall settlement.” Eban + also expressed “concern” that Egypt had no interest in seeking an + interim agreement, but, rather, was trying to “change US position in + favor Arabs.” He also stressed that the “negotiating ball is in + Egyptian court” and that the “next move is clearly up to Sadat.” (Telegram 3179 from USUN, October 6; ibid., Box 1165, + Saunders Files, Middle East Negotiations Files, Middle + East—Jarring Talks, + October 1–11, 1971) to continue our intensive efforts to move + matters forward on interim agreement. Secretary also plans to see Riad + again while two men are in New York,The two + had met on September 29 when Rogers had pointed out to Foreign Minister Riad that + unless a partial step leading to a final agreement were taken, the + status quo would continue. (Telegram 179673 to Cairo, September 29; + ibid., RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 27–14 ARAB–ISR) They met + again on October 8; see footnote 4, Document + 255. but no precise date set. Sisco will also undoubtedly find + opportunity to continue discussion with Mohammed Riad in New York.

+ + + Rogers + + +
+ +
+ + 254. Telegram From the Department of State to the Interests Section in + EgyptSource: National + Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 658, Country Files, Middle East, Middle + East Nodis/Cedar/Plus, Vol. IV. Secret; Immediate; Nodis; Cedar + Plus. Drafted by Sterner and approved by Atherton. Repeated Priority to + USUN for Secretary Rogers and to Tel + Aviv. + Washington, October 2, 1971, 2104Z. +

181659. Tosec 31.

+

1. FYI: + Mohammed Riad told Newlin in N.Y. that Foreign Minister + Riad in speech to GA which scheduled for + Wednesday plans to attack interim agreement.In his October 6 General Assembly speech, Riad announced that Egypt + would reject any interim settlement that allowed Israeli forces to + continue to occupy Egyptian territory. (New York + Times, October 7, 1971, p. 1) We have been + considering how we might get to Sadat in effort to head off Foreign Minister’s taking + line that could constitute serious obstacle to current negotiating + efforts. Problem is somewhat delicate, because we want to avoid + appearing end run Riad in way which might backfire on what we seek + accomplish. Best approach in our view would be for you to seek + appointment with President for Monday evening, purpose of which would be + to convey, as courtesy to President, text of Middle East portion of + Secretary’s address to GA Monday + morning,See footnote 3, Document 255. together with some + comments thereon. USUN will cable text + of Middle East portion of Secretary’s speech as soon as it is in final + form, either later Sunday or early Monday N.Y. time.Done in telegram 3116 from USUN to Cairo, October 3. (National + Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1165, Saunders Files, Middle East + Negotiations Files, Middle East—Jarring Talks, October 1–11. 1971) If + appointment with President not possible, we suggest you carry out + exercise with Heikal, asking him + to pass text and our comments to President. End FYI.

+

2. You should tell Sadat that + Secretary’s remarks on Middle East occupy prominent place in his speech + and constitute important U.S. policy statement. As President will note, + Secretary reaffirms that final peace settlement remains goal of our + policy, and that our position on shape of final settlement and central + role of Jarring mission remains + unchanged. His remarks on this occasion underscore our belief, also + conveyed by Secretary to Foreign Minister at their lunch, that at this + time interim agreement for opening Canal and some Israeli withdrawal is + only practical and realistic way to make progress toward final peace + settlement. We believe this accords with President Sadat’s own view as conveyed to Secretary last May.See Document + 227. Our efforts in intervening months have been + predicated on this understanding of President’s views.

+

3. Secretary told Foreign Minister on Sept 29,See Document 253. + and we want to reinforce this point with President, that we do not think + it is possible to achieve as part of interim settlement certain + fundamental commitments which each side expects as part of final peace + settlement. This means that Egypt cannot expect to get Israeli + commitment for total withdrawal from Sinai in interim agreement; it also + means that Israel will not be able to achieve its objective of Egyptian + commitment to final termination of belligerency in form of permanent + ceasefire. At same time, we want to make it equally clear that we do not + see interim agreement as end of road. We envisage agreement, as + Secretary told Foreign Minister, that has built-in time frame and + commitment from parties for on-going negotiations toward final peace + settlement. We do not think interim agreement could provide basis for + long range stability that US seeks in area and which can only be + provided by final peace settlement based on full implementation of + SC Res 242. We envisage that + following conclusion of interim agreement there would be resumption of + negotiations under Jarring on + final settlement.

+

4. We stress this connection between interim agreement and final + settlement because it is key point and we sense there may be + misunderstanding between our two governments about it. This may be + partly problem of semantics and if so we would like to clear it up as + soon as possible. We note, for example, statements by Egyptian officials + to effect that Egypt rejects “partial settlement.” This term does not + describe what US is seeking. We do not advocate “partial settlement.” To + contrary, we envisage interim agreement as practical first step toward + final peace settlement and we favor it precisely because it offers + prospect of improving conditions for negotiations toward final + settlement. Word “interim” to US connotes idea of something temporary, + of situation existing between one phase and next phase.

+

5. President will note that Secretary places heavy emphasis on interim + agreement as our best hope for progress. He hopes that his speech will + help create momentum toward narrowing gap on this first decisive step + toward peace—a step which we want to achieve this year. We hope that + Egyptian position, which we assume will be fully treated in Foreign + Minister’s speech on Wednesday, will also contribute to this end which + we both seek and will treat interim agreement in such fashion as to add + to this momentum and not close any doors. It is important for both sides + to focus on what they can do for peace rather than, as has been case so + often in past, what they cannot do. This positive quality of President Sadat’s proposal last FebruarySee Document + 203. was precisely what made it such constructive and + hopeful development against long background of negative attitudes that + have characterized Arab-Israel dispute.

+

FYI: We leave to + you whether and if so how to get across thought that, according to some + stories circulating in N.Y., FonMin + will attack interim agreement idea.Bergus met with + Heikal at 1 p.m. on + October 4 and presented a copy of the Middle East portion of + Rogers’s General + Assembly speech. Heikal + assured Bergus that he would + “get to Sadat as urgently as + he could” to pass along the presentation. (Telegram 2408 from Cairo; + National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1165, Saunders Files, + Middle East Negotiations Files, Middle East—Jarring Talks, October 1–11, 1971) + Bergus met with + Sadat on October 7; see + footnote 5, Document + 255.

+

6. FYI: We also + want to bring to your attention fact that Egyptians in N.Y. are engaged + in campaign to discredit Eban’s + speechIn his September 30 speech before + the UN General Assembly, Eban called for Foreign Minister + Riad to meet with him under the auspices of the United States to + discuss an interim settlement or under the auspices of Jarring to discuss a permanent + settlement. (New York Times, October 1, 1971, + p. 1) and in doing so misrepresenting what he said, e.g. + claiming that speech shows Israel has backed off SC + Res 242. On contrary we find speech + helpful on certain key points. Referring to interim agreement Eban says Quote The agreement would + stand on its own feet, but it would not affect or annul the undertakings + which the parties gave in August 1970 to hold discussions under + Ambassador Jarring’s auspices in + conformity with his mandate under the Security Council Resolution 242. + Unquote. Discussing benefits of interim agreement Eban says, Quote A new impetus would be + given to the Jarring mission + which is now in abeyance; and the undertakings which I have given refute + the idea that the Canal agreement would be the last word. On the + contrary, its conclusion and observance would create a favourable + channel for further agreements. Unquote. Again, he says, Quote neither + Egypt nor Israel would attain its final objective in this interim + framework. But Egypt’s right to present its claims in the overall peace + negotiations would remain intact, as would Israel’s freedom to present + its own proposals and reservations. Unquote. These passages indicate + Israel does not see interim agreement as end in itself but fully expects + resumption Jarring negotiations + and reaffirms its commitment to Res 242 + under our June, 1970 initiative and Jarring’s August 7, 1970 report to SYG.See footnote 5, Document + 139. Since we suspect Sadat will be receiving negative interpretations of + Eban speech from N.Y., we are + providing foregoing for what use you may be able to make of it in your + discussions. End FYI.

+ + + Irwin + + +
+
+ +
+ + Proximity Talks and the Backchannel: Separate Department of State and + White House Negotiating Tracks +
+ 255. Telegram From Secretary of State Rogers to the Department of StateSource: National Archives, Nixon + Presidential Materials, NSC Files, + Box 658, Country Files, Middle East, Middle East Nodis/Cedar/Plus, + Vol. IV. Secret; Priority; Nodis; Cedar Plus. + New York, October 7, 1971, 2157Z. +

3258/Secto 86. Dept pass Immediate Action USINT Cairo + and Priority info AmEmbassy Tel Aviv. For Bergus from Secretary.

+

1. We note from reporting that Sadat will probably be leaving Cairo by October 10 so + that we hope that we can have an answer from him to our proposal to + bring the parties closer together in an intensified negotiation with the + United States present.See Document 254. Bergus made a “preliminary presentation” to + Ismail on the morning of + October 8. Ismail then + conveyed the presentation to Sadat, who did not offer his reaction that day. + (Telegram 2453 from Cairo, October 8; ibid., RG 59, Central Files + 1970–73, POL 27–14 ARAB–ISR) We note too that Acting Foreign + Minister Ghalib is stressing the desire that the United States get down + to discussing substance. We have to handle this with great care in order + to avoid getting ourselves committed substantively to the position of + one side or the other at this juncture as we proceed with our good + offices role. You will have noted that Eban has indicated to us that if there were any give by + Egypt on one of the six points cited in the Secretary’s speech,In his October 4 address to the General + Assembly, Rogers called on + Israel and Egypt to accept an interim Suez Canal agreement based on + six points: 1) the agreement would be only a step toward complete + and full implementation of Resolution 242; 2) maintenance of the + cease-fire; 3) determination of a “zone of withdrawal” to establish + the “principle” of withdrawal in a permanent agreement; 4) + establishment of supervisory arrangements to monitor the agreement; + 5) the presence of Egyptian “personnel” east of the Canal; and 6) + free passage of the Suez Canal for all nations. (Department of State + Bulletin, October 25, 1971, pp. 442–444) + Excerpts of the address were printed in the New + York Times, October 5, 1971. Israel would be + prepared to consider such Egyptian views.

+

2. We therefore believe that in connection with your approach on our + procedural proposal, and as a follow-up to it, you need to explore with + him thoroughly one critical point in particular: Relation of the interim + agreement to an overall settlement. In doing so, please do not leave + anything in writing. Secretary intends to explore this point with Riad in his meeting on + Friday,At their 75-minute meeting in + New York on October 8, Rogers emphasized the importance of Egypt’s + participation in proximity talks in an “effort make faster progress + on interim agreement.” He also stressed that the United States + understood Egypt’s concern about the interim agreement becoming the + “new status quo,” declaring, “we will throw our weight behind + ongoing negotiations toward final peace settlement.” (Telegram 3358 + from USUN, October 9; National + Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 658, Country Files, Middle East, Middle + East Nodis/Cedar/Plus, Vol. IV) but we have no hope that he + is either inclined or has any mandate to make a concession in this + regard. We therefore want to get across to Sadat that if he is willing to consider sympathetically + the kind of formulation have in mind on the relationship between an + interim agreement and an overall settlement, that we would be + prepared—hopefully in a negotiation in which the parties are in closer + proximity, to come quickly to grips in a specific way on the other + outstanding issues as described by the Secretary in his General Assembly + statement.

+

3. In hitting this point, you have to make clear that Egyptian + insistence—and we must admit to ourselves they have been absolutely + unbending on this point from the start—on getting a commitment on total + Israeli withdrawal to the international border as part of the interim + agreement, as the Secretary said in his speech, was unrealistic.

+

4. Your presentation should be along the following lines:

+

A. We want to call Sadat’s + attention in particular to two basic principles which Secretary in his + speech said would constitute foundation of fair approach to interim + Canal agreement: (1) that a Suez Canal agreement is merely a step toward + complete and full implementation of Resolution 242 within a reasonable + period of time and not an end in itself; and (2) that neither side can + realistically expect to achieve, as part of an interim agreement, + complete agreement on the terms and conditions of an overall settlement. + Those final terms and conditions will have to be worked out by + negotiations under Ambassador Jarring’s auspices.

+

B. Since these principles are fundamental to our thinking as we pursue + our present diplomatic role with Egypt and Israel, we need to know if + they are also acceptable basis from Sadat’s viewpoint.

+

C. We recognize that Sadat would + have difficulty answering foregoing question without knowing our + thinking about its logical counterpart—namely, nature of commitment by + parties to on-going efforts under Jarring’s auspices to achieve final settlement and + timeframe within which such efforts would take place.

+

D. We therefore want to share with Sadat our specific thoughts on how these two points + might be handled in an interim agreement:

+

(1) We would envisage both sides explicitly acknowledging that the steps + they were taking under the agreement were of an interim nature with a view to facilitating + attainment of a just and lasting peace based on full and complete + implementation of S.C. Resolution 242 in all its parts. To that end, + they would make a commitment to pursue negotiations effectively and + expeditiously under Ambassador Jarring’s auspices.

+

(2) We would also envisage both sides explicitly undertaking to refrain + from firing or other hostile acts and at the same time continuing their + efforts under Jarring’s auspices + to achieve the peace settlement described above.

+

(3) Finally, we would envisage both sides explicitly agreeing to review + interim agreement in its entirety after specified period if final + settlement not achieved during that period. In other words, both sides + would reserve their positions with respect to what happens at expiry of + a specific period of time in light of progress achieved by them in + working out final settlement. Length of timeframe would have to be + negotiated, but in our view six months much too short, given complex + issues to be resolved and need for reasonable period to give this first + step Quote test of peace Unquote time to work.

+

(4) As Jarring negotiations + resume in accordance parties’ undertakings in interim agreement, we + would obviously try to be as helpful as possible to move matters toward + a final agreement.

+

(5) We urge President Sadat to + examine carefully the specific ideas we have outlined above, which we + have formulated carefully and precisely to meet what we understand to be + one of his principal concerns—namely to make certain that an interim + agreement would not lead to an indefinite occupation of Sinai. An + indication from Sadat that these + ideas formed an acceptable basis for dealing with issues of relationship + between interim agreement and final settlement and of ceasefire would + give dramatic impetus to our efforts to help parties realize first + tangible, concrete step toward peace by end of year.Bergus met + with Sadat and Ismail for 90 minutes that evening + to outline the Department of State’s proposal for Egypt and Israel + to participate in what would become known as “proximity talks.” + Sadat reiterated his + frustration with “the arrogance of Israel” as well as his fear that + the interim settlement initiative was “being diverted towards a + partial settlement and a new armistice between U.S. and Israel” by + which Israel would occupy Egyptian territory “for an indefinite + time.” Bergus and Sadat agreed that the interim + settlement should never be referred to as the “Suez Canal + agreement,” as it connoted an avoidance of a final settlement and + peace, and Bergus added that + he was sure that Rogers + would “give clear directive to make certain that all official USG references henceforth and forever + more would be to an ‘interim agreement.’” (Telegram 2447 from Cairo, + October 7; ibid.)

+ + + Rogers + + +
+ +
+ + 256. Telegram From Secretary of State Rogers to the Department of StateSource: National Archives, Nixon + Presidential Materials, NSC Files, + Box 658, Country Files, Middle East, Middle East Nodis/Cedar/Plus, + Vol. IV. Secret; Nodis; Cedar Plus. + New York, + October 7, 1971, + 2317Z. +

3269/Secto 87. Dept pass AmEmbassy Tel Aviv and USINT + Cairo.

+

1. In a somber mood, Rabin, at + his request, met with Sisco in + an early morning breakfast meeting. It was obvious that Rabin was under instructions to + reflect a very deep and disquieting concern of GOI over Secretary’s speech.See footnote 3, Document + 255.

+

2. Rabin said that Egypt had now + achieved two very important goals: (A) they had succeeded in getting the + U.S. to stop supplying aircraft to Israel; and (B) while it is true that + there was nothing in our speech that could be called a proposal, + nevertheless, Israel believed there was an erosion in the position of + the U.S. on an interim agreement.

+

3. Rabin said that Israel sees + Secretary’s speech as a significant departure, a first move by the U.S. + to begin to adopt substantive positions on the six points referred to in + the Secretary’s speech; substantive positions which more closely + approximated the Egyptian view; positions which would give Israel great + difficulty. Rabin singled out + three things in the speech: (A) A re-affirmation by the U.S. of our + position on the overall settlement as laid down in the Secretary’s + December 9, 1969 statement;See Document 73. (B) the question of the + ceasefire; and (C) the question of Egyptian forces crossing east of the + Suez Canal. Rabin, in a posture + more in sorrow than of anger, said he could not emphasize enough the + concern that our statement has caused back home. He maintained that the + UAR will see in the U.S. speech a + turning point, a further move toward them substantively, and would + encourage the Egyptians to sit absolutely tight. He stressed that Egypt + had not made any concessions from the position that was adopted by them + last May.See Document + 227. He said that we could not point to any + position by the Egyptians on any of the six headings cited by the + Secretary where the Egyptian position today is different than that + expressed to us in May.

+

4. Specifically on the question of the ceasefire, while due note was + taken that we had said that six months was too short, they interpreted + our statement to rule out a + ceasefire with an indefinite duration. Insofar as Egyptian forces east + of the Canal, he admitted that we had stated that both sides hold + opposing views, but was disturbed at the reference that we thought this + issue could be compromised.Specifically, + Rogers said: “The + question of an Egyptian military presence east of the Canal is one + on which the parties hold opposite views. But here too the + possibilities of some compromise are not negative.”

+

5. Sisco said insofar as U.S. + attitude overall settlement is concerned, it remains what it has been + for the last two years. As to an interim agreement, there had been no + erosion of our position; we made no proposals in the Secretary’s speech + and carefully avoided surfacing any of the ideas which were discussed + with the GOI in July of this year.Reference is to Sisco’s meetings in Israel from July 28 to August 6. + See Document 245. Moreover, + Sisco pointed out that in + adopting the strong public view that Egypt could not expect to get an + Israeli commitment of total withdrawal in the context of interim + agreement, we were expressing a view which Israel holds. Just as we + ruled out that kind of a commitment on the Egyptian side, so we believe + it is equally realistic to expect a permanent ceasefire that has the + effect of lifting the state of belligerency. Between these views there + ought to be found some common ground between the two sides. On the + question of Egyptian forces across the Canal, Sisco stated that this is probably the + most sensitive point and the most important from the Israeli point of + view. But here too while Sisco + could understand the concern of Israel in that we indicated our belief + that some acceptable compromise could be found, we had been very careful + to avoid mentioning any specific proposals in this regard.

+

6. Sisco readily acknowledged + that the Riad speechRiad addressed the + General Assembly on October 6. See footnote + 2, Document 254. was intended to apply pressure on + the U.S. and to apply additional pressure on Israel. Sisco also acknowledged that as a + minimum, the Egyptian strategy is to get the U.S. committed + substantively as close as possible to their view, if not for the purpose + of achieving an interim agreement of the kind Egypt has in mind, but at + least to divorce or divide the United States substantively from Israel + on the interim agreement in the same way which we are divided on the + overall settlement, but Egypt did not get this in our speech. Sisco expressed regret that Israel did + not find it possible in July to have given him even minimal flexibility + on one or two of the points which he raised with them. Sisco said this was a mistake by the + Israelis. Sisco noted that + Eban had said in the last + conversationSee footnote 4, Document + 253. that Israel would be prepared to consider any + new flexibility from Cairo on any one of the six points. We would be + meeting with Riad on Friday,See footnote 4, Document 255. and + obviously would probe this matter further, and in particular the whole + question of the relationship between an interim agreement and an overall + settlement.

+

7. Rabin then turned the + discussion to Sadat’s Moscow + tripSadat was in Moscow October 11–13 for talks with + Soviet leaders. Kissinger + informed the President in an October 16 memorandum that, judging + from the public statements and speeches made in Moscow, “Sadat gained assurance of continued + military assistance. How specific this is in terms of new equipment + remains to be seen.” Moving to the Arab-Israeli situation, Kissinger stated that “it is not + clear what occurred in Moscow. The speeches and communiqué seem to + reflect Soviet-Egyptian differences. Sadat’s tough language about the use of force to + pressure Israel was not endorsed in the communiqué, and the Soviets + generally avoided talking about the dangers of war.” The memorandum + concluded that “the Soviets will evidently provide some further aid + but have continued to hold to the position that a military solution + is not feasible at this time.” (National Archives, Nixon + Presidential Materials, NSC Files, + Box 637, Country Files, Middle East, UAR, Vol. VII) For additional analysis of Sadat’s trip to Moscow, see Foreign + Relations, 1969–1976, volume XIV, Soviet Union, October + 1971–May 1972, Document 5. and there was an + exchange as to whether Sadat + would seek and get additional commitments of arms. Rabin indicated strongly he did not + feel this was the main point. He stressed that what is more important to + Sadat is the Russian + commitment to intervene militarily in the defense of Egypt in the event + the war of attrition is renewed. Rabin pointed out that unless Israel could in such + circumstances strike in depth, costs of the war of attrition to them + would be greater. He stressed that the Soviets are committed to this + kind of defense to Egypt. He assumed that Sadat would get further arms commitments from the + Russians but underscored that this was not as important as the Russian + commitment to help the Egyptians defend themselves against in-depth + operations. Sisco said our + information indicates Soviets counseling restraint.

+

8. Sisco then raised the question + of the Israeli vote on the Chirep questionReference is to the anticipated vote in the UN General Assembly on Chinese representation in the + United Nations, specifically the issue of expelling the Republic of + China and admitting the People’s Republic of China. and + Rabin was very + non-committal, suggesting a discussion with Eban on this matter. Sisco got the distinct impression that Rabin and Eban were at odds on this matter. Rabin has weighed in against an + Israeli position which would have the effect of contributing to the + expulsion of the Chinese Nationalists. He did not deny reports we had + been receiving from other sources that Eban favors abstaining on the Important Question + resolution.

+

9. Sisco said we would view such + a vote very seriously since if the principle of expulsion by a majority + vote were established, Israel could not be very far down as a candidate for possible + expulsion in circumstances where many in the UN favor application of sanctions. Rabin was unusually mum on this and + he clearly gave the impression of a man under wraps. Sisco asked Rabin to convey his view to the + FonMin and asked that he be + informed that Sisco would be + available to discuss this at his convenience.

+ + + Rogers + + +
+ +
+ 257. Transcript of a Telephone Conversation Between the President’s + Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) and the Assistant Secretary of State for Near + Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Sisco)Source: + National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Henry Kissinger Telephone + Conversation Transcripts, Box 11, Chronological File. No + classification marking. Kissinger was in Washington; Sisco was in New + York. + October 9, 1971, 12:50 + p.m. +

K: Joe, I wanted to tell you something so that you will be the first to + be told by me. I have been reading with mounting concern the cables + coming from New York which we didn’t have even the slightest courtesy of + being informed of.See Documents 255 and 256. Kissinger had telephoned Mitchell at 12:45 p.m. that day + and said: “Do you know what that maniac Rogers did now? The Egyptians are sending a secret + emissary to New York and Sisco is to get the Israelis to do the same and + Sisco will send messages + back and forth like in 1948. Then they are going to come and ask us + to squeeze the Israelis. The Russians will think we are screwing + them. The Egyptians will think we are screwing them. There we are + with this maniac with not one word to us.” Kissinger then added: “I tell you + this will kill the Administration. Everyone knows that State is not + checking with us. The insolence, incompetence, and frivolity of this + exercise is beyond belief. Leave aside the Russians, would you ask + for a secret emissary to come and put your prestige on the line as + an intermediary when there is nothing to believe that anything is + going to happen?” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, + NSC Files, Henry Kissinger Telephone + Conversation Transcripts, Box 11, Chronological File)

+

S: We are doing what the Israelis have wanted for three years, bringing + it to direct negotiations.

+

K: But if this fails, you will come to us and ask us to beat the Israelis + over the head.

+

S: What do you mean “if it fails?”

+

K: You say you are not going to be the mailman any longer, which I don’t + understand.

+ +

S: It’s more semantics than anything else.

+

K: Well, the next time a cable goes out in violation of Presidential + directives that they must be cleared, I will take the originator into + his office and one of us will come out without his job. I will insist + that the originator be fired or I will resign. I like you; I think you + are the most creative Assistant Secretary we’ve got. And I don’t want + you to be a victim.

+

S: I’m afraid I will be. But I want you to know, I am no longer the + principal prime mover on this Henry.

+

K: Who drafts the cables?

+

S: Oh, of course, I have to draft them . . . I know how you feel about + this, but I can’t help you. Honestly, I can’t, I have tried for weeks to + create a dialogue between you, the President, Secretary Rogers and myself. I have tried to + create a White House discussion and I can’t do it. It is something you + and the Secretary have got to resolve.

+

K: We are not going to do it. He has got his directives. I am going to + create a showdown.Kissinger telephoned Haldeman at 2:55 p.m. that day and + said: “I am telling you, you are going to get into a first class + crisis with me. I am not going to let this happen.” When Haldeman asked him what the next + step should be, Kissinger + responded: “I am going to go into the President and tell him we have + to play it this way or go without me, when they go wild on the + Middle East again.” (Ibid.) Later in the evening, Haldeman recorded the following in + his diary about the day’s events: “Henry called at home this morning + and has really blown up regarding Rogers. He feels that we have now thrown away our + bargaining position on the Middle East; that up to now we’ve taken + the role as intermediaries; that now Rogers has told Sadat that we will not function simply as mailmen; + that we will throw our weight into the process and that we will + squeeze the Israelis; in other words, he’s told Sadat we’ll hold our view + regardless of Israeli complaints and that we will not give the + Israelis planes or any other new weapons. This cable was sent to + Sadat with no word to us. + Two days ago, with no word to us again, Rogers proposed secret talks in New York between + Egypt and the Israelis under Sisco—without telling us and without asking the + Israelis first. Henry’s really furious. He feels that our plan + depended on the Russians delivering the Egyptians and we delivering + the Israelis. If Rogers had + tried to clear this with Henry, he would have said we’re not ready + yet for this move—the same as he did with Sisco’s plan to go to Israel in + July.” Haldeman added that + what really seemed to be bothering Kissinger was how he could explain to Brezhnev, right after the + Gromyko proposal (see + Document 251), that we go out and pull + this in New York. “He thinks Rogers’ route will inevitably leave the Russians + sitting solid in the Mideast, where we can get what we want as the + result of a deal with the Russians and without the Israeli’s total + opposition. We could get it, in other words, without an Israeli + confrontation. But now we’re on record as having promised Egypt + everything, so there’s no reason for the Russians to get out.” + (Ibid., Haldeman Diaries, + Cassette Diary)

+

S: I can’t advise you on that Henry. Frankly, I am no longer calling the + shots.

+

K: If you try to run around between these two parties without knowing + where the President will back you, you’ll kill yourself.

+

S: I know. There has been one basic rule in the problem: if you don’t + have the backing of the President you don’t have anyone. He insists that he has his backing. + I don’t want to get between you and Rogers on this. Is there any way . . . I have done + everything I can to create a dialogue between you.

+

K: If you can, on an informal basis, let him know what’s being cooked up + . . .

+

S: Ahead of time?

+

K: Yes. I think what will happen is the President will start squeezing + Rogers out of this like he + has on everything else.

+

S: At some point we will have to call the President in, and if he doesn’t + agree . . .

+

K: He doesn’t know what you are doing. How can he agree if he doesn’t + know?

+

S: Are they in touch?

+

K: No.

+

S: What can I do?

+

K: Well, first I want you to know what I am going to do, and I don’t + bluff. I would hate to have you end up as the fall guy.

+

S: I am going to. I am going to be the fall guy.

+

K: I will do my best to see that you don’t.

+

S: I am going to.

+

K: And second, if we can get some advance information . . .

+

S: I don’t imagine the Secretary feels this is any new departure. He + feels—and I am not arguing, I just want you to know—he is trying to + produce the kind of negotiation that the Israelis have wanted. He feels + he has carte blanche to do this as he sees fit. He tells me he has an + understanding with the President to do this.

+

K: Well, that could be . . .

+

S: He feels he has a clear line from the President. I wrote a paper four + weeks ago to try to create a dialogue. It never got beyond his desk. Not + that I am lily white. I have never been comfortable in this job unless + the President, the Secretary and you have all known what’s being done. I + have lost sleep over this.

+

K: I think we are producing a war the way we are going.

+

S: No, I don’t think it is the wrong direction but . . .

+

K: No, but without coordination everyone ends up furious.

+

S: Is there any way that you can produce a Presidential dialogue?

+

K: Not before I go to China.Kissinger was in the People’s + Republic of China October 20–26. Reports of his meetings with + Chinese leaders are in Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, volume + XVII, China, 1969–1972, Documents 163, 164, and 165.

+ +

S: When are you going?

+

K: About 10 days.

+

S: Then let’s see afterward.

+

K: Can you slow things down until then?

+

S: I don’t know. The Secretary sees Eban on Thursday.Rogers and Sisco met with Eban on October 14 to discuss the + interim agreement. The Secretary briefed Eban on his second conversation with Riad in New + York on October 8, telling him that the Egyptian Foreign Minister + was “less negative” and that he “asked questions and was + thoughtful.” Much of the discussion, which became heated at times, + was dominated by a dispute over the terms of a cease-fire. Eban said that Israel wanted one + without a time limit because a “revision date” could be “changed by + unilateral decision and not through agreed change.” Rogers, on the other hand, + believed that “it is unrealistic to talk of a permanent cease fire + in an interim agreement.” He later added: “I resent the idea that we + don’t support a permanent cease fire. We hope the interim agreement + will lead to a permanent cease fire.” They also discussed the + Secretary’s speech before the UN + General Assembly on October 4, particularly Israel’s negative + reaction to it, which Rogers + characterized as a “personal attack.” (National Archives, Nixon + Presidential Materials, NSC Files, + Kissinger Office Files, Box 134, Country Files, Middle East) + Sadat is going to Moscow around + .See footnote + 10, Document 256. The blank underscore is an omission in + the original.

+

K: You could let me have the reporting cable of the conversation between + the Secretary and Riad.See footnote 4, Document 255.

+

S: That was sent to you last night.

+

K: I never saw it.

+

S: It was sent last night; it goes automatically to you.

+

K: No it doesn’t.

+

S: We can’t send a cable that way without it going to the Situation + Room.

+

K: You did a pretty good job of it on the UN speech.

+

S: Oh well, that’s another . . . I know that problem. I’m glad you + called; I have been very uneasy.

+

K: You have every reason to be. It is going to lead to a showdown.

+

S: And let’s say that we never talked today. I don’t want to report + this.

+

K: Oh Joe, you know, I never talk to anybody.

+

S: Okay.

+
+ +
+ + 258. Telegram From the Department of State to the Interests Section in + EgyptSource: National + Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 658, Country Files, Middle East, Middle + East Nodis/Cedar/Plus, Vol. IV. Secret; Priority; Nodis; Cedar Plus. + Drafted by Sterner; cleared + by Sisco, Davies, and Atherton; and approved by + Rogers. Repeated to Tel + Aviv and USUN. + Washington, October 14, 1971, + 2216Z. +

188739. Bergus from Secretary. + Ref: Cairo 2483.In telegram 2483 from + Cairo, October 9, Bergus + reported his meeting with Ismail that afternoon, during which Ismail conveyed this message from + Sadat to Rogers: “In reply to the message + you conveyed to me on October 8, 1971, respecting the nature of the + commitment between parties towards efforts under Dr. Jarring’s auspices to reach a + final settlement and the time needed to make this effort. While the + ideas by the State Department do not clear the doubts and concerns + of the President concerning an indefinite occupation of Sinai or a + final agreement about the Arab territories, he considers that they + represent a point of departure for an exchange of views and + discussions which he hopes will be fruitful. Therefore, he expects + in a short time and in a specific way to receive the elaboration + (clarification) of the other points contained in the Secretary’s + speech of October 4, 1971, so that a decision may be taken to + nominate an Egyptian representative with a mandate.” (Ibid.) For the + message that Bergus + presented on October 8, see Document 254 + and footnote 2, Document + 255.

+

1. We want to check further Sadat’s interest in our proposal for more proximate and + expeditious negotiating procedure and at same time obtain early + indication whether Sadat’s Moscow + visitSee footnote 10, Document 256. has altered in any way + receptive attitude apparent in your conversations with him and Ismail. We also want to get it across + to him that we cannot get further into specifics of our ideas at this + stage, since this is what the negotiations are all about, and for us to + do this would undermine those negotiations. We want to persuade + Sadat to signify his + willingness to go ahead with procedures we have in mind without further + insistence, at this time, for specifics on our ideas on other issues + involved in interim agreement. We think there is reasonable chance + Sadat can agree to this.

+

2. You should therefore seek appointment with Sadat as soon after his return from Moscow as possible. + We assume Egyptians will expect same procedure to be followed whereby + you sketch out your approach beforehand to Ismail. In doing so you should underline importance + USG is attaching to this phase of + our efforts and desirability of your meeting personally with President + to make sure we have full flavor of his views. You should convey + following points to Sadat.

+

3. We appreciate President’s latest response conveyed to us through + Ismail.See footnote 5, Document + 255. We welcome his statement that he can accept as + point of departure for discussion ideas we outlined concerning manner in + which relationship of + interim agreement to final peace settlement, and question of ceasefire, + could be handled. We also welcome his indication that he views favorably + idea of proceeding in near future to more proximate and expeditious + negotiating procedure.

+

4. We note that President, in latest message conveyed to us through + Ismail, said that he is + awaiting our specific ideas on other aspects of interim agreement before + making final decision to name Egyptian negotiator with mandate to + intensified talks. In our recent exchanges in Cairo (including message + contained State 186256Not found. + conveyed by you through Ismail + Oct 9 subsequent to receiving Sadat’s message in Cairo’s 2483), in Secretary’s speech + to UNGA, and also in Secretary’s two + meetings with Foreign Minister Riad,See + footnote 4, Document 255 and footnote 5, Document 257. we have + endeavored to convey to Egyptians more specifically our concept of + interim agreement. We have also given President Sadat our specific ideas on central + issue (para 3 above) involved in interim agreement. From all of this we + think it must now be clear to Egyptians where we stand on point of most + concern to them—that interim agreement is first step toward final peace + settlement and must not become new armistice. We cannot go further at + this time in terms of delineating our specific ideas without + jeopardizing negotiating process which in our view is only way of making + process toward agreement. Purpose of negotiating process we have in mind + is in fact to assist two sides in coming to grips with those specifics + President Sadat has in mind.

+

5. We also want to emphasize that as negotiations proceed, US as + middleman will obviously be intimately and continuously involved in + negotiations. As Secretary Rogers told Foreign Minister Riad at their second + meeting, US does not intend to play mere mailman role. We will also try + to act as catalyst by putting forward constructive ideas and conveying + frankly to each side our assessment of what is within bounds of + acceptability to other side. From our exchanges in spring and summer we + have good idea of concerns and needs of both sides and therefore of + parameters of possible agreement.

+

6. We hope, therefore, that President Sadat can agree to appointing representative with broad + mandate in substance and procedure to facilitate intensified negotiating + process we envisage for reaching interim agreement. If he is ready in + principle to do this, we would anticipate coming back to him in near + future with suggestions for a specific place and date for negotiations + in close proximity.

+

7. We have in mind active and intensive negotiations. If fact that these + are under way leaks to press, which will probably happen sooner or later, we would say, as + indicated in our last message to President Sadat, that this is merely intensification of present + procedures.Bergus met with Ismail at 6:30 p.m. on October 15 and told him that + he had an important message to convey to Sadat. He then presented the points contained in + paragraphs 3–7 of this telegram. Speaking personally, Ismail told Bergus that he was “not happy with + process whereby Egypt continually said ‘yes, yes’ and subsequently + found itself in the air.” He added that he feared that if Egypt + blindly followed the procedure that Rogers had outlined, it would “soon find itself + beset by further preconditions.” Furthermore, he maintained that + Egypt could not reply to Rogers’s message until Sadat and his advisers learned the results of U.S. + discussions with Israel, at least on the twin issues of linking the + interim agreement to an overall settlement and the cease-fire. + (Telegram 2538 from Cairo, October 15; National Archives, Nixon + Presidential Materials, NSC Files, + Box 658, Country Files, Middle East, Middle East Nodis/Cedar/Plus, + Vol. IV)

+ + + Irwin + + +
+ +
+ 259. Letter From Secretary of State Rogers to Secretary of Defense LairdSource: Washington National Records Center, OSD Files: FRC 330–76–0197, Box 66, + Israel. Secret; Nodis. A stamped notation on the letter reads: “Sec + Def has seen. 15 Oct 1971.” + Washington, October + 15, 1971. + + Dear Mel: + +

Your memorandum to me of October 6Not + found. on Israeli use of American equipment in its September + 18 action against Egyptian missile sitesSee + Document 248. makes a number of + points which, I agree with you, should be discussed with the Israelis: + the technical misuse of the Shrike, and the apparent disregard of two of + the conditions under which we had provided the anti-missile package of + last year. In our judgment, we should not make too much of the violation + of the condition on secrecy, since it was laid down in the context of + the delicate ceasefire situation at that time, which has changed + considerably since then, and since Israel’s possession of the Shrike has + in fact been an open secret for some time. Use of the Shrike in the + absence of a resumption of hostilities by the other side was clearly, in + a literal sense, a violation of one of the conditions of sale. On the other hand, there is no + doubt that use of the Shrike was in response to an escalatory hostile + act by Egypt (the firing of a SAM + across the ceasefire line against an unarmed reconnaissance plane), that + it was the second Egyptian violation in a short period (the first being + a low level Sukhoi overflight of the ceasefire line), and that it was a + relatively restrained reaction in the circumstances. Despite these + qualifying considerations, it will serve a useful purpose, I believe, to + let the Israelis know that we still take seriously the conditions to + which they have agreed. Our own view is that you should bear down + particularly hard on Israel’s technical misuse of the Shrike in a way + and in a mission for which it is not intended. I find your arguments on + this point most persuasive.

+

I am troubled, however, by your intention to hold in abeyance all further + action on sale or delivery of equipment covered by these special + conditions.On October 8, James H. Noyes, Deputy Assistant + Secretary of Defense for Near Eastern, African, and South Asian + Affairs, sent a memorandum to the Director of the Defense Security + Assistance Agency that reads: “The Secretary of Defense has directed + that the sale or delivery of special munitions type weapons to + Israel temporarily be held in abeyance effective today. There is no + intention at this time to cancel any of these sales. Based on + information previously provided by your agency, the attached listing + shows the category of items which should not be delivered or offered + Israel during this temporary suspension. You are requested to take + immediate action to withhold delivery or signing of letters of offer + on this equipment. You are further requested to implement this + decision on a close hold basis and in such a manner that no + speculation will be generated. Further guidance will be provided on + this subject within 30 days.” (Washington National Records Center, + OSD Files: FRC 330–74–0115, Box + 5, Israel) As you know, we have moved into a difficult and + intensive phase of our efforts to bring about an interim Suez Canal + agreement between Israel and Egypt. It becomes doubly important at this + time that in matters of high sensitivity to Israel our every action be + carefully weighed with a view to the broader effects on the negotiating + situation. The Israelis are anxious about the direction of our efforts + in the interim agreement negotiations. I believe it is essential that we + not give them any signals they might misconstrue. To interrupt our arms + relationship, even in such a limited way as you propose would, I fear, + compound our difficulties and could have an adverse impact on the + diplomatic role we are playing.

+

I would, therefore, like to request that any proposals to interrupt + Israeli arms deliveries be thoroughly discussed and coordinated between + us in advance and that, in the present situation, no action be taken to + suspend or delay the sale or delivery of any items, including those subject to the special + conditions discussed in your memorandum to me.Laird + replied to Rogers’s letter + on October 22. He began by noting that he appreciated the + Secretary’s concern. He then continued: “We certainly do not intend + for this temporary ‘hold’ to be misinterpreted by Israel, and by + keeping the matter in defense-to-defense channels I believe this + objective has been accomplished. At the same time, it is precisely + because we do not wish to give wrong signals that we have taken this + action. We realize that the Israeli military were emotionally + distraught by the shooting down of this unarmed aircraft, and could + have made a hasty decision which, in comparison with previous + Israeli responses, may well be regarded as ‘restrained.’ + Unfortunately, this is the very kind of reaction which is most + dangerous and which could lead most directly to escalation and great + power confrontation. In short, we want there to be no + misunderstanding on the part of the Israel Defense Forces as to the + seriousness with which we view the conditions attached to this + equipment.” (Ibid.)

+

With best personal regards,

+

Sincerely,

+ + + William P. Rogers + + +
+ +
+ 260. Letter From Secretary of Defense Laird to Secretary of State RogersSource: + Washington National Records Center, ISA Files: FRC 330–74–0083, Box + 23, Middle East. Secret. + Washington, October + 18, 1971. + + Dear Bill: + +

There is increasing concern here over our continued inability to get + distribution—even on a carefully controlled “CEDAR” basis—of key cable + traffic on the Arab-Israel situation. I recognize the sensitivity of the + present state-of-play, but the New York Times and + Washington Post continue to print reports + which, if true, indicate that a good deal of discussion on + military-security topics is taking place.

+

Obviously, any settlement proposal must address security questions, and + is thus of concern to DOD. Further, as + our experience with the 1970 “stand-still” demonstrates, the + military-security aspects of even limited settlement proposals require + careful review by military-security experts to ensure they are + workable.

+

In short, while recognizing State’s primacy in these critical + negotiations, I am sure you will agree that DOD has a real role to play as well. This requires that we receive—on at + least a “CEDAR” basis—all traffic on this subject. Practically speaking, + it is not enough that we be able to see some particular message upon + request, nor is it feasible that we receive eleventh hour briefings or + selected cables just before NSC + meetings.

+

I would hope that you can arrange for this distribution, at least to my + personal office, to Dave Packard, + and to Warren Nutter. I also + urge you to ensure that your staff take advantage of our capabilities to + check out the practicability of any military-security arrangements being + considered.On October 20, Rogers replied: “I can assure you + that you have been receiving and will continue to receive the + sensitive cables in the ‘CEDAR’ series. We will also make available + to you any cables which are of direct interest to the Department of + Defense, such as those dealing with specific arms transactions. On + our side, we will want to continue to seek the counsel of the + Department of Defense on the military-security aspects of settlement + proposals. On some aspects of our efforts to achieve a settlement, I + have decided not to have documents circulated. I have, however, + asked Joe Sisco to make + certain that you, Dave + Packard, and Warren + Nutter are kept informed both so that you can fulfill + your NSC responsibilities and in + order for us to benefit from your counsel. Please let me know with + whom in your personal office Joe + Sisco should stay in touch.” (Ibid., OSD Files: FRC 330–76–0197, Box 70, + Middle East) Laird replied + to Rogers on November 10, + explaining that Warren + Nutter was his principal foreign affairs adviser and + that Sisco should keep in + touch with him on matters contained in the most sensitive documents. + (Ibid.)

+

Sincerely,

+ + Mel + +
+ +
+ + 261. Telegram From the Embassy in Israel to the Department of + StateSource: National + Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 658, Country Files, Middle East, Middle + East Nodis/Cedar/Plus, Vol. IV. Secret; Immediate; Nodis; Cedar + Plus. + Tel Aviv, October 21, 1971, 1245Z. +

6374. Ref State 191731 and State 192032.In + telegram 191731 to Tel Aviv, October 19, the Department instructed + the Embassy to convey a message to Eban from Rogers that the time had come “to get into real + negotiations on interim agreement” and there was a limited amount of + time before Egypt would decide to “precipitate a UNGA debate” as Sadat’s negotiating flexibility + began to narrow. Rogers also + wanted Eban to know that the + Department had broached the idea of proximity talks with Sadat, that his initial reaction + was “not negative,” and that the Department could “sell” him on the + idea. The Secretary stressed: “We are not asking either Israel or + Egypt to modify their present positions of April 19 and June 4 in + advance on interim agreement, but only that they have open mind and + will be prepared seek ways to accommodate present wide differences.” + Finally, he said that the negotiations stood the best chance of + “getting somewhere” if they were “kept out of public limelight.” + (Ibid., Box 1165, Saunders Files, Middle East Negotiation Files, + Middle East—Jarring Talks, + October 12–November 1, 1971) In telegram 192032 to Tel Aviv, October + 20, the Department authorized the Embassy to make the presentation + to Rafael at 6 p.m. on the understanding that it would make the + presentation directly to Eban + the following day and noted that Sisco would “be making same pitch with Rabin” at noon on October 20. + (Ibid, Box 658, Country Files, Middle East, Middle East + Nodis/Cedar/Plus, Vol. IV)

+

1. Gist of presentation contained in paras 3, 4, 5, 6, 7 of State 191731 + given Rafael Oct. 20 and communicated by him to Eban on latter’s arrival at + airport.

+

2. Chargé saw Eban (who was + accompanied by Gazit) morning + Oct. 21 and made full detailed presentation which was taken down + practically verbatim by Gazit. + Eban acknowledged he had had + word from Rafael and had also received report from Rabin of Oct. 20 conversation with + Sisco, but said he was not + rpt not yet in position to make formal reply. He had, however, several + questions.

+

3. Eban asked just what “not + negative” meant regarding Sadat’s + reaction. Chargé replied Sadat + reaction had been such as to lead USG + to believe it useful to get indication of whether GOI would agree to procedure if final + agreement from Sadat obtained. We + were not now making formal proposal to GOI, and had not yet done so to Egypt either. Upon + affirmative indication from GOI, we + would explore further in Cairo and believe there is chance we can sell + Sadat on idea. If this proves + to be so, we will then so inform GOI + with formal proposal to them as well.

+

4. Eban noted negotiations between + countries frequently begin on “documentary basis” and asked whether this + would be so in this case. Chargé repeated we are not asking either + Israel or Egyptians to mod-ify their present positions in advance or to + make any other pre-commitments + other than to enter into negotiations in real give and take spirit and + with open mind, prepared to seek ways to accommodate present wide + differences. Eban asked whether + proposal being made to Egypt in same terms or whether Egypt would expect + negotiations to start on basis of Secretary’s six points as outlined in + GA speech.See footnote 3, Document + 255. Chargé replied conversations with Egyptians + had extended over longer time than this present short conversation with + Eban but that essential + elements were same in regard both countries. USG was proposing no rpt no documentary or other basis on + which to begin negotiations; question of how each party would look upon + this matter the parties had to explore with each other.

+

5. Eban said that Secretary had + stated after their meetingSee footnote 4, Document 253. that + USG would intensify its efforts + concerning Canal arrangement and he, Eban, was already frequently being asked what next steps + USG would be undertaking. He + understood desire to have no announcement of negotiations in New York + but it would be very hard, in his opinion, to keep matter completely + quiet since everybody would be looking to see results of Secretary’s + statement. Nevertheless, this was subsidiary to primary question of + whether to begin negotiations.

+

6. Eban asked whether Chargé knew + whom Egyptians might designate as their representative. (Prior to + meeting, Gazit (protect) had gone + over Rabin’s report with + Chargé, indicating that Ghaleb + and Ismail had been mentioned as + possibilities.) Chargé said that since no formal proposal had been made + to Egypt and no formal agreement obtained, it followed that there had + been no actual designation of a representative. Nevertheless, he had + heard that Ghaleb might be + considered and also understood that Ismail was intimately involved in discussions. Gazit indicated it already known that + Ghaleb was coming to New + York for remainder of GA.

+

7. In closing, Eban said that he + would be in touch as soon as possible with more definite GOI reply.

+ + + Zurhellen + + +
+ +
+ + 262. Editorial Note +

On November 4, 1971, Assistant to the President for National Security + Affairs Henry Kissinger met in + the Map Room of the White House with Soviet Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin from 1:10 to 3 p.m. to + discuss a Middle East peace agreement. (Library of Congress, Manuscript + Division, Kissinger Papers, Box + 438, Miscellany, 1968–76) It was the third conversation between + Kissinger and Dobrynin focused on the Middle East + since Foreign Minister Andrei + Gromyko had presented to President Nixon a proposal for an Arab-Israeli + peace settlement (see Document 251). At their + first meeting on October 9, Kissinger informed Dobrynin that recent statements by Secretary of State + Rogers at the United Nations + and calls for “secret talks” between Egyptians and Israelis under the + aegis of Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian + Affairs Joseph Sisco should not + be considered as a U.S. reply to Gromyko’s proposal. Dobrynin said he was very grateful because it would + almost certainly have been misunderstood in Moscow and would have had + very “unfortunate consequences.” (Memorandum of conversation, October 9; + Foreign + Relations, 1969–1976, volume XIII, Soviet Union, October + 1970–October 1971, Document 351) On October 15, Dobrynin emphasized the need to focus + on Gromyko’s proposal, insisting + that it was “the most generous offer the Soviet Union would ever make. + They were offering withdrawing their forces, limiting arms shipments + into the Middle East, and guaranteeing the settlement. What more could + Israel possibly want?” Except for the frontier, which the Soviets + believed had to be the international frontier, Dobrynin said that the Soviet Union + would be “extremely flexible” in the settlement. (Memorandum of + conversation, October 15; ibid., volume + XIV, Soviet Union, October 1971–May 1972, Document 4)

+

At the November 4 meeting, Kissinger outlined to Dobrynin two possible procedures for how to proceed: + “One was for the United States to tell the Israelis and for the Soviets + to tell the Egyptians that we were proceeding along this track.” The + other was to bring the Israelis in on an interim settlement but to keep + vague its relationship to an overall settlement until 1973. Kissinger observed that the first + procedure was the “more honorable course”; the second might be the “more + effective course.” Dobrynin said + he would check in Moscow as to their preference and then turned the + discussion to Gromyko’s + proposal:

+

“The Ambassador then said that the Soviet Union had made major + concessions. They were prepared to withdraw their forces, to have an + embargo on arms into the Middle East, and to join a Soviet-American + force for guarantees. In other words, they would be very flexible about + anything that was within the Soviet discretion. Matters that required + Egyptian approval were more complex. He therefore hoped that Dr. Kissinger would be able to concentrate in their + discussions on those three items.

+

“Dr. Kissinger told Dobrynin that the guarantees issue was + really quite simple and that it would probably be settled fairly easily. + If their talks were to have any chance of success, Dr. Kissinger would have to be able to + demonstrate to the Israelis that they were getting something as a result + of these talks that they were not getting as a result of the Rogers/Sisco approach. Ambassador Dobrynin responded by noting that the Israelis were + getting the withdrawal of Soviet forces and a Soviet arms embargo.

+

“Dr. Kissinger then said it would + also help if the terms of the interim settlement were better than those + now being negotiated. Ambassador Dobrynin asked what Dr. Kissinger meant. For example, did he mean that the line + should be at the western end of the pass and not on the eastern end, + that is on the Suez Canal side of the passes not on the Israeli side of + the passes.

+

“Ambassador Dobrynin also asked + whether under those conditions it was conceivable that some Egyptian + troops could cross the canal. Dr. Kissinger replied that it was conceivable but that he + had no really clear idea, and that issue would have to wait.

+

“Ambassador Dobrynin then asked + for Dr. Kissinger’s concept of + the final settlement. Dr. Kissinger replied that he did not really believe in + shooting blanks and therefore would be very careful. It seemed to him + that the demilitarized zones were an essential element. Ambassador + Dobrynin commented that it + was very tough to get a demilitarized zone that did not include some + territory on the other side of the Israeli frontier. Dr. Kissinger stated that in such a case + all of Israel would be demilitarized if the zones were equal. He then + proposed jokingly that the zones start equi distance [sic] from the capitals. Dobrynin reiterated that it would be very hard not to + have a demilitarized zone on the Israeli side. Dr. Kissinger remarked that if Ambassador + Dobrynin could, however, get + agreement on it this would be a tremendous step forward.

+

“Dr. Kissinger finally said that + it seemed to him that the matters which could represent enormous + progress would be: if the Egyptian settlement could be separated from + the others, if the demilitarized zones could be kept entirely on the + Egyptian side, if the interim settlement could be on terms more + favorable to Israel than the present one, and a determination of + concessions Sadat ought to be + prepared to make if he knew an overall settlement was coming. Dobrynin noted that he would consult + Moscow but would like Dr. Kissinger to make a specific proposal at the next + meeting.” (Ibid., Document + 10)

+

Dobrynin prepared his own record + of the November 4 conversation in which he added that President + Nixon and Kissinger were reluctant to present a U.S.-Soviet proposal + to Israeli Prime Minister Golda + Meir until after the U.S. elections the following year. + “More precisely,” Dobrynin + wrote, “they will not inform her during this period about the agreement + with us on the second stage (final settlement and complete withdrawal of + Israeli forces) but only about the first stage—an interim settlement in + connection with the opening of the Suez Canal.” The reasoning in the + White House in this regard, Dobrynin explained, was that “the Israelis definitely + have no interest in returning to their old borders and giving back + territory. Therefore, if the White House were to inform Golda Meir of the agreement between the + USSR and the U.S. that might + possibly be reached, then she, having no interest in the main + thing—withdrawal from the presently occupied territories—would almost + certainly make this agreement public and, taking advantage of the U.S. + election campaign, would try to torpedo it.” At the end of his report, + Dobrynin offered his + assessment, based on his recent meetings with Kissinger, as to where matters + stood:

+

“From the three conversations I have had with Kissinger on a Middle East settlement + since A.A. Gromyko’s departure + from Washington, it is my general impression that the White + House—evidently taking into account that the summit meeting is still + half a year away—is not really prepared at this time for urgent, + detailed discussion of an agreement on all the specific issues of a + Middle East settlement. They appear to be exploring and weighing various + options, and also trying to take into account possible near-term + developments in the region.

+

“They are apparently not averse to waiting a little to see whether the + Egyptians might in the meantime make some concessions. It is obvious + they also do not want to stir up the Israelis prematurely. And + apparently the fact that they are busy preparing for the first summit + meeting—with the Chinese—is also playing a part.

+

“On the whole—and this needs to be emphasized—the White House is + seriously interested in continuing the dialogue with us with a view to + reaching a possible agreement. In all probability, however, the White + House will begin actively preparing issues for consideration at the + Moscow meeting about two or three months before the meeting.

+

“In this connection, we think it advisable to proceed as follows in + discussing a Middle East settlement with the White House in the future: + a) Continue in meetings with Kissinger to probe and clarify the U.S. position, even + if only its general outlines, thus forcing the White House to approach + the various aspects with increasing specificity and nudging them in the + direction we need. b) At the same time, start to work on preparing our + document on the Middle East, having in mind primarily the summit meeting + (for example, in the form of basic principles, provisions, and so + forth), a document that would lay out our specific approach to the main + issues of an interim and final settlement.

+ +

“At some point such a document could be given to Kissinger for transmittal to the + President, and further work here on a Middle East settlement, through + the confidential channel, could be conducted using this specific + document as a starting point. After this preliminary discussion, it + could then be adopted as the basis for consideration of the Middle East + problem at the summit meeting.

+

“Our ‘Basic Provisions’ for a Middle East settlement of June 17, 1969 + [see Document 34], could serve as the point of + departure for such a document of ours, but after they have been revised + to take into account those provisions that have been essentially agreed + with the Americans in the course of our almost year-long exchange of + views with the State Department. Moreover, it would be desirable, for + tactical purposes, not to present this document as a repetition of the + “Provisions” that we have already set forth, but rather as a new + document reflecting the current state of affairs (taking into account + the various contacts and exchanges of views that have occurred, + including with the White House).

+

“In terms of format this document could be presented to Kissinger as a possible draft decision + at the summit meeting, on the understanding that the process of reaching + preliminary agreement on it would be initiated in advance through the + confidential channel. In our first draft we might want to avoid + mentioning the issues concerning our military presence that were + discussed here by the Minister and the U.S. President. For the time + being we might limit ourselves to an oral reaffirmation of this, stating + that we will fulfill our part of the agreement if the White House + accepts the prologue for an overall Middle East settlement as set out in + the document.

+

“The suggestion that we prepare such a document and present it to + Kissinger after a certain + period of time is premised on the need to induce the White House to + discuss the concrete issues related to a settlement, as well as on the + assumption that the White House itself, seeking to protect the + confidentiality of our exchanges of views from the State Department and + other government agencies, is unlikely to prepare its own detailed + document on a Middle East settlement for discussion with us anytime soon + (which could require bringing in additional people on their side, + something they are clearly avoiding for the moment). Our initiative in + this matter is thus all the more appropriate.

+

“As for the questions Kissinger + raised today, he will undoubtedly expect some response from Moscow so + that he can brief the President on the progress of the negotiations.

+

“As noted above, during the conversation we answered two of the questions + that were of greatest interest to him—on demilitarized zones and on the + need to implement a Middle East settlement as a ‘package.’

+

“Bearing in mind the main objective of further clarifying their position + and pushing them towards the solution that we need, it seems to us that at our next meeting + with Kissinger we might refrain + from re-opening a major discussion of these issues. After briefly + reaffirming our position, we could propose continuing the discussion of + other issues, including guarantees, within the framework of the + understanding that was discussed during A.A. Gromyko’s visit to Washington.

+

“There is one further matter. Not being aware of Egypt’s exact position, + we have thus far made no comment here on the ideas voiced by Kissinger regarding an interim (Suez) + solution as it pertains to the withdrawal of Israeli troops and the + crossing of Egyptian forces to the eastern bank of the canal. If our + side can (and should) provide our own ideas in response, we would + request appropriate guidance.” (Soviet-American + Relations, 1969–1972, Document 220)

+

Despite telling Dobrynin that he + would not bring the proposal to the Israelis, the following day, + November 5, Kissinger held a + secret meeting with Israeli Ambassador Yitzhak Rabin to inform him of the proposal Gromyko had presented to Nixon on September 29 and to gauge the + Israeli reaction. No U.S. record of their meeting has been found. + Rabin, however, later + described the meeting in his memoirs:

+

“Kissinger invited me to the + White House under ‘cloak-and-dagger’ conditions. He asked me to come + alone, said that he too would be alone, and had me admitted through a + side entrance in the West Wing, so that by the time we were face to face + my curiosity (not to mention my tension) was at a peak.

+

“‘What I am about to say is on behalf of the president, and you must + promise that you will report it to no one other than Prime Minister + Meir,’ he began in a + conspiratorial manner, ‘and even to her privately and personally.’ An + alarm bell went off in my mind because when Kissinger asked me to go to Israel and deliver a message + to the prime minister personally, there was usually reason to believe + that a crisis was in the offing.

+

“What he now told me was of a secret proposal from Leonid Brezhnev relayed to President + Nixon by Soviet Ambassador + Dobrynin. Brezhnev was suggesting a deal between + the two powers for an overall solution in the Middle East. The + settlement was to be effected in two stages: first a limited agreement + for reopening the canal; then, after the 1972 American presidential + elections (Brezhnev was not + insensitive to Nixon’s domestic + vulnerabilities in an election year), an overall agreement based on the + Jarring document. Brezhnev also offered that if the two + powers could reach an agreement on the character of an overall solution, + he would be willing to make concessions on everything having to do with + the partial agreement. Moreover, once the overall agreement was reached, + the Soviet Union would be prepared to eliminate its operational military + presence in Egypt, leaving no more than a small number of advisers, and join the United States both + in an embargo on weapons shipments to the region and in measures to + safeguard the agreement in whatever form the United States found + necessary . . .

+

“‘I do not intend to negotiate with the Soviet Union, not even at the top + level, without close coordination with Israel. I don’t think that the + United States should negotiate on a matter of fateful importance to + Israel without taking into our confidence at all stages of the + negotiations. This is why I want an answer from Prime Minister Meir: Does Israel agree to the United + States’ entering into such negotiations—on the assumption that the + future borders will not basically be different from the June 4, 1967 + lines and that the boundary between Egypt and Israel must be the + international border? . . . I understand your difficulties, and if + Israel replies to the Soviet proposal in the negative, I won’t blame + her. I would seek ways of preventing American-Soviet negotiations on + Brezhnev’s + proposals.’"(Rabin, The Rabin + Memoirs, pages 203-205)

+

Although Rabin agreed to present + the Soviet proposal directly to Prime Minister Meir in Israel, he had his doubts about + the proposal. “[Kissinger] + depicted the initiative as coming from Brezhnev,” he later wrote, “and I in no way doubted his + sincerity on this point. But I could not shake free of the vision of + Kissinger and Dobrynin closeted away cooking up + deals, with Kissinger + subsequently announcing the results to us as a fait accompli—much as + Sisco had during his earlier + talks with the Soviet ambassador.” (Ibid., page 205)

+
+ +
+ 263. Telegram From the Department of State to the Interests Section in + EgyptSource: National + Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1165, Saunders Files, Middle East + Negotiation Files, Middle East—Jarring Talks, November 1–15, 1971. Secret; + Immediate; Nodis; Cedar Plus. Drafted by Sterner, Atherton, and Sisco and approved by Rogers. Repeated Priority to Tel Aviv. + Washington, November 6, 1971, + 1647Z. +

203152. For Bergus from + Secretary. Subject: Briefing Sadat on Status of Interim Agreement Efforts.

+

1. FYI: Mrs. + Meir’s reply,As part of her reply, Meir asked, as instructed by her Cabinet: “Does US + agree with Israeli concept that negotiations for partial settlement + are basically different from negotiations for overall settlement, in + that some Israeli withdrawal from Canal is presupposed in former, + which is Israeli concession made in advance involving risks and + requiring Israel to insist on certain conditions, whereas in latter + set of negotiations, there can be no conditions, only positions?” + (Telegram 6602 from Tel Aviv, November 1; ibid., Box 658, Country + Files, Middle East, Middle East Nodis/Cedar/Plus, Vol. IV) + conveyed November 1 to + Ambassador Barbour, in effect + leaves our proposal for negotiations in proximity in abeyance while + seeking clarification on questions of (A) when Israel can expect + decision on Phantoms and (B) whether Quote six points Unquote in + Secretary’s UNGA speechSee footnote 3, Document + 255. will be basis for negotiations. Other Israeli + officials have been more explicit in making clear that positive decision + on Phantoms, and assurances that six points will not be basis for + negotiations, are necessary before Israel will agree to New York talks. + We will be considering what our next steps should be in face of this + reply, but for moment we must assume that our proposal for intensified + negotiations is stalled. We note that Sadat has now set in motion series of meetings to + dramatize that decision-making is at hand, and that he is also scheduled + to make speech to People’s Assembly November 11.In the speech, Sadat suggested that Egypt and Israel could reach an + interim agreement if Israel would withdraw from the Sinai Peninsula, + as Jarring had asked Israel + if it would have been willing to consider doing during his exchanges + with both parties in February. Furthermore, Sadat criticized the United States + for what he described as its detachment of his plan for re-opening + the Suez Canal from the larger goal of achieving an overall + settlement. (New York Times, November 12, + 1971, p. 9) We agree with you (Cairo 2637)Dated October 26. (National Archives, Nixon + Presidential Materials, NSC Files, + Box 658, Country Files, Middle East, Middle East Nodis/Cedar/Plus, + Vol. IV) as to advantages of giving Sadat some kind of progress report + before his speech so that at least we don’t come in for criticism that + he hasn’t heard from us recently. We see little further advantage in not + telling Sadat with considerable + degree of candor what political facts of life are on our interim + agreement efforts. We want to be sufficiently frank to leave him with + feeling that we are not trying to hide anything from him; at same time + we want to make it clear we have not given up on interim agreement, even + though this may take longer than we expected. Additional reason for + seeing Sadat is to seek to + clarify where Egypt stands on idea of negotiations in proximity. Last + word we had from Sadat was that + he was attracted to this idea and thought New York was best locale. We + have therefore been operating on assumption that, if Israelis agreed, + prospects were reasonably good that Egyptians would also go along with + our proposal and send negotiator to New York. Heykal’s November 5 Friday + sermon (Cairo 2724 and + 2729),In telegram 2724 from Cairo, + November 5, Bergus + recommended that the Department study a piece by Heikal in that day’s Al-Ahram, which he noted came “perilously + close to slamming the door on negotiations in proximity.” He added: + “Sadat may be having + substantive doubts about value of negotiations in proximity, but + more importantly, I believe he deeply resents fact that we have had + nothing to tell him since mid-October, while our subsequent + discussions with Israelis have been source of continuing series of + reports in Israeli, Arab, and world press.” (Ibid.) Telegram 2729 + from Cairo, November 5, reported the contents of Heikal’s weekly column in detail. + (Ibid., RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 27–14 ARAB–ISR) in + which he says it is impossible for Egypt to accept this proposal, throws + that assumption into considerable doubt. Before reaching decision on + what further approach to make to Israelis, we need best possible current + reading of Sadat’s attitude + toward our proposal. End FYI.

+

2. You should try to get appointment to see Sadat personally for this approach. If necessary we can + convey what we have to say to Ismail, but this is one occasion when we think it + important for President to have full flavor of our comments, and for us + to receive first-hand his reaction and further thoughts. If there + appears to be any problem about meeting with President, therefore, you + should say that on this occasion Secretary Rogers hopes you can see President personally.

+

3. Begin talking points. We have now received Israeli reply to our + proposal for new phase of intensified negotiations in New York. We are + still studying response and what our next steps might be in the light of + it, but in meantime we want to give President progress report.

+

4. As recent Israeli public and press statements have made clear, Israeli + Government has not yet agreed to our proposal for Quote negotiations at + close proximity Unquote in New York. Israelis say their hesitation is + based on two concerns: (A) Absence of US decision with respect to + Israel’s request for future aircraft deliveries. On this point, + Sadat should be told candidly + decision on arms in Egyptian-Soviet communiquéSee footnote 10, Document + 256. has made our task more difficult. (B) Israel + is concerned over six points on interim agreement set forth in Secretary + Rogers’ UNGA speech, which Israelis interpret as + giving Egypt advantage in negotiations. Like Egyptians, Israelis too are + pressing us to clarify further our position on six points. In addition, + each side wants other to make next move. It was against this background + that we put forth idea of proximate and intensive negotiating + procedures, which we still believe would provide opportunity for better + give-and-take between views of two sides and for some simultaneous + progress on issues where differences in position must be resolved if + interim agreement is to be achieved. We are not asking either Egypt or + Israel to abandon their present positions prior to entering such talks. + Purpose of talks is to explore whether middle ground on key issues can + be arrived at. While USG has no blueprint of its own on these + issues, Secretary has indicated parameters in GA speech within which we think agreement must be sought. + In process of seeking such agreement, we would expect to play more than + passive mailman role and would do our best to promote agreement between + parties on terms which they find advantageous. In brief, we would + envisage playing role of active catalyst.

+

5. We are carefully studying Prime Minister’s response and expect to + press this matter further with Israelis in hopes process of negotiations + in close proximity can get started at early date in New York, latter + site having been suggested by Sadat.

+

6. As result of President Sadat’s + reaction to Quote negotiations in proximity Unquote idea during his + meeting with Bergus on October + 7,See footnote + 5, Document 255. we have been proceeding on + assumption that he is interested in this idea and that, if Israelis + agree to send representative to New York for this purpose, President + Sadat will be favorably + disposed toward doing the same. But Heykal article November 5 gives a + different impression. We will soon be responding to Israel’s request for + clarifications but first, in light of Heykal article, we need to know: + Is Egypt still interested in an interim agreement and in entering + negotiations in proximity? We must be certain that Egypt is still + interested in further efforts on our part with Israel are to be taken + seriously by them. End talking points.Bergus presented the + talking points to Ismail at + 1:15 p.m. on November 8. Ismail explained that he and Sadat would need time to reflect on + the presentation and that the Egyptian President would probably meet + with Bergus on November 10. + Nonetheless, Ismail had a + preliminary response to Bergus’s remarks, asking if the U.S. Government + planned to adhere to the six points that Rogers raised in his October 4 + speech to the UN General Assembly. + He also said that he had hoped that the United States “would be + coming up with something which could be a basis for discussion if + Egyptians and Israelis started talking in proximity.” Otherwise, + proximity discussions “would be useless,” he said. He also addressed + the U.S. Government’s imminent decision on aircraft for Israel, + commenting that “linking aircraft deliveries to negotiations in + proximity was a most ‘illogical’ step and a most ‘illogical’ request + from Israel,” as Israel had previously argued that an interim + agreement would undermine Israel’s security. (Telegram 2757 from + Cairo, November 8; National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, + NSC Files, Box 658, Country + Files, Middle East, Middle East Nodis/Cedar/Plus, Vol. + IV)

+ + + Rogers + + +
+ +
+ + 264. Letter From Secretary of Defense Laird to Secretary of State RogersSource: + Washington National Records Center, OSD Files: FRC 330–76–0197, Box 66, Israel. Secret; + Sensitive. + Washington, November 10, 1971. + + Dear Bill: + +

Thank you for your letter of 4 November.On + November 4, Rogers wrote to + Laird: “Your letter to + me of October 22 states that the Department of Defense has placed a + hold on the delivery of certain items to Israel. You say that by + keeping communication with Israel on the matter in + defense-to-defense channels you do not believe the steps we are + taking will be misinterpreted by the Israelis. It is our judgment, + however, especially in the current state of our relations with + Israel, that any interruption of normal procedures or flow of + matériel is likely to be attributed by the Israelis to political + reasons. Again, with the exception of the special case of aircraft + on which a decision is still pending, I must request that there be + no interruption in our arms deliveries to Israel at this time.” He + concluded: “I am confident we can reach a mutually satisfactory + arrangement in which your concerns and ours are satisfied.” (Ibid.) + For Laird’s October 22 + letter, see footnote 5, Document + 259. I share your concern regarding the possible + effects of even a limited cutoff of special arms shipments to Israel, + but I believe a fundamental issue is involved. What is at stake is our + whole contractual relationship with Israel.

+

The IDF repeatedly has requested sale of + sophisticated equipment (e.g., NIKE, LANCE) with the argument, to ease + U.S. concern, that special conditions could be attached to its use. + However, we are now being asked, in effect, to agree to an unwritten but + overriding proviso that “the IDF will + always be free to use any equipment supplied as it chooses if it + considers the circumstances so warrant.” Unless the Israeli military are + willing to acknowledge the absolute necessity of honoring their + commitments, regardless of circumstances, then there can be none of the + mutual respect which must exist if Israel is to trust even marginally + U.S. assurances as a substitute for its present borders.

+

I am attaching copies of our exchange of letters with the Israeli Defense + Attaché.Attached but not printed are + letters dated October 9 and November 3. As is evident, there + is no acknowledgment of a violation. In these circumstances, the + assurances provided have a distinctly hollow ring.

+

It is difficult to continue to approve sales of sophisticated equipment + unless we are assured that the conditions of sale will be honored. As I + see it, we have only two alternatives: we can complete deliveries of + items already agreed to, ignoring the Israeli violations, but approve no + more; or, alternatively, we can reach a clear understanding of the + mutuality of our commitments, and can continue to consider requests for + material covered by these + or other special conditions. The latter course seems plainly the better + one, from all points of view.

+

Meanwhile, we have asked the Israeli Attaché for a fuller written + response. We have not indicated that we are withholding deliveries, and + we are not asking for an abject apology. What we do insist on is an + acknowledgment that there was at least a limited violation, and + assurance that similar violations will not occur in the future. If the + IDF feels the conditions themselves + are unreasonable, then its proper course of action is not to ignore + them, but to request their renegotiation.

+

I genuinely regret that this problem should have cropped up at this + particular time, but, since it did, we should not ignore it. As I + indicated in my letter to you earlier this fall on the subject of + aircraft sales to Israel,Reference is to + the October 22 letter. given our long-term military + relationship with that country, it becomes most important that our + relationship be frank, open, and workable. This requires, first and + foremost, the honoring of mutual commitments.

+

I am hopeful that once the IDF clearly + understands this fact, we will receive the assurances we require, and + our entire relationship will benefit.

+

If you have different thoughts or recommendations, I would be more than + happy to hear from you.On November 11, + Rogers replied: “As I + indicated to you in my letter of October 15, I, too have some + reservations about the Israeli action of September 17. I agree + completely, moreover, with your feeling that Israel’s undertakings + to us must be honored. There are, however, mitigating factors, and + there is room for honest differences of judgment about the + justification for Israel’s use of Shrikes in this instance, to which + I think you have not given full weight.” Later in the letter, + Rogers “strongly” + suggested that the Department of Defense write to Israeli General + Zeira that the Israeli Government had “agreed to abide by the + conditions” of the missile sale and that, while the Department of + Defense did not believe that it abided by the agreement with its + actions on September 17, the Department expected “strict adherence + in the future.” Rogers then + wrote: “By handling it and closing the chapter in this way, I have + no doubt that you will have made your point cogently, and we will + emerge from this with minimal political damage.” (Washington + National Records Center, OSD Files: + FRC 330–76–0197, Box 66, Israel) Rogers’s October 15 letter is Document + 259.

+

Sincerely,

+ + + Melvin R. Laird + Printed from a copy with Laird’s stamped signature and + an indication he signed the original. + + +
+ +
+ + 265. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security + Affairs (Kissinger) to President + NixonSource: National Archives, Nixon + Presidential Materials, NSC Files, + Box 658, Country Files, Middle East, Middle East Nodis/Cedar/Plus, + Vol. IV. Secret; Nodis; Cedar. Sent for information. A stamped + notation on the memorandum indicates the President saw + it. + Washington, November 15, 1971. + + SUBJECT + State of Play in Mid-East Diplomacy + +

A new effort has been made by the State Department to get talks started + with the Egyptians and Israelis to break the deadlock on an interim + settlement. The purpose of this memo is to assure that you are up to + date.

+

The New Initiative

+

State sounded out both Sadat and + Eban on sending a negotiator + to the same location—presumably New York—for intensified talks on an + interim settlement.See footnote 5, Document 255 and the text of + Document 261.

+

State’s plan would be to have Assistant Secretary Sisco work between the two to try to + close the gap between their positions.

+

The Israelis in reply requested a US response to their aircraft requests; + asked whether the points in Secretary Rogers’ UN speech still + stood since Israel regards those points as limiting Israel’s scope for + negotiation; and asked for assurance that we see negotiations on an + interim settlement as basically different from those on an overall + settlement.See footnote 2, Document 263. Ambassador Barbour concluded that this was an + Israeli effort to fend off the US initiative.

+

The State of the Negotiations

+

The prospects for success are not great if State continues its past + practice of trying to minimize differences between the two sides and + “splitting the difference” on principles that are fundamental to + each.

+

You will recall that the original proposals for an interim settlement + envisioned a quite limited mutual pullback or thinning out along the + Suez Canal:

+

—Dayan saw this as a means of (a) + reducing the opportunity for Egyptian military action and (b) perhaps + providing enough diplomatic movement without jeopardy to Israeli security to permit Sadat to continue the ceasefire.

+

—Sadat seemed to recognize that + reaching an overall settlement could take a long time and apparently + felt that some Israeli withdrawal could help buy him the necessary + time.

+

Instead of stopping to recognize that US interests lay in the most + modest—and therefore most achievable—arrangement possible, State began + talking to both sides in terms of a withdrawal that came to seem almost + a half-step to an overall settlement.

+

—Whereas the essence of an interim arrangement is to avoid issues of a + final settlement which cannot be resolved now, State has led Egypt to + see an interim settlement as a step toward Israeli withdrawal to the + pre-war border. While maintaining in Israel that an interim agreement + would not commit Israel to a final border, State has in Cairo and + publicly reasserted US support for Israeli withdrawal to the pre-war + border. This position has been used to encourage Egypt to accept an + interim step.

+

—Whereas the US interest lies in an indefinite extension of the + ceasefire, State has acquiesced in the Egyptian idea of in effect + setting a limit on its extension. While first proposing in Israel an + indefinite ceasefire, State in a general way has contributed to an + atmosphere of arbitrary deadline by speaking repeatedly of 1971 as the + “year of decision.”In a speech on June 22 + to Egyptian naval officers, Sadat said that 1971 was a “year of decision” for + the conflict with Israel.

+

—Whereas the success of an interim agreement lies in keeping the zone of + Israeli withdrawal narrow enough to preserve Israeli military access to + the canal, State adopted the Egyptian position of Israeli withdrawal + to—and eventually beyond—the Sinai passes rather than trying to reduce + Egyptian aspirations. Knowing that Israel would not give up the passes, + State specifically authorized telling Sadat that withdrawal east of the passes would not be + precluded.

+

—Whereas Israel insists that there be no Egyptian troops across the + canal, Secretary Rogers on + October 4 publicly stated that there could be “compromise” on this + issue, meaning that some Egyptian troops could cross. While State + initially presented its view of an interim settlement in terms of no + Egyptian troops across the canal. Mr. Sisco in Jerusalem in July began talking of “750 with + light arms.”

+

—Whereas Israel in February urged the US to refrain from discussing + substance with Egypt, a US representative eventually drafted notes that + became the basis for an Egyptian position paper in June, and Secretary Rogers publicly discussed the possibility for compromise + on specific issues before the UN General + Assembly in October.

+

The contrast between these positions is shown sharply in the attached + table.Dated November 9; attached but + not printed. The table, “US Positions on an Interim Settlement as + Stated to Israel and the UAR,” has two columns—under the headings + “What We Told Israel” and “What We Told Egypt” —in which the U.S. + positions, the officials who expressed them, to whom the officials + expressed them, and when they did so, are detailed. An introduction + to the table reads: “The following illustrate three points: (1) The + Israelis have reason from the record to expect that the US will not + remain simply a go-between in negotiations. We started by simply + passing positions back and forth. We have since put forward + substantive proposals. (2) As the US has become more active, it has + become apparent that the US weight will be more on the Egyptian than + on the Israeli side of the scale within the limited context of + negotiations on an interim arrangement. (3) One position has been + taken with Israel and another with Egypt. A negotiation would bring + this out.”

+

It is also worth recalling how this situation evolved:

+

—After exchanges with Jarring + resumed at the beginning of January, State showed little interest in an + interim arrangement despite several Egyptian feelers. At that time, + Sadat was still talking even + about pulling his own troops back from his side of the canal. If we had + moved then, modest agreement might have been achieved.

+

—After the Jarring talks + collapsed with Israel’s negative reply on February 26,See Document 211. + State became interested in an interim settlement. Then, however, in the + drama of Secretary Rogers’ trip + the proposal became less modest and became a substantial step toward an + overall settlement.Rogers was in Egypt and Israel May + 6–7. See Documents 227, 228, 229, and + 230. In addition, the dialogue on + the subject has led the Israelis to conclude that US weight would be + more on the Egyptian side.

+

Thus the Israelis were confronted with a decision on sending a negotiator + to intensified talks where (1) they could expect from experience that + the US would begin to advance substantive positions when a deadlock + occurred and (2) they could expect that the US positions would be closer + to Arab positions than to theirs. Since a deadlock would be almost + certain to develop quickly, an Israeli decision to join the talks would + be an Israeli decision to submit themselves to combined US and Egyptian + pressures. Confronted with this prospect, it seemed unlikely even before + the Israeli reply that they could accept without getting something + substantial.

+

State has, by withholding aircraft, created a situation where it may have + to agree to provide additional aircraft simply to persuade the Israelis + to come to talks which are bound to deadlock soon. Given the way State + has developed the issues since April, it would take a major confrontation to achieve agreement and + yet we will already have used much of our leverage just to get talks + started.

+

In addition, pursuing an overall settlement via State’s strategy keeps + the Soviets out of the process. State seems to feel that Sadat will push the Soviets out. The + Soviets cannot want this, and they can always undercut any agreement + that would lead in that direction. Unless the Soviets are involved, a + settlement seems unlikely. It would seem easier for us to gain their + agreement to withdraw than for the Egyptians to push them out.

+

In short, what started as a modest and possibly achievable objective to + buy some time has become an exercise almost as costly to the US as an + overall settlement. If the Israelis resist the pressure without + reacting, the Soviet position in Egypt will remain as it is. If the + Israelis resist but at some point become desperate enough to exploit an + incident to mount an attack, the Soviets will find it difficult not to + react.

+

The Issue on Strategy

+

The real issue here is whether State’s strategy for trying to produce an + Arab-Israeli accommodation has any chance of success.

+

—The 1967 UN resolution premised that all + the major issues in a final settlement could be worked out as part of + one big package. It assumed that agreement could be achieved in the near + term.

+

—The Israelis do not believe Arab attitudes can change enough in a short + period to assure Israel of their peaceful intent. Also, they know the + Arabs will not accept border changes now and prefer to try to wear them + down. So the Israelis will oppose any settlement terms the Arabs are + likely to accept in the near term.

+

—The Arabs have said they will not be worn down on the border issue but + they are prepared to make peace with Israel now within pre-1967 borders. + They see allowing time to pass as playing along with Israeli strategy. + Sadat, however, seems to + recognize that some time is needed.

+

—The strategy behind an interim settlement, therefore, should be (a) to + recognize the longer time frame Israel talks about as more realistic but + also (b) to recognize the Arab need to get on with the process, even if + it be prolonged.

+

State’s strategy has been confusing to both sides. State has pursued an + interim settlement as phase one of a quick package settlement. Thus, + what even Sadat conceived as a + tactic for surviving through a longer peace-making process has been + portrayed by State as a larger step toward a package settlement in a + nearer future. Because of State’s past position, the Israelis see in the + new US diplomatic effort no US sensitivity to what the Israelis thought + was the main purpose of an interim settlement—buying time for a more gradual + peace-making settlement, they thought this was the US purpose too.

+

An alternative to State’s strategy would be to acknowledge first to + ourselves that we are working in a longer time frame and that we need to + re-involve the USSR. If we could then persuade the Soviets that this is + the only realistic course for both of us and reach some understanding on + the ultimate objective, then we might have a chance of allaying Israeli + fears that, as soon as an interim agreement was signed, we would hustle + them on to a broader settlement on terms that today could only be + Egyptian.

+

As it now stands, the Israelis see us following an Arab/Soviet strategy, + and yet we have none of the possible advantages of Soviet involvement. + Until we can persuade them that we are at least partially willing to + accommodate their strategy, we can only be in confrontation with them. I + see no possibility of avoiding that confrontation—or of getting anything + significant from it—as long as the State Department’s strategy is + followed.

+
+ +
+ 266. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security + Affairs (Kissinger) to President + NixonSource: National Archives, Nixon + Presidential Materials, NSC Files, + Box 647, Country Files, Middle East, Middle East (General), Vol. + VIII. Secret; Nodis. Sent for information. A stamped notation on the + memorandum indicates the President saw it. + Washington, November 27, 1971. + + SUBJECT + Military Balance in Middle East + +

In view of the recent public statements and reports concerning the + military balance in the Middle East and the role of the Soviets, I + thought you might be interested in the conclusions reached in recent + intelligence studies on this subject.

+

Following the Egyptian-Soviet communiqué from Moscow,See Document 235. + Secretary Rogers in New York + said we would “reconsider” the military balance. Then last week in an + interview with US News November 11 he said, “Up + to now, the military balance has not shifted” and noted that the Soviets + had operated “with some restraint” in shipments over the past four or five months. A few days + after that the State Department noted the arrival of TU–16 + missile-carrying bombers in Egypt.

+

I thought you would be interested in the conclusions of the State + Department study which, in consultation with CIA and DIA, reviewed and + assessed the current balance of Arab and Israeli military forces.The study, entitled “Arab-Israeli Military + Capabilities,” was produced by the Bureau of Intelligence and + Research on November 1. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential + Materials, NSC Files, Box 647, + Country Files, Middle East, Middle East (General), Vol. VIII) + The two main conclusions of this study were:

+

—Israel’s military superiority has been reduced because of Egypt’s much + improved air defense system that would make impossible a pre-emptive air + strike such as that in 1967 and make very costly resumption of deep + penetration attacks such as those in early 1970. But even larger numbers + of additional aircraft would not enable Israel to attack deep into Egypt + without suffering “unacceptable” losses.

+

—Israel does retain the ability to defeat Arab attacks without sustaining + “unacceptable” losses, the ability to break up an Egyptian invasion + force at the Suez Canal and a “definite edge” in attack capability. + Israel is “qualitatively” superior on the ground and at sea and its air + force is capable of inflicting “far more damage” on its Arab neighbors + than they can inflict on Israel.

+

Some of the more important facts that went into the above conclusions + were:

+

—The Israelis have fewer aircraft but they are superior in terms of + performance and the Israelis have more and better combat pilots. Thus, + for instance, Israel’s jet fighters have an average range-load + superiority of about 4:1 over the comparable Egyptian aircraft. While + Israel has about three qualified pilots per supersonic jet aircraft and + more than one pilot for each jet aircraft in their total jet inventory, + it is estimated that it will be as much as two to five years before + Egypt has one available or qualified pilot per jet aircraft.

+

—Even in the question of absolute numbers, the Israelis received 119 new + jet aircraft from the US in 1970 and 1971 while Egypt received 125. + While Egypt retains overall numerical superiority, the increase in + numbers of aircraft over the past two years has been almost even, and + the Israelis have the capacity to put the entire increase to military + use while the Egyptians do not.

+

—Aircraft overhaul and maintenance capabilities of the Egyptian Air Force + are such that only 50–65 percent of its aircraft are operationally ready + at any time. The Israelis keep about 85 to 90 percent of their aircraft + operational and measure their combat turn-around time in minutes + compared to hours for the Egyptians.

+ +

—The Arabs have always outnumbered, out-tanked, and out-gunned Israel but + they have never been able to defeat it in battle. The poor record stems + from qualitative differences in organization, matériel, manpower and + leadership which from “all indications” continue to give Israel a + “decisive advantage” today and for a “considerable time” into the + future.

+

—There has been a “dramatic” improvement in the Egyptian air defense + system since early 1970. Determined to deny the Israelis the freedom to + fly with impunity in Egyptian air space, the Soviets have deployed + extensive air defense equipment including as many as 10,000 Soviet + personnel to man air defense units and five of their own fighter + squadrons.

+

—Israel’s air defense system has also improved since 1967 by the + installation of new equipment and procurement of additional HAWK + launchers and, most important, by retention of the occupied territories + which provide strategic depth, added warning time and permit deployment + of interceptor aircraft nearer to Egyptian bases.

+

—The Arab navies pose no significant threat to Israel whose own navy is + capable of interdicting Arab naval forces, conducting limited + anti-submarine warfare and supporting amphibious operations.

+

This boils down to three main points:

+

1. The shift in the balance that has taken place as a result of the + Soviet-installed defense capability mainly affects Israel’s pre-emptive + strike capability. Israel’s own defensive capability remains adequate + and not in jeopardy. This loss of ability to make a decisive pre-emptive + strike is important to Israel because it deprives Israel of the ability + to impose a short war. It enhances the Arab ability to prolong a war of + attrition, but the Sinai buffer, Israel’s defenses and Egyptian + offensive inadequacy make it difficult for Egypt to direct such a war at + Israel proper. Hence the effect of a war of attrition might be + limited.

+

2. The other important element in the picture is the continuing buildup + in the USSR’s own position in Egypt. Despite a decline in Soviet + shipments this spring—perhaps simply because the massive missile buildup + was completed—the Soviets have this year introduced the SA–6 mobile + missile system, the Flagon-A supersonic interceptor, the Foxbat + reconnaissance aircraft and now the missile-carrying TU–16s. All these + improve Soviet capability against the US and even, in an extreme + situation, against Israel. While Soviet shipments have declined + comparatatively in numbers or tonnage, there seems to be a steady + qualitative improvement in the Soviet position rather than any + significant “restraint.”

+

3. When all the studies of the military balance are complete, the + decision now to provide another complement of Phantoms is political—in + both the Egypt-Israel and the US-Soviet contexts. Everyone here admits + that Israel will need more + planes over a 1–3 year span to continue normal modernization and + upgrading of its air force. The main question is when those planes will + be provided and in what political context.On November 23, the Senate voted 81–14 to provide Israel with $500 + million in military credits for Israel, half of which was earmarked + for the purchase of Phantom jets. (New York + Times, November 24, 1971, p. 1)

+
+ +
+ 267. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense Laird to President NixonSource: + Washington National Records Center, OSD Files: FRC 330–74–0115, Box 5, Israel. Secret; + Sensitive. Drafted by Noyes + on November 29. + Washington, November 30, 1971. + + SUBJECT + Mrs. Meir’s VisitMeir visited the United States November + 30–December 11, meeting with Nixon on December 2; see Document 268. $(PS,80$)and U.S. National + Security Interests + +

Mrs. Meir’s visit will test the + credibility of the U.S. commitment to UN + Resolution 242 and the Administration’s goal for a more evenhanded + Middle East policy. I urge continued restraint on provision of more F–4 + and A–4 fighter-bomber aircraft at this time.

+

A recently completed assessment by the Joint Chiefs of Staff supports + conclusions previously reached in Defense,Moorer attached the + appendix to a DIA study entitled + “DIA Intelligence Appraisal: The Arab-Israeli Military Balance” to a + memorandum to Laird that + day. (Washington National Records Center, OSD Files: FRC 330–74–0115, Box 5, Israel) + State,See footnote 3, Document 266. and CIA regarding substantial Israeli military + superiority. Israel has utilized the ceasefire period advantageously to + an extent not possible for Egypt. The Israelis concur that the Egyptians + have no foreseable capability to attack in force across the Canal. + “Deterrence” is hardly an issue because an Egyptian attack would + constitute an irrational act and the presence or absence of a few + additional Israeli aircraft would not be a predominant component in the + equation.

+

In the longer run, Israel will require replacement aircraft, and we + should not close the door to all future sales, or to assisting Israel to + produce its own “super + Mirage” aircraft—which could be in production by the end of 1974.

+

However, Israel’s immediate aircraft supply requirement is for political, + rather than military, advantage. Affirmative U.S. action would + symbolically underwrite her preferred option of standing pat, and would + serve as a practical repudiation of our own publicly announced + position.

+

In terms of Israeli as well as U.S. and NATO security interests, a new + commitment of aircraft would be counterproductive. The Soviets have + little to lose in a military sense from such a commitment, but its + disclosure would enable them to share with the Israelis the political + benefits of increased polarization in the Middle East. Apart from the + damage to U.S. credibility, a military price would be paid by NATO, the + U.S., and even the Israelis in the long run through the resulting + security implications of an increased Soviet presence in Egypt. In + meeting the need for a counterpart military supply response, the Soviets + would virtually be compelled to increase the numbers of their own + personnel in Egypt since Egypt, per se, cannot even absorb the Soviet + aircraft already available.

+

If we are to pursue our own broader national security interests, the U.S. + must retain some degree of initiative in the military supply sphere. + Likewise, we must be prepared to rely on our own military and political + assessments. Otherwise, the Israelis and the Soviets are left with the + initiative of wrecking any negotiations to avoid uncomfortable choices + or prevent a degree of depolarization that challenges either the Soviet + Middle East political posture or Israel’s image as an indispensable U.S. + cold war instrument.

+

In the event of an emergency requirement we could make aircraft and other + supplies immediately available from our own stocks either from Europe or + the U.S. The monitoring of the situation in the Eastern Mediterranean + has an exceptionally high priority and we are studying very carefully + our military posture in that area, both as it relates to the southern + flank of NATO and our own unilateral interests in the Middle East. + Therefore, I am confident should a military requirement become paramount + we can respond in a timely manner.

+

As expressed to you before, I believe that our military supply + relationship with Israel, in either the private or public context, is by + itself inadequate as the principal operative manifestation of U.S. + policy toward Israel. The coming UNGA + debateSee Document + 270. will provide another critical test. In the + same sense that our present military supply policy suggests a departure + from the old path of least resistance, our diplomatic stance needs to emphasize that our commitment + to Israel’s basic security is as unswerving as is our unwillingness to + live with her present hard line posture. I appreciate the problems that + will be generated by the resulting Israeli discomfort, but this price + appears justified beside our larger goals of peace and by the prospects + for productive dialogue during your Moscow visit.Nixon went + to Moscow in May 1972 for a summit with Soviet General Secretary + Brezhnev.

+ + + Melvin R. Laird + Printed from a copy that bears + Laird’s stamped + signature with an indication that he signed the original. + + +
+ +
+ 268. Editorial Note +

On December 2, 1971, in Washington, Israeli Prime Minister Golda Meir met with senior American + officials to discuss the delivery of Phantom jets to Israel—shipments of + which had not occurred since July—beginning with Secretary of State + William Rogers at noon. She + warned the Secretary that even though Sadat “might be afraid to go to war” and that the Soviet + leadership “might not want war,” Israel “had to be ready” nonetheless + since Sadat could become a “slave + to his own words” and get himself into the kind of trouble that might + draw the Soviet Union further into the region. Rogers agreed, and, thus, he argued + that the United States and Israel “had to leave way out for Sadat,” foremost by “achieving progress + toward peace” by “getting negotiations going” after the UN General Assembly convened. He continued + by saying that “fundamental U.S. support of Israel had not changed and + will not change,” but that the timing of such support “was of course + important” because the United States “did not want anything to make + beginning of negotiating process difficult.” Regarding future + negotiations, Meir reviewed the + differences between the U.S. and Israeli positions and remarked that the + U.S. stand on “the territorial aspects of peace” was “harmful” to + Israel. She also said that the United States seemed to be “punishing” + Israel by withholding Phantoms. After addressing these issues, Rogers ended their session with a + discussion of common U.S.-Israeli objectives. (Telegram 219343 to Tel + Aviv, December 4; National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, + NSC Files, Box 658, Country Files, + Middle East, Middle East Nodis/Cedar/Plus, Vol. IV) His talking points + had been coordinated with President Richard + Nixon and President’s Assistant for National Security + Affairs Henry Kissinger at a + meeting on the previous day, of which there is a tape recording. (Ibid., + White House Tapes, Oval + Office, Conversation No. 627–4)

+

After her conversation with Rogers, Meir met + with the President in the Oval Office from 3:05 to 4:52 p.m., with + Kissinger and Israeli + Ambassador Yitzhak Rabin + present. Nixon assured her of + his commitment to sending Phantoms to Israel and said that Assistant + Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs Joseph Sisco would finalize the + details of their delivery in meetings with Rabin scheduled for the end of the month. The President + also emphasized that his promise of future Phantom shipments did not + depend on a political settlement in the Middle East, foremost because of + his dedication to maintaining a military balance in the region. While + Meir was pleased that the two + issues were not “linked,” she and Rabin both expressed their concern over precisely when + the aircraft deliveries would re-start. Nixon and Kissinger avoided addressing the issue directly and said + only that Sisco and Rabin would negotiate a schedule. The + President added: “Let me say this. I do not want the delivery or + non-delivery of the planes to be a block to the frank discussions which + we should have on the political side. Now, I think that’s what we’ve + really come down to.”

+

The subject then turned to the Soviet Union, with Nixon confiding in Meir the offer that Soviet Foreign + Minister Andrei Gromyko had + privately made to him that the Soviet Union would stop sending arms to + Egypt—in addition to removing its forces from the country—in exchange + for Israeli withdrawal from Egyptian territory (see Document 251). The President explained that Gromyko “didn’t say this in front of + the others” and that “this has not gone to the bureaucracy,” and, thus, + she should not discuss the subject with her Cabinet. As a result of the + Soviet offer, Nixon advised + Meir: “You have the real + negotiations—that’s the other end of the spectrum [from proximity talks] + and that may be involving the Russians, because let’s face it, your + Egyptian friends can’t do a damn thing unless the Russians back them. + You know that, and I know that. Now having said that, we then move to + the ‘appearance’ of negotiations [under the Department of State’s + auspices]. That’s why I use the term appearance. If you were to give us + in this an interim period—don’t—just the appearance of talking to + us—it’s the appearance—I can assure you there won’t be any pressure. No + pressure. Because we will know that this is not—it doesn’t mean—I think + that if you give the appearance that too will cool. This whole business + of the Soviets.” Kissinger + added: “I think what we have to avoid is a Soviet misunderstanding.” In + his concluding remarks, Nixon + reassured her: “We’re not talking about the two of us getting together + and pressuring you.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, + White House Tapes, Oval Office, Conversation No. 628–16; the editors + transcribed the portions of the tape recording printed here specifically + for this volume) There is a tape recording of a meeting between + Nixon and Kissinger earlier that day, during + which they set the parameters for this discussion. (Ibid., Conversation + No. 628–2)

+
+ +
+ 269. Conversation Between President Nixon and the President’s Assistant for National + Security Affairs (Kissinger)Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White + House Tapes, Oval Office, Conversation No. 628–18. No classification + marking. The editors transcribed the portion of the tape recording + printed here specifically for this volume. Brackets indicate unclear + portions in the original recording or those omitted by the editors + except “[laughter]”, added for clarity. + Washington, December 9, + 1971, 4:55–5:15 p.m. +

Kissinger: This Sisco’s going to go crazy in these + other negotiations coming up with schemes. We’ve got to slow him + down.

+

Nixon: Well, how do we? Should we + let him into the deal? Never.

+

Kissinger: He’s too dangerous. + He’s too unreliable. Let me think about that, how I can slow him down. + We may just have to tell Rogers + you don’t want that much activity. I can get the Egyptians to slow down + a little bit through Dobrynin.

+

Nixon: [unclear]

+

Kissinger: He’s one of the + trickiest ones we’ve got.

+

Nixon: [unclear]

+

Kissinger: Well, I thought, Mr. + President—I was really—I was in awe, because you really—that was—there + were so many traps into which you could have fallen—

+

Nixon: Yeah.

+

Kissinger: —and every one of + which would—could have raised enormous political problems for you if—you + have no idea with what suspicion, and determination to have a showdown, + they [the Israelis] came to this country. And they are, actually, now, + from our domestic point of view, in a rather good position to put the + heat on us, at least.

+

Nixon: Yeah, sure they are.

+

Kissinger: And I think they were + floating on air, and we didn’t really give them anything other than what + we—

+ +

Nixon: Well, actually, Henry, + what we could get from the Russians, for them, is a hell of a lot.

+

Kissinger: Yeah. They won’t + think—

+

Nixon: If it’s in their long-term + interests.

+

Kissinger: They won’t think it’s + enough. And I have no illusions that I can negotiate an agreement + they’ll like.

+

Nixon: Yeah, I know, but + we’re—

+

Kissinger: And if we’ve got to + squeeze them, ’73 is a hell of a lot better than ’72—

+

Nixon: That’s right, that’s + right, that’s right. And the Russians understand that.

+

Kissinger: Oh, yes. I’ve got that + worked out with the Russians.

+

Nixon: But, then we can do it. + Then, in the meantime, you see, the Russians have got to keep the damned + Egyptians from screwing around.

+

Kissinger: What I’ve got to do is + to get the Russians to make some modifications in the Rogers proposal, so that we can tell + the Israelis we’ve met our part of the bargain. And that might be + possible. It won’t be as much as the Israelis think they can get, + but—

+

Nixon: What do you mean? The + Russians? They would make it privately to us?

+

Kissinger: Yeah.

+

[unclear]

+

Nixon: Yeah.

+

Kissinger: Well, there would be + improvements. So, I think no one here should object to our getting a + better deal than the—

+

Nixon: You really thought that + she was going to be tougher? [unclear]—

+

Kissinger: Oh, yes. Oh, yeah. + That’s why I went to see her yesterday; to condition her a little bit. + But, I wasn’t making much headway. I mean, she was much harder with me + than she was with you. But, I didn’t handle her so skillfully. And, of + course, I couldn’t [unclear]—

+

Nixon: You couldn’t commit so + much, I know.

+

Kissinger: I couldn’t commit + it—

+

Nixon: But I think I disarmed her + from the beginning by saying, “Now, look here: one track.”

+

Kissinger: Yeah.

+

Nixon: “Let’s do that and forget + it.” Now, let’s talk about the other [unclear] thing.

+ +

Kissinger: Well, when I said—what + was so effective was when I said there is this relationship between + [unclear] this I do for the balance. [laughter] Let’s just get that out + of the way. I mean—

+

Nixon: Yeah.

+

Kissinger: —you were sort of—

+

Nixon: Yeah.

+

Kissinger: —overruling what I had + said.

+

Nixon: Yeah. Yeah. Yeah.

+

Kissinger: It was a terribly + effective way, because it showed that you had gone beyond the + government.

+

Nixon: Um-hmm. Yeah. Which, + still, is true.

+

Kissinger: Which is true.

+

Nixon: But, we know, we know that + this is the reason why, frankly, the—the—the—Bill’s and Sisco’s scheme will not frighten them. + They know that apart from the American political situation, that + American security requires that we not allow the Russians to change the + balance of power in the Mideast. That’s always been the heart of the + problem.

+

Kissinger: That’s right.

+

Nixon: See, that’s what I know. + So, they know damn well, that isn’t credible. But, if a Democrat were + sitting here, they know it would not be credible, because the Democrats + are going to depend on the Jewish vote.

+

Kissinger: Right.

+

Nixon: I, as one who doesn’t + depend on the Jewish vote, they know it’s not credible, because they + know that I won’t let the balance of power be changed. And I think being + quite honest with them about that helps a great deal.

+

Kissinger: That’s right.

+

Nixon: Isn’t that an + incentive—?

+

Kissinger: If we can bring this + off now, we have, one, solved the security problem. Two, we will have to + use these negotiations, which drive the Jewish community crazy, and yet, + at the same time, have some real negotiations go on—

+

Nixon: Hmm?

+

Kissinger: —which, by early ’73, + will lead to a result.

+

Nixon: But you must keep that in + the separate channel. I don’t want any of that—

+

Kissinger: Oh, no.

+

Nixon: What is significant—I want + you to tell Dobrynin, “Quit + talking to Rogers about that + goddamn thing.” Has he been talking to Rogers—

+ +

Kissinger: No.

+

Nixon: —about the Mideast?

+

Kissinger: Well, yes, he talked + about—

+

Nixon: I, I just have to be rough + on that. I said, “Now, if it’s raised, you just ask what it’s all + about.” But, I said [unclear]

+

Kissinger: No, we’ve got to + discipline Dobrynin on that.

+

Nixon: Yeah, Dobrynin. Dobrynin has just got know that for this thing to work, + we’ve got to have that, that two-channel situation.

+

Kissinger: Yeah.

+

Nixon: Because, you know, + Dobrynin likes to talk to + everybody and report back to his government. Now, now—because, you see, + if Bill gets involved in this part—

+

Kissinger: No, no, if—

+

Nixon: —he’ll get involved on the + Hill.

+

Kissinger: No, Bill will do what + he did with the others. You see, first of all, Mr. President, my + strategy will be to waste as much time as possible, because—so that if + there is an interim settlement, you’ll make it at the summit.

+

Nixon: Sure. I should do + both.

+

Kissinger: And, imagine that out + of the summit, there comes SALT, an interim arrangement in the Middle + East, trade, and, maybe, one or two other things. And on this basis, I + can now talk cold turkey to Dobrynin. I’ll tell him, “If Vietnam blows up in this + interval, the Middle East negotiation is dead.”

+

Nixon: Sure. Your feeling is that + they want a Middle East settlement, for: one, they don’t want a + confrontation with us; two, they want—they don’t want the burden of the + Egyptians; three, they don’t want trouble with us, particularly while + they have to deal with the Chinese—

+

Kissinger: Fourth—

+

Nixon: And they think that + China—they don’t want the Chinese messing in the Mideast, is that + it?

+

Kissinger: They think that if + [unclear]

+

Nixon: That’s just because + [unclear]

+

Kissinger: That’s right. If there + is no settlement, say, within two years, the Chinese will take over + their position in the Middle East.

+

Nixon: You think so?

+

Kissinger: Yeah.

+

Nixon: I see. Because, they—

+

Kissinger: They’ll radicalize the + whole area.

+

Nixon: They’ll radicalize it. So, + that’s why they want [unclear]

+ +

Kissinger: And that—what’s even + worse, the Russians—the Chinese may drive them into confrontation with + which they have [unclear] for issues the Chinese face. The Chinese, on + the other hand, are terrified that there’ll be a Middle East deal, + because on the way to the airport, that Marshal who was taking Lin + Biao’s place said to me, “We know the Russians want to make a deal with + you in the Middle East, so that they can throw everything against us.” + So, this is the predicament of the China—of the Russians. And we may + just pick it off. Now, it will require some painful things early in ’73, + but I—

+

Nixon: [unclear] Lin Biao’s—

+

[unclear exchange]

+

Kissinger: Mr. President—

+

Nixon: [unclear] but they’ve got + to in their own interest. In the end, they’re going to lose. See? + [unclear] I’d pit the whole world against them.

+

Kissinger: Mr. President, I have + always said, at the right moment, we’ve got to put it to Israel.

+

Nixon: Yeah. Yeah.

+

Kissinger: As it happens, now + could be the right moment.

+

Nixon: [unclear] at the same + time.

+

Kissinger: At this moment it + would lead to a war.

+

Nixon: Hell, yes.

+

Kissinger: Next year, or well + into ’73.

+

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to the Middle East.]

+
+ +
+ 270. Telegram From the Department of State to the White HouseSource: National Archives, + Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC + Files, Box 1166, Saunders Files, Middle East Negotiations Files, + Middle East—Jarring Talks, + December 1–14, 1971. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Sisco, cleared in IO/UNP, and approved by Sisco. Repeated to USUN. + Washington, December 13, 1971, + 1713Z. +

223761. Tosec 21. Please pass Peter Johnson in the Azores for Secretary + Rogers.Rogers + accompanied the President to the Azores December 13–14 for meetings + with French President Pompidou. For Secretary from Sisco.

+ +

1. We expect a vote on the Middle East resolution within the next two or + three hours and I want to tell you, as a follow up to our conversation + on Sunday,December 12. No record of the + meeting has been found. where matters presently stand and my + recommendation.

+

2. The resolution is essentially the same as the one you reviewed on + Sunday (septel).Reported in telegram 223760 + to the White House, December 13. (National Archives, RG 59, Central + Files 1970–73, POL 27–14 ARAB–ISR) The UN General Assembly adopted Resolution 2799, which had + been proposed by 21 members, on the evening of December 13 by a + recorded vote of 79 to 7, with 36 abstentions. The United Kingdom, + Egypt, France, Jordan, Lebanon, and the Soviet Union voted for the + resolution; Israeli voted against it; the United States and Syria + abstained. The resolution reaffirmed the inadmissibility of + acquisition of territory by force, set forth the principles for a + just and lasting peace in the Middle East, and called for the + reactivation of Jarring’s + Mission. The text of the resolution is printed in Yearbook of the United Nations, 1971, pp. 176–177, and + Bush’s report on its + adoption was sent in telegram 4996 from USUN, December 14. (Ibid., Nixon Presidential + Materials, NSC Files, Box 1166, + Saunders Files, Middle East Negotiations Files, Middle + East—Jarring Talks, + December 1–14, 1971)

+

3. As you know, Egyptians are pressing us to vote affirmatively, whereas + Israelis have made a major pitch to have us vote negatively.Regarding the General Assembly debate, Eban told Bush on December 7 that Israel + and the United States would have to “make best of situation” and + prevent “certain things from happening” rather than trying to + “achieve any specific steps.” Eban was adamant that: 1) there be no changes to + Security Council Resolution 242; 2) that Israel was under no + “obligation” to “accept Egyptian interpretation” of Jarring’s February aide-mémoire; + and 3) that there be no “support for sanctions.” (Telegram 4826 from + USUN, December 7; ibid., Box + 658, Country Files, Middle East, Middle East Nodis/Cedar/Plus, Vol. + IV) The Department instructed Bush to tell Eban that it agreed on the issue of Resolution 242 + and sanctions, but that “it is clear that any resolution which + omitted all reference to Jarring memorandum would be non-starter for + Egyptians and would obtain virtually no support in assembly.” + (Telegram 221645 to USUN, December + 9; ibid., Box 1166, Saunders Files, Middle East Negotiations Files, + Middle East—Jarring Talks, + December 1–14, 1971) Eban + responded to Bush’s + presentation on December 9 by saying that he “appreciated that + parliamentary reasons may dictate need for something” but feared + that a “call might be made for Israel to respond to Jarring.” (Telegram 4900 from + USUN; ibid., RG 59, Central + Files 1970–73, POL 27–14 ARAB–ISR) The debate was held in plenary + sessions December 3–14. See Yearbook of the United + Nations, 1971, pp. 170–175. While resolution in + septel was originally sponsored by 18 countries, including twelve + Africans, we understand four of the Africans have withdrawn their + sponsorship. Since then, Egypt has picked up a few other non-Africans + and the sponsorship is around 23. They will probably be able to get at + least 65 votes for this resolution. The Africans have suggested some + changes to the Egyptians to bring their resolution more in line with its + own report.A Committee of Ten African Heads + of State conducted an inquiry on behalf of the OAU and submitted + proposals to the Secretary General aimed at breaking the impasse in + the Middle East. See ibid., pp. 169–170. Whether Senegal or + other Africans are submitting amendments or not is problematical. The + important thing is that some difference has occurred within the African + group and this will probably be + reflected by some abstentions among them though how many is very + difficult to say.

+

4. Yesterday, Bush put to Riad + the changes which you reviewed on Sunday. Without going into technical + details, you recall this was an attempt to move the references to the + February 8 Jarring memo,See footnote 2, + Document 205. the characterization of the Egyptian + and Israeli replies,For the Egyptian reply, + see footnote 4, Document 206; for the + Israeli reply, see Documents 211 and 213. and the call on Israel to reply + positively on the preambular paragraphs. As we expected, Riad turned + them down.

+

5. Candidly, I do not believe there is any satisfactory vote for us. + Whichever way we go, we will be criticized by one side or the other. Our + basic posture has been, as you know, that diplomatic alternatives will + be required in the post-GA period. The resolution is likely to carry + regardless of how the US votes.

+

6. I recommend an abstention coupled with the explanation of vote along + the following lines:

+

A. The US agrees with much of the resolution sponsored by the 23 + countries.

+

B. However we abstain in the belief that the resolution distorts the + balance of Res 242 and will not get + Jarring’s mission restarted + but rather would help to reenforce the impasse.

+

C. In our efforts we have tried to influence the substance of the + resolution in the direction of the OAU report. We regret that the + resolution does not approximate more closely that report.

+

D. We suggested changes in the resolution which would have maintained the + balance of Res 242 and, by referring to + Jarring’s initiative in the + preamble, would have reflected the reality that his initiative had not + succeeded and would have left open a wider range of options for + resumption of his efforts in the future. Regrettably our suggestions + were not acceptable.

+

E. I hope that all of us can draw one lesson from the Assembly + proceedings on this matter. The US continues to believe that the way to + practical progress towards a peaceful settlement and an interim + agreement is by means of quiet diplomacy. We do not believe that the + Assembly at this point or the SC + subsequently can make a practical contribution to this end at this time. + We hope that at the conclusion of these proceedings the parties + concerned will come to the common judgment that diplomacy must find a + way.

+

7. There remains one further contingency which we might have to consider. + The British on behalf of WEO’s may suggest to Riad this morning that sixth operative paragraph + be amended to read: Qte Calls upon Israel to make a response to the + Special Representative’s aide-mémoire of February 8, 1971, that would + enable the search for a peaceful settlement under the auspices of the + Special Representative to continue. Unqte This is essentially the + formulation contained in the SYG’s report and follows Jarring’s suggestion as a means of + finessing the impasse and giving the Israelis a means to get off the + hook. With this change, the resolution would undoubtedly receive a + greater majority of affirmative votes but it nevertheless leaves res + basically faulty in other respects noted above, and we would intend to + abstain in this contingency even though a smaller group will be with + us.

+

8. We voted against a similar GA res last + yearSee footnote + 8, Document 177. which was even less strong than + this one. Moreover, vote comes at time PM Meir is reporting at home that things have been patched + up between us, and affirmative vote would tend undermine publicly and + psychologically constructive results of President’s talk with PM + Meir. On other hand, I + recognize that Sadat will be + deeply disappointed and Arabs will play our vote as a backoff from our + support of the Jarring + initiative.

+ + + Irwin + + +
+ +
+ 271. Memorandum of ConversationSource: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files + 1970–73, DEF 12–5 ISR. Secret; Nodis; Cedar Plus. Drafted by + Stackhouse (NEA/IAI). The + meeting was held at 9 a.m. in Rabin’s residence. + Washington, December 29, 1971. + + PARTICIPANTS + Ambassador Yitzhak + Rabin + Minister Avner Idan + Assistant Secretary Joseph + Sisco + Mr. H. Stackhouse + +

Sisco said the President had + directed that discussions begin with Ambassador Rabin as a follow-up, through the + Ambassador, of the conversation the President and the Prime Minister had + had December 2,See Document 268. + the purpose being to work out an agreement as it relates to Phantoms and + Skyhawks.A copy of Kissinger’s December 28 memorandum + to Rogers directing him to + begin talks with Rabin is + attached to Document 272. On February 2, 1972, after the fifth and + final meeting between Sisco + and Rabin, Rogers sent Nixon a memorandum to update him + on the outcome of the talks. For Kissinger’s summary and analysis, see Document 277.

+

First, Sisco wanted to tell the + Ambassador what production schedules were under normal circumstances. If + we were to proceed on the basis of new production, that is, new Phantom + production with which Israel could tie in (we were talking here about 42 + Phantoms), this would mean that Israel could receive aircraft from new + production beginning in April, 1973. Regarding Skyhawks, on the basis of + our production line, delivery could begin from new production in July, + 1973, as an add-on to the 18 Skyhawks now scheduled for delivery + November 1972–June 1973. If we were to proceed on the basis of new + production schedules, there were contingencies that could affect + delivery, that is, that would dictate earlier delivery to Israel:

+

A. If we conclude that Soviet deliveries to the Arabs threaten to turn + the military balance against Israel;

+

B. If the Arabs resume the war of attrition or otherwise initiate active + hostilities;

+

C. If there were an interim agreement or some kind of agreement involving + Israeli withdrawal, it was obvious this would involve additional + military risk for Israel.

+

Sisco was aware, he continued, + that the Prime Minister had talked to the President in terms of a + delivery schedule beginning in 1972. Rabin interjected that that was what the Prime Minister + had told him. Sisco said that if + the Ambassador were going to be in town for a few more days he could + have gotten additional information as to what the possibilities were + regarding earlier deliveries. Sisco said he would be in touch with the Pentagon while + Rabin was away and would + see what was possible. Anything in the way of deliveries before the + dates he had described—that is deliveries other than those based on new + production—would have to be done by diversion from our own inventory. By + the time Rabin returned, he + hoped to be able to give him some indication as to what might be + possible, but he had not had the opportunity to explore this fully with + the Pentagon.

+

Sisco then recalled that the + Prime Minister and the President had also discussed political aspects of + the situation, the Jarring + mission, and the interim agreement. Regarding reactivation of the + Jarring mission, Sisco would summarize our position as + follows: We see advantage in some Jarring activity if for + no other reason than that it reinforces the continuance of the + ceasefire. It gives Cairo an opportunity to point to ongoing diplomatic + activity; such activity tends to blur deadlines which have been of + concern to the United States and Israel. So we see reactivation of the + Jarring mission as + desirable. If there were some new response to Jarring from Israel which would take + into account, for example, the OAU approach,See footnote 5, Document 270. + this would be helpful not only in reinforcing the ceasefire’s + continuance but in creating a more satisfactory climate generally. + Sisco expressed the hope + that Israel would look at this.

+

Regarding the interim agreement, Sisco went on, our position remains that we remain + available to the parties if they desire it. On November 1 the Prime + Minister had asked Ambassador Barbour for clarifications.See footnote 2, Document + 263.

+

The first clarification requested was with respect to aircraft. In this + regard, Sisco had said what he + could say at this time.

+

The second clarification was regarding the six points the Secretary had + outlined in his address at the UNGA.See footnote 3, Document 255. On + this, our position was described clearly in the Secretary’s interview in + the November 22 issue of U.S. News and World + Report, in which the Secretary said:

+

“I outlined in my (United Nations) General Assembly speech a few weeks + ago the six areas where there are differences. I want to make clear we + have made no proposals of our own and we have not adopted any + substantive position on any of these six parameters that I outlined. We + have no blueprint of our own that we have put forward.

+

“Both sides have put forward some positive ideas; both sides adhere to + certain points strongly, and both sides will have to make adjustments in + their positions if an interim agreement is to be achieved.

+

“There are a number of difficulties, but I would single out one in + particular: the nature of any Egyptian presence east of the Canal. On + this key point, I also want to make clear that both sides hold strong + views, one insisting that military forces cross and the other taking an + opposite view. While I expressed in my general debate speech the hope + that this and other points might prove reconcilable, I want to make + clear that we have taken no substantive position. The fact that I hope + the reconciliation is possible should not be understood to mean that we + have made a judgment or expressed a substantive view on how it should be + resolved. That is a matter for the parties.”

+

This was our response on this point.

+ +

Sisco said the third + clarification related to:

+

(a) whether the U.S. agrees that negotiations for an interim settlement + are basically different from negotiations for an overall settlement; + and

+

(b) what role the U.S. would play in these negotiations.

+

As to (a), we do not believe there should be any preconditions for + entering into negotiations in close proximity. As far as we were + concerned the principle of no imposed settlement applies to an interim + agreement as it does to an overall settlement. As a minimum, the + objective of close proximity talks should be to reinforce the ceasefire; + therefore, the pace of these talks should be geared to avoid false + deadlines resulting in new crises.

+

As to (b), the U.S. will seek to identify common ground between the + positions of the two sides and use our good offices with both parties to + help them develop such common ground. Israel can be assured that we will + consult fully step-by-step with it in the spirit of the special + relationship that exists between our two countries.

+

Now in light of these clarifications that we have provided, we seek + confirmation that Israel is now prepared to enter into the negotiations + at close proximity suggested earlier by the United States + Government.

+

Sisco then said that we requested + that Israel review the “Minute of Oral Discussion” of August 2, + 1971See footnote + 5, Document 245. (this was the paper, he noted, he + had left with the Prime Minister) and, in particular, point one of that + paper dealing with the relationship of the interim agreement with the + final settlement. At this point Sisco said he wanted to say a word about the Egyptian + position. We have had no new indication of a change in the Egyptian + position regarding an interim agreement. The last formal conveyance by + the Egyptians to us, Sisco + continued, linked the beginning of proximity talks with a further reply + on the part of Israel to the February 8 memorandum of Jarring. When the U.S. first + approached Egypt in October regarding talks in close proximity the + Egyptian reaction was positive. We did not press for a formal, + categorical, 100 percent acceptance of the proximity talk proposal + because we wanted to be sure Israel would go along. We had suggested to + Israel a specific time and place for such talks. But in view of Israel’s + reservations, we did not carry the matter further with Egypt. We wanted + Israel to know precisely what our understanding was of the Egyptian + position on close proximity talks. The last privately conveyed Egyptian + position shortly before the opening of the Middle East GA debate (in mid-December) was one of + linkage between proximity talks and a further Israeli reply to the + Jarring February 8 + memorandum.

+ +

Finally, if Israel was ready to proceed to proximity talks, Sisco said, we would appreciate any + thoughts it might have as to time and place.

+

Sisco said we had chosen to + convey all of this to the GOI and to + have Rabin carry this back + personally in order to diminish the risk of any leaks. It was essential + that there be no government leaks and speculation as it related to these + talks and in particular as it related to military assistance.

+

There was a technical point Sisco + wanted to mention. In the President’s discussion with the Prime Minister + she had referred to F4Fs. Rabin + said that this was a two-seat trainer not equipped for fighting but + which the Israelis wanted to equip for fighting. Rabin said she had said Israel wanted + during 1972 40 A4Es and 10 F4Fs. In 1973, in addition to the 18 A4Ns + already scheduled, Israel wanted another 32. As for Phantoms, Rabin continued, Israel wanted three + per month, with deliveries beginning early in 1972 and continuing in + 1973. Mrs. Meir had talked about + beginning deliveries in January. Rabin said that on the political side of Sisco’s presentation he preferred not + to say anything at the present, but he obviously would report fully to + Jerusalem. On the military side, Rabin made clear in several ways Israel’s very strong + view that deliveries should begin in 1972 and that he could not agree to + a later delivery schedule. In short, Rabin again reiterated he would take what Sisco had said back to Israel and + Sisco in the meantime would + explore matters with the Pentagon. This is a start of talks, Sisco said.

+

Regarding handling of press queries on this meeting, Sisco and Rabin agreed that nothing would be + volunteered to the press. If there was any query from the press to + Rabin he would confirm that + a meeting had taken place and that there had been a regular, routine + exchange of views. If asked whether there had been any discussion of + clarifications, Rabin said he + would “stay out of it.”

+

In closing comments Sisco asked + that General Zeira not raise these matters with the Pentagon in the + interim. This was being held very closely within the USG. Rabin reassured Sisco on this point.

+ +

+ Attachment +

+ + F4E DELIVERY SCHEDULE + + 1972 + 1973 + + + Feb 2 + Feb 2 + + + Apr 2 + Apr 2 + + + Jun 2 + May 4 + + + Aug 2 + Jun 4 + + + Oct 2 + Jul 4 + + + Dec 2 + Aug 2 + + + 12 + Sep 4 + + + + Oct 2 + + + + Nov 2 + + + + Dec 4 + + + + 30 + + + TOTAL = 42 + +
+

NOTE: Majority of aircraft incorporate leading edge slats

+
+ +
+ 272. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of Defense for + International Security Affairs (Nutter) to Secretary of Defense LairdSource: Washington National Records Center, OSD Files: FRC 330–76–0197, Box 66, + Israel. Secret; Sensitive. A stamped notation on the memorandum + reads: “Sec Def has seen, 2 Jan 1972.” + Washington, December 30, 1971. + + SUBJECT + President’s Decision on Aircraft for Israel + +

By memorandum of 28 December Dr. Kissinger has directed Secretary Rogers to initiate immediate + discussions with Ambassador Rabin to conclude an agreement by the U.S. to deliver + A–4s and F–4s on a regular monthly schedule beginning February + 1972.Kissinger’s memorandum is attached but not + printed. In a footnote the memorandum indicates that the + President received “without contradiction” Mrs. Meir’s request for delivery of three + F–4s per month from February + 1972 through December 1973—a total of 69 aircraft; and delivery of an + additional 82 A–4s during the same period. We note, however, that the + memorandum itself does not specify numbers of aircraft or a precise + delivery schedule.

+

Dr. Kissinger’s directive raises + several serious problems:

+

a. It was addressed to Secretary Rogers and not to yourself—yet it in effect gives away + DoD assets.

+

b. As was the case in the August 1970 and December 1970 A–4 sales + decisions, it is physically impossible for the Navy to begin delivery of + A–4s by February 1972 in the configuration Israel insists on. + Modification takes at least three to six months.

+

c. The only possible source for either A–4s or F–4s between now and + November 1972 (for A–4s) and March of 1973 (for F–4s), when aircraft + previously ordered for Israel become available, is to divert them from + U.S. operational units. As has been repeatedly emphasized by the Air + Force and Navy, and officially endorsed by the JCS, any diversion from + short supply U.S. inventories would have a serious adverse impact on + U.S. capabilities.

+

d. Mrs. Meir’s request is an + inflated one, which exceeds Israel’s previous requests (by 24 F–4s) and + clearly exceeds Israel’s short term requirements. As you will recall the + Chiefs have already forwarded to you a carefully worked-out force + modernization sales program for Israel, recommending sale of 63 F–4s and + 60 A–4s through CY 1975, with all sales coming from new production. + Attached is a summary chart showing Israel’s original and new requests, + plus copies of the JCS proposal, and a proposal forwarded by Mr. + Packard to Mr. Sisco show-ing how Israel’s original + requests could be met from new production.Attached but not printed.

+

The Air Force, Navy and Chairman’s office are deeply concerned by the + implications of Dr. Kissinger’s + directive, as am I. The adverse consequences for U.S. force readiness + and for our own national security objectives in the Middle East are + obvious. Accordingly, I recommend that this subject be discussed with + the principals concerned after Monday morning’s staff meeting.The minutes of the meeting, which occurred at + 9:30 a.m. on January 3, 1972, are in the Washington National Records + Center, OSD Files, + DB–TS–99–006. The Secretary of the Navy, Secretary of the Air + Force, Chief of Naval Operations, Chief of Staff, Air Force and the + Chairman will all be prepared to address the subject at that time. In + the meantime, Air Force and Navy are preparing an assessment of the + impact of the proposed program, together with various alternatives open + to us. These will be available by Monday morning.

+ +

Finally, I recommend you call Secretary RogersAccording to a + January 3 letter to Rogers + from Laird, the two spoke on + December 31, and after the conversation, the Secretary of Defense + had his staff study the possibility of delivering aircraft to Israel + beginning February 1972, as Meir had requested. Laird wrote: “It is our conclusion that we can, to a + large measure, meet the delivery schedules requested by Mrs. + Meir. However, based on + our experience with the Israeli requests over the past months I + believe some modifications to her stated schedule would be + acceptable, and still be responsive to the President’s directive.” + He attached Meir’s delivery + schedule and the Department of Defense’s alternatives for Rogers to examine and argued that + the alternative schedules would alleviate the “delivery and + production problems” that the United States would encounter if it + rigidly adhered to what Meir + wanted. (Ibid., ISA Files: FRC 330–75–0155, Box 3, Israel) At a + joint Department of State–Department of Defense meeting on January + 4, Sisco approved “in + principle” proposing the alternative schedules to Rabin, pending Rogers’s approval. (Ibid.) + and ask that he delay meeting with Ambassador Rabin until you have had a chance to + review Dr. Kissinger’s + memorandum and prepare recommendations.

+ + + G. Warren Nutter + + +
+ +
+ 273. Letter From President Nixon to King Hussein of JordanSource: National Archives, Nixon Presidential + Materials, NSC Files, Box 797, + Presidential Correspondence 1969–1974, Jordan—King Hussein. No classification marking. + The letter was transmitted to the Embassy in Amman in telegram 6707, + January 13. (Ibid., Box 617, Country Files, Middle East, Jordan, + Vol. VIII) + Washington, January + 12, 1972. + + Your Majesty: + +

I am always pleased to hear from such a close and valued friend and have + read your letterHussein’s letter was transmitted in telegram 5561 + from Amman, December 10, 1971. (Ibid., RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, + POL 15–1 JORDAN) with great concern.

+

Your letter emphasizes Jordan’s urgent need for financial support, while + at the same time acknowledging our current legislative + difficulties.Before adjourning for the + year on December 17, 1971, Congress passed a stopgap resolution to + extend until February 22, 1972, the nation’s foreign aid program, + the size of which had become the subject of controversy and debate. + At the time of this exchange of letters between Nixon and Hussein, Congress was expected to + approve an appropriations bill that included $1.2 billion less than + the administration had requested. (New York + Times, December 18, 1971, p. 1) As a result of these + difficulties, we have had to delay action with regard to further + financial assistance to several of our friends including Jordan. While + our means for responding to world-wide needs continue to be extremely limited, I am pleased to + inform you that we can provide you immediately with an additional $15 + million. Regarding the level of possible assistance during 1972,Saunders informed Kissinger in a January 24 memorandum that, because + of public reports that Jordan had transferred F–104 aircraft to + Pakistan during the most recent war with India, it had become + “immediately ineligible” for further aid under the Foreign + Assistance Act. For Jordan to receive the aid that the Nixon administration had intended, + the President would have to sign a waiver that allowed Jordan’s use + of the act’s funds as justified by its importance to the security of + the United States. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, + NSC Files, Box 617, Country + Files, Middle East, Jordan, Vol. VIII) you can be sure that + the United States is aware of the urgency of this matter and that we + will communicate with your officials about it shortly.

+

I continue to follow developments in Jordan closely and as you know + attach great importance to our close and friendly relationship.

+

With warmest personal regards,

+

Sincerely,

+ + + Richard Nixon + + +
+ +
+ 274. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department + of StateSource: National + Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1166, Saunders Files, Middle East + Negotiations Files, Middle East—Jarring Talks, January 1–15, 1972. Confidential; + Exdis. Repeated to Amman, + Beirut, Tel Aviv, Paris, London, Moscow, Jerusalem, and + Cairo. + New York, January 12, 1972, 0004Z. +

102. Subj: Bush-Jarring Meeting January 11. Ref: State + 3029.Telegram 3029 to Amman and Moscow, + January 5, conveyed the Department’s disappointment that Jordan’s + Foreign Minister was willing to delay the UN Security Council’s meeting on Jerusalem for only a + week: “We understand Jordanian concern at continuing to be ‘left + alone’ in context Arab-Israeli negotiations and its need at this + point to demonstrate its involvement in political settlement + efforts. At the same time, we do not want to get into position of + appearing to be taking the lead in stimulating Jarring efforts with Jordanians + and Israelis, since this could complicate our own efforts, + particularly with Israelis, on interim agreement.” (Ibid., RG 59, + Central Files 1970–73, POL 27–14 ARAB–ISR)

+

1. Bush called on Jarring AM Jan 11 to ascertain + latter’s current thinking. Jarring was suffering from one of his gloomy phases.

+ +

2. Jarring first denied AFPAgence France-Presse. reports from + Moscow that he had been holding round of talks there prior to his + departure. He had routinely received new Egyptian Ambassador and had + seen Kuznetsov but this did not reflect any initiative on his part.

+

3. Jarring then expressed + unhappiness over Israeli campaign to blame him for Feb 8, 1971, + memorandum.See Document 211. Ideas in that memo were fully + consistent with US positions yet Israel had been at pains to give + impression that US no longer supports him. Jarring also indicated he disturbed over US abstention + on GA + Res 2799(XXVI).See footnote 4, Document + 270. + Bush assured him that there no + question but that US continues to support his mission.Two weeks later, Sisco briefed Jarring in detail on the “state-of-play” of U.S. + efforts to achieve an interim settlement between Egypt and Israel. + (Telegram 15308 to USUN, January + 27; National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 658, Country Files, + Middle East, Middle East Nodis/Cedar/Plus, Vol. V) We + abstained because we were concerned not to worsen the existing + impasse.

+

4. Jarring also indicated that he + concerned because Four Powers no longer meeting.The Four Powers met twice in both June and July and + once in both August and September in 1971. The meetings were marked + almost entirely by Soviet accusations—and U.S. denials—that Israeli + intransigence, with the support of the United States, was + undermining efforts to achieve a settlement between Egypt and + Israel. (Telegram 1495 from USUN, + June 4; telegram 1700 from USUN, + June 25; telegram 1893 from USUN, + July 14; telegram 2023 from USUN, + July 27; and telegram 2334 from USUN, August 20; all ibid., Boxes 1163–1164, Saunders + Files, Middle East Negotiations Files, Middle East—Jarring Talks) The Four Powers had + last met on September 9, 1971, a description of which is in telegram + 2604 from USUN, September 10. + (Ibid., Box 1165, Saunders Files, Middle East Negotiations Files, + Middle East—Jarring Talks, + September 1–October 1, 1972) This contributed to impression + his mission no longer actively supported by Four. Bush said main problem with Four + Power meeting was to know what could constructively be done.

+

5. There had not yet been opportunity for Jarring to talk to new SYGKurt Waldheim was + appointed Secretary General for a term that began on January 1, + 1972. who, he noted, had stated on TV that he had some ideas + on ME which he wished to discuss with + his Special Rep. Jarring said he + would call in Tekoah and + el Zayyat in near future but + unless Israel was willing to make some kind of statement that would + break the impasse, he was pessimistic. In response to question, + Jarring said this did not + necessarily have to be a positive reply to his Feb 1971 memo. The FonMin of Senegal during GA had shown the way. It could be a + statement that Israel does not desire to annex Arab territory but that + it desires secure and recognized boundaries. On other hand, if Israel + merely repeats that it will withdraw to secure and recognized boundaries + to be determined in course of + negotiations this would make it impossible for Egyptians to resume + discussions.

+

6. Jarring mentioned that + Jordanian Amb had also seen him in Moscow and had made clear that GOJ wants an aide-mémoire similar to the + one handed Egypt last Feb. He had taken non-committal attitude and had + said he must be careful not to raise entire Palestine question. (He said + nothing about needing green light from USG.) Jarring said + he would also call in Toukan but latter would have to convince him that + such a step would be useful.

+

7. Bush indicated that this + decision was entirely one for Jarring and the parties to make. At same time, we shared + his misgivings about another aide-mémoire.

+

8. In discussion of Toukan’s imminent return to Amman, Bush said Toukan told us he would be + replaced by Sharaf. Jarring (protect) said this would be + ideal from his standpoint but that he was told in Moscow Toukan would be + replaced by Munim Rifai.

+

9. Jarring said he planned to be + available to parties in NY for indefinite future. He would have to + return to Moscow Feb 8 for a couple of days during visit of his FonMin but otherwise he would be at + UNHQ.

+ + + Bush + + +
+ +
+ 275. Telegram From the Department of State to the Interests Section in + EgyptSource: National + Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 658, Country Files, Middle East, Middle + East Nodis/Cedar/Plus, Vol. V. Secret; Nodis; Cedar Plus. Drafted by + Seton Shanley (NEA/EGY), cleared in NEA/EGY, and approved by + Sisco. Repeated to Tel + Aviv, Amman, Beirut, London, Paris, Moscow, and USUN. All brackets are in the + original except “[May]”, added for + clarity. + Washington, January 22, 1972, + 0117Z. +

12682. Subj: Mid East.

+

1. On Jan 20 Egyptian Interests Section Chief Dr. Ghorbal accompanied by Counselor + ShararaYousef Sharara. called on + Assy Secy Sisco. Ghorbal noted he had just returned from + Cairo where he had seen all appropriate officials up to and including + President Sadat and noted that + what he had to say was on instruction. Sisco offered to bring him up to date since their last + conversation and noted that Jarring had announced Jan 20 his intention to go to Africa for + consultations and will then see if talks under his auspices can be + restarted. Sisco said we + continue to support Jarring + Mission and would welcome any progress Jarring can make. With reference to the US role in any + talks on an interim agreement Sisco said we were unable to tell from Sadat’s Jan 13 speechIn the speech, Sadat criticized the United States for, according to + reports, its decision to sell Phantoms to Israel as well as for + enabling Israeli territorial ambitions in the Middle East. + Furthermore, he warned the Nixon administration that its support for Israel + jeopardized U.S. oil interests in the Arab world. (New York Times, January 14, 1972, p. 1) Marshall Wiley reported from + Cairo, however: “Sadat speech + on Jan 13 leaves door open for further USG effort to arrange proximity talks. Sadat emphasized his willingness to + seek negotiated settlement and did not rule out possibility of + future US role in spite of his attacks on US policy and on + Secretary.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 658, Country Files, + Middle East, Middle East Nodis/Cedar/Plus, Vol. V) if the + door to an interim agreement was closed but have drawn no conclusions + from the speech. He noted, however, that we might soon be raising + prospect of interim talks with Egypt.

+

2. Sisco recalled that when US + had proposed interim talks in October 1971 Egyptian response was + positive whereas Israelis were neither positive nor negative. While + considerable time has since elapsed we have intensively consulted with + Israelis in the course of the last two weeks and hope soon to have their + assent to entering talks in proximity. At that point the US will notify + Egypt of this diplomatic opportunity and Egypt will face a decision. + Sisco said we shared Egypt’s + disappointment in lack of progress to date.

+

3. Sisco noted US did not + conceive of these talks in lieu of the Jarring talks but only as complementary to them and as a + first step toward full implementation of SC + Res 242. We continue to feel that an + interim agreement is feasible, that the Israeli and Egyptian positions + on an interim agreement are reconcilable and that our role has been and + will continue to be a constructive one. We recognized Egypt’s + disappointment and fact there had been some loss of confidence in US; + Egypt would have to decide itself whether we can play useful role. + Situation is admittedly currently more complicated than it was in Oct. + But Arab-Israel negotiations are a “history of lost opportunities.”

+

4. Sisco called Ghorbal’s attention to recent public + statements in Israel suggesting more forthcoming attitude toward interim + talks. He emphasized DefMin Dayan’s call for need to “compromise” and noted PM Meir’s more flexible recent statements. + Sisco said Israel continues + to be interested in an interim agreement. He said while the Arab world + assumption has been that an election year circumscribes US diplomatic + efforts this in fact not the case. President Nixon had declared this an era of + negotiations and the achievement of a peace settlement, even limited + partial one, in the Middle East would be popular domestically. Thus no + incorrect analyses of US position should be made.

+ +

5. Ghorbal thanked Sisco for completing the picture. He + asked Sisco if he could be told + anything specific on the details of recent US discussions with Israel on + an interim agreement. Sisco said + that the details are not yet buttoned down and that he would defer any + discussion of them until such time as he could be more precise. He said + that both Egypt and Israel have been anxious to know where US stands but + that if the US role is to be constructive the US cannot take a stand on + the issues before the parties enter into negotiations. Sisco assured Ghorbal that US will be active when the + time comes. Sisco emphasized + neither side can attain its desired preconditions before negotiations + begin and said he wished Cairo to reflect on this fact. We found it + difficult to see an alternative to talks on an interim agreement at this + time.

+

6. Ghorbal said that he was + distressed to hear Sisco use + phrase “no prior conditions” in context negotiations as this was an + Israeli thesis. Egypt felt it had to know what end of the road was, and + as far as Cairo was concerned this was overall peace settlement in + accordance with SC + Res 242. Ghorbal said it was important for Sisco to understand present mood in + Cairo. Cairo feels 1971 was a wasted year. The US itself had made 1971 a + year of decision and Secretary Rogers’ trip to Cairo last June [May] was an earnest of US endeavor to achieve peace in the + Middle East. But warmth engendered by the Secretary’s trip has not + totally evaporated. Egypt had said yes to everything US asked of it. + What more does Washington want, Egyptians are asking? Sadat had shown great patience and only + latterly had explained his and Egypt’s grievances against the US in + public fora. However Cairo feels that the opportunities lost in 1971 + were lost mostly through fault of US.

+

7. Ghorbal said that US praise for + various Egyptian positions taken in course of last year made only more + bitter the fact that US was renewing supply of Phantoms and Skyhawks to + Israel and now had signed arms licensing agreement with Israel. He said + that a significant portion of Egyptian society regarded these as + “bellicose actions” against Egypt and emphasized this feeling was held + from rank and file to policy levels. He called the Nov Arms Technology + AgreementThe memorandum of + understanding by which the United States agreed to provide technical + and manufacturing assistance to Israel’s arms industry. It + established “streamlined procedures” for American consideration of + Israeli arms requests without specifying which weapons the program + would include. Its signing in November was not announced at the + time. (New York Times, January 14, 1972, p. + 1) reminiscent of US court decision two years ago permitting + US citizens to fight in foreign armies without losing their US + citizenshipReference is probably to the + Supreme Court decision, reached on May 29, 1967, that prevented + Congress from passing laws that stripped U.S. citizens of their + nationality without their consent. The decision was based on the + specific case of a U.S. national who had voted in an Israeli + election and had had his citizenship revoked in 1960, but it dealt + broadly with Congress’s efforts to regulate the participation of + U.S. nationals in the foreign affairs of other countries. In the + case of Israel, the issue once again emerged in October 1969 when + the U.S. Embassy in Israel confirmed, in response to questions, that + the service of U.S. citizens in the Israeli armed forces would not + lead to the loss of their nationality. (New York + Times, October 21, 1969, p. 15) and said this allowed US citizen Jews to + fight side-by-side with the Israelis against Egypt. Why, Ghorbal asked, does US allow Israel to + drag the US into new commitments of far-reaching consequence? Not only + is the US building Israel’s own arsenal, he said, but the recent + agreement will allow Israel to export these arms and encourage + situations such as those which earlier occurred in the Sudan and in + Biafra.

+

8. Ghorbal said the USG had told Egypt that it had only + limited leverage with Israel but now Egypt wonders why US has + surrendered even this limited leverage. He noted US interests in the + Middle East were immense and cautioned that US policy decisions on the + Mideast should be based upon full appreciation of the situation as it + exists which was why he was going to such length on this occasion.

+

9. Continuing Ghorbal said Cairo + feels she has been fed nothing but generalities and semantics in the + last year and while she has received the praise of the US, Israel got + arms and assistance. Cairo no longer is prepared to believe that problem + is one of finding right formulae for peace settlement but rather + fundamental change not only in Israeli policy, but even more in US + policy. While US words mollify Egypt, US in practice is giving Israel + guns and butter. Record in last four years shows that when supplied with + more armaments Israel does not become readier to negotiate. Thus US + argument that it is giving weapons to Israel in order to induce Israel + to enter negotiations does not impress Cairo.

+

10. Ghorbal adverted to + announcement in Jan 20 press that Israel intended to establish an + Israeli city in the Gaza Strip and said this was but one further example + of lack of Israeli intent to withdraw. When President Nixon came to power Cairo’s assessment + had been that the US wanted better relations with Egypt. At that time he + noted Egyptian spokesmen were instructed to emphasize that the Phantoms + then being delivered to Israel had been contracted for during the + Johnson administration. This is no longer the case. US aid level to + Israel in 1971 was $600 million—a new high—and that $80 million was the + comparable figure for the Johnson administration.

+

11. Ghorbal emphasized that + picture he had drawn was by instruction brought to Asst Secy Sisco’s attention and said that what + must now be sought is peace in the Middle East based on security for + all. When the US approached Egypt, Egypt would bear this in mind. + However the US should bear in mind that in any approach to Egypt on an + interim agreement generalities will not suffice nor will ambiguous + phraseology. Either of + these will make Cairo think the time is once again being frittered away + in preservation of a ceasefire which in Cairo’s view is of limited + utility. Cairo’s feeling is that the ceasefire is all the United States + cares about.

+

12. Sisco replied that US feels + ceasefire is in the interests of both Israel and Egypt and that were the + ceasefire presently in existence our sole desideratum we would not now + be as active diplomatically as we are. He told Dr. Ghorbal that he appreciated and + understood his exposition of Cairo’s views and emphasized US remains + available and willing to play a constructive role should both parties so + desire. He said that US would not press Egypt to enter into interim + negotiations but when and if time came simply inform Egypt + straightforwardly, and frankly that the opportunity existed. Cairo would + have to make up its own mind.

+ + + Rogers + + +
+ +
+ 276. Telegram From the Department of State to the Interests Section in + EgyptSource: National + Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1166, Saunders Files, Middle East + Negotiations Files, Middle East—Jarring Talks, February 1–16, 1972. Secret; + Immediate; Nodis; Cedar Double Plus. Drafted by Atherton and Sterner, cleared by Sisco, and approved by Rogers and Kissinger. Repeated to Tel + Aviv. + Washington, February 12, 1972, + 1947Z. +

25304. For Greene from + Secretary.

+

1. Message below from Secretary to Sadat informs him of Israeli willingness to enter + proximity talks and asks Sadat + whether Egypt is itself prepared to enter such talks. We have been + considering timing and manner of this presentation, and have reviewed + question again in light Cairo 445.In + telegram 445 from Cairo, February 11, Greene recommended that he delay his presentation to + Ghaleb until February 14 + or 15, when he could do so alone—as opposed to doing so with the + Spanish Ambassador present, given the local diplomatic protocols + associated with Greene’s + having just assumed his post. (Ibid., Box 658, Country Files, Middle + East, Middle East Nodis/Cedar/Plus, Vol. V) On question + timing, one possibility would be to wait until Ghaleb-Ismail report is completed and we can see what Sadat says to ASU.Sadat addressed the Arab Socialist + Union on February 16, vowing to resign as President if Egyptians + lost confidence in him during the country’s “long political and + military struggle” to retake territory lost during the 1967 war with + Israel. He also remarked that the United States’s further commitment + to Israel in the form of Phantom and Skyhawk fighter jets had + prevented him from taking early military action to recover that + territory. (New York Times, February 17, + 1972, p. 4) We have already seen several indications, + however, that Egyptians are + expecting message from US, and we believe it important that Sadat be aware of and in position to + weigh option we are offering before he goes public. We also think this + is one occasion when there may be positive advantage in not rpt not + conveying message to Sadat + personally, but rather do so through either Ghaleb or Ismail. + Our reasoning here is that we would rather avoid precipitate + Presidential reaction in this case and let him give us considered + response through one of his subordinates (we would of course make it + clear we were available if Sadat + wished to talk about message).

+

2. We agree with Wiley that it + may be desirable to begin to do our business with FonMin + Ghaleb. On other hand, we have, + at Sadat’s specific request, been + conveying our messages to President through Ismail and we would not want sudden switch of procedure + on our part to be misinterpreted by Egyptians. Since you are to pay + courtesy call on Ghaleb Monday, + one way to handle this would be for you to inform Ghaleb that you have oral message from + Secretary to President Sadat and + would appreciate being informed whether Sadat preferred that message be conveyed through + Ghaleb or Ismail. You would, of course, need to + ask for private moment with him in view of fact Spanish Ambassador + accompanying you, and we do not want to reveal fact of this approach to + anyone at this time.

+

3. Seems to us foregoing procedure offers opportunity to put matter to + Ghaleb at earliest moment + without attracting undue attention, but we realize presence of Spanish + Ambassador could present complications and leave it to you to decide how + best to let Ghaleb know you have + message for Sadat and get his + advice as to channel through which to convey it. Secretary also wishes + you at time you see Ghaleb to + convey his appreciation to FonMin + Ghaleb for his recent message + (Cairo 421)Not found. that Quote all + endeavors Unquote toward establishing a just and lasting peace in the + Middle East will be appreciated and welcomed by Egypt.

+

4. You should convey verbatim following oral message from Secretary to + President Sadat (do not leave + anything on paper with Egyptians).

+

5. Begin message. As a result of our discussion + with the Israelis during past weeks,For a + summary, see Document 277. we now + have Israel’s agreement to enter talks in close proximity in a renewed + effort to reach agreement on an interim arrangement for partial + withdrawal of Israeli forces in Sinai and reopening of the Suez Canal. I am persuaded the + Israelis are now ready to negotiate actively and without preconditions + to see whether an interim agreement is possible.

+

6. When we first broached the idea of talks in proximity with you last + October,See footnote 5, Document 255. you said you found the + proposal appealing. I know, Mr. President, how disappointed you are that + the past year has not yielded greater results in terms of the progress + we all hoped for toward a peace settlement. I share this sense of + disappointment personally, but we are now offered a fresh opportunity, + and past disappointments should not keep us from testing it. The + experience of the past year leaves me convinced that the positions of + the two sides on an interim agreement leave room for reconciliation and + that an agreement is not out of the question.

+

7. Mr. President, the purpose of this oral message is not repeat not to + press you on this matter. We have no interest other than to help + facilitate an agreement between Egypt and Israel that meets the concerns + of both sides. I realize the situation is more complicated today than + last October, but I believe that a diplomatic option nevertheless is + available. We are prepared to seek to get talks underway, with Mr. + Sisco as go-between, at a + time and place agreeable to you. If you would care to we would be + pleased to have your views on the matter and particularly any thoughts + you might have on the time, place and level of negotiations which we are + prepared to discuss with Israel. I am personally satisfied that it is + desirable to pursue this effort, but I would understand if you feel you + want to take some time to reflect on these questions or to delay any + response until a later time.

+

8. I am aware, Mr. President, of your concern that any interim agreement + must not be considered an end in itself but rather the first step toward + a final peace settlement in accordance with Security Council Resolution + 242. This has also been our conception from the very beginning. You have + also indicated in your statements recently that Egypt looks to + Ambassador Jarring as the + principal focal point for further peace settlement efforts. If + Ambassador Jarring can find some + way to move ahead constructively with the parties on an overall peace + agreement, the US would welcome it. Such talks, as well as any the US + may conduct relating to an interim agreement, could be mutually + reinforcing.

+

9. If you believe it would be helpful, nothing need be said for time + being that this question of proximity talks has been broached to your + government, so that you may have ample opportunity to consider the + matter without feeling under any particular time deadline. We can understand if you should want to + discuss further the question of proximity talks with us out of the + public spotlight before reaching a decision and would be glad to + consider any other channel or means you might suggest.

+

10. Finally, Mr. President, I do not want the occasion to pass without + expressing to you my warm personal regards. I look back with pleasure + and appreciation upon the cordiality with which I was received by you + personally and your advisors last May. I know the situation now is more + difficult. Nevertheless, it is my hope that we can resume our + discussions on that foundation of good will and respect and in the same + spirit that prevailed at that time. End + message.Greene conveyed the Secretary’s + message on February 23; see footnote 3, + Document 278.

+

11. We recognize that Ghaleb or + Ismail may well respond to + foregoing by raising recent reports of US decisions on aircraft supply + and defense production arrangements for Israel and may ask how Egypt can + be expected any longer to deal through USG when it is Quote arming its enemy Unquote. If reply + raises question of US military supply to Israel, we should in most + dignified and low-key manner possible decline to enter into discussion + of this question. If circumstances are such that you feel it necessary + to respond, you should limit yourself to following comments:

+

A. Question of US military supply to Israel is aspect of US-Israeli + bilateral relations, just as Soviet supply to Egypt is aspect of + Soviet-Egyptian bilateral relations, and experience has shown that there + is no useful purpose served by USG and + Egypt getting into discussion or argument about this question with each + other.

+

B. Middle East arms supply relationships are facts of life with + dimensions which go beyond Arab-Israel problem. We are sure President + Sadat is aware that heavy + Soviet involvement in the area complicates matters for us.

+

C. In our view, efforts to improve US-Egyptian relations and to explore + possibilities for interim agreement and overall peaceful settlement are + worth pursuing on their own merits.

+

12. In view number of reports that Egyptians feel our talks with GOI have restricted US role as go-between, + you should make it clear to Ghaleb or Ismail + that we will be in a position to play a constructive role if Egypt + decides to enter into proximity talks. Delay in obtaining Israeli + agreement to talks during our intensive discussions with them was in + fact largely result of our insistence on retaining such flexibility. We + would intend obviously to consult with both sides but are not repeat not + barred from putting forth suggestions on ways of reconciling differences if this should prove + desirable.Saunders wrote a comment on this sentence: “Yes but—(1) Israelis have it in writing from + us that we will discuss any ‘suggestion’ with + them first. (2) Israelis have made it abundantly clear and in + writing that if they do not first agree with + anything we want to say to Egyptians it will be a non-starter. In + short, while we are not telling the Egyptians a lie nor are we + telling them the whole truth. Sisco may think he can outrun the implications but my bet is they will catch up with him + sooner rather than later.” At same time, hope you can get + across that principal purpose of exercise should be to get a real + negotiation (indirect) going between Egypt and Israel, not Egypt and US + Government.

+ + + Irwin + + +
+ +
+ 277. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security + Affairs (Kissinger) to President + NixonSource: National Archives, Nixon + Presidential Materials, NSC Files, + Box 658, Country Files, Middle East, Middle East Nodis/Cedar/Plus, + Vol. V. Secret; Nodis; Cedar Plus. Sent for information; outside + system. A stamped notation on the memorandum indicates the President + saw it. All brackets are in the original. + Washington, February 17, 1972. + + SUBJECT + Negotiations with Israel—Aircraft, Talks in Proximity + +

Secretary Rogers has sent you the + attached concluding report on Assistant Secretary Sisco’s talks with Ambassador + RabinDated February 2; attached but not printed. + Rogers’s January 14, 24, + and 27 reports to the President are ibid., RG 59, Central Files + 1970–73, DEF 12–5 ISR. The memorandum of conversation of the first + Sisco-Rabin meeting is Document 271. + The memoranda of conversation of their January 10 and 11 meetings + are in the National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, DEF 12–5 + ISR and POL 27–14 ARAB–ISR, respectively. on the provision of + aircraft (delivery schedules at Tab A) and on the talks in proximity + (Sisco-Rabin summary at Tab B).Tabs A and B are attached but not printed. + Mrs. Meir, with Cabinet approval, + has agreed to enter such talks. The following are the essential points + of the Secretary’s memorandum and attachments.

+

Aircraft

+

The Secretary reports that agreement has been reached with Israel on + delivery schedules for 42 Phantom and 82 Skyhawk aircraft and that an Israeli team is currently + discussing the details with Defense preparatory to concluding final + contracts.

+

The final delivery schedule for the Phantoms (Tab A) has been brought + into phase with Mrs. Meir’s + desires of two per month starting this month. [20 are scheduled for 1972 + and 22 for 1973.]

+

Agreement has also been reached on the provision of 82 A–4 Skyhawks. The + Secretary notes, however, there may be some mutually agreed upon + adjustments of their delivery schedule in the course of the present + technical discussions. The Israelis are interested in the option of + taking fewer of the older A–4E model this year in order to receive more + of the new A–4N model from the production line in early 1974.

+

Talks in Proximity

+

On November 1 Mrs. Meir requested + certain clarifications pending Israeli agreement to enter talks in + “proximity” on an interim canal settlement.See Document 263. In the course of + Sisco-Rabin discussions, the Secretary says + that our clarifications have been provided in a manner which provides us + with sufficient scope to play a “constructive role” in the event the + talks get started. The Secretary informs you of his intention to “avoid + false deadlines, proceed at a deliberate pace, avoid confrontations with + the Israelis on various issues, avoid putting forth American blueprints + to resolve the problem.” The following summarizes the Israeli requests + and the US “clarifications”:

+

—Aircraft: As noted above, requests met in full as + to types, numbers and delivery schedules.

+

—Six Points of Secretary Rogers’ UNGA + Speech:See footnote 3, Document 255. These represent areas of + difference between the parties. The US has “made no proposals of our own + and we have not adopted any substantive position” on any of the six + points. We have “no blueprint.” Both sides “will have to make + adjustments” in their positions to achieve an interim settlement. A + particularly difficult problem is “the nature of any Egyptian presence + on the East of the Canal.” While the US hopes this might prove + reconcilable, the US has taken “no substantive position,” nor should our + hope for agreement on this point be interpreted that we have made a + judgment or expressed a substantive view on how it should be + resolved.

+

—Position of the US on (a) whether it agrees that + negotiations for an interim settlement are basically different from + those for an overall settlement, and (b) what role it would play in + these negotiations:

+

(a) The US believes there should be no preconditions laid down for talks + in proximity. The principle of no imposed settlement applies both to an interim and overall + settlement. While we have expressed hope that Israel could find it + possible to reply to Jarring’s + memorandum of February 1971See footnote 2, Document 205. in a + way permitting him to relaunch his mission, we agree Israel should not + be expected to change its position—as Sadat insists—in order to begin talks in proximity. We + will support this view with the Egyptian Government.

+

(b) The US will use its “good offices” to help the parties develop areas + of common ground. In performing this role with Egypt, we will “consult + fully with Israel on a step-by-step basis with respect to any ideas we + may explore with the Egyptians and will make clear to the latter they + are not proposals, are not binding on Israel and are strictly ad + referendum.” The US “will not forward to Egypt, nor will it support any + suggestions or proposals” without making every effort to seek and to + achieve full prior understanding” with Israel. Furthermore, the US will + not forward to Egypt any proposal on behalf of Israel without prior + agreement. (The Israelis have gone on to unilaterally say that prior + Israeli agreement on US “suggestion” to Egypt “is essential both in + principle and in order to avoid possible complications” for which Israel + not be “responsible.”)

+

The US “takes note” that Israel’s position objecting to language which + would create linkage between the interim agreement and the Egyptian + demand for total withdrawal remains unchanged. The US will not make any + suggestion to Egypt with regard to “the relation between the interim + agreement and the overall agreement” without prior agreement with + Israel.

+

The Secretary envisages approaching the Egyptians after Sadat’s trip to Moscow and promises to + clear the instructions here.For the + Secretary’s message to Sadat, + see Document 276. See also footnote 3, Document 278. Sadat visited Moscow February + 2–4.

+
+ +
+ + 278. Telegram From the Department of State to the Interests Section in + EgyptSource: National + Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 658, Country Files, Middle East, Middle + East Nodis/Cedar/Plus, Vol. V. Secret; Nodis; Cedar Double Plus. + Drafted by Atherton and + approved by Sisco. Repeated + to Tel Aviv. + Washington, February 18, 1972, + 0012Z. +

28420. 1. There are a number of indications that Egyptians, in reacting + to Secretary’s message to Sadat,See Document 276. may take position that + interim agreement talks should be conducted under Jarring’s auspices rather than through + USG go-between. On basis of our + discussions with Israelis, we are convinced that this would be an + absolute non-starter so far as they are concerned. For tactical + purposes, however, if Egyptians make this suggestion to you, you should + limit yourself to commenting as follows:

+

A. It is your strong impression that Israel’s decisions to explore idea + of interim agreement and to enter proximity talks for this purpose were + based on understanding that this effort would be conducted through + USG representative. FonMin + Eban made statement along these + lines recently. USG has been operating + on assumption that this is also Egyptian approach; change in that + approach would create new situation and, in your judgment, could add new + complications not likely to be overcome in foreseeable future.

+

B. You should add that this is your off-cuff visceral reaction and that + you have no instructions on this point. You will report Egyptian view to + Washington.Greene reported Ghaleb’s reaction to the Secretary’s oral message to + Sadat in telegram 552 + from Cairo, February 23. Sadat had instructed the Egyptian Foreign Minister + to receive Rogers’s message + on his behalf and told him to emphasize the importance to the + Egyptian Government of keeping secret the content of the message and + the fact that it had even been delivered. Ghaleb said that his own first + impression was that “it was a good and careful message, both in + style and psychology.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential + Materials, NSC Files, Box 658, + Country Files, Middle East, Middle East Nodis/Cedar/Plus, Vol. V) In + his analysis of the meeting sent in a separate telegram, Greene’s “major comment” was that + if there was “any leak at all” regarding Rogers’s message, Sadat might well have taken + “occasion to walk away” from the current round of discussions. He + added: “Ghaleb was equally + obviously sensitive about anything reaching the Israelis.” (Telegram + 554 from Cairo, February 23; ibid.)

+ + + Irwin + + +
+ +
+ + 279. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department + of StateSource: National + Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1167, Saunders Files, Middle East + Negotiations Files, Middle East—Jarring Talks, February 16–March 1, 1972. + Unclassified; Immediate. Repeated to Amman and Immediate to Beirut + and Tel Aviv. + New York, + February 28, 1972, + 0755Z. +

710. Lebanon/Israel in SC. PM Feb 27, + Amb + Bush made following statement + in SC:

+

Quote

+

The USG views with deep concern the + recurrence of incidents along the Lebanese border and the continuing + incursions within Lebanon by Israeli defense forces.

+

Yesterday, we had understood that the military action had ended. We are + distressed and very concerned to find that there have been new incidents + along the frontier and even more extensive measures by Israel.

+

We must, Mr. President, express deep regret and concern that Israel has + prolonged and intensified its attacks on the territory of Lebanon. We + cannot condone such actions. As we have repeatedly made clear, the US + fully supports the territorial integrity and political independence of + Lebanon. We therefore believe the SC + should call upon the Govt of Israel to withdraw its forces immediately + from Lebanese territory.Israeli shelling + and air and ground attacks on Palestinian commando positions in + southern Lebanon began on February 25 after guerrillas fired on + Israeli positions in the Mt. Hermon area. The Israeli forces + withdrew on February 28.

+

The US deeply regrets the loss of life that has occurred on both sides. + We also sympathize fully with Israel’s distress at the loss of life at + the hands of guerrilla infiltrators which apparently precipitated this + latest round. The continuation of such acts of terrorism is not in the + interest of any of the people of the area because it can only delay the + achievement of a just and lasting peace that all of us here support—in + the Security Council and in the United Nations.

+

At the same time, we know that the Govt of Lebanon has made strenuous + efforts over past months to maintain quiet along the border. We + recognize the difficulty of sealing the border completely, but unless + more effective measures can be taken to do so, a situation is + perpetuated in which Israel is exposed to terrorist attacks and feels + compelled in self-defense to retaliate.

+ +

However, the US believes the way to solve the problem lies not in + hortatory declarations nor in further recourse to armed force. It lies, + rather, through direct liaison and cooperation between the parties to + provide the most reliable assurance possible regarding the security of + each. It is the parties who must redouble their efforts to avoid a + repetition of the cycle of attacks and counter-attacks.

+

The US, therefore, urges that both Israel and Lebanon have more frequent + recourse to the international facilities that exist for the exchange of + information and consultation on border matters. Above all, we ask for an + end to cross-border attacks and terrorism, without which the cycle of + action and reaction cannot be broken.

+

These events serve to underline the urgency of moving ahead on + negotiations for a peaceful settlement for until peace is achieved, + failure to satisfy the fundamental and legitimate concerns of all the + peoples of the area will perpetuate tensions.

+

As to the resolution before us, in our statement we have expressed our + concern over the loss of life on both sides. Others here have addressed + themselves to the events which led to the situation as it stands today. + As I look at the resolution, it is brief and to the point, but it would + better reflect the genuine concern that we feel for the loss of life—the + loss of innocent civilian life—if the resolution were amended to include + the words “on both sides” after the word “lives.” The preambular + sentence would then read: “Deploring all actions which have resulted in + the loss of innocent lives on both sides.” It can be stated that as + written the sentence implies that we deplore actions on both sides, but + it would be clearer indeed if the Council would accept this one + amendment. This amendment is in keeping with the views expressed here by + several countries. I strongly hope the Council will accept our + amendment. As the co-sponsors stated, the present text is not entirely + satisfactory to all members of the Council. For our part, we strongly + believe that the thought implicit in the preamb para should be made + explicit. I am most sympathetic with the plea by our colleague from + Italy but the addition of these three words seems to us to express more + fairly the humanitarian concern we all feel. My govt feels so strongly + on this point that I feel I must submit this amendment to the text + before us. End quote.

+

2. Following the defeat of the preambular paragraph (8(US)–4–3)The preambular paragraph was defeated in a + separate vote. + Amb + Bush made following + statement:

+

Quote: We find it incomprehensible that people around this table could + have failed to support the inclusion of the statement which read + “deploring all actions which have resulted in the loss of innocent + lives.” How this Council could + object to such fair, humane language leaves us completely baffled. Yes, + we voted for the resolution without the preambular paragraph for as we + said in our statement, “The SC should + call upon the Govt of Israel to withdraw its forces immediately from + Lebanese territory.” That we have done, but it is our strongly held view + that the Council even at this stage knows enough and should have cared + enough to deplore among other things the actions which resulted in the + loss of innocent lives. Let me be clear, our vote on the final passage + of this resolution was in no way a condonation of events that led up to + Israel’s actions. End quote.Security + Council Resolution 313, unanimously adopted early in the morning of + February 28, reads: “The Security Council demands that Israel + immediately desist and refrain from any ground and air military + action against Lebanon and forthwith withdraw all its military + forces from Lebanese territory.” For a summary of the Security + Council debate, see Yearbook of the United + Nations, 1972, pp. 158–160. The text of Resolution 313 is + ibid., p. 172.

+ + + Bush + + +
+ +
+ 280. Editorial Note +

On March 15, 1972, King Hussein of + Jordan announced to a gathering of 40 to 50 members of the foreign press + and “scores of Jordanian personalities” that Jordan would adopt a new + federation plan once it achieved peace with Israel and the West Bank was + returned to Jordanian sovereignty. Under the plan, Jordan—which would be + renamed the United Arab Kingdom—would consist of two provinces: a + Palestinian one on the West Bank of the Jordan River and a Jordanian one + on the East Bank. Amman would serve as both the federal capital and the + capital of the Jordanian province, and Jerusalem would serve as the + capital of the Palestinian province. (Telegram 1112 from Amman, March + 15; National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1167, Saunders Files, + Middle East Negotiations Files, Middle East—Jarring Talks, March 1–31, 1972) According to the + Department of State, public reaction to the plan in the Arab world was + “largely hostile,” with skeptics viewing it as “a plot concocted by the + US, Israel, and King Hussein to + undermine Palestinian interests and achieve a Jordanian-Israeli peace on + unacceptable terms.” (Memorandum from Eliot to Kissinger, March 22; ibid., Box 617, Country Files, + Middle East, Jordan, Vol. VIII)

+ +

Hussein had sent a letter to + Nixon two days earlier to + inform him of the announcement as well as of the details of the + proposal. He wrote: “We believe the time has come, Mr. President, for us + to enter into a new state which will be a further contribution to the + cause of peace in our area, bearing in mind that an essential part of + any settlement in our area is recognition of the identity of the + Palestinian people who have existed for hundreds of years before 1948 + and continue to exist.” He later added, “It is hoped that the new plan + will also enable the Palestinians, through their responsible + representative elements, to redress the wrongs done to them.” (Telegram + 1069 from Amman, March 13; ibid., Box 1167, Saunders Files, Middle East + Negotiations Files, Middle East—Jarring Talks, March 1–31, 1972) The King sent similar + messages to British, French, and Soviet leaders, Arab Ambassadors, and + Arab leaders not represented in Amman. (Telegram 1072 from Amman, March + 13; ibid.)

+

The letter to Nixon merely + established officially what the King had already conveyed privately to + the United States through secret channels one month earlier, as + discussed in a February 17 CIA + intelligence memorandum. (Central Intelligence Agency, OCI Files, Job + 79B1737A) On April 6, Egypt broke diplomatic relations with Jordan + because, as Sadat explained, + Egypt would “not allow anyone to liquidate the rights of the Palestinian + people.” (New York Times, April 7, 1972, page + 1)

+
+ +
+ 281. Memorandum of ConversationSource: National Archives, Nixon Presidential + Materials, NSC Files, Box 493, + President’s Trip Files, Dobrynin/Kissinger, 1972, Vol. 10. Top Secret; Sensitive; + Exclusively Eyes Only. A stamped notation on the memorandum + indicates the President saw it. All brackets are in the original + except those indicating text omitted by the editors and “[Dobrynin]”, added for clarity. The + meeting took place in the White House Map Room. The President left + the meeting before the discussion of the Middle East. For the full + text of the memorandum of conversation, see Foreign + Relations, 1969–1976, volume XIV, Soviet Union, October + 1971–May 1972, Document 62. + Washington, March 17, 1972, 1 pm + + PARTICIPANTS + The President (at beginning) + Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin + Dr. Henry A. + Kissinger + + +

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to the Middle East.]

+

The Middle East

+

He [Dobrynin] then asked, “What + about the major items? Let’s talk about the Middle East. You told me you + would have some proposition to make.” I said that the first question + that I wanted to raise was: could they give me some expression of how + they propose to inform the Egyptians if some agreement were reached + between the President and Brezhnev?Kissinger and Dobrynin were considering items + for discussion at the upcoming Nixon-Brezhnev summit and the possible agreements that + might be reached. On January 17, Brezhnev wrote Nixon a letter regarding U.S.-Soviet relations in + which he addressed the Middle East: “The situation in the Middle + East, Mr. President, causes serious concern. The tension there is + not diminishing. Rather, to the contrary. Many elements in Israel’s + behaviour cause apprehension. But it should be clear that attempts + to carry out its known designs toward the Arab territories would + lead to far-reaching consequences. In conversation with you in + Washington our Minister for Foreign Affairs set forth in detail + considerations concerning the questions of Middle East settlement. + We are prepared, as before, to work in real earnest to find concrete + solutions on the basis of the principles set forth in that + conversation, and to bring what has been started to successful + conclusion. And here it is desirable to act without delay.” (Ibid., + Document 39) For + Gromyko’s proposals, see + Documents 251 and 252. It seemed to me extremely dangerous to inform + the Egyptians at all since they were bound to be penetrated by the + Israelis. For us it was a matter of the gravest importance. Dobrynin grew somewhat restless. He + said delivering the Egyptians was their problem and they could not be + accountable on that. I said that was not the issue; the issue was + whether the process of notification would create substantive + difficulties that would affect our situation and the possibility of + carrying through with any understanding that might be reached. For + example, I said, the interim agreement we were discussing was worse than + what Bergus had offered them in + the bilateral discussions.See Documents 255, 258, and 263. If they + were going to be asked by the Soviets to accept a worse interim + agreement, there had to be some argument that would make this plausible. + Dobrynin again said that I + seem to be producing one red herring after another to avoid facing + concrete issues. I said this was not the case, and I insisted that they + produce some expression from Moscow of how they would deal with the + implementation of any agreement.

+

Turning to the substance of the settlement, Dobrynin asked whether I had formulated any ideas. I + told him that it seemed to me that the irreducible Israeli position was + for the airfield just east of Eilat, control over Sharm el Sheikh, and a + land connection with Sharm el Sheikh. This perhaps could be wrapped up + in some riparian arrangement of the states along the Gulf of Aqaba, + which perhaps might provide a + fig leaf for Israeli presence in Sharm el Sheikh. (Attached at Tab + BAttached but not printed. is a + memorandum explaining this.)

+

Dobrynin asked my view of + demilitarization. I said in my view demilitarization would have to take + place at least to the western edge of the passes. Dobrynin said that in effect I was + giving him the Israeli position. I said that if he talked to the Israeli + Ambassador, he would not get that idea; this would be next to impossible + to sell to the Israelis. What I was trying to do was to get a position + which the Israelis might accept with some considerable pressure but + short of actions that would lead them to conclude that they were better + off going to war. Dobrynin said + that in effect we were returning to the old position in which all the + sacrifices had to be made by Egypt. I said that the pity was that + Dobrynin could never seem to + understand that these were negotiating arguments that we had already + heard in New York and Washington. If he was talking to me, he should + face the substance of the problem, and the substance was that we were + prepared to use our good offices with the Israelis but only within a + framework that we thought would not drive them to acts of total + desperation.

+

Dobrynin asked why the + demilitarized zone had to be entirely on the Egyptian side. I said it + was because equivalent demilitarized zones would drive the Israelis back + to Jerusalem. Dobrynin asked + whether we would consider proportional demilitarized zones. I said it + seemed to me extremely improbable, but if he wanted to make a proposal + this was of course open to him.

+

Dobrynin indicated that he did + not think we were making much progress. He said the difficulty was that + we did not take the Soviet proposals sufficiently seriously. The Soviet + Union had offered to withdraw all its forces from Egypt, except a number + roughly equivalent to what we had in Iran, not to establish bases + elsewhere, and to accept limitations on its arms shipments.See Document 251. + This responded exactly to what we had said publicly in July 1969 we + wanted. Now we were haggling about a few miles of territory.

+

I responded that Dobrynin always + had the great ability to present his position in the form of enormous + concessions, without ever looking at what we were doing on our side. For + example, the Soviet proposal was a way for the Soviets of extricating + themselves from a difficult situation. Their client could not win a war + with the Israelis. Therefore, a continuation of the situation would lead + to one of two situations: either a conviction on the part of the Arabs + that their alliance with the Soviet Union was not adequate to produce a + settlement, or a war by the Egyptians which would face the Soviet Union with a decision of military + support and a risk out of proportion to anything that could be + achieved.

+

Dobrynin answered that this was + partially true, but there was a third possibility that the Soviet Union + had to consider. The Soviet Union was now at a watershed; its next move + would be a considerable increase of its military presence in Egypt and + other Arab states. He could assure me they were deluged with offers, for + example, to provide air protection to other Arab countries. The Soviet + Union had requests for a massive influx of arms which then could be + given with the argument that the Soviet Union would stay there until the + local people were in a position to defeat the Israelis militarily. + [Note: This seems confirmed by Israeli intelligence.] Also the Soviet + Union was well aware of the fact that its proposal really opened up the + field for us to compete with them much more effectively in the Arab + world than is now the case. In short, it was a major policy act by the + Soviet Union, and if we did not pick it up, the consequences might be + quite serious. However, he would transmit my suggestions to Moscow and + he would give me their reaction.

+

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to the Middle East.]

+
+ +
+ 282. Editorial Note +

On March 21, 1972, Prime Minister Golda + Meir and King Hussein held a secret meeting to discuss their + respective requirements for a peace agreement between Israel and Jordan. + The meeting was originally scheduled for March 16, but Meir cancelled it to protest the + Jordanian federation plan that the King had announced on March 15. After + Hussein opened the discussion + by explaining his reasons for restructuring Jordan, she replied that she + was “shocked” when she had heard about his proposal, especially because + “Israel was not even mentioned” and because, by her interpretation, it + “would lead to the eventual liquidation” of her country. She later + characterized both the territorial aspects of the plan and its position + on Jerusalem as “unacceptable,” describing the section on Jerusalem as + “a tale of horror” and adding that the subject was “not up for + discussion.”

+

They both listed the principles on which they were unwilling to + compromise. Meir said: 1) “Under + no conditions will we return to the boundaries of 1967”; 2) “Secretary + Rogers’s proposals are + totally unacceptable”; 3) “Minor border rectifications are out of the + question”; and 4) “Jerusalem must be a unified city, although Jordan can + control the Arab holy places.” + Hussein responded that he did + not agree with the Prime Minister’s proposals and listed his own + requirements: 1) “A return to the situation as it existed prior to + 1967”; 2) “A complete separation and secession of the West Bank”; and 3) + “The establishment of the UAK, which I have proposed.” He said that the + last point was “the only logical solution for our people” and also + remarked, “I cannot tell my people to give up Jerusalem.”

+

The discussion then turned to the issue of basic cooperation over the + near term. Meir asked Hussein if he was prepared to: 1) “Keep + Jordan out of any eastern front command”; 2) “Not allow Syrian or Iraqi + troops in Jordan”; 3) “Keep the fedayeen out of Jordan”; and 4) + “Continue cooperation with us on contingency planning as before.” She + added, “This is the best we can do.” Hussein replied, “Can’t we work jointly to arrive at + peace?” to which Meir said, “We + can’t accept your paper.” The conversation concluded with Hussein asking Meir when Israel would provide Jordan + with a plan of its own for a settlement between their two countries. The + Prime Minister did not offer a time but instead answered: “We will + produce a plan outlining the principles and designs which we consider + the basis for a settlement. But one final word, Your Majesty, when you + are in Washington the question of the Jarring negotiations is bound to come up. Negotiations + through Jarring will not lead to + anything. The only way we are going to reach a peaceful settlement is + through direct negotiations.” (Attachment A to a memorandum from + Helms to Nixon, March 24; National Archives, + Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Special Files, President’s + Office Files, Box 16, President’s Handwriting)

+
+ +
+ + 283. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in + IsraelSource: National + Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 609, Country Files, Middle East, Israel, + Vol. 10. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Atherton and approved by Sisco and Rogers. + Washington, March 23, 1972, 2027Z. +

50083. For Ambassador from Sisco.

+

1. We are increasingly concerned about current Israeli tactics in their + dealings with Jarring and + Waldheim.Rabin’s + report to Sisco on Jarring’s visit to Israel is in + telegram 33722 to Tel Aviv, February 28. (Ibid., Box 658, Country + Files, Middle East, Middle East Nodis/Cedar/Plus, Vol. V) According + to Bush’s account of his + March 14 meeting with the Secretary-General, the latter said that + Israel had been “engaging in dilatory tactics,” which he “could not + tolerate.” Waldheim was + referring specifically to Tekoah’s week-long delay in returning to New York + from Israel, his lack of communication with Jarring when he did return, and + his ultimatum to Jarring + that he must “disassociate himself” from his February 8, 1971, + memorandum and General Assembly Resolution 2799 when, upon Jarring’s request, he finally got + in touch with the Special Representative. (Telegram 927 from USUN, March 15; ibid., Box 1167, + Saunders Files, Middle East Negotiations Files, Middle + East—Jarring Talks, + March 1–31, 1972) We have no desire to precipitate USG–GOI + dispute over this matter or to seek to quarterback Israeli moves, but + believe it important our concerns and thoughts on this subject get + through to them. It occurs to us that best thing would be for you to + engage GOI on personal basis in + dialogue on this problem, without its having appearance of formal + démarche. You know best how to get this across.

+

2. Following are points we would hope you could get across:

+

A. As Israel knows, we have stayed out of their current negotiations with + Jarring and SYG, and we will + continue to stay out. In spirit of close consultations between us, + however, we want to share our views for their consideration.

+

B. We gather Israelis feel that, if clarification process in Jarring talks can be stalled, this + will eventually convince Egyptians they have no alternative to entering + proximity talks on interim Canal agreement. This may be true, but we + think argument can also be made for contrary view—namely, that some + substantive activity in Jarring + context would make it easier for Sadat to ultimately enter proximity talks on parallel + track.

+

C. Whichever analysis is correct, we see real risk that tactic of + temporizing in Jarring talks + will lead sooner or later to steps by SYG and Jarring which would cast Israel in + most indefensible light, make our own position vulnerable and risk + precipitating return of whole Middle East question to Security + Council.

+ +

D. Israeli position, as we understand it, is that it has not wanted to be + confronted in Jarring talks with + Jarring’s February 8 + memorandum and December UNGA + Resolution.See, respectively, footnote 2, Document 205 and footnote 4, Document 270. We can + appreciate this view and understand it. In our judgment, Jarring is now offering Israelis + precisely this and is in effect saying that he is prepared to resume his + mission without pre-conditions. This will have achieved a major step for + Israeli point of view: In effect the memo and GA Resolution are being disregarded as condition to get + talks started while both sides hold to their own positions substantively + as to the settlement.

+

E. For Israel to press situation still further and ask Jarring in effect to disavow his + memorandum and UNGA resolution + vis-à-vis Egyptians puts him in humiliating and impossible situation. + Furthermore, were he to do so, this would certainly create new obstacles + on Egyptian side. Since Jarring + is not asking Israel to change its position with respect to his + memorandum and UNGA resolution, it + would be unreasonable to expect him to ask Egyptians to change their + position in this respect.

+

F. We have no illusions that clarification process Jarring proposes re elements of + Resolution 242 will lead to new significant breakthroughs, or that it + will not eventually come up against opposing Israeli and Egyptian views + on question of prior withdrawal commitment. We believe Jarring knows this, the Egyptians know + this, as we and the Israelis know this. It is very much in U.S.-Israeli + mutual interests, however, to keep Jarring process going, which will require some semblance + of movement in Jarring talks. As + long as some diplomatic activity is going on, the ceasefire will be + reinforced, the doors to interim Suez Canal talks remain open, and the + outside pressures for outside involvement—four or five power talks, + Security Council, etc.—will be diminished. In our view, diplomatic + activity can only come about if Israelis will drop their present attempt + to obtain preconditions from Jarring and agree to engage in clarification process + which Jarring is offering them + and Egyptians, without seeking to pin Jarring down on relationship of Jarring talks to his February + memorandum and UNGA resolution. If + Jarring is willing to + finesse these documents by getting both sides to resume talks on basis + which does not include specific reference to them, we think this + protects Israeli position fully.On March + 24, before he received this telegram, Barbour met with Eban, who reported to him that contacts with + Jarring appeared “to be + going on in desultory manner” and remarked that Israel still + believed that a partial Suez agreement constituted a “better + approach” than the Jarring + Mission. Barbour replied that + the United States also believed that, at the time, an interim + settlement had a better chance of succeeding than Jarring’s efforts but emphasized + that U.S. officials did not “consider the two incompatible.” He + added that it would be “disastrous for either Israel or the US to + undermine Jarring.” + Eban agreed that it would + not be “good for Israel” to be “charged with responsibility for a + breakdown in the Jarring + talks.” (Telegram 1995 from Tel Aviv, March 24; ibid., RG 59, + Central Files 1970–73, POL 27–14 ARAB–ISR) Telegram 1998 from Tel + Aviv, March 25, reported that telegram 50083 to Tel Aviv, March 23, + arrived after his conversation with Eban. (Ibid.)

+ +

3. We are taking every precaution to assure that knowledge of this + approach to Israelis does not repeat not get back to other governments + or UN officials.

+ + + Rogers + + +
+ +
+ 284. Editorial Note +

On March 26, 1972, King Hussein of + Jordan traveled to Washington, his first stop on a six-week trip abroad. + (New York Times, March 27, 1972, page 10) He + met with President Richard Nixon + on the morning of March 28 for almost 1½ hours, during which he read + from a 45-minute prepared statement that, in part, reintroduced his + federation plan for Palestinian autonomy (see Document 280). The King spent the rest of the meeting + describing Jordan’s financial and military needs, which he hoped the + United States would satisfy. (Transcript of telephone conversation + between Kissinger and Rogers, March 28, 12:32 p.m.; National + Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Henry + Kissinger Telephone Conversation Transcripts, Box 15, + Chronological File) While Nixon + would not officially endorse Hussein’s plan, he said that the United States would + welcome any initiative that would meet the “legitimate aspirations of + the Palestinian people.” White House Press Secretary Ronald Ziegler later said that, “so far + as the Jordanian plan would ‘help the Palestinians develop a voice in + shaping their own future it would seem to be one step in creating the + conditions necessary for peace.’” (New York + Times, March 29, 1972, page 2)

+

On March 29, the King and his advisers met for a half hour with Secretary + of Defense Melvin Laird and + other Department of Defense officials, who told him that the President + had instructed them to “be as forthcoming as possible on behalf of + Jordan’s needs.” After discussing his federation plan, which he raised + in the context of his efforts to confront multiple threats to regional + stability, he mentioned Jordan’s “specific military problems.” + (Washington National Records Center, ISA Files: FRC 330–75–0155, Box 3, + Jordan) In a March 31 follow-up letter to the meeting, Deputy Assistant + Secretary of Defense for Near Eastern, African, and South Asian Affairs + James Noyes informed + Jordanian Ambassador Zuhayr Mahmud al-Mufti that the United States would + sell Jordan the jet aircraft and other military equipment that it + requested if Congress earmarked the credits necessary for Jordan to buy + them. Noyes attached a table to + the letter, which listed the equipment to be sold and their line-item costs for the fiscal years + 1972–1974. (Ibid.: FRC 330–75–0125, Box 14, Jordan)

+
+ +
+ 285. Telegram From the Department of State to the Interests Section in + EgyptSource: National + Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 658, Country Files, Middle East, Middle + East Nodis/Cedar/Plus, Vol. V. Secret; Nodis; Cedar Double Plus. + Drafted by Sterner, cleared + by Davies and Atherton, and approved by + Rogers. + Washington, April 1, 1972, 0113Z. +

56147. 1. You should ask to see Ghaleb as soon as possible drawing to extent you deem + appropriate on following points, without repeat without indicating you + are doing so on instruction from Washington.

+

2. You are concerned that reported remarks by President Sadat in speech at military base in + Delta, to effect that he plans to inform special session of People’s + Assembly about recent contacts with USG, may mean he plans reveal fact if not substance of message + from Secretary to Sadat.In Sadat’s March 31 speech at an air base in the Nile + Delta, he not only said that war with Israel was “inevitable” but + also promised to expose exchanges with the United States. (New York Times, April 1, 1972, p. 2) For the + Secretary’s message, see Document + 276. These special sessions are usually accompanied by + full briefings to press afterwards. Even without briefing to press, + disclosure of information to audience of several hundred maximizes + opportunity for leaks. You wish to recall to Ghaleb that it was Foreign Minister + himself who urged us to hold fact and nature of Secretary’s message very + closely. USG has taken considerable + pains to do so and has not revealed its existence even to closest + friends. Disclosure of message in Cairo will do nothing to advance + prospect of negotiations on any front and on contrary will only weaken + confidence in Washington and other capitals that when they have + something to convey of private or confidential nature Egyptian + Government can be relied upon to respect such communications. It would + be shortsighted to assume that there will not be occasions in future + when both of our governments will want to have this kind of confidence in one another, + which is essential for any kind of diplomatic dialogue.Greene met + with Ghaleb on the morning + of April 3. Ghaleb said that + when Sadat responded to + Rogers’s February + message to him, Greene would + be the “first to know,” and that the response could possibly come + “in the next few days.” Greene explained that the timing was not as + important to the United States as the fact that the exchanges remain + confidential, as the Government of Egypt had previously mandated. + Ghaleb agreed on the + importance of confidentiality and said that Sadat’s response would concern this + question. (Telegram 962 from Cairo, April 3; National Archives, + Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC + Files, Box 658, Country Files, Middle East, Middle East + Nodis/Cedar/Plus, Vol. V)

+ + + Rogers + + +
+ +
+ 286. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security + Affairs (Kissinger) to President + NixonSource: National Archives, Nixon + Presidential Materials, White House Special Files, Staff Secretary’s + Files, Box 37. Secret; Sensitive. Sent for information. All brackets + are in the original except those indicating text that remains + classified. + Washington, April + 8, 1972. + + SUBJECT + Sadat-Brezhnev Meeting in February, + 1972 + +

[2½ lines not declassified] The highlights are as + follows:Sadat met with Brezhnev on February 3 during his February 2–4 visit + to Moscow.

+

The overall impression given [less than 1 line not + declassified] is a sense of the tension that continues to + underline Sadat’s relations with + the Soviets. From the Egyptian leader’s standpoint, the theme of the + entire discussion was one of concern that his relations with the Soviets + are not what they ought to be. He warned that the internal situation in + Egypt will “explode” unless he is able to offer his people more + convincing evidence that the USSR is + fully committed to the Egyptian-Arab cause.

+

Sadat expounded on his concept + that the United States has created “two belts” of pressure on Egypt, one + in the south including Iran, Ethiopia, Chad and the Congo and one in the + north which includes Malta, Jordan, Italy, Greece and Israel. Although + that concept appeared to be mainly for the sake of argument with the + Russians, it does fit with Sadat’s other arguments that Egypt is now confronting the U.S. rather than merely + Israel. But all this, along with some remarks about his problems with + Maoism among Egyptian students, was also aimed at what Sadat believes are Soviet phobias. His + effort, however, does not appear to have made much impression on the + Soviet leaders.

+

Sadat’s strategy proposals for + 1972 are not very exciting. He said he intends to escalate “political + action” prior to your visit to Moscow;Nixon was in Moscow May + 22–28 for the summit with Brezhnev. to prepare to defend against any + Israeli attack and to launch a military attack across the Suez + Canal—perhaps against the Sinai passes. He noted, however, that he does + not have the military means to take such a military action and that he + needs a force of fighter-bombers and some ultra-modern tanks (he did not + mention the time needed to train with this equipment).

+

The Egyptian leader further requested an industrial-military complex, + financed by the Libyans in order to assure domestically produced + ammunition. Given the incongruities between Sadat’s requests and what he claimed to be his strategy + and timing, it is hard to escape the conclusion that his “military + requirements” have a primarily political motivation. They seem to be + more to quiet Sadat’s critics at + home than to prepare for serious military action against the Israelis at + an early date.

+

[less than 1 line not declassified] the Soviet + response was essentially playing for time—perhaps to see how our present + negotiations were going. [less than 1 line not + declassified] Brezhnev + underlined the fact that Soviet policy has not changed and that the + Soviet leadership sees no need for it to change. The Soviets, in effect, + rejected Sadat’s grand design. + The providing of forty U.S. aircraft to Israel did not change the nature + of Soviet-Egyptian “friendship,” according to Brezhnev. Moreover, Moscow’s policy + continues to be one of “solving the crisis peacefully.” In this + connection, Brezhnev told + Sadat that the Arab-Israeli + problem is on the Soviets’ agenda for your summit meeting in May but he + promised nothing except that “in any case we will continue with new + initiatives for a political solution in consultation with you.”

+

Brezhnev avoided falling into the + trap of enabling Sadat to claim + that the Soviets vetoed military action against Israel. He stated that + the Soviets had always striven to help the Egyptian army become an + offensive army but he reminded Sadat that a decision to make any kind of a military + move is a serious one and it is necessary to “weigh many + considerations.”

+

There were some sharp exchanges between Brezhnev and Sadat about Egyptian military requirements and Soviet + willingness to meet them. + Brezhnev stated that in + Moscow’s view, the Arabs need unity as much or more than hardware—even + Saudi Arabia and Jordan should be approached by Sadat, and Sadat should work out—with Soviet help—military + arrangements with the Syrians for the use of Syrian airfields by the + Egyptians. In the end, however, Brezhnev promised hardware:

+

—100 new-type MIG fighters (70 before June 1972 and 30 in the second half + of the year),

+

—20 TU–22 supersonic bombers,

+

—200 T–62 tanks, and more sophisticated communications equipment and + arrangements for licensing some military production in Egypt.

+

Even here, however, the note was one of caution: deliveries are to be + paced with training, wasteful industrial projects are to be avoided, + etc. At the close of the meeting, Brezhnev once again reminded Sadat that the Soviets were not happy about developments + in connection with Libya, the Sudan and the relations between Soviet + experts and the Egyptian military.

+

In sum, [less than 1 line not declassified] + indicate that the Soviet-Egyptian relationship is considerably more + reserved than it was before Nasser’s death. Sadat is trying to manipulate the relationship primarily + to strengthen his domestic political situation. He does not seem + genuinely interested at this time in war with Israel. The Soviets, for + their part, are still holding Sadat at arms’ length. They are playing for time until + they see how our private negotiations develop. The Soviets are clearly + keeping their options open. The Soviets are willing to provide new arms + to the Egyptians but they are concerned about the Egyptian request for + an industrial base which would enable them to produce their own weapons. + Such a development obviously would make Egypt less dependent upon the + USSR for weapon supply.

+
+ +
+ + 287. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security + Affairs (Kissinger) to President + NixonSource: National Archives, Nixon + Presidential Materials, NSC Files, + Box 1167, Saunders Files, Middle East Negotiations Files, Middle + East—Jarring Talks, May + 1–31, 1972. Secret; Nodis; Cedar. Sent for information. A stamped + notation on the memorandum indicates the President saw it. All + brackets are in the original. + Washington, May 17, + 1972. + + SUBJECT + A Preliminary Look at the Mid-East in the Moscow Talks + +

Secretary Rogers has sent you the + attached preliminary thoughts on the issues in discussing the Middle + East at the Moscow summit.Dated May 1; + attached but not printed. For excerpts from the memorandum, see Foreign + Relations, 1969–1976, volume XIV, Soviet Union, October + 1971–May 1972, Document 178. This analysis will be + reflected in your briefing bookThe briefing + book for the Moscow Summit is in the National Archives, Nixon + Presidential Materials, NSC Files, + Box 476, President’s Trip Files. as well.

+

The essence of the State Department analysis is that the Soviets will + make clear their view that there must be progress in the Mid-East or + they will be unable to keep the lid on much longer. State feels that the + Soviets will be seeking some sort of understanding that the great powers + will work together to impose a solution. State’s recommendation is that + we should insist that the focus of negotiations must remain with the + Middle Eastern parties to the dispute and not with the major powers. + State says: “Our counter to any Soviet pressure to renew bilateral or + Four Power talks should be to keep the focus on the need for Egypt to + face up to the necessity of negotiating a settlement with Israel instead + of looking to others to do the job for it.”

+

State acknowledges that a standoff such as this approach will produce + will leave a very unpredictable situation in the post-summit period + since no one can guarantee that Sadat will continue to avoid military action—no matter + how foolish—in the absence of hope for diplomatic movement. The State + memo offers no suggestions for softening the impact of a standoff.

+

The premise of the State memo is correct—that we are limited in any + effort to reach specific agreements because (a) the Israelis are opposed + in principle to the idea of a great-power solution and (b) the Israelis + are unlikely to find palatable any specific terms on key issues that the + Russians could accept. The problem remains how to avoid the worst + effects of a complete stalemate.

+ +

It is true that we are unlikely to want to make any concessions in the + Middle East in the aftermath of Soviet actions in South Asia last + yearReference is to Soviet support of + India during its war with Pakistan in December 1971. and + until there is evidence of a responsible attitude toward Southeast Asia. + However, there are some subjects that we could seek understanding on + that would serve our interests.

+

I would rule out getting too deeply into specifics unless an unusual + opportunity was offered, and I would want to avoid the atmosphere of + total inflexibility since that could lead the Soviets to step up their + military program in Egypt. I would suggest exploring points like the + following designed to lead toward some understanding on a general + framework for future handling of the Middle East problem:

+

—Our ability to move Israel even in a limited way will depend on our + finding a way to avoid the appearance of a US–USSR solution and to + create the appearance of Arab-Israeli negotiation. We are not looking + for a concession in saying this; we are looking for a solution to a + practical problem. We would like to discuss with the Soviets ways in + which an Egyptian-Israeli exchange could be set up outside the glare of + publicity in which all possible solutions could be aired. The mere fact + of the exchange would have significance in Israel, and only if we can + break away from present rigid positions does there seem any chance of + finding a way to move negotiations forward.

+

—The US and USSR should each accept the + idea that the settlement process will take some time. We should each + acknowledge our understanding that the process may even reach over + several years. Such an understanding is not an evasion of responsibility + but an effort to assure that the two of us at least are not measuring + each other’s performance against an unrealistic standard.

+

—One way to buy time over the next few months might be to return to the + idea of an interim agreement for opening the Suez Canal. If this were + coupled with private Egyptian-Israeli talks, it could provide the + outward appearance of movement that Sadat needs. [State recommends that we low-key this + subject because the Soviets will oppose our going ahead as the exclusive + go-between while the Israelis will oppose Soviet involvement. This + problem might be partly met if we were to talk with the USSR as well as to Egypt and Israel.]

+

—There might be some agreement on discussing the ultimate limitation of + US and Soviet forces on Middle Eastern soil.

+

We would not want to create an impression for the Egyptians that we had + renounced the UN resolution of November + 1967, the Jarring talks or the + Rogers Plan. At the same + time, we ought to try to find ways with the Soviets of exploring new approaches that + can break free of the old positions which are at impasse.

+
+ +
+ 288. Memorandum From Director of Central Intelligence Helms to the President’s Assistant for + National Security Affairs (Kissinger)Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box + 131, Country Files, Middle East. Secret; Sensitive. All brackets are + in the original except those indicating text that remains + classified. + Washington, May 18, + 1972. + + SUBJECT + Further Developments on Egyptian Suggestion for Secret Talks on + the Middle East Crisis + +

1. The following developments have occurred since [2 + lines not declassified] 5 April 1972 that secret contact + between the Presidencies of our two governments would be a prerequisite + to renewing serious discussion on a Middle East settlement, as outlined + in my memorandum dated 7 April 1972.Not + found.

+

2. On 29 April 1972, [2½ lines not declassified]. + This message acknowledged that there was interest in exploring the + possibility of a secret, high-level meeting between senior + representatives of the two governments; suggested that an emissary of + President Sadat would be welcome + in the United States, if a meeting were deemed mutually desirable; and + indicated that the timing of such a meeting could clearly not be before + the President returned from his trip in June. [less + than 1 line not declassified] advised that he had given the + foregoing message to President Sadat shortly after the latter returned from Moscow in + late April.Sadat visited Moscow April 27–29.

+

3. On 16 May 1972, [1 line not declassified] that + President Sadat is still + considering the matter of new, secret contacts and would respond to our + message in June, recognizing that little can happen before then in any + case because of President Nixon’s trip. In discussing [less than 1 + line not declassified] the decision of the Egyptian Government + to reduce the size of the U.S. Interest Section in Cairo, [less than 1 line not declassified] stressed that this is not related to + the pending proposal for secret contacts. [6½ lines + not declassified]

+

4. The Department of State has not been informed of this exchange.At the beginning of the year, Rogers met with Haldeman and Mitchell to discuss his “lack of + trust” in Kissinger because + Kissinger had previously + “lied to him” and had “admitted it.” Haldeman wrote in his diary: “We agreed we had to + set up a method so that Rogers would keep us posted on all the meetings he + has with the Soviets or the Israelis, etc. Rogers agreed that he would, if + K[issinger] would notify Rogers about all of his meetings, unless the + P[resident] tells him not to notify. The basic principle to apply is + whatever one of the three knows on foreign policy, all three should, + between K, Rogers, and the + P. (Haldeman Diaries, Multimedia Edition, + January 11, 1972) On January 16, Rogers had another conversation with Haldeman in which he agreed that + “State people have to be kept out of some things” but that he, the + Secretary of State, should not. Rogers added that the “main thing” was that + Kissinger did not keep + him “advised on all that he’s doing.” (Ibid., January 16, + 1972)

+ + + Richard Helms + Helms signed “Dick” above his typed + signature. + + +
+ +
+ 289. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security + Affairs (Kissinger) to President + NixonSource: Library of Congress, + Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CL–179, Middle East, + Chronological File. Secret; Sensitive. Sent for information. A + handwritten notation on the memorandum reads: “The President has + seen, 6–2–72.” All brackets are in the original except those + indicating text that remains classified. + Washington, May 22, + 1972. + + SUBJECT + Sadat Letter to Brezhnev + +

Director Helms has sent you a + memorandum (Tab A)Dated May 2; attached but + not printed. informing you that he has just acquired a copy + of a letter written by Sadat to + Brezhnev on 12 April 1972. A translation of the full letter + is at Tab B.Attached but not + printed. Director Helms believes that the document is authentic. [2 lines not declassified]

+

The highlights of Director Helms’ + appreciation of the letter are as follows. The letter is another + reflection of Sadat’s frustration + with a situation in which the openings for movement seem virtually nil. + It is also an expression of + his concern that the Soviet leaders at the summit talks may tacitly or + otherwise agree to leave the Arab-Israeli situation as it now + stands.

+

Although Sadat did not refer + directly to the possibility of an agreement to limit the quality or + quantity of arms supplies to Egypt and Israel, he clearly is concerned + that such an agreement might be discussed at the summit. The thrust of + his argument is that the balance of power between the Arabs and Israel + can only be shifted if Egypt is provided with the means to develop an + offensive capability in the air. Failing this, he claims, the Israelis + and the United States will be able to freeze the present situation + indefinitely. He cites a variety of evidence to support his belief that + this is, in fact, Israeli and U.S. policy now.

+

Sadat pointed to King Hussein’s proposal for an eventual + Palestine entitySee Document 280. as an especially dangerous example + of the way in which the U.S. and Israel are working. He also included an + implied complaint about the willingness of the Soviets to allow Jews of + military age and technical qualifications to emigrate to Israel. + Sadat’s language indicates + that he remains deeply worried that world attention will turn away from + the Middle East, leaving him with what he calls “a border dispute” which + would lack international support and which would lead to direct + negotiations and “defeat.”

+

Here too, Sadat is subtly + reminding the Soviets that in talking to the United States, they should + not be led into any arrangement that provides for direct negotiations. + For his part, he tried to reassure Brezhnev, that he will stick to his “firm decision” to + reject negotiations with Israel, if the Soviets will stand firm against + U.S. blandishments or pressures. In other words, he will not undercut + Moscow by again using the U.S. as an intermediary. He also asserted, + however, that if the Soviets continue to fail to change the terms of + power between Egypt and Israel, Soviet objectives and even the existence + of the “progressive” Arab regimes may be threatened.

+

On the whole, Sadat’s is not a + strong letter. It does not offer anything new. It is defensive in tone + and very much the plea of a worried client to his patron rather than an + argument presented by one partner to another in whom he has real + confidence. The Soviet leaders may agree up to a point with Sadat’s reasoning but they will hardly + welcome his implicit suggestions that their present policy is a + failure.

+

It is still doubtful that under present circumstances, the Soviets will + run the risks involved in providing Egypt with the kind of effective, + offensive air power Sadat wants. + There are indications, however, in the Soviet-Egyptian communiqué + following Sadat’s Moscow visit + last week that the + Soviets are now willing to give at least some rhetorical support to the + line Sadat took in this letter. + The communiqué omitted the usual stress on the defensive character of + Soviet military support for Egypt and supported the view that, in the + absence of a settlement, the Arabs have “every reason to use other + means” than negotiations to regain territory lost to Israel. Despite + that language, there is nothing in Sadat’s letter or the communiqué to point to any new + diplomatic initiative by the Soviets or the Egyptians.

+
+ +
+ 290. Telegram From the Interests Section in Egypt to the Department of + StateSource: National + Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 638, Country Files, Middle East, Egypt, + Vol. VIII. Secret; Nodis. + Cairo, + May 22, 1972, 1215Z. +

1506. Ref: Cairo 1009.Dated April 5. (Ibid., + RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 27–14 ARAB–ISR)

+

1. In reftel USInt reported statement allegedly made by Sadat to his old political crony, + Mohammed Dakroury, that Egypt would launch offensive across Suez Canal + between April 15 and May 15 of this year. Our source now reports that on + May 19 he asked Dakroury about Sadat’s statement pointing out that May 15 had + passed.

+

2. Dakroury replied that Sadat had + indeed intended to attack but had been dissuaded by the Soviets who had + told Sadat he would have to wait + at least two years before he could attack and win. Dakroury said that + Sadat will not accept a two + year delay and will attack much sooner than that.

+ + + Greene + + +
+ +
+ + 291. U.S. PaperSource: + National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box + 73, Country Files, Europe, USSR. No classification marking. “Handed + to Brezhnev by President May + 26” is handwritten at the top of the first page. After Nixon handed the paper to + Brezhnev, Kissinger noted that it was a + counterproposal to a proposal that Brezhnev gave to him in Moscow on April 22. For + memoranda of conversation of the April 22 and May 26 meetings, see + Foreign + Relations, 1969–1976, volume XIV, Soviet Union, October + 1971–May 1972, Documents 141 and 284. The paper is based on a + draft written by Saunders, + which was in turn based on Saunders’s critique of the Soviet proposal. + (Memorandum from Saunders to + Kissinger, May 19; + National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 482, President’s Trip + Files, Middle East Negotiations, Dr. Kissinger, May 19, 1972, Part I) Other meetings at + which the Middle East was discussed during the summit include those + between Kissinger and + Gromyko during the + afternoon and evening of May 28, both of which are printed in Foreign + Relations, 1969–1976, volume XIV, Soviet Union, October + 1971–May 1972, Documents 292, 293, and 295. + Moscow, undated. +

BASIC PROVISIONS FOR A FINAL SETTLEMENT :nl IN THE MIDDLE + EAST

+

Agreements on a final settlement, termination of the state of + belligerency and the establishment of peace between Egypt and Israel, + Jordan and Israel, Syria and Israel will be governed by the following + principles:

+

a. All signers of the agreements will accept obligations to end the state + of belligerency and to establish peace among them.

+

b. The agreements will contain arrangements for the withdrawal of Israeli + troops from Arab territories occupied in 1967.

+

c. Arrangements for securing the borders will include the establishment + of demilitarized zones and security zones and the participation of + military units of the signatories in a UN force.

+

d. The agreements and the security arrangements will assure freedom of + navigation for ships of all nations, including Israel, through the Suez + Canal and the Straits of Tiran.

+

e. Completion of these arrangements will at some stage involve + negotiations among the potential signers of the agreement.

+

1. The withdrawal of the Israeli troops and + boundaries

+

Israel shall withdraw her troops from Arab territories occupied in 1967 + within an agreed period after the signature of the agreements. + Withdrawal will take place in agreed stages. Flexibility will be + permitted for negotiated changes in borders where those changes enhance + agreed security arrangements.

+ +

The withdrawal of Israeli troops from occupied territories will be + carried out under the supervision of UN + military observers.

+

2. Termination of the state of belligerency and the + establishment of peace

+

The sides in the conflict will agree to terminate the state of + belligerency between them and assume the following concrete obligations + with respect to the establishment of peace:

+

to respect and to recognize the sovereignty, territorial integrity, + inviolability and political independence of one another, their mutual + right to live in peace without being subjected to threats or use of + force or to intervention in their domestic affairs by other nations;

+

to undertake all in their power so that no military or other hostile acts + or the use or threat of force against the other side should originate in + or be committed from their territories;

+

to agree on the freedom of movement by people and commerce across + international boundaries;

+

to settle differences peacefully.

+

3. The Suez Canal

+

In the agreement on the final settlement between Egypt and Israel, Egypt + will assume obligation, in exercising its sovereignty over the Suez + Canal, to ensure freedom of navigation through the Canal for vessels of + all states without discrimination, including Israel. That freedom would + not be denied under any circumstances except the outbreak of war between + Egypt and Israel.

+

Israeli ships will begin to exercise their right to passage through the + Suez Canal upon the opening of the Canal.

+

In order to resume at an early date the use of the Suez Canal for + international shipping and as a practical step which could either be an + integral part of general settlement or an agreed step in advance of a + final agreement, Egypt and Israel will agree on the implementation of + certain measures which will envisage:

+

a) an obligation by Israel to withdraw her forces from the Suez Canal + within a month (tentatively) after reaching agreement on these measures + to the distance of . . . kilometers from the Suez Canal;Omission in the original.

+

b) restoration of Egyptian administration and control in the territory to + be vacated by Israel and movement across the Suez Canal of Egyptian + personnel agreed to be necessary for the exercise of civil authority and + security in the area of the Canal consistent with whatever + demilitarization arrangements may be agreed;

+

c) an obligation by Egypt to take measures for the speediest clearing and + reopening of the Suez Canal.

+ +

4. The Gulf of Aqaba and the Straits of Tiran

+

The Egyptian-Israeli agreement shall envisage an obligation by Egypt to + observe the principle of freedom of navigation through the Straits of + Tiran and in the Gulf of Aqaba for vessels of all countries, including + Israel. It will also provide for stationing of UN military personnel, including Israeli units, at Sharm El + Sheikh and at such other places as may be agreed. The need for the + UN post will be reviewed at agreed + intervals; it will be removed only by agreement of the signatories to + the agreement and of the UN Security + Council.

+

5. Gaza

+

The Gaza strip shall be placed under a transitional administration + endorsed by the UN Security Council with + the participation of Gazan, Jordanian, Israeli and UN personnel pending a final agreement on + the disposition of Gaza. The transitional period would continue until + the refugees in Gaza had been resettled and the residual population had + decided its own future. A referendum shall take place in Gaza under the + United Nations observation five years after refugee resettlement from + Gaza is complete so that its population could decide the destiny of this + territory. In the period after the withdrawal of Israeli troops until + Gaza’s final status has been defined security would be provided by a + United Nations military unit manned by personnel of the UN and by participants in the transitional + administration stationed in Gaza.

+

6. Jerusalem

+

Jerusalem shall remain a unified city. Jordan shall have a role there, + including the administration of the Islamic shrines. The walled city and + adjacent shrines shall be demilitarized and freedom of access to the + Holy places of all religions shall be ensured by Jordan and Israel. + Arrangements shall be negotiated between Jordan and Israel.

+

7. Demilitarized and Security Zones

+

The agreements shall establish two types of zones. There will be + demilitarized zones in which the nature and level of forces and + equipment will be limited by agreement. There will also be security + zones in which each side will have special rights to station troops, + patrol, and maintain facilities. The number, location and size of such + zones will be subject to agreement between the sides. The regime of such + zones will only contain limitations of a purely military nature.

+

A UN force with personnel assigned by the + UN and by the parties to the + agreement will be stationed in the demilitarized zones and in the + security zones.

+

8. Troops and military observers of the United + Nations

+

On the decision of the Security Council and by consent of the signatories + to the agreement small contingents of forces and military observers of + the United Nations will be formed for agreed periods and subject to removal only by agreement + of the signatories and approval of the Security Council.

+

These forces and groups of military observers will be formed from among + the military personnel of member states of the United Nations to be + determined by the Security Council, including units of the signatories + of the agreement and taking into account the opinion of the states in + whose territories these contingents or observers will be stationed. The + extension of the stationing of these contingents and observers after the + expiry of the initial period (5 years tentatively) will be decided by + the signatories of the agreement and by the Security Council.

+

9. International assurances

+

The security of Israel and the neighboring Arab states and, in + particular, the boundaries between them established in the agreements on + the settlement, shall be assured by the Security Council and the great + powers.

+

Such assurances will legally enter into force after signing of the peace + agreements. Corresponding obligations on this score shall be taken by + the signatories.

+

10. The Palestine problem and ensuring the just rights + of the refugees

+

In the interests of establishing a just and lasting peace in the Middle + East the signatories agree to make efforts for the settlement of the + Palestine refugee problem.

+

In the agreements on the settlement the signatories will express their + consent that Palestine refugees will exercise on an individual basis by + means of a poll the choice between repatriation to Israel and resettling + with compensation on the Western Bank of the Jordan river, in the Gaza + strip, other Arab countries or elsewhere.

+

Israel shall assume an obligation on annual quotas of refugees whom she + will admit as well as on the amount of compensation for the property of + the Palestine refugees left in her territory.

+

The implementation of all other parts of the agreements on the final + settlement shall not be delayed until practical measures for solving the + refugee problem are completed.

+

11. Cease-fire

+

For the purpose of providing more favorable conditions for the speediest + settlement in the Middle East the sides in the conflict shall agree at + the beginning of negotiations to continue observing the cease-fire + through the negotiations until those negotiations result in an agreement + which will replace the cease-fire with a permanent peace.

+

12. On the entry into force of the agreements on the + final settlement

+

The agreements on the final settlement would become effective through + their approval by signature of the parties and by the Security Council. The signatories will + act in accordance with the obligations contained in the agreements from + the moment of their signature.

+

13. A Negotiating Process

+

Any reasonable channel of negotiation, secret or public, may be used, and + several complementary channels may be used simultaneously. Whatever the + channel, it is important that the principal elements and details in the + agreements be agreed in exchanges among the signatories. The US and + USSR will support these + exchanges.

+
+ +
+ 292. Editorial Note +

On May 29, 1972, the United States and the Soviet Union concluded the + talks in Moscow by issuing a joint communiqué on areas of agreement and + disagreement on a range of topics that was meant to establish a new era + of stable relations between the two countries. The section on the Middle + East reads: “The two Sides set out their positions on this question. + They reaffirm their support for a peaceful settlement in the Middle East + in accordance with Security Council Resolution 242. Noting the + significance of constructive cooperation of the parties concerned with + the Special Representative of the UN + Secretary General, Ambassador Jarring, the US and the USSR confirm their desire to contribute to his mission’s + success and also declare their readiness to play their part in bringing + about a peaceful settlement in the Middle East. In the view of the US + and the USSR, the achievement of such + a settlement would open prospects for the normalization of the Middle + East situation and would permit, in particular, consideration of further + steps to bring about a military relaxation in that area.” The full text + of the communiqué is printed in Public Papers: + Nixon, 1972, pages + 635–642.

+
+ +
+ + 293. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in + IsraelSource: National + Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 609, Country Files, Middle East, Israel, + Vol. X. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. + Drafted by Stackhouse and + Atherton, cleared by + Seelye and Davies, and approved by Irwin. Repeated Priority to + Beirut, USUN, and London for the + Secretary. + Washington, June 1, 1972, 2235Z. + +

97086. Tosec 257. London for Assistant Secretary Sisco. Subject: Possible Israel Action + Against Lebanon.

+

1. In wake Lod Airport attackOn May 31, + three Japanese guerrillas fired on a crowd of roughly 250 to 300 + people in the Tel Aviv airport, killing 25 and wounding 72. The + Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine claimed sole + responsibility for the attack, timing it to coincide with the + anniversary of the Arab-Israeli war of 1967 as well as retaliating + for the IDF killing of two Arab + guerrillas who had hijacked an airplane to Tel Aviv earlier in the + month. (New York Times, May 31, 1972, pp. 1 + and 27) and indications possible Israeli reprisal against + Lebanon we confront familiar dilemma: whether or not to seek to deter + retaliation which could have salutary inhibiting effect on fedayeen and + GOL in short run but, given + Lebanese circumstances, could also have more far-reaching destabilizing + effect in Lebanon with strains on U.S.-Lebanese relations and (as in + case of 1968 raid) with ultimate strengthening of fedayeen position in + Lebanon. On one hand fact is Israel makes its own decisions and on + previous occasions our direct appeals for them to stay their hand have + rarely if ever seemed to have effect. Our own feeling is that such + appeals for restraint have more often than not aroused Israeli + resentment that we were trying to close off a legitimate option and were + more sympathetic to Arab than to Israeli concerns. The higher the + emotional temperature the more likely this counterproductive emotional + reaction will be evoked. On other hand failure by us to indicate we + believe further violence could have broader destabilizing political + effects in area may well be construed by Israelis as U.S. acquiescence + to any action they may choose to take. It clearly not in our interest + that this be their understanding.

+

2. With foregoing considerations in mind we are inclined to think that + most effective tack would be low key but unmistakable signal as regards + our concerns about Israeli retaliation against Lebanon. Circumstances + may favor such an approach now. We slightly encouraged that Knesset + debate has been postponed and hope this indicates GOI wants to give time for emotions to + cool.

+

3. We therefore think, unless you have serious reservations, that you + should speak to GOI along following + lines at high level at earliest opportunity. As we informed GOI we have gone in strongly to Lebanese Government. We note that + in letter to Security Council Lebanese Government has expressed + disapproval such acts of violence and said it was not implicated in any + way in the matter. We have since been informed by Lebanese that GOL is planning to move to restrict + activities of PFLP. We were not given details as to precisely what + GOL would do, but they have said + they will keep us advised. In our conversations with Lebanese, while + making clear to them we cannot speak for GOI, we have expressed our judgment that their own actions + vis-à-vis PFLP will be factor GOI will + weigh in considering how to respond to Lod Airport killings.On June 2, the Embassy in Tel Aviv replied: + “Embassy does have serious reservations concerning procedure + outlined para 3 reftel. As Department notes, we have already + informed GOI, and Eban acknowledged to Ambassador, + that we have weighed in strongly with GOL. We have also told GOI initial GOL + response was ‘positive.’ Among other points Department proposes to + make to Israelis now, however, there are several which we feel will + only excite argument and convince Israelis that we do not take + sufficiently grave view of role which GOL permits terrorist organizations in Lebanon.” + (Telegram 3501 from Tel Aviv, June 2; National Archives, Nixon + Presidential Materials, NSC Files, + Box 609, Country Files, Middle East, Israel, Vol. X) In our + view, initial Lebanese response has been so far so good. While doubt + obviously remains how effectively GOL + will move against PFLP, we believe that they can best do so in + atmosphere free of further violence and will be watching closely for + evidence of how GOL plans to + proceed.Sisco met with Rabin on June 23 to inform him that U.S. officials + had “told Lebanon it should not expect support in Security Council + from us if it proceeds with its decision in principle to take recent + incidents there.” The Assistant Secretary added that they had + “declined the Lebanese request that we press Israel for release + prisoners taken June 21 but we had said we would inquire what + Israeli intentions were re these prisoners.” Sisco then asked Rabin for more information + regarding Israel’s patrolling policy on the Lebanese border. The + Israeli Ambassador said, “Israeli policy would continue as long as + Lebanese territory used as fedayeen base against Israel,” defending + Israeli patrolling actions as “necessary to forestall fedayeen + attacks.” As for the prisoners, Rabin said that Israel “wanted package deal covering + all Arab and Israeli POWs and was in touch with ICRC.” (Telegram 114024 to Tel Aviv, + June 24; ibid., Box 1168, Saunders Files, Middle East Negotiations + Files, Middle East—Jarring + Talks, June 1–30, 1972)

+ + + Irwin + + +
+ +
+ + 294. Memorandum From Harold + Saunders of the National Security Council Staff to the + President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential + Materials, NSC Files, Box 647, + Country Files, Middle East, Middle East (General) Vol. IX. Secret. + Sent for information. At the top of the page, Kissinger wrote: “Let’s get him + stopped, HK.” Another note by Haig reads: “Eliot informed.” All brackets are in the + original. + Washington, June + 19, 1972. + + SUBJECT + Current State Department Line on the Middle East + +

Reports of recent conversations that Sisco has held with diplomats here in Washington move me + to raise a basic question about the posture we should take toward the + Arab-Israeli impasse over the next few months. This question is + sharpened by Egyptian rejection this week of Secretary Rogers’ February proposal for + proximity talks on an interim agreement.For + Rogers’s proposal, see + Document 276. Egypt’s rejection of his + proposal was conveyed to Greene by Ismail on June 17. Ismail told Greene that Egypt considered the United States + “responsible for the failure of the talks in 1971” and considered + Rogers’s proposal of + February 1972, “unacceptable.” (Telegram 1787 from Cairo, June 18; + National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 658, Country Files, + Middle East, Middle East Nodis/Cedar/Plus, Vol. V)

+

The question is: Do we want to continue prodding the Egyptians gently to + respond positively to our proposal for proximity talks on an interim + agreement, or do we want to lie low until after the election? It seems + obvious to me that the answer is to lie low, and State may be more + inclined to do that following the Egyptian reply. But that was not the + line Sisco was following before + their reply.

+

The basic line that Sisco is + taking comes through in the two attached reports of recent conversations + with Ambassador Ortona and with Ashraf + Ghorbal.Attached but not + printed are telegrams 105507 to Amman, June 14, and 106539 to Cairo, + June 15. These telegrams reported Sisco’s meeting with the Italian Ambassador and his + meeting with Ghorbal. + The composite line that emerges from these conversations goes like + this:

+

—We see no immediate hope for Ambassador Jarring’s mission to achieve a new breakthrough but + continue to hope that an interim agreement might be achieved. We have + never had a reply from Egypt and are still awaiting one. [This, of + course, was overtaken by the Egyptian reply last weekend.]

+ +

—In Moscow we stuck with the Rogers Plan, namely that we thought that both the US and + the USSR should encourage negotiations + and the best way to do this was to press for an interim agreement.

+

—The “next step” after the summit would be for the US to talk with the + Egyptians.

+

—Sadat has three options: renewed + hostilities, accepting “our proposals” or continued drift. [This ignores + that there could be other ideas for conducting negotiations.]

+

—If the USG and the Egyptian Government + could conduct an objective exchange on the respective positions of Egypt + and Israel on an interim agreement, it might come as a surprise to Cairo + to see that the gap between them is not as great as has been supposed. + [The Egyptian reply over the weekend said the gap would remain wide as + long as we rejected a specific link between an interim settlement and + total Israeli withdrawal.]

+

—Sisco would like an opportunity + some day to review these exchanges with Foreign Minister Ghaleb, whom he had not met.

+

The obvious problem consists of the following elements:

+

—The Egyptians feel strong bitterness over what they consider Sisco’s having deceived them last year + by misleading them about the breadth of the gap between the Egyptian and + Israeli positions.

+

—The Egyptian and Israeli positions remain far apart, not close as + Sisco maintains.

+

—Ghorbal, at least, reports the + Soviet impression following the US–USSR summit that the Administration + is placing its emphasis more on the issue of an overall settlement than + on the interim settlement. When Sisco talks up the interim settlement, he creates + confusion about the real Administration positions and raises questions + in Egyptian minds about what the real US position is.

+

—Each time Sisco has one of these + conversations and disseminates it by cable, his line becomes the line + picked up around the area. Thus the impression is created that the gap + is narrow and that the US continues to press actively for negotiations + on an interim settlement.

+

The operational point is whether someone should suggest either to + Secretary Rogers or to Sisco that they should lie low between + now and November. This would not necessarily mean that we would have to + take a completely negative line. We could say that we have put a variety + of proposals on the table and that no one is precluded in the present + situation from pursuing one of these. To maintain the reverse—that we + are actively seeking to begin negotiations at this time—simply turns the + Egyptians off and puts us in the position of appearing to pursue + something that the Egyptians have written off, at least in present + context.

+
+ +
+ + 295. Editorial Note +

Violence across the border between Israel and Lebanon prompted both + countries to lodge complaints with the UN Security Council, which met on June 23, 1972, to discuss + the issue. (Yearbook of the United Nations, 1972, + page 161) In a statement before the Security Council the following day, + U.S. Representative to the United Nations George H.W. Bush said, “To be sure, terrorism in the + Middle East breeds its own deplorable reactions,” referring to the May + 31 terrorist incident at the Lod Airport in Israel and the Israeli + reprisals in Lebanon that occurred earlier in the week. He concluded: + “As I stated last February in this Council, the United States fully + supports the territorial integrity and political independence of + Lebanon. My government hopes and expects that the incidents of the type + that have occurred along the Israeli-Lebanon border will not recur; that + all forces, regular and irregular, will remain on their own side of the + frontier; and that quiet will be maintained. We are aware that the + Government of Lebanon has made efforts to control terrorist elements on + its territory—elements whose activities are as inimical to the interest + of many Arab governments as they are to Israel. We are pleased to note + the absence of cross-border incidents for nearly four months. We hope + that all authorities in the area, including particularly the Government + of Israel, will facilitate and not impede these efforts by Lebanon to + control terrorism.” (Telegram 2330 from USUN, June 25; National Archives, Nixon Presidential + Materials, NSC Files, Box 1168, + Saunders Files, Middle East Negotiations Files, Middle East—Jarring Talks, June 1–30, 1972)

+

On June 26, the Security Council adopted Resolution 316—which France, + Belgium, and the United Kingdom had introduced—by a vote of 13–0–2, with + the United States and Panama abstaining. The resolution condemned the + recent Israeli attacks against Lebanon; asked that Israel refrain from + resorting to further military actions against Lebanon; deplored the + “tragic loss of life resulting from all acts of violence and + retaliation” in the region; expressed the “strong desire that + appropriate steps will lead” to the release “in the shortest possible + time of all Syrian and Lebanese” personnel “abducted” by Israel on June + 21; and declared that if these steps did “not result in the release of + abducted personnel or if Israel fails to comply with the present + resolution,” the Security Council would consider further action. (Yearbook of the United Nations, 1972, page 173) + After the vote, Bush made a + statement before the Security Council criticizing the resolution for not + being either fair or balanced, for not showing equal concern for + casualties on both sides of the Israeli-Lebanese border, and for not + giving equal weight to Arab terrorist attacks and strikes by Israel. He + said: “Mr. President, that resolution did not fulfill what we strongly + believed are the needs of the situation and my delegation therefore was obliged to + abstain.” (Telegram 2345 from USUN, + June 27; National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1168, Saunders Files, + Middle East Negotiations Files, Middle East—Jarring Talks, June 1–30, 1972) The United States + introduced its own draft resolution, but the Security Council did not + put it to a vote.

+
+ +
+ 296. Memorandum of ConversationSource: National Archives, Nixon Presidential + Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger + Office Files, Box 131, Country Files, Middle East. Secret; + Sensitive. Sent for information; outside system. All brackets are in + the original except those indicating text that remains classified. + The conversation took place in Kissinger’s office. + Washington, June 27, 1972, + 12:15–12:45 p.m. + + PARTICIPANTS + Ashraf Ghorbal, Head of + UAR Interest Section + Henry A. Kissinger, + Assistant to the President + Harold H. Saunders, NSC Staff + +

Dr. Ghorbal opened the + conversation by congratulating Dr. Kissinger on the “tremendous job” that he has been doing + in recent months. Ghorbal smiling + said he was especially proud of a “fellow Harvard alumnus.”

+

Dr. Kissinger thanked Dr. + Ghorbal and said that he + hoped it would be possible to make “progress in other areas” as + well.

+

Dr. Ghorbal replied, “I am + counting on it.”

+

Dr. Kissinger replied that + realistically until after the US election no significant moves are + likely on our side. This did not preclude moves initiated by others. But + in spite of that, we recognize the need for a peaceful solution of the + Middle East problem. It will certainly be a major item on the agenda of + the new administration. How that solution will be arrived at, “I don’t + know.” However, we do have to find a way.

+

Dr. Kissinger continued that his + philosophy is to promise less but to deliver on everything we promise. + He felt that the trouble with the US-Egyptian dialogue has been that it + did not lead to any concrete results. We expected too much.

+

Dr. Ghorbal said he was glad to + hear this. He always likes to look to the horizons. Dr. Kissinger’s concern about the + dialogue, he felt, was valid. There has been unhappiness over it in + Cairo.

+ +

Dr. Kissinger said that, very + honestly, he had been afraid this would happen.

+

Dr. Ghorbal said that he would not + report this conversation formally and that if there were anything Dr. + Kissinger wanted to say it + could be reported orally when Ghorbal returned to Cairo. Dr. Kissinger’s conversation with the + Foreign Minister Mahmoud Riad in + New YorkKissinger met with Riad on October 7, 1971, at David + Rockefeller’s residence in New York City. A memorandum of + conversation is ibid., Box 134, Country Files, Middle East. + had never been reported.

+

Dr. Kissinger said that the + reason negotiations conducted from the White House have been effective + is that we have never promised anything we could not deliver. We have + never really had a good dialogue with Egypt about what is “do-able” and + in what time frame.

+

Dr. Ghorbal said that he felt that + Cairo needs now more than a general promise that the US will try again + “after elections.” Cairo’s patience has been “eaten up.” In fact, Dr. + Ghorbal felt that Cairo had + shown more patience since May than he had expected. He said he would + like to take to President Sadat + and to Hafez Ismail some + indication of what they can hope for.

+

Dr. Kissinger said he would like + to start a dialogue with someone on the Egyptian side “who can keep a + secret.” He said he frankly had not believed that the road we were on + would work. On the one hand, Egypt has asked for too much too soon. On + the other hand, the US has “fudged up the differences” between Israel’s + position and Egypt’s to make it seem as if they were smaller than they + actually were. He said this had all worked to Israel’s advantage—not + that anyone here tried to make it turn out that way, but it has been the + objective consequence of what we have done that the status quo has been + continued, and that is what Israel has hoped for.

+

Dr. Kissinger reiterated that in + principle we are prepared to establish a high-level contact. Out of that + we would hope to crystallize some position. This would, however, have to + be kept secret—even from our own people.

+

Dr. Ghorbal [1½ + lines not declassified].

+

Dr. Kissinger, [2 lines not declassified].

+

Dr. Ghorbal asked what kind of + meetings Dr. Kissinger + envisioned. Would it just be Dr. Kissinger and one other to start and where might they + be?

+

Dr. Kissinger said that the + negotiations would be conducted “under my supervision.” He might be in + Europe sometime for Vietnam talks, although he usually makes those trips + in secrecy. He might be in Europe for a few days in September for the Olympics. Or talks could + take place in New York.

+

Dr. Ghorbal said he would like to + come to the substance of the issue. He recognized that Dr. Kissinger could not promise anything + at this point. “But what can you give me at this stage?” We had the + Rogers proposal two years + ago. Where are we in this regard? Where are we on such issues as + demilitarized zones, Sharm al Sheikh, Gaza? He asked how Dr. Kissinger could help him to make his + case in Cairo.

+

Dr. Kissinger said that he did + not want now to make a concrete proposal. The US stands very “generally + behind” the Rogers Plan. The + problem is, in his view, that we have to start Israel moving. From some + points of view making maximum demands plays into Israel’s hands because + Israel finds it easier to turn those aside.

+

Dr. Kissinger continued that he + could see how the Israeli logic might work: The Israelis could argue + that Egypt alone cannot defeat Israel and that the US and USSR will not fight over the Middle East. + Therefore, they could justify going on with the status quo rejecting all + demands that they could find any reason to reject. If, on the other + hand, tensions get too bad, the Israelis can play on the anti-Communist + line to get US support.

+

Dr. Kissinger said that he knew + Dr. Ghorbal was familiar with + Israel’s views on Sharm al Sheikh. “Just thinking out loud,” Dr. + Kissinger said he felt that + it might be possible to work out some formula for a period of time which + could meet Israel’s security concerns. He said he personally could not + be persuaded that Sharm al Sheikh is as essential to maintaining access + to the Gulf of Aqaba as the Israelis feel. The strategic question is one + problem, but the symbolic problem is another. If we talked informally, + we could deal with problems of that kind and seek answers.

+

Dr. Kissinger said that we do not + support the “Israeli possession of the Sinai.” What we need is a formula + to move Israel back. The US is willing to press Israel back but not to + dissociate itself to the extent that it would encourage an attack on + Israel.

+

Dr. Kissinger continued that we + have “gone through the Bergus + exercise”See Document + 238. and “drawn lines on a map until we are sick of + it.” Two years ago he said he favored an interim settlement if it could + be done quickly and with modest terms. He felt that if too much were + tried, the withdrawal would be too much for Israel and too little for + the Arabs. But if a very small withdrawal had been agreed then Israel + would have begun moving and yet the Arabs would have been able to + demonstrate that the small Israeli withdrawal was obviously not a final + settlement.

+ +

Dr. Ghorbal said that it is, + frankly, difficult to sell this point of view in Cairo.

+

Dr. Kissinger said that the + important thing is that Israel should give the Sinai back. The US is + accused of “balance of power politics” and that is a lot of nonsense. We + realize that Egypt is a big country and an important country in the + Middle East. We have no conceivable interest in being in a permanent + state of estrangement from Egypt. If we can normalize relations with + Peking, why can we not do so with Cairo? We have gone against the China + lobby in the United States and we will go against “other lobbies” + provided we can establish a framework where we both know what we are + doing.

+

Dr. Ghorbal said he would convey + this to Hafez Ismail. He jokingly + said that he referred to him as Hafez Kissinger.

+

Dr. Kissinger said with a smile + that he had often been referred to as “the American Ismail.”

+

Dr. Ghorbal said that he wanted to + explain the apprehension that exists in Cairo that Israel will try to + make permanent whatever line is drawn on a map short of a complete + withdrawal.

+

Dr. Kissinger said that he felt + that the mistake that had been made was to get into the issue of drawing + partial withdrawal lines on a map. What has to be done is for us to sit + down and to talk about where we want to come out in the end. Otherwise, + we will never get off dead center. The Israelis are “fanatics,” and “you + are strong minded too.” This is a tough problem, and any solution is + extremely difficult.

+

Dr. Ghorbal said that Cairo is + apprehensive about the “last mile.” That is the most difficult.

+

Dr. Kissinger agreed. He said the + reason he is reluctant to present a final proposal is that he felt we + needed to talk about some sort of interim arrangements perhaps. Just + speaking hypothetically, he wondered whether we could agree on a final + line that would define sovereignty but find some way to provide for + Israeli military control for some interim period—“civil bases” or some + other such arrangement. The US would be willing to bring some pressure + on Israel—but it would have to be pressure that is short of causing a + war.

+

Dr. Kissinger continued that we + cannot have an interest in having Egyptian leaders for the next fifty + years blaming the US for a settlement that Egypt could not live with. He + said he would rather live with the present situation than to have to + live with that kind of solution.

+

Dr. Kissinger went on saying that + we have not had an exchange at “our level”—meaning at the level of the + two presidencies. Maybe there is nothing at all that can be done. But on + our side, we see Egypt as a permanent and important factor in the Middle + East. We recognize that there + have been many faults on our side. Dr. Ghorbal could convey this in Cairo.

+

Dr. Ghorbal replied that Cairo + does not understand the notion that there have not been high-level + exchanges. After all, Secretary Rogers was in Cairo and saw President Sadat.See + Document 227.

+

Dr. Kissinger said that Dr. + Ghorbal could tell Cairo—he + has been in Washington long enough to observe this—that the question is + not a question of whether the level is high or low but that one has to + observe where the agreements that have been worked out in this + Administration have been negotiated. The things that have been worked + out in this Administration have not been negotiated in that channel.

+

Dr. Kissinger concluded that we + would have to wait until after the election for any significant + developments, but a meeting could take place before. He again cautioned + Dr. Ghorbal that it would be of + the utmost importance to maintain the secrecy of any such exchanges.

+

They parted with an exchange of best wishes.

+ + + Harold H. Saunders + Saunders initialed “H.S.” above his typed + signature. + + +
+ +
+ 297. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security + Affairs (Kissinger) to President + NixonSource: Library of Congress, + Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box TS–31, Jordan, Chronological + File. Top Secret; Sensitive. Sent for action. A stamped notation on + the memo indicates the President saw it. + Washington, June + 30, 1972. + + SUBJECT + Israeli-Jordanian Settlement + +

We have received covertly from the political advisor to King Hussein, Zaid al Rifai, a paper which outlines the King’s view of + the shape of a final peace settlement between Jordan and Israel. + Rifai indicates that the + paper represents the maximum concessions they believe are possible. Our comments are solicited + on ways they might improve their position “within the realm of the + possible.” (Tab A)Not printed.

+

The Jordanians believe that if there is to be a movement toward a + solution with the assistance of the United States at the highest level, + they are willing to go “a little beyond the Rogers proposals.”

+

Although the Jordanians are not willing to make territorial concessions, + they are prepared to sign a peace treaty with the Israelis embodying + necessary guarantees, including a determination of ways to change the + June 4, 1967 demarcation line into a permanent boundary. They will + accept rectifications of the line, on a reciprocal basis, in order to + make it a permanent boundary. Their position with regard to Guarantees, + Jerusalem, Gaza and Refugees has the following basic elements:

+

—Guarantees. The guarantees would include total + demilitarization of the West Bank, no outside Arab Armed Forces + stationed on Jordanian soil, a peace treaty, eventual establishment of + normal relations, participation in joint development projects, and + agreements on a procedure for Israelis to reside inside Jordanian + territory near Jewish religious shrines.

+

—Jerusalem. Jerusalem would be an open city under + dual sovereignty of Israel and Jordan, with complete freedom of movement + within the city. The Israelis could occupy the Jewish quarter of the old + city in return for one of the Arab quarters in the Israeli sector.

+

—Gaza. Gaza would become part of the Palestine + region of the United Arab Kingdom (name for a new Jordan with two + autonomous divisions—Palestine and Jordan), with a corridor linking Gaza + to the Palestinian region. This would put the majority of the + Palestinians in the area under one umbrella.

+

—Refugees. Refugees who fled the West Bank in 1967 + could return after any peace treaty. Other refugees would be given the + right of repatriation or be compensated. The Jordanians believe that no + more than ten percent would choose to live in Israel; the remainder, + after proper financial compensation, would be settled in Jordan. With + necessary funds the Jordanians are prepared to commence a resettlement + of refugees in the East Bank immediately.

+

The Jordanian position may provide a possibility for movement toward a + settlement. I have sent a noncommital reply to Rifai, but it might be worthwhile to + explore this in greater detail with a meeting this summer.

+ +

Recommendation

+

That you approve my arranging a meeting with + Rifai to further examine this initiative.Nixon + checked the option indicating his approval for a meeting between + Kissinger and Rifai. On July 27, Haig forwarded a July 15 letter + to Kissinger from Rifai on the most recent secret + meeting between Jordan and Israel, which occurred on June 29. + Haig wrote: “He + [ Rifai] is exceedingly + gloomy about Israeli inflexibility. He is convinced that: 1) Israel + will retain most of the territories, even at the price of perpetual + war; 2) Only the U.S. can exert sufficient weight to change Israel’s + position; 3) Israel not only accepts the inevitability of a new war + but is preparing for one, as early as the end of this year; 4) + Jordan will not participate in a new war as long as there is any + hope of settlement.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential + Materials, NSC Files, Box 137, + Kissinger Office Files, Country Files, Middle East) (Meeting + will be between Kissinger and + Rifai.)

+
+ +
+ 298. Telegram From the Department of State to the Interests Section in + EgyptSource: National + Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 658, Country Files, Middle East, Middle + East Nodis/Cedar/Plus, Vol. V. Secret; Immediate; Nodis; Cedar + Double Plus. Drafted by G. Norman Anderson (NEA/EGY), cleared by + Rogers (in substance) + and Davies, and approved by + Atherton. + Washington, July 19, 1972, 2253Z. +

130867. Subject: Your Meeting with Ghaleb. Ref: Cairo 2040.In + telegram 2040 from Cairo, July 19, Greene informed the Department that Sadat’s announcement one day + earlier of the expulsion of all Soviet military advisers and experts + from Egypt had “substantially” changed the context in which his + previously scheduled meeting with Ghaleb would occur. Greene wrote: “All these things considered, my + (luckily) postponed meeting with Ghaleb takes on a new perspective and could be + markedly significant in determining what happens in next few weeks.” + He then asked for authorization to, among other things: 1) obtain + clarification on the details of the Soviet military withdrawal from + Egypt; 2) state that the U.S. Government received Sadat’s message to Nixon “with particular interest”; + and 3) mention that the U.S. Government had received Saudi Prince + Sultan’s account of his talk with Sadat. (Ibid.) On July 18, Sadat announced in a speech before + the Central Committee of the Arab Socialist Union that he had + ordered all Soviet “military advisers and experts” out of Egypt and + that all Soviet bases and equipment would be placed under Egyptian + control. He did not make clear, however, if the Soviet combat + personnel manning the missile emplacements or the Soviet pilots + would also be withdrawn. (New York Times, + July 19, 1972, p. 1)

+

1. It is very firm policy view here that USG should not repeat not inject itself in any way into + current developments in Egyptian-Soviet relations. In your meeting with + Ghaleb you should carefully + avoid indicating, even in indirect way you propose reftel, any curiosity + about these + developments.In a telephone + conversation with Dobrynin + on the morning of July 20, Kissinger said: “We don’t really know what the hell + is going on in Egypt, and we want you to know that, as far as we’re + concerned, our discussions remain unimpaired. We’re not going to + play little games there. We have given the strictest orders to our + diplomats to stay the hell out of that discussion and not to make + any approaches or anything else.” (Transcript of a telephone + conversation between Kissinger and Dobrynin, July 20, 9:45 a.m.; National Archives, + Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC + Files, Henry Kissinger + Telephone Conversation Transcripts, Box 15, Chronological + File) It follows, therefore, that you should not proceed + along lines suggested para 3 reftel. Re para 3(D), You should make no + reference at this time to our having received report of Prince Sultan’s + discussions with President Sadat. + While we of course have telegraphic account in Jidda’s 2385Not found. of highlights of these + discussions, Saudi Ambassador has not yet presented Sultan’s report + formally and has requested appointment with Secretary in next few days + to do so. Furthermore, Jidda’s 2385 indicates Sadat has impression from Sultan that + USG contemplates early new + initiative on Middle East, and we do not want in any way to feed this + idea.

+

2. In making presentation authorized in State 125234,In telegram 125234 to Cairo, July 12, the + Department instructed Greene + to inform Ismail that: 1) + U.S. officials conveyed Egypt’s negative reply to Rogers’s February proposal to + Israel, including an account of comments that Ismail made when he presented + Egypt’s reply (see Document 278); 2) the + United States did not think “this is best course for Egypt, but it + is Egypt’s decision to make”; and 3) Israel had not yet given U.S. + officials a reaction to Egypt’s reply. (National Archives, Nixon + Presidential Materials, NSC Files, + Box 658, Country Files, Middle East, Middle East Nodis/Cedar/Plus, + Vol. V) Greene’s meeting + with Ghaleb occurred on the + morning of July 20, during which the Egyptian Foreign Minister asked + five questions designed to determine how the United States planned + to approach the Arab-Israeli dispute in the coming months. The + questions concerned: 1) proximity talks for an interim agreement; 2) + further U.S.-Soviet discussions; 3) whether Four-Power discussions + would be reactivated; 4) how the Jarring Mission would be supported; and 5) what + alternatives to what had already been discussed would be considered. + They also discussed Sadat’s + decision to terminate the Soviet military advisory presence in Egypt + and the resulting state of Egyptian-Soviet relations. (Telegram 2054 + from Cairo, July 20; ibid., Box 638, Country Files, Middle East, + Arab Republic of Egypt (UAR), Vol. + VIII) you should limit yourself to talking points in paras + 6–9, eliminating paras 10, 11 and, as you have recommended, para 12. You + should also make clear to Ghaleb + that points you are making on proximity talks per State 125234 as + modified above are based on instructions received week ago, to avoid any + risk that they will somehow be interpreted as reaction to current + developments in Soviet-Egyptian relations.

+

3. Re para 3(C) reftel, you should limit yourself at this point to + expressing thanks for President Sadat’s reply of July 17Sadat’s July 17 message + to Nixon, contained in + telegram 2029 from Cairo, July 18, addressed the President’s June 26 + oral message to him concerning the Moscow Summit and expressed his + appreciation for Nixon’s + “initiative” to keep him informed about the summit’s results. + Sadat also commented + broadly on the importance of the United States and the Soviet Union + reaching out to each other to “strengthen cooperation between them” + and “for the sake of world peace and the peoples of the world as a + whole.” (Ibid., Box 763, Presidential Correspondence 1969–1974, + UAR President Anwar Sadat, Vol. 3) The Interests + Section conveyed Nixon’s + June 26 oral message to Sadat + regarding the Moscow Summit on June 27. (Telegram 1857 from Cairo, + June 28; ibid., Box 638, Country Files, Middle East, Egypt, Vol. + VIII) and to informing Ghaleb it has been passed to President Nixon.

+ +

4. FYI: We agree + with your assessment that we are in new situation, which will require + our keeping antennae finely tuned. Before we begin to draw firm + conclusions, we will also be waiting to see what sort of Soviet presence + in fact remains in Egypt following implementation of Sadat’s decision. Another major factor + will be how Egypt decides to treat USG + under new circumstances. President Sadat’s speech July 24That + day, Sadat delivered a 4-hour + speech before the Central Committee of the Arab Socialist Union, + during which he asserted Egypt’s independence from both the Soviet + Union and the United States. He declared that he would not steer + Egypt toward the United States, which he claimed some had suggested + he do, nor would he allow a total rift between Egypt and the Soviet + Union to develop. (New York Times, July 25, + 1972, p. 1) In March, the Central Intelligence Agency’s Directorate + of Intelligence produced a 10-page memorandum entitled + “Soviet-Egyptian Relations: An Uneasy Alliance,” which concluded: + “Egypt is anxious to reduce its dependence upon the Soviet Union, + but cannot effectively do so until the Arab-Israeli impasse is + resolved. In the meantime, the tenet that ‘the enemy of my enemy is + my friend’ will prevail, and the state of relations between Egypt + and the Soviet Union will continue on the uneasy base achieved after + the debacle of 1967.” (Central Intelligence Agency, OCI Files, Job + 79T00832A) may provide clue in this regard. End FYI.

+

5. Exempt from general declassification schedule of Executive Order + 11652.

+ + + Rogers + + +
+ +
+ + 299. Memorandum From Director of Central Intelligence Helms to the President’s Assistant for + National Security Affairs (Kissinger)Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box + 131, Country Files, Middle East. Secret; Sensitive. All brackets are + in the original except those indicating text that remains + classified. + Washington, July + 24, 1972. + + SUBJECT + Request [1 line not declassified] for + Initial Top-Level United States Government Reaction to Egyptian + Termination of the Soviet Military Advisory Program + +

1. The following development has occurred since [2 + lines not declassified] 13 July 1972 the thoughts of Egyptian + President Anwar Sadat regarding + the possibility of secret talks between Egypt and the United States, as + outlined in my memorandum dated 18 July 1972.Not found.

+

2. During a 19 July 1972 meeting [2 lines not + declassified] asserted that President Sadat’s decision to terminate the + Soviet military advisory program has created a new opportunity for the + USG. [name not + declassified] expressed the view that it is of great importance + to both his government and to the United States Government that the + latter seize this opportunity and make the most of it. [name not declassified] urged that the United + States Government move—and with minimal delay—to develop a concrete plan + for future action for submission to President Sadat on how to progress towards a + peaceful settlement of the Middle East problem. As an opening step [3½ lines not declassified] if I could secure and + forward via Agency channels as soon as possible an initial top-level + United States Government reaction to the Egyptians’ termination of the + Soviet military advisory program. [name not + declassified] said that he would like the United States + Government’s reaction as soon as possible and expressed the hope that we + would be able to reply by 1 August 1972.

+

3. [less than 1 line not declassified] asked, as + his purely personal question, whether the recent Egyptian decision to + terminate the Soviet military advisory program might have any effect on + President Sadat’s apparently + negative position, as set forth in my memorandum dated 18 July 1972, on + the possibility of an early, secret, high-level contact between our two + governments. [name not declassified] gave as his + opinion that high-level contact should be made only in the event that + the United States Government is prepared to offer new ideas and some + concrete plan.

+ +

4. [3½ lines not declassified] indicating that the + Egyptians remain very much interested in the interim solution for the + reopening of the Suez Canal, a partial Israeli withdrawal from the + Canal, and an international presence at Sharm As-Shaykh.

+

5. I would appreciate your advising me what kind of response you prefer + that [less than 1 line not declassified] convey + to [name not declassified] in this + connection.See footnote 4, Document 305.

+

6. The Department of State has not been informed of this exchange.

+ + + Richard Helms + Helms signed “Dick” above his typed + signature. + + +
+ +
+ 300. Conversation Between President Nixon and the President’s Assistant for National + Security Affairs (Kissinger)Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White + House Tapes, Oval Office, Conversation No. 752–6 (2). No + classification marking. The editors transcribed the portion of the + tape recording printed here specifically for this volume. Brackets + indicate portions of the original recording that remain classified, + were omitted by the editors, or were unclear. + Washington, July 25, 1972, 9:55–10:35 + a.m. +

Nixon: What’s your analysis of + the Sadat thing?See footnote 2, Document + 298. I read the—

+

Kissinger: I wanted to talk to + you about it. Of course, I—

+

Nixon: I don’t what the hell it + was.

+

Kissinger: It’s not concrete. + Well first, I’ll give you my analysis and then I have a concrete + operational proposal I want to give you.

+

Nixon: Yeah. Yeah.

+

Kissinger: First of all, I think + the guy is highly unstable.

+

Nixon: Right.

+

Kissinger: You cannot talk of a + coherent long-range strategy.

+

Nixon: Right. Right.

+

Kissinger: There could be three + basic motivations. One is, it’s a blackmail move against the Russians, + that he’s kicking out some of them—

+ +

Nixon: Right.

+

Kissinger: Keeping another batch + of them there in order to blackmail them into giving him a long-range + offensive weapons and needed supplies. Incidentally, one of the better + negotiations we’ve conducted is the one between this building and the + Russians for the last eight months, maneuvering them into a restraint + position on the Middle East.

+

Nixon: Yeah.

+

Kissinger: Because that is what’s + adding the fire. The one that started with your talk with Gromyko.See Document 252.

+

Nixon: Yeah.

+

Kissinger: Because that’s what + Sadat is screaming about. He + made a speech yesterday saying the Russians were too cautious.For Sadat’s July 24 speech, see: Henry Tanner, “Egyptian + Asserts Moscow Caution Caused Ousters,” New York + Times, July 25, p. 1, and “Excerpts From President + Sadat’s Speech in Cairo + Criticizing Policies of the U.S.,” ibid., p. 10.

+

Nixon: I saw that, yeah, + blackmail the Russians.

+

Kissinger: The second possibility + is that he wants to make a move towards us.

+

Nixon: Yeah.

+

Kissinger: Being dissatisfied + with the Russians. And if you remember when we talked about it two years + ago when you went on television with I think it was Howard K. + Smith—See footnote 3, Document 134.

+

Nixon: Oh, yeah.

+

Kissinger: From Los Angeles. We + were saying that if the Egyptians get dissatisfied enough with the + inability of the Russians to produce something they will be forced to + move to us. And that that is the time to brutalize the Israelis. We + never said that publicly. The third possibility—and the most worrisome + one—is that he is getting rid of the Russians—so that he can jump the + Israelis and force the Russians into supporting him.

+

Nixon: That’s what worries + me.

+

Kissinger: That’s the one that + worries me most. Now—

+

Nixon: [unclear] need to do + something, and then—

+

Kissinger: The Israelis probably + figure we have elections. They might well come to terms with clobbering + the bejeezus out of the Egyptians. Now operationally—

+

Nixon: What’s arguing with him + about all that?

+ +

Kissinger: He stops all three of + them really. He’s trying to get offensive weapons. He has [3 seconds not declassified] approached Dick + HelmsSee Document + 299. and asked us to make a specific proposal. And + thirdly he’s started harassing Israeli airplanes with SAM batteries from his side. Now, what I + would like to do, and I wanted to talk to you about it today—in fact, I + was talking to Helms this + morning about these messages.

+

Nixon: Right.

+

Kissinger: First, I’m going to + call in Rabin and tell him + we’ve kept them afloat, we’ve been the best friend they’ve ever had, + we’ve saved them from being brutalized.

+

Nixon: Right.

+

Kissinger: But they sunk the + Egyptians during this campaign.

+

Nixon: That’s right.

+

Kissinger: [unclear]

+

Nixon: That’s right.

+

Kissinger: And they must have no + illusions.

+

Nixon: Let me say, I would say + that, even though it might jeopardize the elections, I’m not going to + fool around.

+

Kissinger: Exactly.

+

Nixon: He’s got to know that.

+

Kissinger: And I will tell Mr. + Rabin this week. Two, I + think we should return the following answer to the Egyptians. We should + say, “Look, you’ve had three years of proposals. You want to deal with + the White House, we don’t operate that way. The way we like to operate + is to have an understanding in principle first of what they are trying + to accomplish, to lay out a game plan, and then we can then come up with + some proposal. Therefore if you want to talk to us send somebody over + late September/early October.” Say honestly we can do nothing before the + elections. Because we can’t, Mr. President. If we made a big proposal on + the Middle East, the Jewish community will go up in—

+

Nixon: Oh, the hell with them. + I’m not going to touch the Middle East.

+

Kissinger: In fact, if we made + the proposal now the Russians would consider it an anti-Russian move + too.

+

Nixon: That’s correct.

+

Kissinger: So what I think we + should do is to have the—is to propose to the Egyptians that they send + my counterpart over here at the end of September/early October, and then work out + a game plan with them—maybe at Camp David or someplace quiet.

+

Nixon: Good. Good.

+

Kissinger: That keeps them happy + [and] keeps the Russians quiet.

+

Nixon: Yeah. All right, you’ll + talk to Rabin and have them + send that over. And the other thing is you naturally have got to talk to + Dobrynin cold turkey on this + too, for him. I don’t know what the hell Dobrynin—

+

Kissinger: Well, I have given + Dobrynin an assurance that + we would not take advantage of the situation. That we would not move + unilaterally.During a meeting with + Dobrynin the afternoon + of July 20, Kissinger told + the Soviet Ambassador: “We were not aware of these events + beforehand. We had not yet fully understood their significance. Nor + did we know the extent of Soviet withdrawal. In any event, I wanted + Dobrynin to know that + the President had issued the strictest orders that there would be no + U.S. initiatives toward Cairo and that we would not try to gain + unilateral advantages.” The memorandum of conversation is printed in + Foreign + Relations, 1969–1976, volume XV, Soviet Union, June + 1972–August 1974, Document 16.

+

Nixon: What’s he think of it? Or + does he—

+

Kissinger: Well, he hasn’t told + me. Well, we got sort of a stupid letter from Brezhnev in which Brezhnev points out that they thought + up this idea of their own withdrawalDobrynin gave Kissinger the letter at their July + 20 meeting. Brezhnev wrote: + “As a result of the exchange of views between the Egyptian + leadership and ourselves it was decided to withdraw part of our + military personnel from Egypt. In determining our position in this + question we proceeded, on the one hand, from the fact that the + contingent now being withdrawn by us, has in the main, fulfilled its + functions. On the other hand, I will tell you frankly, we acted with + account of the exchange of views which took place between us while + discussing the entire range of problems of the Middle East + settlement. It seems to me that this will help dispel doubts which + may have been there as to how we intend to solve the question of our + military personnel in Egypt in case of settlement of the Middle East + problem. We believe that you will find the opportunity to use this + step for bringing your appropriate influence on the leaders of + Israel.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box + 130, Country Files, Middle East, Middle East—Sensitive (RN), + 1971–1974)—

+

Nixon: Yeah.

+

Kissinger: —of having confidence + in you. It’s a dumb statement and now you owe them something.

+

Nixon: Yeah. Yeah.

+

Kissinger: Now that’s sort of a + stupid thing for them to say because it’s so transparent. But what I + think we should do is to answer that letter to Brezhnev in a very warm way.

+

Nixon: Good. Good. Do that.

+

[Omitted here is conversation unrelated to the Middle East.]

+
+ +
+ + 301. Letter From President Nixon to Soviet General Secretary BrezhnevSource: National Archives, Nixon Presidential + Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger + Office Files, Box 130, Country Files, Middle East. No classification + marking. Written in an unknown hand in the upper right-hand corner + of the page is the note: “Handed by K to D[obrynin] 5:45 pm, + 7/27/72.” + Washington, July + 27, 1972. + + Dear Mr. General Secretary: + +

I am most grateful for your letter of July 20 sending me your thoughts on + the recent events in Egypt.See footnote 8, Document 300. These + events impose on us the special obligation to conduct our relations in + conformity with the principles of the Moscow declaration and the + relationship that has developed between us.

+

As Dr. Kissinger has already + informed Ambassador Dobrynin on + my behalf,See footnote 7, Document 300. the United States had no + advance knowledge of the recent events in Egypt. The fundamental + principle which has guided and will guide American policy in this + situation is that an effort by either of us, in the Middle East or + elsewhere, to gain unilateral advantage at the expense of the other is + incompatible with our broader mutual objectives and mutual + responsibility. Experience shows that pursuit of such marginal + advantages is futile as well as dangerous. The fundamental improvement + in the US-Soviet relationship, to which my Administration is unalterably + committed, can be maintained only on the basis of equality and respect + for the legitimate security and political interests of both.

+

Mischievous speculation looking for disruption of our relationship is to + be anticipated in such a situation as this. But you and I did not sign + the Basic Principles of US-Soviet RelationsNixon and Brezhnev signed the Basic + Principles on May 29 at the Moscow Summit; for the text, see Public Papers: Nixon, 1972, pp. 633–635. in order + to repudiate them and all that they represent in the first real test of + their application.

+

On the Middle East question specifically, Dr. Kissinger has also assured your + Ambassador, at my behest, that nothing that has occurred affects the + general principles discussed between your Foreign Minister and Dr. + Kissinger to promote a just + overall settlement cooperatively. The US will take no unilateral actions + in the Middle East. Elaboration of these basic understandings will be + carried forward on the schedule agreed upon by the US side. There has + not been and will not be any breach on our side of the strictest + confidentiality of the US-Soviet exchanges.

+ +

In my view, the recent events only dramatize the dangerous volatility of + the Middle East, which underscores the urgent US and Soviet interest in + helping to resolve the perennial crisis. This is clearly in the interest + of peace and in the interest of furthering and safeguarding the great + progress we have achieved in US-Soviet relations.Brezhnev’s + response was handed to Kissinger on August 11 by Dobrynin; see Foreign + Relations, 1969–1976, volume XV, Soviet Union, June + 1972–August 1974, Document 25.

+

Sincerely,

+ + + Richard Nixon + + +
+ +
+ 302. Telegram From the Department of State to the Interests Section in + EgyptSource: National + Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 658, Country Files, Middle East, Middle + East Nodis/Cedar/Plus, Vol. V. Secret; Priority; Nodis; Cedar Double + Plus. Drafted by Anderson; cleared by Kissinger, Sisco, and Atherton; and approved by Rogers. + Washington, July 31, 1972, 1801Z. +

137986. For Greene from + Secretary. Subject: Response to Ghalib’s Five Questions. Ref: Cairo + 2054.See footnote 5, Document 298.

+

1. You should seek appointment with FonMin Ghalib for purpose of responding to his “five + questions” (reftel).

+

2. FYI: We wish + to avoid giving Egyptians impression we are inclined to rush in with new + diplomatic initiative. Given continued divergence of views between + parties directly concerned, we see no evidence that mechanisms such as + Four Powers, US-Soviet talks, or four or five power statements would + work any better now than before, and we do not favor any such moves. + While we are not optimistic re Jarring reactivation, we are continuing to take line + that we would welcome any progress he could achieve we believe + “proximity talks” on interim Canal agreement continue to offer most + practical approach. In this latter connection, Israel wants us to + continue to stress importance of interim Canal talks under US aegis paralleling + emphasis given to this in PM Meir’s speeches.For the text of + Meir’s July 26 speech to + the Knesset, see Israel’s Foreign Policy: + Historical Documents, volumes 1–2: 1947–1974, Chapter XII, + The War of Attrition and the Cease Fire, Document 38. + End FYI.

+

3. Begin talking points:

+

(A) We appreciate FonMin Ghalib’s + frank comments conveyed at your last meeting on July 20 on his view that + the situation has acquired new momentum. We also understand GOE’s + particular interest in knowing the attitude of USG regarding the coming period. We have studied FonMin’s questions, and wish to deal + with them in a spirit of sincerity and desire for a productive exchange + of opinion.

+

(B) We especially wish to stress one fundamental aspect of US policy on + the question of peace in the Middle East. We do not believe that a + solution of the conflict can be devised by external parties. The + experience we have acquired over the past several years has only + reinforced this view, along with our further belief that progress toward + a settlement can only be made through a genuine negotiating process, in + which the parties directly involved in this dispute take an active + diplomatic role in coping with their differences. We are not suggesting + that talks at outset start face to face, but as Secretary has recently + noted in public statements, ME is only + area where meaningful negotiations not in train. FYI (you should draw as + appropriate on what Secretary has said in this regard, pointing to talks + on such problems as Vietnam, Indo-Pak, Berlin, etc).

+

(C) We do not claim that the concept of “proximity talks” without + preconditions on an interim Suez Canal agreement is the only way to + begin negotiations towards a final settlement but of proposals now on + table we feel this most feasible. We are not pressing the GOE on + “proximity talks” but hope that in the fullness of time such a concept + will be recognized as a way to begin moving along the difficult road to + peace. We remain available, as we have repeatedly stated, to play a role + in this process if Egypt desires us to do so. As Egypt knows, Israel + accepted the proposal of proximity talks without preconditions last + February.See Document 276. In this connection, we know one of + Egypt’s principal concerns has been that any interim agreement not + become final settlement. We hope PM Meir’s stress in her speech that such an interim + agreement would be temporary has been noted in Cairo.

+

(D) We want to dispel the notion that resolution of the Middle East + conflict is of greater importance to the United States than it is to the + parties directly involved. We do not agree that our position on need for + negotiations favors one side against the other. We see Egypt’s bargaining position as one of + equality. Egypt can offer Israel what it most wants: Long-term security + and acceptance as a Middle Eastern state. We do not view entering + negotiations as a “concession” on the part of Egypt. We would not claim + that negotiations would be painless. Both sides would have to expect to + make difficult decisions. We are speaking frankly because we do not wish + to be thought to be attempting to mislead any of the parties.

+

(E) We note Jarring plans shortly + to resume his activity. As we have previously informed GOE, if Jarring can bridge the fundamental + chasm that exists between the parties, we would welcome such a success. + We see no need for UN resolutions or + four or five power declarations at this point in support of Jarring Mission. As Egypt knows, + impasse presently exists—with Egypt insisting that mandate for Jarring include his February 1971 memo + and GA resolution of December 1971See, respectively, footnote 2, Document 205 and footnote 4, Document 270. whereas Israel insists + that Jarring’s mandate rests + solely on SC Resolution 242. We doubt + this chasm can be bridged at this time, and for this reason feel + step-by-step approach envisaged on an interim Suez Canal agreement is + most pragmatic way to proceed.

+

(F) Our previous experience with US-Soviet talks and discussions within + the Four Power framework does not lead us to believe that these forums + can contribute to starting up negotiations between the parties under + present circumstances. We wish again to emphasize that, in our view, + negotiations between the parties are the key to a settlement.

+

(G) Secretary Rogers will be in + NY for UNGA and looks forward to + meeting FonMin Ghalib at that time + and discussing Middle East situation with him.Greene met + with Ghaleb on August 3, + presenting the Department’s response to his five questions, as + instructed. Ghaleb asked him + if his presentation meant that the United States was “moving away + from SC Resolution 242,” to which + Greene responded that + “it did not mean that at all.” Finally, the Egyptian Foreign + Minister commented that a major impediment to an agreement between + Egypt and Israel was their “widely different” conceptions of peace. + (Telegram 2170 from Cairo, August 4; National Archives, Nixon + Presidential Materials, NSC Files, + Box 658, Country Files, Middle East, Middle East Nodis/Cedar/Plus, + Vol. V)

+ + + Irwin + + +
+ +
+ + 303. Conversation Between President Nixon and the President’s Assistant for National + Security Affairs (Kissinger)Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White + House Tapes, Oval Office, Conversation No. 759–5. No classification + marking. According to the President’s Daily Diary, Nixon and Kissinger met from 10:34 to 11:47 + a.m. (Ibid., White House Central Files) The editors transcribed the + portion of the tape recording printed here specifically for this + volume. Brackets indicate unclear portions of the original recording + or those omitted by the editors except “[in]” and “[laughs]”, added + for clarity. + Washington, August + 2, 1972. +

[Omitted here is conversation unrelated to the Middle East.]

+

Kissinger: Actually, you know, in + the Middle East, our negotiations—we can claim 90 percent of the credit. + If we had done what State did, the Russians would still be in Egypt. The + way they conducted these negotiations created so much frustration in + Egypt. I mean, we’ve now got to move after the election. Incidentally, + Sadat sent you a + message.See Document 299. I sent him a message, as I told you + last week, that I’d be prepared to meet a representative of his [in] + early October to—he wanted a private contact with us.See footnote 4, Document + 305. I said early October is the earliest. He sent + you a message saying he wants you to know he wants you to be + re-elected.

+

Nixon: Hmm.

+

Kissinger: [laughs] I said + [unclear] almost unanimous that he understands why you say early + October.

+

Nixon: Well, our main game there + is the Russians, as I told you.

+

Kissinger: Well, the way I would + visualize it is if we could get a deal with the Egyptians, then we can + make the same deal with the Russians, and then everybody will be + happy.

+

Nixon: Well, what about the + Israelis? [unclear]—

+

Kissinger: You’ll have to + brutalize the Israelis.

+

Nixon: That has to be done in any + event.

+

Kissinger: Mr. President—

+

Nixon: It’s in their own best + interests.

+

Kissinger: —if we’re ever going + to screw the Israelis—it’s not even screwing them—if we’re ever going to + brutalize them—

+

Nixon: We’re doing what’s best + for them.

+

Kissinger: I think the first half + of next year is the time to do it. Get it done. Then, by the ’76, + there’ll be a new card.

+ +

Nixon: The main thing is to do it + for the reason that our interests vis-à-vis the Soviet Union must + override everything else in the world today.

+

Kissinger: My objection to + Rogers wasn’t that we were + brutalizing the Israelis; it’s that we were cementing the Russians into + the Middle East—

+

Nixon: That’s right.

+

Kissinger: —and that they were + likely to produce a war. If you can pull off—if the Egyptians think that + after moving to you that things got fluid—

+

Nixon: Yeah?

+

Kissinger: —while when they went + to the Russians it didn’t work, you have restored the American position + among the Arabs. You’ve—the Israelis trust you enough to know that they + get—and we can get them a better deal, I believe, than what Rogers offered them. Not as good as + they want, but better than what they were offered two years ago.

+

Nixon: That’s right.

+

Kissinger: So, while the Israelis + won’t be happy—

+

Nixon: That’s right—

+

Kissinger: And this is why we + shouldn’t make too many moves before November, but after that we + should—

+

[unclear exchange]

+

[Omitted here is conversation unrelated to the Middle East.]

+
+ +
+ 304. Telegram From the Department of State to the Interests Section in + EgyptSource: National + Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 658, Country Files, Middle East, Middle + East Nodis/Cedar/Plus, Vol. V. Secret; Nodis; Cedar Double Plus. + Drafted by Sterner and + approved by Sisco. + Washington, August 8, 1972, 1454Z. +

143197. Ref: Cairo 2170.See footnote 6, Document 302.

+

1. Re para 8 reftel, you are correct in assuming that you should not rpt + not keep GOE informed of our conversations with Israeli officials unless explicitly instructed + to do so. Obviously relationship between USG and Israel on one hand, and between USG and Egypt on other, are different + requiring different levels of confidence in dealing with these two + governments. As to our briefing of Israelis about our exchanges with + Egyptians, we carry this out in manner to carefully protect sources or + other areas of confidence. We are also aware of desirability of being + frank with Egyptians when we can and have sought in the past to keep + them informed. We will continue to follow this practice.

+

2. Exempt from general declassification schedule of Executive Order + 11652.

+ + + Rogers + + +
+ +
+ 305. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security + Affairs (Kissinger) to President + NixonSource: National Archives, Nixon + Presidential Materials, NSC Files, + Kissinger Office Files, Box 131, Country Files, Middle East. Top + Secret; Sensitive; Exclusively Eyes Only. Sent for information. A + stamped notation on the memorandum indicates the President saw it. + All brackets are in the original except those indicating text that + remains classified. + Washington, August + 14, 1972. + + SUBJECT + Our Strategy Towards Egypt + +

On my earlier memorandum on the Egyptian expulsion of the Soviets (Tab + A)Attached but not printed. you + noted the reports that the Egyptians do not want to wait until the + November elections for the US to seize this “new opportunity.”

+

As you know, in late July the Egyptians approached us and sought to open + a confidential channel to the White House via Director Helms [less than 1 + line not declassified].See Document 299. They wanted “new + proposals” from us. We agreed to open the channel and agreed in + principle to confidential exchanges.On July 29, a U.S. official + met [text not declassified] in Cairo to + present talking points provided by Kissinger’s office, in which Kissinger agreed to open a secret + channel and also suggested that a secret, high-level meeting occur + in late September or early October. (Memorandum from Helms to Kissinger, August 1; National + Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 131, Country + Files, Middle East) On July 30, [text not + declassified] confirmed that the message from Kissinger had been passed to + Sadat. (Memorandum from + Helms to Kissinger, August 2; ibid.) + We were willing to begin initial exchanges with someone designated by + Sadat at any location, as + early as late September.

+

However, we made clear that we would not accept preconditions. Our + approach in these talks would be as follows: In all the previously + successful negotiations conducted at the Presidential level, we did not + go into detailed substantive negotiation until we had already achieved a + preliminary understanding on the direction and general principles that + the outcome would follow. In this case we insisted to the Egyptians that + we talk initially about what was realistically achievable. This was the + essence of the matter and the only justification for the direct + involvement of the President.

+

The Egyptians have welcomed the establishment of the channel but have not + yet responded to the above groundrules we proposed.Helms + reported to Kissinger on + August 3 that [text not declassified] had + volunteered two suggestions that would “contribute toward creating + an optimum climate for U.S.-Egypt relations and, more specifically, + have a salutary effect on Sadat” while he weighed his response to the proposal + for high-level talks. First, he suggested that the U.S. Government + “refrain from making public statements during this period which + might have an upsetting effect on Sadat,” such as recent calls by Rogers and Sisco for direct negotiations; + “overly warm endorsements of Israel;” or “announcements of new aid + for Israel.” Second, he suggested that Nixon or Kissinger send a personal message to Sadat. (Memorandum from Helms to Kissinger; ibid.) In response to + the first recommendation, Kissinger’s office passed a message [text not declassified] that said that, + because only Nixon, + Kissinger, and Haig knew about the recent + exchanges, he “must understand if some actions from other branches + of the government are not finely tuned to this effort.” (Memorandum + from Haig to Helms, August 8; ibid.)

+

We have received many reports that Sadat does not want to wait until November. But we have + offered him preliminary talks by late September, and we cannot conduct + these talks under any groundrules other than the above. The alternative + of military action will be suicidal for him. The Israelis plan to behave + scrupulously and give him no pretext for such action.

+
+ +
+ + 306. Memorandum From HoskinsonSamuelof the National Security Council Staff to the + President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential + Materials, NSC Files, Box 658, + Country Files, Middle East, Middle East Nodis/Cedar/Plus, Vol. V. + Secret; Nodis; Cedar Double Plus. Sent for action. In a covering + memorandum to Kissinger on + September 1, Haig wrote: + “State is again off and running. Hoskinson’s memorandum is exactly right and the + cable at Tab A which has been cleared by Secretary Rogers should not be sent.” + Haig concluded: “We + obviously have another Sisco + ploy underway which we must get on top of + immediately.” + Washington, August + 29, 1972. + + SUBJECT + Middle East Settlement Effort + +

State has sent over for clearance a cable (Tab A)The draft telegram is attached but not + printed. intended to smoke out current Israeli views on an + interim settlement and the extent to which they might serve as a basis + for restarting the Israeli-Egyptian dialogue. Put in Sisco’s terms, we should now go back + to Dayan to (1) make it clear we + consider his recent remarks “significant,” (2) ascertain whether and to + what extent he is speaking for the government and, (3) let him know that + we remain available to play a diplomatic role with Egypt if the Israelis + so desire.

+

By way of background, you will recall that last week the Chargé, + Zurhellen, invited Dayan over for an informal talk (Tab + B)Telegram 5429 from Tel Aviv, August + 21, is attached but not printed. during which Dayan made the following major + points:

+

—If Sadat gave up his demand for + an Israeli commitment to full withdrawal as part of an interim + settlement, Dayan would recommend + to Mrs. Meir that Israel drop all + previous positions and start again from scratch with the Egyptians.

+

—While Israel could not retract its position that the final line of + withdrawal could not be the pre-war boundary, he would favor putting + that issue aside and simply say nothing about an interim settlement. + Dayan said there would be a + majority in the cabinet for this approach.

+

—In addition to specifying in an agreement that the “interim solution” + was not a final one, there could be “intrinsic conditions” in the + agreement militating against the situation becoming frozen. For + instance, he could agree to Egyptian forces crossing the Canal into the + Egyptian-held area of + Sinai to the extent required for security, but he would not want, in an + interim agreement, freedom for full Egyptian army attack elements to + cross the Canal. In return, he would be agreeable to Israel being placed + under similar conditions in its zone of occupation, thus making it clear + Israel was not to be accorded full sovereign rights on its side of the + line.

+

Sisco believes that Dayan’s remarks reflect an Israeli + desire to try to build on new developments in the area and to provide + Sadat with a politically + viable alternative to the military option which Sadat might otherwise be tempted to + exercise to put the Middle East back on the U.S. and Soviet front + burner. He thinks that the Israelis are also concerned about the + possibility that they may soon face a new Waldheim and Egyptian initiative at the UNBush met with Waldheim on September 7. Responding + to the Ambassador’s presentation of the Department’s views about his + possible future initiatives, Waldheim said that “any initiative at present time + would be useless, in fact, extremely bad.” He remarked that the next + year might offer new opportunities but said that he realized that + the United Nations could not “simply keep repeating ‘Jarring, Jarring, Jarring,’” particularly because of + Israel’s “lack of confidence” in the Special Representative’s + “objectivity.” Israel had also indicated to him, he said, that it + did not want the “big powers involved in any [Middle East] peace + conference.” Finally, he commented that the proximity talks favored + by the United States “would make him very happy,” adding that Egypt + “made it clear to him” that it was “hoping for more understanding + from [the United States] and others following expulsion of Soviets.” + (Telegram 3121 from USUN, + September 7; National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1169, Saunders Files, + Middle East Negotiations Files, Middle East—Jarring Talks, September 1–30, + 1972) and would much prefer progress on an interim + settlement.

+

If he gets any hint of encouragement at all from the Israelis, Sisco’s next step would undoubtedly be + to pass on Dayan’s views to the + Egyptians. The purpose would be to test the possibility—unlikely as it + may seem—that Sadat would be + willing to drop his demand for an Israeli commitment to full withdrawal + at the outset, if he learned from us that there was a prospect for the + Israelis revising their positions on other aspects of an interim + settlement and would give reassurance that an interim arrangement would + not become final.

+

At best, any scenario like this would be a fairly long shot. For one + thing, there is no real evidence that the Israelis are all that + interested in an interim settlement at the moment and Dayan—as has frequently been the case + in the past—may simply be floating a few of his own ideas. Even if the + Israelis were serious, it seems unlikely that Sadat is prepared to go this far, + especially with nothing more concrete from the Israelis than a promise + to start from scratch on all issues but the one most important to him. + Finally, there is a legacy of distrust of U.S. efforts like this on both + sides of the Canal.

+ +

In short, I feel that any action like this now would be premature, both + in terms of our domestic political situation and the situation in the + Middle East. If the Israelis really want to pass something along to + Sadat they already know we + would be willing and would have no need to probe us indirectly. + Sadat, for his part, may be + looking for us to make a move now that he has expelled the Soviets, but + a false step now could well be more damaging than doing nothing and + taking a more meaningful step later.

+

Recommendation: That you call Sisco and inform him that an effort + such as this seems premature to you.Attached to a September 5 memorandum from Eliot to Haig is a revised version of the + telegram reflecting Kissinger’s concerns regarding the original draft. + (Ibid., Box 658, Country Files, Middle East, Middle East + Nodis/Cedar/Plus, Vol. V) No documentation on whether the telegram + was sent has been found.

+
+ +
+ 307. Memorandum for the President’s Files by the President’s Deputy + Assistant for National Security Affairs (Haig)Source: + National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Special + Files, President’s Office Files, Box 77. Secret. The meeting took + place in the Oval Office. There are tape recordings of this meeting + and an earlier meeting. (Ibid., White House Tapes, Oval Office, + Conversation Nos. 771–2 and 771–5) Transcripts are printed in Foreign + Relations, 1969–1976, volume E–1, Documents on Global + Issues, 1969–1972, Documents 93 and 95. + Washington, September 6, 1972, 10 + a.m. + + SUBJECT + President’s Meeting with Secretary of State Rogers, Dr. Kissinger and :nl M/Gen. Haig + + + PARTICIPANTS + President Nixon + Secretary of State William + Rogers + + Henry A. Kissinger + + M/Gen. Alexander M. Haig, + Jr. + + +

The meeting was held for the purpose of discussing the situation in + Munich which resulted in the death of 11 Israeli athletes together with + Arab terrorists.Armed with automatic + rifles, members of the Black September Organization (named after + Jordan’s suppression of the fedayeen uprising two years earlier) + invaded the Olympic Village at the Munich games and broke into the + quarters of the Israeli team early in the morning on September 5. + Two of the Israeli athletes were killed immediately, and nine others + were taken hostage. German authorities spent hours negotiating with + the guerrillas, who demanded the release of 200 Arab commandos + imprisoned in Israel, before eventually providing them with + helicopters to take them and their Israeli captives to an airport at + Furstenfeldbruck, where a Boeing 707 airplane bound for Cairo was + awaiting their arrival. The 23-hour affair ended at 1 a.m. on + September 6. In an attempt to rescue the hostages, hidden German + sharpshooters exchanged fire with two of the guerrillas as they + moved between the helicopter and the plane. All nine of the + remaining Israeli athletes as well as four of their captors + died.

+

The President stated that he had spoken to Ambassador Rabin the previous evening and found + him to be completely rational. The President continued that the US must + pursue a delicate line which demonstrated justified sympathy for Israel + but which did not serve to encourage Israeli retaliation which could + only further escalate tensions and dangers in the Middle East. The + President noted that he had called Mrs. Meir from San Clemente the day before and assured her + that the United States was working diligently on the terrorist + problem.The President, in San Clemente, + spoke on the telephone with Meir on September 5 from 10:33 to 10:37 a.m., after + which he returned to Washington. He spoke to Rabin, who was in Vancouver, + British Columbia, from 11:15 to 11:27 p.m. (National Archives, Nixon + Presidential Materials, White House Central Files, President’s Daily + Diary) It now remains to outline a number of measures, + practical and public, with which to deal with the problem.

+

Secretary Rogers noted that it + was tragic that the German Government had handled the public + notification of the situation so poorly with initial reports that the + athletes were safe followed by a complete reversal of this news. The + Department of State had formed a task force that had been working all + the previous day and throughout the night on the situation. There was + some indication that the Israeli Government might ask the United States + Government to cancel its further participation in the Olympics. This + developed earlier that morning and General Haig, Dr. Kissinger and Secretary Rogers coordinated on a position which precluded our + becoming involved in this knotty issue. Nevertheless, it could come up + again in the hours ahead. The Secretary noted that one of the measures + which we might consider would be to direct the US flags in Washington be + placed at half mast and declare a day of mourning.

+

The President stated that the United States should not agree to drop out + of the Olympics and that Israel should remain consistent with the + position it announced earlier to see the games through.

+ +

Secretary Rogers stated that all + had agreed on this stand the day before since it would be a terrible + slap at the Germans to precipitously withdraw. It appeared that the + Germans were in deep difficulty already for their handling of the + situation at the NATO airbase. Secretary Rogers stated that most nations were in deep sympathy + with Israel but were they to withdraw from the games that sympathy could + be reversed. An additional problem was the fact that even if the United + States were to accept Israel’s logic it could not control either its + athletes or the head of the Olympic Committee.

+

The President directed that Israel be informed that we wished to + continue.

+

Dr. Kissinger commented that it + was important that the United States not permit Israel to “put the heat” + on us to withdraw. The President noted that withdrawal would be the New York Times/McGovern approach.

+

Secretary Rogers again asked + about the propriety of lowering our flags and a day of mourning. The + President stated that we had not done similar things when deaths + occurred in Ireland or during the earthquake in Peru and we must be + careful not to demonstrate a double standard. Secretary Rogers suggested that we could call + for a period of silence during the funeral of the Israeli athletes. He + added that the Israelis apparently do not want high-level delegations in + order to avoid politicization and perhaps we should send some of our + athletes such as the US swimmer who is of Jewish descent.Reference is to Mark Spitz, who won a record seven + gold medals at the Munich games. In any event, we should + abide carefully by Israel’s own wishes.

+

Secretary Rogers stated that the + Department of State is not favorably inclined towards the suggestion + that we convene the Security Council on the terrorist issue. The + President stated that this kind of action would butt us up against China + and the Soviet Union but if the US were to go to the Security Council + condemning countries which harbor guerrillas, this would in effect + support Israel while at the same time not encouraging it to take + escalatory retaliatory action.

+

Secretary Rogers stated that a + cable had been prepared to the Prime Minister outlining our disgust and + sympathy.Nixon’s September 6 message to Meir is printed in Public Papers: Nixon, 1972, p. 858. He noted that + he would make a strong statement at the International Hijacking + Conference being + conducted at the Department of State that day.At the September 4–15 meeting of the subcommittee + of the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) that + concerned hijacking, Rogers + made a statement on September 6 in which he said: “I know that you + share with me the deep sense of outrage and grief at the senseless + and tragic events which have so marred the Olympic games. These + murders by extremist terrorists are more than crimes against the + citizens of one country. The very spirit which the Olympic games + represent, the spirit of brotherhood and of friendly competition + among people all over the world, has been seriously challenged by + this demented action. In this time of sorrow all men of good will + must ask, What can we do to help insure that such crimes do not + continue?” (Department of State Bulletin, + October 2, 1972, p. 360) The President agreed that the + message should go and that the Secretary should make the statement. He + inquired what kind of a resolution we would seek should we decide to go + to the United Nations.That evening, + Kissinger told Rabin on the telephone that the + United States would “absolutely and very strongly” take the + initiative on a UN resolution. + (Transcript of a telephone conversation between Kissinger and Rabin, September 6, 11:07 a.m.; + National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Henry Kissinger Telephone + Conversation Transcripts, Box 15, Chronological File) On September + 10, Bush addressed the + UN Security Council and closed + by describing a resolution which he said “could be helpful in + addressing” the thrust of the remarks that had been made during that + session. (Telegram 3177 from USUN, + September 10; ibid., Box 1169, Saunders Files, Middle East + Negotiations Files, Middle East—Jarring Talks, September 1–30, 1972) The United + States presented, and the Security Council considered, draft + resolution S/10785, which did not pass. (Yearbook + of the United Nations, 1972, p. 173)

+

Dr. Kissinger stated that no + resolution would be likely to pass. The question is how to posture + ourselves. The resolution should talk about rules of conduct of those + who sponsor radicals who operate across international borders. It is + probable that the Peoples’ Republic of China would veto. On the other + hand, this would be a statesmanlike US position. It would likely + engender extensive debate and would tend to defuse Israeli emotions + during the critical hours ahead. Then when the General Assembly meets + the debate could continue. All this tends to control Israeli retaliatory + action.

+

The President stated that we should now turn to the public relations + aspects of the problem and following that bring Mr. Ziegler to the meeting.

+

Secretary Rogers again expressed + opposition to the United Nations initiative. Dr. Kissinger stated that the government + lawyers could develop a formulation which included something on border + crossing, something on countries who harbor organizations which operate + beyond their borders and in this way the US would go to the Security + Council in a statesmanlike posture and solicit the views of other + nations. Secretary Rogers stated + that it would be impossible to get any kind of action. Dr. Kissinger stated that this was true + but it would serve as a deterrent to Israeli action. Secretary Rogers stated that the Israelis would + not be impressed by Security Council action and that for the moment it + is important that we keep in close contact with them.

+ +

The President noted that we had been doing precisely this. He also noted + that the public statements made thus far by Israel were also + statesmanlike. Dr. Kissinger + stated that all of this is true. Nevertheless if we do nothing it is + probable that we will see strong Israeli action. Secretary Rogers urged that the President think + about this before proceeding with the UN + initiative.

+

The President stated that in his discussions last night with Ambassador + Rabin he underlined the + fact that despite the disadvantages of the tragedy it would bring the + terrorist activity to the attention of the world. Secretary Rogers stated that another advantage + of the tragedy was that it will again underline the need for an overall + settlement. He noted that Dayan + had made some overturesIn an August 11 + interview on the Israeli Government television network, Dayan said that the withdrawal of + Soviet military forces and advisers from Egypt would allow Israel to + redeploy troops along the Suez Canal cease-fire line. He added that + Israel would also be able to reduce the call-up of reservists for + active duty and remarked that there might be hope for an interim + agreement between Israel and Egypt. (New York + Times, August 12, 1972, p. 1) In his commencement address + to graduates of the Armed Forces Command and Staff School on August + 17, Dayan pushed Egypt to + accept an interim accord with Israel along a line that divided the + Sinai Peninsula. (Ibid., August 18, 1972, p. 6) See also Document 306. and that Egypt would + probably launch some initiatives in conjunction with the General + Assembly meeting this fall. This is the basic problem and only a + settlement will solve it. If Dayan was actually speaking for Israel then it is + important that we get the process started for another round of + negotiations.

+

The President stated that the situation in Munich will not soften up the + Israeli attitudes but will strengthen their hawks. Secretary Rogers agreed but said that this only + underlined the need for seeking a solution to the Middle East situation + and certainly there will be efforts in the fall to get negotiations + started.

+

The President stated that Secretary Rogers should make a strong statement at the hijacking + conference. Secretary Rogers + stated that with respect to the UN + initiative we should leave it open until he has an opportunity to check + the Israeli view.

+

The President instructed the Secretary to see what kind of a game plan we + could come up with for the United Nations. Secretary Rogers stated that his people were + tired and he hoped that Dr. Kissinger’s people would also work on this. Dr. + Kissinger stated that if the + decision is made to proceed in the UN it + must be done quickly.

+

The President stated that we might also have some legislation for the + Congress to get the Conventions for Hijacking, etc. moved. Also we + should give some thought to what the Congress could do on terrorism.

+ +

The President told Secretary Rogers to consider the UN initiative seriously, since it might just serve to buy + time. It serves as a visible reaction to the Israeli outcries. Secretary + Rogers said that he would + discuss it with Rabin although + he does not think the Israelis will support it because of their + anti-UN feelings. Secretary + Rogers continued to the + effect that feelings in Israel are very high against the Germans for + three reasons: (1) because they afforded poor protection to the Israeli + athletes, (2) because of the reporting of the incident, and (3) because + of the trigger-happy performance of the German police.

+

The President commented that it was ironic that the German Government + found itself in the position of protecting Israeli athletes. He stated + that in summary the following actions should be undertaken:

+

1. The cable sent to Mrs. Meir.

+

2. Secretary Rogers would make a + strong statement at the Hijacking Conference.

+

3. We would look into the feasibility of a UN initiative.

+

4. We would do whatever remained to be done with our own Congress with + respect to pending legislation and the possibility of new + legislation.

+

5. Secretary Rogers should ask + Ambassador Rabin about the + UN initiative, tell him that we have + no illusions but that it would serve to spotlight the issue.Rogers and + Rabin met on September + 6. A report on their meeting is in telegram 164170 to Tel Aviv, + September 8, printed in Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, volume E–1, + Documents on Global Issues, 1969–1972, Document 98. In his + September 6 Evening Report to the President, Rogers summarized the actions he + and the Department of State were taking; see ibid., Document 97.

+

Secretary Rogers asked that Dr. + Kissinger keep him informed + if he should have any contact with the Israelis. The President told + General Haig to do this should + Ambassador Rabin contact the + White House.

+

Secretary Rogers then noted as an + aside that the President should give a brief speech at the IMF + Conference since it was a good platform for an expression of the + President’s monetary policies. The President stated that Treasury + Secretary Shultz was opposed on the convertibility issue but that Mr. + Burns favored it. Secretary Rogers agreed that this was a problem.

+

Secretary Rogers recapitulated + noting that he would call Ambassador Rabin, that we should continue to consider lowering our + flags and that he would give the speech at the Hijacking Conference.

+

The President stated that he did not think the flag at half mast was a + good idea. Dr. Kissinger agreed. + Secretary Rogers said that we + would just do this in public buildings. The President stated maybe just + the White House. Dr. Kissinger + again stated that he disagreed. Secretary Rogers stated that an alternative would be a moment of + silence during the funeral. + The President stated that it might be worth considering. Dr. Kissinger stated that it was less + troublesome than lowering the flags. The President asked why not do + something on a personal basis. He could go to church at the time of the + funeral. This looked more spontaneous and more of an individual reaction + rather than a government reaction.

+

Press Secretary Ziegler was then + called into the Oval Office and was given the following press guidance. + He should discuss the fact of the meeting, the message to the Prime + Minister, and the fact that we are considering measures to include + consultations with other governments on an urgent basis to see what can + be done to prevent terrorist activity. The point should be made that the + President, Secretary Rogers and + Dr. Kissinger consulted + throughout the night and that close consultation was maintained with + Israel and Bonn. It should be noted that the President talked to + Ambassador Rabin and that + Secretary Rogers will see the + Ambassador later today. The point should be made that precautionary + measures have been ordered by the President to ensure the security of + Israeli and other foreign personnel and facilities in the rising + tensions.

+
+ +
+ 308. Telegram From the President’s Deputy Assistant for National + Security Affairs (Haig) to + President Nixon at Camp David, + MarylandSource: National + Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 609, Country Files, Middle East, Israel, + Vol. X. Secret; Sensitive. Stamped notations on the first page + indicate that the telegram was received at Camp David at 4:35 p.m. + and that the President saw it. + Washington, September 9, 1972, + 1950Z. +

WH27332. Memorandum for: The President. From: Al Haig. Subject: Rising Tensions in + the Mid-East.

+

Pursuant to your instructions, I conveyed to Israeli Minister Idan (in + the absence of Ambassador Rabin + who was en route to Israel) our strong concern for the retaliatory + action taken by the Government of Israel yesterday against refugee + terrorist camps.On September 8, Israeli + fighter jets struck 10 Palestinian guerrilla bases deep in both + Lebanese and Syrian territory in retaliation for the killing of the + Israeli athletes in Munich on September 6. (New + York Times, September 9, 1972, p. 1) I added that + this action was inconsistent with the assurances given by Ambassador + Rabin to Dr. Kissinger yesterday that Israel would + do nothing to upset the “trend of tranquility” in the Mid-East. Idan replied that Israel + intended to abide by the assurances given but that this did not mean + that Israel would stand by idly and not take some action against known + terrorist bases. He implied that the targets were precise and well + identified beforehand. He estimated that there may have been as many as + 90 to 100 casualties inflicted.

+

Idan pointed out that today’s air action over the Golan Heights resulted + from efforts by the Syrian Air Force to bomb Israeli territory. During + these air battles, which involved as many as 90 aircraft, three Syrian + SU–7s were shot down and a fourth was damaged but landed safely. Idan + stated that today’s actions were purely defensive in nature and that he + did not foresee any change in the assessment given by Rabin yesterday. I again reiterated + to him that you were concerned and hoped that Israel would not + jeopardize the good will built here as a result of the improving + situation in the Mid-East, and the sympathy for Israel which had been + engendered by the tragic events in Munich. It was made clear to Idan + that a continuation of clearly unprovoked military aggressiveness on the + part of Israel would not be understood nor condoned by the White + House.Nixon wrote “good” next to these last two sentences. + In a September 11 memorandum, Butterfield informed Haig that the President read this + telegram and “was especially pleased to note that you made it clear + to Minister Idan that a continuation of unprovoked military + aggression on the part of Israel would not be understood, or + condoned, at this end of the line.” (National Archives, Nixon + Presidential Materials, NSC Files, + Box 609, Country Files, Middle East, Israel, Vol. X) On September + 16, Kissinger told Idan: + “But if you do not stop these actions—I must tell you, you are + running an enormous risk in your relations with the President. You + launched an action the day before I go to Moscow and you launch an + action the day after I come back at a time when we are taking an + all-out diplomatic position in your defense and are preventing—going + into actions. We cannot take this. Now there is no President who has + done more for you, and I can tell you, I have just come from the + President and he asked me to call you.” (Transcript of telephone + conversation, 1:28 p.m.; ibid., Henry + Kissinger Telephone Conversation Transcripts, Box 15, + Chronological File)

+
+ +
+ + 309. Memorandum of ConversationSource: National Archives, Nixon Presidential + Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger + Office Files, Box 131, Middle East. Top Secret; Sensitive; + Exclusively Eyes Only. All brackets are in the original except those + indicating text that remains classified. The conversation took place + in Kissinger’s + office. + Washington, September 19, 1972, 3 p.m. + + PARTICIPANTS + Richard Helms, Director of + Central Intelligence + [name and title not declassified] + + Henry A. Kissinger + + Thomas K. Latimer + +

Mr. Kissinger: I appreciate your + role in passing these messages to the Egyptians.Reference is to the exchange of messages between + Kissinger and [text not declassified]; see footnotes 4 and 5, Document 305. On September 7, Kissinger received a message from + Sadat [text not declassified] in which the Egyptian President + discussed “considerations and views” that he wanted taken into + account as the United States and Egypt began a new initiative to + reach a settlement with Israel. (National Archives, Nixon + Presidential Materials, NSC Files, + Kissinger Office Files, Box 131, Middle East) Kissinger received another message + [text not declassified] on September 13 + in which the Egyptian intelligence chief commented that the United + States had abetted Israel in its “dangerous escalation” of violence + in the Middle East since the guerrilla attack at the Olympic games + in Munich. (Ibid.) In response, a message was passed [text not declassified] on September 19 that + advocated breaking the “cycle of violence” in the region, to which + [text not declassified] remarked that the + U.S. Government had “lost much good will in the Arab world” over the + previous few days for the September 10 veto of UN Security Council draft resolution + S/10784 condemning Israeli air strikes in Lebanon and for “refusing + to restrain Israel from killing innocent people in Lebanon.” + (Memorandum from Helms to + Kissinger, September 19; + ibid.) My first question is technical—can the Egyptians keep + these contacts secret or are they penetrated by the Soviets? Is it to + their advantage to let the Soviets know of our contacts?

+

[name not declassified]: They can keep it + secret.

+

Mr. Kissinger: But will they?

+

[name not declassified]: I think they will despite + their past record. It is in their interest to do so.

+

Mr. Kissinger: You have not + passed them pieces of paper? This has all been done orally has it + not?

+

[name not declassified]: Yes, all orally. They + take notes as do I when they pass us a message. It is not to Sadat’s interest to have these secret + contacts known because he fears raising false hopes among his + people.

+

Mr. Kissinger: He might use it as + blackmail with the Soviets but so far, he doesn’t have anything to tell + them. No substance has been exchanged.

+ +

[name not declassified]: Most Egyptians think + Sadat checked with us before + throwing the Soviets out. They do not think he would have been so stupid + as to have taken that action without checking with us first.

+

Mr. Kissinger: I think he was + stupid.

+

[name not declassified]: Sadat took that move as part of what he + saw as the national interest. He thought that the Soviets could not help + Egypt achieve one of the key elements in its national policy, the + regaining of the Sinai.

+

Mr. Kissinger: Why did he not + make us an offer to exchange the ouster of the Soviets in exchange for + pressure on Israel on our part?

+

[name not declassified]: There you are running + into the personality of Sadat. + His pride was involved and a lot of what he felt was . . .

+

Mr. Kissinger: Alright. Do you + know Ismail?

+

[name not declassified]: [less + than 1 line not declassified] He has an unusually well + organized mind for an Egyptian.

+

Mr. Kissinger: Do you mean + Sadat’s mind is not well + organized?

+

[name not declassified]: Sadat is more impetuous. [1½ lines not declassified]

+

Mr. Kissinger: What will he + expect from me?

+

[name not declassified]: He will ask what the US + wants in the Middle East and from Egypt specifically. They think we must + want something more than they have delivered on but they think they have + expelled the Russians and abided by what the Secretary of State called + for. They want to know what they can do to get on the same equal footing + with the US as Israel is.

+

Mr. Kissinger: They can emigrate + five million Egyptians. What I want to get away from is both sides + espousing impossible positions and then palavering endlessly about + technical steps which can never be implemented.

+

[name not declassified]: That is just what the + Egyptians want too.

+

Mr. Kissinger: What can Egypt + accept? Israel will not go back to the 1967 borders. Can Egypt accept + this as an acceptable position, that they must discuss an agreement + which will only represent a slight modification of the present + situation?

+

[name not declassified]: One thing you will + encounter is Egyptian insistence that we take a specific position on + elements of a settlement.

+

Mr. Kissinger: I will not get + into a discussion of a theoretical settlement. Are they capable of a + concrete discussion?

+

[name not declassified]: They say that the US has + to take a specific stand. They want to know how far the US is prepared + to go in pressing Israel.

+ +

Mr. Kissinger: That is none of + their business. All we need do is tell them we will try our best to get + a settlement once they agree to specific, concrete proposals.

+

[name not declassified]: They felt that last year + we did not go far enough in pressing Israel.

+

Mr. Kissinger: But there never + was a specific goal. I never could find out what specific points were + under consideration. Nothing concrete was on the table. Now, they want + to know: 1) what are we willing to do; 2) are we willing to make + concrete suggestions . . .

+

[name not declassified]: And will we exert maximum + pressure. They are convinced that Zionist plans call for gradual + expansion and that only the US has enough muscle to get the Arabs a + settlement.

+

Director Helms: Would it be + useful for [less than 1 line not declassified] to + put down what round one will look like?

+

Mr. Kissinger: I’d like to get + some feel for Ismail, his cast of + mind, what does he want, how will he go about getting it. Will he be + alone?

+

[name not declassified]: He might be alone, + Ghorbal might be along but + Ismail will do the + talking.

+

Mr. Kissinger: How will we get + him here? Shouldn’t he come openly?

+

[name not declassified]: He is an anonymous type, + not so well known as some Egyptians. He could be less conspicuous than + some.

+

Mr. Kissinger: Dick, should he + come openly?

+

Director Helms: Whatever you + want. We can get him here.

+

Mr. Kissinger: My concern is to + protect myself from all these various elements.

+

Director Helms: If he is to come + openly, say in connection with the UN + General Assembly.

+

Mr. Kissinger: Then you can get + us a place in New York. He could talk officially with Sisco for that matter. Do they + understand how our system works? Do they understand that they should + ignore things that come through some channels? Will they now propose a + date?

+

[name not declassified]: They understand that this + channel is the genuine one.

+

Director Helms: We should think + through the merits of a public versus a private trip.

+

Mr. Kissinger: I have to think of + what happens if it blows. I’d like to be one stage removed. If he has a + plausible reason for being here, I can always say he was here anyway so + I saw him.

+

Director Helms: Let us have a day + to think about it.

+

[name not declassified]: They were thinking of a + secret trip but that is not firm.

+ +

Mr. Kissinger: I’m not an expert + in arranging secret trips, you are the experts.

+

Director Helms: Judging from the + past two years you are now.

+

Mr. Kissinger: In general I lean + toward a theatrical arrangement which provides a plausible reason for + his trip.

+

Director Helms: We probably + should get him here publicly.

+

Mr. Kissinger: That’s what I + think.

+

[name not declassified]: He is somewhat stiff in + his bearing and rather haughty but he is thoroughly loyal to Sadat.

+

Mr. Kissinger: Well he and I + should get along very well. My desire to get next to this is near zero. + If it succeeds, it will buy us trouble. However, we cannot go on with + highly publicized proposals which go nowhere. We must have workable, + concrete proposals.

+

[name not declassified]: Sadat’s position is close to that.

+

Mr. Kissinger: I want to find out + what they can really live with. Then, we will see if it can be done. Can + you do a paper which 1) will restate what you have said here regarding + what they want, 2) give me a little background on Ismail, 3) how to set up the meeting—we + can use October to agree on something and then be in a position to + move.See Document + 310.

+

[name not declassified]: [less + than 1 line not declassified] understands the problem of moving + before November.

+

Mr. Kissinger: We cannot stop + sending Phantoms to Israel or everyone will ask what is up.

+

[name not declassified]: These exchanges have + already borne fruit in terms of US-Egypt relations. This was a breath of + fresh air to Sadat to learn that + the United States at the highest level was interested.

+

Mr. Kissinger: To be saddled with + Le Duc Tho and Ismail in one + month is more than one deserves. Will you [name not + declassified] be around and will you introduce us?

+

Director Helms: He will be + here.

+
+ +
+ + 310. Memorandum From Director of Central Intelligence Helms to the President’s Assistant for + National Security Affairs (Kissinger)Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box + 131, Country Files, Middle East. Secret; Sensitive. All brackets are + in the original except those indicating text that remains + classified. + Washington, September 22, 1972. + + SUBJECT + Nature of the Exploratory Talks + +

1. Considerations pertinent to the principal aspects of the proposed + talks with the Egyptian government are set forth below, in accordance + with your request of 18 September 1972.The + request was actually issued on September 19. See Document 309.

+

2. President Sadat’s decision to + enter into secret preliminary talks with the United States Government to + explore the prospects for peace in the Middle East was determined by + certain facts of life in the prevailing situation in Egypt and the + Middle East, which considerations will also shape Sadat’s approach to these talks. In + parlous financial straits and faced with a deterioration of its over-all + economic condition that cannot be arrested without peace, Egypt as a + whole, at all levels, recognizes its need for peace. Egypt’s leadership + recognizes and accepts what it was unwilling to accept prior to 1967, + that the price it must pay for its 1967 defeat by Israel is Egyptian + agreement to allow Israel to exist as a state and in conditions of + genuine peace. The unresolved question for negotiation + concerns only that of Israel’s existence within what borders. + Sadat unquestionably had the + great majority of his people with him when he pursued with the United + States in 1971 the possibilities for a peaceful settlement; his + political troubles at home began only when those efforts collapsed + leaving Sadat and the country in + a no war-no peace quandary which it found intolerable to live with + indefinitely.

+

3. The available evidence indicates that the Egyptian leadership + recognizes that the regaining of Sinai, which is Egypt’s cardinal + national objective, is impossible to achieve by military means because + of preponderant Israeli military strength. In terminating recently the + Soviet military advisory program, Egyptian leadership was well aware + that it was weakening itself militarily for an extended period if not + permanently. The Egyptian decision in this regard can only be + interpreted as reflecting Sadat’s + conclusion that a military solution was unrealistic even with their + former military relationship with the Soviets and that Egypt’s main + objective therefore can only be achieved through some form of peaceful negotiating process. + Sadat’s whole conduct since + his assumption of power supports the conclusion that this has been his + belief all along and that for him the chief importance of Egyptian + military strength consisted only in developing as much credibility of + military threat as was possible for tactical bargaining purposes related + to a negotiating process.

+

4. Among the various considerations that contributed to Sadat’s decision to alter their + military relationship with the Soviets, another was his awareness that + the Soviet presence in Egypt had long been a factor disturbing to the + United States and complicating the quest for peace. Indications [less than 1 line not declassified] suggest that + Sadat probably hoped that one + of the effects of his decision concerning the Soviets would be to unlock + to some degree the existing deadlock and improve the possibility for a + renewal of American interest in seeking a peaceful settlement of the + Middle East problem. Sadat very + likely interprets in this light the timing of the United States + Government’s 29 July initiative on preliminary talks.See footnote 4, Document + 305. + Sadat’s termination of the Soviet + military program, which evoked a universally favorable reaction in + Egypt, eased the internal pressures which had been building around + Sadat and bought him time, + perhaps as much as a year. But malaise and the same pressures will grow + again if the no war-no peace impasse is not eventually resolved.

+

5. While there is real urgency therefore about + Sadat’s need for peace, + there are also real limits on how far he can go and how much he can + concede to get peace. In public opinion in Egypt at all levels, + the emotionalism attaching to the belief that no land lost in 1967 + should be permanently yielded to Israel in a peace settlement and to the + belief that no direct negotiations should be conducted with Israel so + long as it is in occupation of Egyptian soil, is also a fact of life + which Sadat cannot cavalierly + ignore without political peril.

+

6. Against this background, Sadat’s approach to the proposed exploratory talks is likely + to reflect the following:

+

a. The Egyptian leadership is so deeply persuaded of the United States + Government’s total alignment with Israel that it will be entering the + proposed talks without optimism, skeptically, doubtful that any major + breakthrough will result—but hopeful, nevertheless, because of its great + need for peace, and with the feeling that it cannot afford to pass up + any opening or conceivable opportunity for movement towards an honorable + peace.

+

b. It is improbable that Sadat will be undertaking preliminary talks with the + illusion that any grandiose, overall plan for a full settlement of + the Middle East problem + will emerge from the talks. [1½ lines not + declassified] indicated that they are thinking in terms of a + partial Israeli withdrawal with concomitant reopening of the Suez Canal + as a first step in a gradual piecemeal approach to some eventual final + settlement. The Egyptians will be probing to establish what the United + States believes to be realistically obtainable from the Israelis in a + partial settlement, i.e., the depth of partial withdrawal, Egyptian + military presence on the east bank of the Canal, and the nature of the + linkage between partial and final settlement.

+

c. The Egyptians do not believe however that they can + afford to acquiesce in partial steps towards final peace, which do + not lead to further movement towards that ultimate end. + Therefore, the Egyptians predictably will press the United States in + these talks for the general lines of the sort of eventual final + settlement which the United States envisions. They will endeavor to + flush out United States positions on the separate elements of a final + peace, such as the final border, the status of Sharm ash Shaykh and of + Gaza, the nature of international guarantees for the peace, the extent + of demilitarization of Sinai, the presence of Egyptian military + personnel there. One of their two principal objectives in these talks + will be to seek mutual clarifications of the present positions of both + governments on the elements of a peaceful settlement. The Egyptians will + not wish to talk in generalities in these talks, but will insist on + getting down to brass tacks and talking in specific, clear and concrete + terms.

+

d. Sadat’s + second principal objective will be to try to pin down the United + States as to precisely how far it is prepared to go in bringing + pressure to bear on Israel to accept steps towards peace mutually + agreed upon privately between the United States and Egypt. The + Egyptians, from Sadat down, have + an unshakable conviction which is certain to be articulated in these + talks that Israel’s dependence on the United States is so great that the + United States can turn Israel off and on like a spigot. They are equally + convinced that Israel will yield nothing unless constrained to in one + way or another and that only the United States can bring that constraint + to bear. This consideration will be uppermost in Sadat’s mind in entering these talks. + If private preliminary talks can result in a meeting of minds by the + American and Egyptian governments on mutually acceptable steps towards + peace, Sadat will insist upon + firm assurances that the United States Government will commit itself to + a maximum effort to induce Israeli acceptance before Sadat will agree to enter into any + overt negotiating process. Sadat’s current preoccupation with this consideration is a + direct result of his experience with the United States in 1971 when, he + believes, the United States walked away when the going got hot with + Israel, leaving Sadat to hold the + bag and a shaky political position endangered by the dashing of aroused + expectations in his constituency.

+ +

e. Senior Egyptian officials [less than 1 line not + declassified] invariably reflect mystification about United + States policy objectives in the Middle East. While professing an ability + to grasp the depth of the United States Government’s commitment to + Israel, they also assert an inability to comprehend why the United + States should assume a commitment to Israel to a degree which + jeopardizes other interests of the United States in the larger Middle + East picture, notably its economic interests in the Arab world. The + topmost officials of the Egyptian government surmise therefore that + there must be something more, as yet unarticulated to them, which the + United States wants and expects of them as a prerequisite to peace and + improved bilateral relations with the United States. In one form or + another this question will be posed by the Egyptian side in the course + of the talks.

+

7. The holding of these exploratory talks entails two conceivable risks + to United States interests. The first of these arises from the + possibility that the very holding of the talks might generate + unwarranted Egyptian expectations which, if disappointed, could leave + the United States’ bilateral relations with Egypt in more disarray than + before. It is unquestionably true that the exchanges to date between the + two governments concerning preliminary talks have evoked a measure of + hopefulness in the Egyptian leadership which has had something of a + soothing effect on our troubled relations with Egypt. However, several + considerations appear to limit this risk to an acceptable degree. The + United States’ relations with Egypt cannot become much worse than they + have been in the past half year or so. More importantly, as indicated + above, it is doubtful that the Egyptians will embark on these + discussions with any undue optimism. Finally, it is not unrealistic to + believe that the risk may be containable to some degree by the + atmospherics of the talks. At least part of Sadat’s bitterness towards the United States in the past + year has derived from his conviction that the United States was + neglecting and ignoring him with a couldn’t-careless attitude towards + Egyptian needs, aspirations and sensitivities. Part of their evident + pleasure recently concerning our 29 July initiative was caused by their + reading it as a sign of United States interest and concern with the + problem. Even if the talks should yield no tangible results at this + time, the Egyptian reaction would not necessarily be disastrous from our + viewpoint, could in fact prove to be positive, so long as they at least + come away with an impression of genuine United States concern with the + Middle East problems at the highest level and of a sincere United States + desire to continue the effort to locate some reasonable and fair basis + for an eventual solution.

+

8. The second of these risks relates to the possibility that Sadat, if dissatisfied with the outcome + of the talks, might later opt to violate his promise to maintain secrecy + by either public pronouncements by Sadat + as he has done in the past or + by his revealing the talks to the Soviets. To date the Egyptians give + every indication of having taken pains to limit awareness of this + development as tightly as we have. Our estimate is that the Egyptians + will continue to honor their pledge of secrecy. Sadat’s past conduct is not in itself + necessarily a valid indicator on this score. He has never before given + an explicit pledge of secrecy beforehand in his dealings with us; he + prides himself on keeping his word and Egyptians who know him well and + whom we respect contend that Sadat’s personal record in this respect is excellent and + that, for example, if he had been president in August 1970 instead of + Nasir, the Egyptian violation of the ceasefire-standstill agreement + would never have occurred. However that may be, Sadat believes that it was the United + States which did not honor its promises to him in 1971 thus releasing + him from whatever tacit undertaking there may have been concerning + secrecy. A more tangible and compelling reason concerns Sadat’s previously noted conviction + that only the United States can solve his problems. This creates doubt + for us that Sadat will ever + totally abandon all hope of a possible change of heart and policy by the + United States; his betrayal of the current pledge of secrecy could occur + only if he reached such a point of complete despair with the United + States. Revelation to the Soviets by Sadat is less likely, in our estimate, than revelation + by public pronouncement or leak to the press. The strains and coolness + that have marked the course of Egyptian-Soviet relations in the past six + months argue for the unlikelihood of Sadat’s revealing the talks to the Soviets, particularly + when such a move would not appear to serve or advance any significant + Egyptian national interest.In a September + 23 memorandum to Helms, + Kissinger asked him to + pass a message to Egyptian officials informing them that he believed + the time had come to “commence definite planning for the conduct of + talks between the designated representatives of the two + governments.” Kissinger + continued: “The U.S. side does not favorably view overt or covert + travel by Dr. Kissinger to + Europe or some other location outside of the United States, because + such travel would ultimately involve the arrangements with other + governments and possible compromise. On the other hand, the U.S. + side is impressed with the advantages of the Egyptian Government’s + representative traveling overtly to New York with the ostensible + purpose of attending the United Nations General Assembly sessions as + President Sadat’s personal + representative.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, + NSC Files, Kissinger Office + Files, Box 131, Middle East)

+ + + Richard Helms + Helms signed “Dick” above his typed + signature. + + +
+ +
+ + 311. Memorandum of ConversationSource: National Archives, Nixon Presidential + Materials, NSC Files, Box 495, + President’s Trip Files, Dobrynin/Kissinger, Vol. 13. Top Secret; Sensitive; + Exclusively Eyes Only. The conversation took place at the Soviet + Embassy. All brackets are in the original except those indicating + text omitted by the editors. For the full text of the memorandum of + conversation, see Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, volume XIV, Soviet + Union, June 1972–August 1974, Document 55. + Washington, October 2, 1972, + 1:20–3:45 p.m. + + PARTICIPANTS + Andrei Gromyko, Foreign + Minister of the USSR + Dobrynin, Soviet + Ambassador + Victor M. Sukhodrev, Interpreter + Henry A. Kissinger, + Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs + Peter W. Rodman, NSC Staff + + + SUBJECTS + Europe; Nuclear Understanding; Jackson Amendment; Middle East + +

[The conversation began over cocktails in a room adjoining the dining + room.]

+

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to the Middle East.]

+

Middle East

+

FM Gromyko: Alright. Now the + Middle East. I would like to listen to you. I remember what you said to + the General-Secretary and the Prime Minister.

+

Dr. Kissinger: As I told + Anatoliy, we think we know how we might get a settlement with Jordan, + but we don’t think it is a good idea to have a separate settlement with + Jordan. So we think a settlement with Egypt is the heart of the problem. + We have not spoken with anyone. We are not aware of any secret Israeli + plan, whatever you may read, or any secret Israeli/Egyptian talks.

+

Our view is that it is important to make an initial major step with + respect to Egypt. I was never wild about the idea of an interim + settlement but I believe the biggest problem is to get Israel to make an + initial step back. The longer it stays the way it is, the harder it will + be. Therefore, we should try to get the situation into a state of flux. + Without a final determination, we should approach the problem from a + standpoint of security, of security zones, without raising the issue of + sovereignty. For example, the notion that Egyptian sovereignty extends + up to the 1967 borders but for a certain period the Sinai will be + divided into zones—one zone where both sides can station their forces, + other zones where there can + be some patrolling but no stationed forces, and maybe a buffer zone + between them. Thus, for example, Sinai could be divided into five + regions. In that event Egyptian civil administration would extend + immediately to the borders.

+

I doubt Israel would accept this. In fact I am sure Israel would not + accept this without massive pressure. If it is conceivable we could + perhaps apply something like it to the Golan Heights. The major problem + is to get some movement, or else the situation will be frozen so no + movement can ever get started. Once movement starts, other pressures can + continue to work.

+

FM Gromyko: I have two questions. + First, does the United States accept the principle of withdrawal from + all occupied territory? Second, does the United States accept the + principle of a package deal? An all-embracing settlement?

+

Dr. Kissinger: When you say + all-embracing, you mean Syria, because we can get the others.

+

FM Gromyko: I mean vertical as + well as horizontal. I mean that the Suez Canal cannot be separated from + withdrawal and the Palestinian question and Gaza and . . .

+

Dr. Kissinger: We would like to + separate out the question of the Canal, but I see that the others are + related to each other. But in my view the only justified solution is one + all sides can accept. We would like to make progress towards a + settlement. If it can be achieved only by a global approach, we will + consider a global approach. Our view up to now, which has not changed, + is that we should see if we can get a settlement on the Suez Canal + first.

+

FM Gromyko: But Egypt will not + accept this.

+

Dr. Kissinger: So we will look at + the other approach. My own view, as I have told Anatoliy, is that a + global approach will lead to no settlement. This is what Israel would + prefer, because it means no settlement will occur. They would love to + discuss this.

+

FM Gromyko: What nonetheless do + you think practically can be done? Before November, or after + November.

+

Dr. Kissinger: After November we + should take the principles we agreed on in MoscowSee Document 292. + and apply them concretely to each area, to Egypt, to Jordan and to + Syria. And then discuss how one tries to implement the right + solution—whether to pass a UN resolution + or apply direct pressure. If pressure is ever to be applied to Israel, + it is better to do it earlier in the Administration.

+ +

FM Gromyko: We have talked with + some Arabs in New York, and they have indicated again, they have + reiterated, that they can’t accept a partial settlement without it being + part of a global settlement and without withdrawal of Israeli forces. + Then am I right that you are not prepared now to discuss this in a + concrete way?

+

Dr. Kissinger: To discuss + what?

+

FM Gromyko: The whole + problem.

+

Dr. Kissinger: The only thing I + mentioned was security zones. I have said I could not come up with a + very concrete plan by now. What we should discuss is what do you mean by + a concrete proposal.

+

FM Gromyko: Speaking concretely, + what do you think about withdrawal? Are you in favor of complete + withdrawal or not? Second, on the question of a partial or all-embracing + settlement, it is a fact that without an all-embracing settlement a + partial one won’t give results, because the Arabs reject it. As for + Sharm el-Sheikh you know our position: Egyptian sovereignty plus a + temporary stationing of UN personnel. + With respect to the Gaza, the people there must determine their own + destiny.

+

Dr. Kissinger: All this is in the + paper you gave us.See footnote 1, Document 291.

+

FM Gromyko: There must be some + solution to the problem of the Palestinian refugees. On Suez, Egypt is + prepared to allow peaceful passage of Israeli shipping. With respect to + Israel’s independence and sovereignty and existence, we agree to this, + and the Arabs too, although without enthusiasm! With respect to + guarantees, we are prepared to join with you in the most rigorous way + possible, that is in the United Nations Security Council. Well, if we + agreed on this, then we together could bring the necessary influence to + bear on the parties concerned.

+

In short, what is your advice to me? What should I report to the + General-Secretary on your views?

+

Dr. Kissinger: On the problem of + guarantees, the history of UN guarantees + does not create confidence that they operate when they are needed. This + is the President’s view: We will work for a common position we can agree + to, on the basis of the principles we reached in Moscow. But at some + time, it is essential to recognize realities. The Arabs may recognize + Israel’s right to exist, but the same was true of India and Pakistan + before the war.Reference is to the + Indo-Pakistani war of December 1971. The peculiarity of the + Middle East is that war arises among countries who are already at war; + everywhere else war arises among countries who are already at peace! + What we need is some concern for security. We are prepared to bring + pressure on Israel short of + military pressure. We will not allow outside military pressure. Economic + or moral pressures we are willing to do.

+

FM Gromyko: You did not reply. + What should I tell the General-Secretary?

+

Dr. Kissinger: On some of the + proposals you have suggested, we disagree. On others we agree; on others + we should discuss.

+

FM Gromyko: When?

+

Dr. Kissinger: Early November, + after the election. Say the 15th or the 14th or the 13th.

+

Amb. Dobrynin: You will need one week after the election for + celebration!

+

[At 3:45 the meeting ended. Dr. Kissinger had to return to the White House and would + come back to the Embassy at 4:15 to pick up the Foreign Minister and the + Ambassador and accompany them to Camp David.]

+
+ +
+ 312. Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the Department of + State (Eliot) to the President’s + Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 658, Country Files, + Middle East, Middle East Nodis/Cedar/Plus, Vol. V. Secret; Nodis; + Cedar. + Washington, October + 3, 1972. + + SUBJECT + Middle East and Lebanon + +

I am attaching a long memorandum of conversation between the Lebanese + Foreign Minister Khalil Abouhamad and Joe + Sisco on September 27th.Attached but not printed. This conversation was held when + the Foreign Minister asked Mr. Sisco to come to the Lebanese Consulate General in New + York to have a “discreet” meeting with him. It is perhaps one of the + most significant conversations we have held with the Lebanese in recent + years for the following reasons.

+

First, for the first time, the Lebanese have said to us that they are + considering the contingency of a military confrontation with the + fedayeen in Lebanon and they wish to know what the United States would + do prior and during such + developments with particular reference to the possible contingency that + during such a period of confrontation, Syria is apt to send more + fedayeen into Lebanon across the borders.

+

Secondly, the Lebanese Foreign Minister has revealed what it considers to + be stepped up pressure by the Soviet Union in the aftermath of Sadat’s decision to expel the Soviets. + Specifically, the Foreign Minister told Sisco that the Soviet Ambassador had offered Soviet + friendship in the following specific terms: (a) the Soviet fleet could + be made available to enter Beirut “in the case of an Israeli attack on + Lebanese territory”; (b) the USSR + would be willing to consider entering into a military agreement with + Lebanon; and (c) the Soviet Union was willing to reach an arms agreement + with Lebanon at very favorable prices. The Foreign Minister said that + Lebanon has refrained from responding to these Soviet approaches for the + time being at least. This initiative with the Lebanese coincides with + what we believe are parallel Soviet efforts in recent weeks to + strengthen its position in Iraq and Syria. This seems to be a Soviet + move to compensate for its losses in Egypt.

+

Thirdly, the Lebanese Foreign Minister made a major pitch for the U.S. at + some point to make contact with various Palestinian leaders in Lebanon + in order to assure that they do not lose hope and confidence in the U.S. + role in the area. The Lebanese Foreign Minister intends to convey to us + the names of the specific Palestinians whom they believe are key in the + situation in Lebanon.Abouhamad’s follow-up + conversation occurred at Ambassador Buffum’s residence in Beirut on October 20. The + discussion, which lasted over two hours, focused primarily on the + possibility of a confrontation between the Lebanese Government and + the local fedayeen. According to Buffum, “Abouhamad said he wished to make clear that + it is not GOL policy to push for a + confrontation with fedayeen. Such confrontation, he stressed, would + have most serious consequences for Lebanon because of country’s + internal structure, its geographical contiguity with Syria, and its + ties with Arab world.” (Telegram 11400 from Beirut, October 20; + National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 658, Country Files, + Middle East, Middle East Nodis/Cedar/Plus, Vol. V)

+

As you can see from the memorandum of conversation, Mr. Sisco was non-committal, indicating + that the questions posed were so fundamental that they would require + careful study by the U.S. Government.

+ + + Theodore L. Eliot, Jr. + + +
+ +
+ + 313. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security + Affairs (Kissinger) to President + NixonSource: National Archives, Nixon + Presidential Materials, NSC Files, + Box 647, Country Files, Middle East, Middle East (General) Vol. 9. + Secret; Sensitive. Sent for information. Drafted on September 12 by + Hoskinson. A stamped + notation on the memorandum indicates the President saw + it. + Washington, October + 7, 1972. + + SUBJECT + Secretary Laird’s Views on + the Middle East + +

Secretary Laird has sent you a + memo outlining his current views on the Middle East situation and U.S. + policy toward the area (attached).Laird’s August 26 memorandum is + attached but not printed.

+

Secretary Laird is concerned that + President Sadat could still slip + back into a highly dependent relationship with the Soviets and that a + “discreetly stepped up dialogue” might help Sadat over the next three or four critical months.

+

More specifically, he suggests the following actions with Egypt:

+

—Open a higher level channel of communication to Sadat than is provided by our Interests + Section in Cairo.

+

—Ask Sadat how we can be helpful, + short of all the usual impossible steps he believes we can take + vis-à-vis Israel. Specifically, Secretary Laird suggests asking Sadat if we might help identify and “sell” to the + Israelis a mutually acceptable substitute for “proximity talks” under + our auspices aimed at an interim settlement. Alternatively, Secretary + Laird suggests our acting in + full secrecy as an “intermediary” with the Egyptian and Israeli + negotiators remaining in their own capitals.

+

—Stress to Sadat how helpful his + reduced dependence on the Soviets will be at any point when diplomatic + relations are resumed.

+

With the Israelis, Secretary Laird would:

+

—“Encourage” the Israelis to make more encouraging public gestures toward + the Arabs.

+

—“Encourage” the Israelis to exercise particular care to avoid allowing + new information about their weapons plans or capabilities to surface and + urge restraint in action, such as overflights of the Suez Canal, which + might complicate things for Sadat.

+

—“Intercede strongly” to persuade Israel to at least explore Sadat’s position should he agree to + some form of secret talks.

+ +

With little real prospect of advance along the tracks we have traveled in + the Middle East in the past, some of Secretary Laird’s suggestions offer some food + for further thought.Laird sent another memorandum to + Nixon on October 9 under + the subject heading, “Dangers in the Middle East,” which begins: “I + am concerned that Israeli military actions could, before November 7, + precipitate a Middle East crisis and do serious long-term damage to + peace prospects and to our own position in the area.” Kissinger forwarded the memorandum + to Nixon on November 1, + writing: “After Israel’s mid-September raids on Lebanon and Syria we + warned them strongly against repeating. Since then, our embassy in + Tel Aviv has been reporting that the Israelis may be debating the + nature of their current response to the terrorist problem with the + hawks arguing along lines described by Secretary Laird. In the past ten days, a + qualitative change has taken place in the Israeli position, and they + have said they would henceforth attack the fedayeen preemptively and + not wait for provocation. There was one round of attacks since that + statement. The Israelis are aware that we will not associate + ourselves with this Israeli strategy.” (National Archives, Nixon + Presidential Materials, NSC Files, + Box 647, Country Files, Middle East, Middle East (General) Vol. + 9) Much more attention, of course, needs to be given to the + substance of any renewed effort we might make in the future to promote + an Arab-Israeli settlement. Moreover, it is not even clear whether we + should continue to concentrate on the Egyptian-Israel aspects or should + focus more on the Israel-Jordan problem as King Hussein shows signs of genuine interest + in a separate peace.

+
+ +
+ 314. Telegram From the Interests Section in Egypt to the Department of + StateSource: National + Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1169, Saunders Files, Middle East + Negotiations Files, Middle East—Jarring Talks, October 1–31, 1972. Secret. Repeated + to Amman, Jidda, London, Moscow, Paris, Tel Aviv, Tripoli, and + USUN. + Cairo, October 16, 1972, 0940Z. +

2772. Subject: What Chance Middle East Peace? Ref: USUN 3818 (Secto 73), USUN 3723 + (Secto 63), USUN 3651.In + telegram 3818/Secto 73 from + USUN, October 11, Rogers reported his and Sisco’s October 6 meeting with + Saudi Foreign Minister Umar Saqqaf, who, after the Secretary’s + presentation on why the United States continued to support the idea + of proximity talks, said he had planned to speak with Egyptian + officials on the subject. (Ibid., RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL + 27–14 ARAB–ISR) In telegram 3723/Secto 63 from USUN, + October 6, Rogers reported + his and Sisco’s October 5 + conversation with Mohammed + Riad and Mohamed + Zayyat, who had recently been appointed Foreign + Minister, which considered how Egypt and Israel could make progress + toward an interim Suez Canal agreement. (Ibid., Nixon Presidential + Materials, NSC Files, Box 1169, + Saunders Files, Middle East Negotiations Files, Middle + East—Jarring Talks, + October 1–31, 1972) In telegram 3651 from USUN, October 4, the Mission reported that Jarring had told Bush that all the negotiating + tracks in the Arab-Israeli dispute were “blocked” and that, unless + the United States could “assume initiative” after the November + Presidential election, he feared that the Middle East “would become + increasingly unstable.” (Ibid.)

+ +

Summary: Our interim reassessment of the GOE + position and policy on Middle East peace finds no prospect of a change + in what they continue to regard as the central issues, territory and + negotiations, absent evidence of change in US or Israeli positions + thereon. The GOE regards such change as something the USG, not the GOE, must produce—or + induce.

+

1. Prompted by reports of New York conversations about Middle East in + reftels, among others, we have reassessed what we know and can infer + about GOE position on Middle East peace. The fundamental elements of + that position continue to be that “peace” or even “progress towards + peace” are for Sadat and co. + secondary in importance to the territorial issue and the “direct + negotiation” issue. Compelling as the logic of the case for unfreezing + matters is to us Anglo-Saxons, the logic for the Egyptians and other + Arabs closest to their councils is that the present state of affairs is + better, or at least no worse, than “submission” to Israel and the United + States or either or both of them on what they see as the central + issues.

+

2. The resultant impasse was succintly described by Jarring to Bush (USUN 3651). It strikes us as interesting that Jarring seems to have adopted the + Egyptian view of the importance and nature of a “new US initiative” to + breaking his efforts loose. “New US initiative” in this part of the Arab + world we see as a euphemism for US pressure on Israel; it also has the + advantage of passing the buck for doing something from the Govt. of + Egypt to the Govt. of the US. Moreover, alas, the more we talk about the + need for movement involving either of the central issues, and about + opening the Suez Canal, the more Sadat and co. tend to conclude that the US cares more + about changing the present state of affairs than they do; ergo, the more + they tend to sit tight and await a “US initiative” to change the Israeli + position, at least on the territorial issue. As Sadat continues to reiterate, he will + not agree to give up one inch of Arab territory—all he has been and is + willing to negotiate are the modalities and timetable of Israeli + withdrawal to the 1967 border. The “direct negotiation” issue, is in his + view a reinforcement for the territorial issue—indeed, they are mutually + reinforcing.

+

3. We have not so far been able to think of any form of inducement or + compulsion on GOE open to the United States that would yield Egyptian + flexibility in the absence of Israeli agreement to full withdrawal, + whether or not overtly induced by a “new US initiative.” In either event, the scenario + would also have somehow to dispose of or at least neutralize the + Egyptian view that “unlimited” US support of Israel—especially + military—underlies Israeli intransigence on the central issues. A show + of Israeli agreement that was not accompanied by some reassurance about + the military dimension might not be enough to budge Sadat. Conversely, of course, a show of + US compulsion of Israel would further entrench the Israelis, as the + Egyptian leadership well knows even though they do not readily + acknowledge it.

+

4. Our efforts to think of inducement or compulsion open to other + governments in better communication with Sadat than the US is are not much more promising. + Indeed, the renewed Egyptian effort to restore their political, + psychological, and especially economic relationship with the Soviet + Union, while cultivating Western Europeans too, looks to us to be + calculated to help them hang on in the present impasse without losing or + giving away anything of value to them.

+

5. The importance of these relationships is reinforced by the importance + to Sadat of his relationship with + Qaddafi. The latter’s + munificence in return for stonewalling Israel is a major determinant of + Sadat’s policy and posture, + at least as strong as any purely Egyptian factor. The Saudi influence in + the opposite direction is there, but the money does not talk as loudly. + And while, as Saqqaf said (Secto + 73–USUN 3818), Sadat no doubt wants a political + solution, the solution he wants, by all the evidence, rhetorical and + circumstantial, is one involving a degree of Israeli flexibility that, + to put it mildly, is not visible from here.

+

6. In assessing all this, we have tried to allow for the customary + posturing and polemics of the UNGA + context, intensified this year by the US election campaign. There are, + of course, other issues that are important to Sadat and his friends, and that efforts + to move matters would have to take into account; the Palestinian + refugees is prominent among these. But one does not, we believe, get to + these further issues until the central issues are disposed of—as long as + Sadat is in charge. Even with + the current context stripped away (or lived through), however, we do not + perceive an alteration in the Egyptian constellation of forces that + would alone get even an interim solution going. And even if, as + Hafez Ismail once enjoined me + to remember, “the Arabs are very unpredictable,” they can be just as + unpredictable in living up to an agreement they do not want or like, as + they might prove to be in purporting to make one.

+ + + Greene + + +
+ +
+ + 315. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in + IsraelSource: National + Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 610, Country Files, Middle East, Israel, + Vol. XI. Secret; Exdis. Drafted + by Stackhouse and Atherton, cleared in draft in + INR/RNA/NE and AF/N, and + approved by Sisco. Repeated + to Amman, Beirut, Cairo, Tripoli, and USUN. + Washington, October 20, 1972, + 2115Z. +

192092. Subject: Israeli Strategy re Fedayeen. Ref: Tel Aviv 6807.In telegram 6807 from Tel Aviv, October 17, + the Embassy reported Barbour’s meeting with Eban, during which the Israeli Foreign Minister + explained his government’s thinking behind its recent air raid + strategy against fedayeen installations in Lebanon and Syria. + Eban said that “Israel + will not be limited in its response and will act if it gets + information about preparations at a fedayeen base. Israel does not + accept logic that Israelis should let fedayeen train because they + had not attacked across Israeli border for one month. Just as + governments everywhere should act promptly against nests of + hijackers and other terrorists abroad, so Israel should not wait if + it can act to prevent future casualties on its own side and + especially if Israeli action can be taken without causing civilian + casualties.” (Ibid.)

+

1. Appreciate your full report of meeting with Eban. Believe after our talks with + Israelis there and here they understand well our reservations re their + fedayeen strategy as expressed in air attacks October 15.On October 16, Sisco met with Rabin to discuss Israel’s air raids of the previous + day. The Assistant Secretary said that, while the United States + “understood the objective to be that such raids were intended to + ‘encourage’ GOL to take more + effective steps in controlling the guerillas,” he wanted to share + U.S. “misgivings” about the October 15 strikes. He said that the + United States considered the actions “ill-advised” and that “we urge + Israel to try and enlarge its exchanges with the Lebanese + authorities through appropriate channels,” adding that, “in the + absence of prior incidents or border crossings,” such raids were + “more likely to undermine the ability of the GOL to take effective action.” + Finally, Sisco wanted to + emphasize that the United States did not raise this issue on behalf + of Lebanon but at its own initiative to share its concern with + Israel. (Telegram 188750 to Tel Aviv, October 16; ibid.) We + have no desire therefore to prolong this exchange unnecessarily. + Eban made several points to + you in course his comments, however, that do not accord with our view of + past history and present facts. Lest our silence be misconstrued, you + should, in manner you deem most appropriate, register with GOI following points:

+

2. We are sure that Israel is doing all it can to avoid civilian + casualties in its actions against fedayeen targets in Lebanon. But fact + is on every such occasion in recent months, including according to our + best information Oct 15 raids, there have been civilian casualties. We + have greatest respect for Israeli intelligence but it like intelligence + of any country can be wrong. It was unaware for example that tents used + by fedayeen were on Sept 8 occupied by children many of whom were + casualties. (Beirut 9696).Not found. + We gather it was unaware in Oct 15 action that fedayeen at Mazyef were + absent on leave at time of raid.

+ +

3. Eban’s remarks suggest that + principal reason for Hussein’s + crackdown on fedayeen was Israeli pressure on fedayeen in Jordan. While + undoubtedly Israeli policies had part in Hussein’s finally grasping nettle, proximate and + probably decisive factor in our view was direct threat fedayeen posed to + very existence of Hashemite regime. Lebanese situation is very + different—we believe crucially different—from that of Jordan, in number + of respects, and it is risky to draw parallels.

+

4. Eban claims the Lebanese have + backtracked on efforts to get fedayeen out of villages. As Israelis know + from our exchanges on this subject, our info is that fedayeen have been + ejected from and still being kept out of villages.

+

5. If Lebanon is still bound by Cairo AgreementSee footnote 6, Document + 60. then it is an agreement reinterpreted from the + original. What seems more important to us is not rpt not what overall + framework of Lebanese-fedayeen agreement is called, but what actual + Lebanese army restrictions are being carried out against fedayeen on the + ground. By Israel’s own account the Lebanon border has been free of + fedayeen incursions for over a month. This is tangible evidence that + Cairo Agreement, as originally understood, is not rpt not being + fulfilled.

+

6. Eban asserts that Lebanon is + only real base that terrorists now have, and that it is only place where + terrorists are free to train and prepare actions. We are in basic + disagreement with centrality which GOI + accords to Lebanon in problem of terrorism. We believe it overlooks + support of all kinds terrorists are receiving from other Arab countries, + support without which fedayeen movement would be severely crippled. + Eban told Secretary Sept 22 + that without Arab governments’ support terrorist organizations could not + be effective. He spoke of evidence of massive links of terrorist + organizations to Cairo, Beirut, Damascus and certain North African + states. We agree with this evaluation, which puts Lebanon in proper + perspective, and believe it is still valid.

+

7. Eban states that if fedayeen + currently not shooting at Israelis this is not important because they + are training to shoot. With due regard for Israel’s perception of its + own security we cannot agree that quiet along Israel’s ceasefire lines + is unimportant. It is a positive contribution to area stability and to + atmosphere for diplomatic efforts for peace. Of almost equal importance + it reflects a prudent and perhaps a constructive attitude on part of + Israel’s neighbors, in present instance particularly on part of + Lebanon.

+

8. In sum, we agree with Israel that ideal situation would be complete + elimination of fedayeen presence and activities on their territories by all Arab governments. And + we think some of Israel’s earlier reactions to fedayeen incursions have + had salutary effect on GOL + determination to prevent such incursions. Where we diverge from GOI analysis is over latter’s view that + military strikes at fedayeen in Lebanon, even in absence of fedayeen + attacks across border, can seriously inhibit terrorist actions in third + countries or be carried out in ways that neither cause innocent civilian + casualties nor have adverse political repercussions in Lebanon which in + long run are counter to broader U.S. and we believe, Israeli + interests.

+

9. On related subject, we note recent comments attributed to “Tel Aviv + military sources” by CBS correspondent Wasserthile Oct 16 that Israel + does not preclude striking against countries further removed which give + support to fedayeen, including Libya. We deplore Libyan attitude re + fedayeen activities as much as does GOI. We feel, however, that we must make clear to GOI our very real concern that any + military action it might take against Libya—however justified Israel + might consider it in light Libyan policies—could trigger emotional mob + reactions that would place large American community in Libya in serious + physical jeopardy.Barbour presented the Department’s + views to Elizur on the + morning of October 23. (Telegram 6918 from Tel Aviv, October 24; + ibid.)

+ + + Irwin + + +
+ +
+ 316. Telegram From the Embassy in Israel to the Department of + StateSource: National + Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 658, Country Files, Middle East, Middle + East Nodis/Cedar/Plus, Vol. V. Secret; Nodis; Cedar. Repeated to + Cairo. + Tel Aviv, November 9, 1972, 1025Z. +

7357. Subject: US-Israel: Dayan + Visit to Washington.Dayan visited New York and + Washington November 12–14. The memorandum of conversation of + Dayan’s meeting with + Department of Defense officials is Document 319.

+

Summary: + Dayan is the one Israeli leader + who continues to focus on possibility of interim Suez Canal settlement + and by all indications to want it. We believe he should be encouraged. + However, Dayan like rest of GOI is probably convinced that Sadat in due course will take his own initiative to + bring about such settlement and that nothing should be done meanwhile + which might sidetrack him. Dayan + also must be concerned about current unrealistic mood of expectation in + Cairo that US, with elections over, will help solve Egypt’s problem with + Israel. GOI for this reason may charge + Dayan with making strong + pitch in Washington for USG to do and + say nothing about Arab-Israeli problem in coming weeks. As for + substantive questions involved in interim settlement, it would not be + surprising if Dayan’s authority + to talk with Americans about such matters at this juncture is severely + limited; PriMin Meir would not + want to risk mistaken impression in Washington that GOI is ready to send signals to Sadat. Dept might consider using occasion of Dayan’s visit rekindle his desire to + start moving now toward Canal settlement—and to strengthen his hand + within GOI as leading proponent of such + move—by renewing assurances of US willingness to be helpful in spheres + of advance intelligence coordination monitoring and subsequent for any + Canal settlement, possible limited observer role in such settlement, and + fending off undesirable outside Middle East initiatives in meantime. End summary.

+

1. Dayan is the one Israeli leader + who from the fall of 1970 to the present day has wanted strongly to see + a partial Suez Canal settlement and who appears to remain convinced that + one is achievable. Presumably his strong interest in disengagement with + Egypt arises from Dayan’s + responsibility for military situation at Canal, his appreciation of + normalization of life in Israel made possible by past two years of + ceasefire at Canal, and his dread of unpredictable situation to which + renewed shooting could lead. Dayan therefore is the right Israeli leader for US to + encourage on subject of interim Canal settlement.

+

2. There is no reason to think, however, that Dayan does not share conviction of rest of Israeli + leadership that Sadat is being + led inexorably by flow of events toward taking an Egyptian initiative + aimed at Israelis themselves (and not US). While recognizing that + disarray in Cairo’s relations with USSR and Egypt’s internal unrest have weakened Sadat at the moment, making initiative + toward Israel harder for him to undertake, we suspect Israelis like + Dayan look upon Sadat’s current troubles with his own + military and his Soviet allies as sealing once and for all, in Sadat’s mind, notion that Egypt can + afford to delude itself that it has any military option against Israel + for foreseeable future.

+

3. Israelis clearly have sensed mood of unrealistic anticipation in + Cairo, which Minister Greene has + so succinctly reported (Cairo 2933),Dated + November 1. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL + 27–14 ARAB–ISR) that USG + after elections may take major new initiative in Middle East entailing pressure on Israel + to bring about settlement acceptable to Egypt. Israelis undoubtedly view + such mood not only as regrettable sidetrack for gradual evolution of + Egyptian policy in realistic direction, but also as serious potential + danger because of instability to which Cairo’s inevitable disappointment + with US can lead. We therefore believe that if Israeli leadership + charges Dayan with conveying any + message in Washington on November 14, it will be to emphasize need, as + GOI sees it, for US in coming weeks + to do and say absolutely nothing concerning Arab-Israeli problem.

+

4. As we are reporting separately, Israel’s pre-election campaign is now + getting underway, and Dayan is + involved. How involved he is personally is hard to judge, since his + numerous supporters have been applying all their talents to do battle + for him and may have to some extent helped to create the emanations we + are getting to effect that a sparring among leading personalities is + underway within Labor Party. Suffice it to say here, in any case, that + Washington should not be surprised if Dayan’s lips are tightly buttoned Nov 14 with respect to + substantive issues involved in any interim Canal settlement. Fact that + Dayan at first regretted and + later accepted Secretary’s invitation to come to Washington during his + visit to US could conceivably mean that Dayan’s colleagues in Cabinet have hammered out with him + set of guidelines for his talks with US officials. Given Dayan’s propensity to speak his mind on + terms of an accommodation with Egypt and GOI’s concern not to encourage US to say anything on this + subject because of Cairo’s current mood of expectation, one of + guidelines might well be injunction to stay off subject of Suez + Canal.

+

5. If Dayan while in Washington + cannot be drawn out on substantive aspects of Canal settlement, and if + as we expect he takes view that US and Israel should do absolutely + nothing at this time to prime the Egyptian pump, US talks with Dayan Nov 14 can still be turned to + good advantage, in our view, if they serve the purpose of reviving and + strengthening Dayan’s interest in + seeing Canal settlement come to pass. Dept might therefore consider renewing to Dayan assurances of US readiness to: A) + Enter into detailed discussion with Israel at any time of intelligence + aspects of interim settlement, to give Israel added assurance that it + can safely carry out partial withdrawal; B) provide Israel with + meaningful, ongoing assistance in monitoring good performance on + obligations undertaken by Egypt in any Canal agreement, if desired; C) + serve in limited supervisory or observer capacity on ground as part of + Canal settlement arrangements, if desired; and D) assist Israel + meanwhile in fending off any unhelpful outside initiatives on Middle + East arising in UN or other + contexts.

+ + + Barbour + + +
+ +
+ + 317. Memorandum From Harold + Saunders of the National Security Council Staff to the + President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential + Materials, NSC Files, Box 1190, + Saunders Files, Middle East Negotiations Files, Arab-Israeli + Negotiations A Review of the Present Situation and Options for the + Future Mr. Saunders. Secret. + All brackets are in the original. This memorandum is attached to a + November 14 covering memorandum from Saunders to Kissinger under the subject heading, “The Middle + East, 1973–1976,” which begins: “I have prepared this book over the + past couple of months with the thought that new attention would have + to be given to the Middle East—one way or another—after the + President’s re-election. It is consistent with your desire for memos + on where we might go over the next four years.” The book is attached + but not printed. + Washington, November 13, 1972. + + SUBJECT + A Proposal for a New Step Toward Arab-Israeli Peace + Negotiations—How to Use This Book + +

A table of contents immediately follows this + memo.Attached but not + printed.

+

The purpose of this book is to give you a take-off + point for thinking about where we might go from here in looking afresh + at the Arab-Israeli problem. I have done this (a) by putting together + one possible approach to Israel followed by + approaches to the Egyptians and Jordanians and (b) by giving + you a series of variations which could suggest modifications to the + basic approach. I am not pushing any one approach, but I thought it + would be most helpful to put something together as a starting point for + discussion.

+

Many refinements would be necessary if this were to become a basis for + any kind of action. But it seemed desirable to start looking at general + approaches now.

+

There is more material included in this book than you will need + initially. I suggest that you glance over the first + memo under the next tab marked “Strategy—Considerations and + Approach.” Then read fairly carefully Sub-tab 1 marked “Israel,” + which is a full set of talking points for an initial approach to the + Israelis. This will give you a sense of the essence of the approach + put forward for discussion. The heart of the proposal is at the red + tabs in those two papers. Following the Israeli talking paper + are similar papers for use with the Egyptians, Jordanians and Soviets, + but they are all elaborations of the approach initially outlined to the + Israelis.

+

+ If you want to pursue the subject in more detail, you + can later move on to the other tabs which outline the main broad + options for settlements between Egypt-Israel and Jordan-Israel. +

+ +

While the approach below will sound as if it is directed primarily at an + Egypt-Israel settlement, it is one of the premises of the papers in this + book that we should simultaneously develop strategies + toward both the Jordanian and Egyptian fronts, even though + those strategies may be quite different.

+

In a nutshell, the proposed approach on Egypt-Israel + negotiations would differ from the Rogers Plan in three important respects.

+

1. It would begin by trying to establish with Israel a genuinely + reciprocal alliance relationship, in substance though not in name. This + would require a change in style from the past + four years. Instead of hitting the Israelis with a big initiative on a + more or less take-it-or-leave-it basis, we would move through a period + of consultation with them before putting a new initiative in final form + for presentation to the Egyptians or Jordanians.

+

2. Then, it would move to try to reach an understanding in private talks with both sides on the general objectives of a negotiation before either negotiating details or going public. Any interim + step will founder, as in 1971, on these issues eventually anyway.

+

3. Since it is unlikely that the central issue of borders can be resolved + before negotiation, this approach would seek a statement of objective + that could help meet Sadat’s need + while actually accepting the fact that he cannot reach final terms + without negotiating. We would try to shift the issue + from “withdrawal” to “restoration of Egyptian sovereignty” so + as to allow flexibility for phasing withdrawal and even the stationing + of Israeli troops on Egyptian soil. Thus, we would not commit ourselves + in advance of a negotiation to total Israeli withdrawal from the + Sinai.

+

+ The following are the main elements of what I have put + forward as a suggested approach on the Egypt-Israel front: +

+

—Any new initiative would start with an approach to + Israel:

+

—We would propose dealing with Israel as an ally in + substance, if not in name. The purpose would be to increase + confidence and response since we would make clear that any such + relationship would have to be reciprocal.

+

—We would buy the Israeli strategy of stretching the + settlement process over as long a time period as possible with + the pullback of troops staged through agreed phases, but at the same + time we would state that our interests require that + some process of negotiation begin soon. We would say that we + are prepared to press for mixed direct and indirect negotiations as + early as possible so that the role of outsiders would be minimized.

+

—We would say that, before launching a new initiative, + we want to consult with the Israelis in detail on the nature of + that initiative. [This is significantly different in style from what + State is initially considering.]

+ +

—During those consultations, we would seek Israeli authorization for us + to convey a message to President Sadat outlining the agreed + approach. We believe it is essential to tell him that Israel will + negotiate without preconditions and will not at the outset of + negotiation preclude any particular outcome, including + restoration of Egyptian sovereignty in the Sinai. We would tell + the Israelis frankly that this would be our preference but that we will + not try to force it on Israel. In using the word “sovereignty,” we would + deliberately try to shift the issue from “withdrawal” to the question of + sovereignty because this would allow flexibility for maintaining Israeli + troops on Egyptian soil over agreed periods while perhaps beginning to + meet Egyptian requirements for getting most of their land back. Its + purpose would be to provide enough discussion of a + final settlement to try to meet Sadat’s need and then to permit detailed + negotiations on a first step, presumably opening the Canal and + pulling Israeli troops away from it.

+

—We would say that, while the (probably secret) talks on general + objectives would have to precede any negotiation of a partial settlement + on the Canal, we would be prepared to see them continue simultaneously + with more open talks on a Canal settlement.

+

—To Egypt we would privately convey the position + outlined above. We would promise that this new initiative would be + tightly controlled from the White House and would outline our philosophy + of not promising to deliver more than is possible to achieve. We would + offer several secret talks on overall objectives and on procedures for + getting talks started if the Egyptians wish. With Israeli concurrence, + we would tell the Egyptians that we see the objective of negotiation as + the restoration of Egyptian sovereignty in the Sinai, but that we are + not prepared or able to force this objective on Israel. If the approach + is to work, Sadat will have to + decide that the time has come to negotiate, but he will have to have + some confidence that we are serious about pushing beyond an interim + settlement on the Canal.

+

—Unlike previous initiatives, we would propose paying + simultaneous attention to moving negotiations on both the Jordanian + and the Egyptian fronts. Over the past three years we have + concentrated almost exclusively on the Egyptian front. We should now at + least do what we can to facilitate parallel negotiations between Israel + and Jordan. King Hussein will be + here in February to see the President and to ask what support he can + count on, and we will have to be prepared for that. The main choice to be discussed with Hussein at that time is + between:

+

—a settlement that might be called “interim,” would give Hussein much less than he wants on the + West Bank, but would let him start building his United Arab Kingdom with + its autonomous Palestinian province there and

+ +

—a strategy whereby Israel, in agreement with Jordan or not, would + prepare the West Bank for autonomy and ultimate choice of allegiance + over time.

+

—We would inform the Soviets of our general + approach to the problem, indicate willingness to go on discussing the + approach outlined last May, but suggest that we leave + details to Egypt and Israel and concentrate our own talks on issues + which are appropriate for the superpowers to address. These + might include the nature of major power or Security Council guarantees, + the nature of US and USSR support for + UN observer missions in the Sinai, + and perhaps the nature of our ultimate military relationship to the + Middle Eastern nations.

+

—We would leave the Syrian front aside for the + moment. Our primary interest is to keep Syria from preventing + progress on other fronts and to avoid deep Soviet involvement. This may + require that we offer the prospect of an eventual Syrian involvement in + a settlement provided the Syrians themselves are interested. However, if + the Jordanians wanted to try drawing the Syrians into an interim + settlement, then we might find ourselves sounding out the Israelis on a + token pullback or partial demilitarization on the Golan Heights.

+

If you wished to develop this idea, two sets of approaches would have to + be made which are not included in this book:

+

—We would want to develop support for Sadat and Hussein + in those other parts of the Arab world where we have access.

+

—We would want to develop support in key European countries.

+

One final point is that timing will be critical. + We will lose Israeli confidence if we move too quickly because they do + not want us to do anything that will lighten the pressure on Sadat to negotiate with them. On the + other hand, pressure on Sadat + will mount to heat up the Suez front, perhaps before the next US–USSR + summit, in order to force the superpowers to act.

+
+ +
+ + 318. Telegram From the Interests Section in Egypt to the Department of + StateSource: National + Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 638, Country Files, Middle East, Egypt, + Vol. VIII. Secret; Nodis. A typed notation at the top of the first + page reads: “Our Interests Section in Cairo reports that during a + routine call on Undersecretary Fahmy at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs yesterday, + Fahmy indicated that + Egypt has a hole card and wants the U.S. to think it is potent, in + the hope that this will bring us to produce a change in Israeli + policy. Fahmy observed that + it is up to us (Egypt) to devise something new to inject into the + situation.” + Cairo, November 14, 1972, 1110Z. +

3060. (Note: Since content of this message does not strictly speaking + fall into any of the special distribution captions of which I am aware, + I have not used one of them. I request, however, that distribution be as + closely limited as if I had.)

+

1. Summary: During routine call on Undersecretary + Ismail + Fahmy at Ministry Foreign Affairs + November 13, subject of next moves re peace in Middle East came up. In + response to my statement that US view remains as previously expressed + (State 205883),Telegram 205883 to USUN, November 10, reads in part: “A. + As we have consistently made clear, we do not think Middle East + debate at this time can serve any practical purpose. If anything, it + is more likely to delay time when parties face up to fact that there + is no realistic alternative to getting down to some kind of + meaningful negotiating process. B. We take it as forgone conclusion + that no resolution, however carefully formulated to avoid + exacerbating sensitivities of either side, will emerge of the kind + that could help in any way to get such negotiating process started. + In these circumstances we believe the best possible outcome, after + all concerned have had their say during debate, would be to adjourn + debate without any resolution. This would leave matters where they + now stand and avoid further complicating the atmosphere for getting + negotiations started.” (Ibid., Box 1169, Saunders Files, Middle East + Negotiations Files, Middle East—Jarring Talks, November 1–30, 1972) The UN General Assembly discussed the + Middle East in plenary meetings November 29–December 8. See Document 320. + Fahmy made standard, resistant + rejoinder but then allowed himself “personal” observation that “it is up + to us (Egypt)” to devise something new to inject into situation. + Although he would not specify what this might be, I do not rpt not on + reflection think we can prudently assume he was talking about + politico-diplomatic initiative, nor that he was speaking as “personally” + as he professed. Even though he would not signal what Egypt’s hole card + is, he wanted me to believe there is one. End + summary.

+

2. As conversation developed, each of us acknowledged that following US + elections, and in part stimulated by reports of Secretary Rogers’ statement on “Meet the Press” + November 5When asked about the Middle East, + Rogers said: “There + isn’t as much attention focused on peace as there is on war, but we + have had a cease-fire in the Middle East now for about 27 months. We + are going to do what we can diplomatically to see if we can get + negotiations started between Egypt and Israel, and very soon now we + will be very active in discussions of that kind to see if we can get + negotiations started. We think that the Security Council Resolution + 242 has to be implemented fully, but we think that a good beginning + is to attempt to work out an agreement between Egypt and Israel that + would open the Suez Canal, have a partial withdrawal, and have a + commitment to full implementation of Security Council Resolution + 242.” (Department of State Bulletin, November + 27, 1972, p. 622) and Egyptian response thereto (Cairo 2988),Telegram 2988 from Cairo, November 7, transmitted + the Egyptian Minister of Information’s statement: “Egypt has + previously declared on several occasions her rejection of the + holding of direct negotiations with Israel. She has also declared + her rejection of partial solutions to the Middle East problem. The + last of these occasions was the opening session of the present + People’s Assembly session, when President Anwar El Sadat stated that America has + obstructed every attempt to achieve peace based on justice and wants + to face us with acceptance of a fait accompli. The President also + stated in his speech that we would not cede one inch of Arab land + and that there would be no negotiations with Israel.” (National + Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 27–14 ARAB–ISR) + publicists and diplomats in Cairo have been busily trying to get out of + each of us what is new. I said that I have responded to such queries by + restating importance USG attaches to + inauguration of process which engages parties to Arab-Israeli conflict + in discussion of settlement—as before. Fahmy allowed as how he too has been replying that he + has heard nothing new, but he went on to say that both Cairo diplomats + and reports from Khalil in Washington have it that the diplomatic + pundits there believe something new is actually in the making. He + supposed, what with President’s announced intention to re-organize this + administration, it would be at least January before new policy + approaches surface. I simply repeated what has been communicated to me + and said I did not think it would be useful for me to join in + speculation about anything else.

+

3. Fahmy responded with + acknowledgment of latter point, disparaging comment about possible + “trial balloons,” and standard statement of inability to understand why + USG has moved from ’69 to its + present position. After a pause, however, he said he did not expect + change in US stance, so in his personal view “it is up to us.” Egypt’s + next move, he continued, is going to “require a lot of work” on their + part; he would not be drawn on what that would involve. I said at one + point that just as I was not going to try to anticipate what if anything + new USG might say, I would not keep + asking GOE what they have that is new; I assumed that if they have + anything new to say, they will let me know.

+

4. Fahmy said that this might not + be necessary. He said I would be able to perceive the “new” situation + when it develops, and “they will feel it in Washington, Moscow and + Jerusalem too.” Fahmy continued + that “we will have to pull ourselves together here” and get a lot of + work done, and he wound up, as he had started, saying he knows that the + next move is Egypt’s.

+

5. In response to my reiteration of the “negotiating process” point, + Fahmy rather briskly said + that this is not the heart of the matter. Egypt’s leadership, in the + eyes not only of other Arab states but also of the people of Egypt, could not at the present + stage be seen to be seeking a deal. (Comment: + This part of the conversation was the most elliptical, but I thought it + prudent, all things considered, not to try to nail Fahmy down; his role in the + policy-making on this issue is not clear anyway.)

+

6. Fahmy’s remarks about + forthcoming UNGA debate I am reporting + separately.Telegram 3065 from Cairo, + November 14. (Ibid.) In the foregoing context, he seemed to + be saying that this was something GOE figures it has to get through + tactically, with as large a friendly vote on a resolution as possible. + He said he assumed the US would abstain rather than wind up in small, + negative minority.

+

7. Comment: + Fahmy is too accomplished a pro + to embark solo on what has all the earmarks of the first round of a + poker hand. (He said at one point he would not be making a record of + this part of our talk; maybe not. I would be surprised if he believed I + would not.) He was, I think, saying Egypt has a hole card, and wants US + to believe it is potent, in the hopes this will bring US to produce a + change in Israeli policy. The thought (also reflected in government + inspired press) that US policy cannot be expected to change can + plausibly (if illogically) be read as part of an effort to make us take + seriously the threat of Egyptian action, thus (hopefully) impelling the + change they seek.

+ + + Greene + + +
+ +
+ + 319. Memorandum of ConversationSource: Washington National Records Center, OSD Files: FRC 330–77–0094, Box 62, + Israel. Secret; Sensitive. Drafted on November 16 by Brett and + approved by Nutter. The + conversation took place in Rush’s office and the Secretary’s Dining Room. + Dayan also met with + Rogers and Helms that day. (New York Times, November 15, 1972, p. 1) The meeting with + Rogers is summarized in + the President’s Wednesday Briefing, November 21. (National Archives, + Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC + Files, Box 1283, Saunders Files, Subject Files, Israel) No record of + the meeting with Helms has + been found. + Washington, November 14, 1972, 12:15 + p.m. + + SUBJECT + Discussions with MOD Dayan + + + PARTICIPANTS + + Israeli Side + + Minister of Defense Dayan + Ambassador Rabin + Mr. Dror, Israeli Mission + Major General Gur, + Israeli Attaché + LtCol Bar-On, Aide to + MOD + + United States Side + + Deputy Secretary of Defense + Admiral Moorer, Chairman, + JCS * + Assistant Secretary of Defense Nutter + Assistant Secretary of Defense Henkin * + Vice Admiral Peet, Director/DSAA * + Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Noyes + Major General Brett, OASD/ISA + Mr. Kubal, OASD/ISA ** + Col Jones, Military Assistant ** + * Lunch only + ** Pre-lunch discussion only + +

Following introductory comments and a discussion of some of the MOD’s + experience with the British (Rabin: “The British are very good losers”), conversation + turned to Egypt and Israeli-Egyptian relations. Dayan acknowledged Israel was + relatively much stronger than Egypt, and felt Egypt realized it would + lose if it started a war. He believed the present impasse was a result + of Sadat’s lack of real + leadership, his unwillingness to face reality and turn to negotiations. + Instead, since he couldn’t do what he wanted, he did nothing. Secretary + Rush referred to President + Nixon’s difficult decision + to bomb North Vietnam and mine the harbors, despite the risks of + undercutting his trip to Moscow, détente with the Soviets, and loss of + the election. (Dayan: “I’m not + sorry about the result of the election”). This strong action of the + President, to almost everyone’s surprise, received very strong popular + backing in this country, the + trip to Moscow was not cancelled, and the President has been + overwhelmingly re-elected. Perhaps, Sadat might receive surprising support also if he had + the courage to negotiate.

+

Dayan agreed, but felt Sadat was unwilling to take any such + risks. He felt Sadat was weak and + getting weaker. The Russians are not out completely and indeed are + coming back a bit, but probably not with combat personnel and pilots. + They probably will, over time, introduce new weapons but he felt the + Soviets had been deeply offended by the expulsion and would insist on + Egypt meeting Soviet terms. Thus the Soviets might insist on a voice in + selection of MOD, Chief of Staff, etc. He was not sure that the Egyptian + military had been involved in Sadat’s expulsion decision, even though they did not + like the Russians. Rather Sadat + had gotten himself in a hole with his promises of a year of decision, + and blamed the Russians for his failures. Mr. Rush noted that the Soviets were + vitally interested in a détente for a number of reasons, so there was + hope they would be a moderating influence in the Middle East. Dayan agreed the Soviets were not + interested in a confrontation with the U.S. or backing a loser in the + Arabs, but would still seek to keep their position in Egypt. To do this + they knew they had to give something, to meet some Egyptian demands at + least for arms if not for personnel. He thought the Russians would + support better aircraft, perhaps more SAM 6s, etc.

+

The discussions in the Dining Room commenced with Dayan discussing the current + relationship between Jordan and Israel.The + next day, November 15, Meir + and King Hussein held a + secret meeting. As reported in a November 27 memorandum from + Helms to Kissinger, Meir presented Hussein with Israel’s minimum + demands for a settlement with Jordan, which included: 1) Israel’s + retention of the “unpopulated areas along the 1967 Israeli-Jordanian + border in addition to unspecified agricultural settlements along the + Jordan River; 2) Jordan’s resumption of control of the rest of a + demilitarized West Bank, which meant a total absence of Jordanian + army forces west of the Jordan River; and 3) Israel’s retention of + sovereignty over the entire, undivided city of Jerusalem. Meir added that Israel would never + relinquish the Golan Heights and would have to retain a strip along + the eastern coast of the Sinai Peninsula, including Sharm el-Sheikh. + Hussein and Zaid Rifai, who was also present, + believed that the Israeli Prime Minister was on the defensive, + “spending a great deal of time emphasizing how the U.S. could not + pressure Israel in a settlement.” (Ibid., Box 610, Country Files, + Middle East, Israel) Mr. Noyes asked Dayan + whether an interim settlement could be formulated for Jordan that might + be pursued simultaneous to the well known interim canal settlement + proposal. Dayan responded that he + did not believe it would be possible for Hussein to be satisfied and to be able to retain his + position in the Arab world as well as his position in his own + government.

+

To do so he would have to get major concessions from Israel, concessions + which Israel was not prepared to make. Dayan added that for some time an informal arrangement had been under + way with Jordan. This is clearly indicated by the fact that the “bridges + are open.” He considered that this accommodation was a satisfactory one + for the time being to both Israel and Jordan, and that in the near term + he could not see any other solution. Mr. Rush pointed out that King Hussein was certainly one of the most moderate leaders + in the Arab world. Rabin + countered that “Yes, he was moderate to the Western world, but this was + not necessarily the case in his relations with Israel.” Rabin stressed that Hussein unilaterally entered into the + 1967 war even ahead of the Syrians. Dayan and Rabin + then reviewed on a moment-by-moment basis the actions that Hussein had taken in the initial stages + of the Six Day War. Stress was placed on the fact Hussein struck on the ground before any + other Arab army. The conversation then turned to a general discussion of + the situation in the Middle East.

+

About half way through the meal Dayan commented that it was a working luncheon and that + to earn his meal he believed it advisable to turn the discussion toward + some specific subjects of interest to Israel. He stated that his + government was very interested in procuring additional F–4s and A–4s so + deliveries would continue at about the current rate, this being at 2–3 a + month. He did not indicate the overall numbers but he did state that + these aircraft would be needed as attrition aircraft. Mr. Rush responded that the respective + staffs could discuss this in greater detail and that the subject would + be taken under consideration by the USG.

+

Dayan then turned to the subject + of the production of the Mirage type aircraft (MX79), and the need for + Israel to have the approval in principle of the USG for the support of this aircraft. He emphasized this + was a subject of great importance to Israel. He stated that it is + Israel’s desire to produce a simple Mirage type aircraft which would be + available to the IAF by 1976, and one + that would be better than the Mirage. He expected that this airplane + would not be available until some time in 1976 and would be built in + small numbers and not for export. At the same time, he said, this + airplane in no way is considered a substitute for the requirement for + additional A–4s and F–4s. Dayan + then emphasized that what his government needed was a decision on the + principle of the USG supporting + production of this aircraft. Mr. Rush commented that this was a decision of major + importance which affected both governments. He pointed out that the + manufacture of an aircraft was difficult and expensive, and could have + very grave economic consequences. He emphasized this by pointing out the + recent problems that Lockheed Aircraft Corporation had encountered and + the necessity for the USG to help the + company out. He said there have been several companies in the past that + have come close to bankruptcy or gone bankrupt in attempting to produce + competitive military aircraft. Therefore, it was of considerable concern to the USG that Israel undertake this major step + only with full knowledge of the economic problems that could be + encountered. Mr. Rush added that + he would be very candid and that such an undertaking also presented + certain additional problems, not only of an international political + nature but also domestic in regard to our own manufacturers and labor + force. He explained that we cannot back an aircraft that would be + competitive with our own aircraft industries. Dayan responded that he was not + prepared to discuss the economics of the situation but that he was + certain such information could be made available to the USG. He again emphasized that Israel felt + that within the next decade it must produce its own aircraft. Such an + Israeli-produced aircraft should be of some advantage to the USG in that it would no longer be + necessary for Israel to come to the U.S. for all its aircraft and thus + create international political problems. Rabin interjected that his government fully understood + Dr. Nutter’s letter in that the + USG was prepared to support a + prototype program but not production. Rabin stated that no one builds just prototypes but the + purpose is to build prototypes to support production. With this in mind + it was essential that Israel get approval in principle for USG production support of the Israeli + Mirage-type aircraft. Dr. Nutter + responded that our government handled such undertakings on a step by + step basis and that our policy currently was that we “fly before we + buy”. In the case of Israel the initial decision was to support a + retrofit program for the older Mirage aircraft, by furnishing certain + requested equipment. The second step which was recently approved was the + release of equipment and certain know-how to support a prototype + program. Based on a review of the prototype, a logical decision could be + made on whether or not to support production.

+

MOD Dayan then indicated that + Ambassador Rabin had a subject + that he wished to discuss. The Ambassador stated that there was a + critical requirement for Israel to secure certain additional + intelligence capability, and that this could be done by the release of + two USAF C–130s. The Secretary + responded that this subject would be taken under advisement along with + the Israeli views.On November 22, Rush informed Helms that the Secretary of + Defense had determined, based on a review by the Middle East Task + Group, that the United States would not be able to release the two + C–130 planes to Israel. (Washington National Records Center, OSD Files: FRC 330–77–0094, Box 62, + Israel)

+

Dayan then stated that Israel was + most interested in securing the Lance or the Hawk to achieve an + effective surface-to-surface capability to use against missile sites. He + added he would like Major General Gur to address this subject in greater detail. General + Gur stated that the + Israelis were interested in Lance, “smart bombs,” and the Maverick and + that these had been put + before the METG. General Gur + emphasized that the release of these weapons to the Israelis would + greatly increase the accuracy of their attacks while resulting in + minimizing casualties to both sides. He added that they also desire + additional Shrikes. Mr. Rush + responded that this would be taken into consideration. Dayan also cited the need for a weapon + to counter the Foxbat which the Russians prior to their departure from + Egypt had flown at will over the Sinai.

+

Dayan then turned to Mr. Dror and + indicated that he, too, had a subject that he wished to raise. Dror + stated that since the problem had arisen in regard to the aircraft + production know-how, that all other normal know-how had slowed down. + Specifically, he said that requests for production know-how for parts + unrelated to the MX79 had not been forthcoming. In fact, it appeared + that there was a 360° check on all the production know-how for the J–79 + engine parts as well as other F–4 parts. He stated that he had a + specific problem with the environmental control units for which they + already had much of the production data. They needed these units in + order to increase their expertise on assembling and disassembling these + units. Major General Brett responded that this was correct, that all + this information was being held because in our view it related directly + to production know-how for the MX79. However, in the case of the + environmental control units, units had been released sufficient to + support the prototype program.

+

After a few additional amenities the luncheon was concluded.

+ + + G. Warren Nutter + + +
+ +
+ + 320. Memorandum From the President’s Deputy Assistant for National + Security Affairs (Haig) to the + President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential + Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger + Office Files, Box 131, Country Files, Middle East. Secret; + Sensitive; Exclusively Eyes Only. Kissinger initialed the memorandum and wrote “OBE” + at the top of the first page. + Washington, November 21, 1972. + + SUBJECT + Message from the Egyptians + +

Attached at Tab A is a message from Ismail which was delivered through the secret + channel.Dated November 20; attached but + not printed. After handing over the note, Ismail elaborated on several points + orally. The following are the significant points in his + presentation:

+

—The Egyptians attach great importance to future exploratory talks but + these can be adversely affected by a positive response to further + demands by Israel for arms, a blocking position during the coming + discussions in the UN, and the + continuation of Israeli air strikes against Syria and Lebanon.

+

—The Egyptians wish to have the first round of discussions conducted in a + third country and publicly announced at the conclusion.

+

—Although the Egyptian Foreign Minister will be in New York, this channel + remains the sole channel for the discussion of the Middle East problem + between the two Presidents.

+

In elaborating on the above points, Ismail noted that:

+

—Anywhere in Europe such as London, Rome or Paris would be acceptable for + the first meeting. Future sessions could be held both in the US and + Egyptian capitals.

+

—Since the talks would be announced, it would be necessary to have the + third country agree to host the talks before they begin.

+

—With regard to the forthcoming UN Middle + East debate, the Egyptians hope the US will not obstruct the resolution + but rather will accept and live with the fact that the resolution will + come to pass just as it did last year.Reference is to Resolution 2799 adopted December 13, 1971. See footnote 4, Document 270.

+

—These procedural modifications in no way lessen the Egyptian’s desire + for talks with Dr. Kissinger.

+ +

It is my understanding that in the UN + debate which begins next week, we are presently postured to take a + neutral and low-key position. You may, however, want to callGeorge Bush to ensure that our + delegation is properly postured for the debate.

+
+ +
+ 321. Telegram From the Department of State to the Interests Section in + EgyptSource: National + Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 658, Country Files, Middle East, Middle + East Nodis/Cedar/Plus, Vol. V. Secret; Nodis; Cedar Plus. Drafted by + Sterner, cleared by + Atherton, and approved + by Sisco. Repeated to Tel + Aviv. + Washington, December 4, 1972, + 2349Z. +

219619. Ref: Cairo 3247. Tel Aviv 7927.Telegram 3247 from Cairo, December 2, reported the negative + reaction of the Egyptian press to an interview that Rabin gave to the Israeli + newspaper Ma’ariv on November 30, and + conveyed Greene’s concerns + that the Egyptian Government would be “less disposed than ever to + pick up the opportunity for talks under US aegis.” (Ibid.) Telegram + 7927 from Tel Aviv, December 1, transmitted the translation of + Rabin’s replies in the + interview, including this comment: “In contacts which have been held + lately between representatives of Israel and the US, both in the US + and in Israel, it has been clear that there has been no change in + the US position. Our clarification talks with the Americans at the + beginning of 1972 were even formalized through a written + aide-mémoire between the two governments. This aide-mémoire was used + and is used today as the agreed policy between the United States and + Israeli Governments on all things connected with progress on a + political solution regarding the conflict between Israel and Egypt + in the Middle East.” (Ibid., RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 27–24 + ARAB–ISR) Regarding the U.S.-Israeli understanding on the proximity + talks, see Documents 276 and 277.

+

1. FYI. + Rabin interview, although + unfortunate in sense that he chose to make it at all at this time and + thereby reveal existence of US-Israeli memorandum on ground rules for + our role in proximity talks, nevertheless contains essentially accurate + description of some points in this understanding. Careful reading of + Rabin comments reveals + little more than confirmation of well-known tenets of US policy: That + (para four second reftel) there will be no Israeli withdrawal without + agreement between the two sides, that the US wants to preserve the + ceasefire, that US assistance to Israel is to prevent enforced + evacuation from the ceasefire lines; that (para five) solution cannot be + imposed from outside, but must be negotiated on basis SC + Res 242, that gap between two sides on + overall settlement is too great to bridge at this juncture (which is why + we favor interim agreement as means of facilitating negotiations on + overall settlement); that (para six) principal obstacle presently blocking interim agreement talks + is question linkage between that agreement and on-going negotiations for + final peace settlement (which everybody recognizes); that (para seven) + Egypt’s demand for Israeli commitment to total withdrawal as part of + interim agreement is “unacceptable” (if “unobtainable” is substituted + here this is in effect what Secretary said in his 1971 UNGA speechSee footnote 3, Document 255. + and what we have stressed to Egyptians privately on many occasions + subsequently).

+

2. Problem is created by immediate rush by Egyptian press to distort + understanding to fit their worst fears and to cast it in unfavorable + light. We see little profit in trying to refute specific distortions + that appear publicly; we will, however, be sending you text of line that + we propose to use here which you and other posts can also use.Not found. + End FYI.

+

3. We do not feel you should take initiative to seek appointment for + specific purpose of discussing Rabin interview. However, during any future calls you + may have with FonMin officials or in + any next informal contact, you may draw on following.

+

4. Begin talking points. Understanding which + Rabin refers to in his + interview resulted from Israel’s desire for clarifications about US + position concerning interim agreement and role USG would play in proximity talks we had proposed. As we + told Ghaleb when delivering + Secretary’s message to Sadat, + delay in obtaining Israeli agreement to proximity talks was largely + result of our insistence on retaining freedom of action that would + enable US to play such role effectively without being an advocate of + either side.See Document 276. We are satisfied that understanding + reached with Israel at this time does not impair this flexibility. This + point was also reaffirmed in talks with Zayyat in October at UN.See footnote 2, Document 314.

+

5. We wish particularly to make it clear that certain allegations + appearing in the Cairo press are without foundation. On question of + linkage between interim agreement and overall settlement, which US + regards as a key issue, our views are well known to GOE. We view interim + agreement as practical first step that would facilitate negotiations for + final peace settlement in accordance with S.C. Res. 242. We do not accept thesis that interim agreement + should be end in itself or that there should be no linkage between it + and final peace settlement. Secondly, understanding reached with + Israelis last winter concerned U.S. role in negotiations on interim + agreement talks and did not deal with terms of either interim agreement + or final peace settlement. Allegation appearing in one Cairo newspaper + that US agreed to support Israel on question location of final borders + is without foundation. We went no further than reaffirming what we have frankly told + Egyptians on number of occasions—namely that Israel cannot be expected + to agree to total withdrawal to pre-June 5, 1967 lines in context of + interim agreement.

+ + + Rogers + + +
+ +
+ 322. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in + IsraelSource: National + Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 610, Country Files, Middle East, Israel, + Vol. XI. Secret; Exdis. Drafted + by Stackhouse and approved in + draft by Sisco, and by + Atherton. Repeated to + Amman, Beirut, Cairo, Jerusalem, London, Paris, Moscow, Jidda, and + USUN. All brackets are in the + original except those indicating text omitted by the + editors. + Washington, December 16, 1972, + 0145Z. +

227505. Subj: Secretary-Allon + Meeting December 12.

+

Summary: Secretary-Allon conversation December 12 concentrated on outlook + for negotiations with Jordan and Egypt.During a phone call with Haldeman on November 17, Kissinger said that Rogers would “now run wild and try + to win one,” to which Haldeman commented: “And that’s probably true, + because Rogers did talk + about wanting to get into the Middle East thing before he leaves, at + least get negotiations started.” Kissinger told him that “it’s a disaster for the + second term and he’s affronted that it was done without discussion + from him.” The new administration should start “with a clear slate,” + Kissinger added. (Haldeman + Diaries, Multimedia Edition, November 17, 1972) + Atmosphere was extremely warm, cordial and positive. Throughout talk + Secretary stressed conviction time is ripe for beginning negotiating + process: this is in Israel’s interest and ours, and we should be + thinking how to get process started. Allon made clear he felt Israel ready to discuss + comprehensive or limited agreements with Jordan, or an interim agreement + reached through talks under U.S. aegis with Egypt, or both. It evident + however that Allon himself + personally attracted—as he has indicated in public statements—to effort + begin negotiations with Hussein. + He spoke approvingly of Hussein’s + reaction to Munich incidentSee footnote 2, Document 307. and + said Hussein’s plan for West Bank + was good “except for its territorial concepts.” In spite of this + Allon was anxious that U.S. + not give Hussein any “illusions” + when he comes early next year, or appear over eager to move. To + suggestion that Israel might give reassurance re Jerusalem’s future that + would make settlement more feasible, Allon said maximum Israel could give would be extraterritoriality to + Hussein as Muslim + representative for Holy Places under Israeli sovereignty, and it would + not be easy to persuade Israeli public of this. Secretary reassured + Allon we would not give + Hussein illusions but went on + to stress U.S. respect for him, our continuing support of Jordan, + including military support, and our hope King and Israel will find ways + to move toward peace.Hussein visited the United States + February 5–7, 1973, meeting with both President Nixon and Secretary Rogers on February 6. See Foreign + Relations, 1969–1976, volume XXV, Arab-Israeli Crisis + and War, 1973, Documents 14 and 15. Re Egypt, Allon expressed concern Egyptians may + undertake out of frustration some kind of limited military action in + coming weeks. Secretary and Sisco said everything Egyptians said indicated they well + aware military options not practical. Sadat, we believed, would be responsive to effort that + would enable him to show his people he was getting something. Allon asked what Israel could do. Were + proximity talks for an interim agreement the answer? Allon stressed he was not against + interim agreement, he was for it. Secretary replied we believed this was + most promising and feasible approach. Way had to be found to get around + obstacle created by Israel’s reply to Jarring 2/71 memo.For + Jarring’s memorandum, + see footnote 2, Document 205. For + Israel’s reply, see Document 211. + We were not proposing anything at this time but trying to convey our + frame of mind. While stressing Israel ready for negotiations, Allon introduced no new ideas except to + suggest rather tentatively that the U.S. might be instrumental in + bringing Mrs. Meir and President + Sadat into direct and secret + talks. Secretary made clear he did not think this kind of premature + summitry was really a practical alternative. At close, Allon expressed gratification current + state U.S.-Israel relations and improvement U.S. relations with Arabs + (it proves Israeli theory, he said, former does not preclude latter). He + said he hoped U.S. deliveries of aircraft would continue. And he urged + we continue to express to Soviets our interest in exodus under decent + conditions of Soviet Jews. Secretary noted recent record level of Soviet + Jewish emigration and assured Allon we would continue be active in what we thought + would be most helpful way, i.e. through quiet efforts. End summary.

+

[Omitted here is the remainder of the telegram.]

+ + + Rogers + + +
+ +
+ + 323. Telegram From the Embassy in Jordan to the Department of + StateSource: National + Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 617, Country Files, Middle East, Jordan, + Vol. VIII. Secret; Exdis. + Repeated to Beirut, Cairo, Jidda, Jerusalem, Kuwait, Tel Aviv, and + USUN. + Amman, December 17, 1972, 0805Z. +

5622. Subject: Jordan-Israeli Peace Negotiations. Ref: Tel Aviv + 8090.Telegram 8090 from Tel Aviv, + December 8, reported the Embassy’s analysis of the Israeli public’s + attitude toward a settlement with Jordan. (Ibid., Box 1169, Saunders + Files, Middle East Negotiations Files, Middle East—Jarring Files, December 1–31, + 1972)

+

Summary: Gap between Hussein and Israeli positions on peace terms so great + that prospects look slim.See footnote 2, Document 319. Yet + Hussein would try direct + negotiations if he saw reasonable prospect and he could go first, given + independent, nationalist line to which he is committed. Internally, he + is strong enough to have negotiating latitude but attitude of Arab + moderates, especially Faisal, + would be constraint. Outside, especially US, help essential with both + Israel and Arabs. Durability of agreement should not be problem; GOJ stability such that any successor + regime to Hussein almost surely + will continue same conservative, nationalist policy. Indications of + Israeli flexibility are hopeful, but Israelis unrealistic in appraising + Hussein incentive to + negotiate. Critical issue is Jerusalem, and Hussein has little incentive to accept mutilated West + Bank while abandoning claim to Jerusalem, would probably prefer continue + indefinitely as champion of Arab cause rather than formalize humiliating + deal. If, however, Israelis have real incentive to compromise with + Jordan, secret exploratory discussion probably possible, if judged + worthwhile even with slim prospect of success. Would require Israeli + signals of greater flexibility, particularly on Jerusalem; would have to + deal with both Jerusalem and West Bank as inseparable package; and U.S. + would have to accept some public onus (and real responsibility) for + “imposing” settlement. End summary.

+

1. Gap between Israeli and Jordanian asking price for settlement is so + great and incentives on both sides to compromise so modest that + prospects for successful negotiations slim. Nevertheless, Tel Aviv + reftel raises points that require consideration. Unlike complex Israeli + politics, Jordan position depends almost entirely on one man and + Hussein plays his cards very + close to the chest; we have little basis for stating his views other + than public record. This much said, we think Hussein could and would negotiate, but only if he saw + reasonable prospect of settlement satisfactory to him, which he does not now see. As he told + Rouleau of Le Monde recently,Eric Rouleau’s interview with Hussein was published in the + November 4 edition of Le Monde. (New York Times, December 4, 1972, p. + 1) direct negotiation is not problem; problem is what there + is to negotiate about. Hussein is + realist enough to recognize that overwhelming Israeli preponderance of + power ensures Israel can dictate terms of settlement. Hard line coming + out of Jerusalem till now, particularly on Jerusalem (assuming no softer + line is being signalled privately) offers him no inducement to a + negotiation which would, in effect, be capitulation to terms neither his + inter-Arab relations nor his own convictions could tolerate.

+

2. Assuming adequate incentive to do so, Hussein could go first. Since September, 1970, he has + increasingly followed line independent of other Arabs, hewing to tough + line on Jordan national interests. It has been so successful he is + deeply committed and very confident his line is right. He would not let + Egyptian or radical Arab criticism steer him from profitable + negotiation. In fact, he would probably get personal satisfaction from + being leader and key figure and not averse to scoring over Egyptians. + While he would be somewhat constrained by reaction of local + Palestinians, he has sufficient internal stability and support from army + and East Bankers to give him considerable latitude. Bigger constraint + would be reaction of Arab moderates and, crucially, of Faisal (recent Hussein-Faisal conversation, Amman 5564,Not found. underlines difficulties). Any + deal would have to be sufficiently respectable, cosmetically and + factually, for him to defend it effectively to these constituencies. + Faisal’s political and + economic support, hints of possible Kuwaiti thaw, Syrian border opening, + and general warming of Arab climate are assets he will not jeopardize + lightly. If he were to go first, he would need assurance of real help + from USG and other friends, not only + with Israelis but among moderate Arabs.

+

3. Jordanians are following with moderate interest Dayan-Allon debate on West Bank future but show little + inclination to discuss it seriously. They recognize it is primarily a + domestic debate and, in any event, they see little in it that would + provide a basis for serious negotiation. At same time, they have never + liked interim Canal initiative, feeling that it would leave them with + little leverage and diminish chances of satisfactory Jordan-Israel + negotiation. Thus if Israelis showed any signs of real flexibility on + issues with Jordan, Hussein would + have incentive to preempt negotiating initiative from Egyptians. If + Israelis themselves visibly more interested in West Bank/Jerusalem than + Canal settlement, this too might encourage Hussein to negotiate.

+ +

4. Issue of Hussein’s durability + and of what comes after him does not seem to us so great a problem. Most + regimes in world pose same problems in more serious form. Certainly, + Egypt does. Even were Hussein to + go, succession issue would be decided within small group at top with + army holding decisive hand. Army, the potential rivals within leadership + group, the powerful and conservative East Bank clans and tribes, and the + local establishment are all sufficiently like-minded and cohesive that + successor regime will almost certainly be army-based, East Bank + dominated, conservative and nationalist, and will continue Hussein policies and commitments. More + important, it will probably have power and stability to do so. We would + judge Jordanian regime to have less succession problem, more durability + of policy, than almost any Arab regime in area. Indeed, Hussein might raise same issue re + hardening of Israeli line over past several years. Since Israel will + retain de facto power to modify and harden any settlement agreed to + (e.g. through continued military/security control of West Bank) what + assurance can he have that Israeli right wing, at a future time, may not + force GOI to renege.

+

5. What is interesting about Israeli situation as portrayed reftel is not + specifics of Israeli internal dialogue which, framed within domestic + preoccupations, still offers Hussein choice between little and nothing—even the + little is on the wrong, i.e. West Bank end of bargain. Interest lies in + hints of Israeli flexibility and apparent incentive to negotiate, even + though issues are tougher than Egypt-Israeli issue. As reftel points + out, however, Israelis lack appreciation of Hussein’s limited incentive to negotiate. To East + Bankers (and Arabs such as Faisal) Jerusalem, not West Bank, is big issue. West + Bank settlement is viewed by many East Bankers as primarily means to get + some of Palestinians here off their necks and back across river. For + Hussein, return of maximum + Palestine population and minimum territory, with mutilated sovereignty + and with onus of being Hashemite who sold out Arab claim to Jerusalem is + worst of all worlds, a bargain conceivable only in wishful perspective + of Israeli domestic politics. At best, West Bankers are, for Hussein, politically a mixed blessing. + Even as an economic asset their value is limited and Hussein is not man to put economic + ahead of political considerations. As things are going now, with durable + and substantial backing from USG and + Saudis, with Arab trend apparently vindicating his policy, and with + internal situation in good shape, Hussein probably more inclined to go along indefinitely + with existing de facto détente and favorable evolution in economic + relation to West Bank and Israel. He is better off for present as + resolute, if unsuccessful, defender of Arab claims, than stirring up + political trouble for himself to no purpose or accepting humiliation of + settling on present Israeli terms.

+

6. Nevertheless it may be that with diminishing Egyptian (and especially + Soviet) threat on Canal front Israelis are more interested in settlement on Jordan side, where + they perceive vital interests to be served, than on Canal (where limited + withdrawal might be easier but serves lesser Israeli interests). There + may also be, in Israeli views and pressures reflected reftel, enough + flexibility to warrant renewed exploration on Jordanian side. To do so, + however, it would be necessary to accept several conditions.

+

A) Initial probes would have to be secret. Hussein would be very disinclined to stir up public + trouble for himself over an initiative with so little prospect of + success.

+

B) There would have to be some Israeli signals of greater flexibility, + particularly on Jerusalem. Hussein has already given a number of public signals of + his own—flexibility about Jerusalem, about direct negotiations, about + interest in a real and substantive peace which would provide example and + perhaps bridge toward real Arab-Israeli comity over time. Mrs. Meir has unfailingly taken an + uncompromising stand, particularly on Jerusalem.

+

C) Contrary to past tactical thinking, negotiation would have to engage + both Jerusalem and West Bank issues at same time, with Jerusalem as + controlling factor. Extent to which Israelis could give Hussein a respectable and defensible + (particularly with Faisal) + Jerusalem settlement would be decisive. We doubt that any meaningful + discussion of West Bank compromise possible without Jerusalem + concessions as bait.

+

D) Given yawning gap between two sides, we would have to decide that + exploratory initiative is worthwhile even given high probability of + ultimate failure. Thus exploration would have to be publicly invisible, + noncommittal and open-ended, accepting that we do not see end of road + but betting that, once exploration begins, both sides will find more + incentive and more flexibility than so far demonstrated.

+

E) Hussein will have a hard time + accepting even best bargain we might hope Israelis could give. We may + well find that he needs appearance (and even reality) of a settlement + imposed from outside—and that means primarily by Americans and imposed + on both repeat both sides—as defense against Arab critics. Are we + prepared to accept that role and take heat; even, if necessary, to + impose some real pressure on Hussein and Israelis?

+

7. Basic question, obviously, is negotiability of Jerusalem and on this + we find reftel para 8 thought provoking. Everything we have seen + indicates Mrs. Meir dictum that + nothing is negotiable on Jerusalem is an absolute and is universally + shared even by Israel moderates. But reftel suggests that definition of + what is Jerusalem and what is negotiable may be open to discussion. We + have no idea what Hussein + reaction might be. Clearly, however, there are three distinct + areas—historical holy precincts, including walled city; balance of + former (modern Arab Jerusalem); and modern western Jerusalem. Dayan himself argues that Jews should be able to live in Arab + (West Bank) areas even after settlement; thus Israeli “facts” in East + Jerusalem are by same argument not conclusive. Israeli signal that + within limits of unified city and administration, formal sovereignty + over modern Arab city or some portion, and special ordinance re Muslim + Holy Places and access thereto are discussable would probably provide + sufficient incentive at least to initiate dialogue. How far dialogue + could be sustained could only be revealed by course of events; yet there + may be more room for ingenuous compromise than we have supposed. + Cosmetics are important and there are ways for Israelis to help + Hussein save face if face is + less important to them than real peace.

+

8. Whether, as reftel suggests, this is a momentarily favorable + conjunction or more durable trend, we inclined to agree that outside + push would be necessary to move either party toward initiating dialogue; + and while prospects for success are slim, climate is for moment probably + more favorable than at any time in recent years. With Soviet threat on + Egyptian side at least diminished, and Palestinian problem (solvable + only in Jordanian context) persistent and perhaps growing, it may be + worth at least considering an initiative on Jordan-Israel front as + complement or as alternative to renewed Canal initiative, it might even, + by rousing Egyptian fear of being left out, ease path to Canal + negotiation.

+ + + Brown + + +
+ +
+ 324. Telegram From the Interests Section in Egypt to the Department of + StateSource: National + Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 638, Country Files, Middle East, Egypt, + Vol. VIII. Secret; Exdis. + Cairo, + December 22, 1972, + 1305Z. +

3435. Subject: Egyptian View of Peace Issue.

+

Summary: Foreign Office Under Secretary Fahmy in conversation he initiated + December 22 said he thought UNGA + resolution of December 8The UN + General Assembly adopted Resolution 2949 on December 8 by a + roll-call vote of 86 to 7, with 31 abstentions (including the United + States). The resolution reaffirmed Security Council Resolution 242 + and General Assembly Resolution 2799 (see footnote 4, Document 270) and expressed the General + Assembly’s deep perturbation that neither resolution had been + implemented, and, thus, the previously “envisaged just and lasting + peace” in the Middle East had not been achieved. The thrust of the + resolution criticized Israel for its non-compliance with previous + resolutions—resulting in its negative vote—particularly on the issue + of the acquisition of territory by force. For a summary of the + debate in the General Assembly and the text of the resolution, see + Yearbook of the United Nations, 1972, pp. + 175–181. After the vote, Bush made a statement that begins: “We regret very + much that the resolution which has just been voted constitutes + precisely the kind of resolution we had so much hoped could be + avoided at this Assembly. This resolution cannot render constructive + assistance to the processes of diplomacy. It cannot offer + encouragement to the parties to reach a peaceful accommodation of + their differences.” (Department of State Bulletin, January 1, 1973, p. 27) would be of more + help to USG even than to GOE in period + immediately ahead. He said situation has so changed in recent weeks that + it is “too late” for USG only to + continue to say it is available for peace discussions. In reply to a + question, he seemed to be trying to leave inference that in the absence + of movement on the political front, the military option might be a + serious possibility.

+

1. Fahmy opened our December 22 + conversation (which he had requested to discuss bombing in Hanoi) with + discussion of state of play of ME peace + questions. He expressed interest in my forthcoming visit to Washington, + and confirmed I expect to have consultations as well as do some family + and personal business.

+

2. Fahmy expounded at some length + the thesis that recent UNGA resolution + had been the product of long and careful consideration by the Egyptian + and many other governments at the highest levels and that USG should take this into account. He + expressed gratification that US had abstained on the vote, and said he + thought the resolution and the whole exercise would be even more useful + to USG than to GOE in stimulating + movement on the political front. He did not point to any particular + paragraph of the resolution nor offer detailed reasoning.

+

3. He also said that he did not think the USG could any longer continue to say only that it is + available to assist in getting discussions under way. I pressed several + times for a reason but Fahmy + confined himself to repeating the point and deferring an explanation + until I return. He persisted even when I said it would be more useful to + know now.

+

4. I recalled that several weeks ago he had said that he recognized the + next move is up to Egypt and asked whether he was now saying something + else. He said yes, the situation has changed. So I asked whether I could + be clear that GOE is still interested in a political settlement and he + again temporized; he said the political possibility is up to the USG.

+ +

5. Conversation trailed off into pleasantries.

+

6. Italian Ambassador Plaja has come in to say that he gets from + conversations with both Zayyat + and Fahmy in last few days that + they are much interested in my visit to Washington; they have even asked + Plaja what I am going for and he has told them what I have said. Plaja + has little to add to the substance of the matter except that on UNGA resolution he has found the + Egyptians concentrating their attention on para 8. Plaja himself thinks + that para 6 on nonannexation by force will in the long run be more + useful. (This puts this point in somewhat different light than that + reported Rome 7745,Dated December 19. + (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1169, Saunders Files, + Middle East Negotiations Files, Middle East—Jarring Talks, December 1–31, + 1972) in which the Italians attribute to the Egyptians the + importance of the nonannexation paragraph).

+

7. Department repeat as desired.

+ + + Greene + + +
+ + +
+
+ + + +
+ + Index +

+ References are to document numbers +

+ + + + 40 Committee, 91 + 303 Committee, 60, 91 + + + + + + Abouhamad, Khalil, 312 + Ad Hoc Special Review Group on the Israeli Nuclear Weapons + Program, 20, 31, + 35, 37, 59, 63, 79, 86, 94, 117, 119, 133, 150, 153, 160 + Agnew, Spiro: + Four-Power negotiation proposals, 5 + Jarring mission (1971), 209 + Meeting with King of Jordan, 189 + Military contingency planning, 4 + U.S. Middle East policy, 74, 124 + U.S. military aid to Israel, 102 + U.S. settlement proposals, 26 + + al-Aqsa mosque fire (1969), 48 + Allon, Yigal, 2, 4, 13, 188, 223, 228, 229, 230, 245, 322, 323 + Allon Plan, 4, 13, 32, 36, + 182, 192, + 223 + American Jewish community: + Ad Hoc Special Review Group discussions, 117 + Dayan U.S. visit (1970), 190 + Government-organized protests, 54 + Israeli withdrawal and, 66 + Nixon-Ehrlichman/Haldeman discussions, 232 + Nixon-Kissinger discussions, 269 + Nixon memoranda, 233 + Rogers memoranda, 67 + Sisco memoranda, 81 + U.S. military aid to Israel, 101 + + Arab-Israeli military balance (see also + U.S. military aid to Israel): + Kissinger memoranda, 113, 266 + Laird memoranda, 239 + National Security Study Memoranda, 103, 108 + Nixon press conference (Mar. 4, 1969), 218 + NSC discussions, 4, 48, 124, + 243 + U.S.-Israeli communications, 106 + Yariv meetings, 108, 110 + + Arab-Israeli War (1967), 14, 19, 21 + Arab League, Rabat Summit (1969), 67, 70, 73, 74 + Arafat, Yassir (see also Fatah; + Palestinians), 168, 174, 183, 185, 186, 192, 247 + Argov, Shlomo: + Ceasefire efforts, 144 + Interim settlement proposals (1971), 217, 223 + Israeli nuclear capabilities, 41 + Jarring mission (1971), 217 + Meir U.S. visit, 52 + Soviet military aid to Egypt, 110 + Soviet peace plan (Dec. 30, 1968), 1 + U.S.-Israeli bilateral negotiations, 14, 78, 84 + U.S. military aid to Israel, 46, + 118, 192 + U.S. peace initiative (Jun. 1970), + 140, 142, 143 + + Asad, Hafez el-, 184 + Aswan Dam, 233 + Atherton, Alfred L. “Roy”: + Egypt-Israel ceasefire (Aug. 1970), + 143, 146 + Egypt-Israel ceasefire violations, 154, 177, 178 + Four-Power negotiation proposals, 13, 71 + Hussein U.S. visit (1970), 189 + Interim settlement proposals (1971), 234, 253, 254 + International guarantees, 195, + 199, 221 + Israeli incursions in Lebanon (1972), 293 + Israeli nuclear capabilities, 20, + 41 + Jarring mission (1969–1970), 13 + Jarring mission restart proposals (1970), 149 + Jarring mission (1971), 195, 196, + 199, 200, 204, 208, 209, + 219 + Jordanian-Israeli bilateral negotiations, 322 + Lebanese crisis (1969), 64 + Military contingency planning, 134 + Nixon-Meir correspondence, 33 + Proximity talk proposals, 258, + 263, 276, 278, 285, 322 + Rogers Plan, 80 + + Soviet-Egyptian relations, 298 + Soviet peace plan (Dec. 30, 1968), 1, + 2 + UN General Assembly meeting (Oct. 1970), 177 + U.S.-Israeli bilateral negotiations, 52 + U.S. Jordan-Israel settlement proposal, 78 + U.S. Middle East policy, 74, 117, 119, + 124, 172 + U.S. military aid to Israel, 94, + 124, 150, 153, 188, 195, + 204 + U.S. military aid to Jordan, 187 + U.S. peace initiative (Jun. 1970), + 129, 133 + U.S. settlement proposals, 26, + 48, 84 + U.S.-Soviet negotiations, 15, + 22, 61, 111 + U.S. statement of principles, 13 + + Atlantic Alliance, 269 + + + + + + Bar-On, Lt. Col. Aryeh, 319 + Barbour, Walworth: + Border incidents, 64 + Dayan U.S. visit (1972), 316 + Egypt-Israel ceasefire (Aug. 1970), + 143, 146 + Egypt-Israel ceasefire violations, 154 + Interim settlement proposals (1971), 224, 226, 245, + 283, 316 + Israeli incursions in Lebanon (1972), 315 + Israeli nuclear capabilities, 20, + 42 + Jarring mission restart proposals (1970), 187 + Jarring mission (1971), 205, 209, + 226 + Jarring mission (1972), 283 + TWA hijacking (Aug. 1969), 46 + U.S.-Israeli bilateral negotiations, 33, 52 + U.S.-Israeli bilateral treaty proposals, 221 + U.S. military aid to Israel, 106, 130, 136, 245 + U.S. military aid to Jordan, 24 + U.S. peace initiative (Jun. 1970), + 136 + U.S. settlement proposals, 84 + U.S.-Soviet negotiations, 29 + + Beam, Jacob D., 49, 109, 111, 138, 155, 157, 172, 193 + Begin, Menachem, 149 + Behr, Col. Robert M., 56, 60, 68, 90, 91 + Beirut airport attack (1969), 64 + Bennett, Lt. Gen. Donald, 178, 183 + Bérard, Armand, 7, 50, 72, 75 + Bergus, Donald C.: + Egypt-Israel ceasefire (Aug. 1970), + 146 + Egypt-Israel ceasefire violations, 154, 158 + Egyptian political situation, 217, 231 + Interim settlement proposals (1971): + Heikal discussions, 215, + 234, 246, 253 + Sadat discussions, 237, + 255 + Sterner-Sadat discussions, 242 + Voice of Egypt paper, 238, 240 + + Jarring mission (1971), 196, 200, + 206, 213, 215, 219 + Nixon-Sadat correspondence, 197 + Proximity talk proposals, 255, + 258, 263 + Rogers Egypt visit (1971), 231 + U.S.-Egyptian bilateral negotiations, 237 + U.S. Middle East policy, 61, 134 + U.S. military aid to Israel, 92 + + Bitan, Moshe, 36, 42, 52 + Black September (1970), 160, 161, 168, 190 + Black September organization, 307 + Blee, David H.: + Egypt-Israel ceasefire violations, 160, 183 + International guarantees, 195, + 199, 221 + Jarring mission (1971), 195, 199, + 208 + Jordan intervention contingency planning, 126 + Jordan U.S. personnel evacuation, 125 + Military contingency planning, 134 + Palestinians, 183, 192 + U.S. Middle East policy, 172 + U.S. military aid to Israel, 150, 160, 183, 188, + 195 + U.S. military aid to Jordan, 168, 183, 192 + + Border incidents (see also Ceasefire + efforts; Egypt-Israel ceasefire (Aug. 1970); + Egypt-Israel ceasefire violations; Israeli incursions in Lebanon + (1972)): + Ad Hoc Special Review Group discussions, 94, 119 + Beirut airport attack (1969), 64 + Kissinger memoranda, 127 + Nixon-Hussein correspondence, 82 + Nixon-Kissinger discussions, 248 + + Nixon-Kosygin correspondence, 88, + 93, 94 + Porter-Helou discussions, 98 + U.S.-Israeli communications, 142, 308 + U.S. military aid to Israel and, 93, 259, 264 + U.S.-Soviet communications, 120 + + Borders. See Israeli withdrawal; Sharm + el-Sheikh; West Bank. + Brett, Maj. Gen. Devol, 188, 319 + Brezhnev, Leonid Ilyich, 42, 65, 88, 99, 155, 157, 251, 252, 257, 262, 267, 281, 286, 289, 291, 300, 301 + Brown, L. Dean, 168, 185, 189, 201, 220, 236, 323 + Buckley, William F., 102 + Buffum, William B., 138, 312 + Bunche, Ralph, 50, 61, 138 + Bush, George H.W.: + Four-Power negotiations, 213 + Israeli incursions in Lebanon (1972), 279, 295 + Jarring meetings, 274, 314 + Jarring mission (1971), 209, 274 + Jarring mission (1972), 283 + Munich massacre (Sep. 1972), 307 + Proximity talk proposals, 306 + Rogers New York meetings (Sep. 1971), 248 + UN General Assembly Resolution 2799, 270 + UN General Assembly Resolution 2949, 324 + + Butterfield, Alexander, 308 + + + + + + Cairo Accord (1970), 168 + Cairo Agreement (1969), 60, 64, 315 + Cairo communiqué (Feb. 9, 1970), 92 + Caradon, Lord (Hugh Foot), 50, 72, 75 + Cargo, William, 56 + Ceasefire efforts (see also Egypt-Israel + ceasefire (Aug. 1970); Egypt-Israel ceasefire + violations; Interim settlement proposals (1971)): + Ad Hoc Special Review Group discussions, 94, 117, + 119, 133 + Dayan proposal (Dec. 1970), 188 + Kissinger memoranda, 127 + Kissinger-Rabin discussions, 103 + Kissinger-Rogers discussions, 144 + Kissinger-Sisco discussions, 141 + Nixon aide-mémoire, 102 + NSC staff summaries, 112 + Rogers memoranda, 123 + U.S.-Israeli communications, 103, 142 + U.S. peace initiative (Jun. 1970) + and, 129, 133 + U.S.-Soviet communications, 120 + Washington Special Actions Group discussions, 90 + + Celler, Emanuel, 94, 102, 243 + Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) (see also + Helms, Richard M.), 298 + China, People’s Republic of (PRC), 242, + 256, 269 + Cline, Ray, 155, 177, 178, 183 + Conger, Clinton, 48 + Conger, Pat, 74 + Congress, U.S.: + U.S. economic aid to Jordan, 274 + U.S. military aid to Israel, 101, 124, 150, 157, + 195, 243 + + Connally, John, 232 + Constantinople Convention, 53 + Crocker, Chester, 195 + Crowe, Colin, 199 + Cushman, Lt. Gen. Robert E., Jr., 126, + 131, 168, + 172 + + + + + + Dakroury, Mohammed, 290 + Davies, Rodger P.: + Egypt-Israel ceasefire violations, 160 + Israeli incursions in Lebanon (1972), 293 + Israeli nuclear capabilities, 31, + 35 + Lebanese crisis (1969), 60, 68 + Military contingency planning, 4, + 56, 90, 126, 131 + Nixon-Meir correspondence, 33 + Proximity talk proposals, 258, + 285 + Soviet-Egyptian relations, 298 + Soviet military aid to Egypt, 91 + U.S. military aid to Israel, 160 + U.S. military aid to Jordan, 87 + + Davis, Jeanne W., 27, 37, 133, 150, 153, 160, 168, 172, 178, 183, 188, 192, 195, 199, 204, 220, 221 + + Day, Arthur R., 2 + Dayan, Moshe: + Border incidents, 120, 124, 134, + 149 + Ceasefire proposal (Dec. 1970), + 188, 192, 202 + Contingency planning, 4, 13, 36, + 48 + Egypt-Israel ceasefire (Aug. 1970), + 146, 162, 183 + Egypt-Israel ceasefire violations, 160, 183 + Interim settlement proposals (1971), 228, 229, 230, + 240, 245, 307 + Proximity talk proposals, 306 + + Rogers visit (1971), 230 + Sharm el-Sheikh, 208 + Soviet-Egyptian relations, 307 + U.S. military aid to Israel, 160, 167, 188, 190, + 248, 319 + U.S. visit (1970), 187, 189, + 190 + U.S. visit (1972), 316, 319 + + De Gaulle, Charles, 4, 8, 14, 189 + De la Barre de Nanteuil, Luc, 13 + De Palma, Samuel, 17, 29, 83, 197 + De Seynes, Phillippe, 50 + Defense, U.S. Department of (DOD) (see also + Laird, Melvin R.), 260 + Demilitarized zone proposals, 2, 23, 25, 26, 58, 199, 216 + Dinitz, Simcha, 52, 106, 162, 228, 229 + Dobrynin, Anatoly F.: + Israeli withdrawal, 1 + Moscow Summit (1972), 291 + Rogers Plan, 58, 74, 80, + 240 + Soviet-Egyptian relations, 269, + 298, 301 + U.S. peace initiative (Jun. 1970), + 120, 122, 137, 210, 298, + 300 + U.S.-Soviet negotiations: + Kissinger-Gromyko talks, 138, 311 + Kissinger talks, 96, 99, 134, 135, 137, 177, 212, 222, 223, 251, 253, 262, 269, 281, 298, 300, 301 + Nixon-Gromyko talks, 173 + Nixon talks, 281 + Rogers talks, 97, 104, 105, 111, 120, 127, 129, 214, 251 + Sisco talks (1969), 5, 11, + 13, 15, 18, 22, 26, 27, 28, 29, 34, 49, 52, 53, 57, 58, 61 + Sisco talks (1970), 95, 96, 107, 127 + + + Doolin, Dennis J., 126 + Douglas-Home, Sir Alec, 183 + Dubs, Adolph, 107, 120, 137 + Dulles, John Foster, 222, 227, 233 + + + + + + Eban, Abba: + Egypt-Israel ceasefire violations, 154, 157, 169 + Four-Power negotiation proposals, 8, 11, 13, 14, + 15, 29, 70 + Interim settlement proposals (1971), 217, 245, 253, + 254, 256, 257, 283 + Israeli incursions in Lebanon (1972), 293, 315 + Israeli withdrawal, 2, 13 + Jarring mission (1969–1970), 2, 8, 12, 13 + Jarring mission restart proposals (1970), 129, 187 + Jarring mission (1971), 195, 205, + 217, 254 + Jarring mission (1972), 283 + Nixon discussions, 14, 118 + Proximity talk proposals, 261 + Rogers visit (1971), 228, 229, + 230 + Soviet involvement in Egypt, 118 + UN General Assembly Resolution 2799, 270 + UN General Assembly speech (Sep. 30, 1971), 254 + U.S.-Israeli bilateral negotiations, 13, 14, 36, 47, + 71, 74, 77, 78 + U.S. military aid to Israel, 106, 117, 118, 130, + 187, 244 + U.S. peace initiative (Jun. 1970), + 136, 138, 140 + U.S. settlement proposals, 11, + 13, 14, 26, 29, 74, 84, 129 + U.S.-Soviet negotiations, 29, + 61, 187 + + Egypt (see also Egypt-Israel ceasefire + (Aug. 1970); Egypt-Israel ceasefire + violations; Interim settlement proposals (1971); Jarring mission (1969–1970); + Jarring mission (1971); Proximity talk + proposals; Rogers Plan; Soviet-Egyptian relations; Soviet military + aid to Egypt; U.S.-Egyptian bilateral negotiations): + Cairo Agreement (1969), 60 + Jordanian relations with, 280 + Nasser peace appeal speech (May 1, + 1970), 112, 115, 116, 117, + 129 + Nixon-Sadat correspondence, 165, + 197, 215, 219, 298 + Political situation, 14, 39, 51, + 217, 231, 238, 286 + Rogers visit (1971), 225, 227, + 228, 229 + TWA hijacking (Aug. 1969) and, 46 + U.S. peace initiative (Jun. 1970) + response, 136 + U.S. relations with, 19, 225, 227, + 228, 229, 231 + + Egypt-Israel ceasefire (Aug. 1970) (see also Egypt-Israel ceasefire violations): + Ad Hoc Special Review Group discussions, 160 + Agreement text, 145 + Israeli response, 147 + NSC staff summaries, 170, 175, 181 + Sadat speech (Feb. 4, 1971), 203, + 204 + Sadat speech (Mar. 7, 1971), 215 + Sadat speeches (Jan. 1971), 197 + Soviet responses, 155 + UN General Assembly discussions, 177 + U.S. aerial reconnaissance, 146, + 155, 159 + U.S.-Egyptian communications, 215 + Washington Special Actions Group/Senior Review Group + discussions, 172 + + Egypt-Israel ceasefire violations: + Israeli suspension of Jarring mission and, 161 + Johnson, U. Alexis, memoranda, 157 + Kissinger memoranda, 169, 179 + Meir Knesset speech (Nov. 16, 1970), 185 + NSC discussions, 156 + NSC staff summaries, 175, 181 + Rogers press conference statement, 177 + Saunders-Hoskinson memoranda, 159 + Senior Review Group discussions, 177, 178, 183 + UN General Assembly discussions, 177 + U.S.-Egyptian communications, 154, 157, 158, 169 + U.S.-Israeli communications, 154, 157, 162, 169 + U.S.-Soviet communications, 157, + 169, 173 + Washington Special Actions Group/Senior Review Group + discussions, 172 + + Egypt-Israel proximity talk proposals. See + Proximity talk proposals. + Ehrlichman, John, 232 + Eisenhower, Dwight D., 4, 5, 21, 124, 233 + Eliot, Theodore L., Jr., 46, 106, 140, 280, 294, 306, 312 + Elizur, Michael, 106, 228, 315 + Ellsworth, Robert, 1 + Eshkol, Levi, 13, 26, 30, 36, 41, 42, 55 + + + + + + Fahmy, Ismail, 318, 324 + Faisal ibn Abd al-Aziz al Saud (King of Saudi Arabia), 61, 70, 112, 117, 228, 230, 247, 323 + Fatah, 4, 42, + 47, 52, 168, 171, 174, 180, 185, 186, 188, 247 + Fawzi, Mahmoud, 18, 21, 26, 197, 218, 227, 231, 234, 237 + Fawzi, Gen. Mohamed, 158, 165, 231, 242 + Fisher, Max, 95, 233 + Foreign Assistance Act, 274 + Foreign Military Sales Act, 166 + Four-Power negotiation proposals (see also + Four-Power negotiations): + Ad Hoc Special Review Group discussions, 133 + Kissinger memoranda, 11 + National Security Study Memoranda, 6 + Nixon press conference (Mar. 4, 1969), 77 + NSC discussions, 4, 5, 26, 74 + NSC Interdepartmental Group papers, 8 + NSC staff summaries, 198 + Rogers-Foreign Ministers meeting discussions, 50 + Rogers memoranda, 67, 70, 71 + Sisco memoranda, 39 + UN representative discussions, 23 + U.S.-French communications, 7, + 8, 13 + U.S.-Israeli communications, 13, + 14, 33 + + U.S. settlement proposals and, 25 + U.S.-Soviet communications, 1, + 15 + U.S. working paper, 17 + Yost memoranda, 23 + + Four-Power negotiations, 72, 75, 98 + + Bush-Jarring discussions, 273 + Egypt-Israel ceasefire (Aug. 1970) + and, 145 + Kissinger memoranda, 76, 89 + Kissinger-Sisco discussions, 73 + Nixon-Kissinger discussions, 210, 212 + NSC discussions, 209 + NSC staff summaries, 202 + Rogers memoranda, 83, 111, 193, + 213 + Senior Review Group discussions, 183, 199, 208 + Sisco memoranda, 81 + U.S.-Israeli communications, 77, + 78, 84 + U.S. peace initiative (Jun. 1970) + and, 129, 139 + + France (see also Four-Power negotiation + proposals; Four-Power negotiations), 50, + 86, 94 + Freeman, John, 98 + Freeman, Adm. Mason B., 172 + Fulbright, J. William, 102, 151, 195 + + + + + + Garment, Leonard, 54, 77, 95 + Gaza Strip, 53, 58, 216 + Gazit, Mordechai, 154, 224, 228, 229, 261 + Ghaleb, Mohammed Murad, 261, 276, 278, 285, 294, 298, 302, 321 + Ghorbal, Ashraf, 21, 61, 218, 231, 238, 275, 294, 296, 309 + Glick, Brig. Gen. Jacob E., 126 + Golan Heights (see also Israeli + withdrawal), 74, 117, 162, 198, 202, 204, 207, 208, 210, 212, 214, 216, 217, 223, 308, 311, 317, 319 + Goldberg, Arthur J., 81, 232 + Goldwater, Barry, 102 + Goodell, Charles, 102 + Greece, 46, 124, 146, 286 + Greene, Joseph N., Jr.: + Proximity talk proposals, 276, + 278, 285, 290, 294, 302 + Soviet-Egyptian relations, 298 + U.S.-Egyptian bilateral negotiations, 316, 318, 321, 324 + U.S. Middle East policy, 314 + War, possible, 290 + + Gromyko, Andrei A.: + Egypt-Israel ceasefire violations, 156, 169 + Egypt visit (1968), 1, 34 + Interim settlement proposals (1971), 251 + Jarring mission, 138, 173 + Rogers-Foreign Ministers meeting, 50 + Rogers talks, 52, 53, 169 + Soviet military aid to Egypt, 251, 268 + U.S.-Soviet negotiations: + Kissinger talks, 49, 172, 252, 292, 300, 311 + Nixon talks, 28, 173, 221, 251, 262 + Rogers talks, 47, 48, 50, 52, 53, 74, 83, 85, 86, 169, 253 + Sisco Moscow talks (1969), + 28, 39, 47, 48, 49, 71, 86, 133 + + + Gur, Maj. Gen. Mordechai, 319 + Guthrie, D. Keith, 68, 90, 91, 125, 126, 131, 177, 208 + + + + + + Haig, Gen. Alexander M., Jr.: + American Jewish community government-organized protests, + 54 + Arab-Israeli military balance, 97, 243 + Dayan U.S. visit (1970), 190 + Egypt-Israel ceasefire violations, 156, 162 + Four-Power negotiation proposals, 5, 70 + Interim settlement proposals (1971), 241, 243 + Israeli incursions in Lebanon (1972), 308 + Jarring mission restart proposals (1970), 187 + Jarring mission (1971), 209, 210 + Jordan U.S. personnel evacuation, 125 + Meir U.S. visit (1970), 162 + Military contingency planning, 4, + 26 + Munich massacre (Sep. 1972), 307 + Proximity talk proposals, 306 + Rogers Middle East trip (1971), + 227, 228, 229 + Soviet military aid to Egypt, 99, + 162 + U.S.-Egyptian backchannel (1972), + 305, 320 + U.S. Middle East policy, 124 + U.S. military aid to Israel, 79, + 160, 162, 187, 190 + + U.S. military aid to Jordan, 113 + U.S. military aid to Lebanon, 100 + U.S. peace initiative (Jun. 1970), + 142 + U.S. settlement proposals, 26, + 48 + War of attrition, 51 + White House-Department of State divisions, 216 + + Haldeman, H.R.: + Egypt-Israel ceasefire violations, 156 + Interim settlement proposals (1971), 227, 228, 229, + 241 + Jordanian-Israeli bilateral negotiations, 322 + White House-Department of State divisions, 96, 144, + 156, 162, 216, 222, 225, + 232, 233, 257, 288 + + Hart, Parker T., 4 + Hartman, Arthur A., 172, 220 + Hassan bin Talal, el- (Crown Prince of Jordan), 220 + Hassan Muhammed ibn Yusuf, Mawlay al- (King Hassan II of Morocco), + 201 + Heath, Edward, 168, 182, 188 + Heikal, Mohamed, 165, 215, 227, 228, 231, 234, 237, 238, 246, 253, 254, 263 + Helms, Richard M.: + Ad Hoc Senior Review Group discussions, 35, 86, 94, 117, + 119, 133, 150, 153, 160 + Arab-Israeli military balance, 243 + Dayan U.S. visit (1972), 319 + Egypt-Israel ceasefire violations, 160, 177, 178, 183 + Four-Power negotiation proposals, 5, 48 + Hussein U.S. visit (1970), 189 + Interim settlement proposals (1971), 241, 243 + International guarantees, 195, + 199, 221 + Israeli nuclear capabilities, 10, + 20, 31, 37, 38 + Jarring mission (1971), 195, 199, + 204, 208, 209, 210 + Jordan U.S. personnel evacuation, 125 + Jordanian-Israeli bilateral negotiations, 319 + Military contingency planning, 4, + 16, 44, 134 + Moscow Summit (1972), 289 + Palestinians, 174, 180, 183, + 185, 186, 192 + Soviet-Egyptian relations, 310 + UN General Assembly meeting (Oct. 1970), 177 + U.S.-Egyptian backchannel (1972), + 288, 299, 300, 305, 309, + 310 + U.S.-Israeli bilateral negotiations, 216 + U.S. Middle East policy, 3, 6, 26, 39, 74, + 117, 119, 124 + U.S. military aid to Israel, 163, 166 + + National Security Study Memoranda, 63, 148, 150 + Nixon memoranda, 163 + NSC discussions, 124, + 209 + Senior Review Group discussions, 183, 195, 199, 204, 208 + + U.S. military aid to Jordan, 24, + 192 + U.S. peace initiative (Jun. 1970), + 133 + U.S. settlement proposals, 26, + 48 + + Helou, Charles, 26, 60, 61, 64, 70, 98, 100 + Henkin, Daniel Z., 319 + Herzog, Chaim, 42, 52, 106, 228, 229 + Hillenbrand, Martin J., 56 + Holdridge, John H., 44 + Hoskinson, Samuel M., 145, 159, 306 + Humphrey, Hubert H., 232 + Hussein bin Talal (King of Jordan; see also + Jordan): + Border incidents, 82 + Federation plan (1972), 280, 282, + 284, 289 + Jarring mission restart proposals (1970), 189 + Jarring mission (1971), 197 + Jordanian-Israeli bilateral negotiations, 30, 32, + 282, 319, 323 + Nixon correspondence, 82, 220, 236, + 272, 273 + Palestinians, 185, 188 + Sisco Jordan visit cancellation, 109 + Soviet military aid, 69 + U.S. economic aid to Jordan, 220, 236, 274 + U.S. military aid to Jordan, 24, + 87, 113, 284 + U.S. visit (1969), 14, 19 + U.S. visit (1970), 189 + U.S. visit (1972), 284 + + Hyland, William G., 56, 99 + + + + + + Idan, Avner, 271, 308 + Interim settlement proposals (1971; see also Proximity talk proposals): + Barbour memoranda, 226, 316 + Bergus: + Bergus-Heikal discussions, 215, 234, 246, 253 + Bergus-Ismail discussions, 258 + Bergus paper, 238, 240 + Bergus-Riad discussions, 196, 234 + Bergus-Sadat discussions, 237, 255 + + Dayan interview, 307 + Eban UN General Assembly speech (Sep. 30, 1971), 254 + Israeli response, 219 + Kissinger-Ghorbal discussions, 218 + Kissinger memoranda, 216, 240, 265 + Nixon: + Nixon-Ehrlichman/Haldeman discussions, 232 + Nixon-Kissinger discussions, 222, 227 + Nixon-Meir correspondence, 249 + Nixon-Rogers discussions, 227 + Nixon-Sadat correspondence, 219 + + NSC discussions, 209, 243 + Riad UN General Assembly speech (Oct. 6, 1971), 254, 256 + Rogers: + Rogers-Eban discussions, 253, 257 + Rogers Meet the Press + statement (Nov. 5, 1972), 318 + Rogers memoranda, 241, + 258 + Rogers-Riad discussions, 253, 255 + Rogers-Sadat discussions, 227 + UN General Assembly speech (Oct. 4, 1971), 249, 254, 256, 277 + + Sadat speech (Feb. 4, 1971), 203, + 204 + Sadat speech (Nov. 11, 1971), 263 + Senior Review Group discussions, 208 + Sisco: + Sisco-Ghorbal discussions, 275 + Sisco Israel trip, 228, + 229, 241, 243, 244, 245, 246 + Sisco-Rabin discussions, 244 + Sisco-Sadat discussions, 231 + + Sterner-Sadat discussions, 242 + U.S.-Israeli communications, 211, 217, 223, 224, + 228, 229, 230, 244, 245, + 249, 256, 261, 263, 268 + U.S.-Soviet communications, 212, + 251, 252, 262 + + International guarantees: + Four-Power discussions, 193, + 198 + Four-Power UN representative discussions, 23 + Nixon speech (Feb. 25, 1971), 211 + NSC discussions, 5 + NSC Interdepartmental Group papers, 8 + NSC staff summaries, 198 + Senior Review Group discussions, 195, 199, 221 + U.S.-Israeli communications, 14, + 217 + U.S.-Jordanian communications, 189 + U.S.-Soviet communications, 18, + 311 + + Iraq, 4, 21, 42, 48, 51, 52, 93, 94, 106, 161, 167, 172, 177, 182, 186, 188, 282, 312 + Irwin, John N., II: + Interim settlement proposals (1971), 254 + International guarantees, 195, + 199 + Israeli incursions in Lebanon (1972), 293, 315 + Jarring mission (1971), 195, 199, + 208, 209 + Proximity talk proposals, 258, + 270, 276, 278, 302 + U.S.-Egyptian bilateral negotiations, 237 + U.S. military aid to Israel, 124, 178, 195 + + Ismail, Hafez, 255, 258, 261, 263, 276, 294, 296, 298, 309, 314, 320 + Israel (see also Border incidents; + Jordanian-Israeli bilateral negotiations; U.S.-Israeli bilateral + negotiations; U.S.-Israeli relations; U.S. military aid to Israel): + Political situation, 8, 48, 316 + U.S. economic aid, 62, 79, 86, + 93, 96, 164 + U.S. peace initiative (June 1970) + response, 130, 136, 139, 141, 142 + + Israeli incursions in Lebanon (1972): + Laird memoranda, 313 + UN Security Council discussions, 279, 295 + UN Security Council Resolution 316, + 295 + U.S.-Egyptian communications, 309 + U.S.-Israeli communications, 293, 308, 315 + + Israeli nuclear capabilities: + Ad Hoc Special Review Group discussions, 35, 37, + 86, 94, 117, 119, 113, + 150, 153, 160 + + Kissinger memoranda, 38, 40, 47, + 54, 55 + Laird memoranda, 10, 45 + National Security Study Memoranda, 20, 31 + NSC discussions, 5, 26, 35, + 37, 48 + U.S.-Israeli communications, 41, + 42, 52, 55 + + Israeli withdrawal (see also Interim + settlement proposals (1971); Jarring mission + (1971)): + Ad Hoc Special Review Group discussions, 117, 119 + Four-Power UN representative discussions, 23 + Jarring-Eban discussions, 2 + Kissinger memoranda, 27, 66, 127 + Meir interview (Mar. 12, 1971), 217 + Nasser peace appeal speech (May 1, + 1970), 112, 115 + NSC discussions, 209 + NSC Interdepartmental Group papers, 8 + Rogers memoranda, 25 + Rogers Plan on, 34 + Senior Review Group discussions, 208 + UN General Assembly Resolution 2799, 270, 274, 283, + 324 + U.S.-Egyptian communications, 2, + 218, 237 + U.S.-Israeli communications, 13, + 136, 162, 211, 217 + U.S.-Jordanian communications, 189 + U.S.-Soviet communications, 1, + 2, 15, + 49, 107, 251, 311 + + Italy, 4, 8, 46, 57, 146, 166, 169, 225, 227, 230, 279, 286 + + + + + + Jackson, Henry M. “Scoop”, 157, 209, 243 + Jackson Amendment, 157, 162, 166, 195, 311 + Jadid, Saleh al-, 184 + Jarring, Gunnar V. (see also Jarring + mission), 1 + + Bush meetings, 274, 314 + Cyprus location proposals, 193 + Egypt-Israel ceasefire violations, 157 + Four-Power negotiation proposals, 4 + + + Jarring mission (1969–1970): + Cyprus location proposals, 193 + Four-Power discussions, 4, 7, 13, 17, 23, + 50, 72, 75, 83, 111 + Israeli resumption decision (Dec. 1970), 193 + Israeli suspension (Sep. 1970), + 161 + Jarring discouragement, 185 + Jarring questions, 12, 15 + Kissinger memoranda, 11, 25, 167, + 169 + Meir Knesset speech (Nov. 16, 1970), 185 + Meir UN speech (Oct. 21, 1970), 240 + NSC discussions, 4, 43, 124, + 133, 150, 156, 172, 177, + 183, 188 + NSC Interdepartmental Group papers, 8, 10 + NSC staff papers, 116, 152 + NSC staff summaries, 112, 170, 175, + 176, 181, 182 + Restart proposals (see also Jarring + mission (1971)), 3, 75, 88, 120, + 122, 129, 133, 137, 138, + 139, 145, 149, 187 + Rogers memoranda, 34, 67, 70, + 83, 84, 123, 149, 193 + U.S.-Israeli communications, 13, + 29, 33, 36, 52, 84, 99, 140, + 143, 151, 157, 187, 190 + U.S.-Jordanian communications, 189 + U.S.-Soviet communications, 1, + 2, 15, + 22, 28, 34, 39, 49, 61, 80, + 85, 99, 107, 120, 122, + 136, 137, 138, 173 + U.S.-Soviet working paper, 58 + Yost correspondence, 43 + + Jarring mission (1971): + Barbour memoranda, 205, 226, 245 + Bergus memoranda, 231, 242, 246 + Bush-Jarring discussions, 274 + Eban UN General Assembly speech (Sep. 30, 1971), 254 + Nixon-Kissinger discussions, 210, 212, 222 + Nixon-Sadat correspondence, 197, + 219 + NSC discussions, 209 + NSC staff papers, 202, 207, 214 + Rogers memoranda, 197, 200, 201, + 206, 211, 213, 215, 219, + 220, 224, 228, 230, 234, + 235, 241, 244, 250, 253, + 255, 256, 259, 263 + Rogers press conference (Mar. 16, + 1971), 219 + Senior Review Group discussions, 195, 199, 204, 208 + + Thant report, 198 + UN General Assembly Resolution 2799, 270, 274 + U.S.-Egyptian communications, 196, 200, 206, 213, + 215, 218 + U.S.-Israeli communications, 205, 211, 217, 271 + U.S.-Jordanian communications, 201 + + Jarring mission (1972), 275, 283, 292 + Javits, Jacob K., 4, 232 + Jerusalem: + al-Aqsa mosque fire (1969), 48 + Brown memoranda, 323 + NSC Interdepartmental Group papers, 8 + Department of State proposal (1971), 216 + UN Security Council Resolution 298, + 250 + U.S.-Israeli communications, 78, + 228 + U.S.-Jordanian communications, 19, 236, 274 + + Jewish community. See American Jewish + community. + Johnson, Lyndon B., 2, 8, 41, 42, 48, 55, 79, 81 + Johnson, Adm. Nels, 44, 56, 60, 68 + Johnson, Peter, 270 + Johnson, U. Alexis: + Arab-Israeli military balance, 243 + Egypt-Israel ceasefire violations, 154, 157, 177, 178, + 183 + Four-Power negotiation proposals, 71 + Interim settlement proposals (1971), 243 + International guarantees, 221 + Jarring mission (1971), 204, 209 + Lebanese crisis (1969), 60, 68 + Military contingency planning, 44, 56, 125, 126, 131 + Soviet military aid to Egypt, 91 + UN General Assembly meeting (Oct. 1970), 177 + U.S. Middle East policy, 172, + 209 + U.S. military aid to Israel, 150, 160, 183, 188, + 204 + U.S. military aid to Jordan, 168, 188 + U.S. peace initiative (Jun. 1970), + 133 + + Johnson mission, 4 + Johnston mission, 4 + Jordan (see also Border incidents; + Jordanian-Israeli bilateral negotiations; U.S.-Jordanian bilateral + negotiations): + Allon Plan, 4, 13, 192 + Black September (1970), 160, 161, + 162, 163, 168 + Egyptian relations with, 21, 28, 280 + Hassan U.S. visit (1971), 220 + Hussein federation plan (1972), + 280, 282, 284, 289 + Hussein U.S. visit (1969), 14, 19 + Hussein U.S. visit (1970), 189 + Hussein U.S. visit (1972), 284 + Jerusalem, 17, 19, 236, 249, 274 + Jidda PLO talks (Sep. 1971), 247 + Kissinger memoranda, 24, 25, 47, + 54, 76, 77, 81, 84, 89, 114, + 115, 127, 169 + National Security Study Memorandum 33, 16 + National Security Study Memorandum 103, 164 + NSC discussions, 4, 26, 48, + 74, 124 + Palestinian settlement proposals, 181, 182, 183, 185, + 186, 192 + Political situation, 52, 161, 174, + 185, 323 + Sisco memorandum, 39 + Sisco visit cancellation, 109 + Soviet military aid, 113 + U.S. economic aid, 220, 236, 273 + U.S. military aid: + Ad Hoc Special Review Group discussions, 86, 119, 133 + National Security Decision Memoranda, 192 + NSC staff papers, 93, + 112, 170, 176, 181, 182, 191 + Rogers memoranda, 64, + 69, 70, 71, 78, 80, 83, 87, 123, 129, 137, 147 + Senior Review Group discussions, 168, 172, 183, 188, 192 + U.S.-Jordanian communications, 19, 30, 32, 82, 87, 189, 220, 236, 284 + Washington Special Actions Group discussions, 125, 126, 131 + + U.S. peace initiative (Jun. 1970), + 139, 140 + U.S. personnel evacuation, 125, + 126 + + Jordan Crisis. See Black September (1970). + Jordanian-Israeli bilateral negotiations: + Brown memoranda, 323 + Hussein-Meir communications, 32 + + Hussein-Meir secret meetings (1972), 282, 319 + Rogers-Allon discussions, 322 + U.S.-Egyptian backchannel (1972), + 317 + U.S.-Jordanian communications, 30, 32 + + + + + + + Karame, Rashid, 26 + Karamessines, Thomas: + Lebanese crisis (1969), 60, 68 + Military contingency planning, 44, 56, 90, 126, 131 + Soviet military aid to Egypt, 91 + U.S. military aid to Israel, 160, 188 + U.S. military aid to Jordan, 188 + + Kennedy, David M., 4, 74 + Kennedy, Edward M., 232 + Kennedy, Col. Richard T.: + Egypt-Israel ceasefire violations, 160, 177, 178, 183 + International guarantees, 221 + Jarring mission restart proposals (1970), 187 + Jarring mission (1971), 204, 208, + 209 + Military contingency planning, 131 + UN General Assembly meeting (Oct. 1970), 177 + U.S. Middle East policy, 172 + U.S. military aid to Israel, 153, 160, 183, 187, + 188, 204 + U.S. military aid to Jordan, 168, 188 + U.S. peace initiative (Jun. 1970), + 133 + + Kettlehut, Col. Marvin C., 125 + Khartoum declaration (Aug. 1967), 18, 50 + Kissinger, Henry A. (see also White + House-Department of State divisions): + American Jewish community, 54, + 269 + Arab-Israeli military balance, 113, 266 + + Laird memoranda, 239 + National Security Study Memoranda, 108 + NSC discussions, 243 + + Border incidents, 88, 127, 248 + Ceasefire efforts, 104, 127, 141, + 142, 144, 188 + Egypt-Israel ceasefire (Aug. 1970), + 43, 172 + Egypt-Israel ceasefire violations, 169, 179 + + Ad Hoc Special Review Group discussions, 160 + NSC discussions, 156 + Saunders-Hoskinson memoranda, 159 + Senior Review Group discussions, 177, 178, 183 + + Four-Power negotiations, 5, 7, 11, 74, 76, + 81, 89, 210, 212 + Hussein U.S. visit (1969), 19 + Hussein U.S. visit (1970), 189 + Interim settlement proposals (1971), 216, 240, 265 + + Nixon discussions, 222 + NSC discussions, 243 + U.S.-Egyptian communications, 218 + U.S.-Israeli communications, 217, 249 + U.S.-Soviet communications, 252 + + International guarantees, 195, + 199, 221 + Israeli incursions in Lebanon (1972), 308, 309, 313 + Israeli nuclear capabilities, 10, + 20, 31, 35, 38, 40, 47, 55 + Jarring mission (1971): + Nixon discussions, 210, + 212, 222 + NSC discussions, 209 + NSC staff summaries, 202 + Senior Review Group discussions, 195, 199, 204, 208 + U.S.-Egyptian communications, 206, 218 + U.S.-Israeli communications, 212, 217 + + Lebanese crisis (1969), 60, 65, + 68 + Lebanese-Palestinian confrontation plans, 312 + Military contingency planning: + National Security Study Memoranda, 16 + NSC discussions, 4, 5 + Washington Special Actions Group discussions, 44, 60, 90, 125, 126, 131 + + Moscow Summit (1972), 252, 269, + 287, 291 + Munich massacre (Sep. 1972), 307 + + Nasser peace appeal speech (May 1, + 1970), 115 + Palestinians, 172, 174, 180, + 183, 186, 192 + Proximity talk proposals, 265 + + Egyptian rejection, 294 + Nixon discussions, 269 + Sisco discussions, 257 + Sisco-Rabin discussions, 277 + + Rogers Middle East trip (1971), + 222, 229 + Rogers Plan, 127 + Soviet-Egyptian relations, 286, + 299, 300 + Soviet military aid to Egypt, 127, 266 + + NSC discussions, 124 + Sadat-Brezhnev discussions, 286 + U.S.-Israeli communications, 110, 142 + U.S.-Soviet communications, 135, 252 + Washington Special Actions Group discussions, 91 + + UN General Assembly meeting (Oct. 1970), 177 + U.S. economic aid to Israel, 62, + 79, 95, 96 + U.S.-Egyptian backchannel (1972), + 305 + + Classified asset report, 309 + Haig memoranda, 320 + Helms memoranda, 288, + 299, 310 + Nixon discussions, 300, + 303 + Saunders memoranda, 317 + U.S.-Egyptian communications, 296 + + U.S.-Egyptian bilateral negotiations, 21 + U.S.-Israeli bilateral negotiations, 14, 52, 53, 77, + 216 + U.S. Middle East policy, 95, 127 + + Ad Hoc Special Review Group discussions, 117, 119 + Domestic political considerations, 9 + Laird memoranda, 313 + National Security Study Memoranda, 6, 164 + NSC discussions, 74, 124 + NSC Interdepartmental Group papers, 8 + Sisco memoranda, 114 + Washington Special Actions Group/Senior Review + Group discussions, 172 + + U.S. military aid to Israel, 38, + 40, 59, 79, 95, 127, 166, 167, + 266 + + Ad Hoc Special Review Group discussions, 86, 94, 133, 150, 153, 160 + Dayan memoranda, 248 + Laird memoranda, 45 + Meir U.S. visit (1971) + discussions, 268 + National Security Decision Memoranda, 128 + National Security Study Memoranda, 63, 148 + Nixon discussions, 96 + Nixon-Meir correspondence, 249 + NSC discussions, 124 + Nutter memoranda, 272 + Proximity talk proposals and, 265 + Rabin discussions, 102, + 110, 133, 142 + Senior Review Group discussions, 183, 188, 195, 204 + Sisco discussions, 141 + Sisco-Rabin discussions, 277 + + U.S. military aid to Jordan, 24, + 113, 168, 188, 192 + U.S. peace initiative (Jun. 1970), + 142 + U.S. settlement proposals, 27, + 47, 127 + + Jordan-Israel settlement proposal, 76, 77 + NSC discussions, 26, 48 + Rogers memoranda, 25 + + + U.S.-Soviet negotiations, 66, + 127 + + Dobrynin talks, 135 + Gromyko talks, 53, 252, 300, 311 + Nixon-Dobrynin talks, 281 + Nixon-Gromyko talks, 173 + Yost memoranda, 43 + + War of attrition, 49, 51, 104, + 110, 113 + + + Knowles, Lt. Gen. Richard T.: + Egypt-Israel ceasefire violations, 177, 178, 183 + International guarantees, 195, + 199, 221 + Jarring mission (1971), 195, 199 + Palestinians, 183 + + UN General Assembly meeting (Oct. 1970), 177 + U.S. military aid to Israel, 150, 183, 188, 195 + U.S. military aid to Jordan, 188 + + Kosygin, Alexei, 2, 48, 88, 93, 94, 99, 214 + Kraft, Joseph, 232 + Krimer, William D., 173 + Kubal, Robert, 319 + Kutakov, Leonid N., 50 + Kuwait, 86, 93, + 124, 129, + 131, 168, + 176, 236, + 323 + + + + + + Laird, Melvin R.: + Arab-Israeli military balance, 108, 239 + Dayan ceasefire proposal (Dec. 1970), 188 + Dayan U.S. visit (1970), 187, 190 + Egypt-Israel ceasefire violations, 177 + Four-Power negotiation proposals, 5 + Hussein U.S. visit (1969), 19 + Hussein U.S. visit (1970), 189 + Israeli incursions in Lebanon (1972), 313 + Israeli nuclear capabilities, 10, + 20, 31, 37 + Jarring mission (1971), 209, 210 + Military contingency planning, 4, + 16 + Palestinians, 188 + Proximity talk proposals, 260 + Soviet military aid to Egypt, 239 + U.S. economic aid to Israel, 62 + U.S.-Israeli bilateral negotiations, 216 + U.S. Middle East policy, 3, 6, 74, 313 + U.S. military aid to Israel, 10, + 45, 86, 94, 121, 239, 267 + + Kissinger memoranda, 166 + Kissinger-Rabin discussions, 132 + National Security Decision Memoranda, 128, 166 + National Security Study Memoranda, 63, 148 + Nixon-Dayan discussions, 190 + Nixon memoranda, 163, + 195 + Nutter memoranda, 142, + 272 + Rogers communications, 259, 264 + + U.S. military aid to Jordan, 113, 284 + U.S. peace initiative (Jun. 1970), + 121, 128 + U.S. settlement proposals, 26 + + Latimer, Thomas K., 309 + Lebanese crisis (1969), 56 + + Cairo Agreement (1969), 60, 64, + 315 + Military contingency planning, 60, 68 + NSC discussions, 26, 48 + Porter memoranda, 100 + Rogers memoranda, 98 + Soviet statement (1969), 65 + U.S. military aid, 60, 68, 98, + 100 + Washington Special Actions Group discussions, 60, 68 + + Lebanon (see also Israeli incursions in + Lebanon (1972); Lebanese crisis (1969)): + Palestinian confrontation plans (1972), 312 + Soviet relations with, 312 + U.S. intervention (1958), 124 + + Leprette, Jacques, 1 + Lewis, William, 192 + Libya, 4, 21, + 57, 60, 86, 94, 112, 119, 124, 127, 131, 168, 176, 217, 227, 231, 286, 315 + Lincoln, Gen. George A., 4, 5, 26, 48, 74, 124 + Lindsay, John, 102 + Lucet, Charles, 13 + + + + + + MacDonald, Donald, 220 + Malik, Yakov, 22, 50, 72, 75, 181 + Mansfield, Mike, 102 + McCloskey, Robert J., 144, 158, 228, 229 + McCloy, John J., 74, 94 + McConnell, Gen. John P., 5 + McPherson, Lt. Gen. John, 117 + Meany, George, 243 + Meir, Golda, 13 + + Arab-Israeli military balance, 106, 108, 117 + Egypt-Israel ceasefire (Aug. 1970), + 143, 145, 147, 149, 151 + Egypt-Israel ceasefire violations, 151, 154, 185 + Hussein federation plan (1972), + 282 + Interim settlement proposals (1971), 203, 216, 219, + 221, 224, 230, 240, 245, + 249, 262, 306 + Israeli nuclear capabilities, 42, + 55 + Israeli withdrawal interview (Mar. 12, 1971), 217 + Jarring mission, 175, 185, 187, + 188, 195, 240 + Jarring mission (1971), 205, 207, + 209, 211 + + Jordanian-Israeli bilateral negotiations, 32, 282, + 319 + Munich massacre (Sep. 1972), 307 + Nixon correspondence, 33, 101, 102, + 103, 130, 136, 142, 151, + 163, 187, 188, 224, 238, + 249, 307 + Proximity talk proposals, 263, + 277 + Rogers correspondence, 67, 78, 129, + 213, 224 + Rogers discussions, 122, 144, 225 + Rogers visit (1971), 208, 225, + 228, 229, 230 + Sisco Israel trip (1970), 109, 114 + Sisco Israel trip (1971), 228, 229, + 243, 245 + TWA hijacking (Aug. 1969), 46 + United Kingdom visit, 183 + U.S. military aid to Israel, 51, + 52, 59, 79, 86, 94, 95, 96, + 99, 104, 106, 109, 117, + 166, 190, 271, 272, 277 + + U.S. visit (1969) + discussions, 52, 57 + U.S. visit (1971) + discussions, 268 + + U.S. peace initiative (Jun. 1970), + 120, 129, 136, 140 + U.S. visit (1969), 33, 35, + 36, 37, 39, 47, 48, 51, 52, + 73, 77 + U.S. visit (1970), 151, 162, + 240 + U.S. visit (1971), 267, 268 + + Mikhailov, V.V., 15, 22 + Military contingency planning: + Ad Hoc Special Review Group discussions, 133 + National Security Study Memoranda, 16 + NSC discussions, 4, 5 + Washington Special Actions Group discussions, 44, 56, + 60, 68, 90, 91, 125, 126, 131 + + Mitchell, John N.: + Egypt-Israel ceasefire violations, 160 + Rogers New York meetings (Sep. 1971), 248 + U.S. Middle East policy, 124 + U.S. military aid to Israel, 160, 233 + U.S. settlement proposals, 48 + White House-Department of State divisions, 225, 257, + 288 + + Moorer, Adm. Thomas H.: + Arab-Israeli military balance, 243, 267 + Dayan U.S. visit (1972), 319 + Egypt-Israel ceasefire violations, 160 + Hussein U.S. visit (1970), 189 + Interim settlement proposals (1971), 243 + International guarantees, 221 + Jarring mission (1971), 204, 209 + Jordan intervention contingency planning, 125, 126 + Jordan U.S. personnel evacuation, 125, 126 + Military contingency planning, 131 + Palestinians, 192 + U.S.-Israeli bilateral negotiations, 216 + U.S. Middle East policy, 124, + 172, 208, 209 + U.S. military aid to Israel, 132, 150, 153, 160, + 163, 204 + U.S. military aid to Jordan, 192 + + Mosbacher, Emil, 14, 21, 96, 189 + Moscow Summit (1972): + Communiqué, 292, 311 + Kissinger-Gromyko discussions, 252 + Kissinger memoranda, 287, 294 + Laird memoranda, 267 + Nixon-Kissinger discussions, 269 + U.S. settlement proposal, 291 + + Mufti, Zuhayr Mahmud al-, 284 + Munich massacre (Sep. 1972), 307 + Munn, Robert, 86 + Muskie, Edmund S., 232, 243 + + + + + + Narasimhan, C.V., 50 + Nasser, Gamal Abdel: + Ad Hoc Special Review Group discussions, 117, 119, + 133, 160 + Black September mediation, 168 + Death of, 165, 168, 169, + 170, 172, 184, 192, 197, + 286 + Dulles meeting (1953), 227 + Four-Power discussions, 23, 70 Jordanian-Israeli + bilateral negotiations, 30 + Kissinger memoranda, 19, 25, 47, + 51, 66, 76, 88, 89, 114, 127, + 169, 286 + NSC discussions, 4, 8, 26, 47, 48, + 74, 86, 124 + NSC papers, 93, 112, 116, + 170 + Peace appeal speech (May 1, 1970), 112, + 115, 116, 117, 129 + Political situation, 14, 19, 39, + 47, 51, 114, 124, 184, + Senior Review Group discussions, 168, 172, 192 + Soviet military aid to Egypt, 109, 111, 286 + + Soviet peace plan, 1 + Soviet Union visit (1970), 104, 133, + 142 + U.S. Middle East policy, 4, 8, 25, 26, 29, + 36, 57, 60, 66, 67, 83, 116, + 117, 118, 129, 149 + U.S. military aid to Israel, 92, + 104, 105, 112, 115, 116, + 124 + U.S.-Israeli communications, 14, + 29, 36, 52, 99, 104, 106, 109, + 110, 118, 142, 226, 228 + U.S.-Jordanian communications, 19, 189 + U.S.-Soviet communications, 1, + 18, 39, 111, 120 + U.S.-United Arab Republic communications, 21, 109, + 112, 115, 158, 196, 197, + 218, 242 + + National Security Council (NSC): + Arab-Israeli military balance, 4, + 48, 124, 243 + Egypt-Israel ceasefire violations, 156 + Four-Power negotiation proposals, 4, 5, 26, 74 + Interim settlement proposals (1971), 209, 243 + Jarring mission (1971), 209 + Military contingency planning, 4, + 5 + NSC papers, 93, 112, 116, + 152, 156, 170, 175, 176, + 181, 182, 191, 194, 198, + 202, 207, 214 + Senior Review Group discussions, 168 + U.S. Middle East policy, 4, 74, 124 + U.S. military aid to Israel, 124, 209, 243 + U.S. settlement proposals, 26, + 48, 306, 317 + U.S.-Soviet negotiations, 4, 5, 26, 48, 74 + + National Security Decision Memoranda (NSDM): + NSDM 8, “Crisis Anticipation and + Management,” 16 + NSDM 19, 44 + NSDM 40, “Responsibility for + Conduct, Supervision, and Coordination of Covert Action + Operations,” 91 + NSDM 61, 113 + NSDM 66, “Next Steps in the Middle + East,” 128 + NSDM 87, “Military and Financial + Assistance to Israel,” 171 + NSDM 100, “Military Equipment + Package for Jordan,” 192 + + National Security Study Memoranda (NSSM): + NSSM 2, “Middle East Policy,” 3 + NSSM 17, “Further Studies on Middle + East Policy,” 6 + NSSM 33, “Contingency Planning for + the Middle East,” 16 + NSSM 40, “Israeli Nuclear Weapons + Program,” 20 + NSSM 81, “U.S. Arms Transfer Policy + Toward Israel,” 63 + NSSM 82, “U.S. Economic Assistance + Policy Toward Israel,” 62 + NSSM 93, “The Arab-Israeli Military + Balance,” 104, 108 + NSSM 98, “Further Review of Israeli + Arms Requests,” 148 + NSSM 103, “Future Options in the + Middle East,” 164 + NSSM 105, “Addendum to NSSM 103,” 164 + + Newlin, Michael H., 254 + Nixon, Richard M.: + 40 Committee, 91 + American Jewish community, 54, + 81, 232, 233, 269 + Arab-Israeli military balance, 108, 218, 239, 243, + 266 + Black September (1970), 161, 190 + Border incidents, 82, 88, 94, + 248 + Brezhnev correspondence, 281, + 301 + Dayan ceasefire proposal (Dec. 1970), 188 + Dayan U.S. visit (1970), 190 + Eban U.S. visit (1970), 118 + Egypt-Israel ceasefire violations, 156, 162, 169, 179 + Europe trip (Feb.-Mar. 1969), 5, 8 + Four-Power negotiation proposals, 4, 11, 14, 67, + 70, 77 + Four-Power negotiations, 76, 81, 89, + 210, 212 + Heath meetings, 269 + Hussein correspondence, 82, 220, 236, + 273, 280 + Hussein federation plan (1972), + 280, 284 + Hussein U.S. visit (1969), 19 + + Hussein U.S. visit (1970), 189 + Hussein U.S. visit (1972), 284 + Interim settlement proposals (1971), 209, 216 + + Bergus paper, 238, 240 + Ehrlichman/Haldeman discussions, 232 + Gromyko discussions, 251 + Kissinger discussions, 222, 233 + Kissinger memoranda, 240 + Meir correspondence, 249 + NSC discussions, 243 + Sadat correspondence, 219 + U.S.-Egyptian communications, 227 + + International guarantees, 211 + Israeli incursions in Lebanon (1972), 308, 313 + Israeli nuclear capabilities, 38, + 41, 55 + Jarring mission restart proposals (1970), 187, 189 + Jarring mission (1971), 197, 209, + 210, 212, 219, 222 + Kosygin correspondence, 88, 94, 99, + 214 + Meir correspondence, 33, 101, 106, + 130, 136, 187, 188, 249, + 307 + Meir U.S. visit (1969), 52 + Meir U.S. visit (1970), 162 + Military contingency planning, 4, + 5 + Moscow Summit (1972), 269, 287, + 289, 291, 298 + Munich massacre (Sep. 1972), 307 + Nasser peace appeal speech (May 1, + 1970), 112, 115 + Oil company executives meeting, 74 + Press conference statement (Mar. 4, + 1969), 14, 77, 218 + Proximity talk proposals, 265, + 269, 277 + Rogers Middle East trip (1971), + 222, 225, 227, 230 + Rogers New York meetings (Sep. 1971), 248 + Rogers Plan, 58 + Sadat correspondence, 165, 197, 219, + 298 + Soviet-Egyptian relations, 233, + 286, 300, 301 + Soviet military aid to Egypt, 124, 127, 162, 197, + 233, 251, 286 + Soviet military aid to Jordan, 69 + Soviet role, 1, 4, 34, 65, 269 + Syrian political situation, 184 + U.S. economic aid to Jordan, 220, 236, 273 + U.S.-Egyptian backchannel (1972), + 300, 303, 305 + U.S.-Egyptian bilateral negotiations, 237 + U.S.-Israeli bilateral negotiations, 14, 51, 77, 216 + U.S. Middle East policy, 233 + + Domestic political considerations, 9 + Kissinger memoranda, 11, + 24, 25, 27, 38, 45, 47, 51, 54, 55, 59, 65, 66, 76, 77, 79, 81, 89, 95, 113, 114, 115, 127, 134, 166, 167, 169, 179, 216, 223, 240, 249, 265, 266, 277, 286, 287, 289, 297, 305, 313 + Laird memoranda, 121, + 239, 267, 313 + National Security Study Memoranda, 3, 6, + 20, 62, 63, 104, 108, 148, 164 + NSC discussions, 48, 74, 124, 209, 243 + Rogers memoranda, 34, + 58, 67, 69, 70, 97, 123, 184, 227, 235 + Sisco memoranda, 39, 114 + CBS network interview (Jul. 1, 1970), 134 + + U.S. military aid to Israel, 101, 163, 233 + + Ad Hoc Special Review Group discussions, 86, 94 + Aide-mémoire, 102, 103 + Congressional leadership meeting, 94, 140 + Dayan discussions, 190 + Dayan memoranda, 248 + Ehrlichman/Haldeman discussions, 232 + Jordanian response, 92 + Kissinger discussions, 73, 96, 104 + Kissinger memoranda, 59, + 79, 95, 127, 166, 167, 168 + Kissinger-Rabin discussions, 103 + Laird memoranda, 121, + 239, 267 + Meir correspondence, 101, 106, 187, 188, 249 + Meir U.S. visit discussions, 162, 268 + NSC discussions, 124 + Rabin discussions, 151 + Sisco-Rabin discussions, 271, 277 + + + U.S. military aid to Jordan, 24, + 113, 192 + U.S. military aid to Lebanon, 100 + U.S. peace initiative (Jun. 1970), + 121, 128, 129, 136, 139 + U.S. settlement proposals, 25, + 26, 27, 47, 48, 76, 77 + U.S.-Soviet negotiations, 84 + + Dobrynin talks, 281 + Gromyko talks, 173, 251 + Kissinger-Dobrynin talks, 135 + Kissinger memoranda, 127 + NSC discussions, 4, 5, 26, + 48, 74 + Rogers-Dobrynin talks, 97 + Rogers memoranda, 34 + Sisco Moscow talks (1969), + 39 + + War of attrition, 51 + White House-Department of State divisions, 134, 144, + 216, 223, 227, 232 + Wilson U.S. visit (1970), 83 + + Nixon Doctrine, 217 + Noujaim, Gen. Jean, 100 + Noyes, James H.: + Egypt-Israel ceasefire violations, 177, 178, 183 + International guarantees, 195, + 199, 221 + Jarring mission (1971), 195, 199, + 204, 208 + Palestinians, 183, 192 + UN General Assembly meeting (Oct. 1970), 177 + U.S. Middle East policy, 172 + U.S. military aid to Israel, 183, 188, 195, 204, + 259, 319 + U.S. military aid to Jordan, 188, 191, 192, 284 + + NSC Interdepartmental Group for the Near East and South Asia, 8 + + Papers, NSCIG/NEA 69-2A (Revised), + “Further Studies on Middle East Policy,” 8 + + NSC Review Group, 3, 6, 20 + Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), 4, + 31, 35, 37, 38, 41, 42, 52, 55, 86 + Nuclear weapons. See Israeli nuclear + capabilities. + Nutter, G. Warren: + Dayan U.S. visit (1972), 319 + Egypt-Israel ceasefire violations, 177, 183 + International guarantees, 199, + 221 + Jarring mission (1971), 199, 204 + Lebanese crisis (1969), 60, 68 + Military contingency planning, 44, 56, 131 + Palestinians, 183, 192 + Proximity talk proposals, 260 + UN General Assembly meeting (Oct. 1970), 177 + U.S. Middle East policy, 117, + 119, 172 + U.S. military aid to Israel, 132, 142, 183, 204, + 272 + U.S. military aid to Jordan, 113, 168, 192 + U.S. peace initiative (Jun. 1970), + 133 + + + + + + + Oil company executives, 74 + Operation Even-Steven, 146, 155, 159 + Organization of African Unity (OAU), 270 + + + + + + Packard, David: + Arab-Israeli military balance, 243 + Egypt-Israel ceasefire violations, 160, 177, 178 + Interim settlement proposals (1971), 243 + International guarantees, 195, + 199, 221 + Israeli nuclear capabilities, 10, + 20, 35, 37, 38, 41 + Jarring mission (1971), 195, 199, + 204, 208 + Jordan U.S. personnel evacuation, 125 + Palestinians, 192 + UN General Assembly meeting (Oct. 1970), 177 + U.S. Middle East policy, 48, 117, 119, + 124, 172 + U.S. military aid to Israel: + Ad Hoc Special Review Group discussions, 86, 94, 133, 150, 153, 160 + Israeli discussions, 55, + 167 + Kissinger-Sisco discussions, 141 + NSC discussions, 124 + Nutter memoranda, 132 + Senior Review Group discussions, 188, 195, 204, 208 + + U.S. military aid to Jordan, 168, 188, 192 + U.S. peace initiative (Jun. 1970), + 133 + U.S. settlement proposals, 48 + + Pakistan, 48, 73, 243, 273, 287, 311 + + Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), 4, 60, 247 + Palestinian refugees: + Four-Power UN representative discussions, 23 + Johnson mission, 4, 314 + Kissinger memoranda, 47, 216, 297 + Nixon memoranda, 233 + NSC discussions, 26, 124, 209 + NSC Interdepartmental Group papers, 8 + NSC staff summaries, 112, 181, 202, + 207 + Rogers Plan on, 58 + Sisco memoranda, 114 + U.S.-Israeli communications, 1, + 140, 142, 187, 223, 228 + U.S.-Soviet communications, 49, + 53, 311 + + Palestinians (see also Palestine Liberation + Organization or PLO; or Popular Front for the Liberation of + Palestine or PFLP; Jordan; Lebanese crisis (1969); Palestinian refugees): + Black September, 160, 161, 168 + Fatah state plans, 186, 188 + Hussein federation plan (1972), + 280, 284, 289 + Jidda Jordan talks (Sep. 1971), + 247 + Jordanian role, 181, 182, 183, + 192, 280, 297 + Lebanese confrontation plans, 312 + NSC staff summaries, 112, 170, 175, + 176, 181, 182, 191 + Senior Review Group discussions, 177, 183, 188, 192, + 195, 204 + U.S.-Fatah contacts, 174, 180, 185, + 186 + U.S.-Israeli communications, 228, 248, 279 + U.S.-Jordanian communications, 185, 189, 192, 247, + 280, 284 + Washington Special Actions Group/Senior Review Group + discussions, 172 + + Parmenter, William, 177, 204 + Pastinen, Ilkka, 138 + Peacekeeping force proposals. See + International guarantees. + Pederson, Richard F., 4 + Peet, Vice Adm. Raymond E., 319 + Plaja, Eugenio, 324 + Pompidou, Georges, 67, 96, 102, 270 + Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), 4, 46, 48, 60, 124, 293 + Porter, William J., 60, 61, 98, 100 + Pranger, Robert J.: + Egypt-Israel ceasefire violations, 160 + Jordan U.S. personnel evacuation, 125 + Military contingency planning, 90, 131, 133 + Soviet military aid to Egypt, 91 + U.S. Middle East policy, 117, + 119 + U.S. military aid to Israel, 150, 160 + U.S. peace initiative (Jun. 1970), + 133 + + Proximity talk proposals: + Bush-Waldheim discussions, 306 + Defense Department role, 260 + Egyptian rejection, 294 + Kissinger memoranda, 265 + Kissinger-Sisco discussions, 257 + Nixon-Kissinger discussions, 269 + Rabin interview (Nov. 30, 1972), 321 + Sadat speech (Jan. 13, 1972), 275 + Sadat speech (Mar. 31, 1972), 285 + Saunders memoranda, 294 + Soviet role, 265, 269 + U.S.-Egyptian communications, 255, 258, 263, 275, + 276, 278, 285, 302 + U.S.-Israeli communications, 257, 261, 263, 277, + 306, 322 + U.S.-Saudi discussions, 314 + + + + + + + Qadhafi, Muammar, 246, 314 + + + + + + Rabin, Yitzhak, 26, 166 + + Border incidents, 248 + Ceasefire efforts, 103, 144 + Dayan U.S. visit (1970), 190 + Dayan U.S. visit (1972), 319 + Eban U.S. visit (1970), 118 + Egypt-Israel ceasefire (Aug. 1970), + 147 + Egypt-Israel ceasefire violations, 157, 162 + Interim settlement proposals (1971), 217, 223, 238, + 244, 245, 248, 256 + Israeli incursions in Lebanon (1972), 293, 315 + Israeli nuclear capabilities, 31, + 35, 36, 37, 38, 41, 47, 55 + Jarring mission restart proposals (1970), 129, 187 + Jarring mission (1971), 206, 209, + 211, 212, 213, 214, 216, + 217 + Jerusalem, 250 + + Meir U.S. visit (1970), 162 + Munich massacre (Sep. 1972), 307 + Nixon-Meir correspondence, 33, + 101, 130, 187, 224 + Proximity talk proposals, 261, + 277, 321 + Sisco Israel trip (1971), 229, 244, + 245 + Soviet military aid to Egypt, 110, 142, 162, 256 + U.S.-Israeli bilateral negotiations, 14, 36, 52, 78, + 99, 151 + U.S.-Israeli communications, 1, + 4, 5, + 10, 13, 31, 33, 35, 37, 38, + 48, 54, 55, 61, 64, 70, 78, + 84, 86, 96, 102, 103, 104, 129, + 140, 147, 151, 154, 166, + 167, 204, 211, 300 + U.S. Jordan-Israel settlement proposal, 78 + U.S. military aid to Israel, 86, + 93, 94, 95, 96, 106, 117, 141, + 160, 166, 167, 272 + + Dayan U.S. visit (1972) + discussions, 319 + Kissinger discussions, 103, 104, 110, 132, 133, 142, 143, 144, 147, 151, 262 + Meir U.S. visit (1971), + 268 + Meir U.S. visit discussions, 162 + Nixon-Meir correspondence, 187 + Packard discussions, 167, 239 + Rogers discussions, 106, + 129, 130, 209, 225, 229, 272 + Senior Review Group discussions, 119, 140 + Sisco discussions, 129, + 157, 224, 244, 245, 256, 261, 271, 277, 283, 293 + + U.S. peace initiative (Jun. 1970), + 140, 141, 142, 151 + U.S.-Soviet negotiations, 27, + 29 + + Rafael, Gideon, 36, 46, 261 + Raviv, Moshe, 41 + Rhea, Col. Frank W., 131 + Rhodes formula, 52, 53, 58, 61, 67, 71, 74, 80, 83, 85, 107 + Riad, Mahmoud, 1, 165, 195 + + Bergus discussions, 237, 238, 246 + Egypt-Israel ceasefire (Aug. 1970), + 215 + Egypt-Israel ceasefire violations, 154, 157, 158, 169 + Interim settlement proposals (1971), 234, 253, 254, + 256 + Israeli withdrawal, 2, 237 + Jarring mission (1969–1970), 8, 12, 15, 26, + 139, 143 + Jarring mission (1971), 196, 200, + 206, 213 + Nasser speech (May 1, 1970), 115 + Nixon-Sadat correspondence, 197 + Proximity talk proposals, 255 + Rogers communications, 52, 74, 136, + 137, 172, 177, 178, 188, + 253 + Rogers visit (1971), 227 + Sisco discussions, 231 + UN General Assembly speech (Oct. 6, + 1971), 254, 256 + + Riad, Mohammed, 21, 146, 154, 196, 200, 206, 215, 238, 254 + Richardson, Elliot L.: + Four-Power negotiation proposals, 5 + Four-Power negotiations, 70, 78 + Israeli nuclear capabilities, 20, + 31, 35, 37, 38, 40, 41, 55 + Military contingency planning, 4 + U.S. Middle East policy, 73, 74, 117, + 119, 124 + U.S. military aid to Israel, 86, + 94 + U.S. settlement proposals, 26, + 48, 78 + U.S.-Soviet negotiations, 61, + 111 + + Rifai, Abdul Munim, 12, 82, 87 + Rifai, Zaid, 30, 32, 74, 109, 113, 188 + Rogers, William P. (see also Rogers Plan + and White House-Department of State + divisions): + Arab-Israeli military balance, 108, 243, 266 + Border incidents, 64, 82, 88, + 259, 264 + Ceasefire efforts, 123, 140, 142, + 143, 144 + Dayan ceasefire proposal (Dec. 1970), 188 + Dayan U.S. visit (1972), 319 + Egypt-Israel ceasefire (Aug. 1970), + 146, 147, 155, 215 + Egypt-Israel ceasefire violations, 88, 156, 163, 173, + 177 + Foreign Ministers meeting, 50 + Four-Power negotiation proposals, 5, 13, 17, 50, + 67, 70, 71, 76, 83 + Four-Power negotiations, 7, 17, 78, + 83, 111, 193, 213 + Hussein U.S. visit (1969), 19 + Hussein U.S. visit (1970), 189 + Interim settlement proposals (1971), 209, 215, 241, + 258 + + + Eban discussions, 253, + 257 + Meet the Press statement + (Nov. 5, 1972), 318 + Nixon discussions, 227 + NSC discussions, 243 + Sisco Israel trip, 228, + 229, 244, 246 + UN General Assembly speech (Oct. 4, 1971), 249, 254, 256, 277 + U.S.-Egyptian communications, 227, 234, 237, 238, 253, 255 + U.S.-Israeli communications, 224, 230, 238, 256 + U.S.-Soviet communications, 251 + + Israeli nuclear capabilities, 10, + 24, 37 + Jarring mission (1969–1970), 13 + Jarring mission restart proposals (1970), 123, 138, 149, + 187, 193 + Jarring mission (1971), 213 + + Nixon-Kissinger discussions, 210 + NSC discussions, 209 + Press conference (Mar. 16, + 1971), 219 + U.S.-Egyptian communications, 196, 200, 206, 215, 218, 219, 242 + U.S.-Israeli communications, 209, 211, 217 + U.S.-Jordanian communications, 197, 201 + + Jarring mission (1972), 283 + Jerusalem, 236 + Jordanian-Israeli bilateral negotiations, 32, 322 + Kissinger memoranda, 11, 25, 27, + 47, 77, 113, 114, 127, + 134, 166, 169, 216, 240, + 249, 277 + Lebanese crisis (1969), 64, 98 + Middle East trip (1971), 222, 225, + 227, 228, 229, 230, 231 + Military contingency planning, 4 + Munich massacre (Sep. 1972), 307 + New York meetings (Sep. 1971), 248 + Nixon-Meir correspondence, 33, + 130, 136, 187 + Nixon-Sadat correspondence, 197 + Palestinians, 182, 185 + Proximity talk proposals, 255, + 258 + + Defense Department role, 260 + Rabin interview (Nov. 30, + 1972), 321 + U.S.-Egyptian communications, 263, 275, 276, 285 + U.S.-Israeli communications, 261, 263, 322 + + Soviet-Egyptian relations, 233, + 235, 298 + Soviet military aid to Egypt, 123, 124 + Soviet military aid to Jordan, 69 + Soviet peace plan (Jun. 17, 1969), 34 + Syrian political situation, 184 + UN General Assembly Resolution 2799, 270 + U.S. economic aid to Israel, 62 + U.S. economic aid to Jordan, 220, 236 + U.S.-Egyptian bilateral negotiations, 18, 74 + U.S.-Israeli bilateral negotiations, 13, 52, 118, 223, + 228, 229, 230, 304 + U.S. Jordan-Israel settlement proposal, 82 + U.S. Middle East policy, 7, 9, 57, 74, 111, + 123, 124, 175, 233 + U.S. military aid to Israel, 96, + 123, 163, 188 + + Kissinger memoranda, 166, 169 + Laird communications, 259, 264 + Meir U.S. visit (1971) + discussions, 268 + National Security Decision Memoranda, 128, 166 + National Security Study Memoranda, 63, 148 + Nixon-Meir correspondence, 130, 136, 187 + Nixon memoranda, 163, + 233 + NSC discussions, 86, 124 + Press conference (Mar. 23, + 1970), 94, 95, 99, 105 + Rabin discussions, 96, + 106, 142 + Sisco-Ghorbal discussions, 275 + Sisco-Rabin discussions, 244, 271 + + U.S. military aid to Jordan, 69, + 87, 113, 192 + U.S. peace initiative (Jun. 1970), + 123, 128, 129, 136, 139, + 143, 175 + + Israeli response, 138, + 140, 142, 151 + Soviet response, 137 + U.S.–UN discussions, 138 + + U.S. settlement proposals, 25, + 27 + + + Jordan-Israel settlement proposal, 67, 76 + NSC discussions, 26, 48 + Speech (Dec. 9, 1969), 73, 74, 75, 181, 182 + U.S.-Israeli communications, 77, 78, 84 + U.S.-Soviet communications, 85 + + U.S.-Soviet negotiations, 15, + 34, 39, 67, 84, 111 + + Dobrynin talks, 80, 97, 105, 122 + Gromyko talks, 52, 53, 173 + Nixon-Gromyko talks, 173, 251 + Sisco-Dobrynin talks (Mar.-Apr. 1969), 18, 22, 29 + Sisco-Dobrynin talks (1970), 107, 135 + Sisco Moscow talks (1969), + 39 + U.S.-Israeli communications, 29 + + U.S. statement of principles, 13 + + Rogers Plan: + Development of, 25, 28, 58 + Kissinger memoranda, 127 + NSC discussions, 74 + Presentation to Dobrynin, 58, + 61 + Rogers memoranda, 71 + Rogers speech (Dec. 9, 1969), 73, + 74, 75 + Sisco memoranda, 39 + Soviet peace plan (Jun. 17, 1969) and, 34 + Soviet response, 84, 85 + Text a, 58 + U.S.-Israeli communications, 29, + 78, 162, 205 + U.S.-Soviet communications, 80 + + Rostow, Eugene V., 1, 2, 15, 74 + Rush, Kenneth, 319 + Rusk, Dean, 1, 2, + 5, 8, 15, 26, 28, 36, 61, 81, 209 + + + + + + Sabri, Ali, 165, 227, 231 + Sadat, Anwar al-+1p: + Accession of, 165 + Egypt-Israel ceasefire (Aug. 1970), + 197, 203, 204, 215 + Hussein federation plan (1972), + 280, 289 + Interim settlement proposals (1971), 201, 202, 208, + 213, 216, 217, 229, 240, + 241, 245, 246, 253, 254 + + Bergus discussions, 200, + 219, 237, 255 + Bergus-Heikal discussions, 234, 246 + Nixon correspondence, 215, 219 + Rogers discussions, 227, + 257 + Sisco discussions, 230, + 231, 242, 244 + Speech (Feb. 4, 1971), 203, 204, 218, 224, 240 + Speech (Mar. 7, 1971), 215 + Speech (May 20, 1971), 238 + Speech (Nov. 11, 1971), 263 + Speech (Jan. 13, 1972), 275 + Speech (Feb. 16, 1972), 276 + Sterner discussions, 242, 243 + + Jarring mission (1971), 181, 195, + 197, 212, 215, 219, 223, + 226, 270 + Moscow Summit (1972), 287, 289, + 294, 298 + Nixon correspondence, 165, 197, 215, + 219, 298 + Political situation, 217, 229, 231, + 238, 306, 318 + Proximity talk proposals, 258, + 261, 263, 265, 275, 277, + 278, 283, 285, 317 + Rogers visit (1971), 227, 228, + 231 + Soviet-Egyptian relations, 215, + 227, 228, 233, 235, 256, + 257, 268, 286, 287, 298, + 300, 312, 313, 314 + U.S. diplomatic relations renewal, 231, 234, 288, 305 + U.S.-Egyptian backchannel (1972), + 296, 299, 303, 309, 310 + U.S. military aid to Israel, 245, 275, 276 + War, possible, Dakroury discussions, 289, 290 + + Saint George, R. Adm. William R., 153, + 177, 183, + 188, 192, + 195, 199, + 204, 208, + 221 + Sapir, Pinchas, 106, 229 + Saqqaf, Umar, 61, 314 + Saudi Arabia, 17, 42, 43, 47, 52, 57, 61, 67, 74, 86, 93, 117, 124, 127, 129, 131, 168, 177, 182, 186, 189, 220, 225, 228, 235, 243, 247, 286, 298, 314, 323 + Saunders, Harold H., 74, 124 + + Ad Hoc Special Review Group discussions, 86, 94, + 150, 153, 160 + + Arab-Israeli military balance, 243 + Egypt-Israel ceasefire violations, 159, 160, 177, 178, + 183 + Four-Power negotiation proposals, 5, 70 + Interim settlement proposals (1971), 217, 243 + International guarantees, 195, + 198, 199, 221 + Israeli nuclear capabilities, 35 + Jarring mission restart proposals (1970), 188 + Jarring mission (1971): + NSC discussions, 209 + NSC staff summaries, 202 + Senior Review Group discussions, 195, 199, 204, 208 + U.S.-Egyptian communications, 218 + U.S.-Israeli communications, 217 + + Jordan intervention contingency planning, 126 + Lebanese crisis (1969), 60, 68 + Military contingency planning, 4, + 57, 90, 125, 131 + Moscow Summit (1972), 291 + Palestinians, 176, 183, 192 + Proximity talk proposals, 276, + 294 + Rogers Plan, 28 + Soviet military aid to Egypt, 91, + 110, 124 + UN General Assembly meeting (Oct. 1970), 177 + U.S. economic aid to Jordan, 273 + U.S.-Egyptian backchannel (1972), + 296, 317 + U.S.-Egyptian bilateral negotiations, 21 + U.S.-Israeli bilateral negotiations, 14, 36, 52 + U.S.-Israeli desalting project, 77 + U.S. Middle East policy, 117, + 119, :nl 172 + U.S. military aid to Israel: + Kissinger-Rabin discussions, 110, 132 + NSC discussions, 124 + NSC staff summaries, 152 + Senior Review Group discussions, 183, 188, 195, 204 + Yariv meetings, 108 + + U.S. military aid to Jordan, 113, 168, 188, 192 + U.S. peace initiative (Jun. 1970), + 133 + U.S. settlement proposals, 26, + 48, :nl 291 + U.S.-Soviet negotiations, 15, + 22, 53 + + Schumann, Robert, 39, 50, 74 + Secret Egypt-Israel backchannel meeting proposals. See U.S.-Egyptian backchannel (1972). + Seelye, Talcott, 168, 188, 189, 192 + Selden, Armistead I., 178, 183, 195, :nl + 208 + Semyanov, Victor, 1 + Senior Review Group, 168, 172 + + Dayan ceasefire proposal (Dec. 1970), 188 + Egypt-Israel ceasefire violations, 172, 177, 178, 183 + International guarantees, 195, + 199, 221 + Jarring mission (1971), 195, 199, + :nl 208 + Palestinians, 183, 192 + UN General Assembly meeting (Oct. 1970), 177 + U.S. military aid to Israel, 183, 188, 195, 204 + U.S. military aid to Jordan, 168, 188, 192 + + Shakespeare, Frank J., Jr., 189, 209 + Sharaf, Abdul Hamid, 32, 189, 236, :nl + 274 + Sharara, Yousef, 275 + Sharm el-Sheikh: + Department of State proposal (1971), 216 + Kissinger memoranda, 25, 47, 77, :nl + 216 + NSC discussions, 26, 47, 48, + 74, :nl 209 + NSC papers, 112, 198, 202, + 207, :nl 214 + Rogers Plan on, 17, 58 + Rogers travel, 231 + Saunders memoranda, 53, 57 + Senior Review Group discussions, 208, 221 + UN role proposals, 18, 23, 53, + 221, 291, 299 + U.S.-Egyptian communications, 67, + 81, 218, 296, 310 + U.S.-Israeli communications, 13, + 36, 77, 208, 211, 217, + 223, 228, 319 + + U.S.-Soviet communications, 1, + 2, 18, + 28, 34, 49, 53, 57, 61, 80, + 97, 107, 281, 311 + + Shriver, Sargent, 13 + Sinai control and demilitarization proposals, 2, 14, 18, 23, 25, 26, 27, 28, 47, 53, 57, 67, 74, 107, 110, 118, 124, 127, 146, 153, 157, 178, 188, 198, 199, 200, 207, 208, 211, 213, 214, 215, 216, 217, 219, 221, 223, 228, 237, 238, 240, 241, 243, 245, 249, 254, 255, 258, 263, 265, 266, 276, 286, 296, 306, 307, 309, 310, 311, 317, 319 + + Sisco, Joseph J.: + Ad Hoc Special Review Group discussions, 86, 94, + 117, 119, 133, 150, 153, + 160 + American Jewish community, 81 + Arab-Israeli military balance, NSC discussions, 243 + Border incidents, 82 + Ceasefire efforts, 141, 188 + Egypt-Israel ceasefire (Aug. 1970), + 147 + Egypt-Israel ceasefire violations, 157, 160, 162, 177, + 178, 183 + Four-Power negotiation proposals, 4, 7, 13, 17, 39, 71 + Four-Power negotiations, 73, 81 + Hussein U.S. visit (1970), 189 + Interim settlement proposals (1971): + Barbour memoranda, 226 + Bergus paper, 238 + Ghorbal discussions, 275 + NSC discussions, 243 + U.S.-Egyptian communications, 227, 231, 234, 253 + U.S.-Israeli communications, 217, 230, 244, 245, 256 + + International guarantees, 221 + Israel trip (1971), 228, 229, + 241, 243, 244, 245 + Israeli incursions in Lebanon (1972), 293, 315 + Israeli nuclear capabilities, 55 + Jarring mission restart proposals (1970), 149, 187 + Jarring mission (1971): + Barbour memoranda, 226 + Nixon-Kissinger discussions, 210, 212 + NSC discussions, 209 + NSC staff summaries, 202, 207 + Rogers memoranda, 209 + Senior Review Group discussions, 195, 208 + U.S.-Egyptian communications, 196, 200, 206, 215, 218, 219 + U.S.-Israeli communications, 208, 211, 217 + U.S.-Jordanian communications, 197 + + Jarring mission (1972), 275 + Jerusalem, 236, 250 + Jordan U.S. personnel evacuation, 125 + Jordanian-Israeli bilateral negotiations, 32, 322 + Lebanese crisis (1969), 64 + Lebanese-Palestinian confrontation plans, 312 + Meir discussions, 109, 245 + Meir U.S. visit (1970), 162 + Middle East trip (Apr. 1970), 109, 114 + Military contingency planning, 4 + Nixon-Meir correspondence, 33 + Nixon-Sadat correspondence, 197 + Proximity talk proposals: + Kissinger discussions, 257 + Rabin discussions, 277 + Rogers-Allon discussions, 322 + Rogers memoranda, 258 + Saunders memoranda, 294 + U.S.-Egyptian communications, 275, 276, 278 + U.S.-Israeli communications, 257, 263, 306 + + Rogers Middle East trip (1971), + 222, 227, 228, 231 + Rogers Plan, 28, 39, 58, + 61, 66, 80 + Soviet military aid to Egypt, 124, 162 + Soviet peace plan (Dec. 30, 1968), 2 + UN General Assembly meeting (Oct. 1970), 177 + UN General Assembly Resolution 2799, 270 + U.S. economic aid to Jordan, 220 + U.S.-Egyptian bilateral negotiations, 21 + U.S.-Israeli bilateral negotiations, 14, 52, 216, 304 + U.S. Jordan-Israel settlement proposal, 78 + U.S. Middle East policy, 8, 74, 114, + 117, 119, 124, 181 + + U.S. military aid to Israel, 46, + 95, 243 + + Ghorbal discussions, 275 + Kissinger discussions, 141 + Meir discussions, 109, + 245 + Meir U.S. visit discussions, 162 + Nixon-Meir correspondence, 187 + NSC discussions, 124 + NSC staff summaries, 152, 194 + Rabin discussions, 244, + 271, 277 + Senior Review Group discussions, 183, 188, 195 + Yariv meetings, 108 + + U.S. military aid to Jordan, 86, + 87, 113, 188, 191, 192 + U.S. peace initiative (Jun. 1970), + 129, 133, 137 + U.S. settlement proposals, 26, + 48, 84, 85 + U.S.-Soviet negotiations: + Dobrynin talks (1969), 13, 15, 18, 22, 27, 28, 29, 49, 57, 61 + Dobrynin talks (1970), 107, 127 + Moscow talks (1969), 39, 48 + NSC discussions, 48 + Rogers-Dobrynin talks, 120 + Rogers memoranda, 111 + + U.S. statement of principles, 13 + White House-Department of State divisions, 223, 257 + + Smith, Walter B., 22, 85 + Sonnenfeldt, Helmut, 48, 56, 65, 95, 117, 187 + Soviet-Egyptian relations (see also Soviet + military aid to Egypt): + Dayan interview, 307 + Joint communiqué (1970), 142 + Nasser Soviet Union visit (1970), + 142 + Nixon-Brezhnev correspondence, 301 + Sadat-Brezhnev meeting (1972), 286 + Sadat Soviet Union visit (1971), + 215, 256 + Soviet adviser expulsion, 298, + 299, 300, 307, 310 + Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation (1971), 233, 235, 237 + U.S.-Egyptian communications, 228, 302 + U.S.-Soviet communications, 298, + 300 + + Soviet military aid to Egypt (see also + Egypt-Israel ceasefire violations): + Kissinger memoranda, 127, 266 + Laird memoranda, 239 + Nasser peace appeal speech and, 112, 115 + Nixon memoranda, 233 + Nixon-Sadat correspondence, 197 + NSC discussions, 124 + NSC staff summaries, 112 + Rogers memoranda, 123 + Sadat-Brezhnev discussions, 286 + U.S.-Egyptian communications, 109, 197, 231, 242 + U.S.-Israeli communications, 106, 108, 110, 142, + 162, 256, 268 + U.S.-Soviet communications, 39, + 111, 120, 134, 135, 251, + 268 + Washington Special Actions Group discussions, 91 + + Soviet role (see also Four-Power + negotiation proposals; Soviet military aid to Egypt; U.S.-Soviet + negotiations): + Border incidents and, 88, 93, 94 + Egypt-Israel ceasefire (Aug. 1970), + 155, 159 + Interim settlement proposals (1971), 235, 240 + International guarantees and, 221 + Lebanese crisis (1969), 60, 65 + Nixon-Kissinger discussions, 269 + NSC discussions, 4, 26, 48, + 124 + NSC staff papers, 198, 214 + Peace plan (Dec. 30, 1968), 1, + 2, 4, + 15 + Peace plan (Jun. 17, 1969), 34 + Proximity talk proposals and, 265, 269 + Response to U.S. settlement proposals, 84, 85 + Rogers-Foreign Ministers meeting, 50 + Senior Review Group discussions, 195 + U.S.-Israeli communications, 1, + 14, 190 + U.S. military contingency planning, 4 + U.S. peace initiative (Jun. 1970) + response, 137, 138 + + Soviet Union (see also Soviet-Egyptian + relations; Soviet role): + Ad Hoc Special Review Group: + Egypt-Israel ceasefire violations, 160 + Military contingency planning, 133 + + U.S. military aid to Israel, 86, 94, 117, 119, 133, 150, 153, 160 + Lebanese relations with, 312 + Military aid to Jordan, 69, 92 + + + Spitz, Mark, 307 + Stackhouse, Haywood, 140, 149, 183, 206, 271, 293, 315, 322 + Stans, Maurice H., 62 + Stark, Andrew, 50 + State, U.S. Department of. See Proximity + talk proposals; White House-Department of State divisions; Rogers, + William P.; Sisco, Joseph J. + Sterner, Michael E.: + Egypt-Israel ceasefire violations, 154, 157 + Interim settlement proposals (1971), 234, 242, 253, + 254 + Jarring mission restart proposals (1970), 149 + Jarring mission (1971), 200, 206 + Nixon-Meir correspondence, 33 + Nixon-Sadat correspondence, 197, + 219 + Proximity talk proposals, 258, + 263, 276, 285 + U.S.-Israeli bilateral negotiations, 304, 321 + + Stewart, Michael, 39, 50, 67 + Suez Canal, freedom of navigation (see also + Interim settlement proposals (1971)), 1, 2, 4, 8, 17, 19, 23, 25, 39, 47, 48, 53, 57, 58, 66, 80, 107, 115, 121, + 216 + Suez crisis (1956), 21, 124, 233 + Suez partial-withdrawal proposal. See + Interim settlement proposals (1971). + Sukhodrev, Viktor M., 173, 311 + Sultan (Crown Prince of Saudi Arabia), 298 + Symington, Stuart, 102, 243 + Symmes, Harrison: + Border incidents, 82 + Hussein U.S. visit (1969), 19 + Jarring mission (1969–1970), 12 + Jordan intervention contingency planning, 125, 126 + Jordan U.S. personnel evacuation, 125 + Jordanian-Israeli bilateral negotiations, 30, 32 + Sisco Jordan visit cancellation, 109 + Soviet military aid to Jordan, 69 + U.S. military aid to Israel, 92 + U.S. military aid to Jordan, 24, + 87 + + Syria, 1, 4, 15, 21, 36, 39, 42, 46, 47, 48, 51, 52, 60, 66, 67, 73, 80, 93, 104, 124, 127, 161, 168, 177, 182, 183, 184, 186, 188, 190, 202, 204, 208, 210, 213, 216, 217, 218, 228, 244, 250, 270, 280, 286, 288, 291, 295, 308 + + + + + + + Tcherniakov, Yuri, 1, 2, 34 + Tekoah, Yosef, 84, 140, 157, 228, 274, 283 + Territorial settlement proposals. See + Israeli withdrawal. + Terrorism: + Black September and, 160, 161 + Lod airport attack (May 1972), 293, 295 + Munich massacre (Sep. 1972), 307 + TWA hijacking (Aug. 1969), 46 + U.S.-Soviet communications, 2 + + Thant, U: + Four-Power negotiations, 213 + Jarring mission restart proposals (1970), 129, 138, 140, + 143, 145, 170, 185 + Jarring mission (1971), 198, 199, + 201, 203, 213, 217, 221 + Nasser peace appeal, 115 + Rogers-Foreign Ministers meeting, 50 + + Thornton, Thomas: + International guarantees, 221 + Jarring mission (1971), 195, 199, + 204, 208 + U.S. military aid to Israel, 183, 195, 204 + U.S. military aid to Jordan, 192 + + Tiran Straits, 2, 14, 23, 25, 47, 48, 57, 58, 74, 107, 121, 208, 216, 291 + Treasury, U.S. Department of, 166 + TWA hijacking (Aug. 1969), 46 + Two-Power discussion proposals. See + U.S.-Soviet negotiations. + + + + + + United Nations (see also International + guarantees): + Charter, 58, 92, 198, 221 + Rogers-Foreign Ministers meeting, 50 + + + UN General Assembly meeting (1970), 122, 133, 154, 169, 172, 175, 177, 181, 182, 183 + UN General Assembly Resolution 2628, 177, 181, 183, 189 + UN General Assembly Resolution 2799, 270, 283, 320, 324 + UN General Assembly Resolution 2949, 324 + UN Security Council (see also + specific resolutions): + Israeli incursions in Lebanon (1972), 279, 295 + Munich massacre (Sep. 1972), 307 + + UN Security Council Resolution 242: + Israeli acceptance, 120 + Jarring formula on, 1, 8, 12, 17, 22, + 85, 116 + Rogers speech (1969), 73 + Soviet peace plan (Dec. 30, 1968), 1 + U.S.-Israeli communications, 84, + 107 + U.S.-Jordanian communications, 92 + U.S.-Soviet working paper on, 58 + + UN Security Council Resolution 262, 8 + UN Security Council Resolution 298, 250 + UN Security Council Resolution 313, 279 + UN Security Council Resolution 316, 295 + Unger, Lt. Gen. F.T., 94, 119 + United Arab Republic (UAR). See + Egypt. + United Kingdom (see also Four-Power + negotiation proposals; Four-Power negotiations), 13, 50, 83, 146, 183, 209 + U.S. domestic political considerations (see + also American Jewish community), 9, + 113, 209, + 233, 269, + 318 + U.S.-Egyptian backchannel (1972): + Classified asset report, 309 + Haig memoranda, 320 + Helms memoranda, 288, 299, 310 + Kissinger memoranda, 305 + Nixon-Kissinger discussions, 300, 303 + Saunders memoranda, 317 + U.S.-Egyptian communications, 296 + + U.S.-Egyptian bilateral negotiations (see + also U.S.-Egyptian backchannel (1972)): + Greene-Fahmy discussions, 318, + 324 + Irwin memoranda, 237 + Laird memoranda, 313 + Nixon-Fawzi talks, 21 + NSC discussions, 74, 124 + NSC staff papers, 112 + Rogers-Fawzi talks, 18 + + U.S. elections (1972). See U.S. domestic political considerations. + U.S.-Israeli bilateral negotiations: + Department of State proposal (1971), 216 + Kissinger-Eban talks, 13, 77 + Kissinger memoranda, 51 + Meir U.S. visit (1969), 52 + Nixon-Eban discussions, 14 + NSC discussions, 124 + NSC staff papers, 112 + Richardson-Rabin talks, 78 + Rogers-Eban talks, 13 + Rogers-Meir talks, 52 + Saunders-Rabin talks, 36 + U.S. peace initiative (Jun. 1970), + 129 + + U.S.-Israeli relations: + Bilateral treaty proposals, 216, + 221 + Dayan U.S. visit (1970), 190 + Dayan U.S. visit (1972), 316, 319 + Desalting project, 77 + Meir U.S. visit (1969), 33, 35, + 36, 37, 39, 47, 48, 51, 52, + 73, 77 + Meir U.S. visit (1970), 151, 162, + 240 + Meir U.S. visit (1971), 267, 268 + Nixon-Meir correspondence, 33, + 130, 133, 136, 142, 151, + 163, 187, 188, 224, 238, + 249, 307 + NSC Interdepartmental Group papers, 8 + Rogers visit (1971), 230 + + U.S.-Jordanian bilateral negotiations, 129 + U.S. Middle East policy (see also White + House-Department of State divisions): + Ad Hoc Special Review Group discussions, 117, 119 + Bergus memoranda, 134 + Domestic political considerations, 9, 113, 209 + Greene memoranda, 314 + Kissinger memoranda, 95, 127, 134 + Laird memoranda, 313 + National Security Study Memoranda, 3, 6, 164 + + Nixon memoranda, 233 + NSC discussions, 4, 74, 124 + NSC Interdepartmental Group papers, 8 + NSC staff papers, 112, 116, 170, + 181 + Rogers memoranda, 123 + Sisco memoranda, 114 + Statement of principles, 13 + Washington Special Actions Group/Senior Review Group + discussions, 172 + + U.S. military aid to Israel: + Ad Hoc Special Review Group discussions, 35, 37, + 86, 94, 117, 119, 133, + 150, 153, 160 + Barbour-Meir discussions, 106, + 136 + Border incidents and, 93, 259, 264 + Dayan memoranda, 248 + Dayan U.S. visit (1972) + discussions, 319 + Department of State proposal (1971), 216 + Jackson Amendment, 157, 162, 166, + 195, 311 + Johnson, U. Alexis memoranda, 157 + Kissinger memoranda, 38, 40, 59, + 79, 95, 127, 166, 167, + 240, 265, 266 + Kissinger-Rabin discussions, 102, 110, 133, 142 + Kissinger-Sisco discussions, 141 + Laird memoranda, 10, 45, 121, + 239, 267 + Meir U.S. visit (1969) discussions, + 52, 57 + Meir U.S. visit (1971) discussions, + 268 + Nasser peace appeal speech (May 1, + 1970), 112, 115, 116 + National Security Decision Memoranda, 128, 171 + National Security Study Memoranda, 20, 63, 148 + Nixon aide-mémoire, 102, 103 + Nixon-congressional leadership meeting, 94, 140 + Nixon-Dayan discussions, 190 + Nixon-Ehrlichman/Haldeman discussions, 232 + Nixon-Kissinger conversations, 73, 96, 104 + Nixon-Meir correspondence, 101, + 106, 187, 188, 249 + Nixon memoranda, 163, 233 + NSC discussions, 124, 209, 243 + NSC staff papers, 93, 112, 116, + 152, 194, 207 + Nutter memoranda, 132, 142, 272 + Packard-Rabin discussions, 167 + Rogers-Laird communications, 259, 264 + Rogers memoranda, 123 + Rogers-Rabin discussions, 106, + 129, 130, 209, 225, 229, + 272 + Sadat Arab Socialist Union speech (Feb. 16, 1972), 276 + Sadat speech (Jan. 13, 1972), 275 + Senior Review Group discussions, 183, 188, 195, 204 + Sisco-Ghorbal discussions, 275 + Sisco Israel trip discussions, 228, 229, 241, 243, + 244, 245 + Sisco-Meir discussions, 109, + 245 + Sisco-Dayan discussions, 228, + 229 + Sisco-Rabin discussions, 244, + 271 + TWA hijacking (Aug. 1969) and, 46 + U.S.-Egyptian communications, 218 + U.S. peace initiative (Jun. 1970) + and, 123, 128, 129 + Washington Special Actions Group discussions, 90 + Yariv meetings, 108 + + U.S. peace initiative (Jun. 1970) (see also Egypt-Israel ceasefire (Aug. 1970); Jarring mission restart proposals (1970)): + Ad Hoc Special Review Group discussions, 133 + Egyptian response, 136 + Israeli response, 130, 136, 139, + 141, 142, 162 + Jordanian response, 139 + Laird memoranda, 121 + National Security Decision Memoranda, 128 + NSC staff summaries, 175 + Rogers memoranda, 123, 129, 138, + 139 + Soviet response, 137, 138 + U.S.-Israeli communications, 142, 144 + White House-Department of State divisions and, 134, 144 + + U.S. settlement proposals (see also Rogers + Plan): + Jordan-Israel settlement proposal, 67, 75, 76, 78, + 85, 89, 127 + Kissinger memoranda, 27, 47, 76, + 127 + + Moscow Summit (1972), 291 + NSC discussions, 26, 48 + Rogers memoranda, 25, 67 + Rogers speech (Dec. 9, 1969), 73, + 74 + Soviet response, 84, 85 + U.S.-Israeli communications, 84 + Working paper, 17, 21 + + U.S.-Soviet negotiations (see also Rogers + Plan): + Ad Hoc Special Review Group discussions, 133 + Egypt-Israel ceasefire violations, 173 + Kissinger-Dobrynin talks, 135, + 300 + Kissinger-Gromyko talks, 252, + 311 + Kissinger memoranda, 66, 127 + National Security Study Memoranda, 6 + Nixon-Brezhnev correspondence, 281, 310 + Nixon-Dobrynin talks, 281 + Nixon-Gromyko talks, 173, 251 + NSC discussions, 4, 5, 26, 48, 74 + NSC Interdepartmental Group papers, 8 + Rogers-Dobrynin talks, 97, 105, 122 + Rogers-Foreign Ministers meeting discussions, 50 + Rogers-Gromyko talks, 52, 53, 173 + Rogers memoranda, 34, 67, 84, + 111 + Senior Review Group discussions, 195 + Sisco-Dobrynin talks (1969), 13, 15, + 18, 22, 27, 28, 29, 49, 58, + 61 + Sisco-Dobrynin talks (1970), 107, 127 + Sisco Moscow talks (1969), 39, 48 + U.S.-Israeli communications, 13, + 29, 33, 77 + U.S. peace initiative (Jun. 1970) + and, 129, 137 + U.S. settlement proposals and, 25 + Yost memoranda, 43 + + + + + + + Vinogradov, Vladimir, 39, 111, 155, 157 + Vogt, Lt. Gen. John W., 90, 91, 160, 168 + Vorontsov, Yuly M., 111, 120 + + + + + + Waldheim, Kurt, 274, 283, 306 + Walsh, John P., 27, 29, 31 + War, possible, 290 + War of attrition, 49, 51, 104, 110, 113, 119 + Ware, Richard A., 90, 91, 126 + Warnke, Paul, 31, 35, 37, 41 + Washington Special Actions Group (WSAG): + Lebanese crisis (1969), 60, 68 + Military contingency planning, 44, 56, 60, 68, 90, 125, + 126, 131 + Soviet military aid to Egypt, 91 + U.S. Middle East policy, 172 + U.S. military aid to Jordan, 168 + + Watts, William, 74 + Weinberger, Caspar W., 166 + West Bank (see also Israeli withdrawal): + Allon Plan, 4, 13, 192 + Department of State proposal (1971), 216 + NSC Interdepartmental Group papers, 8 + Sisco memoranda, 81 + U.S.-Israeli communications, 36 + + Westmoreland, Gen. William, 26, 96, 168 + Wheeler, Gen. Earle G.: + Israeli nuclear capabilities, 20, + 31, 35, 37, 38 + Military contingency planning, 4 + U.S. Middle East policy, 74, 119 + U.S. military aid to Israel, 86 + U.S. peace initiative (Jun. 1970), + 121 + U.S. settlement proposals, 48 + + White House-Department of State divisions: + Haldeman memoranda, 96, 144, 156, + 162, 216, 222, 225, 232, + 233 + Jordanian-Israeli bilateral negotiations and, 322 + Nixon-Ehrlichman/Haldeman discussions, 232 + Nixon-Kissinger discussions, 233 + Proximity talk proposals and, 257 + Rogers-Haldeman/Mitchell discussions, 288 + U.S.-Egyptian backchannel (1972) + and, 288 + U.S. peace initiative (Jun. 1970) + and, 134, 144 + + Wiley, Marshall W., 158, 196, 197, 238, 275, 276 + Wilson, Harold, 8, 13, 67, 83, 89 + + + + + + Yariv, Gen. Aharon, 35, 108, 110, 146, 160 + Yost, Charles W.: + Egypt-Israel ceasefire violations, 157 + + Four-Power negotiation proposals, 5, 7, 8, 15, 17 + Four-Power negotiations, 67, 72, 75, + 78, 81, 83, 193, 198, 199 + Four-Power UN representative discussions, 23, 24 + Jarring mission (1971), 84, 183, + 185, 205 + Military contingency planning, 4 + Palestinians, 182 + Rogers-Foreign Ministers meeting, 50 + U.S. Middle East policy, 73, 74, 124 + U.S. military aid to Jordan, 24 + U.S. settlement proposals, 26, + 48, 76, 140 + U.S.-Soviet negotiations, 43, + 49 + + Yugoslavia, 4, 169 + + + + + + Zayyat, Mohamed Hassan el-, 200, 274, 314, 321, 324 + Zeira, Maj. Gen. Eliyahu, 264, 271 + Ziegler, Ronald L., 143, 162, 225, 284, 307 + Zurhellen, Z.O., Jr., 157, 228, 261, 306 + + + +
+ + + diff --git a/volumes/frus1969-76ve11p2.xml b/volumes/frus1969-76ve11p2.xml new file mode 100644 index 000000000..0e08222c7 --- /dev/null +++ b/volumes/frus1969-76ve11p2.xml @@ -0,0 +1,59364 @@ + + + + + + + + Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976, Documents + on South America, 1973–1976 + Foreign Relations of the United States + 1969-1976 + Volume E–11, Part 2 + Documents on South America, 1973–1976 + Sara Berndt + Halbert Jones + James Siekmeier + Adam M. Howard + + + + United States Government Publishing Office + Washington + 2015 + frus1969-76ve11p2 + + + +

Released in 2015 as printed book.

+ + + + + + + + + + Foreign Relations of the United States + 1969–1976 + Volume E–11, Part 2 + Documents on South America, 1973–1976 + + + Editor: Sara Berndt + + + Editor: Halbert Jones + + + Editor: James Siekmeier + + + General Editor: Adam M. Howard + + + Washington + 2015 + + + + + +
+ + Preface + +

The Foreign Relations of the United States series presents + the official documentary historical record of major foreign policy decisions and + significant diplomatic activity of the United States Government. The Historian + of the Department of State is charged with the responsibility for the + preparation of the Foreign Relations series. The staff of + the Office of the Historian, Bureau of Public Affairs, under the direction of + the General Editor of the Foreign Relations series, + plans, researches, compiles, and edits the volumes in the series. Secretary of + State Frank B. Kellogg first promulgated official regulations codifying specific + standards for the selection and editing of documents for the series on March 26, + 1925. These regulations, with minor modifications, guided the series through + 1991.

+

Public Law 102–138, the Foreign Relations Authorization + Act, which was signed by President George H.W. + Bush on October 28, 1991, established a new statutory charter for + the preparation of the series. Section 198 of P.L. 102–138 added a new Title IV + to the Department of State’s Basic Authorities Act of 1956 (22 U.S.C. 4351, et + seq.).

+

This statute requires that the Foreign Relations series be + a thorough, accurate, and reliable record of major United States foreign policy + decisions and significant United States diplomatic activity. The volumes of the + series should include all records needed to provide comprehensive documentation + of major foreign policy decisions and actions of the United States Government. + The statute also confirms the editing principles established by Secretary + Kellogg: the Foreign Relations series is guided by the + principles of historical objectivity and accuracy; records should not be altered + or deletions made without indicating in the published text that a deletion has + been made; the published record should omit no facts that were of major + importance in reaching a decision; and nothing should be omitted for the + purposes of concealing a defect in policy. The statute also requires that the + Foreign Relations series be published not more than + 30 years after the events recorded.

+

Structure and Scope of the Foreign + Relations Series

+

This volume is part of a subseries of volumes of the Foreign + Relations series that documents the most important issues in the + foreign policy of the administrations of Presidents Richard M. Nixon and Gerald R. + Ford.

+

Although intended to stand on its own, this volume should be read in conjunction + with other volumes in the series, in particular + Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Volume E–10, Documents on American Republics, + 1969–1972. The reader should also consult + Foreign Relations, + 1969–1976, Volume E–11, Part 1, Documents on Mexico; Central America; and + the Caribbean, 1973–1976, + Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Volume XXI, Chile, + 1969–1973, and + Foreign + Relations, 1969–1976, Volume XXII, Panama, 1973–1976, for + further documentation on the Nixon + administration’s overall policy in Latin America.

+

Focus of Research and Principles of Selection for + Foreign Relations, + 1969–1976, Volume E–11, Part 2 +

+

This volume documents U.S. relations with South America between 1973 and 1976. + U.S. relations with Chile through mid-September 1973 are covered in + Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, + Volume XXI, Chile, 1969–1973, and U.S. relations with Panama are + covered in + Foreign + Relations, 1969–1976, Volume XXII, Panama, 1973–1976. The + eight compilations herein illustrate both the formulation of a new U.S. policy + towards the region as a whole: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile (beginning in + late September 1973), Colombia, Peru, Uruguay, and Venezuela.

+

U.S. policy toward Latin America during this period centered on establishing what + Henry A. Kissinger called a “New + Dialogue” with the region. Launched in October 1973, just days after Kissinger took office as Secretary of State, + the “New Dialogue” was envisioned as a constructive way for the United States to + meet the challenge posed by the perceived emergence of a Latin American regional + bloc. The initiative called for regular meetings of foreign ministers to address + issues of mutual concern and aimed to restore a sense that a special + relationship existed among the United States and its neighbors to the south. + Successful meetings among several Latin American foreign ministers and the U.S. + Secretary of State took place in Mexico City and Washington in 1974. By the time + Kissinger made his trips to Latin + America as Secretary of State in February and June 1976, however, U.S. officials + had largely abandoned the idea of pursuing a unified regional policy as called + for by the “New Dialogue.” Instead, recognizing that Latin America was not a + monolithic bloc, the Ford administration + focused on bilateral relations with the nations of the hemisphere.

+

Increasing congressional and public concern with human rights issues affected + U.S. policy toward much of Latin America during the mid-1970s. These concerns + focused to a large extent on Chile and Argentina, where military regimes aimed + to stamp out what they saw as Communist-inspired efforts at subversion. In 1976, + evidence began to surface suggesting that the security services of the Southern + Cone nations were engaged in a coordinated, transnational effort to eliminate + their opponents. Concern in the United States over Operation Condor became + especially acute after the killing of former Chilean Foreign Minister Orlando + Letelier in Washington in October 1976. Readers interested in + documentation on Operation Condor should consult the chapters in this volume on + Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Uruguay.

+ +

Editorial Methodology

+

The documents are presented chronologically according to Washington time. + Memoranda of conversations are placed according to the date and time of the + conversation, rather than the date a memorandum was drafted. Documents chosen + for printing are authoritative or signed copies, unless otherwise noted.

+

Editorial treatment of the documents published in the Foreign + Relations series follows Office style guidelines, supplemented by + guidance from the General Editor and the Chief of the Editing and Publishing + Division. The documents are reproduced as exactly as possible, including + marginalia or other notations, which are described in the footnotes. Texts are + transcribed and printed according to accepted conventions for the publication of + historical documents within the limitations of modern typography. A heading has + been supplied by the editors for each document included in the volume. Spelling, + capitalization, and punctuation are retained as found in the original text, + except that obvious typographical errors are silently corrected. Other mistakes + and omissions in the documents are corrected by bracketed insertions: a + correction is set in italic type; an addition in roman type. Words or phrases + underlined in the source text are printed in italics. Abbreviations and + contractions are preserved as found in the original text, and a list of + abbreviations is included in the front matter of each volume. In telegrams, the + telegram number (including special designators such as Secto) is printed at the + start of the text of the telegram.

+

Bracketed insertions are also used to indicate omitted text that deals with an + unrelated subject (in roman type) or that remains classified after + declassification review (in italic type). The amount and, where possible, the + nature of the material not declassified has been noted by indicating the number + of lines or pages of text that were omitted. Entire documents withheld for + declassification purposes have been accounted for and are listed with headings, + source notes, and number of pages not declassified in their chronological place. + All brackets that appear in the original text are so identified in footnotes. + All ellipses are in the original documents.

+

The first footnote to each document indicates the document’s source, original + classification, distribution, and drafting information. This note also provided + the background of important documents and policies and indicates whether the + President or his major policy advisers read the document.

+

Editorial notes and additional annotation summarize pertinent material not + printed in the volume, indicate the location of additional documentary sources, provide references to + important related documents printed in other volumes, describe key events, and + provide summaries of and citations to public statements that supplement and + elucidate the printed documents. Information derived from memoirs and other + first-hand accounts has been used where appropriate to supplement or explicate + the official record.

+ +

Advisory Committee on Historical Diplomatic + Documentation

+

The Advisory Committee on Historical Diplomatic Documentation, established under + the Foreign Relations statute, reviews records, advises, + and makes recommendations concerning the Foreign + Relations series. The Advisory Committee monitors the overall + compilation and editorial process of the series and advises on all aspects of + the preparation and declassification of the series. The Advisory Committee does + not necessarily review the contents of individual volumes in the series, but it + makes recommendations on issues that come to its attention and reviews volumes, + as it deems necessary to fulfill its advisory and statutory obligations.

+ +

Presidential Recordings and Materials Preservation Act + Review

+

Under the terms of the Presidential Recordings and Materials Preservation Act + (PRMPA) of 1974 (44 U.S.C. 2111 note), the National Archives and Records + Administration (NARA) has custody of the Nixon Presidential historical + materials. The requirements of the PRMPA and implementing regulations govern + access to the Nixon Presidential historical materials. The PRMPA and + implementing public access regulations require NARA to review for additional + restrictions in order to ensure the protection of the privacy rights of former + Nixon White House officials, since these officials were not given the + opportunity to separate their personal materials from public papers. Thus, the + PRMPA and implementing public access regulations require NARA formally to notify + the Nixon Estate and former Nixon White House staff members that the agency is + scheduling for public release Nixon White House historical materials. The Nixon + Estate and former White House staff members have 30 days to contest the release + of Nixon historical materials in which they were a participant or are mentioned. + Further, the PRMPA and implementing regulations require NARA to segregate and + return to the creator of files private and personal materials. All Foreign Relations volumes that include materials from + NARA’s Nixon Presidential Materials Staff are processed and released in + accordance with the PRMPA.

+ +

Declassification Review

+

The Office of Information Programs and Services, Bureau of Administration, + conducted the declassification review for the Department of State of the documents published in this volume. The + review was conducted in accordance with the standards set forth in Executive + Order 12958, as amended, on Classified National Security Information and other + applicable laws.

+

The principle guiding declassification review is to release all information, + subject only to the current requirements of national security, as embodied in + law and regulation. Declassification decisions entailed concurrence of the + appropriate geographic and functional bureaus in the Department of State, other + concerned agencies of the U.S. Government, and the appropriate foreign + governments regarding specific documents of those governments. The + declassification review of this volume, which began in 2008 and was completed in + 2013, resulted in the decision to withhold 1 document in full, excise a + paragraph or more in 11 documents, and make minor excisions of less than a + paragraph in 35 documents.

+

The Office of the Historian is confident, on the basis of the research conducted + in preparing this volume and as a result of the declassification review process + described above, that the documentation and editorial notes presented here + provide a thorough, accurate, and reliable—given the limitations of space—record + of the policy of the Nixon and Ford administrations toward the American + Republics.

+ +

Acknowledgements

+

The editors wish to acknowledge the assistance of the staff at the Nixon + Presidential Materials Project of the National Archives and Records + Administration at College Park, Maryland, and Melissa Heddon at the Nixon + Presidential Library and Museum at Yorba Linda, California. The editors also + wish to thank Geir Gunderson, Donna Lehman, and Helmi Raaska at the Gerald R. + Ford Presidential Library in Ann Arbor, Michigan, for their expertise and + assistance. The editors would like to acknowledge the Historical Staff of the + Central Intelligence Agency, who arranged access to Agency Files, and John + Haynes of the Library of Congress, who was responsible for expediting access to + the Kissinger Papers. The editors were able to use the Kissinger Papers with the + permission of Dr. Henry Kissinger. The + editors would like to thank the staff in the Manuscript Reading Room at the + Library of Congress for their assistance and Sandy Meagher for her assistance in + expediting the use of Department of Defense files.

+

Halbert Jones, James Siekmeier, and Sara Berndt collected the documents, made the + selections, and annotated them under the direct supervision of successive chiefs + of the Division, Douglas Kraft and Myra Burton, and under the general direction + of two successive General Editors, Edward C. Keefer and Adam M. Howard. Dean + Weatherhead coordinated the declassification review under the supervision of the + Chief of the Declassification + Division, Carl Ashley. David Geyer and Alexander Poster assumed responsibility + for resolving substantive issues of compilation and review during the final + stages of production.

+ + Adam M. Howard, Ph.D. + + General + Editor + + + + Stephen P. Randolph, Ph.D. + + The Historian + + + + Bureau of Public Affairs + + December 2015 + +
+ +
+ + Contents + + + + Preface + III + + + Sources + XI + + + Abbreviations and Terms + XIX + + + Persons + XXVII + + + Note on Covert Actions + XLV + + + Documents on South America, 1973–1976 + + + Argentina + 1 + + + Bolivia + 176 + + + Brazil + 238 + + + Chile + 385 + + + Colombia + 687 + + + Peru + 751 + + + Uruguay + 888 + + + Venezuela + 989 + + + + + + + +
+ +
+ + Sources +

Sources for the Foreign Relations + Series

+

The 1991 Foreign Relations statute requires that the + published record in the Foreign Relations series include + all records needed to provide comprehensive documentation on major U.S. foreign + policy decisions and significant U.S. diplomatic activity. It further requires + that government agencies, departments, and other entities of the U.S. Government + engaged in foreign policy formulation, execution, or support cooperate with the + Department of State Historian by providing full and complete access to records + pertinent to foreign policy decisions and actions and by providing copies of + selected records. Most of the sources consulted in the preparation of this + volume have been declassified and are available for review at the National + Archives and Records Administration.

+

The editors of the Foreign Relations series have complete + access to all the retired records and papers of the Department of State: the + central files of the Department; the special decentralized files (“lot files”) + of the Department at the bureau, office, and division levels; the files of the + Department’s Executive Secretariat, which contain the records of international + conferences and high-level official visits, correspondence with foreign leaders + by the President and Secretary of State, and memoranda of conversations between + the President and Secretary of State and foreign officials; and the files of + overseas diplomatic posts. All the Department’s indexed central files through + July 1973 have been permanently transferred to the National Archives and Records + Administration at College Park, Maryland (Archives II). Many of the Department’s + decentralized office files covering the 1969–1976 period, which the National + Archives deems worthy of permanent retention, have been transferred or are in + the process of being transferred from the Department’s custody to Archives + II.

+

The editors of the Foreign Relations series also have full + access to the papers of Presidents Nixon + and Ford as well as other White House + foreign policy records. Presidential papers maintained and preserved at the + Presidential libraries include some of the most significant foreign + affairs-related documentation from the Department of State and other Federal + agencies including the National Security Council, the Central Intelligence + Agency, the Department of Defense, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Dr. Henry Kissinger has approved access to his + papers at the Library of Congress. These papers are a key source for the + Nixon-Ford subseries of the Foreign Relations + series.

+

+ Research for this volume was completed + through special access to restricted documents at the Nixon Presidential + Materials Project, the Ford Presidential Library, the Library of Congress, and + other agencies. While all the material printed in this volume has been + declassified, some of it is extracted from still classified documents. In the + time since the research for this volume was completed, the Nixon Presidential + Materials have been transferred to the Nixon Presidential Library and Museum in + Yorba Linda, California. The Nixon Presidential Library staff is processing and + declassifying many of the documents used in this volume, but they may not be + available in their entirety at the time of publication.

+ +

Sources for + Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Volume E–11, Part + 2 +

+

As is typical of Foreign Relations volumes covering + periods after the beginning of the Cold War, the core documentation is located + in the National Security Council (NSC) files in + the Presidential Libraries. For this volume, editors consulted the NSC files at the Nixon Presidential Materials + Project, in College Park, Maryland, and the Ford Presidential Library in Ann Arbor, Michigan. The NSC Country Files for the Nixon administration provide key documentation + for individual Latin American countries, as well as documents on U.S. policy + toward the region. Editors also consulted one other important collection in the + Nixon Presidential Materials Project—the NSC + Presidential Correspondence File.

+

At the Ford Presidential Library, editors consulted the National Security + Adviser, NSC Presidential Country Files for + Latin America and the NSC Latin American + Affairs Staff Files (Convenience Files). In addition to the Country Files, the + NSC Institutional Files (or Historical + Files) contain important documents produced by the inter-departmental group that + made policy on Latin America. The Institutional Files contain minutes of NSC meetings and supporting material. A + particularly useful collection, the National Security Adviser’s Memorandum of + Conversation Files, contains transcripts of important conversations among the + President, National Security Adviser, and foreign leaders. Two other collections + at the Ford Presidential Library proved + important in the compilation of this volume: the Presidential Handwriting File + and Presidential Correspondence with Heads of State.

+

The Nixon Administration Intelligence + Files and the NSC Intelligence Files, housed at + the NSC, contain the most useful information + regarding high-level intelligence activities. In particular, memoranda and + reports located in the 40 Committee files and Subject and Country Files proved + especially fruitful. In addition, the Central Intelligence Agency files contain + important finished intelligence and analyses of significant trends in Latin + America. The most useful sources on related intelligence activities were files + from the Office of the Director of Central Intelligence, the National Intelligence Council, and the Office of + Support Services.

+

The core of Department of State documentation is located in the Subject-Numeric + Files, 1970–1973, located at the National Archives research facility (Archives + II) in College Park, Maryland. These files contain telegrams, airgrams, letters, + and memoranda. In addition, material from mid-1973 to 1976, in particular + memoranda of conversation among Kissinger and Foreign Ministers and heads of state, are located + in digitized form in the Access Archival Database (AAD) and the Central Foreign + Policy File, including documents from the P, D, and N Reels. Particularly useful + are Kissinger’s memoranda of + conversation and transcripts of his staff meetings. This documentation is + located in two collections, both housed at Archives II—the files of the Office + of Secretary of State, Transcripts of Henry A. + Kissinger’s Staff Meetings, 1973–1977, and the Office of the + Secretary, Records of Henry A. + Kissinger, 1973–1977. Other important Department documentation is + located in the Lot Files of the Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, housed at + Archives II. These are divided into lot files for individual officers, regional + policy, and individual countries. One Lot File of note is National Security + Study Memoranda, 1969–1977, Lot 80D212. Located in that file are important + top-level documents on the inter-agency policymaking process.

+

In addition to NSC, CIA, and Department of State records, other repositories were + consulted. The Kissinger Papers at the + Library of Congress contain mainly copies of documents available in the NSC files of the Nixon Presidential Materials + Project and the Ford Library. However, + some material could only be located in the Kissinger Papers. In particular, Kissinger’s summaries for the President of his meetings with + foreign leaders during his trip to Latin America in early 1976 proved + informative. The Geopolitical File and the Memorandum of Conversations File + proved especially useful. In addition, Kissinger’s transcripts of his telephone conversations (telcons) are an important source of information + on Kissinger’s relationship with other + Cabinet officials, top White House officials, and members of Congress.

+

Department of Defense records, housed at the Washington National Records Center + in Suitland, Maryland, are instrumental in documenting U.S. policy toward Latin + America, in particular sales of armaments. The most useful documentation can be + found in the Office of the Secretary of Defense files. The Department of Defense + documentation is housed in Record Group 330.

+

For researchers interested in Chile, the U.S. Government, in an inter-agency + effort, declassified documents on U.S. relations with Chile from 1968 to 1991. + The declassified documents are available on the Department of State website in + the FOIA Electronic reading room, in the State Chile Collections. In preparation + for this project, entities of the U.S. Government were required to collect + classified documents that would perhaps be of use to the U.S. officials who were + coordinating the declassification project. In the Ford Presidential Library, those materials are located in the + Project File in the Pinochet/Chile collection.

+

+ Unpublished Sources +

+ + + Department of State + + + Central Files. See National Archives and Records + Administration below. + + Lot Files. For lot files already transferred to the + National Archives and Records Administration, see RG 59, National Archives + and Records Administration. + INR/IL Historical Files + Historical files of the Office of Intelligence Liaison of + the Bureau of Intelligence and Research, in the custody of + the Department of State, 1940s–1980s, including: Asunción, + 1969–1979; Brasília, 1975; Lima, 1963–1979; Montevideo + 1962–79; Santiago, 1963–1979; Uruguay 1973–1980; and ARA–CIA + Weekly Meetings, 1976–1977. + + + + + + FOIA Electronic Reading Room. This resource, + located at http://foia.state.gov, provides access to various collections of + declassified Department of State records, including the following relevant + to the subject matter of this volume: + Argentina Project + Chile Project + Kissinger Transcripts + + + + National Archives and Records Administration, College + Park, Maryland + + + Nixon Presidential Materials + + National Security Council Files, Country Files, Latin + America + National Security Council Files, Institutional Files + (H-Files) + Senior Review Group Minutes + NSC Meeting Minutes + NSSM + NSDM + NSDM Policy Papers + + + Nixon Tapes + + + + + + + RG 59, Records of the Department of State + + + Subject-Numeric Central Files. The + subject-numeric system is divided into broad categories: + Administration, Consular, Culture and Information, Economic, + Political and Defense, Science, and Social. Within each of these + divisions are subject subcategories. For example, the Political and + Defense category encompasses four subcategories: POL (Politics), DEF + (Defense), CSM (Communism), and INT (Intelligence). Numerical + subdivisions specified in the Department Record Classification + Handbook further define the subject of filed material. This filing + system was in use from 1963 through 1973. The following are the + principal central files consulted and cited in this volume. + ORG 7 S: visits of the Secretary of State + POL 7 ARG: Argentina, visits and meetings + POL ARG–US: Argentine-U.S. political relations + POL 7 BOL: Bolivia, visits and meetings + POL 29 BOL: political prisoners in Bolivia + POL 1 BOL–US: general policy and background on + Bolivian-U.S. relations + POL BRAZ–US: Brazilian-U.S. political relations + POL 1 BRAZ–US: general policy and background on + Brazilian-U.S. relations + POL 23–9 CHILE: rebellion and coups in Chile + POL 29 CHILE: political prisoners in Chile + POL CHILE–US: Chilean-U.S. political relations + POL COL–US: Colombian-U.S. political relations + POL 1 COL–US: general policy and background on + Colombian-U.S. political relations + POL PERU–US: Peruvian-U.S. political relations + POL 15 UR + POL 23–8 UR + POL VEN–US: Venezuelan-U.S. political relations + POL 1 VEN–US: general policy and background on + Venezuelan-U.S. relations + + + + Central Foreign Policy File. Beginning in + mid-1973, Department of State telegrams were stored and indexed + electronically, and beginning in 1974, other Department of State + records were catalogued electronically and preserved on microfilm. + The electronic telegrams are accessible through NARA’s Access to + Archival Databases (AAD) system (http://aad.archives.gov). Paper + copies of most microfilmed records are available at NARA. + Electronic Telegrams + P-reel index + + P-reel documents + D-reel telegrams + + Lot Files. These are the decentralized + files maintained within individual offices of the Department of + State. + ARA Files: Lots 75D476, 80D43, 81D324 + Subject and country files of the Assistant Secretary of + State for Inter-American Affairs and U.S. Coordinator, + Alliance for Progress, 1964–1975 + + + ARA/AND Files: Lot 78D46 + Records Relating to Bolivia, 1976–1978 + + + ARA/AND Files: Lot 79D18 + Records Relating to Peru + + + ARA/BR Files: Lot 75D224 + Records of the Office of Brazilian Affairs relating to + Brazil, 1963–1975 + + + ARA/ECA/A Files: Lot 78D56 + Records of the Office of East Coast Affairs relating to + Argentina, 1967–1975 + + + ARA/NCA/C Files: Lot 78D45 + Records of the Office of North Coast Affairs relating to + Colombia, 1967–1975 + + + ARA/NCA/V Files: Lots 73D423, 76D465 + Records of the Office of North Coast Affairs relating to + Venezuela, 1967–1975 + + + Defense Attache Files: Lot 94D501 + Defense Attache Files 1960–81 + + + HA Files: Lots 77D391, 80D177 + Subject and country files of the Bureau of Human Rights + and Humanitarian Affairs, 1973–1977 + + + L/ARA Files: Lot 81D324 + Subject and country files of the Deputy Legal Adviser for + Inter-American Affairs, 1965–1979 + + + National Security Study Memoranda, 1969–1977: Lot 80D212 + Personal Papers of Ambassador David H. Popper: Lot 82D280 + Records of Henry Kissinger: Lot 91D414 + Records of Secretary of State Kissinger, 1973–1977, + primarily memoranda of conversation + + + S/S–I Files: Lot 77D149 + Principal Memoranda + + + Secretary’s Calendar of Events: Lot 76D284 + Executive Secretary Briefing Books, 1958–1976 + + + + Transcripts of Kissinger Staff Meetings, Entry 5177 + Minutes of Secretary of State Kissinger’s staff meetings, + 1973–1977 (formerly Lot 78D443) + + + + + + Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library, Ann Arbor, + Michigan + + National Security Adviser Files + HAK-Scowcroft West Wing Office Files + Memoranda of Conversation + NSC Latin American Affairs Staff Files + NSC Staff for Information Liaison with Commissions and + Committees, + Presidential Correspondence with Foreign Leaders, + 1974–1977 + Presidential Country Files for Latin America + Scowcroft Daily Work Files + Trip Briefing Books/Cables of HAK + + + Collections of Individuals + Seidman, L. William + Shmultz, Edward C. + + + White House + White House Central Files, Subject Files + + + Other Collections + Presidential Handwriting + Project File on Pinochet/Chile + + + + + + Central Intelligence Agency + + National Intelligence Council + Job 79R01012A + + + Office of Support Services (DI) Files + Job 79T00861A + Job 79T00863A + Job 79T00865A + Job 79R01099A + + + Office of the Director of Central Intelligence Files + Job 80M01066A + Job 80M01048A + + + Office of Current Intelligence Files + Job 85T00353R + + + FOIA Electronic Reading Room, http://foia.cia.gov + + + + Washington National Records Center, Suitland, + Maryland + + + Record Group 330, Records of the Office of the + Secretary of Defense + + OSD Files: 330–78–0001, 330–79–0037, 330–79–0061 + Decimal subject files of the Office of the + Secretary of Defense, 1973–1976 + + + + + + + National Security Council + + Nixon Administration Intelligence Files + NSC Intelligence Files + + + + Library of Congress + + Henry A. Kissinger Papers + Geopolitical File, 1964–1976 + Memoranda of Conversations, 1969–1977 + Telephone Records, 1969–1976 + + + + + + + +

+ Published Sources +

+ + Kissinger, Henry A. Years of Renewal. New York: + Simon and Schuster, 1999. + U.S. Department of State. The Department of State + Bulletin. 1973–1976. + U.S. National Archives and Records Administration. Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Richard Nixon, + 1973, 1974. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1975 and + 1975. + _______. Public Papers of the Presidents of the United + States: Gerald R. Ford, 1974, 1975, 1976–1977. Washington: + Government Printing Office, 1975, 1977, and 1979. + +
+ +
+ + Abbreviations and Terms + + + + + + AAA + , Alianza Anticomunista Argentina (Argentine + Anticommunist Alliance) + + + ACDA + , Arms + Control and Disarmament Agency + + + AD + , Acción Democrática (Democratic Action), + Venezuelan political party + + + Adm. + , + Admiral + + + AECA + , Arms + Export Control Act + + + AF + , Bureau of + African Affairs, Department of State + + + AI + , Amnesty + International + + + AID + , Agency + for International Development + + + AMCIT + , + American citizen + + + ANAPO + , Alianza Nacional Popular (National Popular + Alliance), Colombian political party + + + APC + , armored + personnel carrier + + + APRA + , Alianza Popular Revolucionaria Americana + (American Popular Revolutionary Alliance), Peru + + + Apristas + , members of APRA + + + ARA + , Bureau + of Inter-American Affairs, Department of State + + + ARA/ECA + , + Office of East Coast Affairs, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, + Department of State + + + ARA/LA/EP + , Ecuador and Peru, Bureau of Inter-American + Affairs, Department of State + + + ARA/LA + , + Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, Department of State; Bureau for + Latin America, Agency for International Development + + + ARA/LA/APU + , Office of Argentine, Paraguayan, and + Uruguayan Affairs, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, Department of + State; Office of Argentine, Paraguayan, and Uruguayan Affairs, + Bureau for Latin America, Agency for International + Development + + + ARA/MGT/FM + , Financial Management Division, Office + of Management, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, Department of + State + + + ARD + , + accelerated rural development + + + ARENA + , Aliança Renovadora Nacional (National Renewal + Alliance), Brazilian political party + + + ARMA + , U.S. + Army Attaché + + + ASAP + , as + soon as possible + + + + + + + BA + , Buenos + Aires + + + BAF + , + Brazilian Air Force + + + B/D + , barrels + per day + + + Brig. + Gen. + , Brigadier General + + + + + + + Carros de as + alto + , assault vehicles + + + CASP + , + Country Analysis and Strategy Paper + + + CAT + , Comisión asesora del transporte (Transport + Assessment Commission) Colombia + + + CCC + , + Commodity Credit Corporation + + + CGT + , General + Confederation of Workers + + + CIA + , Central + Intelligence Agency + + + CIAP + , Comité Interamericana de Alianza para el + Progreso (Inter-American Committee for the Alliance for + Progress) + + + CIEC + , + Conference on International Economic Cooperation + + + CIEP + , + Council on International Economic Policy + + + + CIES + , Consejo Interamericano Económico y Social + (Inter-American Economic and Social Council), Organization of + American States + + + CINC + , + Commander in Chief + + + CINCSO + , + Commander in Chief, Southern Command + + + CNT + , Convención Nacional de Trabajadores (National + Workers’ Convention), Uruguay + + + COB + , close of + business + + + CODEL + , + Congressional Delegation + + + CONFADENA + , + Confederación de las Fuerzas Armadas de la + Nación (Confederation of the Armed Forces of the Nation), + Bolivia + + + COM + , Chief of + Mission + + + COMUSCINCSO + , Chief of Mission, USCINCSO + + + CONATON + , + Argentine Drug Policy Coordinating Board + + + CONGEN + , + Consulate-General + + + COPEI + , Comité de Organización Politica Electoral + Independiente (Committee of Independent Electoral Political + Organization) Venezuelan political party + + + CPD + , + Congressional Presentation Document + + + CRA + , + continuing resolution + + + CSAF + , Chief + of Staff, U.S. Air Force + + + CT + , Country + Team + + + CUT + , Central Unitaria de Trabajadores (Unitary + Organization of Workers), Chilean labor organization + + + CVP + , cost, + value, profit + + + CY + , calendar + year + + + + + + D, Democrat; Deputy Secretary of + State + + + DA + , Department + of the Army + + + DAO + , Defense + Attaché Office + + + DAS + , Departamento Administrativa de Seguidad + (Administrative Security Department), Colombia + + + DATT + , + Defense Attaché + + + DC + , developed + country + + + + DCI + + , Director of Central + Intelligence + + + DCM + , Deputy + Chief of Mission + + + DDI + , Deputy + Director of Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency + + + DDO + , Deputy + Director of Operations, Central Intelligence Agency + + + DEA + , Drug + Enforcement Administration + + + DEFATT + , + Defense Attaché + + + D/HA + , + Coordinator for Humanitarian Affairs, Department of State + + + D/HA/ORM + , + Office of the Coordinator for Refugee and Migration Affairs, + Department of State + + + D/HR + , Deputy + Coordinator for Human Rights, Department of State + + + DIA + , Defense + Intelligence Agency + + + DINA + , Dirección de Inteligencia Nacional, National + Intelligence Directorate, Chile + + + Dissem + , + dissemination + + + D/LOS + , Staff + Director, NSC Interagency Task + Force on Law of the Sea + + + DOD + , + Department of Defense + + + DOD/ISA + , + Bureau of International Security Affairs, Department of + Defense + + + DOD/OSD + , + Office of the Secretary of Defense + + + Dols + , + Dollars + + + + + + E, Bureau of Economic Affairs Department of + State + + + EA + , Bureau of + East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Department of State + + + EB + , Bureau of + Economic and Business Affairs, Department of State + + + + EB/ICD + , + Office of International Commodities, Bureau of Economic and Business + Affairs, Department of State + + + EC + , European + Community + + + ERDA + , Energy + Research and Development Administration + + + ERP + , Ejército Revolucionario del Pueblo + (Revolutionary Army of the People), Argentine guerrilla group + + + ESMACO + , + Estado Mayor Conjunto de las Fuerzas + Armadas + + + + EUR + , Bureau + of European Affairs, Department of State + + + EX–IM + , + Export-Import Bank + + + + + + + F–2 + , Colombian + Intelligence Service + + + FAA + , Foreign + Assistance Act + + + FAC + , Fuerzas Armadas de Colombia (Colombian Armed + Forces) + + + FACH + , + Chilean Air Force + + + FBI + , Federal + Bureau of Investigation + + + FFB + , Federal + Financing Bank + + + FMS + , Foreign + Military Sales + + + FNU + , first + name unknown + + + FOIA + , + Freedom of Information Act + + + FONOFF + , + Foreign Office + + + FORMIN + , + Foreign Minister + + + FPA + , + Fisherman’s Protective Act + + + FPN + , Frente Popular Nacionalista (Popular + Nationalistic Front), Banzer’s ruling coalition, Bolivia + + + FSO + , Foreign + Service Officer; Fund for Special Operations + + + FRG + , Federal + Republic of Germany (West Germany) + + + FY + , fiscal + year + + + + + + + G–2 + , U.S. Army + or Marine Intelligence at Division/Corps level + + + GA + , General + Assembly (United Nations) + + + GAO + , + Government Accounting Office + + + GC + , Guardia Civil (Peru) + + + GCOB + , + Government of the Commonwealth of the Bahamas + + + GDP + , gross + domestic product + + + Gen. + , + General + + + GNS + , Guyana + National Service + + + GOA + , + Government of Argentina + + + GOB + , + Government of Brazil; Government of Bolivia + + + GOC + , + Government of Chile; Government of Columbia + + + GOG + , + Government of Guatemala + + + GOM + , + Government of Mexico + + + GOP + , + Government of Peru + + + GOU + , + Government of Uruguay + + + GOV + , + Government of Venezuela + + + GSP + , + Generalized System of Preferences + + + GSA + , General + Services Administration + + + GSP + , + Generalized System of Preferences + + + + + + H, Bureau of Congressional Relations, + Department of State + + + HAK + , Henry A. + Kissinger + + + HAKTO + , + Telegram from Kissinger + + + + HIRC + , House + International Relations Committee + + + HR + , human + rights + + + HRC + , Human + Rights Commission + + + + + + + + IA + , + Inter-American Region, Bureau of International Security Affairs, + Department of Defense + + + IA–5 + , Fifth + Institutional Act (Brazil) + + + IADB + , see IDB + + + IA/DSAA + , + International Affairs, Defense Security Assistance Agency + + + IA/ECOSOC + , Inter-American Economic and Social + Council + + + IAHRC + , + Inter-American Human Rights Commission + + + IBA + , + International Bauxite Association + + + IBD + , see IDB + + + IBEC + , + International Basic Economy Corporation + + + IBRD + , + International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (World + Bank) + + + ICA + , + International Coffee Agreement + + + ICCS + , + International Commission of Control and Supervision + + + ICJ + , + International Commission of Jurists; International Court of + Justice + + + ICRC + , + International Committee of the Red Cross + + + ICSID + , + International Center for Settlement of Investment Disputes + + + IDB + , + Inter-American Development Bank + + + IDC + , + Information Dominance Center + + + IFI + , + international financial institutions + + + IG + , + Intergovernmental Group + + + IM + , + Intelligence Memorandum + + + IMC + , + International Mining Company, Colombia + + + IMF + , + International Monetary Fund + + + INR + , Bureau + of Intelligence and Research, Department of State + + + INR/DDC + , + Deputy Director for Coordination, Bureau of Intelligence and + Research, Department of State + + + INR/IL + , + Intelligence Liaison, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, + Department of State + + + INR/RAR + , + Office of Research and Analysis for American Republics, Bureau of + Intelligence and Research, Department of State + + + IO + , Bureau of + International Organizations Affairs, Department of State + + + IRB + , + International Resource Bank + + + ISA + , + International Security Affairs, Department of Defense + + + + + + + JBUSMC + , + Joint Brazilian-U.S. Military Commission + + + JBUSDC + , + Joint Brazilian-U.S. Defense Commission + + + JCS + , Joint + Chiefs of Staff + + + + + + L, Legal Adviser, Department of + State + + + LA + , Latin + America + + + LAFTA + , + Latin American Free Trade Area + + + L/ARA + , + Assistant Legal Adviser for Inter-American Affairs, Department of + State + + + LAS + , Latin + American States + + + LIMDIS + , + limited distribution + + + LDC + , less + developed country + + + LOS + , Law of + the Sea + + + LS + , Language + Services Division, Department of State + + + + + + M, Deputy Under Secretary for + Management + + + MAAG + , + Military Assistance Advisory Group + + + Maj. + , + Major + + + Maj. Gen. + , + Major General + + + MAP + , Military + Assistance Program + + + MAP–T + , MAP + Training Program + + + + MAPU + , Movimiento de Acción Popular Unitaria + (Popular Unitary Action Movement), Chilean political + organization + + + MDB + , Movimento Democráctico Brasileiro (Brazilian + Democratic Movement), Brazilian political party + + + MFM + , Meeting + of Foreign Ministers + + + MID + , + Argentine Political Party + + + MIG + , Soviet + Military Aircraft Design Bureau + + + MILGROUP + , or MILGP, military group + + + MIR + , Movimiento Izquierda Revolucionario (Leftist + Revolutionary Movement), political organization in Chile + + + MNR + , Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario + (National Revolutionary Movement), Bolivian political party + + + MOD + , Ministry + of Defense + + + MPLA + , Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola + (Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola) + + + MTN + , + Multilateral Trade Negotiations + + + MTT + , mobile + training teams + + + MVD + , + Montevideo + + + + + + + NAC + , National + Advisory Council + + + NAM + , + Non-Aligned Movement + + + NEA + , Bureau + of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, Department of State + + + NIACT + , + night action; needs immediate attention + + + NIC + , National + Intelligence Council + + + NIO + , National + Intelligence Office/Officer + + + NPT + , Nuclear + Nonproliferation Treaty + + + NODIS + , no + distribution + + + NOFORN + , + not releasable to foreign nationals + + + NOTAL + , not + received by all addressees + + + NSA + , National + Security Advisor; National Security Agency + + + NSC + , National + Security Council + + + NSC–IG/ARA + , National Security Council + Interdepartmental Group for Inter-American Affairs + + + + NSDM + + , National + Security Decision Memorandum + + + NSSM + , + National Security Study Memorandum + + + + + + + OAS + , + Organization of American States + + + OASGA + , + General Assembly (Organization of American States) + + + ODC + , Office + of Defense Cooperation + + + OECD + , + Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development + + + OES + , Bureau + of Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs, + Department of State + + + OMB + , Office + of Management and Budget + + + OPEC + , + Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries + + + OPIC + , + Overseas Private Investment Corporation + + + OPR/LS + , + Language Services, Office of Protocol + + + + OSD + , Office + of the Secretary of Defense + + + + + + P, Under Secretary for Political Affairs, + Department of State + + + P&A + , price + and availability + + + PADES + , + Economic Development Project for the Southern Regions + + + PCU + , Partido Comunista de Uruguay (Communist Party + of Uruguay) + + + PDC + , Partido Democrática Christiana (Christian + Democratic Party), Chilean political party + + + PL + , Public + Law + + + + PM + , Bureau of + Politico-Military Affairs, Department of State + + + POL + , + Political Section + + + POLAD + , + Political Advisor + + + POM + , Program + Objectives Memorandum + + + Prepcon + , + Preparatory Conference + + + PRC + , People’s + Republic of China + + + PRIMIN + , + Prime Minister + + + PSD + , + Argentina (political party) + + + + + + + Reftel + , + reference telegram + + + + + + S, Office of the Secretary of State + + + SEC + , + Securities and Exchange Commission + + + SECDEF + , + Secretary of Defense + + + SECGEN + , + Secretary General + + + SECTO + , + telegram from the Secretary of State while on travel + + + SELA + , + Sistema Económica de Latinoamérica (Latin American Economic + System) + + + S/NM + , Special + Assistant to the Secretary of State for Narcotics Matters + + + S/P + , Policy + Planning Staff, Department of State + + + S/PRS + , + Office of Press Relations, Office of the Secretary of State, + Department of State + + + SRG + , Senior + Review Group + + + SFRC + , Senate + Foreign Relations Committee + + + SOUTHCOM + , Southern Command + + + S/S + , Office of + the Secretariat Staff, Department of State + + + SSC + , Senate + Select Committee + + + + + + + TELCON + , + telephone conversation + + + TIPO + , + (Weapon for Bol, Feb 20 76 BOL) + + + TOHAK + , + telegram to Kissinger + + + TOSEC + , + telegram to the Secretary of State while on travel + + + TOW + , + tube-launched, optically tracked, wire-guided missile + + + TNE + , + transnational enterprise + + + TRA + , Trade + Reform Act + + + + + + + UCR + , Unión Cívica Radical (Radical Civic Union), + Argentina + + + UN + , United + Nations + + + UNCTAD + , + United Nations Commission on Trade and Development + + + UNESCO + , + United Nations Educational and Social Council + + + UNGA + , United + Nations General Assembly + + + UNHCR + , + United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees + + + UNHRC + , + United Nations Human Rights Commission + + + UNIDO + , + United Nations Industrial Development Organization + + + UNITAS + , + annual maritime exercises conducted within the U.S. Southern + Command + + + USAID + , see AID + + + USAFSO + , + United States Foreign Service Officer + + + USARSO + , + United States Army Forces, Southern Command + + + USCINCSO + , see CINCSO + + + USDAO + , see DAO + + + USDEL + , + United States Delegation + + + USG + , United + States Government + + + USIA + , United + States Information Agency + + + USIB + , United + States Intelligence Board + + + USN + , United + States Navy + + + USSOUTHCOM + , see + SOUTHCOM + + + + USSR + , Union + of Soviet Socialist Republics + + + USUN + , United + States Mission to the United Nations + + + + + + + VAdm + , Vice + Admiral + + + + + + + WOLA + , + Washington Office on Latin America + + + WH + , Western + Hemisphere + + + + + + Z, Zulu (Greenwich) Mean time + + + + + +
+ + +
+ + Persons + + + + + + Adriázola Valda, + Oscar + , Major General (Ret.), Bolivian + Foreign Minister from April 1976 + + + Agosti, + Orlando + , Argentine Air Force Commander in + Chief, 1976 + + + Aguilar, M. + Andrés + , Venezuelan Ambassador to the United + States from 1973 until 1974 + + + Aherne, Richard + W. + , Bureau of Congressional Relations, + Department of State, until July 1974; Office of Political-Economic + Affairs from July 1974; Executive Assistant to the Secretary of + State from March 1976 + + + Allana, Ghulam + Ali + , Chairman of the Chile Ad Hoc Working + Group, United Nations Human Rights Commission, from 1975 + + + Allende, Gossens + Salvador + , President of Chile from November + 3, 1970, until September 11, 1973 + + + Almeyda Medina, + Clodomiro + , former Chilean official in the + Allende government from 1970 until 1973 + + + Anderson, + Robert + , Special Assistant to the Secretary + of State for Press Relations from June 1974 + + + Ash, Roy + L. + , Assistant to the President and Director + of the Office of Management and Budget from February 1973 until + February 1975 + + + Atherton, Alfred L., + Jr. + , Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for + Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs until April 27, 1974; Assistant + Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs from + April 27, 1974 + + + Austin, Granville + Seward + , staff member Policy Planning Staff, + Department of State, from November 1974 + + + + + + + Bach, + Morton + , Assistant to the Director of Office + Operations, Office of the Assistant Secretary for Enforcement, + Department of the Treasury, from 1973 until 1976; Special Assistant + for International Affairs, Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary + (Operations), from 1976 + + + Ballantyne, Robert + Jadwin + , Director of the Office of Technical + Support, Asia Bureau, Agency for International Development, from + 1973; Deputy Director of the Office of Brazilian Affairs, Bureau of + Inter-American Affairs, Department of State, from June 1974 + + + Bánzer Suárez, + Hugo + , President of Bolivia from August 22, + 1971 + + + Barbian, Paul + E. + , Bureau of Economic and Business Affairs, + Department of State, until March, 1974; Division of Operations, + Office of the Secretariat Staff Department of State, from March 1974 + until March 1975; Special Assistant, from March 1975 to June 1976; + Bureau of Economic and Business Affairs, from June 1976 + + + Barrios Llona, + Luis + , Peruvian Ambassador to Venezuela from + February 1975 + + + Bartch, Carl + E. + , Foreign Service Officer, U.S. Mission to + NATO, from October 1974 until January 1975; Foreign Service + Inspector, Department of State, from January 1975 until April 1975; + Director of Argentina-Paraguay-Uruguay Affairs, Bureau of + Inter-American Affairs, Department of State, from April 1975 until + July 1976; Deputy Chief of Mission-Counselor at the U.S. Embassy in + Tegucigalpa from July 1976 + + + Bejares Gonzales, + Marcelo Hernán + , Colonel, Chilean Military + Attaché from 1973 until January 1974; Director of Army Operations + from January 1974 until November 1974; Secretary General of the + Government of Chile from November 1974 + + + Belcher, Taylor + G. + , U.S. Ambassador to Peru from August 29, + 1969, until April 4, 1974 + + + Benavides Escobar, + César Raúl Manuel + , Major General, Interior + Minister of Chile from 1975 + + + + Bentley, Robert + B. + , staff member, Office of Management and + Budget, until October 1973; staff member, Bureau of + Political-Military Affairs, Department of State, from October 1973 + until January 1974; staff member, Office of Management and Budget, + January 1974 until January 1975; Special Assistant to the Assistant + Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs from January 1975 + until May 1976; Political Officer at the U.S. Consulate in São Paulo + from May 1976 + + + Berckemeyer Pazos, + Fernando + , Peruvian Ambassador to the United + States from 1973 until 1975 + + + Berry, Ann + Roper + , Office of Regional Economic Policy, + Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, Department of State, from March + 1975 until 1976; Passport Office, Bureau of Security and Consular + Affairs, Department of State, from 1976 + + + Berstein Carabantes, + Enrique + , Political Adviser, Foreign Ministry + of Chile, from 1974 + + + Binns, Jack + Robert + , Office of the Associate Director for + International Operations, Country Officer for Bolivia, from January + 1973 until July 1974; Political Officer, U.S. Embassy in London, + from July 1974 + + + Black, Edward + B. + , Legislative Officer, Office of + Congressional Relations, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, + Department of State, 1976 + + + Blanco Estradé, Juan + Carlos + , Minister of Foreign Affairs, + Uruguay, from 1973 + + + Bloom, Justin + L. + , Bureau of Oceans and International + Environmental and Scientific Affairs, Department of State, from + December 1974 + + + Bloomfield, Richard + J. + , Staff Director, National Security + Council Interdepartmental Group for Inter-American Affairs, from + 1973; Director of the Office of Policy Coordination, Bureau of + Inter-American Affairs, Department of State, from August 1973; U.S. + Ambassador to Ecuador from May 1976 + + + Boeker, + Paul + , Economic-Commercial Officer, U.S. + Embassy in Bonn from 1973; staff member, Policy Planning Staff, + Department of State, from 1974 until 1975; Office of Investment + Affairs, International Finance and Development, Bureau of Economic + and Business Affairs, Department of State from 1975; Deputy + Assistant Secretary of State for Economic and Business Affairs from + 1976 + + + Bond, Stephen + R. + , staff member, Office of the Assistant + Legal Adviser for Economic and Business Affairs, Department of + State, from May 1974 + + + Bonilla Bradanovik, + Oscar Adrián + , Chilean Minister of the + Interior from 1973 until 1974; Minister of National Defense from + 1974 + + + Bordaberry, Juan + María + , President of Uruguay from March 1, + 1973, until June 12, 1976 + + + Borek, Ted + Andrew + , staff member, Office of the + Assistant Legal Adviser for Inter-American Affairs, Department of + State, from February 1974 + + + Borg, C. + Arthur + , Deputy Executive Secretary, Office + of the Secretariat Staff, Department of State, from June 1975; + Special Assistant to the Secretary of State from July 1976 + + + Borg, Parker + W. + , Special Assistant to the Director of the + Foreign Service until December 1974; Special Assistant to the + Secretary of State from December 1974 until June 1976; Principal + Officer, U.S. Consulate in Lubumbashi, from June 1976 + + + Boright, John + P., + Arms Control and Disarmament Agency from + May 1974 + + + Bosworth, Stephen + W., + Office of Fuels and Energy, + International Resources and Food Policy, Bureau of Economic and + Business Affairs, Department of State, from April 1974 until July + 1974; Director, Office of Fuels and Energy, from July 1974 until + April 1976; Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for International + Resources and Food Policy from April 1976 + + + Botero, Montoya + Rodrigo + , Colombian Minister of Finance from + 1975 + + + Boughton, Priscilla + M. + , Assistant Director for + Multilateral/Bilateral Coordination, Office of Multilateral + Coordination and Regional Social Development Programs, Bureau of + Inter-American Affairs, Department of State, 1976 + + + Bowdler, William + G., + U.S. Ambassador to Guatemala from + October 19, 1971, until August 26, 1973; Deputy Assistant Secretary + of State for Inter-American Affairs from September 1973 until August + 1974; Acting Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American + Affairs, September 1974; U.S. Ambassador to South Africa from May + 14, 1975 + + + + Boyatt, Thomas + D. + , Deputy Chief of Mission, U.S. Embassy in + Santiago from 1976 + + + Bray, Charles W., + III + , Director Office of Press Relations, + Department of State, from 1971 until 1973; Deputy Assistant + Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs from 1976 + + + Brazeal, Aurelia + E. + , Country Officer, U.S. Embassies in + Asunción and Montevideo + + + Bremer, L. Paul + (Jerry), III + , Special Assistant to the + Secretary of State + + + Brooke, + Edward + , Senator (R-Massachusetts) + + + Brousset Escobar, + Jose Luis + , Peruvian Vice Minister of Finance + and President of Banco Popular + + + + Brown, + George + , staff member, Bureau of + Inter-American Affairs, Department of State, from 1975 + + + Brown, L. + Dean + , U.S. Ambassador to Jordan from + September 29, 1970, until November 29, 1973; Deputy Under Secretary + of State for Management, from December 28, 1973, until February 23, + 1975 + + + Brownell, Mary + E. + , Research Assistant, National Security + Council Staff, from August 1974 + + + Buchanan, James + Eldon + , Foreign Affairs Political Analyst, + Bureau of Intelligence and Research Department of State, from June + 1974 + + + Buchanan, John Hall, + Jr. + , member, U.S. House of Representatives + (R-Alabama) + + + Buchen, Philip + W. + , Counsel to the President from + 1974 + + + Buffum, William + B. + , U.S. Ambassador to Lebanon from October + 13, 1970, until January 17, 1974; Assistant Secretary of State for + International Organization Affairs from February 4, 1974, until + December 18, 1975 + + + Burelli Rivas, + Miguel Angel + , Venezuelan Ambassador to the + United States from 1973 until September 1976 + + + Bush, George + H.W. + , Head of U.S. Liaison Office in + Beijing, China, from October 21, 1974, until December 7, 1975; + Director of Central Intelligence from January 30, 1976 + + + Butz, + Earl + , Secretary of Agriculture from 1973 until + October 4, 1976 + + + + + + + Caldera, + Rafael + President of Venezuela from March 11, + 1969, until March 12, 1974 + + + Callaghan, + James + , British Prime Minister and First Lord + of the Treasury from 1976 + + + Callaway, Howard + H. + , Secretary of the U.S. Army from May 15, + 1973, until July 3, 1975 + + + Calvani, + Aristides + , Venezuelan Minister of Foreign + Affairs until 1974 + + + Campora, Héctor + Jose + , President of Argentina from May 25, + 1973, until July 1973 + + + Capriles, + Roberto + , Bolivian Ambassador to the United + States from 1975 + + + Carasales, + Julio + , Argentine Ambassador to the + Organization of American States + + + Carvajal Prado, + Patricio + , Vice Admiral, Chilean Minister of + Foreign Relations from 1974 + + + Case, Clifford + P. + , Senator (R-New Jersey); ranking minority + member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee from 1973 + + + Casey, William + J. + , Under Secretary of State for Economic + and Agricultural Affairs from February 2, 1973, until March 14, + 1974; President and Chairman, Export-Import Bank, from 1974 + + + Castro, + Fidel + , Prime Minister of Cuba until 1976; + President of Cuba from 1976 + + + Cauas Lama, Jorge + Elias + , Chilean Minister of Finance from + 1975 + + + Chaij, Daniel + A. + , Rural Development Division Chief, Office + of Development Resources, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, + Department of State, from July 1974 + + + Clements, William P., + Jr. + , Deputy Secretary of Defense from + January 30, 1973; Acting Secretary of Defense from June 1973 + + + Cleveland, + Stanley + , Deputy Chief of Mission, U.S. + Embassy in Brasiliá, from 1973 until August 1974 + + + Cline, Ray + S. + , Director, Office of Intelligence and + Research, Department of State, from October 26, 1969, until November + 24, 1973 + + + Colby, William + E. + , Deputy Director of Operations, Central + Intelligence Agency, until Sept 1, 1973; Director of Central + Intelligence from September 4, 1973, until January 30, 1976 + + + + Collums, Haley + D. + , Consular Officer, U.S. Consulate in + Ankara, from July 1973 until July 1975; Operations Official, + Department of State, from July 1975 until June 1976; Special + Assistant to the Secretary of State from June 1976 + + + Connor, James + E. + , Secretary to the Cabinet from January + 1975; White House Staff Secretary from June 1975 + + + Contreras Sepúlveda, + Juan Manuel Guillermo + , Director of the + National Intelligence Directorate in Chile from 1974 + + + Cooper, + Charles + , member, National Security Council + Staff, from 1973; Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for + International Affairs from 1974 until 1975 + + + Cortes, + Marcos + , Special Assistant to Brazilian Prime + Minister of Foreign Affairs from 1973 + + + Couto e Silva, + Golbery do + , General, Chief, Civilian + Household of the Presidency, Brazil, from 1974 + + + Covey, James + P. + , Department Duty Officer, Operations + Center, Office of the Secretariat Staff, Department of State, from + 1974 + + + Cox, David + W. + , Political Officer, U.S. Embassy in + Caracas until July 1974; Consular Officer, U.S. Consulate in La Paz + from July 1974 until August 1974; Office of North Coast Affairs, + Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, Department of State, from August + 1974 + + + Creekmore, Marion + V. + , Economic-Commercial Officer, U.S. + Embassy in Bonn, until July 1973; detailed to Foreign Service + Institute from July 1973 until January 1974; Office of Fuels and + Energy, International Resources and Food Policy, Bureau of Economic + and Business Affairs, Department of State, from January 1974 + + + Crimmins, John + Hugh + , Deputy Assistant Secretary of State + for Inter-American Affairs until March 1973; U.S. Ambassador to + Brazil from August 13, 1973 + + + Crosland, Charles + Anthony Raven + , British Secretary of State + for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs from April 8, 1976 + + + Crosswhite, + Clyde + , National Security Adviser, Office of + the Special Assistant to the Secretary, Department of the Treasury, + from 1973 + + + + + + + Davis, Jeanne + W., + Staff Secretary, National Security + Council Staff, from 1973 + + + Davis, + Nathaniel + , U.S. Ambassador to Chile until + November 1, 1973; Director General of the Foreign Service from + November 13, 1973, until March 17, 1975; Assistant Secretary of + State for African Affairs from April 2, 1975, until December 18, + 1975; U.S. Ambassador to Switzerland from January 9, 1976 + + + Dean, Robert + W. + , Deputy Chief of Mission in Mexico, as of + 1973; Chargé d’Affaires in Mexico, May 1973; U.S. Ambassador to Peru + from May 2, 1974 + + + De Araujo, Castro + João Augusto, + Brazilian Ambassador to the + United States from December 1974 + + + De la Flor, Valle + Miguel Angel + , Peruvian Foreign Minister from + 1973 until 1976 + + + De la Madrid Hurtado, + Miguel + , Mexican politician from 1972 + + + Demicheli, + Alberto + , Acting President of Uruguay from + June 12 until September 1, 1976 + + + De Tarr, + Francis + , Director, Office of Operations + Policy, Deputy Director for Coordination, Bureau of Intelligence and + Research, Department of State, from 1975 + + + Devine, Frank + J. + , Deputy Chief of + Mission-Minister-Counselor, U.S. Embassy in Caracas, until May 1973; + Counselor, U.S. Embassy in Caracas, from May 1973 until August 1973; + Department of State official from August 1973 until November 1973; + Director of North Coast Affairs, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, + Department of State, from November 1973 + + + Diez, + Sergio + , Chilean Representative to the United + Nations Human Rights Commission Meeting, 1976 + + + Dodd, + Edwin + , President, Owens-Illinois Corporation, + 1976 + + + Donaldson, William + H. + , Under Secretary of State for + International Security Affairs from November 26, 1973, until May 10, + 1974 + + + + Driscoll, Robert + S. + , Country Officer, U.S. Embassy in + Santiago, from July 1975 + + + Duemling, Robert + W. + , Special Assistant, U.S. Consulate in + Osaka-Kobe, from 1973 until August 1974; Executive Assistant to the + Deputy Secretary of State from August 1974 until August 1976; Deputy + Chief of Mission-Counselor, U.S. Embassy in Ottawa from February + 1976 + + + Duval, + Michael + , see + Raoul-Duval + + + + + + + Eagleburger, Lawrence + S. + , Acting Assistant Secretary of Defense + for International Affairs from January 31, 1973, until May 10, 1973; + Executive Assistant to the Secretary of State from 1974; Deputy + Under Secretary of State for Management from May 14, 1975 + + + Easum, Donald + B. + , U.S. Ambassador to Upper Volta (Burkina + Faso) until January 19, 1974; Assistant Secretary of State for + African Affairs from March 18, 1974, until March 26, 1975; U.S. + Ambassador to Nigeria from May 22, 1975 + + + Eberle, William + D. + , Assistant to the President for + International Economic Affairs from July 1974 + + + Einaui, Luigi + R. + , staff member, Policy Planning Staff, + Department of State, from July 1974 + + + Einhorn, Jessica + P. + , staff member, Office of the Assistant + Secretary for International Affairs, Department of the + Treasury + + + Eisenhower, + John + , military assistance expert, Office of + Management and Budget International Division, Asia, from 1974 + + + Eliot, Theodore L., + Jr. + , Executive Secretary of the Department + of State until September 26, 1973; U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan + from November 21, 1973 + + + Ellis, Clark + N. + , Office of Investment Affairs, + International Finance and Development, Bureau of Economic and + Business Affairs Department of State, until July 1975; + Economic-Commercial Officer, U.S. Embassy in Vienna, from July + 1975 + + + Eltz, Regina + Marie + , Office of Brazilian Affairs, Bureau + of Inter-American Affairs, Department of State, from September + 1973 + + + Enders, Thomas + O. + , Chargé d’Affaires ad interim to the + Khmer Republic (Cambodia) until 1974; Assistant Secretary of State + for Economic and Business Affairs from July 24, 1974, until December + 22, 1975; U.S. Ambassador to Canada from February 17, 1976 + + + Ernst, David + H. + , Deputy Personnel Officer from July 1973 + until July 1974; Deputy Senior Assistant for International Narcotics + Matters, Office of the Secretary, Department of State, from July + 1974 + + + Eyre, + John + , Country Officer for Bolivia, Bureau for + Latin America, Agency for International Development + + + + + + + Fascell, Dante + B. + , Member, U.S. House of Representatives + (D-Florida) + + + Feldman, Mark + B. + , Deputy Legal Adviser, Department of + State, 1973; Acting Legal Adviser, Department of State, from + September 1974 + + + Ferreira Aldunate, + Wilson + , Former Uruguayan Senator and + presidential candidate + + + Fields, Louis + G. + , Assistant Legal Adviser for + Politico-Military Affairs until 1976; Assistant Legal Adviser for + Special Functional Problems from 1976 + + + Figueiredo, João + Baptista de Oliveira + , General, Chief of the + Military Household of the Presidency, Brazil, from 1973 until 1974; + Chief, National Intelligence Service, Brazil, from 1974 + + + Fimbres, Rudy + V. + , Multisector Official, Agency for + International Development, Guatemala, from March 1973 until August + 1973; Independent College of Armed Forces from August 1973 until + June 1974; Deputy Director of the Office of Public Affairs, Bureau + of Inter-American Affairs, Department of State, from July 1974 until + August 1975; Director Office of Bolivian-Chilean Affairs, Bureau of + Inter-American Affairs, Department of State, from August 1975 until + August 1976; Special Assistant to the Coordinator for Humanitarian + Affairs from August 1976 + + + + Fish, Howard + M. + , Lieutenant General, USAF; Director of + the Defense Security Assistance Agency, Department of Defense, from + August 1974 + + + Fisher, John + W. + , Director, Office of Bolivian-Chilean + Affairs, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, Department of State, + until August 1973; Minister-Counselor, U.S. Embassy in Caracas, from + August 1973 until December 1973; Deputy Chief of Mission, U.S. + Embassy in Caracas, from December 1973 + + + Fishlow, + Albert + , Deputy Assistant Secretary of State + for Inter-American Affairs from 1975 until 1976 + + + Flanigan, Peter + M. + , Assistant to the President until April + 16, 1973; Assistant to the President for International Economic + Affairs, and Executive Director, White House Council on + International Economic Policy, from April 16, 1973, until + 1974 + + + Fons, + José + , Colonel, Uruguayan military + + + Ford, Gerald + R. + , Member, U.S. House of Representatives + (R-Michigan); House Minority Leader until 1973; Vice President of + the United States from December 6, 1973, until August 9, 1974; + President of the United States from August 9, 1974, until January + 20, 1977 + + + Forman, + Benjamin + , Assistant General Counsel for + International Affairs, Department of Defense from March 1975 + + + Forrester, Martin + C. + , Country Officer for Venezuela, Office of + North Coast Affairs, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, Department of + State, from 1973 + + + Fouts, Susan + C. + , Office of Regional Economic Policy, + Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, Department of State, from January + 1974 + + + Fraser, Donald + M. + , Member, U.S. House of Representatives + (D-Minnesota), Chair of the International Organizations Subcommittee + of the House Committee on International Relations, 1976 + + + Frechette, Myles + R. + , Political Officer, U.S. Consulate in Rio + de Janeiro, from August 1974 + + + Friedersdorf, Max + L. + , Deputy Assistant to the President for + Legislative Affairs from 1974 until 1975; Assistant to the President + for Legislative Affairs from 1975 + + + Fry, John + C. + , Deputy Director, Office of Science and + Technology, Bureau for Technical Assistance, Department of State, + from May 1973 until May 1976; Deputy Director, Office of + Bilateral-Multilateral Affairs, Department of State, from May + 1976 + + + Fuller, Alexander + S.C. + , Alternate Director of Andean Affairs, + Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, Department of State, from + September 1976 + + + + + + + Gamble, Roger + R. + , Labor-Political Officer, Political + Section, U.S. Embassy in Buenos Aires, from July 1973 until June + 1976; Deputy Director, Operations Center, Office of the Secretariat + Staff Department of State, from June 1976 + + + Gammon, Samuel R. + III + , Executive Assistant to the Deputy Under + Secretary of State for Administration to July 1973; Deputy Executive + Secretary, Office of the Secretariat Staff Department of State, from + July 1973; Acting Executive Secretary, Office of the Secretariat + Staff, Department of State, from August 1974 + + + Gantz, + David + , Assistant Legal Adviser for + Inter-American Affairs from February 1973; Assistant Legal Adviser + for European Affairs from July 1976 + + + García Bedoya, + Carlos + , Peruvian Ambassador to the United + States from 1976 + + + Gardner, James + R. + , Director, Office of Operations Policy, + Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State, from + 1973 + + + Gavazzo, + José + , Major, Uruguayan military + + + Geisel, + Ernesto, + President of Brazil from March 15, + 1974 + + + Gelbard, José + Ber + , Argentine Minister of Economy from + 1974 + + + Gibson Barboza, + Mario + , Brazilian Minister of Foreign Affairs + from 1969 until 1974 + + + Giuliani, + Rudolph + , Associate Deputy Attorney General, + Department of Justice, 1976 + + + Glitman, Maynard + W. + , Director of the Office of International + Trade Policy, Department of State, from 1975 until 1976; Deputy + Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs + from 1976 + + + + Gomez Mantellini, + Jorge + , Director General of the Foreign + Ministry of Venezuela from September 1975 until 1976; Venezuelan + Foreign Minister from 1976 + + + Gompert, David + C. + , Special Assistant to the Secretary of + State from January 1974 + + + Granger, Clinton + E. + , Planning and Coordination Officer; then, + Acting Director, Planning and Coordination, from August 1974 until + September 1976 + + + Greene, James + F. + , Associate Commissioner, Immigration and + Naturalization Service, from July 1974 + + + Greene, James + R. + , Special Emissary to Peru from + 1973 + + + Greenwald, Joseph + A. + , Bureau of Economic and Business Affairs, + Department of State, 1976 + + + Grey, Robert T., + Jr. + , Deputy Director, Office of Security + Assistance and Sales, Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs, + Department of State, from August 1973 until August 1974; Consular + Officer, U.S. Embassy in Canberra, from August 1974 until November + 1974; Political Officer, U.S. Embassy in Canberra, from November + 1974 + + + Grojean, Charles + D. + , Admiral, Deputy Chief of Naval + Operations from 1974 + + + Gutierrez, Mario + Raúl + , Bolivian Minister of Foreign Affairs + and Worship, 1973 + + + Gutiérrez Ruiz, + Héctor + , Former member, Chamber of Deputies, + Uruguay + + + Guzmán Soriano, + Alberto + , General, Bolivian Minister of + Foreign Affairs and Worship, from 1974 + + + Guzmán, + Enrique + , Minister-Counselor, Chilean Embassy + to the United States, from 1974 + + + Guzzetti, César + Augusto + , Admiral, Argentine Foreign Minister + from March 30, 1976 + + + + + + + Haahr, James + C. + , Deputy Chief of Mission, U.S. Embassy in + Montevideo + + + Habib, Philip + C. + , U.S. Ambassador to South Korea until + August 19, 1974; Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and + Pacific Affairs from September 27, 1974 until June 30, 1976; Under + Secretary of State for Political Affairs from July 1, 1976 + + + Harkin, Thomas + R. + , Member, U.S. House of Representatives + (D-Iowa) from 1975 + + + Harrington, Michael + J. + , Member, U.S. House of Representatives + (D-Massachusetts) from 1973 + + + Harrison, Lawrence + E. + , Director, Office of Development + Programs, Bureau of Inter-American :mxAffairs, Department of State, + from 1973 until 1975; Director of Regional Office for Central + America and Panama in Guatemala from 1975 + + + Harrison, Roger + G. + , Special Assistant to the Staff Director, + Interdepartmental Political-Military Group, National Security + Council, from May 1974 until July 1975; member, National Security + Council Staff for Planning and Coordination, from July 1975 + + + Hart, Donald + F., + Economic-Commercial Officer, U.S. + Embassy in Quito until July 1975; Producing Countries Affairs, + Office of Fuels and Energy, Bureau of Economic and Business Affairs, + Department of State, from July 1975 + + + Hartman, Arthur + A. + , Assistant Secretary of State for + European and Canadian Affairs from January 8, 1974, until June 8, + 1977 + + + Hechtman, + Robert + , Office of Bolivian and Chilean + Affairs, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, Department of State, + until February 1976; Assistant Program Officer, Guatemala, Agency + for International Development, from February 1976 until February + 1976; Program Officer, Bureau for Latin America Agency for + International Development, from February 1976 + + + Helms, + Richard + , Director of Central Intelligence + until February 2, 1973; U.S. Ambassador to Iran from April 5, + 1973 + + + Hennessy, + John + , Assistant Secretary of the Treasury + for International Affairs from 1973 + + + Hewitt, Ashley C., + Jr. + , National War College until July 1973; + Deputy Chief of Mission-Counselor, U.S. Embassy in Kingston, from + July 1973 until August 1975; Chargé d’Affaires, U.S. Embassy in + Kingston, from 1973 until 1974; Chief, Industrial and Strategic + Materials Division, Office of International Commodities, Bureau of + Economic and Business Affairs, Department of State, from August + 1975 + + + + Heyman, I. + Austin + , Deputy Director of the Office of + Development Programs, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, Department + of State, from 1973 + + + Hill, Robert + C. + , Assistant Secretary of Defense for + International Security Affairs, from May 11, 1973, until January 5, + 1974; U.S. Ambassador to Argentina, from February 15, 1974 + + + Hinton, Deane + R. + , Assistant Director, White House Council + on International Economic Policy, from 1973 until 1974; Deputy + Director, White House Council on International Economic Policy, from + 1974; U.S. Ambassador to Zaire (Democratic Republic of the Congo) + from August 21, 1974, until June 18, 1975; U.S. Representative to + the European Communities from January 29, 1976 + + + Hitchcock, David I., + Jr. + , Foreign Service Institute from August + 1973 until July 1974; Office of East Asian and Pacific Programs, + Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs, Department of State from + July 1974 + + + Horman, + Charles + , U.S. journalist and filmmaker + killed in the aftermath of the Pinochet coup + + + Huerta, + Ismael, + Chilean Foreign Minister from 1973 + until 1974; Chilean Ambassador to the United Nations from 1974 until + 1977 + + + Humphrey, Hubert H., + Jr. + , Senator (D-Minnesota) + + + Hunt, Cecil + M., + Deputy General Counsel, Overseas Private + Investment Corps, from 1973 + + + Hurwitch, + Robert + , Deputy Assistant Secretary of State + for Inter-American Affairs until August 1973; U.S. Ambassador to the + Dominican Republic from September 1973 until April 1978 + + + Hyland, William + G. + , member, National Security Council Staff + for Operations until January 21, 1974; Assistant Secretary of State + for Intelligence and Research from January 21, 1974, until November + 24, 1975; Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security + Affairs from November 24, 1975 + + + + + + + Iklé, Fred + C. + , Director, Arms Control and Disarmament + Agency, from 1973 + + + Ingersoll, John + J. + , Chief, Tropical Products Division, + Office of International Commodities, International Resources and + Food Policy, Bureau of Economic and Business Affairs, Department of + State, from 1973 + + + Illanes Benitez, + Osvaldo + , Chilean Representative to the + International Court of Justice until November 1974 + + + Illanes Fernandez, + Javier + , Director General of the Foreign + Ministry of Chile from 1975 + + + Ingersoll, Robert + Stephen + , U.S. Ambassador to Japan from + February 29, 1972, until November 8, 1973; Assistant Secretary of + State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs from January 8, 1974, until + July 9, 1974; Deputy Secretary of State from July 10, 1974, until + March 31, 1976 + + + Inouye, + Daniel + , Senator (D-Hawaii) + + + Iribarren Borges, + Ignacio + , Venezuelan Ambassador to the United + States from November 1976 + + + Irwin, John N., + II + , Deputy Secretary of State until February + 1, 1973 + + + Isaacs, Arnold + M. + , Political Officer, Political Section, + U.S. Embassy in Santiago, until July 1973; Office of + Bolivian-Chilean Affairs, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, + Department of State, from July 1973 + + + + + + + Jackson, + Henry + , Senator (D-Washington) + + + Janka, + Les + , Press Liaison Officer, National Security + Council Staff + + + Javits, Jacob + K. + , Senator (R-New York) + + + Jenkins, Kempton + B. + , Deputy Assistant Director for the Soviet + Union and Eastern Europe, U.S. Information Agency, until July 1973; + Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Congressional Relations from + July 1973 + + + + Johnson, Henry + P. + , Program Officer, Agency for + International Development, U.S. Embassy in Panama City, from June + 1973 until February 1974; Deputy Director of North Coast Affairs, + Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, Department of State, from February + 1974 + + + Johnson, Peter + B. + , Political Officer, U.S. Embassy in San + Jose, until August 1975; Office of Policy Planning, Public and + Congressional Affairs, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, from August + 1975 + + + Jordan, Amos + A. + , Acting Assistant Secretary of Defense + for International Security Affairs from April 2, 1974, until June 4, + 1974 and from December 23, 1975, until May 5, 1976 + + + Jorden, William + J. + , member, National Security Council Staff + from 1973 until 1974; U.S. Ambassador to Panama from April 1974 + + + + + + + + Kahan, Jerome + H. + , staff member, Policy Planning Staff, + Department of State, from October 1973 + + + Karkashian, John + E. + , Deputy Director, Office of + Bolivian-Chilean Affairs, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, + Department of State, until January 1974; Director, Office of + Bolivian-Chilean Affairs, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, + Department of State, from January 1974 until September 1975; Foreign + Service Institute from September 1975 until October 1976; Deputy + Director, Office for Combating Terrorism, Deputy Under Secretary of + State for Management, from October 1976 + + + Karamessines, Thomas + H. + , Deputy Director for Plans, Central + Intelligence Agency, until February 24, 1973 + + + Katz, + Julius + , Deputy Assistant Secretary of State + for International Resources and Food Policy until 1974; Deputy + Assistant Secretary of State from 1974 until 1976; Assistant + Secretary of State for Economic and Business Affairs from September + 1976 + + + Keane, John + F. + , Consular Officer, U.S. Embassy in Lima, + from January 1973 until December 1973; Political Officer, Political + Section, U.S. Embassy in Lima, from December 1973 until July 1974; + Country Officer, U.S. Embassy in Mexico City, from July 1974 until + May 1976; Special Assistant to the Assistant Secretary of State for + Inter-American Affairs from May 1976 + + + Kennedy, Richard + T. + , Colonel, USA; Deputy Assistant to the + President for National Security Planning from 1973 until 1975 + + + Kennedy, + Edward + , Senator (D-Massachusetts) + + + King, John + F. + , Coordinator of the Office of Cuban + Affairs, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, Department of State, from + August 1973 until November 1973; Director, Office of Press + Relations, from November 1973 until February 1975; Director of the + Office of Ecuadorian and Peruvian Affairs, Bureau of Inter-American + Affairs, Department of State, from February 1975 until July 1976; + Director of the Office of Regional Political Programs, Bureau of + Inter-American Affairs, from July 1976 + + + Kirk, + Roger + , Deputy Director, Bureau of Intelligence + and Research, Department of State, from March until September 1976; + Acting Director, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of + State, from September 1976 + + + Kissinger, Henry + A., + Secretary of State from September 22, + 1973; Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs from + November 3, 1975 + + + Kleine, + Herman + , Assistant Administrator, Agency for + International Development, and Deputy U.S. Coordinator, Alliance for + Progress, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, Department of State, + from December 1973 + + + Knepper, William + E. + , Deputy Director, Office of Regional + Economic Policy, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, Department of + State, until May 1975; Director, Office of Regional Economic Policy, + Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, Department of State, from March + 1975 to July 1975; Advisor on International Economic Affairs, + Economic/Trade Section, U.S. Mission in Geneva, from July + 1975 + + + Koch, + Edward + , Member, U.S. House of + Representatives (D-New York) + + + + Krebs, Max + V. + , Deputy Chief of Mission + Minister-Counselor, U.S. Embassy in Buenos Aires, until April 4, + 1974; U.S. Ambassador to Guyana from April 4, 1974, until June 15, + 1976 + + + Kubisch, Jack + B. + , Assistant Secretary of State for + Inter-American Affairs and U.S. Coordinator of the Alliance for + Progress, from May 29, 1973, until September 4, 1974; U.S. + Ambassador to Greece, from September 26, 1974, until July 19, + 1977 + + + Kuchel, Roland + K. + , Eastern Europe Division, Bureau of + Intelligence and Research, Department of State, until July 1974; + Deputy Director, Operations Center, Office of the Secretariat Staff, + Department of State, from July 1974 until June 1975; Director, + Operations Center, Office of the Secretariat Staff, Department of + State, from June 1975 until July 1976; Political Officer, Political + Section, U.S. Embassy in Rome, from July 1976 + + + + + + + Lanusse Gelly, + Alejandro Agustín + , President of Argentina + until May 25, 1973 + + + LeBailly, Eugene + B. + , Lieutenant General, USAF; Chairman, + Inter-American Defense Board from 1970 until 1973 + + + Leigh, + Monroe + , Legal Adviser of the Department of + State from January 21, 1975 + + + Leigh Guzmán, + Gustavo + , General, Delegate of the Chilean + military junta from September 11, 1973, until June 27, 1974 + + + Leonard, Will E., + Jr. + , Commissioner, U.S. Tariff Commission, + from 1973 until 1976; Chairman of the U.S. International Trade + Commission from 1976 + + + Letelier de Solar, + Marcos Orlando + , Chilean Ambassador to the + United States from 1971 until 1973; Foreign Minister from 1973; + Staff Member, Institute for Policy Studies, from 1974 until his + assassination on September 21, 1976 + + + Levi, Edward + H. + , U.S. Attorney General from February 2, + 1975, until January 26, 1977 + + + Levine, Leonard + B. + , Trade Specialist, Agency for + International Development from 1973; Economic-Commercial Officer, + U.S. Embassy in Santiago, from June 1974 until September 1976; + International Relations Officer, Department of State, from September + 1976 + + + Lewis, Samuel + W. + , Deputy Director, Policy Planning Staff, + Department of State, until November 1975; Assistant Secretary of + State for International Organization Affairs from December + 1975 + + + Lewis, William + H. + , Special Assistant to the Under Secretary + of State for Security Assistance until May 1974; Director, Office of + Security Assistance, Department of State, from May 1974 until + February 1976; Director of Inter-African Affairs, and Staff + Director, National Security Council Interdepartmental Group for + African Affairs, from February 1976 + + + Lievano, Aguirre + Indalecio + , Columbian Foreign Minister from + 1974 + + + Linder, Robert + D. + , Chief Executive Clerk, White House + Research Office, from 1974 until 1975; Executive Clerk of the + Editorial Staff of the White House from 1975 + + + Lister, + George + , staff member, Bureau of + Inter-American Affairs, Department of State, from 1973 + + + Little, Edward + S. + , Director, Office of North Coast Affairs, + Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, Department of State, as of March + 1973; Coordinator for Cuban Affairs, Bureau of Inter-American + Affairs, Department of State, from October 1973 + + + Lodge, John + Davis + , U.S. Ambassador to Argentina until + November 10, 1973 + + + López Michelsen, + Alfonso + , President of Colombia from August + 7, 1974, until August 7, 1978 + + + López Portillo y + Pacheco, José + , President of Mexico from + December 1, 1976, until November 30, 1982; Mexican Treasury + Secretary, from 1973 until 1975 + + + Lord, + Winston + , member, National Security Council + Staff until 1973; Director of the Planning and Coordination Staff, + Department of State, October 12, 1973, until February 26, 1974; + Director of the Policy Planning Staff, Department of State, from + February 27, 1974 + + + + Loving, + David + , Special Assistant to the Deputy + Secretary of State from May 1976 + + + Low, + Stephen + , Senior Staff Member, National + Security Council, from 1974 until August 31, 1976; U.S. Ambassador + to Zambia from August 31, 1976 + + + Luder, Italo + A. + , Chairman of the Foreign Relations + Committee of the Argentine Senate from 1973; Private Secretary to + President Isabel Perón from + 1974 until 1975; Provisional President of Argentina from September + 13, 1975, until October 16, 1975 + + + Luers, William + H. + , Political Counselor, U.S. Embassy in + Caracas, from March 1973; Deputy Director, Office of Soviet Union + Affairs, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State, from May + 1973 until December 1973; Deputy Executive Secretary, Office of the + Secretariat Staff, Department of State, from December 1973 until + March 1975; Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American + Affairs from March 1975 until September 1976; Senior Deputy + Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs from + September 1976 + + + Luisi, + Hector + , Uruguayan Ambassador to the United + States until 1974 + + + Lyle, Roger + H. + , Lieutenant Colonel, staff member, + International Security Affairs, Office of the Secretary of Defense, + from 1974 + + + Lynn, James + T. + , Secretary of Housing and Urban + Development from February 2, 1973 until 1975; Director of the Office + of Management and Budget from February 1975 + + + + + + + MacDonald, David + Robert + , Assistant Secretary of the Treasury + for Enforcement, Operations, and Tariff Affairs from 1974 + + + Mahoney, Michael + M. + , Consular Officer, U.S. Embassy in Port + of Spain, until April 1974; Consular Officer, U.S. Embassy in + Athens, from April 1974 until October 1975; Office of Policy + Planning and Coordination, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, + Department of State, from October 1975 + + + Mailliard, William + S. + , Member, U.S. House of Representatives + (R-California) until March 7, 1974; Permanent Representative of the + United States to the Organization of American States from March 7, + 1974, until February 1, 1977 + + + Marsh, John + O. + , Assistant Secretary of Defense for + Legislative Affairs from April 17, 1973, until February 15, 1974; + Counsel to the President on National Security Issues from August + 1974 + + + Martínez de Hoz, + José Alfredo + Argentine Minister of Economy + from March 1976 + + + Matteson, Lois + J. + , Operations Center, Office of the + Secretariat Staff, Department of State, from July 1974 until January + 1976; Adviser for Economic and Social Affairs, U.S. Mission to the + United Nations, from January 1976 + + + Maw, Carlyle + E. + , Legal Adviser of the Department of + State, from November 27, 1973, until July 8, 1974; Under Secretary + of State for International Security Affairs from July 19, 1974, + until September 17, 1976 + + + McAfee, + William + , Deputy Director, Bureau of + Intelligence and Research, Department of State, until August 1973; + Deputy Director for Coordination, Bureau of Intelligence and + Research, Department of State, from August 1973 until 1974; Deputy + Director, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State, + from 1974 + + + McClintock, + Robert + , U.S. Ambassador to Venezuela until + March 14, 1975 + + + McCloskey, Robert + J. + , Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for + Press Relations, and Special Assistant to the Secretary, until May + 1973; U.S. Ambassador to Cyprus from June 20, 1973, until January + 14, 1974; Ambassador at Large from February 14, 1974, until February + 20, 1975; Assistant Secretary of State for Legislative Affairs from + February 21, 1975, until September 10, 1976; U.S. Ambassador to the + Netherlands from October 22, 1976 + + + McCullough, Douglas + L. + , Director of Energy Policy, Department of + the Treasury from 1974 + + + McFarlane, Robert C. + (Bud) + , Military Assistant to the President + for National Security Affairs from 1973 until 1975; Executive + Assistant to the Assistant to the President for National Security + Affairs from 1975 until 1976; Special Assistant to the President for + National Security Affairs from 1976 + + + + McGee, Gale + W. + , Senator (D-Wyoming) + + + McNamara, Robert + S. + , President of the World Bank + + + Meany, + George + , President of the AFL–CIO + + + Médici, Emílio + Garrastazu + , President of Brazil until March + 15, 1974 + + + Méndez, + Aparicio + , President of Uruguay from + September 1, 1976 + + + Mercado Jarrín, Luis + Edgardo, + Peruvian Prime Minister from + January 31, 1973, until February 1, 1975 + + + Merino Castro, Jose + Toribio + , Admiral, Delegate of the Chilean + military junta from September 11, 1973, until June 27, 1974 + + + Meyer, + Armin + , Special Assistant to the Secretary + and Coordinator for Combating Terrorism from March 1973 + + + Meyers, Donald + F. + , Industrial and Strategic Materials + Division, Bureau of Economic and Business Affairs, Department of + State, until July 1974 + + + Michel, James + H. + , Deputy Assistant Legal Adviser for + Politico-Military Affairs from October 1973 + + + Michelini, + Zelmar + , Former Uruguayan Senator + + + Miles, Richard + M. + , Office of Soviet Union Affairs, Bureau + of European Affairs, Department of State, from July 1973 until July + 1975; Political Officer, U.S. Embassy in Moscow, from June + 1976 + + + Miller, Dudley + W. + , Deputy Executive Secretary for + Management, Office of the Secretariat Staff, Department of State, + until July 1974 + + + Morales Bermúdez, + Francisco + , General, Peruvian Prime Minister + from February 1, 1975, until August 30, 1975; President of Peru from + August 30, 1975 + + + Morgan, Thomas + E. + , Member, U.S. House of Representatives + (D-Pennsylvania) + + + Mozeleski, Daniel + J. + , Planning Officer, National Security + Council Staff for Planning and Coordination, from January 1976 + + + + + + + + Nguyen, Van + Thieu + , President of the Republic of Vietnam + (South Vietnam) until April 21, 1975 + + + Nieburg, Patrick + E. + , Deputy Assistant Director for Latin + America, U.S. Information Agency, from August 1973 until July 1975; + Public Affairs Adviser from July 1975 until June 1976 + + + Niehous, William + F. + , Managing Director and Vice President, + Owens-Illinois Venezuelan Group, from 1973 + + + Nixon, Richard + M. + , President of the United States from + January 20, 1969, until August 9, 1974 + + + Nosenzo, Louis V. + N. + , Director of the Office of Nuclear Policy + and Operations, Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs, Department of + State, from 1975 + + + + + + + Oplinger, Gerald + G. + , Deputy Director, Office of Atomic Energy + and Aerospace, Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs, Department of + State, from 1973 until 1975; Office of Nuclear Policy and + Operations, Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs, Department of + State, from 1975; Director, Office of Nuclear Policy and Operations, + Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs, Department of State, from March + 1976 + + + Orfila, Alejandro + José Luis + , Argentine Ambassador to the + United States from November 1973 until May 1975; Secretary General, + Organization of American States, from May 17, 1975 + + + Ortiz, Frank Vincent, + Jr., + Deputy Chief of Mission, U.S. Embassy + in Uruguay, from September 1973; Country Director for Argentina, + Paraguay, and Uruguay, until 1975 + + + Ortíz Mena, + Antonio + , President of the Inter-American + Development Bank + + + + + + + Pace, Robert + S., + Political Officer, U.S. Embassy in La + Paz, from June 1973 until July 1975; Office of Chilean and Bolivia + Affairs, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, Department of State, from + July 1975 + + + + Palmer, Ronald + D. + , Deputy Coordinator for Human Rights, + Office of the Coordinator for Humanitarian Affairs, Department of + State, from 1976 + + + Parker, + Daniel + , Administrator of the Agency for + International Development from October 21, 1973 + + + Parker, + David + , Special Assistant to the President, + Appearances and Scheduling, from 1973 until July 1974 + + + Parsky, + Gerald + , Executive Assistant to the Deputy + Secretary of the Treasury and Administrator, Federal Energy Office, + from 1973 until 1974; Assistant Secretary of the Treasury from 1974 + until 1977 + + + Pastrana Borrero, + Misael Eduardo + , President of Colombia from + August 7, 1970, until August 7, 1974 + + + Peet, + Ray + , Vice Admiral, USN; Director of Defense + Security Assistance Agency, Department of Defense, until July 1974; + Acting Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Affairs from + January 6, 1974, until April 1, 1974 + + + Pell, Claiborne de + Borda + , Senator (D-Rhode Island) + + + Pereda Asbún, + Juan + , Bolivian Minister of Interior from May + 1975 + + + Pérez Caldas, + José + , Uruguayan Ambassador to the United + States from November 1974 + + + Pérez, Carlos + Andrés + , President of Venezuela from March + 12, 1974 + + + Pérez La Salvia, + Hugo + , Venezuelan Minister of Mines and + Petroleum from 1973 + + + Perón, Isabel + Martinez de + , Vice President of Argentina + from October 12, 1973, until July 1, 1974; President from July 1, + 1974, until March 24, 1976 + + + Perón, Juan + Domingo + , President of Argentina from October + 12, 1973, until July 1, 1974 + + + Pezzullo, Lawrence + A. + , Deputy Director, Office of Central + American Affairs, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, Department of + State from 1973; Special Assistant to Ambassador at Large McCloskey, + until June 1974; Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for + Congressional Relations from February 1975 + + + Phillips, David + Atlee + , Chief, Western Hemisphere Division, + Central Intelligence Agency, from 1973 + + + Pickering, + Thomas + , Executive Secretary, Department of + State, from July 20, 1973, until January 31, 1974; U.S. Ambassador + to Jordan from March 2, 1974 + + + Pinheiro, João + Baptista, + Brazilian Ambassador to the United + States from 1976 + + + Pinochet Ugarte, + Augusto + , General, Chairman of the Chilean + military junta from September 11, 1973; President of Chile from + 1974 + + + Polik, + William + , Industrial and Strategic Materials + Division, Office of International Commodities, International + Resources and Food Policy, Bureau of Economic and Business Affairs, + Department of State, from 1973 until August 1976; Commercial + Officer, Economic Division, U.S. Embassy in Mexico City, from August + 1976 + + + Pope, Donald + B. + , Publications Division, Office of Public + Affairs, Agency for International Development, from 1974 until 1976; + Office of Development Programs, Bureau for Latin America, Agency for + International Development from 1976 + + + Popper, David + Henry + , U.S. Ambassador to Cyprus, until May + 31, 1973; Assistant Secretary of State for International + Organizations from June 25, 1973, until January 3, 1974; U.S. + Ambassador to Chile from February 22, 1974 + + + Portella, + Petronio + , President of Aliança Renovadora Nacional (ARENA), Brazil; Member of the + Brazilian Senate from 1974 + + + Porter, William + J. + , Under Secretary of State for Political + Affairs from February 2, 1973, until February 18, 1974 + + + Prieto, + Gonzalo + , Chilean Minister of Justice from + 1973 + + + Pringle, Sandy + M. + , Director, Office of Ecuadorian and + Peruvian Affairs, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, Department of + State, from 1973 until 1974 + + + Proper, Datus + C. + , Assistant Director for Policy Analysis, + Office of Policy Planning and Coordination, Bureau of Inter-American + Affairs, Department of State, from 1975 until 1976; + Officer-in-Charge of Policy Planning, Office of Planning, Public, + and Congressional Affairs, Department of State, from 1976 + + + + Puig, Juan + Carlos + , Argentine Foreign Minister from May + 25, 1973, until July 13, 1973 + + + + + + + Queirolo, Luis + V. + , General, Uruguayan Army Chief of + Staff + + + Quigg, + Stuart, + Colonel, Office of Policy Planning + and Coordination, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, Department of + State, from 1974 until 1976; Office of Regional Political Programs + from 1976 + + + Quijano, + Raúl + , Argentine Foreign Minister from + January 19, 1976, until March 24, 1976 + + + + + + + Raoul-Duval, + Michael + , Associate Director, Domestic + Council from May 1974 until October 1975; Assistant to the Counselor + to the President, from October 1975 until April 14, 1976; Special + Counsel to the President, from April 14, 1976 + + + Ratliff, Rob + Roy + , member, National Security Council Staff + and Executive Secretary of the 40 Committee from 1973 + + + Ravenna, + Walter + , Uruguayan Minister of Defense + + + Richardson, Elliot + R. + , Member of the White House Council on + International Economic Policy until 1973; Secretary of Defense from + January 30, 1973, until May 24, 1973; Adviser to the President from + June 1973 until February, 1974; Attorney General from May 24, 1973, + until October 20, 1973; U.S. Ambassador to the United Kingdom, from + March 21, 1975, until January 16, 1976; Secretary of Commerce from + 1976 + + + Rivero, + Horacio + , U.S. Ambassador to Spain until + November 26, 1974 + + + Robinson, Charles + W. + , Under Secretary of State for Economic + and Agricultural Affairs from January 3, 1975, until April 9, 1976; + Deputy Secretary of State from April 7, 1976 + + + Roca-Zela, Manuel + A. + , Minister-Counselor, Peruvian Embassy to + the United States, from 1973 until 1975 + + + Rodman, Peter + W. + , Special Assistant to the Assistant to + the President from August 1974 + + + Rogers, William + D. + , Assistant Secretary of State for + Inter-American Affairs from October 7, 1974, until June 18, 1976; + Under Secretary of State for Economic and Agricultural Affairs from + June 18, 1976, until December 31, 1976 + + + Rogers, William + P. + , Secretary of State from January 22, + 1969, until September 3, 1973; member, White House Council on + International Economic Policy until 1973; + + + Rogovin, + Mitchell + , Special Counsel to the Director of + Central Intelligence from 1975 + + + Rosson, William + B., + General, USA; Commander in Chief, + Southern Command, from January 1973 until July 1975 + + + Rountree, William + R. + , U.S. Ambassador to Brazil until May 30, + 1973 + + + Rumsfeld, Donald + H. + , U.S. Permanent Representative to NATO + from February 2, 1973 until December 5, 1974; White House Chief of + Staff from September 1974 until November 1975; Secretary of Defense + from November 20, 1975 + + + Runyon, Charles + III + , Assistant Legal Adviser for Human + Rights, Department of State + + + Rush, + Kenneth + , Deputy Secretary of State from + February 2, 1973, until May 29, 1974; Secretary of State ad interim + from September 3, 1973, until September 22, 1973; Chair, White House + Council on International Economic Policy from 1974 until 1975; U.S. + Ambassador to France from November 21, 1974 + + + Ryan, Hewson + A. + , U.S. Ambassador to Honduras until May + 30, 1973; Information Career Minister, U.S. Information Agency; + Fletcher School for Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University, from July + 1973 until March 1975; Senior Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau of + Inter-American Affairs, Department of State, from March 1975 + + + + + + + Saccio, Leonard + J. + , U.S. Ambassador to Colombia until July + 12, 1973 + + + Saenz, + Orlando + , Chilean Economic Adviser, Foreign + Ministry from 1973 + + + Sáez Sáez, + Raúl + , Chilean Minister of Economic + Coordination from 1975 + + + Sapena Pastor, + Raúl, + Paraguayan Foreign Minister until + March 8, 1976 + + + Saunders, Harold + H. + , member, National Security Council Staff, + until 1974; Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and + South Asian Affairs from 1974 until December 1975; Assistant + Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs from + December 1975 until 1976; Director, Bureau of Intelligence and + Research Department of State, from December 1, 1975 + + + + Scali, + John + , Special Consultant to the President, until + 1973; Permanent Representative to the United Nations, from 1973 + until 1975 + + + Schacht Aristiguieta, + Efraín + , Venezuelan Foreign Minister from + 1974 + + + Schlesinger, James + R. + , Director of Central Intelligence from + February 2, 1973, until July 2, 1973; Secretary of Defense from July + 2, 1973, until November 19, 1975 + + + Schmults, + Edward + , Deputy Counsel to the + President + + + Schwab, Philip + R. + , Assistant Director, Office of Brazilian + Affairs, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, Department of State, from + 1974; Deputy Director, Agency for International Development, Bogotá, + from December 1974 + + + Schwebel, + Stephen + , Deputy Legal Advisor, Department of + State, from 1974 + + + Scowcroft, + Brent + , Major General, USAF; Deputy Assistant + to the President for National Security Affairs from 1973 until + November 3, 1975; Assistant to the President for National Security + Affairs from November 3, 1975 + + + Seamans, Robert C., + Jr. + , Secretary of the U.S. Air Force until + May, 14, 1973; President of the National Academy of Engineering from + May 1973 until December 1974; Director of the Energy Research and + Development Administration from December 1974 + + + Seidman, L. + William + , Assistant to the President for + Economic Affairs and Executive Director of the Economic Policy Board + from 1974 + + + Shlaudeman, Harry + W. + , Deputy Chief of Mission and Counselor, + U.S. Embassy in Santiago, until 1973; Deputy Assistant Secretary of + State for Inter-American Affairs from 1973 until 1975; U.S. + Ambassador to Venezuela from May 9, 1975, until May 14, 1976; + Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs from May 14, + 1976 + + + Shugart, Thomas H., + Jr. + , Commercial Officer, U.S. Consulate in + Munich, until July 1975; Office of Brazilian Affairs, Bureau of + Inter-American Affairs, Department of State, from July 1975 + + + Shultz, George + P. + , Secretary of the Treasury until April + 17, 1974 + + + Silveira, Antônio + Francisco Azeredo da + , Brazilian Minister of + Foreign Affairs from 1974 + + + Simon, William + E. + , Deputy Secretary of the Treasury from + May 1974; Secretary of the Treasury from May 1974; Chairman, White + House Council on International Economic Policy, from 1975 + + + Simons, Thomas W., + Jr. + , Office of Disarmament and Arms Control, + Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs, Department of State, from 1973 + until 1974; Policy Planning Staff, Department of State, from + 1974 + + + Simonsen, Mário + Henrique + , Brazilian Minister of Finance from + 1975 + + + Siracusa, Ernest + V. + , U.S. Ambassador to Bolivia until July + 30, 1973; U.S. Ambassador to Uruguay from September 27, 1973 + + + Sisco, Joseph + J. + , Assistant Secretary of State for Near + East and South Asian Affairs until February 18, 1974; Under + Secretary of State for Political Affairs from February 19, 1974 + until June 30, 1976 + + + Smith, + David + , Bureau of Intelligence and Research, + Department of State, from 1976 + + + Sneider, Richard + L. + , Deputy Assistant Secretary of State, + Bureau of East Asian Affairs, until September 1974; U.S. Ambassador + to South Korea from September 1974 + + + Sober, + Sidney + , Chargé d’Affaires ad interim, U.S. + Embassy in Islamabad, until December 1973; Deputy Assistant + Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs from + January 1974 + + + Solzhenitsyn, + Aleksandr I. + , Russian novelist, playwright, + and historian + + + Sonnenfeldt, + Helmut + , member, National Security Council + Staff, until January 1974; Counselor of the Department of State from + 1974 until 1976. + + + Sorenson, Roger + A. + , Deputy Chief of Mission-Counselor, U.S. + Embassy in Dublin, until August 1974; Foreign Service Institute from + August 1974 to June 1975; Special Assistant to the Under Secretary + of State for Economic Affairs from June 1975 + + + Springsteen, George + S., Jr. + , Acting Assistant Secretary of State + until August 1973; Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European + Affairs from August 1973 until January 1974; Special Assistant to + the Secretary and Executive Secretary of the Department of State, + from January 31, 1974, until July 14, 1976; Director of the Foreign + Service Institute from July 14, 1976 + + + + Stearns, + Monteagle + , Bureau of Asian and Pacific + Affairs, Department of State, from 1973 + + + Stedman, William + Perry, Jr. + , Director, Office of Argentina, + Paraguay, and Uruguay, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, Department + of State; U.S. Ambassador to Bolivia from October 3, 1973 + + + Stern, + Thomas + , Deputy Director, Bureau of + Politico-Military Affairs, from December 1973 until July 1976; + Deputy Chief of Mission-Minister-Counselor, U.S. Embassy in Seoul, + from July 1976 + + + Sternfeld, + R. + , member, Council on International + Economic Policy + + + Stockman, Charles + J. + , Deputy Director, Office of North Coast + Affairs, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, Department of State, + until September 1973; Assistant Director, Office of Development + Resources, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, Department of State, + from September 1973 until February 1976; Associate Director, Agency + for International Development, U.S. Embassy in La Paz, from February + 1973 + + + Strasser, Daniel + A. + , Political Officer, U.S. Consulate in Rio + de Janeiro, to August 1974; Political Officer, U.S. Embassy in + Bógota, from August 1974 to September 1974; Country Officer for + Dominican Republic, from 1974; Staff, Office of Caribbean Affairs, + as of April 1976 + + + Stroessner Matiauda, + Alfredo + , General, President of + Paraguay + + + Sullivan, Leonor + K. + , Member, U.S. House of Representatives + (D-Missouri) + + + Summ, Godfrey + H. + , Office of Research and Analysis for + American Republics, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department + of State, from 1976 + + + Swift, Elizabeth + Ann + , Chief of Southeast Asian Programs, + Office of East Asian and Pacific Programs, Bureau of Educational and + Cultural Affairs, Department of State, until May 1974; Office of + Philippine Relations, Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, from + May 1974 until February 1976; Legislative Officer for Human Rights + and MIAs, East Asian Affairs, Office of Congressional Relations, + Department of State, from February 1976 + + + Szabo, + Daniel + , Deputy Assistant Secretary of State + for Inter-American Affairs (Economic Policy) from 1974 + + + + + + + Tarr, Curtis + W. + , Under Secretary of State for + International Security Affairs until November 25, 1973 + + + Theis, + Paul + , Executive Editor, White House Editorial + Staff, from 1975 + Thieu, see Nguyen Van Thieu + + + Trucco Gaete, + Manuel + , Chilean Representative to the + Inter-American Committee on the Alliance for Progress until February + 1974; Chilean Ambassador to the Organization of American States from + February 1974 until February 1975; Chilean Ambassador to the United + States from March 1975 + + + + + + + Vadora, Julio + C. + , General, Commander in Chief of the + Uruguayan Army from 1974 + + + Vaky, Viron + P. + , U.S. Ambassador to Costa Rica from + September 11, 1972, until February 9, 1974; U.S. Ambassador to + Colombia from April 5, 1974, until June 23, 1976; U.S. Ambassador to + Venezuela from July 26, 1976, until June 24, 1978 + + + Vallimarescu, + Serban + , member, National Security Council + staff + + + Vance, Sheldon + B. + , U.S. Ambassador to Zaire (Democratic + Republic of the Congo) until March 26, 1974; Special Assistant to + the Secretary of State for Narcotics Matters from 1974 + + + Vargas Prieto, + Oscar + , General, Peruvian Prime Minister from + August 30, 1975, until January 31, 1976 + + + Vázquez Carrizosa, + Alfredo + , Colombian Minister of Foreign + Affairs until 1974 + + + Velasco Alvarado, + Juan + , General, President of the + Revolutionary Government of Peru until August 30, 1975 + + + + Vest, George + S. + , Special Assistant to the Secretary of + State for Press Relations until December 1973; Director, Bureau of + Politico-Military Affairs, Department of State, from December + 1973 + + + Videla, Jorge + Rafaél + , Brigadier General, Chair of the + Argentine military junta and President of Argentina from March 24, + 1976 + + + Vignes, Alberto + Juan + , Argentine Minister of Foreign Affairs + from July 13, 1973, until August 11, 1975 + + + Vine, Richard + D. + , Director, Office of West European + Affairs, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State, until + November 1974; Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European + Affairs from November 1974 + + + + + + + Waldheim, + Kurt + , Secretary-General of the United + Nations + + + Walters, Vernon + A. + , Lieutenant General, Acting Director of + Central Intelligence from July 2, 1973, until September 4, 1973; + Deputy Director of Central Intelligence from September 4, 1973, + until July 31, 1976 + + + Wampler, Mary + E. + , Special Assistant to the Deputy + Administrator, Office of the Administrator, Agency for International + Development, until April 1975; Director Office of International + Narcotics Control, Bureau of Program and Management Services, from + April 1975 + + + Watson, Alexander + F. + , Office of Brazilian Affairs, Bureau of + Inter-American Affairs, Department of State, from July 1973 until + May 1975; Special Assistant for Legislative Matters and Public + Affairs, Office of the Assistant Secretary of State for Economic and + Business Affairs, from May 1975. + + + Weber, Richard + F. + , Deputy Director, Office of Ecuadorian + and Peruvian Affairs, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, Department + of State, until September 1976; Director, Office of South American + Affairs, Bureau for Latin America, Agency for International + Development, from September 1976 + + + Weintraub, + Sidney + , Assistant Secretary of State for + International Finance and Development until 1974; Assistant + Administrator, Agency for International Development, from + 1975 + + + Weiss, + Seymour + , Assistant Secretary of State for + Politico-Military Affairs from August 6, 1973, until January 17, + 1974; U.S. Ambassador to the Bahamas from September 11, 1974, until + December 15, 1976 + + + White, + Robert + , Deputy Permanent Representative to + the Organization of American States from 1976 + + + Williams, Albert + Norman + , Counselor, Political Affairs, U.S. + Embassy in Santo Domingo until July 1974; Assistant Director, + Political Military Affairs, Office of Planning and Coordination, + Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, Department of State, from July + 1974 until August 1976 + + + Wilson, James M., + Jr. + , Special Assistant to the Assistant + Secretary of State from February 1972; U.S. Representative for + Micronesian status negotiations from November 1972; Coordinator for + Humanitarian Affairs, Department of State, from October 1975; + Assistant Secretary of State for Human Rights and Humanitarian + Affairs from November 17, 1976 + + + Wilson, Simon + N. + , Inter-American Organizations Adviser, + Alternate U.S. Representative to the Organization of American + States, and Deputy U.S. Permanent Representative, U.S. Permanent + Mission to the Organization of American States, Bureau of + Inter-American Affairs, from 1973 + + + Wilson, Thomas + F. + , Consular Officer, U.S. Embassy in + Port-au-Prince, from April 1973 + + + Wolfe, Geoffrey + E. + , Office of Monetary Affairs, + International Finance and Development, Bureau of Economic and + Business Affairs, from September 1973 until January 1974; Office of + OECD European Community and Atlantic Political-Economic Affairs, + Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State, from July + 1974 + + + + Wood, Dennis + M. + , Executive Assistant to the Under + Secretary of State for Economic Affairs from 1975 + + + Woods, Ronald + E. + , Director, Office of the Secretariat + Staff Department of State, from July 1974 until August 1976; Deputy + Director, Office of Northern European Affairs, Bureau of European + Affairs, Department of State, from August 1976 + + + + + + + Yofre, + Ricardo + , Argentine Under Secretary General, + Office of the Presidency, from April 1976 + + + + + + + Zimmermann, Robert + W. + , Country Director for Brazil, Department + of State, from October 1974; Director, Office of East Coast Affairs, + Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, Department of State, from October + 1976 + + + Zweifel, David + E. + , Political Officer, U.S. Embassy in + Mexico City until 1974; Deputy Chief of Mission, U.S. Embassy in + Muscat, from 1974 + + + +
+ +
+ + Note on U.S. Covert Actions +

In compliance with the Foreign Relations of the United + States statute that requires inclusion in the Foreign + Relations series of comprehensive documentation on major foreign policy + decisions and actions, the editors have identified key documents regarding major + covert actions and intelligence activities. The following note will provide + readers with some organizational context on how covert actions and special + intelligence operations in support of U.S. foreign policy were planned and + approved within the U.S. Government. It describes, on the basis of + :mbdeclassified :mxdocuments, the changing and developing procedures during the + Truman, Eisenhower, Kennedy, Johnson, Nixon, and Ford + Presidencies.

+ +

Management of Covert Actions in the Truman Presidency

+

The Truman administration’s concern over Soviet “psychological warfare” prompted + the new National Security Council to authorize, in NSC 4–A of December 1947, the launching of peacetime covert action + operations. NSC 4–A made the Director of + Central Intelligence responsible for psychological warfare, establishing at the + same time the principle that covert action was an exclusively Executive Branch + function. The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) + certainly was a natural choice but it was assigned this function at least in + part because the Agency controlled unvouchered funds, by which operations could + be funded with minimal risk of exposure in Washington. + NSC 4–A, December 17, + 1947, is printed in + Foreign Relations, 1945–1950, Emergence of the Intelligence + Establishment, Document 257. +

+

The CIA’s early use of its new covert action + mandate dissatisfied officials at the Departments of State and Defense. The + Department of State, believing this role too important to be left to the CIA alone and concerned that the military might + create a new rival covert action office in the Pentagon, pressed to reopen the + issue of where responsibility for covert action activities should reside. + Consequently, on June 18, 1948, a new NSC + directive, NSC 10/2, superseded NSC 4–A.

+

+ NSC 10/2 directed the CIA to conduct “covert” rather than merely “psychological” + operations, defining them as all activities “which are conducted or sponsored by + this Government against hostile foreign states or groups or in support of + friendly foreign states or groups but which are so planned and executed that any + US Government responsibility for them is not evident to unauthorized persons and + that if uncovered the US Government + can plausibly disclaim any responsibility for them.”

+

The type of clandestine activities enumerated under the new directive included: + “propaganda; economic warfare; preventive direct action, including sabotage, + demolition and evacuation measures; subversion against hostile states, including + assistance to underground resistance movements, guerrillas and refugee + liberations [sic] groups, and support of indigenous + anti-Communist elements in threatened countries of the free world. Such + operations should not include armed conflict by recognized military forces, + espionage, counter-espionage, and cover and deception for military + operations.” + NSC 10/2, June 18, 1948, is printed ibid., Document 292. +

+

The Office of Policy Coordination (OPC), newly established in the CIA on September 1, 1948, in accordance with + NSC 10/2, assumed responsibility for + organizing and managing covert actions. The OPC, which was to take its guidance + from the Department of State in peacetime and from the military in wartime, + initially had direct access to the State Department and to the military without + having to proceed through the CIA’s + administrative hierarchy, provided the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) was informed of all important projects and + decisions.Memorandum of conversation by Frank + G. Wisner, “Implementation of NSC–10/2,” August 6, 1948, is printed ibid., + Document 298. In 1950 this arrangement + was modified to ensure that policy guidance came to the OPC through the DCI.

+

During the Korean conflict the OPC grew quickly. Wartime commitments and other + missions soon made covert action the most expensive and bureaucratically + prominent of the CIA’s activities. Concerned + about this situation, DCI Walter Bedell Smith + in early 1951 asked the NSC for enhanced policy + guidance and a ruling on the proper “scope and magnitude” of CIA operations. The White House responded with two + initiatives. In April 1951 President Truman created the Psychological Strategy + Board (PSB) under the NSC to coordinate + government-wide psychological warfare strategy. NSC 10/5, issued in October 1951, reaffirmed the covert action + mandate given in NSC 10/2 and expanded the + CIA’s authority over guerrilla + warfare. + NSC + 10/5, “Scope and Pace of Covert Operations,” October 23, 1951, is printed in + + Foreign + Relations, 1950–1955, The Intelligence Community, Document + 90. The PSB was soon abolished by the incoming Eisenhower + administration, but the expansion of the CIA’s + covert action writ in NSC 10/5 helped ensure + that covert action would remain a major function of the Agency.

+

As the Truman administration ended, the CIA was + near the peak of its independence and authority in the field of covert action. + Although the CIA continued to seek and receive + advice on specific projects from + the NSC, the PSB, and the departmental + representatives originally delegated to advise the OPC, no group or officer + outside of the DCI and the President himself + had authority to order, approve, manage, or curtail operations.

+ +

+ NSC 5412 Special Group; + 5412/2 Special Group; 303 Committee

+

The Eisenhower administration began narrowing the CIA’s latitude in 1954. In accordance with a series of National + Security Council directives, the responsibility of the Director of Central + Intelligence for the conduct of covert operations was further clarified. + President Eisenhower approved NSC 5412 on March + 15, 1954, reaffirming the Central Intelligence Agency’s responsibility for + conducting covert actions abroad. A definition of covert actions was set forth; + the DCI was made responsible for coordinating + with designated representatives of the Secretary of State and the Secretary of + Defense to ensure that covert operations were planned and conducted in a manner + consistent with U.S. foreign and military policies; and the Operations + Coordinating Board was designated the normal channel for coordinating support + for covert operations among State, Defense, and the CIA. Representatives of the Secretary of State, the Secretary of + Defense, and the President were to be advised in advance of major covert action + programs initiated by the CIA under this policy + and were to give policy approval for such programs and secure coordination of + support among the Departments of State and Defense and the CIA.William M. + Leary, editor, The Central Intelligence Agency: History + and Documents (University of Alabama Press, 1984), p. 63; for text + of NSC 5412, see + Foreign Relations, + 1950–1955, The Intelligence Community, Document 171. +

+

A year later, on March 12, 1955, NSC 5412/1 was + issued, identical to NSC 5412 except for + designating the Planning Coordination Group as the body responsible for + coordinating covert operations. NSC 5412/2 of + December 28, 1955, assigned to representatives (of the rank of assistant + secretary) of the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, and the + President responsibility for coordinating covert actions. By the end of the + Eisenhower administration, this group, which became known as the “NSC 5412/2 Special Group” or simply “Special + Group,” emerged as the executive body to review and approve covert action + programs initiated by the CIA.Leary, The Central Intelligence Agency: + History and Documents, pp. 63, 147–48; Final + Report of the Select Committee To Study Governmental Operations With + Respect to Intelligence Activities, United States Senate, Book I, + Foreign and Military Intelligence (1976), pp. + 50–51. For texts of NSC 5412/1 and NSC 5412/2, see + Foreign Relations, + 1950–1955, The Intelligence Community, Documents 212 and 250. The membership of the + Special Group varied depending upon the situation faced. Meetings were + infrequent until 1959 when weekly meetings began to be held. Neither the CIA nor the Special Group adopted fixed criteria + for bringing projects before the group; initiative remained with the CIA, as + members representing other agencies frequently were unable to judge the + feasibility of particular projects.Leary, The + Central Intelligence Agency: History and Documents, p. 63 +

+

After the Bay of Pigs failure in April 1961, General Maxwell Taylor reviewed U.S. + paramilitary capabilities at President Kennedy’s request and submitted a report in June that + recommended strengthening high-level direction of covert operations. As a result + of the Taylor Report, the Special Group, chaired by the President’s Special + Assistant for National Security Affairs McGeorge Bundy, and including Deputy + Under Secretary of State U. Alexis Johnson, Deputy Secretary of Defense Roswell + Gilpatric, Director of Central Intelligence Allen Dulles, and Chairman of the + Joint Chiefs of Staff General Lyman Lemnitzer, assumed greater responsibility + for planning and reviewing covert operations. Until 1963 the DCI determined whether aCIA-originated project was submitted to the Special Group. In 1963 + the Special Group developed general but informal criteria, including risk, + possibility of success, potential for exposure, political sensitivity, and cost + (a threshold of $25,000 was adopted by the CIA), for determining whether covert action projects were submitted to + the Special Group.Ibid., p. 82. +

+

From November 1961 to October 1962 a Special Group (Augmented), whose membership + was the same as the Special Group plus Attorney General Robert Kennedy and + General Taylor (as Chairman), exercised responsibility for Operation Mongoose, a + major covert action program aimed at overthrowing the Castro regime in Cuba. + When President Kennedy authorized the + program in November, he designated Brigadier General Edward G. Lansdale, + Assistant for Special Operations to the Secretary of Defense, to act as chief of + operations, and Lansdale coordinated the Mongoose activities among the CIA and the Departments of State and Defense. The + CIA units in Washington and Miami had + primary responsibility for implementing Mongoose operations, which included + military, sabotage, and political propaganda programs.See + Foreign Relations, 1961–1963, volume X, Cuba, 1961–1962, + Documents 270 and 278. +

+

President Kennedy also established a + Special Group (Counter-Insurgency) on January 18, 1962, when he signed NSAM No. + 124. The Special Group (CI), set up to coordinate counter-insurgency activities + separate from the mechanism for implementing NSC 5412/2, was to confine itself to establishing broad policies + aimed at preventing and resisting subversive insurgency and other forms of + indirect aggression in friendly countries. In early 1966, in NSAM No. 341, + President Johnson assigned + responsibility for the direction and coordination of counter-insurgency + activities overseas to the Secretary of State, who established a Senior + Interdepartmental Group to assist in discharging these responsibilities.*For text of NSAM No. 124, see ibid., volume VIII, National Security Policy, + Document 68. NSAM No. 341, March 2, 1966, is printed ibid., 1964–1968, volume XXXIII, Organization and + Management of U.S. Foreign Policy; United Nations, Document + 56. +

+

NSAM No. 303, June 2, 1964, from Bundy to the Secretaries of State and Defense + and the DCI, changed the name of “Special Group + 5412” to “303 Committee” but did not alter its composition, functions, or + responsibility. Bundy was the chairman of the 303 Committee.For text of NSAM No. 303, see ibid., Document 204. +

+

The Special Group and the 303 Committee approved 163 covert actions during the + Kennedy administration and 142 + during the Johnson administration through February 1967. The 1976 Final Report + of the Church Committee, however, estimated that of the several thousand + projects undertaken by the CIA since 1961, only + 14 percent were considered on a case-by-case basis by the 303 Committee and its + predecessors (and successors). Those not reviewed by the 303 Committee were + low-risk and low-cost operations. The Final Report also cited a February 1967 + CIA memorandum that included a description + of the mode of policy arbitration of decisions on covert actions within the 303 + Committee system. The CIA presentations were + questioned, amended, and even on occasion denied, despite protests from the + + DCI + . + Department of State objections modified or nullified proposed operations, and + the 303 Committee sometimes decided that some agency other than the CIA should undertake an operation or that CIA actions requested by Ambassadors on the scene + should be rejected. + Final + Report of the Select Committee To Study Governmental Operations With + Respect to Intelligence Activities, United States Senate, Book I, + Foreign and Military Intelligence, pp. 56–57. +

+

The effectiveness of covert action has always been difficult for any + administration to gauge, given concerns about security and the difficulty of + judging the impact of U.S. initiatives on events. In October 1969 the new Nixon + administration required annual 303 Committee reviews for all covert actions that + the Committee had approved and automatic termination of any operation not + reviewed after 12 months. On February 17, 1970, President Nixon signed National + Security Decision Memorandum 40,For text of + NSDM 40, see + Foreign Relations, + 1969–1976, volume II, Organization and Management of U.S. Foreign + Policy, 1969–1972, Document 203. which superseded NSC 5412/2 and changed the name of the covert + action approval group to the 40 Committee, in part because the 303 Committee had + been named in the media. The Attorney General was also added to the membership + of the Committee. NSDM 40 reaffirmed the DCI’s responsibility for the coordination, control, and conduct of + covert operations and directed him to obtain policy approval from the 40 + Committee for all major and “politically sensitive” covert operations. He was + also made responsible for ensuring an annual review by the 40 Committee of all + approved covert operations.

+

The 40 Committee met regularly early in the Nixon administration, but over time + the number of formal meetings declined and business came to be conducted via + couriers and telephone votes. The Committee actually met only for major new + proposals. As required, the DCI submitted + annual status reports to the 40 Committee for each approved operation. According + to the 1976 Church Committee Final Report, the 40 Committee considered only + about 25 percent of the CIA’s individual covert + action projects, concentrating on major projects that provided broad policy + guidelines for all covert actions. Congress received briefings on only a few + proposed projects. Not all major operations, moreover, were brought before the + 40 Committee: President Nixon in 1970 + instructed the DCI to promote a coup d’etat + against Chilean President Salvador + Allende without Committee coordination or approval. + Final Report of the Select Committee To + Study Governmental Operations With Respect to Intelligence + Activities, United States Senate, Book I, Foreign and Military + Intelligence, pp. 54–55, 57. +

+ +

Presidential Findings Since 1974 and the Operations + Advisory Group

+

The Hughes-Ryan amendment to the Foreign + Assistance Act of 1974 brought about a major change in the way the U.S. + Government approved covert actions, requiring explicit approval by the President + for each action and expanding Congressional oversight and control of the CIA. The CIA was + authorized to spend appropriated funds on covert actions only after the + President had signed a “finding” and informed Congress that the proposed + operation was important to national security.Public Law 93–559. +

+

Executive Order 11905, issued by President Ford on February 18, 1976, in the wake of major Congressional + investigations of CIA activities by the Church + and Pike Committees, replaced the 40 Committee with the Operations Advisory + Group, composed of the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs, the + Secretaries of State and Defense, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and + the + DCI + , who + retained responsibility for the planning and implementation of covert + operations. The OAG was required to hold formal meetings to develop + recommendations for the President regarding a covert action and to conduct + periodic reviews of previously-approved operations. EO 11905 also banned all + U.S. Government employees from involvement in political assassinations, a prohibition that was retained in + succeeding executive orders, and prohibited involvement in domestic intelligence + activities.Executive Order 11905, “United + States Foreign Intelligence Activities,” Weekly + Compilation of Presidential Documents, Vol. 12, No. 8, February 23, + 1976. +

+ + +
+ + + + +
+ Documents on South America, 1973–1976 + +
+ Argentina + +
+ 1. Memorandum From the Deputy Director for Plans of the Central + Intelligence Agency (Karamessines) to the President’s Assistant for National + Security Affairs (Kissinger) +

Summary: The CIA reported on + Argentina’s upcoming elections and recommended that the U.S. + Government maintain a policy of non intervention.

+

Source: National Security Council, Nixon Administration Intelligence Files, Subject + Files A–I, 5 February 1973. Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only. A copy + was sent to Meyer. + Forwarded to Jorden by + Ratliff under a + covering memorandum, February 5, in which Ratliff suggested that CIA’s memorandum be placed in the + 40 Committee files and not forwarded to Kissinger. Jorden concurred. In a March 2 + letter to the President, Ambassador Lodge stated he had “steadfastly remained aloof” + in the election. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential + Materials, NSC Files, Box 769, + Country Files, Latin America, Argentina, 1 September 1971–31 + December 1973)

+ + + + Washington, February 2, 1973. + + SUBJECT + The Argentine Elections + +

1. On 11 March 1973, elections will be held throughout Argentina for + municipal, provincial, and federal offices, including the presidency and + vice-presidency. The last such election in Argentina was held in 1963. + Out of a total of nine presidential candidates there are three principal + ones: Hector Campora, + hand-picked by Juan Perón to + carry the standard for the Justicialista Party, still the largest + political movement in Argentina seventeen years after Perón’s fall and exile to Spain; + Ricardo Balbin, the leader of the left-of-center Radical Civic Union, + the best organized party in Argentina; and Francisco Manrique, former + Minister of Social Welfare under President Alejandro Lanusse and the nominee of the Popular + Federalist Alliance, a coalition of a number of small right wing + political groups.

+ +

2. If a single candidate does not capture a majority of the votes on the + initial ballot, a run-off must be held within thirty days. If a run-off + is necessary, it is already scheduled for 8 April 1973. If the two top + candidates together obtain two-thirds of the votes cast, a run-off + election between them will be held. There is also a provision permitting + the Argentine Electoral Court to recognize, without recourse to a + run-off, the merger of two candidates representing at least two-thirds + of the votes cast on the initial ballot into a single + presidential/vice-presidential ticket. If the top two candidates + together do not receive two-thirds of the votes cast, they may form + alliances for a run-off with any presidential or vice-presidential + candidate who received at least fifteen percent of the total initial + vote. In forming these alliances, however, the presidential candidates + may not be changed, only the vice-presidential.

+

3. Our current estimate is that: (a) Campora, Perón’s + puppet candidate, will attain a plurality, but not win a majority of the + votes cast in the initial balloting; and (b) a run-off between Campora and, most probably, Balbin + will be required on 8 April. Though unlikely, we cannot completely + exclude a deal being made between Campora and one of the other candidates in an attempt to + win without a run-off.

+

4. Until quite recently, the Argentine military has steadfastly + maintained that should the Perónist candidate win this election, the + military would not permit him to take office. A report in late January + 1973 indicates that, under the pressure of Perónist political + maneuvering, the Argentine military would now accept Campora’s election subject to some + ground rules which would assure continuing military influence in various + governmental spheres.

+

5. Any political action on the part of the U.S. Government in the + Argentine elections would involve a relatively high-risk factor in the + present highly-charged, volatile political climate in Argentina. As a + result, it is proposed that the U.S. Government continue its current + policy of not intervening in the Argentine elections prior to 11 March + 1973. Reporting from Embassy [less than 1 line not + declassified] should permit us to monitor the electoral + situation closely and alert the 40 Committee to any significant + developments which might merit reconsideration of the present policy of + non-interference.

+ + + Thomas H. + Karamessines + + +
+ +
+ 2. Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the Department of State + (Eliot) to the President’s + Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) +

Summary: The Department of State reported on the outcome of + Argentina’s election and discussed implications for U.S. + policy.

+

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 769, Country Files, + Latin America, Argentina, 1 September 1971–31 December 1973. + Confidential. An April 13 CIA + memorandum observed that Cámpora intended to “follow the wishes + of Perón in every + important aspect of conducting the affairs of his government,” + making Perón “the de + facto President of Argentina.” (Central Intelligence Agency, + Office of the Director of Central Intelligence, Job 80M01066A: + ER Subject Files, Box 15, Folder 11: Executive Registry Subject + Files—1973 WH + Division/DDO)

+ + + + Washington, March + 13, 1973. + + SUBJECT + Peronista Candidate Campora Wins Presidential Election in + Argentina + +

Dr. Hector Campora, the Peronista + candidate, has been elected President of Argentina. Although not all the + votes have been counted, runner-up Ricardo Balbin, Radical Party + candidate, has conceded, having received less than half Campora’s vote. President Alejandro Lanusse on nationwide radio + and television announced Campora’s victory, although he stated the result must be + officially certified by the electoral court. A run-off vote probably + will not be held even though Campora may not have received the majority technically + required to win on the first balloting. The Peronistas also have won the + majority of the Chamber of Deputies, the Senate, and the provincial + governorships. The new civilian government will be inaugurated on May + 25.

+

+ Campora and his Peronista group + stated in the campaign that, if elected, they would accentuate state + participation in the economy, which is already at a high level. They + indicated that new foreign investment would have to provide new + technology and new employment and that foreign ownership of Argentine + banks would be ended. An increase in nationalistic rhetoric is + anticipated. Most of the foregoing was also espoused by Balbin and is to + a large degree an extension of present Argentine policies. In the + formation of policies, it is expected that Campora will take account of the views of the Radical + Party and keep a watch on military reactions. This should moderate any + extremist tendencies.

+

Argentina may seek to establish a stronger leadership role in the + hemisphere as a counter-poise to Brazil, its long-standing rival, and to + assert its independence of U.S. influence. Resumption of relations with + Cuba can be expected to come + fairly early in Campora’s + regime. Relations with Chile will probably continue as at present.

+

We do not now foresee that any U.S. business problems with the new + government will lead to crises in our official relations, although our + rapport will not be as good as it is now.

+

In the long term, a return to an elected government with all political + groups freely participating should lead to political stability, more + consistent economic and social policies, and the achievement of a more + significant role in hemispheric affairs.

+ + + Theodore L. + Eliot, Jr. + + +
+ +
+ 3. Telegram 106611 From the Department of State to the Embassy in + Argentina +

Summary: + President Cámpora, Foreign Minister Puig, and Secretary Rogers discussed nationalism and investment and + trade issues.

+

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, ORG 7 S. + Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Drafted by Neil Seidenman in OPR/LS and by Kubisch on June 1 and approved + in S. Rogers attended + President Cámpora’s inauguration.

+ + + + Washington, June 4, 1973, 1602Z. +

106611. Subject: Secvisit LA: Secretary’s + Meeting With President Campora, + May 26, 1973, 5:00 PM, President Campora’s Office.

+

1. Participants:

+

The President of Argentina

+

Foreign Minister Puig +

+

Jorge Mendez, Ministry of Foreign Affairs (in room as standby + interpreter)

+

Secretary of State, William P. + Rogers +

+

+ Jack B. Kubisch, Assistant + Secretary-Designate for Inter-American Affairs

+

Neil Seidenman, Interpreter

+

2. The Secretary began by saying he knew President Campora was in a very busy period and + that he did not want to take too much of the President’s time so soon + after his inauguration.

+

3. President Campora said that in + meetings like these, no time was ever lost, only time gained.

+ +

4. Secretary Rogers then + delivered a letter from President Nixon to President Campora, adding that there was no objection to + publishing the letter if President Campora wished.

+

5. President Campora said that he + would be glad to make it public if such were President Nixon’s desire. The Secretary + indicated that this would be entirely up to President Campora.

+

6. President Campora then asked + the Secretary what impressions he had gained from his trip which, + President Campora added, he + hoped was being fruitful.

+

7. The Secretary thanked the President for his good wishes. Before + replying to the President’s query, the Secretary said he wished to state + that he recognized the tremendous tasks which lay before the President + of a great country such as Argentina, and he wished to convey to the + President his congratulations and best wishes.

+

8. President Campora replied that + he felt honored by the Secretary’s congratulations, adding that he would + feel even more honored when the problems that faced him as President + were one day surmounted.

+

9. The Secretary went on to say that he considered his trip throughout + Latin America to be a successful one. It was clear to him that in Latin + America and particularly in Argentina there was a feeling of + nationalism, a feeling on the part of the individual countries that they + wished to do things for themselves and not to be dependent upon other + countries.

+

10. Campora remarked that he + agreed with the Secretary’s assessment. The feeling, in point of fact, + had been running for many years, but “obstacles” had repeatedly arisen + to prevent full realization of the peoples’ desire. Now the feeling was + taking on growing significance throughout the hemisphere.

+

11. The Secretary commented that this was of special interest to him. He + said that in his travels to all parts of the world he had observed that + nations that had grown and progressed possessed a tremendous drive of + their own to do so. Much had been said of “ideological pluralism.” This + was a natural thing because there were no two governments exactly alike + in the world.

+

12. President Campora remarked + that the important thing was that differences should not prevail among + the peoples of the world.

+

13. Secretary Rogers then + observed that even with differences, governments could have good + relations.

+

14. President Campora assured the + Secretary that such was the desire of the Argentine nation of which he + had the honor to serve as Chief Executive. Argentina’s desire was to + have a mutual understanding with all of the countries of the world. + However, international relations should also be shaped by a desire to + reduce the gross disparities + between countries. The President went on to say that in his view the + Argentina of today, following a difficult period of institution + building, had need of all the other countries of the world without + exception. But it was also true that the rest of the world needed + Argentina. He stressed that the need for reciprocity was essential, in + spiritual as well as non-spiritual matters.

+

15. The Secretary responded that such was also the wish of the U.S. He + hoped that it would be possible to bring about an improved climate in + the hemisphere because while countries had differences, if these + differences could be discussed in a friendly way, solutions could surely + be found. On the other hand, if there were consistent confrontation, + solutions would be harder to find.

+

16. President Campora stated that + in his administration, there would be no inclination to accentuate + differences. It would rather be to achieve convergence—a meeting of + minds. But within this posture, his government would be consistently + mindful of its mandate to achieve understanding with all governments on + the basis of the reciprocity that every nation deserves. To achieve + harmony on this basis, he said, would be the guiding light of the + government over which he had the honor to preside. On the other hand, + what Argentina could not accept, would be for outside interests + (“terceras posiciones”) to upset relationships between Argentina and + other countries of the world.

+

17. The Secretary said that such had been our policy for many other + countries in the world, including the Soviet Union. We thought we had + done a good job of reducing tensions in the world. The one thing that we + expected was to deal on the basis of mutual respect.

+

18. President Campora replied + that he recognized and appreciated that American policy had followed + these lines towards other countries, and especially in the Western + Hemisphere. He continued that as of May 25, the responsibility for + Argentine policy was in the hands of his administration. Previously such + responsibility had been with a different government. President Campora reemphasized that he agreed + with the Secretary’s statement with regard to the importance of + reciprocity and good will. This had always been a guideline for + Argentina. But starting May 25, this approach would be pursued with even + greater intensity.

+

19. At this point, President Campora begged the Secretary’s indulgence for a brief + moment so that he could accept a phone call which had just been put + through to him from the President of Brazil, who wished to convey his + congratulations.

+

20. While President Campora was + on the telephone, Foreign Minister Puig raised the matter of a possible revised approach + (not specified) on the part of the U.S. to economic relations with + Argentina, which he said he assumed would be implicit in the new foreign + policy orientation outlined by + Secretary Rogers. At this point + President Campora returned.

+

21. Making brief reference to the comments of the Foreign Minister, the + Secretary told President Campora + that the wish of the U.S. was to be able to discuss all matters in a + mature, businesslike way with all of the countries of Latin America. + Investment was a case in point. Sovereignty meant that a country had the + right to establish such rules as it might see fit. It would then be up + to investors to decide where to invest. The Secretary went on to say + that the U.S. was not particularly anxious to encourage investments + overseas, particularly in view of our balance of payments problems. + Large investments overseas tended to create problems in this context + because it took a long time for benefits or earnings from these + investments to return to the U.S. At the outset such investments, + therefore, meant a net outflow of money from the U.S., thus aggravating + the U.S. balance of payments problem. Secondly, the USG was not interested in promoting + investments in countries where such investments would not be helpful or + wanted. If a country did not want such investment, that was all right. + In fact, with so much demand for capital investment all over the world + today, investors had to decide whether to go to Indonesia, to Western + Europe, to Japan, Latin America, or elsewhere. For the USG it made little difference, except for + the burden we had to bear when countries blamed us for the behavior of + certain companies.

+

22. Turning to the matter that had been brought up by the Argentine + Foreign Minister, the Secretary went on to say he appreciated + Argentina’s problem with its trade deficit vis-à-vis the U.S. For this + reason, he was hopeful that it would be possible for the U.S. to extend + generalized preferences, which should be of some help. He added that the + U.S. was particularly sympathetic about such deficits inasmuch as the + U.S. had about the largest balance of payments deficit in the world. The + Secretary pointed out that the Foreign Minister had referred to + Argentina’s trade deficit with the U.S. However, the U.S. itself had a + trade deficit with Japan, and Argentina had a surplus trade balance with + Japan. Therefore, the Secretary said, the overall balance might not be + too unsatisfactory from Argentina’s point of view.

+

23. The Foreign Minister at this point countered good-humoredly that, + although what the Secretary had said might be true, in all seriousness + the accrued deficits in Argentina’s trade with the U.S. over the past 40 + to 50 years, involving billions of dollars, could not be offset by + Argentina’s present surplus with other countries.

+

24. The Secretary acknowledged the Minister’s comment. Recognizing that + time was limited, he indicated to the President that he wished to touch + upon one or two further points. These were (1) that the U.S. wanted to + have good relations with President Campora’s government, and President Nixon had personally asked the Secretary to convey this + to him. (2) The Secretary expressed the hope that it would be possible + for the two governments to hold private conversations at any time about + matters of mutual interest if necessary to forestall any potential + problems.

+

25. President Campora replied + that as the President of Argentina, he wished to pursue the same + objective as President Nixon, + and he wished to reciprocate the Secretary’s desire. President Campora went on to say that he thought + it might be a good thing for both countries to initiate the kind of + conversations suggested by Secretary Rogers, possibly through the medium of some kind of + working groups, in order to achieve the more thorough understandings + that both he and President Nixon + wanted. President Campora added + that, as the Secretary was also aware, very little of substance could be + accomplished in this kind of conversation between them with time so + short. That was why other meetings at appropriate levels could be + helpful in bringing about the results desired by both sides.

+

26. President Campora went on to + say that, speaking for his country, his wish was to have the best + possible relations with the U.S. He emphasized once more that such + relations must be pursued on the basis of mutual respect, harmony and + reciprocal benefit. He concluded by stating that he considered the visit + Secretary Rogers was paying him + on this day to be a good starting point for achieving increased + understanding, and he expressed the hope that further contacts at + appropriate levels could be started soon, consistent with this + objective.

+

27. Secretary Rogers expressed + agreement with the President, indicating that he considered the + President’s suggestion about working meetings to be most appropriate. He + assured the President that Assistant Secretary Kubisch would see that the U.S. side + was fully prepared to participate in such meetings.

+ + + Rogers + + +
+ +
+ 4. Telegram 4021 From the Embassy in Argentina to the Department of + State +

Summary: Lodge suggested + that U.S. officials make approaches to Juan Perón prior to and + immediately following his return to Argentina from Spain.

+

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL ARG–US. Secret; Immediate; + Nodis. In telegram 113357 to Buenos Aires, June 11, Kubisch authorized Lodge to set up a low-key + meeting with Perón, but + indicated that Nixon + would not write a letter to him as Lodge suggested. (Ibid.) No evidence of a + Lodge-Perón meeting has been + found.

+ + + + Buenos Aires, June 6, 1973, 2140Z. +

4021. For Asst Secretary Kubisch + From Ambassador Lodge. Subj: + Suggested Personal Approach to Perón.

+

1. I believe that Perón’s arrival + in Buenos Aires with President Campora, now set for Wednesday, June 20, confronts us + with an unprecedented opportunity for imaginative and realistic + diplomacy: (A) Perón’s great + ambition is to be the leader of Latin America. He has so stated. (B) + While he will probably not reach his objective, there is a good chance + that he will exert enormous influence throughout Latin America because + of his ability to identify himself with people’s preoccupations and + aspirations. Many traditional anti-Perónists are changing their point of + view because of their conviction that Perón is the only person who can save Argentina at this + point. There is a considerable tide in his favor. (C) Perón may well be able to cope with + the ERP and even disband it, thus + removing Campora’s greatest + present worry. President Nixon’s + imaginative and courageous trips to Moscow and Peking changed our + diplomatic frame of reference and constitute a major breakthrough in + diplomatic norms which suggests a breakthrough in the direction of + Perón.

+

2. Based on conversations which I have had with notable people, I believe + that what Perón really wants is + public recognition by the U.S. of his unique role of leadership in the + Argentine situation today. It is a fact of life which we cannot ignore + and which would, without our saying so, place Argentina, as far as the + U.S. is concerned, in a position similar to Mexico and Brazil.

+

3. I believe that Department should consider instructing Ambassador + Rivero in Madrid to make a + friendly approach to Perón prior + to his departure with President Campora for Buenos Aires. Admiral Rivero could say that the American + Ambassador in Buenos Aires would like to call on him while he is here, + to assure him, as Secretary Rogers assured President Campora, that we desire friendly and constructive + relations.

+ +

4. This could have a most beneficial effect on American companies doing + business in Argentina. The consequences of such a move would probably + reduce materially the anti-American sentiments in Argentina and + elsewhere in Latin America. It would be a fresh start and would help to + forestall increased anti-American attitudes which might well ensue when + Perón disappears from the + scene. This would not, as I see it, involve specific financial or + commercial aid. It would be appropriate, I think, for me to hand + Perón a personal letter from + President Nixon. The matter is + urgent and, if we can handle it effectively, could produce benefits of + incalculable significance not only in U.S.-Argentine relations, but + throughout Latin America. The opportunity will probably not return in + such a potentially propitious form.

+

5. I have discussed the foregoing with appropriate members of the Country + Team and the idea has their full support.

+ + + Lodge + + +
+ +
+ 5. Memorandum Prepared in the Office of Current Intelligence, Central + Intelligence Agency +

Summary: + The CIA analyzed Cámpora’s + election, Perón’s return + to Argentina, the rise of Peronism, and its implications for + U.S. relations with Argentina and Latin America.

+

Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of Support Services + (DI), Job 79T00861A: Intel Pub Files (1973), Box 16, Folder 10: + Peronism in Power. Confidential. Forwarded to Kissinger by Walters under a covering note, + July 22, that reads, “I commend this paper to your attention as + an initial assessment of the implications of the return of + Peronism in Argentina.” Copies were sent to Jorden, Rogers, Shultz, Rush, Port, Kubisch, Hurwitch, and Cline.

+ + + + Washington, June + 21, 1973. +

MEMORANDUM: PERÓNISM IN POWER

+

+ SUMMARY +

+

+ + Juan Perón and + the Perónist Movement, exiled from power and politics for almost 18 + years, are back. Despite a systematic exclusion from government, + Peronism retains an almost mystical hold on Argentina, and Perón, once discredited as a + tyrant and moral degenerate, has emerged as a kind of a folk hero. + Perón has managed his + remarkable hold on Argentina, from long years of exile in Madrid, + through careful manipulation of his followers who worship him and + his philosophy of Social Justice with an almost religious fervor, + and by preaching a brand of nationalism that has broad appeal. + Perón’s hand-picked choice for president, + Hector Campora, + overwhelmed his opposition in a vote which shows that many more + Argentines than just the Perónist hard core want what Perón has to offer. +

+

+ The Campora + government has taken office initially promoting a relatively + moderate line, but the Perónist program will create some problems + for the US and the rest of Latin America. Perón has long preached that + Argentina should reduce its ties to the “imperialist” US and shift + its alliances to the “Third World”. Argentina can thus be expected + to take action against some US business interests at home and to + become an outspoken voice of protest against US “domination” abroad. + Brazil will also come in for its share of abuse from Argentina, + although Perón has been + pushing for Latin America to unite against the super + powers. +

+

+ Peronism’s future depends in large part on how well + Campora can do before + the almost 78 year old Perón + passes on. There are strains within Peronism that may defy Campora once Perón is no longer around to hold + things together—strains that may press Campora toward more extremist policies. Yet, + Campora has the + advantages of natural Argentine wealth and a program of wide + popularity to keep him going. Even a modicum of success could insure + his survival, and Perón’s + place in history. +

+

+ Juan Perón and the Peronist + Movement are returning to power in Argentina after 18 years of political + exile for “El Lider” himself and the systematic exclusion of his + followers from the mainstream of Argentine politics. Yet, throughout + those 18 years, the weight of Perón’s strength was always present and could not be + ignored by either the country’s civilian politicians or military + officers who alternated in holding power. How is it that Perón, apparently discredited in 1955 + as a ruthless fascist, as a man who plundered the Argentine treasury, as + a sexual deviate, could be so enshrined in the hearts and minds of an + advanced, sophisticated, and highly cultured society? How is it that + Peronism, a vague concept of social justice in some ways more akin to a + religion than a political movement, could so dominate Argentine + politics?

+

When Perón first came to power in + 1946, Argentina had had only a brief fling between 1919 and 1930 with + the ideas of modern European social democracy. Before 1919, Argentina + had been run by wealthy landowners and business interests centered in + Buenos Aires. By 1930, the conservatives, seconded by the military, had + rejected the radical intellectuals and returned to the traditional + system. Perón was a product of + this background—a professional but ambitious military officer, trained + in part in Mussolini’s fascist Italy—but he came to power in quite a + different way.

+

+ Perón rode to power on the backs + of Argentina’s working class. He organized and politicized them, and + gave them a voice in government they had never had before, even under + the Radicals. In the early days, Argentina’s young people and its large + middle class were uncertain, even + frightened of Perón. His style + of rule, much in the manner of the typical caudillo, with an added + flavor reminiscent of Italy or Spain, gave them no cause for relief. + Nevertheless, the workers found in Perón a champion, and were willing to forgive his + dictatorial style.

+

+ Perón added another + ingredient—the mystic and almost religious veneration of his wife, + Evita. She was the High Priestess of Peronism during her life with + Perón, and became a saint in + the religion of Peronism after her death in 1952. While Perón’s image began to fade in his + last years of rule, hers remained untarnished.

+

By the time of his ouster in 1955, Perón had polarized the Argentine people. Many hated and + reviled him, others worshiped him. A succession of governments that + followed, suffering in part from his economic mistakes and + systematically excluding his followers from politics, made the Perón era look increasingly good. Thus + some people gradually forgot Perón’s excesses in their nostalgia for the good times + under his rule and their veneration of the man himself.

+

Now, Peronism is back—but it is quite a different Peronism than that + which first brought victory in 1946. It has evolved from its fascist + beginnings into a movement that embodies a variety of philosophies, some + of them reminiscent of the early days, but most more leftist in nature. + Peronism is really an evolution of the radical philosophy in Argentina, + with an orientation away from the intellectual middle class toward the + working class. The central theme stems from Perón’s own concepts of Social Justice, or + Justicialismo—an ideology that is more pragmatic than precise, but which + probably represents the political philosophy of more than half of all + Argentines. Peronists believe that the government should have control + over the national economy and should not suffer the dictates of + international or foreign business interests. They believe that the state + should run the major industries and should control the national + financial community. They believe that Argentina should have an + independent foreign policy, free from ties to the super-powers, and + should be able to exert its natural position of leadership in Latin + America.

+

Beyond these major maxims, it is hard to define Peronism. Like many + political movements, Peronism knows what it does not want—but has not + been specific about where it is going. It claims to be anti-Communist, + yet many of its young members have a certain Marxist-Leninist tinge. It + claims that it is not fascist, yet among older adherents there is a + significant current of right-wing ultra-nationalist fanaticism. Coupled + with this vague political philosophy is the religious mysticism of the + movement and the adulation of Perón, which grants him a certain aura of + infallibility.

+

Part of the secret to the magic of Perón lies in the peculiar nature of the Argentine + people and the vast riches of Argentina itself. Argentina is a European country that just happens + to be attached to the land mass of South America. It is a unique + combination of Spanish and Italian peoples, with some small admixture of + other groups—Indians, British, Jews, Arabs, Germans—that has created for + itself a way of life and a philosophy of living that has no equal in the + Western Hemisphere. This way of life is the antithesis of the Calvinist + ethic of the United States and some parts of Europe. It rejects hard + work, it values leisure and the pursuit of pleasure, and it can sustain + this ethic because of the richness of the pampas. This wealth has + permitted Argentina to operate on the brink of economic failure for many + years, while its people eat well and enjoy TV sets and cars—what one + economist calls mini-prosperity with macro-chaos.

+

Problems for Campora +

+

The nature of Peronism and Perón’s position within the movement create a variety of + problems for the Campora + government. After choosing Campora for his total loyalty, Perón demonstrated his hold over the + movement by imposing this unpopular and obsequious figure on the rank + and file. Campora’s chief—and + perhaps only—asset thus far is Perón’s blessing.

+

Argentina’s major political failing in the 20th century has been the + inability of its politicians to subordinate their individual differences + and work together. Now, because of the near-majority vote for Campora, the Peronist domination of + congress, state and local offices, and the fact that the other major + parties have similar political goals, the Peronist leadership may + actually be able to put together a working coalition that will endure. + In Perón’s brief stay in + Argentina last year, he managed to bring together a diverse group that + includes relatively conservative labor leaders, impatient and radical + youth, and moderate economic and business figures.

+

There are several issues, however, that could severely strain this + coalition, and the economic ones are probably the most important. + Argentina has suffered over the past few years from serious inflation, + diminishing foreign investment, erratic grain and cattle production, and + an inability to develop new export products at competitive prices. The + Peronists are in an enviable position—they can probably impose a harsh + and austere economic program and get away with it for a while. They will + be, after all, the most popular government Argentina has had in twenty + years, and they have vowed to correct the mistakes made by their + military predecessors.

+

Unless they do something really extreme, which seems unlikely for the + moment, the Peronists can probably count on labor, business, and much of + the middle class to fall in line. Peronist youth, however, may not be so + easy to convince. They have gone with Perón because he + represents change and anti-militarism and has been saying + “revolutionary” things. They have been the most fervent in their + acceptance of the Peronist “religion,” and they will probably be the + first group to become disenchanted.

+

If they do, Campora could have a + serious problem—especially if frustration or dissatisfaction turns them + to revolution or terrorism. Some old guard Peronists believe the youth + have not bought Peronism at all and are not “true believers,” but that + they have seen it primarily as a way to oust the military and as a + possible vehicle for more revolutionary politics. Whether this is true + or not, Campora may still have a + serious dilemma, since moves to satisfy the more revolutionary aims of + youth could alienate Peronism’s traditional power base.

+

+ Campora’s initial moves have + reflected his moderate stance. He has chosen a cabinet of old-guard + Peronist politicians and avoided placing more outspoken extremists in + positions of influence. Yet, some sources—and some Peronist + documents—claim that this is but an interim government, designed to hold + the line until the Peronists have consolidated their hold. These reports + predict that a more “revolutionary” government will be formed, perhaps + in six months.

+

The future of Peronism hinges in great measure on Perón himself, now almost 78 years + old, and on the ability of the Campora government to achieve a measure of success + before the old man dies. If Perón goes without giving up at least some of his all + encompassing command to his surrogates in Buenos Aires, Peronism could + dissolve, in the traditional Argentine way, into a factionalized + struggle for power. If Campora + can hold things together, and satisfy youth and the skeptical middle + class, the future of his government may be assured, with or without the + presence of Perón.

+

A large factor in Campora’s + success or failure in the post-Perón struggle for leadership will be his ability to + exploit the wave of adulation for Perón that is sure to start in the months to come. The + renaming of streets, plazas, and buildings for Perón and Evita—a re-enactment of + things that were commonplace during the first Perón era—will tend to sanctify the + image of Perón himself. + Campora, if he plays his + cards well, can then claim that he should remain as the chosen + interpreter of Justicialismo.

+

The one major force that has suffered greatly in the resurgence of + Peronism is the armed forces, long considered the final arbiter in + politics. They forced out the Radicals in 1930 and have been deeply + involved in politics ever since. They connived with Perón in bringing “El Lider” to power + in 1946, and then—when they finally rejected him in 1955—removed him. + They have been more than just a surrogate for the wealthy class, at + least in the post-Perón era. In + fact, most military officers probably subscribe to many of the + nationalist tendencies within Peronism. What they object to involves Perón himself—a man who disgraced their uniform—and the + “rabble” that surrounds him.

+

The armed forces still maintain the power to take control of the + government, in a physical sense. They have the tanks and guns. They + would face, however, a populace that had rejected them at the ballot + box, and some segments of the Peronist movement that would take up arms + against them. While Argentine military forces have been willing to trade + blows with each other over their role in government, they have never + been enthusiastic about confronting the popular will. And in the present + state of public disillusion with the military government, only some + major break-down in Campora’s + administration would prompt the people to call them back from the + barracks in the near future.

+

Implications for the US and Latin America

+

The changing nature of politics in Argentina will have most of its impact + at home. Nevertheless, a major tenet of the Peronist philosophy involves + a shift in foreign policy as well. Argentina has never considered itself + either a truly Latin American country or a close ally of the United + States. Its orientation has always been toward Europe. Perón’s own view of the world was + colored by service in Italy as an attaché before World War II, by the + pro-Nazism of much of the Argentine military during World War II, and by + the active effort of the US to prevent his becoming president in 1946. + These experiences probably lie behind a Peronist promise to shift + Argentina away from the US toward an alignment with the “Third + World.”

+

What this means is more likely to be a shift toward better relations with + such countries as Cuba, East Germany, North Korea, and North Vietnam + than the adoption of a virulently anti-US policy, although a + considerable amount of anti-US rhetoric can be expected. The Peronists + hope to augment their trade relations with Europe and bring in European + capital to replace US money. They also intend to take over at least some + US businesses and force out some US banking interests. They do not + intend so much to alienate the US as to demonstrate their independence. + In this regard, they will be joining the governments of Peru, Chile, and + Mexico, which have already moved in this direction.

+

+ Perón also is interested in + developing friendly relations with the Arab states. It is hardly likely, + however, that he would wish to see Argentina become a haven for Arab—or + any other—revolutionaries or terrorists. Such a move could easily + backfire. Yet he seems to know that this is a sensitive area for the US, + and he has always enjoyed being able to stick the needle in Uncle + Sam.

+

A Peronist Argentina will thus be a nagging vexation for the US. + Nevertheless, Campora says that + he intends to maintain friendly relations if he can. He may at times try + to use the US as a whipping boy, + but most Argentines are sophisticated enough to realize that the US is + not the reason for Argentina’s problems.

+

Other countries in Latin America may be more concerned about the impact + of a return of Peronism. In fact, Brazil is already beginning to see the + Peronist hand in all sorts of evil adventures. It seems to think that + Argentina is going to become a haven for revolutionaries, that Campora will attempt to overthrow + pro-Brazilian governments in Bolivia or Uruguay, and that he will + somehow be able to isolate Brazil from its Spanish-speaking neighbors. + The Peronist philosophy of leftist nationalism, obviously anathema to + President Medici and his generals, adds a new aspect to the traditional + rivalry between the two countries.

+

For its part, Argentina has always seen other nations in Latin America as + somewhat inferior. It cites Brazil’s “mongrel” population, the Indians + in other countries, and Argentina’s racial purity as reasons for + Argentine superiority. Thus Argentina’s economic failures have always + stuck in Argentine craws when relations with other Latin nations are at + issue. Argentina under Campora + will probably attempt to be more aggressive in Latin America, opposing + Brazil and the US in international forums, and seeking a greater role in + regional economic activity. This will not sit well with the other + states—they might accept Argentine equality, but never Argentine + hegemony. Nevertheless, Campora + will be saying some things that will strike a responsive chord in Chile, + Peru, Mexico, and perhaps even Venezuela.

+

+ Perón, Peronism, and the + Campora government could + represent Argentina’s last chance to find political peace without + turning to the extremes of leftist revolution or right-wing military + dictatorship. More likely, if the Peronists come unstuck, Argentina will + avoid extremism and continue to fumble along, not doing well, but not + doing all that badly either. Thus, Campora’s chances of achieving a modicum of success are + better than even. And Juan + Perón’s chances of fulfilling his deep ambition—to be + enshrined as the great modern hero of his people—are at an all-time + high.

+
+ +
+ 6. Memorandum From William J. + Jorden of the National Security Council Staff to the + President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) +

Summary: Jorden reported that President Cámpora’s + resignation would pave the way for Perón to assume power.

+

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 769, Country Files, + Latin America, Argentina, 1 September 1971–31 December 1973. + Secret. Sent for information. A stamped note reads, “HAK has seen.” On July 13, the + Argentine Congress accepted Cámpora’s and Solano Lima’s + resignations and appointed Raul Lastiri Provisional President. + (Telegram 5032 from Buenos Aires, July 14; ibid., RG 59, Central + Foreign Policy File, [no film number])

+ + + + Washington, July + 12, 1973. + + SUBJECT + Argentine President Resigns + +

TV stations in Buenos Aires reported this afternoon that recently elected + President Cámpora has resigned. This paves the way for Juan Perón to assume official power as + opposed to the de facto leadership he already clearly wielded. The Vice + President and President pro tempore of the Senate also are said to have + resigned. That means that the President of the Chamber of Deputies will + act as temporary President until elections can be held within the + required 30-day limit.

+

Commanders of the Army, Navy and Air Force are said to have gone into + emergency session. The Army CINC, + General Carcagno, met with Perón + for more than an hour night before last. The reason now becomes more + obvious. Perón will need full + military support if the transition period is to be peaceful.

+

+ Perón’s labor supporters, under + the leadership of the General Confederation of Workers (CGT), are said to be mobilizing for + massive street demonstrations in Buenos Aires. This will obviously be a + pro-Perón solidarity + feast.

+

Shortly after Cámpora’s election, we had some reporting that the above + scenario would be carried out. The real surprise is the timing, since + Perón’s health has been + reported as not too good. It appears he has recovered from the “nervous + attack” he suffered shortly after his triumphal return was disrupted by + rioting and a large-scale gunfight.

+
+ +
+ 7. Intelligence Memorandum +

Summary: In the wake of Cámpora’s resignation, the CIA concluded that Perón’s return to power would + have a negative impact on U.S.-Argentine relations.

+

Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of the Director of + Central Intelligence, Job 80M01048A: Subject Files, Box 1, + Folder 11: A-20: Argentina. Secret. A note on the original + reads: “This memorandum was prepared in the Office of National + Estimates and coordinated with appropriate offices in CIA. Comments may be addressed to: + [less than 1 line not + desclassified].” Sent to Colby and Walters under a July 20 covering memorandum. On + August 11, Colby wrote + on the covering memorandum, “Sorry I’ve been so long. —This is + obviously an excellent paper and presents the present status as + one offering various forks in the road ahead well. —It might be + possible, however, to be a bit more precise on potential + alternative developments and the factors causing them, as the + analysis might then suggest some possible actions to take as a + result. Overall, however, fine. —WEC 8/11/73.”

+ + + + Washington, undated. +

ARGENTINA: PERÓN RETURNS

+

Since Perón’s fall from power in + 1955, no party, no leader, and no formula has succeeded in healing + bitter political and social divisions, nor in raising Argentina anywhere + near its very considerable economic potential. The resounding Peronist + electoral victory under Hector + Campora in March 1973, and Campora’s resignation from office on 13 July, open the + way for Perón to return to the + presidency for a second effort at national reconstruction. Whether the + Peronists of the seventies will rerun the mistakes and excesses of the + forties and fifties, or whether they have learned from hard experience + and can provide the peace and prosperity Argentines yearn for remains an + open question. Argentine history almost requires a certain degree of + pessimism, however.

+

True, the new regime possesses greater assets for success than did the + string of failed governments—especially its charismatic leader and broad + popular support. But it will face a number of formidable problems. + Perón must hold together the + disparate and feuding elements of his movement; maintain his + revolutionary mystique without becoming the captive of self-defeating + xenophobia; contain both the terrorist extremists and the conservative + military; and launch a belt-tightening development program in a + self-indulgent society. Additionally, the 77-year old Perón adds special personal + liabilities as well as strengths to the new regime.

+

The return of Peronism will in general have a negative effect on + US-Argentine relations. The implications for the US are discussed in + paragraphs 24–27.

+

[Omitted here are sections entitled “New Politics, Old Problems;” + “Perón, Master Manipulator;” + “The New Government’s Assets;” “Liabilities and Uncertainties;” and “A Clouded Perspective after Two + Months of Peronist Rule.”]

+
+
+ 8. Memorandum of Conversation +

Summary: During the UN + General Assembly session, Kissinger and Vignes discussed U.S.-Argentine relations.

+

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL ARG–US. Secret; Exdis. Drafted + by Neil Seidenman in OPR/LS + and cleared in S. The conversation took place in the + Waldorf-Astoria Hotel. In telegram 6997 from Buenos Aires, + September 24, the Embassy reported that Perón won the Presidential + election on September 23 with about 61.5 percent of the vote. + (Ibid., Central Foreign Policy File, [no film number]) In a + September 28 memorandum, Kubisch briefed Kissinger for his meeting with Vignes. (Ibid., Central Files + 1970–73, POL 7 + ARG)

+ + + + New York, October 5, 1973, 12:45 p.m. + + SUBJECT + U.S.-Argentine Relations + + + PARTICIPANTS + Foreign Minister Alberto + Vignes of Argentina + Secretary Kissinger + + Neil Seidenman, Interpreter + +

Following a short exchange of views with their principal aides, Foreign + Minister Vignes and Secretary + Kissinger met alone.

+

Minister Vignes opened the + conversation by saying that the advent of Perón affords an opportunity for Argentina and the US to + establish a foundation for cooperation that will be positive, practical, + and beneficial to both countries. The time appears to be ripe for this. + Argentina is one of the only large countries of the hemisphere, in size + and importance, that has a constitutionally elected government, and + whose policies are based upon the will of its people, as opposed to some + other countries where the situation could be sometimes compared to a + time bomb which might go off at any moment. That is why an examination + of problems of interest to both countries will be beneficial. He + acknowledged that there are differences of appraisal between Argentina + and the United States, but even if the objectives of the US were + different from the objectives of Argentina, still there should be room + for dialogue and agreement despite such differences. He said that the + two governments must seek areas of parallel interest so as to get rid of + problems which, however small + they may be, become irritants to public opinion. Public opinion in + Argentina at this juncture is highly sensitized and euphoric as a result + of the recent democratic achievement. Therefore, while this euphoria may + have certain negative reflections, it can also be channeled to positive + ends. That is why it is essential for the GOA and the USG to examine + the situation for openings that will be beneficial to the two + countries.

+

In the economic sphere, Minister Vignes noted, Argentina’s balance of payments has shown + a chronic deficit vis-à-vis the US. The US, with a market place of more + than 200,000,000 people, buys less from Argentina than Argentina buys + from the US with its market of only 24,000,000 people. In other words, + for each dollar that the US spends for Argentine goods, Argentina buys + $2.00 worth. Therefore, there is a need to seek ways to bring about a + change in Argentina’s trade position with the US which has been too + severely negative, thus seriously affecting Argentina’s balance of + payments.

+

Also in the economic sphere, Minister Vignes continued, he wanted to mention Argentine scrap + iron purchases in the US. The present position of the US is that only + orders made before July 1 should be filled. In the event that the US + does not modify this situation vis-à-vis Argentina, the Argentine steel + manufacturing industry will be paralyzed. Argentina’s scrap requirements + for 1973 are 140,000 tons and for 1974 some 750,000 tons. With the world + scrap market in its present state, the US is the only place the GOA can turn to. Minister Vignes concluded by saying that he + would leave a memorandum on this subject with the Secretary’s + advisers.

+

Secretary Kissinger noted that a + memorandum would be helpful. There are two problems before us, he said. + One is the basic relationship between our two countries, and the other + has to do with the specific issues between us in the light of that + relationship. With regard to the first, the USG attaches great importance to Argentina. Regarding the + second, it must be said that a leader who has been in exile for twenty + years who returns to his country and gets 65% of the votes is a man of + historic importance. The Secretary stated that in all frankness he + preferred to deal with big people rather than small people. They may be + more difficult to deal with, but it is more worthwhile. As far as the + United States is concerned, our attitude is a positive one: we wish to + have close and confidential relations with Argentina. He observed that + he is not fully acquainted with the details of some of the specific + issues. The question of scrap sales is an example. But if the Minister + would leave a memorandum on the subject, he will ask Assistant Secretary + Kubisch to deal with the + matter. The important thing is to establish the possibilities for + cooperation between the two countries.

+

Turning to another subject, the Secretary said that he understood that + Argentina has credit arrangements with Cuba. The Minister acknowledged this to be the case but + said that this is purely a financial operation, aimed only at enabling + the Argentine farm machinery industry to operate at full capacity. He + said that Cuba knows that Argentina is “justicialista” and + anti-Communist, as he personally had occasion to put it to Castro in + Algiers. Vignes said that there + is a problem that he would wish to solve with the US in connection with + the Cuban credit arrangement, involving Argentine ships carrying + Argentine products to Cuba. These ships operate at considerable loss, + because they have to return empty and cannot enjoy refueling and + reballasting privileges in US ports under certain rules in effect at + this time. It would be of maximum interest for Argentina to see a + revision of this position on the part of the US so that Argentine ships + might be serviced in US ports.

+

The Secretary replied by noting that there may be difficulty with this. + He promised to look into it, but in the light of present legislation, it + is very doubtful. Also there is the matter of American companies in + Argentina, which are being pressed to take part in these arrangements. + This places them in the awkward position of being in violation either of + Argentina’s laws or US laws.

+

Turning to the political area, Minister Vignes said that Argentina is concerned with the + indifference of the US regarding the issue of the Falkland Islands, + which is a colonial problem within the hemisphere. He could not + understand how the US, which was once a colony, could take such an + attitude. Accordingly, he would be pleased if the USG were to suggest to Great Britain that + it activate negotiations in this regard.

+

On the question of the Organization of American States, Minister + Vignes said that he was + aware that the thinking on the part of the US differs from that of the + Latin American countries. But he believes that, through frank + discussions, it will be possible to make changes that will meet the + interests of all the parties.

+

The Secretary responded that he also believed this will be possible. Of + first importance is that Argentina and the United States have close + contacts. He promised to deal frankly with the Minister. He said that he + was not a professional diplomat, and will say what he thinks. He hoped + that the Minister would deal with him in a similar manner. Minister + Vignes assured the Secretary + that he would, saying words to this effect: I am a professional + diplomat. I was an official with the first administration of General + Perón, as Under Secretary of + Foreign Relations. I am a close and personal friend of Perón’s, and I will be able to + cooperate in a way that will constitute a contribution to the new + relationship between the US and our country.

+

The Secretary recognized that certain things must be done for domestic + reasons. If certain things reinforce the domestic situation, this is + often helpful in the area of foreign policy. But it is also important to + take long-range considerations into account.

+ +

Minister Vignes said that he + wanted to mention that the Argentine Government has submitted various + economic and financial bills to the Legislature, some of which have a + bearing on foreign investment. In these, foreign investment is fully + guaranteed. It should be noted that all foreign investment that was made + during the first administration of Perón is still in effect. Any investment in Argentina + will be made under ground rules that are perhaps stricter in nature than + heretofore, but which were constitutionally arrived at through + congressional action based upon the initiative of the constitutionally + elected government. This is distinct from situations that prevail in + certain countries with de facto governments which, while very favorable + for a given period of time, could change drastically and do away with + everything at once without warning.

+

At this point the private meeting ended with Secretary Kissinger saying that the meeting had + been helpful and Minister Vignes + expressing his gratification. The other members of both delegations were + then invited back for a brief discussion of a press communique.

+
+ +
+ 9. Telegram 7789 From the Embassy in Argentina to the Department of + State +

Summary: Lodge reported that + notwithstanding some outstanding differences over civil + aviation, steel scrap, and sales of U.S. subsidiaries in + Argentina to Cuba, U.S.-Argentine relations seemed to be + improving.

+

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + [no film number]. Confidential. Although the Nixon-Perón exchange of + correspondence has not been found, telegram 7590 from Buenos + Aires, October 16, noted that Nixon’s letter had been commented upon favorably + by the Argentine press and that Perón’s response to Nixon signalled his desire for good relations + with the United States. (Ibid.) In telegram 7533 from Buenos + Aires, October 15, Lodge + reported that Vignes had + told him that the letter from Nixon was a positive step but that it would soon + be necessary to have in-depth discussions on unspecified + “matters of importance.” (Ibid.)

+ + + + Buenos Aires, October 25, 1973, + 2027Z. +

7789. Subject: US-Argentine Relations: A New Era? Ref: BA 7590 and BA 7730.

+

1. Summary. There are straws in the wind which suggest that the attitude + of the Peronist government toward the US may be mellowing. But the test + will come with looming serious bi-lateral problems. The degree of + accommodation with which both governments approach their issues will determine whether the + present harbingers herald a new era in our relations. End summary.

+

2. There is a rising speculation in informed circles in Buenos Aires that + US-Argentine relations may be entering into a new period of closer + cooperation and greater good will. The principal impetus to this + speculation undoubtedly was the widely publicized exchange of letters + between President Nixon and + President Perón on the occasion + of the latter’s inauguration, and the equal play given by the media to + Foreign Minister Vignes’ meeting + with Secretary of State Kissinger in New York. It was less the substance of + these events than their obvious warm and friendly tone which has struck + public opinion. This tone is far removed from the coolness perceptible + on the Argentine side in the period following the inauguration of + President Campora last May.

+

3. Indeed, this change was recently commented upon by the highly regarded + commentator Claudio Escribano in the weekly Argentine magazine Gente (circulation 265m), edition of Oct 19. + Escribano replied to a question concerning Perón’s answer to President Nixon by stating that Perón’s letter was truly important while noting that + Perón has generally been + more careful in his statements about the United States than he has + generally been made out to be. Escribano quoted the portion of Perón’s reply to President Nixon which indicated Perón’s satisfaction with the + substance of the recent meeting between Foreign Minister Vignes and Secretary of State + Kissinger, including the + sentence “This atmosphere makes it possible to think that a new stage is + beginning, the realization of which we look forward to with + understandable mutual interest”. Commenting, then, that if Vignes’ mission had included opening + the way to refinancing the foreign debt, as claimed in high official + circles, Escribano said that possibly some people may moderate their + feelings about the actual influence that Europe may have in the future + on Argentina’s financial and economic improvement. He added that the + possibility of a visit by Secretary Kissinger to Argentina at a later date should not be + ruled out.

+

4. There have been several other recent developments which perhaps are + early harbingers of a possible change in attitude toward the United + States. It is noteworthy in this connection that I was received by + General Perón when he still was + the President-elect on October 5 and that the round of protocolary + functions associated with my departure from the post has included a + luncheon in my honor by Foreign Minister Vignes attended by Minister of Justice Benitez and a + dinner given by Interior Minister Llambi. Also, both Minister of Economy + Gelbard and Minister of + Education Taiana attended my farewell reception on September 20. Perhaps + even more impressive was the attendance at a dinner given by my wife and + me for Mr. and Mrs. Frank Ortiz + on October 19, which included such leading lights of the present government as the new Secretary + General of the Presidency, Dr. Solano Lima; First Vice President of the + Senate, Dr. Allende; the + Minister of the Interior, Benito Llambi; the President of the Central + Bank, Gomez Morales; the Under-Secretary of Justice, Perez Pardo; + ex-Foreign Minister under Perón, + Hipolito Paz; the Uruguayan Ambassador Folle Martinez; and such Foreign + Office luminaries as Ambassador De la Plaza. The atmosphere at dinner + was warm and friendly, and the acceptances by virtually all those + invited—more, in fact, than we had expected—strongly suggest that this + was far from accidental.

+

5. The above suggests that we may indeed be moving into a period in which + greater cooperation will be possible. If so, this would represent an + important achievement on the part of the Embassy and the Department in + guiding our bi-lateral relationships through the shoals of an extremely + delicate and critical period. It is, of course, important to remind + ourselves that these are mere straws in the wind at best. By our prudent + official silence on some of the more dramatic moves of the Argentine + Government after May 25 (recognition of Cuba, North Korea and East + Germany, the credit to Cuba, the Argentine position at the Caracas + Conference of Army commanders and at the OAS meeting in Lima, etc), we have avoided confrontations + on these issues. But we must recognize that we have not yet faced a + crunch with the GOA on matters of + serious importance in our bi-lateral relations and that several of these + issues (civil aviation, steel scrap, sales of U.S. subsidiaries in + Argentina to Cuba) are beginning to loom ever closer. How disturbing + these issues may become to our bi-lateral relations will of course + depend upon many factors, not the least of which are our ability to meet + Argentine aspirations which they regard as reasonable and legitimate and + the alternatives which the GOA may feel + that it has for replacing present arrangements without serious damage to + its own interests. Perón + traditionally has displayed a remarkable pragmatism in his political + decisions, but Perón is not yet + the master in his own house and his freedom of decision is compromised + by the necessities of dealing with the left and right wings of his + heterogeneous movement, elements of which are notoriously anti-American. + Perón recently commented to + an Italian interviewer that the US talk of a new and better relationship + with Latin America thus far is just words and that concrete acts must be + awaited. The same applies in reverse of course; we must wait and see + whether the recent favorable signals of Peronist officialdom indicated + above represent anything more than a new swing in Perón’s habitual pendular politics. In + the meantime, as noted in my 7533, FonMin Vignes on Saturday, October 13, said words to the effect + that the time was approaching when we should talk turkey.

+ + + Lodge + + +
+ +
+ 10. Telegram 8459 From the Embassy in Argentina to the Department of + State +

Summary: The + Embassy suggested that Presidents Perón and Nixon meet to discuss the key issues in + U.S.-Argentine relations, such as the environment, narcotics, + détente, and economic development.

+

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + P840114–1886. Confidential; Nodis. Due to his failing health, + Perón did not travel + to New York. (Telegram 8663 from Buenos Aires, November 28; + ibid., [no film number]) The Perón-Nixon meeting did not take + place.

+ + + + Buenos Aires, November 19, 1973, + 2210Z. +

8459. Subject: Possible Meeting Between Presidents Nixon and Perón: Talking Points. Ref BA 7998, BA 8031, BA 8249, BA + 8189, State 226884.

+

1. Summary. Embassy recommends that President Nixon meet with President Perón during latter’s trip to UNGA. Some background reflections and + possible talking points are suggested. End summary.

+

2. The local press and other media for weeks have given almost daily + prominent play to developing plans for a visit by President Perón to the UNGA. These accounts are believed to have been officially + inspired through deliberate leaks and almost invariably included a + reference to a possible meeting with President Nixon while Perón is in the US. On Nov 15, FonMin + Vignes publicly confirmed + that Perón would travel to New + York in early Dec. A meeting with President Nixon is known to have been under the most active + consideration among Perón’s + entourage and within the Foreign Ministry as an important part of this + trip. In view of Ambassador-designate Orfila’s formal request on Nov 15 for such a meeting, + plus FonMin Vignes’ conversation + with me on Nov 16, the Embassy submits the following suggestions + regarding points which might be touched upon in the conversation between + the two Chiefs of State.

+

3. By way of background, the Mission regards such an interview as a + potentially important step in assisting US-Argentine relations through a + most delicate period and in responding to the GOA’s recent signals for a new, normal, cooperative + relationship, initiated with the Vignes-Kissinger + talks in New York in Oct and clearly stated by Ambassador-designate + Orfila to the Acting + Secretary. While Argentine interest in such a meeting undoubtedly has + additional objectives—enhancement of Perón’s international acceptance and stature and of + Argentina’s prestige at a time when the GOA is clearly engaged in diplomatic offensive to this + end—the meeting could well be used to serve our own purposes as well. + The manner in which Perón + stretches for Third World + leadership at the UNGA and in future + fora could well be determined to some degree by the prospect of a + meeting with President Nixon. In + any case, our failure to arrange such a meeting at a mutually agreeable + site would be interpreted by the sensitive Argentines as a rejection of + their overtures with consequent repercussions for US interests in + Argentina.

+

4. With the return of Argentina to an elected government with majority + support (62 percent) for the first time in many years, the way is at + least open to an effort by Argentina to recoup the role to which she has + traditionally aspired in the hemisphere and by the same token for the + USG to reconsider our relationships + which have labored under inhibiting factors for so many years. + Argentina, along with Mexico and Brazil, seems destined, on the basis of + population, size and resources, to become a secondary world power. + Mexico’s propinquity and Brazil’s long tradition of friendly cooperation + have attracted particularly close policy attention from the USG. In contrast, the distant location of + Argentina, her customary rivalry with the US in the hemisphere, and in + more recent years her political instability and economic stagnation, + have developed in the Argentines a sense of frustration and deep + nationalistic sensitivities in dealing with us. We now have the + opportunity to begin a reversal of that process if, while defending our + own interests, we accord Argentine leaders the respect and recognition + they believe they merit, and cooperate with them in achieving those + aspirations which are compatible with our own. Perón thus far has given evidence of + desiring to avoid the excesses of his earlier administrations (1946–55) + and is widely regarded in Argentina, even by many anti-Peronists, as the + only public figure today with any prospects of being able to pull this + divided country together again. A stable, progressive Argentina could be + a great asset to the US in the Southern Cone. We therefore have an + important stake in the success of the moderate forces in Argentina which + Perón now represents. The + outlook for Argentina and perhaps even for the entire Southern Cone is + clouded indeed if Perón fails in + his attempt at “national reconstruction,” given the absence of any + viable alternative.

+

5. Mission believes consideration should be given to following subjects + in a Presidential meeting:

+

A. Hemisphere policy. In the context of the current meetings on + restructuring of the OAS, the GOA has assumed a position between those + advocating radical change (Peru, Panama et al) and those favoring the + status quo. The GOA favors reforms, but + has adopted a constructive, fairly moderate attitude in the OAS discussions. The recent exchanges of + letters between the Presidents and between Ministers Vignes and Kissinger, capped by a meeting of + Perón with Nixon, should strengthen this attitude + of seeking a new dialogue, pursuant to the Secretary’s invitation to Latin America, instead of + confrontation. Embassy has been told by informed source that with + respect to recent Bogota meeting FonMin Vignes has instructed GOA delegation to avoid positions which might embarrass + “his good friend Henry + Kissinger.” The above notwithstanding, the GOA must operate under certain policy + restraints, given the present inflamed state of nationalism in Argentina + and the heterogeneous elements (including the radicalized youth sector) + which comprise Perón’s + Justicialist movement. Perón + personally is believed to be conservative in viewpoint and Argentina + traditionally prefers to pursue its policy objectives mainly through + bilateral channels. At this time, however, Perón is engaged in an effort to resuscitate Argentine + hegemony in Latin America, lost in the travails which have beset the + country since 1930, and has aligned his country with the Third World, at + least for certain tactical purposes. The GOA seeks to become the bridge between the US and the rest + of Latin America, for which it would like to serve as spokesman. The + major obstacle to this goal, within Latin America, is of course Brazil, + whose dynamic growth in recent years is viewed in Argentina with deep + concern and envy. Perón may + disclaim any rivalry with Brazil, but at the same time may seek + assurances of an even-handed policy on the part of the US. Such + even-handedness is indeed in the long-range interests of the US, but + those same interests preclude our acceptance of Argentina as an + intermediary with the rest of Latin America and such a role would + doubtless be unacceptable to the other Latin American States.

+

B. Ecology. Any reader of Perón’s + public pronouncements since his political comeback after 18 years of + exile must be impressed with his steady refrain of concern over the + human environment and the conservation of natural resources, even + through he deals in cliches which suggest that his real knowledge in + this field is somewhat superficial. It would be desirable to express at + a high level gratification over his obvious interest in this timely + subject, and to offer to him the knowledge and experience which we have + developed in this area. This is indeed a field of possible cooperation, + on both the bilateral and multilateral levels, in which our mutual + interest is apparent and for which the scientific cooperation agreement + of 7 April 72 might serve as an appropriate framework.

+

C. Narcotics. The GOA’s awakening to the + perils and the needs in this field has developed at an encouraging pace + and initial bilateral planning was promising. Nevertheless, much + momentum was lost, at least at the policy level, in the confusion of the + transition between the military government and Perón’s assumption of power, although + cooperation at the enforcement level has continued. There are now signs + of interest on the part of the GOA in + reviving the suspended work of the Argentine Drug Policy Coordinating + Board (CONATON) and with it the functioning of the + Binational Commission on Narcotics. It is suggested that appropriate + appreciation be expressed for past cooperation of the Argentine + authorities as well as our readiness to step up our collaboration in + this area of mutual concern and shared objectives.

+

D. Détente. Under both the Lanusse (military) government and Perón the GOA has pursued a policy parallel to our own, known locally + as “removal of ideological barriers.” Relations have been established + with China, North Vietnam, Cuba, East Germany and North Korea. Perón unquestionably would be pleased + to hear from President Nixon his + views on the progress, objectives and prospects of the US in its efforts + toward détente with Peking and Moscow. At the same time, it would be + appropriate to congratulate the GOA on + its own pragmatic (and generally prudent) approach to relations with + these two world powers. At same time, a potentially serious problem has + arisen from GOA interest in exporting + to Cuba, which under present US legislature places US subsidiaries in + Argentina in a virtually untenable position.

+

E. Investments. Perón’s + government is just now beginning to outline plans for major economic + development program to be undertaken during 1974–76. In addition to help + from international institutions, we believe GOA interest in foreign direct investment is steadily + growing. Despite earlier brave talk of relying on European, Arab or even + Chinese sources, the practicalities of the situation point again toward + substantial dependence upon US sources. The modifications in the foreign + investment law at the direction of the executive before passage are + straws in the wind, even though they fall short of practical + encouragement of such investment. However, it is not clear whether + Perón himself will raise + economic subjects or whether he will leave it to other members of his + entourage, such as Minister of Economy Gelbard, in subsidiary talks. In any case, the Mission + strongly recommends a coordinated approach to this subject between the + government and the American business community. The local US Chamber of + Commerce constitutes an imposing reservoir of knowledge in this field. + Their involvement in preparations for such talks on investment would be + highly useful and they are prepared to send a group to the States for + this purpose. Their participation in any talks with Gelbard and others in Perón’s party would serve also to + boost their standing in dealing with the GOA here.

+

F. Our assumption is that talks at the Presidential level will deal with + broad policy matters, leaving specific issues and problems to Cabinet + level officers and their subordinates. For this purpose the subjects + listed in BA 6558 are still valid. + Should opportunity arise to discuss civil air problems, it would be + useful to indicate we believe broader Argentine interests (e.g. tourism, + economic development) are being + sacrificed to narrower interests or Aerolineas Argentinas in GOA civil air posture to date. Since root + of Aerolineas’ problem is managerial inefficiency and lack of commercial + drive, consideration might be given to offering assistance through Intl + Executive Service Corps.

+ + + Krebs + + +
+
+ 11. Telegram 9050 From the Embassy in Argentina to the Department of + State +

Summary: + Responding to speculation of a prospective visit by Kissinger to Argentina, the + Embassy provided an analysis of key issues in U.S.-Argentine + relations. The issues included Cuba, terrorism, investment, + civil aviation, narcotics, and the environment.

+

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 769, Country Files, + Latin America, Argentina, 1 September 1971–31 December 1973. + Confidential; Exdis. Kissinger did not visit Argentina.

+ + + + Buenos Aires, December 13, 1973, + 1921Z. +

9050. Subject: Contingency Talking Points re Possible Visit to Buenos + Aires by Secretary Kissinger. + Ref: Buenos Aires 9049.

+

1. Summary: In light of speculation in the Argentine press concerning the + possible visit to Argentina by Secretary Kissinger (reftel) the Embassy believes the following + analysis would be helpful to the Department in developing an overall + strategy aimed at maximizing the resulting gains should such a visit + materialize. End summary.

+

2. First, Perón’s “new diplomacy” + has, as exemplified in his recent dealings with Uruguay and Paraguay, + shown a tendency to place the achievement of some concrete result above + the narrower issues his emissaries and predecessors had found to be + sticking points. We should not underestimate Perón’s personal and political needs + and his ambitions to achieve some results befitting his concept of his + proper position on the world stage. He very much wants public U.S. + recognition that he is an important LA + and Third World figure—recognition which, in the minds of most + Argentines, a visit by the Secretary would imply. Perón would therefore likely be in an + expansive mood during any visit by the Secretary and might be more + forthcoming in helping to break the civil air impasse and in giving more + categoric and effective assurances to US companies threatened by + terrorists, especially if there were some US quid pro quo on the issue + of Cuba trade (see below).

+ +

3. There is an obvious pitfall. The Argentines would doubtless wish to + interpret a visit by the Secretary as conferring upon them and their + leader the role of principal Latin American spokesman vis-à-vis the US. + We must avoid giving any such impression to the other Latin Americans, + while at the same time signaling to the Argentines that we do indeed + regard them as a key nation. It should not be too difficult to + accomplish this, especially should a visit by the Secretary to Argentina + be the first stop of a broader Latin American tour including, say, + Brazil, Colombia, and of course, Mexico. The language of the final + communiqué could also be useful in this regard. It might, for example, + refer to the upcoming meeting of Foreign Ministers in Mexico, + reemphasize the US commitment to achieving a new relationship with + LA as a whole, stress the importance + we attach to our own relations with Argentina, and then conclude by + noting Argentina’s important role within the hemisphere.

+

4. In selecting objectives for a possible visit by the Secretary, the + issues mentioned by Kahn do indeed encompass most of our current + bilateral problems and opportunities. In the former category, the US + legislation which provides for sanctions against countries that trade + with Cuba looms as a potentially large barrier to improving our + relations. Argentina is committed, as a matter of high national + priority, to expanding its exports of manufactured goods. The GOA’s attempt to enlarge its share of the + market in Cuba is a part of that effort. US sanctions will not deter the + GOA from carrying out its Cuba + policy though their application by the US may succeed in embittering our + relations.

+

5. The sanctions for such trade under present legislation are: a) denial + of bunkering facilities to Argentine ships in the Cuba trade; and b) the + termination of military assistance and probably closing down of our + military mission and the ending of our housing guarantee program. In the + first case, the sanction will not prevent Argentine ships from trading + with Cuba, but will open US shipping interests to painful retaliation. + The latter two “aid” programs are examples of projects that benefit the + giver, the US, in terms of information, contacts and influence, as much + or more than the recipient. Indeed, the Embassy is presently trying to + devise means of maintaining its ties with the Argentine Armed Forces in + the event they ask us to leave. To leave as the result of what all + Argentines, and especially the military, will perceive as a US attempt + to thwart a legitimate national aspiration can only gain us the lasting + ill will of this key Argentine sector. In sum, while the Embassy + realizes that US Cuba policy cannot be determined by its effects on + Argentina, and that present legislative restrictions cannot be quickly + changed, we urge that, because of the adverse consequences of this issue + for our relations with Argentina, some means of avoiding a confrontation + on this matter be explored on an + urgent basis and that the Secretary be in a position to be reasonably + forthcoming on this question—i.e. that he at least be able to tell the + Argentines that the USG will view + favorably any requests for waivers by subsidiaries of US firms.

+

6. On the issues of terrorism and investment, the visit of the Secretary + will come at a time when both the GOA + and the Argentine public have been forced to face several unpleasant + realities after Swint was killed, Samuelson kidnapped, and Ford and other companies decided to + evacuate their executives and perhaps close down in Argentina. First, it + must now be obvious to both that the terrorists can, if allowed to go + unchecked, virtually end hopes for foreign investment, and with it, + Argentine hopes to end economic stagnation. Secondly, Perón, who was in large part motivated + to improve his US ties for economic reasons, apparently now realizes + that he cannot, even at the risk of splits in his movement, maintain his + present leisurely political efforts to isolate the terrorists.

+

7. In this situation, a visit by the Secretary poses both opportunities + and some modest risks. On the positive side, we should suggest that + Perón, as a minimum earnest + of good faith, make a public statement acknowledging the fact that + foreign investment, so long as it obeys national law, has a positive + role to play in Argentine development and condemning acts which tend to + discourage it. It might, for domestic Argentine reasons, be preferable + to have statement made by Perón + before the Secretary’s trip. Even if Argentines take this step, the + Secretary should stress to Perón + that until GOA anti-terrorist efforts + are successful USG willingness to + transmit its positive view of Argentina to US investors will be of + little value. On the other hand, the Secretary can safely point out that + if settled conditions for foreign investors do prevail the self-interest + of US investors in participating in Argentina’s future growth will + quickly become a positive factor in the country’s development.

+

8. On the less politically charged issue of civil aviation, the Secretary + should not be put in the position of having to discuss the details—or + even get into the substance of the matter. However, he should be + prepared to ask Perón to include + a statement in a final communiqué stating both sides have agreed to + instruct their negotiators to reach a quick and mutually satisfactory + solution to the problem. Such a declaration, coupled with the GOA economic self-interest in reaching an + agreement, might facilitate an early solution to the problem.

+

9. To deal with the GOA’s (and our) + concerns on trade, we recommend that the Secretary: (1) note the fact + that the US is Argentina’s best and fastest growing market for + industrial products, and (2) express our hope that our bilateral trade + be balanced by further increases in Argentine exports to the US rather + than by further decreasing the US share of the Argentine markets.

+ +

10. In the area of narcotics the GOA + has, in spite of some loss of momentum at the policy level, maintained + good cooperation at the enforcement level. It would be helpful if the + Secretary could express his thanks for the GOA’s past cooperation and voice our readiness to increase + our collaboration in this area of mutual concern.

+

11. Because of Perón’s repeatedly + expressed interest in human environment and natural resources, but even + more because of the GOA’s current + dispute with Brazil over development of hydroelectric potential of the + Parana River, Perón may well + raise the subject of ecological basis for this dispute, and in this + context, US abstention in the UN vote on + an Argentine resolution on this subject. The GOA has used the ecology issue to try to achieve its + bilateral policy objectives vis-à-vis Brazil. The US position, which the + Secretary might wish to stress, if the subject is raised, is that while + we fully support the GOA position on + the ecological principle involved, we have refrained from taking a + position of support because we did not wish to take sides on an issue + between two close friends.

+ + + Krebs + + +
+ +
+ 12. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security + Affairs (Kissinger) to President + Nixon + +

Summary: Kissinger informed the + President that U.S. companies operating in Argentina were facing + increasing pressure from the Argentine Government to sell goods + to Cuba, despite U.S. sanctions policy. Kissinger recommended that + sales to Cuba by U.S. firms in Argentina be authorized on a + case-by-case basis.

+

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1338, Unfiled + Material, 1974. Confidential. Sent for action. Shultz and Flanigan concurred. Nixon approved the + recommendation. A typed notation next to the “Disapprove” option + reads: “PREFER.” On a March 14 memorandum from Kissinger and Shultz to Nixon, the President + disapproved a recommendation that a license be granted to allow + a Canadian subsidiary of a U.S. company to export locomotives to + Cuba. ( + Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, vol. E–11, Part 1, + Documents on Mexico, Cuba, and the Caribbean, 1973–1976, + Document 279)

+ + + + Washington, January + 29, 1974. + + SUBJECT + Argentina and Our Cuban Denial Policy + +

Last year the Argentine Government reestablished diplomatic relations + with Cuba and extended to Cuba a $200 million credit for the purchase of Argentine industrial + products. US subsidiaries operating in Argentina are now caught in a + squeeze between the Argentine Government’s insistence that they sell + Argentine-made products to Cuba and our Cuban denial regulations. A + Cuban purchasing mission visited Argentina and requested price and + availability data from at least six US firms. Cuba has subsequently made + Chrysler a firm purchase order for 3,000 automobiles per year for three + years. If the US firms refuse to sell to Cuba, they may be declared in + contravention of Argentine laws and face serious acts of retaliation by + the Argentine government that could put them out of business. If, + however, the companies agree to sell to Cuba, they will violate our + Cuban control regulations.

+

The Cuban-Argentine agreement provides that goods purchased will be + transported by both Cuban and Argentine vessels on a cargo-sharing + arrangement. Under provisions of the US Foreign Assistance Act, the + participation of Argentine vessels in the trade with Cuba would make + Argentina ineligible to receive grant military training (about $500,000 + yearly) as well as future housing guaranty loans. You have the authority + to waive this ineligibility but no such waiver has been exercised in the + past. In addition, Argentine ships trading with Cuba could not bunker in + the US or carry US Government cargoes.

+

To trade with Cuba, US companies must obtain a license from the Treasury + Department. Very few licenses have been given in the past—none in + Argentina. Chrysler, in order to accept the Cuban order, has applied to + Treasury. We therefore need to decide very soon how to treat this issue + in Argentina.

+

Our options are:

+

1. Make no exceptions to our Cuban denial + policy—possibly subjecting US companies to strong Argentine retaliatory + measures and straining US-Argentine relations.

+

2. Make full exceptions for Argentina by granting + a Presidential Waiver on military and economic assistance and by + licensing Argentine ships and US companies in Argentina engaged in the + Argentine-Cuban trade. This would undermine the effectiveness of our + Cuban denial policy and possibly encourage other members of the + Organization of American States to increase efforts to end the + multilateral restrictions toward Cuba.

+

3. Grant no waivers on military and economic + assistance but issue licenses to US firms in + Argentina on a case-by-case basis if they can demonstrate they face + serious Argentine retaliation or possible closure from failure to sell + to Cuba.

+

4. Modify or ease our entire Cuban denial policy + in its multilateral-OAS aspects and + thereby automatically remove the problem with Argentina.

+

I believe the third option best serves our overall interests. It would + hold firm on the broad range of Cuban denial measures with modification only in the granting of a + few licenses to US companies which can clearly demonstrate that failure + to follow Argentine requirements to sell to Cuba would expose them to + serious retaliatory action. We would continue to reaffirm our Cuba + policy and to maintain pressure on US companies and other governments to + hold the present line with us. Treasury and Commerce, who have + responsibility for administering the Cuban denial measures, agree that + Option 3 is the wisest course.

+

Recommendation

+

That you approve Option 3 (grant no waivers of the provisions of our + Cuban denial policy on military and economic assistance for Argentina + but approve issuing licenses to US firms in Argentina on a case-by-case + basis if they can demonstrate they face serious Argentine retaliation if + they refuse to sell to Cuba).

+
+ +
+ 13. National Intelligence Estimate 91–74 +

Summary: The Estimate assessed Argentina’s + prospects in light of domestic politics, U.S.-Argentine + relations, and Perón’s + failing health.

+

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 362, Subject Files, + National Intelligence Estimates. Secret; [handling restriction not declassified]. According to a + note on the cover sheet, the Estimate was prepared by the CIA and the intelligence + organizations of the Departments of State, Defense, Treasury, + and [text not declassified]. All members + of the U.S. Intelligence Board concurred in the Estimate with + the exception of the representative of the FBI, who abstained because the + subject was outside his jurisdiction.

+ + + + Washington, January + 31, 1974. +

PROSPECTS FOR ARGENTINA

+

PRÉCIS

+

+ Perón has thus far held to a + moderate course in both domestic and international affairs, but if he + lives this is likely (60–80 percent chance) to change over time.

+ + —Perón will not be able to + maintain discipline or unity within his disparate + constituency. + + —His economic policies have conflicting objectives and are + unlikely to produce the desired results, despite some initial + successes. + —He does not have the assets to win in competition with Brazil for + regional preeminence or to make a successful bid for leadership in + the “Third World.” + —In frustration, Perón is + likely to shift to the demagogic “solutions” reminiscent of his + first presidency and to tactics which will exacerbate the divisions + within Argentina. + —Domestic political considerations, his own pretensions, and his + basic antipathy to the US will almost inevitably introduce frictions + into US-Argentine relations. + +

Personal and financial risk to US investors in Argentina will remain high + over the foreseeable future.

+ + —The terrorist problem is not likely to be brought under control + any time soon and security hazards for foreign businessmen will + continue. + —Perón’s somewhat + xenophobic nationalism, the conflict between his populism and the + requirements of Argentine development, and his overall inconsistency + present the prospect that the government will turn anti-business + despite Perón’s desire for + capital investment. + +

The state of Perón’s health makes + it very unlikely that he will survive his term. Should he die in office, + no successor will be able to hold his coalition together.

+ + —As things now stand, chances are better than even that there + would be a constitutional transfer of power to the vice + president. + —The odds are lower, but still substantial, for an + unconstitutional transfer of power to an interim government + dominated or strongly influenced by the military. + —Less likely, but still a possibility, is a temporary period of + turbulence, political confusion, and probably violence followed by a + government that the military would have the primary role in + establishing. + +

The Central Intelligence Agency and the Department of State, with the + Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army + sharing their view, do not agree with the judgments that Perón is likely + over time “to shift to the demagogic ‘solutions’ reminiscent of his + first presidency,” or that he “will almost inevitably introduce + frictions into US-Argentine relations.” While such outcomes are possible, Perón’s record since his return to Argentina last June + does not support the judgments that they are “likely” or “almost + inevitable.” The Central Intelligence Agency and the Department of State + estimate that the emerging national consensus being fostered by + Perón’s essentially moderate + policies, reinforced by the general belief in Argentina that all + alternatives to him are unworkable, gives him a slightly better than + even chance of holding to his present course. The Assistant Chief of + Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army believes that the odds + are only about 40 percent that he will be able to do so.

+ +

THE ESTIMATE

+

1. Now that he has returned to power, Juan + Perón’s first tasks are to restore domestic prosperity + and to heal bitter political and social divisions. This will be no easy + task for an ailing man who is nearly 80. Straddling the rifts within his + own fractionalized entourage, containing the terrorist problem, + developing a sensible economic program, and creating an effective + political consensus will severely test Perón’s political talents and his physical energies.

+

2. Argentina is asking of the aging Perón what no leader has achieved in 40 years: to make + the country fulfill its potential. Argentines know that their country, + with its riches in natural and human resources, should be booming + industrially and that its vast fertile land should be a major source of + food for the world. Instead, recurring political crises and economic + mismanagement have slowed its development, though even these failures + have not substantially altered the comfortable life style available to + most of its citizens.

+
+ +

President Juan Domingo Perón

+ + +

+ I. Political Strengths and + Weaknesses

+

3. Perón begins with more + political assets than any government in recent Argentine history. His + support is broader than any leader has known since his heyday a + generation ago. Throughout the nation’s history the population has + denied broad support to elected leaders and offered resistance to authoritarian strong men. This + has contributed to the lag in the development of political institutions. + National chagrin at failure to be great has replaced the pride and + exuberance of the boom years early in the century. Argentina’s current + gamble that Perón—despite the + legacy of corruption and bankruptcy left from his first reign—can turn + aspirations to reality gives the incumbent government an important + psychological advantage so notably lacking in the recent past.

+ +

4. The Peronist movement that returned to power in 1973 is much more + broadly based than the one that first elected Perón in 1946. From its quasi-fascist + origins it has spread to encompass a broad spectrum of political + ideologies and class interests. In addition to the trade union base that + Perón created and used as + his first springboard to power, the movement now includes many young + supporters attracted by his nationalistic appeal and the revolutionary + populism he advocated in exile. Peronism also has been embraced by + substantial numbers from the middle class, as well as businessmen, + professionals, and some of the intelligentsia. Despite the anti-Semitic + overtones of Perón’s policies + during the 1940s, a large segment of the financially important Jewish + community also supports Perón. + While urban labor is the mainstay of the movement, provincial support + has been a key factor in Perón’s + personal strength.

+ +

5. Also working in Perón’s favor + is the realistic attitude adopted by the military forces. After + dominating politics since Perón’s ouster in 1955, they have retreated to the + barracks—at least for the moment. They are disillusioned with their own + record of failure in governing and acutely aware of widespread public + contempt for their leadership. Retirement of numerous senior officers + has reduced anti-Peronist attitudes and the new crop of leaders, while + not apolitical, are persuaded that the military should concentrate on + its professional concerns. Mindful of the need to regain public + acceptance, the military are unwilling to interfere with a legitimate + government without extreme provocation.

+

6. Like the military, opposition parties have adjusted to the realities + of Perón’s landslide victory. + Peronists control the national congress and all but one or two + provincial governments, leaving other parties only marginal + opportunities to make an impact, even if they could work together. In + addition, Perón’s appeals for + national unity have cut into potential support for non-Peronists. The + major opposition group—the Radicals—has cooperated to some extent with + the Peronists in congress.

+

7. Despite the factors working in his favor, Perón has his problems, many of them within his own + movement. During Cámpora’s brief tenure as president, leftists gained an + ascendancy within the Peronist movement that threatened the politically + more moderate trade union base. + This trend, combined with a spread of civil disorder and + leftist-inspired violence, goaded Perón into cracking down harshly on some of his + “Marxist” supporters. This shift to the right intensified the level of + struggle between opposing ideological factions to the point of open + warfare between so-called orthodox Peronists—conservative old guard + labor leaders—and youth and labor groups of leftist persuasion. It also + surfaced dissatisfaction with Perón’s policies. While many left-wing adherents still + cling to a hope that Perón will + eventually move to the left, their disillusionment and sense of + alienation are growing.

+

8. The prospect of chaos in the event of a full-fledged confrontation + among Peronists has not been lost on the extreme left. Marxist + terrorists are intensifying their campaign of kidnapping, assassination, + and bombings in hopes of creating just such a situation. Perón’s problem will be to isolate and + subdue the extremists without alienating his own supporters of the + moderate left. Clandestine para-military commandos have been organized + and equipped by the federal police to take extra-legal action against + left-wing terrorists. The armed forces, except for providing + intelligence support, have avoided involvement in counter-terrorism, + fearing that it would further erode their image. Abstention over the + longer run, however, may prove difficult, if repressive action by + security forces provokes an escalating round of violence that the + government is unable to control.

+

9. Since his inauguration in September, Perón has discovered that consolidating his personal + authority over the Peronist movement is more difficult now that he is on + the scene. In exile and out of power, he could more easily play off one + faction against another and shift to others the responsibility for + making certain decisions. As president, he will be held ultimately + accountable. It will be much harder to please all the diverse elements + in his coalition, and as Perón + begins to make hard decisions, the likelihood increases that he will + alienate one or another group of his supporters.

+

+ The principal view of likely developments, endorsed by + the Director of Central Intelligence, is contained in the two + following paragraphs. + +

This view + is held by the Defense Intelligence Agency, the [less than 1 line not declassified], and + the Department of the Treasury, and is shared by the Director of + Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy, and the Assistant + Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force. + [Footnote in the original.]

+ +

+

10. So far Perón has practiced + conciliatory politics and has pursued essentially moderate policies, but + the nettlesome problems his government faces and the character of + Perón himself give little + promise that this will continue for long. Many who remember the earlier + Peronist era believe that Perón + will eventually revert to his old tactics. And they are probably right, + given his instinct for Byzantine maneuver and for political chicanery and deception. As he acts to + keep his opponents and even his supporters off balance, he is likely to + exacerbate differences within the turbulent Argentine community and to + renew old suspicions and animosities. With the consequent erosion of the + consensus that greeted his return, Perón would not hesitate to turn on his critics and + erstwhile friends.

+

11. Little in Perón’s style of operating promises + effective movement against the difficult problems of contemporary + Argentina. If he finds himself unable to quash the terrorist threat or + achieve successes in remedying the economic situation, he will probably + resort to the demagogic “solutions” he tried before, at the expense of + stability and growth.The Department of the + Treasury would add that while Perón appears likely to make a number of decisions + which will aggravate Argentina’s economic problems, there are + sufficient underlying elements of strength in the economy that + whatever damage accrues could probably be cushioned in the near term + by temporizing measures. The Department of the Treasury considers + that personal, political, and security factors probably will be more + important than economic pressures in determining whether Perón again resorts to demagogic + actions. [Footnote in the original.] With few real solutions + in sight, some such turnaround is probable (60–80 percent chance). But + tactics that served in the 1940s and 1950s will not help Perón now. He no longer has the + resources necessary for grandiose programs, and the more sophisticated + political blocs of the 1970s are not so vulnerable to the kind of + cynical power-brokering he used in the past. Under these circumstances, + it cannot be excluded that he would first turn to the US for economic + assistance. He would have to weigh a request carefully, however, because + many of his more nationalistic supporters would find an approach to the + US difficult to accept.

+

+ Another view of likely developments is contained in the + two following paragraphs.This view + is held by the Central Intelligence Agency and the Department of + State and is shared by the Assistant Chief of Staff for + Intelligence, Department of the Army. [Footnote in the + original.] +

+

10a. So far Perón has practiced + conciliatory politics and has pursued essentially moderate policies. + This is contributing to the evolution of a new national consensus, which + is Perón’s most significant + accomplishment and the key to the eventual solution of Argentina’s basic + problems. The consensus, however, is still extremely fragile.

+

11a. Perón’s ability to continue + his moderate approach will depend largely on how well he copes with + serious problems flowing from the internal security situation and the + economy. The degree to which he is successful in handling these problems + will determine the continuing viability of his coalition. A serious + weakening of the coalition would tempt him to resort to populist + solutions at the expense of stability and growth. He will certainly use many of the + political tactics and stratagems he acquired during his first + administration to attempt to maintain his coalition and move Argentina + ahead, but these need not exacerbate existing differences. He will be + aided in his efforts by the general belief in Argentina that there are + no workable alternatives to him, that his uncertain health allows the + body politic but limited time to strengthen the evolving consensus, and + by the fact that popular hopes are pinned on his efforts. The Central + Intelligence Agency and the Department of State estimate that Perón’s chances of maintaining his + coalition, continuing on a moderate course, and moving Argentina ahead + are slightly better than even. The Assistant Chief of Staff for + Intelligence, Department of Army, believes the odds are only about 40 + percent that he can do so.

+

+ II. Domestic and Foreign + Policies

+

12. Perón has ambitious goals for + at home and abroad, some of which he lacks the means to attain. His + aspirations in the international sphere are more likely to be frustrated + than fulfilled, but he retains a capability to make things difficult for + the US on specific issues. Some of his domestic policies, notably in the + economic field, seem likely to damage both the economy and foreign + investors in Argentina.

+

13. Peronist economic policies are directed at the short run objective of + economic stabilization and long run goals of economic development and + redistribution of income in favor of wage earners. The relevant programs + are being carried out under an economic philosophy which emphasizes + state intervention and economic nationalism. The objectives of the + programs tend to conflict, however. The social programs require outlays + which are inflationary and divert resources from industrial development + projects, while the subsequent economic and political atmosphere + discourages those with the funds and skills that Argentina lacks.

+

14. The Peronists did succeed in achieving some economic successes in + 1973. When they assumed power in May, the country was in the midst of + its worst inflation in 30 years. The cost of living had risen by 56 + percent in 1972 and at an annual rate of about 95 percent during the + first five months of 1973. The Cámpora government quickly clamped a + freeze on prices, and limited wage increases. During the following five + months, the cost of living changed less than 1 percent and the total + increase for the year was about 45 percent. Real gross domestic product + (GDP) registered a 4 to 5 percent + increase in 1973, led by a dramatic improvement in grain production and + exports. The trade surplus was around $870 million, and the + balance-of-payments surplus was around $670 million. Gross foreign + exchange reserves more than doubled to nearly $1.5 billion, as a result + of a sharp growth in short term credits.

+ +

15. If present economic policies are continued, the outlook for 1974 and + beyond is less rosy. In 1974 GDP could + be about as great as in 1973, but the economy will see lowered corporate + profits, reduced private investment, domestic and foreign, and some + shortages of goods and renewed inflation. By 1975, these policies are + likely to produce economic stagnation, lowered real incomes, inflation + and shortages, and problems with the balance-of-payments. Although wage + and price controls have halted the price spiral, inflationary pressures + are mounting; the volume of money in circulation more than doubled in + 1973, public spending continues to outstrip revenues at an alarming + rate, and the budget deficit in 1974 is expected to exceed the 8 percent + of GDP registered in 1973. Large scale + social welfare programs, such as the two year, $1.3 billion public + housing program announced in July, will increase the deficit and divert + needed funds to relatively unproductive endeavors. While recent tax + reforms may reduce tax evasion, government revenues are not likely to + increase since the major thrust of legislative efforts is the + redistribution of income through shifts in the tax burden.

+

16. Argentina’s financial resources—both domestic and foreign—will be + strained to the breaking point if Perón makes a serious effort to complete his overly + ambitious three-year development plan. The plan calls for more than 10 + billion dollars in public sector investment by 1977 in a variety of + projects. Despite Peronist assertions that international financial + institutions will in 1974 provide some $800 million in development + assistance, Argentina will probably receive less than $200 million + during the year. Argentina already has a public external debt of about + $3.2 billion, which requires service payments in excess of $2.2 billion + in the three years 1973 through 1975.

+

17. The state’s takeover of foreign trade in grain and meat is likely to + worsen Argentina’s economic difficulties. This action, combined with + domestic price controls, has discouraged production of these items, the + source of some 80 percent of Argentina’s foreign exchange earnings. For + these reasons and because of poor weather, wheat plantings for 1973/1974 + are down nearly 25 percent and wheat exports from the crop are expected + to be only 1 million tons, as compared with 3.2 million tons from the + 1972/1973 crop. The government also has had difficulty in assuring + domestic supplies of beef—despite record herds—because controlled prices + have deterred suppliers from slaughtering their cattle.

+

18. The clouded economic outlook, political uncertainty, and domestic + terrorism have adversely affected the investment climate. At stake is + some $3 billion in foreign direct investment, of which $1.4 billion is + from the US. Buenos Aires recently passed legislation restricting to + 12.5 percent per year the amount of profit which can be remitted abroad. + The law also discriminates against “foreign” (51 percent foreign equity) + and “mixed” (20 percent to 50 percent foreign equity) companies vis-à-vis “national” companies + (less than 20 percent foreign equity). Although apparently watered down + at Perón’s behest, the + legislation still inhibits new investment from abroad. Congressional + moves against ITT subsidiaries and the “renationalization” of foreign + bank holdings acquired after 1966 are other deterrents. Perón’s aggressive export promotion + will also create problems. As a result of credits granted Castro’s + government ($200 million per year over a six-year period), US + subsidiaries have been pressed to export manufactured goods to Cuba, + which would be in violation of US laws. If US firms refuse to engage in + such trade, there would be reprisals against them and charges of US + interference in Argentina’s affairs.

+

19. One of the driving forces of Perón’s policy since the early 1950s has been a keen + desire to propel himself—and Argentina—onto the world stage as a + spokesman for Latin America and the non-aligned. This hunger for + international prestige and hemispheric leadership is shared by the major + opposition groups and by the overwhelming majority of the populace. They + also share in the attitude of cultural superiority toward Argentina’s + neighbors and a European outlook that underlies its yearnings for an + extra-continental role. Sensibilities have been rubbed raw in recent + years as evidence of Argentina’s own shortcomings has grown and as its + giant rival, Brazil, has surged ahead economically. Thus, Perón’s assertive role in pursuit of + national greatness finds widespread welcome at home. It also diverts + attention from domestic problems.

+

20. In the hemisphere, Perón is + engaged in an effort to capture the leadership of the Spanish-speaking + nations. He will find this difficult, because Argentina’s failures + undermine the credibility of such an effort, and because many of the + Spanish-speaking countries have little sense of kinship with an + Argentina they consider to be arrogant and European. He can be expected + to do what he can to undermine the preeminence of Brazil and to lessen + its influence in the hemisphere—but this is a game he is sure to lose. + In the states between Argentina and Brazil, where the two countries have + traditionally vied for influence, Perón will use both economic and political devices to + try to improve Argentina’s position. But prospects of weaning these + nations away from the Brazilian orbit are marginal in the face of + Brazil’s greater economic and political power. Even in Chile, where + Perón had a good chance to + increase Argentine influence with the new military junta, he has thus + far been outdone by Brazil in terms of economic aid and military assistance.

+

+ The principal view of developments in US-Argentine + relations, endorsed by the Director of Central Intelligence, is + contained in the following paragraph. + This view is held by the Defense Intelligence + Agency, the [less than 1 line not + declassified], and the Department of the Treasury, and is + shared by the Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of the + Navy, and the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of + the Air Force. [Footnote in the original.] +

+ +

21. An amicable relationship with the US serves some of Perón’s purposes—to drive a wedge + between Washington and Brasilia and to attract US and other foreign + capital, for example. Nonetheless, domestic political considerations, + his own pretensions, and his basic antipathy toward the US will cause + Perón to oppose this country + on a number of international issues and will almost inevitably introduce + frictions into US-Argentine relations. On broad international issues, + such as the law of the sea and the “obligations” of the advanced nations + toward the less developed, he will take an anti-US line. To the extent + that he can, however, he will display his independence more in the + measured style of Mexico than in the hostile manner of Peru.

+

+ Another view of developments in US-Argentine relations + is contained in the following paragraph. + This view is held by the Central Intelligence Agency + and the Department of State and is shared by the Assistant Chief of + Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army. [Footnote in the + original.] +

+

21a. Perón’s determination to + promote Argentine interests has led him to seek amicable relations with + the US. He would, among other things, hope to use such relations in his + efforts to foster Argentine development, counter the influence of + Brazil, and to achieve a leadership role in Latin America generally. + However, domestic political considerations and differing foreign policy + goals will cause him to oppose the US on specific issues. To the extent + feasible, he will show his independence from the US in a measured rather + than a hostile manner.

+

+ III. Argentina after + Perón +

+

22. Perón’s precarious health + focuses attention on the succession problem. He has a history of recent + heart attacks, coronary insufficiency, an apparently low-grade + malignancy of the prostate, and other medical disorders. The following + paragraphs outline three broad courses of development in the event of + his death or incapacitation: a by-the-book succession of the vice + president; a non-constitutional transfer of power to an interim + government; a period of turbulence. At this time, chances of a constitutional succession appear better than + even, but the odds could shift fairly rapidly in favor of an unconstitutional takeover. A period of acute instability is considerably less likely, + yet it cannot be ruled out.

+ +
+ +

Vice President Isabel Martínez Perón

+ + +

23. Constitutional: Vice President Perón moves into the + Presidency. With seven years of unpopular military rule + recently ended, legal succession will have a special force of its own. + Unless Perón’s popularity has + largely vanished at the time of his death or incapacitation, + Mrs.Perón’s accession to the + presidency will appeal to several significant power blocs. This would be + the smoothest transfer for the Peronists; to go + further down the line of succession would require the scheduling of an + election within 30 days—a contest which the movement could ill afford + without the unifying presence of Perón. Mrs. Perón and her closest associates are linked with the + conservative wing of the movement, and she can probably count on the + support, at least initially, of the largest Peronist sector, and can + lean on the advice and guidance of Perón’s key advisors. Significantly, [less than 1 line not declassified] that the military would accept her succession. The armed forces, not + anxious for renewed political responsibility and recognizing that + popular sentiment is strongly against them, prefer a position of + influence behind a civilian president. Major opposition parties and business interests would accept, and + perhaps even support, such a moderate Peronist-military alliance as the + forces for legitimacy and stability lined up against the violence-prone + leftist blocs.

+

24. Unconstitutional Takeover: A Caretaker + Government. If the Peronist popularity has seriously eroded, or + if infighting among the Peronists has weakened the moderates’ ability to dominate the movement, + resistance to continued Peronist rule could rule out a constitutional + succession. In these circumstances, the armed forces would probably form + a junta until the political situation calmed enough to permit elections + or establish an interim government in alliance with civilian + groups—possibly with Peronist moderates and the Radical Party. In either + case the rationale would be to maintain order through the uneasy period + sure to follow Perón’s + departure. Lacking a real popular base, a caretaker administration would + have an even more difficult time than would Mrs. Perón in exercising control without + resort to harsh repressive measures. Return to institutional forms would + be some time off.

+

25. A Period of Turbulence. In this case, the + inability of any political party to assert authority and indecision by + the military would prevent a smooth succession. A period of political + confusion and probably violence would ensue as various elements vied for + control. The political vacuum would be of limited duration, though just + how long it would take for the situation to sort itself out would depend + on many variables, such as the personalities involved, the determination + or desperation of the contending forces, and public reaction. How things would sort out is also unpredictable; + but it is reasonably clear that the military would have the primary role + in establishing the government that evolved.

+

26. None of the alternative lines of development provides an inherently + stable situation. Both the constitutional and unconstitutional + successions are essentially “establishment” solutions that will be + opposed violently by the radical left. With Perón gone, no Peronist leader will be able to hold + together the clear majority he was able to garner, and a breakup of the + coalition seems all but certain. Thus, Perón’s death will call into play all the shortcomings + of Argentina’s multiparty system. Moreover, neither the political + parties nor the military are likely to provide a leader with the stature + and charisma to command broad respect. Even if an alliance of the forces + of moderation can control violence and achieve an orderly succession, + the likelihood is that the divisiveness that has retarded Argentina’s + development for decades will continue to thwart solution of the + country’s basic problems.

+
+ + +
+ 14. Telegram 1100 From the Embassy in Argentina to the Embassy in + Brazil +

Summary: In a + meeting with Vignes, + Kubisch noted that + possible sales to Cuba by U.S. firms in Argentina had created a + problem for the U.S. Government and wondered if the Argentine + Government might consider alternative policies.

+

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + [no film number]. Confidential; Immediate. Kubisch traveled to Brasília + after his February 10–11 stop in Buenos Aires. Repeated to the + Department.

+ + + + Buenos Aires, February 11, 1974, + 2010Z. +

1100. Brasilia for ARA Asst Secy + Kubisch from Krebs. Subject: Kubisch/Vignes MemCon: Cuban Denial Policy.

+

1. Summary. Asst Secretary Kubisch told FonMin Vignes that potential sales by Argentine subsidiaries of + US firms to Cuba has raised very serious problem for USG. He asked Vignes whether, in light of foregoing, GOA might be disposed to consider + alternative procedures in order to prevent this problem from doing + damage to our overall bilateral relations at a time when latter are + entering new and promising phase. Vignes said GOA problem + is that firms are located in Argentina and operate under Argentine law + and GOA cannot allow either home + governments or company headquarters to dictate policy. He agreed on + desirability of exploring other possibilities and said that matter could + have been resolved much more easily if it were not for extensive + publicity to date. End summary.

+

2. Meeting took place 12:30–1:30 Feb 11 in FonMin Vignes’ office. Beside Kubisch and Vignes, participating were Argentine + Undersecretary Foreign Affairs Carasales, Ambassador Hill, Minister Krebs and Mr Eaton.

+

3. At close of discussion on possible change in USG posture regarding Cuba and how that subject might be + treated at FonMins meeting in Mexico, Kubisch recalled that nearly 10 months have elapsed + since Argentina re-established relations with Cuba and asked Vignes how relations developing. + Vignes replied “very well”, + that Cuban representatives behaving and Cuba is a good trade partner + because it pays promptly. Kubisch asked how Cubans were paying. Vignes said that GOA believes it can discount credit + documents in Switzerland. Vignes + went on to describe credit line as totalling $1200 million at $200 + million per year exclusively for purchases of specified classes of + Argentine manufactured goods, principally vehicles, tractors, heavy + equipment.

+

4. Kubisch said the possible + participation in this trade by US subsidiaries located in Argentina + raises very serious problem for USG, + not only in that it would establish a precedent for other countries but + in that it would affect our + compliance with OAS sanctions and would + jeopardize the stand we have taken throughout the world. To Vignes’ observation that Canadians are + selling to Cuba, Kubisch replied + these are wholly Canadian firms. Vignes countered that the firms involved here are + established and operating under Argentine law.

+

5. Kubisch said if Argentina is + determined to proceed with these sales, it will create a serious problem + both for the US subsidiaries and for the USG. We would like to know whether Argentina intends to go + ahead in the light of the foregoing and of the effect it would + undoubtedly have on our bilateral relations at this juncture. Vignes said he had been told yesterday + that there would be no problem for the firms and turned to Carasales, who nodded confirmation. + (Comment. This may have referred to allegations appearing in local + press, presumably based on so-called “inside information”, to the effect + that USG would grant waivers. End + comment.)

+

6. Vignes went on to say that + problem is much more serious for Argentina because it cannot allow each + country or each company headquarters to dictate Argentine commercial + policy. He cited Fiat case as an example; company headquarters had + approached GOA seeking relief for local + subsidiary on supplying Cuba as the company wished to have the Italian + parent company do business with Cuba.

+

7. Kubisch asked whether there + might be some alternative procedure, such as arranging the sale through + “third party”. Vignes replied + “this will have to work itself out. We cannot allow this issue to become + an element of discord”. At the same time he stated firmly that Argentina + must be in position to set its own commercial policy and he asked if + Kubisch could agree with + this formulation. Kubisch + concurred that the firms involved are Argentine firms and that we would + hope to explore other possibilities and that we too wished to avoid + having this damage US/Argentine relations.

+

8. Concluding the discussion, Vignes observed that the whole matter could have been + resolved a great deal more easily except for the fact that it has been + extensively publicized over these past months.

+ + + Hill + + +
+ + +
+ 15. Transcript of a Telephone Conversation Between President Nixon and Secretary of State Kissinger + +

Summary: Nixon asked Kissinger to implement, in a low-key way, the + licensing of U.S. firms in Argentina selling goods to Cuba.

+

Source: Department of State, FOIA Electronic Reading Room, Kissinger Transcripts. + Unclassified. Nixon’s + decision to authorize sales to Cuba by U.S. firms in Argentina + is recorded in Document 12. In a + February 20 meeting with Vignes, Kissinger stated that U.S.-Cuban relations must + be “kept apart” from overall hemispheric relations, “otherwise + both problems would be more difficult to solve.” (Telegram 1632 + from Mexico, February 22; National Archives, RG 59, Central + Foreign Policy File, [no film number]) In a February 22 + memorandum to the President, Scowcroft stated that Kissinger had reported from + the Tlatelolco Conference of Foreign Ministers in Mexico City + that “Argentina is moving in our direction on every issue but + Cuba; on that one we will continue to have trouble.” (Memorandum + from Scowcroft to + Nixon, February 22; + Ford Library, + National Security Adviser, Scowcroft Daily Work Files, 1974–1977, Box 6, + 2/19–28/74)

+ + + + Washington, April 17, 1974, 8:28 + p.m. +

K: Mr. President.

+

N: Yes, hi.

+

K: I’m sorry to disturb you. We have one matter with this Latin American + meeting and the one that’s happening at the OAS. As you know, there are a number of American + subsidiaries in Argentina and the Argentines have passed a law according + to which if they don’t sell to Cuba they’re going to be + nationalized.

+

N: I see.

+

K: And you had already approved in February that under those conditions + we can make a special exception and we can’t really take the position + that American companies in Argentina cannot obey Argentine law. If you + had approved that and I held up the implementation of it because the + Brazilian government at that time was changing and they had some doubts + about it, now the Brazilian Government has come to us and have indicated + that they favor our going ahead and if we could go ahead within the next + day on this then Argentina would not introduce a resolution in Atlanta + which would have the effect of lifting the sanctions altogether + throughout the Western Hemisphere.

+

N: It’s a dead loser as far as anything here is concerned to indicate any + backing down in regard to it will raise a hell of a storm.

+

K: Well, we’re not backing down with Cuba. The position we’re + taking—we’re not lifting any. . . .

+

N: Well just don’t make any announcement on it, just do it.

+

K: OK.

+

N: Just do it very very very quietly. Don’t make a big thing out of + it.

+ +

K: No, we wouldn’t announce it, we’d just let the Argentines do it in a + low key way.

+

N: Alright, fine. OK, Henry.

+

K: Right, Mr. President.

+
+ +
+ 16. Telegram 87526 From the Department of State to the Embassy in + Argentina +

Summary: In a + meeting with Secretary Kissinger, Foreign Minister Vignes voiced his concern over + the U.S. Government’s policy toward Cuba.

+

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + P850027–1724. Confidential; Nodis. Drafted by Davis on April 26; cleared by + Luers, Kubisch, Eagleburger, and + Ortiz.

+ + + + Washington, April 29, 1974, 2258Z. +

87526. Subject: Secretary’s Meeting With Foreign Minister Vignes.

+

1. The Secretary met with Foreign Minister Vignes on Tuesday, April 16, for approximately one hour. + Other participants were Ambassador Orfila, Assistant Secretary Kubisch, Stephen + Low of the NSC Staff and + an interpreter. There follows summary of the discussion:

+

2. Cuba and the MFM—Vignes said Argentina seriously + preoccupied by continuing isolation of Cuba. The situation presents a + spectacle which is not in accord with international atmosphere of + peaceful coexistence. There is a need for a solution. Vignes said he would raise Cuba in the + MFM but would not propose a + specific solution. Vignes said + that he thought solution could be found without compromising the US. The + Secretary responded by saying that organizing the MFM so soon after the Mexico meeting was a + mistake. Vignes agreed. The + Secretary said one right step would be to support the selection of + Buenos Aires as the site for the next meeting. The Secretary then said + that if friction developed over the Cuba question in Washington, + US-Latin American relations would be set back substantially and the + whole idea of periodic Foreign Ministers’ meetings could be jeopardized. + The Secretary said he thought that the MFM could set up working groups to prepare for the next + meeting in B.A. and to proceed in the spirit of Tlatelolco. Vignes agreed and stressed his + personal conviction of the importance of good relations between the US + and Argentina.

+

3. Vignes said the Argentine + people would not understand if he did not speak out clearly on Cuba. He + said he thought he had a formula + which would give satisfaction to the US and to Argentina. He would state + at the conference that the problem of Cuba is a problem for all the + Latin American countries and he believed the Foreign Ministers should + face it squarely. The Secretary asked if that was all he was going to + say. Vignes said he intended to + say much more but that the fundamental point was that he was not going + to propose a specific solution. He would speak in general terms about + coexistence and the need for a solution to the problem. He would then + yield to Rabasa who would suggest that Cuba be invited to the next + meeting. The Secretary asked what would happen then. Vignes said that he did not have a + crystal ball but that this procedure would give everybody eight months + and in that time the Secretary would be able to work out a solution. The + Secretary said that if the meeting proceeded in a constructive way, if + Cuba were the only controversial item, if there then were no clear cut + resolution on Cuba, with only Mexico and Argentina speaking on the + subject, then he thought we could live with it. He then asked if + Vignes was going to make any + other proposals on this subject at the OAS meeting. Vignes + said he would not ask for the incorporation of Cuba in the OAS but he could not give assurances that + the matter would not come up. He said if a vote on sanctions came up a + two-thirds majority would be required. In that case the US could + abstain, the vote would fall short and the Ministers would be rid of the + problem. The Secretary then asked if Vignes was definitely planning on making this proposal + if the subject came up and he responded in the affirmative. The + Secretary said that such a move could not come at a worse possible + moment. He said that he personally believed that relations with Cuba + could be improved over time but that if the US is pressed into a rapid + solution it would lead to an explosion. The Secretary said that we could + live with some discussion in Washington but that bringing up Cuba in + Atlanta would be too much. He told Vignes we were considering changing our position on + OAS voting procedures but we could + not do so if a vote on Cuba sanctions were to follow. This would give + the appearance of collusion and would be an impossible move for us.

+

4. Vignes responded by saying + that the Argentines were searching for a solution and that if Mexico + would propose that Cuba be invited to the next conference this proposal + would be accepted and that there would be no further argument. The + Secretary said that we could not accept this and the best solution would + be the one that gave us eight months time. Vignes said that he could not ask the countries to wait + eight months and that the point he wanted to make was that all the + nations should study the problem and search for a solution. The + Secretary pointed out other countries such as Brazil, Chile, and Uruguay + would not agree with the + Argentine approach and the US also could not agree. The Secretary + pointed out that the US could not be put in a position of having a + decision taken in Washington to invite Cuba to a Foreign Ministers’ + meeting. If it reached that point the US would simply have to say that + it would not attend and would work to prevent it from happening. + Vignes responded that he was + not advocating a vote and that he wanted a decision without a vote. The + Secretary said what the US could not have in Washington was a decision + to invite Cuba even if that decision were arrived at by silence. + Vignes said he understood + and proposed that instead of Rabasa saying that he wanted to invite Cuba + to the conference he would ask only for the formation of a working + group. The Secretary said we could consider that though, of course, we + couldn’t support it. (Further discussion concerning MFM tactics and the timing of the Buenos + Aires meeting followed. Vignes + suggested March.) The Secretary then proposed that Vignes make his statement, Rabasa + would then say he proposed to invite Cuba. The Secretary would then say + that he thought that Vignes as + the host for the next conference should consult with all the governments + of the hemisphere about their views. The Secretary said that he would + not oppose or support the proposal but that would, in itself, be a + positive American approach. He would make our position clear and hope + that before March 1975 some progress could be made.

+

5. The Secretary said he hoped that he would be able to visit Buenos + Aires before that time. Vignes + expressed pleasure and said he would so inform President Perón. The Secretary said that + Vignes could count on his + visit because an understanding between Argentina and the US can be the + basis for Western Hemisphere policy.

+

6. Vignes then summarized his + proposal on Cuba and the Secretary agreed that the Argentines should + consult with the other countries about their views and ideas and the + wisdom of inviting Cuba but that no vote would be asked for at the + MFM. The Secretary then asked if + this procedure would enable the subject to be avoided at the OAS. Vignes said he would have to touch on the matter but + that he would say that Argentina had found a solution it considered + viable. The Secretary then repeated that the US was considering the + possibility of agreeing on a change in the voting procedure on + sanctions. He reiterated that we would only be able to do this if there + was no vote in Atlanta because we could not have it appear as if we were + in collusion.

+

7. US subsidiaries—Vignes, near + the end of the conversation, asked about the US subsidiaries and the + question of automobile sales. The Secretary said he thought he could get + a positive answer by Thursday, April 18. Vignes said he wanted to be able to have an answer + before leaving Washington and that it would cover up the other aspects + of the Cuba matter entirely in + the Argentine press. The Secretary said that if the Cuba question could + be handled properly in Washington and Atlanta he could get a decision on + the sales.

+ + + Rush + + +
+ +
+ 17. Memorandum From Stephen Low + of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Deputy + Assistant for National Security Affairs (Scowcroft) +

Summary: Low reported + that Nixon and + Ambassador Hill + discussed the possibility of a Perón visit to the United States and the + security of Embassy personnel in Argentina. Nixon also expressed his + strong objection to waiving a prohibition on assistance to + countries with vessels engaged in trade with Cuba in order to + permit a continuation of aid to Argentina.

+

Source: Ford Library, + National Security Adviser, NSC + Latin American Affairs Staff Files, 1974–1977, Box 11, President + Ford—Appointments + (1). Confidential. Sent for information. Hill was requesting a waiver + of Section 620 (a) (3) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (75 + Stat. 424), which prohibited assistance to countries that + allowed their vessels to transport goods to or from Cuba. On a + June 5 briefing memorandum from Kissinger to Nixon for his meeting with Hill, the President wrote, + “K[issinger]—I have + made a decision—no waiver—Bring me a + decision on this immediately.” (National Archives, Nixon + Presidential Materials, NSC + Files, Box 769, Country Files, Latin America, Argentina, Vol. 3, + January 1974–August 1974) In telegram 4196 from Buenos Aires, + June 7, the Embassy warned the Department that a termination of + assistance under Section 620 (a) (3) of the Foreign Assistance + Act would undermine U.S.-Argentine relations and possibly + hemispheric relations. (Ibid., RG 59, Central Foreign Policy + File, D740145–0532)

+ + + + Washington, June + 10, 1974. + + SUBJECT + President’s Meeting with Ambassador Hill (Thursday, June 6) + +

You may be interested to know that the President and Ambassador Hill did discuss U.S.-Argentine + relations in apparently some length when they met on Thursday, June + 6.

+

Three subjects were discussed. The President asked about the possibility + of a Perón visit, and Hill told him that it looked unlikely + except possibly in connection with a U.N. visit in November. In regard + to Embassy security, the President told Hill that he wanted all possible precautions taken to + see that there were no kidnappings or personal harm to Embassy officials + and that protection should be coordinated with the Argentine Government. + Finally, the President indicated to Hill his strong objection to issuing any waiver to the + Foreign Assistance Act to permit + continuation of aid. He said there would be no change in our attitude + towards Cuba during this Administration.

+

+ ARA officials are aware of the + President’s views in these three matters and will take them into + consideration in their recommendations regarding our dilemma over the + Foreign Assistance Act.

+
+ +
+ 18. Memorandum No. 988/74 Prepared in the Central Intelligence + Agency +

Summary: The + Central Intelligence Agency provided an assessment of + Argentina’s short-term prospects following President Juan Perón’s death. The Agency + concluded that Perón’s + widow and successor was inexperienced and unpopular but that a + new Presidential election would likely “have a traumatic effect + on Argentine society.”

+

Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of Support Services + (DI), Job 85T00353R: Production Case Files (1974–1976), Box 1, + Folder 7, [no folder title]. Secret; [handling + restriction not declassified]. A note on the original + reads: “This memorandum was prepared in the Office of Current + Intelligence, Directorate of Intelligence, and coordinated with + the Directorate of Operations.” In telegram 4841 from Buenos + Aires, June 29, the Embassy reported that Vice President + María Estela (Isabel) Martínez + de Perón had assumed power as Acting President. + (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + D740173–0514) Juan Perón + died on July 1. Perón + remained in office as President, and no new Presidential + election was held.

+ + + + Washington, July 2, + 1974. + + SUBJECT + Short-Term Prospects for Argentina + +

Mrs. Perón’s tenure as president + will depend on how long it takes Peronist and military leaders to work + out a mutually acceptable solution to the succession problem. Since + Perón’s illness last fall, + various right-wing Peronist leaders have been meeting clandestinely with + both retired and active duty officers to discuss succession in the event + of Perón’s death or + incapacitation. [3½ lines not declassified]

+

The military, which is still widely unpopular, prefers an orderly + institutional succession. Major political leaders, Peronist and + non-Peronist alike, agree. With the Peronist Movement likely to undergo + a gradual disintegration, the military will have to play a key role in + establishing whatever government eventually evolves. None of the service + commanders is a particularly strong individual, and squabbles are likely + to develop over what course of action to follow. The stakes are too + great for a serious split in the unity of the military, however, and the + high command probably will stick together.

+ +

One of the first problems may be to convince Maria Estela to stay in the + job and thus avoid the election that otherwise would be mandatory. In + the past she has expressed a reluctance to assume the presidency. She is + not popular, and knows it. She recognizes her lack of experience and + inability to contend with the country’s grave problems. The fact that + Perón on several recent + occasions stated publicly that he had no “heir-apparent” suggested that + Mrs. Perón had given up any + illusions about succeeding him for more than a brief period.

+

Appeals to patriotic duty and her husband’s memory will keep her in the + job for the immediate future. Jose Lopez Rega, Perón’s private secretary and + confidant, will also advise her to retain the presidency. He is + ambitious, and with Perón gone + he will try to control Maria Estela. He is almost universally feared and + detested by political and military leaders, who probably are already + maneuvering for his ouster and exile. Without Perón’s strong hand, confusion within + the highest levels of government will grow as leaders such as Lopez + Rega, and Minister of Economy Jose Ber + Gelbard, contend for positions of power.

+

When Mrs.Perón decides that the + burdens of state are too much for her, military leaders may attempt to + persuade her to convoke a Council of State, representing all political + parties except those of the extreme left. It would be a cumbersome + entity and governing would be difficult. If she agreed to remain as + titular head of such a policy organization, national elections could be + postponed for some time. On the other hand, if Mrs.Perón steps down, her successor, + Senate President Jose Allende, + must within 30 days set a date for elections, according to the + constitution. It is not clear how soon the election must be held.

+

Another presidential election would have a traumatic effect on Argentine + society. It is unlikely that any single party candidate could receive + the absolute majority of votes required by law to forestall a runoff + contest. To form the alliances necessary to gain a majority in a runoff + would require cooperation by political groups that in the past have been + incapable of compromising their differences.

+

If Allende does become President, + the military would probably try to persuade him to put off the actual + election date as long as possible in the hope that candidates could be + agreed on. It is unlikely that Allende himself would be a leading contender since his + Christian Democratic Party is small and he lacks any other political + following. The chances are greater that the military would favor some + sort of coalition ticket. One possibility would be a joining of forces + by former provisional President Raul Lastiri, a long-time Peronist, who + heads the Chamber of Deputies, and Radical Party leader Ricardo Balbin, + who has been cooperating closely with the Peronist government.

+

The sudden return of former President Hector + Campora to Buenos Aires last week, following his + resignation as ambassador to Mexico, increases the likelihood of an attempt to form a + leftist Peronist coalition. A leftist coalition would create turmoil and + division in a campaign, giving the military another reason to try to + postpone elections until a strong candidate can be agreed on. If + military leaders are unable to find a candidate they are convinced will + win, they may turn to an extraconstitutional solution.

+

Even though all political leaders officially pledged to support + Mrs.Perón when she was + installed as temporary chief of state on June 29, a number of Peronist + factions can be expected to act independently now that Perón is dead. This is especially true + of the leftist Peronist youth leaders, who earlier this year were all + but read out of the movement by Perón himself for their disruptive demonstrations and + public attacks on his wage and price stabilization policies. Those who + seek to use Perón’s Justicialist + movement as a means to gain power can be expected to renew their + criticism of the government’s social pact that was designed to control + inflation.

+

The extremist terrorist groups will also try to take advantage of the + leadership vacuum that now exists. The People’s Revolutionary Army + probably will step up acts of violence, and other guerrilla + organizations on the fringes of the Peronist Movement may increase + terrorist operations as confusion in government grows. A general + breakdown of public order of a magnitude that would force overt military + intervention, however, does not appear likely at this time. The + extremists, although well financed, lack numerical strength. They also + have shown some sensitivity to public opinion and probably will not + overplay their hand until the period of mourning for Perón has passed.

+

No matter what happens in the short term, there is no one in view to + replace Perón. The desperate + hope of even those who hated him—that Argentina could at last fulfill + its potential under a stable government—seems to have been dashed by + Perón’s death.

+
+ +
+ 19. Transcript of the Secretary of State’s Principals’ and Regionals’ + Staff Meeting +

Summary: + Kubisch reported on + political developments in Argentina resulting from Isabel Perón’s ascension to + the Presidency and warned that the U.S. policy of applying + countervailing duties on Argentine exports could have negative + repercussions.

+

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Transcripts of Kissinger Staff Meetings, + Entry 5177, Lot 78D443, Box 4, Secretary’s Staff Meetings. + Secret. In a June 19 memorandum to Kissinger, Kubisch recommended that the Secretary ask + Simon to delay an + announcement that countervailing duties were being imposed on + Argentina; Kissinger + approved. (Ibid., Central Foreign Policy File, P830032–2280) In + a June 21 telephone conversation with Simon, Kissinger convinced Simon to delay application of + the countervailing duties for a week. (Department of State, + FOIA Electronic Reading + Room, Kissinger + Transcripts) In a June 21 staff meeting, Kubisch discussed the impact + of the countervailing duties problem on U.S.-Latin American + relations. A transcript of that discussion is published in + Foreign + Relations, 1969–1976, Vol. E–11, Part 1, Documents + on Mexico; Central America; and the Caribbean + 1973–1976. Subsequent U.S.-Argentine consultation + resulted in a U.S. determination that Argentine footwear was not + being subsidized in a way that would trigger countervailing + duties. (Telegram 304031 to Buenos Aires, December 30, 1975; + National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + D750449–0535)

+ + + + Washington, July 10, 1974, 3:20 + p.m. +

[Omitted here are a list of participants and material unrelated to + Argentina.]

+

Secretary Kissinger: How about + Argentina?

+

Mr. Kubisch: I think you are + probably fairly well up to date. The situation for Argentina is still + relatively tranquil. Whether or not Mrs.Perón will be able to hold onto power—I would say almost + certainly not. Whether she will be able to hold onto the office of the + presidency without power as a figurehead is a possibility.

+

Secretary Kissinger: Does she + want power?

+

Mr. Kubisch: I think she probably + wants to carry on as the leader of the Peronist movement. But she really + is a rather sad, very feminine person, and really is sort of bewildered + by it all.

+

Secretary Kissinger: You consider + those two adjectives necessarily—

+

Mr. Kubisch: No. I just want to + give a profile. Just a shorthand description. She is obviously in awe of + the responsibilities. She has a sixth grade education. She was a dancer, + as you may know. And she is surrounded by a lot of very tough, + ambitious, ruthless people. And there is a very real question about how + long she will stay there. From our point of view, it creates some + potential problems for us, both in terms of bilateral matters—because in + this particular period immediately ahead, something like a + countervailing duty action by Treasury can have enormous repercussions + there and strengthen the hands of some of the left.

+ +

Secretary Kissinger: Well, we + just have to stop it. We have got to do something about that + countervailing duty problem. We have got to get on top of it earlier, + and in every case where it is being considered, we ought to get a group + formed. Can we work that out with Simon?

+

Mr. Ingersoll: Sure.

+

Mr. Kubisch: We really have just + been coping in recent weeks.

+

Secretary Kissinger: Yes. But I + never get aware of it until 48 hours before it is done.

+

Mr. Kubisch: That’s the problem. + That is because we are not aware, in a sense. What happens—there was a + complaint made on Argentina a year ago. Treasury didn’t act on it, + because it was just a minor fraction of our imports, until a court made + a decision to require them to act, and then Treasury said “We are going + to announce an investigation.” We have held it off now as a result of + your intervention and other things we have done.

+

Secretary Kissinger: Is + (Vignes) likely to stay?

+

Mr. Kubisch: I don’t know. She + has reaffirmed the entire cabinet. I think he is likely to stay for a + while. I think as long as she stays as President, she will probably + maintain the same cabinet, and maintain some kind of Council of State, + to run the affairs of the country. But the moment there comes a conflict + between two or three of the elements in the government, and she is + unable to resolve it—and she probably doesn’t have the strength or the + intellect or experience to cope with it. So it could be a serious + problem and could create a problem for us, in terms of the next meeting + of Foreign Ministers—Argentina is the Secretary Pro Tem—in the next six + months it could be difficult for us because of that.

+

[Omitted here is material unrelated to Argentina.]

+
+ + +
+ 20. Action Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State for Political + Affairs (Sisco) to Secretary of + State Kissinger + +

Summary: Sisco advised Kissinger to inform the + Argentines they should avoid asking for new assistance or not + allow their ships to engage in trade with Cuba.

+

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + P850149–0591. Confidential; Exdis. Drafted by Bowdler. Neither Approve nor + Disapprove was checked for either recommendation. The staff + study that was attached at Tab A has not been found. Attached at + Tab B is a draft telegram to Buenos Aires, dated July 5, in + which the Department instructed the Embassy to remind Argentine + officials of previous discussions concerning the FAA and to seek assurances that + the Argentine Government would avoid use of Argentine vessels in + the Cuba trade. No evidence that the cable was sent has been + found. Attached at Tab C is telegram 6267 from Caracas, July 9, + and attached at Tab D is telegram 5684 from Mexico, July 6. + Hill’s conversation + with Nixon is summarized + in Document 17. In telegram 5146 from + Buenos Aires, July 14, the Embassy reported that the Argentine + Government planned to charter foreign ships to handle its trade + with Cuba. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy + File, D740187–0781) In telegram 152021 to Buenos Aires, July 13, + the Department stated that it was satisfied with the steps taken + to avoid the shipment of goods to and from Cuba in Argentine + vessels and that aid to Argentina could therefore continue. + (Ibid., [no film number])

+ + + + Washington, July + 10, 1974. +

Suspension of Economic and Military Assistance to Argentina + Under Section 620(a)(3) of the FAA +

+

I have reviewed the staff study at Tab A analyzing the options we have + for dealing with the problem of suspension of economic and military + assistance to Argentina required by Section 620(a)(3) of the FAA and agree with the analysis and + recommended course of action.

+

This action is essentially a holding operation in which we would explain + to the Argentines the applicability of Section 620(a)(3) and ask their + cooperation in either not using their ships in the Cuban trade or, if + they are unwilling to do that, not to press us for new assistance so + that we do not formally have to apply the aid suspension. (From what + Bob Hill told us of his + conversation with the President last month the chances of getting relief + through a Presidential waiver is not in the cards.)

+

Playing for time in my judgment is the wise course in view of the + increasingly fluid status of the Cuban problem. Just this morning + Ambassador McClintock reported on + a conversation with Venezuelan Foreign Minister Schacht in which the latter stated + Colombia, Venezuela, Panama and probably Costa Rica and Honduras would + join in a move to vote reestablishment of relations with Cuba (Tab C). + Last week Rabasa told Jova that President Echeverria in his swing + through South America which he began today would urge his hosts to + reestablish bilateral + relations with Cuba and support Cuban attendance at the Buenos Aires + MFM (Tab D).

+

Given the importance of this particular issue and the closeness with + which you have followed the general Cuban problem, I thought you should + be the one to take the final decision. I recommend that you approve + Option A of the staff study and authorize the cable at Tab B instructing + Embassy Buenos Aires to approach the Argentine Foreign Office. All other + agencies represented on the Under Secretaries Committee have approved + Option A.

+

Recommendation

+

1. That you approve Option A of the staff study (Tab A).

+

2. That you authorize the cable (Tab B).

+
+ +
+ 21. Telegram 6737 From the Embassy in Argentina to the Department of + State +

Summary: The + Embassy provided an analysis of U.S.-Argentine relations after + Juan Perón’s death + and concluded that Argentina’s policies toward the United States + would likely be marked by continuity rather than change.

+

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + D740249–0512. Confidential. Repeated to Brasília. The Embassy’s + follow-up analysis of Vignes’s and Gelbard’s roles in the making of Argentina’s + foreign policy has not been found. In telegram 206240 to Buenos + Aires, September 19, Bowdler informed Hill that this telegram had been “of great use + to Department and White House end-users.” (Ibid., + D740262–0675)

+ + + + Buenos Aires, September 7, 1974, + 1232Z. +

6737. Subject: Assessment of Argentine Foreign Policy Prospects.

+

Summary. With death of Juan + Perón, Argentine foreign policy has lost some of its steam. + The successor government will doubtless try to carry out Perón’s policies but without his + drive. Since they also lack his skill, this may not be a bad thing. + Further, Argentina is likely to be preoccupied with internal affairs for + some time to come, with little attention to spare for foreign policy. In + part because of internal problems, GOA + seeks accommodation with us on bilateral issues and also wants friendly + solution to Cuba issue though it may, depending on future events, feel + compelled to publicly and forcefully disagree with us on matter. End + summary.

+

1. After several years of suffering through a succession of unimaginative + and ineptly executed foreign policies, Argentina, under Juan Perón, quickly moved to reassert the nation’s + “rightful” place in Latin American and world affairs. In his Cuba + policy, his economic opening to the Bloc countries, his wooing of the + “Third World” and his efforts to regain for Argentina a much larger if + not predominant position with neighboring states, Perón gave to Argentine diplomacy two + ingredients it had lacked under his predecessors: first, he provided + domestic leadership which carried the country with him in his foreign + policy departures; secondly, and perhaps more importantly, he gave to + Argentine diplomacy a vision and intellectual coherence, coupled with an + acute appreciation of the obtainable, which other leaders had failed to + provide.

+

2. With Perón gone, the present + prospects for a continuation of the dynamism Perón imparted to foreign policy are + greatly diminished. Like those of Bismarck, Perón’s heirs will claim and indeed believe they are + following the master’s blueprint. Follow-on trade agreements with Cuba + and other socialist countries, identification with Third World causes + and a strong commitment (at least verbally) to Latin American unity can + all be expected in the foreseeable future. In part, the continuation of + the Perón policies is + attributable to momentum and to the need any policy has these days to + appear to have been initiated or endorsed by Perón. It can, however, also be + attributed to the relative lack of creativity and resourcefulness among + Perón’s foreign policy + executors. In addition, the more skillful professionals, such as + Vignes, even if motivated to + continue innovation, lack the domestic political base to project, much + less to implement, new policies. Thus, like Bismarck’s successors, they + may woodenly follow “new policies” with less energy, skill and, above + all, vision, than Perón would + have applied to them. That Perón’s policies will be implemented by hands less sure than + his would be cause for concern if Argentina were to pursue them with + great vigor, for that would certainly increase the chances that either + through miscalculation or design some of those policies might lead to + confrontations with the US and possibly with neighboring states, such as + Brazil. In fact, however, the natural preoccupation with domestic + affairs following the death of so dominant a personality as Perón, + deepened by the severity of the domestic problems he left behind, will + probably take most of the steam out of Argentina’s foreign policy for + some time to come. Indeed, to some extent it has already had that + effect. Further the shift which is now taking place in the GOA toward the Peronist “old guard” may + well give a more measured tone to Argentine policy.

+

3. One might have expected that faced with growing domestic problems, the + GOA (or certain of its members) + would begin to seek “foreign devils” upon whom to blame their problems, + or who might be used to divert the public’s attention from troubles at + home. To date + GOA officials, while issuing public + statements replete with references to anti-national forces that conspire + with local allies against the “patria”, have not yet moved beyond this + somewhat standard rhetorical formulation. It would be premature to + conclude that this will not happen. It may yet. So far, however, + indications are that the energies of the current GOA leadership are and will be almost + totally absorbed by efforts to maintain political stability, keep the + economy afloat and end the deprecations of the terrorists. We had + feared, for example, that Econ Minister Gelbard, in an effort to strengthen his own nationalist + credentials (and his position vis-à-vis Lopez Rega) might loudly make a + public issue of difficulties arising from 620(a)(3) and the + countervailing duties problem. So far, he has not done so. The Foreign + Ministry, moreover, has made a concerted effort to play down both + problems. No publicity has been given to the imposition of sanctions + under 620(a)(3) of the FAA, and after + an initially tough stand on countervailing duties, the Econ Ministry has + been very eager to resolve the matter. This more cooperative spirit in + the Econ Ministry appears to result from Minister Gelbard’s preoccupation with the + ongoing power struggle. He seems to believe that raising problems with + us might in fact simply subject him to new fire from his adversaries in + the Cabinet. There have been no indications that others in the + government want to go to the mat with us on these issues at this + time.

+

4. The closing of the EC market to + Argentine beef offers a case study of what Perón’s death has meant for Argentine foreign policy. + The EC decision, with its serious + repercussions on domestic policy, is the GOA’s most serious foreign policy problem. Under Perón, + Argentina would have had three options open to it; A) bluster and issue + empty threats of reprisal against the EC + to curry favor with certain domestic groups (both left and right), B) + attempt to put together a common front of LA beef producers to bring more effective collective + pressure on EC to change decision, or C) + engage in bilateral talks with EC to + limit damage EC policy has on Argentina. + Were Perón alive he probably + would have chosen the second option. The present government, however, + lacks clout both domestically and diplomatically to put together such a + program. It was thus left with a choice between the first and third + option. To its credit, the GOA has so + far chosen to forego unproductive grandstand play implicit in the first, + and instead has sought the quiet negotiations suggested by the third. + Similarly, on US–GOA issues of less magnitude than the EC beef decision (but with potential for + disturbing our relations), such as civ air and countervailing duties, + GOA has taken path of quiet + negotiations rather than confrontation. The US of course benefits from a + GOA policy of “dialogue” if, as we + believe, it implies a continuation of its willingness to discuss in a + private and businesslike manner our outstanding bilateral problems. On reverse side of coin, GOA officials have shown awareness and + appreciation of fact that US is also seeking no confrontations with + Argentina and wishes to reach mutually satisfactory solutions to our + problems. Both sides understand that issues such as civ air and + countervailing duties are complex ones in which each side will bargain + hard to protect its interests. However, while matters remain in + diplomatic channels and both sides have interests in seeking resolutions + to issues there is room for optimism as to outcome of negotiations.

+

5. Cuba is a special case for the GOA, + because it is a multilateral issue that has aroused a high level of + public interest, and because the GOA + will host the March MFM. Having taken a + leading role in effort to reintegrate Cuba into the inter-American + system, the GOA as it moves to the + right at home cannot afford to at same time give appearance of + abandoning its “progressive” stance re Cuba. Also, commitments made to + other LAs on this issue will not now go away because of Perón’s death. Further, Fon Min + Vignes is closely identified + with the issue of Cuban reintegration and his personal political + position would suffer if he lost the initiative on it. Nonetheless, even + on this issue the GOA gives no evidence + of wanting to beat US over the head; rather, preferred GOA position is one in which US allows + sanctions to be lifted without a bruising struggle in either OAS or MFM.

+

6. Comment. In sum, unless some presently unforeseen domestic upheaval + drastically alters the present balance of power with the GOA, we believe it will in form if not in + substance hew closely to course set by Perón. Cuba question was only major issue in that policy + which promised to lead to serious conflicts of interests with US. With + some of the push gone out of this and other initiatives launched by + Perón, the chances that we can avoid confrontations and establish a + mutually beneficial relationship would seem to be much increased.

+

Note. Embassy will shortly followup this assessment with analysis of + roles it expects Vignes and + Gelbard to play in the + evolving GOA foreign policy scene.

+ + + Hill + + +
+ + +
+ 22. Memorandum of Conversation +

Summary: President Ford, Secretary Kissinger, and Foreign Minister Vignes discussed Cuba policy, + U.S. trade legislation, the selection of a new OAS Secretary General, and the + situation in Argentina.

+

Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Memoranda of + Conversations, Box 6, September 21, 1974, Ford, Kissinger, Argentine Foreign + Minister Alberto Vignes. + Top Secret; Nodis. The meeting was held in the Oval Office. + Handwritten notations modify the first part of the second + sentence of the third paragraph so that it reads: “The hope had + been to let the Cuban situation mature until the meeting [the + Buenos Aires meeting of Western Hemisphere Foreign Ministers] in + March 1975.” Sent to Scowcroft under a covering memorandum from + Low describing it as + “a summary of the Vignes + conversation written in very general terms and with only + elliptical references to subjects like Cuba.” The full + memorandum of conversation is also attached to Low’s memorandum; during their + discussion, Ford, + Kissinger, and + Vignes agreed to + work together to postpone OAS + action on Cuba until after U.S. elections in November and to + coordinate a common approach thereafter. A memorandum of + conversation of a September 21 meeting in which Kissinger briefed Ford in advance of this + meeting with Vignes is + in + Foreign + Relations, 1969–1976, vol. E–11, Part 1, Documents + on Mexico, Cuba, and the Caribbean, 1973–1976, Document + 23.

+ + + + Washington, September 21, 1974, 11:15 a.m. + + Conversation between + President Ford + + Foreign Minister Vignes + + Secretary Kissinger + + Ambassador Orfila + + +

The meeting opened with an exchange of greetings and a press photo + session.

+

President Ford thanked Foreign + Minister Vignes for his + cooperation and helpfulness about which Secretary Kissinger had informed him, and he + asked that the Foreign Minister continue to work closely with the + Secretary. The Foreign Minister said that he had supported a foreign + policy for Argentina based on close relations with the U.S. since his + days in law school.

+

The Foreign Minister explained to the President that we have been working + to improve relations between the U.S. and Latin America since last + April. The hope had been to let the situation mature to its culmination + in March 1975, but the policy has been interrupted by the proposed + resolution which three Latin American nations had introduced at the + OAS meeting this week. The + President and Foreign Minister Vignes agreed that neither wanted to see the matter + progress too rapidly, and that more time would be helpful. Secretary + Kissinger noted the close + cooperation which existed between us. He assured the Foreign Minister + that this would continue and that the United States would consult with + Argentina before making any significant changes in its policy. The Foreign Minister praised our + past and present cooperation and said he looked forward to continuing + this cooperation in future phases of our policy.

+

On bilateral matters the Foreign Minister emphasized the need for action. + He stressed the importance of the Trade Bill. The President assured him + of the efforts which he was making in support of its passage. The + Foreign Minister suggested that another field of cooperation might be + the exchange of technology. Secretary Kissinger noted that our experts are meeting on the + subject. He looked forward to the announcement of concrete results, + perhaps when he visited Argentina next year.

+

Foreign Minister Vignes brought + up the subject of selection of a new OAS Secretary-General. He said it appears likely that + neither of the two present candidates could be elected with a large + majority; therefore, it is necessary to get someone who has broad + support. A third candidate might be from any country, even Argentina, he + said, and the deputy should be an American. Secretary Kissinger explained that we would + follow the consensus on the first vote but would hope that the winning + candidate had a large majority.

+

On departure, Foreign Minister Vignes expressed his pleasure with the conversation and + said he brought the best wishes of President Perón and the Argentine people. + President Ford spoke of the + United States’ warm friendship for Argentina and asked that his best + wishes and those of the people of the United States be conveyed to + President Perón. The Foreign + Minister again thanked the President. He noted that Argentina was going + through a series of crises which are more apparent than real. The + Government, he said, has the support of 90 percent of the people. There + is only a small group of terrorists.

+
+ + +
+ 23. Memorandum of Conversation +

Summary: Kissinger and Vignes discussed trade issues, Cuba policy, the + upcoming meeting of Western Hemisphere Foreign Ministers in + Quito, and the election of a new OAS Secretary General.

+

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Records of Henry Kissinger, Entry 5403, + Lot 91D414, Box 21, Classified External Memoranda of + Conversation, May–November 1974. Secret; Nodis. Brackets are in + the original. The meeting was held in the Secretary’s suite in + the Hotel Excelsior. Kissinger and Vignes were in Rome for the World Food + Conference. In telegram 7708 from Buenos Aires, October 18, the + Embassy reported that Vignes wanted close coordination with the United + States to insure a successful meeting of Foreign Ministers in + Buenos Aires in March 1975 and that Vignes hoped to meet with Kissinger in Rome during the + World Food Conference. (Ibid., Central Foreign Policy File, + D740297–0608) In telegram 236746 to Buenos Aires, October 26, + the Department responded that it hoped that Kissinger and Vignes would be able to agree + on the format and agenda of the MFM when they saw each other in Rome. (Ibid., + D740306–1028) In telegram 7964 from Buenos Aires, October 30, + the Embassy reported on an October 29 meeting between Bowdler and Vignes during which + preparations for the Quito and Buenos Aires MFMs were discussed. + (Ibid., D740310–0292)

+ + + + Rome, November 5, 1974, 9:40–10:15 + a.m. + + PARTICIPANTS + + Alberto Vignes, Minister + of Foreign Affairs, Argentina + Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, + Secretary of State and Assistant to the President for National + Security Affairs + + Peter W. Rodman, NSC Staff + Jose De Seabra, OPR/LS + (Interpreter) + +

[They embrace on greeting, and then sit down. Coffee is ordered.]

+

+ Vignes: You are coming from + Moscow?

+

+ Kissinger: From Moscow, New + Delhi, Dacca, Tehran, Bucharest, Belgrade . . . [Laughter]

+

+ Vignes: Congratulations!

+

+ Kissinger: Since you’re driving + me out of Latin America, I might as well organize the other parts of the + world.

+

+ Vignes: You have to come.

+

+ Kissinger: I’m coming. There is + no way I can avoid it! Before the Foreign Minister’s Conference. To + organize . . . My impression is that Argentina will take over everything + south of Panama. If the Foreign Minister stays Foreign Minister. So I + have to concentrate on Asia.

+

+ Vignes: They’re waiting for us in + Quito.

+

+ Kissinger: [Laughter] I can’t go. + They’re waiting for me in Cyprus. I think they’ll probably lift the + sanctions, don’t you?

+

+ Vignes (pauses): I’d like to know + how you’re going to vote.

+

+ Kissinger: We will abstain.

+ +

+ Vignes: Okay [Bueno]. It will be + important to talk with some countries that have some doubts; so the + conference will obtain positive results.

+

+ Kissinger: Buenos Aires?

+

+ Vignes: Quito.

+

+ Kissinger: We’ll talk to + them.

+

+ Vignes: I talked to Bowdler in Buenos Aires. Did he tell + you what transpired?

+

+ Kissinger: When?

+

+ Vignes: Six days ago.

+

+ Kissinger: No, can you tell + me?

+

[A contingent of Argentine photographers and journalists is admitted + briefly, then dismissed.]

+

You can’t announce, Mr. Foreign Minister, that we will abstain. This is + for your personal information.

+

+ Vignes: No, no. Absolutely. + Ausgeschlossen. [Laughter]

+

+ Kissinger: I always lose my coat + to the Foreign Minister. The only question is whether I lose my shirt. + And you follow me to Rome. Will you support me here [at the World Food + Conference]?

+

+ Vignes: If you support me.

+

+ Kissinger: I think you’ll be + pleased with my speech. Because it talks about access to our + markets.

+

+ Vignes: That’s what I will say in + mine. I get a little bit mad at the United States, but in the + multilateral environment, not in a bilateral environment.

+

+ Kissinger: I don’t know if that + helps me. When is your speech? Today?

+

+ Vignes: Yes, right after you.

+

+ Kissinger: I don’t know if that + creates a good spirit.

+

+ Vignes: The press is saying we + are both here to conspire against the rest of Latin America.

+

+ Kissinger: That’s not bad. It is + partially true.

+

+ Vignes: I have to mend my fences, + like you.

+

+ Kissinger: What if I attacked you + and said it was for domestic reasons?

+

[A call comes in from Secretary-General Waldheim. They agree to meet at the Conference.]

+

+ Vignes: At Quito, I do believe + it’s necessary for the Conference to reach some concrete positive + results. Otherwise we are going to have difficulties at the Buenos Aires + meeting.

+

+ Kissinger: If it doesn’t achieve + positive results, it won’t be because of us.

+ +

+ Vignes: Of course. I believe + there are the necessary number of votes, particularly if the United + States contacts several countries on which it has definite influence, so + they’ll support a positive outcome.

+

+ Kissinger: What did you discuss + with Bowdler? You were going to + tell me.

+

+ Vignes: What I said to Mr. + Bowdler is essentially what + I just said to you. Then I didn’t know the US was going to abstain. I + told him the US position should be one of support for positive results + of the Conference, because this way the problem will be solved for the + United States by the Latin Americans. They’ll do the work. If a negative + result happens, then the US has to work out its problem alone.

+

+ Kissinger: But we are prepared to + work out our problem with Cuba. I told you.

+

+ Vignes: That’s why I attach so + much importance to a positive result. That way the work is done by all + of us. I’m quite pleased it’s going to come out this way.

+

+ Kissinger: If we wanted the + Conference to fail, I would have gone there. Seriously.

+

+ Vignes: No.

+

+ Kissinger: To make it succeed, I + don’t have to go there. Seriously. Quito, not Buenos Aires.

+

+ Vignes: You had no reason to be + the motive for failure.

+

+ Kissinger: But I also have no + reason. I’ve told you what our policy is. So you understand it. But + after the history of American-Cuban relations, it is not dignified for + the United States to work for the success either. But we will not work + for a failure. Believe me. We don’t expect a failure. You don’t expect a + failure.

+

+ Vignes: No.

+

+ Kissinger: So it won’t be a + failure.

+

+ Vignes: Speaking to another + subject, what are the prospects for opening US domestic markets to + Argentine products?

+

+ Kissinger: After the passage of + the Trade Bill, very good.

+

+ Vignes: When Mr. Bowdler was in Buenos Aires, he + contacted some of my people on exchange of technology, which is going to + be discussed at the Buenos Aires meeting.

+

With respect to the OAS, what is your + thinking about the several candidates for Secretary General of the + OAS?

+

+ Kissinger: I was told the man + from Paraguay does have a chance of getting elected. But we are not + actively working. So it depends on whether your judgment was right. + [Laughter]

+

+ Vignes: You remain very serious + when you say that.

+ +

+ Kissinger: I’m hoping I could + emerge as the compromise candidate. I want a permanent job. [Laughter] + Will you support me, as an old friend?

+

+ Vignes: You are destined to a + higher calling.

+

+ Kissinger: I’ll make an Argentine + the Deputy.

+

+ Vignes: It seems that neither of + these two will have a majority.

+

+ Kissinger: If that’s the case, + we’ve made no decision at all. So the situation is exactly as we + discussed.

+

+ Vignes: Argentina had supported + the Paraguayan candidate—as a matter of personal commitment to + Stroessner.

+

+ Kissinger: We’re in the same + position.

+

+ Vignes: But on the second vote we + may change.

+

+ Kissinger: We’re in about the + same position.

+

+ Vignes: We believe the OAS should be changed, should be + restructured, because as it now stands, it’s not efficient. But we also + are in favor of having the Meeting of Foreign Ministers independent of + the bureaucratic structure of the OAS.

+

+ Kissinger: I agree. The only + question is how we institutionalize it. I’m in favor of these Meetings + of Foreign Ministers.

+

+ Vignes: That’s a very positive + fact. When do you plan to come to Argentina?

+

+ Kissinger: In January or early + February.

+

+ Vignes: I wanted to say there has + been some talk in some areas that Buenos Aires wouldn’t offer sufficient + security guarantees for the Meeting of Foreign Ministers. I must say + it’s false, and the US should reject that idea.

+

+ Kissinger: I’ll stay close to the + Foreign Minister! No, we’ll not support a change.

+

+ Vignes: With respect to the + Argentine situation, I want to point out there is a small activist group + using terrorism as a political tactic, but each day their number is + decreasing.

+

+ Kissinger: I’m not worried.

+

+ Vignes: The reason I brought it + up is this situation is surrounded by a great deal of publicity, but it + is not affecting any government decision.

+

I have nothing else.

+

I hope in this Conference here we’re going to agree on one thing, the + absolute need to solve the problem of hunger.

+

+ Kissinger: This is my theme. I’m + doing it in a very conciliatory way. I think it would be unfortunate if, + right after I make my speech, the newspapers say Argentina attacked the + United States. Also, it wouldn’t help what we’re trying to do next + year.

+ +

+ Vignes: No, the fact is we both + have the same goal, that is, to solve the urgent problem of food, and + even with different paths we’re heading for the same objective. My + speech is not based on an attack on the US, because that is not my + temper; but I do attack the policy of the big powers—but particularly + the Europeans. Also, I’m going to blame the inflation on the dollar + devaluation.

+

+ Kissinger: Really? It is a good + thing we’re friends!

+

+ Vignes: I believe we should tell + truths regardless of where it falls.

+

+ Kissinger: Not oil?

+

+ Vignes: Yes, also oil. Of + course.

+

[The conversation then ended.]

+
+ +
+ 24. Interagency Intelligence Memorandum DCI/NIO No. 2721–74 +

Summary: The memorandum concluded that there were no serious + threats to Isabel + Perón’s leadership and that U.S.-Argentine relations + would probably improve as Argentina revised nationalistic + economic measures that discriminated against foreign + investment.

+

Source: Central Intelligence Agency, National Intelligence + Council, Job 79R01099A: O/DDI Intelligence Publication Files + (1965–1975), Box 20, Folder 7: IIM: Argentina: Prospects Over + the Next Several Months. Secret; [handling + restriction not declassified].

+ + + + Washington, December 10, 1974. + +

Argentina: Prospects Over the Next Several MonthsThis memorandum was prepared under the + auspices of the National Intelligence Officer for Latin America. It + was drafted in CIA and has been + reviewed with representatives of CIA, INR, DIA, and Treasury and endorsed by + them. [Footnote in the original.] +

+

Conclusions

+

Mrs. Perón has strengthened her + position since our last assessment, and she is likely to remain in + office over the next several months. [1½ lines not + declassified] she is carrying out her day-to-day tasks with + increasing self-confidence. The major power sectors in the country—the + military, the orthodox Peronists, and the opposition parties—want the + constitutional process she embodies to continue. There is little genuine + public enthusiasm for Mrs.Perón + as a national leader, but most + Argentines continue to support her as the symbol of Peronism and + constitutionality.

+

Discussion

+

1. This memorandum constitutes an update of an earlier memorandum, + “Argentina: Prospects over the Next Several Months,” which was issued on + August 7, 1974. It considers the strengths and weaknesses of the + Perón government, economic + prospects and the order of succession should Mrs.Perón decide to step down. The + memorandum concludes with a section on US-Argentine relations.

+

Forces for Stability

+

2. Over the short term a majority of orthodox + Peronists will stand behind Mrs.Perón. Infighting among Peronist leaders is continuing + but has lessened as confidence in Mrs.Perón grows. The left began drifting away from the + Peronist movement before its founder’s death, and as long as extremists + in this wing threaten the center and the right, the latter two will hold + together. Organized labor remains the backbone of the movement. It is + potentially the most powerful pressure group in the country, but its + leadership is divided and ineffectual, out of touch with its + constituency, and susceptible to manipulation by Peronist politicians. + Rank and file demands for wage increases are likely to cause strains + between the government and labor chieftans, but barring an unforeseen + economic crisis, labor will be the last sector to waver in its support + for Mrs. Perón.

+

3. The Armed Forces also will continue to support + Mrs. Perón, [5 + lines not declassified], but they remain determined to stay out + of the political arena. Mrs.Perón has worked hard at cultivating + top military officers and they approve of her tough attitude toward the + terrorists. The government’s current offensive against the terrorists + pleases the military, but pressures from junior and middle grade + officers for more aggressive action is increasing.

+

4. A fear of the left—and a desire to keep the military out of + politics—will encourage the opposition parties to + continue supporting the government. The Radicals have their sights on + the 1977 elections and do not want the constitutional process disrupted. + Playing the role of the loyal opposition has not been easy and is + causing serious problems within the Radical Party as well as in other + parties. The principal reason is that Mrs.Perón has not continued the dialogue with opposition + parties that was started by her husband. Opposition political leaders + will keep pressing Mrs.Perón to + resume the dialogue, as well as to curb the excesses of the extreme + right. Relations between the government and the opposition will be + strained from time to time, but at least until the terrorists are + brought to heel, opposition leaders will seek to keep Mrs.Perón in office.

+ +

Weaknesses

+

5. Principal weaknesses of Mrs.Perón’s government are its lack of dynamic leadership + and its almost total preoccupation with crisis management. Nowhere + within the government, nor in the sectors supporting the government, has + leadership emerged that appears capable of finding solutions to the + country’s economic and social problems. The new ministers of interior, + Rocamora, and economy, Gomez Morales, both appear to be politically + stronger and more capable than their predecessors. Like the rest of the + cabinet, however, they lack popular appeal and have yet to demonstrate + the qualities of leadership that can give strong policy direction to the + country.

+

6. The government currently has public support for its assumption of + emergency powers under the state of siege, but this support could weaken + unless legal and extra-legal repression is used judiciously. + Mrs.Perón promised + opposition leaders that she would crack down on right-wing death squads. + Her failure, or her inability, to do so has provoked leftist charges of + official sponsorship. Terrorist leaders also accuse US officials in the + country of supporting counter-terrorist activities. The possibility of + attacks against US embassy personnel has become a major security + concern. This danger will grow as government pressure on the terrorists + increases. Actions against US personnel would have high propaganda value + and could probably be carried out successfully especially if limited to + hit-and-run or kidnaping operations.

+

7. Terrorism of both the right and left is a serious problem for the + government but not one that is likely to cause its fall. The struggle + against the leftist extremists will be long and tough. After months of + foot-dragging and soul-searching, the army is beginning to play an + increasing role in the counterterrorist battle. Its participation in + intelligence gathering and coordination is already paying dividends and + could be the key to success. Active duty army officers now are heading + police forces in two key provinces and the army has recently played a + more active role in several others. Military leaders have given their + support to vigilante action by military personnel, but they remain + determined that the terrorists be defeated without a military takeover + of the campaign.

+

8. [1 paragraph (15 lines) not declassified]

+

The Economy—A Mixed Picture

+

9. The economy has factors of both weakness and strength for + Mrs.Perón’s government. The + recent appointment of Gomez Morales to the economy portfolio has boosted + hopes for improved financial management. Although political differences + among Peronists over economic policies appear to have lessened, Gomez + Morales will be under heavy pressure from Peronist labor to grant further substantial wage + increases as inflation accelerates. At the same time, Gomez Morales is + committed to the stabilization measures of the Social Pact until it + expires in mid-1975. This means that he will have to restrain general + price hikes by confining increases to sectors most hurt by higher costs + and poor profits. His biggest challenge will come from the public + sector, which is heavily burdened by deficit spending. He has already + called for public and private austerity, but his efforts to impose + monetary controls will be fought by vested interests in state + enterprises and the federal bureaucracy.

+

10. While price hikes authorized by the government have given temporary + relief to key industries, many firms face a bleak future. Private + investment will continue to stagnate in most sectors as wages outstrip + prices. Excessive demand and the lack of investment will continue to + generate shortages of consumer and capital goods. Major disruptions of + industrial production, however, are unlikely in the near future.

+

11. The most promising change in economic policy would be one which + stimulated grain production. This would ensure the maintenance of a + strong balance of trade and provide the currency needed to finance + industrial development and service the external debt. It remains to be + seen whether effective action will be taken, but Gomez Morales has said + that he would pay greater attention to agriculture than his predecessor + did. He has withdrawn the agrarian reform bill which was before the + Congress, reportedly to include in it greater incentives for the + agricultural sector.

+

12. As to the prospects for 1975, high consumer demand will probably + generate economic growth of 5–7 percent, despite continued lack of + producer incentives. The rate of inflation will probably increase + somewhat. High prices for grain should continue to offset the poor + prospects for meat exports. Lower oil consumption and the renegotiation + of prices for imports from Libya should reduce the nation’s petroleum + bill by 15 percent, to around $450 million. In sum, the economy will + continue to be a problem area, but the immediate prospects are + reasonably favorable and major economic deterioration and a serious + crisis are unlikely.

+

Looking Further Ahead

+

13. While there appear to be no problems of such magnitude as to + seriously threaten Mrs.Perón’s + tenure, the possibility still remains that at some point she will want + to step down. Her performance has exceeded the expectations of most + observers, and there are indications that she is beginning to enjoy the + job. [6½ lines not declassified]

+

14. If Mrs.Perón should leave + office, the succession scenario outlined in our earlier assessment would + still come into play, with one possible exception. It is now more likely that Mrs.Perón’s constitutional successor, + Senate President Jose Allende, would step aside and allow Raul Lastiri, + president of the Chamber of Deputies and Lopez Rega’s son-in-law, to + assume the presidency. Lastiri would be bound under law to set within 30 + days a date for elections. It is not specified how soon elections must + be held, but they probably could not be delayed more than six months to + a year. Lastiri is a Peronist and former provisional president. His + government would be likely to continue Mrs.Perón’s policy of cooperation and close communication + with the United States.

+

US-Argentine Relations

+

15. Relations between the US and Argentina are good, and bilateral + problems are unlikely to have a major impact on domestic policies over + the next few months. Mrs.Perón’s + government will continue to cooperate with the US and make every effort + to settle all questions amicably. The former economy minister, Gelbard, was an outspoken critic of + the US. [2½ lines not declassified] Argentina’s + nationalistic economic policy will be continued under Gomez Morales, but + there probably will be some easing of the stridently nationalistic and + restrictive economic measures that discriminate against foreign business + interests.

+

16. Adding to the prospects for improved US-Argentine relations is the + likelihood that Mrs.Perón’s + government, and particularly Foreign Minister Vignes, will want to avoid any issue + that could mar the meeting of foreign ministers in Buenos Aires next + March. Vignes hopes the meeting + will result in a settlement of the Cuban sanctions question, and to + guarantee a harmonious and productive outcome he will seek the + cooperation of the US. He will press strongly for Secretary Kissinger’s presence and thus will be + anxious to put the best face on relations with Washington.

+
+ +
+ 25. Memorandum of Conversation +

Summary: Secretary Kissinger and Ambassador Orfila discussed the 1974 + U.S. Trade Act, the postponement of the Buenos Aires MFM, and a planned trip by + Kissinger to Latin + America.

+

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + P820117–0538. Confidential; Exdis. Drafted by Ortiz. Approved in + S on January 24. A copy was sent to the White House. The meeting was + held in the Secretary’s office. A summary of the conversation + was sent to Buenos Aires in telegram 17008, January 24. (Ibid., + P850086–2146) In telegram 23922 to Buenos Aires, February 2, the + Department transmitted a letter in which Kissinger informed Vignes that developments in + the Middle East made it impossible for him to visit Latin + America in mid-February. (Ibid., D750038–0252)

+ + + + Washington, January 23, 1975, 12:47 + p.m. + + SUBJECT + The March 1975 Meeting of Foreign Ministers in Buenos Aires and + the Secretary’s Projected Visit to Argentina + + + PARTICIPANTS + + + + U.S. + + The Secretary + + William D. Rogers, + Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American + Affairs + + Frank V. Ortiz, + Country Director for Argentina, Paraguay and Uruguay + + + + + + Argentina + + + Alejandro Orfila, + Argentine Ambassador to the United States + + + +

Ambassador Orfila: You are busy, + Mr. Secretary, so I will get right to the point. My Government has been + following developments relating to the Trade Bill very closely. We are + in close touch with other Foreign Ministers as to how this might affect + the meeting in Buenos Aires. Minister Vignes is telephoning the Venezuelan and Ecuadorian + Foreign Ministers and will ask them directly whether or not they will be + going to Buenos Aires. Vignes + will be very frank with them and will say, “No publicity stunts. Are you + going? Yes or no.” Based upon our reading of the situation, we are + almost certain that they will not go. They are asking for assurances + that the U.S. cannot give.

+

The Secretary: They know that we can’t do what they are asking us to + do.

+

Ambassador Orfila: They seem to + expect that the United States or you, Mr. Secretary, could give + acceptable public assurances on the Bill.

+

The Secretary: I could not do it nor would I. We won’t tolerate this kind + of treatment.

+

Ambassador Orfila: We have been + in continuous touch on this problem with the other countries. For + example with Rabasa. Their position seems to be that if two or more + countries stay away from the Buenos Aires meeting, it would be better to postpone the meeting. From + our own domestic position, the same would be true. There is the + possibility that not only Venezuela and Ecuador but also Colombia and + Peru would stay away from the meeting. This might happen even if + Venezuela indicates, as I understand they might, that there would be no + objection to having the meeting proceed without Venezuela’s + participation. This would not be acceptable to Argentina as it would + imply a position of ideological leadership for Venezuela that Argentina + is not prepared to grant. In view of this situation we believe we must + consider the possibility that the meeting at Buenos Aires be postponed. + Mechanically we should think of ways to do this.

+

The Secretary: We should know when you plan to make the announcement so + we can say something too.

+

Ambassador Orfila: My suggestion + is that we would be better off if we postpone the meeting and coordinate + the announcement.

+

The Secretary: I agree. I think that is a wise decision.

+

Ambassador Orfila: With regard + to your trip, Mr. Secretary, you must be very sure you can go on + February 16. If you can’t go then it would be better to attach to the + announcement of the postponement of the Buenos Aires Meeting an + announcement that you are also postponing your prior trip. I want to + make it absolutely clear that you are welcome in Argentina and that I am + not suggesting in any way that you not go. I am only saying that if + there is any chance that you will not go, then it is better to postpone + your trip and avoid a very negative reaction.

+

The Secretary: What is your recommendation as a friend as to whether or + not I should go?

+

Ambassador Orfila: As a friend, + I hope you will go. Your trip is very important and could be very + beneficial. You should go if you have no doubt that you can make the + trip. It would be very damaging if X number of days before you go, you + cancel your trip. I have been checking with the Middle Eastern people + and there is some confusion. They seem to expect that you will be in the + Middle East at the same time you are supposed to be in Argentina.

+

The Secretary: Did you check with the Middle Easterners or my people here + in the Department? Sometimes I think I ought to open a newspaper. They + publish everything before I know myself what I am going to do. I may go + to the Middle East, but if I do it would require a postponement of my + trip to Latin America by only one or two days. There would be no + substantial postponement. That shouldn’t cause any big problem.

+

Ambassador Orfila: That would be + no problem. But the important thing is to be sure that you are + going.

+ +

The Secretary: It is 95 per cent sure.

+

Ambassador Orfila: But it is + that 5 per cent if you don’t go that could be very damaging.

+

The Secretary: Mr. Ambassador, is it desirable that I go?

+

Ambassador Orfila: Mr. + Secretary, it is very desirable. Your trip would be very beneficial. You + are aware of the feeling in Latin America that the United States does + not give Latin America enough priority.

+

The Secretary: They can’t have it both ways. They can’t complain of the + lack of priority and behave as they are behaving now. Why should the + United States put itself in this position? What do we get from the new + dialogue? It seems to me that the new dialogue consists of a list of + things for us to do and there is not much interest in what the Latin + Americans can do for us. I am not sure this is a good position for us to + be in. I can say this to you because it is not true of Argentina. But + others complain of lack of priority and then when we give priority to + their problems, they use it for domestic political purposes.

+

Ambassador Orfila: You should + remember that this is a result of problems of the past.

+

The Secretary: It could be that my trip would be used to foment great + nationalistic demonstrations.

+

Ambassador Orfila: I don’t think + that would happen, Mr. Secretary. The negative results of the trip would + come after the trip.

+

The Secretary: What do you mean by negative results?

+

Ambassador Orfila: If nothing + positive came from your trip, then there would be an adverse reaction. + It is all a question of image. The United States must project a + favorable, positive image.

+

The Secretary: I’m sorry. I must go to Los Angeles now. I very much + appreciate the position taken by the Argentine Government. I agree that + to have a meeting now would be too dangerous. We would be at the mercy + of any demagogues. I believe that postponement would be understood. In a + domestic sense it could even be helpful for me as another thing Congress + has screwed up.

+

Ambassador Orfila: Thank you for + seeing me, Mr. Secretary. I will stay in close touch with Secretary + Rogers.

+
+ +
+ 26. Interagency Intelligence Memorandum DCI/NIO No. 671–75 +

Summary: The memorandum concluded + that while President Perón did not face an immediate threat, it was + unlikely her regime would last through the end of 1975. Despite + possible friction due to the 1974 Trade Act and increased + terrorism, prospects for harmonious U.S.-Argentine relations + appeared good.

+

Source: Central Intelligence Agency, National Intelligence + Council, Job 79R01042: Policy Files (1974–1976), Box 4, IIM + Argentina: Prospects Over the Next Several Months. Secret; [handling restriction not declassified]. + This memorandum updates Memorandum DCI/NIO No. 2721–74 of + December 10, 1974, published as Document + 24.

+ + + + Washington, March + 19, 1975. +

ARGENTINA: PROSPECTS OVER THE NEXT SEVERAL MONTHSThis memorandum was prepared under the + auspices of the National Intelligence Officer for Latin America. It + was drafted in CIA and has been + reviewed with representatives of CIA, INR, DIA, and Treasury and endorsed by + them. [Footnote in the original.] +

+

CONCLUSIONS

+

Mrs. Perón’s position has eroded + since our last assessment. She will probably remain in office over the + next three months, but the outlook for the remainder of the year is not + favorable. Deteriorating economic and political conditions will have a + serious impact on her political support and will reduce her prospects. + The major power sectors in the country—the military, labor, and the + opposition parties—are beginning to accept the prospect of a shift in + leadership, but they want the constitutional system to remain intact. If + Mrs.Perón does step down, + the most likely outcome is that a constitutional successor would be + found to preside over a caretaker regime until elections.

+

[Omitted here is the Discussion section.]

+
+ +
+ 27. Memorandum of Conversation +

Summary: Kissinger and Vignes discussed sanctions against Cuba, + financial assistance, housing investment guarantees, selection + of the OAS Secretary General, + civil aviation, the Malvinas (Falklands) Islands, Argentina’s + creditworthiness, and Argentine-Chilean relations.

+

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + P820125–0187. Confidential; Nodis. Drafted by Bartch and approved in S on + October 29. The meeting took place in the James Madison Room at + the Department. A summary was sent to Buenos Aires in telegram + 115928, May 18. (Ibid., D750174–1209) On May 2, Rogers and Vignes agreed that a special + conference should be set up to adopt a resolution providing for + freedom of action regarding Cuban sanctions. (Memorandum of + conversation, May 3; ibid., P820125–0139) The referenced + exchange of correspondence on Cuba is in telegrams 93365 and + 106096 to Buenos Aires, April 23 and May 7, and in telegram 3026 + from Buenos Aires, May 1. (Ibid., P850056–1648, P850059–1528, + and P850081–1937) In a May 8 memorandum to Rogers, Bartch listed follow-up + actions to be taken as a result of Kissinger’s May 8 meeting with Vignes. (Ibid., ARA/ECA Files: Lot 78D56, + POL 15–3 ForMin + Vignes, + 1975)

+ + + + Washington, May 8, 1975, + 1:15–2:45 p.m. + + SUBJECT + Luncheon Meeting with Argentine Foreign Minister Vignes + + + + PARTICIPANTS + + + + Argentina + + + Alberto J. Vignes, + Argentine Minister of Foreign Affairs and Worship + + Alejandro Orfila, + Argentine Ambassador + + Julio Carasales, + Argentine Ambassador to the OAS + + + + + + + U.S. + + The Secretary of State + + William D. Rogers, + Assistant Secretary, ARA + + + William S. + Mailliard, Ambassador to the OAS + + + Carl E. Bartch, + Country Director, ARA-LA/APU + + Anthony Hervas, Interpreter + + + + +

The Secretary: I can’t tell you how disappointed I was, and how much I + regret that I was not able to visit your country last month. It was not + any lack of interest on my part; it was due to events I could not + foresee. If I had foreseen them, I would have resigned last year. I was + most anxious to undertake the visit, but it was not possible in April. I + plan to reschedule the visit in August, if that is satisfactory.

+

Minister Vignes: I am aware of + the reasons you were not able to undertake the visit last month, and I + understand the very great problems that compelled you to remain in the + United States. We would be very pleased to receive you in August.

+ +

The Secretary: Argentina has a tremendous capacity to put pressure on me, + because I am a football fan, and I intend to remain in office until + 1976, when the world football match will be in Argentina.

+

Minister Vignes: We’ll try to + arrange a good match for you when you come to Argentina. They play in + August there.

+

The Secretary: How do you see the situation in the Western Hemisphere, + Mr. Minister?

+

Minister Vignes: I think the + situation is good, but it could be better. I think it is important that + we all try to resolve our bilateral problems in the hemisphere.

+

The Secretary: I agree with you.

+

Minister Vignes: There are also + some difficult multilateral problems.

+

The Secretary: Such as Cuba?

+

Minister Vignes: Yes. I find that + the trend now among several of our countries is to try to reach + agreement on the amendment of Article 17 of the Rio Treaty, to give each + country a free hand in deciding whether to have bilateral relations with + Cuba.

+

The Secretary: We have had an exchange of correspondence on that. We + don’t think the matter should be resolved during the current OASGA.

+

Minister Vignes: Neither do + we.

+

The Secretary: Yes, the question can be decided at a special meeting.

+

Minister Vignes: It would be + possible to decide it at a special meeting, with no debate on the + subject at the OASGA.

+

The Secretary: A debate would have an unfortunate reaction here, as far + as U.S. public opinion is concerned.

+

Minister Vignes: Yes. Some + countries are opposed to lifting the sanctions—Brazil, Chile and + Uruguay.

+

The Secretary: Wouldn’t they take the same position at a special + meeting?

+

Minister Vignes: That’s a good + question. Yes, they probably would, but perhaps their positions would + not be as intransigent at a special meeting. The fundamental idea of + some other countries is to resolve the question now, once and for all. + Mexico, Venezuela, Costa Rica, Peru and Panama are of this opinion.

+

The Secretary: Can you handle this for us? Can the Latin American nations + handle this for us?

+

Minister Vignes: What would be + the U.S. attitude if we were to do so?

+

The Secretary: It would have to be done at a special meeting, with no + advance announcement of what is to be done. It shouldn’t be delayed too long. Perhaps it should be + done by the end of June, or early July, at the latest.

+

Minister Vignes: Would the U.S. + vote affirmatively on the lifting of sanctions at such a meeting?

+

The Secretary: Not to lift sanctions, but to permit each country to + exercise freedom of action in deciding on the matter.

+

Assistant Secretary Rogers: Yes. + At the OASGA, we would support the + idea of a special meeting called to consider the question of whether + each country should have a free hand to decide for itself.

+

The Secretary: We’d vote in favor of that.

+

Minister Vignes: Can I handle it + like that, then?

+

The Secretary: How much of this would get out to the public?

+

Minister Vignes: It could be + handled confidentially, with no advance announcement about what is to be + done.

+

The Secretary: If it is to be done in that way, what I told you about how + we will vote must remain confidential.

+

Minister Vignes: A special + meeting could be convened solely to arrive at a solution to the Cuban + question. It should not be constituted as an organ of the OAS. It is possible to do it in that way. + The Foreign Ministers would not have to attend.

+

Assistant Secretary Rogers: + Ambassador Mailliard could + represent us.

+

Ambassador Mailliard: Foreign + Minister Facio has already offered Costa Rica as a site for a special + meeting.

+

Minister Vignes: This is + essentially a political question. We should agree that the meeting + should be convened and straighten out the legal questions later.

+

The Secretary: I agree. Is there anything else I can do for you?

+

Minister Vignes: I’m not going to + make a speech. U.S.-Argentine relations are at an optimum point, and we + should attempt to achieve something concrete and important to our two + nations.

+

The Secretary: If that is so, why did it take two divisions to guard me + when I planned to visit Argentina? Those who handle Latin American + Affairs in the Department are under instructions to pay special + attention to Argentina.

+

Minister Vignes: Then I’ll be + more specific. We have certain financial problems, and we need help. And + we need help from the United States.

+

The Secretary: I understand that you are seeking help from private U.S. + banks.

+

Ambassador Orfila: We are + seeking $600 million in loans from U.S. private banks and the IBRD.

+ +

Minister Vignes: Yes, but the + banks need to know that the U.S. Government morally supports Argentina + in its request for loans.

+

The Secretary: We are prepared to extend such support. Bill, will you + call David Rockefeller? I could call Robert + McNamara; he is a good Democrat.

+

Minister Vignes: Do you intend to + make public the fact that you morally support Argentina’s efforts to + obtain financial assistance?

+

Assistant Secretary Rogers: Let’s + see what we can work out along these lines.

+

The Secretary: We could say that we discussed Argentina’s financial + problems and its efforts to obtain assistance, and that I promised you + the moral support of the U.S. Government, as long as you don’t leave the + impression that we exercise any control over the decision to extend the + loans. Some formula would have to be worked out to make it clear that we + are only using our influence.

+

Minister Vignes: Yes, that the + U.S. Government is extending its moral support to Argentina’s attempts + to find a solution to its financial problems.

+

The Secretary: You see, I am too easy for you.

+

Minister Vignes: I thought you + were going to say a lot more. Another matter. We need a small sum of + money for housing investment guarantees. Housing is a serious problem + for us, and we intend to undertake a program to resolve it.

+

The Secretary: How much?

+

Minister Vignes: The ideal sum + would be $100 million. Is that a lot?

+

Assistant Secretary Rogers: We + can do something for you, but we can’t go that high.

+

The Secretary: I don’t know about this, but Bill says we can do + something.

+

Minister Vignes: We already have + $14 million authorized for us in housing investment guarantees, but that + is a very small amount. I hope you can give us more before I leave + Washington.

+

The Secretary: Are you going to take all the credit for this, or will + there be something left for me?

+

Assistant Secretary Rogers: + Perhaps we could call it the Kissinger-Vignes + Housing Project.

+

The Secretary: Can you have some houses built by the time I get there in + August? Do I have to do housing projects for every one of the Foreign + Ministers who are attending the OASGA?

+

Minister Vignes: No. Give the + money to us, and there will be nothing left for the others.

+ +

The Secretary: Good idea. I’ll tell them I gave it all to the Argentines. + Is there anything else? Let me know which piece of furniture in this + room you’d like to take back with you.

+

Minister Vignes: I’d like to + raise the question of support for the candidates for election as OAS Secretary General.

+

The Secretary: We only know of the official candidates. We want to see + how the first few votes go. For whom will you vote?

+

Minister Vignes: On the first + ballot, and the first ballot only, we’ll vote for Sapena Pastor. This is because of a + commitment President Perón made + personally to President Stroessner. In the second round, we’ll vote for + the Argentine candidate, who will be nominated by another country. We + expect Sapena Pastor to receive + no more than five votes on the first ballot.

+

The Secretary: We won’t support anyone on the first ballot unless someone + nominates me.

+

Minister Vignes: Will you support + the Argentine candidate on the second round?

+

The Secretary: We won’t oppose him. We won’t support anyone else, and we + won’t organize votes for any candidate. We’d like to wait until I have + had a chance to talk to a few other Foreign Ministers. We’ll talk about + this again at the reception on Saturday. That should not be unhelpful to + you.

+

Minister Vignes: The next + Secretary General should be very active and capable of making the + changes in the OAS that need to be + made. He should be a good friend of the United States, and able to serve + the interests of all of the members of the OAS. He must be independent from the influences of his own + country and not reflect the political orientation of his government.

+

The Secretary: If a reasonable consensus emerges, we won’t oppose it. I + don’t want to make a positive commitment before talking to others but at + a minimum you will have our neutrality. We’ll do nothing against your + candidate, and it may be that we will be able to do more. I’ll talk to + you again on Saturday evening, and I won’t make a decision until after + that.

+

Minister Vignes: The new + Secretary General should not reflect a trend to the left.

+

The Secretary: I agree.

+

Minister Vignes: We think that is + important.

+

The Secretary (proposing toast): Mr. Minister, personal friendship means + much to me, and I am very pleased to recall how pleasant everything went + when we met in Mexico. There is a strong special relationship between + our two countries. We are interested in strengthening our relations with + Latin America, and Argentina occupies a crucial place in these relations. I propose a toast + to the continued friendship of our two peoples and governments.

+

Minister Vignes (responding): I + was also pleased at our meeting in Mexico, Mr. Secretary, and at our + meeting here in Washington. The solidarity of our two governments is at + an optimum level, and there is a sincere friendship between our two + countries. I propose a toast to the maintenance of our mutually + beneficial relations, and to your personal happiness, Mr. Secretary, and + to that of Mrs. Kissinger.

+

The Secretary: I agree with the guidelines you have set forth, that the + new Secretary General should not be too far to the left, and that he + should have a position of some independence. After talking to the + others, we won’t do anything until I talk to you again. I can see no + circumstances in which we would oppose the Argentine candidate.

+

Minister Vignes: Fine. What about + the airlines?

+

The Secretary: I don’t know anything about that. Perhaps that is a + subject Mr. Rogers or the + Country Director deals with.

+

Ambassador Orfila: There are + negotiations for frequencies and the treatment of the airlines involved + on both sides. We found some rigidities on the part of both countries in + dealing with these problems. We want to do our best to become more + flexible and we hope you will do the same.

+

The Secretary: I haven’t looked into this, but we’ll do the best we + can.

+

Minister Vignes: I’d also like to + mention the Malvinas. We are engaged in negotiations with Great Britain + about these islands, which have only 1,800 inhabitants. We consider this + a remnant of colonialism in our hemisphere.

+

The Secretary: Do we have a consulate there? There are lots of people I’d + like to send there.

+

Minister Vignes: There was a + statement about the Malvinas that was drafted in Buenos Aires that was + to have been included in the joint communiqué issued at the end of your + visit to Argentina. We were pleased by the language in the statement, + and we hope it can be issued.

+

The Secretary: We’ll see what can be done. Can we do that in August?

+

Ambassador Mailliard: You don’t + intend to raise the Malvinas in the OASGA, do you?

+

Minister Vignes: No. If someone + else raises issues of that kind, then we would have to say something + about the Malvinas, but we don’t intend to initiate the subject.

+

The Secretary: Do you think the Panama Canal negotiations will be + raised?

+ +

Minister Vignes: Yes, but only to + request a report on the progress of the negotiations.

+

Ambassador Mailliard: Foreign + Minister Tack wanted the Secretary to know that Panama has no intention + of raising a fuss about this at the OASGA. He is having lunch with Ambassador Bunker today.

+

The Secretary: We have a difficult domestic situation. It won’t do Tack + any good to get an agreement with us if Congress objects to it, so we + have to bring Congress along with us, and that isn’t easy. We’re trying + to get a treaty negotiated as soon as possible.

+

Ambassador Orfila: There is the + question of credit for Argentina and statements about Argentina’s credit + worthiness. I have had two letters from the Comptroller of the Currency + about this, and he seems to agree that Argentina is not a “problematic” + country as far as credit is concerned. Nevertheless, the examiners of + the Federal Reserve District of New York continue to list Argentina as + “problematical”, and they are under the jurisdiction of the Comptroller + of the Currency.

+

The Secretary: I’ll talk to Secretary Simon about it this afternoon. I don’t know what can be + done about it.

+

Minister Vignes: Our negotiations + with Chile are very delicate. There was an agreement in 1971 to refer + the Beagle Channel boundary dispute to arbitration, but this was not + well received by Argentine public opinion. There was a military + government in power in Argentina at that time, but now there is a + democratic government with popular support. I’ve attempted to suggest a + direct agreement between Argentina and Chile to avoid arbitration. An + arbitrator could decide against the interests of either country. We have + to undertake an internal dialogue about this. We may have trouble with + our Congress.

+

The Secretary: We welcome the improvement of relations between Argentina + and Chile, as evidenced by the recent meeting of President Pinochet and President Perón in Argentina. We don’t think it + desirable to ostracize Chile.

+

Minister Vignes: Nor any other + country in the hemisphere. That is the reason we reacted against the + attempt yesterday to make decisions about OASGA matters without having the United States present.

+
+ +
+ 28. Telegram 6087 From the Embassy in Argentina to the Department of + State +

Summary: Hill analyzed the political + situation in Argentina in the wake of a recent military + crisis.

+

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + D750313–0944. Secret. Repeated to Brasília, La Paz, Montevideo, + Santiago, Asunción, USCINCSO for POLAD, and DIA. In + telegram 5736 from Buenos Aires, August 27, the Embassy reported + that Perón had defied + the will of the Armed Forces by refusing the resignation of Army + CINC General Numa Laplane. + (Ibid., D750295–0966) On August 28, the Army forced Perón to accept the + resignation and replace Numa Laplane with Videla, ending the crisis. + (Telegrams 5781 and 5820 from Buenos Aires, August 28 and 29; + ibid., D750298–0433 and D750299–1087) On September 13, Luder became provisional + President in order to allow Perón to recover from an illness. (Telegram 6147 + from Buenos Aires, September 12; ibid., D750316–0939) On October + 16, Perón resumed office + as President. (Telegram 6749 from Buenos Aires, October 9; + ibid., D750351–0473)

+ + + + Buenos Aires, September 10, 1975, + 1900Z. +

6087. Subject: Analysis of Political Situation in Wake of Military + Crisis. Refs: A) BA–5781 and B) BA–5950.

+

1. Summary: The outcome of the recent military crisis (see Ref A) pointed + up clearly that real political power no longer resides with the + President. At this point, whether or not she remains as President is a + question of almost academic interest. There is a power vacuum at the + center and it is not she who will fill it; hence, whether she remains as + figurehead President for yet some time, or whether a new government + headed by Luder or someone like + him takes over from her, Mrs.Perón is no longer at the center of the equation. Others + must try to fill the vacuum, and in so doing turn the economy around, + come to grips with rampant terrorism and myriad other problems. A + civilian/constitutional solution cannot be discounted. Indeed, that is + what almost everyone in Argentina hopes for—including the Armed Forces. + The magnitude of the problems and tenuousness of the mandate, however, + are such that the civilians who try to fill the vacuum will have no + better than a 40/60 chance of succeeding and getting through to the 1977 + elections. The country may have moved too far towards collapse to now be + saved by a weak, patch-work government—even if it be a constitutional + one. The dynamics of the situation are such as to make it likely (though + not yet inevitable) that the Armed Forces will at some point have to + step in, whether or not they want to and whether they do so directly or + indirectly. They would be the only strong, cohesive sector left to fill + the vacuum (the other powerful sector—labor—being too fragmented and + poorly led to do so). The officers who are likely to play key roles are + moderate conservatives, and are reasonably well inclined towards the US. + There is not likely, then, to be a new Portugal here. However, whether the military can do any + better than the civilians in solving the country’s basic problems + remains to be seen. They will have the strength and authority to do so, + but their record of problem solving over the past 45 years is not + inspiring. Should they too fail, a vacuum of serious proportions would + be created and frustrations reach dangerous levels. Under those + circumstances, extremes would become “thinkable,” whether from the right + or the left. End summary.

+

2. Mrs.Perón and the power + vacuum. The recent military crisis pointed up again that it is not + Mrs.Perón who commands. + Labor had earlier faced her down, forcing her to honor collective + bargaining and get rid of Lopez Rega, after she had said she would not. + The Congress also defied her, and won, electing a provisional President + of the Senate against her wishes and ousting Lastiri from the Chamber of + Deputies. Even her minor victory in having Toranzo rather than Osella + Munoz elected to replace Lastiri was a pyrrhic one which served only to + split her party even further and contributed to the undermining of + Antonio Benitez, the strongest figure in her Cabinet. Now the Armed + Forces have imposed their demands against her expressed will. In the + final analysis, they could make their decisions stick. She could not. + Further, she is embattled on other fronts. Her own party is split, with + at least a strong minority (and possibly even a majority) opposed to + her. The check scandal (see Ref B) refuses to die and there are possible + new charges against her having to do with a reported marriage previous + to her bonds with Perón. In sum, + Mrs.Perón’s authority and + image have been irretrievably undermined.

+

3. Mrs.Perón sticks with Lopez + Rega to the end, with predictable results. This need not have been but + comes as no surprise. Mrs.Perón’s only chance, once Lopez Rega was ousted, was to make + a fresh start, disassociating herself from him and appointing Ministers + not identified with him. Given the tenacity with which she had stuck by + Lopez Rega, however, few expected that she would do so. Indeed, many had + expected that she would resign shortly after Lopez Rega. That she did + not do the one may have had to do with the other. In other words, she + may well have stayed on at Lopez Rega’s request, thus keeping one foot + in the door for him. Certainly she has defended his interests and fought + for his adherents every inch of the way, trying first to hang on to + Rodrigo, and then to the Villones, Condity, Vignes and others. At this point, however, the game + appears to be up. The Lopez Registas have been pretty well cleaned out + of the government, and Mrs.Perón + certainly cannot keep any doors open. The problem, however, is that + Mrs.Perón may not realize + that the game is up. The realities of the situation suggest that she + leave the Presidency, but she just may not perceive it that way.

+

4. Power vacuum to be filled. As stated above, even if she stays on as + President, someone else must fill the vacuum. Attention should therefore be focused on that + rather than upon the question of whether or not she goes, a question + which has to do only with the form and not the substance of what fills + the vacuum. If she stays on for awhile, the strongest of her Cabinet + Ministers will probably run the government—in something of a repetition + of Benitez’s minicabinet. Who those Ministers may be remains to be seen. + At the moment, Cafiero is the only strong figure in the Cabinet, and his + failure to come back from the US with more than expressions of sympathy + may hurt his position too.

+

5. If Mrs.Perón resigns (or is + forced to resign), the Congress will elect a new President to serve out + her term—or attempt to do so. Earlier on, Luder had the inside track. More recently, he has lost + some ground and there is increasing talk of BA Governor Vicente Calabro as a possibility. Even so, the + odds at this point must remain on Luder.

+

6. Whoever fills the power vacuum (assuming that someone does), they will + need the strong support of the Armed Forces and at least the tacit + support of labor. The first will be easier to secure than the second, + for labor is not likely to be enthusiastic about the kind of financial + restraints which must be applied if the economy is to be turned around. + Casildo Herreras and other leaders may talk of going along with the + government, but they know full well that the rank and file will follow + them only so far. On bread and butter issues, their maneuver room is + tightly limited. It is likely to take something more forceful than + backroom politicking to keep labor in line—and whether a civilian + government (be it Mrs. Perón’s, + Luder’s or someone else’s) + would have that force is an open question. Further, a year of Lopez + Reguismo had disastrous results for the unity of the body politic. The + consensus which had existed while Perón was alive has been replaced by extreme + fragmentation. This is especially true in the Peronist party. There, + divisions, animosities and sheer jockeying for position have become + intense—and there is no Juan Domingo + Perón to bring it under control. Mrs.Perón cannot. It is doubtful that + Luder, Robledo, or any of + the other Peronist players at this point could either. Thus, the + fundamental power base of any Peronist government may be too tenuous to + enable it to deal effectively with the two most serious and basic + problems the country faces: A) economic malaise, and B) rampant + terrorism.

+

7. The military. The Armed Forces, on the other hand, have emerged from + the recent crisis over Damasco’s appointment (see Ref A) more united + than they have been since 1973. Since May of that year, the Army has + been commanded by generals who believed it should cooperate closely with + the government. Carcagno was politically minded and tried to be more + populist than the Peronists. Laplane also represented the “populist” + tendency and was sympathetic to Peronismo. He pushed a form of + professionalism “at the service of and integrated with the government’s + programs and policies.” All three commanders, Carcagno, Laplane and even Anaya (though, admittedly, + he to a much lesser degree), had one foot in the government’s camp even + though they represented first and foremost the Army. This produced a + certain amount of split vision on the part of the leadership and + confusion below them as to what was expected of the Army. With the + conclusion of the recent crisis, this is no longer the case. The + overwhelming majority of officers lined up against Laplane and Damasco + (who also represented the “populist” line). Those who supported the + latter were by and large retired. The Army now stands highly unified and + sure of itself. The dominant line around which it has united is one led + by officers of a traditionalist/moderately conservative stripe. They are + not golpistas. On the contrary, Army CINC + Videla is more insistent on + straight professionalism than were his predecessors. They do not wish to + enter the political arena—let alone + take power. But neither do they have any ties of sympathy to the + Peronist government. Videla + represents the Army (and, thus, the Armed Forces) first, foremost and + only, and he sees the role of the Armed Forces as being one of defending + and guaranteeing the nation and the constitution.

+

8. Even though divisions have been largely overcome, no trigger mechanism + for intervention has been activated. On the contrary, the Armed Forces + remain opposed to intervention—or perhaps better said, they do not rpt + not want to take power unless and until there is no other + alternative.

+

9. This gives evidence that the Argentine military have changed. Either + they are more democratically minded and dedicated to the constitution + than they were ten years ago, or they are more politically astute, or + both. They will, then, move in only reluctantly. As suggested above, + however, given the power vacuum, the weakness of what might fill it + short of the military, and the increasing magnitude of the problems + faced, there may well be no alternative. This is not to say, however, + that the military must necessarily put generals in the executive + offices. They might, if they can find acceptable figures to front for + them, prefer a “Guido solution”—i.e. a civilian President controlled by + the military. Even so, the Armed Forces would still be running the + country.

+

10. Since the military are likely to move only as a last resort, the + situation they take over would likely be an unsettled one. To impose + order, they would probably use a heavy hand, and at least initially + would not likely brook much opposition to the economic and political + measures they deemed necessary. The “populist” line in the Armed Forces + was defeated in the recent crisis. Indeed, it was shown to have very + little strength. The generals who might take over in the future are + moderate conservatives. They certainly would not open the way to the + left, à la Portugal. On the contrary, they are more likely to crack down + on the left. They would doubtless try to reach some understanding with the labor leadership, but the + interests of the two institutions are not in concert. The Armed Forces + would stand on the side of economic austerity. Labor would not. Hence, + there is little basis for an understanding; rather, relations between + the two would probably more closely resemble those of the Lanusse period—i.e. labor held in + line by both carrot and stick, and probably more of the latter than the + former. (See septel for additional analysis of possibilities of a + labor-military alliance.)

+

11. No guarantee of military success. Even assuming that the Armed Forces + do at some point move in to fill the power vacuum which now exists, + there is no assurance that they would fare much better than the civilian + politicians in coming to grips with the country’s basic ills. With + respect to the terrorists, for example, it should not be forgotten that + prior to 1973 the military had a free hand in trying to wipe them + out—with no success. On the economic side, too, there are doubts as to + the military’s ability to cope. They understand the need for austerity + but whether or not they perceive and could treat effectively the root + ills is doubtful. Their record under Lanusse in this regard was not inspiring. Further, there + is an open question as to whether or not they would in the final + analysis have the stomach to take strong repressive measures against + labor should the latter rebel against austerity measures. The mood of + the generals now in control suggests that they would, but that could + change quickly when faced with the act rather than the thought.

+

12. What happens if the military fails? If the civilian/constitutionalist + forces fail in their efforts to stabilize the country, there will be a + turn to the military. Should the military themselves fail, the + consequences would be more serious. Frustrations would mount to + dangerous levels, and normally moderate Argentines might begin thinking + of extreme solutions. The door just might then be opened to the + left—though given the number of old-line fascists still lurking in + Argentina, one neither could not discount the possibility of some sort + of right-wing dictatorship. There are some junior and field grade + officers in the Army and Air Force who might support a leftist solution. + There are even more, however, who, if it came to that, would favor a + rightist rather than a leftist dictatorship.

+

13. Role of terrorism. Terrorism—along with a faltering economy—will + continue to be one of the most serious and and immediate problems any + government must face. The terrorists have little popular support but + their influence is widely spread throughout the country. At this point, + they do not have the capability to overthrow the government and take + power. Their actions have, however, already interrupted the normal flow + of economic and political life in Argentina. To demonstrate that it is + effective, any government, whether civilian or military, must reverse the tide. Mrs.Perón’s has so far been unable to do + so—a factor which has contributed to the undermining of her position. + The terrorists do, then, have some degree of impact upon a government’s + durability. Should the military take power and also fail to stabilize + the country, the terrorists might have the capability to carry the + extreme left to power—though it would take the worst of all possible + contingencies for this to happen.

+

14. Why should the US care? The US has important interests in Argentina. + The most tangible are in the form of about 1.5 billion dollars of + private investment we have here. Less tangible, but no less important, + are a number of political considerations. Argentina is one of the four + largest and wealthiest countries in Latin America. It dominates the + Southern Cone and continues to have marked influence in the OAS. If led by a moderate, responsible + government favorably disposed to US, it could be of great assistance in + working out more viable hemispheric relationships—as indeed under FonMin + Vignes it did play a helpful + role from Tlatelolco until its internal disarray became acute earlier + this year. A disoriented Argentina under irresponsible and hostile + leadership, on the other hand, could create serious problems for our + whole hemispheric position—both in the OAS and otherwise. For example, Argentina is ahead of all + other LA states in nuclear development + and could build a nuclear device if the GOA so chose. Given the traditional and at times emotional + rivalry with Brazil, which could also build a bomb, the ingredients for + a dangerous arms race are there—to be activated should either side + behave irresponsibly. This would complicate enormously our relations + with both and our position in the rest of the hemisphere.

+ +

15. Future role in the North-South equation. On the world stage, too, a + stable Argentina led by a responsible, friendly government could play an + important role in helping to forge a more harmonious world order, which + we have defined across the board as being in our interests. Its position + as one of the world’s major food exporters militates in favor of such a + role. Even more so perhaps does its almost unique position as a bridge + between developed and poor nations. Ethnically European and a basically + wealthy country (even though its economy is temporarily in a state of + disarray), Argentina is at the same time a participating member of the + Third World. It is, then, in a position to perceive and understand the + points of view of both. Argentina could do much to interpret the views + of the two sides, one to the other, and to influence Third World + positions in more responsible directions. It must have a firmer domestic + base, of course, before it can play such a role, but the potential is + there and could be extremely useful to us in the future.

+ +

16. What can the US do? The above are reasons why the US should wish to + see stable, responsible government in Argentina. With it, Argentina + could be a valuable partner. A breakdown which might open the way to extremes, on the other hand, + would threaten the loss of American investments and create serious + problems for us here and in the rest of the hemisphere. At the moment, + the situation is in between. The government is unstable and is too beset + by internal problems to be an effective partner in international + endeavors. The worst, however, appears to be still several stages + further down the road. Hopefully, Argentina will never get there, but + given the rate of deterioration over the past six months, no one can be + overly sanguine. There is little the US can do which will significantly + affect the outcome here. We can encourage them and perhaps reward + movement in the right direction with moral and economic support. We must + be alert to take advantage of such opportunities. Basically, however, it + is up to the Argentines to put their own house in order. If they cannot + do it, no one can do it for them.

+ + + Hill + + +
+ +
+ 29. Memorandum of Conversation +

Summary: In a meeting with Foreign Minister Robledo, Kissinger stated that U.S. + policy toward Latin America would focus increasingly on + relations with Argentina and a small number of other key + countries rather than on the region as a whole.

+

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + P820125–0019. Confidential; Nodis. Drafted by Bartch and approved in S on + October 21. The meeting was held at the U.S. Mission to the + United Nations. In Kissinger and Robledo’s previous meeting in New + York, September 23, Kissinger stated that he was coming to believe + that the United States should “pay particular attention to two + or three key countries [in Latin America] and be generally + helpful to the others.” Robledo proposed setting up informal + working groups in Argentina and the United States to study the + possibility of establishing economic, cultural, and + technological exchanges. The Foreign Minister also stated that + the Argentine Government was planning to place greater emphasis + on measures to fight subversion. (Telegram Secto 13024 from + USUN, September 23; ibid., + D750331–0908)

+ + + + New York, September 28, 1975, 11:40 a.m.–12:05 + p.m. + + SUBJECT + Secretary’s Meeting with Argentine Foreign Minister + + + PARTICIPANTS + + + + Argentina + + Angel Robledo, Argentine Foreign Minister + Rafael Vasquez, Argentine Ambassador + Carlos Ortiz de Rosas, Argentine Ambassador to UN + + + + + + + + + U.S. + + The Secretary + + William D. Rogers, + Assistant Secretary, ARA + + + Carl E. Bartch, + Country Director, ARA/ARU + + + + +

The Secretary: When do you return to Argentina?

+

Minister Robledo: Tomorrow evening.

+

The Secretary: We were talking about a number of steps we could take, the + last time we met.

+

Minister Robledo: I think there are some fundamental things we could do. + Perhaps one of them is to frame our relations within the broad + projection of Latin American policy. Not the policy of Latin American + integration, but the policy you defined as emphasizing relations with + three or four countries in the area. Our first priority is the question + of stability, especially with regard to the guerrilla problem. The + guerrillas are part of an external process; that is, all of their + practical direction is received from the outside, especially their + ideological direction, corresponding to an international plan. We are + going to fight them aggressively, and not only by taking repressive + measures, but fundamentally, within our whole nation and society. To + this end, we believe it necessary to undertake a great public + information effort in all popular sectors within the country. Within + this context, we shall have to provide a new meaning, to renew the + significance of the meaning of relations with the United States. This is + necessary also because of the image the United States projects + throughout the world as a great stabilizing force. To accomplish this, + it would be useful for the U.S. Government or the Department of State to + issue a public statement expressing your sympathy and support for the + survival of constitutional and democratic institutions, and also for the + authentic participation of the majority of the people in the political + process. Naturally, this should refer specifically to the Argentine + case. We believe a declaration of that kind would help create a good + climate within the U.S. and international financial institutions. In + addition, this would be interpreted as a good gesture toward relations + with Latin America. At present, the United States receives the support + of certain sectors in Latin America, but these are minority sectors; and + I think we have to project an image attractive to the majorities.

+

The Secretary: Do you think my remarks at the Latin American luncheon + next Tuesday would be an appropriate occasion for such a + declaration?

+

Mr. Rogers: Perhaps a brief statement today, after you have concluded + your meeting with the Minister.

+

The Secretary: I could insert a few sentences in my toast at the + luncheon.

+ +

Minister Robledo: It is important that the declaration receive coverage + in our local press.

+

The Secretary: Is it better to say something today or Tuesday?

+

Ambassador Ortiz: The Minister believes it would be better to issue a + declaration today. It would not be fair to the other Latin American + nations who will be represented at the Tuesday luncheon to say something + only about Argentina.

+

The Secretary: OK, we’ll do it today. This will appeal to the missionary + instinct of the Latin American Bureau. After a few years with the + Department, I am more qualified to head a church than a foreign office. + My associates like to reform other countries, especially allied + countries, because it is too dangerous to try to reform unfriendly + countries.

+

Mr. Rogers: You are bucking for Pope.

+

The Secretary: Yes. The work is steady and there are no press + conferences.

+

Minister Robledo: Yes, it is easier in church.

+

The Secretary: I think I have more talent to be a renaissance Pope than a modern one.

+

Ambassador Ortiz: Especially because the procedures for electing Popes + were much easier in those days, before the College of Cardinals + prescribed present methods.

+

Minister Robledo: I think it is important to demonstrate a new approach + which will be extremely valuable to Latin American policy, reflecting a + greater effort to become closer in our relations, using fewer labels, + such as the “Good Neighbors” and other slogans. We have always had + labels of this kind in the past, but the results have not measured up to + the hopes they engendered. At the present time I believe we should take + the first practical steps to implement a new policy and only consider + expectations later.

+

The Secretary: As I said in our previous conversation, the traditional + U.S. approach to Latin America is no longer going to be possible. I + don’t think it is possible to find one policy that applies to all of + Latin America and one label for that policy. The interests of the + various countries are too different. Except for language, Nicaragua has + no more to do with Argentina than with us, and in many respects less. + What we are going to do is to concentrate on a few key countries, and + not have any label, such as the “New Dialogue,” and say that takes care + of everybody. And of course we place great stress on our relations with + Argentina for many reasons including the fact that the world football + matches will be held there in 1978, and I will need free tickets. I know + Argentina will win, because otherwise it will take an army division to + protect the winners. There is a limit to heroism. I talked to your + predecessor about means of improving our relations with Argentina and + there are even more urgent reasons for doing so today.

+ +

Ambassador Ortiz: This conception that you have relates to Argentina’s + long-standing aspirations. It was discussed with President Kennedy in Palm Beach, the idea that + the United States ought to establish especially close relations with + four key countries in Latin America, and concentrate its efforts on + them.

+

The Secretary: Which ones?

+

Ambassador Ortiz: About the same ones as now. Argentina, Brazil, and now + Venezuela, and perhaps Peru or some other country on the Pacific coast. + This would be important for the national interests of these countries, + and would contribute to the prosperity and stability of their + neighbors.

+

Minister Robledo: I think we should start working to create a climate of + intensified cooperation and publicize our intentions in Argentina. Mr. + Secretary, we don’t want to take up any more of your time.

+

The Secretary: I have found when a general statement is made, it is + important to have it translated into specific form. I think we should + find a way to exchange ideas on what should be done because otherwise + with the pressure of work each of us has the momentum may be lost.

+

Minister Robledo: We are sending a memorandum with a few suggestions + regarding specific matters, including the efforts we are making with + international and U.S. financial institutions. We are going through a + very difficult financial period. Our economic problems will be resolved + with our own means and by our own efforts. We will need a relaxation in + the due dates for certain loans that are becoming due. In principle + these requests are being accepted and are being resolved in a spirit of + good will in Washington.

+

The Secretary: Treasury working with good will? Secretary Simon is a diplomatic master. I can’t + get him to show good will in working with me.

+

Minister Robledo: We are also interested in the informal working groups + we discussed.

+

The Secretary: Yes. I decided to go ahead with that the other day.

+

Ambassador Vasquez: We have already had talks with the Department about + that last Friday, and we will continue our efforts.

+

Minister Robledo: I believe we are creating conditions that will enhance + our relations and resolve our problems, by taking action on (1) economic + and financial matters, (2) informal working groups, and (3) the + declaration we spoke of earlier today.

+

The Secretary: We have a great interest in Argentina’s stability and + development, and in a strong Argentina. We want to maintain good + relations, so it is up to us to find a way to implement our + intentions.

+

Minister Robledo: I have great confidence the means will be found.

+ +

The Secretary: Thanks for your confidence.

+

Minister Robledo: When may we expect to see you in Argentina?

+

The Secretary: I have had to postpone several visits to Latin America, + and I have decided that I never will be able to get away long enough to + do it all in one trip. So I hope to make two shorter visits, one in + November and the other in February, and I intend to include + Argentina.

+

Minister Robledo: Then I’ll see you in Buenos Aires.

+

The Secretary: Yes.

+
+ +
+ 30. Telegram 8179 From the Embassy in Argentina to the Department of + State +

Summary: Hill stated that the United + States should maintain a low profile in Argentina because of the + political uncertainty that the country was experiencing. The + Ambassador added that the U.S. Government should take care not + to give the impression that it did not consider Argentina to be + one of the key countries in Latin America.

+

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + D750436–1166. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. The Embassy sent its + submission for the Country Analysis and Strategy Paper (CASP) for Argentina in airgram + A–223, October 28. (Ibid., P750165–2294) In telegram 282526 to + all American Republic diplomatic posts, December 1, Rogers asked Ambassadors in + the region to suggest actions that the United States might take + to improve relations with the nations of the hemisphere. (Ibid., + D750417–0263)

+ + + + Buenos Aires, December 16, 1975, + 1433Z. +

8179. For Assistant Secretary Rogers from Ambassador Hill. Subject: Suggestions for Bettering Relations + Within Latin America With Special Emphasis on Argentina. Ref: State + 282526.

+

1. As indicated in the recent CASP, the + turmoil and uncertainty through which Argentina is now passing dictate a + low US profile. It is not a good time for major initiatives in + US-Argentine relations. We are in something of a holding pattern until + we can foresee the likely outcome of events here. This holding action, + however, does not mean that we should simply write Argentina off. It is + a country with great potential, and could be an enormous bread basket if + its resources were properly utilized. I would therefore urge that the + working groups in Washington and here should go forward. We should, for + example, continue to work toward expansion of US-Argentine trade, with + our principal efforts focused in these working groups.

+ +

2. In any case we should not rpt not give the Argentines the impression + that because of their economic and political problems, we no longer + count them among the important, or key, countries of Latin America.

+

3. One positive action we could take would be to expand the flow of + visitors in both directions. Many Argentines in leadership positions + know all too little about the US. We should therefore encourage more + high-level visitors from Argentina and expand our exchange program + generally. At an appropriate time, moreover, I would hope we could + encourage the exchange of congressional visits from both houses.

+

4. Finally, with respect to the rest of the hemisphere as well as to + Argentina, I would suggest that we begin now to map out a series of + Presidential visits as well as visits by the Secretary of State, + Secretary of Treasury, and perhaps other Cabinet officers. These need + not take place immediately but should be carefully planned and spaced + over the four year Presidential term.

+ + + Hill + + +
+ +
+ 31. Telegram 8233 From the Embassy in Argentina to the Department of + State +

Summary: The + Embassy analyzed the political turmoil in Argentina, concluding + that a military takeover of the country was likely.

+

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + D750440–0355. Confidential; Priority. Repeated to Asunción, + Brasília, La Paz, Montevideo, Santiago, and DIA. Telegram 6087 from Buenos + Aires, September 10, is Document 28. In + telegram 7681 from Buenos Aires, November 21, the Embassy + reported that while Perón had diverted the momentum against her by + abandoning some of her previous intransigence, the government + remained paralyzed, with a power vacuum at the top. (National + Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D750406–0829) In + telegram 7691 from Buenos Aires, November 21, the Embassy + reported on the increasing involvement of the Armed Forces in + fighting subversives, observing that “no security force in the + world has had much luck in struggle against terrorists when govt + it was defending was corrupt and discredited, as is Mrs. + Peron’s. In struggle + against terrorists, Armed Forces are put in uncomfortable + position of defending an entity they themselves abhor.” (Ibid., + D750407–0997) In telegram 8055 from Buenos Aires, December 10, + the Embassy reported that the military had apparently decided + not to intervene in politics for the time being. (Ibid., + D750429–0866)

+ + + + Buenos Aires, December 18, 1975, + 1220Z. +

8233. Subject: Further Analysis of Argentine Turmoil. Ref: (A) BA 8055; (B) BA 7681; (C) BA 7229; (D) + BA 6087; (E) A–248 of December 1, + 1975.

+ +

1. Summary: Odds are still on the side of a military takeover—even if it + takes place after first of year—unless civilian politicians can come up + with a solution of their own. Civilians continue to talk of various + scenarios which might produce such solution but since so far all seem to + hinge on Mrs.Perón’s voluntarily + resigning or taking back seat—which she gives no evidence of being + willing to do—none can yet be taken very seriously. Whether country gets + through to elections or whether military take over, a new and dangerous + ingredient is seen in growing alienation of Labor rank and file from + leadership and in efforts of extreme left to take advantage of resulting + gap. Chances that extreme left just might have future opportunity to + seize power are thus enhanced. End summary.

+

2. Ever since Lopez Rega was ousted in July, Mrs.Perón’s days have seemed to be + numbered. While one could speak of a power vacuum even prior to her + entry into the hospital on November 3, subsequent to that date it has + become near complete. Mrs.Perón + displays more insouciance than concern. She is spending only a few hours + per week at the Casa Rosada and has left the government virtually + paralyzed. As one visiting American newsman put it only half in jest: + “There has been no government in Argentina for the past several months. + Thus, if the country gets through to elections with Mrs.Perón still in office that will simply + prove that it doesn’t need a government, so why hold elections at + all?”

+

3. With the vacuum having become so marked, by all logic the other shoe + should have dropped some time ago—i.e., the dynamics of the situation + should have led Mrs.Perón to + resign or should have led to her ouster. That this has not happened—at + least not yet—is evidence of an encouraging change in attitudes. It + demonstrates a stronger will toward constitutionalism than existed in + the past, and it shows that the Argentine military have matured. Were + this ten years ago, there would have long ago been tanks in the streets + and a general in the Casa Rosada. But today, they are resisting the + temptation to intervene, not only because they were badly burned in the + 1966–73 period and do not want to reassume the responsibility for + governing the country, but also because they too wish to stay within the + constitutional bounds.

+

4. A greater will toward constitutionalism does not, however, fill or + alter the existing vacuum of power—and that vacuum cannot continue + indefinitely. The Armed Forces would prefer a constitutional solution, + but in the absence of one, they will probably step in themselves. The + decision of the December 5 meeting of general officers to hold off for + now apparently was even more tenuous in nature than it appeared at the + time (see Ref A). Several military contacts, who had previously + downplayed the possibility of a coup, have, since December 5, suddenly + shifted over to describing a coup as “inevitable.” Timing has not yet + been determined, but most + observers expect the military to act before March. The theory advanced + by some observers that the military will not intervene in what may be an + election year overlooks the fact that the military are beginning to have + grave doubts that the elections would solve anything anyway. They, and + many opposition politicians, are reaching the conclusion that no matter + how much Peronism fragments, one or another of its segments would + probably win the next elections, not with 62 percent of the vote as in + September of 1973, but with 30 percent or so, which would still be more + than the UCR’s traditional 25 percent. + Thus, one Lt. Col. recently remarked to EmbOff: “Why wait until + elections which will simply perpetuate the failure which is already + apparent? Better to move now.”

+

5. The odds, then, remain in favor of military intervention, unless rpt + unless the civilian politicians are able to produce some kind of + solution or mechanism to fill the vacuum. As the UCR’s Antonio Troccoli put it to EmbOff + several days ago: “We must have a card of our own to play if we are to + keep the military from claiming the pot.” Until November 17, the + civilian politicians had seemed on the verge of playing such a + card—i.e., by demanding that Mrs.Perón step aside. She disarmed that initiative (see Ref + B) and a new one has not yet developed. One may be, in the form of an + effort on the part of the Peronists to heal their splits and lever + Mrs.Perón to one side. Raul + Lastiri last week met secretly with Antiverticalista leaders Enrique + Osella Munoz and Luis Rubeo to discuss how this might be done. According + to a well placed Peronist who was present at the meeting, Lastiri agreed + to bring Lorenzo Miguel into the effort and, again according to source, + latter subsequently accepted. We note that just after this Lorenzo + Miguel instructed Labor Deputies in Congress to try to make peace with + and reintegrate the break-away “working group.”

+

6. According to source, main outline of “solution” discussed by Lastiri + and Osella Munoz would be following: A) Verticalistas would agree to + Antiverticalista demands that democratic elections be held within + Peronist Party this spring and officers elected by members themselves + rather than named from above as in the past. B) Entire Cabinet will be + changed and figures respected by both sides will be named to replace + present incumbents. C) Mrs.Perón + must either go on leave or long mission abroad, or she must accept + ceremonial role while real executive authority is exercised by a council + of advisors made up of most eminent and respected Peronists such as + Alberto Rocamora and Roberto Ares. And D) consensus based on dialogue + with other parties—and especially with UCR—must again become keystone of government’s policies. + Source described UCR’s Balbin as not + only privy to but as a “silent partner” in the Lastiri-Osella Munoz + initiative.

+

7. If the steps described above could in fact be taken they might produce + a viable situation. At the moment, however, one cannot be overly sanguine concerning the + prospects. Divisions and animosities are deep and will not be easily + overcome. Indeed, many observers doubt that they can be overcome at all + at this point. Moreover, while Lastiri may be amenable, other + Verticalistas may not be. Source insisted that Lastiri had talked to + Mrs.Perón about the project, + but there is no evidence that she supports it and would be willing to + acquiesce. If she is not, then this scheme, as have previous ones, would + founder on Mrs.Perón’s own + stubbornness.

+

8. Whether the civilians are able to forge a solution and manage to make + it through to elections, or whether the military take over, as at this + point seems more likely, there is one ingredient which may produce a + more unstable and dangerous situation than foreseen in our last major + assessments (see Refs C and D). That is, Labor can no longer be counted + on to follow the decisions and policies of its leaders. Increasingly, + there is a gap between the leaders and the rank and file, and, as + indicated in Ref E (A–248 is a key document and should be read + carefully, even though it is an airgram), the far left is trying, with + some success, to take advantage of this void. Thus, should the military + take over, they might well not be able to control labor simply by making + a deal with the leaders, as they did in 1966. They may have to use + force. Civilian leaders, even be they Peronists, may find it + increasingly difficult to control Labor at all. Further, leftist inroads + in the Labor movement would certainly increase the chances that the far + left might be able to exploit the frustrations and increased divisions + which would result should the Armed Forces too, after having taken + power, fail to come to grips with the country’s political and economic + problems—i.e., should they not rule well.

+

9. As stated in Ref D, the possibility of an extreme leftist takeover is + still several steps further along the road—and it is still only a + possibility. However, in view of the situation described in A–248, it + does not seem so remote a possibility. On the contrary, it is one which + must be taken seriously and watched most carefully.

+ + + Hill + + +
+ +
+ 32. Telegram 660 From the Embassy in Argentina to the Department of + State +

Summary: In an + analysis of Argentine perceptions of the United States, + Hill reviewed + U.S.-Argentine relations since 1973 and noted that internal + turmoil had deprived Argentina of its ability to forge a + coherent foreign policy.

+

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + D760036–0529. Secret; Immediate. Repeated to Brasília, La Paz, + Montevideo, Santiago, Asunción, and USCINCSO for POLAD. In telegram 10605, + January 15, Rogers asked + all American Republic diplomatic posts to comment on perceptions + of the United States in their host countries. (Ibid., + D760016–1144)

+ + + + Buenos Aires, January 30, 1976, + 2105Z. +

660. Subject: Argentine Perceptions of the US. Ref: State 010605. For + Assistant Secretary Rogers from + Ambassador Hill.

+

1. Argentine perceptions of its relationship with the US have changed + markedly over the past three years. During Campora’s brief turn in the Presidency, Argentina saw + itself as the rival of the US and Brazil for hemispheric leadership. It + was not so quixotic, even then, as to believe this rivalry could be + articulated in military or economic terms; rather, it was posited on the + assumption that other Spanish speaking nations of the hemisphere would + turn naturally to a strong Argentina as their champion against the US + and Portuguese-speaking Brazil—especially if Argentina adopted a posture + of confronting the two.

+

2. With Campora’s ouster and + Perón’s assumption of the + Presidency, this conflict model gave way quickly to a policy of close + cooperation with the US. Perón, and even more so his Foreign Minister, + Vignes, believed that while + Argentina should maintain an independent policy line—including + membership in the Third World—she could gain far more from cooperation + than from confrontation with the US. In time, Argentina’s whole approach + to the hemispheric equation came to be built around the conviction that + there should be a Washington-Buenos Aires axis—an axis which would + dilute the lines between Washington and Brasilia and at the same time + validate Argentina’s own leadership pretensions. The Kissinger-Vignes relationship became the core factor of Argentine + foreign policy, outliving Perón, who died in July of 1974. US-Argentine + relations during this two-year period (more or less from July of 1973 + until July of 1975) were as good as and probably better than they had + been for many years.

+

3. Almost from the death of Perón + forward, however, Argentine policy began to be troubled by internal + contradictions. Its success depended upon a solid domestic base—a + resurgent Argentine. With that base becoming, on the contrary, ever more + insecure and with Mrs. + Perón unable to offer + leadership even to her own party—let alone to the country or the rest of + the hemisphere—Vignes’s foreign + policy was left dangling in air. With the intense political turmoil that + began in June of 1975 and Vignes’s ouster two months later, it collapsed altogether. + Argentina is now too caught up in its internal strife to forge a strong, + coherent foreign policy (though Quijano will probably do a much better job of trying + than have his two immediate predecessors). Few Argentines still have any + pretensions for leadership in the foreseeable future. And, while, all + Foreign Ministers since Vignes + have continued to say that good relations with the US are one of the + cornerstones of their policies, there is no longer any far-reaching goal + or global vision behind it. On the contrary, one now has the impression + that Argentina is simply looking for a friend who can throw her a rope. + Increasingly, the “what can we do together in the hemisphere” approach + of Vignes is giving way to one + of “you are our friends; can you bail us out when the time comes?” + (though most Argentines know full well that neither the US nor anyone + else can do much to help them until they themselves come up with a + stable govt).

+

4. Implicit in the above analysis is the conclusion that if the + US-Argentine equation has changed, it has done so either because the + factors on the Argentine side have shifted, or because Argentina has + adjusted its perception of what its relationship to the US should be. + Basically, changes have not come about because of any Argentine + perception of changing factors on the US side. Secretary Kissinger’s failure to visit Argentina + as planned last spring hurt their feelings and caused the Argentines to + wonder about our sincerity, but it did not lead to any basic policy + changes; rather, the policy collapsed several months later because of + domestic factors here. Indeed, in Argentine calculations, the US has so + far remained a relative constant. They did not understand Watergate and + are puzzled by our inability to act in Angola. They believe we may have + been relatively weakened by the series of traumas that have beset us, + but the US is still the colossus of the north, and, to the extent that + it is still based on any clear rationale, Argentine policy, whether + friendly or hostile, must be addressed primarily to it.

+

5. This is not to say, however, that there are not nuances within that + relative constant. Argentines have watched closely developments in the + US—and in the US world position. They have opinions about those + developments and how they may relate to Latin America. In time, these + new perceptions could have real impact on Argentina’s conceptual + construct of its relationship with US. Given below are what we + understand those perceptions to be. These are geared to A through J of + para two of reftel.

+

6. Argentines generally see the US as weakened by the series of + difficulties we have faced during the past few years. They were glad to see us get out of Vietnam + but still saw it as a US defeat. They do not understand why Congress is + revealing US intelligence secrets and they perceive that this will + inhibit our initiatives in a number of ways and perhaps embarrass our + friends. On Watergate, Argentines are more ambiguous. Most seem to + believe it showed American institutions and the democratic system were + strong, but at the cost of leaving the US political scene in + considerable disarray.

+

7. Vietnam did not cause most Argentines to question our ability to live + up to international commitments. Most seemed to feel we had done all + that was humanly possible in an impossible situation. The Thieu govt was + seen as corrupt and unacceptable to its people. Commitments to it were + not seen, therefore, as meaning much. Argentines saw the collapse as a + defeat for the US but they were glad to see us get out since they hoped + that would enable us to give more attention to other areas.

+

8. Argentines generally do not understand the differences between the + administration and the Congress. Most remain convinced that the + Executive branch can follow through if it really wishes to. The few + sophisticated observers (largely North American experts in the Foreign + Ministry, a few intellectuals and newspapermen) who do understand are + worried. They see what happened to the trade bill and in Angola. In + their minds, then, the administration’s ability to follow through on + commitments is in some doubt. Even they, however, have not yet drawn any + definite conclusions and some feel this is a passing phenomenon which a + new administration would be able to sort out quickly. Should + administration’s problems with Congress continue and new measures be + blocked because of it, Argentines would indeed begin to wonder seriously + about US dependability.

+

9. As suggested above, most Argentines do not understand the US political + process. If things go wrong, they usually blame the Executive. + Basically, however, it does not matter much to most Argentines which + branch of govt is at fault. If commitments are not kept, the USG as a whole is blamed.

+

10. The traditional view prevails, but it may be changing. Argentina’s + willingness to cooperate with us and accept our security guarantees is + still high, but it is falling and, if present trends continue in the US, + will fall still further.

+

11. Thinking Argentines are concerned by the implications of Cuban + involvement in Angola. Military men especially draw from it the lesson + that Argentina needs a larger and more modern armed force to counter + such Cuban capabilities. Military men are also beginning to wonder if + what is happening in Angola means they cannot count on the US to help + them against such a threat and they point out Angola is nearer Argentina + than the US.

+ +

12. Argentina wavers between two poles with respect to bilateralism + versus multilateralism. On the one hand, it has frequently alluded to + the advantages of speaking with one voice, and it is a fully + participating member of the OAS and + SELA. On the other, it has + generally preferred to deal with the US on a bilateral basis. This may + have been because it saw itself as a key country with definite interests + of its own to articulate—interests which it did not wish to see + submerged in some multilateral forum or démarche. But at the same time + there are a number of long-range interests which it believes might best + be advanced through multilateral channels. One wonders if Argentina may + not shift increasingly to the multilateral channel as its own position + weakens and it feels its voice alone to have insufficient impact.

+

13. We do not believe Argentina’s voting patterns have changed + appreciably over the past two years—certainly not since 1973 when she + first became officially associated with the Third World. To the extent + that they have changed, this probably results from Argentine perceptions + of what is to her advantage in the world at large, not from a changing + perception of the US.

+

14. Embassy has no evidence that GOA + turning away from US and to another nation for economic and political + support. US continues to be a major trading partner and one of GOA concerns is its unfavorable (for + GOA) balance of trade with US. In + spite of current adverse economic conditions here, US sales have held + up. Furthermore, US is not dependent on Argentina for flow of any + critical raw materials: sugar, meat and meat products have been + principal US imports. At the same time, there is little doubt GOA would like to be less dependent on US + trade and US or US supported financing. In recent years, GOA has sought closer trading ties—without + notable success—with the East Bloc countries, including the USSR, Cuba and China. GOA has also played active role in + organization of Latin American economic system (SELA), remains member of LAFTA and probably hopes that eventually + Latin American organizations will provide opportunities for diminishing + GOA/US interdependence. Same thing can be said, with respect to + political relations, in that GOA policy + evidently aimed at gradual increase importance of multilateral LA relations at expense of US + influence.

+

15. Argentines generally remain convinced that the US could give massive + assistance to developing countries if it wished to. They have little + appreciation for the US’s own economic problems. Suggestions on our side + that the US simply could not provide Argentina with the amount of + financing it believes it requires even if all conditions were favorable + are generally countered by pointing to the massive US assistance to + Vietnam or substantial assistance to other areas. If you can do it + there, why not here, they ask.

+ +

16. In sum, with the exception of a few trained observers, most + Argentines, caught up in their own internal problems, perceive only + vaguely, as through a fog, changing US factors. They understand that the + US may have been relatively weakened, but continue to believe that it + has the power and wealth to work its will if it so wished. In the final + analysis, then, what is somewhat in question is US will, not its + capabilities, and it is incomprehensible to most Argentines that the US + may have lost the will to protect and assure its own interests in the + world. If they once concluded that it had, then their perceptions of the + US as a hemispheric partner (or antagonist) would change markedly.

+ + + Hill + + +
+ +
+ 33. Telegram 36721 From the Department of State to the Embassy in + Argentina +

Summary: At a + luncheon at the Argentine Embassy, Secretary Kissinger and Foreign Minister + Quijano discussed + inter-American relations, bilateral relations, the Secretary’s + trip to Latin America, and Argentine-U.K. talks concerning the + Falkland (Malvinas) Islands.

+

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + D760056–0788. Confidential; Priority. Drafted by Bartch and approved by + Rogers.

+ + + + Washington, February 14, 1976, + 0238Z. +

36721. Subject: Secretary’s Meeting With Argentine FonMin.

+

1. At Argentine Embassy luncheon February 12 the Secretary and Argentine + FonMin Quijano discussed + inter-American relations, U.S.-Argentine bilateral relations (including + expropriation cases involving U.S. firms), U.S. relations with Latin + America, the Secretary’s trip to Latin America, and Argentine-UK talks + concerning Falkland (Malvinas) Islands (reported septel also sent to + London).

+

2. The Secretary said the major problem in U.S. relations with Argentina + is the expropriation of US firms. Unless that is resolved soon, + Argentina will find itself in great trouble with our domestic + legislation. Quijano said he had + had a long talk with Economy Minister Mondelli just before he left + Buenos Aires. He said Mondelli was optimistic that significant progress + was being made to resolve the problem. Quijano said that first of all studies had to be made to + determine the amount of compensation to be paid. In the case of Chase + Manhattan, the decision was made and was about to be put into effect + when the + GOA decided to refer the matter to + Congress for ratification. That should be completed in a few days.

+

3. The Secretary and Quijano + agreed that aside from the expropriation cases, relations between + Argentina and the US are excellent. The Secretary said we have attached + great importance to Argentina. It is one of the two or three most + important countries in South America. When you think of Latin America, + you think of Brazil, Argentina and Venezuela. So we believe our + relations with Argentina are of great importance and we are willing to + cooperate with Argentina. The Secretary said he still expected to visit + Argentina, in connection with the OAS + meeting next June in Chile.

+

4. Quijano emphasized the + importance of an ongoing dialogue between Latin America and the US. He + and the Secretary agreed that the Tlatelolco meeting in February 1974 + had been useful in providing a basis for a continuing exchange of views. + Quijano said it is important + to achieve Latin American unity in order to discuss such issues as + trade, finance and technical development with the US. He said the Latin + American nations would welcome US ideas on how this could be achieved. + Secretary said we had faced same problem with the Europeans. They asked + if we favored European unity, and when we replied that we did, they + asked us to bring it about.

+

5. Secretary said it would be ridiculous for us to try to bring about an + organization from which we would be excluded and which would then + proceed to put pressure on us. He said he had supported Tlatelolco + meeting, but all of the commissions that had been created as a result + were used to make demands on the US. He said there must be at least a + minimum of reciprocity in such matters. Quijano conceded that there must be a give and take, but + repeated that Latin America is looking to us for answers. He and + Secretary agreed that it might be useful to revive the spirit of + Tlatelolco as a basis for resuming the dialogue. Quijano said Argentina is attempting to + work within SELA to exert a moderating + influence. He thought the US could work with SELA and use it in a positive way. He said the worst thing + that could happen is to terminate the dialogue between Latin America and + the US.

+ + + Kissinger + + +
+ +
+ 34. Telegram 1186 From the Embassy in Argentina to the Department of + State +

Summary: + Ambassador Hill told Air + Force Commander in Chief Agosti that the Argentines would have to + determine their country’s future, adding that the United States + would recognize an Argentine Government that effectively + discharged its international obligations.

+

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + D760065–0825. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Repeated to DIA. In telegram 984 from Buenos + Aires, February 12, the Embassy reported that the military + appeared to have given up on the ability of civilians to govern + and to be awaiting an appropriate moment to step in. The Embassy + concluded that the United States “must now wait for coming + developments and hope for a stable, responsible govt.” (Ibid., + D760054–0425) In telegram 1042 from Buenos Aires, February 16, + Hill reported on a + conversation in which a Foreign Ministry official told the + Ambassador that he had been asked by “the military planning + group” to prepare a study on how best to avoid problems with the + United States on the human rights issue. The officers reportedly + intended “to carry forward an all-out war on the terrorists” but + wished “to minimize any resulting problems with the US.” (Ibid., + D760058–0466) In telegram 44004 to Buenos Aires, February 24, + the Department commended Hill for his handling of Agosti’s inquiry and of the + human rights issue. (Ibid., D760068–1074) In telegram 1292 from + Buenos Aires, February 26, the Embassy transmitted a memorandum + of conversation of the Hill-Agosti meeting. (Ibid., + D760072–0725)

+ + + + Buenos Aires, February 21, 1976, + 1340Z. +

1186. Dept pass to Assistant Secretary Rogers.

+

1. On February 19, Ambassador Hill, accompanied by the Defense Attaché, Acting Air + Attaché and the Acting Chief of Air Force Section USMILGP, called on new + Argentine Air Force CINC + Agosti.

+

2. Agosti, without any of his + aides present, received the Ambassador and his party in his office in + Air Force headquarters. After a brief but warm exchange of pleasantries, + Ambassador Hill turned + conversation toward specific matters of interest between our two air + forces. Though he followed the Ambassador’s points closely, Agosti appeared not to be well informed + on the subject and evidenced interest in raising other topics.

+

3. At what Ambassador and party believed to be end of protocol visit, + Agosti asked that he be + allowed to raise one question with the Ambassador. He asked the + Ambassador for his assessment of the current situation in Argentina. + Ambassador Hill said he would be + glad to answer the question but noted that to be useful, he would have + to be frank and candid in reviewing the situation. Agosti responded this was exactly the + kind of analysis he wanted from the Ambassador. Ambassador Hill noted that the current situation + in Argentina was a difficult one but stressed as he did throughout the + conversation that solutions to Argentina’s present difficulties could + only come from the Argentines themselves. The US wished to be a friend + of Argentina but had learned + through long experience that it did neither itself nor Argentina any + good by intervening in local matters.

+

4. The Ambassador noted that there was a growing belief in the US that + the constitutionalist policy of the Armed Forces most recently expressed + by General Videla in general was + giving way to a forming of resignation among political and military + leaders that only a military intervention could deal with the country’s + problems. The Ambassador noted that whether or not this was indeed the + case, it was a matter for the Argentines to decide among themselves. At + this point in time, the Ambassador noted, he in all candor could not + deny that many influential Argentines were seeking to discern the policy + the US would adopt if an intervention should indeed occur. He noted that + at present it is the US Government’s policy to recognize a government + that effectively exercises power and responsibly discharges its + international obligations.

+

5. However Argentina resolved its problems, the Ambassador noted that he + had an obligation to tell General Agosti that there were two problem areas which could + perturb US/Argentine relations. The first concerned investment problems. + (At this point the Ambassador briefly reviewed our outstanding + investment disputes and synthesized for Agosti the relevant portions of the US Trade Act.) He + further noted that the country’s present economic state would make it + difficult for the country to raise funds without recourse to the IMF or other international lending + institutions. The second broad area in which problems could arise would + be in the area of human rights, an issue that had become sensitive in + the US.

+

6. Agosti followed Ambassador’s + entire exposition with great attention and by mutual agreement with the + Ambassador had all of the Ambassador’s remarks translated into Spanish + to avoid confusion even though Agosti speaks English. It was clear as Agosti escorted Ambassador Hill to his car that his expressions + of thanks for his candid appraisal were very sincere ones.

+

7. Comment: Ambassador Hill told + Agosti he would not object if + substance of conversation were discussed with Army and Navy CINCs. Doubtless Agosti will soon transmit this + conversation to his two fellow CINCs + who along with Agosti have in + recent days tried through several indirect means to assess US views re + the political situation. (Detailed memcon will follow by septel.)

+ + + Hill + + +
+ +
+ 35. Telegram 1373 From the Embassy in Argentina to the Department of + State +

Summary: The + Embassy reported on widespread rumors that a military coup was + inevitable, adding that no significant segment of Argentine + society accused the United States of being responsible for the + anticipated coup. The U.S. Government therefore remained on good + terms with both civilian politicians and military leaders.

+

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + D760076–0478. Secret; Immediate. Repeated to Asunción, Brasília, + La Paz, Montevideo, Santiago, and DIA. In telegram 1790 from Buenos Aires, March 18, + the Embassy stated that while a moderate caretaker + administration was likely to emerge initially in the wake of a + coup, the magnitude of the country’s problems and the presence + of hard-line officers in the Armed Forces could lead to + “military rule for an extended duration and of unprecedented + severity.” The Embassy added that while U.S. interests were + unlikely to be sharply affected by developments in the short + term, the failure of any military regime to address the + country’s problems could allow leftist extremists to build a + broader base, resulting in “a disastrous situation of such + magnitude that US interests across the board would be seriously + threatened.” (Ibid., D760104–0479)

+ + + + Buenos Aires, February 28, 1976, + 1620Z. +

1373. Subj: Political Crisis. Ref: BA–1325 (Notal).

+

1. Several Congressional leaders including Troccoli of UCR have told EmbOffs that effective + action in Congress clearly not possible and that they regard coup as + inevitable. Troccoli commented that announcement Feb 26 that Anti + Verticalista Peronists will support joint session of Congress is + virtually meaningless. Joint session will not even begin until next week + at earliest. Senator Luder last + night—Feb 27—indicated it might not be convened until March 8, and even + when it convenes it is only charged, in effect, with studying crisis and + recommending solutions. “Joint session,” Troccoli concluded,” is only a + facade. Constitutional solution has already been discarded. We are now + simply waiting for the inevitable to happen.” (Note: Whether coup is + inevitable or not, it is significant that most politicians now believe + it is.)

+

2. According to Troccoli, several other Radicales and Anti-Verticalista + Peronists, key factor in decision of Anti-Verticalistas not to support + move in Congress to oust Mrs.Perón was conviction on their part that coup was + inevitable no matter what they did (see reftel). This, in turn was + result of failure of military to give them any kind of guarantees. + Spokesmen for working group and dissident Labor Deputies reportedly + asked military leaders week of Feb 15–21 for assurances that if they, + the dissident Peronists, joined in Congressional initiative to oust + Mrs.Perón and bring in + Luder, Armed Forces would + not overthrow Luder government + further down road. Videla, + Viola, Massera and other senior military leaders reasoned that national + crisis so acute and Luder’s + mandate would be so weak that chances were very high he too would fail, + leaving the military with no choice but to take over. Thus, while they encouraged + Anti-Verticalistas to support action in Congress they could not give + assurances latter had wanted. Anti-Verticalistas therefore, resigned + themselves to coup and are playing for the future with latter in mind, + they will take no action which could be used to undercut their position + with Peronist movement. They will continue to criticize Mrs.Perón but will not support move to + oust her. In general, their attitude now seems to be one of “if we are + all going down anyway, let’s do nothing which will further divide the + Peronist movement in the process.”

+

3. Question now largely academic one, but many observers, including + Embassy, still of view that reasons given by Anti-Verticalistas are not + persuasive. With or without military assurances, removing Mrs.Perón by constitutional means and + bringing Luder was at least + worth a try. In final analysis, what Anti-Verticalistas have done is to + opt out.

+

4. Reports Embassy is getting from various sources close to military tend + to coincide with those of DAO regarding + shape of future military govt. and direction of its policies. According + to our reports, General Videla, + rather than Viola, will be President. At least initially, Cabinet + reportedly will be all military—with possible exception of Econ + Minister. Papal Nuncio told Amb Hill Feb 27 he understands Admiral Montes will be new + Foreign Minister (DAO has similar + report). Congress will be closed, but political parties will continue to + function (though possibly within narrowed parameters). In general, it + now appears that military will follow relatively moderate line.

+

5. Both UCR and Anti-Verticalista + Peronists have told EmbOff they plan to go on record as being against + coup but then to accept it and to cooperate to extent possible with + military govt. As Troccoli put it: “We do not want to rock Videla’s boat; on contrary, we want + his govt to succeed. He is a reasonable, moderate man and we prefer him + to any of the hardliners who might take his place if initial phase of + military administration goes badly.”

+

6. What military will do with Mrs.Perón not clear. Several sources have indicated they + believe decision made not rpt not to let her leave country. Nuncio told + Amb Hill he understood she might + simply be detained at military resort area such as Ascochinga in Cordoba + for indefinite period. “If they let her go back to Spain, she and Lopez + Rega could create problems for new govt which it would rather avoid,” he + noted.

+

7. Position of USG: On what may be eve + of coup (whether it takes place within days or weeks), Embassy believes + USG is in good position. None of + the major parties or responsible sectors are accusing USG of being behind it. On contrary, + several Radicales and Peronists have stated their certainty that USG has stood by as close friend wishing + them the best but has not intervened in Argentina’s internal affairs in + any way. We believe Sec + Kissinger’s recent + acceptance of luncheon invitation with Quijano contributed significantly to this atmosphere. + Our stock with democratic civilian forces therefore remains high, but at + same time our bridges to military are open.

+ + + Hill + + +
+ +
+ 36. Airgram A–32 From the Embassy in Argentina to the Department of + State +

Summary: The + Embassy provided its assessment of the human rights situation in + Argentina, concluding that terrorist suspects had been subject + to extralegal killings, arrests, and incarceration, but that the + extent of official involvement in these abuses was difficult to + assess.

+

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + P760037–0384. Confidential. Drafted by Political Officer Frank + Zambito; cleared by Acting DCM + Hugh Woodward and Hill; + approved by Political Counselor Wayne Smith. In telegram 45319 + to all diplomatic posts, February 25, the Department sent + instructions for human rights reporting. (Ibid., + D760071–0412)

+ + + + + A–32 + + + + Buenos Aires, March + 9, 1976. +

Subject: Human Rights: The Argentine Situation. Ref: State 045319.

+

Following answers are keyed to Paragraph 12 reftel:

+

A) Argentine constitution of 1853 is in effect. This constitution is + closely patterned after the US Constitution and provides most of the + legal guarantees as does ours. Major exception is “State of Siege” + provision, which gives federal government power to temporarily suspend + habeas corpus and to move accused persons from place to place within the + country without their consent. State of Siege also allows government to + offer prisoners option of choosing exile rather than standing trial. + State of Siege does not, however, repeat not suspend due process clauses + and in theory arrested persons still allowed right to trial, + representation by counsel of their choice, etc. In view of subversive + situation, an anti-subversive law passed in 1975 gave federal government + power to rule that newspapers were acting to further subversive cause, + thus allowing government to either suspend or close them.

+

B) Actual practices of current government with respect to human rights a + most confusing one. With regard to the great majority of cases, + constitutional provisions are applied. With respect to terrorists, + however, there is strong evidence to support thesis that human rights + violations do indeed occur. During the past three years over 2,000 Argentines have died as a + result of political violence. By far largest number of these deaths were + caused by left and right-wing terrorists. The left-wing terrorists in + particular made police, army officers and other government officials one + of their major targets. Right-wing terrorists, on the other hand, have + directed their fire against leftist students, union officials, + congressmen and persons sympathetic to leftist causes in general. On + government side, there is evidence to indicate that faced with + large-scale subversive violence, police and army officials have on + occasion resorted to extralegal killings, arrests and incarceration for + long periods of time and torture of suspected terrorists. While there is + no evidence to indicate that these acts are carried out under “official” + government policy, there have been no cases where police officials or + army officers have been brought to trial for abusing prisoners. With + regard to free speech, the federal government has in the past three + years closed down almost a score of publications on the extreme left and + right of the political spectrum. On the right, the publications were + charged with fostering virulent anti-Semitism or inciting violence, in + some cases publishing threats against the lives of specific individuals. + On the left, publications have been closed because it was believed that + their source of funds was proceeds of political kidnappings or were + publishing prosubversive literature. Despite this, however, the great + bulk of the press has been free to express its views and in the past 18 + months the government has been subjected to harsh and critical + examination by its press critics.

+

C) As noted in A above, question of government involvement in violations + of human rights difficult to assess. Clearly some high-ranking army and + police officials have condoned these practices, although no evidence to + indicate that policy-level officials, i.e., undersecretary and + cabinet-level officials, have ordered these acts as official policy. + Exception to this generalization would be former Social Welfare Minister + Jose Lopez Rega, who is charged with having organized the right-wing + terrorist group, the Triple A, using government funds. However, from + recent revelations it appears that even this once very powerful minister + set up his apparatus in secret with pilfered government funds and kept + his cabinet colleagues in the dark as to his activities.

+

D) Amnesty International has recently compiled a list of lawyers it + claims have been detained for defending persons charged with political + crimes. In many cases this charge is doubtless true and lawyers who were + fulfilling their professional obligations have found themselves afoul of + the law. There is also, however, evidence to suggest that in some cases + the defense attorneys themselves were the “above ground” arm of the + terrorist apparatus.

+

E) Embassy officials have from time to time discussed with Argentine + officials their concern that human rights violations could be a complicating factor in our + bilateral relations but have never made a formal démarche on the subject + as Argentines feel their legal practices are an internal political + matter.

+ + + Hill + + +
+ +
+ 37. Telegram 62045 From the Department of State to the Embassy in + Argentina +

Summary: The + Department reported on a request by the Argentine Military + Attaché for information on Argentines in the United States with + leftist sympathies. The Department noted that the U.S. + Government did not intend to provide the requested information, + adding that, as a matter of policy, it did not wish to receive + detailed information on plans for unconstitutional changes of + government.

+

Source: Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, Box 16, Buenos Aires. + Secret; Immediate; Noforn; Roger Channel. Drafted by Bartch; approved by Emerson Brown in INR/DDC and by Ryan.

+ + + + Washington, March 13, 1976, 1825Z. +

62045. For Ambassador only. Subject: Possible Military Coup in + Argentina.

+

1. Major General Luis Miro, Argentine Military Attaché, called at + Department of Army March 12 and stated he had been requested by + Argentine military to attempt obtain from US military information on + Argentine nationals in US who may be leftist or Communist sympathizers, + or former members of ERP, or who may be + sponsored by GOA and are employed by + Argentine airlines, Consulates, OAS, + IBRD, or any other international + organizations in US. He said information is required for possible recall + of individuals in case of military coup in Argentina in near future, and + to determine whereabouts of persons who may be hostile to coup.

+

2. Miro said military is exercising great restraint and hopes when it + moves it would be in response to popular demand in Argentina. He doubted + however that there would be any great civilian demand for coup. He said + military does not have depth of experience necessary to govern for any + extended period and that it is therefore imperative that power be + returned rapidly to “a reasonable civilian element.” He added that coup + is “open secret,” with situation in Argentina having deteriorated to a + point of no return. He said only a change of government can halt further + deterioration. He saw little or no hope for friendly US press when + military moves, and he anticipates that no matter how restrained Armed Forces are, they will + be accused of human rights violations and as having dictatorial + ambitions.

+

3. We do not intend to supply information Miro requested, and Department + of Army will so inform Miro when he returns March 17 from visit to New + York and Boston. In accordance with standing instructions from Assistant + Secretary Rogers, reiterated + during ARA Chiefs of Mission meeting + last November, we do not wish to become recipients of detailed + information concerning plans for unconstitutional changes of government. + We especially do not wish to receive advance information of possible + moves in such detail as to provide the impression that we ourselves + could in any way have become involved in, or identified with, or + supportive of developments of this kind.

+ + + Kissinger + + +
+ +
+ 38. Telegram 1751 From the Embassy in Argentina to the Department of + State +

Summary: Hill reported on a + conversation with Navy Commander in Chief Massera in which the + possibility of a military coup was discussed in hypothetical + terms.

+

Source: Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, Box 16, Buenos Aires. + Secret; Immediate; Roger Channel. In telegram 1715 from Buenos + Aires, March 15, the Embassy reported that the military + leadership was coming under increasing pressure from hardliners + to carry out a coup. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign + Policy File, D760098–0063) In telegram 1916 from Buenos Aires, + March 23, the Embassy reported that large-scale troop movements + in connection with a coup attempt had begun on the afternoon of + March 22. (Ibid., D760109–0938) In telegram 2034 from Buenos + Aires, March 26, the Embassy reported that the military junta + had met less opposition than expected in overthrowing Perón and that it had named + General Jorge Videla as + President. (Ibid., D760115–0439)

+ + + + Buenos Aires, March 16, 1976, 2105Z. +

1751. Subject: Ambassador’s Conversation with Admiral Massera. For Asst + Sec Rogers from Amb Hill.

+

1. Accompanied by Pol Couns I had coffee today with Alexandro Shaw, Pres + of Banco Shaw. Admiral Massera, Commander in Chief of the Navy, was also + there. Massera sought opportunity to speak privately with me and Pol + Couns. He said that it was no secret that military might have to step + into political vacuum very soon. They did not want to do so but at this + point choices seem to be between military intervention and total chaos + leading to destruction of the Argentine State. Massera said he did not + want to discuss possible intervention as he was sure I would regard it as diplomatically + incorrect. However, he said, he did wish to approach me as a friend to + say that military were terribly concerned about their public relations + in the US should they have to intervene. He admitted that military were + inexperienced in terms of public relations problems in Argentina, much + less in the US, and he asked if I could indicate to him one or two + reputable public relations firms in the US which might handle the + problem for a future military govt.

+

2. I emphasized that USG could not in + any way become involved in Argentine internal affairs. I said that while + I could not give any such advice as he had requested, I could quite + properly make available to him the list of public relations firms + available in the Embassy’s commercial library. Massera indicated that + would be fine and that he would appreciate receiving such a list “within + next few days”.

+

3. Massera said military were fully aware of the need to avoid human + rights problems should they have to take power. He said Argentine + military intervention if it comes will not follow the lines of the + Pinochet takeover in Chile. + Rather, he said, they will try to proceed within the law and with full + respect for human rights. This did not mean, he said, [garble—they would + not press?] the war against the terrorists; on the contrary, they + intended to step up the fight against terrorism and subversion, but they + would do so within the law. They had no intention of resorting to + vigilante-type activities, taking extra-legal reprisals or of taking + action against uninvolved civilians. [garble—If the three?] CINCs have to move, he said, their + intention is to do so in the most “democratic” and moderate manner + possible. He noted that they are having some difficulties restraining + hot heads, but expressed confidence that they would be able to do + so.

+

4. Massera said he hesitated to raise subject with me but that at same + time he wished to assure me and reps of other govts that if military + feel called upon to move they will not harm Mrs.Perón. He said this was a knotty + problem but that the thinking of the three CINCs at the moment was that probably best thing would be + that Mrs.Perón simply leave the + country. On the other hand, there were many within the military who + wished to take stronger action against her. A possible compromise + solution would be to detain her in Argentina on Martin Garcia Island or + in some military resort area such as Ascochinga until such time as final + determination as to her future could be made.

+

6 [sic]. Comment: Admiral Massera was very correct + throughout the conversation. He scrupulously placed all his comments in + the conditional tense, and several times emphasized that he was only + speaking of hypothetical possibilities. Nonetheless, Pol Couns and I had + distinct impression that Massera was talking about a coup which will + probably come within the next few days, possibly even before the + weekend.

+ +

7. My plans: I have planned and have reservations to depart Argentina the + evening of Mar 17. Should I cancel these plans now and coup should take + place on, say Mar 18, that might be taken by many as proof that we had + prior knowledge of military action. Further, it might be alleged that I + had cancelled plans and stayed here to help direct the coup. I therefore + believe that it is in the best interest of the USG that I proceed with my plans as though we had no + forewarning. To be sure, every newspaper and magazine is now speculating + that the golpe may come shortly, but that is only hearsay. The fact that + I would be out of the country when the blow actually falls would be, I + believe, a fact in our favor indicating noninvolvement of Embassy and + USG. Hence, I intend to depart on + schedule. I am, however, changing my plans and will fly from Miami to + Washington. I should arrive there by noon Mar 19, and will be available + for consultations that afternoon and the morning of the 20th if you so + desire and longer if necessary.

+ + + Hill + + +
+ +
+ 39. Telegram 72468 From the Department of State to All American + Republic Diplomatic Posts and the Commander in Chief of the Southern + Command +

Summary: In an + analysis of the military coup that was developing in Argentina, + the Bureau of Intelligence and Research concluded that the new + regime would not pose a threat to U.S. interests but that human + rights violations could become a serious issue in U.S.-Argentine + relations.

+

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + D760113–0958. Confidential. Drafted by Buchanan; cleared by Louis + Misback in INR/RAR, Jack + Smith in ARA/APU, and Ryan; approved by Kirk.

+ + + + Washington, March 25, 1976, 1921Z. +

72468. Subject: INR Analysis of + Developments in Argentina.

+

1. Communiqués and statements issued by the Argentine junta do not + clarify how long the military intends to remain in power, nor what + policies will be implemented. Such evidence as exists, however, + indicates that the junta has planned a moderate conservative approach, + featuring:

+

—A heavy law-and-order emphasis with top priority assigned to the + counterterrorist effort.

+ +

—A house-cleaning operation against allegedly corrupt political and labor + figures, including plans to try Perón on corruption charges.

+

—Avoidance of a rabidly anti-Peronist or anti-labor posture, and an + attempt to work with amenable sectors of the powerful union + movement.

+

—Implementation of a moderate austerity program which will emphasize less + state participation in the economy, fiscal responsibility, export + promotion, favorable attention to the neglected agricultural sector, and + a positive attitude toward foreign investment.

+

2. Junta’s capability: There is little reason to be sanguine about the + future of the military government and its ability to provide solutions + to pressing problems. The terrorist menace can probably be controlled, + if not eradicated, but designing an economic strategy which will promote + recovery without provoking widespread opposition will be difficult. The + austerity measures favored by many experts, as well as the junta itself, + cannot be enforced without considerable sacrifice on the part of a + working class not inclined to pay the price. Persistent efforts to + enforce austerity would probably produce a combination of popular + resistance and policy disagreements within military circles that would + undermine the junta’s ability to rule. The path would then be open for + another governmental shift, probably involving the emergence of a new + military faction with its own approach.

+

3. Perón’s fate: Contrary to + expectations, the junta has decided to detain Perón within Argentina and apparently + intends to try her on corruption charges. The objective is probably to + expose in definitive fashion the alleged immorality of Peronist politics + and politicians and, thereby, prevent Perón’s subsequent resurrection as a martyr. However, + this tactic could easily backfire. Argentines will not bemoan the + removal of Perón, but they tend to view her as a pathetic rather than a + sinister figure. The public may reject an attempt to make her solely + responsible for the nation’s ills. The junta will likely monitor public + reaction to their plans, and leave open the possibility of simply + exiling Perón.

+

4. US interests: US interests are not threatened by the present military + government. The three service commanders are known for their pro-US, + anti-Communist attitudes, and, in fact, one of the junta’s early + statements refers to Argentina’s need “to achieve an international + standing in the Western and Christian world.” Investment problems will + be minimized by the junta’s favorable attitude toward foreign capital, + while the government’s probable intention of seeking US aid, tangible + and/or moral, to overcome pressing economic problems will provide added + insurance against openly anti-US attitudes and policies.

+

5. Human rights is an area in which the new government’s actions may + present problems from the US perspective. Several thousand alleged subversives are already being + held under a state of siege declared in November 1974, and that figure + will mount as the security forces intensify their counterterrorist + efforts. The military’s treatment of these individuals has been less + than correct in the past, and will probably involve serious human rights + violations in the future. A harbinger of things to come may be contained + in the junta’s decree establishing the death penalty for those attacking + security personnel. The scope of this problem could reach beyond the + treatment of subversives if, over the coming months, the junta attempts + to enforce unpopular social and economic policies.

+ + + Kissinger + + +
+ +
+ 40. Transcript of the Secretary of State’s Staff Meeting +

Summary: Kissinger and Rogers discussed the stance + that the United States should adopt toward the military junta + that had taken power in Argentina.

+

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Transcripts of Kissinger Staff Meetings, Lot + 78D443, Box 4, Secretary’s Staff Meetings. + Secret.

+ + + + Washington, March 26, 1976, 8:12 + a.m. + +

[Omitted here are a list of participants and discussion unrelated to + Argentina.]

+

[Mr. Rogers:] In Argentina, although the junta has had some pretty good + success, we’re trying to make whatever estimates we can about what’s + going to happen. We’ve asked both the Mission and Washington to do their + own visualizations—to compare them. But I think the preliminary estimate + has got to be that it’s going to go downhill. This junta is testing the + basic proposition that Argentina is not governable, so they’re going to + succeed where everybody else has failed. I think that’s a distinctly + odds-on choice.

+

I think we’re going to look for a considerable effort to involve the + United States—particularly in the financial field. I think we’re going + to see a good deal—

+

Secretary Kissinger: Yes, but + that’s in our interest.

+

Mr. Rogers: If there’s a chance of it succeeding and if they’re not + asking us to put too much up on the table. What we’re going to try to + do, when and if they come up with such a plan, is what we were prepared + to do about six months ago. We had worked out as intermediaries a sensible program for + international assistance, using the private banks and monetary + institutions.

+

Whether we can pull that off again, I don’t know; but I think we’re going + to hear from them very early on in terms of financial programs.

+

I think also we’ve got to expect a fair amount of repression, probably a + good deal of blood, in Argentina before too long. I think they’re going + to have to come down very hard not only on the terrorists but on the + dissidents of trade unions and their parties.

+

Secretary Kissinger: But—

+

Mr. Rogers: The point I’m making is that although they have good press + today, the basic line of all the interference was they had to do it + because she couldn’t run the country. So I think the point is that we + ought not at this moment to rush out and embrace this new regime—that + three–six months later will be considerably less popular with the + press.

+

Secretary Kissinger: But we + shouldn’t do the opposite either.

+

Mr. Rogers: Oh, no; obviously not.

+

Mr. McCloskey: What do we say + about recognition?

+

Mr. Rogers: Well, we’re going to recognize this morning a formal note in + response to their request for recognition—as have virtually all the + other countries of Latin America. But beyond that, Hill will keep his mouth shut.

+

Secretary Kissinger: Yes, but + what does that mean concretely? Whatever chance they have, they will + need a little encouragement from us.

+

What is he telling them?

+

Mr. Rogers: What? Oh, nothing. He has not been talking with them yet. He + has not been invited to talk with them. He’s ready to go in and talk + with them when and if they request a meeting. But the Generals who are + now presently occupying the Ministerial posts are there very + temporarily—probably for the week—until the junta can make its final + decisions as to whom they’re going to appoint. They will make decisions + on who they will appoint within a week.

+

We think we know who’s the Foreign Minister—which is the key + appointment.

+

Secretary Kissinger: Who?

+

Mr. Rogers: Probably a fellow named Vanek, who we have worked with in the + past. And if he is appointed, then I think we’re in a position to work + with him.

+

Secretary Kissinger: But can I + see some instructions on what you’re going to tell Hill if somebody should come in—

+

Mr. Rogers: Yes.

+ +

Secretary Kissinger: —because I + do want to encourage them. I don’t want to give the sense that they’re + harassed by the United States.

+

Mr. Rogers: No. What I was basically concerned about in the first + instance was the public posture.

+

Secretary Kissinger: I agree with + that.

+

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to Argentina.]

+
+ +
+ 41. Telegram 2061 From the Embassy in Argentina to the Department of + State +

Summary: The + Embassy characterized the coup as moderate and concluded that + the U.S. Government should sympathetically consider any + Argentine requests for assistance while avoiding + over-identification with the junta.

+

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + D760119–0409. Secret; Priority. Repeated to Asunción, Brasília, + Caracas, La Paz, Lima, Mexico City, Montevideo, and + Santiago.

+ + + + Buenos Aires, March 29, 1976, 1945Z. +

2061. Subject: Videla’s Moderate + Line Prevails.

+

1. Summary: It is too early to make any firm predictions concerning final + success of the experiment in govt undertaken by the Armed Forces on Mar + 24. Even so, with Videla now + named Pres and his new Cabinet now named, it is perhaps a convenient + moment to report several short-term conclusions: A) Videla is at least for the time being + in a strong enough position to keep the hardliners in check and impose a + moderate approach; B) the terrorists are likely to keep a relatively low + profile for the next few weeks, especially in view of the fact that the + Armed Forces have launched a massive drive against them; C) the new govt + has not yet presented its full economic program, but the approach + evidenced so far is encouragingly pragmatic and deliberate, and D) once + the govt begins to impose an austerity program, labor reaction may + stiffen, but so far it has been almost nonexistent; indeed, absenteeism + reportedly ceased to be a problem almost the day after the coup. The + USG of course should not become + overly identified with the junta, but so long as the new govt can hew to + a moderate line the USG should + encourage it by examining sympathetically any requests for assistance. + End summary.

+

2. The coup d’état which culminated during the early hours of Mar 24 can + now definitely be judged as moderate in character. In their first statements the three members of + the junta indicated they had taken power only to save the country and + that their takeover was not directed at any group or sector. They did + not attack the memory of Gen Perón, nor did they say anything derogatory + about Peronism or any other party. They have arrested some high + officials such as Raul Lastiri, Julio Gonzalez and Gov Carlos Menem who + are believed to be guilty of malfeasance or abuse of power and they have + rounded up a good number of suspected terrorists. But it is now clear + that there have been no massive arrests. No one has been put against a + wall and no one has been pulled in simply because they happened to be a + Peronist or because they served in the last govt. Most Congressmen, + Governors and other deposed officials have simply been told to go home. + Mrs.Perón herself is in + custody but clearly the junta does not intend to make a martyr of her. + If there is an investigation of her questionable activities, it will + probably be a fair one, and if she is convicted, her sentence is likely + to be nothing more than exile. Indeed, many in the military would like + to put her on a plane to Madrid even without an investigation.

+

3. Several extreme left-wing parties, mostly Trotskyites and Maoists in + orientation, have been banned, but the charters of other parties, + including the orthodox Communist Party (PCA), remain in force. Political + activity is suspended temporarily and the various parties have had to + remove signs and slogans from their headquarters. Their organizations + are intact, however, and several of the Embassy’s sources within the + parties have expressed hope that limited political activity may resume + within six months or so.

+

4. Prior to the coup, there had been fears that hardline commanders in + the field might exceed their orders and arbitrarily shoot or arrest any + labor leaders, Peronist or leftist they did not like. As indicated + above, however, this did not happen. Videla and his moderate colleagues kept the hawks in + line. Further, the smoothness with which the coup was carried out and + the way in which it was accepted by the people did much to enhance + Videla’s image. Probably at + least for the next several months, therefore, his position relative to + that of the hardliners will be overpowering. It is most unlikely that + any of them would try to move against him. If they did, they would lose. + Thus, for now, Videla’s moderate + policies seem safe.

+

5. If fending off the hawks was Videla’s first concern, coming to grips with the + terrorists was his second. Indeed, in order of importance the second + outranks the first, but the new govt needed a firm political base in + order effectively to confront the terrorists and thus its first thought + had to be for institutional unity. With that now assured, at least for + the time being, the Armed Forces have launched a nationwide effort + against the terrorists. Many suspected terrorists have been rounded up. Widespread searches are + being conducted and shifting roadblocks have resulted in the capture of + several guerrillas in Cordoba and elsewhere.

+

6. For their part, the guerrillas are likely to continue some hit-and-run + operations such as today’s assassination of a police commissioner, but + they will probably keep a fairly low profile for the next few weeks. + Tactically, they will probably want to get the lay of the land and wait + for the military to drop its guard. Strategically, they probably hope + popular opinion will begin to swing against the military govt within a + few weeks. That would be the time to move. They may have some + recalculating to do, however, for so far the military have not behaved + in the repressive way the terrorists seem to have expected. If Videla can hold to his moderate + course, the guerrillas may be surprised to find several weeks from now + that the govt continues to enjoy popular support.

+

7. Equally as pressing as the terrorist problem is that of the economy. + The govt has not yet had a chance to present its plan, but the economic + team is now in place and looks impressive. The contacts the Embassy has + had so far with Econ Min Martinez de Hoz and some of his assistants + indicate they have a firm grasp of the problems and hopefully will have + a practical approach to their solution. Detailed analysis of economic + program will follow ASAP.

+

8. As encouraging as the new govt’s own performance so far has been + public reaction to it. Most Argentines were glad to be rid of + Mrs.Perón’s pathetically + incompetent govt. But they did not rush into the streets to cheer the + Armed Forces or jeer the Peronists. They approve of what the Armed + Forces have done, but they have some healthy reservations. They have + seen military govts start off well before, only to fail further down the + road. They hope this one will be different and at this point are willing + to give it their support. But no one seems to expect miracles, and that + is one of the most mature phenomena about this coup.

+

9. Even labor so far is quiescent. Absenteeism, for example, disappeared + as a major problem on Mar 25. Many labor leaders have made their peace + with the military and are willing to cooperate. For its part, the junta + has handled labor intelligently and with prudence. Some of the more + corrupt labor leaders have been arrested, but most leaders have been + left alone. The CGT is intervened but + most unions within it are functioning more or less normally. The crunch, + however, has not yet come and will not until the govt introduces its + econ program and begins to impose austerity measures.

+

10. US position. This was probably the best executed and most civilized + coup in Argentine history. It was unique in other ways too. The US has + not been accused of being behind it, except by Nuestra + Palabra, the organ + of the PCA. The Embassy hopes to keep it that way. Clearly, we should + not become overly identified with the junta. That would not be good for + them or for us. Nonetheless, Argentina’s best interests, and ours, lie + in the success of the moderate govt now led by Gen Videla. He has a chance of pulling + Argentina together again, stopping terrorism and getting the economy + going. His govt, moreover, has promised to solve quickly our various + investment problems (Exxon, Chase Manhattan, Standard Electric, etc.) + and to bring about a better climate in general for foreign investment. + Should Videla’s govt fail, that + might on the one hand open the door to the hardliners, who would return + Argentina to the polarization of the past and who, being more + nationalistically inclined than the moderates, would not take as + favorable an attitude toward the US and US investments. On the other + side, Videla’s failure could + also bring about conditions under which the extreme left might have an + opportunity to make a bid for power, which would clearly run contrary to + all our interests.

+

11. Thus, while we should move discreetly and keep our distance, we + should also, so long as the Videla govt sticks to a moderate course, look + sympathetically on any requests for assistance it may direct to us.

+ + + Hill + + +
+ +
+ 42. Telegram 2528 From the Embassy in Argentina to the Department of + State +

Summary: The + Embassy reported on the Argentine Government’s human rights + record since the coup, concluding that any abuses and arbitrary + behavior did not reflect official policy.

+

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + D760145–0248. Confidential. In telegram 2288 from Buenos Aires, + April 6, the Embassy reported on incidents of right-wing + terrorist violence against leftists during the 12 days following + the coup, noting that while there was no evidence that the + violence was officially inspired, the incidents could damage the + new Argentine Government’s reputation for moderation. (Ibid.) In + telegram 83929 to Buenos Aires, April 7, the Department noted + that it was receiving inquiries about arrests in Argentina since + the coup and it asked the Embassy to report on individuals + detained by the new regime. (Ibid.)

+ + + + Buenos Aires, April 16, 1976, 1315Z. +

2528. Subject: Junta Record on Human Rights to Date. Ref: State 83929, + Buenos Aires 2035, Buenos Aires 2288, Buenos Aires 2061.

+

Summary: Following the March 24 coup, the junta put into practice its + plans to arrest those members of the Peronist govt it believed most likely to have been involved in + corruption, malfeasance and similar misdeeds. In addition, in line with + its oft-announced war against subversion, the military moved to arrest + as many known or suspected subversives as possible. Though this wave of + arrests was expected, it has naturally been the source of much private + comment in political circles. The golpe and the subsequent arrests were + carried out against the backdrop of continuing terrorist acts by both + left and right. At this point, 3 weeks after the coup, it appears that + arrests have been relatively few and by and large have been carried out + within the legal framework established by the new junta. End + summary.

+

1. In the 3 weeks after the coup, the junta govt has arrested + approximately 1500 persons. The bulk of these are govt officials, + national and provincial, and labor leaders who are being held on charges + of corruption. In addition, some suspected subversives have also been + arrested. Added to the 1500 persons already being held by the Peronist + govt under the state-of-siege provisions, the total number of political + and quasi-political prisoners is now approximately 3000. While these + arrests have been the subject of much conversation in political circles, + the general consensus is that the arrests so far, with few exceptions, + have been carried out within legal framework.

+

2. Even to Peronists who may themselves yet face legal difficulties with + the junta, fact that the great majority of the names of those arrested + have been released to the press is taken as encouraging sign. (Embassy + will shortly be sending Washington press clips giving names of those + arrested to date.)

+

3. In recent days, EmbOffs have discussed arrest issue with wide circle + of contacts and finds them in general satisfied that junta acting with + relative moderation in this delicate area. For example, former Peronist + Interior Minister Rocamora told EmbOffs that to his knowledge most + Peronists arrested since coup are being held on straight-forward + corruption charges and in most cases he believed the junta would have + little problem proving charges in course. Luis Rubeo, former Peronist + Congressman and prominent advisor of Meatworkers Union, told EmbOffs + that to his personal knowledge [garble—Meatworker?] officials in Buenos + Aires province and Santa Fe province, where Rubeo has his base, have + been treated in a fair manner. Only two second level officials of the + union are being held on corruption charges. Rubeo opined that both had + had their hands in till. Osella Munoz, a leading Peronist Congressman of + the Anti-Verticalista tendency, agreed with analysis of his two Peronist + colleagues, adding that in his view some of the labor leaders being held + “with little doubt deserved it.”

+

4. Enrique Vanoli, Political Secretary of the UCR Party, [garble—indicated that UCR officials?] were having no problem with the military + in area of human rights. + Both he and party leader Ricardo Balbin believe that most of the + right-wing assassinations that have taken place since the coup (in the + style of the Tiple-A) have been carried out by off-duty policemen + without the knowledge or authorization of senior Army officers. + Heriberto Kahn, columnist for La Opinion and man + close to the CINCs, agreed with + Vanoli’s view and added that Videla, Viola, Massera et al were disturbed by these + incidents and realized they must stop right-wing terrorism as well as + that from the left.

+

5. Senator Eduardo Paz, former Chairman of the Senate Armed Forces + Committee, and a man who despite coup maintains good contacts with + military, told EmbOff that clearly some arbitrary behavior on part of + authorities had occurred. He cited three cases in his home province of + Tucuman where the provincial Econ Min and two men on the Governor’s + private staff had been severely beaten by Army troops shortly after the + coup. One man died as result of beating and other two are in serious + condition. Paz, upon learning of these incidents, went directly to + General Harguindeguy, Interior Minister, to register a protest. He told + Harguindeguy that he knew the background of the three men involved and + believed they deserved legal penalties. The most severe measures the + Army wishes to apply within the law will meet with public support, he + added, but measures outside the law will result in public sympathy not + only for clearly corrupt former officials against whom they are applied, + but even for terrorists. According to Paz, Harguindeguy agreed and + immediately called in aides to look into the matter, telling Paz that + the military high command, try as it would, could not control every + officer and thus prevent this kind of incident. However, they had made + it clear that this type of arbitrary justice was not authorized, + approved or condoned by the junta, and would be stopped wherever it came + to light.

+

6. Our political sources, plus U.S. newsmen here (who are very sensitive + to human rights issue) continue to express surprise that junta has acted + with as much moderation as it has so far, given the atmosphere of + left-right terrorism which the country has endured for the last three + years. Its policy is to respect human rights and it is taking measures + to curb any local commander who may, in exceeding his instructions, + violate them. Even so, with arrests being made and as yet no composite + list issued of those detained, horror stories based on imagination + rather then fact, are inevitable. Most common and inaccurate story + making rounds is that former ForMin + Vignes is being held in a cell + aboard Naval vessel in Buenos Aires harbor. In fact, reliable sources + indicate that he, along with many prominent officials, has been placed + under house detention and major inconvenience he is suffering is + necessity to notify authorities before going out of his home. Another + story making rounds is that Raul Alfonsin, leader of liberal wing of + UCR, is being held by authorities. Story is similarly + inaccurate. Indeed, Alfonsin called Pol Couns yesterday regarding visa + case and was most amused when told he allegedly under arrest.

+

7. Comment: To date those human rights violations which have occurred + have represented exceptions which have resulted from excesses on part of + individual military officers and police officials. They do not rpt not + represent junta policy. From personal contact and from stories relayed + by our political sources, it would appear that junta wants very much to + avoid a human rights problem. In this regard, (Apr 13) La Opinion predicts that in “next few days” military will + either publicly charge those they feel are guilty of specific crimes or + release them. Lab Att gives similar account from labor source who + expected this process to begin after Easter holiday. Indeed, we + understand from good sources that Videla called in senior generals late last week to + demand that composite list of all those detained, with charges against + them, be issued ASAP. He also asked + for details of the recent right-wing killings, noting that he wanted + this activity stopped. His subordinates claimed they still not know the + perpetrators of the terrorist acts but reportedly left meeting with + understanding they were to act quickly to see it ended.

+ + + Hill + + +
+ +
+ 43. Telegram 2748 From the Embassy in Argentina to the Department of + State +

Summary: Hill reported that the + hard-line attitudes expressed by several Argentine Cabinet + members during a luncheon conversation had given him a sense of + unease about the direction of the regime.

+

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + D760161–0110. Secret; Exdis.

+ + + + Buenos Aires, April 27, 1976, 1635Z. + +

2748. For Asst Sec Rogers from + Amb Hill. Subject: Luncheon + Conversation With Senior Members of Govt.

+

1. On April 22 I lunched at the home of Alejandro Shaw with Admiral + Massera, Minister of Defense Klix, Secretary of Finance Alemann, + Secretary of Economic Planning and Coordination Klein and several + others. Massera was his usual jovial self and left early to get back to + work. All expressed confidence in the new govt’s success. These are intelligent, well-meaning + men. Yet, I came away from the luncheon with a sense of unease. One + cannot form any definitive judgments or make predictions on the basis of + one luncheon conversation, but I did read some storm warnings.

+

2. First of all, while the new govt is off to a good start, it has a long + and most difficult road ahead. There should be no room for cockiness. + Unfortunately, however, there was some of that at the luncheon. When I + asked Klein, for example, what arrangement the govt was likely to + negotiate with labor, he replied that the govt had not yet made any move + to reach an accommodation with labor, nor did it intend to do so. He + professed himself to be unconcerned. “Labor will have to come to us,” he + said. Klein was equally insouciant concerning the wage-price squeeze. I + noted that prices are climbing but wages are not. This of course is in + line with the govt’s anti-inflationary austerity measures, but, I asked, + did the govt plan any measures to give the wage-earner some relief or at + least to make the pill less bitter to swallow?

+

3. Klein replied in the negative. The Argentine wage-earner, he said, + will just have to learn to shop more wisely. There is probably a good + deal in that, but the way in which he answered suggested that Klein at + least is not worried about the views of the wage-earner.

+

4. Massera himself continued to reflect balance and moderation on the + human rights issue, but some of the others at the table seemed to favor + a harder line. When I asked what was going to happen to the members of + the previous govt being held on ships in the harbor, Massera answered + that a list of all those held will be issued shortly, that each is being + investigated, and, if necessary, will be tried in accordance with the + law. Alemann, however, added that I should remember that “all those + people are criminals,” and several others present suggested that no one + should waste any sympathy on the likes of Lorenzo Miguel. Wayne Smith, + the Political Counselor, who had accompanied me, said the question was + not one of sympathy for Miguel and those of his ilk but of whether or + not they are treated in accordance with the law. If they are not, voices + might be raised abroad in their defense and the GOA’s image would suffer. One of the other guests stated + that only those who had themselves shown respect for the law deserved + its protection. Admiral Massera, I am happy to say, did not agree with + this approach to the application of the law; rather, he continued to say + that everything must be and would be done legally.

+

5. All at the table agreed that the struggle against the terrorists must + be prosecuted vigorously. Defense Minister Klix went even further. He + insisted that “one must be fanatic to defeat fanatics” and observed that + “if the other side hits below the belt, so must we.” Exactly what he + meant by that is open to question, but it is clear that Klix is neither + as prudent nor as wedded to a rule of law as is Videla.

+ +

6. What is said at lunch does not necessarily reflect the govt’s official + policies, but it does reveal something concerning the thinking of its + members. The junta has so far maintained the support of the majority + precisely because it has acted with moderation and has tried to remain + within the law. The overall impression I carried away from the April 22 + luncheon, however, is that there are some in the government who are not + as enthusiastic over this approach as is Videla. This is disturbing and bodes ill for the future. + What is needed here is vision and reconciliation, not a return to the + petty vindictiveness of the past.

+ + + Hill + + +
+ +
+ 44. Telegram 3460 From the Embassy in Argentina to the Department of + State +

Summary: + Ambassador Hill reported + on his conversation with Undersecretary General of the + Presidency Ricardo Yofre + regarding U.S. Government concern over human rights abuses in + Argentina. Although Yofre + was confident such abuses would be limited, the Embassy + concluded that hard-liners posed a threat to the moderate line + favored by Videla.

+

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + D760202–1291. Secret; Priority; Exdis. In telegram 3390 from + Buenos Aires, May 21, the Embassy reported on the abduction of + Uruguayan refugees Zelmar + Michelini and Héctor + Gutiérrez Ruiz by armed men who invaded their + residences. (Ibid., D760205–0965) In telegram 127301 to Buenos + Aires, May 23, the Department transmitted a press report that + the bodies of Michelini, + Gutidrrez Ruiz, and two other Uruguayans had been discovered on + May 22. (Ibid., D760200–0798)

+ + + + Buenos Aires, May 25, 1976, 1156Z. +

3460. Subject: Conversation with Undersecretary of the Presidency.

+

1. On May 21 Ambassador Hill, the + Minister, and the Political Counselor, had lunch with Dr. Ricardo Yofre, the Undersecretary + General of the Office of the Presidency. Given below are the highlights + of the conversation.

+

2. Ambassador Hill opened the + conversation by saying the US was very concerned over the human rights + issue, especially in the wake of the Michelini and Gutierrez + Ruiz kidnappings. According to Yofre, Videla and his staff were shocked by the kidnappings, + and are trying to get to the bottom of the question. Yofre also said Videla had planned to hold a press + conference on Wednesday, May 26, but that this might now be postponed in + order to have better hold on the situation and to be able to make a more + definitive statement regarding the situation of those who have been detained since March 24. By + next week, Yofre said, it is + planned: (A) To release many of those currently detained; (B) to be + ready to publish a complete list of those detained (Yofre noted that although the Navy had + drug its feet it has now given Videla a roster of the prisoners being held aboard the + ships in the harbor); (C) to be ready to announce speedy trials for + those whose investigations are completed; (D) to announce several new + measures of “revolutionary justice” under which those who are known to + be guilty of crimes against the state but against whom there is + insufficient evidence will be punished by such measures as having their + political rights suspended for a number of years.

+

3. Dr. Yofre called attention to + Videla’s recent “opening to + the other sectors” under which he has lunched with a number of + scientists, writers and with ex-Foreign Ministers such as Hipolito Paz + (a Peronist), Miguel Angel Zavala Ortiz (Illia’s Foreign Minister), + Pablo Pardo and others. Also as part of this “opening”, Videla has appointed Oscar Camilion + (MID) Ambassador to Brazil, Americo + Ghioldi (PSD) Ambassador to Sweden, + Hector Hidalgo Sola (UCR) Ambassador to + Venezuela and Leopoldo Bravo (Bloquista) to the Soviet Union. (Yofre said the new Ambassador to + Washington had not yet been confirmed, but that a decision would + probably be made within the next few days. He confirmed that Arnoldo + Musich has the inside track.) Yofre asked if Videla’s opening has been noted in the United States and + by US newsmen here, and if so whether or not it has reassured them + regarding the government’s moderate policies.

+

4. The Political Counselor answered that the opening has been noted both + by the Embassy and by US newsmen. However, he said he doubted newsmen + were reassured and he related a conversation with a key US journalist in + which the latter had concluded that Videla’s lunches with reps of other sectors and his + appointment of political party figures to ambassadorships simply + underlined Videla’s own + moderation; in the eyes of the correspondent, they did not indicate that + Videla could control the + hardliners. This, the Political Counselor said, seems to be the question + foremost in the minds of many observers. Everyone recognizes that + Videla himself is a sincere, + decent and moderate man. But there are many in the Armed Forces who want + more drastic solutions, and who obviously are not enthusiastic over + Videla’s moderate approach. + Can he control such hardliners?

+

5. Yofre admitted that Videla is having trouble with the + hardliners but stated categorically that Videla can and will control them. Yofre noted that Videla’s style is not one of frontal + confrontations; hence, he is maneuvering behind the scene and is waiting + for an appropriate moment to assert himself. He wants to control the + hardliners, but he wishes to do so in such a way a way as not to split + the Armed Forces wide open.

+ +

6. Dr. Yofre noted that there are + two distinct complications in checking the hardliners and in bringing + the human rights problem under control: (A) The first is that the + country is in an all-out war against subversion. In the heat of battle + there will inevitably be some violations of human rights. And Yofre warned that the government plans + to drastically step up its campaign against the terrorists very shortly. + (B) Secondly, he said, there are a number of groups who are operating on + their own. Videla and his staff + have not yet been able to determine whether these groups are operating + from within the government or from outside. Whatever the case, it is + clear that these groups are operating in violation of the government’s + policies and may have as one of their objectives to undermine the image + and position of the present government (the suggestion, then, is that + they are hardliners who would like nothing better than to embarrass the + present government). It was doubtless such a group was responsible for + the Michelini kidnapping and + murder, Yofre said. He concluded + that the government must get to the bottom of the question and bring + such groups under control.

+

7. Interestingly, Dr. Yofre + admitted that there are serious problems between the Army and the Navy. + He noted, for example, that the Navy has arrested a number of people + without informing the Army. He specifically referred to problems between + the Foreign Ministry, which is under the control of the Navy, and the + Office of the Presidency, which Videla controls himself. Yofre voiced the opinion that the Navy was making a mess + of things in the Foreign Ministry and that Naval officers under Admiral + Guzzetti (the Foreign + Minister) are showing signs of petty jealousy and vindictiveness towards + members of the Office of the Presidency. By way of illustration, + Yofre claimed that the Naval + officers who are reorganizing the ministry are trying to get rid of his + law partner, Arnoldo Listre, currently Argentine Minister-Counselor to + the OAS. According to Yofre, the Navy is taking the position + that Listre is a dangerous leftist. In fact, however, Yofre noted Listre’s real sin is that + he is a close friend of Yofre’s + and thus has an “in” with the Office of the Presidency. This makes the + Navy nervous. (Note: Listre is well known to EmbOffs. He is a respected + and moderate member of the UCR. We + would therefore agree with Yofre’s analysis.)

+

8. Ambassador Hill indicated that + relations between our two governments are excellent, but that we are + having some problems of communication. He suggested, therefore, that + Yofre might serve a very + useful purpose if he were willing to act as a conduit between the + Embassy and President Videla. We + frequently have views and information which might be of interest to the + President, Ambassador Hill + noted, but we of course did not wish to bother the President himself. If + we could pass such information through Yofre, and Yofre + in turn could pass to us any + views or impressions which the President would like to call to our + attention, it could be most helpful.

+

9. Yofre agreed that this was an + excellent idea and said he would suggest it to President Videla immediately. He noted that + perhaps as the first piece of information to pass through the pipeline, + the President would be interested in knowing whether or not General + Motors and Chrysler plan to close down their plants for a period of + time. Ambassador Hill said he + would check and would have the Political Counselor call that afternoon. + (This was done—neither General Motors nor Chrysler do plan to close + their plants, although they may have to lay off some workmen).

+

10. Comment: Yofre is obviously + convinced of Videla’s good + intentions and believes the latter, in his quiet and unassuming way, + will be able to control the hawks and guarantee the survival of the + moderate line. Perhaps. However, unless Videla is able very quickly to stop the sort of + death-squad activities such as the Michelini kidnapping and murder, most observers will + conclude that he has lost control of the situation, and his image will + suffer an irretrievable loss. It may well be that his hardline enemies + murdered Michelini with the + primary purpose of embarrassing President Videla. But that is all the more reason for Videla to wish to bring them in line. + Indeed, he must bring them under control or they will very likely do in + his govt.

+ + + Hill + + +
+ +
+ 45. Telegram 3462 From the Embassy in Argentina to the Department of + State +

Summary: In view + of the worsening human rights situation, Hill requested permission to + deliver a démarche to the Foreign Minister to express the + concern of the U.S. Government.

+

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + D760203–0109. Secret; Immediate; Limdis. In telegram 129048 to + Buenos Aires, May 25, the Department concurred. (Ibid.) In + telegram 3576 from Buenos Aires, May 28, Hill reported on his May 27 + démarche to the Foreign Minister, noting that he had advocated + “some sort of statement on part of GOA deploring terrorism of any kind, whether from + left or right, and reaffirming GOA’s resolve to enforce law and respect human + rights.” Hill added that + while “Guzzetti + indicated his understanding of the problem, I did not have the + impression he really got the point.” (Ibid., + D760208–0267)

+ + + + Buenos Aires, May 25, 1976, 1525Z. +

3462. Subject: Request for Instructions.

+

1. In view of the general worsening human rights situation here, I + believe the time has come for a démarche at the highest level. Hence, I + request instructions to ask for an urgent appointment with the Foreign + Minister.

+

2. I wish authorization to say to him the following: quote The US very + much sympathizes with the moderate policies announced by President + Videla and had hoped to be + helpful to Argentina in her process of national reconstruction and + reconciliation. We fully understand that Argentina is involved in + all-out struggle against subversion. There are, however, some norms + which can never be put aside by governments dedicated to a rule of law. + Respect for human rights is one of them. The continued activities of + Triple A-type death squads which have recently murdered Michelini, Gutierrez Ruiz and dozens of others and have just + kidnapped a member of the Fulbright Commission, Miss Elida Messina, are + damaging the GOA’s generally good image + abroad. These groups seem to operate with immunity and are generally + believed to be connected with the Argentine security forces. Whether + they are or not, their continued operation can only be harmful to the + GOA itself and cause consternation + among Argentina’s friends abroad. End quote.

+

3. In view of the pace of developments, I would appreciate reply by + immediate cable.

+ + + Hill + + +
+ +
+ 46. Briefing Memorandum From the Director of the Bureau of + Intelligence and Research (Saunders) to Secretary of State Kissinger + +

Summary: The Bureau of Intelligence and Research + concluded that security forces were probably involved in + extrajudicial killings in Argentina, but that there was no + evidence to support the contention that the military regimes of + the Southern Cone were cooperating in an international + assassination program.

+

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + P760092–1738. Secret; Not Releasable to Foreign Nationals. + Drafted by Buchanan. An + expanded and updated version of this report was sent to all + American Republics diplomatic posts, Lisbon, Oslo, Paris, Rome, + Stockholm, and USCINCSO in + telegram 178852, July 20. Like this memorandum, the updated + report noted that the fact that the killings of foreign + political figures were happening primarily in Argentina lent + “credence to the idea that their origins lie in a uniquely + Argentine set of circumstances rather than in an elaborate + international conspiracy.” The report also noted that Argentine + security personnel were “clearly involved in the anti-exile + activities, although it is impossible to assess in what numbers + or at what level of command.” (Ibid., + D760279–0200)

+ + + + Washington, June 4, + 1976. +

Murders in Argentina—No Intergovernmental Conspiracy

+

The recent murders in Argentina of former Bolivian president Juan Jose + Torres and ex-Uruguayan parliamentarians Zelmar Michelini and Hector Gutierrez Ruiz raise questions about the security + practices of the governments of the Southern Cone (Argentina, Brazil, + Bolivia, Chile, Paraguay and Uruguay). Most precisely:

+ + —What degree of cooperation exists among the security forces of + the Southern Cone? and + —Do these security forces actively participate or passively + acquiesce in a program to execute political exiles who oppose one of + the governments involved? + +

The fact that all the countries cited are controlled by conservative + military regimes whose record on human rights has been criticized will + generate rumors and allegations of the existence of an intergovernmental + assassination program. However, there is no evidence of any such + conspiracy.

+

Southern Cone security forces undoubtedly coordinate their + anti-subversive efforts insofar as information exchanges are concerned, + and Argentina and Brazil may provide advice and limited training to + smaller neighbors. Cooperation of this sort is logical:

+ + —all the Southern Cone governments consider themselves targets of + leftist subversion of an international character; + —there is irrefutable evidence that terrorists move back and forth + across Southern Cone boundaries; and + + —terrorists based in Bolivia (ELN), Uruguay (Tupamaros), Chile + (MIR), and Argentina (ERP) are formally, if somewhat + ineffectually, associated together in a Revolutionary Coordinating + Junta (JCR). The JCR is primarily a creature of the Argentine ERP, and according to available + information, it has not sponsored any major operations. + +

There is no evidence to support a contention that Southern Cone + governments are cooperating in some sort of international “Murder Inc.” + aimed at leftist political exiles resident in one of their countries. + Furthermore, it is difficult to understand why the Uruguayan or Bolivian + authorities would themselves execute or conspire to have the Argentines + execute men like Gutierrez Ruiz + , Michelini and Torres. These men + pose no threat to their governments.

+

The fact that these incidents are occurring in Argentina and not + elsewhere in the Southern Cone suggests that they are attributable to a + uniquely Argentine set of circumstances. Amidst the murderous + three-cornered battle going on in Argentina amongst left-wing + terrorists, government security personnel and right-wing goon squads, + exiles can become victims for a number of reasons:

+ + —Operational involvement with one of the Argentine terrorist + groups, as appears to have been the case with Chilean MIR leader Edgardo Enriquez. + —Past association with foreign and/or Argentine leftist groups, a + fact that, in and of itself, is sufficient cause for death in the + eyes of fanatical Argentine right-wingers. This may have been the + crime of Michelini, Gutierrez Ruiz and Torres. + —Efforts by hardliners in the Argentine government to force + President Videla into more + stringent suppression of terrorists, a motivation which also may lie + behind the death of the prominent Uruguayan and Bolivian + exiles. + +

In all likelihood, the assassinations are the work of right-wingers, some + of whom are security personnel. Argentine President Videla probably does not condone or + encourage what is happening, but neither does he appear capable of + stopping it.

+
+ +
+ 47. Telegram 3741 From the Embassy in Argentina to the Department of + State +

Summary: The + Embassy reported circumstantial evidence that elements of the + Argentine security forces were involved in the killing of + foreign political figures in exile in Argentina. The Embassy + also called the theory that hard-liners within Southern Cone + governments were working together to eliminate Communists and + leftists “interesting,” adding that it “would possibly explain + developments.”

+

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + D760219–0086. Secret; Immediate. Repeated Priority to Asunción, + Brasília, La Paz, and Montevideo. In telegram 137156 to Buenos + Aires, Montevideo, Asunción, Santiago, Brasília, and La Paz, + June 4, the Department noted its concern over “the recent sharp + increase in the number of assassinations of foreign political + figures in exile or political asylum in or from your countries” + and asked if “the deaths of political refugees or asylees from + your country abroad could have been arranged by your host + government through institutional ties to groups, governmental or + other, in the country where the deaths took place.” (Ibid., + D760214–0807)

+ + + + Buenos Aires, June 7, 1976, 1508Z. +

3741. Subject: Possible International Implications of Violent Deaths of + Political Figures Abroad. Ref: State 137156.

+

1. Elements of GOA security forces may + well have been involved in murders of Uruguayans Michelini and Gutierrez Ruiz and of Bolivian + ex-President Torres. Embassy has no positive evidence that this is the + case but there is considerable circumstantial evidence. Those who + kidnapped Gutierrez Ruiz , for + example, remained at his home for something like an hour, made no effort + to hide their presence and obviously did not fear intervention on part + of police. Left-wing terrorists unlikely to have behaved with such + impunity. Further, federal police at first refused to even accept + denuncia of Mrs. Michelini when + she attempted to report that her husband had been kidnapped, and they + made no effort to investigate until several days later.

+

2. Even though elements of govt security forces may be involved, it is by + no means clear that such operations are condoned by top echelons of + GOA. On contrary, Videla and moderates may well + disapprove. Videla reportedly + very disturbed over Torres murder and is said to have given orders that + matter must be investigated thoroughly and those guilty brought to + justice. So far, however, despite his seemingly good intentions, + Videla has not been able to + stop abuses. Sources close to him insist that he will shortly take + measures to bring situation under control. So far, however, he has not + asserted himself and taken effective measures. This could simply reflect + his cautious style. On the other hand, some observers are convinced that + Videla does not have the + strength to confront the hardliners and that a confrontation would lead to his removal as + President; hence, this theory holds, he must ride along and hope that a + propitious moment presents itself.

+

3. Whatever the reason for Videla’s continued inertia in this area, the results are the + same. Our best estimate is that elements of security service are + involved, that they have approval at least of their immediate superiors + and count on tolerance (or more) of levels even higher. How high + acquiescence goes is impossible to determine at this time. One thing is + clear, Videla cannot long hide + behind protestations of innocence. If such abuses continue much longer + without effective countermeasures, culpability (whether by omission or + commission) inevitably will be imputed to his govt.

+

4. Argentine security forces are certainly in touch with sister services + in neighboring countries and there may well be cooperation among them. + UNHCR here has told EmbOff his + office has names of Uruguayan security officers now in Buenos Aires who + are cooperating with GOA security + forces in identifying Uruguayan exiles of interest to GOU. UNHCR is investigating five specific cases of Uruguayans + believed to have been taken back to Uruguay. UN rep suggests that hardline elements within Uruguayan + military sponsored deaths of Michelini and Gutierrez + Ruiz , with executive assistance of like-minded elements + in Argentine security forces. Theory is that this was intended as + warning to others in GOU against any + “apertura” to moderate or leftist elements, and would have practical + effect of eliminating potential leaders of Uruguayan opposition. Embassy + Montevideo is in better position to comment on this theory. Whether + GOU was involved or not in + Michelini/Gutierrez Ruiz affair, we believe, as + indicated above, that Argentine security forces, or elements thereof, + were. GOA would have limited interest + in elimination of such exile leaders for its own ends, however; hence, + it is likely that killings were meant as a favor (whether requested or + not) to GOU or to elements in Uruguayan + military/security forces.

+

5. In case of former President Torres of Bolivia, we have less to draw + upon. Reports have reached us that Torres was considered by GOA to have been directly and actively + involved with Bolivian extremists such as ELN and Argentine Montoneros. + GOA, or its hardline elements, + might have had sufficient cause to kill him for own ends, or same + situation may have existed as outlined above for Uruguay. UNHCR rep, who knows countries of region + well, feels that killing of exile leader such as Torres is not in + Bolivian style—Embassy La Paz will be better judge of that. On other + hand, UN rep told us that posters have + been reported in city of Salta and Argentine/Bolivian border areas which + carry photos and names of prominent Bolivian exiles such as Torres and + which ask Argentine public to report whereabouts to Argentine (sic) + police. Posters are said to carry seal of Bolivian Govt. We have no + confirmation of this.

+ +

6. UN rep also reports presence of + Chilean security officers in Mendoza, and says he is certain there are + Brazilian officers on liaison missions here as well. He has no firm + reports as yet of forcible repatriations or arranged killings of + nationals of these countries, however, but he believes they are taking + place.

+

7. In realm of speculation, UN rep + suggests that there may be an informal “understanding” and cooperation + among hardline elements in military governments of Southern Cone to + purge area of what they consider “Communist and leftist” elements, by + specific killings and by intimidation of various exile communities and + resultant exodus to countries out of region. The theory is interesting + and would possibly explain developments.

+ + + Hill + + +
+ +
+ 48. Memorandum of Conversation +

Summary: Kissinger and Guzzetti discussed bilateral relations, regional + and international issues, terrorism, and human rights.

+

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + P820118–1531. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Einaudi and approved in + S on March 7, 1977. Brackets are in the original. The meeting + took place in the Secretary’s suite in Santiago where he and + Guzzetti were + attending the OAS General + Assembly meeting. The memorandum of conversation is dated June + 6, but according to Kissinger’s Calendar of Events, the meeting + occurred on June 10. (Secretary’s Calendar of Events; ibid., + Executive Secretary Briefing Books, 1958–1976: Lot 76D284, Box + 243, Secretary’s Visit to Latin America, 6–13 June 1976, + follow-up) A report on Kissinger’s June 18 meeting with Martínez de Hoz is ibid., + Central Foreign Policy File, D760238–0062. A report on Simon’s June 16 meeting with + Martínez de Hoz is + ibid., D760242–0883.

+ + + + Santiago, June 10, 1976, 8:10–9:15 + a.m. + + PARTICIPANTS + + + + The United States + + The Secretary + Under Secretary Rogers + + Under Secretary Maw + + Luigi R. Einaudi, S/P—Notetaker + Anthony Hervas, Interpreter + + + + + + Argentina + + Foreign Minister Guzzetti + + Ambassador Carasales + + Ambassador Pereyra + Mr. Estrada + + + + +

+ Guzzetti: If you do not mind, I + prefer to speak Spanish. It is difficult for me to express myself in + English.

+

The Secretary: Not at all. I myself negotiate with the Germans in English + even though I was 15 when I left Germany.

+

You realize, of course, that no matter what happens, I will be in + Argentina in 1978. That is the year the World Cup will take place.

+

Pereyra: We are waiting for it too.

+

The Secretary: Argentina will win.

+

+ Guzzetti: I am not sure.

+

The Secretary: If you can control an Argentine crowd when Argentina + loses, then you can say you have really solved your security problem. I + remember in 1967, I think it was, the Scottish team precipitated a riot + after a World Cup loss.

+

+ Carasales: Yes it was in 1967. It + is difficult to lose.

+

The Secretary: It is better not to be in Brazil when Brazil loses. There + a loss leads to suicides in the street.

+

But perhaps it will be possible for me to be in Argentina in several + capacities.

+

Pereyra: What is the outlook in the United States?

+

The Secretary: The political situation is crazy. Now it seems clear that + it will be Carter for the Democrats. Even though he lost badly in + California and New Jersey.

+

Rogers: Ford did better against + Reagan than Carter against his rivals.

+

The Secretary: And a 69-year old Japanese linguistics professor won the + Republican Senatorial nomination in California.

+

+ Carasales: California is a very + peculiar state.

+

Pereyra: Did you know that Argentina briefly claimed California in 1817? + An Argentine battleship first visited Hawaii, then stayed 15 days in + California, claiming the area for Argentina.

+

The Secretary: Just a minute now. I want you to know that we bought + Hawaii, we paid for it, and we intend to keep it forever.

+

Of course, if we were to tell our press that we were opening negotiations + with Argentina over California and Hawaii that would at least take + Panama out of the headlines.

+

+ Guzzetti: Our main problem in + Argentina is terrorism. It is the first priority of the current + government that took office on March 24. There are two aspects to the + solution. The first is to ensure the internal security of the country; + the second is to solve the most urgent economic problems over the coming + 6 to 12 months.

+

Argentina needs United States understanding and support to overcome + problems in these two areas.

+ +

The Secretary: We have followed events in Argentina closely. We wish the + new government well. We wish it will succeed. We will do what we can to + help it succeed.

+

We are aware you are in a difficult period. It is a curious time, when + political, criminal, and terrorist activities tend to merge without any + clear separation. We understand you must establish authority.

+

+ Guzzetti: The foreign press + creates many problems for us, interpreting events in a very peculiar + manner. Press criticism creates problems for confidence. It weakens + international confidence in the Argentine Government and affects the + economic help that we need. It even seems as though there is an + orchestrated international campaign against us.

+

The Secretary: The worst crime as far as the press is concerned is to + have replaced a government of the left.

+

+ Guzzetti: It is even worse than + that . . .

+

The Secretary: I realize you have no choice but to restore governmental + authority. But it is also clear that the absence of normal procedures + will be used against you.

+

+ Guzzetti: We want to restore + republican rights. In the meantime, we must defeat terrorism and resolve + our economic problems. It takes time.

+

The Secretary: We can’t help you much on the terrorist front.

+

+ Guzzetti: I understand.

+

The Secretary: But in the economic field, we may be able to do something. + I understand your Minister of Finance will be in Washington next week. I + hope he will not be there before Rogers gets back.

+

+ Guzzetti: Yes.

+

Rogers: Martínez de Hoz is a + good man. We have been in close consultations throughout. He will be + seeing Simon.

+

+ Guzzetti [To the Secretary]: I + would be grateful if you could see him, to give him some support as he + takes his first steps . . .

+

The Secretary: I will see him for 15 minutes as a symbolic gesture.

+

+ Guzzetti: Yes, thank you very + much. That would help our image greatly.

+

The Secretary: We will use our influence in the private sector to see + what can be done.

+

+ Guzzetti: Martínez de Hoz will also be going to + Europe. But he will be visiting the United States first, and I believe a + successful visit in the United States will be a precondition to his + success in Europe.

+

The Secretary: I don’t know the details of the financial situation. But + we have a foreign policy interest in Argentina. We should be able to use + our influence. The private sector can be of greatest assistance. I will + call David Rockefeller.

+

Rogers: Yes. Chase could be very helpful.

+ +

The Secretary: And I will call his brother, the Vice President.

+

Pereyra [To Guzzetti]: I think + Secretary Kissinger would be + interested in hearing about the large number of people who have entered + Argentina since 1973.

+

+ Guzzetti: Since 1973, often + illegally or semi-legally, ½ million foreigners have entered Argentina + as asylees. A large number of them have come from Chile.

+

The Secretary: Half a million? That is amazing. I didn’t know.

+

+ Guzzetti: They have come from all + our neighboring countries: Uruguay, Paraguay, Bolivia, as well as + Chile.

+

Few have normal work, with proper documentation. Most are very poor and + subsist in semi-legal fashion. Many provide clandestine support for + terrorism. Chile, when the government changed, resulted in a very large + number of leftist exiles. The Peronist Government at the time welcomed + them to Argentina in large numbers.

+

The Secretary: You could always send them back.

+

+ Guzzetti: For elemental human + rights reasons we cannot send them back to Chile. But we have tried + third countries. No one wants to receive them. There are many + terrorists.

+

The Secretary: Have you tried the PLO? They need more terrorists.

+

Seriously, we cannot tell you how to handle these people. What are you + going to do?

+

+ Guzzetti: We are cooperating with + international organizations to try to help them get documents and to get + them work. Those who want to leave, of course, can. We are prepared to + pay their fare.

+

The Secretary: If you can find a place for them.

+

+ Guzzetti: Right.

+

Pereyra: The problem is that everyone worries, and no one helps. Think of + what happened to the Greek exiles.

+

The Secretary: I understand the problem. But if no one receives them, + then what can you do?

+

+ Guzzetti: We are worried about + their involvement in the terrorism problem. But many fear persecution, + and do not want to register.

+

The Secretary: How many are we talking about?

+

+ Guzzetti: The total number of + foreigners in Argentina, combining legal and illegal, would be around + 500,000.

+

The Secretary: And how many of these do you feel are engaged in illegal + activities?

+

+ Guzzetti: It is difficult to say. + Perhaps 10,000. Only 150 Chileans are legal. We have no names. Only the + refugee committees know something in detail. But their problems create + unrest, and sometimes even logistic support for the guerrillas.

+ +

The Secretary: We wish you success.

+

+ Carasales: You are very kind.

+

The Secretary: I do not know what to say. We will do what we can on the + economic front. A stable Argentina is of interest to the hemisphere. + That has always been true. It is basic.

+

But this problem of terrorism is strange. There have always been parts of + cities that were not really safe, that had no government. That in itself + was not a political problem. But when it merges with political + terrorism, we have no clear precedents.

+

The problem should be studied. Unfortunately, those who have the time to + do so are usually on the side of the guerrillas.

+

+ Guzzetti: The terrorist problem + is general to the entire Southern Cone. To combat it, we are encouraging + joint efforts to integrate with our neighbors.

+

The Secretary: Which ones?

+

+ Guzzetti: All of them: Chile, + Paraguay, Bolivia, Uruguay, Brazil.

+

The Secretary [sharply]: I take it you are talking about joint economic + activities?

+

+ Guzzetti: Yes. Activities on both + the terrorist and the economic fronts.

+

The Secretary: Oh. I thought you were referring only to security. You + cannot succeed if you focus on terrorism and ignore its causes.

+

+ Guzzetti: You are right. People + need to develop a broader consciousness that the only way to defeat + terrorism in the future in our part of the world is through greater + regional integration and economic stability.

+

The Secretary [mollified]: That sounds like a good idea.

+

+ Guzzetti: We must create + disincentives to potential terrorist activities. Specifically, terrorism + is becoming extraordinarily virulent. People on the outside don’t look + for details. They don’t see the provocations that we face, or our + efforts to resolve them.

+

The Secretary: Let me say, as a friend, that I have noticed that military + governments are not always the most effective in dealing with these + problems.

+

+ Guzzetti: Of course.

+

The Secretary: So, after a while, many people who don’t understand the + situation begin to oppose the military and the problem is + compounded.

+

The Chileans, for example, have not succeeded in getting across their + initial problem and are increasingly isolated.

+

You will have to make an international effort to have your problems + understood. Otherwise, you, too, will come under increasing attack. If + there are things that have + to be done, you should do them quickly. But you must get back quickly to + normal procedures.

+

+ Guzzetti: Yes, we must find + procedures so as not to alienate people. I will so advise our + President.

+

Pereyra: I would like to comment. Many persons who write are on the wrong + side. We have been truly trying to reach our people. But there is little + to make opinions change. The fact is that internal subversion is linked + up to other countries. The problem is soluble so long as domestic + conditions hold. But if the integrity of government is challenged, then + to apply the principle of political balance means to favor subversion. + Terrorism feeds upon and creates tensions among neighbors. So we need + both domestic stability and regional unity.

+

The Secretary: It is certainly true that whatever the origin, terrorism + frequently gains outside support. And this outside support also creates + pressures against efforts to suppress it.

+

But you cannot focus on terrorism alone. If you do, you only increase + your problems.

+

+ Guzzetti: Yes, there is a need + for balance between political rights and authority.

+

The Secretary: I agree. The failure to respect it creates serious + problems. In the United States we have strong domestic pressures to do + something on human rights.

+

+ Guzzetti: The terrorists work + hard to appear as victims in the light of world opinion even though they + are the real aggressors.

+

The Secretary: We want you to succeed. We do not want to harass you. I + will do what I can. Of course, you understand, that means I will be + harassed. But I have discovered that after the personal abuse reaches a + certain level you become invulnerable.

+

[Group moves to sitting room]

+

+ Guzzetti: Until now, the United + States Government has abstained on the Falkland Island issue. The issue + is very important to Argentina. We hope that the United States + Government would reconsider its position and help us.

+

The Secretary: It is difficult for us to get involved.

+

+ Guzzetti: I know.

+

The Secretary: It is difficult for us. But I suspect that, even so, over + time the problem can be solved. The original purpose of the British + presence is no longer being served by the Falklands, which are no longer + necessary to protect sealanes.

+

+ Guzzetti: That is true, but what + troubles us is that Great Britain wants self-determination for 2,000 + people—and 1,600 of them are employees of the Falkland Island Company. + This is not a question of historic rights. So long as this uncertain situation is unresolved it + can always be complicated by collateral issues. I am convinced they will + start again.

+

The Secretary: I know the British Prime Minister. It is a good thing for + the peace of the world that he no longer has the Navy he had before + World War II. But they found out in Iceland how useless modern weaponry + can be under certain circumstances. Sharp steel poles in gunboats can + cut up frigates. I am afraid that I think the same will happen to the + United States Navy.

+

Pereyra: Chesterton once said that in the England of the future the arms + would be so sophisticated that bows, arrows and knives would settle the + issue.

+

The Secretary: That is true. We spend so much on increased sophistication + that next we will get a plane that plays the national anthem + automatically. Yet I remember in Vietnam on the Ho Chi Minh trail the + F–4’s with their missiles in 400 sorties destroyed 15% of their targets. + DC–4’s armed with cannons destroyed 85%. An F–15 can’t even see a truck. + And now, look at Angola. Modern warfare is becoming too complicated for + the modern warriors. The British admirals will have to settle.

+

+ Guzzetti: Talking about Angola, + we must prepare to solve South Atlantic security.

+

The Secretary: What do you mean?

+

+ Guzzetti: We must improve contact + so that each country can be prepared to control its own area of + responsibility in the South Atlantic so as to prevent recurrences of + Angola.

+

The Secretary: I can see no objection right now to an exchange of views + at the Navy level on what might be done. But the major problem is to get + Cuba out of Angola. Secondly, we must demonstrate the limits of Cuban + strength. It is absurd that a country of 8 million that has no resources + should send expeditionary forces halfway around the globe.

+

I can tell you, that we cannot and will not tolerate new Cuban activities + of this kind. A few advisors may be OK but organized military units are + unacceptable.

+

+ Guzzetti: Angola could become the + spearhead of further efforts.

+

The Secretary: If the troops get out, we would not permit them to return. + The local forces do not fight well.

+

Pereyra: We have information that in Angola there is a strong reaction + against Cuba.

+

The Secretary: Perhaps. We do not have any good information. Our evidence + is that Cuban troops don’t like being there and didn’t like the + casualties. We suspect there is something of a rivalry between the + Cubans and the Soviets over who to support in Angola. There is a rivalry within the MPLA between black and mulatto leaders. + Some, like Neto are very white. There is a basis for racial conflict. We + hear that the Soviets support the blacks, the Cubans support the + mulattos.

+

+ Guzzetti: They have internal + problems.

+

The Secretary: Yes. It is a real problem for the Cubans.

+

+ Carasales: Do you believe Castro + will withdraw his troops?

+

The Secretary: He may withdraw some, perhaps. Then he thinks he can stop. + He may believe he doesn’t need all 15,000 men there now.

+

+ Carasales: The rate of withdrawal + seems slow. It will take them a year at least.

+

The Secretary: More than a year. In fact, we can’t even confirm that he + is withdrawing any forces now.

+

[At 9:10 the Secretary and Guzzetti leave for a word alone. At 9:14 they re-emerge, + and the meeting ends.]

+
+ +
+ 49. Transcript of the Secretary of State’s Staff Meeting +

Summary: Shlaudeman reported that the + security forces in Argentina appeared to be out of control and + noted that there seemed to be little that the United States + could do to influence the situation.

+

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Transcripts of Kissinger Staff Meetings, + Entry 5177, Lot 78D443, Box 10, Secretary’s Staff Meetings. + Secret. Kissinger + chaired the meeting, which was attended by all the principal + officers of the Department or their designated alternates. The + Chief of the Argentine Federal Police, Brigadier General Cesáreo + Angel Cardozo, was killed on June 18 by a bomb placed under his + bed. (Washington Post, June 19, p. A–12) + In a July 10 memorandum to Kissinger, Shlaudeman described the background of political + violence in Argentina and concluded that the situation there was + likely to be marked by “continuing instability + and little opportunity for constructive U.S. action + until more effective governmental leadership emerges.” (National + Archives, RG59, Central Foreign Policy File, + P760117–0987)

+ + + + Washington, July 9, 1976, + 8:21–9 a.m. +

[Omitted here are a list of participants and discussion unrelated to + Argentina.]

+

Secretary Kissinger:

+

Go ahead, Harry.

+

Mr. Shlaudeman: Well, let me just + say that it looks very much that this group for Videla in Argentina—the security + forces are totally out of control. We have these daily waves of + murders.

+ +

Secretary Kissinger: Whom are the + security forces working for though?

+

Mr. Shlaudeman: They’re working + for themselves pretty much now.

+

Secretary Kissinger: Yes, but in + what direction?

+

Mr. Shlaudeman: It’s what’s + turned into a very large-scale Mafia warfare between the security forces + and the leftist urban guerrillas. We get our human rights + constituents—who, it sometimes seems to me, are the only ones we + have—clamoring after us all the time about Argentina, because they think + it is another Chile—but it isn’t.

+

Secretary Kissinger: It’s + worse.

+

Mr. Shlaudeman: It’s totally + different. The Chileans eliminated their opposition, really, in the + first 24 hours; but nobody in Argentina is in control of anything. And + this thing is a bad situation.

+

Secretary Kissinger: But what + could be done if we wanted to do something—

+

Mr. Shlaudeman: I don’t think + there’s anything we can do, frankly.

+

Secretary Kissinger: —if they’re + out of control?

+

Mr. Shlaudeman: I think we have + to wait until somebody surfaces to get a handle on this.

+

Secretary Kissinger: Do the + security forces work according to some theory? I mean do they have + specific targets?

+

Mr. Shlaudeman: Yes. I think + their theory is that they can use the Chilean method—that is, to + terrorize the opposition—even by killing priests and nuns and + others.

+

The problem is that they’re up against a much tougher situation with the + Chileans where the guerrillas are very well organized, very well + armed.

+

Secretary Kissinger: But whom do + the guerrillas get their support from?

+

Mr. Shlaudeman: They’re getting + most of their support internally. They have a lot of middle-class + supporters.

+

Secretary Kissinger: But where do + they get their arms from?

+

Mr. Shlaudeman: They get their + arms from killing people and building a very large war chest.

+

Secretary Kissinger: Yes, but + what is their basic orientation?

+

Mr. Shlaudeman: There are two + groups—the ERP and the Montoneros. The + ERP are Trotskyites—

+

Secretary Kissinger: That’s a + great choice we have.

+

Mr. Shlaudeman: —really.

+

Secretary Kissinger: But if these + guerrillas are so powerful that even something doesn’t put them down, + what are they screaming about—that they can terrorize and kidnap?

+ +

Mr. Shlaudeman: That’s exactly + right.

+

Secretary Kissinger: I mean what + is it that should be done?—because, clearly, these movements aren’t + going to stop their kidnapping; are they?

+

Mr. Shlaudeman: No, not at + all.

+

I think the difference between the two countries has to be explained—the + difference between these situations—and the fact is that we can really + do nothing at the moment about this situation, I think.

+

Secretary Kissinger: But even if + we could, what would we do? Wouldn’t the operational consequence of + telling the government to lay off be that the terrorists take over—if + the situation is as you’ve described it?

+

Mr. Shlaudeman: Yes; and I also + think that telling them to lay off is fruitless, because the people who + are doing it—they have no real control of it.

+

Secretary Kissinger: That’s the + position. But it isn’t just mindless terror either, is it?

+

Mr. Shlaudeman: No—although it + descends to that level at times.

+

Secretary Kissinger: But on both + sides.

+

Mr. Shlaudeman: Very much so. The + terrorists—the guerrillas are using these bombs increasingly, if you say + the story about the police chief’s daughter’s best friend who put the + bomb under his bed and blew him up.

+

Secretary Kissinger: What was she + doing in his bedroom? (Laughter.)

+

Mr. Habib: She had gone to study. + (Laughter.)

+

Secretary Kissinger: Do you want + to do a memo for me—

+

Mr. Habib: I will.

+

Secretary Kissinger: —giving me + the breakdown of the various groups so that I understand what I am + reading?

+

Mr. Habib: I will.

+

Secretary Kissinger: O.K.

+

[Omitted here is material unrelated to Argentina.]

+
+ +
+ 50. Memorandum of Conversation +

Summary: Ford and Musich briefly discussed the guerrilla + problem and the Argentine economy. Musich maintained that the + guerrillas in Argentina received support from outside the + country.

+

Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Memoranda of + Conversations, Box 20, July 19, 1976—Ford, Argentine Ambassador + Arnaldo T. Musich. Secret; Nodis. Brackets are in the original. + The meeting took place in the Oval Office. According to the + President’s Daily Diary, the meeting lasted from 2:25 to 2:36 + p.m. (Ibid., White House + Central Files, President’s Daily Diary)

+ + + + Washington, July 19, 1976, 2:35 + p.m. + + PARTICIPANTS + President Ford + + Amb. Arnoldo T. Musich, Argentine Republic + + Brent Scowcroft, Assistant + to the President for National Security Affairs + Amb. Harry W. Schlaudeman, Assistant Secretary of State for + Inter-American Affairs + Hampton Davis, Assistant Chief of Protocol + + + SUBJECT + Presentation of Credentials + +

[The press entered for photos.]

+

President: I hope you will join us tomorrow night at the White House reception.

+

Musich: I hope to, with my wife.

+

President: You were assigned to Washington before.

+

Musich: That is right.

+

[The press departed.]

+

President: Are you a skier?

+

Musich: No, unfortunately. I am a jogger and a biker.

+

President: I hear you have as good snow as Chile.

+

Musich: Not really. It is softer on our side.

+

President: We are happy to have you here. I would be interested in + hearing your evaluation of the current situation in Argentina.

+

Musich: First, Mr. President, may I convey the greetings of my President + and the government leadership.

+

We appreciate the firmness with which you have led the fight to + reactivate the economy. It is important not only for the United States + but for the world.

+ +

Let me point out the specific character of the guerrilla in Argentina. + These are not local people. They are well organized, and they have + foreign support.

+

President: From where?

+

Musich: From Cuba and elsewhere, like Chile. So I would hope that if + circumstances demand, we could have direct contact, without, of course, + prejudice to regular diplomatic channels.

+

President: Are they coordinated or separate?

+

Musich: We think they are coordinated at the top, at least.

+

President: They don’t seem to be as active.

+

Musich: They are active on an individual basis now rather than by group + action as earlier.

+

President: Why are they more visible in Argentina?

+

Musich: That is a difficult question. I think it happened earlier in + Chile and Brazil. There they were encouraged earlier to come to the + area.

+

President: How is your economy coming?

+

Musich: We are right now in a recession but we expect a good recovery + later on.

+

We hope for a good wheat crop.

+

President: How about the drought?

+

Musich: It was not enough to damage the crops.

+

President: It is nice to have you here and I’m looking forward to seeing + you tomorrow evening [at the White House reception for the Diplomatic Corps].

+
+ + +
+ 51. Telegram 4844 From the Embassy in Argentina to the Department of + State +

Summary: The + Embassy commented on a Bureau of Intelligence and Research + report on Southern Cone security practices, suggesting that the + report might have underestimated the extent of cooperation + between regional security forces.

+

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + D760285–0673. Secret. In telegram 178852 to all American + Republic diplomatic posts, July 20, the Department transmitted + INR Report No. 526, an + updated version of the June 4 report to Kissinger on Southern Cone + security practices that is published as Document 46. The report concluded that “the evidence + does not conclusively establish the existence of formal, + high-level coordination among Southern Cone security forces for + the express purpose of eliminating exiles,” though it did + suggest “that cooperation does occur on at least a localized and + opportunistic basis.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign + Policy File, D760279–0200)

+ + + + Buenos Aires, July 23, 1976, 2000Z. +

4844. Subject: South American Southern Cone Security Practices. Ref: + State 178852. (Not releasable to foreign nationals/not releasable to + contractors or contractor-consultants/warning notice—sensitive + intelligence sources and methods involved)

+

1. Embassy Buenos Aires offers following comments on INR Report No. 526 of July 19, 1976, as + transmitted in reftel:

+

2. First, we agree with INR assessment + that present evidence does not rpt not confirm that Southern Cone + security forces are involved in well-organized conspiracy to eliminate + exile leaders. It should be emphasized, however, that local governments + have motivation and opportunity to do so, and it would be equally + erroneous to conclude that such conspiracy is unlikely.

+

3. However, INR assessment + underestimates degree of cooperation between regional security forces, + in our opinion. Report recognizes that regional governments have + organized to exchange information and to cooperate in certain areas + (Operation Condor). It does not appear to take into consideration recent + reports of the presence in Argentina of security forces personnel from + Uruguay and Chile, for example, who appear to be acting as advisors to + the Argentine forces in connection with nationals of their own countries + supposed to be involved in subversion. One recent report cited Argentine + Army source reference to a Uruguayan Army major assigned to the + Uruguayan military intelligence service “who has been in Buenos Aires + for the past several weeks cooperating with Argentine security forces in + anti-terrorist operations.” Another report, [less than + 1 line not declassified] cited presence in Buenos Aires of + Uruguayan defense intelligence service personnel working in conjunction + with Argentine security service. INR + should also note [less than 1 line not + declassified] which makes clear the extensive interchange of personnel and active + cooperation between Chile and Argentina on security matters. We consider + that the evidence is heavily weighted in favor of the conclusion that + both Chilean and Uruguayan security personnel are joining in operations + of the Argentine security forces against terrorists and subversives, + both in Buenos Aires and other parts of Argentina, although we cannot + document the conclusion. It is probable that Argentine security + personnel in turn have traveled to neighboring countries to cooperate + with local security forces. Without question, regional governments have + recognized and responded in kind to “internalization” of + terrorist/subversive effort, represented in Southern Cone by the + JCR.

+

4. In addition, there appears also to be misunderstanding, to which we + may have contributed, as to composition of the various forces engaged in + battle in Argentina. In para 4 of reftel, INR refers to “. . . tri-cornered battle among security + personnel, leftists and right-wing assassins.” This description implies + that there are right-wing extremists operating completely independently + in Argentina. During period of Triple A under last Peronist govt this + was true as right-wing labor goons were probably as active as off-duty + security personnel in murdering and harassing leftists. In our best + judgment, the only “right-wing assassins” operating in Argentina at this + point, however, are members of the GOA + security forces. The battle is a two-sided affair, not tri-cornered. + Only real question is degree to which security forces personnel may be + operating out of GOA control.

+ + Chaplin + +
+ + +
+ 52. Telegram 5637 From the Embassy in Argentina to the Department of + State +

Summary: In a full + review of the human rights situation in Argentina, the Embassy + concluded that security forces were responsible for most abuses + but that their actions did not appear to reflect official + Argentine Government policy.

+

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + D760329–0476. Secret; Priority. Repeated to Asunción, Brasília, + Montevideo, and Santiago. In telegram 195912 to Buenos Aires, + August 6, the Department requested the Embassy’s assessment of + the human rights situation, noting that human rights problems in + Argentina had “come under rapidly escalating scrutiny in last + few weeks.” (Ibid., D760304–0832) In telegram 4852 from Buenos + Aires, July 23, the Embassy reviewed the junta’s performance + during its first four months in power, noting that human rights + abuses were “likely to continue and perhaps even increase in + Argentina, thus placing serious strains on US-Argentine + bilateral relations.” (Ibid., D760286–0286) In telegram 5521 + from Buenos Aires, August 24, the Embassy reported that elements + of security forces had been responsible for the murder of 30 + people whose bodies were found in a field near Pilar on August + 20. (Ibid., D760323–0669)

+ + + + Buenos Aires, August 27, 1976, 2020Z. +

5637. Subject: Human Rights Situation in Argentina. Ref: (A) State + 195912, (B) Buenos Aires 4852, (C) Buenos Aires 5521.

+

1. Summary: Political violence, with consequent violations of human + rights, has been a feature of Argentine life for several years. + Left-wing terrorism began in 1969 and over the years has been + responsible for hundreds of political assassinations, kidnappings and + attacks against private property and military and police installations. + Counter, or right-wing, terrorism appeared in 1974 with the emergence of + the famous Triple A (comprised of off-duty policemen and labor goons). + Counterterrorism, prior to the change of govt, however, seemed to be + aimed not so much at leftist terrorists as at progressive political + figures and opponents of Mrs.Perón and Lopez Rega. Its victims numbered in the + hundreds and it was guilty of shocking atrocities. This, then, was the + situation the military inherited when it took power on March 24 of this + year. President Videla + immediately promised to defeat left-wing terrorism and at the same time + to respect human rights; the government, he said, would monopolize power + (i.e. vigilante activities outside the law would not be tolerated). In + terms of the struggle against leftist subversion, Videla has been as good as his word. + The govt has had marked success. The ERP has been severely damaged if not neutralized. The + Montoneros have suffered important losses. The hope that + counterterrorism would be brought under control, however, has not been + realized. If anything, counterterrorism has increased. Kidnappings, + tortures and murders of real or suspected “leftists” are + common-place—often on the flimsiest pretexts. Further, it is clear that + in most cases the security forces themselves, or at least elements + thereof, are the authors of + these abuses. President Videla + and those around him continue to insist that this does not represent + govt policy, which remains one of respect for human rights. Policy or + not, however, police violations of human rights remain uncurbed. There + is contradictory evidence as to why. Some believe Videla is simply insincere in his + protestations. This cannot be disproved or rejected out of hand. What + seems more likely, however, is that the security forces are taking + advantage of divisions within the govt, unclear policy guidelines, fuzzy + lines of command and the fact that the govt must depend upon them in its + fight against subversion. In short, because of these conditions, the + security forces are operating with mission-type orders without much + subsequent reference to the top levels of control. Even if this is the + case, of course, the results are the same. Human rights violations + continue. The willingness and ability of the present leaders of the + GOA to correct this situation and + stop human rights violations are not yet clear, but there is some + evidence that they are moving in the right direction. The political + ambiance in which they are operating is complex in the extreme and the + options are few. Even though leaders of what might be described as the + political opposition (the UCR, the + Peronists, labor leaders, etc) are deeply concerned over the question of + human rights, they remain willing to give Videla the benefit of the doubt and more time to bring + about rectifications. They have good reason to be patient, for most + observers are convinced that if Videla is pushed aside, he would be replaced by someone + far worse—probably a hardliner who would not even give lip service to + respect for human rights. In sum, as the democratic forces in the + country see it, Videla may be a + weak reed for them to lean upon, but he is the only reed they have. + President of Peronist Party, Deolinod Bittel, just coming out of four + months of house arrest, for example, commented to EmbOffs on Aug 26, + “Dr. Babbin of UCR and I are in full + agreement that only the most irresponsible Argentine would wish to bring + about the failure of the Videla + govt, for what would follow it would doubtless be worse.” End + summary.

+

2. The environment of terrorism. In contrast to the Chilean situation, + political violence and human rights violations are not a new factor in + Argentina. Anti-govt terrorism and repressive countermeasures are + familiar themes in recent Argentine history. The current state of siege + was not instituted by the present govt; rather, it was imposed by + Mrs.Perón’s govt (the + Lanusse govt had also ruled + under states of siege). Political prisoners in significant numbers were + held by the previous regime, and by the regime before that, as well as + by the present govt. Terrorism and counterterrorism regularly left + bodies in the streets well before the latest military coup. There has + been a relative rise in the numbers of victims on both sides since March + 24 of this year, but the major + change has been in the degree of interest shown by international + opinion. Prior to the change of govt there were few expressions of + concern from abroad concerning counterterrorism. Now, such expressions + are commonplace.

+

3. The terrorist threat from the left certainly did not end on March 24. + On the contrary, since then an estimated 200 military and police have + been killed by terrorists and an unknown but significant number of + civilians have died at their hands. An average of at least one active or + retired member of the military or police is being killed every day, and + bombings of specific targets are common. There have been several + “spectaculars” such as the killing of the federal police chief in his + own bed and the July bombing of police headquarters. Left-wing terrorism + has been the most significant factor in Argentina’s inability to attract + foreign investment.

+

4. GOA drive to control leftist + subversion. In its drive to defeat the terrorists, the GOA has acknowledged killing some 450 + claimed terrorists since March 24, and an unknown but undoubtedly large + number of real or suspected terrorists and “subversives” have been + detained. The GOA has had considerable + success in reducing the ERP, but it is + generally conceded that the Montoneros, despite losses, remain a + dangerous and intact organization of an estimated 7,000 militants. This + basic struggle between security forces and terrorist organizations is + likely to continue for at least another year or so with a clear cut + victory for the GOA not yet + assured.

+

5. The visible battlefield. It is a grim fight and as in most such + struggles of blood and passion there are violations of human rights on + both sides. On the govt side, for example it is generally accepted that + the police and military are using torture to obtain information from + captured terrorists. This type of abuse is unfortunately all too common + in forces around the world engaged in combat when immediate operational + intelligence of direct and urgent concern and members of the engaged + forces feel that the “enemy” has forfeited any rights by taking up arms. + As in most such circumstances, it is usually impossible to pinpoint the + degree of abuse or specific responsibility.

+

6. Legal detentions. Also as part of their visible efforts against + terrorism and subversion, the security forces have detained numerous + persons for investigation and questioning under either the provisions of + the state of siege, the arms control laws, etc. Treatment of those who + are actually “booked” tends to be relatively “proper”. Their homes may + be ransacked and valuables stolen during the arrest, but once in custody + torture does not seem to be routine. Some are held indefinitely, as they + legally can be under the state of siege (see para 7), but others are + freed after a short time and still others passed on to the procedures of + the regular courts or to military courts martial when this is prescribed + by law.

+ +

7. State of siege. The state of siege currently in effect in Argentina + was imposed by Mrs.Perón’s govt + on Nov 6, 1974. The current military govt has not changed its status. As + with state of siege provisions in most Latin American constitutions + which have been regularly invoked throughout their history, many + individual guarantees are suspended. The govt is authorized to hold + suspects indefinitely and to move them from place to place within the + country. Habeas corpus is suspended, as are many other rights, but + judicial recourse is not altogether absent. Sooner or later those held + under the state of siege must be released. And the courts continue to + function. The state of siege is not an exceptional state of affairs in + countries such as Argentina, and a reasonable utilization of such powers + by the govt is not considered by most Argentines as constituting a + violation of human rights. It does become questionable to public opinion + when abused, as with the mass roundups of suspects in sports stadiums in + Chile. Some Argentines are concerned that the govt here may be verging + on abuse. An estimated 3,000 to 5,000 persons are now detained under the + provisions of the state of siege. The GOA has released no total or list of those detained, and as + various individuals are released others are detained; hence, it is + almost impossible to determine how many prisoners are being held for a + “reasonable” few weeks or a month and how many for an “unreasonable” few + months. Whatever the length of time, enough people are affected by the + detentions so that there is widening concern.

+

8. Other juridical measures. In addition to the state of siege, the + GOA, since taking power, has + promulgated a number of new laws and modifications to old ones. The + penal code has been modified to include new offenses and to increase + penalties for others. Certain laws, such as the “act of institutional + responsibility”, described even by the cautious Argentine press as + “revolutionary justice”, clearly appear to be violations of political + and civil rights by any objective standard, but they do not appear to + constitute violations of human rights in the generally understood sense. + Moreover, the regular civil courts continue to function. They are, for + example, dealing with charges of corruption and other abuses against + members of the deposed govt. The courts have even challenged the GOA’s failure to observe a provision of + the constitution which permits a person held under state of siege to + elect to leave the country, and the GOA + has committed itself to resolve the legal conflict explicit in this + case.

+

9. Counterterrorism. While the above-described spin-off effects of the + govt’s visible and “legal” drive against left-wing terrorism—e.g., a + propensity not to take prisoners in combat, harsh interrogation of + captured terrorists, legal detention of those suspected of terrorist + connections, and emergency legislation which suspends certain rights—may + have negative implications for the human rights situation, they do not by any means represent + the main problem. The area which is the cause of greatest concern is the + much more complex and obscure matter of counterterrorism practiced by + elements of the security forces whose authority (in terms of the origin + of the orders upon which they act) is unclear. Since 1974, elements + commonly described as representing the “extreme right” of the political + spectrum have conducted their own terrorist campaign against the leftist + guerrillas and, almost indiscriminately, against persons and groups + identified—sometimes only very vaguely so—with the left. During + Mrs.Perón’s govt, the best + known of the rightist counterterrorist groups was the Triple A, made up + largely of police personnel operating unofficially and some labor union + goon squads. Without doubt, the Triple A counted with support at the + highest levels of Mrs.Perón’s + regime. With the advent of the military govt, the Triple A faded from + the forefront (probably because of its identification with the Perón regime), but counterterrorism, + if anything, increased. Our best estimate is that such activities are + now carried out almost exclusively by active-duty and retired military + and police personnel who are pursuing the anti-leftist campaign in + something of the manner of a crusade. The worst of these units seems to + spring from the federal police, rather than from the military. Their + method of operation is well-known: civilian clothes, movement in the + night in unmarked cars, kidnapping (as distinct from the legal arrest + described in para 6), torture and even murder. Their victims have + sometimes been targeted on the flimsiest of pretexts. The five priests + who were murdered in July, for example, had nothing to do with + terrorism, nor did the Bishop of La Rioja, who ostensibly was killed + last month in an automobile accident but is believed to have been + murdered by rightist “death squads.” A particular target has been the + foreign refugee community living in Argentina, particularly Uruguayans + and Chileans, with the Michelini-Gutierrez + Ruiz murders and the recent disappearance of 17 Uruguayan + refugees the most notorious cases so far. There are no statistics + concerning the numbers of kidnappings, sessions of torture and bodies + left scattered about, but the total since March must be in the + hundreds.

+

10. Weeks’ case. To be sure, the line between “legal arrest” and + “kidnapping” is sometimes blurred. The case of Father James Martine + Weeks is perhaps illustrative. Weeks was taken into custody by Air Force + intelligence agents in civilian clothes on Aug 3. The seminary in which + he lived was ransacked and many valuables stolen. To the ex-nun + housekeeper, the intruders pretended they were Montoneros, but they made + no such pretense to Weeks; to him, they freely admitted they were + intelligence agents (suggesting they may originally have planned to kill + Weeks and the others and blame it on the left). Weeks was not involved + with subversion and the only “evidence” found against him were a few “Marxist” books and a + “revolutionary” record. Even so, Weeks might never have been seen again + had it not been for the Embassy’s urgent inquiries on his behalf. Once + the Embassy’s interest became known, Weeks and those arrested with him + apparently were switched from the category of “clandestine detainees” to + “legally arrested”. Even at that, however, the GOA denied consular access for almost ten days and never + replied to US protest notes on the subject.

+

11. Official position of GOA. The modus + operandi of security forces engaged in these extra-legal activities + makes it clear that they enjoy support from above. The question is: how + high does that tolerance reach? One theory is that the top levels of the + GOA, including President Videla, are fully aware and approve of + these sub rosa operations. In order to mute consequent damage to the + govt’s image at home and abroad, however, this theory runs, Videla feigns innocence and promises + rectifications which he in fact has no intention of making. Such a + theory cannot be rejected out of hand, but some available evidence—see + para 12—tends to refute it, and it imputes to Videla a more Machiavellian turn of + mind—and a greater ability to dissemble—than he appears to merit.

+

12. GOA must depend upon security + forces. Videla must be aware of + the myriad human rights violations, but the factors behind his failure + to curb those abuses are probably far more complex than those suggested + in the paragraph above. First, unlike the present Chilean or Uruguayan + Govts, the GOA faces a dangerous + terrorist threat from the left, one which if not brought under control + could paralyze the economy and threaten the very existence of the govt. + To defeat that threat, the Videla govt must rely on the existing security forces. + So long as the threat from the left is there, therefore, the govt will + hesitate to take steps to curb the excessess of the security forces if + there is a high risk that in so doing it might demoralize, divide or + alienate them. Evidence that the govt would like to control them, + however, was seen in the appointment in early July of Gen Corbetta as + Chief of Federal Police. Corbetta stated publicly that he would not + tolerate illegal methods and he made genuine efforts to stop them. His + efforts unfortunately coincided with the bombing of police headquarters + in early July. Within days, police extremists had reacted by killing + five Catholic priests and dozens of other victims. Corbetta was soon + forced out by a near mutiny of the police and replaced by an officer + who, while described as having the same inclinations as Corbetta, took + command with a public expression of support for the police and any + measures they deemed necessary to defeat subversion. The govt had tried + and failed to control the police (see Buenos Aires 4852).

+

13. Divisions within govt. Secondly, Videla must concern himself not only with the reaction + of the security forces, but must also guard his flanks within his own institution. There are + many officers who regard him as too soft, others who oppose his govt’s + economic program, and still others who are bitterly opposed to the + opening to the civilian political sectors which Videla and Viola hope at some point to + bring about. Some observers hold that should Videla move to force the human rights + issue before he has consolidated his political position, the result + might be that in the ensuing turmoil he and his moderate followers would + be removed from office and be replaced by hardliners who would not even + wish to restrain counterterrorism.

+

14. Lack of coordination. Finally, the junta system itself is a + contributing factor. Collegiate rule and division of responsibilities + among the three services militate against a strong central authority and + clear lines of command. This results in a situation in which each corps + commander, each provincial governor, each municipal interventor and so + on down the line, tends to operate with a high degree of independence. + If a commander, or governor, is anti-Semitic, then Jews in his district + are likely to have a hard time. If he is anti-Radical, UCR headquarters may be closed, etc. This + is further complicated by an absence of coordination among the services + or among individual units. Confusion often seems to reign. People + working for the Army are arrested by the Navy. People who have been + given a clean bill of health and released from detention in one zone are + arrested the next day in another. Until this situation is corrected, + until there are clear guidelines and clear lines of command from a + strong central authority capable of enforcing its orders, excesses on + the part of the security forces are not likely to be effectively + controlled.

+

15. Conclusions. In sum, while human rights abuses are certainly + occurring in Argentina, they do not appear to result from a policy on + the part of the top levels of the GOA; + rather, they represent acts on the part of elements of the security + forces which the present leaders of the govt, because of the conditions + mentioned above, are hampered or prevented from controlling. This is not + to say the GOA does not, in the end, + bear responsibility. And if the present leaders cannot in due time bring + their subordinates under control, they cannot expect to continue to + convince other govts or private investors that the GOA is worthy of confidence. Hence, what + is in question more than anything else are the intentions—and the + ability—of the present leadership to clear up lines of command, bring + the security forces firmly under control, and curb human rights + violations. There is some evidence that they are moving in that + direction. Sanctions have been promised against those (police) + responsible for the mass murder on Aug 20 (see Buenos Aires 5521). I + Corps commander, moreover, has instructed military forces in his area to + apprehend “unauthorized” persons or groups operating against leftists + (see IR 6804 0212). Further, projected changes in the military command structure may represent a + first step on Videla’s part + toward consolidating his position. Certainly most Argentine political, + religious and labor leaders with whom we are in contact, while very + disturbed over the excesses at this point, remain willing to give + Videla the benefit of the + doubt and hope that he will yet right these wrongs. Indeed, they have + few other options, for the consensus of opinion is that if Videla and the moderates are replaced, + they will be replaced by hardliners, even less acceptable to those + concerned over human rights. A high-ranking official of the Office of + the Presidency recently stated to EmbOff: “We know we must get human + rights matter under control and we want to do so, but if we move + precipitately the only result may be the overthrow of Videla, and what good will that do the + cause of human rights in Argentina?” The President of the Peronist + Party, Deolindo Bittel, virtually echoed these words in a remark to + EmbOffs on Aug 26 concerning possibility of improvement in human rights + situation. “To be sure, there must be rectifications”, he said, “but it + would be folly to push Videla so + hard that we push his govt to failure.”

+ + Chaplin + +
+ +
+ 53. Telegram 227379 From the Department of State to the Embassy in + Argentina +

Summary: The + Department directed Ambassador Hill to inform Argentine officials that if they + did not curb human rights abuses, the Harkin Amendment would require + the U.S. Government to vote against future IDB loans to Argentina.

+

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + D760347–0156. Confidential; Immediate; Exdis. Drafted by + Shlaudeman; cleared + by Wilson and Gamble; approved by Robinson. The Harkin Amendment was attached + to H.R. 9721, a bill that increased U.S. participation in the + Inter-American Development Bank; it required the U.S. Government + to vote against IDB loans to + countries engaged “in a consistent pattern of gross violations + of internationally recognized human rights.” President Ford signed it into law on May + 31, 1976. (P.L. 94–302) On August 31, Kissinger approved a + recommendation for an affirmative vote on the IDB loan and for a notification to + the Argentine Government that the Harkin Amendment might have to be applied in the + future. (Memorandum from Greenwald and Shlaudeman to Kissinger, August 25; ibid., P760142–2290) + Hill responded to + his instructions, “I was somewhat disappointed to note from + reftel [227379] that apparently my presentation [in Washington] + resulted only in a reaffirmation of an affirmative vote on the + IDB loan. I still think + this is a mistake and could result in misinterpretations here + concerning the seriousness with which the USG views this [human rights] + problem.” (Telegram 6017 from Buenos Aires, September 15; ibid., + D760348–0842)

+ + + + Washington, September 15, 1976, + 0005Z. +

227379. For the Amabassador. Subject: Harkin Amendment.

+

1. The Harkin Amendment to the + IDB authorization bill instructs + the US Executive Director to vote against loans or grant assistance to + any country which “engages in a consistent pattern of gross violation of + internationally recognized human rights—unless such assistance will + directly benefit the needy people—”. The legislative history of the + amendment indicates congressional intent that the exception clause be + interpreted broadly.

+

2. However, the exception cannot be applied to a loan to Argentina for + industrial credits which goes before the IDB Board on September 16. The Department has therefore + found it necessary to examine the question of whether “a consistent + pattern of gross violations” exists in the case of Argentina. We have + concluded that available evidence does not at this time justify a firm + conclusion that the Argentine Government is engaged in such a pattern + and have asked on that basis that Treasury instruct the Executive + Director to vote for the loan. The Department particularly recognizes + the chaotic and possibly transitory nature of the current Argentine + situation.

+

3. But we are also aware that elements of the GOA are involved in right-wing terrorist activities and + that those in central authority have taken little apparent action to + restrain them. It is clear that the Harkin determination in this case is a very close thing. + The GOA’s failure to take measures to bring the security + forces under control would necessarily lead to the conclusion that we + are looking at a “consistent pattern” rather than a transitory + situation.

+

4. You should seek an appointment at the highest available level of the + GOA to make the following + points:

+

—The USG fully realizes that the GOA is engaged in a most serious effort to + suppress violent subversion and regain national stability. We are + seeking to cooperate with the program of economic restoration so + critical to that effort.

+

—That cooperation could be restricted by the Harkin Amendment. (You should explain the precise + wording and workings of the amendment.) The administration opposes the + injection of this issue into the international lending agencies, but the + Congress in this case differed and the amendment imposes a legal + obligation on us.

+

—We are therefore obliged to vote against loans or grants by the IDB where a consistent pattern of gross + violations of human rights exists. The judgement on that point in the + case of Argentina has proved difficult to make.

+

—We are well aware of the critical public order problems confronting the + GOA and have taken note of + President Videla’s statements + that he intends to ensure respect for fundamental human rights. On the + other hand, right-wing counter-terrorism and outbreaks of anti-Semitism + have raised the question of whether a consistent pattern within the + terms of our law might not in fact exist in Argentina.

+

—We have decided that the evidence does not at this moment justify a firm + conclusion that such a pattern does exist. The US Executive Director + will therefore vote affirmatively on the current loan application for $8 + million in export credits.

+

—But it is apparent that this finding cannot be sustained for long, under + the law we must carry out in the absence of action by the GOA directed at bringing counterterrorism, + torture, arbitrary detention and anti-Semitism under control. Such + action will be necessary if we are to avoid voting against future loans + to Argentina in which a determination under the Harkin Amendment is required.

+

—Our intention is to deal with Argentina in a cooperative and helpful + spirit during this difficult period. It is in that spirit that we are + offering this explanation.

+

5. We will make the same points to Ambassador Musich here. We are also + briefing appropriate members of the Congress.

+ + + Robinson + + +
+ +
+ 54. Telegram 6276 From the Embassy in Argentina to the Department of + State +

Summary: Hill reported on a + conversation with Videla, who maintained that lower-level officials in + the U.S. Government did not understand the difficulties faced by + Argentina. Hill + responded that the U.S. Government wanted Argentina to quell + terrorism as quickly as possible without damaging its image or + relations with other governments.

+

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + D760361–0450. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. In telegram 6177 from + Buenos Aires, September 21, Hill reported on other portions of his September + 21 conversation with Videla. (Ibid., D760356–1130) Telegram 227379 to + Buenos Aires is Document 53. In + telegram 231122 to all diplomatic and consular posts, September + 17, the Department provided guidance on the human rights + provisions of the International Security Assistance and Arms Export Control Act of 1976. + (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + D760353–0445) In telegram 6130 from Buenos Aires, September 20, + Hill reported on his + September 17 discussion of the human rights situation with + Guzzetti, who said + that the Argentine Government was “somewhat surprised” by strong + U.S. interest in the issue, since the impression that he had + gained from his June 10 conversation with Kissinger was that “USG’s overriding concern was not + human rights but rather that GOA ‘get it over quickly’.” Hill replied that the U.S. + Government’s hope that the terrorist problem would be resolved + quickly “in no way implied an insouciant attitude regarding + human rights.” (Ibid., D760355–0430) For the June 10 meeting, + see Document 48.

+ + + + Buenos Aires, September 24, 1976, + 1535Z. +

6276. Subject: Ambassador Discusses US-Argentine Relations With President + Videla. Ref: (A) Buenos + Aires 6177, (B) State 227379, (C) State 231122.

+

1. As reported in Ref A, President Videla received me at 11:15 a.m. yesterday, Sept 21 and + I was with him about an hour and a half. I opened conversation by going + directly into human rights issue. I told him of great concern I had + found in US. There was, I said, great sympathy for his government, which + had taken over under difficult circumstances and which all understood to + be involved in struggle to the death with left-wing subversion. However, + such things as the murder of the priests and the mass murders at Pilar + were seriously damaging Argentina’s image in the US. US was seriously + concerned with human rights issue not just in Argentina but around the + world, and we now have legislation under which no country determined to + be consistently guilty of gross violations of human rights can be + eligible for any form of US assistance, be it economic or military. I + explained to him what would happen if Harkin Amendment were invoked against Argentina (see Ref + B). I told him, however, that for the moment this had been avoided. US + would vote for Argentine loan in IDB (I + explained that question of interest rates for some portions of loan had + still to be resolved but that this not related to Harkin Amendment). I told President + frankly, however, that I saw this vote as probably last time US would be able to avoid invoking + amendment against Argentina unless rpt unless GOA moved quickly to demonstrate it is taking measures to + get human rights situation in hand. I pointed out that so far as I knew, + not one single person has been brought to justice or even disciplined + for excesses of which elements of security forces have been guilty. I + also pointed out to him human rights provisions of new security + assistance legislation (see reftel C) and indicated Uruguay had already + lost three million dollars in military aid because of it. I promised to send texts of pertinent + provisions of new security assistance legislation and Harkin amendment to Foreign + Ministry.

+

2. President thanked me for frank exposition of problem and expressed + appreciation for US affirmative vote in IDB. He said he had been outraged by the murders at Pilar + which, indeed, had been an affront to his govt.

+

3. I asked, then, if any sanctions were going to be taken against those + responsible, thus showing that his govt did not condone such acts. + Videla avoided reply. I + suggested that, in the final analysis, best way to proceed against + terrorists was within law. And why, I asked, did not GOA use existing court system to bring + members of former govt to trial, instead of leaving them in prison + without charges.

+

4. Videla did not answer either + question; rather, he launched into long exposition of difficult + situation his govt had inherited. Economy had been on the rocks and + terrorism rampant. Further, he said, Argentina was now at war with + international communism, which, through penetration of the schools and + even the church, had been on verge of takeover. Although he had earlier + deplored to me mass murder at Pilar, certain of his subsequent + statements suggested that he views killings of some leftists as good + object lesson.

+

5. He said govt was taking action to control problem of anti-Semitism in + Argentina. He said he thought problem had been exaggerated, but that + GOA wants none of that sort of + thing and has issued decree banning Nazi-sympathizing publications which + were principally responsible for stimulating anti-Semitism.

+

6. President said he had been gratified when FonMin Guzzetti reported to him that + Secretary of State Kissinger + understood their problem and had said he hoped they could get terrorism + under control as quickly as possible. Videla said he had impression senior officers of USG understood situation his govt faces + but junior bureaucrats do not. I assured him this was not the case. We + all hope Argentina can get terrorism under control quickly—but do so in + such a way as to do minimum damage to its image and to its relations + with other governments. If security forces continue to kill people to + tune of brass band, I concluded, this will not be possible. I told him + Secretary of State had told me when I was in US that he wanted to avoid + human rights problem in Argentina.

+ +

7. Videla replied that his govt, + too, wished to avoid such a problem. Nothing, he said, must be allowed + to upset good relations with US.

+

8. I asked what his govt’s attitude would be if Congressman Koch wished to visit Argentina? + Videla assured me his govt + would pose no objections to such a visit. Let the Congressman come and + see for himself, he concluded.

+

9. Videla expressed marked + concern over fire at new chancery site (see septels) and asked me for + all the details.

+

10. President told me General Miro, Argentine MilAtt in Washington, who + President said was classmate and close friend of his, had called him + from US to express concern over impact Musich resignation might have. + Miro had asked if Musich departure meant that economic mission around + Musich would also go and there would be change of policy. President said + he had assured Miro that this not the case. Economic team in Washington + will stay and there will be no change of policy.

+

11. Other items raised in discussion were reported in reftel A Sept + 21.

+

12. Comment: I came away from meeting with Videla somewhat discouraged. He says he wants to avoid + problems with US but he gave no indication that he intends to move + against those elements in security forces who are responsible for + outrages—and thus begin to get situation in hand. Indeed, he may not be + in any position to so move. I came away with very strong impression that + Videla is not in charge, + that he is not the boss and knows he is not. He is probably not going to + move against hardliners. He is a decent, well-intentioned man, but his + whole style is one of diffidence and extreme caution. In the present + situation, more assertiveness than he can provide may be needed to get + human rights situation under control.

+ + + Hill + + +
+ +
+ 55. Memorandum of Conversation +

Summary: Acting Secretary Robinson and Assistant + Secretary Shlaudeman + discussed terrorism, the Argentine economic situation, and + refugee issues with Foreign Minister Guzzetti.

+

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + P830033–1258. Confidential. Drafted by Zimmermann on October 8; + cleared by Robinson and + in draft by Shlaudeman. + The meeting was held in the James Madison Room at the Department + of State.

+ + + + Washington, October 6, 1976, 1 p.m. + + SUBJECT + U.S.-Argentine Relations + + + PARTICIPANTS + + + + Argentina + + His Excellency Rear Admiral Cesar Augusto Guzzetti, Minister of Foreign + Affairs and Worship of the Argentine Republic + His Excellency Arnoldo Tomas Musich, Ambassador of the + Argentine Republic + Colonel Repetto Pelaez, Undersecretary General, Ministry + of Foreign Affairs + His Excellency Federico Bartfeld, Chief, Latin American + Division of Foreign Ministry + + + + + + United States + + The Acting Secretary of State + The Honorable Harry W. + Shlaudeman, Assistant Secretary for + Inter-American Affairs + Mr. Robert W. + Zimmermann, Director, Office of East Coast + Affairs, ARA/ECA + + The Honorable Edwin M. Martin, Chairman, Consultative + Group on Food Production and Investment in Developing + Countries, IBRD + + + + +

After an initial exchange of amenities, and mutual expressions of + gratification in connection with the rededication of the statue of San + Martin that morning, Foreign Minister Guzzetti conveyed his appreciation for this opportunity + to exchange views on certain items of mutual interest.

+

+ Guzzetti began the substantive + conversation by noting that the military government is now six months + old and that its antecedents and current situation are well known. + Nevertheless, he said, he wished to express his personal views, + especially regarding subversion. In this regard he noted that the + government had achieved some success and there are hopes that within + three to four months the government will have dealt with the subversive + groups. However, he said, Argentina has other problems as well: + educational, social and economic; the most important of which is the + need to push economic reform. Argentine economic problems are being + effectively attacked by Minister Martínez + de Hoz and there already is clear evidence of substantial + recuperation.

+ +

One of the most important issues facing the government, Guzzetti continued, is the capacity of + international terrorist groups to support the Argentine terrorists + through propaganda and funds. The armed forces, when they took over in + March, found the country destroyed economically and psychologically. It + was a country in crisis. But in six months the government is on the road + to recovery. The outside world speaks of the Argentine government as + rightist and fascist. This is far from reality. Argentina had to face + the situation realistically and is trying to find a means to interpret + the situation to the outside world. The present regime wishes to + establish a democracy; this is the nation’s most important task.

+

Another problem is that of the refugees, Guzzetti continued. Although people often think of the + refugees in the same context as the terrorists, these are different + problems. In total there are some 10,000 refugees, of which 90 to 95% + came to Argentina from Chile some two or three years ago. They live in + Argentina without documentation or clear means of support. Argentina is + taking seriously the problem of trying to relocate these people and + provide them with legal documentation—or allow them to leave if they so + desire. But other countries must cooperate and receive some of these + people. The problem is both social and humanitarian and Argentina + welcomes the help of the United Nations refugee organization. The issue + has no real connection with Argentina’s subversive problems although, + naturally, a few of the refugees perhaps are connected with terrorist + groups, just as certain Argentines are so connected. Guzzetti said that in May [June] in Santiago he explained the refugee + problem to Secretary Kissinger + and believed the latter understood the Argentine difficulties in this + area. A solution cannot be found overnight. It depends on assistance + from other countries including the U.S., France, and Denmark, for + example. Argentina must reeducate the refugees and control them but does + not want to return them to Chile. The point is that the refugee problem + has become mixed up with the issue of subversion in the eyes of + foreigners and has created a highly unfavorable impression of Argentina + abroad.

+

Acting Secretary Robinson + recapitulated the three themes touched upon by Guzzetti: terrorism, progress in the + economic area and the problem of the refugees. He said that he was + pleased that Guzzetti would be + seeing the Secretary the following day in New York and that the Foreign + Minister would find him sensitive to Argentina’s problems. The U.S. is + very aware of the progress Argentina has made in restoring its economy + in the last six months. He said that he has great respect for the + capacity of the Minister of Economics, Martínez de Hoz, to cope with such problems as + inflation, severe deficits, foreign debt, and productivity.

+

Obviously, he continued, Argentina is now facing a kind of subversive + civil war. During this initial period the situation may seem to call for measures that are not + acceptable in the long term. The real question, he emphasized, is + knowing how long to continue these tough measures and noted that the + Foreign Minister had indicated that they might be required for another + three or four months.

+

+ Guzzetti responded that the + outside world must recognize that the terrorist groups have a complex + underground structure abetted from abroad. Their destruction will + require yet another two or three months. The relaxation of government + measures will be gradual and the return to political normalcy will not + be immediate. This will require time, and the restoration of the economy + will also take time. Argentina is just finishing the first phase of its + program but is aware that there exists a certain impatience in the + outside world. The disintegration of Argentina morally, physically and + psychologically is very difficult for foreigners to comprehend and the + situation cannot be resolved overnight.

+

The Acting Secretary said that it is possible to understand the + requirement to be tough at first but it is important to move toward a + more moderate posture which we would hope would be permanent. It is + helpful, he remarked, to hear the Minister’s explanation of the + situation. The problem is that the United States is an idealistic and + moral country and its citizens have great difficulty in comprehending + the kinds of problems faced by Argentina today. There is a tendency to + apply our moral standards abroad and Argentina must understand the + reaction of Congress with regard to loans and military assistance. The + American people, right or wrong, have the perception that today there + exists in Argentina a pattern of gross violations of human rights. Under + current legislation the administration might be prevented under certain + circumstances from voting for loans in the IDB, for example. The government is placed in a difficult + position. In reality there are two elements that must be considered. + First, how long is it necessary to maintain a very firm, tough position? + Our Congress returns in January and if there is a clear-cut reduction in + the intensity of the measures being taken by the Government of + Argentina, then there would in fact be a changing situation where the + charge that a consistent pattern of gross violations exists could be + seen as invalid. Second, it is very important that Argentina find a + means to explain the Argentine position to the world. There is also a + third element and that is that there are many well meaning people in the + United States, though perhaps somewhat naive, who indiscriminately take + the side of those imprisoned in Argentina. Their attitudes are + reinforced by instances where the US Government has been unable, in the + case of arrested US citizens, to have consular access. The U.S. is not + going to defend these persons if they break your laws but we must have + prompt consular access. In summary there are three issues: the question + of timing of the relaxation of extreme countersubversion measures; + promoting an understanding of the problems facing Argentina; and + consular access.

+ +

Assistant Secretary Shlaudeman + said that he wished to make clear that there is no question of + advocating any specific political structure for the Government of + Argentina; it is a question of human rights. Our Congress is focused on + that issue.

+

+ Guzzetti asked, in relation to + human rights, why it is that only one side of that issue receives + attention. Nothing is said, for example, when a military official is + killed. It is a question of subversive groups who are underground and + controlled from abroad. Their existence has important ramifications and + requires special actions. It is a situation that has existed for five + years. It began, he said, by terrorism—by their actions.

+

In response to a question from Ambassador Martin, the Foreign Minister + said that there are two principal terrorist groups in Argentina today, + the ERP, which is Leninist-Marxist, or + Maoist, and the other, the Montoneros, is moving very close to the + former in ideology. Terrorist organizations in Latin America are linked + underground and have their central control in Paris.

+

Ambassador Martin noted that he is no longer a USG official but he has talked with many people interested + in Argentina and he is convinced that one thing must be achieved if + anti-Argentine opinion in the U.S. is to be weakened. People must be + provided with convincing evidence that the only terrorism is leftist + terrorism. The Foreign Minister said he understood the problem. He + remarked that the international connections of the terrorists must be + publicized. For example, he said, representatives of terrorists have + appeared on Italian TV.

+

Acting Secretary Robinson + remarked that in 1850, when the State of California was struggling to + become established, the official forces of law and order were + inadequate. Consequently, the people organized vigilante groups but the + U.S. has forgotten this bit of history and forgets that comparable + conditions exist elsewhere today. Accurate information is important in + explaining Argentina’s problems and what Argentina is trying to do to + establish stability and a just society. Individuals cannot have liberty + in an atmosphere of terror.

+

Ambassador Musich remarked that it should be worth explaining to the + American people the difference between the situation in Argentina today + and a civil war. Civil war is a kind of conventional war but terrorism + is different.

+

The Acting Secretary noted the importance of pressing home the fact that + terrorism in Argentina is aimed at the overthrow of the government. He + referred to the movie of some years ago called “State of Siege” which + gave the impression that the terrorist side is fighting for the rights + of the people. The U.S., he emphasized, somehow must view its moral + principles in the light of conditions in other parts of the world where + situations are completely different.

+ +

The Foreign Minister complained that the terrorists seem to find it easy + to reach American public opinion but the Argentine Government cannot, or + at least it is very difficult. He agreed however that it is important to + make a real effort. Ambassador Musich interjected that when Videla narrowly escaped assassination + there was no reaction of sympathy whatsoever.

+

The Acting Secretary noted that our job is to determine what we can do + about this situation. He said we would be remiss if we did not underline + again the very serious problem we face with our Congress unless + Argentina can properly explain its position and move to a situation in + which it is able to soften its countersubversion measures. This will be + necessary in order to avoid the concept of a consistent pattern of gross + violations, and the changed situation must be perceived by the American + public.

+

Ambassador Martin remarked that if members of religious groups violate + the law it is essential that they not simply “disappear.” It should be + sufficient to arrest them and bring them to trial. In the United States + people simply do not believe that religious men can act in a fashion + that warrants summary treatment.

+

Ambassador Musich then remarked that a negative vote in the + Inter-American Development Bank could have a bad effect in Argentina. + Assistant Secretary Shlaudeman + responded that we also have a problem in that the two loans for $90 + million coming together will further concentrate critical attention + here. We will not, he said, vote no, but it would be to our mutual + advantage if a vote on one of the two pending Argentine loans could be + postponed. There is no difficulty with the $60 million loan but we do + have a problem with the $30 million loan. We would like to separate the + two votes, postponing consideration of the second loan. The situation + would then be reexamined at a later date and if there were progress we + would not have a problem.

+

Acting Secretary Robinson said + that it would be helpful if the Foreign Minister were to repeat his + views to the Secretary in New York. The United States, he said, is + anxious to cooperate with Argentina within the limits imposed by our + Congress; the United States wishes Argentina success in its endeavors. + Foreign Minister Guzzetti + responded that there were other themes such as the water conference and + LOS which they might touch upon at + another time, and asked for understanding for the Government of + Argentina while it resolves its terrorist problems.

+

The luncheon closed with mutual expression of appreciation for the + opportunity to exchange views.

+
+ +
+ 56. Memorandum of Conversation +

Summary: Secretary Kissinger reassured Foreign Minister Guzzetti that he wished the + Argentine Government to succeed and expressed understanding for + the fact that Argentina was engaged in a civil war. The + Secretary added that the increasingly serious human rights + problem was complicating bilateral relations, and he encouraged + the regime to restore as many civil liberties as possible.

+

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + P820118–1700. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Fernando Rondon in + ARA/ECA on October 8. + Approved in S on October 26. The meeting was held in the + Secretary’s suite at the Waldorf Astoria Hotel. In telegram + 251484 to Buenos Aires, October 9, the Department reported to + the Embassy on the conversation between Kissinger and Guzzetti. (Ibid., + D760381–0046)

+ + + + New York, October 7, 1976, 5:15 p.m. + + SUBJECT + Secretary’s Meeting with Argentine Foreign Minister Guzzetti + + + + PARTICIPANTS + + + + ARGENTINA + + Foreign Minister Cesar + Augusto Guzzetti + + Ambassador to the United States Arnoldo T. Musich + Ambassador to the UN + Carlos Ortiz de Rosas + + + + + + US + + The Secretary + Under Secretary Philip + Habib + + Assistant Secretary Harry W. + Shlaudeman + + Fernando Rondon (notetaker) + Anthony Hervas (Interpreter) + + + + +

Foreign Minister Guzzetti: You + look tired.

+

The Secretary: Do I look tired? That’s unusual. I’m recovering from the + debate.

+

Ambassador Ortiz de Rosas: The victor of that debate is Israel.

+

The Secretary: Ninety percent of our population is Jewish. Did you find + the debate worthwhile?

+

Ambassador Ortiz de Rosas: Absolutely. Some points were very well + taken.

+

The Secretary: By whom?

+

Ambassador Ortiz de Rosas: Both. The debate was addressed to the American + voter. In the analysis and counteranalysis of foreign policy, I think + the President fared very well.

+

The Secretary: We’ll have to see.

+

Ambassador Ortiz de Rosas: Carter will have problems.

+

The Secretary: How?

+ +

Ambassador Ortiz de Rosas: In open diplomacy.

+

The Secretary: Yes, many things Carter said were outrageous. We are not + giving Saudi Arabia $7.5 billion in arms. Last year it was $400 million. + All the rest was road building material, engineering equipment, barracks + construction material. Iran’s figures are also wrong.

+

Ambassador Ortiz de Rosas: There was a well-taken point by the President + on Iran.

+

The Secretary: He did not mention Argentina. You are lucky (laughter). + He’ll get you in the next debate. There is one consolation. There are + only three more weeks to go.

+

Foreign Minister Guzzetti: That + is not too much. Mr. Secretary, I’m going to speak in Spanish. You will + recall our meeting in Santiago. I want to talk about events in Argentina + during the last four months. Our struggle has had very good results in + the last four months. The terrorist organizations have been dismantled. + If this direction continues, by the end of the year the danger will have + been set aside. There will always be isolated attempts, of course.

+

The Secretary: When will they be overcome? Next Spring?

+

Foreign Minister Guzzetti: No, by + the end of this year.

+

With respect to economic steps and the results we have achieved, with + your support we have been able to achieve results. The recovery is + continuing. We will begin to go upwards. The facts are clear enough.

+

That is not all. Last time we spoke of the refugees. The Chilean refugee + problem continues to be the problem. We are seeking to provide permanent + documentation in the country for refugees or send them out in agreement + with other countries. With the cooperation of other countries, we can + reduce the pressure.

+

The Secretary: You want terrorism in the United States?

+

Foreign Minister Guzzetti: No, + the refugee problem is not a terrorist problem. Many left their + countries due to changes of government. Many want to live in peace + elsewhere. A small minority may be terrorist.

+

The Secretary: As I told you in Santiago, we’ll be prepared to cooperate + on the refugee problem.

+

Can we give them parole?

+

Mr. Shlaudeman: We hope that the + Attorney General will approve a program this week for 400 heads of + family or 1600 people.

+

The Secretary: How many refugees are there?

+

Mr. Shlaudeman: Yesterday, the + Minister said there were maybe 10,000.

+

Foreign Minister Guzzetti: Ninety + percent are Chilean.

+

Mr. Shlaudeman: And there are + some Bolivians and Uruguayans.

+

The Secretary: Are other nations helping?

+ +

Mr. Shlaudeman: Some are taking + some. Even the Cubans are reluctant to take more Chileans.

+

The Secretary: Why is it in our interest to send Chileans to Cuba? I’m + not so subtle. Can’t they go to France?

+

Mr. Shlaudeman: Sweden is taking + a few.

+

Foreign Minister Guzzetti: Small + groups have gone.

+

There is another problem which we did not consider in Santiago. It is the + problem of a supposed anti-Semitic campaign. I spoke frankly to Allon + and to a Jewish organization here. The government is doing all it can to + avoid the appearances of an anti-Semitic campaign. A distorted image is + being created by leftist groups. The Argentine government is taking the + necessary control steps to avoid a problem. These steps are serious. We + do not want the human rights problem to get mixed up with problems that + are alien to it, such as the Jewish problem. Our country has a large + Jewish community integrated into the country. Despite anti-Semitic + episodes in the country, there has never been persecution.

+

The Secretary: Is there any foundation to charges of anti-Semitism?

+

Mr. Shlaudeman: We have been + assured by Jewish leaders in Argentina that they are not threatened.

+

The Secretary: Look, our basic attitude is that we would like you to + succeed. I have an old-fashioned view that friends ought to be + supported. What is not understood in the United States is that you have + a civil war. We read about human rights problems but not the context. + The quicker you succeed the better.

+

The human rights problem is a growing one. Your Ambassador can apprise + you. We want a stable situation. We won’t cause you unnecessary + difficulties. If you can finish before Congress gets back, the better. + Whatever freedoms you could restore would help.

+

On economics, we have Harkin. We + will do our utmost not to apply it to Argentina unless the situation + gets out of control. There are two loans in the bank. We have no + intention of voting against them. We hope you will keep our problems in + mind. Eventually we will be forced into it.

+

Foreign Minister Guzzetti: + Yesterday, we discussed the problem with Under Secretary Robinson and Mr. Shlaudeman. Argentina is ready to + postpone a loan to avoid inconveniences.

+

The Secretary: You were in Washington?

+

Foreign Minister Guzzetti: + Yes.

+

There are other credits in Export-Import Bank.

+

The Secretary: No. The Harkin + Amendment does not apply to the Export-Import Bank. Proceed with your + Export-Import Bank requests. We + would like your economic program to succeed and we will do our best to + help you. The special problem is only in the IDB.

+

Foreign Minister Guzzetti: With + help received, we can look forward to the effective recuperation of the + Argentine economy.

+

The Secretary: We would welcome it and support it. As I told you, we want + a strong and stable and effective situation in Argentina. On the Jewish + situation, you know the sensitivities as well as I do. I have no reason + to suppose your government is doing anything.

+

Foreign Minister Guzzetti: + Absolutely not.

+

Another problem, we will be requesting placet for + a new Ambassador.

+

The Secretary: You have resigned?

+

Ambassador Musich: Yes sir.

+

The Secretary: You just got here.

+

Foreign Minister Guzzetti: + President Ford is in an + electoral campaign.

+

The Secretary: You are concerned about agrément?

+

Foreign Minister Guzzetti: We + will request agrément today or tomorrow.

+

The Secretary: Agrément we can give quickly but credentials . . .

+

Foreign Minister Guzzetti: We + understand.

+

The Secretary: When will he be arriving?

+

Foreign Minister Guzzetti: In + thirty days.

+

The Secretary: By that time, whatever has happened will have happened, + and the President will have more time. Are you sending a man as good as + his predecessor?

+

Foreign Minister Guzzetti: + Yes.

+

The Secretary: He will be treated like a friend.

+

Foreign Minister Guzzetti: I have + raised my main points. I could touch on Law of the Seas and your long + letters.

+

[Omitted here is discussion of Law of the Sea issues.]

+
+ +
+ 57. Telegram 6871 From the Embassy in Argentina to the Department of + State +

Summary: Hill noted that Guzzetti seemed to have + returned from the United States without having been impressed + with the gravity with which the U.S. Government viewed the human + rights situation in Argentina.

+

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + D760392–0544. Secret; Priority; Exdis. In an October 20 + memorandum sent through Habib and Robinson, Shlaudeman informed Kissinger that Hill had “registered for the record a bitter + complaint about our purported failure to impress on Foreign + Minister Guzzetti how + seriously we view the rightist violence in Argentina,” and he + proposed to respond to Hill for the record. (Ibid., + P840077–1553)

+ + + + Buenos Aires, October 19, 1976, + 1815Z. +

6871. Subject: Foreign Minister Guzzetti Euphoric Over Visit to United States.

+

1. FonMin Guzzetti returned to + Buenos Aires Oct 14 after having spent some two weeks at the UN and in Washington. When I met him at the + airport, he appeared tired but anxious to talk to me after he had + reported to President Videla. + Subsequently, he asked me to call on him at 6:30 p.m. the next day (Oct + 15). I did so and after a wait of only a few moments, he bounded into + the room and greeted me effusively with an abrazo, which is not typical + of him. He took me to his private office where for 35 minutes he + enthusiastically told me of the success of his visit.

+

2. He spoke first of his lunch in Washington with Deputy Secretary + Robinson, Asst Sec Shlaudeman and Ambassador Martin. He + emphasized how well they understood the Argentine problem, and said that + “the consensus of the meeting was to get the terrorist problem over as + soon as possible.” He said he agreed fully with Amb Martin’s warning to + “be careful with the Catholic church and with anti-Semitism”, and that + he had reported this to President Videla.

+

3. Guzzetti was almost ecstatic + in describing his visit with Vice President Rockefeller. One could + clearly sense the Prussian-type, simple submarine commander rather + overwhelmed by his meeting with the powerful and famous Rockefeller. He + complimented the Vice President on his Spanish and his knowledge of + Argentina. He said that the Vice President urged him to advise President + Videla to “finish the + terrorist problem quickly. . . . The US wanted a strong Argentina and + wanted to cooperate with the GOA.”

+

4. He considered his talk with Secretary of State Kissinger a success. The Secretary, he + said, had reiterated the advice given to him at the Santiago meeting, + had urged Argentina “to be careful” and had said that if the terrorist + problem was over by December or January, he (the Secretary) believed serious problems could be + avoided in the US. Guzzetti said + the Secretary had assured him that the US “wants to help Argentina.”

+

5. Guzzetti said that his talks + at the UN with Amb Scranton and Sec Gen + Waldheim were protocolary. He + had thought that in his two conversations with Waldheim the latter would raise the + issue of human rights, but, in the event, he had not done so. Guzzetti said he had been embarrassed + at the UN by the failure of the GOA to inform him fully and promptly + concerning the Campo de Mayo bombing attempt against President Videla. This, he said, had made it + very difficult for him to answer questions on the subject.

+

6. Guzzetti said his reception at + the State Department, by the Secretary at the UN, and the ceremonies dedicating the San Martin monument + had gone far beyond his expectations. He expressed appreciation that + high officials in our government “understand the Argentine problem and + stand with us during this difficult period.” He said he was “satisfied + that the State Dept clearly understands the problem and that there would + be no confrontation between the two governments over human rights.” He + purposely had not brought up the letters from Congressman Harkin and a second letter from the 56 + Congressmen, he said, because he “had found them (the State Dept + officials) so sympathetic that he had seen no reason to do so.”

+

7. The GOA had wanted, he said, to name + Roberto Guyer as Amb to replace Musich, but Sec Gen Waldheim at the UN had said that he could not spare Guyer until the end of + the year. Guzzetti reported that + he had been told agrément would be forthcoming promptly from the USG for Ambassador-nominee Aja Espil. He + understood that there was not a chance Aja Espil could present + credentials until after the US elections. Hence, he said, Ambassador + Musich would be asked to stay in Washington until late October or early + November.

+

8. In apparent recognition that at least for the next few months + circumstances will be difficult, Guzzetti noted that he hoped future loans from the + IDB might be postponed “until + stability returns to Argentina” (read, to avoid the US voting no). + Clearly, he hopes by January the human rights situation will be over, + and that the loan applications would then go forward, assured of a + favorable US vote.

+

9. Comment: Guzzetti’s remarks + both to me and to the Argentine press since his return are not those of + a man who has been impressed with the gravity of the human rights + problem as seen from the US. Both personally and in press accounts of + his trip, Guzzetti’s reaction + indicates little reason for concern over the human rights issue. + Guzzetti went to US fully + expecting to hear some strong, firm, direct warnings on his govt’s human + rights practices. Rather than that, he has returned in a state of + jubilation, convinced that there is no real problem with the USG over this issue. Based on what Guzzetti is doubtless reporting to the + GOA, it must now believe that if it + has any problems with the US over human rights, they are confined to + certain elements of Congress and what it regards as biased and/or + uninformed minor segments of public opinion. While this conviction + exists, it will be unrealistic and ineffective for this Embassy to press + representations to the GOA over human + rights violations.

+ + + Hill + + +
+ +
+ 58. Telegram 262786 From the Department of State to the Embassy in + Argentina +

Summary: + Shlaudeman assured + Hill that he and + other U.S. officials had shared human rights concerns with + Guzzetti during + meetings in Washington, and he stated that the Argentine Foreign + Minister must have heard only what he wanted to hear on this + issue.

+

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + [no film number]. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Drafted by Shlaudeman and approved by + Kissinger and + Robinson. Telegram + 6871 is Document 57. In an October 20 + draft of this telegram, the concluding paragraph reads: “With + respect to your closing admonition about the futility of + representations, we doubt that the GOA has all that many illusions. It was obvious + here that even Guzzetti + knew his country had a problem. In any event, you and we have + laid it out as best we could. In the circumstances, I agree that + the Argentines will have to make their own decisions and that + further exhortations or generalized lectures from us would not + be useful at this point.” (Department of State, FOIA Electronic Reading Room, + Argentina Declassification Project) In telegram 7062 from Buenos + Aires, October 27, Hill + told Shlaudeman that it + was “reassuring to have chapter and verse on what Guzzetti was told.” Hill added that “we continue + to believe many in GOA maintain + their illusions GOA has no + serious human rights problems” and suggested that a protest by + the Department would reinforce the message delivered to + Guzzetti. (National + Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P850108–2013, + N760007–0818)

+ + + + Washington, October 22, 1976, + 2345Z. +

262786. For Amb. only from Asst. Sec. Shlaudeman. Subject: Guzzetti’s Visit to the U.S. Ref: Buenos Aires 6871.

+

1. As in other circumstances you have undoubtedly encountered in your + diplomatic career, Guzzetti + heard only what he wanted to hear. He was told in detail how strongly + opinion in this country has reacted against reports of abuses by the + security forces in Argentina and the nature of the threat this poses to + Argentine interests. An example of the filter he employed (or perhaps a + reflection of his poor grasp of English) is the quotation ascribed to + Ambassador Martin on “being careful” about the Catholic church. What Ed + said was that if priests were + guilty of crimes, they should be arrested and tried—but if they simply + disappeared or were shot that could never be accepted in this + country.

+

2. As for the “consensus of the meeting,” on our side it was that + Guzzetti’s assurances that a + tranquil and violence-free Argentina is coming soon must prove a reality + if we are to avoid serious problems between us. Guzzetti’s interpretation is strictly + his own. With respect to “understanding” Argentina’s problems, we did + indeed take cognizance of the violent assault on Argentine society from + the other side and expressed the hope that we could continue to be + helpful in the task of restoring Argentina’s economy.

+

3. On the Harkin problem, the + Secretary warned Guzzetti that + we would be forced to vote against Argentine loans absent an improvement + in conditions. We have told the Argentines that we would not vote + negatively at the moment in light of our understanding of the current + situation in the country, but might be forced to abstain. (If our + impression that counter-terrorism has declined recently is ill-founded, + please correct it.) The GOA has + postponed a $30 million industrial-credits loan, but not as Guzzetti indicated for several months. + The loan should come up again within a few weeks.

+

4. Finally, with respect to Guzzetti’s “jubilation” and its effect, we doubt that + the GOA has such illusions. It was + obvious in our contacts that Guzzetti knew his country has a problem—one that + requires a speedy solution. And we will continue to impress on Argentine + representatives here, as we expect you to do there, that the USG regards most seriously Argentina’s + international commitments to protect and promote fundamental human + rights. There should be no mistake on that score. I recommend that you + read and bring to the attention of the GOA the Secretary’s speech of October 19 before the + Synagogue Council of America as a basic statement of our policy of + practical efforts to enhance respect for human rights—in Argentina or + elsewhere.

+ + + Kissinger + + +
+
+ +
+ + Bolivia + +
+ 59. Telegram 599 From the Embassy in Bolivia to the Department of + State +

Summary: + Ambassador Siracusa + argued that Bolivia was not a “police state” but had overreacted + to the threat from the extreme left.

+

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 29 BOL. Confidential. Repeated + to Buenos Aires, Brasília, Asunción, Lima, Santiago, Rio de + Janeiro, and USCINCSO for + POLAD.

+ + + + La Paz, February 2, 1973, 1400Z. +

599. Subj: Some Perspective on the Political Prisoner Issue.

+

1. As recent reporting has shown, the Government of Bolivia has come + under increasing domestic political pressure and criticism for its + handling of political prisoners. In addition, the Mary Harding case + (often inaccurately reported) and a recent statement on violence by a + group of clergymen has brought this issue to such public attention + internationally that Bolivia under the Banzer government may be + increasingly viewed as a police state. An impartial perspective on this + issue is therefore desirable at this time.

+

2. The accusation that Bolivia is a police state is far more a political + slogan than a matter of fact. The GOB + has in fact “declared war” on extremism, making no bones about it, and + has in fact overreacted in its fear of the left and in its zeal to + protect itself. Nevertheless, Bolivia today is not a country dominated + by fear and oppression as sensational reporting and exaggerated rhetoric + tend to portray. Freedom of expression (as exemplified by the current + court maneuverings and by ample press coverage thereof, as well as of + the political prisoners issue in general) is greater now than under the + two previous regimes. Furthermore the level of violence, organized or + unorganized, is far less and freedom from intimidation is far more. An + impartial appraisal suggests that a small but vocal minority, which was + unfortunately silent in the face of past abuses (nightly bombings, + unexplained murders, intimidations through the media and by + “demonstrators”, etc.) has chosen, because of political differences with + the Banzer regime, and in some cases sincere but distorted ideas as to + how social justice may be advanced, to exaggerate the abuses of the + present.

+

3. With regard to political prisoners, the Banzer government is clearly + in a dilemma and merits some sympathy as well as criticism. While there + is no doubt that the Minister of Interior has been overzealous in making + political arrests and often too slow in the processing of them as well as inept in his defense of + his actions, neither is there any doubt that the hard core of political + prisoners (which are the ones they seek to identify and hold) are + dedicated to the overthrow of the government. They would presumably + continue subversive activities if they were released within Bolivia and + many would no doubt engage in terrorism. It is sad to note that + violence, being deplored today by some in an indirect attack on the + present government, is nonetheless implicitly accepted by many of these + same people who have adopted the slogan “Justice Before Peace”.

+

3. The Department will recall that the GOB has in the past tried to solve its problem by exiling + the political prisoners to other LA + countries, but this effort largely failed as these countries have + refused to accept more than just a token number. On the other hand, + Bolivia does not have the resources, tradition nor capability to conduct + orderly and fair trials, by international norms, of these prisoners. The + legal system is wholly inadequate to the task. More than likely, such + trials would become circuses and would bring even greater domestic and + international discredit to Bolivia, as well as exacerbate political + tensions within Bolivia. It is probable therefore that the GOB will continue arrests on the bases of + evidence or denunciations, and will try to resolve the issue of guilt or + innocence through indefinite jailing and interrogation rather than + trial. As the Department is aware, a large number of people have passed + through this process in the last year and a half. Best estimates today + are that about 300 people remain jailed as political prisoners and past + performance suggests that many of these will be freed as the result of + the GOB’s procedures.

+

4. While what is going on in Bolivia today with regard to political + prisoners does violence to our standards, it is nevertheless within the + Bolivian tradition and is sanctioned by supreme decrees which are also + within Bolivian traditions as the law of the land. It has been in part + at least to change this tradition in favor of greater due process that + some have recently raised their voices against violence. But progress, + if any, in this regard must be tempered by the fact that Bolivia is an + underdeveloped country in all respects and its political and legal + institutions border on the primitive. Politics are played for keeps. The + winners take the spoils and the losers pay the price of losing. The + Banzer revolution was viewed by those who participated in it and who now + carry it out as a fight to the death against extremism. Many on both + sides lost their lives and many of those now in power suffered much and + also recognize the consequences should they now lose out. President + Banzer and other Bolivian leaders are, like their predecessors, + typically Catholic Bolivian family men, who are seeking by their rights + and in conformity with Bolivian standards and practice to govern this + land and to solve its problems, including the political prisoner issue. + With time they will find + solutions as it obviously is not in their interest to see the problem + continue with the degree of heat it has been generating.

+ + + Siracusa + + +
+ +
+ 60. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rogers to President Nixon + +

Summary: Rogers + recommended Nixon invite + Banzer to Washington for a State visit.

+

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 7 BOL. Confidential. A + typewritten note attached to the memorandum reads, “Approved—see + memo of 4/26 from Mrs. Davis. jlh.” The February 22 memorandum to the + Department has not been found. In telegram 2063 from La Paz, + April 11, Siracusa + reported that he had informed Banzer that Nixon had approved the visit + “in principle.” (Ibid.) In telegram 2708 from La Paz, May 7, + Siracusa, on behalf + of the President, extended an invitation to visit the United + States. (Ibid., Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 770, Country Files, + Latin America, Bolivia, Vol. 2, 1971–1974)

+ + + + Washington, March + 27, 1973. + + SUBJECT + State Visit of President of Bolivia + +

The Department was informed on February 22 that you had disapproved a + State Visit by Bolivian President Banzer. The memorandum further + indicated that you plan to receive no Latin American Chief of State + during 1973. I believe it is important to our relations with Latin + America that you receive at least one leader from that area for a State + Visit during the year. For the reasons outlined below, I believe that + leader should be President Banzer.

+

The Banzer Government, which took office in August 1971 as Bolivia was + descending into chaos, has reasserted responsible government with a + broadly-based centrist regime in opposition to the extreme left. Banzer + has attempted with some success to introduce an element of stability in + Bolivia and has recently enacted a politically difficult + devaluation/economic stabilization program, to which the United States + has contributed heavily.

+

Dependent on mineral exports for over 80% of its foreign exchange + earnings (tin itself accounts for 50%), Bolivian officials and public + have reacted with shock and dismay to indications that the GSA plans to accelerate the disposal from + our strategic stockpiles of tin and seven other metals produced by Bolivia. The economic loss to + Bolivia can be significant, but the psychological blow can cause even + more damage.

+

Well before stockpile disposals became an issue, President Banzer took + the initiative to seek an invitation from you for a visit to Washington. + Our decision to move into a program of accelerated stockpile disposals + and its inevitably unsettling effects in Bolivia, provides a new, and in + my view powerful, justification for an invitation to President Banzer as + a gesture of support to this cooperative government.

+

For the reasons stated above, I recommend that you approve a State Visit + by President Banzer later in the year and authorize me to extend the + invitation through the Bolivian Foreign Minister who will be in + Washington for the April 4–14 OAS + General Assembly.

+ + + William P. + Rogers + + +
+ +
+ 61. Letter From Bolivian President Banzer to President Nixon + +

Summary: Banzer informed Nixon that he was disturbed by + the announcement of the sale of U.S. reserves of strategic + minerals, which, by depressing tin prices, would harm the + Bolivian economy. Banzer noted that no amount of U.S. assistance + could compensate for the lower tin prices.

+

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 749, Presidential + Correspondence, President Banzer, Bolivia, 1971–1974. No + classification marking. The text is a translation prepared by + Language Services; Banzer’s original letter in Spanish is ibid. + On April 6, Banzer expressed similar concerns to U.S. officials + in La Paz. (Telegram 1961 from La Paz; ibid., RG 59, Central + Foreign Policy File, [no film number]) Nixon’s reply to Banzer’s + letter is referenced in the source note to Document 63.

+ + + + La Paz, April 13, + 1973. + + Mr. President and Distinguished Friend: + +

Deeply disturbed by the announcement made by your Secretary of the + Treasury concerning the possibility of the sale of United States + reserves of strategic materials, I consider it my duty to send you this + message expressing the concern which that announcement has aroused in + the people of Bolivia, who regard it as presaging the approach of a time + of serious economic depression with all of the accompanying backwash of + sacrifices and hardships.

+

I am writing to Your Excellency because I am sure that the Government of + the United States cannot be indifferent to the very serious damage that such a measure would + inflict upon my country, bearing in mind that Bolivia spared no effort + and did not haggle over prices at the time when Bolivian minerals + represented such effective cooperation in the defense of democracy. At + that time of trial, far from seeking to benefit from a privileged + situation, we acted as loyal supporters of the cause, setting aside + material advantages for the sake of continental solidarity.

+

I need not tell you, Mr. President, that we do not regret having acted + so, but we do ask for consistent treatment. Your Excellency well knows + that my country is struggling doggedly to resolve the innumerable great + problems that affect its development and seriously endanger its social + peace, maintained with such difficulty in recent times. The dumping of + any quantity of your country’s reserves of tin, which will relieve the + problems of its powerful industry very little, if at all, will have, on + the other hand, a terrible impact on Bolivia’s economy and will be a + cause of distress and discouragement for its people.

+

The announcement that the sales would be regulated, in order not to + create unfavorable consequences for the countries concerned, does not + alleviate our worry, Mr. President, because we are sure, even so, that + the countries whose economies depend in large measure on the price of + ores will find that their just aspirations for progress will be + seriously affected.

+

I have thought it opportune to address you, distinguished friend and + President of the country that leads all others in acting on behalf of + peoples who are struggling to attain better standards of living, because + the alternative that faces Bolivia is truly critical. All financial or + technical assistance, however well intended, will always be ineffective + and deficient if the poor countries are not enabled to learn to be + self-supporting with their own resources and if those resources do not + obtain in foreign markets the fair prices they should have, free from + paternalistic attitudes or regulations in which the interests of the + more powerful countries prevail.

+

These are the thoughts that have impelled me to send you this message. + They express the distress of a country which knows what poverty is and + which therefore fears to see that poverty made more acute by measures + such as those announced by the Secretary of the Treasury of the United + States. As the leader of my country, aware of my duties and + responsibilities, I can do no less than appeal to the understanding of + you, my colleague and friend, who are standard-bearer of a great cause + and who therefore will surely not be indifferent to the concern that + possesses us.

+

Trusting that Your Excellency will dispel any doubt about the intentions + motivating your Government on the sale of strategic reserves and will restore confidence to + my country, I am happy to renew to you the assurances of my highest and + most distinguished consideration.

+

Cordially yours,

+ + General H. Banzer + +
+ +
+ 62. Country Analysis and Strategy Paper +

Summary: Ambassador Siracusa provided an overview of U.S. interests + in Bolivia, which included supporting the Bolivian military, + providing economic assistance, and interdicting narcotics.

+

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 1 BOL–US. Secret. Sent as an + enclosure to airgram A–75 from La Paz, April 16. The final + version of the CASP has not + been found.

+ + + + La Paz, undated. +

AMBASSADOR’S OVERVIEW

+

In last year’s CASP we were primarily + concerned with the need for President Banzer to broaden the base of his + government and fortify the resolve of the coalition parties, the MNR, FSB and the private sector, to make + the coalition work so the extremists could not return to power and + destroy once again the country’s hopes for stability and economic and + social progress. I stressed that our major objective for FY 73 was to help the GOB keep the leftist opposition at bay + long enough to permit the Government to restore economic stability and + growth potential. That objective has been achieved to the point that + although the leftists are still present and have not dropped their hopes + of overthrowing the Government, they do not presently constitute a + threat to the Banzer regime.

+

The governing coalition, although still not fully consolidated, is much + more cohesive than previously and it appears that a broadening of its + base by bringing in additional political parties, as suggested in last + year’s CASP, is not now as important + as is continuing the process of strengthening its present base among the + labor, student and campesino sectors. I am + optimistic that the coalition, under the increasingly able leadership of + President Banzer, will continue in power within this CASP timeframe, and possibly well beyond + it. I make that statement with the full realization that the lifespan of + the average Bolivian government + is nine months, and the present government has already doubled its + actuarial life expectancy. I am fully cognizant also of Bolivia’s + turbulent history and the tendency for situations and governments here + to change overnight. This could occur once again, but even if it does I + am relatively confident that such a change would come about from an + internal coalition convulsion rather than from action by the leftists, + and a successor government would probably be similar in philosophy and + policy to the present one.

+

A strong military is key to continued political stability, and this + CASP addresses itself to the need + to maintain and support that important pillar of any Bolivian + government, which still believes strongly in the potential threat of + those exiles who continue plotting in neighboring countries. We + carefully reviewed the level of MAP + funding and concluded that although Bolivia’s share of regional MAP grant resources is high, it is not + excessive, and that any reductions would adversely affect both our + efforts here and our region-wide security interests.

+

While I believe Bolivian fears of externally-aided subversions are + exaggerated they are, nevertheless, real to the government. With the + victory of the Peronistas in Argentina, whom the GOB views as populist and anti-military, + the GOB’s fears will probably become + even more pronounced as it now finds a heretofore friendly neighbor + replaced by one more philosophically attuned to Chile and Peru, and + which may well become another safe-haven for disgruntled Bolivian + plotters. Also, the expected Argentine assistance, particularly + military, may be less likely to be forthcoming. This event may well turn + Bolivia more toward the Brazilian sphere of influence, thereby tending + to exacerbate Argentine-Bolivian relations. This relationship, as it + evolves, will have implications for our own longer-term hemispheric and + bilateral policies, and is deserving of our close and continued + attention.

+

Bolivia is of marginal importance to the U.S. on commercial grounds, and + it is unlikely that that level of importance will increase substantially + during this CASP timeframe despite our + expanding efforts to promote the acquisition of U.S. products. + Nevertheless, the GOB is laying the + necessary groundwork for a strengthening of its economy and for the + attraction of private foreign investment. During the past year it + successfully and amicably settled the last two outstanding + nationalization cases involving U.S. private interests, and it has since + signed an oil exploration contract with Union Oil of California, and + others reportedly to come, portending I believe, a notable increase in + foreign private investment during the coming years. The GOB also took the long-overdue, momentous + decision to devalue its currency, which hopefully will enable it to + strengthen its finances and put it in a position where it can obtain + approval for new projects by international lending agencies, and attract + new foreign development funds. Dramatically improved commercial opportunities for the + U.S., however, are not likely to appear during this CASP timeframe. In examining policy + considerations surrounding new private U.S. investment we concluded that + OPIC guarantees similar to those + granted in the past could create difficulties involving other U.S. + interests of higher priority, and we recommend that in future + investments OPIC be extremely cautious + in offering guarantees in the extractive industries, and abstain from + offering 100% guarantees in any instance. After a thorough review of + Bolivia’s development level and needs we concluded that we can best + achieve our interests here by continuing economic assistance during + FY 1974 and FY 1975 at a level approximately equal to that of 1973, and + continuing to assist Bolivia to attract development funds from + international agencies, third countries and private foreign + investment.

+

An area of U.S. concern which has received and will continue to receive + our closest attention is our interest in interdicting the export of + narcotics and dangerous drugs to the U.S. On repeated occasions I and + members of my staff have emphasized President Nixon’s and our Congress’ deep concern + over this issue to Bolivian officials from President Banzer down, and + have explained to them the potential action, including suspension of all + U.S. assistance, which we must take if adequate steps are not taken + locally to prevent that traffic. Within the limits of its economic + capabilities the GOB has responded + fully to our efforts, although the longstanding requirement that it + ratify the Single Narcotics Convention is unlikely to be met for some + years yet because of the potentially unsettling domestic social and + political effects an arbitrary decision of the GOB to end coca production would have. Realizing this, + visiting INCB Board members have told us they do not believe + ratification is feasible.

+

To assist the GOB in improving the + capability and professionalism of its police forces both for general + police activities and more specifically for narcotics enforcement, we + have recommended that the USAID + Public Safety Program be continued and that the BNDD office be expanded + to two full-time officers. We reviewed carefully the question of + political prisoners and concluded that conditions have improved + noticeably during the past year, and further improvement is likely. We + believe that partly as a result of our discreet but persistent + persuasion and partly as a result of the GOB’s own desire to reduce this problem to the lowest level + consistent with internal security, the GOB will further reduce its repressive measures to the + point that most basic liberties will be granted to all but the hard-core + subversives by the end of FY 1975. As to + the latter, the GOB considers that a + “state of war” exists with them.

+

Our policy recommendations are directed toward preserving and advancing + U.S. policy interests primarily through a strengthening of the Bolivian political and economic + system. Bolivia needs a period of peace and stability with justice if it + is to escape from its underdeveloped state and advance into the + Twentieth Century. As a member of this hemisphere in which we have a + vital interest, and as the second poorest country in Latin America + Bolivia will continue to be of interest to us and to require assistance + of us. I believe the policy considerations recommended in this CASP will advance those interests, while + at the same time avoiding an over-identification with the U.S., thereby + permitting the GOB and Bolivia to avoid + the stigma of Bolivia’s appearing to be a U.S. client state.

+

All our optimism for political and economic development and the + stabilization program may come to naught, I fear, if premature and + insufficiently controlled sales of tin and certain other stockpile + commodities basic to the Bolivian economy are made. Such sales could + seriously disrupt Bolivia’s economy, with unpredictable domestic + political repercussions.

+

[Omitted here are Section II, Analysis of Major Issues; Section III, + Interest, Policy and Resource Analysis; and Annex A, Summary of + Resources.]

+
+ +
+ 63. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant for National + Security Affairs (Kissinger) to + President Nixon + +

Summary: Kissinger recommended that + Nixon sign letters + to Banzer and Prime Minister Thanom Kittikachorn of Thailand + announcing stockpile disposal of 5,000 tons of tin during the + first 6 months of FY 1974.

+

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 749, Presidential + Correspondence, President Banzer, Bolivia, 1971–1974. + Confidential. A stamped note on the memorandum indicates the + President saw it. Attached at Tab A is an undated draft of a + letter from Nixon to + Banzer, not published. The final version of the letter, dated + June 4, is ibid. Tab C, Banzer’s April 13 letter to Nixon, is Document 61. Tabs B, D, and E are attached but not + published.

+ + + + Washington, May 30, + 1973. + + SUBJECT + Bolivian President Banzer’s and Prime Minister Thanom’s Letters Re + Tin Sales + +

Bolivian President Banzer and Thai Prime Minister Thanom have written you + letters (Tab C and Tab D respectively) urging restraint in sales of tin + from the stockpile under your recently announced excess stockpile disposal program. I have + prepared replies for your signature to General Banzer (Tab A) and Prime + Minister Thanom (Tab B) designed to allay their concerns about potential + disruption to their countries’ economies.

+

Background

+

In March you made a series of decisions aimed at reducing the nearly $6 + billion worth of materials in the stockpile that are excess to our + national security requirements. One of your decisions was to lift your + ban on sales of excess tin and to begin release of tin from the + stockpile at a rate that would stabilize the tin price at last fall’s + level plus an appropriate allowance for dollar devaluations. At that + time it was estimated that a disposal rate of 5–10,000 tons/year would + be required to accomplish your objective. The Department of State + undertook during April formal consultations with major foreign producers + on disposal of tin and 28 other excess stockpile materials. The tin + disposal rate that State put forward during the consultations with the + producers was 15,000 tons/year; purposely set high to give you + flexibility.

+

The announcement of your removal of the tin sales ban triggered the + expected responses from the major tin producers. General Banzer and + Prime Minister Thanom with their two letters have appealed directly to + you for relief from the economic harm to their countries that they + allege will ensue from the tin sales.

+

Secretary Shultz, Fred Malek, and + the General Services Administration have recommended that we proceed now + with a disposal rate for tin of 10,000 tons/year. Secretary Rogers in his memorandum (Tab E) to + you forwarding General Banzer’s letter recommends 9,000 tons/year. There + is no evidence available that either the 9 or 10,000 ton rate would have + a serious adverse impact on the Bolivian or Thai economies.

+

Nevertheless, to alleviate General Banzer’s and Prime Minister Thanom’s + concerns, the enclosed replies state that you have reduced the rate from + the 15,000 tons that was discussed with them earlier and instead are + directing the disposal of 5,000 tons during the first six months of + FY 74 (which of course is a rate of + 10,000 tons/year). In addition it promises a review in a few months of + the impact of tin sales in order to reduce the rate if warranted by + serious market disruptions. If prices are not affected by our sales, the + disposal rate could be increased at that point.

+

In view of your desire to expedite sales of the stockpile materials, + Secretary Shultz and I are + directing GSA and the Department of + State to submit by November 15 an assessment of the impact of the sales + together with proposals for changes in the rates where appropriate. If + sales fail to affect + prices, rates can be increased. If our foreign policy objectives are + affected, you may wish to slow sales.

+

Recommendation

+

I recommend that you sign the letters to General Banzer (Tab A) and Prime + Minister Thanom (Tab B) announcing a 5,000 ton rate for six months with + subsequent rate review.

+

+ George Shultz and Fred Malek + concur.

+
+ +
+ 64. Telegram 155286 From the Department of State to the Embassy in + Bolivia +

Summary: The + Department sent the Embassy the text of a letter from Nixon to Banzer concerning + consultations with tin-producing nations over increased + stockpile sales.

+

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + [no film number]. Confidential; Immediate. Drafted by Meyers (text received from the + White House on August + 6); cleared by Fisher in + ARA/BC and by John + Ingersoll in EB/ICD; approved by Katz. Repeated to London. Nixon’s June 4 letter is + ibid., Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 749, Presidential Correspondence, + President Banzer, Bolivia, 1971–1974. On September 7, the + Department informed Bolivian Ambassador Valencia that the U.S. + Government would begin sales on September 10. Valencia noted + that the U.S. Government’s action seemed to reflect its sincere + desire to avoid a deleterious impact on the economies of Bolivia + and other tin-producing nations. (Telegram 179280 to La Paz, + September 10; ibid., RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, [no + film number])

+ + + + Washington, August 7, 1973, 1610Z. +

155286. Subject: Letter From the President to President Banzer on Tin + Disposals.

+

1. Please pass following letter from the President to President + Banzer:

+

Quote August 6, 1973

+

Quote Dear Mr. President

+

Quote As you will recall from my letter of June 4, 1973, following + consultations with Bolivia and other tin producing countries I + authorized the sale of 1,500 tons of tin from the United States + strategic stockpile during the last month of fiscal year 1973 and the + sale of an additional 5,000 tons during the first six months of fiscal + year 1974. Demand for this tin has been almost unprecedented. The 1,500 + tons sold without difficulty and the 5,000 tons, which we anticipated + selling over a six-month period, was disposed of within the first + fifteen days of July.

+ +

Quote Despite these prompt sales, tin market prices have continued to + rise, reaching record highs on both the London and New York markets. + Indeed, many observers believe prices at the current levels, if + sustained, will hasten the substitution of tin-free steel and other + metals for tinplate, a development that would threaten the interests of + producing countries.

+

Quote Because of these developments and because the United States has an + interest in market stability, I have directed the Department of State to + begin consultations with all tin producing countries regarding a further + increase in our disposal program for the current fiscal year. You may be + certain as I assured you in my earlier letter, that in directing this + undertaking I wish to avoid any undue disruption of the world market, as + well as any action that would harm Bolivian interests or damage + relations between our two countries. I can also assure you that we will + begin an immediate review of our revised disposal program, should tin + prices drop precipitously from their present record levels.

+

Quote I continue to look forward to meeting you and Mrs. Banzer in + Washington later this year.

+

Quote With warm personal regards, Sincerely, Richard Nixon +

+

Quote General Hugo Bánzer Suárez, + President of Bolivia, La Paz, Bolivia Unquote

+

2. Cable Immediate when message delivered as Dept intends begin + consultations with producer Embassy reps on Aug 8.

+

3. Original of President’s letter follows by pouch.

+ + Rogers + +
+ + +
+ 65. Briefing Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for + Inter-American Affairs (Kubisch) + to Acting Secretary of State Rush + +

Summary: Kubisch + informed Acting Secretary Rush that Banzer’s decision to postpone his + State visit indicated the seriousness of the economic and + political instability in Bolivia. Kubisch reported that the unwillingness of the + U.S. Government to offer assistance for budget support likely + contributed to Banzer’s decision.

+

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 7 BOL. Confidential. Drafted + by Binns on October 3. + Karkashian and + Shlaudeman + concurred. Attached is telegram 6010 from La Paz, October 2, not + published. On October 9, Pickering forwarded to Scowcroft a copy of Banzer’s + October 3 letter to Nixon apologizing for the postponement and a + suggested reply. (Ibid., Central Foreign Policy File, + P750018–0349) In telegram 6283 from La Paz, October 16, + Stedman informed the + Department that he thought Banzer postponed so that he could + hold negotiations with international and Bolivian officials + regarding austerity measures. (Ibid., P750018–0343) Banzer’s + trip was not rescheduled.

+ + + + Washington, October + 3, 1973. +

Postponement of the Bolivian President’s State Visit

+

At 5:00 p.m. Tuesday, October 2, Acting Foreign Minister Cespedes + informed Ambassador Stedman in + La Paz that President Banzer wished to postpone his State Visit + scheduled for October 16–17. Cespedes said the reason for this decision + was that the GOB will shortly announce + stringent new economic measures which could provoke popular unrest. The + Bolivian authorities state the armed forces may be required to maintain + order, in which case President Banzer believes it necessary to remain in + Bolivia (La Paz 6010).

+

We have no specific information regarding the actions the GOB is preparing to take. We know that a + special governmental commission has recommended that a number of + politically sensitive measures be enacted to correct the deteriorating + fiscal and monetary situation.

+

Banzer’s decision to deal with this problem at this time and at the + expense of the State Visit, to which he has attached great importance, + clearly indicates the seriousness of the domestic situation. The GOB’s failure to obtain large-scale + commercial financing for its budgetary deficit, together with the + realization that we are unwilling to respond favorably to requests for + budget support in the form of program assistance, probably precipitated + the decision. At the same time, the apparent urgency of the situation + indicates that we can expect renewed requests for program assistance to + cover Bolivia’s budgetary shortfall.

+
+ + +
+ 66. Telegram 900 From the Embassy in Bolivia to the Department of + State +

Summary: Because + military assistance gave him an important source of leverage in + his management of bilateral relations, Ambassador Stedman urged that the + Department refrain from cutting aid to the Bolivian armed forces.

+

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + [no film number]. Confidential. Repeated to USCINCSO. In telegram 23517 + to all American Republic diplomatic posts, February 5, the + Department listed the levels of military assistance allocated + for Latin American countries in FY 1974. (Ibid., [no film number]) The Department, + citing “world-wide reductions and high priority requirements in + Cambodia and the Middle East,” denied Stedman’s request to maintain + the level of military assistance at $3.5 million. (Telegram + 39843 to La Paz, February 28; ibid., + P750001–0806)

+ + + + La Paz, February 11, 1974, 1359Z. +

900. Department pass DOD. Subj: + Allocation of FY 74 MAP. Ref: State 023517.

+

1. Reftel gives the FY 74 allocation of MAP for Bolivia at $2.730 million + (matériel $2.300, training $.400). Since this represents a substantial + cut in anticipated level and will dismay GOB and cause problems for us with GOB military at a crucial time in Bolivian political + situation, I would appreciate urgent reconsideration and upward + adjustment in the Bolivia program for FY + 74 to a level not less than the Continuing Resolution authority which + has become common knowledge. I offer the following reasons in support of + my request:

+

A. The FY 74 allocation of $2.73 million + is a reduction from the Continuing Resolution level of $3.5 million + consisting of $2.9 million MAP–M and + $.6 million MAP–T. To go below $3.5 + million will mean heavy cuts of much needed equipment and training to + operate equipment already delivered under the FY 72 and FY 73 programs + for all services.

+

B. Bolivian authorities have been pressing us hard in recent weeks for + expeditious delivery of equipment in ongoing programs. They appear to be + wondering whether we are holding back for some unstated reasons. Were I + to inform the Bolivian Government at this time that the MAP grant program is now down to $2.73 + million when they have knowledge that CR level is $3.5 million, their + concerns would be increased and our rapport cum credibility reduced.

+

C. A reduction in the Military Aid Program will be viewed as companion + piece to “bad news” on PL–480. We have + had to tell the GOB that there will be + no further PL–480 Title One program for + FY 74 and that the chances are slim + that there will be any for FY 75. The + impact on President Banzer, personally, will be quite negative.

+ +

D. Recently the Bolivian military authorities came to us with an urgent + appeal for ammunition, and while we did approve the sale, we initially + conditioned it on their coming to Panama to pick it up and our making a + collection of payment in advance of its delivery. While this was + ultimately worked out to our and the Bolivians satisfaction, + nevertheless our conditions were not well received.

+

E. I would observe that this 2.73 figure is drastically below the MAP figures in our approved CASP (4.7 million), in the congressional + presentation document (4.450 million) and in the congressional + presentation document as published (5.2 million). I have no basis on + which to explain to the GOB why these + higher figures are inoperative or what has caused this cut in the + Bolivian MAP. While we may be + misinformed, we have heard informally that the Congress has authorized + funds sufficient to cover the approved Bolivian program.

+

F. Bolivia is passing through a critical and fluid political/military + period. President Banzer, although an Army General, is now quite + dependent on the Bolivian Armed Forces for his survival. Recent + decisions on the economic front have brought the popularity of the + Banzer regime to its lowest point since the October ’72 devaluation, + with a consequent increase in divisive tendencies within the military. + In a setting such as this, we can further our interests at little cost; + or we can lose effective rapport by making the downward cut in our + FY 74 MAP. The military program has been one of my principal + influence and leverage mechanisms with the GOB. I have been able through the military program to apply + pressure or to enlist support where political and economic means were + not appropriate. To reduce the effectiveness of the tool will harm my + ability to operate effectively.

+

2. In view of foregoing, I strongly recommend that ways be found to hold + the FY 74 MAP program at the FY 73 + level. Meantime, I shall not inform GOB + nor will I have MILGP do so either.

+ + Brewin + +
+ + +
+ 67. Telegram 2581 From the Embassy in Bolivia to the Department of + State +

Summary: President + Banzer, Country Director Karkashian, and Ambassador Stedman discussed economic and + military assistance to Bolivia.

+

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + D740096–0755. Confidential; Priority. Repeated to USCINCSO. Nixon’s letter to Banzer has + not been found. The Departments of State and Defense allocated + the $4 million FMS credit on + April 12, and Banzer accepted the terms on April 24. (Telegram + 2604 from La Paz, April 24; ibid., D740096–1013) According to + telegram 3098 from La Paz, May 14, Banzer expressed pleasure to + Stedman on May 13 + that the U.S. Government had begun shipping the MAP equipment. Banzer also + informed Stedman of + Bolivia’s desire for continued economic development assistance. + (Ibid., D740118–0978)

+ + + + La Paz, April 24, 1974, 1705Z. +

2581. Subj: Conversation with Bolivian President Banzer: Economic and + Military Assistance and the State Visit.

+

1. President Banzer made the following points during courtesy call on + April 23 by Country Director Karkashian and Ambassador:

+

A. The GOB and he, personally, are + deeply grateful to the USG for + continuing U.S. economic assistance, with special regard for those loans + made for emergency activities shortly after he assumed power. The + government would very much like to have the U.S. consider an additional + PADES loan since it has proven to + be an effective development tool and a positive factor for stability in + the country.

+

B. The government is seriously considering our recent offer of $4 million + FMS credit and will communicate its + response promptly. The GOB may wish to + use the line of credit for transport aircraft, heavy construction + machinery, and other hardware which might have a productive purpose.

+

C. The government is pleased to learn that a team composed of IDB, IBRD, and AID technicians + will soon arrive in Bolivia to assess flood damage. Based on that + assessment, the President said, he hoped that projects might be + developed to prevent future flooding and to relocate and house + refugees.

+

D. The President was pleased to learn that USG technicians will arrive soon to study the possibilities + of substitution of alternative crops for coca. He suggested examination + of possible courses of action such as purchase of coca leaf production + and its destruction, or incentive payments directly to farmers to + produce other commodities.

+

E. President expressed his continued interest in prompt delivery of + military equipment for the TIPOs in + accordance with understandings reached with US. The Ambassador described + the current delivery forecasts and reported on the arrival of + significant military items in recent weeks and within the coming month. President seemed + pleased but repeated his firm desire that the TIPOs be brought up to strength as quickly as possible to + raise the morale of the troops and to create a dissuasive force to + inhibit the outbreak of internal disorder.

+

2. Country Director Karkashian + explained the operations of an FMS + credit, noted the increasing difficulties of acquiring MAP grant aid and pointed out the desirability of Bolivia’s + utilization of FMS credit. Karkashian expressed the appreciation + of Washington authorities for Bolivia’s continued effective cooperation + in combatting drug trafficking. While stating the U.S. policy of + continued support and assistance for the Bolivian Government, he + carefully avoided specific commitments for loans for crop substitution, + new PADES operations, and for + reconstruction.

+

3. In the discussion of FMS credit, + President Banzer said that it was his hope that COFADENA would become an + effective instrument for economic and social development. He said it + should concentrate its activities rather than continuing as at present + to aggressively enter a wide range of activities. He expressed his hope + that external credits might facilitate COFADENA acquisition of + productive equipment and that its future profits could then be turned to + benefit the lot of the common soldier with better housing and medical + care. In this way he hopes to reduce the demands on the treasury for + military expenditures and burdening the nation with credits for + non-productive military equipment.

+

4. President Banzer told Karkashian that he regretted having to postpone the + State visit to the U.S. scheduled for last fall, but domestic political + factors arising from economic measures precluded his departing the + country. The President said he hoped that he be able to make the trip + sometime in the future at President Nixon’s and his mutual convenience. Karkashian responded that this was + also the desire of the USG as set forth + in President Nixon’s letter to + President Banzer.

+ + + Stedman + + +
+ + +
+ 68. Telegram 4041 From the Embassy in Bolivia to the Department of + State +

Summary: Stedman and Banzer discussed + the possibility of Bolivian purchases of arms from the Soviet + Union. Banzer indicated that prompt deliveries of munitions from + the United States would preclude Bolivia from purchasing Soviet + weapons.

+

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + D740163–0507. Confidential; Exdis. “Carros de asalto” are + armored assault vehicles. In telegram 4082 from La Paz, June 24, + Stedman reported: “I + concluded during our talk [on June 20] that without specific + P&A [price and + availability] data on a tank substitute such as an assault car, + the pressure on US for equipment would increase if I applied + more pressure on him not to accept matériel from the USSR.” (Ibid., D740165–0716) In + telegram 142916 to La Paz, July 2, the Department informed + Stedman it would + send the P&A data as soon as + possible. (Ibid., D740176–0364) In telegram 4746 from La Paz, + July 23, Stedman again + asked for the P&A data and + for a $2.5–$4.0 million FMS + credit for Bolivia for FY 1975 + to purchase the vehicles. (Ibid., D740199–0668) In telegram + 174463 to La Paz, August 9, the Department notified Stedman that it could not + offer any direct FMS credits to + Bolivia pending enactment of the 1975 Foreign Assistance Act. + (Ibid., D740219–0870)

+ + + + La Paz, June 21, 1974, 1247Z. +

4041. Subj: President Banzer Comments to Ambassador on Soviet Offers of + Military Equipment.

+

1. During call I made June 20 on President Banzer for another purpose, I + indicated that I had heard that Bolivian military officers were + exploring possible equipment purchases from European countries and that + one officer had received offers of communications equipment and tanks + from the Soviet Union. I indicated that I did not know very much about + this matter but had heard that the Bolivian Army was interested in tanks + since they had been in touch with us recently. President Banzer picked + up my remarks and said that Col. Rivera had made a trip for other + purposes to Europe and had made a visit to the Soviet Union where he had + received offers of some military equipment. President noted that Soviet + Ambassador to Bolivia had been active in recent months trying to press + military equipment on Bolivia and also had been active in offering + Soviet financial and technical cooperation for the construction of the + Bala dam. President also informed me that he was planning to name a new + Ambassador to the Soviet Union and probably would send Dr. Richardo + Anaya of Cochabamba. In the latter connection, he said the subject had + come up as to whether or not Bolivia should accept exchange of persons + programs, increased cultural presentations, and how to deal with + military equipment offers. President Banzer said that there had been no + formal offer made to the GOB and that + the government had not made any decision to accept Soviet equipment. + President said, on his own volition, that the great difficulty with + Soviet equipment, even if it is a gift, is that it generally comes + accompanied by technicians with other interests. He said his own experience with the Soviets here in + Bolivia was that he had to kick out several members of the Soviet + Mission for intelligence activities. But, said President Banzer, the + problem is that the morale of the Bolivian Army is dependent upon + younger officers having relatively new equipment to work with. GOB has no intention of using military + equipment, but there is a need to boost morale in the troops. He said + the best way to counter the Soviet pressure for Bolivia to accept their + military equipment is for the prompt delivery by friendly countries of + items appropriate for the Bolivian military.

+

2. President Banzer said that he knew quite a bit about the tank + situation as that was his basic military specialty, having been trained + in this in the U.S. He said he knew the M–48 but considered it too heavy + for Bolivia. He volunteered that he knew that the M–41 was no longer + available. In sum, he said that he was well aware that the U.S. no + longer produces a medium size tank appropriate for Bolivia. Accordingly + he said that it would be an appropriate alternative if we were to + provide for Bolivian purchase of “carros de asalto.” He said that he had + personally purchased some equipment from Cadillac-Gauge and felt that + late models of assault cars would satisfy the morale needs of the + Bolivian Army. I asked him directly whether he felt that US sale of + assault vehicles of this sort would eliminate any interest in tanks + offered by other countries. His reply, while somewhat elliptical, was + based on the financial aspect of other countries’ offers. He noted it + would be most difficult for Bolivia to pass up what might amount to a + gift. He said that he would have difficulties with younger members of + the Armed Forces were he to refuse to accept equipment from other + suppliers at little or no cost, although he himself did not wish to have + other countries’ technicians physically present in this country. The way + he left the subject was that prompt deliveries of programmed and + suitable military equipment from others would reduce Soviet pressures to + give equipment and any junior military officers desires to have such + equipment.

+ + + Stedman + + +
+ + +
+ 69. Telegram 5772 From the Embassy in Bolivia to the Department of + State +

Summary: Stedman conveyed Banzer’s + request for a U.S. guarantee of Bolivian neutrality in the event + of a war between Chile and Peru.

+

Source: Ford Library, + National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for Latin + America, Box 2, Bolivia, State Department Telegrams to SecState, + Nodis. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Repeated Immediate to Santiago, + Brasília, and Lima. In telegrams 210975 to La Paz and 236927 to + Santiago, September 25 and November 20, the Department refused + to guarantee Bolivian neutrality but promised consultations if + events warranted them. (National Archives, RG 59, Central + Foreign Policy File, D740269–0217 and D740306–0982) Telegram + 7408 from La Paz, November 13, transmitted Banzer’s expression + of appreciation for the offer of consultation. (Ibid., + D740327–0422)

+ + + + La Paz, September 5, 1974, 2015Z. +

5772. Subj: Bolivian President Banzer Requests USG Guarantee of Bolivian Neutrality in Event + Peruvian/Chilean Conflict.

+

1. Summary: President Banzer took opportunity courtesy call by USCINCSO General Rosson and me to request USG consider guaranteeing Bolivian + neutrality in event Peruvian/Chilean conflict. Also stated that Bolivia + needs a minimum military capability to defend its territory in event + Bolivia involved in Peru/Chilean armed operations. President said this + concern is one he has long held and would have raised with President + Nixon if he had made trip to + U.S. in Oct 1973 and would surely raise with President Ford were he to have opportunity to + make trip to U.S. during his term in office.

+

2. On Sept 5 General Rosson, + USCINCSO, and I made early + morning courtesy call on President Banzer. After usual exchange of + pleasantries, General Rosson + noted improvement in Bolivian Armed Forces over that he observed last + year. General Rosson stressed + marked progress in maintenance capability of several units. Rosson also noted strengthened balance + of payment situation. President acknowledged degree of improvement but + said that rate of advancement not as fast as he and the Armed Forces + wished. He also noted that political stability was key factor required + to enable the country to exploit its riches and to benefit from present + high level of foreign exchange earnings from minerals exports. President + then said he had a deep-seated concern which he had held for a long time + and wished to tell us about because it is a matter of grave importance + to Bolivia. He said he has been and is troubled about the near-term + prospect of armed conflict between Peru and Chile and the probable + involvement of Bolivia.

+

3. President Banzer said that he had had the opportunity during his 26 + years of military service to meet and know Peruvians and Chileans, military and civilians, from + low-ranking to high authorities. He said he had attended conferences, + been on missions, and served in other countries such as the U.S. as + military attaché, and had gotten to know Peruvian and Chilean thinking + about one another. Recently he had had private conversations with + President Velasco of Peru and + President Pinochet of Chile. + Both men expressed to him feelings which Banzer himself said he had + observed are strongly held by the people of both countries. In the case + of Peru, there is a fervent desire to reconquer territories lost in the + War of the Pacific. In the case of Chile, there is a firm conviction + that it will defend territories now under its sovereign control. + President Banzer said that he has concluded that in the short or in the + medium term there will be armed conflict between the two countries. He + is convinced that even though Bolivian policy is neutrality, his country + will be involved against its will. He noted, for example, that a + Peruvian military officer now holding a high position in the GOP, when a member of the Inter-American + Defense Board some years ago, had revealed to him, when he was military + attaché in Washington, Peruvian war plans which involved use of Bolivian + air space. Banzer said that the Peruvian plans include the use of + airports built but not now used (he said that he himself knows none of + such airport) to launch air strikes from Peru into Bolivia to pass south + behind the Bolivian Cordillera and then into Chilean territory. + President Banzer noted further that the problem is not merely a + three-cornered problem involving Bolivia, Chile, and Peru, but will + involve many other Latin American countries. Brazil will surely back + Chile. Paraguay will sympathize with Brazil and Chile because of its + ideological compatibility. The Argentine position is not now clear + because of the muddled situation there.

+

4. President Banzer said that the Peruvian/Chilean problem is now + severely aggravated by the totally opposite ideologies of the two + countries. He also noted that the Armed Forces of both countries having + talked about reconquest and defense for so many years now have a + passionately held doctrine. He said that he has evidence that Peru has + attempted to influence domestic political events in Bolivia to bring + about a regime more compatible with the present one in Lima. While + history might suggest that Bolivia would side with Peru because they + both lost in the War of the Pacific, the present ideological situation + in Peru prompts Bolivia to adopt its basic policy of neutrality. + President Banzer said that Peruvian President Velasco told him that Bolivia may work + out an access to the sea with Chile, but it would be worthless if it + included former Peruvian territory because Peru intends to reconquer + that area.

+

5. President Banzer stressed the fundamental policy of Bolivia that it be + neutral in the event of conflict between Peru and Chile, but he emphasized that because Bolivia + might inevitably be involved and has limited capability to defend its + territory, it needs a guarantee, both military and moral, of a friendly + and strong country. The U.S. is the obvious choice among Bolivia’s + friends to provide this guarantee. Also he said that Bolivia needs a + minimum military capability to protect its territorial sovereignty in + the event of a conflict. He said that he would be derelict in his duties + if he did not ensure that Bolivia’s forces are at least able to move to + the frontiers to protect them against incursions from either Peru or + Chile. He said this subject had been raised confidentially in the March + 1974 Cochabamba consultative meeting but has been kept out of the + Bolivian press. He said that the issue is one which he cannot raise + publicly in Bolivia because the Bolivians will believe that he is + seeking to exploit the situation to maintain himself in office. In this + regard, he said that he and his government are firmly wedded to holding + elections in 1975 and to turning the government over to the elected + President.

+

6. President Banzer asked General Rosson and me to transmit to the highest levels of the + U.S. Government for serious consideration his personal appeal for a + guarantee of Bolivian neutrality and for the necessary minimum military + defensive capability, based on his concern that Bolivia would be drawn + into a Peruvian/Chilean conflict which he fears is coming soon. He noted + that he was not making a “denuncia” but was presenting facts as they now + exist.

+

7. General Rosson spoke for + himself and me, thanking President Banzer for his clear and concise + statement of Bolivia’s concerns and said that they would be transmitted + to Washington as the President had requested. The conversation then + closed with expressions of traditional friendship between the U.S. and + Bolivia.

+

8. Comment and action requested: President Banzer appeared sincerely + troubled about the Peruvian/Chilean situation. Accordingly, I urge that + the Department arrange for the highest possible review of President + Banzer’s request and, to the extent possible, obtain as positive a reply + as we can make to him about maintenance of Bolivia’s neutrality in the + event of a Peruvian/Chilean conflict. As to the minimum military + capacity, an expression of cooperation and forthcomingness related to + the MAP grant matériel program and + future FMS credit levels would be + appropriate. A letter from President Ford on these two points should be considered as a + possible vehicle for our reply. I also note that President Banzer’s + request strengthens our proposal that the Policy Planning Staff visits + to Latin America include Bolivia. It should not be overlooked that the + President broadly hinted that he would like an invitation to visit the + U.S. If such a visit could be timed in the early spring of 1975, before + the Bolivian elections but after Banzer has taken himself out of the + race, I believe it would help Banzer guide Bolivia through the constitutional transition + with less instability—a major U.S. objective here. Separate telegram + will follow elaborating our views on a possible visit of President + Banzer to Washington.

+

9. Dept please pass DOD/OSD, DOD/JCS, + USCINCSO, and DOD/ISA.

+ + + Stedman + + +
+ +
+ 70. Telegram 10423 From the Embassy in Peru to the Department of + State +

Summary: Assistant + Secretary Rogers and + President Banzer met in Lima and discussed Bolivia’s access to + the sea, arms limitation, and U.S. assistance.

+

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + D740359–1015 and D740359–0139. Confidential; Immediate. Repeated + to La Paz and Santiago. In telegram 10424 from Lima, December + 11, the Embassy conveyed highlights of the Declaration of + Ayacucho, which committed the eight signatories to create + conditions to permit the limitation of armaments and to consider + Bolivia’s land-locked situation. (Ibid., + D740359–0142)

+ + + + Lima, December 11, 1974, 0225Z. +

10423. Subject: Rogers’ Conversation with Bolivian President Banzer.

+

1. At the request of the Bolivian Ambassador to Peru, Sanjinez, I met + with President Banzer the morning of December 10 at the Bolivian + Embassy. Sanjinez and Ambassador Dean were also present. Banzer expressed pleasure at the + wording of the Declaration of Ayacucho which he described as “one step + more” toward the resolution of the problem of Bolivia’s access to the + sea. (Noting that his economic advisers had told him that the Bolivian + economy “had reached the takeoff point”, he stressed that Bolivia needed + sea access more every day.) Bolivia had always had collaboration and + understanding from the U.S. and the Bolivian people were very grateful + for it. I asked him what ideally would be the next step in the process + of obtaining Bolivia’s sea access. He replied that it would be a summit + conference with the Presidents of Bolivia, Chile and Peru in attendance, + but gave no indication that such a meeting was planned.

+

2. Turning to the question of the possibility of war between Peru and + Chile, Banzer affirmed that he was concerned and replied that General + Torrijos and President Perez + also had expressed disquiet about the prospects for war. Sanjinez + interjected that he and Banzer disagreed somewhat about the likelihood of war—in his opinion + there was no logical reason to believe that war would take place soon. + This view was based on Peru’s negative internal factors and Chile’s lack + of aggressive military capacity. Sanjinez conceded however that wars do + not have to be logical and said he was aware of the obsession on the + part of many Peruvians with the desire to regain the lost territory now + held by Chile. Banzer recounted what Velasco had told him several months ago, i.e., that “we + are going to reconquer the lost territory in Arica.” He added that he + had heard a declaration from Pinochet in Brazil to the effect that Chile would fight + to the last man to preserve this territory.

+

3. Both of the Bolivians considered that the wording contained in the + Declaration of Ayacucho which called for a limitation on offensive + weapons was noteworthy. We touched on the limited role of the U.S. in + encouraging peace. The Bolivians thought that building up their country + economically and militarily might have a neutralizing effect on the + tensions. Banzer confided that he looked favorably on the future + resumption of diplomatic relations between Bolivia and Chile and + referred to excellent prospects for trade between the two countries. He + suggested that we might want to finance a port on the Pacific coast for + Bolivia. Sanjinez added that in doing so we should channel our efforts + through the World Bank and the IDB.

+

4. I then asked Banzer and Sanjinez what the U.S. might do to encourage + President Velasco’s call for a + limitation on offensive arms. I observed that it was particularly + important this week since Congress was now considering the question of + armaments for Chile. It was agreed that this was an extremely + complicated problem, one which the U.S. alone could not solve. The + Soviet Union and France also were involved deeply in this matter and + their cooperation would be a necessity.

+

5. Banzer thanked me for U.S. economic assistance but he urged me to help + him obtain a new loan for Bolivia. 1975, he thought, would be a + difficult year for Bolivia because the price of Bolivian raw materials + had lowered yet he needed additional funds to pay for contemplated and + necessary pay raises for government workers. He said that GOB expenditures of $800 million would + exceed receipts by some $300 million. Banzer stressed that necessary + bilateral and multilateral assistance for 1975 could be significantly + reduced for 1976 which would be a much better year for the Bolivian + economy.

+

6. He complained about the delay in the delivery of military supplies + while emphasizing that Bolivia only wanted defensive weapons which could + be used to “dissuade” extremists and guerrillas. New equipment was also + needed to help the morale of his soldiers. He said he was encouraged by + General Rosson who had promised + to try to speed up the delayed deliveries.

+ +

7. Referring to Bolivian politics, he claimed that the Bolivian military + would be delighted to turn over the reins of government if there were + someone to whom they could turn it over. Unfortunately, the political + parties of Bolivia were disintegrated and divided. He described his + program of obligatory civil service as being supported by the vast + majority of Bolivian people. There were only about two thousand + opponents most of whom were labor union heads and aspiring politicians. + As he did yesterday, Sanjinez affirmed that Banzer was in complete + control of his country and pointed to Banzer’s presence in Lima as + evidence that the country was safely in his control.

+

8. In closing, Banzer praised Ambassador Stedman with whom he said he had an excellent working + relationship.

+ + + Dean + + +
+ +
+ 71. Paper Prepared in the National Security Council Interdepartmental + Group for Inter-American Affairs +

Summary: U.S. officials reassessed NSDM 160 and recommended that + development assistance to Bolivia be allocated based on + economic, as opposed to political, criteria.

+

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), + Box H–232, National Security Decision Memoranda, NSDM 160. Confidential. Sent by + Rogers to Scowcroft under a February 5, + 1975, covering memorandum. NSDM 160 is Document 111 in Foreign Relations, + 1969–1976, Volume E–10, Documents on American Republics, + 1969–1972.

+ + + + Washington, undated. +

Reassessment of NSDM 160 + of April 14 [4], 1972: Situation and Outlook in + Bolivia

+

+ Problem: + NSDM 160 approved a forthcoming U.S. + assistance policy toward Bolivia in response to the unique circumstances + existing at the time. Specifically, large inputs of military and + economic assistance were endorsed on the basis of political rather than + traditional development or security assistance criteria. The + circumstances in Bolivia have changed markedly, calling into question + the continued validity of the policy conclusions and recommendations + contained in NSDM 160.

+

+ Environment at Time of NSDM 160: On August 22, 1971, the Armed Forces of + Bolivia, leading elements of the private sector, and several major + political parties jointly overthrew the military government of Gen. Juan José Torres. Col. Hugo Bánzer Suárez was named President + and head of the + civilian-military coalition which functioned as the Nationalist Popular + Front (FPN).

+

The Torres regime had been marked by chaotic political conditions and + dependence on extremist elements in the universities and labor unions. A + deteriorating political situation was + punctuated by the expropriation of major U.S. investments and, in June + 1971, the ouster of the Peace Corps. During the 10 months Torres held + office, foreign private and public investment came to a virtual + halt.

+

The Banzer Government inherited an economic + crisis; unemployment had risen to 25–30% of the work force, + with its heaviest incidence among laboring groups which had been + radicalized by Torres’ supporters. Bolivia faced massive balance of + payments and budget deficits. Extreme political + instability made it politically impossible for the government + to adopt an IMF standby agreement which + would have alleviated the critical balance of payments problem. The + nation’s deteriorating economic situation + nevertheless posed a serious threat to the Banzer Government’s future + and presaged the possible return to power of leftist elements hostile to + the United States. Those groups, some of them operating from exile in + Chile under the protection of the Allende Government, were actively engaged in planning + and promoting the overthrow of the Banzer regime.

+

These, then, were the circumstances which led to the NSDM 160 response supporting rapid and + large-scale U.S. assistance. NSDM 160 + called for a forthcoming development assistance program without + requiring the negotiation of an IMF + Standby Agreement as a precondition; further, it instructed the Defense + Department to be responsive to Bolivian requests for military assistance + and endorsed a three to four year Military Assistance Program in order + to fully equip 5 “TIPO” regiments for + internal security purposes. NSDM 160, + in short, recognized the extraordinary circumstances of that period and + was premised on the assumption that the success of the Banzer + Government—or, at least, the prevention of a return to power by the + extreme left—was in the U.S. national interest.

+

+ Current Environment: Bolivia is currently + experiencing a period of relative political + stability and improved economic + prospects. The political + stability—President Banzer has been in power over three years—is + due in large part to Banzer’s proven adroitness in detecting incipient + coup plotting and thwarting conspirators. This stability has been + accompanied by a decrease in the likelihood of an early return to power + by the extreme left, a result both of Banzer’s internal policies and the + increasingly hostile climate toward radical Bolivian exiles in + neighboring countries. Those neighbors, especially Brazil, contribute to + Bolivia’s stability in another way: they appear to have a greater + appreciation of the value to themselves of a stable Bolivia and + consequently a greater willingness to play a role in maintaining it. Finally, political + stability has permitted reasonably coherent development planning within + the Bolivian Government and has encouraged the accretion of competent + technical skills in the bureaucracy.

+

The economic crisis described in NSDM + 160, in addition, has largely receded and Bolivia faces greatly improved + economic prospects. In 1974, Bolivia enjoyed a substantial balance of + payments surplus, due to high world prices for its major exports (tin + and other minerals, oil and gas, cotton and sugar), although a balance + of payments surplus in 1975 is problematical. The internal budget in + 1974 will either balance or be in only a slight deficit position which + will drop in 1975 to a moderate deficit requiring around $boliviano 300 + million (US$ 15 million) in Central Bank financing.

+

In short, the political and economic circumstances which prevailed during + the Torres period and which led to the policy response contained in + NSDM 160 no longer reflect current + Bolivian realities. That is not to say, however, that Bolivia is on the + verge of resolving its long-standing basic political and economic + difficulties. Although the threat posed by the extreme left has receded, + civilian political institutions remain fragile and the armed forces + dominate the political system. There is constant plotting against Banzer + and the likelihood of an eventual extraconstitutional change of + government is virtually certain. Per capita income is still the second + lowest in the Western Hemisphere, and perhaps as much as half of the + population still do not fully participate in the national economy. + Favorable world prices for Bolivia’s major exports cannot be relied on + indefinitely, and the cost of essential imports continues to rise. But + progress—at least for the short term—is being made. Bolivia is, for + example, investing much of its newly acquired wealth in developing the + country’s infrastructure in an attempt to maintain or increase the + export base.

+

+ Conclusions: The NSC–IG/ARA concludes that while Bolivia’s development needs + remain great, they can now be met by more normal development techniques. + Bolivia’s current difficulties are those faced by many other lesser + developed nations which receive U.S. assistance. U.S. development + assistance policy toward Bolivia, therefore, should employ normal + development criteria, taking into account Bolivia’s status as one of the + least developed states in the Hemisphere.

+

The NSC–IG/ARA further notes that + many of the special circumstances which prompted the extraordinary + military assistance program called for in NSDM 160 no longer exist. The military institution in + Bolivia, however, has grown in political significance since NSDM 160 was issued, and a forthcoming + military assistance policy will remain a key element of our policy + toward Bolivia. Once the Military Assistance Program approved by NSDM 160 has been completed, however, + more normal policy and program + criteria can be employed in developing military assistance programs for + Bolivia.

+

NOTE: The Military Assistance Program undertaken in response to NSSM 160 is scheduled for completion by + the end of FY 1976, by which time the + last of the Bolivian Army’s five mobile (TIPO) regiments will have been equipped.

+
+ +
+ 72. Telegram 1086 From the Embassy in Bolivia to the Department of + State +

Summary: Citing + Bolivia’s cautious policy regarding purchases of military + equipment and the importance of enhancing the efficiency and + morale of the Bolivian military, Ambassador Stedman asked the Department + for an increase in FMS + allocations to Bolivia for FY + 1975.

+

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + D750052–1087. Confidential; Priority. On February 12, Bolivia’s + Ambassador requested a $12 million FMS allocation for FY 1975. (Telegram 34359 to La Paz, February 14; + ibid., D750054–0908) On March 10, the Department acknowledged + the request but noted that the legislation appropriating FMS funds had not yet been + enacted. (Telegram 53439 to La Paz, March 10; ibid., + D750084–0437) In telegram 1720 from La Paz, March 11, Stedman urged the Department + to notify Bolivia “that chances of acquiring FMS credits in the neighborhood of + $12 million are quite small.” (Ibid., D750085–0419) According to + telegram 60734 to La Paz, March 18, Karkashian met with the Bolivian Ambassador on + March 17 to do so. (Ibid., D750094–0719)

+ + + + La Paz, February 13, 1975, 1540Z. +

1086. For Asst Secy Rogers and + PM Director Vest. Subject: Request for Increase in + FY 75 FMS Credit for Bolivia.

+

1. I would appreciate your help in obtaining an increase in the FMS credit allocation for Bolivia in + FY–75 from $4 million to $10 + million. The increase would make a major contribution to strengthening + our relations and to achieving significant US objectives. It will help + us move away from MAP grant material in + an orderly way and will build confidence in Bolivia that we treat its + concerns seriously. More importantly, it will also enable the Bolivian + Armed Forces to carry on with their non-military civic action mission of + nation-building and economic development work in the rural areas.

+

2. We were fortunate in obtaining a $4 million FMS credit for FY–74 which + the GOB decided to use for its Air + Force. Prudently, President Banzer determined that transport aircraft + should be purchased which would serve productive purposes. Since C–130s + were beyond the reach of this + credit, the FAB bought Convair 580 Turbojets. I cite this as evidence of + Bolivia’s cautious policy on military purchases.

+

3. The present Bolivian regime is concerned that it is not adequately + equipped to cope with serious internal security problems, that it cannot + protect its borders from foreign incursion, and that better equipment is + needed in both military and civic action fields to enhance the + efficiency, morale and professional level of the Armed Forces.

+

4. Whether justified or not, there is a growing malaise on part of + President Banzer and within the Bolivian Armed Forces that the US + program of equipping five mobile regiments (TIPOs) has been too slow and is even now subject to further + delays. This reaction has not yet manifested itself in any other way + than grumbling in private and occasional digs in public. A more mature + relationship will arise through FMS + credits. Of course, meantime we should fulfill our objective of getting + the five TIPOs into shape through grant aid.

+

5. Bolivia devoted less than 1.7 percent of GNP to its military in 1974. + It has purchased very little new equipment for any of its services, but + pressure to re-equip cannot be put off very much longer. We may be able + partially to satisfy Bolivia’s desire for tanks by an offer of the + Cadillac-Gauge assault car. We may be able to satisfy Bolivia’s interest + in such productive items as C–130s, well drilling equipment, hospital + and medical supplies, road building equipment, house construction + equipment, communications, as well as strictly military supplies.

+

6. Bolivian foreign policy is aligned with ours. We have no bilateral + problems. President Banzer and virtually all senior military officials + have expressed a strong desire and felt need for additional military + assistance in form of credits but have not made nuisances of themselves. + Eventually they will buy military equipment and the additional FMS will help channel those purchases + toward the necessary and the most productive.

+

7. In sum, an increase at this time in the FY–75 FMS allocation would + be a healthy, welcome and major input into Bolivia.

+ + + Stedman + + +
+ + +
+ 73. Telegram 3254 From the Embassy in Bolivia to the Department of + State +

Summary: President + Banzer, Minister of the Interior Pereda, and Ambassador + Stedman discussed + threats to Bolivia’s external and internal security.

+

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + D750164–0238. Confidential. Repeated to Lima, Santiago, and + USCINCSO. The May 8 + conversation between Stedman and Banzer is reported in telegram 3201 + from La Paz, May 8. (Ibid.) On May 7, the Bolivian Cabinet + required Gulf Oil Company to state if it had passed bribes to + Bolivian officials between 1966 and 1972, and it requested a + U.S. Government investigation. (Telegram 3191 from La Paz, May + 8; ibid., D750162–0178) The September 1974 Banzer-Rosson conversation is + summarized in Document + 69.

+ + + + La Paz, May 9, 1975, 2055Z. +

3254. Subj: Bolivian Concerns About Peruvian Arms Build-Up and Internal + Security Problems.

+

1. During conversation with President Banzer on May 8 about alleged Gulf + Oil Co. bribery, he said he wished to review a deep-seated concern about + Peruvian arms build-up and internal security problems affecting Bolivia. + Present during the conversation was the Minister of the Interior, who at + the moment was also acting Foreign Minister.

+

2. President Banzer said that he has received continuing reports of + sizeable quantities of military equipment arriving at the Port of + Matarani. He said that information is reaching him from highly reputable + officials of Bolivian state entities who have visited Matarani seeking + to expedite delayed shipments of needed materials for their operations + in Bolivia. These officials have stated that ships not carrying military + equipment are being delayed and that dock facilities are being + pre-empted for delivery of Soviet tanks, ammunition, and other military + equipment. President said that the Peruvian authorities in the Matarani + area are telling inquirers that much of this equipment is destined for + La Paz so as to reduce any Peruvian concerns about an arms build-up in + their own country.

+

3. President Banzer said that continuing reports of sizeable arms + delivery to Peru, particularly in the southern area, is a matter of + great concern to him. He is worried, he reported, about the possibility + of conflict between Peru and Chile and also about possible use of + military equipment across Bolivia’s borders. He said he would like to + turn to his other concern which involves the concentration of + extremists, terrorists, and Communist forces on Bolivia. He asked the + Minister of Interior to elaborate.

+

4. The Minister of Interior said that the recent successes of Communist + forces in Indo-China have inspired groups such as the ERP and the ELN to consider that they are + engaged in a winning cause. They therefore are encouraged to take more aggressive action, especially + against countries like Bolivia which are calm but weak. He noted that + Bolivia has frontiers with five Latin American nations and is unable to + adequately cover those borders to prevent infiltration. The Minister + went on to note that a recent meeting in Lisbon of ELN type groups has + resulted in decisions to move against Bolivia and Paraguay. He said that + information received from Argentine intelligence sources is that some + fifty armed guerrillas are being prepared to penetrate into Bolivia. He + observed that another motivation for picking on Bolivia was the + continued bitterness in the extreme left forces about the liquidation of + Che Guevara here. The Minister said that the problem of Bolivia’s + internal security is or should be a concern for its neighbors and also + for the US. He expressed the hope that it might be possible to have + continuing conversations with us on these problems with the aim of + developing some form of common strategy.

+

5. President Banzer then said that the two concerns, i.e. Peru and + internal security, were constant preoccupations of his and referred me + back to the conversation in his office with USCINCSO General Rosson in September 1974. He said that + the Bolivian population gives little or no support to extremist + elements, but with a new aggressiveness on the part of those hostile to + Bolivia, it is possible that inroads in some areas might be made. He + said that Bolivia needs either to increase its internal security + capability through delivery of military equipment or to accelerate + economic development activities. At one point he noted that possibly + both courses of action need to be pursued. He noted that the regime has + the full support of all elements of the Armed Forces and of the + population. He said that he had recently dispatched the chiefs of staff + of the three Armed Forces around the country and that their report + confirmed the solidarity of adherence to the Banzer regime. He said that + if it were in the interest of the US to help Chile, one way is to + provide assistance to Bolivia. For example, he said Bolivia’s production + of foodstuffs could be expanded greatly and thus Chile could be fed from + a neighboring country rather than having to import food from longer + distances as it does now. He also said that in relation to the arms + build-up in Peru some additional military assistance to Bolivia, which + is now more closely attuned to the ideology of Chile, would help keep + the relative strengths in nearer balance. While on the subject of Chile, + he said that while he is hoping that some progress can be made toward a + solution of the access to the sea, he can only state at the moment that + Chile has shown a disposition to discuss possibilities.

+

6. President concluded the talk by repeating what he had said earlier in + the discussion about the Gulf Oil Co. matter—that he considered the + bilateral relations between Bolivia and the US as excellent. He said he even detected that they + had improved in recent months. While he did not clearly or specifically + ask me for anything, it is quite clear that he is repeating his firmly + held view that the US should seriously consider expanding military and + economic assistance here for the benefit of Bolivia, the deterring of + tension between Chile and Peru, and to avoid potential build-up of + hostile elements in what he considers to be a strategic geographic area. + I intend to dig further into the basis for the Minister of Interior’s + analysis, either directly or indirectly. It may be that we can dispel + some of the pessimistic attitudes by offering differing and more + profound analysis of currents in neighboring countries and within + terrorist groups. The conversation with the President and the Minister + of the Interior did reveal that both are seriously concerned but that + some of their preoccupation may be based upon their isolation, + frustration, and weakness. I have no recommendations for new or + different action by the US at this time and will report further if + additional information or observations are developed by me or members of + the Embassy staff.

+ + + Stedman + + +
+ +
+ 74. Telegram 133974 From the Department of State to the Embassy in + Bolivia +

Summary: The + Department provided talking points for the Embassy to use in + explaining FY 1975 FMS allocations for Bolivia.

+

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + D750200–1009. Confidential; Immediate. Drafted by Williams; approved by + Bloomfield, + Weber, Weany, and + Karkashian; and + cleared by Ryan. In + telegram 3718 from La Paz, May 31, Stedman requested “guidance as to how to answer + any queries about $20.5 million [FMS] allocation to Peru in light [of] that + country’s major arms build-up, relations with Chile, and sharp + public differences with USG on + several fronts, which have been well publicized here.” (Ibid., + D750191–0451)

+ + + + Washington, June 9, 1975, 1947Z. +

133974. Subject: FY 1975 FMS Allocations. Ref: La Paz 3718.

+

1. Defense message 090304Z May 75 informed MILGPs/MAAGs of tentative + FY 1975 FMS credit allocations. Embassy may now proceed on basis of + dols 4.0 million FMS level for Bolivia and inform GOB that USG currently processing FMS credit justification for this amount. FYI. Assuming + interagency approval of this credit, which we believe will be forthcoming well before June 30, + 1975, DOD will proceed with signature + of credit agreement in Washington before that date. End FYI.

+

2. Department appreciates fact that dols 20.5 million credit level for Peru may give rise to + some concern on part of GOB. Following + are points which can be used with GOB + officials. Our Military Assistance Programs in a given country include + various component parts. Bolivia has traditionally had, and continues to + have, a MAP grant matériel program in + addition to FMS credits, while Peru + receives no MAP grant for matériel. + While the Bolivia MAP grant program is + not large in absolute terms, it represents 50 percent of the Latin + America MAP program. As the MAP grant program in Bolivia is phased + out, we expect to increase the level of FMS credits in order to continue to be responsive to + Bolivian Armed Forces needs. Additionally, one cannot ignore the fact + that countries with larger military establishments, and the economic + base to support them, would normally expect a commensurate proportion of + FMS credits, i.e. Argentina, Brazil + and Chile, among others. As a policy matter, however, USG discourages purchases of weapons + systems which would significantly increase offensive capabilities. FYI. + For this reason, we are holding Peruvian requests for 280 additional + APCs and four missile systems + “under review”. Thus, besides the purchase of A–37B aircraft (which were + offered to Bolivia), the bulk of Peru’s FMS credits will be used to purchase non-combat vehicles, a + water barge, and medical equipment. End FYI.

+ + + Kissinger + + +
+ + +
+ 75. Telegram 170862 From the Department of State to the Embassy in + Bolivia +

Summary: + Department and Bolivian officials discussed issues of continuing + concern in U.S.-Bolivian relations, including Bolivia’s efforts + to obtain an outlet to the sea, the Trade Act of 1974, the Gulf + Oil Company scandal, and PL 480 + assistance.

+

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + D750250–0902. Confidential. Drafted by Pace; cleared by Fouts, Karkashian, and Polik; and approved by + Ryan. On July 1, + Foreign Minister Guzmán + sent a diplomatic note to the Embassy requesting PL 480 assistance. (Telegram 4715 + from La Paz, July 9; ibid., D750237–0789) In telegram 182625 to + La Paz, August 1, the Department informed the Embassy that + Bolivia would not be allocated PL 480 assistance in FY 1976. (Ibid., D750267–0999) No report by + Karkashian on GSA sales and the stockpile + legislation has been found.

+ + + + Washington, July 19, 1975, 1926Z. +

170862. Subject: Ambassador Capriles Call on Department.

+

Summary: Ambassador Capriles, + accompanied by DCM Arnal and First + Secretary Fernandez, called on ARA/BC Country Director Karkashian and Bolivia Desk Officer + Pace July 17. During lengthy + discussion, Capriles commented on + prospects for Bolivia’s efforts to obtain outlet to the sea and various + issues of continuing concern in U.S.-Bolivian relations. End + summary.

+

1. Ambassador Capriles requested + July 17 meeting with ARA/BC to discuss a number of pending bilateral + issues. Capriles also took + advantage of meeting to inform DeptOffs of his concern over status of + Bolivia’s efforts to secure an outlet to the sea. Noting that + dissatisfaction is increasing within Bolivia over the lack of positive + results from the GOB’s year-old + campaign over the outlet-to-the-sea issue, Capriles stated that further delay is likely to stir up + latent anti-Chilean sentiments among Bolivians. Capriles indicated that such a trend + might eventually force the Banzer government to reevaluate diplomatic + relations with the present GOC. In + response, Country Director commented that Bolivia consider opening a + dialogue with Peru on this theme simultaneously with present + Bolivia-Chile discussions.

+

2. Capriles then turned to various + bilateral economic issues. He and DCM + Arnal expressed Bolivia’s continuing interest in having antimony, + tungsten and ferrovanadium included on the list of products to receive + preferential treatment under the Trade Act of 1974. Country Director + noted that the Bolivian request is probably too late for inclusion on + the initial GSP product list but + promised to look into the matter. In the context of the Trade Act, + Capriles also noted his + continuing desire to resolve the Applegate/Youngquist and Embosa + investment disputes.

+

3. Capriles also discussed the + continuing high interest of both the GOB and Bolivian public opinion at large in ascertaining + all the facts in the “political + contributions” made by Gulf Oil Company. Capriles expressed as his personal opinion the view that + Bolivia should prosecute Gulf Oil in U.S. courts, seeking damages in + compensation for the harm done to Bolivia abroad by the Gulf + allegations. The Country Director noted the Department’s efforts to + encourage Gulf Oil to make a full disclosure of the facts in the case. + At the same time, he commended the GOB + for its handling of the case to date.

+

4. With regard to the PL 480, Title I + program of assistance to Bolivia, Capriles presented DeptOffs with a diplomatic note + requesting the resumption of wheat deliveries to Bolivia under this + program. The Country Director described the changed conditions which + limit USG flexibility in the granting + of PL 480, Title I aid in recent years, + but promised to keep the Ambassador informed of developments. Capriles also mentioned Bolivia’s + continuing interest in acquiring Ex-Im + Bank financing for development projects.

+

5. Ambassador Capriles also + requested updated information on GSA + sales of tin and other strategic minerals, together with the status of a + bill before Congress to renew GSA’s + authorization to sell from the strategic stockpile. The Country Director + promised to provide the Ambassador with a report on recent GSA sales and on the status of the + legislation.

+ + + Kissinger + + +
+ + +
+ 76. Telegram 8135 From the Embassy in Bolivia to the Department of + State +

Summary: + Ambassador Stedman + requested $3.3 million in MAP + funding for FY 1976 in order to + ensure that the U.S. Government could meet its commitments to + Bolivia.

+

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + D750403–0198. Confidential. The CASP was transmitted as an enclosure to airgram + A–58 from La Paz, April 9. (Ibid., D750064–2116) In telegram + 272585 to La Paz, November 18, the Department informed Stedman that the Bolivian + MAP program would be phased + out in FY 1977. (Ibid., + D75041–0441) In telegram 284501 to La Paz, December 3, the + Department informed Stedman that it would “make all efforts to + provide IG endorsed level of + dols 3.3 million,” and + that, “in the meantime, MILGP can continue to obligate funds + under CRA up to dols 2.2 million level.” (Ibid., + D750419–1118)

+ + + + La Paz, November 19, 1975, 1245Z. +

8135. Subject: MAP Matériel Program for + Bolivia. Ref: State 272585.

+

1. I appreciate receiving information contained in reftel describing the + relationship of the decision memorandum based on the CASP and the decision made by Under + Secretary Maw regarding the + dates of phaseout of MAP Matériel Grant + Program for Bolivia. I am struck, however, by the absence of any + discussion in reftel of the amounts of money required to complete the + equipping of the five mobile regiments here in either time frame. I am + particularly concerned that if the Bureau moves forward with a + recommendation for the FY 1977 phaseout + without insuring a substantial increase in the grant levels, the US will + be in the embarrassing position of being unable to fulfill its + commitment. In short, it is not just a question of dates, but it is also + the necessary financing to make the phaseout date realistic.

+

2. My concerns are heightened by the inability of the IG mechanism to have had an impact on the + FY 1976 budgetary request for + military assistance. The Department has gone forward with a $2.2 million + MAP grant matériel request to the + Congress for FY 1976 although the IG agreed to a level of $3.3 million. + Furthermore, I note newspaper reports that the Congress is contemplating + sharp cuts in the FY 1976 security + assistance programs. If the shortfall in FY 76 MAP grant matériel + for Bolivia is not made up in 76 or 77 and if the FY 77 financial level is not adequate in + its initial submission to the Congress, we shall not be able to make + good on our commitment to equip five mobile regiments by the FY 77 phaseout date.

+

3. Accordingly, I request that an addendum to the action memorandum + submitted by the Bureau to Under Secretary Maw’s office be supplied in which agreement is sought on + the financial levels to make the earlier phaseout date reasonable.

+ + + Stedman + + + +
+ +
+ 77. Telegram 27 From the Embassy in Bolivia to the Department of + State +

Summary: President + Banzer informed Ambassador Stedman of Bolivia’s efforts to gain an outlet + to the Pacific through negotiations with Chile. The Ambassador + suggested to the Department that the matter presented the U.S. + Government with an opportunity to contribute to the lowering of + tensions in the region.

+

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + D760001–0674. Confidential. Repeated to Lima and Santiago. + Telegrams 10662 and 10681 from Lima, both December 30, 1975, are + ibid., D750450–0326 and D750450–0592. Capriles’s démarche to + Rogers in which he + requested “U.S. sympathy and support” for a tentative agreement + with Chile on Bolivian access to the Pacific is reported in + telegram 301358, December 23, 1975. (Ibid., D750445–0598) On + February 14, 1976, Banzer asked Stedman whether Kissinger could discuss Bolivia’s outlet to the + Pacific with President Morales + Bermúdez of Peru. (Telegram 1333 from La Paz, + February 14; ibid., D760057–0659) In telegram 37667 to La Paz, + February 16, the Department authorized Stedman to tell Banzer that + the U.S. Government was following the matter with great + interest. The Department also informed the Ambassador that + Chilean Foreign Minister Carvajal and OAS Secretary General Orfila had advised against any U.S. initiative + on the issue in talks with the Peruvian Government. (Ibid., + D760058–0459)

+ + + + La Paz, January 2, 1976, 1830Z. +

27. Subject: Bolivia’s Outlet to the Sea.

+

1. President Banzer took me aside on January 1 at the traditional New + Year’s day ceremony with the diplomatic corps to talk with me privately + about Bolivia’s efforts to obtain an outlet to the sea. He said that + matters were proceeding just about as he had explained to me a couple of + months ago. While several important aspects will have to be negotiated + carefully with Chile, nonetheless the Chilean response is very + constructive and forms the basis for diplomatic negotiations which + should lead to a successful resolution of the problem. The President + said that the ball is now in Peru’s court. He volunteered his opinion + that no country should apply overt or aggressive pressure on Peru to + accept the creation of the corridor from former Peruvian territory. The + President said that any overture to Peru should be low key (“muy + suave”).

+

2. President Banzer told me that the GOB + has received information confirming that the Soviet Union is meddling in + this matter and has counseled Peru not to accept the Bolivia-Chile + accord. Banzer said that it is his opinion that the Soviets wish to + block what appears to be a successful initiative by non-Communist + nations in the Southern Cone.

+

3. During the same ceremony at the Presidency the Papal Nuncio told me + that he had just had a private talk with the Foreign Minister who told + him that Bolivia has information that the Soviets are pressuring Peru to + refuse the creation of the corridor.

+ +

4. Although I have no idea whether there is any validity to this + information, whether or not it is a ploy by the Bolivians to elicit + support for Peru to come through, I am convinced that Bolivians could + well believe this story. I note that the President did offer counsel + that any overture should be low key with regard to Peru. I wonder now if + this story does not provide us with another reason to make a formal but + low-key presentation to the GOP. If so, + perhaps the Department will authorize that the points made by Ambassador + Dean reported in para 5 of + Lima’s 10662 be repeated formally to the appropriate Peruvian + authorities in the Foreign Ministry, but with a more positive tone about + our future support.

+

5. I myself have known Julio Sanjines for a long time and have always + considered him to be a very interesting Bolivian, well worth cultivating + for his independent opinions and views. In the present situation he does + not reflect present GOB policies or + positions as set forth in statements to me by President Banzer and other + GOB officials acting on his + instructions. His view that Peru should not be “pressed” (Lima 10681) is + not in accord with the Capriles + démarche to Assistant Secretary Rogers. Nor is his view that Peru should be left alone + for two or three months in accord with remarks made to me by Foreign + Ministry Subsecretary Ostria on December 31 that Bolivia will not wait + very long for a Peruvian reply.

+

6. The remarks of Chilean Foreign Ministry official Bernstein reported in + Santiago 8720 are interesting but I would like to repeat that neither + the GOB nor this Embassy has advocated + US participation as a fourth party in the negotiations.

+

7. This matter, as far as we here in La Paz are concerned, is not a + parochial one of supporting Bolivia’s request for an outlet to the sea + but is an opportunity for the USG to + contribute to the reduction of long-standing tensions between Chile and + Peru which have arisen at times to serious levels and have led in part + to a large arms build-up in the area.

+ + + Stedman + + +
+ + +
+ 78. Telegram 1481 From the Embassy in Bolivia to the Department of + State +

Summary: Stedman recommended an + increase in MAP assistance for + Bolivia.

+

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + D750065–1102. Confidential. Repeated to the Secretary of Defense + and USCINCSO. In telegrams + 3280 and 3828 from La Paz, April 28 and May 18, Stedman repeated his request + to retain the present structure of the miltary group in Bolivia. + (Ibid., D760161–1044 and D760192–0568) In telegram 131681 to La + Paz, May 28, the Department denied Stedman’s request. (Ibid., D760206–0969) In + telegram 138216 to La Paz, June 5, the Department informed + Stedman that because + of a $6 million MAP–M ceiling, it had no choice but to cut + Bolivia’s allocation. (Ibid., D760216–1036)

+ + + + La Paz, February 20, 1976, 2005Z. +

1481. Subject: FY1977 Military Security Assistance. Ref: State 36160; La + Paz 1400 181630Z Feb 76.

+

1. The US Security Assistance Program in Bolivia has been seeking to + accomplish two objectives: the equipping of five TIPO regiments in accordance with a + long-standing commitment with MAP grant + matériels and the shifting from donations to FMS cash and credit sales. The MAP grant program for the TIPOs has lagged badly both as to financing and timing of + deliveries. This is a matter of concern to the President of Bolivia, the + Bolivian military, and all US elements working here. While the FY76 + MAP grant program has not yet been + made effective by legislation, Bolivia is included at the level of $2.1 + million but we are hoping that this will be increased so that an + effective amount of at least $3.3 million will be obtained. Depending + upon the success achieved in 76 financing and many problems with price + inflation or equipment substitution, we may be able to complete the + financing of the program in FY 77. + Meantime we are continuing on an upward trend in FMS credit offers for Bolivia. This is a + healthy shift provided that the US military authorities treat Bolivian + requests as valid ones stemming from a sovereign and proud though poor + country.

+

2. The US is continuing a bilateral AID + technical assistance and loan program in Bolivia at a modest level + appropriate to the absorptive capacity of the country and geared to help + the rural poor. Bolivia has been able to obtain project credits from + other international lenders on reasonable terms to assist in the + difficult work of integrating this nation and providing a reasonable + infrastructure for development. The country still has additional debt + capacity available to it and if world minerals prices improve as is + expected, its capacity to take on extra debt will rise accordingly. The + Inter-American Development Bank has become the leading international + financial institution in terms of value of development credits. The + World Bank is reportedly intending to create a consultative group in Bolivia. These two + organizations are quite optimistic about the near-term potential for + economic and social development in this country.

+

3. Bolivia remains friendly to the US and is enjoying a period of + political stability such as has not occurred in modern history. The + leadership on internal and external policy, both political and economic, + is moderate and orthodox and there are no bilateral problems between the + US and Bolivia. Although the country is a source of the raw material for + the production of cocaine, the Bolivian authorities are cooperating with + the US in efforts to diversify crop production and also to reduce + illicit trafficking in paste and crystal.

+

4. While there is at times talk about purchases of military equipment + from countries other than the US, most of these purchases have not + materialized. GOB policy is quite + conservative and there is a desire to conserve foreign exchange. Thus, + most equipment deliveries from countries other than the US have been + almost gift or on easy credit terms. Bolivia continues to consider + itself a responsible member of the Western Hemisphere under US + leadership and wishes to continue its moderate program of modernization + of its military with US advice, US grants, and US credits. Given the + relatively small volume of financing required, it is clearly in the US + national interest to continue to meet our security assistance objectives + with the modest US resources program.

+ + + Stedman + + +
+ + +
+ 79. Memorandum of Conversation +

Summary: Assistant Secretary Rogers, Ambassador Stedman, Secretary Kissinger, and President + Banzer held a wide-ranging discussion of U.S.-Bolivian + relations.

+

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + P820118–1270. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Einaudi on January 18, + 1977, and approved in S on March 7, 1977. Brackets in the + discussion are in the original. The meeting was held in + President Banzer’s home. Kissinger visited Latin America from June 6 to + June 13. In a May 26 memorandum, Rogers briefed Kissinger for his meeting with Banzer. (Ibid., + ARA/AND Files, Records Relating to Bolivia, 1976–1978: Lot + 78D46, POL 7, Kissinger Visit) In telegram + 4516 from La Paz, June 9, the Embassy sent a summary of Banzer’s + narcotics action plan to the Department. (Ibid., Central Foreign + Policy File, D760221–0079) On June 17, Kissinger approved a request + that he recommend Presidential approval for a $45 million coca + substitution program in Bolivia. (Memorandum from Vance and Luers to Kissinger, June 11; ibid., + P760117–1018)

+ + + + Santa Cruz, Bolivia, June 7, 1976, + 8:30–10:30 a.m. + + PARTICIPANTS + + + + The United States + + + The Secretary + Under [Assistant] Secretary + Rogers + + Under Secretary Maw + + Ambassador Stedman + + Luigi R. Einaudi, S/P—Notetaker + Anthony Hervas—Interpreter + + + + + + Bolivia + + President Hugo Bánzer + Suárez + + Foreign Minister Adriazola + Ambassador Crespo + Interior Minister Pereda + 2 others + + + +

+ Bánzer: My English is Colonel’s + English, not President’s English. I am sorry.

+

The climate today is not normal. This is a hot land, but you have been + greeted by a cold south wind.

+

The Secretary: In the United States, a southwind means a warm wind.

+

Banzer: Yes. Here it is the opposite.

+

The Secretary: I have been very impressed by the foliage. It is very + luxuriant.

+

You have been in the United States?

+

Banzer: Yes. I once spent 2½ years as Military Attaché in Washington. I + also spent some time at Fort Knox.

+

The Secretary: I am very pleased to be here in Bolivia.

+

We think our relations are now quite satisfactory.

+ +

Banzer: Yes. Your Ambassador here is in constant touch with our + Ministers. He knows our sentiments well.

+

The Secretary: I appreciate very much the opportunity to be here with you + now and to underscore our interest.

+

Rogers: I met President Banzer in Lima in December 1974, at the meeting + of Ayacucho where the Andean countries signed an agreement on arms + limitation.

+

Banzer: Yes, some advance has been made on this point. But signatures on + documents are not enough. We need to take more effective steps.

+

The Secretary: What do you have in mind?

+

Banzer: The solution of the landlocked status of Bolivia.

+

The Secretary: Am I right that Peru has announced that it is ready to + discuss the outlet issue?

+

Banzer: A meeting has just taken place between Chile and Peru in Lima. + They will meet again in Santiago at the end of the month. We hope that, + once they reconcile their approaches, it will be possible to reach a + solution.

+

The Secretary: We support Bolivia in its search for access to the sea. In + Venezuela I spoke to President Perez about it. He agrees.

+

Banzer: We know this is a difficult matter. But we believe it is not an + impossible one.

+

It is of vital importance to Bolivia.

+

It is vital because Bolivia’s geographic isolation makes Bolivia a very + dependent country. This dependency in turn makes Bolivia underdeveloped, + not only economically but emotionally as well.

+

The Secretary: What I have seen of Bolivia so far does not suggest that + you are emotionally underdeveloped. And I take it that although we are + closer here to the Atlantic, you are speaking of an outlet to the + Pacific.

+

Banzer: Yes. Access to the sea from the Altiplano is very important to + us, for many reasons.

+

The Secretary: If you get access, you will have to build the necessary + infrastructure.

+

Banzer: There is already a road and rail communication from Bolivia to + the Pacific. And there is a port as well. It is not, however, in the + area we would receive under the Chilean proposal.

+

The Secretary: Arica would stay Chilean?

+

Banzer: Yes. We will have to build a separate port of our own, reach a + trilateral agreement with Peru on the port, or conceivably even + internationalize part of the city or the province itself.

+

The Secretary: Would Chile agree to that?

+ +

Banzer: We have not discussed that yet. But it would be convenient for + Chile. If Bolivia were to build a separate port, Arica would suffer and + perhaps even die. Ninety-five percent of the trade handled by Arica is + Bolivian. As a practical matter, therefore, it would be advantageous for + the Chileans to reach an agreement with us.

+

The Secretary: Have you decided what territory you would give Chile in + exchange?

+

Banzer: No, not exactly. We are studying our frontiers now.

+

The Secretary: Is there much population in the territory you would get + from Chile?

+

Banzer: No, very little. The lands are mountainous and desolate. They are + empty and underdeveloped.

+

The Secretary: In sum, you would say the current negotiations depend now + on Peru?

+

Banzer: It depends very much on their relations with Chile. But we + believe that there is a very positive disposition in Peru to maintain + good relations.

+

We must realize that only a few years ago Bolivia’s return to the Pacific + was a dream. Now that our country knows it has great potential, to get + to the Pacific has become a precondition for our development.

+

Let me give you a small example of the meaning of access. If a small + farmer here in Santa Cruz needs an incubator, he will have to import it + from the United States or Europe. It will be shipped to Arica. Then if a + problem occurs at the pier or in storage, the Chilean Government has no + interest in resolving it. It is not Chilean cargo. There is a delay. + Then the rail line is in bad condition. Suppose there are difficulties. + Again, the same thing happens. Chile has no inherent interest in + speeding up the shipment.

+

The Secretary: But don’t you pay?

+

Banzer: Yes, but trains normally have problems. One day can become weeks. + Our poultry man will encounter losses and delays; his delays delay our + development day by day. People become discouraged by so many + obstacles.

+

Adriazola: The losses in storage have sometimes run to $650,000 to + $700,000 daily.

+

Banzer: But that is an economic issue. We believe access will have much + greater impact by reducing tensions and even avoiding war. Because this + has been a festering issue for nearly a century. In Peru generations + have been dedicated to the idea of revenge. And the same happens in + Chile, where the idea is to defend what they conquered in the War of the + Pacific.

+

The Secretary: If Bolivia were between them, then war would be less + likely.

+ +

Banzer: Exactly. The existence of a corridor would force the invaded + country to align itself with the other. That fact would affect any + planning for war and help to deter it.

+

Our basic objective is to contribute to peace and to develop the area in + an integrated manner with Peru and Chile.

+

The Secretary: Would you get the railway?

+

Banzer: Yes. And we would immediately seek the resources to improve it + and the road, and to construct an airport as well.

+

Also, our oil pipeline goes through the proposed corridor.

+

There is no other solution. Any other solution would force Chile to + divide its territory.

+

The Secretary: But will Peru agree to the Chilean proposal?

+

Banzer: It is possible that they will say yes, but it is likely to be + conditioned.

+

The Secretary: Such as—perhaps—water rights? Because I presume that Peru + needs water for the desert areas on its coast.

+

Banzer: A solution would bring benefits to all three countries.

+

We are also concerned that without a practical, peaceful solution there + could be other kinds of trouble. We are concerned, for example, that the + Angolan experience might be repeated here.

+

The Secretary: Not a second time. We will not tolerate it. Cuba is + permitted one military expedition a century.

+

I know there are problems. Nonetheless, I think that your discussions are + useful. I spoke to de la Flor the last time I was in Lima. He said that + they would study the issue with care. But I didn’t get the impression + that he felt an urgent need to bring the negotiations to a rapid + conclusion. Am I wrong?

+

Banzer: No, you are right. Chile’s attitude is better. Chile needs a + solution to improve its image.

+

The Secretary: I, too, think that Chile wants a solution. In February, I + did not believe that Peru had made up its mind.

+

Do you mind if I discuss this with de la Flor when I see him?

+

Banzer: No, not at all. But we are concerned that Peru might misinterpret + your interest and react adversely. De la + Flor is touchy. I don’t know how the two of you get + along. I would not want him to take it as US pressure.

+

The Secretary: No, de la Flor is a friend. I will not pressure him. I + will ask what his intentions are.

+

By accident, he was the first Foreign Minister that I met after becoming + Secretary of State. It was at the United Nations. He followed me in + speaking at the General Assembly. After hearing his speech, which was interminable, I met him and + we talked. His rhetoric is worse than his performance.

+

Banzer: Obtaining an outlet to the sea is one of the essentials of our + policy. We have not, as in the past, made it a partisan issue in + domestic policy. It is simply a question of vital national interest.

+

The Secretary: You are clearly preparing for success by taking an active + LOS role. Our delegates complain + constantly at the activities of yours.

+

+ Maw: No, as a matter of fact, the + Bolivians have always taken very positive and constructive + positions.

+

The Secretary: Maw is our expert. + He says your speeches are ferocious.

+

Banzer: I think one way to cooperate on this outlet question would be to + strengthen cooperation aimed at increasing the general development of + the region. Both McNamara and + Ortiz Mena have discussed + these issues with us and know them well. The World Bank and the IDB could play an essential role in + cooperation for development of the region.

+

This is a strong argument for Peru also. The area Chile offers us, which + borders Peru, is very poor. But so is the Peruvian territory contiguous + to it. A pole of development would aid Peru as well.

+

A good policy for you would be to support the development of this area. I + think that this is something that the United States could do without + raising susceptibilities.

+

The Secretary: That we can do. It is relatively easy. I will speak to + McNamara about it when I + return to Washington. He is an old friend.

+

Banzer: He knows the problem well. He has visited our countries + recently.

+

Even if we do not solve this problem, and obtain an outlet to the sea, we + are sure the stability of Bolivia will not be effected.

+

But if we fail, our people would then know that our country would + continue to be an underdeveloped country. They would be very let down. + There would be profound internal resentment and some would seek revenge + against those who refused to satisfy our needs.

+

We do not want arms. We want the development of our country. We want + peace.

+

The Secretary: Do you think Peru will make a rapid decision?

+

Banzer: No. I repeat, there are generations in Peru raised with the idea + of revenge. We have a similar problem here. Many Bolivians were educated + with the idea of reconquest. But, facing the problem with realism, we + can see that we are in no condition to think in terms of revenge. There + are still some who do, however. We can convince them. We have the moral authority to do so. + They know we are not doing this just to try to stay in power.

+

The Secretary: We sympathize. Many others in the hemisphere do as + well.

+

Banzer: We have reactivated support not only here but elsewhere. It is a + useful weapon. I have spoken to many Presidents. They are committed to + our support.

+

The Secretary: What is Brazil’s position?

+

Banzer: Full support. Brazil put me and Pinochet in contact for the first time in Brasilia.

+

The Secretary: What do you think of Pinochet?

+

Banzer: He is a man of decision. He has problems. But he agrees with us + on the outlet. As soldiers, we have committed ourselves and our honor to + a solution. The problem is Peru. They have their reasons. Let us not + forget that in 1879 Chile invaded Peru, occupied Lima for two years, and + committed many moral outrages.

+

The Secretary: Yes, I know. But Peru has no quarrel with Bolivia. They + cannot object to a corridor for Bolivia on the grounds that it would + stop their possibilities of reconquest from Chile.

+

Banzer: If we could add a small port or international role for Peru to + the corridor proposed by Chile, it would be a great monument to the will + for peace.

+

We believe that in Peru’s emotions, the future can outweigh the past.

+

The Secretary: It should be tried. We will give you support in a delicate + way, without arousing resentment.

+

Banzer: The outcome would favor all three countries. But no one dares to + admit it publicly. Chile wants to defend its territory. Peru wants more + but knows it cannot get it. Bolivia cannot make the announcement because + we do not want to upset either one. But it is a good solution.

+

The Secretary: I will talk to Silveira tonight. What do you think?

+

Banzer: Brazil is interested. Through us, Brazil thinks that it can gain + access to the Pacific. We see this very clearly.

+

I have some other points as well.

+

The Secretary: What do you think of Peru’s military buildup?

+

Banzer: Yes, they have constantly increased their military preparedness. + They are preparing revenge. They have obtained much Soviet + equipment.

+

The Secretary: Are they stronger than Chile?

+

Banzer: In equipment. But Chile has better soldiers.

+

The Secretary: Bolivia also.

+ +

Banzer: Yes. But we do not want to be involved. If there is a war, we + would be involved because there is only 120 kilometers width of coast + without entering our territory. One division may be able to operate + there, but not an army corps. One country or the other would have to use + our territory in case of a conflict. We would enter the war against the + first that had violated our territory for then we would then not only be + landlocked but violated as well.

+

The Secretary: You think war is possible?

+

Banzer: Yes, if the problem is not solved as we suggest. We have begun + three-way peace talks between the armies. But we do not believe in + documents. We need acts.

+

I think this is all we can say on this issue. The dynamics of our + conversation have not enabled me to welcome you properly. Of course, I + know the Foreign Minister did so already. I know he did so because I + told him to. And I know he did so because I was there too last night—but + as an ordinary citizen mingling in the crowd.

+

The Secretary: I am touched. I did not know you were there.

+

Banzer: Power is temporary, citizenship is permanent. As a Bolivian + citizen, I did not want to miss the first arrival of an American + Secretary of State on Bolivian soil. So, last night, I was there in the + crowd, with my wife and children, to help receive you.

+

I would like you to have a clear understanding of who we are. This is a + government of the Armed Forces. We call it such because the Armed Forces + have the fundamental responsibility of government. But we have the + support of civilians as well. There are only 40 officers in the + government compared to thousands of civilians. This is not a + pre-eminently military government.

+

We have clear goals. We seek national unity. Our geography conspires + against unity. We have varied cultural origins. In the highlands, + Quechua and Aymara, here in the lowlands, Guarani.

+

We seek the physical, cultural and spiritual integration of our country. + And we have done much. Here in Santa Cruz, before, it was difficult for + a man of the highlands to survive. Now they are doing much, they are the + promoters of growth.

+

The Secretary: People from the highlands?

+

Banzer: Yes, the majority of the new settlers here are from there.

+

We want development because we have great potential. We now have 5½ + million people in this country. We could support 50 million. We are rich + in minerals. All forms of energy and raw materials abound.

+

This wealth has long been dormant, awaiting better opportunities. Now is + the time to take advantage of it.

+

This development effort should be directed to help the human base, the + peasantry. Then we will be a nation, not a collection of villages. And + then we must return to the sea.

+ +

These are the objectives of the Bolivian people.

+

The Secretary: We followed your coming to office and your policies since + with great interest. We want to help you as best we can.

+

Banzer: Thank you. We do recognize the cooperation we have been receiving + from the United States, but we are bothered by delays. Too often, + opportunities are lost because of delays.

+

There is a program worthy of mention in this connection. It is help for + the Bolivian Government Agency for Community Development. It is directed + primarily to and by the peasantry. We have succeeded in changing + attitudes.

+

The US Government has helped, but we could use more help. We need + permanent support in this regard.

+

The peasant must also work for his own development. Before, the peasant + always asked for everything from the government: he wanted schools, + water, everything to be provided to him by the government, without his + contributing anything. Now, through this community development + organization, the peasant contributes 1/2. The other the government + provides, partly through its own funds, sometimes through external + credits. This effort needs permanent support. There are similar + programs, such as civic action of the Armed Forces, that work only with + domestic resources.

+

Programs seeking these objectives are giving good results. The effort our + government is investing in the future is to change permanently the + attitudes of the peasants by offering them the means of improving their + own lot through low-interest, long-term credits. These are now 50–50. In + the future, we want them to take the major responsibility + themselves.

+

The Secretary: What exactly can be done to help from the outside?

+

Banzer: Bolivia needs roads, dams, schools, hospitals. Technical + cooperation is essential to improve crop yields. The United States + Government, through its Embassy, has been in constant contact with our + officials and our efforts. The Embassy works, but the results are + slow.

+

Ambassador Stedman: We have two + development loans to Bolivia now, from AID.

+

The Secretary: How long did they take to negotiate?

+

+ Stedman: The first loan took 18 + months. The second . . .

+

The Secretary [To Banzer]: Our AID + bureaucracy is composed of junior professors who could not reform the + United States, so they are dedicated to reforming the rest of the world. + And their conditions are endless.

+

Banzer: We believe that our development policies, with the support of + private enterprise and others, can help us develop a great deal without social and political + costs. The results go beyond what has been given.

+

We can see the results in the stability and peace here in Bolivia. We are + something of an island of peace within South America. There are no + kidnappings here. No crimes. Strikes last hours, not weeks.

+

The Secretary: So that is why you are called underdeveloped! In these + days no country can be self-respecting without kidnappings and popular + demonstrations.

+

Banzer: It could be that, in the past, our people were a bit intimidated. + But we value politics. We have studied it. We will be developing a new + political system by 1980. It will not be a traditional one. That gave + bad results. We must find a new political formula that will not repeat + the errors of the past. Then we will have fulfilled the responsibility + of the Armed Forces. We will then be able to continue to help our + country, but without assuming direct responsibility for the nation’s + course.

+

This phenomenon is rather generalized. In our countries, the military are + frequently obliged to assume power to rebuild the political + situation.

+

The Secretary: I know that in Chile the military had never interfered + before. When they did, it was because they thought they faced an extreme + situation. We understand your problem.

+

Do you get political science lectures from our representatives?

+

Banzer: No.

+

+ Stedman: There are no junior + professors here.

+

The Secretary: I remember what conditions were like in Bolivia when I + first came to Washington. Things have improved.

+

I believe, sociologically, that the Armed Forces career is the one that + is most open to talent. Is that so?

+

Banzer: Yes, that is very true. But there are some other characteristics + of government that must also be kept in mind. We know we must respect + human dignity and freedom of the press. Sometimes freedom becomes + libertinage, but we know freedom must be respected.

+

The Secretary: If you lived in a city where the only morning newspaper + was the Washington Post, I am not sure that you + would be so favorable to freedom of the press.

+

Banzer: I know, I lived there.

+

The Secretary: They only write well about Rogers because he is a Democrat.

+

Banzer: I also wanted to explain that we seek to link economic to social + development. As the standard of living improves, the chances of peace + also improve.

+ +

In foreign affairs, we believe that the international community must + resolve its differences. Rich and poor countries cannot coexist at peace + for ever. The naked differences that exist now increase the danger of + communism. We believe the industrialized countries should recognize the + importance of better prices for raw materials. Current patterns create + permanent tensions.

+

The Secretary: I agree with you. We have made a major effort in this + regard. We have philosophical disagreements internally. Many of our + people are instinctive ideological advocates of the free market. Yet we + cannot reject internationally what every government accepts + domestically. We favor stabilization of prices, but it is a slow + process.

+

If I may make a point, not aimed particularly at Bolivia, because many + were involved. The confrontation at Nairobi helped our internal enemies. + It lead to a stupid two-vote margin which helped the enemies of + cooperation for development. Bolivia abstained. Our friends must + understand that we need help. We cannot allow an unholy alliance between + radical LDCs and US conservatives to + kill development.

+

Banzer: I would like to comment on the strategic tin stockpile. We + believe it is adequate and that it should be maintained. But we do not + believe it should be used as a strategic instrument to control prices. + For us, it is hard to mine our mineral riches. Yet Bolivia is the only + free world major tin producer. Any variation in price affects us + greatly. And our ores are expensive to extract. Mining is the base of + our economy.

+

I repeat, I have no objection to strategic stockpiles as such. But I do + not believe they should be used to regulate prices.

+

The Secretary: We have no policy to regulate prices by manipulating + strategic stockpiles. Nixon + wanted to reduce the stockpiles. This was not aimed against Bolivia, of + which he was an admirer. We have signed the Tin Agreement. I have made + clear we do not want fluctuations, particularly downward. [Turns to + Stedman] Is something being + planned now?

+

+ Stedman: There is no authority . + . .

+

Banzer: I hope you will not get new authority from Congress.

+

The Secretary: Has any been requested?

+

+ Stedman: Yes, but . . .

+

The Secretary: Who is the Chairman?

+

+ Stedman: Bennett.

+

Banzer: This would have a major impact on Bolivia.

+

The Secretary: They won’t have time. Fortunately, Congress has only 70 + days left in this session, of which 40 will be spent studying the sexual + exploits of their colleagues.

+ +

Banzer: That is why democracy sometimes doesn’t work.

+

In your UN speech you said technology + should be part of the patrimony of humanity. We agree. Bolivia has a + great need for technology. And yet we contribute scientific know-how to + the rest of the world. For example, there are more than 1,000 Bolivian + doctors in the US. In Chicago alone, there is a colony. We train them at + $30,000 a head. We get no compensation when they leave. We hope more + could be done on this front.

+

The Secretary: We agree. I discussed this very issue in Nairobi.

+

Banzer: On another point, in Nairobi, it was agreed that development + assistance should go to the neediest. But the lowest level do not give + returns. Bangladesh continues, does not resolve its problems. Money will + not solve their problems.

+

I believe assistance should go to countries with high development + potential. Bolivia has great food potential. That is the best help to + give internationally. Assistance based on profitability. It is better to + invest in productive areas and then to grant food so produced to those + who cannot help themselves. We in Bolivia will be wheat exporters + soon.

+

The Secretary: On the question of technical personnel and the brain + drain, I have referred to this many times. I really don’t know how to + solve it. We would be interested in your ideas. Do you have some + proposals?

+

Your other point is interesting. Our attitude on foreign assistance is to + give preference to countries in this hemisphere. Between Bolivia and + Bangladesh, we would prefer to give more to Bolivia.

+

Banzer: I also have a point on the question of transnational + corporations. Sometimes they disturb the morals of the people. They are + not directly tied to governments, but their attitudes affect the + relations of host countries with the countries where the transnationals + are headquartered. Here in Bolivia, for example, Gulf is the United States. Popular opinion does not distinguish + between Gulf and the US Government.

+

The Secretary: We do not object to measures to control transnationals. + Your major problem is to decide at what point controls become so + burdensome that the parent company no longer feels it is worthwhile to + compete. In the United States we believe there is some legal obligation + not to have expropriations without compensation. But we also believe the + company should meet international standards, and we are prepared to + consider formalizing them on questions of illegal conduct.

+

Banzer: Could be. But the companies should behave better.

+

The Secretary: We do not say that there should be no regulation, only + that it should not discriminate against the companies.

+

Banzer: Let us now turn to the drug issue.

+ +

The Secretary: Yes, I was going to raise it.

+

Banzer: We know Bolivia produces coca leaf that is in turn used to + produce cocaine. We would honestly like to cooperate to neutralize the + damage so caused. We have a narcotics control law. We are implementing + the law. But we have few resources.

+

To be effective, we have drawn up a plan. We must first attack production + (and here we have a substitution program, but coca is very profitable, + and we must find alternative incentives). Second, we must control the + elaboration (but this is something that requires substantial means, such + as helicopters, etc.) Cocaine can be manufactured anywhere. It is easy + to make.

+

The Secretary: You will not find it with helicopters, if it is being + produced in a private home.

+

Banzer [Nods]: Then, thirdly, we must control sales and marketing. For + this we need specialized and well-paid personnel.

+

The Secretary: What do you need specifically to implement your + program?

+

+ Stedman: They have presented us a + $50 million program over five years.

+

The Secretary [To Banzer]: Our bureaucracy is torn by conflicting + emotions. They want to do something, but they don’t want me to do + it.

+

[Turns to Rogers] This has been going on long enough. I want to know from + Vance exactly what he did in + Colombia. I want a full report on the situation in Bolivia, Colombia and + Mexico. And I want to know, not what our people think they can get, nor + what they think they can negotiate. I want to know what our people think + they need, not what they can get from OMB.

+

[To Banzer] We will get in touch with you in a month.

+

Banzer: We believe that $290 million worth of cocaine goes annually to + the United States, causing death and other problems. We should be in a + position to do something.

+

Rogers: It would certainly help our balance of payments.

+

Banzer: We want to help you. We do not have the resources to do all we + want.

+

The Secretary [To Rogers]: I want an answer by opening of business on + Monday. Have Vance send the + answer to me through Eagleburger.

+

[Turns to Banzer] We will be in touch within a month with our preliminary + ideas.

+

Banzer: I would like to send my greetings through you also to President + Ford and to the American + people and my special congratulations on your bicentennial.

+ +

The Secretary: I would like to thank you also, in the name of President + Ford. This has been a very + useful conversation. We will do our utmost to respond positively.

+

Banzer: I agree. I think it is possible that we have saved tons of paper + and years of negotiations.

+

The Secretary: I believe anything can be solved in two hours. The problem + is to terrorize the bureaucracy so that it will find the two hours.

+
+ +
+ 80. Memorandum From the Director of the Office of Management and + Budget (Lynn) and the + President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Scowcroft) to President Ford + +

Summary: Lynn and Scowcroft outlined the Department of + State/Agency for International Development multiyear option and + the OMB 1-year option for + funding narcotics control in Bolivia. The National Security + Council Staff recommended the State/AID proposal.

+

Source: Ford Library, + President’s Handwriting File, Box 22, Foreign Affairs, Foreign + Aid. Confidential. Sent for action. A stamped notation on the + first page reads, “The President has seen.” On August 11, + Harrison informed Scowcroft that this memorandum reflected + Kissinger’s views. + (Ibid., National Security Adviser, NSC Latin American Affairs Staff Files, Box 1, + Bolivia, Economic, Social) Ford initialed his approval of Option I and his + disapproval of Option II.

+ + + + Washington, July + 27, 1976. + + SUBJECT + Multiyear Budget Commitment for Narcotics Control Assistance to + Bolivia + +

On June 6, Bolivian President Banzer presented Secretary Kissinger with a $96 million proposal + for major enforcement ($51 million) and crop substitution ($45 million) + programs to halt cocaine production and traffic in Bolivia. At that + time, Secretary Kissinger + assured Banzer that U.S. narcotics assistance would be increased and + that an official response to his proposal would be forthcoming + shortly.

+

State and AID request your approval of a + response to Banzer that would include a commitment of “substantial” + future assistance if justified by the results of a pilot crop + substitution project now underway and enhanced enforcement efforts in + Bolivia. State believes that the program would eventually include:

+ + + + up to $8 million in narcotics assistance funds + over a 5-year period for an enforcement program beginning in 1977, + and + + up to $45 million in AID funds for a 5-year coca crop substitution program + beginning in 1979. + +

The State/AID recommendation sharply reduces Banzer’s request for + enforcement assistance because of limited Bolivia absorptive capacity + but attempts to obtain Banzer’s cooperation by pledging up to the full + amount of the crop substitution aid he + requested. If you approve, State will transmit an Aide-Mémoire which + points out that assistance will depend on the willingness of Bolivian + authorities to take firm enforcement action and to reduce coca + production to legitimate levels. Although State does not plan to specify + the precise amount of future assistance, our Ambassador would be + authorized to inform Banzer orally that we were considering up to $45 + million in aid if justified by the + pilot program. State maintains that:

+ + • Failure to respond to Banzer’s request for crop substitution + aid risks losing the + opportunity to test Banzer’s commitment to move ahead with a tough + narcotics program and might even cause him to relax what little + enforcement he is currently undertaking. + • The U.S. aid pledge can be sufficiently caveated to avoid + locking the U.S. into a large program if the Bolivians do not + undertake a meaningful enforcement program. + • The U.S. should proceed with a multiyear commitment in Bolivia + because of the unique opportunity, even though program details have + not yet been formulated. + • The proposed effort in Bolivia, a major producing country, would + complement and strengthen the program in Colombia, a major + trafficking country. + +

+ + OMB + and + NSC + have + reviewed the State/AID proposal pursuant to your memorandum of April 21 + regarding new foreign commitments.

+

+ + OMB + recognizes + the State arguments but has a number of reservations about a large + multiyear commitment to Bolivia at this time.

+ + • Cocaine is a lower priority drug (after heroin, amphetamines, + and barbituates) as reported in the Domestic Council’s + White Paper + on Drug Abuse. + • [less than 1 line not declassified] + raises major questions about Banzer’s ability and desire to + undertake a meaningful narcotics program given political and family + constraints. + • Results from a U.S.-sponsored pilot crop substitution project + currently underway will not be known for two years; it is premature + to make a multiyear commitment before we know whether the program + makes sense. + • The Bolivians would resent efforts to reduce this commitment + even if they did not perform. + • A program for Bolivia would not be particularly effective in + reducing the flow of illicit cocaine into the U.S. unless production + could also be reduced in Peru which is the other major + producer. + + • A large multiyear commitment to Bolivia would set a precedent + leading other narcotic producing countries to expect sizable forward + U.S. commitments in advance of completed planning. + +

In view of these reservations, OMB + believes that it would be unwise to make a multiyear commitment at this + time. Accordingly, + OMB recommends a second approach which would:

+ + + Provide modest increases in enforcement + assistance within existing budget levels to test Bolivian political + will, capability, and performance. + + Increase funding to accelerate the pilot crop + substitution project now underway, but avoid promising any + substantial increases or discussing any particular funding level + until a specific program can be developed based on the results of + the completed pilot project. + +

If you approve this option, State will transmit an Aide-Mémoire which + points out that the U.S. Government endorses the current Bolivian + resolve and is ready to support the Bolivian government in its effort + immediately with increased enforcement assistance and funding for the + pilot crop substitution project. Funding consideration of a multiyear + crop substitution program in the future, however, must be based on the + results of the pilot project.

+

+ + NSC + believes that + it is imperative to be responsive to the Banzer initiative. Failure to + make a commitment to a multiyear effort would be perceived by the + Bolivians as a rebuff and would have unfortunate consequences for our + efforts to interest leaders throughout Latin America in joint narcotics + control programs. Moreover, State’s proposed careful response would make + the commitment contingent on Bolivia’s ability and willingness to use + the funds effectively. There is no question of being locked-in to a + multiyear program that does not achieve its goals. Accordingly, + NSC recommends you + approve the State proposal.

+

Recommendations:

+

+ Option I: Authorize commitment to Banzer of + “substantial” AID funds, if justified + by the results of the pilot project, and up to $8 million of enforcement + assistance. Authorize our Ambassador to indicate to Banzer that up to + $45 million could be made available over a five-year period. (State/AID + and NSC recommendation)

+

+ Option II: Limit commitment to increases that can + be funded within 1977 budget totals while expressing support for longer + term aid based on results of the pilot project. (OMB recommendation)

+
+ + +
+ 81. Telegram 207837 From the Department of State to the Embassy in + Bolivia +

Summary: The + Department instructed the Embassy to deliver to the Bolivian + Government an aide-mémoire outlining parallel U.S. and Bolivian + anti-narcotics efforts.

+

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + D760320–0389. Confidential; Immediate. Drafted by Nicholson; + cleared by Parker, + Harrison, Luers, + Wampler, Heyman, and Lion and in draft + by Pace, Eyre, Brown, and Cusack; approved by + Vance. In telegram + 6731 from La Paz, August 25, Stedman informed the Department that he thought + the guidelines in the aide-mémoire to be overly rigid. (Ibid., + D760325–0060) In telegram 212007 to La Paz, August 26, the + Department disagreed, replying that the aide-mémoire represented + a “balanced effort.” (Ibid., D760325–1024)

+ + + + Washington, August 20, 1976, 2119Z. +

207837. For Ambassador from Vance + and Luers. Subject: Narcotics + Control: Presidential Authorization of Forward Commitment of Funds. Ref: + State 165221.

+

1. Authorization of the forward commitment of funds for a crop + substitution and enforcement effort in Bolivia was approved by the + President on August 13, 1976. The Embassy may now deliver the following + aide-mémoire.

+

Quote:

+

During their conversations on June 6, 1976, President Banzer informed + Secretary of State Kissinger of + the intention of the Government of Bolivia to launch an all-out effort + to stop trafficking of drugs within and from Bolivia and to rationalize + the production of coca to reduce it to the levels required for + legitimate uses. These ambitious and encouraging plans of the Government + of Bolivia were brought to the attention of President Ford who welcomes and wishes to + encourage the Bolivian initiative to combat the international drug + traffic. It is only through such a comprehensive undertaking and close + international cooperation that we can hope to have a real impact on this + problem affecting the US and Bolivia. The US Government stands ready to + join in and support this Bolivian effort.

+

For its part, the US Government will:

+

—Provide the technical expertise, the cooperation of the Drug Enforcement + Administration (DEA) and financial + aid from the Department of State to + the Bolivian agencies charged with drug enforcement and control to + enable them to mount a program designed effectively to attack known + trafficking points and provide the long-term capability to control + trafficking; and concurrently

+

—Immediately expand and accelerate the research program and pilot program + now underway in the Yungas and Chapare areas.

+ +

If these projects indicate that it is economically, socially and + agriculturally feasible, the Agency for International Development + (AID) will make available + substantial loan funds over a five-year period to finance up to 75 + percent of the costs of development projects to assist the rural poor + now growing coca in the Yungas and Chapare regions. This financing for + specific projects to be mutually agreed upon would begin as soon as + there is sufficient information from the pilot program to determine the + type of activity which should be undertaken and the costs involved.

+

The Government of Bolivia, for its part, in response to this US + Government assistance, will:

+

—Immediately intensify efforts to apprehend and convict cocaine + traffickers, prevent new plantings of coca throughout Bolivia and place + strict controls on the transport and marketing of coca leaf.

+

—Provide the necessary regulations, manpower and financial resources to + reduce coca production to legal usage levels through the development of + alternate income sources for coca producers, and

+

—Create an effective nationwide network of narcotic enforcement + institutions.

+

If these parallel courses of action are satisfactory to your government + we are prepared immediately to begin mutual planning for the program, + and then promptly initiate its implementation. Unqte.

+

2. We feel that the above represents a significant new initiative, our + first effort in the hemisphere at a comprehensive drug control + program—production reduction, control and enforcement. You are to be + commended for your foresight and perseverance in moving the GOB toward the decisive discussion between + the Secretary and President Banzer on crop substitution at Santa + Cruz.

+

3. However the immediate USG interest is + prompt and effective GOB action to stem + the flow of cocaine to the US and it is because of the primacy of this + interest that we are obliged to tie our inputs closely to progress in + the enforcement area.

+

4. Following receipt of a favorable response from the GOB to the conditions set forth in the + aide-mémoire, a team will immediately proceed to Bolivia to work with + Mission and Bolivian officials on details of the programs we will + support under the new forward commitment. We must seek the most + appropriate and effective ways to expedite pilot crop studies, build up + GOB enforcement capabilities and + establish the outline of a viable crop substitution program. To + facilitate this effort we have agreed upon the following precepts to + guide the team and the Mission in this complex effort to effect a joint + plan. We are confident that you will understand that these guidelines + are dictated by the delicacy and complexity of this very important and + novel effort in narcotics control.

+ +

—The US cannot be committed to providing any predetermined total or kinds + of aid. Assistance will be phased and each US input will be dependent on + effective progress in the previous phase. Team-Mission recommendations + will, of course, be subject to review by the regional CCINC interagency + group and approval by the senior adviser, S/NM and, to the extent AID funds are involved, by the ARA/LA and, as necessary the AID Administrator. The forward funding authority gives + AID the authority to authorize up + to $45 million in loans over 5 years for income substitution and the + Department of State to make INC grants up to $8 million for enforcement + and control over five years. INC funds will also be available for + expansion of the pilot project. These amounts should not be given the + GOB unless you deem it absolutely + necessary to elicit Banzer’s commitment to a strong enforcement/control + program and then only in the context of the mutual obligations set forth + in the aide-mémoire.

+

—US support for Bolivian efforts to reduce coca production is justified + in the context of gaining GOB support + for enforcement and as essential to stopping the growth of coca destined + for the manufacture of cocaine. Thus, economic development activities in + the coca producing areas must be justified on developmental grounds. At + the same time, such activities will not be financed by the USG without clear progress by the GOB toward effective control of coca + production and adequate enforcement and prosecution measures against + major manufacturers and traffickers. These two aspects of control are + interrelated; unsatisfactory progress in either one would unavoidably + put the seriousness of the GOB’s + commitment in doubt.

+

—USG support for improved enforcement + seeks to obtain the commitment and support of law enforcement officials + and personnel to strengthen their capability to detect and eliminate + major manufacturers and traffickers. More precisely, we are not + interested in establishing a massive nationwide narcotics agency per se + but rather to build one which can destroy, suppress and deter major + trafficking. This implies a smaller rather than larger staff mobility, + reliable communications and, above all, an extensive and carefully + developed and targeted intelligence network. The size, composition and + equipment of the narcotics enforcement apparatus is a function of its + mission and what it will take to accomplish it. Consequently, there are + sound planning reasons for concentrating initial inputs on a specific + target area and groups—to gain experience as well as to test the mettle + of the political leadership to proceed against the more influential and + important traffickers. Therefore, we should give emphasis in the overall + enforcement plan to the inputs required for the DNSP to mount a major + operation in the Santa Cruz area. It should be made clear that the US + wishes to see the GOB moving + successfully on the Santa Cruz traffickers before we make any major deliveries of + equipment for the overall enforcement effort or authorize loan financing + to implement the accelerated crop substitution program.

+

—The US views early GOB action to place + coca production under an effective control and licensing system to be + prerequisite to authorization of any AID loan for the crop substitution program. In this initial + phase, new planting would be prohibited and plantings in new areas be + phased out in a short time frame. (Licenses would not be withheld from + traditional growers until appropriate measures are in place for crop + substitution.)

+

Promulgation of a plan, development of implementing instrumentalities and + an organization to enforce production controls for reducing coca + production to legitimate usage levels is to be the sine qua non of major + AID financing.

+

—Bolivia does not have a major addiction problem; therefore, requirements + for US assistance in prevention and treatment should not be major. Dr. + Dupont, Director of NIDA, recently visited Bolivia and recommended that + we start by inviting Dr. Noya, Bolivian leader in this field, to visit + the US for orientation and to pinpoint areas of future cooperation. + Therefore, the team will limit its involvement in matters of prevention + and treatment to courtesy visit and discussions and furthering the + invitation.

+

—INC funds have certain limitations in their uses. They may not be + utilized to pay for intelligence, or rewards, to pay salaries of host + government personnel, nor for expenses associated with the detention or + incarceration of narcotics offenders. As a matter of program policy, INC + funds should not be programmed for other than ordinary hand guns, + weapons systems, office furniture or electronic surveillance + equipment.

+

5. Further details on the team composition will be supplied by separate + cable. Please advise your estimate of a desirable ETA.

+ + + Habib + + +
+ + +
+ 82. Telegram 9124 From the Embassy in Bolivia to the Department of + State +

Summary: In a + conversation with Ambassador Stedman, Foreign Minister Oscar Adriazola + complained that U.S. human rights policy restricted security + assistance and made it difficult for Bolivia to fight + communism.

+

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + D760426–0101. Confidential. In telegram 231122 to all diplomatic + and consular posts, September 17, the Department discussed + “explicit congressional policy guidance on human rights matters + [that] definitively links provision of security assistance to + human rights observance.” (Ibid., D760353–0445) In telegram + 45319 to all diplomatic posts, February 25, the Department + explained the requirement that Embassies report on human rights + policies. (Ibid., D760071–0412)

+ + + + La Paz, November 15, 1976, 1500Z. +

9124. Subject: Guidance on Human Rights Provisions of New Security + Assistance Legislation. Ref: (A) State 231122, (B) State 045319.

+

1. I called on Foreign Minister, Air Force General Oscar Adriazola, on + November 12 to discuss human rights sections in the new security + legislation and to leave a note containing the text of those provisions. + The Foreign Minister said he would examine the legislation carefully and + expressed hope that it did not establish conditions to be met before + providing security assistance. If that were to be so, it would infringe + the sovereignty of recipient countries and he, personally, would + recommend that Bolivia not accept assistance so conditioned. I explained + that current legislation calls for analysis of treatment of human rights + in each country receiving security assistance and that these reports + will serve as a basis for Presidential and congressional decisions as to + maintaining, modifying or suspending assistance. The Foreign Minister + concluded that this is not conditioned assistance and expressed the hope + that Congress and the U.S. executive branch make every effort to + understand the circumstances in the Southern Cone which have led to the + military taking power. He expressed his personal view that our officials + are relying too much on exaggerated press reports which in large measure + are based on self-serving allegations from extremists who are trying to + undermine governments which came to power to rescue nations from + Communist and Marxist domination.

+

2. Foreign Minister Adriazola said that the United States is the leader + of the Western world in a desperate fight against communism. Bolivia and + the Southern Cone countries consider themselves allies of the U.S. and + respect the U.S. as the leader in this fight. Yet Southern Cone + countries are dismayed when the U.S. virtually turns against military + governments even when they have taken power to halt the takeover by + communism. Allende was taking + Chile into the Soviet camp; Torres was facilitating the communization of Bolivia; + Perón was permitting the + fracturing of Argentine society and allowing the increasing militancy of + armed leftists within that country; the Tupamaros in Uruguay almost + brought that country to chaos from which the Communists would have been + the beneficiaries. Those forces pressing for Communist control have long + used violence and terrorism. Abuses of human rights are tools for + Communist subversion and disruption. Criminal acts such as those must be + dealt with, according to the Foreign Minister. As allies of the U.S. in + the worldwide fight against communism, the Southern Cone countries think + that what they have done by overthrowing alien ideologies and preserving + legitimate societies is a major contribution in the worldwide + anti-Communist fight of the U.S. Rhetorically he posed this question, + quote “would the U.S. prefer for us to become enslaved by Communist + forces who have no respect for human rights or for us to maintain + respect for human rights for the masses but deal effectively with + criminal elements seeking to undermine orthodox institutions?” + Unquote.

+

3. In the case of Bolivia, the Minister in effect lectured to me. He + cited freedom of the press, which the SIP just confirmed in its + Williamsburg meeting, as the greatest brake on abuses of human rights. + He said that the GOB does not have a + policy of repression and maintains its courts and legal system open and + free without manipulation. He asserted that the military regimes which + have come to power in the Southern Cone did not do so in the quest for + power or to establish dictatorial governments. They are the legitimate + guardians of freedom of the population from subversion, violence, + terrorism, and domination by communism. The struggle goes on and the + regimes must continue to be vigilant in defense of the interests of the + people. The regimes understand the difference between dissent and + subversion; permit the former as witness the free press in Bolivia. He + complained that the U.S. Congress does not understand what subversion is + and has taken a one-sided position, colored by media, academics, exiles, + etc. He mused that when Communists suppress human rights as a conscious + policy the Congress seems very little concerned. But let a Latin + American military government restrain a Communist agitator from + subversion and there is an immediate negative reaction.

+

4. The Minister closed by suggesting that the U.S. push the United + Nations Human Rights Commission to become more active in the question of + human rights abuses in the Soviet Union, Cuba, and Mainland China as a + necessary step to root out clearly conscious policies of gross + violations of human rights. He said it would be interesting to + investigate Mexico. He repeated his request that the U.S. executive + branch do what it can to try to help U.S. Congressmen to get facts + before legislating and to + understand the realities of Southern Cone military regimes so as to have + a clearer perspective on human rights.

+ + + Stedman + + +
+
+ +
+ + Brazil + +
+ 83. Backchannel Message From President Nixon to Brazilian President Médici + +

Summary: Nixon + informed Médici he + strongly opposed an effort by Venezuela and Ecuador to lift + OAS sanctions on Cuba.

+

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 772, Country Files, + Latin America, Brazil, Vol. IV, 1973–1974. Top Secret; + Exclusively Eyes Only. On April 18, Scowcroft informed Kissinger that Nixon had “reacted strongly to an item [text not declassified] regarding + Venezuela’s and Ecuador’s efforts to remove OAS sanctions from Cuba. Scowcroft attached a copy of + the item with Nixon’s + handwritten note, “K[issinger]—inform State now—we are to vigorously oppose this move—get our + position in the private channel to Médici.” (Ibid.)

+ + + + Washington, March + 6, 1973. +

Please bring the following message from President Nixon exclusively to the attention of + President Medici.

+

There are indications that Venezuela and Ecuador may seek to have + sanctions against Cuba lifted when the General Assembly of the OAS convenes in Washington in April. + President Nixon wants President + Médici to know that he + strongly opposes such a move and that the United States will take + vigorous action in opposition if such a proposal is made. Anything + President Médici is able to do in + support of the United States position will be deeply appreciated.

+
+ +
+ 84. Memorandum From the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence + (Walters) to the President’s + Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) +

Summary: Médici + informed Nixon that + Brazil would publicly oppose an attempt to lift sanctions on + Cuba.

+

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 772, Country Files, + Latin America, Brazil, Vol. IV, 1973–1974. Secret; [handling restriction not declassified]. + On March 20, in a backchannel message, Nixon informed Médici that he appreciated + Brazil’s opposition to lifting OAS sanctions on Cuba. (Ibid.)

+ + + + Washington, March + 8, 1973. + + SUBJECT + Reply from President Médici + of Brazil + +

1. The following message [1 line not declassified] + is President Médici’s reply to + President Nixon’s message:

+

“President Médici greatly + appreciates President Nixon’s + message to the effect that in view of the indications that Venezuela and + Ecuador may demand the abolition of sanctions against Cuba during the + forthcoming meeting of the OAS, he, + President Nixon will strongly + oppose any such abolition and that the U.S. will vigorously oppose such + a proposal if it is made.

+

“President Médici wishes to inform + President Nixon that Brazil’s + position will also be firm and resolute against any such attempt as that + referred to above whatever the country which makes such a proposal.

+

“In the same way Brazil will publicly oppose any indirect attempt—and + this seems more likely—aimed at achieving the same objectives through a + resolution which would in practice open the way for a future lifting of + the sanctions.

+

“Brazil would very much like to be able to count on the support of the + United States in such a case.”

+

2. [less than 1 line not declassified] President + Médici’s representative + (Colonel Dieguez) said that the President and Foreign Minister Gibson Barboza, who was asked by the + President on the evening of 7 March to draft the above position, wished + to convey additional thoughts orally. On the occasion of a recent + meeting with the Venezuelans at Santa Elena, the Venezuelan Foreign + Minister told Gibson Barboza + that he planned to introduce a resolution at the upcoming OAS meeting. The Venezuelan insisted that + it would not be a motion to lift sanctions because a meeting of + consultation would be the only appropriate forum for such an action. + Moreover, the Venezuelan reportedly also agreed that such a motion would + be defeated easily. What the Venezuelan proposes, he told Gibson, is to head off an alternative Peru-Ecuador + resolution in stronger terms. The Venezuelan apparently wishes to enlist + Ecuador as co-sponsor of a resolution which, in effect, would say that + times have changed, as attested to by U.S. rapprochement with the + Soviets and Chinese, and the end of the Vietnam war. On that basis, the + Venezuelan is said to have gone on, the OAS must publicly state that a new era of peace and + brotherly love is upon the world.

+

3. Dieguez said that Brazil will oppose the Venezuelan resolution because + it could lead to judgments by individual nations that they are free of + commitment to the sanctions. Gibson + Barboza estimated that at least eight nations would jump + on that bandwagon and embrace Cuba. While Gibson believes that it will be a difficult task to + defeat the Venezuelan resolution, Brazil will oppose it steadfastly and + would hope to count on the U.S. to oppose any such “we are all at peace + and brothers” proposal as well as any subsequent meeting of consultation + move to end sanctions.

+

4. [2½ lines not declassified]

+

5. The following comment was additionally received [less than 1 line not declassified]:

+

“Since President Médici has + brought this matter to the knowledge of the Brazilian Foreign Ministry, + I would like, for obvious reasons, to be authorized to inform the + Ambassador, who is not a square. [name not + declassified]”

+ + + Vernon A. + Walters + Lieutenant General, USA + + +
+ +
+ 85. Telegram 95947 From the Department of State to the Embassy in + Brazil +

Summary: The + Department informed the Embassy that, given the rapid economic + development of Brazil and congressional hostility to indefinitely + continuing assistance programs, bilateral assistance (with the + exception of narcotics and family-planning assistance) would be + phased out.

+

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 1 BRAZ–US. Confidential; + Immediate. Repeated to Rio de Janeiro. Drafted by Lippincott, + cleared by Low and + Kleine, approved by + Crimmins. The FY 1974–1975 CASP submission, February 17, is + ibid. On May 10, the Embassy reported that it had “learned + informally” that the IG was + planning on phasing out U.S. Government economic assistance to + Brazil and wanted confirmation from the Department. (Telegram + 2757 from Brasília, ibid.) The final version of the CASP has not been + found.

+ + + + Washington, May 18, 1973, 2137Z. +

95947. Subject: FY 74 CASP—IG + Review. Ref: Brasilia 2757.

+

1. Information contained para one reftel correct. Approved decision + memorandum accompanying revised approved 1974 CASP reads as follows:

+

U.S. bilateral assistance. The IG + determined that the bilateral assistance program for Brazil should be + phased out and that substantial progress should be made toward this + objective during the CASP time frame. + To this end, the IG reached the + following conclusions:

+

(1) The AID program for Brazil should be + terminated concurrently with the full disbursement of the existing + AID loan pipeline and in any case + no later than FY 1978.

+

(2) The bilateral program for each year until termination should be + appreciably smaller than that for the preceding year. These programs + should not exceed $5–6 million in FY + 1974 and $3–4 million in FY 1975, moving + to an austere monitoring level thereafter.

+

(3) The Country Team should forthwith prepare a plan for phasing the + bilateral program down and out and recommend the manner in which this + intention should be made known to the Government of Brazil.

+

(4) The phase-out of the AID program + will not preclude further AID financing + of narcotics control and family planning activities in Brazil. In the + case of family planning the international institutions should be + considered first. AID will also + continue to be willing to provide services to Brazil on a reimbursable + basis.

+

2. In IG discussions of CT proposals contained in CASP submission there was unanimous view + that idea of indefinitely continuing $5–6 million TA program for Brazil + was unrealistic and unwise given the rapid development of Brazil, its + sturdy reserve position, increased congressional hostility to + indefinitely continuing assistance programs, and estimates of the + requirements for a “mature partnership” with a country rapidly emerging + as a world power. Several agencies felt that consideration should be + given to immediate termination and the levels shown in the decision + memorandum are the highest on which agreement could be obtained.

+

3. Immediate cessation of the bilateral concessional assistance was + avoided only by the persuasiveness of two arguments: 1. That the sizable + loan pipeline would require some A.I.D. presence for monitoring purposes + for several more years, and 2. given the success of our past programs in + helping Brazil and the current good state of our relations, our + phase-out should be sufficiently gradual to avoid the charge of + arbitrary and peremptory unilateral action.

+

4. On the other hand it was agreed in the IG that real and provable progress toward phase-out must be + made in order to avoid or blunt congressional attacks on a continuing + AID program in Brazil with its risk + of subsequent mandatory, peremptory termination.

+

5. John Hannah informed of above and approves.

+ + + Rush + + +
+ +
+ 86. Memorandum From Richard T. + Kennedy of the National Security Council Staff to the + President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) +

Summary: Kennedy recommended that Kissinger approve FMS credits in FY 1974–1975 for Brazil to purchase + aircraft even though it would constrain future allocations of + FMS credits.

+

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 772, Country Files, + Latin America, Brazil, Vol. 4, 1973–1974. Confidential. Sent for + urgent action. Kissinger + approved the recommendation. Kissinger wrote on the memorandum, “See me. HK.” + Attached but not published are Tab A, a chart on FMS credits, undated, and Tab B, a + memorandum to the Director of OMB from Tarr, May 1. On August 31, the Brazilian Air + Ministry signed a contract with the Lockheed Corporation to + purchase the C–130s, and the Ministry intended to sign a + contract with the Northrop Corporation not later than September + 7 to purchase the F–5s. (Memorandum from Peet to Schlesinger, September 4; + ibid., RG 59, ARA/NSC–IG Files: Lot 75D224, DEF 12–5, Sale of + F–5s, 1973)

+ + + + Washington, May 23, + 1973. + + SUBJECT + Advance Commitment of FMS Credit + for Brazil + +

Recognizing that the advance commitment of FMS credit to support large aircraft procurement programs + would have the effect of severely limiting the availability of credit in + future years and thereby restrict the President’s flexibility to meet + other requirements that may arise, we arranged last September to have + all requests for such advance commitments submitted to OMB and your staff for prior approval. The + precise situation we visualized then is now upon us.

+

Under Secretary Tarr has + recommended, with the concurrence of Defense and Treasury, that we agree + now to provide FMS credit totalling + about $170 million over the three years Fiscal 1974–76 to Brazil for + purchase of U.S. aircraft (Tab B). OMB + has asked for our comments.

+

The Brazilians wish to buy 9 C–130s and 48 F–5Es. The primary competition + is the French Mirage. Though the Brazilians reportedly prefer to buy + from us, the French are offering more attractive terms, such as a longer + repayment period and guaranteed credit.

+

The problem is a shortage of uncommitted FMS credit in FY 74 and 75. + Starting with the congressional ceiling of fiscal 1972 and 73 and + subtracting present commitments, expected earmarking for Israel, and the + Brazil sale, only $9 million in credit would remain uncommitted for + FY 74 and $33 million for FY 75 (detailed chart, Tab A). The + President’s flexibility will be severely limited, particularly in FY 74, if we authorize this commitment. We + have examined every conceivable way to minimize the problem and protect + the President’s flexibility.

+ +

—A cash sale would be unacceptable to Brazil.

+

—Using non-guaranteed private credit would mean higher interest rates to + which Brazil would not agree.

+

—Extending financing into FY 77 in order + to lower the FY 74–75 amounts would + require delaying deliveries, which Brazil would not accept.

+

—The Ex-Im Bank will not designate a + country as “developed” and finance its purchases until its per capita + annual GNP reaches $1,200. Brazil’s per capita GNP is only about + $500.

+

If Congress authorizes a FMS program + ceiling higher than the $550 million of the last two years, the problem + would be reduced. We have requested $760 million and Senator Fulbright’s + bill cites $700 million. Something above $550 million, therefore, is a + reasonable expectation, though we cannot count upon a higher + authorization.

+

There is no question that the aircraft sale to Brazil would be in our + interest. The sale would signal the end of the unilateral and + unrealistic FMS restraints of the late + 1960’s, which were resented as paternalistic by Latin American + governments. It would respond to the Brazilian need for equipment they + believe essential, would benefit our balance of payments, and would help + maintain and strengthen our traditional close relationship with the + largest Latin American country.

+

Consequently, in spite of the possible stringent limitations on FMS credit availability, I recommend that we advise OMB that the advanced commitment of FMS credit for Brazil should be + approved.

+

+ Bill Jorden concurs.

+
+ +
+ 87. Telegram 1738/Secto 191 From the Embassy in Jamaica to the + Department of State +

Summary: + Rogers and Gibson Barboza discussed a + possible visit by President Nixon, economic matters, and a speech by + Kissinger on a “New + Atlantic Charter.”

+

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, ORG 7 S. + Confidential. Repeated Priority to Brasília and Rio de Janeiro. + Rogers visited Rio + de Janeiro and Brasília May 19–22. In telegram 1734 from + Kingston, May 27, the Embassy sent to the Department a + memorandum of conversation of a separate Rogers-Gibson Barboza conversation on + Law of the Sea. (Ibid.) Kissinger’s April 23 speech is printed in + Foreign + Relations, 1969–1976, volume XXXVIII, Part 1, + Foundations of Foreign Policy, 1973–1976, Document 8. + In telegram 3014 from Brasília, May 19, the Embassy informed the + Department that Gibson + Barboza might raise the issues of collective + economic security and the multilateral commercial negotiations + of 1973, strengthening the UN + and OAS, terrorism, and + regional issues. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign + Policy File, [no film number]) The 2-year U.S.-Brazil Shrimp + Conservation Agreement was signed on May 9, + 1972.

+ + + + Kingston, May 28, 1973, 0620Z. +

1738/Secto 191. Subj: SecVisit LA: + Conversation with Brazilian FonMin Gibson + Barboza.

+

1. Following presentation of gifts, Secretary had approximately one hour + talk with Foreign Minister in the presence of advisors: Ambassador + Rountree, Under Secretary + Casey, Pedersen, Kubisch, Szabo and DCM + Cleveland on US side; SecGen + Carvalho E Silva, Ambassador Araujo + Castro, Director Americas Department Expedito Rezende, + and American Desk Officer Frassinetti Pinto on Brazilian side.

+

2. After welcoming Secretary’s visit, FonMin lauded the excellent present + state of US-Brazilian relations. In this connection, he thought that + President Médici’s visit to US in + December 1971 had marked a high-point in US-Brazilian relations, and had + materially enhanced the quality of these relations.

+

3. President’s visit: Foreign Minister added that Brazil, and in + particular President Médici + himself, looked forward to the visit of President Nixon, which GOB felt would make an important further contribution in + the same sense. Secretary replied that as Foreign Minister Gibson knew, the President was anxious + to visit South America and particularly Brazil, and intended to do so + during President Médici’s term of + office. He originally had in mind later this year but there was a + problem about the Venezuelan election in November; hence with Christmas + season coming on thereafter, it seemed as if Jan or Feb of 1974 would be + the best time for visit. FonMin pointed out that Brazil would be + electing a new President on Jan 15, 1974, and suggested that + Presidential visit following these elections might be awkward because of + possible confusion of roles of President Médici and the President-elect. The Secretary agreed + this could be a problem, but wondered if there might not be advantages as well; a visit at + this point would enable the President both to renew and cement the close + personal relationship which he had established with President Médici, but also get to know the + President elect with whom he would be working in the future. The + Secretary agreed in any case to consider the matter again in the light + of FonMin’s information and be in touch.

+

4. The Secretary emphasized that he did not want his own visit to be + considered as a public relations visit but rather as one designed to + produce results which counted. The Secretary added that relations + between State Department and Congress in US were steadily improving, + which gave the Department a capacity to influence Congress in areas + where congressional problems might have arisen in our relations with + Latin American countries.

+

5. Shrimp agreement: In this connection, Secretary said he knew GOB had been somewhat concerned about the + length of time it had taken us to submit to the Congress necessary + legislation for implementation of US-Brazilian agreement on shrimp + fishing. This delay had been caused by bureaucratic difficulties in + Washington. He was happy to be able to inform FonMin that these had been + overcome and that the legislation would be submitted late the same week + or early the next. FonMin thanked the Secretary and acknowledged there + had been indeed some difficulties in the implementation of the + agreement, in particular late arrival of notification of vessels + authorized to fish under agreement. In this connection he made specific + reference to “Apollo 12” case. The Secretary assured the FonMin that on + his return he would make an effort both to expedite congressional + consideration and approval of implementing legislation, and to insure + that streamlined procedures were adopted which would bring an end to + difficulties the FonMin had mentioned. He pointed as well to US desire + to renew fishing agreement when it expired at end this year; FonMin did + not comment audibly on this point.

+

6. Law of the Sea: Secretary underlined basis of US position. In a + lengthy reply, Gibson Barboza + reiterated essential points of Brazil’s position, describing it as + “extreme position” on which flexibility was limited by legislative + action; nevertheless FonMin insisted on Brazil’s desire to find some + accommodation in this area with [garble—member?] countries and US, and + in particular reiterated assurances that Brazil had no intention of + using its control over territorial sea to hinder US defense posture.

+

7. Other agreements: FonMin described shrimp agreement as a “good + agreement” because it provided a pragmatic solution to an important + problem in a manner which did not prejudice the legal position of either + Brazil or the US. He also spoke warmly of our bilateral agreement on + peaceful uses of nuclear energy, which once again took account of but did not attempt to + settle disagreement in principle over matter of peaceful nuclear + explosions. FonMin spoke warmly of the US-Brazil treaty on scientific + and technological cooperation which set a pattern for future cooperation + in this field; indeed, he felt strongly that the size and number of + programs under this agreement should be substantially expanded. The + Secretary promised to look into this question on his return.

+

8. US aid to Brazil: FonMin expressed + considerable concern over fact that FY + 1974 aid budget contained no provision + for continuing loans to Brazil. He pointed out that despite success of + “Brazilian miracle”, which had perhaps been oversold, Brazil remained a + less developed country in severe need of continued capital support. + Concern over discontinuance of US bilateral loan assistance was + motivated particularly by fear that such action on USG part would discourage international + financial institutions, particularly World Bank and IDB, from continuing to lend support to + Brazil at previous rate. He specifically asked that USG review and revise this policy. + Secretary in reply pointed out that for some years the US had been under + pressure to move from bilateral aid, which many countries felt involved + excessive US interference in their internal affairs, to multilateral + aid. (Gibson commented that + Brazil much preferred bilateral.) Secretary added that he could see no + evidence in past cases where bilateral aid had been terminated (e.g. Korea and Taiwan), that this + had discouraged World Bank and other international financial + institutions from continuing to support a developing country. He said he + would certainly do all he could to discourage any such reaction.

+

7[9]. Multilateral Trade Negotiations: FonMin + Gibson Barboza emphasized + the importance which GOB attached to + success of forthcoming MTN as well as + to the work of Committee of 20 on International Monetary System. FonMin + hopes to be able to attend opening session MTN in Japan. In his view the combined work of C–20 and + MTN will change the face of the + world and establish a new basis for international economic relations, + one likely to last a long time. Hence Brazil intends cooperate fully in + these negotiations, and looks in this connection to visit Ambassador + Malmgren later this week. Secretary indicated his pleasure at FonMin’s + approach, which largely parallels our own, and hopes US and Brazilian + delegations would be able to work closely together in course of MTN.

+

8[10]. Atlantic Charter: In this connection, + FonMin expressed his concern about Kissinger speech proposing a “New Atlantic Charter”, + which he felt suggested an exclusive relationship between US and Europe + (as well as a questionable “Atlantic” Japan) and failed to consider the + role and importance of the under developed countries in trade matters + and in general. Ambassador Araujo + Castro added this concern was generally shared by the developing country + Embassies in Washington. Secretary felt this speech had been somewhat + misunderstood. GOB should not worry + excessively about it. Kissinger’s speech had been interpreted as statement of + general purpose, designed in particular to insure that the Atlantic + Alliance, which had played and should continue to play such an important + role in the security of the Western world, should not be split because + of competition and differences on trade matters. We in no sense had in + mind an exclusive club. The point, he added, was that bulk of the trade + problems to be discussed in MTN lie + among the developed countries. FonMin pursued this point in various ways + for considerable period but finally appeared to accept Secretary’s + assurance at time he left the session in order to proceed to a private + lunch for Secretary Rogers.

+ + Rogers + +
+ +
+ 88. Telegram 3289 From the Embassy in Brazil to the Department of + State +

Summary: Rountree reported on Brazilian + internal politics and the good prospects for sustained economic + growth. The Ambassador added that while the United States and + Brazil had failed to achieve consensus on international + commodity agreements and the Law of the Sea, the Brazilian + military’s decision to strengthen ties with the United States + boded well for future relations.

+

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL BRAZ–US. Confidential. + Repeated to São Paulo and Rio de Janeiro.

+ + + + Brasília, May 30, 1973, 2015Z. +

3289. Subject: Assessment of U.S.-Brazilian Relations.

+

1. In the course of my calls on the President, the Foreign Minister, and + other Ministers and senior Brazilian leaders incident to my departure + from the country, I have been struck by the consistency of their remarks + concerning the state of U.S.-Brazilian relations. I share their view + that relations have probably never been better. This is of course due to + a combination of factors which I shall touch upon in this, my final + substantive message from Brazil as Ambassador, but clearly the general + atmosphere created by top level relationships, notably that between + President Nixon and President + Médici, is one of the most + important aspects. The recent visit of Secretary Rogers and his cordial talks with + Brazilian leaders contributed significantly in this regard.

+ +

2. Brazil has responded extremely well to our enunciation of the concept + of a mature partnership. Indeed, no other approach could have succeeded + as well in this country which, following the revolution of 1964, has + developed a sense of national purpose and cohesion second to none in + Latin America. The chaos and confusion of the early 60’s have been + replaced by order and a sense of direction, supported by a Cabinet + largely of technocrats who have been highly successful in devising + pragmatic policies and methods conducive to rapid progress. The new + confidence which has been developed has rendered it possible for + Brazilian leaders to discuss outstanding issues in a manner devoid of + the hang-ups which so often mar reasonable negotiation among nations of + the hemisphere.

+

3. In the nine years since the revolution the Brazilian regime has + consolidated its position and established a substantial degree of + political stability and tranquility. The major speculation at present is + upon the choice of President Médici’s successor, and whether under the new leadership + there will be any fundamental change. It seems reasonably certain in my + view that the military leadership of Brazil, with a key input by + President Médici, will select a + successor unlikely to depart drastically from current policies. Whether + Ernesto Geisel, widely + regarded at this time to be the front runner, or another senior general + (the possibility of which I have never discounted) is selected, the + incumbent is likely to seek sustained stability and an essential + continuity of policy, although some change of style is likely, + particularly in terms of less obsession with security measures. + Ernesto Geisel, for instance, + has the public image of being politically somewhat more liberal than + Médici. Thus a Geisel administration might lift some + of the present restrictions on the body politic. That might include such + measures as easing censorship, and possibly establishing a meaningful + dialogue with the legislature and modifying the terms of some of the + extraordinary legislation such as Institutional Act No. 5. Although it + is not envisaged that within the next few years the executive, and + ultimately the military establishment, would relinquish control over the + decision-making process, these actions would be preliminary steps + towards a gradual political “opening.”

+

4. As in any society, there are counter-forces which, if they grew in an + unbridled fashion, could lead to a different outcome. There are those + who seek to turn Brazil’s nationalism away from a cooperative stance + toward the United States, advocating instead courses tying the nation + primarily to other world groupings, or to an inward-looking system less + compatible with our views on a desirable world structure. In their + present eclipse, these forces tend to be disregarded, but they retain + nevertheless a considerable potential. The pattern of our present + relationships with Brazil has helped to contain them; this pattern not + only must be retained but further improved.

+ +

5. Assuming that political stability will be maintained, the prospects + for sustained economic progress in the coming few years are very good. + The international business community continues to look confidently upon + Brazil as a prime investment opportunity, and international lending + agencies as well as governments are likely to remain sources of + investment capital of substantial magnitude. Brazil’s firm commitment to + private enterprise as the motor of development is unlikely, under + anticipated conditions, to alter, and foreign investment will continue + to be important as a means of growth. If, therefore, the successor + regime permits the same degree of pragmatic and imaginative use of the + tools of government which has characterized the Médici period, Brazil should register a + continued high rate of economic growth, and prospects for the United + States to benefit through mutually advantageous trade are most promising + if we are able to maintain our competitive position.

+

6. It is clear that at the present time Brazil considers its friendly + relations with the United States to be the cornerstone of its policy, + and that situation will remain for the foreseeable future. Brazil is a + growing power with strong policies based first on its national interest, + but reaching out for regional and in some degree world leadership. It + sees its future intertwined with that of the United States, and this + fact will, in my judgement, render it possible for our bilateral + relationships to continue on a mutually satisfactory basis.

+

7. We have been successful in the past few years in finding acceptable + solutions to virtually all of the bilateral issues which have arisen. + This success has been attained by a pragmatic approach and a willingness + to find means to achieve agreement in practice, even in cases where + differences in principle must be preserved by the respective parties. Of + the remaining disagreements, international commodity agreements and the + Law of the Seas are the most troublesome. It is significant that the + more difficult problems require action largely in multilateral fora. To + the extent to which aspects of these problems can be resolved on a + bilateral basis, this has so far been done with relative ease.

+

8. A number of actions of the Brazilian Government in the recent past + have been sources of particular gratification, but none more so than + decisions of the Brazilian military leadership to strengthen relations + with the United States in every practicable way. Thus President + Médici recently approved the + procurement by the Brazilian Air Force of F–5 aircraft, not only because + of financial and technical considerations but also, importantly, because + of the political decision that military ties with the United States are + of great importance. Similar decisions with respect to helicopters and + other important military equipment have signified a decline in the + bitter resentment by Brazilian military leaders of what they considered to be an earlier unreasonable + and paternalistic attitude on the part of the United States with respect + to sales of military equipment, an attitude which had caused them to + turn primarily to European sources of supply.

+

9. There are, of course, important discussions and negotiations ahead in + which we will be seeking Brazilian support on such matters as + international monetary reform, multilateral trade relations, the future + of the OAS, the Law of the Seas, and + others. The atmosphere for these negotiations and discussions is good, + and thus also are the prospects for at least some degree of success. + Beyond that, we must pursue and tailor our programs in this country in a + manner designed to reinforce the base of solid human relations which + underlies and gives warmth and force to our excellent bilateral + relations. In this way we hope that as Brazil matures and gains + strength, it will continue to be one of our closest and warmest friends, + and an asset in an area of particular importance to us. So long as + Brazil, with half the land area and population of South America, and + with a high percentage of the resources of the continent, acts along + present lines, we can proceed with an otherwise impossible degree of + confidence in the future of the area.

+ + + Rountree + + +
+ +
+ 89. Letter From President Nixon to Brazilian President Médici + +

Summary: Nixon asked + Médici if Brazil + would send peacekeeping troops to Vietnam as part of the + International Commission of Control and Supervision.

+

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 749, Presidential + Correspondence, President of Brazil Emilio Garrastazu Médici. Secret. Kissinger sent the letter to + Nixon on July 16, + under cover of a memorandum in which he informed the President + that a letter from him to Médici would greatly improve the prospects of a + favorable Brazilian reply. Although the memorandum of + conversation between Rogers and Médici has not been found, Rogers briefed Nixon on his May 23 + conversation with Médici + in a May 29 meeting. (Conversation Between President Nixon and Secretary Rogers, May 29; ibid., + White House Tapes, + Cabinet Room, Conversation No. 124–3) On July 24, Médici informed Nixon that because some of the + members of the ICCS were not + upholding its mission, and its members had been subjected to + attacks, he declined the President’s offer. (Ibid., NSC Files, Box 749, Presidential + Correspondence, President of Brazil Emilio Garrastazu Médici)

+ + + + Washington, July + 14, 1973. + + Dear Mr. President: + +

Secretary Rogers has given me a + full report of his conversation with you during his visit to Brazil this + May. It is gratifying to know that the close and cooperative relations + between our two nations remain as strong as ever.

+

As Secretary Rogers told you, one + of the major objectives of my Government continues to be the maintenance + and strengthening of peace in Vietnam. During the past six months + important progress has been made in achieving that goal, which I regard + as essential in order that the Vietnamese people may determine + peacefully their political future and that stability and development may + flourish in all of Indochina.

+

A vitally important element in the maintenance of peace is effective + international supervision of the cease-fire in Vietnam and of other + provisions of the January 27 Agreement and its Protocols. As you are + aware, this function has been performed by the International Commission + of Control and Supervision, composed of Indonesia, Canada, Hungary and + Poland. Although the ICCS has been + beset by many problems during the initial stages of its operations, it + has made steady progress toward fulfilling its duties and, I am + convinced, has played a most valuable role in assuring implementation of + the peace agreement.

+

As you know, Canada, after nearly twenty years of involvement in + cease-fire supervision in Indochina, has decided to terminate its + participation in the ICCS at the end + of this month. I believe that it is essential that the ICCS continue its important functions and + that, to enable it to do so, Canada be replaced by another country which + has the will and capability to help supervise the peace in Vietnam. + After extensive consideration + of this matter, including consultations with the South Vietnamese and + Indonesian Governments, we have concluded that Brazil would be admirably + qualified to take Canada’s place in the ICCS. I would therefore deeply appreciate your Government’s + giving this matter its most serious consideration. If, as I hope will be + the case, you should reach an affirmative decision, we would proceed to + consult with the North Vietnamese Government prior to extending to your + Government a formal invitation.

+

I realize that an undertaking of this nature involves many factors, + including burdens on your country’s resources. Basically, about 300 of + your citizens—perhaps 75 percent military and 25 percent civilians—would + be involved in the ICCS operations. + Minister Stanley M. Cleveland, my + Chargé d’Affaires, whom I have asked to deliver this letter, can provide + you with additional information regarding the personnel, logistical and + financial aspects of this undertaking.

+

I regard this letter, Mr. President, as a continuation of the frank and + fruitful dialogue we have maintained in the past regarding our + responsibilities toward the world community. I believe the effective + implementation of the peace agreements we have finally worked out in + Vietnam is highly important to world peace and stability. Mindful of + Brazil’s long tradition of participation in international peace-keeping + efforts, I earnestly hope your Government will join in the effort to see + that the peace agreements succeed in Vietnam.

+

With warmest personal regards.

+

Sincerely,

+ + + Richard + Nixon + + +
+ +
+ 90. Memorandum From William J. + Jorden of the National Security Council Staff to the + President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) +

Summary: Jorden informed Kissinger that with discreet coordination, + Washington and Brasília could rationalize the process of + distributing assistance to the new Chilean Government. The + Department instructed Crimmins to meet with Foreign Minister Gibson Barboza to discuss the + matter.

+

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 772, Country Files, + Latin America, Brazil, Vol. 4, 1973–1974. Secret; Sensitive; + Eyes Only; Completely Outside the System. Sent for action. The + attached memorandum, entitled [title not + declassified] is not published. Scowcroft approved the + recommendation for Kissinger. On September 14, Kissinger, [text not declassified] stated, “We appreciated very + much the message conveyed through him from Foreign Minister + Gibson Barboza. Our + Ambassador will be discussing this matter with the Foreign + Minister and indeed may already have done so. We believe the + Minister and the Ambassador should determine the manner and + level of further contacts on this subject.” The message was to + be cleared by Crimmins + before it was relayed to Cortés. (Ibid.)

+ + + + Washington, September 13, 1973. + + SUBJECT + Brazilian Views on Chile + +

It seems clear that we and the Brazilians are moving on a parallel track + concerning Chile. The attached memo is based on [less + than 1 line not declassified] a talk with Marcos Cortes, Special Assistant to + Foreign Minister Gibson Barboza. + The latter apparently authorized the contact. The main points were:

+

1) Brazil expects an early request from the new Chilean Government for + economic, and possibly other, assistance. This probably would mean help + in restoring essential services and in providing a better food supply + for the Chilean people.

+

2) The Brazilians are disposed to honor such a request one way or + another.

+

3) Brazil expects similar requests to be made to the US.

+

4) Discreet coordination between Washington and Brasília could avoid + duplication and assure that aid goes in + the right amounts to the right places.

+

5) Brazil is prepared to use this channel [less than 1 + line not declassified] for communications on this subject if we + wish.

+

6) [2½ lines not declassified]

+

As you know, we have instructed our Ambassador, John Crimmins, to deliver roughly the + same message to the Brazilians through Foreign Minister Gibson Barboza. He was unable to do so + yesterday because he was in Rio + on business. He may have delivered the message today (no firm word yet) + or will certainly do so tomorrow.

+

In my judgment, it would be better to handle this exchange on the + Ambassador-Foreign Minister level. Both understand the problems and + subtleties. If we use the lower level contact, it would mean both + parties constantly having to go to higher authority for guidance, + instructions, etc. Thus, I think we should go back through this channel + informing Mr. Cortes that we + appreciate very much the message he conveyed. Our Ambassador will be + discussing this with the Foreign Minister and we believe the two of them + should determine the level and manner of further contacts on this + subject.

+

Recommendation:

+

That you approve sending a message to Brasília [less + than 1 line not declassified] for delivery to Mr. Cortes along the above lines, + accompanied by instructions to the Ambassador informing him of our + preference that he handle the matter personally unless he sees + advantages in doing otherwise.

+
+ +
+ 91. Telegram 184123 From the Department of State to the Embassy in + Brazil +

Summary: The + Department informed Crimmins that he could raise with Gibson Barboza the issue of + diplomatic recognition of the new Chilean Government, as well as + the attitudes of Chile’s neighbors toward it, the future of the + new regime, and U.S. assistance.

+

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + P850027–1631. Secret; Flash; Eyes Only. Drafted by Devos, + cleared by Bowdler, + approved by Kubisch. In + telegram 182529 to São Paulo, September 13, the Department + instructed Ambassador Crimmins to deliver a démarche to Gibson Barboza on Chile. + (Ibid., Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 772, Country Files, Latin America, + Brazil, Vol. 4, 1973–1974) On September 14, Cortés informed [text not declassified] that Gibson Barboza would probably + raise the following issues: the diplomatic recognition of, + attitudes in the region toward, and the future form of the + Chilean regime. Also, Cortés stated that Gibson Barboza might inquire + about the Chilean regime’s requests for assistance. (Department + of State, INR/IL Historical + Files, Box 19, Brasília 1973–1980) No record of the Crimmins-Gibson Barboza meeting has + been found.

+ + + + Washington, September 15, 1973, + 1727Z. +

184123. Subject: Consultation on Chile.

+

1. With regard to your meeting with ForMin + Gibson Barboza, you may wish to + draw on the following:

+ +

(A) Recognition question—We do not wish to approach the question of + relations with the new government in the context of recognition per se. + During the past several years, the practice has been to avoid seeming to + give either “approval” or “disapproval” of new governments. Thus, we do + not wish to give emphasis to any public act of “recognition” of the new + GOC. We have not initiated formal + contacts with the GOC, but we do have + informal avenues of communication with members of the new government—in + due course we expect to take some action which will be a “continuance of + relations,” but the final decision as to when and how we will + characterize continuation of relations has not yet been made.

+

(B) Feelings of other govts—We agree with Brazilian assessment that while + various governments have made loud pronouncements of sorrow at Allende’s death, and the overthrow by + the military, at least some Latin American governments privately harbour + more sympathetic sentiments toward the new government than they publicly + demonstrate.

+

(C) Future of GOC—It is still too early + to assess the form and philosophy of the new regime. While it has called + for a national effort of reconciliation, it has not yet defined itself + further and it may be some time before it does begin to evolve a + political and economic philosophy. There is no evidence to date to + suggest that the military will relinquish control in the near + future.

+

(D) Request for assistance—The USG has + not rpt not received any formal request for assistance. We have, + nevertheless, received informal approaches on possible assistance such + as medical supplies, foodstuffs, and some military items previously in + the discussion or pipeline stage. We are carefully examining our + position with regard to all types of assistance and, while our + presumption at present is that we will be as helpful and cooperative as + we are able to and appropriately can, we have not made any final + decisions as yet.

+ + + Rush + + +
+ +
+ 92. Memorandum of Conversation +

Summary: Kissinger and Gibson Barboza discussed regional issues and + Brazil’s growing role in world affairs.

+

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL BRAZ–US. Secret; Exdis. The + meeting took place at the U.S. Mission to the United + Nations.

+ + + + New York, September 26, 1973, 10–11 + a.m. + + PARTICIPANTS + Secretary of State Kissinger + + Brazilian Minister of Foreign Affairs Mario Gibson Alves Barboza + + Brazilian Ambassador to United States Joao Augusto de Araujo Castro + + Brazilian Ambassador to United Nations Sergio A. Frazao + + William J. Jorden, NSC Staff (Latin American + Affairs) + + + SUBJECT + Conversation with Brazilian Foreign Minister + +

The Secretary welcomed the Brazilian Foreign Minister and his colleagues. + The Minister congratulated the Secretary on his new assignment and + wished him well in his new responsibilities. He said Brazil’s interest + was in part selfish because “your success will be our success.”

+

The Secretary thanked the Minister and noted that Brazil is the only + country in Latin America he has visited except Mexico. He said that + beyond the importance of close personal relations between the leaders or + our two countries, close relations between our two countries were + absolutely essential to the state of Latin America. He said that he was + very eager to establish the closest possible relations. He said he + believed that until now our communications had been quite close, but he + wanted to make sure they remained that way.

+

The Brazilian Minister noted that our contacts had always been + exceedingly close and he too hoped that they would continue that + way.

+

The Secretary said that he thought the Minister would like our new + Ambassador (John Crimmins).

+

+ Gibson Barboza said that the + Ambassador was a “good man” and that he and the Ambassador were friends. + He noted that the new Ambassador was very knowledgeable about the + situation in Brazil. He was looking forward, he said, to very close + relations with him. He said he had already had several extensive talks + with the Ambassador. As to the overall situation in U.S.-Brazil + relations, he said that he saw “no real problems” at the moment.

+

At this point, Ambassador Araujo + Castro started to say something, but the Secretary + interrupted him to tell the Minister that his Ambassador “has not been scolding me lately.” + He indicated that this was a pleasant change.

+

Turning back to the Minister, the Secretary said: “Let’s say this; if + something gets bogged down between us, please get in touch with me + directly and if it’s humanly possible we will get it done.” He noted + that he continued in his position as Assistant to the President and that + might help expedite action when it was needed.

+

+ Gibson Barboza thanked the + Secretary very much. He said he would take advantage of the offer but + only when it was absolutely necessary. Referring to overall relations, + he noted that, of course, there was a difference in our roles in the + world as a result of “our relative weight.”

+

The Secretary noted that that situation is changing. He said that in 25 + years we would be close to equals.

+

The Brazilian Minister said that was possible, but that, of course, the + whole world was changing. He admitted that it might be true that “we are + a bit more ahead of some others.” The Secretary said he thought the + situation was changing faster than that. He predicted that over the next + 25 years Brazil would become a super power; he said that the country was + on its way to being a major power today.

+

+ Gibson Barboza said that “as we + see it” Brazil is called on to share more responsibility. He said his + country was now planning a larger role in world affairs. He said there + was an “expression called Latin America” but that there were tremendous + variations and differences among the countries in the Hemisphere. He + said that over the years it had been Brazil’s position to recognize + those differences. He referred to the situation in Chile and underlined + the necessity for the United States and Brazil to cooperate on this and + many other matters.

+

The Secretary said that he supported Chile and Brazil’s position. He + noted that we faced different domestic situations in dealing with such + matters. He said it had become customary that when an anti-U.S. + government was overthrown, we have to “apologize for it.” He noted that + we had sent in emergency medical supplies and that we would be offering + economic assistance. But, he said, we would try to keep our actions at a + low key.

+

Ambassador Araujo Castro repeated + the necessity for close cooperation.

+

The Secretary pointed out that “those who don’t like us” generally end up + attacking not only us but our friends as well. For example, he pointed + out that the Russians had been oppressing intellectuals for the past + fifty years, but intellectuals in the United States never made an issue + of this. They are doing so now because the Soviet Union is becoming more + friendly with the United States Government.

+ +

The Secretary said that we understood that Brazil would be conducting its + own policy. We recognize, he said, that you don’t want to do it through + us or anyone else. We will occasionally mention problems to you, if you + permit us to, but this will be done in a spirit of working together, not + trying to tell Brazil what to do.

+

+ Gibson Barboza said he wanted to + explain something. He referred to the Chilean request for helmets and + flares, which we had conveyed to Brazil. You asked if you should tell + the Chileans, he said, and we said “no.” It would have meant your acting + through us, and we felt it was better for us to deal directly. We + believe that that is better for you and for us. He pointed out that the + Chileans have in fact come directly to them in the last few days with a + request for the helmets and flares and Brazil had agreed to provide + them.

+

The Secretary asked Jorden what + the status of this was. Jorden + told the Secretary that we had met the Chilean request and that the + material had already been sent. He said it looked as though Chile would + get a double order.

+

The Brazilians said that they would check from their end, and if the + request had already been met they would not duplicate it.

+

The Secretary urged the Brazilian Foreign Minister not to let his + colleagues get confused by what we had to testify to in public. The + Minister said the Brazilians understood completely.

+

The Secretary said that he had told the Brazilian Ambassador several + years ago that we would “like to do more in Latin America.” How can we + get your views, he asked, on what we should do? I told the Ambassador + four years ago, he said, and now we are ready to do it. He said he + wanted the Brazilians’ advice and pointed out that we have not asked + anybody else about this matter.

+

+ Gibson Barboza said he felt that + efforts to develop some kind of overall policy toward Latin America had + failed. He said the continent was very much diversified and any policy + had to take those differences into consideration. We would, of course, + appreciate an overall Latin American policy that was effective, he + said.

+

The Secretary said he was thinking of sending someone he trusted—perhaps + former Secretary of Commerce Peterson—to a few key countries in Latin + America. He would then expect Peterson to make recommendations to him + regarding new policy approaches.

+

The Brazilian Minister said he thought that would be all right. But it + would be necessary to avoid simply “getting another report.” He thought + it might be good especially if the mission kept a very low profile. He + urged that it receive as little publicity as possible. Otherwise, he + said, it would raise expectations too high.

+

The Secretary said he did not have in mind any “huge affair” like the + Rockefeller mission of 1969. He was thinking of a very small group—Peterson and perhaps Assistant + Secretary Kubisch and one or two + others.

+

The Brazilian Minister said that this overall approach could never be a + substitute for bilateral dealings.

+

The Secretary said he understood. He said that our relations with Brazil + were most important and a quite separate matter. He pointed out, as an + example of what he was thinking, that there was a question of our + relations with Argentina. We would like to get Brazil’s views on the new + government and our respective relations with it.

+

The Brazilian Minister pointed out that the Perón government was sending invitations to all + countries to send special missions to attend the coming inauguration of + the President.

+

The Secretary said that the Argentines seemed eager for him to go to + Buenos Aires for this purpose. He said he didn’t think he could; but if + the Brazilians considered it extraordinarily important, he would look at + it again.

+

+ Gibson Barboza said that speaking + personally, he was discarding the idea of his going himself.

+

The Secretary said that if Gibson + Barboza didn’t go, then he would not go either. The + Brazilian Minister said that this was something that he intended to talk + with his President about before making a final decision.

+

+ Gibson Barboza noted that at the + last inauguration of their President (Campora last May) Brazil had sent the President of its + Congress. The Secretary said we had sent Secretary Rogers.

+

+ Gibson Barboza said he understood + that our representative did not get to the ceremony in time because of a + traffic jam.

+

The Secretary asked what Brazil’s estimate was should something happen to + Perón. Would his wife + succeed him?

+

The Brazilian Minister said that “in my opinion” Mrs.Perón would never succeed her husband. + He said he considered that there were several possibilities: (1) another + Peronist leader would take power; or (2) there would be an armed coup + d’état. On the latter, he pointed out that the Argentine army right now + was “bashful.” He noted that they had left power apologizing for their + failures. He said we have seen in Argentina just the reverse of what we + have in Brazil. “We started with Goulart”, he said, “and ended with the + Army. In Argentina, they started with the Army and ended with a + Goulart.”

+

The Brazilian Minister said he understood that Perón is a very sick man. He said we + had to think of his not finishing his term of office.

+

The Secretary said we had information that Perón had a heart problem. Gibson Barboza noted that he also has cancer. He is a + tired man. He can’t bear the full strain of the office.

+ +

The Secretary noted that the Argentines were eager to have an emissary + see him in advance of the meeting next week with the Foreign + Minister.

+

+ Gibson Barboza said Argentina’s + problem was how to introduce and apply a very hostile economic policy. + He said that they would have to freeze wages and other spending and take + other belt-tightening measures.

+

The Secretary said that on matters like this we are prepared to have the + closest consultations.

+

+ Gibson Barboza thanked the + Secretary very much. He said that “since you are mentioning specific + points” he wanted to raise the question of Cuba. He said he was + convinced that Cuba was no longer a foreign policy problem but rather an + internal problem for individual countries. He said Brazil felt that Cuba + was certainly no threat to them. They bother us, he said, because they + still support subversion and export revolution. But, he added, Cuba is + basically an internal problem.

+

The Secretary asked whether this problem could be eased by our relaxing + pressures along the lines of the Venezuela initiative.

+

The Foreign Minister pointed out that Venezuela had the problem of early + Presidential elections. He said that all the candidates were seeking + support from the left. He said that they seem to think that an opening + to Cuba could bring them left wing support. He said that Cuba had urged + Venezuela to try to bypass the Rio Treaty and use the OAS council for a decision.

+

The Secretary asked what Brazil’s view was.

+

+ Gibson Barboza said that he felt + Venezuela was not going to press the matter as a result of the change in + Chile. He said he thought that now they had ten votes instead of twelve + and that “they were discouraged.”

+

The Secretary said that, on Cuba, our policy is: we are not planning any + move on Cuba. There will be no “secret trips.” There will be no + meetings. If we change our policy—which we are not planning to do—we + will consult with you, he said. He said the President’s inclination was + not to change our policy. But, he added, if you tell us we should, we + will consider it.

+

The Brazilian Foreign Minister said that some governments in Latin + America were afraid the United States was going to move. The Secretary + asked how we could dispel that impression. Gibson Barboza said that “you should tell them.” He + mentioned the governments of Colombia, Venezuela, Uruguay, and + others.

+

The Secretary asked if Brazil would maintain its position. Gibson Barboza replied + “absolutely.”

+

Ambassador Frazao raised the problem of Chile in the United Nations. He + said that Cuba was pushing it very hard. He thought it important for the United States to let + other governments know its position. The Secretary said that we would + take “a very tough stand.” The Ambassador said he hoped the Chilean + Minister of Foreign Affairs would come to the UN session to explain his government’s position.

+

The Secretary said we would be tough. We will not accept any condemnation + of Chile. He said we needed Brazil’s support. Minister Gibson Barboza said we would have + “unqualified support” from Brazil.

+

The Secretary pointed out the differences between the Cuban situation and + China, which many people were trying to describe as similar. He pointed + out that Cuba was a very small island, but it is in the Caribbean; + China, he said, is very far away. But Cuba and what it does has an + effect on Latin America. He said he could assure the Brazilians there + would be no “spectacular initiative” on Cuba.

+

+ Gibson Barboza said his + government sees no change in the Cuban situation. He said that they had + no idea of changing policy. If Brazil ever did, he said, we would let + you know first. He added that it was important that the United States + tell others in the hemisphere where we stand on this matter. He said + there were some who were not inclined to move toward Cuba, but who + worried about being “surprised.” He said none of them wants to be in a + position of recognizing Cuba after the United States.

+

The Secretary thought that perhaps he should send a message to all our + Ambassadors in the Hemisphere restating our position on Cuba, but + putting it in an overall description of our Latin American policy, not + as an isolated matter.

+

Ambassador Frazao said that perhaps the Secretary should “do it here.” He + said the position we take in the next few weeks would be important. The + Secretary said that the United States would maintain the position taken + by Ambassador Scali last week. We + will take a strong stand against Cuba, he said.

+

The Foreign Minister referred to the OAS + and pointed out that the position of the United States has been to wait + and see what others do. That, he said, was the impression that Brazil + and others had. He thought it was important for the United States to + take a strong and clearer position.

+

Ambassador Frazao pointed out that in Latin American consultative bodies + in the UN, Cuba had come in with the + votes of the Central American governments. This had been a surprise.

+

The Secretary said we would watch this carefully. He pointed out that he + had not always been able to follow such details (like the OAS debates) while in the White House.

+

+ Gibson Barboza referred to the + Special Committee on Reform of the OAS + Charter of the Rio Treaty. At the last meeting of the OAS, he said, we had to fight very hard to resist the trend + toward weakening the Charter. He said that we had to stand by the + principles of self-determination and non-intervention.

+

The Secretary said he was trying to think through this whole problem and + the OAS. Before we can make up our + minds, he said, we need your thoughts and ideas. How do we best make any + changes that are necessary?

+

+ Gibson Barboza said we could + consult closely on this either through Ambassador Araujo Castro here or through the U.S. + Ambassador in Brasília. The Secretary said that we should consult very + soon.

+

The Secretary then raised the initiative of the Mexican President to have + some kind of a meeting of Western Hemisphere leaders in Mexico in an + informal setting. Gibson Barboza + said he thought this was “not a great idea.” The Secretary agreed that + there were many problems associated with this subject. The Secretary + mentioned the possibility of his making a trip to Brazil next year. The + Foreign Minister said he would be most welcome.

+

(The Secretary turned to Jorden + at this point and asked him to arrange for the State Department to + prepare a working paper for him on the Rio Treaty and the OAS situation.) He told the Foreign + Minister that after he had had a chance to study the details, they could + talk further.

+

The Brazilians raised the matter of the meeting of leaders of the armies + of the Western Hemisphere in Caracas some two weeks ago. Gibson Barboza noted that it was the + first time in such meetings that political elements had been introduced. + He said that there was a severe difference on ideological grounds. He + said the central development was that the dangers of communism in Latin + America had been replaced by imperialism and economic aggression as + dangers. He said that Peru had led the way and had been supported by + Argentina, Venezuela, Colombia and others. He noted that the U.S. Army + representatives had taken a very low profile and had not worked to + oppose this trend.

+

At this point the Secretary noted that he was already late for his next + meeting and he asked to be excused.

+

Farewells were exchanged, and the Brazilian party left the office.

+
+ +
+ 93. Telegram 217488 From the Department of State to the Embassy in + Brazil +

Summary: Thanking + the Ambassador for his suggestions, the Department suggested + possible approaches he could use to improve the dialogue with + Brazil.

+

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 772, Country Files, + Latin America, Brazil, Vol. 4, 1973–1974. Secret; Immediate; + Nodis. Drafted by Bowdler, approved by Kubisch and Eagleburger. In telegram 7372 + from Brasília, October 29, Crimmins reported that the Brazilian Government + was dubious that the United States really desired a special + relationship with Brazil. Crimmins recommended close policy coordination + between Brasília and Washington on regional issues, in + particular on Chile. (Ibid., RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + P840121–2657) The Kissinger-Gibson + Barboza correspondence has not been + found.

+ + + + Washington, November 4, 1973, + 0356Z. +

217488. Subj: Consultations with Brazil. Ref: Brasília 7372. For + Ambassador Crimmins.

+

1. We have carefully considered your thoughts expressed reftel concerning + an apparent feeling of dissatisfaction by the GOB with the state of our consultations. We share that + concern and had been becoming somewhat uneasy ourselves even before + arrival of your telegram. The somewhat reserved reception given our + first approach on Chile and what seemed to us to be a rather perfunctory + reply to Secretary Kissinger’s + personal letter to Gibson + Barboza bringing Gibson up to date on what had happened in New York + during the latter’s absence and requesting Gibson’s advice regarding attendance at the Bogota + Foreign Ministers’ meeting made us wonder if something was going wrong. + We are perhaps more aware of this here because of the contrast between + Gibson Barboza’s response to + Secretary Kissinger’s request + for advice on attending the Bogota Foreign Ministers’ conference and + those received from Mexico and Argentina which were lengthy, warm and + personal messages containing carefully considered and thoughtful + comments.

+

2. In view of the importance which all of us in USG give to especially close relations with the Brazilians, + we want to make sure that the dialogue does not suffer from lack of + initiative or input from our side. We appreciate your specific + suggestions for provision of various additional materials. We are + looking at what is available, which may not already have been sent to + you, and will forward as much as possible of the instructions and + memoranda concerning decisions and attitudes in the three or four areas + of particular interest to your consultations, i.e., restructuring the + OAS, Argentina, Cuba and Chile. In + this connection we are also assembling a review of the steps we have + taken to date, or are in + process, to assist the Chilean Government to be sure that you are fully + apprised of them when you meet with Gibson + Barboza.

+

3. We will also undertake a more energetic campaign with Ambassador + Araujo Castro and his + Embassy staff here in Washington to share with them more fully some of + the concerns and considerations which are governing our actions as we + move through the problems of the hemisphere.

+

4. Your suggestion to Gibson + Barboza for a follow-up on the New York meeting with + Secretary Kissinger seems to us + to provide another basis to strengthen the consultation process. You can + explain to Gibson that in part + as a result of his advice, the Secretary decided not to proceed at this + time with his idea for a special mission to Latin America to make + recommendations for new policy approaches. The Secretary did ask on that + occasion for the GOB’s thoughts on our + approach to Latin America and we are still interested in the response to + that question. We are proceeding here with a review of our relations + with Latin America, including restructuring of the OAS. Because Gibson Barboza will not be present at Bogota and his + views will not be reflected there, we will be interested to know in a + private way what his views are in this matter. Indeed, we are interested + in his views on the wide range of subjects of mutual interest and are + hopeful you will be able to obtain them.

+

5. We hope these considerations will be helpful to you and urge that you + continue to share with us your thoughts on the progress of our + consultations with the GOB.

+ + + Kissinger + + +
+ +
+ 94. Telegram 440 From the Embassy in Brazil to the Department of + State +

Summary: The + Embassy commented on the election of Geisel as President, noting that the return to + representative government promised by the Médici regime had not taken + place.

+

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + [no film number]. Confidential; Priority. Repeated to Buenos + Aires, Caracas, Montevideo, Santiago, Recife, Rio de Janeiro, + and São Paulo.

+ + + + Brasília, January 18, 1974, 1910Z. +

440. Subject: Election of General Geisel—Embassy Comment. Ref: Brasília 421 (Notal).

+

1. The “anti-campaign” of the opposition MDB party “anti-candidate” Ulysses Guimaraes may have had + its touch of cynicism, but this was in perfect keeping with the + “non-event” of the election of General Geisel.

+

2. In a country with some democratic tradition, whose government claims + legitimacy based on the will of the people, the rubber-stamping exercise + which characterized the “election” of Brazil’s next President can only + be called a charade. What makes this non-event even sadder for the + sympathetic observer was, on one hand, the smug self-satisfaction and + hypocrisy of those who ran the show—the government apparatus supported + by the so-called majority political party, and, on the other hand, the + almost complete apathy of the public. Few people in Brasília took + cognizance of a national “election” in their midst. Were it not for + newspaper headlines and TV, there would have been no public + acknowledgment of the event. The only positive aspect of the exercise + was that it was peaceful and orderly, an accomplishment of considerable + note since achievement of non-violent succession is one of the more + problematical aspects of authoritarian regimes.

+

3. It is obvious that along with the remarkable accomplishments of the + Médici government in the + economic field and in the areas of national integration and security + during the last five years, it did not permit a return to representative + government—as it had promised—and thus the present election represented + its most notable political failure. There is, at this point, no concrete + indication to the observer of the Brazilian scene that the return of + democratic institutions—representative government, habeas corpus, civil + liberties, absence of censorship—is other than a rhetorical objective of + the new administration.

+

4. The mood among politicos and intellectuals is gloomy—with good reason. + Columnist Castello Branco claims that this is at least in part their own + fault (see reftel). The gloom is intensified by the total absence at this writing of any ray of + knowledge on anyone’s part—except Geisel’s—as to who will be in the new administration, + what the new administration will do, how it will act. With the exception + of the heavily censored Estado de São Paulo and + surprisingly the gutsy—or foolish—Journal de + Brasília, the reaction in the daily press has been expectedly + sycophantic.

+

5. This telegram does not address itself to the much more profound + question as to whether democracy can exist in Brazil at this stage in + its history and whether it is a good thing for Brazil. The only point we + wish to make is that it doesn’t exist now in spite of all pretenses and + trappings by the government to the contrary. One of the major questions + which the Médici administration + did not answer and which the new Geisel administration may have to address, at some time + during its term of office, is how can this government continue to base + its legitimacy on the popular will when it refuses to permit the popular + will to be expressed or exercised. President Geisel might have to face the alternatives of either + permitting some political opening or of finding another source for his + government’s legitimacy.

+ + Tuch + +
+ +
+ 95. Draft Telegram From the President’s Deputy Assistant for National + Security Affairs (Scowcroft) to + Secretary of State Kissinger + +

Summary: In light of Shultz’s preparations to announce a + countervailing duty investigation regarding Brazilian footwear, + Scowcroft presented + to Kissinger options for + minimizing damage to bilateral ties between the United States + and Brazil.

+

Source: Ford Library, + National Security Adviser, Scowcroft Daily Work Files, Box 6, 2/19–28/74. + Secret; Sensitive. Kissinger was in Jerusalem February 27–28. On + February 20, Kissinger, + in a conversation with Gibson + Barboza in Mexico City, stated that he would do + the best he could to delay the application of countervailing + duties on Brazilian footwear. (Telegram 1556 from Mexico, + February 22; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy + File, [no film number])

+ + + + Washington, February 27, 1974. + + SUBJECT + Countervailing Duty Investigation Announcement—Brazil + +

+ Shultz is determined to announce + a countervailing duty investigation on footware from Brazil this week. + He wants you to realize that [he] is not announcing formal proceedings, but only + starting the information gathering process which he believes goes a long + way towards being as consistent as he can with what you told the + Brazilian Foreign Minister. Kubisch and Hennessy have explained to Shultz the progress you made with the Brazilian Foreign + Minister, but Shultz feels he + must move ahead and that he has quasi-judicial authority in this field. + He believes it is essential to take a concrete public action before + hearings on the trade bill start next Monday. Shultz’ position is a strong one, + since we are seeking more flexible countervailing duty authority and the + Brazilian shoe case is a clear-cut instance of an export subsidy. You + should also be [1½ lines not declassified] and + Treasury is not, therefore, overly impressed by the commitment the + outgoing Foreign Minister gave you.

+

At our request, Shultz agreed to + delay his action from February 28 to March 1 to give you a chance to + decide how to proceed. Nothing but your personal intervention could hope + to change Shultz’ position.

+

There are essentially three choices:

+

First, let Shultz go ahead on + Friday. If this is done, Kubisch + will arrange to have our Ambassador talk with the Brazilian Foreign + Minister in advance. He would emphasize that our domestic situation and + the importance to all Latin America and Brazil of the over-all trade + bill including preferences require action now on footwear which is a + domestic issue. Moreover, he would stress that this is only an + investigation and there will be time to find a mutually satisfactory + solution with the new government while the investigation proceeds.

+

Second, you could send a message to Shultz explaining your commitment to the Brazilian + Foreign Minister, noting the poor timing so soon after your multilateral + and bilateral commitment in Mexico and suggesting that we make clear to + the Congress our intention to move quickly on the matter with the new + Brazilian Government after March 15.

+

Third, you could send a strong message to Shultz urging delay on the organized investigation for + overriding foreign policy reasons and indicating that this issue is + sufficiently important that the decision between our Latin American + foreign policy interests and our domestic and trade bill interest can be + made only by the President.

+

We have discussed these options in detail with Jack Kubisch who agrees that they are + the alternatives and believes you should make another try with Shultz along the lines of option two. + Kubisch says he has done + everything he can with Treasury. Our feeling is that there is probably + no way Shultz can be headed off + and that simply starting an investigation of the facts can be explained + to the Brazilians as outlined + above. Therefore, we would recommend either of the first two + options.

+

As a footnote, you should be aware that Shultz also has on his desk a similar investigation on + Colombian cut flowers. We believe we can get him to delay action for at + least a few days while the issue is discussed with the Colombians for + the first time.

+

Warm regards.

+
+ +
+ 96. Action Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for + Inter-American Affairs (Kubisch) + to Secretary of State Kissinger + +

Summary: Because the Department of the Treasury was + scheduled to announce a countervailing duty proceeding on + Brazilian shoes, and the duty contradicted an understanding + between Kissinger and + Foreign Minister Gibson + Barboza, Kubisch had a letter drafted to explain the + Treasury’s decision.

+

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + P850150–1169. Confidential; Exdis. Drafted by Kubisch. Attached is the draft + of a telegram to Gibson + Barboza, not published. A handwritten note + indicates it was sent on March 7. Telegram 45677 to Brasília, + March 7, transmitted a letter from Kissinger to Gibson + Barboza informing the Foreign Minister that + Shultz would make + the announcement March 8. (National Archives, RG 59, Central + Foreign Policy File, [no film number]) On March 7, Ambassador + Crimmins delivered + Kissinger’s letter. + Gibson Barboza + informed Crimmins of his + displeasure regarding the decision and the short notice given + Brazil, and he questioned whether the United States and Brazil + shared a “special relationship.” Crimmins responded that the U.S. Government had + been requesting countervailing duty discussions since September + 1973, but the Brazilians had not agreed. (Telegram 1572 from + Brasília, March 7; ibid., P740141–0350)

+ + + + Washington, March + 6, 1974. +

+ Brazil: Possible Countervailing Duties on + Shoes +

+

As we discussed last night, an announcement by the Treasury Department of + a countervailing duty proceeding on Brazilian shoes is scheduled to be + made on Friday of this week. This action, of course, is contrary to your + understanding with Brazilian Foreign Minister Gibson Barboza.

+

You asked that I prepare, on a contingency basis, a letter from you to + Gibson Barboza explaining + the Treasury decision, but to hold it for 24 hours because you expected + to discuss this with Secretary Shultz once again, along with a similar action Treasury + is proposing to take on cut fresh flowers from Colombia.

+ +

Recommendation:

+

That you authorize the attached telegram to Gibson Barboza if Secretary Shultz was unwilling to reconsider or defer the Treasury + action.

+
+ +
+ 97. Telegram 1850 From the Embassy in Brazil to the Department of + State +

Summary: Crimmins discussed the + prospects for political liberalization in Brazil. He concluded + it would be a continuing source of difficulty for the Geisel administration.

+

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + [no film number]. Confidential. Repeated to Rio de Janeiro, São + Paulo, and Recife. In airgram A–24, February 16, the Embassy + summarized Huntington’s discussions of “decompression” in + Brazil. (Ibid., P740012–0462) In telegram 3722, May 25, the + Embassy concluded that the Geisel administration, despite backsliding in a + few areas, continued to pursue political liberalization. (Ibid., + D740132–0519)

+ + + + Brasília, March 19, 1974, 1348Z. +

1850. Subj: The Interregnum: Signs of Reopening.

+

Begin summary. The January 15–March 15 period was marked by mounting + discussion of signs of a possible political opening in the Geisel administration. One early + alleged portent, ARENA President + Portella’s designation to + coordinate the choice of candidates with the party’s bases, came a + cropper. Other signs were more durable: Professor Huntington’s visit to + Rio, during which he met with Geisel intimate General Golbery, added “decompression” + to the local political lexicon. Meetings between Geisel administration representatives + and church leaders left the latter guardedly hopeful of an improvement + in church-state relations and of new political directions under the + Geisel administration. The + appointment to the Cabinet of three politicians also fueled hopes for a + broader decision-making base, with Falcao taking the lead on public + statements on dialogue. Against the consequent rising expectations the + new President will have to consider potential resistance within the + Armed Forces to such changes. The conflict seems certain to be a source + of difficulty for the new administration no matter how cautiously it + moves. End summary.

+

1. The two-month period between Geisel’s January 15 election and his inauguration on + March 15 was a kind of interregnum marked by growing speculation and + discussion, much of it public, about possible new directions in the + Geisel administration. One + starting point was the idea that, having scored unarguable successes in + the economic, financial, and + administrative fields, notable (although criticized) achievements in the + social field, and having virtually eliminated the threat of subversion + or widespread disorder, the revolution of 1964 could now turn its + attention to the political sector. Perhaps a more basic impulse was the + revolution’s long-evident concern with its legitimacy, a concern which + has led it to ponder possible means of institutionalizing its power + through normal and democratically based political structures without + seeing its achievements frittered away and Brazil weakened by + “unscrupulous and self-seeking” politicians misleading a “politically + unsophisticated” mass.

+

2. During the period various terms were used for what is alleged to be in + the offing, including institutionalization, national reconciliation, + reopening, and (the current favorite) decompression. ARENA President Petronio Portella, presumably loath to + entertain pejorative implications about the process to date, preferred + to speak more vaguely—and perhaps more accurately—of a “new style.”

+

3. In fact, Portella himself has + figured in one of the developments which first gave rise to the + discussion, the so-called Portella mission. This calls for him, at Geisel’s direction, to tour the + country, meeting with local ARENA + leaders to seek unified and cohesive party support at the regional, + local, and even grassroots level, for the strongest possible candidates + for the gubernatorial and congressional elections later this year. Press + commentary approvingly contrasted Portella’s (and ARENA’s) apparently influential role with that of his + predecessor Rondon Pacheco, who in 1970 carried out a mission identical + in purpose but empty of content because the candidates were, as everyone + knew, actually picked by the top echelons of the government itself. + Subsequently it was publicly intimated that in key states, Geisel would make the choice directly. + As March 15 approached public comment became increasingly skeptical of + any significant difference between the two missions. In fact, according + to Paulo Affonso, Secretary General of the Presidency of the Chamber of + Deputies, the names to be presented to Geisel are to be selected by Geisel’s chief advisor, General Golbery, and Minister of + Justice Armando Falcao (see below); and one alleged selection, that of + Paulo Egidio Martins for São Paulo, has already been reported in the + press.

+

4. Portella also announced that as + a sign of the heightened prestige and influence to be enjoyed henceforth + by the legislative branch, congressmen would be invited to participate + in discussions with governmental technicians while projected legislation + was still in its formative stages. While some, including the independent + Jornal do Brasil, reacted favorably to the + idea, others perceived the vitiation of the true legislative role that + could result, and considerable criticism ensued. Both Portella and the Jornal stuck to their guns, however, and as an apparently well-intended effort to + foster executive-legislative consultation and dialogue, the proposal may + still bear some fruit.

+

5. The visit to Rio in early February of Harvard Professor Samuel + Huntington also contributed to discussion of + “decompression”—Huntington’s term. As reported in Rio’s A–24 of February + 16, 1974, Huntington met with various officials on the Geisel team, including Golbery, who was + interested in identifying safe means of accomplishing decompression. + While “decompression” quickly caught on as the fashionable term in + political circles, media discussion was slight. Those who did + comment—Jornal do Brasil, columnist Carlos + Castello Branco, and the bi-weekly Vissao—agreed + on the central thesis that decompression must be gradual, and that too + rapid a rate risks a corresponding backlash in reaction + (“recompression”). All three comments took more or less for granted that + some decompression was in prospect. The Jornal’s + lengthy editorial praised Huntington’s views and declared, “there can be + no political development without a political conscience which must + always be updated by foreign and Brazilian scholars.” Castello Branco + felt the situation at the end of the Médici regime was really “political stagnation aided by + the anesthesia of administrative and economic success.”

+

6. Also heralded, although cautiously, as a sign of reopening was the + February 19 meeting between Cardinal Paulo Evaristo Arns and General + Golbery. Initially more guarded in their expectations than official + church statements suggested, Cardinal Arns and other members of the + hierarchy appear, according to ConGen Sâo Paulo, to have renewed their optimism that there + will be significant improvement under Geisel—not only in church-state relations but also in + terms of a broader political opening. The ConGen continues, “Golbery is reported to have told the + Cardinal not to expect any institutional changes during the first year + of the Geisel administration + beyond the initiation of a more open political dialogue. Without being + specific, however, Golbery reportedly led the Cardinal to expect greater + liberalization of the system during Geisel’s second year in office, particularly in the area + of political rights and civil liberties. Our church sources believe that + the monthly contacts which have taken place in recent months between + military officers representing General Geisel and representatives of the CNBB will not only + continue but will gradually shape into a more meaningful dialogue of + concrete ways to solve outstanding problems between church and state. We + have been told that church authorities around the country are almost + uniformly optimistic about the prospects for an improvement in relations + and that even Dom Helder Camara is reserving judgment.”

+

7. According to ConGen Rio, “Limited + broadening of the decision-making base, the lifting of prior censorship + of the newspapers, and the ending of interrogations and the torture of subversives are among the + revelations” made to church leaders by Geisel administration representatives. “Church leaders, + while pleased with these assurances, have explained that an informal + church-state accord containing an across-the-board church endorsement of + the administration that the continuing dialogue will help dispel the + atmosphere of confrontation which existed between the church and past + military governments.” [sic] The ConGen comments, “The revelations by + Geisel representatives as to + the new directions of the incoming administration have not been made + exclusively to the church leadership. Our checks with local political + leaders and top newspaper editors indicate that they too have received + the same message from Golbery, his lieutenants, or even from Geisel himself.”

+

8. The naming of three politicians to the Geisel Cabinet further added to discussion of a new + opening to the political sector. Aware that Ney Brago is a former army + officer and Arnaldo Prieto is free of the taint of pre-1964 political + prominence, comment centered on “old pol” Armando Falcao and his + anticipated role as Minister of Justice. The idea in this case was that + Falcao would use his extraordinary capacity for adaptation and his + redoubtable general political talents and experience to establish a + dialogue between the government and the press, church, and Congress. + According to an Embassy source, Geisel himself instructed Falcao to this effect, and + “sources close to Falcao” have been cited as declaring these sectors to + be his principal target areas. Falcao himself vowed to “fill the halls + of the Ministry of Justice with cassocks and longhairs.” Some of the + comment, however, also took due account of Falcao’s well-established + regard for law and order. Nevertheless, pointed out the news-weekly Veja, the portfolios given the politicians in the + Cabinet—Justice, Education and Culture, and Labor—“were precisely those + sectors in which the revolution intervened most drastically. Thus, they + are the areas which need professional conciliators.”

+

9. Since then, various Congressmen have spoken enthusiastically to + Embassy officers about Falcao’s capacities and the new administration’s + intentions. Since his meeting with Golbery—which was arranged by + Falcao—Chamber President Flavio Marcilio, who has been pushing for + reform but was previously privately skeptical that any real opening + would take place, appears now to be sincerely hopeful. Other + Congressmen, including even radical MDB + Autentico Marcos Freire, have spoken to Embassy officers in similar + terms, and a substantial crowd of Congressmen went to the airport to + welcome Falcao upon his arrival in Brasília.

+

10. Comment: Some of the assertions about the extent of the + “decompression” have been fatuous, even ridiculous. For example, the possibility that Falcao would + accept the offer of an interim office in the former Chamber of Deputies + in Rio was cited as a further instance of increased ties between the + executive and legislative branches. The evidence seems unmistakable, + however, of a genuine intention on the part of the new administration to + establish a dialogue with heretofore disaffected (the church, + intellectuals, students) or largely disregarded (Congress, the political + class) sectors. It is a measure of how hungry for attention and a sense + of participation the latter have been that they should be reacting as + favorably as they are to the prospect of what may be only occasional + conversation. MDB leaders during the + two-month period have shown considerably greater restraint than their + ARENA colleagues, doubtless a + reflection of their electoral interests as well as their ideological + inclinations. Thus we find Marcos Freire’s recent (March 15) remarks + most interesting.

+

11. There has been some discussion of even more significant changes, + e.g., the elimination of IA–5, or + alternatively its (whole or partial) incorporation into the + constitution, thus eradicating its “exceptional” condition. We do not + anticipate, however, that the revolution will divest itself of its + principal tools, or move at any but an extremely gradual and measured + pace. The establishment of a dialogue—should it come to pass—should + nevertheless not be downgraded. The engagement of politicians, + intellectuals, and the church in serious discussions, which are seen by + these groups to have some influence on the course of government, could + have an important decompressing effect.

+

12. No matter how gradually or carefully carried out, however, + decompression seems certain to be a continuing source of difficulty for + the Geisel administration. + According to congressional sources, Falcao and Golbery are to be the + principal agents within the government, the former to conduct the + dialogue and the latter to keep the Armed Forces in line. Each runs some + risk: Falcao, now enjoying a wave of good feeling, will by the same + token be an obvious target if expectations are not met; Golbery’s + unenviable task will be all the harder for the fact that he is a + controversial man among his colleagues, who consider him “tainted” with + founding the National Intelligence Service, accepting a cheap + appointment to the Accounts Court, and heading (in Brazil) the + “multinational” Dow Chemical Company. Military officers will be keeping + a close watch on the three politicians in the Cabinet, and some officers + are already upset by the signs of tinkering with a model they consider + too successful to require alteration, particularly for the sake of + gratifying priests and politicians. For an example of hardline views, + see IR 6 809 0176 74 of March 15, 1974.

+

13. The potential for serious conflict within the administration is + clear. Celio Borja, the intelligent, highly respected ARENA Deputy whose appointment as + Chamber Majority Leader was hailed as another portent of dialogue and increased congressional + prestige, has pointed out another potentially troublesome element: 1974 + is an election year in Brazil, tempting ARENA and MDB candidates + alike toward the kinds of statements and actions that will tend to + confirm the worst fears harbored within still important sectors of the + Armed Forces.

+ + + Crimmins + + +
+ +
+ 98. Telegram 1640 From the Embassy in Chile to the Department of State + and the Embassy in Brazil +

Summary: President Geisel and Secretary Shultz discussed the effects + of higher oil prices on Brazil. Geisel noted that Brazil was dependent on + imports of oil for about 80 percent of its consumption and that + Brazil had increased exports in order to earn foreign exchange + to pay for oil.

+

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + D740073–0337. Confidential; Priority. Also sent to Rio de + Janeiro and São Paulo.

+ + + + Santiago, April 2, 1974, 1432Z. +

1640. Subj: Geisel-Shultz Meeting.

+

1. Following is report of meeting between President Geisel and Secretary Shultz approved by Assistant Secretary + Hennessy.

+

2. Summary: In a positive, cordial 35-minute conversation, President + Geisel and Secretary + Shultz concentrated on the + petroleum question and its ramifications. President Geisel stressed Brazil’s vulnerability + in petroleum and the consequent dependence on Arab attitudes. There was + mutual agreement on the importance of US-Brazil cooperation and + collaboration on other issues of common concern. The President noted + that there would be many opportunities for discussion of mutual problems + and the search for solutions to them.

+

3. During the conversation, Foreign Minister Silveira was with President Geisel. Ambassador Crimmins and Assistant Secretary + Hennessy accompanied + Secretary Shultz.

+

4. After an initial exchange of amenities, Secretary Shultz said that President Nixon had requested him to extend to + President Geisel his cordial + greetings, his best wishes for success and his special thanks for the + very warm reception accorded Mrs. Nixon. President Geisel replied that he and Brazil had been honored by + Mrs. Nixon’s visit, not only + because of her own qualities but also because her coming had been an act + of friendship and special courtesy on the part of President Nixon. President Geisel said that in his administration the continuation + and strengthening of the friendship between Brazil and the United States + would be a special concern, and he asked that Secretary Shultz transmit that desire to + President Nixon. Saying that he + would be delighted to do so, Secretary Shultz noted that President Nixon, who had high respect for Brazil, fully + reciprocated President Geisel’s + sentiments.

+

5. In response to Secretary Shultz’s observation that the importance of Brazil to + the United States was illustrated by the fact that Brazil was one of our + most important trading partners, President Geisel pointed out that Brazil had to expand its exports + because of the need to compensate for the increased costs of imported + oil. Secretary Shultz stated + that Brazil and the United States had a common interest in seeing a drop + in oil prices. President Geisel + expressed doubt about the prospects for such a decrease and went on to + say that, if it were not for the Brazilian hydroelectric availabilities, + the consequences of the oil crisis would be much more severe for Brazil. + Secretary Shultz observed that + high prices were of course stimulating very strong action to develop new + and additional sources of energy through intensified exploitation and + research. President Geisel + commented that that kind of development would take five to ten years and + a great deal of resources: meanwhile, the effects of high prices would + be severe. Secretary Shultz + replied that he believed that oil prices next year would be at an + appreciably lower level. After President Geisel said that he hoped the Secretary was right, the + Secretary noted that we had found that the consumption rate of petroleum + thus far in 1974 was eight per cent lower than had been expected. + Continuing, he pointed out that, if production levels in the Middle East + picked up to the pre-September levels, there would be a considerable + excess of supply over demand, with consequent downward pressure on + prices.

+

6. Secretary Shultz, referring to + President Geisel’s earlier + reference to strengthening ties, stated that the petroleum question was + an example of issues in which Brazil and the US had a stake in common. + He went on to say that he had found many situations in international + forums in which the two countries had a coincidence of interests. Thus, + he pointed out, mutual support was possible in international settings. + President Geisel agreed and asked + Foreign Minister Silveira to + take careful note.

+

7. Returning to the oil question, President Geisel said there was a substantial difference in the + relative effects of the crisis on Brazil and the United States, with + Brazil being dependent on imports for about eighty per cent of its + requirements and the United States being almost self-sufficient. + Petroleum, the President asserted was Brazil’s greatest vulnerability, + and because of that fact, Brazilian policy in this sector was very + dependent on the Arab countries’ attitudes. Emphasizing this point, the + President said that without oil Brazil would stop.

+ +

8. The Secretary said that he understood the President’s points. He + stated that, because the United States was less vulnerable, it should + take the lead as he had done in Venezuela, even though some of his + comments may not have been popular. In elaboration, the Secretary + pointed out that the problems faced by the poorest countries as a result + of the oil crisis were stunning and heartrending. Although the United + States and Brazil can get along with the situation, he said, many others + cannot, and we have felt obliged to keep stressing this to the oil + producers.

+

9. President Geisel expressed the + opinion that many other factors were also present, notably the political + factor. The Arabs, he commented, were using oil as a weapon—the only + weapon they had—against the world. He explained that when he said that + he was not justifying the Arab attitude, simply acknowledging it as a + fact. The President noted that Brazil was not involved in the + Arab-Israeli conflict but was certainly suffering its effects. Secretary + Shultz stated that, although + the oil weapon was being used by the Arabs principally against the US, + they really had done us a favor by waking us up while we were still + basically self-sufficient; if the crisis had occurred three or four + years later, we would have been much more dependent on imported oil.

+

10. President Geisel said that he + wanted to note, by way of an observation, that the United States may not + have suffered the direct effects of the crisis so seriously as many + others, but it was suffering indirectly as a result of the series of + consequences arising from the effects on countries linked to the United + States, like the Western European nations and Brazil. The Secretary + agreed that all countries were paying high prices and that the problem + was great for everyone. President Geisel concluded the discussion on oil by saying that + the short term would be difficult but he hoped that the issue will be + resolved over the long run. The Secretary said that it would undoubtedly + be solved.

+

11. The Secretary then recalled that Finance Minister Simonsen—whom he + described as a hard bargainer—and he would be at the IDB meeting in Santiago together. The + Secretary stated his belief that they would find many issues at the + meeting on which the US and Brazil could work together in a cooperative + and positive way, as had been the case in the MFM in Mexico City. He noted that several such matters had + been identified in the useful and constructive meeting he had just had + with the Finance Minister. The President replied that there would be + many opportunities in the coming days to discuss mutual problems and + seek mutually acceptable solutions. The President commented that + Minister Simonsen was a young, + open and capable man; the Secretary added that he was also dynamic.

+

12. The meeting concluded with the President expressing regret that the + Secretary could spend so little time in Brazil on this visit and urging him to return to get to + know Rio, São Paulo and other parts of the country.

+ + + Popper + + +
+ + +
+ 99. Memorandum From Director of Central Intelligence Colby to Secretary of State Kissinger + +

Summary: Colby reported that President Geisel planned to continue + Médici’s policy of + using extra legal means against subversives but would limit + executions to the most dangerous subversives and terrorists.

+

Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of the Director of + Central Intelligence, Job 80M01048A: Subject Files, Box 1, + Folder 29: B–10: Brazil. Secret; [handling + restriction not declassified]. According to a stamped + notation, David H. Blee signed for Colby. Drafted by Phillips, [names not + declassified] on April 9. The line for the concurrence + of the Deputy Director for Operations is + blank.

+ + + + Washington, April + 11, 1974. + + SUBJECT + Decision by Brazilian President Ernesto Geisel To Continue the Summary Execution of + Dangerous Subversives Under Certain Conditions + +

1. [1 paragraph (7 lines) not declassified]

+

2. On 30 March 1974, Brazilian President Ernesto Geisel met with General Milton Tavares de Souza + (called General Milton) and General Confucio Danton de Paula Avelino, + respectively the outgoing and incoming chiefs of the Army Intelligence + Center (CIE). Also present was General Joao + Baptista Figueiredo, Chief of the Brazilian National + Intelligence Service (SNI).

+

3. General Milton, who did most of the talking, outlined the work of the + CIE against the internal subversive target during the administration of + former President Emilio Garrastazu + Médici. He emphasized that Brazil cannot ignore the + subversive and terrorist threat, and he said that extra-legal methods + should continue to be employed against dangerous subversives. In this + regard, General Milton said that about 104 persons in this category had + been summarily executed by the CIE during the past year or so. Figueiredo supported this policy and + urged its continuance.

+

4. The President, who commented on the seriousness and potentially + prejudicial aspects of this policy, said that he wanted to ponder the + matter during the weekend before arriving at any decision on whether it should continue. On 1 April, + President Geisel told General + Figueiredo that the policy + should continue, but that great care should be taken to make certain + that only dangerous subversives were executed. The President and General + Figueiredo agreed that when + the CIE apprehends a person who might fall into this category, the CIE + chief will consult with General Figueiredo, whose approval must be given before the + person is executed. The President and General Figueiredo also agreed that the CIE is + to devote almost its entire effort to internal subversion, and that the + overall CIE effort is to be coordinated by General Figueiredo.

+

5. [1 paragraph (12½ lines) not declassified]

+

6. A copy of this memorandum is being made available to the Assistant + Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs. [1½ + lines not declassified] No further distribution is being + made.

+ + + W.E. + Colby + + +
+ +
+ 100. Telegram 82931 From the Department of State to the Embassy in + Brazil +

Summary: + Kissinger and + Silveira discussed + countervailing duties and Brazil’s foreign policy.

+

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 772, Country Files, + Latin America, Brazil, Vol. 4, 1973–1974. Confidential; + Immediate; Exdis. Drafted by Watson and cleared by Bowdler and Schwab. Silveira was in Washington + for the Foreign Ministers meetings April 17–18. In telegram + 75824 to Brasília, April 13, the Department transmitted to the + Embassy a letter from Kissinger to Silveira in which Kissinger said he supported setting up working + groups or preparatory commissions on science and technology, + resources transfer, and possibly on problems of foreign + investment. (Ibid., RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + P840114–2591) In telegram 2533 from Brasília, April 15, + Crimmins reported on + his conversation with Silveira, in which they discussed Brazil’s + regional policy, including relations with Peru, Chile, + Argentina, and Cuba. (Ibid., Nixon Presidential Materials, + NSC Files, Box 772, Country + Files, Latin America, Brazil, Vol. 4, + 1973–1974)

+ + + + Washington, April 23, 1974, 2316Z. +

82931. Subject: Conversations Between Secretary and Foreign Minister + Silveira. For Ambassador + Crimmins.

+

Summary: The Secretary met with Brazilian Foreign Minister da Silveira twice prior to the + commencement of the Washington meeting of Foreign Ministers. At the + first meeting on April 16 Ambassador Araujo + Castro and Assistant Secretary Kubisch were present. At the second meeting the following + day Brazilian Ambassador to the OAS + Maciel was also present.

+

Both the Foreign Minister and the Secretary stressed the importance of + close relations and frequent consultations on a broad range of issues. + Although he expressed concern over the issue of countervailing duties on + shoes, Silveira said he was + satisfied with the results of Secretary Shultz’s recent visit. He urged the US not to take any + further measures prejudicial to Brazil.

+

The Foreign Minister said the GOB would + pay more attention to its relations with other Latin American countries + and would try to harmonize its interests with theirs. He indicated that + the GOB would be less rigid on the Cuba + issue, but would not renew relations with Cuba for the time being.

+

+ Silveira said the PRC had indicated a desire for relations + with Brazil, but that, although Brazil was interested in increasing + trade with China, the establishment of relations would be a very gradual + process. He indicated that Brazil would maintain a lower profile on the + Portuguese-Africa issue and noted that Brazil’s Middle East policy was a + function of its dependence on Arab petroleum suppliers.

+

The Foreign Minister said Brazil was opposed to the idea of inviting Cuba + to the next MFM and would support US + efforts to avoid having this issue considered at the Washington meeting. + He said that the Argentine subsidiaries issue was between the US and + Argentina and did not concern Brazil. Brazil expected US subsidiaries in + Brazil to obey Brazilian laws, he added. Silveira said Brazil did not want the OAS to undergo major reform, only + updating. He was wary of allowing OAS + sanctions to be lifted by a simple majority vote. End summary.

+

1. Foreign Minister Silveira + told the Secretary that President Geisel wants the best possible relations with the United + States. Silveira added that the + GOB believes that Brazil has a + special relationship with the United States and he hoped the United + States shared this belief. Silveira said that Brazil did not want praise from the + United States because praise merely transfers responsibility without + benefits. The Secretary replied that he understood that Brazil did not + want formal praise or recognition from the United States. Later he added + that he understood that in order for a Latin American country to be + accepted in Latin America, it must express its independence from the US. + The Secretary said that we consider Brazil to be the new country in + Latin America, although our relations with Argentina and Mexico are also + important. He said that our problem is how to reconcile the special + position of Brazil with our need for good relations with the others.

+

2. The Secretary asked the Foreign Minister for his views on how the two + countries could give expression to their special relationship. Silveira replied that the Secretary + and he could have informal consultations every six months or so at alternate + locations. When the Secretary asked how the US could meet with Brazil + and not with other Latin American nations in view of Brazil’s reluctance + to be publicly praised or singled out by the United States, Silveira said that Brazil could + accept this kind of praise because it would consist of acts not merely + words. The Secretary suggested that consultations could take place at + all levels of government on a broad range of topics including issues + being considered in international forums, such as population and LOS. At the April 17 meeting the Secretary + said that he had spoken with the President who had confirmed our desire + to have especially close relations with Brazil. He reiterated that these + relations could be a de facto arrangement without publicity or special + praise carried on by meetings between the Secretary and the Foreign + Minister twice a year as well as by exchanges at other levels.

+

3. Silveira described the + results of Secretary Shultz’s + visit as very constructive as far as the GOB was concerned. He added that it is difficult, however, + to explain to Brazilian public opinion the issue of the countervailing + duty on shoes, especially why the United States is not applying the same + regulations to Argentina, Italy, or Spain as it is to Brazil. He + recognized that failure to make progress on this issue after January 16 + was essentially Brazil’s fault, but he added that it was not the fault + of the present administration and the US decision to announce the + beginning of the formal investigation two days before the Geisel administration took office made + the issue look like a challenge to the new administration. The Secretary + replied that he understood the problem but that it would have been worse + if the U.S. had announced its decision after the Geisel administration had taken office. + Silveira agreed but said + that it would have been better for the US to have made the announcement + in January. He said that the GOB’s + approach to this issue will be to try to be frank but avoid + confrontations. It will seek to harmonize interests. At one point + Silveira said the US should + refrain from further measures prejudicial to Brazil. Then he reiterated + the GOB’s satisfaction with Secretary + Shultz’s visit. He said + Shultz had agreed that the + two countries should examine Brazil’s export incentive system together + and that the problem should be discussed in the GATT.

+

4. Silveira stressed that Brazil + must focus more attention on its relations with other Latin American + nations and will try to be more creative in handling them. Brazil wants + to harmonize its national interests with those of the other Latin + American countries and is making progress in that regard. He cited the + natural gas agreement with Bolivia as an example. Silveira expressed the belief that in + Latin America Brazil can be useful not only to itself but also to the US + and added that he hoped the US recognized this.

+

5. The Foreign Minister said that certain aspects of Brazilian foreign + policy would be less rigid than in the past. He specifically said the + + GOB would not renew relations with Cuba for the time being, + but indicated that the GOB’s approach + would be somewhat more relaxed on this issue.

+

6. The Foreign Minister said that Brazil was improving its relations with + the PRC. The Chinese Ambassador in + Moscow had congratulated President Geisel on his inauguration and indicated that the PRC was interested in establishing + diplomatic relations with Brazil. Silveira pointed out that China is Brazil’s second + largest sugar customer and that Brazil was interested in developing that + market. He said, however, that the establishment of relations with China + would be a gradual process and that the GOB was not taking any final decision on this issue + now.

+

7. Silveira confirmed that + Brazil was gradually changing its position on the question of Portugal + and Africa. He said the GOB wants to be + realistic but not offensive. He said that the GOB will not try to mediate the differences between + Portugal and African nations unless asked to do so specifically by both + sides. Silveira noted that the + GOB was not going to make any + further mention of the concept of an African-Brazilian-Portuguese + community.

+

8. Silveira noted that the basic + factor in Brazil’s Middle East policy was that Brazil had to import + about 700,000 barrels of petroleum a day and that most of this had to + come from the Arab states.

+

9. The Secretary initiated discussion about the Foreign Ministers + meeting. He suggested that the result of the conference should be the + creation of working groups to consider three or four of the agenda + items. He said that he felt frankly that it was a mistake to call such a + meeting so soon after the Mexico meeting. He said that although the + meeting did not have to be a success it was very important to avoid the + impression of serious conflict or failure. In this regard he said it + would be most unfortunate if the issue of Cuba, which a number of + delegations, particularly Argentina and Mexico, wanted to raise, were to + become the focal point of the meeting. Silveira said that Foreign Minister Vignes had told him that he did not + want a confrontation over the Cuba issue at this meeting. He wanted + merely to express his point of view. The Secretary replied that he had + discussed the issue with Vignes + and that the issue would be handled in the following fashion: Vignes would express his views, + Mexican Foreign Minister Rabasa would suggest that Cuba be invited to + the next meeting of Foreign Ministers and the Secretary would then + propose that the host country for the next meeting consult with the + others on the issue.

+

10. Silveira said that he would + state Brazil’s opposition to inviting Cuba to the next meeting of + Foreign Ministers. He added that the smaller countries were also opposed + and the pressure on the issue seemed to have slackened. Initially, he + said, Brazil would stick to the jurisdictional position. If there was little positive reaction to the + positions expressed by Mexico and Argentina, Silveira added, there might be no + need for the Secretary to speak to the issue. The Secretary agreed and + said that he hoped that the issue could be removed from the meeting + without a vote on it. He said he wanted to avoid a situation where the + United States was standing alone against the Mexican suggestion.

+

11. The Secretary said that he understood that Buenos Aires would be the + location of the next conference and that he perceived no reason not to + have it there. Silveira + rejoined that there were three reasons why the next meeting of Foreign + Ministers should not be held in Buenos Aires. First, he said, Perón would turn it into a demagogic + affair. Second, Perón would be + able to pressure the small countries which are otherwise undecided on + the Cuba issue. Third, security was a serious problem in Buenos Aires. + The Secretary replied that Perón + needed the support of the US and Brazil and they can prevent him from + turning the meeting into a demagogic affair.

+

12. The Secretary raised the issue of the US subsidiary companies in + Argentina. Silveira replied + that the GOB had nothing to do with it. + It was a problem between the United States and Argentina. He added that + the GOB wanted American firms in Brazil + to obey Brazilian laws.

+

13. On the question of restructuring the OAS + Silveira said that the GOB wanted to update the OAS a little, but not to reform it. He + specifically suggested that the economic rules be modernized and + systematized and stated that the GOB + needed US support to oppose the Peruvians on this issue.

+

14. The Secretary asked Silveira + for his views on the idea that sanctions should continue to be voted by + a two-thirds majority but could be lifted by a simple majority. + Silveira said that this + would have to be studied carefully to determine what all the + implications would be. He stressed it should not be a public relations + move and that we should not give anything away gratis unless it was + absolutely necessary.

+ + + Kissinger + + +
+ + +
+ 101. Telegram 90883 From the Department of State to the Embassy in + Brazil +

Summary: Meeting + during the OAS General Assembly + session in Atlanta, Kissinger and Silveira discussed the possible establishment of + a U.S.-Brazil special coordinating mission, trade issues, and + Brazil’s relations with neighboring countries.

+

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + P840114–2579. Confidential; Immediate; Nodis. Drafted by + Watson; cleared by + Bowdler, Schwab, and Gammon; approved by Eagleburger. In telegram 86800 + to Brasília, April 27, the Department transmitted a letter in + which Kissinger informed + Silveira he + supported the idea of setting up a working group to discuss + science, technology transfer, and transnational enterprises. + (Ibid., P840114–2584)

+ + + + Washington, May 2, 1974, 2337Z. +

90883. Subject: Conversation in Atlanta Between Secretary and Foreign + Minister Silveira. Ref: State + 0829931. For Ambassador Crimmins.

+

Summary: The Secretary met with Foreign Minister Silveira during lunch on April 20 in + Atlanta. Also present were Ambassador Araujo Castro, Ambassador Maciel, Assistant Secretary + Kubisch and Stephen Low of the NSC.

+

The Foreign Minister agreed with the Secretary that the MFM came out well. They decided to propose + Brasília as the site of the meetings of the science and technology + working group established at the MFM. + In their discussion of bilateral relations the Secretary and the Foreign + Minister agreed they should meet twice a year, once in each country. + They also agreed that a bilateral commission to consider political, + economic and scientific issues would be established. On the question of + the countervailing duty on shoes, Silveira implied that he may believe that Secretary + Shultz and Finance Minister + Simonsen agreed to deal with + the specific bilateral issue at the GATT, rather than bilaterally. The + Foreign Minister approved of the US decision to grant licenses to the + Argentine subsidiaries of American automotive firms.

+

+ Silveira described relations + between Brazil and several Latin American nations. Among the highlights + of these remarks were: Brazil was making progress in its efforts to woo + Uruguay from Argentina; the GOB was + considering inviting the President of Venezuela to Brazil; that despite + Brazil’s good relations with Chile, Brazil would not be a major supplier + of military equipment to Chile; Brazil was advising Chile and Bolivia + separately on the question of Bolivian access to the sea; Brazil would + try to improve relations with Peru; Brazil would not recognize Cuba nor + support Cuba’s attendance at the next MFM. He reiterated his view that the OAS should be simplified but not reformed. + End summary.

+ +

1. The Secretary and Foreign Minister Silveira agreed that the Washington meeting of Foreign + Ministers turned out very well. They discussed the locations for the + meetings of the working groups on the transfer of science and technology + and on trans-national enterprises which were established at the + Washington MFM. The Secretary supported + Silveira’s proposal that + the science and technology working group hold its meetings in Brasilia + and suggested that perhaps the trans-national enterprise group could + meet in Mexico or Costa Rica.

+

2. The Secretary said that Brazil and the United States should consult + before either nation makes a major move in Latin America. He proposed + that he and Silveira get + together twice a year, once in Washington and once in Brazil. He asked + Silveira for his views as + to how the relationship between the two countries should be worked out + and suggested that a scientific cooperation commission be established + which, inter alia, could work on oil shale technology. Silveira replied that they could + establish a US-Brazil special coordinating commission such as Brazil has + with other countries. He explained that it could deal with economic, + political and scientific subjects. The Secretary suggested that topics + like the countervailing duty on shoes issue could be handled by the + commission. Later in the conversation Silveira again raised the issue of a commission and + noted that Brazil already had commissions with Argentina, Chile and + Bolivia. He added that if the US agreed to establish one with Brazil, it + might also establish one with Argentina. He said the focus of the + commission should be political. The Secretary tentatively agreed to the + establishment of such a commission which, he said, would include a + scientific committee. He promised to write to the Foreign Minister about + the idea by the end of May.

+

3. Silveira said that Secretary + Shultz had agreed to + negotiate the issue of the countervailing duty on shoes within the GATT. + When the Secretary said that there was no problem with this provided + Shultz accepted it, + Silveira reaffirmed that + Shultz had accepted + international negotiations on the issue. When the Secretary asked + whether Silveira was referring + to such things as the definition of subsidies, Silveira replied “yes, you are + considering everything as a subsidy.” (Comment: Silveira left the impression that he + may believe that Secretary Shultz and Finance Minister Simonsen agreed to handle the countervailing duty on + shoes at the GATT, whereas in fact they apparently agreed to continue + handling the specific issue on a bilateral basis but to discuss the + general issue of export subsidies at the GATT.)

+

4. The Foreign Minister said that he approved of the USG’s decision to grant licenses to + Argentine subsidiaries of US automobile firms to trade with Cuba. He + added that he could not understand why his predecessor had been so + strongly opposed to such action.

+

5. Silveira described Brazil’s + relations with a number of Latin American countries. He said that Brazil + and Argentina were close to agreement on the river issue. He stressed Paraguay’s importance to Brazil + by noting that Brazil “would even defend” that country. In Uruguay the + security situation had improved. He noted that although Uruguay had + signed an agreement with Argentina and had been attracted to Argentina, + it was “acting better now.” The GOB had + asked the GOU for an interpretation of + the Argentine-Uruguayan agreement, he said. “Even if it is settled,” he + added, “it will be confused enough so it won’t work.”

+

6. The Foreign Minister said the GOB was + “watching Colombia and Venezuela.” Brazil was thinking of inviting the + President of Venezuela to visit Brazil. He noted that Brazil had not had + such a visit for a hundred years and that the GOB wanted to create a climate which would make such visits + possible. He said Brazil was ready to do many things with Venezuela, but + not let it have Guyana.

+

7. Silveira said that Chile and + Brazil had excellent relations, but Brazil was not going to send major + supplies of military equipment to Chile. He said Brazil will not + encourage Chile to take any action against Peru.

+

8. The Foreign Minister said that Peru had poor relations with all its + neighbors: Bolivia, Chile, and even Brazil. He said that he would try to + “enter” Peru and suggested that the fact that both countries had + military governments with similar objectives could facilitate his + effort. Silveira asserted that + it was Velasco’s advisors that + created most of the problems between Peru and Brazil and added that if + Velasco should leave office + the situation would change for the better. He said Brazil would try to + maintain a dialogue and engage in common ventures with Peru. The + Secretary said that he would visit Brazil before Peru so that he could + discuss with Silveira US policy + toward Peru.

+

9. The Foreign Minister said that Peru was worried about Bolivia, noting + that Peru can veto any concession Chile might make to Bolivia. Assistant + Secretary Kubisch explained that + the treaty settling the war between Peru and Chile required that Peru be + consulted in any disposition of Chilean territory that formerly belonged + to Peru and that the President of the United States is the arbitrator of + any differences of interpretation. Silveira said that he was advising both Chile and + Bolivia privately on the question of access to the sea for Bolivia. + Silveira suggested that + Chile could grant Bolivia certain “jurisdictions” over a seaport and an + access corridor which would be less than full sovereignty. He promised + to send the Secretary a paper on this subject. The Secretary asked him + to do so.

+

10. On Cuba Silveira said that + in a year or so Brazil would be more flexible, but would not recognize + Cuba. He added that for domestic reasons China would be easier to + recognize than Cuba. The Secretary asked what Brazil would do if Cuba + was present at the next meeting of Foreign Ministers. Silveira allowed as how it was a difficult problem but + told the Secretary the United States would not be forced to make a + decision on that matter. He said that the Paraguayan Foreign Minister + had told him that he would not attend such a meeting. Silveira added that Chile and Uruguay + also would not attend. When the Secretary pressed him again on what the + GOB would do, Silveira replied, “nothing. I must be + rigid with Cuba, but I’m not going to say so. Our strategy is based on + the behavior of Cuba. We are not ready to make concessions.” Silveira said that Cuba can only be + invited to the next MFM by consensus. + When Ambassador Araujo Castro + asked what was meant by “consensus”, the Secretary replied if Brazil, + the US, Paraguay, Uruguay, Chile were against Cuba’s attending the next + meeting there could be no consensus. The Secretary and the Foreign + Minister agreed to remain in close contact on this issue. Silveira said “we will never change + our position without consulting with you. We are not ready to make + concessions—in words yes—but not actions.”

+

11. Silveira said that whereas + others wanted to reform the OAS, he did + not see how that could be done. He would just like to simplify it a + little. Later he indicated that Brazil would not be out in front in + efforts to restructure the OAS or + revise the Rio Treaty. He implied that the countries that want the + changes will have to fight their own battles.

+ + + Rush + + +
+ +
+ 102. Telegram 4355 From the Embassy in Brazil to the Department of + State +

Summary: + Crimmins argued for + an increase in FMS funding and + stressed the importance of U.S. military assistance to + Brazil.

+

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + D740157–0256. Secret. Repeated to Rio de Janeiro, JCS, OSD (IA/DSAA), + and USSOUTHCOM. In + telegram 31505 to all American Republic diplomatic posts, March + 8, the Department required all ARA posts to provide by June 15 an assessment of + the need for U.S. Government security assistance for their + respective countries. (Ibid., [no film number]) In telegram + 83250 to all diplomatic posts, April 24, the Department outlined + its plans for military assistance. Brazil received $60 million + for FMS and $800,000 for MAP training. (Ibid., + D740096–0402)

+ + + + Brasília, June 17, 1974, 1230Z. +

4355. Dept pass AID. Subject: + Ambassador’s Assessment of U.S. Security Assistance. Ref: A. State + 031505; B. State 083250.

+ +

Summary: Given Brazil’s strategic geographic position, its increasing + importance in regional and world affairs, and the likelihood that the + Brazilian Armed Forces will continue to be the predominant element in + its government for at least the next several years, a primary goal of + our policy toward Brazil should be the maintenance of the U.S. + orientation of the Brazilian Armed Forces, who, in large measure, view + Brazil’s security and foreign policy interests as being parallel with + those of the U.S. The Security Assistance Program provides an essential + tool for preserving and increasing our influence. A secondary, but + important, consideration in the provision of security assistance to + Brazil is the commercial benefit to be derived by the U.S. from sales to + Brazil of U.S.-manufactured equipment under FMS credit sales. Finally, it is in our interest to promote + the reasonable modernization of the Brazilian Armed Forces both for + their possible usefulness in self-defense, international peace keeping + operations, and in the case of ASW forces, for their possible + contribution to the total force concept. Optimum pursuit of these + interests will require higher FMS + credit levels for Brazil than indicated by current dollar guidelines + both in FY 1975 and the remainder of the + planning period. End summary.

+

1. Brazil occupies half the land area of South America, has a population + of over 100 million, and has experienced a period of very rapid and + well-managed economic growth since 1968. It has major quantities of + natural resources and a large and expanding industrial base. As a + result, Brazil exercises considerable influence on its neighbors, and + has demonstrated its potential for eventual world power status. Its long + coastline parallels strategic sea lines of communication, and its + eastern extension is only 1700 miles from the African continent. The + Brazilian Armed Forces provide the power base for the current + government, as they have for each administration since 1964, and are + likely to continue their pivotal political role for the immediately + foreseeable future. The Armed Forces therefore are a primary target + group in maintenance of U.S. influence with Brazil in support of broad + U.S. objectives.

+

2. Our military relationship with Brazil stems principally from our World + War II alliance when Brazilian and U.S. troops fought side by side in + Italy. Subsequently, this relationship was developed into what the + Brazilian military consider to be a “special tie” with the U.S., through + continued use of the joint Brazil-U.S. military and defense commissions, + and of U.S. equipment, doctrine, and management and organization + techniques. After the 1964 revolution, this relationship continued, but + was restricted by two factors: strict limitations on U.S. military sales + to Latin America, and the development of the Brazilian Armed Forces into + a self-sustaining institution capable of developing its own doctrine, + management and training, and supplying a good deal of its own material + requirements. As a result of the sales limitations, some 90 percent of Brazil’s foreign + military purchases in the period 1966 to 1970 were made from third + country sources. Although the past two years have seen an increased + share of U.S. supply to Brazil’s equipment needs, third country + suppliers retain a significant position. We recognize that we cannot + base our military relationship on equipment supply and associated + logistics support so firmly as we have in the past. As Brazil moves + toward the status of a world power, it will tend to reject any form of + military relationship that indicates a client status. Our objective + should be, rather, to foster a mature, cooperative partnership that + depends not so much on assistance in the development of the Brazilian + Armed Forces as on the acceptance of mutually perceived strategic goals + and a commonality of national interests. But this will be no easy task, + and throughout the 1970’s and, perhaps, beyond, the readiness of the + U.S. to meet reasonable Brazilian equipment needs will continue to be an + essential building block for the mature relationship described + above.

+

3. The U.S. delegation, JBUSMC, is + the principal U.S. Defense Agency in Brazil for military cooperation + between the Armed Forces of the two countries and has, in an additional + MAAG role, executed the Security + Assistance Program in Brazil. The joint commission, co-equally + structured and traditionally established and accepted in Brazil, offers + unique benefits to the U.S., and the U.S. delegation role should be + strengthened and utilized to realize its full potential in the + cooperative partnership sense referred to above. This plus a very active + and very effective DAO, working + cooperatively, reinforce each other to advantage. (These views have been + provided by the Mission to the JCS + review of U.S. military policy, programs and presence in Latin + America.)

+

4. The goals of the Security Assistance Program should, therefore, be (a) + the maintenance and enhancement of the U.S.-oriented outlook of the + Brazilian Armed Forces, (b) promotion of commercial benefits to the U.S. + where appropriate, (c) provision of assistance for self defense and + possible Brazilian cooperation in international peacekeeping missions, + and (d) in so far as a U.S. strategic basis for this exists, enhancement + of Brazilian capabilities to take part in a “total force” structure in + regard to anti-submarine warfare. Success in moving toward these goals + should assist us in deriving military and political benefits from our + relationship with Brazil, such as Brazilian cooperation in the solution + of international problems (a primary U.S. interest in the Embassy’s + CASP submission) continued + influence with Brazil in her relationship with her neighbors, + particularly in the strategic Southern Cone, the possible provision of + Brazilian bases, facilities and transit rights in a general emergency + involving protracted conventional operations and, under the same + circumstances, Brazilian assistance in protecting vital sea lines of + communications.

+ +

5. In developing our recommendations for the Security Assistance Program + for Brazil, we have acted on certain assumptions based on our + understanding of current realities and trends in Brazil; that the Armed + Forces will continue to exercise major influence in internal politics; + that, within budgetary limitations, the Armed Forces will continue to + modernize their equipment and organization; that third country suppliers + will continue to offer equipment, including that of a sophisticated + nature, to Brazil at attractive terms; and that U.S. suppliers will be + unable to compete with these terms without the government support that + third country suppliers enjoy. The successful sale of F5E and C–130 + aircraft to Brazil under FMS credits + during 1973 has improved our opportunity for consolidating the U.S. + position as the principal foreign military influence over and source of + equipment for the Brazilian Armed Forces. During FY 75/76, however, and subject to budgetary limits, the + Brazilian Army would like to begin procurement of equipment for a field + army air defense system, two armored infantry brigades, and + modernization of artillery, engineer and signal units, while the Navy is + expected to seek suppliers for both AAW and ASW equipment and will + probably decide on a construction program for vessels of the patrol + frigate type that could involve expenditures of up to $500 million. + Thus, the U.S. response to Brazilian needs during FY 75/76 will have considerable influence + on Brazilian procurement decisions during the planning period.

+

6. The Security Assistance Program takes on added significance as a + policy resource in the light of the phasing-out of the USAID program in Brazil, scheduled for + completion in FY 1977. Although this + will leave a substantial residual pipeline that will continue to flow to + Brazil, no new obligations will be undertaken, and the AID Mission will be reduced to caretaker + level. The AID program in Brazil has + had significant impact on the social and economic progress of Brazil + and, perhaps most important in terms of sustained U.S. influence, has + provided training in the U.S. for thousands of Brazilian technicians and + managers, members of the influential “technocrat” class, who, to a + significant degree, manage the everyday life of Brazil. Particularly in + these terms, the USAID program, with + its concentration on civilian managers, has had an impact complementary + to that exerted by the Security Assistance Program. Although we will + continue our efforts to maintain a widespread U.S. orientation among + Brazilian technocrats, the end of the AID program here increases the importance of the Security + Assistance Program as a vehicle for U.S. influence.

+

7. We are unable to develop firm figures for economic assistance likely + to be granted to Brazil by third countries during FY 75 and the remainder of the planning + period. We believe, however, that substantial inflows from third + countries are more likely to come in terms of direct investment, import loans and financial + loans rather than concessional assistance. Brazil received $3.7 billion + in capital inflow of this type during CY + 1973, and prospects for CY 1974 are for + a continued high level of inflows. Brazil maintains a relatively healthy + balance of payments, and its debt structure has been improved in recent + years. Concessional military assistance has had an insignificant impact + on Brazil’s balance of payments. Brazil receives substantial aid from multilateral donors such as the + World Bank and the IDB. The IDB’s 1974–76 loan program for Brazil + foresees total possible loans of $165 million for 1974, and $421 million + for 1975–76, mainly in the fields of agriculture, energy production, + education, public health and industry. The IBRD’s proposed projects for the next few years in Brazil + foresee total possible loans of approximately $500 million, mainly in + the fields of transportation, industry, energy production, and + agriculture. Although these figures are probably larger than the actual + volume of loans which will be approved, they are indicative of Brazil’s + capability to absorb major projects, and they put into perspective the + government’s relatively minor commitment of resources to military + procurement.

+

8. We have no estimate for the scale of third-country military assistance + likely to be offered to Brazil in FY 75. + If, however, the record of the past few years—which saw, for example, + major purchases by Brazil of military aircraft from France and ships + from England and Germany—is indicative of the future, third country + military suppliers will continue aggressively to pursue major equipment + sales to Brazil with the advantage of attractive government-sponsored + credit facilities.

+

9. As represented by the FY 75/79 POM, the Security Assistance Program + presented an effective and well-organized package for meeting the + priority needs of the Brazilian Armed Forces and maintaining U.S. + influence as a supplier. This approved program represented sufficient + attention to Navy requirements and Army needs to keep the U.S. in + contact with the procurement plans for these services, and provided + tentative plans for the sale of F5E aircraft to the Brazilian Air Force. + However, the later decision to provide FMS credits for the sale of the F5E over a three-year + period, while welcomed by us as a breakthrough in terms of our influence + on Brazilian procurement planning, has lessened the effect of both our + FY 1974 and 1975 programs on the + Brazilian Army and Navy, and has had a similar impact on our planning + for these services in the out years. If provision of FMS credits for Brazil during FY 75 is held to the latest guidance level + of $60 million (Ref B), the effect of the F5E sale would be to weaken, + with respect to the other Brazilian services, the very momentum + generated by the F5E sale. Sales generated by FMS credits during the CASP years 1975/76 are basic to the success of the + Brazilian FY 76–80 Security Assistance + Program as submitted to the Unified Command. Since the major areas in + which we will meet + third-country competition are early purchases of equipment in critical + modernization fields, failure to provide adequate FMS credit levels now can adversely + influence likely cash and credit sales further into the planning period. + A Brazilian decision to purchase U.S. patrol frigates, for example, + would have important economic value for the U.S. and substantially + improve the position of the U.S. as the predominant source of military + equipment for Brazil. The same can be said with respect to the other + priority areas such as Army air defense, as outlined in para 5. + Procurement of these items from third-country sources, however, would + greatly reduce our ability to reestablish and maintain the U.S. as the + primary source of military equipment, training and technology for + Brazil, and in turn, our ability to fulfill the major goal of + maintaining the U.S. orientation of the Armed Forces.

+

10. We should, therefore, move to consolidate the position we gained + through the F5E/C130 sale by providing sufficient additional FMS credit levels to assure the + maintenance of existing relationships and the achievement of our + objectives. I believe that, as indicated in the Mission’s POM and CASP submissions, FMS + credit levels for Brazil along the following lines are necessary:

+ + + + FY 75 + FY76 + FY77 + FY78 + FY79 + FY80 + + + $75M + $90M + $90M + $100M + $100M + $100M + +
+

We estimate that Brazil’s overall military modernization requirements, as + related to the JSOP objective force will involve the expenditure by + Brazil of about $1.5 billion over the next decade. We believe, further, + that the Brazilian Armed Forces are firmly committed to carrying out + this modernization, and that, subject to an unforeseen drastic slowdown + in the national economy, they will do so. Allocation of FMS credit resources at the level + recommended above during the planning period will serve U.S. political, + commercial and security objectives in Brazil. I recommend that the + Department support the Country Team recommendations for FMS credit levels as contained in the + Embassy’s FY 75–76 CASP. (It should be noted that in + response to a request for specific items in connection with the FY 1974 $51 million level, the Brazilian + Armed Forces requested a total of $80 million.)

+

11. Another important element of the Security Assistance Program, though + modest in cost, is the training program. The value of the training + program to the Brazilian Armed Forces, and to the U.S. effort to + maintain influence with them, exceeds its nominal cost of $800 thousand + in grant funds. The program is used in high priority, high impact + technical and professional assistance, and demonstrates continuing U.S. + interest in, and concern for, the development of the Brazilian military + for IS. The training courses + are closely aligned with Brazilian participation in the FMS program and are an effective influence + on planning for purchase, operation and maintenance of military + equipment. Orientation visits, which bring to the U.S. the cream of the + professional military class, have significant professional impact, and + moreover, give the trainee an exposure to U.S. Government, culture and + political systems. We believe that we should give full value to this + important program by raising grant training levels to a minimum of $1 + million annually throughout the planning period. This increase, while it + would do no more than compensate to some extent for real losses suffered + through inflation, would permit continued efforts on our part to + maintaining the U.S. orientation of younger officers of the Armed + Forces.

+

12. To sum up, the U.S. Security Assistance Program in Brazil is an + essential tool for our efforts to influence Brazilian policy. The + program has been effective in beginning to reestablish the U.S. as a + primary source of equipment, training and doctrine for the Brazilian + Armed Forces. It is very much in our interest, however, to consolidate + and expand our recent gains in the provision of military equipment to + Brazil. This will require increased levels of FMS credit and MAP + training availability for FY 75 and the + remainder of the planning period. I recognize that full pursuit of this + goal will raise difficult problems, but I believe we should do all we + can to take advantage of the momentum we now enjoy.

+ + + Crimmins + + +
+ +
+ 103. Telegram 134642 From the Department of State to the Embassy in + Brazil +

Summary: + Silveira warned + Kissinger that if + the U.S. Government applied countervailing duties to Brazilian + footwear, it would damage bilateral ties.

+

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + D740164–0955. Confidential; Immediate; Stadis; Exdis. Drafted by + Watson, cleared by + Ballantyne and + Kubisch, approved by + Eagleburger. On June + 6, Silveira wrote to + Kissinger on the + possibility of setting up a special committee for cooperation + between the two countries. (Telegram 125471 to Brasília, June + 13; ibid., D740152–0400) On June 13, in a letter to Silveira, Kissinger agreed to regular + consultations. (Telegram 125457 to Brasília, June 13; ibid.) In + a June 21 telephone conversation, Kissinger informed Secretary Simon that “we paid a + horrendous price in Brazil” because of the damage to bilateral + ties over the duties on shoes. (Department of State, FOIA Electronic Reading Room, + Kissinger + Transcripts) On June 25, Kissinger informed Silveira that U.S. law required that + countervailing duties on shoes be applied. (Telegram 136133 to + Brasília, June 25; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign + Policy File, D740166–1128)

+ + + + Washington, June 22, 1974, 1612Z. +

134642. Subject: Letter to the Secretary From Foreign Minister Silveira Concerning Countervailing + Duty on Brazilian Shoes.

+

1. English text of Foreign Minister Silveira’s letter to the Secretary delivered June 21 + follows:

+

2. Begin text: My dear Henry, it + was with great pleasure that I received your letter dated June 14, 1974. + The subjects dealt with in your message are extremely important and will + deserve the most careful attention on our part. I hope I shall be in a + position to respond to them very soon.

+

3. Meanwhile, allow me to request your kind attention to a matter of the + utmost urgency, related to the investigation now undertaken by the + Treasury Department, on the export of Brazilian foot-wear to the + American market. In a spirit of cooperation, the Brazilian authorities + have agreed to provide pertinent information to the Department of the + Treasury and, to that effect, Brazilian officials have participated in + two meetings in Washington, D.C., on the technical level.

+

4. As I had the occasion to stress during our talks in Washington, April + last, Brazil attaches the utmost importance to the subject and we cannot + accept that it be settled in the light of American sectorial interests + through a rigid and automatic interpretation of United States + legislation. It is our considered view that the problem involves wider + and more comprehensive interests of both Brazil and the United States + and that the solution to the problem should be sought through bilateral + negotiations, taking into due account the norms and rules of + international trade.

+ +

5. During his visit to Brazil and in direct follow-up to the Foreign + Ministers’ meetings in Tlatelolco and Washington, Ambassador Eberle left it to be understood that a + solution might be found in the context of the multilateral trade + negotiations, when and if the Trade Reform Act is approved, thus + endowing the American administration with a greater margin of discretion + in the application of countervailing duties. Unfortunately, as it was + felt in the course of the technical meeting which has just taken place + in Washington, there are strong indications to the effect that the + Treasury Department is determined to act promptly and to immediately + impose countervailing duties on the import of Brazilian foot-wear thus + ignoring the arguments adduced by the Brazilian exporters and + disregarding the information provided by the competent Brazilian + authorities.

+

6. Such an action, on the part of the United States Department of the + Treasury, prior to the enactment of new and more enlightened + legislation, which will allow the United States to observe the norms and + rules of international trade, will affect, it is easy to see, not only + the interests of an important sector of our industrial exports but + likewise the wider framework of our traditionally cordial relations.

+

7. Cognizant as I am of your deep-felt interest in strengthening + relations between our two countries and of your acute perception of the + diplomatic implications of supposedly technical decisions, I decided to + submit this question to your direct attention, with the firm hope that a + timely intervention of the State Department will insert all this problem + into the context of the wider and more permanent interests of the United + States of America.

+

8. In awaiting from you a positive response, at your earliest + convenience, I have instructed Ambassador Joao Augusto de Araujo Castro to deliver to you this + personal message, to which I attach the utmost urgency and importance. + Cordially yours, Antonio Azeredo da + Silveira. End text.

+

9. In presenting the letter to Assistant Secretary Kubisch, Ambassador Araujo Castro stressed the great + importance the GOB attached to the + countervailing duty issue and said that Silveira would be discussing it with President Geisel today. Araujo Castro said he understood that + Treasury felt it had to appear tough on this issue in order for Congress + to give it discretionary authority in imposing countervailing duties in + the Trade Reform Act. But why did Brazil have to be the object of this + toughness? he asked. The US seemed willing to sacrifice relations with + some countries over this issue, he said. The decision may be viewed by + Treasury as technical or legal but it is a diplomatic problem and its + diplomatic effects will be very bad, he said.

+

10. Econ Counselor Thompson Flores, who accompanied Araujo Castro, noted that the USG through DISC, EXIM, etc. provides some + of the same incentives to + US exporters for which it is criticizing Brazil. He added that with the + TRA before Congress and discussions + taking place in Geneva, the entire issue of export subsidies seemed to + be in a period of transition. Consequently, it would seem to be an + inappropriate time for the US to impose countervailing duties on + Brazilian exports.

+

11. Kubisch said that he would + see that Silveira’s letter was + brought to the Secretary’s attention promptly. He said his understanding + was that the Treasury Department was required by law to carry out its + enforcement responsibilities, and that Treasury appeared to have no + discretion in the matter if a bounty or grant were found to exist. Even + so, he continued to hope that with close consultations and good will on + both sides, a mutually acceptable solution might yet be found.

+

12. Portuguese text of Silveira’s letter being pouched.

+ + + Kissinger + + +
+ +
+ 104. Memorandum From the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence + (Walters) to the President’s + Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Scowcroft) +

Summary: Walters informed Scowcroft [text not + declassified] with Brazilian officials on political and + economic matters, and on Brazil’s relationship with China, the + Soviet Union, Argentina, Cuba, and Portugal.

+

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Henry A. Kissinger Office + Files, Box 147, Agency and Congressional Files, CIA, Colby, 1974, 2, General Walters. Secret; [handling restriction not + declassified].

+ + + + Washington, July + 25, 1974. + + SUBJECT + Brazil + +

[1 line not declassified] Brazilian National + Intelligence Chief, General Figueiredo, [less than 1 line not + declassified] and Chief Presidential Advisor, General Golbery. + [less than 1 line not declassified] They + expressed the following views:

+

1. Political “decompression” (allowing broader political activity) is an + aim of the Government and it is coming. It will be cautious and + measured. The opposition and others will have to behave in a responsible + manner.

+ +

2. Brazil has realized that the monopoly on oil exploration of Petrobras + will not produce new fields. In about a year they will change existing + legislation to permit U.S. and West Europeans to participate as only + they have the necessary technology. This is a break with a long-standing + nationalistic myth and it will take a year to educate young officers and + others to accept fundamental need to allow foreign participation in oil + prospecting. This is a very big step.

+

3. Brazilians are moving towards some sort of normalization with Red + China. This too will require an educational process to convince young + officers of advantages in this course.

+

4. They are concerned with events in Portugal and their impact in Brazil. + Figueiredo believes Spinola + is much more of a Naguib than a Nasser. He is, however, more concerned + with rightist tendencies of hard-line young officers. 1974 will be a + difficult year but Geisel will + make it and sailing will be easier thereafter. Golbery agreed with this + assessment.

+

5. Brazil has no intention of changing its policies towards Cuba. If the + U.S. is ever forced to change its policies, they hope we will let them + know well in advance of any public move on our part.

+

6. They expressed great concern about situation in Argentina. They hope + Mrs.Perón can maintain + herself as there is no acceptable alternative to her. She has signalled + Brazilians that she would like to come to Brazil. They feel it is + premature and would rather wait a while to see if she can hold on to + power. The Argentine Armed Forces were inhibited by a “failure + complex”.

+

[1 paragraph (6½ lines) not declassified]

+ + + Vernon A. + Walters + + Lieutenant General, USA + + +
+ +
+ 105. Telegram 169605 From the Department of State to the Embassy in + Brazil +

Summary: + Secretary Kissinger + informed Foreign Minister Silveira that the U.S. Government was obligated + by law to impose a countervailing duty on Brazilian footwear. + Kissinger suggested + the two countries work out their differences at a technical + level to prevent the dispute from damaging bilateral ties.

+

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + D740211–1163. Confidential; Immediate; Exdis. Drafted by + Ballantyne; cleared + by Kubisch and Bowdler, and in draft by + Knepper, Glitman, Self, and Crawford; + approved by Kissinger. + In telegram 139040/Tosec 101 to Kissinger in Moscow, June 27, the Department + transmitted Silveira’s + letter which requested that the U.S. Government refrain from + applying the duties, noting that Brazilian public opinion would + not understand the new duties. (Ibid., + D740170–0623)

+ + + + Washington, August 3, 1974, 0204Z. +

169605. Subject: Letter From the Secretary to the Brazilian Foreign + Minister.

+

1. Please pass the following letter from Secretary Kissinger to Foreign Minister + Silveira as soon as + possible:

+

2. Begin text: Dear Antonio: I want to thank you for your letter of June + 27 on the subject of exports of Brazilian footwear to the United States + and bring you up to date on developments since my letter to you of June + 25.

+

3. The Treasury Department is now in the final stages of analyzing the + information gathered by U.S. and Brazilian experts. It will make a + determination soon as to the existence of bounties or grants and, if so, + what the amount of countervailing duty should be. I understand that + Secretary Simon will write to + Minister Simonsen regarding the + issues in this case.

+

4. I have continued to discuss with Secretary Simon Brazil’s interest in this + proceeding. As a result of these discussions, I have reached the + conclusion that a political resolution of this problem is not possible + for a number of reasons: The pertinent U.S. legislation is mandatory, + leaving the Treasury Secretary no discretion to refrain from imposing a + duty in the event his investigation uncovers a bounty. Private U.S. + commercial interests have resorted to the courts to oblige the executive + branch to take appropriate action under this law. Secretary Simon has given his personal, formal + commitment to the Senate to uphold and administer this statute in an + expeditious manner. Our performance in this regard is being monitored + closely by the Congress, and our legislative advisors are convinced that + the passage of the Trade Reform Act’s provisions dealing with + countervailing duties, which would materially improve our ability to + deal with this very type of problem, is dependent upon our scrupulous + implementation of the present law. Lastly, the issue extends beyond U.S.-Brazilian trade + relations, involving a number of countries in this hemisphere and in + Europe, effectively removing the possibility of an isolated, bilateral + political settlement.

+

5. Under the circumstances, in my judgment, the only profitable course of + action at this time is to work together in the technical area in an + effort to resolve the immediate problem with the least damage to our + bilateral trade and relations. It is a source of satisfaction to me that + the technical representatives of our governments are now cooperating to + achieve this objective. On my part, I will continue to seek passage of + the Trade Reform Act which should help achieve solutions to some of the + problems inherent in the countervailing duty law, and, among other + things, provide for a system of generalized preferences for imports from + developing countries.

+

6. I appreciate fully the importance of this issue, and that it has + implications extending beyond the trade in shoes. I am aware of the + vital role export earnings play in Brazil’s development strategy and the + contribution a dynamic Brazil is making to the stability of the + hemisphere. For this reason, I believe, our mutual interests call for + continued close cooperation on the technical level regarding this case. + Let me assure you that I will continue to give this issue my closest + personal attention.

+

7. With warmest regards, Henry. End text.

+ + + Kissinger + + +
+ +
+ 106. Summary Memorandum +

Summary: President Ford and Foreign Minister Silveira discussed OAS sanctions on Cuba and Brazil’s + economic progress.

+

Source: Ford Library, + National Security Adviser, Memoranda of Conversations, Box 6, + September 29, 1974, Ford, Kissinger, Brazilian Foreign Minister Silveira. Secret; Nodis. The + meeting was held in the Oval Office. The full memorandum of + conversation is ibid. According to the President’s Daily Diary, + the meeting lasted until 10:40 a.m. (Ibid., White House Central Files, + President’s Daily Diary) Silveira was in Washington for bilateral + discussions after attending the UN General Assembly in New York. On November 12, + Kissinger told + Ford that the + Brazilians would probably abstain in the OAS vote to lift sanctions on + Cuba: “They [the Brazilians] are slightly more hard line than + us, but they don’t want to be left behind. State had been for + voting for, but I straightened that out.” (Ibid., National + Security Adviser, Memoranda of Conversations, Box 7, November + 12, 1974, Ford, + Kissinger)

+ + + + Washington, September 29, 1974, 9:45 + a.m. + + SUBJECT + Summary of Conversation Between President Ford and Brazilian Foreign + Minister Silveira on + Sunday, September 29, 1974, at 9:45 a.m. in the Oval Office + + + PARTICIPANTS + The President + Minister of Brazilian Foreign Affairs Antonio Francisco Azeredo da + Silveira + + Secretary Kissinger + + Brazilian Ambassador Joao Augusto de + Araujo Castro + + Lieutenant General Brent + Scowcroft + + +

The first part of the meeting was an exchange of information about + Brazil, in which the high professional quality of Brazil’s military + forces and foreign service was noted. Foreign Minister Silveira said he hoped that President + Ford would come to Brazil + some day, and the President said he would like to see more of Latin + America, including Brazil. The President spoke highly of Brazil’s + development program and control of inflation.

+

There was an exchange of comments about the situation in the Middle East, + in which both sides noted their efforts to impress upon the Arabs the + importance of a responsible position.

+

The discussion turned to Cuba. Castro’s recent strongly anti-United States speech was + noted. Both sides noted that Castro’s behavior could affect their vote + at the Quito Rio Pact meeting. The Foreign Minister and the President + said that a suspension of OAS sanctions + would not automatically entail a lifting of each country’s own embargo + on Cuban contacts. Both expressed the concern about appearing to yield + to Cuba.

+

President Ford agreed to mention + in the public statement following the meeting how impressed he was with + Brazil’s economic progress.

+
+ +
+ 107. Telegram 226024 From the Department of State to the Embassy in + Brazil +

Summary: + Secretary Kissinger and + Foreign Minister Silveira discussed bilateral issues, petroleum + prices, Cuba, and regional policy.

+

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + D740291–0954. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Drafted by Watson; cleared by Ballantyne, Zimmermann, and Bowdler; approved by Eagleburger. Silveira was in Washington + for bilateral discussions after attending the UN General Assembly in New + York.

+ + + + Washington, October 12, 1974, + 1932Z. +

226024. Subject: Luncheon Meeting Between the Secretary and Brazilian + Foreign Minister Silveira, + September 28.

+

Summary: The highlights of the conversation between the Secretary and + Foreign Minister Silveira on + September 28 were: The Secretary tentatively agreed to visit Brazil in + late January; both stressed the need for better communication between + our governments concerning the Cuba issue; Brazil tentatively planned to + abstain on the Quito resolution vote, the US would vote against or would + abstain; Silveira noted + Brazil’s trade deficit with the US and stressed the importance of + increased US investment in Brazil; the Foreign Minister warned that the + US was “demoralizing” the human rights issue by politicizing it; Brazil + continues to support Sapena + Pastor for OAS Secretary + General. End summary.

+

1. The Secretary invited Foreign Minister Silveira to lunch at the Department on September 28. + Also present were Ambassador Araujo + Castro and Minister Holanda Cavalcanti as well as + Assistant Secretary Rogers, + Deputy Assistant Secretary Bowdler, Einaudi and Ballantyne. The conversation was wide ranging. The + following paragraphs describe the discussions of the principal + topics.

+

2. Secretary’s visit to Brazil. It was tentatively agreed that the + Secretary would visit Brazil in the second half of January. They + mentioned as subjects for discussion at that time: Further bilateral + consultations (referred to by Silveira as “our joint commission”), restructuring of + the OAS and the incorporation of the + meetings of Foreign Ministers into the OAS mechanism.

+

3. Cuba. Silveira expressed + appreciation for the visit by Deputy Assistant Secretary Shlaudeman. The Secretary noted that + it was most important for the two governments to keep in touch and not + try to out-guess each other. Silveira said that he would never do this but that + inasmuch as the US position on Cuba had appeared ambiguous, Brazil felt + it had to formulate its position without the US. He insisted that the US + should have taken a decisive position on the Cuba issue earlier. The Secretary explained that + the US delayed forming its position not only to play for time but also + because inasmuch as the US was a leader of the anti-Castro faction, a + change of position by the USG would + have greater influence than a change of position by other governments. + If a change had to be made, it would be easier for the US to follow a + majority rather than to try to form a majority. He stressed that the US + wanted to stand by Brazil on this issue and that was why he sent + Shlaudeman to meet with the + GOB.

+

4. Silveira said he understood + that the US had been discussing the Cuba issue with the Mexicans. The + Secretary responded that we had had no substantive discussions with the + Mexicans on the Cuba issue. We had not authorized the Mexicans to act as + our mediator; Rabasa was not our spokesman in Latin America. The + Secretary told Silveira to + check anything the GOB heard from the + Mexicans on this subject with the US before drawing conclusions. + Silveira said that he had + kept in touch with AmEmbassy Brasília concerning OAS Permanent Council action on Cuba but + that the information which it provided was always 48 hours late. He + suggested using Ambassador Araujo + Castro as the channel of communication on the Cuba issue + rather than AmEmbassy Brasília which, he said, was too slow. The + Secretary replied that, if Ambassador Araujo Castro needed to see him, he will always receive + him, but added that AmEmbassy Brasília should not be faulted for not + being aware of policy which had not been formulated pending receipt of + Brazilian views.

+

5. The Secretary said the US would prefer that the Quito meeting not take + place at all and that the issue of Cuba sanctions not come up for + another year. The status quo was acceptable. He said the US would not + vote for the Quito resolution unless Brazil did. He added the US might + vote against it even if Brazil should vote in favor of it. We would go + no further than to abstain. He stressed that the US wanted to follow + Brazil’s lead on this question. Silveira said that Brazil planned to abstain, but that + if Cuba should attack Brazil, Brazil would vote against the resolution. + Brazil, he said, would make a sound and rational evaluation of Cuban + behavior before reaching a definitive decision.

+

6. The Secretary asked Silveira + if it were possible to obtain some sort of assurances from Cuba. + Silveira asked whether we + weren’t doing something about this. The Secretary said we were not but + that we would welcome messages of assurance from any source. The + Secretary denied that Senators Javits and Pell + were acting on behalf of the administration. When Silveira suggested that American + private enterprise was somehow behind the visit of Senators Javits and Pell to Cuba, the Secretary replied + that we knew nothing about any private enterprise involvement and + stressed that our economic denial program would continue. He then asked Silveira what sort of assurances we + should try to get. Silveira + replied that it would be useful to get assurances that Cuba was not + going to intervene in other countries. He added that this was of + domestic significance in Brazil where there were groups strongly opposed + to recognition of Cuba. The Secretary suggested that Peru (De la Flor) might serve as an + intermediary to obtain such assurances. Silveira replied that he would look into the matter and + get in touch with the Secretary the following week. (When Ambassador + Bowdler met with Araujo Castro on other matters October + 5, he asked whether Foreign Minister Silveira had any further thoughts on a possible Peruvian + approach to Cuba. Araujo Castro + said he had no further word but had the impression that Silveira came out of the meeting with + President Ford on September 29 + thinking that the President and the Secretary felt that Fidel Castro’s speech of September 28 + had upset the efforts regarding assurances. He added, however, that this + was just his impression and that Silveira had not explicitly spoken to him about this + subject.)

+

7. Bilateral relations. The Foreign Minister said that bilateral + relations could not be any better. He implied that the United States + could now have confidence in Brazil’s ability to face international + problems and accept international responsibilities. He had two specific + complaints, however. First he complained that the US had not offered + support to Brazil during the petroleum crisis. When asked what the US + could have done, Silveira + suggested that we could have assured that Brazil would have access to + petroleum supplies. He said “you know our situation. If there were no + petroleum problem, we’d have no development problem in Brazil.” His + second complaint concerned trade. He said “in our trade balance with the + United States last year Brazilian exports grew by only 10 percent while + your exports to us increased 200 percent. This year we have done well to + increase our exports to the United States by 15 percent while your + exports to us are up 100 percent. I am not complaining about this. We do + not seek to balance trade bilaterally. I want as much trade as possible + between our countries. The problem is that we now have many important + projects which oblige us to take options. If you don’t induce your + investors to be interested, our decisions on these options won’t involve + US investment and the consequences will be that we are going to move + apart. For instance, our biggest aluminum project is now with the + Japanese. Afterwards, there may be something with Kaiser and Alcoa as + they are coming. But the Japanese project is enormous, 640,000 tons. If + we take other options like this it’s going to influence our bilateral + relations.” When the Secretary asked what the US could do, Silveira criticized remarks made by + Assistant Secretary Rogers + during his confirmation hearings to the effect that the increase in + petroleum prices was going to + cause Brazil “terrible” economic problems. Silveira’s apparent implication was that such remarks + undercut international confidence in the Brazilian economy.

+

8. Middle East and petroleum. Silveira said that the only way to deal with the Arabs + was to be just about the Middle Eastern conflict and added that Brazil + could never be in favor of occupation of territories by force. He warned + against mixing the energy crisis with the Israeli-Arab dispute. The + Secretary agreed and stated that we had no intentions of linking the two + problems. Silveira said that + Brazil wanted to be informed of the results of meetings among the + petroleum consuming nations. In discussing ways to convince the + petroleum producers to lower their prices he suggested the possibility + of some compromise on price with an arrangement for the consumers to pay + the producers some time in the future. The Secretary assured Silveira that there would be no + military intervention in the Middle East by the United States.

+

9. Human rights. The Foreign Minister warned that the US may be + “demoralizing” human rights by making a political issue out of the + subject.

+

10. Coffee. Silveira asked + whether the US was in favor of a new coffee agreement or not. The + Secretary said he would look into this matter. (See State 216227).

+

11. OAS Secretary General. Silveira confirmed that Brazil was + strongly backing Paraguayan Foreign Minister Sapena Pastor who had 10 certain votes + and needed just two more to be elected. He urged the US to support + Sapena Pastor. When asked + about Mexico’s proposal that the Foreign Minister of the Dominican + Republic be chosen the next Secretary General, Silveira said frankly that Mexico + knew the Dominican could not win. He characterized the Mexican proposal + as a blocking move.

+

12. Latin American economic bloc. The Foreign Minister was asked for his + views on the proposal by Mexican President Echeverria for the formation + of a Latin American economic bloc. Silveira described the proposal as unrealistic, + explaining that economic problems were global not hemispheric. He + characterized Echeverria as eager to be famous, hoping to become the + next Secretary General of the United Nations.

+

13. Argentina. The Foreign Minister said that he thought Mrs.Perón’s position would be eroded by + her lack of decisiveness. The Armed Forces although depressed and + inefficient were, according to Silveira, Argentina’s only cohesive force, but Silveira refused to predict when the + next major change in Argentine politics would occur.

+

14. Latin American meetings. Silveira was generally noncommittal as to whether Brazil + would be represented at the Ayacucho meeting and the proposed meeting of + Latin American Presidents in Caracas in July 1975.

+ +

15. Peru-Chile. Silveira told + the Secretary that Brazil would not support either country’s occupying + territory by force. He repeated his view that Brazil will have no + automatic alignments.

+ + + Ingersoll + + + +
+ +
+ 108. Telegram 279836 From the Department of State to the Embassy in + Brazil +

Summary: The + Department informed the Embassy of its concern over a series of + restrictive measures that Brazil placed on imports. The + Department instructed the Embassy to transmit a list of products + subject to the new restrictions.

+

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + D740372–0367. Unclassified; Priority. Drafted by Williams; cleared by Slattery + and in STR, USDA/FAS, Commerce, and Treasury; approved by + Dunford. Repeated to the UN + Mission in Geneva, the EC + Mission in Brussels, and to Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo. + Telegram 4685 from Brasília, June 26, and telegram 4532 from Rio + de Janeiro, December 9, are ibid, D740168–0930 and D740357–0334. + In telegram 142, January 7, 1975, the Embassy informed the + Department that the import restrictions reported in Rio de + Janeiro 4532 were in addition to those reported in Brasília + 4685. (Ibid., D750006–0795) In telegram 585 from Brasília, + January 22, the Embassy informed the Department that it thought + efforts to scale back import restrictions should be directed + toward specific commodities or trade provisions that constituted + a clear violation of the GATT. The Embassy concluded that + across-the-board criticisms risked damaging bilateral relations. + (Ibid., D750024–0300)

+ + + + Washington, December 21, 1974, + 2007Z. +

279836. Subject: Brazilian Import Restrictions. Ref: (A) Brasília 4685, + (B) Brasília 8859, (C) Rio A–151, (D) Rio 4532, (E) Brasília 9036, (F) + Geneva 7528.

+

1. We are increasingly concerned over series of restrictive import + measures imposed by Brazil in recent months (Refs A through D) and + anticipate raising issue with GOB and + in GATT once we have clearer picture of nature and extent of these + measures. In general, Brazilian actions appear inconsistent with the + spirit of international commitments undertaken in the GATT and IMF to avoid unilateral resort to trade + restrictions for balance of payments purposes; some of them may violate + specific GATT provisions and bound tariff rates.

+

2. For example, recently adopted measures regulating public sector + imports (Refs B and C) appear to contravene Brazilian obligations under + GATT Article XVII (1), subparagraphs B and C, which state inter alia + that government enterprises should “act solely in accordance with + commercial considerations” in its purchases involving imports. Further, + according to reports from Embassy in June (reftel A) new import restrictions/duty increases may + affect fresh foods including apples and pears. If so (and this is still + unclear to us at this stage) this would constitute impairment of bound + concessions. As Embassy is aware, apples and pears presently bound at 37 + percent rate, which is scheduled to be reduced to 32 percent once Brazil + concludes all GATT Article XXVIII renegotiations.

+

3. Action: To assist us in developing appropriate course of action re + Brazilian measures, Embassy should transmit to Washington and Geneva on + priority basis list of products subject to new restrictions and/or duty + increases. To extent possible Embassy should also (A) report if any + GATT-bound items are affected, (B) ascertain whether exemption of LAFTA items applies to imports from + non-LAFTA countries, and (C) + determine what time limit, if any, GOB + has placed on duration of these measures. Finally, we would appreciate + indication from Embassy of relationship between measures reported + Brasília 4685 dated June 26 and those mentioned in Rio 4532 of December + 9; are measures reported in December same as or in addition to those + reported in June?

+

4. Refs (A) through (E) being repeated to Geneva. Future cables re this + subject should also include Geneva as info addressee.

+ + + Sisco + + +
+ +
+ 109. Telegram 46847 From the Department of State to the Embassy in + Brazil +

Summary: The + Department instructed the Embassy to deliver a démarche to + Foreign Minister Silveira to inform him of congressional concern + over human rights abuses.

+

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + D750073–1045. Confidential; Immediate. Drafted by Watson; cleared by Zimmerman, + Crunyon in L, and Lister; + approved by Bowdler. In + telegram 14917 to all diplomatic posts, January 22, the + Department described Section 502B of the Foreign Assistance Act + of 1974, which required the President to reduce or terminate + assistance to any government which engaged in a consistent + pattern of gross violations of human rights. (Ibid., + D750025–0090) In telegram 43532 to all diplomatic posts, + February 26, the Department informed posts in countries + receiving U.S. security assistance that “human rights factors + must, under existing Department of State policy, be carefully + considered in planning and carrying out our Security Assistance + Programs.” (Ibid., D750069–0367) Crimmins raised the cases of Kucinski and Wright + in a meeting with Araujo Castro on April 25. (Telegram 7073 from + Brasília, August 14; ibid., D750281–0294)

+ + + + Washington, March 3, 1975, 1615Z. +

46847. Subject: Approach to GOB on Human + Rights. Ref: (A) State 43532 (B) State 094917 [14917].

+

1. Reftel A requests addressees to + assure that the host government is aware of the great interest in the + United States in the international promotion of human rights, + particularly as noted by the relevant provisions of the Foreign + Assistance Act of 1974, which were transmitted by reftel B.

+

2. The congressional attitude on human rights issues remains as described + at January Chiefs of Mission meeting by members of congressional staffs. + The Department is continuing to receive a steady flow of inquiries on + the general human rights situation in Brazil as well as on specific + cases of alleged human rights violations there. For example, Congressman + Fraser has just asked + whether the Embassy might make inquiries and express concern about the + well-being of Ana Rosa Kucinski Silva and her husband. Inquiries of this + sort are of course complicated by two factors: First, Minister Falcao’s + assertion that Wilson Silva’s whereabouts are unknown and his wife has + no record and is unknown to the authorities and second, the fact that + according to our files we have never made direct official inquiries in + Brazil regarding anyone who does not have a possible claim to U.S. + citizenship. (Of course, in other countries we have inquired about the + welfare of non-U.S. citizens.) We would appreciate your comments on + Fraser’s request. Exchange + of correspondence with Fraser + being pouched.

+

3. With reference to para 1, however, we believe that it would be useful + for you personally to alert Silveira to the atmosphere on human rights here in general and in the + Congress in particular. You could cite cases of particular interest such + as Paulo Stuart Wright and Ana Rose Kucinski and her husband. We leave + entirely to your discretion the timing and style of your approach.

+ + + Kissinger + + +
+ +
+ 110. Briefing Memorandum From the Director of the Arms Control and + Disarmament Agency (Ilké) and the Director of the Bureau of + Politico-Military Affairs (Vest) + to Acting Secretary of State Ingersoll + +

Summary: Iklé and + Vest informed + Ingersoll that the + FRG-Brazil agreement on the + sale of nuclear materials to Brazil increased the difficulties + for the U.S. Government in coordinating nuclear export policies. + Iklé and Vest thought it important that + the Germans delay their sale until U.S. and German officials + could discuss the matter.

+

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + P830132–1855. Secret; Exdis. Sent through Sonnenfeldt. Drafted by + Oplinger; cleared by + Wolfe, Kalicki, and + Bloom. Attached but + not published are Tab A, Talking Points, and Tab B, an informal + translation of the FRG note, + both undated. In a March 21 meeting with German Ambassador Von + Staden, Ilké stated his initial reaction to the Brazil-FRG agreement was that it would + make it harder for the U.S. Government to apply stricter + safeguards on the transfer of nuclear materials to Iran. + (Telegram 66020 to Bonn, March 24; ibid., D750102–1013) In a + March 25 meeting, Ingersoll informed Von Staden that “Secretary + Kissinger is very + concerned about this whole problem area [nonproliferation] and + that U.S. believes that an agreement on more stringent + multilateral controls is possible” and requested that the FRG defer the agreement with + Brazil until discussions with U.S. officials could take place. + The FRG agreed to discussions. + (Telegram 66712 to Brasília, March 26; ibid., + D750106–0309)

+ + + + Washington, March + 22, 1975. +

+ FRG Nuclear Assistance to + Brazil—Talking Points for your Meeting with Ambassador von Staden

+

The FRG Embassy on March 21 delivered a + note (Tab B) to us indicating that the Germans intend to proceed with + the export of nuclear equipment, materials, and technology to Brazil, + including reprocessing and enrichment capabilities. The United States + had urged the FRG to withhold final + decisions on supplying reprocessing and enrichment technology until the + key suppliers had had an opportunity to discuss multilaterally the + possibility of adopting common constraints on these sensitive nuclear + exports in the proposed nuclear suppliers’ conference. While the German + note indicates that they would apply IAEA safeguards (including a PNE exclusion) to + supplied materials and facilities, it appears that only limited and + somewhat unclear additional controls would be applied, involving + safeguards over derived technology and re-exports. The FRG note recognizes that German conditions + fall short of our own preferred conditions as presented in the US + five-point aide mémoire, but expresses the view that + more stringent conditions than theirs could not be obtained + multilaterally. There is at least a possibility that this + German view is based upon bilateral discussions with France.

+

This development undoubtedly compounds the substantive and procedural + difficulties ahead of us in coordinating nuclear export policies. It is + therefore important to our objectives that we make every effort to + induce the FRG to withhold finalization + of the Brazil agreement until we can have further detailed consultations + with them.

+

In discussing this matter with von Staden, the main point that we wish to + convey is our concern that a decision to supply reprocessing and + enrichment technology to a non-NPT + party, under terms whose details are not yet clear, could preclude + multilateral agreement on certain specific constraints which are + essential to our mutual non-proliferation objectives. For this reason, we consider it extremely important that no final + action be taken until we have had a chance to discuss the matter in + more detail in the next week. +

+

When you have delivered the attached talking points to von Staden, we + suggest that, if agreeable with von Staden, you arrange for Louis + Nosenzo (PM), to pursue the technical questions with + the Embassy after the meeting.

+
+ +
+ 111. Telegram 2866 From the Embassy in Brazil to the Department of + State +

Summary: + Crimmins suggested + possible topics for Kissinger’s prospective trip to Brazil. + Specifically, the Ambassador requested that the Secretary raise + with Geisel political + liberalization, in particular human rights abuses.

+

Source: Ford Library, + National Security Adviser, Trip Briefing Books and Cables of + Henry Kissinger, Box + 8, 4/75 Latin America (trip cancelled). Confidential; Priority; + Stadis; Exdis. Because of the impending collapse of the South + Vietnamese Government and crises in the Middle East, Kissinger’s visit to Latin + America was postponed until 1976.

+ + + + Brasília, April 15, 1975, 1930Z. +

2866. For Assistant Secretary Rogers from the Ambassador. Subject: Sec Visit LA: Possible Address to Brazilian Political + Situation.

+ +

1. It would be useful for the Secretary, during the course of his meeting + with President Geisel and + possible conversations with General Golbery, Chief of the Civil + Household, to inquire carefully about the Brazilian political situation, + especially the outlook for decompression.

+

2. Presumably the Secretary will be addressing, either on his own + initiative or in response to questions from Geisel, current political dynamics in the US as they + affect foreign affairs (e.g., the executive-legislative relationship, + the temper of Congress and public opinion). In this kind of context it + would be natural and appropriate for the Secretary to ask a general + question about Brazilian political evolution. I would hope that, in the + course of this discussion, the Secretary could observe that we have + watched with interest and admiration the President’s efforts to bring + about, slowly and surely, a political environment in keeping with the + growing complexity of Brazilian society created by its rapid economic + growth. The Secretary should also note that we are fully aware of the + delicacy and subtlety of the task that the President has undertaken, + that we understand that indeed there have been some recent difficulties, + and that, as friends of Brazil and believers in its bright future, we + wish the President well in his efforts.

+

3. Depending on the course of the conversation, there may be an + opportunity in this framework for the Secretary to mention the human + rights question, noting that this is a matter of widespread interest in + the United States, that concerned sectors of opinion recognize that one + of the objectives of the decompression process is to improve the + observance of human rights, and that this is another important reason + for our hopes that the process can continue.

+

4. Concerning Golbery, the Department is aware of the current attacks + that he, as the architect of decompression, with possible Presidential + ambitions, is under from hardliners, who view him with extreme + suspicion. Because of his somewhat exposed position, I believe that too + obvious an effort to seek him out might redound to his disadvantage. + Therefore, we will seek opportunities for the Secretary to have brief + chats, as private as possible, with him at the Itamaraty working lunch + and dinner. The Secretary could take the same line with him as that + sketched out above for the meeting with the President.

+

5. I would be grateful for your comments.

+ + + Crimmins + + +
+ +
+ 112. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security + Affairs (Kissinger) to President + Ford + +

Summary: By seizing two U.S. + shrimp boats, Brazil triggered Section 3 (b) of the Foreign + Military Sales Act barring sales, credits, or guarantees for the + purchase of weaponry. Kissinger informed the President that a + termination of assistance to Brazil would strain bilateral ties + and recommended that he waive the provisions of the FMS Act and allow the continuation + of assistance to Brazil for national security reasons.

+

Source: Ford Library, + National Security Adviser, NSC + Latin American Affairs Staff Files, Box 1, Brazil, Political, + Military. Confidential. Attached at Tab A is a memorandum from + the President to the Secretary of State and a Justification, + both undated; attached at Tab B is a memorandum from Kissinger to the President, + May 6; and attached at Tab C is a memorandum from Lynn to the President, May 7. + The attachments are not published. According to telegram 109691 + to Brasília, May 10, Ford signed the Presidential Determination on + May 9. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + D750165–0084) The U.S.-Brazilian Shrimp Agreement was signed on + March 14 and ratified by the Senate in October. See Document 115.

+ + + + Washington, undated. + + SUBJECT + Presidential Determination to Permit Resumption of Foreign + Military Sales to Brazil + +

The Department of State has recommended that you make a Determination as + required by Section 3(b) of the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) Act to waive the suspension of + military sales to Brazil on the basis that such a waiver is important to + the national security of the United States (Tab B).

+

The Brazilian Navy’s March 22, 1975 seizure of two U.S.-flag shrimp boats + for fishing within the 200 mile territorial waters claimed by Brazil may + bring into play several legislative provisions calling for restrictive + actions against Brazil in the assistance and trade fields. The point of + seizure was 386 nautical miles from the conservation area delineated in + the U.S.-Brazil Shrimp Agreement signed on March 14, 1975, seaward of + the 12-mile contiguous fishing zone recognized by the United States, but + within the 200-mile territorial sea claimed by Brazil. The U.S. regards + the seizure site as high seas, not covered or in any way affected by the + Shrimp Agreement, in which all nations enjoy freedom to fish. Brazil + regards it as territorial sea in which non-Brazilian vessels must obtain + Brazilian government consent in order to engage in fishing, and + apparently interprets the Shrimp Agreement as implying that U.S. vessels + will not fish outside the agreement area.

+

Section 3(b) of the FMS Act has been + automatically triggered and will bar FMS sales credits, or guarantees to Brazil for a one-year + period. Section 3(b) further states that this restriction may be waived + by the President if he + determines such waiver is “important to the national security of the + United States” or if he receives “reasonable assurances from the country + involved” that no further such seizures will occur.

+

I believe that continued U.S. suspension of military sales, credits and + guarantees to Brazil would have a severe adverse affect on our relations + with this largest, strongest, and most populous of the Latin American + nations at a time when Brazil is emerging as a force within the + hemisphere and an increasingly influential nation on the world + scene.

+

A continuing cut-off of military sales, credits and guarantees by the + U.S. would be taken by the Brazilians as an unfriendly act, disruptive + to their military modernization plans. It could threaten the successful + implementation of the Shrimp Agreement and could possibly harden + Brazilian attitudes on Law of the Sea issues during the delicate + multilateral negotiations currently underway.

+

Mr. Lynn points out in his + memorandum of concurrence (Tab C) that the Department of State believes + that since Section 502(B) of the Foreign Assistance Act (Human Rights) + expresses only the sense of Congress, a finding that “extraordinary + circumstances” indicate that security assistance to Brazil should not be + terminated or reduced is not required. Brazil is a country which is + popularly assumed to have engaged in violation of human rights, and this + Determination therefore is potentially subject to Section 502(B) in the + same way as the recent Determination making aid available to Spain. You are not obliged to comply + literally with a sense of Congress resolution like Section 502(B); + however, I believe that as in the case of the Spanish determination, it + is preferable to respond to Congressional interest in human rights + outside of this Determination. We intend to carry on consultations in + Congress which will allow us to treat the subject broadly, rather than + focus on aid to an individual country. + The Department of State concurs.

+

Informal discussions with members of appropriate Congressional staffs on + this issue indicate that no serious Congressional repercussions will + result from approval of this waiver. I concur in this assessment as does + Max Friedersdorf.

+

Section 654 (c) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, + requires that any determination which you may make waiving the + provisions of Section 3(b) of the FMS + Act, as amended, be published in the Federal + Register unless you conclude that to do so “could be harmful to + the National Security of the United States.” In this case I recommend + that the waiver be withheld from publication. The Section 3(b) + suspension has not yet become public knowledge and, should publicity + occur, it is likely to result in a strong adverse public reaction in + Brazil.

+ +

The Department of Defense concurs in this recommendation. The memorandum + at Tab A will give effect to this recommendation.

+

Recommendation

+

That you sign the memorandum at Tab A.

+
+ +
+ 113. Telegram 115636 From the Department of State to the Embassy in + Brazil +

Summary: + Kissinger and + Silveira discussed + trade and energy issues, Cuba, Portugal, and the election of an + OAS Secretary General.

+

Source: Ford Library, + National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files, Box 2, + Brazil—State Department Telegrams from Secstate, Nodis. Secret; + Immediate; Nodis. Drafted by Zimmermann, cleared by Ryan, approved by Rogers. On + April 14, the preparatory conference for the oil + producer-consumer conference stalemated over what issues should + be emphasized. Some nations wanted to focus on energy-related + issues, while others demanded that the conference address + broader economic issues. Agreeing that the conference should + center on energy-related issues, Kissinger and Silveira exchanged views on April 14 and 15. + (Telegram 85460 to Brasília, April 15; National Archives, RG 59, + Central Foreign Policy File, D750131–0405) In telegram 2884 from + Brasília, April 16, the Embassy reported that Silveira did not think that + the Kissinger-Silveira view would prevail. + (Ibid., D750132–0672)

+ + + + Washington, May 17, 1975, 0011Z. +

115636. Subject: Highlights of Secretary’s Luncheon for Silveira.

+

1. Following are highlights of exchanges during Secretary’s luncheon for + Foreign Minister Silveira + Saturday, May 10.

+

2. Trade consultative group. The Secretary urged Under Secretary + Robinson to go to Brazil to + discuss trade and commodity issues. (There was no discussion of a + specific agenda.)

+

3. South Vietnamese properties. In response to a question from Silveira, the Secretary said we would + take a decision early next week on the matter of the Algerians taking + responsibility for protecting South Vietnamese property in the U.S.

+

4. U.S.-Brazil relations. The Secretary emphasized the great importance + we attach to our relations with Brazil and our desire to consult at + least on major problems despite mutual inability to agree on all issues. + He also thanked Silveira for + the frankness of his correspondence. Silveira responded that he thought this was a good way + to build friendship. Brazil will never be strident and these + interchanges can be helpful to both of us. Brazil can provide insights + regarding Latin America.

+ +

5. PrepCon. Silveira asked what + the U.S. intended to do now. The Special Session (of the U.N.) will + probably be a mess. Brazil wanted to put oil and energy at the top of + the agenda and then move on to other subjects. This would assure + adequate attention to the energy problem. But the smaller countries must + be allowed to talk about their problems as well and once this is + recognized the LDCs will be more + relaxed. The Secretary responded that we did not want to put raw + materials questions into the PrepCon. We are prepared to talk about + these issues but in some other forum. It was the U.S. impression that + Algeria wanted to turn the meeting into a confrontation with the + industrial world. However, we can try to reassemble the PrepCon early in + the fall and see what comes of it.

+

6. Oil prices. Silveira + maintained the Middle East conflict was the prime cause of high oil + prices and that the problem could only be resolved between the U.S. and + the USSR as the only ones capable of + offering the necessary guarantees. The Secretary pointed out that there + were many other causes of high oil prices and that the Arab-Israeli + conflict was not governing. He also pointed out the difficulties of + negotiations with the Soviets.

+

7. Consultations. The Secretary noted that he had issued instructions + that we were never to do anything in the Western Hemisphere without + consulting Brazil. Silveira + responded that consultation would be more productive if not confined to + Latin American-U.S. relations. Silveira thought consultations could be improved and + suggested that lately there were too many small accidents occurring + along the road of good relations. He specifically mentioned + countervailing duties. The Secretary noted his genuine interest in + consultation and possible machinery was discussed. It was agreed that + whatever machinery is agreed upon should be flexible and chaired by the + Secretary and the Foreign Minister. The matter will be discussed further + in August when the Secretary hopes to visit Brazil. Meanwhile Itamaraty + will develop its ideas on an agenda and submit them for the Secretary’s + consideration.

+

8. Cuba. Silveira said Brazil + could agree on a meeting to discuss Cuba without explaining at this time + the formula to be used. He also said that Brazil would vote in favor of + a freedom of action resolution at a later session of the OAS called to consider the Rio Treaty + changes.

+

9. Portugal. Silveira said he + did not think the Communists will end up in key positions, and there is + a chance that the military situation may change. The key figure is Vasco + Goncalves and he is emotionally confused. If he is changed the situation + will alter drastically. It was agreed that there should be more + systematic consultation on Portugal.

+

10. OAS Secretary General. The Secretary + said we wanted to work with Brazil on this issue. Our only commitment is + not to work against Orfila and + we cannot support the Peruvian candidate. Silveira + responded that Sapena Pastor would probably withdraw + as a candidate but Brazil could not vote for Orfila. Brazil would look with favor + on a Central American candidate, perhaps Guatemala.

+ + + Kissinger + + +
+ +
+ 114. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security + Affairs (Kissinger) to President + Ford + +

Summary: Kissinger advised Ford to sign a Presidential + Determination allowing Brazil to purchase Sidewinder + missiles.

+

Source: Ford Library, + National Security Adviser, NSC + Latin American Affairs Staff Files, Box 1, Brazil, Political, + Military, 2. Confidential. Sent for action. Scowcroft initialed the + memorandum for Kissinger. Ford initialed the memorandum. Attached at Tab A + is a signed determination from the President to the Secretary, + May 22; attached at Tab B is a memorandum from Ingersoll to the President, + including a Justification, April 16; and attached at Tab C is a + memorandum from Lynn to + the President, April 24. The attachments are not published. + According to telegram 121642 to Brasília, May 23, the + Presidential Determination authorizing the sale of Sidewinder + missiles to Brazil was signed on May 22. (National Archives, RG + 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D750182–0560)

+ + + + Washington, May 20, + 1975. + + SUBJECT + Presidential Determination for Sale of the Sidewinder Missile to + Brazil + +

Deputy Secretary of State Ingersoll has recommended that you make a Determination, + required by Section 4 (The Conte Amendment) of the Foreign Military + Sales (FMS) Act, to permit Brazil to + make credit purchases of a sophisticated weapon—the air-to-air + Sidewinder missile (Tab B). The Conte Amendment prohibits the use of + funds authorized by the Act to provide credit for the sale of + sophisticated weapon systems to any underdeveloped country unless you + determine that it is important to U.S. security.

+

On May 21, 1973, President Nixon + found it to be important to U.S. national security to make credit + available for the sale of F–5E aircraft to five Latin American countries + including Brazil. The Brazilians believed, when they purchased the F–5E + aircraft for credit in 1973, that they would be permitted to purchase + the Sidewinder also on the same terms.

+

I see no objection to agreeing to the Brazilian request. The F–5E is + designed to carry the Sidewinder (AIM–9) air-to-air missile as one of + its principal armaments. Although we do not normally sell consumables like munitions for + credit—only for cash—appropriate missiles are frequently packaged in + with initial sales of aircraft. The Brazilians understand in this case + that future sales of the Sidewinder will be for cash, and that no new + credits would have to be extended to cover the initial sale of the + missiles.

+

Consultations with Congress, in conjunction with the possible sale of the + F–5E to Brazil and the other Latin American countries, revealed a + diminution of hostility to transfers of sophisticated arms to Latin + America since the Conte Amendment was enacted in 1967. Although there is + growing antagonism on arms sales there has been no adverse reaction in + Congress to the earlier decision to sell the F–5E to Brazil. I + believe—and Mr. Friedersdorf + agrees—that Congress will accept the sale of the Sidewinder missile as + an integral part of the F–5E weapon system. Two other countries in Latin + America—Argentina and Venezuela—have already bought the Sidewinder + without adverse reaction in Congress.

+

Foreign Assistance Act Section 502(B)—concerning human rights—potentially + applies to Brazil. This is, however, a sense of Congress resolution + which is not binding. The Department of State has plans to deal with the + purport of Section 502(B) outside this Determination.

+

I recommend you make the necessary Determination that extension of credit + for sale of the Sidewinder to Brazil is important to the security of the + United States. The memo at Tab A will give effect to this + recommendation.

+

Subject to your approval, the Department of State will inform Congress of + your Determination along with the statement of reasons attached at Tab + A. The law requires that Congress be informed and also requires that the + pertinent documents be published in the Federal + Register. +

+

Mr. Lynn concurs in this + recommendation to sell the Sidewinder missile to Brazil (Tab C) as does + the Department of Defense.

+

Recommendation

+

That you sign the Determination at Tab A.

+
+ +
+ 115. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security + Affairs (Kissinger) to President + Ford + +

Summary: Kissinger advised Ford to request the Senate’s + ratification of the Shrimp Agreement with Brazil, which would + regulate the total number of ships (including U.S. ships) in an + area of the ocean between the accepted 12-mile zone off the + coast of Brazil and Brazil’s claim of a 200-mile zone.

+

Source: Ford Library, + National Security Adviser, NSC + Latin American Affairs Staff Files, Box 1, Brazil—Fisheries + Problem. No classification marking. Sent for action. Published + from an uninitialed copy. On June 10 Linder informed Kissinger that Ford had signed a message to + the Senate requesting ratification of the agreement. (Ibid.) + Attached but not published are Tab A, message to the Senate, May + 22; Tab B, a memorandum from Ingersoll to Ford, May 3; and Tab C, the U.S.-Brazilian + Shrimp Agreement of March 14. On July 21, the Assistant Director + for Legislative Reference, James M. Frey, informed Ford of Enrolled Bill H.R. + 5709, the Offshore Shrimp Fisheries Act Amendments of 1975, + which would implement the March 14 agreement. (Ibid.) The Senate + ratified the agreement on October 28. Linder informed Scowcroft on December 23 that + Ford had signed the + instrument of ratification of the agreement. (Ibid., + Brazil—Economic, Social)

+ + + + Washington, undated. + + SUBJECT + Transmission to the Senate of the Agreement with Brazil concerning + Shrimp + +

Attached at Tab A for your signature is a memorandum transmitting to the + Senate for their advice and consent to ratification an Agreement with + Brazil concerning shrimp fishing, together with an Agreed Minute and a + related exchange of notes concerning compensation. Another related + exchange of notes concerning interim undertakings is also transmitted + for the information of the Senate. These documents were signed at + Brasília on March 14, 1975. A report from Deputy Secretary Robert Ingersoll on the Agreement (Tab + B) will also be forwarded to the Senate.

+

The necessity for an agreement arose in 1970 when Brazil asserted a claim + to a 200-mile territorial sea. The claim encompassed important shrimp + resource areas outside the twelve-mile exclusive fishery jurisdiction + recognized by the U.S. which have been exploited for several years by a + large number of U.S. flag vessels. The United States and Brazil signed + an Agreement concerning Shrimp on May 9, 1972, which expired after + several extensions on February 28, 1975. That Agreement was effective in + conserving the shrimp resources in the area to which it applied and + assured U.S. fishermen access to these resources without risk of + incidents arising from the different juridical positions of the two + governments on law of the seas issues.

+

The renegotiated Agreement continues to provide these benefits without + prejudice to the juridical position of either government on the territorial sea question. The + Agreement will extend through December 31, 1976. The interim nature of + the Agreement reflects the expectation that the underlying question may + be settled by general international agreement on the law of the sea.

+

The Agreement provides for a limitation of the total number of vessels + exploiting the resources in the defined area and on the number of U.S. + flag vessels permitted. It defines the authorized times for fishing and + provides for an exchange of information by the parties to the Agreement. + For reasons of convenience and economy, the Brazilian Government is + assigned responsibility for enforcement of the terms of the Agreement, + and the U.S. will pay Brazil $361,000 annually for enforcement expenses. + The major portion of this expense will be recovered from the fishermen + through continuation of a licensing system administered by the Secretary + of Commerce. (Amended legislation to this effect will be sought by the + Executive Departments concerned.) Any U.S. vessel apprehended for + violation of the Agreement will be turned over to U.S. authorities for + appropriate action.

+

Representatives of the U.S. shrimp fishing industry have indicated + general satisfaction with the terms of this Agreement.

+

This has been cleared with Max + Friedersdorf and we do not envisage opposition to + favorable Senate consideration of the Agreement. Paul Theis has cleared the text of the + proposed Memorandum to the Senate.

+

Recommendation:

+

That you sign the transmittal message at Tab A.

+
+ +
+ 116. Telegram 146237 From the Department of State to the Embassy in + Brazil +

Summary: + Kissinger informed + Silveira that he + understood Brazil’s need for nuclear energy and did not want + Brazil’s agreement with the FRG + to obtain nuclear materials to damage the overall relationship + between the United States and Brazil. At the same time, the + Secretary was concerned about the implications for nuclear + proliferation of the Brazil-FRG + agreement.

+

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + D750217–0235. Confidential; Immediate; Exdis. Repeated to Bonn, + Vienna, and the Mission to the IAEA. Drafted by Rogers; cleared + by Kahan, Ballantyne, Opplinger, + Boright, Hoyle, + Sonnenfeldt, and + Kuchel; approved by + Kissinger. The + Crimmins-Silveira conversation is + summarized in telegram 4875 from Brasília, June 18. (Ibid., + D750211–0866) In telegram 138496 to Brasília, June 13, the + Department reported on a discussion with Araujo Castro regarding + Brazil’s negative reaction to the public debate over the + Brazil-FRG nuclear + agreement, which was criticized by U.S. officials. (Ibid., + D750206–1167) The June 16 conversation between Kissinger and Genscher on the + Brazil-FRG nuclear + agreement is summarized in telegram 150292 to Brasília, June 25. + (Ibid., D750221–0436) In Silveira’s response to Kissinger, June 29, he stated + that there had “been a fair amount of misinformation as to the + nature of the agreement and undue haste in the evaluation of the + Brazilian purposes.” (Telegram 153500/Tosec 50022 to Kissinger, June 29; ibid., + D750225–0453)

+ + + + Washington, June 20, 1975, 2341Z. +

146237. Subject: FRG-Brazil Nuclear + Accord: Personal Message From the Secretary. For Ambassador from the + Secretary. Ref: Brasília 4875.

+

1. Please deliver following message to Foreign Minister Silveira:

+

2. Begin quote: Dear Antonio: Ambassador Crimmins told me about his talk with you on Brazil’s + nuclear agreement with the Federal Republic of Germany. I was heartened + by your statement that the public discussion of this matter must not be + allowed to affect the present cordial and constructive relationship + between our two countries. Though we are concerned about the agreement, + from the proliferation point of view, I fully share with you this basic + point.

+

3. We did not invite, and in fact regret, the public debate. We would + have much preferred that the matter remain in diplomatic channels. The + short statements which Foreign Minister Genscher and I made on June 16 + were designed to lay to rest some of the misunderstandings which have + affected the press treatment of the agreement, and to calm the public + temper. I hope we have done so.

+

4. We understand and support Brazil’s desire to expand its use of nuclear + energy as a tool for development. Count on our cooperation and + assistance in your endeavor where Brazil considers it useful, to the + limit permitted by our overall nuclear policy. And let us continue to + exchange views on our common aim of avoiding the proliferation of + nuclear weapons in the hemisphere.

+ +

5. As always, I look forward to having your thoughts.

+

6. Warmest personal regards, Henry A. + Kissinger. End quote.

+ + + Kissinger + + +
+ +
+ 117. Telegram 5292 From the Embassy in Brazil to the Department of + State +

Summary: + Crimmins informed + the Department that the Brazil-FRG agreement on nuclear cooperation reflected + Brazil’s desire for major power status. The Ambassador concluded + that if Brazil became a nuclear power, it would strain its ties + to the United States.

+

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + D750224–0307. Confidential; Priority; Limdis. Repeated to Bonn, + Buenos Aires, Rio de Janeiro, and São Paulo. The text of the + Brazil-FRG agreement was + sent to the Department in telegram 10706 from Bonn, July 2. + (Ibid., D750230–0721) Angra I was a nuclear power plant near Rio + de Janeiro constructed by Westinghouse.

+ + + + Brasília, June 27, 1975, 1845Z. +

5292. Subject: Effects on U.S./Brazilian Relations of the German + Agreement.

+

Summary: The German/Brazilian agreement on nuclear cooperation signed in + Bonn on June 27 has been described in the press as the most important + economic agreement Brazil has ever entered into, but it has far greater + importance as a step in Brazil’s drive for major power status. Motivated + by future energy needs, the attraction of an explosives option and the + potential for a nuclear industry, and alleging the uncertainty of U.S. + supplies of enriched uranium, Brazil has decided on the German contract + as the key element of its nuclear strategy. The mistrust of the U.S., + generated in the average Brazilian by well publicized portrayals of U.S. + reactions as an attempt to modify or block the agreement and to maintain + Brazil dependent, is likely to support the movement of Brazilian foreign + policy away from the U.S., especially on nuclear proliferation issues + and as Brazil’s nuclear export potential comes into being. On the + commercial level, it is doubtful that U.S. firms would participate in + joint ventures and sell new technology in the future, that the U.S. will + continue to sell Brazil enriched uranium for new reactors, or that + Brazil would be interested in participation in a regional or U.S. + enrichment plant. In non-nuclear areas, Brazil’s enhanced status could + also affect U.S./Brazilian relations. Brazil will continue to rely on + the U.S. nuclear shield, but appears to want to develop, over time, an + explosives capability. The + U.S. will have to keep the development of Brazilian nuclear capability + under close scrutiny. Barring a radical change in U.S. nuclear policy, a + new and divisive element has been added to U.S.-Brazilian relations. End + summary.

+

1. US/Brazilian differences over nuclear energy policy are not new. Two + decades ago, the U.S. blocked, for an extended period, delivery to + Brazil of some early model—and unsuccessful—German gas centrifuges. More + recently, Brazil refused to sign the NPT on the grounds that it limited Brazil’s sovereignty. In + its qualified adherence to the LANFZ, it specifically reserved its + rights to PNE’s. For some time, therefore, Brazil has made clear that it + wished to acquire a nuclear option beyond constructing and operating + reactors, and purchasing enriched fuel from abroad. Four long-term + objectives have motivated Brazil’s aims: A) nuclear-powered generating + capacity fueled from domestic sources is the most secure way in the long + run to satisfy rapidly rising electricity demands in the center/south + and northeast; B) with a large domestic market, substantial + hydroelectric potential, and potentially recoverable uranium deposits, + Brazil could eventually develop an efficient, high-technology + export-oriented domestic uranium-enrichment industry; C) a nuclear + capability supports Brazil’s drive to acquire a national high technology + industrial base; and D) Brazil needs to have a nuclear explosives option + to fulfill its “destiny” as a great power, and to offset Argentina’s + head start in developing a nuclear capability which might some day + become an effective political, or even military, resource. President + Costa e Silva’s 1969 statement to the effect that the logical conclusion + of nuclear research was the testing of its results in an explosive + device made explicit that Brazil had no intention of renouncing PNE’s. + There is every evidence, also, that some influential elements chafed + under the nuclear tutelage of the United States, this appearing most + markedly in the running debate over the commitment of Brazil to + (American) light water reactors and occasional statements by Brazilian + scientists and federal legislators to the effect that Brazil should + develop its own nuclear technology based on natural uranium and thorium. + (Of course, the agreement with the FRG + does not invalidate these arguments, but, under the changed + circumstances, they are unlikely to have any impact for the immediate + future.)

+

2. Several events and trends have coincided over the past two years to + affect Brazil’s nuclear policy: A) the reiterated refusal of the U.S. to + sell its proven, efficient enrichment and reprocessing technology + encouraged the determined Brazilians to pursue the industrially-unproven + German enrichment alternative which offers Brazil independence from + foreign-enriched fuel; B) the U.S. was unable, the Brazilians claim, to + give Brazil ironclad guarantees of supply of nuclear fuels, and the + confusion and frustration which resulted from the “conditional contract” problem made the U.S. + appear to be less than dependable in that respect. (It is difficult to + estimate to what extent the supposed “unreliability” was exaggerated + within GOB circles by those already + intent upon a relationship with the FRG, the first steps in the establishment of which had been + taken well before the “conditional contract” issue arose.); C) The + GOB became increasingly aware that + U.S. Government policy was moving toward ever-tighter safeguards; D) the + Arab oil embargo and the resultant high prices for oil made nuclear + energy relatively cheaper and emphasized the dangers of dependence on + foreign sources of supply of energy; E) the inception of the Geisel government brought into play an + outward-looking foreign policy, based on the oft-repeated formula of + “ecumenism”, “responsible pragmatism” and “no automatic alignments” that + not only implied broader relations with the Arabs, Eastern and Western + Europe and China, but also a loosening of ties with the U.S. in search + of foreign policy “independence” and “grandeza” (greatness, grandeur); + F) the Indian nuclear explosion of mid-74 and the limited U.S. response + to it seemed to the Brazilians to signal the end of effective + non-proliferation practices—about which they had been consistently + skeptical—and, in that sense, represented both a threat and an + opportunity.

+

3. The tremendous amount of publicity that USG efforts with the FRG + received here brought into sharp public awareness the unhappiness of the + U.S. over the deal. Unfortunately—and undoubtedly, in part, by official + inspiration, from Brazilian FRG + sources—U.S. objections were held locally to be based on U.S. resentment + and frustration at losing a lucrative commercial contract and on the + U.S. desire to perpetuate Brazil’s dependence on the U.S. in general and + in nuclear matters in particular. Except in the most thoughtful and + politically sophisticated circles, short shrift was given to the real + U.S. concerns over non-proliferation. When these were mentioned at all, + they were usually dismissed as a cover for the “true,” i.e., commercial + and political concerns of the U.S. The U.S. was presented as a + disappointed suitor trying meanly and deceitfully to prevent Brazil from + trysting with a new beau, and, more seriously, as attempting to prevent + Brazil from realizing its destiny and economic development potential. + Some serious commentary did recognize the logic of the U.S. position in + regard to non-proliferation, but also presented the Brazilian position + that the U.S. had neither right nor wisdom on its side in attempting to + restrict Brazil’s sovereignty. These feelings are very broadly shared, + with varying degrees of sophistication, by Brazilians of every shade of + political opinion. Moreover, these sentiments are accompanied by a great + outburst of national pride, principally because of the validation of + Brazil’s candidacy to the nuclear club but also because of Brazil’s + independence, even defiance, of the United States. The repercussions are + likely to be felt for an + indefinite period. They will complicate our bilateral relations in that + they feed what has become, during the Geisel/Silveira + administration, a tendency in official circles to suspect—or to play + upon suspicions of—U.S. motives. The fact that the GOB–FRG + agreement is widely hailed as a great triumph of Brazilian diplomacy + (and its slogans of pragmatism and no automatic alignments) is certainly + not going to diminish the prickliness of GOB stances.

+

4. A growing nuclear capability is also likely to enhance the already + pronounced Brazilian movement toward a foreign policy as independent as + possible of U.S. influence and will probably increase the potential for + policy conflict with the U.S. in a number of fields, a potential already + inherent in the Brazilian drive to world power status. As Brazil + acquires its nuclear capability through the German agreement and other + arrangements, the U.S. relationship with Brazil on nuclear proliferation + issues will be strained. In the short and medium run, Brazil is likely + to refuse to agree to any “nuclear club” initiatives on multilateral + non-proliferation controls which would restrict Brazil’s freedom of + action. At this point we have only the FRG statements that all aspects of technology and + facilities transferred in the long run, Brazil may export nuclear + technology, perhaps less skillfully and less scrupulously than the major + powers, which would quite possibly bring Brazil and the U.S. into direct + conflict over non-proliferation. Similarly, Brazil probably would not be + receptive to new initiatives on the denuclearization of LA although this attitude might change in + the long run as other LA countries + develop nuclear capability.

+

5. The German contract will undercut U.S. sales of nuclear technology and + fuel to Brazil, but future technological developments or German failures + could affect this. Both GE and Westinghouse believe that there will be + no contracts with U.S. prime-contractor reactor vendors during the + 8-reactor program. U.S. companies also question the attractiveness of + participation through local joint ventures in building German reactors. + Although some GOB officials continue to + state that there will be a role for U.S. firms in joint ventures with + Brazilian enterprises, we share the companies’ pessimism about this + possibility and, indeed, question the sincerity of the Brazilian + statements. Secondly, whether Brazil will continue to buy U.S. enriched + uranium depends critically on the terms of the amended agreement for + cooperation. We seriously doubt that the GOB would accept a new agreement if it does not permit the + reprocessing of U.S. fuels within Brazil and retention of the plutonium. + This would mean that the GOB would not + buy any more fuel from the U.S. after Angra I. Thirdly, new developments + in reactor technology could affect Brazil’s German commitment but not + necessarily. Like the U.S., the FRG + also has a major program in the HTGR (uranium/thorium or + plutonium/thorium fueled) and an excellent fast breeder program. The + line of progress could well go:

+ +

(1) PWR—Enriches uranium fuel,

+

(2) PWR—uranium or plutonium/thorium fuel—so-called “light water + breeder”,

+

(3) HTGR—Enriched uranium/thorium,

+

(4) HTGR—plutonium/thorium,

+

(5) Gas-cooled fast breeder, within a continuing joint program with the + FRG.

+

Fourthly, any Brazilian interest in U.S. proposals for regional + enrichment appears doubtful, even though the jet nozzle technology has + not yet been proven efficient on an industrial scale. The fact that the + FRG could furnish only the + jet-nozzle process at this time because the tripartite deal with the UK + and Holland (Urenco) restricts dissemination of the gas centrifuge is + not immutable. In a few years, this could well change and the FRG might furnish the gas centrifuge to + Brazil as a proven process.

+

6. In non-nuclear areas, U.S./Brazilian cooperation will be affected by + Brazil’s increased international status as a potential nuclear power, + the boost this gives to Brazil’s transition to becoming a second-tier + developed country, and the resultant effects on Brazil’s willingness to + assume greater international responsibilities and to exercise more + leadership. The latter two considerations are consistent with long run + U.S. objectives and will give Brazil a pattern of international + interests more like ours, but it will also enhance Brazil’s capability + for political and economic independence from the U.S. and other big + powers.

+

7. Ultimately, the question that must be answered is, will Brazil develop + a nuclear explosive device? Up to now, Brazil has been content to + operate behind the protective nuclear shield offered by the U.S., a + situation quite well suited to Brazilian priorities, needs and general + ideological view of the world. Partly because of the high cost of bombs + and delivery systems, Brazil has at least publicly eschewed nuclear + weapons; it will continue to rely on the U.S. shield against any other + superpower’s nuclear might. The Brazilian authorities, however, clearly + believe that non-proliferation is a dead letter, and they will not leave + Brazil open to the possibility of nuclear blackmail on the part of its + neighbors or other middle powers, nor renounce a policy tool that they + appear sure others will grasp. In that sense, the decision to acquire a + nuclear weapons capability can fairly be said to have been taken. In the + operational sense, however, it seems reasonable to say that no immediate + decision has been made, although references to Brazil as a “nuclear + power” permeate press treatment of the subject—and with the clear + implication of an explosives capability. Rather, it appears that Brazil + will concentrate on developing its technology to the point that an + explosive device could be constructed within a relatively short time of the decision to do so. + Although this judgment is based on our best estimate of Brazilian + desires and intentions, there is, of course, no solid guarantee that + Brazil would show that much restraint. In our serious pursuit of + non-proliferation, world peace and stability, we will have to keep the + development of the Brazilian nuclear capability under close and + continuing scrutiny, and be prepared to face the need to challenge + Brazil should conditions warrant.

+

8. In sum, the publicity given in Brazil to our attitude toward the + contract has resulted in the widespread conviction here that the U.S., + for commercial and superpower motives, sought to prevent Brazil from the + legitimate pursuit of its highest national interests. The resultant + damage to bilateral relations currently appears containable. There are + many Brazilian interests that are served by good relations with the U.S. + Brazil, in East-West political terms, is conservative and + anti-Communist. Moreover, the actual establishment of a full fuel cycle + capacity within the country is still a long way off and not assured. The + lesson should not be lost on us, however. An issue on which the U.S. and + Brazil are in fundamental disagreement, which was previously only + abstract, has become concrete. While the level of its potential for + conflict and cooperation cannot be fully assessed at this time, it seems + clear that, barring a radical change in current U.S. nuclear policy—and + the GOB quite possibly assumes that + over time the U.S. will accommodate to the Brazilian nuclear reality—a + new and divisive element has been added to U.S.-Brazilian relations.

+ + + Crimmins + + +
+ +
+ 118. Action Memorandum From the Director of the Bureau of + Politico-Military Affairs (Vest) + to Secretary of State Kissinger + +

Summary: Vest argued + that the U.S. Government should clarify to the Brazilians and + West Germans its concern with the nuclear proliferation + implications of the Brazil-FRG + agreement.

+

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + P830113–0932. Secret; Exdis. Published from an uninitialed copy. + Drafted by Nosenzo on + July 7; cleared by Boright, Kratzer, Vine, and Rogers. Sent through Sonnenfeldt. Kissinger disapproved both + recommendations, and a handwritten note indicates that he + transmitted his decision in telegram Secto 6064, July 12. + (Ibid., P840126–2194) Attached but not published is Genscher’s + letter to Kissinger, + June 25. Telegram 10706 from Bonn, July 1, is ibid., + D750228–0240. Other attachments have not been + found.

+ + + + Washington, July 8, + 1975. +

+ + FRG + Nuclear Sale to Brazil +

+

The Problem

+

Recent statements by FRG Chancellor + Schmidt and Brazilian Foreign Minister Silveira, if accurately reported by the press, portray + you as concurring with, or having no objections to, the FRG/Brazil + nuclear assistance agreement. While we do not wish to encourage further + controversy over this matter, we believe it is important to set the + record straight since uncorrected distortions of the US position making + it appear that we approved the sale could adversely affect our position + in the nuclear supplier talks and arouse further public and + Congressional concern. In order to clarify our position on the sale, we + believe that it would be desirable to remind appropriate FRG and GOB officials that while we wish to contain negative + publicity and avoid any disruption of our relationships, we have + conveyed our concerns about the transaction at high levels and regret + that the press has portrayed us as approving transfers of sensitive + enrichment and reprocessing technology.

+

Substance of Agreement

+

On June 25, FRG Foreign Minister + Genscher wrote to you advising you that the agreement would be signed on + June 27 (Attachment 1). His letter enclosed the Federal Government’s + replies to parliamentary questions concerning the political and economic + scope of the agreement, which contains a statement of the + safeguards-related provisions. Bonn’s 10706 (Attachment 2) contains the + text of the agreement itself. In addition, the FRG and Brazil have signed a protocol authorizing + industrial cooperation in specified areas covering the entire fuel + cycle, under terms which are + spelled out in annexes which have not been made available to the + U.S.

+

There are no surprises concerning the substance of the agreement as + described in the replies to parliamentary questions or in the + safeguards-related articles of the agreement itself. It provides for + sale of up to eight reactors, a fuel fabrication plant, pilot + reprocessing plant, and cooperation in uranium enrichment. The + safeguards and controls are generally the same as those the FRG mentioned to us in bilateral + discussions. Given the FRG decision to + export the sensitive technologies of enrichment and reprocessing, which + represents our fundamental objection to the sale, the safeguard + conditions appear to be quite stringent and, with one possible major + exception, appear consistent with likely understandings on common + nuclear export policy which may be agreed by the nuclear suppliers.

+

However, neither the Q’s and A’s nor the text of the agreement mention + FRG direct participation in the + reprocessing and enrichment plants. The FRG has told us that they will have adequate flexibility + under the agreement to ensure that these activities would involve “joint + ventures” between the FRG and Brazil. + Thus far, it would appear from Brazilian press reports that although the + FRG’s involvement in facilities + supplied to Brazil will be substantial at first, it will be largely for + purposes of training, with the likely eventual result that Brazil will + obtain purely national control of a full nuclear fuel cycle under + safeguards. If this interpretation is not modified in the course of + implementing industrial-level arrangements, it would be quite the + opposite of the US concept of full and active supplier involvement in + management and operations to provide an additional non-proliferation + constraint.

+

German and Brazilian Statements

+

While concentrating on the substance of the FRG/Brazil agreement, the + German Parliamentary reply indicates that the FRG “gained the impression that its objective arguments + were understood” and that the US “expressed its satisfaction with the + safeguards agreed upon.” The FRG does + not give the slightest hint of our repeated expressions of concern over + the unprecedented transfer of sensitive enrichment and reprocessing + technology involved in the agreement—those elements of the sale (in + contrast to the power reactors) which we argued were potentially + dangerous, given the difficulty of effecting sufficiently adequate + safeguards. In fact, as indicated in the attached press report + (attachment 3), Schmidt recently stated that we did not make “a single + criticism” of the nuclear transaction and that “I suppose this is not of + primary importance” to the USG. This, + of course, is inconsistent with your discussion with Foreign Minister + Genscher and the press statements made after your meeting.

+ +

Your attention is also called to three cables (attachment 4) which + indicate that Foreign Minister Silveira, enroute to Bonn for the signing, disclosed to + Brazilian journalists that you had communicated with him on the FRG-Brazil nuclear accord. As a result Jornal de Brasília reported you as guaranteeing + Washington concurrence in the terms of the agreement, but did not + mention the concerns you expressed in your message to Silveira about proliferation. + Silveira has more recently + refused direct comment on your letter, characterizing it as “personal.” + In the context of concluding their nuclear agreement, both the Germans + and the Brazilians seem to have distorted your communications and tried + to make the US appear to approve sales involving the transfer of + sensitive nuclear technology as long as safeguards are applied—a stance + which is not only incompatible with our own national policy and our + position vis-à-vis the other nuclear suppliers, but which is likely to + fuel Congressional concerns even further.

+

Further Steps

+

In order to clarify our position on the German-Brazilian sale, we believe + we need to remind appropriate FRG and + GOB officials that while we wish to + contain negative publicity and avoid any disruption of our + relationships, the fact remains that we did relay our concern at high + levels about the transaction, and we regret that the press has portrayed + us as approving transfers of sensitive enrichment and reprocessing + technology. Attachment 5 is a draft cable, for your approval, + instructing Ambassador Crimmins + to so inform appropriate GOB officials. + I believe that a similar message should be conveyed to FRG officials through their Embassy in + Washington.

+

Recommendation

+

That you approve the cable at Attachment 5 instructing Ambassador + Crimmins to remind + appropriate GOB officials of our + position concerning the transaction and expressing regret that we have + been portrayed as approving the FRG/Brazil nuclear sale.

+

That you approve a similar approach to the FRG which I will convey to FRG Embassy representatives here in Washington.

+
+ +
+ 119. National Intelligence Estimate 93–1–75 +

Summary: The authors of the + Estimate predicted that although the United States and Brazil + would disagree over economic issues, the Brazilian Government + would continue to desire close, cooperative bilateral + relations.

+

Source: Central Intelligence Agency, National Intelligence + Council, Job 79R01012A: Box 500, Folder 3: (NIE 93–1–75), + Outlook for Brazil, NIE 93–1–75, July 1975. Secret; [handling restriction not declassified]. + According to a note on the cover sheet, the Central Intelligence + Agency and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of + State, Defense, the Treasury, the NSA, and the Energy Research and Development + Administration participated in the preparation of this Estimate. + The Director of CIA submitted + this Estimate with the concurrence of all members of the USIB except the representative of + the FBI, who abstained on the + grounds that it was outside his jurisdiction.

+ + + + Washington, July + 11, 1975. +

THE OUTLOOK FOR BRAZIL

+

+ PRÉCIS +

+

Brazil’s long-term economic prospects are good, but in the shorter term + it will experience reduced rates of growth, relatively high rates of + inflation, and large deficits in its balance of trade.

+ + —Brazil’s prospective growth rate for 1975 constitutes good + performance by current world standards, although it will be a + disappointment of expectations after the 10 percent annual growth of + 1968–1974. + —Discontent with economic conditions contributed to the unexpected + success of the opposition party in last November’s election. + —Should economic conditions appreciably worsen, the regime would + become increasingly vulnerable to attack by its domestic critics and + there could be a resurgence of economic nationalism. + +

President Geisel has undertaken to + liberalize the political system through a process which has come to be + known as “decompression.”

+ + —The aim is to ease controls on political activity and to widen + participation in the political process. + —“Decompression” has had some important results, including the + remarkably free 1974 congressional elections and some easing of + press censorship. + —But it rests on a fragile consensus among various groups not to + challenge the status quo in any serious way, and it has run into + opposition from conservative members of the military + hierarchy. + —The outlook for political liberalization in Brazil, although + better than at any time since 1968, is still not particularly + favorable. + —A return to civilian rule in the next few years is highly + unlikely. + +

Pragmatic considerations, particularly economic ones, will continue to + guide the formulation of Brazilian foreign policy.

+ + + —Preferential treatment for Brazilian exports will be a primary + goal, and protectionist measures by the developed countries will be + viewed as inimical to Brazil’s vital interests. + —Brazil has aspirations to a role as an emerging world power, and + its policymakers have a sophisticated understanding of the reality + of economic interdependence and of the constraints imposed on + Brazil’s autonomy by its need for foreign capital, technology, and + raw materials. + —Nonetheless, Brazil remains an underdeveloped country, and it + will side with such countries on many issues in order to secure + economic concessions and to force a redistribution of the world’s + wealth to its own advantage. + —Brazil cannot aspire to become spokesman for the Spanish-speaking + countries of Latin America, but wants to solidify its position as + the paramount power there so that it can play an international role + as an emerging major power. + +

While Brazil has almost certainly not made a decision to develop nuclear + weapons, the government does not want to foreclose this option.

+ + —It sees nuclear power as an important factor in supplying its + future energy requirements. + —It regards US pressure to sign the Nuclear Nonproliferation + Treaty as an unacceptable infringement of its sovereign + rights. + —It is purchasing from West Germany the technology and facilities + for a complete nuclear fuel cycle. + +

Within a framework of strong traditional ties, Brazil’s foreign policy + will almost certainly diverge increasingly from that of the US.

+ + —Disagreements are most likely to involve economic issues and will + probably become more numerous with the passage of time. + —Despite differences on specific issues, Brazil overall will + continue to desire close and cooperative relations with the + US. + +

[Omitted here is the body of the NIE.]

+
+ +
+ 120. Telegram 6684 From the Embassy in Brazil to the Department of + State +

Summary: In a + meeting at the Foreign Ministry, the Ambassador expressed his + displeasure with a Brazilian decree that permitted retaliation + against countries that put restrictions on exports from that + country. He thought a follow-up letter from Kissinger to Silveira would prove + productive.

+

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + D750278–0345. Confidential; Priority; Exdis. Repeated to São + Paulo and Rio de Janeiro. The Simon-Simonsen letter is in telegram 177583 to + Brasília, July 28. (Ibid., D750260–0313) In telegram 6498 from + Brasília, July 5, the Embassy reported that Brazil intended to + apply retaliatory measures against countries, including the + United States, that discriminated against Brazilian exports. + (Ibid., D750269–0284) In telegram 185309 to Brasília, August 6, + the Department instructed the Ambassador to deliver a démarche + to Silveira on the + matter. (Ibid., D750270–0918)

+ + + + Brasília, August 11, 1975, 1705Z. +

6684. Subject: Trade Measures. Ref: State 185309.

+

1. I made a presentation, based on reftel, to the SecGen of the Foreign + Ministry Friday, August 8. (The Foreign Minister could not see me until + early evening Friday and I did not wish to delay the presentation until + then.)

+

2. Speaking from talking points, I covered the material in reftel (see + para 8). In additional remarks, I emphasized the sense of disappointment + and discouragement we felt with respect to our very considerable + efforts, going back to 1973 when the shoe case was first taking shape, + to establish continuing consultations on trade issues in order to find + solutions, insofar as possible. I noted particularly the disheartening + effect of the adoption of the measure on the basis of the Robinson mission and the Simon-Simonsen letter which epitomized our own intentions to + maintain an open dialogue on trade problems between us. (Guerreiro, + responding to my offer to give him a copy, indicated that he had seen + the Simon letter.) I said that + we assumed and expected that any possible invocation of the decree would + be preceded by consultations.

+

3. Guerreiro listened to my presentation carefully, nodding occasionally + to my pitch about our longstanding and recently accelerated efforts to + set up effective two-way consultations. In reply, he stated the + following:

+

A. The decree was issued (at no time did he give the slightest indication + that it would be withdrawn or suspended) in order to fill a gap in + Brazilian law and regulations. He explained that there had been no + provision of Brazilian law that permitted retaliation against + restrictions on Brazilian exports. He noted that, with respect to + international instruments, the GATT did, of course, authorize + retaliation, provided that + other means of resolving differences had been unsuccessful. He added + that the LAFTA treaty was not at all + clear on the subject, although there were those who argued that the + authority to retaliate was implicit in the LAFTA document. In Brazilian domestic law and regulations + there had been no parallel authority, and the decree was intended to + fill that void.

+

B. He said that, despite press accounts, the decree was not aimed at the + United States. There were many other problems with other countries, + particularly in the LAFTA area (read: + Argentina) and those cases were “even clearer” than the ones with the + United States.

+

C. He affirmed that the decree was entirely prospective. He stated that + there certainly would be consultations before any implementation of the + decree—that being one of the purposes of the decree’s requirement that + the Foreign Minister be consulted—and that the GOB’s hope was that it would never be necessary to use the + decree.

+

4. I gave Guerreiro a copy of my talking points and asked him to pass it + to the Foreign Minister, with the explanation that I would have taken + the matter up with him but that the urgency of the subject had + counselled against delay. The Secretary General said that the Foreign + Minister would see the talking points that very day.

+

5. I also told Guerreiro that, unless he objected, I proposed to make a + copy of the talking points available to Minister Simonsen. Guerreiro replied that he + understood and certainly had no objection.

+

6. Comment: I consider that the approach was useful in recording the US + reaction in clear and firm terms, with sorrow more prominent than anger + but with the tone of warning about the decree’s negative implications + unmistakable. Guerreiro’s answer was a soft one, somewhat disingenuous + with respect to our being an object of the decree but not overly so + since the GOB does have growing + problems in the LAFTA area as well as + with the EC.

+

7. I believe it would be useful for the Secretary to follow up with a + letter to Silveira, drawing on + the points made in the talking points. Such a letter, couched, of + course, in friendly but also in sober terms, is warranted by the + importance of the subject which is on a par with other questions treated + in the ongoing correspondence. It would underline to Silveira our concerns and might also + forestall an injured innocence communication from him. With respect to + Silveira’s role, we are + satisfied, after checking with sources in the economic ministries and + agencies outside the Finance Ministry, that that Ministry’s attribution + of sponsorship of the decree to the Foreign Ministry was entirely + correct. For example, when I raised the decree with the President of the + Central Bank, his first words were: “That’s diplomacy.” Like the + disciplined official that he is, he went on, however, to explain the + decree somewhat along the lines of Guerreiro’s comments. A well-placed + source in the Secretariat + of Planning, disturbed by the publication of the decree, made a point of + telling the Embassy Financial Attaché that the Secretariat had had + nothing to do with the decree, which, he said, had come out of + Itamaraty, “with some support from the Finance Ministry.”

+

8. The text of the talking points paper follows:

+

9. Qte: The USG has noted with concern + the reported promulgation of a new decree which appears to envisage + retaliatory action against countries which in some manner are deemed to + impede the entry of Brazilian exports into their market. Although we + note that application of this decree is prospective and that the US is + not specifically singled out and identified as a target of such + measures, we are concerned by the timing of the reported measure, the + apparently broad nature of its provisions (including the lack of any + reference to the GATT), and the lack of any consultations with the US as + one of Brazil’s principal trading partners.

+

10. The Embassy has been instructed to convey these US concerns and to + request clarification of the nature of this measure and of the + intentions of the Brazilian authorities with respect to its application. + The inquiry is made in a spirit of cooperation but with deep concern + over the potential implications and repercussions for our bilateral + relations if the measure is applied in the manner which its broad terms + appear to suggest. Our purpose also is to clarify US attitudes and to + forestall any potential misunderstanding as to how the US would view, + and might be required to react to, the application of the measure.

+

11. The United States recognizes that, given the nature, size and + dynamism of the commerce between the United States and Brazil, there are + important trade issues between us. Our effort has been to foster a + climate, and to create consultative machinery, in which these issues + could be addressed expeditiously and effectively, and through which new + problems could be identified, discussed and, if possible, negotiated at + an early stage. The correspondence of Secretary Kissinger, correspondence between + Secretary Simon and Minister + Simonsen, the visit by Under + Secretary Robinson, the + resultant agreement to establish a bilateral economic consultative + mechanism (with a sub-group on trade), past cooperation between the two + governments with respect to countervailing duty cases, and the Embassy’s + regular and periodic consultations with Brazilian authorities—all these + have been designed to advance this purpose. The possibility of + additional steps to further this effort was part of my recent + consultations in Washington.

+

12. US authorities have been under the impression that these purposes and + special efforts in the economic sphere were fully understood and shared + by the Brazilian authorities, and that good progress was being made by + the two parties.

+ +

13. Against this background of shared effort, the reported decree would + appear to us to be untimely and regrettable. While U.S. authorities + appreciate the Brazilian preoccupation in regard to its export prospects + and the balance of payments, US views on the reported decree may be + summarized:

+

(A) The measure would be contrary to our efforts, as outlined in + Secretary Kissinger’s + correspondence, to resolve trade problems by consultation and + negotiation, either bilaterally or in the framework of the GATT, in a + spirit of cooperation.

+

(B) Following so soon after Under Secretary Robinson’s visit, including agreement to establish a + trade consultative mechanism to deal with bilateral problems, the + measure could not help having markedly negative effect on these efforts + at strengthened bilateral cooperation.

+

(C) With respect to the problem of export subsidies and countervailing + duties, while the US recognizes that Brazil considers the present + provisions under the GATT unsatisfactory, the decree, in our view, is + counterproductive with respect to current efforts to negotiate a new + subsidy/countervailing duty code in the multilateral trade + negotiations.

+

(D) Until such time as a new code is agreed and ratified, US + countervailing duty actions, prescribed by US law, are consistent with + US rights and obligations under the GATT, and retaliation against such + measures would, therefore, be unjustified. Retaliatory measures under + the decree would also, very probably, lead to further difficulties + brought about by a mutually harmful process of retaliation and + counter-retaliation.

+

(E) Implementation of the decree could have an unsettling effect on + relations outside the trade area.

+

14. We appreciate the cooperation which the US has received from the + Brazilian authorities in the past. Consistent with Secretary Kissinger’s proposals for increased + consultations and with the agreed consultative mechanism, we hope that + this cooperation can continue through consultations on, and negotiation + of, such issues as will arise from time to time, in advance of + unilateral action by either government. Unqte.

+ + + Crimmins + + +
+ +
+ 121. Telegram 201480/Tosec 100086 From the Department of State to + Secretary of State Kissinger + +

Summary: In a letter to Kissinger, Silveira discussed Cuba, détente, and trade + policy.

+

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + [no film number]. Confidential; Immediate; Exdis. Kissinger was in the Middle + East from August 21 to 31, shuttling between Alexandria and + Jerusalem. Repeated to Brasília and to Eleuthera for Rogers on August 25. Kissinger’s July 27 letter to + Silveira was + transmitted in telegram 177906 to Brasília, July 27. (Ibid.) In + telegram 7462 from Brasília, August 27, the Embassy outlined + topics for a response to Silveira’s letter, highlighting détente, + North-South relations, trade relations, consultative mechanisms, + and Cuba policy. (Ibid., D750296–0734)

+ + + + Washington, August + 25, 1975. +

201480/Tosec 100086. Subject: Letter to Secretary From Brazilian Foreign + Minister. Ref: State 201066, Tosec 100070.

+

1. Following letter from Foreign Minister Silveira to Secretary Kissinger delivered late afternoon Friday, August 22 by + Brazilian Embassy.

+

2. Begin text: My dear Henry: I + have just received your letter of today’s date, in which you apprise me + of the measures that the United State Government will be adopting as + from tomorrow, for the lifting of certain restrictions to the trade with + Cuba. Although the measures pertain, for the time being, only to trade + conducted by subsidiaries located in third countries, they still cannot + fail to produce an impact on the bilateral relations between the United + States and Cuba, to the extent that they will provide an opening for a + Cuban reaction indicating, as you said, whether the Cubans “are prepared + for serious talks”. I thank you for the information, which will + certainly be useful for keeping posted on the policy of the countries + that voted at San Jose in favor of the lifting of the sanctions against + Cuba.

+

3. Both at Quito and in Washington, I had the opportunity to refer once + again to the fact that, in my view, the Cuban problem was being dealt + with in the OAS under the prism of the + global policy of the “détente” rather than under the more proper one of + continental relations. The two subjects are, to a certain point, + interconnected but from Brazil’s viewpoint the primarily continental + perspective of the Cuban problem should never have been lost from sight. + To us, the fundamental questions are, in this order, 1) Does Cuba no + longer constitute a threat to the security of the other members of the + TIAR, ceasing to intervene directly or indirectly in their internal + affairs? 2) Is Cuba disposed to cooperate with the other countries of + the inter-American system, undertaking firm commitments in this + connection?

+ +

4. I am not unaware of the great significance of the Helsinki meeting and + of the positive aspects of the policy of “détente”, which you so ably + summarized in your letter of July 27. You know my viewpoints on the + “détente”, which do not necessarily coincide with yours. I understand + the American and the Soviet objectives in pursuing the “détente” in + their bilateral relations, and I admit that the countries both of the + Western and Eastern blocs can benefit from the détente, at least while + it creates perspectives of immediate peace and of a greater possibility + of cooperation in the efforts for economic and social development. What + it should not be, however, is a policy of simplification of the world + reality, accentuating the natural tendency of the two leader nations to + govern the world jointly. Helsinki, notwithstanding the presence of 35 + Chiefs of State, is in my view reminiscent of many other meetings in the + past, and, in some form, it was still the continuation of a world + history focused on the Northern Hemisphere as the starting point. In + this sense, I think that it was more of an epilogue than a prologue, for + I already do not see how it will be possible to ignore the emergence of + new protagonists, coming from the Southern Hemisphere, in the history + that is to be written from now to the end of the century. I do not refer + specifically to any particular country. I do think of the past reality + of the developing world, with its dissatisfactions, its ambitions, its + justifiable requirements, its frustrations and its reactions.

+

5. I intend to address myself to this topic in my speech at the Special + Assembly, of which I will send you the text as soon as it has been + completed. I deem it important that all of us, responsible governments + of developed and developing countries alike, join efforts in finding + constructive way out of the current impasse in the overall relations + between the Northern and Southern Hemisphere. The exasperation with + which some industrialized countries view the demagogic behavior of some + developing countries is but the same feeling of exasperation these less + developed countries harbor against what they see as a lack of + understanding on the part of the developed countries towards problems + originating in an inequitable economic order on the international level. + Mutual recrimination only aggravates the impasse.

+

6. Although I do not believe that the Department of State has let itself + be influenced by the New York Times report from + Associated Press that I had proposed a “formal” resumption of the new + dialogue, I wish to reiterate that the willingness on the part of the + Brazilian Government to carry on a dialogue is a constant, not a + contingent attitude. But, being realistic and pragmatic, we certainly + would not formally propose something about which previous soundings had + not produced positive results. As regards the new dialogue, no sounding + out has been effected, nor do I believe that there exists now a climate + conducive to such.

+

7. I do not wish to conclude this letter without referring to the recent + decree by the Brazilian Government on the adoption of retaliatory measures against countries that + discriminatorily restrict the entry of Brazilian products. Upon the + publication of the decree, there followed a diplomatic action by + Ambassador Crimmins to Itamaraty + (the only one to do so), in which, besides requesting clarifications, + the Ambassador expressed his surprise at the fact that such a measure + had been adopted without previous consultation with Washington.

+

8. I must admit my surprise at both his diplomatic action and his + comment, to which, incidentally, we have given no publicity. The Erga + Omnes measure adopted by Brazil has general application and is not + specifically directed at any one country and it is even somewhat + intriguing that the U.S. Government has volunteered as its target. As a + matter of fact, we have problems of access to the markets of many + developed countries, not only to the U.S. market. As to the comment that + there had been no consultation with Washington, I consider it + appropriate to point out that since the measure was not specifically + aimed at the United States, there was no reason for consulting with the + United States Government. Even if this had been the case, it is not the + practice on the part of the United States to engage in previous + individual consultations before adopting measures of a general nature + that might affect our trade. This notwithstanding, we have repeatedly + maintained consultations with the U.S. Government on the problems of our + bilateral economic relations, during which the question of access (to + the U.S. market) has been discussed. Just recently, although the U.S. + Embassy had clearly indicated that Undersecretary Robinson did not wish consultations on + countervailing duties, the major implications of this problem were dealt + with. On that, as well as on other occasions, we have repeatedly + observed the inequality between the freedom assumed by the developed + countries in defence of their economy through schemes such as alleged + “market disruptions” and denied to the developing countries in + protecting their considerably more fragile economic structures.

+

9. This letter turned out to be long and varied in its content, but I + wanted to bring our correspondence up to date.

+

10. Though we cannot afford the luxury of purely intellectual pleasures, + I want to tell you, quite candidly, that the frank and honest letters we + exchange have been, amidst the perplexing problems that beset us, a + source of satisfaction in my work as Brazil’s Minister of Foreign + Relations.

+

11. I wish you success in your current endeavors in the Near East. Warm + regards, Antonio End text.

+

12. Draft reply in preparation. Maw +

+

Unqte

+ + + Ingersoll + + +
+ +
+ 122. Telegram Secto 10214 From Secretary of State Kissinger to the Embassy in + Brazil +

Summary: In a + letter to Silveira, + Kissinger discussed + détente, sanctions on Cuba, and the dialogue among the nations + of the hemisphere.

+

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + P840099–1284. Confidential; Niact; Immediate; Exdis. Repeated + Immediate to the Department.

+ + + + Jerusalem, August 30, 1975, 2015Z. +

10214. Subject: Action Memo: Proposed Reply to FM Silveira. Ref: A) Tosec 100276 + (Notal), B) Tosec 100274 repeat of Brasília 7462.

+

1. Please deliver the following message to Silveira from Secretary Kissinger:

+

2. Begin text: Dear Antonio: Your letter of August 20 was slightly + delayed in its transmittal to me here in Jerusalem. I share your feeling + that our exchanges are a source of personal satisfaction, and I am + answering immediately because, beyond the personal dimension, our two + countries are too important to the emerging global order, and our + futures are too closely joined to allow any possible misunderstanding or + misinterpretations to cloud our relations.

+

A fundamental theme running through your letter deals with the + relationship between our policy of détente with the Soviet Union and our + posture toward the developing world. I think it important, Antonio, that + I seek to clarify the distinction I see between these two central + aspects of American foreign policy.

+

As for détente, the United States shares two things with the Soviet + Union: The power to destroy the world and the traumatic memory of two + world wars in this century. No government can responsibly do less than + to try to chain that power and learn from that past. These issues may + have originated in the old world but that fact makes them no less + important to all of us and to world peace. Massive military forces still + confront each other in Europe.

+

The Helsinki Conference was indeed an epilogue—an epilogue to World War + II. But it was by no means easily reached. It would be disingenuous of + me to suggest we did not have to engage in exchanges with the Soviet + Union in the effort to hammer out an outline for the accord. But the + conference was the culmination of three years of painstaking + negotiations among all the states involved leading toward a better + definition of East-West relations. Each country, large and small, had + points it wished to advance and important interests it had to protect. + These had to be accommodated or there would have been no final + agreement. It is difficult to interpret this broad effort as an exercise in condominium. + Certainly the participants did not look on it as such. But détente is a + limited process with limited ends. The Helsinki Conference as you + emphatically point out does not represent the full range of problems + affecting the world today. Who could question that this open country + with its varied population and its market for ideas and products + extending across the world could be insensitive to or isolated from the + dramatic changes underway in the Southern Hemisphere. The great + importance I place on my forthcoming address before the UN Special Session demonstrates the + profound preoccupation over economic problems that we share with the + “emerging protagonists” from the Third World.

+

But I cannot, Antonio, in all candor agree that there is in any of our + policies that have evolved toward the Third World over the past months a + “natural tendency of two leader nations to govern the world jointly.” + The crucial debate now before us is over trade relations, commodities + and a re-examination of international monetary arrangements. Yet, the + Soviet Union and other Communist nations are not only not influential on + US policies in this regard but they have virtually opted out of the + debate. The Soviets played neither an interested nor active role in the + World Food Conference, the World Population Conference, Sixth Special + Session of the General Assembly nor the Preparatory Conference in Paris. + In these fora where North/South issues have been examined seriously we + have played an active and concerned role. An obsession with East/West + relations in no way motivated the attention and initiatives we brought + to those meetings. How do we approach these North/South issues? Though + you could not say so, I believe that Brazil should be one of the leading + forces in any search for a truly global order. Brazil’s own importance + and our shared understanding that mutual recrimination will not aid the political environment required for + a successful outcome make this inevitable. I was heartened by your + references to this point in your São Paulo speech and I look forward + with great interest to your address in New York.

+

Now to Cuba. Some countries may have acted at San Jose in the mistaken + belief that détente requires normalization with Cuba. We did not. + Neither détente, nor our relations with the Soviets, nor any desire to + improve relations with Cuba governed our actions at San Jose. If + anything our motives are to reduce Soviet influence in Cuba. In San Jose + we joined in a freedom of action formula that had majority support. This + formula was a Latin American initiative which we supported in order to + remove an irritant in hemispheric relations and preserve indeed revive + hemispheric support for the Rio Treaty. Last week without abandoning our + embargo on direct trade with Cuba we modified those of our own sanctions + which would have conflicted with the decision taken at San Jose. The + determining criterion of our policy was therefore entirely hemispheric without concern + for extraneous considerations like détente.

+

Opinions will obviously vary about the nature of the Cuban subversive + threat. My own judgment is that an increasing number of American states + no longer see Cuba as a serious threat. Whether or not there has been a + real and enduring change in Cuban intentions and capability for + subversion, there is more confidence on the part of the states + themselves about their ability to deal with whatever threat does exist. + Your point about the “emergence of new protagonists coming from the + Southern Hemisphere” is again relevant here. For despite the manifold + problems which confront us all, I do sense in most Latin American + countries an increasing sense of responsibility for their own + advancement and security and in many cases an increased sense of + confidence in their own ability to exercise that responsibility. The + strengthening and re-affirmation of the Rio Treaty at San Jose provides + further reassurance in this regard. The treaty of course remains our + ultimate safeguard against any recrudescence of the Cuban threat to + which we must certainly remain alert. I also share your doubt whether + Cuba is disposed to cooperate in the hemisphere and to undertake firm + commitments to its neighbors. We will be looking for evidence of Cuba’s + readiness to undertake its international and hemispheric + responsibilities. Our posture toward Cuba and toward its role in the + hemisphere will be conditioned by our evaluation of their behavior.

+

You have raised the question of our own relations with Cuba. As I have + indicated our lifting of sanctions against third countries has not eased + our embargo on direct trade with Cuba. Should Cuba adopt a more + cooperative approach in the future we may eventually consider changes in + our posture, but such changes will be based on a reciprocal process in + which Cuba will have to demonstrate its readiness to fulfill its + obligations to us. Should such an evolution begin you will be among the + first to know, directly from me.

+

Finally, Antonio, I am concerned about the question of the broader + hemispheric dialogue which you raise in your letter. I share your view + that the current climate is not conducive to a resuscitation of the new + dialogue in a formal sense. But I remain as interested as I always have + been in the problem of improved communication within the hemisphere. And + I have been greatly heartened by the high quality of dialogue that we + witnessed at the recent OAS General + Assembly and at the San Jose meeting on the Rio Treaty. Yet it seems to + me that on the issues that transcend hemispheric concerns, the Latin + American nations themselves need to come to some agreement on how a + regional dialogue can be folded into the global debate.

+

On this issue, as on others, I as always welcome your views. I believe + that close consultation between us and our governments will be an indispensable requisite to any + progress we make on the problems which confront both of our nations. + Warmest regards, Henry. End + text.

+ + + Kissinger + + +
+ +
+ 123. Telegram 248481/Tosec 160048 From the Department of State to + Secretary of State Kissinger + +

Summary: The Department transmitted a letter from Silveira in which he outlined + for Kissinger his + concept of the structure of a “special relationship” between + Brazil and the United States.

+

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + D750362–1106. Confidential; Immediate; Exdis. Repeated Immediate + to Brasília. Drafted by Eltz, cleared by Fishlow, approved by Zimmermann. Published from an + unsigned copy. Kissinger + was in Tokyo. Summaries of the September 22 and 27 Kissinger-Silveira conversations, in + which they discussed bilateral and regional issues, are in + telegrams 227373 to the Secretary’s Delegation in New York, + September 24, and 235769 to Brasília, October 3. (Ibid., + D750330–0181 and D750342–1215) Kissinger’s visit to Brazil was postponed until + 1976. The June 1974 Kissinger-Silveira correspondence is referred to in the + source note to Document 103. On + October 15, Rogers + outlined options for Kissinger regarding a bilateral mechanism with + Brazil. (National Archives, RG 59, L/ARA Files, Country and General Files, 1965–1979: + Lot 81D324, POL 1 BRAZIL, + General Policy, 1975) On October 18, Barbian indicated Kissinger wanted “a more + formal structure with at least semi-annual meetings.” (Telegram + Secto 16021 from the Secretary’s Delegation in Tokyo, October + 18; ibid.)

+ + + + Washington, October 18, 1975, + 2204Z. +

248481/Tosec 160048. Subject: Letter From Brazilian Foreign Minister + Silveira. Ref: Secto + 16021.

+

1. Following is English translation of letter to you from Foreign + Minister Silveira which was + delivered by Brazilian Embassy night of October 17.

+

2. Begin text of letter:

+

My dear Henry:

+

I need not tell you of the pleasure which our two meetings in New York + gave me. Bill Rogers must have + already made you aware by now of the agreement of the Brazilian + Government with the new dates proposed for your visit to Brasília. + Genscher has agreed to be here on November 17 through 19. Thus, we will + be ready to welcome you on the 20th, when I shall have the pleasure of + honoring you with a banquet soon after your arrival. The President will + receive you on the 21st; next morning on the 22nd you will be able to + fly down to Rio for the week-end which has been promised to Nancy. I + also await a word from you on + the suggestion which I conveyed through the Department of State on our + joint inauguration of the direct dialing telephone system between Brazil + and the U.S.A. It would be a good opportunity, for instance, to make + your visit known to the public.

+

I shall now take up the subject of the establishment of a “special + relationship” between our governments, a matter on which I promised to + write you. You told me that you are convinced of the need of such a + relationship, even though you knew of the political difficulties which + would result from making a distinction singling Brazil out from the + other nations of the hemisphere. You also asked me to make suggestions + on means and formulas which would render that relationship operational, + so that there would be something which could be formalized on the + occasion of your visit to Brazil. I confess that I find some difficulty + in reopening the subject in its substantive aspect, but not in its + formal one. From the formal viewpoint the establishment of a “special + relationship” between Brazil and the U.S.A. is an issue that could be + taken care of through the creation of a special coordinating committee, + as I have proposed in my letter to you dated June 6, 1974, to which you + replied on the 13th of the same month. Such a committee as contemplated + in my proposal would provide the adequate framework, both ample and + flexible, for the institution of an operational mechanism at high level + for mutual consultation on matters of either individual or common + interest of the parties. Such a committee would be different from the + traditional joint commission as it would be concerned basically with + political consultations.

+

It is in its substantive aspect that the understanding at which the two + governments may arrive appears to me to be less clear. Like you, I + believe that what is necessary is that there exist on both sides a clear + awareness of this “special relationship” as well as straightforward + ideas about what it really signifies. From Brazil’s viewpoint the two + aspects are interconnected. Evidently, both Brazil and the United States + can live without the formal establishment of a special relationship + between the two governments. In the measure, however, that one can be + useful to the other for the attainment of certain common or particular + aims, this relationship can be really important. Importance, therefore, + is the function of the objectives of this relationship.

+

It is not for me to presume what could be the interests of the United + States within a “special relationship” with Brazil. I can state, + [omission in the original] be. Basically, in our case, the aim would be + to obtain from the United States Government the recognition that an + economically strong and prosperous Brazil, as a member of the community + of developed countries, will be an important factor in the survival of + the values of the Western world. Under these conditions, it is important + that no obstacles be raised against the swift economic expansion of Brazil, through measures which + might impede or retard that development. More than this, it is important + that this rapid transformation be helped by the creation of favorable + conditions for trade expansion, for the diversification of exports, for + the increase of Brazil’s commercial and economic presence in the world, + for domestic industrialization and, above all, for technological + modernization under conditions leading to autonomy and creativity rather + than perpetuate or increase dependence.

+

A special coordinating commission, as I see it, should serve to realize a + “special relationship” of this type. A joint commission along classic + standards would run the risk of merely making us still more dependent. + As I mentioned to you in New York, the systems of consultation between + highly unequal countries frequently produce the result of not altering + the conduct of the stronger and manacle the weaker ones. We have seen + examples of this in our own bilateral relations. The United States + Government has frequently a multiplicity of reasons not to alter its + behavior, be it for reasons of global policy, or for reasons of domestic + policy. On certain occasions, it would be said that certain measures are + not possible because they could not count on the support of “trade” or + other more articulate groups, whether professional or under the pressure + of public opinion. On other and more frequent instances, the + justification put forward is that of the lack of support by Congress. I + cannot omit noting that allegations of the same order, coming from + Brazil, are never considered as carrying the same weight or + validity.

+

In sum, my dear Henry, neither my + government nor I lack the willingness to attempt to articulate a + “special relationship” between Brazil and the United States, a + relationship that would be really meaningful for both countries. + Naturally, I have taken in full consideration the argument that you + presented me in New York in the sense that the Department of State and + you yourself need a mechanism of special understanding between the + United States and Brazil which would make it possible to prevent some + sectors of the American administration from taking abrupt measures, with + a negative effect on Brazil. I would like, nonetheless, to be sure that + both of us are thinking of the same thing when we talk about a “special + relationship” between our countries.

+

As aiding material for our forthcoming conversation on the subject, I am + sending you herewith a few preliminary suggestions aiming at indicating + along general lines the format which might be adopted for the + commission. I enclose also a copy of the “memorandum of understanding” + that I am to sign with the United Kingdom next week, which in my view, + establishes an extremely flexible framework for consultations. Warmest + regards from Antonio. End text of letter.

+
+ +
+ 124. Action Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for + Inter-American Affairs (Rogers) + to Secretary of State Kissinger + +

Summary: Rogers + summarized Silveira’s + vision of a consultative mechanism between the United States and + Brazil, and he recommended that Kissinger inform Silveira of his support for the idea of setting + up such a mechanism.

+

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + P830109–1749. Confidential; Exdis. Drafted by Eltz on December 23. Attached + but not published are Tabs 1–3. Tab 1 is a December 23 draft of + the letter transmitted in Document + 125. Tab 2 is Silveira’s letter transmitted in Document 123. Kissinger and Silveira were in Paris from + December 15–17 for a meeting of the CIEC. Although the Paris Kissinger-Silveira memorandum of + conversation has not been found, Rogers briefed Kissinger on the topics that Silveira would probably + raise: visits of dignitaries, a UN resolution on Zionism, Angola, the bilateral + consultative mechanism, and economic issues. (Telegram 295457 to + Brasília, December 17; ibid., D750439–0443) The U.S. Government + requested that Brazil oppose a UN proposal to withdraw UN troops from South Korea. (Telegram 248497 to + Brasília, October 19; ibid., D750363–0006) Brazil decided to + abstain.

+ + + + Washington, December 24, 1975. +

Response to Brazilian Foreign Minister Silveira’s Suggestions for a New + Bilateral Mechanism

+

The Problem

+

Now that you have approved the recommendations forwarded in my memo of + October 31 regarding a new bilateral mechanism with Brazil, and have, in + Paris, again expressed to Brazilian Foreign Minister Silveira your agreement to move + forward on such a mechanism, you should respond to Silveira’s letter of October 16 on + this subject.

+

Background

+

As agreed during your bilateral meetings with Silveira in September, he sent you on + October 16 his suggestions with respect to a new mechanism to formalize + bilateral exchanges at the policy level (Tab 2). Silveira’s thoughts on the type of + mechanism are generally consistent with the outline you approved in my + memorandum of October 31 (Tab 3).

+

In his letter, however, Silveira + went beyond the delineation of mechanics and addressed the fundamental + question of what we can expect from the bilateral relationship. He made + the point that the GOB is interested in + a process which will result in greater weight being given to Brazil’s + views and needs in the formulation of US policies in areas of vital + interest to Brazil.

+

In your October 19 message on the Korea question, you thanked Silveira for his suggestions and told + him that you would be back in touch after studying his proposals. Now that we have your approval of + a US position, you should respond to the Silveira letter, including some comments on the goals + which a more formalized bilateral mechanism can realistically hope to + achieve.

+

Recommendation

+

That you authorize transmission of the message to Silveira attached at Tab 1.

+
+
+ 125. Telegram 2699 From the Department of State to the Embassy in + Brazil +

Summary: + Kissinger informed + Silveira that he + agreed to setting up a consultative mechanism.

+

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + D760004–0023. Confidential; Immediate; Exdis. Drafted by + Zimmermann; cleared + by Fishlow, Ryan, Einaudi, and Rogers; + approved by the Secretary. On February 3, Rogers sent a copy of a + Memorandum of Understanding worked out between the Embassy and + the Foreign Office which stipulated semi-annual meetings. + Kissinger approved + the Memorandum of Understanding on February 7. (Ibid., L/ARA Files, Country and General + Files, 1965–1979: Lot 81D324, POL 1 BRAZIL, General Policy, + 1975)

+ + + + Washington, January 6, 1976, 2156Z. +

2699. Subject: Bilateral Mechanism with Brazil.

+

1. Please deliver the following message from the Secretary to Foreign + Minister Silveira:

+

2. Begin text: Dear Antonio: I am pleased that we were able to meet in + Paris for another personal exchange; it is always helpful to have your + considered views and analysis of the challenges we face.

+

As I mentioned in Paris, I continue to place value on a new bilateral + mechanism between the United States and Brazil. Your provocative and + thoughtful letter of October 16 on this subject reached me, as you know, + during my flight to China. Your detailed suggestions in that letter were + very useful. I would like to refer back to them here, in order to move + forward towards implementing the general understandings we reached + during our New York and Paris meetings so that we have an agreed plan to + announce during my visit.

+

First, I believe as do you, that we should address the question of a + “special relationship” in all candor. I trust neither of us is under any + illusions or holds misunderstandings of the benefits to be gained from + whatever consultative + mechanism we establish. My government fully recognizes that—to use your + words—“an economically strong and prosperous Brazil, as a member of the + community of developed countries, will be an important factor in the + survival of the values of the Western world.” I am aware that the + developed countries, and in particular the United States, are frequently + suspected of seeking an exclusive predominance in global political and + economic affairs. You have my full assurance that this is not our aim. + It is neither possible nor desirable to freeze the status quo among + nations. To harbor such a goal would be to blind oneself to the whole + course of history despite much talk about polarization and “camps” in + world affairs, I could never subscribe to the proposition that there is + a fixed or inherent division between “developed” and “developing” + countries. The sooner the gap is narrowed, if not eliminated, the fewer + causes for friction there will be in the world. This has been one of the + cardinal aims of our economic assistance programs over the years. And it + lies at the heart of our search for new forms of cooperation.

+

The real difficulties arise not in broad philosophy but in questions of + methodology and pace. In this context the thought you expressed in Paris + that we can achieve the same goals using different techniques is an + intriguing one; I am not certain this is always the case but certainly + the concept warrants further exploration in the consultative process. It + is natural and understandable that the developing countries should be in + a hurry, while the encrustations of law and vested interests dampen a + sense of urgency on the part of the developed countries. But all + countries require orderly procedures as a prerequisite for progress. The + outcome in the final analysis must be responsible compromise affording + to the developing countries the necessary opportunities and means to + make steady progress in development without simultaneously weakening the + global economic and financial structure. My proposals to the Seventh + Special Session of the UN constituted a + serious effort to just this end.

+

Brazil, as the most advanced of the developing nations, is in a unique + position to appreciate these tensions. And in the context of US-Brazil + relations, it is this methodology and pace, particularly in the economic + area, that should form an important part of the substance of whatever + consultative mechanism we establish. By the nature of things neither of + us can be completely responsive to the other, but I would look upon our + mechanism as a means of achieving at least some of the goals of each + side and offering opportunities for better mutual understanding.

+

As to questions of form, I find myself in substantial agreement with the + ideas expressed in your letter. In essence I concur that the classic + joint commission is not the most suitable procedure for our two countries. What we need is a + process that will enable us to provide the political framework for + technical consultations. As you suggest this could be accomplished by + formal consultations once a year in each country on a rotating basis. We + are also in substantial agreement on the composition of delegations. We + might therefore consider drawing up a memorandum of understanding along + the lines of the one you have signed with the United Kingdom. Having + reached a general understanding of the outline for a consultative + mechanism to be headed by the two of us, I suggest that if you have no + objection we work out the details through routine diplomatic channels. I + shall ask our Embassy in Brasília to be in touch with the appropriate + members of your staff for this purpose.

+

With warm personal regards. Henry. End text.

+ + + Kissinger + + +
+ +
+ 126. Telegram 672 From the Embassy in Brazil to the Department of + State +

Summary: + Crimmins maintained + that it was unlikely that direct U.S. Government assistance + programs could be used to mitigate human rights abuses, but that + regional assistance efforts could be effective.

+

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + D760029–0551. Confidential. In an April 25, 1975, letter, + Crimmins informed + Velloso that the U.S. Government was phasing out its bilateral + economic assistance program because of Brazil’s rapid economic + progress, the redirection of U.S. assistance to relatively less + developed nations, and increased U.S. reliance on multilateral + channels. (Telegram 9891 from Brasília, November 14, 1975; + ibid., D750397–0365)

+ + + + Brasília, January 26, 1976, 1355Z. +

672. Subject: New Initiatives in Human Rights. Ref: AIDAC 75 State + 298250, AIDTO Cir A–687 (12/9/75).

+

1. We assume that because of the decision to phase out assistance to + Brazil, AID financed human rights + activities, if carried out here, at all, would be part of AID/W regional + funded activities.

+

2. Brazil’s best-known human rights problem is, of course, the arbitrary + arrest and mistreatment of people suspected of subversion or of links + with organizations deemed to be subversive. We consider this problem, at + least at bottom, to be almost totally impervious to direct influence by + AID activities. It stems from + determined and deep-set attitudes on the part of the security elements + in Brazil’s Armed Forces, + elements generally considered to be carrying out their illegal + activities contrary to the wishes of the country’s chief executive; no + conceivable AID program could be aimed + directly at them.

+

3. Indirect efforts, the impact of which would be almost impossible to + measure, are conceivable, although they would risk some political costs, + especially because Brazil’s long-standing international notoriety + regarding human rights has made the government extremely sensitive to + “outside interference.” (Brazil was among the handful of countries which + voted with Chile against the recent UN + resolution on human rights in that country, and explained its vote on + sovereignty grounds.) The GOB has + nevertheless shown itself concerned with the damage human-rights + violations do to its foreign image, and actions taken by international + bodies can be helpful in fostering that concern. A complicating factor + is that while multilateral action might well reduce the political costs + to any individual nation, direct action—a UN resolution critical of Brazil, for example, or a + condemnatory ICJ report mentioning + Brazil by name—would almost certainly stiffen government attitudes and + reduce the chances of GOB cooperation + with international bodies on human rights.

+

4. Within Brazil, the problem of arbitrary arrest and torture has been + taken on by various groups, including the opposition party (MDB), some elements of the Catholic Church + (particularly the Justice and Peace Committee in São Paulo), the Order + of Brazilian Lawyers, and the São Paulo state journalists’ union (on + cases involving journalists). These groups would not be appropriate + recipients of AID, or even IAF, + assistance, but their activity and the signs, however scant, of their + usefulness in calling attention to individual cases and calling for just + treatment suggest that other groups less connected to national or + international institutions, such as lower-level professional + associations, neighborhood groups, or legal-aid societies, could be + identified and encouraged.

+

5. Such groups would, of course, have a potential utility far broader + than that of assisting the relatively tiny (in national population + terms) number of people picked up in the antisubversion net. Members of + Brazil’s large underpriviledged groups, if accused of a crime, can find + themselves caught up in an old-fashioned, overburdened, and inefficient + judicial system, unassisted by meaningful legal counsel, subject to long + periods of detention awaiting trial, and, if convicted, confined to + out-moded, ill-equipped, and overcrowded prisons. In fact the GOB has recently begun a judicial reform + effort (aimed essentially at stream-lining judicial procedures), + although it is still at an early stage. For their part, several state + governors have in the recent past constructed model prisons and begun + rehabilitation programs.

+

6. It should be clear from the foregoing that human rights are an + extremely sensitive matter in Brazil and internationally for the + Brazilian Government. One + element of that sensitivity has to do with the GOB’s suspicions, clearly indicated on more than one + occasion, about US intentions in the human-rights field. Given the range + and importance of our other interests in Brazil, it follows that any + idea of USG effort, however indirect, + on behalf of human rights in Brazil should be given careful, detailed, + and broad policy review.

+

7. Within the above context, we recommend continuation and/or expansion + of the type of cooperative programs summarized in attachment Birnbaum + memo (ref Air). While most of these efforts are long range in nature, + they are focused on key target groups who should be influential in + molding future policies. Specifically, we urge AID/W explore + continuation of the SUNYA legislative program in Brazil and renew + attempts to establish a regional legal education activity either through + a direct institutional contract or in collaboration with the Ford Foundation. USAID/Brazil assisted + Ford activities in this area + in past through provision of participant training grants. Mission + understands University of Illinois (J. Heller) has small legal exchange + program with several Brazilian (and other LA) institutions which might serve as vehicle for an + expanded program.

+

8. As far as direct assistance to Brazil is concerned, there is some + potential for short-term consultants and observational training in + judicial and penitentiary reform and in the development of prison + rehabilitation/vocational training programs. No program development + exploration has been undertaken because of the USAID phase out. AID/W is undoubtedly + aware that assistance in such areas would be politically sensitive in + the US because it will be easily misinterpreted and connected with the + notoriety of countersubversion violations of human rights; centrally + funded or regional projects would probably cause less problem than + direct bilateral assistance.

+ + + Crimmins + + +
+ +
+ 127. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security + Affairs (Scowcroft) to President + Ford + +

Summary: An interagency working + group devised a process for negotiations with Brazil to prevent + the spread of nuclear materials and technology. Low-key exploratory talks would + be followed by full-scale negotiations if enough common ground + existed.

+

Source: Ford Library, + National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for Latin + America, Box 2, Brazil (2). Secret. Sent for action. The + President approved the recommendation. Attached but not + published is Tab A, a February 17 memorandum from Scowcroft to Kissinger, Rumsfeld, Ilké, and Seamans, notifying them of the + President’s decision.

+ + + + Washington, February 14, 1976. + + SUBJECT + Nuclear Negotiations with Brazil + +

State has forwarded an interagency study regarding steps to be taken in + our nuclear negotiations with Brazil (Tab B). Our nuclear cooperation + with Brazil to date, carried out under an earlier limited agreement, + involved the sale of one power reactor, several research reactors, and + the associated fuel. A new agreement is required for the pending + purchase of the fuel for two German-built reactors and any possible + future sales of U.S. reactors and fuel.

+

The study contains an analysis of the constraints that we would expect to + require in a new agreement to give maximum assurance against the + possible use of U.S. equipment, special nuclear material, or technology + in any nuclear explosive development that might be contemplated by + Brazil. Such constraints are pertinent since Brazil has not joined the + Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), has not + been willing to give a general commitment to accepting safeguards on all + of its nuclear facilities, has not ruled out the development of + “peaceful nuclear explosives”, and has recently contracted with the + FRG to acquire uranium enrichment + technology and a chemical reprocessing facility to recover plutonium + from spent reactor fuel. Although these latter facilities are to be + safeguarded by the IAEA, many in the U.S. have expressed concern that + placing such potential in Brazilian hands is dangerous, and it may well + stimulate Argentina to posture itself for nuclear weapon + development.

+

We have been putting off our negotiations with Brazil (and straining our + bilateral relations as a result) for almost two years while trying to + devise the substance of a new agreement which would meet our + non-proliferation concerns, would hold open the Brazilian market for + U.S. reactor and fuel sales, and would have a reasonable chance of being + acceptable to Brazil. Now that we have come to an understanding with the other major nuclear + exporting countries on common export policies to reduce proliferation + risk, we are in a position to take the next step with Brazil in trying + to reach agreement. Furthermore, a new agreement might offer the + opportunity to close some of the loop-holes we perceive in the + Brazil-FRG deal; namely we could + control Brazilian acquisition of plutonium by limiting the reprocessing + of U.S. fuel converted in German reactors. This last would be a definite + plus in gaining the requisite Congressional approval for a new agreement + with Brazil—and without strong proliferation restraints such approval + would be very uncertain.

+

The study proposes that our contact with Brazil be carried out in two + steps: First, low-key exploratory talks, without commitment on either + side to proceed further, to determine the Brazilian attitude toward the + types of restraints and conditions we have in mind. Following these + initial exploratory talks, we would be prepared to proceed with full + scale negotiations if our initial contacts reveal a sufficient common + ground of mutual interest.

+

State has requested that you approve the initial exploratory talks. Even + though the talks are not intended to involve formal positions or + tentative agreement, State feels that the Brazilian nuclear issue is + sufficiently sensitive in Congress that it is advisable to have your + explicit sanction for a contact with Brazil on this subject. If we were + to reach the next stage involving negotiation with Brazil, your approval + would then be sought for our detailed negotiating position. ACDA, ERDA, and DOD agree with + this approach, and I concur.

+

The Secretary of State will be in Brazil on February 19, and it may be + useful for him to indicate, at that time, our willingness to hold + exploratory talks on the question of nuclear cooperation.

+

Recommendation

+

That you approve my signing the memorandum at Tab A.

+

PROPOSED NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE BRAZILIAN GOVERNMENT ON A + NEW NUCLEAR AGREEMENT

+

The Problem

+

To decide the nature of the position that the United States should take + in negotiating a new agreement with Brazil on peaceful nuclear + cooperation.

+

Background/Analysis

+

+ Reasons for Proceeding: For more than a year, + Brazil has been awaiting our proposals for a revision of the existing + ERDA civilian nuclear agreement + for cooperation. A draft amendment to the 1972 U.S.-Brazilian Agreement + which was presented for the consideration of the Brazilian Government in 1973, was withdrawn + by the U.S. in 1974 to permit us to reflect our new and more rigorous + non-proliferation policies which were then being considered. However, no + substitute draft has yet been forwarded. Moreover, we have consciously + deferred our Brazilian negotiations on the grounds that the higher + priority Iranian agreement might establish a new frame of reference for + all new nuclear agreements. As of late, we have been delaying a + resumption of negotiations to await the outcome of the London Suppliers + Conference so as to assure that our proposals are compatible with the + London consensus. Throughout this period, however, we have repeatedly + assured the GOB that our proposals for + a new agreement would be forthcoming. Moreover, we have repeatedly + expressed a general desire to cooperate with Brazil in the nuclear field + as evidenced by Secretary Kissinger’s message of June 20 to Foreign Minister + Silveira.

+

Although our nuclear negotiations with Iran are still in progress (with + the outcome in doubt), we believe that further delay in responding to + Brazilian interests could have serious adverse effects on our overall + relationships. Indeed, the U.S. Embassy has ranked the delays in the + resumption of our negotiations as one of the most serious sources of + strain in our bilateral relations with Brazil. These strains have + undoubtedly been heightened by the furor that developed in this country + over the recent Brazilian-FRG + Agreement, and the charges in Brazil and Germany that U.S. expressions + of proliferation concerns about the agreement masked commercial pique + over having “lost” a lucrative sale for U.S. suppliers. Elements in the + GOB are, at best, interpreting our + continued silence as a failure to understand and support Brazil’s desire + to expand its nuclear power capability as a tool of development.

+

We thus have a strong incentive to demonstrate that we are still + interested in developing a common basis for nuclear cooperation with the + GOB. Also, there is only a limited + advantage in awaiting the results of our Iranian negotiations, since the + two agreements will in any case have their own distinctive features + since Iran is an NPT party, whereas + Brazil is not. Most importantly, the results of the London Suppliers + Group now are clearly in hand for us to take into account in the + negotiations. Accordingly, while the challenges in the face of a new + U.S.-Brazilian agreement may be formidable, it is in our interest to + resume the negotiations as soon as possible to ward off further serious + damage to our nuclear relationships. More positively, we also have a + very real incentive to seek areas of mutual interest that can convert + what has proven to be a troubled technical area into a field of + constructive interaction. This could serve to strengthen the overall + bilateral relationships. A new agreement with Brazil also could enable + us to retain some positive influence over Brazil’s future nuclear power + program and could serve to preserve some continuing U.S. role in a + program of major national + importance to the GOB. Accordingly, + this paper recommends the prompt initiation of exploratory talks with + the GOB to be followed by full-scale + negotiations if a sufficient basis for agreement appears in sight. A + series of recommended positions to be employed by the U.S. is also set + forth.

+

[Omitted here are sections entitled “Brazilian Interests,” “Key Issues To + Be Considered,” “Recommendations,” and “Conclusion.”]

+
+ +
+ 128. Memorandum of Conversation +

Summary: President Geisel and Secretary Kissinger discussed petroleum + prices, a visit by Geisel + to the United States, Brazil’s trade deficit with the United + States, and Brazil’s 200-mile territorial sea claim.

+

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + P820117–0826. Secret; Nodis. The conversation was held in + Planalto Palace. Drafted by Rogers on February 21 and approved in S on March + 12. The February 21 Memorandum of Understanding, in which both + nations pledged to hold consultations semi-annually, is in the + Department of State Bulletin, March 15, + 1976, pp. 337–338. In memoranda to Bentley, Woods directed that follow-up memoranda on trade + issues, a visit by Geisel, and Brazil’s 200-mile territorial sea claim + be written. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy + File, P820117–0832 and P820117–0833)

+ + + + Brasília, February 20, 1976, 10–11 + a.m. + + SUBJECT + Secretary’s Meeting with the President Geisel and Foreign Minister Silveira + + + + PARTICIPANTS + + + + Brasília + + President Ernesto Geisel + + Foreign Minister Azeredo da + Silveira + + + + + + + US + + The Secretary + Assistant Secretary William + D. Rogers (notetaker) + + + + +

The Secretary: Mr. President, I would like to thank you for the warm + reception I received on my arrival.

+

President Geisel: We take great + pleasure in your visit.

+

The Secretary: My wife so very much wanted to make the trip. She was + hopeful I could delay it.

+

President Geisel: It is too bad + that she is not here.

+

The Secretary: She would love to come to Brazil.

+ +

President Geisel: Foreign Minister + will make all the arrangements for the trip when she is ready to + come.

+

The Secretary: The Foreign Minister and I are really good friends. We see + each other frequently, and now we are regularizing those meetings and + that relationship with the new Memorandum of Understanding we are + signing on Saturday.

+

President Geisel: Brazil and the + United States have good relations now; Silveira reports to me about all his meetings with + you.

+

The Secretary: We understand each other and in the broad sense our + objectives are the same, though we may use different tactics to reach + those objectives on occasion.

+

President Geisel: Fundamentally, + the US and Brazil are walking the same path. There is not, however, a + 100% identity of views on everything. But we understand each other.

+

The Secretary: That is our conviction. Brazil has grown so that it now + can work with the United States without complexes, and on the basis of + equality and partnership.

+

Foreign Minister Silveira: + Complexes, indeed! Let me tell you, we have them.

+

President Geisel: My personal + impression is that our relationships, which are already strong, should + be intensified in this bilateral framework. We talk in international + fora like the OAS and the UN, but there is not yet a sufficiently + high level of understanding between our two countries. We need to work + more intensively on the bilateral issues between us, with greater + reciprocity and understanding.

+

The Secretary: For our part, we are ready to talk with you and reach + bilateral agreement before we meet in multilateral fora, and we are also + prepared to work on our bilateral issues.

+

President Geisel: I don’t mean to + downplay the importance of the multilateral fora. They exist. But the + United States and Brazil need to arrive at a higher understanding + between ourselves. There is a good working relationship between you two + foreign ministers, and the agreements that you have been able to work + out have been good. But the need for greater understanding, in my view, + goes beyond the efforts of the Department of State and Itamaraty. It + should extend also to intellectuals, to economic, scientific and + cultural exchanges. We need more of these.

+

The United States leads its own life. Not much attention is paid to + Brazil in the United States, now, and what is said about Brazil is + distorted. Our image is an image of dictatorship, and of violence. This + does not correspond to the realities of modern Brazil. We really ought + to work out ways in which the understanding of Brazil in the United + States may be more profound and more in accord with realities.

+ +

The Secretary: Since my trip here in 1962, I have been profoundly + convinced that Brazil is destined for world greatness. There is and + should be a special partnership between Brazil and the United States. We + need to intensify our relationships, not only on the foreign ministerial + level, but also on the highest levels. I do hope you will be able to + visit the United States this year, for it will provide a great + opportunity to symbolize for the people of our country the significance + we attach to our relations with Brazil. We are going to propose that you + consider the possibility of a visit in September, if that will be + convenient. We will work out the precise dates. The two Presidents could + symbolize together, in this way, the special relationships we see + between our two countries. As far as we are concerned, its domestic + organization is Brazil’s concern. We have trouble enough conducting our + own domestic policy, without trying to conduct yours.

+

President Geisel: You are right, + but this is not the prevailing attitude in the United States.

+

The Secretary: There are a lot of frustrated missionaries in my + country.

+

President Geisel: I take great + pleasure in receiving the invitation of President Ford to visit the United States, and I + would really like to see the President. But speaking frankly, there is + one difficulty which is stuck in my throat. It is hard for me to + envisage a visit just now, in view of the problem for us which arises + from the foreign commercial policy of the United States, which is not + yet overcome. You know, we had a serious problem with the increase in + petroleum prices. We have not overcome that yet, entirely. In addition, + there is the more recent problem of our grave imbalance of payments. The + United States is a very important part of this problem. Our deficit in + trade with your country is US $1.5 billion. The US under its law, + creates more restraints all the time on our exports. I don’t know + whether this is right or wrong, but it places me in a difficult + position. This is the difficulty with a visit by me. It is impossible + for public opinion here to understand how two good friends can have such + difficult problems. I speak frankly.

+

The Secretary: The difficulty is that we operate under severe + congressional restrictions now. Sometimes these are so severe that they + destroy the very design of our foreign policy. As I said in my toast, we + approach these issues within a political framework, not as a matter of + economic detail. And we are prepared to work hard for an international + agreement in Geneva to govern subsidies and countervailing duties. But + we must solve this issue somehow. It is just not worthy of great + countries to haggle about shoes.

+

President Geisel: I agree. I read + both speeches at the banquet. We can’t consider these matters as merely + economic. They vitally affect our political relations. I also understand + that Congress is under heavy pressure in trade questions, but, really, we also have to recognize + that the trade balance between the United States and Brazil is the + Achilles heel of the development of Brazil. We are having a very + difficult struggle this year, and we cannot minimize it. So I emphasize + that we must struggle for a solution, for this is Brazil’s truly great + problem.

+

The Secretary: Relations with Congress are going to be tough this year, + without a doubt. The new President, I think, will have a stronger hand. + I am also persuaded, incidentally, that President Ford will win. The Democrats have no + issue.

+

President Geisel: (In English) + What about Kennedy?

+

The Secretary: I think, that Kennedy really doesn’t want it. Mr. Rogers knows him. What is your + opinion, Bill? I think, also, that if Kennedy got the nomination, he would either win a + tremendous victory or suffer a tremendous defeat. The US public doesn’t + want a movie star this year. They want a steady, strong leader. If + Eisenhower were around, he + would win. But I really don’t think my theory about Kennedy will be tested. More likely + than Kennedy, I think Humphrey will get the Democratic + nomination. You know, I am not a Republican. I have worked with + Democratic Presidents. But I often wonder, when I look at the catalog of + Democratic candidates, just where in life it occured to people like + Carter, Bayh and Udall that they should begin their executive careers by + becoming President. One of the group may well win the nomination. My + thinking is that if they do, they will be defeated by President + Ford.

+

President Geisel: Your prediction + is valuable to me, and is, in fact, very like mine, even though I + confess to you that I am fairly ignorant about US politics. But it is + evident, to me, that this year Congress is going to be strong. The new + President next year, on the other hand, is bound to be stronger than + President Ford is now. And this, + I think, will make our relationship stronger. It could remove some of + the stones which are now in our path.

+

The Secretary: But to return to our basic problem, what we need is to + create the political will to deal with and control the technical + agencies. This is the importance of my visit, as I see it, to establish + control over the technical agencies.

+

President Geisel: I share a + profound conviction that our two countries must be closer. There are + many reasons for this, and I am prepared to do all I can to help. But + may I ask an indiscreet question? How will the US settle the problem of + Congress’ establishing a 200-mile limit? Will it fight Congress, or + accept it?

+

The Secretary: Mr. President, there are no indiscreet questions between + us. We should indeed speak frankly. In this spirit, I say to you that + the State Department wants to settle that issue as part of an overall international + agreement. For this reason, the President does not want a confrontation + with the Congress this year on it. He is working out ways to delay + action, and we are developing procedures for that purpose, so that there + can be Congressional delay until after the Law of the Sea Conference. + While we’re on this, let me also mention the deep sea issue. We have + tremendous pressures, particularly in the Congress, to start + exploitation of these resources. We want, though, to settle both issues + through international agreement. Brazil’s role, Mr. President, could be + decisive on this. I hope we can work together.

+

President Geisel: I am in accord + on that. We are prepared to see how we can use our influence to help the + Law of the Sea Conference. We should continue to avoid difficulty and + confrontation. You are also right, and I agree, that we need a joint + study between our two countries, to see if we can work out a line of + action, for we want to settle the matter, not have a crisis. The seabeds + are going to be very important to mankind. As we use up our surface + resources, we are going to be turning increasingly to the deep seas.

+

The Secretary: Our technical people in New York should intensify their + discussions, then, for this will be a good year to settle the + question.

+

President Geisel: The US has moved + ahead in technology in this area, and we therefore need close + cooperation. Brazil is prepared to cooperate. You are right that the + matter should be settled in a global framework, otherwise, there might + be a real conflict. If the US begins exploitation alone, there would be + serious friction, and all the other countries would be on the other + side. For this reason, we should keep exploring for joint solutions with + you.

+

The Secretary: This is exactly our view, Mr. President.

+

President Geisel: Well, we will + see you at the football game tomorrow.

+

The Secretary: You know I saw the Brazilian team in Mexico in 1970. It + had a really great offensive, and I found it very exciting.

+

President Geisel: The Brazilians + do get excited about football. It has even political significance here. + In 1974, the President attended the first game—like tomorrow’s—which + begins the process of selecting the national team. That team lost the + World Cup, and the Government party then lost the elections. Some people + think the two events were connected. So you can see why I am preoccupied + in selecting a really good team, starting tomorrow, for the 1978 World + Cup.

+

The Secretary: Thank you Mr. President. It has been a great honor.

+
+ +
+ 129. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security + Affairs (Scowcroft) to President + Ford + +

Summary: Scowcroft transmitted to + President Ford a report + from Kissinger on his + visit to Brazil.

+

Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CL 176, + Geopolitical File, Latin America, Trips, February 1976, Trip + Book, Folder 10. Secret; Sensitive. Sent for information. + Ford initialed the + memorandum.

+ + + + Washington, February 22, 1976. +

Secretary Kissinger has asked + that I pass you the following report.

+

“The reception here in Brazil has been warm, and the warmth is not + artificial; it reflects a basically friendly attitude about the United + States in Brazil.

+

“Brazil is important. It is the largest and most powerful Latin American + nation, with continental geography and continental resources and power + potential.

+

“Brazil has gone to extreme lengths to demonstrate the friendship with + the United States in the two days I have been here. Some measure of the + Brazilian response was suggested by the fact that the other ambassadors + here have concluded that the welcome was an order of magnitude warmer, + and the press coverage ten times more extensive, than that accorded the + French and the German foreign ministers who were recently here.

+

“This is a big country, with a big heart and a faith in its greatness and + its future which makes it possible for them to deal with us without + complexes. Among the President and his close advisers I have found a + basically healthy attitude about the United States and a considerable + regard for you.

+

“They take a world view. Furthermore, the interest by Brazil in world + affairs—SALT, the opening to China, détente, the Middle East—is the + interest of serious men, not dilettantes, for they think that they have + a world role to play.

+

“Indeed, they are right. I have tried to say as much while I was here. + The thrust of my statements, public and private, have been that Brazil + is emerging on the world scene, that the United States welcomes this, + that Brazil will make a positive contribution to the future world order + and that we are prepared to work with Brazil, intensively, in + consultation on bilateral and world problems of common interest.

+

“This is of more than diplomatic significance. Brazil counts. Its voice + means much in international councils; it is, for example, the key to the + resolution of the deep sea question, without which the Law of the Sea Conference cannot + succeed. Its trade and finance are important in the global scheme of + things. It is becoming a world power. This is what must be understood + for any fair assessment of what strong relations with Brazil mean to us. + If Brazil should turn against us in world affairs we would lose a good + friend and face a much more complicated situation.

+

“The Cuba issue has intruded itself into the press questioning. I have + tried to make clear that I am not here to organize a crusade against + Cuba. I have said that we ourselves will not stand idly by in the face + of further provocative interventionist expeditions by Cuba. But we will + do what we need to do, and we are not trying to organize others, even + Brazil, to line up with us. The point is sensitive here, however, since + the present Foreign Minister was an advocate of early recognition of the + MPLA Government. This has not sat + well with his vigorous anti-Communist President, and his military + colleagues.

+

“Brazil is indeed a military government, but one less blatantly so than + Peru. Here, no one wears a uniform to the office, the government does + not style itself, as the Peruvians do, the military government of + Brazil. There is no feeling here that the military are the Jesuits of a + new order, but rather that they are one part of a total national effort. + There is a sense of movement toward more participation and more + democracy. The President’s chief advisor, General Golbery, who looks + like a grade school mathematics teacher and talks like a speculation + philosopher, made the point. He puts it that Brazil has moved from + dictatorship to authoritarianism, and is now moving to democracy. The + question is how fast, not whether.

+

“The major irritant to our relations—the thing that stuck in his throat, + as the President put it—is the $1.6 billion trade deficit between the + U.S. and Brazil, and the impression here that, rather than help, the + United States is piling up one trade restriction after another against + Brazil’s exports. The President even went so far as to say that he would + find it hard to explain to his public how he could travel to the United + States while the problem is unsolved. We had good talks on the subject + and the Brazilians put forward an interesting idea which I shall discuss + with Simon upon my return.

+

“I confess I really like the Brazilians. The President is a protestant, + gentle in the Brazilian mode, but firm, a real father figure, and, I + think, incapable of cruelty or of tolerating cruelty. The others, except + for Golbery, were all civilians; again, another difference from Peru, + and civilians, I add, who are on top of their responsibilities, + competent, armed with the facts, able to face them, and with a program + for meeting Brazil’s economic and balance of payments crisis. The + Minister of Finance and the Minister of Planning are both as able as any + official in the entire hemisphere; they will be in Washington regularly + in the coming months, and well worth meeting.

+ +

“In short, the spirit of the visit was warm; the talks, businesslike; the + results, in my view, highly beneficial, for our long term interests in + this hemisphere and in the world.”

+
+ +
+ 130. Telegram 1718 From the Embassy in Brazil to the Department of + State +

Summary: The + Ambassador informed the Department that the U.S. military + assistance program for Brazil was important for maintaining + access to the military in Brazil, which would be the predominant + group exercising political power in the near term.

+

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + D760071–0513. Secret; Immediate. Repeated to JCS, OSD (IA/DSAA), + SOUTHCOM, Rio de + Janeiro for the Consulate and the Joint U.S.-Brazil Military + Commission, and São Paulo. In telegram 36160 to multiple + American Republic posts, February 13, the Department transmitted + information on military assistance levels for FY 1977. (Ibid., + D760056–1006)

+ + + + Brasília, February 25, 1976, 1630Z. +

1718. Pass AID. Subject: Ambassador’s + Assessment of U.S. Security Assistance for FY 1977. Ref: (A) State 036160, (B) 75 Brasília 10957.

+

Summary: Since the Brazilian Armed Forces are likely to continue to be + the predominant power base for Brazil’s Government for the foreseeable + future, a primary goal of U.S. policy toward Brazil should be the + maintenance of the U.S. orientation of the Armed Forces, who, to a large + degree, view Brazil’s security and foreign policy interests as being + compatible with those of the U.S. This target group will continue to be + important over the next several years as Brazil assumes a larger role in + the world and the opportunities for divergence from the U.S. increase. + The Security Assistance Program is a major tool for preserving our + access to the military sector, securing commercial benefits, and + promoting the modernization of the Brazilian Armed Forces for a possible + contribution to the “total force concept”. (The nature of that + contribution being as yet undefined.) While Brazil’s ability to use + FMS credit has diminished because + of growing balance of payments problems, to further the foregoing + interests and preserve its advantageous position for future as reliable + military partner and supplier, U.S. should provide level of credit + adequate to meet basic undeferrable needs of Brazilian forces on + appealing terms. End summary.

+

1. Brazil occupies half the land area of South America, has a population + of 110 million, and experienced a period of very rapid and well managed + economic growth between 1968 and 1974. Though now considerably below the 9–10 percent growth + rate of that period, the present rate of 4–5 percent still compares + favorably with that of other LDC’s in + current world-wide economic slump. It has major quantities of natural + resources, some of them of importance to the U.S. and a large and + expanding industrial base. As a result, Brazil exercises considerable + influence on its neighbors, and has demonstrated its potential for + eventual world power status and its determination to attain it. Its long + coastline abuts on important sea lines of communication, and, at its + eastern extension, is only 1700 miles from the African continent. Brazil + is a major market for U.S. goods and services, and attracts a high level + of U.S. investment. During 1975, Brazilian imports from the U.S. reached + $3 billion, making it our seventh largest market—second only to Mexico, + in Latin America, and larger than France or Italy. U.S. direct + investment in Brazil through 1975 was $3.2 billion, the largest in any + Latin American country. In terms of global U.S. interests, Brazil, as it + strives to realize its impressive potential, will take on increasing + weight in the collective resolution of the critical issues of world + interdependence. Given its intention to seek a better distribution of + world wealth and economic power and its important role in the collective + LDC effort to this end, Brazil will + probably find itself frequently differing with the U.S. in international + and hemispheric forums and resisting U.S. action it regards as + restrictions on its freedom of action.

+

2. Since 1964, the Brazilian Armed Forces have provided the power base + for the government. They are likely to continue their pivotal political + role for the immediately foreseeable future. The Armed Forces therefore + are a primary target group in pursuit of broad U.S. objectives. Our + military relationship with Brazil has continued since our World War II + alliance when Brazilian and U.S. troops fought side by side in Italy. + Subsequently, this relationship was developed into what the majority of + Brazilian military consider to be a “special tie” with the U.S., through + continued linkage through the Joint Brazil-U.S. Military and Defense + Commissions (JBUSMC and JBUSDC) and through use of U.S. + military equipment, doctrine, and management and organization + techniques. After the 1964 revolution, this relationship continued, but + was restricted by such factors as the limitations on U.S. military sales + to Latin America; the steady reduction in recent years of most forms of + U.S. military assistance; and the evolution of the Brazilian Armed + Forces into a more self-reliant, autonomous institution capable of + developing its own doctrine, management, and training, and supplying a + good deal of its own material requirements. In part because of U.S. + sales limitations, some 90 percent of Brazil’s foreign military + purchases in the period 1966 to 1970 came from third-country sources. + Although the past four years have seen an increased share of U.S. supply + of Brazil’s equipment needs, third-country suppliers retain a + significant position. We + recognize that we cannot base our military relationship on equipment + supply and associated logistics support so firmly as we have in the + past. As indicated above, Brazil will tend to reject any form of + relationship that indicates a client status as it moves toward world + status. Our objectives should be, rather, in the longer term, to foster + a mature, non-paternalistic partnership that depends not so much on + assistance in the development of the Brazilian Armed Forces as on the + acceptance of mutually perceived parallel strategic goals and an + underlying convergence of national interests. Given the possibilities + for divergences noted in paragraph 1, this will be no easy task, and + throughout the rest of the 1970’s and, perhaps, beyond, the readiness of + the U.S. to meet reasonable Brazilian equipment needs on favorable terms + will continue to be a major building block for a mature relationship + with the Brazilian military. In broader sense, our military relationship + with Brazil gives us an excellent opportunity to demonstrate by our + actions in an important sector a fundamental precept in our larger + policy toward Brazil, that is, that the U.S. accepts and welcomes + Brazil’s emergence as a major power and that it is prepared to + contribute to the attendant modernization process in Brazil.

+

3. The goals of the Security Assistance Program should, therefore, be (A) + the maintenance and enhancement of the U.S. orientation of the Brazilian + Armed Forces, (B) preservation of Brazilian preference for U.S. + technology and organization, with attendant commercial benefits to the + U.S. where appropriate, and (C) improvement of Brazilian capabilities to + take part in a “total force” structure, should that participation, as + yet undefined, turn out to be important. Success in moving toward these + goals should assist us in deriving military, and by extension political, + benefits from our relationship with Brazil, such as (A) preservation of + military as a pro-U.S. power group well placed to influence the internal + decision-making process and the country’s overall political evolution; + (B) Brazilian cooperation in the solution of international problems (a + primary U.S. interest in the Embassy’s CASP submission); (C) the possible provision of Brazilian + bases, facilities and transit rights in a general emergency involving + the U.S. and the USSR in protracted + conventional operations; and (D) under the same circumstances, Brazilian + assistance in protecting sea lines of communications; and (E) + cooperative attitude of Brazilian military in specialized, + quasi-military U.S. programs, such as mapping, or on issues such as Law + of the Sea or fishing jurisdictions where concern and involvement of + military may be significant.

+

4. The Security Assistance Program and plan as recommended is designed to + be responsive to the primary modernization needs of the Brazilian Armed + Forces and is based largely on common evaluation carried out within the + joint Brazil-U.S. Military Commission. In general, the Army is organizing into highly + mobile brigade organizations and its needs are modern weapons, + communications and transportation. Emphasis will be on anti-tank missile + system, an air defense system, new families of light and self-propelled + artillery, tanks and armored personnel carriers, engineer equipment and + communications. Army planning looks to the attainment of improved + capabilities in both internal and regional stability. Training programs + will be designed to achieve and sustain proficiency in the maintenance + and operation of the more sophisticated equipment. The Navy effort is + directed principally at strengthening the anti-submarine warfare (ASW) + capability. Destroyers and helicopters will increase Brazilian + capabilities for ASW screening and convoy and search and detection + capabilities. Standard missiles and modern torpedoes will correct + serious deficiencies in the AAW and ASW capabilities of the Navy. + Strengthening the Brazilian Marine Corps is also a Navy goal and + amphibious vehicles, armament and engineering equipment will, along with + continued training and exercises, increase the Corps’ effectiveness. The + Brazilian Air Force modernization is planned to permit it to carry out + its air defense and support roles. F–5 aircraft, as acquired within the + time frame of the plan, have satisfied the BAF requirement for a ground support aircraft as well as + the defense of bases and areas. Acquisition of heavy transport and ASW + aircraft and helicopters will augment the BAF capability to support the Army and the Navy in their + principal roles as well as to increase its ability to support GOB “civic-action” in developing or remote + areas of Brazil. The Brazilian Armed Forces are fully capable of + utilizing and maintaining the proposed levels and types of equipment and + the recommended training levels will enhance the capabilities of the + Brazilian Armed Forces to operate and manage their forces.

+

5. Economic assistance granted to Brazil by third countries has not been + of major proportions, with major Western European countries and Canada + providing a total of $5 million to $6 million yearly, mostly in form of + technical assistance. Substantial inflows from third countries are more + likely to come in terms of direct investment and financial loans rather + than concessional assistance. Brazil received $5.8 billion in capital + (net) of this type from all sources during CY 1974 and almost 5.4 billion (estimated) in CY 1975. Prospects for CY 1976 are for continued inflows of this + kind. Third-country concessional military assistance (almost exclusively + training and visits) has had an insignificant impact on Brazil’s balance + of payments. Brazil receives substantial Aid from multilateral donors + such as the World Bank and the IDB. The + IDB’s 1975–77 loan program for + Brazil foresees total possible loans of $380 million for 1975, and $595 + million for 1976–77, mainly in the field of agriculture, energy + production, education, public health and industry. The IBRD’s proposed projects for the next few + years in Brazil foresee an + annual average of loans of approximately $500 million per year, mainly + in the fields of transportation, industry, energy production, and + agriculture. Although these figures are probably larger than the actual + disbursement they are indicative of Brazil’s capability to absorb major + projects. They also put into perspective the government’s relatively + minor commitment of resources to military procurement.

+

6. We have no estimate for the scale of third-country military assistance + likely to be offered to Brazil in FY 77. + Should, however, the record of the recent past—which saw, for example, + major purchases by Brazil of military aircraft from France and ships + from Britain and Germany—be indicative of the future, third-country + military suppliers will continue aggressively to pursue major equipment + sales to Brazil with the advantage of attractive government-sponsored + credit.

+

7. As set out in POM submissions of the + recent past, the Security Assistance Program represented a carefully + tailored package for meeting the priority needs of the Brazilian Armed + Forces and maintaining U.S. influence as a supplier. The approved + programs provided sufficient attention to Navy and Air Force needs to + keep the U.S. in contact with the procurement plans for these services. + (The Brazilian Army has no current plans to use FMS credit.) As pointed out in recent messages (Brasília + 10957), the Brazilian Government’s responses during 1975 to a serious + balance of payment problem, involving additional import restrictions and + tightened controls on the use of foreign exchange, have caused the + Brazilian military to reduce sharply its intended procurement of + military equipment from foreign sources. Restraints on foreign purchases + are expected to be tightest during FY + 1977, with Brazilian military able to use not more than $50 million of + FMS credit—$40 million less than + the previously approved ceiling. We expect the need for FMS credit to begin rising again slowly + after FY 1977 as economic conditions + improve though a tendency on the part of the Brazilian military to + procure more items domestically or from third-country sources may keep + FMS credit requirements during next + five years well below earlier estimates. In view of this expected + increase in competition from domestic and third-country suppliers and + more selective use by Brazil of its foreign military procurement + dollars, the US willingness to continue meeting at least basic Brazilian + credit needs will be important factor in preserving position of U.S. + suppliers in an at least temporarily shrinking market and in maintaining + image of U.S. as a credible and cooperative defense partner and as a + consistently reliable source for basic equipment on favorable terms. By + protecting its position in this sense at time of financial stringency, + U.S. could remain in strong competitive position for future when + Brazilian military may be in position to resume even higher level of + foreign procurement. In view of Brazil’s current unfavorable balance of + payments situation, I believe + that, as indicated in the Mission’s POM, FMS credit levels for + Brazil along the following lines are required to meet basic needs and + preserve the U.S. position:

+ + + FY77 + FY78 + FY79 + FY80 + FY81 + + + $50M + $55M + $60M + $60M + $60M + +
+

We estimate that Brazil’s overall military modernization requirements, as + related to the JSOP objective force, will involve the expenditure by + Brazil of about $1.5 billion over the next decade. We believe, further, + that the Brazilian Armed Forces are firmly committed to carrying out + this modernization, and that, except in case of a prolonged and drastic + slowdown in the national economy, they will do so. Allocation of FMS credit resources at the level + recommended above during the planning period will serve U.S. political, + commercial and security objectives in Brazil. Furthermore, as noted in + the FY 76–77 CASP submission, I am concerned that the FMS credit offered to Brazil be at a + sufficiently low credit cost to be fully competitive with third-country + offers.

+

8. Another important element of the Security Assistance Program, though + modest in cost, is the training program. The value of the training + program to the Brazilian Armed Forces, and to the U.S. effort to + maintain channels of influence to them, exceeds its nominal cost in + grant funds. The current planning level of $1.1 million for this + activity is necessary to permit continued efforts on our part to + maintain the U.S. orientation of the younger officers of the Brazilian + Armed Forces. The program is used in high priority, high impact + technical and professional assistance, and demonstrates continuing U.S. + interest in, and concern for, the development of the Brazilian military + forces. The training courses are closely aligned with Brazilian + participation in the FMS program and + are an effective influence on planning for purchase, operation and + maintenance of military equipment. Orientation visits, which bring to + the U.S. the cream of the professional military class, have significant + professional impact, and moreover, give the trainee an exposure to U.S. + Government, culture and political systems. The increased MAP–T level will, however, do no more + than compensate to some extent for real losses suffered through + inflation. Given Brazil’s growing interest to the U.S. in global terms + and the possibilities for differences with the U.S. deriving from + Brazil’s pursuit of a world role, I am especially interested that we + increase our impact on the younger, middle grade officers. We should + recognize that the highly influential group of senior military officers + whose bonds with their U.S. counterparts were forged in World War II is + passing from the scene. Younger Brazilian officers do not share these + bonds, and, in many cases, harbor reservations toward the U.S., stemming not only + from an emotional reaction to criticism of Brazil from U.S. sources, but + also from ignorance or misinterpretation of the complex and changing + social and political fabric of the U.S. Furthermore, even though the + Brazilian military establishment is essentially hierarchical, what they + might see as unfavorable results of the political liberalization process + or some severe economic failure could tempt the younger officers to seek + a political role. Similarly, the younger officers may be particularly + inclined to sympathize with or even encourage increasing third-world + tendencies of Brazilian foreign policy or to be attracted to view now + widely held among civilian foreign policy specialists that U.S. efforts + to preserve world order and resist expansionism is less relevant now to + Brazil’s basic interests.

+

9. I am aware that MAP–T activities, + within their functional goal of contributing to the Security Assistance + Program, cannot and should not be diverted to other purposes. I believe, + however, that we can go some way toward accomplishing our objective to + get in better touch with younger officers through increased exchange + activities. I recommend that consideration be given to (A) increasing + and expanding our participation with the Brazilian Armed Forces in + personnel and instructor exchange programs and (B) the expansion of the + Army Foreign Area Officer Program for Brazil and institution of similar + programs for the Navy and Air Force. I believe there are also + substantial possibilities for exerting U.S. influence on the Brazilian + Armed Forces through the exchange of research and development and + technical information, and I again urge that the Department give early + and favorable consideration to execution of the pending master agreement + on this activity with Brazil.

+

10. The Security Assistance Program is, therefore, a major program in our + efforts to keep and expand channels of influence to a very important + Brazilian leadership group.

+ + + Crimmins + + +
+ + +
+ 131. Telegram 2212 From the Embassy in Brazil to the Department of + State +

Summary: + Ambassador Crimmins + reported on steps taken by the Embassy to impress upon Brazilian + officials the U.S. Government’s concern regarding human rights + abuses.

+

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + D760095–0954. Confidential. In telegram 45319 to all diplomatic + posts, February 25, the Department requested information and + analysis regarding human rights abuses in countries receiving + U.S. economic development or military assistance. (Ibid., + D760071–0412) Airgram A–11, March 12, is ibid., + P760041–0592.

+ + + + Brasília, March 12, 1976, 1900Z. +

2212. Subject: Human Rights: 1976 Reporting Requirement: Brazil. Ref: + State 045319.

+

1. Following is summary of airgram (Brasília A–11) pouched March 12, + 1976: Brazilian constitution provides normal legal guarantees and + human-rights provisions, and also provides for state of siege. Instead + of using latter, however, government has armed itself with “exceptional + measures” (including Institutional Act–5) which in effect enable + executive to operate outside constitution. Constitution declares these + measures are in force, and while there has been discussion of + incorporating them in constitution in attenuated form, government shows + no sign of relinquishing them.

+

2. Principal focus of international concern has been on arbitrary arrest, + torture, and imprisonment for political crimes of association or + opinion. Geisel administration’s + efforts to bring security apparatus under control and end its notorious + abuses have seen gains and losses for both sides, but at present time + administration has advantage. Deaths around turn of year of two + prisoners in Army custody in Sâo Paulo led to moves to establish tighter + controls in Sâo Paulo under new commander, while other commands have + adopted more open and positive approach. Reports indicate persons not + now being tortured and outcry on arrests as they occur is being met with + prompt response. Practice is new, however, fight against subversion + continues, and as long as arrests go on, potential for abuses + remains.

+

3. Thus, government is opposed to mistreatment of prisoners and has taken + steps to end abuses. Inhibitions against death-squad activities have + included formal judicial action, but threat of removal from office + appears to be only inhibition in real terms against mistreatment of + alleged subversives. Detainees’ right to complain of mistreatment and + subsequent investigations have normally not been allowed to affect trial + outcome or lead to effective corrective action.

+ +

4. Only recent and available report we know of is Amnesty International + report for 1974/1975, which Department holds. We find report largely + relevant and accurate. UN Human Rights + Commission has again delayed release of its pending report on alleged + human-rights violations in Brazil.

+

5. Ambassador, Embassy officers, AID + representatives, and senior officers of US Military Mission have + discussed human rights with appropriate Brazilian officials, and Embassy + and Consulate officers, and USIS through carefully targeted information + program, have also sought to convey US concern in contact with + Congressmen, journalists, lawyers, police officials, and churchmen. + Ambassador’s speech on human rights in US constitutional development and + vigorous Embassy efforts on behalf of US citizen Fred Morris gave + important support to this end. In that torture is seen as practice of + small minority rather than of Brazilian military as an institution, US + security assistance is not seen as fueling repressive practices.

+ + + Crimmins + + +
+ +
+ 132. Telegram 2584 From the Embassy in Brazil to the Department of + State +

Summary: + Ambassador Crimmins + reported that if the U.S. Government increased tariffs on + imports of Brazilian shoes, it would undo a significant portion + of the goodwill generated by Secretary Kissinger’s recent visit and + Secretary Simon’s + prospective visit.

+

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + D760113–0692. Confidential; Immediate; Exdis.

+ + + + Brasília, March 25, 1976, 2120Z. +

2584. Pass Treasury for Suchman, Parsky and Bushnell. Subject: Trade Problems.

+

1. Summary: Francisco Dornelles of Finance Ministry has returned from his + recent trip to Washington in a very optimistic mood and expects + resolution of shoe problem would put Brazil in a favorable position + against other shoe exporters to the U.S. Embassy is concerned that this + optimism may be premature. If shoe decision should be different from + present Brazilian expectations, we must expect a very strong negative + reaction, thus undoing a good deal of the benefit of Secretary Kissinger’s visit.

+

End summary.

+ +

2. Francisco Dornelles of the Finance Ministry called in FinAtt late + afternoon of March 24 to review the results of his most recent trip to + Washington. Dornelles made two main points:

+

A. He was hopeful that the President’s decision on the escape clause + action on shoes would come out in such a way as to place Brazil in the + same competitive position in the U.S. market as other exporting + countries. By this he meant two things: (1) That the President’s + determination would provide for an across-the-board tariff increase and + (2) that Treasury would exercise its waiver authority under the Trade + Act and suspend countervailing duties as a result of the implementation + of such a Presidential decision.

+

B. That the Presidential determination not close off the possibilities of + further Brazilian penetration of the U.S. shoe market. In other words, + Brazil would have difficulty with the tariff-quota mechanism.

+

3. Dornelles characterized the meetings with Treasury and others in + Washington as extremely friendly and described his trip as an + unqualified success, which proved wrong his earlier hesitancy about + participating in the sub-group meetings. He was particularly happy with + what he said was Treasury’s agreement to exercise its waiver authority + under the Trade Act, after the President’s determination was put into + force, and suspend the current countervailing duties without rpt without + the Brazilian side’s having to change their export incentive system. He + claimed that he had received firm assurance on this from Assistant + Secretaries Macdonald and Parsky. + Dornelles has also returned with the clear impression that the shoe + decision will be an across-the-board tariff increase, which, with the + suspension of the countervailing duties, would put Brazil in a very good + competitive position vis-à-vis other exporters. He said he had obtained + this impression after talking with Ambassador Yeutter and Treasury + officials.

+

4. Dornelles made two other specific requests: (A) that we give him + advance notice on the ITC decision so that he can fly to Washington and + settle any outstanding problems that may require solution to complete + the scenario outlined above and (B) that all arrangements for the + forthcoming visit of Secretary Simon (including the agenda) be made through us and not + through the Brazilian Embassy Washington and the Foreign Ministry. He + said Simonsen wishes to keep the + visit within Treasury/Ministry of Finance channel.

+

5. In response to the question as to why he had not pursued Simonsen’s idea put to Secretary + Kissinger for some kind of a + broad interim agreement on the Brazilian system of subsidies, Dornelles + replied that the Minister had not really thought through his scheme and + any move in that direction would require at least one year to work out + and implement. When FinAtt mentioned the problem of third/country + actions such as the one being contemplated on soybean oil by the American soybean producers, he said + that these problems could be handled on a case-by-case basis. In fact, + he claimed that after talking to Valentini of the Ministry of + Agriculture he was certain that the offending subsidy will be withheld + as promised by Valentini in Washington. When it was mentioned to him + that Washington was seeking some very definitive assurances in this + regard in order to stave off a trade complaint from the American soybean + producers, Dornelles offered his services in trying to persuade the + Ministry of Agriculture to withdraw the subsidies should our own efforts + with the Ministry of Agriculture not prove fruitful.

+

6. Comment: Dornelles has apparently returned with very fixed ideas about + what we are prepared to do to solve the shoe problem. While the Embassy + would welcome the kind of outcome Dornelles is expecting, we are not + aware that any decision is imminent; thus, his optimism would at best + seem premature. We have received other indications that the Brazilians + have concluded from the Washington meetings that Secretary Kissinger’s trip has very definitely + improved the political climate on trade issues from their standpoint and + that progress can be made without the Brazilian side having to give + much, at least for the time being. We are not sure whether this optimism + may not have raised unrealistic expectations which, if not realized, + would in the long run do more harm than good to our relations with + Brazil. Given Dornelles’ own interpretation of what was said on shoes, + there is the very real danger that, unless the final decision comes out + the way he expects, the benefits from Secretary Kissinger’s visit and the expected + good effects of Secretary Simon’s visit will be greatly diminished.

+ + + Crimmins + + +
+ +
+ 133. Telegram 111035 From the Department of State to the Embassy in + Brazil +

Summary: In a + letter to Silveira, + Kissinger discussed + the possibility of a waiver of a countervailing duty on + Brazilian footwear and other trade issues.

+

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + D760177–0409. Confidential; Immediate; Exdis. Drafted by + Shugart, cleared by + Zimmermann and + Rogers, approved by Kissinger. Repeated Immediate to São Paulo. In + telegrams 79100 and 91811 to Brasília, April 2 and April 16, the + Embassy transmitted messages from Silveira to Kissinger that informed Kissinger that increased + tariffs on Brazilian footwear would damage bilateral relations. + (Ibid., D760124–0101 and ibid., D760144–0506) On April 12, + Seidman laid out the + options for Ford with + regard to import relief for the domestic footwear industry. + (Ford Library, + Papers of L. William + Seidman, Box 1, Briefing Papers, April 1976, + Duplicates, Classified) On April 16, Ford, in Economic Policy + Decision Memorandum 8, decided not to provide import relief for + the domestic footwear industry. (Ibid., Box 57, Executive Policy + Board Subject Files, Policy Board Decision + Memoranda)

+ + + + Washington, May 8, 1976, 0028Z. +

111035. Subject: Letter From the Secretary to Brazilian Foreign Minister + Silveira.

+

1. Please deliver following letter to Foreign Minister Silveira from the Secretary.

+

2. Begin text: Dear Antonio: I am delighted that we need not be further + preoccupied by the concerns you expressed in your last two letters + regarding the outcome of the escape clause action on shoes. Since I was + unable to give you the good news of the President’s decision myself, I + asked Bill Rogers to call you on + my behalf. He has told me that you are happy with the outcome which, by + the way, reflected my own strong recommendations.

+

3. Our governments are now in a position to discuss in concrete terms the + relationship between adjustment assistance and a waiver of the + countervailing duty on footwear. I defer to Bill Simon and his experts on this subject, but in light + of the adjustment assistance route, I doubt that a waiver can be legally + granted unless your government modifies current export incentives for + footwear.

+

4. On another subject, it was gratifying to learn from Ambassador + Crimmins of your personal + support for the establishment of a U.S. Trade Center in Sâo Paulo. I + share your view that your government’s decision should rest on its + merits, not on unrelated trade issues. I have no doubt that the center + would serve the interests of both our economies. It would stimulate the + flow of capital equipment Brazil will need to support its development + priorities; it would also encourage direct investment by U.S. firms + previously unfamiliar with your country’s burgeoning markets. To operate + effectively, the center will need import facilities similar to those + enjoyed by Brazilian firms participating in numerous trade fairs held each year in the + United States. I hope that your government can see its way clear to + approve this proposal.

+

5. Antonio, I think the way is now clear for real progress in addressing + our outstanding trade problems. The next major step in that direction is + Bill Simon’s visit to + Brazil. I know you share my hope that his consultations there will lead + to the kind of tangible results we both had in mind when signing the + Memorandum of Understanding two months ago. Warm regards, Henry A. Kissinger. End text.

+ + + Sisco + + +
+ +
+ 134. Memorandum From Secretary of the Treasury Simon to President Ford + +

Summary: Secretary Simon informed President Ford that the recently signed + agreements with Brazilian leaders meant that relations between + the two nations would improve.

+

Source: Ford Library, + National Security Adviser, Kissinger-Scowcroft West Wing Office Files, Box A3, + Treasury Department, 5/24/76–10/27/76. Eyes Only. Ford initialed the + memorandum.

+ + + + Washington, May 24, + 1976. + + SUBJECT + Trip to Chile, Brazil and Mexico + +

The purpose of my trip was to explore ways in which we could develop + closer economic ties with the countries of Latin America. Economic + cooperation in Latin America can bring not only economic benefits to the + United States but also can assist us in our foreign policy goals in that + part of the world. We have been able to develop such a parallel economic + and political approach in the Middle East, and based on my experiences + in these three countries, I believe we can also do it in Latin + America.

+

Each of the countries I visited poses a different set of problems, but I + completed this trip very optimistic about the economic potential in + Latin America. I met with President Pinochet in Chile, President Geisel in Brazil, and President Echeverria in Mexico, as + well as having extensive discussions with their economic leaders. In + each of the countries, I made it clear that I was not bringing + additional aid commitments, but rather that I wanted to find ways + we could help the countries to help themselves.

+

[Omitted here is material unrelated to Brazil.]

+

Brazil

+

Brazil offers great economic potential and certainly is playing a central + role in Latin America. Henry + Kissinger visited there in February and established a + consultative mechanism to provide political impetus to our relationship. + During my visit, we were able to reach agreement on important bilateral + issues which should help us to expand trade and investment between the + United States and Brazil.

+

In the trade area, we agreed on the following:

+

(1) That Brazil would phase-out its subsidy program which has resulted in + an unfair trade advantage for Brazilian products.

+

(2) That as a result of this action, we would act to further liberalize + trade by agreeing not to reevaluate present countervailing duties on + footwear until the last quarter of 1977; and by waiving countervailing + duties on leather handbags, effective July 1, 1976. In addition, with + respect to soybean oil, we resolved the threatened action by the U.S. + industry. Based on the Brazilian government’s action, the U.S. industry + announced they would not file a complaint.

+

In the investment area, we agreed to work together to facilitate U.S. + private sector investment in Brazil. They gave me a list of key + Brazilian projects in areas such as iron ore, oil, hydroelectric power, + copper and agriculture, and I am distributing these to the private + sector here in the United States. We also arranged for a negotiation of + a double tax treaty which will be an important step towards increasing + investment. A team from Brazil will visit Washington in June to + negotiate this treaty.

+

I believe these agreements will mark a new level of cooperation between + the United States and Brazil. In order to ensure that the relationship + grows, Finance Minister Mario + Simonsen and I established a formal mechanism, under the + framework of the memorandum which Henry + Kissinger signed last February. It involves the + establishment of a consultative group on trade, investment and financial + issues which will meet regularly. In this way, I believe that we have + properly institutionalized the important economic relationship between + Brazil and the United States.

+

[Omitted here is material unrelated to Brazil.]

+
+ +
+ 135. Telegram 177779 From the Department of State to the Embassy in + Brazil +

Summary: + Shlaudeman and + Pinheiro discussed + human rights and trade policy. Shlaudeman defended U.S. Government efforts to + open up trade between the two countries.

+

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + D760276–0761. Confidential. Drafted by Zimmermann and approved by + Shlaudeman. + Shlaudeman’s + references to Ford’s + “courageous decisions” on free trade and “favorable treatment” + of Brazilian interests relate to the President’s decision to + forego tariff increases on imports of footwear, referred to in + the source note to Document 133. + Senator Long’s June 17 letter to Ford requested protection from imports and + subsidies for domestic sugar producers. In telegram 178637 to + Brasília, July 19, Seidman informed Long that no protection or + subsidies would be forthcoming. (National Archives, RG 59, + Central Foreign Policy File, D760278–0378)

+ + + + Washington, July 17, 1976, 1736Z. +

177779. Subject: Call on Assistant Secy. Shlaudeman by Amb. Pinheiro.

+

1. In initial courtesy call July 16 on Asst. Secy. Shlaudeman, Amb. Pinheiro focused attention on two + subjects: human rights and US trade policy.

+

2. Human rights. Pinheiro said + that he considered this to be the most difficult part of his mission. As + illustration he noted that when Israel goes into Uganda as rescue + mission we applaud but when Brazil and others try to combat terrorism + and subversion then there are accusations of violation of human rights. + The idealism of the US is shared by the people of Brazil but it is + manipulated by people who are the victims of organized campaigns. If + Brazil had not taken strong measures, the problems would be more + difficult now than in Argentina. Professional diplomats understand the + problem but many of the politicians do not. This is now leading to + congressional restrictions that will lead to difficulties in our + relations. What does Congress want, he asked? There is no national + policy of torture in Brazil; this does not exclude low level excesses + but the perpetrators are punished.

+

3. Trade policy. Pinheiro stated + that the US Trade Act is changing this country into one of the most + closed societies in the world. He cited textiles and particularly + specialty steels. He agreed these were not vital to Brazil but the + amplification of this policy could disrupt world trade. Actions such as + those on specialty steels are particularly difficult to understand in + the light of US economic recovery. Pinheiro said that the GOB recognizes that the US is doing everything possible to + diminish the effects on Brazil, especially following Secretary Simon’s visit, but Brazil is deeply + concerned about the overall implications.

+ +

4. Assistant Secretary Shlaudeman + commented that the struggle for free trade is constant. He noted that + the President had taken courageous decisions in this regard and that + Brazilian interests have received favorable treatment. He urged that we + be alert to these issues so that they can be discussed in their early + stages.

+

5. Pinheiro said that the latest + example of a restrictive mentality is a letter in early June from Sen. + Long to the President requesting radically increased tariffs on imported + sugar. The US sugar market is marginal to Brazil but there will be + serious consequences for others if Long’s request is granted. (We are + checking into this.)

+

6. In conclusion Amb. Pinheiro + said he did not wish to be misunderstood. He recognizes that + US-Brazilian relations are now enjoying a better climate of mutual + understanding than in many years.

+ + + Kissinger + + +
+ +
+ 136. Telegram 183401 From the Department of State to the Embassy in + Brazil +

Summary: The + Department informed the Embassy of Congress’s intent to phase + out the military training program for Brazil.

+

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + D760285–0077. Confidential; Immediate. Drafted by Eltz; cleared by Zimmermann, Winship, Black, Borek, Quigg, Ledogar, Johnson; + approved by Luers. + Repeated Immediate to Rio de Janeiro for the Consulate and for + the Chairman of the U.S. Delegation to the Joint U.S.-Brazil + Military Commission. In telegram 6085 from Brasília, July 12, + Crimmins reported + that terminating funding for military training would cause the + Brazilian military to suspect that U.S. interest in Brazil was + waning. (Ibid., D760268–0300) In telegram 6421 from Brasília, + July 22, Crimmins + reported that the Brazilian Government was unhappy with the + impending termination of grant military training. (Ibid., + D760282–0396) In telegrams 191824 and 243040 to Brasília, August + 3 and September 30, the Department informed the Embassy that + $100,000 had been granted to Brazil for training but that + Congress explicitly directed that the funds were for phasing out + the grant military training program. (Ibid., D760299–0692 and + D760369–0291)

+ + + + Washington, July 23, 1976, 2228Z. +

183401. Subject: Grant Military Training for Brazil. Ref: A. Brasília + 6085; B. Brasília 6421.

+

1. Department has reviewed issues raised Ref A. and Ambassador’s + recommendations for limited phaseout of program in transition quarter. + Judgment here is that, while there is no legal prohibition to provision + of grant training to Brazil in the TQ or in FY 77, there would be serious difficulties in ignoring the intent of + Congress to quote terminate unquote program for Brazil as reflected + explicitly in House International Relations Committee report on + legislation for FY 76.

+

2. Plan of action is to consult in the next few days with key members of + HIRC in attempt gain their + understanding and acquiescence in the continuation of a limited number + of specific training activities through TQ and possibly FY 77 in order to effect a termination + which minimizes the disruption to programs where an abrupt cutoff would + violate the reliance and expectations which had reasonably developed. It + must be emphasized that these activities will be limited in number and + that criteria for selection of specific projects will include a finding + that substantial planning and preparation has already been done, making + abrupt cancellation difficult. Department’s intent is to phase down + Brazil program in orderly fashion, arriving at point where it is limited + to training that is clearly justifiable as being “in connection with + regional activities” consistent with congressional intent. We do not + intend to continue program at anything close to level which would + otherwise have been approved for Brazil, or to open door for setting in + motion plans for new projects during the phaseout period.

+

3. As soon as congressional consultations are complete, Department will + provide more detailed guidance.

+ + + Robinson + + +
+ +
+ 137. Telegram 8010 From the Embassy in Brazil to the Department of + State +

Summary: The + Embassy recommended that an invitation for the head of the + Brazilian Army Intelligence Center to visit the United States be + deferred in light of concerns over human rights and Operation + Condor.

+

Source: Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, Box 11, Brasília. Secret; + Roger Channel. Telegram 209192 to Buenos Aires, Montevideo, + Santiago, and La Paz, August 23, is Document + 241.

+ + + + Brasília, September 16, 1976, 1225Z. +

8010. Subject: Invitation for U.S. Visit to Brasília Chief of Army + Intelligence Center. Refs: A. DA + WashDC//DAMI–FLT//1018137 Sep 76. B. State 209192.

+

1. Reftel A indicates US Army + Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence (ACSI) is considering + extending an invitation to BG Antonio da Silva Campos, Chief of the Brazilian Army + Intelligence Center (CIE), for a visit to the US under the ACSI G–2 (Intelligence) Tours Program. Campos + has been in his present position less than a year and seems to be + President Geisel’s choice to + tighten control over key Brazilian security agency that acted in past + with considerable autonomy and has been identified with some human + rights violations. Position of CIE Chief, despite change of + personalities and Geisel’s + determination to end mistreatment, has not yet lost its association in + public eye with past human rights abuses.

+

2. In light of our current concern about “Operation Condor,” we are + particularly uneasy about inviting at this time director of major + intelligence agency which may become extensively involved in + coordinated, trans-national pursuit of political dissenters. Fact of + visit, which could hardly be kept secret, could mislead leaders of + Brazilian and other Southern Cone intelligence services about firmness + of US opposition to certain aspects of Condor, and possibly be + misinterpreted by human rights proponents in US, Brazil itself, or in + third countries. Even if Operation Condor question were resolved + quickly, we think invitation should at least be deferred to allow more + time to see how Campos, and CIE under his direction, will perform on + human rights. Pending Department’s review of the situation, DAO has been asked to hold up any approach + on the invitation as requested by reftel A.

+

3. If on other hand Department determines other interests justify + invitation for Campos at this time, we would urge that presence in US be + used to make strong and candid pitch to him at high ACSI level about A) + US concern over Operation Condor; and B) depth of general US commitment + to human rights.

+ + + Crimmins + + +
+ +
+ 138. Action Memorandum From the Coordinator for Human Rights and + Humanitarian Affairs (Wilson) and the Legal Adviser of the Department of + State (Leigh) to Secretary of + State Kissinger + +

Summary: Wilson and Leigh reviewed for Kissinger three options + regarding the U.S. Government’s vote on an IDB loan for Brazil: voting + against the loan, voting for it contingent on improvements in + the human rights area, and voting for it without making any + representations.

+

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + P760168–1248. Confidential. Sent through Robinson. Drafted by Hill and Shlaudeman on October 24. + Swift, Boeker, and Austin concurred. A + typewritten note at the bottom of the last page of the + memorandum indicates that Robinson directed EB to vote yes on the loan and that he later + instructed Wilson and + Shlaudeman to + “arrange a low-key approach to Brazilians,” which would note + that the United States voted yes because of Brazilian progress + in human rights and that U.S. cooperation would continue “as + long as this progress is sustained.” Attached but not published + is the Department’s undated Human Rights Report on + Brazil.

+ + + + Washington, October + 25, 1976. +

+ + Harkin Amendment: Brazil IDB Loan +

+

The Problem

+

On Wednesday at 10:00 a.m., we must state our position in the + Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) + on a Brazilian application for an $8 million loan to finance + exports.

+

Background/Analysis

+

Unless the loan would “directly benefit . . . needy people”, the + Harkin Amendment requires + the US to vote “no” if Brazil is found to be engaging in a “consistent + pattern of gross violations of internationally-recognized human rights”. + As this loan does not meet the terms of the exception, we must make a + judgment about the present human rights situation in Brazil. L and + D/HA feel that the Harkin Amendment compels the US to + vote against this loan because of the continuing serious human rights + situation in Brazil. H and EB feel that + improvements over the last 9 months make it possible to vote for the + loan. H feels a positive vote must be accompanied by discussions with + the Brazilians at a level no lower than the Foreign Minister describing + the reasons for our vote. ARA and + EB believe that a “consistent + pattern of gross violations” does not currently exist in Brazil.

+

L and D/HA’s + View:

+

This paper presents a fundamental question: whether we fight against the + inflexibilities of the Harkin + Amendment by distorting the language and intent of the Amendment so as to narrow the scope of its + current application, or whether we apply the human rights criteria in a + straightforward way, thus laying the foundation for a later approach to + Congress requesting it to modify the Harkin Amendment. L believes that the former course is + doomed to failure because the Congress will progressively tighten the + legislative strictures. Admittedly the latter course is politically + painful. The former course is likely to put the State Department on the + defensive; the latter may put the Congress on the defensive. In the long + run we believe the latter course is preferable.

+

Whereas the legislative history of the Harkin Amendment indicates that Congress intended to + offer great leeway on the interpretation of the criterion, direct + benefit for “needy people,” the same is not true for the other + criterion, “consistent pattern of gross violations of internationally + recognized human rights.” With respect to the upcoming loan, it is + agreed that there was no possibility of using the needy people + exception. Thus, we are forced to face the human rights criterion. For + reasons stated below, we do not believe that this criterion can be + interpreted in such a way as to allow the U.S. representative to vote + for the loan.

+

Brazil has had a long history of serious human rights violations under + the military governments which have come to power following the 1964 + coup. While L and D/HA recognize that + the Geisel administration has + recently undertaken to curb such abuses, they perceive no real + improvement. Thus they are not prepared to state that there is evidence + of a break in what has indisputably been a “consistent pattern” of human + rights violations since 1964. The correction of isolated incidents of + abuses which ARA notes is not, in their + view, sufficient to change a generalized pattern.

+

Large numbers of persons remain in prison in Brazil without having been + charged or brought to trial. Due process of law has not been restored in + many cases for persons detained for alleged security or political + offenses. The exercise of vigilante justice by “death squads” and the + recent activities of right-wing terrorist groups have not been curbed by + a military security apparatus or government which should have the + capability of doing so. Incidents of gross abuse of human rights still + occur in the prisons. Moreover, the Government of Brazil has still not + demonstrated any intention of restoring to full force the human rights + guarantees included in the 1967 Constitution. These rights have been + effectively suspended by executive decree in cases held to involve + national security. Police and other action pursuant to the decrees are + immune from judicial review under the Constitution. The Government’s + failure to support its recent more promising actions with necessary + changes in the legal regime suggests that the improvements which ARA cites are only superficial.

+ +

+ ARA’s argument for not finding Brazil to + be engaged in a “consistent pattern” of gross human rights violations is + based on the assertion that many other Latin American countries exhibit + similar tendencies. The question is not, however, how many governments + may on occasion fail to respect fully the human rights of their + citizens, but rather the frequency and the manner in which any one + government may violate those rights. Even if numerous other countries + had human rights postures as weak as Brazil’s, that would not affect the + question of invoking the Harkin + Amendment against Brazil. The standard to be applied is not a + country-to-country comparison. The Harkin Amendment forces us to evaluate the situation in + each country in terms of certain “internationally-recognized” values, + and L and D/HA have concluded that the + Government of Brazil has still not taken sufficient corrective measures + to end the pattern of abuses in existence since 1964. Contrary to ARA’s suggestion, L and D/HA do not believe that their decision + that a “no” vote is legally required for Brazil at this time will + logically result in similar recommendations for any more than four or + five countries eligible for IDB + loans.

+

+ ARA and EB’s view:

+

There are clear indications that President Geisel has made efforts to improve the human rights + situation. In January he removed the Army General commanding a district + in which flagrant violations had occurred; a considerable number of + other personnel changes followed in that command and elsewhere in the + security structure. Reports of torture of political prisoners have + virtually ceased since that time. Political arrests have decreased + significantly since January and where these occur, there is an + increasing observance of formal legal procedures through the military + tribunal system. A relaxation of censorship has allowed a broad public + debate of political arrests and human rights questions. It is far from + self-evident, contrary to the apparent views of L and D/HA, that failure to curb police death + squads and a lunatic rightist group represents governmental + encouragement of or acquiescence in a “consistent pattern of gross + violations”—any more than the FBI’s + failure to suppress Cuban exile terrorists justifies Castro’s charges that the USG is implicated in their acts. In short, + the current situation—which is what we must deal + with for both legal and policy purposes—is characterized by sufficiently + positive features so as to make a finding of a “consistent pattern” of + gross abuse unreasonable.

+

Further ARA + Views:

+

Neither the law nor our own procedures yet provide us with anything like + precise criteria for defining what constitutes a consistent pattern of + gross violations. Admittedly, Brazil is not a democratic state. But the + case for finding it a gross violator seems based more on impressions and general reputation + than on the comparative measurements that are about all we can + rationally use in the absence of precise tests.

+

Currently there is considerably less political violence in Brazil than, + for example, in Colombia or Mexico—both countries that have so far + escaped opprobrium. Brazil has a far more open and equitable society + than does, say, Peru or Guatemala where large Indian populations live in + virtually feudal conditions. Brazilians in the vast majority live freer + of fear and with more opportunity to express themselves than do the + populations of at least 10 other countries in Latin America.

+

The charges against Brazil focus currently on denial of due process in + security cases; the use of torture and the failure to implement + constitutional guarantees of human rights. Due process in security cases + is denied by all Hispanic-American governments (and Haiti and Jamaica) + except for Costa Rica and occasionally Venezuela. The test is the number of such cases. In terms of its size, + Brazil’s number is currently small. All police + and security forces in Latin America outside the Commonwealth Caribbean, + including those of Venezuela and Costa Rica, use torture to extract + information. The test here is pervasiveness and bestiality. The evidence + is that the use of torture, particularly in its more horrible forms, has + been declining in Brazil. As for effective constitutional guarantees, + they can reasonably be said to prevail only in Venezuela, Colombia, + Costa Rica, Barbados and Trinidad—five out of 24.

+

We conclude that if Brazil is to be found guilty of a consistent pattern + of gross violations, the same judgment will have to be applied to

+ + Mexico + Guatemala + Nicaragua + El Salvador + Panama + Dominican Republic + Haiti + Argentina + Bolivia + Paraguay + Uruguay + Chile + Guyana, and probably to + Peru and possibly to + Jamaica. + +

Options:

+

+ Option I—Vote against the loan.

+

+ Pro:—In the judgment of L and D/HA the Harkin Amendment requires a “no” vote because of what + they see as a continuing pattern of human rights violations which have + not yet been sufficiently corrected by the Government of Brazil.

+ +

—A negative vote would satisfy the Congress that the Department was + carrying out the intent of the Harkin Amendment and quiet voices criticizing us for + disobeying the law.

+

+ Con:—Our refusal to support GOB export programs, especially when taken + on sensitive human rights grounds, will have an extremely adverse impact + on our relationship with Brazil, calling into question the credibility + of our recent efforts to strengthen bilateral ties.

+

—It may draw charges we seek to embarrass Geisel before the politically important November + municipal elections, and thus strengthen the hardline military elements + opposed to Geisel’s + liberalization policies, and undermine his ability to continue progress + in the human rights field.

+

—Other members of the IDB may again + accuse the US of introducing a political issue into a financial + undertaking as they did after an earlier US “no” vote on a Chile loan, + but this is inherent in the Harkin Amendment itself.

+

+ Option II—Vote for the loan but + instruct Ambassador Crimmins + to discuss the question with the + Brazilians at the highest levels, but in any case no lower than the + Foreign Minister, explaining that our yes vote was based on our + recognition of Brazil’s efforts to improve the human rights situation + and our hope that improvements will continue. We would discuss + Congressional opposition to human rights violations in Brazil and + express our hope that continuing improvements will make possible “yes” + votes on future loans. H supports this option.

+

+ Pro:—This would be a positive approach aimed at + support of Geisel’s human rights + improvements.

+

—We might be able to convince all but the Congressional hard liners that + we are taking positive steps to encourage observance of human rights in + Brazil.

+

+ Con:—We can expect an outcry from human rights + advocates in Congress and elsewhere that we are ignoring the law. We + could try to blunt this by pointing to the ameliorating action taken by + the GOB and stating our position that + our vote, coupled with discussion with the GOB, represents a positive attempt to encourage further + improvements in human rights situation in Brazil.

+

—President Geisel does not receive + Ambassadors on substance and a representation, however phrased, at the + presidential or ministerial level would produce strong resentment and + charges of interference in Brazilian internal affairs. Indeed, formal + representations at any level will run head-on into Brazil’s very real + nationalism and risk a closing of hardline ranks—precisely the effect we + are trying to avoid.

+

+ Option III—Vote for the loan, without making any + representations as described above.

+ +

+ Pro:—This would be consistent with our expression + of support for Brazilian development goals and would be in keeping with + the recent commitments to closer bilateral ties.

+

—It would avoid any possible counterproductive effects on the + political/human rights liberalization process in Brazil which could flow + from a negative US position on the basis of Harkin Amendment provisions.

+

—It would reflect the difficulty we have in reaching a clearcut decision + as to the existence of a “consistent pattern” and would be consistent + with ARA’s views that no such pattern + exists in Brazil.

+

+ Con:—We can expect even stronger charges from + human rights advocates in Congress and elsewhere that we are violating + the law.

+

—The vote will be used by Harkin + Amendment supporters to demonstrate the need for even stronger Harkin-type amendments which the + Executive cannot circumvent.

+

Recommendations:

+

+ D/HA and L recommend that you accept + Option One and authorize us to vote against this loan with appropriate + explanations to the Brazilians and the Congress.

+

+ Alternatively, H recommends that you accept Option + Two and authorize us to vote for the loan but instruct our Ambassador to + explain our vote to the Brazilians at the highest levels.

+

+ Alternatively, ARA and EB recommend that + you accept Option Three and authorize us to vote for the loan without + representations.

+ +

Congressional Concerns:

+

The decision in this case will affect our ability to amend the Harkin language and to prevent similar + or stronger language from being added to other legislation, such as + authorization for the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank. Our + posture thus far on Harkin + affected loans has drawn some criticism, especially on the Argentine + vote, but our prior consultation and representations to the GOA worked to our advantage.

+

We are particularly disturbed by a growing mood among some members who + have been strong supporters of multilateral aid to institutions and programs to sharply limit the funds + available to international lenders (IDB, World Bank, African Development Fund), their rationale + being that only a cutoff of funds to these institutions will be + effective in view of the Administration’s unwillingness to find any + country to be a gross violator of human rights. H believes the human + rights activists in Congress will view a “yes” vote on the loan to + Brazil as further evidence of the Administration’s intractibility. + Unlike the situation in Argentina, where a new government faced a + chaotic situation, thus making + viable the argument that a consistent pattern of violations of human + rights had not been established, the assumption is widespread that + Brazil has been a long-term violator of human rights. To point to + positive trends in Brazil without being able to say conclusively that a + new pattern of adherence to internationally + recognized guarantees of human rights has developed will not be + convincing in the Congress. Therefore, to defend a “yes” vote, the + Department must point to the improvements and changes in the human + rights area brought about by the GOB + and also argue that we are using our vote to urge the GOB to continue further in this positive + direction.

+
+ +
+ +
+ Chile + +
+ 139. Telegram 4549 From the Embassy in Chile to the Department of + State +

Summary: Although + press reports discussed mass executions of prisoners in Chile, + the Embassy indicated that it had no hard information to confirm + or deny the allegations.

+

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + [no film number]. Confidential; Immediate. In telegram 189464 to + Santiago, September 24, the Department informed the Embassy of + news reports on torture and executions in Chile’s National + Stadium. (Ibid.) In telegram 4589 from Santiago, September 25, + the Embassy informed the Department that two U.S. citizens + detained in the National Stadium reported that they saw no + mistreatment of prisoners, and neither did other foreigners + detained in the same location. (Ibid., + P750018–1258)

+ + + + + Santiago, September 24, 1973, 2128Z. + +

4549. Subj: Press Reports. Ref: State 189464.

+

1. Although we have no hard information to confirm or deny allegations + reported reftel, we doubt summary mass executions at National Stadium + have taken place. Volleys fired for purpose would be heard far away in + stillness of Santiago night curfew. Stadium in populated area and on + edge of areas where many foreigners reside. Entire Foreign Press Corps + and two ICRC Representatives visited + National Stadium Sept 20. While not allowed individual interviews, they + did have voice contact with detainees whose only complaint was slowness + of interrogation process and quality of food. Jerry O’Leary of Washington Star news, an experienced Marine + Reserve Officer, tells us it would be physically impossible for + executions to take place there without knowledge outside of stadium. He + was given special access and in two-and-half hours there interviewed + many and saw complete list of detainees, and no one made claim that + prisoners being shot. Executions are kind of news we are confident + Chileans would eagerly carry to US as well as other missions and to + foreign correspondents.

+

2. Dept has in hand file of messages reporting considerable effort made + by Embassy in behalf of Garret-Schesch couple and other US detainees. + Couple made no complaints about Embassy handling of their case to consul + who received them into custody. Rather, expressed gratitude for Embassy + efforts.

+

3. Re resident exilees, see Santiago 4377 and previous.

+

4. Comment: Reports suggest initiation of concerted defamation campaign + to smear new GOC. Such statement will + not facilitate our efforts in behalf of other Amcit detainees.

+ + + Davis + + +
+ + +
+ + 140. Telegram 190162 From the Department of State to the Embassy in + Chile +

Summary: The + Department instructed Ambassador Popper to raise with the Chilean Government the + question of human rights abuses.

+

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Country Files, Box 777, + Latin America, Chile, Vol. 8, 1 Jan 1973–31 Mar 1974. + Confidential; Immediate; Exdis. Drafted by Gantz; cleared by Feldman and Kubisch; approved by Porter. Repeated to the + Mission to the United Nations and the Mission in Geneva. In + telegram 4629 from Santiago, September 27, Davis reported that he had met + with Huerta as + instructed; in his discussion with Huerta, he stated that the Embassy wanted to be + in the position of advising members of Congress of the démarche + privately or in executive session. (Ibid., RG 59, Central + Foreign Policy File, P750018–1255) In telegram Tosec 99/192805 + to USUN, October 4, the + Department informed the Embassy it thought it important to + discuss Popper’s + démarche in open session in Congress. (Ibid., P750014–0156) In + telegram 4674 from Santiago, September 27, Davis replied that public + discussion of the démarche could be damaging and unhelpful, and + he expressed a belief that private consultations with Chilean + leaders would be the most effective means of protecting human + rights. (Ibid., P750011–2084)

+ + + + + Washington, September 24, 1973, 2326Z. + +

190162. Subject: Protection of Human Rights. Ref: (A) Geneva 5001, (B) + State 185343. For Ambassador Davis.

+

1. In spite of some recent positive steps Department concerned about + alleged GOC treatment of persons, + especially aliens, who have been detained and are ultimately to be tried + and/or deported by GOC. To date there + has been considerable adverse press comment; we have received several + inquiries from Senators, Congressmen and public and anticipate + questioning before Fascell + subcommittee and current Fraser + subcommittee hearings on human rights matters. We would like to be able + to say that we had expressed our concern to new GOC at first available opportunity, and that response had + indicated their sensitivity to these problems and strong desire to avoid + any violations of GOC’s legal and + humanitarian obligations. Moreover, we recognize that as a practical + matter GOC adherence to human rights + principles in treatment of prisoners and conduct of trials will make it + much easier for a cooperative relationship between the GOC and USG to receive the support from Congress and American + public opinion it requires.

+

2. We realize, nevertheless, that GOC + will be extremely sensitive to any official USG démarche on this subject. For this reason, we have + concluded that démarche should not take place until after we have + formally continued relations with new government, that it should be + raised in context of other major areas of USG–GOC common interest, + and that it should emphasize positive steps GOC has already taken in human rights matters. Consistent + with these caveats, Ambassador should, unless he perceives overriding + objection, make or have made démarche on human rights along lines outlined paras 3–5 below at + earliest appropriate opportunity, drawing on background information + provided paras 6–8 at his discretion.

+

3. The United States is reluctant to raise questions of human rights with + the GOC because in so many instances + they are essentially matters of domestic jurisdiction. We understand + fully the serious problems of security which the GOC has faced in recent days and that + substantial steps had to be taken in order to restore public order. We + view the positive steps which the GOC + has already taken in human rights matters as evidence both of the GOC’s basically humanitarian nature, + consistent with long Chilean tradition, and its realization that human + rights problems, if not resolved, could cause serious danger to GOC’s international reputation. Insofar as + the United States is concerned, we realize that an “adverse press” for + the GOC on human rights matters could + interfere with our own efforts to assist the GOC and to work closely with it in the months ahead. It is + in this spirit that our remarks should be taken.

+

4. We, ourselves, and, we believe, international opinion, have been + favorably impressed by a number of very positive steps which the GOC has taken in recent days toward + assuaging the perhaps unjustified fears of many concerning the situation + in Chile. We know that the GOC has + assured the UN High Commissioner on + refugees that it is not their intention to deport political refugees to + the countries from which they fled, and that refugees who are not + allowed to remain in Chile will be able to choose their destination. + Missions from the United Nations High Commissioner for refugees and the + International Committee for the Red Cross which have come to Chile with + GOC approval to assess relief needs + of refugees and to provide assistance to political detainees, + respectively, should be effective in showing world opinion that the + GOC intends to respect fully its + international obligations with respect to these persons. Reported GOC invitation to foreign journalists to + observe the situation, and assurances that accused will be able to + retain defense counsel, add to this impression.

+

5. The International Community has certain basic expectations as to + treatment of resisters, detainees, and those accused of crimes, of which + the GOC has indicated its awareness by + these actions it has already taken. Resisters who have laid down their + arms, and detainees, are expected to receive fair and humane treatment + pending release or trial, including contact with consular + representatives for those who desire such communication. Summary + executions or beatings obviously would violate international norms. The + trials themselves should cause few serious problems if they are public, + open to foreign observers, and limited to persons charged with specific + common crimes. GOC has available to it + able international lawyers who can advise GOC with respect + to applicable international norms and expectations of international + community. In short, USG impressed with + early indications of GOC respect for + human rights and hopes GOC will + continue to exhibit same responsiveness and forthright approach.

+

6. FYI: Chile is party to Geneva Conventions on the law of war, which + apply in part to civil strife, the convention relating to the status of + refugees and its protocol, applicable to refugees and certain political + asylees, the Vienna Convention on consular relations which provides a + right of consular access, and the universal declaration on human rights, + an affirmation which lacks the binding force of law but nevertheless is + widely accepted as a consensus of the international community on the + rights of individuals. Article 3 of each of the Geneva Conventions + provides that quote: In the case of armed conflict not of an + international character occurring in the territory of one of the high + contracting parties each party to the conflict shall be bound (to + provide humane treatment, on a non-discriminatory basis, to) persons + taking no active part in the hostilities, including members of the armed + forces who have laid down their arms. End quote. In addition, this + provision expressly prohibits a number of acts, including quote: The + passing of sentences and the carrying out of executions without previous + judgment pronounced by a regularly constituted court affording all the + judicial guarantees which are recognized as indispensible by civilized + peoples. End quote.

+

7. The Convention on Refugees defines refugees as persons who have + remained outside the country of nationality due to a “well-founded fear + of being persecuted for reasons of . . . membership of a particular + social group or political opinion.” Articles 32 and 33 restrict + expulsion of refugees; Article 16 provides for access to local courts. + Article 14 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights provides + specifically for an individual right of asylum, except for non-political + crimes. Under Article 11 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights + persons charged with penal offenses are afforded a variety of due + process guarantees, including the right to a public trial. Although the + declaration does not itself create any legally enforceable international + obligations, it is perhaps the most widely recognized statement of the + minimum standards of justice a nation is expected to provide. The + International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights adopted by the + UN General Assembly in 1966 provides + similar due process guarantees and, in addition, restricts expulsion of + aliens lawfully present in a country and makes expulsion subject to + legal process (Article 13). (Article 4 provides an escape clause in + times of public emergency threatening the life of a nation.) This + covenant has not yet entered into force but the government of Chile has + adhered to it.

+

8. Article 36 of Consular Convention affords consular officers right to + visit nationals of his state who are detained locally, and requires authorities of receiving state + to notify consul when national of his state has been detained, at + request of detainee. End FYI.

+ + + Rush + + + + +
+ +
+ 141. Telegram 4647 From the Embassy in Chile to the Department of + State +

Summary: + Ambassador Davis + reported that he had advised Ambassador Designate Heitman of the + “public relations implications” of the unexplained + disappearances of Charles + Horman and Frank Teruggi.

+

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + [no film number]. Confidential; Immediate. In telegram 4594 from + Santiago, September 27, Davis reported on the Embassy’s efforts to + account for various U.S. citizens in Chile, in particular, + Horman and Teruggi. + In the latter case, U.S. officials were investigating + discrepancies regarding a body discovered at a local morgue and + presumed at the time to be Teruggi. Davis also noted: “I raised Teruggi and + Horman cases with + Foreign Minister Huerta + yesterday, urging maximum GOC + efforts to locate Horman, + positively identify Teruggi and ascertain full facts if he was + in fact the deceased reported in the morgue.” (Ibid.) The + Embassy also reported separately that the body found in the + morgue was not Teruggi. (Telegram 4665 from Santiago, September + 27; ibid.)

+ + + + + Santiago, September 27, 1973, 2036Z. + +

4647. Subject: W/W: Amcits in Chile: + Teruggi and Horman. Reference: + Santiago 4638.

+

1. At lunch today with Ambassador Designate Heitmann I raised Teruggi and + Horman cases, pointing out + public relations implications of any continuance of the present + situation where circumstances of their disappearance remain unexplained. + I went over all the facts and reports that have come to our attention in + each case. Heitmann said he would interest himself in this matter + immediately and see if he could get full information on both cases as + soon as possible.

+

2. Comment: It now appears that body in the morgue is not rpt not + Teruggi. We shall be sending a separate telegram on this as soon as it + can be prepared.

+ + + Davis + + +
+ +
+ 142. Transcript of the Secretary of State’s Staff Meeting +

Summary: Kissinger and Kubisch discussed the human + rights situation in Chile during the Secretary’s Staff + meeting.

+

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Transcripts of Kissinger Staff Meetings, + Entry 5177, Lot 78D443, Box 1, Secretary’s Staff Meetings. + Secret; Nodis. Kissinger + chaired the meeting, which was attended by all the principal + officers of the Department or their designated alternates. A + “Summary of Decisions” of the staff meeting, October 4, noted + “so far as the new government of Chile is + concerned, we should not support moves against them by seeming + to disassociate ourselves from the Chileans and on the other + hand should not be in a position of defending what they are + doing in Santiago.” (Digital National Security Archive, Item No. + CL00881) In telegram 195002 to Santiago, October 1, the + Department forwarded the text of the Newsweek article to the Embassy. (Ibid., Central + Foreign Policy File, [no film number]) On October 2, a U.S. + consul who had visited the morgue confirmed that the facility + held approximately 150–175 bodies and that most of the dead had + apparently been shot. However, he also reported that the wounds + of the dead varied considerably and that he had not noticed any + bodies bearing gunshot wounds under the chin, as reported in the + Newsweek article. A U.S. citizen who + visited the morgue with the consul and examined all of the + bodies reportedly “never commented on likelihood they result of + mass execution.” (Telegram 4766 from Santiago, October 2; + ibid.)

+ + + + + Washington, October 1, 1973, 3:27–4:03 + p.m. + +

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to Chile.]

+

Mr. Kubisch: Today’s Newsweek is carrying really the first reputable + report about Allende’s death in + Chile. Their correspondent there is reporting that something over 2700 + politicals have been killed. The Government has acknowledged 284 + deaths.

+

Secretary Kissinger: Executed or + killed?

+

Mr. Kubisch: Just killed. There’s + knowledge that there have been 284 deaths, but the Newsweek correspondent apparently bluffed his way into a + morgue and found 2700 bodies.

+

Secretary Kissinger: But how do + you get from 284 to 2700?

+

Mr. Kubisch: Because the daughter + had told him that’s the story, that they had listed 250 corpses. That’s + the basis for his story; he saw only 250 corpses himself.

+

More may come out in coming days. We really don’t know; our Embassy + hasn’t been able to confirm it. We recommend caution.

+

Secretary Kissinger: “Caution” in + what way?

+

Mr. Kubisch: Caution in not + trying to get ourselves too closely identified that the regime there in + Chile is not as bad as people say.

+

As I say, we don’t want to get into the position of defending what they + have or haven’t done.

+

Secretary Kissinger: But we don’t + also want to get into the position of explaining horror.

+ +

Mr. Kubisch: No; on the contrary. + We are continuing to fulfill our commitments to the Government with + foodstuffs, medicine, and so on.

+

For example, in some of these Congressional hearings, I’ve been asked: + “How many people have been killed? Is it true, the rumors we hear?” And + I just have to say: “We don’t know. We don’t have substantiated facts. + We can tell you what the Government has announced.”

+

Secretary Kissinger: Yes. I agree + that we should not knock down stories that later prove to be true, nor + should we be in the position of defending what they’re doing in + Santiago. But I think we should understand our policy—that however + unpleasant they act, the Government is better for us than Allende was.

+

So we shouldn’t support moves against them by seemingly disassociating, + and we certainly shouldn’t defend them with more internal repression + that we should stay out of.

+

Is it going to come up at the UN?

+

Mr. Kubisch: I don’t think so. + You know, the Cubans raised this, at one point, in the Security + Council.

+

Secretary Kissinger: Then it was + going to come up again?

+

Mr. Kubisch: There was a + possibility that it would come up again, but the later word that I’ve + seen is there’s not wide support for it being reopened. I don’t + know.

+

Mr. Sisco: Not as a formal agenda + item.

+

I do know, Mr. Secretary—as expected in these informal debates—some + people make reference to that in these debates. But other than that I + don’t know.

+

Secretary Kissinger: No. Joe, do + you have anything else on this?

+

Mr. Sisco: No, sir.

+

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to Chile.]

+
+ +
+ 143. Telegram 4802 From the Embassy in Chile to the Department of + State +

Summary: + Ambassador Davis + reported on his meeting the previous evening with Ricardo Claro + regarding their discussion of Charles Horman and Frank Teruggi.

+

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + [no film number]. Confidential; Immediate. Claro was a Chilean + lawyer, businessman, and professor of political economy with + close ties to the military junta who also served as an economic + adviser in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In telegram 4715 + from Santiago, September 29, the Embassy reviewed the available + information on Horman and + Teruggi. Davis also + noted: “I took occasion of call by Admiral Huidobro, chief of + staff of military junta, to raise Teruggi and Horman cases once again and to + urge that gov[ernment] exert every effort to find out what + happened to them. Huidobro said GOC had already made exhaustive search in Horman case—including loud + speaker announcements in all places of detention. He was less + familiar with Teruggi case, but promised to go through all + possible procedures, including computer file check, and leave no + stone unturned. As Department aware, this approach to Huidobro + follows my earlier approaches to FonMin Huerta and Ambassador-Designate + Heitmann.” (Ibid.) The Embassy later reported that Steven Volk, + a U.S. citizen and friend of Teruggi, visited the morgue with + consular officials on October 2 and identified one of the + unclaimed bodies as Teruggi. (Telegram 4787 from Santiago, + October 2; ibid.)

+ + + + + Santiago, October 3, 1725Z. + +

4802. Subject: Approach to Foreign Office on Missing American Citizens + Horman and Teruggi. Ref: + Santiago 4715.

+

1. I had opportunity last night to talk to Ricardo Claro. Claro brought + up the GOC’s concern over what it had + heard about the rider, sponsored by Senator Kennedy and approved by the Senate, to aid legislation. I used the opportunity to + point out to Claro that it would be helpful if the GOC were able to clear up the mysteries + involved in the cases of the two missing or deceased Amcits. I pointed out the unexplained + fact that Teruggi had reportedly been released from the National Stadium + and then his body appeared at the morgue shortly thereafter—brought by + military authorities. Moreover, the GOC + had reported him still detained a day or two later. I also pointed out + that neighbors of Horman had seen + him detained by persons in military uniforms, but the military + authorities continued to deny that he had ever been detained. I asked + that other unanswered questions—such as autopsy results, nature of + wounds on Teruggi’s body, etc.—be answered fully in both cases. Claro + agreed that these important points needed to be cleared up and indicated + he would talk as soon as possible with Admiral Huerta in order to put more pressure on + the appropriate military authorities to try to get the full facts on + both cases. He promised to report back to me as soon as possible.

+ +

2. Claro called me again today and said that the appropriate authorities + would be in touch with me very shortly in the Teruggi and Horman cases.

+ + + Davis + + +
+ +
+ 144. Telegram 4904 From the Embassy in Chile to the Department of + State +

Summary: + Pinochet denied + reports of mass executions and sharply criticized legislation in + the U.S. Senate that would cut off U.S. assistance to Chile.

+

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + [no film number]. Limited Official Use; Immediate. Repeated to + USCINCSO and DOD/DIA. + On October 4, the Senate approved an amendment to a foreign + assistance bill sponsored by Kennedy denying all but humanitarian assistance + to Chile. (Telegram 197523 to Santiago, October 4; ibid.) On + October 5, the Embassy informed the Department of Santiago press + reports that Huerta would + present concrete evidence to the UNGA that the Allende Government planned to assassinate + military and civilian opposition leaders before it was deposed + (“Plan Zeta”), which the junta had used to justify its coup. + (Telegram 4886 from Santiago; ibid.) In an October 12 + conversation with Davis, + Pinochet stated that + the junta was attempting to minimize loss of life, but that it + would prove difficult, as “left extremists” continued to attack + government officers. (Telegram 4992 from Santiago, October 12. + See Document 146.)

+ + + + + Santiago, October 9, 1973, 1913Z. + +

4904. Subject: Pinochet + Criticizes U.S. Senate Amendment Ref: Santiago 4886.

+

1. Summary. Junta Pres Gen Augusto + Pinochet deplored U.S. Senate amendment to Foreign + Assistance Act as based on misinformation concerning real situation in + Chile. Statements by senior officials outlined govt plans in several key + economic areas. Another 19 extremists were executed, numerous persons + arrested, and various arms caches and guerrilla camps discovered. Former + CUT Pres Luis Figueroa sought + asylum in Swedish Embassy, and former Deputy Dir of Investigations + Samuel Riquelme was captured. Junta continued to reveal instances of + alleged subversive activities and corruption. End summary.

+

2. In Oct 5 statement released through junta press spokesman, Gen + Pinochet “deplored” U.S. + Senate amendment to Foreign Assistance Act on aid to Chile, claiming amendment was due to + “misinformation” broadcast abroad by Marxists. Pinochet urged U.S. legislators to + visit Chile and see situation for themselves. He stressed that system of + justice is completely operative in Chile and that human rights are being + fully respected. He again + denied reports of mass executions and said official death toll now + stands at 476 civilians and 37 military/police. As part of campaign to + “correct” junta’s overseas image, publishers assn. has printed 20,000 + copies for distribution abroad of a pamphlet entitled “Three Years of + Destruction.” Chilean Bar Assn. sent letter which strongly defended the + military coup to similar groups in other countries. Top guild leaders + plan overseas travel to defend junta and have announced they will also + refute arguments presented by Sen[ator] Kennedy. Several guilds have already sent telegrams to + Kennedy protesting his + statements, and Chileans are privately buttonholding emboffs they know + to make known their surprise and disappointment. Cuproch Pres Julio + Bazan will attend AFL–CIO convention [in] Miami [on] Oct 18 to answer + Sen Kennedy.

+

3. Junta issued barrage of statements concerning future govt policies. + MinFinance Adm Gotuzzo made statement + Oct 8 on wage and price policy and public sector deficits (septel). Over + weekend, Central Bank Pres Gen Cano held press conference on results of + IMF Nairobi meeting which he used + to outline junta’s emergency economic plans. FonMin Adm + Huerta announced Chile’s + intention to increase participation in Andean Pact. Other senior + officials held press conferences devoted to agricultural production + plans and housing policies. On Oct 7, during visit to several slums in + La Reina area of Santiago, MinInterior Gen Bonilla laid heavy emphasis on self-help home + construction. Ministry of education announced school year will now end + Dec 22 and that all student associations in each school have been + recessed. Oct 12 holiday was cancelled.

+

4. Junta announced 19 extremists (11 in Valdivia, 4 in Temuco, 3 in + Talca, and 1 in Arica) had been executed for various terrorist acts. Ten + others were also killed in scattered locations, purportedly trying to + flee from arrest or to escape from custody. Weekend searches and + seizures, both in Santiago and in provincial cities, resulted in arrest + of some 150 persons and capture of weapons and explosives. Most + spectacular was discovery of arsenal including twelve 65 mm mortars in + Santiago house owned by husband of Allende’s Private Secretary Miriam Contreras (La + Payita), who is still a fugitive with a reward offered for her arrest. A + reported 30 tons of “Marxist propaganda” was discovered in Agricultural + Training and Research Institute (ICIRA). Two additional guerrilla + schools were discovered, one in Vicuna (Coquimbo Province), and the + other near resort of La Leonera south of Santiago. Some provincial + courts martial are continuing to hand out sentences to UP activitists, + most typically five or six years “internal exile” at isolated northern + localities of Pisagua, Tocopilla, and Tal Tal. Navy called all available + retired personnel to active duty. Govt reminded citizens that death + penalty is now in effect for car theft or for possession of stolen vehicles; police announced + that many vehicles have now been recovered.

+

5. Swedish Embassy announced CUT Pres + and former MinLabor Luis Figueroa (communist) had taken asylum there. + Former Deputy Dir Investigations Dept Samuel Riquelme was captured + trying to enter Argentine Embassy. Both were on “most wanted” list. Govt + spokesman ruled out possibility of granting safe conduct passes to + Carlos Altamirano, Oscar Garreton, and Miguel Enriguez if they should + seek asylum since all three have been indicted in navy subversion plot. + Newsmen were allowed to visit Communist Party Sec Gen Luis Corvalan in + Santiago and detainees on Quiriquina Island near Concepcion; they + reported no signs of mistreatment in either case. Corvalan allegedly + denied knowledge of “Plan Zeta” to kill top military and opposition + leaders (reftel). Nine radio stations were authorized to broadcast their + own news reports, in addition to mandatory three daily official + bulletins from govt press office.

+

6. Junta continued to reveal examples of purported UP corruption and + subversion. Latest examples are OIR request to Radio Prague for + assistance in setting up radio beamed at Chilean Campesinos, Marxist + plans to extend control over economy through Central Bank, an alleged UP + protection racket at the Santiago racetrack, case of convicted criminal + who was given high post in tax office because he was MAPU member, and $700,000 dollars worth + of books printed for Cuba at Quimantu govt publishing house.

+ + + Davis + + +
+ +
+ 145. Memorandum of Conversation +

Summary: Secretary Kissinger and Foreign Minister Huerta discussed the situation + in Chile and the types of assistance the U.S. Government could + provide.

+

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–1973, POL CHILE–US. The meeting was held + in Kissinger’s office at + the State Department. Drafted by Karkashian. Pickering approved the memorandum for Kissinger on October 23. + According to Kissinger’s + Record of Schedule, the meeting lasted until 6:45 p.m. (Library + of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers) In an October 9 memorandum, + Kubisch briefed + Kissinger in advance + of the meeting, noting that the while it was in the U.S. + interest to help the Chilean junta consolidate power, its + “actions in the human rights field have rendered our task more + difficult.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files, 1970–1973, + POL CHILE–US) When + Kissinger was called + out of the meeting, Kubisch informed Huerta that a “variety of Chilean governmental + and military authorities” had made requests for “rifles, + bayonets, submachine guns, ammunition, and tear gas.” Karkashian noted that the + Chilean government had also requested “training in such + sensitive areas as counter-insurgency, psychological warfare and + detention camp organization and management.” Kubisch informed Huerta it would extremely + difficult for the U.S. Government to comply with the requests at + the present time. (Telegram 207026 to Santiago, October 18; + National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Country Files, Box 777, + Latin America, Chile, Vol. 8, 1 January 1973–31 March + 1974)

+ + + + + Washington, October 11, 1973, 6 p.m. + + + SUBJECT + The Secretary’s Meeting with the Foreign Minister of Chile + + + PARTICIPANTS + + + + Chile + + Admiral Ismael + Huerta, Foreign Minister + Ambassador Enrique + Bernstein, Political Adviser, Chilean Foreign + Ministry + + + + + + U.S. + + Secretary of State Kissinger + + Assistant Secretary of State, Jack B. Kubisch + + + John E. + Karkashian, Acting Office Director, ARA/BC + + + +

The Secretary began by stating that while he was very busy, he was + nevertheless eager to see the Minister so that the latter could clearly + understand our position. He said the Department of State used to tell + other countries how to run their business but he had abolished that + practice and now the Department conducted foreign and not domestic + policy. He said domestic policy was Chile’s problem and the only time + the United States would be concerned with Chilean domestic policy would + be when it made our foreign policy more difficult.

+

The Secretary said that Minister Huerta should understand that the United States was + interested in what was going on in Chile. He said that the new + government basically was in our interest and that the changes effected + in Chile were beneficial to the Western Hemisphere. The Secretary said + that the United States therefore would help the new government, and that the Minister should + start with this assumption.

+

Regarding practical problems, the Secretary said, the Minister should + first understand the very complex domestic situation in the United + States and the fact that we had to advance carefully on specific issues. + As an example, he pointed out that it would not be difficult to continue + supplying certain military equipment under the arrangements which + existed before; however, it would be difficult to supply such items as + riot control and police-type equipment. The Secretary noted that it + would be easier for us if these items could be obtained elsewhere. He + said that if they could not be obtained from other sources, we would do + whatever was necessary to help furnish them. Regarding regular military + equipment, food, medicine, and the debt problem, the Secretary said we + should have no difficulty in helping Chile. He said the United States + was determined to see the new government succeed. Even if this proved + difficult, the Secretary said, the United States would do what had to be + done.

+

Regarding the domestic situation, the Secretary said, Minister Huerta was the better judge of Chilean + necessities. The Secretary said that we realized certain things could + cause problems due to the hostile press. He added that we would take the + liberty from time to time to make our views known on a confidential + basis. He said he would not bother the Minister with particular issues + such as the question of asylum which had already been discussed with Mr. + Kubisch. The Secretary said + that what he wanted the Minister to understand was that our basic + philosophy was to be supportive and helpful.

+

Minister Huerta thanked the + Secretary for making the points he said he himself would have raised. + The Minister said he had thought it might be necessary to explain the + situation in Chile but after listening to the Secretary and after having + talked with Mr. Kubisch earlier, + he believed he could economize on everyone’s time. He said he had come + to Washington to present in absolute frankness the serious situation in + Chile but he wanted to make clear that the principal effort for recovery + must be made by Chileans. He said the circumstances were favorable + because after the nightmare Chile had experienced, all Chileans were + ready to go back to work. The Minister said that within this framework + he believed it possible for Chile to present its needs and receive help + from the United States.

+

The Secretary said that he was willing to talk about technical and + practical matters, but he had total confidence in Mr. Kubisch to carry on such discussions. + He said the basic issue was that the Minister understand clearly the + United States position. He said Chile would have to help from time to + time and take into account the problems of the United States; however, + this would not affect the basic position; it would simply be a matter of tactics. The Secretary + said that the major effort the GOC must + make was to prevent a partisan war in Chile. If the GOC believed it had to be brutal to + accomplish this goal it must also understand that this could damage + Chile in the external press.

+

Minister Huerta said that his + government was fully aware of the unfavorable image being created by the + foreign press. He added that while this was a matter of concern, the + GOC was even more concerned with + controlling the internal situation.

+

The Secretary said he thought they understood each other. He noted that + the State Department was disciplined and would be more so in time. He + said Mr. Kubisch’s Bureau was + already very disciplined and he expressed confidence in Ambassador + Davis.

+

Minister Huerta said his + government was very happy with Ambassador Davis who was a good friend of Chile. The Secretary said + there was no question about that.

+

Mr. Kubisch noted that he had + engaged in discussions earlier in the day with the Chilean delegation on + economic and technical matters in which various U.S. agencies had also + participated. He said that in these discussions the Foreign Minister had + raised the question of how press inquiries should be handled.

+

The Secretary said that any press release should be as low key as + possible and that he saw no need to announce anything now. Mr. Kubisch suggested that it simply be + confirmed that a meeting had taken place. The Secretary said that a + statement could be made merely noting that an exploratory meeting had + taken place in which Chilean problems and needs were discussed. He added + that the press should be given as little hard news as possible.

+

Minister Huerta said that the word + “exploratory” could be misunderstood and wondered if it would not be + preferable to say that a general discussion of bilateral relations + between both countries had taken place. The Secretary agreed and asked + if Minister Huerta had been in + diplomacy before. When the Minister said “no”, the Secretary noted that + was the reason why the Minister was so good at it.

+

The meeting ended with expressions of satisfaction at the frankness of + the exchange and the mutual understanding of each other’s position.

+
+ +
+ 146. Telegram 4992 From the Embassy in Chile to the Department of + State +

Summary: + Davis reported that + during a meeting in Pinochet’s office that evening the two men + discussed the human rights problem in U.S.-Chilean relations, + including the cases of Horman and Teruggi.

+

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + [no film number]. Secret; Immediate. Davis formally left his post + on November 1; David H. + Popper officially replaced him in Santiago on + February 22, 1974.

+ + + + + Santiago, October 12, 1973, 2330Z. + +

4992. Subj: Conversation with Pinochet.

+

1. At Colombus Day reception today junta President Pinochet said he would like a quiet + moment to talk—so I went by his office at 7 p.m. tonight.

+

2. Pinochet was gracious and + eloquent in expressing disappointment at my transfer. He said Chile + greatly needed our help, both economic and military assistance. He added + that if the junta government fails, Chile’s tragedy will be permanent. I + took the occasion to point out that political problems we are + encountering at this time. A discussion of the Kennedy amendment, Teruggi and + Horman cases, and the human + rights problem ensued. Pinochet + indicated that the Chilean government shares fully our concern for human + rights, and is doing its best to prevent violations and loss of life. He + added that this is not easy, as the left extremists continue to attack + officers and soldiers, engage in sniping and attempt acts of sabotage. + Half of the extremists’ arms, Pinochet said, are still available to them, and motor + and bazooka factories and all matter of other illicit arms manufacturing + continue to be uncovered. If the army should let this problem get out of + hand, the result would be far greater bloodshed than Chile is presently + experiencing. If the left extremists had had their way, and had carried + out their own autogolpe plan, there would have been a million dead. + Nevertheless, Chile shares our concern and is doing its best. (The + foregoing conversation was clearly understood by Pinochet to be private and in + confidence).

+

3. I reiterated assurances of the good will of the USG and our desire to be helpful. I noted + that we had some problems which would oblige us to defer consideration + of Chilean requests in some areas. So far as economic and military + aid are concerned, I said we would + want to wait before addressing this question until the Kennedy amendment was clarified + through a Senate-House conference. Regarding copper, Pinochet said Chile realizes it should + pay compensation. He added, however, that Chile is broke, and will need + some help getting on its feet + if it is to be able to meet these and other obligations. He asserted + that a large part of Soviet and Eastern European aid had been “a fraud”, as Chile had had + to pay for it in copper.

+

4. In conclusion Pinochet said he + would like to get together again after Huerta’s return, when Huerta and the junta had had the opportunity to sort out + the results of Huerta’s U.S. + trip.

+ + + Davis + + +
+ +
+ 147. Memorandum From Rob Roy + Ratliff of the National Security Council Staff to the + President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) +

Summary: Ratliff recommended that Kissinger reapprove a CIA proposal for funding + pro-government groups in Chile.

+

Source: National Security Council Files, Nixon Administration + Intelligence Files, Minutes of 40 Committee. Secret; Sensitive; + Eyes Only; Outside the System. Scowcroft approved for Kissinger on October 15. + Jorden concurred + with Ratliff’s + recommendation. Attached but not published is Tab A, a + memorandum for the 40 Committee, October 10. In a Memorandum for + the Record, October 15, Ratliff noted that the 40 Committee had + telephonically approved the recommendation. (Ibid.) The Agency’s + determination that the previous 40 Committee approval was + invalid is discussed in + Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, vol. + XXI, Chile, 1969–1973, Document 366. On October 11, + Kubisch requested + Porter’s approval of + the CIA proposal. (Department + of State, INR/IL + Congressional Liaison Files, 1959–1990: Lot 94D565, James Gardner Chron File) On + October 16, Gardner + confirmed that Porter + thought that it was not necessary to vote on the proposal. + (Ibid.)

+ + + + + Washington, October + 15, 1973. + + + SUBJECT + Initial Post-Coup Support in Chile + +

With the Ambassador’s concurrence, CIA + asks for approval to disburse $34,000 which it promised under the 40 + Committee’s 20 August 1973 approval—an approval CIA now considers invalid because of the coup.

+

This action—$25,000 to help the Chilean Society for Industrial + Development to purchase a small network of radio stations, and $9,000 to + cover travel costs for three Christian Democratic Party members to tour + Latin America and Europe explaining their party’s decision to support + the new Chilean government—was covered in the previous 40 Committee + approval which the Agency, after consultation with State, considers + invalid.

+ +

Ironically, Under Secretary Porter said it was not necessary for him to vote on this + proposal since it was covered by the earlier Committee action which he + considers, in the absence of any contrary action, to remain valid; + Defense, JCS and CIA 40 Committee principals approve this + action.

+

RECOMMENDATION:

+

That you approve CIA’s proposal to + expend $34,000.

+
+ +
+ 148. Telegram 5088 From the Embassy in Chile to the Department of + State +

Summary: The + Embassy reported that the body of Charles Horman had been found and + identified.

+

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + [no film number]. Limited Official Use; + Immediate.

+ + + + + Santiago, October 18, 1973, 1958Z. + +

5088. Subj: W/W Deaths; Charles E. + Horman.

+

1. Embassy informed afternoon October 18, 1973 that previously + unidentified male body which delivered to morgue on September 18, 1973 + and given autopsy number 2663 had been identified through fingerprints + as being that of Charles E. + Horman. Unidentified body delivered to Santiago cemetery + on October 3 and apparently interred thereafter. Cause of death was by + bullet wound. Body had been picked up on street by military and + delivered to morgue.

+

2. Embassy sending note to foreign office requesting autopsy report and + exhumation of body.

+

3. Embassy advising wife and father.

+ + + Davis + + +
+ +
+ 149. Telegram 5093 From the Embassy in Chile to the Department of + State +

Summary: + Pinochet and + Davis discussed the + image of the Chilean Government in the United States, Chile’s + economic problems, and U.S. assistance.

+

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + P750018–1223. Secret; Priority; Exdis. In telegram 5124 from + Santiago, October 19, Davis reported on a conversation on human rights + with Minister of Justice Gonzalo + Prieto, during which Prieto informed him that detainees accused of + pre-September 11 crimes would be tried in civilian courts. + (Ibid., [no film number]) In September and October, the U.S. + Government shipped a total of $216,000 in medical supplies to + Chile. (Telegram 218967 to Brasília, November 6; ibid., Nixon + Presidential Materials, NSC + Files, Country Files, Box 772, Latin America, Brazil, Vol. 4, + 1973–1974) Telegram 4992 from Santiago is Document 146.

+ + + + + Santiago, October 18, 1973, 2241Z. + +

5093. Subject: Conversation with Pinochet. Ref: Santiago 4992

+

1. Summary: I called on junta President Pinochet Oct 17. Conversation revealed GOC preoccupation with image in U.S. and + sensitivity to need for both U.S. and GOC caution in development of overly close public + identification. Pinochet + expressed worry over need for large price increases but saw no + alternative. PDC President Aylwin and + Cardinal Silva plan visit U.S. to try to help with Chile’s public image + problem. End summary.

+

2. Like number of other Ambassadors, I made a routine request for a + protocol call on junta President Pinochet a couple of weeks ago. Pinochet received me Oct 17 (and also + received a number of other Ambassadors during the course of the + afternoon).

+

3. Pinochet was in a relaxed and + friendly mood. One thing which seemed to be exercising him, however, was + a report he had just received that a Chilean by the name of F. Huneeus + had been in touch with a John E. Reilly of the Overseas Development + Council. Pinochet’s information + led him to believe that Reilly had put Senator Kennedy up to his human rights + amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act. Pinochet asked me if I knew anything about Reilly. + (Comment: so far as I can tell, Pinochet was exaggerating his suspicions on the basis of + what he seemed to know. I expect to send Pinochet a brief note telling him what we know about + Reilly from an old biographic register and a word about the Overseas + Development Council—information which is not derogatory in either case. + If the Department has derogatory information about Reilly which would + make this course inadvisable, I would appreciate word.)

+

4. As Pinochet had told me + earlier (reftel) that he wanted to talk about economic cooperation which + he had had a chance to talk with Admiral Huerta, I asked about Pinochet’s reaction to the Huerta trip. + Pinochet said he had had + only a very brief opportunity to talk with Huerta, but his impression was that the trip had gone + well. He smiled and said he understood we would like to be helpful, but + in some cases would just as soon that help were funneled through Brazil + or some other third party. So far as Chile’s economic planning is + concerned, Pinochet said rather + apologetically that the GOC is behind + schedule in working out its economic plans and needs. He left me with + the impression he would be getting back to me on this subject before + long.

+

5. Mentioning the fact that the U.S. Government has now brought a + substantial amount of emergency medical supplies into Chile, I said I + thought it might be useful if we put out a small press story. I added + that we would be happy to follow any preference or guidance Pinochet might have in this regard and + was therefore mentioning it to him. I said I thought it might be helpful + at this moment to show our interest and support in this humanitarian + field. Pinochet said he thought + this would be a fine idea. His comment was that publicity on strictly + humanitarian things would be fine but that we should keep “pretty quiet” + about any cooperation in other fields. I agreed, and mentioned our + assistance with mine detector gear as an example of the other kind of + thing. (Comment: Both in regard to third country channeling of aid and publicity, Pinochet is showing considerable + understanding of, and at least some sensitivity to, the problems our two + countries face.)

+

6. In the general economic field, Pinochet said that the necessity to resort to very large + price increases (Santiago 5065) was worrying him. He said he appreciated + how painful these increases will be for Chilean consumers and + particularly Chilean working people. He said the necessity for this was + an inheritance from the Allende + period and a dose of bitter medicine that Chile had to take in order to + put itself on the way to recovery. (Comment: The Chilean Government is + just beginning to take the painful economic steps necessary for + recovery. Public morale pressures are sure to mount rapidly. Whether the + junta will have the single-minded determination to follow through on its + present course without backtracking remains to be seen.)

+

7. Pinochet told me that Cardinal + Silva has promised him that he will try to help with Chile’s public + image problem abroad. Pinochet + thinks the Cardinal may be able to travel up to Washington and talk with + Senator Kennedy and other key + political and church officials within the next week or two. I commented + that the Cardinal was highly respected as a leading progressive figure + in the church and he would have considerable influence. (Comment: PDC President Aylwin called on me morning + Oct 18 and said he is also considering a trip abroad in which he will + make some efforts to improve Chile’s image. Aylwin expects to go to a + political meeting in Hamburg and to visit Washington in early December. + Aylwin will try to convince Kennedy and other leading democrats that Chile needs U.S. assistance, + and that help in Chile’s economic recovery will speed normalization and + the return to democratic institutionalism. Aylwin expressed some moral + qualms about involving his party deeply in an apology for the + junta—particularly because he fears the Ley De Fuga has been used on + occasion to eliminate extremist opponents of the military regime. On + balance, however, Aylwin seems to be coming around to the view that the + junta government must be helped for the sake of Chile. Like Cerda, he + characterized the PDC-Junta October 10 + meeting as constructive.)

+ + + Davis + + +
+ +
+ 150. Telegram 212443 From the Department of State to the Embassy in + Chile +

Summary: The + Department concurred in the Embassy’s view that a single + coordinated channel for Chilean requests for military supplies + would be undesirable, and it observed that the provision of + lethal equipment in the prevailing congressional and public + atmosphere would hurt the future ability of the U.S. Government + to aid the Chilean + Government.

+

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Country Files, Box 777, + Latin America, Chile, Vol. 8, 1 January 1973–31 March 1974. + Secret; Priority; Nodis. Drafted by Shlaudeman; cleared by Gammon; and approved by + Kubisch. In telegram + 5121 from Santiago, October 19, the Embassy informed the + Department it thought that a single channel for Chilean requests + of military supplies would stimulate a very comprehensive list, + substantially increasing the pressures on the Department for a + prompt response, which would be politically damaging given the + current climate. (Ibid.)

+ + + + + Washington, October 27, 1973, 0004Z. + +

212443. Subject: GOC Requests for + Military Supplies. Reference: Santiago 5121.

+

1. We concur in your judgment that a single coordinated channel for + Chilean requests in this area would be undesirable at this time. Our + thought had been that such a channel would provide for review of these + requests at upper levels of GOC where + perhaps sensitivity to political considerations involved would be more + acute. However, your point that result could be clear priority lists + headed by undesirable items is persuasive.

+

2. We note your assessment that the GOC + is not likely to desist from pushing requests for sensitive military + items. That may prove to be the case, but our minimum objective must be + to minimize the damage that an insensitive Chilean attitude can produce. + There should be no question + that the provision of lethal equipment in the prevailing atmosphere of + Congressional and public opinion could have severe consequences on terms + of our future ability to assist and cooperate with the GOC. This is not to say that we are + disposed to deny matériel critically needed by the junta and unavailable + elsewhere. It does mean that GOC should + weigh carefully its requirements in light of Chile’s longer-term + interests and keeping in mind other sources of supply.

+

3. Our impression has been that Foreign Minister Huerta and Admiral Eberhard are + reasonably receptive to this line of reasoning. We recognize that other + ranking Chilean officers may not be, but would hope for sufficient + sophistication among the key officers to make our educational efforts + worthwhile. We will continue and reinforce these efforts here, as we + know you will there.

+ + + Kissinger + + +
+ +
+ 151. Telegram 216697 From the Department of State to the Embassy in + Chile +

Summary: The + Department informed the Embassy it did not intend to pressure + either the copper companies or the Chilean Government to reach + an agreement on compensation for expropriation, and the + Department recommended direct negotiations between the companies + and the Chileans.

+

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + P750026–2009. Secret; Priority; Exdis. Drafted by Shlaudeman and Feldman; cleared by Karkashian, Kennedy, Miller, Hunt, and Lee; approved by + Kubisch. In telegram + 5141 from Santiago, October 23, Davis described Saenz’s plans for compensating the U.S. copper + companies expropriated during Allende’s tenure in office. (Ibid., + P750018–1215) In a December 12 conversation with Kubisch, Saez asked that “the + USG not press too hard on + the ITT case because of its sensitive nature” and expressed + concern that if it became a propaganda issue it would exacerbate + an already difficult problem. However, Saez suggested that + discussions on ITT could begin as early as January 1974, and + Kubisch agreed. + (Telegram 245016 to Santiago, December 14; ibid., P750029–0776) + On March 13, 1974, Cerro reached a compensation agreement with + the Chileans. (Telegram 1270 from Santiago, March 14, 1974; + ibid., [no film number]) On July 13, 1974, Anaconda reached a + settlement. (Telegram 4125 from Santiago, July 13, 1974; ibid., + D740188–0393) On October 23, 1974, Kennecott reached a + settlement. (Telegram 6444 from Santiago, October 23, 1974; + ibid., D740302–0628)

+ + + + + Washington, November 2, 1973, 2158Z. + +

216697. Subject: Copper Compensation Problems. Ref: (A) Santiago 5141; + (B) Santiago 5168; (C) Santiago 4754.

+

1. Our objective in this remains to achieve recognition of debt and just + compensation for equity in accordance with international law as stipulated in the Paris Club + Agreement of April 19, 1972. Satisfactory resolution of this and other + expropriation issues is necessary not only to protect the rights of U.S. + nationals and broader U.S. investment interests, but to make it feasible + for the USG to provide or support the + financial assistance the new government will need.

+

2. At this stage we believe the USG + should not be in the position of pressuring the parties on either side, + of mediating negotiations, or of giving GOC an independent assessment of its proposals. Therefore, + you should advise Saenz that in + our opinion the only way to test the practicality of his proposals is to + go forward with direct discussions with the companies. (FYI: we are + unable to predict at this point whether Kennecott might eventually be + persuaded to accept $80 million for its 49 (percent) equity. It is not + at all clear that Kennecott has thought through its strategy or + objectives. Nor are we confident that a rapid settlement with Anaconda + is in prospect. Apparent cordiality of initial meeting with Quigley does + not mean that Saenz can expect + less than tough bargaining in that quarter. End FYI)

+

3. We see considerable merit in the GOC + taking these cases one at a time, pressing to resolve the easier ones + while working more gradually to narrow the differences in the others. A + prompt resolution of the Cerro case followed by a settlement on Exotica + and with Anaconda might set the stage for eventual agreement with + Kennecott. At an appropriate time, if necessary, the USG would be prepared to use its good + offices to help facilitate the resolution of any dispute that cannot + otherwise be settled. However, it would be premature for USG to intervene at this point. We will, + of course, appreciate being kept closely informed as the talks proceed + so as to be prepared if our direct assistance should be required.

+

4. We believe a word of caution to Saenz is in order on another point. There is a danger + that GOC will become locked into a + particular procedure or framework that may not hold practical solutions + in all cases. Although a reconstituted copper tribunal might play a + useful role in certain respects, we have some doubt that adequate + solutions can be based on corrections of mathematical errors in previous + calculations and we wonder whether the tribunal would be a suitable + means of resolving disputes that cannot be negotiated. The GOC should consider whether the tribunal + can be used in any case without precluding other procedures, such as + direct settlement or arbitration, in more difficult cases, and without + endorsing concepts such as the excess profits deduction which the United + States could not accept for broad legal and political reasons. In sum, + we believe it important that the GOC + maintain the possibility for maximum flexibility pending substantive + discussions with the company.

+

5. A consideration also worthy of GOC’s + attention is importance of maintaining contact with and favorable + attitude of the companies. Walsh expected a telegram inviting him to + resume negotiations by end of last week. He has had no word until now despite + telephone calls to Santiago and inquiries of Embassy here. We realize + that Saenz is stretched thin and + that GOC must deal with a mountain of + pressing problems. Nevertheless, it should be possible to establish a + preliminary schedule for talks and to keep in touch with companies. + (Anaconda has now been informed by GOC + that it will be back to them by mid-November) if Saenz finds it difficult to travel to + New York, and we can understand why he would, he might wish to hold next + round of meetings in Santiago. (Walsh and Anaconda heard that GOC may be in process of establishing a + special commission to handle expropriation problems. Any info you may + have on this point would be appreciated.)

+

6. We will furnish comments on ITT problem in septel.

+ + + Kissinger + + +
+ +
+ 152. Memorandum for the Record +

Summary: The Chairman of the 40 Committee concurred + with CIA that the September 11 + coup in Chile so completely changed the political situation that + previous approvals of covert action were no longer valid.

+

Source: National Security Council Files, Nixon Administration + Intelligence Files, Minutes of 40 Committee. Secret; Sensitive; + Eyes Only. The August 20 approval is referenced in footnote 4 in Document + 340 in + Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, vol. XXI, Chile, + 1969–1973.

+ + + + + Washington, November + 5, 1973. + + + SUBJECT + 40 Committee Actions + +

[Omitted here is material unrelated to Chile.]

+

2. The Chairman concurred with CIA that + the military coup of 11 September in Chile changed the political scene + so completely that the Committee’s 20 August 1973 approval of a major + covert political action initiative (“Chile: Request for Funds to Support + Opposition Political Parties and Private Sector Organizations through + June 1974,” dated 13 July 1973) is not valid, and that CIA should submit any new plans for covert + action to the Committee for approval.

+

[Omitted here is material unrelated to Chile.]

+
+ +
+ 153. Briefing Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for + Inter-American Affairs (Kubisch) + to Secretary of State Kissinger + +

Summary: Kubisch + informed Kissinger of + the arrests and executions in Chile, concluding that the junta + was desisting from summary executions.

+

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files, 1970–1973, + POL 29 CHILE. Secret; + Nodis. Tab A and Tab B are published. In airgram A–218 from + Santiago, November 9, the Embassy described the security + situation as of the end of October and outlined the measures + taken by the Chilean Government during the state of siege. + (Ibid., POL 23–9 CHILE) + Kissinger was in + Japan November 14–16.

+ + + + + Washington, November + 16, 1973. + +

+ Chilean Executions +

+

You requested by cable from Tokyo a report on this subject.

+

On October 24 the Junta announced that summary, on-the-spot executions + would no longer be carried out and that persons caught in the act of + resisting the government would henceforth be held for military courts. + Since that date 17 executions following military trials have been + announced. Publicly acknowledged executions, both summary and in + compliance with court martial sentences, now total approximately 100, + with an additional 40 prisoners shot while “trying to escape”. An + internal, confidential report prepared for the Junta puts the number of + executions for the period September 11–30 at 320. The latter figure is + probably a more accurate indication of the extent of this practice.

+

Our best estimate is that the military and police units in the field are + generally complying with the order to desist from summary executions. At + least the rather frequent use of random violence that marked the + operations of these units in the early post-coup days has clearly abated + for the time being. However, there are no indications as yet of a + disposition to forego executions after military + trial.

+

The Chilean leaders justify these executions as entirely legal in the + application of martial law under what they have declared to be a “state + of siege in time of war”. Their code of military justice permits death + by firing squad for a range of offenses, including treason, armed + resistance, illegal possession of arms and auto theft. Sentences handed + down by military tribunals during a state of siege are not reviewable by + civilian courts.

+

The purpose of the executions is in part to discourage by example those + who seek to organize armed opposition to the Junta. The Chilean + military, persuaded to some degree by years of Communist Party + propaganda, expected to be confronted by heavy resistance when they overthrew Allende. Fear of civil war was an + important factor in their decision to employ a heavy hand from the + outset. Also present is a puritanical, crusading spirit—a determination + to cleanse and rejuvenate Chile. (A number of those executed seem to + have been petty criminals.)

+

The Junta now has more confidence in the security situation and more + awareness of the pressure of international opinion. It may be a hopeful + sign that the Junta continues to stall on bringing to trial former + cabinet ministers and other prominent Marxists—people the military + initially had every intention of standing up before firing squads. How + the military leaders proceed in this area from now on will be influenced + to some degree by outside opinion, and particularly by ours, but the + major consideration will continue to be their assessment of the security + situation.

+

At Tab A is a Chile situation report and at Tab B a fact sheet on human + rights in Chile.

+

+ Attachments:

+

Tab A—Situation Report

+

Tab B—Fact Sheet

+

Situation Report: Chile

+

The country is calm at the moment and there is little overt challenge to + the military’s firm control. Seven leftists reportedly died in an attack + earlier this week on a military post in a Southern city. This, however, + was the first such leftist initiative since mid-September. The general + impression is that the Marxist left has given first priority to + underground survival in the face of unrelenting pressure.

+

The Junta has announced that state of seige measures will remain in force + for at least another eight months, but they have relaxed the curfew + somewhat, revoked on-the-spot executions, placed some restrictions on + searches, and promised that persons charged with civil offenses + committed before the coup will be prosecuted under standard civil + procedures. Although the traditional parties are well represented on the + commission charged with drafting a new constitution, there is growing + apprehension among them that the Junta’s “anti-political” orientation + will close off normal political activity for a long time to come. Again + ruling out any timetable for turning Chile back to the civilians, Junta + President Pinochet reinforced + these fears by placing much of the blame for the country’s present state + on politicians in general.

+

Security and political preoccupations are receding somewhat in the face + of economic issues. The October cost of living rose 88 per cent, + bringing the cumulative total for 1973 to 528 per cent, reportedly the + highest in the world. Although the cost of living surge was anticipated + in allowing artificially controlled prices to seek their true levels, + the resulting economic hardship + has had a serious impact on lower and middle income groups. As a result, + the government’s tough stabilization policy is coming under fire from + various quarters. Despite subsidies to wage earners, falling liquidity + and growing unemployment raise the threat of recession. IMF and CIAP missions are currently in Chile, studying the + Government’s economic stabilization plans.

+

The IMF tentatively projected a + potential 1973 balance of payments deficit of $800 million. Assuming + debt relief of some $350 million is obtained from the Paris Club and + other creditors, the foreign exchange gap would be reduced to $450 + million. According to the Chileans, private U.S. and Canadian banks have + already pledged $171 million in new financing of which $70 million is in + highly liquid dollar acceptances. Also, the IMF is likely to provide at least one credit tranche of $43 + million by year’s end. These credits will lessen the gap but a + considerable balance of payments deficit is expected to remain at the + end of the year. Additional credits may be forthcoming from West Europe, + Japan, Brazil and Argentina although most of these are likely to + materialize after the first of the year.

+

Internationally, the Junta’s repressive image continues to plague it. + Italy still withholds recognition, and reaction continues strongly + adverse among West European socialist governments. This attitude was + manifested in the stalling of IBRD + loans to Chile, despite the fact that the Junta has made good on the + Allende Government’s IBRD arrearages, and in the continued + suspension of bilateral lines of credit.

+

Chilean Ambassador Heitmann presented credentials to President Nixon on November 9. On November 14, + we announced our second CCC credit to + Chile—$24 million for feed corn. Our longstanding commitment to sell two + surplus destroyers to the Chilean Navy has met a reasonably sympathetic + response in Senate consultations. The Chileans, meanwhile, have sent us + several new requests for controversial military equipment.

+

Media criticism and Congressional inquiries growing out of the deaths of + two American citizens—Frank Teruggi and Charles Horman—continue heavy. The only negative line of + inquiry during Ambassador Davis’ + appearance before the Senate Latin American Subcommittee concerned + Horman. A Jack Anderson + staffer has already telephoned our Consulate in Santiago; we also expect + in-depth coverage from the New York Times which + is now making inquiries. We have instructed Embassy Santiago to deliver + a note underlining our desire for a full investigation of the + circumstances of death and specifying unanswered questions and + discrepancies in GOC explanations thus + far. Our Chargé has already prepared the Foreign Ministry for this + démarche and impressed upon it the need for prompt, specific + answers.

+ +

+ FACT SHEET—HUMAN RIGHTS IN CHILE +

+

(Prepared November 15, 1973)

+

Figures without asterisk are from public sources.

+ + + + Total arrested in Chile since September 11 + 13,500* + + + + Arrested originally and held in National Stadium in + Santiago + 7–8,000 + + + Released from Stadium + 6,500 + + + + Presently held in Stadium + 0 + + + Detained in Santiago jails + 550 + + + Detained outside Santiago + 2,000 + + + Estimated number serving sentence or pending trial + 1,500* + + + + Executions acknowledged + 100 (approx) + + + Executions according to intelligence source + 320* + + + Number killed attempting to escape military custody + 40 + + + + + American citizens detained (27 detainees had been released by + October 17) + 0 + + + American citizens dead since coup + 2 + + + + + Safeconducts issued to asylees in Embassies + 1,791 + + + Safeconducts issued to others + 3,100 + + + + + Safeconduct requests not yet acted upon + 408 + + + + + Departed from Chile (Chileans and foreigners) + 2,000 (approx) + + + + + Foreigners registered with UNHCR for permanent resettlement + + + In safe havens (refugee camps, etc.) + 820 + + + At home (possibly some under house arrest) + 824 + + + In diplomatic missions + 172 + + + In GOC detention + centers + 203 + + + + Total number still in foreign Embassies + N.A. (368 a/o mid-Oct.) + + + + Total dead: According to Chilean authorities + 600 (approx) + + + According to Barnes article in October 8 Newsweek + + 2,796 + + + According to October 21 Washington Post + article on CIA Director + Colby’s statement to + Congressional Committee + 2–3,000 + + + Recent SRF source estimate + 1,500* + +
+ +
+ +
+ 154. Telegram From the Station in Chile to the Central Intelligence + Agency +

Summary: + Following allegations that U.S. officials had mishandled the + cases of Charles Horman + and Frank Teruggi, the Station provided an account of actions by + two consular officers assigned to the cases.

+

Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of General Counsel, + Job 12–01548R: Legal Subject Records Files (OGC), Box 1, Chile + Special Search Project, CIA + Documents Denied in Full Pertaining to Charles Horman and Frank + Teruggi—Gonzales/Privacy Issues—[text not + declassified]. Secret. Printed from a copy that the + CIA Review Staff forwarded + to the House Select Committee on Intelligence on January 19, + 1976. To prepare the copy for the Committee, the telegram number + and time, and the names of the two consular officers were + deleted from the copy. The officers are identified here, + however, by bracketed insertions. The identifiers “Officer A” + and “Officer B” were handwritten on the copy prepared for the + Committee. No original copy of the telegram has been found. In + telegrams 5132 (October 20), 5135 (October 20), and 5143 + (October 23) from Santiago, the Embassy forwarded a detailed + three-part chronology of its efforts to account for Horman’s welfare and + whereabouts. (All telegrams are in the National Archives, RG 59, + Central Foreign Policy File, [no film number]) In telegram 5129 + from Santiago, October 19, the Embassy provided additional + information on the role played by Timothy Ross, a British + journalist, in the Horman + case. (Ibid.)

+ + + + Santiago, November + 24, 1973. +

1. Embassy in general and Consulate in particular are being charged with + inefficiency and negligence in handling of Frank R. Teruggi and + Charles E. Horman cases. + Following paragraphs contain background on more important aspects of + involvement of [consular officers John Hall and James Anderson] [1 + line not declassified]. Headquarters may wish to refer to + Embassy telegrams Santiago 5132, 5135, and 5143 for chronological + listing of events in these two cases.

+

2. The fact that Horman had been + detained was first reported to the Consulate morning of 18 Sept by + telephone. Caller had no specific info to provide, but based on call + Consul Purdy contacted DEA and MilGroup + to get search underway. Since Horman had never registered at Consulate, basic bio data was not immediately + available. On 19 Sept at approx 1100 hours Mrs. Joyce Horman (wife of + Charles) appeared at Consulate to report fact her husband missing. [3 lines not declassified]

+

3. Officer A [John Hall] told Mrs. Horman that Consulate had received + reports that her husband missing and that search was underway. She was + asked to provide needed bio data on both her husband and herself, which + she did. Naturally, she was distraught, nervous and frightened. Officer + A told her to keep in frequent touch with the consulate. She asked for + transportation and Embassy escort to take her to her home and was told + that consulate not able to provide that service. She asked what further + steps she could take and was instructed to report the disappearance to + the uniformed national police (Carabineros). Details of the conversation + and the additional bio data was passed by Officer A to Consul Purdy. + Officer A had no further contact with Mrs. Horman nor did he speak with Edmund C. Horman, father of + Charles. As part of efforts by all Consulate officers to track down + leads in the Horman case, Officer + A interviewed a friend of the Hormans, Mario Carvajal, on 6 October. + Carvajal provided information which indicated the army probably had + Horman in custody as of 0800 + hours, 18 Sept. At that time Carvajal’s wife was called by a person + identifying himself as a member of the sim. The caller asked if the + Carvajal’s “gringo” friend was an extremist; they answered that they did + not know his (Horman’s) political + leanings. At Officer A’s request, Carvajal dictated and signed a sworn + statement of his recollection of the telephone call.

+

4. Officer B was introduced to Mrs. Horman on 6 October but had no + conversations with her. However, Officer B had two conversations with + Mr. Edmund Horman. Circumstances behind these two conversations are as + follows:

+

A. On 8 October Timothy Ross, British journalist, contacted the Consulate + to advise that he had info possibly bearing on the Horman case. Officer B talked with Mr. + Ross on that date. The lead provided by Mr. Ross, after investigations, + turned out not to refer to Horman, however, Mr. Ross indicated that because of three + years experience in Brazil he had good leftist contacts and would check + with them to see if they knew anything about Horman’s disappearance. On 11 Oct Mr. Ross said he had + received word from his contacts that there was a system in existence for + getting wanted people out of Chile secretly and that this escape + pipeline had three Americans in process for clandestine departure. The + contact said one of the persons was Horman. Ross was asked to get proof relative to this, + such as a letter from Horman or + some other definite indications. Ross said he would try. On 12 Oct Ross + [illegible] advised that his contacts confirmed that Horman was in the escape pipeline. + (Please see Embassy telegram Santiago 5129.) At the request of Ambassador Davis, arrangements were made by + Officer B for Mr. Horman to meet + with Mr. Ross the evening of 16 Oct to detail the above story to Mr. + Horman. At the specific + request of the Ambassador, after the meeting was concluded, Officer B + called Mr. Horman aside and, + following instructions of Ambassador, said: “If you put any credence in + the information from Mr. Ross, you may wish to consider that any + continuing Embassy pressure in this case may be double-edged.” It was + obvious from Mr. Horman’s + reaction that he did not like this statement. He replied, “I trust your + judgement more than mine, but I realize any decision would have to be + made by me.”

+

B. On 19 Oct (the day after the body of Charles had been found), Mr. + Horman came to Consulate + looking for Consul Purdy at about 1310 hours. Officer B was the only + officer present in the Consulate at that time. Mr. Horman went to lunch with Officer B + where they joined a secretary and another Vice Consul. Conversation was + normal during lunch and subject of son was not touched upon. Upon return + to Consulate, since Mr. Purdy was still not present, Mr. Horman sat down in Officer B’s office + to wait. Mr. Horman said he + blamed the Embassy in part for not saving his son’s life but said he + realized that not everyone was to blame. He said his son had been + anti-establishment, but that was no reason to kill him. Officer B made + no effort to counter any of his statements or to argue with him, instead + just listened. During his discourse, Mr. Horman indicated that he was going to do his best to get + the Inter-American Police Academy closed, because “the U.S. helped train + the people who shot my son.” The only definitive statement made by + Officer B to Horman during this + time was: “Mr. Horman, I can only + say that both our official and unofficial contacts with the Chilean + military have indicated that your son was never officially listed as + being in the National Stadium.” Horman replied: “Oh, I don’t believe he was officially + listed. To find out what happened, you would have to talk to military + intelligence and not regular army officers.” At no time did Mr. + Horman indicate any + antagonism toward Officer B. Altho he did criticize some Embassy + officers without naming them, it was obvious, however, that he was + referring to Captain Ray Davis, Consul Purdy, PAO James Halsema, and + Ambassador Davis.

+

5. Throughout the period Officer B was actively involved in carrying out + investigations, such as neighborhood checks to locate witnesses to the + detention, visiting the National Stadium, and visiting the morgue as + part of the Horman case. However, + primary activity in this case as well as the Teruggi case was undertaken + by Consul Purdy.

+

6. In the Teruggi case, Officer B interviewed friends of Teruggi, + including Steven Volk, Irena Munoz (fiancée of David Hathaway, Teruggi’s + roommate), and others. Officer B accompanied Volk to the morgue, along + with an Embassy officer temporarily detailed to the consulate, to identify the body of + Teruggi. Altho we have not seen Volk’s sworn statement made in the U.S., + he apparently criticized Consul Purdy for not allowing him to try to + identify the body of Teruggi earlier. This criticism is justified + because Volk asked Officer B if he could see the body because Hathaway + had not been positive that the body was not that of Teruggi. (Hathaway + had been unable to identify the body when he was taken to the morgue by + Consul Purdy.) Consul Purdy refused, and Volk overheard the refusal + later in the day. Officer B was able to convince Purdy that Volk should + be allowed to view the body. In a letter to the Wall + Street Journal, Volk mentioned having gone to the morgue with + Officer B.

+

7. [less than 1 line not declassified] both + Officer A and Officer B did everything in their power to assist in the + attempt to locate the two missing Americans, as well as assisting other + U.S. citizens who may have been in trouble or believed that they might + be. Neither believe that they undertook any action or made any statement + which would discredit the Consulate [less than 1 line + not declassified].

+
+ + +
+ 155. Memorandum From the Director of Operations Policy of the Bureau + of Intelligence and Research (Gardner) to the Deputy Director of the Bureau of + Intelligence and Research (McAfee) +

Summary: Department and CIA + officials discussed the possible provision of secret assistance + to the PDC and other private + sector organizations in Chile.

+

Source: Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, Congressional Liaison + Files, 1959–1990: Lot 94D565, James + Gardner Chronological File. Secret. The CIA’s memorandum of proposal has + not been found. On December 7, Gardner outlined reasons for covert action in + support of the PDC. By his + estimation, such action would support centrists as opposed to + right-wing groups, support democracy in Chile, and strengthen a + group that could perhaps compel the junta to curtail human + rights abuses. Gardner + added that exposure of the assistance would not damage the + reputation of the U.S. Government since the motive was to + prevent the extinction of democracy, and that an abrupt cut-off + of assistance might create resentment in the PDC. (Ibid.)

+ + + + + Washington, November + 27, 1973. + + + SUBJECT + + ARA–CIA Weekly Meeting, 23 November 1973 + + + PARTICIPANTS + + ARA—Messrs. Kubisch, Shlaudeman and Bowdler (for latter half of + meeting); CIA—Mr. Flannery and + INR/DDC—James R. Gardner + + +

Chile

+

Most of the discussion centered around the CIA proposal for giving covert assistance to the Chilean + PDC and private sector + organizations. The sum proposed is [dollar amount not + declassified], of which [dollar amount not + declassified] would go to the PDC, [less than 1 line not + declassified] and another [dollar amount not + declassified] for contingencies. The purpose of the assistance, + as explained in the CIA memorandum of + proposal and by Mr. Flannery, is to help the PDC and elements in the private sector bridge the radical + change in the situation brought about by the Junta’s overthrow of + Allende.

+

Mr. Shlaudeman said that in his + view the rationale for extending the assistance was a negative but real + one. If we held off now we could be causing ourselves trouble, for it + would look as if we had been interested simply in knocking off Allende. There was no question in his + mind that a most important objective was for us to get out of political + action in Chile once and for all. But the proposed program was a minimum + one for a minimum time. He felt it should be extended with the clear + understanding that after such and such a date the party would be + over.

+

Mr. Flannery said that one problem was that reflected in the claim of the + PDC that, if there were no PDC activity, the only ones that would benefit would be the + Communists, since they would continue to operate and would continue to + receive money.

+

Mr. Shlaudeman commented that + this claim presumed a condition in Chile that was unlikely; that is, one + in which the military would tolerate political activity by the + Communists. Nonetheless, without the help of the PDC it was quite possible that the Junta + would not be able to perform as an effective government, especially in + the economic sphere. It needed the help of talented members of the + PDC, although not necessarily that + of the PDC itself. But a PDC break with the Junta, because of the + effect it might have on individual dispositions to cooperate, could mean + a breakdown in the effectiveness of the new government.

+

Mr. Kubisch said that, as we + knew, he was in principle opposed to covert political operations:

+

(1) The political action possibilities available to us through CIA represented a means of influencing + events and an instrument for action that should be used only if there + were need.

+

(2) Given the evolution of events in the South American region in the + last 25 years, and the increasing polarization in the region of + contending political elements, and the history of our involvement in + covert political and military action, we had to be extremely careful + about using this instrument. In his view, we should employ it with the + greatest reluctance and only when no other and better means were + available. The damage to the US and to the USG were it to become known that we were engaged in covert + operations could be very great, and across the board, in today’s world. + We have been hurt by publicity about covert programs. Therefore his + initial stance would be one of strong skepticism when proposals for + covert political action were raised. His preference was for none + whatever in the hemisphere. It would be good if we could go for years + without resorting to them, if such restraint would do us no harm. + Therefore he would recommend use of such programs only if there were no + other way to accomplish a vitally important end.

+

(3) He nevertheless wished to consider the present proposal carefully. + The importance of Chile and the views of important US officials who were + concurring in the proposal commanded our most careful attention. But his + first reaction was clearly negative.

+

Mr. Kubisch then referred to the + help that we had given to anti-Allende elements in the 1970 election and said that + whatever it was we had done, we had done it to oppose Allende and we had not achieved our + objectives. Our interests in Chile as a result of the 1970 elections + came under direct and material threat. We now have a different situation + in Chile. While it was understandable that we felt it necessary to + oppose Allende in 1970, and to + help his opposition once he was in office, the question now was whether, + given the abrupt change in Chile and in the security situation there, it + was really essential to fine tune a political situation simply to be a moderating + influence and to help the opposition stay alive. He found it difficult + to see a persuasive case that we should do so. His feelings were + sharpened by the problems that seemed to be emerging between the Junta + and the PDC, and by the fact that the + Secretary had made it clear that the change in regime in Chile was very + much in our interest and that we should do all we could to help the + Junta succeed. In view of the Secretary’s remarks, he would not be + comfortable recommending assistance to any element in Chile that was not + completely identified with the Junta. It was not essential to the + success of the Junta that the PDC + survive as an entity. He mentioned in this regard the situation in + Mexico and Brazil.

+

Mr. Shlaudeman said that the case + of the PDC in Chile was to be + distinguished from Brazil and Mexico since the PDC was a real party with a real base, and it was the only + real surviving element in the political system. What we were talking + about in this proposal was help only in a transitional term. It was + perhaps correct to say that the survival of the PDC as a party was not important—but what was important was + that we not give the impression that we had no problems with a right + wing dictatorship and that we had no interest in the survival of + democracy in Chile after all that we had said over the years. He + therefore still felt it would be best to tell the PDC that we would finance it for three to + five months but that we were getting out of this kind of activity for + good in very short order, that it was up to the PDC to put its house in order.

+

Mr. Shlaudeman said he was + talking only about assistance to the PDC, he was against that part of the proposal that had to + do with [less than 1 line not declassified]

+

Mr. Shlaudeman said that in his + view, based on what he knew of the operations in Chile, the security + risk would be minimal. The reaction of the junta if it found out about + our assistance to the PDC would not be + great if our aid went to the more + conservative wing of the party and not to that represented by Tomic. Six + or seven months from now, he said, the reaction would probably be + somewhat sharper.

+

Mr. Kubisch asked what would + happen if in January or February the Junta found out that we had made + money available to the PDC. They + naturally would ask what the hell we were doing, were we still + intervening in Chile; still meddling? If we could say that our program + had ended with the overthrow of Allende, our position would be sound, but if, on the + other hand, we had to say that we had given a little to help the PDC over a transitional period, wouldn’t + the reaction be bad?

+

Mr. Shlaudeman said he really + didn’t think it would be.

+

Mr. Kubisch said that when + Allende had been president, + it was possible to make a case that his opposition should be supported. + Now, however, the situation was much different, the right wing was in + control. Were we perhaps not + saying simply that the situation had gone too far the other way for our + taste? In gross terms, when a major threat to US interest was involved, + we should use means to correct the condition, no matter how extreme they + might be. This was not such a case. Just because we did not like a + government was no reason to intervene in their countries. He himself + didn’t like the Junta but he could not see it as a serious, extreme + threat to our interests.

+

Mr. Shlaudeman said he agreed, + but said that he was worried about the effects of a drastic, immediate + cut off right now, especially since we had been saying every since 1962 + that our primary interest in Chile was the survival of democracy.

+

Mr. Kubisch responded that + Chilean democracy had taken the country close to disaster. He felt that, + attractive as an orderly disengagement would have been, the present + circumstances did not make this the preferable option. There were a lot + of things that we favored abroad, that we thought were good things, but + simply because we felt that way was no reason to use covert action to + see them realized, unless, as he had said before, our interests were + actually gravely threatened.

+

Mr. Kubisch concluded the + discussion by saying that he wished to think about the matter a little + more, even though he saw little prospect that his mind would change. It + was agreed that Mr. Shlaudeman + would speak to Ambassador Davis + if the latter might advance any considerations that had not be given + sufficient attention.

+

The meeting ended with brief discussions about Perón’s health, electoral prospects in + Venezuela, and the stability of the government in Peru.

+
+ +
+ 156. Telegram 303 From the Embassy in Chile to the Department of + State +

Summary: The + Embassy forwarded a request from General Leigh for U.S. Government + support in acquiring aircraft and an air defense system.

+

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + [no film number]. Confidential. Repeated to SecDef, JCS, CSAF, and USCINCSO. In a December 3, 1973, letter to the + Northrop Corporation, Leigh expressed the “firm intent” of the Chilean + Air Force to purchase fifteen F–5Es and three F–5Fs. Leigh recognized that some + elements of the aircraft were government-furnished equipment and + would have to be purchased through the U.S. Government, and + requested Northrop contact the U.S. Government on the matter. + (Memorandum for the Record, January 19, 1974; Washington + National Records Center, OSD + Files, FRC 330–79 0061, Negotiations–Chile Sales) On January 23, + the Department instructed the Embassy to demur if Leigh sought a response to his + January 15 request. (Telegram 14758 to Santiago, January 23; + National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, [no film + number])

+ + + + + Santiago, January 18, 1974, 2130Z. + +

303. Subject: Request for Equipment by Chilean Air Force.

+

1. I have received letter dated January 15, 1974 from General Leigh, junta member, and CINC Chilean Air Force (FACH) requesting U.S. Government support + in acquiring equipment to increase operating efficiency of FACH. Equipment desired is:

+

A. Fighter-bombers: 18 F–5E aircraft; 18 A–7D aircraft.

+

B. An air defense system consisting of: 7 groups of 35mm guns + (approximately 28 guns); 3 medium range missile batteries; 7 short range + missile batteries; 2 fixed warning radars; 4 mobile warning radars; and + 4 mobile command and control radars.

+

2. Letter notes that F–5E acquisition “already underway” and re other + items states that for many reasons Chile prefers to acquire equipment + from U.S. sources and realizes this will require decided USG support. Leigh requests urgent decision.

+

3. I am sending interim reply acknowledging receipt of letter and + indicating it being forwarded to Washington for consideration. Copies + both letters being pouched.

+

4. Comment: We have been told informally that Chile is attempting to + secure credits for the F–5E acquisition from sources outside the U.S. + and that the FACH share of any U.S. + FMS credits will be applied to + other referenced systems (the A–7D and the air defense system). We also + understand that Chile is looking at the British MK–2 Buckaneer aircraft + as well as the A–7D aircraft and will acquire whichever appears to be + first available.

+

5. Action: Request guidance for definitive reply to General Leigh.

+ + Thompson + +
+ +
+ 157. Transcript of the Secretary of State’s Staff Meeting +

Summary: Kissinger and Kubisch discussed the Chilean + Government’s interest in acquiring heavy weaponry. Kubisch noted that large + purchases of tanks and warplanes would make it politically more + difficult for the U.S. Government and international financial + institutions to provide needed economic assistance to Chile. + Kissinger expressed + the view that the Chilean Government should be allowed to decide + for itself whether or not to buy the equipment.

+

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Transcripts of Kissinger Staff Meetings, Lot + 78D443, Box 2, Secretary’s Staff Meetings. Secret. Kissinger chaired the meeting, + which was attended by all the principal officers of the + Department or their designated alternates. The Mexico City + meeting to which Kissinger referred was a regional Meeting of + Foreign Ministers planned for February 1974. In telegram 680 + from Santiago, February 11, the Embassy reported that Kubisch had affirmed to + Huerta in a February + 10 meeting that U.S. policy was to support the junta in Chile + and had added that the Chilean Government would have to do what + it could to deal with the human rights situation and to improve + its international image. (Ibid., Central Foreign Policy File, + [no film number]) In telegram 710 from Santiago, February 13, + the Embassy reported that Kubisch and Huerta had discussed Peru’s military buildup and + the possibility of a Peruvian attack on Chile. + (Ibid.)

+ + + + + Washington, January 31, 1974, 3:08–3:58 + p.m. + +

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to Chile.]

+ +

Mr. Kubisch: We’ve got a problem + arising from Chile with heavy armaments that affect our arms program and + other considerations. The Chileans have just informed us informally that + they’re going to request the opportunity to buy 18 F–5 aircraft at a + cost of about 50 or 60 million dollars and that they would like to go + ahead and acquire 15 medium tanks that they had requested last + September, just before Allende + was overthrown, under an FMS credit + arrangement. The problem here is this: We don’t have the official + request yet on the aircraft. If they spend 60 million dollars of their + own money, they’re talking about borrowing the money on their own + commercial terms for buying the aircraft; and it’s going to make it very + difficult for us and for some of the financial institutions to give them + the kind of economic and financial help they’re going to need over the + coming months, because the attitude will be that they’re spending for + aircraft and things they don’t really need.

+

On the other hand, the military junta in Chile feel they definitely need + this because the Soviets have delivered Soviet medium tanks to Peru. + And, as you know, there’s a real problem between Peru and Chile. We just + are really becoming seized with this problem and will be doing an + analysis on it and making recommendations on it.

+

Secretary Kissinger: But what do + you think your recommendations are going to be?

+

Mr. Kubisch: I think my + recommendations from ARA are going to + be to give the tanks, about 15 million dollars worth, under the FMS program, because it was on credit sales requested from the + Allende government and from + the Soviet tanks in Peru.

+

On the aircraft, we will probably recommend that we give them the license + to buy them—they buy them with their own money. But we’re going to have + to do it after weighing the implications of that on economic assistance + programs. And, finally—

+

Secretary Kissinger: Can they be + given an option of weighing these economic programs?

+

Mr. Kubisch: Consult.

+

Secretary Kissinger: Consult—but + don’t beat them over the head. I mean we’re not—no: I know we have the + strong conviction that we know better what’s good for other people than + they do.

+

I think we have to reassess the whole arms delivery program in Latin + America. With the military markets being what they are, I don’t see why + it is in the American interest for French planes—not to speak of Russian + planes—to be bought by governments.

+

Mr. Rush: Right.

+

Secretary Kissinger: It seems to + me that military governments are going to buy equipment and can not be + denied equipment by our conception of what their country requires. And + all we’re going to do is to create a group of Nasser-like colonels in + these countries. And, therefore, I think—basically, I mean, we should + tell them what the impact on the aid + program will be.

+

We should also make clear that we’ll support an aid request for them anyway. But if then they want to go + ahead, my inclination would be to let them buy it.

+

Mr. Kubisch: That’s certainly my + inclination.

+

I should say that there was a meeting on the Hill with Ambassador Popper and Harry + Shlaudeman in our Bureau, with about 15 administrative + aides of Senators and Congressmen, earlier this week, on Chile. And + several of them—particularly, an aide to Senator Church, an aide to + Senator Kennedy, an aide to + Senator Inouye—

+

Secretary Kissinger: I have no + doubt.

+

Mr. Kubisch: —said, “We want you + to know, Ambassador Popper and + Mr. Shlaudeman, that we’re + watching very closely what the Administration is going to do on + assistance to Chile—another Greece-sort of problem. Then we’re going to + crank it right into the legislation and tie your hands to it.”

+

So that’s another aspect of the problem.

+

Secretary Kissinger: But it is a + curious thing that we can sell the tanks because a left-wing government + that was moving towards Communism requested it. But it’s certainly more + advantageous for the United States than the Allende government was—in any international forum that + you can imagine.

+

Just think of the Mexico City meeting with an Allende government there.

+

Mr. Kubisch: It would be + impossible.

+

Secretary Kissinger: I don’t + think we could have it. That we can not consider on its merits.

+

Now, I know that that’s what Church is going to do. I would certainly not + have generated the request from the Chileans. And, if it comes, we + should try to find some way of meeting and go to the Congress and tell + them.

+

Mr. Kubisch: We’ll have to mount + a fairly massive program on the Hill to line up supporters and sympathetic people and + build on them.

+

Secretary Kissinger: Look, if + Chile, after the impact of this request on its aid program, chooses not to pursue it, we shouldn’t be + heartbroken.

+

Mr. Kubisch: You know, the + real—

+

Secretary Kissinger: But we + should not engage in a massive lecturing to them of what is best for + their country.

+

Mr. Kubisch: Absolutely. And they + perceive a real threat, in the new government in Chile, to themselves. + And this is worrisome too for Peru and Bolivia because we’re now coming + up on the 100th Anniversary of the War of the Pacific, when the Chileans + marched all the way up to Lima, occupied the country, took away several + major provinces rich in minerals in Southern Peru—took away Bolivian + access to the sea—and retained those provinces well into the 20’s and + 30’s and retained some of them until this day—until they were finally + negotiated out. And there is a kind of revanchism in Peru and Bolivia to + get this territory back from Chile. As a result, they’re buying Mirage + aircraft and buying Soviet aircraft, as they have the Chilean military + responsible for their own security and feel they are responsible for + themselves.

+

And we really can’t do it for ourselves; we just can’t.

+

Secretary Kissinger: Well, this + we ought to make a request for to the Congressional Committee.

+

Mr. Kubisch: Twenty million + dollars of economic aid. I have no doubt in my own mind they’re going to + opt for 60 million dollars of military arms.

+

Secretary Kissinger: So do I.

+

Mr. Kubisch: The tanks are one + thing, but F–5 aircraft—which not only denies them 20 million dollars of + an A.I.D. loan but maybe two or three hundred million dollars of support + worldwide—that might be deferred, if not thrown to them—which they + really need.

+

Secretary Kissinger: I think the + international institutions ought not to be so affected by the 60 + million, by the military purchases. I can see that the 20 million dollars coming out of American + appropriations could be affected, but why should World Bank and other + credits be affected?

+

Mr. Kubisch: Well, the attitude + among the Socialist governments in Europe and the governments in Europe + that have strong Socialist and Communist parties has been, as you know, + very much against this overthrow of Allende, and they have hosts in the international + institutions and they have been lobbying to defer institutions in the + World Bank and elsewhere, for the time being, until they see what + happens in Chile—see what kind of a course the government will follow—so + there will be some pressure from other governments, I think.

+

Secretary Kissinger: Let me talk + to [Robert] McNamara about + that.

+

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to Chile.]

+
+ +
+ 158. Telegram 846 From the Embassy in Chile to the Department of + State +

Summary: + Popper outlined ways + in which the Chilean Government might articulate its response to + accusations of human rights abuses in order to dampen + international criticism of the regime.

+

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + P740146–0996. Confidential; Immediate; Exdis. Repeated immediate + to Moscow, Mexico, and USUN. + Telegram 564 from USUN, + February 20, reported on a Chilean request for U.S. support in + defeating an effort to establish a working group of the U.N. + Human Rights Commission to visit Chile and investigate alleged + human rights violations. (Ibid., Central Foreign Policy File, + [no film number])

+ + + + + Santiago, February 22, 1974, 2214Z. + +

846. Subj: Chilean Request for Support in UN Human Rights Commission. Ref: USUN 564.

+

1. Summary: Department may wish to consider authorizing USUN to suggest to Chilean UN Del outlines of a Chilean govt posture + on charges of human rights violations which might help to dampen effort + to attack and isolate Chile in UN + organs. Position would explain rationale for September 1973 coup, + describe junta’s human rights record in terms of state of emergency + activities, offer to cooperate in an impartial study, and state + intention to restore democratic practices. End summary.

+

2. Since it seems rather unlikely that anything done about Solzhenitsyn case (reftel) would + succeed in heading off an anti-Chilean resolution in the UN human rights commission, may I make a + suggestion which may warrant consideration in responding to USUN’s request for Dept. views. Suggestion is put forward with + some diffidence. Last thing I would want to do is to appear to be + masterminding strategy on tactics for Dept or USUN.

+

3. Chileans will understandably be inclined to bridle at HRC condemnation of their governmental + practices, and particularly at being the object of a study by an HRC committee after they have already been + condemned in a resolution. They will regard themselves as the target of + a Marxist conspiracy in the UN. They + will not see why they should cooperate as requested with the proposed + committee in these circumstances, and as indicated reftel will hardly + want to have it visit Chile.

+

4. At the same time, Chileans should realize that if they limit + themselves to all-out resistance to such a resolution, they will + probably lose. In losing, and in subsequently refusing to cooperate with + the committee, they may well project themselves along the road which has + led South Africa, Portugal and Israel to become the pariah states of the + UN. Chile can ill afford to be in + such a position at this juncture in its history.

+

5. There is a chance that Chile could blunt the attack against it by + reacting in a different way.

+

6. First, by cogent statements in the HRC explaining the background of the present situation: how + the Allende regime was + destroying democracy in Chile as pointed out by Congress, the Supreme + Court and the Controller General; how extremist elements were preparing + to establish by violence a totalitarianism of the left; how the country + had collapsed into economic chaos; how the military had thereupon + intervened as a civic duty acclaimed by bulk of the country.

+

6. Second, by describing openly what measures have had to be taken and + why, by defending Chile’s record re asylum and refugees and its pledge + to try all detainees not released after investigation, and by noting + progress already made.

+

7. Third, by a clear indication that the junta has as its objective the + restoration of traditional Chilean democratic practices, including those + involving human rights guarantees, when that becomes possible. (This may + be the most difficult statement for the Chilean rep to formulate in + [garble] acceptable to Santiago.)

+

8. Fourth, by highlighting the disparity between the treatment being + accorded to Chile and the blind eye turned to the systematic, permanent, + and doctrinaire violations of individual rights practiced in the + communist states. Finally, by agreeing to cooperate with a study + committee if an impartial one is chosen, to the extent of furnishing + information and possibly, if in Chile’s judgment a useful contribution + can thereby be made at some stage, through a visit by the committee to + the country.

+

9. A basic element in this scenario would be the stress placed on the + provisional nature of the measures taken by the junta. Copies of the human rights covenants are + not readily available here, but in my recollection they are pretty well + loaded with escape clauses that would apply to the present state of + emergency in Chile under its laws.

+

10. The immediate objective of such an approach would be to set the stage + for toning down the draft resolution in USUN 564, notably Emb, by replacing the condemnation of + Chile by an expression of concern regarding reports of human rights + violations there. The longer-range objective would be to establish a + defensible posture to which the Chileans could hew as the communists and + their radical non-aligned friends seek to close in on Chile in one + UN organ after another, to rob it of + those associations and that respectability which it is going to want and + need in the international community.

+

11. We could not today discuss or even suggest a course of this character + in Santiago without serious political risk: the junta is extremely + sensitive to anything it might construe as intervention. It may not even + respond happily to soundings from USUN + along above lines. But if as indicated reftel Chilean and Bazan has + asked USG for help to defeat a + resolution of type quoted therein—and if resolution is actually going to + be introduced and passed in HRC—it + would be perfectly legitimate for USUN + to suggest something of the sort. Procedure is anything but sure-fire + but I believe Chile would have enough friends in HRC and other UN organs to make a solid stand on this ground.

+

12. In any event, if resolution is pressed I hope US will find it + possible to aid Chilean del in + derailing or softening resolution. Most desirable outcome would be to + negotiate a text Chileans could live with and we could support; but at + very least I hope we can avoid aligning ourselves with Chile’s + critics.

+ + + Popper + + +
+ +
+ 159. Telegram 38951 From the Department of State to the Embassy in + Chile +

Summary: During a + February 22 discussion at a Meeting of Foreign Ministers in + Mexico City, Huerta and + Kissinger discussed + Chilean economic problems and Chile’s request for military + assistance. Kissinger + assured the Foreign Minister of U.S. support.

+

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Country Files, Box 777, + Latin America, Chile, Vol. 8, 1 January 1973–31 March 1974. + Confidential; Nodis. Drafted by Low on February 22; cleared by Bloomfield. According to + telegram 40006 to Santiago, February 28, the penultimate + sentence in paragraph 2 should read, “the GOC, he said, had applied for $190 + million in food credits which the U.S. had said it would + consider after July 1.” (Ibid.) In his appearance before a + congressional symposium on February 28, Swedish Ambassador + Edelstam made no criticism of U.S. policy towards Chile. + (Telegram 40733 to Stockholm, February 28; ibid., RG 59, Central + Foreign Policy File, [no film number]) Telegram 661 from + Santiago, February 10, reported on Kubisch’s February 10 meeting with Huerta during the Assistant + Secretary’s visit to Chile. (Ibid.)

+ + + + + Washington, February 27, 1974, 1517Z. + +

38951. Subject: Secretary’s Bilateral Discussion with Chilean Foreign + Minister Huerta.

+

1. The Secretary had a 25 minute conversation with Chilean Foreign + Minister Huerta at the palace of + Tlatelolco on February 22 after lunch and before the conference + reconvened. The Secretary was accompanied by Bloomfield, Ara and Low, NSC. The Foreign Minister was accompanied by Ambassadors + Bernstein and Claro.

+

2. Huerta noted he had an economic + and a political problem to review with the Secretary; problems which he + had already taken up with Kubisch and the chargé in Santiago. He noted that the + Paris Club negotiations were very important and requested our support. + The Secretary assured him of that. Huerta then described the food and inflation problem in + Chile. The GOC, he said had applied for + $190 million in food credits which the US had said after July 1. The + Secretary noted it was a large amount.

+

3. The Secretary said we wanted the government to succeed and would + implement this policy. He noted our difficult domestic situation but + said we could live with it as long as the GOC didn’t get nervous about it. He made reference to the + meeting on Chile noting that we had tried to get the Swedish government + to call off Ambassador Edelstam but it had refused, promising only he + would not be inflammatory. Foreign Minister Huerta said he would understand as long as the decision + centers weren’t influenced.

+

4. Huerta noted his concern about + Peruvian arms. He said the Chilean need was for peace and reconstruction + but there were some in his country who might try to make trouble. He + said that Cubans were maintaining the Soviet tanks and that Soviet + influence in Peru was continuing. The Secretary said he was aware of the Chilean requests + for arms and noted that we have approved the tanks, but, he said, this + was tactically not the best time for the airplanes. It would be better + delayed until later in the year. He offered to exercise US influence + with Peru to see that there was not trouble. Again he promised to be as + helpful as we could, reestablishing our traditional friendship with + Chile.

+ + + Casey + + +
+ +
+ 160. Telegram 942 From the Embassy in Chile to the Department of + State +

Summary: + Popper recommended + that the Department agree to support a proposal for covert + assistance to the PDC.

+

Source: Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, Box 16, Santiago, + 1963–1979. Secret. Roger Channel. In telegram 332 from Santiago, + January 22, the Embassy reported that Ministry of Interior + Decree 1899, which clamped down on all political activity, + seemed to be “particularly aimed at Christian Democratic Party.” + (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, [no film + number]) On March 2, Flannery sent the March 1 CIA proposal to Gardner, and on March 4, + Gardner sent a copy + of the proposal and telegram 942 to Shlaudeman. (Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, Box 16, + Santiago, 1963–1979.) On March 19, Phillips sent a memorandum to Gardner which maintained that + continued PDC subsidies would + liquidate obligations for which the PDC thought the U.S. Government responsible and + maintain an important source of information, while termination + of the funding might cause bitterness towards the U.S. + Government. (Ibid.)

+ + + + + Santiago, February 27, 1974, 1545Z. + +

942. Subject: Assistance to Christian Democratic Party (PDC).

+

1. Summary: After weighing factors pro and con, I recommend Dept agree to + covert funding request [less than 1 line not + declassified] for period July 1, 1973, to March 31, 1974. A + necessary condition of transfer of funds would be clear acknowledgment + that USG had no commitment whatever to + further funding of any character, thus keeping our options as to future + completely open. End summary.

+

2. Since my arrival at post, I have carefully considered what action + USG should take re [less than 1 line not declassified] aid + PDC and have reached conclusion noted + in summary above.

+

3. Proposal as detailed to me here involves [less than + 1 line not declassified] funds to PDC for following activities covering period July 1, 1973, + to March 31, 1974:

+

[table not declassified]

+ +

Total expenditure would be [dollar amount not + declassified] this compares with annual subsidies of [dollar amount not declassified] and [dollar amount not declassified] in preceding + years FY 1972 and FY 1973.

+

4. Factors in favor of continuing financing through March 1974 may be + stated as follows:

+

A. Approval would permit us to maintain the good will of the PDC, while withdrawing from the + large-scale support programs carried on during the Allende years. The funds requested are + only a fraction of the subsidies given the PDC in FY 1972 and 1973 and + are smaller still when the current local purchasing power of these funds + is considered.

+

B. We have a contingent obligation of a sort for at least the period July + 1 to September 11, 1973, since the PDC + at that time had every reason to expect continuing U.S. government + support in the struggle against the Allende regime. In fact, as you recall, a funding + request for the PDC of $350,000 for + FY 1974 was being processed when the + military uprising occurred.

+

C. A complete cut-off of funds would likely be interpreted by the PDC as a signal that the U.S. government + has abandoned the PDC after using it in + the struggle against Allende. + Granting the funding request, however, would keep our options open and, + in the short run, assist in influencing the PDC in the direction of strengthening its policy of + maintaining correct relations with the junta, support of constructive + junta goals, and avoiding at all costs an open break with the + government. The impossibility of providing further funding should an + open break occur would be emphasized to the recipients.

+

D. The PDC is the only national, + vertically-structured party in Chile that is non-Marxist and has broad + popular appeal. Furthermore, it is the largest cohesive political + grouping in Chile, having steadily obtained a third of the vote + nationwide in recent years. In the event of reasonably free national + elections in the foreseeable future, the PDC appears to be the odds-on-favorite, especially if all + Marxist parties should be disfranchised.

+

E. Since we are approaching the end of the period covered by this request + (March 1974), the granting of these funds should not lock us into any + further funding commitments, which would be completely contingent on + further events and our reading of them. I would insist that our + completely uncommitted attitude towards any further funding in the + future be spelled out to the PDC + recipients and, as well, that they understand that we regard the + situation post-coup as an entirely new and changed situation.

+

F. Funding would permit the PDC to carry + out at least minimum programs in areas, especially those involving labor + unions and among Campesinos organizations, that would otherwise be in + danger of being left to the + exclusive, albeit clandestine ministrations of the communist party and + other Marxist groups.

+

G. The PDC has had an excellent record + on the security of its funding arrangements. Knowledge of their + existence has been strictly compartmented and highly restricted among + PDC leaders. The risk of compromise + is, we believe, slight.

+

5. The following adverse factors must also be taken into account:

+

A. I am reluctant to become involved in covert funding activities or + other covert operations unless these can be reasonably expected to + produce important results from the national policy standpoint not + attainable in any other way.

+

B. This payment will continue our PDC + funding into the post-coup period, albeit on a reduced scale. Although + part of this funding covers the July–Sept pre-coup period, it will + require great and continuing effort on our part to convince the PDC that we consider the situation to have + changed and that we are completely uncommitted to any future + funding.

+

C. The development of the relationship between the PDC and the government will have to be + watched closely, since differences between them on human rights, + economic policy, and labor union matters are likely to continue and + perhaps grow. The chance exists that the relationship may become openly + antagonistic at some point in the future. In these circumstances we + would not want to be linked to the PDC, + even as to past actions, at any point in the post-coup period.

+

D. Continued funding maintains the PDC’s + dependence on us. It also raises questions about the PDC’s viability as a genuinely national + and self-sustaining institution. The other interests involved, however, + in my judgment outweigh this consideration. It is clear that without our + support the PDC will under the + exceptional situation created by the military seizure of power be far + less able to maintain financial solvency than it was before.

+

6. On balance, I recommend approval of the funding request submitted in + the amount of [dollar amount not declassified]. + Because the period involved has virtually terminated, the demise of La + Prensa last week will not affect the amount of the funding request.

+ + + Popper + + +
+ +
+ 161. Memorandum 1030/74 Prepared in the Central Intelligence + Agency +

Summary: The + Central Intelligence Agency provided an analysis of the + situation in Chile six months after the coup.

+

Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of Support Services + (DI), Job 79T00863A: Intel Pub Files, Box 32, Folder 3: Aspects + of the Situation in Chile. Secret; [handling + restriction not declassified]. The memorandum was + prepared in response to a March 1 request by William Morrell in + preparation for Treasury Secretary Shultz’s April 1–4 visit to Santiago as the head + of the U.S. delegation to an IDB meeting. (Ibid., National Intelligence Council + Files, Job 80B01495R: Policy Files, Box 5, Folder 14: NIO, Latin America, 1974) In + telegram 1188 from Santiago, March 11, the Embassy reported that + the Chilean Government had issued its most detailed policy + statements to date as a prelude to a ceremony marking the + junta’s six months in power. The statements pledged to enhance + Chile’s social and economic development while denouncing + communist groups and the Radical and PDC parties. (National Archives, RG 59, Central + Foreign Policy File, [no film number])

+ + + + + Washington, March 21, + 1974. + + + SUBJECT + Aspects of the Situation in Chile + +

The Situation in Brief

+

After six months in power the Chilean armed forces and national police + appear more determined than ever to permanently restructure their + nation’s political, economic, and social systems before allowing a + return to civilian rule. Junta President Pinochet says this will take at least five years.

+

Pinochet’s emergence as the military government’s leader in fact as well + as in name probably is the single most important development of the + junta’s first half-year. Some personal, interservice, and policy + disputes have surfaced within the government but they have not been + serious enough to threaten its stability. Similar sources of friction + undoubtedly will arise in the future without straining the regime’s + cohesion.

+

Supporters of the late President Allende have been unable to take much effective action + against the new government. The left has not been destroyed, however. + Efforts to reorganize and unite, both within Chile and abroad, continue. + The regime probably is correct in its belief that incidents of + anti-government violence will increase after university classes resume + later this month. Security measures recently have been eased somewhat, + but the armed forces and carabineros remain alert against such attacks + and are capable of taking effective counter-measures.

+

The military’s firm belief that its cause is “just” has begotten a + self-righteousness that leaves little room for political dissent and + only a limited opportunity for civilian counsel. This attitude has + largely precluded support for + the regime from the political parties and risks alienating potentially + supportive elements of the population. If unmodified, it eventually will + create serious problems for the government and could cause the + evaporation of the reservoir of popular goodwill toward the armed + forces.

+

Economic policy is a key area of controversy within the regime. Some + military men have taken issue with the government’s team of civilian + economic advisers, and there are real policy differences between the + contending groups. The struggle over economic policy is an important + front in the multifaceted maneuvering for influence and power.

+

The government has been the target of numerous charges related to alleged + violations of human rights. Many of the accusations are merely + politically inspired falsehoods or gross exaggerations—the junta has not + been bloodthirsty. The government has given first priority to repressing + perceived security threats, however, and respect for human rights has + been a secondary consideration.

+

Stability of the Junta

+

An intention to rotate the presidency was implicit in statements made by + the junta members in the period immediately following the coup. A + one-year term reportedly was agreed on. Late last year, however, + Pinochet apparently had to + fend off a bid by Admiral Merino, the navy commander and a member of the + junta, to advance the first rotation date to January 1. Pinochet soon thereafter made a series + of statements on the presidency in which he appeared to be declaring + that it would not rotate at all, and a recent report indicates that the + junta now has a formal agreement to this effect.

+

In any case, Pinochet and the + army clearly intend to retain their positions of dominance in the + government. The army looks upon itself as the armed forces’ premier + service and army officers consider permanent army control of the junta + presidency to be both natural and proper. The other services, including + the carabineros, will continue to seek to increase their influence on + government policy, but they are unlikely to challenge the army’s claim + to “first among equals” status or to force a showdown over the junta + presidency.

+

+ Pinochet has had disagreements + with a number of generals. One important general recently was eased into + retirement following a series of personal and policy disputes with the + junta president. Some senior officers [less than 1 + line not declassified] look upon Pinochet as a late-comer to that effort and probably + feel that others are more deserving of the presidency. Pinochet appears determined to prevent + the emergence from within the military of potential rivals for power. + His position now is firmly enough established for him to deal forcefully + with disgruntled officers, and further changes in the high command and + cabinet shifts probably will + take place. The fact that Pinochet left Chile to attend Brazilian President + Geisel’s inauguration is an + indication of the growing strength of Pinochet’s position.

+

Opposition groups still are attempting to rebuild their organizations, + form an effective alliance, and take action against the junta, but the + government’s strict security measures have severely retarded this effort + within Chile. Despite foreign assistance from Soviet, Cuban, and other + sources, parallel efforts in Moscow, Havana, Paris, Rome, and elsewhere + are being hampered by long-standing tactical and ideological differences + among the various leftist groups. Nevertheless, the government is + concerned over the fact that the left retains the wherewithal to harass + through guerrilla or terrorist attacks. The opposition’s ability to + mobilize the masses and provoke strikes remains more questionable. Much + will depend on whether Chilean workers can be convinced that the + sacrifices they are making now really will pay off with a better life in + the not too distant future.

+

It appears that Pinochet’s tenure + in office will last as long as he can avoid a serious falling-out among + the services and retain the confidence of the bulk of the army. Concern + over possible leftist opposition and Peruvian revanchism will help + Pinochet keep personal, + inter-service, and policy disputes within manageable proportions, and he + seems likely to retain his position indefinitely. There is still a + danger that the armed forces’ determination to reconstruct Chile its own + way will alienate potentially supportive segments of the population. The + enforced “recess” of the non-Marxist political parties, for example, is + seriously straining the government’s relations with the Christian + Democratic Party. The military has its own ideas about building a base + of civilian support, however, and they do not include working closely + with any organized political group.

+

Differences Over Economic Policy

+

The government’s implementation of an economic recovery program prepared + by a group of University of Chicago-trained technocrats has disturbed + some military men. [4½ lines not declassified] + The junta’s policy Advisory Committee, which is run by Colonel Julio + Canessa, has become the focal point of military dissent from the + programs advocated by the junta’s team of civilian economic + advisers.

+

The Advisory Committee is wary of the civilians’ orthodox macroeconomic + approach and has surmised that certain aspects of the recovery program + are geared to benefit special interest groups rather than the nation as + a whole. The committee fears that instead of stimulating output steeply + higher prices could restrict demand to the point of inhibiting + production. It advocates a short-term softening of the recovery program + to avoid aggravating opposition to the junta among lower income groups. The Advisory + Committee’s desire to give political and social factors more weight + reflects the fact that segments of the Chilean armed forces and national + police are attracted to a populist/statist approach to government and + are not happy with the free enterprise orientation of the civilian + advisory team.

+

The difference in outlook recently became apparent when the government + discussed the return of the textile industry to private ownership. The + Canessa committee’s proposals for state-worker control with limited + owner participation were rejected and the eventual outcome was a victory + for the civilian advisers. The government felt it necessary to issue a + statement detailing the terms for the return, however, to dispel any + notion that private firms seized under Allende were being returned to their owners + unconditionally. Conditions for such returns include a pledge by the + owners to abide by a yet to be issued regulation on a labor-management + relations.

+

The struggle between the civilian economic team and the military Advisory + Committee has not been definitively resolved. Pinochet seems to be somewhat + disenchanted with the results of the recovery program, [3½ lines not declassified]. The military’s + inclination to seek counsel within its own ranks is a plus for the + Advisory Committee. The civilian economic advisers’ influence will + almost certainly be reduced if Pinochet follows through on reported plans to integrate + them into Canessa’s group.

+

On the other hand, the economic portion of the statement of goals issued + by the junta after six months in power reinforces the government’s + policy of reliance on free market forces. Pinochet has expressed sympathy with the lower income + groups bearing the brunt of the economic recovery program and promised + that this generation of workers will “reap the fruits of their + sacrifices”, but he also has stressed that further privations lie + ahead.

+

The ongoing debate over economic policy is part of maneuvering for power + and influence in which personal, ideological, policy, and inter-service + factors are sometimes indistinguishable. It may thus be difficult to + discern who has won the contest, if and when the issue is decided. Over + the next several months the economic program probably will continue to + reflect the input of both groups, with the junta listening to the + proposals they put forth on a given topic and making an ad hoc decision + depending on the merits of the case. Time appears to be on the side of + the Canessa committee, however, and eventual modification of the + emphasis on free enterprise is likely.

+

Alleged Violations of Human Rights

+

Many of the accusations regarding the military government’s lack of + respect for human rights are traceable to a world-wide Communist-orchestrated campaign to + discredit the junta. Some of these claims are simply false, others are + exaggerations or distortions of reality. On the other hand, junta + President Pinochet’s blanket + assertion that “human rights have not been violated in Chile” overstates + the junta’s case.

+

The armed forces and police expected leftist paramilitary brigades to + offer significant resistance to the coup, but widespread opposition + failed to materialize. As a result, more force than turned out to be + absolutely necessary was used to carry out and secure the coup and + civilian casualties probably totaled about 2,000. In the hectic weeks + immediately following the takeover some commanders in the provinces + appeared to be acting independently of central authority and more than a + hundred prisoners were shot and killed while “trying to escape”. In + addition, about 170 persons have been executed since the coup. At + present there are over 5,000 political prisoners, including about 40 + well-known detainees on Dawson Island in the remote Straits of + Magellan.

+

The regime has regularized its security procedures and now claims that + arrests, detentions, trials, and executions are being properly carried + out under constitutional and statutory provisions for a state of siege. + A National Executive Secretariat for Detainees was established in + January and was charged, among other things, with protecting the rights + of prisoners and their families. Security forces have been ordered to + conform to the standards of the Geneva Conventions in their treatment of + persons arrested on political or national security grounds. + Representatives of international organizations concerned with human + rights have been allowed to visit Dawson Island and other detention + centers. Thus, in contrast to the confusion and emotion of the first + weeks after the coup the government now is committed to an official + policy of stern, but correct, treatment of detainees.

+

Whether this policy is being strictly followed in the field is less + certain. There does appear to be some abuse by units engaged in active + military or intelligence operations. [4½ lines not + declassified]. Many officers do not regard techniques of + physical coercion or mental pressure to be “torture” so long as they + cause no permanent damage and are not apparent to the casual observer. + Thus, it seems likely that the type of strong-arm methods employed by + many of the world’s police and security forces will continue to be + practiced in Chile.

+

The junta has a generally good record on the granting of safe-conduct + passes to those seeking political asylum. Thousands of Chileans and + foreigners who took refuge in various embassies in Santiago have been + allowed to leave the country. The number of “deferred” requests for safe + conduct has been shrinking steadily and now is less than two hundred. + Many of those remaining in the embassies are officials of the Allende regime or leftist notables + against whom the government is preparing formal charges and extradition + requests.

+ +

Court martials of military officers suspected of collaboration with the + left have begun and some civilians also are being tried. Trials for + high-ranking Allende regime + officials and the other most prominent leftist prisoners do not appear + to be imminent, however. The government says that it is still + investigating the cases of these leftist luminaries in order to + determine what, if any, charges will be brought them. There is no + evidence of a sense of urgency in this matter. Important jurisdictional + and procedural issues remain unresolved. A key question is which + tribunals, civilian or military, will have jurisdiction over crimes + committed prior to the coup.

+
+ +
+ 162. Action Memorandum From the Director of the Policy Planning Staff + (Lord) to Secretary of State + Kissinger + +

Summary: Lord outlined policy options + for Kissinger regarding + the sale of U.S. military equipment to Chile.

+

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 777, Country Files, + Latin America, Chile, Vol. 8, 1 January 1973–31 March 1974. + Secret. Drafted by Einaudi and Simons, and cleared by Bowdler and Stern. Attached but not + published is Tab A, a March 14 memorandum from Bowdler and Weiss, through Donaldson, to the Secretary, + which outlined options on arms sales to Chile. On April 25, + Kissinger approved + the first two recommendations and disapproved the third. Next to + the first recommendation, he wrote, “But please check with Brent + [Scowcroft] and make + sure DOD is aboard.” A notation + below Kissinger’s note + reads, “Taken care of.” Low summarized the memorandum for Scowcroft on April 3. (Ibid.) + Kissinger’s speech + to the OAS General Assembly is + printed in the Department of State Bulletin, May 13, 1974, pp. 509–515.

+ + + + + Washington, March 22, + 1974. + +

+ Sale of Military Equipment to + Chile +

+

The Chileans are pressing us for a wide variety of weaponry to redress + their military imbalance with Peru. Some of these weapons were initially + offered for sale to the Allende + government. Nonetheless, adverse public and Congressional reaction to + expensive military sales is certain to be heightened by the current + human rights situation in Chile. This reaction could jeopardize our + capacity to help Chile in other areas, and might also threaten broader + interests, such as the FY 75 security + assistance legislation about to be presented to Congress, and our + ability to deliver on the Mexico City pledge to maintain present aid levels.

+ +

+ The basic issues, therefore, are:

+

—Can we meet our previous commitments for military sales and our + assurances of support for the junta without running a serious risk of + jeopardizing our relations with Congress and our broader interests?

+

—If we do sell, how much should we sell and when?

+

—Are any counterbalancing moves available to draw the political poison + from arms sales to Chile?

+

Background

+

+ 1. The Equipment + Picture

+

Although our grant material program with Chile was terminated in 1968, + the U.S. maintained a small FMS credit + sales program during the Allende + regime. On the day of the coup, September 11, 1973, sales of all lethal + items to Chile were placed under review. Prior to the coup, we had + officially notified the Allende + government of our willingness to sell the M–60 medium tank and + authorized release to Chile of price and availability data on the F–5E + aircraft to preempt purchase of MIG-21’s from the USSR.

+

In August 1973 the GOC formally + requested 15 M–60 tanks (cost: $7.5 million). Since the coup the GOC has advised the U.S. of its intention + to request 18 F–5E’s on a cash basis (cost: $60 million). Delivery of these tanks and aircraft will lessen, but + not close, Chile’s gap with Peru. +

+

In addition, Chile has expressed interest in acquiring three major + weapons packages (A–7D aircraft, extensive air defense including + missiles and cannon, and the TOW + anti-tank/assault weapon), a number of lesser items (air traffic control + radar, vehicle mounted recoilless rifles, armored personnel and mortar + carriers, anti-aircraft cannon and fire control radar, and riot control + equipment), as well as a small package of non-lethal equipment. Neither + the A–7D nor the TOW has previously + been sold in Latin America.

+

The junta is convinced that Chile faces a major threat from Peru, which + now enjoys significant superiority in both tanks and fighter aircraft. + If we deny what the junta considers its minimal + needs, Chile will make every effort to meet them elsewhere, and its + disillusionment and frustration could have unpredictable long-term + consequences.

+

+ 2. The Economic Picture

+

Chile is seeking to reschedule its massive external debt obligations in + order to help resolve the economic chaos inherited from the Allende period. On economic grounds + alone, the expenditure of large sums on arms acquisitions at a time when + Chile is pleading for concessional economic assistance and generous debt + rescheduling is certain to increase criticism of Chile in the US + Congress and elsewhere.

+ +

3. The Congressional + Picture +

+

Military sales to Chile are unpopular with important members of Congress + on three counts: (1) there is extensive distaste for the human rights record of the GOC; (2) opponents of US economic + assistance criticize uneconomic use of limited + resources by poverty-stricken regimes; and (3) there is concern + lest military sales encourage arms races.

+

+ Congress has written all three counts into the + legislative record. Of the many provisions in the Foreign + Assistance and Foreign Military Sales Acts registering these concerns, + only Section #4 of the FMS Act (the + Conte-Long Amendment), which requires Presidential national security + findings for sales of sophisticated equipment to Latin American + countries, or interdepartmental findings that specific items are not + “sophisticated”, is mandatory. However, taken together + these provisions unambiguously state the trend of Congressional + thinking on three issues unavoidably relevant to major arms sales to + Chile at this time.

+

These Congressional concerns cannot be dismissed as those of a marginal + group, for their most intense advocates are members whose support will + be needed if we are to deliver on your pledge at Mexico City to + “maintain, as a minimum, present aid + levels.”

+

Bureau and Agency Views

+

+ With multiple caveats, predominant views support + authorizing sale now of the F–5E, M–60 medium tanks, an anti-tank + weapons system (not the TOW), + armored vehicles, radar, mines, and certain other minor items, + privately informing the GOC of the + decision, and considering additional requests on a case-by-case + basis.

+

This posture would arouse sharp Congressional criticism, would not + satisfy all the GOC’s perceived needs, + and could still result in acquisitions of other items from third + countries. However, it would satisfy the GOC’s most urgent needs, would specifically address GOC concerns over Peruvian acquisition of + Soviet tanks, and would permit the USG + to honor prior commitments to Chile. It would also require no new + findings or determinations under the Conte-Long Amendment.

+

In general, this posture is supported by ARA, PM, EB, and L in State and by DOD, CIA, + and ACDA. No one strongly supports either holding all requests for FMS credit for major sales under review, + or resuming normal FMS credit sales + now.

+

Nonetheless, there are important dissenting views and refinements:

+

—AID finds it difficult to support any + option in view of their Congressional concerns. (Treasury has not + commented.)

+

—ACDA believes that after selling + F–5E’s and M–60’s we should make a discreet approach to the GOC suggesting that it might wish to + consult with Peru on the possibilities for exercising mutual restraint + in arms acquisition. It + argues that if we are reasonably forthcoming in meeting Chilean security + needs, the GOC might be willing to + approach the GOP along these lines.

+

—L would have preferred to keep all sales under review given human rights + and economic considerations, but accepted the limited-sales option + because of Peruvian purchases of Soviet tanks. PM reluctantly assented to the tank sale for the same + reason.

+

—EB, while endorsing limited sales + because it sees “no viable alternative,” believes the Chilean + authorities should be warned explicitly that significant military + purchases by Chile will make it most difficult or even impossible for us + to convince the Congress to authorize meaningful amounts of development + assistance.

+

—H endorses an alternative option of first making strong representations + to the GOC to defer purchases of major + military items by stressing the compelling economic rationale against + such purchases; coupling this with efforts to reduce tension between + Chile and Peru; and falling back to limited sales to Chile only if this + fails. It believes that timing is an important element: any delays would + give the GOC more time to improve the + human rights situation and thus reduce Congressional criticism.

+

+ S/P Views

+

+ S/P was not involved in preliminary work + on this issue, (memorandum at Tab A) but after careful study of an + admittedly complicated issue, it is our view that:

+

1. Sales of the F–5E aircraft (on a cash basis) and + M–60 tanks (using FMS credit + financing) would meet our previous commitments. Were we also to + sell mines and an anti-tank system, these sales, whose total cost would + approximate $70 million, with only about $10 million in credits, would meet Chile’s minimal perceived urgent defensive + needs.

+

2. Resumption of additional sales may also prove + desirable, but we should first get a better grasp on the overall + West Coast security picture and on possible counter-balancing + steps. The GOC is dependent on + U.S. political support in many areas, and while the degree of dependence + should not be exaggerated, it may permit us to defer resumption of + further sales until mid-year, long enough to clarify the Chile-Peru + situation, the possibility of countervailing steps, and the Chilean + economic and human rights situation in Congress.

+

3. In any event, we need a better feel for the + Chile-Peru situation. The junta feels Chile’s national security + is in danger; Peruvian acquisition of Soviet tanks provides the + immediate rationale for Chilean pressure to purchase; local arms races + are a serious Congressional concern; ACDA recommends we push the Chileans to explore restraint + with Peru after agreeing to resume sale to Chile. But we do not have a + clear picture of what these tensions are, whether they are reducible by + local or U.S. initiative, or, + if so, whether such initiative would most effectively take place before + or after resumed U.S. sales to Chile. A National Intelligence Study of + arms acquisitions and the security situation on the West Coast of South + America has begun but is unlikely to be completed before mid-May.

+

4. We could also usefully examine whether we can + sensibly take other steps to preempt or counterbalance the certain + adverse effects on other U.S. interests in Chile, the + hemisphere and beyond (e.g. the security assistance program worldwide). + The feasibility and desirability of such counterbalancing steps has not + yet been examined at all.

+

Recommendations:

+

+ ARA, PM, + and S/P recommend, in light of these + considerations:

+

1. That you authorize immediate private notification to the Chileans that + we are willing to sell now the F–5E’s and the M–60’s previously + committed. We are also prepared to sell mines and the LAW anti-tank + system, and will continue to examine their other arms requests on a + case-by-case basis.

+

2. That, in informing the GOC of this + decision, we explain the possible consequences of public and + Congressional reaction, emphasizing that we are doing so only in an + effort to share our concerns with the GOC, not lecturing them about what they consider to be + their own needs.

+

3. That, before authorizing any additional sales, + you direct an interagency task force chaired by State/ARA and consisting + in addition of PM, S/P, INR, + L, and H, in State, and of ACDA, + DOD, AID, and CIA, to undertake + a study of the possibilities and modalities for reducing tensions + between Chile and Peru, including the role of possible arms control + initiatives; taking into account the progress of the West Coast National + Intelligence Study now underway. The task force should also explore + possible steps the U.S. might take in the human rights field to preempt + or minimize the adverse effects of resumed arms sales to Chile. The + study should be submitted by April 12, 1974, in time for your + consideration before your speech at the OAS General Assembly in Atlanta. (In view of the time + pressure, we are moving ahead informally on this study now.)

+ +
+ +
+ 163. Telegram 64524 From the Department of State to the Embassy in + Chile +

Summary: As the + Chilean Government prepared to put a number of political + prisoners on trial, the Department instructed the Embassy to + make a démarche to Chilean officials on the human rights + issue.

+

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Country Files, Box 777, + Latin America, Chile, Vol. 8, 1 January 1973–31 March 1974. + Confidential; Priority; Exdis. Drafted by Runyon, Gantz, and Isaacs; cleared by Shlaudeman, Karkashian, and Kubisch; approved by Maw. In telegram 1323 from + Santiago, March 18, the Embassy reported that the Chilean + Government had extended a “state of siege” for an additional six + months and that trials of MIR + and Socialist Party members were under way or planned for the + coming weeks. (Ibid., RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, [no + film number]) Telegram 828 from USUN, March 11, reported on the Chilean + Government’s response to criticism of its human rights record; + in a letter, Huerta + asserted that the Soviet Union was responsible for attacks on + Chile and that his Government upheld human rights. (Ibid., + D740071–0322) Telegram 190162 is Document + 140. Telegram 4674 is discussed in the source note to + Document 140.

+ + + + + Washington, March 30, 1974, 1910Z. + +

64524. Subj: Human Rights in Chile: Trials. Refs: A. USUN 828; B. Santiago 1131; C. State + 190162; D. Santiago 4674.

+

1. In view of helpful GOC statement re + fair trials (Ref A) and imminent initiation of what promises to be + series of major trials, Dept believes it timely for embassy to make new + démarche on corrosive human rights issue. Our objectives in this effort + are to assure: (1) that the GOC is + aware that the trial atmosphere and outgrowth will affect the USG’s ability in the face of U.S. public, + especially congressional opinion, to continue to develop the close and + mutually beneficial relationship that we desire to have with the GOC; and (2) that the GOC understands the longstanding U.S. + position on human rights questions, including the importance of fair and + open trials and of avoiding arbitrary detentions.

+

2. Ambassador should seek earliest opportunity (preferably before major + trials have actually begun) to discuss trials at appropriately high + level, drawing on the following:

+

(A) The form of Chile’s government and the shape of its social and + economic policies, of course, are Chilean matters.

+

(B) As the GOC knows, however, there + exists an impression in the minds of many Americans, including members + of the U.S. Congress, that the GOC is + not doing all that it could to promote human rights. This concern has + been reflected in part in Sections 32 and 35 of the most recent foreign + assistance act which deal, respectively, with the questions of political + prisoners and broader issues of human rights. The reported impending + trials of a large number of high-level Chilean officials have generated + considerable adverse publicity diverting political attention from the numerous positive + accomplishments of recent months. U.S. public and congressional interest + in events in Chile in the next few weeks and months, especially the + trials, will affect the climate in which our foreign aid and military assistance legislation + will be considered in congressional hearings to commence shortly. The + GOC may have objections to the + relating of human rights concerns to the granting of bilateral + assistance, but it is a fact which both the GOC and the USG must take + into account in our efforts to develop a mutually beneficial association + in the spirit of frankness which has characterized our relations up to + now.

+

(C) USG wishes to help the GOC in its efforts to build a strong, + economically viable nation which has, inter alia, the full confidence of + the international community. This confidence depends not only on Chile’s + economic and political relations with the outside world, but also on its + continued efforts to observe internationally accepted standards on human + rights.

+

(D) We applaud, in this context, the GOC + position (per Ref A) that detainees will be released “except for those + who are prosecuted for common crimes punishable under laws ante-dating + the acts with which they are charged and whose detention or liberty can + be decided only by the ordinary courts of justice.” We are hopeful that + this means that detainees found subject to prosecution will be dealt + with employing (1) proper charges, (2) adequate defense counsel and time + and facilities for defense, (3) open trial before a proper court of the + independent civil judiciary, and (4) proper appeals procedures. While we + recognize that Chilean legislation governing state of siege may dictate + some modification of these principles, we hope that the procedures used + will hew closely to these generally accepted standards of due + process.

+

(E) The GOC’s commendable desire to + commence trials promptly will, we hope, belie further charges that the + GOC has unreasonably delayed the + charging and trying of persons in custody. Fair and open trials, + reasonable sentencing in those cases where persons tried are found + guilty, or prompt release where acquitted or not prosecuted will not + only be consistent with Chile’s traditions, but will provide Chile’s + friends with a firmer basis for helping to create a more constructive + climate of opinion towards Chile. The GOC’s splendid collaboration with the UNHCR, ICRC and other international organizations is evidence to + us of its sensitivity to this issue and of its constructive intent.

+

3. Dept appreciates embassy’s excellent reporting on human rights + matters. We would appreciate continuing to receive all information + embassy can furnish concerning who is to be tried, when, where, and with + what guarantees or lack thereof. (See Articles 10 and 11, Universal + Declaration, Article LR, Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.)

+

4. FYI: Dept notes (A) that Pinochet statement Ref B “we have normal legal trials + and the courts function in a totally independent manner” undercuts GOC position that Article 4 of covenant’s public emergency + exception licenses deprivation of right to trial or trial other than in + accordance with normal legal process, i.e., at a minimum, guarantees of + Article 14 of covenant; (B) Article 4 of covenant does not limit rights + protected by certain other articles. Notably in present case by 6(1), + (2), (4), and (5), 7, 15, 16, and 18; and (C) basic requirement of + Article 14 covenant respecting public access is that there be “fair and + public hearing”, etc. Any closing must be for specified reasons and only + of that part of trial where such specified reasons clearly require, + subject further, however, to the court’s (not legislative, not + executive) discretion to avoid prejudice through publicity to the + interests of justice. We wish to avoid an examination of GOC’s precise commitments under its + international undertakings and degree to which GOC may or may not be complying, but embassy may draw if + useful. End FYI.

+ + + Kissinger + + +
+ +
+ 164. Telegram 1687 From the Embassy in Chile to the Embassy in Panama + and the Department of State +

Summary: In Santiago for a meeting of the IDB Board of Governors, Shultz discussed economic and + human rights issues with Pinochet.

+

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + D740074–0992. Confidential; Immediate; Exdis. Sent to Panama for + Shultz and Hennessy. In telegram 1726 from + Santiago, April 4, the Embassy concluded that Shultz seemed to convince + Pinochet of the + harmful potential of criticism Chilean human rights abuses. + (Ibid., D740076–0934) In telegram 1731 from Santiago, April 4, + Popper reported that + he had spoken to Huerta + about human rights along similar lines, drawing upon the + instructions he had received in telegram 64524 to Santiago, + published as Document 163. (Ibid., + D74077–0016)

+ + + + + Santiago, April 3, 1974, 1800Z. + +

1687. Subject: Shultz-Pinochet Meeting. Panama for Secretary + Shultz and Hennessy.

+

1. Following report of conversation evening April 2 between Secretary + Shultz and junta President + General Pinochet is uncleared by + Secretary, who departed Santiago early April 3. Assistant Secretary + Hennessy and Ambassador + Popper also present. + Pinochet accompanied only by + foreign office interpreter.

+

2. Summary. In cordial 40-minute meeting late April 2 Secretary Shultz and junta President Pinochet covered range of economic + questions and touched on human rights issue. Pinochet stressed Chile’s need for foreign investment and its + desire to encourage them, under new legal arrangements. Secretary + Shultz noted importance of + private as well as public investment for Chile, and expressed hope + remaining copper compensation negotiations would be promptly concluded. + Pinochet hoped this could be + done by end of year.

+

3. On human rights, Secretary welcomed constructive remarks in Pinochet’s IDB (Inter-American Development Bank) speech (septel) and + described concern felt by visiting US Congressional delegates over + reports of detention of persons without due legal process. President + explained reasons for delayed trials. Said trials under provisions of + Chilean law would begin in Paris. Emphasized importance for entire + hemisphere of the setback communism had suffered in Chile. End + summary.

+

4. After amenities, Secretary Shultz said that President Nixon had asked him to extend to President Pinochet his greetings and his best + wishes. President Nixon hoped + that, out of the chaotic economic situation the present government of + Chile had inherited, order, discipline and progress would emerge. + Pinochet expressed his + appreciation and referred warmly to presidential letter which Mrs. + Nixon had given to him in + Brasilia.

+

5. Continuing, President Pinochet + expressed particular appreciation for the assistance US had rendered + Chile at Paris Club negotiations, and for various other types of + “indirect support” (nature not specified) which US government had + rendered to Chile. Pinochet said + his government considered the IDB + meeting extremely important, since it was a developing nation which need + assistance. He said Chile now had a government which respected human + rights, but which was also authoritarian. After the events of September + 1973, there was no other way in which leftist infiltration could be + prevented, but the authority of his government would always be exercised + within the framework of respect for the individual as a human being.

+

6. The President said his government was now studying ways in which to + encourage and receive foreign investment. Chile urgently needed foreign + resources to bring it to the point of economic take-off. The regime had + inherited many industries which had been put under state control. Most + of them were in bad shape and needed “an injection” to put them into + condition for productive and profitable work.

+

7. Secretary Shultz said he + recognized that the receipt of both private and public capital, the + latter largely from the IDB, was of + strategic importance to Chile. He considered the steps Chile had taken + with respect to appropriate compensation for past expropriations to be + very significant as far as the US was concerned. Noting that an + agreement had been worked out with the Cerro Corporation, he hoped + negotiations would proceed promptly for a settlement of the Anaconda and + Kennecott cases, as this would be an essential consideration in the + resumption of the flow of US private capital to Chile.

+ +

8. President Pinochet said this + was exactly right. His government had said in the first days of its + incumbency that it intended to resolve the copper problem. “Ours is not + a thieving government,” he said. The previous government had used what + it called expropriation as a means of stealing the clothes from people’s + backs. The government was now trying to normalize its relations in many + ways; it was dealing with the companies concerned; he hoped that by the + end of the year all of the outstanding problems in this regard would be + solved.

+

9. As regards foreign investment, the president stated, Chile was + attempting to work out a single legal statute or code (Cuerpo) which + would include regulations with respect to private investment, social + organization problems, and taxation. This was in part responsible for + the delay in proceeding with settlements. The junta had been in power + only a little more than six months; it was worth remembering that before + President Geisel even took over + in Brazil, he had had six months of preparation and study. The junta was + adapting itself to emerging problems as it went along. It was completing + a study of the political, economic and social situation of the country + and attempting to chart its course systematically, so that it would not + uselessly dissipate its energies. One should remember that the junta had + had no experience in the art of government.

+

10. Secretary Shultz indicated + that the president was being unduly modest. He was glad the president + understood that an essential aspect of Chilean economic recovery was the + establishment of conditions under which private capital would agree to + come in.

+

11. In this regard, the secretary went on, the entire world economy was + in a sense in turmoil, and this created many difficulties for all + government. It was often hard to determine just what governments of + underdeveloped countries wanted. Citing a purely domestic example, + Secretary Shultz noted that in + the United States last summer, people wanted lower prices, especially + for food, and there had been great emphasis on the price of chickens. + Somehow, over the objections of professional economists, price ceilings + had been put on broilers. What happened was that farmers who could not + make a profit producing them started to drown their little chicks. This + was a predictable result, and the kind of thing that was happening all + over the world today. The Secretary appreciated the problems confronting + developing countries. But it had to be remembered that economic forces + were relentless, and that economic problems had to be worked out with + due regard for them, and not by working against them. This had been the + American experience.

+

12. President Pinochet said that + he understood the point. On his side he wanted to stress that the + present Chilean government must be successful. If Chile went down, the + repercussions would be immediate, not only in Chile but also in all of + Latin America, Central America and Mexico, and even further north. The communists + understood what the Chilean experience meant to them, and they realized + that this experience had had a destructive effect on their doctrine. + Thus they were seeking by every means to bring down the junta. They had + been able to provoke tension between Chile and Peru. They were trying to + enlarge their foothold in Peru and extend it from that point to the rest + of America. The Chileans were the ones who were stopping communism + today. He believed they would be successful.

+

13. Secretary Shultz said that he + knew this to be the case, and he hoped they would be successful. He + understood how difficult this struggle was. One problem involved was the + matter of the preservation of human rights, which President Pinochet had mentioned in the address + to the IDB April 1.

+

14. Secretary Shultz noted that + eight congressmen had come to Santiago with him as members of the + delegation to the bank meeting. They had done their best to ask as many + questions as possible, to explore every interesting line of inquiry, and + even to ask questions at random of people in the street.

+

15. Their findings might interest the President. The Secretary had met + with them at noon April 2 and had found that they came away with a + basically favorable impression of what they had seen in Chile. They + found an open community, not one with the feeling of being overwhelmed + or oppressed in any strenuous way. On the other hand they had expressed + concern regarding the question whether justice was being applied on an + even handed basis. They had an interest in being assured that persons + were held and tried in a proper judicial and legal way. Accordingly, + they had welcomed the comments on human rights in President Pinochet’s speech to the bank and + assumed that over time his announced respect for human rights would be + fully implemented in the country.

+

16. Exactly, replied the President. Perhaps Chile had been somewhat slow + in pronouncing judgement. If so this was for two reasons. First, the + government kept finding more and more incriminatory material. Only the + previous day the newspapers had published a letter indicating that + Orlando Letelier (when + Chilean Ambassador to the US) had been involved in selling machine guns + clandestinely to President Allende. Second, if trials had started early on, they + would inevitably have been biased because of the highly emotional mood + of the country with respect to members of the previous government.

+

17. Therefore, in this month of April, Chile would begin trials in + accordance with its laws, and those accused would have all the rights + accorded by the legal code of the country. Unfortunately, the law did + not cover in precise terms all of the presumed offenses, such as + preparations which had been under way for massive killings, or the kind + of stealing and extortion in + which some of the accused were involved. Nevertheless, the accused would + be judged under the law. Even if a man who in equity would deserve a + life sentence should receive only a year’s imprisonment, this would + still be a useful outcome for the future. Chile was acting serenely and + calmly.

+

18. The President reiterated that he respected human rights. Logically, + he said, at the beginning, because of the hatreds on both sides some + things had escaped control. This had long since ceased. As the Secretary + could see, the allegations made by Socialist Party leader Carlos + Altamirano of constant political killings in Chile, with bodies floating + in the Mapocho River (which cuts through Santiago) and lying in the + streets, were utterly false. If the situation depicted by opposition + Chilean leaders abroad still existed, there would be no Chilean children + on the streets or women driving cars on the streets.

+

19. Secretary Shultz remarked + that he had heard that the women of Chile had led the opposition to + Allende, and that they were + a major force to contend with when aroused. It was said that in the US + men had the last word, which he personally found quite acceptable.

+

20. The President, matching the Secretary’s jocularity, said that there + was a proverb among Chileans, that “women always have the superior + rank.” In his speeches he constantly referred to the role of the women + in recent political developments. Chilean mothers realized that unless + they acted, their children would lose their liberty. They were educating + a new generation of Chileans. This was why he would strive to ensure + that communism would not come to Chile.

+

21. Ambassador’s comments in septel.

+
+ +
+ 165. Telegram 2046 From the Embassy in Chile to the Department of + State +

Summary: During a + meeting with Pinochet, General William B. Rosson of the U.S. Southern Command + noted that concerns about the junta’s human rights record + affected the ability of the U.S. Government to provide it with + military assistance.

+

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + D740090–1029. Secret; Exdis. On April 25, the Department + informed the Embassy that it had approved the sale to Chile of + 18 F–5E aircraft, 15 M–60 tanks, anti-personnel and anti-tank + mines, and the light anti-tank weapon (LAW) system; and that it + would continue to examine their other arms requests on a + case-by-case basis. (Telegram 84285 to Santiago, April 25; + ibid., D740098–0052) In telegram 86774 to Santiago, April 27, + the Department reported that Kubisch had told Ambassador Heitmann that the + arms sales had been authorized in order to deter aggression in + the region. (Ibid., D740101–0067)

+ + + + + Santiago, April 18, 1974, 1638Z. + +

2046. Subject: General Rosson’s + Visit and Arms from US.

+

1. Summary: Ambassador was present at meeting late April 16 between + General Pinochet, head of GOC junta, + and General William B. Rosson, + USCINCSO. Pinochet pressed hard for decision on + US arms for Chile, and initiated discussion which gave General and + Ambassador opportunity to explain problem raised by human rights issue. + End summary

+

2. After amenities, General Pinochet turned immediately to arms question. Said that + Chile had performed great service in displacing Allende’s Marxist government. It was + unique in the world in that Chile had accomplished this action with no + outside assistance. Chile has ousted the communists and would continue + to oppose them. But as regards armaments “US had not taken Chile’s + outstretched hand.” In particular the US had not responded with regard + to M–60 tanks which Pinochet + himself had requested of General Underwood in 1972 and which are needed + now to counter a possible attack from Peru—a country which was being + aided in its preparations by the Soviet Union in order to reimpose + Marxism in South America.

+

3. General Rosson explained that + Chilean request for arms purchases was still under study in Washington + and unfortunately he did not have any further information not already in + the hands of GOC. General Rosson then went on to explain that + the US Embassy, US military group and USSouthCom had supported Chilean + requests for assistance.

+

4. At this point General Rosson + pointed out that one of the problems affecting a decision from + Washington on the Chilean arms request is the issue of human rights. + General Pinochet replied that + opposition to arms shipment in Washington based on human rights + considerations is unjust. Pinochet said that Chile was and would continue to be a + democratic country but it + resented being criticized unjustly. For example, it was frequently said + that individuals had “disappeared” when the fact was that these people + frequently had aliases and were detained by the government under names + different from those known to inquirers, thus making identification + extremely difficult. He further commented that Chile could hardly be + said to have had a revolution since it had cast out Marxism with the + death of 1500 persons; an act which could be more accurately described + as a “movement” rather than a revolution. Subsequently, the Chilean + government had had to take steps to preserve internal security. The + communists who were protesting about this all over the world had no + regard whatever for human rights or for human beings as individuals.

+

5. Ambassador agreed that, in a sense, a double standard does exist, with + Chile being held to a much higher level of performance than communist + states. This was in part because the world had come to think of Chile as + an outstanding democratic nation. Whatever the inequities, the + Ambassador and General Rosson + explained, the fact was that there was concern by many in the US with + regard to the human rights issue.

+

6. Comment: Discussion was probably most direct high-level Chilean + complaint so far re USG delay in + responding to Chilean arms requests (State 75132). We expect we will + have more of same, and will be communicating our views as to + implications to Department in septels.

+

7. Pinochet comments also give + insight into one of our major difficulties in dealing with human rights + issue here. GOC military leaders are + imbued with self-righteousness at their success in having freed Chile of + Marxist regime. They attach overriding importance to fact that their + subsequent efforts to prevent subversion are proceeding in strict + accordance with Chilean law. And they are indignant at international + Marxist campaign against them, involving patent untruths and + distortions. As result, they are largely insensitive to grounds for + non-ideologically-motivated foreign concern at state of observance of + human rights in Chile.

+

8. They are also plainly unable to realize that an important part of + negative international reaction to Chilean events derives from foreign + perception of Chile quite different from their own. As an example, when + Pinochet deprecates the loss + of 1500 lives, he is thinking of those saved by timely military action + in contrast to Allende’s + repeated predictions of a civil war costing a million lives. It is very + doubtful that he realizes his remarks would not go down well if + disseminated publicly, because foreign public is so largely ignorant of + civil war atmosphere which is still pervasive in Chile.

+ + + Popper + + +
+ +
+ 166. Telegram 99532 From the Department of State to the Embassy in + Chile +

Summary: + Commenting on allegations that Chilean political prisoners had + been tortured, the Department discussed the political costs that + Chile would incur if it did not adhere to its professed + prohibition of torture of detainees, and suggested ways the + junta could address accusations of such abuses.

+

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + D740117–0986. Confidential. Drafted by Gantz; cleared by Runyon, Karkashian, and Isaacs; approved by Shlaudeman. When Chilean + defense lawyers raised the issue of torture being used to obtain + confessions, the prosecutor denied the allegation and stated + that the proper manner for defense lawyers to proceed was to + file direct personal charges against the agent who had + supposedly committed the abuse. (Telegram 2375 from Santiago, + May 3; ibid., D740117–0931)

+ + + + + Washington, May 14, 1974, 0424Z. + +

99532. Subj: Human Rights—Allegations of Torture. Refs: A. Geneva 2215; + B. Santiago 2375; C. Santiago 2483.

+

1. Former Congressman Charles Porter met with several Department + officials Monday, May 6, to discuss his recent visit to Santiago as a + member of the fair trial committee for Chilean political prisoners + (memcon pouched). While Porter + acknowledged that he and others had been pleasantly surprised at the + elements of due process in the FACH + trials, he alleged that discussions with defense lawyers indicated that + torture of prisoners, primarily by electric shock methods, to obtain + confessions continues to be the standard operating procedure. Unqte + Porter’s account tends to + coincide with other reports we have received (e.g., para 3, ref A), + although we have no way of knowing if the reported abuses continue or if + they are as widespread as Porter + maintains. We are concerned that junta’s efforts to eliminate use of + torture, which we believe sincere, have not been as successful as they + and we would have hoped.

+

2. GOC is, of course, highly sensitive + on torture issue (ref B) but ambassador may find it appropriate and + useful to raise subject privately, perhaps in context of our + gratification over recent decision to commute death sentences. Following + points can be drawn upon in discussing the torture issue.1

+

3. USG believes GOC shares our view that torture of detainees is not only + repugnant to UN charter and Geneva + Conventions for the protection of war victims, but that its use is + political liability for GOC. Whatever + its validity, testimony of Porter before joint meeting of Fraser and Fascell subcommittees of U.S. congress + underlines both importance with which U.S. public views this issue and + the political costs to Chile of failing to curtail effectively such + practices, especially as it affects USG’s ability to be helpful.

+ +

4. We are aware that junta has already given instructions prohibiting use + of torture; information provided by diverse sources, even if unclear on + frequency of such abuses, indicates that problem may still exist. We + would hope, therefore, that junta could find means of assuring that its + orders to cease this activity are being implemented.

+

5. Without presuming to advise GOC about + conduct of its internal affairs, it occurs to us that abuses of this + nature at the operational level might be easier to control and + international opinion might be reassured if greater efforts were made to + assure that: (A) family of detainees and clergy are granted access + within reasonable period of time after arrest, usually not more than 24 + hours; (B) ICRC, and in principle, + other humanitarian bodies, are granted free access; and (C) detention is + resolved promptly by release or trial. Publication of comprehensive + lists of current detainees might also be helpful.

+

6. We have noted reports that various trials are taking place in parts of + the country outside Santiago. USG + welcomes this move insofar as it means early reduction of number of + people detained without charge. However, they could dilute or discredit + advances made by opening FACH trials + unless, like those taking place in capital, trials will be public, + adequate arrangements are made for defense counsel and presentation of a + defense.

+ + + Rush + + +
+ +
+ 167. Transcript of the Acting Secretary of State’s Principals’ and + Regionals’ Staff Meeting +

Summary: Sisco, + Kubisch, and + Hartman discussed + Chile-Mexico relations, forthcoming congressional hearings on + Chile, and the attitude of European nations toward the Chilean + Government.

+

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Transcripts of Kissinger Staff Meetings, + Entry 5177, Lot 78D443, Box 3, Acting Secretary’s Principals’ + and Regionals’ Staff Meetings. Kissinger chaired the meeting, which was + attended by all the principal officers of the Department or + their designated alternates. Secret. A draft of Shlaudeman’s June 12 testimony + before Fraser and + Fascell’s + subcommittees is ibid., ARA + Files, Miscellaneous Chile Subject Files, 1971–1976: Lot 80D43, + Shlaudeman Testimony + Before Fraser-Fascell + Subcommittee.

+ + + + + Washington, June 10, 1974, 3:–3:50 + p.m. + +

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to Chile.]

+

Mr. Sisco: All right. Chile.

+ +

Mr. Kubisch: In a word, on Chile, + there are really two things of interest in the last week or so. The + first was that Mexico and Chile have been really at sword’s points since + Allende’s overthrow. + President Echeverria considered Allende to be a good friend of his. And when Allende was killed or committed + suicide on September 11, Mrs. Allende was invited to come to Mexico where she stayed + with President Echeverria. And the Mexican Government declared a formal + three-day national mourning period. And they have had a lot of problems + between the two governments. There were 71 Chileans and some other + nationals in the Mexican Embassy in Santiago, as asylees, that the + Chilean Government would not give safe conduct to, to leave the country. + Rabasa went down a week ago and got them all out. The Mexican Government + sent a plane down and got them out.

+

The other thing of immediate interest to us is that on Wednesday + afternoon of this week, Congressman Don + Fraser’s Subcommittee on International Organizations and + Human Rights, and Dante + Fascell’s Subcommittee on Inter-American Affairs—the two + subcommittees jointly are going to have a meeting on Chile. This is the + first one for some time. It was going to be held just by Fraser, and Fascell, to be helpful, got in on it, + getting some Congressmen interested in the political and international + relations aspect of the problem to question the witnesses, too. And they + are going to question us very hard about our policy towards Chile, about + human rights in Chile and the abuse thereof, the repressive nature of + the regime, why we are giving economic and proposing to give military + assistance to a regime that denies people their rights, etc. We have + worked out answers to all the questions pretty well. We are taking the + position—I saw it reflected in today’s out-date of Newsweek Magazine, + that Newsweek said that as a result of strong but + private pressures by the U.S. Government and other governments, the + Chilean Government is beginning to moderate its policies and so on. We + are taking the position that it isn’t very helpful to talk about these + things publicly.

+

Mr. Sisco: I approved that paper, + which talks in terms of rescheduling. I just think we ought to go ahead + on that.

+

Mr. Kubisch: As far as the + Congressional consultations are concerned, we are moving ahead with + those.

+

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to Chile.]

+

Mr. Hartman: If you have any + positive facts that we can get out to the European governments on Chile, + we ought to do it, because they are all up in arms on it. The British, + the Dutch, the Belgians.

+

Mr. Kubisch: All the socialist + governments in Western Europe, or those with very big socialist or + communist parties in Western Europe have really been very down on + Chile.

+

Mr. Sisco: Is this becoming + another Greece, Art?

+

Mr. Hartman: Yes, very much. If + we have anything positive to say, we ought to try to say it.

+

Mr. Sisco: Is there anything we + can say on that?

+

Mr. Kubisch: To the + Europeans?

+

Mr. Sisco: We don’t have to go + out beating the bushes, but I think we ought to be able to make some + facts available.

+

Mr. Kubisch: There are some + things we can do. Whether it is wise for the United States to associate + itself very closely as a defender of the Chilean regime vis-à-vis + European governments is something I think that ought to be considered + very carefully.

+

Mr. Sisco: How many European + countries does Chile have relations with?

+

Mr. Kubisch: I think the present + government has relations with about half of the West European + governments.

+

Mr. Sisco: What about an informal + suggestion, just very indirect, saying there is work to be done here and + they ought to start doing it?

+

Mr. Kubisch: To the Chileans?

+

Mr. Sisco: Yes. Is that + completely out of the question?

+

Mr. Kubisch: No. We talk to them + about it all the time, in Washington and in Santiago. They just are so + insensitive, it is almost impossible to believe.

+

Mr. Sisco: That is so + characteristic of these authoritarian governments.

+

Mr. Kubisch: They say in effect, + “Look, we have done what was right, we are honest people, we tell the + truth. We are doing what is good for these people of Chile. We got rid of all these bandits and + these criminals, and these dirty, no-good commies. And we are pure. And + why in the hell can’t you all understand that?” And we say it is not + that simple.

+

Mr. Sisco: Okay.

+

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to Chile.]

+
+ +
+ 168. Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the 40 Committee + (Ratliff) to the President’s + Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) +

Summary: Ratliff + recommended that Kissinger approve a 40 Committee proposal for + the provision of covert aid to + the Christian Democratic Party for commitments made before the + coup.

+

Source: National Security Council Files, Nixon Administration + Intelligence Files, Chile, 1973–. Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only. + Outside the System. Sent for action. Low and Kennedy concurred. Attached but not published + was the January 7 memorandum to the 40 Committee containing the + request. Popper + discussed the January proposal in Document + 160. On June 24, Scowcroft approved the recommendation for + Kissinger. In a June + 25 memorandum for the record, Ratliff noted that the 40 Committee + telephonically approved the recommendation on June 24. (Ibid., + Minutes of 40 Committee) Colby informed Kissinger on September 5 that of the $1 million + authorized in August 1973, only $13,000 was spent, all before + the coup; Colby added + that “the sum of about $50,000–60,000” authorized in 1974 had + been provided to cover obligations “undertaken before the coup + and was clearly given with the statement that it was not for + current or projected activities. Thus, the statement can be made + that we have given no political assistance since the coup and + that any assistance given before the coup was in the hope that a + change in the Allende + government would occur as a result of the election of 1976.” + (Ibid.)

+ + + + + Washington, June 11, + 1974. + + + SUBJECT + Termination of the Chile Account + +

Last August the 40 Committee approved a $1 million covert action program + for Chile, but it never got started because less than a month later a + coup changed the picture completely. This January, CIA submitted a request for [dollar amount not declassified] to meet + outstanding obligations to the Christian Democratic Party (PDC) and provide the party operating funds + for three months while the Agency sorted things out and determined if + additional aid were warranted (TAB + A).

+

Defense and JCS 40 Committee principals + promptly approved the proposal, but State wrestled with it and after + lengthy deliberation, including + consultation with our Ambassador, State voted to approve compensation + for commitments made before the coup up to $50,000. CIA participated in State’s deliberations + and says this is an acceptable resolution. These funds are available in + CIA’s budget for the current fiscal + year which ends 30 June.

+ +

Recommendation:

+

That you approve the State/CIA compromise authorizing payment to the + PDC of not more than $50,000 for + commitments made before the coup in Chile.

+
+ +
+ 169. Telegram 4226 From the Embassy in Chile to the Department of + State +

Summary: + Popper reported that + he had explained to Defense Minister Bonilla the factors that made + it difficult for the U.S. Government to provide military + equipment to Chile.

+

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + D740192–0983. Confidential. Repeated to Lima. Telegram 150955 to + multiple posts, July 12, stated that the Department was + “reviewing entire area of Human Rights and authoritarianism in + light of seriousness with which problems are viewed by + Congress.” (Ibid., D740188–0199) In telegram 4247 from Santiago, + July 18, Popper reported + on other aspects of his conversation with Bonilla. (Ibid., + D740194–0123) In a July 18 telephone conversation with Kubisch, Kissinger referred to + Popper’s meeting + with Bonilla and asked + if “our Amb[assador] to Chile could be taught that he is not to + reform the Chilean Government.” Kissinger expressed his preference for the new + Chilean Government over that led by Allende, and he told Kubisch, “Let’s see what we + can do on military equipment for them.” Kubisch expressed concern that + making military equipment available to Chile could prompt + Congress to pass legislation restricting the Department’s + ability to provide foreign military assistance. Kubisch suggested informing + the Chileans privately that military aid would be forthcoming. (Department of State, + FOIA Electronic Reading + Room, Kissinger + Transcripts)

+ + + + + Santiago, July 17, 1974, 2152Z. + +

4226. Subject: New Defense Minister Complains Re US Arms Deliveries. Ref: + State 150955.

+

1. Summary: Defense Minister Bonilla expresses hope for expanded military assistance + from USG. Notes anomaly inherent in + USG having reacted more + responsively to Chilean arms requests when Allende in office than since, and deplores continuing + arms imbalance vis-à-vis Peru. Especially concerned re TOW and M–60 tank deliveries. Ambassador + explains problems presented for US, referring inter alia to Section 32 + of Foreign Assistance Act. End summary.

+ +

2. Accompanied by Arma, I paid courtesy call on General Oscar Bonilla Bradavonic, who last + week moved over to defense from post of interior minister in general + cabinet reshuffle.

+

3. After amenities, Bonilla + launched into a mild philippic with regard to US military aid to Chile. Burden of his complaint was + that Peru had acquired some 200 Soviet tanks and other modern matériel, + while Chile was finding it most difficult to obtain even fifteen M-60 + tanks, and had been told TOW anti-tank + device could not be made available because it was a sophisticated + weapon. Chileans were deeply concerned, he said, over great imbalance + between Peruvian and Chilean arms inventories.

+

4. Bonilla pointed out that + under Marxist regime of ex-President Allende Soviets had been prepared to send to Chile the + same type of tanks Peru finally obtained, on extremely advantageous + terms. At that time, Chilean armed forces had evaded and delayed + Allende’s efforts to move + forward with a Soviet arms purchase. Today, the very weapons US had + agreed to supply Chileans during the Allende period were apparently being withheld or + deliveries postponed. Could it possibly be said that USG was more favorable to a Marxist than + an anti-Marxist regime? And in these same ideological terms, was it fair + to consider Chilean and Peruvian requests for US arms on a more or less + even basis?

+

5. I took exception to Bonilla’s + approach as being vastly oversimplified. Said Bonilla must remember two essential + elements of present situation. First, it was becoming increasingly + difficult to obtain military assistance funds from US Congress and + people, and what there was had to be spread among a large number of + countries. Moreover, certain weapons such as M–60 tanks were in short + supply in our own forces (for example, because of diversions during the + Arab-Israeli war) and surely Chileans could not expect us to give lower + priority to rebuilding our own inventories than to needs of other + countries, friendly though they are.

+

6. Second point, I continued, was that while people of US of course + prefer anti-Marxist to Marxist regimes, rightly or wrongly they look at + problem in much broader terms. They prefer democratic governments and + institutions to dictatorships or other authoritarian regimes, and this + inevitably influences members of congress and organs of public opinion. + Human rights problems are very real factor in Chile, and there is no + doubt they increase our difficulties in meeting Chilean needs.

+

7. I took occasion at this point to carry out instruction re FAA Section 32 (political prisoners) + contained in State 150955. Read out text of Section 32, explained that + it was not a mandatory requirement, but enlarged upon its relevance to + assistance programs for a large number of aid recipients.

+

8. Bonilla took response + amicably. Asked if it would not be possible for Chileans to manufacture + two in their own plants. (TOW seemed + to be his principal + immediate preoccupation.) Arma + commented that it was a complex weapon, and even if this were + technically possible there would be questions re patents and royalty + rights of US manufacturers.

+

9. Comment: I have heard this rather truculent note regarding US military + assistance from Chilean officials before, even from General Pinochet. It is a natural reaction of + blunt military men who lack the political sensitivity and bureaucratic + experience to understand the problem from our angle. Presentation is + always good-natured. I think it is useful to reply with equal + frankness.

+

10. Army Secretary Callaway will + no doubt be hit with same story during his official meetings next week. + We will give him updated briefing on his arrival in Santiago.

+

11. Other aspects of conversation reported septel.

+ + + Popper + + +
+ +
+ 170. Telegram 4315 From the Embassy in Chile to the Department of + State +

Summary: + Secretary of the Army Callaway urged Pinochet and Bonilla to allow interested parties to + investigate the human rights situation in Chile, noting that + openness could counter the perception that the regime was overly + repressive.

+

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + D740199–0012. Confidential; Immediate. Repeated immediate to + DOD, the Office of the + Secretary of Army, and COMUSCINCSO for General Rosson. In telegram 4294 from + Santiago, July 20, the Embassy sent the Department a summary of + the human rights situation in Chile, including information on + the rights and treatment of detainees. The Embassy reported that + although there was cause for concern over human rights problems + in Chile, an examination of the human rights situation led “to + qualified rather than utterly sweeping conclusions.” (Ibid., + D740196–1019)

+ + + + + Santiago, July 23, 1974, 1428Z. + +

4315. Subject: Secretary Callaway’s Conversations in Santiago July 22

+

1. Summary: Opening, top-level discussions with Chilean President and + Defense Minister feature rationale for junta’s conduct, and frank + exchange on human rights problems confronted by Chile at home and + abroad. End summary.

+

2. Secretary Callaway met with + Defense Minister Bonilla a.m. + July 22, and had meeting and private lunch with President Pinochet, + before beginning technical + meetings with top Chilean army personnel afternoon July 22. Latter + reported separately. Ambassador present at meetings and lunch.

+

3. At opening session General Bonilla reviewed circumstances which had resulted in + September 11, 1973 coup, in terms familiar to Department. Bonilla expounded at length on + excesses of Allende regime. + Stressed that regime’s resort to illegal procedures to maintain its + policies and position; depicted graphically economic hardships and chaos + to which country reduced; described subversive activities of extreme + left participants in Unidad popular coalition, including illegal arms + imports and manufacture and efforts to subvert armed forces. Explained + that Chilean military, with long tradition of abstention from all + political activity, at first loyally attempted to serve government. When + however it became apparent that no other force could prevent institution + of an extreme leftist dictatorship, which was in preparation, armed + forces yielded to near-universal public clamor for action and undertook + September 1973 coup.

+

4. Now, Bonilla continued, + government was attempting to combat Marxist conspiracy, internal and + external, designed to force country back into socialist path. Massive + leftist propaganda worldwide had given completely misleading image of + life in Chile, and Chileans themselves did not have resources adequately + to combat this propaganda campaign. Secretary Callaway should while he was here get + into streets and ask population how they felt about events in Chile, + especially in low income areas. He would see for himself how normal life + was in Chile and how widespread support for government is.

+

5. Under questioning by Secretary and Ambassador, Bonilla gave us some information and + figures which may be of interest. He stated that number of those killed + during September–October 1973 fighting was about 1,600 (this is not + inconsistent with our estimate that 2,000 to 2,500 people have been + killed in fighting or executed since September 11); there have been no + executions to our knowledge since December 1973. Further, Bonilla said, total number of persons + detained for internal security offenses or suspicion since September 11 + was about 17,000. Of these over 11,000 had been released; total now in + custody was between 5,000 and 5,500. Many of those detained were held + for only a short period; for example, it had been necessary in September + 1973 to detain all persons in buildings from which snipers were firing + on forces around Moneda. Within a few days, all but a few of these had + been released.

+

6. Bonilla repeated (see + Santiago 4247) that there were two classes of internal security + detainees. First were there because of specific charges under Chilean + law, including offenses under Chilean State of War and State of Siege. + Second group were being held in preventive detention, also under + authority given to government under Chilean State of Siege regulations authorized under + constitution years ago, permitting government to move individuals from + one site in country to another. (Bonilla reminded Secretary that Allende had sought similar authority + from Chilean congress, but that congress had refused to grant it.) This + group was decreasing in size as investigation of each case continued; + members of it were continually being released with the sole stipulation + that they must take no action which would jeopardize state security.

+

7. Discussion covered much the same ground during private lunch for + Secretary hosted by General Pinochet. Most noteworthy was Pinochet assertion that all Chilean + military and intelligence services had issued orders that there must be + no torture or other excesses. Pinochet confirmed that “ten or eleven” individuals from + a number of these services had been arrested for excesses against + prisoners—which, we gather, includes robbery of individuals being + searched, etc., as well as torture. Like Pinochet, top army leaders + Generals Bonilla, Bravo, and + Brady insisted that effective measures had been taken to halt + torture.

+

8. During this discussion Secretary Callaway and Ambassador noted that certain members of US + Congress and certain organs of public opinion in US continued to be + disturbed by reports of human rights violations in Chile. Secretary + pointed out that while these views might ignore internal security + requirements which led to current Chilean practices, he could say as + former member of Congress that such sentiment did exist. Comparing his + own experience in effort to gain support for volunteer army, Secretary + advised his hosts to encourage as much personal investigation as + possible on part of responsible Americans interested—making available to + them opportunity to see for themselves what was going on in Chile. This + would not by any means overcome all criticism, but most officials and + people of the US approached such problems honestly and with open mind, + and eventually—just as in case of media views re volunteer army—some of + the observers would report situation objectively. Chileans might not + receive completely fair treatment, but this was best course they could + take to protect their interests.

+

9. Pinochet and others present + were impressed with Secretary’s points. Believe luncheon led to better + understanding of USG concerns by + president and top army generals, and that it will be helpful here.

+

10. This message cleared by Secretary Callaway.

+ + + Popper + + +
+ +
+ 171. Action Memorandum From the Acting Assistant Secretary for + Inter-American Affairs (Bowdler) + and the Acting Legal Advisor (Feldman) to the Undersecretary of State for Political + Affairs (Sisco) +

Summary: Bowdler and Feldman noted that in recent + weeks the Chilean Government had failed to make sufficient + progress in eliminating civil rights violations and recommended + that the Embassy be instructed to deliver a low-key démarche on + the subject.

+

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + P850148–2670. Confidential. Drafted by Gantz on August 29; cleared by + Runyon and Shlaudeman. Tab A, a draft + telegram, was sent as telegram 196836 to Santiago, September 7. + (Ibid., D740249–0676) The attachments at Tab B have not been + found. On September 9, Popper reported that even though the U.S. + Government might find the IAHRC’s recommendations “eminently reasonable,” the + Chilean Government did not, largely because the regime + considered itself “to be engaged in a deadly game, against + conspirators both at home and abroad, in which their lives are + at stake.” Popper + concluded that the U.S. Government should encourage the junta to + restore normal legal and procedural practices as soon as + possible. (Telegram 5492 from Santiago, September 9; ibid., + D740250–1095) In telegram 5689 from Santiago, September 18, + Popper reported that + he had told Carvajal and Merino that Chile had to improve its human + rights record if it wished to secure assistance from the U.S. + Government. (Ibid., D740262–0074)

+ + + + + Washington, September + 3, 1974. + +

+ Human Rights Démarche in Chile +

+

In recent weeks we have become increasingly concerned that the failure of + the Government of Chile to make sufficient progress in eliminating + continuing civil rights violations would jeopardize our ability to + continue to provide appropriate economic and military assistance, and + credit military sales to the Government of Chile. Several efforts have + been made in both Houses of Congress either to cut drastically or to + eliminate entirely assistance to Chile; we believe these efforts are + likely to be successful either immediately or in the not-too-distant + future unless there is some significant movement by the GOC toward complying with its + international obligations with respect to human rights matters.

+

Since the Inter-American Human Rights Commission has recently made + suggestions to the Government of Chile to improve its legal procedures, + there is a new, multilateral foundation for a further approach by US. + ARA and L, therefore, believe that + time is now ripe for a new démarche on this subject following Ambassador + Blake’s recent consultative visit. A telegram authorizing an appropriate + low-key approach is attached for your approval.

+

Recommendation:

+

That you approve the attached cable.

+ +

Attachments:

+

A. Cable to Santiago, with referenced cables and press release.

+

B. Additional cables for background.

+
+ +
+ 172. Memorandum of Conversation +

Summary: Ford, Kissinger, and Rockefeller discussed how to + mitigate the problem of leaked information on U.S. covert action + in Chile.

+

Source: Ford Library, + National Security Adviser, Memoranda of Conversations, Box 5, + September 6, 1974, Ford, + Kissinger, + Rockefeller. Secret; Sensitive. According to the President’s + Daily Diary, the meeting took place in the Oval Office and + lasted from 9:26 to 10:30 a.m. (Ford Library, President’s Daily Diary). A + September 8 article in the New York Times + entitled, “CIA Chief Tells + House of $8 Million Campaign Against Allende in 70–73,” referred to + a letter from Harrington + to Morgan which + contained confidential information from a closed session of the + House Armed Services Subcommittee on Intelligence. During a + September 9 meeting with the President, Kissinger informed Ford that the leak had come + from Congress and that it had not had significant repercussions. + (Ford Library, + National Security Adviser, Memoranda of Conversations, Box 5, + September 6, 1974, Ford, + Kissinger, + Rockefeller)

+ + + + + Washington, September + 6, 1974. + + + PARTICIPANTS + President Ford + + Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, + Secretary of State and Assistant to the President for National + Security Affairs + Nelson Rockefeller, Vice President-Designate + Lt. Gen. + Brent Scowcroft, Deputy + Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs + + + SUBJECTS + Visits; 40 Committee; NSC Meeting + on Israeli Requests; Preparation for Rabin Visit + +

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to Chile.]

+

+ Kissinger: The New York Times has a copy of something on 40 Committee + operations in Chile. We will brief the 40 Committee next week. What + happened is this: Johnson put money in the ’64 elections. We put + $500,000 into the ’70 elections and spread it out. We then put more in + to influence the Congressional elections and that failed too. After the + elections we put money into opposition parties and newspapers. It was + designed to keep the democratic process going. This was not a regular + covert activity. There was no attempt at a coup. Though there could have + been in ’70 if we hadn’t failed.

+ +

There are two problems: The substance is embarrassing but we can ride it + out. The other is the leaks. The 40 Committee has followed the same + procedures since President Eisenhower.

+

Rockefeller: I was on it.

+

+ Kissinger: All these activities + are approved by the Deputies in regular but secret process. If these + things leak, we haven’t a government.

+

President: Who did it?

+

+ Kissinger: I want to think about + that. The Committees are briefed on these activities. The problem is + this is the most secret activity we have. If there are minutes, we + should be able to track it. We might have terHorst make a statement, not + on the facts but on the principle.

+

President: Let me know Monday. If the committees were informed it + shouldn’t be a problem.

+

+ Kissinger: They were regularly + informed.

+

President: Let’s ride it out and we’ll see.

+

+ Kissinger: We have to have these + things.

+

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to Chile.]

+
+ +
+ 173. Telegram 5559 From the Embassy in Chile to the Department of + State +

Summary: The + Embassy reported that although the junta was firmly in power a + year after the overthrow of Allende, its weaknesses included the limited + capacity of a military-dominated government, the political + liabilities created by repressive human rights practices, and + the vulnerability of an economy dependent on a single commodity. + Despite these challenges, the Embassy concluded that public + support for the Chilean Government appeared to remain at a high + level.

+

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + D740253–0688. Confidential; Priority. Repeated to Buenos Aires, + Lima, La Paz, Brasília, Asunción, Quito, USUN, and the Mission in + Geneva.

+ + + + + Santiago, September 11, 1974, 2015Z. + +

5559. Subject: One Year of the Chilean Junta.

+

1. Summary: As it reaches its first anniversary, the military junta which + overthrew the leftist government of Salvador Allende on September 11, 1973 is + firmly ensconced in power. Its greatest source of strength is that it + has, and is seen to have, supplanted political and social strife, + hyper-inflation and an economy near chaos by internal order and a fairly + effective if harsh austerity program which could pave the way for future economic growth. Its + weaknesses include the rigidity and limited capacity of a government + dominated in almost all respects by the military; the actual and still + more the potential liabilities created by repressive human rights + practices, both at home and abroad; and the vulnerability of an economy + irrevocably tied to the price fluctuations of a single export + commodity—copper.

+

2. We see no effective threat and no alternative to the junta at the + moment. It is slowly relaxing its human rights restrictions, but whether + and to what extent it will move toward full restoration of traditional + Chilean democratic norms remains very much an open question. End + summary.

+

3. The inevitability of revolt. In evaluating the junta’s record, it is + important to bear in mind the situation which led to the coup. To a + considerable extent, rather than seeking power, the junta had power + thrust upon it. The thousand days of the Allende regime had left the country in a shambles. It + was wracked by political disputes, polarized by social antagonisms, + disorganized by labor and civic unrest, and impoverished by unsound + economic policies. It is reasonable to believe that the situation had + deteriorated so sharply that some form of violent change was + imminent—from the extreme left if not from the right. In these + circumstances the assumption of power by the military was urged by some + and welcomed by most as an appropriate response. A nation traumatized by + what it had been through in the main responded gratefully to the + reestablishment of order, sobriety, and more normal economic processes, + even at the cost of further suppression of traditional Chilean freedoms. + What remained of the left went underground to await a more auspicious + day, while centers of anti-junta activity were organized outside the + country.

+

4. Nature of the military government. New as they are to politics and + civil administration, the leaders of the junta have organized their + government with considerable success. With the single exception of + economic and financial matters, all leading government functions + continue to be headed by active or retired military officers. There is + no Caudillo, although the senior member of the four-man junta, Army + Commander General Augusto Pinochet Ugarte, has + emerged as Chief of State, and is gradually assuming greater ascendancy. + This is still a regime in which all the military services participate: + while rivalries exist, they do not affect decision-making at the general + policy level. Government leaders work hard and appear to maintain high + standards of personal official probity.

+

5. Administration is frequently heavy-handed and fumbling; the military + types vary widely in their administrative ability; the prevailing thrust + of the leaders is self-righteous, didactic, intolerant, and + conservative. As time has gone by, fear of an imminent Marxist + counterattack has diminished, + but it is still a leading element in government thinking. It has + resulted in a strident and oversimplified anti-Marxist approach in most + areas of the regime’s activity.

+

6. The new Chilean society. An authoritarian society has taken shape + within this framework. Traditional political activity and the + parliamentary system have been suppressed, and the normal political + processes of interaction and feedback between government and people have + been curtailed. Leftist parties have been banned; the others have been + placed in “recess,” forbidden to carry out political activities and + limited to the barest administrative tasks. What remains of a once + lively press is supine and controlled, largely through self-censorship. + Elections are forbidden in all social organizations; new leaders are + appointed, and initiatives flow from the top down. The traditional + gremios (professional, student and business organizations) continue to + function. Their notions of a corporate state influence the junta, which + is ideologically tugged this way and that by advisers who on the extreme + are authoritarian, nationalistic and militaristic, while on the moderate + wing they are less rigid and more populist in approach.

+

7. The human rights problem. In these circumstances, the exercise of + human rights in Chile has been severely restricted. The junta has + utilized strained legalisms and a compliant judiciary to justify harsh + punitive measures—in the early days of the regime, summary executions; + later, trials based on the retroactive application of present emergency + legislation, sometimes accompanied by strong circumstantial evidence of + torture. With experience over time, and with its success in + counteracting the clandestine internal opposition, the regimes + self-confidence has increased. A moderating trend has set in in this + area, but there is no doubt that its continuance is subject to the + maintenance of strict internal security standards. By all indications, + the system of lengthy detention with little or no contact with families + or attorneys, stringent investigation measures, and military justice + will continue to be in effect for some time.

+

8. Nevertheless, Chile is by no means a totalitarian society. Its record + in releasing third-country nationals who took refuge in safe quarters, + and asylees holed up in embassies, has been good; about 8,500 have gone. + The government has allowed all manner of international observers, + official and unofficial, to enter the country freely, and has affored + them quite extraordinary opportunities to visit and talk with leading + officials, detainees, and critics. The continuance of a four and + one-half hour nightly curfew and the ubiquity of armed security forces + are borne easily by the average Chilean, whose daily life continues to + be carried on in a surprisingly normal fashion.

+

9. Economic factors may be crucial. It is in the economic area that the + government’s problems may be greatest. The policy of austerity adopted to rein in Chile’s + unequalled inflation has been pursued quite vigorously. But it has + proved more difficult than anticipated to counteract world-wide + inflationary forces and the inflationary momentum of an inefficient + productive process heavily supported by public deficit financing. The + cost of living index rose by over 200 percent during the first eight + months of 1974 and seems likely to exceed 300 percent by the end of the + year.

+

10. At the same time, under what the government calls the “social market + economy,” the state continues to disburse resources to moderate the + extreme hardship to which the lower and middle income groups have been + subjected. Wages are periodically raised, the lowest levels more than + proportionately; a national public housing program is getting under way; + and agricultural output is being stimulated by sharply higher prices. + With the approach of the Southern Hemisphere summer months, the junta + has survived a rigorous winter of scarcity and unemployment and looks + forward to easier times in the future. It relies on improvements in + agriculture, paper and pulp production, copper mining, and other + extractive and capital goods industries to take up the slack which low + demand for durable consumer goods has created during the austerity + period.

+

11. The Chilean economy, however, remains extremely vulnerable to + external forces. Chile’s initial steps in the international economic + area were highly successful: with USG + support it refinanced heavy international obligations on very + advantageous terms; it benefitted from the reopening of lending by + international banking organizations; and it prepared for an as yet + unrealized inflow of private foreign investment through new and + encouraging domestic legislation. Beneficial as they are, these + developments may well be undercut by events substantially beyond Chile’s + control. Exports of copper usually comprise 75 to 80 percent of total + Chilean exports. While copper at up to $1.40 a pound earlier in 1974 + beefed up Chile’s international balances, the price in mid-September had + slid to 66 cents. On the other hand, Chile’s imports, nearly half of + which consist of food and petroleum, still had to be bought at almost + unprecedented prices. With the highest per capita debt burden in all of + Latin America, and with anything but a well-rounded or efficient local + production base, Chile is ill equipped to withstand an international + depression.

+

12. The prospects ahead. As the new regime enters its second year, it has + settled down for the longer haul. For the time being it maintains + excellent internal security against left-wing terrorist elements. It + responds huffily and uneasily to criticisms of its civil and political + rights practices from the Catholic Church and the Centrist Christian + Democratic Party. While originally committed to the eventual restoration + of democratic procedures in a Chile purged of the demagogy and social + conflict of its recent + past, it is moving in that direction very slowly indeed. It would be + unsafe to predict when, how or if it will reach that goal.

+

13. Somewhat surprisingly, given the economic hardships and political + restrictions of the last year, public support for the government appears + to remain at a high level; there are few of the objective signs of + discontent one might expect to see. While the trauma of the Allende denouement persists, most + people would agree that there is no alternative to the junta. The regime + will continue its search for more efficient administrative procedures; + the struggle between authoritarian hard-liners and the more populist + elements will continue to surge about the junta chiefs; the economic + effort will move ahead but may be submerged under international + developments. Meanwhile, pro-junta Chileans will continue to react + sharply to outside criticism, most of which they regard as the + propaganda of Marxist conspirators who carp at the mote in the Chilean + eye, while ignoring the beam in the eye of the communist world.

+

14. More detailed analysis follows in separate airgrams.

+ + + Popper + + +
+ +
+ 174. Action Memorandum From the Acting Assistant Secretary of State + for Inter-American Affairs (Bowdler) to Secretary of State Kissinger + +

Summary: Given congressional opposition to U.S. + arms sales to Chile, Bowdler suggested to Kissinger that a sale of + weaponry be held in abeyance while assuring the Chileans that + the U.S. Government was in the process of completing action on + the purchase.

+

Source: National Archives, RG 59, ARA Files, Subject and Country Files: Lot 81D324, + DEF 12–5 CHILE Military Sales, 1974–75. Secret. Drafted by + Karkashian on + September 25; cleared by Jenkins, Vest, and Gantz. Sent through Maw. Kissinger wrote on the memorandum, “Chilean + foreign minister inquired about TOWs—where does it stand? HK” Attached at Tab A is + a draft cable, not published, instructing the Embassy to assure + the Chilean Government that the U.S. Government was doing + everything possible to meet the needs of the Chilean armed + forces; the cable added that Chilean officials should understand + the importance of the human rights issue. The final draft was + sent as telegram 220331 to Santiago, October 7. (Ibid., Central + Foreign Policy File, D740283–0919) Attached at Tab B is telegram + 5805 from Santiago, September 24, not published, which noted + Chilean dismay at delays in receiving arms. In an October 8 + memorandum, Rogers + reminded Kissinger that + he had approved ARA’s September + 26 recommendation on October 7, and suggested that because the + weaponry in question was defensive, its sale to Chile would not + arouse significant Congressional criticism. (Ibid., ARA Files, Subject and Country + Files: Lot 75D476, Chile 1974)

+ + + + + Washington, September + 26, 1974. + +

+ Chilean Requests for Arms + Assistance +

+

The recent visit to Chile of Major General George Mabry, CONUSARSO, has + given rise to renewed, urgent requests from the Chilean military that we + respond to their arms purchase needs, principally the provision of 100 + M–48 tanks and a limited number of TOW + anti-tank weapons. The Chilean military are convinced that Peru’s + current arms superiority (air power and armored vehicles) and revanchist + spirit will trigger, at some time, a Peruvian attempt to recapture + territory lost to Chile in the War of the Pacific (1879–83).

+

We have been actively seeking to provide Chile on an urgent basis a + minimal deterrent capability. DOD + shares our concern and interest and is currently ascertaining the + availability and possible timing of deliveries on key items requested by + the Chileans. Because of the Congressional mood and media climate on + Chile following Congressman Harrington’s exposé, we propose to hold off + implementation and formal notification to the Chileans of DOD’s decision on what items can be made + available on an urgent basis until after Congress recesses in + mid-October. On the TOW, we would wait + until Congress reconvenes in November and consult with key leaders + before implementing a decision to expedite delivery of the TOW to Chile. We are confident that there + will be little significant Congressional opposition to providing the TOW, unless the issue becomes entangled with the uproar + over CIA activities in Chile.

+

Attached at Tab B is Ambassador Popper’s most recent cable on this subject urging early + and favorable action.

+

Recommendation:

+

That you approve the cable attached at Tab A, authorizing Ambassador + Popper to assure the Chilean + Government that we will continue to honor our commitments to it and that + we are in the process of completing action on various pending Chilean + arms requests.

+

Attachments:

+

Tab A—Proposed cable

+

Tab B—Santiago’s 5805

+
+ +
+ 175. Telegram 6180 From the Embassy in Chile to the Department of + State +

Summary: + Popper reported that + he had informed Defense Minister Bonilla of the U.S. Government’s intention to + act soon on Chilean arms requests. Bonilla expressed great satisfaction and + responded to Popper’s + comments on human rights issues by offering a justification and + a plea for understanding of the Chilean Government’s handling of + internal security threats.

+

Source: Ford Library, + National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for Latin + America, Box 3, Chile–State Department Telegrams, To + SECSTATE–EXDIS. Secret; Exdis. The instruction for this démarche + is in telegram 220331 to Santiago, October 7. (National + Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D740283–0919) + Telegram 5805 from Santiago is discussed in the source note to + Document 174. On December 2, + Rogers assured + Heitmann that the U.S. administration’s intention to sell + weapons to Chile remained unchanged, but he noted the serious + problem posed by strong congressional opposition to any military + assistance. (Telegram 264721 to Santiago, December 3; ibid., + D740349–0725)

+ + + + + Santiago, October 9, 1974, 2051Z. + +

6180. Subject: Chilean Requests for Arms Assistance. Refs: (A) State + 220331; (B) Santiago 5805.

+

1. Summary: DefMin Bonilla + conveys appreciation for our expression of hope for a favorable USG response to Chilean requests for M–48 + tanks and TOWs within next two months. Emphasizing decrease in number of + internal security detainees, he defends need for stringent methods in + coping with violent extremists, but displays understanding for our + Congressional and media problem in months ahead. End summary.

+ +

2. Since Dept’s instruction, for which we are grateful, stopped short of + specific commitments, I decided appropriate level for démarche + authorized therein would be Defense Minister Gen. + Oscar Bonilla. Accordingly, I + saw him on Oct 9, with Chief of US MILGP (Capt Davis) present.

+

3. I carefully communicated substance of paras 2 to 5 of instruction to + Bonilla. He expressed great + satisfaction with regard to indications that within near future way + would be open for purchase of tanks and TOWs. He took our point that our willingness to strengthen + Chilean army in this way, at a time of shortages in our own forces and + other difficulties, is based on our sense of responsibility to help + preserve hemisphere stability. He asserted that Chileans had no military + aims against Peru, and no reason whatever to attack any of Chile’s + neighbors. He understood that in entertaining the Chilean arms request, + our purpose was deterrence.

+

4. Bonilla said he would + communicate our message directly to the junta. He had no doubt that it + would be fully appreciated. Time-frames mentioned would be helpful for + Chilean planning purposes.

+

5. Turning next to what I had said in regard to the human rights issue, + Bonilla offered both a + justification and a plea for understanding. He pointed out that there + had been vast changes in internal security procedures in Chile since the + early days of the junta. The number of detainees on security grounds was + being steadily reduced. Immediately, those being released were people + who had been held without specific charges, but releases of those + charged and perhaps even those sentenced would eventually take place. + Detention centers such as the National Stadium, Pisagua and Chacabuco + had been or were being closed. The number of those newly detained for + security reasons had now fallen to only one or two a day. Because of + complaints about torture, it was now a practice of the Chilean security + authorities to have a doctor examine all those entering or leaving + detention centers, to determine whether they had been physically + abused.

+

6. Continuing, Bonilla said the + whole business of security detention was distasteful to the junta. It + was expensive, it absorbed the energies of too many people, and it + provoked sharp and unjustified reactions. Unfortunately, as a result of + leftist propaganda, the outside world had a vision of rivers of blood + running in Chile—an obvious absurdity. He, Bonilla, would like personally to invite any US Senators + concerned to come to Chile and confirm for themselves what the situation + was like here today. If they, or any one else, would give him concrete + cases of abuse or of disregard for human rights, he would have the + matter investigated immediately. At the outset of the coup, it had been + necessary to use the emergency provisions of the Chilean constitution to + supplant normal legal safeguards for detainees, but this situation had + changed and was changing very significantly.

+ +

7. At the same time, Bonilla + pointed out, a serious internal security threat still existed in Chile. + This was proved by the Oct 5 raid on a hideout of the violent leftist + MIR (Movement of the Revolutionary + Left) organization. In the house where the MIR leader Miguel Enriquez had been killed, the authorities + had found an arsenal of automatic weapons. They were constantly finding + other clandestine arms stocks. The world had to understand that it was + not possible to deal with terrorist opponents as if a situation of + normalcy prevailed. The MIR and their + likes had no concern for human rights. They used the human rights issue + to gain support from others. For example, they and other leftists had + flooded the courts with habeas corpus (Amparo) requests on behalf of + non-existent individuals to create the impression that thousands were + being unlawfully detained.

+

8. In response to Bonilla’s + remarks I agreed that Chile’s internal security problems were often + ignored or misunderstood outside the country. What seemed to me + important was to continue the trend toward more normal practices. I + applauded the large-scale release of detainees now taking place. Every + move in this direction was helpful in coping with the Congressional + difficulties I had cited in my presentation. Bonilla said he understood.

+

9. In noting the desirability of discretion in connection with arms + purchases, I discussed with Bonilla international news reports of the Chilean + purchase of F–5s and A–37s. He realizes the potential problem which + could arise if there were premature publicity for the purchases now + contemplated, particularly during the next sixty days.

+

10. Comment: I believe our message will help to assuage Chilean fears and + suspicions and to produce a more relaxed approach to the problem of + security vis-à-vis Peru. It will be still more effective if we can give + Chileans go-ahead signals for acquisition of meaningful quantities of + M–48s and TOWs even before periods + mentioned in reftel A expire.

+

11. On the human rights discussion, Bonilla’s remarks must be viewed in the perspective of + Chilean legalisms. Junta has made a case that all its internal security + measures are justified under long-standing provisions of Chilean + constitution, which allow a government to suspend virtually all human + rights guarantees in time of war or emergency. It is a case which many + Chilean lawyers challenge, but it is junta orthodoxy, and it is the + basis for Bonilla’s + protestations. At the same time, it is clear to me that he grasps the + relationship between critical news reports and Congressional action. + Bonilla is known as a + relative moderate in Chilean government circles, and I believe he will + exert his influence in favor of restraint.

+ + + Popper + + +
+ +
+ 176. Telegram 242788/Tosec 707 From the Department of State to the + Embassy in Italy +

Summary: + The Department suggested to Kissinger that congressional leaders be called + regarding military assistance to Chile, and that the United + States accept some Chilean citizens under detention who would + soon be released.

+

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + D740317–0678. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Drafted by Karkashian; cleared by + Shlaudeman, + Jenkins, Aldrich, + Vest, and Raphel; + approved by Rogers. Kissinger was attending the World Food + Conference in Rome. On November 7, Kissinger informed Rogers that he approved the “Chile arms package + and inter-related issues as presented in paragraph 3.” Kissinger did not want to + decide on the human rights circular until he had a chance to + discuss it upon his return to Washington. (Telegram 245395/Secto + 525 to Quito, November 7; ibid., D740320–0679) Rogers was in Quito for a + meeting of foreign ministers. In an October 1 telephone + conversation, Kissinger + assured Senator Edward M. + Kennedy (D–MA) that the Department of State was + concerned about human rights issues and told Kennedy that he believed that + the Senator’s proposed amendment to restrict military assistance + to Chile would have “unfortunate consequences.” (Department of + State, Electronic Reading Room, Kissinger Transcripts)

+ + + + + Washington, November 5, 1974, 0050Z. + +

242788. Tosec 707. Subject: Chile Arms Package and Human Rights.

+

1. In accordance with the instruction which you approved on October 7, + Ambassador Popper reassured the + GOC on October 9 that we would + honor our commitments on Chilean arms requests. He also stated that we + hoped to give the GOC a favorable + response within 30 days to its urgent request for medium tanks and that + we hoped to make a favorable decision within 60 days on the expeditious + delivery of the TOW anti-tank system. + (We conceive a minimum defense capability package for Chile to include + approximately 100 M–48 tanks, 100 armored personnel carriers, and up to + 20 TOW launchers with 400 missiles. Our + best information is that the Peruvians have or will shortly have 300 + Soviet medium tanks.) Expiration of the 30 days and developments in the + human rights field following your decision of October 7 warrant a final + weighing of the case.

+

2. On October 24, the International Committee of Jurists (ICJ), headquartered in Geneva, released a + report supplemental to its September 5 basic review of the Chile human + rights situation asserting continued violations by the Chilean + Government and alleging that contrary to GOC claims, the detainee population in Chile is increasing + rather than decreasing. The ICJ’s + latest report is being highlighted by the U.S. media. Additionally, we + have just seen the final report of the Inter-American Human Rights + Commission (IAHRC) which sent a team + to Chile in July–August. The GOC has + been given the report and a copy has gone to the Secretary General of + the OAS. At the discretion of the + latter, copies probably will be given to OAS delegation heads on a “reserved” basis. The report, + while recognizing some recent progress in some fields, condemns the + GOC + for consistent human rights + violations, including the systematic use of torture. We must expect that + it may be leaked to the public at any time, with predictably grave + repercussions.

+

3. In view of the foregoing developments we propose the following + scenario for the Chile arms package and various inter-related + issues:

+

A. Following the Congressional elections Assistant Secretary Rogers would telephone Congressman + Fascell and one or two other + key Congressional leaders with whom we have already discussed arms sales + to Chile to review our existing commitments and the proposed Chile arms + package. He would say we believe it essential in the interest of + regional peace and stability and in light of our previous commitments to + go ahead with the FMS cash sale of this + minimal package.

+

B. We would also inform Fascell, + et al that while we believe there are some recent encouraging signs in + the Chile human rights situation (following the IAHRC team’s visit), we share their + concern over continuing abuses. We would make clear that we are aware in + taking this action of the strong probability that the Congress will + enact a tough amendment to the FAA + restricting or prohibiting all military assistance, including FMS credit sales to the GOC, pending fundamental and continuing + improvements in the human rights field. (It seems likely that a + Presidential determination of significant progress in human rights will + be required to resume military deliveries.)

+

4. The cost to our Congressional and media relations is likely to be + substantial if we proceed with the above scenario. In particular, the + chances for obtaining from the Congress a satisfactory security + assistance bill would be reduced. Nevertheless, the risks to regional + security, the cost to U.S.-Chile bilateral relations and perhaps equally + important our ability to influence Chilean human rights behavior, + persuade us that we should proceed to do what we have said we would + do.

+

5. To help in some degree to ameliorate the adverse reaction when word of + the Chilean arms package becomes public, we may wish to request from the + Attorney General standby authority to accept a limited number of Chilean + citizens currently under detention who may be released shortly in + accordance with the GOC’s announced + intention. Additionally, we renew our recommendation that you authorize + the human rights circular in Win + Lord’s memo which you have with you. The circular is + unclassified and we would see that it is made public in order to + reinforce our worldwide interest and concern that individual human + rights be protected and to identify clearly and forcefully the U.S. with + this objective.

+ + + Ingersoll + + +
+ +
+ 177. Transcript of the Secretary of State’s Regional Staff + Meeting +

Summary: + Kissinger, Rogers, + and Maw discussed + congressional attempts to cut off military assistance to Chile + and the potential impact the cut off would have on the military + government in Chile.

+

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Transcripts of Kissinger Staff Meetings, Lot + 78D443, Box 5, Secretary’s Staff Meetings. Secret. Kissinger chaired the meeting, + which was attended by all the principal officers of the + Department or their designated alternates. In a meeting with + Ford on the same + day, Kissinger, in + outlining administration strategy to prevent Congress from + cutting FMS, stated, “I think + our strategic position has to be to go to the people against the + Congress. I will go to the people too and talk about the + Executive–Legislative relationship. In the name of human rights, + they [Congress] will undermine national security.” (Ford Library, National + Security Adviser, Memoranda of Conversations, Box 6, December 3, + 1974, Ford, Kissinger) In a December 4 + memorandum to Kissinger, + Rogers suggested that he inform Kennedy that terminating military assistance + would lessen the U.S. Government’s leverage with the junta, and + that Peru might perceive termination of assistance as a “green + light” to invade Chile. (National Archives, RG 59, ARA Files, Subject and Country + Files: Lot 81D324, DEF 12–5 CHILE, Military Sales + 1974–75)

+ + + + + Washington, December 3, 1974, 8:07–9:07 + a.m. + +

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to Chile.]

+

Mr. Rogers: On Chile, as you know, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee + passed unanimously a Kennedy ban + on arms assistance.

+

Secretary Kissinger: I think it’s + a disaster.

+

Mr. Rogers: Well, I said as much to Kennedy. He’s unimpressed. There’s a memorandum of my + conversation with him. I sent the letter.

+

Secretary Kissinger: We won’t + rest until we have left wing governments in power everywhere. It’s too + dangerous for military people. If they were like Peru, they’d have no + trouble.

+

Mr. Rogers: Is that a left wing government?

+

Secretary Kissinger: Well, + whatever it is. It’s, at least, anti-American.

+

Mr. Rogers: Anti-American, anti-free press. They control all + newspapers.

+

It passed unanimously and was put up to the committee by Humphrey. And I gather that, in + general—

+

Secretary Kissinger: Is that one + of those things you guys sneaked by me on the Foreign Aid bill?

+

Mr. Ingersoll: No. We talked—

+

Mr. Maw: Kennedy got ahold of Humphrey the night before the meeting + and said he would oppose the bill on the floor unless Humphrey put this in. Humphrey put this in the bill without + telling us what he was doing at all.

+ +

Now, there is a chance of making a compromise in the Conference + Committee, because the House bill does permit a waiver for a MAP up to 10 million dollars—and that + includes training.

+

Secretary Kissinger: Oh, come on! + Ten million dollars—when the Cubans are putting instructors and the + Soviets are putting tanks into Peru?

+

Mr. Maw: It isn’t on the merits. + The whole thing is on this silly human rights question and the publicity + on it. Kennedy has the ball and + is going to try to run with it.

+

Secretary Kissinger: If we don’t + stand with what our interest is, and if every time we get tackled we get + compromised or call something a compromise, that’s the same as yielding + and we’re in deep trouble.

+

What are the options going to be for Chile to overthrow the military—to + bring a government in that’s going to be extremely hostile for us, in + all probability?

+

I don’t know what the options are or for the military to become more + non-aligned and get their arms from the non-aligned. What else is going + to happen? You don’t expect a military government to be without + arms.

+

Mr. Maw: These people aren’t + concerned about that; they’re only concerned about—

+

Secretary Kissinger: But we’re + concerned about it.

+

Mr. Maw: Yes. And, unfortunately, + they’ve got the votes to get us in trouble on this human rights issue. + And if we can square that away—

+

Secretary Kissinger: Oh, come + on—if we can square away the human rights! How are you going to square + the human rights issue with Don + Fraser? He’s going to come out and redouble his efforts + for human values.

+

I’ll see him, but I’ll guarantee that’s going to be the outcome.

+

Mr. Maw: What is the answer?

+

Secretary Kissinger: How are we + going to square away the human rights issue?

+

Mr. Maw: The only way is to make + a good statement, letting it get published.

+

Secretary Kissinger: Out of the + question. I don’t yield to this sort of nonsense. That won’t do it. I’ll + meet with Don Fraser.

+

Mr. Holton: Do you want to try with Kennedy? He wants to see you too.

+

Secretary Kissinger: On what?

+

Mr. Holton: He wants to talk about his trip and compare notes with + you.

+

Secretary Kissinger: Kennedy I’d be glad to see. I have good + relations with him. With Kennedy + there’s a chance of getting something.

+ +

Mr. Holton: He would like to see you this week.

+

Secretary Kissinger: Alone?

+

Mr. Holton: Yes.

+

Secretary Kissinger: Without + talking to him.

+

Mr. Holton: Do you want to do it?

+

Secretary Kissinger: Kennedy I’ll see. You keep it out of + the newspapers.

+

Mr. Holton: I won’t put it in the Post first thing + in the morning.

+

Secretary Kissinger: I’ll see + Kennedy.

+

Mr. Ingersoll: Maybe you can + swing him around.

+

Secretary Kissinger: On Chile I + can’t swing him around. We have to fight a general battle, which we do + not open by this self-serving human rights attitude. And I don’t want to + hear that in a large group anyway. I’ve told you people a hundred times. + Our record on human rights is very good, but I won’t play that sort of + self-serving game by publishing a document. I absolutely will not do + it.

+

We’ve got more people out of more countries than almost anybody else, but + I am not going to play that game. But I want us to stand for what is in + the national interest—

+

Mr. Maw: Of course.

+

Secretary Kissinger: —and not go + running around for compromises every time.

+

Somebody has to take these things on. They are going to cripple any + foreign policy we have. I’ve been telling you people for years what was + going to happen on Ethiopia, and you cannot have military governments + that you don’t give arms to. They’re going to get it sooner or later + from somebody else.

+

From the minute they were closing the base in Ethiopia, I predicted what + was going to happen.

+

Mr. Ingersoll: Humphrey didn’t tell us about putting + this thing in. We had no idea until the morning of the Senate + Foreign—

+

Secretary Kissinger: Well, I had + no idea until after the staff meeting. It wasn’t told to me + yesterday.

+

Mr. Ingersoll: I thought we + talked about it yesterday afternoon.

+

Secretary Kissinger: It wasn’t + clear to me. Ten million aid is clearly + an insult.

+

Mr. Rogers: That’s a complete ban—outward.

+

Secretary Kissinger: Well, what’s + ten million?

+

Mr. Rogers: Ten million—what Carl was trying to suggest—was in the House + bill, as a possible compromise.

+ +

Secretary Kissinger: Gentlemen, + what kind of a goddam compromise is 10 million dollars to a country + whose neighbor is getting large amounts of tanks and in which it’s + scared out of its mind? It’s nothing.

+

Mr. Maw: There’s nothing in the + House bill and there’s nothing in the Senate bill.

+

Secretary Kissinger: But don’t + tell me we won’t salvage anything. The difference between 10 million and + nothing is nothing. Somebody has to say what the consequences are, and + that is not simply a human rights issue.

+

Mr. Maw: Yes, sir.

+

Secretary Kissinger: Also, I’d + like to know whether the human rights problem in Chile is that much + worse than in other countries in Latin America or whether their primary + crime is to have replaced Allende and whether people are now getting penalized, + having gotten rid of an anti-American government. Is it worse than in + other Latin American countries?

+

Mr. Rogers: Yes.

+

Secretary Kissinger: Well, I + think the consequences could be very serious, if we cut them off from + military aid.

+

Mr. Rogers: There’s no question about it, but the difference between what + we—

+

Secretary Kissinger: Well, I + think it’s a helluva lot more important on how we vote ourselves.

+

Mr. Rogers: It really, I think, raises a serious proposition with + Congress because the great majority of the members of Congress feel very + strongly about it, rightly or wrongly.

+

Secretary Kissinger: That may + very well be.

+

Mr. Rogers: They’ll go to the mat on the issue.

+

Secretary Kissinger: They’ll + what?

+

Mr. Rogers: They’ll go to the mat on the issue—as you’ll hear from what + Teddy [Kennedy] was talking + about.

+

Secretary Kissinger: It may well + be. And Teddy knows when we have a Castro-like government in Chile. What are we going to + say—the State Department wanted to compromise between 10 million?

+

Mr. Rogers: No, no.

+

Mr. Ingersoll: No, no. We don’t + have any other alternative, unless we fight it on the floor.

+

Secretary Kissinger: It makes no + great difference to me whether we get nothing or 10 million. What is the + benefit? And, you know, we won’t get 10 million either.

+

Mr. Maw: Unless we can beat the + Senate thing on the floor, we’re in real trouble.

+ +

Secretary Kissinger: But we’ve + got to get a better progressional system where we’ve got people lined up + to fight on this. There must be other people lined up to fight besides + myself personally, and it can’t be that we get hit time and again and + nobody is there to support what’s right. And no one is against human + rights. This is an issue of balancing the overall interests of the + country.

+

Mr. Rogers: Miki wasn’t standing up on this issue.

+

Secretary Kissinger: Were we + standing up on the issue is the question.

+

Mr. Maw: We weren’t even + consulted. We got it out in a staff report, in the staff level. We got + them to agree to take all—to eliminate—

+

Mr. Rogers: Restrictions.

+

Mr. Maw: —restrictions.

+

Secretary Kissinger: Well, am I + wrong that this sort of thing is likely to finish off that + government?

+

Mr. Rogers: Yes; I think that’s true.

+

Secretary Kissinger: All right. + What’s going to happen after that? Does anyone know?

+

Mr. Rogers: If they don’t get the arms?

+

Secretary Kissinger: No. What + will happen if that government collapses?

+

Mr. Rogers: There are two possibilities. One of them is that you could + have a reversion to the Christian Democrats. You know, this government + is now in the process of severing its relationship with the Christian + Democratic Party.

+

Secretary Kissinger: I don’t + think they should vote with us in the OAS or the UN, and I think + it’s better than the Allende + Government.

+

Mr. Rogers: Well, I agree.

+

Secretary Kissinger: And if the + army winds up totally demoralized, that will affect amongst those out of + office the whole future of politics. If it becomes clear that the army + can ever move again, the left will become immeasurably strengthened; am + I wrong?

+

Mr. Rogers: That’s true. The question is which part of the left—the + Christian Democratic Party or the Socialist members of the Popular + Front. The base of that government is not—

+

Secretary Kissinger: I have no + use for that government.

+

Mr. Rogers: The major concern of that government and the cause of its + erosion right now is the threat from Peru. They would be considerably + less disturbed about the question of arms supplies from the United + States if the Peruvian threat didn’t exist.

+

Secretary Kissinger: The fact is + that throughout the Allende + Government it was an article of faith that military supplies to Chile + should be continued. There was + never any effort to stop it, even when they were expropriating us. When + human rights were strengthened under the Allende Government, there was never any move to stop it. + The worst crime of this government is that it’s pro-American in the eyes + of many of these supporters, of these cut-offs.

+

Is this government worse than the Allende Government? Is human rights more severely + threatened by this government than Allende?

+

Mr. Rogers: Well, I can’t say that, Mr. Secretary. In terms of freedom of + association, Allende didn’t + close down the opposition party. In terms of freedom of the press, + Allende didn’t close down + all the newspapers.

+

Now, in terms of human rights, the effectiveness of the criminal process, + there you have an argument. There was arbitrary arrest and torture.

+

Secretary Kissinger: The fact is + there was no challenge to the pipeline. There was no challenge to the + military supplies, toward Chile, during that whole period.

+

Mr. Rogers: Well, it’s true. In fact, the present proposal is an + implementation of a commitment or proposition that we put to the + Chileans, to the military, during the Allende Administration.

+

Secretary Kissinger: Whom are we + going to win in Latin America by that sort of a policy? Who is going to + be more for us than before? Do we cut off military aid to Chile, and how many of our people + are really egging Kennedy on.

+

Mr. Rogers: I’m sorry?

+

Secretary Kissinger: How many + State Department people are egging him on.

+

Mr. Rogers: Preparing to take him on?

+

Secretary Kissinger: Egging him + on.

+

Mr. Rogers: I don’t know of anyone prepared to take him on.

+

Secretary Kissinger: I wouldn’t + want to take a secret ballot in ARA.

+

Mr. Rogers: Well, I’m not sure he needs any egging on from ARA.

+

Secretary Kissinger: Well, I + think it’s a disaster. It’s going to be useless to Chile.

+

Mr. Rogers: Yes. I wrote a couple of answers on it.

+

Secretary Kissinger: I’ll talk to + Teddy for old times sake. But let my office arrange it.

+

Mr. Holton: I’ll go into it.

+

Secretary Kissinger: I’ll go into + it. It’s useless; I’ll talk to him about his trip.

+

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to Chile.]

+
+ +
+ 178. Transcript of the Secretary of State’s Principals and Regionals + Staff Meeting +

Summary: + Kissinger, Rogers, + and Maw discussed the + implications of a ban on U.S. military assistance for Chile.

+

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Transcripts of Kissinger Staff Meetings, Lot + 78D443, Box 5, Secretary’s Staff Meetings. Secret. Kissinger chaired the meeting, + which was attended by all the principal officers of the + Department or their designated alternates. In telegram 7654 from + Santiago, December 18, the Embassy reported that the Chilean + military would seek to procure weapons from Spain, the Arab + nations, and the PRC. (Ibid., + Central Foreign Policy File, D740368–0466) In a December 23 + staff meeting, Kissinger, Rogers, and Maw discussed the possibility of completing + commercial sales of arms to Chile in a manner consistent with + the ban on military assistance, and Kissinger expressed his intention to have a + public fight with Congress over the role in foreign policy that + it was asserting for itself. (National Archives, RG 59, + Transcripts of Kissinger + Staff Meetings, Lot 78D443, Box 5, Secretary’s Staff + Meetings.)

+ + + + + Washington, December 20, 1974, 8:10–9:02 + a.m. + +

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to Chile.]

+ +

Secretary Kissinger: Did you see + that cable of what the Chilean army is thinking of? It sneaked through, + or was it an INR report?

+

Mr. Hyland: Embassy cable.

+

Secretary Kissinger: Embassy + cable. Three days ago.

+

Mr. Rogers: Well, the truth—the reality of the aid ban—

+

Secretary Kissinger: What exactly + does that aid ban do?

+

Mr. Rogers: Well, the generality is quite clear. It bars credits for cash + sales; it does not bar commercial sales. The generalization of those + principles into materials and pipeline—

+

Secretary Kissinger: You mean the + 10 million went out too?

+

Mr. Rogers: It’s not including training.

+

Secretary Kissinger: Now, just a + minute. This is another one of those things. I got into going along with + the argument that it’s only a cut of 10 million from 20 million. Now I + find that I was told that we could save it in the House conference. Now + it’s disappeared without any information to me.

+

Mr. Maw: They knocked it out at + the last meeting. They didn’t even know what they were doing in the + Conference Committee meeting.

+

Secretary Kissinger: But what did + we do?

+

Mr. Maw: We’ve got 55 million for + aid.

+

Mr. Rogers: 25.

+

Mr. Maw: 25.

+

Secretary Kissinger: Do you + believe that a military government will do nothing when it’s cut off + from aid?

+ +

Mr. Rogers: No. I know they’re casting wildly about.

+

Secretary Kissinger: Are we not + going to rest until we get a left wing government that forces them + toward the Arabs or Chinese or somebody? But how can we acquiesce on + this? There was a big debate in this room on whether it should be 10 + million or 20 million, and now we wind up with nothing. Did anyone + believe if I had known this that I would have agreed to it?

+

Mr. Rogers: Well, you got a memorandum of my conversation with Kennedy on this.

+

Secretary Kissinger: Yes, but I + know what Kennedy’s position is. + I wouldn’t have paid the slightest attention to it. My position is that + I don’t yield to Congress on matters of principle.

+

Mr. Rogers: Well, we took it on this one—there’s no question about it. + And now what we have to do in the first instance—

+

Secretary Kissinger: Yes, but we + have to have a system on matters so that my views could not be obscured. + I don’t tolerate the Department making these concessions. You, at least, + ought to give us a chance to threaten a veto. You know, it’s wildly + against the national interest.

+

Mr. Rogers: And I argued it up on the Hill.

+

Secretary Kissinger: Yes, but I + didn’t know about it. I could have argued it up on the Hill, but to that level we have to + fight—on the Turkish aid thing. You + know what the consequences of this might be.

+

Mr. Rogers: Well, it’s hard for me to believe that you didn’t understand. + You were faced with an outline.

+

Secretary Kissinger: No.

+

Mr. Rogers: My last recollection is that we raised this in a staff + meeting the day or two before I went there.

+

Secretary Kissinger: I understood + that the Senate was going to cut it off, that the House was going to + pass something, and that the conference was going to raise something. + And when I was told it was only 10 million, then I was told, well, the + request was only 20 million; and then I acquiesced. That was my + knowledge. And I was also told if you get the 10 million, you also have + a sale.

+

Mr. Maw: The Senate bill survived + the conference, and Humphrey + promised he would give us—the House—10 million.

+

Secretary Kissinger: I was told + that Humphrey had to humor + Kennedy in the Senate and + that it would be rescued in the House.

+

Mr. Rogers: Well, I don’t read that confirmation because my diagnosis of + this thing all along the line is that we were faced with an absolute + ban. That’s why, as Carl knows, I was up on the Hill.

+

Secretary Kissinger: I would have + been delighted to go to the mat.

+

Mr. Maw: We didn’t know this, + when the conference report actually came out.

+ +

Secretary Kissinger: We’ve got to + go to the mat on things of national interest. What else are we here for? + You can’t throw a country to Kennedy just because it satisfies some ego trip that + he’s got.

+

Well, what can we do now? Does that mean they cut off all military + assistance out of there?

+

Mr. Rogers: Commercial sales are still O.K.

+

Secretary Kissinger: But what + does that mean in practice?

+

Mr. Rogers: That’s the big question.

+

Secretary Kissinger: I know the + question. What’s the answer?

+

Mr. Rogers: The answer is Pentagon lawyers are still raising + compunctions. We’ve got to argue them around it; right, Carl?

+

Mr. Maw: Yes. We finally got some + language in the conference report that we stuck in after we got through + it.

+

Secretary Kissinger: Yes, but how + the hell did it happen that I didn’t know about this? This is an + important question to me. I would have held up the bill on this issue + and, given the eagerness of these guys to leave, they would have put + something in there.

+

Now that that’s done, what can we do?

+

Mr. Rogers: Well, the first thing we’re doing is organizing a working + group with the Chilean military to try to get as much as we can—from the + language of the bill that has come out.

+

The second thing we’re doing is looking around for whatever other policy + alternatives there are. We have to reassure them.

+

Secretary Kissinger: But how can + you reassure a country you’ve just cut off military aid to? I mean how do you reassure + them?

+

Mr. Rogers: Well, their first question, when they came in to me + yesterday, is: “What can the United States do to guarantee this?”

+

Secretary Kissinger: Don’t you + think it’s absurd for the United States to guarantee a country to which + it isn’t selling arms? I didn’t understand that it had been cut off, + until Kennedy snapped at me + yesterday, for having played so unfair with him, at the swearing-in of + the Vice President.

+

I told him, “Do you realize it’s going down the drain?” “Well, he said, + “we can afford to lose a country now and then.”

+

We can’t acquiesce on that, and I have to talk to the President. We + cannot do it. We cannot get into that business while I am here, of + behaving that way, of making a deal with a Senator that we know is + against the national interest. You know the only possible outcome of + this can be an extreme left wing government in Chile or driving the + Chilean Government sort of toward the Arabs.

+

You’ve already seen that in that cable—whether they’re willing to go + toward the Arabs or the Chinese—and when we reach a point when the Chinese have to save us + from the Russians in Latin America, it’s a disgrace.

+

Well, what can be done? Is there anything we can do with the new + Congress? Of course, they’ll be worse than the old one. Now, we need a + special act up there.

+

Mr. Maw: We’ve got to work out a + sales program here so we carry on a program using their money. That’s + what we’ve got to do.

+

Mr. Rogers: The first thing is commercial sales, and the second thing is + the situation. The regrettable part about the situation is they are + about to come up with a program to retain this. We may have a + better—

+

Secretary Kissinger: Assurances + is total nonsense. It is total, unadulterated nonsense. The United + States has no guarantee—no right to give a guarantee to Chile that will + never be implemented, so we better work out something.

+

What’s the difference between FMS and + commercial sales?

+

Mr. Rogers: Availability of commercial equipment—Government arsenal.

+

Secretary Kissinger: Well, we + better talk to the Pentagon. But when am I going to know about it?

+

Mr. Maw: When we get the answer + from the Pentagon.

+

Secretary Kissinger: Well, when + will that be—Monday morning? If you need help, I’ll call Schlesinger—

+

Mr. Maw: Right.

+

Secretary Kissinger: —at the + staff meeting Monday morning.

+

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to Chile.]

+
+ +
+ 179. Memorandum of Conversation +

Summary: Chilean Chargé Guzmán and Kissinger discussed the + implications of a ban on U.S. military assistance to Chile and + Kissinger’s + prospective trip to Latin America.

+

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + P820123–0667. Confidential; Nodis. The meeting was held in + Kissinger’s office + at the State Department. Drafted by Isaacs. In a December 20 meeting with the + President, Kissinger + stated, “The Chilean aid cut is + disastrous. I want us to do everything possible to get arms for + Chile. They [the Chileans] can buy commercially but Defense says + they won’t sell if there is any DOD component.” (Ford Library, National Security Adviser, + Memoranda of Conversations, Box 7, December 20, 1974, Ford, Kissinger) The Foreign + Assistance Act of 1974, which included a ban on FMS to Chile, was signed into law + by Ford on December 30. + Upon signing the legislation, Ford stated, “I regret the action of Congress in + cutting off the modest program of military assistance to Chile,” + adding that he did not consider the measure to be an effective + way to promote human rights there. (Statement on Signing the + Foreign Assistance Act of 1974, December 30, 1974, Public Papers: Ford + , 1974, p. 780) Rogers informed Kissinger on January 4, 1975, + that Maw thought that + continued U.S. training of the Chilean military was inconsistent + with Congress’s cutoff of military assistance, but Kissinger decided to continue + the assistance until he could consult with Congress upon their + return. (Department of State, Electronic Reading Room, + Transcripts of Kissinger + Telephone Conversations)

+ + + + + Washington, December 24, 1974, 3:25 p.m. + + + SUBJECT + 1. Cut-Off of U.S. Military Assistance to Chile + 2. Secretary’s South American Travel Plans + + + PARTICIPANTS + + + + U.S. + + The Secretary + Assistant Secretary, Mr. William D. Rogers + + ARA/BC/C, Arnold M. + Isaacs (notetaker) + + + + + + Chile + + Chilean Chargé d’Affaires, Enrique Guzman + + + + +

Secretary Kissinger: I want you + to know that we are strongly opposed to the Congressional action. We + will do our best to reverse it, although I don’t know how soon that will + be. Meanwhile we will make a maximum effort to make available as much as + possible on the basis of commercial sales. I hope we can arrange for the + sale of the TOW.

+

You know the problem that causes us difficulty with Congress. We don’t + want to tell you how to conduct your domestic affairs, but anything you + and your government can do on this score would help.

+

Mr. Guzman: We are very grateful + for all you have done and for seeing me on this occasion.

+

Secretary Kissinger: What can we + do about military training?

+ +

Mr. Guzman: The ban on training is + psychologically our greatest problem. Second is the problem of cash + sales. There are certain items like tanks . . . Sometimes there were + contracts . . .

+

Secretary Kissinger: Are students + coming up in January?

+

Mr. Guzman: Yes, a new class is + due to arrive. Also there’s the question of students who are here on + multi-year programs. We don’t know for sure what happens to them.

+

Mr. Rogers: Those here now can stay.

+

Secretary Kissinger: We must look + into this further.

+

Mr. Guzman: There are two more + important problems.

+

We are very worried about the situation with Peru. Even assuming for + purposes of argument that there is no immediate threat, Peru is + receiving aid from the Russians and we + are being forced to divert our scarce resources from our economic + needs.

+

Secretary Kissinger: The reason + I’m seeing you is that I realize the situation is critical. You can + count on my raising the subject with the new Congress. I’m planning a + speech on Congress’ action and foreign policy. That won’t be immediately + but rather in 2 to 3 months. It will cover the global problem of + Congressional limitations on military assistance.

+

Mr. Guzman: Mr. Secretary, I’ve + just received a telex invitation from my Foreign Ministry—inviting you + to go to Santiago on your January trip to South America.

+

Secretary Kissinger: It will + probably be in February.

+

Mr. Guzman: Our Minister is very + interested that you visit Chile. Are you planning to go to Santiago?

+

Secretary Kissinger: I haven’t + fixed an itinerary. But we’ll pay a domestic price here if I go.

+

Mr. Guzman: I hope you will also + take into account the political implication in Chile of going to Lima + without going to Santiago.

+

Secretary Kissinger: But if I + went to both?

+

Mr. Guzman: We wouldn’t mind at + all.

+

Secretary Kissinger: I can + understand your concern. You can tell your government that when I go to + Latin America, I would not stop in Peru without stopping in Chile.

+

The reason I’m seeing you is to assure that you don’t do anything panicky + before we have a chance to act.

+

Mr. Guzman: Thank you very much, + Mr. Secretary, for seeing me. I shall convey your comments to my + government.

+
+ +
+ 180. Telegram 49 From the Embassy in Chile to the Department of + State +

Summary: In + anticipation of a possible visit to Chile by Secretary Kissinger, Popper and Pinochet discussed key + bilateral issues, including human rights and U.S. economic and + military assistance.

+

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + D750003–0830. Confidential; Priority; Exdis. Because of the + impending collapse of the South Vietnamese Government and crises + in the Middle East, Kissinger’s first trip to Latin America as + Secretary of State was postponed until February 16–24, 1976. He + did not visit Chile until June 7–9, 1976, when he attended the + OAS General Assembly there. + On January 6, the Embassy reported that although there had been + no major change in the human rights situation, some individuals + within the Chilean Government understood that the issue was + affecting Chile’s international image. (Telegram 84 from + Santiago, January 6; ibid., D750005–0495.) In telegram 131 from + Santiago, January 7, the Embassy commented on reports that + Pinochet and other + Chilean officials had become convinced of the need to curtail + human rights abuses. (Ibid., D750006–0976.) In telegram 726 from + Santiago, February 3, Popper reported that Chilean military officials + were “desperately concerned” by the prospect of a Peruvian + attack and by the refusal of the United States to provide even + minimal material and moral support. (Ibid., + D750038–0954.)

+ + + + + Santiago, January 3, 1975, 1725Z. + +

49. Subject: Conversation with President Pinochet.

+

1. Summary: President Pinochet + warmly welcomes Secretary’s visit; requests U.S. support for Paris Club + debt renegotiations; hopes U.S. can find way to help with military + assistance; and asserts centerpiece of GOC policy is friendship with U.S. End summary.

+

2. I called on President Pinochet + January 3 to solicit any views he might wish to express in advance of my + departure for participation in the COM + conference and consultation in Washington. Foreign Minister Carvajal and DCM were also present.

+

3. Secretary’s visit: President Pinochet began by expressing his genuine pleasure at the + prospect of Secretary Kissinger’s visit, asserting that it would be extremely + helpful. He noted that the GOC would + have an opportunity to expose the Secretary to the same views which had + been expressed to members of his policy planning staff during their + October visit here. In addition, the Secretary would have an opportunity + to observe for himself the reality of the Chilean situation, so + different from the image which has been created abroad. He thought this + particularly important in the area of human rights. The Secretary would + be able to see for himself that the Chilean Government respects human + rights. The President said he would not contend that abuses have not + occurred or that they do not still occur on occasion, but the fact is + that a military officer is serving a prison term as result of such + transgressions and there is no question but that abuses are rapidly + declining.

+ +

4. The Secretary would appreciate that Chile has special problems. It is + clearly impossible for the GOC to + handle the juridical aspect of armed terrorism other than by means of + military tribunals, since the civilian courts of ordinary justice have + no body of statute law envisaging such offenses. The President said he + had been holding discussions with the Minister of Justice with a view to + attempting to distinguish between violent acts and such offenses as + distribution of propaganda, remanding perpetrators of the latter + offenses to civilian courts. I agreed that a sharper distinction between + terrorist activities and other offenses could be helpful.

+

5. The President noted that official GOC + proposals for the release of 200 prisoners to Mexico were being carried + forward in such a way that President Echeverria would not be able to say + that he had no official knowledge of the GOC offer. President Pinochet said he hoped soon to be able to deliver the + 200 prisoners, “with Laura Allende at their head,” to Mexico.

+

6. I said that as of now the tentative date for the Secretary’s visit + remained February 18, but that this of course depended upon agreement + with other countries to be visited with regard to proposed dates. I said + we would be in touch further with the GOC as soon as more definite word was available.

+

7. The Foreign Minister asked that I determine the subjects the Secretary + would like to cover in order that the GOC might be fully responsive to his interests. He said he + assumed that the Secretary would wish to have GOC views on subjects on the agenda for the Buenos Aires + MFM. I said I would seek to + determine the Secretary’s interests and inform him. I said I shared his + assumption and further assumed that the Secretary would wish to have + Chilean views on bilateral matters and the human rights issue which + poses such problems for us.

+

8. Economic assistance: President Pinochet said the GOC + very much needs U.S. support in the next round of Paris Club debt + renegotiations. He noted that falling copper prices have posed a serious + balance of payments problem to the GOC + and that debt relief is essential for the GOC to manage the situation. I said I was hopeful that we + could be of assistance in this regard, as we had been last year.

+

9. President Pinochet also + expressed his strong desire that the USG avoid placing any obstacles in the way of potential + U.S. investors in Chile.

+

10. I said that far from impeding U.S. investment in Chile, we had hoped + to see it revive. We had begun some preliminary discussions with Chilean + authorities about renewed OPIC + operations here which might serve as a further incentive to potential + U.S. investors. I said that I would be considering with my colleagues in + Washington other possible ways in which we might be of assistance, including the possibilities of + guarantees for low-cost housing program and Ex-Im Bank activities.

+

11. Military assistance: The President said he could not fail to mention + GOC interest in U.S. military + assistance, noting that the GOC + remained hopeful that we would find a way to help. I said that both the + Department of State and the Embassy had exerted every effort to assist + Chile in this area. The executive branch, from President Ford down, had consistently opposed + restrictive legislation with regard to Chile. I read and left with the + Foreign Minister, President Ford’s December 30 comment on aid to Chile in his statement upon signing the FAA of 1974, noting that I had seen + nothing of this statement in the local press. The President grimaced at + the part of the statement in which President Ford indicated he shared Congressional + concern about the human rights situation, but seemed to take my point + about Presidential opposition to the military assistance cut-off for + Chile.

+

12. I also reminded the President of the Secretary’s conversation with + Chilean Chargé Guzman in which + the Secretary said we would work to change the restrictive legislation, + in the new Congress. However, I observed that this would inevitably + require some months. President Pinochet acknowledged that delay would be inevitable and + asserted he thought the new Congress would be more difficult than the + old one. I said that might be true, but other circumstances might also + change in the interim. I also noted that we were examining carefully how + much leeway the restrictive legislation left us with regard to military + training, and would be in touch with Chilean military leaders. President + Pinochet reminded me again + that during the Allende + Government he had made clear to my predecessor, to General Underwood, + USCINCSO, and to General + Maybry, USARSO, the Chilean army’s + unwillingness to accept Soviet arms even at the bargain prices and + favorable credit terms then being offered. He remarked that Chile was + now paying the price of having assumed that position.

+

13. GOC policy: General Pinochet concluded by saying the + United States will one day understand that Chile is a true friend, + probably the best, and perhaps the only true friend in the hemisphere. + Even though Chile is a better friend of the United States than the U.S. + is of Chile, friendship with the U.S. continues to be a centerpiece of + GOC policy. “In our case,” he said, + “that has always been true, and it is too late to change now.”

+ + + Popper + + +
+ +
+ 181. Memorandum From the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence + (Walters) to the President’s + Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) +

Summary: Walters + reported on a meeting with the Chief of the Chilean intelligence + service, Colonel Juan + Contreras. During the meeting, Contreras delivered a + memorandum from Pinochet + outlining the economic and military assistance desired by the + Chilean Government.

+

Source: Ford Library, + National Security Adviser, Kissinger-Scowcroft West Wing Office Files, Box 4, Chile. + Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only. A copy of the January 3 memorandum + from Pinochet that was + delivered by Contreras + to Walters is attached + and published. In a handwritten note attached to the memorandum, + Scowcroft suggested + to Kissinger that the + U.S. Government respond to Pinochet’s message by having Walters indicate that “we want + to do what we can,” and that Kissinger “would hope to discuss it if you are + able to visit Chile”; Kissinger approved. In a memorandum to Scowcroft, December 31, 1974, + Walters noted that + he had declined a Chilean invitation to Santiago for private + discussions with Pinochet, and that he had suggested, as an + alternative, that Contreras travel to the United States to meet + with him. He added that Contreras was scheduled to visit Washington + during the week of January 6–10 and was expected to deliver an + appeal for assistance from Pinochet. (Ibid., Box 3, CIA–Communications + 16)

+ + + + + Washington, January + 7, 1975. + + + SUBJECT + Conversation with Colonel Juan + Contreras, Chief of the Chilean Intelligence + Service + +

1. On 7 January 1975 I saw the Chief of the Chilean + Intelligence Service, Colonel Juan + Contreras, in my office. He came as a special envoy + from President Pinochet with + a message for you to be delivered through me. +

+

2. I saw Contreras alone for + forty-five minutes and then had him to lunch with two of my assistants. + While we were alone he handed me the attached memorandum from President + Pinochet.

+

3. + Contreras + told me: +

+

a. The Chilean Government has completely dismantled the + Armed Extremist Organization. They have infiltrated a member + into the Central Committee of the Chilean Communist Party. He tells them + that Communist instructions for the time being are to + lie low and avoid violence. +

+

b. President Pinochet is awaiting your visit with great pleasure + and interest. He is willing, following your visit, to take a number + of steps in the direction of human rights and let you have the + credit for having persuaded him to do it. He wants to do everything + he can to make your trip a success. They will take all + necessary unostentatious security precautions.

+

c. In great confidence Contreras told me that President Pinochet has decided to replace + Chilean Ambassador to U.S. Heitmann with a civilian politician who speaks good + English. Several names are under consideration. A man by the + name of Filippi is well up on the list.

+

d. Chileans do understand the current difficulties of both the U.S. + Government and the Agency and realize that they must help us to help + them.

+

e. They have released many prisoners including former + Ambassador to the U.S. Letettier but cannot release Socialist + Clodomiro Almeyda + yet. He was Allende’s + Vice President, and they fear that if they release him he will go to + Mexico and set up a Chilean Government in Exile that, given the present + mood of the UN, could easily obtain wide + recognition. After Allende’s and + Almeyda’s term runs out in + 1976 they could do it then.

+

f. Chileans are still very concerned by Peruvian + intentions and say Peruvians now have 137 tanks in Southern + Peru but not nearly enough tank crews. There are, however, both Soviet + and Cuban technicians there.

+

g. Private relations with President Peron and Argentines are excellent and the two Services + are exchanging information on terrorists.

+

h. If there are any subjects other than those covered + in the memorandum that you would like to take up with President + Pinochet, he would appreciate any information you would care to + transmit prior to your visit to Chile. +

+

3. I told Contreras that in + order to make it possible for us to help the Chilean Government they + must help us to help them by steps in the field of human rights and now + that they have dismantled armed subversion (as he told me) these should + be easier. He understood and accepted this. He went away quite happy + after reiterating President Pinochet’s invitation to me to visit Chile when I could. + I promised Contreras to + transmit President Pinochet’s + memorandum to you.

+

+ + Vernon A. + Walters + +

+

+ Lieutenant General, USA Deputy + Director +

+

Attachment as stated.

+ +

+ Memorandum from President delivered to Lt. General + Vernon A. Walters by + Colonel Juan Contreras + +

+

+ A. Economic

+

1. We need help from the U.S. to renegotiate the + Chilean external debt with the European Nations. +

+

2. Request EXIMBANK to be more forthcoming with credits + for Chile, for the copper, phosphate and steel industries. +

+

3. Use influence for favorable U.S. votes for Chile in + the International Economic Organizations (IBD, IMF, World Bank, + etc.). +

+

4. Obtain that AID + assist the Chilean Government. +

+ +

+ B. Military

+

1. That the U.S. assist us in some form to purchase + weapons (defensive) for the purpose of avoiding an armed conflict + with Peru. +

+ +

-250 tanks

+

-tank ammunition

+

-anti-tank missiles

+

-electronic surveillance of frontiers, air, sea and land

+

-logistic support for equipment delivered

+

-aircraft

+

-ships (submarines, mortar torpedo launchers, and landing craft)

+ +

2. Obtain a statement or pronouncement from the U.S. in + the sense that if Peru attacks Chile using the Russian equipment + they have that the U.S. will oppose this. +

+

3. Obtain the support of the U.S. against a possible + accusation against Chile if attacking Peru in the UN Security Council. This American + veto would have to be previous to a veto by China on the same + subject.

+

4. For the purchase of arms, if this is necessary, + authorize the formation of a company in the state of Delaware that + could make it possible to acquire and ship arms. +

+

Santiago 3 January 1975

+
+ +
+ 182. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for + Inter-American Affairs (Rogers) + to Secretary of State Kissinger + +

Summary: Rogers + briefed Kissinger on + Popper’s démarches + to Foreign Minister Carvajal and Interior Minister Benavides, in which the + Ambassador had stated that legal reform and improved human + rights practices would help to improve Chile’s international + image and to placate the Chilean Government’s critics.

+

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + P830132–0278. Confidential. Drafted by Hechtman and Gantz. Tabs A–D are attached + but not published. In Tab A, a February 6 memorandum to + Kissinger, Rogers listed the 10 démarches + Popper made to + Chilean officials on human rights from April 1974 to February + 1975; next to the entries for December 13, 1974, and February 3, + 1975, Kissinger wrote, + “What was this about?” Tab B is telegram 7578 from Santiago, + December 13, 1974. In Tab C, telegram 23898 to Santiago, + February 1, the Department instructed Popper to communicate to + Benavides that + legal reform, improved human rights practices, and a Chilean + invitation for an IAHRC visit + were important for Chile to restore its international + credibility. In Tab D, Telegram 789 from Santiago, February 4, + Popper relayed to + the Department that Benavides thought that Chilean efforts towards + legal reform and curbing human rights abuses were adequate. + Popper concluded + that future dialogue on the human rights problem should not be + conducted with Benavides.

+ + + + + Washington, February + 8, 1975. + +

+ Démarches in Chile on Human + Rights +

+

You inquired (TAB A) about Ambassador Popper’s meeting with Foreign Minister Carvajal of December 13 and his + meeting with Interior Minister Benavides of February 3.

+

1. December 13, 1974 Meeting: Ambassador Popper took advantage of a meeting called to review the + Ayacucho conference to brief the Foreign Minister on developments in + Congress regarding the FAA. Carvajal raised the question of what + kinds of “fundamental improvements” in observance of human rights would + be required to support the Presidential waiver provided in the original + House version of the bill. Ambassador Popper mentioned that Congressional critics might be + impressed and progress be possible if the GOC were to move towards restoration of normality regarding + the applicability of traditional Chilean legal requirements and the + state of siege, restoration of habeas corpus, a role for civil court + review of military sentences and convincing assurances regarding alleged + practice of torture (TAB B).

+

2. February 3, 1975 Meeting: In a conversation on another matter January + 30, Interior Minister Benavides asked Ambassador Popper to meet with him on civil rights matters. We + suggested several points that might be made (TAB C). Ambassador + Popper’s conversation + concentrated on the GOC’s detainee + release program, but Popper also + raised with Benavides the + significance to foreign observers of procedural safeguards and use of normal legal processes, + such as restoring the rule of law, habeas corpus, proper trials and + appeals. He also noted that the release of a few well known prisoners, + while important and welcome, was probably not sufficient to restore the + GOC’s image unless accompanied by + substantial progress in these other areas. Ambassador Popper’s report of the meeting is at + TAB D.

+

+ Attachments: +

+

TAB A-Briefing Memo Feb. 6

+

TAB B-Santiago 7578 Dec. 13

+

TAB C-State 023898

+

TAB D-Santiago 00789

+
+ +
+ 183. Memorandum From the Chief of the Latin America Division of the + Central Intelligence Agency (Phillips) to Director of Central Intelligence Colby + +

Summary: Phillips reported that U.S. officials had + persuaded the Chilean Government to take steps to curb human + rights abuses and to liberalize its policy toward the media.

+

Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of the Director of + Central Intelligence, Job 80M01542R: Executive Registry Subject + Files, Box 2, C–7: Chile. Secret. [drafting + information not declassified]. Sent through the DDO. A copy of the memorandum was + sent to Walters. In a + January 4 memorandum to Walters, [name not + declassified] asserted that the U.S. Congressional + cutoff of assistance to Chile was not having a significant + impact on Chilean policy. (Ibid.) In telegram 1118 from + Santiago, February 20, the Embassy reported on Pinochet’s February 18 + announcement, and observed that while there had been improvement + in the area of human rights, until progress was made “on other + fronts (due process, modifying state of siege), Chile will + continue to have both a problem and a poor world image.” + (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + D750061–0357)

+ + + + + Washington, February + 21, 1975. + + + SUBJECT + Efforts to Assure Greater Concern for Human Rights in Chile + +

1. On 18 February 1975 President Pinochet for the first time acknowledged publicly that + individuals had exceeded their authority and mistreated prisoners and + that many had been punished and some had been removed from their + positions. At the same time, he announced the establishment of medical + commissions to assure the good health of prisoners. The day before, he + reiterated that his regime had waved the power of prior censorship and announced that the + new Chilean constitution would contain provisions concerning freedom of + the press.

+

2. These statements represent the culmination of [less + than 1 line not declassified] efforts, begun in October 1974, + to improve the Chilean government’s policies on human rights [less than 1 line not declassified] In mid-October + [less than 1 line not declassified] + approached President Pinochet + and key members of the junta to persuade them to modify existing press + policies. On 31 October General Pinochet publicly renounced prior censorship of the + press and eased restrictions on foreign newsmen expelled from Chile.

+

3. In December, [less than 1 line not + declassified] convinced Air Force General Leigh and other senior members of the + junta that the government must improve its performance on human rights + in order to obtain loans and military aid from the U.S. and European countries. [less than 1 line not declassified] urged + President Pinochet publicly to + ban all forms of torture, to recognize habeas corpus, and promptly to + notify the interested parties in cases of arrest. The government + subsequently instructed all security services to notify appropriate + embassies when foreigners were arrested. Pinochet issued orders to all unit commanders to guard + against all forms of prisoner abuse.

+

4. In January, further representations were made to President Pinochet that he admit publicly + misdeeds by army personnel and [less than 1 line not + declassified] presented documented cases of torture and + mistreatment of prisoners directly to Pinochet. [less than 1 line not + declassified] that inspired Pinochet’s public announcements on 18 February. In + addition, the influence of [less than 1 line not + declassified] has resulted in a general reduction of sentences + for numerous detainees and in increased government efforts to persuade + other countries to accept Chilean political exiles.

+ + + David A. + Phillips + + Chief Latin America Division + + +
+ +
+ 184. Action Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for + Inter-American Affairs (Rogers), + the Director of the Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs (Vest), and the Assistant Secretary of + State for Congressional Relations (McCloskey) to Secretary of State Kissinger + +

Summary: Rogers, Vest, and McCloskey outlined options for Kissinger for FMS sales to Chile in light of + Congress’s prohibition on military assistance.

+

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + P830133–2615. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Karkashian and Michel on March 3. Sent + through Maw. Gantz, Richardson, and Stern concurred. A notation at + the top of the memorandum indicates that Kissinger “approved 1st recommendation” in telegram Secto + 77, March 7. On the first page of the memorandum, the phrase, + “as permitting cash sales,” is underlined, and a notation in the + margin reads, “DOD does not + concur, see Tab A supp[lement].” A notation next to the first + recommendation reads, “with respect to new items, consult + Congress.” The two tabs are not published. Tab A is a March 4 + memorandum from Leigh to + Maw providing a + legal opinion on the President’s authority to sell defense + articles and services to Chile. Tab B is a January 3 memorandum + from Foreman to Fish + transmitting an undated list of pending FMS actions. Telegram 42/Secto 77 from Aswan, March + 7, containing Kissinger’s approval and his instruction that + Congress be consulted regarding new items, is ibid., + P850014–1285. In a March 8 memorandum, Springsteen informed Rogers, + Vest, and McCloskey of Kissinger’s decision. (Ibid., + P830113–1174)

+ + + + + Washington, March 4, + 1975. + +

+ U.S. Military Sales to Chile +

+

The Problem

+

Section 25 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1974 denies the use of funds + for military assistance to Chile in FY + 1975. It also defines military assistance to include “sales, credits and guaranties,” thus raising the question of + whether FMS cash sales may be made. The + legislative history of this provision suggests that cash sales are not + prohibited, so long as no U.S. funds are involved. Nevertheless, + congressional opponents of U.S. cooperation with the present Government + of Chile (including Senator Kennedy, the sponsor of Section 25) may take the + position that this section was intended to cut off cash sales as well as + other forms of military assistance. The Legal Adviser has construed the + statute as permitting cash sales (Tab A), but has counseled in the + strongest terms that no action be taken on the basis of this + construction without prior congressional consultation.

+

The GOC has requested us to supply, on + an FMS cash sales basis, spare parts + difficult or impossible otherwise to obtain. A variety of options are + available. We can go ahead with cash sales or decline to make sales. If + it is decided to make cash sales, we can consult with the Congress + before making such sales, afterwards, or not at all. There are problems + and risks in each of the available choices.

+ +

Background/Discussion

+

Section 25 of the FAA states:

+ +

“Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the total amount of + assistance for Chile under the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, and + the Foreign Military Sales Act during Fiscal Year 1975, may not + exceed dollars 25,000,000, none of which may be made available for + the purpose of providing military assistance (including security + supporting assistance, sales, credit sales, or guarantees, or the + furnishing by any means of excess defense articles or items from + stockpiles of the Department of Defense).”

+ +

It is not clear whether the foregoing language is meant to be a + prohibition on the use of funds for military + “assistance” (defined so as to include cash sales), or a substantive + prohibition on such “assistance” altogether. Under the latter + interpretation, no new contracts could be signed and contracts already + entered into in FY 1975 will have to be + canceled or implemented but without assurance of delivery, i.e. + contractual arrangements already negotiated would be continued to retain + production priority standing and cost quotations, but no deliveries + would be made prior to the lifting of the Congressional restriction. (A + list of pending FMS sales actions is + attached at Tab B.)

+

The Chileans are particularly concerned by two amendments signed in + FY 1975 to contracts which were + signed in FY 1974. These are amendments, + signed on November 16 and December 23, to the FMS sales contract for 18 F–5E aircraft purchased on May + 15, 1974. The first amendment would change three of the eighteen + aircraft from the fighter to the trainer model; the second would add on + the sale of the Sidewinder missile, the aircraft’s principal armament. + The Chileans assumed that standard weaponry for the aircraft they had + purchased would be made available. It was not included in the original + contract; hence the amendment of December 23. The Chileans are also + greatly concerned by a sales contract signed October 24, 1974, for the + sale of spare parts required to keep operational a number of naval + vessels purchased from the U.S., including two surplus destroyers + transferred on January 8, 1974.

+

The Chileans contend that it makes no sense to deny essential items + without which equipment already purchased is of little or no use. They + argue that these post-July 1 amendments are not contracts for new items + but add-ons to the original contracts, and that in any case the FAA should correctly be interpreted to + permit FMS cash purchases. They do not + understand what they regard as an unnecessary reluctance on our part to + interpret and implement the legislation in a manner as favorable as + possible to Chile’s needs.

+

As you will recall, we had proposed delivering to Chile a minimal defense + package of M–48 tanks, APC’s and the + TOW anti-tank system. The FAA amendment ruled out that package, adding to Chilean + frustration and fear of growing Peruvian military superiority. (The + evidence of serious internal conflict in Peru may reduce this latter + pressure somewhat.) There is likely to be a substantial impact on our + relations with the Junta if we are perceived to be less than forthcoming + on these critical add-ons and spares.

+

In light of the ambiguity of the statute, and the apparent strong + hostility on the part of some members of Congress to U.S. military + cooperation with the present Government of Chile, a policy decision is + required. Although cash sales are possible as a matter of law, as + explained in the Legal Adviser’s opinion at Tab A, proceeding with such + sales in the absence of a fundamental change of GOC policy and practice with regard to human rights could + provoke Congressional charges that the intent of Congress had been + circumvented. This, in turn, could increase the likelihood of continued, + and perhaps even more stringent, legislative restrictions with respect + to Chile.

+

If we were to defer action on further cash sales until after June 30, + section 25 will expire (except for further obligations of U.S. funds + under a continuing resolution) and the risk of Congressional antagonism + to cash sales would be diminished accordingly.

+ +

The Options

+

1. Without prior Congressional sanction or consultation, proceed with the + following FMS procedures:

+

a. Cash sale and delivery of add-ons to existing contracts (i.e. + Sidewinder missile and change of three aircraft from fighter to trainer + model).

+

b. Cash sale and delivery of naval spare parts contracted prior to + enactment of Section 25 of the FAA.

+

c. Implementation short of delivery of all other FMS cash sales contracted prior to enactment of Section 25 + of the FAA, in order to allow the + GOC to continue applicable payment + procedures, retain production line priorities and existing quotations, + until the congressional restriction is lifted.

+

+ Pros: +

+

—Would confirm to GOC our commitment to + be supportive.

+

—Would enhance Chile’s defensive capability and thus contribute to + regional peace and stability.

+

—Would reduce GOC temptation to make + costly, desperation purchases from other sources.

+ + +

+ Cons: +

+

—Could arouse strong congressional disagreement with our interpretation + and application of the law, which could adversely affect future + assistance to Chile and other Administration programs.

+

—Could reduce pressure on GOC to enact + human rights reforms.

+

—Could encourage the Chileans to request additional FMS cash sales.

+

2. Without prior congressional sanction, but rapidly informing key + Congressmen of our action, proceed with the following FMS procedures:

+

a. Cash sale and delivery of add-ons to existing contracts (i.e. + Sidewinder missile and change of three aircraft from fighter to trainer + model).

+

b. Cash sale and delivery of naval spare parts contracted prior to + enactment of Section 25 of the FAA.

+

c. Implementation short of delivery of all other FMS cash sales contracted prior to enactment of Section 25 + of the FAA, in order to allow the + GOC to continue applicable payment + procedures, retain production line priorities and existing quotations, + until the congressional restriction is lifted.

+

+ Pros: +

+

—Would confirm to GOC our commitment to + be supportive.

+

—Assuming Congress did not call a halt, would enhance Chile’s defensive + capability and thus contribute to regional peace and stability.

+

—Assuming Congress did not call a halt, would reduce GOC temptation to make costly, desperation + purchases from other sources.

+

+ Cons: +

+

—Would arouse strong congressional disagreement which could adversely + affect future assistance to Chile and other Administration programs.

+

—Could reduce pressure on GOC to enact + human rights reforms.

+

—Assuming Congress did not call a halt, could make it more difficult to + resist Chilean requests for additional FMS cash sales.

+

3. Take no action to implement particular sales without prior + consultation with key congressional leaders. Seek to confirm political + acceptability of our interpretation, and cite progress already made on + human rights and need to offer incentive to Chileans for additional and + fundamental changes.

+

+ Pros: +

+

—Would be helpful in assuring GOC that + we still wish to be supportive.

+

—Would reduce risk of adverse congressional reaction.

+ + +

+ Cons: +

+

—Could result in congressional rejection of this interpretation, thereby + effectively blocking further military sales during fiscal year.

+

—Would continue to keep GOC dangling on + issue of vital importance to it.

+

4. Put aside issue of whether pending FMS cash sales remain permissible. Make no deliveries on + any pending FMS contracts. However, + allow GOC, if it chooses, to continue + applicable payment procedures to retain production line priorities and + existing cost quotations but make no deliveries until congressional + restriction is lifted. Carry out above without congressional + consultation.

+

+ Pros: +

+

—Would indicate some flexibility on our part on Chile’s behalf.

+

—Would at least assure present production line priorities and costs if + and when restriction is lifted.

+

—Reduce risk of adverse congressional reaction.

+

+ Cons: +

+

—Would still not give Chile anything now.

+

—Could be misleading and even more damaging to bilateral relations than + outright cancellation if GOC continues + to make payments on contracts and restriction is not lifted.

+

5. Treat legislative restrictions as if they were applicable to FMS cash sales. Offer GOC option to cancel or continue + implementation of post-July 1 FMS cash + sales cases with understanding that delivery cannot be made prior to + lifting of restriction. Couple this action with strong démarche on human + rights.

+

+ Pros: +

+

—Would be best received by Congress and Chile critics.

+

—Would put maximum pressure on GOC to + enact basic human rights reforms.

+

+ Cons: +

+

—Would do damage to our current and longer range bilateral relations by + demonstrating an apparent indifference to Chile’s perception of its + vital national interests.

+

—Would increase GOC’s sense of + isolation, and might strengthen hardline elements who argue for a + go-it-alone policy.

+

—Would increase likelihood of costly, desperation buys of equipment + wherever possible with adverse effects on acute balance of payments + problem.

+

6. Take no action on the FMS cash sales + issue at this time. If progress on human rights reforms continues and + major changes are effected we can revert to more permissive options.

+ +

+ Pros: +

+

—Would avoid adverse congressional reaction.

+

—Could provide incentive to the GOC to + make basic human rights reforms.

+

+ Cons: +

+

—Would tend to confirm GOC fears that + USG is indifferent to its fate.

+

—Would continue to keep GOC dangling on + this crucial issue and could risk hardening of its position on human + rights.

+

—Would continue risk of costly, desperation military purchases from other + sources with concurrent repercussions on balance of payments.

+

Probable Other Agency Views:

+

+ DOD has been looking to State for policy + guidance on how to handle FMS cash + sales cases.

+

Recommendations:

+

That you approve, without prior congressional sanction or consultation: + a) sale and delivery of add-ons to existing contracts; b) sale and + delivery of naval spare parts contracted prior to enactment of Section + 25, FAA; and c) implementation short of + delivery on all other FMS cash sales + contracted prior to enactment of Section 25, FAA (Option 1). Supported by ARA. L does not concur in this recommendation.

+

ALTERNATIVELY, that you approve, without prior congressional sanction, + but rapidly informing key Congressmen: a) sale and delivery of add-ons + to existing contracts; b) sale and delivery of naval spare parts + contracted prior to enactment of Section 25, FAA; and c) implementation short of delivery on all other + FMS cash sales contracted prior to + enactment of Section 25, FAA (Option + 2). Supported by PM.

+

ALTERNATIVELY, that you approve consultations with key congressional + leaders in order to confirm acceptability of cash sales limited to spare + parts and add-ons (Option 3). Supported by L and H.

+

L and H believe that any decision to permit cash sales to Chile which is + not first found to be acceptable to the Congress would be exceptionally + inadvisable in light of the text of the statute, strong congressional + interest in Chile, and the apparent intent of many members of the + Congress to prohibit all military sales to that country. These factors + would make a policy of reliance on a permissive interpretation of the + law exceedingly difficult to defend in the absence of congressional + acquiescence and would risk more restrictive legislation. Accordingly, + both L and H strongly recommend prior congressional consultations in + order to determine whether, in fact, such an interpretation would be + politically acceptable.

+ +

ALTERNATIVELY, that we put aside issue of whether pending FMS cash sales remain permissible and + allow GOC if it chooses, to continue + applicable payment procedures on the clear understanding that no + deliveries can be made until the congressional restriction is lifted + (Option 4).

+

ALTERNATIVELY, that we decline to consider further FMS cash sales to Chile and so inform the + GOC, coupled with a strong démarche + on human rights (Option 5).

+

ALTERNATIVELY, that we take no action until there is clear and public + evidence of major human rights reforms following which we can pursue + Options 1, 2 or 3 (Option 6).

+

Attachments:

+

Tab A—Legal Adviser’s Opinion.

+

Tab B—List of pending FMS sales + actions.

+
+ +
+ 185. Memorandum From Ambassador Popper to the Assistant Secretary of State for + Inter-American Affairs (Rogers) +

Summary: Popper + provided Rogers with a + briefing on outstanding issues with Chile upon his arrival in + Santiago for meetings with Chilean officials.

+

Source: National Archives, RG 59, ARA Files, Assistant Secretary Files, Subject and + Country Files: Lot 78D261, Chile, Secretary Kissinger’s Visit, April 1975. + Secret. Rogers was in + Chile from March 11 to March 12. (Telegram 1434 from Santiago, + March 7; ibid., Central Foreign Policy File, D750081–0002) The + papers enclosed with this memorandum have not been found. In + telegram 2023 from Lima, March 12, Rogers reported on his meeting with Pinochet, in + which Kissinger’s + planned visit to Chile was discussed. Pinochet urged that Kissinger be made familiar + with Chile’s economic problems, and he referred to his + Government’s interest in arms purchases in response to Peru’s + military build-up. (Ibid., D750087–0183) Kissinger’s projected visit to + Chile was subsequently postponed; he did not travel to Santiago + until June 1976. During an April 2 staff meeting, Kissinger indicated that he + wanted Chilean debt rescheduled at a meeting of the Paris Club + so that the IBRD would find + Chile creditworthy, thus allowing the possibility of loans. + (Ibid., Transcripts of Kissinger Staff Meetings, Lot 78D443, Box 6, + Secretary’s Principals’ and Regionals’ Staff + Meetings)

+ + + + + Santiago, March 11, + 1975. + + + SUBJECT + Special Briefing Points + +

I apologize for the length of the enclosed papers, but believe if you + have time to read them, they will be of some assistance to you.

+

Let me mention particularly a few outstanding features.

+ +

1. The Chileans’ interest in Hemisphere problems is secondary to their + interest in bilateral US-Chilean problems. Your visit will help them to + make up their minds about inter-American issues. As to internal Chilean + matters, you will find that the situation has changed only very slightly + in recent months.

+

2. The Chileans want three things from us: first, a resumption of the + arms shipment process; second, continuing and expanded economic + assistance, particularly through the Paris Club and the international + financial institutions at this time; third, a greater understanding of + the relationship between their internal security problem as they see it + and the controversy over human rights.

+

3. With respect to human rights, it will be worth while to reiterate that + a policy of releasing political detainees into exile is not in itself a + solution to the problem. Much more is needed. At this moment, the + Chileans face a real setback, if they should decide not to admit the + UN Human Rights Commission study + group. I hope you will mention the consequences of a refusal to do + so.

+

4. As to the Secretary’s trip, the Chileans will do everything possible + to be helpful. There will be no substantive or security problems. We + will need a reading from you as to the possibility of putting up the + Secretary in a private residence which has been offered to us, or in the + Embassy residence: there are fairly serious drawbacks in using either of + the two best hotels.

+

5. Pursuant to your instruction, we have deferred action on the PDC request that you, and Secretary + Kissinger, arrange to meet + with President Frei individually. We will need an early decision on this + matter.

+
+ +
+ 186. Telegram 1947 From the Embassy in Chile to the Department of + State +

Summary: + Ambassador Popper + reported that the Chilean reaction to the U.S. Government’s ban + on military assistance had initially been restrained but that + resentment and anti-U.S. sentiment seemed to be growing within + the Chilean Government.

+

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + D750114–0750. Confidential; Exdis. In telegram 282507 to + Santiago, December 27, 1974, the Department instructed the + Embassy to “reflect on the effect in Chile of the congressional + arms ban.” (Ibid., D740376–0267) USDAO Brasília Message No. 146 and DATT–IR0076 have not been + found.

+ + + + + Santiago, April 2, 1975, 1612Z. + +

1947. Subject: Growth of Anti-US Sentiment in Chile. For Assistant + Secretary Rogers From + Ambassador. Ref: State 282507, Dec 27, 1974.

+

1. I have kept in mind your interest in being fully informed of the + effects in Chile of the congressional arms ban (reftel). In our messages + immediately following passage of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1974 we + pointed out that the ban was only one of several factors impinging upon + Chilean opinion, and that it would be difficult to isolate the effect of + this particular action, but that we would do our best to advise you of + changes in Chilean attitudes as they occurred.

+

2. In the succeeding three months we have been impressed with the mature + and restrained reaction to the arms ban, and to FAA limitations on economic assistance, on the part of the + Chileans, including military officers of higher rank in and out of + government. In general Chileans have couched their comments to us in + terms of sorrow rather than anger, with an unusual understanding of the + way in which the Congressional majority has prevented the executive + branch from moving forward with what Chileans had regarded as + commitments to improve their military matériel base vis-à-vis Peru. + Whatever bitterness they have felt they have kept largely to + themselves.

+

3. I sense the beginning of a change in the Chileans’ foreberance. The + change is coming about less because of the arms ban than because of the + intensely dramatic impact, among the Chileans, of the difficulties which + have enveloped US foreign policy on so many fronts in recent weeks. + Lacking a sense of history, a good many Chileans are prone to sell the + US short; to conclude that we are either less capable or less dependable + than they had thought; and to draw the conclusion that our deficiencies + are at least in part the result of our softness toward communism. + Without being at all clear on what alternatives they have, these voices + suggest that perhaps Chile should increasingly look elsewhere for + support. And there is an anti-American edge to their comments.

+ +

4. I commend to you two rather striking messages in this regard. The + first, describing the remarks of Chilean officers in Brazil, is + contained in USDAO Brasilia message + no. 146 of March 1975 (IR 6-809-0082-75, 311400Z March 75). This message + was sent to DIA and not to State, but I + am sure your staff can get it. The second message is one from our own + DAO (DATT-IR0076 April 75) and makes very much the same sort of + point, in more detail. It has been repeated to State.

+

5. I do not want to exaggerate. There has been no appreciable change in + the position of the Government, and no Government spokesman has reacted + to any Embassy personnel in the terms used in these messages. But + because this is almost totally a military government, the thoughts + expressed by the Chilean military on the professional level are bound to + percolate upward, and the effects are likely soon to become + apparent.

+

6. To come back to the arms ban, I would point out that the series of + rebuffs the Chileans think they have received from US gives a powerful + impetus to such anti-US sentiments. The Chileans are smarting from what + they regard as the double standard applied to them by critics abroad who + condone much more comprehensive human rights violations in communist + States. One element to be weighed in deciding how far the USG should go in applying military and + economic pressures against Chile on human rights grounds is the + possibility that the Chilean reaction may weaken the position of + moderate and reasonable men in this country. To the extent that this + happens, our leverage in seeking improved human rights practices through + persuasion will be reduced. I am not suggesting that we change our + present stance on these matters, but simply pointing out what the + consequences might be, in the developing atmosphere.

+ + + Popper + + +
+ + +
+ 187. Telegram 2055 From the Embassy in Chile to the Department of + State +

Summary: Minister + of Economic Coordination Saez informed Popper that the Chilean + Government planned to announce a series of measures that would + result in an improvement of Chile’s human rights practices.

+

Source: Ford Library, + National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for Latin + America, Box 3, Chile, State Department Telegrams, + SECSTATE–NODIS. Secret; + Immediate; Nodis. On April 10, Popper reported that Saez had informed him that + the inclusion of more civilians in Pinochet’s Cabinet would help bring about + improvements in the human rights area. (Telegram 2160 from + Santiago, April 10; ibid.) The Decree Law on National Security, + April 30, decreed that detainees would either be charged or + released within five days, and that notification of family + members would take place within two days. However, the Embassy + reported that the measure represented “little substantive change + from legal situation concerning national emergency and status of + detainees which has existed since Sept 1973 coup.” (Telegram + 3084 from Santiago, May 2; National Archives, RG 59, Central + Foreign Policy File, D750155–0617) Although the Minister of + Justice assured U.S. officials that the law would change the + Chilean Government’s detention practices, the ICRC reported that no such change + occurred. (Telegram 4454 from Santiago, June 23; ibid., + D750218–0556)

+ + + + + Santiago, April 7, 1975, 0010Z. + +

2055. Subject: Chile—Prospective Modifications in Human Rights Practices + For Assistant Secretary Rogers + from Popper.

+

1. Summary. After meeting with junta, Min Econcoord Raul Saez informs us + he expects GOC to announce within a + week series of measures which if effective would result in some + improvement of Chilean Govt human rights practices. Saez is pushing for + additional measures. Believes failure to include Chile in Secretary’s + Latin American itinerary would set back his efforts, unless entire trip + were called off. End summary.

+

2. As you know, I have been talking discreetly for the last week or so + with FonMin Carvajal and Raul + Saez, to see what might be done in the human rights area to make it + easier for the Secretary to included Chile in his trip. While full of + good will, Carvajal has so far + been unproductive. Saez however, is desperately seeking progress in the + human rights area in order to salvage Chile’s tottering foreign credit + standing. He succeeded in arranging a meeting evening April between the + four members of the junta and its economic team (Saez, Minister of + Economy Fernando Leniz, Minister of Finance Jorge Cauas) and filled me in on + results April 6.

+

3. Saez says he put the case for an improvement in human rights practices + very strongly, having in mind your private talk with him when you were + here, and mine thereafter. Pinochet reacted explosively, but subsequently calmed + down, and by end of meeting agreement had been reached on following + points.

+

4. First, a decree law modifying the constitution is to be issued—Saez + believes, by April 8—which will provide that notwithstanding the existence of any declared State of + Emergency, any person detained by police or security forces must have + his case presented to the appropriate tribunal within five days of + arrest. Choice of tribunal (whether military or civil) will depend on + provisions of Chilean law with respect to alleged offense. In effect, + decree would restore concept of amparo (habeas corpus), making legally + impossible the prolonged secret detention of internal security detainees + which is now common.

+

5. Second measure will be publication of a new anti-terrorism law which + will modernize inadequate and outdated Chilean legislation in this area + and thus serve to clarify proper role of internal security authorities + and courts in this field. New law, which junta has been promising for + weeks to produce, exists in draft. It will stand until superseded by a + new-code of National Security.

+

6. Third step, to be taken partly to help in dealing with current dispute + in Germany over economic assistance to Chile, is a clarification of what + GOC will do to release internal + security detainees now in custody. Saez says he may himself be able to + announce in few days that Chile will release all 1,107 detainees + currently held without charge under state of siege provisions, as soon + as countries can be found to receive them. (Up to now, Chileans have + been insisting first increment of one hundred must be fully placed + before others can be processed.) Saez also expects a more definite + commitment from Government that internal security detainees being tried + or already sentenced, numbering three to four thousand in all, will + eventually be permitted to go into exile.

+

7. Fourth measure will be a formal request from Pinochet to commission [garble] of + jurists junta early on appointed, for a progress report on new + constitution it is drafting. So far, commission has been moving at a + snail’s pace, purpose would be to energize it, and I presume to + stimulate discussion re the kind of new democratic system the projected + constitution is to embody.

+

8. Fifth, Pinochet will announce + that a new system of voter registration and identification is to be + worked out to avoid repetition of the electoral fraud which allegedly + inflated the Allende regime’s + pluralities. No commitment as to when or how an election or plebiscite + would be held, but the implication would be clear.

+

9. Sixth, Pinochet will continue + to demand that the UN Human Rights + Commission seek to send study commissions to the USSR and Cuba, but will admit the Chile + study group regardless of the response.

+

10. On one point, Saez failed to get the junta’s agreement. He tried hard + to arrange for the appointment of civilian sectors to replace the + military men heading up Chile’s two leading universities: the University + of Chile and Catholic University in Santiago. He will revert to this + matter. Further, at a meeting with the junta scheduled for April 8, he + intends to press for + increasing civilian participation in the cabinet. Specifically, he wants + the ministers of public works, housing, mines, and justice (i.e., one + held by each of the armed forces and one carabinero) to be headed by + civilians. The military occupants of the first three posts, he points + out, have no conception of how to use properly the substantial public + funds they control.

+

11. I complimented Saez for his political courage and told him I thought + that if his program were actually carried out, it might mark something + of a turning point in the human rights situation here. The root of the + problem seemed to me to be the absolute power of DINA (National Intelligence Agency) to do + whatever it desired in detaining and handling suspects. The most + difficult problems we had in our Embassy had to do with allegations of + torture. Could not something be done to make it clear that the + government opposed maltreatment? If as we had heard, officers and men + had been punished for torture, could not the government publish the + facts?

+

12. Saez said he had remonstrated with Pinochet about DINA, + so far without much success. He was also pushing for the return to Chile + of Renan Fuentealba, a Christian Democratic leader summarily expelled + from Chile some months ago on very flimsy grounds. He believed he had + heard that over two hundred persons had been punished for mistreating + detainees. Some had received long prison terms. I said this was an + astonishing figure, but I urged that if his information were correct, it + be published at once. Saez said he thought it might already have been + used, in a television program in Germany last week.

+

13. Comment. Saez made it plain that he has been having hard sledding. He + complained of what he termed fascist advisers to the junta. He believes, + nonetheless, that the six decisions listed above will become matters of + public knowledge within one week. I am not so sanguine, given the + government’s propensity to wobble on matters of central significance to + it. But if Saez keeps pushing, as he will, I am inclined to believe that + the financial squeeze may eventually be effective in bringing the junta + around. These measures will not in themselves dismantle the junta’s + internal security system. But they could start a trend toward confining + that system somewhat more closely to actions actually necessary to + prevent subversion.

+

14. Finally, Saez said he hoped the Secretary would not omit Chile from + his South American itinerary. Failure to come here would set back + efforts to liberalize the situation, this would not be the case if the + entire trip were cancelled, but it would be if the Secretary visited + other South American countries.

+ + + Popper + + +
+ +
+ 188. Memorandum of Conversation +

Summary: During a breakfast meeting, Kissinger, Rogers, Carvajal, and Trucco discussed human rights + violations in Chile and the junta’s efforts to obtain weapons + from the United States and other countries.

+

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + P820125–0227. Secret; Nodis. The meeting took place in the James + Madison Dining Room in the Department. Drafted by Ryan; cleared by Rogers; + approved by Gompert on + May 13. A memorandum of Kissinger’s conversation with Ford at 9:30 a.m. on May 9 + does not indicate any discussion of military sales to Chile. + (Ford Library, + National Security Adviser, Memoranda of Conversation, Box 11, + May 9, 1975)

+ + + + + Washington, May 9, 1975, 8 a.m. + + + + + SUBJECT + The Secretary’s Breakfast Conversation with Foreign Minister + Carvajal of Chile of May + 8th, 1975 + + + PARTICIPANTS + + + Chile + + Foreign Minister Patricio + Carvajal + + Ambassador Manuel + Trucco + + Ambassador Enrique + Bernstein (Foreign Ministry Political Advisor) + + U.S. + + The Secretary + Assistant Secretary William D. + Rogers + + Deputy Assistant Secretary Hewson A. + Ryan (Notetaker) + + + +

[Omitted here is discussion of reform of the Inter-American system; the + U.S. Trade Bill; a possible Kissinger trip to Latin America; Cuba; an Uruguayan + initiative on commodities and energy; and the Panama Canal + treaties.]

+

Amb. Trucco: We are also faced + with the problem of the Human Rights Commission report. It is not really + a report, but rather a document prepared for us and then given to the + United Nations at Geneva. This is an item on the agenda. Some countries + have come to us saying they do not want a discussion but indicate a + statement from Chile stating that the U.N. Commission is coming and that + any discussion now would prejudice the U.N. investigation.

+

The Secretary: What do you want?

+

Amb. Trucco: We are prepared to + discuss the case if it is a serious approach and not a propagandistic + approach. We have made much progress in recent months.

+

The Secretary: I hold the strong view that human rights are not + appropriate for discussion in a foreign policy context. I am alone in + this. It is not shared by my colleagues in the Department of State or on + the Hill. We are interested in + foreign policy, but there are strong pressures which must be taken into + account. Chilean foreign policy supports the United States. Your government is much better for U.S. + interests than its predecessor. However, it is in our mutual interest + for us to avoid embarrassment. We will not do anything to embarrass your + government but we cannot go through this General Assembly without some + mention of human rights. We will give strong support to keep it in the + lowest key possible. We will not harass you. We think you have made + progress in human rights.

+

It would be helpful, however, if before my arrival something more could + be done, but that is your sovereign decision to make. We will have to + make some statement on human rights in this session, but we will show it + to you and listen to your views in advance.

+

Mr. Minister: This matter could lead to a very long session, perhaps of + several days length. Some countries prefer to say in the conversations + that “We will send the matter to the U.N., so let us not take it up + here.”

+

The Secretary: We have no reason to oppose this. That would probably be + best. Will it be acceptable?

+

Mr. Rogers: We could perhaps arrange a very short discussion with a + mention of the U.N. human rights group.

+

Amb. Trucco: We have indications + that Mexico will make a sharp speech. That would produce a reply.

+

The Secretary: You mean you will reply?

+

Amb. Trucco: Yes.

+

The Secretary: We will not be the first to speak.

+

Mr. Minister: We prefer to send this matter to the U.N.

+

The Secretary: Wouldn’t you have problems when you take it to the + U.N.?

+

Amb. Trucco: It is already + there.

+

The Secretary: Who is on the U.N. group, Uganda?

+

Amb. Trucco: Pakistan, Ecuador, + Senegal, Austria and Sierra Leone.

+

The Secretary: Pakistan? There is a great defender of human rights.

+

Mr. Rogers: It’s really a fairly good group.

+

The Secretary: We will not use the human rights issue to harass Chile. We + will show you what we plan to say.

+

Amb. Trucco: If it could be + transferred to the conversations, it may be better.

+

Mr. Rogers: We will have a statement in reserve and will show it to + you.

+

The Secretary: I will not initiate it in the conversation. If it comes up + in the general debate, we will have a short statement. We intend to help + you avoid ostracism. I think that Chile’s record on human rights is + improving. Our particular intention is to be as helpful as possible to the Government of Chile as + we can. We cannot always do this in view of the current Congressional + climate.

+

Mr. Minister: Thank you.

+

The Secretary: What other problems?

+

Mr. Minister: Weapons, particularly defense weapons, are a great + need.

+

The Secretary: Didn’t we work out an agreement for sales through a + commercial channel?

+

Mr. Rogers: The guidance systems for the TOWs are manufactured only in arsenals.

+

The Secretary: Couldn’t they buy some third country’s, like Iran?

+

Mr. Rogers: No.

+

The Secretary: Who thought that arrangement up? How did we get involved + in this retroactive business?

+

Mr. Rogers: Congress. But hopefully it will expire on June 30. We have to + persuade Congress that if there is a continuing resolution that part of + the law will not be included. We are going to do our best.

+

The Secretary: I am in complete disagreement with the lawyers and I will + take it up with the President. I will call Schlesinger today. What are the items—TOWs?

+

Mr. Rogers: Yes TOWs, the weapons + support on aircraft, are the main problem.

+

Amb. Trucco: Also spare parts for + the Army.

+

Mr. Rogers: And Navy, too . . .

+

Amb. Trucco: In the Air Force + there is also the case of the engines in England. We can’t have the + engines on our Hawker Hunters overhauled.

+

Mr. Minister: If we can be of any help to the United States, we wish to + offer our assistance. I remember that the Chief of Naval Intelligence + came to Chile and indicated interest in information which we might + develop on the activities of Russian submarines and ships in the area. + We had on Easter Island some U.S. surveillance equipment which was + removed in the time of the previous government. We would be glad to + offer our collaboration on Easter Island now, but we don’t have the + equipment.

+

The Secretary: We had this program before?

+

Mr. Minister: Yes, but if you made this offer now, we would be willing to + collaborate.

+

The Secretary: I’ll look into the sales problem. I want the paper on this + before 9:45 when I go to the President. I’ll take it up with him.

+

What’s Kennedy’s attitude?

+

Mr. Rogers: I talked with his staff yesterday and they had not heard of + the new developments in human rights. They were pleased.

+ +

The Secretary: I’ll look into the problem. What’s the basis of the + disagreement?

+

Mr. Rogers: Differences between our lawyers and the DoD lawyers.

+

The Secretary: I’ll do my best. I wish to reaffirm my attitude on human + rights. Our intention is to avoid economic isolation. If you can help us + with our domestic problems, it would be most helpful. I am not making it + a formal issue, but it would be helpful if something could be done when + I go to Latin America. Since you extended the courteous invitation, I + will certainly stop in Chile.

+

Who’s in the chair?

+

Mr. Rogers: It’s a temporary Chairman now and there’s some talk of + Lievano.

+

The Secretary: Will there be any order?

+

Mr. Rogers: No.

+

The Secretary: Then there will be chaos. Do I have to reply to all of the + issues?

+

Mr. Rogers: No, not all of them are against the United States.

+

The Secretary: Are we expected to express a view on all of them?

+

Mr. Rogers: No, in fact on the Uruguayan issue on oil, we probably + shouldn’t.

+

The Secretary: Rogers thinks that + I shouldn’t because it’s the one issue I know something about.

+

Mr. Minister: Thank you again Mr. Secretary for your kindness.

+

The Secretary: Mr. Rogers will + see you to the door downstairs.

+
+
+ 189. Memorandum Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency + + + Washington, May 12, + 1975. + +

[Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of the Director of Central + Intelligence, Job 80M01542R: Executive Registry Subject Files, Box 2, + C–7: Chile. Secret. 1 page of source text not declassified.]

+
+ + +
+ 190. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security + Affairs (Kissinger) to President + Ford + +

Summary: Kissinger recommended that + Ford approve the + immediate resumption of limited FMS sales and deliveries to Chile.

+

Source: Ford Library, + National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for Latin + America, Box 3, Chile 2. Secret. Sent for action. Scowcroft initialed for + Kissinger. Ford approved the + recommendation. Tabs A–D are not published. Tab A is an unsigned + and undated memorandum from Kissinger to Schlesinger and Ingersoll informing them of Ford’s decision to resume + FMS sales and deliveries. + Tab B is a March 4 memorandum from Leigh to Maw giving a legal opinion on the President’s + authority to sell defense articles and services to Chile. Tab C + is a March 24 memorandum from Forman to Fish outlining the legal position of the + Department of Defense on military sales to Chile. Tab D is a May + 15 letter from 101 Congressmen to Kissinger indicating their understanding that + cash military sales to Chile would be unaffected by the + legislative restrictions on military assistance. In a May 20 + memorandum to Kissinger + under which a draft of the May 26 memorandum was transmitted, + Granger asserted + that the legal positions of both the Department of State and the + Department of Defense were supportable and concluded that + “political considerations favor the immediate resumption of + limited FMS sales and + deliveries.” (Ibid.)

+ + + + + Washington, May 26, + 1975. + + + SUBJECT + U. S. Military Sales to Chile + +

Section 25 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1974 denies the use of funds + for military assistance to Chile in FY + 1975. It also defines military assistance to include “sales, credits and + guaranties,” thus raising the question of whether FMS cash sales may be made. Congressional + opponents of U.S. cooperation with the present Government of Chile + (including Senator Kennedy, the + sponsor of Section 25) may take the position that this section was + intended to cut off cash sales as well as other forms of military + assistance. The Department of State has construed the statute as permitting cash sales (Tab B). The Department of + Defense does not concur in this interpretation (Tab C).

+

Section 25 of the FAA states:

+ +

“Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the total amount of + assistance for Chile under the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, and + the Foreign Military Sales Act during Fiscal Year 1975, may not + exceed dollars 25,000,000, none of which may be made available for + the purpose of providing military assistance (including security + supporting assistance, sales, credit sales, or guarantees, or the + furnishing by any means of excess defense articles or items from + stockpiles of the Department of Defense).”

+ +

There is some doubt whether the foregoing language is meant to be a + prohibition on the use of funds for military + “assistance” (defined so as to include cash sales), or a substantive + prohibition on such “assistance” altogether. Under the latter interpretation (Defense’s position) no + new contracts could be signed and contracts already entered into in + FY 1975 would have to be cancelled + or implemented but without assurance of delivery, i.e., contractual + arrangements already negotiated would be continued to retain production + priority standing and cost quotations, but no deliveries would be made + prior to the lifting of the Congressional restriction.

+

The Chileans are particularly concerned by two amendments signed in + FY 1975 to contracts which were + signed in FY 1974. These are amendments, + signed on November 16 and December 23, to the FMS sales contract for eighteen F-5E aircraft purchased on + May 15, 1974. The first amendment would change three of the eighteen + aircraft from the fighter to the trainer model; the second would add on + the sale of the Sidewinder missile, the aircraft’s principal armament. + The Chileans assumed that standard weaponry for the aircraft they had + purchased would be made available. It was not included in the original + contract; hence the amendment of December 23. The Chileans are also + greatly concerned by a sales contract signed October 24, 1974, for the + sale of spare parts required to keep operational a number of naval + vessels purchased from the U.S., including two surplus destroyers + transferred on January 8, 1974.

+

The Chileans contend that it makes no sense to deny essential items + without which equipment already purchased is of little or no use. They + argue that these post-July 1 amendments are not contracts for new items + but add-ons to the original contracts, and that in any case the FAA should correctly be interpreted to + permit FMS cash purchases. They do not + understand what they regard as an unnecessary reluctance on our part to + interpret and implement the legislation in a manner as favorable as + possible to Chile’s needs.

+

The legal positions of the two Departments are summarized below:

+

+ Department of State: Section 25 of the Foreign + Assistance Act of 1974 is an ambiguous provision of law. This ambiguity + results from the fact that the statute is a combination of two + amendments to the bill. The legislative history reveals that both + amendments had their origin in efforts directed at limiting or + prohibiting the use of appropriated funds for assistance to Chile in + FY 1975. Further, although some + inconsistent remarks were made in the Senate debate, the predominant + view expressed in the legislative history, and particularly in the + highly authoritative conference report, reflecting the intent of + representatives of both Houses, is that Section 25 was intended to bar + the use of appropriated funds for military assistance and the financing + of military sales to Chile. Therefore, on the basis of the statutory + language and the intent of Congress disclosed by the legislative + history, the Department of State concludes that Section 25 does not + constitute a legal bar to the execution or performance of cash sales + contracts under the Foreign Military Sales Act which are not financed by U.S. credits or U.S. + guaranteed loans made to the Government of Chile in prior fiscal + years.

+

The Department of State Legal Advisor is of the opinion that unless + further legislation is enacted cash sales will clearly be permissable + after June 30, 1975, but believes that further legislation is + likely.

+

+ Department of Defense: On its face, Section 25 + (Kennedy Amendment) of the + FAA expressly prohibits “sales” as + well as credit sales during FY 1975. + Further, the text of the Amendment is phrased in terms of a prohibition + on assistance rather than the use of funds. Accordingly, there is no + question of any ambiguity which might have been raised by a prohibition + on the use of funds for making cash sales. The Department of Defense + does not share the Department of State’s view that the word “sales” + should be read out of the Kennedy + Amendment and, further, that the Amendment should be construed as a + prohibition on the use of funds rather than on assistance as such.

+

Defense does not believe the legislative history of the Amendment + provides persuasive support for the State position. Senator Kennedy introduced his Amendment on the + floor of the Senate on August 5, 1974. As originally introduced, the + Amendment was drafted in terms of a prohibition on the obligation of funds to furnish assistance to Chile under the + military assistance chapter of the Foreign Assistance Act and under the + Foreign Military Sales Act.

+

On October 2, 1974 Senator Kennedy + introduced a new Amendment on the Senate floor deleting a proposed $10 + million dollar ceiling on assistance to Chile in the form of MAP, credit sales, and guaranties and + substituted a complete prohibition on MAP, security supporting assistance, sales, credit sales, + guaranties, and the furnishing by any means of excess defense articles + or items from DOD stockpiles. In + explanation of this Amendment, Senator Kennedy stated: “My amendment would halt all military assistance, including all government transfers of military equipment + and assistance to Chile.”

+

On December 4, 1974 Senator Kennedy made a statement on the floor even stronger than + the one made by him on October 2. Senator Kennedy stated:

+ +

“I want to emphasize that this Amendment prohibits all forms of + military assistance including but not limited to those enumerated in + the Amendment.”

+ +

Finally, the House version on which the House conferees receded also + specifically suspended (as distinguished from prohibited without waiver + possibility) sales as well as credit sales. The House version made an + exception for MAP training in the + amount of $800,000, which the House conferees also receded on. For this + consideration alone, it would be incongruous to contend that the result + of the Conference is to exclude FMS + training cases from the scope of the Amendment.

+ +

Conclusion

+

As pointed out earlier, the immediate problem involves the conversion of + eighteen F–5E aircraft to the trainer version, sale of the Sidewinder + missile, and spare parts for the Chilean Navy. Both State and Defense + believe that in the absence of further legislation, cash sales will be + permissible after June 30, 1975. In addition, Defense believes + deliveries also may be resumed on July 1, 1975 on FY 1975 sales concluded before the + enactment date of the FAA of 1975. + However, this position does not reflect the possibility that new + legislation similar to the Kennedy Amendment could be enacted in FY 1976 with the same restrictive results. + The Chileans have been waiting since December for the U.S. to resolve + the legal dispute and reach a decision on these contracts. The issue + could be forwarded to the Attorney General to decide but even then it + could be several weeks before an opinion would be forthcoming.

+

+ White House Counsel has reviewed + the issue and believes either State’s interpretation or that of Defense + could be supported.

+

The Chileans correctly assumed that the F-5s purchased less than one year + ago would be equipped with the Sidewinder missile and that spare parts + required to keep their naval vessels operational would be available. I + agree that it makes little sense to deny items without which previously + purchased equipment is impossible of being maintained. As you know, Peru + has continued to receive very substantial amounts of sophisticated + military equipment from the Soviet Union. Resumption of limited FMS support at this time would be a + psychological boost for the Chileans and would provide an important + stabilizing factor in this volatile situation. Moreover, a new element + of support for the resumption of FMS + sales to Chile has been introduced by the letter from 101 Congressmen at + Tab D.

+

It is my judgment that cash sales to Chile can be supported under the + FAA and that an immediate + resumption of limited FMS sales and + deliveries to Chile is in the national interest.

+

Recommendation

+

That you authorize me to sign the memorandum at Tab A.

+
+ +
+ 191. Memorandum From Stephen + Low of the National Security Council Staff to Secretary + of State Kissinger + +

Summary: Noting that proceeding + with arms deliveries to Chile might lead Congress to pass more + restrictive legislation on military assistance, Low recommended that the + resumption of weapon sales to Chile be delayed until at least + July 1.

+

Source: Ford Library, + National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for Latin + America, Box 3, Chile 2. Secret. Sent for action. Granger and Janka concurred. Kissinger approved the + recommendation. On June 22, McFarlane informed Davis that Ford’s May 26 approval of Kissinger’s memorandum [Document 190] “was overcome by + subsequent events and specifically a later paper Steve sent over + urging that we hold off in going ahead with arms sales and + deliveries until after the beginning of the fiscal year.” + (Ibid., Chile, 3) The letter from 101 Congressmen referred to in + this memorandum was attached to Document + 190 as Tab D.

+ + + + + Washington, June 6, + 1975. + + + SUBJECT + Chile Arms Sales + +

At this stage, authorization to proceed with the $50 million of arms + sales Chile has requested would permit us to deliver only about $1.5 + million of that before July 1. This has led Carl Maw to the view that we should withhold authorizing + these sales until after July 1 but proceed with them after that if the + new provision in the continuing resolution permits us to do so. The one + hundred Congressmen who signed the McDonald letter urging us to proceed with the sales has + complicated the problem. It has focused attention of those opposed to + arms transfers to Chile on the matter and particularly on the legal + question of whether or not authority exists for such sales. This + increases the likelihood that a new and stiffer provision will be + included in the continuing resolution which will rule out all arms + transfers. Senators Thurmond and Helms are circulating a letter on the same subject in + the Senate.

+

Thus, if we proceed now, we would appear to be acting at the last minute + before more restrictive legislation comes into effect, either as a + result of the prompting of a small group of Congressmen and Senators or + after having stimulated them to a particular interpretation of the law. + In the current atmosphere this cannot help but contribute towards + Congressional hostility towards U.S. programs in Chile and other + international arms efforts. If, on the other hand, the Congress does not + change the Chile arms provision in the new continuing resolution, after + having had the interpretation that it permits sales brought to its + attention, we would be on sounder grounds to proceed later.

+

A further factor is the recent spate of stories in the Post and New York Times on torture in + Chile, and the growing impression that the Chileans really have not taken the measures they + indicated they would to improve the human rights situation. Some + intelligence reports indicate they may be hardening their position + towards the visit of the U.N. Human Rights Commission group.

+

One could urge going ahead now on the grounds that there is never a good + time to proceed with arms sales to Chile, and the general atmosphere + towards Chile has somewhat improved. Furthermore, since the provision on + arms transfer to Chile is likely to be stiffened anyway, we ought to + take this opportunity to transfer what we can and show our good faith to + the Chileans.

+

Recommendation

+

Nevertheless, because proceeding to authorize the sales would aggravate + our problems on the Hill without + permitting us to transfer any significant quantities of arms to Chile, I + recommend that we hold off until July 1 and proceed then if the + flexibility we now have remains in the continuing resolution. + Furthermore, we should take care not to inform the Chileans now that we + will go ahead after July 1, since any publicity about our plans to do so + would almost guarantee a stiffer provision in the CRA.

+

+ Clint Granger and Les Janka concur.

+
+ +
+ 192. Memorandum From Stephen + Low of the National Security Council Staff to the + President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) +

Summary: Low + summarized a National Intelligence Estimate on Chile, which + concluded that even as the economic situation there continued to + deteriorate, the military would remain in power for the + foreseeable future. The NIE also concluded that the Chilean + Government would gradually loosen its authoritarian controls and + lessen its repression.

+

Source: Ford Library, + National Security Adviser, NSC + Latin American Affairs Staff Files, Box 1, Chile, Political, + Military 1. Secret. A notation in an unknown hand at the top of + the memorandum reads: “7/29 [July 29]—no comeback rec’d + [received]—F.” Attached but not published is NIE 94–1–75, + “Prospects for Chile,” June 6. An attached note indicates that + Ratliff sent + Kissinger’s copy of + the estimate to Low on + June 13.

+ + + + + Washington, June 30, + 1975. + + + SUBJECT + Chile NIE + +

Attached is an NIE on Chile recently completed by the Intelligence + community. You may wish to glance at the two-page précis.

+

In summary, the NIE concludes that:

+

—the military is well entrenched and will remain in power for the + foreseeable future;

+

—it will gradually loosen its authoritarian controls and lessen its + repressive nature;

+

—it retains substantial popular support;

+

—the economic deterioration resulting from serious balance of payments + deficits will continue until the price of copper recovers;

+

—this economic deterioration will lead to widespread dissatisfaction with + the military government, including limited manifestations of discontent + and the possibility (one in four) of massive unrest;

+

—Chile will continue to be made an international target of protest + groups;

+

—Peru will remain the Chilean Government’s overriding foreign policy + concern.

+

The major issue which emerged from preparation of the NIE was over the + economic situation and its effects on political stability. The Embassy + and Treasury are somewhat less pessimistic than the NIE.

+

+ ARA, however, is somewhat more so, + believing that a second year of inflation of over three hundred percent + will create conditions which will pose a serious threat to the + regime.

+
+ +
+ 193. Memorandum From Stephen + Low of the National Security Council Staff to the + President’s Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Scowcroft) +

Summary: Noting disarray in U.S. policy towards + Chile, Low suggested + holding an inter-agency Senior Review Group meeting to clarify + the U.S. Government position.

+

Source: Ford Library, + National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for Latin + America, Box 3, Chile 2. Confidential. Sent for action. + Granger concurred. + Neither approve nor disapprove was checked, but a notation in + Kissinger’s hand on + the first page of the memorandum reads: “1st let me straighten + out ARA.” On the second page, + Kissinger wrote next + to the last three sentences of the second paragraph, “NO—I agree + with DOD.” No record of an + SRG meeting on Chile has + been found, and a July 31 entry on a routing sheet attached to + the memorandum indicates that Low’s memorandum was overtaken by events. The + CASP for Chile for FY 1976–1977 was transmitted in + airgram A–86 from Santiago, May 18. (National Archives, RG 59, + Central Foreign Policy File, P750084–1651) Telegram 4600 from + Santiago, June 30, provides an account of the meeting between + Popper and Pinochet, + in which Pinochet + expressed concern about the threat from Peru and complained that + the Chilean military mission in Washington was unable to get + straight answers from the Department of Defense on the status of + FMS transactions. (Ibid., + D750227–0136)

+ + + + + Washington, July 1, + 1975. + + + SUBJECT + Disarray in Chile Policy + +

During the last year and a half we have done what we could to support the + Chilean Government in its attempts to get its economy under control and + defend itself against the possibility of Peruvian aggression from the + North. At the same time we have made clear to the GOC the problems which are created for us + by the continuing reports and criticism of denial of human rights there. + The President and Secretary have both expressed to Chilean Government + representatives U.S. support and sympathy for its efforts to rebuild the + nation. We made a major, successful effort with our European allies to + get a new Chilean debt rescheduling approved by the Paris Club. We have + a large PL–480 program and have urged + the IBRD to support loan projects. We + have promised to sell military spare parts as soon as possible.

+

There is strong criticism of this policy from the Congress and from + within the U.S. Government. Human rights advocates in both Houses forced + us to interrupt military sales and credit. A number of officers in the + Embassy at Santiago have written a dissent to the CASP submission which was considered in a + pre-IG meeting at State. Their + dissent, which was strongly supported by the Policy Planning office in + ARA, called for cutting off all + economic and military assistance to Chile until the human rights + situation improved. All other agencies supported the Ambassador’s recommendation, which + called for continued support, together with the stepped-up + representations on human rights.

+

One of the main elements of U.S. assistance to Chile was to be a Housing + Guarantee loan of $55 million. The loan had been approved by the + Inter-Agency Chile Coordinating Committee and Development Loan + Committee. It had been announced to the Congress, which had no + objection, and to the Chileans, who were enthusiastic about it. At the + last minute, a few days before the end of the fiscal year, a decision + was taken, without consultation, by ARA + to reduce that loan to $30 million, with the possibility left open of + making up the difference during the second half of the year. The + Chileans have not been informed, but other government agencies are + intensely annoyed.

+

On military sales, we had held off until July first, as a result of + Paragraph 25 of the Foreign Assistance Act, which restricted FMS transactions with Chile. The CRA contained no such restriction or + implication of one, though a number of Senators (Kennedy, Brooke, McClellan) are under the impression that it + continues to apply. However, the lawyers, State as well as Defense, are + agreed that the restriction lapsed with the Act. The Senators’ failure + to understand this does not create any legal obstacle. ISA is addressing a memo to Secretary + Schlesinger asking his + approval to proceed with $5 million already approved by HAK (and the President) made up of naval + spares, sidewinders and a substitution of F-5B Trainers for F-5E + Fighters. It also plans to write the Secretary concerning a remaining + nearly $50 million of valid contractual obligations signed with the + Chileans but suspended because of Paragraph 25. Carl Maw apparently believes that he + has an understanding with Defense that it will not authorize sales to + Chile without checking back with him. My understanding was that Defense + could go ahead on its $5 million previously authorized by State (and us) + if there was nothing in the CRA to + prohibit it. ARA wants a hold put on + everything, including the $5 million, until the matter can be + reconsidered.

+

Chilean President Pinochet called + in our Ambassador on Monday to protest the run-around being given his + representative in Washington in terms of arms sales. He also expressed + his continuing preoccupation with the threat from Peru now that the + installations have been completed for the Soviet tanks and other + military equipment 150 miles from the Chilean border.

+

The Chileans will be very upset when they learn of the substantial + reduction in the Housing Guarantee loan. If we now authorize the $5 + million military sales, the signals being transmitted to them will + indeed be confused. If we don’t, the signals will be clear, but do they + conform to the policy the Secretary wants to follow?

+

Treasury is annoyed at the Housing Guarantee decision which it considers + a departure from agreed policy. It wants guidance on what it should do in response to questions + it is getting from New York on a $200 million commercial loan being + floated there, and on how to handle pressure to urge the IBRD to process more loan projects. All + agree that the Chilean economy is in real trouble as a result of the + steady decline in the copper price. An indication that the U.S. is + withdrawing its economic support could dry up sources of external + capital and precipitate an economic crisis.

+

In order to straighten this out, there may be some point to holding an + SRG, which would give other + agencies an opportunity to express their views and clarify guidelines + for future policy.

+

Recommendation

+

That you discuss this with the Secretary and schedule an SRG on the subject soon.

+

+ Clint Granger concurs.

+
+ +
+ 194. Memorandum From the Deputy Director of the Central Intelligence + Agency (Walters) to the + President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) +

Summary: At Pinochet’s direction, Contreras met with Walters and discussed Chilean + foreign policy concerns, including a proposal for a U.N. Human + Rights Commission visit to Chile, possible Peruvian aggression, + and the difficulty of acquiring weaponry.

+

Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of the Director of + Central Intelligence, Job 80M01542R: Executive Registry Subject + Files, Box 2, C–7: Chile. Secret. Rogers informed Kissinger of Walters’s meeting with Contreras on July 7. (Minutes + of the Secretary’s Principals’ and Regionals’ Staff Meeting; + National Archives, RG 59, Transcripts of Kissinger Staff Meetings, Lot + 78D443, Box 7, Secretary’s Analytical Staff Meetings.) According + to a July 7 memorandum summarizing the Walters-Contreras conversation, + Contreras indicated + that “he exchanges intelligence information regularly with the + Argentine and Brazilian security services and noted that he has + his own representatives in Buenos Aires and Brasília who work + directly with these services.” (Central Intelligence Agency, + Office of the Director of Central Intelligence, Job 80M01542R: + Executive Registry Subject Files, Box 2, C–7: Chile.) In a + meeting of Department and CIA + officials, July 11, Rogers characterized Contreras as “the most + notorious symbol of repression in Chile.” (Department of State, + INR/IL Historical Files, + ARA Weekly Meetings, + 1976–1977) In an August 25 meeting with ARA officials regarding a visit to Washington by + Contreras at that + time, a CIA official referred + to Contreras as one of + Pinochet’s + “unfortunate advisors.” (Ibid.)

+ + + + + Washington, July 9, + 1975. + + + + SUBJECT + Visit of Chief of Chilean Intelligence Service + +

Colonel Manuel Contreras, Chief + of the Chilean Intelligence Service, arrived in Washington at President + Pinochet’s direction to + discuss with me certain matters + he wished passed to Secretary Kissinger. I saw him on 5 July.

+ +

1. Chilean reluctance to receive the UN + Human Rights Commission was due to the prejudices and partial statements + made by several members of the Commission. This stacked the situation + against Chile from the outset. They felt they were in a non-win setup + but, mindful of the political importance of receiving this Commission in + the U.S. and elsewhere, they were keeping the door open for such a visit + at a “more appropriate time.” Initially the Chileans were planning to + reject two members of the Commission in the hope that this would + discourage the others, but decision for rejection now was taken by + Pinochet after Contreras left Santiago.

+

2. The Chileans hoped they could count on U.S. support and, if need be, + veto, againt any attempt to expel Chile from the UN.

+

3. Chileans feel very concerned about the situation in Peru which now has + more than 400 tanks (some without crews) to Chile’s 40. Some of these + tanks are now in the south of Peru. Chileans are concerned that Peruvian + General Graham may come to power after Velasco. They view Graham as close to the Soviets and a + revanchist.

+

4. Chileans believe that Cubans and Soviets are spurring an effort + (supported by Peruvians) to overthrow Banzer in Bolivia and thus align + it with Peru.

+

5. Chileans are having great difficulty in purchasing arms to + counterbalance weaponry Peru has received from USSR. President Pinochet would like to see if there is any way the U.S. + could arrange indirect military aid for + Chile through a third country. Pinochet understands direct military aid is not possible for U.S. now. + Contreras says that such + countries as Taiwan, Brazil, Paraguay and Spain would be willing to + help. Chileans are particularly interested in tanks and anti-tank + weapons. They are manufacturing an anti-tank rocket but cannot acquire + the solid propellant for it.

+

6. Colonel Contreras expressed + some concern over activities of the PRC + Embassy in Santiago. Its members’ constant travelling to Argentina and + Peru concerns them.

+

7. Contreras said Chileans have + excellent liaison relationships with both the Argentine and Brazilian + Services with broad exchange of information.

+

8. Contreras transmitted a + personal invitation to me from President Pinochet to visit Santiago for Independence Day + celebrations on September 18. I told him that I greatly appreciated the + invitation but such a public appearance would be exploited against Chile + and the Agency and I much hoped to go at another time and more + discreetly.

+ + + Vernon A. + Walters + + Lieutenant General, USA Deputy + Director + + +
+ +
+ 195. Telegram 4824/Tosec 60104 From the Embassy in Chile to the + Department of State +

Summary: Pinochet + indicated he would be willing to receive a “truly impartial” + group to investigate human rights abuses, but not the UNHRC. Although he understood + that it would be difficult for the U.S. Government to provide + assistance, Pinochet + requested it anyway.

+

Source: Ford Library, + National Security Adviser, Trip Briefing Books and Cables for + Henry Kissinger, + 1974–1976, 7/9–12/75, Europe, TOSEC 5. Confidential; Immediate; Exdis. Repeated + to Kissinger as telegram + 163457/Tosec 60104 on July 11. On July 4, Pinochet cancelled the visit + of the UNHRC three days + before it was scheduled to arrive in Santiago. (Memorandum From + Rogers to Ingersoll, July 9; National + Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P810150–1244) A + summary of the July 9 conversation between Ingersoll, Rogers, Valdes, and + Trucco is in + telegram 164813 to all American Republic diplomatic posts, July + 12. (Ibid., D750242–0058)

+ + + + + Santiago, July 10, 1975, 2024Z. + +

4824. Tosec 60104. Subject: Meeting with President Pinochet on UNHRC Study Group.

+

Summary. President justifies decision on UNHRC working group; indicates ban on visit not necessarily + final; suggests willingness receive “truly impartial” investigative + group; recognizes decision poses difficulties for USG; but nevertheless requests US + assistance. End summary.

+

1. President Pinochet asked me to + see him at his home at 11:30 a.m. today, July 10. FonMin Carvajal and DCM also present. Meeting lasted forty minutes and was + cordial throughout.

+

2. Pinochet began with a + justification of his action in banning visit of UNHRC working group. This was couched in + now familiar terms of evidence that by communist design cards are + stacked against Chile in international organizations. Recital on this + point included allegedly improper transmittal to UN by OAS Human Rights + Commission Secretary Reque of incomplete and classified report on Chile, + without Chilean comments submitted thereon, which subsequently published + by UN and now selling in US; the + procedural irregularities in the ILO condemnation of Chile and the + action of the Mexico City Conference on International Women’s Year; + evidence that communists were determined to utilize working group visit, + through staged seeking of asylum in embassies, demonstrations, etc., to + provoke GOC reactions which would mar + Chilean image; and improper behavior of working group itself in taking + testimony in Paris, New York (allegedly with help of Cuban Ambassador) + and Lima, before coming to Chile, with intention of subsequently + preparing its report in Caracas, a hotbed of Chilean refugees.

+

3. I said I could appreciate Chilean motivation and could understand an + emotional reaction. However, I wondered whether cost of taking this step might not exceed cost + which GOC foresaw was involved in + visit.

+

4. President said he had considered matter very carefully and was + persuaded that the group would condemn GOC if it came. He thought that the very act of accepting + the visit of this working group tended to convey an impression that its + impartiality was likewise accepted. If group then condemned Chile, as he + fully expected, consequences would be worse than those of denying the + group entry.

+

5. I said that part of the problem was the dramatic impact of this after + Chile had admitted a number of other investigative groups and had agreed + to admit this one. If group came and then condemned Chile, and GOC then wished say there was evidence + that it could not obtain a fair and impartial investigation and would + not accept such groups in the future, that would be one position. But to + have accepted the group and then to refuse entry seemed difficult to + justify publicly in a convincing way. Furthermore, a report issued by + the study group without visiting Chile would probably be worse for Chile + than one issued after a visit.

+

6. President reverted to point that Chilean experience with previous + groups had been highly unsatisfactory. He was persuaded it was better to + refuse UNHRC group entry than to lend + credence to its inevitable condemnation of Chile by permitting it to + come.

+

7. I said that Col. Valdes, Under Secretary of Foreign Relations, and + Amb. Trucco had seen Acting + Secretary Ingersoll and Asst. + Sec. Rogers yesterday. I + understood that the Acting Secretary had explained that while we had + made every effort to be helpful to Chile, inevitably this decision made + it more difficult for us to continue to do so. The hope had been + expressed that it might be possible to consider the decision taken not + as a cancellation of the visit but as a postponement, and to work toward + rescheduling the visit.

+

8. The President said that the decision could be regarded as a + postponement rather than a definitive cancellation. Possibly something + could be done toward the end of the year. He said he was not opposed to + the visit of an impartial group; indeed he would welcome a visit by + trustworthy, prestigious “men of good will”. He then commented again on + the evidence of partiality in the behavior of the working group in + taking testimony before coming to Chile and in planning to go to Caracas + thereafter.

+

9. I said I did not find it unreasonable for the group to take testimony + prior to arrival in Chile, to gain perspective on the present situation, + though perhaps its plan to proceed to Caracas could be considered + imprudent. However, these items were not necessarily evidence that it + would be impossible to obtain a fair hearing from the working group. + Obviously the group was not going to depart saying that the situation in Chile was + perfect. On the other hand, I thought it entirely possible that having + seen the situation in Chile for itself, having had freedom to talk to + detainees and the man in the street, as well as to government officials, + it might very well produce a balanced report.

+

10. The President laughingly said that I was a good advocate, but he + still thought decisive action of the kind he had taken was what the + political situation at the UN required. + He noted that the US sometimes acted decisively too, and in his opinion + to very good effect. He recognized the decision posed problems for us + and our relationship with Chile. He reiterated that Chile is and has + been a greater friend of the US than the US is of Chile. He remarked, as + he had with me a few days previously, upon Chile’s truly desperate + plight in terms of lack of military supplies and said he really did not + know where to turn. He expressed hope for US understanding and + support.

+

11. I said I would be departing this evening on consultation in + Washington and naturally these matters would be of top priority in my + talks.

+

12. Comment: The President really has not provided anything new in the + way of justification for his action, save possible his concern that + condemnation by an investigative group would represent a serious + watershed in terms of Chile’s future in the UN and related agencies, and possibly with US.

+

13. The President now takes the position that his decision was to + postpone rather than cancel the visit of the group. My impression is + that position is more formal and tactical than a matter of conviction. + But it is something for us to work on.

+

14. President’s reference to the visit of a truly impartial group might + later conceivably provide a basis for some progress in this area. Of + course, what Chile most wants is a prestigious group which will justify + GOC actions past and present. This + is obviously impossible to achieve. On the other hand, it might be + possible to suggest a group sufficiently objective to be free, even in + Chile’s eyes, of the taint of communist infiltration or manipulation and + which would be willing to carry out an investigation here. One + possibility might be a group of jurists selected from the membership of + the international court of justice, or some similar group of uncommitted + personalities. There would still remain, however, the question of who + would create, organize and finance such an operation. End comment.

+ + + Popper + + +
+ +
+ 196. Memorandum From Stephen + Low of the National Security Council Staff to the + President’s Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Scowcroft) +

Summary: Low + informed Scowcroft of + disagreement between Congress and the Executive Branch of the + U.S. Government over arms sales to Chile.

+

Source: Ford Library, + National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for Latin + America, Box 3, Chile 2. Confidential. Sent for information. + Scowcroft wrote “OK” + on the memorandum and initialed it. The Pinochet-Popper conversation mentioned + here took place on June 30 and is referenced in the source note + to Document 195. The Maw-Popper meeting referred to + here took place on July 14 and is described in telegram 174230 + to Santiago, July 24. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign + Policy File, D750254–1055) In telegram 4698 from Santiago, July + 5, the Embassy reported on Pinochet’s July 4 announcement that he had + decided not to allow the United Nations Human Rights Commission + to visit Chile. (Ibid., D750233–0196)

+ + + + + Washington, July 16, + 1975. + + + SUBJECT + Chile Arms Sales + +

We may be running into difficulties on the Chile arms sales.

+

President Pinochet raised with + Ambassador Popper the question + of $11 million in FMS credits which + were left over from FY 71 to FY 74. We have all along told the Chileans + that this was theirs. After the Section 25 restriction in last year’s + Foreign Military Assistance Act, we told them they would no longer be + able to use it for FMS items, and + Defense would not permit them to use it for commercial consumables. They + have always been able to use it for other commercial purposes. At the + meeting with Maw, it was decided + that the money would continue to be available to them and that Popper could assure them of this. That + is, that we would not take steps to withdraw it. It was also decided + that no FMS sales would be authorized + even for the $52 million of valid obligations signed under the FY 75 Continuing Resolution before Section + 25 prohibition was voted in December, until the Chileans took some steps + in the human rights field which would compensate for the very bad + impression left when they cancelled the visit of the UN Human Rights Commission Group.

+

+ Clint Granger and Les Janka along with OMB are concerned that this decision will + get played to Congress and the press in the form of “our finding new + money” or “releasing new credits,” which is not the case. We could + explain ourselves, of course, but that might not preclude Senator + Kennedy’s introducing a new + punitive provision in the new Foreign Military Assistance Act. Defense + feels that this is likely to happen in any case and therefore that we + should go ahead and authorize + not only Chilean use of the $11 million they already have, but also the + further $52 million. This would at least be of some significant help to + the Chileans. Then the Congress can decide whether it wants to take + responsibility for cutting off further assistance or not.

+

In any case I do not see how we can prohibit to the Chileans use of money + from earlier years. We could find a legal justification, but we are + certainly not required to do so. I can see some merit in Defense’s + position.

+

In this connection, ISA is pushing hard + to go ahead soon with the $52 million sale. It is my understanding they + are going to Secretary Schlesinger with a recommendation that he request an + SRG meeting on this subject.

+

Their interest in this is to get HAK + personally involved, because they are not convinced that lower levels of + State are reflecting his views in this matter.

+

It is possible that Secretary Schlesinger could bring this up with HAK.

+
+ +
+ 197. Memorandum of Conversation +

Summary: Kissinger, Rogers, and Popper discussed U.S. policy + towards Chile, including issues relating to the level of U.S. + assistance to be provided to the country, the human rights + situation, and the status of weapon sales. Kissinger expressed a desire + to strengthen Chile and to deliver military assistance.

+

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + P820123–1831. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Karkashian on July 21; cleared + by Rogers. The hold on sales of armaments before July 1 is + discussed in Document 191. Ingersoll reported to + Kissinger on July 15 + that he had met the previous day with Popper and representatives + from NSC, ARA, H, PM, and L, all of whom agreed that it was + politically impossible to initiate any new military assistance + for Chile, but that the U.S. Government would inform the Chilean + Government that FMS credits + from prior years were still available to them. (Telegram + 165671/Tosec 70003 to the Secretary, July 15; National Archives, + RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P850011–2305) On July 24, + the Department informed the Embassy that FMS sales agreed to prior to July + 1, 1974, and a few items contracted in early FY 1975 before the suspension of + assistance would be delivered. (Telegram 174230 to Santiago, + July 24; ibid., D750254–1055) In telegram 737204 from the + Central Intelligence Agency, August 30, the CIA sought information on what + steps might be taken to exert positive influence on the Chilean + Government. (Central Intelligence Agency, Office of the Director + of Central Intelligence, Job 80M01542R: Executive Registry + Subject Files, Box 2, C–7: Chile)

+ + + + + Washington, July 18, 1975, 5:15 p.m. + + + SUBJECT + Ambassador Popper’s + Meeting with the Secretary + + + PARTICIPANTS + The Secretary + Ambassador David H. + Popper, American Ambassador to Santiago, Chile + Assistant Secretary William D. + Rogers, ARA + + + John E. Karkashian, + Country Director, ARA/BC (notetaker) + +

Secretary: Is this just a courtesy visit or do we have some problems in + Chile?

+

+ Popper: There are some + substantive points we wanted to discuss with you.

+

Secretary: I want to know what happened to the $50 million that we were + going to give the Chileans in housing guarantees. How did that get cut + in half?

+

Rogers: It didn’t get cut. It was split in half for optical purposes. We + anticipate going ahead with the second half in the next fiscal year.

+

Secretary: We’re in the next fiscal year. Are they going to get it + now?

+

Rogers: We signed them up for $30 million before the end of the last + fiscal year and we can go ahead now with the remaining $25 million in + this fiscal year.

+

Secretary: I can’t get a straight answer on this question. Have we or + have we not cut this program in half? How do the Chileans perceive what we have done? If this is a + technical matter, fine, but if this is an actual cut-back, I am against + it.

+

Rogers: No, it isn’t a cut-back. We did not want to appear too generous + with the Chileans in FY 1975. Therefore, + we divided the original amount in two parts; the Chileans are not losing + anything.

+

Secretary: Will this action preclude the Chileans getting something else + in this fiscal year?

+

Rogers: No, this will have no effect on the rest of the program. It is + just an optical split.

+

+ Popper: This won’t hurt them if + they get the second tranche. If I may raise some other points, the + Chileans must have some kind of a death wish. Their cancellation of the + Human Rights Working Group visit has had a very adverse impact on our + ability to be helpful.

+

Secretary: Why does Chile have to be the only country that must receive a + human rights investigating body? Why doesn’t Amin receive a human rights + commission? What about some of the other African countries where people + are executed in the public square? There has to be some limit to this + screaming hypocrisy.

+

+ Popper: The cancellation of the + UN visit was tactically a bad move. + It makes the problem that much more difficult. Chile also has some very + serious economic difficulties: the high cost of petroleum imports and + the depressed price of copper exports have brought it to dire economic + straits. If things don’t pick up, the Government will have to adopt some + very tight controls over the economy. The economic prospects for the + months ahead are very bad. Also, the Chileans are paranoid about the + threat they perceive from Peru and their belief that there is a + worldwide Communist conspiracy being conducted against them.

+

Secretary: Well, isn’t it true?

+

+ Popper: The Chileans think we + have misled them on our commitments and they are very disappointed about + the delays in arms sales.

+

Secretary: Why don’t we give them the arms now?

+

Rogers: Well, we are going ahead.

+

Secretary: When the hell are they going to get the arms? What’s the + answer?

+

+ Popper: There are $9 million in + old credits that are available to them. However, the things they want + are TOWs and tanks. We were on the + verge of giving them those items.

+

Secretary: Why didn’t they get them? Why haven’t we delivered the M–48 + tanks we promised to them?

+

Rogers: We couldn’t move before July 1 because of the restrictive + legislation and then they cancelled the UN visit.

+ +

+ Popper: There are also some + bureaucratic problems and the question of availabilities—TOWs and tanks have not been readily + available. More recently, of course, the Chileans further complicated + the problem by cancelling the human rights visit.

+

Secretary: There can be no doubt about my policy. I want to strengthen + Chile. I don’t want to drive them to despair. Is it true that we told + Defense to put a ‘hold’ on arms sales to Chile?

+

Rogers: Since July 1, yes. I gather that in your meeting with Fraser an understanding was reached on + what items might be released to the Chileans if some progress were made + on human rights.

+

Secretary: I knew that would happen. Did you think that I told Fraser that Chile wouldn’t get arms? + Not even remotely did I say that. Who said that I did? Where did you get + that information?

+

Rogers: We got it from Fraser’s + office.

+

Secretary: I said I would be willing to listen to the kinds of things + that he felt needed to be done, but not to tie our program to them. That + approach always has the opposite effect. If we say that you must do + something so that we can do something, it will not happen that way. I + don’t agree with that approach.

+

Rogers: The other alternative is to tell the Congress that we are going + to go ahead because we believe it is technically and legally + permissible. The third alternative is to do it and let the Congress find + out about it.

+

Secretary: How much assistance can we provide to Chile?

+

Rogers: Under the Continuing Resolution, the ceiling is $20 million in + military credits. The practical problem is whether to go ahead with + tanks and TOWs. We were prepared to + move ahead when the GOC cancelled the + UN visit.

+

Secretary: I believe your analogies are correct. There is a great deal of + foot dragging all over this building. Just enough so that nothing + happens and it is difficult to pin the responsibility on anyone. When a + Portuguese-type government takes over in Chile, you will all sit around + and wring your hands.

+

Rogers: Where do we go from here?

+

Secretary: I favor the delivery of some military assistance to Chile. I + told Fraser that I wanted to + assist the Chileans and then we would see what we could do to improve + the situation. I did not say that first there must be human rights + improvements and then we would assist the Chileans. It cannot work that + way.

+

+ Popper: Perhaps we can move + forward on both fronts.

+

Secretary: I have no trouble with that.

+

Rogers: The crucial point is whether we advise or do not advise the + Congress.

+ +

Secretary: What is your view?

+

Rogers: I think we must advise the Congress. There is too much at stake + and we would be asking for trouble if we didn’t.

+

Secretary: Let me think about that. What other problems do we have?

+

+ Popper: There appears to be a + tendency in the Congress to cut economic assistance to Chile. This would + really hurt them because U.S. aid is + really critical. It could lead to a chaotic situation. A cut in PL–480 allocations for Chile may be in the + making. Chile is by far the most important recipient in the hemisphere. + I hope we can keep the same level that has been projected for + Chile—400,000 tons, valued at $55.1 million.

+

Secretary: How does that compare historically?

+

+ Popper: It is about the same.

+

Rogers: Back in the 60’s, Chile was very high on the wheat side so it is + not out of line.

+

Secretary: I have no intention of having Chile cut. What is the + population of Chile?

+

+ Popper: 10 million.

+

Secretary: Peru?

+

+ Popper: 15 million.

+

Secretary: I am still thinking of going to Latin America some time.

+

+ Popper: Including Chile?

+

Secretary: Well, if those madmen do something on human rights.

+

+ Popper: Well, I hope that with + time we can have some effect on the Chileans. There are a number of + people in the Chilean Government who are actively working toward the + right objectives, but they need time and some encouragement from us.

+
+ +
+ 198. Memorandum of Conversation +

Summary: Kissinger and Maw discussed Chilean human rights violations + and U.S. military assistance with Fraser and other members of Congress.

+

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + P820123–1780. Confidential; Nodis. Drafted by Richardson on August + 5.

+ + + + + Washington, July 28, + 1975. + + + SUBJECT + Secretary Kissinger’s + Meeting with Congressman Fraser and Colleagues + + + PARTICIPANTS + + + + STATE DEPARTMENT + + Secretary Kissinger + + Deputy Secretary Ingersoll + + Under Secretary Maw + + Assistant Secretary McCloskey + + + James + Wilson + + William B. Richardson (notetaker) + + + + + + CONGRESS + + Congressman Fraser + + Senator Bumpers + Congresswoman Meyner + Congressman Buchanan + + Congressman Biester + Senator Cranston + Congressman Gude + Congressman Bingham + Congressman Badillo + + + + + + STAFFERS + + John Salzberg (Fraser) + Robert Boettcher (Fraser) + William Jackson (Cranston) + William Reintzes (Gude) + + + +

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to Chile.]

+

+ Fraser: On Chile, I strongly + regret the cancellation of the visit by the U.N. Working Group, + especially since this took place a day or two before they were + physically in Chile. The Chileans have also kicked a Washington reporter + out. What we seem to be getting out of this whole group is much of the + same.

+

+ Kissinger: We made strong + representation on this Working Group matter and we sincerely regret what + happened. I think that that sort of government has the same attitudes of + the Greek junta and there is a great possibility of them becoming an + empty shell. Also there is a great danger that this movement will go in + the direction of Portugal, which would be bad for Latin America. I am + concerned about future political developments in Chile. We could have a + situation where the younger military officers may stop looking towards + the United States and acquire + views similar to the Portuguese military officers there. There could be + no structure left and we could get stuck with a left wing dictatorship, + farther left than Allende.

+

On Chile, we have made more representations on human rights than any + other country. I don’t know about any better alternative. I really don’t + know how to navigate on this matter. I am unhappy with the U.N. action. + I do think that by showing an understanding of their problems, we can + move them more toward our views on human rights. Both Rogers and I were very disappointed + with what happened. Both Bill and I hope we can allow this study to take + place. All of these problems feed on each other. For example, because of + Congressional sensibilities the United States Government has held back + $10 million in housing aid. The Chileans were supposed to get $30 + million, but have only received $20 million so far, all of this for + human rights reasons. The Chileans feel they will be harrassed no matter + what they do. They feel they are probably being used by us. In the + Turkish matter, for example, it has been that if one gets into a + confrontation position, no one achieves what they want. I don’t know + enough about Chile, whether they have enough incentives to improve their + domestic situation. On the military side, the Chileans are paranoid + about a threat from Peru. They certainly noted a cut off of military + aid effective last month. Who sat + in on that meeting with the Under Secretary a few days ago? Was it you + Carl? What were the reasons they gave for turning down that U.N. + Group?

+

+ Maw: They wanted to postpone the + visit because they felt the present time was not propitious. They don’t + want it now and they were also objecting to the composition of this + group. The Chileans did tell me, however, that they would like + Congressional groups to go down there and look at the situation.

+

+ Fraser and Buchanan: That would be a good idea. + (Badillo, Meyner and Biester also concurred by shaking their heads and + expressing interest).

+

+ Kissinger: Sounds like a good + idea. Let’s see what would happen if we could lift the arms embargo for + one year and use it as leverage for getting progress on human rights. We + would then make a massive effort to persuade the Chileans to improve + their human rights performance. We would see what would happen. The + Chileans would not be receiving much military aid any way. Can we try this? I realize this is also a + Kennedy matter and he is not + present.

+

+ Fraser: The House cut military + aid with a human rights waiver.

+

Bumpers: What was the final cut?

+

+ Kissinger: The final cut was from + $20 million to, I think, the House cut it to $10 million. It was cut in + conference. I think the Chileans think of this in terms of principle rather than in actual + terms of figures. We have expended a lot of credit to the Congress on + this. I would like to try this.

+

+ Fraser: I would prefer a + variation of what you were saying. I think we should ask the Chilean + Government for some specific steps for them to take as a basis for which + Congress could be persuaded to resume military aid.

+

+ Kissinger: Let’s try it and be in + touch.

+

+ Fraser: Mr. Secretary, I wasn’t + thinking about $15 or $20 million military aid. Chile is in the Military + Aid bill and it will probably be going solo unless it is linked with + aid to Israel. If the Chile bill + goes solo, it will be a very hot item. Some of us could, however, + support a modest program, if this was preceded by improvements in human + rights.

+

+ Kissinger: Let’s talk to the + Chileans and I will put Bill + Rogers on this. I must say that the principle may be the + most important issue in this whole business.

+

+ Buchanan and Meyner: We like this + approach. We should work it out.

+

Bingham: I still want to know why the PL–480 share for Chile is so disproportionate.

+

+ Kissinger: I assure you it is not + on the basis of the historical record. I can only reemphasize that we do + not want to drive the Chileans back to even the left of Allende. We must retain a margin of + influence there. Last year we didn’t have any because military aid was completely cut off. Can I see if + PL–480 share for Chile conforms + historically with what we have done in Latin America?

+

Bingham: I don’t want to stretch this thing out. It is not a hot item. + Our Committee is involved with this for the first time.

+

+ Kissinger: Carl Maw will get you these + figures.

+

[Omitted here is discussion on Asia, Voice of America, Europe, and the + UNGA.]

+
+ +
+ 199. Action Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for + Inter-American Affairs (Rogers) + to Secretary of State Kissinger + +

Summary: Rogers + outlined the implications of different approaches to the problem + of security assistance for Chile.

+

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + P830113–0540. Secret; Exdis. Sent through Maw. Drafted by Rogers. + Gantz, Wilson, + Richardson, and + Vest concurred. + Although the memorandum is dated August 5, the drafting date is + given as August 11. Attached but not published is a suggested + letter to Carvajal. + There is no indication the letter was sent. None of the options + for approval or disapproval were checked, although Kissinger wrote on the first + page of the memorandum, “See me Tuesday.” In telegram Secto 9001 + from Vail, August 16, the Secretary’s delegation informed the + Department that Kissinger had taken no action on the memorandum + but wished to see Rogers + and Maw on Tuesday, + August 19. (Ibid., P840126–2280) No record of a meeting has been + found. A memorandum of conversation of the Kissinger, Rogers, and + Popper meeting + referred to in the first paragraph is published as Document 197. On August 19, Lord informed Kissinger that although the + staff of S/P agreed with L and H + that arms sales to Chile should be held up, Lord himself supported “a + discreet program combined with candid talk and advance notice to + Congress.” (Ibid., P830113–0469)

+ + + + + Washington, August 5, + 1975. + +

+ + FMS + Sales to Chile +

+

The Problem

+

At our meeting with Ambassador Popper before your trip, you said you wanted to reflect + on the question whether to consult with Congress about resuming military + sales to Chile during the interim before Congress enacts the FY 1976 legislation.

+

Discussion

+

In FY 1975, our lawyers and DOD’s had concluded that Section 25 of the + Foreign Military Assistance Act prohibited all military aid, including + both sales and credits, to Chile. DOD’s + lawyers also agree with our own that Section 25 expired on July 1, and + that we are therefore legally free to resume cash military sales to Chile. (We cannot extend credits. There + was no legislative authority for credits in FY 1975, and therefore the continuing resolution does not + continue any credit authority.)

+

Congress, however, is not of one mind about sales to Chile. The issue is + a contentious one. Congressman McDonald, who recently visited Chile has sent us a + letter, signed by 100 of his colleagues, saying that we had authority to + make sales during FY 1975 and he hopes + we will jolly well get on with it now. On the other hand, Kennedy and Brooke had a colloquy on the record, during the + continuing resolution debate, + the burden of which was that the continuing resolution maintained the + ban on sales from FY 1975 into FY 1976.

+

Since then, there has actually been a hardening of positions, in Congress + and in Chile.

+

Some backsliding has occurred in human rights + practices in Chile in recent months. The National Security Law, which + had a difficult birth last May, has not been fully implemented. Families + have not been notified about arrests of relatives. Habeas corpus has not been observed. There are even some + indications of the possible basis in fact for current newspaper + allegations that the GOC may be behind + the recent disappearance of some 119 opposition figures. President + Pinochet personally has + taken some of the hard-line decisions on human rights, such as the one + to bar the UN Human Rights Commission + Working Group.

+

The Chile military aid issue will be on + the table when Congress returns in September. Final consideration of + this year’s legislation is scheduled to begin then. We can be certain + that McDonald and Kennedy will be at each other’s + throats. There is little doubt that Fraser will try to repeat his success of last year in + banning all military aid of any kind. + Some Congressmen may even try to cut off any deliveries of equipment + which are begun but not completed during August, and reduce economic + assistance. Chile could well become a test case of the Department’s + intentions in the human rights field.

+

Chile has pending about $50 million of contracts for various kinds of + equipment. Whether they would want to carry out all of these contracts + immediately is questionable. The most important are the anti-tank + weapons, the sidewinders for their F-5’s, and the spare parts they need + to keep their present equipment moving. This $6.3 million package, + rather than the full $50 million, would clearly have a better reception + on the Hill just now.

+

+ The Legal Adviser and H, however, counsel against any + sales in the present circumstances. They are concerned that a + resumption of sales to Chile following Pinochet’s rejection of the UNHRC Working Group would be perceived by many in Congress + as a reward for conduct inconsistent with U.S. human rights policies, as + set forth in the Foreign Assistance Act. The combination of members + opposed to security assistance for Chile on human rights grounds, those + ideologically opposed to the Pinochet government, and those who would see the issue + as one of Executive Branch compliance with expressions of Congressional + policy such as Section 502 B of the Foreign Assistance Act, would pose a + genuine risk of legislative action to preclude even delivery of the + items proposed to be sold to Chile. Moreover, the anticipated negative + Congressional reaction might well extend to other issues. This could + weaken the prospects for favorable action on Turkey and produce new and + stronger provisions on human rights in the pending foreign assistance + bill, according to H and L.

+ +

They believe that our ability to avoid legislation that would be + counterproductive in our policy toward Chile, and perhaps other + countries as well, could be enhanced if the Government of Chile could be + persuaded to take minimal steps to improve human rights first. In that + event, we could then defend limited cash sales to Chile as a reasonable + response to positive steps and designed to encourage further progress, + they suggest.

+

+ ARA agrees that there is much to be said + for postponing military sales to the Chileans now, until after Congress + has had a chance to consider Chile’s turn down of the UN Working Group and the furor now brewing + over the 100 plus dead Chilean Leftists in connection with the FY 1976 legislation. Ambassador Popper would prefer to have some sales + for the Chileans, but he would not feel his task was utterly compromised + if there were none just yet. He has recently advised Pinochet that the GOC can use its past credits for certain + military items.

+

+ However, if we are to go forward with sales during this + short interregnum between the expiry of Section 25 and the passage + of the new legislation, then ARA + thinks we should do so with a discreet package, that we should talk + frankly to the Chileans about the relationship of future military + aid and the GOC human rights image, and that we + should tell Congress what we are doing before we do it.

+

There is a good deal to be said for both measures—that is, talking + plainly to Congress and Chile. If we make a clear, though quiet, + statement to the Chileans, they will not conclude that they face clear + sailing in the U.S. now, in spite of their recent human rights record. + And if we tell the Congress that we are making some limited sales, but + are also doing some plain speaking to the Chileans, we will avoid the + danger that Congress will find out after the fact, and denounce us not + only for bad policy but for duplicity as well.

+

We have tried to design a quiet but clear statement to the Chileans. A + draft letter from you to Foreign Minister Carvajal is attached. This tells him that we are going + forward with a package of sales, including the anti-tank missiles and + the spares, but also gives him some understanding of the situation in + Congress and our assessment of the difficulty in the way of future + military aid to Chile in the absence of + some improvement in human rights practices. We would tell the key + Congressional human rights advocates of the plan set out in the letter + before it goes out.

+

Here, in summary, then, is the trellis of options as we see them, and the + balance sheet for each. If you accept the first option—no sales now—then + you need not address the second and third options. If you decide on + sales during the Congressional interregnum, then you should address + points two, three and four:

+ +

The Options

+

1. To Sell or Not to Sell: In this uncertain + interim period, before Congress considers the FY 1976 military aid + legislation, authorize no military sales to Chile.

+

+ Pros: +

+

—A hold on sales would avoid a Congressional and public attack from some + quarters that our policy is designed to support the Chilean junta in all + circumstances and whatever its human rights practices;

+

—A hold would also avoid the charge that we acted behind Congress’ + back;

+

—Chile would not think that we accept its decision to cancel the UNHRC Working Group.

+

+ Cons: +

+

—Leaves the issue to Congress, even though Congress has not yet spoken + about FY 1976 military aid.

+

—May turn the GOC away from what it sees + as its last remaining ally and increase its paranoia and possible + radicalization.

+

—Forces Chile to seek the armaments it thinks it needs to counter the + threat from Peru from other sources.

+

+ Bureau Views: +

+

+ ARA, H, L, PM and D/HA recommend that + we hold off on sales until Congress considers this year’s legislation, + beginning in September.

+

Approve Interim Sales Disapprove Sales

+

2. A Small Package of Sales or a Big One: If we + decide to conduct some sales before Congress acts, offer first a package + of anti-tank equipment and spares.

+

+ Pros: +

+

—This package is easier for Congress to swallow. We can stress that the + anti-tank weaponry is obviously not to maintain internal authority but + to defend Chile against Peru, which is armed by the Soviets.

+

—We can move this equipment quickly.

+

+ Cons: +

+

—Does not give Chile everything it wants.

+

+ Bureau Views: +

+

If you prefer this Option, ARA, H, L, + PM and D/HA recommend that you approve the small package.

+

Approve Small Package

+

Approve Entire $50 Million

+

3. Talk to the GOC: If we go ahead with a package, couple the sales + with a frank but quiet statement to the Chileans about their human rights image in this country, + along the lines of the draft letter (attached) from you to Carvajal.

+

+ Pros: +

+

—Is consistent with our public position that we do engage in quiet + diplomacy on human rights;

+

—Gets the point across to the Chilean junta that there is sincere concern + with their human rights record at the highest level of the USG; and

+

—Avoids misunderstanding in Santiago that they have a clear field, and + that the sales are a signal that we accept their treatment of the UN Working Group.

+

+ Cons: +

+

—Might be misunderstood by Pinochet as meddling in his internal affairs.

+

—Would seem to Congressman McDonald and others as an example of a double standard, + and an unfriendly act against Chile in its hour of need and crisis.

+

+ Bureau Views: +

+

If you approve Option 2, ARA, H, L, + PM and D/HA recommend that you send the letter to Foreign Minister + Carvajal.

+ +

Approve Letter Disapprove Letter

+

Other

+

4. Tell Congress: In all events—whether we go + forward with sales or not, whether we do a small package or $50 million, + and whether we talk to the Chileans about their human rights posture or + not—we should advise the Congress of what we are doing before we do + it.

+

+ Pros: +

+

—Congress is concerned about Chile. To move on the vexed and disputatious + question of sales now, behind Congress’ back, would not be well + received.

+

—If we did, we might persuade Congress that the Department is not to be + trusted on Chile and on human rights issues in general.

+

—To discuss the question with key Congressional actors will give us an + opportunity to explain the Peruvian threat, make clear that we are not + going whole hog and that we are presenting a balanced position on human + rights to the GOC.

+

+ Cons: +

+

—Might inspire the liberals to move that much more quickly and decisively + to cut any sales off at the pass;

+

—Congressional consultation in this instance might set an awkward + precedent for other future cases.

+ +

+ Bureau Views: +

+

If you approve Option 1, ARA, H, L, + PM and P/HA recommend that Congress + be advised. If you approve Option 2, ARA, H, L, PM and D/HA recommend that Congress be advised + prior to going forward with a sales package.

+

Approve Disapprove

+
+ +
+ 200. Action Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for + Inter-American Affairs (Rogers), + the Assistant Secretary of State for Congressional Relations (McCloskey), and the Director of the + Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs (Vest) to Secretary of State Kissinger + +

Summary: Rogers, McCloskey, and Vest recommended that Kissinger authorize roughly + $10 million in FMS sales to + Chile after consulting with Congress.

+

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + P810150–1436. Confidential. Drafted by Driscoll and Fimbres on September 19. Sent + through Maw. Rogers wrote on the + memorandum, “Bremer + discussed with Rogers + 29–9 [September 29]. Matter to be raised informally with DOD through Scowcroft.” Rogers indicated that + Kissinger approved + the first two recommendations on September 28. Neither approve + nor disapprove was checked for the other + options.

+ + + + + Washington, September + 20, 1975. + +

+ Security Assistance Levels for + Chile—FY 76 and 77 +

+ +

The Problem

+

Our proposal for security assistance levels for Chile for inclusion in + the Congressional Presentation Document should go forward to Congress + September 25. The President earlier approved FY 76 $20 million for FMS + and $0.9 million for MAP training. + Recent events in Chile have made a credit program, at least, + indefensible in Congress. We would at the same time like to sell for + cash at minimum some spares and anti-tank weapons.

+

Background/Analysis

+

We had hoped—and had been promised—that President Pinochet would announce major + improvements in internal security practices in his September 11 address. + He did not. He lowered the state of siege one level and announced + release of some political prisoners. We believe the GOC announcement will have a negligible + practical result, in Chile and in the perception here of Chile.

+ +

—repression continues. Since postponement of the UN Working Group visit, the GOC has purged the universities, arbitrarily arrested—but + subsequently released—several Christian Democratic and labor leaders, + and has generally ignored the provisions of the new National Security + Law announced in May with much fanfare. In addition, circumstantial + evidence suggests a GOC role in the + affair of the “missing 119”. And there is no give on rescheduling the + UNHRC Working Group, or in + substituting an OAS Human Rights + Commission trip.

+

The Options

+

1. Submit the CPD with the FY 76 FMS + credit level of $20 million approved by the President; support unlimited + FMS sales authority.

+

+ Advantage +

+

—it would maintain in the minds of the military governing Chile the + impression that the U.S. Executive supports them and does not hold their + human rights practices against them.

+

+ Disadvantage +

+

—it will focus critical Congressional debate on Chile, which eventually + will weaken our ability to defend other parts of our military assistance + programs.

+

—it will also help convince Frazer and others who are particularly + bullish on this issue that we are so insensitive to their concerns that + we are willing to push a program for the country most publicly + identified recently with human rights violations.

+

2. Delete Chile FY 76 CPD for credits but, following + Congressional consultation, provide some $10 million of spares and + TOWs in FMS cash sales.

+

+ Advantage +

+

—the fact that we asked $20 million for Chile last year and eliminate the + program this year would show that we do, at least in paradigm cases, + take human rights practices into consideration in our military + assistance program proposals.

+

—it would make us more credible when we say we do not condone abuses.

+

—it would be a clear signal to all in Chile, military and civilians, that + we mean business on human rights.

+

—the cash sales would off-set our military assistance to Peru, help + maintain stability in the area, and preserve at least some influence in + the GOC military.

+

+ Disadvantage +

+

—we single out Chile for punishment.

+ +

—by tailoring our program to avoid criticism from some quarters in the + Congress, we risk having them attempt to impose their views in the + future.

+ +

3. Whatever our decision, we believe we must inform Congress. We also + believe that no FMS sales should be + made without Congressional approval.

+

+ Advantage +

+

—it demonstrates our desire to consult on “difficult” cases.

+

—to move on the sales questions behind Congress’ back would be + unwise.

+

—we would present a balanced posture on human rights.

+

—it gives us a chance to discuss the Peruvian threat.

+

+ Disadvantage +

+

—it reminds Congress of the sales aspect and might encourage a total + cutoff.

+ +

Recommendations:

+

1. That you reject option 1, forwarding the CPD with a FY-76 credit + level of $20 million and pressing ahead with large cash sales.

+

+ ARA, H, PM, L, D/HA recommend you + approve rejecting this option.

+

2. That you approve option 2, the deletion of Chile from the CPD and at the same time that you approve + the provision of a discreet FMS cash + sales defensive package consisting of:

+ +

20 TOW Launchers

+

400 TOW missiles

+

100 Sidewinders for the previously purchased F–5

+

Navy spares and munitions

+

$0.9 million of FMS cash training + (mainly for the F–5)

+

Substitute 3 F–5-F trainers for 3 F–5-E’s in the F–5 contract, signed + in FY 74.

+ +

This package could cost roughly $10 million.

+

+ ARA, H, PM, D/HR, and L recommend + approval.

+

3. That no FMS sales to Chile take place + until we have consulted with and obtained at least passive approval of + the Congressional leadership.

+

+ ARA, H, PM, D/HR, L, and IO recommend approval

+

4. That you inform Foreign Minister Carvajal of our decision during your bilateral with him + September 29.

+

+ ARA, H, PM, D/HR, and L recommend + approval.

+

+ Alternatively +

+

That Ambassador Popper inform the + GOC in Santiago

+

That you inform Ambassador Trucco +

+

That Mr. Rogers inform Ambassador + Trucco +

+ + +
+ +
+ 201. Memorandum of Conversation +

Summary: Kissinger, Rogers, Carvajal, and Trucco discussed human rights, U.S. Government + assistance, the Chilean economy, and Chile’s foreign policy.

+

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + P820123–2643. Confidential; Nodis. Drafted by Driscoll; cleared by Rogers. A + typewritten notation at the bottom of the memorandum states, + “This version was agreed upon by Ambassador Lackington, Desk + Officer Driscoll, and + interpreter Hervas.” None of the Chilean documents were + attached. On October 3, the Department sent a summary of the + conversation to the Embassy. (Telegram 235949 to Santiago, + October 3; ibid., D750344–0175) Although the briefing memorandum + to Kissinger has not + been found, on September 15 Fimbres sent a memorandum to Rogers in which he recommended + that Kissinger inform + Carvajal that human + rights abuses made it increasingly difficult for the U.S. + Government to assist the junta and that the United States + supported Pinochet’s + expressed desire for political liberalization. (Ibid., ARA Files, Subject and Country + Files: Lot 81D324, DEF 12–5, CHILE Military Sales, + 1974–1975)

+ + + + + Washington, September + 29, 1975. + + + SUBJECT + Secretary’s Meeting with Foreign Minister Carvajal + + + + PARTICIPANTS + + + + Chile + + Foreign Minister Patricio + Carvajal + + U.N. Permanent Representative Ismael Huerta + + Ambassador to the U.S. Manuel + Trucco + + Foreign Ministry Political Advisor Enrique Bernstein + + Foreign Ministry Economic Advisor Thomas Lackington + + + + + + US + + The Secretary + Assistant Secretary William + D. Rogers + + Chile Desk Officer Robert S. + Driscoll + + + + +

Foreign Minister: I want to thank you for giving us this opportunity to + talk to you.

+

The Secretary: Well, I read the Briefing Paper for this meeting and it + was nothing but human rights. The State Department is made up of people + who have a vocation for the ministry. Because there were not enough + churches for them, they went into the Department of State.

+

Foreign Minister: We would like to leave these documents with you.

+

The Secretary: My God! What’s that? One of your speeches?

+

Foreign Minister: It consists of several documents. One explains the + current status of the economy. Another explains the requirements of the + armed forces. Another is the state of the laws under the new level in + the state of seige; one concerns the new Council of State, and the final one explains the + legal dispositions the government is thinking of taking.

+

The Secretary: My view on the question of human rights is that it is on + two levels. One is that it is a total injustice. Nobody goes around + making statements regarding what is going on in Kampala or the Central + African Republic or hundreds of other countries around the world. The + other is the problem of helping your government under the present + conditions, which we did not create, but which make it difficult for us. + It would help enormously if something can be done. We will study the + documents. We understand the problem. It is not in the interest of the + United States to turn Chile into another Portugal. (I’ll be in great + trouble when this is leaked to the papers.) However, this is my personal + conviction, and I stand behind it.

+

What can be done visibly to bring about a change in congressional + attitudes? We do not need to discuss it now. However, it is our problem. + Otherwise, Congress will place restriction upon restriction against U.S. + interests. Look at Turkey—the restrictions there do not serve any U.S. + interest.

+

This is the issue we face. (I have not read fully all the briefing + papers.) I do not know what can be done. Anything to alleviate that + situation, and in a somewhat visible way, would be enormously helpful. + This is the basic orientation, but the solution has to be a Chilean one. + We don’t know the details of what you can do.

+

We have a problem with the Turks. They so adhered to principal that they + withdrew 15,000 troops without telling us. This is something we could + have used with our Congress. But they were intent on showing they could + not yield to pressures. It would have ended the whole thing if we could + have issued a communiqué stating the reduction. They had 35,000 troops, + and now they only have 20,000. This is not exactly analogous.

+

Foreign Minister: Regarding human rights, first I am convinced that the + alleged violations of human rights are absolutely false. I have + conducted my own personal investigation in my own country to be + absolutely convinced in my own conscience to make sure they are not + taking place.

+

The Secretary: Why did you cancel United Nations group? You shouldn’t + have invited them in the first place. Why did you invite them?

+

Foreign Minister: We had to cancel because there was a bad atmosphere to + begin with. They started badly. Both here in New York and in Lima they + talked to people regarding the situation. They were supposed to + investigate the present situation. However, they were hearing old + testimony. And the atmosphere inside and outside the country was being + artificially made into a commotion (sic). The commotion made impossible a thorough and impartial + investigation, and I think the government was right in not authorizing + the visit. The Working Group has prepared a report which is not fair. My + President left the door open for a later visit of the Working Group, but + with the report I feel the door is closed. It was unfortunate. We have + admitted the Inter-American Human Rights Commission, and the + International Committee of the Red Cross has been there since 1973.

+

The Secretary: Why did you invite the group to begin with?

+

Foreign Minister: They created artificially a very bad atmosphere. The + Government of Chile has followed a plan to liberalize emergency + measures, but the Government of Chile must take measures to control + terrorism. Terrorism is a very serious problem all over the world.

+

The Secretary: That does not happen in the United States. In this country + they only shoot at the President.

+

Foreign Minister: I have asked David + Popper whether he would prefer to live in Buenos Aires or + Santiago. He answered “no” because his colleague in Buenos Aires lives + like a prisoner in his Embassy.

+

The Secretary: I have no precise suggestions to make. I don’t know the + conditions. Our point of view is if you do something, let us know so we + can use it with Congress. I see in this document you paroled 200 people, + and they have gone to Panama.

+

Ambassador Trucco: We have + authorized more than 200 people to leave the country, and they have no + place to go because no one will allow them in. The President of Colombia + said he would have to take measures against the Chileans already there. + And Facio says some are creating trouble in Costa Rica. Costa Rica is + not willing to accept any more Chileans. They are creating problems.

+

The Secretary: You will know what to do. We cannot go beyond what we have + said. What other problem do we have to discuss?

+

Ambassador Trucco: One problem we + are having is with the Ex-Im Bank + limitation of the $500,000 (sic).

+

The Secretary: Why?

+

Ambassador Trucco: The previous + listing on Chile has not changed with circumstances. This situation + dates from the Popular Unity Government.

+

The Secretary: It took me two years to get our institutions to reduce + credit to your country. (To Rogers) Will you call Casey?

+

Assistant Secretary Rogers: I’ll + call today. Everything is fine with the IDB and the World Bank?

+

Ambassador Trucco: With the World + Bank we are experiencing certain delays, but we are not pressing the + World Bank.

+

Assistant Secretary Rogers: We + should have no problem. We are leaning hard on the bureaucracy.

+ +

The Secretary: Bill, talk to the Ex-Im + Bank. These are vestiges of the previous government. Your situation with + the private banks?

+

Assistant Secretary Rogers: Do + you need any help?

+

Ambassador Trucco: No, we don’t. + Our Finance Minister is coming next month, and presently their offers + have doubled.

+

The Secretary: As I understand it, with commercial sales you’re + alright—the problem’s with FMS.

+

Ambassador Trucco: The problem + with commercial sales is that no export licenses have been approved + since 1974.

+

Assistant Secretary Rogers: It is + cleared now for purchases made prior to June 1974.

+

The Secretary: How about the $10 million of sales you are talking about. + We could go forward in Congress with a proposal for $20 million in + credit, but Congress would throw it out. Our tentative judgment is not + to do it. Do you have any problems with that? On cash sales, could we do + more?

+

Assistant Secretary Rogers: The + original figure was $6 million, but we changed it to $10 million.

+

Foreign Minister: On our list here we have items which are in excess of + $10 million.

+

The Secretary: Why do we have to say no commercial sales? Why don’t we go + through with it? If $10 million are not enough, we could add a few + millions.

+

Assistant Secretary Rogers: We + are prepared to be responsive.

+

The Secretary: If $10 million is not enough, add more. What next, part of + south Peru or part of western Bolivia?

+

Foreign Minister: The new government in Peru is improved. We have hope + for better relations with this President. And with Bolivia we are + working earnestly to resolve our problems, but we have made no + commitments regarding the form of the solution.

+

The Secretary: Thank you. That would be very helpful.

+

Foreign Minister: Regarding Peru, we still have Soviet influence. They + are receiving a Soviet training vessel in Callao with over 100 + “cadets.”

+

The Secretary: But how many Soviets are there now?

+

Assistant Secretary Rogers: In + southern Peru?

+

The Secretary: What is our position? Soviets in the north are alright; + but in the south, they are bad?

+

Foreign Minister: We have just heard that the Soviets are on board a + ship. But this just proves the continued close relation between the + armed forces and the Soviet Union.

+ +

The Secretary: The new Government of Peru has not been in office long + enough to make any changes yet.

+

Foreign Minister: On the day of the coup—August 29—at 8:00 a.m., the + Peruvian colleague of the Chilean military commander in Arica called him + to say that they were going to take over the government, “and we are + going to eradicate communism and Marxism from Peru.” That morning I sent + a cable to my Embassy in Lima. The Embassy said it was 9:30 a.m. and all + was normal. We hope to have better relations, but there is still some + Soviet influence.

+

The Secretary: We will treat these requests sympathetically. On PL–480 I understand Chile is getting 2/3 of + the total for Latin America.

+

Ambassador Trucco: Yes, this is + going well.

+

The Secretary: How is the economic situation? Is it improving?

+

Foreign Minister: Yes, it is improving. I believe the economic measures + to be sound. The Finance Minister is very strict. I have never seen a + Finance Minister like this one in Chile. Traditionally, after the budget + was approved, we used to ask the Finance Minister for more money. But + this is not the case with this government. Now he asks for cuts. He has + cut us to 80% of the original budget. The measures are very strict, but + they are good for the country. I am convinced that next year it will be + better. We have been expanding our nontraditional exports, and next year + we may not have to renegotiate the external debt. The measures are very + good and the people willing to cooperate.

+

Ambassador Trucco: The Balance of + Payments deficit is wiped out and completely financed.

+

The Secretary: (To a whispered exchange in Spanish between Trucco and Carvajal about a copper + producer-consumer conference) We have agreed to do it.

+

Ambassador Trucco: We are + attending a copper exporters meeting in Lima.

+

The Secretary: Stay in touch with us. We can set up some sort of ad hoc group which can set objective criteria to + define the interests of the producers and the interests of the + consumers. This might be according to a percentage of production and + consumption.

+

Ambassador Trucco: Ambassador + Popper has had recent + meetings with the three financial ministers to discuss the Chilean + position.

+

Foreign Minister: Our impression is very good regarding your speech on + the matter.

+

The Secretary: As I stated in my speech we favor this. Why don’t you + coordinate among the producers? We will set this up.

+

One other thing: I have heard that you want to invite the OAS General Assembly to Santiago.

+ +

Foreign Minister: Yes, in April of next year.

+

The Secretary: Do you think that would be alright with the other + countries?

+

Foreign Minister: Nobody had made any statement against it.

+

The Secretary: How about Mexico?

+

Ambassador Trucco: I have spoken + to Colina (of Mexico). He was skeptical. He said that the situation had + passed. But I do not know what situation he was referring to.

+

The Secretary: Maybe Echeverria?

+

Ambassador Trucco: I also talked + with President Lopez of + Colombia.

+

The Secretary: We won’t oppose.

+

Ambassador Trucco: I have talked + with Burelli Rivas of + Venezuela; and he talked to President Perez; and Perez thought it had some merit. Panama also + is in favor. I believe a meeting of the OAS General Assembly would do a lot of good.

+

The Secretary: I would rather like it.

+

Ambassador Trucco: It would show + the real situation and how it has been distorted. They would see the + effect of the social programs and the economic programs to bring the + country back to normalcy.

+

The Secretary: Would I have to stay the whole week? I would have to + listen to too many speeches.

+

Assistant Secretary Rogers: Last + year the meeting was good. It only lasted two days.

+

The Secretary: Last year was outstanding. It was the best I ever + attended. The Foreign Ministers met for two days, and the other sessions + were left to the experts. I would be in favor of such a meeting.

+

Ambassador Trucco: The only + country with which we might have some problems is Mexico, but they can + be assured they would receive all courtesies.

+

The Secretary: Do you have the facilities?

+

Assistant Secretary Rogers: They + are excellent.

+

Foreign Minister: I am sure they are better than those (OAS) in Washington.

+

The Secretary: That is not hard to do.

+

Ambassador Trucco: They would be + the same facilities arranged for the 1972 UNCTAD.

+

The Secretary: If you can get your Latin American friends to support it, + the U.S. will have no difficulties.

+

Ambassador Trucco: (Handing over + another document) This is on the talks in Santiago among the countries + of the Andean Pact on the limitation of armaments. Ambassador Bernstein + presided over these talks.

+ +

Assistant Secretary Rogers: + Should we make a public statement on these talks?

+

Ambassador Trucco: Nothing at + this time.

+ +
+ + +
+ 202. Memorandum For the Record +

Summary: In an October 3 meeting, Department of + State and CIA officials + discussed Trucco’s + concern over Contreras’ + reported separate channel to Washington. Rogers stated that the U.S. + Government should speak with one voice regarding Chile + policy.

+

Source: Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, ARA Weekly Meetings, 1976–1977. Secret. Drafted by + De Tarr on October + 7. Memoranda for the record on the July 11 and August 25 ARA/CIA + meetings are ibid.

+ + + + + Washington, October + 3, 1975. + + + SUBJECT + ARA/CIA Weekly Meeting, 3 October 1975 + + + PARTICIPANTS + + + + + ARA + + + Assistant Secretary William + D. Rogers + + Ambassador Hewson + Ryan + + Mr. William + Luers + + Dr. Albert + Fishlow + + + + + + + + CIA + + + [names not declassified] + + + + + + + INR/DDC + + + + Francis De + Tarr + + + + +

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to Chile.]

+

Chile:

+

Ambassador Ryan said that Chilean + Ambassador Trucco had expressed + concern that Colonel Manuel + Contreras, the Director of Chile’s Directorate of + National Intelligence (DINA), has a + separate channel to Washington (Contreras’ conversations with CIA officials are reported in notes covering meetings of + August 25 and July 11).

+

Assistant Secretary Rogers said + that this is a very important time in our relations with Chile. Our + position toward Chile is going to be expressed both publicly and + privately. It has been decided that no military assistance is to be + given to Chile this year, neither grants nor loans. It may be possible + to provide a discreet package of cash sales, but even this would be difficult given + congressional feelings. In addition, Chile wants the OAS General Assembly to be held in + Santiago next April. We will condition our attitude to their desire on + the support that the Chileans receive in Latin America, and also on the + issue of human rights. The basic outlines of our current Chilean policy + will be made clear in the near future to the Chilean Foreign Minister, + and will arouse considerable interest in Santiago. We must all be aware + of the broader context of our current relations with Chile. It is + important that there be no misunderstandings, and that the US speak with + one voice.

+

Ambassador Ryan repeated that + Ambassador Trucco had mentioned + Contreras as having a + separate channel between Chile and the USG and has said that he, Trucco, had not even known that Contreras was coming to Washington. + It is clear, Ambassador Ryan + added, that Trucco and Contreras do not get along.

+ + +

Mr. Sampson said that it was possible that the military Attaché, General + Morel, had known that Contreras + was coming. Morel knows and sees General Walters. Ambassador Ryan remarked that Morel is being replaced. Mr. Sampson + said that the CIA is not interested in + military questions concerning Chile. He had met Morel in General + Walters’ office; Morel was + concerned with the Peruvian military buildup.

+

Assistant Secretary Rogers said + that, in any case, the Chileans will be writhing and flailing about not + getting military credits. It was thus necessary to sensitize the CIA to the situation.

+

Ambassador Ryan also said that + the Department should be informed of any movements planned by Contreras.

+

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to Chile.]

+
+ +
+ 203. Transcript of the Secretary of State’s Staff Meeting +

Summary: Kissinger and his staff + discussed human rights abuses in Chile and military assistance + for the country.

+

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Transcripts of Secretary of + State Kissinger’s Staff + Meetings, Lot 78D443, Box 8, Secretary’s Staff Meetings. Secret. + Kissinger chaired + the meeting, which was attended by all the principal officers of + the Department or their designated alternates. The reference to + “Mission Friends” in this document is an incorrect transcription + of a reference to Lutheran Bishop Helmut Frenz, whose residency + permit had just been revoked by the Chilean Government for + “anti-patriotic activities and for gravely endangering the + public security and peace.” (Telegram 6670 from Santiago, + October 3; ibid., Central Foreign Policy File, D750344–0601) + “Four toes” is an incorrect transcription of “four TOWs,” a reference to anti-tank + weaponry. The time at which the meeting began is not recorded, + but it ended at 9:06 a.m. In Section 502(b) of the amended + Foreign Assistance Act of 1974, Congress instructed the + President to reduce or terminate assistance to any government + which engaged in a consistent pattern of gross violations of + human rights. On October 7, Rogers informed Popper that in an October 2 lunch meeting with + Trucco, Rogers had reinforced + Kissinger’s comments + to Carvajal during the + September 29 Kissinger-Carvajal conversation, in particular that the + administration would probably not request FMS credits for Chile from + Congress. (Telegram 238245 to Santiago, October 7; ibid., + D750346–1211)

+ + + + + Washington, October + 6, 1975. + +

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to Chile.]

+

Mr. Rogers: The second thing I want to mention to you is the action by + the Chileans with respect to Mission Friends. Mission Friends is the + head of the Lutherans in Chile. They got the UN—

+

Secretary Kissinger: They’re + particularly trying. (Laughter.)

+

Mr. Rogers: They got the UN Medal last + year for his work with respect to the Chilean refugees. He made the + mistake of going to Europe, from which he is originally sending his wife + and six children to Chile; and they told him he couldn’t come back. The + Council of Churches is raising hell about this.

+

I would like to say quietly: This is really not helpful as far as the + United States and our position is concerned.

+

Secretary Kissinger: But now can + you explain one other thing to me, Bill? Why is it that our Ambassador + in Chile should share the same impression that I do—that we’re dragging + our feet on everything? I saw a cable from him this weekend.

+

Mr. Rogers: On the cash sales?

+

Secretary Kissinger: Yes.

+

Mr. Rogers: The basic problem is our friends over at the Pentagon.

+

Secretary Kissinger: Yes, but + isn’t it also true that if you drag your feet much longer it will be cut + off legally?

+ +

Mr. Rogers: No. Kennedy’s + legislation won’t even go in—I mean, many weeks from now—and final + action on the thing will be action—it will be part of the Foreign + Assistance Act. You’re not going to have special legislation on that + before the Act itself goes through. But the answer to the question—

+

Secretary Kissinger: But what is + it that holds it up at the Pentagon? I can see people saying they’re + against it, but what can the Pentagon be holding up?

+

Mr. Rogers: The definition of the package.

+

Secretary Kissinger: I mean, + what’s the dispute between four TOWs and three half tracks? What is the + dispute? Besides they’re paying for it, aren’t they?

+

Mr. Rogers: Right.

+

Secretary Kissinger: Why can’t + they define their own package?

+

Mr. Rogers: I had lunch with Trucco last week and I said, “Give us your definition of + the package.”

+

Secretary Kissinger: Then who’s + holding it up—Trucco or the + Pentagon or we?

+

Mr. Rogers: We are not. No—we really aren’t.

+

Secretary Kissinger: But if they + apply to the Agriculture Department by mistake, we won’t correct it + until we find out; right? (Laughter.)

+

Well, there must be something wrong if in four months they can’t produce + orders for ten million dollars.

+

Mr. Rogers: No, no. It’s one week, really. The decision in principle was + met last week to go ahead with the cash sales. That was the first time + the decision was made.

+

Secretary Kissinger: It’s the + first time that I didn’t understand. I thought the decision was made + last July.

+

Mr. Rogers: On cash sales? No.

+

Secretary Kissinger: Well, what + is it that Popper is complaining + about—that if we drop them out of the OAS, Bill, they’ll consider that very seriously?

+

Mr. Rogers: Yes. But if we solace them—

+

Secretary Kissinger: But why do + we have to solace them? They’d rather be defeated in Congress than be + dropped out by us?

+

Mr. Rogers: That’s what Popper + says, and I don’t believe it.

+

Secretary Kissinger: Well, that’s + capable of objective determination; isn’t it? Why should we not put them + in if they’d rather be defeated by the Congress?

+

Mr. Rogers: Well, because they are not the only ones that are going to be + defeated by Congress, if you go to the mat of Congress on this + issue.

+ +

Secretary Kissinger: You don’t + have to go to the mat. They knocked it out last year without defeating + anybody else.

+

Mr. Rogers: Well, Congress, quite frankly—a lot of people in Congress + would like to have it in there just in order to have a target to shoot + at.

+

Secretary Kissinger: That’s not + true. The target they want to shoot at is the Chilean Government. And if + you take this target away from them, they’ll go after PL–480 or something else.

+

Mr. Rogers: Well, they’ll try that anyway.

+

Secretary Kissinger: Well, in + that case you’re not going to deflect the people that are anti-Chile by + taking it out yourself.

+

Mr. Rogers: You’re not going to deflect anti-Chile. What you are going to + deflect is the possibility that they attack you and this Department for + abrasing these Chileans.

+

Secretary Kissinger: They’re + going to attack me, and they’re going to attack me on Chile anyway. + That’s part of the game now. And if the Department can’t take some heat, + then I feel sorry for it. The Department is going to take hundreds of + the heat that I’m going to take. So if that’s the consideration, then + we’re not going to be attacked. We’re going to be attacked for PL–480, for anything else. That’s the name + of the game now with Chile. That’s how you move your morality.

+

Mr. Rogers: We have a defensible proposition, the collapse of—

+

Secretary Kissinger: We have a + defensible proposition with FMS by + pointing out that it creates such an enormous equality in that area and + that if things ever blow that area we’re going to wind up again with a + radicalized military.

+

Mr. Rogers: Politically—with the Congress of the United States.

+

Secretary Kissinger: Let them + vote against it. They voted against it last year, and we also knifed + it.

+

Mr. Rogers: But my judgment certainly is: Very strongly, we’re going to + have a lot more defensible position if we go for PL–480 and economic assistance.

+

Secretary Kissinger: Except + you’ll never get military assistance started again because a lot of + people are against it anyway—to any Latin American country, to any + country. They’d like us to be in the position, even though it is clearly + demonstrable, that military aid gives + you five times the leverage that economic aid does—it’s incomparable more. The theory is that + economic aid is good and military + aid is bad.

+

Mr. Rogers: Well, that’s an argument for Hartman to make in this case of what have we got that + military assistance has been providing?

+

Secretary Kissinger: We got rid + of Allende, for one thing.

+

What we have gotten for economic aid + would be provided.

+ +

Mr. Rogers: That’s right too.

+

Secretary Kissinger: It depends + on what you get. What’s your definition of getting something?

+

Mr. Rogers: There’s been no action on the human rights thing.

+

That’s not the thing. The basic position posed by Chile is, even if you + are in the Parradine case, in the perception of most Congressmen, are + you going to relate or hinge human rights performance with military + assistance?

+

Secretary Kissinger: That’s an + interesting question, but I ought to be told that that’s what we’re + operating under.

+

Mr. Rogers: Pardon me?

+

Secretary Kissinger: But that + ought to be brought to my attention—that this is the operating principle + of the Department—which it hasn’t been while I’ve been here.

+

Mr. Rogers: The question isn’t whether or not it’s the operating + principle of the Department. The question that Congress is asking is: + Are you ever, in any case, going to make the linkage? And the Chile case + presents that issue in principle.

+

Secretary Kissinger: Together + with 30 other countries in the world—Saudi Arabia—

+

Mr. Rogers: Right.

+

Secretary Kissinger:—Iran.

+

Mr. Rogers: Then the argument becomes, on the other side: If you give + here, you’ve got to give—

+

Secretary Kissinger:—Gulf states, + Kuwait—do they have such great human rights performances? If you once + establish that principle, that’s an important question to decide; and + you just can’t slide that through. I mean, if I read that cable by + accident, I would have thought that the Chileans liked it that way. And + if that’s the case, you’re not making any point.

+

Mr. Rogers: That’s the case that the Congress wants.

+

Secretary Kissinger: The + Congress—our case is to do what’s best for the country. The Congress can + then vote whatever it chooses. We’re not in the business of psychiatric + second-guessing of what the Congress might want to do. We put up what we + think is right. Let the Congress vote it down.

+

Mr. Rogers: Oh, I agree with that.

+

Secretary Kissinger: And we can + determine the intensity. It’s not such a simple issue on whether you + link human rights issues to military sales—not at all a simple + issue.

+

Mr. Rogers: I agree with that.

+

Secretary Kissinger: And once you + establish that principle—first of all, you have to determine what the + human rights issue is in Chile that distinguishes it from 30 other human rights issues around the + world. Is it significantly better or worse than Kenya, to which we’re + starting a program now? Is it significantly worse than Zaire? Is it + significantly worse than the Gulf states?

+

Mr. Rogers: I thought the answer to that question was the purpose of this + elaborate exercise the Department has been going through in the last two + or three months in terms of analyzing all the human rights + practices.

+

Secretary Kissinger: I don’t know + what the Department is going through. It hasn’t been discussed with me. + It is not clear to me that we’re going to link military sales to human + rights issues. Military sales are basically linked to the defense of + those countries and whether the defense of those countries is in our + interest.

+

Anyone who wants to join a missionary organization should wait for the + next Secretary of State. That’s not what we’re doing foreign policy + for—in the absence of some overriding case. It has to do with the + defense of those countries, whether that defense is in the national + interest of the United States. That’s what we’re selling arms for.

+

Mr. Maw: We have done—

+

Secretary Kissinger: If they have + gas chambers, that’s another matter.

+

Mr. Maw: We have done the + exercise called for by 502(b), and all of our conclusions are that + military sales requirements are paramount and they say we’ve taken into + account the human rights situation in arriving at the levels proposed. + We increased in Korea—

+

Secretary Kissinger: But that + just isn’t true.

+

Mr. Maw: We take it into account + by saying—

+

Secretary Kissinger: It’s not a + borderline case of whether a country should or should not be because it + doesn’t have a defense problem—then I can understand it.

+

Mr. Maw: We don’t have that.

+

Secretary Kissinger: Churchill + supported the Soviets when he thought it was in the British national + interest, even though he fought them all his life. I just don’t agree. + We’re going down a slope here that’s not going to be manageable. Even + though we’ll get Congressional applause for one year, after a year or + two we will have set a principle that is going to be impossible to + maintain.

+

Mr. Habib: Also, you shouldn’t + set it for one country and then not for another country.

+

Secretary Kissinger: If we once + set it in one country that we’re cutting off foreign military sales for + because we don’t like their human rights practices, how are we going to + defend it in Korea?

+ +

Mr. Habib: In Korea they have a + clearer issue than in Chile, by anyone’s definition.

+

Secretary Kissinger: + Indonesia?

+

Mr. Maw: It’s very important in + Indonesia.

+

Secretary Kissinger: It’s + important in Chile, for overriding reasons. If you have a military + government and you deprive them of arms, you’re getting them ready to be + taken. And there’s no sense kidding anybody about that. How can a + military government survive that can’t get arms? Do you have any ideas + on who’s going to follow them?

+

Mr. Rogers: The military government—(a)—has been blowing arms on the + market; (b), we’re proposing to sell them arms.

+

The question is whether or not to grant them military assistance in the + form of credits or grants.

+

Mr. Maw: The strategy, I thought + here, was we know we’re going to lose in Congress—

+

Secretary Kissinger: I do not + understand the impact in Chile. I thought this had been worked out with + the Chilean Government to save them from Congressional embarrassment. + That I can understand. I did not know it was going to be presented as + our protest on the human rights issue.

+

Mr. Rogers: Going back to Popper’s program, I had lunch with Trucco the next day. And I said, “I + want to be sure that you and Carvajal understand exactly what the Secretary was + saying, because I don’t want it a week or two or three from now to hear + this. It’s a great sort of a problem for you.” He said, “I understand. I + will talk to Carvajal.”

+

+ Carvajal is in New York. He + talked on the telephone.

+

+ Popper hasn’t talked to anybody + about this.

+

Now, if it’s a question of the Chileans, we can go back once more to be + absolutely certain they understand, to be absolutely sure this is the + better way to do it, rather than have them become the essential point of + contention for a helluva political fight.

+

Secretary Kissinger: It won’t be + such a huge fight because the fight will be about Chile. They’ll make a + fight about Chile no matter what you put into this thing. I have just + never experienced that with the Congress; it’s not my experience.

+

Mr. Maw: Mr. Secretary, the + thought was if you go in for some FMS, + you know you’re going to lose. And you lose at the same time the right + to make sales.

+

Now, maybe we can salvage the sales rights. That’s the hope by this + tactic.

+

Secretary Kissinger: Then you’re + not making a human rights point—so, you know, you’ve got to make up your + mind what the argument here is. + If you want to save sales—if you go in to the Congress and tell them + “We’re trying to make a human rights point” you’re asking for them to + cut off the sales.

+

If you’ve once granted the principle that you’re cutting off foreign + military sales on human rights grounds, then it’s just an oversight that + we are permitting cash sales.

+

Mr. Maw: It’s a risk.

+

Secretary Kissinger: It’s not a + risk; it’s a certainty. What is the principle under which you’re then + going to defend the right to make cash sales, except that they’re going + to miss it?

+

Mr. Maw: Well, we know we’re not + going to get FMS on the votes.

+

Secretary Kissinger: Well, we + nearly got it last year. It wasn’t that far away last year.

+

Mr. Maw: We slipped through on + the sales.

+

Mr. Lord: I thought the plan was + that you were going to make strategy on reports—has that changed? Not + cut any country out.

+

Secretary Kissinger: Except + Chile.

+

Mr. Maw: Until this came + along.

+

Mr. Lord: The last I saw, Chile + wasn’t cut out either.

+

Mr. Maw: It happened since the + report.

+

Secretary Kissinger: Well, what + is the real reason though? The reason is Defense is getting out of its + cotton-picking mind. Defense is tough on SS–19s but on nothing else. + (Laughter.) Isn’t that the real reason? I mean, when we cut out all the + baloney, isn’t it a fact that we don’t want to testify and that Defense + doesn’t want to testify? Is there any other reason?

+

Mr. Rogers: On Chile for assistance?

+

Secretary Kissinger: Yes.

+

Mr. Rogers: Yes. The basic reason is the essential question: Do you want + to continue providing assistance—grant and credit assistance—to that + country, given the present political circumstances in the United States? + You can justify cash sales, because that’s cash and carry.

+

Chile, if it wants to spend its own money, can provide for its own + defense. You’re not essentially boycotting or blockading—

+

Secretary Kissinger: Can you + avoid having that applied to any other country?

+

Mr. Rogers: The opening wedge. In my judgment you can.

+

The reasons are two: (1), Chile, I believe—although you may argue that + Zaire is just as bad, is just as bad on the human rights as you can + find—

+

Secretary Kissinger: I doubt + it.

+ +

Mr. Rogers: Well, bad in a lot of ways, because of the fact that we have + been cooperating with them very hard—making clear to them—

+

Secretary Kissinger: I doubt it, + seriously. I’m not even sure whether it’s, by orders of magnitude, worse + than other Latin American countries. It just happens to be the focal + point of left wing agitation.

+

Mr. Rogers: Look, you’ve got 4,000 political—

+

Mr. Habib: You’ve got 4,000.

+

Mr. Rogers: You’ve got a lot more political prisoners in Chile than you + do—you’re talking essentially about a thousand political prisoners in + the United States.

+

Secretary Kissinger: How many do + you have in Brazil?

+

Mr. Rogers: Not anything like that per capita.

+

Secondly, security interest in the United States—that’s as marginal a + case for security interest as you can find.

+

Secretary Kissinger: Except if + the government is overthrown.

+

Mr. Rogers: Right. The possibility of a Portugalization of Chile is as + close to zero as it is in any country.

+

Secretary Kissinger: Until the + government gets overthrown.

+

Mr. Rogers: What?

+

Secretary Kissinger: Until the + government gets overthrown.

+

Mr. Rogers: Who’s going to overthrow it? The terrorists are cleaned out. + There are no serious terrorists in that country.

+

Mr. Maw: Those that aren’t driven + out are in jail.

+

Secretary Kissinger: What?

+

Mr. Maw: Those that aren’t driven + out are in jail.

+

Secretary Kissinger: You better + let me think about this again. I just didn’t understand what we were + doing. I think I’d rather have the Congress knock it out.

+

Mr. Rogers: O.K. Do you want to take another look at the paper we + have?

+

Secretary Kissinger: + Absolutely.

+

It’s one thing to say we’re not going to go on the barricades for it. I + can see where we knock out grant aid, but I want to get a confirmation + of whether Carvajal understands + what we’re talking about.

+

Mr. Rogers: O.K.

+

Secretary Kissinger: We can never + get it started again. Under these conditions they’d have to have a + better human rights record than we before we can get it started + again.

+

Mr. Rogers: Carvajal will be in + Washington Tuesday or Wednesday. I’ll talk to him.

+

Do you trust me?

+

Secretary Kissinger: Not + completely. (Laughter.)

+
+ +
+ 204. Memorandum of Conversation +

Summary: Kissinger and Ford agreed that the administration should + request Congress for FMS + credits for Chile.

+

Source: Ford Library, + National Security Adviser, Memoranda of Conversations, Box 15, + Ford, Kissinger, October 6, 1975. + Secret; Nodis. In a telephone conversation at 8:10 p.m. on + October 6, Kissinger + told Rogers that he + opposed making an issue of FMS + sales to Chile under Section 502(b) of the 1974 Foreign + Assistance Act. Rogers + responded that, “we do not disqualify Chile under that + [Section],” and that Chile was not slated to receive any FMS credits in any case. + (Department of State, Electronic Reading Room, Kissinger + Transcripts)

+ + + + + Washington, October 6, 1975, 9:20 a.m.–10:23 + a.m. + + + PARTICIPANTS + President Gerald R. + Ford + + Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, + Secretary of State and Assistant to the President for National + Security Affairs + Lt. General Brent + Scowcroft, Deputy Assistant to the President for National + Security Affairs + +

+ Kissinger: I had opposed not + putting Chile on the FMS because it + would be knocked off. Now State wants to list them as non-complying with + human rights and that is why they were knocked off. Now I think we + should put Chile back on and let Congress knock it off. I don’t think we + should link FMS with human rights.

+

The President: I agree. That would be setting a very bad precedent. It + could be applied almost anyplace.

+

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to Chile.]

+
+ +
+ 205. Transcript of Secretary of State’s Staff Meeting +

Summary: Kissinger, Maw, and Rogers discussed FMS credits for Chile. Rogers stated that in order to + get congressional approval for the administration’s foreign + assistance proposals, it should not propose FMS credits for Chile.

+

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Transcripts Kissinger Staff Meetings, Lot + 78D443, Box 8, Secretary’s Staff Meetings. Secret. Kissinger chaired the meeting, + which was attended by all the principal officers of the + Department or their designated alternates. In his October 8 + conversation with Carvajal, Rogers stated that if the administration + proposed FMS credits for Chile, + Congress would deny the request. Carvajal and Rogers agreed that the U.S. Government should + refrain from proposing FMS + credits for Chile in order to prevent a fight that might prevent + sales from going forward. (Ibid., Central Foreign Policy File, + P810150–1158) On October 8 Rogers sent Kissinger a memorandum informing him of his + conversation with Carvajal. (Ibid., + P830035–1082)

+ + + + + Washington, October 8, 1975, 8:08 a.m. + +

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to Chile.]

+

[Mr. Rogers:] On Chile, I had a long meeting with the Pentagon yesterday. + They want to get cracking on the sales program. They want to consult + with the Congress beforehand. The question is that they—

+

Secretary Kissinger: That’s + another six weeks, right?

+

Mr. Rogers: No. It shouldn’t be anything like that. There are just really + three key people with respect to the issue who spoke to it on the floor + during the debate on the Continuing Resolution—McClellan and Brooke, primarily—McClellan, who was + for, having said the Continuing Resolution continued to furnish + sales—and an erroneous statement. But the Pentagon feels, quite + properly, they’ve got to consult with him.

+

Now, the packages that we have worked out—

+

Secretary Kissinger: Well, you + know damn well that Brooke is + going to say “No.”

+

Mr. Rogers: Not if the Pentagon press is right—and they will. What we + want to say is to clear the books of previous sales committed—sales + which we were committed to.

+

Secretary Kissinger: Why do I + have the uneasy feeling that you guys are euchring me step-by-step into + an arms embargo on Chile?

+

Mr. Rogers: Well, you shouldn’t. There’s nothing malevolent with what + we’re proposing here.

+

Secretary Kissinger: No. But + you’re going to propose the arms cutoff on the 502, right?

+

Mr. Rogers: No, not on the 502.

+ +

Secretary Kissinger: But that’s + how it’s going to be leaked. Then you’re going to say you’re clearing + the books on sales. After that, nothing will be done; then we have an + embargo—right?

+

If the only reason you’re going to sell is on the ground that it’s + already been committed, if you’re not going FMS on the ground—which I’m sure will get around—that it’s + the first victory for 502(b), how are you going to resume? That’s what’s + going to happen, you know.

+

Mr. Maw: You’re not cutting off + sales entirely.

+

Secretary Kissinger: On the + ground that these were things that were ordered before.

+

Mr. Maw: No. Sales generally.

+

Mr. Rogers: Sales generally.

+

Let me restate what I was saying. What is going forward is, (1), to clear + the books of all the stuff that had been ordered beforehand and to + propose an additional package. Clearing the books is 60 million dollars’ + work. It’s a helluva lot of stuff. It’s reconfiguring the F–4s. It’s all + the munitions for the—

+

Secretary Kissinger: What—so they + don’t shoot?

+

Mr. Rogers: They don’t now. That’s the problem. And it’s also the—

+

Secretary Kissinger: I had the + impression that Chile is being thrown to the wolves. I do not know why I + do have that impression.

+

Mr. Rogers: If anybody was trying to play ducks on this measure, they + would have leaked the issue long ago.

+

Secretary Kissinger: No, not as + long as they’ve got it blocked in the bureaucracy—which seems to have + happened for a month.

+

Mr. Maw: It’s still sitting—

+

Secretary Kissinger: That’s + right.

+

Mr. Maw:—until you release + it.

+

Secretary Kissinger: I’ve been + releasing it since July once a week. (Laughter.)

+

Mr. Rogers: The Pentagon is prepared to go. They want to talk to the + Congress with respect to the past sales—

+

Secretary Kissinger: What do you + think Brooke is going to say? + I’ll tell you what Brooke is + going to say. That’s a mental riot. What do you think Brooke is going to say? Do you think + Brooke is going to say: + “Good. That’s exactly the proposition I’ve been waiting for”—

+

Mr. Rogers: No.

+

Secretary Kissinger:—or he’ll + rush out on the Senate floor? I’ll tell you what his constituency wants + him to say: “That’s a great way to get campaign votes for nothing.”

+

Mr. Rogers: And the alternative is to go ahead with consultation on that, + and the Pentagon is vigorously opposed to that.

+ +

Secretary Kissinger: But why + didn’t they consult six weeks ago, two months ago? This issue is not + new. Why did we wait for three months, only to conclude that now we’ve + got to start the process of consultation?

+

Mr. Rogers: No. Part of the reason was—

+

Secretary Kissinger: I know it’s + unfair of me to think there’s foot-dragging when things like that go + on.

+

Mr. Rogers: Look, the bureaucratic decision of getting the foot-dragging + settled has been settled. It’s part of the problem of getting that whole + package through.

+

Secretary Kissinger: But part of + the package was turned down. Who was in favor of the FMS thing?

+

Mr. Rogers: To give FMS credit?

+

Secretary Kissinger: What time + did it take not to give them FMS? If I + judge the bureaucracy correctly, two seconds.

+

Mr. Maw: It was not settled until + your talks with the Chileans.

+

Secretary Kissinger: But it + didn’t take time, for God Sakes. It wasn’t settled. I didn’t want it. I + was sort of maneuvered into it. It’s totally against my policy and you + know it.

+

Mr. Maw: Once you got maneuvered + into it, then it came out of the papers—

+

Secretary Kissinger: You know + it’s against my policy. I really resent Bureaus maneuvering me that + way.

+

And if you may think it’s wrong, then state a different view. I do not + believe it is proper to use our military—our military sales are either + because they’re for our security or they are—if we once get into other + criteria, we’re licked.

+

Mr. Maw: And they’re doing the + same thing now on economic aid, and someone is approving that bill up + there on human rights grounds.

+

Mr. Rogers: The issue is, very simply: Do you want to take the Congress + on with respect to credits on farms or on Chile?

+

Secretary Kissinger: In fact, you + could make an equally good case that if you let them win on FMS that they’ve got their pound of flesh. + They’re going to get their pound of flesh.

+

Do you think that Chile will sneak through the Congress? There are only + two ways. (1), we can say that we’ve dropped them from FMS because we find their human rights + things are repugnant. “Therefore, you’ve got your pound of flesh. + Therefore, don’t take any more”—that’s one way of doing it—or to say our + position on FMS is given on the grounds + of security. Therefore, let them link it to human rights as their + responsibility and knock it out.

+

If we don’t, do you not think we’re going to have a human rights thing on + Chile up on the Hill?

+ +

Mr. Rogers: Of course they are. My own assessment is as a matter of + straight, raw politics: You have a better case of keeping the sales + program alive if you don’t go for credits. That’s what it comes down + to.

+

Secretary Kissinger: That’s an + argument that’s perhaps possible, but not the way this thing is going to + wind up being played.

+

Mr. Rogers: But we don’t play it that way. The only thing that we’re + proposing to do now with respect to the credit issue is Chile. That’s + going up in the next day or so.

+

Secretary Kissinger: It’s not + going up with my approval.

+

Mr. Rogers: No.

+

Secretary Kissinger: There should + be absolutely no misapprehension about it. And I am perfectly capable of + sitting on it for six weeks.

+

Mr. Maw: It holds up the Mideast + and everything. The Portuguese will be pulled out. We’re trying to send + some papers through separately, and OMB + is raising hell about it this morning. But we’ve got to release our + Mideast package. We’ve got to release a lot of others. We’re getting a + lot of flak, and the only unsettled question at the moment is Chile.

+

Secretary Kissinger: Which I + never had a chance to focus on.

+

Mr. Maw: Well, last Monday we + stopped it when it was going through with no FMS. You said you wanted another look at it.

+

Secretary Kissinger: Yes. But I + ought to be in on these decisions much earlier.

+

Mr. Rogers: No decision was made. It hadn’t matured, really, until a + couple of days before you and I talked about it in New York. Nobody was + trying to do anything behind your back. No decision was made.

+

Secretary Kissinger: How did it + mature? What’s the definition of “mature”?

+

Mr. Rogers: Well, it’s only by then that all the relevant Bureaus of the + Department came together in a proposal to you, which was made available + in a memorandum to you last week. You and I talked about it in New + York.

+

Secretary Kissinger: The relevant + Bureaus can just as well get together six weeks earlier, because all + they do is weep around with each other so that they can finally make a + compromise.

+

Mr. Maw: All Bureau work had been + done on every one of these items, holding it up on Chile to make a + decision.

+

Secretary Kissinger: But what + inspiration were we looking for, and what was it that we gained by + waiting six weeks on Chile? What fact was missing that we needed?

+

Mr. Maw: Because we couldn’t go + with Chile until the Mideast package was settled, so everything was held + up at once.

+ +

Secretary Kissinger: Why was + everything held up at once?

+

Mr. Maw: You have to have a + number that adds up to the total budget approval.

+

Secretary Kissinger: The fact + that OMB can’t decide earlier doesn’t + mean—

+

Mr. Maw: We’ve got money in + various other corners, which we allocate to Chile—if that’s the + decision. It would still add up to the total number, but we have to go + forward this week with that package. We’re having trouble now getting + the Portuguese cleared.

+

Mr. Rogers: My basic argument is you go and propose 20 million for + credits and Chile and I think you’re really closing the door with + respect to possibilities. I propose zero for Chile to go with the sales, + and I think we have a fighting chance of getting it through.

+

I’m meeting with Carvajal this + afternoon. I talked with Trucco; + on Monday I went over the ground with him again. I said, “Look, we want + to be sure what your opinion is. Do you want politically for us to take + that fight on with respect to credits now, or do you feel that that’s a + less attractive alternative to you than just sticking with the sales—the + cash sales?” He said his judgment is—and I’m talking with Trucco and Carvajal again on the telephone—that + he would just as soon avoid the fight with respect to the credits. I + said, “O.K. I want you to understand this, and let’s talk about it + again.”

+

Secretary Kissinger: Would we + threaten to cut off PL–480 if they + didn’t? (Laughter.)

+

Mr. Rogers: I will see him [at] 4 o’clock again this afternoon, and I + will give you a report on that conversation.

+

Mr. Maw: As soon as you have + that, let me know what the answer is so I can send it over to the + White House.

+

Secretary Kissinger: I haven’t + seen it.

+

Mr. Maw: Yes, you’ve seen it, + except with respect to Chile.

+

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to Chile.]

+
+ +
+ 206. Memorandum From Stephen + Low of the National Security Council Staff to the + President’s Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Scowcroft) +

Summary: Low + informed Scowcroft of the + particulars regarding the decision to sell arms to Chile.

+

Source: Ford Library, + National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for Latin + America, Box 3, Chile 2. Confidential. Sent for information. + Scowcroft wrote “OK” + and initialed the memorandum. Attached is an October 9 covering + memorandum, in which Rogers informed Maw that “Defense is firm that the [Chilean + FMS] proposal should be + vetted with some of the Congressional leadership beforehand.” + (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + P830108–2107) On October 11, Maw sent a letter to Fish indicating that the + Department of State concurred that FMS arms sales agreed to between July 1 and + December 30, 1974, should proceed, with the understanding “that + actual delivery of items is to be withheld pending completion of + successful joint DOD/State consultations with Congress.” (Ibid., + P830108–2106)

+ + + + + Washington, October + 8, 1975. + + + SUBJECT + Chile Arms Transfers + +

After some lengthy meetings I think the Chile arms problem is under + control. The understanding between me, State and Defense is as + follows:

+

A) The 1976 FMS proposal will contain no + allocation of grants or credit for Chile.

+

B) State agrees to begin arms sales as promptly as possible and will so + indicate to Defense by means of a letter from Carl Maw to General Fish. Both Departments understand that + Congressional consultation will have to precede these sales. State + agrees that the objective is eventually to supply the FMS credits contracted for by the Chileans + in 1975 before the restrictions were placed on them by the Congress and + to add a few new items. This could amount to as much as $90–$100 + million, but Defense understands that this is a goal and that we will + only go to Congress with a small package in the beginning.

+

C) Defense would like to have its request for an SRG remain on the books. As soon as sales get underway it + will formally request to have it withdrawn. Until then it understands + that we will not act on it.

+

For the moment nothing is required of you. I will continue to follow + this.

+
+ +
+ 207. Intelligence Memorandum 0767/75 +

Summary: The CIA + memorandum concluded that continuing international pressures on + Chile to curb human rights abuses would only produce a token + response by Pinochet. + Because of these abuses, it was unlikely that the U.S. + Government would provide significant military assistance to the + Chilean Government.

+

Source: Ford Library, + National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for Latin + America, Box 2, Latin America–General 3. Secret; [handling restriction not declassified]. A + typed notation at the bottom of the first page reads: “This + memorandum was prepared by the Office of Current Intelligence + with the assistance of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research, + Department of State, which concurs in its principal judgments. + Comments and queries may be directed to [less + than one line not declassified] of the Office of + Current Intelligence, code 143, extension 5115. Written in an + unknown hand on the cover page, not published, is, “Stephen Low + NSC.” In telegram 6841 from + Santiago, October 10, the Embassy provided a review of the + Chilean political situation since Pinochet took power, concluding that despite + international pressure on the regime to improve its human rights + practices, it would not make significant improvements. (National + Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + D750353–0435)

+ + + + + Washington, October + 21, 1975. + +

Chile After Two Years of Military Rule

+

Political Outlook

+

The military junta that replaced Salvador + Allende remains solidly in control after completing two + years in power on September 11. There is every reason to expect that the + junta, or something like it, will still be running Chile two years + hence. Neither its status as an international outcast nor the grave + economic and social problems it must deal with have produced any + substantial wavering in the Pinochet government’s determination to follow the course + it has marked out. In essence, this calls for maintaining an + authoritarian style of rule and setting its own pace for any easing of + security measures or of restrictions on political activity. Pinochet’s reported ouster of four + influential civilian advisers—all exponents of the hard line—may be a + first step in the direction of a more moderate approach.

+

The regime still commands the backing of the influential upper classes + and a majority of the middle and lower middle classes. The people of the + poorest economic strata, who supported Allende so stalwartly, have been rendered apathetic by + their preoccupation with the struggle to survive and intimidated by + their fear of the armed forces. The political parties have largely been + silenced; those on the left have been outlawed and the others have been + “recessed.” Despite strong support from Moscow and Havana, Chileans in + exile abroad pose no direct threat and many concede that they have + little hope of overturning the government. Unity within the armed forces + seems assured as long as Pinochet can avoid a further serious deterioration in + the political or economic + situation. We do not foresee things worsening to the point that the + unity would be threatened. There is, in sum, no base of opposition from + which a successful challenge to the authority of the present regime + could be launched.

+

For the first time since seizing power, leading military officials + apparently are beginning to discuss the country’s political future—a + subject that had been shunted aside by the moratorium on all political + activity and the need for emergency economic measures after the coup. + Growing international criticism and a few encouraging economic + indicators may be prompting President Pinochet and his advisers to give more thought to the + kind of political structure they want to establish in place of what they + have termed an outmoded system of “unrestricted ideological pluralism.” + Their ideas about what should transpire in the years ahead are vague, + however, suggesting that the path toward any sort of institutional + reform will be long and arduous. Pinochet has frequently asserted that the armed forces + should not relinquish control for some time to come, and he has still + not outlined a timetable for political “normalization.”

+

Contradictory statements by various government spokesmen suggest that + there is little consensus about what type of political and legal system + should be created. A commission has been at work since November 1973 + drafting a new constitution to replace the 1925 document, but completion + is evidently a long way off. Pinochet has announced that provisional constitutional + statutes in certain specific areas are in preparation. Although some + officials anticipate a constitutional referendum before 1980, their + optimism may be premature.

+

+ Pinochet provided his thinking on + Chile’s future political structure in a televised interview in + September. The president said that under a new constitution he saw room + for no more than three political parties. He clearly intends to exclude + the Communists, Socialists, and far leftist factions of other parties. + Senior army generals have raised the possibility that these parties + would represent the conservative, centrist, and moderate leftist + segments of the political spectrum. Pinochet’s statements cast some doubt on whether this + last category would include the Christian Democrats, the country’s + largest and best organized political entity. What does seem certain is + that the military will set strict guidelines for overseeing any future + political process. To avoid what Pinochet termed the “unrestricted ideological pluralism” + of many small parties, a substantial minimum registration would be + required for legal recognition.

+

Some political exile groups, notably the less extreme members of + Allende’s former coalition, + have reached an agreement with left-wing Christian Democrats to organize + a united front. This unity will probably enable them to capitalize on + the widespread anti-Chilean sentiment abroad in hopes of undermining the regime at home. + The exiles probably cannot mobilize much support within Chile, and their + propagandizing will amount to more a nuisance than a threat to the + junta.

+

The government’s outlawing of the leftist parties that supported + Allende and the ban on all + political activity by the remaining parties have squelched any + well-organized channel of domestic criticism. The moratorium has posed a + real dilemma for the Christian Democrats. If they refrain from any + political role they risk becoming atrophied, while on the other hand a + position of outright defiance could provoke total proscription. Party + leader and former president Eduardo Frei has tried to avoid a direct + confrontation between the party and the government, but his statements + and those of other party functionaries have bordered dangerously on the + limits of criticism tolerated by the junta. Extreme right-wing advisers + have urged Pinochet to ban the + party, but he has preferred to preserve the fragile modus vivendi, + probably to avoid inciting additional censure from European countries + where the Christian Democrats have influential friends.

+

Pinochet’s recent proposal to form an advisory council of state that + would include all former presidents, as well as other prominent + citizens, can be viewed as primarily an effort to mollify foreign + critics of the regime’s anti-democratic practices. Frei would not + participate without clear cut guarantees of an early return to + democratic rule, however. And that appears increasingly unlikely in view + of Pinochet’s categorical + rejection of any reversion to the status quo ante. This viewpoint was + further highlighted by the government’s stinging rebuff to recent + statements by party leaders indicating a desire to reach an + understanding with the military regime. What Pinochet may have in mind is to divide + the Christian Democrats and at the same time make it impossible for them + to cooperate other than on his terms. If Frei rejects the invitation to + join the council, Pinochet can + then proceed without the Christian Democrats, putting the blame on them + for being obstructive and uncooperative. The council, which in any case + is not expected to wield much influence, might then emerge as a + handpicked body of sycophants.

+

Some reports claim there is widespread sentiment within the armed forces + for broader civilian participation in the government. As in other policy + areas, a division of views probably does exist within the junta on the + desirability of a move in this direction. Civilian advisers, + particularly those on the economic team, already play a significant role + in some aspects of policy making, but the military dominates the cabinet + and much of the bureaucracy. Military leaders are likely to give + continued lip service to this idea, but the paucity of “nonpolitical” + civilians will retard any strong shift toward greater civilian + encroachment in the administration. Some cosmetic changes may be made in + response to continued + international pressures on Chile, but the armed forces—and the army in + particular—are not likely to yield their prerogatives in key areas of + responsibility.

+

Disagreements within the junta, which nearly erupted into an open clash + in August between President Pinochet and General Leigh, the air force member of the junta, have been + smoothed over for the moment. Pinochet apparently bowed to the demands of his three + junta colleagues and agreed to consult more regularly before making + important decisions and appointments. Although tempers have been cooled, + the apparent strong differences between Pinochet and Leigh will very likely put them at odds again. While + General Leigh’s outspoken + statements to some extent represent a devil’s advocate role, he also + resents Pinochet’s tendency to + run a one-man show with little respect for the views of his ostensible + partners. He has repeatedly stated that the government must show more + concern for the impoverished sector of Chilean society. His recent + comments suggest that he is trying to put some distance between himself + and the president by advocating more relaxed economic and political + policies. Leigh’s candid remarks + have frequently antagonized the President, but the latter has + compromised where necessary to preserve the unity of the junta. + Pinochet obviously is loath + to present a divided face to a generally hostile outside world at a time + when the government still has more than enough problems to deal + with.

+

Despite these internal differences, it appears now that there will be no + major shifts in the junta’s basic outlook. Its composition may change in + time, but Pinochet seems assured + of his primary position. Navy dissatisfaction with the performance of + junta member Admiral Merino, who has been notably inactive, may result + in his replacement at some point. Leigh might also consider resigning or leaving the + government if disagreements with the President become irreconcilable. + There is at least a remote chance that the navy, air force, and + Carabineros will gradually relinquish all political activity and, in + essence, leave Pinochet and the + army in charge of the government. In no case, however, do we anticipate + a change in the army’s predominant role.

+

Opposition to the military government from the remnants of leftist groups + remaining in Chile is largely checked by the vigilance of the security + forces. The controversial Directorate of Intelligence (DINA) has clamped down sternly on all + potential and real dissidents. DINA’s + heavy-handed methods, the source of much of the furor over human rights + abuses, make it unlikely that anything more than occasional minor acts + of terrorism or sabotage will disturb the present tranquility. Indeed, + the absence of significant armed opposition to the regime and the + international clamor over internal security practices seem to be slowly + drawing high officials into curtailing the activities of the + anti-subversion agencies. Pinochet recently ordered the circulation of a secret decree demanding + compliance with existing procedures for detentions throughout the + country. The action reportedly came after an investigation verified that + maltreatment of prisoners is continuing and that people are being + arrested and imprisoned without notification of their relatives.

+

The excesses of security forces have stimulated wide expressions of + international concern, but there have been few echoes at home, except + among the church hierarchy and the recessed political parties. Whatever + doubts Chileans may have about the propriety of their government’s + behavior, they tend to consider it a domestic affair and resent any + outside interference or questioning. Nevertheless, a few notable voices + are being raised in favor of greater liberalization. General Leigh has expressed his own conviction + that the government should undertake a process of “détente” and has + argued against holding political prisoners indefinitely or jailing + anyone on ideological grounds.

+

With little appreciation for the international repercussions, however, + the government continues to take steps that are certain to create + unfavorable reactions. After a dozen former Allende officials were released on September 12, it was + revealed that some charges were still pending against them. Now the navy + has begun a secret trial against nine individuals—including some of + those released in September—on charges of subversion. If indictments are + made, the case is likely to become a cause celebre to rival the + controversial 1974 air force trials. The inclusion of Luis Corvalan, + secretary general of the outlawed Chilean Communist Party, will provide + Moscow and Havana with renewed ammunition for their attacks on + Chile.

+

The measures Pinochet announced + recently to put his government in a better light have done little to + quiet even his mildest critics. The decision to reduce the state of + siege is no more than a gesture; it is supposed to allow limited review + by civil courts of cases previously considered by courts-martial, but it + could easily be circumvented. Unless the government shows a genuine + determination to abide by measures designed to limit abuses of its + arbitrary power—and so far it has not—it cannot expect to inspire + confidence about its intentions.

+

Economic Outlook

+

Chile is still struggling through an agonizing period of economic + readjustment to overcome the problems inherited from the Allende era and even before. The + difficulties are staggering, for Chile must deal with an inflation rate + that is one of the world’s highest and a serious balance-of-payments + problem brought on by sharply reduced world copper prices and costly + imports of foodstuffs, petroleum, and capital goods. Government + economists are issuing optimistic forecasts that some improvement is in + sight, but the government’s ability to make a go of its economic strategy will depend a great + deal on the general pace of the world-wide economic and industrial + recovery.

+

Meanwhile, the high social cost of the government’s austerity program is + worrying those military leaders who are most apprehensive about the + regime’s ability to cope with the social dislocation caused by the + deflationary program. Unemployment, for example, is up from 10 percent + in late 1974 to an estimated 18–22 percent in recent months. While the + government has sought to alleviate suffering among the lower classes by + making periodic wage readjustments and maintaining low-cost public + service employment projects, these palliatives have barely touched the + more glaring problems. The past winter has caused severe hardship, + particularly among the lower classes.

+

Among the negative projections, industrial output is expected to drop 20 + percent for the year and a slump in domestic demand will reduce real + GDP by 10 percent in 1975. The low + price of copper on the world market—it dropped from an average of 93 + cents in 1974 to an average of 57 cents so far this year—is the most + important reason for the country’s failure to increase export earnings + and reduce its foreign debt, which now totals almost $4 billion. + Brazil’s reported decision to increase copper purchases from Chile and + the likelihood of Brazilian investment in Chilean copper mining + enterprises might bring some relief. In any case, copper production is + not likely to increase much in the short term. Production is expected to + slip nearly 10–15 percent this year, mainly as a result of an agreement + among producing nations to curtail shipments in order to prop up the + world market price.

+

Even the positive side of the ledger shows only a few modestly hopeful + signs. In recent months the annual inflation rate has been cut to half + of 1974’s level of 376 percent, but the trend could be reversed + abruptly. Bringing inflationary pressures under sustained control will + not be a quick or easy task. A policy of gradual devaluation probably + will help curb Chile’s endemic inflationary psychology in addition to + stimulating non-traditional exports.

+

The government’s restrictive fiscal and monetary measures have helped to + restrain domestic demand and curb imports this year, perhaps by as much + as 18 or 19 percent from 1974 levels. Food imports alone have decreased + by 30 percent this year owing to a notable growth in agricultural + production (6 percent since last year). These gains, plus a 30 percent + annual increase in nontraditional exports, have encouraged the + government to believe that it can slightly ease the balance-of-payments + gap. Better prospects for 1976, however, will still be conditioned to + some extent on a hoped-for moderate upturn in copper prices. Current + indicators suggest that any increase will be modest at best.

+

The government is likely to succeed in trimming its deficit to 12 percent + of expenditures this year compared with 55 percent in 1973 when it assumed power. The slash in + public spending, however, is causing government investment outlays to + shrink. In addition, uncertainty resulting from the anti-inflation + program has made Chilean businessmen reluctant to undertake new + projects. Private foreign investment inflows, on the other hand, have + picked up slightly but are little more than a trickle at this point. + Continued large capital flows from international financial institutions + will be possible only if Chile can improve its international image.

+

We continue to believe that if the junta does not see substantial results + from its austerity efforts by the end of the year, Pinochet will soon thereafter be + casting about for possible new policies and new economic managers. As of + now, however, we see at least an even chance that the current economic + team headed by Minister Jorge + Cauas will bring about enough of an economic recovery to + guarantee retaining the basics of the current program.

+

International Outlook

+

Chile has had scant success in countering charges that it violates human + rights or generating sympathy and support through diplomatic offensives + and public relations campaigns. It is doubtful that Chile can expect + much support at international forums, where it frequently is a target of + condemnation by blocs of liberal and radical nations.

+

Leftists outside of Chile will never forgive the junta for overthrowing + the first democratically elected Marxist government in Latin America and + suppressing the political institutions that brought it to power. + Allende’s exiled followers + form a permanent claque of living “martyrs” who manage to turn sympathy + for the junta’s executed and imprisoned victims into political + opposition in Western capitals and much of the Third World.

+

+ Pinochet is aware of the high + penalty Chile is paying for its poor image, but his actions suggest that + this will not deter him from taking a go-it-alone position no matter + what the costs. His last-minute decision to bar a UN human rights fact-finding mission in + July hardened the negative international attitude toward Chile. Even + nations nominally disposed to be cordial and impartial began to see + Chile as the bete noire of international society. Predictions by Chilean + diplomats that Pinochet’s + September speech would rectify this situation crumbled when he defended + his decision to keep the UN group out of + Chile and held out no hope for a change of mind.

+

The incident is receiving wide play in the current session of the UN. The highly unfavorable report of the + UN Human Rights Commission contains + shocking charges, and several Western European governments plan to + sponsor a resolution condemning Chile’s stand on human rights. There is + little doubt but that this adverse publicity will further accentuate Chile’s ostracism and + diminish its ability to attract credit, especially in Western + Europe.

+

Continuing international pressures on Chile to change its ways may + produce a token response as growing awareness of its isolation forces + the junta to be more forthcoming. A hopeful sign was the recent release + of a number of labor leaders who apparently had been arrested by + security forces on spurious charges. Pinochet acted in this instance at the behest of US + labor leader George Meany, who + [less than 1 line not declassified] protested + the action. It is also possible that more trenchant economic + considerations, such as problems in renegotiating its foreign debt, will + convince the regime that adoption of a more democratic orientation is in + its own best interests.

+

Aside from the problem of overcoming its international isolation, Chile’s + major foreign policy concern is the perceived threat posed by Peru. + Chile’s northern neighbor has acquired a growing arsenal of weapons from + the Soviets and has made rapid strides in improving its military + capabilities. Anxiety over the possibility that Peru plans to avenge its + defeat by Chile in the War of the Pacific (1879–1883) continues to + dominate the thinking of military men in Santiago. War fever swept the + border area a little over a month ago when it was rumored that Peru + would strike if Chile ceded a tract of land to Bolivia in an area of + former Peruvian territory. Tensions have largely subsided as a result of + the change of government in Lima. The new Peruvian president, Morales Bermúdez, is believed to be + more level-headed than former President Velasco and less likely to engage in military + adventures. Nevertheless, there is a lingering distrust of Peruvian + motives, and Chile will continue to be preoccupied with building up its + own forces, concentrating mainly on defensive preparations in the + northern border area.

+

Chile has had little success in obtaining weapons abroad, and its luck is + not likely to change soon. Most of the western governments that would be + likely arms suppliers are disinclined to deal with the present military + regime. Strong condemnation of Chile in the UN will further complicate difficulties in finding new + sources of military assistance. Brazil has extended some help, but Chile + is still far from fielding a force to match Peru.

+

Much of the concern about future Chile-Peru relations is now focused on + the problem of Bolivia’s quest for access to the sea. Chile agreed to + negotiate the matter when diplomatic relations were resumed last + February, and La Paz is pressing hard for an early settlement. Chile, + meanwhile, probably has no intention of ceding territory and running the + risk of alienating nationalist sentiment. Moreover, diplomatic + flexibility is constrained by the terms of a 1929 protocol which + requires Peruvian consent for any boundary rearrangement. Santiago apparently is thinking along + lines of granting greater communications, transportation, and port + facilities to Bolivia, perhaps under some long-term lease + arrangement.

+

The negotiations have only recently approached the stage of preliminary + proposals, and Chile has indicated that it does not want to rush a + solution. It is eager to retain Bolivia’s good will in the event of + conflict with Peru, but there is a limit to the price it will pay. + Pinochet’s reported proposal + to give Bolivia control over a strip of land only if Peru can be + persuaded to grant a similar stretch along its side of the border + appears to be a well-calculated stroke to put the ball in Peru’s court. + Peru would almost certainly be unwilling to go along with such a scheme + even though it has indicated support for Banzer’s general objectives. As + things stand now, there is a good chance that a stalemate will + develop.

+

In the meantime, the danger of a clash between Peru and Chile over this + or other problems will remain a distinct possibility. Chile can be + expected to use every avenue to keep relations cordial, but there is + always a chance that a diplomatic blunder or a minor border incident + could blow up into a confrontation. Talks on arms limitation among the + Andean nations have brought the two nations to the conference table to + discuss acceptable limits on weapons procurement, but negotiations are + likely to be prolonged and probably will not have much impact in + stemming the headlong momentum toward acquisition of new and more + advanced weapons. At best, these meetings will serve as a vehicle to + allow both sides to talk and perhaps to lessen suspicions about each + other’s intentions.

+

Relations with the US have been cordial but somewhat strained. From + Chile’s viewpoint the difficulty stems from the US inability to respond + to Chile’s perceived needs, especially regarding weapons that Chile has + sought to balance its currently unfavorable position vis-à-vis Peru. + Chile’s continuing excesses in the human rights area make it unlikely + that increased US military assistance will be forthcoming. The Pinochet government still considers + the US to be its major ally and hopefully the chief source of capital + and technology, although the US trade and investment stake in Chile is + now minor. However, growing frustration over a prolonged restriction of + US arms assistance is likely to create bitterness in the months + ahead.

+

Nonetheless, there is little chance that Chile’s military leaders will + find a viable substitute for the US even though they are looking + actively outside the hemisphere for new friends and assistance. The most + they can hope for is to ride out the current difficult situation with + the expectation that an improvement in the economy and diminishing world + interest in Chilean affairs will eventually bring greater support from + the US and Western Europe.

+
+ + +
+ 208. Editorial Note +

On February 28, 1975, Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American + Affairs William D. Rogers + informed Secretary of State Henry D. + Kissinger of congressional efforts to investigate past + Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) + covert operations in Latin America. Noting that such investigations + could have “the gravest consequences” on U.S. policy in the region, and + that “Chile would perhaps be the most colorful copy,” he concluded, “we + must have some modus vivendi that will allow us to cooperate in the + legitimate concerns of the Congress and still avoid the severe damage to + our position in Latin America that more revelations and acknowledgements + of past questions will entail.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central + Foreign Policy File, 1975, P830122–0662)

+

On July 1, 1975, Senator Frank Church (D–Idaho) informed Deputy National + Security Adviser Brent Scowcroft + that the Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect + to Intelligence Activities (the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence) + would investigate cases of “covert para-military operations and covert + political action operations.” With regards to Chile, Church stated that + the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence would primarily examine + “those covert action programs intended to affect the outcome of the 1964 + and 1970 Chilean elections, as well as activities undertaken between + 1970 and 1973 in Chile, and the rationale for these activities.” (Letter + From Church to Scowcroft, July 1; + Ford Library, National + Security Adviser, NSC Information + Liaison with Commissions and Committees Files, Box 6, Authority to + Conduct Covert Actions.)

+

The Committee decided to hold open, as opposed to executive, sessions on + CIA covert action in Chile from + 1964. The administration was divided as to whether to support the + Committee’s intent to hold open hearings. Director of the Bureau of + Intelligence and Research William G. + Hyland argued that if the administration cooperated with + the Committee, the administration could “ride out as quickly as possible + this adverse period which should end shortly and thus get the hearings + behind us.” (Memorandum From Marsh to Ford, + October 31; ibid., March Files, 1974–1977, Box 59, SSC–Chile) Since the Committee planned to + hold open hearings in any event, if the administration supported open + hearings, Director of Central Intelligence William E. Colby could publicly state that the nature of + covert activity was to support the Chilean democratic process. In + addition, if the administration cooperated with the Committee in holding + open sessions, the administration could limit the release of the names + of Chileans who had worked with U.S. covert operatives.

+

However, Counsel to the President Philip W. + Buchen, Counselor to the President John O. Marsh, and Attorney General + Edward H. Levi, + Colby, and Scowcroft demurred. They argued that an open session + would set a bad precedent, while having a “shattering effect on the + willingness of foreign political parties and individuals to cooperate + with the U.S. in the future on such operations.” Ford decided to advocate holding + executive sessions. (Memorandum From Marsh to Ford, + November 1, ibid., President’s Handwriting File, Box 3, National + Security–Intelligence) Therefore, CIA + officials did not participate in the public hearings regarding covert + action in Chile. (Letter From Rogovin to McFarlane, November 4; ibid., Raoul–Duval Files, Box 31, CIA–Covert Activities)

+

In a November 19 Department of State staff meeting chaired by Kissinger, the Secretary asked + Rogers about the impact of + the release of the reports of the congressional investigations on + inter-American relations. The Assistant Secretary replied the Latin + American nations would respond, “‘What kind of country is this? How can + you do business with people like this who spill their guts all over the + place?’” Later in the conversation, Kissinger summed up the impact of the reports as “a + national disgrace.” (Minutes of Secretary of State’s Staff Meeting, + November 19; National Archives, RG 59, Transcripts Kissinger Staff Meetings, Lot 78D443, + Box 9, Secretary’s Staff Meetings)

+
+ +
+ 209. Transcript of a Telephone Conversation Between Secretary of State + Kissinger and the Ambassador + to the United Nations (Moynihan) +

Summary: Kissinger and Moynihan discussed an upcoming + U.N. resolution on Chile.

+

Source: Department of State, Electronic Reading Room, Kissinger Transcripts. + Unclassified. On November 10, USUN sent the text of the resolution which + expressed distress at Chilean human rights violations and called + for the Chilean Government to restore and safeguard human + rights. (Telegram 5821 from USUN, November 10; National Archives, RG 59, + Central Foreign Policy File, D750390–0598) Moynihan’s November + 12 speech to the General Assembly is published in the Department + of State Bulletin, December 15, 1975, pp. + 867–871. On November 12 the resolution was adopted by a vote of + 88–11, with 20 abstentions. (Telegram 5870 from USUN, November 12; National + Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + D750394–0552)

+ + + + + Washington, November + 11, 1975. + +

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to Chile.]

+

M: Right. One last thing. The question of Chile comes up tomorrow. The + Department says we should vote with this resolution. Bill Rogers thinks it. Bill Buffum thinks it. We think it. I + hope you will sign off on that because it will make things follow.

+

K: What resolution is that?

+

M: It says the practice of human rights in Chile—it says you haven’t done + very good and to do better.

+

K: We are experts at undermining our friends.

+

M: Can I make this point? It has merit. I think the resolution is + marginally justified. If we get this resolution passed I propose to make + a speech on Thursday in the General Assembly. I will start off with how + come the only thing the UN . . . about + is Chile and South Africa and then make a case for Chile. Chile is the + first country to consider letting the Human Rights Commission come. The + Latin Americans will probably split about 7-7-7. The Western Europeans + are solidly for it. If we aren’t for it I am afraid we will have + problems with Fraser.

+

K: I will probably go along with it but I don’t like it.

+

M: But I think it is tactfully the way to go.

+

K: But when we get a Portuguese government in power in Chile we will be + in a . . .

+

M: I agree. And I will make a speech on this behalf.

+

K: I will get Rogers to call you + on that.

+ +

M: I will have to ask for a call by this afternoon.

+

K: I’ll get him to call you by this afternoon.

+
+ +
+ 210. Telegram 7681 From the Embassy in Chile to the Department of + State +

Summary: The + Chilean Government expressed dismay at the U.S. Government’s + vote in favor of a U.N. resolution criticizing human rights + practices in Chile.

+

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + D750395–1016. Limited Official Use. Sent for information to the + U.S. Mission to the United Nations. In a November 13 + conversation with Carvajal, who expressed dismay at the U.S. vote + in the United Nations, Popper suggested that the junta “consider + carefully what it might do to get out of its present dead end.” + (Telegram 7683 from Santiago, November 13; ibid., D750395–1032) + On December 22, after a meeting with Pinochet, Huerta held a press briefing + and stated that the U.S. vote for the resolution could be + explained by domestic U.S. politics and the personality of the + U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations. (Telegram 8635 from + Santiago, December 23; ibid., D750446–0395)

+ + + + + November 13, 1975, + 1800Z. + +

7681. Subj: GOC Note on US Vote on + Chilean Human Rights Resolution.

+

1. Following is informal Embassy translation of third person note (signed + by FonMin Carvajal) handed to + Ambassador by Carvajal Nov + 13.

+

2. Begin text: The Ministry of Foreign Affairs presents its compliments + to the Embassy of the United States of America and has the honor to + refer to the vote cast on Nov 11 in the Third Committee of the United + Nations General Assembly concerning the alleged violation of human + rights in Chile.

+

3. With great surprise and disappointment the Government of Chile has + noted that the delegation of the United States cast its vote on this + occasion in favor of a draft resolution which from any point of view is + unjust and is designed to support a biased and arbitrary report prepared + by a working group of the Human Rights Commission. The text approved the + committee, with the favorable vote of the United States, represents a + clear intervention in the internal affairs of a member state, violates + the principle of the juridical equality of states, and plays havoc with + the most basic norms of law. In addition, it is manifestly + discriminatory since there are several dozen countries, members of the + United Nations, which are accused of violating human rights; the United + Nations, however, has chosen to concern itself only with the Chilean + case. Further, the bias with which the Third Committee has operated becomes even more evident when + it is considered that the text of the approved draft was printed and + circulated before the Chilean representative was able to present the + views of his country.

+

4. In any event, the vote of the United States delegation is not + consistent with the excellent relations which exist between the United + States and the Chilean Governments, nor with the cooperation which + should exist between both delegations to the General Assembly on matters + which affect the interests of our respective countries as well as on + those of a general nature, as was shown in the case of the matter which + concerned the Washington Government and was the subject of your + Embassy’s note 315 of October 22 (Chilean position on Zionism + Resolution).

+

5. Therefore, the Government of Chile expresses its fervent hope that + when the resolution approved by the Third Committee is considered by the + plenary of the General Assembly, the United States delegation will + reconsider its vote. Complimentary close. Santiago, November 12, 1975. + End text.

+ + + Popper + + +
+ +
+ 211. Memorandum From Stephen + Low of the National Security Council Staff to the + President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Scowcroft) +

Summary: Low + informed Scowcroft that + the executive branch of the U.S. Government was increasingly + adopting hostile postures toward Chile.

+

Source: Ford Library, + White House Central + Files, Subject File, Box 12, CO 33 Chile, 10/1/1975–1/20/1977. + Confidential. Sent for information. Scowcroft initialed the memorandum. Attached but + not published is telegram 272701 to Santiago, November 18. On + October 19, the New York Times reported a + U.S. official’s allegation that the Chileans had agreed with the + Arab nations to vote for a draft U.N. resolution linking Zionism + with racism in exchange for their support against charges of + human rights violations. (“U.S. Aide Charges Chile Sold U.N. + Vote to Arabs,” p. 1) The Kennedy Amendment to the Foreign Assistance and + the FMS Acts, introduced on + November 11, stipulated that no military or security supporting + assistance could be given to Chile, no sales of defense articles + or services could be made to Chile, and no credits could be + extended to or loans guaranteed for Chile for the export of + arms. (Telegram 267844 to USCINCSO, November 13; National Archives, RG 59, + Central Foreign Policy File, D750396–0802) In telegram 7509 from + Santiago, November 7, the Embassy reported that the Chilean + Government had agreed to allow the departure from the country of + an American priest and three nuns suspected of harboring leftist + terrorists. (Ibid., D750387–1111)

+ + + + + Washington, November + 18, 1975. + + + SUBJECT + Our Increasingly Hard-Nosed Attitude towards Chile + +

In the past public criticism of the Government of Chile was largely + confined to the Congress and the press. Increasingly, however, the + Executive has been adopting hostile postures towards the Chilean + Government both publicly and privately.

+

The first manifestation of this was our decision to strike Chile from the + list of those countries receiving FMS + for 1977. This was followed by the front page New York + Times article based on a USUN + source accusing the Chileans of selling their vote on Zionism. Then we + voted in favor of the resolution condemning Chile for its human rights + practices. Today (Tuesday) State instructed our Embassy in Santiago to + present a note of protest to the Chilean Government at the Foreign + Minister level. The instruction described a five-day delay in granting + Consular access to an American priest as “completely unacceptable” and + told the Embassy to state that we view such a delay as “outrageous.” + (Telegram attached.)

+

At the same time Senator Kennedy + has introduced an amendment which would deny all arms transfers to Chile + whether FMS or commercial sales, and + including munitions control licenses.

+

As you are aware, we were successful in getting the Chileans to release + three nuns and a priest who were returned to this country. Then we voted + in favor of the resolution condemning Chile on human rights. We may consider Chilean refusal to give + us access to the priest unacceptable, but we should not be + surprised.

+
+ +
+ 212. Telegram 8493 From the Embassy in Chile to the Department of + State +

Summary: The + Embassy reported that a critical pamphet by former President + Frei would place the Chilean Government in a difficult position. + The junta would have to decide between not responding to direct + criticism or taking actions that would reinforce its isolation + from Chilean civil society and the world community.

+

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + D750439–0286. Confidential. Repeated to La Paz, Lima, and Buenos + Aires. In the pamphlet, Frei envisioned a majority of Chileans + coming together in a democratic Chilean Government to form + consensus on policy. (Telegram 8549 from Santiago, December 18; + ibid., D750441–0023) In telegram 686 from Santiago, January 27, + 1976, the Embassy reported that although Frei’s pamphlet + criticizing the junta would add to its difficulties, there was + no apparent weakening of the junta’s control. (Ibid., + D760031–0692)

+ + + + + Santiago, December 17, 1975, 1821Z. + +

8493. Subject: Christian Democrats on the Offensive. Ref: A) Santiago + 8347; B) Santiago 8385; C) Santiago 8386.

+

1. Summary: Christian Democratic (PDC) + Secretary reports that party has prepared for distribution an analysis + of Chilean situation and statement of position by ex-President Frei, + which will attack government (hold this information until statement is + released). PDC leaders are prepared for + strong reaction; they even believe statement may catalyze change of + GOC leadership. Embassy doubts + government is in such straits, but believes publication will present + government with unpleasant choice of ducking a hard-to-duck direct + challenge, or taking counter-action which if characteristically + insensitive could deepen its domestic and foreign isolation. End + summary.

+

2. EmbOff Dec 15 had long talk with Rafael Moreno, Christian Democratic + Party (PDC) Secretary (protect). Moreno + had returned to Chile only a week earlier after two and one-half months + abroad, principally in Brazil on private contract, but with two long + sessions in Washington and New York, where he talked with wide variety + of official, Congressional and private persons.

+

3. Moreno said that seen from abroad, he had had following principal + impressions of Chile: (A) Economic situation is bad and shows little + sign of improvement; (B) Relationship between church and state has + become more difficult: Moreno was particularly impressed with US church’s strong support for + Chilean colleagues and its criticism of GOC; (C) Swing of USG + against Chile, as exemplified by favorable vote on UNGA resolution on Chilean human rights. + Moreno said he had strong impression that USG would not backtrack from its new position.

+

4. In few intensive days since his return to Santiago, Moreno said he had + talked with wide spectrum of opinion and arrived at following + conclusions:

+

A) Economic situation is even worse than he had pictured while abroad. + Lack of confidence has spread throughout middle-class, so that even + formerly firm supporters of government now criticize economic program, + although in general not yet criticizing government itself. Moreno said + that lacking substantial increase in copper prices—and there is no sign + of that—continuing present GOC economic + policy will only drive Chilean economy further into the ground.

+

B) Church-State relationship is even more difficult than he had seen from + abroad. Church will not challenge GOC + openly, by for example mounting demonstrations in the streets. However, + church hierarchy, clergymen and broad stratum of supporters are more and + more decisively against government. He noted particularly that GOC (whatever the merits of the cases) had + alienated important holy cross, Jesuit and Maryknoll orders as result of + actions against MIR. He expected that + current meeting of Episcopal conference in South of Chile would reject + Bishop Camus’ resignation as Conference Secretary (it has), and that a + supporter of Cardinal would be elected President of Episcopal committee + (this did not happen). Both would be identified with Cardinal Silva, + whose firm line vis-à-vis the GOC was + strongly supported by Pope Paul + during Cardinal’s recent visit to Rome. Moreno thought that Catholic + laymen were increasingly sensitive to government’s hard line policy.

+

C) Pinochet’s position has become + more individualized as he has emphasized his presidential authority. + Appearance now is of a personal dictator who returned from what he saw + as triumphal visit to Spain intending to impose a Francoist pattern on + his country.

+

D) Partly as a result of Pinochet’s more assertive position, Chilean Air Force is + thoroughly out of sorts with Pinochet and the army, and almost ready to try something + else. Navy also is alienated from Pinochet. Latter himself was rebuffed by General + Arellano, who got away with it.

+

5. In addition to this analysis, Moreno noted signs of opportunistic + swing by leading pro-junta newspaper “El Mercurio.” Moreno said that + PDC President Aylwin’s statement on + CIA and PDC (ref A) had been published in “Mercurio” at express + order of Director Rene Silva, and against advice of senior editor Arturo + Fontaine, who supported government position against publishing document. Moreno noted in addition + “Mercurio’s” strong editorial against government’s new decree law on + censorship and media suspension (ref B). Moreno described decree law as + a “stupid” step intended to justify GOC + closure of PDC magazine “Politica y + Espiritu.” Moreno saw “Mercurio” disengagement from government as + important bellwether.

+

6. Moreno continued that in context of this analysis and background, + ex-President Frei in next few days will issue lengthy pamphlet analyzing + present Chilean situation and giving his judgment on it. (He asked that + word of impending publication be held tightly.) Moreno said the analysis + had been in the works for considerable time, at least since October. + Moreno continued that in party leadership’s judgment moment had now come + for PDC to make its position clear. + Party members were increasingly uneasy, and lack of public clarification + of party’s position during period when GOC appeared so nervous would only tend to drive party + members to the left, since increasingly they see little prospect of + PDC’s moderate course affecting + Chilean events.

+

7. He said that statement would be given very wide distribution. Party + had handled reproduction “prudently,” but made no attempt at doing it + clandestinely. It had not warned any of its armed forces friends what + was afoot. Intention was to present a fait accompli to the armed forces, + in the hope that military leaders would take whatever action they + considered appropriate for Chile’s future.

+

8. Asked about possible worst case GOC + reaction to Frei initiative, Moreno said government could only expel + Frei, Party President Aylwin, and/or party leadership, and outlaw the + PDC. He commented that such a worst + case was no longer much of a deterrent. As for best case, publication + could catalyze change in government leadership, which would bring with + it change in policy. He said it made little difference who would take + leadership, but he assumed the army would continue on top, and that all + junta members would be replaced.

+

9. EmbOff wondered whether PDC might not + be engaged in wishful thinking. Moreno admitted possibility but said + time for action had come, and that party thought it could not delay + longer making its position clear to public.

+

10. Comment: PDC searched its soul year + ago and embraced moderate policy line aimed at eventual democratic + cooperation with military government, only to find government rebuffing + any thought of such cooperation with increasing vehemence. We agree with + PDC that government is nervous but + doubt any change in its leadership is imminent. Rather, it is PDC which, largely immobilized and slowly + disintegrating, must feel that it can no longer remain passive. Recent + release of Senate Committee report on CIA and Chile (ref C), according to Moreno, was body blow + to Frei, and we imagine it may have led him to move before effects cut + too deep.

+ +

11. EmbOff was careful to make clear to Moreno that he understood much of + latter’s analysis but could not in any way be identified with it or + advise Moreno on substance or timing.

+

12. Embassy just received advance copy of Frei pamphlet. It is under his + name, 67 double-spaced pages long, and is entitled “The Mandate of + History and the Requirements of the Future.” First page states: “I am + often asked what I think about the situation in Chile. This is my + answer.” Report on pamphlet follows.

+ + + Popper + + +
+ +
+ 213. Telegram 314 From the Embassy in Chile to the Department of + State +

Summary: + Popper urged the + Chilean Government to signal its firm intention to improve the + human rights situation.

+

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + D760015–0770. Confidential; Priority. Repeated to San José, the + Mission in Geneva, USUN, and + London. On January 28, Diez, in a meeting with Trucco and Ryan, stated he understood + that the U.S. Government could not support Chile in the upcoming + UNHRC meeting in Geneva. + In addition, Diez and + Trucco informed + Ryan of the junta’s + draft decree to alleviate human rights violations. (Telegram + 24117 to Santiago, January 31; ibid., + D760038–0137)

+ + + + + Santiago, January 15, 1976, 1255Z. + +

314. Subject: GOC and UNHRC Meeting in Geneva.

+

1. Summary: Sergio Diez, Chilean + rep to forthcoming UNHRC meeting, + asked Ambassador for US understanding in face of attempts to condemn + Chile on human rights issue as basis for recommendation to apply + economic sanctions. He said GOC is + seriously considering specific measures to improve human rights + practices, but doubted he would have anything concrete to offer at + Geneva. Speaking personally, Ambassador urged GOC at least signify its firm intention to move in this + direction. Diez will seek + appointments in Washington when en route, later in month. End + summary.

+

2. Ambassador Sergio Diez called + on Ambassador Jan 14 for over one hour’s animated talk, on what he + termed informal and personal basis. He will head Chilean delegation to + UNHRC meeting in Geneva early + February. He said he expects UNHRC to + approve and send to EcoSoc meeting later in year a report along same + lines as UNHRC Working Group’s + critical interim report on human rights in Chile. Diez fears that USSR and allies will use report in EcoSoc + as base from which to condemn + Chile, and to recommend economic sanctions against it by member states. + He believes communist countries and their tools are unalterably + committed to destruction of GOC; that + they have the votes; and that best that can be done is to diminish + somewhat their dominance of situation.

+

3. Thus, Diez expected Chile to + lose on any vote, but said US position was crucial, and WE position also + important. USG, he said, is relatively + sympathetic to GOC; its criticisms on + human rights are therefore taken very seriously by others as based on + strong moral grounds. Further, UN + proposals, if supported by US, would result in cutting off loans to + Chile from IMF and US private banks. + This would be tragic, because extreme and unjustified pressures on Chile + would inflame Chilean nationalism in foreign affairs and rigidify + Chilean human rights practices still further.

+

4. Diez recognized that Chilean + position in Geneva would be complicated by current confrontation with UK + in Sheila Cassidy case, and with Costa Rica (which normally to some + degree supports Chile) over enforced retention of extremist leader + Andres Pascal Allende in Costa Rican Embassy in Santiago.

+

5. Diez described private meeting + he had had with President Pinochet January 12. Said he had spoken with complete + frankness, and found Pinochet + fully open to argument. Stated Pinochet recognized there had been serious abuses of + authority by government agencies. President was studying ways to prevent + such abuses without destroying authority of government, since lessening + of authority would make it more difficult to maintain essential internal + security. Pinochet was + specifically considering: (1) Reducing severity of state of siege; (2) + providing medical checks for detainees during interrogation period, in + order to prevent torture; (3) reorganizing security agencies, + particularly transferring Directorate of National Intelligence (DINA) to jurisdiction of Interior + Ministry; and (4) establishing “tribunal” composed of distinguished + Chileans of unquestionable authority to exercise Ombudsman function in + behalf of detainees. Diez noted + that such measures could not be put through hurriedly, and he doubted + anything would be done in time for Geneva meeting. Diez expected to see Pinochet again January 19.

+

6. Reportedly at Diez’ suggestion, + Pinochet also lunched + earlier in week with Papal Nuncio, who gave Pinochet frank exposition of “charges” that had come to + his attention. Diez thought that + such words from man of good faith and fellow catholic were + important.

+

7. Speaking personally, Ambassador encouraged Diez on matter of GOC + taking concrete steps to improve human rights conditions in country. + Said that US and WE can be influenced by improvements, and suggested + that by moving effectively, GOC might + be able to separate them from its all-out ideological opponents. + Ambassador also noted that, even if such changes could not be put into + effect in time for Geneva meeting, Chilean Rep at least should make solemn commitment + on part of GOC to apply them + subsequently. Any steps toward normality would be useful in this + context. Ambassador was certain Washington authorities would receive + with great interest any assurances Diez could give in this regard.

+

8. Diez expects to travel to + Washington about January 22. He would like to see Assistant Secretary + Rogers and Leonard Garment, together in + Washington if possible, after Chilean Ambassador Trucco’s requested appointment with + Secretary Kissinger.

+

9. Comment: Diez is a rather + forlorn figure. He recognizes and is keenly frustrated by Chile’s + unenviable position. He has little room for maneuver: he knows most of + communist world and many third world leaders are GOC’s implacable enemies. He thinks UNHRC Working Group has been + irretrievably alienated by refusal of GOC to receive it last July—he admits this was a monumental + blunder—and by insidious influence of UN + Secretariat staff. He unquestionably regards US position as critically + important, as much for its bearing on Chilean morale as for its + influence on other countries. We hope Department can encourage him to + continue seeking genuine and meaningful improvements in Chilean human + rights practices.

+

10. Septel reports further on some human rights aspects of talk.

+ + + Popper + + +
+ +
+ 214. Telegram 904 From the Embassy in Chile to the Department of + State +

Summary: + Pinochet deplored + past U.S. votes in the U.N. and OAS that criticized Chile’s human rights record. He + also stated he would be willing to accept human rights + investigative groups other than the UNHRC.

+

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + D760041–0207. Confidential; Priority. Repeated priority to + USUN and the Mission in + Geneva. In telegram 298 from Santiago, January 14, the Embassy + reported that it believed that the Chilean Government employed + torture but that it could not assess the frequency or extent of + the abuse. (Ibid., D760014–0881) On January 28, noting rising + opposition in Congress and the public to the junta’s human + rights abuses, the Department instructed Popper to inform Chilean + officials it wanted Chile to accept a group from the UNHRC. (Telegram 21202 to + Santiago, January 28; ibid., D760032–0782) On January 29, the + Ambassador reported that Illanes ruled out a UNHRC visit, and wanted to shift emphasis away from + the U.N. Commission to an inter-American human rights + commission. (Telegram 745 from Santiago, January 29; ibid., + D760034–0696) Telegram 24117 is Document + 213.

+ + + + + Santiago, February 3, 1976, 2104Z. + +

904. Subject: Call on President Pinochet. Ref: A) Santiago 745; B) State 21202; C) State + 24117.

+

1. Summary: President Pinochet + Feb 2 summoned to his Vina Del Mar summer residence visiting State + Department Bolivia/Chile Country Director Fimbres. Polcouns accompanied. Pinochet’s performance was + extraordinary during hour and half of conversation and tea. He went from + expected tough interrogatory pose on US position at Geneva UNHRC meeting and deplored past US votes + in UN and OAS, to comradely bonhomie over the pastry. Chilean concern + over Geneva meeting was reflected in that FonMin Carvajal will leave for Geneva this + week, passing through Washington on his return. Pinochet reaffirmed that he will not + let Allana study group of UNHRC enter Chile, although he + reiterated he would be willing to accept anyone who comes without prior + publicity. He chided the Embassy as for partiality to the Christian + Democrats and ex-President Frei, but appeared somewhat more open and + flexible than usual. End summary.

+

2. Geneva UNHRC meeting: Pinochet began session with direct + interrogation on USG position to be + assumed on Chile at current Geneva meeting on UNHRC. He was evidently reacting to exposition of US + position, and suggestion that slate could be cleaned only by allowing + Allana working group in, + made by Ambassador Popper under + instructions to FonMin Director General Illanes last week (refs A and B). Pinochet, with + Carvajal behind him, was + concerned less US position was already frozen. Vote against GOC would influence others, since no one + wants to be the right of the USG and + resolution against GOC in Geneva would + strengthen campaign against Chile. The approach paralleled that of Ambassadors Diez and Trucco to Ambassador Hewson + Ryan (ref C). Pinochet said he could not understand what had brought + USG to current impasse with Chile, + and why Chile—such a friend of the US—should be singled out as it + is.

+

3. Fimbres said US position is + not inflexible and that among other things US vote would depend on text + of resolution presented. He hoped that with respect to new GOC decree intended to protect detainees + against torture (Santiago 0756) GOC + would make full explanation assuring that deficiencies in Decree 1009 + would be overcome. Pinochet + stressed decree was intended to regulate Decree 1009 more closely. He + also insisted new decree was wholly Chilean in concept and in no way + reflected outside pressure.

+

4. Pinochet reacted sharply with + familiar words against alleged prejudices of Allana, asserted that he had been + right to prevent Allana group’s + visit to Chile, and that group would not be allowed to come to Chile. He + said visitors would be welcomed and could see everything, if they + arrived without prior publicity, so that opposition forces would have no + time to set up anti-GOC stories. + Pinochet also reacted + against what he thought was intimation that new decree was the result of + foreign pressure: he said it had been strictly sovereign decision of + GOC’s free will. He added that it + will be strictly applied; GOC will come + down hard against any transgressors. In fact, he claimed three persons + had been found abusing detainees so far this year, and they would be + severely punished. Pinochet also + recalled that torture was nothing new in Chile: civil police had always + been tough with criminals. Fimbres recalled US position at last OASGA and asserted Pinochet action on working group had + cut the ground from under US. Accordingly, US accommodation was more + difficult now.

+

5. Carvajal to Geneva: In a + further indication of concern over the outcome of the Geneva meeting, + Carvajal said he would be + leaving for Geneva later in the week, via New York, and would pass + through Washington for talks next week on his return. His plans are + being held tightly. He hoped he could time visit to Washington to + coincide with expected appointment of Trucco with the Secretary.

+

6. World Bank and PDC: For openers, + Pinochet spoke strongly + against the way the World Bank was handling the Chilean loan request, + and against the Chilean Christian Democrats. He said he was aware the + Embassy keeps in close touch with the PDC. He also attacked ex-President Frei’s criticism of the + GOC, and warned the USG against trying to force on Chile a + return to party government. He said forcefully that he had cut off + discussions of the Frei document.

+

7. OASGA and foreign reporters: + Pinochet said all foreign + reporters would be allowed in to cover the OASGA. He hedged a bit when asked about the Washington Post’s Joanne Omang, recounting the + familiar story of her supposed + bad faith in interviewing him last year. But he left the impression that + she would be admitted.

+

8. Pinochet relaxed somewhat + after his initial outburst but returned again to his theme of US + abandonment. He warmed to memories of American military and civilian + friends, and his harshness toward the USG reflected sorrow that the US had taken an + incomprehensible path. There was little said about a weakening US + vis-à-vis Communism—rather a sense that the US had abandoned its old + friends. But there were very strong words describing Senator Kennedy.

+

9. Fimbres replied + nonpolemically, underlining the considerable amount of US cooperation + made available to Chile, and accenting when possible what the USG expects of the GOC.

+

10. Despite his strong views, the impression was of a President with a + healthy regard for US power and a reservoir of good will still remaining + for the US and its government. The new decree and the release of the + asylee-terrorists (miristas) seemed intended to placate the US and other + democratic critics. Pinochet did + not appear interested in Fimbres’ exposition of what the US is doing for Chile + economically and militarily; he was not even aware of details. His + concern seemed more directed at the lack of approval, the psychic pat on + the back, and continued appreciation which he sees as not forthcoming + from the US.

+

11. The Embassy takes with some skepticism Pinochet’s assertion that anyone could inspect Chile who + comes without publicity. The qualification, if nothing else, probably + makes the offer a non-starter.

+ + + Popper + + +
+ +
+ 215. Memorandum From Stephen + Low of the National Security Council Staff to the + President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Scowcroft) +

Summary: In anticipation of a meeting between + Scowcroft and + Trucco, Low briefed Scowcroft on the status of + U.S.-Chilean relations, in particular military sales, human + rights, and the OAS General + Assembly meeting in June.

+

Source: Ford Library, + National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for Latin + America, Box 3, Chile 2. Confidential. Sent for information. + Scowcroft initialed + the memorandum. The missing portion of the memorandum is in the + original. No record of the meeting has been found. The Kennedy Amendment prohibited + military and security assistance; credits and loans for arms; + and deliveries of military assistance. (Telegram 27598 to + Santiago, February 4; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign + Policy File, D760043–0061) On February 13, Rogers, Carvajal, and Trucco discussed the UNHRC meeting in Geneva, + military assistance, Chile’s relationship with its neighbors, + and OASGA preparations. + (Telegram 37518 to Santiago, February 14; ibid., D760058–0127) + On March 1, Trucco and + Clements discussed + U.S. arms sales policy towards Chile, and its relationship with + its neighbors. (Memorandum of Conversation, March 1; Washington + National Records Center, OSD + Files, FRC 330–79–0037–333 Memcons Only, January–May, + 1976)

+ + + + + Washington, February + 25, 1976. + + + SUBJECT + Meeting with Chilean Ambassador Trucco Thursday, February 26 (3:00 p.m.) + +

Ambassador Trucco may wish to + discuss a number of issues which are of concern to his government, but + his principal concern will be with the threatened cutoff of military + sales to Chile. He may also talk about human rights and the upcoming + OAS General Assembly in + Santiago.

+

Military Arms Sales

+

The Chilean Government’s inability to improve its performance on human + rights and recognize that truly meaningful changes are necessary to + improve its international image has put real limitations on our ability + to provide assistance, both economic and military, to Chile. Recently + the Senate passed an amendment to the Foreign Military Assistance Act + which would ban all military transfers to Chile, including spare parts + and equipment already purchased and under production. The amendment + (Kennedy Amendment) is a + manifestation of the depth of feeling on the human rights issue and of + the limitations which it imposes on our actions.

+

The Chilean Government has been alarmed over the widening disparity in + military capability between Chile and Peru. Peru has made large + purchases of sophisticated military equipment, including Soviet tanks, + much of which has been positioned in southern Peru near the border. Chile genuinely fears a + Peruvian invasion to regain territory lost during the War of the Pacific + in 1879. Chile’s inability, both on financial and political grounds, to + find sources of supply for military equipment to upgrade its + capabilities contributes to heightened concern. In this context the + Senate passage of the Kennedy + Amendment produced a strongly negative reaction in Chile. Chile has + indicated that if such legislation is passed it would probably call for + the removal of our military mission there.

+

The bill will come to the House floor next week. It now contains the + Buchanan Amendment which + prohibits MAP and FMS credit but permits FMS and commercial sales. Harrington is expected to offer a + substitute amendment similar to Kennedy’s. We think it can be defeated. The bill would + then go to Conference before March 15. Humphrey is managing it and has taken a strong stand in + opposition to permitting any military sales to Chile. We will be seeking + to come out of Conference with something as close to the Buchanan Amendment as possible. If + necessary to defeat the Kennedy + Amendment, we would be willing to sacrifice some or all of the new + FMS sales or commercial sales. We + are most anxious to preserve the $122 million of previously committed + FMS which is in the pipeline. + Trucco will no doubt express + his deep concern about this issue and ask for strong Administration + support to defeat the Senate amendment.

+

Human Rights

+

On the human rights issue, Trucco + may tell you of recent actions to improve protection of human rights. + The Chilean Government has released all detained Peace Committee + employees except one and has allowed nearly all Chileans who have sought + asylum in foreign embassies to leave the country. It has permitted + publication of criticism of the current government’s policies. It has + also issued a decree which, if fully implemented, could do much to + prevent abuses of political detainees. Implementation, however, remains + the key and thus far no implementing regulations have been issued.

+

On the other hand, the government has continued its purge of Chilean + universities and denied entry into the country of US correspondents + (Rudy Rauch of Time and Juan de Onis of the New York Times). There is evidence that + mistreatment of detainees is continuing despite the new decree. Chile + continues to refuse to allow the UN + Human Rights Commission group headed by Allana to examine the situation inside the country. We + recently (February 19) supported a resolution passed (unanimously) at + the UN Human Rights Commission in Geneva + that expressed profound distress at Chilean human rights violations.

+

+ OAS General + Assembly

+

+ Trucco will probably express his + government’s hope that Secretary Kissinger will head the US delegation to the OAS General Assembly in Santiago this June. Two countries + opposed holding the meeting in Chile (Mexico and Jamaica) and may send + only low-level representations or not go at all. The Chileans place high + importance upon the Secretary’s attending, particularly in view of his + recent visit to Lima. The Secretary has indicated publicly he wishes to + go, although his schedule for June has not yet been worked out and there + are conflicting international commitments. ARA would like to get concessions in the human rights area + from the Chilean Government before committing the Secretary to + attend.

+

+ Trucco has been privately + critical of the State Department’s attitude toward Chile, and + particularly of Bill Rogers. He has made little attempt to hide his + feelings. He quotes the Secretary’s expressions of full support for the + Chilean Government made in Mexico City and Washington to the former + Foreign Minister and says Rogers + is not following the Secretary’s instructions. He forgets, however, that + recent discussions by the Secretary with the present Foreign Minister + did contain reservations based on the human rights problem.

+

+ Trucco has also asked to see + Deputy Secretary Clements. He + cancelled his appointment yesterday but has been rescheduled for + Monday.

+

Talking Points

+

Arms Sales

+

1. As you know, we have done the best we could under the legislative + restrictions in effect. We moved ahead with the sale of some previously + agreed equipment in order to establish the principle that we believe we + are entitled to do so under the present legislation. We restrained the + level, however, in order not to prejudice the current legislation, but + sales shipments are continuing. Training, of course, would have to come + under sales.

+
+ +
+ 216. Memorandum From the Country Officer for Chile (Fimbres) to the Assistant Secretary of + State for Inter-American Affairs (Rogers) +

Summary: With plans for a visit to Chile by the + Inter-American Human Rights Commission in doubt, Fimbres recommended unilateral + steps that the United States might take.

+

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + P830106–1703. Confidential. Drafted by Fimbres on March 9; cleared by + White. Sent through + Ryan. None of the + recommendations is checked. In an attached March 9 memorandum to + Rogers, not published, Mailliard stated that USOAS did not believe that + the U.S. Government should make “any strong unilateral + démarches” on human rights. Instead, Mailliard suggested that + Popper might “go to + the Chilean Government with a checklist to ask if they have + considered the various contingencies connected with their + hosting the [OAS] General + Assembly.” Mailliard + also suggested that the junta might be asked to consider the + possibility of responding to the IAHRC report by inviting the commission to visit + Chile. In a second attachment, telegram 57655 to Santiago, March + 9, the Department concluded that Orfila’s idea of creating a special human rights + body to visit Santiago would not prosper, and suggested that the + Embassy inform the junta it might receive the IAHRC report and invite it or a + sub-group to visit Chile and review areas where it thought the + report was inaccurate. In telegram 55095 to Santiago, March 6, + the Department noted press reports that three members of the + IAHRC had announced their + decision not to run for reelection in light of OAS inaction on their Chile + report. (Ibid., Central Foreign Policy File, + D760086–0717)

+ + + + + Washington, March 10, + 1976. + + + SUBJECT + Unilateral Steps with Respect to Human Rights in Chile + +

We had hoped that in conjunction with the Inter-American Human Rights + Commission (IAHRC) and the upcoming + OASGA we could take a more active + role in pressing the Chileans on this issue. But events of the last few + days suggest that the IAHRC by + self-destructing may have gone the way of Allana Working Group in terms of GOC acceptability. We are asking for the + Embassy’s further assessment in this regard, particularly if a + pre-OASGA visit would be + acceptable to the GOC. (See attached + cable.)

+

Assuming an IAHRC visit will not be + acceptable, we may have to seize the nettle ourselves. This is not a + very desirable alternative and prospects for success at best are + uncertain. However, in the present environment, it may be a choice + between a unilateral démarche and inaction.

+

We can consider several approaches. Two of these relate to a letter from + the Secretary to Foreign Minister Carvajal. We could use as a setting the hopefully + successful outcome of Buchanan’s + language in the Security Assistance Bill. The letter would refer to + Executive efforts to keep the door open to Chile. It would underline + that the new U.S. law: 1) does + not shut the military pipeline and sales; 2) opens the possibility of + future credits on the basis of a U.S. presidential determination of + progress on return to traditional legality. At the same time the + Secretary could reiterate his hopes for attending the OASGA and refer to his comment to + Buchanan that human rights + is a critical issue in our bilateral relations. He could also note the + series of measures (e.g. Decree 1?) and establishment of a human rights + commission taken by the GOC and urge + their full implementation.

+

Recommendation

+

That if the House prevails on the Chile language, we prepare a letter + along the lines described above recommending the Secretary’s + signature.

+

Advantages

+

—It would be a clear indication that the Secretary’s presence at the + GA would be directly related to a + returning trend to civility in Chile;

+

—It would put the Chileans on notice that our weighing in on behalf of + the Buchanan amendment committed + us to seek every opportunity to convey to them the strong concerns in + the U.S. on this problem;

+

—The letter together with Popper’s accompanying remarks would be a clear signal to the + GOC that the USG was speaking with one voice;

+

—It is consistent with our abstention on the OASGA site.

+

Disadvantages

+

—The Secretary may want to go to Santiago (period)

+

—Linking the Secretary’s presence to this issue ignores other reasons + USOAS may have for his participation;

+

—Our efforts could provoke a hostile reaction and cause Pinochet to pull up the + drawbridge.

+

Recommendation

+

We prepare a letter as described above but excluding language which ties + the Secretary’s presence at the OASGA + with movement on bringing to an end the post-Allende emergency + period.

+

Advantages

+

—It gives the Secretary freedom of action;

+

—It lets us pursue at the Secretary’s level other interests we have in + the OASGA.

+

Disadvantages

+

—We throw away our trump card. With the OASGA only three months away there would be little time to + use it later.

+ +

—It reduces the letter and our démarche to a general plea to reason on + the part of the Chileans.

+

Recommendation

+

No letter. But a démarche by Popper to Pinochet suggesting the Chileans move further down the + road toward normal civil rights during the next three months.

+

Advantage

+

—It does not put the Secretary on the line either with respect to the + OASGA or the internal Chilean + situation.

+

Disadvantages

+

—This is least likely to elicit a positive response from the GOC.

+

—Pinochet might consider + Popper as speaking on his + own despite the Secretary’s remarks to Buchanan.

+
+ +
+ 217. Telegram 2261 From the Embassy in Chile to the Department of + State +

Summary: + Popper reported that + a U.S. Congressional delegation to Chile thought that + terminating military assistance and reducing economic aid was the best way to force the + Chilean Government to improve human rights in the country. The + Embassy, however, thought that maintaining some assistance and + encouraging the Junta to improve human rights was a better + tactic.

+

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + D760103–0412. Confidential; Immediate. The Congressional + delegation included Reps. Toby Moffett (D–Connecticut), George + Miller (D–California), and Tom + Harkin (D–Iowa); the delegation was in Chile + March 11–15. (Telegram 38229 to Santiago, February 18; ibid., + Central Foreign Policy File, D760060–0085) On March 16, the + Embassy reported that the CODEL’s criticism of the Junta would likely + complicate the Embassy’s efforts to mitigate human rights abuses + in Chile. (Telegram 2172 from Santiago, March 16; ibid., + D760101–0899)

+ + + + + Santiago, March 18, 1976, 2140Z. + +

2261. Subject: Codel Moffett: Aftermath. Refs: (A) State 064985; (B) + Santiago 2172.

+

1. In efforts to place Codel visit controversy in perspective for + interested parties on the Hill. + Following points may be useful to Department.

+

2. Human Rights: Abuse of human rights is not issue. USG recognizes that abuses exist and has + registered its disapproval. Question is what is most effective method of + bringing GOC conduct to acceptable + standards. Codel endorses meat-axe tactic: sanction GOC by ban on military cooperation and reduction or elimination + of economic aid. This course risks driving GOC into shell. Closing itself off from those who have best + chance of influencing it, and increasing repression even more. + Alternative course followed since coup with increasing sharpness, is + more subtle effort to modulate political, economic and military support + to encourage GOC to improve human + rights conditions. Congressional restrictions, not total ban supported + by Codel, have served to underline urgency of problem of human rights + abuses and strengthened our arguments. Further drastic restrictions at + this time are unlikely to help, could be counterproductive, and are not + as flexible as carrot/stick approach Executive can apply.

+

3. Codel expertise: We question whether flying visit by Congressmen with + no prior experience with Chile, no Spanish, clearly defined and held + views, and inclination to listen primarily to views of only one side, is + best basis for Congressional action. Sophomoric attempt to penetrate + Villa Grimaldi, as well as elementary discourtesy in Etzaguirre case if + not Benavides, left impression + with GOC and many Chileans which can + only make it more difficult to convince them of seriousness of US + Congress and objectivity of other delegations which may wish to come to + Chile for genuinely objective look. Codel damaged the prestige of the + House in Chile and leadership, e.g., Doc Morgan, should be made aware of + it.

+

4. Conduct of Codel: It may have damaged more than helped the causes we + all wish to advance. Embassy has already pointed out possible + deleterious effect on parole program and vicariate of solidarity effort. + But Codel visit—by their attitudes and own statements, as well as GOC attempts to exploit it—also exposed + individuals to reprisal from GOC. Not + only church and other private people who cooperated with them, but even + prisoners they saw in detention, can now look for less cooperation and + clemency from GOC.

+

5. Internal Security: Most observers agree Chileans give the current + regime credit for re-creating “domestic tranquility.” The near anarchy + of the last months of the Allende Government is still in people’s minds. So is the + current disorder in Argentina. Many Chileans saw no alternative to + military takeover and, by and large, still applaud the junta for ending + chaos. We and many others contend that the price, in terms of abuses of + human rights, has been and continues to be too high. We believe that + after two and one half years it is high time to restore more normal + conditions. Our views on this aspect of the problem are well known, + publicly and privately.

+

6. Sale of Matériel: Bulk of weapons and other military supplies and + training sought in US by GOC are not + counter-insurgency or crowd control instruments—this point was clearly + made to Codel. F–5’s and anti-tank missiles are not needed and cannot be + used effectively to combat + underground cells of the MIH or Communist Party or street + demonstrations, much less PDC critics. + GOC access to US military equipment + is justified by such objective considerations as the need for some + deterrent capability against the disproportionate weapons strength of + Peru, and the need to modernize the rapidly deteriorating inventory of + equipment felt by any military establishment to defend its country.

+ + + Popper + + +
+ +
+ 218. Telegram 109592/Tosec 110739 From the Department of State to + Secretary of State Kissinger + +

Summary: In light of Chile’s lack of progress on human + rights, Ryan suggested + how Kissinger might use + his upcoming trip to Chile to promote an improvement in the + human rights situation.

+

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + D760173–0465. Confidential; Priority; Exdis. Drafted by + Fimbres; cleared by + Flaten, Palmer, + King, White, Ortiz, and Barbian; approved by Ryan. Repeated priority to + Santiago. Kissinger was + in Nairobi, Kenya, attending an UNCTAD conference. In telegram 3604 from Santiago, + April 21, the Embassy informed Rogers that it thought Kissinger should use his visit + to Chile to impress upon Pinochet that human rights violations harmed + bilateral relations. (Ibid., D760151–0918)

+ + + + + Washington, May 5, 1976, 1806Z. + +

109592. Tosec 110739. Subject: Briefing Memorandum; Chile and the OASGA.

+

1. We have been giving some thought to the Chilean angle of your trip to + the OASGA. The human rights climate + in Chile between now and the OASGA + shows little prospect for improvement. There is concern here that your + presence in Chile will help legitimize the military regime. Earlier in + the year we thought things seemed to be looking better on the human + rights front. Unfortunately, practices have not kept up with promises. + The security forces are not riding quite as roughshod as before and + there has been a reduction in the detention rate and reports of torture, + but we cannot say that on balance this reflects a significantly + favorable trend.

+

So much for the good news. Now we have uncovered further problems. Under + the continued state-of-siege, persons are still being detained but their + whereabouts are unknown. This is in violation of GOC legislation of May 1975 and January + 1976. There has also been growing repression of political freedoms. Opposition forces in the + universities were purged. The Christian Democratic leadership + particularly is complaining of increased personal harassment. They claim + this is radicalizing the remnants of the party. And there is enough + evidence to suggest the GOC struck back + at several Chileans who met with visiting U.S. Congressmen.

+

The upshot is a higher noise level on Chile in the Congress. Fraser called us on the carpet last + week to question our aid program. + Chairman Morgan has been pressed + by his colleagues who visited Chile to question your trip to Santiago. + These same Congressmen are also supporting a mid-May conference in + Washington on Chile. It looks very much like a media event on human + rights on the eve of the OASGA.

+

The IAHRC report will surface before + the OASGA. It will say there are + signs of improvement; it will also say abuses have occurred. Our own + assessment will probably have to go forward to the Congress before June. + It will have to reflect that the GOC’s + performance during the last year was disappointing, that credible + reports point to arbitrariness and physical abuse, and that new GOC legislation aimed at regularizing + detention procedures was not broadly enforced and specific violations + still continue.

+

The Congress will also be dismayed when they find out the latest on the + refugee program. The GOC has changed + its mind and now will not allow any state-of-siege detainees to depart + for their assured countries of resettlement. Our parole program will be + seriously impacted.

+

This unhopeful trend led us to encourage Bill Simon’s trip to Chile. In considering this, he + suggested the GOC break loose the exile + decrees to accelerate our parole program. This was before we knew of the + new GOC policy. The Chileans have now + promised to reverse their field in a number of these cases.

+

The Chileans have begun to clean up their act for the OASGA. The night curfew has been cut one + hour. Known detention centers are beginning to look like Potemkin + villages. (Interrogation sites are another thing.) But preparations for + handling the media trouble us. A GOC + black list includes many foreign newsmen. This may prevent a number of + U.S. journalists from covering anything but the OASGA in Santiago. Thus press harassment + could become a major story from the OASGA.

+

This situation has several opposing dimensions. The Chileans will want to + take advantage of your presence to draw a more benign picture of the + Chilean scene. We expect President Pinochet to invite you to a private meeting. It would be + awkward to accept, but an insult to refuse. He is the one we have to + reach if we are to turn the GOC around. + On balance, it might be better to go along with the meeting and try to + maximize our return from it. This would mean raising the human rights + issue and making it known that we did.

+ +

To balance a meeting with Pinochet, we are thinking of a small, informal + meeting of about forty-five minutes with private individuals from the + democratic parties, the church, and the business community. The Cardinal + and ex-President Frei would not be included. A meeting with them we + think would cause such static with the GOC as to jam any human rights message we deliver to the + GOC.

+

On the domestic front, if you are to meet with Pinochet, it would be + useful to anticipate this to the Congress. You will meet increasing flak + on your probable presence in Chile. We can assure the Hill that a theme of your trip will be + human rights. Also that we will vet the subject with Pinochet.

+

Some of your Latin American colleagues should also be apprised of your + plans. Argentina, Venezuela, Colombia, Costa Rica, and perhaps several + others, might want to be consulted. We expect some of them when + approached will wish we had not. Others may warm to the idea and try to + be helpful. We are asking our Ambassadors in these countries to give us + a reading on what we can expect and whether it is worthwhile to pursue + the idea. When we have their views and have sorted out our options we + will send you an action memorandum.

+ + + Sisco + + +
+ +
+ + 219. Telegram 4341 From the Embassy in Chile to the Department of + State +

Summary: The + Embassy reported that a visit to Santiago by Secretary of the + Treasury Simon had + produced tangible improvements in the human rights situation and + provided leverage for further progress.

+

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + D760178–1186. Secret; Immediate; Limdis. Repeated immediate to + Brasília and Rio de Janeiro. In an April 10 memorandum, + Rogers told + Kissinger that + Simon’s May 7 visit + as part of a Latin American trip could encourage progress on + human rights. (Ibid., P760057–0539) In telegram 4426 from + Santiago, May 11, the Embassy reported that while the Chilean + Government had not announced expected policy changes in the + human rights field in conjunction with Simon’s visit, Simon had forcefully + emphasized to Chilean officials that the U.S. Government saw the + human rights situation there as a problem. (Ibid., D760181–1155) + In telegram 4475 from Santiago, May 12, the Embassy concluded + that a new avenue for human rights inquiries had potentially + been opened by Carvajal’s statement to Simon that members of the Chilean security + forces had been punished for abuses. (Ibid., D760184–1005) In a + May 24 memorandum to Ford, Simon reported that he had informed the Chilean + Government it must improve the human rights situation or face a + loss of support in the United States and other nations. + (Ford Library, + National Security Adviser, Kissinger-Scowcroft West Wing Office Files, 1969–1977, Box + A3, Treasury Department, 5/24/76–10/27/76) In a June 2 + memorandum to Kissinger, + Rogers assessed the + human rights issues that emerged from Simon’s visit. (National + Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + P760092–1784)

+ + + + + Santiago, May 8, 1976, 1730Z. + +

4341. Subject: Treasury Secretary Simon’s Visit to Chile: Accomplishments.

+

1. Summary: Secretary Simon’s + nine-hour visit to Chile resulted in specific human rights achievements + and generated leverage which will assist further progress. The evening + before the Secretary’s arrival the GOC + announced the release of 49 political prisoners, the vast majority of + whom will go into exile in the U.S. During lengthy and often legalistic + discussions with the Chilean Cabinet (virtually every important Minister + attended), Secretary Simon + achieved:

+

(A) Commitment from the GOC [to] + continue the U.S. parole program and other similar programs and to + accelerate procedures; (B) the agreement of the GOC to a public statement that the GOC will shortly meet with the UNHRC working group to establish procedures for a review in + Chile of the human rights situation; and (C) a private and fairly + detailed admission by the government that officials have been tried and + convicted for human rights abuses. GOC + officials also tabled an outline of proposed constitutional statues, + which were neither new nor significant.

+

2. During dinner with President Pinochet, Secretary Simon repeated the main themes of his + visit: that economic freedoms must be complemented by personal and + political freedoms and that Chile must—by making human rights + progress—help us to help them. The Secretary publicly and privately made clear that desired + economic cooperation depended on what happened in human rights in Chile. + End summary.

+

3. Most immediate measurable impact of Secretary Simon’s trip obviously was the release + of 49 political prisoners. Almost all of these persons have been + approved for the U.S. parole program, increasing significantly the total + who will go to the U.S. Even more important was the clear commitment of + all those present at the discussion to the continuation of the U.S. + parole program and other similar programs, and the acceleration of + procedures.

+

4. The discussion with respect to a third-party onsite inspection of + human rights observance in Chile was a complicated duel. My reading of + the exchanges is that the GOC offered + to meet with representatives of the UNHRC working group to establish procedures by which some + element of the UN will be able to come + to Chile for onsite inspection. Others present at the meeting believe + that GOC officials committed themselves + to work out general procedures but not yet to accept a visit. (Comment: + In any case we should proceed to maintain pressure on the GOC for movement in this area as if we had + a commitment.)

+

5. In the past, GOC officials have + referred on a few occasions—and in vague general terms—to the punishment + of officials guilty of human rights abuses. We have received some + reports that the GOC, in fact, has + moved against a number of people involved in such abuses. During + Secretary Simon’s discussion on + this subject, Foreign Minister Carvajal described 41 cases (without using names) and + agreed that Secretary Simon + could make public reference to this matter. (Comment: This development + is significant in that it provides an opening for further efforts by + ourselves and others to verify particulars of GOC actions to punish those guilty of abuses of human + rights.)

+

6. We spend hour and one-half on human rights and five minutes on + economic issues. Chileans tended to emphasize legalistic and historical + justifications rather than discuss specifics. We pressed our interest in + seeing specific progress on ending the state of siege and expanding + habeas corpus jurisdiction. Although the Chileans made no commitments, + they now know what we have in mind.

+

7. During brief economic discussion, Finance Minister Cauas raised the GOC desire to: (A) sign OPIC Agreement; (B) have EXIM Bank credit + and guarantee ceiling increased from its present $700,000; (C) establish + links between the GOC and Federal + Reserve and EXIM Bank, so that GOC + officials can influence judgments on creditworthiness by these + institutions and (D) establish consultations between the two governments + on copper commodities policy.

+

8. In the private session Secretary Simon told Cauas specifically that the latter should not expect us + to sign an OPIC agreement unless the + GOC took steps in the human rights + area which brought U.S. public opinion around. In his public statement the Secretary said that the + U.S. is prepared to work closely with Chile in the months ahead, but can + help promote Chile’s economic prosperity only within the framework of a + system ensuring personal and political freedoms. The elimination of U.S. + public concern over human rights in Chile would pave the way for dynamic + joint efforts in economic development.

+

9. Comment: We will be reporting in detail by septels on various aspects + of Secretary Simon’s + discussions. As the above indicates, measurable progress was made in the + parole program and other human rights areas; the GOC was made clearly aware of the USG’s continuing interest in specific + remedial steps, and we in Santiago were provided leverage for further + efforts here. Chile’s considerable group of enemies in the US Congress + and press will no doubt try to put down results of Secretary Simon’s trip. This is a bad rap. The + results of this trip are significant and measurable and should be used + as basis for further progress.

+

10. On the basis of these long and sometimes tortuous discussions, I have + the impression that the best way to get at the human rights problem in + Chile is (A) to be firm, and (B) to be specific.

+ + + Boyatt + + +
+ +
+ 220. Memorandum of Conversation +

Summary: Popper and Robinson discussed the Chilean economy, human + rights, U.S. military sales to Chile, and Kissinger’s trip to the OAS General Assembly.

+

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + P760080–1912. Confidential. Drafted by Driscoll; approved by + Loving on May 21. In + a May 11 briefing memorandum to Robinson in anticipation of a meeting with + Popper, Rogers informed the Deputy + Secretary that Popper + was interested in discussing foreign investment and the Chilean + economy, the human rights situation, a prospective Bolivian + outlet to the Pacific Ocean, and Chile’s conduct in + international forums. (Ibid., P760069–1419) On September 23, the + Embassy in Peru reported on the U.S. and Peruvian Governments’ + settlement of the Marcona expropriation case. See Document 323.

+ + + + + Washington, May 11, + 1976. + + + SUBJECT + Ambassador Popper’s + Meeting with the Deputy Secretary—May 11, 1976—CHILE + + + PARTICIPANTS + The Deputy Secretary + Ambassador David H. + Popper + + +

+ Popper: Congratulations on your + new position. The pace of the Department’s work never slows down. + Domestic politics are interfering with foreign policy-making. A veto of + the Angola UN membership application as + hinted in press today, would be harmful. The delivery of aircraft + purchased by Chile is also affected by domestic political + considerations.

+

+ Robinson: The President said the + other day we must go forward on creating a long term foreign policy and + not allow ourselves to be shunted off by election year problems. How are + things going in Chile?

+

+ Popper: I see Simon has made some small but + significant progress, especially on prisoners. But after all the + statements are made, Chile must change its internal security system and + not its words to improve its image. The Church reports that arrests have + gone down from 150 a month, to 30. My feeling is that the GOC is more self confident and has eased + up. Part of it certainly is improved copper prices. The Treasury sees 80 + cent copper by the end of the year.

+

+ Robinson: During the recession, I + foresaw prices rising rapidly once the price started going up. The + African mines and development of new sources are very shaky. When people + understand that, the price is bound to go up. When I first went to + Zambia, I said that copper would rise to .85 cents a pound. They were + amazed. When I went back two weeks ago, everything was in pretty bad + shape. But now the price is + .725 a pound and they allow I might be right. There might be a temporary + drop in the price, but ultimately, it will be $2.00 a pound.

+

+ Popper: Chile prepared its budget + on the basis of 60 cents a pound. They are going to be way ahead. They + are going to finish the year with less foreign indebtedness than they + started with. What reception have you had for your International + Resources Bank proposal?

+

+ Robinson: Many people are not + especially interested in the proposal. The New York + Times article by Silk was the most balanced appraisal of the + proposal. The Wall Street Journal was very + critical.

+

+ Popper: We need some sort of + mechanism to protect investors’ rights so that they will take risks. The + word “bank” is a misnomer.

+

+ Robinson: Basically, it is a + guarantee fund through which the private sector can acquire a + performance guarantee through the Bank.

+

+ Popper: What progress has been + made on our initiatives at the 7th Special Session of the UNGA?

+

+ Robinson: Basically, the third + world is suspicious, but we see signs for constructive dialogue on all + elements of our complicated proposals. The complexity is essential. We + presented the proposals in broad brush form so everybody can contribute + to their ultimate formulation. We got as much done as we could in Kenya. + Many delegates there said we saved the conference, which was headed for + disaster.

+

+ Popper: After a year the world + economy looks better; accordingly, the pressures are eased. When the + economy is at its worst, the pressure on LDC’s makes progress very difficult. I hope the Department + keeps pushing on the producer/consumer conference.

+

+ Robinson: Copper bonds would be a + precedent-making measure of improving the copper market. They would be + geared to each producing country’s circumstances. The bonds would + finance intergovernmental production. The sale of the copper would be + made at close to the gross average sales price over a period. Copper + would not depress the market, but would be held until the price rose. + You could use market prices, the current or the deferred price, + whichever is best, or you could use average prices. The arrangement + would give the consumer a long term price. The USG could buy bonds. They would replace aid. We might look + for ways to accept commodities in lieu of repayment on the bonds. The + bonds would be redeemed by periodic payments. Their advantage is they + are a flexible instrument. If someone were to come out with such a + proposal, we would like to look at it. But the initiative ought to come + from the producing countries. We would be suspect if we proposed it.

+

+ Popper: But the human rights + position in Chile is bad. There are political objections for our doing + anything with or for the Chileans. Human rights considerations affect + everything.

+ +

+ Robinson: That would make more + sense in Peru, where they really have human rights violations.

+

+ Popper: That is probably so. The + question of arms sales to Chile is a perplexing one. Essentially, they + have paid for F–5 and A–37 aircraft, but it is very difficult to get the + Executive Branch to decide to allow their delivery. We will be in breach + of contract if we do not deliver. It places a question on our + reliability as a supplier. According to law, Chile can buy, but the + Executive Branch is reluctant to move anything. I mention this for your + information. Congress is cutting back on economic aid. I can understand + that. Chile should not get a disproportionate share of our aid, but + there is a danger of increasing the junta’s paranoia if we cut too + quickly and sharply. They feel they are the victims of a double + standard. Current Congressional efforts to cut off aid are counter-productive and are not + favored by the democratic opponents of the regime. If aid is to be phased down, it should be + done gradually. The new bill has a limit of 25 million, which is drastic + indeed. The parole program under which we are bringing people to the + U.S. is progressing satisfactorily. The delays are not our fault. We are + constrained to limit our program to those the GOC will let go. We are trying to compensate for those we + had expected to take from Peru, by adding that shortfall to the target + for Chile. I understand Congressional consultations are involved: this + is a tactic that can be used today to obstruct almost any desired + action. This little program for Chile is an expensive program per + capita. But I am sure it is responsive to our traditional humanitarian + concerns.

+

+ Robinson: The expense was on the + order of $1,000 per head in the Viet-Nam program.

+

+ Popper: I don’t know the cost + breakdown. It takes a lot of our Consulate’s time. The + Inter-Governmental Committee of European Migration manages the program, + and they work with the Voluntary agencies. The cost of the Vietnamese + program could not be much lower than ours.

+

+ Robinson: Do you favor giving the + unused portion of the program for Peru to Chile?

+

+ Popper: Yes. When I return to + post, I will submit a proposal. We are caught between the liberals and + the conservatives in this.

+

+ Robinson: When do you go + back?

+

+ Popper: I am planning to see the + Secretary before I go, in a week or so. Can you give me any advice on + whether he is going to the OAS?

+

+ Robinson: I think he is going to + go. At first he said that he did not want to and suggested that I go in + his place. But I pointed out to him that the Marcona problem is still + unsettled. I cannot break my policy of not appearing on the west coast + of Latin America until it is.

+ +

I am generally doubtful about any sort of working relationship with the + OAS. What comes out of there is + usually the lowest common denominator. It is difficult in the domestic + political context to come up with anything concrete. The Panama Canal is + an issue in the election. The Secretary should go, but it may be + difficult because we cannot offer anything beyond UNCTAD IV. This will not be enough for + the Latins. But we can lose more by not going than by going. I suppose + he will have to see Pinochet + while he is there.

+

+ Popper: I don’t see how he can + avoid a presidential invitation.

+
+ +
+ 221. Memorandum of Conversation +

Summary: Popper and Kissinger discussed the Secretary’s upcoming + visit to Chile and how to address the human rights problem.

+

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + P820117–2370. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Driscoll.

+ + + + + Washington, May 15, + 1976. + + + SUBJECT + Visit to Chile and Human Rights + + + PARTICIPANTS + The Secretary + Ambassador David H. + Popper + + Mr. R. Driscoll, ARA, Notetaker + +

+ Kissinger: I am going to the + OAS meeting. I suspect Pinochet will ask for an appointment, + but I don’t want you to ask ahead of time.

+

+ Popper: Pinochet has already indicated he + wants to see you.

+

+ Kissinger: I want to see him in + as small a group as possible. Do you think we can get anything on human + rights?

+

+ Popper: I think we should try. + There is a fifty/fifty chance that we can get something.

+

+ Kissinger: I am not in the + business of overthrowing governments. I want that made clear.

+

+ Popper: I understand.

+

+ Kissinger: I don’t see any + alternative to this government. What would happen if another one came + into power?

+ +

+ Popper: A new government would be + from the extreme left or the extreme right. It is hard to say which, but + wherever it came from, it would be more totalitarian.

+

+ Kissinger: Other than human + rights, what else can I do?

+

+ Popper: What can you do, Mr. + Secretary:—one of the things that would interest them will be seeing + you. They trust you and believe you to be a friend, as opposed to some + elements of the USG.

+

+ Kissinger: That is for sure.

+

+ Popper: One thing you can say is + to discuss with them the bearing of détente on US/Chile relations. They + feel that the détente policy has been discredited and dropped. They see + the U.S. as slowly coming around to the all-out anti-communist course + they are on. It is an oversimplified view. It would be helpful if you + could set them straight.

+

+ Kissinger: It is a weird + assignment to push away people who want to be friendly. What rationale + can I use on human rights?

+

+ Popper: That after two and + one-half years they should be able to begin relaxing. These practices + harm our relations. They see the situation in Cold War terms. They are + the only country in the hemisphere to have ousted a Marxist government. + They have a David and Goliath complex. Unless they keep their security + tight, they feel they will be infiltrated and overthrown.

+

+ Kissinger: Where am I + staying?

+

+ Popper: You will be staying in + the manager’s apartment at the Hotel Carrera. It will not be the best + place you have ever stayed, but I am sure you will be comfortable. + Should Flo call Mrs. Kissinger?

+

+ Kissinger: Is there anything to + see there? How cold is it?

+

+ Popper: There is frost but no + snow. The climate will be like north Florida in the winter time. There + are vineyards, handicraft centers, beautiful mountain scenery, and the + sea coast for Mrs. Kissinger to see.

+

+ Kissinger: It would be nice for + your wife to call Nancy.

+

+ Popper: Would it be useful to + indicate to the government of Chile that it ought to make some + constructive step on human rights during or before your meeting with + Pinochet? The easiest one would be to invite the UN or OAS group to come + down. They agreed to discuss the modalities of such a visit during the + Simon stop, but they have + not yet agreed on a visit.

+

+ Kissinger: Would not such a group + just condemn Chile?

+

+ Popper: The GOC feels they can build balance into a + report if it has an ongoing dialogue with the investigating group. The + second area is to ask them to lower the state of siege or to give the + civil rights some jurisdiction in internal security cases, or + reestablish habeas corpus . . . something of that sort.

+ +

+ Kissinger: It would help most if + these things appear to be the result of my conversation with + Pinochet.

+
+ +
+ 222. Telegram 2171 From the Mission to the United Nations to the + Department of State +

Summary: Allana + informed Bennett that the junta showed no signs of granting + permission for an on-site inspection by the U.N. Human Rights + Commission Working Group on Chile, and that the Working Group + planned to hold a press conference to highlight the junta’s lack + of cooperation.

+

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + D760194–0543. Confidential; Immediate. Repeated to Santiago. In + telegram 4770 from Santiago, May 20, the Embassy suggested that + Bennett urge the Working Group to delay its announcement on + Chile’s lack of cooperation or at least to indicate that further + discussions with the Chilean Government were still possible. + (Telegram 4770 from Santiago, May 20; ibid., D760195–1162) In + telegram 124601 to USUN, May + 21, the Department instructed Bennett to stress to Diez “our hope that talks with + the Ad Hoc Working Group will not end in failure predicted by + Allana” and to urge + him to consider a formula that would allow for a Working Group + visit. (Ibid., D760196–0734) In telegram 5051 from Santiago, May + 27, the Embassy reported that while a press release issued by + the Working Group after discussions with Chilean representatives + indicated that little progress had been made, the Group and the + junta had avoided a “hard break.” (Ibid., + D760206–0309)

+ + + + + New York, May 19, 1976, 2245Z. + +

2171. Subject: Relations With UN Human + Rights Commission Working Group. Ref: USUN 1976.

+

1. Summary. The Chairman of the ad hoc working group on Chile, G. Allana (Pakistan), asked for a + meeting with Ambassador Bennett to provide USG with a report on the progress of current talks between + the five-member working group of the human rights commission and reps of + the government of Chile. Allana + reported that the talks have so far been unsatisfactory and the Chileans + show no signs of granting permission for an on-site inspection by the + working group. Allana indicated + that unless the Chileans agree by Monday May 24 to allow a visit by the + working group, the working group will hold a Tuesday press conference + and make clear the Chileans’ lack of cooperation. Allana said working group convinced + that GOC is trying to use the working + group for publicity purposes. End summary.

+

2. In a brief meeting on May 19 held at the request of Mr. Ghulam Ali Allana (Pakistan), Chairman + of the Human Rights Commission’s ad hoc working group to inquire into + the situation of human rights in Chile, Allana briefed Ambassador Bennett on the progress of the + talks being held with Chilean + government reps, Amb Sergio Diez + and Mr. Schweitzer, legal adviser and son of the Chilean Minister of + Justice. Allana stated he deemed + it important to brief the US on the problems encountered by the working + group because the outcome of these meetings could prove embarrassing to + the US.

+

3. Allana pointed out that the + meetings are being held at the request of the Chilean government. (The + text of the Chilean government’s letter requesting the meeting was given + to Ambassador Bennett by Huerta + in confidence last week reftel and discussed in reftel pouched + addressees.) Allana noted that + the working group ordinarily meets in Geneva and has come to New York + solely for this meeting. The group is therefore incensed at the lack of + cooperation exhibited by the Chileans and feels that the Chilean + government has called the meeting simply so that it can claim to have + made a sincere effort to negotiate with the group and that the failure + of the talks lies with the working group.

+

4. The main point of disagreement concerns the attitude of the Chilean + government towards a visit by the working group. The working group has, + according to Allana, stated its + willingness to negotiate other suggestions made by the Chileans. + Allana claims the Chilean + rep at one point stated his government had decided to allow the visit + and this would be confirmed by Friday. The statement was later + retracted. According to Allana, + the Chileans now claim they do not wish to make a decision on a visit by + the working group until after the OAS + ministerial ending June 25. Allana states that is too late because the group has + other commitments and must organize its schedule now. The working group + will draft its report in August for presentation to the GA in September and would thus have to + visit Chile in June or July. Allana has asked the Chileans for a firm answer by + Monday. If the Chileans are not forthcoming, the working group will hold + a press conference on Tuesday which would be unfavorable to the Chileans + since working group considers GOC has + not made a sincere effort to accommodate the group and is attempting to + use it solely to gain favorable publicity for themselves. In event + GOC does not invite visit by + working group, Allana indicated + commission’s subsequent report to the GA + would be harsh on Chile and predictably lead to renewed attacks on + GOC.

+

Comment: As in previous conversations, Allana appeared to be attempting to put responsibility + on US to effect forthcoming attitude on part of Chile.

+ + Scranton + +
+ +
+ 223. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for + Inter-American Affairs (Rogers) + to Secretary of State Kissinger + +

Summary: Rogers + informed Kissinger that + he had discussed U.S. policy toward Chile with Department of the + Treasury officials and with Chilean Ambassador Trucco. He stressed to + Trucco that there + was no division within the U.S. Government on policy towards + Chile and that progress in the human rights field was + essential.

+

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + P840041–1871. Confidential. Drafted by Rogers and Keane. On May 20, the Washington Post reported that Simon stated that while the + Secretary of State and Secretary of the Treasury agreed on Chile + policy, congressional liberals and “a quietly dissenting sector + of the State Department argue that the junta should receive no + U.S. support,” due to its human rights abuses. (“Chile Freeing + New Group of 50 Prisoners,” Washington + Post, May 20, 1976, p. A1) On June 5, Rogers informed Kissinger of an indication + received from a member of the Chilean Embassy staff that + Trucco “had not been + hearing” when U.S. officials such as Simon told him that the + ability of the U.S. Government to help Chile depended on + improvements in Chile’s human rights image. (National Archives, + RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + P760092–1949)

+ + + + + Washington, May 28, + 1976. + +

+ Human Rights in Chile +

+

+ Summary: I had extensive conversations with + Parsky and Ambassador + Trucco of Chile, all + directed at coordinating your visit with Simon’s. Parsky + and I cleared the air regarding a Washington Post + story alleging a Treasury/State division over Chile policy. After + Parsky checked with Simon, we agreed there are no + differences. We were also at one that:

+ + —the GOC must continue to + announce prisoner releases, + —we must try to obtain a GOC + invitation to the UN Human Rights + Commission Working Group, and + —the GOC should announce publicly + the proceedings against officials responsible for prisoner + abuse. + +

When Trucco and I met I stressed + that:

+ + —our policy is one of concern about human rights behavior in + Chile, not who governs, + —there is no State/Treasury division on our Chile policy, and that + it is disadvantageous to both Chile and the U.S. to suggest that + there is, + —progress in human rights is essential, (e.g. public announcement + of actions taken to punish officials who have abused prisoners) + and + —an agreement on a visit by the UN + Human Rights Commission would be very helpful. + +

+ Trucco concurred on these points + and recognized the value of linking prisoner release announcements with + the visits of high-level American officials. End + Summary. +

+ +

In our conversations last Thursday and Friday, Parsky and I agreed that it was + preeminently desirable to maintain the momentum of Simon’s visit. We both agreed that, to + this end, the establishment of procedure for a visit by a Working Group + from the UN Human Rights Commission + would be helpful. I agreed to raise this point with Trucco when I saw him later in the + day. I brought to Parsky’s + attention the Washington Post report of a + statement by Simon that there + were differences between Simon + on human rights in Chile and some middling level officers in the State + Department. Parsky checked with + Simon, who was in California + and reported back that in fact Simon said that there was perfect unity between the + policy making echelons in State and Treasury. The reporter, one Diuguid, + told Simon that he, the + reporter, understood that there were some middling level officials that + did not agree; Simon did not + endorse that statement but said only that whatever the views of the + middling level officers were it was the policy making level which + counted and that there was unanimity there.

+

+ Parsky, Simon and I are at one for the + proposition that it is important that Chile continue the announcements + of prisoner releases. But we all agreed that this should not be the + primary focus of our efforts. Rather, we ought to try to insure that the + UN Human Rights Commission Working + Group be invited to Chile, and that there be public announcement of the + proceedings against those officers who abused prisoners.

+

As to the signature of the OPIC + agreement, Parsky affirmed that + Simon said that the + agreement would not be signed until there were further advances on the + human rights front. Parsky and I + agreed, therefore, that we ought to sign when and only when the Chileans + move forward “another notch or two” on human rights. This is what the + Chileans expect.

+

With all this in hand, I met with Trucco for an extensive lunch on Friday. I first + addressed myself to the statement he had made to the Deputy Secretary to + the effect that he had understood from two sources that middle level + officers of the Department of State had said that our policy was to + change the government in Santiago. I told him that, at the Deputy + Secretary’s request, I had undertaken the sternest and most complete + inquiry. I was able to affirm to him that no middle level officer had + made such a statement. Beyond that, I represented that this was + distinctly not the policy of the United States Government. It was our + policy to be concerned with human rights behavior in Chile. It was not + our policy to intervene. The decision who was to govern Chile was a + question for Chile, not for the United States. He said he was glad to + have this assurance. We both agreed that it would be desirable to + reiterate the point to the German Ambassador to Chile who was one of + those who was allegedly under a misapprehension, on the basis of his earlier meetings here in + Washington. We will authorize Popper to do so.

+

I then discussed the importance of continued human rights progress. + Trucco agreed that it was + desirable to maintain the momentum of the Simon visit through the visit of the Secretary of State + to Santiago. As Parsky and I had + foreshadowed, I emphasized the importance of an agreement with respect + to the visit of the UN Human Rights + Commission satisfactory to Chile. Trucco told me that Sergio Diaz and the son of the + Minister of Justice were both in New York at that very moment. He would + call them and emphasize the desirability of coming to an agreement on + the UN Commission matter. He assured me + that he was optimistic that an understanding as to procedures for such a + visit could be effected in the next day or two.

+

We then turned to the question of public treatment of Treasury and + State’s view about human rights. I emphasized that Treasury and State + were at one. He said that he understood that and disclaimed any + statements to the press to the effect that there was a difference of + view between Treasury and State. I suggested to him that it was + disadvantageous both to Chile and the U.S. to suggest that there was a + difference between the two Departments.

+

In terms of additional steps that might be taken prior to the visit of + the Secretary, I suggested that more could be said publicly with respect + to Chile’s effort to bring to the bar of justice those officers who had + abused prisoners. This, I said, would demonstrate the sincere intent of + Chile to observe human rights standards. He agreed that more could be + done on this and said that he would talk to the Foreign Minister about + the possibility of an announcement of the facts with respect to some 41 + such cases. Chile could not release the names of the officers. This + could lead to retaliation against their families.

+

Beyond this, he agreed that it was desirable to continue to maintain a + steady pace of prisoner releases. The linkage of such prisoner releases + with the visits by high level official Americans was not a bad thing. He + hinted that this could insure an enhanced public awareness of what Chile + was doing. A routine announcement of release in Santiago got no press. + When it was linked to Simon or + Kissinger, it gets real + coverage in the U.S., he said.

+

I told him that we were contemplating an announcement of the Secretary’s + trip no earlier than the middle of the week. We would have to be in a + position to respond to questions about the human rights implications of + a visit by Kissinger to + Santiago. I agreed that I would discuss the general line of our public + statement with Trucco + beforehand.

+
+ +
+ + 224. Memorandum From Secretary of the Treasury Simon to President Ford + +

Summary: With the administration’s request for + economic assistance to Chile facing congressional opposition, + Simon sought + Presidential approval for a statement to the Senate Foreign + Relations Committee reiterating the administration’s strong + belief that aid to Chile was in + the best interests of the United States.

+

Source: Ford Library, + President’s Handwriting File, Box 22, Foreign Affairs–Foreign + Aid, 8. No classification marking. Ford approved the recommendation on June 2. + (Ibid.) In a June 4 memorandum to the President, Connor indicated Greenspan, + Lynn, Marsh, and Scowcroft concurred. (Ibid.) In + a June 5 memorandum to Kissinger, Rogers indicated he concurred. (National + Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P760092–1930) On + May 30, Rogers reported + to Kissinger on + Simon’s meeting with + the Foreign Assistance Subcommittee of the SFRC. Although Simon informed them that he + had made it clear to the Chilean Government that economic aid was linked to their human + rights performance, there was no support in the Subcommittee for + any military assistance, including commercial sales. (Ibid., + P760092–1730) A transcript of Simon’s report to the Subcommittee is in a U.S. + Senate Report of Proceedings, May 27, vol. 1.

+ + + + + Washington, June 2, + 1976. + + + SUBJECT + Economic Assistance to Chile in the Security Assistance + Legislation + +

As you know, Congressman Frazier, in an attempt to express Congressional + dissatisfaction with the Chilean Government’s performance on human + rights issues, added an amendment in the House to the Security + Assistance Bill which would limit economic assistance to Chile, at the + end of this fiscal year through September 30, 1977, to $25 million. On + my recent trip to Chile, the Government emphasized that they are + committed to ensuring human rights, and they took some positive steps in + that direction during and after my visit. In light of this progress, I + have made a concerted effort to oppose any cut in economic assistance + that might be added to the bill when considered by the Senate. Such a + cut is being contemplated by Senators Kennedy and Cranston.

+

Last Thursday morning I appeared in executive session before Senator + Humphrey’s Foreign + Assistance Subcommittee of the Committee on Foreign Relations. Senator + Javits suggested at that + meeting if you would informally agree to be guided by the views of the + majority of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations prior to the + granting of economic assistance to Chile, he thought the Senate would + not reduce such assistance. However, I made no commitment to the + Committee until I could get your views.

+

I request that I be authorized to advise the Senate Foreign Relations + Committee that the Administration strongly believes that economic + assistance to Chile is in the best interests of the United States, and + therefore believes that + your request for assistance to Chile must be fully authorized; that the + Administration will be ready and willing to consult closely with the + Senate Foreign Relations Committee before the obligation of specific + assistance programs for Chile but cannot be bound by the views of the + majority of a single Congressional committee.

+

The Security Asssistance Bill is expected to be on the Senate floor at + the end of the first week in June or at the beginning of the second week + in June. I need to communicate your views prior to the bill’s reaching + the floor.

+ + + William E. + Simon + + +
+ +
+ 225. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for + Inter-American Affairs (Rogers) + to Secretary of State Kissinger + +

Summary: Rogers + informed Kissinger of + the possibility of further congressional action to restrict the + transfer to Chile of military equipment. Rogers added that a cut-off of + matériel that was already in the pipeline for Chile would + seriously impair bilateral relations.

+

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + P760092–1928. Confidential. Drafted by Fimbres and Ryan; cleared by Black.

+ + + + + Washington, June 5, + 1976. + +

+ CHILE—Your Meeting with Pinochet and the FMS Cash Pipeline Problem +

+

The Hill is on the verge of + resolving how we proceed on the Chilean pipeline. A decision is likely + while you are on your trip. We expect Senate action on the FAA on June 8 and a conference report by + the end of next week. An immediate cut-off is a + possibility.

+

President Pinochet will + undoubtedly raise the subject with you. He will stress the importance of + the U.S. meeting its commitment on matériel deliveries. He may want + assurances the Executive would veto any cut-off. However, the President + has signaled that he would not veto on the issue of Chile alone. We cannot be optimistic.

+

We suspended delivery of FMS cases + during 1975 because of Section 25 of the FAA, which prohibited new FMS credits and FMS cash + sales. With expiration of this provision in June 1975, we proceeded to + release matériel and approved F–5 pilot training. Of a total of $5 + million which we approved, about $650,000 went for F–5 pilot training + and the rest for non-lethal + spare parts. Some $112 million still remains in the pipeline, including + a squadron of F–5s and a squadron of A–37s.

+

+ The House bill would leave the pipeline alone. + Were this to prosper, it might be taken as signalling Hill approval for us to move ahead on + deliveries. The Senate Committee bill would + immediately enact an embargo. We expect the full Senate to vote + on the bill June 8 (there are no amendments so far).

+

If House action this week cutting off all military assistance for Uruguay + on human rights grounds is any indication, we may expect some House + pressure to accept the Senate version in conference.

+

The Congressional climate toward Chile has + deteriorated further, despite the Simon trip and his meeting with the SFRC. Hence, an immediate shut-down of + the pipeline is possible. It is hard to think of a single action which + could at one stroke more thoroughly impair U.S./GOC relations. In + Chilean eyes, the F–5s have become an unusually important test case of + the USG’s reliability and adherence to + its pledged word. Impending arrival of the first aircraft has been + prominently publicized in the local press. Even the junta’s Chilean + critics would view a cut-off negatively in the context of Chile’s + defenselessness against Peru.

+

+ Pinochet and his colleagues are + fully aware of the progress of the two bills. They are surprised at what + has happened so far. They thought things were well in hand following the + Simon visit. Timely and + meaningful human rights measures by them could possibly bear on the + outcome. But we can give the GOC no assurances in this regard.

+
+ +
+ 226. Telegram 5434 From the Embassy in Chile to the Department of + State +

Summary: The + Embassy reported that although it believed that that junta could + have arranged the deaths of Chilean political refugees in + foreign countries, it lacked evidence to confirm such + allegations.

+

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + D760219–0217. Secret; Immediate. Repeated immediate to Buenos + Aires, Montevideo, Asunción, Brasília, and La Paz. In telegram + 137156 to Buenos Aires, Montevideo, Asunción, Santiago, + Brasília, and La Paz, June 4, the Department noted its concern + over “the recent sharp increase in the number of assassinations + of foreign political figures in exile or political asylum in or + from your countries” and asked if “the deaths of political + refugees or asylees from your country abroad could have been + arranged by your host government through institutional ties to + groups, governmental or other, in the country where the deaths + took place?” (Ibid., D760214–0807)

+ + + + + Santiago, June 7, 1976, 1606Z. + +

5434. Subj: Possible International Implications of Violent Deaths of + Political Figures Abroad. Ref: State 137156.

+

1. Clearly, other addressee embassies are better able than we to comment + on willingness of their governments to cooperate with Chileans. We note + in general the similarity in outlook of all countries queried, and + similar situation in most. We assume (1) that armed forces and + intelligence services of all these countries cooperate to some extent, + (2) that all these governments are capable of covert killing, but that + (3) national interests of each country determine extent to which + cooperation would extend to such violence.

+

2. Specific comments follow:

+

(A) Embassy believes that deaths of Chilean political refugees could have + been arranged by GOC through + institutional ties to groups or governments in countries where deaths + took place. Argentina is the specific case. Probably most Chileans + killed there were engaged in extremist activity against GOA forces, but we [garble] that Chilean + Directorate of National Intelligence (DINA), for example, sought cooperation with Argentine + forces or groups such as AAA.

+

(B) Deaths of foreign political refugees/asylees in Chile: Since the + period immediately after the September 1973 coup, we are not aware of + any foreign refugees/asylees killed in Chile. If any were, they probably + were engaged in extremist activity. Thousands of foreign political + activists came to Chile during the Allende period, and some were killed during turbulence + soon after the coup. We would not exclude cooperation in such deaths, + but foreigners also may have been caught up in action against Chileans + of similar political background. Since 1973 Chile has not been a likely + place of refuge for people hostile to GOC.

+ +

(C) We have no evidence to support or deny allegations of such + international arrangements. We believe these arrangements are possible, + and that it is also possible Chilean agents have been involved in + killings abroad, possibly in cooperation with foreign governments.

+

(D) We have no evidence of arrangements among governments to return + political asylees against their will, but we do not find it + inconceivable that governments might have cooperated in specific + cases.

+ + + Popper + + +
+ +
+ 227. Memorandum From Les Janka + of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for + National Security Affairs (Scowcroft) +

Summary: Janka + informed Scowcroft that + the Administration would work to have the House-Senate + Conference Committee accept the House version of the Security + Assistance Bill, which would allow cash sales of matériel to + Chile.

+

Source: Ford Library, + White House Central + Files, Subject File, Box 23, FO 3–2/CO 27–CO 54. No + classification marking. Sent for information. Brownell concurred. Scowcroft wrote “Thanks” on the + first page of the memorandum and initialed it. The text of the + Buchanan and + Fraser Amendments is + attached at Tab A, and the text of the Kennedy Amendment is + attached at Tab B. The May 18 memorandum has not been found. In + telegram Hakto 7 from + Santiago, June 7, Kissinger informed Scowcroft that the “Kennedy proposals for a cutoff of all military + sales and transfers to Chile would be disastrous to our efforts + in Chile and elsewhere in the hemisphere. I want now to ensure + that everything is being done to block this. If the situation is + as serious as it appears from here, the President should be + brought in.” (Ibid., National Security Adviser, Trip Briefing + Books and Cables for Henry + Kissinger, 1974–1976, Box 25, June 6–13, + 1976–Latin America, Hakto) In + telegram Tohak 12, June 9, Scowcroft replied that the White House would work to keep + the Fraser Amendment + from being added to the Senate version of the bill and to have + the Kennedy Amendment + removed from the final text in the House-Senate conference + committee. (Ibid., 6/6–13/76 Latin America, Tohak, + 1)

+ + + + + Washington, June 8, + 1976. + + + SUBJECT + Limitations on Chile in Security Assistance Legislation + +

You inquired about the details of limitations on military and economic + assistance to Chile contained in the security assistance legislation now + under consideration. The House-passed bill contains a + Buchanan amendment which + terminates military assistance including FMS credits but permits cash sales. The House bill + further contains a Fraser + amendment which limits + economic assistance levels to Chile to a total of $25 million in the + transition quarter and FY 77; + we requested $68 million. (House provisions at Tab A)

+

+ The Senate version of the bill, which will be + debated tomorrow, contains a Kennedy amendment which imposes a + total embargo on military assistance or sales to Chile effective on + the date of enactment of the bill. Such a provision would cut + off the pipeline and even sales of spare parts would be banned. (The + language of the Kennedy amendment + is at Tab B) The Senate bill contains no ceiling on + economic assistance to Chile, but Kennedy plans to introduce a floor amendment + incorporating Fraser’s + ceiling provision.

+

Consistent with the position approved by the President in our memo of May + 18, we will work to have the House-Senate conference accept the House + version over that of the Senate since Buchanan’s amendment permits cash sales and a continuing + flow of spare parts for U.S. equipment already in Chile. We will + strongly oppose adding a ceiling on economic assistance on the Senate + floor and work for deleting the Fraser amendment in conference. Our prospects for + achieving this result are not bright. Senator Humphrey has indicated that he can + offer no assurances on Chile, since he will have to give the liberal + forces something to ensure deletion of the concurrent resolutions on + human rights and protect our Korea levels. Unlike our Korea program, + Chile does not have the support of the farm bloc or the arms industry + since its program is so small. A call from you to Humphrey stressing the importance of + at least a $50 million assistance level (exclusive of OPIC guarantees and CCC credits) would be very useful.

+
+ +
+ 228. Memorandum of Conversation +

Summary: Kissinger and Pinochet discussed U.S. assistance to Chile, + human rights, and regional issues.

+

Source: Ford Library, + National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for Latin + America, Box 3, Chile, 3. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Rogers. The + meeting took place in Pinochet’s office. Kissinger was in Chile for the sixth regular + session of the OASGA. + Kissinger’s + statement on human rights at the OASGA is published in the Department of State Bulletin, July 5, 1976, pp. 1–5. In + telegram 3779 from Santiago, April 24, the Embassy provided + background material for Kissinger’s June meeting with Pinochet at the OASGA; the Embassy suggested + that the Secretary inform Pinochet that the human rights practices of the + Chilean Government were more repressive than circumstances + dictated, and that Pinochet needed to take specific steps to + improve the human rights situation. (National Archives, RG 59, + Central Foreign Policy File, D760156–0824) Kissinger and Rogers met with Foreign + Minister Carvajal and + Finance Minister Cauas + on June 10. Cauas noted + that the IDB vote on a proposed + loan to Chile had been delayed at the request of the U.S. + Government so that Congress could be informed in accordance with + legislation that prohibited U.S. aid to countries that committed gross violations of + human rights. Kissinger + told the Chilean officials that he supported the loan, that it + was “a bad precedent to let Congress approve loans,” and that he + would “get this situation under control when I get back to + Washington.” On human rights, Kissinger added that he trusted the Chilean + Government’s “good faith and your good will.” (Memorandum of + Conversation, June 10; ibid., P820118–1621)

+ + + + + Santiago, June 8, 1976, noon. + + + SUBJECT + U.S.-Chilean Relations + + + PARTICIPANTS + + + + Chile + + Augusto Pinochet, President + + Patricio Carvajal, + Foreign Minister + Manuel Trucco, + Ambassador to United States + Ricardo Claro, OAS/GA + Conference Coordinator for Chilean Government + + + + + + United States + + The Secretary + + William D. Rogers, + Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs + Anthony Hervas (Interpreter) + + + +

The Secretary: This is a beautiful building. The conference is well + organized. Are you meeting with all the delegations?

+

Pinochet: Yes. Two or three a day. I want to tell you we are grateful + that you have come to the conference.

+

The Secretary: It is an honor. I was touched by the popular reception + when I arrived. I have a strong feeling of friendship in Chile.

+

Pinochet: This is a country of warm-hearted people, who love liberty. + This is the reason they did not accept Communism when the Communists + attempted to take over the country. It is a long term struggle we are a part of. It is a + further stage of the same conflict which erupted into the Spanish Civil + War. And we note the fact that though the Spaniards tried to stop + Communism 40 years ago, it is springing up again in Spain.

+

The Secretary: We had the Spanish King recently, and I discussed that very issue with + him.

+

Pinochet: I have always been against Communism. During the Viet-Nam War, + I met with some of your military and made clear to them my + anti-Communism, and told them I hoped they could bring about its + defeat.

+

The Secretary: In Viet-Nam, we defeated ourselves through our internal + divisions. There is a world-wide propaganda campaign by the + Communists.

+

Pinochet: Chile is suffering from that propaganda effort. Unfortunately, + we do not have the millions needed for counter propaganda.

+

The Secretary: I must say your spokesman (Sergio Diez) was very effective in this morning’s + General Assembly session in explaining your position. In the United + States, as you know, we are sympathetic with what you are trying to do + here. I think that the previous government was headed toward Communism. + We wish your government well. At the same time, we face massive domestic + problems, in all branches of the government, especially Congress, but + also in the Executive, over the issue of human rights. As you know, + Congress is now debating further restraints on aid to Chile. We are opposed. But basically we don’t want + to intervene in your domestic affairs. We can’t be precise in our + proposals about what you should do. But this is a problem which + complicates our relationships and the efforts of those who are friends + of Chile. I am going to speak about human rights this afternoon in the + General Assembly. I delayed my statement until I could talk to you. I + wanted you to understand my position. We want to deal in moral + persuasion, not by legal sanctions. It is for this reason that we oppose + the Kennedy Amendment.

+

In my statement, I will treat human rights in general terms, and human + rights in a world context. I will refer in two paragraphs to the report + on Chile of the OAS Human Rights + Commission. I will say that the human rights issue has impaired + relations between the U.S. and Chile. This is partly the result of + Congressional actions. I will add that I hope you will shortly remove + those obstacles.

+

I will also call attention to the Cuba report and to the hypocrisy of + some who call attention to human rights as a means of intervening in + governments. I can do no less, without producing a reaction in the U.S. + which would lead to legislative restrictions. The speech is not aimed at + Chile. I wanted to tell you about this. My evaluation is that you are a victim of all + left-wing groups around the world, and that your greatest sin was that + you overthrew a government which was going Communist. But we have a + practical problem we have to take into account, without bringing about + pressures incompatible with your dignity, and at the same time which + does not lead to U.S. laws which will undermine our relationship.

+

It would really help if you would let us know the measures you are taking + in the human rights field. None of this is said with the hope of + undermining your government. I want you to succeed and I want to retain + the possibility of aid.

+

If we defeat the Kennedy + amendment,—I don’t know if you listen in on my phone, but if you do you + have just heard me issue instructions to Washington to make an all-out + effort to do just that—if we defeat it, we will deliver the F–5E’s as we + agreed to do. We held up for a while in others to avoid providing + additional ammunition to our enemies.

+

Pinochet: We are returning to institutionalization step by step. But we + are constantly being attacked by the Christian Democratics. They have a + strong voice in Washington. Not the people in the Pentagon, but they do + get through to Congress. Gabriel Valdez has access. Also Letelier.

+

The Secretary: I have not seen a Christian Democrat for years.

+

Pinochet: Also Tomic, and others I don’t recall. Letelier has access to the Congress. + We know they are giving false information. You see, we have no + experience in government. We are worried about our image. In a few days + we will publish the constitutional article on human rights, and also + another setting up the Council of State. There are a number of efforts + we are making to move to institutionalization. In the economic area, we + have paid our debts, after the renegotiation. We are paying $700 million + in debts with interest this year. We have made land reforms. And we are + taking other constitutional measures. We have freed most detained + prisoners. There have been 60 more just recently. In September 11, 1974, + I challenged the Soviets to set free their prisoners. But they haven’t + done so, while we have only 400 people who are now detained. On + international relations, we are doing well. In the case of Bolivia, we + have extended our good will. It all depends now on Peru.

+

The Secretary: I have the impression that Peru is not very + sympathetic.

+

Pinochet: You are right. Peru does not wish to see the idea proposed.

+

The Secretary: Peru told me they would get no port out of the + arrangement.

+

Pinochet: Peru is arming. Peru is trying to buy a carrier from the + British for $160 million. It is also building four torpedo boats in + Europe. Peru is breaking the + arms balance in the South Pacific. It has 600 tanks from the Soviet + Union. We are doing what we can to sustain ourselves in case of an + emergency.

+

The Secretary: What are you doing?

+

Pinochet: We are largely modifying old armaments, fixing junked units. We + are a people with energy. We have no Indians.

+

The Secretary: I gather Chile generally wins its wars.

+

Pinochet: We have never lost a war. We are a proud people. On the human + rights front, we are slowly making progress. We are now down to 400. We + have freed more. And we are also changing some sentences so that the + prisoners can be eligible for leaving.

+

The Secretary: If you could group the releases, instead of 20 a week, + have a bigger program of releases, that would be better for the + psychological impact of the releases. What I mean is not that you should + delay, but that you should group the releases. But, to return to the + military aid question, I really don’t + know how it will go tomorrow in the Senate.

+

+ Trucco: The Buchanan amendment is workable.

+

The Secretary: I repeat that if the House version succeeds, then we will + send the planes.

+

+ Trucco: (Discusses the technical + aspects of the 1975, 1976 and 1977 legislation.)

+

+ Trucco: The problem is now in the + Senate, for the FY 1977 bill. Fraser has already had his amendment + passed by the House.

+

The Secretary: I understand. We have our position on that. My statement + and our position are designed to allow us to say to the Congress that we + are talking to the Chilean government and therefore Congress need not + act. We had the choice whether I should come or not. We thought it + better for Chile if I came. My statement is not offensive to Chile. + Ninety-five percent of what I say is applicable to all the governments + of the Hemisphere. It includes things your own people have said.

+

+ Trucco: That’s true. We are + strongly in favor of strengthening the OAS Commission.

+

The Secretary: We are not asking the OAS + to endorse anything. I have talked with other delegations. We want an + outcome which is not deeply embarrassing to you. But as friends, I must + tell you that we face a situation in the United States where we must be + able to point to events here in Chile, or we will be defeated. As Angola + demonstrates, Congress is in a mood of destructiveness. We were in a + good position in Angola. We thought Angola could become the Viet-Nam of + Cuba. This would have occurred if Cuba had begun to sustain 20 + casualties a week. Cuba could not have stood that for long. We had the + forces for that. Congress + stopped us. But I am persuaded that the Executive, whoever is elected, + will be stronger after the election.

+

Pinochet: How does the US see the problem between Chile and Peru?

+

The Secretary: (after a pause) We would not like to see a conflict. Much + depends on who begins it.

+

Pinochet: The question is really how to prevent the beginning.

+

The Secretary: The American people would ask who is advancing on + whom.

+

Pinochet: But you know what’s going on here. You see it with your + satellites.

+

The Secretary: Well, I can assure you that if you take Lima, you will + have little U.S. support.

+

Pinochet: We did it once, a hundred years ago. It would be difficult now, + in view of the present balance of forces.

+

The Secretary: If Peru attacked, this would be a serious matter for a + country armed with Soviet equipment. It would be serious. Clearly we + would oppose it diplomatically. But it all depends, beyond that. It is + not easy to generate support for U.S. military action these days.

+

Pinochet: We must fight with our own arms?

+

The Secretary: I distinguish between preferences and probabilities. It + depends how it happens. If there is naked aggression, that means + greater, more general resistance.

+

Pinochet: Assume the worst, that is to say, that Chile is the aggressor. + Peru defends itself, and then attacks us. What happens?

+

The Secretary: It’s not that easy. We will know who the aggressor is. If + you are not the aggressor, then you will have support. But aggression + does not resolve international disputes. One side can stage an incident. + But generally we will know who the aggressor is.

+

+ Carvajal: In the case of Bolivia, + if we give Bolivia some territory, Bolivian territory might be + guaranteed by the American states.

+

The Secretary: I have supported Bolivia in its aspirations to the sea, + but de la Flor is not happy about it.

+

+ Carvajal: If we gave some + territory to Bolivia, and then permitted Peru to use the port, Peru + would get everything it needs.

+

The Secretary: It is my feeling Peru will not accept.

+

Pinochet: I am concerned very much by the Peruvian situation. + Circumstances might produce aggression by Peru. Why are they buying + tanks? They have heavy artillery, 155’s. Peru is more inclined to Russia + than the U.S. Russia supports their people 100%. We are behind you. You + are the leader. But you have a punitive system for your friends.

+

The Secretary: There is merit in what you say. It is a curious time in + the U.S.

+ +

Pinochet: We solved the problem of the large transnational enterprises. + We renegotiated the expropriations, and demonstrated our good faith by + making prompt payments on the indebtedness.

+

The Secretary: It is unfortunate. We have been through Viet-Nam and + Watergate. We have to wait until the elections. We welcomed the + overthrow of the Communist-inclined government here. We are not out to + weaken your position. On foreign aggression, it would be a grave + situation if one were attacked. That would constitute a direct threat to + the inter-American system.

+

+ Carvajal: There is massive Cuban + influence in Peru. Many Cubans are there. The Peruvians may be pushed. + And what happens to the thousands of Cuban soldiers now in Africa, when + they are no longer needed there.

+

The Secretary: If there are Cuban troops involved in a Peruvian attack, + then the problem is easy. We will not permit a Cuban military force of + 5,000 Cubans in Peru.

+

+ Carvajal: They now have a system, + where the Peruvians enter in groups of 20, but the Peruvian registry + registers only 1.

+

The Secretary: The Cubans are not good soldiers.

+

+ Carvajal: But there is the danger + of irresponsible attack.

+

Claro: I have sources in Peru. There is, I am told, a real chance that + Cuba could airlift troops to Peru.

+

The Secretary: This would change the situation, and the question then is + easy. We will not permit Cuba another military adventure. A war between + Peru and Chile would be a complex thing, but a war between Cuba and + Chile or others, we would not be indifferent.

+

Claro: Your planners were down here in 1974. They did not believe that + there was a Cuba threat. The Soviets use Cuba for aggression, I argued. + Angola has since confirmed this.

+

The Secretary: We will not tolerate another Cuban military move. After + the election, we will have massive trouble if they are not out of + Angola. Secondly, I also feel stronger that we can’t accept coexistence + and ideological subversion. We have the conditions now for a more + realistic policy. It would help you if you had some human rights + progress, which could be announced in packages. The most important are + the constitutional guarantees. The precise numbers of prisoners is + subordinate. Right to habeas corpus is also important. And if you could + give us advanced information of your human rights efforts, we could use + this. As to the Christian Democrats, we are not using them. I haven’t + seen one since 1969. We want to remove the weapons in the arms of our + enemies. It is a phenomenon that we deal with special severity with our + friends. I want to see our relations and friendship improve. I + encouraged the OAS to have its General + Assembly here. I knew it would + add prestige to Chile. I came for that reason. We have suggestions. We + want to help, not undermine you. You did a great service to the West in + overthrowing Allende. Otherwise + Chile would have followed Cuba. Then there would have been no human + rights or a Human Rights Commission.

+

+ Trucco: We provided the General + Assembly the answers to some of the Secretary’s suggestions. What will + be missing will be our explanation of the coming constitutional + acts.

+

The Secretary: Can you do those while the OAS is here?

+

Pinochet: We have wanted to avoid doing anything while the OAS is here, since it then looks as though + we did it to dampen OAS pressure. We + might be able to in 30 days.

+

The Secretary: If we can, we are prepared to say we have the impression + that the constitutional act is helpful.

+

Pinochet: I discussed it in my inaugural speech.

+
+ +
+ 229. Memorandum of Conversation +

Summary: Kissinger and Cardinal Silva discussed the + political and human rights situation in Chile.

+

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + P820118–1245. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Driscoll; cleared by Fimbres; approved by Rogers. + The meeting took place in the Secretary’s office. On May 29, + Rogers recommended + Kissinger meet with + Silva, given the Cardinal’s prominence as a human rights + advocate. Such a meeting would demonstrate Kissinger’s sincere interest + in the issue, Rogers + said. (Ibid., P840150–0525) At a June 25 meeting of ARA and CIA officials, a CIA official reported that “at the present there is + nothing going on with DINA; we + are providing no equipment, training or technical + support–nothing to abet repression of human rights, but if + Cardinal Silva spreads stories of CIA–DINA + collaboration, we’re in the soup.” (Memorandum of Conversation, + June 29; Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, ARA–CIA Weekly + Meetings, 1976–1977)

+ + + + + Washington, June 14, 1976, 11 a.m. + + + SUBJECT + Meeting with Raul Cardinal Silva + + + PARTICIPANTS + + + + + U.S.CHILE + + The SecretaryRaul Cardinal Silva + Under Secretary William D. + Rogers + + ARA/BC/C, Robert S. + Driscoll (notetaker) + Anthony J. Hervas (Interpreter) + + + + +

Secretary Kissinger: Do you speak + English, Your Eminence?

+

Cardinal Silva: Unfortunately, no.

+

+ Kissinger: As you know, I’ve just + come back from Chile.

+

Silva: Yes, the Ambassador called me in Panama to say that you wanted to + meet with me. I am here at your disposition this week.

+

+ Kissinger: I was very moved by + the Chilean people.

+

Silva: We are in a situation which is perhaps the most serious in our + history. Our chief is now an army general—the first in 150 years. We + have never had one before. We find ourselves greatly surprised.

+

+ Kissinger: Do these military + people have a Nazi mentality?

+

Silva: Most do not—however, the group in power does. They have found + support in a tiny fascist group in Chile.

+

+ Kissinger: It is hard for us to + judge that what is happening is not the result of previous + conditions.

+

Silva: I believe that the coup was due to the lack of political tact on + the part of the Marxists. They used, preached and glorified violence. + They declared class war—especially against Chile’s powerful middle + class. The middle class combined with the upper class and made possible the military takeover. They + managed to overcome the old tradition that the military not interfere in + politics. Once the military took power, the people did not oppose them. + The majority were not with Allende. I would say 70% of the people were against the + government.

+

+ Kissinger: Yes, but that 70% was + not united.

+

Silva: The 70% were against Salvador Allende. When the military took power the extreme right + got on the bandwagon and became the real power. Now the situation is + reversed. Now I would say that only 30% are with them. All of the + democratic forces, and this includes most of the right, and the left are + against the military. Because of this they prohibit all elections, labor + unions and other organizations. There is no possibility of doing + anything against them.

+

+ Kissinger: What do you think, + Your Eminence, should happen?

+

Silva: The military must change the manner of its behavior. Because the + military is united no one else has a chance of forcing this change. We + must return to a democratic system. We cannot expect abrupt change. It + will be gradual change. Human rights and labor rights have to be + restored. Then the military must invite all the political parties to + collaborate to restore the country.

+

+ Kissinger: Over what period of + time would this take place?

+

Silva: It is impossible to say. We are starting to hear among the + military of a debate over how the country is being run. We have the + possibility, with the help of the U.S., to influence this process.

+

+ Kissinger: How?

+

Silva: Pinochet asked through a + military friend that I help him in the U.S. I replied that Pinochet must help me to help him. + Your (U.S.) pressure must continue. You have to say, “allow us to help + you.” They have to change their manner of governing. They do not + understand the U.S. situation. Here you have to consult with the people + and you cannot do anything against the will of the people.

+

+ Kissinger: This is more or less + what I told Pinochet. The thing + that concerns me is that many people want to cut off all relations. I do + not think this will succeed. Rather, this would bring back the left wing + problem of before.

+

Silva: I do not know. The left wing is made up of friends of Allende. We do not want to help only a + small group of people. We want to be sure that we help all the people. + We want to assist the democratic forces.

+

+ Kissinger: We would have + preferred a Christian Democratic Government. But they move the same way + the Christian Democrats in Europe are moving. Their program became + indistinguishable from the Marxists. This leads to a general + demoralization.

+

Rogers: The left wing of the Christian Democrats are that way.

+ +

+ Kissinger: I have said the same + thing to His Holiness, who agreed with me.

+

Silva: I do not defend the Christian Democrats. Jaime Guzman, the + ideologue of the military, asked if the Church’s only solution is + Christian Democracy. I replied that we work within a broad Christian + framework. The Tomic program lost the election as would any similar + one.

+

+ Kissinger: What we would have + liked to have seen was a Christian Democrat win.

+

Silva: Yes, but they provided for the success of Allende. The Frei government was a lot + different from the one proposed by Rodomiro Tomic.

+

+ Kissinger: There is no question + about it. We support the return of democracy in Chile. I made that very + clear while I was there. Pinochet promised me they would publish a new + constitution very soon. But we have not seen it.

+

Silva: This could be a serious error. They do not plan to consult with + the people. What sort of constitution will that be? One without the + right to strike? But the constitution will be a step forward. It is not + important that it has some bad features because these will be shortly + changed.

+

+ Kissinger: What does Your + Eminence think we should do? You do not want us to single you out? What + concretely can we do?

+

Silva: I can suggest only part of what you might do. You have the over + all insight. You have to help the Chilean people. Many are hungry. We + have to save the organizations that are necessary for democracy. We have + to save the cooperatives and the unions. By repressing these groups the + military is giving more power to the Communists. If we do not save the + organizations—the unions and the cooperatives—in a few more years, after + the emergency period is over, the Communists will be the most powerful + group. The Church has many social action organizations. A word from you + to the foundations could save these organizations.

+

+ Kissinger: Are you going to talk + to the foundations?

+

Silva: Yes, the Ford Foundation + and the Inter-American Foundation.

+

+ Kissinger: What did they say?

+

Silva: The Ford Foundation said + that if Mr. Parker would say + something favorable, it would be very easy to provide funds.

+

+ Kissinger: Why should Parker have anything to do with it? I + know Mr. McGeorge Bundy. I shall talk to him.

+

Silva: We have a good program—a food for work program. Our organization + is not part of the government. If you could help support this, it would + be most important.

+ +

Silva: I want to talk to you about something very confidential. I want to + ask that the CIA not tell DINA that “so-and-so” is a Communist.

+

+ Kissinger: To the best of my + knowledge this is not done.

+

Silva: The Montealegre arrest was due to this. Hernan Montealegre was a + lawyer for the Solidarity Vicariate.

+

+ Kissinger: It is inconceivable. + In any large organization the reserves of stupidity seem inexhaustible. + I haven’t heard of it. It is unauthorized. I’ll have to check on it. (To + Rogers) Have you heard of this?

+

Rogers: No, especially not in this case.

+

Silva: I heard this from another Intelligence + Service, not DINA, and they tell me + that this is so.

+

+ Kissinger: I can’t guarantee it + is not true. These things normally do not come through me. If it was + true, I assure you that it will be stopped.

+

Silva: This must be handled with much discretion.

+

+ Kissinger: We are interested that + you continue as our conscience. We do not want to do anything to make + your position difficult. We shall be grateful for your suggestions from + time to time.

+

Rogers: We have seen each other from time to time.

+

+ Kissinger: We shall keep in + touch.

+

Silva: I am grateful for the chance to visit you. This gives me support. + Pinochet asked that I talk + with people in your Congress about economic assistance. We have a human + rights problem, yes, it is getting better, yes; I hope the present + situation ends. I cannot lie for these people.

+

+ Kissinger: The danger is that + Congress takes all its ideas from the Allende exiles.

+

Silva: They want a complete overthrow—this would be a worse error.

+

+ Kissinger: If you could point out + a middle course, it would be most helpful.

+

Silva: I could talk with Senator Kennedy.

+

+ Kissinger: Could we publicize + this meeting, Your Eminence?

+

Silva: Of course—that is what is needed.

+
+ +
+ 230. Transcript of a Telephone Conversation Between Secretary of State + Kissinger and the Assistant + Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Rogers) +

Summary: Rogers and Kissinger discussed comments by Deputy Permanent + Representative to the OAS + Robert White, who + expressed support for an OAS + Human Rights Commission report on Chile which concluded that + repression and torture continued despite new decrees that + supposedly guaranteed the rights of prisoners.

+

Source: Department of State, Electronic Reading Room, Kissinger Transcripts. + Unclassified. On June 15, the Washington + Post reported that Diez criticized an OAS + HRC report on Chile, noting + that it did not recognize Chilean Government initiatives to + improve human rights, leftist arms importation to Chile, open + propaganda campaigns with Chile and abroad, and the constant + threat of terrorist violence. The Post + reported that White + expressed support for a resolution praising the HRC report. (“U.S., Chile Disagree + on Rights,” Washington Post, June 15, + 1976, p. A23) Rogers + began his position as Under Secretary of State for Economic + Affairs on June 19.

+ + + + + Washington, June 16, 1976, 10:35 a.m. + +

K: That White has lashed out at + the Chileans down there. I think I have made it very clear what my + strategy is. I have not become a super liberal. This is not an + institution that is going to humiliate the Chileans.

+

R: The instructions were clear to him. This is in an effort to try + individual cases.

+

K: According to the Washington Post after the + Chileans rejected the report, he made a passionated defense of it and + then humiliated the Chileans. It is a bloody outrage.

+

R: Then he has gone beyond his instructions.

+

K: What are we going to do?

+

R: I am going to call him right now and find out exactly what + happened.

+

K: Who is White anyway?

+

R: Number 2 to Maillard.

+

K: Why don’t we get him out?

+

R: I will call him. I don’t trust [him] anyway.

+

K: I know but it was a direct quote. I understand you have been + confirmed—congratulations.

+

R: Did it happen this morning?

+

K: Yes.

+

R: And what about the others?

+

K: They all were.

+

R: Good.

+

END

+
+ +
+ 231. Memorandum From Stephen + Low of the National Security Council Staff to the + President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Scowcroft) +

Summary: Low + recommended that Scowcroft support a new $15 million contract for + spare parts for the Chilean military. Although Congress had + banned spare part sales to Chile and the Department of State + opposed the deal, Low + argued that the contract could be justified as a necessary part + of the package of transfers that Congress had allowed to go + forward.

+

Source: Ford Library, + National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for Latin + America, Box 3, Chile, 2. Confidential. Sent for action. In the + first sentence of the third paragraph, “were talking about” was + crossed out and “ruled out” was written in an unknown hand. The + last sentence on the bottom of the first page of the memorandum + was underlined. Although no record of a Kissinger-Scowcroft meeting has been + found, Scowcroft wrote + underneath his approval, “Have discussed with HAK [Kissinger]. Go ahead.” In a June 21 memorandum, + Ryan informed Acting + Secretary of State Robinson of Kissinger’s approval of the non-lethal spare + parts sale to Chile, contingent upon prior congressional + consultations. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy + File, P840037–1989)

+ + + + + Washington, June 18, + 1976. + + + SUBJECT + Chile Arms: Spare Parts Contract + +

During the Conference Committee’s consideration of the Chile arms + provision, we pushed for approval of commercial sales, continued spare + parts deliveries, training in progress, and pipeline. We pointed out + that to cut off the pipeline would involve a $25 million bill paid by + the American taxpayer. Chiefly for this reason the conference agreed to + permit pipeline deliveries and training in progress. However, it + specifically prohibited commercial sales and spare parts sales. When we + asked them to broaden it to include sales only to the Government of + Chile, thus permitting private commercial sales, they refused saying + they wanted the narrowest possible interpretation placed on the + provision.

+

The existing pipeline contracts provide for spares for one year. + Defense’s desire to conclude a new contract for $18 million would + provide follow-ons for this. Defense would be happy with what it could + get and would be willing to accept $15 million.

+

We could make the argument with Congress that the spare parts they were + talking about were for all equipment ever shipped to Chile. The contract + we want is a small one of only $15 million which will provide spare + parts specifically for the pipeline which the Congress approved. + Therefore, we are interpretating our action as carrying out the will of + Congress to deliver a viable pipeline package. Without the spare parts add-on it is quite possible + that Chile would not accept the pipeline deliveries, the contract would + be broken and the American taxpayer would have to shoulder the + burden.

+

If we go with the new contract for $18 or $15 million we will undoubtedly + get some flak. State feels it will be serious and that we will have gone + a fair distance in undermining the progress made in the last year + towards reestablishing trust between the Executive and Legislative + branches.

+

+ Les Janka, who was involved in the + negotiations on the Hill, + believes that if we take a firm position on this, explaining that we + believe that we are carrying out the intent of Congress and are open + about it, informing Senator Humphrey of what we are doing before we do it, that we + will not seriously damage our relations with the Congress.

+

Recommendation:

+

That you discuss this with Larry or with the Secretary, giving them our + assessment and recommending that State agree to a $15 million spare + parts contract, to be signed with the Chileans before enactment of this + bill.

+
+ + +
+ 232. Telegram 152569 From the Department of State to the Embassy in + Chile +

Summary: In + response to allegations by Rafael Gonzalez Verdugo, a former + Chilean intelligence officer, that U.S. officials may have been + complicit in the death of Charles + Horman, the Department instructed the Embassy to + examine his credibility and explore the possibility of arranging + for Gonzalez and his family to leave Chile.

+

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Personal Papers of Ambassador + David H. Popper, + 1968–1979: Lot 82D280, Chrons (May–Aug)—1976, Incoming + Telegrams. Confidential; Stadis. On June 10, the Washington Post published an article + based on an interview with Gonzalez. (Joanne Omang, “Chilean + Charges General Ordered American’s Death,” Washington Post, June 10, 1976, p. + A21)

+ + + + Washington, June 19, 1976, 2005Z. +

152569. Subject: Embassy Follow-up On W/W Death of US Citizen Charles Horman. Ref: Santiago 5745.

+

1. Gonzales’ reference to Horman + has revived considerable interest here in this case. It has also + prompted inquiries on whether Gonzales might not also have some + knowledge regarding the death of AmCit Frank Teruggi and about the disappearance of some + Chileans following the September 1973 coup.

+ +

2. Gonzales’ mention of Horman is + seen as the first real break in US efforts to ascertain the + circumstances surrounding the deaths of these two Americans. + Accordingly, we want energetically to take advantage of Gonzales’ + revelations to press the GOC for a + further, more comprehensive, investigation of the case. As we informed + you, Consular Officer James + Anderson has confirmed that it was Gonzales he + accompanied to the cemetery to exhume Horman’s remains. This tends to support a conclusion + that indeed Gonzales may know something about Horman’s disappearance and death. While + this may have been the extent of his contact with the Horman case, we must make certain this + is the case. Hence, you should seek to obtain as much information as + possible from Gonzales on Horman + and Teruggi while taking care not to elicit false information which + Gonzales might believe would help his case.

+

3. Likewise, regarding the alleged close involvement of US intelligence + agents with the GOC during the + aftermath of the coup, it would be helpful if we could obtain further + views from Gonzales [1½ lines not declassified]. + This will lead to further speculation on the degree of US intelligence + participation in the events immediately following the Junta’s takeover. + But again, Gonzales could try to take advantage of this line of inquiry + to increase the pressure on us to get him out.

+

4. Overall, the Department believes we have two objectives: 1) To + ascertain how much Gonzales knows regarding the deaths of two American + citizens, and, of no lesser concern, 2) The humanitarian aspect of + securing exit from Chile for the entire family, or Gonzales’ wife and US + citizen child. Accordingly, the department would like a vigorous + follow-up by the Embassy to ensure a prompt and responsive GOC reply to your note delivered June 14. + Since we want to extract as much information as possible from Gonzales, + this could be enhanced by our making every effort to secure a + safe-conduct for him and his family. We are aware that this latest + revelation diminishes his chances in this regard. This suggests + discretion on his and our part on how we handle his allegations with the + Congress and public.

+

5. In conjunction with GOC reply to your + note, we would like your comments on the above and your assessment on + how we can best proceed to achieve our objectives.

+ + + Kissinger + + +
+ +
+ + 233. Memorandum From Stephen + Low of the National Security Council Staff to the + President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Scowcroft) +

Summary: Low + recommended that Scowcroft advise Kissinger to provide the Department of State’s + authorization for the Department of Defense to negotiate an + agreement on spare parts for Chile, while simultaneously + continuing consultations with Congress.

+

Source: Ford Library, + National Security Adviser, National Security Council Latin + American Affairs Staff Files, 1974–1977, Box 1, Chile, + Political, Military, 2. Confidential. Sent for action. Scowcroft wrote “OK” on the + memorandum and initialed it. On June 22, Kissinger instructed Eagleburger to inform + Scowcroft “how + outraged I am that the Chile matter has not yet gone ahead. I + want you [Eagleburger] + to take the responsibility for getting the Department moving on + this since they are obviously dragging their feet despite + explicit instructions. I will not repeat not accept any further + procrastination or resistance. Rogers has also been instructed.” (Telegram + Hakto 4; Ibid., Trip + Briefing Books/Cables of Henry A. + Kissinger, Box 26, 6/20–28/76, Paris, Munich, + London, San Juan, P.R., HAKTO, 20)

+ + + + + Washington, June 21, + 1976. + + + SUBJECT + Chile Arms + +

The $15 million spare parts agreement with Chile is moving very slowly. + On Friday, State sent up to the Secretary an action memorandum with + three alternatives:

+ + —to disapprove it, + —to approve it without consultation with the Congress, or + —to consult with Senators Humphrey, Case, and McGee, and Congressmen Morgan and Fascell. If they were favorable, to authorize + Defense to enter into the agreement. + +

He approved the last of these.

+

Today (Monday, June 21) Chuck Robinson went up to see Senator Humphrey. They had a long conversation + on the matter. Humphrey was not + enthusiastic, but he was not entirely negative and seemed willing to go + along provided he was convinced it was necessary. Humphrey posed three questions:

+ + —whether the spare parts could not be obtained from other + countries like Israel, + —whether the pipeline itself could be repackaged to include the + spare parts and stay within the $112 million total, and + —exactly what was in the pipeline and spare parts package? + +

+ Robinson was not able to provide + answers on these questions. He is telegraphing the Secretary tonight + with a report on the meeting and will await the Secretary’s response + before deciding whether to go back to Humphrey + with more information; whether to check with the other Senators and + Congressmen named in the memorandum; and whether to authorize Defense to + proceed.

+

The Security Assistance Bill will be passed by the House and the Senate + on Tuesday, the 22nd. I understand there is some pressure to get an + early signature by the President. At best, I suppose that could not be + until early the week of the 29th. Nevertheless, if Defense is to work + out this agreement with the Chileans, it must act immediately. Not only + does the agreement have to be negotiated, but the Chileans must get + approval from Santiago. All of this must be completed and a final + document signed before the bill is signed by the President. Unless + Defense is authorized to proceed by State within the next day or two, I + do not believe there is any chance of getting the $15 million spare + parts package.

+

Recommendation:

+

I therefore suggest you wire the Secretary separately pointing out to him + that unless he instructs State to authorize Defense to negotiate the + agreement while simultaneously carrying on the consultations with + Congress, there is no possibility of getting this agreement.

+
+ +
+ 234. Telegram 158555/Tosec 170316 From the Department of State to + Secretary of State Kissinger + +

Summary: In order to avoid alienating Senator Humphrey, Robinson recommended that + Kissinger approve a + $6 million agreement for aircraft spare parts for Chile as + opposed to two open-ended $3 million contracts.

+

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + P760110–0978. Secret; Immediate. Sent for action. Drafted by + Robinson, Jenkins, and Shlaudeman; cleared by + McCloskey and + Jordan; approved by + Robinson. Kissinger was in the United + Kingdom for meetings with Callaghan and Crosland. Kissinger approved Recommendation A. The first + sentences of paragraphs one and three were underlined, as was + the phrase, “cancel the letters of authority,” in the first + sentence of paragraph nine. A notation on the front of the + telegram reads: “SECTO 17079 + answers 6/27.” Secto 17079 from Dorado June 28, transmitting the + Secretary’s approval of Recommendation A, is ibid., + D760249–0371.

+ + + + + Washington, June 26, 1976, 0156Z. + +

158555. Tosec 170316. Subject: Security Assistance to + Chile. For the Secretary from Robinson.

+ +

The Problem:

+

1. Humprey is most unhappy about the spare parts package. He thinks we + did not deal fairly with him. The $9 million in aircraft spares is + apparently acceptable, but the $6 million in army and navy spares now + reprogrammed into the pipeline came under highly critical examination by + Humphrey’s staff. We could + cancel these latter signed contracts (which we can legally do) and + probably retain Humphrey’s good + will, although at cost to our relations with Chile. Or, we can go ahead + as planned, alienating Humphrey + and risking Senate action to retaliate, perhaps within the + appropriations bill for 1977.

+

Discussion:

+

2. Senator Humphrey and his staff + have reacted vigorously and critically to our decision to go ahead with + the spare parts package for Chile. Humphrey and Kennedy are quoted in today’s Washington Post as complaining that we are rushing spare parts + deal through as last-ditch effort to beat Congressional ban. Post quotes “It is a shoddy deal, said Humphrey angrily.”

+

3. In phone conversation this morning with Humphrey, he urged me to reconsider the $6 million army + and navy spare package, which he emphasized was a direct flaunting of + the expressed intent of the conference to suspend future spare parts + sales. The air force segment ($9 million) he indicated was at least a + logical extension of the pipeline F–5 sales, but the army/navy package + was not even support for pipeline material. Humphrey urges that we cancel the army/navy LOA’s and + substitute $6 million of the air force component into the pipeline. Then + he said, he believed there would be little opposition to the remaining + incremental $3.2 million spare package which would be strictly support + items for the F–5 pipeline sales. This process would assuage Humphrey’s irritation and be seen as a + fair compromise.

+

4. Humphrey told McCloskey in a telephone call + yesterday his considerable disappointment that we had decided to go + ahead before he could examine all the facts and make a recommendation. + His staff subsequently focused on two criticisms: that we sought the + Senator’s advice but gave him no real chance to give it; and that the $6 + million of spare parts for the army and the navy now reprogrammed into + the pipeline relates to equipment the Chileans have had for some time, + and not to items in the existing pipeline. This, they asserted, is + clearly contrary to the intent of the Congress and not what he had + understood from our briefing.

+

5. We now face leaving Humphrey + with a sense of having been dealt with in a less than candid fashion. + Considerable Congressional flack can be expected in any case. But + Humphrey feels that he did + the administration a service in saving the Chilean pipeline from + Kennedy’s assault, and serious damage to our + relationship could result if he were to be left with sense of having + been badly aggrieved. It should be noted that the security assistance + legislation (appropriations) is not yet out of the Senate. If we lose + Humphrey, there is the + chance that Kennedy might yet be + able to mobilize enough votes to punish our programs, even though the + Chilean package would probably survive.

+

6. On the other side, the Chileans have now signed the letters of offer + reprogramming the $6 million of nonpipeline spares into the pipeline. + The Chilean army and navy regard these spare parts as critical. If we + cancel, there will be a strong reaction from Santiago. Humphrey’s formula would mean deletion + of $6.0 million in army and navy spares which were not in the original + pipeline, are not related to the pipelined aircraft and which we in + State were not aware were unrelated to the pipelined aircraft until + yesterday. It would also delete the $6.0 million in trucks which were in + the original pipeline but which the Chileans can purchase from other + sources. As you know, the prospects for working out a constructive + relationship with the Chilean Government and of obtaining significant + progress on human rights are fading as the Chileans perceive US as + taking a series of hostile or retaliatory actions.

+

7. Although perhaps difficult for the Chileans to believe, it is the + case, however, that they were most fortunate that the pipeline was + preserved. As matters stand, we will be able to deliver the aircraft + they want above all else—and to provide the $9.2 million supplemental + package of aircraft spares. We would probably be able in time to bring + them to the realization that the loss of the spares for the army and the + navy could be considered of minor importance compared with the threat of + losing the F–5’s.

+

8. I have discussed this with Scowcroft who agrees that a viable relationship with + Humphrey is too important to + jeopardize for the sake of preserving $6 million in spare parts for + Chile not related to aircraft.

+

+ 9. Recommendations:

+

a) That we act expeditiously as urged by Humphrey to cancel the two letters of authority with the + Chileans (which we can legally do) which provide the Chilean army and + navy with approximately $3 million each of open-ended spare part + requisitional authority for established inventory equipment and + substitute $6 million of aircraft spares. With the incremental spares + package of $3.2 million we would cover the $9.2 million total + requirement of spares for pipelined aircraft.

+

b) Alternatively, we can sit tight, absorb whatever flack we get and hope + that Congressional irritation will be manageable.

+

c) Or, cancel the $6 million army/navy spare LOA’s and reinsert the $6 + million original order for trucks in the pipeline. This would leave us + with an incremental aircraft spare package of $9.2 million.

+
+ +
+ 235. Telegram 6507 From the Embassy in Chile to the Department of + State +

Summary: The + Embassy reported that top Chilean officials signaled their + displeasure over U.S. Government aid restrictions by not attending a reception in + honor of the U.S. bicentennial.

+

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + D760260–0864. Limited Official Use. On July 1, the Department + informed the Embassy of the limitations imposed on Chile by the + Security Assistance Act, signed by Ford on June 30. The Act prohibited military + assistance, including education, training, credits, and cash + sales. In addition, it capped economic assistance at $27.5 + million for FY 1977. (Telegram + 163805 to Santiago, July 1; ibid., D760255–0646) On July 2, + Cauas stated that + because the limitation on economic assistance had been expected, + and the amounts were small, the limitation would not affect the + Chilean economy. (Telegram 6661 from Santiago, July 9; ibid., + D760265–0557)

+ + + + + Santiago, July 6, 1976, 1954Z. + +

6507. Subject: Chileans Show Their Resentment Over Aid Cuts.

+

1. Summary: Chileans give vent to their displeasure over restrictions on + U.S. military and economic assistance by petty discourtesies. End + summary.

+

2. For local reasons, Ambassador hosted large Embassy bicentennial + reception July 2 rather than the fourth. That same morning, local press + carried word that President Ford + had signed security assistance act. News articles recapitulated effect + of act on economic and military assistance for Chile.

+

3. Embassy reception was characterized by massive “no shows” among GOC hierarchy. President Pinochet had regretted previous day. + Almost entirely without sending regrets, none of his advisory staff + attended; Foreign Minister and Under Secretary were only cabinet or + sub-cabinet members present; and army and navy each sent only one + low-level representative. On other hand, junta member and air force + CINC, General Leigh, and most other air force + officers invited were present, undoubtedly because aircraft are the only + major hardware items still to be delivered to Chile. From reliable + sources we have heard that orders re GOC attendance at reception went out to officials during + day July 2.

+

4. Attendance by hundreds of non-governmental figures, lower-level + government officials, and press and media was excellent. For first time + in our memory, Cardinal Silva was present.

+

5. We gather from local press that President Pinochet sent message of congratulation to President + Ford. Foreign Ministry’s + note of good wishes to President Ford, the Secretary and Ambassador was received in + Embassy, signed only by Chief of Protocol.

+ +

6. We will watch carefully to see whether Chileans follow up with + substantive retaliatory measures.

+ + + Popper + + +
+ +
+ 236. Memorandum of Conversation +

Summary: During a meeting with Scowcroft and Merino on the issue of spare + parts for military equipment purchased from the United States, + Trucco discussed + improvements in Chile’s human rights record.

+

Source: Ford Library, + National Security Adviser, Memoranda of Conversations, Box 20, + July 12, 1976, Scowcroft, + Chilean Admiral Jose Toribio Merino. Confidential. The meeting + took place in Scowcroft’s + office at the White + House. In a July 9 memorandum, Brownell informed Scowcroft that Merino would want to discuss congressional + restrictions on arms sales to Chile; the pipeline of arms sales + to Chile; and the Chilean Government’s human rights practices. + (Ibid., Presidential Country Files for Latin America, Box 3, + Chile, 3)

+ + + + + Washington, July 12, 1976, 3 p.m. + + + PARTICIPANTS + + Brent Scowcroft, Assistant + to the President for National Security Affairs + Admiral Jose Toribio Merino, Chilean Junta Member + Manuel Trucco, Chilean + Ambassador to the United States + Rear Admiral Ronald McIntyre, Chilean Naval Attaché + + Mary Brownell, NSC Staff (Notetaker) + +

Admiral Merino said Chile is + grateful for what the United States has done for it. He pointed out, + however, that there is a continuing problem which the United States must + resolve with regard to the supply of naval spares to maintain + deteriorating equipment previously purchased from the United States. + Chile can buy the materials abroad but they are much, much more + expensive. He noted that the United States supplies Argentina and Peru, + but not Chile.

+

+ Scowcroft noted that this is a + very difficult situation for us because the supply of military equipment + to Chile has become a highly emotional issue with the Congress.

+

+ Merino expressed concern about + the possibility of a Peruvian attack against Chile, noting that Peru has + vastly superior military forces and equipment and is receiving Soviet + and Cuban support. He added that if Chile should be attacked, we could + expect increasing problems also in neighboring nations such as + Argentina, Uruguay, Bolivia, and Peru.

+ +

+ Scowcroft said we have done the + best we could for Chile and in fact had come out better than we had + expected earlier in the year would be possible. We were able to get the + pipeline approved. He added that our worst problems with the Congress + may have passed and some additional movement may be possible later in + the year. He also noted that we are aware the Chileans have taken some + positive steps. We are aware of Chile’s problems and of their needs and + would be willing to do what we can to help Chile acquire these needed + spares elsewhere if that would be useful.

+

Ambassador Trucco returned to the + mention of positive actions which have been taken by Chile and said that + Chile will be doing more. Within 35 days he expects new constitutional + acts to be issued which will contain human rights protections. He also + brought up the Harkin Amendment + requiring the United States to vote negatively in international + financial institutions against loans to countries that have been + sanctioned on human rights and do not cooperate with the UN or the OAS on human rights. He stressed that Chile has not been + sanctioned and pointed to debate on the issue at the OAS General Assembly in Santiago as + evidence Chile is cooperating with the OAS. Chile is still talking with the UN regarding a possible Working Group + visit, but the Working Group is trying to make it as difficult as + possible for Chile to accept a visit by taking actions such as + scheduling its first meeting on the Chile human rights question in + Mexico—the only country which refused to attend the General Assembly. He + handed Scowcroft a copy of a + letter to the President of the UN + Commission on Human Rights seeking to stop that meeting in Mexico. The + Ambassador said Chile is trying to keep open the possibility of a + meeting with the Working Group, which would help solve the problem for + the United States as well as for Chile.

+

In response to comments on Cuban presence in Peru, Scowcroft noted that any information on + this subject would be helpful to us. While we have heard reports of + Cuban military presence, we have no confirmation of anything that would + approach the numbers mentioned.

+

Admiral Merino expressed + appreciation for the meeting.

+
+ +
+ 237. Telegram 184182 From the Department of State to the Embassy in + Chile +

Summary: The + Department reported on a conversation with Trucco, in which the + Ambassador said that the Chilean Government was examining the + desirability of continuing to receive U.S. economic assistance + since the amount involved was relatively small and receiving + aid subjected Chile to + congressional scrutiny.

+

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + D760286–0236. Confidential; Priority. Drafted and approved by + Shlaudeman. In + telegram 7172 from Santiago, July 22, Popper reported that the + Chilean Government appeared to be reviewing its economic + relations with the United States in light of the restrictions + imposed by the Security Assistance Act. (Ibid., + D760283–0096)

+ + + + + Washington, July 24, 1976, 1853Z. + +

184182. Subject: GOC Review of + Chilean-US Economic Relations. Ref: Santiago 7172.

+

1. During the course of a wide-ranging talk on July 22, Trucco told me that the GOC was examining the desirability of + continuing to receive U.S. bilateral economic assistance. He noted that + the amount is small and the problem large inasmuch as the Congress + focuses on Chile as an aid recipient. + He suggested that it might be better to dispense with such assistance + altogether.

+

2. I replied that the problem in part seemed to lie in an impression + among some members of Congress that our aid to Chile over these last three years has been + disproportionately large when compared with assistance levels for other + Latin American countries. With the Chilean level now coming more into + line with others, I thought the difficulty would diminish. I added that + we hoped to contribute in a modest fashion to Chile’s efforts to + reconstruct her economy.

+

3. Comment: I suspect this is what the review reported in the reftel is + about. I think we should let the Chileans make their own decision on + this point, although we can’t be sure there is any real seriousness to + it. They could just be showing their pique over the arms embargo + again.

+

4. We will report on the rest of the conversation with Trucco by septel.

+ + + Robinson + + +
+ +
+ 238. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for + Inter-American Affairs (Shlaudeman) to Secretary of State Kissinger + +

Summary: Shlaudeman reported to Kissinger that the military + regimes of the Southern Cone had coordinated intelligence + activities, including finding and killing subversives located in + their countries and Europe.

+

Sources: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + P760138–0562. Secret; Noforn; No contract. Drafted by Proper and Luers on August 2. On July 30, + CIA officials informed + ARA officials that while + Operation Condor was originally developed to exchange + intelligence information between the Southern Cone nations, it + was emerging as an organization that identified, located, and + assassinated guerrilla leaders. The CIA characterized this development as “an + understandable reaction to the increasingly extra-national, + extreme, and effective range of the Junta’s activities,” but + noted that such activities were bound to complicate U.S. + relations with the security services, adding that it would be + necessary to handle requests for information from those services + “far more gingerly.” (Memorandum for the Record, August 3; + Department of State, INR/IL + Historical Files, ARA–CIA Weekly Meetings, 1976–1977) In + telegram 178852 to all American Republic diplomatic posts, July + 20, the Department transmitted an INR report on the possibility of an + intergovernmental assassination plot involving Southern Cone + security forces; the report concluded that “the evidence + supporting such speculation is scanty.” (National Archives, RG + 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D760279–0200)

+ + + + + Washington, August 3, + 1976. + +

+ ARA Monthly Report (July) + The “Third World War” and South America

+

The military regimes of the Southern Cone of South America see themselves + as embattled:

+

—on one side by international Marxism and its terrorist exponents, + and

+

—on the other by the hostility of the uncomprehending industrial + democracies misled by Marxist propaganda.

+

In response they are banding together in what may well become a political + bloc of some cohesiveness. But, more significantly, they are joining + forces to eradicate “subversion”, a word which increasingly translates + into non-violent dissent from the left and center left. The security + forces of the southern cone

+

—now coordinate intelligence activities closely;

+

—operate in the territory of one another’s countries in pursuit of + “subversives”;

+

—have established Operation Condor to find and + kill terrorists of the “Revolutionary Coordinating Committee” in their + own countries and in Europe. Brazil is cooperating short of murder + operations.

+ +

This siege mentality shading into paranoia is perhaps the natural result + of the convulsions of recent years in which the societies of Chile, + Uruguay and Argentina have been badly shaken by assault from the extreme + left. But the military leaders, despite near decimation of the Marxist + left in Chile and Uruguay, along with accelerating progress toward that + goal in Argentina, insist that the threat remains and the war must go + on. Some talk of the “Third World War”, with the countries of the + southern cone as the last bastion of Christian civilization.

+

Somewhat more rationally,

+

—they consider their counter-terrorism every bit as justified as Israeli + actions against Palestinian terrorists; and

+

—they believe that the criticism from democracies of their war on + terrorism reflects a double standard.

+

The result of this mentality, internally, is to magnify the isolation of + the military institutions from the civilian sector, thus narrowing the + range of political and economic options.

+

The broader implications for us and for future trends in the hemisphere + are disturbing. The use of bloody counterterrorism by these regimes + threatens their increasing isolation from the West and the opening of + deep ideological divisions among the countries of the hemisphere. An + outbreak of PLO-type terrorism on a worldwide scale in response is also + a possibility. The industrial democracies would be the battlefield.

+

This month’s trends paper attempts for the first time to focus on + long-term dangers of a right-wing bloc. Our initial policy + recommendations are:

+

—To emphasize the differences between the six countries at every + opportunity.

+

—To depoliticize human rights.

+

—To oppose rhetorical exaggerations of the “Third-World-War” type.

+

—To bring the potential bloc-members back into our cognitive universe + through systematic exchanges.

+

Security Cooperation is a Fact

+

There is extensive cooperation between the security/intelligence + operations of six governments: Argentina, Brazil, Bolivia, Chile, + Paraguay, and Uruguay. Their intelligence services hold formal meetings + to plan “Operation Condor.” It will include extensive FBI-type exchanges of information on shady + characters. There are plans for a special communications network. These + details are still secret, but broad security cooperation is not. + Officials in Paraguay and Argentina have told us that they find it + necessary to cooperate with each other and their neighbors against + internationally-funded terrorists and “subversives.”

+ +

+ The problem begins with the definition of + “subversion”—never the most precise of terms. One reporter + writes that subversion “has grown to include nearly anyone who opposes + government policy.” In countries where everyone knows that subversives + can wind up dead or tortured, educated people have an understandable + concern about the boundaries of dissent. The concern doubles when there + is a chance of persecution by foreign police acting on indirect, unknown + information. Numerous Uruguayan refugees have been murdered in + Argentina, and there are widespread accusations that Argentine police + are doing their Uruguayan colleagues a favor. These accusations are at + least credible, whether or not they are exact.

+

The Nature of the Left-Extreme Threat: A “Third + World War”?

+

Uruguayan Foreign Minister Blanco—one of the brighter and normally steadier members + of the group—was the first to describe the campaign against terrorists + as a “Third World War.” The description is interesting for two + reasons:

+

—It justifies harsh and sweeping “wartime” measures.

+

—It emphasizes the international and institutional aspect, thereby + justifying the exercise of power beyond national borders.

+

+ The threat is not imaginary. It may be + exaggerated. This is hard to suggest to a man like Blanco, who believes—probably + correctly—that he and his family are targeted. One must admire his + personal courage.

+

Even by objective standards, the terrorists have had substantial + accomplishments over the years:

+

—At one time or other, urban and rural guerrillas have created severe + problems for almost every South American government, including those + where democracy is still surviving.

+

—They have provoked repressive reactions, including torture and + quasi-governmental death squads. (The guerrillas typically claimed to + welcome repression, but we wonder if they really like what they + got.)

+

—They still pose a serious threat in Argentina and—arguably—a lesser + problem in two or three other countries.

+

—There is a terror-oriented “Revolutionary Coordinating Junta”, possibly + headquartered in Paris, which is both a counterpart of and an incentive + for cooperation between governments.

+

+ Nevertheless, it is also true that, broadly speaking, + both terrorists and the peaceful Left have failed. This is true + even in the minds of studious revolutionaries. Che Guevara’s romantic + fiasco crushed hopes for rural revolution. Allende’s fall is taken (perhaps pessimistically) as + proving that the electoral route cannot work. Urban guerrillas collapsed + in Brazil with Carlos Marighela and in Uruguay with the Tupamaros. The + latter represented a high-water mark. Their solid, efficient structure + posed a real wartime + threat. Probably the military believe that torture was indispensable to + crack this structure.

+

There is still a major campaign in Argentina. We expect the military to + pull up their socks and win. They have precedents to guide them, and the + terrorists have no handy refuge in neighboring countries.

+

What will remain is a chain of governments, started by Brazil in 1964, + whose origin was in battle against the extreme left. It is important to + their ego, their salaries, and their equipment-budgets to believe in a + Third World War. At best, when Argentina stabilizes, we can hope to + convince them that they have already won. The warriors will not like + this. They already snicker at us for being worried about kid stuff like + drug-smuggling when there is a real military campaign going on. They + accuse us of applauding the defeat of terrorism in Entebbe but not in + Montevideo. Our differing perceptions of the threat + are raising suspicions about our “reliability.” +

+

What the Right-Wing Regimes Have in Common

+

These governments are reactive: they derived their initial legitimacy + from a reaction against terrorism, left-extremism, instability, and (as + they see it) Marxism. Thus, “anti-Marxism” is a moral + and political force. +

+

+ There is also an ideology that is more positive in + origin: that of national development. +

+

—The vision of nation has been as effective in South America as it was in + Europe. (It may yet turn out to be as destructive; this paper looks only + briefly at the potential for conflicts between Latin nations and blocs.) + Military establishments, traditional protectors of boundaries and national integrity, are in a position to + profit from the new nationalism.

+

—Economic development is a pressing need and a public demand. Disciplined + military establishments can work with technocrats to produce economic + development. In the countries we are considering, the military is always + the strongest national institution—sometimes almost the only one. It + has, typically, saved the nations from civilian chaos.

+

+ National developmentalism is therefore real medicine, + closer to most citizens than trendy left or right-wing causes. + To this extent, military power can find a popular base.

+

National developmentalism has obvious and bothersome parallels to + National Socialism. Opponents of the military regimes call them fascist. + It is an effective pejorative, the more so because it can be said to be + technically accurate. But it is a pejorative. + These days, to call a man fascist is not primarily to describe his + economic views.

+

In practice, the military regimes tend to be full of the same + inconsistencies that characterize non-military, pragmatic, + non-ideological regimes.

+ +

—Local political institutions are (reasonably) considered to have been a + failure, and it is suggested that “democracy doesn’t work for us.” + Leaders want to build more efficient institutions, to organize their + societies entirely differently. Yet there is, at some level of + consciousness, an acceptance that democracy is the ideal eventually to + be sought.

+

—No other institution is allowed to challenge military power, yet + political parties and courts often exist and perform some valid + functions. Brazil’s toothless parliament, for example, does cautiously + articulate public opinion and provide a dormant alternative to military + rule.

+

—Insecure, repressive governments nevertheless allow substantial + “democratic” freedoms, including varying degrees of freedom of + expression. The ambiente is more like Washington + than Moscow. You can buy a good newspaper, a pair of decadently-flowered + blue jeans, a girlie magazine, or a modern painting.

+

—These military regimes do not expect to last + forever. There is no thought of a Thousand-Year Reich, no + pretense of having arrived at ultimate Marxist-style truth.

+

+ From the standpoint of our policy, the most important + long-term characteristic of these regimes may be precisely that they + are reversible, in both theory and practice. They know it. But + they do not know what to do about it. Political and social development + lag. Long after left-wing threats are squashed, the regimes are still + terrified of them. Fighting the absent pinkos remains a central goal of + national security. Threats and plots are discovered. Some “mistakes” are + made by the torturers, who have difficulty finding logical victims. + Murder squads kill harmless people and petty thieves. When elections are + held, the perverse electorate shows a desire to put the military out of + power. Officers see the trend ending with their own bodies on the + rack.

+

No more elections for a while.

+

We do not suggest that there is a hopelessly vicious circle. Since some + of these regimes are producing really solid economic successes, the + officers may eventually trust civilians to succeed them and provide an + honorable exit. So far, the military has found it easier to ride the + tiger than to dismount. When an alternative government eventually has to + be found, it might be that the only one available will be at the far + left.

+

But There Are Also Leading Differences.

+

In discussing the general characteristics of the southern military + regimes, we have made some indefensibly broad generalizations. The + following is an attempt to correct the worst distortions, + country-by-country. It is important to be clear about the differences + because, for reasons we shall develop later, our policy should be to + emphasize what the countries do not have in + common rather than what they do.

+ +

The front-burner cases are Argentina, Chile, and Uruguay.

+

+ Argentina is the most interesting, both because it + is important and because the directions of the new regime are not clear. + The Argentines are politically sophisticated like the Brazilians, but + unlike the Brazilians, the Argentines lack social and even military + unity. To recover economically, they must break the power of traditional + structures, and especially of the labor movement. There is also a + genuine challenge from left-wing terrorists and right-wing + counter-terror. The problem approaches civil-war dimensions. We believe + that the Brazilian model will prevail. In the long run, thus, we think + the military will win. Videla—or + his successor—will have more trouble with hard-line military officers + and right-wing terror than with the left. Forces probably connected to + the regime have already been killing exiles and priests, among + others.

+

+ Chile has been the subject of so much action + lately that you probably do not need to hear any more. The Chileans have + smashed the Left almost as thoroughly as the Brazilians, but the + repressive apparatus is much more unrestrained. There is no one at the + top like Geisel who even seems to + wish to moderate human-rights abuses. The Santiago regime provides the + archetype of the reasoning that criticism of torture can come only from + international Marxist plotters. The military seem particularly insecure + and isolated, even with respect to the Chilean public.

+

+ Uruguay is the third pressing case (with Argentina + and Chile). Foreign Minister Blanco was the first to talk about the “Third World + War,” and he still insists that the threat continues high in his + country. Given this picture, Uruguay is, of course, eager to cooperate + with its neighbors in defensive measures. Nevertheless, unlike the + Chileans, the Uruguayans have maintained some sense of proportion about + human rights and international public opinion. Civilians are up front in + the government, give the military substantial support, and interact + relatively well.

+

+ Brazil: We can and should relate to Brazil as an + emerging world power rather than as a trouble-spot. Yet its 1964 + “revolution” is the basic model for its neighbors. The biggest problem + is that, despite remarkable successes, the Brazilian armed services + still cannot find a way to relax their hold on power. On the other hand, + they are not much worried about it. They have been able to tap civilian + talent for economic purposes. The Left is smashed, but it is not clear + whether the President can control the zeal of his security forces. + Attempts at political distensão have largely + flopped. (The word carries both the English sense of “distending”, or + enlarging authority from a narrow military base, and the French sense of + “relaxing”. Better than détente?) Brazil, like the other large + countries, does see itself as a world actor, and this inhibits + extremism.

+ +

+ Bolivia is an interesting case but not a hot + problem. This is the scene of one of the three genuine social + revolutions in Latin America—which makes it all the more puzzling that + Che Guevara thought he had a contribution to make. Despite his failure, + he left lasting worries. The Bolivians still consider that Che’s death + makes them a target of revenge for international terrorists. We cannot + quite perceive the same menace. In Bolivian terms, the government is + notably stable and economically successful. It has been moderate on + human rights.

+

+ Paraguay is marching to the same tune as its + neighbors but is a mile behind. This is the kind of nineteenth-century + military regime that looks good on the cartoon page. Paraguay, however, + has eminently sound reasons for being backward and is not in the least + apologetic. The Paraguayans remember that, in the Chaco War, they fought + off the massively superior armed forces of three neighbors for a + ridiculously long time. Pride was saved, if nothing else. There is no + democratic tradition whatever. The government has reacted to fear of the + left rather than the kind of specific challenge posed in the other + countries.

+

A Political Bloc In Formation?

+

If police-type cooperation evolves into formation of a political bloc, + our interests will be involved in ways that are new for South America. + Such a bloc is not here yet. The conditions for + its formation are largely present: +

+

—The conviction that an international leftist threat amounts to a “World + War” and hence requires an alliance.

+

—Highly compatible philosophies and political objectives in other + respects.

+

—Improved transport and communication between neighboring countries, + which previously had better links with the U.S. and Europe than with + each other.

+

—A suspicion that even the U.S. has “lost its will” to stand firm against + communism because of Viet-Nam, détente, and social decay.

+

—Resentment of human rights criticism, which is often taken as just one + more sign of the commie encirclement.

+

—Exclusion by the military of the civilian, democratic interplay which + helps to maintain a sense of proportion.

+

There are a few inhibitions on formation of a bloc. Nationalistic + thinking is the obvious one. Traditional feuds have largely shaped the + sense of nation. With the exception of the Peru/Chile tension, however, + border disputes are no longer an overriding factor in the southern + cone.

+

To predict a political bloc would still be speculative. Common sense + could assert itself. There is plenty of it available in these countries + and even some in their armies. We do think that the trend toward bloc + thinking is present, clear, and troublesome.

+ +

If a Bloc Does Form . . .

+

In the early stages, we will be a “casual beneficiary” (as one reporter + puts it) for reasons that are too obvious to need elaboration here. On + the main East-West stage, right-wing regimes can hardly tilt toward the + Soviets and Cubans. The fact that we are an + apparent beneficiary can easily lull us into trouble, as has + historically been the case in this hemisphere.

+

But we would expect a range of growing problems. Some are already with + us. Internationally, the Latin generals look like our guys. We are + especially identified with Chile. It cannot do us any good. Europeans, + certainly, hate Pinochet & + Co. with a passion that rubs off on us.

+

More problems are on the schedule:

+

—Human rights abuses, as you know, are creating more and more problems of + conscience, law, and diplomacy.

+

—Chile’s black-sheep status has already made trouble for its economic + recovery. The farther to the right the drift goes in other countries, + the more difficulties we can expect in our economic links with them.

+

—We would like to share with, say, the Brazilians a perception that we + are natural allies. Brazilian participation in a right-wing bloc would + make this unlikely.

+

—Eventually, we could even see serious strains with the democracies + farther north. Orfila has told + us that he thinks a confrontation is possible. Uruguay and Venezuela + have just broken relations over an incident involving political asylum. + A precedent?

+

+ Over the horizon, there is a chance of serious + world-scale trouble. This is speculative but no longer + ridiculous. The Revolutionary Coordinating Junta now seems to have its + headquarters in Paris, plus considerable activity in other European + capitals. With terrorists being forced out of Argentina, their + concentration in Europe (and possibly the U.S.) will increase.

+

+ The South American regimes know about this. They are + planning their own counter-terror operations in Europe. + Argentina, Chile, and Uruguay are in the lead; Brazil is wary but is + providing some technical support.

+

The next step might be for the terrorists to undertake a worldwide attack + on embassies and interests of the six hated regimes. The PLO has shown + the way. We can picture South American activities on a comparable scale, + again using the industrial democracies as a battlefield. The + impossibility of peaceful change will radicalize exiles who might, in + earlier days, have looked forward to returning home peacefully.

+

Our Response: How to end the Third World War.

+

Till now, though we have tried to exercise a moderating influence, we + have not taken a long-term strategic view of the problems that a right-wing bloc would create. + This paper has tried for a sharper focus. We shall have more + recommendations in months to come, but the following are a fair + start:

+

1) Distinguish between countries with special + care. If we treat them as a whole, we will be encouraging them to view + themselves as an embattled bloc. In our dealings with each country and + in Congressional testimony, we should, for example, reflect recognition + that:

+

—Argentina, with its virtual civil war, faces a problem much different + from its neighbors.

+

—Uruguay, with its substantial remnants of military/civilian interplay, + is not comparable to Chile.

+

—Brazil has the weight, sophistication, and world-perspective to share + many of our concerns.

+

Our military-sales programs may also provide an opportunity for + distinction. Aid no longer provides significant leverage. There is vast + interest in overall economic relations—but not much freedom of + movement.

+

2) Try to get the politics and ideology out of human + rights. This objective will be hard to reconcile with the + equally pressing need to multilateralize our concern. To avoid charges + of “intervention,” we must increasingly work through the Inter-American + Human Rights Commission. The countries that support us there, however, + will tend to be democracies (and perhaps one or two radical Caribbean + governments). Right-wing regimes will feel besieged. Ideally, we should + keep one or more of them with us. If that is impossible (as now seems + likely), we should take special care to make clear + that authoritarian regimes of the right have no monopoly on + abuses. (Your Santiago speech had the right balance).

+

3) Oppose Rhetorical exaggerations—there and here.

+

—Make clear in our South American dealings that the “Third World War” + idea is overdrawn and leads to dangerous consequences.

+

—In Congressional testimony here, stress that the threat is real for a + country like Argentina.

+

4) Bring them back to our cognitive universe. But + how? Our Embassy in La Paz has recommended that we exchange intelligence + briefings with the Bolivians. This might provide a way to reach + suspicious military officers and work on their “Third World War” + syndrome. But there are hazards. We would fail to produce information + sustaining their thesis, and they might conclude that we were badly + informed or uncooperative. Instead, we think we should work on + systematic mid-level exchanges—something more than exchanges of + information on terrorists. We need to achieve a perception that neither + détente nor distensão is a threat to the + legitimacy of friendly regimes.

+

In time, perhaps we can convince them that a Third World War is + undesirable.

+
+ +
+ 239. Telegram 7720 From the Embassy in Chile to the Department of + State +

Summary: Although + the Chilean Government had tried to convey the impression that + the rule of law guided the detention of political prisoners, the + Embassy reported that the authorities increasingly picked up and + held, or disposed of persons perceived to be a threat to the + regime.

+

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + D760306–0874. Confidential; Priority. In telegram 6573 from + Santiago, July 7, the Embassy reported on the possible existence + of clandestine detention centers. (Ibid., + D760262–0206)

+ + + + + Santiago, August 9, 1976, 2250Z. + +

7720. Subject: Illegal Detentions and Disappearances: Chile. Ref: + Santiago 7212 and Previous.

+

1. Summary: In recent months the GOC has + tried to convey the impression that the detention of political prisoners + takes place in accordance with pertinent laws and decrees under its + state of siege authority. It has also sought to convince observers that + the number of persons held on internal security grounds has declined. In + fact, relatively few cases of such detention have recently been + publicized. Reports of mistreatment of detainees have also decreased. + But we have evidence—which is growing in quantity and detail—that the + Government is resorting increasingly to an alternative procedure: + picking up and holding, or otherwise disposing of persons who are then + said to have “disappeared.” This evidence cannot be made public for + security reasons; nevertheless, the GOC + is widely known to be acting in disregard of its own laws. A prime + example of the current tactics is afforded by the case of the Budnik + brothers, who we now know are in DINA’s hands. End summary.

+

2. Official, publicized detentions: beginning in September 1974 with + President Pinochet’s “challenge” + to the USSR and Cuba to release + political prisoners, the GOC has first + frequently and then irregularly made public statistics on the number of + people detained under state of siege authority and thus to be held + indefinitely without judicial proceedings; those in process of being + tried; and those already tried and serving sentences (our categories I, + II and III respectively). All were considered internal security cases, + although many category II and III cases were prosecuted under regular + arms control legislation.

+

3. From February 1976 on, the GOC + apparently began making a determined effort to reduce state of siege + detention cases (category I) to a minimum—first, by taking in few new + detainees, and since May, by releasing a considerable number of + detainees in country or into exile. They can thus claim, as they do, + that the GOC is now holding only a few more than 400 “political + prisoners.” At the same time, the 3,000 plus persons undergoing trial or + already convicted (categories II and III) have simply dropped out of + Government public statistics, although statistical information can be + acquired by interested parties.

+

4. Disappearances: as the Department is aware, “disappearances” continue. + The number of persons who disappear may or may not be greater now than + earlier, but the proportion of disappeared to those formally detained + seems to us definitely higher. In some cases, unidentified persons are + seen to pick up a man; in others, he simply drops out of sight. The + family may or may not receive a cryptic telephone call or other + indication that the detainee is still alive.

+

5. When it addresses this subject at all, the Government is likely to + suggest that the “disappeared” voluntarily went underground, changed + names, or ran away with girlfriends. We have even gotten a hint that one + of the charges against Hernan Montealegre (Vicariate of Solidarity + Defense lawyer accused of communist membership) may be that he + fabricated and gave publicity to bogus disappearances under orders from + the Chilean Communist Party, in order to discredit the GOC. So far there has been no way + definitely to tax the Government with responsibility for disappearances, + in the absence of specific information. But Chileans who work in this + area are convinced of government—usually DINA—complicity in many cases. As far as we know the police + never seriously investigate them. Their antennae obviously are as good + as the vicariate’s, and they want no run-ins with the Directorate of + National Security (DINA). GOC Human Rights Spokesman Sergio Diez, who is well aware of the + GOC’s image problem, for example + told the Ambassador—perhaps disingenuously—that he could not understand + why the government had not launched a major investigation when it heard + that the Budnik brothers (reftel) had disappeared.

+

6. Number of disappeared: hard information is lacking. The vicariate of + solidarity has a running account of over 1,000 since the coup, but the + evidence on many of these is poor. The ICRC in late 1975 spoke of about 600. The vicariate is now + in the process of distributing (we are promised a copy) a multi-volume + work reproducing documentary evidence on some 340 “disappearances.”

+

7. More recently, we know [less than 1 line not + declassified] that the GOC + detained illegally 60–80 Communists in the Santiago area in the period + just before the June OAS General + Assembly. The ICRC (protect) had a + hard list of 29 disappearances for June (para 10, Santiago 6573), and + another 16 up to July 30. Our latest, preliminary June figures for + Santiago from the vicariate of solidarity showed 23 arrests, of whom 14 + had not subsequently surfaced. When an ICRC representative visited Cuatro Alamos July 29, it was + empty, although he knew that a dozen or more people had been there during the month. + Supreme Court President Eyzaguirre visited an empty Cuatro Alamos the + same week, and he told the Ambassador August 2 that he also had heard of + people who had disappeared.

+

8. We still do not know how “disappeared” detainees are treated. We think + it possible that some of the communists who have been detained for many + months may have been killed or tortured by DINA. This may have happened in the recent case of the dual + citizen (Spanish and Chilean) ex-communist and UN functionary, Carmelo Soria Espinoza (Santiago 7581), who + seems clearly to have been murdered.

+

9. Places of clandestine detention: [less than 1 line + not declassified] information from a reliable source that the + detained communists who disappeared are rotated among army camps in + Peldehue (30 miles north of Santiago) and Penalolen (in Santiago’s + southeast suburbs), and navy installations in Valparaiso and Talcahuano. + The ICRC has long had its eye on the + two navy posts. (See also para 10, Santiago 6573.)

+

10. The Budnik brothers: The most notable case of current interest is + that of Julio and Eduardo Budnik, whose July 22 disappearance and + subsequent fate has been bizarre. Since our last detained report + (Santiago 7358), EmbOffs have talked to Rabbi Kreiman and the family’s + lawyer, and other information has been developed. President Pinochet twice fended Kreiman off on + the telephone. Then, in an August 4 meeting he repeated that the + brothers were not in GOC hands and + insinuated that they had either fled to avoid penalties for passing bad + checks by going to Argentina, or had been kidnapped by extremist + bandits. Kreiman picked up the last point to as why, then, the police + had not taken aggressive action to find them. Pinochet undertook to give the police + appropriate orders. We have what we consider quite reliable reports that + the Budniks in fact are in DINA’s + hands.

+

11. Comment: As indicated above, all the foregoing leads us to conclude + that while the GOC is trying on the one + hand to improve its image by claiming that the number of Chilean + political prisoners is decreasing, on the other hand it is resorting + with perhaps growing frequency to extra-legal methods of disposing of + presumed dissidents. Since the beginning of 1976, the primary targets of + the DINA have shifted: formerly they + were MIR terrorists; now that the + MIR has been neutralized, they seem + to be the Chilean Communist leadership.

+

12. We will do our best to determine how wide-ranging the new DINA tactics may be. Taken in conjunction + with the expulsion of anti-Marxist lawyers Jaime Castillo and Eugenio + Velasco, these “disappearances” tend to give Chilean internal security + operations rather more of a + cast of terror. In this connection, it will be interesting to observe + what happens to the ten labor leaders known as the “dinamicos” (Santiago + 7617). They are the most prominent publicly vocal opponents of the + regime at this time.

+ + + Popper + + +
+ +
+ 240. Evening Report Prepared by the Central Intelligence Agency +

Summary: The CIA reported that Argentina, + Uruguay, and Chile had agreed to suspend initiation of a planned + counterterrorist operation in Europe until Brazil decided + whether or not to participate.

+

Source: Ford Library, + Project File on Pinochet/Chile, Box 1, Evening Reports, + 8/13/1976. Secret.

+ + + + + Washington, August + 13, 1976. + +

EVENING REPORT—LATIN AMERICA

+

[Omitted here is material unrelated to Chile.]

+

+ Decision by “Condor” Countries to Suspend + Counterterrorism Operations in Europe—The South American + countries which had agreed to launch a counterterrorism operation in + Europe (Argentina, Uruguay, and Chile) have agreed to suspend initiation + of the plan until Brazil decides whether or not to participate. Brazil + has agreed to participate in the intelligence coordination aspects of + Condor in South America but has not agreed to participate in joint + actions in Europe. The other Condor countries apparently have not ruled + out moving forward on the Paris operation without the Brazilians.

+

[Omitted here is material unrelated to Chile.]

+
+ +
+ + 241. Telegram 209192 From the Department of State to the Embassies in + Argentina, Uruguay, Chile, and Bolivia +

Summary: The Department directed the Embassies in + Argentina, Uruguay, Chile, and Bolivia to express deep concern + to high-level government officials regarding rumors of + assassination plotting.

+

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + P760139–1959. Secret; Immediate. Roger Channel. Repeated + immediate to Brasília and Asunción. Drafted by Zimmerman and + Luers on August 18; + cleared by Shlaudeman, + Kirk, and Habib; approved by the + Secretary. In telegram 210906 to Buenos Aires, Montevideo, + Santiago, La Paz, Brasília, and Asunción, August 24, the + Department informed the recipients of telegram 209192 that the + reference in paragraph 4 part B to “2.B.” should read “3.B.”, + that the reference in paragraph 4 part C to “2.D.” should read + “3.D.”, and that the references in paragraph 8 to “2.B.” and + “2.C.” should read “3.B.” and “3.C.” (National Archives, RG 59, + Central Foreign Policy File, P760139–2183) In an August 30 + memorandum, Shlaudeman + informed Kissinger of + what he thought was the purpose of the démarches: “what we are + trying to head off is a series of international murders that + could do serious damage to the international status and + reputation of the countries involved.” (Ibid., + P860084–1945)

+ + + + + Washington, August 23, 1976, 2217Z. + +

209192. Subject: Operation Condor.

+

1. You are aware of a [less than 1 line not + declassified] on “Operation Condor.” The coordination of + security and intelligence information is probably understandable. + However, government planned and directed assassinations within and + outside the territory of Condor members has most serious implications + which we must face squarely and rapidly.

+

2. In considering how most effectively to bring our concerns to the + attention of the governments involved:

+

—We recognize that the internal problems in the three key Condor + countries are significantly different.

+

—We want to demonstrate in our discussions our appreciation of real host + government concerns and threats to their security.

+

—We propose to engage the highest level of government in Argentina, + Uruguay and Bolivia in a broad discussion of the issues and security + questions involved.

+

3. For Buenos Aires, Montevideo and Santiago: You should seek appointment + as soon as possible with highest appropriate official, preferably the + Chief of State, to make representations drawing on the following + points:

+

A. The USG is aware from various + sources, including high government officials, that there is a degree of + information, exchange and coordination among various countries of the + Southern Cone with regard to subversive activities within the area. This + we consider useful.

+

B. There are in addition, however, rumors that this cooperation may + extend beyond information exchange to include plans for the assassination of subversives, + politicians and prominent figures both within the national borders of + certain Southern Cone countries and abroad.

+

C. While we cannot substantiate the assassination rumors, we feel + impelled to bring to your attention our deep concern. If these rumors + were to have any shred of truth, they would create a most serious moral + and political problem.

+

D. Counter-terrorist activity of this type would further exacerbate + public world criticism of governments involved.

+

E. We are making similar representations in certain other capitals + {without specifying}.

+

4. For Buenos Aires: You are authorized to add to your approach the + following points if you deem it appropriate:

+

A. We are fully aware of security threats created by terrorist activities + within Argentina. It is not the intention of the U.S. Government to + attempt to advise the government of Argentina on how best to get its + internal security problem under control.

+

B. Activity along lines of 2.B. would have serious negative impact on + Argentine image abroad in general and foreign refinancing efforts of + Martínez de Hoz, in + particular.

+

C. In connection with para 2.D., you should include statement of our + profound concern regarding attacks on refugees from whatever quarter in + Argentina and make specific reference to some 30 Uruguayans who have + disappeared and about whom we made representations to Ambassador Musich + in Washington.

+

D. We are prepared to undertake periodic exchanges with the government of + Argentina of information on the general level and mode of communist and + other terrorist activity in the Hemisphere and elsewhere if the GOA would be interested. [FYI: We would + plan to provide background material to you later to serve as a basis for + oral exchanges at a level agreed upon jointly with the GOA.]

+

5. For Montevideo: We assume your best approach is to General Vadora rather than to either Acting + President or President Designate who apparently know nothing about + Operation Condor and, in any event, would probably have little influence + on situation. You may use talking point D. in paragraph 4 on exchange of + information if you consider it appropriate.

+

6. For Santiago: Discuss with [less than 1 line not + declassified] the possibility of a parallel approach by + him.

+

7. For La Paz: We agree with your suggestion [La Paz 3657], as you see. + While we are not repeat not instructing you to make the specific + démarche on Condor, you may wish to take an appropriate occasion with + Banzer or other senior GOB official to + propose periodic exchanges of information such as contained in para 4.D. + above.

+ +

8. You will be aware of extreme sensitivity of points 2.B. and 2.C. Great + care must be taken not to go beyond phrasing used.

+

9. For all action and info addressees: You should of course be certain + that no agency of the U.S. Government is involved in any way in + exchanging information or data on individual subversives with host + government. Even in those countries where we propose to expand our + exchange of information, it is essential that we in no way finger + individuals who might be candidates for assassination attempts.

+

10. Warning notice: Sensitive intelligence sources and methods + involved—not releasable to foreign nationals—not releasable to + contractors or contractor consultants.

+
+ +
+ 242. Telegram 8210 From the Embassy in Chile to the Department of + State +

Summary: Given + Pinochet’s + sensitivities regarding pressure by the U.S. Government, + Popper suggested + approaching DINA Director + Contreras, rather + than Pinochet, to express the Department’s concerns about + Operation Condor and rumors of assassination plotting.

+

Source: Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, Box 16, Santiago, + 1963–1979. Secret; Immediate. Roger Channel. In telegram 3123 + from Montevideo, August 24, Ambassador Siracusa suggested that the + Department consider making “parallel representations” to the + Embassies of the Condor countries in Washington, adding that he + would defer action pending further instructions. Given recent + indications that Condor operations had been shelved, Siracusa wrote that “time for + consultation on this grave matter seems affordable.” (Ibid., Box + 16, Montevideo) On August 27, Shlaudeman, in a meeting with CIA officials, stated a démarche + of Pinochet would be + futile, but that representations to the Chilean Government would + be made [text not declassified]. + (Memorandum for the Record, August 30; ibid., ARA–CIA Weekly Meetings, 1976–1977) In telegram 8223 + from Santiago, August 24, Popper characterized the U.S. Government’s + relations with DINA as + “formal, correct, and cool,” and described DINA Chief Contreras as “far from a + conservative, reliable intelligence operative. His credibility + with us . . . is low.” (Ibid., INR/IL Historical Files, Box 16, Santiago, + 1963–1979) Telegram 209192 is Document + 241.

+ + + + + Santiago, August 24, 1976, 1530Z. + +

8210. Subject: Operation Condor. Ref: State 209192.

+

1. While I appreciate importance of objective sought in reftel, I + seriously doubt that an approach to President Pinochet is the best way to achieve + it.

+

2. In my judgment, given Pinochet’s sensitivity regarding pressures by USG, he might well take as an insult any + inference that he was connected with such assassination plots. + Furthermore, cooperation among Southern Cone National Intelligence + Agencies is handled by the + Directorate of National Intelligence (DINA). Apparently without much reference to any one else. + It is quite possible, even probable, that Pinochet has no knowledge whatever of Operation Condor. + Particularly of its more questionable aspects.

+

3. [less than 1 line not declassified], we have + agreed that purpose of instruction will be best achieved if he conveys + the message to Colonel Manuel + Contreras, the head of DINA. He can do it in the context of having heard a rumor + which he cannot believe, but which if substantiated would be disastrous + for the perpetrators. [less than 1 line not + declassified] I believe this would be the most effective way of + getting the message across without undesirable complications.

+

4. I note that the instruction is cast in urgent terms. Has Department + received any word that would indicate that assassination activities are + imminent? The only such info we have seen is one report from Uruguay + unconfirmed by other sources.

+

5. Please advise.

+ + + Popper + + +
+ + +
+ 243. Memorandum From the Director of the Office of Bolivian-Chilean + Affairs (Fimbres) and the + Officer-in-Charge of Chilean Political Affairs (Driscoll) to the Assistant Secretary + of State for Inter-American Affairs (Shlaudeman) +

Summary: Three officers in the Bureau of Inter-American + Affairs reported their research and findings in Department of + State records on the disappearance and death of Charles Horman.

+

Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of Information + Management Services, Job 09–02528R, Box 2, Horman/Teruggi/Weisfeiler [3 of + 5]. Secret. Forwarded through Hewson A. Ryan, Deputy Assistant Secretary of + State for Inter-American Affairs. The memorandum was also signed + by “W.V. Robertson,” possibly referring to William Van Bogaert + Robertson, who at the time worked in the Office of Economic + Research and Analysis, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, but + may have been temporarily detailed to the Bureau of + Inter-American Affairs to assist on the Horman case. The “Gleanings,” + which provided more detail on the memorandum’s findings, is + attached but not published. None of the other referenced + documents, in particular, the October 30, 1973, memorandum to + Colonal Hon, are attached.

+ + + + Washington, August + 25, 1976. + + SUBJECT + + Charles Horman + Case + + +

This case remains bothersome. The connotations for the Executive are not + good. In the Hill, academic + community, the press, and the Horman family the intimations are of negligence on our + part, or worse, complicity in Horman’s death. (While the focus of this memo is on + Horman, the same applies to + the case of Frank Teruggi.)

+

We have the responsibility:

+ +

—categorically to refute such innuendos in defense of U.S. + officials;

+

—to proceed against involved U.S. officials if this is warranted.

+ +

Without further thorough investigation we are in a position to do + neither. At the moment we do not have a coherent account of what + happened (see attached “Gleanings”). That is why we believe we should + continue to probe.

+

Based on what we have, we are persuaded that:

+ +

—The GOC sought Horman and felt threatened enough + to order his immediate execution. The GOC might have believed this American could be killed + without negative fall-out from the USG.

+ +

There is some circumstantial evidence to suggest:

+ +

—U.S. intelligence may have played an unfortunate part in Horman’s death. At best, it was + limited to providing or confirming information that helped motivate + his murder by the GOC. At worst, + U.S. intelligence was aware + the GOC saw Horman in a rather serious light + and U.S. officials did nothing to discourage the logical outcome of + GOC paranoia.

+ +

Our leads are:

+ +

—Rafael Gonzalez: His mental condition is open + to question. Yet this may be selective since he can also be pretty + lucid. If he is unbalanced, it is for Chilean intelligence to + explain why they kept him on the payroll for so many years and used + him as contact with us on Horman. We should question him further along the + lines suggested in the enclosure.

+

—Enrique Sandoval’s brother: Inquiry would + have to be made with considerable discretion. Approaching the + brother (most likely, Colonel Guillermo Sandoval Velasquez) to + confirm Horman was shot at + the stadium would be terribly sensitive. Revelation of his + indiscretion in 1973 would endanger the Colonel and possibly others. + We are skeptical that anything positive can be accomplished through + this line of inquiry.

+

—The GOC: The + Chileans have failed satisfactorily to explain why Gonzalez was + chosen to deal with our Consulate in the search for Horman’s body. We could press them + on this point. Preferably after we clarify a few things with + Gonzalez. We could also ask for a complete copy of the autopsy of + Horman’s body, which we + do not seem to have.

+

— + CIA: [4½ lines not declassified]. Further, we find + it hard to believe that the Chileans did not check with the Station + regarding two detained Americans when the GOC was checking with Horman’s friends and neighbors regarding Horman’s activities. The Station’s + lack of candor with us on other matters only heightens our + suspicions.

+

—Other Actors: Accounts by Mrs. Horman, Terry + Simon, Frank Manitzas, Capt. Davis, and others don’t all fit in place. There is + room for further inquiry here. But this should wait a bit.

+

—Coroner/morgue: We have accepted without + questioning the morgue record that a body, later identified as + Horman’s, was dumped in + the street and was logged into the morgue at 1330, 9/18. A death + certificate was issued a week later and an autopsy was performed + October 5 putting the time of death as 0945, 9/18. This implies that + Horman was killed no + later than about 17 hours after being detained. That is, he was shot + early 9/18. This is in conflict with reports the Chilean + intelligence was trying to get a line on Horman throughout the morning of 9/18. Is it + possible the records are phony to conceal the time of death? And + why?

+

—DIA/FBI: We have asked INR to question both DIA and FBI about any records they might have on Horman and Teruggi. We have assumed + all along that the liaison, if any, was the CIA. We may be wrong. This is an avenue we have to + either follow or close.

+

—Teruggi: Finally, the Horman and Teruggi links are + interesting. Both worked for FIN (clipping service), did chores for + Professor Fagin at the Ford + Foundation, and both were arrested and almost immediately shot. Of + 80 Americans who required the Embassy’s attention, only these two + appear to have been tortured and then shot. In their October 30 memo + to Colonel Hon the Chileans lumped them together as radicals. + Gonzalez’ statement that Horman was considered as knowing too much comes to + mind. Further inquiry must tie in the circumstances of both + deaths.

+ +
+ +
+ 244. Telegram 8956 From the Embassy in Chile to the Department of + State +

Summary: The + Embassy reported that in a speech commemorating the third + anniversary of the establishment of the Chilean junta, Pinochet failed to indicate + that there would be any imminent liberalization of human rights + practices.

+

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + D760345–0603. Secret; Priority; Limdis.

+ + + + + Santiago, September 13, 1976, 2200Z. + +

8956. Subject: Chile: Little + Comfort in Pinochet’s Third + Anniversary Speech.

+

1. On September 11, the third anniversary of the assumption of power by + the Chilean junta, President Pinochet delivered a major address which provides an + opportunity to assess the effect of your representations with the + Chilean Government concerning the human rights question.

+

2. I regret to report that the President’s declaration contains little of + encouragement to us. On the whole, as the Embassy is reporting in + detail, the speech was a hard-line reaffirmation of existing policies + and practices.

+

3. The President’s only reference to relations with the United States + reads as follows: “As for our ties with the United States of North + America, in spite of obstacles that some political elements of that + country have persistently created, even to the point of breaching rules + and principles of international law, our bilateral relations are on a + good footing. The personal contact that the Chief of State who is + speaking (i.e. Pinochet) had in Santiago with the Secretary of State Mr. + Kissinger last June + contributed importantly to this; so likewise did the positive view of + our economic progress that Secretary of the Treasury Mr. Simon was able to recognize and + divulge during his visit to Chile”.

+

4. Contrary to our hopes, the speech gives us no reason to expect any + imminent liberalization of the GOC’s + human rights practices. On the contrary, the tone is one of a need for + continued and even increasing authoritarianism, together with an + insistence that only military government over a prolonged period can + create the conditions for a new democratic order in Chile. Not announced + in the speech was a decision the same day to release 205 additional + political prisoners held under the state of siege. This is welcome, but + does not indicate that detentions and “disappearances” have ceased to + occur in Chile. They still do occur.

+

5. The Constitutional Acts—sections of an as yet uncompleted new + Constitution—which the President promised to promulgate in this speech + are now on the record. One of them deals with constitutional rights and duties. While elaborate, it + abounds in qualifications which vitiate much of its substance. Moreover, + the exercise of rights continues to be subject to the restrictions + imposed during periods of state of siege. These emergency powers are + themselves recodified in a second Constitutional Act. Contrary to our + hope, President Pinochet did not + take advantage of the occasion to reduce the level and severity of the + state of siege, as he has previously done on junta anniversaries.

+

6. The culminating point in the speech was a stern warning to the + government’s democratic critics that it intended drastically to tighten + up the current “political party recess in order to cut off efforts to + revert to an earlier political system or to oppose the regime. In this + context the speech must be read as an injunction against further + criticism and political activity by democratic political figures, church + leaders and independent trade unionists. A similar threat is directed to + the press and media.

+

7. On the economic side, the speech generally maintains the current + policy line, though there are indications that the Government’s + austerity policy will be somewhat relaxed in 1977 and that social + assistance activities will be intensified.

+

8. Related to all the foregoing, you may have noticed that the GOC has failed to reach an accommodation + with the United Nations Human Rights Commission working group to end the + controversy between them over the abrupt cancellation of the working + group’s visit in July 1975. The working group report to be submitted to + the forthcoming United Nations General Assembly will probably be at + least as negative as previous reports. Pinochet gave no hint of flexibility on this + subject.

+

9. Accordingly, while Chile’s human rights practices are generally no + worse than those of other Southern Cone states, it is difficult to + foresee any improvement in our problems with Chile over human rights + matters in the immediate future.

+ + + Popper + + +
+ +
+ 245. Telegram 4526 From the Embassy in Costa Rica to the Department of + State +

Summary: Noting + that there had been no reports in some weeks indicating an + activation of Operation Condor, Shlaudeman instructed that no further action be + taken.

+

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + D760355–0146. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Shlaudeman was in Central + America September 15–21. (Telegram 226288 to San José, Managua, + San Salvador, Guatemala, and Tegucigalpa, September 13; ibid., + D760345–0605) In an August 30 memorandum to Kissinger addressing Siracusa’s hesitation to raise + Operation Condor with the Uruguayan Government, Shlaudeman recommended that + U.S. officials deliver a démarche on Operation Condor to + Uruguyan officials in Washington and Montevideo. In telegram + Secto 27128 from Lusaka, September 16, Kissinger informed the + Department that he had declined to approve the proposed message + to Montevideo instructing Siracusa to deliver a démarche on Operation + Condor; the telegram also noted that Kissinger had “instructed that + no further action be taken on this matter.” (Ibid., + D760350–0102) In telegram 231654 to Managua, September 18, + Luers informed + Shlaudeman of + Kissinger’s decision + and noted, “I will await your return to discuss how best to + clear the boards with the Ambassadors on this matter.” + (Department of State, INR/IL + Historical Files, Box 16, Managua, 1961–1979)

+ + + + + San José, September 20, 1976, 1818Z. + +

4526. Subject: Operation Condor. Ref: State 231654.

+

Unless there is some complication I am unaware of, there would seem to be + no reason to wait my return. You can simply instruct the Ambassadors to + take no further action, noting that there have been no reports in some + weeks indicating an intention to activate the Condor scheme.

+ + Todman + +
+ +
+ 246. Memorandum From Mary + Brownell and Dan + Mozeleski of the National Security Council Staff to + Les Janka of the National + Security Council Staff +

Summary: NSC staff members + reported that a car bomb had killed former Chilean Foreign + Minister Orlando + Letelier and his American assistant, Veronica + Moffitt, in Washington. They added that while right-wing + Chileans were obvious suspects, it seemed unlikely that they + would wish to create a martyr for the Chilean left.

+

Source: Ford Library, + National Security Adviser, National Security Council Latin + American Affairs Staff Files, Box 1, Chile, Political, Military, + 3. Official Use Only. Sent for information. Attached but not + published is a suggested statement on the + bombing.

+ + + + + Washington, September + 21, 1976. + + + SUBJECT + Bombing of Former Chilean Ambassador’s Car + +

At approximately 0915 this morning an explosion destroyed an auto in the + vicinity of the Rumanian and Irish Embassies near Sheridan Circle. Two + persons were killed and one injured. Neither Embassy was damaged, but a + car belonging to an Embassy employee reportedly was damaged.

+

One of the dead has tentatively been identified as Orlando Letelier, former Chilean + ambassador to the United States and a prominent figure in the Allende government. The identification + of the deceased as Letelier is + reasonably certain, but we do not yet know if the next of kin has + confirmed the identity of the body. Letelier has been in the U.S. for a couple of years + after being imprisoned in Chile after the coup. He was the director of + the Trans National Institute, a policy research organization in + Washington; he also taught at American University. We understand from + State that his release from Chile was brought about as a result of + pressure from the Hill, major + U.S. newspapers, and the Department.

+

The other two people in the car are identified as Michael and Veronica + Moffitt, both of whom also work at the Trans National Institute. Michael + Moffitt is the only survivor. (Do not release the + names of the Moffitts as we do not yet know if the next of kin have been + notified.)

+

The FBI is conducting the investigation + in cooperation with the Metropolitan Police Department. FBI jurisdiction arises from the law + Protecting Foreign Diplomats and International Persons which has a + provision covering former ambassadors to the United States.

+

No group or individual has claimed credit for the bombing, and we have no + evidence on the perpetrators or their specific motivation. In view of + Letelier’s role in the + Allende government, right + wing Chileans are the obvious + candidates. But they seem to be too obvious, and + we think that they would think twice about creating a martyr for the + Chilean Left. We know of no specific event which would precipitate the + bombing as an act of revenge. Nor is there any specific action under way + on the Hill or in the UN which could be linked to the murder.

+

We suggest that you use the attached statement trying to keep the event + in a low key until we have something firm to work on.

+
+ +
+ 247. Telegram 9212 From the Embassy in Chile to the Department of + State +

Summary: + Ambassador Popper + speculated on who might have been behind Letelier’s assassination.

+

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + D760356–0956. Secret; Immediate. No record of the September 21 + Luers-Popper + telcon has been found. In a + September 21 letter to Kissinger, Trucco expressed “the most complete repudiation + of such a condemnable action,” and requested a U.S. Government + investigation. (Ibid., P900101–0906) On September 25, Shlaudeman informed Habib: “My CIA counterpart tells me that all + the reports we have on this subject [Operation Condor] have been + disseminated to the FBI. The + Agency has also responded to requests from the Bureau for traces + on several possible Chilean suspects.” (Memorandum from + Shlaudeman to + Habib, September 25; + ibid., P840037–1089) On October 4, Associate Deputy Attorney + General Giuliani sent a + summary of the FBI’s + investigation of the car-bombing to Edward Schmults, the Deputy Counsel to the + President. The summary stated that “the manpower being devoted + to this investigation varies depending on the leads, but is + estimated to be approximately 75–100 special agents working on + the case throughout the United States.” (Ford Library, Edward C. + Shmultz Files, Box 17, Letelier Bombing Investigation) On October 5, + Schmultz forwarded the summary to Duval.

+ + + + + Santiago, September 21, 1976, 1958Z. + +

9212. Subject: Assassination of Orlando + Letelier. Ref: Luers-Popper + TelCon, September 21.

+

1. I appreciate prompt advice to us concerning bombing of ex-GOC FonMin Letelier and his two companions. Details are filtering + in from Washington, including Senator Abourezk’s statement attributing + responsibility to “Chilean Tyranny”. As of 1500 hours local, GOC has maintained public silence.

+

2. Department will be better able than we are to estimate the extent of + the adverse effect of this outrage on the junta’s position in the United + States. We are sure there will be a verbal outburst, and note that the + assassination could not have been better timed to attract the attention + of the United Nations General Assembly now convening in New York. We would guess that the GOC would hasten to deny all + responsibility. It may well suggest the affair is a leftist provocation + designed to hurt the GOC. This is not + inconceivable, but is unlikely to be widely accepted in the absence of + any confirming evidence.

+

3. We recall two previous instances in which junta opponents were + mysteriously attacked: The case of General Carlos Prats, killed in + Buenos Aires in September 1974, and the case of Bernardo Leighton, + seriously wounded in Rome in October 1975. In both cases, to our + knowledge, investigation as to the perpetrators proved fruitless. The + attack on General Alfredo Canales, the junta’s Ambassador in Beirut in + July 1974 has remained equally mysterious.

+

4. Based on obvious motivation, suspicion will fall first of all on the + GOC Directorate of National + Intelligence (DINA). Letelier was a first-rank political + foe of the junta. He was politically active in exile. Silencing him will + tend to inhibit some other exiles from speaking, writing or plotting + against the junta.

+

5. But we have never had any indication that DINA was in any way operational in U.S. territory, and it + is difficult for us to believe that even its rather fanatical leaders + would expose themselves to the consequences of being implicated in a + terrorist act in Washington. Further, if DINA had been planning to kill Letelier and if President Pinochet knew of such plans, it seems + to us unlikely that the Chileans would have promulgated so shortly + before the crime the decree depriving Letelier of his Chilean citizenship.

+

6. Another possibility is that DINA or + other GOC sources could have stimulated + action by some rightist group located outside Chile. We have in mind + possible cooperation by Southern Cone Government security authorities to + eliminate enemies abroad. We hope our intelligence efforts in other + capitals will follow up on any indications that Southern Cone Government + intelligence agencies are organizing for terrorism outside the + region.

+

7. Here in the Embassy we are confining ourselves to referring all + inquiries to USG spokesmen in + Washington. We will beef up our local security precautions against the + possibility that an action-reaction syndrome could temporarily make us a + target for Chilean response to emotional statements from the U.S.

+ + + Popper + + +
+ + +
+ 248. Memorandum for the Record +

Summary: In response to continuing controversy + surrounding the disappearance and death of Charles Horman, James E. + Anderson summarized his involvement in the case.

+

Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of General Counsel, + Job 12-01548R: Legan Subject Records Files (OGC), Box 1, Chile + Special Search Project, CIA + Documents Denied in Full Pertaining to Charles Horman and Frank + Teruggi—Gonzales/Privacy Issues—[less than 1 + line not declassified]. No classification marking. + Anderson, who had + been a counselor officer in Santiago in September 1973, was a + political officer in San Jose in September 1976. None of the + documents referenced in the memorandum were attached to this + copy.

+ + + + + San + Jose, September 22, + 1976. + + + SUBJECT + Chile—Charles Edmund + Horman + + +

During his 19–21 September 1976 visit to the San Jose Embassy, Mr. Harry + W. Schlaudeman, Assistant Secretary of State for Latin America Affairs, + told the writer that there continues to be considerable interest, + Congressional, organizational, and private, in the circumstances + surrounding the death of Mr. Charles E. + Horman in Chile in September 1973. He said this interest + has been enhanced by the statements made by Rafael Gonzalez Verdugo, + Chilean Air Force Intelligence Officer, who is in asylum in the Italian + Embassy in Santiago and has said that he was present when orders were + given by General Lutz for Horman + to be executed. (See attached copy of an article from the Washington Post dated June 10, 1976.)

+

In view of the above the writer felt that it might be of assistance for + him to recount to the best of his memory what he recalls about this case + and also to forward copies of some of the memoranda prepared by him + during the investigation by the Consulate of this case. (The memoranda + held by the writer are not complete by any means, however, it is assumed + that all memoranda are available in the Department of State, since the + file on Horman was sent to + SCA.)

+

The writer would like to say that he had no direct dealings with the + widow of Charles Horman, and his + conversations with Horman’s + father, Mr. Edmund C. Horman, were very limited and if the writer + recalls correctly were limited to two. Mr. Frederick Purdy, Consul in + Santiago at that time, was the person who dealt most extensively with + these two relatives.

+

As background, and the writer again wishes to stress to the best of his + memory, the Consulate was first advised of the fact that Charles + Horman had been detained on 18 or 19 September 1973 when + his wife appeared at the Consulate to ask for assistance. It is believed + that she returned to the Consulate several other times and that other + inquiries were made by friends of Horman. The writer assumes that the Consulate records on + Horman were checked with + negative results, because the Consul always said that Mr. C. Horman was not registered. The name + of Horman was added to the + Consulate’s list of those persons that could not be located and was + checked on an almost daily basis with lists maintained by the Chilean + authorities of persons detained in the National Stadium. The writer + knows that this was done because he was present and assisted in checking + the list on at least three occasions. The name of Horman was never located on the + listings and the Chilean authorities at the National Stadium + consistently denied that he was in the Stadium or had ever been in the + Stadium. In addition, checks were made at the morgue and hospitals in an + effort to locate this missing U.S. citizen. The writer at this time is + unable to give any other information as to the type of reports which may + have been received by the Consul or which might have been results of + actions taken by the Consul, although there is a complete chronology + available in the Department.

+

At the request of the Ambassador and when the Consulate finally received + some manpower assistance from the Embassy, the writer on 1 October 1973 + went to the address of Charles + Horman to make a neighborhood check to try to ascertain + by whom and when Horman had been + detained. Attached is a copy of a memorandum prepared at that time of + the results of that investigation. Also attached is a copy of another + memorandum dated 1 October of a conversation with Mr. Steven Volk, a + friend of Mr. Horman.

+

On 5 October 1973 the father of Horman, Mr. Edmund Horman, arrived in Chile to press for + a continued and more thorough search for his son. Attached is a copy of + a letter written by the father to Senator J. William Fulbright and which + appeared in the Congressional Record—House on + October 31, 1973. The writer believes this letter pretty well covers the + present feelings and viewpoints of Mr. Horman on the activities of the Embassy and the + Consulate in regard to the search for his son.

+

The writer talked to Mr. Horman on + the first occasion to cover information provided to the writer on 8 + October 1973 by Mr. Timothy Ross, a British journalist in Santiago. The + writer does not have a copy of the memorandum prepared on October 8, but + attached are copies of memoranda dated October 10, 15, and 17, 1973 + which set forth the writer’s activities and Mr. Ross’ statements. (Also + attached are two memoranda dated October 18, 1973 covering discussions + with other persons in the investigation of the disappearance of Mr. + Horman.) The only other occasion that the writer was + with Mr. Horman was when Mr. + Horman accompanied the writer + and Mrs. Marian Tipton, another Consular Officer, to lunch. No + substantive comments were discussed at this lunch.

+

As a result of pressure from the Embassy and the contacts made by Mr. E. + Horman during his visit to Chile, the body of C. Horman was finally located by the + Chilean authorities in mid-October 1973. The writer recalls that the + Consulate was told by the Chilean authorities that it had taken so long + to locate the body because of a mixup or misreading in the cadaver’s + fingerprints, and the body was interred as unidentified. The Consulate + took efforts to have the body disinterred and returned to the morgue for + a complete autopsy, which was carried out. The cause of death was + determined as multiple bullet wounds, and if the writer recalls + correctly, seven bullets had penetrated the body. The Consulate and the + Embassy then started pressing for the release of the body for return to + the U.S. for proper burial. However, the body was not released until + March 1974. During this long lapse the Consulate was repeatedly assured + that the body was under refrigeration, however, this was incorrect, + since at a date unknown the body was again interred.

+

In March 1974, while the writer was in the Consulate alone, a person who + identified himself as Rafael Gonzalez Verdugo appeared at the Consulate. + He said he was a Chilean Intelligence Officer connected with the Air + Force and that he had received orders from Military Intelligence to + assist the Consulate in obtaining possession of Horman’s body for shipment to the + United States, but that this had to be done immediately. This is after + more than four months of constant pressure by the Consulate and the + Embassy. Since retrieval of the body was of major concern, the writer + accompanied Gonzalez to the cemetery and obtained its release. The + writer does not have a copy of the memorandum which he prepared covering + his actions taken with Gonzalez; however, he does recall asking Gonzalez + how and why Horman was killed and + Gonzalez said that he must have been out after curfew or else leftist + terrorists killed him. The writer asked Gonzalez why it had taken so + long for the authorities to release the body and he said it was because + the Chileans were conducting an investigation into what had happened to + Horman and because of normal + Chilean red tape. In other words, Gonzalez was very non-committal about + the circumstances and said he had only been detailed to assist the + Consulate in obtaining possession of the body, which was buried in the + National Cemetery. The writer refrained from asking too many questions + because he did not want anything to delay the acquisition of the + body.

+

When Gonzalez walked into the Consulate in March 1974, the writer + recognized his face and later checked Consulate records and found that he had refused Gonzalez a + nonimmigrant visa to the U.S., the writer believes sometime in 1972. The + reason for the refusal was that he had been residing in the U.S. in an + irregular status for several years. The writer does not recall Gonzalez + mentioning during the visa interview that he had a U.S. citizen child or + that the child was ill, however, he may well have done so (it is + possible that this refusal report is still on file with the Consulate in + Santiago). While with Mr. Gonzalez in March 1973, the latter did not + bring up the visa refusal nor did the writer, however, Gonzalez did say + that he had been to the U.S. assigned with CORFO as an undercover + Chilean Intelligence Officer and that is why he spoke such good English. + To the best of the writer’s knowledge and recollection, the visa refusal + interview and the day we went together to get Horman’s body are the only times the + writer saw or talked to Gonzalez. It is possible that Gonzalez returned + to the Consulate several times to try to overcome the visa refusal.

+

The writer is unaware of all the allegations made by Gonzalez, however, + he has heard that Gonzalez has said that Gonzalez and the writer had a + social relationship dating back to 1972. As indicated above, this is + untrue. Gonzalez has also indicated, according to what the writer has + heard, that he knew the writer had a “dual role” in the Consulate. The + writer cannot comment upon what this allegation might have been based, + however, it should be recalled that on several occasions the writer was + accused of being an Agency employee in Chile by certain Chilean press + and TV commentators. As to other statements or ideas which are alluded + to in the Post article, the writer does not + recall ever having met General Lutz and he knows he was never in Lutz’s + office or home. The Defense Attache, (Col. William Hon), to the best of + the writer’s knowledge, held all conversations with Lutz in regard to + Horman’s death. The writer + has no information relative to the possibility that an “American + Intelligence Officer” was present, but doubts this statement to be true + because of the situation in Chile at that time. At no time did any + Chilean, either civilian or military, admit to the writer direct + knowledge that he or she knew that Horman was arrested by the military authorities and/or + executed. To the best of the writer’s knowledge, neither the Consulate + nor the Embassy was ever able to prove that Horman was taken to the National Stadium. The writer has + no information as to why the Chilean authorities delayed such a long + time prior to releasing the body. When Horman’s body was shipped to the U.S. it was addressed + to the Forensic Laboratory in New York City. It was not until members of + the GAO investigating team interviewed + the writer in La Paz, Bolivia, that the writer was even sure that the + body shipped was in fact that of Horman. At that time, GAO team members said that the body had been positively + identified as Horman’s by the + laboratory.

+ +

The writer wishes to stress once again that he has no knowledge of why + Horman was detained if in + fact he were, why he might have been shot, or any other knowledge of + this case which has not already been reported to the Department of + State. He is not concealing any information. One might ask if this were + true why the writer kept copies of statements and memoranda. The reason + for this is that the writer prepared a draft cable for his supervisor + because of the sensitivities of this case. Accompanying this draft + telegram was background information for use by his supervisor in + deciding whether or not to transmit the draft. (The writer did not know + that the cable was even sent until June 1976 when he saw it in + Washington.) Apparently the supervisor had the copies of the background + information held in the writer’s personnel file because in October 1974 + they were sent to him in La Paz for his review. Also attached is the + copy of the note forwarding these documents.

+
+ +
+ 249. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for + Inter-American Affairs (Shlaudeman) to Secretary of State Kissinger + +

Summary: Shlaudeman reported that, when questioned about + Operation Condor, DINA + Director Contreras + responded that it consisted only of intelligence-sharing + operations and that it did not involve the planning of + assassinations.

+

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + P860053–1545. Secret. Attached and published is a memorandum + summarizing an October 3 meeting with Contreras in Santiago. In + telegram 246107 to Santiago, October 4, drafted on October 2, + Shlaudeman informed + the Embassy in response to telegram 8210 from Santiago, + published as Document 242, that the + Department agreed “that our purpose can best be served through + [less than 1 line not declassified] + approach to Contreras + and that the issue should not repeat not be raised with + Pinochet. [less than 1 line not declassified] is + receiving instructions to consult with you on manner and timing + of approach.” (Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, Box 16, Santiago, + 1963–1979) In an attached note, Shlaudeman informed McAfee, “I have authority from above for this. + Would appreciate no clearances shown and + distribution confined to S, P, M, you and me.”

+ + + + + Washington, October + 8, 1976. + +

Operation Condor

+

[less than 1 line not declassified] reporting on + the approach made in accordance with your instructions to Colonel + Contreras, Chief of the + Chilean National Directorate of Intelligence (DINA). As expected, Contreras denied that Operation Condor has any other + purpose than the exchange of intelligence. Contreras also revealed that he was already aware of our + concern.

+

The approach to Contreras seems + to me sufficient action for the time being. The Chileans are the prime + movers in Operation Condor. The other intelligence services are also + aware of our concern [less than 1 line not + declassified] and now, undoubtedly, by way of Contreras. We will continue to watch + developments closely and recommend further action if that should be + necessary.

+

Attachment:

+

[less than 1 line not declassified]

+

1. [1 line not declassified] met with Juan Manuel + Contreras, Chief of the + Chilean National Directorate of Intelligence (DINA), and an aide to discuss Operation Condor.

+

2. [less than 1 line not declassified] is very + worried about reports it has received from various sources on the + formation of Operation Condor by DINA + and its counterparts in the Southern Cone and Brazil. [less than 1 line not declassified] that according to our + reliable information, Operation Condor consists of two elements: the + exchange of intelligence concerning extremists and the planning of + executive actions—assassinations—against extremists in Europe and other + foreign areas. [less than 1 line not + declassified] is extremely concerned about the latter aspect. + Contreras said that he was aware of our concern.

+

3. Contreras said that our + information is distorted. Operation Condor does exist, has its + headquarters in Santiago, but its only purpose is the exchange of + intelligence concerning the extremists within the participating + countries, which include Chile, Argentina, Uruguay, Paraguay, Bolivia, + and Brazil. Contreras added + that Condor can already take credit for preventing two assassination + attempts against President Hubo Banzer of Bolivia. He commented that any + Condor member would be violating the agreement if it carried out any + missions independently of the others and expressed confidence that such + had not occurred.

+

4. Contreras denied that Condor + is even thinking of implementing executive actions even though the + extremists are planning and carrying out such actions all the time. As + examples, Contreras cited the + attempted assassination of President Jorge Videla of Argentina on 2 October and an uncovered + attempt against President Augusto Pinochet of Chile about a month ago. Contreras commented + that even if DINA had contemplated + executive actions in Europe, which it has not, it could be carried out + effectively only by agents who had lived in Europe for a long time and + DINA has no agents who meet this + criteria.

+

5. Contreras claimed that DINA has only two officials abroad, a + liaison officer in Brazil and another in Argentina, and denied that + there are any officials in + Europe or Washington. According to Contreras, Colonel Mario Jahn, former deputy director of + DINA, reverted back to the Air + Force before leaving on his assignment to Washington. (He arrived in + January 1976 to become a member of the Inter-American Defense + Board.)

+

6. Contreras repeated that [less than 1 line not declassified] its fears + about Condor’s real motives are unfounded.

+
+ +
+ 250. Letter From Attorney General Levi to Director of Central Intelligence Bush + +

Summary: Levi requested that the Central Intelligence + Agency collect appropriate foreign intelligence and + counterintelligence information in support of the Department of + Justice’s criminal investigation of the Letelier assassination.

+

Source: National Security Council, NSC Intelligence Files, INT File. No classification + marking. On October 21, Scowcroft sent a memorandum to Levi indicating he endorsed + his recommendation. (Ibid.)

+ + + + + Washington, October + 9, 1976. + + + Dear Mr. Bush: + +

As you are aware, the Department of Justice is conducting an + investigation to determine who may have been involved in the death of + Orlando Letelier, the + former Chilean ambassador to the United States who was assassinated on + September 21, 1976, in Washington, D.C. On the basis of information + developed in that investigation, we have reason to believe that the + responsible parties may be outside the United States, and that the + assassination may be part of a program of violent activities directed by + foreign powers, foreign organizations, or their agents at persons within + the United States or elsewhere.

+

I have been advised that information leading to a determination of + whether any foreign powers or their agents have been or may be involved + in such a program of violent activities would be significant foreign + intelligence and/or counterintelligence as defined by Section 2(a) of + Executive Order 11905. I understand that the Central Intelligence Agency + may be in a position to obtain information bearing on these violent + activities. I have recommended that the National Security Council + consider levying requirements upon the CIA to develop abroad such foreign intelligence or + counterintelligence information. If the National Security Council + endorses my recommendation, I am satisfied that such a request would be in accordance with + applicable laws and regulations relating to CIA activities including Section 4(b) of Executive Order + 11905.

+

A criminal investigation into the Letelier assassination is presently being conducted by + the Department of Justice in conjunction with the Office of the United + States Attorney for the District of Columbia. Since, as noted above, + CIA’s compliance with a National + Security Council request would be in accordance with the applicable laws + and regulations, information developed as a part of the Agency’s foreign + intelligence and counterintelligence activities which would be subject + to dissemination pursuant to Section 5(c) of Executive Order 11905 and + the applicable guidelines I have promulgated pursuant thereto may be + disseminated in accordance with such procedures.

+

Sincerely,

+ + + Edward H. + Levi + Attorney General + + +
+ +
+ 251. Telegram 10032 From the Embassy in Chile to the Department of + State +

Summary: Noting + that requests for aid prompted + congressional and other attacks on the Chilean Government, + Carvajal told + Popper that Chile + would not seek further bilateral assistance from the United + States.

+

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + D760389–0704. Secret; Exdis. In a September 21 meeting with + Simon and Parsky, Cauas indicated that the + Chilean Government was “planning to tell U.S. not to proceed + with aid to Chile”; the Chilean + Finance Minister explained that “after much deliberation GOC has decided that given small + amount of aid involved and + given stress every time aid to + Chile is brought up, it was not worth it.” (Telegram 252555 to + Santiago, October 12; ibid., D760383–0798) In telegram 252354 to + Santiago, October 12, the Department reported on an October 7 + meeting between Kissinger and Carvajal, in which the Chilean Foreign Minister + stated that “the GOC believes + it would be better to eliminate all bilateral economic + assistance next year.” (Ibid., D760382–0941)

+ + + + + Santiago, October 16, 1976, 1610Z. + +

10032. Subject: Chile: FonMin Carvajal on Termination of U.S. Aid. Ref: State + 252354.

+

1. In the course of my meeting with FonMin Carvajal October 15 he referred to his meeting with the + Secretary in New York on October 7. Carvajal said the GOC + has made a firm decision not to request further bilateral assistance + from the United States. He said that the amount now involved was not + significant enough in current Chilean economic terms to warrant the Congressional and + other attacks on the Chilean regime which would take place. Accordingly, + the Chileans do not wish to be included in our next budget cycle for + bilateral assistance.

+

2. The FonMin said the Secretary had promised to think about the matter. + I said that we might be getting some instructions from Washington in + response to his discussion of this subject with the Secretary and + Finance Minister Cauas’ similar + statement to Secretary Simon.

+

3. Turning to the UNHRC Working Group + report, Carvajal said he had + raised with the Secretary the possibility that the UNGA might recommend economic sanctions + against Chile. Carvajal said the + Secretary had assured him we would “oppose, or at least not support” any + recommendations for economic sanctions.

+

4. Comment: Carvajal’s + understanding of the discussion squares generally with reftel.

+ + + Popper + + +
+ +
+ 252. Airgram A–155 From the Embassy in Chile to the Department of + State +

Summary: + Popper reported on + an October 15 conversation in which he asked Carvajal about the possibility + of a gradual relaxation of human rights restrictions in order to + improve U.S.-Chilean relations. According to the Ambassador, the + Foreign Minister showed rock-hard resistance, claiming that the + threat of international communism justified Chile’s + measures.

+

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + P760166–0456. Confidential; Limdis. Drafted and approved by + Popper. In telegram + 10130 from Santiago, October 20, the Embassy reported on a + statement by Pinochet + that the Chilean Government would not accept foreign loans that + stipulated that the recipient take particular political action. + (Ibid., D760393–1060)

+ + + + + Santiago, October 19, + 1976. + + + SUBJECT + Ambassador’s Discussion with Foreign Minister Carvajal + + +

+ Summary: Queried as to the possibility of + beginning a gradual relaxation of human rights restrictions in order to + improve Chilean-U.S. relations, Foreign Minister Carvajal showed rock-hard resistance + to any changes in Chile which would, as he put it, weaken its resistance + to the onslaught of international communism. Carvajal maintained in essence that + democracies had failed in Chile and elsewhere, and that Chile was content to wait until the + rest of the world realized that it had chosen the right course. END SUMMARY.

+

I visited the Chilean Foreign Minister, Vice Admiral Patricio Carvajal, October 15 for a + tour d’horizon on the occasion of his return + from the United Nations General Assembly meeting in New York, and prior + to my departure for Washington. The more immediately topical aspects of + the conversation are reported in a number of cables.

+

Following 45 minutes of official discussion, after the notetakers had put + away their notebooks and before departing, I said I would like to add a + more personal word. I said I was going to Washington greatly + disappointed by the evident deterioration of the relations between our + two countries. I did not want to argue with him once again the rights + and wrongs of our respective positions, but I would be interested to + know whether he saw any prospect for an evolutionary change in Chile + which might reverse the current trend in our relationships.

+

It seemed to me that the Chileans must realize that the American + preoccupation with the maintenance of human rights standards in other + countries, and very notably Chile, was increasing rather than + decreasing. I did not foresee any immediate change in this regard.

+

Even compared to its neighbors, Chile remained an outstanding example of + a government which followed a highly restrictive policy in the human + rights area. The junta had been in power for more than three years. It + had wiped out or decimated the known Marxist opposition. Ever since the + first few months of its incumbency, terrorism had been almost entirely + absent. The domestic tranquility which prevailed in Chile today was + probably unequalled anywhere in South America. There was no immediate + threat to the stability or tenure of the Government.

+

In these circumstances, I remarked, it was difficult for Americans to + understand how the Government could justify the maintenance, without any + relaxation, of the state of siege. Under it, Chileans continued to be + deprived of those individual procedural rights and safeguards to which + Secretary Kissinger had referred + in his June 8 speech before the OAS + General Assembly. It was not for me to tell the Chileans what they + should do to solve their problems, but I had to say that the conclusion + seemed to me inescapable: If Chile really wished to avoid continued + isolation from the countries of the advanced Western world, it could + with no appreciable risk begin an evolutionary process of restoring + individual rights.

+

I asked Carvajal what he thought + the prospects were for developments along this line.

+

The Minister replied with a vigorous “No”, followed by a series of + spirited monologues in effect justifying the maintenance of all current + restrictions. Much of this + covered all too familiar ground. The basic argument was that Chile had + been a target of “communist” attacks. The Allende Government had destroyed democracy in Chile, and + the forces of world communism were inflexibly determined to overcome the + government which had destroyed Allende and restored freedom to the Chilean people.

+

The political warfare of the communists was evident in many ways, + Carvajal asserted. It could + be seen in the unbalanced treatment given to Chile in the columns of the + New York Times and the Washington + Post. It could be heard over the air through + broadcasts of the 26 Russian transmitters which every night carried + “Escuche Chile”, a daily half-hour Spanish language news and propaganda + program. It was evident in the extreme bias of the UN Human Rights Commission Working Group + and especially its Chairman, Mr. Allana of Pakistan. Chile could not get a fair hearing + in any international organization. It was only necessary to see what had + happened in UNESCO, where + discriminatory attacks on Chile were interjected in public sessions, + while a proposal that UNESCO hear + Soviet dissident Andrei Amalrik was thwarted.

+

+ Carvajal’s conclusion was that + the GOC simply could not afford to + relax. The present policy line was a necessity if Chileans were to be + free to live and work in tranquility. France had frequently strayed from + a liberal democratic system, sometimes with vast internal disorder, but + nobody condemned the inconstant French for their autocratic governments. + For almost the first time in 140 years, Chile had found it necessary to + do so, for compelling reasons. The Chilean Government did not intend to + permit in Chile the kind of political chaos now existing in Southern + Europe.

+

Moreover, the Minister volunteered, the junta had no intention of coming + to terms with the Christian Democratic Party. The Christian Democrats + had been responsible for the accession of Allende, he stated bitterly. President Frei had been a + weak man, and under him the Christian Democrats had been demagogic, + immoral and arrogant. Chile did not intend to go back to that + situation.

+

+ Carvajal returned repeatedly to + the theme that, under communist influence, Chile’s opponents were + attacking it in an unbalanced and discriminatory way. Nobody had + attacked the British for their behavior in Northern Ireland over a + period of years, although it was far worse than what the Chileans had + had to do. The Argentine Government had been unable to prevent several + thousands of violent political killings for years, but Argentina was not + in the dock as Chile is. The Chilean Government had had no connection + whatever with the murder of Orlando + Letelier, but American senators assumed immediately that + it must have been responsible. The Directorate of National Intelligence + (DINA) was not such a super force + as to be able to have disposed of General Prats in Buenos Aires, Bernardo Leighton + (almost) in Rome, and Letelier + in Washington at almost precise annual intervals. Carvajal was sorry that Letelier had died, but it was a + mistake to regard him as an idealist. Carvajal knew from his own experience in the GOC Defense Ministry that Letelier had been involved in an + incredible plot designed to land an airplane carrying arms in Chile in + circumstances that appeared to implicate the CIA. (This was not fully explained.)

+

At various points in the course of Carvajal’s remarks, I interjected the obvious + observations and corrections. I sought to bring him back to the original + area of discussion, noting that whatever might have been the case in the + past, the concern with international human rights in the United States + no longer focussed so narrowly on Chile. Chile had after all been a + leader in the political and social evolution of the Western world. Its + present status was all the more striking to humanitarians who by no + stretch of the imagination could be said to be communists.

+

+ Carvajal responded by stating his + conviction that no action which Chile could realistically take would + satisfy the opposition. It would only weaken Chile and lead to pressures + for further relaxation. Of what use would it be, he asked, to shorten or + abolish the curfew, or to release Luis Corvalan, the Chilean Communist + Party leader. This would only feed the fires.

+

I said it did not seem to me that these were the things Chile could best + do to set the stage for an improvement in our relations. Rather, the + Chileans should look at the arbitrary detentions which were still taking + place, the “disappearances”, the lack of any civilian tribunals to + adjudicate internal security cases, the many allegations of torture and + the like. I repeated that I personally thought a start could be made in + these areas with no risk whatever to Chilean security.

+

By this time more than 45 minutes had gone by since the start of the + discussion. I again expressed my disappointment that, in the + circumstances, there seemed to be no prospect for improving our + relations. Carvajal said he was + sure the junta was on the right track. Chile would wait, even if it + suffered. As time went on the rest of the world would come to understand + the real situation and would join Chile in its campaign against + international communism.

+

+ COMMENT: Interestingly, Carvajal did not attempt to maintain, + as Chilean spokesmen in the United Nations often do, that human rights + violations were not being committed in Chile. He did not once refer to + the constitutional acts promulgated after President Pinochet’s September 11 address—acts + which inter alia purport to establish the basis for an updated human + rights regime for Chile. Only at the very end of the discussion did he + make a short reference to the desirability of instituting a new and + purified democracy at some vague and indefinite time in the future.

+ +

From the beginning both of us emphasized that we were speaking + personally, and it would therefore be unfair to regard Carvajal’s adamant stand as an + official policy line. Nevertheless, his view is typical of the thesis + propounded by Pinochet’s right + wing advisers and espoused by the hard-line armed forces leaders. It is + worth noting that Carvajal did + not always talk this way. In my many contacts with him between February + 1971 and July 1975 he was relatively moderate and reasonable, reflecting + the thought that in due course the junta would be prepared to relax its + emergency arrangements and move back toward political normality. + Carvajal’s conversion began + with the uproar created by Pinochet’s abrupt, last-minute refusal to allow the + UNHRC Working Group to enter + Chile in 1975. His posture has if anything toughened in the last + year.

+ + + Popper + + +
+ +
+ 253. Paper Prepared by the Central Intelligence Agency +

Summary: The CIA reviewed items which could + come up in a meeting between Popper and Colby, including deteriorating relations with + Chile, the human rights situation, and Operation Condor.

+

Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of the Director of + Central Intelligence, Job 79M00467A: Subject Files + Correspondence, Box 8, Folder 16: B–7.2: Briefings of + Ambassadors. Secret. Attached but not published are a covering + memorandum [name not declassified] to + Colby, November 23; + a curriculum vitae for Popper; and a Country Profile for Chile. A + record of the conversation between Popper and Colby has not be found.

+ + + + + Washington, undated. + +

ITEMS WHICH MAY BE DISCUSSED

+

A. Deteriorating relations between the U.S. and + Chile. Our firm insistence on the recognition of human rights + in Chile has been a continuing thorn in the side of the Chilean + government, which regards it as meddling in internal affairs. The + Ambassador’s 4th of July Reception was shunned by the Chilean + government, with Air Force General Leigh the only junta member attending. A recent + intelligence report [less than 1 line not + declassified] indicates that the Chileans plan on assuming a + more distant, but still correct, attitude toward the U.S. Embassy in the + future. The Chileans also asked to be excluded from this year’s foreign + aid + appropriation allegedly because + of their unwillingness to be subjected to the political pressures which + follow acceptance of such aid.

+

B. Release by the Chilean Government of nearly 300 + political prisoners. Press reports highlighted the fact that + the GOC announcement followed by only + two days a statement by President-elect Carter that U.S. aid in the future would be tied to human + rights issues; our clandestine reporting indicates that although this + move is indeed an attempt to improve the image of Chile abroad, its + planning predated the Carter announcement by several weeks. News of the + release of the political prisoners has been received in the U.N. and + elsewhere with guarded optimism as a step in the right direction.

+

C. [1 paragraph (5½ lines) not declassified]

+

D. Condor (the Southern Cone intelligence + cooperative agreement between Chile, Argentine, Paraguay, Uruguay, + Bolivia and Brazil.) In early October, after consulting with Ambassador + Popper, [less than 1 line not declassified] confronted the Chilean head + of DINA, Colonel Manuel Contreras, with U.S. knowledge of Condor’s + existence. Colonel Contreras denied that our information of Condor was + accurate and refused to admit that one of its objectives was to + operate against terrorists in Europe. Recent clandestinely + acquired information indicates that plans for Condor are continuing.

+

E. [1 paragraph (12 lines) not declassified]

+
+ +
+ 254. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for + Inter-American Affairs (Shlaudeman) to Acting Secretary of State Robinson + +

Summary: Shlaudeman reviewed topics that Robinson might wish to discuss + with Popper, including + human rights in Chile, UNGA + and UNESCO resolutions, the + junta’s termination of the U.S. assistance program, and the arms + imbalance between Peru and Chile.

+

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + P760185–1435. Secret. Drafted by Levine on November 22; cleared by Fimbres, Hewitt, and Luers. Robinson and Popper discussed the Chilean + economy and human rights. Popper thought that the human rights situation + was improving, and Robinson and Popper thought that the U.S. Government should + encourage such progress. (Telegram 289068/Tosec 310069 to + Kissinger, November + 25; ibid., D760438–0305)

+ + + + + Washington, November + 23, 1976. + +

Your Meeting with U.S. Ambassador to Chile David H. Popper, November 24, 1976 at + 4:00 pm.

+ + PARTICIPANTS + The Acting Secretary + Ambassador David H. + Popper + + +

SETTING

+

Ambassador Popper is in the + Department for consultation after his service on the promotion panels. + He will be returning to Chile this week. You may wish to discuss the + following:

+

1. The recent release of political prisoners held without charge under + state of siege authority.

+

2. Resolutions under consideration by the UNGA Third Committee and UNESCO.

+

3. The request by the GOC not to be + included in next year’s foreign assistance legislation.

+

4. The growing arms imbalance between Chile and Peru.

+

BACKGROUND/ANALYSIS

+

The GOC announced early this week that + it would release unconditionally about 300 political prisoners being + held under state of siege provisions. It also announced that it would be + willing to release Chilean Communist Party leader Corvalan in exchange + for Soviet dissident Alexander Bukovsky and another former Communist in + exchange for a Cuban prisoner. We have also been working with the GOC to facilitate the proposed + Corvalan-Bukovsky prisoner exchange. Later in the week it announced that 198 persons would be + released from internal exile (relegation).

+

The prisoner release appears to have been timed for maximum impact on the + Chile debate in the UNGA Third + Committee. A resolution pointing towards future economic sanctions + stands a good chance to be passed during this session. Now it appears + that support for the resolution is weakening in reaction to the prisoner + release and the suggested prisoner exchange. In Nairobi, a UNESCO resolution proposed by Cuba and + Norway on Chile may be losing some support due to this week’s + announcements.

+

Several weeks ago the Chileans asked us, through a Memorandum delivered + to me, not to give them any economic assistance next year. Foreign + Minister Carvajal had mentioned + this idea to the Secretary during the bilateral in New York on October + 7. We are now in the process of negotiating a phase-out of the AID program in Santiago.

+

In New York Foreign Minister Carvajal also discussed with the Secretary his fears of + the growing arms imbalance with Peru. The impending sale of Soviet SU–22 + fighter bombers to Peru exacerbates this problem and, given the + limitations against the purchase of US military equipment, is forcing + the Chileans to begin to look elsewhere for military hardware: to Israel + and to Brazil most recently. It may also be forcing them to reexamine + their human rights policies and may have been another factor influencing + last week’s prisoner release.

+

TALKING POINTS

+

+ 1. Release of Prisoners

+

—Release of those held without charges under state of siege authority and + those exiled within Chile are positive steps which we welcome.

+

—We should provide the Chileans with some positive feedback and encourage + them to continue in this direction.

+

+ 2. + UN Chile Debates

+

—The news of the prisoner release may ease some of the pressures to + condemn Chile in stronger terms than last year.

+

—We will not support UNGA or other + resolutions opening the door to the application of economic + sanctions.

+

+ 3. End of Economic + Assistance

+

—The GOC, sensing that Congressional + debate results in greater losses than the meager aid involved, may be lapsing into a “siege + mentality” by cutting the aid tie.

+

—We must be sure to keep some lines of contact open that would permit us + to continue humanitarian assistance and provide some avenues of + influence.

+ +

+ 4. Chile-Peru Arms + Imbalance

+

—Peru, with Soviet-made military hardware, has a matériel advantage over + Chile.

+

—The Chileans should be encouraged to discuss the arms problem directly + with the Peruvians.

+
+ +
+ 255. Telegram 11822 From the Embassy in Chile to the Department of + State +

Summary: + Popper discussed + with two influential Chilean army generals what the junta might + do in the field of human rights to improve its image in the + United States.

+

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + D760460–0729. Secret. Airgram A–156 from Santiago was not found. + On November 4, the ICRC + representative in Santiago informed the Embassy that although + serious human rights problems remained, human rights practices + in Chile had improved since August. (Telegram 10862 from + Santiago, November 11; ibid., D760421–0674) A December 6 CIA report noted that because + there had been a “sharp decline in the number of prisoners held + by the government,” the human rights situation was substantially + improving. (Department of State, Electronic Reading Room, Chile + Collections)

+ + + + + Santiago, December 14, 1976, 2022Z. + +

11822. Subject: Chile: Dialogue on Human Rights Matters. Ref: Santiago + A–156, October 26, 1976.

+

1. Summary: In second private meeting with two influential Chilean Army + Generals, Ambassador pursued question they had raised as to what GOC might do to improve its position on + human rights in the U.S. Noting favorable reaction evoked by mass + release of Chilean political prisoners, Ambassador conveyed his belief + that human rights questions would be at least as important to the Carter + administration as to this one; expressed confidence that steps Chileans + might take to improve their situation would be fairly considered in the + ongoing USG evaluation of Chile; warned + that backsliding from progress already made would be unfortunate and + large-scale disappearances or new reports of torture particularly + harmful; and suggested that now was the time for further movement toward + normalization. Ambassador also suggested restrictions on DINA. Generals made no commitments, but + we have impression our thoughts will be carefully considered at top + GOC level. End summary.

+

2. Department will recall that in late October Ambassador and Army + Attaché Colonel Cummings met with Interior Minister General Cesar Benavides Escobar and Secretary-General of Government + Brig. General + Hernán Bejares Gonzalez to + exchange impressions, privately and informally, regarding what might be + done by GOC to moderate international + criticism of Chile on human rights grounds (Ref Santiago A–156). On that + occasion Ambassador cited the Secretary’s suggestions at the OAS General Assembly meeting in Santiago + as an appropriate guideline. Although the generals made no commitments, + they listened carefully to our elaboration of these suggestions.

+

3. About three weeks later GOC announced + release of over 300 political prisoners being held without trial, thus + virtually clearing its detention centers of prisoners in this category. + While we have no basis for connecting the release with the dinner + conversation, it was clearly a step designed in large part to assuage + foreign opinion. Subsequently, top GOC + military have continued to express interest in what they might do to + improve Chile’s position overseas, particularly in the United States. + They have been especially concerned over what policy line the new + administration might adopt. Accordingly, they welcomed a suggestion to + meet with us again, after the Ambassador’s return from Washington. We + lunched on December 13.

+

4. Ambassador made several points to start the discussion. First, he said + that prisoner release had evoked a favorable response in U.S., both + officially and among the public. U.S. Government spokesmen in UNGA and other international + organizations had made favorable references to it. Press had given it + very good play. Subsequent release of prisoners by Indonesia and Iran + might not have been entirely unconnected with the Chilean action.

+

5. Second, Ambassador noted that human rights considerations were + obviously going to be as important for new administration as they had + been for the present one. He recalled statements by Secretary-Designate + Vance at recent press + conference, and Vance + Newsweek interview, to indicate that this would + remain a matter of concern but pointed out that the pragmatic and + even-handed approach Secretary-designate had advocated would give + Chileans a fair opportunity to present their case in an effective way. + Much would depend on the current evolution of GOC Internal Security policy.

+

6. Third, Ambassador suggested that accordingly, Chileans might wish to + consider desirability of launching new human rights improvements in the + next few weeks, so that the intent and direction of the GOC course of action would be plain by the + time the new administration and the Congress began to review major human + rights problems.

+

7. Finally, Ambassador pointed out that it was most important that gains + already attained through prisoner release should be maintained. If there + were credible reports that screws had again been tightened and that + GOC was moving back into period of + extreme repression, all the + good effects of recent developments would be reversed and opposition to + present regime further solidified.

+

8. Benavides and Bejares indicated that they + understood situation in general terms laid out by Ambassador. They + evinced confidence that current relaxation could continue. As at our + previous meeting, they did not particularize, but they talked in terms + of continuing evolution and further steps.

+

9. We spent some time discussing the question of the mysterious + disappearances of persons who might have been picked up by government + agents for alleged opposition activities. As usual, the generals + deprecated this possibility, noting that in a country like Chile a + certain number of people would vanish each year in any case; that it was + a favorite tactic of leftists to drop out of sight and obviously in + their interest to have their relatives charge that the government had + arrested them; and, by way of illustration, made the claim that 150 + Chileans had been found to be fighting in Angola, with 15 Chilean dead. + The generals responded to the Ambassador’s question as to the source of + this information, by saying they would try to get it. (Comment: We would + be interested to know if there is confirmation from any other source.) + In any case, General Benavides + put the number of disappearances since September 1973 at about 400, a + figure more than 50 PC lower than estimates of the ICRC and others interested in political + dissidents.

+

10. Conversation then turned to other measures GOC might possibly take. We suggested that any meaningful + relaxation of the state of siege would be helpful, and that if a new + internal security code were promulgated by GOC it might make this possible. It would be important, + however, that the code not contain within it Draconian sanctions such as + summary expulsions from the country, which although not unusual in + Chilean history, were widely repugnant elsewhere. Suggestion was also + made that GOC might wish to consult + some private outside authority on content of such a code, to ensure that + it would be in line with current legal thinking in democratic + societies.

+

11. Ambassador raised a further point in this connection. He noted that + the Directorate of National Intelligence (DINA) had attained an unenviable notoriety in the outside + world; it was being cited in tandem with SAVAK and the Korean CIA as a modern variety of gestapo. + Anything that could be done to limit its functions strictly to + intelligence, within the country, would be helpful. Perhaps its + personnel should be changed. Bejares commented that indeed DINA should be an intelligence rather than a police + organization.

+

12. Ambassador continued that with a less restrictive security policy it + might be possible for the government to build upon the credit already + gained by its release of prisoners, encouraging reconciliation with + moderate, non-violent opposition elements and incorporating the energies of these people in the + effort to rebuild Chile. The Generals agreed in principle. They said + that many of those released had been restored to their old jobs. Rather + interestingly, they expressed the view that many Marxists who had jobs + in the bureaucracy had been able to resist all coercive measures because + of civil service job protection provisions. They did not believe job + discrimination on account of political belief was a major factor in + Chile. (Comment: We disagree.)

+

13. Both Benavides and + Bejares expressed + appreciation for the frank exchange of views and suggested the + discussions be resumed at an opportune time.

+

14. Comment: We cite the points made by Benavides and Bejares not as necessarily indicative of the objective + situation in Chile, but rather of their state of mind and approach. We + believe we made some impression on them in indicating that the steps + they might take to clean up the Chilean situation would be fairly + considered in the ongoing U.S. evaluation of Chile, and with our + specifics as to the sort of thing the GOC might do. As in the case of our previous meeting, we + have the feeling that our views will be communicated to Pinochet; the + two generals are in his closest entourage. We would not be surprised if + the GOC announced some significant + further steps of relaxation before January 20.

+ + + Popper + + +
+ +
+ 256. Action Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for + Inter-American Affairs (Shlaudeman) to the Under Secretary of State for + Political Affairs (Habib) +

Summary: Shlaudeman reviewed the + investigation into the disappearance and death of Charles Horman and recommended + sending a telegram instructing the Embassy to re-interview + Rafael Gonzalez.

+

Source: Department of State, Virtual Reading Room, Chile + Declassification Project. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Shlaudeman on January 15, + 1977; cleared by McAfee + and Aldrich. Tabs 1 and 2 were not attached.

+ + + + + Washington, December + 29, 1976. + +

Investigating the Horman + Case +

+

As you may recall, two American citizens, Charles Horman and Frank Teruggi, were killed in the + aftermath of the Chilean Coup. We have not been able to establish responsibility in + either case, although the reasonable assumption is that both were + murdered by Chilean security forces or irregulars connected in some way + to those forces.

+

The death of Charles Horman in + particular has been the subject of extensive congressional and press + attention. Senator Javits has + continued over these past three years to demand a better accounting than + the Department is so far able to give him. In my confirmation hearings + last June I promised him that we would do everything possible to clear + up the case.

+

Behind much of the agitation over this affair is the allegation that + Horman was fingered by the + CIA. We have no evidence in support + of that contention, but a Chilean—one Rafael Gonzalez Verdugo—has made + statements to the press and to a consular officer directed at + implicating the Agency. Gonzalez, a permanent resident alien of the + United States with an American citizen wife, is currently in asylum in + the Italian Embassy in Santiago.

+

Some time ago I asked Fred Smith, + recently our Consul General in Mexico City, to examine the record of the + Horman case and give me + recommendations on what further action we might take. He has produced a + comprehensive report (Tab 2). Smith has recommended that Gonzalez be reinterviewed and + has drafted a set of very precise questions for the purpose (draft + telegram at Tab 1).

+

The Italians have been trying once again to persuade the Chilean + Government to let Gonzalez leave the country. I have been holding off + pending the results. It now appears that the Chileans are not about to + relent.

+

I believe we must now pursue the matter, although it is my own view that + the CIA was not involved in the + Horman tragedy. I have + cleared the attached cable with the CIA + and have made a few minor changes in the questions it contains at that + Agency’s suggestion.

+

Recommendation:

+

That you approve the telegram at Tab 1.

+ +
+
+ +
+ Colombia + +
+ 257. Ambassador’s Overview, Country Analysis and Strategy Paper +

Summary: Ambassador + Saccio informed the + Department that economic and military assistance, trade, and + high-level visits were the means by which the U.S. Government + could maintain pro-U.S. stability in Colombia.

+

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files, 1970–1973, + POL 1 COL–US. Secret. Sent + as an enclosure to airgram A–52 from Bogotá, March 13, 1973. On + February 5, the Ambassador informed the Department he thought + coffee, the Darien Gap, and narcotics would be the key issues in + U.S.-Colombian relations in the short- and medium-run. (Telegram + 958 from Bogotá, February 5; ibid., POL COL–US)

+ + + + + Bogotá, undated. + +

AMBASSADOR’S OVERVIEW

+

Colombia is one of the very few less developed countries that has + achieved considerable progress in finding solutions for basic economic + and social problems in a free and democratic context. While we do not + expect any significant change from this performance within the CASP timeframe, we do foresee within the + middle future—the next decade—the probability of political instability + and deterioration of the present social system. Some of the principal + factors which will contribute to these developments include: a) high + population growth, b) rapid urban growth, c) insufficient savings and + capital investment, d) depletion of natural resources, e) an increase in + misguided nationalism and f) an incapacity to develop rapidly enough to + meet the challenge posed by the more severe problems the future will + bring. Progress will continue to be made, but with cities growing at six + and seven per cent each year (doubling in size in less than twelve + years) there will be serious problems involved in attempting to increase + employment and redistribute income.

+

During the CASP timeframe we expect no + startling political changes and no major social or economic upheavals. + The threat of an unguided populist “revolution” has considerably + diminished as a result of the severe loss suffered by General Rojas + Pinilla’s ANAPO in last year’s + election and the present disorganized leadership of that party. The + established parties are again dominant, and the partial dismantling of + the National Front agreement that will permit the participation of all + political parties in the 1974 presidential election comes at a most + propitious time for the change-over.

+ +

The situation will in fact be measurably better if the Liberals take to + heart the bitter political lessons of the past and decide to present + only one candidate. In the best of possible situations this would mean, + we believe, a victory by a comfortable if not overwhelming majority for + the Liberal candidate and a Liberal majority in the Congress. The + alternative is a divided government: a plurality president, Liberal or + Conservative, and a split Congress. This would not be a catastrophe, + however. The Colombian political system is sufficiently flexible and + stable, as the National Front experiment itself has proven, to permit + the normal functioning of the government under trying conditions.

+

The ideological differences between the two most probable candidates of + the traditional parties are not so great as to threaten the workings of + the present system. The probable Liberal candidate is slightly left of + center, and the probable conservative candidate is, in our terms, a + moderate conservative, who is already aware that a laissez-faire response to Colombia’s problems is not possible. + We do not expect, in any event, that either a Liberal or Conservative + government will be successful in finding solutions to Colombia’s long + term basic problems, which are bound to become more acute as the decade + advances.

+

How are U.S. interests involved? Though the next two years require no + drastic change in our approach or effort aside from a little more + attention to specific areas such as economic assistance, trade, military + assistance and high level exchanges of visits, now might very well be + the time, in view of our fears as to what the middle future otherwise + holds for us, to give thought to what changes should be made in our + longer term programs. In fact, in the event of any widespread + agricultural disaster, such as frustration of India’s hopes for the + forthcoming monsoon or another hard year for Soviet agriculture, we + shall be in the middle future sooner than we plan. Population will + “catch up” and surpass the food supply sooner than the green revolution + had given us hope to expect. The repercussions in Latin America can + easily be predicted.

+

Barring this or a similar catastrophe in the next two years in the + resource or world trade field, we will have no basic problems in our + relations with Colombia. Our bilateral assistance program, even if we + begin its gradual reduction during the CASP timeframe, will continue to be a political asset. It + would also be helpful to recognize more fully Colombia’s importance to + us by an interchange of high-level visits, i.e. a State visit by + President Pastrana and, in due + time, his successor, with a return visit by President Nixon, if he should visit Latin + America or a visit by the Secretary or Under Secretary of State.

+

Colombia is primarily concerned, at least on the political surface of the + Inter-American system, with trade preferences in the world markets and + commodity agreements, specifically coffee, and with bridging the widening gap between rich + and poor nations. Colombia desires a more substantial transfer of the + resources and technology necessary for development—but free of burdens + which could become onerous even for Colombia.

+

Because of the multilateral nature of the problem, we have not included + coffee as one of the major issues in the CASP. Nevertheless, I want to emphasize that Colombia’s + concern over the coffee issue is one of the primary irritants in our + bilateral relations. The President and Foreign Minister have repeatedly + emphasized that our bilateral assistance in no way makes up for the + losses in the purchasing power of its coffee income which Colombia has + sustained as the result of dollar devaluations and their effect on + Colombia’s terms of trade outside the dollar area.

+

Another major concern of the Colombian government is its position + vis-à-vis the developed nations, especially the United States, in the + world trade arena. Any steps which the United States could take to open + up greater opportunities for Colombian exports would have a significant + and beneficial impact on our relations, as well as on the economy of + Colombia.

+

Concerning the Law of the Sea, the GOC + still feels that consultations over a matter of such great mutual + concern should be much closer than they have been in the past. Visits to + Colombia by high level U.S. officials, suggested in the body of the + CASP, could help assure that + Colombia maintains its present LOS + position and continue to serve as a bridge between the 200 mile states + and the more restrictive position of the United States.

+

We obviously are seriously limited in responding effectively to these + concerns, just as Colombia and Latin America are limited in making the + corresponding bootstrap effort, but undoubtedly we must attempt to + respond if we consider the Inter-American system important to our + well-being and security. Current proposals for U.S. withdrawal from the + Inter-American system are not mere intellectual exercises, but reflect a + growing disillusionment with what many Latin Americans consider a + half-hearted U.S. commitment to the system.

+

[Omitted here are the FY 74 Policy and + Resource Planning Table; Section II, Analysis of Major Issues; Section + III, Interest, Policy and Resource Analysis; and Annex A, Summary of + Resources.]

+
+ +
+ 258. Telegram 1735/Secto 188 From the Embassy in Jamaica to the + Department of State +

Summary: Pastrana + and Rogers discussed the + inter-American system, law of the sea, military and economic + assistance, coffee policy, and narcotics.

+

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files, 1970–1973, + POL COL–US. Confidential; + Immediate. Repeated to Bogotá. Rogers was in Jamaica as part of a May 12–28 + trip to Latin America. The Department prepared a background + paper on Colombian coffee for the Secretary. (Ibid.) On May 11, + Nixon wrote to + Pastrana that the + Colombians should feel free to raise any matters with Rogers. + (Ibid., Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 751, Presidential Correspondence, + Republic of Colombia, Bogotá, Dr. Misael Pastrana Borrero) In telegram + 4363 from Bogotá, May 26, the Ambassador transmitted a summary + of Rogers’s May 17 meeting with Vázquez, in which they discussed the law of the + sea, the Quita Sueño issue, the OAS structure, and the transfer of U.S. technology + to the Soviets. (Ibid., RG 59, Central Files, 1970–1973, ORG 7 + S)

+ + + + + Kingston, May 28, 1973, 0230Z. + +

1735. Secto 188. Subj: SecVisit LA: + Secretary Rogers—Conversation + with Colombia President Pastrana, May 18, 1973.

+

1. Secretary of State William P. + Rogers met with President of the Republic of Colombia + Misael Pastrana Borrero at Casa + Bolivar, Bogota, Colombia, May 18, 1973, at 11 am. Participants were: + Colombian side—President Pastrana, FonMin Alfredo Vazquez Carrizosa; US + side—Secretary Rogers, Assistant + Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs Jack Kubish, US Ambassador + to Colombia Leonard J. + Saccio.

+

2. The President noted first the importance of reviving the InterAmerican + System—that it should perform much more effectively in the economic + field. The Secretary indicated and the Foreign Minister agreed that the + two had had a very constructive talk the day before on the subject.

+

3. On the Law of the Sea the President referred to the conclusions of the + Santo Domingo conference last year; that the Latin American countries + had almost all agreed to the basic Colombian proposal of the patrimonial + sea. There remains Brazil which once it decides to accept the Colombian + proposal will carry the two remaining countries, Peru and Ecuador. The + President believes Brazil can be persuaded. Colombia is in a special + position having coastlines both in the Pacific and the Atlantic + (Caribbean). The Caribbean requires a special regimen being a mare + nostrum. The Secretary suggested that Colombia was in a better position + to urge agreement among the Hemisphere nations and that he would + appreciate such an effort. The US would be suspected of trying to + dominate these countries if it tried to get such agreement.

+

4. The President noted that the relations between our two countries are + very satisfactory and expressed his gratitude for our assistance in his + program of economic development and social progress. He emphasized the importance of the social + factor and mentioned specifically the education program in which there + has been added some one million places at the elementary level; the + health loan—the first of its kind in the world; the recently signed + low-cost housing loan and the Urban Regional Sector Loan in the + development of 42 cities (population 30,000 to 100,000) to stem the flow + of migration to the four big cities.

+

5. As to the terms and conditions of loan assistance he repeated what he + had told the Ambassador and Mr. Weissman earlier in the week as to the + nature of his problem, namely the lack of flexibility in solving + budgetary problems to meet changing conditions once sectoral loans are + signed. This was not to say he disagrees with the conditions of the + loans. He is a firm believer in self-help and the need for a national + effort. The proof is in how Colombia has performed in this regard. The + Secretary said this matter would be reviewed on his return to + Washington.

+

6. The President then turned to coffee and made an impassioned plea that + the US adopt a positive long-term policy both from the point of view of + the benefit to the US in being responsive to the most important problem + of substantial number of Hemisphere countries and from that of the + importance economically and socially to these countries. He emphasized + the importance of a positive view by the United States even if quote we + don’t come to an agreement unquote.

+

7. In his presentation he made the following points:

+

(A) that Colombia very much wants continuation of an effective + international agreement.

+

(B) That President Nixon’s report + to the US Congress on coffee pointed up that the price of coffee had + risen a moderate percentage compared to the very substantial percentage + increase in the other food products over a period of years.

+

(C) That coffee was a small farmer’s business in Colombia, some two + million out of a population of twenty-two million depending on it for + their livelihood.

+

(D) That distribution of the proceeds of coffee production represents one + of the best methods of the equitable distribution of wealth in the + country.

+

(E) That the current price of coffee is at the same level it was thirty + years ago.

+

(F) That US policy on coffee is of extreme importance since coffee is a + major factor in the economy of fourteen countries;

+

(G) In explaining the importance of the factor of equitable distribution + of wealth, the President stated that 38 cents of each coffee dollar went + to the producer, the rest is used in the economic and social development + of the coffee area (including health, school and family services).

+ +

8. The Secretary asked what was the reason for the creation of the + Producer’s Corporation (intended to manage the market) if Colombia is so + concerned that the international pact be continued. The President + explained that the present high price of coffee is due to special + circumstances and is unlikely to be maintained indefinitely. The coffee + cycle is usually three years which means that they would be faced again + with the problem of low prices in the near future. He said that Colombia + is very much concerned that there be stability of economic policy. He + implied that the corporation was of a temporary nature by saying that it + was exploratory and an experiment and at the present time the best and + easiest device that could be adopted to manage the market. The Secretary + noted the existence of such a corporation would be considered a Cartel + operation by our Congress. The President acknowledged this difficulty + but said it was important that the Executive Branch (of the US) should + be on their side. He emphasized again that Colombia was interested in + stability rather than speculation; that in this respect the pact had + been a good experience and they wanted very much that it be + continued.

+

9. President Pastrana addressed + himself to the military assistance program and emphasized the need for + adequate equipment to fight guerrillas and possibly clear them out from + the remote inaccessible areas of the country. He realized that some of + our difficulties are due to the fact that our two countries have + different budget years, and hoped that problems of this sort would be + solved since it was far better for Colombia to buy armaments from the US + than from other countries. He mentioned the requirements for helicopters + but did not go into detail. The Ambassador noted that he was ready to + discuss a five-year plan with the President on the entire military + assistance program, that time had not permitted him to do so before the + arrival of the Secretary.

+

10. On the subject of drug abuse, the President noted that he had + appointed a new Minister of Justice, a young man with drive who is + determined to resolve the problems of organization and coordination, he + mentioned the proposed law that had been approved by the Senate and + would surely be approved by the House of Representatives when Congress + met in regular session in July; also the recent decree providing for the + destruction of confiscated drugs. He assured the Secretary that his + government was determined to tackle the problem with all its resources + and he welcomed our cooperation. He mentioned the need for equipment, at + which point the Ambassador informed him that we had been authorized to + make available equipment in connection with the organization of the + program of the new Minister, a sum of over $400,000.

+ + Rogers + +
+ +
+ 259. Memorandum From William J. + Jorden of the National Security Council Staff to the + President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) +

Summary: Jorden informed Kissinger that the Embassy had told members of + the Colombian Government that the expropriation of the + International Mining Company would damage bilateral + relations.

+

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Country Files, Box 779, + Latin America, Colombia, Vol. 1, 1969–1970. Confidential. Sent + for information. In an undated memorandum, Scowcroft informed Jorden that Kissinger wanted him to write + a shorter memorandum for the President on IMC, which “emphasize[d] actions + the U.S. Government is taking.” (Ibid.) On September 10, + Jorden drafted the + memorandum for Kissinger, which informed the President that Embassy + officials had spoken to the Ministers of Finance, Mines, and + President of the Central Bank. Scowcroft wrote on the covering memorandum, + “HAK does not wish to + forward [to the President]. BS.” (Ibid.)

+ + + + + Washington, August + 10, 1973. + + + SUBJECT + Possible Expropriation of US Mining Company in Colombia + +

You asked for a report on this matter.

+

The Problem

+

Ten days ago, the Colombian Minister of Mines (strongly anti-American) + sent to the Senate a bill that would permit expropriation of the + US-owned International Mining Company without cash compensation. If + passed and put into effect, the action would trigger US sanctions. Under + the Hickenlooper amendment, we would have to cut off aid to Colombia (approximately $85 million + in FY 1973). The Gonzalez amendment + would require us to vote against loans for Colombia in multilateral + institutions.

+

Background

+

+ IMC has been operating gold mines in + Colombia for 50 years. It owns the mines and there is no contractual + agreement. In recent years, the company had been losing money and was + actively seeking Colombian participation, private or public. Now, with + world gold prices at record highs, the company is showing a profit. I + gather the company is unpopular in the region where it operates. This + may be because of company actions or merely because it is foreign-owned, + extractive and paternalistic. In any event, the ill feeling against the + company makes expropriation attractive politically.

+

In March, the Colombian Government made an offer for 51% interest in the + company. It would have made no cash payment but would have given the + company other advantages—new concessions, a higher level of profit remittances, assumption + of debts, etc. The company said “no.” For its part, IMC wants payment not only for assets + (some $2–4 million) but for gold still in the ground (estimated at $20 + million).

+

Current State of Play

+

+ IMC-Colombian negotiations are + continuing. There is some brinkmanship on both sides. The company knows + that the Colombians will not want to risk the US sanctions that would + probably follow expropriation. But the Government has a politically + popular issue and it knows the company will not want to lose everything. + Both company and Colombian officials seem privately confident that an + acceptable agreement can be worked out. The proposed legislation is read + by the company and by our Embassy as more of a “club” in the negotiating + process than a precursor of likely action. What Colombia wants seems to + be a joint venture with continued IMC + management. The sticking point—for both parties—will be the price.

+

US Actions

+

We have been doing some quiet missionary work with other members of the + Colombian Government, underlining the unfortunate effects on Colombia of + precipitate action. The Finance Minister, President of the Central Bank, + and others reportedly are deeply concerned (once they realized what was + happening) and opposed to expropriation without some agreement + acceptable to IMC. We have also called + in the Ambassador here and conveyed our concern. He is close to + President Pastrana and has + undoubtedly passed the word along.

+

It now appears that cooler heads will prevail on this matter, but we must + keep after it. Meantime, the company appears satisfied with the + prospects and has asked for no US governmental intervention—though they + are pleased with what we have done so far. Incidentally, the Colombian + Government is proud of its past good record on investment disputes. The + Colombians bargain hard—as they did on the recent Texaco and Mobil Oil + cases—but have reached agreements in the past with the companies + concerned.

+

Conclusion

+

This now seems to be moving in the right direction toward an eventual + settlement. But the capacity of Latin Americans to cut off their noses + to spite their faces is unbounded.

+
+ +
+ 260. Telegram 8786 From the Embassy in Colombia to the Department of + State +

Summary: The + Embassy assessed the Pastrana government’s prospects and Colombia’s + problems in light of the upcoming presidential elections.

+

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + [no film number]. Confidential. Repeated to Cali, Medellín, and + USCINCSO.

+ + + + + Bogota, October 26, 1973, 1715Z. + +

8786. Subj: Policy Problems for Colombia and the US in an Election + Year.

+

Summary: The Pastrana + Administration has provided solid, sensible government for four and one + half years but has never distinguished itself by its dynamism. Now, with + elections six months off, and deprived of a number of experienced + officials who have left their posts to run for office, the + administration finds itself less efficient at the same time that + economic problems increase in severity: Inflation is up sharply, there + is a serious budget deficit and tax revenues are not keeping pace with + the need. Electoral considerations and a weakened administration mean + that the govt probably will not correct the fiscal situation. Therefore + the mission has postponed the signing of two new sector loans in + education and agriculture. We believe the situation to be short-term and + that once the elections are over administration will become more + forceful. Unless the political situation changes dramatically in the + next few months, either Alfonso + Lopez, the Liberal candidate, or Alvaro Gomez, the + Conservative, will win the presidency. Either man can be expected to + pursue domestic and foreign policies that in the main mesh with US + interests. End summary.

+

1. Inflation, budgetary deficits and insufficient tax revenues are three + of the most serious economic problems currently facing the Govt of + Colombia. The process of treating these problems in a balanced manner is + complicated by a decline in the capacity of the administration and by + the April 1974 Presidential and Congressional elections, the first since + the establishment of the national front in 1958 in which the Presidency + is wide open and parity between the two traditional parties is not + required in Congress. The purpose of this message is to discuss these + developments more fully and analyze their consequences for US + policy.

+

2. Turning first to economic questions, inflation in Colombia is running + at about 25 percent; the figure is somewhat higher among the poor, who + spend most of their earnings on food. This would not be an alarming + figure in many countries, but it is in Colombia, a nation that has + followed a developmental pattern based on a policy of cheap labor and low prices. Not only are + prices high, but many basic commodities such as wheat, milk and cooking + oil are in short supply. These increases and shortages are serious and + in an effort to help out I have strongly urged that we respond + positively to Colombia’s request for PL–480 commodities.

+

3. Unless the situation I have described eases we can expect strikes and + demonstrations and extremist elements may well be able to turn protests + to their advantage. In the eyes of many Colombians, protests will be + justified; profits are up, coffee prices are high, exports and + construction are booming, and business and industry are generally in + good shape.

+

4. We might expect that in a prosperous economy afflicted by inflation + and shortage the government would improve its tax collections and impose + new sources of revenue. It is an unfortunate fact that tax collections + have not kept pace with inflation and evasion is widespread. Nor has the + government been able to get new tax measures through the Congress. There + is almost no chance that the current session of Congress which ends on + December 15 will enact any fiscal legislation.

+

5. As a result of the government’s poor fiscal performance budget + deficits have increased and current deficits will go higher as the + administration subsidizes wheat and other primary food products to hold + down food prices between now and the election. The government recently + announced a ten percent reduction in public spending in an attempt to + keep the deficits to a more manageable level. It remains to be seen how + successful this effort will be; in many cases it may mean nothing more + than the postponement by a few months of necessary expenditures. Even if + the government were to reduce costs by the full ten percent, which we + doubt it can do, the year’s deficit would still be about the same as + last year in real terms which represented a sizeable increase over + 1971.

+

6. Another facet of the over-all problem is the style of the Pastrana government and the fact that + some key officials have resigned in order to be eligible for elective + office. Pastrana did not in the + past exercise imaginative leadership, but attempted to govern on the + basis of consensus. He is as decisive now as at any time in the past, + but the economic problems that beset the nation and the prospect of the + elections make it difficult for him to control his bureaucracy and to + make it function in a coherent manner.

+

7. One factor that must be considered when we discuss GOC performance is the possibility that + Liberals and Conservatives will act partially on behalf of their + parties. Non-civil service government jobs are divided fifty-fifty + between Liberals and Conservatives and many officials are in a position + to influence the elections. Liberal leaders are satisfied that Pastrana, a Conservative, is and will + remain impartial, but they are less confident about other Conservatives + in the administration.

+ +

8. Election campaign To the foregoing we must add the stresses and + strains of an election year. In order to reduce civil strife and + political hubris the leaders of the Liberal and Conservative parties + agreed in the late 1950’s to share power for 12 years, later extended to + 16 years. This year that part of the pact affecting the Presidency and + the Congress comes to an end and the Liberal and Conservative parties + each have Presidential candidates.

+

9. The front runner at the moment is the Liberal, Alfonso Lopez Michelsen, who in his + own self interest will attempt to avoid demagogy and project an image of + statesmanship and moderation. Whether Lopez succeeds depends not so much + on his own inclinations but on his opponents, the conservative, Alvaro + Gomez Hurtado, and the third party Anapo candidate, Maria Eugena Rojas de Moreno, the daughter + of the old dictator.

+

10. For all his high intelligence and breeding, Gomez has a reputation + for using tough tactics when indicated. He has already told us that he + could not exclude the possibility that his followers would take the + gloves off as the campaign develops. Moreover it would be unreasonable + to expect that the populist, xenophobic Anapo would hesitate to go to extremes if it could thereby + improve its chances in the Presidential race. The Anapo candidate, Mrs. Moreno, has no + chance of winning but hopes for a sizeable Congressional delegation.

+

11. The most likely winner is Lopez, who is a moderate despite + conservative rhetoric to the contrary. Some of Lopez’ advisors are + disappointed thus far in his vague campaign statements and lack of + toughness with Gomez; if they have their way we can expect Lopez to + sharpen his campaign after the first of the year. Gomez would respond in + kind and the US would inevitably become the butt of campaign rhetoric. + Lopez can be counted upon to cooperate with the US in most areas of + domestic and foreign policy although we believe he will move fairly + quickly to establish relations with Cuba and the People’s Republic of + China, as well as to identify more closely with third world aspirations. + A Gomez victory would mean a continuation of current GOC policies with perhaps a slight turn to + the right on foreign affairs. In any event, the US will have little + trouble accomodating to either Lopez or Gomez, or they to us.

+

12. Implications for US policy. The obvious conclusion I believe is that + we must exercise special prudence and care over the next several months + to avoid being drawn into the developing political maelstrom.

+

13. On the diplomatic side these changes are necessarily more of style + and nuance than substance. We will need to be more careful in + documenting our responses to any changes in our policy which could + affect the GOC’s capacity to plan and + execute programs. Our inability, thus far, to respond to their PL–480 wheat needs is a good if unfortunate + example and we have left + the GOC under no illusions regarding + its prospects. It will also mean holding the number of high level visits + to a minimum.

+

14. Inevitably, however, the most important change involves the aid program, the largest in Latin America, + which until this year has averaged over $80 million per annum.

+

15. Primarily as a result of the budget squeeze the GOC has been unable to meet its local + currency contribution to the aid + supported sectors. Even before the announced ten percent expenditure + reductions the GOC and the mission had + agreed to between a 15 to 20 percent mutual reduction in sector + disbursements this year. This followed high level GOC public pronouncements that our + assistance was inflationary and that more flexibility was required to + ease the situation. As a result of the new 10 percent budget cut we are + expecting another reduction in aid + targets.

+

16. After frank and harmonious discussions, the aid director and I have decided to postpone the signing of + two new sector loans in education and agriculture. In addition we are + insisting the aid disbursements on + secto loans not get too far ahead of GOC contributions. We are also watching very closely the + GOC treasury float which in effect + allows aid funds to be temporarily used + to pay non-development type expenditures.

+

17. Last Feb, President Pastrana + criticized the International Lending Agencies requirement of local cost + expenditure obligations and specifically pointed out that sector loans + (read aid) demand matching resource allocations by the debtor country. + This reaction by the President stemmed from our practice of disbursing + most of our loans and then applying pressure in the last months of the + year for the GOC to come up with the + necessary counterpart as a condition precedent to obtaining new loans. + Given the lackluster performance of the government and the dim short + term prospects for increased efficiency, I believe it is only prudent to + not repeat this exercise.

+

18. I have not intended to paint a pessimistic picture regarding the + future of Colombia but rather to describe a difficult but temporary + problem situation which calls for, I believe, a shift from an exposed, + aggressive policy of all out cooperation with the developmental agencies + of the government to a more subdued, less vulnerable position. I wish to + emphasize the transitional nature of this situation and express my + conviction that within a very short time after the new government takes + office we can expect a return to a competent, purposeful government + committed to economic and social development in a democratic framework + and able and willing to utilize our bilateral assistance to that + end.

+ + + White + + +
+ +
+ 261. Telegram 1 From the Embassy in Colombia to the Department of + State +

Summary: + Predicting victory by the liberal candidate, Alfonso López Michelsen, the + Embassy discussed the electoral campaign and mentioned that U.S. + policy had not been an issue in the campaign.

+

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + [no film number]. Confidential. Repeated to San José, Cali, + Medellín, and USCINCSO.

+ + + + + Bogota, January 2, 1974, 1443Z. + +

1. Subj: Presidential Campaign: Yearend Roundup.

+

Begin summary. Presidential elections will be held on Apr 21, 74. The + Liberal candidate, Alfonso Lopez + Michelsen, is acknowledged to be the front runner; Alvaro + Gomez, the Conservative, is waging a well financed, intelligent + campaign, but it is doubtful he can overcome the Liberal majority. The + Anapo candidate, Maria Eugenia + Rojas de Moreno is campaigning vigorously, but the strategy she is using + seems to be losing her votes to Gomez on the right without any + appreciable gains on the left. The campaign has been marked by restraint + and there is little likelihood of serious outbreaks of violence. Pres. + Pastrana, a Conservative, + is completely impartial, as is the military establishment. Up to now the + US and its policies have not been an issue in the campaign. End + summary.

+

1. By the end of 73 the Pres. campaign had been in full swing for over + three months, with almost four months to go before elections on Apr 21, + 74. The Anapo candidate, Maria + Eugenia Rojas de Moreno, kept on working thru the holidays and the + Conservative, Alvaro Gomez, made a last-minute decision to do the same. + Alfonso Lopez, the Liberal, + went to the US for several days rest.

+

2. Lopez is the acknowledged front runner in the campaign despite his + lack of charisma, contradictory statements, vague programs and inability + to communicate effectively with masses of people. Many reports are + circulating about his poor health and heavy drinking, but those who know + him best tell us he is in better shape now than at any time in the last + eight or ten years. He does not enjoy really good health, but he seems + to be holding up well enough under the strains of the campaign. Mrs. + Moreno and Gomez are working the hardest, with Lopez moving along at a + measured pace to protect his health. Both Gomez and Moreno are in + excellent physical condition. Mrs. Moreno plans to visit two-thirds of + Colombia’s 922 municipios before election day and to hold 300 rallies in + Bogota, where she has her own following and is counting on a large vote + from the lower classes.

+ +

3. Some of the more important issues the candidates have discussed to + date have been the cost of living, education and other govt services, + corruption in govt, agrarian reform and agric production and personal + security. The real issue, however, which encompasses all of these, is + stability and consolidation vs. continued attempts at social change with + the resultant shocks to society. Gomez believes that many people are + tired of new laws, reforms and social programs. He cannot openly say so, + but he is getting the message across that if you want a breather after + so many years of change, or talk of change, vote for Alvaro. The heart + of his message is let’s settle down, stimulate production and exports + and by this means develop a truly strong and healthy society. Lopez + talks about the need for continued social progress, redistribution of + income, the great Liberal traditions, but his heart seems not to be in + what he is saying. Still, he represents the forces of moderate change + and the issue is clearly drawn, if unspoken. Mrs. Moreno espouses a + mixture of populism and socialism. The Anapo campaign theme is “Socialismo a La Colombiana”, + defined as positive nationalism, Colombia for the Colombians, opposition + to imperialism from all quarters, access by the little man to education, + credit, housing and jobs and participation of all classes in govt. To + date none of the candidates has dragged the US into the campaign, nor + would be proposed policies of either Gomez or Lopez be detrimental to US + interests. Mrs. Moreno has no chance of winning and the Anapo rhetoric, in any event, is just + that.

+

4. If Alvaro Gomez is to have any chance of winning, he needs to rally as + many Conservative Anapistas to his banner as he can. His strategy has + been to brand Anapo as Marxist and + Communist, thus scaring many Conservative Anapistas in rural Colombia + back into their party of origin. Mrs. Moreno is furious at the tactic, + which appears to be working well, and she lashes out at Gomez at every + opportunity. Unfortunately for Moreno, she has played into Gomez’ hands. + The backbone of Anapo has always been + Conservative votes, even though many Liberals went over to the third + party after Alfonso Lopez + entered govt in 67. Now, most Liberal Anapistas are back with Lopez, but + Moreno and her advisors, rather than attempt to build on the + Conservative base, have alienated this sector by taking on leftist + advisors and spouting leftist jargon. The candidate’s husband, Senator + Samuel Moreno, has convinced her that she must seek the votes of the + urban poor and the resentful—those who have a grudge against the present + system. The strategy probably is not picking up left of center votes, + but it certainly seems to be helping Alvaro Gomez on the right. As for + the far left, this element has always been a minor factor in Colombian + political life; of the few votes that are out there, most are already + committed to the leftist coalition candidate of UNO (Union of National + Opposition). The only + element in the Anapo strategy that + makes sense has to do with the probability that General Rojas will die + before the next scheduled Pres. elections in 78. Once he goes there is + little chance his daughter can keep the allegiance of his followers. In + the circumstances, her advisors believe they must seek now to establish + a new-political base on which to build. Although Moreno talks about + winning, what she and the top leadership want is to keep the Party alive + and return as large a delegation as possible to the Congress.

+

5. By far the most money has been spent by Alvaro Gomez; his campaign is + well-financed and his first name covers the country (an attempt to + disassociate him from the name of Gomez, which is anathema to hundreds + of thousands of Liberals because of their belief that Alvaro’s father + initiated and fanned the violence of the forties and early fifties). The + Liberals tell us they have enough money to do all the advertising needed + and that they will begin to spend heavily for propaganda in January. + Anapo is hard up for money, but + there are enough aspirants for Congressional seats to finance Mrs. + Moreno’s rallies. A Conservative close to Gomez has told us that there + is now 46,000,000 pesos in the Conservative Pres campaign chest (one + peso equals four US cents) and that at least that much more will be + collected and spent before the elections. The Liberals have much less + cash in hand than the Conservatives and calculate that the Lopez + campaign will cost a total of 66,000,000 pesos. The campaigns of + Congressional candidates and those for local offices are not included in + these figures.

+

6. One of the great unknowns for the Liberals is the attitude former Pres + Carlos Lleras Restrepo will finally adopt. When 73 began Lleras was the + supreme leader of the Liberal party, busily engaged in reorganizing + party structures and coyly preparing the way for his own candidacy. As + the year closed he had no official status in the party, refused to speak + out on political matters, and had made no endorsement of Lopez. After + Lopez beat him in June for the Liberal party nomination Lleras sulked + for months. Lleristas are concerned that unless their leader jumps into + the campaign they will be left unprotected in the jockeying for position + on the electoral lists and will have no claim on choice jobs in the next + administration. It would appear that Lleras needs a bit more time to get + over his defeat; he also seems to want Lopez to come to him to say “we + need you”, at which time he can demand some concessions on strategies + and programs. He no longer considers Lopez a friend and is known to be + out of sympathy with the campaign and Lopez’ treatment of the issues. + The ex-president has many supporters, but just as many enemies. Most of + the latter are to be found around Lopez and Party Dir Julio Cesar + Turbay. These are the men who are running the Liberal Party today and we + doubt they will crawl to Lleras after suffering real or imagined hurts + at his hands for so many years. + One factor that may influence Lleras to enter the campaign is the chance + to smash Gomez. A mob burned his house in 1952 and it is widely believed + that young Gomez organized and led the arsonists. Lleras told a friend a + few weeks ago that he would enter the campaign only if Gomez had a + chance of winning and his info as of early Dec was that the Liberals + were so strong in all of Colombia’s cities that Gomez could not possibly + win. Nevertheless, Lleras needs the Liberal party more than the party + needs him at this point and we expect to see him working for the ticket + not later than March first.

+

7. One question very much on the minds of Colombian leaders is whether + there will be a return to violence in the first freely contested + National elections since 1949. Lopez and Gomez are determined to keep + the campaign from degenerating into name-calling and bloodshed and + agreed before the campaign started to investigate all incidents and fix + blame impartially. Unfortunately, the Liberal and Conservative press + have not done much to maintain the dialogue on an unemotional plane, but + the candidates have so far shown restraint in their public remarks. The + Liberals are confident of victory and certainly have no need to arouse + old hatreds. Gomez, on the other hand, is in a very real dilemma. He is + counting on Lopez’ lack of charisma and Liberal divisions to cause a + high rate of abstention among Liberals on election day and hopes to + squeeze to a narrow victory with the votes of former Anapistas and an + aroused Conservative party. His problem, however, is how to keep the + Conservative party at a high pitch of enthusiams without using the + Liberals as a whipping post. So far, he has trod carefully in this area + in order not to provoke a backlash that would sink him under an + avalanche of Liberal votes. Mrs. Moreno is a close friend of Lopez and + they have scrupulously avoided attacking each other. Lopez has construed + certain constitutional provisions to mean he can appoint Anapistas to + his govt, despite the requirement for parity in non-civil service jobs + between Liberals and Conservatives. He believes the best means to put an + end to Anapo as a major opposition + force is to co-opt it into the govt.

+

8. Pres Pastrana is maintaining + an absolutely impartial stance in the campaign. So well is he succeeding + that Liberals hold him above suspicion, while Conservatives complain + that the least a Conservative Pres should do is to tilt his impartiality + slightly toward his coreligionaries. Pastrana is not a strong exec, however, and Liberals + complain that some conservatives in key govt jobs are using their + offices to benefit the Gomez candidacy. The Liberals have half the govt + and we doubt they are less adept than the Conservatives in the political + uses of public office. The army is completely neutral and there is no + possibility of any military interference in the electoral process, + either before or after the elections.

+

9. We will submit more detailed statistical analyses later, but for now + it is enough to keep in mind that of Colombia’s 22 departments the only ones considered to be + solidly in the Conservative column are Antioquia, Boyaca, Caldas, + Guajira, Huila, Narino and Santander. The overall Conservative margin in + these seven depts probably will not amount to more than 200,000 votes. + The Liberals can wipe out that margin in Bogota alone if they get out + the vote here. In short, Alvaro Gomez is waging an uphill fight. He has + the money, the organizational skills and political instincts to close + the gap appreciably but probably not enough to win.

+ + + White + + +
+ +
+ 262. Telegram 3504 From the Embassy in Colombia to the Department of + State +

Summary: In + reporting López’s + victory in the presidential election, the Embassy commented on + the high abstention rate, the low conservative vote, and the + Liberals’ control of both Houses of Congress.

+

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + D740096–1180. Confidential; Immediate. Repeated to Cali, + Medellín, and USCINCSO. On + July 14, Vaky reported + on the Electoral Court’s official vote tally for the + presidential election. Out of a total of 5,174,224 votes cast, + López received + 2,911,292; Gómez received 136,736; Rojas de Moreno received + 490,530; Echeverri received 136, 736; and Duarte received 5,657. + (Telegram 6256 from Bogotá, July 16; ibid.) In an August 5 + memorandum, the CIA concluded + that while López would + probably be more aggressive than his predecessors in reaching + out to Communist countries, and while he might criticize some + aspects of U.S. policy, the new Colombian President saw his + criticism as constructive and therefore it would not damage + bilateral ties. (Central Intelligence Agency, Office of Support + Services (DI), Job 79T00863A: Intel Pub Files, Box 34, Folder 1: + Colombia Under A New President, No. 1035/74)

+ + + + + Bogota, April 24, 1974, 2306Z. + +

3504. Subj: Election Analysis.

+

1. With almost all votes counted and a breakdown available by department, + we are now in a position to offer a preliminary analysis of the + elections.

+

2. The most striking features of the election were the high abstention + rate, the low Conservative vote, the virtual demise of Anapo and the absolute majority for the + Liberals that will give them clear control of both Houses of + Congress.

+

3. That a smaller percentage of eligible voters should go to the polls in + this, the first Liberal/Conservative face-off in National Elections in + twenty-eight years, than in 1970 is a source of speculation and + wonderment. The Liberal vote was just about what we had anticipated, but Conservatives abstained in + large numbers as did Anapistas. The great mass that has never voted + remained out of the electoral process again this year.

+

4. With respect to the Conservatives, what seems to have happened is that + Gomez’ strategy of not provoking the Liberals into a massive turnout was + successful, but with Conservatives, not Liberals. Gomez’ cool and bland + approach left Conservatives in a distinctly apathetic mood. Nor did + Gomez’ hopes for an overwhelming return of Conservative Anapistas to + their former party materialize. Rather than vote for either Gomez or the + Anapo candidate, Mrs. Moreno, + they stayed home on election day. In comparing the 74 and 70 elections, + there is a close correlation in many departments between the drop-off in + the Anapo vote from 70 and the + decrease in the Conservative vote. For example, in the department of + Cordoba the Conservatives (including Conservative Anapistas) received + 79,000 votes in 70, of which 41,000 went to Anapo. In 74, Anapo + received 5,000 votes in Cordoba, down 36,000 from 70. The Conservatives + won 42,000, down 35,000 from the combined Conservative Anapo total in 70. This pattern was + repeated throughout the nation, although it does not hold in every + instance.

+

5. Another factor in the route of the Conservatives was the inactivity of + the progressives in that party. The leaders of that group, Belisario + Betancur, a proven vote getter, Hernan Jaramillo and J. Emilio + Valderrama, remained on the sidelines throughout the campaign. Their + followers were treated harshly by Bertha De Ospina and the old + Lareanistas and received poor position, or no position, on Congressional + lists. In the wake of defeat the recriminations we anticipated in Bogota + A–51 of March 14, 1974 have begun and the Conservative party has entered + into what promises to be its most difficult period in many years.

+

6. The Liberals who went to the polls seemed not so much inspired by + Lopez, a most uncharismatic figure, as they were impelled by fear that + Gomez might win. Despite Gomez expensive effort to present himself as a + man of peace (an effort that included posters showing him holding a + dove), many voters saw in him the spirit of his father, Laureano, and + hustled to the polls to vote against the old man.

+

7. As for Anapo, the movement may well + be finished as a major opposition force. The few Congressmen elected on + the Anapo ticket probably will drift + back to their old parties. Mrs. Moreno has made brave statements that + she intends to keep the organization together and prepare for 1978, but + no one believes her. Not only did she lose the Conservative Anapo vote, but the urban Liberals on + whom she counted decisively rejected her and her party. The person most + responsible for the Anapo debacle + probably is Senator Samuel Moreno Diaz, the candidate’s husband, a + corrupt and singularly unintelligent politician.

+ + + Vaky + + +
+ +
+ 263. Telegram 3911 From the Embassy in Colombia to the Department of + State +

Summary: + Vaky and Lopez + discussed inter-American relations and trade and investment + policy.

+

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + D740110–0637. Confidential; Limdis. In telegram 45858 to Bogotá, + March 7, the Department of State informed the Embassy that the + Department of the Treasury was preparing to announce the + initiation of a Countervailing Duty Proceeding in response to a + Colombian tax-credit system for exports of cut flowers. (Ibid.) + In telegram 2500 from Bogotá, March 25, the Embassy sent a + summary of a letter from Vázquez to Kissinger in which the Foreign Minister + maintained the export promotion system did not constitute a + subsidy. (Ibid.) CATs were negotiable certificates issued by the + Colombian Government which businesses could use to pay taxes. + (Telegram 2632 from Bogotá, March 29; ibid.) The reference to a + “nickel project” relates to plans by the Hanna/Chevron company + to invest in Colombia. (Telegram 9519 from Bogotá, November 20, + 1973; ibid.)

+ + + + + Bogota, May + 7, 1974, 1630Z. + +

3911. Subject: Conversation with President-elect.

+

1. Summary. In a private luncheon conversation, President-elect Lopez + ranged over a number of topics. He indicated he was more interested in + bilateral relations with the US than hemispheric community, more + interested in meeting Colombia’s economic needs and problems than the + Andean Pact per se. He implied that if it came to that he would not + sacrifice Colombia’s needs to a larger bloc consideration. He expressed + concern over Carlos Andres Perez + economic address, and said that his administration would not be tempted + to imitate Venezuela. He indicated that he is moving very cautiously and + slowly in forming his government. All in all Lopez indicated that he + would follow a careful and pragmatic course; he reflected a very + thoughtful, sober mood with respect to the problem he faces. End + summary.

+

2. Principal points Lopez made were as follows:

+

A. In response to my question about how he saw US-Colombian relations + over the next several years, he said he saw no real problems. He went on + to say that he was not a particular supporter of the community or bloc + idea, or of hemisphere “solidarity” that he thought Colombia had its own + problems and needs and these were not the same as other countries; that + Colombia would of course attend hemisphere meetings, but he was more + interested in a sound bilateral relationship and would concentrate on + that.

+

B. With regard to specific problems, he did not appear very perturbed + over the cut flowers issue. He said he thought the CAT system should be revised. He mused + that he had thought of a system whereby the CAT would be available only if a product’s price fell below + a given level. I said I was not sure if that would escape the subsidy + definition. He mused about + other ways to stimulate exports such as letting the exchange rate + “crawl” a little faster as the IMF + suggested. On foreign investment, he indicated that there would be + strict rules and tough negotiations on things like mining concessions, + but he did not oppose investment. He wondered why the nickel project was + taking so long, and he said that the government had to revise and review + its rules and regulations (e.g. the petroleum code and natural gas) so + that a comprehensive, modern but incentive-granting regimen existed. (He + implied he was anxious to see both the Hanna and Peabody projects get + underway.)

+

C. He said a viable coffee agreement was very important to Colombia.

+

D. With regard to the Andean pact, he repeated what he said regarding the + hemisphere he was not particularly enamored with bloc positions and bloc + action. He thought each country had specific needs and therefore + uniformity should be neither automatic nor rigid. The ability to make + exceptions to general norms was important.

+

E. He was surprised at Carlos Andres + Perez economic speech, as much by its “unsophistication” + as anything else. Perez seemed to just throw in the kitchen sink. Lopez + knew people would think his administration would be influenced by Perez + but he did not intend to do anything similar. “Perez can afford to + nationalize: Colombia could not”.

+

F. He was still in the process of organizing his government. He has not + decided fully on his Cabinet and would not announce it until shortly + before inauguration. He did say that he would probably name Rodrigo Botero as Minister of Finance. + He asked this be held in confidence, though he said he assumed it would + begin to leak since he had designated Botero as his Liaison with Minister Echeverria. I asked + him whom he would name as Foreign Minister, and he said “probably + Turbay”. He said he owed Turbay a debt, and if Turbay wanted it he would + name him. He had suggested this to Turbay before the election, and the + latter asked that they talk about it again after the election. He has + not had a chance to do so yet. If it was not Turbay, he was not sure + whom he would name. Lopez said he wanted new faces in the Cabinet, and + he would appoint a number of women to positions in his government.

+ + + Vaky + + +
+ +
+ 264. Telegram 8538 From the Embassy in Colombia to the Department of + State +

Summary: + Vaky reported that a + decision by the Colombian Government to virtually eliminate tax + rebates for a wide range of commodities would substantially + reduce the chances that the U.S. Government would be required to + impose countervailing duties on Colombian exports to the United + States.

+

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + D740268–1003. Unclassified. Repeated to Cali and + Medellín.

+ + + + + Bogota, September 23, 1974, 2210Z. + +

8538. Subject: Revision of Export Promotion Program-CAT. Pass Treasury for Suchman. Ref: + Bogota 8493.

+

1. Begin summary. The long awaited revision of the CAT system was unveiled evening of Sept 20 + by Presidential decree which goes into effect Jan 1, 1975. It virtually + eliminates CAT tax rebates for a wide + range of mostly primary sector commodities including cut flowers. Other + non-coffee and petroleum exports will be entitled to only a 5 percent + CAT as compared to 13 and 15 + percent under the former system. End summary.

+

2. The CAT was reduced to one-tenth of + one percent for a wide range of products in short supply in Colombia + and/or products where world prices have risen substantially. Major + products in this category include: cereals, most live animals, sugar, + cement, chemical and pharmaceutical products, fertilizers, plastic + materials, wood, precious and semi-precious stones, flowers, and metals. + Some of these products were entitled to only a one percent CAT under the old system.

+

3. All other agricultural exports not specifically provided the one-tenth + of one percent CAT will be entitled to + a seven percent CAT of which two + percent points will continue to be transfered to ICA to help small agricultural producers. + This will mean that these exporters will not receive a CAT of 5 percent as compared to 13 percent + under the former system.

+

4. All other export products will be entitled to 5 percent CAT rebates. Under the former regulations + products in this category were entitled to a 15 percent CAT. No mention is made in the + presidential decree of the 40 percent domestic value added requirement + which was mandatory under the old system.

+

5. The announced CAT reductions are + certain to make exporting less profitable than it otherwise would be. + However, it is not clear if these reductions will be a sufficient + dis-incentive to slow down significantly the growth of non-traditional + exports. The future growth and profitability of these exports will + depend on (a) the strength of world demand and price trends for Colombia products + abroad, (b) continued access to world markets, and (c) GOC’s exchange rate policy.

+

6. Begin comment: Under present law modification of the CAT could not be put info effect until 1 + Jan 1975 unless emergency economic powers were used. The budget saving + from the reductions in CAT will not be + realized until the second half of 1975 where fewer CAT certificates will then be maturing. + The decision to substantially reduce the CAT may be a measure taken by the GOC to help redistribute income. That is, instead of using + government revenues to subsidize exports through CAT rebates, which only indirectly + benefits the poor; the funds saved by reducing the CAT could be used to support programs of + more direct benefit to the poorer Socio-Economic groups. In any event, + the decision to substantially reduce the CAT goes a long way in reducing the danger of future + countervailing duty claims against Colombian imports to the US.

+

End comment.

+ + + Vaky + + +
+ +
+ 265. Telegram 9572 From the Embassy in Colombia to the Department of + State +

Summary: + Vaky informed the + Department that key Colombian officials understood the + seriousness of the narcotics problem, and that over the past two + years Colombia had made progress in its drug enforcement + efforts. However, Vaky + was not satisfied with the progress to date, and he predicted + that there would be a need for continued U.S. assistance and + encouragement for the foreseeable future.

+

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + D740306–0958. Confidential. In telegram 233134 to all diplomatic + posts, October 23, the Department requested that Embassies + report on narcotics control activities in their countries. + (Ibid.)

+ + + + + Bogota, October 26, 1974, 1456Z. + +

9572. For the Secretary From the Ambassador. Subject: Presidential + Directive on Narcotics Control Activities. Ref: State 233134.

+

1. I place the highest priority on the narcotics interdiction program in + Colombia. I have personally spoken with President Lopez as well as with + key Colombian officials to impress upon them the need for action and our + willingness to cooperate. President Lopez has assured me that he + understands the seriousness of the Colombian narcotics situation. I am + very encouraged by President Lopez’ appointment of Gen. Matallana as the new Director of the + Security Police (DAS) with a mandate to take charge of and make + effective an expanded narcotics interdiction program. The mission + activities in the drug program are under the daily review of the DCM. Our mission narcotics plan has the + necessary flexibility to reassign priorities to achieve our goals. To + the extent possible this action plan is developed in collaboration with + the concerned GOC law enforcement + bodies.

+

2. Over the past two years Colombia has made progress in its drug + enforcement efforts and it is expected that the activities undertaken by + the Lopez Administration will result in additional improvements. Members + of the mission team remain in close daily contact with GOC officials involved in enforcement, + education and rehabilitation in order to encourage and assist the GOC in all areas of the drug program.

+

3. The GOC is cooperating and dedicating + its available resources to the war on illicit drugs. However, I am by no + means satisfied with the progress to date in stemming the flow of + illicit drugs from Colombia to the US and foresee the need for continued + US assistance and encouragement for some time to come.

+ + + Vaky + + +
+ +
+ 266. Telegram 2128 From the Embassy in Colombia to the Department of + State +

Summary: + Vaky reported that + the outcome of the Quito MFM, + the provisions of the U.S. Trade Act, and the U.S. Government’s + handling of bilateral issues had caused the Colombian Government + to doubt the sincerity and reliability of the United States.

+

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + D750078–1057. Confidential; Priority; Limdis. The Quito + Conference is discussed in Documents + 386, 389, and 396. In telegram 519 from Bogotá, + January 17, Vaky + reported on January 14 conversations between U.S. and Colombian + officials on textiles, stating that the Colombians sought to + stabilize and increase their share of the U.S. market. (Ibid.) + The Urrutia-Thomson Treaty of 1914 guaranteed Colombia’s right + of access to the Panama Canal. López, in a conversation with Mailliard and Vaky, expressed concern that + the current Panama Canal negotiations maintain Colombia’s rights + under the Urrutia-Thomson Treaty. The U.S. officials assured him + that Colombia would be consulted with regard to U.S. capacity to + comply with the Treaty. (Telegram 802 from Bogotá, January 27; + RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D750031–0766) Kissinger’s March 1 speech is + in the Department of State Bulletin, + March 24, 1975, pp. 361–369. In telegram 4902 from Bogotá, May + 29, Vaky reported that a + U.S.-Colombian agreement on textiles had been signed. (Ibid., + D750189–1046)

+ + + + + Bogota, March 5, 1975, 2130Z. + +

2128. Subject: The US and Colombia: The Problem of Linkages. For ARA Asst Sec Rogers from the Amb.

+

1. Summary. This cable is intended to give you a tentative overview of + the GOC’s perception of US in the hope + that this may be helpful to you, particularly in the light of possible + forthcoming visits: A significant change is occurring in the GOC’s perception and attitude toward US. + It appears to be increasingly one of doubt about the sincerity of our + interest or of our capacity to cooperate in the crunches, and a + corresponding conclusion that they cannot depend upon close ties with US + alone to defend their own interests. This perception is not new in + Colombia, but the readiness of the GOC + to act systematically on it is. This perception is the result of the + linked impact of a variety of factors, especially the Quito conference, + the trade act and our response to a series of bilateral issues. It is + not that the GOC is becoming hostile; + rather it is becoming more calculating and hard-headed, more willing to + offset US and to develop more leverage to deal with US. To some degree + this is understandable; but the point is that at the moment Colombia is + moving away from US, and the ultimate degree of friendship or + antagonism, warmth or coolness of our basic relationship is still to be + decided. A conscious awareness of how the GOC “sees” US and of how linkages among the various things + we do reinforce each other would help optimize beneficial effects. End + summary.

+

2. More than most LA countries, Colombia + has approached the whole question of a relationship with US with + understanding and moderation. Thus while Colombia shares the Latin + American fear of the + interventionist tendencies of our power, it has also been more disposed + then most to appreciate the benefit side, to be cooperative and to “help + US out” (e.g. flowers and countervailing duties). More than most, + Colombians have understood what we had in mind when we talked of + mutuality, interdependence and dialogue.

+

3. Now, however, a subtle but significant change is in process in the + GOC’s perception of US. The image + of the US which increasingly appears to form the basis for the Lopez + administration’s attitude toward US may be described approximately as + follows: a) whatever the rhetoric, the US as a nation and a people are + basically indifferent to Latin America’s ordeal; at least they are + unwilling or unable to implement any special treatment for the region; + b) the US readily departs from its philosophy and rhetoric when it feels + its self interest requires, and it frequently “exports” its problems; in + particular the US does not hesitate to use its power as a sanction or to + “intervene” when it feels it must; c) all of this is understandable and + realistic, but what it means is that for Colombia to depend too much + upon close ties with US is to subject Colombian development and national + life to US-determined interest, priorities and perceptions and to US + domestic crises and swings.

+

4. This Colombian perception is the result of the linked impact of a + number of complex and long-range factors, such as basic changes in the + world structure; what they see as the impact on US of our recent and + current domestic economic, political and spiritual crises: The CIA “revelations”. But there are three + proximate sources for this “cooling” which it is important for US to + understand: a) the GOC’s reaction to + Quito b) the image of US they saw revealed in the Trade Act and c) our + reaction to a series of bilateral issues.

+

5. Quito. President Lopez said to Ambassador Mailliard that the GOC + had assumed that in agreeing to an OAS + meeting the US also implicitly agreed it should be a success. The GOC believes it was in our power to help + secure the requisite votes, and that therefore our decision not to do so + was a deliberate one that left it out on a limb. What it is particularly + important to understand is that their unhappiness rests basically on + personal dimensions. Colombians are intensely personalistic, and dignity + and self-esteem are extremely important. The Foreign Minister and the + President, and more abstractly all the GOC, felt personally embarrassed by the results. Their + dignity and self-esteem were damaged, and they fastened on us as the + cause. One does not, in their view, treat a friend that way. That is why + the resentment has been deep and why logical arguments do not alleviate + it.

+

6. Trade Act. The Colombians consider that the Trade Act neither hurts + nor particularly benefits them. They understand the concepts behind it + and give us credit for them. To them however the conditions in Title V are reminiscent of the + Hickenlooper amendment and are evidence that we are still prepared to + attach conditions to our assistance. To them import-sensitive exceptions + are deliberate departures from our stated philosophy when adherence to + it becomes difficult. To them there is little in the act that shows any + special consideration for Latin America. What they see demonstrated, in + short, is not so much our principles, but how readily we depart from + them under pressure when we think we have to. They understand this as + realistic and even inevitable, and they do not condemn us for it (as + some of their neighbors do). What they simply conclude is that there is + doubt as to how much access to markets they really get.

+

7. Bilateral problems. Consider the Colombian perspective on some current + bilateral matters: although somewhat assuaged by the presidential + invitation, the GOC still feels it is + not as highly regarded by US as some other nations. The Secretary’s + March 1 speech, for example, made clear to the world that his trip and + yours were important opening guns to grasp the “new opportunity”. Yet as + far as Colombian knew at the moment they are left out of both.

+

8. Textiles may be our most touchy current bilateral problem. The + Colombians understand our problems; yet their industry is vital to them, + too. And so they are waiting to see what treatment we offer them in the + light of all we have said about friendship, access to markets, a new + world order, etc. Whether they will agree to limit themselves + voluntarily depends upon whether they will think our offer reasonable in + terms of their own interests. But more than that, they think that what + is at stake here is a test case of the future—of the role of comparative + advantage in a new world trading system. What they are afraid of is that + we will handle it in terms of the domestic political pressures of the + moment, rather than as a problem of mutual interests in a new world + system as we talk about.

+

9. Colombia’s concern with the Urrutia-Thomson Treaty rests more on + concepts of dignity and sovereignty than on estimates of benefit alone. + What they see is a treaty right they enjoy [garble] although they have + periodically brought this subject up over the past year and a half to + ascertain our purpose and thoughts, all they have heard us say is, + “don’t call us, we’ll call you.”

+

10. Although Colombia has ratified the Quita Sueno Treaty, we have not. + The GOC can only conclude that the + matter is not very important to us.

+

11. Their efforts up to now to find out what we think about a new coffee + agreement have elicited no real answer. Because they have had no + indication we wanted a new agreement, Colombia stopped entering actively + into tech discussions in the ICO, feeling it pointless. We in turn + interpreted that as meaning Colombia had no interest. And so we have danced around each other + waiting for evidence of each other’s good faith. What the Colombians + look for is private consultations and a meeting of the minds with + US.

+

12. In short, the Colombian perception of US is a total perception. All + of these—and other—factors reinforce each other, and it is their linked + impact that has added up to doubt a cumulative doubt of the sincerity of + our interest, of our willingness or capacity to be helpful in the + crunches (which is when they think they need our help the most), and + even of how much Colombia itself really wants to open up to US.

+

13. It is not that Colombia is becoming hostile, far from it. But it is + becoming hard-headed. It is less disposed to be cooperative to “help us + out”. It is more prepared to balance and offset us than to follow our + leadership. In short the GOC seems to + be moving to a conception of a relationship with US that is based on a + calculation of their own interests and a toe-to-toe bargaining strategy, + even if it means risking our irritation, displeasure or opposition.

+

14. All of this is coupled with the growing conviction that the GOC needs to create new relationships and + arrangements to advance Colombia’s interests and improve its leverage. + Thus Colombia is more disposed now than it ever has been to [garble] + into a dumb-bell pattern and to regional arrangements such as SELA.

+

15. There is nothing particularly unique, extraordinary or surprising in + all of this. These perceptions are not particularly new. What is new is + that the Lopez admin is more prepared than its predecessors to act + systematically on these perceptions. The Lopez govt is a far different + thing than the Pastrana govt. + To some degree, too, Colombia’s desire to be master of its own fate is + understandable, even desirable. But the point is that Colombia is at the + moment moving away from US and it is not clear where it is going to + stop. The precise degree of warmth or coolness, alienation or + cooperation, irritation or politeness which the basic relationship will + ultimately exhibit is still very much in doubt. A subtle erosion in our + relationship is in process—some of it unavoidable—and it will take a + conscious effort to arrest it.

+

16. Like most LA’s, Colombia judges the + value of cooperation with US, and the sincerity of our [garble] and it + decides how to deal with US—in short it “sees” US—in terms of how we + respond to their concrete problems, situations, interests and needs. + This egocentric attitude should neither irritate nor surprise US. LA’s have no other way of conceiving a + relationship with US, given their long history of gravitation around our + power pole and their list of past grievances. “What have you done for me + lately?” is to the Latinos a perfectly legitimate question to ask. And + so when we talk of mutual adventures they first seek to test our good + faith, and the only way they know how to do that is to judge how we + relate to what they consider their major concerns and needs.

+ +

17. This situation is still with US. The Secy’s March 1 speech was + excellent. Cellos are more soothing than trumpets. But ultimately the + question will be the same: What does it mean for me? When the Secy says + commodities policy is essential, the Colombians will say, “fine, how + about coffee?” when we say access to markets is vital to the developing + world, the Colombians say, “we agree; how are you going to treat me on + textiles?”

+

18. None of this argues for simply catering to every Latin whim. It does + mean we have yet to win Latin America’s confidence. That in turn + underlines the importance of an accurate understanding of how the + Colombians “see” us and of a conscious awareness of linkages, i.e. how + separate issues reinforce or offset each other. Many of our problems + obviously maybe intractable, e.g. textiles. But our style and + responsiveness on others might be shaped differently were we aware of + the linkages, e.g. visits, and canal question.

+

19. Curiously we often forget about this linkage effect. Our bilateral + policies are often the prey of two interrelated circumstances a) the + domestic structure of our bureaucracy which means different experts + handle different problems with different perspectives and criteria, and + b) the absence of any consensus as to a fundamental purpose governing + our relations with LA which can serve as + an arbiter when contradictory US sub-interests are involved. Neither the + “special relationship” nor any other concept of LA importance has ever really received bureaucratic-wide + consensus or acceptance up to now. In the absence of such an accepted + over-arching concept or purpose, issues tend to become decided on tech, + parochial or individual bases, without particular regard to on-going + relations or to each other.

+

20. No matter how you slice it, Colombia is unique in the hemisphere and + uniquely positioned to be consecutive. It is, after all, large + enough—fourth in size, third in population—to be important, it is + democratic enough to be listened to with respect by the left; + non-ideological and pragmatic [enough] to work with the right; dynamic + and rich enough—the most industrialized country in the Andean Pact + including Venezuela—to be a force in economic integration; poor enough + to be a spokesman for the third world in any international forum; and + moderate and realistic enough to be willing to respond to us if we prove + ourselves willing to help them with their problems.

+ + + Vaky + + +
+ +
+ 267. Telegram 8169 From the Embassy in Colombia to the Department of + State +

Summary: + Vaky informed the + Department that the Colombian Government proposed phasing out + the U.S. AID program, and + provided his views on the implications for bilateral + relations.

+

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + D750297–0045. Confidential; Immediate; Exdis. In telegram 207024 + to Bogotá, August 30, the Department welcomed the news of + Colombia’s desire for a phase-out of the AID program, adding that AID would provide grant and loan + funding for high-priority development projects during FY 1976. (Ibid.)

+ + + + + Bogota, August 27, 1975, 1627Z. + +

8169. For ARA + Rogers and Klein. Subject: Phase + Out of AID Program.

+

1. Finance Minister Botero + invited me to his office to discuss the state visit (he will accompany + the President), and proposed that we agree to phase out the AID program by the end of FY 76. He called this an informal “sounding + out” to see what I thought, but in response to my direct question he + said it was not a personal position; it was a government consensus.

+

2. His reasoning was as follows: Colombia’s capital resource prospects + were truly excellent as a result of tax reform, the coffee market, the + elimination of subsidies, and effective mobilization of domestic + savings. The figures, which will be released soon, are nothing short of + staggering. This meant that Colombia was increasingly able to shoulder + the burden of development itself with these resources and capacity, it + will be increasingly difficult for the US bureaucracy to justify an + AID program; the US Congress will + increasingly question it; there will be better use for the funds in the + poorest countries. Either levels will come down further, or sooner or + later a policy decision will be made by the US to phase out as we had + done in Brazil, etc. Or else, if no explicit policy decision is made, + the technical, bureaucratic restrictions, requirements and procedures + will become so involved that Colombia will not find it worth while.

+

3. As he said in Paris, he went on, the responsibility for Colombian + development rests squarely on Colombia and nowhere else. Colombia was + now in a position to assume that responsibility. That was what the + Alianza had been all about. The bilateral development program has been a + success because the need for it has been outgrown. It is not supposed to + go on forever.

+

4. Since both sides must inevitably question the program’s continuance + sooner or later, why wait until one or the other takes a unilateral + decision and thereby presents a difficult situation. Why not gracefully + anticipate the situation, + and take the joint step and announce jointly that it has been agreed + that the bilateral AID program has + served its purpose and will be phased out, making clear that this is + precisely what AID was supposed to + do—work itself out of a job. The President’s visit would provide a very + graceful context for such joint agreement.

+

5. In response to my direct question, Botero acknowledged that there was a political dimension + to this as well. Colombia, he said, wanted a friendly but new + relationship with the US—one of equality and mutual self-respect. The + donor-recipient relationship was not the kind of tie we should now have. + The US was going to need credible friends in the hemisphere; Colombia’s + was a voice of reason and moderation, but it will not be credible if it + is beholden to the US; it will be a better friend if it is not.

+

6. Botero asked me to think about + it and suggested we meet again next week. Some decision along this line + will have to be made soon. In a scheduled meeting between AID personnel and the planning board + scheduled for the afternoon of Aug 27, the Colombians will suggest a + study of the pipeline and what phase out date might be established.

+

7. Comment: I consider this, in effect, as a GOC decision. From a developmental point of view the logic + is pretty compelling and Botero + is of course right that internally we ourselves will increasingly + challenge the program’s continuance. In any case I do not see that we + have any choice, and I think we must now go back to the drawing board. A + credible public case can be made, as Botero suggests, in terms of the AID program having accomplished what it + was supposed to, etc., and we should begin thinking of the scenario in + terms of the visit.

+

8. This does however trigger another consideration transcending the + AID issue and reaching to the very + substance of our total purpose and relationship with Colombia. For + possibly good and understandable reasons what may be happening, in + effect, is that channels of customary US-Colombian interaction are being + cut. Is the GOC purpose by doing that + to establish independence (the Hirschman “arms length” thesis)? Is it + just reaction to a style of tie as Botero said? If so are there substitutes to link our two + societies (not necessarily our two governments)? How does one maintain a + constructive bilateral relationship if transnational links get reduced + or eliminated? These are things to which we will be addressing ourselves + in future cables, but in the meantime I think Washington should consider + these conceptual but real overall problems—not by any means unique to + Colombia—and particularly in terms of the setting for the visit.

+ + + Vaky + + +
+ +
+ 268. Telegram 8457 From the Embassy in Colombia to the Department of + State +

Summary: The + Embassy analyzed the López administration’s first year in office, + concluding that while the Colombian Government had moved away + from a close identification with the United States, it remained + basically friendly. The Embassy suggested that Colombia might + aim to play the role of middleman in what it a perceived to be + growing confrontation between the United States and Latin + America.

+

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + D750306–0494. Confidential. Repeated to Cali and Medellín. + Airgram A–84 from Bogotá, July 14, is ibid.

+ + + + + Bogota, September 4, 1975, 1750Z. + +

8457. Subject: The Lopez Administration Takes Hold.

+

1. Summary. At the end of its first year the Lopez administration has + demonstrated its ability to govern effectively and even, at times, + imaginatively. After turning in what seemed a somewhat lackluster + performance during the earlier part of the period it came on stronger + during the final months as the administration gained greater confidence + and authority and programs started earlier began to prove themselves. + What appeared as an uncertain and even bumbling handling of foreign + affairs, typified in the administrations first outing at the Quito + conference, has evolved into a cautious, pragmatic pursuit of Colombia’s + interests. While Colombia is moving away from a close identification + with the U.S., the Lopez administration remains basically friendly. + Colombia may hope to play the role of middleman in what Colombians + perceive as growing U.S.-L.A. confrontation; it will certainly have the + capacity to do so. The government has not lived up to popular + expectations with regard to socio-economic programs, but neither has it + justified the initial and largely unreasoned fears of some economic + groups, which now appear to have accommodated themselves to the + administration. The tax reform package enacted during the economic + emergency has at least provided the basis for the beginning of a more + equitable distribution of wealth and has contributed to significant + progress in slowing the cost-of-living increase. The government enjoys + broad political support in the Congress and throughout the country, up + noticeably since a drop in confidence at the end of 1974, although there + are also foci of discontent (e.g. segments of the urban working class, + students) simmering beneath the surface. Rural guerrilla activity + continues at the same rate as in the past but urban terrorism, primarily + in the form of kidnappings, may be on the rise. End summary.

+

2. Foreign policy. The central development in Colombian foreign policy + during the first year of the Lopez administration from the U.S. point of + view has been the clear emergence of a policy of attaining at least the + appearance of equality and independence in its relationship with the U.S. This policy appears + designed to enhance Colombia’s ability to exercise greater influence + among other L.A. countries and LDC’s. + There has been growing evidence that Colombia is moving to adopt a more + active role in regional affairs.

+

3. The move toward equality and lesser dependency vis-à-vis the U.S. is + the product of several factors. It responds to the view probably long + held by Lopez and such close collaborators as Finance Minister Botero that Colombian-US relations + though friendly should be at arms length, together with more recent + doubts about the sincerity of our interest and our capacity to cooperate + on problems affecting Colombia, and the conclusion that Colombia cannot + depend upon close ties with US alone to defend its interests. (Bogota + 2128). Lopez’ experience in his first Foreign Policy venture at the + Quito conference of Foreign Ministers in Nov 1974 when, as the GOC saw it, the U.S. failed to support the + Colombian co-sponsored initiative to lift OAS sanctions on Cuba, and by abstaining, condemned it to + failure, reinforced the belief that Colombia should diminish its + reliance on the U.S. The immediate result of the Quito experience was + the decision by the GOC to recognize + Cuba. Given Colombia’s tradition of respect for legality and for working + within the OAS, Cuban recognition was + indeed a significant step. It was a result of pique over the outcome of + the Quito conference, impatience with the OAS system and with the U.S., and the momentum of earlier + GOC actions on Cuba (in the closing + days of the previous government, conservative President Pastrana, described the + Colombian-Cuban Air Piracy Agreement as the beginning of a rapprochement + with Cuba. In his July 20 speech, Lopez asked, could we have done less + than continue on that road? Cuban recognition was clear evidence of the + GOC’s willingness to take an + independent line on matters which it perceives as affecting its + interests, without regard to U.S. desires.

+

4. In a series of subsequent visits and meetings with other heads of + government, Lopez has moved cautiously and pragmatically to establish a + position of regional leadership and initiative. In the March 1975 + meeting in Panama with the heads of the Costa Rican, Panamanian, and + Venezuelan Governments, Lopez declared his support in moderate terms for + Panama’s aspirations regarding the Canal Zone and, in another move + undertook to continue Colombia’s rights under the Thomson-Urrutia + agreement by dealing directly with Panama, rather than relying on the + U.S. The meeting in Santa Marta, Colombia in July with Venezuelan + President Perez and Panama + General Torrijos, was primarily a forum for Lopez and Perez to + coordinate Andean Pact policy and discuss bilateral issues. Lopez + clearly places much importance on the relationship with Venezuela for a + variety of reasons, including historical ties, geographic proximity, + common democratic forms, Venezuela’s wealth, ideological similarities between the two governing + parties, and long association if not friendship between Perez and Lopez. + It is equally clear that Colombia’s approach to this relationship is + characterized by the same pragmatic pursuit of Colombia’s interests that + inspires Colombia’s other relations. The principal outstanding + differences between the two countries; the offshore boundary dispute in + the Gulf of Venezuela and the situation of the estimated one-half to one + million Colombians living illegally in Venezuela, will probably not, + assuming mutual forebearance, jeopardize cordial relations but they will + remain at least potential irritants between the two countries for some + time. At any rate, Lopez does not appear prepared to hitch Colombia’s + star to Venezuela’s foreign policy ambitions. Lopez’s recent August + meeting with President Rodriguez in Quito is the first in what will + probably be a series of visits to Andean Pact capitals aimed at + establishing a leading role for Colombia in the pact and in the + region—Lopez also signed an agreement on sea limits which protects + Colombia’s rights but which does not change Colombia’s LOS positions. Lopez appears to envision + Colombia rather than Venezuela, as the natural leader and spokesman in + the Andean Pact, not merely despite Venezuela’s affluence and ambition + but because these attributes awaken apprehensions regarding Venezuela + among other states.

+

5. Thus, Lopez foreign policy strategy appears to be (1) to establish + Colombia as an influential middle power in regional fora, independent + enough from the U.S. to be credible to the more militant countries and + (2) by virtue of moderate policies and democratic institutions, be in a + position to maintain amicable and fruitful relations with the U.S. by so + doing Colombia would be in a stronger position to play a key role as + broker or middleman in what the Colombians see as a situation of growing + U.S.-L.A. confrontation. Lopez is well on the way to accomplishing the + first portion of the equation. The second portion depends in part on the + U.S. response on a number of common issues. Quita Sueno, the coffee + agreement, the trade preferences provide opportunities to improve the + tone of the U.S.-Colombian relationship. Two additional issues, the + Panama Canal treaty and the GOC + requirement that foreign-owned banks sell down to a minority position + possess the potential for serious damage to U.S.-Colombian + relations.

+

6. Concern for increasing foreign trade (evidenced by Lopez’s frequent + reference to Colombia’s potential of becoming the Japan of Latin + America) is an underlying consideration in Colombian foreign policy. + Lopez in his inaugural address stressed the importance of trade + relations with the communist countries, and several commercial + agreements have been signed. This was a continuance of predecessor + policies and does not portend any significant change in Colombia’s + relationships with these countries.

+ +

7. The domestic record. About halfway through his first year President + Lopez correctly observed that he had spent so much time “putting out the + fires” he had inherited that his other objectives had suffered. The + situation undoubtedly contributed to an impression of limpness of style + and uncertainty of direction on the part of the administration as Lopez + moved, in part by experiment, to “put out fires” and place his own stamp + on the government. After over a year in office the image and record of + the Lopez administration have greatly improved for several reasons, + among them (1) the fiscal success of the tax reforms which have greatly + improved revenues and helped slow inflation, and their psychological + acceptance by economic groups which formerly felt threatened, (2) + Lopez’s declaration of a state of siege, which invested him with a + greater aura of authority and decisiveness, (3) Lopez’s recent move to + assume the role of Liberal party leader, and (4) the windfall of the + Brazilian coffee frost which guarantees increased coffee earnings and + has imparted new optimism in the country.

+

8. The following balance sheet of the government’s accomplishments and + failures would indicate that the administration during its first year + has done a credible job dealing with the “fires” and laying the basis + for the attainment of longer-term objectives:

+

A) The cost-of-living increase. (One of Lopez’s “fires”) which averaged + around 26 percent through 1974, has slowed significantly and 1975’s + outlook is for an increase of about 20 pc. The improvement, however, has + been at the cost of increased unemployment and a drop in the economic + growth rate.

+

B) The tax reforms enacted during the economic emergency constitute a + credible start toward the goal of a more equitable distribution of the + country’s wealth. The increase in revenues has served as a weapon + against inflation by removing pesos from consumers’ pockets. The + Government’s plan is to use the revenues thus gained to finance programs + which will furnish badly needed social services to the poor. These + programs include the already enacted Sala Cuna law, which establishes + free day care centers in cities for preschoolers, as well as plans to + improve health, education and nutrition in rural areas. In addition to + the direct, favorable social impact of these programs, the Government + expects that the construction of schools, roads, hospitals, water supply + and sewage systems will provide a fillip to the construction industry + and to employment. It is not at all clear, however, whether even given + adequate financing the Government’s administrative/technical apparatus + is capable of making significant progress creating, staffing and + operating these ambitious programs, say by the 1978 elections.

+

C) Security has become of growing concern to Colombian society, much as + it has for many others. Although political violence and guerrilla + activity have probably not increased over the levels of recent years, + the public’s concern over + what it perceives as a rise in criminal activity has grown. The root + causes of the lawlessness are not apparent. In Bogota, for example, most + of the criminals are employed native born city dwellers from the working + class or lower middle class, rather than the unemployed or alienated + peasants recently transplanted to the city. Sources close to Lopez + report that it was primarily his concern over crime, especially + kidnapping, which caused him to proclaim a state of siege. So far the + state of siege seems to have been more effective as a psychological + security blanket, rather than as a means to reduce crime, although it is + probably too soon to tell. Its effectiveness against kidnappers, who + operate in small relatively professional gangs, is even more doubtful. + Most kidnapping hitherto appear to have been purely criminal operations, + rather than for the purpose of financing political subversion. While it + is not yet clear whether the recent kidnapping of Sears executive Donald + Cooper was criminal or political, it seems likely to have been the + latter. The problem of security against crime—and against political + terrorism—may be one of the most intractable items on the Lopez + agenda.

+

D) Stability. The outlook for stability is better now than it has been + during most of the year. The wave of more or less spontaneous civic + strikes (Paros Civicos) against high prices and poor public services + which plagued the government, especially in the fall and winter of 1974, + subsided even before the imposition of the state of siege for a variety + of reasons, some of them not altogether clear. There are no troublesome + labor disputes under way or on the horizon. The politically volatile + university students, now on vacation, can be expected to resume their + perennial agitation after the resumption of classes. The activities of + the guerrilla bands will probably continue at the same rate of recent + years. The special powers conferred to the government by the state of + siege will have an inhibiting effect on all of the above sectors. + Dissatisfaction among some sectors of the military over the firing of + the popular former Army commander General Valencia Tovar and Lopez’s + handling of public order seems to have subsided, especially after the + declaration of a state of siege which increased the military’s public + security role as well as their salaries.

+

9. Support for Lopez in the Liberal and Conservative parties and in the + Congress is also stronger than at any time during the past year. The + Conservative party has been from the beginning unswerving in its support + for Lopez, probably in order to improve its chances to continue to + participate in future governments by proving itself as a loyal and + useful coalition ally, and in order not to do anything to discourage + division in the liberal party, which playing some sort of opposition + role might tend to do. The President’s own liberal party seemed until a + few months ago to be the potential source of an effective opposition, with the assumption by + ex-President Carlos Lleras of a position critical of Lopez. Lleras has + since, however, veered to a position in support of Lopez (A–84) and + through his Movement for Liberal Democratization (MLD) is concentrating + on weakening Julio Cesar Turbay’s control over the party. Lopez is + maintaining neutrality in the Lleras-Turbay struggle, and has made clear + that he does not regard as harmful the clash of differing opinions + within the party, as long as support for the government is not + jeopardized. Lopez, who had maintained a strictly hands off attitude in + party matters from the beginning of his administration, has now moved to + organize loyalist groupings of Lopistas in both houses of Congress and + in the Bogota liberal directorate. The strategy seems clear: Lopez is + and aims to continue being in a position to play a determining role with + regard to who the next liberal party Presidential candidate will be, and + thus to ensure the good behavior of all contenders. The loyal support + which Carlos Lleras has provided the government in recent months is + evidence of the efficacy of this strategy.

+

10. There are, nevertheless, a number of soft spots in the social and + political texture of stability which although now quiescent or + potential, may well give Lopez rough sailing in the future. More than + sufficient reasons for social and political unrest continue to exist, + scarcely abated by the Mandato Claro. Most Colombians live in poverty, + and price rises, although at a lower rate than the past, worsen their + plight. The anti-inflationary measures have sharpened unemployment and + under-employment. Expectations that the Lopez administration would + quickly enact radical measures to help the disadvantaged were not + fulfilled. However, the government has developed an imaginative and + far-reaching program designed to reach the poorest 40 percent of the + population. Called the National Food and Nutrition Plan, its main + elements are integrated rural development projects financed by Foreign + Assistance including AID. The program + should provide the Government with a reasonable vehicle to resolve many + of Colombia’s most serious social problems.

+ + + Vaky + + +
+ +
+ 269. Telegram 222598 From the Department of State to the Embassy in + Colombia +

Summary: The + Department concluded that President López’s statement that the United States was + primarily responsible for Colombia’s drug trafficking did not + reflect a slackening of interest on Colombia’s part regarding + drug interdiction.

+

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + D750324–0178. Confidential; Priority; Limdis. Drafted by Bown; + cleared by Dugstad, Johnson, Costaki, and Devine; approved by Luers. Repeated to Caracas and + Mexico. In telegram 8825 from Bogotá, September 13, Vaky reported that López had been upset for some + time over the U.S. media’s reporting on drug trafficking in + Colombia, but a September 12 editorial in the New York Times provoked him to issue a communiqué + blaming the drug problem on “powerful organizations who + commercialize the product in the United States;” López’s communiqué was + transmitted to the Department in telegram 8826 from Bogotá. + (Ibid., D750318–0499) In telegram 8849 from Bogotá, September + 15, Vaky reported that + López assumed that + the responsibility for drug-interdiction efforts rested with the + United States. (Ibid., D750319–0588)

+ + + + + Washington, September 18, 1975, 1716Z. + +

222598. Subject: President Lopez’ Communiqué on U.S. Responsibility For + Drug Traffic in Colombia. Reference: A. Bogota 8825; B. Bogota 8826; C. + State 219462.

+

1. We have considered President Lopez’ communiqué blaming the USG for drug traffic in Colombia and your + comments. We agree with your recommendation that the communiqué not be + taken as a deliberate provocation, and our response to the issue at the + noon briefing (reftel C) attempted to deal with the issue in a moderate + tone.

+

2. While President Lopez was, we believe, unduly one-sided in laying the + blame on us, the issue he raised and his concern are, indeed, valid. The + Mexicans, too, have pointed out the problem to us, privately however. We + agree certainly that an important cause of the drug traffic in Colombia + is the difficulty in combating it in the U.S. The issue is one being + considered by the Domestic Council now, and its report will contain + recommendations that should lead to an improvement in our performance in + the U.S.

+

3. Hence, we do not look upon President Lopez’ comments as placing him in + fundamental disagreement with us. Rather, it emphasizes the + international nature of the problem and the need for cooperation between + our two countries in dealing with it. We do not interpret his remarks as + an indication of slackening of interest on his part in combating the + drug traffic in Colombia. Certainly we are prepared to cooperate with + him in the joint effort. In the U.S. we, for our part, expect in the + near future to move directly against some of the major trafficking + networks which are the cause of his concern.

+ +

4. You may draw on the above as appropriate in discussion with the + Foreign Minister.

+ + + Kissinger + + +
+ +
+ 270. Memorandum of Conversation +

Summary: Ford, Kissinger, and López discussed trade issues, narcotics, and the + Panama Canal.

+

Source: Ford Library, + National Security Adviser, NSC + Latin American Affairs Staff Files, Box 15, Visit, September + 25–26, 1975, President Lopez of Colombia, 5. Secret; Nodis. The + meeting took place in the Oval Office. In an undated memorandum, + Kissinger briefed + the President on topics López would want to discuss, which included + trade, U.S. assistance, the Panama Canal, the Quita Sueño + treaty, and narcotics. The Secretary noted that the Green + Amendment would give the President discretionary authority to + exempt Venezuela and Ecuador, which did not participate in the + 1973–1974 oil embargo, from the OPEC countries’ exclusion from the GSP. (Ibid.) In telegram 8463 from + Bogotá, September 4, Vaky, in preparation for the meeting, stated + that Colombia desired to forge a more independent relationship + with the United States and aimed to be a spokesman on regional + issues. (Ibid.)

+ + + + + Washington, September 25, 1975, 11:17 a.m.–12:17 + p.m. + + + PARTICIPANTS + President Gerald Ford + + President Alfonso Lopez + Michelsen of Colombia + Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, + Secretary of State and Assistant to the President for National + Security Affairs + Lt. General Brent + Scowcroft, Deputy Assistant to the President for National + Security Affairs + Felipe Lopez, Private Secretary and Son of the President + +

The President: It is a real pleasure to meet you and have you here. We + have already agreed that we have no problems.

+

Lopez: We have no problem at all. For example, with your AID we have decided that we don’t need + your help any more. You can use the funds for needy countries.

+

The President: We readily appreciate your cooperation. We have had other + experiences where countries having no obvious need keep on asking. It + gives us trouble with the Congress.

+

Lopez: We are going to get 40–50 percent more from our coffee exports. + Why should we ask for aid?

+

The President: It is really a fine example and will be helpful.

+ +

Lopez: On coffee, we could get along with no agreement, but others want + to go ahead with an agreement and we will go along. We will let Brazil + use second-grade coffee to keep their quota. The same with sugar.

+

On the trade bill, we are not affected in any way, but we resent the + treatment of Venezuela and Ecuador. I know it was not the Executive + Branch that wanted this.

+

The President: We have been working hard to get that changed. I am + convinced it was a mistake, because neither country supported the oil + embargo. I don’t think Congress knew what it was doing.

+

+ Kissinger: We are supporting the + Green Amendment.

+

Lopez: I am having lunch with them. Is there anything I can do?

+

The President: I would tell them how Latin America feels about this. You + can do this effectively because you aren’t affected. You can also point + out that you are giving up aid and not + going to blackmail your own coffee prices.

+

Lopez: I will do that. After all, coffee consumption is declining.

+

On the drug problem. It is a worldwide problem, but because of our + situation, we are the center of traffic. I made a strong statement + because the New York Times blamed us.

+

The President: They blame me for everything else!

+

Lopez: A small country like us is invaded by people with and without + passports, by planes, boats, etc., heavily financed from within the U.S. + We don’t have the materials to fight back.

+

The President: How can we help?

+

Lopez: We could use technology and economic help. We could use + helicopters to find where the planes land. We catch them all the + time.

+

+ Kissinger: We gave $900,000 for + that.

+

Lopez: It is too little. The tourists spend $50 million in Colombia. It + has just gone up to $250 million. That is not tourists—it is bribes, + etc.

+

We have both a Pacific coast and an Atlantic coast which makes it ideal + for smugglers. If you could help us to deal with them, we + wouldappreciate it.

+

The President: We will do everything we can. It is a terrible problem for + us and we want to do everything possible. Do you need technical people + or money, both, or what?

+

+ Kissinger: I asked Brent to look + into the possibility of helicopters. We have given them elsewhere.

+

The President: By all means, we will look into it. Are helicopters the + best way?

+

Lopez: Yes, to locate airfields and boats.

+

The President: I would suggest you mention this in your meetings with the + Congress. If they know you are working so hard to solve it, it will help + us to get the money to help.

+ +

Lopez: The drug operators are worldwide. You can’t deal with the problem + by just dealing with it in the U.S.

+

The President: That is right. We have found that after the decline in + drug use, but recently it has been on the rise again and with harder + drugs.

+

Lopez: We can’t control marijuana. We try to control traffic in it, but + we concentrate on cocaine and heroin.

+

The President: Drug users account for a high quantity of crime in the + U.S. Their demands are insatiable.

+

Lopez: Now let’s discuss Panama—[to Kissinger] your favorite subject. [Laughter]

+

Torrijos came to see me a few days ago. [To Kissinger] Do you know him?

+

+ Kissinger: I have met him, a year + ago.

+

Lopez: I am sorry to see your Embassy was attacked.

+

+ Kissinger: They are making a + mistake. We are trying to get it done, but we have to say certain + things. And it is terribly emotional in this country and we can’t do it + until the elections are over. Then we can sign in 1977.

+

Lopez: Let me be frank. Torrijos says the same thing, that he has to have + something to show.

+

The President: We sent Bunker down there with a new position.

+

+ Kissinger: Yes, it was much more + forthcoming. We did start with 50 years, though.

+

Lopez: They don’t think so. Let me tell you, it is easier for a small + country to negotiate with a big one than with one of equal size. I would + rather negotiate with the Soviet Union than Panama.

+

I asked how they would defend the Canal. They said they had thought of + that and offered to let the U.S. in in case of aggression.

+

In the Canal Zone, they want to have full jurisdiction.

+

+ Kissinger: That they can get + after the transition period. That is not the problem. The problem is + about guerrilla action and the borderline between civil disturbance and + guerrilla action.

+

Lopez: It is between action against third parties and action between + Panamanians.

+

+ Kissinger: Yes. We do have the + right to defend the Canal against third parties. We have asked for 50 + years, but we can slip that.

+

Lopez: Do you need fourteen bases?

+

+ Kissinger: Look, we can maneuver + so we can give up more, but if we have to do it all now and with + publicity, the Congress will stop it. We must have time. We sent a + different team down there and we found we can give up a lot. We can give + up a little at a time so that over the period they will get what they need. But we need to + maneuver. The House just voted again to take away our ability to + negotiate.

+

The President: That is right, and 32 senators sent me a letter against a + treaty. They should know that a newly-elected President can do a lot + that I can’t now.

+

Lopez: If you could do something without negotiating.

+

+ Kissinger: Outside the + discussions?

+

Lopez: Yes. Something you are not going to use.

+

+ Kissinger: You think that would + help?

+

Lopez: Very much.

+

+ Kissinger: That I think we can + do. Defense would go along with some of that. We had been holding it + back for the negotiation, but we can do it now.

+

Lopez: The small things. Torrijos has his own enemies who say he is + getting nowhere after a year. If he had something concrete, even small, + it would help him.

+

+ Kissinger: We will look at it. We + had decided against it in the NSC.

+

The President: Let’s look into it.

+

+ Kissinger: I haven’t looked at + the Defense team report, but we can do something.

+

Lopez: I want to make clear I am not threatening. I am not the bearer of + any threats.

+

The President: You will be very well received on the Hill. No threats,giving up aid, help + on drugs.

+

Lopez: I don’t want to say that without a treaty Panama could be another + Vietnam.

+

+ Kissinger: If you could tell + them, however, the attitude of all of Latin America, so then they + understand just what the attitudes are.

+

The President: I didn’t realize until I was preparing for you that + Colombia had transit rights.

+

Lopez: Yes. The treaty of Thomson-Urrutia. We would negotiate with Panama + after they got control. They are willing to give the U.S. the right of + military intervention, but as allies, not unilaterally. What they don’t + like is the assertion of the right of intervention in the Canal Zone + based on the treaty of 1903. Over the next 18 months, then, I will try + to present the picture of the two of you working together and that + things are moving along. Torrijos doesn’t always follow my advice, but + he listens to me.

+

The President: We were talking in the Blue Room about inflation. Colombia + is doing better than we are, but we both are scared as we look around + the world.

+ +

Lopez: One way we are doing it is to fight inflation by inflation—we + raise interest rates very high to sop up demand. It is working.

+

The President: Our big problem is fiscal. We do have interest rates high, + but we are running a deficit of $60–80–90 billion.

+

Lopez: According to the World Bank, we made the most radical tax reform + in the world. More so than Canada. We had a fiscal problem, but we have + doubled the interest rates in one year. This is better than issuing more + money.

+

(The meeting ended.)

+
+ +
+ 271. Memorandum of Conversation +

Summary: Kissinger, Ford, and López discussed OPEC, the U.N., the Darien Gap, trade, and the + Panama Canal.

+

Source: Ford Library, + National Security Adviser, NSC + Latin American Affairs Staff Files, Box 15, Visit, September + 25–26, 1975, President López of Colombia, 6. Secret; Nodis. The meeting + was held in the Oval Office. On September 26, Kissinger and López held a follow-up + conversation, in which they discussed regional and world issues, + and European history. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign + Policy File, P820125–0025) Rogers sent Kissinger a briefing memorandum in advance of + this meeting on September 19. (Ibid., ARA/NCA Files, Records + Relating to Colombia, 1967–1975: Lot 78D45, POL 7.2, López State Visit, + 3)

+ + + + + Washington, September 26, 1975, 11:30 + a.m.–noon + + + + PARTICIPANTS + President Ford + + President Alfonso Lopez + Michelson, President of Colombia + Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, + Secretary of State and Assistant to the President for National + Security Affairs + Lt. General Brent + Scowcroft, Deputy Assistant to the President for National + Security Affairs + +

[There was small talk about soccer, while the photographers came in and + took pictures.]

+

Lopez: Have you any news on oil? The OPEC meeting.

+

President: Brent?

+

+ Scowcroft: Not since I mentioned + the latest to you this morning.

+

+ Kissinger: It looks like it will + end at 10 percent.

+

President: The Saudis have been much tougher.

+

Lopez: Venezuela told me they were for 5 percent.

+ +

President: We can handle such an increase. But I worry about other + countries for whom every increment is a heavy burden.

+

+ Kissinger: This is encouraging + about Venezuela. They have been among the radicals.

+

President: We can do it, but Japan, Italy, etc., are not so fortunate. It + is shortsighted. The higher the prices the more conservation they + force.

+

Lopez: There is an increasing number of countries in the UN who are voting against you. Will it not + bring an end to your patience? I ask, because it seems to me something + must happen sooner or later.

+

+ Kissinger: Look at some of the + new countries—Sao Tome, Cape Verde. There they sit with an equal vote + and are very susceptible to radical pressures.

+

President: And I guess they can be easily corrupted.

+

Lopez: They have little to discuss, so they attack the United States. It + is a conversation topic.

+

+ Kissinger: And it’s free. But we + are beginning to keep a log of who talks and votes against us. Some of + these guys are amazing; Kaunda sat right here and in answer to a + question as to how to help get the right party elected in Angola, he + said: “You get them in power first, then we will hold the elections.” + Then in his evening toast he blasted us for undemocratic practices.

+

Lopez: The fact is the UN standards are + lowering every year. I suspect sooner or later something will + happen.

+

President: If the abuse continues to expand, I think Congress will react + adversely. They can deny money.

+

Lopez: Or force your withdrawal.

+

President: We have to keep a record so we can go to them and say we won’t + take this abuse and have you come back bilaterally for help.

+

Lopez: It is popular to vote against you.

+

+ Kissinger: But it will no longer + be free.

+

Lopez: I hear they are thinking of expelling Chile from the UN. I’ll find out more this afternoon.

+

+ Kissinger: We will fight it. And + South Africa.

+

Lopez: Even that?

+

+ Kissinger: I told the Africans we + abhorred apartheid, but if it is done for one reason one time, it can be + done for another reason another time.

+

Lopez: Even if they violate the Charter?

+

+ Kissinger: You can argue Namibia, + but not apartheid.

+

Lopez: I am glad to hear, privately, that you will not tolerate abuse + from the radicals. It looks bad for the moderates not to look as + good.

+

President: I had a check made on the narcotics. I know it is of highest + priority for you too. For this year we are appropriating $1.3 million, which is a huge + increase. This gives us an opportunity to charter boats and aircraft—and + we will look into the purchase of helicopters if necessary.

+

Lopez: I really thank you. I was pleased to hear a member of the Senate + Foreign Relations Committee this morning saying you would provide money + to help in the program. He raised it himself.

+

When I was here with the President Lleras to talk to President Nixon,we talked about the highway. I + want you to know I no longer think it is that urgent. It is still a + jungle and we must protect against hoof and mouth disease.

+

President: There was a meeting yesterday, and I think a timetable may be + set. We are making progress.

+

Lopez: It is a necessity, but we are not in a hurry. It will cause me + some political trouble in the region, but it is not a real problem.

+

President: We want you to know we are not holding back.

+

Lopez: No, we know that.

+

President: There is a Michigan delegation going to Colombia with 130 + people in the trade delegation led by George Lambrinos. He is a good + man.

+

+ Henry, how about Panama?

+

+ Kissinger: The important thing is + not the details but the fact that the President has determined to move + it to a conclusion. But we have to bring the Congress along carefully. + We can’t take too big steps at once, and Torrijos must recognize that. + If it is helpful to turn something over, we can manage that. I am + speaking very frankly to you—Torrijos should not break up the talks.

+

Lopez: Exactly what I have said. I told Torrijos to look at the polls. + There is a trend in the U.S. to a hard line. I said, “Look at the + emergence of Wallace—he is a fact.” I said, “Let the Americans handle + the problem their way.” They have a tendency to publish things they + should not. You remember the letters. I told him I had to ask permission + to publish them. I see completely that this is not the most favorable + time to make concessions. To a certain extent the question is semantic. + “Indefinite” has many meanings.

+

+ Kissinger: We have said 50 years. + That is not our last word. But we know they can’t defend it + themselves.

+

Lopez: We very much appreciate your having us here.

+

President: I thoroughly enjoyed our visit and your charming wife.

+
+ +
+ 272. Telegram 10609 From the Embassy in Colombia to the Department of + State +

Summary: + Vaky informed the + Department that López + believed he had obtained a commitment in Washington for funding + to support the interdiction of illegal narcotics.

+

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + D750381–0814. Confidential; Priority. Repeated to the DEA and Caracas.

+ + + + + Bogota, November 3, 1975, 2055Z. + +

10609. Subject: GOC Expectation of US + Narcotics Aid. State for S/NM. Caracas + for Ambassador Vance, Luns and + DEA.

+

1. It is clear from a series of conversations with the President, the + Foreign Minister and the Minister of Justice that; A) The President + believes he was promised substantially increased aid for narcotics interdiction (and + specifically helicopters), and as a result the GOC is expectant as to how this will be implemented; B) The + need to attend to the narcotics problem is now very much in the minds of + the highest levels (presidential and cabinet) of government, partly as a + result of the focus given the problem by the presidential visit to + Washington; C) The awareness of the need organizationally and + procedurally to coordinate the governmental effort in a more effective + way is also substantially heightened, and as a result some serious + thinking and planning is apparently being given within high GOC circles to the reorganization of the + official effort.

+

2. As a consequence of all this we may in turn expect; A) Some changes in + organization and/or delineation of responsibilities which may mean, + depending on what happens, that we will have to change our habits of + dealing with, and our reflexes and notions about the GOC setup; and B) Requests for additional + aid or more likely requests for us + to indicate how we are going to provide promised aid. Therefore, + Washington should be aware that since we appear to be entering a new + phase in our relationship with the GOC + on this problem; and since the expectation of, and willingness to + receive, more help is greater—and the need and opportunity as well, we + may well have to go back to the drawing board on the NCAP, or at least + augment our projections. Over the next several weeks we will be trying + to define the situation more clearly, and we will be submitting + recommendations as we develop them.

+

3. The most significant conversations were as follows:

+

A) On Oct 20 the Foreign Minister told the Ambassador that he (the + Minister) had been asked by the President to consult the Ambassador on + how we proceeded regarding the additional help on narcotics which the + President was promised in Washington. The Ambassador said that there + were pending ProAgs still unsigned and expressed the hope that these could be moved; that as to the + future, it would be useful to examine carefully what the GOC plans and strategy were so that a + logical conclusion could be drawn as to what equipment might be needed + to implement these; that this made essential the question of what + agencies of the GOC were to do what and + with whom the President wanted us to deal as to future aid and equipment; and that coordination + was particularly important to prevent duplication of effort or equipment + requests. The Minister agreed these were important steps and said he was + going to coordinate a study of these points. In a subsequent + conversation on Oct 30 with the Ambassador and Dept Asst Sec Luers the Minister discussed the point + of coordination and organization at length. The pros and cons of various + kinds of coordination were discussed. The Minister expressed a + preference for the Ministry of Justice as the main focal point and the + council on drugs as the main vehicle. He said that next week he would + like to organize a lunch with the Ambassador and the Minister of Justice + to discuss these matters.

+

B) During a courtesy visit on the President by the Ambassador and Mr. + Luers on Oct 30, the + President referred to the narcotics matter, stating that in his second + meeting with President Ford in + Washington he had been told that the USG had “decided” (sic) to grant Colombia 1.3 million + dollars additional aid. When we suggested that this figure corresponds + to what we have extended in the past and its citation may have been + that, the President said it was specifically couched in future terms as + what the US would offer and his son (his note taker) had made notes in + that regard. In any case, the President said, the figure was not + important; what was important was effective cooperation. (Comment: the + President was, I think, quite sincere that the precise figure was not + important, and I do not believe he would hold us to that. But he was + equally sincere that Colombia wanted more and sizeable help, and that he + expects and thinks we offered.) The President mentioned helicopters and + said these would be most useful and were required. Some discussion was + held on the problem of GOC coordination + and organization and with whom technical examination of plans and needs + ought to be held, the President indicating he was thinking primarily of + the police and DAS and expressing his + own confidence in General Matallana as the one to manage most of this. + The President said he would give more thought to this question of + internal organization.

+

C) In a conversation with the Minister of Justice on Oct 31, the + Ambassador stressed the desirability of proceeding to sign pending + ProAgs. The Minister agreed. A long discussion was held on the question + of coordination and organization; various devices were discussed, with + the ambassador pointing out that there were different + dimensions—enforcement action, education and rehabilitation, high-level + policy coordination, intelligence collection—all of which had different + characteristics which + required different forms of cooperation. The Minister indicated he would + get back to us after giving these matters further thought.

+ + + Vaky + + +
+ +
+ 273. Telegram 40131 From the Department of State to the Embassy in + Colombia +

Summary: The + Department informed the Embassy that it was willing to provide + increased anti-narcotics funding if Colombia developed a + realistic control program and implemented commodity assistance + programs.

+

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + [no film number]. Confidential; Immediate. Repeated to the + Mission in Geneva. Drafted by Ernst and McLaughlin; cleared by Kranz, Grown, + Wampler, and + Mantonelli; approved by Ernst. In telegram 1176 from Bogotá, February 3, + the Embassy informed the Department that López had tapped the Ministry + of Defense as the executive authority responsible for + coordinating the drug enforcement effort in Colombia. (Ibid., + D760043–0056) In telegram 1671 from Bogotá, February 13, the + Embassy recommended specific levels and types of assistance to + be offered to the Colombian Government to support its + anti-narcotics efforts. (Ibid., D760058–0436)

+ + + + + Bogota, February 19, 1976, 1748Z. + +

40131. Bogota for Ambassador, Geneva for Vance. Subject: GOC + Narcotics Reorganization and Associated Assistance Request. Ref: (A) + Bogota 0981, (B) Bogota 1176, (C) Bogota 1414, (D) Bogota 1671, (E) + Bogota A–105, August 25, 1975.

+

1. Your reports of GOC plans to + reorganize its national narcotics control effort have been welcomed here + as indication of substantially increased GOC commitment to international narcotics control program. + While we are confident Embassy has not implied any commitment on + specific aspects of GOC request for + increased assistance, proposals outlined in Bogota 1671 underscore need + for cautious approach to entire assistance question. In sum, we are + prepared to provide increased narcotics-related assistance to GOC provided: (A) GOC develops a realistic control program which proposes to + attack specific problems in specific ways; (B) Successful implementation + requires commodity assistance using narcotics funds; and (C) Funds made + available by Congress. End summary.

+

2. We do regard Colombia as a high cocaine priority country and consider + it appropriate to augment our assistance considerably beyond prior + levels, if this is required to diminish its middleman role in the substantial cocaine traffic + from Latin America to the United States, as noted in your NCAP (Ref. E). + We also welcome your assessment that a reorganization of the Colombian + effort as outlined in Refs A and C is appropriate to the situation and + that it augurs more effective efforts. We note your estimate of the + ability of the military to perform in this area. We understand the role + of the military for command and coordinating purposes as well as + maintaining and operating of aircraft, but assume the people doing most + of the actual gathering of intelligence, interdicting and enforcing + would essentially be national police, DAS and customs trained and experienced in those + functions.

+

3. With respect to further U.S. assistance, we regard the citation of an + overall dollar amount and specification of equipment (Ref D) to be + premature. A reasonable rationale for and justification of an enlarged + program must be based on a full analysis and definition of the nature, + scope and incidence of the narcotics traffic problem to be attacked, + together with carefully planned and described approaches to meet it at + the most feasible points at which suppression efforts could be applied. + While money is a function of program, and there is a “chicken and egg” + aspect as far as that goes, the program itself must be a function of + elaborated need.

+

4. Thus, while Ref D is a good summary of what we might rpt might do, we + would be hard pressed at this point to sell it to Congress. Much staff + work on both sides remains to be done if we and the GOC are to develop a realistic outline of + a workable narcotics control effort. Once it has been agreed that + certain types of actions will be required (and that, if undertaken, they + have reasonable chance of success), we can then jointly determine what + equipment will be needed, how much of this need can be met from existing + GOC inventory, and how much and + what types should be provided under narcotics assistance rubric. At this + point, however, we do not wish in any way encourage unrealistic GOC expectations which, if not met, would + lead to a diminution of the Colombian effort.

+

5. FYI only: At this time we can plan rpt plan on a program in the range + of eight to ten million dollars, the maximum that would be available in + our FY 76 and FY 77 programs combined, assuming Congressional + appropriations for both years reach levels requested by executive + branch. End FYI.

+

6. Further, several considerations must bear heavily on our approach. + First, cocaine ranks after heroin in the prioritization of drugs of + abuse made in the domestic council white paper. Second, we have heavy + and increasing assistance commitments to other countries, certain of + which must be given higher priority. Third, our entire FY 1976 narcotics assistance request is for + but 42.5 million dollars, and this has yet to be acted upon by the + Congress. Fourth, we must be absolutely assured that equipment provided by assistance funds will be + used for narcotics control purposes and not diverted to general support + of military or general law enforcement entities. Should this ever not be + the case, our program would be placed in grave jeopardy in the + Congress.

+

7. We suggest it appropriate in the circumstances for a small number of + Washington-based specialists to join with key members of the Embassy’s + narcotics control committee, at a suitable time soon after the + Secretary’s visit, for an up-to-date analysis of the detailed nature of + the interdiction problem in Colombia. This would be followed by careful + development of a program with the Colombians into which can be fitted + appropriate amounts and types of available U.S. grant equipment. We have + in mind from Washington, for example, a representative of S/NM for overall programming, one each + specialists in aviation, communications and general drug enforcement. In + our approach we would give priority to developing and equipping units + having drug control as their specific charge over those that would have + it as one among other responsibilities.

+ + + Ingersoll + + +
+ +
+ 274. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security + Affairs (Scowcroft) to President + Ford + +

Summary: Scowcroft informed the + President of Kissinger’s + conversation with López, + in which they discussed the Quita Sueño issue, textiles, and the + racial dimension to potential Cuban intervention in the + Caribbean.

+

Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CL 176, + Trips, February 1976, Trips Book, Folder 11. Secret; Sensitive. + Sent for Information. Ford initialed the memorandum. Kissinger held conversations + with López and other + Colombian officials on February 22 and February 23. (National + Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P820117–0997 and + P820117–0809) In telegram 54203 to Bogotá, March 5, the + Department informed the Embassy of the follow-up action after + the Secretary’s conversations. (Ibid., + D760086–0764)

+ + + + + Washington, February + 23, 1976. + +

Secretary Kissinger asked that + the following report be passed to you on his visit to Bogota:

+

The contrast between Brazil and Colombia could hardly be greater. It is + not just a matter of hot versus cold, or high versus low—though Bogota, + I find to my discomfort, is about 9000 feet high. Brazil is protocol and + rush from one mass meeting of ministers to another but with close attention to economic detail, + energy prospects, ore exports, arid agriculture and so forth. Here, + President Lopez-Michelson suggested that we repair to his equivalent of + Camp David, for long philosophical talks in the evening and this + morning. I confess I rather like it this way, particularly when the + talks are with someone as acute as President Lopez.

+

He remembers his visit with you warmly. We have picked up where you left + off. As you know, we have no bilateral problems with Colombia. They are + moderately disturbed that our Senate Foreign Relations Committee cannot + even consider the treaty we have proposed to quitclaim our interests + over some Caribbean reefs to Colombia. They take this, not as an insult + to themselves so much as a hint of what is in store for us all from + Congressional management of other, larger foreign relations issues. They + are interested in our trade relations, particularly in more flexibility + for textile imports. But with Lopez, these issues are too small to + create complexes. With him, we can talk broadly about Latin America and + the world, knowing that he is not grinding any particular local + axes.

+

He, like every other Latin leader I have met, is profoundly concerned + with our current political process. He knows the details of the campaign + thus far, is not impressed by the Democratic pack and is well aware that + we are in a difficult transition process. He is appalled by the + frivolity with which we disclose information extremely damaging to other + countries. He hopes that a stronger executive will emerge after November + and he can hardly wait.

+

Cuba is much on his mind. As an international lawyer, he recognizes the + juridical issues and talks to them in public. During one meeting with + the press, he hinted that he did not see much legal difference between + what the Cubans were doing in Angola and our effort in Vietnam, i.e., it + was bad. But the real meaning of the Cuban adventure in Angola is for + him—he told me privately—the specter of race warfare. He is persuaded + that Castro will now be tempted + to turn his attention to the Caribbean, emerging from Angola as a + successful fighter against white imperialism and with extraordinary + credentials as the savior of the blacks everywhere. There are, the + President points out, no lack of troubled waters in the Caribbean for + his fishing—from Belize in the west all the way to Guyana on Venezuela’s + border. Colombia itself has its own festering race problem on the coast + and on its several Caribbean Island possessions. But as Lopez wisely + points out, it is impossible to talk about this dimension in public, for + to do so will only make matters worse.

+

In private, though, he is prepared to admit that he is as concerned now + about Cuba as President Perez of + Venezuela is, but that he sees the danger as a new Cuban strategy to + exploit the racial dimension in the troubled geopolitics of the region. + He thinks Castro will just not + go to his grave before he + has tried for some role in the world beyond Cuba, and Lopez does not see + that Castro role as a + constructive or peaceful one.

+

This is what gives point to his concern about our position in the world, + and our capacity, given Congressional division and electoral + preoccupation, to manage our own power effectively this year. I stressed + to him my conviction that you were a strong President, more able and + more conscious of this problem than any other contender, that you would + win, and that the United States would regain much of its domestic + equilibrium and self-confidence after the November election.

+
+ +
+ 275. Telegram 2298 From the Embassy in Bogotá to the Department of + State +

Summary: The + Embassy commented on the different perceptions of U.S and + Colombian officials with regard to anti-narcotics efforts and + warned there was potential for misunderstanding.

+

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + D760081–0266. Confidential; Priority. Repeated to Caracas and + DEA. Telegram 40131 to + Bogotá is Document 273. In telegram + 2314 from Bogotá, March 3, Vaky requested clarification of some of the + proposals of telegram 40131. (Ibid., + D760081–0297)

+ + + + + March 3, 1976, + 1641Z. + +

2298. Department for ARA Deputy Asst Sec + Luers and S/NM + Vance + DEA for EOIL Caracas for DEA. Subject: Perceptual Factors in + US–GOC Narcotics Cooperation. Ref: + State 40131.

+

1. The potential for mutual misunderstanding on narcotics aid to Colombia, and even for a dispute + between our two governments, increases to the extent we fail to + understand or take into account the differences which exist between us + in perception and conditioning. (Our separate reply to reftel expresses + some of our concerns in this regard.) This cable therefore recapitulates + in some detail the GOC perception and + reasons therefore in the hope that it will be helpful as we all come to + grips with the issue.

+

2. The GOC position and logic has + several separate strands. First, it is important to remember that the + top echelon, starting with the President, do not rpt not consider + narcotics a Colombian problem with which the US has offered to help. + Rather they view it as the reverse. It is important to remember what + President Lopez said prior to his state visit (75 Bogota 8826). That is + the way he really feels. He frequently compares the international narcotics situation to + the 18th century opium wars, as he did in that statement. He does not + say this to avoid action or cooperation or just to needle us, but in + order to make clear what he believes is the true perspective, i.e. that, + while this is an international problem, the nation with the most at + stake both as victim and cause—and therefore with perhaps the greatest + obligation for action—is the United States.

+

3. The GOC recognizes the impact of the + drug traffic on Colombia, is worried about it and sincerely wants to + eliminate it. It accepts our formulation that the problem is serious + [and] difficult and requires major action. One cannot fault the + President and his Ministers on their sincerity and readiness to take + action. The GOC believes that the + traffickers are well-financed, well organized and sophisticated and are + therefore formidable foes. It does not believe that it alone has the + resources to match the traffickers. Therefore it feels that if an + interdiction effort is to be successful in Colombia we must help.

+

4. President Lopez believes that President Ford and the Secretary promised that the US would + support a major Colombian interdiction effort. He understood that the + 1.3 million dollars mentioned as already earmarked this year, was an + example, not a limit. He understood that aid would be substantial but realistic in terms of what is + possible and needed. The President and the GOC believe that elimination of Colombia as the main + trafficking center for cocaine is also a USG wish and objective.

+

5. At this point I refer to the statement at the end of para 4 of reftel + that “we do not wish in anyway to encourage unrealistic GOC expectations which, if not met, would + lead to a diminution of the Colombian effort”. Leaving aside the + adjective “unrealistic” for a moment—we should not delude ourselves that + the GOC has not been encouraged. We + have long since passed that point. The Colombians have indeed felt + encouraged to believe we would extend substantial support if they would + undertake a major effort. This occurred in the conversations in + Washington; it continued during the discussions with CoDels Javits and + Wolff. And if there is still any doubt one has only to read the last + paragraph of President Ford’s + February 23 statement (State 45483). Those adjectives are + unqualified.

+

6. The thread therefore runs something like this: The GOC believes the trafficking problem is + serious and huge, that it cannot fight it by itself, that the US has + promised aid—and indeed has both an interest and an obligation to do + so—and has in effect invited a mutual major effort.

+

7. At this point, the GOC’s logic is + simple, perhaps simplistic. It believes that if you set an objective you + do so intending to devote the necessary resources to it. As far as the + GOC is concerned, if it is going + to take action in this + field it wants to sharply reduce the trafficking problem, not just + contain or hold it. Therefore what it set about was a major, massive + national effort. (It uses the phraseology—as the Foreign Minister + did—that the problem requires us to “wage war” on the traffickers; this + military imagery may disturb parts of our bureaucracy but it faithfully + reflects the commitment and seriousness with which the GOC views the issue.)

+

8. The proposed plan involving MOD + “generalship” of the narcotics effort is a typical, and in some ways the + only possible, implementation of these concepts. If an all-out effort is + to be waged, the GOC reasons, it must + be nation-wide with all resources mobilized. This means—as it meant + during the violencia, during the counter-insurgency, and during the + current kidnapping wave—that the military must be brought in. The + necessary coordination cannot effectively be provided, in the + President’s view, except by the MOD + which stands above and outside of the individual services now + acting.

+

9. In short, what has happened is that the GOC has responded to our professed concerns, taking our + words at face value to mean that we are serious about wanting to end the + cocaine problem. They are in sum calling our bet—asking US to put our + money where our mouth is. They are, in effect, testing whether we really + mean what we say, i.e. are we prepared to pay the cost of an “all-out + effort” as President Ford said, + or whether we are in effect saying we will help if it does not cost too + much.

+

10. What then are realistic and unrealistic expectations? The GOC has without question probed to see how + much equipment it can get; what did it have to lose? I doubt very much + if any Colombian official really supposed that anything like $50 million + would be forthcoming. But this kind of opening gambit should not be + taken to mean that the GOC is not + serious or sincere about wanting to combat the problem massively and + nationally. While $50 million was the blue sky optimum, nevertheless + they do believe that a necessary effort—if we are serious—is in the + 10–15 million range (the Foreign Minister’s private estimate to me; I + did not comment).

+

11. We are faced with the real possibility of two distasteful outcomes—on + the one hand, the missing of an opportunity to mount an effective + combined effort because we are unable to put up the supporting resources + to the degree required, and, on the other, a scenario in which each + government charges the other with bad faith and responsibility for + failing to mount an effective effort.

+

12. The danger depends in large part on how our two sets of perceptions + and conceptions—each equally egocentric and determined by respective + domestic environments—accommodate to each other. Our bureaucracy is, + explicably, sensitive to congressional considerations (many of which are contradictory) and so we + are, explicably, hypersensitive to budget levels, military involvement + and how surely we can guarantee what will happen. We seem to have been + taken aback by the alacrity and magnitude of Colombia’s response to our + general urgings, and now do not know how to fit it all in. The question + is to what degree we remain totally obsessed with our bureaucratic + requirements and try to universalize them as the “real” environment + within which we must work. We have to grapple with these practical + matters, of course, but let us understand clearly that to the degree we + cannot accommodate or mutually adjust to each government’s needs and + perceptions and to the intrinsic reality of the situation itself, we + risk a serious problem indeed.

+

13. One final comment: reftel states that “. . . we are confident Embassy + has not implied any commitment on specific aspects of GOC request . . . etc.” My experience is + that that kind of phrasing usually reflects some unspoken suspicion or + fear that the exact opposite did in fact occur. If Washington has any + such fear or suspicion, please rest easily. Neither I nor any member of + my staff has implied any commitment nor have we led the Colombians on. I + do remind you, however, that our willingness to provide helicopters was + specifically expressed in the Presidential conversations in Washington + last September.

+ + + Vaky + + +
+ +
+ 276. Telegram 58331 From the Department of State to the Embassy in + Colombia +

Summary: The + Department welcomed López’s strong commitment to anti-narcotics + measures and accepted his decision to make the Colombian + Ministry of Defense responsible for directing and coordinating + the anti-narcotics effort. The Department informed the Embassy + that it would send down intelligence specialists to aid in the effort to stem the flow + of illegal drugs to the United States.

+

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + [no film number]. Confidential; Immediate. In telegram 90271 to + Bogotá, April 14, the Department informed the Embassy that $9 + million of anti-narcotics assistance to Colombia was allocated + through FY 1977. (Ibid.) In + telegram 4306 from Bogotá, April 30, the Embassy reported that + Vaky had briefed the + Colombian Foreign Minister on the narcotics control assistance + package described in telegram 90271 to Bogotá. (Ibid., + D760165–0853) Telegram 2314 from Bogotá is referenced in the + sourcenote to Document 275. Telegram + 2298 from Bogotá is Document + 275.

+ + + + + Washington, March 10, + 1976. + +

58331. Subject: Narcotics Assistance. Ref: Bogota 2314 and 2298.

+

1. We are in substantial agreement with views expressed reftels. Colombia + continues to be of major importance in our international anti-narcotics + effort and holds the key to our hopes of substantially reducing amount + of cocaine reaching U.S. We are pleased with the strong commitment of + President Lopez to deal with the problem and are fully committed to + being responsive. As you know his decision to place responsibility for + directing and coordinating the anti-narcotics effort in the hands of the + MOD and give the military a key + role has raised a number of concerns here. Nevertheless, we recognize + this (1) is a Colombian decision, (2) given the structure of the + Colombian government, makes sense, and (3) is probably essential to + conduct the concerted major effort needed to achieve the results we + seek.

+

2. Thus we are anxious to move ahead in preparing a program in which we + would do our part. We have already included 8–10 million dollars for a + Colombian program in our preliminary planning through FY 1977, but wish emphasize that in the end + the program might be larger or smaller, as required by GOC plan of attack and degree to which our + participation required. We are committed to doing our share in a major + cooperative effort, and it is on this basis that we would like to see + talks go forward with the Colombians. Assuming these talks would lead to + a solid program we would expect no serious problem in presenting it to + Congress.

+

3. The team we propose to send would bring together those from Washington + who know what we need to draft a program which meets requirements here + and those from mission who know the details of the problem in Colombia. + We would hope that their discussions could develop the outlines of a logical narcotics + suppression plan which mission could then discuss with GOC. From basic plan (as distinguished + from organization) to agreement on resource requirements would not be + long process.

+

4. To provide the above team with best, most current possible + information, DEA is prepared to send to + Bogota two or three intelligence specialists to go over material + collected during Operation Kitchen and interview those Americans at post + who were involved. These persons would contact GOC officials only with prior mission approval. Initial + study would be available three weeks after team reached Bogota, and will + concentrate on cocaine trafficking methods and patterns. Team can depart + Washington as soon as mission cables its approval.

+

5. In addition to work to be done by intelligence team, we hope other + mission elements will be asked to cooperate fully in providing current + data base for planners. For example, economic/commercial section should + reactivate its investigation of ether imports, DAO could update October 75 DIA Military Intelligence Summary for Colombia (which + reports that Colombia Air Force has 34 rpt 34 helicopters), etc.

+

6. Proposed Timing: To avoid further delays, intelligence team can depart + Washington as soon as Embassy approves visit. We would suggest that + planning team not wait for completion of study, but arrive Bogota about + one week after intelligence team has set to work, using early arrival + for discussions with mission officials, field visits and if mission + concurs, preliminary talks with GOC + officials. Kissinger + unquote.

+ + + Ingersoll + + +
+ +
+ 277. Telegram 5516 From the Embassy in Colombia to the Department of + State +

Summary: + Vaky informed the + Department that Lievano + was disappointed with the level of U.S Government funding of + anti-narcotics efforts, and perceived a U.S. lack of confidence + in Colombia’s military to lead the effort. Vaky requested that the + Department continue to reserve previously earmarked + anti-narcotics funds for Colombia.

+

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + D760217–0970. Confidential; Priority. Repeated to Caracas, + USCINCO, and DEA. In telegram + 146051 to Bogotá, June 14, the Department informed the Embassy + it was concerned that the Colombians seemed to be backing away + from López’s declared + intention to undertake a major anti-narcotics effort, and it + instructed Vaky to + inform the Colombian President of the Department’s policy. + (Ibid., D760229–0184)

+ + + + + June 4, 1976, + 2251Z. + +

5516. Subj: Narcotics Assistance.

+

1. During my farewell call on the Foreign Minister, Lievano let his hair down on the + narcotics program. He said that the Minister of Defense had become quite + irritated (Molestoso) and felt that the discussions we had had with his + staff on the narcotics program indicated a lack of confidence in the + military. In addition, since the proposal we had made did not correspond + in level or nature to their concept of what they felt they should and + could do, the Minister of Defense has decided there was no point in + getting involved in the narcotics field; the ministry will therefore not + undertake the coordinated major interdiction efforts they had talked + about.

+

2. I said to the Minister that I was very disturbed to hear that and + especially that there was irritation. I believed that there was probably + misunderstanding over what we were able and not able to do. I noted, for + example, that levels offered were dictated by Congressional + appropriation. Our proposal was designed to make optimum use of + admittedly only very limited available funds. I also pointed out that we + were required to comply with certain procedural and congressionally + mandated restrictions as to use of equipment, and that ProAgs had to + reflect this.

+

3. The Minister said he understood all of that and he was not implying + any lack of good faith on our part. However, he said, the whole US + approach did not appear to be consonant with the depth of the problem. + The Minister then entered upon a calm and gentle lecture. For the + future, he said, the US should bear in mind that the narcotics traffic + problem is very deep and very big. If we felt it was as serious as we + said it was, and if we felt the effects of the narcotics [garble] were + as deleterious to our society as we said they were, then the only + logical conclusion is massive action to combat it. The US cannot handle + the problem with small, + haggling (regateo) limitations and restrictions every step of the way, + nor, he added, with relatively small amounts of funds. Colombia had felt + that the problem was of such magnitude that a major and all-out “war” + was necessary to cut the traffic. I told the Minister that we did + believe that the problem was serious and required major efforts, but I + did want to point out that the nature of the problem did not really + require massive movements of men and equipment but good operational + intelligence and quick responses to take advantage of that intelligence. + Therefore, it should not be a question of large levels of funds or even + equipment, but really of people and strategy. The Minister added that he + could understand that. But while he agreed it was not a question of just + levels of funds, part of the problem lay in what he continued to call + “haggling” and restrictiveness in procedures.

+

4. I asked the Minister where, then, we should go from here and he + suggested that we continue as we are and continue to cooperate with the + F–2 and other agencies. Until there + was further internal consideration of whether to have a central point of + command/coordination, we should just continue the present pattern. I + said we would do so and would probably even seek to expand cooperation + with the F–2.

+

5. Comment: Operationally, I do not think the situation we have arrived + at is catastrophic. We will still be able to work fruitfully with the + agencies as we have been doing. Psychologically, however, I fear we have + not fared very well. The perception at high levels, and certainly in the + military, appears to be what we feared it might, viz., that we did not + consider the matter serious enough to cut red tape, take chances, make + special efforts and provide high levels of aid. To judge from the + Minister’s repetitive use of the word “regatear” they see our insistence + on the conditions we were instructed to [garble] out to them as + nitpicking and haggling. The MOD’s + irritation apparently reflects a) disappointment at the level of our + response to their proposals and, I think more seriously and + specifically, b) their reaction to our position on helicopters, i.e. + that the helicopters would be flown and maintained by a private company + under contract instead of being given to the FAC. (Although State 61912 gave us a fall-back position to + permit FAC operation and maintenance + “if the GOC is adamant”, we were never + able to get that far; as soon as we laid out our suggestion, the + military just froze up and walked away.) Not used to negotiating ProAgs, + the military, with perhaps more pride than justification, assumed that + we took their intentions in good faith and that we would give them the + tools to do the job; our explanations as to requirements and procedures + simply looked like small haggling to them and they apparently decided + the levels of aid were not worth the + trouble of negotiation (unless they have second thoughts later). There + may not be much equity in that perception, but that is the way they apparently saw it, and therefore + that perception is a political fact.

+

6. My impression is that at high levels, and certainly at the two + Ministers’ level, they have concluded that since we are apparently not + going to be in a position to backstop a large “war” on drugs, they too + might just as well relegate the matter back to the nature of an on-going + police operation and let the technicians work it out. I do not rpt not + believe their goodwill, their concern or their intention to continue + cooperation at the police level is adversely affected. But I doubt they + will be very patient with any exhortations they may receive from any + future visiting Congressman or official seeking to stimulate Colombia to + greater efforts.

+

7. In my farewell call on the President I will, if it seems appropriate, + discuss the matter further with him. In the meantime, I do believe we + can expand cooperation effectively with the F–2 and we intend to begin to concentrate our efforts there + and with the judicial police. We should be able to use much of the funds + currently earmarked in various kinds of additional programs with the + existing agencies.

+

8. Action requested: I ask that pending my talk with the President, the + funds which had been earmarked, and which I understand from State 133234 + would be available until August 31, continue to be reserved for Colombia + to give us time to study additional activity with the national + police.

+ + + Vaky + + +
+ +
+ 278. Briefing Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for + Inter-American Affairs (Shlaudeman) and the Special Assistant to the Secretary + of State and Coordinator for International Narcotics Matters (Vance) to Secretary of State Kissinger + +

Summary: Shlaudeman and Vance reported that the Chargé in Bogotá had + reached an agreement on increased narcotics assistance to the + National Police.

+

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + P760132–0548. Secret. Sent through Habib. Drafted by Vance and Luers. Attached but not published are Tab 1, + telegram 7617 from Bogotá, July 29, and Tab 2, a June 11 + memorandum from Vance + and Luers to Kissinger. In telegram 8176 + from Bogotá, August 12, Sanchez reported on his conversations + with Colombian officials regarding the operational details of + the anti-narcotics plan. (Ibid., D760310–1037)

+ + + + + Washington, July 30, + 1976. + +

Narcotics Program Assistance to Colombia

+

Today, our Chargé in Bogota reports that he has reached an agreement on + arrangements which would finally permit our increased narcotics + assistance program with Colombia to proceed (see Bogota 7617 at Tab 1). + It would involve among other things the transfer of three helicopters, a + reasonable number which the Colombians now find acceptable. We have + directed the Chargé to press forward urgently and have briefed + Ambassador Sanchez, who will treat completion of the program as top + priority.

+

As we reported to you in our memorandum of June 11 (Tab 2), our planning + for an enhanced narcotics program to Colombia, following the Ford-Lopez conversation of September + 25, envisaged a total program in FY’s 76 + and 77 of almost $9 million. We made it clear to the GOC that this was “starters” because the + next fiscal year begins October 1 and, if an effective program could be + developed which called for more equipment, including aircraft, we would + sympathetically consider future needs, funded from still more FY 77 monies.

+

The Foreign Minister told the Chargé July 28 that President Lopez concurs + in our now negotiating this agreement with the National Police. The + Colombian Defense Minister, with whom the earlier negotiations were + carried on, has finally said that his Ministry is not currently + interested as the helicopters envisaged cannot be used for + anti-guerrilla and other internal security operations. He has really + aspired to another helicopter wing for his air force. The Chargé reports + that he has confidence that he can now move rapidly to complete these + negotiations with the Police as the Police envisage a program about like + the one we had hoped to see develop.

+ +

If we do not have this matter moving in the very early future, we will + recommend to you appropriate action including the possibilities of a + message from you to President Lopez and/or a Shlaudeman/Vance visit to Bogota.

+
+ +
+ 279. Memorandum of Conversation +

Summary: Kissinger and Lievano discussed human rights, Panama, and + economic relations.

+

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + P820118–1945. Secret; Sensitive; Nodis.

+ + + + + Mexico City, December + 1, 1976. + + + PARTICIPANTS + + U.S. Side + + The Secretary + Mr. William Rogers, Under + Secretary for Economic Affairs + + Colombia Side + + Foreign Minister Indalecio Lievano + Aguirre + + +

The Secretary met over lunch with Foreign Minister Lievano.Lievano stressed human rights and touched on Panama and + economic relations as well.

+

+ Human Rights: This issue was at the top of + Lievano’s agenda. His + suggestion was blunt: do not hang U.S. policy in the hemisphere around + the human rights issue. To make human rights performance the test of our + relationship with the nations of the Americas would chill our ties with + a goodly number who happen not to share our own democratic preferences + just now, would create no end of difficulties for the few other + democracies, and would probably not do much for human rights.

+

+ Panama: On the Canal treaty, we have perhaps a + year. As before, he urged that we consider Torrijos the one viable + alternative. We should not think we would be better off negotiating with + one of the old Panamanians. Duration is the nub. Why not look at two + treaties, one on the Canal zone for a shorter term and one on defense, + framed perhaps like our mutual defense treaties with other countries, + for a considerably longer period. Panama would buy this, he said.

+

+ Economic Relations: + Lievano restrains his enthusiasm + for the G–77. Latin America is different from Africa and has different + interests. It would be far + better if the North-South dialogue were regionalized. We have a special + relationship within the hemisphere. Use it. He would like to see a + program of major U.S. concessions in the trade area, though he chided us + that we had best recognize from the outset that if we are to do anything + significant we are going to have to disappoint our trade union + interests. We should nevertheless try to move in a major way in a dozen + or so industrial areas and unveil a regional plan at the OAS Special General Assembly.

+
+ +
+ 280. Telegram 12007 From the Embassy in Colombia to the Department of + State +

Summary: The + Embassy indicated that sharply reducing or eliminating the + Military Group in Colombia would damage the U.S. Government’s + relations with the Colombian military.

+

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + D760445–0898. Confidential; Immediate. Repeated to Caracas, the + Secretary of Defense, the JCS, + and USCINCSO. In telegram + 4988 from Bogotá, May 20, the Embassy reported on why U.S. + military assistance to Colombia, and military groups in + particular, were important in maintaining close U.S. Government + ties with Colombia’s military. (Ibid., D760159–1163) In telegram + 10303 from Bogotá, October 7, the Embassy informed the + Department that it thought an 18-member U.S. military group in + Colombia was necessary for effective management of military + assistance over the next few years. (Ibid., D760379–0303) On + December 1, the Department asked the Embassies in 11 Latin + American nations to comment on the desirability of retaining + military groups in their respective host countries. (Telegram + 292128 to Lima, Bogotá, Caracas, Tegucigalpa, Managua, San + Salvador, Guatemala, Santo Domingo, Mexico, Santiago, and Quito, + December 1; ibid., D760444–0539)

+ + + + + Bogota, December 1, 1976, 2152Z. + +

12007. Subject: Future of Military Groups. Ref: (A) State 292128; (B) + Bogota 10303; (C) Bogota 4988.

+

1. As indicated reftel B, highest levels of Colombian defense + establishment have expressed strongest preference for continuation of + MilGroup in Colombia of structure and size essentially comparable to + that they now have. We use “that they now have” advisedly; they consider + that MilGroup is in fact “theirs”, treating and using it as a co-located + and integral part of their own general staff. In their perception of the + problem, then, the USG is talking about + sharply reducing or eliminating what they view as a key element of their + general staff, all without the consultation and mutual accord called for + in our bilateral military mission agreement of April 1975. All + indications we have received from the Colombians are that they are quite + apprehensive about the implications for them of AECA, and do not + repeat not want any sudden radical changes.

+

2. For these reasons, and to ensure the availability of enough U.S. + military personnel to provide sound management of the projected security + assistance program for Colombia, particularly considering the recent + renewal of FMS credit for Colombia + after a three-year lapse, the basic position of post remains as + expressed in reftel B; i.e., a MilGroup staffing level of eighteen for + the next couple of years; and an assumed phased reduction to lower + levels thereafter.

+

3. A more accelerated reduction of the MilGroup in Colombia necessarily + remains subject to a number of caveats, some dependent on unilateral + action and others on bilateral and multilateral considerations. Reftel A is not explicit on what tasks + and responsibilities are envisioned for a retained “Military Group,” and + it is thus difficult to determine meaning of “efficient operations” + against which we are to assess minimum personnel needs. Reftel C did advance posts’s + alternative proposal for administering military assistance in the field. + A review of that proposal and its caveats should be useful, particularly + since some steps in the direction of that alternative have already been + taken, as a function of the establishment of Offices of Defense + Cooperation (ODC) elsewhere.

+

4. We suggested doing away with the traditional MilGroup of MAAG organization, with particular + reference to its internal administrative responsibilities as a + full-fledged independent military unit. The ODC concept, with the IDC + as an integral part of the Embassy rather than as a separate military + command, appears to lend itself to our idea. We then advised that we + felt that, if fully supported administratively by the Embassy, a liaison + element of a minimum of eight relatively senior officers, two to work + with each host military service and two to work with the Defense + Ministry and joint staff, could probably accomplish specified tasks and + constitute a continued U.S. military presence that could be both + effective and palatable to the Colombian military.

+

5. However, as stated in ref C, this concept would only work under the + following five conditions:

+

A. That it be uniformly applied in Latin America to avoid the + interpretation that some countries may be receiving second class + treatment.

+

B. Fast, effective U.S. backstopping; e.g. MTT’s, ETS.

+

C. Top quality, sensitive, language qualified personnel.

+

D. Elimination of the current flood of administrative requirements with + which MilGroups are taxed.

+

E. Full prompt consultation with the Colombians, with all possible + accommodation to their views on any significant changes, the consultation having enhanced prospects + if presented in the context of a conceptual change. Particularly in a + parallel regional framework, as opposed to simply seeking their + acquiescence in a further shrinking of personnel resources.

+

G. Finally, that if these conditions cannot be met, the concept would not + work, and that we may as well stay with the traditional MilGroup + pattern, streamlined where possible.

+

6. We feel that our earlier perceptions, as amplified in reftel C, remain + valid. However, the limited information in our possession indicates that + our caveats remain, to a considerable extent, to be addressed. Paragraph + one of reftel A speaks of retaining “Military Group” designations + because of their unique character and representation responsibilities, + apparently in place of the ODC + designation and an unknown portion of the ODC concepts previously announced. In this connection, the + term “Military Group” has no special cachet in Colombia, where it is in + only unilateral U.S. usage. As noted reftel C, another term would be + equally acceptable to Colombia.) Indicators so far are that uniformity + in application in the region is of less concern in current Washington + thinking than are differences; for example, the potential for “more + generous” treatment of nations as disparate as Brazil and Bolivia, + neither of which incidentally enjoys Colombia’s (and Venezuela’s) unique + distinction in South America as functioning democracies.

+

7. In summary, it may be practical and perhaps desirable, to have a + smaller Security Assistance Organization in Colombia, eventually, based + on the information we have now. However, it is unclear how we can get + there as soon as October 1, 1977, except as a forced and unilateral + action ignoring what we know of strong Colombian preferences and + sensitivities. We therefore reiterate our view that the present MilGroup + structure and a manning level of eighteen for the next couple of years, + declining thereafter, makes most sense to U.S. here. We would welcome, + however, a somewhat fuller explanation of Washington thinking and + planning, especially with regard to projected missions and tasks.

+ + Sanchez + + +
+
+ +
+ Peru + +
+ 281. Memorandum From William J. + Jorden of the National Security Council Staff to the + President’s Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Scowcroft) +

Summary: Jorden informed Scowcoft of the state of play + involving the IPC investment dispute.

+

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Country Files, Box 793, + Latin America, Peru, Vol. 3, January 1972–December 31, 1973. + Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only. Outside the System. Sent for + action. Attached but not published were undated draft letters + from Flanigan to the + President and from the President to Velasco. Although there is no indication that + Scowcroft informed + Hinton of NSC approval, Nixon decided in late February + to send Greene as an + intermediary to Peru. (Paper prepared by the Department of + State, April 21; ibid. RG 59, National Security Study Memoranda, + 1969–1977: Lot 80D212, NSSM + 158)

+ + + + + Washington, February + 8, 1973. + + + SUBJECT + Investment Dispute with Peru + +

This is a particularly sensitive matter and is forwarded for your + information only.

+

You may be aware that we have had a long-standing dispute with Peru + centering on nationalization of the International Petroleum Company + (Standard Oil of New Jersey) properties in 1968. It is the single, most + sensitive issue between us. IPC had a bad record, indeed, in Peru and + nationalist sentiment is such that no Peruvian + government can survive if it agrees to make payment for the properties. + We have argued that some repayment should be made, however modest, as a + matter of principle.

+

We have tried for years to find some way out of this impasse to no avail. + The last effort, through third parties, was blown out of the water by + premature press disclosure.

+

At NSC–CIEP sessions last November it + was agreed to make one more try. Peter + Flanigan was given responsibility for the effort. He now + believes that he has developed an approach that at least has some + promise. It amounts to getting Peru to pay the U.S. for all claims. We would then distribute the payment + to all U.S. companies owed by Peru—including IPC. Peru would, of course, + insist that she was making no payment to IPC.

+

I have studied the suggested approach and conclude it is worth a try. It + is going to be a hard row to hoe and I remain skeptical about Peru’s acceptance. But Peru is + too important to us—in the future especially—to fail to try every + possible route to a solution.

+

The proposal is outlined in the attached draft memo from Flanigan to the President. Also + attached is a draft letter from the President to President Velasco of Peru which designates + James Greene (of Hanover + Trust) as the authorized intermediary to deal with this problem.

+

I have studied this and agree it is the only sensible approach available + at the moment. I have cleared it—but with the clear understanding that I + was informing you immediately.

+

If you agree with this, you could have someone on your staff inform + Dean Hinton in Flanigan’s shop that you approve for + the NSC. Or, you can wait until + Flanigan submits it to the + President—in which case I assume it will come to you for clearance—and + then act. In any case, I felt you should know the state of play and be + aware that I have read this carefully and approve.

+

Recommendation:

+

That you have Dean Hinton + informed that this is approved for NSC.

+
+ +
+ 282. Memorandum From the Acting Assistant Secretary of Defense for + International Security Affairs (Eagleburger) to Secretary of Defense Richardson + +

Summary: Eagleburger informed Richardson of the broad + outlines of the U.S. Government’s policy towards Peru. He + requested approval for presidential waivers of + congressionally-mandated withholding of FMS for Peru and an SRG meeting if the waivers were denied.

+

Source: Washington National Records Center, OSD Files: FRC 330–78 0001, Peru + 1973. Secret. Richardson + approved the actions on March 20. NSSM 158 is published in + Foreign + Relations, 1969–1976, vol. E–10, Documents on + American Republics, 1969–1972, as Document 637. + National Security Decision Memorandum 11 and 19 are ibid., Documents 593 and 607, respectively. + Attached but not published at Tab A is a February 23 telegram + from Belcher to the + Secretary of State; at Tab B is Belcher’s undated overview to the FY 1974–75 CASP for Peru; at Tab C is a + March 8 Memorandum for the Record from LeBailly; at Tab D is a + February 20 telegram from Belcher to the Secretary of State; and at Tab E + is a undated draft letter to Crimmins from Eagleburger. On April 14, Eagleburger informed Richardson that he had sent + the letter to Crimmins + on March 22, and that a request for a Presidential Determination + issuing the waiver to the Pelly Amendment was being processed at + the Department. (Ibid.) No SRG + meeting on Peru was held.

+ + + + + Washington, March 19, + 1973. + + + SUBJECT + Peru + +

The purpose of this memorandum is to review broad USG policy toward Peru, to request your + affirmation of OSD policy + positions—particularly with regard to the response to NSSM 158 (Review of US + Policy Toward Peru)—and to inform you of proposed DOD initiatives.

+

In 1968, the Peruvian military took control of their government after a + dispute with the elected President over, among other things, the terms + of settlement of an expropriation action against International Petroleum + Company (IPC), a subsidiary of Standard Oil Company of New Jersey. Since + that time the Government of Peru (GOP) + has implemented policies that have as an objective the achievement of a + measure of independence from previously established ties to the US. The + GOP began to formulate foreign + policies on the basis of universality; its economic policies stressed + state control of internal centers of economic power and the + diversification of the country’s external trade patterns. The GOP has continued to express its sense of + affinity to the US; but inevitably the trend of its nationalistic + policies has created conflicts with domestic political content for both + countries. The two most significant disputes at this moment concern IPC + and the seizure of US fishing boats. This latter dispute is having a + serious impact on US security interests. (Tab A)

+ +

+ The Fisheries Dispute. Large-scale fishing by US + commercial interests occurs annually off the coasts of Peru and Ecuador + from November through March. These countries claim sovereignty out to + 200 miles from their coastlines and have intermittently been seizing US + fishing boats in that area. The frustration over this lengthy dispute + has produced a body of US legislation imposing sanctions against + countries seizing these boats. Such provisions are found in the + Fishermen’s Protective Act (FPA); the + Naval Loan Extension Act (unclear); and the Foreign Military Sales Act + (Pelly Amendment). In addition, the Foreign Assistance Act requires boat + seizures be considered in decisions concerning resistance.

+

As you know, the Pelly Amendment to the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) Act of 1968 requires the suspension + of FMS to a country which seizes or + fines an American-owned fishing boat for engaging in fishing more than + 12 miles off that country’s coastline. In 1969, the US Military Group + was expelled from Peru following public disclosure of the suspension of + FMS to that country. A small + seven-man Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG) remained and is still functioning. In 1971, Peru + began to exercise considerable restraint and did not interfere with US + tuna boats throughout the 1971–72 fishing season.

+

In 1972, the US Congress passed a strengthening amendment to the + Fishermen’s Protective Act (FPA)—a law + that provides for (1) the USG to + reimburse fishing boat owners for fines levied in connection with + fishing activities in international waters and (2) withholding an amount + equal to that of the fines from foreign assistance + funds (including MAP funds) + programmed for the offending country if that country fails to reimburse + the USG in the amount of the fines. + This latter provision has never been applied to assistance funds for + Peru. Although the 1972 amendment did not change the basic provisions of + the FPA, it strengthened the clauses + relating to collection of claims against foreign countries and to + deductions from foreign assistance funds. The provisions of the + amendment have not been implemented as yet because Congress has failed + to provide certain start-up funds. Nevertheless, the FPA is correctly interpreted by Peru as + potentially punitive, and the passage of the recent amendment was given + wide publicity in that country evoking anti-US demonstrations. In an + apparent change of policy after 20 months of restraint, Peru seized a US + boat on 12 December 1972 and, in return, the US immediately suspended + FMS without stating so publicly. + Since the beginning of January 1973, Peru has gone on to capture 23 + additional boats and levied fines of $742,860. The USG has been unsuccessful in efforts to + achieve a temporary fishing agreement for an interim period pending + negotiation of the broader matter of off-shore sovereignty to be + addressed by the forthcoming Law of the Sea Conference.

+ +

The fallacy of the Pelly Amendment is that it posits the availability of + FMS from the US as adequate + leverage to preclude a foreign country’s engaging in seizure of US + fishing boats. Clearly, this assumption has been demonstrated to be + false. Yet the legislation has made US security interests in Peru and in + the hemisphere hostage to an economic-political issue.

+

+ The IPC Case + . One of the first acts of the Peruvian + military upon assuming control of the government in 1968 was to + nationalize IPC without providing compensation. In response to this + expropriation and to bring the Peruvian government to a reasonable + negotiating position, NSDMs 11 and 21 of 1969 approved a strategy + to:

+

—Maximize non-overt economic pressures on Peru to induce agreement on a + satisfactory settlement.

+

Defer applying the Hickenlooper Amendment (cutoff of foreign assistance + in response to expropriation) as long as a plausible basis could be + found.

+

—Explore all possibilities for a settlement.

+

Although assets of other US firms have been expropriated, the Peruvian + government has emphasized a general policy of paying compensation. + However, in the case of IPC, the GOP + maintains an uncompromising position while publicly portraying the + matter as one of national honor. The settlement of this issue is + generally considered to be central to normalization of US-Peruvian + relations. (Tab B)

+

+ + NSSM 158. It was + under the above conditions that NSSM + 158, Review of US Policy Toward Peru, was + addressed by the Senior Review Group (SRG) in November 1972. The central issue was to determine + the optimum strategy which would serve the full range of US interests in + Peru in the context of our global and hemispheric policies and + interests. The Treasury Department and Overseas Private Investment + Corporation dissented from that focus by stating that the central issue + concerned the effect of any change in policy in the IPC case on our + worldwide expropriation policy. Three courses of action were + considered:

+ +

+ Option 1. Continue the current policy of + non-overt economic pressure with variations in pressures keyed to + the IPC case.

+

+ Option 2. Move to a tougher policy by applying + all or some of the relevant legislative restraints.

+

+ Option 3. Conclude that the IPC case is not + going to be settled in the short run and relax the sanctions in + order to reduce the damage to other interests, while keeping future + options open.

+ +

Defense supported Option 3 as best designed to protect US security + interests; State initially supported Option 3, but was willing to accept + a variant of Option 1; and Treasury took a strong position in favor of + delaying a final decision + pending exploration of what was characterized as hopeful indications for + a settlement of the IPC case. The members agreed to delay consideration + for a 90-day exploratory period. If by the end of February 1973 + development of an approach for initiating talks with the Peruvians did + not prove feasible, the SRG was to + reconsider the options. To date, the SRG has not been reconvened.

+

A subissue concerning our military relations with Peru was not addressed. + At the time of the SRG meeting, the + Peruvians had refrained for a lengthy period from any action against US + tuna boats which would bring on sanctions. Hence, US-Peruvian military + relations were considered to be improving, resumption of FMS credits for Peru was under study, and + the USG was taking action on several + Peruvian requests for commercial purchase of military items. It was + shortly thereafter, December 1972, that the Peruvian Navy began again to + seize US boats.

+

+ US Security Interests. As you know, during World + War II a unified concept of security interests arose among the + individual countries in the western hemisphere. This mutual security + relationship was formalized in 1947 by the Inter-American Treaty of + Reciprocal Assistance—subsequently ratified by the US and Peru along + with 19 other Latin American states. The agreement has been strengthened + by resolutions of the Foreign Ministers of the Organization of American + States in 1948, 1951, and 1962. In this regard, US security interests + related to Peru include:

+ + —Maintenance of a stable, friendly government. + —Prevention of hostile alignments or installation of hostile + forces, bases, or matériel. + —Continuance of US-Peruvian military cooperation. + —Continued success, with Peruvian participation, of the + Inter-American security system. + —Achievement of support for security aspects of US Law of the Sea + position, i.e., narrow territorial sea (no greater than 12 miles) + coupled with free transit through and over international + straits. + +

These security interests and the important professional relationship + which our military has arduously developed with the Peruvian armed + forces over a number of years are now under severe strain. Application + of the Pelly Amendment in reaction to these recent seizures is + jeopardizing sales of US manufactured military equipment, to include + A–37B and F–5 aircraft, in excess of $85 million. (Tab C) An indication + of the scope of Peruvian interest in obtaining US military equipment was + their request for price and availability data totalling almost $300 + million submitted in 1972. Should legislative sanctions cause the US to + be unable to respond to at least a portion of the Peruvian needs for + modernizing their armed forces equipment inventories, the Peruvians will + of necessity come to accept as fact the unreliability of the US as a + source of equipment. In + addition to other third countries, the Soviets have made continued + overtures toward Peru for the sale of military equipment, including + MiG–21 aircraft, with attractive terms. Reports indicate that the + Soviets recently convinced the GOP to + purchase Mi–8 helicopters for use in oil exploration rather than + US-built Bell helicopters. Should Peru purchase MiGs, the Chilean Air + Force would likely be forced to accede to Soviet pressures and also + accept these high performance aircraft. Major Soviet sales could be + accompanied by Soviet or Soviet-sponsored advisors and technicians whose + influence and presence could only be counter to US hemispheric security + interests. (Tab D) A high level Soviet military mission visited Peru + during this past week.

+

Inability to proceed with FMS since + December 1972 has also delayed the proposed sale of US ships (including + the destroyer Isherwood) presently on loan to + Peru. A US decision to sell the loaned ships had been informally + accepted by Peru just prior to FMS + being placed under review. Continued Congressional antipathy toward the + current ship loan program as well as the probability of a confrontation + with Peru over return of the Isherwood could be + avoided if FMS were resumed allowing + Peru to purchase these ships.

+

In addition to the negative effect on US interests that application of + the Pelly Amendment creates, I am concerned by our Country Team’s + assessment that, if the recent FPA + Amendment is activated requiring deductions to be made from our military + assistance training program, the small US MAAG of seven men will be asked to leave. The vacuum + created by the loss of the MAAG’s + influence on Peru’s military government and armed services could be + filled by third country advisors pursuing interests which, in some + cases, would be in conflict with or damaging to our own. Application of + the FPA Amendment would not only + greatly damage US-Peruvian relations, but would also assist in + coalescing anti-US regional attitudes.

+

Considering the above, it appears that OSD policy should emphasize the importance of US security + interests in this region without compromising USG efforts to resolve other conflicts. Implied therein is + the requirement to separate matters pertaining to US security interests + from other lower order disputes when actions to resolve those disputes + imperil our security relationships. By waiving those legislative + sanctions which reduce FMS and military + assistance to functions of the fisheries dispute, the USG would signal its readiness to do so. + It is recognized that in the US this policy may initially involve a + domestic political cost for the administration.

+

With your approval, the following actions will be taken with regard to + Peru:

+ +

1. I will sign the letter to State at Tab E requesting a + Presidential waiver of the Pelly Amendment to the FMS Act.

+ +

2. Should the deduct provisions of the Fishermen’s Protective Act be + implemented, I will seek a determination that military assistance + funds will not be used for this purpose.

+

3. Should either of these waivers not be forthcoming, I will request + the SRG be reconvened to address + the response to NSSM + 158.

+ +

+ Lawrence Eagleburger + +

+

+ Acting Assistant Secretary +

+
+ +
+ 283. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense Richardson to the President’s Assistant for National + Security Affairs (Kissinger) +

Summary: Richardson + recommended to Kissinger + that a SRG be convened to + review U.S. policy towards Peru.

+

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Country Files, Box 793, + Latin America, Peru, Vol. 3, January 1972–December 31, 1973. + Secret. On April 18, Richardson sent a copy of the memorandum to + Rogers. (Ibid., RG 59, Central Files, 1970–1973, POL PERU–US) Belcher’s February 23 telegram + is referred to in the source note to Document 282. On March 23, in telegram 1894 from + Lima, Belcher informed + the Department of Peru’s “probable imminent decision” to + purchase Soviet MIGs. (Ibid., + RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, [no film number]) NSDM 199, December 26, 1972, is + Document 640 in + + Foreign + Relations, 1969–1976, vol. E–10, Documents on + American Republics, 1969–1972. No SRG meeting on Peru was + held.

+ + + + + Washington, April 18, + 1973. + + + SUBJECT + Deteriorating US-Peruvian Relations + +

I have become increasingly concerned by the rapid deterioration in US + relations with Peru over the past several months. This deterioration has + been highlighted by our Ambassador to Peru in messages of 232214Z Feb 73 + and 232225Z Mar 73. The immediate cause is the recent seizures of US + fishing vessels. It appears that these seizures were stimulated by the + October 1972 revision of the Fisherman’s Protective Act and subsequent + public reaction in Peru.

+

Since FMS to Peru have again been placed + “under review” following the December 1972 seizure, both the US Country + Team and the Peruvian Naval Attaché in Washington have expressed the + extreme frustration and dilemma of the Peruvian Navy created by the + review. The major ships of Peru’s Navy are obsolete, and Peru is + currently exploring means and sources for their replacement. The + Peruvian Air Force is also + deeply affected because of its desire to modernize with A–37B and F–5E + aircraft. The sale of these aircraft is contingent upon the ability of + the US Government to sell seat ejection cartridges and mini-gun barrels. + Both of these Services must look elsewhere if assured FMS are not soon forthcoming from the + United States. The Soviets have made continued overtures toward Peru for + the sale of military equipment with attractive credit terms and have + recently demonstrated new equipment (including MiGs) to the Peruvian + Joint Chiefs of Staff equivalent, both in the Soviet Union and in Cuba. + Should Peru purchase MIGs, the Chilean Air Force may accede to Soviet + pressure and also accept these aircraft. Intelligence reports indicate + that Peru is also considering the acquisition of Soviet T–54 tanks.

+

Parallel to the problems caused by the seizure of US fishing boats, is + the equally frustrating matter of the 1968 Peruvian expropriation, + without compensation, of the International Petroleum Company (IPC). + Following the most recent review of US policy toward Peru (National + Security Study Memorandum 158), National Security Decision Memorandum + (NSDM) 199, dated 26 December + 1972, stated that the Senior Review Group (SRG) would reconsider the situation if, by the end of + February 1973, the initiation of talks with the Peruvians in the IPC + case had not proven feasible.

+

The US Ambassador to Peru has identified a number of expected or possible + actions and reactions which could further raise the intensity of + bilateral conflicts within the next few months and has suggested that we + should not go further into this difficult period without some plan for + management.

+

In my view, the inability to make progress in resolving the IPC dispute, + combined with the deteriorating situation brought about by the fisheries + problem, makes it urgent that US policy toward Peru be reviewed. I + therefore recommend an early meeting of the SRG for this purpose.

+

+ E.L.R. +

+
+ +
+ 284. Transcript of Telephone Conversation +

Summary: Kissinger and Shultz discussed how the United States should + vote on an Inter-American Development Bank loan to Peru.

+

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, + Kissinger Telephone + Conversation Transcripts (Telcons), Box 19, Chronological File, + April 24–25, 1973. No classification marking. In a telephone + conversation that took place at 4:30 p.m. on April 24, Shultz informed Kissinger that the President + of the IDB, Antonio Ortíz Mena, had told + him that “abstention would be be appropriate,” in his view, + “because the Peruvians would regard this as a gesture of good + faith on our part”; Kissinger and Shultz agreed that the United States should + abstain. (Ibid.) In telegram 77610 to Lima, April 25, the + Department instructed the Embassy to inform the Peruvian + Government that the abstention was intended to express deep + concern over U.S.-Peruvian investment disputes while also + showing “good faith as a step towards successful conclusion of + the Greene mission.” + (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Country Files, Box 793, + Latin America, Peru, Vol. 3, January 1972–December 31, + 1973)

+ + + + + Washington, April 24, 1973, 1 p.m. + +

S: Your comments on the Watergate and so on were marvelous.

+

K: Aren’t you nice.

+

S: It’s a great talk that we need more of, so good work.

+

K: Well, I appreciate your saying that.

+

[Omitted here is discussion not related to Peruvian affairs.]

+

S: I had a different problem I wanted to check with you on. Are you + familiar with the question of a vote of a loan to Peru.

+

K: No.

+

S: That is coming up.

+

K: Yeah I was with it once, now I’ve forgotten it again.

+

S: Well you know, we have our expropriation policy. There are various + laws and what not that surround it, but the operative thing is the + President’s policy that we don’t approve loans through international + financial institutions where a country has expropriated without making + compensations for where negotiations are not probably under way. We have + this long standing dispute with Peru over their international petroleum + corporations—

+

K: That I know.

+

S: And more recently they have sold the property that was expropriated + and since there were presumably negotiations about that, that seems like + a pretty hard line action on their part. Now we had put together a + mission that is a secret mission undertaken by a man named Greene to see if we couldn’t sort of + wrap all of the different parts of our Peru problem in one piece and + negotiate it out and be done with it. He seemed to be making some + progress and then the last go the President got sick and sort of + postponed it and whether it is on the track or not is hard to say. There’s apparently + lots of maneuvering in Peru about who would succeed if [it] does and he + had the typical various elements of radicals, moderates, and so on. Now + we have a loan coming up in the Inter-American Development Bank + tomorrow. It’s possible to postpone the decision for a few days in which + there is a difference of view about how we should vote. With the State + Dept and the Defense Dept taking the position that we could vote yes for + the loan on the grounds that there is this Greene mission and that there is at least some + expectation he’ll be invited back. And that is a show of good faith and + we have to be careful that we don’t undermine our foreign policy and + defense policy with Peru. The NSC had a + meeting this morning as well as Flanigan, has the view that we should abstain. Our vote + is not going to control this issue, they are going to get the loan + anyway, but we should abstain and talk about how we don’t like the + expropriation. But at any rate this would be a last hard approach and we + could see then whether or not they continue on in good faith. The + Treasury Dept’s view has been that we have our hard line policy on + expropriation that clearly they are in violation of it and we should + stick to our hard lines. The State Dept and Defense Dept arguing that + well if you do that you only encourage the radicals and they will + explode over that. And we arguing maybe it would work just the other way + around. You have to be willing to stand up to these things in order to + make an impact. I call you because under the rules of how this is + administered, one of the Departments such as State or Defense have a + right to insist that the matter goes to the President, and it can’t be + decided by the Secretary of the Treasury under those circumstances. I + have the authority to instruct our vote. They would go along with an + abstension approach such as the NSC, I + think a Mr. Jordan was I’m told + there, I don’t know him, but he was your representative.

+

K: Yeah.

+

S: Really it involves from a straight economic commercial standpoint it + seems to me clear that we could vote no. The arguments that may have to + do with things assessing our foreign policy objectives, our defense + policy objectives and whatever anybody knows about the internal politics + of Peru, and how—

+

K: When do you have to know. Let me think about it.

+

S: Well I ought to know, we have to do something about it today and I’m + looking to you as the proxy president more or less. I don’t really see + how we can get to the President so he can decide it.

+

K: Well, we can certainly not vote for it. I mean that’s out of the + question. The only choice is between abstaining and voting against + it.

+

S: That’s my view.

+

K: What’s your view on that.

+ +

S: Well my view is that we can vote against. We can undoubtedly get them + to postpone the vote for three or four days which puts it right into the + context of the IDB meeting that I’ll be + going to.

+

K: Let me see if I can get you an answer before the end of the day. I’m + not going to take it to the President, but let me think about it.

+

S: All right, that would be good.

+

K: I don’t tend to lean towards voting against. I tend to lean for a hard + line. I think when you are in as much trouble as we are you might as + well be tough.

+

S: Yeah, that’s my instinct. But I don’t know that much about the other + aspects of Peru. Which is why I’m calling you. Now if we are going to go + for a postponement we have to get going on that this afternoon, so the + sooner you can—

+

K: I’ll call you before 3:00 I hope.

+

S: Thank you.

+

K: Bye.

+
+ +
+ 285. Telegram 310 From the Consulate in the Netherlands Antilles to + the Department of State +

Summary: Rogers and + Mercado discussed + Peru’s maritime claims, fishing rights, and the lifting of a ban + on Peruvian participation in the Foreign Military Sales + program.

+

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files, 1970–1973, ORG 7 + S. Confidential; Immediate. Repeated for information to Lima. On + May 14, Nixon signed + Presidential Determination 73–13 waiving the Pelly Amendment + allowing FMS of 24 A–37 + aircraft. (Memorandum From Peet to Clements, June 3; Washington National Records + Center, OSD Files: FRC 330–78 + 0001, Latin America 092.2–850, 1973) In telegram 3361 from + Mexico, May 14, Rogers + requested Belcher’s and + Crimmins’s views as + to whether he should inform the Peruvian Prime Minister in his + upcoming May 16 meeting. (National Archives, RG 59, Central + Files, 1970–1973, ORG 7 S.) In telegram 3101 from Lima, May 14, + Belcher recommended + Rogers inform de la + Flor in their first May 16 meeting. (Ibid.) In telegram 91988 to + Caracas and Lima, May 14, Crimmins suggested that Rogers should demur if the + matter came up in the conversations in Peru. Instead, Crimmins recommended that + after Rogers returned to + Washington he could then inform the Peruvians that the waiver + had been issued as a result of the conversations in Lima. + (Ibid.)

+ + + + + Curaçao, May + 27, 1973, 1430Z. + +

310. Subject: Secvisit LA: Memorandum of + Conversation—Secretary Rogers + and Prime Minister Mercado of + Peru. Secto 175.

+

1. Secretary Rogers met with + Prime Minister Edgardo Mercado + Jarrín, at the Minister’s office on May 16 at 5:00 p.m. + Participants were US side: + Ambassador Taylor G. Belcher and + Assistant Secretary-Designate Jack B. + Kubisch; Peruvian side: Mr. Igor Velasquez of the Foreign + Office.

+

2. After the customary exchange of pleasantries in which Mercado referred to the present + meeting as an opportunity to continue the talks he had held previously + with the Secretary when he was in Washington and New York as Foreign + Minister, Mercado made a short + presentation of the revolutionary government’s philosophy. He said that + the US should not think that the anti-American tone of some of the news + reporting was an expression of his government’s policy. The + revolutionary process was one of freeing Peru from the shackles of the + past when less than 10 percent. What the revolutionary government wanted + was a more equitable sharing of Peru’s wealth. In carrying out the + measures required to assure this better distribution, US and other + private interests naturally had been affected and this had led to + investment and other disputes with the US.

+

3. The Prime Minister referred specifically to the 200-mile problem and + went into some detail in expressing the well-known Peruvian position. In + doing so, he reiterated his government’s pledge that this claim of + sovereignty was a limited one in that the Government of Peru did not + contest the right of free passage and over-flights and jointly agreed to + scientific surveys. Despite this fact, the US government had applied the + Pelly Amendment to Peru and this adversely affected the security + interests of his country. Mercado said that Peru needed to carry out a + modernization program and they preferred to buy US equipment. He + referred to the several lists which had been provided the Embassy and he + handed the Secretary an abbreviated list of items which all three + services wished to purchase. When Secretary Rogers asked what the priorities might be on this list, + Mercado indicated that + spares, aircraft and medium tanks were the most urgently needed items, + in that order.

+

4. The Secretary said that he had had an opportunity during his meeting + with President to discuss both the 200-mile problem and Foreign Military + Sales. He said he would like to present in general terms his view of US + attitude toward the revolutionary government. First, he wanted to assure + the Prime Minister that we wanted the revolutionary government to + succeed in achieving its program. Second, we wanted to assure the Prime + Minister that we had no worries with regard to the basic ideology of the + government. Third, he wanted to observe that military officers were + practical men and he suggested that we talk in practical terms. + Secretary Rogers observed that + the US was the strongest nation in the world and that our position + traditionally had been in support of a three-mile limit. And that we + could enforce our will should we choose to. However, such was not our + policy and we had no intention + of using force to enforce our views throughout the world. Different + nations were making different claims with regard to territorial seas. + Some were proposing 12, others 50. Canada, for instance, was claiming + 100 miles for pollution control purposes. The US Government could not + accept any of these positions pending the outcome of the Law of the Sea + Conference. The Secretary also described the USG position with regard to the use of seabed resources + beyond a specified territorial sea and our hope that this might be made + subject to regulation and exploitation by an international regime. Until + such time as there was an international agreement resulting from the + LOS conference, the US would never + approve a concession with regard to the many and differing individual + claims for a more extensive territorial sea.

+

5. The Secretary suggested that we might deal with the fishery problem as + a separate issue. In itself it was not a serious matter economically but + the principle involved is vital to US interests. Therefore, what we + should try for is an interim agreement pending the LOS conference decision. He suggested that + we were fortunate in that we had probably six months during which there + would be no fishing for tuna in this area, so we ought to be able to + discuss the matter without the embarrassment of further seizures and + during the period hopefully we could reach an agreement which would not + compromise either country’s juridical position. The Secretary said that + he understood that any such interim agreement would have to be + acceptable to Ecuador because of the Santiago agreement but that there + were various suggestions which could be considered in informal talks and + that perhaps with the help of Peru, Ecuador could be brought along.

+

6. Mercado commented that at our + request, when he was Foreign Minister, he had arranged for the GOP to hold off on seizures for over a + year in order to give us a chance to come up with some proposals for an + interim agreement but that we apparently had been unable to reach + agreement within the US Government and no proposals had been + forthcoming. The cause of public reaction to the fact of the Ecuadorian + seizures and the general knowledge that the tuna boats were in Peruvian + waters. The GOP had been unable to + continue its conciliatory policy during the last fishing season. As a + result, we had again applied the coercive Pelly Amendment, thereby + depriving Peru even of spare parts required for pilot safety. What the + Prime Minister wanted to know was whether or not we were prepared to act + favorably on their requests for arms. If the answer was no, then + obviously they would have to look elsewhere.

+

7. Secretary Rogers reminded + General Mercado of the reasons + for Congressional actions such as the Pelly Amendment. He said he could + accept almost any solution to this problem which did not involve conceding on the question of + sovereignty. He asked whether Peru in using force against our fishing + boats was attempting to force the US Government to accept Peru’s + position. He reminded the Minister that we were not asking Peru to give + up its juridical position. We wanted to await a general decision as a + result of the forthcoming LOS + conference. All we were proposing now was a modus operandi for the + forthcoming fishing season in the belief that the basic problem would be + solved at the LOS conference.

+

8. Mercado said that the + informal talks might be restarted through the Foreign Ministry on a very + confidential basis, with the talks taking place outside Peru, perhaps in + connection with jointly attending international conferences. If these + were successful, then they could be formalized in a new quadripartite + conference (Peru, Ecuador, Chile, and US) which would be of public + knowledge.

+

9. Secretary Rogers then asked + whether Peru would go to such informal, confidential talks in good faith + and be prepared to take into account not only its own political problems + but also those faced by the US Government in this connection with this + issue. Mercado said he could + not make such a commitment if the question of Peruvian Sovereignty was + involved. Despite several attempts on the part of the Secretary to + clarify exactly what it was he was proposing, Mercado seemed not to understand, + making several references and in an almost belligerent tone to the fact + that we had to appreciate the 200-mile question was a serious internal + political problem for the government. Finally the Secretary said, “why + can’t you just say yes, we will try with good will to reach an agreement + taking into account each other’s political problems? Can you agree to + that?” Mercado hesitated for a + moment and then said yes. The Secretary then noted we had reached an + agreement which would enable us to lift the ban on FMS for spares and A–37–B aircraft as soon + as a date could be set for the first informal, confidential discussions + to be held in Washington.

+

10. Having in mind the rumors of an impending take-over of the Cerro de + Pasco Corporation, the Secretary asked Mercado point blank whether his government was planning + any further moves which might cause him (the Secretary) any + embarrassment in the near future. After a pause, Mercado said no, and then went on to + mention the fact that there could be a problem in the future over Cerro. + He described briefly the present situation of the company in Peru and + its investment needs and problems, saying that the matter was under + study by a Government Commission which had come at variance with the + value set by the company. He said that this was a matter which would + have to be discussed and negotiated but he did not expect any action + until late July or early August. There would be no confiscation, on the + contrary, there would be negotiation.

+ +

1. In view of the late hour and our next appointment, only passing + reference was made to the following matters:

+

1) General Mercado brought up + the matter of US Trade Legislation, referring to the fact that with + regard to general preferences the law included a paragraph on + expropriation which was prejudicial to Peru. The Secretary reminded the + Prime Minister that the language referred to expropriation without + compensation and not just expropriation as such.

+

2) The Prime Minister then said that our stockpile disposal program was + damaging to Peru’s interests. The Secretary said that we were conferring + with the governments concerned and no action would be taken prior to + these discussions. Whatever we decided, we would attempt to assure there + was no disruption of the world markets.

+ + Rogers + +
+ +
+ 286. Telegram 311 From the Consulate in the Netherlands Antilles to + the Department of State +

Summary: Rogers and + de la Flor discussed U.S.-Peruvian relations, and U.S. policy + towards Latin America.

+

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files, 1970–1973, ORG 7 + S. Confidential; Immediate. Repeated for information to Lima. In + Rogers’s conversation with Velasco, Velasco discussed the reasons behind his 1968 + military coup and the Peruvian Revolution, and U.S. policy with + regard to Peruvian requests for loans from IFIs. (Telegram 1736 + from Rio de Janeiro, May 19; ibid.) President Nixon’s May 3 report to + Congress is printed in the Department of State Bulletin, June 4, 1973, p. 717 Rogers’s remarks about + Latin America can be found ibid., June 25, 1973, pp. + 903–927.

+ + + + + Curaçao, May + 27, 1973, 1430Z. + +

311. Subject: Secvisit LA: Memorandum of + Conversation—the Secretary and Foreign Minister de la Flor of Peru. + Secto 176.

+

1. Secretary of State met with Foreign Minister Gen. Brig. Miguel Angel de La Flor Valle at the Foreign + Ministry on May 16, 1973 at 9:45 a.m. Participants were US side: the + Secretary, Under Secretary Casey, Mr. Kubisch, + Mr. Pedersen, Ambassador Belcher + and Interpreter; Peruvian side: Foreign Minister De La Flor, Acting + Secretary General Ambassador Juan Jose Calle y Calle, Peruvian + Ambassador to the U.S. Fernando + Berckemeyer, Director of Economic Affairs Ambassador Juan + de la Piedra Villalonga, Director of Protocol Ambassador Guillermo Lohmann Villena, and Director + of Public Relations Minister Igor Velazquez Rodriguez.

+

2. After the customary exchange of pleasantries the Secretary referred to + press reports concerning who invited whom. He said he asked to come, and + was very pleased to be here to discuss our problems. The Foreign + Minister in his opening remarks referred to both President Nixon’s and the Secretary’s recent + statements with regard to U.S. policy towards Latin America and noted + that they emphasized a search for new dimensions in our relationships + and a particular desire to eradicate paternalism. He said he had been + very encouraged by President Nixon’s recent message to Congress and considered the + references to Latin America most positive. He also expressed + appreciation for the Secretary’s arrival comments. In particular as they + indicated an appreciation of the revolutionary process in Peru and + accepted Peru’s nationalistic approach to its problems. He looked + forward to the Secretary’s visit as an opportunity to draw on the basic + good will that exists on both sides to solve some of our outstanding + problems. He hoped that during his visit the Secretary would have a + chance to come to know of Peru’s successes as well as its problems and + that perhaps he would see that the revolutionary process here was really + a sui generis case. He felt that much information about Peru reached the + United States in a distorted form and indeed some of the reporting had + been done maliciously.

+

3. Secretary Rogers said that he + thought that perhaps there existed in Peru a misconception of U.S. + policy and that it should be clear to all that, as he had stated on + arrival, we fully recognize Peruvian sovereignty and the Peruvian rights + to opt for any system to solve its problems and that this was the system + of government which we would be prepared to deal with. The fact was that + we supported the concept of ideological pluralism. Each nation should + decide for itself as to its relations with other nations. In these + relations there obviously must be a mutality of interest. As far as the + U.S. was concerned much depended on whether the other country was + friendly or hostile towards US and in this instance the Secretary said + he was thinking specifically in terms of Cuba. If a country’s attitude + was hostile we would find it difficult to respond with friendly + overtures. However, in the case of Peru, there was a tradition of + friendship going back to the days of independence and we hoped to build + on that basis of friendship and good will to improve our relations. It + was for this reason that President Nixon had asked him to come to Peru. Since the U.S. has + been able to improve its relations with adversaries such as the Soviets + and the Chinese. There was certainly no reason we could not accomplish + the same thing with our friends. The Secretary said that he hoped + sincerely that, in the speed and the manner in which Peru desired, we + would be successful in improving our relationships.

+ +

4. The Foreign Minister agreed fully with the Secretary. Certainly + traditional friends should be able to settle their differences and there + was both the will and the intent on the Peruvian side, with mutual + respect and taking into account our respective interests. He said Peru + was looking for a new system on which to base its further development + and a more equitable sharing of the country’s wealth. He recognized that + no country could be fully “independent” in the strict sense of the word. + These days this term was a relative one. Peru needs help from abroad and + despite its nationalistic attitude, it needs U.S. investment. + Unfortunately in any revolutionary process vested interests are + adversely affected. Unfortunately in some cases reactions to the + Peruvian revolutionary program have resulted in confrontations and + obviously a great effort was needed to overcome the results of such + confrontations and arrive at solution to existing problems. The Foreign + Minister said that in view of the great contrasts between our two + countries, issues which were of tremendous impact in Peru were of + relatively little importance to the United States and we should + appreciate that at times Peruvian reactions might seem stronger than + what would be the case in the United States. If the United States wants + to help Peru in its development process and if it appreciates the new + efforts being made by the government of Peru in this connection, then + the United States should try to be measured in its reaction to events in + Peru.

+

5. The Foreign Minister then turned to the question of security and spoke + of the need for the U.S. to take Latin America into greater + consideration when thinking of its own national security. He felt that + the success of development efforts in Latin America was vital to the + U.S. and that we should appreciate the fact that if social unrest + becomes rampant in this area, the United States cannot consider that its + Southern flank is secure.

+

6. The Secretary said the he could make a number of comments on the + Foreign Minister’s observations but that he was in basic agreement. He + accepted the fact that there were divergencies between the developed and + developing nations and that the GOP + should appreciate that our’s is a very complex system with a built-in + balance of powers in the federal government and an influential private + sector. He pointed out, nevertheless that despite our differences over + the IPC expropriation, when the earthquake disaster hit Peru all these + sectors moved together to extend help to the people affected by the + catastrophe. In referring to the Hickenlooper amendment the Secretary + said it had been his decision not to apply it. He hoped that the + minister would understand that this was a most serious move on his part + and that in making such decision all the various interests involved had + to be taken into account. The Secretary said that ever since World War + II the people of the United + States had been helping other countries, even including our former + enemies. We did so because it seemed the right thing to do. What we need + and hope for is a little more understanding of our internal problems in + extending the help that we would like to give to developing nations. + With regard to security he agreed that great contrasts of wealth and + poverty within a country could lead to instability. The Secretary + pointed out, however, that until very recently the real threat to the + security of the world was the strained relations between the United + States and the Soviet Union and China. We and the Soviets as nuclear + powers could easily destroy the world. Fortunately we had been + successful in significantly improving our relations with both the Soviet + Union and China, and now we could turn with much greater attention to + the problem represented by the developing nations.

+

7. At this point the meeting in the foreign office ended in order to + visit President Velasco.

+ + Rogers + +
+ +
+ 287. Telegram 3670 From the Embassy in Peru the Department of + State +

Summary: The + Embassy requested guidance on how to answer questions by + Peruvian officials with regards to sales of F–5 aircraft to + Latin American nations.

+

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + [no film number]. Confidential. On May 23, the Department + informed the Embassy that on May 21 the President had signed + Determination 73–14, which granted credit to the governments of + Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, and Venezuela in connection + with the sale of F–5s. (Telegram 98509 to Brasília, Santiago, + Buenos Aires, Bogotá, Caracas, and Lima, May 23; ibid.) There is + no indication the Department provided guidance to the Embassy. + On June 8, in a telegram forwarded to Lima, the Department + stated that the U.S. Government was prepared in principle to + sell F–5s if the request were made. (Telegram 108603 to + Bridgetown, Georgetown, Guatemala, Kingston, Managua, Mexico, + Panama, Port au Prince, Port of Spain, San Jose, San Salvador, + Santo Domingo, Tegucigalpa, and Nassau, June 8; + ibid.)

+ + + + + Lima, May + 31, 1973, 2259Z. + +

3670. Subject: Credit Sales of Northrop F–5 Military Aircraft. Ref: State + 98509.

+

1. Embassy notes Peru not included in list of countries for which + President determined sale of F–5 military aircraft is important to U.S. + national security. We assume this stems from suspension of FMS to Peru at time determination + initiated.

+ +

2. However, once consultations with Congress are completed and + availability of F–5’s to various LA’s, + including Chile, becomes public, we anticipate GOP will raise with us usual questions, to wit: (A) why + does U.S. sell major system to avowedly Marxist state which historical + adversary of Peru? (B) Does U.S. consider Chile good credit risk as + compared Peru? (C) Why are F–5’s not offered to GOP?

+

3. Embassy believes it can turn these questions temporarily by: (A) + Referring to GOP priority interest in + acquiring A–37 B’s, and (B) fact GOP + purchasing mission in UK is reportedly interested in purchase of + Canberras on very favorable terms ($500,000 per copy with guarantee of + 10 years supply of spares).

+

4. Embassy nevertheless wishes call Department’s attention to this + potential problem with GOP and would + appreciate press guidance.

+ + + Belcher + + +
+ +
+ 288. Telegram 129032 From the Department of State to the Embassy in + Peru +

Summary: The + Department informed the Ambassador that the Peruvian Government + needed to publicly announce the existence of discussions to + resolve investment disputes before the U.S. Government could set + forth criteria for supporting IFI loans to Peru.

+

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Country Files, Box 793, + Latin America, Peru, Vol. 3, January 1972–December 31, 1973. + Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Drafted by Pringle and Kubisch; cleared by Hinton, Hennessy, Jorden, and Rush. NSDM 199/CIEPDM, December 26, 1972, is Document 640 in + Foreign + Relations, 1969–1976, vol. E–10, Documents on + American Republics, 1969–1972. In telegram 4584 from + Lima, July 3, Belcher + informed the Department that he was not able to discuss the + Department’s proposal with Velasco, but did discuss it with de la Flor on + July 2, in which he and de la Flor discussed the risks involved + if the talks, after made public, failed. (Ibid., P840114–1800) + In telegram 4661 from Lima, July 5, Belcher informed the Department that de la Flor + had told him that he discussed the U.S. Government proposal with + Velasco. (Ibid., + P840114–1796)

+ + + + + Washington, June 30, 1973, 0126Z. + +

129032. Subject: Greene Mission; + IFI Loans. Eyes Only for Ambassador + Belcher.

+

1. Special group established pursuant NSDM 199/CIEPDM A7 has reviewed status of Greene negotiations and also + considered position USG should adopt on + loans for Peru expected to come to vote in IBRD and IDB in near + future. As a result, you should make a private approach to President Velasco or, if it is not possible to + see him, you should seek to reach Velasco through Prime Minister Mercado. In addition, you should see + Foreign Minister de la Flor since he has been a major advocate of a good + faith gesture by the US through IFI + lending. In these meetings, you should make the following points:

+

A. Peru has requested US support for Penrong IFI loans on the grounds that it would be helpful in + providing positive impetus toward early resolution of pending investment + disputes through Greene + negotiations.

+

B. US prepared to give tangible evidence of our good will and confidence + in Peru by supporting presentation to IBRD and IDB boards and + positive vote on three loans at this time, as follows: (1) dols 25 million in IBRD for agricultural and livestock + credit, (2) dols 6 million animal + health program, and (3) dols 6.2 + million (approximately) National Health Institute (both are IDB + FSO), provided GOP understands the following:

+

(I) U.S. domestic law (Gonzalez amendment) prohibits our supporting + IFI loans to countries which have + expropriated without compensation unless the president determines that + any one of the following conditions are met:

+

—An arrangement for prompt, adequate, and effective compensation has been + made.

+

—The parties have submitted the dispute to arbitration under ICSID or other arbitration rules.

+

—Good faith negotiations are in progress aimed at providing prompt, + adequate, and effective compensation under the applicable principles of + international law.

+

It follows from our vote that we will have to explain publicly when + asked, that “good faith” negotiations to arrive at a just settlement are + in progress with Peru, and thus we see as essential that GOP agree or be prepared themselves to + confirm existence of such good faith negotiations. We believe that best + way to handle this would be for GOP to + agree to issuance of a mutually satisfactory press release along lines + suggested para 4 below.

+

(II) US support for loans on basis of “good faith” negotiations also + implies that, although parties may be far apart at present time, + negotiations are expected to reach a successful conclusion within a + reasonable period of time, and in fact we are not prepared to engage in + long drawn out negotiations and expect finalization in the next few + months. Because Mr. Greene is a + special emissary of the president and because prestige and credibility + of USG would be publicly committed to + success of negotiations, their collapse or failure would be a severe + blow to US-Peruvian relations. We would almost certainly be required to + revert to a negative position with respect to assistance to Peru:

+ +

Damage might not be limited to economic sphere but could also spill over + into other areas (FYI military credits, for example, end fyi). In our + view, GOP at highest levels must + acknowledge their understanding of this now, and see what is at stake, + before asking that we go ahead and support these loans.

+

2. You should make clear that we are not urging this course on GOP, that decision is one for GOP itself to make; and our strong + preference would be to defer consideration of these loans until + negotiations with Greene are + farther along, such as after August visit.

+

3. It is essential that you carry out foregoing instructions precisely. + Even a slight misunderstanding on GOP’s + part now could have the most serious consequences later if Greene negotiations were to fail.

+

4. Suggested text for possible press statement follows:

+

A. Quote: President Velasco of + Peru, Prime Minister Mercado + and other members of the revolutionary government of the armed forces + have held exploratory conversations with a special emissary of President + Nixon. The meeting focused + on a broad review of United States investments in Peru with particular + reference to a number of current investment disputes, the resolution of + which would eliminate a source of friction between the two governments + and enhance the traditionally close and friendly relations between Peru + and the United States.

+

B. In the discussions, President Velasco made clear the view of the government of Peru + that, while it fully shared President Nixon’s desire for a mutually satisfactory settlement of + investment issues this could, in no way, entail any change in the + position of Peru with respect to IPC. As far as the government of Peru + is concerned, the IPC case is settled. President Nixon’s special emissary acknowledged + this to be the position of the government of Peru on this matter.

+

C. The two presidents are agreed that resolution of outstanding + investment issues would greatly facilitate the achievement of the more + cordial and productive relationship that both governments desire, and it + is anticipated that further discussions will be held in Lima in the near + future. End quote.

+

5. Since IPC matter not brought up by Greene we do not wish you to discuss IPC other than to + answer if they ask that our public reply will not go beyond language of + communiqué.

+

6. Imperative we receive answer by COB + Tuesday.

+ + Rogers + +
+ +
+ 289. Telegram 5644 From the Embassy in Peru to the Department of + State +

Summary: The + Ambassador informed García + Bedoya that the U.S. Government would request a + postponement of an IBRD vote + on a loan for Peru until the public announcement of the + discussions to resolve investment disputes.

+

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + P840114–1731. Secret; Immediate, Nodis. Telegram 5520 from Lima + has not been found. In telegram 157090 to Lima, August 9, the + Department informed the Embassy that because the Peruvian + Government agreed to an announcement, the U.S. Government would + vote for a $25 million IBRD + agricultural and livestock credit loan for Peru. (Ibid., + P840114–1942) The August 9 Peruvian Government announcement of + its agreement to investment discussions with Greene is in the Department of + State Bulletin, August 27, 1973, p. + 310.

+ + + + + Lima, August + 4, 1973, 0005Z. + +

5644. Subj: Greene Mission. Ref: + Lima 5520.

+

1. In view of fact that statement on Greene visit provided Lima 5520 was cleared by Council + of Ministers, Foreign Office SecGen informed me that our proposed + changes would have to be approved by same group. Unfortunately, in view + of absence from city of several members as well as difficulty of + convoking special meeting this would mean that revisions could not be + considered until Tuesday, August 7.

+

2. This timing most unfortunate in view of scheduled vote at the World + Bank as well as Greene’s + scheduled arrival in Lima. Under the circumstances and after further + discussion with Garcia Bedoya, we decided that Greene visit should be postponed one + week, on assumption in intervening time we would be able reach agreement + on final text.

+

3. Garcia Bedoya reluctantly accepted our reasoning for suggesting + postponement of vote in World Bank. I explained to him that we would + much prefer public announcement of Greene mission prior to vote. This would probably + satisfy most interested parties. It would be much more difficult to + respond to queries resulting from our affirmative vote if we did not + have language which had not been mutually agreed upon. I told the SecGen + that we planned to ask for postponement when Peruvian loan came up + Tuesday morning. I explained this was customarily approved by the + directors on a one-time basis, which meant that the loan would then be + considered and voted upon August 14.

+

4. On the off chance that we can get our text approved over the weekend + or on Monday, we have left it that a final decision on requesting a + postponement will not be made until Monday afternoon.

+ + + Belcher + + +
+ +
+ 290. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security + Affairs (Kissinger) to President + Nixon + +

Summary: Kissinger recommended that + Nixon sign a + Presidential Determination to authorize credit for Peru’s + purchase of F–5 aircraft.

+

Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CL 298, + Memoranda to the President, 1973, August–December, Folder 3, + 1973, September. Secret. Nixon signed the Determination. Attached but not + published at Tab A is a September 20 memorandum from Nixon to Rogers issuing Presidential + Determination 74–4; at Tab B is a July 20 memorandum from + Rush to the + President; and at Tab C is a September 10 memorandum from + Ash to the + President.

+ + + + + Washington, September + 19, 1973. + + + SUBJECT + Presidential Determination to Authorize Credit for F–5 Sales to + Peru + +

Acting Secretary Rush has + recommended, with Defense concurrence, that you determine it important + to U.S. security to authorize credit for the sale of F–5E aircraft to + Peru (Tab B). The Foreign Military Sales Act requires such a + determination before credit can be extended to underdeveloped countries + for the purchase of sophisticated weapons systems.

+

Peru is interested in purchasing up to 24 F–5s and is about to make a + final choice between the F–5 and the French Mirage. An extension of + credit to finance Peru’s purchase under the Foreign Military Sales Act + will most likely be required.

+

Due to the foreign military sales credit ceiling of $550 million + contained in the Continuing Resolution Authority (with $300 million + earmarked for Israel) and the need to fund existing contractual + commitments, there may not be adequate credits to finance this F–5 + purchase beginning in FY 74. However, we + believe that the Peruvians would accept delaying procurement of the F–5s + beyond FY 74. Peru’s purchase of 27 + A–37B aircraft should satisfy the immediate needs of their Air Force. A + favorable finding regarding the F–5 aircraft is expected to have a + sufficient positive political impact on the Peruvians to insure the + choice of the F–5 over the Mirage.

+

In May 1973, you determined that it was important to the security of the + United States to extend credit to Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, + and Venezuela in connection with the sale of F–5 aircraft. This + determination would do the same for Peru.

+

We anticipate significant, but not overriding, adverse Congressional + reaction to this waiver. The criticism will probably focus on expropriations and seizures of + U.S. fishing boats. In addition, the small group which opposes arms + sales in general will be critical.

+

Bill Timmons and Roy Ash concur + (Tab C).

+

Recommendation

+

That you sign the Determination at Tab A.

+
+ +
+ 291. Memorandum of Conversation +

Summary: Kubsich and García Bedoya discussed regional issues and + investment and fisheries disputes.

+

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files, 1970–1973, + POL PERU–US. Secret; Nodis. + Drafted by Frechette on + October 29; cleared by Weber and Kubisch. The meeting took place in Kubisch’s office. The text of + Kubisch’s speech can + be found in the Department of State Bulletin, November 12, 1973, pp. 608–613. Belcher informed the + Department that even though Velasco had threatened to expropriate the Cerro + corporation, he had not. In addition, the Cerro corporation, in + Belcher’s words, + “using what appears to us extreme language,” had stated that the + Peruvian Government had negotiated in bad faith and refused to + sell its assets to the Peruvians. (Telegram 7065 from Lima and + Telegram 190532 to Lima, both September 25; ibid., Central + Foreign Policy File, [no film number])

+ + + + + Washington, October 23, 1973, 5 p.m. + + + SUBJECT + Meeting between Mr. Kubisch and Peruvian Foreign Ministry Secretary + General Garcia Bedoya—October 23, 1973 (5:00 p.m.) + + + PARTICIPANTS + + + + Peru + + Peruvian Foreign Ministry + Secretary General Carlos Garcia Bedoya + Peruvian Minister-Counselor + + Manuel A. + Roca-Zela + + + + + + + U.S. + + Mr. Jack B. + Kubisch, ARA + + Mr. Richard F. + Weber, ARA-LA/EP + + Mr. Myles R.R. Frechette, ARA-LA/EP/P + + + +

Garcia Bedoya had asked for an urgent meeting with Mr. Kubisch on October 23 because he was + returning to Lima on the following day. In requesting the appointment he + had said that he wanted to discuss U.S.-Peruvian bilateral relations and + the Peruvian version of the inter-governmental agreement connected with + the Greene Mission.

+ +

The meeting lasted almost an hour and the atmosphere was cordial. The + principal points covered in the conversation are as follows:

+

Garcia Bedoya began by saying that he wanted to give Mr. Kubisch his view of the work of the + OAS Special Committee. With respect + to the political subcommittee, he said there had been much discussion + concerning definitions of democracy. Peru, he said, had participated + fully in those discussions and was very interested in such concepts as + pluralismo and plena participatión. Garcia Bedoya stated that he + believed that through discussion, these problems could be overcome. With + respect to the Rio Treaty, he said that Peru believed changes were + required.

+

Concerning economic matters, Garcia Bedoya said that there was a great + deal of hard work to be done and that progress had been very slow. He + said that he believed the U.S. had the erroneous impression that the + Latins were trying to commit the U.S. to new and increased levels of + bilateral assistance. What the Latins were trying to achieve was a new, + more realistic and effective cooperation with the U.S.

+

Garcia Bedoya said he had read Mr. Kubisch’s Boston speech to the Inter-American Press + Association with great interest, and in connection with that speech + asked whether Secretary of State Kissinger planned to go to Bogota. He said he believed + that all Latin American foreign ministers were most interested in + talking to Secretary Kissinger, + and he thought that such talks with the Secretary of State would be + beneficial. He asked Mr. Kubisch + whether Peru could be informed as early as possible if the Secretary + were to go to Bogota. Finally, referring to the next session in Lima of + the OAS Special Committee, he asked + whether Mr. Kubisch would be + travelling to Lima.

+

Mr. Kubisch began by explaining + the origin of the Bogota meeting. He then said that Secretary Kissinger had not been officially + invited to Bogota, that he had no plans to go there and that he had many + other commitments. However, Mr. Kubisch said that if all the Latins wanted the Secretary + to go, he could not see how the Secretary could refuse. In sum, Mr. + Kubisch said that while + attendance by the Secretary was possible, it was not probable. With + respect to a meeting in Bogota of Latin American foreign ministers, Mr. + Kubisch noted that the U.S. + did not think it a good idea for the Latin Americans to get together and + attempt to present a prescription to the U.S. concerning hemispheric + relations, to be either accepted or rejected à la Consensus of Viña del + Mar. By the same token, he said that the U.S. was not seeking to develop + a U.S. prescription for the Hemisphere, which the Latins could either + accept or reject. Mr. Kubisch + said that in his view, the objective should be a dialogue between all + the countries in the Hemisphere. However, this dialogue should be + private and frank, not aimed at international or domestic opinion. He + believed that out of such a dialogue all of the countries in the Hemisphere working together could + develop policies and approaches which would contribute to the common + good of all. Garcia Bedoya agreed that it was important to avoid another + Consensus of Viña del Mar, and the Bogota meeting should be very + carefully planned to avoid such an outcome. He said his government would + watch and approach it very carefully. Mr. Kubisch asked that Peru keep the U.S. advised of its + attitude toward the Bogota meeting through Ambassador Belcher. In response to a question by + Mr. Kubisch, Garcia Bedoya said + that his Foreign Minister had left New York before the Bogota meeting + had been suggested and he had not yet been formally invited.

+

Mr. Kubisch pointed out that in + one or two days Ambassador Jova would present the U.S. position on + possible changes to the Rio Treaty. With respect to economic questions, + Mr. Kubisch said that it was + unrealistic for the Latins to think that they could pressure the U.S. + into making specific commitments with respect to assistance for the + Hemisphere. He said that this was a misreading of the way the U.S. + Government and the U.S. Congress operated. Pressure, he said, would not + produce a commitment from the United States. Mr. Kubisch said he had just returned from + a briefing on the Middle East by the Secretary. The Arabs, he said, had + tried to pressure the U.S. with oil. Both they and the Russians had + found out that pressure of this kind does not work with the U.S.

+

Mr. Kubisch remarked that he + hoped to see Garcia Bedoya in Lima, and said that although he did not + know for sure, he expected to be present at the forthcoming Lima session + of the OAS Special Committee.

+

Garcia Bedoya said that one of the reasons for his early return to Lima + was to be present during Mr. Greene’s next visit. Mr. Kubisch asked him how he saw the prospects for a prompt + settlement. Garcia Bedoya said that he sincerely hoped there would be a + prompt settlement. Peru, he said, was prepared to be reasonable. + However, because of the disparity in size and power between the two + countries, his government expected the U.S. to be more reasonable than + Peru.

+

Concerning the Cerro Corporation, Mr. Kubisch said that in his view, the Peruvian Government + had been very restrained in its reaction to the Cerro communiqué. Garcia + Bedoya agreed, saying that the sort of thing Cerro said in its + communiqué had hurt Peruvian feelings. He observed that, bearing in mind + the nationalistic set of the military government, Peru’s reaction + indicated that it seeks a negotiated settlement of the Cerro + problem.

+

Mr. Kubisch asked whether there + had been any progress in the fisheries dispute talks, and Garcia Bedoya + replied that it was up to the U.S. to do whatever was necessary to + persuade the Ecuadoreans to return to the negotiating table. Peru, he + said, because of its treaty commitments could not negotiate bilaterally with the U.S.; however, if + the U.S. could take care of some of Ecuador’s preconditions for + returning to quadripartite talks, Peru would be happy to negotiate and + would be prepared to offer its good offices so that such talks could + take place as quickly as possible.

+

Mr. Kubisch asked whether Peru + would seize U.S. fishing vessels this season, adding that he was very + worried about this problem. Garcia Bedoya replied that Peru was worried + also and said that for a long time his government had been restrained + with respect to seizures. However, nothing had come of that restraint. + He stated that it would be difficult to avoid seizures if U.S. vessels + were too numerous off the coast of Peru.

+

Mr. Kubisch asked Garcia Bedoya + what he thought of the situation in Chile. The latter said that in his + view, things were still confused, but that perhaps it would be better if + there were no more paredones de la derecha.

+

Garcia Bedoya pointed out that his government had provided the U.S. + Embassy in Lima with its counter-draft of the inter-governmental + agreement which would be issued if the Greene Mission succeeded. Mr. Kubisch said that he had just received + the agreement that afternoon and had not had a chance to study it.

+
+ +
+ 292. Telegram 223776 from the Department of State to the Embassy in + Peru +

Summary: Shlaudeman informed Peruvian + Chargé Roca that the U.S. Government would support IFI loans to Peru once the dispute + over the expropriated properties of U.S. companies was + resolved.

+

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Country Files, Box 793, + Latin America, Peru, Vol. 3, January 1972–December 31, 1973. + Confidential; Immediate; Nodis. Drafted by Frechette; cleared by + Shlaudeman, + Weintraub, Sternfeld, Weber, and Hennesy; approved + by Kubisch.

+ + + + + Washington, November 13, 1973, 1823Z. + +

223776. Subj: US Vote on IBRD Loan for + Peru. For Ambassador.

+

1. Deputy Assistant Secretary Shlaudeman called in Peruvian Chargé Roca afternoon + November 12 to convey USG position on + dols 24 million IBRD Education Loan for Peru which + scheduled for vote November 13.

+ +

2. Mr. Shlaudeman said we wanted + to inform the Peruvian government in advance of our vote on the loan in + order to avoid any misunderstanding. He said we were going to abstain + for reasons which the Peruvian Government would understand from its + conversations with Mr. Greene. + Shlaudeman then emphasized + our view that it would be highly desirable if no further loans for Peru + were to come up in the IFI’s and + especially in the IDB until the + Greene mission is + successfully completed. He explained that we wish to avoid any possible + confrontation with Peru and to maintain a propitious climate for the + Greene negotiations. It is + our hope that the Peruvians will avoid any actions that could adversely + affect that climate. Shlaudeman + said the USG believes prospects for a + settlement in the near future are good and that, when we have such a + settlement, the problem with the IDB + and IBRD will disappear. Finally, he + asked Roca to transmit the foregoing to his government.

+

3. Roca said he would gladly transmit the information to his government, + noting that his task would be eased by the fact that his government + already knew from Mr. Greene the + reasons for the US abstention. With respect to the IDB he said he understood the situation. + He noted that he had reported often to his government on the atmosphere + in Congress and had explained at length such legislative restrictions as + the Gonzalez amendment. He said that he always tried to report + objectively to his government and would also do so in this instance, + particularly in the interest of preserving the climate for a successful + conclusion of the Greene + mission. He said he would emphasize our view on the desirability of not + moving forward in the IDB but would + also mention the IBRD—observing + however that in the latter institution the US does not have a veto.

+

4. US Executive Director at IBRD, + Charles Sethness, also gave advance word to IBRD Management and Peruvian alternate Executive Director. + Sethness will make the following statement when Peru loan comes to a + vote: Quote. Our abstention today on the loan to Peru now before the + board, which we request to have entered in the minutes, reflects the + facts that both progress has been made in the negotiations presently + underway but a settlement has not in fact been reached on numerous + investment disputes. We continue to be seriously concerned about the + settlement of these issues and hope that a settlement can be reached at + an early time so that we may be able to support future lending to + Peru.

+ + + Rush + + +
+ +
+ 293. Telegram 16696 From the Department of State to the Embassy in + Peru +

Summary: The + Department instructed Belcher to express to Velasco the U.S. Government’s + concern that a recent Peruvian purchase of tanks from the Soviet + Union could lead to increased tensions in the region.

+

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Country Files, Box 794, + Latin America, Peru, Vol. 4, January 1974. Secret; Exdis. + Repeated to Moscow. Drafted by Frechette and Shlaudeman; cleared by Pringle, Grey, Miles and Kubisch; approved by Kissinger. There is no + indication Belcher and + Velasco discussed + the matter. In telegram 193548 to Lima, September 4, the + Department, noting reports that the Peruvian Government had + entered into new credit arrangements for further Soviet arms + purchases, asked the Embassy to review the instructions in + telegram 16696 and to deliver a démarche to Velasco. (National Archives, + RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D740245–0870) Telegram 8043 + from Lima, September 24, which reports on the subsequent meeting + with Velasco, is Document 299.

+ + + + + Washington, January 25, 1974, 1756Z. + +

16696. Subject: Peruvian Purchase of Soviet Tanks. For Ambassador.

+

1. You should seek an appointment with President Velasco at an early date to discuss + this subject. Exact timing is left to your discretion in light of + developments with respect to the Greene mission. You should make the following + points:

+

2. Now that the news of the Peruvian purchase of Soviet tanks is public, + you have been instructed to seek an appointment with the President to + convey our reaction. These comments are offered in furtherance of the + friendly but candid dialogue which we believe should characterize + U.S.-Peruvian relations.

+

3. We do not question Peru’s sovereign right to buy arms wherever it + chooses; but we are concerned at the entry of the Soviet Union into the + Latin American arms market. Prior to this sale, the only country in the + hemisphere to obtain significant Soviet arms was Cuba, a communist + country dependent on the Soviet Union. Soviet arms sales in other parts + of the world have at times proved seriously destabilizing. Some + countries have found that an arms relationship with the Soviet Union + ultimately produced unforeseen and undesirable effects, including arms + races and strained relations with their neighbors, as well as Soviet + interference in their internal affairs. The President will agree that + the Soviet interest in arms sales has not normally been exclusively + commercial in nature.

+

4. The USG has every confidence that the + GOP will thwart any Soviet attempts + to meddle in Peru, but we do fear that the sale itself will produce a + destabilizing effect in the area. There are reports making the rounds + that a large number of tanks is involved. Peru’s neighbors might react + by seeking increased armaments, and an arms race could ensue. Contrary to alarmist rumors and + some public statements in Lima, there is no evidence available to us + that any one of Peru’s neighbors has so far engaged in a build-up of + military hardware that could be considered inordinate or threatening. + The introduction into Peru of Soviet or Cuban military technicians on + any significant scale would be an additional destabilizing factor of + considerable proportions. We know the GOP does not, in fact, want an arms race or any other form + of instability in the area. The President’s own recent statements that + Peru prefers to spend its money for development rather than arms, as + well as his suggestion of a meeting with bordering states to freeze arms + procurement, are particularly welcome in that regard.

+

5. We recognize that our legislative and other restrictions have in the + past frustrated Peruvian attempts to satisfy their arms requirements in + the United States. However, the President will realize that a real + effort has been made to correct this situation to the extent possible. + President Nixon took an + important step in that direction in May by determining that sales to + Peru could be resumed under the Foreign military sales act. Our desire + has been to be responsive to Peru’s legitimate needs, and our + disappointment over this purchase from the Soviets is, therefore, + particularly acute. Regrettably, it is likely to make a satisfactory + relationship between us in the arms field more difficult to achieve.

+

6. We must also be concerned by the effect of this transaction on + Congressional and public opinion in the U.S. As the President is aware, + some members of Congress and some sectors of our public opinion are + already inclined to take an unsympathetic view of certain GOP policies. This purchase, particularly + if it is followed by other acquisitions of Soviet arms, could produce + such an adverse impact as to complicate our efforts to improve relations + between the U.S. and Peru.

+

7. The USG has made evident its desire + for a significant improvement in those relations. We are highly + gratified by the progress of the negotiations with Mr. Greene. We look forward to an + equitable settlement of the outstanding investment disputes and to the + removal of the irritations and impediments these have produced. It is + also our hope that progress can be made through quiet negotiations + toward an interim solution to the fisheries dispute. The USG trusts that the GOP decision to purchase Soviet tanks does + not signify a lessening of Peruvian interest in improved relations nor + an intention to enter into a continuing arms relationship with the + Soviet Union.

+

8. Begin FYI. Department assumes that Velasco’s reactions to the foregoing will give us some + indication of GOP intentions in this + field. We have deliberately omitted any specific mention of Chile, but + have little doubt that Velasco + will know what troubles us in stressing the danger of an arms race. He + should also have no difficulty in calculating that the Chileans may put great pressure on us to + redress the balance. We would appreciate any thoughts you might have on + what could be done at this juncture to reassure the Chileans and lessen + that pressure.

+

9. Our public reaction will be confined to low-key background briefing of + the media. Guidance prepared for that purpose follows septel.

+

10. We also intend to brief the Brazilian, Venezuelan and Colombian + Governments without asking for any action on their part. Embassy + Santiago will be prepared to respond to GOC questions, but will not take the initiative in raising + this subject. The telegram of instructions to these posts is being + repeated to you. End FYI.

+ + + Kissinger + + +
+ +
+ 294. Editorial Note +

On February 19, 1974, the United States and Peru agreed on a compensation + package for expropriated U.S. companies in Peru. The agreement capped + nearly eight months of negotiations. Department of State documents on + the negotiations can be found in the National Archives, Central Foreign + Policy File, for 1973 and 1974. White House documents are ibid., Nixon Presidential + Materials, NSC Files, Country Files, + Box 793, Latin America, Peru, Vol. 3, January 1972–December 31, 1973 and + ibid., Box 794, Vol. 4, January 1974.

+

In the settlement, the Government of Peru agreed to give the Government + of the United States $76 million dollars to distribute to the + expropriated companies. The Peruvians attached a “unilateral statement,” + Annex A, to the agreement “without modifying the provisions of the + Agreement.” The statement contained a list of companies which could be + indemnified under the agreement. Because compensation for the + International Petroleum Company (IPC) was a sensitive domestic issue, + the list did not include the IPC. In turn, the U.S. Government attached + a “unilateral statement,” Annex B, in which it recognized the Peruvian + Government’s position as set forth in Annex A but stated the annex did + not change “by interpretation or otherwise, the provisions of this + Agreement.” Therefore, according to the U.S. interpretation of the + settlement, the IPC could be compensated under the terms of the + agreement. For the text and a discussion of the agreement, see the Andean Times, February 22, 1974, pp 3–5. Under + the terms of the agreement, the Esso Standard Corporation, a subsidiary + of the IPC, received $22 + million in compensation. (Telegram 275595 to Lima, December 1; National + Archives, Central Foreign Policy File, D740365–0435)

+
+ +
+ 295. Memorandum of Conversation +

Summary: Kissinger and de la Flor discussed regional + issues and the dispute over fishing rights.

+

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + P820043–2412. Confidential; Nodis. Drafted by Zweifel; cleared by Kubisch; approved by Bremer on February 21. The + meeting took place in the Foreign Minister’s suite in the Hotel + Camino Real. Kissinger + and de la Flor were in Mexico City for a meeting of the + hemisphere’s Foreign Ministers. The meeting followed a November + 14–16, 1973, Latin American Foreign Ministers Conference in + Bogotá that approved eight points as the “bases for a new + dialogue between Latin America and the United States”: + cooperation for development, prevention of coercive economic + measures, restructuring the inter-American system, solution of + the Panama Canal question, restructuring the international + commerce and monetary systems, compelling multinational + enterprises to respect the sovereignty of their host nations, + transfer of technology, and a reconsideration of the general + panorama of relations between Latin America and the United + States. (Telegram 9438 from Bogotá, November 17, 1973; ibid., + [no film number]) Kissinger’s Mexico City speech is in the + Department of State Bulletin, March 18, + 1974, pp. 257–262.

+ + + + + Mexico City, February + 20, 1974. + + + SUBJECT + Secretary Kissinger’s + Meeting With Peruvian Foreign Minister de la Flor + + + PARTICIPANTS + + + Peruvian Delegation + General Miguel Angel de la Flor, Minister of Foreign + Relations + Ambassador Luis Marchand, Undersecretary for Foreign + Policy, Ministry of Foreign Affairs + Mr. Oscar Faura, Interpreter + + + + + US Delegation + Secretary of State Henry A. + Kissinger + + Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs + Jack + Kubisch + + Legal Adviser Carlyle + Maw + + Donald Barnes, Interpreter + + David E. Zweifel, + Second Secretary, US Embassy + + + +

+ HAK: Mr. Minister, everyone has told me + that you will be my biggest problem.

+

Fon Min de la Flor: And what do you say?

+

+ HAK: I tell them that you were the first + Latin Foreign Minister I spoke to in New York and that we got along very + well.

+ +

Fon Min de la Flor: Yes indeed. And I want to reiterate and make formal + the invitation I extended to you in New York to visit my country.

+

+ HAK: I accept with great pleasure. When + I visit Latin America, Peru will be among the first of my stops. I will + not visit all countries, but only will go to 4 or 5 including Peru.

+

Fon Min de la Flor: When will this be?

+

+ HAK: I do not know for sure. Much + depends on the President. I hope it will be in the Spring.

+

Fon Min de la Flor: That would be a good time—it will be Autumn in Peru. + You travel a lot.

+

+ HAK: All the time.

+

Fon Min de la Flor: I want you to know that we sincerely hope you will + come. As I told Assistant Secretary Kubisch, such a visit enables one to get to know a + country and its people.

+

+ HAK: If you will take one or two of my + trips to the Middle East, I will come immediately. (laughter) Compared + to the Arabs, Latin Americans have a Scandanavian temperament.

+

Fon Min de la Flor: You mean we are colder than the Arabs?

+

+ HAK: Yes, you are colder than the Arabs + but warmer than we are. I like the Latin temperament.

+

Fon Min de la Flor: We are very emotional, but motivated by humanism. We + have a very constructive attitude. Probably we talk too much and do too + little. In fact, I told my colleagues this afternoon that we had talked + 3 hours without having accomplished anything.

+

+ HAK: Don’t feel you are alone. We had a + 3-day Energy Conference with European and US participation last week. At + the end, I was not sure what we had discussed.

+

Fon Min de la Flor: I hope this meeting does not end the same way.

+

+ HAK: I have come with the full + expectation and determination that this meeting succeed. We will not be + able to satisfy all your desires. I do not want to promise anything on + which we cannot deliver. On some issues we will not be able to meet your + positions. Nonetheless, we will consider your opinions very + seriously.

+

Fon Min de la Flor: Having arrived at this point, may I comment that + great expectations have been aroused concerning what will come out of + this meeting—both on the part of the press and the public. We believe + that all of these expectations center on your contribution, especially + what you can say on our eight points and on the two which you have + raised. We don’t want this to be a repetition of just one more + meaningless conference like the many that have taken place in the + past.

+

+ HAK: What we have to avoid is a + high-sounding proclamation, followed by no action.

+ +

Fon Min de la Flor: Exactly.

+

+ HAK: We must design a program to work on + for years to come. I want you to know that I have brought one of the + highest-ranking US delegations to attend such a conference in years. My + purpose is to create an atmosphere of unity and direction so that the + public in the US will come to take Latin American relations very + seriously. Besides a program per se, we must + create a new spirit of equal partnership; that is what I wish to bring + about.

+

Fon Min de la Flor: I know Mr. Secretary, that you have studied all of + our eight points very carefully. I would like to ask if, in your public + address tomorrow, you plan to treat all of the eight points equally, or + will you emphasize some more than others?

+

+ HAK: I will deal with all in some + detail. In my speech tomorrow I will not refer to them simply as “your + points”, but will give an answer; otherwise the press will say this is + just another platitudinous speech. At the same time my Latin American + colleagues are so temperamental that they will attack me whatever I say + (laughter). What do you think?

+

Fon Min de la Flor: If you express your points of view publicly, the + Latin Americans will have to respond publicly. If you refer to the + points in your speech and a member of the media then asks my opinion, I + must give it. If your speech is very general, the press can attack it as + being only a repetition of previous statements of goodwill. If it is too + detailed, you then will have committed yourself publicly to a position + that you will have to defend in private. You will have to choose between + those points you address in public as opposed to those you want to make + in private. The press can misinterpret your remarks—we all know how the + press is.

+

+ HAK: I will have to consider your + recommendation. What we need in the US is public support for a new + policy. If I speak only in generalities, the people here will be + disappointed and people in the US will say that it has been “just + another meeting”. If I make good proposals, you, of course, will agree + with me.

+

Fon Min de la Flor: If your proposals are good I would have to recognize + it. The problem is that we face the possibility of real frustration + since it has been so long since we have met. Another possibility (as I + mentioned to Assistant Secretary Kubisch) is that many Latin Americans will not agree on + your proposals. A third possibility is that the US will be seen as + leading Latin America just as she has done in the past—paternalism. I + can tell you that the press will be very harsh if you deal only with + points of interest to the US and not with others. Hence, on the eight + points, your opinions will have tremendous import for the future of + Latin America.

+

Peru’s position has never been one of confrontation or friction with the + US. Our position is a realistic one of a people in transition, seeking + maturity. We are humanists. + We are faced with problems such as the role of foreign capital in our + economy; this is important in discussing your desire to change the basis + for US-Latin American relations. I repeat: ours is a firm, non-violent + position which we maintain with our heads held high. Although there are + seeming contradictions in our two governments’ policies which might be + misinterpreted, we know that if and when we find ourselves in + opposition, we shall be frank, sincere, and friendly.

+

+ HAK: And tough! (laughter)

+

Fon Min de la Flor: Ambassador Marchand has just handed me a very apt + phrase—“Mental colonialism is as dangerous as imperialism”.

+

+ HAK: As we seek to move from a position + of domination to one of cooperation, we do so not as a favor to you but + as a recognition of the times. If the US tries to lead Latin America by + the hand, we will exhaust ourselves. Such an attitude is incompatible + with our objectives. Either we will bring about a cooperative spirit + between peoples of dignity or the Latin community will disintegrate with + each country going its own way. This is the choice which faces us.

+

In regard to concrete items, I have to tell you frankly that I have + studied your paper on such issues as economic coercion, and that we + cannot move to your position. I will suggest some ways in which we might + handle future disputes. At the same time, I want you to know that + whatever we promise we will achieve. You will not agree with all we + offer. I ask you to look at the direction in which we are moving as well + as at the specifics we propose. You will find this in my speech.

+

Fon Min de la Flor: I appreciate that. I also know you won’t promise to + eliminate all legislative restrictions. This is out of your hands. + However, if you convince us that you understood + our position and are willing to make your maximum effort along these + lines, we will be satisfied.

+

+ HAK: This is exactly what I will do, but + can I do so publicly?

+

Fon Min de la Flor: If you do state such a position publicly, I + immediately will back you up on it.

+

+ HAK: I will do this.

+

Fon Min de la Flor: We have just signed a very important bilateral + agreement. We very much wanted to sign it before this meeting.

+

+ HAK: In fact you went home to sign + it.

+

Fon Min de la Flor: That is why I can appreciate your travels (laughter). + Moving from this agreement, I see an improvement in our relations. + However, there are still points which endanger even better relations. I + refer to the tuna issue—specifically the Pelly Amendment. So long as + this exists we will have difficulty in moving smoothly to truly + harmonious relations.

+

+ HAK: We can—although not publicly—as + long as our present laws exist, and considering that we have put our + relations on a new basis, make + sure that the laws will be applied in the most flexible manner. As we + move from confrontation to trust, I will do what I can to alleviate the + legal obstacles.

+

Fon Min de la Flor: Would you like a whiskey?

+

+ HAK: No thank you. I must go. I must + work on my speech.

+

Fon Min de la Flor: You spoke of cooperation. For us this is vital. We + have made a proposal which you may have seen—I refer to a system for + collective economic security. This has two aspects: one is a program + which would operate in such cases as natural disaster and would provide + for collective effort to reduce the repeated calls for bilateral and + unilateral assistance. The other aspect is for collective action in + situations such as the present scarcity of resources. We would propose + that we meet, review the situation, and then take positions which place + full value on Latin American views.

+

+ HAK: For foreseeable problems, + consultation is essential. We sometimes differ, especially when you + insist that we have an obligation to act rather than that we act + voluntarily. This is a matter of principle, not action. Assistant + Secretary Kubisch is having a + heart attack. He thinks I am antagonizing you (laughter).

+

Fon Min de la Flor: I understand fully. I also am frank. It is the only + way for non-diplomats to understand each other.

+

+ HAK: I already told Jack Kubisch that the only way I could + enter the State Department was as Secretary. I am not qualified for any + other entry (laughter).

+

Fon Min de la Flor: Really, we don’t pretend to set forth precise + obligations; at the same time the US does have an obligation towards + Latin America.

+

+ HAK: Moral but not legal.

+

Mr. Kubisch: Furthermore, our + people and our Congress would not accept any legal obligation.

+

Fon Min de la Flor: At least you should refrain from measures which + retard development.

+

+ HAK: We must do better, we must + contribute on a long-term systematic basis. You will see tomorrow.

+

Mr. Kubisch: We should go.

+

+ HAK: I have an appointment for which I + am late.

+

Fon Min de la Flor: Two more small points. Will you say anything on + Cuba?

+

+ HAK: I will be very frank. Cuba is + primarily a domestic problem within the US. From a foreign policy point + of view, a government which can deal with Peking can deal with Havana. + What I am trying to do is to create a new spirit. If we mix in our + discussion too much talk about + Cuba, this will lead to a domestic (US) debate on the wrong issue. This + does not mean that I am asking you to change your view at all. I hope + this is not our last meeting. I ask that the Cuba issue be deferred for + a later time. I will not mention Cuba in my speech. My opposition is not + dogmatic. I hope you will not repeat what I have said to others.

+

Fon Min de la Flor: Today we received with great satisfaction one of your + statements in which you referred to “convivencia pacifica”. Some Latins + may not realize that we must cooperate for development. I think your + phrase is significant. This, plus the frank talk we have had is most + encouraging. I think you should repeat the phrase in your speech.

+

+ HAK: I will include it.

+

(The Secretary rose and took leave of Minister de la Flor.)

+
+ +
+ 296. Telegram 1798 From the Embassy in Peru the Department of + State +

Summary: + Belcher outlined the + reasons why the Peruvians agreed to compensate expropriated + U.S.-owned companies.

+

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + [no film number]. Confidential; Limdis. Nixon’s letter to Velasco is referred to in the + source note to Document + 281.

+ + + + + Lima, March + 7, 1974, 1203Z. + +

1798. Subj: Greene + Mission—Elements Leading Peru to Agreement and Their Implications.

+

1. Summary: On February 19, 1974, the Governments of the United States + and Peru signed an agreement resolving outstanding investment disputes, + thus removing a major and persistent irritant in relations between the + two countries. What were the pressures on the Peruvian Government which + led it, after more than five years of confrontation, finally to put an + end to these apparently intractable disputes? Influences were many, some + of which grew in importance as negotiations continued. However, there is + little doubt that the fall of the Allende regime in Chile and Peru’s growing sense of + isolation in the Hemisphere provided the final and most important + impetus. Other factors were: (1) the contribution which an agreement + could make toward stabilizing conditions for Peru internally as well as + externally; (2) concern for the economy, including continued + availability of Foreign Assistance; (3) an effort to offset closer relations with the + Soviets, and perhaps to counterbalance the purchase of Soviet tanks; and + (4) the prospect that the appearance of rapprochement with the United + States could lend added respectability and permanence to the Velasco revolution.

+

2. The agreement has been applauded by the U.S. press as a diplomatic + achievement by the administration of considerable importance in future + relations with the Hemisphere. Conversely, in Peru, the government + oriented and controlled press regarded the agreement as a “victory” in a + struggle with an imperialist power which was finally forced to accept + the legitimacy of the Peruvian model. For Velasco, the perspective was, in fact, somewhat + different. Preoccupied by events in Chile and perhaps concerned by + thoughts of his own succession, the agreement not only added a possible + source of assistance but removed a potential threat to the stability of + his revolution without detracting either from its integrity of + independence. End summary.

+

3. On February 19, 1973, in a secret meeting with Velasco, Special Presidential + Representative James Greene + handed the Peruvian President a letter from President Nixon suggesting that the U.S. and + Peru attempt once again to resolve certain investment disputes which for + several years has poisoned relations between the two countries. On + February 19, 1974, one year to the day later, Peru and the United States + signed an agreement under which Peru agreed to pay compensation of $76 + million (plus a net of $34 million in related remittances). The event + has been viewed in the U.S. press as a significant administration + Foreign Policy achievement and as a landmark in U.S. relations not only + with Peru but possibly with Latin America. It is of some interest to + consider what brought this development about and what implications it + may have.

+

4. Immediate considerations were perhaps the most important, but short + range historical developments were significant in setting the context. + In October 1968, the Armed Forces overthrew the tottering Belaunde + regime, repudiated the Act of Talara, and seized IPC, an event which has + since become the symbol of the Peruvian Revolution. Subsequent efforts + by then Under Secretary of State Irwin in April and September 1969 failed to resolve the + resulting dispute between the U.S. and Peru, and the Peruvian + Government, under the shadow of U.S. retaliatory legislation, embarked + on its twin course of confrontation—with the U.S. abroad and with the + traditional economic and social establishment at home. In retrospect the + failure of this first U.S. effort was not surprising; the Irwin mission was handicapped from the + outset by other problems such as the seizure of U.S. fishing boats, and + by the perception of the Revolutionary Government that agreement with + the U.S. over IPC would expose it to attack from the very leftists and + nationalists who had supported it against Belaunde.

+ +

5. The Greene mission began under + more favorable circumstances. The Velasco government had been in office for four years and + had become more self-assured—perhaps even institutionalized. Its unique + and in many respects genuinely revolutionary programs were well matured. + The initial overture was discreet, and President Nixon’s initiative probably flattered + Velasco’s vanity. Finally, + there was undoubtedly underway a growing appreciation on the part of the + government that continued confrontation with the U.S. was not in Peru’s + own self interest. Conversely, for Velasco, in firm control of his country, it would cost + little to explore what the U.S. might have in mind. There are also + indications that it had occured to him that it might be possible to + include Cerro de Pasco, already at that time a Peruvian objective, in a + negotiated package at relatively little expense. In any event, Velasco accepted the overture, and + when Greene left, it appeared + that there might be a further meeting in March.

+

6. Before the next meeting could take place, however, a number of + important events occured. Velasco suffered a near fatal illness, civil + disturbances broke out in the South, Peru nationalized the fishmeal + industry, and Secretary of State Rogers paid what developed into a surprisingly + successful visit to Lima. Against this backdrop, Greene’s second visit in mid-June + found the Peruvian Government willing to talk, but still bemused by the + continued easy availability of credit from the International Banking + Community and by expectations of support from the IBRD Consultative group meeting in Paris. + Nonferrous metal prices were high, and the prospects of increased copper + and petroleum output by 1977 or earlier were buoyant. The two sides + remained far apart. In the meantime, during meetings in Lima aimed at + restructuring of the OAS, Peru took the + lead in taking positions contrary to those of the United States.

+

7. The situation had changed only slightly when Green next visited in + mid-August, although it was clear that the government continued to be + concerned by internal unrest. Some deportations had taken place, and the + government felt impelled to stage a demonstration by Campesinos in favor + of land reform to counter dissatisfaction among medium and small + farmers. With high prices for imported wheat and continued poor + prospects for fishmeal, the balance of payments picture was also less + favorable. It was in this context that the Peruvian Government finally + agreed to the carefully worded text of a formal public announcement of + the negotiations which was released on August 9. Peru also upped its + offer from $5 million to $40 million. Nevertheless, the government was + seemingly in no haste to pursue negotiations, and early September found + Prime Minister Mercado at a + meeting in Caracas of Inter-American Army Chiefs of Staff and Foreign + Minister de la Flor in Algiers at a nonaligned conference, where both + took stridently anti-U.S. positions.

+ +

8. Green’s fourth visit took place in late September. In the meantime, + the government had been forced to reassure the small and medium farmers, + whose discontent had become more pronounced; more important, the + Allende regime in Chile had + been overthrown. Thus, while Greene found the Cabinet in general and Velasco in particular highly exercised + over an offensive public announcement by the Cerro Corporation, + substantial progress was made; so much so that detailed negotiations on + the text of an agreement could get underway in earnest. In retrospect, + it is probable that this stage marked an important turning point as the + Cabinet realized that an agreement would bring major benefits to Peru, + while failure of the negotiations could entail continued U.S. + obstruction of development financing for Peru.

+

9. Further visits in the early parts of November and December saw + additional progress, in particular, a considerable narrowing of + differences over the amount of the financial settlement, against the + background of renewed disturbances in the South, growing Peruvian + concern at the adverse impact of the world energy crisis, and Velasco’s acknowledgement that Peru + had purchased Soviet tanks. On December 20, the Foreign Minister even + confided to the Ambassador that he hoped the agreement could be + concluded before the end of the year. (He was almost certainly motivated + by the fact that the nationalization of Cerro de Pasco on January 1 was + then a foregone conclusion and he feared the U.S. might regard that + action as a provocation and overturn the agreement.)

+

10. In early January, Greene + wrote the Prime Minister to suggest a compromise formula on the + financial settlement, which was accepted. Nevertheless, there ensued + considerable skirmishing over the exact amount of the remittances, + including a major problem involving a $9 million claim against Cerro de + Pasco which surfaced only on January 15, and it was necessary for + Greene to enter into one + last negotiating session on February 7, 1974 to make it plain that + unless these issues were satisfactorily resolved, no agreement could be + concluded. Most of the difficulties appear to have been created by + middle and upper level bureaucrats either concerned about their future + legal liability or seeking to be obstructive, and were worrisomely + reminiscent of the difficulties which had frustrated Belaunde in his + efforts to reach agreement with IPC.

+

11. However, by this time it was clear that the Peruvian Government was + determined (at the insistence of President Velasco, it is rumored) on an agreement, and at a + Cabinet meeting on February 12 the final package was approved. (Even at + this stage there was some opposition, and the vote on the resolution of + the Cerro issue was nine in favor to four against, including Foreign + Minister de la Flor.) And, we presume, Minister of Energy and Mines + Fernandez Maldonado and the representative of Minister of Transport and + Communications Menesesl finally, after a frenzied week of activity, + innumerable loose ends—some of considerable complexity—were tied up, and the agreement was signed + on February 19, coincidentally just the day before the Foreign + Ministers’ meeting with Secretary Kissinger in Mexico, although the U.S. press has + speculated that the timing was at U.S. urging, it was actually the + Peruvian side that displayed the most anxiety to bring the negotiations + to a rapid and successful conclusion.

+

12. Was there a turning point in the foregoing series of events at which + Velasco decided that an + agreement with the United States was in his interest? Or were there a + series of points at which minor decisions were made and which taken + cumulatively gradually nudged the matter toward conclusion? The latter + seems the most plausible, with the shock of Allende’s downfall providing the final, irreversible + impetus. Within this context, several motivating concerns suggest + themselves:

+

A. Allende’s overthrow, there can + be no doubt, came as a deep shock to the Revolutionary Government. With + Argentina apparently drifting somewhat to the right under the leadership + of Peron, Peru suddenly became + isolated with only Cuba (and to a certain extent, Panama) for company on + the leftward end of the Hemispheric spectrum. The specter of a similar + event taking place in Peru was chilling and impelled the Peruvian + Government to take steps to protect its flanks, including importantly + the removal of a major irritant in its relations with the U.S. Peru was + also no doubt concerned by the prospect of a relieved United States + rushing to render economic and military assistance to the Chilean Junta. + Further, the reduced likelihood of the U.S. becoming a potential + antagonist would also be reassuring to someone who thinks, as Velasco probably does, that the U.S. + Government has more than a little to do with Allende’s overthrow. Reports that + Cuban leaders, motivated by fear of losing a friendly regime in Peru as + well as in Chile, have urged Velasco not to further antagonize the U.S. lend credence + to this belief.

+

B. Related to the foregoing was undoubtedly Velasco’s concern that “revolution with stability,” the + central theme of his administration, be maintained. There were many + indictions that the government, particularly after Allende’s end, felt itself beleaguered + on both left and right, and that the domestic disturbances, as a sign of + growing public discontent, were the sources of considerable worry. + Stresses have also been apparent within the Cabinet. The Navy in + particular, was disturbed by the nationalization of the Fishmeal + Industry and by Velasco’s + attacks on freedom of the press, while on the left some generals had led + the government to take exposed positions from which it had subsequently + had to retreat. These considerations probably assumed importance some + time before Greene’s second + visit in August. Further, Secretary Rogers’ visit, which ended very warmly after a cool + start, probably also encouraged the government to the view that the + settlement of differences with the U.S. could contribute to stability at + a time when other props were beginning to appear uncertain.

+ +

C. Another Peruvian concern which grew in intensity after Greene’s second visit in August + stemmed from increasing strains on the Peruvian economy. The Cabinet was + shaken by Greene’s point in one + negotiating session that, with the exception of preparatory work at + Cauajone, there had been no Major Foreign Investment in Peru for the + past several years. Peru’s balance of payments problems also appeared + more serious as the energy crisis added some $100 million to estimated + import costs. (On the other side of the coin is the fact that higher + than anticipated copper prices made the acquisition of Cerro a more + attractive economic proposition.) Resolution of investment disputes with + the U.S. would improve Peru’s international credit rating, could + increase confidence, and could open the door not only to U.S. credits + through the Export Import Bank and possibly CCC, but also would lead to a more cooperative U.S. + attitude in International Financial Institutions. This last point was + underscored when in early September the U.S. agreed to let two IDB loans go forward for Peru. (Approval + of two IBRD loans, one in August and + one in November, also helped to make this point.) It is interesting in + this connection to note that, beginning with Greene’s fourth visit in late + September, the Cabinet became much more responsive to his suggestions of + the positive benefits that could accrue to Peru from reaching an + agreement.

+

D. Velasco may also have + perceived in an agreement a counterbalance to Peru’s relations with the + Soviets. As previously reported, an analysis of available facts has left + the Embassy to believe that Peru’s decision to buy Soviet tanks was + probably reached in late 1972 or early 1973. This may have been an + element in Velasco’s decision to + pursue President Nixon’s + proposal conveyed by Greene in + February 1973. (On the other hand, it is also arguable that the Peruvian + Military, disgruntled by the inability or unwillingness of the U.S. to + supply requested arms, believed that the Soviet purchase was fully + justified and that the government felt no compunction to make a + compensating gesture toward the United States.) In any event, + improvement of relations with the U.S. could have the effect of + disarming some criticism from the right—particularly within the + Cabinet—while the tank purchase would maintain Velasco’s leftist credentials. In late + December, when Velasco first + publicly acknowledged that Peru had bought the tanks, the thought must + have occured that subsequent agreement on investment with the U.S. would + serve as public notice of U.S. acceptance of the fact.

+

E. Finally, and perhaps more tenuous, is the probability that Velasco has begun to worry over his + succession as well as assuring the permanency of the social and economic + changes over which he has presided. There have recently been indications + of further health problems which no doubt heighten his sense of + morality. Agreement with the U.S. would place a welcome stamp of + respectability and even of acceptance on the Peruvian Revolution. If, + before he leaves office, Velasco + were to pay an official visit + to the U.S., he could well feel that a further important step toward + legitimizing the Peruvian Revolution as neither capitalist nor communist + had been taken.

+

13. From the U.S. point of view, the agreement may properly be regarded + as a significant achievement. It serves to reaffirm the principle of + adequate compensation for expropriated properties. It removes a major + irritant in relations with Peru, one of the Hemisphere’s shrillest and + most persistent U.S. critics. As an accommodation with a sometime + antagonist, it is consistent with the fresh start the U.S. is seeking to + make in Latin America.

+

14. There are indications that the Government of Peru views the agreement + from a different perspective. Since it constitutes an intergovernmental + quitclaim, the Peruvian Government may think it well worth the price to + know that, even in the event of a counterrevolution, there will be no + return of any expropriated property as occured in Chile. It constitutes + visible evidence for domestic as well as external consumption that the + U.S. accepts Peru’s right to expropriate. It also opens the door to + additional sources of financing, and there is no doubt that the U.S. + will be expected to play a more constructive role, including taking an + active—if not leading—part in the next meeting of the IBRD consultative group. Peru will almost + certainly feel misled if the U.S. does not. Finally, while the + Government of Peru no doubt also welcomes the removal of a serious + irritant in its relations with a major world power, there is no + indication that it also necessarily welcomes the agreement as an + opportunity for a general rapprochement, either bilaterally or within + the OAS (or other multilateral) + context, with the United States. Indeed, there is a reason to believe + that, inasmuch as in the government’s view the agreement neutralizes a + potential threat, it further frees the government to pursue an + independent international course. As recently as February 28, for + example, Prime Minister Mercado + emphasized to a public audience that Peru and the United States, as less + developed and developed countries, respectively, could by definition + have no interests in common.

+

15. While much of the foregoing is speculation, it is apparent that there + was a great deal in the investment disputes settlement to make it + attractive to Velasco’s Peru, + quite apart from the fact that the value of the assets Peru received far + exceeded $76 million. As Velasco + looks about him at the present state of Argentina, Chile and even Cuba, + he must derive some satisfaction at the relative success and stability + which has accompanied his own revolution, a state of affairs to which + the February 19 agreement with the United States has made a further + contribution.

+

16. Request Department consider whether this report should remain limdis or be given wider distribution + to include other interested Washington agencies. Department may also + wish to consider lateral distribution in field, particularly to other + ARA posts.

+ + + Belcher + + +
+ +
+ 297. Telegram 86749 From the Department of State to the Embassy in + Peru +

Summary: Following + up on meetings with de la Flor during multilateral meetings in + Washington and Atlanta, Kissinger informed the Peruvian Foreign Minister + that he had arranged for CCC + credits for wheat for Peru.

+

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + P850093–2277. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Drafted by Kubisch; cleared by Enders, Butz, Simon and Dunlop; approved by + Kissinger. On April + 17, Kissinger and de la + Flor met in Washington, and discussed Latin American regional + issues, economic assistance, and Middle Eastern issues. (Ibid., + P820043–1933) A record of the Kissinger-de la Flor meeting in Atlanta has not + been found. Kissinger + and de la Flor were in Washington for a meeting of the + hemisphere’s Foreign Ministers and in Atlanta for a meeting of + the OASGA.

+ + + + + Washington, April 27, 1974, 1734Z. + +

86749. Subject: Letter to Foreign Minister of Peru

+

1. Please arrange for the following letter from the Secretary to be + passed to Foreign Minister de la Flor at the earliest possible time.

+

2. Begin text. Dear Miguel Angel: Before I depart Washington for the + Middle East this weekend, I want to tell you once again how much I + enjoyed being with you in both Washington and Atlanta this past + week.

+

3. In my view, the meeting of Foreign Ministers in Washington worked out + very well. I think it served to strengthen our dialogue, to define the + issues more clearly, and to launch the kind of analytical and technical + work program we need in order to find solutions to some of the problems + we have been considering—I look forward to continuing working closely + and personally with you during the months ahead as we strive to improve + Inter-American relationships still further and greatly increase our + progress towards common objectives.

+

4. When we met privately in Atlanta, you asked for my help in obtaining + supplies of wheat and urea fertilizer for Peru. Since my return to + Washington, I have looked into this and, in the case of wheat, have made + arrangements for the Commodity Credit Corporation (CCC) to extend credit to Peru immediately + for 100,000 tons of new crop wheat. As you know there have been sharp + cutbacks in this program, so this will be an exception to the CCC’s current policy—an exception which I + have arranged on the basis of our conversation. You should have your + Embassy here in Washington make the application directly to Mr. Clayton + Yeutter, Assistant Secretary for International Affairs and Commodity + Programs, in our Department of Agriculture.

+

5. Unfortunately, the outlook for urea fertilizer is far less + encouraging. I am informed that urea is in very short supply. However, + there may be some possibility that we could help Peru arrange for + commercial contracts for some + small lots of urea. We would be more than happy to assist Peruvian + purchasing agents in attempting to locate supplies for delivery later in + the year, after our peak demand season in the United States. If you + would like further help on this, please let me know, or, if you prefer, + have your Embassy or purchasing agent in the United States get in touch + with Jack Kubisch and I will + leave instructions for him on this matter.

+

6. On another subject, we have passed word to the Chilean authorities in + Santiago that we understand Mexico would be willing to offer asylum to + Clodomiro Almeyda and + Orlando Letelier and ensure + that they did not engage in any political activity. I will let you know + when and if I hear anything further from them on this.

+

7. Once again, thanks for all your help in both Washington and Atlanta. + It is always a very special personal pleasure for me to see and be with + you. With warmest regards, Henry. End text.

+ + + Kissinger + + +
+ +
+ 298. Memorandum of Conversation +

Summary: Kissinger, de la Flor, and Fernández Maldonado + discussed the future of U.S. policy towards Latin America and a + possible Export-Import Bank loan for a pipeline project in + Peru.

+

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + P820097–1190. Confidential; Exdis. Drafted by Pringle. The meeting took + place in Kissinger’s + office at the Department of State. In telegram 185626 to Lima, + August 23, the Department sent a summary of the memorandum of + conversation to the Embassy. (Ibid., D740233–0926) Kissinger’s September 23 + speech is in the Department of State Bulletin, October 14, 1974, pp. + 498–504.

+ + + + + Washington, August 22, 1974, 5 p.m. + + + PARTICIPANTS + + + + PERU: + + Foreign Minister de la Flor + Minister of Energy Fernandez-Maldonado + Ambassador Berckemeyer + + Foreign Ministry Spokesman Faura + + + + + + U.S.: + + The Secretary + Deputy Assistant Secretary Shlaudeman + + + Sandy Pringle, + ARA/EP, Notetaker + Neil Seidenman, OPR/LS, + Interpreter + + + + +

Secretary Kissinger greeted the + Foreign Minister and, after photographs of the two were taken, the group + was seated.

+

Foreign Minister de la Flor: It is a great pleasure for me to see you + again and to express, as I did by letter, my great pleasure that you are + remaining as Secretary of State in the Ford administration. I am gratified personally, and I am + pleased as Foreign Minister—it means the new dialogue will continue.

+

The Secretary: I called attention to the new dialogue in my speech to the + American Legion Convention a few days ago. I didn’t say much about it, + but it was a key point.

+

I hope to arrange a dinner with all of the Latin American Foreign + Ministers at New York next month. When will you be in New York?

+

Foreign Minister de la Flor: About the 19th to the 26th. And you?

+

The Secretary: On the 21st or 22nd for about three days and again the + following week for about three days.

+

Foreign Minister de la Flor: Do you speak on the 23rd?

+

The Secretary: Yes, do you speak right after me again?

+

Foreign Minister de la Flor: I don’t want to speak right after you. + You’re hard to follow—you get too much applause.

+

The Secretary: Yours was a bloodcurdling speech—and given in uniform.

+

Foreign Minister de la Flor: I have to wear my uniform for speeches.

+

The Secretary: You addressed yourself to the subject of imperialism, as I + recall.

+

Foreign Minister de la Flor: I remember our meetings in Atlanta with + pleasure.

+

The Secretary: Yes, and I remember our private talk there also.

+

Foreign Minister de la Flor: I greatly appreciate, as I wrote you, your + help in arranging the CCC wheat credit + for Peru.

+

The Secretary: One of the important things about personal relationships + is that we can cut through bureaucratic redtape.

+

Foreign Minister de la Flor: Yes, we have had long talks about + bureaucracy.

+

You’re very busy, so I’ll get right down to business.

+

The Secretary: In contrast to the usual mode of procedure.

+

Foreign Minister de la Flor: First I wish to repeat the invitation to you + and Mrs. Kissinger to visit + Peru. We hope you will definitely come later this year.

+

The Secretary: I will visit Peru on my first trip to South America.

+

Foreign Minister de la Flor: This year?

+

The Secretary: I hope it will be late this year or early next—certainly + before the Meeting of Foreign Ministers in March.

+ +

Foreign Minister de la Flor: I am in Washington accompanying a mission + headed by the Minister of Energy and Mines; our purpose is to obtain + financing for a petroleum pipeline. We will go from here to San + Francisco and Tokyo. We are arranging for an important loan from Japan. + However, due to inflation, higher petroleum costs and other factors, we + will also need additional credits of approximately $250 million. We have + talked to the Export Import Bank, which is well disposed toward helping + us, and with private American banks. The private banks have made known + to us the importance which they attach to the participation and support + of the Export Import Bank.

+

The Secretary: Is there any problem?

+

Mr. Shlaudeman: There may be with + respect to lack of data, but we are prepared to move the matter along + toward a decision.

+

Energy Minister Fernandez-Maldonado: I wish to express my pleasure in + meeting you and my satisfaction that you are continuing in office. Warm + congratulations.

+

The Secretary: This will bankrupt me.

+

Foreign Minister de la Flor: No, never.

+

Energy Minister Fernandez-Maldonado: The construction of the petroleum + pipeline from the jungle to the coast is of greatest importance to Peru. + We hope to complete it by July 1976. In this regard we will be gratified + for any help from the Export Import Bank.

+

The Secretary: I will have to look into this matter from the financial + point of view.

+

From the foreign policy point of view, I will support it strongly.

+

Is there a problem?

+

Mr. Shlaudeman: Only with respect + to data regarding proven oil reserves, as far as I know.

+

The Secretary: What is the cost?

+

Mr. Shlaudeman: It is a major + project. The cost is over $500 million, of which about $200 million + would be U.S. goods and services.

+

Energy Minister Fernandez-Maldonado: We will be providing additional data + to the Export Import Bank. U.S. experts have worked on this, and + Petroperu is preparing reports on reserves which I am sure will justify + the loans.

+

The Secretary: When do you need a decision?

+

Energy Minister Fernandez-Maldonado: The matter is very far advanced. The + pipe has been purchased, and some equipment has already arrived in Peru. + We are fighting against time and need a decision as soon as + possible.

+ +

Foreign Minister de la Flor: There was a meeting with the Export Import + Bank today. The Bank has two questions for us: 1) Exactly what U.S. + private and Export Import Bank participation is Peru seeking? 2) + Precisely what information does Peru have on oil reserves? There is some + uncertainty in the Bank as to these matters. We will be able to answer + the first question after we return from Japan at the end of the month. + Our technical experts will be able to provide the data on reserves by + mid-September.

+

The Secretary: We will keep a friendly eye on it. “Friendly eye” means we + will hold down the number of committees. I don’t know how your Ministry + works but let me tell you about mine. I received a memo a few days ago + signed by seven officers recommending that I call a Senator on some + matter. Then I learned they had already called the Senator’s assistant + to tell him what I was going to say.

+

That’s the truth—my imagination isn’t up to inventing it.

+

Foreign Minister de la Flor: The fact that we have two ministers on the + mission shows the importance we attach to the pipeline and how much we + wish to avoid all possible delay—time is money.

+

The Secretary: We will give you any support we can.

+

Foreign Minister de la Flor: We are grateful. It shows once more how + important Dr. Kissinger is to + Latin America and to Peru.

+

The Secretary: I have very deep feelings for Latin America as well as + personal respect for the Foreign Minister—partly because he intimidates + me.

+

Foreign Minister de la Flor: But I have come without my uniform.

+

With your moral and material support we feel much better.

+

There is one more matter of great importance to Peru and the Hemisphere + which I wish to raise. At the present time the region is polarized into + two groups because of two rival candidacies for the OAS Secretary Generalship. At Atlanta I + spoke to you about Peru’s very distinguished and able candidate, Carlos + Garcia Bedoya, whom you know. He could give strength and leadership to + the OAS. We have promises of some votes + for him on the first ballot and others for the second ballot. In the + present polarized situation, we would very much like to have U.S. + support for Peru’s candidate.

+

The Secretary: Do we have a candidate? When is the vote?

+

Mr. Shlaudeman: No candidate and + no position. The vote is in April.

+

The Secretary: I will look into it and let you know. Nobody has put up my + name as a candidate?

+

Foreign Minister de la Flor: You are our permanent candidate. Permit me + to give this small remembrance to you and Mrs. Kissinger. It is a book about ancient + Peruvian ruins.

+ +

The Secretary: Thank you very much. We can talk in New York about OAS matters.

+

Foreign Minister de la Flor: Also MFM + matters—and I hope you will be able to give us a date for your trip.

+

The Secretary: It may be too soon for me to be able to do that.

+

Foreign Minister de la Flor: (As the group reached the door to depart), I + hope you are now a serious family man.

+

The Secretary: I’ll talk to you in private about that; I don’t want to + loose your respect.

+
+ +
+ 299. Telegram 8043 From the Embassy in Peru to the Department of + State +

Summary: + Ambassador Dean reported + on his conversation with Velasco regarding Soviet arms sales to Peru.

+

Source: Ford Library, + National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for Latin + America, Box 6, Peru–State Department Telegrams–To + Secstate–Exdis. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Repeated to Santiago + and USUN. In telegram 193548 + to Lima, September 4, the Department, noting reports that the + Peruvian Government had entered into new credit arrangements for + further Soviet arms purchases, asked the Embassy to deliver a + démarche to Velasco. + (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + D740245–0870) In telegram 8001, September 23, Dean reported his conversation + with Grojean. (Ibid., + D740267–0529) “Plan Inca” refers to Velasco’s plan for nationalization of + significant commercial enterprises. (Telegram 6692 from Lima, + August 13; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy + File, D740222–0421.) In telegram 8034 from Lima, September 24, + Dean reported on + three September 22 explosions in Lima on a pedestrian bridge. No + damage was reported. (Ibid., D740268–0629)

+ + + + + Lima, September 24, 1974, 1656Z. + +

8043. Subject: Démarche to President Velasco on arms purchases and other matters of mutual + concern. USUN for Bill Bowdler. Refs: (A) State 193548, + (B) Lima’s 7895, (C) Lima’s 8001, (D) Lima’s 8034.

+

1. In my call on President Velasco (September 23), I found the President to be + unusually quiet, cold and uncommunicative during the first 15 to 20 + minutes of our meeting. It was a rather uneasy monologue on my part as I + went through a series of points I wished to make tailored insofar as + possible to the existing climate here and in Washington. After referring + to some of my recent travels around Peru, our last meeting during Army + Secretary Callaway’s visit and + the frank dialogue we wished to maintain, I launched into point number + one, i.e. the current flurry of news stories about US involvement in the + internal affairs of Chile under + Allende and a wire service + report carried in the local press about alleged CIA involvement through Peace Corps representatives in + rural affairs in Paraguay. Without going into any detail regarding these + stories, I assured the President that our policy is the same as stated + in my arrival statement and during my credentials presentation when I + told him we wished Peru and his government well and were prepared to + cooperate in his developmental efforts to the degree that resource + availabilities permitted and without treading in any way on Peru’s + sovereignty or national dignity. I said this continued to be our policy + and the implications or hints carried in the Peruvian press of CIA or other US interventionist efforts in + aid or Peace Corps programs in Peru + were absolutely untrue.

+

2. I then mentioned the Braniff/Aeroperu problem. I told the President of + our efforts here, in Miami and Washington to assist Aeroperu in + obtaining its unfettered flight permit, and of the myriad of steps + leading up to the successful inauguration of its service to the US. I + mentioned upcoming civil air consultations (with exact dates still being + worked out), and expressed our hope that the new Braniff permit under + consideration by the GOP would not + place any further restrictions on Braniff which might be prejudicial to + consultations, adding that the differences we might have over + procedures, frequencies and routes could best be worked out during the + consultations. In addition I told the President I would be discussing + the same matter and making the same request to Transportation Minister + Meneses a little later in the day (which I have done).

+

3. I next referred to the conversation that Admiral Grojean and I had Friday night + (September 20) with Admiral Arce + (reftel C). I told the President that I checked out the report his + government had received concerning the alleged arrival of F–4’s in Chile + and found them to be false. I said that this type of aircraft is + destined largely for NATO use and has not been authorized for sale + anywhere in Latin America.

+

4. I referred to Admiral Arce’s charge + that the US was favoring Brazil and Chile over Peru, and said that this + was not the case. I described to the President our even-handed policy + and referred to the level of FMS + credits made available to Peru and Chile (equal at $15 million each in + FY 74), and told him we had asked + for $20.5 million in credits each for Peru and Chile for FY 75: if cuts in these totals were to be + made in Congress, it appeared from my reading they were more likely in + the Chilean than in the Peruvian package. I told the President that we + recognize that legislative and other restrictions on military sales in + the past have frustrated Peruvian efforts to acquire matériel in the US + (and for this reason Peru looked elsewhere) but added that since May + 1973 we have been as responsive as possible and even-handed.

+ +

5. I pointed out to the President that some requests will take time to + process and some (such as certain types of missiles) might not be + approved because of overall policy, but this does not represent a + special negative treatment of Peru’s requests. I referred to + Congressional interest in our arms sales and certain Congressional and + press concerns over the possibility of an arms race or even a conflict + between Chile and Peru. On the question of the two destroyers that Peru + has requested and that Admiral Gearhard + is trying to obtain for this country (which I also support), I said we + were pushing this request but must recognize that there is also the + question of availability, and interagency and congressional + examination.

+

6. I congratulated the President on his arms limitation effort + (moratorium), his exchange of high-level visits with neighboring + countries, and his plans for a meeting of Presidents at the + Ayacucho-Junin celebration scheduled for December. I allowed as how this + would provide another opportunity to work out agreements and to reassure + neighboring countries of Peru’s desire for peace in the area.

+

7. During most of the foregoing the President was quiet, reserved and + unresponsive. Only at one point, when I referred to Arce’s charge of + favoritism toward Chile did he chime in to support that charge, saying + quote yes you are both feeding and arming Chile unquote. This gave me an + opportunity to emphasize our even-handed policy and to point out again + that except for the period of Pelly and other types of restrictions we + have attempted to be as forthcoming with Peru as we have been with Chile + (and this included wheat as well as weapons). Certainly we wish to do + nothing to increase tensions or contribute to an arms race. To the + contrary we would hope to the extent possible to help in efforts to + reduce suspicions, and would be interested in any suggestions he may + have in this regard.

+

8. After about 20 minutes’ time the President finally began to open up by + stating that neither the Soviets nor the Cubans nor any others are going + to dominate Peru. He said that the Soviets in Peru are under control and + that Peru deals with Cubans because they speak the same language and are + simpaticos. He added, however, that the Cubans have little to contribute + to Peru despite the admittedly numerous exchanges of official visitors + that have taken place in recent times. In this regard he referred to the + visit of Raul Castro, described some of the tourist attractions that + Raul was shown but said there was no special significance to the visit. + He said that Fidel Castro wished + to visit Peru but quote this we won’t permit unquote and indicated his + belief that the reaction to such a visit would be negative to Peru’s + interests. Then the President volunteered the information that his son + was returning September 23 from a week’s visit to Cuba. He said, + however, that this should not be given any ideological meaning because + his son (21 years old) + apparently has fallen in love with a Cuban girl (I understand the + daughter of the Cuban Ambassador) and had gone to Cuba to visit her.

+

9. Earlier I had given the President an opportunity to comment about the + size of the Soviet and Cuban presence in Peru by telling him what Arce + had told us, i.e. that there were some four Soviet military advisers and + no Cuban military advisers. The President said nothing to confirm or + deny the Soviet figures (our information indicates there are 14 not 4), + but seemed to agree with Arce’s statement on Cuba; he said there are no + Cuban quote military advisers as such unquote. The President then + reiterated what he had told me before that neither he nor his government + is pro-communist. They are Nationalist Revolutionaries who get flak from + both extreme right and extreme left. He said the communist party is + legal but watched. He tended to attribute the noise bombs set off in + Lima September 22 to the rightists—perhaps the same group that was + behind the Miraflores rioting (reftel D). He then pointed to the Plan + Inca which he said was not communist but a National Revolutionary + effort. He said it was there for all to see and had some quote bad + unquote and quote good unquote features depending on one’s point of + view, but it was not communist. He said the press law for one has been + attacked, especially from the outside, but added it is designed to + achieve objectives of the revolution, and to bring into the main stream + certain classes or groups of Peruvians. I told the President that + through my prisms the press law was one of the features of Plan Inca + that did not fit into my concept of communication with the people, but I + could see what he was trying to do.

+

10. I took this moment to tell the President of the concern his Plan Inca + statement, especially its reference to elimination of all foreign + participation in Peruvian petroleum activities, had caused US oil + companies drilling in the Amazon under contract with the GOP. I told him of a meeting I had with + representatives of a number of such companies who had requested the + meeing to discuss their concern. I said I was able to tell them of the + reassurances I had received at the ministerial and sub-ministerial + levels of his government to the effect that contracts negotiated under + the present government would be respected, a position which the + President had also stated in a subsequent press conference. The + President said this was absolutely the case.

+

11. I told the President that in my travels around the country and in my + calls on Peruvians of all walks of life, I had occasion to call on + Victor Raul Haya de la Torre, head of the Aprista Party. The President + said that was a good idea and took the occasion to tell me that his + relations with existing political parties in Peru are good, that many of + the Christian Democrats are cooperating with him in his government, and + that only one party, Accion Popular, had been proscribed for acting outside the law. I also + mentioned to the President my contacts at social and other occasions + with several Ambassadors of neighboring countries from which I had been + able to observe an undercurrent of some concern and suspicion with + regard to other countries’ intentions. I told Velasco that where I could I attempted + to add perspective and to work toward conciliation and understanding—but + of course my role is very limited in this area. I said the problems seem + to be complicated by psychological and historical attitudes which add to + mutual suspicions, especially between Peru and Chile.

+

12. As I left, I assured the President that we do not consider him or his + government to be communist; we are not favoring one country over + another, but are following an even-handed policy and are ready to work + toward conciliation and against a costly arms race. He said he too hoped + to avoid such a race because Peru with all of its economic problems and + developmental efforts could ill afford to spend excessive quantities on + arms.

+

13. Comment: The initial coldness shown by Velasco could have been due to any one or a combination + of the main subjects of the visit—arms purchases (especially Soviet), + and Peru-Chile tensions and our concerns over them, or to the report of + F–4 deliveries to Chile, or to the belief that we are favoring Chile + over Peru (which President also shares fully), or perhaps to Velasco’s concern over Sunday night + bombings, or to the press reports of CIA involvement in internal affairs of Hemisphere countries + and to questions (almost allegations) re possible similar involvement + here. In any case, the President thawed eventually and I am convinced + that this conversation opened avenues for further discussions of these + important subjects in the future and may have cleared the air somewhat. + We can certainly expect the Peruvians to be alert both here and in + Washington to any signs of discriminatory US treatment favoring Chile + over Peru, especially in arms area. I personally believe we can be + forthcoming in many ways, including supplying the two destroyers Peru + has requested without upsetting the balance. In his conversation with + Navy Minister Arce, Admiral + Grojean pointed out that Chile + got its two DD’s from US before Peru because that country asked first + and at a time (before the Greene + agreement) when there was in fact a hold on military supplies to Peru. + As the Embassy has reported, we think the odds are low on an eventual + conflict over Arica and do not believe an attack by Peru is yet anything + more than a contingency plan—if that. Peru is concerned over ideological + differences with its neighbors and is super-sensitive to criticism of + its revolutionary measures (especially its new press law) in other + capitals.

+

14. This concern is augmented by uncertainty over armed forces unity as + well as evidence of increasing political and economic dissatisfaction. + Opposition to the radical trend of the revolution resulted in the quote resignation unquote of + former Navy Minister Vargas Caballero and led to rumblings within the + navy. These rumblings continue below the surface and there are some + signs of the same within the air force. The government must also be + upset by the psychological campaign against it which followed the + Miraflores riots. The September 22 noise bombs may possibly represent an + effort to un-nerve the government; these bombings certainly displeased + Velasco.

+

15. The army remains the key to Velasco’s power and while united by its desire to run + the state and strong with respect to the other two services, the + basically moderate elements in the army are believed to outnumber by + quite a bit the leftists (although the latter are more outspoken and + occupy the important commands) and one of the key ministerial positions, + further indicates of relative strength of these two sectors within the + army (and this division is admittedly an oversimplification) may come at + the end of the year when important ministerial and command changes are + due. This is not to imply that Velasco is losing his grip—he is still in very firm + control—but these manifestations of domestic opposition add to his + suspicions and concerns.

+ + + Dean + + +
+ +
+ 300. Telegram 211664 From the Department of State to the Embassy in + Peru +

Summary: Kissinger, de la Flor, and + other Peruvian and U.S. officials discussed arms purchases, the + upcoming OAS elections, an EXIM + loan, and Braniff Airlines.

+

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + [no film number]. Confidential. On May 30, the Peruvian Ministry + of Transportation informed Braniff it must submit appropriate + justification for its increased number of flights in 1973 and + for its proposed July 1 increase in flights and pay a 20% tax on + the new flights; or “work out an agreement with Aeroperu [the + Peruvian National Airline] having equivalent economic value.” + (Telegram 119985 to Lima, June 6; ibid., D740145–0478) In + telegram 9245 from Lima, October 31, the Embassy informed the + Department that Peru had issued an operating permit to Braniff + retroactive to April 1 and valid until February 28, 1975. + (Ibid., D740312–0037)

+ + + + + Washington, September + 25, 1974. + +

211664. Subject: Secretary’s Meeting With Peruvian Foreign Minister.

+

1. Foreign Minister de la Flor met with the Secretary in New York + September 24 and raised two subjects:

+ +

A. Reporting in U.S. media on Peruvian arms purchases. De la Flor expressed concern over + U.S. press reports that arms race taking place and that GOP has aggressive intent, saying reports + have very negative psychological effect. They cause problems for GOP and give rise to unfounded concern in + Chile. He said they all originate in U.S. and that, while he knows the + Secretary cannot intervene with U.S. press, he wants the Secretary to + know Peru is not purchasing arms for aggressive or revanchist purposes. + He stressed GOP’s desire use its + resources to foster development but said Milgov has no intention of + letting Peru find itself defenseless or inadequately prepared, as it had + in past with disastrous consequences. The Secretary stressed + desirability of all countries in area using restraint with respect to + arms purchases.

+

B. OAS Secretary General elections. + De la Flor said situation + now at impasse; there are two candidates and neither has enough votes to + win. Peru has extremely able candidate but does not wish to put him + forward officially if he would be defeated. He requested U.S. support + for Peruvian candidate. The Secretary said the U.S. has not decided in + favor of anyone and that there will be ample opportunity to discuss this + further before the elections take place. He promised that USG would talk to GOP again on subject before making final decision.

+

2. Subject of Exim Bank financing for trans-Andean pipeline was touched + upon, with the Secretary observing that more economic data was needed + and de la Flor stating that it would be supplied.

+

3. Braniff problem was discussed during period when Secretary was absent + from meeting and will be subject of separate telegram. Kissinger unquote.

+ + + Ingersoll + + +
+ +
+ 301. Memorandum From Stephen + Low of the National Security Council Staff to the + President’s Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Scowcroft) +

Summary: Low + informed Scowcroft of + coup plotting in Peru and recommended that Dean be advised to keep a low + profile in order to maintain a posture of non-involvement.

+

Source: Ford Library, + National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for Latin + America, 1974–1977, Box 6, Peru, 1. Secret; Sensitive. Sent for + information. Scowcroft + wrote “OK” on the memorandum and initialed it. In telegram 9200 + from Lima, October 30, the Embassy informed the Department of + coup-plotting. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy + File, D740310–0428) On October 31, the Department passed + telegram 9200 to the directors of the USCINCO, CIA, DIA, and the Chairman of the JCS. (Telegram 239218 to USCINCSO, October 31; ibid., + D740310–0947) No instruction to Dean to maintain a low profile has been + found.

+ + + + + Washington, October + 30, 1974. + + + SUBJECT + Our Posture in Peru + +

As I mentioned in the staff meeting, I am concerned that our posture in + Peru could be exploited to our disadvantage in the event of a coup + attempt there. There are increasingly insistent reports that a coup + against Velasco may be mounted + very soon. The latest report, from a good source, predicts that a coup + attempt could take place as soon as Thursday, the 31st. These reports + are given substance by the number of known explosions which have + occurred recently in Lima, the public reports of corruption in high + levels in the Peruvian government, and the intention recently expressed + by the President to modify military retirement regulations.

+

If a coup occurred it would be stimulated by more moderate elements of + the Navy, supported by Army and Air Force officers. There are two + possible outcomes: either it would be successful, or it would be + suppressed as a result of a Velasco crackdown.

+

On at least four recent occasions, U.S. officials or Americans known to + be close to them have been informed by Peruvians in Lima that a coup was + imminent. [3 lines not declassified]

+

In the event a coup is attempted and is successful, there will be many in + this country who will see this as another in the line of U.S. + interventions beginning with Bolivia in August 1971 and including Chile + in September 1973, and now Peru, which have gradually eliminated the + radical governments of South America. We will be asked immediately + whether we had any prior knowledge of the coup and what we did with this + information. If a government crackdown thwarts the coup attempt, as is more likely, it is quite + possible that American contacts with plotters may come to the surface + and we will be charged with intervention.

+

In either event, it strikes me that appropriate steps should be taken + very promptly to indicate to the Peruvian government that we have had + reports of plotting but assuring the GOP that we immediately disassociated ourselves from such + contacts and made clear we would do nothing to encourage any action of + this kind. Secondly, I think the Ambassador should be warned to keep a + very low profile and be willing to sacrifice reporting responsibilities + for maintenance of a posture of non-involvement.

+

I expressed these views to ARA (both to + Rogers and Shlaudeman) and to CIA. It is too late to take action now + before the 31st. If that date passes without incident, I may come back + to you to ask help in getting State action.

+
+ +
+ 302. Telegram 8696 From the Embassy in Argentina to the Department of + State +

Summary: Einaudi + reported on institutional and leadership divisions in the + Peruvian Government.

+

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + D740346–0753. Confidential. Repeated to Lima and + Santiago.

+ + + + + Buenos Aires, November 29, 1974, + 1234Z. + +

8696. Dept for S/P; ARA and INR. Subj: Comments on Internal Peruvian Politics.

+

1. Summary: This cable summarizes the impressions of S/P staff member Luigi Einaudi about the + internal situation in Peru today, drawing heavily on his long background + and perspective on Peruvian affairs and conversations he had recently in + Lima during the policy planning teams consultation with the GOP. His conclusion is essentially that + the military government has entered its most serious crisis since 1968, + that the crisis is likely to be prolonged into the new year, and that it + is unlikely that the “Peruvian Revolution” will be able to recover its + previous momentum, although the government will remain + military-dominated. End summary.

+

2. The immediate cause of Peru’s most serious crisis since 1968, a crisis + which is provoked by several simultaneous problems, is the pending retirement of senior + officers (Cavero, Arce, et al), who have acted as mediators between + military institutions and the military government. Until now, the + retirement of politically-important generals has been staggered, + allowing for the relatively easy absorption of command changes. The + coming retirement of a dozen senior generals forces a wholesale shakeup + that naturally causes increased tension among contending factions.

+

3. This internal struggle is aggravated by the difficult personal + positions of key members of the revolutionary inner circle, including + President Velasco, whose + successor may be determined by the outcome of command changes. Most + affected by current developments is General Graham, Chief of the Council + of Presidential Advisers (COAP), who virutally served as acting + President during the incapactitation of Velasco. Graham’s power, facilitated by the relative + weakness of both prior Prime Ministers (Montagne and Mercado), is now under pressure for + two reasons: First, Graham has little more than a year to go before + retirement, meaning that unless he accedes to the presidency directly or + is otherwise confirmed in his present position, he may well see his + ambitions dissolve entirely; and second, the incoming Prime Minister, + Army Chief of Staff Morales + Bermúdez, has a significant power base on his own, and is + unlikely to give Graham as much scope as he has been accustomed to + having in recent years.

+

4. The internal struggle within the military leadership thus involves + both institutional questions (the relationships between the military + institutions and the government) and personal rivalries (Graham vs + Morales). It is further + complicated by ideological tensions. Graham, like Velasco himself, and unlike some of + the other members of the government (e.g. Fernandez Maldonado), is not a + leftist ideologue. But he has a personal vision of a Peru radically + restructured by the revolution, and is committed to a posture of + continuing militance and military control. Morales, on the other hand, is somewhat more + conservative and may be expected to be inclined toward a posture of + revolutionary consolidation, perhaps even opening the way toward greater + civilian participation in the long term, because the measures which + formed the original revolutionary consensus have been largely + implemented, the line between these two positions is now quite sharply + drawn. On the basis of past experience, however, this dichotomy is more + theoretical than real, as most military officers remain quite + unideological.

+

5. The tensions within the government are further aggravated by the + crisis with the navy. While the navy has never participated as a + co-equal member in the government, the alienation of much of its officer + corps creates and reflects unease within the army. Under these + circumstances, active opposition from the navy could well set off + politcal changes in the + governing group in the direction of broadened military + representation.

+

6. Internal military tensions also take place against the backdrop of the + July press law, probably the greatest miscalculation of the government + since attaining power. The press law has done more than damage Peruvian + international standing. For the first time, it has converted latent + disaffection of important segments of the middle classes and a small but + influential sector of intellectuals into open antagonism toward the + government. The gravity of internal military tensions has prevented the + government from adjusting to this reaction as it had so often + successfully done in the past. Indeed OIGA’s opposition to the + government may have reflected some military opinion; its closing may be + the result of a power struggle within the military rather than an + attempt to control the press as such. If so, dissension within the + military may now for the first time be feeding external dissension, and + producing a dangerous multiplier effect.

+

7. Maneuvering quietly behind the scenes to take advantage of this + situation is Apra, the only remaining + semi-organized mass civilian organization. Repeating a long-time “carrot + and stick” approach that projects an image of willingness to collaborate + “within the revolution” while quietly stimulating acts to make the + military feel increasingly isolated, Apra’s leader Haya de la Torre hopes to strengthen the hand + of military leaders who may want to give Apra a role in the government as a means of gaining popular + support and consolidating the revolution. Such an “entente”, however, + seems relatively unlikely, as the government if already under fire for + surrendering its principles on foreign contracts. An accommodation with + the Apra is likely to be seen as a + last resort by current military leaders, as it would gain little new + military support and would smack of the revolution surrendering to + habits of the past. General Odira, after all was sacked precisely for + this reason in 1962.

+

8. It is difficult under these circumstances to evaluate the role of + international tension. Government fears of “counterrevolutionaries” are + undoubtedly genuine, and focus on the possibility of an incident with + Chile and on the always latent fear of the CIA. Fear of possible US intervention was clearly evident + during the planning consultations. Civilian Foreign Ministry officials + inquired at length about the “limits” to a Latin American country’s + freedom of action vis-à-vis the United States, seeking to define what + acts the US would consider “unacceptable” and implicitly therefore, + susceptible of triggering a “Chile-style” intervention. The explusion of + the Peace Corps should be understood partly as a precaution in this + context. It seems likely, however, that international pressures are also + being manipulated by the governing faction to strengthen its grip, and + to demonstrate domestically its continuing control of the situation.

+ +

9. The cumulative impact of these problems on the government and the + society has led to a dramatic loss of confidence over the past six + months. The closed and secretive nature of military politics and the + uncertain international economic environment compound the above problems + and feed Lima’s always hyperactive rumor mill to create an atmosphere of + suspicion generalized even among leading government officials outside + the immediate inner circle. General Grahams’ presentation to the + planning group was illustrative of one dangerous consequence, even among + the innermost circle. In relating the chief characteristics of the + Peruvian Revolution, the “rejection of violence” was amended for the + first time [garble] to read “the rejection of violence as a system.” + This conditional clause, which appeared underscored on the slide with + which Graham presented his lecture, can only be read as an explicit + warning that the government will pitilessly repress its opponents.

+

10. The future. Current tensions seem unlikely to abate until the + denouement of the retirement process with the installation of a new + governing team. By February a clearer assessment should be possible. Two + conclusions, can be drawn from the above analysis: First, that in the + absence of a civilian base and despite Apra’s hopes, the government will continue to be military + for the foreseeable future; second, though tension may abate after + February, conflict over personal power and the direction of the + revolution will continue and may seriously debilitate the governments + capability to inspire confidence and follow coherent policies, thereby + bringing the revolution, in fact if not in theory, more into line with a + pragmatic dictatorship of the nationalist center.

+ + Montllor + +
+ +
+ 303. Telegram 10425 From the Embassy in Peru to the Department of + State +

Summary: The + Embassy transmitted an analysis of the long-term implications of + Peru’s 1968 revolution.

+

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + D740359–0838. Secret.

+ + + + + Lima, December 11, 1974, 1111Z. + +

10425. Department Pass S/PC for Einaudi. Subject: The United States and + the Peruvian Revolution.

+ +

Summary: This message reviews the Peruvian revolution, American + interests, and problems affecting our relations. With the signature last + February of the agreement resolving outstanding investment disputes, we + expected that relations would improve markedly and they did to some + extent. However, at the same time, the Velasco Government has recently adopted a number of + radical measures. Faced with mounting domestic opposition and economic + problems it has become prone to blame the United States (the CIA and external conspiracies) for many of + its troubles any may be inclined to reduce further the United States + presence, official and unofficial, in this country. U.S.-Peruvian + relations appear designed to undergo continual strains as the Peruvian + Government broadens and deepens the Peruvian Revolution. We cannot now + say how new ministers taking office will influence the general course or + specific policies of the revolution. However, the basic thrust and + objectives of the revolution are in any event expected to be pursued by + the new ministerial team under Velasco’s direction. End summary

+

1. The Peruvian Revolution. In 1968, with popular support, President + Velasco overthrew his + predecessor (President Fernando Belaunde) and ushered in a series of + sweeping, nationalistic changes. Velasco set out to assert Peru’s economic and cultural + independence by drastically reducing traditional foreign (primarily + U.S.) influences in Peru while expanding ties with the communist + countires. He also undertook to restructure society, sharply curtailing + the Peruvian private sector and dismantling the parliamentary system + which existed in Peru. The revolution has declared that it favors state + and worker-controlled (social property) enterprises, and promised to + reorganize society on a “particapatory” basis suggestive of corporatism. + It has applied a far-reaching program to redistribute virturally all of + the large estates. The Peruvian reforms have been enacted by a military + government which shows no signs of relinquishing its control of Peru. In + the course of this year, the government has all but abolished an + independent press and purged the navy of ranking moderates. The + government has also become preoccupied with domestic and alleged foreign + opposition. The regime says it sees CIA’s hand behind many of its troubles, which tactic also is a + useful device to cow its domestic opponents. The worsening world + economic situation has exacerbated the government’s headaches as + inflationary pressures have compounded domestic discontent with over six + years of Velasco rule. The + President at 64, and with a history of serious circulatory disorders, + has grown more arbitrary and apparently is bent on pushing through more + radical measures during his remaining time. So far, Velasco’s opponents have not shown + themselves capable of challenging his rule, although recently there have + been a few scattered but inconclusive reports that the army—which has + the final say on how Peru is run—may be tiring of Velasco. Even so, the United States must continue to deal + with Velasco and face the + prospect that, advised as he is by a coterie of leftist military and + civilian advisors, he will continue to whittle away at our interests and + presence unless Prime Minister Designate Morales Bermúdez serves as a moderating influence. + Concern exists also about Peru’s revanchist intentions toward Chile. + Since the inception of the revolution, the Peruvian Armed Forces have + spent heavily on weapons and become the first South American Military + Forces to acquire Soviet arms. It seems highly illogical for Peru to + embark on a military adventure against Chile but GOP arms purchases and the unpredictable + behavior of President Velasco + are worrisome. Although improbable, a war by miscalculation cannot be + ruled out because of the increased Peruvian and Chilean military + presence in the border area, where an incident might get out of + control.

+

2. American interests

+

(A) The security field. The United States predominant role in hemispheric + security is being challenged by Peru which has assumed leadership in + questioning the validity of the Rio Pact, as it now stands, and has + purchased Soviet arms (up to now 200 or more Soviet tanks and a few + helicopters). Concern arises over what use Peru might put its Soviet + arms to, whether more Soviet weaponry might not be acquired, and over + Soviet intentions. Peru continues to express interest in American + weaponry, and will be receiving shortly 131 armored personnel carriers, + S2E antisubmarine surveillance aircraft, 24 A–37B jet trainers and other + U.S. matériel. In addition, Peru is anxious to purchase an additional + 280 armored carriers and appears seriously interested in F5E jet + fighters.

+

(B) The economic field. Peru is rich in minerals (copper, lead, zinc, and + possibly exportable quantities of petroleum). U.S. investment in the + extractive field totals well over a billion dollars; $50 to $100 million + is invested in other areas. In 1973, U.S. exports to Peru totalled $413 + million, which represents over 30 percent of Peru’s imports. Peru has + become a champion of raw material producers’ organizations, notably the + Copper Producers’ Organization (CIPEC), and has announced that it will + seek eventual full control of mining and carry out all petroleum + operating in Peru.

+

(C) The political field. Since 1968, Peru has espoused a “third world” + foreign policy, voting often but not always against us in the United + Nations, Organization of American States and other world forums. Peru + has a vice-presidency in the non-aligned conference organization and + plans to host NAC meeting in 1975. Peru + is also a vocal advocate of the 200-mile territorial sea position and + has, in the past, captured U.S. fishing boats. The last seizure took + place in early 1973. This country is a major producer of coca and we are + making a serious effort here to try to stop the illicit flow of + narcotics to the United States; Peru has been cooperative in this + regard.

+ +

3. Bilateral Questions

+

(A) The American presence. Nationalism verging on xenophobia is + motivating force in the Peruvian Revolution. To some extent, this means + a return to Peruvian sources of inspiration as the country exalts it’s + Inca heritage and downgrades Spanish and more recent American + influences. In practice, the Revolution has drawn on Yugoslav and Cuban + precepts among others, a mix served up by Peru’s leftist intelligentsia + with close ties to key military leaders. Peru seeks to diminish the role + of private enterprise and to limit individual liberties, substituting + for parliamentary democracy a system founded on organized “bases” such + as campesinos [trade?] workers. Peru rejects democracy as the U.S. + understands it as unsuited to the task of incorporating the + “zmarginados” (dispossessed) into the social order. The totality of U.S. + influences brought to bear on Peru may be decreed by GOP to be antithetical to these tenets of + the Peruvian “process”. In order to reduce U.S. influence, the + revolution seems to be seeking to limit our presence. The explusion of + the peace corps probably represents an effort to purge the country of + “alienating” foreign influences notwithstanding the + government-controlled press charge that the volunteers were spies. Next + to go could be missionary groups, such as the Mormons, and even USIS + binational centers. There may also be an attempt to close or limit the + activities of foreign news agencies, including AP and UPI. GOP attitudes toward aid are ambivalent, particularly in the + presidential palace and to much lesser extent in the technical + ministries. There was a report that President Velasco wanted to turn down a recent + $10 million rural development loan. In any event, the GOP accepted the loan and gave it + widespread, favorable publicity. Finally, there is Peru’s CIA syndrome. President Velasco and his supporters, surveying + admitted U.S. actions in Chile and the recent declarations of CIA Director Colby, and in need of a whipping boy, have turned on the + CIA—though without turning up any + evidence whatsoever of misbehavior. USG + protestations of innocence, both public and private, have so far fallen + largely on deaf ears.

+

(B) Military cooperation. The United States seeks to maintain close + military ties with Peru in order to limit communist country influence in + the field of defense and maintain a relationship with an institution + that has dominated Peru’s independent history. However, due to U.S. + Congressional restrictions and our own perceptions of what Peru needs or + does not need, our military relations have been uneven despite Peru’s + traditional preference for American training and hardware. In 1967, the + USG refused to sell supersonic jet + aircraft to Peru; the GOP bought + Mirages. In 1973, after FMS credits had + been turned off and on, due to fishing boat seizures, and due also to + unbeatable prices, Peru purchased Soviet tanks. Today, we are holding up + a Peruvian request to make a second purchase of armored personnel + carriers after they already bought 130 from the U.S. We are also hesitant to provide + Peru (and Latin America) with a variety of weapons such as TOW anti-tank missiles and helicopter + gunships. While we might invoke security grounds for not providing some + weapons systems, in other cases the GOP + can perceive that we are acting paternalistically as far as Peru is + concerned e.g. the lack of approval for more APC’s. In Peru’s eyes, our unwillingness to contribute to + the Peru/Chile arms imbalance constitutes interference in their security + affairs and disregards Peru’s other concerns about its borders with + Brazil and Ecuador. Furthermore, if Peru can afford to buy something, + why should the USG refuse to sell? The + Peruvians may otherwise again respond by shopping in the USSR or Europe. (The former’s political + motives and the latter’s credit terms also vex the Peruvians, who may + wind up irritated with all their arms suppliers.) Given U.S. policy of + treating Peru and Chile evenhandedly, we must simply bear with Peruvian + grievances. Dispite our ups and downs, they give few signs of wanting to + dispense with U.S. arms or become dependent on the Soviets. This might + not be the case if the United States refused to provide a modest + (current FMS levels) amount of military + credits to Peru because of a possible Congressional ban on military + credits for Chile. Such a policy might precipitate the further + radicalization of Peru. It would needlessly alienate those professional + military who see arms acquisition not in political terms but as a means + to fulfill their duty of defending the country.

+

(C) Peru/Chile rivalry. It is impossible to disassocate U.S. arms + assistance from Peru’s rivalry with Chile. Any military aid to Chile is resented in Peru. Delays + on Peruvian requests are interpreted as favoritism toward Chile. We must + live with accusations by either side that we are unfair. More worrisome + is the potential threat to hemispheric peace posed by Peruvian matériel + superiority over Chile, particularly if additional Soviet arms or, for + that matter, arms from any origin, further increase that superiority. + The Embassy does not believe that Peru, faced with internal division, + economic problems and Pinochet’s + fearsome (compared to Allende’s) + military regime, would go to war now. Unless Peruvian arms acquisitions + or the stationing of its forces point more clearly in the direction of + war, notwithstanding President Velasco’s penchant for dramatic action, at this juncture + the Embassy discounts the likelihood of warfare deliberately begun by + Peru. Should it occur, there is a possibility that Chile would seek + American mediation. Peru would probably prefer to have the problem aired + before its “third world” friends at the U.N. The Peru/Chile situation is + an endemic contingency which must be watched continually.

+

(D) Future nationalizations. The Revolution’s Inca ban, published in + July, states unequivocally Peru’s intention to control its mineral + wealth. This probably means the eventual nationalization of two large + American mining enterprises: Marcona (iron) and Southern Peru (copper). Miners’ Unions to the + left of the government are calling for their immediate expropriation. + Nevertheless, development needs for foreign capital temper the + government’s demands and it appears more likely that Peru will negotiate + Marcona’s amicable takeover while biding its time with Southern Peru. In + the petroleum field, service contracts with the U.S. oil companies will + probably be respected pending a hoped for but by no means assured + petroleum bonanza. Paer can be counted on to bargain hard with U.S. + mineral companies, while keeping an eye cocked to foreign credit markets + so as not to close external capital doors. The realization that the + communist countires cannot supplant western capital purveyors is a + further restraint on rash action.

+

(E) Foreign economic policy. A champion of raw material producers’ + organizations such as CIPEC (copper) and OPEC (petroleum), Peru subscribes to efforts to artifically + raise mineral resource prices. Each and every time the United States + threatens to try to hold down such prices, Peru will react as a “third + world” country and accuse us of engaging in econimic aggression. This + appears to be an area where Peru will be intransigent. In general terms, + it leads the chorus in denouncing multinational corporations and + supports the Latin hard line on the transfer of science and technology. + In its policy toward foreign investment, it resists any significant + liberalization of the Andean Pact’s decision 24 and applies these + regulations more stringently than other members of the Pact. It adheres + to the Calvo doctrine and reacts strongly against real or imangined + infringement of economic sovereignty. When local critics charged that + provisions for foreign arbitration in the Japanese oil pipeline contract + were in conflict with the constitution, the government charged them with + being unpatriotic and counterrevolutionary. It deported some, jailed + others, and closed publications where those criticisms first appeared. + When an editor pointed out that, as a result of the “Greene Agreement”, the GOP had tacitly exonerated IPC from + several hundred millions of dollars in tax claims, the GOP closed his magazine and brought suit + against him. The GOP’s reaction to the + payment of several million dollars to Exxon for IPC (under Greene Agreement) is likely to be + equally sharp.

+

(F) Foreign political policy. Peru’s stance on “third world” political + issues still shows a little flexibility in world forums. The tendency is + nonetheless to side with the Afro-Asian majority on topics such as + Vietnam, the Middle East and Africa (it votes against us), and to resist + joining that bloc on Korea and Cambodia (where high-level lobbying by + the U.S. and others has so far gained abstentions). Within the OAS, Peru has denounced traditional U.S. + primacy. It seeks to reincorporate Cuba into that body and rewrite the + Rio Pact, with a provision for sanctions for economic aggression. Peru + will probably favor a Latin American move to form an organization + without the U.S.

+ +

(G) Fisheries dispute. Peru has shown no willingness to compromise its + 200-mile territorial sea claim and appears convinced that its thesis + will triumph at the Law of the Sea Conference. Peru believes that time + is on its side and therefore is in no hurry for a world regime + regulating this issue. The result will be that U.S. tuna boats will risk + detention every fishing season, unless Peru looks the other way for + reasons of its own (e.g. GOP hopes for + U.S. military and economic assistance).

+

(H) Narcotics cooperation. The United States attaches high priority to + arresting the illicit flow of narcotics to the United States from Peru, + a major producer of coca. Elements of the military government are + concerned over coca traffic and have cooperated with us in this field + despite peasant resistance to production controls on a traditional, + easily grown cash crop.

+

(I) Civil air negotiations. Peru’s tough approach to international + negotiations is manifest in the current round of civil air talks. Peru’s + postion amounts to de facto rejection of the Bermuda principle and + insistence an “equality” as measured by equivalence of operations. It + regards traffic to and from Peru as an exploitable natural resource and + insists that if Braniff’s services are greater than Aeroperu’s, then + Braniff must pay for this “privilege”. Peru’s “take it or leave it” + approach is based apparently on the belief that Braniff has more to lose + as a result of curtailment of its profitable routes to Peru than does + the fledgling Aeroperu. Peru expects the United States to accede to + Peruvian demands. Peru appears to have been able to line up support for + its policies in countires such as Ecuador and Bolivia, which increases + pressures on Braniff.

+

(J) U.S. Bank Credits. Peru’s foreign borrowing requirments in 1975 will + be very high—perhaps as much as $11 billion—if it is to maintain + reasonable balance of payments equilibrium. Opinion in banking circles + is divided over whether banks will be willing to acquire this much more + Peruvian paper; certainly interest rates will be higher and probably + repayment periods will be shorter. Peru is likely to regard a real + credit squeeze as a retaliatory, capitalist action against the + revolution, and Peruvian rhetoric would contribute little to improve the + situation.

+

(K) U.S. attitudes toward the Peruvian states. Up to now, the generally + nonrepressive nature of the Peruvian revolution has resulted in few + outcries in the U.S. over civil liberties in Peru. With the takeover of + the Peruvian press, however, the American press has begun to + editorialize about the Peruvian “dictatorship”. If middle class + opposition and possibly terrorism grow more serious, the regime is + likely to adopt tougher measures against its opponents. Such measures + could stir up U.S. public opinion against Peru, as could any dramatic + increase in Soviet/Cuban arms and influence.

+ +

4. Comment: Going beyond innovative reforms, which included land + redistribution, the industrial community, education reform and a + determination to reduce the country’s dependence on outsiders (notably + ourselves), in 1974 the Peruvian revolution embarked on a more radical + course aimed at accelerating the creation of a new society. Peruvian + ideologues speak of a new man, one who works for society as a whole and + not entirely, or even largely, for individual profit. In order to reform + human nature, and revolution seeks to purge Peruvian society of foreign + influences. While private enterprise and western influence is chipped + away, local Marxists—with major support by Soviets, Cubans and other + communist countries—lend their support to the military governors, hoping + to inherit the new state. The reforming zeal of the Velasco regime is real but so is its + desire to hold on to power by debilitating rival power centers + (political parties, the business class, land-holders, foreign interests, + professional groups and unions) and incorporating the population into + “participatory” groups. The first years of the revolution went more or + less smoothly thanks to a reasonably united armed forces (Army, Navy, + Air Force); pragmatic economic management (under Prime + Minister-Designate Morales + Bermúdez); and high prices for Peruvian exports. There + was also widespread civilian disenchantment with the way Peru had been + run prior to 1968. More recently, the revolution has been marked by + arbitrary rule, a divided Armed Forces (although no significant cracks + have appeared in the army’s unity), economic dislocation and growing + opposition including limited terrorism (presumably from the fearful + middle class and disgruntled navy elements).

+

5. President Velasco apparently + has no inclination to slow the pace of the revolution and, stimulated by + a left wing advisers, appears intent on restructuring Peruvian society. + When things go wrong, as they are bound to in any revolution, Velasco blames foreign devils (the + CIA) for many of his troubles. This + bodes poorly for the U.S.-Peruvian relations. In addition, Velasco seems intent on reducing the + U.S. role (our presence and interests) before his time in power runs + out.

+

6. U.S. Peruvian relations will outlast Velasco. Pending change, we are engaged in a + damage-limiting operation, one which preserves our interests and our + self-respect despite a possible further reduction in our presence. The + revolution has not yet penetrated deeply into society. While many + reforms are probably irreversible, a new government might well seek to + reduce the class divisions and xenophobia stirred up by Velasco (and Sinamos). The Army, which + has the power to decide whether Velasco must go—unless illness overcomes him first—is + generally moderate (albeit nationalistic and reform-minded) and leans + toward U.S. technology and arms. It presumably does not want a + confrontation with the U.S., nor with Chile, that might isolate Peru + further in the region and risk defeat. The U.S. should sustain military + cooperation at present levels, + trying to limit Peru’s arms purchases by not raising present FMS credit levels and refusing to sell + weaponry to Peru which might give it too decisive a military edge over + Chile. (This message does not speculate about the possibility of further + Peruvian arms purchases of Soviet weaponry which could force US to + review our whole policy toward this country, depending on the nature of + a USSR-Peru deal.) We should also try + to stay in the aid game at the present + momentum without increasing bilateral assistance beyond CASP levels. While not antagonizing + Velasco, we should be + careful not to appease him. As a strong man, he would take such a stance + as a sign of weakness and probably interpret our posture as one of + inability or unwillingness to check his actions against American + interests. He might thereby be more tempted to damage those interests + (e.g. in the economic field or in his dealings with the communist + countries).

+

7. The question exists whether Peru might be ruled differently when + pragmatic General Morales + Bermúdez becomes Prime Minister on February 1. A + deliberate man, Morales Bermúdez + would probably act cautiously at first, testing Velasco’s strength and testing his own + popularity within the army. However, up to now, no one has been able to + stand in Velasco’s way and it is + likely that he will continue to set the basic course of the revolution + as long as he remains in power.

+ + + Dean + + +
+ +
+ 304. Transcript of the Secretary of State’s Staff Meeting +

Summary: Kissinger instructed Rogers and and Special + Assistant for Press Relations Anderson to protest a Peruvian official’s claim + that the CIA was involved in + unrest in Peru.

+

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Transcripts of Secretary of + State Kissinger’s Staff + Meetings, Lot 78D443, Box 6, Secretary’s Principals’ and + Regionals’ Staff Meetings. Secret. In telegram 1538 from + Caracas, February 7, the Embassy reported that Peruvian + Ambassador Barrios Llona + had stated the day before that the CIA was involved in “‘just about everything that + goes on in Latin America’” including recent unrest in Peru. + (Ibid., Central Foreign Policy File, D750046–0082) In telegram + 29385 to Lima, February 7, Rogers conveyed the Department’s concern to + Roca-Zela that + Peruvian officials had alleged CIA intervention in Peru, adding that the + allegations had no foundation. (Ibid., [no film number]) In + telegram 28577 to all American Republic diplomatic posts, + February 7, the Department reported Anderson’s statement that Velasco’s personal secretary + had publicly announced that APRA and left-wing groups were responsible for the + recent violence, and allegations of CIA involvement had no foundation. + (Ibid.)

+ + + + + Washington, February + 7, 1975. + +

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to Peru.]

+

Secretary Kissinger: That reminds + me—Bill, I want a very tough protest to the Peruvians on the CIA involvement.

+

Mr. Rogers: All right, sir. As soon as we can get Berckemeyer.

+

Secretary Kissinger: And I want + Anderson to say + something.

+

Mr. Rogers: Yes.

+

Secretary Kissinger: Just say + it’s a lie and they know it’s a lie.

+

Mr. Anderson: Yes, sir.

+

Secretary Kissinger: But you say + it publicly.

+

Mr. Anderson: Yes, sir.

+

Mr. Rogers: I’ll try to reach Berckemeyer.

+

Secretary Kissinger: We don’t + even have the capability any more! (Laughter.)

+

Mr. Rogers: That’s what I told him. We had done it when it fizzled out + too.

+

Secretary Kissinger: Tell him + it’s not women with empty pans.

+

What is that thing Letelier + accused me of? On that, I assured him the women that were marching in + Chile weren’t organized by it.

+

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to Peru.]

+
+ +
+ 305. Telegram 1172 From the Embassy in Peru to the Department of + State +

Summary: The + Embassy reported on anti-government activity and Velasco’s degree of control in + Peru.

+

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + D750050–0260. Confidential; Priority. Repeated to Bogotá, + Brasília, Buenos Aires, Caracas, La Paz, Quito, Santiago, USCINCSO, DIA, and JCS. On February 12, the Department forwarded the + telegram to the USUN. + (Telegram 32244 to USUN, + February 12; ibid., [no film number]) In telegram 1271 from + Lima, February 13, Dean + reported on a conversation with Brousset Escobar, who maintained that Velasco remained in control of + the military and that friction between him and Morales Bermúdez was minimal. + (Ibid., D750053–0463)

+ + + + + Lima, February 11, 1975, 2315Z. + +

1172. Subject: Further Commentary on Lima Disorders.

+

Summary. It appears that President Velasco’s hold on the country may have been damaged + somewhat by the February 5–6 disorders in Lima. The Peruvian Army itself + cannot yet have fully digested events and decided who must be blamed for + the mishandling of the Guardia civil strike and subsequent violence. It + is possible, however, to make certain observations on the police strike, + the civil disorder that followed, APRA’s situation, popular attitudes toward the government, the + call for a popular revolutionary movement and other matters being + debated by Peru’s Army as it decides what, if anything, must be done to + cope with anti-government feelings.

+

1. The police strike. The violence of February 5–6 should not have + occurred. To most close observers, Peruvian and foreign, it is difficult + to understand why the police did not receive a healthy raise or why the + army did not provide Lima with security as soon as the police went on + strike. Moreover, why did the cabinet (President Velasco) decide to use force against + the police? A possible explanation may be that Velasco believed that the GC, as a paramilitary force, had to be + dealt with harshly as an example to other elements of the armed forces + that might be tempted to waver. He may have believed that since the + GC is a relatively poor relation, + severity toward them would not be resented by those elements of the + three principal services that count. Apparently the army consciously + decided to teach the police a lesson in obedience and tragedy ensued. + Only hours before the army attacked the police, Bishop Bambaren of Lima, + who was mediating the strike, was reportedly assured that violence would + not take place. But it did, and, in the ensuing riots, according to + official figures 86 persons were killed, 162 injured and 1,012 civilians + arrested. La Prensa of February 11 states that + 520 policemen are under arrest; and incredibly, the GOP claims there were no military or + police deaths. The embassy estimates 200 deaths, including a number of policemen. The police + themselves are telling friends that between 100 and 200 police died; the + Embassy cannot vouch for the true figures.

+

2. The command structure. On February 5, after civil disorders broke out + in downtown Lima, a state of emergency was declared in Peru by the + cabinet. Power thereby passed from the interior ministry and other + civilian authorities to the regional military commanders; in + Lima-Callao’s case to General Rodriguez Figueroa. According to mission + sources, Rodriguez recieved his orders directly from Velasco, thus bypassing recently + installed war Minister Morales-Bermúdez. From February 5 until this date, + Rodriguez’ command has issued communiqués in its name on the curfew, + travel, amusements, hoarding and other matters. President Velasco rules Lima through Rodriguez. + Based on the limited information available to the Embassy, Prime + Minister Moreles-Bermudez has been largely if not entirely out of the + picture so far.

+

3. The civil disorders. Both the army and civilian political activists + were unprepared for the February 5 disorders. Assuming APRA was heavily involved, then it is + moderately surprising that trouble did not take place in Trujillo and + other areas of the “APRA North” part + of Peru. It appears that APRA simply + did not have time to react nationally to the fast-breaking events of Feb + 5. The demonstrations were a popular, largely youthful lightning + reaction against alleged massacres of policemen (the GOP still insists that none died) and + against a series of GOP targets: the + Military (the downtown military officers’ club); Sinamos (its newspaper, + Correo, and part of the building it occupies, + the civic center, were gutted by fire); and Expreso, the most militant, + pro-Moscow communist mouthpiece of the revolution (Expreso’s workers + repulsed a mob seeking to set fire to Expreso’s building). Later in the + day, the poor, no doubt incited by political activists, had a heyday + rampaging through supermarkets and downtown stores. Car burnings added + to the general confusion. Attacks on the Chancery and Sheraton appear to + have been incidental to the real objectives of the demonstrators, or at + least not the central objective of the large mass of the demonstrators. + Finally, after over three hours of mob rule, the army rolled into + downtown Lima in tanks and armored carriers, gradually restoring order + over the next two days.

+

4. Reprisals against APRA. The + government-influenced Peruvian press and Presidential Press Secretary + Zimmermann have accused + APRA publicly of being responsible + for the civil disorders. Names have not been mentioned although La + Cronica asserted on February 10 and 11 that the Aprista Dean of the Lima Bar Association, + Carlos Enrique Ferreyros, might be involved. The “ultra” left (Maoists) + and oligarchs have also been mentioned, as has CIA (see para 6). APRA + is, of course, a high priority + target for the leftist and communist civilian supporters of the GOP. In addition, APRA has always been fair game for the + army. In an interview with a Buenos Aires newspaper (La Opinion), APRA leader + Haya de la Torre, who will be celebrating his 80th birthday on Feb 22, + denied party complicity in the riots; he did not preclude that + individuals may not have acted on their own. Any serious reprisals + against APRA could provoke APRA’s move to clandestinity as well as + terrorism, an action which APRA has + resorted to in the past. A MilGov confrontation with APRA might also threaten Peru’s relations + with + Carlos + Andres Perez + ’ Venezuela, given what are + assumed to be very strong Accion Democratica-APRA ties (Embassy Caracas might be able to shed light on + current ad[ministration] attitude toward APRA).

+

5. APRA and Maoism. Anti-communist + APRA is not the only political + group which must be taken into account but also its unlikely Maoist + allies (Bandera Roja and Patria Roje). Together, APRA (apparently Armando Villanueva’s + faction probably with Haya’s quiet blessing) and the Maoists have made + the SUTEP teachers union the most militant and anti-government of the + large unions. Perhaps acting jointly, APRA’s agitations and Maoist student leaders provoked the + February 5–6 disturbances after the army incredibly had given them a + popular cause. APRA is believed also + in touch with Accion Popular (Belaunde’s Party), which has a following + in the middle class suburbs. So far, Peru’s civilian opposition to + Velasco has been divided. + Continued Velasco rule could + unite them.

+

6. The CIA. In Pavlovian fashion, regime + apologists, from Foreign Ministry Press Spokesman Faura in Washington to + Lima’s La Prensa and Expreso (and Peru’s + Ambassador to Venezuela, Luis + Barrios, Caracas 1538), suggested or flatly accused the + CIA of engineering with APRA the Feb 5 disorders. However, on Feb + 6, Presidential Press Secretary Zimmermann blamed APRA + and the ultra left. Since then, the government-owned press has zeroed in + on APRA, sometimes alleging that + APRA learned its tricks from the + CIA, but no longer accusing CIA of participation in the Feb 5 riots. + In fact, information available to the Embassy suggests that President + Velasco himself is persuaded + that the CIA was not involved. Both the + Department of State spokesman and the Ambassador in an Embassy + communiqué have so stated categorically. Leftist editorial writes remain + on the CIA wicket, nonetheless, and + continue making loose charges against the USG.

+

7. Popular attitudes. In Lima, the unpopularity of the Velasco government rose perceptibly + with the takeover of the press on July 28. Over six years of military + rule and recently increasing economic problems, particularly + unemployment and inflation, add to the dissatisfaction. The Army’s + “massacre” of policemen—demonstrating students shouted “Velasco assassin”—was what it took to + suddenly, almost spontaneously + set off Lima’s crowded downtown areas against the regime. APRA and Maoist student agitators took + advantage of the popular mood.

+

8. Pro-government civilians. Up to now, the military have refused + adamantly to allow any one civilian organization to represent the + revolution. The MilGov itself has wanted to create grass roots + organizations but in its own, largely ineffective way through Sinamos + (the social mobilization agency which was a major target of the + demonstrators). The disorders of February 5–6 gave the impetus to + leftist civilian desires for umbrella organizations grouping the + revolution’s militants. On February 9, the creation of a coordinating + committee grouping popular organizations (labor centrals, industrial + communities, peasants, women, youth, etc.) was announced. Communists, + Trotskyites, other socialists and opportunists were all in one bag. The + coordinating committee (Lima 1089) answered an undefined “call” from + President Velasco and set out to + defend the Revolution, assuming, among other tasks, responsibility for + food supplies. On February 10, the ministry of food announced that food + supply was its business; already, the coordinating committee is stepping + on government toes. Undaunted, a second group of civilians has just + announced the birth of the movement of the Peruvian Revolution (septel), + a group composed of marxist and leftist intellectuals and journalists, + headed ostensibly by Alberto Ruizz Eldredge. Sinamos and the Christian + Democrats are absent. The army’s reaction to these disparate bandwagons + is unknown. Worried about February 5–6 popular demonstrations, civilian + supporters of Velasco are + anxious to group themselves. Whether the army is ready to be crowded to + the left by “mass” civilian groupings, purporting to represent the + campesinos and workers, is unclear. Furthermore, Peru does not appear + ready for a system of Cuban style block captains and revolutionary + brigades. Unless a Velasco, + desperate for public support, wants to take a plunge to the left, it + seems unlikely that the military will wish to permit any massive sort of + movement that would polarize the country still held together in part by + a conviction that the military are not communists or even Marxists.

+

9. Where was Velasco? Throughout + last week, people asked, “where is Velasco?” There was no response, not a word from + Velasco. He turned power + over to his military commanders, kept in touch with them, and they + restored order in Lima (General Rodriguez) and kept the lid on in the + provinces. It is anyone’s guess why Velasco disappeared. Perhaps, he wanted to stay above + the fray. Perhaps, he wanted to prove that this is “military” rule and + not Velasco rule. However, the + mobs shouted insults and scribbled “death to Velasco” on walls. The President + should have spoken to his followers; he did not. More than ever, the + population felt ruled by a cold, impersonal force—the armed forces. + General Rodriguez’ communiqués were signed by his public relations chief, a Colonel Araujo. + Pundits said that Araujo became the best-known man in Peru. Velasco ruled from a distance, + possibly from the well-guarded military training center (CIMP), possibly + from his home at Chaclacayo or a beach house at Punta Hermosa. As + Velasco told reporters at + his January 29 press conference, “let them take the presidential palace. + I do not live there.”

+

10. The burden of responsibility. As noted in the summary paragraph, it + is too early to know who will be blamed for the riots. The army failed + to provide security for the first day and a half when Lima was stripped + of police protection. Somehow the army could not believe that civilian + elements in Lima might riot. The army failed to secure the city when it + assaulted the police barracks. Again it was insensitive to the popular + mood. But when the army rolled down the streets, order was imposed in a + matter of hours. The tanks were not challenged; the army commanded. Just + how long the army can go it alone is another matter. The police are + needed. Accounts remain to be settled. Peru’s generals must decide what + is wrong; the Navy and constabulary are to some extent disaffected; the + air force fence-sits. Whether the army is capable of renewing its + leadership and thereby give the country new rulers is a question the + Embassy cannot yet address. Velasco appears in charge, but we do not know what is + being said by his generals and middle-class officers behind his + back.

+

11. Comment. In the coming days, Mission will try to plumb the army for + insights into their views on the impact of recent events on the power + situation. Has Velasco been + weakened? Will he remain in power or has he forfeited that right? Would + War Minister Morales-Bermúdez be + called upon, or would a troop commander such as Rodriguez take over? The + non-violent image of the Peruvian revolution has certainly suffered; + following suppression of the riots longer-term repression could follow. + This had previously not been the pattern of the revolution. The country + must also face its economic problems with inflation sure to spark pay + raise demands and labor unrest. Bilaterally, our civil air dispute with + Peru might have serious repercussions on our relations. It might be the + kind of foreign problem that Velasco could cite to hold his generals together. + Alternatively, it could be the kind of problem that they could cite to + enforce change. Again, the Embassy does not know what is going on in + army councils. We shall try to learn.

+ + + Dean + + +
+ +
+ 306. Telegram 2060 From the Embassy in Peru to the Department of + State +

Summary: + Rogers and Morales Bermúdez discussed + bilateral issues.

+

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + D750089–0247. Confidential. The Peruvian national airline + (Aeroperú) and Braniff Airlines had been negotiating the + allocation of air routes which would serve as the basis of an + agreement between U.S. and Peruvian aeronautical authorities. + (Telegram 54642 to Lima, March 11; ibid., [no film number]) On + May 31, 1974, the Embassy of Peru requested Department approval + for the sale of 280 APCs. (Memo + from King to Winship, + December 16, 1975; ibid., P760005–1330) Due to crises in + Southeast Asia and the Middle East, Kissinger’s visit was postponed until + 1976.

+ + + + + Lima, March + 13, 1975, 2010Z. + +

2060. Subj: Assistant Secretary Rogers’ Meeting with Prime Minister Morales Bermúdez. Dept Please Pass to + Secretary from Assistant Secretary Rogers.

+

1. Prime Minister Morales + Bermúdez received Secretary Rogers for a half-hour visit this morning (March 13) + following which PriMin was to proceed immediately to nearby Chaclacayo + to participate in President Velasco’s meeting with UN SecGen Waldheim.

+

2. In his usual well-organized manner Morales Bermúdez proceeded through an agenda covering + several topics. He first restated comments which he said he had made + yesterday to SecGen Waldheim to + effect developed countries “must do more” to help Peru and other LDC’s meet the current world problems of + inflation and recession. He said Peru’s raw materials prices have + declined, mentioning copper prices particularly, and adding that Chile + suffers even more on this account, while prices continue to rise for + Peru’s imports of manufacturers, intermediate goods, and foodstuffs. He + briefly discussed Peru’s twin efforts to achieve basic structural + reforms and economic development. He asked that US do more than in the + past to help Peru. He said, as an example, Peru is looking for buyers + for its excellent-quality cotton. But he stressed that Peru’s main + problem now is to obtain imports at moderate prices. He later said + GOP hopes for additional CCC credits to stretch out its repayment + schedules for needed commodities.

+

3. Morales Bermúdez said he was + sure FonMin de la Flor had discussed TRA issues, and Secretary Rogers assured him this had been the case. PriMin said + that TRA impact will be greater + elsewhere in LA than in Peru, but that + here, too, USG—both by seeking + modifications in TRA and in trade + negotiations—could do more to be of assistance to Peru and LDC’s generally. Secretary Rogers discussed our interest in + expanded world trade, and importance of the authority provided in TRA to executive branch to participate in + the trade negotiations, which could greatly expand trade opportunities for the LDC’s. He assured Morales Bermúdez that USG will take LA views and interests fully into account in its MTN deliberations.

+

4. Morales Bermúdez then turned + to bilateral issues, beginning with Braniff-Aeroperu negotiations. He + said he hoped negotiations can be kept at airline-to-airline level, + without involving the two governments in confrontation as in the earlier + expropriation cases. He considers Braniff-Aeroperu dispute to be a + lesser problem (de segundo plano) in our relations, and recommended that + the two airlines be encouraged to keep talking, looking toward an + equitable solution of their respective claims. Ambassador replied that + USG likewise hopes to avoid a + confrontation over the civil air issue, and would welcome further + airline-to-airline negotiations to help avert such a confrontation. He + pointed out that governments are necessarily involved in some respects, + since air routes constitute a government’s rights rather than an + airline’s rights, and the proposed addition of New York as an Aeroperu + access point involves a USG and not + merely a Braniff decision. Ambassador said USG hopes to avoid placing restrictions on Aeroperu + operations to US, but negotiations have not yet been successful and + restrictions may have to be imposed. He emphasized that the two airlines + have not even been in contact recently. He and Morales Bermúdez then agreed to ask + respective airline representatives to get together promptly to resume + talks.

+

5. Morales Bermúdez then referred + to the long-pending request for additional 280 APC’s, expressing GOP hope + that they could be funded under the army portion of the $15 million + FMS program. He said GOP is in effect paying cash for the + initial APC purchase, but added that if + USG does not choose to approve the + additional request then GOP wants to be + informed accordingly so that the army’s portion of the $15 million can + be applied to the initial APC purchase + or used for alternative purchases. Ambassador called attention to + arrival in Peru of some 90 APC’s from + initial purchase; Morales + Bermúdez acknowledged this and repeated his request re + army’s portion of new FMS package. + PriMin then stressed that GOP has no + aggressive intentions against any of its neighbors, saying emphatically + that GOP does not even have any + contingency plans for offensive actions (but rather only defensive + plans). He said GOP needs more APC-type vehicles to defend its own large + territory and its frontiers with five neighbors. He said the APC’s are needed to make up for the + virtual total absence of such vehicles in the past.

+

6. Secretary Rogers said he + appreciated receiving these comments. They would be most useful in the + planning for a visit by the Secretary. He mentioned that everything was + contingent on developments in the Middle East but that if all went well + there and a trip to Latin America could then be finally arranged it + would be most useful for relations between the two countries. Morales Bermúdez said he concurred + fully and would be pleased to take part in the program to be arranged + for the Secretary’s visit.

+ + + Dean + + +
+ +
+ 307. Memorandum Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency +

Summary: The CIA discussed the succession issue + in Peru and identified Morales + Bermúdez as the most probable candidate to + succeed Velasco.

+

Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of Support Services + (DI), Job 79T00865A: Staff Notes and Memos (1975), Box 25, + Folder 23, Prospects for Change in Peru’s Leadership, No. + 0543/75. Secret; No Foreign Dissem; Controlled Dissem. [drafting information not + declassified] In telegram 978 from Lima, February 5, + the Embassy reported on “popular riots” in Lima. (National + Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, [no film number]) + In telegram 1707 from Lima, March 2, the Embassy reported that + Velasco was ill, + “perhaps from a brain hemorrhage or aneurism.” (Ibid., + D750073–0181) In telegram 1795 from Lima, March 4, the Embassy + reported that Velasco + suffered a mild attack, and that Morales Bermdez would assume greater powers. + (Ibid., D750076–0104)

+ + + + + Washington, March 25, + 1975. + + + SUBJECT + Prospects for Change in Peru’s Leadership + +

Recent events, including the violence in Lima on February 5 and President + Velasco’s stroke on February + 28, are creating an atmosphere of uncertainty and restlessness within + the Peruvian military. We have received reports of renewed plotting and + dissatisfaction among top officers and there apparently is concern at + the cabinet level that important government programs are receiving + insufficient attention. In this environment, we are likely to see + increased pressure for Velasco + to begin transferring his presidential duties to a successor. There are + also likely to be new government initiatives designed to build civilian + support for the regime. We do not expect any decisive resolutions of + these problems very soon, but the uncertainties surrounding the + President’s health, coupled with his apparent unwillingness to leave + office and continued disagreements over government reforms, will cause + serious tensions over the next several months.

+

+ + Velasco’s Position +

+

[4 lines not declassified] Velasco reportedly is resuming his + duties, but if he is incapacitated again, even for a short time, we + expect military leaders to + demand that he step down and be succeeded by another army officer, most + likely Prime Minister Morales + Bermudez. If Velasco remains in office but is unable to continue his + decisive leadership, pressure for a change is likely to become acute, + possibly irresistible. In any event, Velasco’s reported desire to die in office rather than + step down is likely to increase the sense of unrest in the officer + corps, where a premium is placed on firm leadership and certainty of + command. Many officers already might prefer to see Velasco step down gracefully rather + than have the country continue under an ailing president.

+

+ Velasco has been the country’s + only president since the armed forces overthrew the previous civilian + government in October 1968. During these years, he has been a strong + leader and has set the tone for all major foreign and domestic policies. + He has avoided designating a successor, however, or establishing precise + guidelines for choosing one.The + Revolutionary Statute states only that a military officer will be + appointed president by unanimous vote of the Revolutionary Junta, + which is composed of the three heads of the armed services. The + President is not a member of the Junta, which, on paper, is the + highest decision-making entity in the government. [Footnote in the + source text.] This reflects Velasco’s feeling that he personally must lead the + revolution, and probably a concern that any officer who had sufficient + military backing would not carry through radical domestic programs with + the same zeal he has exhibited.

+

During Velasco’s serious illness + in 1973, there was a great deal of maneuvering among top generals when + it appeared that the President would die or be permanently + incapacitiated. Following his recovery, however, the succession issue + has surfaced only intermittently. While there reportedly has been some + plotting connected with Velasco’s most recent stroke, it appears to be rather + low-key compared to that of two years ago. This reflects, of course, the + fact that Velasco recovered much + more rapidly this time, but also seems to reflect a more sober and + broader view of the situation within the military, possibly the result + of recent anti-government activity. The low level of plotting in a sense + reflects the attitude of Prime Minister Morales Bermudez, who unlike his predecessor is cautious + and less inclined to participate in divisive plotting.

+

Although there are important pressures on military leaders to come to + grips with the succession issue, many generals still seem to be holding + back. This reflects an understandable desire to postpone consideration + of a successor president while the incumbent remains in office and + probably still commands widespread respect, if not active support. In + addition, President Velasco’s + oft-demonstrated ability to parlay intraservice disagreements into + political advantage has worked to prevent a serious move to displace him + or designate a successor.

+ +

Despite these factors, it is likely that there will be continuous + pressure against Velasco’s + remaining in power. The President can be expected to resist and some of + the more radical officers and his long-time associates will probably + support him. Velasco simply does + not appear in as strong a position as in the past, however, not only + because of his medical problems, but because many officers may blame him + for much of the increasingly vocal civilian dissent that culminated in + the riots on February 5. In the past year, for instance, Velasco has undertaken a number of + activities that have sparked civilian dissent and disapproval by other + officers. These include the takeover of all national newspapers last + summer, the closure of two popular weeklies, the outlawing of a major + civilian party, the forced resignation of a navy minister and a number + of subordinate admirals, and the start + of a sweeping socio-economic reform program that has alarmed the middle + class. Then, in February, the government’s overreaction to a police + strike caused widespread violent demonstrations in Lima for the first + time since the military took power.

+

+ Morales Bermudez +

+

During this period, Prime Minister Morales + Bermúdez has emerged as the strongest candidate to + succeed Velasco, for the + following reasons:

+

—He has a reputation for competence and integrity.

+

—His relatively moderate political views appeal to many other officers in + all three services.

+

—He apparently has not been involved in petty plotting during his tenure + as a top government-military figure.

+

—He is the most likely choice to allay the military’s concern for + maintaining its unity and stable leadership.

+

+ Morales Bermudez seems to be + aware of his strength and for the time being apparently has decided to + use his authority to convince Velasco and other ministers that the time has come for + the President to begin delegating his duties. At this point, a sudden + move to oust Velasco by + Morales Bermúdez is not + likely.

+

However it occurs, Morales + Bermudez’ probable elevation to the presidency is not + likely to be trouble-free. Velasco apparently doubts that the Prime Minister has + sufficient “revolutionary” zeal and may still support a more radical + officer such as General Graham Hurtado. Graham is a long-time + presidential confidant and head of the influential Presidential Advisory + Council, but his support within the army does not appear strong, and his + backing in the more conservative navy and air force probably is minimal. + There are probably one or two other radical generals who harbor + presidential ambitions but none, including Graham, commands the + widespread support that Morales + Bermúdez apparently enjoys. Velasco probably still commands sufficient support and respect among cabinet-level + generals that he could delay Morales + Bermudez’ assumption of presidential duties, but time no + longer appears to be on Velasco’s side.

+

As president, Morales Bermúdez + would probably concentrate on consolidating rather than expanding + domestic socio-economic reforms. Foreign policy, on the other hand, + would remain essentially the same regardless of which general serves as + president. We would expect Lima to follow its strongly nationalistic, + Third World oriented policy, that has been tempered by economic realism + in dealing with foreign investment and assistance. In large part, this + is the result of Morales + Bermudez’ policies as economy minister, a post in which + he served from 1969 to 1973. As President, Morales Bermúdez therefore could be expected to + emphasize these concerns and might be inclined to use a more cooperative + approach in relations with Washington.

+

During its more than six years in power, the military has been unable to + win the active support of the majority of civilians, despite a sincere + belief that it is working in their behalf. This lack of support is based + on a number of factors, the greatest being, a general apathy toward + national political and economic problems; an inherent distaste for + authoritarian military rule; and continued strong allegiance to + traditional civilian parties that are allowed no meaningful voice in the + government. Adding to this is the military’s apparent paternalistic + attitude that it knows what is best for the people, who cannot be + trusted with the future of the country. Despite the creation of a large + number of civilian-staffed bureaucracies, including one to mobilize + popular support, the military government remains largely isolated from + the civilian population.

+

In order to build civilian support and to guard against further violent + unrest, President Velasco—immediately prior to his recent stroke—reportedly + began the formation of a pro-government political organization.The government has been careful to avoid + reference to a pro-government political “party,” since military + leaders maintain a strong enmity toward traditional political + parties, which they feel are largely responsible for Peru’s level of + socio-economic underdevelopment. [Footnote in the source + text.] Although the plan envisages a long-range program of + citizen education and organization, it probably has high priority as a + result of the disorders on February 5. While the President’s illness and + convalescence may delay implementation of specific aspects of this + program, there is probably sufficient support within the government to + ensure that it will go ahead.

+

There already exist, however, serious disagreements over the scope and + control of such an organization. For example, while Morales Bermúdez is reportedly opposed + to extensive military involvement in politics, other cabinet ministers see this as a + means of boosting their own prestige and power in the government.

+

A key element affecting the success of this venture is the relationship + between the pro-government organization and traditional political + parties. Given the gulf between the military and civilian sectors, we do + not expect that any political movement run by the military in + competition with other parties—which still command wide followings—will + achieve its goal in the foreseeable future. The only party of any + national significance that strongly supports the military is the + pro-Soviet Communist Party, and there are serious limitations on its + ability to drum up support for a government party.

+

Given Morales Bermudez’ current + strong position in the government, and especially as he assumes more + important leadership responsibilities, we may witness a gradual increase + in government-civilian intercourse through the traditional political + parties, particularly the American Popular Revolutionary Alliance + (APRA). APRA is the country’s most popular party and commands + strong support among labor and agricultural groups. While it has been + anathema to the military since an outburst of violence in the 1930s, the + military leadership may be maturing to the point where it will realize + that accommodation is necessary to the continuation of its reform + programs. This process is more likely to be speeded up under Morales Bermúdez than under the + command of a more radical general.

+

+ Conclusion +

+

In sum, we expect to see increased pressure on Velasco to step down or at least give + up some of his responsibilities. Velasco can be expected to resist, but time is against + him; if he stays on tensions within the military will increase and + gradually erode his position. If Velasco suffers another stroke or other illness that + incapacitates him even temporarily, we feel that he will probably not be + allowed to resume the presidency.

+ +
+ +
+ 308. Telegram 4291 From the Embassy in Peru to the Department of + State +

Summary: + De la Flor and + Dean discussed + regional and bilateral issues, including recent U.S. protests to + the Peruvian Government and the expropriation of Gulf Oil.

+

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + D750182–0564. Confidential; Priority. In telegram 3973 from + Lima, May 14, the Embassy reported that Peru perhaps + expropriated Gulf Oil in order to strengthen its credentials in + the region and the Third World, and that the expropriation could + be adopted by other countries as a precedent. (Ibid., + D750169–0967) In telegram 4294 from Lima, May 23, the Embassy + reported on the portion of the Dean-de la Flor conversation relating to civil + aviation issues. (Ibid., D750182–0601)

+ + + + + Lima, May + 23, 1975, 2130Z. + +

4291. Subj: Ambassador Meets With Foreign Minister.

+

1. Foreign Minister de la Flor called Ambassador to Ministry on May 22 + for one and a half hour conversation. While principal topic discussed + was civil air problem (septel), meeting touched on several other aspects + of U.S./Peruvian relations.

+

2. Two U.S. protests to GOP:

+

A. Minister referred to two recent protests U.S. has made to GOP, the first on GOP effort to hold preliminary rump session without U.S. + participation prior to OASGA, and the + second over GOP’s fulsome + congratulations to Viet Cong for their victory over “imperialism.” Both + cases, he said, were instances of overreaction by a big, developed + country to plausible moves by a small, less developed country. Nothing + sinister should have been read into Peru’s effort to call meeting + preliminary to OASGA; purpose was to + get Latins to talk matters over among themselves (“you know how Latins + are—we like to talk.”), and to undertake some advance preparation for + session so that subsequent formal meetings would be more businesslike + and productive. Unfortunately, U.S. officials do not understand Latin + mentality (sic) and so misinterpreted Peru’s efforts.

+

B. Turning to U.S. protest over GOP’s + Viet Cong recognition, de la Flor said that Acting Director General de + la Puente had telephoned him that same night (May 9) to tell him of + Ambassador’s démarche. Minister said protest caught him completely by + surprise, since he had been with Secretary Kissinger both that day and the day before, and the + Secretary had made no mention of it. De + la Flor granted that subject was raised during his + meeting with Secretary the next day. Minister went on to defend GOP action, noting that it is consistent + with GOP’s third world policy and does + not mean that GOP shares communist + ideology. Noting the timing of the two U.S. protests, de la Flor + commented that démarche on Viet Cong recognition was probably result of U.S. unhappiness over Peru’s + preliminary OAS meeting and would not + otherwise have been made. Ambassador said this not the case and drew + Minister’s attention to our similar protest to India. U.S. could be + expected to make similar protest in all cases in which other countries + glorify victory of communism over nations we have befriended.

+

3. Gulf expropriation: de la Flor said he had been disturbed by questions + asked him in Washington as to whether Gulf expropriation was in response + to two U.S. protests. This of course not the case. Expropriation was + separate development in which, for quite distinct reasons, Peru felt it + must act as it did. Minister said he had also been asked why there had + been no prior consultation with U.S. This, he said, was because decision + had been made in Cabinet meeting and there had been no time to consult. + (Note: here Minister contradicted Acting Secretary General de la Puente, + who had earlier told Ambassador that decision to expropriate was taken + shortly after May 2 revelation of Gulf bribery actions.) Minister then + complained that U.S. press in typical fashion had treated expropriation + as confiscation; this is not the case and Peru intends make full + compensation. De la Flor + commented he was used to poor treatment at hands of U.S. press, but this + to be expected considering fact that he dealt with difficult issues such + as Cuba.

+

4. Peruvian press treatment of U.S.: Ambassador said that one element + contributing to mood de la Flor found in Washington is that USG and business community have become + sensitized by constant barrage of anti-U.S. statements on part of + Peruvian press and some GOP officials. + De la Flor responded that + U.S. should not be so thin-skinned. After all, Press is made up of many + different elements ranging all the way to Trotskyites, and these + elements state their opinions freely, sometimes to the offense of other + countries. U.S. is not alone. In one ten-day period, de la Flor + recalled, he had received protests from the U.S., the USSR, Argentina, Chile and Yugoslavia. + Ambassador responded that one big difference is that attacks on U.S. are + constant and unending. De la + Flor demurred, but was silent when Ambassador asked him + if he could cite one recent article favorable toward United States.

+

5. U.S./Peruvian relations: Ambassador said that as practical matter Peru + should seek to cool rhetoric in Press and by public officials while two + countries seek to resolve issues between them. There are aftter all many + areas of cooperation. Here Ambassador mentioned recent $20-million + FMS credit, hot ship destroyer + transfer, sale of A–37B’s and APC’s, + forthcoming U.S. attitude at recent Paris meeting of World Bank + consultative group, U.S. aid program, + etc. De la Flor listened + careflly but noted that U.S. has not responded to Peru’s request to buy + more APC’s. Ambassador pointed out that + request not rejected but remains under study, and if approved Peru now + had credits with which to buy them. De la + Flor commented that this is all very well, but that U.S. + also gives military aid, and + perhaps more of it, to Chile. Ambassador said the reverse was true—Peru + is receiving aid, but Chile will not. Minister responded, “ah, but there + are ways.”

+

6. Tension with Chile: Ambassador expressed mild surprise at de la Flor’s + concern over arms purchases by Chile. He said it was his impression that + Peru had made considerable progress in effort to defuse tension with + Chile. Here Ambassador referred to President Velasco’s disarmament initiative, + Ayacucho declaration, subsequent disarmament meetings, gestures of + friendship on Peruvian/Chilean border, etc. These efforts appear to have + achieved good results, and Peru is to be congratulated. De la Flor seemed pleased and + mollified.

+

7. Visit to U.S. of Commerce Minister Arias: Ambassador asked de la Flor + about Arias visit to Washington. Minister replied that Arias had told + him he “had very good visit” and had remarked favorably on calls at + Agriculture and Commerce. Ambassador asked why Arias had cancelled + scheduled appointments at State and Treasury as well as New York visit. + De la Flor said he was + under impression Arias had completed Washington visit; when Ambassador + said this not in fact the case, de la Flor said he “didn’t know about + that”, but that Arias was exhausted by his long European trip and + therefore not up to visiting New York. (Comment: this lame excuse was + the only one de la Flor had for Arias’ failure to complete his program. + We are puzzled by Arias’ action and cannot yet account for it.)

+ + + Dean + + +
+ +
+ 309. Telegram 4920 From the Embassy in Peru to the Department of + State +

Summary: + Dean reported on + speculation that if Velasco remained healthy, there would be a + gradual transfer of power from Velasco to Morales + Bermúdez.

+

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + D750213–0528. Confidential. Repeated to La Paz, Quito, Santiago, + and USCINCSIO.

+ + + + + Lima, June + 18, 1975, 2230Z. + +

4920. Subject: Shifting Power in Peru.

+

Summary. Primarily because of doubt concerning the health of President + Velasco, there has been + increasing speculation about a shift of power from President Velasco to Prime Minister Morales Bermudez. Although rumors of + an abrupt shift, Palace coup or at least semi-forced retirement of President Velasco exist, the Embassy considers + it more likely (barring rapid deterioration of Velasco’s health) that the transfer of + power will be a gradual process with a flow of power from President to + Prime Minister. End summary.

+

1. A combination of events since the February assumption of the Prime + Ministership by General Morales + Bermúdez has led to increasing speculation that a shift + of power from President Velasco + to Prime Minister Morales + Bermúdez is taking place. The February riots, continued + uncertainty about the physical and mental condition of President + Velasco, dimming economic + prospects, especially in the petroleum area, and difficult current + economic and labor situation make it necessary for the GOP to exert more forceful leadership than + President Velasco is believed + able to offer, and has led to speculation that Prime Minister Morales Bermúdez is stepping into the + breach.

+

2. Prime Minister Morales + Bermúdez has been careful to defer to President Velasco and has engaged in no + usurpation of presidential prerogatives. Yet the fact that he, with the + assistance of selected ministers, has been carrying out visible press + conference-type “dialogues with the people” and reports that he set up + an “economic policy council” composed of several ministers, which + according to some has diminished the importance of the presidential + advisory council (COAP), tend to enhance the position of Morales Bermúdez at Velasco’s expense. The Embassy also + understands that Morales + Bermúdez is beginning to act on questions of personnel or + patronage formerly reserved for Velasco.

+

3. Recent statements by Morales + Bermúdez on the need to eliminate subsidies, which up to + now have been a pillar of “Velasquista” policy, and rumors that new + economic austerity measures possibly including devaluation are imminent, + also serve to increase speculation on a possible flow of power from + President Velasco to Prime + Minister Morales Bermudez.

+

4. The condition of President Velasco’s health is the key to any sudden or dramatic + power transfer. Were he in good health, there is no question but that he + would currently be beyond challenge, either direct or indirect. But + President Velasco’s ill health + has forced him to withdraw from his more active pace of 1974. His + presence at the June 7 patriotic ceremonies was his first public + appearance in four months. It has also been months since he held one of + his famous free-wheeling press conferences. That he works a full day is + doubtful. Indeed, it is generally said that his participation in Council + of Ministers meetings, at least during March and April, was minimal. In + spite of appearing to be in relatively good health on June 7 (Velasco in fact walked from his car to + the reviewing stand), rumors about his mental and physical condition + persist.

+ +

5. It is natural in Peru that any discussion of power shifts and erosion + of presidential influence will include rumors of coup plots and a + showdown between principals. Along with and relating to continuing + rumors of impending economic decisions and possible devaluation (the + latter a measure Velasco has + consistently and adamantly opposed) some guesses are being made that + Morales Bermúdez will + actually assume the presidency, perhaps before the July 28 National + Celebrations. Although it is possible that Velasco could retire in glory or be retired under less + than voluntary conditions, the Embassy considers that should Velasco’s health remain stable the + transfer of power will be a gradual process. There are several reasons + for this.

+

6. First, Velasco’s image, + hammered into the Peruvian consciousness daily by the media, as father + of the revolution, makes him almost unchallengeable. It would + ill-behoove any army general to depose Velasco and expose himself to possible military + dissension and civilian reaction. Coups can be contagious.

+

7. Secondly, such action may be unnecessary if Velasco, counselled by family and + doctors, withdraws voluntarily from much of day-to-day decision-making. + This to some extent is happening and, insofar as Velasco’s participation in the + decision-making process is erratic or sporadic, his declining ability + automatically contributes to the slow accretion of power by Morales Bermudez. Even though such + power must be exercised cautiously to avoid Velasco reaction. The Prime Minister is said to now have + the solid support of key generals who expect him to ensure that + necessary governmental decisions are taken. Yet Velasco still seems to reserve for + himself certain controversial decisions—the Gulf expropriation is a + probable example—and he could reassert himself at any time on other key + issues. Thus, at this stage there seems to be unstable balance in the + power equation. If it is true that Morales + Bermúdez can not engage in frontal challenge to Velasco, neither can Velasco with impunity remove Morales Bermudez.

+

8. At some time, perhaps soon, the point may be reached where Velasco will be overruled on some + policy issue by Prime Minister Morales + Bermúdez and the Council of Ministers. That event would, + of course, be evidence that a major transfer of power had taken place. + From that point on the flow of power from Velasco to Morales + Bermúdez would be much more rapid. The composition of + expected economic austerity measures could signal such a shift. It + should be noted that Morales + Bermúdez is circumscribed as part of the revolutionary + team of generals and even with Velasco out of the picture, he would not necessarily, or + at least initially, have the authority Velasco exercised. Also future power struggle between + moderate and more radical generals cannot be ruled out and there is no + assurance that Morales Bermúdez + would come out on top in such a case.

+ +

9. Rather than a Palace coup, the most likely denouement of the gradual + de facto transfer of decision-making which appears to be taking place + would be co-existence of Morales + Bermúdez and Velasco until the retirement or death of the latter. The + power of Prime Minister acting in council would be greatly enhanced on a + de facto basis, at least temporarily, while President Velasco’s role becomes more + ceremonial—as the Revolution’s father figure—who perhaps retains a veto + power over major decisions.

+

10. Such a scenario avoids open confrontation and the threat that would + portend for GOP stability. Velasco remains in his present + position but progressively less involved in important deliberations. No + one rules out, of course the possibility that Velasco might from time to time assert + his will and determine key decisions, but the likelihood is that with + the passage of time he will be less able to carry the day as power + passes to Morales Bermúdez and + the other “revolutionary” generals.

+ + + Dean + + +
+ +
+ 310. Telegram 6062 From the Embassy in Peru to the Department of + State +

Summary: + Dean reported that + he had impressed upon García + Bedoya the importance of compensation for the + expropriation of the Marcona company’s holdings in Peru.

+

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + D750263–0170. Limited Official Use; Immediate. On July 23, + Richter informed Dean of + the impending expropriation. On July 24, Dean informed Garcia Bedoya of + the importance of compensation for Marcona. Dean informed the Department + he would write a letter to Richter regarding compensation. + (Telegram 5979 from Lima, July 24; ibid., D750255–0990) Although + there is no indication Dean discussed the matter with Morales Bermúdez, the + Ambassador left a copy of his letter to Richter with Morales + Bermdez’s principal aide, and the aide informed Dean that he would raise the + matter with Morales + Bermúdez. (Telegram 6101 from Lima, July 31; + ibid., D750264–1011) On August 4, Dean discussed the expropriation with de la + Flor. Dean reported that + de la Flor “is now fully aware of the dire implications of the + Marcona problem and seems to be seized with the need to begin + serious negotiations to resolve it.” (Telegram 6244 from Lima, + August 5; ibid., D750269–0205)

+ + + + + Lima, July + 30, 1975, 1937Z. + +

6062. Subj: Marcona Expropriation—Ambassador Speaks with Foreign Ministry + Officials.

+

1. During National Day Ceremonies, Ambassador had opportunity to discuss + Marcona expropriation with Foreign Ministry Secretary General Garcia + Bedoya and make brief mention of problem to Foreign Minister de la Flor + at ceremonial function. Ambassador asked for appointment to discuss problem and all its + implications and Secretary General agreed to meeting today, July 30 + (time to be determined). Although Foreign Minister is unavailable today + (he is in San Jose) he agreed to meeting tomorrow.

+

2. During conversation with Garcia Bedoya, Ambassador pointed out urgency + of establishing orderly process for determination of compensation. He + referred to letter he had written to then Acting Foreign Minister + Richter (Lima 5979) and danger to continued good and improving relations + between two countries as result of expropriation without compensation, + citing intense Washington interest in this problem and semi-automatic + nature of certain USG legislative and + administrative requirements. Ambassador also referred to Mines Minister + Fernandez Maldonado’s speech (Lima 6043) at Marcona, which requires + clarification by the GOP. Ambassador + pointed to strong political tone of speech which raised serious + questions, not only with regard to Marcona’s rights to plead its case + (through its Peruvian lawyers, etc.) But also to rights before Peruvian + law of multinational firms generally. Ambassador referred to important + implications of this speech to all present and prospective foreign + investors in Peru and to future activities of private banks and + international lending institutions in this country. All these points + need urgent clarification. Garcia Bedoya said he understood the problem + thoroughly and agreed something must be done. Ambassador noted that + Acting Foreign Minister’s advance warning had helped to forestall strong + instructions from Washington, but that this would be inevitable unless + orderly compensation procedures were established immediately.

+

3. Comment: We are pushing for these promised appointments and have also + requested appointment with Prime Minister Morales Bermúdez regarding this matter.

+ + + Dean + + +
+ +
+ 311. Telegram 7174 From the Embassy in Peru to the Department of + State +

Summary: The + Embassy reported that Morales + Bermúdez would continue Velasco’s policies but in a + more orderly fashion.

+

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + D750301–0719. Secret; Immediate; No Foreign Dissemination. + Repeated to La Paz, Quito, Santiago, Mexico, Bogotá, Brasilia, + Caracas, USCINCSO, and + DIA. In telegram 7130 from + Lima, August 29, the Embassy informed the Department of the + coup, stating that there was no resistance to it. (Ibid., + D750300–0269)

+ + + + + Lima, August + 30, 1975, 2030Z. + +

7174. Subject: Peruvian Change of Government: Why? Why Now? Where + Now?

+

Summary: On a preliminary basis, Mission elements agree that army leaders + decided to move Velasco aside + and replace him with Morales + Bermúdez primarily becasue of Velasco’s increasingly eratic behavior + and personal rule (or mis-rule). We believe key army commanders in + effect forced Morales Bermúdez + to act and gave little importance to the fact that the non-aligned + conference was taking place in Lima. We think Morales Bermúdez as President will + continue the Peruvian revolutionary process, but his approach will be + more orderly and prudent. End summary.

+

1. This message contains the preliminary assessment of all interested + elements of the Mission as to why the armed forces obliged former + President Velasco to step down, + why the prime actors did not wait until the nonaligned conference had + closed in Lima, and what we may expect during the early days, at least, + of the Morales Bermúdez + presidency.

+

2. Why remove Velasco? Velasco’s leadership over the last + months of his presidency was increasingly erratic. He took the decision + to nationalize Marcona while his Minister of Mines was out of the + country. There is much evidence that he and those radicals who probably + urged him to take this step did not think through the implications, and + were surprised when they learned of the possible consequences, + particularly in the economic field. Velasco dramatically (and quixotically) nationalized + Gulf Oil de Peru, a grandstand play with no economic justification, + supposedly for “moral” reasons.

+

3. Velasco’s impromptu press + conferences had long since become an embarrassment to his more sensible + followers. Sipping Pisco, Velasco made outrageous charges against U.S. diplomats + and offended other countries ranging from Chile to the USSR. He gratuitously and fulsomely + congratulated the Viet Cong for their victory over U.S. imperialism.

+ +

4. Velasco crossed the line + between being strong-willed and being obstinate and petty. He + tongue-lashed every minister but Morales Bermudez. He sinned against the + sacred Latin rule of diplomatic asylum by refusing to accede to the + request of the Agrentine ambassador that an asylee in his Embassy be + granted safe-conduct. He ordered wholesale deportations of journalists + and political opponents of right and left.

+

5. Velasco lost control of + himself on more than one occasion, and the leadership below him knew it. + Some even feared he might order some military move against Chile, which + his top generals did not believe would be in Peru’s best interest even + if it were militarily prepared to do, which they further believe it was + not.

+

6. Why remove Velasco now? We + have been speculating on the form and timing of the transfer of power + from Velasco to Morales + Bermudez, which appears to have had several almost inexplicable aspects. + Why, for example, did the coup come when it did, on the last day of the + NAC, in a manner which must + inevitably be embarrassing to the GOP + before its new third world associates, despite the GOP’s efforts to put the best possible + face on it? Second, why did Morales + Bermúdez leave Lima for a tour of the South if he had + this move in mind? It would appear that he would have been better placed + at the center of things in Lima, rather than announcing his move from + Tacna, where he would have been most vulnerable had Velasco been able to rally + support.

+

7. One scenario which so far occurs to us appears to provide answers to + the foregoing questions. [3 lines not + declassified] army discontent with Velasco’s rule and rumors to the effect that + high-ranking generals were urging Morales + Bermúdez to move to oust Velasco. This same report said that the commanding + generals of all the military regions met with Morales Bermúdez to urge him to act, + and that after the meeting, the commander of the third military region, + General Luis La Vera Velardi and his chief of staff, General Briceno, + stayed behind and told the Prime Minister that if he did not do so soon, + they would overthrow Velasco + themselves. [3 lines not declassified] reported + that the Peruvian Investigative Police (PIP) learned at 10:00 a.m. + August 29 that La Vera had announced the revolt of his troops against + Velasco and their support + for Morales Bermudez.

+

8. Against this background, we speculate that La Vera presented Morales Bermúdez with a fait accompli. + Possibly La Vera may have told him that he (La Vera) had obtained the + support of the other regional commanders and would move, with or without + Morales Bermudez. Presented with this ultimatum, the Prime Minister may + have made his decision. (Another variation of this scenario may have + been that Morales Bermúdez was + in the plotting at an earlier stage and went to the South to allay the + suspicions of Velasco and his + supporters.) The timing of the coup in relation to the NAC may have + been attributable to the fact that the regional commanders, in + particular La Verga, are more immediately aware of discontent in the + countryside and to have awarded higher priority to the removal of + Velasco than to + embarrassment before the Third World. They (and possibly the Prime + Minister) may also have reasoned that, precisely because a coup during + the NAC was so unlikely, it would + therefore have the best chance of success.

+

9. The assistant army attaché has a report that Morales Bermúdez finally made up his + mind to move against Velasco + some weeks ago, while visiting La Paz for its anniversary celebration. + If so, the exact timing may have resulted simply because Morales Bermúdez path crossed that of + La Vera in the South in connection with the celebration of Tacna’s + return to the “Patria.” It is now (the 29th) or never.

+

10. Whither the revolution; from the first announcements of the change of + government on August 29, the Army Commanders have stressed their + adhesion to the principles of the Peruvian Revolution. Morales Bermúdez re-stated his loyalty + to the revolution in his first public address in Tacna that day. We + believe that Morales Bermúdez is + a revolutionary but we also assess him as a prudent and careful man. He + has attitudes and work habits one associates with Finance Ministers, and + he has twice served as Finance Minister, under Belaunde and Velasco.

+

11. Even if Morales Bermúdez were + farther toward the center of the political spectrum than we believe he + is, however, he would not at least initially be able to wrench the + revolution very far to the right of its current course. There are + radical generals, such as Rodriguez Figueroa, who move up as Morales Bermúdez does so. They will + continue to influence policy. When Morales + Bermúdez conducts meetings, he lets everyone have his + say, and we believe the radicals will continue to speak up.

+

12. If Morales Bermúdez is really + a centrist, the revolution may move in the direction over time. However, + for the coming months, we anticipate that the Peruvian Revolution will + continue on much its present course, but that affairs will be conducted + more prudently and in a more orderly fashion.

+

13. Relations with the United States should improve, particularly if + Morales Bermúdez is disposed + (and is able) to resolve the Marcona problem. However, this improvement + will be related to the greater degree of order and prudence we expect + from the new president; we would be surprised if Peru were significanly + to moderate its Third World stance, as the appearance of Morales Bermúdez and members of his + cabinet before the NAC on August 30 + seems designed to demonstrate. In short, while we believe the transition + from Velasco to Morales Bermúdez will be beneficial + for both Peru and our relations with this country, we do not at this point foresee a + significant deviation from the course Velasco charted.

+ + + Dean + + +
+ +
+ 312. Memorandum of Conversation +

Summary: Kissinger and de la Flor discussed bilateral + economic issues, in particular compensation for expropriated + companies.

+

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + P820123–2530. Confidential; Nodis. Drafted by King. Kissinger and de la Flor were + attending the UNGA in New + York. On September 29, the Secretary’s Delegation sent a summary + of the memorandum of conversation to the Department. (Telegram + Secto 14009, September 29; ibid., P840126–2330) The Greene Agreement was the + February 19, 1974, U.S.-Peruvian agreement regarding + compensation for expropriated companies. It is discussed in Document 296. In telegram 5210 from + Lima, June 30, 1975, the Embassy reported that the U.S. and + Peruvian delegations had initialed an understanding with regard + to Braniff’s air routes. (Ibid., D750226–0512)

+ + + + + New York, September 24, 1975, 5:40 p.m. + + + SUBJECT + Secretary’s Meeting with Peruvian Foreign Minister de la + Flor + + + PARTICIPANTS + + + + Peru + + Foreign Minister de la Flor + Peruvian PermRep to the UN + Silva + Foreign Office Spokesman Faura + + + + + + U.S. + + The Secretary + Assistant Secretary William + D. Rogers—ARA + + John King, + Notetaker + Anthony Herves, Interpreter + + + +

[Omitted here is a social exchange, a discussion of Kissinger’s proposed trip to Peru, and + of the United Nations, Middle East and Africa.]

+

Foreign Minister: I would like now to go to a second point, which is that + in connection with our problems with the United States we should attempt + to find solutions through dialogue and in terms of the friendship and + cooperation which have always existed between our two countries. We + should in no way seek a confrontation that causes frictions.

+ +

The Secretary: That is our attitude also.

+

Foreign Minister: That is what my President, General Morales Bermudez, + told me just before I left for the U.S. to tell you: We believed that + after signing the Greene + agreement that all our problems were put aside. Then we had the Braniff + problem, and now we have another problem relating to the nationalization + of Marcona. This is a question I have already discussed with Secretary + Rogers during the special + session, and I hope this will not become a problem between the United + States and the Government of Peru.

+

The Secretary: Certainly not, if you yield. I want to make it + diplomatically easy for you.

+

No, look, I don’t want you to yield. We have to work something out + here.

+

Foreign Minister: We have talked with Marcona and found them to be + intransigent. (Faura’s translation: “A waste of time.”) We feel that + continuing these conversations would not lead anywhere.

+

From the point of view of my government, we have a law which exists—for + better or for worse, but it exists—and our new President, Morales + Bermudez, feels that to derogate such a law would carry too great a + political risk.

+

The Secretary: But does that have to be done? We don’t want you to change + your law.

+

Foreign Minister: The question therefore is whether we can exchange ideas + between our two governments for a viable formula to settle the question + in a manner that satisfies both sides.

+

The Secretary: (Nodding to Secretary Rogers) If you can’t settle with them then it’s not + possible. Rogers is our + specialist in surrender. He’s basically a Democrat and I’m going to use + him as my safe-conduct if they win the next election. He alienates all + the conservatives by agreeing to the expropriation of American property + in Latin America. He gives away the Panama Canal. He reestablishes + relations with Cuba.

+

Foreign Minister: That is precisely what has contributed to improving + relations with Latin America, which looks on all these steps you are + taking as very positive. We feel that another very important point in + your relations with Latin America is that some private U.S. companies + with property and interests in Latin America have not shown an honest + and positive attitude in dealing with Latin America. But I will refer to + one company that has observed all our laws and maintained the best + relations in Peru, and that is the Southern Peru Copper Company.

+

The Secretary: I think what we should do . . . We have no intention of + getting into a conflict because of private companies in Peru, and Bill + (Rogers) will cooperate in seeking a settlement that respects Peruvian + law and national dignity.

+ +

Foreign Minister: We most deeply appreciate your statements here and I + feel confident that we are going to be able to maintain good + relations.

+

The Secretary: (Escorting de la Flor to the elevator) I’ll be down in the + next three or three-and-a-half months.

+
+ +
+ 313. Telegram 274015 From the Department of State to the Embassy in + Peru +

Summary: In a + briefing memorandum to Kissinger, Rogers reported that even as a Marcona + settlement seemed illusive, Peru and the United States had + established a scenario to work towards a settlement.

+

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + D750403–0518. Confidential; Immediate. In a meeting on October + 22, U.S. and Peruvian officials agreed that pursuing + government-to-government talks would be the best way to resolve + the Marcona dispute. (Telegram 8797 from Lima, October 23; + ibid., D750369–0302) On November 11, U.S. and Peruvian officials + discussed compensation, and Peruvian officials stated they + desired an ore shipping and sales agreement. (Telegram 9371 from + Lima, November 12; ibid., D750394–0370)

+ + + + + Washington, November 19, 1975, 2101Z. + +

274015. Subject: Marcona—Briefing Memorandum Sent to the Secretary by + Assistant Secretary Rogers.

+

1. The following is a briefing memorandum sent to the Secretary by + Assistant Secretary Rogers + concerning Marcona:

+

Quote: Marcona: Last July’s sudden expropriation of the Marcona + Corporation’s Peruvian mining subsidiary by the Velasco Government has had significant + repercussions. It has cost its perpetrators dearly by contributing to + the replacement of Velasco by + Morales Bermudez. And it has brought us directly into the act. Morales + Bermudez, who is eagerly seeking ways to reconcile Peru’s revolution + with better relations with us, reinterpreted the expropriation decree to + allow for payment of compensation. But the GOP and Marcona did not come close to agreement in their + direct discussions. At their joint request, we first directly involved + ourselves almost four weeks ago.

+

Last week, an interagency delegation headed by Albert Fishlow held a second round of + discussions at both the technical and political level in Lima. These + negotiations were particularly intense, and were dominated by the + effort, responsive to the wishes of Foreign Minister de la Flor, to find + a way for Peru to resume ore sales immediately. (Marcona, in an effort + to protect its interests, has prevented shipments up to now.) With the consent of the + company, two specific interim proposals were presented to the Peruvians. + Both were ultimately rejected by the GOP, although the second came very close to acceptance, and + may yet ring the bell.

+

Despite the apparent impasse, we believe we have accomplished three + important things. We have:

+

—Clarified the parameters within which an acceptable settlement must be + found. The Peruvians now know that they will not get off cheap, and are + now thinking in the range of 30 million dollars or more (still far from + Marcona’s present claim of 100 million dollars, but a great + improvement). In addition, they have a clearer notion of the political + and economic tradeoffs between an outright cash settlement that would + eliminate Marcona from the Peruvian scene, as compared to a settlement + involving an ongoing, though indirect, relationship with Marcona;

+

—Accelerated the internal audit process which, for Peruvian political + reasons, will have to be completed before any settlement can be reached. + (The previous head of the Peruvian state mining concern, who had opposed + any settlement and therefore delayed accounting, has only recently been + replaced; now there is no excuse, and indeed a stimulus to come to some + preliminary result, in view of the December 7 or 8 date now set for the + Peruvians to come to Washington.)

+

—Devised a scenario that should enable the playing out of the settlement + process without a major U.S.-Peruvian confrontation. This scenario is + based on Peruvian awareness that the U.S. must vote against any loan + coming up in the International Financial Institutions and a willingness + to refrain from bringing loans to a vote. It also depends upon + sufficient progress in negotiations before mid-December, by which time + we will have to decide on Peru’s continuing eligibility for GSP. Its success depends on our continuing + to walk the fine line between being scrupulously unyielding without + being threatening.

+

The next two weeks are critical. We have put the initiative back to Peru, + and they know it. Our negotiators hope that Peru may yet accept some + version of the interim proposals, which entails the resumption of + shipments with a commitment to continued negotiations toward just + compensation. This would re-establish some common interests between + Marcona and Peru and would provide the flexibility which would make an + ultimate settlement easier. End of quote.

+ + + Kissinger + + +
+ +
+ 314. Telegram 897 From the Embassy in Peru to the Department of + State +

Summary: + Dean reported that + although the Morales + Bermúdez government was more moderate than the + Velasco government, + Peru still adhered to its revolutionary precepts.

+

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + [no film number]. Confidential. In telegram 10605 to all + American Republic diplomatic posts, January 15, Rogers asked Ambassadors to + report on the attitudes of their host country with regard to + U.S. power and policies. (Ibid.) UN General Assembly Resolution 3379, adopted on + November 10, 1975, determined that “Zionism is a form of racism + and racial discrimination.” (New York + Times, November 11, 1975, p. 65)

+ + + + + Lima, January 29, 1976, 1608Z. + +

897. For Assistant Secretary Rogers. Subj: Current Peruvian Perception of the U.S. + Ref: State 10605.

+

1. I have consulted with interested members of this mission in preparing + the following response to your questions on how Peru currently perceives + U.S. power, posture and policies. The Peruvian revolution is now seven + years old. One of its principal stated goals is to end this country’s + “dependance on and subservience to the United States”. The revolutionary + government set that goal in 1968 in response to conditions as it + perceived them at the time. However, the phenomena you cite—Watergate, + outcome of the Vietnam War, differences between the President and + Congress, and the Angola War—would be seen within the revolutionary + context as additional vindication for GOP efforts to adjust its former relationship with the + U.S.

+

2. The Peruvian change of government in August 1975 brought to the + presidency a more prudent and moderate leader than Former President + Velasco. This change + coincided with increasing economic difficulties, which have apparently + contributed to a realization of a need for a slower approach to the + continuing revolutionary goal of reducing ties (especially economic + ones) with the U.S.

+

3. Revelations of U.S. intelligence activities, aprticularly in Chile, + are of special interest for the government of this neighboring, + leftist-oriented country. I believe the new administration of Morales Bermúdez is not paranoid about + possible U.S. “destabilizing” activities here, but there are those + within the government and without who are still suspicious that + revelations concerning CIA activities + or plans elsewhere may show that the U.S. could be up to similar + activities here.

+

4. In responding below to your other specific questions, I sometimes + differentiate between the official GOP + line and thinking, the probable perceptions of others below the + policy-making level in government, and the informed public. As a general + proposition, I think Peruvians still perceive the U.S. as a colossus—for good or ill, depending on + their own point of view. As to perceptions of U.S. strengths and + vulnerabilities based on the Vietnam outcome, the official GOP line (which has not formally been + changed since Velasco days) is + that the imperialist U.S. lost a “war of liberation”. There is a + widespread perception in Peru (fostered by the media) that + nationalist-communist forces defeated the U.S. and its allies (or + clients or lackeys) in Southeast Asia. Traditional middle class groups + whose political strength was centered in the APRA and Accion popular parties, together with some + moderate military officers, are rather perplexed about perceived erosion + of U.S. interest or will in foreign policy, which they feel manifested + itself in Vietnam’s later stages.

+

5. There is respect and admiration (often grudging) for the U.S. + throughout this country. Watergate is perceived as an indication that + the U.S. can have government scandals as any nation can. Revolutionary + ideologues can perceive a rottenness in the capitalist system, while the + informed public, cognizant of past and present Peruvian moral + imperfections, probably wonders why so much fuss was made about it.

+

6. The Vietnam outcome has had no noticeable effect on Peru’s view of + U.S. ability and willingness to live up to international commitments. + Apart from periodic criticisms on the past “Monroe Doctrine” role of the + U.S., few believe the U.S. has any significant present-day commitment to + Peru or other Latin American countries. Those who are aware of U.S. + defense commitments toward the hemisphere and toward other countries + probably believe we can and will honor them to the extent we continue to + view those commitments as reflecting U.S. national interests.

+

7. As to differences between the administration and Congress in terms of + U.S. ability to follow through on its commitments, I believe few here + believe that Congress could block the administration if the executive + were determined to initiate or carry out a particular policy. There is + little perception here that Congress played any significant part in the + Vietnam war, in waging it or losing it. Administration/Congress + differences do not affect Peru’s posture regarding cooperation with and + dependence on the U.S.

+

8. Generally speaking, the GOP does not + understand the U.S. political process, and does not appreciate fully the + role played by Congress. That being so, some within the GOP may perceive what they consider to be + executive insincerity or half-heartedness in attempts to get Foreign + Policy measures affecting Latin America through Congress. The GSP provision excluding OPEC members, and particularly Venezuela + and Ecuador, is a case in point.

+

9. The traditional Peruvian Government attitude of cooperation with the + U.S. changed radically in 1968, and Peru’s present “Third World” + orientation dates almost as far back. The factors you cite in your cable, in themselves, are + likely to have little impact on GOP + foreign policy. Rather, they simply tend to reinforce prevailing + revolutionary attitudes that a change in Peru’s traditional posture was + long overdue. It still remains true, however, despite the anti-U.S. + barrage in the government-guided press, that there is a reservoir of + good will towards the U.S. among individuals both within and without the + government. At the same time, these elements have very limited influence + on Peru’s Foreign Policy, especially in the multilateral field.

+

10. Cuban and U.S. involvement in Angola reinforces the GOP’s determination not to become involved + in any way. This attitude is reflected in the GOP’s refusal to date to recognize any of the warring + factions in Angola and its obvious preference that the future of Angola + should be settled as quickly as possible with the smallest damage to + third world unity. The informed public probably sees the Angolan + situation simply as one in which the U.S. is backing one side and Cuba + and the Soviet Union another. Peru will probably see a defeat for one + side as a defeat for its backers. The press, which is heavily + leftist-infiltrated, can be expected to play up a defeat for the + U.S.-backed side, if that is the way the Angola affair turns out. The + Cuban intervention in Angola may be mildly disturbing to the GOP, which espouses the principle of + non-intervention. The Cuban relationship will probably continue to be an + important but somewhat uncomfortable one for the Peruvian + Government.

+

11. The GOP sees Latin American + “strength through union” in dealing with the U.S. The revolutionary + government is an enthusiastic supporter of SELA and has sought to promote U.S.-Latin American + confrontations in the OAS and + elsewhere. Within larger fora, such as the UNIDO and the non-aligned conference, both of which Peru + hosted recently, the GOP takes care not + to go so far as to provoke specific bilateral U.S. retaliation.

+

12. I do not believe that GOP + perceptions of the U.S. have changed recently so as to influence its + voting position in the UN or other + International fora. The GOP continues + to want to rely less on the U.S. and continues to aspire to leadership + in the third world, but it has taken a cautious approach on questions + such as the Korea issue, and the Zionism/racism resolution and radical + efforts to exclude Israel from the UNGA.

+

13. Since 1968, the revolutionary government has sought to widen its + international sources of economic and political support. It receives + assistance from first world and second world countries and there are + even limited prospects for third world assistance from the Arabs. Peru + similarly has a wide range of commercial arrangements besides those it + has with the U.S. I doubt that Peru can or will attempt to reduce its + sales of raw materials to the U.S. but may well seek by withholding exports to increase their + price. As to the sale of U.S. products here, the GOP will probably continue efforts to + discourage imports, particularly “non-essential” imports from the U.S., + for economic and political reasons. However, consumers will continue to + want U.S.-produced goods, and Peruvian producers will continue to + require U.S. imports.

+

14. The GOP probably believes that the + U.S. is not wholly willing to meet the needs and concerns of developing + nations, although it probably has little doubt of U.S. ability to do so. + Revolutionary ideology is that the U.S. is at least morally, if indeed + not legally, bound to help countries such as Peru, given the history of + U.S. “economic imperialism”. It is in part to pressure the U.S. to meet + that perceived obligation that Peru cooperates so whole-heartedly with + the Group of 77, UNIDO and SELA.

+

15. In sum, the GOP follows its + revolutionary precepts and cooperates closely with other members of the + third world for reasons that pre-date U.S. troubles of the last year or + so, but those problems reinforce the revolutionary government’s + prevailing attitudes.

+ + + Dean + + +
+ +
+ 315. Memorandum From the Director of the Policy Planning Staff + (Lord) to Secretary of State + Kissinger + +

Summary: Lord summarized for Kissinger the necessary + elements for a settlement of the Marcona expropriation.

+

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Records of Henry Kissinger, Lot 91D414, + Box 19, Nodis Briefing Memoranda, 1976. Confidential. Drafted by + Einaudi and Fishlow. Tab + 1, an undated paper entitled, “Expropriation Revisited: the + Marcona Case in Peru,” is attached but not + printed.

+ + + + + Washington, February + 14, 1976. + +

+ Your Stop in Peru: The Marcona + Dispute +

+

The attached memorandum contains an analysis of the Marcona + expropriation—an analysis Bob + Ingersoll, with his extensive business background, + explicitly commended—and reviews the latest round of the + negotiations.

+

Because the issue currently dominates our bilateral relations—rather more + than we would wish, though we have little room for maneuver—the + Peruvians are certain to attempt to draw you into it. Familiarizing + yourself with it will also tell you a great deal about Peru, and about + why Latin Americans sometimes + implicitly assume conflict with us. Finally, the case documents how—in + the original spirit of Tlatelolco—we have recently tried to compose + differences, and how, even so, a gap remains that could still trigger + sanctions.

+

You noted on the margin of the ARA Scope + Paper that it would help for you to know what our position was. The + memorandum sets forth that position in detail. In brief, however, it is + as follows:

+

The negotiations have reached a critical point. Three weeks remain to + reach a final settlement in principle, if not in form.

+

+ Two ingredients will be necessary to any + solution.

+

The first is Peruvian willingness to pay a substantial + settlement. We cannot replicate the circumstances of the + Greene settlement when a + relatively small sum sufficed to compensate for all outstanding + expropriation cases. This time we do not have five years of disrupted + relations behind us—nor companies willing to settle for half a loaf.

+

The second ingredient is clarification of our own + position on the sum actually required for settlement. Marcona + is clearly worth more than Peru has yet been willing to concede. Our + internal calculations suggest, however, that Marcona’s own estimates of + its worth are somewhat inflated. But we will need an independent + valuation if we are to be effective in persuading Marcona of that fact. + Preliminary results of this independent valuation, which is being + undertaken by the Stanford Research Institute, should be ready by + February 23. Our negotiators will, therefore, be better armed in the + next round to know what constitutes a feasible final range. [NB: we are + also exploring what flexibility may be available to finance the + settlement and thereby cushion its impact on the limping Peruvian + economy.]

+

+ You can provide an impulse to closing the great gap + that still remains on the amount of settlement by telling the + Peruvians you recognize the enormous effort Peru has made, but that + you are genuinely concerned lest the March 11 deadline expire + without an agreement. The reality of our concern has already + been conveyed accurately by an interagency decision to withhold $28 + million in CCC credits pending progress + toward a more relevant bottom line. You could also heighten Peruvian + perceptions of our concern by explicitly designating Bill Rogers to lead the final round of + negotiations (which have thus far been conducted by Al Fishlow, with support from Luigi + Einaudi and an interagency team). An escalation to Rogers will indicate how seriously we + take the matter; the flattery may partially offset our firmness.

+

To facilitate your perusal of the attached memorandum, which is extremely + lengthy, an analytical table of contents is provided + on the first page.

+ +
+ +
+ 316. Memorandum of Conversation +

Summary: Kissinger and Morales Bermúdez discussed Peruvian politics and + United States–Peruvian relations.

+

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + P820117–0982. Confidential; Nodis. Drafted by Einaudi; approved + by Covey on March 8. + Kissinger’s February + 17 speech in Caracas is in the Department of State Bulletin, March 15, 1976, pp. 313–326. A + record of the Kissinger-de la Flor conversation could not be + found. The following exchange occurred between Kissinger and Fernández + Maldonado on the afternoon of February 18:

+

+ Prime Minister Fernández Maldonado: + Talking about Marcona. . .

+

+ The Secretary: I am not here to negotiate + on Marcona. I have every confidence in Fishlow and the Ambassador.

+

+ Prime Minister Fernández Maldonado: I was + saying to Ambassador Dean that on the basis of this effort this can + be resolved shortly.

+

+ The Secretary: We need to have something + to deal with the company, so that I can accept. When we have + concluded our review of the problem, we will tell you what our + judgment is. (Memorandum of Conversation, February 18; ibid., + P820117–0977)

+ + + + + Lima, February 18, 1976, 11:55 a.m.–12:45 + p.m. + + + SUBJECT + Secretary’s Meeting With Peru President Francisco Morales + Bermudez + + + PARTICIPANTS + + + + PERU + + President Francisco Morales Bermudez + Foreign Minister Miguel Angel de la Flor + Ambassador to U.S. Carlos Garcia Bedoya + Oscar Faure, Interpreter Military Aide + + + + + + UNITED STATES + + The Secretary of State + Assistant Secretary William + Rogers + + Ambassador Robert + Dean + + Luigi Einaudi, Policy Planning Staff (Notetaker) + Anthony de Hervas, Interpreter + + + +

The Secretary’s party has driven directly to the Presidential Palace. + After introductions to the President, those not scheduled to participate + leave.

+

+ Kissinger: (Glancing at the many + people remaining.) Now we can still take decisions by majority vote.

+

Morales Bermudez: I am very satisfied to have you here, even for such a + brief time in Lima and in Peru.The Peruvian + interpreter embroidered regularly, sometimes mistranslating. This + memcon reflects what President actually said. The Secretary and the + President, followed by the others, exit to meet photographers. + [Footnote in the source text.] +

+

+ Kissinger: Mr. President, I want + to thank you for your cordial reception. I have looked forward for a + long time to visiting Peru. Your Foreign Minister’s invitation was the first I received to + visit Latin America. I am very pleased to be here.

+

Morales Bermudez: (Makes an open gesture conveying readiness to hear + anything further the Secretary would have to say.)

+

+ Kissinger: I had a good visit in + Caracas. The President of Venezuela spoke with admiration of you and + your government.

+

I come here with sympathy for the objectives of your revolution and with + every intention of working to find ways to strengthen our + cooperation.

+

Morales Bermudez: Well, I think that to develop a sincere base for + cooperation, the first priority is mutual understanding. Since I had not + met you before, I think your trip gives us a chance to improve our + relations and should be very productive.

+

+ Kissinger: That is our attitude + as well. We are prepared to show maximum understanding of you, for your + necessities here.

+

Morales Bermudez: I would like to say to you . . . (stops as waiter + enters to serve drinks.)

+

+ Kissinger: (Taking a glass of + pure Pisco in his hand) After this I will agree to everything you ask. + (Approving smiles all around)

+

Morales Bermudez: We in Peru as you know are in the midst of a process of + profound structural changes. We have 7 years of experience behind us. + The revolution has therefore reached a second phase. The first stage + achieved much. We are now in a period in which we must both establish + continuity and make a few rectifications of policy.

+

One of the major political problems we have faced has been ensuring that + the outside world knows precisely what is happening here in Peru. It has + cost us great effort to have outsiders understand our process. Even now + many people do not understand what we want and what we have + achieved.

+

+ Kissinger: I confess that when I + came to Washington in 1969 I had some preconceptions myself. At that + time we were involved in an expropriation issue. It took me a while to + understand the authentic national nature of the process in Peru. Once I + had done so, however, I made a great effort to avoid the application of + the Hickenlooper Amendment and to establish a basis for better + understanding.

+

Morales Bermudez: Speaking of understanding, we have found it difficult + sometimes not only to deal with the external arena, but the internal one as well. There are even now + some Peruvians who do not fully understand the revolutionary process and + who doubt our ultimate objectives. Therefore, in this second phase we + support dialogue as a method opening the revolution, of explaining its + purpose, and of learning the feelings of our people.

+

+ Kissinger: How do you do + this?

+ +

Morales Bermudez: We have begun a dialogue not only in the capital but + also in the provinces. People have an opportunity to ask and the + Government to answer. That way we receive suggestions and resolve + worries. We also hold dialogues with organized groups: peasants, + workers, miners, industrialists, businessmen, that is to say all social + groups.

+

+ Kissinger: Where does your major + opposition, if any, come from?

+

Morales Bermudez: Our political path is very difficult. Essentially, we + face two sources of opposition. The first is based on the traditional + privileged sectors who have had to yield in the interests of the great + majorities. The second is from the extreme left which wants to + capitalize on some measures of the revolution with different ends in + mind. Those are the two flanks of opposition the Government must + face.

+

In this second phase we have opened widely to all sectors of opinion, in + compliance with the revolution’s principle of idealogical pluralism, + accepting the expression of the views of all groups.

+

One group is represented by the socialized press. But we have now made an + opening to other viewpoints as well. You will find an infinite variety + of magazines and other publications expressing all varieties of + opinions. We respect these ideas.

+

+ Kissinger: I have seen some of + the things they have written about me. It certainly seems to reflect a + wide variety.

+

Morales Bermudez: You should see what they have written about us, + too.

+

+ Kissinger: I am not complaining; + you should see the US press.

+

Morales Bermudez: During the first phase of the revolution, we prepared + an overall plan of government, from which are derived our specific + economic policies. We are now in the process of revising that plan. This + is entirely natural. Conditions and situations have changed, and + therefore the objectives must also change. We think that by next March + we will already have a new government plan to present to the + country.

+

+ Kissinger: Your dilemma is that + what you achieve is taken for granted, and you have to keep making + progress.

+

Morales Bermudez: That is so. But as concerns our objectives some can be + maintained unchanged, others need to be perfected, while others must now + be corrected. And as you say we have to keep in mind the need to allow + for a process of continuing change.

+

We want a social democracy with full participation. We had ample + experience with formal democracy. As practiced here, it did not give + results, so now we are searching for a new form. Our approach is based + on socialism of a non-Marxist variety; on nationalism, not chauvinism; + and, what is perhaps most important, on Christian humanism; all + accompanied by a deep sense of Peru’s history.

+

+ Kissinger: Our basic approach is + to cooperate with countries even if we have different social + philosophies or views of economic organization, so long as there is a basis for international + cooperation. We believe each country must determine their internal + affairs for themselves.

+

Morales Bermudez: As concerns foreign policy, you know our position. I + know you are a friend of our Foreign Minister and therefore that + anything I might say would be redundant.

+

But I want to stress that the purpose of Peru is that its relations with + the United States be the most harmonious possible. We are on the same + continent. We cannot escape geographic reality. In addition, many ties + have existed between our countries. Applying your principle, differences + of idealogies must not be allowed to affect practical realities. We have + many common interests. On a basis of maintaining our freedom and + independence as a sovereign country, we can overcome our + differences.

+

+ Kissinger: As you said, Peru and + the United States have a tradition of cooperation. We have no + conflicting national interests. We are both fundamentally dedicated to + peace and progress. Sometimes however, conflicts arise that derive from + the way you pursue your national aspirations. We have legislation, of + which we do not always approve, whose implementation under such + circumstances creates a challenge to practical wisdom. We will go to the + limit of what is legally possible. But success it not assured. We have + had many sad experiences with many countries of a mutual escalation of + unilateral actions. I believe there will be an improvement after the + election.

+

On the one big issue between us, we do not protest your right to take the + steps you have taken. But we should make every effort in the next weeks + to find a solution. Our side will make a maximum effort. We do not want + conflict. But we must ask you to keep in mind our own difficulties. If + the problem can be overcome, then we can contribute substantially to the + revolutionary program you will announce in March.

+

Morales Bermudez: In this respect, cooperation should be reciprocal. We + do not have a Congress like the United States but we have a very active + internal front. I am aware of your problems. The effort you are making + is being matched by us. We want no vacuum. You should know we too are + making a major effort in our country to avoid problems.

+

+ Kissinger: When you mentioned + earlier your search for new patterns of democracy, I had been tempted to + ask for your advice . . . (laughter), seriously, your attitude will be + our attitude. We cannot allow our attitudes to affect the internal + structures of other countries. So we are both aware of what we must do. + I am sure we can find a constructive outcome. (Pause, then indicating + the Foreign Minister). But your negotiators are very good.

+

Morales Bermudez: This will depend on our Ambassadors as well. Both have + fine human qualities.

+ +

+ Kissinger: We have great + confidence in our Ambassadors and count on them.

+

Morales Bermudez: (In aside to Foreign Minister) Will you be talking to + Kissinger about this?

+

De La Flor: Yes, this afternoon. At that meeting I will speak about the + critical problem we have all been discussing so far without mentioning + its name...

+

+ Kissinger: We will do our best. + (To De La Flor) We have talked before. You know I do not like to have + economic relations affect relations between Governments. This should be + settled on political, not economic, grounds. I do not like us to act as + lawyers for private companies. But we have some necessities of our own + imposed on us. Within those limits will be an understanding of your + points of view as our discretion permits.

+

(To Morales Bermudez) It is important for the + United States to show support for a progressive country that seeks the + social and economic advance of its people. Therefore we will do + everything possible to get a solution.

+

Morales Bermudez: I have every hope that your visit will be very fruitful + for our relations.

+

+ Kissinger: This is my intention. + For the great problem of our times is how can governments representing + peoples with different levels of living cooperate effectively.

+

Morales Bermudez: We hope also that the US will change somewhat its + policy not just toward Peru but toward the rest of Latin America as + well. We have been concerned for sometime at the growing distance + between us. We have seen the United States very distant from the Latin + American countries. A change in United States policy, looking a bit more + toward Latin America, will be very fruitful.

+

+ Kissinger: Did you have a chance + to see what I said in Caracas?

+

Morales Bermudez: Not yet.

+

+ Kissinger: We will send a text. I + called attention to the need to establish new patterns of relations and + indicated some concrete areas where this could happen.

+

If I may say so, there is a problem on both sides (Morales Bermudez nods + agreement). What usually happens is that someone like myself says + something, it is well received, and then nothing happens. What we need + is a program that brings our peoples and their governments into regular + contact.

+

I should also mention that for the United States it is important that we + not hear just criticism from Latin America. Over time, constant + criticism produces discouragement and sometimes animosity among our own + peoples. I know one Latin American head of state who specializes in anti-US speeches, then sends us + letters that he does not mean what he is saying. Our public never sees + the letters (laughter, general winks of agreement as reference is + understood).

+

Morales Bermudez: I agree that is a problem.

+

+ Kissinger: We are prepared, if we + can find the issues to engage us, to work with you on a weekly or a + monthly basis so that we avoid the problem of a speech every six months + followed by inaction.

+

What we have respected about Peru is that you have said in private what + you have said in public. This enables us at least to understand the + problem, if not always to resolve it.

+

Morales Bermudez: That is most important.

+

+ Kissinger: I appreciate, Mr. + President, your courtesy in receiving me so soon after my arrival. We + wish you all success.

+
+ +
+ 317. Telegram 2314 From the Embassy in Peru to the Department of + State +

Summary: + Dean reported that + members of the Peruvian military disliked Morales Bermúdez’s leftist + political stance. Because rumors of coup plotting were so openly + discussed, the Ambassador concluded that they were not + credible.

+

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + D760091–0365. Secret. The Embassy acquired a February 5 draft of + Plan Tupac Amaru, which called for a pro-labor domestic policy, + a more activist state, and a Third World agenda in foreign + policy. (Telegram 2681 from Lima, March 22; ibid., D760107–1050) + In telegram 2204 from Lima, March 6, Dean reported that because + Morales Bermúdez did + not seem to be “in charge” there had been a spate of rumors of + coup-plotting. (Ibid., D760085–0463)

+ + + + + Lima, March + 10, 1976, 1400Z. + +

2314. Subject: Continuing Political Uncertainty. Ref: Lima 2204.

+

Summary: Political tension, catalyzed in part by recent events in + political/labor area, remains high. Dissident military officers led by + navy are disturbed by perceived leftward governmental drift and have + been discussing various forms of opposition including possible coup. + APRA party and private industry + organizations may prepare for more active opposition role. Fact that + current “coup plotting” is not being closely held may mean serious + attempt is not to be mounted now. End summary.

+

1. Recent surfacing of political tensions is attributable to preview of + GOP Plan Tupac Amaru (draft of + which is radical in content and tone); labor unrest, particularly the + Arequipa general strike; and more vocal opposition within and without military to perceived + leftward drift of Morales + Bermúdez regime: “Coup plotting” which occasioned spate + of rumors late last week apparently continues but planning is vague and + does not seem to be too closely held. This activity seemingly centered + in navy, and linked to APRA as well as + the private business community, may be intended more as a warning to + Morales Bermúdez that + leftward drift will meet with stiff opposition than as serious coup + effort.

+

2. A Peruvian industrialist who is at least tangentially involved + outlined opposition effort to EmbOff March 8. He said effort is centered + on firm navy opposition to what it perceives as the leftward trend which + is clearly demonstrated in the Plan Tupac Amaru. The navy is allegedly + supported by a significant number of army and air force officers. + According to same source, three regional army commanders are in contact + with navy dissidents. Expanding on theme of discord in army, source said + that General Sanchez, Commander of the Third Region (Arequipa) had his + “ears pinned back” by ruling junta last week for his mismanagement of + Arequipa general strike. Embassy is unable to confirm this, but + Ambassador was told by FonOff + official March 7 that Cabinet had split over Arequipa strike issue. + Fernandez Maldonado and his supporters prevailed and it was Fernandez + Maldonado who finally resolved Arequipa situation (this may have led to + weekend rumor that Fernandez Maldonado had taken over government). The + Arequipa strike was settled March 5 by making various concessions to + unions.

+

3. According to above source and others familiar with dissident activity, + the APRA party is involved in whatever + plotting is taking place and is said to “support fully with its civilian + force” efforts of navy and other military dissidents. In addition, an + air force colonel approached the Peruvian Society of Industries asking + that they continue to press for modification of the governments economic + policy which is said by society to be strangely private enterprise. + Society of Industry official told EmbOff that his organization, jointed + by Automobile Manufacturing Association and the Chambers of Commerce + throughout Peru, are stepping up activity for their own reasons + unrelated to any coup plotting. Official said that business groups have + concluded that the Morales + Bermúdez regime intends to proceed toward a socialized + economy and now may be their last opportunity to alter that course.

+

4. Serious student rioting in downtown Lima March 5, which according to + students resulted in one student death, and the March 5 machine-gunning + of the home of ex-Navy Minister and Ambassador to the U.S. Admiral Jose Arce Larco (no injuries + reported) added to weekend tension. According to leftist Expreso, Arce, + who claimed he had no enemies, said machine-gunning could have been work + of CIA. (Note: Arce was and remains + extremely unpopular with navy officer corps.)

+ +

5. Comment: Political pot is bubbling but “coup plotting” appears too + widely known on the Lima rumor circuit to constitute a credible effort. + Although timing for possible coup is said to be the March 7–15 period, + this appears unlikely. Neither military nor police now seems to be on + alert status although both are aware of coup talk. Discontent, however, + is serious and certain to continue. End result may be modification of + GOP political plan (Embassy now + analyzing and will report on preliminary draft of the plan) or isolation + and removal of the dissident elements.

+ + + Dean + + +
+ +
+ 318. Telegram 2418 From the Embassy in Peru to the Department of + State +

Summary: + Dean reported that + he understood Rogers’s concern regarding the importance of + avoiding intelligence activities which could implicate the U.S. + Government in coup plotting.

+

Source: Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, Box 14, Lima, 1963–1979. + Secret; Immediate; Roger Channel. Attached but not published was + a note in an unknown hand that reads: “Dean’s answer to Rogers . . .” Rogers’s instructions to + Dean could not be + found.

+ + + + + Lima, March + 12, 1976, 1920Z. + +

2418. For Assistant Secretary Rogers from Ambassador Dean. Subject: [less than 1 line not + declassified]

+

1. [1 paragraph (8 lines) not declassified]

+

2. [1 paragraph (17 lines) not declassified]

+

3. You are correct in your presumption that our attachés have been + getting pressure from DIA for extensive + reporting, to the extent of open telephone calls from the quote DIA alert center unquote. In a sharply + worded cable yesterday [less than 1 line not + declassified] requested curtailment this practice. [1 line not declassified] This would be of help to + me and to our colleagues in dealing full cooperation here but your + message would help our people explain any intelligence gaps or cutoffs + and also avoid ill-considered intelligence requirements.

+

4. I share fully your view that details of coup plotting and timing are + not vital and that our procurement of this level of information carries + unnecessary risks. We were caught flat-footed on the specifics of the + change of government here last August 29. As far as I can see this in no + way affected our security situation here nor did it lead to any negative reaction from Washington. + It was a comfortable situation to be in, as long as the requirements of + personnel and Embassy security were met (as they were), and we were + thoroughly aware of the main directions and implications of the + political situation at that time.

+

5. As you know from our overall reporting, the contradictions and + opposing forces in the present situation are being discussed widely all + over town. Rumors of coup plotting and even the names of a few of the + possible coup participants are being bruited about. I am sure that every + Embassy in town is gathering information and reporting to their home + offices. In the order of probabilities I think it is most likely that + nothing will happen in the next few days and that the reaction to Plan + Tupac Amaru and Fernandez-Maldonado’s increasing role will largely serve + as an indication of the deep concern and opposition within the body + politic. The second-ranking probability is that some navy hot heads and + their supporters will experience early retirement. The possibility of a + serious coup attempt ranks in third place. If it happens it could be + rough. Many Peruvians seem to be in a show-down mood.

+

6. We are taking no sides and are determined to avoid any involvement or + appearance of involvement. The situation this year is somewhat different + from 1974 and early 1975 in that we are no longer automatically + considered or charged as being involved in political action or rumored + action here. Our position is one of support for Peruvian development and + the GOP’s programs of social reform. + Where we have problems such as Marcona, we are known to be committed to + a process of peaceful negotiation in good faith and without rancor or + enmity.

+

7. One additional question that concerns me is the security of our own + reporting channels. In a visit to my office today Dave Belnap of the Los Angeles Times said that Jim Foster of Scripps + Howard News Service had decided to stay on longer in Lima because he had + received word from his Washington office of Embassy reporting of coup + plotting in Lima. In addition to the question of the extent and manner + that we keep our ear to the ground, this type of report raises the + question of the extent and manner in which we should report what we + hear.

+

8. This has been a longer reply than I had intended. The important point + is that I understand your message and will comply. We have been highly + sensitive to this problem over the past two years but I agree that a + review of the bidding and a reaffirmation of our guidelines to all + concerned are indeed necessary at peak points on the political fever + chart when the interest runs high and the trickle of information and + rumors becomes a torrent.

+ + + Dean + + +
+ +
+ 319. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for + Inter-American Affairs (Rogers) + to Secretary of State Kissinger + +

Summary: Rogers + informed Kissinger of + Morales Bermúdez’s + efforts to maintain the Peruvian Revolution by steering a middle + course between the political Left and Right.

+

Source: National Archives, RG 59, ARA/AND Files, Records Relating + to Peru: Lot 79D18, POL 1–2, + Basic Policies. Confidential. Drafted by King on April 2. Telegram 3079 + from Lima, April 1, is attached but not published. In paragraph + 12 of telegram 3079 the Ambassador reported that the moderate + tone of Morales Bermdez’s speech could represent an attempt to + diminish coup-plotting on the part of the moderate-conservative + elements.

+ + + + + Washington, April 5, + 1976. + +

+ Peru’s New Revolutionary Program +

+

You will recall that President Morales + Bermúdez told you when you met him in Lima February 18 + that his government would publicize a new political-economic program for + Peru in March. His partial unveiling of the plan, only in broad-brush + strokes and without specific details, came in a televised two-hour + address Wednesday evening, March 31. The speech practically coincided + with our decision to send Carl + Maw to Lima for what we hope will be the final political + negotiations to settle the Marcona matter.

+

Of greatest immediate interest to us, of course, were Morales Bermudez’ + comments on that issue. While he did not mention the company, its claims + or the arrival of the “final phase” of our negotiations, his elliptical + references to the problem were encouraging. Indirectly acknowledging + that the GOP may have acted + precipitously in expropriating Marcona, he said the GOP now is concluding its study of the + “conditions of transfer” of the company to the state.

+

Attached is Embassy Lima’s initial assessment of the overall thrust of + the speech.

+

As we interpret his vaulting rhetoric, what Morales Bermúdez said was, in general terms, + foreshadowed by what he told you in your conversation, i.e. that the + Peruvian Revolution will continue on a middle course, neither communist + nor capitalist, and that radical efforts from either the right or left + to alter that course would be dealt with firmly, even forceably.

+

He also indicated that the details of the middle course Peru will follow + under his six-year plan (which is named Tupac + Amaru, after the meztizo descendant of + the Incas who led the bloody Indian revolt against the Spaniards in the + 18th century, now adopted by Peru’s military as the mystic symbol of the + Revolution) would be made public over the coming weeks and months.

+ +

It was the trial-ballooning of the specifics of that plan, not long after + you left Lima, which triggered a spate of coup + plotting against Morales + Bermúdez among centrist and right-wing officers of all + three services. Coming on top of a few perfervid and unfortunate + revolutionary speeches the President made while touring the south of the + country, the semi-official outlines of Tupac + Amaru frightened moderates in the military as well as in the + civilian upper and middle classes; these elements saw in the plan a + radical and abrupt transformation of Peruvian society and its saddling + with an inflexible socialist state.

+

The consequent turmoil both within the military and civilian sectors has + been unprecedented in recent years. The would-be plotters have been + telling our Embassy, [less than 1 line not + declassified] that Morales + Bermúdez has tolerated too much communist penetration + into the government, has allowed the Revolution to lurch dangerously + leftward, has been indecisive, is drinking too much, etc., and therefore + must go. The flood of reports we have received from these people + convinces some analysts an attempt on Morales Bermúdez will be made in the next few weeks. + These conspiracies reached fever pitch early this week as those most + worried awaited his definitive speech.

+

We tend to agree, as the Embassy suggests in its final comment (para 12 + of the attached cable), that the speech may serve to relieve the + moderates’ anxieties, at least to some degree.

+

How this could translate into additional room for maneuver for Morales + Bermudez, and especially what it might do for Peruvian negotiating + flexibility as we come up to decision-making on Marcona, is more + difficult to assess.

+

I would only add that if Morales Bermudez, with the speech and the + outline of his plan to follow, has managed to confound his critics in + Peru as much as he has confused our analysts, he may well have found the + middle way that could vouchsafe his continuance in the presidency.

+
+ +
+ 320. Memorandum of Conversation +

Summary: Kissinger and de la Flor discussed a prospective + settlement for Marcona and Peruvian-Chilean relations.

+

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + P820118–1635. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Einaudi on January 13, + 1977. The meeting took place in Kissinger’s suite. Kissinger and de la Flor were in Santiago for an + OASGA meeting. A record + of the de la Flor-Maw + conversation has not been found.

+ + + + + Santiago, June 8, 1976, 9–10:05 + a.m. + + + PARTICIPANTS + + + + The United States + + The Secretary + Under Secretary Rogers + + Under Secretary Maw + + Luigi R. Einaudi, S/P—Notetaker + Anthony Hervas, Interpreter + + + + + + Peru + + Foreign Minister de la Flor + Secretary General Marchand + + OAS Ambassador + Alvarado + + + +

de la Flor: You look marvelous. Work is obviously the best preserver of + youth.

+

The Secretary: I certainly had a marvelous time in Lima last February. It + is a beautiful city. In fact, I understand you may hold the + extraordinary session of the General Assembly in Lima next year.

+

de la Flor: Yes. This is a point I want to raise with you after the + photographers leave.

+

The Secretary: When I walk into the OAS + I see so many personal friends that it is always a pleasure. You are one + of the best.

+

de la Flor: I can say the same. I can reciprocate fully. And I do not say + that in official terms. The future will be the best way to reveal that + this is so. After neither of us is in office any longer, I will invite + you to visit Lima, with your wife, and to stay with me.

+

The Secretary: Yes, we will be friends when both of us are out of office + . . . in 1981.

+

de la Flor (laughs): I doubt you will retire. You may reach 1980, but I + doubt I will.

+

The Secretary: It will be difficult for you, too, to leave. You have done + much.

+

de la Flor: No, it will not be difficult. I have already been out of the + Army too long.

+ +

The Secretary: You intend to go back to troop command?

+

de la Flor: I must. My job is exhausting. I have had too many problems + with the United States . . . Maw + won’t let me sleep.

+

The Secretary: You, too, give us some worries. What is holding up a + settlement on Marcona?

+

de la Flor: We have some problems. We will be talking further with Dr. + Maw tomorrow.

+

The Secretary: Dr. Maw? [turning + to Maw] Are you a Dr.? [to de la + Flor] Had I known, I would not have hired him.

+

+ Maw: I am a J.D.

+

The Secretary: I am a professor. Those lawyers’ degrees fool generals, + not me.

+

de la Flor: He is a good man.

+

The Secretary: We will go to the limit. We want no victories. We do not + want to put anyone in a difficult position. [turning to Maw] Have you reached an agreement on + when you will get together?

+

+ Maw: Yes, tomorrow.

+

The Secretary: Let’s see if we can’t resolve this now. We are really + close. [to Maw] What is the + sticking point?

+

+ Maw: There is a small cash + problem.

+

The Secretary: There is a difference in amount?

+

+ Maw: Yes, but we can compromise + if we can get an equivalent to cash.

+

The Secretary [to both men]: Look, we are too close to break down now. + Talk tomorrow, if you can’t reach an agreement then, we can talk again + this week.

+

de la Flor: We have talked to Maw + a great deal. The big point for us is the financing. Marcona has been + very hard. But the financing is now the only factor. The basic + understanding is a good one.

+

The Secretary: It’s true. That is why we want to clean this up. Maw is a good friend of mine. You + understand the pressures that we are working under. We have used the + utmost flexibility. I think it would be better to settle this now.

+

+ Maw: We are meeting at 9:30 + tomorrow.

+

The Secretary [to Maw]: Good. And + you will stay until you finish.

+

[To de la Flor] While in office you have nationalized everything you + could. Soon you will have nothing left to repay.

+

de la Flor: No. But this is a good solution—for the company, for the + United States and for Peru.

+

+ Maw: The proposal is + self-financing.

+

The Secretary: Well, you will discuss it tomorrow, not now. Tomorrow we + will let neither of you out of the room. [to de la Flor] Don’t worry about being outnumbered. + In any case Einaudi is an agent of yours. We sometimes think he should + worry more about the US than Peru.

+

de la Flor: We know he is a friend. We like him very much. Now I am even + being attacked because he gets too much from me because of our personal + friendship. But when the friendship of countries is involved, all else + is secondary.

+

The Secretary: You will not be returning soon to the Army?

+

de la Flor: At the latest by the end of the year. Politically, my + position has been eroded. I have had too many problems with the United + States.

+

The Secretary: You have done much to improve our relations and to make + confrontation between us impossible.

+

de la Flor: That has been my purpose from the beginning; since January + 1972, when I became Foreign Minister.

+

The Secretary: Yes. You are my senior.

+

de la Flor: In position, yes; in politics, no.

+

[Omitted here is a discussion of OAS + reform.]

+

The Secretary: Let’s talk about the meeting we are attending now.

+

First, there is the human rights question. This involves two problems. We + want to state our convictions on the importance of fundamental human + rights. Second, we don’t want to elaborate a new form of intervention. + What we will do is make a general statement without attacking any + particular country. We will call attention to the IAHRC report on Chile and say that the + United States is worried by conditions there. But we will not ask the + Assembly to do anything except in general terms. We will also call + attention to Cuba. But we will not ask for any resolution.

+

What do you think?

+

de la Flor: Peru’s position is also one of principle. We do not want to + alarm Chile which is our immediate neighbor. I agree with you on the + need for norms to define the functions of the Inter-American Human + Rights Commission. Sometimes in the name of human rights there is + excessive intervention. I believe we have the same position.

+

The Secretary: I have been told some of my colleagues expect great + things. We are not here for theater.

+

de la Flor: Yes, we had heard of possible announcements on Chile.

+

The Secretary: The press wants to hear me say something. But my job is + foreign policy. What I will say will be based on my responsibilities, + not on what makes good press.

+

de la Flor: What you say will be well received.

+

The Secretary: I will be very firm on human rights in general and I will + mention the IAHRC report on + Chile.

+ +

de la Flor: I feel that is a highly respected position. I also think, as + a neighboring country of Chile, that it is important to avoid major + problems.

+

[Omitted here is a discussion of OAS + reform, the Generalized System of Preferences and the International + Resource Bank]

+

de la Flor: You have just been to Bolivia. I saw in press reports that + you favor Bolivia’s outlet to the sea.

+

The Secretary: Yes. But I didn’t say whether the outlet was to be to the + Atlantic or the Pacific.

+

de la Flor: True, but there is still an important issue. When you say + that the solution will contribute to peace and development in Latin + America, others will think you support the Chilean proposal.

+

Peru believes the outlet should guarantee peace and development. But if + there is no port, there can be no development. If there is no port, + there can be no peace. We consider the Bolivian corridor should not + become another Danzig. Clemenceau warned Danzig would lead to the Second + World War, and Danzig led to the conflict between German and Poland. We + do not want such an outcome. We do not want war in this part of the + world. You know that. Though I am a soldier, I want peace.

+

The Secretary: How could this lead to war? You are opposed to a + corridor?

+

de la Flor: No. The issue is that the Chileans propose a corridor without + a port.

+

The Secretary: Could Bolivia build one?

+

de la Flor: You know they could not. The costs would be prohibitive.

+

The Secretary: Nevertheless, if what you say is true, a corridor without + a port could conceivably lead to a war between Bolivia and Chile, but + not with Peru.

+

de la Flor: Theoretically. But their fear of the north, and their efforts + to obtain a port, would eventually involve Peru as well.

+

The Secretary: I am told Peru has so many Soviet tanks that you are + running out of spare parts and room to put them.

+

de la Flor: Chile has just as many US tanks.

+

But the point is, we want peace. And we want no false solutions to + endanger peace.

+

The Secretary: I am not applying any pressure. This is something for the + negotiating parties to resolve. You have said you will study the matter. + Beyond what I have already said, no more is needed.

+

de la Flor: We are talking with Chile to seek a solution.

+

The Secretary: It is not our responsibility.

+

de la Flor: Yes. But it is our responsibility.

+ +

The directing ideals of US foreign policy are basic, regardless of + government. This gives coherence. We do the same. That is why we do not + accept pressures. We do not have power like the United States. But I can + affirm that the presence of other countries in the corridor negotiations + could create problems.

+

You also know other foreign elements want to create confusion. The + communists are doing everything possible to stir up trouble over this + issue.

+

The Secretary: We will not be active. We want a positive solution. We + will not put forth what it should be. You will hear no more from me on + this.

+

But I hope we will be seeing a good deal more of each other. My wife + wants to visit Peru.

+

de la Flor: In that case, we will not let you in alone again.

+
+ +
+ 321. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for + Inter-American Affairs (Shlaudeman) to Secretary of State Kissinger + +

Summary: Shlaudeman outlined two different policy options + regarding prospective Peruvian purchases of Soviet aircraft. + Kissinger decided to + wait for an agreement on Marcona before delivering a démarche to + the Peruvians on Soviet arms purchases.

+

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + P760120–0606. Secret. Sent through Maw. Drafted by Shlaudeman, King, and Einaudi on July 22. Pezzullo concurred. Kissinger approved the first + recommendation on July 30. On August 2, Kissinger summarized the + memorandum for the President. (Ibid., P760125–0785) Kissinger’s June 8 + conversation with Pinochet is Document + 228.

+ + + + + Washington, July 21, + 1976. + +

+ Chile-Peru and the Congress +

+

You have asked that we examine what might be done to focus constructive + attention in the Congress on the dangers to regional stability inherent + in Soviet military sales to Peru and the growing imbalance of military + forces between Peru and Chile. An effective Congressional strategy will + require us to address the complex interaction between Chile and Peru and + our own policies.

+

Our Problem

+

For more than two years, we have argued extensively in the Congress that + cutting Chile off from military assistance and supplies would increase regional tensions in + light of the Peruvian arms buildup and the ancient enmities between the + two countries. That argument has had no discernible impact. Key members, + including notably Fascell and + Humphrey, think our case is + a smokescreen designed to permit us to continue bolstering Pinochet’s repressive regime.

+

The growing military imbalance and the potential increased Soviet role + are such as to now offer some prospects of persuading responsible + members that our warnings are not simply deceptions. But the voting in both houses on the recent Security + Assistance legislation demonstrates that our chances for obtaining a + modification in the Chile ban remain virtually nil under prevailing + circumstances. To turn the Congress around on Chile we would + need:

+

—dramatic progress on human rights in Chile, or

+

—much clearer evidence than we have of Peruvian planning for a war of + aggression, plus

+

—an unmistakable record of vigorous US efforts to persuade or coerce Peru + into shutting down its military buildup.

+

What we could automatically expect from Congress at + this point would be demands to cut off military and economic + assistance to Peru. Any such public outcry now would limit our + options, strengthen the Soviet hand, and risk reversing a trend in the + Peruvian domestic political situation that is clearly favorable to other + US interests, and which may also inhibit Peru’s willingness to obtain + Soviet weapons.

+

Our practical options in this situation, therefore, center on a + Congressional strategy carried out in conjunction with measures to + influence both Chile and Peru.

+

Peru and the SU–22

+

The immediate key is what the Peruvian Government does about the Soviet + offer of 30-odd SU–22 fighter-bombers. A purchase of this magnitude + would almost certainly convince the Chileans of Peru’s aggressive + intentions, and would probably set off major political repercussions + throughout South America, possibly leading to a genuine arms race.

+

The moderates now in control in Peru are likely to look more closely at + these implications than their immediate predecessors. They are also + increasingly aware that Peru’s desperate financial condition greatly + increases the economic risks entailed. Hence, presumably, their reported + desire to improve relations with the United States and with their + neighbors.

+

But the incentives remain.

+

—The terms of the Soviet offer are apparently financially attractive.

+

—The latest turn in Peruvian politics does not necessarily mean that + Morales Bermúdez is now in a + secure position. Buying off the generals with new arms and the populace with a “patriotic cause” may + still be a tempting tactic.

+

—Most motives for the buildup, in particular Peru’s fear that Chile might + comply with its apparent commitment to act unilaterally on Bolivia’s + access to the sea, are probably unchanged.

+

In light of these considerations, a Peruvian decision + to back off from SU–22 would be a decisive signal in our + judgment. It would not affect the underlying tensions, but + would materially reduce the likelihood of a major crisis.

+

The Chilean Perspective

+

Following your meeting with Pinochet on June 8, Foreign Minister Carvajal gave Bill Rogers a paper urging that we + “act vigorously before the US Congress” to avoid a prohibition on arms + to Chile in order “to reestablish the historical balance of power + between Chile and Peru.”

+

No actions realistically available to us or to the Chileans over the next + few years can restore that balance. But no balance can be achieved if + either Peru or Chile becomes so isolated that their endemic paranoia + leads them to undertake extreme measures. The current sense of isolation + in both countries is already high.

+

From a Chilean standpoint, the restrictions on military transactions with + us are an incomprehensible—and dangerous—betrayal. The supply of spares + and defensive arms to counter the Peruvian buildup is thus essential to + Chilean stability and the regional balance. And we can + realistically aim at modifying the Chile ban in the FY ’78 security legislation to permit + furnishing spare parts for US-origin equipment and perhaps strictly + defensive anti-tank and anti-aircraft weaponry. + Humphrey has indicated that he + would reconsider the absolute ban next year—but not before—if Chile were + to show credible improvement on the human rights front.

+

The Multilateral Dimension

+

Though vital, arms for Chile will not alone ensure regional stability. + Chile’s drive for security had led it to seek alliances with its + neighbors, and specifically to attempt to engage Bolivia’s desire for an outlet to the sea in a way that would + isolate Peru. And Peru is determined to prevent + Chile from unilaterally turning formerly Peruvian territory over to + Bolivia.

+

In this multi-cornered game, Peru’s potential + purchase of Soviet fighter-bombers is the single most immediately + destabilizing element.

+

Our Objectives

+

In dealing with Peru, we should seek:

+

—to turn off the SU–22 sale, and

+ +

—to persuade the Peruvians that a continuation of their buildup will call + into question their credit worthiness and thus shut off their access to + international financing.

+

In dealing with Chile, we should seek to make + clear to Pinochet that any + significant restoration of Chile’s access to military supplies from the + U.S. will require:

+

—perceived progress on human rights, and

+

—an educational effort to ensure its accurate portrayal to Congress.

+

+ Multilaterally, we should seek to focus regional + and overall Latin American attention on the need for a renewed effort + toward arms limitations.

+

Finally, in dealing with Congress, we should seek + informal consultations so linked to our policy options that they convey + our active concern without precipitating destructive reactions.

+

Our Options

+

The most obvious course of action is immediate + bilateral pressure on Peru. This would involve informing Peru + that we would find further Soviet purchases unacceptable and that + without assurances, including cancellation if necessary of any SU–22 + deal, we would oppose any further public or private U.S. assistance or + credits to Peru. Such a course would naturally be coupled with an + immediate and strong approach to Congress to lift the Chile ban as well + as to inform it on Peru.

+

We believe, however, that such a course of action is unworkable and + possibly self-defeating. Our relations with Peru and our ability to talk + with and influence the Peruvians have been impaired by the dispute over + Marcona. We are now probably too close to a settlement to use that as + leverage to pressure the Peruvians on the SU–22. We could try of course, + just as we could try to stall the U.S. bank loans Peru so desperately + needs until we get some satisfaction.

+

The advanced state of both the Marcona and bank negotiations and the + history of our relationship with the Peruvian military since 1968, + however, strongly suggest that a better tack is to clear the decks of + the Marcona dispute and work from there toward a frank dialogue on the + arms question. Peru’s economic crisis is so severe, + and the commercial banks are so concerned, that we will have ample + opportunity to use economic pressure almost immediately again in any + case. +

+

A second line of approach would be to attempt to develop multilateral pressure on Peru and its neighbors. This + would involve using a variety of instruments (OAS, Inter-American Development Bank, Andean Pact, etc.) + and arguments (Soviet penetration, dangers of regional conflict, + wastefulness of resource diversion to military ends, etc.) to activate + regional concern over arms purchases, and thereby deter Peru from continuing its military + build-up. This approach could possibly also entail a more active U.S. + role in seeking a generally acceptable solution to the issue of + Bolivia’s outlet to the sea.

+

Though elements of such an approach could be useful, we believe it is too + long-term and uncertain to constitute a realistic option.

+

Against this background, we believe the most effective course of action + is to be sought in a combination of phased bilateral + pressure on Peru and selective multilateral and Congressional + consultations. We are therefore developing for your consideration a + series of options on how to:

+

—approach Peru directly on the volume and sources of its arms + purchases;

+

—undertake initial consultations with Venezuela, Colombia and Brazil on + the Peruvian buildup and the prospects for more definitive regional and + inter-American action on arms control; and subsequently

+

—open in coordination with DOD a series + of congressional consultations on the Chile ban, beginning with selected + members of the more conservative armed forces committees.

+

+ The immediacy of Peru’s possible SU–22 purchase, + however, requires us to make a decision now on whether and how to + approach the Peruvians. In particular, we need your guidance on + the relationship of any approach on the SU–22 to the Marcona + negotiations.

+

We have two basic options:

+

+ OPTION ONE: + To approach Peru directly before a Marcona + settlement, without conditioning the settlement itself on + Peru’s not obtaining the SU–22, but making clear that future relations + would be severely impaired should the purchase be made.

+

Pro

+

—would convey our concern in time to affect any impending GOP decision;

+

—would not depend on the still uncertain Marcona time table.

+

Con

+

—might stimulate the GOP to make or + reaffirm an SU–22 purchase out of nationalistic orneriness and prevent + consolidation of moderate tendencies in GOP;

+

—might delay or prevent a Marcona settlement without for the time being + preventing new U.S. private credits.

+

+ OPTION TWO: + To approach the Peruvians soon after the Marcona + settlement. +

+

Pro

+

—does not foreclose our options on whether to approach Peru directly on + the SU–22 or on arms issue in general;

+ +

—would not endanger the Marcona settlement;

+

—would enable us to plan our démarche in a context of greater mutual + confidence.

+

Con

+

—might be too late to prevent a SU–22 purchase.

+

+ Under both options, the nature of our presentations in + the Congress would be heavily influenced by the Peruvian response to + the initial démarche. +

+

Recommendations:

+

That you authorize us to prepare a démarche for delivery in Lima + following settlement of the Marcona dispute (Option + Two)

+ +

ALTERNATIVELY, that we prepare a démarche on the SU–22 purchase for + immediate delivery to the GOP (Option One)

+ + +
+ +
+ 322. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for + Inter-American Affairs (Shlaudeman) and the Director of the Policy Planning + Staff (Lord) to Secretary of + State Kissinger + +

Summary: Shlaudeman and Lord advised Kissinger to stress to + Peruvian officials the negative consequences of their purchase + of SU–22 aircraft from the Soviet Union.

+

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + P760154–1688. Secret. Drafted by Einaudi and Patton. In telegram + 249016 to Lima, October 7, the Department instructed the Embassy + to pass a letter from Kissinger to de la Puente in which Kissinger regretted it was not + possible to meet at the UNGA + in New York. (Ibid., D760378–0001)

+ + + + + Washington, September + 10, 1976. + +

+ Soviet Planes for Peru +

+

This memorandum attempts to clarify our broad options in light of the + virtual certainty that Peru will acquire the SU–22. Because of Marcona + and its side effects, the week ahead is critical.

+

The Peruvian Dynamic

+

The Peruvian Air Force is committed to the SU–22. The purchase will be + virtually impossible to reverse:

+ +

—The Army supports the Air Force. It has already bought T–55 tanks + and a host of lesser Soviet weapons as part of a three-service + modernization plan.

+ +

—The Navy is unhappy at any Soviet connection, but cannot make a + strong case against the purchase. It has just won against the + domestic political left, and cannot convincingly argue that the US + offers a reliable alternative for arms.

+

—President Morales Bermúdez + is uneasy, but may not have the power to enforce a decision against + predominant military opinion. The Air Force has been loyal. Recent + internal troubles make its support more necessary than + ever.

+ +

The GOP knows that the SU–22 purchase + will unleash new tensions. But it calculates that criticism is less + damaging than renewed military dissension—and that real politik confirms that bargains with neighbors are best + made from strength.

+

The chief—indeed probably only—deterrent to final announcement of the + purchase is the balance of payments loan Peru is currently concluding + with foreign commercial banks. Ironically, however, the generous terms + on which the SU–22 is being offered (particularly the moratorium and + lack of down payment), makes it the only aircraft available to Peru + whose acquisition is consistent with the short-term economic austerity + measures the banks support. Most banks have thus apparently been + satisfied by GOP assurances that any + arms purchases will fall within the financial programs submitted to + them.

+

Once Marcona is settled and the loan is secured, the GOP probably also calculates that the + SU–22 purchase will demonstrate domestically that, appearances and press + reports to the contrary, Peru has not mortgaged its independence to the + foreign banks and the United States. In 1974, the purchase of Soviet + tanks offset the Greene + agreement in much the same way.

+

What Can We Do About It?

+

Peru has played its immediate cards well. So long as our conditions are + met, we cannot renege on a Marcona settlement. And the lead American + banks are now irrevocably committed to balance of payments financing for + several months.

+

Our dilemma is increased by the fact that this is the best GOP in years—probably the best we are + likely to get for some time. Except for the SU–22, all signs point to + growing Peruvian realism and desire to accommodate our interests. In + addition, Morales Bermudez’ survival is Peru’s best chance to recuperate + from Velasco short of anarchy or + outright dictatorship.

+

If a purchase is made and we do not react, however, the military rulers + of Peru’s neighbors will be under irresistible pressure to upgrade their + own military capabilities. Our inability to provide anything comparable + to the SU–22—because we do not want to increase the likelihood of + conflict, because Congress limits what we can do, and because we do not, + in fact, have comparable weapons systems readily available to offer—would predictably erode our + influence and perhaps ultimately invite new Soviet credit sales to other + Latin American countries.

+

If, conversely, a purchase is made, and we react by cutting off bilateral + assistance, we would appear to justify Peru’s behavior and lose our + otherwise growing opportunities for influence. Similarly, to create a + stink over a Soviet action we cannot stop or counter directly would only + increase the insecurity of Peru’s neighbors.

+

Like inaction, therefore, obvious attempts to penalize Peru seem likely + to be ineffective and possibly counterproductive. Either course risks + conveying an impression of US impotence and driving Peru—and possibly + some of its neighbors—closer to the Soviet Union, and perhaps to + conflict as well.

+

Our first objective should, therefore, be to try to prevent the + purchase—now, before it is irrevocably made. Given our limited specific + leverage, and the fact that some papers have actually been signed (the + Chileans have even just told us that they have reliable intelligence + that a purchase of 18—not 36—SU–22s is now final), we cannot be very + sanguine at prospects of success. But we must try.

+

Even if the SU–22 purchase is too far along to stop, however, it may not + be too late to minimize its military, psychological and political + impact. The Soviet Union probably hopes to provoke us into measures that + will have the opposite effect. We should not take the bait.

+

Two objectives are central in this regard. The first is to prevent Peru’s + military build-up from leading—however inadvertently—to armed conflict + with Chile or its other neighbors. The second is to limit the Soviet + Union’s opportunity to turn the SU–22 sale to geopolitical advantage. + These more limited objectives depend fundamentally on our ability to + enlist the cooperation of both Peru and Chile.

+

The implications for Carl Maw’s + visit to Lima next week are reasonably clear: We should drive a hard + bargain on Marcona—but should get it, restoring relations to “normal”. + We should then make clear to both Foreign Minister de la Puente (who is + a childhood friend of Morales Bermudez) and Prime Minister Arbulu that, + though we want to cooperate with Peru—even on defense matters—we are + very concerned at the implications of an SU–22 purchase. We should:

+ +

—review all the potential negative consequences of the SU–22 for + Peru’s development, and for its regional and hemispheric + relations;

+

—indicate that you intend to take the situation up personally with + Foreign Minister de la Puente when you see him in New York; and

+

—conclude, without explicit threats, that should Peru make such a + purchase in any case, we will have to draw our own + conclusions.

+ +

Our subsequent actions will clearly have to be guided by the response we + receive. But there can be little doubt that Peru’s military involvement with the Soviet Union will + continue, and that our efforts to limit its consequences will remain a + source of recurring headaches.

+
+ +
+ 323. Editorial Note +

On September 23, the Embassy transmitted the English-language text of a + settlement on the expropriation of the assets of the Marcona mining + company. The Government of Peru agreed to pay Marcona $61.4 million in + compensation. (Telegram 8702 from Lima, September 23; National Archives, + RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D760359–1185) Part of the Government + of Peru’s payment was to come in the form of iron-ore sales. The + Peruvian Government ore-sales entity, MineroPeru Commercial, agreed to + sell 3.74 million tons of Peruvian ore pellets to the Marcona company at + above market-prices. Because a clause in the agreement contained a + Paris-International Chamber of Commerce Arbitration Clause, it could not + be singed in Peru, and therefore would be signed in Panama. (Telegram + 240982 to Panama, September 28; ibid., D760366–0035) On September 30, + the Embassy in Panama notified the Department that the ore-sales + agreement had been signed. (Telegram 6803 from Panama, September 30; + ibid., D760369–0361)

+
+ +
+ 324. Telegram 239313 From the Department of State to the Embassy in + Peru +

Summary: The + Department informed the Embassy that it was encouraged by Peru’s + apparent interest in controlling coca cultivation, and that the + Department thought there was a basis for providing assistance + and developing a comprehensive coca reduction program.

+

Sources: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + D760363–0965. Confidential; Priority. Drafted by Brown; cleared by Weber, King, Bach, Fuller, Sullivan, Ortiz, Fields, Wampler and Pope; approved by Vance. In telegram 7879 from + Lima, September 1, the Embassy reported on Peru’s proposal for + funding, providing personnel, and implementation of a joint + U.S.-Peruvian coca reduction program. (Ibid., + D760332–0269)

+ + + + + Washington, September 25, 1976, 1641Z. + +

239313. Subject: Coca Control Initiative. Ref: Lima 7879; Lima 8045; Lima + 8410; Lima 8584.

+

1. We are encouraged by GOP’s apparent + serious interest in trying to bring coca cultivation under control to + prevent its diversion to cocaine production. There now appears to be a + basis for moving ahead with the GOP to + try to develop a comprehensive program that we could support. Since + there are indications that the GOP + might consider enforcing coca controls at an early stage we would be + willing to consider ways in which we might provide assistance for such + enforcement even before a comprehensive program could be developed or + implemented.

+

2. The Peruvian proposal (Lima 07879 para 14) sets forth basic principles + for developing a comprehensive program most of which we find acceptable. + It should set [the] context for developing a plan of action.

+

3. You may discuss the foregoing with GOP and develop a mutually convenient date for the visit by + our experts to begin preparatory talks. Even before that visit we + believe the Embassy and GOP could begin + to collect and review existing studies on the coca issue. The team would + include an expert on training to discuss the points in that part of the + Peruvian proposal.

+

4. Concerning the association of Attorneys General, we believe the + Peruvian proposal has merit. We would be prepared to cover the expenses + (transportation and lodging) for the first meeting. We would prefer not + to make a commitment now to support the association as a permanent + institution with its own Secretariat. That question, we suggest, would + be appropriate for discussion by the Attorneys General at the first + meeting. We also suggest that participation in the first meeting be + limited to the principal producing, trafficking and consuming countries: + Peru, Bolivia, Ecuador, Colombia, Mexico, Canada and the U.S. Inviting + other countries to join could be subject on the agenda. Mid-October, we believe, is too near to + make the necessary arrangements and we would prefer now to leave the + date to be worked out on the basis earliest convenience to the + participants. We agree Lima would be the appropriate site.

+

5. We believe, as GOP apparently + intends, cocaine problem should be highlighted as principal focus of + meeting to dispel notions of other governments that they are being + excluded from a meeting of direct importance to them.

+

6. Re para 4 above, this cable has not yet received Justice Department + clearance. Therefore, no commitment can be made on level of U.S. + attendance at proposed meeting.

+ + + Kissinger + + +
+ +
+ 325. Telegram 249900 From the Department of State to the Embassy in + Peru +

Summary: Shlaudeman, Maw, and Foreign Minister de + la Puente discussed the Marcona settlement, cooperation on + anti-narcotics programs, and U.S.-Peruvian military + relations.

+

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + D760379–0300. Confidential; Immediate. Drafted by Strasser and Fuller; cleared by Shlaudeman and Luers; approved by Fuller. Repeated to Santiago. + In telegram 8314 from Lima, September 14, Dean advised the Department + that the U.S. Government offer FMS to the Peruvians to preempt a Peruvian claim + that it was forced to buy Soviet aircraft. (Ibid., D760346–1026) + In telegram 8580 from Lima, September 21, Dean proposed the sale of A–4M + and F–5 aircraft. (Ibid.) On September 23, Maw approved a $20 million + FMS credit for Peru for + both FY 1976 and 1977. (Telegram + 234245 to Lima, September 21; Telegram 8678 from Lima, September + 23; ibid., D760356–1154)

+ + + + + Washington, October 7, 1976, 2111Z. + +

249900. Subject: Meeting with Peruvian Foreign Minister in NY.

+

Summary and introduction—there follows MemCon of meeting by Asst. Sec. + Shlaudeman and Security + Assistance Consultant Maw with + Peruvian Foreign Minister Jose de la Puente October 1 in New York. + Discussion ranged from the recent Marcona settlement; through USG Assistance to Peru, particularly in + narcotics field; to the military supply relationship, including Peruvian + purchase of Soviet fighter-bomber.

+

1. Marcona settlement—Mr. Maw + expressed pleasure that the Marcona settlement was now behind us. He + said that the implementing ore-sales contract was at that moment being + signed in Panama. The dispute + was settled in a mutually satisfactory manner. Foreign Minister de la + Puente also expressed satisfaction and called the Marcona settlement “a + model negotiation”, which had laid the basis for further relations + between our two countries. He said US negotiator Maw was firm yet respectful and + praised his great skills in the negotiation.

+

2. US assistance now available—(A) Mr. Maw said with the Marcona dispute behind US, the US + Government can now turn to efforts to help Peru. Mr. Shlaudeman said we are now at a point + where we can intensify relations between our two countries. The US + understands the difficult period through which Peru is going.

+

(B) Mr. Maw told the Foreign + Minister that settlement of the dispute had enabled us to meet the + September 30 deadline to provide FMS + credits to Peru. Mr. Shlaudeman + said that we would soon consider substantial CCC credits for Peru and that two aid loans will also now go forward.

+

3. Narcotics Aid—(A) The Assistant Secretary also announced our intention + to help provide assistance to Peru’s narcotics effort. We consider their + efforts in this area a positive development.

+

(B) The Foreign Minister expressed dismay at the reach of illegal + narcotics networks as far as 800 miles into Peru from Colombia. Mr. + Shlaudeman said this is a + complicated problem, involving the economics of certain areas; the crop + substitution program for producers of coca is an important measure.

+

(C) Mr. Shlaudeman expressed + interest in US-Peruvian cooperation. The USG is prepared to finance a study to define the drug + problem in Peru and how to deal with it. US experts will be going to + Peru for preliminary talks (State 239313).

+

(D) The Foreign Minister asked the appropriate contact point for + cooperation in this matter and was told his Government should deal with + our Embassy in Lima. De la Puente asked who the Peruvian counterparts in + this effort should be. It was agreed that the Peruvian Ministries of + Agriculture and Health were important, but that the coordinating role + for the effort should be the Ministry of Interior, as this was not only + an economic but also an enforcement problem.

+

(E) The Foreign Minister asked if the possibility of international + cooperation in drug enforcement has been examined. Mr. Shlaudeman expressed the belief that + there must be an effort of international organization in this area. The + US supports the idea of regional cooperation in drug enforcement.

+

(F) de la Puente pledged to speak to senior colleagues in the Peruvian + Government about this matter on his return to Lima.

+

(G) Mr. Maw suggested the + desirability of Assistant Secretary Shlaudeman going to Lima in the near future to discuss + this matter. Mr. Shlaudeman said he would be pleased to + go to Lima. The Foreign Minister expressed interest. He is concerned + that not only in the large but also the small towns of Peru the youth + are being attracted to cocaine, and the use of semi-processed cocaine is + common among Peruvian youths.

+

4. Military relationships—(A) Assistant Secretary Shlaudeman expressed interest in + examining the State of US-Peruvian military relations which he + characterized as having been tortured and difficult.

+

(B) Saying that we had received GOP + requests for offers to provide aircraft, Mr. Shlaudeman said that we also have + reports of Peru’s intention to buy Soviet bombers. He said it was + difficult to be competitive with Soviet offers.

+

(C) The Foreign Minister admitted it is hard to beat the Russians. He + said he had spoken the night before with the Chilean Foreign Minister + Carvajal, who said that when + he was Chief of Staff of the Chilean Armed Forces under Allende, he had dealt with the + Russians. The Soviet Military Attaché at that time refused to discuss + the price tag of the items in question or such things as time of + delivery and spare parts arrangements. He just insisted on yes or no + answers concerning Soviet purchases.

+

(D) The Foreign Minister said, however, that the problem of aircraft + purchases goes back over three years. Expressing his desire to be frank, + he said that word had gone out to American, French and British, as well + as the Russians, that Peru would like to replace its aircraft. The US + showed little interest in the request. French and British offers were + too expensive. The Russian offer, however, was extremely attractive.

+

(E) Mr. Shlaudeman said the US is + prepared to make available price and availability data on the A–4 + Skyhawk. We cannot outbid the Soviets, however. Also, the FMS credits being made available are not + sufficient to cover aircraft purchases. Speaking candidly, he said the + USG is not refusing to provide + aircraft, and it is not our position on principle to refuse aircraft to + Peru.

+

(F) de la Puente said Peru’s intention was merely to replace obsolete + aircraft so that Peru will have a relatively respectable air capability + over a period of time.

+

(G) Mr. Maw said that in recent + discussions in Washington, a suggestion had been made to send to Peru a + group of top people to examine questions of availability, price and need + of such purchases. He suggested among this group that General John + Waggener be included. The Foreign Minister said this was excellent. He + thought Prime Minister Morales + Bermúdez would love to have General Waggener and in fact + he knew that Waggener had already spoken to the Prime Minister about + this idea. It was also suggested that General Cavazos of DOD/ISA be part of the mission.

+ +

(H) Mr. Shlaudeman said that the + Soviet SU–22 introduces a new military dimension into the region. It + offers an offensive capability and is more sophisticated and powerful + than aircraft held by Peru’s neighbors. He said he was pleased de la + Puente is talking to Chilean Foreign Minister Carvajal and said that he had + suggested to the Chileans that they talk to the Peruvians and not only + to the US about these matters.

+

(I) Mr. Shlaudeman said that he + hoped the military study mission would be completed before he went to + Peru.

+

(J) The Foreign Minister said he will discuss these proposals with Prime + Minister Morales Bermúdez and he + was sure he would be delighted with them. He expressed the difficulties + inherent in an American offer to replace that of the Soviets’. Though + sympathetic personally to it, he said it would be difficult to convince + the military to accept inferior aircraft at less attractive costs. It + will be especially difficult among the younger officers. The Foreign + Minister said it would not be easy to undo what had already been done + and admitted that the Soviet offer had “placed them in a mess”. He felt + the Soviets had been clever in offering Peru very sophisticated aircraft + (not of the type desired or requested) at bargain-basement prices. It + would now be difficult for Peru to go back on such an offer. Minister de + la Puente expressed concern that the purchase of sophisticated, + offensive aircraft is inconsistent with Peru’s posture on the + diminishing of tensions and on arms reduction in Latin America.

+

(K) Mr. Shlaudeman said that + there has been Peruvian interest in the US F–5 interceptor, which is not + an offensive but a defensive aircraft. The Foreign Minister said that + the US had an upper hand in one area, that of spare parts. The Foreign + Minister asked the Americans to keep close touch in Washington with his + Ambassador. He did not mean that working-level contact with the Peruvian + Air Attaché should cease but thought that the Ambassador had “an overall + approach” to the problem.

+

(L) The Foreign Minister said he would raise this matter within the + Cabinet. (He said he meets once a week with the Prime Minister along + with the three other members of the Junta.)

+

5. Economic relations—(A) Mr. Shlaudeman expressed an interest in further exchange in + areas such as trade and cooperation for development. In response, the + Foreign Minister stated his belief in the value of private foreign + investment—meaning American investment—in the process of Peru’s + development. Development means an increase in productivity. It is + important to expand employment which also has the political effect of + absorbing political demands of the labor sector which had previously + gotten out of hand. He believes Peru has gotten beyond the phase where + there are “good and bad” Peruvians, i.e., workers and managers. Peru + needs foreign companies and recognizes they operate to make a profit. Their objectives can + be harmonized with national interests.

+

(B) Minister de la Puente said the Peruvian system of mini-devaluations + is proving successful. The devaluations are scientifically computed, and + do not provide great unknowns to foreign business. The myth has been + broken that devaluation of currency represents an admission of economic + failure on the part of a country.

+

(C) LOS matters were touched on briefly, + and it was hoped that there might be discussions on this matter in the + future.

+ + + Robinson + + +
+ +
+ 326. Telegram 10217 From the Embassy in Peru to the Department of + State +

Summary: + Dean reported that + U.S.-Peruvian relations had improved during 1976. However, new + problems were emerging, such as human rights and narcotics, + which could complicate future relations.

+

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + D760421–0520. Confidential. Repeated to Brasília, La Paz, Quito, + and Santiago.

+ + + + + Lima, November 9, 1976, 1915Z. + +

10217. Subject: U.S.-Peruvian Relations: Where They Are and Where They + May Be Going.

+

Summary: The Peruvian Government has changed its political course and + economic policies over the last year. The changes are favorable to U.S. + interests and prospects for further improving bilateral relations. The + key to these changes was Peruvian economic difficulties, brought on by + the world economic slump and the GOP’s + own errors. During the next two years or so of recovery efforts the + GOP can be expected to look to the + U.S. for understanding and assistance and bilateral relations should be + better than during the previous eight years. Areas of potential friction + in our bilateral relations include human rights, arms purchases + especially those from the Soviet Union, and narcotics. The Mission + recommends continuance of the present U.S. approach to Peru. We can + exercise some influence but the GOP + will continue to make decisions on the basis of what it sees as domestic + imperatives. End summary.

+ +

Background: The First Phase of the Revolution

+

1. The Peruvian Revolutionary Government of the Armed Forces took power + eight years ago. During the seven years of General Juan Velasco Alvarado’s leadership—now termed + the first phase of the revolution—bilateral U.S.-Peruvian relations were + mediocre at best. This was so even though the U.S. expressed and + demonstrated support for the overall stated goals of the revolution: to + develop the country and bring about full participation by the + people.

+

2. The U.S. did not in fact object in principle to the Revolutionary + Government’s announced determination to end what it saw as excessive + economic and political dependence upon the U.S. The bilateral + difficulties arose and continued because of the means the GOP employed to end its “subservience” to + the U.S. First, the GOP undertook a + series of expropriations of U.S. economic holdings under the general + rubric of gathering unto the Peruvian State all basic industries. + Expropriations began with the International Petroleum Company (IPC), + just six days after the October 3, 1968 coup d’état.

+

3. Compensation to U.S. owners of expropriated property has been at first + denied by the GOP and then has been the + subject of tedious negotiations. It took over five years to reach a + compensation agreement for IPC and other initial expropriations. We have + only just settled the Marcona Mining Company case (expropriated July + 1975). Compensation for the small former Gulf Oil Company holdings taken + in May 1975 is still pending (although the GOP has indicated its desire to reach a settlement + satisfactory to the company).

+

4. The U.S. retaliated against the earlier Peruvian expropriations + without compensation by withholding economic assistance to Peru. (A + complicating, but not directly related factor, was Peruvian seizure of + U.S. tuna boats and our retaliation by cutting off military and economic + aid). As regards later expropriations, U.S. private bankers implicitly + linked balance-of-payments loans that the GOP was seeking to a Marcona settlement.

+

5. A second irritant to bilateral relations was that, in attempting to + reduce or offset traditional U.S. influence in the country, the + Revolutionary Government sought ties with a number of communist + countries, notably the Soviet Union and Cuba. Aside from diplomatic + activity, Cuban influence grew through the activities of civilian + advisors in various ministries and links to the government palace. + Soviet influence waxed through the sale of military equipment and + associated training of Peruvian Military Officers in Peru and the USSR. In seeking a diplomatic + counterweight to the U.S., the Revolutionary Government also sought + membership and then leadership in the non-aligned movement. In return + for what it perceived to be valuable support from its NAM + partners, Peru went along at + least with some NAM moves of no + particular interest to Peru but which were irritating to the U.S.

+

6. Domestically, the GOP welcomed + support from various communist and leftist groups. In return, these + groups enjoyed carte blanch to attack the U.S., particularly in the + press and in public statements. A number of leading military officers in + command and governmental positions were themselves radicals, including + the one-time Prime Minister Fernandez Maldonado and Foreign Minister + Miguel Angel de la Flor. Although not pro-communist, the irrascible, + ultra-nationalist President Velasco permitted and even encouraged anti-U.S. attacks + from all quarters.

+

The Second Phase: Movement Back Toward the + Center

+

7. The low State of U.S.-Peruvian relations began tentatively to change + in August 1975, with the removal by the Armed Forces of President + Velasco and his replacement + by General Francisco Morales Bermudez. Morales Bermudez’ leadership + promised to be somewhat less radical and dogmatic than that of Velasco, more pragmatic, prudent and + predictable. He had the reputation of being a trained economist and + experienced Finance Minister, at a time when there were signs that the + Peruvian economy was in trouble.

+

8. The ambience of U.S.-Peruvian relations was improved in the early + months of the new regime, but it was hard to point to any concrete + measures tending to real improvement until March–April 1976. At that + time the Navy, which had long chafed under the leftward lurches of the + revolution, found enough support among Army leaders to lead a campaign + to force a change in the Directors of the Government-guided newspapers + and a purge of communists and many leftist/anti-U.S. elements in the + press. The Navy and its Army colleagues also forced the scrapping of the + new Revolutionary plan “Tupac Amaru”, which had elements that would have + kept U.S.-Peruvian relations at their low ebb.

+

9. Moderate-to rightist Army leaders set about purging top and then + middle-grade radical officers. In July the leftist Fernandez Maldonado + fell along with others including de la Flor. The moderate General + Guillermo Arbulu Galliani became Prime Minister and a Civilian Career + Diplomat, Jose de la Puente Radbill, was named Foreign Minister.

+

The Economic Crisis: Key to Change

+

10. Meanwhile, the economic situation had become critical, and the GOP frankly recognized it. Civilian + Finance Minister Luis Barua Castaneda correctly ascribed the “crisis” to + a combination of the world recession and consequent lessened demand for + Peruvian raw materials, and to the economic and investment errors of the + first phase. Other spokesmen + including Morales Bermúdez + himself said the same thing. The inescapable conclusion was that things + would have to change. Morales Bermudez’ first, pre-July, prescription, + “the more crisis, the more revolution”, simply would not do.

+

11. Peru had to increase production and exports. Because of one of + Velasco’s last irrational + acts while in office, the nationalization of Marcona, Peru was foregoing + yearly iron exports worth $100 million. Copper prices were down. The + anchoveta fish, basis for Peru’s second largest export, fishmeal, had + disappeared. Petroleum finds were disappointing, particularly since Peru + had invested heavily in an oversized pipeline to bring hoped-for riches + from the jungle over the Andes to the sea. The revolutionary concepts of + social property and industrial community lowered production or at least + did not increase it, while they scared off potential investors. + Agricultural production was not keeping pace with population growth. + Peru simply ran out of foreign exchange, and there was no prospect of + balance-of-payments help from the U.S. and the west while the GOP withheld compensation for Marcona and + continued a revolutionary program that was beyond its means. Economic + help of the kind Peru needed was not available from communist countries + nor, for all Peru’s brandished third-world image, from the Arabs.

+

12. In May and particularly July, Peru began to take the required + measures to put its economic house in order. Devaluation, more + economically rational pricing of food and consumer goods, and + compensation for Marcona are among the more visible measures. One hears + of pending changes in the concept and implementation of social property + and the industrial community. The Commerce Minister talks of incentives + for potential investors, particularly foreign ones.

+

13. Politically, the GOP with moderates + now in control has veered its domestic orientation toward the center. It + has all but ceased attacking the U.S. and has ceased to tolerate the + violent attacks in the media that were a feature of the Velasco period. The GOP has moved against its erstwhile + domestic communist supporters and their foreign, particularly Cuban, + advisors. This has particularly been the case in labor, where the GOP has locked up labor activists for + fomenting strikes that are illegal under the State of Emergency declared + last July and renewed monthly.

+

14. Internationally, the GOP’s move back + toward the center has led Peruvian Foreign Policy to distance itself + somewhat from the non-aligned movement, at least its radicals and those + primarily interested in political as distinct from economic issues. Peru + recently took a relatively moderate position, helpful to the U.S., on + several key issues at the Colombo meeting of the non-aligned and in + UNESCO. President Morales Bermúdez has announced that + the GOP will devote more energies to + relations with its hemispheric neighbors. A program of high-level visits with the Argentines, + Bolivians, Colombians, Chileans, Brazilians and Venezuelans is under + way.

+

Looking Ahead

+

15. The reorientation of Peruvian domestic and foreign policies described + above has meant improvement in U.S.-Peruvian relations. U.S. banks are + prepared to help Peru economically through a $200 million-plus + balance-of-payments loan. Despite this, we believe that Peru will + continue to suffer economic difficulties for at least two years. During + this period the GOP will see a + reasonably friendly political stance toward the U.S. as necessary to + obtain the economic assistance, particularly from U.S. banks and the + IFI’s, that Peru will need. Such a + climate of relative good feeling and intensified cooperation should + permit us to continue and intensify our efforts to lay the foundations + for steadily improving relations over the longer term.

+

16. The current GOP course to lessen + far-leftist influence in the country becomes increasingly more difficult + to reverse because the Morales + Bermúdez government is alienating the left and its + international supporters. These quarters are in turn beginning + (verbally) to attack the Government in retaliation and the distance + between the Revolutionary Government and its erstwhile leftist + supporters is growing.

+

17. As to foreign policy, Peru will probably remain a member of the + non-aligned movement, but it is likely to concentrate on the economic, + “bread and butter” issues of the north-south dialogue. Peru is likely to + exercise a moderating influence as regards political issues that + particularly concern the U.S.

+

18. Regarding relations with the Soviet Union, we think the GOP will be on guard against undue + activities or influence but will seek to maintain a beneficial + relationship. For their part, we think the Soviets will continue to play + for the long term in Peru, seeking to maintain influence in the armed + forces and win friends among middle-grade officers through the arms + assistance and training programs. That means the USSR is likely to continue to offer + attractive arms deals to Peru, and Peru, although increasingly aware of + the constraints and political costs, will be tempted to accept certain + of them for reasons of economics and availability and in the belief that + it can minimize the dangers of concomitant communist influence or + indoctrination.

+

19. Cuba is another matter. The Cubans here have been less patient and + more activist than their Soviet colleagues. It is comparatively cheap + for the GOP to allow relations to + worsen and reduce the Cuban presence here. Peruvian state security could + be enhanced, as some Peruvian military officers now in the ascendency + appreciate. On the other hand, Cuba is likely to try to maintain + influence clandestinely, and may ultimately encourage guerrilla/terrorist groups. If so, + Peruvian relations with Cuba will worsen even more.

+

20. As to the type of Peruvian Government the U.S. is likely to be + dealing with, we do not see any real challenge to continued military + rule, nor any marked disposition among the military to permit a return + to civilian government. We cannot completely discard a military decision + to turn the government back to civilians through some phased election or + simple substitution process, but we do not foresee this for some time to + come. Rather, if Morales + Bermúdez is discredited by failure to cope with the + economic crisis, a group headed by Arbulu or some military troop + commander might displace him. We do not see a strong leftist clique on + the horizon and therefore conclude that if Morales Bermúdez is removed his successor will likely be + a politically moderate-to-rightist figure. It follows that we do not see + a return to the radical policies of Velasco over the next two years.

+

Clouds on the Horizon

+

21. The human rights field may prove troublesome in our bilateral + relations. Up until now Peru’s record has been relatively clean and this + country does not have a tradition of violence or physical abuse. + However, if as we anticipate, the GOP + increasingly restricts the activities of the left, including the labor + left, we may see an action/reaction cycle. This could involve more and + more active leftist reaction to government pressure, more government + pressure, leftist direct action including terrorism/guerrilla activity, + government suppression and possibly even repression. GOP’s decisions are now taken in + consultation with the military commanders, principally the five zone + commanders. This group has in the past shown little regard for + international public opinion when it perceived serious national + questions to be at stake. Thus, Peru could possibly come to be perceived + as a “human rights problem country” with the possible strains on our + bilateral relations that this perception could bring.

+

22. Another potentially troublesome problem may be continued Peruvian + arms purchases, including those from the USSR. U.S. Congressmen and press will probably criticize + such purchases, and the military government’s reaction is likely to be + negative.

+

23. A third cause of possible future friction is the broad narcotics + problem. The illegal over-production of coca leaves by the Peruvian + Campesino is the basis for much of the illicit international cocaine + traffic. Peruvian law enforcement agencies have good programs of + cooperation with the U.S. to combat illegal trafficking. However, Peru + is only just beginning to perceive that it should move to eliminate + illegal coca production, and its adoption of effective control programs + is likely to be slow at best. Some poppies are being planted in the + nearly inaccessible north of + the country, perhaps now solely to supply opium for consumption by the + Chinese community in Lima and Guayaquil. If opium growing continues + unchecked in Peru, however, heroin traffickers may turn here for + supplies.

+

24. The Mission has dealt with various problems areas in our relations + with Peru in the CASP, the narcotics + control plan and in specific messages. A consistent element of our + recommendations and of present U.S. policy toward Peru has been that the + U.S. should deal openly and frankly with the GOP in a continuing dialogue and effort to advance mutual + interests and to resolve problems. We should reiterate our support for + the overall stated aims of the Peruvian revolution (without, however, + endorsing every means the GOP adopts). + We should indicate our willingness to cooperate toward the proclaimed + goals of the revolution within our own real economic and political + limits, and the constraints of Peruvian sovereignty. At the same time, + we should ourselves understand that while U.S.-Peruvian relations are + improved, and while we may have more influence than we did a year ago, + the GOP will still take policy + decisions on the basis of what it sees as domestic imperatives.

+ + + Dean + + + +
+
+ +
+ Uruguay + +
+ 327. Intelligence Memorandum Prepared in the Central Intelligence + Agency +

Summary: The + Central Intelligence Agency described the ongoing crisis between + President Bordaberry and + elements of the Uruguayan military, nominally over the + appointment of a new defense minister. It concluded that + although civilian support for the military position was slim, + the military could still overthrow President Bordaberry if it chose to.

+

Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of Support Services + (DI), Job 79T00861A: Intel Pub Files (1973), Box 4, Folder 30: + Uruguay (Sit Rept 1). Secret; [handling + restriction not declassified].

+ + + + + Washington, February + 9, 1973. + +

Uruguay(Situation Report Number 1—As of 3:00 PM EST)

+

1. President Bordaberry’s + position in his confrontation with the military has continued to + deteriorate as the rebellious generals have stiffened their resolve to + force Bordaberry to back down on + the appointment of retired general Francese as defense minister. As long + as the military remain adamant, Bordaberry’s only way out would be to give in to the + generals’ demand that he dismiss Francese. This would surely mark + Bordaberry as merely a + puppet of the military, although he might save some face by accepting + the collective resignation of the entire 11-member cabinet that was + presented to him this morning. Contacts were made between the rebel + generals and representatives of the military this morning in an apparent + attempt to find a compromise solution.

+

2. The army has taken control of all radio and television stations in the + capital and is using them exclusively to broadcast military communiqués. + The “army and air force commands” have again demanded that the President + fire Defense Minister Francese and have issued a call for their comrades + in the navy to join them. As of 1300 hours, however, the navy continued + its support of the President and had sealed off the port area.

+

3. Most civilian political sectors have expressed their support for the + President, but the Christian Democrats’ newspaper—which usually speaks + for the Frente Amplio, the principal leftist coalition—has sided with + the military. The Communist-controlled labor confederation has announced + that it will declare a general strike if the military seizes power. [less than 1 line not declassified] the Communists + view the strike as a “pro forma” move and do not intend to antagonize + the military by provoking any + violence. The Communists apparently are hopeful that a progressive + nationalist regime would come to power if the military took control and + are prepared to adopt a wait-and-see attitude.

+

4. The army and air force have the power to overthrow President Bordaberry, even if the navy continues + to support him. So far, however, the rebel leaders have focused only on + forcing the removal of the defense minister. Their apparent willingness + to negotiate earlier today indicates that they may be willing to step + back from the brink if Bordaberry gives in to their demand. The armed forces do + not appear to have a plan to govern and might well accept some solution + that gave the military a direct voice in the government but retained a + civilian at the top.

+
+ +
+ 328. Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the Department of + State (Eliot) to the President’s + Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) +

Summary: Eliot + summarized the dispute between President Bordaberry and the different + branches of the military and reported that instructions had been + given to the Embassy to remain neutral.

+

Source: Nixon Library, + NSC-Latin America, Box 796, + Folder 3. Confidential. In a memorandum to Scowcroft on the same date, + Howe reported that there did not appear to be any “foreign + involvement” in the dispute and that it “does not concern + political orientation and factions but rather the degree of + civilian versus military control in the government.” He noted + that Uruguay “has one of the few democratic governments that + have survived in Latin America” but that there appeared “to be + no immediate policy implications for the US.” + (Ibid.)

+ + + + + Washington, February + 9, 1973. + + + SUBJECT + Army and Air Force Insurrection in Uruguay + +

Current Situation:

+

President Bordaberry has sought + and obtained the resignation of Defense Minister Malet and replaced him + with 73-year old retired Army general Francese who served as Minister of + Defense during the late 1960s. Partly due to this act and other + complications, including recent criticism of the Armed Forces by a + Uruguayan Senator, a conflict has developed between the Army of Uruguay, + led by General Cesar Martinez, probably supported by the Air Force, on + the one hand, and President Bordaberry, supported by the Navy, on the other.

+ +

Martinez and the Commander of the Air Force, Brigadier Perez Caldas, have stated that they + would not accept the orders of the new Minister of Defense and have + called for his removal. The President has asked for their resignations + and addressed the nation on radio-TV late February 8, calling for + harmony and public support.

+

The Navy is supporting the constitutional government and has drawn up + forces within part of downtown Montevideo, including the port area. The + Army and Air Force have occupied most of the radio and TV stations in + Montevideo, thus obtaining greater access to the public ear, and have + blocked off part of the city where the main Army base in Montevideo is + located. The Army has called on the Navy to join with it and the Air + Force and to return to its traditional role in the water, reserving to + the Army activities on land, but the Navy has declined. There is some + indication that the Cabinet has resigned to free the President’s hand in + the conflict.

+

This is the first time in recent history that the armed forces of + Uruguay, which have been stimulated by their success against the Tupamaro urban guerillas to greater involvement, + have become politically active. The principal players on the Army side + do not seem to have a significant personal following. If they are + removed from the scene, calm may be restored. Representatives of the + President and the dissidents met late on February 9, and while there has + been no physical conflict between the opposing groups thus far, we are + seriously concerned about the likelihood of the overthrow of the + Bordaberry Government, + although time can be a coolant.

+

Our Role:

+

Our Embassy has been instructed to be careful to avoid being drawn into + the conflict or to be used as an intermediary. We do not wish to get + ourselves into a position where we even appear to be a party to the + demise of Uruguay’s democratic constitutionalism should that take place. + Our Embassy has been authorized to take the line with the Uruguayan Army + leaders of all factions and others that we hope and urge that the + conflict can be resolved within the framework of Uruguay’s great + constitutional tradition and without bloodshed.

+

Probable Orientation of a Military + Government:

+

Should a military takeover occur, we expect that a new government would + probably be more conservative than the Bordaberry government. This general orientation is by no + means a certainty, however, because the leaders of the activist military + appear to have no definite politico-social orientation, other than a + desire for more vigor in the address to Uruguay’s serious social and + economic problems. In any event, the technical and administrative competence of the Uruguayan + military is very much in doubt.

+ + + Theodore L. + Eliot, Jr. + Executive Secretary + + +
+ +
+ 329. Memorandum From Serban + Vallimarescu of the National Security Council Staff to + the President’s Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs + (Scowcroft) +

Summary: Vallimarescu reported on the + situation in Montevideo, analyzed the roots of the conflict and + noted the degree of support for each side.

+

Source: Nixon Library, + NSC-Latin America, Box 796, + Folder 3, Uruguay Vol. I [1 of 2]. Secret. Sent for urgent + information.

+ + + + + Washington, February + 9, 1973. + + + SUBJECT + Uruguayan Situation Report + +

President Bordaberry’s position + in his confrontation with the military appears to have deteriorated as + the rebellious generals have stiffened their determination to force the + President to dismiss retired General Francese as Minister of Defense. As + things stand now it would seem that Bordaberry’s only way out would be to give in to the + generals’ demands. This would certainly mark him as merely a puppet of + the military although he might save some face by accepting the + collective resignation of the entire 11-member Cabinet that was + presented to him this morning. Behind the scene attempts to find a + compromise solution are continuing.

+

A communiqué issued earlier today in the name of “Army and Air Force + Commands” announced that, in view of “false” news reports, the Army and + the Air Force had taken over the broadcast facilities of two major + Montevideo radio stations to broadcast the “true” version of developing + events. While denying that the Army and the Air Force sought to create a + situation of violence or to damage the nation’s institutions, the + communiqué called again for the dismissal of the Minister of Defense. A + second communiqué from the same source made a strong appeal to the Navy + to join the dissident Army and Air Force elements. The Navy Command + flatly rejected the appeal. Our Embassy reports that the Navy’s + barricade of the old city section of Montevideo has been reinforced by the addition of various + heavy vehicles at various intersections near the harbor. Nearly all + Montevideo radio and TV stations are apparently under the control of the + Army and the Air Force and are being used exclusively to broadcast + martial music and military communiqués.

+

Most civilian political sectors have expressed their support for the + President. However, a newspaper which usually speaks for the principal + leftist coalition has sided with the military. The Communist-controlled + labor confederation has announced that it will declare a general strike + if the military seizes power. A clandestine source reports, however, + that the Communists view the strike as a “pro forma” move and do not + intend to antagonize the military by provoking any violence. The + Communists apparently hope that a “progressive” nationalist regime woud + come to power if the military took control. Another clandestine source + reports that journalists linked to the extreme leftist National + Liberation Movement claim that a military coup is inevitable and + represents a great victory for “the forces of national liberation.”

+

Our Embassy in Montevideo has been instructed to be careful to avoid + being drawn into the conflict or to be used as an intermediary. We do + not wish to get ourselves into a position where we even appear to be a + party to the demise of Uruguayan constitutionalism should that take + place. Our Embassy has been authorized to take the line with the + Uruguayan Army leaders of all factions and with others that we hope and + urge that the conflict can be resolved within the framework of Uruguay’s + great constitutional tradition without bloodshed.

+

I should point out that there are no ideological differences between + President Bordaberry and the + senior military leaders. Bordaberry, who was elected President on November 28, + 1971, is a member of the conservative wing of the Colorado Party, one of + the two traditional Uruguayan political parties. He is a staunch + anti-communist and a friend of the United States, as are the military + leaders who are challenging him. The civilian-military conflict has been + developing for the past several months over the military’s insistence + for a more prominent role in the policy-making process. The Army and Air + Force leaders have been actively charging politicians with corruption + and misuse of government funds. They have been unhappy with the slowness + of the executive in investigating their allegations.

+
+ +
+ 330. Telegram 436 From the Embassy in Uruguay to the Department of + State +

Summary: The + Embassy reported that the Uruguayan military, now the dominant + power in Uruguay, shared some elements of a leftist political + orientation with the reformist Peruvian military government. + Ultimately, however, the Embassy concluded that Uruguay’s + military was unwilling to govern directly and too nationalistic + to consciously model itself on the military of any other South + American nation.

+

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files, 1970–73, POL 23–8 UR. Confidential; + Priority; Limdis. Repeated for information to Brasilia, Buenos + Aires, Lima and Southcom. In telegram 519 from Montevideo, + February 16, the Embassy reported that a meeting had taken place + between some leaders of the military and the Convención Nacional + de los Trabajadores (CNT), and + that on February 13 the Central Committee of the Communist Party + of Uruguay (PCU) had declared + its support for some points in the military’s platform. The + Embassy concluded that there was “a coincidence of interests” + between the military, the labor movement and the communist party + that led to “a tactical ‘alliance’ which is very unstable, given + the extreme hostilities which have existed between these groups + in the past.” (Ibid.)

+ + + + + Montevideo, February 11, 1973, 1828Z. + +

436. CINCSO for POLAD. Subject: Preliminary Analysis of + Possible External Orientation of Uruguayan Military. Ref: MVD 2773, 2672, 2621, A–167 of October 7, + 1972.

+

1. Summary: The Uruguayan military group, which has now openly attained + dominant power in Uruguay, share many common characteristics with other + reformist, Latin American military. There are some similarities with the + orientation of the Peruvian Military. Basically, however, the Uruguayan + military at this stage are inward rather than outward looking. They are + highly nationalistic and suspicious of foreign activities. End + summary.

+

2. Speculation that the Peruvian military government is the model for the + Uruguayan military dissidents and that the Uruguayan military want to + set Uruguay on a radical populist, not to say Marxist, left has been + most active in spreading this line. Developments during the past few + days will no doubt reinforce this hypothesis, especially abroad. In my + judgment and based on what we know now and previous service in Peru, + there are some important similarities between the orientation of the + Uruguayan military dissidents and those observed in their Peruvian + brothers-in-arms.

+

3. The Uruguayan military share the conviction of their Peruvian + colleagues that they and only they can save the nation and can identify + disinterestedly with the well-being of the masses. They have some common + group characteristics of idealism, moralism, being thin-skinned, + prideful, suspicious and contemptuous of those not agreeing with them. + They instinctively distrust politicians and businessmen, believing them to be corrupt almost by + definition. They tend to see problems and their solutions in simplistic + and idealized terms as perusal of their policy statements shows. (MVD 429 and 432). We note section of + Army/Air Force communiqué 7773 which reads: “ . . . the Armed Forces + neither adhere nor adjust their mental outlooks to any specific + politically partisan philosophy, but seek to adjust their beliefs and + orient their actions according to the native and original concept of an + ideal Uruguay . . . which will offer the greatest well-being and + happiness to all its sons. This concept will be achieved with the + creation and consolidation in all Uruguayans of the mystique of + Uruguayaness, which consists in recovering the great moral values of + those who forged our nationality and whose basic facets are: patriotism, + austerity, disinterest, generosity, honesty, self-denial and firmness of + character . . . ” They are thus more eclectic than ideological, but + because they desire public support, if not adulation, share a strong + tendency towards demagoguary. They also share a suspicion of foreign + activities in their country and a great desire for independence from any + form of foreign tutelage. As in Peru, the Uruguayan military have made + studies of various aspects of Uruguay’s problems at the Military + Institute for Superior Studies (IMES) under the direction of civilian + instructors, most of whom are believed to have a statist, but not, as in + Peru, Marxist orientation.

+

4. There are also important differences between the Peruvian and + Uruguayan situations. There is a great difference between the two + countries, their cultures and their traditions. The Uruguayan military + must operate in a country having a highly developed institutional + framework, a high degree of civic pride and individual freedom, a + well-educated and sophisticated population, and a strong tradition of + civilian control over the military. The Uruguayan military realize they + will have to rely on civilian collaboration. Apparently at this stage, + they as individuals are not willing to assume direct responsibility for + governing as in Peru.

+

5. If the Uruguayan military were to look abroad for a model, Argentina, + the nation most resembling Uruguay, comes first to mind. However, + Uruguayans are all too aware of the failures of “Argentine Revolution”. + Brazil is an attractive model because it is a working one. However, + Brazil is traditionally feared even more so as its growing power is felt + here. The Uruguayan military, conscious of their nationalistic image, + will not wish to appear open to charges they are the southern appendage + of the northern colossus. Thus, while Brazilian model will have great + influence of Uruguayan military thinking, we doubt there will be an open + identification.

+

6. Peru, on the other hand, is far away. It has a good nationalistic + image acceptable to many political segments in Uruguay, especially on far left and among dissident + youth. It is also widely believed here that “Peruvian Revolution” is a + success. These factors may incline some of the Uruguayan military not to + reject an identification with the Peruvian model, if they believe it is + in their interest to project a radical, revolutionary image. The + Marxists will do everything they can to push for this identification. + However, we expect the Uruguayan military to remain basically + inwardly-oriented and highly nationalistic.

+

7. We shall report soon what we perceive to be the attitudes of the + dissident Uruguayan military towards the U.S. As of now, few of us here + doubt that it will take some time before it will be possible for us to + establish an easy working relationship with this group. We do not + foresee at any time soon that they will drop their disposition to be + highly suspicious of us.

+

8. [less than 1 line not declassified]

+

9. Department may disseminate as desired.

+ + Ortiz + +
+ +
+ 331. Telegram 453 From the Embassy in Uruguay to the Department of + State +

Summary: The + Embassy noted that an agreement between President Bordaberry and the armed + forces had ended the political crisis with minimal changes to + Uruguay’s government institutions or personnel, although the + “locus of power” now rested in the military. The Embassy + recommended that the U.S. adopt “a low-key, business as usual + position” on routine interactions between the two governments + but watch new developments carefully.

+

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files, 1970–73, POL 15 UR. Confidential; + Immediate; Limdis. Repeated Immediate to Southcom and to DIA. In a memorandum to Kissinger, February 13, + Eliot reported many + of the same points about the agreement but made no policy + recommendations. (Nixon + Library, NSC-Latin America, Box + 796, Folder 3, Uruguay Vol. I [1 of 2])

+ + + + + Montevideo, February 13, 1973, 1328Z. + +

453. Subj: Preliminary Recommendations Re U.S. Posture in New Uruguayan + Situation.

+

1. Although it will be some time before the full implications are known, + the “total agreement” reached between the President and the armed forces + has ended Uruguay’s institutional crisis at least temporarily. To all + appearances the agreement essentially preserves the constitutional and + institutional framework. Aside from a few changes in top officials the structure of the GOU has scarcely been altered. Essentially + what has been overturned is not so much the government or the + institutions but the locus of power with the military now dominant over + the civil authority.

+

2. While obviously it is too early to recommend the most advisable + posture in this new situation our current thinking is that we institute + a low-key, business-as-usual position insofar as routine operations are + concerned. Since there has been so little change in the GOU structure, any other position on our + part would seem abnormal. Contrary to our expectations we have received + several friendly feelers from elements of the military dissidents. We + therefore recommend continuation of normal official and personal + relations with GOU officials and + agencies.

+

3. However, immediately ahead we will be faced with other than routine + decisions. As examples, there are pending, requests for naval vessels; + ammunition; offers of equipment under Mimex-Simex; the loan for the Fiat + plant; agricultural commodities, etc. Also we will have to decide the + manner in which we go about dunning the GOU for a ten percent payment on grant military assistance + and the past-due postal debt. As of now we believe we should handle each + such case on an ad-hoc basis. However, we should be very slow in + undertaking any new commitments until the situation is more clear. It + may well develop that at least in the short term our policy objectives + in Uruguay will be easier to accomplish under the system now established + if military pressures on the Uruguayan bureaucracy make it function more + effectively.

+

4. It is worth emphasizing that throughout this crisis the military + dissidents no less than the constituted authorities took great pains to + emphasize their commitment to Uruguay’s legal framework and + constitutional structures. The military have thus far held to this + legalistic line despite great temptations to do otherwise and despite + some elements who favor extra-constitutional actions. This commitment to + legality and constitutional form is to a great extent explained by + Uruguay’s strong democratic traditions. However in my judgment the + military are also influenced by what they believed might be the domestic + and foreign, perhaps especially U.S., reaction to a Golpe in the usual + Latin American sense. Another satisfying result is that; although there + were moments of great tension, restraint avoiding the shedding of blood + was exercised.

+

5. We appreciate Department’s efforts in avoiding public comment that + might complicate our position in the transition period. What has + emerged, we consider, is an Uruguayan solution to an Uruguayan + problem.

+ + Ortiz + +
+ +
+ 332. Telegram 28424 From the Department of State to the Embassy in + Uruguay +

Summary: The + Department of State concurred with the Embassy’s recommendation + that contact with the Uruguayan Government should be normal but + that any new initiatives should wait until developments in + Uruguay were clearer.

+

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files, 1970–73, POL 15 UR. Confidential; Limdis. + Drafted by Stedman and + K.N. Rogers; cleared by Crimmins; and approved by Meyer. Repeated for information + to Southcom. Telegram 453 from the Embassy in Uruguay is Document 331.

+ + + + + Washington, February 14, 1973, 2243Z. + +

28424. Ref: MVD 453. Subject: + Preliminary Recommendations Re U.S. Posture in New Uruguayan + Situation.

+

1. We concur in “wait and see” policy regarding Uruguayan Developments. + Regular contact should be resumed by mission personnel with GOU authorities. Naturally, we will follow + through on any existing commitments, but agree that we should go very + slowly in completing any unfinished business, undertaking any new + initiatives in existing programs, and starting up new activities.

+

2. Pending items in para 3 reftel should be weighed carefully on ad hoc + basis in consultation with US. Dunning GOU on ten percent payment on military assistance and + collection of postal debt appears to US as routine matters to be taken + up as normal business.

+

3. Members country team are commended on excellent reporting.

+

4. We have no intention of making any public comments on Uruguayan + situation. If asked, we will stick to facts as we know them and avoid + interpretation.

+
+ +
+ 333. Memorandum Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency +

Summary: The Central Intelligence + Agency concluded that the February dispute between President + Bordaberry and the + Uruguayan military had ended with the armed forces “in virtual + control of the government,” and that the military would soon + move toward economic reform.

+

Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of Support Services + (DI), Job 79T00861A: Intel Pub Files (1973), Box 11, Folder 1: + The Future Role of the Military in Uruguay. Secret; [handling restriction not declassified]. + Attached notes indicate that the memorandum was distributed to + Kendall, Jorden, + Stedman, Vallimarescu, and Summ.

+ + + + + Washington, April 10, + 1973. + + + SUBJECT + The Future Role of the Military in Uruguay + +

Summary: The military revolt that occurred in mid-February after + President Bordaberry attempted + to stop military meddling in politics has left the armed forces in + virtual control of the government. Bordaberry remains in the presidency only at the + sufferance of the armed services, who appear to want to maintain + civilian institutions intact to give military control of executive + policy a semblance of continued democratic rule and + constitutionality.

+

The vehicle for the military’s direction of government will be a newly + created National Security Council composed of the commanders of the + three branches of service and key cabinet ministers. The military’s + initial interest in civilian matters has been to move against corruption + in and out of government. There are indications, however, that the armed + forces will quickly turn their attention to measures to halt economic + deterioration, which last year was reflected in the 94-percent increase + in the cost of living.

+

It is clear that the military officers now overseeing the government have + the potential to make dramatic changes in Uruguay’s deteriorating + economy. The unanswered question is whether they can bring Uruguay’s + people out of their lethargy and complacency to join in the + struggle.

+

[Omitted here is the body of the memorandum]

+
+ +
+ 334. Telegram 1176 From the Embassy in Uruguay to the Department of + State +

Summary: The + Embassy reported that “a period of relative political calm” had + been reached since the February crisis, and assessed the factors + among the military, President Bordaberry, economic development plans, + political parties, the left, and the public that might influence + future events.

+

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files, 1970–73, POL 14 UR. Confidential. Repeated + for information to Southcom and DIA. Airgram A–27 from Montevideo, March 3, + reported that the rise to power of the military over a civilian + political structure that had seemed stable could be attributed + to a number of factors, including longstanding Uruguayan + economic troubles, the relative prestige of the military versus + the government bureaucracy and politicians, Bordaberry’s lack of + institutional support from a political party, and Bordaberry’s poor management + of the crisis. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files, + 1970–73, POL 15 UR) In telegram + 1199 from Montevideo, April 24, Ortiz reported on his April 20 meeting with + Foreign Minister Blanco. Blanco asserted that Bordaberry had power over the + military, which he described as anti-communist, and that the new + National Security Council (COSENA) would be a useful tool to + curb corruption. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign + Policy File, [no film number])

+ + + + + Montevideo, April 18, 1973, 1940Z. + +

1176. Subj: Uruguay Two Months After the Crisis. Ref: Montevideo’s A–27 + of March 3, 1973.

+

1. Summary: After two turbulent months, a period of relative political + calm has been reached, accompanied by some public optimism that + long-standing problems will at last be attacked. The military’s + leadership has consolidated its central role in the Bordaberry administration and retains + the initiative. However, the current political balance is very fragile + and pressure by the military for reform, action and change could at any + moment provoke a renewal of last February’s serious civilian-military + problems. End summary.

+

2. The traditional suspension of all activities during Holy Week (tourist + week in secular Uruguay) also marks the two-month point since the severe + civilian-military confrontation of early February. The political + situation here remains fluid. However, some conclusions can now be + reached about the “soft golpe” of early February and the changes it has + already produced. There follows an assessment of the various factors + influencing the current political scene and their probable + implications.

+ +

3. The military—Uruguay’s military leadership has emerged from the + conflicts and uncertainties of the past two months with its + determination to press forward with reform and its self-confidence + largely unshaken. The military’s chosen instrument for action—The + National Security Council (COSENA)—has weathered its initial + “shakedown”. The military chiefs appear satisfied with its operation. + Although some complain of the long hours which COSENA meetings take from + their daily schedules, no major + challenges have been mounted to the military’s insistence on a central + role in governmental affairs. President Bordaberry has not sought to assert himself in a manner + contrary to military wishes. The armed forces leadership now admit that + their communiqué of March 23 attacking alleged misuse of privileges on + the part of congressmen boomeranged badly against them. However, they + consider this a tactical error of no larger consequence, except as a + lesson that they are not invulnerable to criticism. They attribute the + relative quiet of the political left as an unwillingness to confront + them on issues of major importance. Two months’ day-to-day involvement + in the governing of the nation has also reduced the aggressive and + somewhat bombastic tunes of the military’s earlier public statements. + Its leadership now appears more reserved, aware of the complexities of + the problems they face and somewhat more wary of such hasty actions as + their March 23 communiqué which leave them open to counterattack and + criticism.

+

4. The play of forces within the ranks of the armed forces’ leadership + remains a subject of endless speculation by those outside the military’s + core group. It is generally agreed that such generals as Cristi, the two + Zubias, Vadora and Army CINC Chiappe Posse represent the + conservative, traditional wing of military thinking, which holds that it + is preferable for armed forces to guide, but not itself direct, the + GOU. On the other hand, Army + General Gregorio Alvarez and Col Ramon Trabal of the Defense + Intelligence Service apparently believe that the accomplishment of the + goals of the military will require the creation of active support by the + masses. They favor more “populist” policies and would see the armed + forces more directly involved in governing. Conflicts between these two + points of view have undoubtedly occurred—General Alvarez implied as much + to the chargé in a recent conversation (being reported separately). As + an example, there was a clear difference of opinion between the two + groups on their approach to the communist-dominated CNT Labor Federation. Following several + meetings between Armed Forces Chiefs and CNT Leaders, a military communiqué was issued which termed + the Armed Forces efforts toward National Development and the activities + of the CNT to be “irreconcilable”. This + indicated that conservative military elements had succeeded in imposing + their views upon those who favored a softer, more conciliatory approach. + Likewise, Col Trabal’s recent request for a tribunal of honor because of + press stories about his over-liberal “influence” was probably designed + to seek the “seal of approval” from more conservative military leaders + on his conduct since last February. For the moment, however, these + differences appear to be more of style and tactics than of substance. + Whatever their internal disagreements, the military’s leadership + continues to march under one banner. These differences are thus far of less importance to them + now than the overriding need to preserve military unity and a common + action front. A very significant but largely unknown factor is the + position of Junior Military Officers. As of now, we believe they are + content with developments.

+

5. The President—President Bordaberry, whose private attitudes during the past two + months have alternated between deep pessimism and bright hope, is + presently in an “up” mood according to sources close to him. Not a + problem-solver himself, he appears increasingly content to rely on the + COSENA mechanism to deal with his administration’s basic problems. As + “Chairman of the Board”, he is closely consulted by the military + leadership. They now speak of him with respect and deny that there was + any intention to replace him during the February crisis. References to + the President as the “jeep” (gree[?], square and driven by the military) + have largely disappeared. The President is cautious in asserting his + personal leadership, probably because he feels it is not needed in the + present situation. His relative inactivity in this regard infuriates + civilian politicians, particularly his continual delays in patronage + matters such as appointments to the boards of autonomous state + enterprises. However, the President, a political conservative himself, + obviously feels at home with his military leaders and not too + uncomfortable in his role as their Senior Advisor.

+

6. The five-year development plan—long term development programs in + Uruguay are traditionally announced with great fanfare and promptly + forgotten. The current plan recently announced by the Bordaberry Administration (MVD 1140) may prove to be no exception. It + does, however, offer a sharp break in philosophy as compared to existng + governmental economic management and therefore could provide some + insight into thoughts of the current military-civilian co-government on + the issue of long-term progress in this country. [less + than 1 line not declassified] that Minister of Economy and + Finances Cohen’s initial interventionist, state-dominated approach to + development was ultimately not accepted as basis for the current plan. + As originally drafted by the office of planning and budget, it posits a + much freer economy in which market factors rather than state + intervention would play a major role. This draft emerged largely + unchanged in its final form, indicating that at least the military + leadership had no basic problems with its philosophy. Though weak in its + specific programs to implement this philosophy, the new development plan + nevertheless gives grounds for some optimism that military leaders do + not now intend to push for increased state inervention in the economy + and its manipulation for short-term goals.

+

7. The traditional parties—political leaders for both the Colorado and + Blanco parties remain + somewhat defensive and highly uncertain about the implications for them + of the military’s new central role. Most are hoping fervently that serious conflicts can be + avoided which could affect the holding of elections in 1976. The + Presidents “national accord” coalition is frayed at the edges, but most + of its members see no alternative but to continue to support the + administration. Blanco + opposition leader Ferreira + Aldunate has now apparently given up any serious hope of + elections before 1976 and continues to seek to build his forces by + across-the-board opposition to President Bordaberry and an open door to disaffected “frente” + elements. One senior Colorado leader, lamenting what he termed the + refusal of the President to assert strong civilian leadership, declared + that the main role of the traditional parties now is to, “shore up the + facade” (of constitutional government). In general, most of these + leaders see the role of civilian politicians in the next few years as + somewhat marginal “whipping boys”. Their main hope now rests with + surviving the next three years until new elections which they believe + can be a vehicle for reassertion of their position.

+

8. The left, the Marxist and non-Marxist left, as represented principally + by the “Frente Amplio”, continues its cautious “open options” stance + toward the military. Earlier optimism regarding possible openings which + the military’s leadership would allow have been greatly dampened by the + armed forces “irreconcilable” position with regard to its actions and + those espoused by the “Frente”. Radical elements within the “Frente + Amplio”, and in other groups such as the CNT and the Communist-dominated [garble] student + federation, continue to press for more vigorous opposition to the armed + forces. Thus far, however, “Frente” leaders have continued to stress the + compatability of their goals with those of the military and to proclaim + a common “anti-oligarchy” front with the armed forces.

+

9. The public—aside from those Uruguayans directly involved in one of the + above groups, the public remains largely indifferent to and on the + margin of current events. Recent opinion surveys indicate public support + for military “guidance” of the government, but rejection of the notion + of the military taking power itself. The public prestige of civilian + politicians has never been lower while that of the armed forces + continues high. Thus far, a majority of Uruguay’s population is much + more concerned with problems of day-to-day living, rather than larger + questions of military or civilian leadership. We do, however, detect + some growing public optimism that some chronic problems may be + improved.

+

10. Perspectives—the present relative tranquility on the Uruguayan + political scene rests upon the fact that none of the major groups + involved see it in their basic interst to disturb the balance. The + military appears satisfied that it retains the upper hand; the President + is content with this situation because it is basically in harmony with + his own political conservatism and goals; leaders of the traditional + parties see the current stability as offering the best hope for 1976 elections; and the left + is anxious not to foreclose any opportunities to strengthen its own + position however, given the military’s insistence on change and reform, + the political situation will not be static but rather dynamic. It is + doubtful that the spindly legs upon which the current balance of forces + rests are elastic enough to survive a major confrontation between any of + the main political forces. A round of serious labor disputes and + strikes, refusal by the Congress to approve new law considered essential + by the military, frustrations within military or with the bureaucracy in + implementing the military’s program, all could provide the spark for a + new and serious political crisis. Despite the military leaders’ hopes to + guide rather than govern, the current political situation remains + unstable. When new disequilibriums arise in the present balance of + forces, the military may well be drawn further and further toward direct + control of the government.

+
+ +
+ 335. Telegram 2025 From the Embassy in Uruguay to the Department of + State +

Summary: The + Embassy reported that the Uruguayan crisis, which culminated in + the June 27 closure of Congress, had reached a decisive stage + but it was unclear what the final outcome would be. Ortiz recommended that, if + President Bordaberry and + Foreign Minister Blanco + made the traditional courtesy call at the Embassy on July 4, he + emphasize the “common commitment to democratic ideals” shared by + the two countries.

+

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + [no film number]. Confidential; Immediate; Limdis. Repeated for + information to La Paz.

+ + + + + Montevideo, July 2, 1973, 2034Z. + +

2025. Subject: The United States and Events in Uruguay.

+

1. From our reporting, Dept. is aware that a decisive stage has been + reached in Uruguay’s chronic political and economic crises. The + executive acting with and at the Bhas now taken steps such as the + dissolution of the Congress and of the powerful communist-dominated + labor confederation (CNT) from which + retreat seems inconceivable. Problems affecting the general population + such as shortages of essential goods and food-stuffs, interruption in + essential services and work stoppages are also being confronted with + unusual and unexpected vigor. After several days of almost complete + general work stoppages, the city is returning to normal. Most + indications that we have are that the population at large is either + supporting the actions of the military, particularly those affecting their daily + necessities, or is apathetic to them. There is a disposition to accept + the assurances of the President that the illegal measures taken were + necessary and temporary and that there will be a return to the + traditional democratic forms. The opposition groups, the leaders of + which are in hiding, are in a state of shock over the suddenness and the + sweeping nature of the government’s moves, but seem to be organizing to + present a united front. There is as yet very little publicly expressed + opposition, mostly because the opposition press organs are not + publishing. However, it is much too soon to determine what the eventual + outcome of this hardline policy will be. We have no doubt that Uruguay + is in for many months—if not years—of renewed severe pressures and + tension. There is some chance that the general situation will improve, + especially if the Uruguayans are able to work and produce in peace.

+

2. As we view this still developing situation, it is clear that the + essential factors and interests at play are almost exclusively of + domestic Uruguayan concern. Soviet support of the Uruguayan Communist + Party and its involvement in the Uruguayan Labor movement is a special + factor, but does not detract from our view that at play here is an + attempt by Uruguayans to find Uruguayan solutions to Uruguayan problems. + This Embassy, therefore, has maintained the position of a careful + observer of developments. We are refraining from giving any indications + or any grounds for suspicion that we are in any way intervening in + developments here.

+

3. The Department’s attention is directed to following situation which + could arise. On morning of July 4, if the normal precedent is followed + (and this year there would be every reason for it to be broken), I can + expect a call on me by President Bordaberry and Foreign Minister Blanco on the occasion of the + celebration of our National Day. In past years, the President and FonMin + have made a 15–20 minute call at the Embassy residence an hour or so + before our diplomatic reception begins. On these occasions, the + President and FonMin have usually conversed on matters of small moment + and in platitudinous terms.

+

4. Should the President who was invited weeks ago decide to come call day + after tomorrow, I do not see how reference to the momentous current + events in Uruguay can be avoided. I will listen attentively to the + President’s comments. Should the President ask me how the U.S. views + current developments, I would propose to answer along the following + lines: The United States is traditionally bound to Uruguay by many + strong fraternal ties based upon our common commitment to democratic + ideals. The two nations share common aspirations and common + institutions. What is currently taking place in Uruguay is a process + arising from purely internal Uruguayan conditions and it will be + resolved bearing Uruguay’s own best interests in mind. The United States is following events with + close attention and we are confident that solutions meeting with the + approval of a majority of the Uruguayans will be reached.

+

5. Request the Department’s earliest guidance.

+ + Ortiz + +
+ +
+ 336. Telegram 130541 From the Department of State to the Embassy in + Uruguay +

Summary: The + Department concurred with the Embassy’s recommendation on how to + respond to President Bordaberry’s potential inquiry, with a few + caveats.

+

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + [no film number]. Confidential; Immediate; Limdis. Drafted by + Kenneth N. Rogers of ARA/LA/APU; approved by Hurwitch; and cleared by Stedman. The full text of + Nixon’s speech is in + Public Papers: Nixon, 1969, pp + 887–891. Telegram 2025 from the Embassy in Uruguay to the + Department of State is Document + 335.

+ + + + + Washington, July 3, 1973, 2103Z. + +

130541. Subject: July 4 Meeting. Ref: Montevideo 2025.

+

1. If President Bordaberry calls + and asks you how the US views current developments in Uruguay, you may + respond as you have indicated in para 4, except that you should not + repeat not indicate that the US shares with Uruguay common institutions + and commitment to democratic ideals. You should convey that we are + interested in events in Uruguay and concerned about the future. You + should avoid giving the impression that we are indifferent to the + closing of the legislature. You should also convey the impression that + we have for Uruguay every good wish for the future.

+

2. You should also refer to President Nixon’s October 1969 speech on the general attitude of + the US government to internal governmental changes in Latin America when + the President said “. . . we must deal realistically with governments in + the inter-American system as they are. We have, of course, . . . a + preference for democratic procedures. . .”

+ + + Rush + + +
+ +
+ 337. Telegram 2164 From the Embassy in Uruguay to the Department of + State +

Summary: + Ortiz reported on + his conversation with Defense Minister Ravenna, who explained the + Bordaberry + administration’s economic and social goals and its reasons for + the suppression of opposition parties.

+

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + [no film number]. Confidential. Repeated for information to + Brasilia, Buenos Aires, La Paz, and Southcom.

+ + + + + Montevideo, July 13, 1973, 1917Z. + +

2164. Subject: Defense Minister’s Views on Current Situation. Ref: + Montevideo 2148.

+

1. On July 11, Minister of Defense Walter + Ravenna asked me to come in to discuss a hospital + supplies problem in which he is personally interested (see septels). + Ravenna, who is one of + leading civilian figures of the GOU, + took the occasion for a lucid exposition of the Bordaberry Administration’s goals and + tactics. He spoke with great conviction. Highlights of the conversation + follow:

+

2. DefMin said it was very important for the U.S. to understand precisely + what was going on in Uruguay and what issues were at stake. He said + there currently existed a “state of war over the future of Uruguay’s + economic development”. At issue was whether or not Uruguay would be able + to develop economically, socially and politically or would be condemned + to continued stagnation and ultimate ruin. He said Uruguay’s situation + was not like Vietnam although the “war” was against Marxist subversion. + As a long-time friend of the US, he sincerely believed that the outcome + was of significance to the US interests in the Southern Cone of South + America. Uruguay would remain an outpost of democracy which, in view of + the situation in Chile and Argentina, was a factor of importance. + Speaking with feeling, Ravenna + said that President Bordaberry, + with the full support of the armed forces, was determined to uproot the + Marxist infiltration of Uruguayan society which had done such enormous + damage to the country. There was no turning back possible; there would + be no mediation or negotiation. A set of priority goals had been + established, starting with labor, and eventually to encompass the + educational sector. These goals would be achieved at a controlled pace + and President Bordaberry sets + the pace. The President was personally committed to this great national + struggle and knew he had the support of the vast majority of + Uruguayans.

+

3. Ravenna said strike reports and + accounts of disturbances were greatly exaggerated. The interior was + practically 100 percent normal and fully supported the government’s + actions. In Montevideo the center of Marxists penetration the government’s tactics + were slowly but surely breaking the power of the extreme leftist labor + leaders and there was no doubt that the government would prevail. + Ravenna said it was important + to bear in mind that many of the Marxist leaders were Maoists and + further to the left than communists.

+

4. The principal goal of the difficult task undertaken by the military + was to create in Uruguay a climate in which capital could be formed and + investments made, jobs created and opportunities opened up. Foreign + investment would be welcomed under set rules. Drastic measures were + required if this goal is to be achieved.

+

5. Ravenna said US comprehension + of the stakes in play and the goals to be achieved was very important + and he was sure the Embassy was so advising the USG.

+

6. I asked Dr. Ravenna where the + actions against the opposition Blanco party fit into the description of the situation + he had just given me. He replied that the Blancos were badly split, that + one faction had gone so far as to form an alliance with the “Frente + Amplio” but that a majority of the Blanco Party members who could not stomach such an + alliance were joining the Etchegoyan faction which was supporting + President Bordaberry. He said + the democratic sensibilities of many Uruguayans were affected by drastic + measures that had had to be taken but that there had been a general + rallying to the government.

+

7. Comment: Ravenna is one of the + best friends the US has in Uruguay. He is a straight-talking, sincere + man who has a distinguished record of public service. I would like to + believe that he has considerable influence in the councils of + government, particularly on the military. His balanced views, + sophistication and good judgment are important qualities at this time. I + report his views as I consider them to be a good statement of the + administration’s goals and actions as he conceives them to be.

+ + Ortiz + +
+ +
+ 338. Telegram 205744 From the Department of State to the Embassy in + Uruguay +

Summary: During + an October 15 meeting with Kubisch, Uruguayan Ambassador Luisi suggested that the U.S. + could encourage the Government of Uruguay by converting part of + its military sales program into a grant program. Kubisch replied that the U.S. + would consider any proposal Uruguay wished to bring, but that a + new grant program was unrealistic.

+

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + [no film number]. Confidential; Priority; Limdis. Drafted by + Rogers; approved by Kubisch; and cleared by Bowdler and in OSD/ISA. + Uruguayan Foreign Minister Blanco also met with Kubisch and Bowdler at the Department on + September 28, 1973. See telegram 195330 to Montevideo, October + 1. (Ibid.)

+ + + + + Washington, October 17, 1973, 1801Z. + +

205744. Subject: Ambassador Luisi + Calls On Asst. Sec. Kubisch.

+

1. On October 15, Uruguayan Ambassador Hector + Luisi called on Asst. Sec. Kubisch at the Department. Ambassador Luisi told Mr. Kubisch that his resignation as + Ambassador, now three months old, had not been accepted. He said that he + had submitted it because of his unhappiness over events in his nation + during the recent past, but that of late he was encouraged by efforts of + military and civilian leaders to work in harmony toward solutions of + problems. He said that he had hope for the future of his country and + would serve Uruguay to the best of his ability so long as he was + Ambassador.

+

2. Ambassador Luisi said that he + had been concerned about the situation in Chile and Argentina, and + possible effect that could have on Uruguay, but that he was pleased that + the Uruguayan army had not yet been engaged in excesses or executions. + He said he was encouraged with the progress of the preliminary talks on + the matter of rescheduling foreign military sales credit arrearages + here, and in that connection he visited Ambassador Robert Hill, Assistant Secretary of + Defense for International Security Affairs, on October 10.

+

3. Ambassador Luisi told Assistant + Secretary Kubisch that he had + informed his government that the USG + had responded to events in Uruguay these past months with “sad + pragmatism” and that he had wanted the activist military leaders to + understand USG concern. He also said + that he hoped that US military officers assigned in Uruguay might + improve contacts with the Uruguayan military which he thought was now + lacking partly due to aloofness and uncertainty on the part of the + Uruguayan military. Such improved contacts, he thought, might have a + stabilizing influence.

+

4. In order to encourage the Government of Uruguay, he wondered if a + “gesture” of understanding could be made by the USG. He first suggested that such a gesture would be to convert part of the foreign + military assistance sales program to a grant program.

+

5. Asst. Sec. Kubisch said that + he was pleased that Ambassador Luisi had visited Ambassador Hill. The Asst. Sec. praised + Ambassador Luisi for his personal + and official representation in behalf of his government in Washington + during the past five years. Mr. Kubisch said that the US has cherished its friendship + for Uruguay over many decades and that we had great respect for that + nation and admiration for its democratic institutions and social + progress. Mr. Kubisch added that + although we could hardly take comfort from recent developments in + Uruguay, we had, of course, accepted the realities of the present + situation.

+

6. The Asst. Sec. said that we would like to make some appropriate + gesture as Ambassador Luisi had + requested to boost the morale of the government, including the military + interests. He assured Ambassador Luisi that any GOU + proposal would receive sympathetic consideration within the bounds of US + policy and legislative limitations. However, he said, that due to a + number of limitations of which the ambassador was no doubt aware that + entering into a significant new grant program at this juncture was not + possible.

+

7. In response to a question of the Ambassador, Mr. Kubisch said that a low profile theme + for the US in this hemisphere was unrealistic, but that the USG wanted its presence to be constructive + and helpful. Mr. Kubisch hoped + that Uruguay would find its own solutions to its own problems and, + needless to say, the USG would not + interfere in any way in Uruguay’s internal affairs.

+ + + Kissinger + + +
+ +
+ 339. Telegram 3712 From the Embassy in Uruguay to the Department of + State +

Summary: + Ambassador Siracusa + reported on his December 26 conversation with President + Bordaberry, who + argued that the United States should not interpret events in + Uruguay to mean that a military government had been established. + He said that he and other leaders had chosen to try to end + stagnation and to save Uruguay’s democratic institutions, which, + “as they operated, were themselves the real threat to democracy + in Uruguay.”

+

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + [no film number]. Limited Official Use. Repeated to Southcom. + Siracusa presented + his credentials on September 25. In telegram 3341 from + Montevideo, November 12, the Embassy outlined the Bordaberry administration’s + policies in the four months since the Congress had been closed. + It noted that Bordaberry + had often allied himself “with the so-called hardliners,” and + that the President and military leaders together had “proclaimed + in often messianic terms that they are saving Uruguay” and were + “drawing the line for a new morality and new approach to the + country’s problems.” (Ibid.)

+ + + + + Montevideo, December 26, 1973, 1957Z. + +

3712. Subj: Conversation With President Bordaberry.

+

1. President Bordaberry received + me this morning for a half hour courtesy call prior to my departure on + leave. He seemed to me to be relaxed, in good health and to exude an air + of confidence.

+

2. During our conversation I told him that I had made an intensive effort + in my three months here to learn as much as I could about Uruguay, to + meet as many people as possible and to initiate a program of visits to + the interior. I said that I had been very favorably impressed by the + country and its people and by the warmth, friendliness and hospitality + with which I had everywhere been greeted as representative of the United + States. I said also that I, together with my collaborators in the + Embassy, have noted in this time a clear and widespread sense of + optimism, based apparently on the hope and expectation that the + government’s programs will be effective in solving some of the + long-standing, economic problems in the country. However, I said, I + would be less than frank if I did not note at the same time that I had + detected also a certain sadness that Uruguay’s cherished democratic + institutions had been to some extent sacrificed or limted as a price for + the undertakings which were the source of optimism. I said that we had + been studying these developments most carefully and that it was my hope + that we would be justified in providing at least some programs of + assistance for Uruguay. In this regard I said it was my intention, while + in Washington, to support a capital imports loan which is now being + developed by the aid mission with the + President’s economic collaborators. I said I thought, however, that the + encouragement which has been generated by decisions reached at San + Miguel and Nirvana could easily be dissipated if follow-on performance did not produce results within + a reasonable timeframe. In addition, I said, disappointment if results + were not achieved could lead to repercussions of a political nature. + This I observed, was cause for some concern because if such developments + were in turn to lead to repressive acts this could clearly limit the + ability of the USG to collaborate with + Uruguay. I mentioned in this regard especially the sensitivity in the US + Congress on the question of individual liberty and democratic + institutions, a sensitivity which, I said, was even greater after the + events of Chile and especially important because of our long-standing + admiration for Uruguay’s support for democratic institutions.

+

3. President interrupted me at this point to thank me for the frankness + of my remarks. He went on to recall that when I had presented + credentials he had made a particular point of asking, more than anything + else, for understanding (“comprension”) on our part of what was + happening in Uruguay. He said he thought it would be a great mistake if + Americans were to interpret developments here in any way as the + establishment of a military regime in Uruguay. If the military had + wanted to take power, he said, there would have been nothing to prevent + their doing so. The fact is, he said, that the military did not want to + take power, but rather to develop a stronger level of participation in + government by providing the civilian government with the necessary + authority to have a chance of solving the obvious problems which had + been plaguing the country for such a long time and which, in turn, had + produced such grievous episodes as that of the Tupamaros. As for the + dissolution of the Congress, he said, it should be recalled that this is + not precedent setting since it is the third time in this century that it + has happened in Uruguay. After the defeat of the Tupamaros, he said, the + military felt a sense of encouragement as well as a greater + responsibility for a continuing effective role in national affairs. He + said they had backed him in his efforts to consult extensively with the + various political leaders and parties in the country (with the exception + of the communists) in an effort to attack the country’s problems. But + the effort, he said, had been totally unproductive and frustrating as + the politicians simply wanted to go on playing their personal form of + politics as usual and ignoring the country’s real needs. He said the + situation had truly arrived at the border of chaos and that had drastic + action not been taken the country would eventually have been faced with + acceptance of chronic anarchy or a truly military takeover as + alternative. He hoped fervently, he said, that the US would understand + the choices that he and his collaborators had been confronted with and + would view with sympathy and support to the extent possible their + efforts to save Uruguay from destroying itself. In the long run, he + said, everything they have done has really been an effort to end the stagnation of more than two + decades and to save Uruguay’s democratic traditions and institutions + rather than do violence to them. In a sense, he said, these + institutions, as they operated, were themselves the real threat to + democracy in Uruguay.

+

4. The President then went on to say that he hoped we would be able to + collaborate not only in the economic field but in the military field as + well. I noted at this point that we had recently done things of a + positive nature such as providing a moratorium and an extension of + amortization time on certain military credits, assisting the Uruguayan + railway in a very promising possibility of rehabilitating rolling stock + from military sources at a minimum of cost and in carrying out certain + public relations activities such as the UNITAS fleet visit, the visit of the Thunderbirds and the + USAFSO parachute team, with the + visit of ranking officers from Southcom. On a continuing basis, I said, + we have been helping the Uruguayan military effectively through the + Mimex program and that I expected momentarily to receive a request for + assistance for the Air Force’s planned acquisition of A–37 jets. The + President said he appreciated these steps and hoped that the US would + understand the very constructive role being played by the Uruguayan + military today. He asked that we look with understanding on their + efforts to provide at least a minimum amount of equipment necessary to + modernize forces sufficiently to permit their carrying out their + essential role in Uruguayan society.

+

5. I told the President that as I had said in the begining our approach + is one of sympathetic understanding and that this includes the necessity + for the military to participate constructively and appropriately in the + government. I said that my comments with respect to assistance should be + taken as indication of our attitude up to now—leaving it to the + Uruguayan government to decide for itself the limits of what is accepted + as an internal matter. I added finally that I had thought it important, + however, to bring to the President’s attention, that this could under + certain circumstances become a delicate matter for the US. The President + replied that he understood perfectly and hoped that the US officials and + press would be as understanding as well.

+

6. In terminating our conversation the President said that he thought + 1973 had surely been the most difficult year he would face in his + presidency. He said he looked forward to 1974 as being a year of + achievement and one which would not present him with the same kinds of + problems and difficult decisions which had characterized 1973.

+ + + Siracusa + + +
+ +
+ 340. Telegram 2224 From the Embassy in Uruguay to the Department of + State +

Summary: The + Embassy reported that military politics and the military + decision-making process were unsettled, which had temporarily + improved President Bordaberry’s position.

+

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + D740218–0183. Confidential. Repeated for information to + Asuncion, Buenos Aires, Brasilia, Southcom, and DIA. Telegram 2233 from + Montevideo, August 8, transmitted the following correction: + “Para 4, reftel, should be corrected to read as follows: + ‘Marcial Bugallo, Minister of Labor until mid-July, told an + EmbOff that he and other ministers repeatedly got calls from the + Joint Staff (ESMACO) urging + a certain action and then from a service CINC or other senior officer + urging a contrary action. The Director of Planning and Budget + recently told the AID rep that + there were some serious doubts in the GOU about approving Navegacion Atlantida’s request + for a sub-loan under AID’s + L–022. That was later followed by an ESMACO officer’s call to the DCM urging Mission approval of the + sub-loan, although the GOU had + not officially determined its position. Several days later, Col. + Cicalese, who serves as Sub-Director of Planning and Budget, + informed the AID rep that the + Director of ESMACO, Brig. + Cardoso, had definitely rejected the company’s request for + GOU approval of the + sub-loan. The military is not united on policy. Siracusa.’” (Ibid., + D740218–0686) Telegram 1658 from Montevideo, June 17, summarized + the apparent resolution of the late May 1974 crisis in which + Bordaberry named + Gen. + Julio Cesar Vadora as + Army CINC and Bordaberry “agreed to + accepting stronger military participation in the government.” + (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + D740158–0610) “Chiappe” refers to the former Army CINC, Lt. Gen. Hugo + Chiappe.

+ + + + + Montevideo, August 8, 1974, 1207Z. + +

2224. Subj: The Uruguayan Military: A Lack Of Cohesion. Ref: MVD 1658.

+

1. Begin summary. The Uruguayan military establishment seems to have + entered a period of indecisiveness, probably due to the fact that the + new, post-Chiappe Army leadership has not yet gone through its shakedown + period and because there still is no agreed position vis-à-vis the + military’s future role in government. At present, the Joint Staff + (ESMACO) makes some decisions, + the service CINC’s others and the + junta de generales (theoretically the military’s focal point for + decision-making) still others. Orders and advice, frequently + conflicting, are passed to civilians in government from various military + sources. The obvious lack of decision and unity temporarily appears to + have given the President a freer hand and he has moved to spark + constitutional reform and to make organizational changes in the past few + weeks. However, the military is well aware of its problem and that very + fact could induce the military establishment to define its position. End + summary.

+

2. With the armed forces having recently moved formally into the economic + decision making process through the economic and social council and + having placed a number of military officers in important government posts, it would seem that + the military is the driving force in the nation’s efforts towards + economic and political change. However, a better description of the + present state of affairs is that the military presence is the spur + prodding such efforts but no one hand is on the reins.

+

3. Following the death of the Vice President in May, a discussion over + succession contributed to serious internal splits in the army and led to + the replacement of army CINC Chiappe + and other senior officers. The military, shaken by its experience, set + up the Junta de Generales, a mechanism designed to give the three + service CINC’s guidance on major + policy and personnel decisions to be conveyed to the President for + implementation. There is evidence that this modus operandi is not + functioning. An ESMACO officer told + the DCM that the system was not + functioning because of the various power centers in the military. + Sometimes ESMACO instructs + ministries to act but matters of greater importance are carried to the + CINC’s for resolution and the + ministries are instructed. However, should any general officer hear + about and disagree with the CINC’s, he + reportedly can take the matter to the junta de generales which + theoretically makes it the major decision-making organ. The very + cumbersomeness of the system is a deterrent to military conciseness and + coherence.

+

4. Marcial Bugallo, Minister of Labor until mid-July, told an EmbOff that + he and other Ministers repeatedly got calls from the Joint Staff (ESMACO) urging a certain action and + then from a service CINC or other + senior officer urging a contrary action. The director of planning and + budget recently told the AID Director + that the military opposed an AID loan + under consideration. That was followed by an ESMACO call to the DCM + urging approval of the loan. The military is not united on policy.

+

5. President Bordaberry addressed + the nation on June 27, urging constitutional reform, and FonMin + Blanco further outlined + administration thinking on the subject in a major address on July 18, + Constitution Day. The executive had cleared both speeches with the + CINC’s. However, the CINC’s failed to clear them down the + line, prompting several ESMACO + officers to protest in writing and one to resign (see IR 6 900 0126 74). + Despite the new mechanism to take and communicate agreed-to armed forces + positions the CINC’s apparently + continue to act on their own or, as some officers claim, they “are being + sold a bill of goods by the smart politicians.”

+

6. On Constitution Day, 4th Division Commander General Alvarez put on a + military show in Maldonado. The principal speaker, a military officer, + in the presence of the Minister of Interior, also a military officer, + praised the armed forces as the leaders of change and the future + directors of the nation. That line is acceptable to many officers, + including key men of flag and + general rank. Nevertheless, Generals Rodolfo and Eduardo Zubia have been + in touch with representatives of the traditional parties, attempting to + establish a dialogue with the politicos. The Colorado Party Directorate + claims that over 80 senior officers, including members of the junta de + generales, are in touch with party people, trying to find a means by + which the military can extricate itself from its predicament with honor + and get the country back on the road to constitutionalism. The armed + forces know where they are but do not seem to be agreed as to where they + should go from here. Dissidents have not been appeased but there is + either a temporary cease-fire or a lack of leadership.

+

7. The Navy, although headed by hard-lining Admirals Gonzalez and Marquiz, remains basically + constitutionalist. Divisions have been serious enough to have caused + some disciplinary incidents. While things have not deteriorated to that + degree in the other services, it is clear that company and field grade + officers are critical of their general and flag rank superios, including + the CINC’s. Another center of + discontent seems to have developed in ESMACO, where a group of fairly senior officers with time + for reflection have been openly critical of the CINC’s failure to staff things before + making decisions.

+

8. The current state of disarray is a two-edged sword for the president. + It gives him more freedom of action and he is moving, having made a + number of organizational and cabinet changes in the past month, and + having sparked the long process of constitutional reform. However, the + deteriorating situation within the military establishment, added to + resentment in some military quarters over recent presidential actions + (and the CINC’s concurrence + therewith), could well force the armed forces into defining their + position. How this might be done and what the end result might be are, + at this point, unpredictable.

+ + + Siracusa + + +
+ +
+ 341. Memorandum of Conversation +

Summary: Kissinger and Blanco discussed the role of the legislative + branch, subversive movements, and Cuba.

+

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + P820125–0458. Confidential; Nodis. Drafted by Bartch; approved by Covey on October 29. + Distributed in S/S and to + Peter Rodman at the + White House. The + meeting took place in the Secretary’s Office. Blanco was in the United + States for the OAS General + Assembly. Telegram 110984 to Montevideo, May 13, gave a + shortened account of the meeting that focused on Blanco’s statements about the + problems of Uruguay and the portion of the conversation + regarding Cuba. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign + Policy File, P850083–2585) A May 9 Briefing Memorandum and + background papers for the meeting are in the National Archives, + RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P820145–0375. The text of + Kissinger’s March 1 + speech, “The United States and Latin America: The New + Oppurtunity,” presented to the Combined Service Club in Houston, + is printed in the Department of State Bulletin, March 24, 1975, pp. + 361–369.

+ + + + + Washington, May 10, 1975, 3–3:45 + p.m. + + + SUBJECT + Uruguayan Foreign Minister’s Bilateral Meeting with the + Secretary + + + PARTICIPANTS + + + + Uruguayans + + Foreign Minister Juan Carlos + Blanco + + Ambassador José Perez + Caldas + + Ambassador (OAS) Mateo + Marquez Sere + + + + + + U.S. + + The Secretary + Assistant Secretary (ARA) + William D. + Rogers + + Ambassador (USOAS) William S. + Mailliard + + Ambassador Ernest V. + Siracusa + + Country Director (ARA–LA/APU) Carl E. Bartch + + + + +

The Secretary: How many Uruguayans are here?

+

Minister Blanco: Three.

+

Ambassador Siracusa: I am half + Uruguayan.

+

The Secretary: Ambassador Siracusa is an outstanding officer. He first came to my + attention because of the excellent reports he did when he was in + Bolivia. I wasn’t in the Department at that time.

+

Minister Blanco: He and I have + an excellent understanding.

+

The Secretary: Mr. Minister, you may sometimes think that we spend more + time with those who disagree with us than with those who agree with us. + And you you would be right. I very much appreciate the strong position + you have taken at the OASGA. It has + been very valuable. Would you like tea or coffee?

+

Minister Blanco: Coffee, + please.

+ +

The Secretary (to an aide): Coffee for everyone except me. Everyone will + drink coffee. That is one of the few things I can act decisively on in + this Department. Our biggest problem in this country is the role of the + legislature. I think Congress is totally overplaying its hand, and there + will be a backlash if this goes on much longer, because I don’t think + the U.S. public wants to see the Executive Branch totally paralyzed in + its conduct of foreign policy. Congress also has internal problems and + is not able to act effectively. Cutting off aid to Turkey must be one of the most insane moves ever + made. Here is a country that is doing nothing to us, that is situated + between the Soviet Union and the Middle East. Why should the U.S. public + care where the dividing line is established in Cyprus? That is what it + is about, you know. This whole move was pushed through by Greek + restaurant owners. The President and I called in Congressional leaders + last October. We were obeying the law, but we didn’t announce it. But + the Congressional leadership has lost control over the House. When Bill + (Ambassador Mailliard) was + there, even three years ago, the leadership could control the Congress. + Today it’s a waste of time for me to spend an hour with the Speaker of + the House. He can’t control anything. Who ever heard of the Greeks + (except as a people, of course)? Bill, what’s happened on the Chilean + determination?

+

Assistant Secretary Rogers: You + have a memorandum on that.

+

The Secretary: Every day I find there is a law that I never heard of + before. Secretary Rogers is an + outstanding man, but he is a lawyer, and when he sees a law, he applies + it immediately. Every day I am stopped from doing something because of + laws I never knew existed. Usually if you throw something into the State + Department, it takes three weeks to come out again, but if there is a + law involved, it is acted upon immediately.

+

Minister Blanco: I read your + Houston speech with great interest, Mr. Secretary, and I was + particularly interested in your statement that in six months you had + appeared before Congressional committees 37 times.

+

The Secretary: I have had another study done since then. In 16 months, I + have met 116 times with Congressional groups including meetings with the + Congressional leadership on human rights, Jewish questions, etc.

+

Minister Blanco: The role and + organization of the legislature also concerns my country, Mr. Secretary, + and Latin America generally. The legislatures were established in the + old days, but now they have to deal with so many modern, complex + problems they can’t understand.

+

The Secretary: Another problem is that they can’t act in any consecutive + fashion. We’re stuck with one law, the action on Turkey for example, and + they have gone on to something else. They have no span of attention, no continuity. They + can only pass laws; they can’t conduct policy.

+

Minister Blanco: Yes, and they + lack the information required to make intelligent decisions.

+

The Secretary: I was invited to meet with some Senators, and there were + four or five presidential candidates present.

+

Ambassador Mailliard: At + least.

+

The Secretary: There is nothing in the Constitution that says the Senate + has the right to give its advice and consent on policy. That only + applies to presidential nominations and treaties. But I didn’t argue the + point, so I went. But they didn’t have any ideas; they didn’t know what + should be done, and they were scared, because they knew that if an + unpopular decision were made, the Jewish community would stick them. So + they were going to leave that up to us. At the end, Senator Mansfield + said what a wonderful meeting it had been, and that I must come back and + see them again when our Middle East policy review has been completed. I + could go there every two weeks, and it wouldn’t help. That is a pity, + because our system of separation of powers used to work beautifully. The + previous leaders could control things.

+

Ambassador Mailliard: Yes, they + used to know what they were doing, and what needed to be done.

+

The Secretary: There used to be three or four strong men in the Congress, + and they could make decisions.

+

Ambassador Mailliard: If + Morgan and I agreed, there + was never any question in the House Foreign Affairs Committee.

+

The Secretary: I was at a meeting chaired by one of the oldest and most + respected members of the Congress, Rep. Mahon, and after I gave my + presentation he congratulated me, but when it came time to vote, he + voted against the position I took. I asked him about it later, and he + said he agreed with me, but as Chairman of the Committee he had to think + about getting reelected two years from now. As long as that is true, you + have to rely on seniority.

+

Minister Blanco: But many + complain about the weaknesses of the seniority system.

+

The Secretary: The Senate can wreck things, but it can’t do anything + constructive because there is never any consensus. The House is even + worse. It is a rabble, with more than 400 members, and even the leaders + don’t know what to do.

+

Ambassador Mailliard: It is a bad + situation, but it may straighten itself out.

+

The Secretary: It is so bad it is bound to change. The Congress has no + public support. The latest poll I saw indicated that only 20 per cent + of those interviewed + thought Congressmen were doing a good job. Even at the height of + Watergate, they ranked lower than Nixon, and it is worse today. If I look on this as a + historian, I wouldn’t bet that the democratic process would survive + another 20 years, at least not in Western Europe. Maybe that doesn’t + apply here.

+

Minister Blanco: Yes, look at + Italy. What we are trying to do at home is to build a new framework, to + strengthen the democratic system.

+

The Secretary: There is no democratic framework in Italy. The bigger + parties cancel each other out, so that a little party with two per cent + of the vote can wreck everything.

+

Minister Blanco: We must meet + the challenge in Western Europe and Latin America to build a strong and + effective democratic system, and to make it work. It is now almost + impossible to do this, and the problem is worse for a small, + underdeveloped country, where an impasse between the executive and + legislative branches stops the whole country.

+

The Secretary: The major problem is that the legislature can’t understand + the problems it has to deal with.

+

Minister Blanco: We are trying + to undertake reforms, including amendments to the Constitution, to + strengthen the democratic process. I met recently with several Senators, + including Senators Jackson and + Javits.

+

The Secretary: What did they want, free emigration of Jews from + Uruguay?

+

Minister Blanco: I know that the + Senate committees have big staffs, and the House has a big staff.

+

The Secretary: Most of the staff is composed of disgruntled former + employees of the Executive Branch, including several ex-Foreign Service + Officers. They go there to pursue their vendettas. Who else would want + to work there? (To Assistant Secretary Rogers) You have several people from ARA over there.

+

Assistant Secretary Rogers: I + don’t think so.

+

The Secretary: Three of the Church Committee staffers are former State + Department employees.

+

Minister Blanco: We need + completely new reforms. We are trying to develop our own solutions to + the political crisis facing Western civilization. The second most + important thing is that we must solve the problem of subversion and + terrorism. Many may have thought when this first started that this only + happened in countries with military governments, or as the result of + tyranny, or because of social injustices. But now we have it in + Argentina, Chile, Paraguay, Bolivia, Venezuela, Colombia, Central + America, Mexico, and even Western Europe.

+

The Secretary: And we’ll have it here sooner or later.

+ +

Minister Blanco: In Western + Europe, it can be stopped without altering the life of the country. But + in our own country, it destroyed our small defenses, and we have had to + fight for our life. We do not ask others to do it for us; we will do it + ourselves, and we will continue to do it. But these subversive movements + are all inter-connected. We can fight them in our country, but it is + difficult when they get assistance from abroad. We had all the evidence + we needed about the assistance the Tupamaros receive from abroad, and + their connection with Havana, and we could have reported on this at the + Quito meeting. But we didn’t want to embarrass the Argentine Foreign + Minister.

+

The Secretary: Let me give you our view on Cuba. We have no illusions + about Cuba. We attach no importance to Cuba from a national point of + view. The Cubans can’t do anything for us, or to us, unless they + establish a Soviet base there.

+

Minister Blanco: Which is not + likely.

+

The Secretary: No. But something must be done to strengthen the + inter-American system. We are not going to lift our blockade in the near + future, certainly not before the next presidential election. Bill + Rogers’ candidate will keep agitating on this, however. He has a great + capacity for picking the wrong issues.

+

Assistant Secretary Rogers: The + Secretary means Senator McGovern. The Senator said that Castro had told him how sorry he was + that McGovern had lost the election.

+

The Secretary: Senator McGovern actually said that?

+

Assistant Secretary Rogers: + Yes.

+

The Secretary: He’ll get even less than 38 per cent next time. Well, Mr. + Minister, this is our attitude on Cuba, and we can understand it if you + have difficulties with it. We may consider lifting sanctions, but we + won’t lift the blockade even if the OAS + removes its sanctions. What the Cubans want from us is trade, you know. + So we may negotiate with Cuba about lifting the blockade, if we can get + something in return. But I don’t see it. Have you discussed our formula + with Minister Blanco?

+

Ambassador Mailliard: I have.

+

Minister Blanco: All of these + formulas are based on the assumption that we must lift the sanctions + imposed on Cuba. But we think that Cuba must make changes in its foreign + policy before the sanctions are lifted, not after. Mr. Secretary, in + your foreign policy speech in Houston, you listed several changes Cuba + must make, but we think these conditions should be fulfilled before we + remove the sanctions. We are too weak to achieve this bilaterally, and + we think the only way to do this is as a prerequisite to lifting + sanctions. That is why we put such great emphasis on multilateral + action.

+

The Secretary: If we enter into bilateral relations with Cuba, that is + one of the things we’ll require—not that the Cubans stop their subversion in the United States, + because they don’t have the capability—but that they stop their + subversion in Latin America. We have no compulsion to establish + relations with Cuba, but if more countries do this on their own, it + weakens the inter-American system. We are now thinking of a formula to + give each state freedom of action. If you vote against this, it won’t + affect our relationship, and we will not be pushing for affirmative + votes.

+

Minister Blanco: Mr. Secretary, + I want you to understand our position.

+

The Secretary: Intellectually, you’re right.

+

Minister Blanco: We think it + extremely important to show how subversion works. If the decision is + taken to lift sanctions, that would weaken our moral strength. We are + trying to show that subversion has foreign support. We’d lose our moral + and political strength if the sanctions are lifted. We are convinced + that the cause we are fighting for is a good cause.

+

The Secretary: We should discuss some time how the left-wing and the + intellectuals are demoralizing public opinion on every issue. In Europe, + 90 per cent of television is controlled by extreme leftists and + intellectuals and they are preventing the public from receiving a fair + perception of events and of reality. I saw a survey of television + programming in the Netherlands, Britain, Germany, and one other country, + and it indicated that nothing favorable about the United States is being + shown. The Viet Cong are depicted as heroes, the United States as an + ogre, and U.S. farmers as being poor and oppressed. I don’t know where + you’d find such farmers in the United States. Only eight per cent of our + population are farmers, and they are not noticeably poor. Perhaps the + Mexicans are. But the left-wing extremists are demoralizing public + conceptions.

+

Minister Blanco: Yes, that is + the point.

+

Assistant Secretary Rogers: Mr. + Minister, the press is waiting downstairs.

+

The Secretary: I want to let you know, personally, Mr. Minister, how much + I appreciate the strength and courage you have displayed at the OASGA.

+

Minister Blanco: Thank you, Mr. + Secretary. We will continue to pursue our present orientation as + strongly as we can.

+
+ +
+ 342. Letter from Russell E. Olson, Political Officer of the Embassy in + Uruguay to Aurelia A. Brazeal, + Country Officer for Uruguay and Paraguay, ARA–LA/APU + +

Summary: Olson responded to Brazeal’s queries on the Embassy’s practices + regarding human rights and on the human rights situation in + Uruguay.

+

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + P840001–0317. Confidential. The July 29 letter from Brazeal to Olson has not been + found. “A–23” refers to a March 8 airgram entitled “Human Rights + and Fundamental Freedoms in Uruguay.” (National Archives, RG 59, + Central Foreign Policy File, P750047–1488)

+ + + + + Montevideo, August 8, + 1975. + + + Dear Rea: + +

The Ambassador, Jim Haahr and I + discussed your letter of July 29 in some depth. Inasmuch as it arrived + only yesterday I will provide herein only a partial response thereto. + And yes, we will review A–23 with a mind to up-dating where + appropriate.

+

With respect to the past we believe we have done a good job. We have + monitored the situation, reported accurately and completely the + information available, provided perspective (not apologies) and made + U.S. views and concerns known to the GOU from lower levels up to the President himself. On the + operational side we (and a GAO team) + took an in-depth look at MAP and found + that we were doing nothing which might contribute to police-type + activities or capabilities. At the same time the GAO concluded that when the Public Safety + program was terminated no facet of it was being carried on through any + type of subterfuge.

+

With respect to the future we have been and will be continuing to follow + leads and compile information with which to keep the Department + informed. However, Rea, we cannot put the Embassy in the position of + becoming a policing or investigatory agency pursuing every rumor of + human rights violations without jeopardizing our larger mission. To + really pursue what would amount to investigations would be + counterproductive as the resentment here would be intense, not because + of fear for what might be uncovered but because it would be considered + unjust foreign intervention not in keeping with proper relations between + friendly states. As you put it so well in the May 10 Luers to Kessler memo, do we really + want to disassociate ourselves from a friendly government? I might add, + particularly in a case when abuses probably are minimal compared with + many other states and where we have limited leverage to begin with. In + summary, we have a larger mission here which we do not wish to + jeopardize.

+ +

The foregoing in no way affects the substance of what we do but rather + the tactics we employ. We will keep the GOU well informed as to our position and will gather + information but we will tread carefully in gathering it.

+

That which follows is an off the top of the head response to the + questions in para 5 of your letter.

+

You ask whether more extreme treatment of prisoners is taking place. + Assuming that there was physical abuse of prisoners in the past, the + answer is no. Are more subversives—economic and political—being + arrested? In the sense of continuing arrests, yes. In the sense of a + higher volume of arrests, no. We believe that the number of arrests has + diminished greatly. On the economic side the only case in months was + Ramon Diaz who was held a few days, was released, and immediately + returned to publishing his economic journal. Political arrests, per se, + are also down to virtually nothing. I can think of none recently. The + arrests of subversives, in this case those who are distributing + communist propaganda, painting walls and the like, continue. However, + there is not a great deal of such activity so there are not many + arrests—compared with a few years ago.

+

There is some torture of prisoners. We are quite sure that a prisoner + died on July 31 as a result of mistreatment and that the Minister of + Interior has ordered an internal investigation. We believe it to be an + isolated case and absolutely contrary to policy and intent.

+

The Council of State Human Rights Committee is functioning. It does + receive reports (confidential) on all arrests of subversives. How + effective it is I don’t know. We have several friends on the committee + and will ferret this out soon.

+

Censorship exists. It is not “creeping” or evolving from the decree to + seize communist literature in the mail.

+

I know of no pattern concerning persons being released. Some leave the + country voluntarily and others stay, get jobs and move back into + society. Many others are given provisional releases before their time is + up and re-enter society. Psychologically this is tough because I assume + they live in constant fear of being picked up again. On the other hand + it probably is no worse than a U.S. prisoner on probation who happens to + draw a particularly tough probation officer who looks for any pretext to + re-commit him.

+

With respect to Aresmendi I do not know the condition of his release. It + may have amounted to voluntary expulsion if that’s not a conflict in + terms. Michelini may just have + rushed off to Argentina without a passport (Uruguayans often use just + their cedulas to travel there) and may not have even tried to obtain a + passport at the Uruguayan Embassy in BA. + We do not know.

+ +

I repeat, the foregoing is off the top of my head. We will up-date A–23 + with the best information available and it will be authoritative as this + is not.

+

Must rush to get this in the pouch. Will keep you posted.

+

Sincerely,

+ + Russell E. Olson + +
+ +
+ 343. Telegram 295966 From the Department of State to the Embassy in + Uruguay +

Summary: The + Department summarized discussions held with Wilson Ferreira Aldunate, + Uruguayan former senator and presidential candidate, on December + 12.

+

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + D750437–0247. Confidential; Immediate. Drafted by Brazeal; approved by Ryan; and cleared by Lister and Bartch. In a memorandum to + Rogers on November 26, Siracusa urged that Ferreira not be “received by anyone in the + Bureau, Department of State, or Executive Branch” since he had + “taken to sniping at the Uruguayan government in a most + irresponsible fashion” and “his reception by anyone in the + Department or Executive Branch would be exploited for personal + propagandistic purposes in a way adverse to our interest.” + (National Archives, RG 59, Human Rights Subject Files 1973–1975, + Lot 77D391, Human Rights—Uruguay) In telegram 291185 to + Montevideo, December 10, the Department responded that Rogers + had declined to see Ferreira, but since “it is our policy to listen + to just about anyone who wishes to talk to us” and since + Ferreira “remains + one of the few non-Marxist political quote figures of importance + unquote,” Ferreira would + be received by lower-level personnel in ARA. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign + Policy File, D750429–0935) In telegram 4266 from Montevideo, + December 11, Siracusa + responded that he believed a meeting with Ferreira “will have a + detrimental effect on our relations with Uruguay” since “he is + on a mission abroad looked upon by the GOU as an effort to defame it.” (National Archives, + RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + D750432–0335)

+ + + + + Washington, December 16, 1975, 1759Z. + +

295966. Subject: Meeting With Wilson + Ferreira. Ref: (A) MVD + 4266, (B) MVD 4080, (C) State + 291185

+

1. APU Country Director, Deputy Director, Desk Officer and George Lister met with Uruguayan + opposition leader Wilson + Ferreira and son Juan Raul Ferreira December 12. + Following are highlights of conversation:

+

A. Ferreira said the primary + purpose of his trip to the US (and Mexico, Columbia, etc.) was to raise + the issue of Human Rights in Uruguay. He made essentially the same + points as reported in reftel B, that between 25–30,000 persons had + passed through Uruguayan jails under the present administration, that + between 5–8,000 persons are normally in jail in Uruguay at any given time, and that torture is a + common practice. Ferreira + mentioned, among others, the specific case of Lopez Balestra, an + ex-congressman, who according to Ferreira was arrested and tortured two months ago. He + also said Uruguay’s population had declined since the present regime + assumed power.

+

B. Ferreira said every Uruguayan + believes the USG is responsible for + keeping the Bordaberry regime in + power. Asked for a specific example, he mentioned the political crisis + of last May. Ferreira stated + that it is commonly believed that the USG intervened to keep Bordaberry in power. He also said the Bordaberry administration has received + more US assistance over the last two years than all previous democratic + Uruguayan Governments. This assistance comes from private US banks, the + USG economic and military + assistance programs, the International Financial Institutions + “indirectly controlled by the US” (e.g. World Bank, IDB)

+

C. The meeting lasted an hour and a half. Ferreira stated he had talked to Senator Kennedy and Congressman Fraser’s Staff Assistant in addition + to others. MemCon follows by Pouch.

+

2. Bartch informed Uruguayan + Minister Talamas (Ambassador was not available) earlier this morning + that meeting had been scheduled at Ferreira’s request. Talamas expressed appreciation for + being notified in advance, and said he would inform Ambassador Perez + Caldas.

+ + + Ingersoll + + +
+ +
+ 344. Telegram 4335 From the Embassy in Uruguay to the Department of + State +

Summary: The + Embassy requested information on the Department’s response to + Ferreira’s charges, + arguing that he had spread rumors alleging the Ambassador’s + involvement in the political crisis of May 1975.

+

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + D750439–0184. Confidential. In telegram 1788 from Montevideo, + May 29, the Embassy reported that the previous weeks’ + confrontation between Bordaberry and the Uruguayan military had been + “a standoff with no clear winners or losers.” (National + Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D750189–0877) + Siracusa was absent + from Uruguay May 2 to May 30. (Telegram 1312 from Montevideo, + April 22, National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + D750141–0068, and telegram 123317 to Montevideo, May 28, + National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + D750185–1028)

+ + + + + Montevideo, December 17, 1975, 1734Z. + +

4335. Subject: Meeting with Wilson + Ferreira. Refs: A) MVD + 4087; B) State 295966.

+

1. Embassy would be interested in learning telegraphically how Department + officers responded to allegations made by Wilson Ferreira December 12 as to U.S. role here (reftel + B, para 1B).

+

2. What Ferreira presented as + statements of fact or general belief are, in fact, rumors generated or + retreaded frequently by Ferreira + and his followers among others. For example, Wilson Ferreira’s supporters were + among those perpetrating rumors that the Ambassador had personally + intervened to secure the Bordaberry regime during the political crisis of last + May. The truth is that the Ambassador was in the United States during + the entire month of May and that the Embassy otherwise took no position + or action whatsoever in regard to this crisis. As for the magnitude of + “US Assistance” being greater than that accorded “all previous + democratic regimes,” we assume Dept. officers were able to correct his + gross misimpression, including the fact that the impact of recently + signed modest aid loans has not in any + way begun to be felt.

+ + + Siracusa + + +
+ +
+ 345. Telegram 298008 From the Department of State to the Embassy in + Uruguay +

Summary: The + Department outlined its response to the charges made by + Ferreira.

+

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + D750441–0200. Confidential. Drafted and approved by Jack M. + Smith of ARA–LA/APU. The + pouched report on the conversation has not been found. Telegram + 4335 from the Embassy in Uruguay to the Department of State is + Document 344.

+ + + + + Washington, December 18, 1975, 1651Z. + +

298008. Subject: Meeting With Wilson + Ferreira. Ref.: Montevideo 4335.

+

1. Department Officers categorically denied Ferreira’s allegations of US involvement in Uruguayan + political crisis of last May and asked him how he got that erroneous + impression. Ferreira replied + that he learned of Embassy involvement from “his own people” in the + GOU, whom he “naturally” could not + identify to US. Department Officers said they were aware from the + Embassy’s reporting that rumors to this effect had been circulated in + Montevideo, but repeated that they were not rpt not true.

+

2. Department Officers informed Ferreira that USG + assistance to Uruguay was very modest indeed. He replied that although + direct USG assistance might be small, + the recent growth of Uruguay’s external debt proves that private lenders + as well as international financial institutions are encouraged to + support Uruguay by the well-known favorable attitude of the USG toward Uruguay. In this connection he + asked why the USG was giving such + strong support to Vegh Villegas. Department Officers replied that the + USG was not supporting Vegh as an + individual, but had given its blessing to Vegh’s economic reform plan, + which promised to pull Uruguay out of the economic stagnation from which + it has been suffering for a number of years.

+

3. More detailed report on the conversation has been air pouched to + you.

+ + + Kissinger + + +
+ +
+ 346. Memorandum from Special Assistant and Human Rights Officer, + Bureau of Inter-American Affairs (Lister) to Deputy Assistant Secretary of State, Bureau + of Inter-American Affairs (Ryan) +

Summary: Lister + outlined to Ryan the + need for a strategy session regarding human rights in + Uruguay.

+

Source: National Archives, RG 59, HA Country Files 1977, Lot + 80D177, Human Rights Uruguay—1976. Confidential. The letters + from Congressman Fraser + and Senator Kennedy and + the Department’s replies were not attached, but some late 1975 + correspondence between Fraser and the Department is in the National + Archives, RG 59, Human Rights Subject Files 1973–1975, Lot + 77D391, Human Rights—Uruguay. In telegram 241 from Montevideo, + January 20, the Embassy summarized the human rights situation in + Uruguay and suggested ways that aid might be targeted to improve human rights in + Uruguay. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + [no film number])

+ + + + + Washington, January + 22, 1976. + + + SUBJECT + Uruguayan Human Rights Strategy Session + +

I think the immediate reason for this session is the need to answer the + two attached letters from Kennedy + and Fraser. The more important + reason is to think over where we are going on Uruguayan human rights, in + general. Some background follows:

+

1. Uruguay is achieving rapidly increasing attention in the international + human rights arena, including the + Hill. There may well be + Congressional hearings on Uruguayan human rights this session.

+

2. WOLA (Joe Eldridge) is already + circulating and ridiculing one of our previous (Oct. 1975) Congressional + responses on the subject as a “whitewash”.

+

3. Amnesty International is making Uruguay a special target this + year.

+

4. The ICJ has taken strong issue with + another of our Congressional letters.

+

5. Montevideo Embassy’s 241 of Jan. 20 deserves careful study.

+

6. In the reply to Fraser, we may + be hit on the second sentence of para. 2 and the first sentence of para + 3. In the reply to Kennedy, we + may be hit on para. 2 of page 2.

+

None of the foregoing is anyone’s fault. But at the moment we are clearly + on a collision course with the Hill and The Movement on this subject. We want to be + sure that what we say now we will be able to, and wish to, defend + later—possibly in public hearings.

+ + + George + Lister + + +
+ +
+ 347. Memorandum of Conversation +

Summary: Siracusa and Blanco discussed human rights.

+

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + P840001–0333. Confidential. Drafted by Siracusa. The meeting took + place at the Foreign Ministry. The memorandum of conversation + was sent to Ingersoll + under a March 4 covering memorandum from Rogers and Wilson, + summarizing Siracusa’s + approach as “quiet diplomacy” and noting that it had been + commended by Rogers. Siracusa was scheduled to meet with Ingersoll on March 10. A + briefing memorandum for that meeting, which describes human + rights as the “one potentially significant issue” in + U.S.-Uruguayan bilateral relations, is in the National Archives, + RG 59, HA Country Files 1977, Lot 80D177, Human Rights + Uruguay—1976.

+ + + + + Montevideo, January + 27, 1976. + + + PARTICIPANTS + The Ambassador + Foreign Minister Juan Carlos + Blanco + + + + SUBJECT + Human Rights + +

I met with Foreign Minister Blanco today for over an hour at my request. The subject + of my call was Human Rights and our discussion was wide-ranging.

+

I began by telling the Minister that I had come on a delicate subject. I + hoped he would understand that I came as a friend of Uruguay and in the + best possible spirit to promote continuation of the good relations which + traditionally existed between our two countries. I was prompted at this + time to raise with him again the subject of human rights by knowledge of + the fact that we had been informed that Amnesty International intends to + launch an all-out campaign against Uruguay on this subject. I have been + given to understand, I said, that this would be the first such campaign + directed at a single country. I am told, I said, that they have + assembled over 100 pages of “documentation” on reported violations since + June 1973 and they claim that this includes 22 deaths by torture. I said + the report is apparently to be released soon and to be given broad + circulation. I said it was my understanding that the Uruguayan Embassy + in Washington is informed of this and that for this reason, perhaps, my + information is not news to the government of Uruguay.

+

I then went on to remind the Minister of the deep moral concern which the + U.S. has always had for the rights of individuals because of its open + democratic and liberal traditions. Recently, I said, this concern has + become even more intensified in the international field because of + circumstances and trends in the world today which have led increasingly to violation of the broad + principles contained in the Universal Declaration on Human Rights. The + concern of the American people, I said, has strong echo in the Congress + as well as in the Executive Branch, and this subject, which can affect + our foreign relations, is becoming a matter of increasing concern to the + Department of State.

+

As U.S. representative in Uruguay, I said, it is my responsibility to + inform my government as best I can of the actual situation in this + country with respect to human rights. At the same time, as a friend of + Uruguay interested in promoting continued good relations, it is also my + responsibility, objectively to try to interpret with sympathy and + understanding the circumstances under which the government of Uruguay is + trying to deal with its problems. I have done this, I said, together + with my associates in an even-handed manner which has, I believe, given + the Department of State a true, unbiased and objective picture of the + situation (in which propagandistic distortions and exaggerations have + been filtered out), and an accurate appreciation of the forces which + have created the situation in Uruguay today characterized by a setting + aside of many traditional institutions, liberties and guarantees. The + serious problem is, I said, that even looked at from the most objective + and considerate point of view one cannot escape the fact that violations + do occur. I noted for example, that in the GOU’s current campaign to counter and expose military, + financial and political activities of the communist party several + hundred people have apparently been arrested. It is commonly believed, I + said (and confirmed to me by direct knowledge of at least one individual + case that I have), that persons taken in this round-up are taken in a + manner which must give concern to human rights. Typically, I said, they + are taken from their homes without warning and thereafter simply + disappear. Their families do not know where they are or what their + circumstances may be. In one case that I am familiar with the family was + finally told, after several weeks, that if they wished to send clothing + and small personal items, they could do so;—but they were not told of + the prisoner’s whereabouts or welfare. Such a situation can apparently + persist for weeks or months, I said. It is to be assumed, I said, that + such people are not arraigned before a judge nor are they, at least at + this stage of their detention, given access to legal advice and + assistance. Even more disturbing, I said, are widespread reports that + such detainees are typically covered immediately with a capucho and that during interrogation they may be + subjected to other forms of pressure including water immersion, the + constant playing of loud volume music in their cells, being forced to + stand on their toes for protracted periods, and threats of physical + abuse. Quite apart from the question of physical torture, about which I + have heard no direct reports, it is clear if there is truth in these + allegations, human rights in general, as they are commonly understood, + are being ignored and + psychological torture, at the very least, is being applied not only to + the prisoners but also to their families. I acknowledged that while the + picture I was painting was a grim one, it did appear that physical + torture, which is commonly believed to have occurred during the height + of the anti-Tupamaros campaign is uncommon if it occurs at all and that + this, presumably, reflects more rigid controls by the GOU. However, I said, it is hard to escape + the conclusion that the lesser, but still harsh, procedures I had + described must at least be condoned by GOU officials and military/police high commands.

+

We briefly discussed AI and I was frank + in telling the Minister that I had found the style of some AI reports to be propagandistic in tone + rather than judicious and even-handed, and their content, as regard + Uruguay, sometimes shockingly exaggerated. On the other hand, I said, I + also know that they have attacked communist countries and others for + human rights violations. AI, I said, is + generally considered humanely inspired although many believe that they + see political motivation and manipulation behind it. In summary I told + the Minister that there is no question on that the forthcoming report of + AI is going to focus attention once + again on the situation in Uruguay and that this kind of attention could + have repercussions harmful to our good relations, especially since, even + when the distortions are filtered out, this will still remain a + considerable residue of truth. Undoubtedly, I said, such a report would + generate strong interest in Congress in knowing exactly what the + situation is here. It could generate interest in the media as well and + there might be a greater than unusual number of foreign correspondents + visiting Uruguay to study this situation. There could then be, I said, + pressure for U.N. action or for study visits by such organizations as + the Red Cross, the Human Rights Committee of the OAS and perhaps by AI and the ICJ. How + Uruguay would react, and the degree of openness with which it would be + willing to give its side of the story, and perhaps, to prove it by + permitting visitations would be greatly important.

+

But most important of all, I said, is the urgency for Uruguay to take + steps now to eliminate such abuses as do occur. In this regard I + suggested that the Uruguayan Government, which seems to me to have the + understanding and support of the overwhelming majority of the Uruguayan + people, should have more confidence in itself and be more open in its + actions in this area. I said that we have always assumed on the basis of + our analysis that crude violations and torture did not reflect the true + policy of the political leaders of this government or military and + police high command; there is, however, evidence already described that + other questionable practices appear to be condoned. We also had been led + to believe that the Council of State charged with a vigilance obligation + in this area had been working to good effect and was itself convinced that it was promptly informed + of new arrests so that it could guarantee the rights of individuals. + Recent experience, I said, seems to suggest that this system has at + least for the moment broken down. I suggested that it would be helpful + if the Uruguayan Government would see to it that clear instructions + forbidding inhumane treatment are given from the top of the government + and through the military hierarchy, and move to provide for disciplinary + action if they are violated.

+

The Minister listened most attentively to all of this. In his own + response he started by saying that he perfectly understood and + appreciated my motives in coming to him and the frankness with which I + had spoken. He said he considered this an act of friendship and that he + would discuss in detail the whole thing with President Bordaberry.

+

He then went on to say that I was absolutely right in the view that the + use of torture is not the policy of the government or of the military or + police high command. He said it is probably true, however, that the + system of information established by the Council of State has recently + broken down. He hoped that I would understand that what he was about to + say was in no way intended to justify torture which must be condemned in + all circumstances—it was intended however to explain why the system of + detention without notice is in fact practiced in Uruguay today.

+

He then described in some detail his theory of the “Third World War” + which he believes is now underway. Nuclear stalemate, and even the + impossibility of conventional warfare which carries within it the + potential for escalation to nuclear exchange, has produced the policy of + détente and all of its implications between + the U.S. and the Soviet Union. But this, he said, had caused warfare of + a different type to break out on a widespread front. This, he said, is + the warfare involving the international communist apparatus which seeks + to exploit any discontent and any opening that it can, anywhere in the + world, to promote its long-range purpose of winning out over the + democratic, free and non-communist world. In a place such as Uruguay, + this took the form of communist providing the Tupamaros (who at the + outset had no political content or plan of government) with a conceptual + framework within which to operate. And in his mind, he said, this is + what amounts to an international conspiracy, backed by communism to + carry out this battle on a worldwide front.

+

The Government of Uruguay, in accordance with this theory and the + evidence of it which they have had all too greatly at hand, actually + considers itself at war with these forces. The purpose, he said, of the + arrest system which is in practice, and including the holding of + prisoners incomunicado for protracted periods, to benefit by the + advantages of cross interrogation. On first interrogation a certain + prisoner may not reveal much of + value; but something said by another may lead to reinterrogation which + will produce something of value and promote a picture of the workings of + the apparatus. This is, he acknowledged, inconsistent with a system of + prompt arraignment and trial of detainees but is believed to be + justified by the threat faced. In all situations of warfare, he said, + acts viewed from the perspective of those at peace appear to be + monstrous. He then repeated with conviction, however, that physical + torture of detainees is against GOU + policy, not knowingly condoned by it and that it occurs at all it is + very rare. He acknowledged, again, however, the other forms of pressure + which I had described do exist.

+

After the Minister had replied I repeated my concern that the spotlight + for human rights violations is going to focus on Uruguay; that however + exaggerated it might be, the residual truth of practices inconsistent + with the Human Rights declaration will put great pressure on the U.S. to + take some stand on this issue. I told him that I for one did not believe + that any form of pressure by governments in this field is likely to be + effective; probably just the reverse, whereas quiet, understanding + diplomatic representations might be productive. But I felt it my duty to + point out that recent legislation did call for some action where “gross + violation” is judged to exist. What “gross violation” might be, I said, + is hard to define.

+

It is my hope, I said, as well as my government’s hope that the + government of Uruguay would act with all promptness in such a way as to + eliminate those violations as may occur, and would act with increasing + openness. I said that I could appreciate his theory of the “Third World + War” but that this clearly had in it the seeds of a self-serving + justification of long-range repression. In all my observations of + current evidence and of history, I said, it has been made clear that + long-term repression ultimately ends in an exaggerated exploitation of + freedom, once the repression is eased, and that this seems to give + advantage to those against whom the repression was aimed all along. I + called attention to current events in Portugal and in Spain in this + regard. I expressed the hope that the Government of Uruguay, being + sufficiently confident in itself, in the support of the people and in + its own authority, would take steps to restore respect for individual + freedoms generally and for the humane treatment of detainees especially. + Having at this time, I said, what appears to me to be the overwhelming + support of the Uruguayan people as well as the requisite authority, the + necessary steps could be taken with minimum threat to internal security + and the long-range restorative objectives of the government which, I + said, I was convinced are aimed at defending cherished traditions of the + Uruguayan people.

+

The meeting ended on the most friendly terms with the Minister again + repeating his appreciation of my having come to him and his promise to discuss the whole issue with + President Bordaberry. I told him + that I would be glad if he or the President thought it to be useful to + discuss the issue with the President himself. +

January 28, 1976. Foreign Minister + Blanco telephoned + me this morning. He said he had had a long and thorough + discussion with the President of the meeting which I had had + with him yesterday. He said the President, like himself, wanted + me to know that he clearly understood and appreciated the + friendly spirit which had motivated my action on this subject + and that he thanked me for it. [Footnote is in the source + text.]

+ +

+
+ +
+ 348. Telegram 1610 From the Embassy in Uruguay to the Department of + State +

Summary: The + Embassy responded to the passage of an amendment in the Foreign + Operations Subcommittee of the Appropriations Committee, House + of Representatives, that would cut off all U.S. military aid and credit sales to Uruguay + for fiscal year 1977. Although the Embassy assumed the + subcommittee had passed the amendment because of its “perception + of the human rights situation in Uruguay,” the Embassy believed + that the amendment would “adversely affect other U.S. interests + without changing the situation it is intended to correct.”

+

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + D760176–0864. Limited Official Use; Priority. In telegram 109861 + to Montevideo, May 5, the Department reported the passage of the + amendment in subcommittee. (National Archives, RG 59, Central + Foreign Policy File, D760173–0911) The amendment was introduced + by Rep. Edward I. Koch of + New York. (Congressional Record, House of + Representatives—Wednesday, May 5, 1976, pp. 12586–12587) + Lister forwarded + Koch’s statement to + Luers and telegram + 1610 on May 7. (National Archives, RG 59, HA Country Files 1977, + Lot 80D177, Human Rights Uruguay—1976)

+ + + + + Montevideo, May 7, 1976, 1428Z. + +

1610. Subj: Amendment Against Military Assistance to Uruguay. Ref: State + 109861.

+

1. Summary: Embassy assumes that the House Foreign Operations + sub-committee based its favorable vote on the Koch Amendment on its (the + sub-committee’s) perception of the human rights situation in Uruguay. We + believe the action to have been ill-founded, first because of a false + impression as to the Uruguayan situation and second because such a + measure, if enacted, would adversely affect other US interests without + changing the situation it is intended to correct. We recommend that the + department ensure that the committee receive a portrayal of the + situation as reported in depth by the Embassy and that the approach used + before a senate committee by James + Wilson last December be reiterated. As the Department is aware, this + Embassy has persistently sought to influence the human rights situation + here by direct, private representations to key officials. End + summary.

+

2. Embassy assumes that the Foreign Operations sub-committee of House + Committee on Appropriations voted to cut off all military assistance and + credit sales to Uruguay for FY 77 on + human rights grounds. We believe the sub-committee decision to have been + ill-founded on two grounds, 1) the nature of the human rights situation + in Uruguay and, 2) the fact that such a measure, if enacted, would have + a negative impact on other US interests without having an offsetting + positive impact on human rights violations.

+

3. We have reported extensively on the human rights situation in Uruguay. + MVD 1343 (Comments on supplementary + ICJ report on Uruguay) is the + latest in this long series of detailed reports. We do not have the + language of the Koch Amendment, + but assume it reflects the view of some sub-committee members that there + is here “a consistent pattern of gross violations of universally + recognized human rights”. We realize this language is open to + interpretation but our view, based on direct knowledge and objective + analysis is that it does not describe the situation in Uruguay + today.

+

4. The influence of the armed forces in the GOU has been reported frequently as has our belief that + neither that influence nor some objectionable practices can be changed + by our cutting assistance in order to apply pressure. Bilateral + diplomacy remains the basic weapon. As the Department told a Senate + committee, we must maintain contact and influence and yet try to + persuade governments who feel strongly besieged that they are following + wrong and self-defeating policies if they violate human rights while + trying to achieve the security they long for.

+

5. We recommend that the Department do what it can to portray to the + committee the situation in Uruguay as we have objectively reported it + and reiterate the approach made by James + Wilson to the sub-committee on Foreign Assistance and + Economic Policy of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee last + December.

+ + + Siracusa + + +
+ +
+ 349. Telegram 2046 From the Embassy in Uruguay to the Department of + State +

Summary: The + Embassy reported that although the GOU could have arranged the deaths of Uruguayan + exiles in Argentina, it had no evidence that the GOU did so. The Embassy doubted + that the GOU would have seen a + need to arrange for their killings, given “the relatively stable + political and security situation here.”

+

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + D760219–0064. Secret; Immediate. Repeated for information to + Asuncion, Brasilia, Buenos Aires, La Paz, and Santiago. In + telegram 137156 to Buenos Aires, Montevideo, Asuncion, Santiago, + Brasilia, and La Paz, June 4, the Department asked whether “the + deaths of political refugees or asylees from your country abroad + could have been arranged by your host government through + institutional ties to groups, governmental or other, in the + country where the deaths took place” and whether the posts had + “evidence to support or deny allegations of international + arrangements among governments to carry out such assassinations + or executions.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign + Policy File, D760214–0807) In telegram 2082 from Montevideo, + June 9, the Embassy noted that although “Uruguayan security + officers have also informed GOA + of such Uruguayans of interest to GOU,” the embassy believed “that such + identification, if it does occur, is for purpose of detention in + Argentina and subsequent interrogation.” (National Archives, RG + 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D760221–1040)

+ + + + + Montevideo, June 7, 1976, 1723Z. + +

2046. Subject: Possible International Implications of Violent Deaths of + Political Figures Abroad. Ref: State 137156.

+

The following sub-paragraphs respond to similarly lettered sub-paragraphs + of para 2 of reftel.

+

A) The deaths of Uruguayan refugees or exiles abroad could have been + arranged by the GOU through + institutional ties to governmental or other groups in Argentina, the + only country in which to our knowledge such exile deaths are known to + have taken place. However, the question is not whether they could have + been arranged but rather were they in fact so arranged. We know of no + evidence to indicate that the recent deaths of Michelini, Gutierrez, and Mr. and Mrs. Whitelaw, have been the + result of any GOU action, or desire, or + by “arrangement”. A source close to the President told us that + speculation in the palace was that an official Argentine group killed + the four acting independently of the GOA; Blanco Party + leaders here close to the murder victims have told us they do not + believe that the GOU was in any way + responsible; [1 line not declassified] that the + killings had been stupid and senseless.” Furthermore, considering the + fact that these persons lived safely in Argentina for a number of years, + and considering the relatively stable political and security situation + here, we see no reason why the GOU + should suddenly take a new and different tack concerning the four. Some + observers here speculate that these people may have been victims of + far-rightist terrorist groups, or death squads, who by killing prominent leftist exiles seek to + demonstrate that Argentina is no safe place for any such; and some + believe these groups act at least within a margin of tolerance by some + levels of Argentine police.

+

B) There have been no known deaths of foreign political refugees or + asylees in Uruguay.

+

C) We have no evidence to support allegations of international + arrangements to carry out such assassinations or executions. [less than 1 line not declassified] indicate that + intelligence is exchanged among official security services and that + Uruguayan officials do travel to Argentina and Chile on occasion to + interrogate Uruguayan prisoners or to obtain results of interrogations + by those officials. [less than 1 line not + declassified] indicate that Uruguayan authorities are opposed + to the killings of any Uruguayans arrested, as they want the prisoners + held as sources of information. These reports therefore tend to deny the + existence of international arrangements to carry out assassinations.

+

D) We do not have evidence of any agreed or standing blanket arrangements + about governments of the area to return political asylees against their + will to their countries of origin. Uruguayan police tell liaison that + they have no such arrangements, and the DATT reports that his contacts have never given any hint of + the possibility that such arrangements exist. [less + than 1 line not declassified] However, that former Argentine + CGT Leader Casildo Herreras, who + arrived here before the coup, had been under surveillance in Uruguay and + was to have been picked up quietly and returned to Argentine + authorities. This was reported as being done at the request of a senior + Argentine official with the approval of President Bordaberry. If true, we consider this + an isolated case; and considering the level to which that request + reportedly went, it seems unlikely that there is any standing + arrangement. This is a technical point, but Herreras was not here at + that time as a refugee or political asylee. He obtained asylum in the + Mexican Embassy after the coup. Also, it is possible that even Herreras + would not have been turned over in a surreptitious manner as a FonOff source told us at the time that + the GOA was considering an extradition + request and according to ARD, a senior + military officer and senior FonOff + official traveled to Buenos Aires to consult with Argentine authorities + concerning Argentine plans for formal extradition proceedings.

+ + + Siracusa + + +
+ +
+ 350. Telegram 16118 From the Delegation of the Secretary of State in + Mexico to the Department of State +

Summary: Kissinger and Blanco discussed the problems of “middle-income + countries,” the political situation in Uruguay, and + Argentina.

+

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + D760225–0603. Confidential; Immediate; Exdis. Repeated for + information to Montevideo. Kissinger and Blanco were both in Chile for the OASGA from June 7–9. Kissinger traveled to Mexico + on June 10 to meet with President Echeverria and senior Mexican + officials.

+ + + + + Mexico City, June 11, 1976, 1742Z. + +

16118. Subject: Secretary’s Bilateral Meeting With Foreign Minister + Blanco.

+

1. Summary: The Secretary (accompanied by Bill Mailliard) met with Foreign Minister Blanco (accompanied by OAS Ambassador Marques Sere) for + approximately an hour on June 10. The bulk of the wide-ranging + discussion centered on internal security, human rights, and terrorism, + and on the particular economic problems of the middle income countries + in ther efforts to obtain their share of international public financing. + End summary.

+

2. Blanco raised with the + secretary his concern over the problems faced today by middle income + countries such as Uruguay. We [asked?] press for increased internal + savings because our middle classes are already heavily pressed by our + open economic policies. Yet because we are not among the poorest + countries we have great difficulty in obtaining access to public + bilateral and international financing. Many Latin American countries are + in the same situation, and find themselves virtually forced into the + arms of the third world if they wish to be heard and have their needs + considered. Thus they are no longer able to serve, as they have so + frequently in the past, as a buffer between the developed countries and + the developing ones.

+

3. The Secretary indicated that he was now focusing on the fact that + aid and Congressional policies + provided for distributing most of U.S. aid funds to the poorest countries. He said that he had no + objection to providing funds to the poorest countries, but suggested + that the USG should make a distinction + between assistance and relief. It is the middle income countries that + stand to make the most progress from assistance.

+

4. Blanco noted that the present + internal situation is a complex one, reflecting a more or less constant + political development process rather than a crisis. (The press several + days ago had given wide play to the fact that Blanco had been paged in the meeting + hall for an urgent call, which turned out to be a request for payment + for a previous call.) There was + some discussion of the situation in Argentina and how that related to + Uruguay’s security problem. Blanco thought stabilization of the Argentine regime + would take some of the pressure off Uruguay but felt that the country + would continue to be under strong pressures because of the long border, + open economic policies and potential problems in Bolivia and Eastern + Peru.

+

5. The Secretary indicated his understanding of the pressures on Uruguay, + but suggested that unless certain minimum standards were observed the + pressures in the United States would become unmanageable and it would be + impossible to do with Uruguay what we wished to do. There would, + however, be no “crusade” on the part of the USDEL. He and Blanco also entered into a wide ranging discussion + concerning the motivation of the present generation of well-educated + middle class origin terrorists.

+ + + Kissinger + + +
+ +
+ 351. Telegram 2147 From the Embassy in Uruguay to the Department of + State +

Summary: + Siracusa recommended + that, although the circumstances of President Demicheli’s accession to office + were unusual, he be instructed to “continue business as usual + with the GOU.” Bordaberry stepped down on + June 12.

+

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + D760228–0431. Confidential; Immediate; Exdis. In telegram Secto + 16151, June 13, Rogers, who was traveling with Kissinger in Mexico, noted + that any Embassy actions regarding the change of power should be + “correct” and explained, “We should try by all means to avoid + any conduct which could be interpreted as signaling either our + approval or our disapproval of what has occurred.” (Ibid., + D760228–0231) In telegram Secto 16164, June 14, Rogers + emphasized to Siracusa + that “we should without cavil treat the new government as the + Government of Uruguay,” and that “in this delicate phase, I + would like to stay in close touch with you” since it was + important “to avoid any false signal either of preference or + disapproval.” (Ibid., D760228–0982)

+ + + + + Montevideo, June 13, 1976, 1900Z. + +

2147. Subject: Recommend Continuation Relations With Demicheli Government. Ref: Secto + 16151.

+

1. After the signing of the ACTA installing Demicheli as President, the Chief of Protocol announced + to those Chief of Mission present (a majority) that “el cuerpo + diplomatico ha consagrado un acto”. He said nothing else. Literally this + means “the diplomatic corps has consecrated (sanctioned) an act”.

+ +

2. In the circumstances of Saturday night’s events and the GOU’s view thereof, I doubt we will be + receiving the customary note containing usual assurances. The GOU, given presence of most of the + ambassadors at the ceremony, and the Chief of Protocol’s remarks related + thereto, presumably takes it for granted that this circumstance + signifies a continuation without further formality.

+

3. Despite the irregularities involved, including failure to give any + formal advance notice of what the ceremony was to be, who the new + president would be, or in what circumstances the office had been + vacated. I believe there is in fact a continuation of the same + government. Also, the published statement of the armed forces assuring + no changes in international policies can probably be assumed to mean as + well respect for international obligations.

+

4. Recommendation: I recommend that I be authorized immediately to + continue business as usual with the GOU + without further question or formality. Doing this will be consistent + with actual situation regarding most other countries, as signified by + their ambassador’s witnessing the signing of the “ACTA”. It would also + be, in my opinion, “correct” conduct signifying neither approval, + disapproval or preference. To avoid speculation, authorization should + reach me early on Monday.

+ + + Siracusa + + +
+ +
+ 352. Briefing Memorandum From the Acting Assistant Secretary of State + for Inter-American Affairs (Ryan) to Secretary of State Kissinger + +

Summary: Ryan + summarized the removal of Bordaberry, the actions of the military + regarding Uruguayan Government institutions, and the reaction of + the Uruguayan populace, concluding that U.S. interests in + Uruguay were not threatened by these changes. He argued that the + passage of the Koch + amendment could harm U.S. relations with Uruguay by giving “the + upper hand” to “military hardliners.”

+

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + P760097–2115. Confidential. Drafted on June 17 by Brazeal. A handwritten + notation on the first page of the memorandum indicates that + Kissinger saw the + memo.

+ + + + + Washington, June 18, + 1976. + +

+ Uruguay: Current Political + Situation +

+

The dispute between President Bordaberry and the Uruguayan military over the future + political process in Uruguay was resolved June 12 by Bordaberry’s removal from office. Vice President and + President of the Council of State, Alberto + Demicheli, has been sworn in as interim President. He has + announced he will serve only two or three months until a newly-formed + Council of the Nation—composed of senior military officers, cabinet + ministers, and selected civilian leaders—chooses a new chief + executive.

+

Military Restricting Government

+

The armed forces are moving quickly to restructure the government. The + military has already given signals, mainly through “institutional acts” + and announcements, that it foresees an eight to ten year time frame for + restructuring Uruguay’s political system. We expect them to announce + soon that no elections will be held this November, that the political + rights of certain individuals will be proscribed, that political parties + and labor unions will be allowed gradual participation in the political + process, and that guidelines for a new constitution will be written and + ratified by plebiscite. The reorganization of the political system is an + ambitious undertaking, particularly for military leaders who do not + always work well together. Disagreements within military circles could + undermine their ability to implement a new political system and create + new political crises.

+

Domestic Reaction

+

Most Uruguayans over the past few years have given high priority to + economic growth and domestic tranquility. While Bordaberry’s ouster was peaceful, and + the military’s plans for a new political structure produced no immediate + opposition, it remains to be seen if the general population will + gracefully accept attempts by the military to institutionalize their + role in politics through a new constitution or structure that could + leave the civilians with only a figurehead role.

+

The new President reiterated that this transitional phase will not bring + any change in the government’s foreign, economic or social policies. + There is not expected to be any change in personnel in the government’s + key policy-making bodies. Foreign Minister Blanco and Minister of Finance Vegh Villegas are the + most influential civilians; Blanco presently has the best chance of replacing + Demicheli.

+

U.S. Interests

+

U.S. interests are not threatened by the new Uruguayan Government. An + early government statement refers to the fact that the replacement of + people does not imply changes in the international, political, economic + and social directions followed by the government. Blanco is pro-U.S., as is Vegh. + Consequently, Uruguay’s constructive support for U.S. positions in + hemisphere and world forums should continue.

+ +

Our friendly relations with Uruguay, however, will become strained should + U.S. legislative sanctions, like the Koch amendment, be taken against Uruguay for its human + rights performance. Military hardliners would gain the upper hand and + make it difficult for the moderate civilians and military leaders to + improve Uruguay’s human rights performance.

+
+ +
+ 353. Telegram 154322 From the Department of State to the Embassy in + Uruguay +

Summary: The + Department described a June 19 meeting among Ferreira, Luers, Lister and Smith.

+

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + D760242–0007. Confidential; Priority. Repeated for information + to Buenos Aires. Drafted by Smith;, cleared by Zimmerman; approved by + Ryan. In telegram + 2324 from Montevideo, June 23, the Embassy reported that + Ferreira’s “broad, + sweeping charges, without foundation,” were intended “to involve + USG, the Ambassador and + this Embassy in Uruguayan internal affairs and to further his + own political interests.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central + Foreign Policy File, D760243–0809)

+ + + + + Washington, June 22, 1976, 1803Z. + +

154322. Subject: Discussion With Wilson + Ferreira on Human Rights in Uruguay.

+

1. Uruguayan ex-Senator Wilson + Ferreira, accompanied by his son, Juan, and a friend, + Louise Popkin of New York, called on Deputy Assistant Secretary + Luers on June 19. George Lister and Jack Smith of ARA were also present.

+

2. Ferreira began by complaining + about the difficulty he experienced in obtaining a U.S. visa at the + American Embassy in London. He said the consular officer seemed to + assume he must be a communist since he was living in exile. He said the + consular officer insisted on confirmation that he had been invited to + testify before a congressional committee, which implied that in the + absence of such an invitation he would have been denied a visa. He noted + that he had no difficulty obtaining a visa in Buenos Aires for his trip + to the U.S. last November. Mr. Smith explained that it is easier for the Embassy in + London to issue visas to residents of the U.K. than to + non-residents.

+

3. Ferreira said he considered + the American Embassy in Montevideo to be “our enemy”, because it acts as + the representative of the GOU. He said + the Embassy intervenes in internal Uruguayan affairs and when it does so, it intervenes “against + us.” An example of this intervention occurred during the political + crisis of last May. On this occasion, he said, Ambassador Siracusa personally approached a + number of generals to urge them to support Economy Minister Vegh + Villegas. Mr. Smith pointed out + that Ambassador Siracusa was not + in Uruguay during the May 1975 crisis, but in the U.S. Ferreira said the Embassy was just as + bad when the Ambassador was away as when he was there.

+

4. Ferreira accused the USG of misrepresenting the facts with + respect to the human rights situation in Uruguay. He said members of his + party had close contact with officers of the Embassy in Montevideo, who + expressed to his representatives their “horror” at the human rights + situation in Uruguay. The Embassy’s recommendation to his son that he + not resume residence in Uruguay after his last U.S. trip confirmed that + the Embassy was aware of the seriousness of the human rights situation. + In its public statements, however, such as Ambassador Siracusa’s letter to the Washington Post and various letters from the + Department to members of Congress, the USG appears to be defending the GOU and thus signals to the GOU that it does not need to improve. Mr. Luers replied that in our public + statements we have never asserted that the human rights situation was + satisfactory in Uruguay and that in our private discussions with the + Uruguayan authorities we have continually pressured them to improve.

+

5. Ferreira said the GOU was responsible for the deaths of + ex-Parliamentarians Michelini and + Gutierrez Ruiz because it + had told the GOA that they were + Tupamaros and had asked for their expulsion from Argentina. In April, + Foreign Minister Blanco had + made a trip to Buenos Aires for the sole purpose of requesting their + expulsion. He said the Peron + Government had decreed Michelini’s expulsion about a year ago, but he had appealed + the order and the appeal was never decided. On April 29, 1976, the + Argentine military government issued another order for Michelini’s expulsion, but for reasons + that are not clear, Michelini was + never notified of this order. He said the fact that Michelini and Gutierrez were held for several days + before being killed and the fact that they were not tortured, i.e., not + interrogated, means that the operation was directed from Montevideo. The + GOU would have no reason to have + them interrogated, since it knew they were not Tupamaros and thus would + have nothing to tell.

+

6. Ferreira said the plans for + Michelini’s proposed trip to + the U.S. last year were made in secret out of fear that the GOU would try to prevent it. Someone, + however, leaked the plans to the GOU, + which blocked the trip by annulling Michelini’s passport and warning the airlines against + transporting him. He noted that a subsequent letter from the Department + of State to a member of Congress said that the + USG had informally + discussed Michelini’s travel + plans with the GOU and had informed the + GOU that there was no basis for + denying Michelini a U.S. visa + provided he was in possession of a valid travel document. Mr. Smith assured Ferreira that it was not the USG which had informed the GOU of Michelini’s travel plans and that our statement re his + visa eligibility was made in response to a GOU inquiry on this subject. Ferreira replied that the USG reference to a valid travel document seemed to have + suggested to the GOU this means of + blocking the trip, because shortly thereafter his passport was revoked. + Mr. Smith inquired whether + Michelini could not have + availed himself of the travel documents issued by the GOA to foreigners. Ferreira replied that the GOA would not even issue Michelini an identity card.

+

7. Mr. Luers asked how many + Uruguayans were in Argentina and how many of these were in jeopardy. + Ferreira replied that there + were some 500,000 Uruguayans abroad, mostly in Argentina. Of these, some + 250 to 300 were in jeopardy. Most of the Uruguayans had gone to + Argentina because they could earn twice as much and the cost of living + was only one-half that in Uruguay. Thus, they were four times better + off. He said he believed President Videla was sincere in his desire to respect human + rights, but that he is unable to stop the abuses that are going on. + Interior Minister Harguindegui, on the other hand, is “a monster.” + Ferreira considered it + impossible that the kidnapping of Bolivian ex-President Torres could + have been carried out without the complicity of the Argentine police. + After his kidnapping, he was taken alive to a point some 120 km from + Buenos Aires, where he was killed. This means, he said, that the + kidnappers must have passed with impunity through several police or + military checkpoints, where cars are thoroughly checked for + firearms.

+

8. Ferreira said the fact that + the governmental leaders in Uruguay are civilians tends to lend + respectability to the government. In his view, however, the civilians + are worse than the military. He said the current government is + maintained in power only by massive assistance from the U.S. When Mr. + Luers pointed out that our + aid to Uruguay is quite modest, + Ferreira replied that the + USG was behind the assistance given + to Uruguay by the private banks and the IMF. Mr. Luers + objected that the USG cannot ask + private bankers to abstain from doing business with every country which + does not have a democratic government. Ferreira replied that this might be so, but it was not + necessary to urge them to lend money to such countries.

+

9. As another example of what he considered an improper attitude by the + USG toward the current government + in Uruguay, Ferreira said the + USG had invited an Uruguayan + policeman to join a group of journalists now touring the U.S. When asked + for particulars, Ferreira said + this was a man named Casale, who, although holding a press card, was + widely known to be a policeman.

+ +

10. Ferreira said he was aware, + from a recent letter from Acting Assistant Secretary Ryan, that the Department was opposed + to the Koch amendment to deny + military assistance to Uruguay. He, however, intended to lobby for its + passage.

+ + + Robinson + + +
+ +
+ 354. Memorandum From Robert W. + Zimmermann, Director of the Office of East Coast Affairs, + ARA/ECA, and the Deputy + Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Ryan) to the Assistant Secretary of + State for Inter-American Affairs (Shlaudeman) +

Summary: Zimmermann + and Ryan outlined the + Department’s contacts with Koch over the course of May and June.

+

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + P840001–0322. No classification marking. The talking points + prepared for Luers were + not attached, but a set of relevant talking points is in the + National Archives, RG 59, HA Country Files 1977, Lot 80D177, + Human Rights—Uruguay—1976.

+ + + + + Washington, June 22, + 1976. + + + SUBJECT + Congressman Koch—Bureau + Contacts + +

Per your request, I attach the letter sent by Hew Ryan to Congressman Koch regarding the latter’s proposed + amendment to terminate all U.S. security assistance to Uruguay because + of poor performance in the field of human rights. I also attach the + talking points prepared for Bill + Luers’ meeting with Koch to discuss human rights in Uruguay.

+

In a bureau meeting in mid-May it was agreed that Bill Luers would request a meeting + with Congressman Koch to discuss + with him the human rights situation in Uruguay, to make it clear that + the Department did not confirm the extent of Amnesty International’s + allegations concerning Uruguay, and to explain why we would oppose an + amendment to terminate US security assistance to Uruguay. This meeting + was scheduled for May 26 but was cancelled.

+

In a subsequent bureau meeting it was agreed that a letter making the + same points would be sent to Koch. The letter from Hew was then prepared, cleared and + ready for mailing. In the interim, Bill + Luers’ meeting with Koch was rescheduled for June 10 and it was thought that Bill might deliver the + letter in person. Subsequently, however, it was decided to mail it + instead.

+

We understand that you have instructed “H” to make the Department’s views + concerning the Koch amendment + known on the Hill and indicated + that we should try to retain full or partial U.S. security assistance to + Uruguay if at all possible.

+

+ Attachment +

+

+ Letter From the Acting Assistant Secretary of State for + Inter-American Affairs (Ryan) to Rep. Edward I. + Koch + + Source: + National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840001–0323. + No classification marking. The text of the letter was sent to + Montevideo in telegram 148535, which stated that the letter was + signed and sent to Koch on + June 11. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + D760233–0661) +

+ +

Washington, June 11, 1976

+

+ Dear Mr. Koch: +

+

I am sorry that you have sponsored an amendment to the Foreign Assistance + Appropriation Act to cut off all security assistance to Uruguay. I + particularly regret that in support of your amendment you have stated + that “terrorism by the Uruguayan Government against its own people is a + well established fact, documented by Amnesty International and confirmed + by the State Department” and that you have cited a Department witness as + having “confirmed Amnesty International’s assertion that Uruguay is at + least the equal of Chile in terms of torture.” While we share Amnesty + International’s concern about human rights in Uruguay we do not share + their conclusions about the human rights situation there.

+

It is in our national interest to maintain good relations with Uruguay, + in part because of the influence that Uruguay—in spite of its small + size—exerts in hemispheric and world affairs. Uruguay has been + consistently friendly toward the United States and plays a moderating + and constructive role in the Organization of American States and the + United Nations. Last year, when most of Latin America was attacking our + Trade Act, Uruguay’s reaction was moderate and realistic. In the UN General Assembly Uruguay sided with the + United States on such important issues as the anti-Zionism resolution + and Korea.

+

The human rights situation in Uruguay leaves much to be desired. There + have undoubtedly been cases of serious violations of human rights and + the police and judicial procedures are not such as to provide guarantees against recurrences. + However, the situation is clearly better than it was when the struggle + against the Tupamaro terrorists was at its height two or three years + ago. Furthermore, the friendly relations between our two governments has + permitted us to discuss this problem in a frank and friendly manner. We + have been assured that such violations as may occur are contrary to the + Uruguayan Government’s policy. We believe that our private diplomatic + representations have had a positive effect in strengthening the + Uruguayan Government’s resolve to improve the human rights situation in + that country.

+

It is inaccurate to describe the Uruguayan Government as a military + dictatorship. In fact, power is shared by the civilian government, with + which we conduct our formal relations, and the military, with whom we + deal primarily through US military contacts, which are facilitated by + our modest security assistance program. In view of the complexity of the + political situation in Uruguay and the open channels of communication to + the Uruguayan Government which our traditional friendly relations have + given us, the Department does not believe that a legislated denial of + assistance to Uruguay would serve the cause of human rights in that + country or serve the interests of the United States in international + affairs.

+

If you would like to discuss further the human rights situation or the + political situation in Uruguay, either formally or informally, the + Department would be happy to make officers with the appropriate + background available to you.

+

Sincerely,

+ + + Hewson A. + Ryan + Acting Assistant Secretary for Inter-American + Affairs + + +
+ +
+ 355. Telegram 2722 From the Embassy in Uruguay to the Department of + State +

Summary: + Siracusa criticized + the Department’s handling of the accusations made by Koch against the Embassy in + Uruguay, asking that the Department brief Koch using Embassy reporting on + Ferreira.

+

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + D760281–0662. Unclassified. Repeated for information to Buenos + Aires. In telegram 2341 from Montevideo, June 24, the Embassy + responded to material that Koch had placed in the Congressional Record on + June 22, which questioned the integrity of the Embassy’s human + rights reporting and which Siracusa believed was based on information + Ferreira had given + to Koch. Siracusa asked that the + Department decontrol telegrams 2270, 2322 and 2324 from + Montevideo, all of which discuss the Embassy’s assessments of + Ferreira, and make + them available to Koch + for placement in the Congressional Record. (Ibid., [no film + number]) In telegram 169681 from the Department of State to the + Embassy in Uruguay, July 8, Kissinger noted that “the Department is most + concerned about the allegations Ferreira has made about the U.S. Embassy and + U.S. officials and believes these changes must be refuted.” + (Ibid., D760264–1208) A letter from Ryan to Koch regarding Ferreira, dated July 14, is in the National + Archives, RG 59, HA Country Files 1977: Lot 80D177, Human Rights + Uruguay—1976.

+ + + + + Montevideo, July 21, 1976, 1854Z. + +

2722. Subj: Congressman Koch’s + Charges. Ref: State 169681 and Montevideo 2341.

+

1. I received from Hew Ryan a + copy of his recent letter to Congressman Koch, bearing no date, but which I assume had been sent + about mid-July. State 169681 said this was being sent to all ARA posts and said the charges made + against us were “completely unfounded”. While I appreciate this, I must + say I and my colleagues are disappointed in the letter which gives + evidence of having been so chopped up by multiple drafters and clearers + that it ends with little or no impact. Certainly it does not constitute + a very notable reaction to a totally unwarranted, uninformed and unfair + attack on this Embassy. Also, it says nothing whatsoever about + Congressman Koch’s ridiculing of + our labor officer who, entirely on his own and in consultation with no + one, exercised his citizen’s right to communicate with his own + Congressman about a matter about which he felt deeply.

+

2. It should be no surprise, therefore, that the Department’s letter + apparently had no effect on Congressman Koch. USINFO now reports the text of the Congressman’s + letter to the editor of the New York Times, + published on July 19, which charges that this Embassy “shuns the idea + that there is a human rights problem in Uruguay”—and again ridicules the + labor attaché for his personal view.

+

3. It is thus, unfortunately, all too evident that Congressman Koch has not been adequately briefed on + this Embassy’s reporting of human rights, or else that he chooses to + ignore the facts given him as he pursues his own objectives, whatever these may be. + Likewise, he apparently has not been told, or if told ignores the fact, + that we have asked that he be informed that the labor attaché’s letter + was strictly a representation of his own view, and that he is not + responsible for human rights reporting here and in fact has had little + or nothing to do with it.

+

4. In light of these comments, I ask the Department to reconsider my past + recommendation. It seems to me that since the truth we seek to expose is + in the substance of this Embassy’s reporting, the best way to expose it + is to open it to public scrutiny. I therefore recommend again that the + reports specified in Montevideo 2341 be decontrolled and together with + this message, be referred to Congressman Koch and/or others for publication in the Congressional Record. Recent American history + illustrates all too painfully how artful explanations fail where the + simple and whole truth would have served so well.

+ + + Siracusa + + +
+ +
+ 356. Telegram 196058 From the Department of State to the Embassy in + Uruguay +

Summary: Deputy + Assistant Secretary Ryan + described his visits to Reps. Koch and Fraser prior to hearings they held on human + rights in Uruguay.

+

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + D760304–0872. Secret; Priority; Stadis. Ryan’s August 4 testimony at + the hearings is in Hearings Before the + Subcommittee on International Organizations of the Committee + on International Relations, Ninety-Fourth Congress, Second + Session, pp. 109–114.

+ + + + + Washington, August 7, 1976, 0046Z. + +

196058. Subject: Human Rights Hearings.

+

1. Pursuant to our conversations and your cable to Harry I visited both + Fraser and Koch privately prior to the Uruguay + human rights hearings.

+

2. I showed them a file of your MemCons and cables on the human rights + issue which both scanned and which Koch read in some detail.

+

3. I also stressed to them the personal danger which ad hominem attacks + on you in congressional sessions could place you.

+

4. They both seem to agree with me and Fraser was careful to avoid any personal references in + Wednesday’s hearings. However, this was not entirely the case with + Koch who in the hearings made + it clear that he preferred to believe Wilson Ferreira.

+ +

5. By now you should have seen my testimony which includes a statement of + the Department’s full support for you and your work in Uruguay.

+ + + Habib + + +
+ +
+ 357. Telegram 2941 From the Embassy in Uruguay to the Department of + State +

Summary: + Siracusa described + his conversation with Army Chief of Staff Queirolo and Army Commander in + Chief Vadora regarding + human rights.

+

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + D760305–0958. Confidential. Repeated for information to Buenos + Aires.

+ + + + + Montevideo, August 7, 1976, 1248Z. + +

2941. Subj: Human Rights Discussion With Lt. Gen. + Vadora and Gen Queirolo.

+

1. Following up a conversation which I had with Gen. + Luis V. Queirolo, Chief of Staff + of the Uruguayan Army, at a farewell party for Defattaché Garibay, I + invited the general to lunch at my residence for continuation of the + conversation which was on the subject of human rights in Uruguay. In + accepting, the general said that Lt. Gen. + Julio C. Vadora, Commander in + Chief of the Army, would like to come as well. During the three-hour + luncheon, in which I was accompanied by DCM + James C. Haahr, the discussion + was wide-ranging and frank.

+

2. I pulled no punches in trying to convey my own and my government’s + concern on the problem of violations of human rights wherever they may + occur and, specifically, in regard to Uruguay against which very serious + charges had been leveled. I said that I and my Embassy have tried to + present the most precise, objective and honest information we could + obtain to my government, including the bad with the good. The fact that + our reports vary considerably with those of others charging Uruguay with + violations has resulted in my Embassy and myself being accused of + defending Uruguay. This had come to the point, I said, where it had been + necessary for a Department of State witness to reject this charge in the + US Congress only the day before. I said I would freely admit to a deep + feeling of sympathy for this country where I have lived for three years + and an understanding of what the government is trying to achieve. I also + recognize, I said, the supportive attitude which most Uruguayans appear + to have for it. On the other hand, I said, I do not in any sense consider it my duty to defend + Uruguay and that I would not do so. I also stated that whereas I + believed the majority of Uruguayans, while not necessarily enthusiastic + about what is going on here, have shown themselves to be in the mood at + least up to now to accept it as necessary catharsis. I warned, however, + of the fragility of such a situation and how easily such a process could + become repression. The inevitable reaction to prolonged repression would + be increasing confrontation, vengeance and more repression from which + there could be only one outcome ultimately, the defeat of the oppressor. + All of my experience, I said, had shown me the inevitability of this + fact which was something which the governors of Uruguay today had best + keep uppermost in mind so as to restore the country, with all possible + speed, to a more representative government and to the enjoyment of the + freedoms they had once known. I got into much of this introductory + following Gen. + Vadora’s frank admission to me, + (putting it in less diplomatic terms than I had) that the government had + found it necessary in its restorative “process” to suppress many of the + free institutions which had operated here in the past.

+

3. I stated very frankly that whatever the facts, rights or wrongs might + be, (and this could be subject to controversy) the fact that is clear to + me is that those who are attacking Uruguay on the subject of human + rights are clearly winning the battle. Therefore, I said, it is urgently + incumbent upon the Uruguayan Government and particularly the armed + forces to combat this increasingly bad image in the only way which can + be successful. This, I said, would be by conscientiously reviewing their + own practices, eliminating the abuses which exist, and proving this to + the world by inviting open inspection. For this I recommended most + strongly not only a continuing relation with the International Red Cross + but also, importantly, an invitation to the inter-American Commission on + Human Rights as well.

+

4. Discussing this theme I laid out the reasons why I had not accepted + the GOU’s invitation to visit the + prisons last month. I also stated that the generally favorable reports + which I had received privately from my colleagues who had visited them + came as no surprise. But I said what concerns me, and what some of them + told me had bothered them as well, was not the condition and treatment + of people who are in the male and female prisons for the subversion, but + what happens to them from the moment of their arrest until they get + there. It is this, I said, which is being most criticized and upon this + the prison visits had shed no light.

+

5. Elaborating on this I stated, for example, that quite apart from + allegations of the outright physical torture of prisoners (about which I + had no direct reports), I did have sufficiently direct knowledge of some + cases to believe that psychological toruture, to put it in the least offensive terms, was practiced. + I then described the essence of two cases known to me which are + substantially similar and which included the surprise visitations of + arresting officers, in or out of uniform; the hooding of a prisoner—even + before his own family; threats designed to intimidate; the spartan + conditions of confinement; the passage often of many weeks before family + has any knowledge of the prisoner’s whereabouts or welfare; and delay in + access to a lawyer and the general slowness of the judicial process. + This, I said, did not seem to me to be compatible with humane standards + or in any way justified by conditions in this country—assuming they + could ever be justified. The generals listened most attentatively making + no denial, confirmation of or even defense of what I had described. They + seemed, more than anything else, extremely thoughtful. Terminating this, + I stated that I had been assured on more than one occasion by high + officials that abuses of prisoners is contrary to the policy of the + government and that torture is forbidden. Accepting this as so, I said, + I found it hard to reconcile such a state policy with the treatment I + had described. I also said that assuming flagrant abuses might reflect + moments of uncontrolled passion (exaltations) by guards and + interrogators, that examples of their disciplining for such infractions + are not easily at hand.

+

6. I also raised the question of recent occurrences in Argentina which, + it seemed to me, in absence of actions by the Uruguayan Government are + likely to give rise to more serious attacks. I noted, for example, the + accusations made in June that one Uruguayan and a number of Chilean + refugees were taken from a hotel and badly beaten before their release. + The reports said that among those who had tortured them was an Uruguayan + officer who had paid special attention to the Uruguayan prisoner. I also + called attention to recent reports by the UN high commissioners for refugees of the disappearance of + 19 Uruguayans registered with his agency. Nothing further has been heard + of these people except a denial by the Argentine Government that they + had been taken by any official forces, and published appeals for news of + their whereabouts by family members. Actually, I said, there are reports + that the total number is 30 rather than those 19 registered with the + high commissioner. What strikes one as strange, I said, is the fact that + the Government of Uruguay, so far as I know, has made no public + statement of concern for the welfare of these people. In view of the + Argentine Government announcement, I said, one would have to conclude + that they were taken by terrorist groups and therefore must be in grave + danger. The generals listened to this with attention and concern. Gen. + Vadora’s observation regarding + the delicacy of statements which could impute blame to a friendly + government was not very energetic—presumably because I had already noted + the Argentine Government’s excusing itself officially from any knowledge + of the act.

+ +

7. Turning to what might be done by Uruguay, I made several specific + suggestions as follows:

+

A) First and foremost, that any practices subject to criticism as + violation of fundamental human rights—obviously including any form of + physical torture but certainly including, in my own judgment, what I had + described as psychological abuse and disregard for family concern, + should be eliminated.

+

B) The whole judicial process should be speeded up so that there did not + exist a situation in which weeks transpired before a family knows of the + whereabouts and welfare of an arrested member, or wherein such a + prisoner’s access to legal advice and defense is inordinately + delayed.

+

C) The government should realize that it faces a serious problem + affecting Uruguay’s image and acceptability in the family of nations, + and that it is basically a problem with which the government alone can + deal. To do its best to combat what I described as a losing battle up to + now, I suggested that it should consider issuing a clear, complete, and + honest statement as to its attitude on the subject of human rights and + its practices. The worst thing, I said, that such a statement could do + would be to simply criticize Uruguay’s accusers.

+

D) The government should also promptly, I said, invite impartial + international observers to come here to review the situation. It should + give them every facility and access to places of incarceration and to + prisoners themselves. This should include, I said, not only those + prisons already visited but all the others where prisoners may be held + in whatever stage of their processing.

+

8. Commenting on my point about the slowness of justice Gen. + Vadora stated that procedures + under military justice are no different than they have always been and + continue to be in Uruguay today for those subject to civil judgment. He + said that this has long been recognized as a grave weakness of the + Uruguayan system, which is indeed subject to criticism. But he + emphasized that it is nothing new invented for subversives. He said if + you will visit prisons where common prisoners are held you will find + that they too are subject to an indefinite status which may or may not + be defined for years. What they do know is the maximum for an offense, + such as 5–15 years. Whether it in the end will be 6, 8 or the maximum is + left to be determined by a slower process, including assessment of + behavior etc. To illustrate his point he said that a very well known + Uruguayan play, entitled “1040” was written and produced here about 10 + years ago by a noted author dramatized this very fact.

+

9. At one point I asked Gen. + Vadora what the government views + as the long-term solution to the problem of prisoners classified as + subversives. The general’s reply was immediate. He said that right now + up to 1,500 of them could probably be released and that some but not all might even be paroled in + this country. There were, however, about 500 of them who pose long-term + dilemma because they are not only held for belonging to a subversive + organization but had actually performed, in connection therewith, + criminal acts subject to severest penalties. Also, this would include + people so indoctrinated they could not be entrusted in freedom not to + commit the same crimes again. In response to this I suggested that + Uruguay consider offering to deport some of its releasable prisoners to + other countries (not those adjacent to Uruguay) if any were willing to + take them. They might challenge Uruguay’s accusers, for example, to + undertake a positive campaign for the resettlement of these people + instead of just attacking Uruguay for its alleged mistreatment of them. + As with my other suggestions, this one seemed to meet with thoughtful + consideration but no comment one way or the other.

+

10. Among factors of interest which emerged during this long conversation + are the following:

+

A) Gen. + Vadora put the total number of + prisoners held that day on charges of subversion at 2,017. This figure + to contrast with the more or less 5,500 alleged by AI and ICJ. Saying that about 1,500 of these had been reported by the + visiting Ambassadors to be resident at the Libertad and Punta de Pieles + prisons, I asked where the rest were to be found. He said about 250 of + them are here in Montevideo at “El Cilindro” and at the long established + Punta Carretas prison, and at a smaller prison “Carlos Nery”, and that + others are at a small prison in the interior at Paso de Los Toros. When + asked if this 2,017 figure included those taken and still held from the + anti-communist roundup of last year, he said that it did. He said 450 + were taken in that drive, that 200 are still being held and that the + latter group had been processed but not yet sentenced. Eventually, he + said, these 200 would be sent to one or another of the established + prisons, principally La Libertad and Punta de Rieles.

+

11. In spite of the directness of my statements, neither Gen. + Vadora or Gen. + Queirolo ever showed any + resentment or altered the serious, concerned attitude which they + displayed throughout. They seemed to be truly preoccupied with the + problem and interested in the observations and suggestions made. They + made no commitment about any particular action except to observe that + Chile’s experience with the inter-American Human Rights Commission had + not been a very good one. To this I responded that I thought it + reflected no prejudice on the part of the commission but the + circumstances which they had encountered in Chile. The luncheon ended as + friendly as it had begun with their statement that they would like to + have opportunity in future for similar, frank discussions.

+ + + Siracusa + + +
+ +
+ 358. Telegram 3123 From the Embassy in Uruguay to the Department of + State +

Summary: + Siracusa discussed + potential problems with the démarche regarding Operation + Condor.

+

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + P860084–1950. Secret; Niact; Immediate; Roger Channel. Repeated + Immediate for information to Asuncion, Brasilia, Buenos Aires, + La Paz, and Santiago. For State 209192, see Document 241. Operation Condor, an + intelligence-sharing apparatus among Southern Cone governments, + had evolved into an organization that identified, located, and + assassinated suspected guerrilla leaders and regime critics. See + Documents 137, 238, 240–242, 245, + 249, 253, 359, 367, and 368.

+ + + + + Montevideo, August 24, 1976, 1645Z. + +

3123. Subject: Operation Condor. Ref: State 209192.

+

1. Since tomorrow is a holiday I will have no chance of seeing Gen. + Vadora until perhaps Thursday or + Friday at the earliest. Therefore wish to make certain observations for + clarification:

+

A) [3 lines not declassified] as I understand it + the information concerning Condor activities of the kind we are making + representations [less than 1 line not + declassified] have come almost exclusively [less than 1 line not declassified] for all of us to base our + concerns on “rumors”, and especially for me to tell Gen. + Vadora that our concerns are + based on “rumors”, seems hardly likely to be convincing or believed as + government representations of this gravity and sensitivity, and at the + levels contemplated would not be made on the basis of “rumors”. [3½ lines not declassified] before acting, + therefore, I wish assurances that this factor has been fully taken into + account including all of its potential consequences. Perhaps, at + minimum, some invented but harmless source could be stated as + responsible for rumors to place them outside the Southern Cone.

+

B) [6 lines not declassified]

+

C) While I think the Department is right that only person I could talk to + here at this time who could have the desired influence is Gen. + Vadora, I am disturbed that + confining my representations to him alone will have a bad effect on the + integrity of my acceptance here and especially on my valuable relation + with FonMinister Blanco. + Obviously, what I will be talking about is not a matter of defense + arrangements or security assistance for which I might logically go to + the chief of the army. It is a matter affecting political relationships + between states and therefore one which, I believe, I must take up with + the FonMinister as well. Finally, since consultation at the levels + contemplated elsewhere must inevitably get back to Blanco, I feel I must discuss it with + him even though this may be the first news he has of the allegedly + contemplated “operations”.

+ +

D) Representations on matters of this kind, which are of such a sensitive + nature that they could affect an ambassador’s relationship with specific + key officials, or even to the government to which he is accredited, are + often better done by the Department of State with the ambassadors in + Washington. Since nothing is said about this aspect in the referenced + instruction it is my recommendation that the ambassadors of the + countries concerned be called in by the Department to receive similar + representations at least at the assistant secretary level. Since in the + case of Uruguay the ambassador is a military man who may have influence + on his commanders, it seems all the more appropriate.

+ +

E) So as not to appear insensitive to the other side of the terrorist + coin, I believe we should add to our representation some statement of + understanding and concern for the fact that terrorists who may be + [unclear] targets are reported to have their own target lists of + government officials and other citizens who they intend to assassinate. + In the case of Uruguay, the Department is familiar with the OPR–33 list + which is said to include FonMinister Blanco and Finance Minister Vegh Villegas, among + others.

+

2. I will await response this message before proceeding. Perhaps some of + my colleagues may have views on parallel representations in their + countries. Also, in view of concerns here for the source of information + and over the flimsiness of basing our action on “rumors”, I hope they + can defer action pending further clarification. Since our latest + information is that plans for Condor “operations” are shelved pending + clarification of Brazil’s attitude, time for consultation on this grave + matter seems affordable.

+ + + Siracusa + + +
+ +
+ 359. Action Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for + Inter-American Affairs (Shlaudeman) to Secretary of State Kissinger + +

Summary: Shlaudeman discussed the questions raised by + Siracusa regarding + the Condor démarche and recommended that Siracusa approach both + Blanco and + Vadora, while a + parallel approach was made by Shlaudeman to the Uruguayan Ambassador in + Washington.

+

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + P860084–1945. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Shlaudeman; cleared by + O’Donohue. The proposed cable from Shlaudeman to Siracusa is attached but not printed. (National + Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P860084–1948) No + decision is recorded on the memorandum, but in telegram Secto + 27128 from the Secretary’s Delegation in Lusaka, September 16, + Kissinger “declined + to approve message to Montevideo and has instructed that no + further action be taken on this matter.” (National Archives, RG + 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D760350–0102) Tab 2 is Document 358; Tab 3 is Document 241.

+ + + + + Washington, August + 30, 1976. + +

+ Operation Condor +

+

You raised a number of questions about Siracusa’s reactions (Tab 2) to the instructions to him + on Condor (Tab 3). My comments on his cable follow.

+

[2 lines not declassified] The CIA [less than 1 line + not declassified] does not believe Siracusa’s representations would unduly endanger him in + light of widespread talk about Condor and the assassination aspect among + officers of the security services of the southern cone. [3½ lines not declassified]

+

If we take this tack, the question is: should Siracusa also make representations? I + believe he should. Our approach as originally conceived is couched in + terms of a continuing exchange of information on the ground in + Montevideo. A proposal of that kind from Siracusa would offer the most constructive and effective + method of handling the problem. Dealing only with the Ambassador here + would foreclose establishing that kind of relationship.

+

We agree with Siracusa that, if + he does it in Montevideo, he should talk both to the military and to + Blanco.

+

A parallel approach here, as Siracusa suggests, is acceptable to me and would help to + preserve his position with the government there. But it is not my sense + that this démarche is being made for domestic U.S. political + considerations. What we are trying to head off is a series of + international murders that could do serious damage to the international + status and reputation of the countries involved.

+ +

We agree with Siracusa that he + should add that the Condor targets have their own lists of Uruguayan + Government officials targeted for assassination. It is precisely for + that reason we propose to engage the Government of Uruguay in an + exchange of views on the security situation so that we can demonstrate + our appreciation of the problems they face.

+

Options:

+

We have three options in the Uruguayan case. We could do it:

+

—by Siracusa to General Vadora and to Blanco, supported by a démarche to + the Ambassador here [less than 1 line not + declassified]

+

[less than 1 line not declassified]

+

[less than 1 line not declassified]

+

Recommendation:

+

That you authorize the attached telegram to Siracusa instructing him to talk to both Blanco and Vadora, informing him of a parallel + approach by me here and referring to a communication he will receive + [less than 1 line not declassified] on + additional protection for the source. (Tab 1) Phil Habib has concurred in the attached + suggested telegram.

+

+ ALTERNATIVELY, that we ask Siracusa to have the message conveyed + [less than 1 line not declassified] if in his + judgment that can be done.

+

+ ALTERNATIVELY, that I make the démarche here, with + no action to be taken in Montevideo for the time being.

+

Attachments:

+ +

Tab 1—Telegram to Siracusa +

+

Tab 2—Montevideo 3123

+

Tab 3—State 209192

+ +
+ +
+ 360. Telegram 3388 From the Embassy in Uruguay to the Department of + State +

Summary: + Siracusa and + Blanco discussed + Uruguayan politics, human rights, the Koch and Harkin amendments, and the + reasons behind the ouster of Bordaberry.

+

Source: National Archives, Central Foreign Policy File, + D760343–1179. Confidential. The Harkin amendment to the U.S. Foreign Assistance + Act forbade U.S. economic aid + to any government that engaged “in a consistent pattern of gross + violation of internationally recognized human rights.” (75 Stat. + 424) MVD 2941 is Document 357.

+ + + + + Montevideo, September 11, 1976, 1202Z. + +

3388. Subj: Meeting with Foreign Minister.

+

1. Summary. In more than an hour’s discussion with FonMinister Blanco we reviewed human rights and + internal political developments. Blanco said that while reaction to the Koch amendment, if passed, would be + extremely negative, a negative vote by the US on IDB loans, based on the Harkins Amendment, + would be infinitely worse. He said a proposed replacement of medidas + prontas de seguridad by a law to be applied with “due process”, and + publication of prisoner-release data should be viewed as steps toward + greater openness on human rights. He admitted personal opposition to the + recent act nullifying political rights of many people but maintained + that developments since June, including Bordaberry’s ouster and even this act should be viewed + as a part of the process aimed at eventual democratic restoration in + Uruguay. He felt it important that I review these issues with President + Mendez before my departure on consultation. Such a meeting has been + arranged for the late afternoon of September 14. End summary.

+

2. I met with FonMinister Blanco + on September 9 for a discussion prior to my departure for consultation + in Washington. I had also requested a meeting with the new President + Aparicio Mendez. I told the minister I thought it important that I have + from him an interpretation of the political developments in Uruguay in + the last three months as this would be a matter of interest in the + Department of State. I also said that as the question of human rights + has almost become the fulcrum of relations between our two countries, an + up-date on this subject was also of importance; this especially in view + of the recent testimony in the Congress regarding Uruguay; the progress + of the Koch amendment; and, very + importantly, the actuality of the Harkins amendment and its implications + for several IDB loans for Uruguay which + will be coming up for decision in the next few months.

+

3. Regarding human rights I briefed the minister on my recent discussion + with Generals Vadora and + Queirolo (MVD 2941) telling him how this particular + discussion had come about. Blanco said he thought this had been an important and useful contact. I + found this of interest in light of the fact that I have since heard from + two sources that there is developing some resentment in the GOU (unspecified where) because of my + “pressing too hard” on the subject of human rights.

+

4. I went on to state that I did not know what the outcome would be + regarding the Koch amendment. I + called the minister’s attention to testimony before the Fraser Committee by Ambassador + Ryan and the department’s + position in opposition to the Koch amendment. At the moment, I said, what happens to + this amendment depends on whether a parallel proposal is introduced into + the Senate version of the bill and, if not, what action would be decided + upon in conference committee. As of the moment, I said, the outcome + cannot be predicted but one would have to assume that the amendment + could become law.

+

5. Regarding the Harkins amendment I gave Blanco copies of the pertinent provisions of the law, in + English and in Spanish, as well as a paper listing four proposed IDB loans for Uruguay, totalling $85.4 + million. These are to come before the board in the next couple of months + and will require the US to take the Harkins amendment into account in + deciding how to vote. After studying section 28 of Public Law 94–302, I + said, as the minister was aware from Ambassador Ryan’s testimony, that the problem of + defining what is a “consistent pattern of gross violation” of human + rights is a difficult one and that insofar as I was aware this has not + yet been defined. However, I said, section 28 lists what are considered + to be “gross violations” of internationally recognized human rights, + including among other things, torture, cruel or degrading treatment, + prolonged detention without charges, etc. Speaking very frankly, I said + that whereas I personally accept the GOU’s statement that it does not advocate or condone + torture, there have been past instances at least in which torture has + apparently occurred. Beyond this, I said, it is also a fact, and + especially with regard to certain cases coming under security laws, that + people are subjected to procedures of arrest and confinement which might + be considered cruel or degrading, especially psychologically, and that + prolonged detention without charges or access to legal advice or to + families is in such cases fairly commonly practiced. The minister did + not deny that this was so. Therefore, I said, in deciding how to vote in + the light of the Harkins amendment what seems to be the controlling + element is not whether these kinds of violations have happened or do + happen to some degree in Uruguay but what constitutes a “consistent + pattern”. How that would be decided, I said, I did not know. If to avoid + making such a determination the escape of finding that the loan directly + benefitted the needy was utilized, it might be considered by some, prima + facie, to be a tacit though unspoken finding of a consistent pattern of + gross violation. As a result of this, I said, we face a real dilemma in + what could be [a] critical decision profoundly affecting relations + between our two countries.

+ +

6. In the light of the above, I said, it seems to me that something + dramatic, constituting a clear improvement in openness as regards human + rights in Uruguay, seems to me to be urgently needed in order perhaps to + avoid developments which can critically affect our relations. In regard + to this I told the minister, as I had told Generals Vadora and Queirolo, that no amount of criticism + directed against those people who have mounted a human rights campaign + against Uruguay, or even of unproved denial of charges, was likely to be + effective. I said again that in my opinion Uruguay was consistently + losing ground on this issue and that the only way to change the trend + would be to correct whatever is wrong regarding the human rights + situation and to re-establish openness and due process in such a way as + to prove that past abuses will not reoccur and that the present + situation is acceptable or rapidly becoming so.

+

7. Regarding the above, I said that I had been intrigued and encouraged + by two recent developments. These were President Mendez’ reference in + his inaugural speech to the replacement of medidas prontas de seguridad + with a new law on a “State of Danger”, to be applied with “due process”, + with his statement that the objective was to deprive criticism of + Uruguay (on human rights grounds) “of any vestige of truth”; and + finally, with the publication this week of a statement detailing the + number of people who have been processed and released since 1972. I said + I hoped all this pointed to a new trend toward openness, and that if so + I hoped that the trend could receive a dramatic and positive + acceleration. This, it seemed to me, could be the kind of thing which + would help resolve the dilemma which may be fast approaching regarding + decisions under the Harkins amendment. I noted how some such dramatic + step would be strengthened if a move toward international verification + by the Inter-American Human Rights Commission were to be invited.

+

8. In reply Blanco said he + wanted to repeat again his opinion that the Koch amendment, if it should become law, would have a + very adverse and counterproductive effect in Uruguay. Of this, he said, + he had no doubt. But he went on to say that an adverse US vote under the + Harkins amendment would be infinitely worse and not just because of the + economic penalty [it] would impose. This is because, he said, the + Koch amendment at least could + be looked upon as an adverse act of the legislature imposed against the + will of the executive; but, in contrast, the Harkins amendment could + only be applied against Uruguay after a specific, adverse executive + decision. If under it a decision were made to vote against an IDB loan for Uruguay this would constitute + public and open executive branch condemnation of Uruguay. It could not + help but be bitterly resented in this country. It would reflect, he + said, an unfriendly lack of sympathy and understanding for what the + Uruguayan Government is in all sincerity trying to do, and a callous + disregard of the circumstances which brought the great adversity to this country which its current + leaders are trying to correct. He feared, he said, that the reaction + would be not only bitter and resentful but highly nationalistic. The end + result would therefore be, he said, totally counterproductive in terms + not only of US/Uruguayan relations but also in terms of what the Harkins + amendment is presumably intended to bring about, namely, an improvement + in human rights treatment.

+

9. Regarding the President’s speech and the publication of data on + arrests, the minister stated that overall intent is, clearly, to move + toward a greater degree of openness and due process, always consistent, + however, with that degree of state security needed to underwrite the + restorative political process in which the government is engaged. The + idea for a new law of “State of Danger”, to replace the medidas prontas, + is not a new one, he said. It has been talked about and studied for at + least a couple of years but there is now a decision to go ahead with it. + This will be done in the full realization that it, like the medidas + prontas, will be criticized because of the emergency features it will + retain; but it will nevertheless be a step in the right direction, he + said, and it will lead to greater openness and due process as the + President had stated. Actually, when this might be promulgated, he did + not know. The publication of arrest data, he said, resulted from an + initiative of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs precisely aimed at + achieving greater openness. The initial announcement had been made, he + said, without explanation because it was simply to establish a pattern + and any explanation would have made it appear to be a response to + criticism. This, he said, the government needed to avoid for reasons + which could easily be appreciated. From now on, he said, it is the + intent (as we had learned from ESMACO—Montevideo 3327) periodically to publish the names + of persons who have been released and the terms of their release.

+

10. With regard to inviting international inspection, the minister said, + the problems were still difficult and he could see no clear solution at + this time. I suggested that this would be the best way to prove that a + new, improved situation was in process even though it might well result + in some criticism of past practices. I urged again that the matter be + studied and that at minimum the government might consider entering into + discussion with the inter-American human rights commission on the terms + and conditions under which verification visits might be made. Apart from + this, I said, promptly restoring due process by giving detainees prompt + access to lawyers and family and to early, public trial would be a most + effective way of countering criticism on human rights grounds.

+

11. We then proceeded to the subject of political developments since + June. In regard to this I noted that whereas President Bordaberry had been criticized abroad + for his part in acts limiting democratic practice in Uruguay, the same + critics have now criticized his ouster as breaking the last link of + constitutionalism. I also said that the recent promulgation of Constitutional Decree No. 4, + depriving a great number of people of their political rights had, + insofar as I could tell, been received with some degree of shock by + Uruguayans and had only added to criticism of Uruguay abroad. If these + developments, I said, in fact were part of a process (as announced at + the time of President Bordaberry’s ouster) of restoring more ample political and + party activity, the failure to make clear how this restoration is to + come about and when has made Uruguay vulnerable to the criticism that an + authoritarian government is becoming more so. This criticism, I said, + joins that of human rights to effect adversely the image of Uruguay + abroad.

+

12. The minister in response said he thought it was a good thing I wanted + to talk to President Mendez because it was important that I raise the + same considerations with him and get his point of view. He said that he + would recommend that I be received and would also brief the President + carefully on the background of our discussions on human rights and + particularly of this discussion today. Apart from that he said he would + be very frank to tell me, as I perhaps already knew, that he had opposed + and continued to be opposed to the decree depriving people of their + political rights. He did not think it was necessary or effective and he + recognized its adverse impact on Uruguay’s reputation as well as the + negative reaction of Uruguayan citizens. Such things, he said, were not, + however, the dictation of any particular individual. What is happening + in Uruguay, including this, he said, represents a consensus often + laboriously achieved after much debate of different points of view. This + included, he said, the steps leading to President Bordaberry’s demise. With regad to + this, he said, the fact is that there was no great military opposition + to President Bordaberry + personally and much appreciation of what he had done for the state over + the years. There was also much about which the military and the former + President agreed and were in harmony. There was even a strong desire by + the military that President Bordaberry not only finish his constitutional term but + that he remain on for a still longer period. What had made this + impossible, however, was the development of the dialogue between the + President and the military on the evolution of the “political process” + in Uruguay in this year and in the immediate future. Here, he said, even + he had parted company with the President who he had tried to influence + differently since the dialogue was initiated last December, up to and + including late in the afternoon of the day when the President was + finally ousted. While the issue was very complex, he said, it boiled + down to this: President Bordaberry and the military had agreed basically on a + wide spectrum of “temporary measures” which had to be applied as part of + the process of recovery and restoration of Uruguay, politically, + economically and socially. But the word temporary is the key. What + Bordaberry essentially was + trying to do was to “institutionalize” and make permanent many of the + measures which the military + firmly regarded as temporary. It was on this basis that they finally + broke and it is on this basis that one can legitimately view this break + as positive in terms of the process toward eventual democratic + restoration in Uruguay. We are beginning, he said, to see some of the + elements of this and more will be forthcoming, such as eventual election + of mayors and the lifting of restraints on political party organization + and activity. Nevertheless, he concluded, he felt it important that I + have an in-depth discussion with the President and promised to arrange + it.

+

13. My meeting with President Mendez has now been set for Tuesday, + September 14, at 5:00 p.m.

+ + + Siracusa + + +
+ +
+ 361. Telegram 3451 From the Embassy in Uruguay to the Department of + State +

Summary: + Siracusa recounted + his September 14 discussion with President Aparicio Mendez, who + took office on September 1, regarding subversion, democracy, + human rights, and prisoner releases.

+

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + D760348–0690. Confidential. Telegram 3388 from the Embassy in + Uruguay is Document + 360.

+ + + + + Montevideo, September 15, 1976, 1944Z. + +

3451. Subj.: Meeting with President Aparicio Mendez. Ref.: Montevideo + 3388.

+

Summary: In an hour long discussion President Aparicio Mendez said the + GOU’s ultimate purpose is to + restore full democracy to Uruguay but that this result should not be + expected immediately and particularly not so long as subversion is not + brought under control in neighboring states. While rejecting + international verification of human rights, he said the government is + working toward eliminating abuses which have existed and intends to + place Uruguay “above criticism”. The new law of “danger”, largely but + not wholly to replace the medidas prontas de seguridad, should go to the + council of state next week, he said. They are also considering a + procedure for “benign” treatment of prisoners, particularly women, which + should accelerate releases. A white paper on subversion, security and + human rights is also under consideration. He made an eloquent appeal for + the US to give Uruguay the consideration due a traditional friend in + adversity, when considering our attitude on human rights, such as under + the Harkins amendment. End summary.

+ +

1. President Aparicio Mendez received me at 5:00 p.m. September 14 for a + discussion which lasted one hour. Having been briefed by FonMinister + Blanco (reftel), the + discussion, after initial courtesies in which I expressed my best wishes + for success in his heavy, new responsibilities, quickly entered at his + initiative into the subject of human rights and internal political + developments.

+

2. The President said he wanted to make clear at the outset that his + personal task as he sees it, and in fact the objective of the current + “civilian-military” government, is the restoration of democracy in + Uruguay; but he said the process would necessarily be a difficult and a + long one and he would not venture to predict exactly how long it would + take. Nevertheless, it would certainly be about three years at least, he + said, before the first manifestations of new political activity + (probably the elections of mayors) would occur. Prior to this he said, + there would be some party activity in developing new leadership + following the measure (Constitutional Decree No. 4) which deprived + former leaders of the right of active participation in politics.

+

3. Regarding his own role President Mendez said that he knows he is + subject to considerable criticism and misunderstanding. But he believes + that he has undertaken his responsibilities at personal sacrifice in + view of his age (72 years) and his state of health, which includes a + problem of high blood pressure, and he says he would not do this except + to serve his country as he believes he can. He knows he is considered by + some simply to be the instrument of the military but he said + emphatically that this is not so. The military, he said, are dedicated, + serious people who very easily could have taken over the entire + government had they wanted to because they obviously had the power; but + they have resisted doing this feeling that the civilian-military + structure which exists is more effective and will give better results. + It would be a mistake, he said, to believe that the government operates + on other than a process of debate in effort to achieve consensus. In + this, he said, the civilian participants—the President, civilian members + of the cabinet and council of state—have an important and responsible + role. Prompt restoration of a fully open Uruguayan society, with all its + former characteristics, he said, should not be expected immediately and + certainly not until subversion is ended in South America, particularly + Argentina and Brazil. Full restoration of liberty, he said, prior to + that eventuality would only invite a quick return of subversive + aggression here, on its former scale or worse, and this would subject + the nation again to what it suffered during the Tupamaro period. This, + he said, will not be allowed to happen. But he emphasized again that + within these limitations, and with the restructuring and new forms which + will be devised, the clear and ultimate aim of the government of Uruguay + is democratic restoration.

+ +

4. Turning to human rights, I made some prefatory remarks along the lines + I had taken with the FonMinister regarding the Koch amendment and the Harkins + amendment. Before commenting on this, the President produced a very + large folder containing, he said, a long list of confidential documents + which had never been shown to anyone before and which were now being + copied so that they could be provided for the confidential information + of my government. He said this represented an effort to let us see from + the inside the kinds of problems which the government has faced + regarding subversion and which it still faces. Perusing the list he + mentioned several documents concerning the “antecedents” of Wilson Ferreira Aldunate—pausing to + observe that he thought it important the USG “understand the nature of this man”. He, himself, he + said “had been deceived” by Wilson + Ferreira and, although he did not elaborate, he indicated + that those documents referring to Wilson + Ferreira would show his subversive connections and + actions. He then mentioned other documents concerning subversive + activity which would be included. When I told him that while this was + interesting and we would be glad to receive whatever the government + wished to give us, what seemed to me of more immediate importance was my + desire that he understand the implications of the Harkins amendment and + my hope to hear from him what we might expect in terms of developments + on human rights in Uruguay, and especially the significance of those + portions of his inaugural address which related to this subject. He said + he agreed and that he did not wish to place undue importance on + Wilson Ferreira. In fact, he + said, discussing this only yesterday, it had been agreed that the + government’s best course would be to ignore him as they did not wish to + contribute to his “pretended martyrdom.”

+

5. I then had opportunity to explain to the President the status and + implications of the Koch + amendment proposal and of the Harkins amendment. With regard to this he + said he had just learned that the Senate did not include a measure + parallel to the Koch amendment in + its version of the act. While he considered this a favorable indication + he nevertheless understood that a final decision would be made in + conference committee. Regarding the Harkins amendment he said he would + be thoroughly frank and realistic by admitting that some of the human + rights violations described therein had occurred in Uruguay. But he said + he was certain that the USG, which he + believes has friendly disposition toward Uruguay, could not consider its + possible application except in light of the total background of + subversion in this country and its brutality which has forced a reaction + in self-defense which itself had produced some abuses. He expressed + confidence that the understanding and sympathy due a friend would enter + into US judgment and here he deviated to remark on historical and + constitutional similarities, and differences, between the US and Uruguay. He talked at some + length about the great thinkers and documents of early American history + and the “coincidence of giants” which produced a constitution which + could endure as has ours. Uruguay, he said, also had giant figures in + its earliest years (around 1830), and its first constitution embodied + most of the great principles of our own and had been a document worthy + of respect. But the vicissitudes of subsequent Uruguayan history had + produced other documents which were the creations not of giants but of + political figures; and they were intended, he said, to serve politicians + more than broad national purpose. This basic flaw had brought the + country eventually to distortion of this democratic practice, its + penetration by alien ideas, the deception of its youth and eventually + the tragedy of the Tupamaros experience; and they to the necessary + reaction to it. He said he hopes and was confident that the US would + bear all of this in mind in determining its attitude and relations with + Uruguay.

+

6. I returned the conversation more to specifics by pointing out that I + was not sure how much latitude there would be because of the precise + language of the law. I said that my country has a deep sense of moral + obligation regarding human rights and that I recognized that Uruguay did + as well as it was one of the proponents of basic human rights measures + at the UN. We had, I assured him, been + viewing this problem in Uruguay with the sympathy and with understanding + due a friend, but also with concern. Now, I said, the focus of attention + on Uruguay produced by the campaigns directed against it in the last few + months, together with congressional interest and the text of our law, + had brought about a situation in which decisions must soon be made under + the Harkins amendment because of the nearly $85 million in IDB loan projects for Uruguay which will + come before the board in the next few months. The problem, I said, is + that even if one can successfully discount much of the exaggeration from + accusation against Uruguay on human rights there still remains, as the + President himself said, a residue of basic truth including precisely the + kinds of violations specified in the act. Therefore, I said, what + remains to be considered is what constitutes a consistent pattern of + such violations and as to this, I said, I would hazard no guess except + to say that an adverse decision on these grounds could be entirely + possible. For this reason, I said, I had expressed to FonMinister + Blanco a keen interest in + the meaning of the President’s reference in his inaugural speech to a + new law of “danger” to be applied with “due process”, to his statement + that Uruguayan practice would have to be made “above criticism”, and to + the meaning of the recently announced intention to publicize the names + of persons released from prison.

+

7. Responding, the President said that the final touches in the new law + had been made only yesterday and he expected that it would go to the council of state next + week. I then asked whether this was intended to replace the medidas + prontas de seguridad and eventually what would be its significance and + the manner of its application under due process. He replied that it + could not wholly replace medidas prontas but, as he had stated in his + speech, the medidas prontas would in future be applied only + infrequently, if at all. He said the medidas prontas must be maintained + because they provided the legal and constitutional means of setting + aside the guarantee of habeas corpus, which has been necessary and which + would continue to be necessary. Under the medidas prontas, he said, a + judge might order the liberation of a prisoner but if he is considered + to be one who truly endangered the state he could then be held + indefinitely at the order of the executive. Under the new law which + would apply to most detainees, he said, such people would no longer be + held at the order of the executive but would be definitely sentenced by + a judge and remanded to those prisons especially prepared for persons + charged under security laws. These, he said, were model prisons which + accorded this class of prisoner far better treatment than Uruguay was + able to provide the common criminals. He said he thought this had been + amply demonstrated during the prison visits which Ambassadors had + recently made. At this point he noted that the total number of prisoners + held under security laws was just about 2,000. He also said that trial + and sentences under the new law would prevent anyone from being held in + military curateles or prisons other than those especially prepared for + security prisoners. When I asked him if it was intended that such people + in future be given open trials, saying that by this I meant public + trials with presence of witnesses and the press, he answered in the + negative. But he went on to explain that Uruguay has never followed this + kind of trial practice—that it has never had open trial in that sense + because of the differences in our juridical systems. But trials in the + future would be open, he said, in the sense that prisoners would have + prompt access to legal advice and the trial records would be available. + He also confirmed that it was intended, following the precedent now + established, periodically to publicize the names of persons released + from prison.

+

8. When I suggested the possibility of inviting international + verification the President’s response was no more encouraging than + FonMinister Blanco’s had been + (reftel). I emphasized Secretary Kissinger’s support for this procedure and said we + thought it could alleviate the problems of discussions such as we were + having by taking the problem of human rights out of the bilateral + sphere. It could also do more, I said, toward clarifying the true + picture of the situation in a country than any other means. The + President said Uruguay, at least at the moment, did not have such faith + in this procedure. He said he feared that international bodies from + which such commission come have themselves been so influenced by the forces against which Uruguay + is fighting that they could not be considered to be truly objective.

+

9. I then suggested that it might be well for Uruguay, in order to put + its own case before the world, to issue some kind of white paper which + would put into focus the whole problem of subversion here and problem + now existing as the government sees it. I noted that Ambassador + Ryan had a few months ago + made a similar suggestion to the FonMinister. The President stated that + precisely this subject was discussed just yesterday and that it would be + under active consideration. He then went on to say that they also had + discussed a new “act of benign treatment” (Acta de benignidad). This, he + said, would underwrite a “benign” attitude and treatment toward a broad + spectrum of security cases, with a specific intent of releasing people + from prison, particularly women. In cases thought worthy of benign + treatment, but still considered dangerous, prisoners could be released + if they had some other country which would accept them. But even this, + he said, produces its own kinds of dilemma. There are cases, he said, + involving, “cretines utiles”, (useful fools) who had been deceived, and + entrapped into security violations by those exploiting their good + intentions and emotions. For example, he said, there are some nuns who + the government would like to release from prison. But it fears to do so, + he said, because of its honest concern that they would be murdered by + the same subversive elements which exploited them if they left the + protection of prison. This was a “Shakespearean dilemma”, he said “to + be, or not to be”; but a best effort would be made to deal with it.

+

10. Summarizing at the end of his very frank and forthright discussion + the President repeated again that the government of Uruguay has as its + ultimate intent the restoration of democracy but that he must emphasize + in all honesty the process had to be a slow one. It also believes that + it continues to be the object of a serious subversive threat against + which it must defend itself; and until the situation is greatly improved + especially in neighboring countries, so that a relaxation of the guard + here would not simply invite the return of subversives to renew their + attacks, sweeping changes are not to be expected. Nevertheless, the + President said, within the requirements of security every effort would + be made to correct such violations as have occurred so as to improve the + situation and, as he had said, place Uruguay “above criticism”. He ended + by again appealing for US sympathy and for its understanding, as a + traditional friend of Uruguay, of the reality of the problem with which + the government is trying to deal. When I expressed my regret to the + President that my very first interview with him had to be devoted to + such a delicate and sensitive subject, he said I should feel completely + at ease because the government recognized its importance, believed me to + be a sincere friend, and welcomed the opportunity to give me its point + of view prior to my returning to Washington for consultation.

+ + + Siracusa + + +
+ +
+ 362. Telegram 3462 From the Embassy in Uruguay to the Department of + State +

Summary: + Siracusa stressed to + Shlaudeman his + belief that passage of the Koch amendment would damage U.S.-Uruguayan + relations and would have a detrimental effect on human rights in + Uruguay.

+

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + D760350–1185. Confidential. In telegram 3537 to the Department, + September 21, the Embassy reported on negative Uruguayan + reaction to the Koch + amendment. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy + File, D760358–0246) In telegram 238199 to Montevideo, September + 25, the Department notified the Embassy that the House-Senate + conference committee had included the Koch amendment in the final + version of the appropriations bill. (National Archives, RG 59, + Central Foreign Policy File, D760362–1100) In telegram 3955 to + the Department, October 19, the Embassy reported that Uruguayan + criticism of the Koch + amendment “has abated” and that “the prevailing mood, for the + most part, remains one of ambivalence.” (National Archives, RG + 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D760392–1250) Telegrams 3388 + and 3451 from the Embassy in Uruguay are published as Documents 360 and 361, respectively.

+ + + + + Montevideo, September 16, 1976, 1552Z. + +

3462. Subj: Koch Amendment. Ref: + Montevideo 3388 and 3451.

+

1. I have just learned that a version of the Koch amendment has been introduced into the Senate bill. + Since I am leaving later today and will not be in Washington for about a + couple of weeks I wish to stress to you most emphatically and sincerely + that I believe the passage of this amendment can do serious damage to + our relations with Uruguay and, no matter how well intended it may be, + is likely to have a counter-productive effect; that is, instead of + helping the situation regarding human rights in this country it is + likely because of its punitive and condemnatory nature to produce such a + reaction as to have a harmful effect on what we believe to be a clear + trend toward improvement. Moreover, it is almost certain to reduce the + influence we would otherwise have to nurture this trend.

+

2. I call your attention to the two references outlining my recent + discussions with the FonMinister and with the new President Aparicio + Mendez. Both indicate concern in the Government of Uruguay on this + subject and, I believe, a healthy trend toward greater openness. + Supporting this is the fact that recently the diplomatic corps was + invited to visit the prisons where security prisoners are held and, as + we have reported, found them to be on the whole more than satisfactory. + There is also the new law, scheduled to go to the council of state next + week, which will largely replace the medidas prontas de seguridad and, + according to what I have been told by the President (and only last night + by the Minister of Defense), will lead to greater openness and due + process in the treatment and trial of prisoners accused under the + security laws. There is also the President’s statement to me about a + procedure for more “benign” treatment which could lead to accelerated releases. Finally, there is the + recent publication of the number of prisoners released under various + categories since 1972 and the stated intent, regularly in the future, to + publish the names of released prisoners. All of this, I submit, is a + healthy trend which may be due in part at least to our quiet, diplomatic + efforts and it is something we should encourage rather than thwart. I + would also say that the Koch + proposal itself and the spotlight of congressional hearings have + probably also had a good effect of focusing GOU attention on this problem and on inducing concern for + its image. Nevertheless, this good effort could well be lost, I fear, if + the proposal is actually put into effect. What I have said here applies + as well to the Harkins amendment which, if applied, would certainly be + counterproductive and seriously damaging to our relations. I hope the + Department can bear these factors in mind in making a vigorous effort to + see to it that the Koch amendment + does not become law.

+

3. As a final point I would like to reiterate that in our opinion, the + accusations against Uruguay which have inspired this legislation are to + a considerable extent exaggerated and inaccurate; I believe that our + diligent effort to discover and report the true facts in this difficult + area have amply demonstrated this. This is not to say, of course, that + there have not been nor are not now some violations of human rights. + There have been and there are, as we have always said. But as we have + also said, the situation was doubtless a lot worse several years ago, at + the height of the campaign against Tupamaro terrorism, than it has been + since and there is, I believe, a real move to improve. I also wish to + call attention to the appeal made to me by the FonMinister and the + President: that is, that the USG, in + judging these matters, give Uruguay the consideration due a longstanding + and traditional friend in adversity which is struggling to deal with a + serious problem, and that it take into account all of the relevant + factors which produced a reign of terror here against which the + government eventually reacted with force.

+ + + Siracusa + + +
+ +
+ 363. Memorandum of Conversation +

Summary: Robinson, Shlaudeman and Siracusa discussed Uruguayan politics, human + rights, the IAHRC, and the + Harkin amendment + with Blanco and Perez + Caldas.

+

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + P760167–2864. Confidential. Drafted on October 13 by Zimmerman; + cleared in D and by Shlaudeman and Siracusa; and approved in D. The meeting took + place in the Deputy Secretary’s Office. An October 6 memorandum + from Zimmerman to Shlaudeman regarding preparation for the meeting + is in the National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + P840051–0493, and an October 8 Briefing Memorandum from + Shlaudeman to + Robinson is National + Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + P760161–2360.

+ + + + + Washington, October 8, 1976, 4 p.m. + + + SUBJECT + US-Uruguayan Relations + + + PARTICIPANTS + + + + Uruguay + + Foreign Minister Juan Carlos + Blanco of Uruguay + Uruguayan Ambassador to U.S., Perez Caldaz + + + + + + + United States + + Acting Secretary Robinson + + Assistant Secretary Harry W. + Shlaudeman, ARA + + Ambassador Ernest V. + Siracusa + + Mr. Robert W. + Zimmermann, Director, ARA/ECA + + Mr. Donald C. Tice, Special Assistant to Acting Secretary + Robinson + + + + +

Following the initial amenities, Foreign Minister Blanco stated that terror in Uruguay + had created a serious disbalance which the government is now seeking to + rectify with a new approach to meet the subversive situation and at the + same time rebuild the economy. Uruguay, he said, has all the problems of + a small country seeking further development. The personal contribution + of the new President, Aparicio Mendez, can be important to the design of + new institutions that retain human values but place them in a new + framework required by current conditions. On the political side this + does not mean that there will soon be a Congress or general elections. + The Congress that eventually may be established should perhaps set out + general guidelines rather than address itself largely to details. + Uruguay must also consider the experience of countries in other parts of + the world such as Portugal, Spain and others in Latin America.

+

The Acting Secretary responded that one of the basic problems Uruguay + faces in the United States with regard to human rights is the absence of + appreciation for the difficulties with which the country has had to + cope. Human rights are relatively academic until a system has been + established that permits individual freedoms. When subversive activities threaten the + overthrow of a government, that government must take appropriate steps, + and when it does so these steps are interpreted here as violations of + human rights. This perspective is reflected in our Congress. The United + States is a stable country and thus the people have very broad rights; + consequently U.S. citizens react when people abroad do not enjoy the + same human rights. The U.S. believes in human rights but must see them + in relation to the problems existing in any particular place. At the + same time we have the responsibility to administer our laws in this + area, as in others. A way must be found of working with countries such + as Uruguay which have problems of stability. The problem is to assure + the protection of human rights while effectively recognizing the special + security situation in certain countries. Meanwhile our Congress has + imposed restrictions on economic and military assistance in selected + instances.

+

Ambassador Siracusa commented + that he has had discussions with the Foreign Minister and the President + of Uruguay and has sought to explain the Koch and Harkin + Amendments to them. He said he has also endeavored to transmit his views + on the situation in Uruguay as factually as possible. We are now trying, + he said, to deal with the aftermath of the problem created by these + amendments, and at the same time convince Congress that the law is being + honored. Picking up on a comment by the Acting Secretary, Ambassador + Siracusa noted that the new + “law of danger”, which will largely replace the Medidas Prontas, will + tend to provide more open treatment of prisoners and speedier trials, + and access by family and lawyers. Nevertheless, he said, the U.S. + Congress is more impressed with the reports of Amnesty International + than the information submitted by the Embassy.

+

Replying to a reference by the Acting Secretary to that portion of the + Foreign Minister’s speech at the UNGA + relating to international standards for human rights, Foreign Minister + Blanco said that a + reexamination of this issue must begin with a clear, strong statement on + the substance of the problem. Uruguay is much more interested in human + rights in Uruguay than anyone else in the world. Uruguayans are born, he + continued, with special sensitivity to this issue and any foreign action + in this area complicates the nation’s internal problems. When there is + outside interference people become more radical and there is a distinct + negative effect that interferes with the internal process of relaxation. + Uruguay is quite aware of what is wrong but it is in the tradition of + the country to seek to move to higher and higher standards. A practical + way must be found to deal with this issue. The stability of the social + order and human rights go together and it is for this reason that + Uruguay is seeking to find new institutions to promote a social order + that will encompass personal freedoms.

+

Responding to a question from the Acting Secretary whether he had + proposed international action in his UN + speech, the Foreign Minister stated that any international or unilateral action must be taken + equally with regard to all countries. All aspects of life in each + country should be charted. For example, how are women treated? Are the + people free in their personal lives? Uruguay today is among the 30 or 40 + countries with the highest living standards. Thus Uruguay becomes deeply + angered when it is attacked in the manner of the Koch Amendment in spite of its problems + and its high standards. International mechanisms are being used in an + arbitrary fashion for political purposes with the intent to create + difficulties for a nation that has successfully put down leftist + subversion. The movements of the left in the world today are attacking + such nations.

+

Prior to the Tupamaros, the Uruguayan political intelligence apparatus, + he continued, consisted of only four or five men who did not even have a + car and only a small house for headquarters. The whole structure that + has been erected today was built to meet this new kind of warfare. Now + some people say the Tupamaros are finished and there is no longer a + problem, but this is simply not so. Leftists have assassinated the + Uruguayan Military Attaché in Paris and have drawn up a list of future + targets, including Blanco. + Moreover, Uruguay is now providing more information regarding the number + of people in jail and those released. As of 15 days ago the total number + of subversive prisoners in Uruguayan jails was 2,054. Also 1,800 + prisoners have been released without any further ado and have resettled + themselves except for those few who have chosen to go abroad. The + Foreign Minister said that he had told McDermott of the International + Commission of Jurists that if Uruguay had simply killed the terrorists + and dumped them into the Rio de la Plata nothing would have been heard + from human rights organizations. Instead the Tupamaros were put in jail + under better conditions than ordinary criminals.

+

Continuing on the same theme, the Foreign Minister stated that the + problem of Uruguay is in reality comparatively small. The charges are + that the armed forces of Uruguay have killed by torture 22 people in the + course of seeking to keep down terrorism. In fact, Uruguay can + demonstrate that some of those on the list of 22 were not killed. The + total number of people killed during the Tupamaro era on both sides + (military, police, and Tupamaros) were only 200 or 150, or even less. + Just one death is to be greatly regretted but the world must be + reasonable. He cited Lebanon and Cambodia. Very few countries, he + claimed, could have achieved the results obtained by the Government of + Uruguay at so little cost and yet Uruguay is called a chamber of + torturers. He claimed that the Uruguayan military is just as sensitive + to the human rights issue as he is. These are people who go to church + and take holy communion. Uruguay knows it has problems, he continued, + and that there are some excesses, but the armed forces are against such + excesses and seek to avoid + them. The Koch Amendment, + however, complicates the nation’s political life and promotes + anti-Americanism in all sectors of society. The GOU is trying to calm the people down. Blanco said he understands the + position of the Department of State and the people of the United States, + but it is important for the U.S. to understand Uruguayan difficulties as + well. The situation is not what Uruguay would wish it to be; but + objectively the figures compare favorably with those for any other + country in which similar circumstances exist.

+

The Acting Secretary returned to the question of how to deal with this + problem in order to get better understanding on both sides. Assistant + Secretary Shlaudeman noted that + it was an extremely difficult problem. One aspect of the matter is that + there is a great deal of skepticism in Congress regarding whatever the + Department of State says; this situation has a long history. Ambassador + Siracusa, he continued, + keeps us informed and it is not our desire to employ these unilateral + measures nor do we believe they are productive. The U.S. view is that + the problem should be dealt with by the inter-American system, + multilaterally. The misgivings of Uruguay about the IAHRC and Amnesty International are well + known but it still seems to be the best method of attack. The advice he + would give, he said, is for Uruguay at least to consider inviting the + Inter-American Human Rights Commission to make a visit. Obviously there + are risks involved but the head of the IAHRC appears to be a fair-minded man. Shlaudeman emphasized that this is + just a suggestion as the U.S. is not in the business of providing + prescriptions or imposing solutions.

+

There ensued some discussion of a possible role for the IDB in certifying whether loans would + indeed directly benefit the poor of the recipient country. Commenting on + how easy it is for a single instance to fuel the entire controversy, + Acting Secretary Robinson said + that the IAHRC indeed may be the best + approach to the problem. It is important that the Congress have some + separate source of information that would assist in their understanding + of the situation. The Foreign Minister pointed out that Uruguay has been + answering all charges that have arisen in the Inter-American system but + no response had ever been received. Shlaudeman said that we understood this but Uruguay’s + cooperation in that respect was simply not sufficient to satisfy general + public opinion; what he had proposed was to invite the IAHRC to visit Uruguay.

+

The Foreign Minister responded that at first Uruguay had tried to be open + with international organizations, first in 1974 with Amnesty + International and the International Commission of Jurists, and later + with the International Red Cross. The GOU explained to the ICJ + the physical problem that faced Uruguay in terms of the large number of + people detained during the Tupamaro period vs. limited court facilities + which led to delays in bringing + people to trial. Nevertheless, when the ICJ team left it gave a very hostile press conference and + made wild charges. In the case of the IRC, which visited prisons, the + GOU sought permission to make + public the report of that organization but the Red Cross raised + technical difficulties; up to now Uruguay has not been able to make any + release on that visit. Hence Uruguay is very skeptical about future + visits by international commissions. Perhaps, he added, (and he + emphasized this was not official), the new composition of the + Inter-American Human Rights Commission would make it more + acceptable.

+

The Acting Secretary asked whether it is not possible to refute the + charges against Uruguay point by point. The Foreign Minister replied + that in terms of statistics this would be possible, but otherwise it is + extremely difficult to answer in this way. Ambassador Siracusa then commented on the recent + visit by various members of the Diplomatic Corps to Uruguayan prisons + and underlined the fact that the simple mathematics of total prison + capacity in itself refuted AI charges + about the number of prisoners held. He stated, however, that to be + convincing to Congress and the American people these judgments must come + from outside sources.

+

The conversation then turned to the Harkin Amendment. The Acting Secretary explained that we + are required to vote against loans in the IDB if there exists a consistent pattern of gross + violations of human rights and the loan is not of direct benefit to the + needy. Unfortunately, the burden of proof is on the Department of State + to prove that there is not a consistent pattern. If some acceptable + investigating board could issue a report perhaps enumerating isolated + cases, but coming to a conclusion that a pattern of violations does not + exist, then the Department of State would be in a better position to + make a judgment. The IAHRC would seem + to be the most likely group for this task.

+

The Foreign Minister said that there is an immediate problem however in + that there are two or three loans to be considered in the near future by + the IDB in the area of fishing, a dam, + and refrigeration facilities for meat. The Foreign Minister said that he + is deeply worried about the effect in Uruguay of a Harkin Amendment negative vote, not + just in economic terms but more importantly in terms of political + impact. The Foreign Minister was told we would look into these loans + immediately but there may be no problem if it is possible to show that + they benefit the needy. It was explained that basically the problem + loans are those which provide credit for industrial development and for + export credits, i.e. where the use of the money is very general. + Shlaudeman noted in this + connection that during the next several months when we have this problem + facing us, it is very important that the loans be structured so that the + benefits to the needy are clear.

+
+ +
+ 364. Telegram 292202 From the Department of State to the Embassy in + Uruguay +

Summary: The + Department informed the Embassy that an Uruguayan military + official had made a threat against Congressman Koch in July 1976, and asked + for the Embassy’s recommendations regarding the threat.

+

Source: Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, Roger Channel, Montevideo + 1962–79. Confidential; Roger Channel. Drafted by R. C. Graham of + ARA/ECA; cleared in + ARA and S/S; and approved in INR. Koch’s letter to Attorney General Levi and Levi’s letter to Secretary of + State Kissinger are in + National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + P840121–2166.

+ + + + + Washington, December 1, 1976, 0155Z. + +

292202. Subject: Threat Against Congressman Koch.

+

1. Congressman Edward Koch wrote + to Attorney General Levi on + October 19 informing him of a threat to “get” Koch which a Uruguayan military + official reportedly made [less than 1 line not + declassified] in Montevideo. According to Koch’s letter, this threat was reported + to [less than 1 line not declassified] which in + turn notified the Department of Justice. The Department of Justice, the + letter continues [less than 1 line not + declassified] to inform Koch of the threat and FBI agent, Richard T. Taylor, Jr., did so by phone on + October 1.

+

2. Quoting from the letter, which is being separately pouched, the threat + was described as follows: “He (Taylor) advised me that in July of 1976 a + conversation took place between a Uruguayan military official [less than 1 line not declassified] in Montevideo, + in which the Uruguayan military person said, in a conversation relating + to my legislative efforts in the House of Representatives to end all + military aid to Uruguay: ‘maybe we + would have to send someone to the U.S. to get Congressman Koch.’”

+

3. Koch’s letter asked what he and + his staff should do in view of the threat, and whether FBI protection was in order. He further + asked whether the Uruguayan Government should be advised that it would + be held responsible in the event of an assault upon him or his staff. + Attorney General Levi forwarded + Congressman Koch’s letter to the + Department and asked that we reply to this latter question.

+

4. Congressman Koch is clearly + concerned. The Embassy is requested to assess the seriousness of this + threat. In this regard it would be helpful to know the identity and + position of the military official quoted. In addition the Embassy’s + recommendation is requested concerning the manner in which this incident + may best be brought to the attention of the GOU, if such action appears warranted.

+ + + Robinson + + +
+ +
+ 365. Telegram 4652 From the Embassy in Uruguay to the Department of + State +

Summary: + Ambassador Siracusa + summarized the Embassy’s information regarding the threat + against Congressman Koch, + noting that this was the first time he had been informed of it. + He recommended against a dé;marche to the GOU on the subject, but proposed + that the USG should oppose the + appointments to positions in Washington of two Uruguayan + military officials linked to the threat.

+

Source: Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, Roger Channel, Montevideo + 1962–79. Secret; Roger Channel; Stadis; Eyes Only. An attached + note indicated that this cable was distributed to DDC, S/S, P, ARA, and INR on + December 4. The telegram was forwarded to Habib under a covering + memorandum from Shlaudeman on December 13, discussing the threat + and the potential appointments of Fons and Gavazzo. (Department of State, RG 59, Central + Foreign Policy File, P84121–2164) In a December 29 memorandum to + Saunders, DeTarr + summarized the case and gave the date of the threat against + Koch as June [text not declassified]. (Department of + State, INR/IL Historical + Files, Africa, Latin America, Inter-Agency Intelligence + Committees, Uruguay 1973–80) Telegram 292202 to the Embassy in + Uruguay is Document + 364.

+ + + + + Montevideo, December 2, 1976, 2010Z. + +

4652. Subj: Threat Against Congressman Koch. Ref: State 292202.

+

1. Prior to receiving reftel, I had never heard anything whatsoever about + a threat against Congressman Koch + [2 lines not declassified] it turns out that + a remark as described in reftel was made some months ago by Uruguayan + Army Col. Jose A. Fons, [1 line not declassified] The matter is further + complicated by [less than 1 line not + declassified] The name of Army Major Jose Nino Gavazzo Pereira, also of the army intelligence + unit, SID (Defense Intelligence Service) to aid in judgment of this matter there follows my + chronological summary [less than 1 line not + declassified]

+

2. The story begins with [1½ lines not + declassified] dated July 23. He mentioned that [less than 1 line not declassified] Col. Fons, had once said “after a couple of + drinks” when they were discussing the Uruguayan military’s “extreme + irritation” with Congressman Koch, that “maybe Uruguay would have to send someone to the + United States to ‘get him’.” [less than 1 line not + declassified] he felt at the time that Fons “was just talking out loud”; but + he added that should the Koch + amendment be approved, “the inclusion of Koch on the Condor target list might seriously be + considered by Condor members.”

+

3. On 2 October [1½ lines not declassified] noted + that he believed Fons’ earlier + remark “should be taken less seriously than when originally reported.” + His reasons were that aggressive action would require concurrence of + higher-ups who, although feeling Koch and the Congress had acted unjustly toward Uruguay, + “had no intention of modifying traditional ties and dependency on the + United States.” He also felt that in the aftermath of the Letelier assassination Uruguayans + would take no such risk with their image. [1½ lines + not declassified] His view that in the event Uruguay were to + decide to go ahead with such a thing, they would entrush the operation + “to only one person, Major Gavazzo”; and their modus operandi, he said, would be to + send him into the United States for a few months to develop the + “operational plan.” He offered to report immediately should his + evaluation change.

+

4. [less than 1 line not declassified] dated 4 + November, [less than 1 line not declassified] + both Fons and Maj. + Gavazzo had been assigned to the + US, the former to the inter-American Defense Board to arrive in early + January of 1977, and the latter as assistant military attaché; to arrive + in March of 1977. He offered the view that the assignments appear “to + uncoincidental and neither will have a Condor Mission.”

+

5. On 19 November [less than 1 line not + declassified] “long discussions” with Fons about his assignment and the + latter’s avowal that his superiors, Generals Prantl and Vadora, have never seriously + contemplated any operations in the United States as it “was too risky + and highly counterproductive.” He said Fons’ assignment was to give a plum to a Senior Colonel + not likely to make General and Gavazzo’s was to “get him out of the day-to-day fight + with terrorists because he had been burned and is known to terrorists.” + [less than 1 line not declassified] Both were + aware that their respective assignments could be misunderstood [less than 1 line not declassified] Fons has taken great pains to explain + [less than 1 line not declassified] their two + assignments were a coincidence. He said that neither Fons or Gavazzo “is being assigned to Washington with a Condor + Mission.” [less than 1 line not declassified] + that in the US climate, following the Presidential election, the GOU “has no intention whatsoever of making + any comments or taking any action that would irritate US + authorities.

+

6. [less than 1 line not declassified], dated + December 1, [2 lines not declassified] expresses + the opinion that after his “exhaustive discussions with Fons, [less than 1 + line not declassified] that “Fons earlier statement re Koch should not be taken seriously today.” He notes that + this was made after a few drinks and was never repeated. [3½ lines not declassified] both recognize that + since subject has been raised [less than 1 line not + declassified] and exhaustively discussed. They would be suspect + should anything happen. Can only repeat that [less + than 1 line not declassified] neither has Condor Mission”.

+

7. I have also learned from the AIRA of his recent discussions with + Fons of the latter’s + prospective assignment to the US, and of Fons’ expressed concern that his and Gavazzo’s assignments, which he took + pains to say were “conicidental”, might be misunderstood. Fons also told AIRA that he was + concerned for his own safety in the US and had asked superiors whether + he could request FBI protection. He was + told, he said, that he could + not request it but could accept it “if offered.” AIRA and others who + know Fons characterized him as a + loose talker. Many here recall that he was nearly court martialed a + couple of years ago for creating an incident at a diplomatic reception + by making wild, communist charges against persons in the GOU.

+

8. Evaluation: After careful reflection I accept [less + than 1 line not declassified] that Col. Fons’ remark, as such, should be + considered, in the context in which it was made, not to consittute, in + itself, a real threat to Cong. Koch. I also agree that even had there been any + semblance of seriousness at the time, the probability of any aggressive + action has been rendered virtually zero by subsequent discussion [less than 1 line not declassified] which would + surely lead directly to blame of Fons, Gavazzo and + GOU should anything whatsoever + happen to Cong. Koch. It is also + probable [less than 1 line not declassified], + that the assignments of both Fons + and Gavazzo to the US are + conicidental, having nothing to do with any threat to Cong. Koch or anyone else; reflecting, + rather, service needs and motives [less than 1 line + not declassified]. On the other hand, since coincidentally or + not, the assignments precisely carry out [less than 1 + line not declassified] what would happen and who would be + involved if an attempt were contemplated, I do not, repeat do not, see + how we can in conscience allow the assignments to be realized, minimal + or even non-existent as the threat may be. There is a further + consideration that the AIRA, while believing Fons to be unoffensive, considers Gavazzo to be a dangerous type.

+

9. Conclusion and Recommendation: My conclusion (re para. 3 of reftel) is + that we have no basis to notify the GOU + that it would be held responsible for anything that might happen to + Cong. Koch. A remark made after + drinks some months ago by a known loose talker is just not adequate + basis for serious overture which would be offensive to the extreme to + the GOU; and, to base such an overture + solely on the fact that Koch was + a sponsor of an amendment against Uruguay would appear gratuitously to + impugn the integrity of the GOU itself. + As for the manner of blocking the assignments of Fons and Gavazzo, I propose that this be done by the Department’s + advising Ambassador Perez Caldez that neither assignment would be + welcome. I further suggest that this be done with minimum explanation. + One possibility, drawing on Fons’ + own expressed fears, could be that the notorious relations of both + officers to SID and to the Uruguayan anti-terrorist campaign could make + them targets for incidents which we would prefer not to have happen in + the US. It might also be noted that the USG, having heard of Fons concerns, and as it would not be able to provide + protection, would prefer to avoid any potential risk. Such a course of + action, I believe, would be effective and would have minimum potential + for damaging overall relations. There might well be [less than 1 line not declassified] and even the possibility of + some degree of retaliation. + I believe we must accept this, however, unless we are prepared to ignore + the whole thing which I do not repeat not recommend.

+

10. I wish to end this message by stating that I am appalled that there + could have been an exchange of communications reporting and judging a + subject so potentially explosive and even tragic, concerning a threat + against an American Congressman, the integrity of this mission, and the + relations between the US and Uruguay, without the Ambassador even being + aware of it until receipt of the referenced message. I intend to take + this up in further and separate communication. Since I note that Cong. + Koch was briefed on this + matter by an FBI on October 1, some + days before I saw him, [less than 1 line not + declassified] I sincerely request that the Department make + known to him that I was totally unaware that such an even off-hand + remark had been made when I met with him. This is particularly important + since when he asked if it would be safe for him to come to Uruguay, I + rather lightly remarked that he would be as safe as I always am. A + [illegible] would probably travel around together.

+ + + Siracusa + + +
+ +
+ 366. Memorandum for the Record +

Summary: Participants in the ARA/CIA weekly meeting + discussed the threat against Congressman Koch and whether or not to make + a dé;marche to the GOU.

+

Source: Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, Africa, Latin America, + Inter-Agency Intelligence Committees, ARA–CIA Weekly + Meetings 1976–77. Secret; Sensitive.

+ + + + + Washington, December + 10, 1976. + + + SUBJECT + ARA/CIA Weekly Meeting, 10 December 1976 + + + PARTICIPANTS + + ARA—Assistant Secretary Harry W. Shlaudeman, + Mr. Joseph Grunwald; CIA—Mr. [name not declassified], + Mr. [name not declassified]; INR/DDC—Francis De Tarr + + +

+ Uruguay: Threat Against + Congressman Koch + +

+

Most of the meeting was devoted to a discussion of the threat made by a + Uruguayan security official last July [less than 1 + line not declassified] in Montevideo against the life of + Congressman Koch (reported in + State 292202 dated December 1 + and described in detail in Montevideo 4652 dated December 2; [less than 1 line not declassified] concerning the + threat on July 23, Congressman Koch wrote to Attorney General Levi on October 19 after having been + contacted by an FBI agent, and Attorney + General Levi wrote to the + Secretary on November 5; with Mr. Luers concurrence, we sent Mr. [name + not declassified] copies of these letters as well as State + 292202 and Montevideo 4652 earlier in the week.)

+

Assistant Secretary Shlaudeman + said that we are now faced with an operational problem. The Attorney + General had referred Congressman Koch’s letter of October 19 to the Department.

+

Mr. [name not declassified] said that the FBI had briefed Congressman Koch. [3½ lines not + declassified] In the meeting with Koch, they had tried to put the matter into perspective. + [2½ lines not declassified].

+

Assistant Secretary Shlaudeman + said that the question remains as to whether we say anything to the + Uruguayan Government. If we do, we run a risk as far as the source is + concerned. [1½ lines not declassified].

+

[3 lines not declassified] Congressman Koch seemed to accept this line of + reasoning.

+

Assistant Secretary Shlaudeman + said that they could not be certain on this point. It was ambiguous, and + this is the major question.

+

Mr. [name not declassified] said he saw no reason + to believe that Congressman Koch + has changed his position since the meeting on October 26. They have + heard nothing further from him. He seems to be satisfied. The matter + seems to have been laid to rest.

+

Assistant Secretary Shlaudeman + suggested that the same people talk to Congressman Koch again and ask him whether he is + satisfied or whether he wants to have a démarche made.

+

[3 lines not declassified] They had gone into the + matter. The threat is not a serious one. So why make a démarche?

+

Mr. [name not declassified] said that he felt that + a personal meeting was indicated, not a letter. Reference should be made + to the meeting on October 26, and Congressman Koch could be told that no new + information has been developed since that time. He would then expect to + get something in writing. One of the Department’s legislative liaison + people should be involved. [1½ lines not + declassified]

+

Assistant Secretary Shlaudeman + asked what Mr. [name not declassified] would + recommend if Congressman Koch + still wanted to have a démarche made. Mr. [name not + declassified] said that in his view there is no reason to think + he would. He is a rational man.

+

Assistant Secretary Shlaudeman + asked Mr. [name not declassified] how much he + thought Congressman Koch should + be told. Mr. [name not declassified] said that he + thought Congressman Koch should + be told everything we know, except for information about the source. The + objective is to put the + matter in its proper perspective, to try to lay it to rest. [1½ lines not declassified] Ambassador Siracusa’s telegram contains the + information needed to put it into perspective, that is, to show it is + not sufficiently serious to make a démarche. We have no reason to make a + démarche.

+

Assistant Secretary Shlaudeman + said we would see, adding that he would go see Congressman Koch or call him.

+

Assistant Secretary Shlaudeman + then asked what Mr. [name not declassified] + thought should be done about the two Uruguayans who want to come to the + United States. Mr. [name not declassified] said: + it is up to you all to decide if you do not want to take even a minimum + chance. As managers we may come out this way. Basically, it is a + decision for the Department. [2½ lines not + declassified]

+

[3 lines not declassified]

+

In conclusion, Assistant Secretary Shlaudeman said that we would let Mr. [name not declassified] know how we come out on the matter.

+

[Omitted here is discussion of Embassy personnel and Cuba.]

+
+ +
+ 367. Telegram 4755 From the Embassy in Uruguay to the Department of + State +

Summary: + Siracusa, noting + that he now had reason to believe that the Condor countries + continued to direct assassination operations in foreign + countries, reiterated that the appointments of Col. Fons and Maj. + Gavazzo to positions in + Washington should be blocked. He ruminated on the broader + responsibility of the USG + regarding knowledge of assassination plots and requested further + information on “what the Washington intelligence community + thinks of Condor.”

+

Source: Department of State, INR–IL Historical Files, Roger Channel, Montevideo + 1962–79. Secret; Roger Channel; Eyes Only. A handwritten + notation indicates that this cable was distributed to ARA, P, S/S and OD. Telegram 4652 from the Embassy in + Uruguay is Document + 365.

+ + + + + Montevideo, December 10, 1976, 1910Z. + +

4755. Subj: Condor Operations. Ref: Montevideo 4652.

+

1. You will recall that in reftel, [1 line not + declassified] there are various statements that officers + mentioned had no “Condor Mission” in the US and [less + than 1 line not declassified] conviction that there was no such + mission. When I prepared that message and gave my own evaluation, I was + under the impression that the Condor Organization had determined + sometime ago not to engage in “operations” for the time being, even though it would go ahead and + fulfill its mission of intelligence and security coordination and + cooperation among its various members. [less than 1 + line not declassified] now makes clear that this is not the + case and I believe you should read this communication if it has not yet + been brought to your attention. It reports the failure of a joint + Uruguayan-Argentine effort to “operate against” three Uruguayan + “terrorists” in Paris. One of the three, the only one whose name is + mentioned, is an OPR–33 member, Hugo Andres Cores Perez. The mission is + said to have failed because of Cores’ sudden disappearance, one day + before the team had located his residence in Paris.

+

2. This information, it seems to me, reenforces my recommendation in + para. 9 of reftel that the assignments of Col. Fons and of Maj. + Gavazzo to Washington be blocked. + It also should alert us to the concern that if Condor is real [less than 1 line not declassified] and even if it + has no present intention of “operating” in the US, there is no guarantee + that this would always be the case. Moreover, it seems to me to raise + the important moral question of whether we, being privy to a plan to + undertake an assassination attempt, are not thereby in some sense + tainted by this knowledge and become at least passive collaborators. + Only last night I read a news account from Spain accusing the CIA of shared responsibility for the + murder of the Spanish Premier a couple of years ago on the grounds that + it knew of the plot and did not warn him. I do not know who Cores is + except that he is another human being, but what if the name mentioned + was Wilson Ferreira or someone + else in whom there may be a broader sympathetic interest? Would this + change our attitude? And since we do not know the names of the other + two, it could be that he could be one of them, even though [less than 1 line not declassified] Ferreira was removed from the Condor + target list. But the source of the information of his “removal” is the + same Col. Fons, who as I have + reported, is said to be a loose talker and who has also said to others + here that Wilson Ferreira is a + dead man in any case. His reasoning, I am told, is that other enemies + will get him so Condor does not have to do it.

+

3. I appreciate the great difficulty of the kinds of problems posed here, + as to the line of delineation between moral obligation [less than 1 line not declassified] I do not know + exactly where it should be drawn but confess that I am bothered by being + the possessor of such information. I am also concerned that our regular + official liaison on this subject here (and I assume at other nearby + embassies as well) raises the question whether we become passive + collaborators if we seek and obtain such information yet stand silent as + “operations” are carried out. I am also mindful of the fact that recent + publicity of alleged CIA assassination + plots has brought forth clear executive and congressional direction that + this shall not again occur. How does the problem I pose here relate to + such directives? Is the + Condor intelligence operations here consistent with them?

+

4. Perhaps it would help to know, if possible, what the Washington + intelligence community thinks of Condor. I have often been struck by a + somewhat unreal feeling about it all, perhaps now reinforced by + knowledge of the source of our information and his peculiar + characteristics. I wonder whether reporting from other countries tends + to corroborate the reality of Condor as an “operative” organization in + addition to its security-intelligence coordination missions.

+

5. In para. 10 of reftel I expressed my concern that the exchanges, [less than 1 line not declassified] regarding the + possible threat against Congressman Koch could have gone on so long without ever having been + brought to my attention. Recently, at his request, we provided Frank Ortiz for use in S/S with a reference to a standing + instruction, still valid, which apparently had been lost sight of in the + Department but which gives the Chief of Mission or his designated + assistant the right to see “all available information [less than 1 line not declassified] which the principal officer + indicates is of interest to him.” Based on this authority, [less than 1 line not declassified] I intend from + here on to see to it that the DCM + reviews on a bi-weekly basis everything covered by this instruction to + me. I had thought [less than 1 line not + declassified] was providing me with everything but he obviously + was not. Perhaps you might consider whether this [less + than 1 line not declassified] should be brought to the + attention of other Chiefs of Mission who may not be aware of it, as I + was not.

+ + + Siracusa + + +
+ +
+ 368. Telegram 306332 From the Department of State to the Embassy in + Uruguay +

Summary: + Shlaudeman wrote + that he would tell Perez + Caldas that the appointments of Fons and Gavazzo to positions in + Washington were not satisfactory due to the potential for + “unfavorable publicity” if their appointments became public.

+

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Defense Attaché Files 1960–81, + Lot 94D501, Uruguay. Secret; Priority; Roger Channel. Drafted by + Shlaudeman and + approved in INR. In telegram + 307586 to Montevideo, December 20, Shlaudeman described his meeting with Perez + Caldas and noted that the ambassador appeared to be “sympathetic + to the request.” (Department of State, INR–IL Files, Vol. 17: Roger + Channel, Montevideo 1962–79) In telegram 4888 from Montevideo, + December 21, Siracusa + agreed to use the same line of reasoning if the GOU approached him on the matter. + (Ibid.) In telegram 4936 from Montevideo, December 23, Siracusa reported to Shlaudeman on his meeting with + Defense Minister Ravenna, + who “said he would inform the president promptly of what had + been told to him.” (Ibid.) Telegrams 4652 and 4755 from the + Embassy in Uruguay are published as Documents 365 and 367, + respectively.

+ + + + + Washington, December 18, 1976, 0009Z. + +

306332. Subject: Condor. Ref: (A) Montevideo 4652, (B) Montevideo + 4755.

+

1. I plan to inform Ambassador Perez + Caldas on December 20 that Fons and Gavazzo + would not repeat not be welcome in Washington because their coming could + lead to unfavorable publicity damaging to the relations between the two + countries. It should be sufficient for the purpose to note the intense + congressional and media interest in the purported presence here of + intelligence operatives from countries under attack on the human rights + front. You will wish to follow the same line and to assure that visas + are not issued to Fons and + Gavazzo.

+

2. I have now learned that [less than 1 line not + declassified] discussed the Fons threat with Congressman Koch. [less than 1 line not + declassified] believes he is satisfied that a démarche to the + Uruguayan Government would only compromise a valuable source. I plan to + discuss the matter with Koch when + he returns to Washington next month.

+

3. I share the doubts and perplexity you express in Ref (B) with respect + to the situation we find ourselves in. But in the absence of a démarche + to the GOU—which I understand you + oppose—what would you suggest? We will address the questions you raise + about the [less than 1 line not declassified] and + the reassessment of Condor in a separate message.

+ + + Kissinger + + +
+ +
+ 369. Action Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of Inter-American + Affairs (Shlaudeman) to the + Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs (Habib) +

Summary: Shlaudeman reported on the results of the + démarche to the GOU regarding + the appointments of Fons + and Gavazzo to positions + in Washington.

+

Source: Department of State, INR–IL Historical Files, Africa, Latin America, + Inter-Agency Intelligence Committees, Uruguay 1973–1980. Secret; + Nodis. Drafted by C. W. + Bray of ARA on + December 30. The memorandum was copied to INR. Tabs 1 and 2 are attached but + not published. There is no indication of approval or disapproval + of the recommendation.

+ + + + + Washington, December + 31, 1976. + +

+ Uruguayan Intelligence Personnel to the + US +

+

On December 17 you authorized me to inform the Uruguayan Ambassador that + the assignments of Col. Fons to + the Inter-American Defense Board and Maj. + Gavazzo as Assistant Military + Attaché here would not be welcome. I did so, and the Uruguayan + Ambassador indicated his understanding of our position.

+

The démarche, however, has precipitated something of a dust-up in + Montevideo. The essence of it is well described in the attached [3 lines not declassified] Our Ambassador, who + originally favored the position I conveyed to the Uruguayans, has now + reconsidered his views and appears to believe that we should reverse + course to permit Fons, at least, + to take up his assignment at the IADB. + His most recent views are at Tab 2.

+

I continue to believe that if we allowed either individual—and + particularly Fons, who is both + involved in CONDOR and uttered the original threat against Congressman + Koch—to come to Washington, + we would be buying trouble. The fact that the Director of the Uruguayan + Defense Intelligence Service felt it necessary to go out of his way [less than 1 line not declassified] “that there + were no other motives for these assignments” and that neither officer + “would have (any) mission other than those officially and legitimately + connected with their jobs while assigned to the US” gives me some + pause.

+

The cost of denying visas to the two individuals could be an increase in + the security risks to American personnel in Montevideo. [3 lines not declassified] and that the Uruguayans + will continue doing (as presumably they have in the past) whatever they + think to be in their national interest in their relationships [2 lines not declassified] as comparable in + benefit to the costs which could be incurred should it become known that + we had deliberately allowed Fons, + in particular, to take up residence here.

+ +

Since the IADB is an international + organization, the only grounds on which we could refuse a visa to + Fons is Section 212(A) (27) + of the Immigration and Nationality Act, i.e., “Aliens who the consular + officer or the Attorney General knows or has reasons to believe seek to + enter the United States solely, principally, or incidentally to engage + in activities which would be prejudicial to the public interest, or + endanger the welfare, safety, or security of the United States.”

+

I do believe the presence of either individual in the U.S. would be + prejudicial to the public interest. On the other hand, I would send + rather precise instructions to our Ambassador simply to convey our + desire not to have these two individuals in the United States without + referring to the law.

+

[1 paragraph (2 lines) not declassified]

+

+ Recommendation: +

+

That you reaffirm our original decision to deny entry to Fons and Gavasso.

+

Approve Disapprove

+ +
+
+ +
+ Venezuela +
+ 370. Ambassador’s Overview, Country Analysis and Strategy Paper +

Summary: The Ambassador’s + overview of U.S. interests in Venezuela focused on trade, in + particular petroleum. In addition, the Ambassador noted that + Venezuela’s foreign policy would become more oriented towards + Latin America and Europe, and less towards the United + States.

+

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files, 1970–1973, + POL 1 VEN–US. Secret. + Drafted by Cox on March + 14; cleared by Luers, + McClintock, and the + CT; approved by Devine. Sent as an enclosure + to Airgram A–143 from Caracas, March 18, 1973.

+ + + + + Caracas, undated. + +

Venezuela is important to the United States as the source of 40% of U.S. + oil imports; as the third largest market for U.S. exports in Latin + America and the 11th largest in the world; as a host for almost $3 + billion in U.S. private investment; as a major supplier of iron ore; and + as the locale of the most economic large resource of unexploited + petroleum in the Hemisphere.

+

In the petroleum field there has been some easing of tensions since the + early 1971 period when an atmosphere of confrontation existed between + the Venezuelan Government and the oil companies over greatly increased + taxes and tough new controls designed to force the companies to maintain + high levels of production, exports and investment. Tension had also + resulted from Government charges that lower levels of output were + designed to punish Venezuela for its nationalistic oil policies. + Negotiations on trade and petroleum matters authorized by President + Nixon have done much to ease + these tensions. The more important elements of the U.S.-Venezuela Trade + Agreement which Venezuela denounced New Year’s Day 1972 have been + preserved by an exchange of Notes. Hopefully after the elections + December 9, 1973, an energy agreement can be concluded between the two + governments under which development of the Orinoco Petroleum Belt oil + resources can be carried out. However, the potential for conflict + arising from Venezuela’s desire to increase its control over, and income + from, its natural resources, while less serious than last year, still + exists.

+

Venezuelan entry into the Andean Pact could threaten existing and future + U.S. investment and disrupt normal patterns of imports of particular + commodities. The new ad valorem tariff schedule, which will require + repeated changes to correct deficiencies and to track with arrangements + with the Pact, is another imponderable for future U.S./Venezuelan trade + and investment, as are Venezuela’s interpretation of Pact Decision 24, domestic + legislation on foreign investment, and growing competition from Japan + and Europe. Yet there are still substantial opportunities for investment + in and trade with Venezuela in the next five years. On balance of + payments account, much of U.S. dollar outgo for purchase of Venezuelan + oil is compensated by U.S. profit remittances and almost a billion + dollars of annual U.S. exports to Venezuela.

+

Politically the December 1973 elections will almost certainly proceed + normally and either COPEI or Acción Democrática will win. Neither, however, + will gain a majority and whoever wins will have to govern on the + sufferance of the other. Nationalism will remain an irritant to + relations between the two countries, but it should not be any more of a + problem in the near term than it has to date, no matter which party + wins. In the long term Venezuela is facing social and economic pressures + which, in the next five years, could juxtapose severe societal strains + with an economic downturn. If this occurs there is a possibility of + drastic changes in the domestic picture, with concomitant effects on + relations between our two countries. Aside from the uncertainty this + entails, such a threat to the democratic system here would be of + concern; as one of the few working democracies in South America, + Venezuela in its attempt to operate a stable, free government merits our + sympathy and support.

+

Venezuela’s fast-evolving foreign policy of unity and integration with + the countries of South America, her loosening of the formerly extremely + close ties with the United States, her interest in Europe, and her + desire for leadership in the Caribbean will probably continue whoever + wins the election; the “Betancourt Doctrine” is probably gone for good. + Venezuela’s moderate Law of the Sea positions and her apparently + successful attempt to gain the adherence of both the “Santo Domingo + Group” and the respectful attention of the “Montevideo Group” will in + the long run be of benefit to the U.S. Venezuela may become the bridge + between the 12-mile countries and the 200-mile group. The Venezuelan + Government is still a strong supporter of the UN and OAS. It has + attempted to seek a lifting of OAS + sanctions against Cuba. Such steps will probably be accompanied by a + process of reestablishment of trade relations, probably involving + petroleum, with formal diplomatic relations likely, no matter which + party wins. We do not foresee a settlement of the highly complex + continental shelf boundary dispute with Colombia until after the 1974 + Colombian elections. Tensions between the two countries over this + problem will continue until some interim or long-term agreement is + reached. Continental shelf negotiations with the Netherlands Antilles + will begin after the elections but will probably go nowhere until a + settlement with Colombia is reached. The dispute with Guyana will remain + quiescent. A major discovery of + petroleum by this country or others in disputed territory could, of + course, drastically change this generally optimistic picture.

+

As in the past, the economic relationships of the two countries will in + the future be of paramount importance, as the United States confronts a + growing need for energy and as the psychology of nationalism and a + seller’s market in petroleum put increased pressures on the large + American investment portfolio in this country. It will be necessary for + the United States, keeping these three factors firmly in mind, to avoid + being overly sensitive to nationalist rhetoric which in months and years + to come will continue to be used by Venezuelans to demonstrate their + credentials for leadership in this continent. We should concentrate on + enhancing and increasing the surprisingly large deposit of friendship + and respect for the U.S. which still exists in Venezuela.

+ + + Robert + McClintock + + +
+ +
+ 371. Telegram 58100 From the Department of State to the Embassy in + Venezuela +

Summary: + Crimmins and + Aguilar discussed + anti-Americanism in Venezuela and United States-Venezuelan + relations.

+

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + [no film number]. Confidential; Limdis. Drafted by Forrester; cleared by + Edward Little and + Stockman; approved + by Crimmins. According + to a memorandum of an April 5 conversation between Calvani and Rogers in + Washington, the Venezuelan Foreign Minister expressed surprise + at U.S. inquiries about changes in Venezuelan policy towards the + United States, as reflected in some of Caldera’s speeches. Rogers + replied that the U.S. Government had simply asked for a + clarification of Venezuelan policy, just as it was frequently + asked for clarifications of its own policy. (Ibid., Central + Files, 1970–1973, POL + VEN–US)

+ + + + + Washington, March 29, 1973, 2020Z. + +

58100. Subject: Ambassador Aguilar’s Call on Acting Assistant Secretary Crimmins: President Caldera’s Statements During LA Tour. Refs: State 35197, Caracas + 2422.

+

1. At his request, Ambassador Aguilar called on Acting Assistant Secretary Crimmins at the Department, Saturday, + March 24. Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary Little and Venezuelan Desk Officer Forrester were also present.

+

2. Aguilar opened by asking if + Mr. Crimmins knew the reason for + the call. Mr. Crimmins answered + no and admitted his considerable curiosity. Aguilar explained that he had been recalled March 16 for + consultations with FonMin + Calvani. According to + Aguilar, Calvani expressed puzzlement with + questions Ambassador McClintock + asked him during their March 8 meeting regarding a possible shift in + Venezuelan policy towards U.S., its attitude toward Cuba and + anti-Americanism in Venezuela. Aguilar observed that Ambassador McClintock had travelled unmolested + throughout Venezuela; sizeable U.S. investment was flourishing; GOV had launched major effort to attract + U.S. tourists; Venezuela’s qte masses unqte are not anti-American; and + none of major political parties has introduced U.S. as issue in election + campaign.

+

3. Aguilar contended friendship + must be measured in deeds, not words, mentioning seeming U.S. proclivity + toward paying more attention to our enemies than to our friends. As + example Aguilar referred to + minimum press coverage Caldera’s + state visit received in U.S. versus coverage like visit by Chile’s + President Allende would probably + receive.

+

4. Aguilar concluded saying + Venezuela is one of few remaining LA + democracies and that special U.S.-Venezuela relations are historic, thus + Ambassador McClintock’s query re + a changing Venezuelan policy towards U.S. seems inexplicable and without + basis. Aguilar also asked + whether Ambassador had acted with knowledge or instructions from + Department.

+

5. Mr. Crimmins responded that + Ambassador McClintock had called + on FonMin Calvani at the behest + of and with authorization of Department. He cited as major factors + prompting query about the significance to GOV position of reported Caldera statements: the long history of close + U.S.-Venezuelan relations, the fact that Venezuela is indeed one of few + LA democracies and a key country in + the area; Venezuela’s leading role in the hemisphere; and President + Caldera’s stature as a person + and statesman. Because of these factors, Mr. Crimmins continued, the Department + attaches special significance to what President Caldera says and what the President + says can have special weight in the hemisphere. Placing inquiry to + Calvani in broad context, Mr. + Crimmins noted growing trend + in hemispheric relations for strident rhetoric and sterile + confrontation. Fact is that Caldera’s statements, as reported in Brazilian + publication qte Manchete unqte, gave these pronouncements hemispheric + impact and could have indicated that GOV was associating itself with negative chorus.

+

6. Mr. Crimmins said that + Calvani’s response and + Aguilar’s own comments fully + satisfied the Department’s query, and he stressed that our questions + were not based on any a priori political judgment. We had, through the + inquiry, sought reassurance about GOV’s + attitude, and it had been given.

+

7. Aguilar, although indicating + he was not fully convinced, thanked Mr. Crimmins for this explanation and said he would relay + his response to Caracas. Concluding, Mr. Crimmins suggested that FonMin Calvani, if he considered further discussion useful, might + wish to pursue the matter further with Secretary Rogers during the OASGA meeting next month. Aguilar said he would pass this + suggestion to Calvani.

+

8. Finally, Aguilar noted that + his approach to the department was extremely confidential, had not been + discussed with other GOV officials, and + that FinMin Oberto, then in Washington, did not know why Aguilar had been recalled for + consultation.

+ + Rogers + +
+ +
+ 372. Telegram 4042 From the Embassy in Colombia to the Department of + State +

Summary: + Secretary Rogers and + Venezuelan officials discussed economic issues in United + States-Venezuelan relations.

+

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files, 1970–1973, ORG 7 + S. Confidential; Immediate. Repeated to Caracas. The Secretary’s + May 14 statement upon arrival in Caracas is in the Department of + State Bulletin, June 25, 1973, p. 906. + Rogers was in Bogotá + during a May 12–28 tour of Latin America that took him to + Mexico, Nicaragua, Venezuela, Peru, Colombia, Brazil, Argentina, + the Netherlands Antilles, and Jamaica.

+ + + + + Caracas, May + 17, 1973, 1951Z. + +

4042. Subj: Secy’s Economic Discussion with Secvisit LA: Venezuela.

+

1. Secy Rogers and Principals met + with Foreign Min and other Cabinet Level Officials GOV May 15 for hour and half to discuss + economic issues. Summary of discussions fols:

+

2. Calvani welcomed Secy’s arrival + May 14 statement that era of paternalism past and that US seeking new + equality in trade and economic policy. Calvani said world tomorrow must be based on equality + and fol fundamentals: (1) Democracy; (2) International social justice + meaning developed countries obligations increase in proportion to their + capacity, and (3) Democratic nationalism. As example democratic + nationalism he pointed to Venezuelan policy to defend natural resources + of which there has been lack of US understanding at times. Venezuela + building new guidelines for foreign trade which not only include oil but + also replacement of substitution of imports by promotion of exports + designed for world market.

+

2. Secy Rogers said purpose of + visit was to have frank exchange of views and while some problems exist + there is a fundamental mutuality of interests. US forced to concentrate on matters of security over + last several years but now has improvement relations with Sov Union and + China and diminishing problems other areas. US now able to focus on + Latin America. Secy emphasized US policy is to deal with each nation as + sovereign and independent without raising unrealistic aspirations. US + supports multilateral development within context OAS and regional development such as + Andean Pact. US now in a position to be more cooperative with Latin + America and particularly wants Venezuelan views so that they might be + reflected in US policy.

+

3. Whereas Venezuela was expecting specific points of new US policy + Calvani said Secy provided + rather general framework of US policy. He referred to ominous silence + which followed consensus of Vina Del Mar Conference in 69 and indicated + hope US would adopt specific policies for each country from which a + general policy would develop. Secy said US seeking restructuring of + OAS based on general principles + without demagoguery. However it should be noted US people feel that US + has been ample with its resources toward the less developed countries. + US has difficulty with concept of legal obligations to help LDCs. Perhaps US aid not always implemented correctly but this not due to + lack of good will. Our effort now to approach problems with Latin + America should be based on mature partnership where problems do not + impair relations. With specific regard to Venezuela, US needs its secure + source of oil for which we provided a good market for Venezuela.

+

4. Diaz Bruzual, Director of Institute of Foreign Trade, indicated + concern with US trade bill and its emphasis on unfair competition. US + restrictions against export subsidies could help Venezuelans as well as + restriction on exports containing imported technology. Venezuelans + export industry cannot compete on same basis with DC’s and needs element of protection. At + present Venezuela has two draft bills providing for export subsidies. + Secy Rogers said US trade bill + has worldwide application with emphasis on DC trade practices. It merely provides US with same + authority that other DC’s already have. + Trade bill not intended to apply to LDC’s and in fact will be helpful to LDC’s.

+

5. Bruzual said provision that prevents application of generalized + preferences to countries applying reverse preference could result in + vertical trade integration, that is, trade blocs. Referring to + ministerial level meeting in Tokyo next Sept Bruzual said concentration + on tariffs alone of little help to LDC’s and stressed that trade negotiations should include non + tariff barriers as well as other issues of interest to LDC’s.

+

6. Undersecy Casey stressed that + GATT Meetings include NTB’s as well as tariffs but it difficult to + extend scope of meetings to other issues. However, there can be parallel + meetings within OECD and IMF. Secy Rogers emphasized need to take into account Latin + America position within GATT consultations.

+ +

7. Dr Perez La Salvia, Min of + Mines and hydrocarbons, said Venezuelan oil has not enjoyed the same + preference in the US as other western hemisphere countries. It is in + U.S. interests to give preference to Venezuela in light of increased + energy need. He expressed dissatisfaction with Shultz report. While Venezuela cannot + hope to supply all U.S. import needs it hoped to participate in a + percentage of U.S. preference. Venezuela has not completed study U.S. + energy policy but noted token western hemisphere preference 50,000 + B/D of No. 2 fuel oil eliminated. + Stimulation of construction of refineries in U.S. will be detrimental to + Venezuela in other countries since it will reduce Venezuelan access to + U.S. market for refined products. Increase in price crude oils is + adversely affecting Venezuelan oil production which now must face + competition from other sources of heavy oil. Increased demand for oil by + U.S. and other LDC’s will provide + bargaining leverage for LDC’s to + increase their share of world market for non/traditional exports. + La Salvia lamented + situation where DC’s have rich markets + for industrial production and LDC’s can + only share in poor markets. Oil exporters believe that oil can be used + as instrument of negotiation with DC’s + to achieve more equitable distribution of oil in line with international + social justice. Venezuela seeks more than mere participation in the + share of oil profits but rather cooperation between the importing and + exporting countries to obtain a more equitable share of industrial + markets. Secretary Rogers + responded that in recognition of LDC + needs, U.S. has been supporting generalized preferences. The U.S. oil + policy has generally been well received because the elimination of + quotas enables everybody to export to the U.S. The U.S. recognizes the + need for diversification of export to LDC’s but objects to implications that U.S. owns the + market. He said the people of the U.S. developed their market and did + not inherit it from anybody. Secretary Rogers noted that the need for oil in the U.S. is great + and that it must avoid overdependence on oil from the Middle East. This + fact leads naturally to increased cooperation between Venezuela and the + U.S. Secretary indicated such frank discussion with GOV has been extremely useful and is + necessary element in enabling U.S. to formulate policy which will + benefit its relations with Venezuela and Latin America.

+ + Rogers + +
+ +
+ 373. Telegram 106610 From the Department of State to the Embassy in + Venezuela +

Summary: + Caldera and Rogers discussed + anti-Americanism, economic relations, an energy agreement, the + OASGA, and Cuba.

+

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files, 1970–1973, ORG 7 + S. Secret; Priority. Drafted by McClintock on May 27; cleared by Pedersen and + Kubisch. Rogers’s + May 15 luncheon speech in Caracas is published in the Department + of State Bulletin, June 25, 1973, pp. + 907–910.

+ + + + + Washington, June 4, 1973, 1556Z. + +

106610. Subject: Secvisit LA: Secretary + Rogers Meeting with + President Caldera of + Venezuela

+

1. Secretary Rogers and President + Caldera met on May 15 at + Lasona (official residence of President Caldera) at 4:30 p.m. Other participants were:

+

US: Assistant Secretary Kubisch +

+

Ambassador McClintock +

+

Venezuela: Foreign Minister Calvani +

+

Venezuelan Ambassador to Washington Aguilar +

+

2. Caldera said he had been + concerned at a recent representation by Ambassador McClintock suggesting that USG thought that at least in recent months + Caldera had adopted an + anti-American attitude. He said this certainly was not the case and + affirmed his warm friendship for the United States.

+

President said that he had been surprised several years ago when his + minister of education had made a speech in an interior village charging + “foreign oil companies” with fomenting student disorders, that + Ambassador McClintock had replied + in another speech coming to the defense of “foreign oil companies” even + without identifying them as American.

+

3. President Caldera went on with + some emotion to state that over a period of half a century Venezuela had + been pillaged by the foreign oil companies. He said, “they took out + immense profits, many times over their investment, and left us with a + pittance.” President Caldera then + spoke of the nationalization of US-owned copper mines in Chile. He said + this was clearly justified because companies had made huge and + unreasonable profits. He seemed to be developing a thesis that + expropriation without compensation is warranted simply on the grounds + that foreign companies have been successful enough to amass considerable + profits.

+ +

The Secretary challenged this thesis and said that if the only criterion + for expropriation without compensation was the success of the foreign + company in acquiring profits, there would be no foreign investment + anywhere in the underdeveloped countries.

+

Secretary repeated official US position on expropriation subject to the + rule of international law that full and due compensation should be paid + by the nationalizing government.

+

4. President Caldera repeated + almost identically refrain of his foreign minister in Calvani’s May 14 luncheon speech that + LDC’s are condemned to produce raw + materials at low world market prices and are then forced by the highly + industrialized countries to buy their manufactured products at + exaggeratedly high prices.

+

5. After having delivered himself of these charges, the President readily + agreed with the Secretary that a frank exchange of views was the best + way in which to let off steam and to come to better understanding. He + again reaffirmed his friendly feeling for the United States and said + that when he went on his honeymoon 32 years ago, the nation he had + chosen first to visit was the U.S., including a traditional honeymoon + stop at Niagara Falls. Reaffirming once more his desire to maintain and + strengthen friendly relations with the United States, President made + additional point that in long history of US-Venezuelan relations, + including those in the petroleum industry, Venezuela had never gone back + on its word and had evenhandedly applied its laws.

+

6. Secretary briefly recapitulated statements made in his luncheon speech + re conversations initiated last autumn which might eventually lead to an + energy agreement with Venezuela, but stressed that we were not pressing + for negotiations and that what Venezuela did with its famous tar belt + was a Venezuelan responsibility. Secretary then handed President the + letter dated May 11 from President Nixon. Caldera + read it with great attention and said that the third paragraph was of + paramount importance.

+

7. During the interview Secretary took opportunity to praise Dr. + Calvani for his skillful + diplomacy in presiding over the last OASGA. Calvani said + that first meeting of study committee would take place in July and that + two governments had offered their capitals as venue—Venezuela and Peru. + He said, however, that if Peru insisted on being the host, Venezuela + would gracefully withdraw.

+

8. During conversation Cuba was briefly mentioned, and President + Caldera ticked off names of + Latin American governments who had or were intending to recognize the + Castro regime of which the + latest government was that of Argentina. He strongly implied that this + process of recognizing Castro’s + Cuba would continue at an accelerated rate and said repeatedly, “we must + find a formula—we must find a formula.” Secretary replied that since + Castro himself had many times + stressed that he did not, + repeat not, want to re-enter OAS, the + question seemed really not to be a realistic one.

+

9. The meeting ended on a cordial note and President Caldera was visibly pleased that + Secretary made an official presentation to the government of Venezuela + of a dress uniform of the Venezuelan independence hero, General Paez, + the centenary of whose death had been celebrated the previous week. This + uniform had been contributed by the Smithsonian Institution, and + President Caldera gladly + autographed a book of portraits of President Paez dedicated to Secretary + Dillon Ripley. The President ended the interview in high good humor and + the entire meeting was perhaps best summed up in the words of FonMin + Calvani in saying it had a + “cathartic effect.”

+
+ +
+ 374. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for + Inter-American Affairs (Kubisch) + to Acting Secretary of State Rush + +

Summary: Kubisch + informed Rush that on + December 12, COPEI candidate + Fernandez conceded defeat to AD + candidate Andrés Pérez + in the Venezuelan presidential election. Kubsich discussed the + significance of Pérez’s + electoral victory for United States-Venezuelan relations.

+

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Bureau of Inter-American + Affairs, Office of North Coast Affairs, Records Relating to + Venezuela, Lot 73D423, 1973 Presidential Elections, Political + 14, Venezuela, 1973. Confidential. Drafted by Forrester. Tabs A and B were + not attached. In telegram 8948 from Caracas, October 18, + McClintock reported + that the election would be close and that the United States + could live with either the AD or + the COPEI candidate. (Ibid., + Central Foreign Policy File, [no film number]) In telegram + 222224 to Caracas, November 10, the Department observed that it + was in the U.S. interest “for December 9 to witness free, + orderly, honest exercise in representative democracy followed by + peaceful and constitutional turnover of power to whatever + leaders people of Venezuela may freely elect to govern them + during coming five years.” (Ibid.)

+ + + + + Washington, December + 13, 1973. + +

Venezuelan Election

+

On December 12, Lorenzo Fernandez, the COPEI candidate, conceded victory to the Democratic Action + candidate, Carlos Andres Perez. + Perez’ electoral triumph by 350,000 votes, an 8% majority, was a + landslide. (For background, see attached memo—Venezuelan Elections, Tab + B.) Unlike Caldera’s outgoing + Social Christian (COPEI) + Administration, Perez appears likely to enjoy a majority in + Congress.

+ +

From the standpoint of major United States interests, Perez’ election may + be significant along the following lines:

+

Petroleum

+

Primary U.S. interest in Venezuela continues to focus on petroleum. + (Venezuela supplies 30% of all U.S. petroleum imports.)

+

President-elect Perez stated during a recent press conference that:

+ +

—He would never impose an embargo as Venezuela’s OPEC associates have done.

+

—Like it or not, the U.S. is Venezuela’s main petroleum market.

+

—His government would “speed up implementation of the Reversion Law” + by which foreign oil concessions begin to revert to the state in + 1983.

+ +

In view of Venezuela’s rapidly diminishing reserves (12–14 years at + current production levels), Perez favors development of the Orinoco Tar + Belt. While he recognizes that such development will require foreign + investment and technology, Perez stated that the Tar Belt would be + exploited according to Venezuela’s interest; it will not be exploited to + serve the needs of developed countries.

+

Energy Agreement

+

Perez stated on December 11 that “our oil policy will be a great + instrument to break down trade barriers—it will be a Latin American + weapon against the totalitarian trade policies of the industrialized + nations against the developing countries.” This suggests that in return + for the “security” of Venezuelan oil supply to the U.S. market, the new + government will endeavor to win from the U.S. assurances of unrestricted + supplies of the foodstuffs, raw materials and commodities needed for + Venezuela’s industrial development. Perez will also seek preferential + access to the U.S. market for non-traditional Venezuelan exports.

+

Foreign Affairs

+

Perez stated that “Venezuela will endeavor to have good relations with + all countries . . . above all with the U.S.” AD leaders cherish their long history of close relations + with U.S. Government officials, as well as with U.S. political and labor + leaders.

+

Perez is likely to:

+ +

—continue, but on a lower key, Caldera’s Caribbean initiative;

+

—play a greater leadership role in the Andean Pact;

+

—continue President Caldera’s + policy of negotiations on the Colombian border dispute;

+

—dissipate Caldera’s momentum + to establish relations with Cuba.

+

—continue Venezuela’s moderate Law of the Sea stance.

+ +
+ +
+ 375. Telegram 11017 From the Embassy in Venezuela to the Department of + State +

Summary: + Ambassador McClintock and + President-elect Pérez + discussed trade matters, in particular petroleum.

+

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + [no film number]. Confidential. In telegram 246933 to Caracas, + December 19, the Department transmitted a congratulatory message + from Nixon to Pérez. + (Ibid.)

+ + + + + Caracas, December 28, 1973, 2150Z. + +

11017. Subject: Interview with President-Elect Perez. Ref: State + 246933.

+

1. I called this afternoon on the President-elect of Venezuela and + presented the message from President Nixon set forth reftel.

+

2. Carlos Andres looked in top form. He was obviously delighted with his + victory and appeared leaner and younger than when I last saw him when he + lunched at the residence some four or five months ago. Delighted with + our President’s message, he agreed with me when I observed that the two + victors in the recent Venezuelan elections were Carlos Andres Perez and the Venezuelan + voter.

+

3. The President-elect said that he confronted many problems of which the + principal ones were the management of Venezuela’s petroleum resources + and its unexpectedly huge increment of income from oil. He clearly + recognized the dangers of inflation and said that his immediate problems + would be those of management, both of incoming revenue and outgoing oil. + He agreed with me that means must be found to make the transition + between the relatively simple extraction of conventional petroleum and + the technically much more difficult and costly task of tapping + Venezuela’s unused resources in the Orinoco Belt.

+

4. The President-elect was receptive when I said that we in the Embassy + had been studying ways and means of being more responsive to Venezuela’s + legitmate desires in terms of two-way trade. I recalled that almost + three years ago in a speech to the Venezuelan Association of Executives + I had prophesied that with proper discipline of the human element, + Venezuela could become the Japan of South America since it had such + abundant resources of raw materials and energy.

+

5. When Carlos Andres expressed concern as to how he could handle these + problems and develop a new industrialized Venezuela, I reminded him that + it was not necessary to invent the wheel to become an industrial state. + Venezuela could easily import technology from advanced industrialized + countries and in fact by paying for such specialized skills and + knowledge eliminate much of the evolutionary process through which other + nations had become industrial powers.

+ +

6. The new President-Elect said that by January 2 he hoped to have a + staff organized and to be able to function in preparation for taking + over the office of the presidency. He listened appreciatively when I + said that it was our practice in Washington for the President-elect to + appoint a special representative at least to the Department of State to + be kept au courant of problems in foreign policy. I cited as the most + recent instance the appointment by President Nixon of former Ambassador Robert + Murphy, my old chief in Brussels, as such a representative to the + outgoing Secretary of State.

+

7. I also inquired of Carols Andres if he planned to have representation + on the Venezuelan delegation which will meet with Secretary Kissinger in Mexico City next + February. He responded that indeed this would be the case and recalled + that he had recently sent an unofficial representative to Tehran for the + last OPEC oil talks.

+

8. Our conversation was intimate and cordial. Carlos Andres was pleased + when I conveyed the congratulations of Frank Devine and Bill + Luers. He said, “I told Luers before he left that if I won the elections, he + would be a special guest at my inauguration.”

+

9. The most important message resulting from this interview was the + President-elect’s earnest assurance that he wanted to talk quickly with + the United States on our mutual petroleum interests, covering apparently + every aspect of those relationships from present day oil production and + revenues to the transition between now and 1983, the reversion law and + the ultimate development of the Orinoco belt. He said several times that + he wanted these conversations to begin as quickly as possible. I said he + would find an equally ready response in terms of timing from the U.S. + side.

+ + + McClintock + + +
+ +
+ 376. Telegram 252354 From the Department of State to the Embassy in + Venezuela +

Summary: + Kissinger instructed + the Ambassador to express the U.S. Government’s deep concern + about the steep increase in the price of petroleum.

+

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Country Files, Box 797, + Latin America, Venezuela, Vol. 2, 1972–. Secret; Immediate; + Nodis. Drafted by Forrester on December 29; cleared by Kubisch; approved by Kissinger. In telegram 252282 + to Tehran, Jidda, and Kuwait, December 29, the Department + instructed posts to express concern over the destabilizing + impact of price increases and to promote greater consultation + and mutual understanding between oil producers and consumers. + (Ibid., RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P810097–2368) In + telegram 11015 from Caracas, December 28, the Embassy reported + that Venezuela had increased its oil prices by 82 percent. + (Telegram 11015 from Caracas, December 28; ibid., [no film + number])

+ + + + + Washington, December 30, 1973, 0202Z. + +

252354. Subj: Venezuelan Oil Price Increase Ref: A) Caracas 11015; (B) + State.

+

For the Ambassador from the Secretary.

+

1. I am transmitting State 252282 to you for your information. As you + will have seen in the press (a summary of the Washington Post account was cabled earlier today, December + 29), there is strong reaction within the USG and general public to the latest price increases.

+

2. We are fully aware of the different economic and political realities + between Venezuela and Arab Nations, and the fact that Venezuela + continues to supply a very large percentage of U.S. oil imports. + However, since latest price increase will have very important economic + impact, unless you perceive important economic impact, unless you + perceive objection, you should make known to appropriate GOV officials our deep concern over the + drastic price rise at the earliest opportunity. You should draw, as + appropriate, on points A, B and C of reftel.

+ + + Kissinger + + +
+ +
+ 377. Telegram 2699 From the Embassy in Venezuela to the Department of + State +

Summary: + Shultz and Pérez discussed oil prices. + Pérez emphasized + that he thought the poorer nations of the world needed to + organize to achieve higher prices for essential commodities.

+

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + D740069–0387 Secret; Immediate; Limdis. Repeated to Brasília and + Rio de Janeiro. In telegram 3759 from Caracas, April 29, + McClintock reported + that Schacht informed + him through an intermediary that Shultz’s visit “had caused a most negative + effect not only with President Andrés Pérez but, perhaps more importantly, with + those elements of the Venezuelan Cabinet who wished to assume a + nationalistic and anti-American stance at this particular time.” + However, Schacht wanted + “to be a good friend of the United States and is seeking means + to back up his arguments to President Andrés Pérez that Venezuela’s + best policy is in fact to be a good friend.” (Ibid., + P850083–1945)

+ + + + + Caracas, March 29, 1974, 1256Z. + +

2699. Brasilia and Rio for Secretary Shultz. Dept Pass Secretary Kissinger and Under Secretary Donaldson; Pass Treasury. Subject: + Secretary of Treasury Shultz’s + call on Venezuelan President Carlos Andres + Perez.

+

1. Following his hour-long interviews separately with President of + Central Bank Lafee and Finance Minister Hurtado, Secretary Shultz accompanied by Assistant + Treasury Secretary Hennessy and + myself were received at Miraflores Palace by President Carlos Andres Perez shortly after noon + yesterday (March 28).

+

2. Throughout Perez was frank and firm in presenting his points of view, + while maintaining a friendly and low-key tone.

+

3. After brief amenities on the honor for Venezuela of Mrs. Nixon’s visit, he went directly to the + petroleum and price issue, citing his preference for candidness. He + referred to Secretary Shultz’s + statement on eve of his departure from Washington with regard to what + the Secretary believed was an unnecessarily high price for petroleum and + the stir it had caused in Venezuelan press.

+

4. President Perez used this + event as an illustration of need for the US to comprehend the Venezuelan + reality and point of view. He went on to explain in detail the problems + of poorer countries in general and Venezuela in particular with specific + emphasis on the need for a better balance between the prices of their + raw materials and the prices they had to pay for imported manufactured + goods and technology. He referred to the fact of over a century of low + raw materials prices (particularly petroleum) and only now the emergence + of more balance.

+

5. Shultz explained that his + statement was not one that prices “must come down” but was rather a view + based upon our analysis of the outlook for prices, given the economic + factors at work. He explained his analysis that high oil prices would bring into play market forces + on both supply and demand side so that without even counting on + undreamed of technologies one could see from conventional and other + known reserves a very large new supply coming on stream. The examples of + the US shale, Venezuelan and Canadian tar sands were given. This led to + the inevitable conclusion, he said, that petroleum prices would of + necessity decline.

+

6. The President said he did not agree with this analysis. According to + his information, there would be a growing demand among the + industrialized nations for conventional petroleum and an inadequate + supply to meet that demand, with the result that world oil prices would + remain high. Although he recognized Secretary Shultz’s argument that alternative + sources of energy such as the Athabasca tar sands, shale and coal in the + United States and even the Orinoco tar belt, might enter into the world + energy supply picture, the development of such alternative sources would + likewise be of very high cost and thus, said he, the price of oil would + not come down.

+

7. Shultz admitted there was a + difference of analysis and suggested that perhaps more analytical work + might be done, since a boom-bust pattern of prices was in no one’s + interest. Perez reiterated his great desire for a better balance between + the prices of commodities and manufactured goods. He added that he saw + the Washington energy conference as forming a rich man’s bloc against + poor. Shultz explained that the + purpose of the Washington energy conference was not to develop a bloc + against the oil producers and the poor, but to establish a factual basis + which would serve as a point of departure for dialogue and understanding + among consumer and producer alike. He reiterated our purpose too of + finding cooperative solutions and avoiding confrontation.

+

8. Shultz assured President + Perez of the United States’ + very real concern for the poorer countries of the world and in + particular our recent concern lest these less fortunate nations be + unable to pay for oil at present prices and thus set back their + development. At this point President noted that US had been siding with + the LDC’s in seeking a common position + on oil prices.

+

9. President Perez in picking up + his theme of the need for greater comprehension on part of US alluded to + the fact that in recent years there had been a great increase in + “sometimes irrational and primitive” nationalism.

+

10. President Perez expressed + genuine concern on the need to avoid a confrontation between rich and + poor at the forthcoming UN Special + Assembly on energy. He asked, “How can we have the US on our side?”

+

11. The President said that the countries of the world had to get + together to work out some solution for the problem of high prices for + industrial exports and technology. Secretary Shultz responded that he welcomed the idea of cooperating to + avoid confrontation at U.N. perhaps through more objective analysis and + suggested he sit down with his Venezuelan colleague Finance Minister + Hurtado in Santiago to discuss how such an approach might be pursued. + Secretary Shultz said he would + telegraph Washington before meeting with Finance Minister Hurtado in + Santiago to get their ideas on ways of working together such as by + establishing a better analytical basis for dialogue. Both Shultz and President Perez expressed a hope that these + conversations might lead to better understanding on all sides. + Incidentally, in discussing forthcoming UN meeting, Perez said the Cuba problem would come up. He + also said explicitly that special assembly would be confronted by + political problems in addition to those of a purely economic + character.

+

12. Adverting to the Santiago meeting, President Perez went further than had his + Minister of Finance an hour earlier (reported septel), saying that he + had instructed Hertado next week in Santiago to make two formal + proposals with reference to the structure of the Inter-American + Development Bank. The first would be to offer a Venezuelan capital + contribution to a special trust fund of unspecified dimensions; and the + second would be to call for an amendment of the bank’s constitution + through an increase in the capital which in effect would eliminate the + United States veto.

+

13. The President at no time mentioned probable early reversion of oil + company assets in Venezuela, as had Hurtado in his conversation with the + Secretary, but confined his observation on petroleum largely to the + question of the alleged validity of present high prices. He stressed + over and over again the need for the nations of the world to get + together to achieve a fairer balance of prices for all essential + commodities. He hoped the initiatives taken by Secretary Kissinger at Mexico City could + continue under study with the hope of reaching the stage of positive + action and said he believed that meeting had had a positive effect on + US-Latin American relations.

+

14. In closing, the President reaffirmed earnestly the desire of + Venezuela to be a loyal supporter of the United States and added the + necessity to resolve the problems he had cited to make that possible. He + said, “help us do this,” and cited Secretary Shultz’s earlier remark that deeds + were more important than words.

+

15. Shultz thanked President and + explained that President Nixon + had given him express instructions to come, listen and learn—that was + why he did not go directly to Santiago—and that he was most appreciative + of the time given him by the President and high officials of his + government.

+ + + McClintock + + +
+ +
+ 378. Memorandum From the President’s Deputy Assistant for National + Security Affairs (Scowcroft) to + the President’s Assistant for International Economic Affairs (Flanigan) +

Summary: After Pérez announced a broad policy to nationalize + foreign investment, Scowcroft informed Flanigan that the Department of State would tell + the Venezuelan Ambassador that while the U.S. Government + recognized the sovereign right of expropriation, it expected + prompt, adequate, and effective compensation to be paid.

+

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Country Files, Box 797, + Latin America, Venezuela, Vol. 2, 1972–. Confidential. Scowcroft wrote on the + memorandum: “Peter—as we discussed this morning, I think this is + getting straightened out. B[rent].” In telegram 90161 to + Caracas, May 2, the Department instructed the Embassy to refrain + from comment on Pérez’s + April 29 statement on nationalization and noted that it intended + to discuss the matter with a Venezuelan Embassy representative. + (Ibid., RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D740105–0537) In a + May 3 memorandum, Flanigan informed Scowcroft that the Department’s response was + “extraordinarily inadequate.” (Ibid., Nixon Presidential + Materials, NSC Files, Country + Files, Box 797, Latin America, Venezuela, Vol. 2, 1972–) In a + May 3 memorandum to Scowcroft, Low agreed that “State’s reaction to the + Venezuelan statement was slow and their outgoing instruction was + indeed weak,” and he transmitted a draft reply to Flanigan. + (Ibid.)

+ + + + + Washington, May 6, + 1974. + + + SUBJECT + Venezuelan Nationalization—Your Memo of May 3 + +

We had also been in touch with State on this and expressed our views that + we should promptly communicate three points to the Venezuelans:

+

1. That we recognize their sovereign right of expropriation;

+

2. That this brings with it a responsibility for prompt, adequate and + effective compensation, which we believe they understand and sympathize + with, and that their recognition of this could provide an opportunity to + assume a position of influence and leadership as other nations in the + Hemisphere seek to deal with this same problem; and

+

3. That we consider consultation to be a two-way street. We regret that + they had not seen fit to give us warning of their statement, but hope + that as the matter progresses towards agreement on compensation, we can + stay in close contact.

+

State informed us that they are calling in the Venezuelan Ambassador on + Monday and assured us they will make a presentation of this nature to + him. Normally this would also be done in Caracas, but in this particular + circumstance State prefers to make the first + representation in Washington.

+

We believe that President Andres + Perez’s statement may have been only an expression of a + hazy intention; until the Venezuelans provide us with further details, + we should confine ourselves to the kind of presentation outlined above. We have no reason to + believe that the Venezuelan Government does not intend to provide full + compensation. This is particularly true in view of their presently + comfortable financial position. Our response to the President’s speech + therefore should be a positive one and assume their intention to + compensate.

+
+ +
+ 379. Telegram 93175 From the Department of State to the Embassy in + Venezuela +

Summary: + Shlaudeman informed + Aguilar that the + U.S. Government expected prompt, adequate, and effective + compensation for the expropriation of U.S. assets in Venezuela. + Aguilar assured + Shlaudeman that + Venezuela would implement any nationalization in accordance with + its constitution.

+

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + [no film number]. Confidential; Immediate. Drafted by Devine; cleared by Forester, + Brookins, and Ganz; approved by Shlaudeman. Telegram 90161 is discussed in the + source note to Document 378. Telegram + 3961 from the Embassy in Venezuela, May 6, reported on + Venezuela’s new economic nationalism measures. (National + Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy FIle, + D740108–1006)

+ + + + + Washington, May 6, 1974, 2355Z. + +

93175. Subject: Discussion of New Economic Nationalism Measures with + Venezuelan Ambassador. Ref: A. State 90161; B. Caracas 3961.

+

1. Deputy Assistant Secretary Shlaudeman and other appropriate Department officers + today received Venezuelan Ambassador Aguilar accompanied by Felix Rossi, Minister Counselor + for Petroleum Affairs.

+

2. Shlaudeman referred to + President Perez’ speech of April + 29, recognized importance of that national address and noted great + attention it had received in Venezuela and abroad. He said that exact + import of speech obviously remained to be defined but that it appeared + to have very significant implications for Foreign capital investment in + Venezuela. In view of these, and without prejudging course of future + action taken to implement President’s speech, Shlaudeman said that predominance of + US business interests among some of categories likely to be affected + suggested desirability of exchange of views at this time.

+

3. Shlaudeman noted public + interpretation that nationalization of some U.S. investments is involved + and said that on this basis he wished restate USG position on such matters. He emphasized that while + USG does not question sovereign + right to nationalize, provided process is for public purpose and neither + arbitrary nor discriminatory, it does expect compliance with + international law in terms of prompt, adequate, and effective compensation. He added that we + wanted to be sure there was no misunderstanding on that point.

+

4. Going on from this point, Shlaudeman said USG + attaches great importance to sound, positive, constructive relationship + with Venezuela and hopes that implementation of President Perez’ policies may be carried out in + manner consistent with these aspirations. USG can understand domestic factors which may have shaped + broad outline of President Perez’ speech, although we may not agree with aspects + affecting foreign investment. But USG + does trust that as GOV moves forward + with measures affecting foreign investment in Venezuela this will be + done in a manner fully consistent with good relationship which we seek. + Toward this end, Shlaudeman said + we wish GOV to know that USG looks forward to a constructive + dialogue on these matters as the GOV + moves ahead in its program.

+

5. Ambassador Aguilar expressed + appreciation and understanding for Shlaudeman’s words and said that he himself was not yet + fully in position to comment substantively upon President Perez’ remarks. At same time, he + wished to make two points. First of these was that Venezuela has + democratic government based upon freely expressed will of the people and + conducted in accordance with provisions set forth in Venezuelan + constitution. This assures, he said, that implementation of President’s + words will involve due process in accordance with constitution. + Secondly, Ambassador Aguilar + said that public pronouncements by President Perez since his election and highly + positive tone of FonMin Schacht’s discussion with Secretary Kissinger have clearly demonstrated + friendly and positive attitude of GOV + toward United States. He felt sure that this in itself would contribute + to constructive implementation in which Shlaudeman had expressed interest. In closing his reply, + Ambassador Aguilar added that he + felt GOV would certainly favor dialogue + of type suggested.

+

6. In balance of discussion, brief reference was made to + interrelationship of these matters with Venezuelan membership in Andean + Pact, fact that some other members of pact have already faced up to + implementation of Pact’s provisions in a constructive manner, and to + mutual desirability from standpoint of both USG and GOV of + contributing through meaningful dialogue to anticipating and + forestalling erroneous and exaggerated treatment of entire matter in + terms of public, press, and other pertinent attitudes.

+

7. Conversation closed on note that Ambassador would be reporting to his + government and would be in further contact thereafter.

+

8. MemCon will be pouched and further instructions provided septel.

+ + + Rush + + +
+ +
+ 380. National Security Study Memorandum 203/Council on International + Economic Policy Study Memorandum 35 +

Summary: The President directed a review of U.S. + Government policy options towards Venezuela.

+

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 365, Subject Files, + National Security Study Memoranda, NSSMs. Confidential. In + telegram 4420 from Caracas, May 16, the Embassy reported that + Pérez announced the + nationalization of foreign oil companies’ concessions and assets + at no more than net book value. (Ibid., RG 59, Central Foreign + Policy File, D740121–0763)

+ + + + + Washington, June 10, + 1974. + + + TO + The Secretary of the Treasury + The Secretary of Defense + The Secretary of Commerce + The Director of Central Intelligence + The Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs + + + SUBJECT + Review of U.S. Policy Toward Venezuela + +

The President has directed that a review be undertaken of recent actions + in Venezuela relating to nationalization of foreign holdings and plans + to assist other Latin American nations in replacing American businesses. + Alternative policies available to the United States should be examined + and recommendations made. The purpose of the study is to examine options + for adopting a constructive and comprehensive response to the Venezuelan + announcements on nationalization of foreign firms consistent with the + new initiatives taken by the United States at the MFM conferences in Mexico City and + Washington. A major objective should be to engage the Venezuelans in a + more frank and frequent discussion of joint concerns than has been the + case heretofore. The study should analyze:

+ +

—the political and economic framework within which the recent + announcements relating to foreign investment have been made;

+

—the probable objectives of the Venezuelan Government in pursuing its + policy towards foreign investment;

+

—implications for the U.S. of Venezuelan intentions to urge + replacement of American enterprise and investment elsewhere in the + Hemisphere;

+

—the issues and negotiating parameters in resolving the questions of + compensation;

+

—the best means of advancing U.S. interest in continued participation + by American firms in management, exploration, development and + marketing of Venezuelan mineral resources;

+ +

—the most effective way to ensure continued access by the U.S. to + Venezuelan primary products;

+

—the possible issue of preferences for oil imports from + Venezuela;

+

—alternative U.S. positions, including negotiation of a bilateral + accord;

+

—specific recommendations for implementation.

+ +

The study should be conducted by the NSC + Interdepartmental Group for Inter-American Affairs, augmented for this + purpose by representatives from CIEP + and the Departments of Treasury and Commerce. It should be submitted by + July 5, 1974, for consideration by the NSC Senior Review Group, including representation from + CIEP and the Departments of + Treasury and Commerce.

+ + + Henry A. + Kissinger + + + Peter M. + Flanigan + + +
+ +
+ 381. Telegram 126784 From the Department of State to the Embassy in + Venezuela +

Summary: The + Department authorized the Ambassador to discuss with Pérez Venezuela’s + expropriation of U.S. holdings and compensation for the + expropriation.

+

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + D740154–0075. Confidential; Immediate; Limdis. Drafted by + Ellis and Low; cleared by Ganz, Bond, Forrester, Membership of + Expropriation Group, Kubisch, and Enders; approved by Sisco. In telegram 6500 from Caracas, July 13, + McClintock reported + on a discussion with Pérez regarding expropriation and the future of + the oil industry. (Ibid., D740188–0412) Telegram 106608 to + Caracas, May 21, instructed the Embassy to have an “early + session” with President Perez. (Ibid., D740126–0867) In telegram 100872 + to Caracas, May 15, the Department expressed concern regarding + economic consequences of Perez’s policies. (Ibid., + D740120–0956)

+ + + + + Washington, June 14, 1974, 0041Z. + +

126784. Subject: Venezuelan Economic Nationalism. Ref: (A) State 106608; + (B) State 100872.

+

For Ambassador from Acting Secretary

+

1. You are authorized to discuss this matter with President Perez in near future, at his + initiative or yours. This guidance reflects discussion of USG interests in Venezuela in light of + economic nationalism measures recently announced, and of courses of + action open to USG, in meeting of + interagency coordinating group on expropriations on May 30.

+ +

2. FYI: We consider principal US interests affected by Perez proposals as + follows.

+

A. Continued access to Venezuelan petroleum and iron ore supplies with + any reductions in exports to US spread over sufficient time to permit + easy adjustment.

+

B. Avoidance of unilateral actions by National Governments (as opposed to + mutually negotiated arrangements) to abrogate agreements entered into by + our private investors in good faith.

+

C. Fair treatment for existing US investment, including in the case of + expropriation, the payment of prompt, adequate, and effective + compensation as required by International Law.

+

D. A continued role for US business in Venezuela which will be mutually + beneficial to both countries.

+

E. Venezuela’s cooperation with the US in revitalizing Inter-American + relations along positive and constructive lines. End FYI.

+

3. We recognize that some Venezuelans argue that these interests conflict + in part with growing Venezuelan nationalism. We recognize also that + careless assertion of our interests might lead to a counterproductive + confrontation. At the same time, as indicated in Ref B, we do not want + in any way to give GOV erroneous + impression that USG is not concerned + about far-reaching measures announced by Perez. Our judgment is that + Perez recognizes that any country’s nationalism, including ours or + Venezuela’s, must take into account the impact of actions on other + countries. Given this situation we believe that the most useful way to + serve US interests is to initiate a frank but constructive dialogue with + Perez himself, particularly since it appears that he is calling the + shots personally.

+

4. You should not rpt not make any reference in your discussion to + possibility of returning here for consultations. The purpose of the + meeting would be both to express USG + interests and concern and at the same time to elicit from him an + indication of how GOV intends to + implement measures announced or contemplated which affect important US + interests. You will particularly wish to determine if he has those + interests in mind and if he is looking for means to harmonize them with + his own. This will help to clarify the apparent gap between Perez’ + continuing public posture of aggressive nationalism and those factors + and assurances which appear to provide affected companies with basis for + optimism that suitable modus vivendi can be worked out.

+

5. The substance of the following points should be made during the course + of your discussion with Perez:

+

A. There is a long tradition of friendship and cooperation in the + relations between our two countries; this extends also to the economic + and business area. It is our view that this is an important tradition + which is worth + maintaining because it continues to serve the interests of both of our + countries. Its spirit is embodied in the new relationships which were + discussed in Mexico City and Washington in terms of the inescapable + interdependence of today’s world. It is exemplified in tangible form in + the traditional trade patterns between our countries.

+

B. Basic to the preservation of this kind of relationship is the + necessity to maintain close communications between us. The United States + undertook in Mexico City to consult insofar as possible with the other + nations of the Hemisphere in actions it took directly affecting their + economies. This was not an easy commitment to make, and it will not be + easy to maintain. Our ability to do so will depend in no small part on + the other nations’ willingness to approach us in the same spirit. The + implications of the economic measures recently announced are of concern + to us. They will have an important effect on legitimate American + interests and we believe it of primary importance to initiate a frank + and open dialogue with the GOV on this + subject.

+

C. We need to have a better idea of what the recently announced measures + portend. To the extent they involve expropriation, we, philosophically, + are of the belief that such measures can often be ill-advised. + Nevertheless, we recognize the right of expropriation by sovereign + nations and we know President Perez is equally conscious of the importance we attach + to the precept under international law that this carries with it a + concomitant obligation to provide fair treatment in terms of prompt, + adequate, and effective compensation.

+

D. Implementation of the measures which have been announced will involve + negotiation between the GOV and + American companies of difficult and complicated matters. We hope that + the GOV will approach them in a spirit + which will permit conclusion of new consensual arrangements leading to + continuation of constructive participation by these companies in the + Venezuelan economy.

+ + + Sisco + + +
+ +
+ 382. Telegram 145991 From the Department of State to the Embassy in + Venezuela +

Summary: + Asserting that Venezuela’s recent oil price increase was + unwarranted, the Department instructed the Ambassador to + encourage the Venezuelans to lower oil prices so as to create + conditions for continued economic growth in the international + economy.

+

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + D740179–0492 Confidential; Immediate. Drafted by Creekmore; cleared by + Katz, Bosworth, Shlaudeman, Devine, and McCullough; approved by + Katz. On July 8, + Shlaudeman and other + Department officers, in a meeting with Rossi, emphasized U.S. + Government concern over the higher price of oil and its negative + impact on the U.S. public. (Telegram 148195 to Caracas, July 10; + ibid., D740183–0429) On July 9, the Ambassador delivered his + démarche to Schacht and + informed the Department that the Foreign Minister would take the + matter up with the President. (Telegram 6263 from Caracas, July + 9; ibid., D740183–0003) Oil prices were among the subjects + discussed when McClintock + met with Pérez on July + 13; Pérez expressed + “satisfaction that after many, many years Venezuela was at last + receiving a good price for its oil.” (Telegram 6500 from + Caracas, July 13; ibid., D740188–0412) Telegram 5954 from the + Embassy in Venezuela, July 1, reported the Venezuelan + Government’s announcement that tax reference values will + increase by 35 cents per barrel. (Ibid., + D740174–0288)

+ + + + + Washington, July 6, 1974, 0031Z. + +

145991. Subject: Démarche Opposing High Oil Prices. Ref: Caracas + 5954.

+

For the Ambassador

+

1. Our previous efforts to induce moderation on the part of the producers + on the question of oil prices have not been very fruitful. Most + producers, including Venezuela, seem determined to continue the trend of + escalating prices. Our information suggests that only the opposition of + Saudi Arabia prevented much larger price increases from being agreed to + at Quito.

+

2. We are concerned by the apparent belief of Venezuela and some other + producers that they can raise prices with impunity. In this respect, we + regard Venezuela’s recently announced increase as particularly + unfortunate and unwarranted. We have decided to press more vigorously, + and in a bilateral context, our opposition to high prices and our + conviction that lower prices are in the long term interests of both + producers and consumers. On July 8, the Department will make known its + views to the acting Chargé in the Venezuelan Embassy. You should seek an + early appointment with the appropriate senior Venezuelan official to + make a similar representation. The talking points prepared for the + Washington meeting are provided below. You should draw on them in making + your démarche in Caracas. FYI—similar démarches will also be made to + other OPEC governments to seek + avoidance of new price increases. End FYI.

+ +

3. Talking points—

+

—I have asked you to come in because of our interest and concern in oil + pricing developments.

+

—Reports from Caracas indicate a further increase in tax reference values + (TRV). Our information is not yet official and complete, but our + understanding is that the average TRV for all crude and products has + risen 35 cents from 14.08 dols. to + 14.43 dols. per barrel.

+

—We are disturbed by this announced increase. We believe the continued + upward trend for oil prices is both unfortunate and unwarranted.

+

—As you know, the United States strongly believes that world oil prices + are already critically high. As a result, the world economy is + dangerously strained and world development is being retarded. The new + increase just announced by the GOV will + compound the difficulties consuming countries face in trying to adjust + to the enormous and abrupt increase in price over the past eighteen + months. On the basis of current market conditions, oil prices should be + falling rather than rising.

+

—The direct and indirect burden of high oil prices on the US consumer is + a heavy one. The plight of developing consumer countries is even more + pressing. Their increased expenditures for energy are surpassing their + total aid receipts and could lead in + some cases to virtual economic collapse.

+

—We believe current price levels are contrary to the long-term interests + of Venezuela and other producers. In our interdependent world, the + economic futures of all countries are closely related. All nations, + producers and consumers, will suffer in a world that is characterized by + faltering and failing economies.

+

—The Government of Venezuela should be aware of the negative impact its + attitude on price is having on its image in the United States. The US + public, press, and Congress have not overlooked the fact that Venezuela + is a leader within OPEC for continued + price increases.

+

—For months we have tried to be understanding of the position and + policies of Venezuela. We appreciated that Venezuela continued to supply + oil to US during the recent Arab embargo. But we strongly oppose high + oil prices. I hope you will bring to your government’s attention our + firm conviction that high prices are detrimental to all countries and + our hope that it will see fit to reconsider its views on prices in + general and this most recent decision in particular.

+

—We would also hope that we could build on our historic ties and + traditionally good relations to ensure meaningful cooperation between + producing and consuming nations and thereby contribute to an + international economic system that provides for continued economic + growth at sustainable price levels.

+

4. The GOE official, with whom you speak, will probably insist that the + tax increase was designed to reduce company profits and not increase the cost of oil to the + ultimate consumer. In fact, the tax rise will increase oil prices. + Should the issue arise, you may wish to draw on State 117824, which + discusses the relationship of taxes to company profits.

+

5. Please report reaction of GOV to your + démarche.

+ + + Sisco + + +
+ +
+ 383. Transcript of Secretary of State Kissinger’s Staff Meeting +

Summary: Kubisch briefed Kissinger on economic nationalism in + Venezuela.

+

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Transcripts of Kissinger Staff Meetings, Lot + 78D443, Box 2. Secret; Nodis. Kissinger chaired the meeting, which was + attended by all of the principal officers of the Department or + their designated alternates.

+ + + + + Washington, July 16, 1974, 3 p.m. + +

The Secretary’s Principals’ and Regionals’ Staff Meeting, Tuesday, July + 16, 1974, 3:00 p.m.

+

[Omitted here is material not related to Venezuelan affairs.]

+

pp 9–10 Venezuela Economic Nationalism—Four + pending proposals of the new GOV. The + importance of avoiding sniping at Venezuela stressed.

+

[Omitted here is material not related to Venezuelan affairs.]

+

Secretary Kissinger: Jack?

+

Mr. Kubisch: Venezuela?

+

I really would like to say a few words about it today because in recent + weeks—really, since President Pérez came to office in late March—he’s embarked upon a + number of programs that’s been causing a lot of pain around Washington + and proposed a number of actions that are of great concern to American + companies and American investors in Venezuela.

+

I think I’d just like to say a couple of words to make sure that we see + this in its proper perspective and assess what the implications are for + American companies and for us.

+

In the first place, I think it’s important to realize that Venezuela has + one of the highest standards of living in Latin America and the highest + per capita income.

+ +

Secretary Kissinger: What’s that + got to do with “economic nationalism”?

+

Mr. Kubisch: I’m coming to + that.

+

As a result, it has this high standard of living because it has + squandered—there’s a feeling in the country they have squandered their + foreign exchange earnings in petroleum and iron ore exports on imports + without industrializing and developing an economic infrastructure in the + country. There’s been a growing resentment in Venezuela at the massive + foreign—primarily U.S.—domination of the economy of the country.

+

Now, with the great increase in oil prices and the oil revenues from + perhaps two billion last year to 10 billion this year. There’s a feeling + they have an opportunity really to develop their own country, and there + is a wide consensus in the country to try and do this—to develop an + industrial capacity to an economic infrastructure, and so on. And + President Pérez has come to + power against this kind of background. He’s made four major + proposals.

+

One is a series of populist measures—such as wage increases, + redistribution of income, revitalizing the agricultural sector, and just + generally things that have widespread appeal to the people of + Venezuela.

+

The second and third concern: oil and iron ore. Oil and iron ore together + account for about 95 percent of Venezuela’s wage earnings. The oil + concessions that have about 10 years to run were scheduled to revert to + Venezuela beginning about 1983. He and all the other Presidential + candidates campaigned on a program of having them converted immediately. + And he said that he’s going to nationalize the oil properties within two + years, and he has established a commission to make recommendations in + six months—around three more months now—on how to accomplish this. On + the iron ore side—primarily Bethlehem Steel, U.S. Steel—he says he’s + going to nationalize those too.

+

Secretary Kissinger: What does + that mean for us?

+

Mr. Kubisch: For us it means + this: We have, I think, several very important interests in Venezuela. + On the oil front, we need a long-term secure supply of oil. So whatever + program is developed by the Venezuelan Government with the oil + companies, it should assure us access to this oil—not only for the + proved reserves they have now but perhaps in the Orinoco tar sands where + there are additional deposits to be developed. In iron ore we really + need a short-term access to iron ore, and the companies can develop + other sources of supply. President Pérez has indicated he wants to establish a steel + industry there and use the iron ore—

+

Secretary Kissinger: But how is + he going to nationalize?

+

Mr. Kubisch: This hasn’t been + determined yet. He’s going to the companies. He’s going to his own + commission.

+ +

Secretary Kissinger: Is McClintock there?

+

Mr. Kubisch: Yes.

+

Secretary Kissinger: He hasn’t + put forward a proposal yet.

+

Mr. Kubisch: No. He’s waiting for + recommendations by this commission on the oil.

+

Secretary Kissinger: Sure. I + assume we don’t care whether he nationalizes as long as there’s adequate + compensation.

+

Mr. Kubisch: That’s a primary + concern. His settlement—whatever it is—does not prejudice other American + investment elsewhere in the world—in other words, that there be fair + compensation—something that’s negotiated mutually satisfactorily with + the companies themselves.

+

There’s a fourth element in his program that has appeal in Venezuela + also. And that is there are certain sectors of the economy—service and + merchandising sectors—that have, to some extent, been dominated by + Americans. Sears has a large chain of department stores there. IBEC—the Rockefeller chain—has a large + group of supermarkets there. He has issued instructions that those + American investors must reduce their investment to 20 percent or less + equity within three years.

+

Those are the main elements of what he’s seeking to do.

+

In the meetings that—

+

Secretary Kissinger: But do we + have to make any decisions about any of that?

+

Mr. Kubisch: I think the only + decision we need to make now is to not panic about this and not be + sniping away at the at the Venezuelans all the time in such a way as + to—

+

Secretary Kissinger: Well, I + can’t panic because I’m not on the distribution list for any of these + cables. (Laughter.)

+

Mr. Kubisch: Well, every once in + a while there’s a meeting—

+

Secretary Kissinger: There’s + nothing like ignorance to keep a man calm! (Laughter.)

+

Mr. Kubisch: Every once in a + while there’s a meeting of an inter-agency group that says, “Did you + hear what’s happening in Venezuela? We better go in and pound on the + table before President Pérez.” + If so, it’s a sure losing proposition. It’s the sort of thing we can’t + win inside of Venezuela, though it might enhance our stance around the + world.

+

[Omitted here is material not related to Venezuelan affairs.]

+
+ +
+ 384. Memorandum From the Chairman of the Interdepartmental Group for + Inter-American Affairs (Kubisch) + to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) and the President’s + Assistant for International Economic Affairs (Eberle) +

Summary: Kubisch transmitted an NSC interdepartmental group’s review of U.S. policy + towards Venezuela. The study focused on potential responses to + Venezuelan economic nationalism.

+

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), + Box H–205, NSSM Files, NSSM 203. Confidential. The + review was prepared as a response to NSSM 203/CIEPSM 35, June 10, published as Document 380. The annexes are attached + but not printed.

+ + + + + Washington, July 26, + 1974. + +

+ Review of U.S. Policy Toward + Venezuela +

+

In accordance with the instructions of NSSM 203/CIEPSM/35 of June 10, 1974, I attach a review of + U.S. policy toward Venezuela with particular emphasis upon those aspects + of relationships affected by recent manifestations of economic + nationalism.

+

The study reflects agreement by all members of the augmented NSC Interdepartmental Group for + Inter-American Affairs consisting of the following agencies: State, + Defense, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Treasury, CIA, AID, Commerce, USIA and the Federal Energy + Administration. Representatives of CIEP and NSC also + participated in the preparation of the report.

+ +

+ Attachments:

+ +

+ Review of U.S. Policy toward Venezuela +

+ +

CONTENTS

+ + + + Page + + + + + I. SUMMARY AND INTRODUCTION + + + + A. Venezuela’s Importance to the United States + 1 + + + B. New Directions + 2 + + + + II. THE DEVELOPMENT OF ECONOMIC + NATIONALISM + + + + A. The Setting + 4 + + + B. The Major Industries Affected + + + 1. The Petroleum Industry + 5 + + + 2. The Iron Ore Industry + 6 + + + + 3. Other Industries + 7 + + + C. Government Policies Toward Foreign Investment + + + 1. The AD and COPEI 1958–1973 + 7 + + + 2. President Carlos Andres + Perez’s New Economic Program for Venezuela: The + Speech of April 29, 1974 + 9 + + + + U.S. AND VENEZUELAN INTERESTS AND + NEGOTIATING PROSPECTS + + + + A. The Perez Government’s Attitude Toward the U.S. + 12 + + + B. New Possibilities for a Larger International Role for + Venezuela + 13 + + + C. The Move to Nationalization: Objectives and Negotiating + Positions + + + 1. Petroleum + + + a. GOV Interests and + Options + 15 + + + b. The Companies’ Stake and Assessment of their Negotiating + Position + 18 + + + c. United States Government Interests + 20 + + + d. USG Assessment of the + Negotiations + 21 + + + 2. Iron Ore + 23 + + + 3. Other U.S. Companies + 25 + + + D. U.S. Commercial Interests in Venezuela + 26 + + + E. U.S. Political Interests + 27 + + + F. U.S. Security Interests + 28 + + + + PROSPECTS FOR A BILATERAL + AGREEMENT + + 29 + + + + U.S. POLICY OPTIONS + + 32 + + + A. A Hands-Off Policy + 32 + + + B. A Parallel Dialogue + 34 + + + C. An Out-Front Policy + 35 + + + D. Increase U.S. Support for Venezuela’s Development + 36 + + + E. Creation of an Explicit “Special Relationship” + 37 + + + + VI. RECOMMENDATION + + 39 + +
+ +

+ ANNEXES +

+ + + + + A. President Perez’s + Speech of April 29 + + + B. United States Oil-Related Interests and Objectives in + Venezuela + + + C. Goals, Objectives, and Aspirations of Venezuelan Petroleum + Policy + + + D. Venezuelan Government Operation of a Reverted Oil + Industry + + + E. Prospects for a Special Relationship + + + F. An Illustrative List of Actions the U.S. Might Take To + Support Venezuelan Development + +
+ +

+ I. SUMMARY AND + INTRODUCTION

+

+ A.Venezuela’s Importance to + the United States

+

Venezuela is profiting greatly from sharply inflated petroleum prices. + Total government revenues from petroleum for 1974 are anticipated to be + about $9 billion; Venezuela’s international reserves have already risen + in the last six months from less than $2 billion to nearly $5 billion. + Venezuela’s leaders consider this situation a major opportunity to “sow + petroleum” in behalf of long term national development through a new + economic program, part of which calls for nationalization of the + petroleum industry within two years. The disposition of these new + earnings has also become an important factor on the inter-American + scene, for they reinforce Venezuela’s aspirations to leadership and + offer a new source of capital assistance for less-favored nations.

+

Venezuela also has one of the strongest and most dynamic democratic + governments in Latin America and a strategic location at the southern + entrance to the Caribbean. Its importance to the United States is + further underscored by the following:

+

—Venezuela is our single largest foreign source of petroleum, providing + about 28 percent of U.S. imports and 10 percent of our total national + consumption. It continued to export oil to us throughout the recent + embargo even though it is a founding and active member of OPEC.

+

—Venezuela provided 30 percent of U.S. iron ore imports in 1973, valued + at $127 million, and 10 percent of total U.S. consumption of iron + ore.

+

—U.S. private investment in Venezuela totals some $2.5 to $3 billion, of + which $1.5–2.0 billion is in the oil industry. This investment has + contributed $150–$200 million annually to the U.S. balance of payments + in the form of profits and interest.

+

—The United States annually exports over $1 billion worth of goods and + services to Venezuela, making it our third largest market in Latin + America, and our 12th largest in the world. With its sharply increased + petroleum income Venezuela should become a rapidly growing market for + U.S. products and services.

+

—Venezuela will likely occupy a pivotal position in the development of + the “New Dialogue” between the United States and Latin America: its + membership in the Andean Pact, its growing influence in the Caribbean, + and the historic alliances between its civilian leaders and those of + Colombia, Costa Rica and Puerto Rico all give Venezuela significant + regional influence.

+ +

B. New Directions

+

With its wide popular support, Venezuela’s newly-elected government has + initiated a sweeping new economic program aimed at achieving control + over major national resources and reducing disparities in personal + income. President Carlos Andres + Perez considers this program essential to the survival of + democracy in Venezuela.

+

Venezuela now proposes to recover national control of its basic + industries. Petroleum and iron ore have traditionally supplied 95 + percent of all Venezuelan export earnings. Both industries are + controlled almost in their entirety by foreign interests, mostly from + the U.S. Their nationalization is seen by Venezuelan leaders as serving + Venezuela’s broad interests and, at the same time, enhancing its + position of leadership in the Americas. They do not view it as an + anti-American posture. Nor is there evidence of a general Venezuelan + policy of supplanting U.S. investment in the Americas.

+

Implementation of the new economic program is in its incipient stage. + Affected U.S. business interests are in touch with the Government of + Venezuela, seeking to identify their future role in the country. They + believe that their marketing facilities in this and other countries, + together with their advanced technology in the extraction, refining and + industrial utilization of both petroleum and iron ore, will provide them + with important bargaining chips with a government which needs those + elements and appears to have sufficient support to eschew the narrow + course of hypernationalism. On the other hand the GOV holds the option of reducing oil + production substantially and looking for technical expertise in the + international market place. Compensation for expropriated properties + should become an issue only if even the minimum expected accommodation + fails.

+

The U.S. national interest would be served by continued access in the + short run (4 to 6 years) to Venezuelan iron ore and, in the long run, to + Venezuelan petroleum. In seeking to advance these interests and in + handling the compensation issue, if it arises, we must have due regard + for other political, security, and commercial interests affecting our + relations with Venezuela.

+

Developing circumstances have eliminated or greatly attenuated, in the + Venezuelan case, many of our standard instruments of negotiating + leverage, such as financial assistance, AID programs, oil preferences and offers of formal + bilateral agreements. In lieu thereof, the defense and advancement of + our important interests will best be served by improved rapport, based + on frank and friendly dialogue with the Government of Venezuela. By + demonstrating that we recognize Venezuela’s aspirations and will support + them on a basis of reciprocal consideration and accommodation, we + increase the likelihood of a successful outcome of negotiations over the future role of our + companies. Our priority task is to initiate this constructive dialogue + and create an environment conducive to its successful fruition.

+

[Omitted here are Sections II, III, and IV.]

+

+ V. U.S. Policy Options

+

In line with NSSM-CIEPSM guidance, the + options which follow focus on a major nationalization of U.S. + investments in the context of our broader interests in Venezuela. + Because negotiations are still at an incipient stage, we lack any + significant elaboration of the GOV’s + position on the future role U.S. iron and petroleum companies might play + in extracting and processing those materials. The options which follow, + therefore, represent broad approaches to the negotiations and to the + environment in which they are taking place. Further analysis will be + warranted as negotiations progress, particularly if a movement toward + confrontation develops.

+

The U.S. oil and steel companies’ particular interests relating to their + investment in Venezuela fit within a broader U.S. concern with + protection of U.S. investments overseas, with maintenance of a flow of + energy and raw materials to our economy, and with preservation of longer + term political and security interests in Venezuela. Similarly, the + acquisition of control over its extractive industries fits within a + broader Venezuelan government program of industrial and general economic + development. The options below take these interrelationships into + account. The first three present differing levels of general USG involvement in the negotiating between + the companies and the GOV. Options four + and five represent more general approaches to supplement the negotiating + options.

+

+ A. A Hands-Off Policy.

+

This course of action would leave the process of negotiation to the + private U.S. companies which are involved. We would follow the + negotiations carefully, so as to be prepared to become involved if the + course of negotiations turned against the companies in such a way as to + threaten our interests. Normal diplomatic interchanges with the GOV, either at its initiative or in cases + where we were certain such interchanges would not be objected to by the + GOV or the companies, would not be + precluded, but we treat the negotiations as a matter basically between + the companies and the GOV.

+

Advantages

+

a. Would conform to the role suggested to us by the companies themselves. + This role was urged because of the companies’ fear that U.S. involvement + in the negotiations might be conterproductive and cause the GOV to take a more extreme position in order to demonstrate + its independence from the U.S.

+

b. Would leave negotiations to the experienced hands of the interested + private parties, most of whom have a long history of relationship and + dealings with the government of Venezuela.

+

c. Would reduce the risk of confrontation with the GOV by not directly addressing Venezuela’s + contention that subsidiaries of foreign firms doing business in the + country are subject only to Venezuela + jurisdiction.

+

d. Would avoid premature USG involvement + by deferring participation until it had become more clearly + necessary.

+

Disadvantages

+

a. If the negotiations turn against the companies, our involvement may + come too late to support either their or our own national interests.

+

b. The private companies alone may not have sufficient bargaining + strength to compete with the government of Venezuela and will therefore + be at a disadvantage in the negotiations.

+

c. Important national interests are involved, involving both oil and iron + ore supply and prices, and more broadly long-term relationships which we + may not be able to protect if the negotiations are left completely in + the hands of the private companies.

+

d. Important principles of U.S. international economic policy are + involved, e.g. prompt, adequate, and effective compensation for + expropriated properties, which should be advanced at the governmental + level. This consideration is not likely to arise, however, until the + companies first goal of maintaining a role in Venezuela, and perhaps + even a reasonable guarantee of continuing access to the petroleum, + fails.

+

+ B. A Parallel Dialogue.

+

Recognizing that important national interests are involved in the + negotiations apart—if not neatly separable—from the specific regarding + the nationalization of U.S.-owned interests, we should quietly maintain + a dialogue with the GOV to identify + possible broader problems arising from the negotiations. This dialogue + should be carried on regularly, but, for the USG part at least, in a manner consistent with option one + as regards avoiding comment on, or involvement in, specific of the + company negotiations.

+

Advantages

+

a. To a great extent such a dialogue is unavoidable. We cannot stop + diplomatic exchange during the negotiations.

+

b. The advantages considered under a and b of option one would apply.

+ +

c. To enter a parallel dialogue would implement our joint commitment at + Tlatelolco. We agreed there to bring out conflicts of national interests + and to deal with them frankly, with concern for results and less for + complicating public treatment of them.

+

d. There will inevitably be publicity on progress of the negotiations, + and on points of conflict. The large number of companies involved will + almost inevitably lead to a public confusion on what is really + happening. We must be clear on what is, in fact, happening. Consultation + on these problems would serve the purposes of both governments, assuming + a continuing will to keep the setting conducive to an agreed + accommodation of interests.

+

e. The separate officially communicated Venezuelan view of how the + negotiations are proceeding could be useful to the U.S. companies + involved, as well as to the USG.

+ +

Disadvantages

+

a. We may get drawn into discussion on ongoing negotiations to a depth + which our companies would not welcome. Our official comments would be + subject to misinterpretation and possible use against the companies + positions.

+

b. It takes two to make a dialogue and the new government has not been + disposed to consult in advance on its policy initiatives.

+

c. We would be more open to the traditional Latin charge that the USG supports the aims of its national + firms to the detriment of the independent development of Latin American + countries. (This potential might be lessened to the extent that the + USG avoided official discussion of + specific issues or support for company positions.)

+

+ C. An Out-Front Policy

+

The USG would seek to interpose itself + between the private companies and the Government of Venezuela. The + USG would take an active role in + the negotiations and/or attempt to use strong political and economic + pressure in support of an outcome that would protect U.S. and company + interests.

+

Advantages

+

a. The prospect of an outcome more favorable from the standpoint of U.S. + interests might be greater by virtue of the greater bargaining power + brought to bear, although this is by no means certain.

+

b. A clear signal would be given—in Venezuela and elsewhere—of our + unwillingness to accept continued erosion of the U.S. business presence + and our national economic interests abroad despite the political costs + which might be involved.

+

Disadvantages

+

a. This would almost insure early confrontation with the new and + basically friendly government of a leading Latin American democracy, + causing potentially serious harm to our overall relations and security + interests.

+

b. There is reason to believe that the government of Venezuela sees + itself as embarking upon a comprehensive new economic development + program rather than a bilateral problem with the U.S. Such a + confrontation risks a polarization, with the United States being + internationally cast in a role of opposition to the force of nationalism + in Latin America.

+

c. We are not exactly dealing from strength in today’s relations with + Venezuela. Our elements of leverage are perhaps lower than ever before + in view of (1) our need for Venezuelan oil, (2) the importance attached + to Venezuelan cooperation in the vitalization of inter-American + relations, and (3) the affluence and economic independence which + Venezuela enjoys today by virtue of surplus oil revenues.

+

d. Given the complexity and the economic and legal issues involved, + especially with regard to the petroleum issue, it would be difficult if + not impossible for the U.S. Government to play a meaningful role in + specific negotiations, except perhaps, if compensation becomes a central + issue.

+

+ D. Increase U.S. Support + for Venezuela’s Development.

+

To improve the environment for negotiations we would, without publicity + or declaration of any “special relationship,” identify the USG officially with the GOV aspirations to industrialize and + diversify its economy. Steps in this direction could include + facilitating the training of Venezuelan technicians abroad, + encouragement of U.S. industrial and commercial involvement in the + Venezuelan development plan, assistance in the GOV’s drive to upgrade the depressed agricultural sector, + reaffirmations of our willingness to assist with the modernization of + Venezuelan armed forces, and general cooperation in the inter-American + context. This program should, to the extent possible, operate in support + of continuing favorable relations with the Venezuelan government. A + sufficiently adverse turn of the company negotiations or of GOB public posture toward this country + would, of course, call for a reassessment of the value of such + cooperation and atmospherics. From such a positive approach we would + expect to develop the most cooperative background possible which would + promote a favorable GOV attitude toward + our interests. (See elaboration of possible courses of action in Annex + F.)

+

Advantages

+

a. This would be a constructive approach to Venezuela’s legitimate + charting of a more ambitious course of national development.

+ +

b. There is a good chance that the GOV + would be receptive to this approach.

+

c. There would probably be a useful fallout across the entire spectrum of + our relations with Venezuela providing a beneficial setting for the + protection of our economic interests and the interests of the U.S. + companies in Venezuela.

+

Disadvantages

+

a. Such a cooperative approach would be difficult to sustain if the + GOV took harsh action against U.S. + companies.

+

b. It could be subject to serious criticism from elements in the U.S. who + do not view nationalization as legitimate nor past U.S. posture in these + case as “firm” enough.

+

c. It might encourage others to treat our overseas interests arbitrarily + in the belief that such action is rewarded rather than punished.

+

E. Creation of an Explicit “Special + Relationship” +

+

As in the case of Saudi Arabia, we would attempt to negotiate a publicly + proclaimed “special relationship”, commissions and working Groups, + interchange high-level visits, and set out to assist in the development + and the diversification of Venezuela’s economy. We would offer to assist + Venezuela substantially with modernization of her armed forces, + consistent with the requirements of inter-American security. A formal + bilateral agreement might be part or the end result of this effort. Part + of the package would, of course, provide for a mutually satisfactory + outcome of the negotiations with the companies.

+

Advantages

+

a. International recognition would be afforded Venezuela as a nation of + special importance to the United States, and special relationships would + come publicly into existence with the implication of two-way trades on + measures affecting each other.

+

b. Massive U.S. attention and assistance might result in Venezuela giving + special consideration to our economic interests.

+

c. Might lead to substantial expansion of hemisphere’s petroleum + reserves.

+

+ Disadvantages +

+

a. Such singling out of Venezuela would be resented by other members of + the inter-American community.

+

b. Venezuela has invested heavily in developing its “Third World” + credentials and may not itself consider a “special relationship” with us + compatible with these and with its pretensions to leadership in Latin + America.

+

c. The substance of such a relationship might be much less than the form. + The immediate economic, political, and military advantages which we have to offer Venezuela + might not be sufficient incentive for the GOV at this time to make major economic concessions in + return. See Section IV “Prospects For a Bilateral Agreement,” and Annex + E “Prospects for A Special Relationship.”

+

d. Given these circumstances, the GOV is + unlikely to be willing to enter into any bilateral trade, investment, or + energy agreement. An offer on our part to discuss such a special + relationship might result in the GOV + stiffening its position in negotiations with the companies.

+

e. It might be premature to offer such a relationship to Venezuela until + negotiations with the companies have progressed sufficiently to indicate + that such a massive USG effort is + necessary to preserve our interests. A premature offer could indicate to + the GOV that we consider the position + of the companies weak, and therefore encourage the GOV to go for a maximum takeover of U.S. + investments.

+

+ VI. Recommendation

+

Options B, A Parallel Dialogue, and D, Increase U.S. Support for + Venezuela’s Development, taken together, offer the greatest chance for + the USG to assume a role supporting + both our national interests and a favorable outcome for company + negotiations. Their advantages are outlined above. The companies have + generally not sought official intervention in negotiations over + nationalization, yet the Secretary has committed the United States to + meet points of conflict with Latin American countries in continuing + dialogue, and with a minimum of public posturing. The balancing act set + out in B describes a course essentially meeting both imperatives.

+

The dialogue should be constant, quiet, and at the highest level + possible. We should seek to bring out the objectives of each government + in the negotiations and identify broad areas of agreement and of + disagreement. Misapprehensions over these should be avoided at the start + so that we do not limit necessarily the area of maneuver and compromise + through feeding public antagonism. The course of negotiations will also + involve many disparate companies with differing aims and personalities, + leading inevitably to a confusing picture of what is happening. It will + be important that we hear the GOV + version of the negotiations at each stage, even though the USG should be constrained from getting + between the parties except at the point—essentially at the end of the + line—when the compensation question will call for our close review, and + possible official comment or action.

+

In the important case of oil company negotiations, our interest in a + continuing flow of Venezuelan oil to this country would call for a new + analysis of our options should the Venezuelan position be to exclude + U.S. companies from Venezuelan operations at a precipitate rate, or to + threaten diversion of the oil to other markets. Both possibilities offer + little benefit to + Venezuela in our view, yet are possible results of the negotiating + process.

+

Option D should be fleshed out immediately, using a Venezuela Working + Group to identify means available to the USG to be of assistance to Venezuela in attaining its + developmental objectives. The timing and visibility of these moves to be + helpful to Venezuela will have to be examined closely. There is some + danger in “discontinuing” to the extent that our actions might be + construed as “buying” favorable treatment for U.S. firms and handing + Perez’s opposition a political opening. We face the same sensitivity, + however, when we do not do in normal interchange + what we might have been expected to do, exposing ourselves to the + opposite change of holding positive actions hostage to the same + favorable treatment of U.S. interests.

+

In our approach to Option D we should make a strong effort to head off + the charge that the conflict of national interests, to some degree + inherent in the nationalization process, implies a U.S. intention to + restrain or subvert Venezuelan development. The Venezuelan government + will furthermore be under political pressure to broaden its options and + show its independence. The tendency is strong in any country enjoying + newly available financial means to go to excess in removing all + appearance of dependence. The longer range ties, which are recognized to + be beneficial to both sides, will have to be reinforced carefully and + continously in order to lay the basis for a political climate in + Venezuela which will permit a reasonable accommodation to U.S. + interests.

+

[Omitted here are the Annexes.]

+
+ +
+ 385. Telegram 11246 From the Embassy in Venezuela to the Department of + State +

Summary: The + Embassy recommended a frank but low-key dialogue with Venezuela, + possibly combined with a high-level visit, to resolve investment + disputes and to avoid the development of an adversarial + relationship.

+

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + D740327–0708. Secret; Priority; Limdis. A summary of Pérez’s public letter to + Ford is in telegram + 9337 from Caracas, September 20. (Ibid., D740265–0417) The + substance of the July 9 aide-mémoire that was said to have + incensed President Pérez + was laid out in Document 382. NSDM 257 is published in + Foreign + Relations, 1969–1976, vol. E–11, Part 1, Documents + on Mexico, Cuba, and the Caribbean, Document 16. + Portions of the July 26 study memorandum on U.S.–Venezuelan + relations are published as Document + 384. Telegram 10979 from Caracas, November 6, + presented Embassy views regarding a proposed chief of mission + conference in Washington, December 2–6. (Ibid., D740319–0637) + Telegram 8738 from Caracas, September 5, presented the Embassy’s + initial views regarding consultation among policy planning + staffs in Venezuela. (Ibid., D740246–0604) In telegram 7221 from + Quito, November 13, Ingersoll reported on Schacht’s suggestion that + a special envoy be designated to study bilateral problems and + prepare an agenda for discussions between the two countries. + (Ibid., P850146–0852)

+ + + + + Caracas, November 13, 1974, 1650Z. + +

11246. Subject: Venezuela: Policy Recommendations. Ref: A. Caracas 10979; + B. Caracas 8738; C. Quito 7721.

+

Summary—For the first time since Bolivar, Venezuela has the economic + strength and political leadership in President Perez to make her will felt beyond her + borders. As a principal supplier of oil and iron ore to the U.S., as a + major trading partner and host to a large U.S. private investment, + Venezuela is far too important to allow us to drift into an adversary + relationship. By carefully initiating a frank but low-key dialogue with + Venezuela along the lines of the Secretary’s “new dialogue” with Latin + America, we can best reach solutions to our differences and safeguard + our high stakes in this country. Depending upon its progress, the + regular dialogue might later be reinforced by a high-level USG visit to Venezuela as recognition of + her new and increasing importance in world affairs. End summary

+

1. Since World War II Venezuela has prospered greatly from petroleum, but + national pride has been galled by the Venezuelans’ conviction that their + prime resource, a wasting asset, was being pumped away by foreigners for + their great benefit, with Venezuela having to struggle for whatever + advantages it could squeeze from the foreigners. At the same time the + Venezuelans’ sense of grievance was heightened by what they considered + as grossly unfair terms of trade between Venezuela and the + industrialized countries (i.e., the United States) as the prices of + imported goods rose but the prices of Venezuela’s oil and other raw + materials did not. Venezuelan resentment was further magnified by unsuccessful efforts to work + out a special bilateral deal for access to the U.S. oil market in the + form of “Hemispheric preference.” Venezuelans attributed this to a lack + of U.S. concern and responsiveness to their problems.

+

2. The energy crisis and President Carlos Andrez Perez’s electoral + victory in December 1973 coincided and together have changed Venezuela’s + perception of herself and her world role. Venezuelans are confident that + they now have the strength to achieve many of the economic aspirations + they have held over the years.

+

3. Besides immensely strengthening the Venezuelan economy, the vastly + increased revenues from oil have bolstered the political position of + President Perez to the point + that he is rapidly emerging as a hemisphere figure. Perez, an energetic + and articulate popular leader, is a shrewd, self-made career politician + from the hardscrabble Andean state of Tachira. (Unlike most Latin + American Chiefs of State he has no college degree, and he also speaks no + English.) Although he has had comparatively little experience in Foreign + Affairs he has been quick to exploit the opportunities in international + relations, offered by Venezuela’s changed circumstances. Besides + providing large sums for development assistance and international + lending, Perez (with Colombia and Costa Rica) has taken the initiative + in the OAS to lift sanctions against + Cuba and has proposed a meeting of Latin American Nationalism.” More + importantly, he has constituted himself a Latin American spokesman for + the developing Third World countries vis-à-vis the developed nations, + especially the United States. While this self-assumed role may be + privately resented by some of Perez’s neighbors, none is likely + seriously to dispute it so long as Perez professes to speak for their + general interests—and has the money, oil and other resources they + need.

+

4. Perez’s reply to President Ford following the latter’s September 18 energy speech + to the United Nations typifies Venezuela’s new self-assurance. Although + President Ford’s remarks were + directed to a far wider audience than Venezuela, Perez, still incensed + by our aide mémoire of July 9, may have genuinely believed that + Ford’s speech was directed + at Venezuela. Perez did not hesitate to make a public reply designed + (successfully) to win him broad domestic as well as international + support (the Presidents of Peru and Ecuador publicly endorsed Perez’s + reply to President Ford). What + irritated the Venezuelans most about this episode was that so little + attention in the U.S. was given Perez’s message that Venezuela had to + publicize it via paid advertisements in leading U.S. newspapers. This + reaction suggests that one of the simplest and easiest ways to offend + Venezuela is to ignore her. Another, more certain, way is publicly to + imply criticism.

+

5. An adversarial relationship with Venezuela might not only jeopardize + the hitherto uninterrupted flow of Venezuelan petroleum to the U.S. but also adversely affect the + $3 billion U.S. investment in Venezuela, including the evolution of the + process of nationalization of U.S.-owned oil and iron ore companies, and + also the expanding U.S. export market in this country (currently about + $1.5 billion annually). Confrontation would stimulate Venezuelan + nationalism, strengthen Perez domestically, make him a champion of + anti-U.S. sentiment in Latin America, and drive him to lend increasing + support to hardline Third World positions.

+

6. In order to avoid the above risks, the Embassy recommends that we + attempt to initiate a low-key dialogue with the Venezuelan government at + various levels. Without compromising Perez’s independent stance, such a + dialogue would enable us to have regular, serious, sustained and, as + warranted by progress achieved, higher-level consultations with Perez + and the GOV to work out durable + solutions to problems. In urging this approach, we believe Perez is not + so much anti-U.S. as a hard and nationalistic bargainer. The resort to + dialogue has already been approved in principle by NSDM 257 of June 10, 1974.

+

7. Specifically, we suggest increased consultation on economic and + political issues through more institutionalized and regular dialogue + between the embassy and appropriate Venezuelan ministries, at various + levels including the Ambassadorial-Ministerial. After careful + preparation the Secretary’s plan for talks between S/P representatives and the GOV hopefully could open new avenues of + communication, possibly along the lines suggested in Caracas 8738.

+

8. If we are to have a serious, productive dialogue with Venezuela, an + agenda must be selected based upon mutual interests rather than serious + differences. From the aspect of diplomatic tactics, we can get far more + mileage in a future negotiation with President Perez if we make it seem that in fact + it is our desire to assist him to achieve his ambitious program of a + fundamental reordering of the Venezuelan economy, as outlined in his + speech to Congress to April 29 this year (see Annex to study memorandum + of July 26, 1974). Many of these objectives, such as vastly increased + steel, aluminum, and shipbuilding industries, directly concern the + transfer of technology which formed a significant contribution at the + conference of Tlatelolco. Other points in President Perez’s speech to the nation included + an almost revolutionary betterment of the agricultural sector of the + republic; and here, too, U.S. technology in terms of scientifically + improved crops, the availability of needed agricultural machinery, and + possibly even a contribution by our own Peace Corps, could be made to + seem to President Perez as a + constructive attempt by the United States to assist him in achieving a + goal which will have also important sociological (and political) + benefits.

+

9. If we follow this suggestion, the United States would need to define + its interests most carefully, perhaps along the lines of the + recommendation in the study memorandum of July 26, 1974, in response to + + NSSM 203. Within this framework the following subjects are + illustrative of the topics which might be included:

+

(A) Petroleum Prices and Access to Venezuelan Oil

+

Since there appears to be little likelihood of U.S. efforts leading to a + lower price for Venezuelan petroleum, our primary objective should be to + obtain long-term access to Venezuelan oil at no higher than current + prices. This is not to say that we should acquiesce to the level of + current prices for the long run, but access rather than price should be + our main consideration. Given the Venezuelan determination to accelerate + reversion of the petroleum industry and to nationalize as soon as + possible the iron industry, we should make every effort to ensure that + the bilateral atmosphere will contribute to the most advantageous future + arrangements both from the standpoint of the U.S. oil companies and the + U.S. Government. The more services which the U.S. can continue to + provide, especially in the areas of marketing and technology, the more + we will be able to depend on Venezuela as a source of petroleum.

+

(B) Petro-Dollar Recycling

+

Venezuela is trying to get out in front of the OPEC member countries in proposing that they offer some + positive suggestion to the consumer countries for recycling excess + revenue. One of the Venezuelan initiatives will involve sending a + cabinet-level mission to some Arab and other oil-producing countries to + set the stage for this subject to become an agenda item at the December + OPEC ministerial meeting. + U.S.-Venezuelan interests may coincide in this important area.

+

(C) Bilateral Trade

+

Although U.S. trade with Venezuela has in the past been conducted through + private companies without participation of the two governments, we may + find it in our interest to examine seriously the possibility of + government-to-government arrangements. Venezuela’s extractive industries + will soon be nationalized and the GOV + already controls the purchase of basic agricultural commodity imports. + The GSP provisions of the trade bill, + including the possible exclusion of Venezuela as an OPEC country, will heighten the need for + bilateral consultations and possible negotiations for an access + agreement.

+

(D) Investments

+

As indicated in sub-paragraph B above, there is an important element of + Venezuelan investment in multinational financial institutions and also + directly in U.S. financial markets. Likewise, Venezuelans are interested + in the possibility of future U.S. investment in their country. In this + connection we note that there are important U.S. investments in + Venezuela which are affected by the provisions of the Andean Pact.

+ +

(E) Technological Cooperation in Petroleum Development

+

Declining production will eventually require the GOV to develop its other potential reserves, notably the + Orinoco Tar Belt, which is supposed to contain 700 billion barrels of + fiscous, mineralized oil. Foreign technology will inevitably be required + in some form. The Shell company already has signed an agreement with + CVP for the demetalizing of heavy + oil, and this could be the forerunner of more extensive technological + agreements with foreign sources. The director of hydrocarbons in the + ministry of mines has confidentially told the embassy that there would + be a good possibility of U.S.-Venezuelan cooperation for development of + the Orinoco Belt, but that such cooperation would have to be cast, for + political reasons, in terms of technological cooperation in the + development of “heavy” crudes, with no mention of the precise + geographical location.

+

10. If the new dialogue is successful, serious consideration might be + given at a future date to a visit to Venezuela by the Secretary. In the + meantime we suggest the desirability of a letter from President + Ford to President Perez calling for dialogue as a means + of forestalling additional high-level public statements which can only + exacerbate the present atmosphere of confrontation. We believe President + Perez would act positively + to such an unmistakable indication of our concern for our relations with + one of our major oil suppliers and a major Latin American power. + Opportunity would be afforded for decisions in our bilateral relations + and for avoiding strains resulting from oil company reversion. Such a + demonstration of friendship would, we believe, neutralize anti-U.S. + pressures on Perez and encourage him to be a more responsible and + cooperative hemisphere partner.

+

11. The foregoing was drafted before the receipt of Quito 7721, from + which it appears that FonMin Schacht also is thinking of a jointly framed agenda of + U.S.-Venezuelan bilateral problems. We welcome the suggestion of Deputy + Secretary Ingersoll that + Assistant Secretary Rogers would + be the appropriate person to go to Venezuela to talk about such an + agenda.

+ + + McClintock + + +
+ +
+ 386. Telegram 11890 From the Embassy in Venezuela to the Department of + State +

Summary: + McClintock assured + Pérez that the U.S. + Government did not have a “hard line” policy towards + Venezuela.

+

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + D740349–0499. Secret; Limdis. In telegram 11830 from Caracas, + November 29, the Embassy informed the Department that U.S. + mining companies and the Venezuelan Government were near a + settlement of a dispute over expropriated U.S. holdings. (Ibid., + D740347–0799)

+ + + + + Caracas, December 2, 1974, 2039Z. + +

11890. Subj: President Perez on + US-Venezuelan Relations: Possible Dialogues.

+

1. At breakfast this morning, the President complained at the “hard line” + which the USG apparently wanted to take + against Venezuela. I said so far as I knew, there was no special “hard + line” and that we were pleased at the initiative of FonMin Schacht in Quito when he had suggested + to Deputy Secretary Ingersoll + the preparation of an agenda and the initiation of serious talks to lay + out the course of future US-Venezuelan relations.

+

2. Presdient said that Venezuela was not like the Arab countries which + used oil as a political weapon. Venezuela had its own program for + national improvement and sincerely desired to be a loyal friend of the + US. He pointed out that the forthcoming nationalization of the iron ore + industry (Caracas 11830) would be the precursor of similar arrangements + with the foreign petroleum companies and that he thought it would be + clear to all that Venezuela intended to be reasonable. Therefore, he + found it difficult to understand why the US wished to follow a “hard + line.” I said we did not and that it should not be beyond the realm of + ingenuity on both sides to lay out principles governing our economic + relations which would be beneficial to both countries. Here I mentioned + the transfer of technology and the various ways in which the US could be + helpful to Venezuela in realizing President Perez’s ambitious program for economic development as + outlined in his speech of last April 29.

+

3. The President questioned me several times as to whether I would be + going up to Washington next month, and I said that so far as I knew I + was still scheduled to attend a meeting of Chiefs of Mission early in + January. I also mentioned the forthcoming US-Venezuelan symposium to be + held under the auspices of the Fletcher School Jan 26–29. I said if both + govts could see to it that delegations on each side were made up of high + caliber participants drawn from govt as well as private sector, it might + be possible informally and without commitment at Fletcher to trace out recommendations + for the future management of our relations and which could then be + studied by govts and perhaps used as the basis for eventual official + agreements. To this suggestion the President agreed. He said, however, + that he thought it would be unwise for the Fletcher symposium to be + attended by [our?] press on either side because this would tempt + speakers to plead to the gallery and thus the meeting would degenerate + into a nationalistic debate which could be of no benefit to either + side.

+ + + McClintock + + +
+ +
+ 387. Telegram 13700 From the Department of State to the Embassy in + Venezuela +

Summary: + Kissinger and + Pérez Guerrero + discussed the Trade Reform Act, producer-consumer communication + on commodities, and U.S.-Venezuelan relations.

+

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + [no film number]. Confidential; Priority; Exdis. Drafted by + Johnson; cleared by Divine and Rogers; approved by Ealum. A + memorandum of conversation of the meeting is ibid., S/S–I Files, Lot 77D149, Principal + Memoranda.

+ + + + + Washington, January 21, 1975, 0049Z. + +

13700. Subject: Secretary’s Meeting with Dr. Manuel Perez Guerrero, + Venezuela’s Minister of State for International Economic Affairs. For + the Ambassador

+

1. Secretary met for about one hour on afternoon of January 17 with Dr. + Perez Guerrero, Minister of State for International Economic Affairs. + Venezuelan Ambassador Burelli + Rivas, Venezuelan Embassy Petroleum Attaché Felix Rossi, + Assistant Secretary Rogers, and + Henry Johnson, Deputy + Director, Office of North Coast Affairs, were also present.

+

2. In wide-ranging, free, and frank exchange, the Secretary and the + Minister touched generally on U.S.-Latin American policy, new dialogue, + trade reform act, and need for improved producer-consumer communication + on all commodities.

+

3. On oil, the Secretary said the U.S. was not concerned with OPEC per se but rather with the rapid + increase in oil prices, the balance of payments difficulties this + increase has caused for many countries, and the possible threat to + western civilization. The Secretary indicated he thought the price issue + could be settled only on the basis of a common perception of the long-term. He said we would be + willing to talk with OPEC as soon as + the consumers are organized and that we would like to talk with + producers about long-term price commitments if they are prepared to talk + about long-term supply commitments.

+

4. On U.S.-Venezuelan relations, the Secretary stressed seriousness of + our intention to improve relations. He said we are willing to have a + dialogue in either a hemispheric or bilateral forum but that we urgently + feel need to do something beyond rhetoric to get relations with our old + friend Venezuela back on track. If Venezuelans have any proposals, we + very much want to hear them. The Secretary requested the minister + specifically to convey to President Carlos + Andres Perez our desire for dialogue and readiness to + listen to Venezuela’s ideas and proposals.

+

5. The minister asked the Secretary about his plans for a visit to + Venezuela. The Secretary replied that he fully intended to travel to + Latin America including Venezuela but that events in Mid-East might + force him to postpone the date.

+ + + Kissinger + + +
+ +
+ 388. Telegram 23909 From the Department of State to the Embassy in + Venezuela +

Summary: + Kissinger and + Escovar discussed the Trade Bill, postponement of the Buenos + Aires MFM, and the April OAS General Assembly.

+

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + [no film number]. Confidential; Priority; Exdis. The Senate + Finance Committee’s mark-up of the Trade Reform Act included a + provision for exclusion of OPEC members from the Generalized System of + Preferences. (Telegram 10952 from Caracas, November 5, 1974; + ibid.)

+ + + + + Washington, February 1, 1975, 2034Z. + +

23909. Subject: Secretary’s Meeting with Dr. Ramon Escovar Salom, + Venezuela’s Foreign Minister

+

For the Ambassador

+

1. Secretary met for about fifty minutes on afternoon January 29 with Dr. + Escovar. Venezuelan Ambassador Burelli + Rivas, Minister Counselor Paparoni, Assistant Secretary + Rogers, Interpreter Anthony + Hervas, and Desk Officer Sonandres also present.

+

2. Meeting was amicable and frank. Discussion centered on US–LA relations (with specific reference to US + Trade Bill, postponement of Buenos Aires MFM, and April OAS General + Assembly) and on USG–GOV + relations. Secretary gave his + views on recent Latin American actions against USG. Escovar, who presented Secretary with copy of his + book, was conciliatory in his approach. Both agreed to discussions on + bilateral issues.

+

3. Secretary began conversation by frankly calling Buenos Aires MFM postponement a tactical mistake, + contrasting its back page press treatment with the very considerable + exposure which his visit to BA would + have brought Latin America viewpoint in principal US newspapers.

+

Latin America knew executive branch position on trade bill and his + inability obtain quick changes. He added that there would be no new + international order without US. In sum, Secretary observed that + anti-foreign sentiment was currently significant factor in US and that + frankly, we needed a little help from Latin Americans.

+

4. Turning to US-Venezuelan relations, Secretary called for review of + bilateral issues which could be conducted at any time. Said Middle East + may cause him to delay tentatively planned February visit to Venezuela + and other Latin American countries but he expressed hope visit could be + concluded prior to April 16 opening of OAS General Assembly which the Secretary looked forward to + attending. He said that ties of GOV to + LDC’s and US to Europe and across + Pacific could complement each other without either country abandoning + its own interests. Secretary asked Foreign Minister to convey his warm + personal regards to President Perez whom he referred to as dynamic leader.

+

5. Escovar, for his part, expressed understanding of Congressional + procedures regarding trade bill, he recommended best forum for carrying + forward “new dialogue” was OAS, + organization in need of philosophical and political change. Escovar + found idea of bilateral review excellent and one which could be + conducted through our embassies. Foreign Minister stressed OPEC was economic, not political, and + that Venezuela sought new economic order, not a policy of hostility + toward US. Foreign Minister regretted lack of dissemination in US of + Latin American and Venezuelan viewpoint.

+

6. MemCon follows.

+ + + Kissinger + + +
+ +
+ 389. Telegram 2668 From the Embassy in Venezuela to the Department of + State +

Summary: + McClintock + recommended that the United States intensify bilateral dialogue + with the Venezuelan Government in response to its campaign for + regional leadership and a new economic order.

+

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + D750084–0084. Confidential. Repeated Priority to Buenos + Aires.

+ + + + + Caracas, March 10, 1975, 2111Z. + +

2668. Subj: Venezuela’s Aspirations for International Leadership. + Department Pass all Ara Posts. Buenos + Aires for Secretary Rogers.

+

Begin Summary:

+

Venezuela, fast emerging as a Hemisphere power, is engaged in an + ambitious drive, utilizing its oil wealth, to assert leadership in Latin + American political and economic affairs and to expand its influence in + the Third World. Despite the anti-US tone of President Perez’s vigorous efforts to establish + a “New International Order,” should the US choose openly to combat its + formation, which implies a stronger and more unified Latin America, the + US risks not only harming its interests and relations with Venezuela, + the Hemisphere and the Third World, but also of stimulating the + hostility of a potentially new and competitive power center. A possibly + historic challenge is thus facing the United States, which this embassy + believes can best be met by intensifying US dialogue with Venezuela and + the rest of Latin America in order to promote US interests in the + Hemisphere and beyond, as well as to guide our evolving relationship + from confrontation towards cooperation.

+

End summary

+

1. Shortly after Carlos Andres + Perez was elected President of Venezuela, he made public + his intention to use Venezuela’s leverage as an important petroleum + supplier as his major foreign policy “instrument” (but not, he said, as + a “weapon”) on order to obtain for his country economic and commerical + benefits as well as modern technology. In the year since he became + President, Perez has gone considerably further than this, having moved + rapidly to capitalize upon the opportunities in international affairs + presented by Venezuela’s oil wealth and surplus revenues if not, in + fact, as a “weapon,” certainly as an increasingly effective “instrument” + to assert for Venezuela broad leadership in Latin American political and + economic affairs, and also to expand Venezuela’s influence in the Third + World.

+

2. In dealing with the United States, Perez has adroitly exploited the + energy crisis to support the creation of a “New International Order” in + which raw material-producing countries, especially in Latin America, would receive a fairer price + for their exports, thereby legitimatizing the high price of oil and + other raw materials. In this connection, President Ford’s and other US officials’ energy + statements and, more recently, the OPEC exclusion feature of the US Trade Act of 1974 provided + targets of opportunity for Perez both to gain domestic political support + and to further his leadership role in the Hemisphere against US + “coercion”. This has strained US-Venezuelan relations, although + Venezuela insists it is anxious to avoid “confrontation” with the US + over energy matters. At the same time, nationalization of the US-owned + iron industry, accomplished at the beginning of 1975, and + nationalization of the largely US-owned oil industry, scheduled for + later this year, are domestically popular issues which, although they + probably would have been pursued by any Venezuelan President at this + juncture, build up Perez’s credentials as a strong nationalistic leader + unafraid of the US in the eyes of Latin America, OPEC and the Third World.

+

3. In his political relations with Latin America, President Perez seeks to catalyze the unity of + all Latin America as a coherent group able to defend its interests + effectively vis-à-vis the United States and other developed countries. + This accounts for Venezuela’s efforts to lift OAS sanctions against Cuba and Venezuela’s resumption of + relations with that country. In recent months Perez has launched a + strenous diplomatic offensive to offer friendship, cooperation and + support to his Latin American fellows, concentrating on his smaller or + closer neighbors, including the Caribbean area. Venezuela was an + organizer of the November 1974 Quito conference on Cuba (and suffered + the principal onus for the failure of that meeting); Perez played a + prominent part in the Ayacucho sesquicentennial celebrations in + December; was host to the meeting of Central American Presidents in + Venezuela the same month; and has proposed a meeting of Caribbean heads + of state and later of all Latin American Presidents during 1975. Perez + has sent personal emissaries to most Latin American countries and is + receiving a swelling stream of high-ranking foreign dignitaries. In + March, following a “triumphal” return from the OPEC chiefs of state conference in Algiers, he is scheduled + to visit Mexico and Panama and probably Argentina, and he may make + further official visits in the Hemisphere this year. He may also meet + with Fidel Castro later on in + 1975. He has publicly given emphatic support to Panama in its Canal + negotiations with the US. In late March or early April 1975 the army + chiefs of Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Panama, and Peru + will confer in Caracas. All of these developments, although perhaps not + deliberately contrived, may diminish the lustre of Secretary Kissinger’s announced visit to South + America. To me the President has frequently complained of the + Secretary’s alleged “Olympian indifference” to the Latin Western + Hemisphere.

+ +

4. With respect to the OAS, Perez seems + less interested in vitiating its activity than instilling among the + Latins a sense of unity so as to place dialogue within its framework on + a more equal basis. He was the main instigator of the special OAS council meeting which unanimously + voted against the US on the Trade Act of 1974. Postponement of the March + Buenos Aires MFM, largely at + Venezuela’s instigation (an action publicly justified by passage of the + US Trade Act of 1974), testifies to the success of Venezuela’s efforts + both to draw Latin America together in order to negotiate more + effectively with the more developed countries, particularly the US, and + to augment Venezuela’s influence looking toward a stronger, more united + hemisphere.

+

5. It should also be noted that there is a tendency among Venezuelan + labor leaders to favor the formation of Latin American Trade + Secretariats and a Latin American Labor Central which would exclude the + US labor movement and possibly lead to the abandonment of Orit. And in + April, at the invitation of Venezuela’s petroleum workers federation, + representatives from the Petroleum workers unions in all the OPEC countries will meet in Caracas to + demonstrate labor solidarity among the OPEC countries.

+

6. In his economic relations with Latin America President Perez aims at expanding Venezuela’s + power base in the area while at the same time promoting Latin solidarity + by strengthening the hand of raw material and commodity producers in + their economic relations with the industrial powers, especially the US. + In order to facilitate these objectives, Perez has felt he must + dissipate the animus against Venezuela as a rich country, some of whose + wealth is being acquired at the expense of its poor neighbors. Besides + providing large sums for development assistance and international + lending, Venezuela has acted to neutralize the oil price issue in Latin + America by offering help to the Central American countries to alleviate + the impact upon them of the high cost of oil and to assist them in + stabilizing foreign exchange earnings from coffee. Venezuela is also + negotiating bilateral petroleum arrangements with Peru and Argentina, + with probably more Latin and Caribbean countries to follow. These deals + are ostensibly designed to ease their balance of payments difficulties + and also make money available for much-needed development, but they also + inescapably entail those countries’ greater dependence on Venezuela.

+

7. Frustrated by the dominant role played by Brazil, Argentina and Mexico + in LAFTA, Venezuela has chosen, + principally for political considerations, to assume an active leadership + role in the Andean Pact and to reaffirm Caracas as the Pact’s financial + center. Venezuela is also undertaking a number of bilateral and + multilateral economic initiatives in the Caribbean. Meantime, Perez has + not hesitated to utilize such issues as the US Trade Act to deflect + Latin attention away from the high price of petroleum. Perhaps most significantly of all, in + order to institutionalize Latin American economic solidarity, Venezuela + is co-sponsoring with Mexico formation of a strictly Latin American + Economic System (SELA), apparently + with some success. Despite reservations in the Hemisphere concerning + SELA, Venezuela appears thoroughly + committed to the concept and organization of SELA, which the GOV has + described as of the “utmost importance” and which may be used to expand + the use of Cartel-type operations to other commodities in addition to + oil.

+

8. In dealing with the Third World, President Perez seeks to gain both influence, by + projecting in international forums, especially the UN, the image of Venezuela as an + underdeveloped country, and prestige by portraying himself as the Latin + American spokesman for developing countries, as opposed to the developed + nations, especially the US. This is well illustrated by Venezuela’s + espousal of the creation of a “New World Order” to redress grievances of + the developing nations. By paradoxically joining in the vanguard of the + “poor” against the “rich”, Venezuela and other newly-rich OPEC countries hope to create a solid + front to deflect criticism of their privileged status. Thus, although + oil-wealthy Venezuela would appear to be an increasingly strange + bedfellow with the underdeveloped Third World, in strictly economic + terms, the Venezuelan government has apparently decided that Venezuela’s + long-term political as well as economic interests are better served by a + diplomatic strategy of identification with the LDC’s.

+

9. The evidence adduced in this analysis clearly indicates that Venezuela + as a country and Carlos Andres + Perez as a President intend to do their utmost to occupy + the center stage in multinational forums since in most such forums the + United States and the industrialized countries will be consistently + outvoted by the Third World countries. Venezuela can thus at least + superficially count on a number of parliamentary victories even though + it and its adherents may lack the political and economic power to give + these resolutions real substance. However, the diplomatic fact remains + that increasingly we risk being publicly defeated by Venezuela as a + leader (A) of the Latin American Republics and (B) of the lesser + developed countries. In consequence, our best diplomatic strategy, as + indicated below, will be to seek to get into the clinches with Perez and + his government on a bilateral basis and not to be picked off at + long-range in multinational forums where the majority will consistently + vote against us.

+

10. It is a cardinal point of Perez’s foreign policy for Venezuela to + enter into diplomatic relations with all nations, regardless of + political orientation, in order for Venezuela to build bridges to (and + gain possible allies with) as many different states as possible. Thus, + since Perez became President, Venezuela has instituted diplomatic + relations with such diverse countries as North Korea, East Germany, + Bulgaria and Gambia, besides + Cuba. The President has also received invitations to visit France, + Romania, Spain, Mainland China and Yugoslavia during 1975. In + internationsl organizations and conferences Venezuela is now currying + favor among the Third World by taking a much more independent (and + hardline anti-US) stance. Venezuela’s increasing identification with + Third World aspirations is likely to be reflected during the forthcoming + Law of the Sea Conference in Geneva.

+

11. Finally, Perez does not hesitate to exploit his country’s position as + a founder-member of OPEC. Unity with + OPEC is the first line of + Venezuela’s oil price defense, and Perez and his advisors know that if + the organization falters, Venezuela’s nearby markets could be swamped + with highly competitive Middle East Petroleum. To reassert Venezuela’s + solidarity with that organization Perez with much fanfare attended the + OPEC Chiefs of State meeting in + Algiers in March.

+

12. This Embassy has already presented its policy recommendations in + favor of frank, sustained and productive dialogue with the Venezuelan + Government to further US bilateral interests with Venezuela (Caracas + 11246, Nov 13, 1974) and CASP for + FY 75–76. This is being + accomplished, with encouraging results, and the Embassy is gratified + that bilateral talks have begun in Washington. In the message referred + to, the embassy noted that while President Perez’s assertion of leadership may be privately + resented by some of his neighbors, none is likely to dispute it so long + as he professes to speak for their general interest and has the money, + oil and other resources they need. However, Venezuela’s leadership + ambitions will not alter the fact that the Latin countries, most + especially the larger ones, will continue to determine their own + policies according to their particular needs and interests.

+

13. The United States presently experiencing a profound readjustment in + its relations with Venezuela and the Hemisphere as a new balance is + being struck between the colossus of the north and its hitherto weak + neighbors to the south. If the effort to forge a solid Latin American + front prospers (which of course cannot be taken for granted), new + circumstances will create important if not historic challenges for the + United States. These will include the possibilities of formation of New + Latin American institutions and practices based upon an adversary + position to the US; problems in the supply of energy and raw materials + to the US; obstacles to US investment in Latin America; erosion of US + influence in the OAS and other + international organizations and disruption of the traditional friendship + between US and Venezuelan labor groups. On the other hand, evolution of + greater Latin American solidarity—which may be inevitable whether led by + Venezuela or not—offers the possibility of a more mature and lasting + relationship between the US and a more responsible Latin America, less + dependent on the US for development and assistance.

+ +

14. As far as Venezuela’s own aspirations as a spokesman for Latin + America and the Third World are concerned, the US must bear in mind that + Venezuela is a quintessentially nouveau riche country, strongly if at + times ignorantly led, and passing through a period of rapid change and + effervescent nationalism, but thrusting forward to secure its place in + the sun without the experience or maturity in the larger arena of foreign relations which would + otherwise temper its impetuosity. If the essence of effective diplomacy + is the ability to adapt to changes in the political and economic + environment, then in dealing with Venezuela the US should be wise and + skillful enough to exercise tact, forbearance and imagination in + intensifying our bilateral dialogues with Venezuela and the Latin + American countries in order to promote specific US interests in the + Hemisphere.

+

15. In particular, our response to Venezuela’s leadership ambitions must + be subtle and careful. If we choose openly to combat greater Latin + American unity, the US risks harming its highly important interests in + Venezuela and exacerbating its relations with the Hemisphere (and the + Third World). In addition, it would risk fortifying the anti-US bias + inherent in the development of greater Latin American solidarity and + stimulating the hostility of a possible new and competitive Hemispheric + power center. If, on the other hand, the US openly endorses this + solidarity drive, the US could be accused of “paternalism” toward Latin + America and might have to accept blame should Latin American unification + fail.

+

16. We recommend as a better course a watchful but silent posture with + respect to Venezuela’s current leadership drive, while intensifying + bilateral dialogues with Venezuela and other Latin countries to ensure + the US new opportunities to guide Venezuela and the Hemisphere away from + confrontation and towards cooperation. Over a century and a half the + relationship between the US and Venezuela has been one of love-hate, + like a marriage with no possibility of divorce. Over that period the + material advantages in US exploitation of Venezuelan oil and iron have + been dramatically on the American side. It is therefore little short of + the miraculous that the new president’s policies have in fact not as yet + hurt us, and with restraint and skillful diplomacy we may yet succeed in + building a more enduring nexus of mutual interest.

+ + + McClintock + + +
+ +
+ 390. Memorandum of Conversation +

Summary: Kissinger and Escovar discussed the trade bill, + Panama, the Paris producers-consumers conference, Cuba, and the + OAS.

+

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + P820125–0215. Confidential; Nodis. Drafted by Sonandres. The + conversation took place in the James Madison Room at the + Department of State. On April 23, President Ford informed Pérez that Kissinger was cancelling a + planned trip to Latin America because of the “tragic events in + Indochina,” adding that he had asked Kissinger to give high + priority to rescheduling the trip. (Telegram 93044 to Caracas; + ibid., Central Foreign Policy File, [no film number]) Kissinger’s March 1 Houston + speech is published in the Department of State Bulletin, March 24, 1975, pp. + 361–368.

+ + + + + Washington, May 10, 1975, 8:15 a.m. + + + SUBJECT + U.S.-Venezuelan Relations + + + PARTICIPANTS + + + + + VENEZUELA + + Ramon Escovar Salom—Foreign Minister of Venezuela + Dr. Miguel Angel Burelli + Rivas—Ambassador of Venezuela to the United + States + + Simon Alberto + Consalvi—Ambassador of Venezuela to the United + Nations + + + + + + US + + The Secretary + + William D. + Rogers—Assistant Secretary, ARA + + + William H. + Luers—Deputy Assistant Secretary, ARA + + Thomas W. Sonandres—Chief of Venezuelan Affairs + (Notetaker) + Anthony Hervas—Office of Language Services + (Interpreter) + + + +

The Secretary: (On balcony) Good morning, Mr. Minister. It is very nice + to see you again. Mr. Ambassador (Ambassador Consalvi), I understand + that you have read my books. A London Times + reviewer years ago pointed out that it is not a question of Henry Kissinger being a great writer, + but that he requires great readers.

+

Amb. Consalvi: I am a very good reader.

+

The Secretary: Why don’t we require everyone attending the OAS General Assembly to read one of my + books?

+

(Ushering the Minister to the Madison Room breakfast table) I am very + appreciative for your understanding of the cancellation of my trip. I + don’t know if you comprehended that the events which caused it were + totally unexpected.

+

The Minister: We know that you have to face unexpected events. Our + response was calm.

+ +

The Secretary: I appreciated how you handled the situation and your + understanding. There are no headlines when Venezuela makes a calm + statement.

+

The Minister: Calmness does not produce headlines. It was unfortunate + that you couldn’t go, but understandable why you could not.

+

It (the explanation for the trip cancellation) demonstrated that you + understand Latin America. We know that you want to go and that you can + do a great deal.

+

The Secretary: I’m thinking now of visiting Latin America in August, if + you consent.

+

The Minister: I think that this is fine, in principle. However, at the + end of August we are planning a meeting of chiefs of state.

+

The Secretary: Of Latin America?

+

The Minister: Yes.

+

The Secretary: May I come as an observer?

+

The Minister: Perfect. It is not a meeting against the United States. + Moreover, if you are present . . .

+

The Secretary: I’m going to the Arab Summit meeting. I’ve seen some Arab + ministers more often than they have seen each other. However, there are + two possibilities—either you change your summit meeting or I change my + trip. I’ll discuss this with an open mind.

+

The Minister: There is a third possibility. You could come as an + observer.

+

The Secretary: I can give a better anti-US exposition than you can. Pass + your resolutions against the US Congress and we will support them. Note + the candidate (Assistant Secretary) Rogers is supporting for Secretary of State. (Senator) + McGovern has five supporters in the country for his presidential + candidacy and Rogers is one. One + of these days I’ll have to select an assistant secretary who supports + administration policy.

+

The Senate has opened diplomatic relations with Cuba. The trouble with + (Prime Minister) Castro is that + if he continues to give each visiting senator a gift, a few prisoners, a + few million dollars, what will he have left to give us when we begin + negotiations? He’s got a real problem over what to give to the United + States Government.

+

The Minister: It is a problem which has become very complicated. + Previously, we had to deal with the power of the United States Executive + Branch. Now, we understand that it is also important for us to deal with + the United States legislature, to present it with the Latin American + viewpoint.

+

The Secretary: When Senator Javits was preparing to visit Cuba, I was in New York to + give a speech. I said there that my opposition was not with the Senator’s trip to Cuba, + but to his coming back. He didn’t talk to me for several weeks.

+

Seriously, we basically encourage these visits which help create public + interest and spread the responsibility. However, it is best that there + is only one Secretary of State.

+

The Minister: We are extremely interested in relating with the Congress. + We would like to improve our image in the United States.

+

The Secretary: Senator Kennedy + has, beginning with the days of his brother, made important contacts in + the Department of State. He telephones me, beginning the conversation + with reference to a cable number. Since the Department is based upon not + showing me any action cable of importance, I don’t know what he is + talking about.

+

It is important for Latin America to be understood.

+

The Minister: This is our interest too. We want to reach the US Congress. + We want to be a mature country. For this reason, we are interested in + your visit. You can carefully analyze events and can reach very + intelligent conclusions. In spite of the days of (Presidents) Roosevelt + and Kennedy when there was + interest in Latin America, there was never anything concrete + implemented. This was due to the inexperience of Latin America and also + to the lack of experience of the United States and to the too mechanical + US interpretation of the facts.

+

The Secretary: This was one of the errors of the Alliance for + Progress.

+

The Minister: What troubles us now is the position of the United States + after Vietnam. Will the reaction be one of harshness or one more + tranquil and receptive? We have seen elements of this reaction in your + public comments, but it is not always easily understandable what to + expect next.

+

The Secretary: Let me put it this way. After Vietnam, we cannot yield to + any other pressure. On the other hand, we see it crucially important + that we build a new international system in which a larger number of + countries participate, a system in which justice is more evenly + distributed. If countries choose to deal with us through confrontation, + we will not react in a conciliatory fashion. Progress is not produced by + confrontations.

+

The Minister: We strongly agree.

+

The Secretary: This certainly will be our policy so long as this + Administration is in office and it won’t change in another + Administration.

+

The Minister: There is anxiety, not only in Venezuela but in Latin + America, that the great power of the United States, which has been, in a + sense, withdrawn from Asia, will be concentrated in this area of the + world in an inflexible manner. In this context, I think that the anxiety over Panama is a very + interesting question of the moment. I think the world could benefit from + some deflating (desinflar). The United States + would be in a good position, with regard to Panama, to engage in + deflating. Next year is the 600th (Note: translation error) anniversary + of the Congress of Panama and the world would like to see the resolution + of the issue this year.

+

The Secretary: 600th?

+

Mr. Luers: Sesquicentennial + anniversary.

+

The Secretary: What?

+

Mr. Luers: 150 years.

+

The Secretary: I thought that Venezuela had perhaps come up with a new + theory of history.

+

With regard to Panama, I’ll tell you exactly our position. The + Administration wants to conclude the treaty and I think that we have the + framework in which it could be mutually accepted, but we have massive + opposition in the Congress and we have to take massive action to avoid + that there be difficulties on Panama in the Congress. If there are + delays in the course of our transactions, they are to further our + objective. Frankly, the worst which can happen is to bring pressure + against us now. The Administration does not need it and the Congress + will react the other way. I think that we can manage. We also have + opposition from our military. It requires some careful handling. We are + now meeting in the government on this issue this week. I will try to + move it to conclusion this year.

+

The Minister: I would be prepared to make contacts in the Congress.

+

The Secretary: It would help.

+

The Minister: What we need to do is to dialogue with both branches of the + (US) government.

+

The Secretary: Not for long. In the long run, we cannot tolerate every + country lobbying in our legislature. It (lobbying) could become + intolerable. If it does, we are going to make it into a political issue + next year. We don’t object if a foreign minister expresses his point of + view, but only if this does not detract from the normal course of our + relations. (To Rogers:) Has the Minister seen Congress? I don’t mean to + object. This is fine.

+

The Minister: There is no need to worry. It is our political task to deal + in states where there are varied political factors. The need for + dialogue (with the Congress) was made obvious by the passage of the + Trade Act. I understand your position and, if I were you, would feel the + same way.

+

Another problem which worries me is the US view toward integration. It is + important that each time we talk about LAFTA or the Andean Pact it is understood that we are not + talking against the United States.

+ +

The Secretary: You usually are.

+

The Minister: Not always. I read your Houston speech. I saw that you + referred to the identification of Latin America with Latin America and + against the United States. Although I recognize that this Latin American + identity is primary, the United States has, at times, helped us to + exercise it. There are two reasons (for this identification + characterization). First, as the Secretary knows, it existed in Latin + America prior to Independence, a generalized identification due to being + part of the Spanish Empire. In the last few years, it has expressed + itself in economic independence, an expression which I use in prudent + terms, because it is clear what it means. In spite of the distinct + regimes in Latin America—military dictatorships as well as democracies, + we concur to a great extent that this is what really identifies us, + notwithstanding what the Secretary said in his Houston speech. I think + that it is very important to be aware of our goal of seeking economic + independence. I believe that we are providing consistency and firmness + to this Latin American position.

+

I would like to make a very specific reference, in concrete terms, to the + Venezuelan case; that is, the reaction to the nationalization of + petroleum. We believe that the nationalization which we are now + undergoing of the iron ore and petroleum properties is a model of + democratic nationalism. I state this with little modesty. It is without + revolution, without chopping heads and within juridical norms.

+

The Secretary: We have recognized this. I substantially agree with your + position. We have had no problem with you on this. On Latin American + integration, we think that it is principally a Latin American problem. + We didn’t like the holding of a Latin American caucus prior to the + OAS meeting as it turns the General + Assembly into a confrontation. We don’t object to other efforts to + integrate Latin America. We don’t object to the meeting (of Latin + American chiefs of state) you described. We may object to a speech, even + a Venezuelan one, but not to the concept. It is more popular in Latin + America to be critical of the United States than to be in support. This + is a fact of life.

+

Amb. Burelli: More or less.

+

The Secretary: I’ve been struck by the warm, personal friendships + (between government leaders) upon which to build better relations. We + are not in principle against Latin American integration. It should lead + to some form of cooperation between the United States and Latin America. + However, we understand that there has to be a process of construction + first.

+

The Minister: Now, the moment is excellent. We have to seek a new form of + cooperation. Your assistance in our fertilizer, food, agricultural + production would be useful. This might be the best opportunity we have. + I would like to suggest a certain reevaluation of certain principles on which our relationship + is founded. For example, when we discuss multinational corporations, + when we regulate their conduct, we should reevaluate the concept of + ethics. We have common, historical principles and a common independence + movement. In this case, the Bicentennial of the United States offers a + good opportunity, one in which to think of means of cooperation between + the United States and Latin America. Your own (personal) political + health can help in this effort. We know that you can contribute ideas + and imagination.

+

The Secretary: If you want to say good things about me to the Congress, I + take back what I said earlier.

+

The Minister: In the case of Venezuela, we are a mature country. We have + learned through experiences similar to those of the United States and + England. We consider that we have passed through the milk-fed + stage—(after translation) I was curious how lactante would be translated. Democracy is a very brief + phenomenon but a very important one which gives us a good pedagogical + experience. It is useful in our relations with the United States, Latin + America and the Third World. In spite of everything stated against + democracy, the fountainhead of democracy is still respected throughout + the world. Here, Venezuela can act as a bridge.

+

The Secretary: I agree very much. It is a reason why our relations with + Latin America and with Venezuela in particular are so crucial to us now. + But, if I may be frank, ideally we should be able, if not to agree, at + least to cooperate in some of the international forums being created. + For example, we are, in principle, very eager to have prior consultation + before something like the (Paris) producers-consumers conference. On the + other hand, at the conference itself, Venezuela very often joins with + the most radical group. At Paris, Venezuela was closer to Algeria than + to us. If relations between the developed and developing world are to + become those of bloc confrontations, then, sooner or later, the rule of + power will prevail. This would be a disaster for the developing + countries. It is not logical to presume that the developed nations will + remain paralyzed forever. I don’t want to get into the issues of the + Paris conference. They are capable of solution. We do not oppose + discussing raw materials although we cannot discuss all issues at the + same time. We think at some point that the conference will begin again. + But we also think that we should have bilateral contacts as we do with + Iran. It is natural for the United States and Venezuela to be in some + regular contact. Of course, we don’t expect you to be our spokesman. We + will still have disagreements. It is not even desirable, for either of + us, to agree, for then some great speeches would never be made. One idea + which has occurred to me is that we should discuss scientific, + technological, and, occasionally, political themes. This could be + through a bilateral joint commission as in the Middle East. It could + allow a more natural and + informal contact. We cannot do this with every country, but we thought + that it could be done with Venezuela, which is in a crucial position + between the developed and the Third World.

+

The Minister: We are fully in agreement.

+

Amb. Burelli: But we already have one.

+

The Secretary: But we can enlarge upon it. (Note: After the meeting, Mr. + Rogers explained to the + Secretary that bilateral talks had begun between the Department and the + Venezuelan Embassy, but that nothing akin to a joint commission had been + formed.)

+

The Minister: We have a group in the Foreign Ministry of qualified + personnel including representatives of the opposition, at least of the + principal opposition party.

+

The Secretary: Take the Paris preparatory conference. Preliminary talks + could have resulted in our taking several of your ideas seriously and, + perhaps, your taking a few of ours seriously. That conference was + premature. We are prepared to talk about commodities, but you + undoubtedly will agree that we cannot discuss all commodities. It was + like the (UN) Special Assembly, it + accomplished nothing.

+

The Minister: Undoubtedly.

+

The Secretary: A schedule could be set up on each commodity.

+

The Minister: I think that we are embarked on a path toward solution. The + problem of the conference was that it tended to be too ecumenical. Like + the Ecumenical Council of the church, it needs time.

+

The Secretary: Some developing countries call for cooperation but at a + conference seek confrontation. There only can be one or the other. Some + developing countries think that they can get individual advantage by + maneuvering, but this will not work either. Anyone can engage in + rhetoric, but, sooner or later, he must face concrete reality.

+

The Minister: I would like to add, with regard to our relations with + Algeria, that they must be seen in the Third World context. They do not + prevent Venezuela from making its own points or from holding discussions + with the United States.

+

The Secretary: I think that this is important. The degree to which the + pressure of the non-aligned is becoming a solution in and of itself. The + moment could come when the most cohesive alliance is that of the + non-allied which could produce a counter-organization.

+

Let me make an aside. I personally like the Algerian leaders, especially + (President) Boumediene. My experience there has been that he has his + problems in resolving what he says publicly with what he is prepared to + do realistically. I blame myself for not speaking with him before the + Paris conference. The Europeans confuse him. They do him no favor by not + telling him the truth. I already think that Boumediene is a good man, + but the position which he takes depends upon the advice he receives. We must prevent + the elevation of rhetoric. I think that we have to set up a more formal + structure which can be helpful. There is no reason for confrontation. We + have no reason to split Venezuela off from her friends. You are mature + enough to know what are your own interests. So, if we can proceed on + this basis, it would be useful.

+

We’ll send Rogers to some + meeting. He never says much.

+

The Minister: We agree. I understand that there are some subjects which + we can discuss. I don’t want to take up too much of your time, but with + regard to the OAS, there is the matter + of Cuba. What produces unnecessary concern are the leftist groups in + Latin America taking it as a cardinal problem, a crucial issue. I + understand that prevailing criteria, that of you yourself, is to seek + that the matter is not resolved now. I would express our concern that + the matter be settled as soon as possible. Venezuela is not engaging in + any escalation of rhetoric.

+

The Secretary: It has escalated to a pretty good level already. Rogers will apologize for me + later.

+

The Minister: I would like to state that the Inter-American system, the + OAS Charter, the Rio Treaty, as + they function now, are rather inefficient in solving this irritating + problem. I cannot analyze the internal domestic problem of the United + States, the internal factors which operate. However, finding the way to + resolve Cuba and other bilateral and multilateral issues would clear the + way for your own Latin American trip. This could be done before you go + to Latin America. This is of the greatest interest now, here at the + General Assembly. As it stands now, it will be an innocuous meeting.

+

The Secretary: The best way out of this dilemma is to put the issue to a + special meeting, in June if you want. At that conference, we would vote + to permit each nation to maintain the pursuit of its own policy. This + can be taken up before I go to Latin America, but we don’t think + Washington is the best place to make this decision.

+

The Minister: I think that you underestimate Washington.

+

The Secretary: But this could be done in the next six weeks. We would be + in a position to agree to arranging such a meeting. We would support + both procedural solutions and the result at the conference.

+

The Minister: I think that this position is very positive, even though I + am not aware of what internal factors are involved. Our concern is with + an OAS decision. Its prestige has + deteriorated and could be weakened still more. Its weakening is not + good, neither for the United States nor Latin America.

+

The Secretary: The OAS can grant powers + to a special organ of consultation and we would all have the matter + going in the right direction. The meeting could be in June.

+ +

The Minister: This could renew the new dialogue. There are disadvantages. + There are great expectations at this (OAS) meeting that we are going to find a magical formula + for the Charter and the Rio Treaty. I personally believe that we should + be conservative in modifying the norms of the OAS. We can object extensively to the watch mechanism of + the OAS, yet not produce anything + better. Since there is no great thing which will result from the + Assembly, the resolution of the Cuba issue would give a great + psychological expression to it. I emphasize the psychological because + Dr. Kissinger gives great + significance to psychological factors. We must also grant new value to + this aspect. We must not give the impression of rigidity to gain time. I + will have to consult with the President of Venezuela.

+

The Secretary: Do so. We are prepared for a solution in June.

+

Mr. Rogers: We can comment on this now.

+

The Secretary: We can issue a statement at this (General Assembly) + meeting.

+

The Minister: This could be done in a fashion so that we do not create + the image of dilatoriness.

+

The Secretary: We could discuss all reforms of the Charter and Rio Treaty + and ratify them too.

+

The Minister: Possibly.

+

The Secretary: Why don’t you consult with your President?

+

The Minister: I agree.

+

The Secretary: What else? The secretary generalship of the OAS. If there is an impasse, I shall be + the candidate. The State Department would unanimously support me. I’ve + now reached the point where I only occasionally swear in an ambassador + who doesn’t want my job. I swore in one ambassador who wanted it. He + held a press conference before the swearing in saying that he wanted the + job and then again afterwards at another. But, do you have any ideas? We + are interested in your position.

+

The Minister: We haven’t decided. We are consulting. Monday perhaps, + maybe tomorrow we will have a position.

+

The Secretary: We are not supporting any candidate.

+

The Minister: We can discuss this point.

+

The Secretary: On the boat?

+

The Minister: Monday I’ll be seeing you.

+

(Rising) I think that we are on a positive road.

+

The Secretary: I’ve been very pleased with the meetings which we’ve had. + I think that we are developing a good relationship. We think that a + strong Venezuela pursuing its own policy is in our interests. We want to + maintain rational positions. (Escorting the Foreign Minister to the + elevator and then to the Diplomatic entrance)

+ +

The Minister: I had a good talk with Ambassador Shlaudeman before coming to the United + States.

+

The Secretary: I’m pleased. He’s a good man.

+

The Minister: Until later, Mr. Secretary.

+

The Secretary: Good-bye.

+
+ +
+ 391. Telegram 118884 From the Department of State to the Embassy in + Venezuela +

Summary: The + Department informed Shlaudeman of specific ways the U.S. Government + intended to improve its relations with Venezuela.

+

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + D750178–0941. Confidential; Priority; Exdis. Drafted by + Sonandres, Luers, and + Devine; cleared by + Einaui, Low, Hitchcock, Nieburg, Katz, Wood, and Einhorn; approved by Duemling. The April 4 + memorandum of conversation between Luers, Einaudi, and Pérez in Caracas is ibid., P830117–1845. On + April 21, Kissinger sent + a letter to Escovar proposing the establishment of a mechanism + for strengthening bilateral ties. (Telegram 91364 to Caracas; + ibid., P850056–1619) On May 20, Escovar informed Shlaudeman that he thought + agricultural development, nutrition, and fertilizer development + were some of the areas the mechanism could address. (Telegram + 5334 from Caracas, May 22; ibid., + D750181–0133)

+ + + + + Washington, May 21, 1975, 2119Z. + +

118884. Subject: Strengthened Bilateral Relations With Venezuela. Ref: + State 091364.

+

For Ambassador Shlaudeman +

+

1. As you are aware, Secretary’s letter to Escovar (reftel) suggested + strengthened and more effective bilateral relations. Proposal was + outgrowth of prior Luers-Einaudi + visit to Caracas and conversation with Foreign Vice Minister John Rafael + who was left expecting that we would be back to him with specific + proposals as to what forms we see an expanded and improved collaboration + taking.

+

2. Our intention in this initiative is to probe, using the building block + approach, for climate and common ground to dialogue and work out areas + of cooperation. We will go half-way, even somewhat beyond, to express + our interest and identification with Venezuelan aspirations. What + technology or other assistance we may offer will be on basis of working + at Venezuela’s side, not directing. Dialogue is a two-way street, of + course, which GOV, if it buys concept + of proposal will have opportunity to demonstrate.

+ +

3. Our general thinking in approaching this new relationship includes + following:

+

—In following up the Secretary’s letter and as the result of the fruitful + discussions that Luers and + Einaudi held during their visit to Caracas, we have concluded that there + are a wide variety of areas in which the US and Venezuelan Governments + can improve their collaboration.

+

—This collaboration could take the form of increased communications at + senior levels of Government, increased consultations between our + respective delegations prior to and at international meetings, bilateral + cooperation between our two governments on specific projects or + programs, and continuing bilateral talks between the Venezuelan Embassy + and the USG and between the GOV and American Embassy in Caracas.

+

—The areas mentioned during the Luers-Einaudi visit as potential candidates for + increased cooperation through specific projects and programs included + agriculture, fertilizer production, transfer of technology, technical + assistance, cultural and educational programs, and assistance to third + countries. Our feeling here in Washington is that most or all of these + areas could become the basis for fruitful activities, but that much + previous work remains to be done to establish priorities, modalities, + and availability of resources.

+

—Our procedural concept has been that Embassy Caracas and appropriate + Venezuelan Government Ministries would initiate discussions, possibly + supplemented by USG-Venezuelan Embassy + talks, which could be followed by a second stage of exchange of + higher-level official visits. The US proposes that these initial + discussions aim at establishing an ad hoc working group between our two + governments the leadership of which would be at the sub-cabinet level. + The group would be given a clearly delimited period, perhaps six months, + to prepare recommendations to both governments on steps that can be + taken in specific areas to bring about closer collaboration and + consultation.

+

—We do not wish to bring about exaggerated expectations on either side of + what can be achieved by the working group and would not therefore press + for any publicity.

+

—We do, however, consider that the working group could be an important + means of improving communications between the US and Venezuela and of + defining areas of potential cooperation.

+

4. FYI. The Department would expect that our side of any eventual working + group would be headed at the Assistant or Deputy Assistant Secretary + level with representatives from Agriculture, Treasury, USIA, AID, and possibly interior or other agencies. We also would + not necessarily expect that + exchanges between the various counterpart elements of the working group + would take place at one time.

+

5. More FYI: If high level economic consultation mission of some or all + of department officials Robinson, Enders, + and Fishlow, now under + consideration, takes place with Brazil, we [are] prepared to have one or + more members visit Caracas on way to or from Brazil. In addition, IO would hope to repeat successful + pre-UNGA consultations with GOV of last summer again this year. End + FYI.

+

6. As reporting cables indicate, both the Secretary and the Deputy + Secretary spoke to Escovar about this concept of a strengthened + bilateral relationship. Fon Min reacted positively, said he would be + seeing you soon after his May 20 return to Caracas—perhaps at + luncheon—and would discuss with you formation of GOV-Embassy group to plan future + relationship. This cable is intended provide you with useful background + and guidance for that discussion.

+ + + Ingersoll + + +
+ +
+ 392. Telegram 6441 From the Embassy in Venezuela to the Department of + State +

Summary: + President Pérez and + Ambassador Shlaudeman + discussed the impending nationalization of the private-sector + petroleum companies operating in Venezuela.

+

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + D750218–0547. Confidential; Priority; Exdis. Article 5 of the + prospective law to nationalize the petroleum industry in + Venezuela would allow for mixed government-private enterprises + (which could include foreign-based companies) after the + nationalization had taken place. (Telegram 6030 from Caracas, + June 11; ibid., D750204–0334) On August 29, 1975, Pérez signed a law + nationalizing the assets of private-sector oil companies + operating in Venezuela, and the next day he signed a law + establishing a state-run company that would take full + responsibility for the nation’s oil industry on January 1, 1976. + (Telegram 9282 from Caracas, September 5, 1975; ibid., + D750308–0367)

+ + + + + Caracas, June 23, 1975, 2045Z. + +

6441. Subject: Meeting with the President—Petroleum Nationalization.

+

1. Summary: President Perez + expressed the hope that the USG would, + as nationalization of the petroleum industry goes forward, distinguish + between its own interests and those of the companies, while separating + the problem of the organization of the petroleum industry here from our + differences over oil pricing and OPEC. + He said that the companies are obstructing the process of + nationalization by pressure tactics and unreasonable negotiating positions. His particular fear is + that they will end up taking their claims to the Venezuelan courts, a + move he believes would be seriously disruptive. The President has + concluded that he must now take a hand himself in the negotiations and + plans to talk personally to the companies.

+

2. I told the President it is our position not to inject the USG into these negotiations and that we + are not acting as anyone’s silent partner. I did remind him of our + concern with respect to compensation and said quite frankly that I could + foresee differences arising between us on that front. The President + reacted favorably to my suggestion that he include the smaller + concessionaires in his talks with the companies.

+

3. Throughout the conversation Perez reflected the prevailing nervousness + here over nationalization and its consequences. He has so far mishandled + the project politically, allowing the opposition parties to seize the + initiative and create a national debate over future foreign + participation in the oil industry. But much more serious for the + President and his government is the prospect of trying to operate a + nationalized industry under poor competitive conditions and without the + cooperation of the big companies. A less fearful and more businesslike + atmosphere would be to our advantage as nationalization goes forward + since excessive emotion is likely to produce defiant gestures harmful to + our interests and those of the companies. End summary.

+

4. I spent about 90 minutes alone with President Carlos Andres Perez over breakfast at + his residence (La Casona) on June 21. We touched on a number of matters, + but petroleum nationalization was very much on the President’s mind and + he kept coming back to that topic.

+

5. Perez said he hoped the USG would + distinguish between the US national interest and the companies’ + interests, and not simply automatically support the latter as a powerful + if silent partner. Clearly, in his view, the two governments must + address the larger issue of maintaining the relationship between a + dependable supplier (Venezuela) and its principal market (the U.S.). We + should find some way to treat this issue on a higher plane, free of + interference from the narrower concerns of the multinationals. Above + all, the President said, “We should keep distinct and separate the + problem of the organization of the petroleum industry in Venezuela” on + the one hand and our differing views with respect to oil pricing and + OPEC on the other.

+

6. Referring to the successful nationalization of the iron-mining + industry, Perez argued that a similarly smooth and equitable transition + to state ownership of the petroleum industry would be very much to the + long-term advantage of the US, establishing a useful precedent and + demonstrating that “violent” expropriations are not necessary. However, + he asserted, the companies are “obstructing” the process. Creole in particular has taken a hard + line. Its proposal contemplates guaranteed liftings of only 600,000 + B/D as opposed to the company’s + “normal” volume of 1.4 million B/D. + Perez thought that offer was clearly a form of pressure designed to + frighten the GOV.

+

7. In addition, the President asserted, the companies have intimated that + they might claim compensation for reserves in the ground—a totally + “unacceptable” concept as far as the GOV is concerned. Finally, the companies seem to have in + mind “renting” to the GOV by means of + contracts, the foreign technicians now working for them. The Venezuelan + side can see no reason why these technicians should not simply continue + as they are under the same conditions of employment, and without any + middleman role for the companies.

+

8. Perez said he knows full well that Creole’s tough approach reflects an + initial negotiating position which, as customary in such bargaining, may + be modified in time. But his fear is that the gap between the two sides + will prove too wide, the negotiations will founder and the companies + will take their cases to the Venezuelan courts. If that were to happen, + in his opinion, the nationalization process would be seriously disrupted + to the disadvantage of both Venezuela and the US. The President + concluded that it is now time for him to take a personal hand in the + negotiations. He said he plans to call the companies in at an early + date.

+

9. As for the reversion legislation now in the Congress, Perez complained + bitterly that Copei is playing the + game of the extreme left. It is ridiculous, he said, to argue that + Venezuela can run its oil industry without outside help. In his view, + mixed companies will particularly be needed for the exploitation of the + Orinoco Tar Belt, which, unlike some of his countrymen, he does not + regard as a “sealed box” to be left unopened indefinitely. The President + thought it would be impossible for Venezuela to develop this resource on + its own “now, in 10 years, or even in 20.” (He obviously does not share + the optimistic view of indigenous technological progress offered by + Gumersindo Rodriguez—State 144760.) Mixed companies would force the + purveyors of Foreign Technology to share the risks involved, thus + insuring their interest in efficient operations. This principle had been + applied against the company’s wishes in the case of the takeover of U.S. + steel’s briquetting plant.

+

10. In response to all of this, I first noted our position against + becoming involved in negotiations of the kind the GOV is conducting with the oil companies, + a position that reflects our basic system in the United States. I could + assure him that we are not involved, as manifested by the fact that I + had had no previous knowledge of Creole’s 600,000 B/D offer. This did not mean, of course, + that I was not prepared to discuss the issues with him as he might + desire.

+ +

11. I pointed out that the basic USG + concern is with compensation and told the President quite frankly that I + could foresee problems arising between us in that respect. For example, + the situation of the smaller concessionaires is potentially troublesome, + in part because they have been ignored so far by the GOV and see little future for themselves + here. On that point the President said it is his current intention to + leave all the operating companies just as they are for the time being; + i.e., presumably all the concessionaires could continue to participate + in Venezuela’s industry in conformity with whatever general formula is + developed and under the umbrella of the “holding company” to be headed + by General Alfonso Rivard. (This would be contrary to numerous previous + indications that the GOV plans to + “consolidate” the smaller operations.) The President also said he would + include the smaller concessionaires in his own forthcoming talks with + the companies (para 5).

+

12. As for the local controversy over the reversion legislation and + Article 5, I said I simply do not understand it since the difference + between mixed companies and “association contracts” would not seem to + amount to much in practical terms.

+

13. On leaving, I again assured the President that I would be available + at any time to discuss any of these issues in the spirit of + accommodation we both want to strengthen.

+

14. Comment: The President, along with just about everybody else I have + seen here, is exceedingly nervous about nationalization. Politically he + has mishandled the entire project by appealing to Copei and its leftest partners for a + “consensus” before the fact. That mis-step created an essentially + sterile national debate over “mixed companies” and painted the GOV into a corner where every move toward + reasonable arrangements with the concessionaires will bring cries of + “sell-out.” (Perez told me he is now trying to turn this corner by + inspiring realistic statements on the problem of operating a + nationalized petroleum industry from businessmen, academics and + professionals—elements hitherto largely silent.)

+

15. But what most worries the President, and serious Venezuelans of all + kinds, is the prospect of trying to operate this complex industry in an + unfavorable international competitive climate and without the support of + the big companies. Here the President is caught between the political + requirements imposed by the forces of nationalism and the underlying + national interest in an efficient and profitable oil industry. We will + want to keep this prickly situation in mind over the months ahead. It + seems particularly important to me that we resist any temptation to + exacerbate the prevailing nervousness. Nationalization is going to come + in any case. If it comes in an atmosphere of fear and emotional defiance + we are likely to find the consequences unpleasant.

+ + + Shlaudeman + + +
+ +
+ 393. Telegram 214126 From the Department of State to the Embassy in + Venezuela +

Summary: + Ford informed + Pérez that he + thought an OPEC oil price + increase could damage the world economy, and he urged the + Venezuelan President to attempt to convince the OPEC nations not to increase oil + prices.

+

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + D750312–0063. Confidential; Immediate; Exdis. Drafted by + Creekmore; cleared + by Enders, Luers, and Sorenson; approved by + Kissinger. Kissinger’s May 1 Kansas City + speech is in the Department of State Bulletin, June 2, 1975, pp. 713–719. Kissinger’s May 26–28 speeches + in Paris are in the Department of State Bulletin, June 23, 1975, pp. 837–844 and 849–855. On + September 26, Springsteen, in a memorandum to Scowcroft, summarized Pérez’s September 23 response + to Ford, in which he + stated an increase in oil prices would not have a significant + effect on the world economy. (Ford Library, National Security Adviser, + Presidential Correspondence with Foreign Leaders, 1974–1977, Box + 5, Venezuela, President Carlos + Andrés Pérez)

+ + + + + Washington, September 9, 1975, 2109Z. + +

214126. Subject: OPEC Oil Price + Decision.

+

1. You are requested to deliver the following letter from President + Ford to President Perez as soon as possible. Quote: Dear + Mr. President: I wish to present for your consideration my concerns on + an issue of great importance to relations between developed and + developing countries, and to the well-being of not only our two + countries but all the nations of the world.

+

Since the consumer/producer preparatory meeting in Paris last April, the + United States has made a major effort to re-establish a basis for + dialogue and cooperation between the nations of the developing world, + including those which export oil, and the industrialized nations. We + have undertaken a fundamental review of our overall policy toward the + developing countries. This review has resulted in a new approach to the + producer/consumer dialogue that responds more fully to these nations’ + concerns, particularly those raised by your government’s representatives + and other delegations during the Paris meeting. Since Secretary + Kissinger articulated the + general outlines of this new approach in speeches in Kansas City and + Paris in May, we have made much progress in establishing the + constructive understandings necessary to promote further mutually + beneficial cooperation among the nations of the world. Furthermore, as + you know, we have made a number of important specific proposals for + cooperation at the current special session of the United Nations General + Assembly.

+

The economic dialogue will be a centerpiece in the new evolving + relationship between the industrial and developing nations. We are + pleased that our efforts, and those of your government and others, have + succeeded in establishing a consensus for its resumption. Over the past months, we have + clearly demonstrated our commitment to a constructive dialogue and our + belief that its success requires each participant to recognize and take + full account of the vital interests of the others.

+

As you can appreciate, the progress which we have made in developing the + new U.S. position has required considerable consultation with interested + groups in our society in order to create a greater public awareness of + the concerns of the oil producers and other developing countries and the + need for cooperative solutions to our common economic problems. I am + concerned, however, that this greater public understanding will be + jeopardized should the member countries of OPEC increase the price of oil this fall. I do not mean to + indicate that such action by OPEC + would cause us to question our fundamental commitment to the dialogue. + However, it would inevitably tend to affect support in this country for + new solutions to international economic problems.

+

Another oil price increase by OPEC + would also have a significant negative impact on the economics of all + the oil importing nations—both developed and developing—at the very time + that signs of progress in the fight against recession and inflation are + appearing. Such a price increase would impose shocks on the U.S. + economy, on the more vulnerable economies of Europe and Japan, and on + the highly fragile economies of the developing world. It would at the + very least reduce the progress toward economic recovery, and could in + fact plunge a number of countries into extremely serious + difficulties.

+ +

It is because I am aware, Mr. President, of your sensitivity to the + interdependence of the world economy, of the high priority which you and + your government give to promoting the welfare of all the developing + countries, and of your commitment to a successful economic dialogue + between developed and developing countries that I am asking you to weigh + heavily the adverse effects—both psychological and real—which a price + increase could have. It is my hope that you will use your considerable + influence among the producer countries to assure that these concerns be + properly emphasized and that the possible consequences be understood—not + least of which is hindrance of movement toward the broader objectives + which all of us seek to achieve.

+

For my part, you can be assured of a continuing determined effort to + bring our two countries closer together, both in our bilateral relations + and in cooperative efforts to solve broader world problems of mutual + concern. Sincerely, Gerald R. + Ford. His Excellency Carlos + Andres Perez, President of Venezuela, Caracas. End + quote.

+

2. Report when delivery effected.

+ + + Kissinger + + +
+ +
+ 394. Telegram 241105 From the Department of State to the Embassy in + Venezuela +

Summary: The + Department instructed the Embassy to present the U.S. position + on compensation for the expropriated assets of private oil + producers.

+

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + D750351–0761. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Drafted by Schwebel, Fishlow, Farer, and Hart; cleared by Ingersoll, Rogers, Enders, and Leigh; approved by Kissinger. Repeated to Jidda, + Kuwait, and London. Ingersoll and Shlaudeman met on October 6; no record of the + meeting has been found. (Memorandum from Rogers to Ingersoll, undated; ibid., + ARA/NC Records, Lot 76D465, Petroleum Nationalization, + Venezuela, 1975) In telegram 9518 from Caracas, September 11, + the Embassy reported that in calculating the compensation due to + expropriated oil companies the Venezuelan Government intended to + deduct depreciation and amortization, workers’ benefits, debts + to the Venezuelan Government, the value of oil extracted beyond + each company’s assigned reservoirs, and the value of properties + which the Ministry of Mines determined were subject to the 1971 + Reversion Law. (Ibid., Central Foreign Policy File, + D750315–0613) In telegram 10672 from Caracas, October 13, the + Embassy reported that the Venezuelan Government made a formal + offer of compensation. If the companies did not accept within 15 + days, the Venezuelan Government would ask the Supreme Court to + determine the amount of indemnification. (Ibid., + D750355–0389)

+ + + + + Washington, October 9, 1975, 2028Z. + +

241105. Subject: Démarche to Venezuelan President on Oil + Nationalizations.

+

To the Ambassador from the Secretary

+

1. I have reviewed and approved the instructions developed at your + meeting with the Deputy Secretary and the bureaus concerned and + accordingly request you to make the following points ASAP to the President of Venezuela.

+

2. The USG has followed the process of + nationalization of oil in Venezuela with great interest and + understanding. We remain hopeful of a mutually satisfactory settlement + with all of the companies. We appreciate that a continuing, + post-nationalization role for the companies is projected, and that + Venezuelan oil will continue to flow to the U.S. Because of our joint + interests, this is a prospect we welcome and wish to encourage.

+

3. It does not, of course, follow that our two governments have a common + view about appropriate standards of compensation. We do not agree with + the standard of compensation set out in the Venezuelan law. At the same + time, we recognize and respect the fact that Venezuela differs.

+

4. We particularly wish to emphasize at this point the importance of + negotiating ongoing contractual relations with all companies regardless + of size. The President will appreciate the problems that would be posed + for the USG should it turn out that the + largest producers are given attractive contracts while smaller producers + receive very much less or no + contracts at all. We seek equity for all producers. The contracts should + be of substantial duration or renewable at the instance of the + companies.

+

5. In our view, deductions from the payments to be made pursuant to the + Venezuelan law should be made in an equitable and fair fashion. In + particular, in our view:

+

(A) For some of the companies, outstanding claims for drainage are quite + substantial in amount. In light of the facts that drainage was + unavoidable, did not give rise to liability at the time it occurred, + that at least in certain cases drainage claims had been settled by + agreement with CVP for compensation to + be amortized over the remaining life of the relevant concession, and our + understanding that the GOV uniformly + endorsed contracts providing that, in the event of the premature + termination of the concessions, drainage claims would lapse, we believe + that deductions ought to be nominal.

+

(B) For all of the companies, there is concern that the bonds received as + payment will constitute yet further reduced compensation. In general, it + would seem to us unfair if the bonds were of such duration or the rate + of interest so low as to reduce compensation significantly.

+

(C) The requirement that a proportion of the bonds be placed in a + guaranty fund should not work so as to further diminish the real + compensation afforded the companies.

+

(D) The failure to provide the companies credit for the bonuses which + they paid the GOV for the rights to + explore and produce in cases where exploration resulted in commercial + finds could generate problems with the companies if significant in + amount.

+

6. For AmEmbassy London: We are also contemplating raising the question + of compensation for American holders of overriding royalties. We + separately shall ask you to explore with HMG whether it is prepared to + make such an approach on behalf of British nationals who are such + royalty holders, since we are inclined to raise this with the GOV if HMG would be willing to do so. + Details follow septel.

+ + + Kissinger + + +
+ +
+ 395. Telegram 248521/Tosec 160064 From the Department of State to + Secretary of State Kissinger + +

Summary: Shlaudeman + informed the Department that he had delivered a démarche to + Pérez on + compensation for expropriated U.S. oil companies.

+

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + D750363–0152. Confidential; Priority; Exdis. Drafted and + approved by Matteson. + Kissinger was in + China from October 19 to October 23. On October 28, all but two + of the U.S. petroleum companies subject to the oil + nationalization law accepted the Venezuelan Government’s + compensation offer. (Telegram 11240 from Caracas, October 29; + ibid., D750375–0513) The Venezuelan Government indemnified the + expropriated companies approximately $1.03 billion. (Telegram + 11992 from Caracas, November 19; ibid., D750403–0398) The + Venezuelan Congress gave final approval to the compensation + agreement on December 16. (Telegram 13199 from Caracas, December + 18; ibid., D750441–1151) Telegram 241105 is published as Document 394.

+ + + + + Washington, October 19, 1975, 1913Z. + +

248521. Tosec 160064. Subject: Petroleum Reversion—Démarche to the + President. Ref: State 241105.

+

1. Summary. President Carlos Andres + Perez responded in a forthcoming manner to the démarche I + carried out in accordance with the Secretary’s instructions. He said he + would look at the various problem areas of the various companies and + might want to meet again with me next week in the company of the + Minister of Mines and the President of Petroven. It is most important if + we are to maintain the President’s confidence that the oil companies not + get word of this démarche.

+

Action requested. If another meeting does occur I might be pressed on the + specific problems of specific companies. I am disinclined to go beyond + today’s generalized presentation but would appreciate the Department’s + guidance. End summary.

+

2. I breakfasted alone with President Carlos + Andres Perez this morning (October 19) and took the + occasion to carry out the Secretary’s instructions in the reftel.

+

3. In covering each of the points in order (Paras 2-5d of reftel) I + stressed our concern that all companies receive fair treatment and that + all wishing to do so have the opportunity to continue in Venezuela under + equitable conditions. I told him quite frankly that if one or more + companies perceive an element of discrimination in the process we could + have problems between us. Carlos Andres heard me out without + interruption, only offering a smile when I came to the fact that the two + governments are in disagreement with respect to what is an appropriate + standard of compensation.

+

4. The President in response conceded that perhaps not enough attention + had been given to the problems of the smaller producers. He said it was the intention of the + GOV to maintain relations with all + the companies that want to continue here. He noted that the element of + “profit” in the contracts under negotiation represent an inducement to + that end.

+

5. On drainage, the President acknowledged the extreme difficulty of + applying equitably this controversial provision of the law. The problem + has been political, with the opposition highlighting the USSE by + fabricating a law suit advancing huge claims for drainage (Caracas + 10317). The President said he had been forced into a difficult + “maneuver” to replace the judge in the case who was on the point of + issuing arrest orders against a number of company presidents. He had + also asked the French National oil companies to provide a technical + opinion on the drainage question, fully expecting that such an opinion + would be favorable to the companies. After the French declined there was + no choice but proceed under the law, seeking the least onerous formula. + In the President’s view, the deductions now indicated come to only a + small fraction of what might have been taken—amounting in total, he + said, to less than 200 million bolarivares.

+

6. With respect to the compensation bonds, the President expressed + satisfaction over what he took to be a resolution of the issue. He + thought the bonds as tax-free instruments would be highly negotiable and + attractive to investors. He thought it to Venezuela’s advantage in the + international money market to issue such good paper rather than the + heavily discountable bonds initially contemplated. (I did not tell him + so but the companies we have talked to seem at least moderately + satisfied by the concessions the GOV + has made in this area.)

+

7. The President said that the GOV is + examining ways to liquidate the guarantee fund at a more rapid rate than + initially intended. As for the amortization of concession bonuses, the + President acknowledge that some companies were being penalized rather + heavily for having received concessions at a date too late to permit + full amortization. But he saw no method of providing relief under the + law.

+

8. I responded to these comments by suggesting that the reactions of the + companies affected by one or more of these problems could be skewered if + they thought they were being trated unfairly overall. It seemed to me + that each case should be examined individually in that light. The + President asked me for specifics. What cases did I have in mind and what + were the problems involved? I said we were far from familiar with all + the details of all the comapny situations. However, we were aware of + particular difficulties in some instances. I mentioned Amoco, Sun and + Chevron, while noting that this was by no means a complete list. The + President said he would check with the minister of mines on the various + problem areas of the various companies and that he might want to ask me + to meet later in the week with the Minister, the President of Petroven + and himself to go over this ground again.

+ +

9. Comment. Carlos Andres reacted dispassionately and even with a touch + of conciliation to my presentation. My guess is that he was reflecting + what of late I have detected to be a strong personal sense of confidence + in the smooth passage of nationalization. I suspect that he has not been + kept fully informed on the problems of the smaller companies or that + they have not put forward their positions with sufficient candor and + detail. In that sense the démarche was probably particularly timely. My + hope is that it will suggest the possibility of adjustments in the more + difficult cases, particularly on the fee-per-barrel side.

+

10. It should be clear, however, that the cordial and forthcoming + attitude of today’s meeting could change very rapidly. The President + manifested his concern on several occasions over the occidental affair + which he sees as a threat to all the companies and to his ability to + deal with them on an even-handed basis. He is troubled by the + “irresponsibility” of the opposition as particularly demonstrated by + Copei’s exploitation of the + anti-US, anti-MN line. (He specifically criticized Caldera and his “unnecessary” attack on + the oil companies last August—Caracas 8105.)

+

11. Is is my most devout hope that word of this démarche will not repeat + not reach the oil companies. The President brought up with me again the + apprehension he feels whenever engaged in confidential discussion with + USG. He is nothing less than + appaled at what he believes is our inability to prevent leaks of private + exchange with other governments. If we keep his confidence we could have + some effect on the nationalization outcome; if we fail on that score we + surely will not.

+

12. Action requested. I was somewhat distressed to find myself pressed on + the names of companies with problems. I gave as little as I could in the + light of the President’s frank and forthcoming attitude. If another + meeting is convoked he and his colleagues may well ask for more + specifics. My inclination is to decline to go beyond the generalized + presentation of today but I would appreciate the Department’s guidance + on that point.

+ + + Shlaudeman + + +
+ +
+ 396. Memorandum of Conversation +

Summary: Kissinger and Pérez discussed regional issues, in particular + Cuba and Panama.

+

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + P820117–0876. Confidential; Nodis. Drafted by Rogers; approved + by Covey on March 8. The + meeting took place at Pérez’s residence, La Casona. On February 16, + Kissinger and + Pérez discussed + inter-American relations and Panama. (Ibid., P820117–0886) In a + second February 17 conversation, they discussed oil, and Middle + Eastern and Soviet politics. (Ibid., P820117–0990) Kissinger was in Caracas + during a February 16–24 Latin American tour that included stops + in Venezuela, Peru, Brazil, Colombia, Costa Rica, and Guatemala. + Kissinger’s February + 17 speech to the U.S.-Venezuelan Symposium II in Macuto, + Venezuela, is printed in the Department of State Bulletin, March 15, 1976, pp. + 313–321.

+ + + + + Caracas, February 17, 1976, 8:30 a.m. + + + SUBJECT + Breakfast Meeting between Secretary Kissinger and President Perez + + + + PARTICIPANTS + + + + US + + The Secretary + + William D. Rogers, + Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs + (Notetaker) + + + + + + Venezuela + + President Carlos Andres + Perez + + Foreign Minister Escovar Salom + + + +

The Secretary: You know Mr. President, Rogers’ party may in fact win.

+

Perez: Well I have to admit we have more faith in the Democrats.

+

The Secretary: But the fact of the matter is, Mr. President, they’re not + always competent in the field of foreign policy.

+

Perez: In Latin America, however, people have the feeling that the + Democratic Party cares more. There has traditionally been more to their + policy on Latin America. Roosevelt was a great leader. He seemed to have + respect.

+

The Secretary: Well, I have worked for several Democratic presidents. And + on the whole the foreign policy of Democratic presidents has often not + been competent. They have had no theory. Now in terms of internal social + policy, I am perhaps closer to the Democrats. And the same may be true + of the economic aspects of our foreign policy.

+

Perez: It is a disturbing thing to contemplate the exercise of world + leadership by people who do not understand the world.

+

The Secretary: There is a definite ambivalence in the American people at + the present time. They loved Moynihan because he seemed to talk firmly. + But the American people don’t like it if policy leads to crises. There is the most virulent + anti-communism among the same Congressmen who scream no intervention. + They try to suggest we use our economic aid to punish the Russians. But they are distinctly + ambivalent. Take JFK for instance. I thought he was intelligent but a + leader needs a sense of direction.

+

Perez: The problem in Latin America is what does the United States want + of Latin America, and what does Latin America want of the United + States.

+

The Secretary: Some Latin American leaders seem to feel it essential for + their political responsibilities to kick the U.S. from time to time. Mr. + Rogers will apologize to you + tomorrow for my saying so.

+

Perez: I want to tell you quite frankly that we are very much afraid + about the Caribbean. That is to say, Williams evidently feels the same way about us, that he + has to kick us from time to time.

+

The Secretary: The last time I saw Williams, he advanced a very interesting theory about + international law. He felt he ought to have 200 miles. And he was + prepared to start measuring the 200 miles from the farthest oil derrick + under his jurisdiction. I accused him of harboring the notion that he + would put an oil derrick in Florida waters.

+

Perez: There is also a contradictory sentiment in Latin America. Power, + you should understand, creates both an attraction and a fear. We are + afraid because there have been interventions. Anti-U.S. attitudes are + strong. And they are manipulated constantly by the ideologically + committed and the terrorists. The big question is how to meet this + threat. In one instance, the ex-Christian Democratic youth has protested + your visit. This is all a way of conducting politics. The Christian + Democratic Party will not say anything but they use youth to insinuate + that COPRI is opposed to your visit.

+

The Secretary: You know, this is too bad in connection with the visit + because the U.S. press will report that Latin America is against us.

+

Perez: You need to demonstrate the interest of the United States in + maintaining its important relationships with Latin America.

+

The Secretary: This is a difficult problem. I’ve said a hundred times + that we regard Latin America as of great importance to us and this is + all very well as a general proposition. But the real problem is how do + we do something concrete, because if we don’t figure out something on + which we can all go to work, the whole discussion degenerates into + rhetoric. The Alliance for Progress had its problems but it certainly + enthused people to do something. The problem is now how do we work + together.

+

Perez: We must systematize our relationships. In the first instance, we + have to improve our bilateral relationships. In the second, the US also + has to pay attention to the community of Latin America, and to the integration sentiment of the + region. Integration is a growing movement. Latin American attitudes + favor it.

+

The Secretary: I’m going to propose in my speech to the Symposium that we + work with SELA and particularly that + we try to work with them on transfer of technology.

+

Perez: This is good. But, at the same time since technology involves the + free enterprise system in the United States, it raises the problem of + the recent scandals of the TNEs.

+

The Secretary: I agree. It’s absurd. I condemn bribes. But for the most + part, these people have done nothing illegal in the United States. They + are being held to an abstract moral principle.

+

Perez: The Europeans are certainly a good deal less scrupulous along + these lines.

+

The Secretary: Look what happened to the royal family. Bernhard has been + severely hurt.

+

Perez: Then there’s the issue of agriculture. I am glad to see that the + provisional fund is developing. What we are interested in is the + carrying on of investigatory research in Latin America. You proposed + this in Houston. We want to follow through.

+

There is another problem and that is trade. Your law really hasn’t + affected Venezuela in its pocket, but it has done grave moral damage. I + speak also of the Hickenlooper Amendment. I realize it is the + parliamentary system that is at fault. Your Congressmen don’t understand + us and Congress does great damage to our relationship.

+

The Secretary: Congress is out of control. We have to have strong + leadership. Any pressure group can alter Congress’ direction.

+

Perez: The United States did very badly with respect to the Cuban move in + Angola. Castro is clearly an + adventurer. But the matter was poorly handled by the United States + because it didn’t listen to our advice.

+

The Secretary: I agree with you. I have to emphasize that I take Latin + America seriously. But sometimes the style of politics here is + confrontational. It is hard to develop a relationship like ours and + Europe. In human terms, our relations with Latin America are in fact + warmer than with Europe, but our relations with Europe have a constancy + which doesn’t exist in Latin America.

+

The President: What we need is to have systematic exchanges. I agree this + is important. It is true that a President here, if he gets too close to + the United States, is subject to public accusation. But we must cut the + Gordian knot.

+

The Secretary: Take Echeverria. He gives a blood curdling public speech + about the US and then he’ll send a private letter to me saying that we + shouldn’t pay too much attention to what he said publicly.

+ +

Perez: We need more cooperation between the United States and Venezuela. + I’m looking forward to reading your speech. You are right that there is + more than the issue of consultation. We must have evidence that we are + really treating our problems. Another major issue is the mosaic of + politics in the region. Legitimacy is a major concern for a number of + countries. Which raises an important question of whom the United States + should deal with in such countries as Argentina and Chile. Real leaders + and truly representative persons are hard to find. We must solve this + problem of legitimacy.

+

The Secretary: We will help. Tell us occasionally what you need. With the + best of intent, we sometimes lack imagination.

+

Perez: First, as to Cuba. We meet in the wake of a major active + intervention. U.S. support is important. In the missile crisis we + supported the United States totally. This was not so in the Dominican + Republic case. On détente, in Latin America, we’re beginning to have a + problem with the relaxation of tensions with Castro. He is responding; his language is better. We are + concerned about the possibility of a surprise in the announcement of new + U.S. relationships with Cuba, as well as by a surprise news announcement + of an invasion. In either case, we would find ourselves in a difficult + position. We need more consultation. We urged you to move at Quito. What + would have happened, I ask you, if at Quito the United States had, in + fact, improved its relations with Cuba. Might this have changed things + and avoided Angola?

+

The Secretary: I don’t agree with that [at] all. Quito was a Latin + American failure, in the first instance. In the second, we have had + contact with Cuba. It knows we were prepared to normalize relations. We + were prepared to follow the same pattern of evolving relationships that + we used in China. Cuba went into Angola, after the Costa Rican meeting. + I don’t think Quito provoked them. We had private messages which we sent + through intermediaries which went much farther than our speeches.

+

I don’t care really much who runs Angola. But when a little country sends + 10,000 troops across the water, we are now forced to demonstrate that + they can’t do it again. We are not going to provoke them. But what we + are afraid of is that once they have done it in another part of the + world, they will do it in Latin America.

+

We realized that U.S. policy toward Cuba two years ago was not right. So + we moved systematically to change it. I even discussed the possibility + of meeting with Castro.

+

Perez: Something of the same thing happened to me. The Prime Minister of + Guyana sent word suggesting a meeting with Castro to talk about the Caribbean. I responded that I + would probably meet one day with Castro but Angola would not permit us to think seriously + about altering our + relationship now. Later I was sent a message that there was an attempt + against my Government by the United States. I gave this no credit. But + as to Burnham, Castro has + convinced him that Brazil might invade him with a helping hand from the + United States.

+

The Secretary: Mr. President, as to any report that we were going to make + an attempt against your government, it’s not true. That should be + obvious enough. It’s not been reported in the New York + Times, and these days if something isn’t in the New York Times, it’s not true. Seriously, + however, it is easy for other countries to create difficulties in the + Western Hemisphere. But as to your government, we have every reason to + help it. You are an authentic popular leader. So the idea that we would + move against you is a total lie. There are absolutely no CIA activities in your country of any sort + like this.

+

Perez: I didn’t take it seriously when it was first mentioned to me.

+

The Secretary: But the problem of Guyana is a serious one, particularly + in their apparent willingness to refuel Cuban aircraft.

+

Perez: I am concerned. It is a small country but it is a spiny problem. I + have told them that I can’t go through with any plan to supply them with + oil at lower costs now because of Cuba. But I can’t create too much of a + problem as far as Guyana is concerned because I want to avoid a reaction + against Venezuela from the other black Caribbean states.

+

The Secretary: I had great admiration for De Gaulle. He knew that a + country must move straight ahead. But the French are now prepared to + recognize the MPLA. In our view, we + feel there is no point in moving too quickly on the MPLA. We’re prepared to adjust over time, + but not immediately.

+

Perez: What about Cuba and Panama.

+

The Secretary: If Panama identifies itself with Cuba, we will have to + stop it, even if it leads to war.

+

Perez: I am grateful for your frank assessment. We tried to prevent the + rapproachement of Cuba and Panama because we said to Torrijos that this + would oblige the U.S. to respond with hostility. Of course we would have + to show solidarity with Panama throughout all this. But we tried to hold + them back.

+

The Secretary: I am quite persuaded we can settle the problem with Panama + and I think it’s also fair to say that Torrijos behaved rather well in + Cuba.

+

Perez: Torrijos has told me that there are two issues remaining. One, the + duration of the treaty and, two, the lands and waters issue. As to + duration, he takes the position that the treaty should not extend beyond + the end of the century. If we can make any contribution to the solution + of either of these problems, we would be glad to do so.

+ +

The Secretary: We can solve this bilaterally. On duration, we’re quite + close. But we can’t say what the final result is going to be. I do know, + however, that Panama is an explosive issue in the United States. Our + effort must be to facilitate the possibility of a treaty. We are moving + the negotiations along. I hope to have a treaty before the end of the + year.

+

Perez: How will you arrange this. I’m prepared to talk to Torrijos any + time I can be of help. In spite of all his defects, Torrijos is a man + who is trustworthy. He wants to resolve the problem of the Canal. And he + regards it as the problem of the Canal and not the problem of the U.S. + We all know that failure would damage the relations of the United States + with all of Latin America.

+

The Secretary: This time next year we’ll have a treaty to present to the + Congress.

+

Perez: I’m also concerned about Peron. She has recessed the Congress and I think this is + very dangerous. It’s very unstable in Argentina. She is discredited.

+

Escovar: She doesn’t understand politics. I met her once. She had a good + man in Robledo and he’s gone.

+

Perez: I think you’re wise not to go to Argentina. But your visit to Peru + on the other hand is very important. They have been tempted to + confrontation but Morales + Bermúdez is a moderate. These are, however, difficult + times for him. We are negotiating a possible oil loan to Peru. And the + Minister of Foreign Affairs has proposed the reduction of military + expenditures which is a healthy sign. There is also the problem of + Chile. The Bolivian outlet to the sea is the one really promising + solution. The Bolivians and the Chileans are ready to exchange + territories. The problem is Peru. Perhaps during your visit to Lima you + could ask if the United States could do anything, and say you would be + happy to help if you could.

+

The Secretary: I’ll do that and let you know what Morales Bermúdez says.

+

Perez: This is very important in Peru. We are thinking about $50 million + of economic aid in the form of central + bank note purchases. Peru has a very serious balance of payments + problem. Morales Bermúdez is + making some progress in Peru towards democracy. And they need the + relations with you. What is needed is a cooperative agreement on + military aid among all the countries. + The prices of conventional weapons are going sky high.

+

The Secretary: I’ll get involved. I look forward to seeing you shortly, + Mr. President.

+
+ +
+ 397. Telegram 2062 From the Embassy in Venezuela to Embassy in + Brazil +

Summary: + Schlaudeman informed Kissinger that the United States and Venezuela + had been unable to conclude a Foreign Military Sales agreement + because of disagreement over a provision in the financing + arrangements. The Ambassador added that Pérez wanted access to + equipment in order to keep the officer corps content, and he + suggested that a modest program of credits and training was in + the national interest of the United States.

+

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + P840125–2528. Confidential; Immediate; Exdis. Repeated to Rio de + Janeiro and the Department. Kissinger was in Brasilia on February 20 as part + of his Latin American tour. On January 26, the Embassy informed + the Department that if FMS to + Venezuela were cut, the U.S. Government should reassure the + Venezuelans that a lower level of military sales would not + indicate declining interest in the maintenance of close + relations with the Venezuelan armed forces. (Telegram 940 from + Caracas, January 26; ibid., D760029–0849) No record of the + reported February 17 Kissinger–Pérez discussion of the FMS issue has been found.

+ + + + + Caracas, February 20, 1976, 2048Z. + +

2062. Subject: Military Assistance to Venezuela.

+

1. Summary: The FMS problem referred to + by Carlos Andres Perez in + conversation with you comes down to the provisions of the Venezuelan + constitution prohibiting the GOV and + its entities from submitting to the jurisdiction of foreign courts. + Treasury insists that the proposed credit agreement assign jurisdiction + over any future litigation to District of Columbia courts. A related + problem is Dante Fascell’s + effort to eliminate grant MAP training + funds from this year’s foreign assistance act. I believe we serve our + national interest by continuing modest training and credit programs. But + I note that we are better off allowing FMS credit to vanish because of a legal dispute than we + would be in confronting a finding by the Congress or the administration + that Venezuela is too rich to qualify. End summary.

+

2. I understand that President Perez raised with you at breakfast on Tuesday his + disappointment over our inability to provide FMS credits to Venezuela this fiscal year. The background + to this issue follows.

+

3. We offered $17 million in FMS credits + last fiscal year in the form of a guaranteed loan from the Federal + Financing Bank (FFB), a dependency of + the Treasury Department. The loan agreement provided that any litigation + arising from the contract would take place exclusively in District of + Columbia courts. The GOV’s comptroller + general informed the Ministry of Defense that this provision could not + be accepted since the Venezuelan constitution limits the resolution of + disputes involving government entities to the national courts or + international tribunals.

+ +

4. The Ministry of Defense then suggested reverting to the practice + employed in previous direct FMS credit + agreements with DOD: i.e., simply + omitting any reference to possible future litigation. Treasury rejected + this proposal, asserting that no exceptions could be made to the + standard provisions of FFB’s loan + agreements. Nor would treasury entertain substituting recourse to an + international tribunal. Treasury maintained that the insistence on + District of Columbia venue was unrelated to its continuing opposition to + the extension of any FMS credits to + Venezuela—opposition based on the judgment that “no economic + justification” can be found for such credits and that their denial would + have no “lasting negative impact on efforts to improve bilateral + relations with the GOV.”

+

5. We were thus unable to conclude an FMS credit agreement in FY + ’75. The congressional presentation document submitted to the congress + last October 30 sets an FMS credit + level of $16 million for FY ’76. But as + matters stand the venue issue will once again block agreement. It is my + understanding that no FMS credit will + be requested for Venezuela in FY + ’77.

+

6. A related issue is the attempt in the congress initiated by Dante Fascell to eliminate $800 + thousand in MAP training from the + FY ’76 foreign assistance act. + Fascell’s point is that + Venezuela can afford to pay for its own military training, but the armed + forces here see the move as another hostile act comparable to the + adoption of the OPEC clause in the + Trade Reform Act. I am told that we hope to prevent a similar move in + the Senate and will work to have the conference committee drop the + Fascell provision from the + final version. An additional complication has surfaced in Congressman + Vanik’s contention that the Hickenlooper Amendment might have been so + triggered by Venezuela’s “expropriation” of the oil industry.

+

7. Comment: Carlos Andres Perez + worries intermittently about his military. Venezuela has, after all, + enjoyed less than 20 years of non-military rule in all its history. He + hopes we will give him a hand in keeping the generals and colonels more + or less content. FMS credits offer a + useful instrument to that end because, unlike private credit or cash + sales, they can be contracted without congressional approval and the + public debate with the marxists possibly entailed in that process. The + military are prepared to pay commercial interest rates and thus would + not likely be impressed by Treasury’s argument that FMS credits represent economic + assistance.

+

8. My own view is that we have a continuing national interest in + providing modest military credits and training. The armed forces are + going to be a critical element of this society for a long time to come. + Their relationship with the U.S. has been historically good and has, I + believe, served during the last 15 years or so to support the + establishment of a + stable, democratic system of government. I find it difficult to foresee + much of the traditional relationship surviving our withdrawal of credit + and training facilities.

+

9. I should note, however, that if we are to eliminate Venezuela from the + FMS list, it is far better to do so + on the basis of this narrow legal dispute than in response to a judgment + by the Congress or the administration that this country no longer + qualifies for military credits. In the first instance we fade away more + or less gracefully; in the second we face a repeat of the damaging + affair of the Trade Reform Act.

+ + + Shlaudeman + + +
+ +
+ 398. Memorandum of Conversation +

Summary: Scowcroft, Low, Senator Robert Taft, and Edwin Dodd of Owens-Illinois, + Inc., discussed the kidnapping an Owens-Illinois executive in + Venezuela and the Venezuelan Government’s threat to expropriate + the company’s holdings there after the company acceded to the + kidnappers’ demands.

+

Source: Ford Library, + National Security Adviser, Memoranda of Conversations, Box 19, + April 8, 1976, Scowcroft, + Senator Robert Taft, Edwin + Dodd (Owens-Illinois). Confidential. The meeting + took place in Scowcroft’s + office. In telegram 2340 from Caracas, February 28, the Embassy + reported on the February 27 kidnapping of Owens-Illinois + managing directory William + Niehous. (National Archives, RG 59, Central + Foreign Policy File, D760075–0832) Niehous’s kidnappers demanded an increase in the + wages of Owens-Illinois’ employees in Venezuela and the + publication of their manifesto. (Telegram 3919 from Caracas, + April 6; ibid., D760129–0599) On April 6, the Department + informed the Embassy that Owens-Illinois complied with both + demands, publishing the manifesto against the wishes of the + Venezuelan Government. (Telegram 81910 to Caracas, April 6; + ibid., [no film number]) In telegram 3976 from Caracas, April 7, + the Embassy reported that Owens-Illinois representatives had + been told by Venezuelan Government officials that the company’s + assets would be nationalized. (Ibid., + D760131–0469)

+ + + + + Washington, April 8, 1976, 2 p.m. + + + SUBJECT + + Niehous Kidnapping and + Owens-Illinois Expropriation + + + PARTICIPANTS + + Brent Scowcroft, Assistant + to the President for National Security Affairs + Senator Robert Taft + + Edwin Dodd, President, + Owens-Illinois + + John Marsh + + + Stephen Low, NSC Staff + + +

Mr. Dodd reviewed the history of + the Niehous case, from his + kidnapping on February 27 to the events of the last two days. He + described the situation as reported, adding two further points. The + company had information that the Government of Venezuela had been in + direct contact with the kidnappers without informing the company. It was + only when the GOV completely rejected + the kidnappers’ demands through this separate confidential channel that + it became evident to the company that it must take steps if Niehous’ life was to be saved.

+

Mr. Dodd also made clear that the + company had discussed the possibility of publication of the manifesto in + the foreign press with the GOV which + had responded, “We would frown on your publishing it elsewhere.” Mr. + Dodd said that the company + understood the GOV could not approve + publication. It had interpreted this relatively mild reply to mean that + it would receive a rap on the knuckles, but nothing more. Therefore, the + company did not expect as severe punishment as it received. He said he + understood that President Perez + could not publicly or totally back down from his initial statement and + asked for US Government help in getting the President to moderate his + position.

+

General Scowcroft explained the + difficulties of dealing with the problems of Niehous’ safety, discouraging further + kidnapping, and the expropriation issue. He noted that Ambassador + Shlaudeman had met with + President Perez on Wednesday + evening, expressing our displeasure with the use of expropriation as a + sanction against the company. He noted, however, President Perez felt very strongly the need to + react firmly against terrorism but said that Perez had told the + Ambassador that he had no desire to persecute Owens-Illinois. He told + Mr. Dodd that we understood the + company’s problem and would be as helpful as possible.

+

Senator Taft asked whether expropriation for this purpose would not + encourage further kidnapping and terrorism. The General fully agreed and + noted that our Ambassador had made this point to President Perez.

+

Mr. Low pointed out the danger of + any publicity being given to US representation to President Perez which would make it more + difficult for him to back away from his initial position.

+
+ +
+ 399. Action Memorandum From the Acting Assistant Secretary of State + for Inter-American Affairs (Ryan) to Secretary of State Kissinger + +

Summary: Ryan laid + out three options for Kissinger on providing direct FMS credits to Venezuela.

+

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + P840125–2520. Confidential. Sent through Maw. Drafted by Sonandres and + Williams on June 3. + Stern, Ganz, + Lewis, Eisenhower, Crosswhite, and Lyle concurred. Kissinger approved Option 1. + He wrote in the margin, “Send a letter to Pérez explaining decision.” + Attached but not published are Tab 1, an undated suggested + letter from Kissinger to + the Foreign Minister; Tab 2, an undated suggested letter from + Kissinger to + Simon; and Tab 3, + telegram 2062 from Caracas, February 20, published as Document 397. Kissinger’s letter to + Pérez is in telegram + 141194/Tosec 160171 from the Department to the Secretary’s + Delegation in Mexico, June 10. (Ibid., + D760222–0847)

+ + + + + Washington, May 27, + 1976. + +

Foreign Military Sales Credits (FMS) for Venezuela

+

+ The Problem +

+

You told Venezuelan President Carlos Andres + Perez last February in Caracas that you would look into + the legal impasse which has prevented the Venezuelan Government from + utilizing its $17 million FY 1975 and + $16 million FY 1976 credit + allocations.

+

+ Background/Analysis +

+

The impasse stems from the court venue clause of the standard text of the + FMS loan agreement which allows + Treasury’s Federal Finance Bank, the entity charged with administering + FMS, to select either a Venezuelan + or a District of Columbia court to adjudicate litigation arising from + the agreement. The Venezuelan Government interprets its Constitution as + prohibiting it from accepting the clause whereas the FFB insists upon its inclusion. Ambassador + Shlaudeman set forth this + problem in a February 20 message to you (Tab 3).

+

There was no impasse prior to 1975 when the Defense Department, then + charged with FMS administration, + omitted the disputed clause on the premise that Venezuela’s excellent + credit rating made potential default or litigation remote. In 1975, the + Federal Finance Bank, which then became the agent for virtually all + FMS credits, insisted upon a + standard text for its loan documents containing the venue clause to + which Venezuela objects. Despite requests by Defense and State last + summer and again last month, Secretary Simon has steadfastly maintained that no exception to + that text would be made.

+

A new aspect of this case is the willingness of the Defense Department to + extend a $10 million direct credit to Venezuela, a procedure not + involving FFB financing or the disputed + clause. Under Secretary + Maw ruled December 10, + however, that FFB credit more + appropriately should be assigned that country. Defense has nonetheless + recently indicated that sufficient new obligation authority to support a + $10 million direct credit program appears available, providing that + projected FY 1976 funding levels are + enacted by the Congress. Defense firmly believes that a continued modest + FMS credit program for Venezuela is + in our national interest.

+

+ The Options +

+

1. When FY 1976 authorization and + appropriation is passed, authorize Defense to extend a $10 million + direct credit to Venezuela on a one-time basis.

+

+ Pro—You would be responding favorably to Perez, + extending the credit which he very much desires to placate his military. + You would also be lessening the impact of decisions this year to + terminate all military assistance (i.e., indirect FMS credit, the military group presence in + Venezuela, and a modest grant military training program). Further, Perez + could use reassurance that commitments taken in Caracas last February + have not been forgotten. Additionally, authorization on a one-time basis would provide additional time to + accustom Venezuela to the phaseout of our military assistance programs + and for us to seek new ways to maintain traditional close relations with + the Venezuelan military. Such authorization would not, however, do + violence to Congressional and other Executive Branch views aimed toward + bringing these programs to an early termination.

+

+ Con—The authorization would risk undermining + FFB procedures with other Latin + American countries, as well as limiting new obligation authority for + Israel. It would conflict with the L view that no FMS credit be given Venezuela because of + the “inadequate” compensation paid U.S. companies affected by the recent + petroleum industry nationalization (ARA + and EB disagree, believing that it would + be inappropriate for the United States Government to take a position on + the adequacy of compensation in that American companies have settled + with the Venezuelan Government). Moreover, PM fears that the provision of direct credit this fiscal + year will create an undesirable precedent causing Venezuela to seek + additional authorization next year despite our qualification to the + Venezuelan Government that the $10 million credit is on a one-time + basis. PM and Treasury further object to + the adverse impact of such authorization on budget outlays.

+

2. Inform the Venezuelans that you have ascertained that the Treasury + ruling on retention of the FFB venue + clause remains irreversible and that, consequently, the United States + Government cannot be of assistance.

+

+ Pro—If FMS credit + is to be terminated, it is far better to place the onus on Venezuela + over a narrow legal impasse than to place it on us over a political + finding that Venezuela is “ineligible” or “oil-rich”.

+ +

+ Con—You would appear unresponsive to Perez’ + personal request to you.

+

3. Seek to have the venue clause deleted from the FFB agreement with Venezuela via a letter + to the Secretary of the Treasury.

+

+ Pro—The request would demonstrate to Perez your + personal interest and involvement.

+

+ Con—The request would not be fruitful. Secretary + Simon reiterated to us this + month that no exception would be made to the FFB standard text for Venezuela or any other country. + Treasury strongly opposes FMS credit to + Venezuela on economic grounds as well.

+

+ Bureau/Department/Other Agency Views +

+

+ ARA and Defense support Option 1, + basically because of the political advantage gained by responding + favorably to this key Third World leader, without doing injustice to the + planned phaseout of assistance. Defense, although accepting the + “one-time” caveat of Option 1, nonetheless firmly believes that a + continued modest FMS program in FY 1977 is in our national interest.

+

+ PM, L, T, Treasury, and OMB prefer Option 2, basically because it + would uphold the role established for FFB and reflect their and congressional opposition to + “assistance” to oil-rich nations in general and Venezuela in particular + in light of that country’s “inadequate” compensation for the recent + nationalization of U.S. petroleum companies.

+

+ Recommendation: +

+

That you authorize Defense to extend $10 million FY 1976 FMS direct credit + to Venezuela on a one-time basis (Option 1 favored by ARA and Defense although Defense + recommends a continued FMS program in + FY 1977).

+

+ ALTERNATIVELY, that you sign the letter to the + Venezuelan Foreign Minister at Tab 1 noting that you have ascertained + that the Treasury ruling on retention of the FFB venue clause remains irreversible. (Option 2 favored by + L, PM, T, OMB, Treasury and, if Option 1 is + not selected, by ARA.)

+

+ ALTERNATIVELY, that you sign the letter to the + Secretary of the Treasury at Tab 2, requesting that the venue clause be + deleted from the Venezuelan FY 1976 + FMS Credit Agreement text (Option 3 + favored by no one).

+

+ Attachments:

+

1. Suggested letter to Foreign Minister.

+

2. Suggested letter to Secretary Simon.

+

3. Caracas 2062.

+
+ +
+ 400. Telegram 135826 From the Department of State to the Embassy in + Chile +

Summary: As a + follow-up to their February 16–17 meetings in Caracas, Kissinger informed Escovar of + U.S. policy towards Venezuela in the areas of education, food + research, energy, technology transfer, and regional issues.

+

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + D760214–1014. Confidential; Immediate; Exdis. Drafted and + approved by Glenn. For the February conversations between + Kissinger, Pérez, and Escovar, see Document 396.

+ + + + + Washington, June 4, 1976, 0105Z. + +

135826. Subject: Letter from the Secretary to Foreign Minister + Escovar.

+

1. Please deliver the following letter from Secretary Kissinger to Foreign Minister + Escovar:

+

2. Begin text. Dear Mr. Minister: I shall be looking forward to reviewing + with you in Santiago progress we have made since our February meeting in + Caracas.

+

The three months since our conversations have been productive:

+

On education, we have signed an agreement of understanding for a new + academic program with talks scheduled soon toward developing a joint + project.

+

A Latin American Food Research Center, we have concluded a preliminary + study. We find the proposal eminently feasible, and invite a Venezuelan + initiative toward this end in the international group for Agricultural + Development (PGAD), an initiative which we are prepared to support.

+

On energy, we find the suggestion of your government to seek ways to + assist energy-poor Latin American nations excellent and one which we + propose to incorporate in our efforts to create an international energy + institute. In this same area, the current visit to the United States of + an eight-man Venezuelan energy team is an important step toward joint + cooperation in alternate uses of energy.

+

On transfer of technology, we shall assign for the first time in Latin + America a full-time technical assistance specialist to our embassy in + Caracas to respond to specific requests from your government for + services which you finance and direct. We consider this an innovative + approach which may have application elsewhere in the hemisphere.

+

However, we must do more. We share common goals in seeking international + economic solutions, in combatting terrorism, in establishing a + meaningful code for transnational corporations and on economic + integration. My government continues to stand ready as I announced in February to cooperate with + the Latin American Economic System (SELA). The role of your government with respect to + restoring the Organization of American States to an effective voice in + the hemisphere, an effort which we support, will be a determining factor + in the future of that organization.

+

Mr. Minister, this will be my fourth trip as Secretary of State to Latin + America and my second this year. I will be going to the General Assembly + in a further effort to strengthen the foundations of U.S. relations in + the hemisphere. I hope for harmony. You fully understand the importance + of creating a positive climate. And you appreciate that, given the + current situation in the U.S., discord would only hurt our common goals. + We have important issues to address, including the workings of the + inter-American system, and the policies of economic cooperation between + the OAS member states. None of these is + inherently divisive, so I very much hope that we can [have the] same + atmosphere of understanding as prevailed last year.

+

We have already conveyed ideas on OAS + reform. I understand that you have looked at some of our proposals. We + are not wedded to any specific formulas or solutions. What I do look for + is a serious effort on the part of the Foreign Ministers themselves to + give some purpose to our organization, and to relieve it of a portion of + its excessive bureaucracy. Our proposal for beginning such a reform is + to call on the general assembly to adopt guidelines for a study group or + other mechanism that will assure a serious look at the functional and + structural failing of the OAS. We quite + frankly have found the charter reform a sterile exercise and would like + to move that discussion to a more practical level. You can help on this, + I will look forward to hearing your ideas.

+

On the cooperation for development agenda item, we can engage in some + serious exchanges on trade and technology. I will be bringing several + proposals to the discussions, as I would hope that we can take some + innovative approaches to the perennial technology transfer debate. This + hemisphere, I am convinced, could become a model for the world in + developing regional programs in technology exchange.

+

Allow me a special word on human rights. We seek your counsel to find a + hemispheric position respectful of national sovereignty. I cannot help + but feel that the reputation of the OAS + would be tarnished were its members not to speak up on human rights at + Santiago. How to do this is an important question, however. We hope it + can be done in such a way as to result in institutional strengthening of + the inter-American Human Rights Commission, an endorsement of the + commissions findings on Chile, and an extension of its mandate to + continue monitoring the situation there. I shall value especially highly + your views on this matter.

+ +

Your wise and friendly counsel has been of great assistance to me in the + past. I look forward to these further discussions with you in Santiago. + Warm personal regards. Henry A. + Kissinger. End text.

+

3. The Department does not plan to release the text and prefers that it + remain a privileged communication. Unquote

+ + + Kissinger + + +
+ +
+ 401. Memorandum of Conversation +

Summary: Kissinger and Escovar discussed inter-American + relations, the Niehous + kidnapping, international economic affairs, and African + politics.

+

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + P820118–1601. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Einaudi on January 14, + 1977. Kissinger and + Escovar were in Santiago for a meeting of the OASGA. The text of Kissinger’s June 8 speech in + Santiago on human rights is in the Department of State Bulletin, July 5, 1976, pp. + 1–5.

+ + + + + Santiago, June 9, 1976, 8:05–9:10 + a.m. + + + PARTICIPANTS + + + + The United States + + The Secretary + Under Secretary Rogers + + Luigi R. Einaudi, S/P—Notetaker + Anthony J. Hervas, Interpreter + + + + + + Venezuela + + Foreign Minister Escovar + + + +

As the group enters, a photographer begins to take pictures. The + Secretary leaves to take a call from Washington.

+

Rogers: I suspect that call has to do with the Shlaudeman nomination.

+

Escovar: It is still to be confirmed?

+

Rogers: Yes, many nominations were made at once.

+

Escovar: I suppose that electoral tensions have contributed to the + delay.

+

Rogers: Yes.

+

Escovar: And I suppose specifically that the Reagan candidacy continues + to create problems.

+

Our general impression, of course, is that Carter is very strong.

+

Rogers: Yes, he has broad support, particularly among Blacks.

+ +

Escovar: We see parallels to JFK. I have heard tapes of Carter’s + campaign. He is quite charismatic. On the other hand, he is an unknown + quantity as concerns foreign policy.

+

Rogers: Yes. But the basic principles of US foreign policy must continue + . . .

+

Escovar: Whatever the government?

+

Rogers: Absolutely.

+

[Secretary of State enters].

+

The Secretary: Some McCarthyites are after Shlaudeman. [Turning to Rogers.] Could you draft a + message to Sparkman for me? The Department is paralyzed. [Turning to + Escovar] Are any Latin Americans opposed to Shlaudeman?

+

Escovar: No.

+

The Secretary: The delay is an insult to Venezuela.

+

Escovar: We thought Shlaudeman + was a very good Ambassador.

+

The Secretary: Let us go in to breakfast.

+

Ramon, it is a great pleasure to see you again. I must say that my + February trip could not have begun any better than with my visit to + Venezuela.

+

Escovar: Yes.

+

The Secretary: Your President is coming to visit us in October?

+

Escovar: I think he is planning to come after the election, precisely + because he would not want to . . .

+

The Secretary: I understand.

+

Escovar: He could go the United States immediately afterwards.

+

The Secretary: Fine. We should pick a date sometime in November. Then it + could hold, even if there is a change in Administration.

+

Or, would President Perez want to + wait until February?

+

Escovar: He would be ready to come in December or any other date would be + convenient.

+

The Secretary [To Rogers]: What do you think?

+

Rogers: November should be ok.

+

The Secretary: It would be good if the new President had a chance to talk + to Perez while thinking over his approach to the Administration. I think + November or December would be all right.

+

Escovar: I told President Perez + last night of your greetings. He asked me to transmit his greetings to + you in return.

+

The Secretary: What do you think about this General Assembly? Do you + think the speech on human rights will do any good?

+

Escovar: I am not very optimistic. Not much will come of it. Nonetheless, + I liked your statement. I told the press it was very positive.

+ +

The Secretary: That’s good. We could use that in our press. Do you + mind?

+

Escovar: On the contrary, I have no doubts whatsoever in saying your + contribution to good understanding with Latin America has been extremely + important.

+

The Secretary: Thank you.

+

Escovar: You are greatly esteemed in the hemisphere.

+

The Secretary: I have a great deal of affection for Latin America. That + helps.

+

Escovar: Even at the time of your speech in Brazil, President Perez made a declaration very + different from many of the speculations that were carried in the + press.

+

The Secretary: I appreciate that. I don’t think we ever consult with the + Brazilians on matters that we do not take up with Venezuela as well.

+

Escovar: We thought it entirely logical. Brazil is important. It can + contribute to stability.

+

The same is true of Argentina. But Argentina is in a very poor situation, + and is consumed with internal problems.

+

The Secretary: Yes. Their situation is extremely difficult.

+

Escovar: The new Argentine Foreign Minister seems good. The military have + good intentions. But they must graduate from the barracks, control + repression, and establish order without Chileanizing their society.

+

The Secretary: Do you think Chile is improving on the human rights + issue?

+

Escovar: Very little. I spoke an hour with Pinochet. It was a difficult conversation. I brought up + the question of political prisoners and pointed out that if conditions + were as stable as the Chileans themselves claimed, they did not need + political prisoners.

+

Venezuela undertook action in behalf of Corvalan in particular because + Podgorny wrote directly to President Perez asking for help.

+

The Secretary: He is asking everyone. He has written to us, too.

+

Escovar: The problem with the Chilean military is that they have no + political sense.

+

The Secretary: They have never been in politics before.

+

Escovar: The Argentines have more experience. There have been many coups + there.

+

The Secretary: Even so, I wish they wouldn’t try Mrs. Peron. She was not qualified to be + President. Her presidency was a joke by her husband. Will they really + try her, do you think?

+

Rogers: She was in with a bad bunch.

+ +

The Secretary: Can’t they just throw her out? Wasn’t she illiterate?

+

Escovar: [Nods agreement.]

+

The Secretary: Did she enjoy being President?

+

Escovar: Yes. I have the impression she did.

+

We in Venezuela are very interested in Argentine stability for the sake + of continental peace.

+

The Secretary: Really? I had not thought Argentina was that decisive.

+

Escovar: Yes. Argentina is essential to North-South equilibrium in the + continent.

+

+ Pinochet should be pressured to + understand politics more. Pinochet is not vulgar, but he is hard. He has no + political savvy. That is the problem.

+

The Secretary: I talked with him. First in a group, then alone. I said + some things I did not say in front of others. He always says he is doing + what we are asking.

+

Escovar: The prisoners are the key.

+

The Secretary: He says he only has 400.

+

Escovar: Maybe. But whatever the number, it is damaging.

+

We are going to ask Castro also + for political prisoners. We could use a better example from Pinochet to bring pressure on the + Cubans.

+

Our relations with Castro are + deteriorating.

+

The Secretary: On whose side: his or yours?

+

Escovar: Ours. There is the matter of Angola. And then there have been + tensions over the Embassy.

+

The Secretary: Your Embassy in Havana?

+

Escovar: Yes. Conditions there are bad. We asked for the release of + Venezuelan prisoners now being held in Cuba. Men who participated in the + Bay of Pigs.

+

The Secretary: Castro is cynical + about prisoners. He has used them as pawns in dealing with McGovern and + Kennedy.

+

Escovar: We should campaign on human rights. Seen broadly, Chile could be + used to put pressure on the Communists.

+

The Secretary: I agree, but we don’t want to overthrow the Chilean + government either. We want to increase freedom, not bring about greater + repression.

+

Escovar: True, but if the US were to pressure Chile, it could get + results.

+

The Secretary: Did they understand my speech?

+

Escovar: Not fully.

+

The Secretary: I could not discuss these issues in front of everyone in + detail. I think personal pressure works best.

+ +

Escovar: I told Pinochet that we + liked you as Secretary of State precisely because of that. You are + intelligent. And you understand how things can be done.

+

The Secretary: I told Pinochet we + could not maintain support if he did not make progress. That is a fact + of life.

+

Escovar: Good.

+

I am not optimistic about Latin America.

+

The Secretary: No?

+

Escovar: No. The pressures are building up. Even in Peru the situation is + bad. And then [we] have people like the Paraguayans.

+

The Secretary: You missed the Paraguayan. He went on for 45 minutes.

+

Escovar: Yes.

+

The Secretary: What you say is true. But what can we do?

+

Escovar: The United States should pressure these governments to seek a + greater measure of legitimacy.

+

The Secretary: Even Peru?

+

Escovar: Yes. I was there after your visit. Morales is a serious man and + has a great deal of good will.

+

The Secretary: I agree.

+

Escovar: Furthermore, the Prime Minister, who is generally thought to be + a leftist, is really more of a puritan type.

+

The Secretary: That can be dangerous in politics.

+

Escovar: Yes. The military often need lessons in politics. The + politicians in Peru need a lesson, too. APRA represents another type of innocence, which is also + dangerous.

+

The Secretary: Can we influence Peru?

+

Escovar: Yes, I think you can. And Ecuador is considering a new + constitution.

+

The Secretary: But are we influential in that?

+

Escovar: No. But in any case, if the United States pressures for + democracy in ways appropriate to the country in question, it can have a + great influence. For example, there is, of course, no alternative to + Somoza in Nicaragua. But there are other cases where something could be + done. I asked Torrijos, for example, why he hadn’t founded a political + party.

+

The Secretary: Torrijos has been very sound. I am very impressed with + him. He has been provoked many times and has handled it well.

+

Escovar: He has intuition.

+

It would be useful if there were a clearer US position in favor of + democracy. There has just been a meeting of European Social Democrats, + including Brandt, Kriesky and others.

+ +

The Secretary: I know. They are all friends of mine.

+

Escovar: The European Social Democrats are closer to Latin America than + other outside political groups.

+

The Secretary: Can we use my statement yesterday as a general statement + in support of democracy in the hemisphere?

+

Escovar: Yes. It can be used. The bicentennial also affirms the + democratic convictions of the United States and provides a similar + opportunity. Yesterday, President Perez signed a decree making July 4 a national holiday + in Venezuela.

+

The Secretary: What a charming gesture. That is very nice.

+

Escovar: We are worried that the United States position toward Latin + America might harden.

+

The Secretary: Are you referring to Cuba, or to Latin America as a + whole?

+

Escovar: As has happened in the past, we believe there is a great + tendency in the United States to value authoritarianism to fight + communism. Our own experience in Venezuela is the opposite.

+

The Secretary: I agree completely. The best defense against communism is + democracy. Institutional processes are vital.

+

Escovar: Latin America lived a great trauma with Foster Dulles. The fear + of reversal is always present.

+

The Secretary: As a practical matter, if the Democrats win in November, + there is always the possibility of over-activity. This happened before + with the Alliance for Progress. But it would be done with great good + will, not in the Dulles style. It might even go too far in the direction + you want.

+

I believe democracy should not be visibly the result of US pressures. Do + you agree?

+

Escovar: [Nods agreement]

+

The Secretary: We have to permit evolution to occur naturally.

+

As for the Republicans, if I stay, you know my views. If Connally comes + in, you might get a Dulles type of policy again. But to be frank, if the + Republicans win, it will be up to me whether I stay or not.

+

In any case, whoever wins, the major lines of foreign policy are set. I + have tried to use this year to give to the American people a sense of + success, and thereby to forestall tendencies toward isolationism.

+

In this regard, what happened in Nairobi was most unfortunate. The way in + which the IRB was voted down was not + helpful in our public opinion.

+

I understand Venezuela abstained on the IRB.

+

Escovar: Yes.

+ +

The Secretary: The detail doesn’t matter. We can keep the lesson of + Nairobi in mind here and consider the IRB within the OAS + framework.

+

On the broader forces at work in the United States, there are two + tendencies. One is extreme anti-communism, the other liberal + isolationism. I believe we must participate in the development process, + otherwise the international system will become prey to confrontation. + You understand that, too. That is why I have always thought you were + establishing credentials for a constructive dialogue. And now is the + time to begin.

+

After the election, I am optimistic of progress. The strategy I have to + follow now is to state objectives. I cannot carry them out. But we can + get momentum going. Last year, the very mention of commodity problems + caused explosions in the United States. This year we are even talking + about common funds. Little by + little we can make progress. I believe Perez Guerrero understands + this.

+

Escovar: Yes.

+

The Secretary: Today I will make some specific proposals. They will not + be contentious. But they will set the stage. Then, after the elections, + when the visit of your President takes place (and by the way, I think it + should be late November, or better yet, early December: before then + people will still be too tired from the campaign) it will be useful to + sit down with the new President and go over all of these things.

+

Incidentally, Carter won big in Ohio, which means he’s in as the + Democratic nominee.

+

Escovar: In relation to Nairobi, I spoke to Perez Guerrero. He told me of + the premature vote. The Bank should be looked at later, more calmly.

+

The Secretary: What we should have done would have been to get Perez + Guerrero’s advice. If we could have avoided a vote, we could have + presented it as a success to our people. We could have maintained + momentum. Now, everyone is debating what went wrong. Our representatives + were economic technicians, not political types. At 33 to 31, the vote + was so close we should not have let it go against us.

+

Escovar: Perez Guerrero told me that Robinson was very positive.

+

Now, if you will permit, I know you have much work, but there are a few + bilateral problems that I would like to take up.

+

First, there is the Owens-Illinois kidnap and expropriation case. + Recently there has been some very harsh correspondence from the State + Department. We know there is disagreement over the expropriation. We + think the company is being a bit harsh. When Shlaudeman was here the situation was + more positive. I hope to have a chance to discuss this soon with + Ambassador Vaky.

+

The Secretary: If you want to hear about democratic institutions, you + will [hear] a great deal about them from Vaky. Seriously though, + Shlaudeman + was our best man for Latin America. Without exception. I am sorry we had + to move him from Venezuela.

+

On Owens-Illinois, I agree with your government on the substance of the + kidnap issue. Never negotiate with terrorists.

+

On using expropriation as punishment, however, there we have our + differences. If individuals behave contrary to your laws, they should be + prosecuted as individuals.

+

Escovar: I understand your position. But President Perez was annoyed with the tone of the + recent communication from the State Department.

+

The Secretary: Who signed it?

+

Escovar: President Perez thought + it amounted to intervention in the internal affairs of Venezuela.

+

The Secretary: I don’t know the details. Rogers evidently does not either. When was it sent?

+

Escovar: Four days after Shlaudeman left. It is important that President + Perez not lose confidence . + . .

+

The Secretary: He should ingore the note. (To Rogers) Look at it. If it + is offensive, have it withdrawn.

+

Escovar: It is not offensive. The President is very sensitive. In part + this was a semantic problem. I will explain it to him. But I wanted to + tell you. Because I received a letter from you via Maillard on bilateral + matters dealing with transfer of technology, agriculture and so forth + that proves your constructive position.

+

We want an intelligent appropriation, not confrontation. We know all + about verbal radicalism. We are superdeveloped in rhetoric. But our + policies do not always correspond.

+

The Secretary: I understand. When President Perez takes radical positions, but cooperates with us on + specifics, it increases his legitimacy. We have no problems of principle + with this. So long as you do not organize against us we have no + objection. We certainly have no objection to SELA for example.

+

Escovar: Turning to another matter, I have recently traveled in the + Caribbean. Some governments there are serious, some are not. The Grenada + Prime Minister is not very trustworthy. The British warned us that some + of the pay provided for civil servants went to his private account in + Switzerland. When I saw him I thought he was looking for a deal. + Nonetheless, others are more serious.

+

The Secretary: Trinidad?

+

Escovar: The Prime Minister is not in love with Venezuela. But he is + respectable. And then there is Jamaica.

+

The Secretary: Manley seems to reserve all his love for himself and none + for Jamaica.

+ +

Escovar: Thompson is brilliant. But the government is close to Cuba. + Perez wants to talk to Manley.

+

The Jamaicans are to the left of Fidel. The Caribbean will be a turbulent area in the + years ahead.

+

The Secretary: Will Castro try to + organize the Black Caribbean + into a bloc?

+

Escovar: Yes, and with his African adventures and symbolism behind him he + may have some success. We are worried.

+

The Secretary: I take it you are talking about a different form of + subversion than that undertaken by Guevara.

+

Escovar: Yes. They are exploiting ideology and racial affinities. To + counteract the Cubans, we are seeking to improve our own relations with + Africa. Senghor will come to Venezuela in January.

+

The Secretary: He is one of the most brilliant leaders in Africa. We want + to invite him also. Perhaps he can visit the United States as well.

+

Escovar: We also want to establish contact with Houphuet-Boigny from the + Ivory Coast, Nyerere and others. The model of Guyana and Jamaica is + Tanzania. We in Latin America must pay attention to this phenomenon, for + the young in the Black Caribbean + are looking naturally to Africa.

+

The Secretary: I like Nyerere very much personally. But when I was in + Tanzania I found quite a depressing situation. I remember an + extraordinary scene of goose-stepping soldiers, no straight lines, no + shoes tied and about of the soldiers losing their shoes while + marching.

+

We should certainly exchange ideas on dealing with Africa. Venezuela has + advantages in dealing with Africa that we do not.

+

Escovar: The real advantage on the Latin American side is to be found in + Venezuela and Brazil which are mulatto countries. Chile and Argentina + are European. Peru and Colombia are Indian.

+

We want to maintain an active international position. Our role is + facilitated by maintaining relations with communist countries. I was + attacked in Venezuela for coming to Chile. But I have been to Moscow as + well and so could not be criticized effectively.

+

The Secretary: We welcome your international role. We should exchange + views more on Africa. I should write President Perez about my African contacts. + Through you, perhaps, we can get a dialogue going.

+

Escovar: That is a good idea. I followed your trip in the newspapers.

+

The Secretary: Yes, in Liberia I was made a principal chief, which means + I am eligible to have 100 women at my disposal . . .

+

Please send my warm regards to President Perez. And remember that, personally, are always welcome + in Washington.

+
+ +
+ 402. Telegram 180174 From the Department of State to the Embassy in + Venezuela +

Summary: The + Department summarized for the Embassy the current status of the + positions taken by the Secretary in his February and June + meetings with Venezuelan leaders.

+

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + D760280–0928 Confidential; Immediate. Drafted by Sonandres; + cleared by Fry, + Berry, Boughton, Quigg, Brown, Offenberg, Chaij, and Mahoney; approved by Devine. On July 22, the + Embassy informed the Department of progress on the issues taken + up by Kissinger in his + February and June meetings. (Telegram 8895 from Caracas, July + 22; ibid., D760282–0940)

+ + + + + Washington, July 21, 1976, 1537Z. + +

180174. Subject: Follow-up to the Secretary’s February and June Latin + American Trips.

+

1. ARA bureau tasked with updating + status on Venezuelan positions taken by the Secretary during his + February (Items A through F) and June (Items G through I) Latin American + trips. Department understands the current status of these items as + follows:

+

(A) Closer cooperation in energy research. Team of Venezuelan energy + experts made CU-sponsored May visit to US to survey non-petroleum energy + research. An additional visit is programmed for late July for the + Director of the Venezuelan Council for Nuclear Industry.

+

(B) Bilateral narcotics agreement. Signing has been delayed by recent + Caracas press publicity of an alleged CIA–DEA link.

+

(C) Latin American Food Research Center. A Department telegram, now being + cleared, would inform the Venezuelan Government that there may be merit + in the concept of converting the San Felipe Agricultural Center into a + Latin American Center and would offer our support for a GOV proposal to have the International + Group for Agricultural Development (IGAD/LA) establish a working group + to study the idea in depth.

+

(D) Educational development and planning. The US and GOV signed in May a statement of + understanding establishing a new program of high level scholarly + exchanges. Embassy Caracas and the Venezuelan education ministry are to + identify topics within the general field of educational development + suitable for cooperation between the two governments. The education + ministry and the Department will then select a small number of experts + to meet in Caracas to develop one or two projects for implementation + under the agreement. This program replaces all Department of State + funded educational programs in Venezuela. No additional programs are + contemplated.

+ +

(E) FMS credits. The Secretary + authorized a $10 million FY 1976 direct + credit to Venezuela on a one-time basis in June, thus complying with his + promise to President Perez to + look into the issue.

+

(F) Science and Technology Agreement. The Department (OES), after a complete review of US + capabilities and other US aspects of the proposed agreement, will + instruct Embassy Caracas to explore with the GOV the nature of such an agreement.

+

(G) State visit. Embassy Caracas is ascertaining the dates which + President Perez wishes for the + visit.

+

(H) African letter. ARA has submitted + for the Secretary’s signature a proposed letter to Perez on our African + policies.

+

(I) Reported US note on Owens-Illinois. You agreed to look into a “US + note delivered on June 4” on the subject. We cannot identify this note. + Embassy Caracas, at Department instruction, made an oral démarche on + June 2, reminding the GOV that we look + to it to assure the safe return of kidnapped US citizen William Niehous. This was done because + of indications then that the GOV might + be moving toward more forceful action. The GOV reacted “sharply and negatively,” considering this + “interference” in internal Venezuelan affairs. We, of course, disagree. + However, we seriously doubt that anything is to be gained by pursuing + the matter further.

+

2. Action requested: Please cable concurrence or any appropriate comment + by COB Thursday, July 22. Has the May + energy team visit generated any follow-up developments? Can you estimate + date for narcotics agreement signing? Have embassy and education + ministry talks begun on educational development?

+ + + Kissinger + + +
+ +
+ 403. Letter From President Ford to Venezuelan President Pérez + +

Summary: Ford expressed concern that Venezuela might + raise petroleum prices at the December OPEC meeting.

+

Source: Ford Library, + National Security Adviser, Presidential Correspondence with + Foreign Leaders, 1974–1977, Box 5, Venezuela, President + Carlos Andrés Pérez. + Secret. During a November 19 meeting with Iribarren, Ford stressed the heavy damage + of an increase in oil prices for the economies of the developing + world and urged a deferral of an increase. (Telegram + 299311/Tosec 320105 to Caracas, December 9; National Archives, + RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840086–2313) In a November + 20 letter to Ford, + Pérez stated that + OPEC was not responsible + for world economic problems, that Venezuela’s decisions + regarding the price of its oil had been in strict conformity + with OPEC’s decisions, and + that the organization was developing assistance programs for + developing countries. (Ford Library, National Security Adviser, + Presidential Correspondence with Foreign Leaders, 1974–1977, Box + 5, Venezuela, President Carlos + Andrés Pérez)

+ + + + + Washington, November + 9, 1976. + + + Dear Mr. President: + +

The decision last May of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting + Countries not to increase the price of oil was a responsible action + which has contributed to the process of global economic recovery. In the + spirit of our countries’ close relationship, however, I wish to bring to + your attention my deep concern about reports that Venezuela may seek an + increase in the price of oil at the December OPEC meeting, and to urge you to bring your country’s + considerable influence to bear instead to oppose an increase, which + would have harmful effects on world inflation and recovery, the plight + of the developing countries, and international economic cooperation.

+

The oil exporting countries have already made substantial gains in + purchasing power as a result of economic recovery and greater demand for + oil in the oil-importing countries. OPEC nations will earn $125 billion this year from their + oil exports, about 20 percent more than in 1975, and more than 400 + percent above what they earned in 1973 on a similar volume of oil + exports. In this regard, I understand that the marketing difficulties + confronted by Venezuela earlier this year have eased, at least in part + because of the modifications made by my Government in our domestic oil + entitlements program. It is unfortunate that Venezuela appears to have + responded to this strengthened market position by implementing a + unilateral price increase, during a period in which OPEC had decided not to increase the + prices.

+

A further oil price increase would generate inflationary pressures which + are not in any nation’s interest. Currently the industrialized countries + are making dramatic progress in controlling inflation through major + policy actions, with the average rate of inflation for major countries + falling to half its 1974 rate. Our analysis of the composition of exports from the major + industrialized countries to the oil producers indicates that the prices + of these goods have risen only by 30 percent since mid-1973, and by only + 4 percent over the past year. Prices of our largest export—grain—have + actually fallen by $50 a ton in the last year. But the industrialized + countries alone cannot solve the problem of inflation. Oil-producing + countries too have a responsibility to control world inflation.

+

I am also concerned that an increase in the price of oil could undermine + the fragile economic recovery and the already weak balance of payments + situation in both developing and industrialized countries. The oil bill + of the oil-importing developing countries has quadrupled from $2 billion + in 1973 to $13 billion this year. Some of these developing countries are + just beginning to regain a more satisfactory rate of growth and to + reduce their trade deficits as demand for their exports has increased + and they have begun to adjust to the burden of higher oil prices. Many + of the poorer developing countries, however, continue to experience + desperate balance of payments difficulties and, as a result, wholly + unsatisfactory prospects for economic growth. Among the industrialized + countries, there are several which have not yet begun to recover from + the severe economic recession of 1974–1975 and continue to experience + large balance of payments deficits; a number have virtually exhausted + their ability to borrow. Even in the United States, where recent + economic activity has been more vigorous, the recovery has slowed. My + deep concern, therefore, is that the possibility of truly global + economic recovery which we are seeing will be threatened by the slowdown + in growth and the adverse inflationary and balance of payments effects + of a new increase in the price of oil. All countries have a vital + interest in the maintenance and strengthening of the global recovery and + the increase in international trade which will accompany it.

+

Finally, I am concerned that a new increase in oil prices could prejudice + the creative and constructive process of dialogue among developed and + developing countries to which your government and you yourself have made + a major contribution. I am also committed to that process. I have taken + a number of decisions to ensure a positive United States approach to the + problems of the developing world. This year the United States will + provide more funds for economic assistance than in any year since our + post-war Marshall Plan, more aid than + any other country in the world. I also have committed my Government to + give serious consideration to a number of other new approaches to the + problems of the developing countries. I am working to maintain support + for constructive policies toward the developing world. I believe that + further progress in a number of areas of the North-South relationship, + including the official development assistance made available to the developing world, should + be possible in the coming months. In particular, I am optimistic that + the Conference on International Economic Cooperation, which is scheduled + to meet at the ministerial level in mid-December, can achieve positive + and concrete results beneficial to developed and developing countries. + But the international structure which both you and I wish to build must + be based on due regard for the impact of individual national decisions + on the rest of the world. Actions which appear to overlook this impact + seriously undermine domestic support in this country for a constructive + approach to the problems of the developing world.

+

I hope, therefore, that when you have given full consideration to all the + implications of the oil price question, the significant influence of + Venezuela and your personal stature and international leadership will + contribute to a decision by the oil-exporting countries as responsible + as that of May and that there will be no new price increase.

+

Sincerely,

+ + + Gerald R. + Ford + + +
+ +
+ 404. Memorandum of Conversation +

Summary: Ford and Iribarren discussed the effects of higher oil + prices on the world economy, and Ford urged Venezuela to delay an increase in the + price of oil.

+

Source: Ford Library, + Memoranda of Conversations, 1974–1977, Box 21, December 1, 1976, + Ford, Venezuelan + Ambassador Ignacio Iribarren + Borges. Secret; Nodis. The meeting took place in + the Oval Office. According to the President’s Daily Diary, on + November 30, Ford + participated in a ceremony to receive diplomatic credentials + from Iribarren from + 11:15–11:22 a.m. (Ford + Library, President’s Daily Diary) No record of the conversation + has been found. Scowcroft’s undated briefing memorandum for the + President’s December 1 meeting is ibid.

+ + + + + Washington, December 1, 1976, 4–4:46 + p.m. + + + PARTICIPANTS + President Ford + + Amb. Ignacio Iribarren + Borges, Venezuelan Ambassador to the U.S. + + Brent Scowcroft, Assistant + to the President for National Security Affairs + +

President: As I said yesterday in a preliminary way, I am very concerned + about an oil price increase. The meeting is in December and as you know + I have communicated with President Perez. I have read his reply very carefully. It is a + very thoughtful communication and I read it in the spirit of our close cooperation. Of + course, I do not agree with every point, but I think we can disagree as + friends.

+

There are wide areas of agreement. One principal area is the need for + cooperation between developed countries and the less developed + countries. We agree in this area, but as much as we want to maximize our + effort, in a stagnant economy our ability and that of other developed + countries to contribute is greatly diminished. In addition to the + economic impact, if the developed countries are in economic difficulty, + the political problem of agreeing how to help is greatly magnified.

+

We started our recovery about May of last year. We have entered a + pause—it’s longer than we anticipated—but I think the trend will + reverse. The pause elsewhere—for example, in Japan—is even more + pronounced. So, though we have made progress from the depth of the + depression, we are not out of the woods yet. In addition, the + international financial world is not as healthy as it should be. Any + price increase will inevitable have an adverse impact. How severe it + will be depends on how big it is. We would prefer none. President + Perez makes a persuasive + case to the contrary. But if the world economy should fall into a slump, + the pressures on the U.S. would be severe, and despite our good + intentions, we could not do what we wish for the under-developed + countries. It seems to me it is too great a risk to chance a jolt to the + world. I must state my case very frankly, as I have to Saudi Arabia and + as I will to the Iranians.

+

+ Iribarren: As you know, we are a + moderate in these matters. We will go to these meetings. The President + sent you the frank letter—as befits a friend.

+

I cannot forecast the amount of any increase but I could not say there + wouldn’t be one.

+

President: Even a delay, until the world comes out of this pause, would + be helpful.

+

+ Iribarren: I understand there may + be a postponement of CIEC. My + President has always said there should be a close connection. If you + could make a gesture in CIEC, it would + help with my President.

+

President: Of what sort?

+

+ Iribarren: It is necessary to + develop a new order in the world. You have recognized it in your + statements. President Perez here + would be very helpful.

+

President: I have always stood for reducing the disparity between the + developed countries and less developed countries. We have made offers. + We have accepted commodity agreements in a number of areas. We have + shown our good will.

+

+ Iribarren: You have. I think the + steel price rise will be very harmful with respect to OPEC.

+ +

President: I understand. My price advisory council met today on this. I + haven’t seen their report, but I am very critical of the increase, as + has been Governor Carter. Until then I can’t say what action I can + take.

+

+ Iribarren: I will contact my + President immediately. He has just returned from his long trip.

+

President: You know how strongly I opposed the trade restrictions against + Venezuela. It was most short-sighted and I have done everything I could + to get it reversed.

+

+ Iribarren: My President + understands. Unfortunately some members of Congress thought my country + participated in the embargo.

+

We are in a difficult situation. As my President said, the OPEC prices have been adjustments. We are + just trying to maintain purchasing power.

+

President: I urge that there be no price increase, but if there must be + one, I urge a delay until the world economy starts moving forward again. + It is psychologically as well as substantially important. There are many + countries having problems—Mexico, Canada, Great Britain, Italy, + Portugal, etc.

+

I was pleased to see your President stop in Portugal. If Portugal were to + fall off either to the left or the right it would be very bad.

+

+ Iribarren: We are helping a lot + there. Also in Spain.

+

President: I am pleased with developments there. I think the King is doing a good job.

+

+ Iribarren: I think the appointment + of Suarez was a wise move. He is doing good things.

+
+ +
+ 405. Memorandum of Conversation +

Summary: Scowcroft and Owens-Illinois officials discussed + the possible nationalization of the company’s holdings in + Venezuela and the status of the Niehous kidnapping case.

+

Source: Ford Library, + National Security Adviser, Memoranda of Conversation, Box 21, + December 14, 1976, Scowcroft, William Spengler, and John Andrews + (Owens-Illinois). Confidential. In telegram 285976 to Caracas, + November 22, the Department reported that Director of Andean + Affairs Devine had + discussed the prospective nationalization of Owens-Illinois with + the new Venezuelan Ambassador and had identified the matter as a + potential problem in U.S.–Venezuelan relations. (National + Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D760434–0808) + Niehous remained in + captivity until June 1979, when he was freed by Venezuelan + police. (“Abducted American Freed in Venezuela,” New York Times, July 1, 1979, p. + 7)

+ + + + + Washington, December 14, 1976, 1:15–1:40 + p.m. + + + SUBJECT + Owens-Illinois—Venezuela + + + PARTICIPANTS + + Brent Scowcroft, Assistant + to the President for National Security Affairs + William Spengler, President Owens-Illinois, International + Division + John Andrews, Washington Representative for Owens-Illinois + David Lazar, NSC Staff + +

Mr. Spengler used the meeting principally to update General Scowcroft on the current Owens-Illinois + situation in Venezuela. He said that the Government of Venezuela had + asked O–I to build, at Government expense, two new furnaces to increase + the capacity of the present O–I facility in that country. The estimated + cost would be about $45 million. Mr. Spengler said that O-I had made a + counter-proposal under which the new furnaces, when built, would be + offered for sale to the “private sector” (i.e. Owens-Illinois) so that + the resulting package would be owned 51% by the GOV, 49% by O–I. (Comment: It was not clear whether O–I’s + counter-proposal related only to the new furnaces or to the entire + facility as expanded by them but, in context, the latter seems + probable.)

+

According to Mr. Spengler they have discussed this proposal with Laria + who so far says “maybe”. Mr. Spengler pointed out that the risk to O–I + of passing their technology to the Government of Venezuela without being + paid for it (the $45 million would include costs and fees to O–I but + nothing for the technology involved in the furnaces) is offset to some + extent by the fact that the furnaces would take two years to build + during which time O–I would be taking dividends out of the country on + their present investment. Mr. Spengler said that O–I this year, for the + first time (under the impetus of Section 24 of the Andean Code) had taken $3 million in + dividends out of Venezuela and would anticipate a like annual dividend + for the next two years. Mr. Spengler indicated that O–I probably will go + ahead with the construction of the new furnaces.

+

Mr. Spengler said that arbitration of the nationalization problem still + is supposedly in the game but indicated his opinion that the GOV eventually will back away from + arbitration.

+

General Scowcroft said that, + although we didn’t pretend to know the intentions of the Venezuelan + Government, we find this new initiative on their part a hopeful + sign.

+

Mr. Spengler touched on the Niehous matter. While not denigrating the efforts of the + Venezuelan Government to find Mr. Niehous, he did express the wish that they had been and + were more capable. He also expressed the hope that the State Department + would not let this matter drop but would keep reminding the Venezuelan + Government of it. General Scowcroft assured him we would stay in touch with State + on this. Mr. Lazar pointed out that the Venezuelan Government had strong + reasons of its own for wanting to find Mr. Niehous and solve the case.

+

Mr. Spengler said there was no action that Owens-Illinois wanted of the + U.S. Government now but that he had only wished to bring us up to date. + The meeting ended at 1:40 p.m.

+
+
+ +
+ + + + diff --git a/volumes/frus1977-80v18.xml b/volumes/frus1977-80v18.xml new file mode 100644 index 000000000..e4dc1fb4f --- /dev/null +++ b/volumes/frus1977-80v18.xml @@ -0,0 +1,58520 @@ + + + + + + Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume + XVIII, Middle East Region; Arabian Peninsula + Foreign Relations of the United States + 1977–1980 + Volume XVIII + Middle East Region; Arabian Peninsula + Kelly M. McFarland + Adam M. Howard + + + + United States Government Publishing Office + Washington + 2015 + frus1977-80v18 + + + +

Released in 2015 as printed book.

+ + + + + + + + + + Foreign Relations of the United States + 1977–1980 + Volume XVIII + Middle East Region; Arabian + Peninsula + + Editor: Kelly M. McFarland + General Editor: Adam M. Howard + + United States Government Printing Office + Washington + 2015 + DEPARTMENT OF STATE Office of the Historian Bureau of Public Affairs For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government + Printing Office Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512-1800; DC + area (202) 512-1800 Fax: (202) 512-2250 Mail: Stop IDCC, Washington, DC + 20402-0001 + +
+ + About the Series +

The Foreign Relations of the United States series presents + the official documentary historical record of major foreign policy decisions and + significant diplomatic activity of the U.S. Government. The Historian of the + Department of State is charged with the responsibility for the preparation of + the Foreign Relations series. The staff of the Office of + the Historian, Bureau of Public Affairs, under the direction of the General + Editor of the Foreign Relations series, plans, + researches, compiles, and edits the volumes in the series. Secretary of State + Frank B. Kellogg first promulgated official regulations codifying specific + standards for the selection and editing of documents for the series on March 26, + 1925. These regulations, with minor modifications, guided the series through + 1991.

+

Public Law 102–138, the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, established a new + statutory charter for the preparation of the series which was signed by + President George H.W. Bush on October 28, 1991. Section 198 of P.L. 102–138 + added a new Title IV to the Department of State’s Basic Authorities Act of 1956 + (22 U.S.C. 4351, et seq.).

+

The statute requires that the Foreign Relations series be + a thorough, accurate, and reliable record of major U.S. foreign policy decisions + and significant U.S. diplomatic activity. The volumes of the series should + include all records needed to provide comprehensive documentation of major + foreign policy decisions and actions of the U.S. Government. The statute also + confirms the editing principles established by Secretary Kellogg: the Foreign Relations series is guided by the principles of + historical objectivity and accuracy; records should not be altered or deletions + made without indicating in the published text that a deletion has been made; the + published record should omit no facts that were of major importance in reaching + a decision; and nothing should be omitted for the purposes of concealing a + defect in policy. The stature also requires that the Foreign + Relations series be published not more than 30 years after the events + recorded. The editors are convinced that this volume meets all regulatory, + statutory, and scholarly standards of selection and editing.

+

Sources for the Foreign Relations + Series

+

The Foreign Relations statute requires that the published + record in the Foreign Relations series include all + records needed to provide comprehensive documentation of major U.S. foreign + policy decisions and significant U.S. diplomatic activity. It further requires + that government agencies, departments, and other entities of the U.S. Government + engaged in foreign policy + formulation, execution, or support cooperate with the Department of State + historians by providing full and complete access to records pertinent to foreign + policy decisions and actions and by providing copies of selected records. Most + of the sources consulted in the preparation of this volume have been + declassified and are available for review at the National Archives and Records + Administration (Archives II) in College Park, Maryland.

+

The editors of the Foreign Relations series have complete + access to all the retired records and papers of the Department of State: the + central files of the Department; the special decentralized files (“lot files”) + of the Department at the bureau, office, and division levels; the files of the + Department’s Executive Secretariat, which contain the records of international + conferences and high-level official visits, correspondence with foreign leaders + by the President and Secretary of State, and the memoranda of conversations + between the President and the Secretary of State and foreign officials; and the + files of overseas diplomatic posts. All of the Department’s central files for + 1977–1981 are available in electronic or microfilm formats at Archives II, and + may be accessed using the Access to Archival Databases (AAD) tool. Almost all of + the Department’s decentralized office files covering this period, which the + National Archives deems worthy of permanent retention, have been transferred to + or are in the process of being transferred from the Department’s custody to + Archives II.

+

Research for Foreign Relations volumes is undertaken + through special access to restricted documents at the Jimmy Carter Presidential + Library and other agencies. While all the material printed in this volume has + been declassified, some of it is extracted from still-classified documents. The + staff of the Carter Library is processing and declassifying many of the + documents used in this volume, but they may not be available in their entirety + at the time of publication. Presidential papers maintained and preserved at the + Carter Library include some of the most significant foreign-affairs related + documentation from White House offices, the Department of State, and other + federal agencies including the National Security Council, the Central + Intelligence Agency, the Department of Defense, and the Joint Chiefs of + Staff.

+

Some of the research for volumes in this subseries was done in Carter Library + record collections scanned for the Remote Archive Capture (RAC) project. This + project, which is administered by the National Archives and Records + Administration’s Office of Presidential Libraries, was designed to coordinate + the declassification of still-classified records held in various presidential + libraries. As a result of the way in which records were scanned for the RAC, the + editors of the Foreign Relations series were not always + able to determine whether attachments to a given document were in fact attached + to the paper copy of the document in the + Carter Library file. In such cases, some editors of the Foreign Relations series have indicated this ambiguity by stating that + the attachments were “Not found attached.”

+

Editorial Methodology

+

Documents in this volume are presented chronologically according to time in + Washington, DC. Memoranda of conversation are placed according to the time and + date of conversation, rather than the date the memorandum was drafted.

+

Editorial treatment of the documents published in the Foreign + Relations series follows Office style guidelines, supplemented by + guidance from the General Editor and the Chief of the Editing and Publishing + Division. The original document is reproduced as exactly as possible, including + marginalia or other notations, which are described in the footnotes. Texts are + transcribed and printed according to accepted conventions for the publication of + historical documents within the limitations of modern typography. A heading has + been supplied by the editors for each document included in the volume. Spelling, + capitalization, and punctuation are retained as found in the original text, + except that obvious typographical errors are silently corrected. Other mistakes + and omissions in the documents are corrected by bracketed insertions: a + correction is set in italic type; an addition in roman type. Words or phrases + underlined in the original document are printed in italics. Abbreviations and + contractions are preserved as found in the original text, and a list of + abbreviations and terms is included in the front matter of each volume. In + telegrams, the telegram number (including special designators such as Secto) is + printed at the start of the text of the telegram.

+

Bracketed insertions are also used to indicate omitted text that deals with an + unrelated subject (in roman type) or that remains classified after + declassification review (in italic type). The amount and, where possible, the + nature of the material not declassified has been noted by indicating the number + of lines or pages of text that were omitted. Entire documents withheld after + declassification review have been accounted for and are listed in their + chronological place with headings, source notes, and the number of pages not + declassified.

+

All brackets that appear in the original document are so identified in the + footnotes. All ellipses are in the original documents.

+

The first footnote to each document indicates the sources of the document and its + original classification, distribution, and drafting information. This note also + provides the background of important documents and policies and indicates + whether the President or his major policy advisers read the document.

+ +

Editorial notes and additional annotation summarize pertinent material not + printed in the volume, indicate the location of additional documentary sources, + provide references to important related documents printed in other volumes, + describe key events, and provide summaries of and citations to public statements + that supplement and elucidate the printed documents. Information derived from + memoirs and other first-hand accounts has been used when appropriate to + supplement or explicate the official record.

+

The numbers in the index refer to document numbers rather than to page + numbers.

+

Advisory Committee on Historical Diplomatic + Documentation

+

The Advisory Committee on Historical Diplomatic Documentation, established under + the Foreign Relations statute, monitors the overall + compilation and editorial process of the series and advises on all aspects of + the preparation of the series and declassification of records. The Advisory + Committee does not necessarily review the contents of individual volumes in the + series, but it makes recommendations on issues that come to its attention and + reviews volumes as it deems necessary to fulfill its advisory and statutory + obligations.

+

Declassification Review

+

The Office of Information Programs and Services, Bureau of Administration, + conducted the declassification review for the Department of State of the + documents published in this volume. The review was conducted in accordance with + the standards set forth in Executive Order 13526 on Classified National Security + Information and applicable laws.

+

The principle guiding declassification review is to release all information, + subject only to the current requirements of national security as embodied in law + and regulation. Declassification decisions entailed concurrence of the + appropriate geographic and functional bureaus in the Department of State, other + concerned agencies of the U.S. Government, and the appropriate foreign + governments regarding specific documents of those governments. The + declassification review of this volume, which began in 2012 and was completed in + 2014, resulted in the decision to withhold 3 documents in full, excise a + paragraph or more in 17 documents, and make minor excisions of less than a + paragraph in 36 documents.

+

The Office of the Historian is confident, on the basis of the research conducted + in preparing this volume and as a result of the declassification review process + described above, that the documentation and editorial notes presented here + provide a thorough, accurate, and reliable record of the Carter administration’s policy toward the Middle East + region.

+ + Adam M. Howard, Ph.D. + + General Editor + + Stephen P. Randolph, Ph.D. + + The Historian + + + Bureau of Public Affairs + August 2015 + + + +
+ +
+ + Preface +

Structure and Scope of the Foreign + Relations Series

+

This volume documents the Carter + administration’s formation of U.S. policy toward the Middle East region, with + particular attention paid to strategic interests in the Gulf, the Indian Ocean + region, Arabian Peninsula states, and Iraq. The volume is best read in + conjunction with other volumes in the subseries, in order to understand the + breadth and scope of U.S. relations throughout the Middle East region. The most + important of these volumes include: Foreign Relations, 1977–1980, vol. VIII, Arab-Israeli + Dispute, January 1977–August 1978; Foreign Relations, 1977–1980, vol. IX, Arab-Israeli + Dispute, August 1978–December 1980; Foreign Relations, 1977–1980, vol. 1977–1980, vol. X, + Iran: Revolution, January 1977–November 1979; and Foreign Relations, 1977–1980, + vol. XI, Iran: Hostage Crisis, November 1979–January 1981. + Documentation on oil and energy issues is in Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, vol. XXXVII, Energy + Crisis, 1974–1980. For U.S. bilateral relations with Iraq in the last + 6 months of 1980, see Foreign + Relations, 1981–1988, vol. XX, Iran; Iraq, April 1980–January + 1985.

+

Focus of Research and Principles of Selection for Foreign Relations, 1977–1980, Volume XVIII

+

This volume represents the range of diplomatic and political issues that affected + the Carter administration’s policies + toward the Middle East and Indian Ocean region as well as bilateral relations + with the Arabian Peninsula states and Iraq. Additionally, the challenges to U.S. + interests created by the shifting strategic balance in Southwest Asia provide a + common thread that runs through all of the compilations in the volume.

+

To a significant extent, Carter and his + advisers viewed their situation in the Middle East through a Cold War lens. From + the outset, the administration focused its essential policy toward the region on + strengthening relations with U.S. partners like Saudi Arabia, cultivating new + relationships with the recently independent Gulf states, and reestablishing + relations with states like the Yemen Arab Republic and Iraq. At the same time, + the administration sought to manage and mitigate Soviet influence in the region + both diplomatically in the case of the 1977–1978 Indian Ocean arms control talks + and militarily in support of the Yemen Arab Republic and Saudi Arabia against + perceived threats from Soviet-backed states like the People’s Democratic + Republic of Yemen.

+ +

In 1979, however, two events prompted the administration to dramatically raise + its strategic engagement in the region. The end of the Shah of Iran’s rule in + February and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December pushed U.S. + policymakers to seek a new security framework centered on the Gulf. Although + some officials, like Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs + Zbigniew Brzezinski, had long pushed + for the creation of a Rapid Deployment Force in the Gulf region, the events of + 1979 highlighted the need for a more robust U.S. military capacity to meet the + challenges of the new security environment as well as future threats across + Southwest Asia and the northern arc of the Indian Ocean. Carter articulated this new imperative in his + January 1980 State of the Union Address, in which he held that the United States + would use military force to protect its interests in the Middle East. This + position became known popularly as the “Carter Doctrine.”

+

The new regional challenges which emerged led the administration to abandon some + earlier goals and refocus its energies on others. In the Indian Ocean, the + United States abandoned its demilitarization dialogue with the Soviet Union. + With the loss of its military proxy in Iran and with Soviet forces on the ground + in Afghanistan, Carter and his foreign + policy advisers began to view the Indian Ocean as a vital staging area for U.S. + regional deterrence efforts. In the same vein, the drive to increase U.S. + military presence in Southwest Asia, which after March 1980 took form as the + Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force, prompted Washington to seek access and basing + rights across the region.

+

Acknowledgements

+

The editor wishes to acknowledge the assistance of officials at the Carter + Library, Atlanta, Georgia, especially Ceri McCarron and James Yancey. Special + thanks are due to the Historical Staff of the Central Intelligence Agency, who + were extremely helpful in arranging full access to the files of the Central + Intelligence Agency. The editor would like to also thank Sandy Meagher, for her + valuable assistance in expediting the use of Department of Defense files.

+

Kelly M. McFarland, Richard Moss, and Craig Daigle collected documentation for + this volume and Kelly M. McFarland selected and edited it, under the supervision + of Adam Howard, then Chief of the Middle East and Africa Division, and the + direction of Susan C. Weetman, the former General Editor of the series. Adam + Howard and Kristin Ahlberg reviewed the volume. Chris Tudda coordinated the + declassification review, under the supervision of Carl Ashley, Chief of the + Declassification Division. Stephanie Eckroth and Rita Baker did the copy and + technical editing. Do Mi Stauber Indexing Service prepared the index.

+ + Kelly M. McFarland + + Historian + + + +
+ +
+ + Contents + + + About the Series + III + + + Preface + IX + + + Sources + XIII + + + Abbreviations and Terms + XVII + + + Persons + XXV + + + Note on U.S. Covert Actions + XXXIII + + + Middle East Region; Arabian Peninsula + + Middle East Region and the Gulf + 1 + Indian Ocean + 329 + Iraq + 420 + Saudi Arabia + 451 + The Yemens + 732 + + + + Index + 907 + + + + +
+ +
+ + Sources +

Sources for the Foreign Relations, + 1977–1980, Volume XVIII

+

In the preparation of this volume, the editors used extensively the Presidential + papers and other White House records in the Jimmy Carter Presidential Library in + Atlanta, Georgia. These records were essential for documenting the roles of + President Jimmy Carter, Assistant to the + President for National Security Affairs Zbigniew + Brzezinski, and other members of the National Security Council + Staff in developing and implementing U.S. policy toward the Middle East region. + The National Security Affairs files in this collection are divided into two + subseries: Brzezinski Material and Staff + Material. In the Brzezinski Material + subseries, the Country File, the Country Chron portion of the Brzezinski Office File, and the Subject File + proved the richest source on the range of bilateral and regional issues. The + General Odom File, however, is particularly useful for documentation relating to + the development of the Persian Gulf Security Framework and the Rapid Deployment + Joint Task Force between 1979 and 1980. The Staff Material subseries is also an + important resource for its ability to reveal the development of U.S. Middle East + policy at the working level of the National Security Council. Documentation in + the Middle East and Defense Security Files was particularly useful for this + volume.

+

Separate from the National Security Affairs collection is the National Security + Council Institutional Files, which focus primarily on the records of meetings of + the National Security Council and subgroups the Policy Review Committee and the + Special Coordination Committee. It also includes supporting documentation + provided to the Department of State, Department of Defense, the Central + Intelligence Agency, and others for the meetings. These records are particularly + useful for documenting the central role the Special Coordination Committee + played in the Carter administration’s + deliberations on the future of the U.S. defensive posture in the region. The + National Security Council Institutional Files also serve as a central repository + for documentation on Presidential Review Memoranda and Presidential + Determinations produced by the Carter + administration.

+

Two additional Carter Library collections supplement documentation from the + National Security Affairs and National Security Council Institutional Files: + Brzezinski Donated Material and the + Plains File, a body of documents assembled to aid President Carter in writing his memoirs Keeping the Faith. Each collection contains significant + documentation on the policymaking process toward the Middle East region, including meeting minutes, memoranda, + and Presidential correspondence with Middle East leaders.

+

To document the Department of State’s participation in the formulation of U.S. + policy in the Middle East region, the Central Foreign Policy File and the + special decentralized files of the Department of State (“lot files”) organized + at the bureau, office, and division levels were crucial. For this volume, the + Central Foreign Policy File provided a central repository of the Department of + State’s telegram communications with posts in the Arabian Peninsula, including + accounts of meetings with Middle Eastern leaders for which no memoranda of + conversation were kept. It also contains important cabled correspondence between + Carter and Secretary of State + Cyrus Vance and their counterparts + in the region. Several lot files were particularly useful including the records + of Secretary Vance (Lot 84D241), the + General Program Country files of the Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs (Lot + 86D371), the Saudi Arabia Historical files in the Office of Arabian Peninsula + Affairs (Lot 91D410), and the files of the Bureau of Near Eastern and South + Asian Affairs (Lot 91D491).

+

Finally, this volume’s account of the Carter administration’s efforts to construct a new Persian Gulf + Security Framework would have been incomplete without Department of Defense + Records. Within the files of the Office of the Secretary of Defense, FRC + 330–80–0017 provided key documentation on the administration’s dialogue with the + Soviet Union on the Indian Ocean and relations with Saudi Arabia. FRC + 330–82–0205 contains a useful collection of documents on Secretary of Defense + Harold Brown’s communication with + U.S. and Middle East officials, as well as Department of Defense memoranda on + regional defense planning.

+

In addition to the paper files cited below, a growing number of documents are + available on the internet. The Office of the Historian maintains a list of these + on its website and encourages readers to consult that site on a regular + basis.

+

Unpublished Sources

+ + Department of State, Washington D.C. + + Office of the Secretariat Staff, Cyrus R. Vance, Secretary of State—1977–1980, Lot + 84D241 + + National Archives and Records Administration, College + Park, Maryland + + Record Group 59, General Records of the Department of State + Central Foreign Policy File + Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, Lot + 91D491 + Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs, General Program + Country Files 1980–1984, Lot 86D371 + + Office of Research and Analysis for the Soviet Union and + Eastern Europe, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Lot + 90D113 + Office of Arabian Peninsular Affairs, Bureau of Near + Eastern and South Asian Affairs, Historical Files Pertaining + to Saudi Arabia 1973–1990, Lot 91D410 + Office of the Secretariat Staff, Official Working Papers + of S/P Director Anthony + Lake, 1977–January 1981, Lot 82D298 + Subject Files of Edmund S. + Muskie, 1963–1981, Lot 83D66 + Under Secretary for Political Affairs: David D. Newsom Subject + Files, Lot 81D154 + + + + + Jimmy Carter Presidential Library, Atlanta, Georgia + + Brzezinski Donated + Material + National Security Affairs + Brzezinski + Material + Brzezinski + Office File + Country File + General Odom File + Subject File + Trip File + + Staff Material + Defense/Security + Global Issues + Middle East + Office + + + + + National Security Council + Institutional Files + + + Papers of Walter F. Mondale + Plains File + Presidential Materials + President’s Daily Diary + + + + + Central Intelligence Agency, Langley, Virginia + + Office of Congressional Affairs + Job 81M01032R + + Office of the Director of Central Intelligence + Job 80M00919R + Job 81B00112R + Job 81B00401R + Job 81M00919R + Job 82B00162R + Job 82M00501R + + Office of Near East and South Asia Analysis, Directorate of + Intelligence + Job 76T00412R + + + Office of Support Services, Directorate of Intelligence + Job 80T00071A + Job 80T00634A + Job 82T00150R + Job 82T00466R + + + + National Security Council, Washington D.C. + + Carter Intelligence Files + + + Washington National Records Center + + RG 330 Office of the Secretary of Defense + FRC 330–80–0017 + FRC 330–81–0202 + FRC 330–82–0205 + FRC 330–81–0713 + + + + + +

Published Sources

+ + Brzezinski, Zbigniew. Power and Principle: Memoirs of the National Security + Adviser, 1977–1981. New York: Farrar, Straus, Giroux, 1983. + Carter, Jimmy. Keeping Faith: Memoirs of a + President. New York: Bantam Books, 1982. + Congressional Quarterly. Congress and the Nation, + 1977–1980, vol. V. Washington: Congressional Quarterly, Inc., + 1981. + The New York Times. + United Nations. Yearbook of the United Nations, + 1974–1980. New York: United Nations Office of Public Information, + 1975–1981. + United States. Department of State. Bulletin, + 1974–1980. + ______. National Archives and Records Administration. Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Jimmy Carter, + 1977–1980. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1978, 1979, + 1980, 1981. + The Wall Street Journal. + The Washington Post. + +
+ +
+ + Abbreviations and Terms + + ACDA, Arms Control + and Disarmament Agency + ACE, Allied Command + Europe + AF, Bureau of African + Affairs, Department of State + AF/I, Office of + Inter-African Affairs, Bureau of African Affairs, Department of State + AFLC, Air Force + Logistics Command + AID, Agency for + International Development, Department of State + AIPAC, American + Israel Public Affairs Committee + Amb, + Ambassador + AMCONSUL, + American Consulate + ANZUS, Australia, + New Zealand, United States Alliance + APC, armored + personnel carrier + ARAMCO, Arabian + American Oil Company + ARG, amphibious ready + group + ARP, Arabian + Peninsula + ASAP, as soon as + possible + ASW, anti-submarine + warfare + AWACS, Airborne + Warning and Control System + BBC, British + Broadcasting Company + b/d, barrels per day + BIB, Board for + International Broadcasting + BIOT, British Indian + Ocean territory + Blumto, series + indicator for telegrams from W. Michael Blumenthal + BQ, Bill Quandt + C, confidential + C3I, Command, Control, Communications, + Intelligence + CBU, cluster bomb + unit + CDA, Camp David + Accords + CDR, Commander + CENTO, Central + Treaty Organization + CHUSEOPE, Chief, + U.S. European Command Operational Planning Element + CHUSMTM, Chief, + U.S. Military Training Mission, Saudi Arabia + CIA, Central + Intelligence Agency + CIEC, Conference on + International Economic Cooperation + CINC, + Commander-in-Chief + CINCEUR, + Commander-in-Chief, European Command + CINCLANT, + Commander-in-Chief, Atlantic Command + CINCPAC, + Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Command + CINCPACFLT, + Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet + CINCRED, + Commander-in-Chief, Readiness Command + CINCUSNAVEUR, Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Navy, Europe + CJCS, Chairman, + Joint Chiefs of Staff + CNO, Chief of Naval + Operations; Chief Naval Officer + Codel, + congressional delegation + COE, Corps of + Engineers, U.S. Army + COMIDEASTFOR, Commander, Middle East Force + + COMSEVENTHFLT, Commander, U.S. Navy Seventh Fleet + CONUS, contiguous + United States + CPI, Consumer Price + Index + CPX, command post + exercise + CRAF, Civil Reserve + Air Fleet + CSCE, Commission on + Security and Cooperation in Europe + CTF, Commander Task + Force + CVBG, carrier battle + group + CY, calendar + year + D, Deputy Secretary of State + DA, David Aaron; + Defense Attaché + DALO, Department of + the Army Logistics Office + DAMA, Department of + the Army Materiel Annex + DAMO, Department of + the Army Military Operations + DARCOM, Department + of the Army Materiel Development and Readiness Command + DAS, Deputy Assistant + Secretary + DASD (NEASA), Deputy + Assistant Secretary of Defense for Near Eastern and South Asian + Affairs + DASS, Deputy + Assistant Secretary of State + DATT, Defense + Attaché + DCI, Director of + Central Intelligence + DCM, Deputy Chief of + Mission + DCR, Deputy Chief, + United States Military Training Mission + DepSecDef, + Deputy Secretary of Defense + DI, Directorate of + Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency + DIA, Defense + Intelligence Agency + DIVENGER, + Division Engineer + DM, Deutsch + Mark + DO, Directorate of + Operations, Central Intelligence Agency + DOD, Department of + Defense + DOD/DSAA, Defense + Security Assistance Agency, Department of Defense + DOD/ISA, + International Security Affairs, Department of Defense + DOD/ISA/FMRA, + Office of Foreign Military Relations, International Security Affairs, + Department of Defense + DOD/ISA/NESA, + Office of Near East and South Asian Affairs, International Security Affairs, + Department of Defense + DOD/ISA/SA, + Office of Security Assistance, International Security Affairs, Department of + Defense + dols, dollars + DPC, Defense Planning + Committee (NATO) + DSAA, Defense + Security Assistance Agency + E, Under Secretary of State for Economic + Affairs + EB, Bureau of Economic + and Business Affairs, Department of State + Emb, Embassy + EOPE, see + USEOPE + ESF, Exchange + Stabilization Fund, Department of the Treasury + EUCOM, European + Command + EUR, Bureau of + European Affairs, Department of State + EUR/SE, Office of + Southern European Affairs, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of + State + EUR/SOV, Office of + Soviet Union Affairs, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State + + Exdis, exclusive + distribution, indicating extremely limited distribution or + dissemination + EXIM, Export-Import + Bank of the United States + F–5, U.S.-designed + light jet fighter aircraft + F–16, U.S.-designed + multirole jet fighter aircraft + FBIS, Foreign + Broadcast Information Service + FCO, Foreign and + Commonwealth Office (United Kingdom) + FMS, Foreign Military + Sales + FonMin, Foreign + Minister, Foreign Ministry + ForMin, Foreign + Minister + FRC, Federal Records + Center + FRG, Federal Republic + of Germany (West Germany) + FY, fiscal year + FYDP, five-year + defense program + FYI, for your + information + G–7, Group of 7: + Canada, Federal Republic of Germany, France, Italy, Japan, United Kingdom, + United States + GAO, Government + Accounting Office + GDR, German + Democratic Republic (East Germany) + GOB, Government of + Bahrain + GOI, Government of + Iran, Israel, Iraq, or India + GS, Gary Sick + GSRS, general + support rocket system + H, Bureau of Congressional Relations, Department of + State + HA, Bureau of Human + Rights and Humanitarian Affairs, Department of State + HAWK, surface-to-air + missile system + HM, His/Her + Majesty + HMG, His/Her + Majesty’s Government + HNS, host-nation + support + HQ, + headquarters + IBRD, International + Bank for Reconstruction and Development + ICA, International + Communications Agency (formerly United States Information Agency) + IDA, International + Development Association + IEA, International + Energy Agency + IG, interdepartmental + group + IMET, International + Military Education and Training, Department of Defense + IMF, International + Monetary Fund + INR, Bureau of + Intelligence and Research, Department of State + INR/DDC/OIL, + Office of Intelligence Liaison, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, + Department of State + INR/RNA, Office of + Research and Analysis for Near East and South Asia, Bureau of Intelligence + and Research, Department of State + IO, Indian Ocean; or, + Bureau of International Organization Affairs, Department of State + IraqInt, Iraqi + Interests Section + IRS, Internal Revenue + Service + ISA, International + Security Affairs, Department of Defense + J, Office of the Under Secretary of State for + Political Affairs + JC, Jimmy + Carter + JCS, Joint Chiefs of + Staff + + JCS/J5, Plans Section, Joint Plans and Policy + Office, Joint Chiefs of Staff + JCSM, Joint Chiefs + of Staff Memorandum + JMC, Joint Military + Commission + JTF, joint task + force + KT, kiloton + L, Legal Adviser, Department of State + L/PM, Assistant Legal + Adviser for Politico-Military Affairs, Department of State + LDC, less developed + country + LGB, laser-guided + bomb + Limdis, limited + distribution + LOA, letter of + approval + LOC, lines of + communication + LST, landing ship, + tank + LTC, Lieutenant + Colonel + LTG, Lieutenant + General + MAAG, Military + Assistance Advisory Group + MAC, Military + Assistance Command + MAGTF, Marine Air + Ground Task Force + MAP, Military + Assistance Program + MARAD, Maritime + Administration, U.S. Merchant Marine + MAU, Marine + Amphibious Unit + MBD, million barrels + per day + MBFR, Mutual and + Balanced Force Reductions + MED, + Mediterranean + MemCon, memorandum + of conversation + MER, multiple + ejection bomb rack + MFA, Minister or + Ministry of Foreign Affairs + MG, Major + General + M/Gen, Major + General + MIDEASTFOR, + Middle East Force + MiG, Mikoyan-Gurevich + jet fighter (Soviet Union) + MilCon, Military + Construction + MinDef, Minister + of Defense + MinInt, Minister + of the Interior (Iraq) + MOD, Minister or + Ministry of Defense + MODA, Minister or + Ministry of Defense and Aviation (Saudi Arabia) + MTM, Military + Training Mission + MTT, military + training team + NAM, Non-Aligned + Movement + NATO, North Atlantic + Treaty Organization + NEA, Bureau of Near + Eastern and South Asian Affairs, Department of State + NEA/ARN, Office of + Lebanese, Jordanian, Syrian, and Iraqi Affairs, Bureau of Near Eastern and + South Asian Affairs, Department of State + NEA/ARP, Office of + Arabian Peninsular Affairs, Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, + Department of State + NEA/INS, Office of + Bhutan, India, Maldives, Nepal, and Sri Lanka Affairs, Bureau of Near + Eastern and South Asian Affairs, Department of State + NEA/IRN, Office of + Iranian Affairs, Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, Department + of State + + NEA/PAB, Office of + Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Bangladesh Affairs, Bureau of Near Eastern and + South Asian Affairs, Department of State + NEA/POL–MIL,Office of Political-Military Affairs, Bureau of + Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, Department of State + NEA/RA, Office of + Regional Affairs, Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, Department + of State + Niact, night + action + NIO, National + Intelligence Officer + Nocontract, no + contractor distribution + Nodis, no + distribution other than to persons indicated + NoForn, no foreign + dissemination + NORAD, North + American Aerospace Defense Command + Notal, not received + by all addressees + NSAM, National + Security Action Memorandum + NSC, National + Security Council + OASD/ISA/NESA, Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, Office + of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security + Affairs + ODC, Office of + Defense Coordination + OECD, Organization + for Economic Cooperation and Development + OJCS, Office of the + Joint Chiefs of Staff + OMB, Office of + Management and Budget + O&M, operation and + maintenance + OPEC, Organization + of Petroleum Exporting Countries + OPIC, Overseas + Private Investment Corporation + ORPA/ME, Middle + East Division, Office of Regional and Political Analysis, Central + Intelligence Agency + OSD, Office of the + Secretary of Defense + P, Office of the Under Secretary of State for + Political Affairs + P&D, production + & deployment + PACOM, Pacific + Command + para, + paragraph + PD, Presidential + Determination + PDRY, People’s + Democratic Republic of Yemen (South Yemen) + PermRep, + Permanent Representative + PG/IO, Persian Gulf/ + Indian Ocean + PLO, Palestine + Liberation Organization + PM, Bureau of + Politico-Military Affairs, Department of State + PM/ISO, Office of + International Security Operations, Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs, + Department of State + PM/ISP, Office of + International Security Policy, Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs, + Department of State + PM SANG, U.S. Army + Project Manager, Saudi Arabian National Guard Modernization Program + PM/SAS, Office of + Security Assistance and Sales, Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs, + Department of State + PO, Political + Officer + POL, petroleum, oil, + and lubricants + POMCUS, + prepositioning of materiel configured in unit sets + PRC, Presidential + Review Committee; Policy Review Committee; People’s Republic of China + PRM, Presidential + Review Memorandum + + R&D, research and + development + RADM, Real + Admiral + RAF, Royal Air Force + (United Kingdom) + RCC, Revolutionary + Command Council (Iraq) + RDF, Rapid Deployment + Force + RDJTF, Rapid + Deployment Joint Task Force + REDCOM, Readiness + Command + REDEYE, + shoulder-launched surface-to-air missile system + reftel; ref, reference telegram + Reps, + representatives + RG, Record + Group + Roland, + Franco-German-designed mobile surface-to-air missile system + RO/RO, roll on/roll + off + Rpt, repeat + RSAF, Royal Saudi + Air Force + S, Secretary of State; Secret + SACEUR, Supreme + Allied Commander Europe + SAG, Saudi Arabian + Government + SALT, Strategic Arms + Limitation Talks + SAM, surface-to-air + missile + SAMA, Saudi Arabian + Monetary Agency + SANG, National + Guard, Saudi Arabia + SCC, Special + Coordination Committee + SCTG, surface + combatant task group + SEATO, Southeast + Asia Treaty Organization + SecDef, Secretary + of Defense + Secto, series + indicator for telegrams sent from the Secretary of State while on + travel + SLOC, sea line of + communication + SNEP, Saudi Naval + Expansion Program + SOCP, Saudi Army + Ordnance Corps Program + S/P, Policy Planning + Staff, Department of State + Specat, special + category + SPR, Strategic + Petroleum Reserve + S/S, Office of the + Secretariat Staff, Department of State + SSBN, ballistic + missile submarine + S/S–O, Operations + Center, Office of the Secretariat Staff, Department of State + Stinger, portable + infrared-homing surface-to-air missile + SWA, Southwest + Asia + SYG, Secretary + General (United Nations) + T, Office of the Under Secretary of State for + Security Assistance; after August 22, 1977, Under Secretary of State for + Security Assistance, Science, and Technology + TACAIR, tactical + aircraft + Tosec, series + indicator for telegrams sent to the Secretary of State while on + travel + TOW, tube-launched, + optically-tracked, wire-guided anti-tank missile system + U, Office of the Under Secretary of State; + Unclassified + UAE, United Arab + Emirates + UCP, Unified Command + Plan + UK, United + Kingdom + UN, United + Nations + UNCTAD, United + Nations Conference on Trade and Development + UNGA, United Nations + General Assembly + + UNHCR, United + Nations High Commissioner for Refugees + UNRRA, United + Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration + U.S., United + States + USA, United States + Army + USAF, United States + Air Force + USCINCEUR, + United States Commander-in-Chief, Europe + USDAO, United + States Defense Attaché Office + USEOPE, + Operational Planning Element, United States European Command + USG, United States + Government + USINT, United + States Interests Section + USLO, United States + Liaison Office + USMC, United States + Marine Corps + USMTM, United + States Military Training Mission + USN, United States + Navy + USNATO, United + States Mission to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization + USSR, Union of + Soviet Socialist Republics + USUN, United States + Mission to the United Nations + V–B–B, + Vance-Brown-Brzezinski meeting + VOA, Voice of + America + WASHDC, + Washington, D.C. + XM1, early + designation for the U.S. main battle tank eventually known as the M1 + Abrams + YAR, Yemen Arab + Republic (North Yemen) + YARG, Government of + the Yemen Arab Republic + Z, Zulu Time Zone (Greenwich Mean Time) + ZB, Zbigniew + Brzezinski + ZBB, zero-based + budgeting + + + +
+ +
+ + Persons + + Aaron, David L., Deputy Assistant to the President for National + Security Affairs + Abalkhail, + Muhammad, Saudi Minister of Finance and National + Economy + Abdullah bin Aziz + al-Saud, Saudi Second Deputy Prime Minister + Abzug, + Bella, member, U.S. House of Representatives (D-New + York) from January 3, 1973, until January 3, 1977 + Adham, + Kamal, Director of the Saudi General Intelligence + Directorate + al-Ahmar, Abdullah ibn + Husayn, Yemen Arab Republic tribal leader and + politician + Ahmed bin Abdul Aziz + al-Saud, Saudi Prince and Deputy Minister of + Interior + Ali, Salim + Rubayyi, President of the People’s Democratic + Republic of Yemen from June 22, 1969, until June 26, 1978 + Alim, Abdallah + Abdal, Former Paratroop Commander, Yemen Arab + Republic Army + Alireza, Ali + Abdullah, Saudi Ambassador to the United States from + 1975 until 1979 + Allon, + Yigal, Israeli Foreign Minister from June 3, 1974, until + June 19, 1977 + Alston, Philip H., U.S. Ambassador to Australia from April 29, + 1977 + Arafat, + Yassir, Chairman of the Palestine Liberation + Organization + al-Arashi, Abdul Karim + Abdullah, President of the Yemen Arab Republic from + June 24, 1978, until July 18, 1978 + Aref, Abdul + Salam, President of Iraq from February 8, 1963, + until April 13, 1966 + Arietti, Michael R., Foreign Affairs Officer, Office of Arabian Peninsula + Affairs, Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, Department of + State + Armacost, Michael A., member, National Security Council Staff for East + Asian/Chinese Affairs until July 1979 + al-Asad (Assad) + Hafez, President of Syria + Ashtal, Abdullah + Saleh, People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen’s + Permanent Representative to the United Nations from May 29, 1973 + al-Asnaj, + Abdullah, Yemen Arab Republic Foreign Minister from + 1975 until 1979; Advisor to Yemen Arab Republic President + Atherton, Alfred L. (Roy), + Jr., Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern + and South Asian Affairs from April 25, 1974, until April 13, 1978; + Ambassador at Large from April 7, 1978, until May 22, 1979; U.S. Ambassador + to Egypt from July 2, 1979 + al-Ayni (Aini), + Muhsin, Yemen Arab Republic Permanent Representative + to the United Nations + Aziz, Tariq, + Deputy Prime Minister of Iraq from 1979 + Azzawi, + Fadhil, Head of the Iraqi Interests Section in + Washington from 1979 until 1980 + Baker, + Howard, Senator (R-Tennessee) + al-Bakr, Ahmed + Hassan, President of Iraq from July 17, 1968, until + July 16, 1979; Prime Minister of Iraq from July 31, 1968, until July 16, + 1979 + Barre, Siad, + President of Somalia + Bartholomew, + Reginald, member, National Security Council Staff + until April 1979; Director, Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs, Department + of State, from July 1, 1979 + Begin, + Menachem, Prime Minister of Israel from June 21, + 1977 + Benson, Lucy + W.P., Under Secretary of State for Security + Assistance, Science, and Technology until January 5, 1980 + Biden, Joseph Robinette, + Jr., Senator (D-Delaware) + Blumenthal, W. + Michael, Secretary of the Treasury from January 23, + 1977, until August 4, 1979 + + Bodine, + Barbara, Office of Arabian Peninsula Affairs, Bureau of + Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, Department of State + Bowie, + Robert, Director, National Foreign Affairs Center, + Central Intelligence Agency + Bremer, L. + Paul, Deputy Executive Secretary, Department of State, + after 1979 + Brezhnev, + Leonid, General Secretary of the Central Committee of + the Communist Party of the Soviet Union + Brown, George S., General, USAF; Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff until + June 20, 1978 + Brown, + Harold, Secretary of Defense + Brzezinski, Zbigniew K., Assistant to the President for National Security + Affairs + Byrd, + Robert, Senator (D-West Virginia); Senate Majority + Leader + Carlucci, Frank C., Deputy Director of Central Intelligence + Carrington, Lord (Peter + Alexander Carrington), Secretary of State for + Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs of the United Kingdom from May 1979 + Carswell, + Robert, Deputy Secretary of the Treasury + Carter, James Earl + (Jimmy), President of the United States + Carter, William Hodding, + III, Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs + from March 25, 1977, until June 30, 1980; Department of State + Spokesman + Case, Clifford P. Jr., Senator (R-New Jersey) + Castro, + Fidel, President of Cuba + Cathey, Charles H., Jr., Major General, USA; Head of U.S. Military Training + Mission in Saudi Arabia from July 1977 until July 1979 + Cecil, Charles O., Foreign Affairs Officer, Office of Arabian Peninsula + Affairs, Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, Department of + State + Chapin, Frederic L., U.S. Ambassador to Ethiopia from 1978 until + 1980 + Christopher, Warren M., Deputy Secretary of State + Church, Frank F., Senator (D-Idaho); Chairman, Senate Committee on + Foreign Relations + Claytor, W. Graham, Jr., Deputy Secretary of Defense from August 24, 1979, + until January 16, 1981 + Clements, William Perry, + Jr., Deputy Secretary of Defense from 1971 until + 1977 + Clift, A. + Denis, Assistant to the Vice President for National + Security Affairs + Cluverius, Wat T., + IV, U.S. Ambassador to Bahrain until August 2, + 1978 + Constable, Peter D., Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern + and South Asian Affairs; member of Iran Working Group, Department of + State + Cooper, Richard N., Under Secretary of State for Economic and Agricultural + Affairs, + Countryman, John R., Deputy Director, Office of Regional Affairs, Bureau of + Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, Department of State; Office Director, + Office of Arabian Peninsula Affairs, Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian + Affairs, Department of State + Crawford, William R., Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern + and South Asian Affairs + Cutler, + Lloyd, White House Counsel from October 1, 1979, until + November 30, 1980 + Dayan, + Moshe, Israeli Minister of Foreign Affairs until October + 21, 1979 + Dean, John + Gunther, U.S. Ambassador to Lebanon + Denend, Leslie G., member, National Security Council Staff; Special + Assistant to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs from + January 1980 until January 1981 + Dickman, François M., U.S. Ambassador to the United Arab Emirates until + August 4, 1979; U.S. Ambassador to Kuwait from October 24, 1979 + Dinitz, + Simcha, Israeli Ambassador to the United States + Dobrynin, Anatoli F., Soviet Ambassador to the United States + Dodson, + Christine, Deputy Staff Secretary, National Security + Council, from January 1977 until May 1977; Staff Secretary, National + Security Council, from May 1977 + + Draper, + Morris, Director, Office of Lebanon, Jordan, Syrian Arab + Republic, and Iraq Affairs, Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, + Department of State + Duncan, Charles W., Jr., Deputy Secretary of Defense + Earle, Ralph, + II, Head of the U.S. Delegation to the SALT talks; + Director, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency from January 3,1980, until + January 15, 1981 + Eilts, Hermann F., U.S. Ambassador to Egypt until May 20, 1979 + Eisenhower, Dwight D. + , President of the United States from 1953 until + 1961 + Eizenstat, Stuart E., Executive Director, White House Domestic Policy Staff + and Assistant to the President for Domestic Affairs and Policy + Ermarth, + Fritz, member, National Security Council Staff for + Defense Coordination from September 1978 until November 1980 + Evron, + Ephraim, Director-General of the Israeli Foreign + Ministry + Fahd bin Abdul Aziz + al-Saud, Crown Prince of Saudi Arabia + Fahmy, + Ismail, Deputy Prime Minister of Egypt from 1975 until + 1977; Foreign Minister from 1973 until 1977 + Fish, + Hamilton, member, U.S. House of Representatives (R-New + York) + Fish, Howard M., Lieutenant General, USAF; Director, Defense Security + Assistance Agency, until March 1, 1978 + Ford, Gerald R., President of the United States from 1974 until + 1977 + François-Poncet, + Jean, French Minister of Foreign Affairs from 1978 + until 1981 + Fraser, John + Malcolm, Prime Minister of Australia + Fukuda, + Takeo, Prime Minister of Japan from December 24, 1976, + until December 7, 1978 + Funk, Gerald P., member, National Security Council Staff + Gamasy (Jamasi), Mohammed + Abdel Ghani, Lieutenant General, Egyptian Minister + of Defense until September 1978 + Gandhi, + Indira, Prime Minister of India from 1966 until 1977 and + 1980 until 1984 + Gates, + Robert, Special Assistant to the Assistant to the + President for National Security Affairs from April 1979 until December 1979; + National Intelligence Officer for the Soviet Union, Central Intelligence + Agency, from January 1980 + Gelb, Leslie H., Assistant Secretary of State for Politico-Military + Affairs from February 23, 1977, until June 30, 1979 + Gerlach, + Frederick, U.S. Liaison Office, Riyadh, from 1978 + until 1982 + al-Ghashmi, Ahmed bin + Hussein, President of the Yemen Arab Republic from + October 11, 1977, until June 24, 1978 + Giscard d’Estaing, + Valéry, President of France + Gnehm, Edward William, Jr. + , Deputy Chief of Mission, U.S. Embassy in Sana, Yemen + Arab Republic, from 1978 until 1981 + Gromyko, Andrei A., Soviet Minister of Foreign Affairs + Habib, Phillip C., Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs from + June 16, 1976, until April 1, 1978 + al-Hajri, + Abdullah, Prime Minister of the Yemen Arab Republic + from December 30, 1972, until April 10, 1974 + al-Hamdi, + Ibrahim, President of the Yemen Arab Republic from June + 13, 1974, until October 11, 1977 + Hammadi, + Sa’dun, Iraqi Foreign Minister from 1974 + Hassan II, + King of Morocco + Henze, Paul B., member, National Security Council Staff for + Intelligence Coordination + Holbrooke, + Richard, Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian + and Pacific Affairs from March 31, 1977, until January 13, 1981 + Hudayan, + Salih, Saudi Military Attaché, Yemen Arab + Republic + + Humphrey, Hubert H., Senator (D-Minnesota) + Hussein bin + Talal, King of Jordan from 1952 + Hussein al-Tikriti, + Saddam, Vice Chairman of the Iraqi Revolutionary + Command Council and Assistant Secretary-General of the Ba’ath Party + Inderfurth, Karl F. + (Rick), Special Assistant to the Assistant to the + President for National Security Affairs until April 1979 + Ismail, Abd + al-Fattah, President of the People’s Democratic + Republic of Yemen from December 21, 1978, until April 21, 1980 + Jackson, Henry M. + (Scoop), Senator (D-Washington) + Janka, Leslie A., Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Near Eastern + and South Asian Affairs + Javits, Jacob K., Senator (R-New York) + Jones, David C., General, USAF; Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, from + June 21, 1978 + Jordan, + Hamilton, White House Chief of Staff from 1979 until + 1980 + Jughman, + Yahya, Special Representative of the Yemen Arab Republic + President + Kennedy, Edward + (Ted), Senator (D-Massachusetts) + Khaddam, Abdul + Halim, Syrian Minister of Foreign Affairs + Khairollah, + Adnan, Iraqi Deputy Commander-in-Chief and Minister of + Defense + Khalid bin Abdul + Aziz, King of Saudi Arabia + al-Khateeb, + Mouhyi, Head of Iraqi Interests Section in + Washington from 1977 until 1979 + Kirbo, + Charles, friend of President Carter + Kissinger, + Henry, Assistant to the President for National Security + Affairs from January 1969 until November 1975; Secretary of State from + September 1973 until January 1977 + Komer, Robert W., Under Secretary of Defense for Policy + Kosygin, + Aleksey, Chairman of the Soviet Council of + Ministers + Kreisberg, Paul H., staff member, Policy Planning Staff, Department of + State + Lake, W. + Anthony, Director, Policy Planning Staff, Department of + State + Lance, Bert, + Director of the Office of Management and Budget from January 23, 1977, until + September 21, 1977 + Lane, George M., U.S. Ambassador to the Yemen Arab Republic from + October 5, 1978, until July 4, 1981 + Lawrence, Richard D., Major General, USA; Chief, United States European + Command Operational Planning Element + Linowitz, Sol + M, Special Representative of the President to the Middle + East peace negotiations from December 4, 1979 + Maestrone, Frank E., U.S. Ambassador to Kuwait + Maynes, Charles W., Assistant Secretary of State for International + Organization Affairs from April 14, 1977, until April 9, 1980 + McGiffert, David E., Assistant Secretary of Defense for International + Security Assistance + McIntyre, James T., Director, Office of Management and Budget from + September 24, 1977 + Mengistu, Mariam + Haile, President of Ethiopia + Miller, G. + William, Secretary of the Treasury from August 6, + 1979, until January 31, 1981 + Moi, Daniel + arap, President of Kenya from 1978 + Mondale, Walter F., Vice-President of the United States + Moore, + Frank, Assistant to the President for Congressional + Liaison + Muhammad, Ali + Nasser, President of the People’s Democratic + Republic of Yemen from June 26, 1978, until December 27, 1978, and from + April 1980 + + Muhammad bin Abdul Aziz + al-Saud, Saudi Prince, full-brother of King + Khalid + Murphy, + Daniel, Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for + Policy + Murray, Robert J., Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Near + Eastern, African, and South Asian Affairs + Muskie, Edmund S., Secretary of State from May 8, 1980, until January 18, + 1981 + Nasser, Gamal + Abdel, President of Egypt from June 23, 1956, until + September 28, 1970 + Newhouse, + John, Assistant Director, International Security + Programs Bureau, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency + Newsom, David D., Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs from + April 13, 1978 + Nimetz, + Matthew, Counselor, Department of State, until March 19, + 1980; Assistant Secretary of State for Arms Control and International + Security Affairs from February 19, 1980, until December 5, 1980 + Nixon, Richard M., President of the United States from 1969 until + 1974 + Owen, David, + British Foreign Secretary from February 21, 1977, until May 4, 1979 + Owen, Henry D., Special Representative for Economic Summits from March + 1977; member, National Security Council Staff for International Economics + from October 1977; Ambassador at Large from October 1978 + Pahlavi, Mohammad + Reza, Shah of Iran from September 16, 1941, until + February 11, 1979 + Parker, Richard B., U.S. Ambassador to Lebanon from February 10, + 1977 + Peacock, + Andrew, Australian Minister for Foreign Affairs + Peck, + Edward, Chief of Mission, U.S. Embassy in Bagdad + Peres, + Shimon, Acting Prime Minister of Israel from April 22, + 1977, until June 21, 1977 + Porter, William + James, U.S. Ambassador to Saudi Arabia from February + 21, 1976, until May 27, 1977 + Powell, Joseph + (Jody), White House Press Secretary + Pustay, + John, Lieutenant General, USAF; Assistant to the + Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff + Qaboos bin Said al + Said, Sultan of Oman + Quandt, William B., member, National Security Council Staff for Middle + East and North African Affairs from January 1977 until August 1979 + Ransom, David M., Deputy Chief of Mission, U.S. Embassy in Sana, until + September 27, 1978; Deputy Director, Near East and South Asia Region, Office + of the Secretary of Defense + Reagan, Ronald W., Governor of California; Republican nominee for + President; President of the United States from 1981 + Renouf, Alan P., Australian Ambassador to the United States from 1977 + until 1979 + Ribicoff, Abraham A., Senator (D-Connecticut) + Rosenthal, Benjamin + Stanley, member, U.S. House of Representatives + (D-New York) + Sabbagh, Isa K., Special Counselor, U.S. Embassy in Jidda + al-Sadat, + Anwar, President of Egypt + Said, Ahmad + Abdu, Yemen Arab Republic + Salih, Ali + Abdullah, President of Yemen Arab Republic from July + 18, 1978; Vice President of Yemen Arab Republic from June 24, 1978, until + July 18, 1978 + Salman bin Abdul Aziz + al-Saud, Saudi Prince and Governor of Riyadh + Sarkis, + Elias, President of Lebanon + Saud bin Faisal + al-Saud, Saudi Deputy Minister of Petroleum and + Mineral Resources; Minister of Foreign Affairs + + Saunders, + Harold, Assistant Secretary of State for Intelligence + and Research from December 1, 1975, until April 10, 1978; Assistant + Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs from April 11, + 1978, until January 16, 1981 + Schlesinger, James R., Assistant to the President from 1977 until 1978; + Secretary of Energy from August 5, 1977 + Scotes, Thomas J., U.S. Ambassador to Yemen Arab Republic (North Yemen) + from January 21, 1975, until April 24, 1978 + Seignious, George M., + II, Director, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, + from December 4, 1978, until January 3, 1980 + Shahi, Agha, + Pakhistani Permanent Representative to the United Nations from 1967 until + 1972 + Shayba, Ali, + Yemen Arab Republic Chief of Staff + Sick, Gary, + member, National Security Council Staff for Middle East and North African + Affairs + Sober, + Sidney, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near + Eastern and South Asian Affairs + Solarz, Stephen + Joshua, member, U.S. House of Representatives (D-New + York) + Solomon, Anthony M., Under Secretary of the Treasury for Monetary Affairs + from March 1977 until March 1980; New York Federal Reserve Bank President + from April 1980 + Spiers, Ronald I., U.S. Ambassador to Turkey from May 26, 1977, until + January 11, 1980; Director, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department + of State, from January 28, 1980 + Sterner, + Michael, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near + Eastern and South Asian Affairs + Stevens, Theodore Fulton + (Ted), Senator (R-Alaska) + Stone, + Richard, Senator (D-Florida) + Strauss, Robert S., Special Representative of the President to the Middle + East peace negotiations from April 24, 1979, until November 6, 1979 + Suleiman, Sadek J., Omani Ambassador to the United States from 1979 + Sultan bin Abdul Aziz + al-Saud, Saudi Minister of Defense + Tarnoff, Peter R., Executive Secretary of the Department of State and + Special Assistant to Secretary Vance + Thatcher, + Margaret, British Prime Minister from May 4, + 1979 + Thornton, + Thomas, member, National Security Council Staff for + South Asian and United Nations Affairs + Toon, + Malcolm, U.S. Ambassador to the Soviet Union until + October 16, 1979 + Turki + al-Faisal, Director of the Saudi General Intelligence + Directorate + Turner, + Stansfield, Admiral, USN; Director of Central + Intelligence + Twinam, Joseph W., Director, Office of Arabian Peninsula Affairs, Bureau + of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, Department of State; Deputy + Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs + Vance, Cyrus R., Secretary of State from January 23, 1977, until April + 28, 1980 + Veliotes, Nicolas A., Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern + and South Asian Affairs from 1977 until 1978 + Waldheim, + Kurt, United Nations Secretary General + Warnke, Paul C., Director, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, from + March 14, 1977, until October 31, 1978 + West, John C., U.S. Ambassador to Saudi Arabia from June 8, + 1977 + White, John, + Deputy Director, Office of Management and Budget + Wiley, Marshall W., U.S. Ambassador to Oman from November 7, 1978 + + Wisner, Frank G., + III, Deputy Executive Secretary, Department of + State + Yamani, Ahmed + Zaki, Saudi Minister of Oil + Young, Andrew J., U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations from January 27, + 1977, until September 23, 1979 + Zablocki, Clement J., member, U.S. House of Representatives + (D-Wisconsin) + al-Zawawi, Qais bin Abdul + Munim, Omani Minister of Foreign Affairs + Zia al-Haq, + Mohammed, General, President and military ruler of + Pakistan from July 1977 + Zorinsky, + Edward, Senator (D-Nebraska) + + + +
+ +
+ + Note on U.S. Covert Actions +

In compliance with the Foreign Relations of the United + States statute that requires inclusion in the Foreign + Relations series of comprehensive documentation on major foreign policy + decisions and actions, the editors have identified key documents regarding major + covert actions and intelligence activities. The following note will provide + readers with some organizational context on how covert actions and special + intelligence operations in support of U.S. foreign policy were planned and + approved within the U.S. Government. It describes, on the basis of declassified + documents, the changing and developing procedures during the Truman, Eisenhower, Kennedy, Johnson, Nixon, + Ford, and Carter Presidencies.

+

Management of Covert Actions in the Truman Presidency

+

The Truman administration’s concern over Soviet “psychological warfare” prompted + the new National Security Council to authorize, in NSC 4–A of December 1947, the + launching of peacetime covert action operations. NSC 4–A made the Director of + Central Intelligence responsible for psychological warfare, establishing at the + same time the principle that covert action was an exclusively Executive Branch + function. The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) + certainly was a natural choice but it was assigned this function at least in + part because the Agency controlled unvouchered funds, by which operations could + be funded with minimal risk of exposure in Washington.NSC 4–A, December 17, 1947, is printed in Foreign Relations, + 1945–1950, Emergence of the Intelligence Establishment, Document + 257.

+

The CIA’s early use of its new covert action + mandate dissatisfied officials at the Departments of State and Defense. The + Department of State, believing this role too important to be left to the CIA alone and concerned that the military might + create a new rival covert action office in the Pentagon, pressed to reopen the + issue of where responsibility for covert action activities should reside. + Consequently, on June 18, 1948, a new NSC directive, NSC 10/2, superseded NSC + 4–A.

+

NSC 10/2 directed the CIA to conduct “covert” + rather than merely “psychological” operations, defining them as all activities + “which are conducted or sponsored by this Government against hostile foreign + states or groups or in support of friendly foreign states or groups but which + are so planned and executed that any US Government responsibility for them is + not evident to unauthorized persons and that if uncovered the US Government can plausibly disclaim any + responsibility for them.”

+

The type of clandestine activities enumerated under the new directive included: + “propaganda; economic warfare; preventive direct action, including sabotage, + demolition and evacuation measures; subversion against hostile states, including + assistance to underground resistance movements, guerrillas and refugee + liberations [sic] groups, and support of indigenous + anti-Communist elements in threatened countries of the free world. Such + operations should not include armed conflict by recognized military forces, + espionage, counter-espionage, and cover and deception for military + operations.”NSC 10/2, June 18, 1948, is printed + ibid., Document 292.

+

The Office of Policy Coordination (OPC), newly established in the CIA on September 1, 1948, in accordance with NSC + 10/2, assumed responsibility for organizing and managing covert actions. The + OPC, which was to take its guidance from the Department of State in peacetime + and from the military in wartime, initially had direct access to the State + Department and to the military without having to proceed through the CIA’s administrative hierarchy, provided the + Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) was + informed of all important projects and decisions.Memorandum of conversation by Frank G. + Wisner, “Implementation of NSC–10/2,” August 12, 1948, is + printed ibid., Document + 298. In 1950 this arrangement was modified to ensure that + policy guidance came to the OPC through the DCI.

+

During the Korean conflict the OPC grew quickly. Wartime commitments and other + missions soon made covert action the most expensive and bureaucratically + prominent of the CIA’s activities. Concerned + about this situation, DCI Walter Bedell Smith + in early 1951 asked the NSC for enhanced policy guidance and a ruling on the + proper “scope and magnitude” of CIA operations. + The White House responded with two initiatives. In April 1951 President Truman + created the Psychological Strategy Board (PSB) under the NSC to coordinate + government-wide psychological warfare strategy. NSC 10/5, issued in October + 1951, reaffirmed the covert action mandate given in NSC 10/2 and expanded the + CIA’s authority over guerrilla + warfare.NSC 10/5, “Scope and Pace of Covert + Operations,” October 23, 1951, is printed in Foreign Relations, + 1950–1955, The Intelligence Community, Document 90. The PSB + was soon abolished by the incoming Eisenhower administration, but the expansion of the CIA’s covert action writ in NSC 10/5 helped ensure + that covert action would remain a major function of the Agency.

+

As the Truman administration ended, the CIA was + near the peak of its independence and authority in the field of covert action. + Although the CIA continued to seek and receive + advice on specific projects from the + NSC, the PSB, and the departmental representatives originally delegated to + advise the OPC, no group or officer outside of the DCI and the President himself had authority to order, approve, + manage, or curtail operations.

+

NSC 5412 Special Group; 5412/2 Special Group; 303 + Committee

+

The Eisenhower administration began + narrowing the CIA’s latitude in 1954. In + accordance with a series of National Security Council directives, the + responsibility of the Director of Central Intelligence for the conduct of covert + operations was further clarified. President Eisenhower approved NSC 5412 on March 15, 1954, reaffirming the + Central Intelligence Agency’s responsibility for conducting covert actions + abroad. A definition of covert actions was set forth; the DCI was made responsible for coordinating with + designated representatives of the Secretary of State and the Secretary of + Defense to ensure that covert operations were planned and conducted in a manner + consistent with U.S. foreign and military policies; and the Operations + Coordinating Board was designated the normal channel for coordinating support + for covert operations among State, Defense, and the CIA. Representatives of the Secretary of State, the Secretary of + Defense, and the President were to be advised in advance of major covert action + programs initiated by the CIA under this policy + and were to give policy approval for such programs and secure coordination of + support among the Departments of State and Defense and the CIA.William M. Leary, + editor, The Central Intelligence Agency: History and + Documents (The University of Alabama Press, 1984), p. 63; for text + of NSC 5412, see Foreign Relations, 1950–1955, The Intelligence Community, + Document 171.

+

A year later, on March 12, 1955, NSC 5412/1 was issued, identical to NSC 5412 + except for designating the Planning Coordination Group as the body responsible + for coordinating covert operations. NSC 5412/2 of December 28, 1955, assigned to + representatives (of the rank of assistant secretary) of the Secretary of State, + the Secretary of Defense, and the President responsibility for coordinating + covert actions. By the end of the Eisenhower administration, this group, which became known as the + “NSC 5412/2 Special Group” or simply “Special Group,” emerged as the executive + body to review and approve covert action programs initiated by the CIA.Leary, The Central Intelligence Agency: History and + Documents, pp. 63, 147–148; Final Report of the + Select Committee To Study Governmental Operations With Respect to + Intelligence Activities, United States Senate, Book I, Foreign and Military Intelligence (1976), pp. 50–51. + For texts of NSC 5412/1 and NSC 5412/2, see Foreign Relations, + 1950–1955, The Intelligence Community, Documents 212 and 250. The membership of the + Special Group varied depending upon the situation faced. Meetings were + infrequent until 1959 when weekly meetings began to be held. Neither the CIA nor the Special Group adopted fixed criteria + for bringing projects before the group; initiative remained with the CIA, as + members representing other agencies frequently were unable to judge the + feasibility of particular projects.Leary, The Central Intelligence Agency: History and + Documents, p. 63.

+

After the Bay of Pigs failure in April 1961, General Maxwell Taylor reviewed U.S. + paramilitary capabilities at President Kennedy’s request and submitted a report + in June that recommended strengthening high-level direction of covert + operations. As a result of the Taylor Report, the Special Group, chaired by the + President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs McGeorge Bundy, and + including Deputy Under Secretary of State U. Alexis Johnson, Deputy Secretary of + Defense Roswell Gilpatric, Director of Central Intelligence Allen Dulles, and + Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Lyman Lemnitzer, assumed greater + responsibility for planning and reviewing covert operations. Until 1963 the + DCI determined whether a CIA-originated project was submitted to the + Special Group. In 1963 the Special Group developed general but informal + criteria, including risk, possibility of success, potential for exposure, + political sensitivity, and cost (a threshold of $25,000 was adopted by the + CIA), for determining whether covert action + projects were submitted to the Special Group.Ibid., + p. 82.

+

From November 1961 to October 1962 a Special Group (Augmented), whose membership + was the same as the Special Group plus Attorney General Robert Kennedy and + General Taylor (as Chairman), exercised responsibility for Operation Mongoose, a + major covert action program aimed at overthrowing the Castro regime in Cuba. When President Kennedy + authorized the program in November, he designated Brigadier General Edward G. + Lansdale, Assistant for Special Operations to the Secretary of Defense, to act + as chief of operations, and Lansdale coordinated the Mongoose activities among + the CIA and the Departments of State and + Defense. The CIA units in Washington and Miami + had primary responsibility for implementing Mongoose operations, which included + military, sabotage, and political propaganda programs.See Foreign + Relations, 1961–1963, volume X, Cuba, 1961–1962, Documents + 270 and 278.

+

President Kennedy also established a Special Group (Counter-Insurgency) on + January 18, 1962, when he signed NSAM No. 124. The Special Group (CI), set up to + coordinate counter-insurgency activities separate from the mechanism for + implementing NSC 5412/2, was to confine itself to establishing broad policies + aimed at preventing and resisting subversive insurgency and other forms of + indirect aggression in friendly countries. In early 1966, in NSAM No. 341, + President Johnson assigned + responsibility for the direction and coordination of counter-insurgency + activities overseas to the Secretary of State, who established a Senior + Interdepartmental Group to assist in discharging these responsibilities.For text of NSAM No. 124, see ibid., volume VIII, National Security Policy, + Document 68. NSAM No. 341, March 2, 1966, is printed ibid., 1964–1968, volume XXXIII, Organization and + Management of U.S. Foreign Policy; United Nations, Document + 56.

+

NSAM No. 303, June 2, 1964, from Bundy to the Secretaries of State and Defense + and the DCI, changed the name of “Special Group + 5412” to “303 Committee” but did not alter its composition, functions, or + responsibility. Bundy was the chairman of the 303 Committee.For text of NSAM No. 303, see ibid., Document 204.

+

The Special Group and the 303 Committee approved 163 covert actions during the + Kennedy administration and 142 during the Johnson administration through + February 1967. The 1976 Final Report of the Church Committee, however, estimated + that of the several thousand projects undertaken by the CIA since 1961, only 14 percent were considered on a case-by-case + basis by the 303 Committee and its predecessors (and successors). Those not + reviewed by the 303 Committee were low-risk and low-cost operations. The Final + Report also cited a February 1967 CIA + memorandum that included a description of the mode of policy arbitration of + decisions on covert actions within the 303 Committee system. The CIA presentations were questioned, amended, and + even on occasion denied, despite protests from the DCI. Department of State objections modified or nullified proposed + operations, and the 303 Committee sometimes decided that some agency other than + the CIA should undertake an operation or that + CIA actions requested by Ambassadors on the + scene should be rejected.Final + Report of the Select Committee To Study Governmental Operations With + Respect to Intelligence Activities, United States Senate, Book I, + Foreign and Military Intelligence, pp. + 56–57.

+

The effectiveness of covert action has always been difficult for any + administration to gauge, given concerns about security and the difficulty of + judging the impact of U.S. initiatives on events. In October 1969 the new + Nixon administration required annual + 303 Committee reviews for all covert actions that the Committee had approved and + automatic termination of any operation not reviewed after 12 months. On February + 17, 1970, President Nixon signed + National Security Decision Memorandum 40,For text + of NSDM 40, see Foreign + Relations, 1969–1976, volume II, Organization and Management of + U.S. Foreign Policy, 1969–1972, Document 203. which + superseded NSC 5412/2 and changed the name of the covert action approval group + to the 40 Committee, in part because the 303 Committee had been named in the + media. The Attorney General was also added to the membership of the Committee. + NSDM 40 reaffirmed the DCI’s responsibility for the coordination, + control, and conduct of covert operations and directed him to obtain policy + approval from the 40 Committee for all major and “politically sensitive” covert + operations. He was also made responsible for ensuring an annual review by the 40 + Committee of all approved covert operations.

+

The 40 Committee met regularly early in the Nixon administration, but over time the number of formal + meetings declined and business came to be conducted via couriers and telephone + votes. The Committee actually met only for major new proposals. As required, the + DCI submitted annual status reports to the + 40 Committee for each approved operation. According to the 1976 Church Committee + Final Report, the 40 Committee considered only about 25 percent of the CIA’s individual covert action projects, + concentrating on major projects that provided broad policy guidelines for all + covert actions. Congress received briefings on only a few proposed projects. Not + all major operations, moreover, were brought before the 40 Committee: President + Nixon in 1970 instructed the DCI to promote a coup d’ etat against Chilean + President Salvador Allende without Committee coordination or approval.Final Report of the Select + Committee To Study Governmental Operations With Respect to Intelligence + Activities, United States Senate, Book I, Foreign and Military + Intelligence, pp. 54–55, 57.

+

Presidential Findings Since 1974 and the Operations + Advisory Group

+

The Hughes-Ryan amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act of 1974 brought about a + major change in the way the U.S. Government approved covert actions, requiring + explicit approval by the President for each action and expanding Congressional + oversight and control of the CIA. The CIA was authorized to spend appropriated funds on + covert actions only after the President had signed a “finding” and informed + Congress that the proposed operation was important to national security.Public Law 93–559.

+

Executive Order 11905, issued by President Ford on February 18, 1976, in the wake of major Congressional + investigations of CIA activities by the Church + and Pike Committees, replaced the 40 Committee with the Operations Advisory + Group, composed of the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs, the + Secretaries of State and Defense, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and + the DCI, who retained responsibility for the + planning and implementation of covert operations. The OAG was required to hold + formal meetings to develop recommendations for the President regarding a covert + action and to conduct periodic reviews of previously-approved operations. EO + 11905 also banned all U.S. Government employees from involvement in political assassinations, a prohibition + that was retained in succeeding executive orders, and prohibited involvement in + domestic intelligence activities.Executive Order + 11905, “United States Foreign Intelligence Activities,” Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, Vol. 12, No. 8, + February 23, 1976.

+

Approval and oversight requirements for covert action continued to be governed by + the Hughes-Ryan amendment well into the Carter administration, even as the new administration made + alterations to the executive branch’s organizational structure for covert + action.

+

President Carter retained the NSC as the + highest executive branch organization to review and guide U.S. foreign + intelligence activities. As part of a broader NSC reorganization at the outset + of his administration, President Carter + replaced the Operations Advisory Group (OAG) with the NSC’s Special Coordination + Committee (SCC), which explicitly continued the same operating procedures as the + former OAG.The broader NSC reorganization sought to + reduce the number of NSC committees to two: the Policy Review Committee + (PRC) and the Special Coordination Committee (SCC). The SCC’s jurisdiction + included all intelligence policy issues other than annual budget and + priorities reviews; the SCC also had jurisdiction over other, + nonintelligence matters. Presidential Directive 2, “The National Security + Council System,” January 20, 1977, Carter Library, Vertical File, + Presidential Directives. See also Zbigniew + Brzezinski, Power and Principle: Memoirs of + the National Security Advisor 1977–198 (New York: Farrar, Strauss, Giroux, 1983), pp. 59–62. + Membership of the SCC, when meeting for the purpose of reviewing and making + recommendations on covert actions (as well as sensitive surveillance + activities), replicated that of the former OAG—namely: the Assistant to the + President for National Security Affairs; the Secretaries of State and Defense; + the Director of Central Intelligence; the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; + and the Attorney General and Director of the Office of Management and Budget + (the latter two as observers). The designated chairman of all SCC meetings was + the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs. Carter formalized the SCC’s replacement of the + OAG in EO 11985 of May 13, 1977, which amended President Ford’s EO 11905 on “United States Foreign + Intelligence activities.”Executive Order 11985, + “United States Foreign Intelligence Activities,” May 13, 1977, Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, Vol. + 13, No. 20 (May 16, 1977), pp. 719–720. In practice, the SCC for + covert action and sensitive surveillance activities came to be known as the SCC + (Intelligence) or the SCC-I, to distinguish it from other versions of the + SCC.

+

The SCC’s replacement of the OAG was reaffirmed in E.O. 12036 of January 24, + 1978, which replaced E.O. 11905 and its amendments. E.O. 12036 also reaffirmed + the same membership for the SCC-I, but identified the Attorney General and the + Director of the Office of Management and Budget as full members of the + Committee, rather than merely observers.

+ +

Also in the first days of the Carter + administration, the SCC-I established a lower-level working group to study and + review proposals for covert action and other sensitive intelligence matters and + report to the SCC-I. This interagency working group was chaired by the Deputy + Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs (David Aaron), or in his absence, the NSC + Director for Intelligence Coordination. The working group was named the Special + Activities Working Group (SAWG). The SAWG was active in early Carter administration reviews of ongoing + covert action, and remained active through at least 1978. NSC officials in + mid-1978 sought to downgrade or abolish the SAWG and replace it as needed with + ad hoc working groups. Internal NSC reviews at the end of the Carter administration state that the SAWG + gradually fell out of use. By late 1979, the means for debating, developing, and + guiding certain covert actions was an interagency working group chaired by + Aaron at the NSC. This group was + referred to by several names during the late Carter administration, including the Deputy’s (or Deputies) + group, the Aaron group, the interagency + group, the Black Chamber, and the Black Room.

+

The Carter administration made use of a + new category of presidential findings for “world-wide” or “general” (or + “generic”) covert operations. This continued a practice initiated late in the + Ford administration in response to + the Hughes-Ryan requirement for presidential findings. The worldwide category + covered lower-risk operations that were directed at broad policy goals + implemented on a worldwide basis as assets allowed. These operations utilized + existing assets as well as existing liaison contacts with foreign intelligence + or security services, and in some cases also consisted of routine training or + procurement undertaken to assist foreign intelligence partners or other agencies + of the USG.A new type of document —known as “Perspectives”—provided more + specific tasking guidance for these general, worldwide covert activities. + Perspectives detailed the themes to be stressed in furtherance of a particular + policy goal. Riskier operations required their own presidential finding or + Memorandum of Notification (see below). Perspectives were drafted by the CIA and cleared by the Department of State, so + that the CIA could vet the operational + feasibility and risks of the program while State could assess the diplomatic + risks and verify that the program was consistent with overall foreign policy + goals. At least initially, Perspectives did not require further coordination + with the OAG, SCC, or the President. Once an agreed-upon Perspectives document + was finalized by CIA and the Department of + State, it was transmitted to the field, and posts were required to make periodic + reports on any achievements under the Perspectives guidelines. Beginning in + 1978, actions in this worldwide category were authorized by the President as + specific line-item additions to a previously existing “world-wide” finding, + though Perspectives were still used to provide additional details.

+ +

Another new document used during the Carter administration was the “Memorandum of Notification” + (MON). MONs were initially used to introduce higher-risk, significantly + higher-cost, or more geographically-specific operations under a + previously-approved worldwide or general objective outlinedExecutive Order 12036, “United States Foreign Intelligence + Activities,” January 24, 1978, Weekly Compilation of + Presidential Documents, Vol. 14, No. 4 (January 30, 1978), pp. + 194–214. Since E.O. 12036 governed foreign intelligence activities, all + references in the E.O. to the “SCC” were effectively references to what was + known in practice as the SCC (Intelligence), or SCC-I. in a + Perspectives document. Like Perspectives, MONs had to be coordinated between the + CIA and the Department of State, but they + also required broader interagency coordination within the SAWG or SCC. MONs + subsequently came to be used for significant changes to any type of finding, not + just worldwide ones. Entirely new covert actions continued to require new + presidential findings. The Hughes-Ryan amendment stipulated that Congress be + notified of new findings “in a timely fashion,” but did not specify how much + time that meant. During the Carter + administration, the CIA typically notified + Congress of new covert initiatives within 48 hours, including those outlined in + Perspectives or MONs.

+

In October 1980, the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1981—also + known as the Intelligence Oversight Act of 1980—scaled back the Hughes-Ryan + amendment’s provisions for congressional oversight of covert action. While the + requirement to notify Congress about presidential findings remained in place, + the new Act limited the committees of Congress that had to be briefed to the two + intelligence committees, and also explicitly clarified that this requirement to + keep the committees “fully and currently informed” did not constitute a + requirement for congressional approval of covert action or other intelligence + activities. Moreover, the new Act stipulated that if the President determined it + was “essential to limit prior notice to meet extraordinary circumstances + affecting vital interests of the United States,” the President could limit prior + notice to the chairmen and ranking minority members of the two intelligence + committees, the Speaker and minority leader of the House, and the majority and + minority leaders of the Senate–-a group that came to be known as the “Gang of + Eight.” If prior notice of a covert action was withheld, the President was + required to inform the two intelligence committees “in a timely fashion” and + provide a statement of the reasons for not giving prior notice.PL 96–450, Sec. 407 (October 14, 1980). See also the + description of the Hughes-Ryan amendment and its replacement by PL 96–450 + in: Richard A. Best, Jr., “Covert Action: Legislative Background and + Possible Policy Questions,” Congressional Research Service, RL33715, + December 27, 2011, pp.1-2; and L. Britt Snider, The Agency + and the Hill: CIA’S Relationship with + Congress, 1946-2004, Washington: Center for the Study of + Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency, 2008, pp.280–81.

+
+ + + + + + +
+ Middle East Region; Arabian Peninsula +
+ + Middle East Region and the Gulf +
+ 1. Memorandum From William + Quandt and Gary + Sick of the National Security Council Staff to the + President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, + Staff Material, Middle East, Chron File, Box 130, Quandt: 2/1–2/77. Secret. Sent for + information. Brackets are in the original. + + + Washington, February + 2, 1977 + + + SUBJECT + Four-Year Goals in the Middle East + +

In the Middle East region, there are three broad areas in which to + consider our foreign policy objectives. Most critical is the + Arab-Israeli conflict, which will affect virtually all of the others in + some fashion. But also important are the development of cooperative + relations with key Middle East countries and a number of issues in the + Persian Gulf/Indian Ocean area.

+

The Arab-Israeli Conflict

+

Peace in the Middle East is a goal to which the United States is deeply + committed. Our interests and our friendships require it. But a conflict + which has remained unresolved for over fifty years cannot be brought to + a sudden end. Our objective, therefore, over the next several years, + should be to begin the process of seeking a peaceful settlement.

+

By the end of this year, we expect that a framework for negotiations will + exist. We could then urge the parties to develop a set of principles + that would outline the shape of a final peace agreement. For example, + all parties to the negotiations might be asked to agree that:

+ + + —The purpose of the negotiations underway is to achieve a peace + agreement that will guarantee the sovereignty of all the states in + the area. To this end, the parties commit themselves to work toward + a termination of all hostile actions and to the eventual + normalization of their relations. + —Peace must be based on mutual recognition and the establishment + of agreed and secure borders which do not constitute a source of + future conflicts. + —The parties are committed to work for a peace agreement that will + meet the legitimate concerns of the Palestinian people. + —The parties agree that a peace agreement should be implemented in + stages and that during the transition to full peace special security + measures for all sides will be essential. + +

The next step in negotiations, presumably during 1977, would be to work + on specific tradeoffs such as the end of belligerency for partial + Israeli withdrawal in Sinai and the Golan Heights. Next one might turn + to the Palestinian issue, perhaps seeking a solution within a confederal + Jordanian-Palestinian context.

+

As Israel is asked to make concessions on territory and on the + Palestinians as part of the negotiating process, the United States will + want to maintain a continuing and close dialogue on security issues, on + arms transfers, and on U.S. guarantees of the various parts of the peace + agreement. We will probably have to accept the reality that very high + levels of arms transfers to Israel will be required throughout this + phase. Only at a considerably later point in the peacemaking process can + we anticipate the possibility of reductions.

+

To the degree possible, we will want to keep the Soviet Union out of the + substantive part of the negotiations. The one area in which the Soviets + could be tested as to their intentions would be in trying to induce the + Palestinians to moderate their position on Israel’s existence. We should + make it clear that we expect the Soviets to use their influence with the + PLO to bring about acceptance of + the essential points of UN Resolutions + 242 and 338.

+

Middle East Development Prospects

+

Much of the Arab world is on the threshold of rapid socio-economic + change. Everywhere independence has been achieved, but only rarely has + serious attention been devoted to development. In the last part of this + decade, however, we can expect a more serious concentration on domestic + issues. The United States will therefore have an unusual opportunity to + assist in the development of an important part of the world. Since Arab + capital is abundant, the US contribution + will be primarily through technological assistance, our private sector + activities, and some ideas that will promote regional cooperation. To a + large degree, the same is true for Iran.

+

More specifically, the US should try at + an early date to revitalize our ongoing bilateral economic relations + with key countries. Joint commissions that already exist in Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Iran should be + made to work more effectively. Particularly in the case of Egypt, our + efforts need a higher degree of coordination for maximum political and + economic impact.

+

In the initial stages of our effort to promote development, we may have + to take initiatives and provide leadership. Our goal, however, should be + to encourage the countries of the area to assess their own needs and to + do their own planning. We should then try to improve our ability to be + responsive to their needs.

+

US Governmental efforts should + appropriately be directed at Egypt, Syria, Jordan and Lebanon. The private sector will remain + active in Iran and Saudi Arabia, and increasingly in Algeria and Iraq as + well. By 1980, we should be able to count on a very high volume of trade + with the Middle East, relatively modest transfers of US aid, with the exceptions of Israel and + perhaps Egypt, a very large private sector involvement in development + activities, and ongoing government-to-government consultations on + economic issues.

+

[This general issue should be raised during the staffing process with + State, Treasury and Commerce for suggestions on specific + instrumentalities and courses of action, which extend beyond our + technical expertise.]

+

Arabian Peninsula and Persian Gulf

+

US interests in this area revolve almost + entirely around questions of oil production, price and supply, together + with protection and encouragement of the considerable US commercial investments in the region. + From these interests, we derive an immediate stake in the security and + stability of the Persian Gulf region, both in terms of the regional + balance and in terms of our strategic relationship with the USSR. Our present situation in the area, + with the exception of oil prices, is basically favorable, and + realistically we would have no grounds to be dissatisfied if our + position four years from now was essentially the same. However, + fundamental trends at work in the area may tend to erode that position. + By the mid-1980’s, these trends could create a much more difficult + situation for US policy as Iraq begins + to replace Iran as the second largest oil producer in the Gulf, as + Soviet requirements for outside sources of oil possibly become more + acute, and as Soviet capability to project military influence into + remote areas comes to rival our own. Therefore, our policies over the + next four years must be designed to preserve our present advantages + while establishing policies designed to cope with foreseeable problems + just over the horizon.

+

We should attempt to expand the favorable climate for commercial exchange + with Iraq into other areas, with the objective of reestablishing + diplomatic relations at some point within the next four years. Barring + major political disturbances, + Iraq will emerge as a major regional power in the Gulf area over the + next 5–10 years, and it is in our interests to be in a position to + encourage them to adopt more moderate positions and reduce their + dependence on the Soviet Union. Our success will depend heavily on + internal developments in Iraq and on the progress toward a settlement of + the Arab-Israel dispute, which is the single greatest impediment to + improved US-Iraqi relations. We should, + however, be alert and responsive to even incremental shifts, + demonstrating our willingness to meet them at least half way. A + realistic objective over the next four years would be to establish a + relationship with Iraq comparable to that which we now have with Algeria + or Syria.

+

We should encourage the development of closer cooperation and + coordination among the nations of the Gulf on political, economic and + security matters. Although such initiatives must originate in the + region, we can stress our support for such an evolution in our normal + diplomatic contacts and visits and by offering preferential treatment to + economic, technical and security assistance requests which have a + regional or multilateral dimension.

+

We should begin to explore with the USSR the possibility of establishing mutually acceptable + limitations on military presence in the Indian Ocean area. At the + present time, neither superpower has a major military capability in the + area, but the basic support structure for a larger permanent presence is + being established. It is in our long-term interests to develop + meaningful limitations on US-Soviet + military presence, whether by formal agreement or by the development of + unwritten norms of behavior, which will serve to inhibit a sizeable + Soviet buildup. Otherwise, the Soviet interest in protecting its sea + lanes through the area, its determination to establish itself as a + global military power, and the momentum of its rivalry with China for + influence in the Third World may lead to a continuing upward spiral of + Soviet military presence which will directly affect the security of our + own oil supply and which would be difficult and expensive for us to + counter effectively.

+

In terms of oil pricing and supply, our most direct and powerful + influence lies in our own domestic energy policy and our diplomatic + influence with other energy consumers. The more we can help to flatten + the world demand curve for oil and the more we can demonstrate our + determination to explore vigorously alternative energy technologies, the + more weight will be given to our arguments in favor of adequate + production at manageable prices.

+
+ +
+ + 2. Action Memorandum From the Director of the Bureau of + Politico-Military Affairs (Gelb) + and the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian + Affairs (Atherton) to the Under + Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Habib)Source: + National Archives, RG 59, Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian + Affairs, Program Files for Oman, 1974–1989; UAE, 1989; Political Relations, 1969–1989, Lot 91D491, + Box 6, Def–15—MidEastfor 1977. Confidential. Drafted by Twinam and John E. Burgess (PM/ISO) on March 1; cleared by + William Lewis (AF/I) and in + substance by Granville S. Austin (S/P). Also cleared by Peter Lande (NEAPAB), Charles Naas (NEA/IRN), Albert Thibault (NEA/INS), Richard Hobbs (NEA/RA), and Sober. Burgess initialed the + memorandum for Gelb. + + + Washington, March 7, + 1977 + +

Future of Middle East Force

+

Issue for Decision:

+

Whether, as next step in obtaining a policy decision on pursuing the + Middle East Force negotiations, we should define for DOD what we believe would be the best + arrangement we will be likely to obtain for future support of Middle + East Force, seeking DOD’s view as to + whether this arrangement would be feasible from an operational + standpoint.

+

Background/Analysis:

+

The Indian Ocean posts have now responded with assessments of the + prospects for their host countries providing additional support to + Middle East Force to alleviate the pressure Bahrain feels from hosting + it alone.In telegram 30235 to multiple Middle + Eastern posts, February 10, the Department responded to a meeting + among Bahraini officials and Ambassador Cluverius in which the Bahrainis were seeking a + larger “burden sharing” role by regional nations, by asking + diplomatic posts in the region how their host governments would + respond to such a request. (National Archives, RG 59, Central + Foreign Policy File, D770047–0592) In telegram 244 from Manama, + January 29, Cluverius + described the initial conversation between himself and Bahraini + officials. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + D770033–0245) A summary of their generally similar views is + at Attachment 2.Attached but not printed is + the “Summary of Embassy Comments on an ‘Alternative Formula’ for + Middle East Force.” On the basis of their assessments and + recent additional comments by the Bahraini Foreign Minister, we see a + possibility of negotiating to keep Middle East Force in operation on the + following basis: (a) terminating the deployment agreement with Bahrain + and putting the Middle East Force Command to sea; (b) seeking a minimum + of six months in-port time for the Middle East Force flagship at a + number of Gulf/Indian Ocean ports, including Bahrain, with the + understanding that all of the port + calls would be simply visits and would not imply that Middle East Force + maintained anything resembling a headquarters ashore; and (c) + negotiating with Bahrain to keep a small DOD administrative logistical contingent there having + minimal specific identification with the Middle East Force Command.

+

We are not certain whether DOD would + find such an arrangement feasible. We are convinced, however, that + nothing more in the way of support from Bahrain or other countries in + the region for Middle East Force will be obtainable, and sustainable + over time under conditions consistent with our broader interests in the + area. We think it important to define this maximum obtainable + arrangement for DOD rather than to + await a DOD proposal for a negotiating + position. We suggest that you do so by approving the letter at + Attachment 1 to Deputy Secretary of Defense Dayan.Attached but not + printed. A handwritten notation on the first page of the memorandum + notes that Habib signed the + letter to Dayan and that it + was sent on March 11. In so doing, we would not be committing + the Secretary or the Administration to a policy decision on whether + Middle East Force should be maintained under the conditions posed by the + area’s political realities.

+

Arms Control Aspects:

+

In view of the Secretary’s intention to explore Soviet attitudes toward + Indian Ocean arms control discussions, there may, at some point, be a + need to reassess the role and composition of Middle East Force. Whether + US-Soviet discussions will + ultimately take place, whether discussions will apply to the Persian + Gulf, and whether ship deployments and port access will be touched on, + however, are still unclear. We believe that the current situation + counsels against major alterations to Middle East Force’s present + composition and mission. We specifically wish to avoid any actions which + would lead toward an “Indian Ocean Squadron” orientation.

+

Recommendation:

+

That you sign the letter at Attachment 1.

+
+ +
+ + 3. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in + BahrainSource: National + Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770094–0476. Secret; + Niact Immediate; Exdis. Drafted by Twinam; cleared by Sober, Janka, George Churchill (PM/ISO), Richard Hobbs (NEA/RA), Peter Lande (NEAPAB), Charles Naas (NEA/IRN), William Lewis (AF/I), and Leo Reddy (S/S); approved by Atherton. Sent for information + Immediate to Abu Dhabi, Doha, Dhahran, Jidda, Karachi, Kuwait, + Islamabad, Muscat, Nairobi, Port Louis, Tehran, Victoria, the + Department of Defense, JCS, CNO, CINCEUR, CINCUSNAVEUR, COMIDEASTFOR, CINCPAC, and CINCPACFLT. + + + Washington, March 19, 1977, 0343Z + +

61525. Exdis for the Amb—military addees handle as Specat Exclusive. Subject: Middle East + Force Discussions. Reference: State 30235.See + footnote 2, Document 2.

+

1. To pursue further possibility of retaining some sort of facilities in + Bahrain in support of U.S. Middle East Force operations, you should + approach appropriate GOB officials + along following lines indicating you are speaking under + instructions.

+

(A) USG has reviewed question of + continued U.S. Navy presence in Gulf/Indian Ocean and has determined + that such presence will continue to serve broad interests in stability + of area.

+

(B) USG is deeply appreciative of + hospitality which Bahrain has extended over many years to Middle East + Force Command and of contribution Bahrain has thus made to facilitate + maintenance of U.S. Naval Command in area.

+

(C) USG, as you know, would be pleased + to have the present arrangements in Bahrain continue somewhat longer. + (FYI: If at any point in your + discussions you feel it tactically advisable, you are authorized to + suggest to GOB that efforts to work out + a new formula for U.S. Navy presence in region in orderly fashion would + be measurably assisted if GOB would + extend present Middle East Force arrangements six months to a year. End + FYI).

+

(D) At the same time USG understands + GOB’s desire to work out new + arrangements which would permit U.S. Navy to continue to operate in area + without Bahrain appearing to be the sole point of regional support for + such operations. USG is prepared to + consider GOB’s ideas on how such new + arrangements might be worked out.

+

2. Begin FYI: After careful review with + DOD and taking into account recent + assessments of certain Embassies in area on likelihood of host + governments accepting Middle East Force visits, we believe Middle East + Force could continue to operate effectively on following basis if + necessary:

+ +

(A) Stationing agreement with Bahrain would be allowed to terminate upon + assurance that Bahrain would continue to permit Middle East Force ships + to visit and that status of forces provisions of current agreement would + be retained to cover DOD personnel + stationed in or visiting Bahrain in official capacity.

+

(B) Flagship and Middle East Force Command would cease to use Bahrain as + a homeport and Command would operate at sea from flagship. There would + be no ostensible Middle East Force Command presence onshore in + Bahrain.

+

(C) Middle East Force ships, including flagship, would be permitted to + visit Bahrain in approximately same manner they visit other selected + ports in area. For flagship we would need assurances that each such + visit could be up to one month in duration in Bahrain, two weeks + duration elsewhere. We would seek minimum of six such visits elsewhere, + and prefer four months total flagship time in Bahrain, providing a total + of seven months in port. If, as negotiations proceed, GOB proves unwilling to accept this + proportion of inport time, we would be prepared if necessary to scale + down progressively number of visits to Bahrain, and increase visits + elsewhere, to the point that inport time for flagship in Bahrain totals + two months a year—we would make every effort to restrict our requests to + other littoral states for increased inport time to frequency and + duration cited reftel.

+

(D) We would then negotiate with GOB to + retain as much as possible of the present administrative and logistical + support facilities Middle East Force presently enjoys in Bahrain, + including arrangements for flag aircraft. If necessary, DOD personnel permanently stationed ashore + in Bahrain (with possible exception of flag aircrew) would be within an + organizational structure having no direct ostensible link with Middle + East Force Command. Hence, support which DOD contingent provided to visiting Middle East Force ships + and personnel would, in appearance, be no different from support it + might provide to other DOD activities + including DOD participation in Bahrain + school. Obviously, present dols 4 + million per year rent which DOD pays to + GOB would have to be reviewed and + reduced in light of the facilities Bahrain continues to make available. + End FYI.

+

3. You are requested to seek clearest and most definitive possible GOB view of what support it might continue + to provide Middle East Force. You should report conversations fully, + without indicating acceptance of any formula at this stage without + further instructions. As discussions with GOB proceed, you can be guided by the consideration + presented para 2 above in seeking to + mold GOB thinking, but should not + repeat not indicate firm agreement to any of these conditions without + specific instructions. We would appreciate your assessment whether basic + operating conditions provided FYI above + are negotiable and indeed might be + made more flexible from our standpoint, e.g., would Bahrain be willing + to authorize more than four months of flagship visits annually with + understanding that additional time would not necessarily be + utilized.

+ + Vance + +
+ +
+ 4. Telegram From the Embassy in Bahrain to the Department of + StateSource: National + Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770098–0182. Secret; + Immediate; Exdis. Sent for + information to Abu Dhabi, Doha, Dhahran, Jidda, Karachi, Islamabad, + Muscat, Nairobi, Port Louis, Tehran, Victoria, and + Kuwait. + + + Manama, March 22, 1977, 1340Z + +

676. Subject: Principle of New Format for MIDEASTFOR Acceptable to GOB. Ref: Manama 649.In telegram + 649 from Manama, March 20, Cluverius described the conversation he had with the + Bahraini Foreign Minister concerning the contents of telegram 61525 + to Manama, March 19 (see Document 3), + describing options for a new format for the Middle East Force. + (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + D770094–0476)

+

1. Summary. Foreign Minister summoned me March 22 to inform me that Amir + and Prime Minister have accepted concept of new format along lines which + FonMin and I had discussed + (reftel). Decision will be + presented to full Cabinet March 27; FonMin expects Cabinet will readily put its seal of + approval on Amir’s decision. FonMin + sought clarification on number of points. End summary.

+

2. FonMin summoned me March 22 to + inform me of results March 21 meeting reported Manama 659In telegram 659 from Manama, March 21, Cluverius commented on press + reports and “local rumors and other indicators to effect that Navy + will stay in one form or another.” (National Archives, RG 59, + Central Foreign Policy File, D770096–0625) (Notal). Based on ideas FonMin and I have discussed, + particularly those described reftel, + FonMin said he, Amir, and Prime + Minister had considered three options during their March 21 meeting: + Keep Navy as it is, have it withdraw completely, or accept new + arrangement along lines he and I had developed over recent months. + FonMin said they had little + trouble choosing new arrangement. Bahrain values its ties with USG, and is strongly supportive of US role in region, and is pleased that way + can be found to maintain those ties, and support area interests, and at + same time relieve Bahrain of “imperialist base” image. He said decision + would be put before full Cabinet + at regular session March 27; he said he expected Cabinet would have no + trouble giving its approval to decision made by Amir and Prime + Minister.

+

3. FonMin said there will be many + details for him and me to work out over coming weeks—and he recalled + that ideas we had discussed remain subject to USG approval—but he wanted to get some items cleared up as + soon as possible:

+ + (A) Seventy-five personnel, with families, to remain after + de-homeporting. Was FonMin + correct in telling Amir that this figure does not include school + staff? I confirmed that they are additional to school staff. FonMin said fine, he just wanted to + be sure he had not misinformed Amir. + (B) Does Navy wish to keep its aircraft here after de-homeporting? + I said it did because location is relatively central to operating + area and services are good. FonMin made note but did not otherwise respond. + (C) Legal situation. FonMin + said he hated thought of getting deeply involved with GOB legal adviser (an expert + hairsplitter) on ways to cover new arrangement. He wanted to know + ASAP if exchange of notes we + had discussed (para 5 reftel) would be acceptable to + USG as way of handling all + elements of new arrangement. Would USG need to tell Congress, or seek its approval for new + arrangement? I said I would seek answers to these questions on + urgent basis. + (D) Duration. FonMin said he + felt a short period was not worth it, just as it is not worth it to + have DOD run school only for year + or so. He suggested open-ended arrangement subject to review every + two years. I said I would report his view. + (E) Rent. FonMin stressed that + question of rent is minor, of no interest to him, but even minor + questions must be answered. I agreed and said that while I had not + given it much thought either, I supposed USG would want to reduce it in line with reduced + presence. FonMin agreed that + this was likely and that he and I could work it out later. + (F) Port time. FonMin said + Navy access four months a year was agreeable. I said I felt Navy + would not need more than that but, as I had said earlier, it would + like to have more assured access time “just in case”. He said we + could talk about it later when we get more deeply into + details. + (G) Auspices. FonMin expressed + considerable concern over nature and image of Navy presence here + after de-homeporting. As he explained his concern he reached point + described para 2(D) of State + 061525:See Document + 3. “no ostensible link with MIDEASTFOR Command”. He said he + would prefer post de-homeporting arrangements to be tied as closely + as possible to DOD school. I said I + was not sure school could provide full rationale (having in mind + budgetary and other presentations to Congress) but that I felt + something could be worked out. In this regard, Dept might wish to + explore with DOD possibility of + putting residual presence here under, say, USMTM auspices. + (H) Communications. FonMin + asked if Navy wanted to keep antenna field at Jufair. I said it did + not since Navy really did not need it to maintain its communications. Navy has not + needed this field for some time and it is, in any case, destined to + be covered by reclamation project. + +

4. After decision in favor of new format, meeting with FonMin was most notable for what was + not discussed. FonMin again made no + mention of quid pro quo in security assistance or any other area. Nor + did he ask what others might do for Navy. He did not mention any + reduction whatever in Navy use of Jufair compound. Beyond curiosity + about antenna field he did not mention Navy communications, which + previously had been a somewhat touchy point (Manama 244See footnote 2, Document + 2.—Notal). It is + possible that FonMin did not raise + communications question in more detail simply because he does not + understand it. While it may well be that we will be able to keep present + communications set-up totally in place, I feel it would be prudent to + keep moving, as DOD is doing, on + alternative facilities for CHUSMTM.

+

5. Our basic approach to GOB, worked out + over past few months, has worked and task now is to nail down the + details, some of which, such as the “legal situation” and “auspices” + described above, are major and could still derail us. FonMin clearly wants to make much of + the de-homeporting aspect, including, he said, some kind of ceremony in + June, and to handle the post de-homeporting arrangement in as low-key + and invisible manner as possible. In his mind the school is important + not only for itself but as cover for our continuing military presence + here. While I appreciate problem school has given DOD, I would hope we can now accept that + DOD should run entire school for at + least first two years of new MIDEASTFOR format.

+

6. Next steps. FonMin said he and I + should begin to work out details soon after March 27 Cabinet meeting. I + have asked Admiral Crowe to return to Bahrain from Jordan to be on hand + as we work out these details. Formal USG acceptance of concept, and of as many details as + possible, should be forthcoming as soon as possible, as should answers + to FonMin’s questions posed above. + Question of de facto extension of at least some of present arrangements + is one I will, first, work out with Admiral Crowe and then, with Dept + approval, raise with FonMin.

+

7. Public posture. As noted Manama 659 (Notal) rumor that Navy will stay is common here and, + following March 27 Cabinet meeting at latest, decision to this effect + will be widely known. It is important that we consider urgently our + public posture on this. Since a credible de-homeporting has been key to + GOB acceptance of new format, it is + necessary that our, and GOB’s, public + statements fit this image. Request Dept. consider approach I outlined most recently in para 4 Manama 577In telegram 577 from Manama, March 13, Cluverius outlined his thoughts as + to new approaches to the Middle East Force. (National Archives, RG + 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770086–0663) (Notal) in which GOB and USG would jointly + announce termination of stationing agreement and establishment of MIDEASTFOR as afloat command. While + such announcement should be delayed as long as possible, ideally until + June, we will probably have to use it sooner. In any case we will need + interim guidance which, if Dept. agrees, could be simply present + guidance that discussions are continuing.

+

8. I will present further thoughts to Dept over next few days on details + of new arrangement.

+

9. Dept. please pass to military addressees included State 061525.

+ + Cluverius + +
+ +
+ 5. Action Memorandum From the Acting Director of the Bureau of + Politico-Military Affairs (Bartholomew) and the Assistant Secretary of State for + Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Atherton) to Secretary of State VanceSource: National Archives, RG 59, Bureau of Near + Eastern and South Asian Affairs, Program Files for Oman, 1974–1989; + UAE, 1989; Political Relations, + 1969–1989, Lot 91D491, Box 6, Def–15—MidEastfor 1977. Secret. Sent + through Habib. Drafted by + George Churchill (PM/ISO) and + Twinam on April 28; + cleared in DOD/ISA/FMRA and + by James Rohwer (L/PM), William + Lewis (AF/I), and Robert Flaten + (H). Churchill initialed for all clearing officials. A handwritten + notation in the upper right-hand margin of the first page reads: + “Approved by P—‘not necessary to go to S’ 5/4/77.” + + + Washington, May 2, + 1977 + +

Circular 175 Procedure:—Request for Authority to Negotiate and Conclude + an Executive Agreement with the Government of Bahrain regarding the + Termination of the Homeporting Arrangement for Middle East Force, and + the Retention of Administrative and Logistic Facilities to Support the + Middle East Force Command Afloat

+

Summary

+

In 1975, the Government of Bahrain gave us notice that it wished to have + the U.S. Navy’s Middle East Force withdraw from Bahrain by June 30, 1977.In telegram 859 from Manama, July 26, 1975, Twinam described the meetings he + had conducted with the Bahraini Foreign Minister. He noted the + Government of Bahrain’s desire that the Middle East Force leave + Bahrain by mid-1977. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign + Policy File, D750258–0511) Recently the Bahraini Government + formally decided that it would consider an arrangement with the + following features: a) the current stationing agreement would be + terminated; b) homeporting in Bahrain for the Middle East Force Command + and flagship would cease; c) Middle East Force Command would have no + ostensible connection with Bahrain other than as a periodic visitor; d) + Bahrain would permit Commander Middle East Force and his flagship to + visit Bahrain for at least 4 months per year (in-port time); and e) the + US would be permitted to retain + logistic support facilities in Bahrain manned by Department of Defense + personnel.

+

Department of Defense has indicated that an arrangement along these lines + would be feasible, provided in-port time for the flagship in Bahrain and + other Persian Gulf/Indian Ocean countries could total at least 6 months, + per year with a requisite number of two-week visits for maintenance + purposes. Queries to Embassies in the area indicate that this criterion + could probably be met through regular ship visits to other ports.

+

The Government of Bahrain’s desires regarding compensation are unclear + and are likely to remain so until negotiations begin. We now pay $4 + million in annual rent, which we hope to reduce. The Bahrainis have in + the past suggested concessional arms assistance; we intend to keep arms + supply questions separate from these negotiations and to hold the line + at non-concessional sales within our limited Persian Gulf arms transfer + guidelines.

+

Background

+

The U.S. Navy’s Middle East Force has for over a quarter century operated + in the Persian Gulf/Indian Ocean and used support facilities at Bahrain, + originally under informal arrangements with the UK, and since Bahrain’s independence in 1971 under an + Executive Agreement.See Foreign + Relations, 1969–1976, vol. XXIV, Middle East Region and + Arabian Peninsula, 1969–1972; Jordan, September 1970, Document + 113. The agreement provides the US Navy access to Bahrain and incorporates + customary status of forces privileges and rights for US Department of Defense personnel. At + present, the Command consists of a Rear Admiral, with a staff of 64, a + flagship (auxiliary command ship) with a complement of 387, and a + shore-based support group of 82, all stationed or homeported in Bahrain, + in addition to two Atlantic Fleet destroyers under the Force’s command + during their rotational assignments to the area. The primary mission of + Middle East Force is to evidence + U.S. Government interest in the stability of the region by making + goodwill visits to friendly ports.

+

During the October 1973 Arab-Israeli war, the Government of Bahrain + invoked the one-year termination clause of the 1971 Executive Agreement, + but as US-Arab relations improved, we + were able to negotiate the continuation of the Middle East Force + presence by meeting certain Bahraini concerns about exercise of criminal + jurisdiction over U.S. Navy personnel and by increasing the rent for the + Middle East Force facilities from $600,000 to $4 million per year.

+

In August 1975, bowing to pressure at home and in the region against + providing military facilities to a major power, the Government of + Bahrain notified us it wished to have the U.S. Navy withdraw from + Bahrain by June 30 of this year.The Bahraini + Government’s letter of notification was handed to Ambassador + Twinam in a meeting with + the Foreign Minister on August 12, 1975. (Telegram 948 from Manama, + August 12, 1975; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy + File, D750278–0587) Since June 1976, however, there have been + discussions, initiated by the Government of Bahrain, to seek a way in + which Middle East Force might continue to use facilities in Bahrain. The + Bahrainis indicated a need to have other states in the region share the + political burden of support for the regional U.S. Navy presence.

+

The Government of Bahrain has now formally decided to consider an + arrangement which would permit the U.S. to retain its logistic support + facilities manned by 75 Department of Defense personnel and would allow + Commander Middle East Force and his flagship to visit Bahrain at least 4 + months per year, provided the 1971 agreement were terminated, Bahrain + ceased to be homeport for the Command and flagship, and the Middle East + Force Command had no ostensible connection with Bahrain other than as + periodic visitor.

+

The Department of Defense has indicated it could maintain the Middle East + Force presence in the area on this basis, provided that the flagship has + access to at least six months in-port time in Persian Gulf/Indian Ocean + countries, with at least four of those months in Bahrain, and with a + requisite number of two-week visits for maintenance purposes. On the + basis of the Department’s queries to certain of our Embassies in Indian + Ocean countries,See footnote 2, Document 2. it is our assessment that + sufficient in-port time for the flagship can be arranged in Iran, Saudi + Arabia and Kenya which, along with the time assured in Bahrain, would + meet Department of Defense requirements. (We may possibly also be able + to obtain some in-port time in Pakistan, should our relationship + permit.)

+ +

As soon as we are reasonably assured of a workable arrangement in + Bahrain, we propose to approach other Persian Gulf and Indian Ocean + governments about providing additional in-port time for the MIDEASTFOR Flagship. We are fairly + confident that such friendly states as Iran, Saudi Arabia, or Kenya (and + possibly Pakistan) would not seek specific compensation for permitting + the MIDEASTFOR Flagship to + conduct visits of somewhat greater frequency or duration than in the + past.

+

Since last June, the Government of Bahrain has periodically suggested + that some form of increased security assistance relationship with the + US would be one of the conditions + for its continuing to provide support for the Middle East Force. In + keeping with our Lower Gulf arms policy, we have discouraged informal + Bahraini feelers in the last few years about supplying such weapons at + TOW, HAWK and REDEYE, but on + the basis of surveys in 1972 and 1976 we have recommended that Bahrain + acquire a small number of coastal patrol boats and 10 helicopters. We + have provided a limited amount of training for Bahraini officers in the + U.S.

+

Throughout the latter part of 1976, the Bahraini Prime Minister urged + that future US/Bahraini Security + Assistance arrangements involve concessional U.S. funding for arms + purchases, while the Crown Prince/Defense Minister expressed interest in + purchasing F–5 aircraft and + missile-armed naval patrol craft. In December 1976, a Department of + Defense survey team concluded a visit to Bahrain to take a comprehensive + look at Bahrain’s defense requirements. Its recommendations are + currently under review in the Departments of State and Defense prior to + release to the Government of Bahrain. In recent discussions of possible + new arrangements for support of the U.S. Navy in Bahrain, the Bahraini + Foreign Minister has refrained from raising with our Ambassador the + question of future security assistance, but this issue could arise again + as formal negotiations with the Government of Bahrain proceed.

+

The recommendations on military equipment, (helicopters, Vulcan + anti-aircraft guns and lightly armed patrol craft) which we anticipate + making to the GOB will be well within + the parameters of the restrictive policy we have maintained for sale of + military equipment to Lower Gulf countries since their independence and + should be fully in accord with the thrust of the present world-wide + review of arms transfer policy. Our Ambassador anticipates that these + recommendations will meet with general approval within the GOB. While certain Bahraini leaders may + wish to consider our willingness to provide such equipment as a + condition for the U.S. Navy’s continued use of facilities, we will + insist that arms supply questions are outside the scope of these + negotiations. We can with accuracy maintain that we are prepared to sell to Bahrain only equipment + that would be justifiable on policy grounds without reference to the + future status of the U.S. Navy there.

+

U.S. Negotiating Approach

+

Since the feasibility of maintaining an afloat Middle East Force Command + depends on in-port time in the area for the command and flagship + totalling at least six months per year, our strategy will be to commence + negotiations with the Government of Bahrain for access and support + facilities and—as soon as the course of negotiations gives reasonable + assurance of an agreement with Bahrain—to approach other regional + governments including Iran, Saudi Arabia, Kenya, and possibly Pakistan, + to ensure reasonably that the required additional in-port time is + obtainable.

+

With the Government of Bahrain, we will: a) agree to terminate the + Executive Agreement of 1971; b) seek written assurances that the Middle + East Force Command and flagship will be allowed at least four months + in-port time per year; c) seek authorization to retain a logistic and + administrative staff (reduced from the present 82 to 75, with + accompanying dependents) and facilities, including facilities for the + MIDEASTFOR flag aircraft and + its crew, in Bahrain; d) seek to continue the status of forces + provisions of the Executive Agreement of 1971 for any Department of + Defense personnel residing in or visiting Bahrain. We plan to propose + the exchange of notes at Tab 2;Attached but + not printed at Tab 2 is the text of the draft notes. further + details of the arrangement would be contained in a lease.

+

Regarding compensation, we will seek to reduce the annual rent payment + from the present $4 million. If necessary, we could fall back to the + current $4 million figure, in recognition of inflationary pressures and + the value of the Bahraini facilities to maintenance of the afloat Middle + East Force.

+

If the Bahrainis request military equipment as a condition for continued + facilities for MIDEASTFOR, we + will insist on handling this request as a separate aspect of our + relationship. We would handle such requests on the basis of the existing + Lower Gulf arms policy and in keeping with the present worldwide policy + review on transfer of military equipment and training.

+

Legal Considerations

+

The U.S. negotiating objectives can be achieved in agreements which can + lawfully be concluded as Executive Agreements, although the payment of + rent for the use of facilities will have to be made subject to the + appropriation of funds by Congress.

+ +

A Memorandum of Law analyzing the relevant legal issues is at Tab 1.Attached but not printed at Tab 1 is the April + 28 Memorandum of Law.

+

Congressional and Public Considerations

+

The proposed new agreement relates to a continuation of a currently + existing U.S. presence under a changed format. No new U.S. facilities + are contemplated. However, raising with Congress the administrative + support arrangements for Middle East Force in Bahrain may well lead to + questions concerning the general value of keeping this U.S. presence in + the area. We believe that our case will be sufficiently strong and + reasonable that, if necessary, it can be made public and successfully + defended. It would, however, be inappropriate to invite public interest + groups or other public comment, since the Bahrainis would be uneasy with + any publicity about these arrangements. We can anticipate media interest + which should be handled in close coordination with Bahrain.

+

We do need to consult with the Congress on the new arrangements, + including any rent or other fees which the Department of Defense must + pay in Bahrain for facilities. We do not anticipate serious + Congressional opposition to the proposed new arrangements. However, + there will be Congressional interest in the number of Department of + Defense personnel remaining in Bahrain, or visiting there, and in the + retention of status of forces privileges for them.

+

We can anticipate significant Congressional concern about any appreciable + military supply commitments we make with Bahrain, particularly if + Congress perceives them as linked to facilities to support MIDEASTFOR.

+

Once concluded, the agreement would be transmitted to Congress in + accordance with 1 U.S.C. 112b (The Case Act).Reference is to the section of Title 1 of the United States Code + governing the transmission of international agreements for + congressional approval.

+

Indian Ocean Arms Control

+

As we progress toward US–USSR discussions on arms limitations in + the Indian Ocean, our negotiating position will be best served by + maintaining our force presence in the area—including Middle East + Force—at a steady level. Continuance of Middle East Force as an afloat + command would not limit our flexibility in these discussions since: a) + agreement on actual limitations is likely to be a lengthy process; b) + review and adjustment of Middle East Force is always possible; c) Soviet + interest is focussed on Diego Garcia, rather than on deployments.

+ +

Recommendations:

+

1. That you authorize our Ambassador in Bahrain to enter into + negotiations with the Government of Bahrain looking toward an agreement + regarding access and support facilities in Bahrain for Middle East Force + Command and flagship.

+

2. That you authorize an approach to other governments of the Persian + Gulf/Indian Ocean area as appropriate, to arrange the required + additional in-port time for Middle East Force Command and flagship.

+

3. That you authorize the Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern and South + Asian Affairs, with the concurrence of PM, L, DOD and other + concerned offices and agencies, to approve the wording of the above + draft agreement with the Government of Bahrain.

+

4. That you authorize our Ambassador in Bahrain to sign the above + agreement with the Government of Bahrain.Habib approved all four + recommendations on May 3.

+
+ +
+ 6. Paper Prepared in the Central Intelligence AgencySource: Carter Library, National + Security Affairs, Brzezinski + Material, Country File, Box 50, Middle East: 4–6/77. Secret; [handling restriction not declassified]. + Prepared with contributions from the Center for Policy Support and + the Offices of Economic Research, Regional and Political Analysis, + and Strategic Research, Directorate of Intelligence. + + + PS 77–10004 + + + Washington, June 1977 + + +

Soviet Role in the Middle East

+

[Omitted here is a key to dissemination control abbreviations.]

+

Key Judgments

+

The Soviets’ economic, military, and political position with the + principal Arab states has eroded over the past five years, and shows no + sign of early improvement. The low state of relations between the USSR and Egypt stands out as an important + failure of Soviet foreign policy under General Secretary Brezhnev.

+ +

Moscow’s relations with the radical Arab states—notably Iraq and + Libya—have expanded significantly in recent years. This improvement has + been based primarily on increasing sales of Soviet arms, and has not + resulted in a commensurate increase in Soviet political influence among + the Arab radicals.

+

The USSR has few official contacts and + virtually no political influence with Israel. Occasional Soviet contacts + with Israeli officials are intended primarily to intimidate the + Palestinians and to show third parties that the Soviets play an + essential role in Middle East diplomacy.

+

Substantial improvement in the Soviet position in the Middle East is not + likely, at least until there is a fundamental change in the leadership + of Egypt, Syria, Jordan, Iran, or Saudi Arabia. The Soviets probably + will continue to make limited progress in strengthening their relations + with Libya.

+

The Soviets’ military presence in the Middle East has diminished + considerably since 1973, but the Soviets retain the capability quickly + to project additional military power into the area. This gives Moscow + the potential directly to affect the military balance and the level of + political tension in the region.

+

Soviet leaders want to reconvene the Geneva conference to demonstrate + that the USSR plays a central role in + Arab-Israeli negotiations. Moscow has neither the desire nor the + ability, however, to force the Arabs or Israelis to make the political + concessions that will be necessary to restart the conference.

+

The USSR would not be capable—even by + withholding or providing additional military equipment—of eliciting + fundamental changes in the Arabs’ stand on the basic issues of the + Middle East conflict. Soviet policy will remain one of supporting + positions already endorsed by the principal Arab states and the + Palestinians.

+

Soviet influence in the Middle East is greatest during periods of tension + and “no war-no peace.” In any negotiating forum the Soviets will attempt + to avoid appearing obstructionist, but should not be expected to play an + effective, positive role.

+

[Omitted here is the body of the paper.]

+
+ +
+ + 7. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United + Arab EmiratesSource: National + Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770334–0882. Secret. + Drafted by David M. Winn (NEA/ARP); cleared by Douglas Keene (PM/SAS) and in DOD/ISA; approved by Twinam. Sent for information to + Manama, Doha, Jidda, Kuwait, and Muscat. + + + Washington, September 14, 1977, 2156Z + +

220667. Subject: UAE Request for TOW’s. References: (A) 76 State + 178831,In telegram 178831 to Abu Dhabi, + July 20, 1976, the Department responded to a UAE request for TOW missiles, noting that the U.S. + Government had not furnished these missiles to the United Arab + Emirates or other nations as it would contribute to an “unnecessary + arms buildup in region.” The Department instructed: “You could say + that our desire is to give UAE arms + requests the most careful consideration. In this connection, we + would be interested in UAE + rationale for renewed request for TOW in light of our common desire for stability and + avoidance of an arms race in the region.” (National Archives, RG 59, + Central Foreign Policy File, D760278–0206) (B) 76 Abu Dhabi + 1911 (Notal),Telegram 1911 from Abu Dhabi, July 14, 1976. + (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + D760272–0094) (C) 76 Abu Dhabi 2101 (Notal),In + telegram 2101 from Abu Dhabi, August 3, 1976, the Embassy reported a + discussion between Sterner + and UAE General Khaldi regarding + planned U.S. military training and weapons orientation for the + UAE military. During the + meeting, Sterner “noted + specifically with regard to training that we would not believe it + appropriate to offer training or demonstrations on weapons which + were clearly not applicable to UAE + needs.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + D760298–0887) (D) 76 Abu Dhabi 2135 (Notal),In + telegram 2135 from Abu Dhabi, August 5, 1976, the Embassy evaluated + the threat posed by the armored forces of the United Arab Emirates’ + neighbors, the United Arab Emirates’ defense needs, and the U.S. + policy of avoiding an arms race in the lower Gulf region as + rationale for supplying TOW + missiles. It concluded: “We do not minimize negative arguments on + this question and recognize that decision on TOWs for UAE merits careful consideration. Nevertheless, we + genuinely believe weight of argument is in favor of positive + decision in this case. We particularly do not find persuasive + argument that Department says is ‘basic reason’ for its previous + negative decision—that UAE faces no + present threat from armored attack. Today’s peaceful border can + overnight become the direction from which a hostile attack can be + directed. In the Arabian Peninsula alone we have seen this happen in + the case of Kuwait and Iraq, of Oman and the PDRY. In each of those cases we + decided TOW was an appropriate + weapon to supply in view of threat these states faced. It is + certainly not unreasonable for UAE + to be viewing this evidence and deciding that it would like to be + prepared before the threat actually emerges.” (National Archives, RG + 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D760303–0427) (E) Abu Dhabi + 1921 (Notal),Telegram 1921 from Abu Dhabi, July 17, 1976. + (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + D760276–0467) (F) Manama 723.In + telegram 723 from Manama, March 29, Cluverius discussed the question of U.S. arms sales + to Bahrain. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + D770162–1118)

+

1. In response to Embassy Abu Dhabi’s recent inquiry regarding status of + decision concerning sale of TOW + anti-tank missile system to UAE (ref E), Department and + DOD have conducted intensive review + of issue similar to that carried out in September 1976. During review, + both agencies concentrated in particular on question of whether or not + TOW has become weapon common enough + in inventories worldwide to be considered non-sophisticated in Gulf + military context. Issue of Abu Dhabi defense justification for TOW also was closely examined.

+

2. Consensus of expert opinion emerging from review is that (a) TOW still is sufficiently sophisticated + weapon to require compelling defense requirement justification for + selling it to lower Gulf states, and (b) that sufficient defense + justification—in form of specific armor threat to UAE—does not exist. Department therefore + has decided not to pursue issue further at this time and Embassy should + so inform MG Khaldi and Sheikh + Khalifa.

+

3. In informing UAEG, post should draw on following: (a) Administration’s + policy is to minimize U.S. arms sales abroad, avoiding sales which go + beyond legitimate defense requirements. (b) In this context, USG examined question of TOW sale in light of degree to which + UAE’s acquisition of weapon would + meet realistic armor threat. (c) We were unable to identify threat to + UAE for which TOW was appropriate defensive weapon. (d) + USG remains committed to assisting + UAE develop appropriate defense + capability and welcomes further discussion of how we might be helpful to + modernization of federal defense forces within U.S. policy + framework.

+

4. For Manama and Doha: Bahrain and Qatar were included in recent review + since they are remaining lower Gulf states to which we have not sold + TOW, and Bahrain on several + occasions has already informally expressed interest in acquiring this + weapon. Conclusion in case of Bahrain and Qatar was same as in UAE case. While we have no desire to + initiate discussion of TOW with these + governments, Ambassadors are instructed to use above responses in + parrying any future TOW requests.

+ + Vance + +
+ +
+ + 8. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Arab Emirates to the + Department of StateSource: + National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780067–0602. + Secret; Exdis. Sent for + information to Doha, Jidda, Kuwait, Manama, Muscat, Tehran, and + USCINCEUR. + + + Abu Dhabi, February 13, 1978, 1223Z + +

409. Subject: UAE Desire for Military + Relationship With U.S. USCINCEUR + for POLAD. Refs: (A) Abu Dhabi 0286,In + telegram 286 from Abu Dhabi, February 1, the Embassy described + UAE plans to reorganize the + country’s military. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign + Policy File, D780048–0314) (B) Abu Dhabi 0408.In telegram 408 from Abu Dhabi, February 13, the + Embassy reported on a conversation between Dickman and UAE Commander-in-Chief Brigadier + Shaikh Sultan bin Zayid during which they discussed Zayid’s desire + to amend or cancel the 1975 U.S.–UAE agreement governing foreign military sales. + (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + D780065–0871)

+

1. In course of my February 12 meeting with Shaikh Sultan bin Zayid, new + Commander in Chief, of UAE Defense + Forces (reftels), he said moves toward unification of UAE armed forces had increased interest in + UAE having real military + relationship with U.S. He said UAE must + take necessary steps to protect its wealth and assure stability. This + required UAE to improve not only + training but equipment of its armed forces so that it could provide a + credible deterrent in the event of an external attack. To my question of + where he felt the threat lay for UAE, + Shaikh Sultan said that at moment, there is no immediate palpable + external threat to UAE but situation + could suddenly change.

+

2. After I had reviewed at some length the history of U.S. arms policy in + lower Gulf and its constraints and U.S. belief that the UAE’s security can best be achieved + through regional cooperation especially with its two large neighbors in + the Gulf, Shaikh Sultan said UAE + understood U.S. policy but did not believe it was logical. UAE security, just as for any other + country, first depended on UAE itself. + Iran and Saudi Arabia played an important role in the general security + of region but UAE could not rely on + Saudi Arabia and Iran forever. What would happen if there were a sudden + change in either of these two countries? He thought UAE had two choices, either to have + capability to defend its oil resources or to ask Saudis or Iranians to + do it but in latter case, UAE could not + maintain its independence and it would be back to where situation was + when British were responsible for regional security.

+ +

3. Warming to his point, Shaikh Sultan said that UAE does not want intermediate military relationship with + us, “one that is restricted to M–16s.” While UAE has funds to purchase almost any kind of sophisticated + weapons it wants from various sources, it would much prefer to have “a + real military relationship with the U.S.” so that it knows where to look + for its security and for development of its armed forces. He believed + U.S. had real interests in Gulf and particularly in UAE, which has now become important source + of energy for U.S. markets. UAE + welcomed this and wanted to expand its relations in all fields. However, + he felt U.S., while outwardly manifesting interest in security and + stability of UAE, was in fact + “selective.” If there are to be close relations between U.S. and UAE, it has to be close in all its + aspects, neither side can pick and choose. If U.S. really interested in + UAE security, then it should be + willing to respond to requests which UAE believes are necessary for its defense.

+

4. My response was to point out where we had tried to be responsive, + within the limits of our policy, in responding to felt UAE desires for cooperation in military + field. A well disciplined and highly trained force could in many cases + be just as effective as one with large amounts of sophisticated + equipment. Given the small number of native Emirians, it seemed to me + that UAE would want to improve quality + of its native personnel rather than buy fancy equipment which could only + be used by foreigners now in UAE armed + forces. I also pointed out that thrust of U.S. administration to curb + new arms sales abroad made it highly unlikely that UAE could expect any change in policy we + had pursued in lower Gulf.

+

5. Shaikh Sultan indicated he hoped we could discuss issue again. He had + raised matter to know where UAE stood + so that government not stumble should matter be raised at higher levels + in future. If UAE could not count on + U.S. for help in protecting country’s patrimony, it would like to know + so that it could look elsewhere.

+

6. Comment: Shaikh Sultan’s comments are a more expanded version of + comments he and older brother Shaikh Khalifa bin Zayid conveyed to me + last year (77 Abu Dhabi 708In telegram 708 + from Abu Dhabi, March 8, 1977, the Embassy reported on a + conversation between Shaikh Sultan and Dickman during which they discussed U.S. lower Gulf + arms policy and the sale of TOWs to the United Arab Emirates. + (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + D770079–0405) and 156).In telegram + 156 from Abu Dhabi, January 13, 1977, the Embassy reported on + Dickman’s conversation + with Shaikh Khalifa bin Zayid during which they discussed the United + Arab Emirates’ acquisition of TOWs. (National Archives, RG 59, + Central Foreign Policy File, D770013–0255) However, now that + Sheikh Sultan has his new position, he speaks in much more authoritative + terms and undoubtedly has done this to probe again USG + attitudes. Bright and ambitious but still young and relatively + inexperienced in managing a modern military institution, Shaikh Sultan + is less likely than Chief of Staff General Khaldi to understand and + accept gracefully the broad policy reasons why the U.S. has been unable + to meet the requests for TOW and other + sophisticated weapons. While UAE + President Shaikh Zayid probably did not instruct him to discuss issue + with me, Zayid will have to listen to what Shaikh Sultan (his second + son) has to say and weigh how U.S. response to kind of open-ended + military relationship that Sultan seems to desire will affect nature of + growing U.S.–UAE relationship in other + fields.

+ + Dickman + +
+ +
+ 9. Memorandum From the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff + (Jones) to Secretary of + Defense BrownSource: Carter Library, National + Security Affairs, Staff Material, Defense/Security, Ermarth, Box 4, Middle East/Persian + Gulf: 9–12/78. Secret. + + + JCSM–282–78 + + + Washington, September + 7, 1978 + + + SUBJECT + Review of US Strategy Related to + the Middle East and the Persian Gulf (U) + +

1. (C) Reference your memorandum, 17 March 1978, “Review of US Strategy to Safeguard Availability of + Oil from the Middle East and the Persian Gulf,” which requested a review + of US and Soviet strategies for the + region.In the March 17 memorandum to the + Joint Chiefs, Brown noted: + “The President and I have stated that the Middle East and Persian + Gulf cannot be separated from our security and that of NATO and our allies in Asia; and that + the United States intends to safeguard the production of oil and its + transportation to consumer nations without interference by hostile + powers.” To that end, and due to recent Soviet moves in the Horn of + Africa with the goal of gaining access to the Gulf region, Brown continued: “I believe it + appropriate for us to review Soviet and U.S. strategy, plans, force + structure and deployments as they relate to these important U.S. and + allied interests.” (Washington National Records Center, RG 330, + OSD Files, FRC 330–81–0202, Box 60, Middle East + 092 1978)

+

2. (S) The Appendix contains the review,Attached but not printed is the 48-page review. In addition to + identifying the major U.S. interests in the region, summarized here, + the review details Soviet and American strategy, as well as Soviet + capabilities, in the region. In part, the review concludes that “in + light of US interests and the + threats to those interests, it is considered that a coherent + strategy for the Persian Gulf/Middle East region is now a matter of + urgency.” an advance draft copy of which was provided to the + Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs), in preparation for the Camp David + Summit.The Camp David summit between + President Carter and + Egyptian President Sadat and Israeli Prime Minister Begin took place September + 5–17. The review concludes that:

+

a. The Soviet Union has well-defined interests and specific objectives, + an opportunistic but congruent strategy, and the capability to pursue + that strategy. Additionally, it is increasing its military capability + and, given the opportunity, may opt for more overt military measures to + further its interests. Section II of the review and the supporting + annexes provide a detailed analysis of Soviet interests, objectives, and + strategy.

+

b. The major US interests in the region + are:

+ + (1) To assure continuous access to petroleum resources. + (2) To assure the survival of Israel as an independent state in a + stable relationship with contiguous Arab states. + (3) To prevent an inimical power or combination of powers from + establishing hegemony. + +

c. Existing US strategy should be + expanded to provide adequate guidelines to insure that national + interests are protected and advanced.

+

d. There are two major obstacles to the realization of US interests in the area: the turmoil + produced by the Arab-Israeli conflict and the diametrically opposed + strategic aims of the Soviet Union.

+ + (1) Arab animosity toward Israel creates conditions leading to + economic reprisals and possibly denial of oil to the West. It + threatens Israel’s security and provides an opportunity for Soviet + penetration into regional states. While the Joint Chiefs of Staff + strongly endorse the administration’s efforts to resolve the + Arab-Israeli dispute, additional measures to enhance the security of + all parties to the dispute could improve stability and accelerate + progress toward a settlement. + (2) Resolution of the Arab-Israeli problem, while of immense value + to the United States, would still leave the Soviet Union actively + and purposefully working against US + interests in the region. In this decade, the Soviets have become + increasingly confident of their ability to forcefully promote their + interests in the area. It appears they are striving to gain ultimate + control over critical raw materials, particularly oil; enhance their + southern flank security by neutralizing Iran and Turkey; foster a + more friendly government in Afghanistan; and generally strengthen + the Soviet position at the expense of the West. The Soviets are + adept opportunists and have reason to hope for significant gains in + the Horn of Africa and in southern Africa. These gains, if realized, + will impact so profoundly on key Middle East and Persian Gulf states + that, without compensating measures by the West and the United + States, in particular, these states may be forced to accommodate the + Soviets to the jeopardy of the West and, particularly, the North Atlantic + Alliance. + +

3. (S) The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider the development and + implementation of a comprehensive US + strategy for the region a matter of utmost urgency. They recommend that + the following objectives serve as the basis for that strategy:

+ + a. A full or partial Middle East peace settlement enhanced by + guarantees (which, if necessary, could include a presence of US military forces) and a determined + effort to discourage reliance on the Warsaw Pact as the principal + arms supplier to key countries in the area. + b. A revitalized CENTO Alliance + with a more active planning and leadership role by the United + States. In particular, the current impasse within CENTO over the issue of political + guidance needs to be resolved before CENTO can proceed with military planning. In addition, + the United States should minimize the restrictions on arms transfers + to CENTO nations and take steps + to coordinate NATO and CENTO plans. + c. A firm and public commitment to the security of Saudi Arabia + and Iran. This commitment should provide sufficient flexibility to + take whatever future steps are necessary to fulfill US obligations. It could also precede + and facilitate an increase in the current levels of Western military + sales to the region, the development of a base infrastructure, and, + ultimately, an expansion of the US + military presence in the region, if necessary. + +

4. (S) A public declaration of policy embracing the above objectives + could serve to counter or deter Soviet military presence in the region + and enhance regional stability. A supporting military strategy would + include these basic elements:

+ + a. Countering of Soviet military presence in the region. + b. Assisting in the development of local base infrastructures + which are adequate to support the introduction of significant US military forces to the + region. + c. Maintaining a limited military presence which is sufficient to + provide evidence of US interest in + the region, enhance stability, and facilitate the introduction of + surge forces if and when necessary. + d. Seeking to prevent (and be understood as seeking to prevent) + any major conquests by a regional power or powers. + +

Details of the recommended strategy are contained in Section III, with + supporting US and allied military + initiatives in Annex A.Attached but not + printed at Annex A is the “Recommended US and Allied Military Initiatives in the Middle + East/Persian Gulf Region.”

+

5. (S) The Joint Chiefs of Staff strongly recommend that the attached + report be formally considered by the NSC and used as the basis for a strategy for the next decade, the implementation + of which conveys to the USSR as well + as US friends and allies the importance + the United States attaches to stability and security of the region.

+

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

+ + David C. Jones + General, USAF + Chairman, Joint Chiefs of + Staff + + +
+ +
+ 10. Memorandum From the Deputy Secretary of Defense (Dayan) to President CarterSource: Carter Library, National Security Council, + Institutional Files, Box 71, PRC + 079, 11/30/78, Pakistan. Secret. Carter wrote “Charles” and initialed “J” in the + upper right-hand corner of the memorandum. Copies were sent to + Vance, Brown, and Brzezinski. + + + Washington, November + 9, 1978 + + + SUBJECT + U.S. Policy in the Middle East + +

I just returned from the Middle East and Africa, as you know, where I met + with, among others, the heads of government and military chiefs of Iran, + Saudi Arabia, Kenya and Sudan. I found in each country a great + appreciation for what the United States had done to contribute to the + peace and security of the region, and a desire for a closer relationship + with us.

+

I also found grave concern in Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Sudan about the + threat from the Soviet Union. Each leader saw himself and his country on + the front lines of opposition to Soviet encroachment and domination. + Each had clearly in mind the scope and speed of Soviet arms supply + demonstrated in Ethiopia, and the Soviet propensity for subversion and + political intervention accomplished in Afghanistan. Each thought we + seriously underestimated the weight of the Soviet threat to the region. + Each, in one way or another, professed not to understand the objectives + of the United States in the region. They argued that we are equivocal in + declaring and pursuing our objectives and in supporting our friends.

+

I explained that American policy was indeed aimed at building up and + supporting our friends. I said we were not indifferent to Soviet activities. I said you personally + had taken a number of actions that made this clear—for example, in + Zaire; in arms supply to Egypt, Sudan, Yemen, Turkey; in the F–15 sale + to Saudi Arabia; and in your efforts to bring about a resolution of the + Arab-Israel conflict, which would do much to limit Soviet opportunities + in the region. The leaders acknowledged these strong steps.

+

I recognize that most of what I heard is a familiar story to us. I + recognize also that the nature of these governments, and their + relatively small size and close proximity to the Soviet Union or to + Soviet activities in neighboring states, makes them more fearful than we + believe is warranted.

+

Nevertheless, I recommend we carefully weigh their message. The area of + the Persian Gulf-Arabian Peninsula is a fragile and potentially + explosive one, as events in Iran suggest.On + November 4, a protest by students at Tehran University turned + violent when Iranian soldiers opened fire on protesters attempting + to take down a statue of the Shah. This was followed the next day by + attacks by anti-government crowds on Western businesses, hotels, and + the British Embassy in Tehran. The risks of instability are + significant and Russian opportunities for meddling are substantial. My + preliminary judgment is that, for a small additional investment of + political and financial capital, we could constructively advance + American purposes in this area. For example, we might make stronger and + more frequent statements of American interest and policy, do more + consulting with the governments, develop a more elaborate web of defense + and other contacts (ship visits, military exercises and the like), and + consider, for the poorer countries, additional financial assistance.

+

In view of the extreme importance of this area to U.S. and Allied + national security interests, I recommend we undertake, on an interagency + basis, a prompt review of U.S. policy toward the area, to see what + measures we might take to strengthen our position there. I know + Harold Brown shares my view + and I believe he also recommended such a study.Carter wrote + “ok” in the margin next to this + paragraph.

+ + C.W. Dayan Jr. + +
+ +
+ + 11. Memorandum From the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff + (Jones) to Secretary of + Defense BrownSource: Washington National Records + Center, RG 330, OSD Files, FRC 330–82–0205, Box 16. Secret. + Brown initialed the + memorandum on January 12. A January 12 note to Brown from his assistant, Rear + Admiral Thor Hanson, reads: “This has some bearing on your luncheon + item on your ME trip.” (Ibid.) + + + CM–182–79 + + + Washington, January + 11, 1979 + + + SUBJECT + Middle East/Persian Gulf Initiatives (U) + +

1. (S) At our meeting on 9 January 1979No + memorandum of conversation has been found. the subject of + possible US military initiatives in the + lower Persian Gulf, particularly the assignment of a Defense Attache to + Oman and basing initiatives in Oman and Saudi Arabia, was discussed. + These initiatives seem to support Deputy Secretary Dayan’s recommendation for a prompt + interagency review of US policy toward + the Persian Gulf/Arabian Peninsula area,See + Document 10. as well as Dr. + Brzezinski’s 30 November + request to sketch out broad options for US strategy in a general region from the Horn of Africa to + India.Not found.

+

2. (S) You will recall that on 7 September 1978, in response to your + request,See footnote 2, Document 9. the Joint Chiefs of Staff + forwarded a proposal entitled “Review of US Strategy Related to the Middle East and the Persian + Gulf,” (JCSM 282–78), a copy of which + is provided at the Enclosure.Attached; + summarized in Document 9. In that + paper the JCS present the requirement + for the development and implementation of a comprehensive US strategy towards the Middle East/Persian + Gulf. While the current Iranian situation will obviously complicate + achievement of US objectives in the + region, the basic thrust of the memo—the need for a coordinated US strategy in the Middle East/Persian Gulf + and the proposed military initiatives to support that strategy—remains + intact and will continue to provide a major contribution to the + development of a comprehensive strategy for the region. At pages 46–48 + of the paper you will find a summation of a military strategy which + would support such a policy. Annex A to the paper expands upon these + military initiatives and includes the Lower Gulf states. Page A–3 + describes possible basing initiatives in Saudi Arabia and the need for + access to Masirah Island, Oman. The establishment of a Defense Attache in Oman, although not + specifically proposed, would be supportive of these initiatives.

+

3. (S) We are prepared to discuss the military initiatives listed above + as well as others proposed in JCSM + 282–78 with a view toward their implementation. Concurrently, we + recommend that the NSC develop a + comprehensive policy for the Middle East/Persian Gulf region.

+

4. (S) You may also want to consider expanding your forthcoming trip to + the Middle East to include some of the Lower Gulf nations to discuss the + implications of and requirements for a more declaratory US policy in the region. Pakistan, Turkey + and Iran (if conditions warrant) might also be appropriate as a + demonstration of our concern for CENTO.

+ + David C. Jones + General, USAF + Chairman, Joint Chiefs of + Staff + +
+ +
+ 12. Action Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Near + Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Saunders) to Secretary of State VanceSource: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign + Policy File, P890025–2682. Confidential. Drafted by A. Peter + Burleigh and David Winn (NEA/ARP). Sent through Newsom, who initialed the memorandum. Tarnoff initialed the memorandum + in the upper right-hand corner. + + + Washington, January + 15, 1979 + +

Response from the President to the Sultan of Oman

+

The Sultan of Oman wrote to President Carter January 3The letter + is in the Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, + Middle East, Subject File, Box 73, Oman: 1–4/79. expressing + his concern at what he considers to be the deteriorating security + situation in the Persian Gulf and neighboring areas, and proposing + closer consultations between the Omani and U.S. Governments. Attached is + a draft reply, for the President’s approval, under cover of a Tarnoff-Brzezinski memorandum.Not + attached and not found.

+ +

You met with the Omani Ambassador to the United States on January 5The memorandum of conversation is in the + National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + P790013–1325. during which meeting he gave you a letter from + the Sultan of Oman to the President. At the same time the Omani + Ambassador stated that the Sultan would like to send a team to + Washington to discuss the regional security situation with senior USG officials.

+

On January 8 our Ambassador to Oman met, under instructions, with the + Omani Foreign Minister of State regarding some of the questions which + have arisen about Omani arms requests of the United States + Government.A partial record of Wiley’s January 8 meeting with + Zawawi is in telegram + 31 from Muscat, January 9. (National Archives, RG 59, Central + Foreign Policy File, [no film number]) Minister Zawawi stated that his government + would present an aide memoire on arms needs to the Ambassador at the end + of this month or in early February.

+

In the same conversation, Minister Zawawi noted that he had recently been sent to Amman to + discuss the status of the Middle East peace negotiations with King + Hussain. He anticipated being sent to Cairo and Rabat in the near future + for the same purpose. He then offered to proceed to Washington to brief + appropriate USG officials on the + substance of these talks.

+

As you know, the Omani Sultan is one of the very few Arab leaders who + have been supportive of the Camp David agreements and who have publicly + dissented from the Baghdad Summit decisions regarding Camp David in + general and the role of President Sadat in particular.During the November 2–5, 1978, Arab League Summit at + Baghdad, the assembled leaders of 20 Arab States and the Palestine + Liberation Organization voted to reject the Camp David Accords + signed in September. We would anticipate that if Minister + Zawawi were to come to + Washington, he would wish to discuss both the Middle East peace process + and the Persian Gulf security situation.

+

In the attached Presidential reply to the Sultan, we mention your + invitation to the Minister of State for Foreign Affairs as another sign + of our determination to keep the dialogue with Oman active.

+

Recommendation:

+

That you authorize the despatch of the attached telegram to Embassy + Muscat which instructs Ambassador Wiley to invite the Omani Minister of State for Foreign + Affairs to Washington.Attached but not + printed. A handwritten note on the draft telegram indicates that it + was sent as telegram 1849 to Muscat, January 16.

+ +

And that you approve the proposed Presidential reply to Sultan Qaboos.An + unknown hand approved the recommendation. A stamped notation + indicates that it was approved on January 16. See Document 13.

+
+ +
+ 13. Letter From President Carter to Omani Sultan QaboosSource: + Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Middle + East, Subject File, Box 73, Oman: 1–4/79. No classification marking. + Brzezinski sent the + letter to Carter under a + January 18 memorandum that indicated Vance had approved an earlier version of the letter + (see Document 12) and requested that + Carter sign the letter. + A handwritten note on Brzezinski’s covering memorandum states that + Carter signed the letter + on January 18. + + + Washington, January + 18, 1979 + Your Majesty: + +

Thank you for your letter of January 3,See + footnote 2, Document 12. + addressing pressing security problems in your area and proposing closer + consultations between our two governments. I appreciate Your Majesty’s + views on matters which are of concern to all who value peace and + stability in the Middle East, the Arabian Peninsula and the Persian + Gulf.

+

I wish to assure Your Majesty of the United States’ continuing interest + in the security of Oman and its neighbors. The views that you expressed + in your letter are of particular interest to me in view of recent events + in Iran and the Soviets’ efforts to enhance their influence in this + area. Any threat to an area of such strategic importance to the United + States would be of deep concern to us. You can be certain of our resolve + to help our friends to preserve the independence and stability of your + region. I know that this is an objective that we share.

+

Accordingly, Your Majesty, I am pleased that Secretary Vance has extended an invitation to + Minister of State for Foreign Affairs Zawawi to come to Washington in the near future. An + exchange of views between our foreign ministers will be an important + step in our continuing consultations. I know that the Secretary looks + forward to meeting with Minister Zawawi.

+ +

Please accept, Your Majesty, my appreciation for your support and + counsel. With best wishes for you and your family in the coming + year.

+

Sincerely,

+ + Jimmy + Carter + +
+ +
+ 14. Memorandum From the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff + (Jones) to Secretary of + Defense BrownSource: Carter Library, National + Security Affairs, Staff Material, Defense/Security, Ermarth, Box 4, Middle East/Persian + Gulf: 1–3/79. Secret. Brown + initialed the memorandum on January 23. Attached but not printed is + a January 23 covering memorandum from Hanson forwarding the + memorandum to Brzezinski. + The covering memorandum also notes that Brown had sent a copy of the policy paper to + Carter. + + + Washington, January + 23, 1979 + + + SUBJECT + The Middle East/Persian Gulf: Updating National Policy (U) + +

(S) This complements the earlier memorandum on Saudi Arabian oil + facilities.Not found. Oil production in + Iran came to a standstill on December 28, 1978, following strikes + and continuing unrest. Documentation on U.S. concern about oil + supplies and the vulnerability of Persian Gulf, and particularly + Saudi, oil facilities is in Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, vol. + XXXVII, Energy Crisis, 1974–1980. It addresses the + need for an overall strategy for the Persian Gulf region, and provides + some specific proposals in that regard.

+

David C. Jones

+

General, USAF

+

Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

+ +

Attachment

+

Paper Prepared in the Office of the Joint Chiefs of + Staff and the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for + PolicySecret.

+

Washington, January 18, 1979

+

THE MIDDLE EAST/PERSIAN GULF: Updating National Policy

+

FOREWORD

+

The security of the Persian Gulf and continued Free World access to the + region’s petroleum resources are of vital interest to the United States. + Particularly in light of recent events in Iran, the Horn of Africa, and + the PDRY, there is a critical need for + the development of a US national policy + for the entire region. Such a policy should provide the necessary + framework for the coordinated implementation of various diplomatic, + economic, and military initiatives.

+

Several factors warrant consideration during policy formulation. These + include the critical strategic importance of the region’s petroleum + resources, the US commitment to the + resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict, and the significant impact of + recent Soviet gains throughout the area.

+

Although policy objectives delineating vital US interests should focus on the expanding overt Soviet + threat, US initiatives to counter lower + levels of conflict should also be included. Initiatives in these areas + will in turn deter larger scale confrontations as it is considerably + more difficult to dislodge an established influence base than to deter + initial entry.

+

A review of the current regional situation indicates that the two + contingencies considered the most likely in the near term are these:

+ + —Attack by the PDRY, with Cuban + assistance, on the YAR and/or + Oman. + —Incursions by Iraq on Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. + +

While efforts to enhance the capabilities of Saudi security forces are + ongoing, existing security arrangements to protect the oil fields are + minimal at best. (It should be noted, however, that the Saudis have been + especially sensitive to any US overtures + to assist in oil field security in the past).

+ +

With regard to the two contingencies cited, incursions by Iraq would have + an immediate and direct impact on the US + unless Saudi Arabia is provided significant outside military assistance. + In the PDRY case, Saudi Arabia would + be drawn into the conflict which in turn would threaten US interests. By assisting the Saudis with + the PDRY problem, the US would serve its own best interests which + include the need for stability in the region.

+

The formulation of a comprehensive national policy that signals + heightened US concern and the desire to + expand our role in Persian Gulf security should begin with a major + policy statement by the President. Such a statement, preceded by + consultation with key congressional leaders and set in the context of + recent events in Iran,The Shah left Iran for + permanent exile on January 16. would establish the overall + framework for the new approach and could have a significant impact on + both the Soviet Union and the Middle East. The statement would also + provide a useful backdrop for the forthcoming trip to the area by the + Secretary of Defense.

+

An expanded discussion of specific military initiatives that should be + coordinated with selected diplomatic and economic efforts commences on + page 13.

+

The Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff are prepared to + assist in further policy development and initiative implementation as + appropriate.

+

[Omitted here is the table of contents, the 15-page paper, and Tabs + A–H.]

+
+ +
+ + 15. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense Brown toPresident CarterSource: + Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Middle + East, Trips/Visits File, Box 112, 2/9–19/79 Brown Visit to the Middle East: + 1/79–2/10/79. Secret; Sensitive. + + + Washington, undated + + + SUBJECT + My trip to the Middle East + +

I believe this trip will be an important one in the eyes of the countries + I am visiting. It is the first visit of a Secretary of Defense to each + of these states and, more significantly, it comes at a time of great + tension and turmoil in the area. The Soviet Union and states of the + area—moderate and radical—are watching and weighing American attitudes + and actions.

+

I see the broad objectives of my trip as, first, to express in word and + deed that the United States shares an interest in the security of the + region, and second, to stimulate additional momentum toward an + Egypt-Israeli peace settlement.

+

I attach draft instructions for your review and approval.Attached but not printed. The final version of + Brown’s instructions is + printed as Document 19. If you agree + with them, I ask that you issue them to me. I especially call to your + attention five issues requiring your scrutiny and decision:

+

1. Linkage of security and political/economic + issues. I would not seek specific commitments on peace or + economic policies, but would emphasize the importance of cooperation in + the latter areas if the U.S. is to be able to help provide a security + shield against external opponents.

+

2. Regular Security Consultations. I propose to + establish mechanisms for regular security consultations with Saudi + Arabia, Israel and Egypt. This mechanism would be a vehicle for + continuing dialogue on a range of security matters.

+

3. Arms Supply. I propose meeting a limited number + of the specific arms supply requests of each of the countries.

+

4. U.S. Military Presence. Without U.S. + commitment, I propose to sound out Saudi Arabia on the desirability, + from its point of view, of various forms of U.S. military and + intelligence presence.

+

5. FMS Credits. I + propose to offer post-treaty FMS + credits to Egypt in principle and to propose to Saudi Arabia the + possibility of at least nominal + U.S. financial (FMS) participation in + third country assistance programs, eg., Jordan, Yemen, Sudan, and + Egypt.

+

I realize these are decisions on which there may not be full agreement + within the government. I believe, however, that the Middle East is of + such great importance that we must accept a more active leadership role + on security matters in order to counteract the developing lack of + confidence in the United States which has been exacerbated by events in + Iran. We will need to manage this process carefully. I believe the + approach contemplated by the draft instructions is a prudent first + step.

+ + Harold Brown + +
+ +
+ 16. Memorandum From Gary Sick + of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for + National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)Source: Carter Library, National Security Council, Institutional + Files, Box 73, PRC 090, 2/1/79, + Secretary Brown’s Trip to + Middle East. Secret. Sent for information. A stamped notation on the + memorandum reads: “ZB has + seen.” + + + Washington, January + 31, 1979 + + + SUBJECT + PRC on Secretary Brown’s Trip to the Middle East + (C) + +

Defense has prepared a discussion paper (Tab A)Attached but not printed is the undated discussion + paper which was forwarded to Secretary Brown in the form of a letter from Carter. See Document 19. in the form of an agenda for the + meeting. It covers the key questions and provides some suggested + answers. The two key questions are as follows:

+ + 1. How far are we willing to go in providing strategic assurances + to the Saudis and others? Are we prepared to offer some kind of + unilateral U.S. presence or higher security profile? + 2. What specific answers are we prepared to give these four + nations on bilateral requests during the course of Harold Brown’s trip? (S) + +

Strategic Issues

+

The underlying choices in the strategic issue are highlighted in two + papers at Tab B.Attached but not printed are + a January 31 memorandum from Rutherford Poats to Brzezinski and an undated + memorandum by Ermarth. + Rud Poats presents a case for a multilateral + approach which incorporates security, energy, financial and + other considerations in a + ministerial level consultation mechanism. Fritz Er-marth’s comments, in + contrast, stress the need to consider a larger unilateral role for the United States, with all the risks and + costs that implies. Tab CAttached but not + printed is an undated paper prepared in advance of the PRC meeting. presents the + perspective from the Saudi desk at State which urges us not to proceed + faster than the Saudis are prepared to move (all you need to know is + that it compares the Saudis to a milk cow which produces best when calm + and not startled). (S)

+

Our verbal reassurances to the Saudis have been less than convincing. + This trip provides an opportunity to add both symbolism and substance to + our security relationship. It seems to me that the proper theme for + Brown’s presentation is to + stress the two-way nature of security. We do not + want to make a strong pitch which links security protection to oil so + blatantly that it “startles the cow”, but we do want to engage them more + actively in considering the kind of difficult decisions they must face + if our security relationship is to be more than arms length. The + following points spell out such an approach in detail:

+

—We are deeply concerned about the events of the past year for the + security and stability of the region. (Review in fairly stark terms the + events in Ethiopia, Yemen, Afghanistan and Iran.)

+

—We have taken some steps to respond in ways that would be apparent to + the Soviets. (Accelerated arms deliveries to Yemen, Seventh Fleet ships + on station in the Arabian Sea and at the mouth of the Indian Ocean, and + the F–15 visit.)

+

—However, we see the threat of growing instability and the emergence of + radical regimes as a serious development—as you do—as we are involved in + a reexamination of our regional security strategy in the light of these + events. (Brown might use some + hypothetical examples of a higher U.S. profile, e.g. more frequent ship + visits, a larger or more capable naval presence, regular visits of + combat aircraft, joint military exercises on a broader scale, closer + exchange of military intelligence, more frequent consultation on + regional security matters, etc.)

+

—However, we cannot plan or act unilaterally. There must be active + cooperation and support from our friends in the region. It is a two-way + street. (Possibly note the need for congressional/public support, + support facilities in the region, etc.)

+

—We would find it extremely helpful to have your views on the nature of + the threats facing the region, the ways in which the United States could + be most helpful in contributing to security and stability, and the ways + in which we can work together. (S)

+ +

This general approach would provide the opportunity to let them get their + own concerns off their chest and to indicate areas where they feel we + can be most helpful; it would also provide an introduction to a + discussion of bilateral issues in a broader strategic framework; + and—most importantly—it would serve to underline our shared concerns and + our seriousness of purpose in a more convincing manner than heretofore. + (C)

+

It also lets them know in unmistakable terms that they + will have to be prepared to play a role of their own that will not + be cost free, but it does so by making them partners, not + merely objects of great power attention. The message would, of course, + have to be tailored to fit the audience.

+

Specific Bilateral Issues

+

The Defense paper (pp. 2–5) examines a series of bilateral issues for + each of the countries visited. Specifically, recommendations are made + for the approval of arms sales for each country.Inderfurth + drew a line from the end of this sentence to the bottom margin of + the paper and wrote: “ZB, Keep in + mind that the Congress is less favorably + disposed to the Saudis than when the arms sales package was up last + year. In fact, I have some doubts whether that same package could be + passed today. Given their behavior at the Baghdad conference, the + recent OPEC price increase + their + lack of support for Camp David, the Saudis are losing friends here. + As you know, Church (who + railed against the package) was recently quoted as saying it’s time + ‘to take the gloves off’ with the Saudis. Concern about events in + Iran + the security of the Gulf are the two factors going for us now + in enhancing the relationship. Rick.” Many of these + suggestions have not been staffed. Many are extremely controversial + (e.g. initiating FMS credits for Egypt, + providing $1 billion in loans to Israel for airfield construction, and + providing F–5 munitions for Saudi Arabia + previously turned down by Congress). Moreover, the Egypt-Israel package + needs to be examined in the political context of the current + negotiations and our overall relations. (S)

+

This meeting is not the proper place to put together a + carefully balanced and politically sensitive package of items for + the trip. (C)

+

Harold Brown should be provided + with some positive replies which he can give in each case. The replies + should be substantial enough to give life to the reassurances, but not + so extensive as to empty our quiver prematurely. They should be + carefully balanced among the Egypt-Israel-Saudi triangle. (S)

+

RECOMMENDATION: That you suggest the establishment + of a small, high-level State-Defense-NSC working group to develop a package proposal which can + be put to the President next Monday. (S)

+

Bill Quandt and Fritz Ermarth concur. (U)

+
+ +
+ + 17. Minutes of a Policy Review Committee MeetingSource: Carter Library, National + Security Council, Institutional Files, Box 73, PRC 090, 2/1/79, Secretary Brown’s Trip to Middle East. + Secret. The meeting took place in the White House Situation Room. + Sick sent the minutes to + Brzezinski under a + February 7 covering memorandum; Brzezinski subsequently approved the + minutes. + + + Washington, February 1, 1979, 3–4:30 + p.m. + + + SUBJECT + Secretary Brown’s Trip to + the Middle East + + + PARTICIPANTS + + + State + Warren + Christopher, Deputy Secretary + Harold Saunders, + Assistant Secretary of State (NEA) + + + + + Treasury + Anthony Solomon, + Under Secretary for Monetary Affairs + Fred Bergsten, Assistant Secretary for International + Affairs + + + + + Defense + Harold Brown + Charles Dayan, + Deputy Secretary + David McGiffert, + Assistant Secretary for International Security + Affairs + Robert Murray, + Deputy Assistant Secretary for International Security + Affairs + + + + + OMB + James McIntyre + John White, Deputy + Director + + + + + JCS + Gen. David + Jones + LTG William Smith, + Assistant to CJCS + + + + + CIA + Adm. Stansfield + Turner + Robert Bowie, + Deputy Director for National Foreign Assessment + Robert Ames, NIO for Near + East and South Asia + + + + + Vice President Mondale + Denis Clift, + National Security Affairs Adviser + + + + + White House + Zbigniew + Brzezinski + David Aaron + + + + + NSC + Gary Sick + Fritz + Ermarth + + + +

Secretary Brown opened the meeting by noting that he had + promised to make a visit to the Middle East when he had met with various + Middle East leaders a long time ago. Many things had happened in the + meantime. The Camp David meeting had occurred with its initial agreement + and the subsequent slowing of the negotiation process. There had been + the evolution of the Iranian political process and fall of Iran as a + major regional security contributor at least with respect to U.S. + advantage. It was now time to realign our security relations in the + region and the trip provided a timely opportunity to discuss security + issues with the nations of the region. The purpose of the meeting was to + seek answers to three basic questions. First of all, should we seek + closer relations with these nations in some cases? That question on the trip was at best + preliminary. However, it could set the stage for further action later + on. Secondly, what sort of security cooperation do we want with these + nations? In the case of Israel and Jordan, we have had a close + cooperation for a long time. However, it should be possible to draw + attention to the fact that the threat emanates not from each other, but + from the outside. This might be hard to do, but on the other hand these + nations are not likely to do it for themselves. Thirdly, if we wish to + pursue this path, what is the state of U.S. willingness to carry out its + end of the agreement? This turns on questions of public attitudes, + congressional attitudes, and economic capacity. In addressing these + issues Secretary Brown proposed to use the general outline which + had been distributed to members of the PRC the previous day entitled, “Secretary of Defense Trip + to the Middle East, PRC Discussion + Paper.”See footnote 2, Document 16. He proposed dividing this + into a series of five questions. First of all, are the general + objectives as spelled out in the first page of the paper satisfactory? + Secondly, are the proposed initiatives for each country acceptable? + Three, how should we treat the linkage between oil and security of + financial aspects [assets?] and security issues? + Four, what financial support is available on our side to meet some of + these requirements in the various areas? And, fifth, what sort of public + posture should be adopted, specifically with regard to the press who + will be accompanying on the trip? He then turned to the question of the + general objectives spelled out in the paper and asked for comments + around the table. (S)

+

Dr. Brzezinski led off and said that he found the + objectives to be acceptable. He thought it was necessary to focus on + regional security as a general issue. However, addressing that question, + the next question was what we should do about the regional security + issues. He would personally prefer to deal with this question as a + whole, not to disaggregate it. (C)

+

Mr. Christopher said that he had no argument with the + general objectives. However, he found the specific issues in the paper + perhaps too ambitious. He did feel that the timing of the trip was + fortuitous. (U)

+

Mr. Dayan + noted that the time is right for this kind of a trip and felt that the + public visibility is an important aspect.

+

Mr. McIntyre said that he was not certain that there + was a sufficient consensus of opinion developed on what the precise + needs and objectives are on this case. The questions as stated imply + levels of commitment. He is not sure that enough inter-agency work has + been done to examine those implications. He noted that he had caught + hell on the Hill in presenting the foreign affairs budget in testimony. + Even to imply increased economic + or financial commitment at this time would create great concern in the + Congress.

+

Secretary Brown noted that a U.S. willingness to accept some + obligations are important. He noted that our approach up until now had + been largely to rely on words of assurance and in cases of third-country + arms purchases to attempt to get the Saudis to pay for everything. This + had left the Saudis feeling restive.

+

Mr. McIntyre suggested that the Secretary could go out + and ask what they would like to have. Then perhaps the President would + be in a position to make offers later on.

+

Mr. Dayan + noted that they had been very specific on their requests for + equipment.

+

Dr. Brzezinski noted that there was a real danger in + asking them to specify what they want. In the Kenyan case we sent a + survey team out and they came back with proposals for a billion dollars + worth of equipment. Perhaps it would be better to give a range + ourselves. He noted that the President attaches high importance to the + Brown trip with respect to + security, strategic and diplomatic objectives in the region. First of + all, it will give the region a sense that U.S. shares their concern for + regional security. He noted that this immediately leaves the question of + how much we are willing to involve ourselves and that leads to a + question of financing. Since the security of this region is also + important to the Europeans, Japanese and others, it is possible that we + might be able to turn to them for assistance in that line. Secondly, he + looked to this trip to introduce some added momentum into the + Egyptian-Israeli dialogue toward peace negotiations. Overall we should + review the geo-strategic situation for the countries of the region and + elicit a dialogue with them. We should focus on areas of interest to + them, specifically South Yemen, Afghanistan, and Iran.

+

At that point (3:18 p.m.) the Vice President arrived.

+

Dr. Brzezinski continued that he would hope some form + of consultative mechanisms could be established for security discussions + with the countries of the region. This would serve as token of our + seriousness of interest. However, such consultations should not serve + simply as surrogates to strengthen the hands of one nation or another to + improve its own bargaining positions in the negotiations. Rather it + should create a sense of shared concern and shared objectives. In + addition, perhaps we could go beyond the mere consultations and explore + the possibility of a direct U.S. military presence in the region. + Finally, he felt that we should think about multilateral consultative + mechanisms which would bring in the Europeans, the Japanese, and others, + particularly in areas of financial and energy interests.

+

Secretary Brown noted that would probably be most appropriate + after the visit as a follow-up since it was not really in his area of + responsibility.

+ +

Vice President Mondale asked how the discussions on this visit + would relate to the Fahd visit + to Washington.On February 20, Saudi Foreign + Minister Saud informed + Ambassador West that + Fahd’s visit, scheduled + for March 13–14, would have to be postponed indefinitely due to + Fahd’s health. + (Telegram 1515 from Jidda, February 20; National Archives, RG 59, + Central Foreign Policy File, P850027–2387) He felt that Crown + Prince Fahd must be able to see + something coming.

+

Dr. Brzezinski noted that it should provide more than + tone to the forthcoming meeting. Secretary Brown should talk seriously about the U.S. role. He + should encourage Israel to talk seriously about Yemen, Afghanistan, and + other regional problems.

+

Mr. Solomon strongly seconded the suggestion that we + make a serious effort to multilateralize these issues. He felt that if + we go too far toward the bilateral and take too much of a lead ourselves + we jeopardize getting the Europeans on board with us at a later + date.

+

Secretary Brown wondered whether we could expect anything + from the Europeans beyond financial assistance.

+

Dr. Brzezinski said they know unless we are willing to + do it, their own security is at stake.

+

Mr. Solomon said that for us to get too far in the lead + is risky.

+

Dr. Brzezinski said who else could we expect to take + the lead? The French have only a little naval power; the British have + some, but have withdrawn it from the area; the Germans are clearly not + coming back in; and the Japanese have nothing to offer on the security + side.

+

Mr. Solomon noted that the economic costs in providing + security for the region could be a shared responsibility.

+

Admiral Turner said that he felt our approach should be + more bilateral than regional and more regional than global. He noted + that the Saudis disapproved not of the regional problems but of us. They + needed reassurance directly from us and he was not sure that the + regional approach would work. On the contrary it could drive the Saudis + toward the arms of the Syrians and Iraqis. We need to reassure them that + we are not using them as a pawn in a bigger game.

+

Secretary Brown replied that it is in their interests and + ours for them to realize that the Iraqi threat depends on what happens + elsewhere and that everything that happens in the region is catalyzed by + the Arab-Israel conflict. The real threat is one of regional instability + and Soviet stimulation of radical forces. The fact that they, i.e. the + Saudis, must do something about it is new.

+

Mr. Aaron + said that the Saudis don’t believe that we have a vision of the regional + situation.

+

Mr. McIntyre wondered if we do have a vision.

+ +

Vice President Mondale said that reduced to simplest form our + vision is to stop the Russians in the region. He wondered whether the + concerns that we are hearing from the Saudis are something new? He + thought they sounded neurotic and rather vague on what they think we + should do about it. Do they realize that in many of these cases that + there was nothing that we could do about it? Or do they really believe + we could? How much do they think is soluble by us?

+

Dr. Brzezinski said there were two new aspects to the + question. First of all, the events of what happened in Ethiopia, Yemen, + and Iran brings the danger home and very close to them. The U.S. did not + respond to those events. They have the feeling that we didn’t do much. + Secondly, there are now more divisions among the Saudi royal family. In + the past we saw Prince Saud as + a hardliner, but then we felt that Fahd was in control. It is now less clear that Fahd is in charge of the situation. + The succession to the Crown Prince position is in question. The Saudis + today are faced with external anxiety and internal divisions.

+

Secretary Brown noted that in addition to that we are + beginning to see public attacks on the U.S. in Saudi newspapers which is + also something new.

+

Mr. Saunders agreed with Dr. Brzezinski. He felt that you could + date the beginning of new attitudes in Saudi Arabia from the time of + Angola and Somalia and those fears have been extenuated since the events + of Ethiopia and Yemen.

+

Vice President Mondale wondered whether this situation was + substantially worse. (The group felt that it was.) He thought that we + had been getting along with the Saudis very well earlier in the + Administration. Now it seems to be the reverse.

+

Secretary Brown noted it was the force of events. Previously + they may have thought that we were stronger than we were. Now perhaps + they think we are not as strong as we really are.

+

Mr. Dayan + said that on the basis of his trip out there, he found that they do not + understand our inability to act.See Document 10. For instance, when we + tell them it takes 36 months to get them a tank, they simply can’t + believe that we are not stalling.

+

General Jones said that we are approaching a crisis in + confidence. He had just left the head of the Turkish Army and he + betrayed a sense of desperation. He thought that we should have been + able to do something and was extremely worried about the situation in + Iran. He had thought that we were more powerful than we turned out to + be. We need to enunciate a clear policy and come to a consensus that + this part of the world is + absolutely critical to the well-being of ourselves and our allies. The + nations of the region have come to expect the U.S. to be timid in + responding and unwilling to face Congressional opposition.

+

Admiral Turner said they often do not hear an expression of + concern on our part.

+

Dr. Brzezinski said that indeed one problem was that we + didn’t express enough concern, but even more important than that is that + we really didn’t do much and they are watching our actions as much as + our words. In some cases we need to be prepared to do something + unpopular and tough. We must be able to flex our muscles. For instance, + if there is a direct threat to Saudi Arabia from South Yemen or if the + Cubans suddenly arrive in South Yemen, it might be necessary for us to + be prepared to run it over. He realized that this was not a popular + line.

+

Vice President Mondale wondered why we do not simply say, when + they ask us for equipment, that tanks are underway.

+

Mr. Dayan + said that finally we did. When they asked for tanks for North Yemen, we + ended up taking them from the U.S. inventory to make sure that they + arrived expeditiously.

+

At that point (3:40 p.m) the Vice President and Mr. Aaron left the meeting.

+

Secretary Brown then turned to Saudi Arabia. Were we prepared + to initiate consultations on security issues with the Saudis? + Contingency planning?

+

Secretary Dayan said we should say yes on consultations and + that we should be as forthcoming as possible on military equipment that + they have asked for. In the past we have told them no on STINGER which + they wanted. They had purchased some REDEYE but when they asked for more, we said that the line + was not open. They said that cost was no object. Why not reopen the + line? He could not see any objection to that himself. There was no money + involved on our part.

+

Secretary Brown noted that there was indeed a Congressional + problem about additional arms sales to Saudi Arabia.

+

Mr. Christopher noted that the request for F–5 munitions has been put off in the past + by Congress. His reading of the Congressional mood which he thought was + no different from anyone else’s was considerably upset by the fact that + the Saudis had not followed through on the Camp David agreements and oil + and had given us grounds for concern by their performance in Baghdad. It + would take a hell of a sales job to convince them to give more on Saudi + Arabia without a peace treaty first. However, with a peace treaty this + position could change. But we should not kid ourselves, that we would be + facing a major battle in Congress.

+ +

Mr. Saunders noted that Church is making a speech tonight in Miami attacking + Saudi Arabia.

+

Mr. Solomon wondered how much better off we would be if + an explicit linkage were made between our security provisions and their + cooperation on economic and oil matters. He felt that there would be + some good feeling on the Hill if we could get the Saudis to agree to a + package of some sort on energy or finance.

+

Secretary Brown wondered how the Saudis would react.

+

Mr. Christopher said he thought it would be a mistake + to try to create an explicit linkage. Fahd’s reaction this week to a fairly explicit linkage + attempt is a good example of the kind of reaction we could + anticipate.See Foreign + Relations, 1969–1976, vol. XXXVII, Energy Crisis, + 1974–1980, Document 185.

+

Secretary Brown said they must know that we only love them + for their oil.

+

Mr. Solomon said he hoped that by the time Fahd arrived to talk [to] the + President enough linkage could be established to get the job done.

+

Dr. Brzezinski said that there is no need to make + linkage explicit, but it can be put in terms of tying in our mutual + interests in security and oil, because the two do overlap.

+

Mr. Solomon again stressed the fact that the Europeans + should be brought in. This is as much in their interest as it is in our + own. We are better off not having the United States as the semi-sole + guarantor.

+

Secretary Brown said that the French, Germans, + British and others certainly are free to sell weapons. They are not + likely to do anything else on the military level.

+

Mr. Saunders wondered what we would do if they would + ask for squadrons of combat aircraft.

+

Secretary Brown said that we could rotate aircraft through + Dharan.

+

Mr. Solomon wondered if they should all be U.S.

+

Secretary Brown doubted whether the French, British or others + would in fact participate.

+

Mr. Saunders said he had some doubts whether the Saudis + would want such a show of force.

+

Secretary Brown said we have to think about what elements we + could in fact multilateralize. He is not sure the Saudis were in fact + interested in a multilateral role. He was not sure what kind of + political guarantees they really would like to have.

+ +

Mr. Solomon noted that the Europeans can give something + that the Saudis would like very much, and that is access to the + Deutschmark, Swiss franc and other European money markets. If we would + work it out with the Germans and other European countries, this would + permit them to diversify their holdings somewhat.

+

Secretary Brown wondered if this would be a suitable subject + for him to raise on his trip.

+

Dr. Brzezinski said we should talk to the Europeans + first. Maybe it was not the best forum to discuss this kind of + issue.

+

Mr. Solomon said he would be meeting with five + Ministers of Finance from Europe next week. He would first of all need + to do more homework. He would do some more work on it and send out a + proposal for review.

+

Secretary Brown wondered whether he should raise the question + of oil field security. The Saudis had been leery of this subject in the + past.

+

Dr. Brzezinski said it would be a mistake for Secretary + Brown to raise it; rather, he + should ask the Saudis to define their own view of their security + problems and to give us a list. We should ask them what is their list. + Are they confident that the oil fields are secure? It is also important + that we link our ability to help solve their problem to continued + progress on the Camp David agreement. That is not simply a matter of + psychology, it is a matter of fact.

+

Mr. McGiffert said he thought it was dangerous to go + that far.

+

Mr. Bowie + said that the Saudis see the Camp David accords as a threat to their own + security.

+

Dr. Brzezinski said he understood that that’s the way + the Saudis viewed the subject, but it was our objective to try to make + them understand that the Camp David agreements were to initiate a + process in the West Bank.

+

Mr. McGiffert wondered when do we want the Saudis to + act and what do we want them to do.

+

Mr. Saunders said that was very straightforward. If the + treaty was signed, we would not want them to go back to Bagdad and join + with the rejectionists.The rejectionists + included Algeria, Iraq, Libya, the People’s Democratic Republic of + Yemen, Syria, and the PLO. They + came together after the December 1977 Tripoli conference (see footnote 4, Document 161) in opposition + to Sadat’s dialogue with the Israelis. More information on the + formation of the group is in telegram 1525 from Tripoli, December 5, + 1977. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + D770450–1012) We would want them to support Sadat, to + continue their aid to Egypt. We would like them to work to bring the + Palestinians into the process. They are asking us to move the Israelis + to an agreement. If they want us + to succeed, they must listen to us as to how to do it our own way.

+

Mr. McIntyre said he was concerned about the fourth + point in the paper regarding the Saudis which calls for us to agree in + principle to continue our joint cooperation in third country military + assistance programs, including nominal US financial participation. He had reservations about + agreeing to something he knows nothing about.

+

Dr. Brzezinski agreed and noted that agreement in + principle often leads to a commitment which even worse leads to our not + keeping the commitment.

+

General Jones noted that we should be forthcoming to our + approach to consultations.

+

Mr. McIntyre said it is important that we not imply a + lot of commitments when in fact we could encounter disagreement later on + about those commitments. He had a real concern that the questions be + analyzed in advance. He saw the approach outlined in this paper as + exactly the same approach as we used toward the Iranians.

+

At that point (4:00 p.m.) Dr. Brzezinski left the meeting.

+

Mr. Sullivan wondered what arguments there were + against the idea of consultations.

+

Secretary Brown said that the arguments against were that we + would promise more than we could deliver.

+

Mr. Christopher said that the simple fact of talking + often leads to a request. We are expected to put something into the + pot.

+

Secretary Brown noted that regardless of that, there is no + way that we could be more tied to the Saudis now.

+

Mr. Christopher wondered if this type of thing would in + fact help prevent the situation that happened in Iran.

+

Secretary Brown said “no.”

+

Mr. Saunders noted that it was not a budget + problem.

+

Mr. Solomon wondered whether we should be careful to + limit our involvement to external threats.

+

Secretary Brown said they don’t want internal involvement + from the United States.

+

Mr. McGiffert noted that the first question they would + put to us in consultations is “What would we give if Yemen + attacked?”

+

Mr. McIntyre wondered whether we had thought through + our response in that case.

+

Mr. Solomon noted that our interests lie in working as + closely as possible with them.

+

Secretary Brown said that it is alleged that the Saudis are + not so much in danger as the Iranians were. They have a large royal + family which remains close to the + people. He could not vouch that this was true.

+

Mr. Saunders said that the real issue in Saudi Arabia + is that of corruption, and that’s the point where the Iranian case and + the Saudi case are very similar.

+

Mr. Dayan + said that this region was an area of overwhelming significance to the + United States and the West. There is a positive need to demonstrate that + we understand that. The sooner there is public visibility on the + subject, the better. He drew attention to a CIA paper which had just been published which was a + reassessment of the Saudi position,See Document 181. and noted that they + were re-evaluating their own policy. This was of overriding strategic + importance to the United States. It should be met head on.

+

General Jones also drew attention to the point in the paper + which indicated that the Saudis intended this call for consultations as + a direct test to the US commitment. He + felt that we should be forthcoming in regard to contingency + planning.

+

Mr. Christopher said he agreed with that, but that we + should not directly link security issues with economic and energy + issues; and secondly, we should make it clear that we can’t stop + something from happening inside Saudi Arabia—external threats, yes; but + internal threats, we could not deal with.

+

Secretary Brown then turned to Egypt. He wondered whether we + should encourage Sadat to play a role outside his own country in line + with his own idea of providing an intervention force for Africa and + other regions. He said that if you examine the whole region, looking for + a replacement for Iran except for money, Egypt came the closest.

+

Mr. Dayan + said that he thought the list of initiatives presented for Egypt were + very good, especially the fourth one which called for the initiation of + FMS credits.

+

Secretary Brown thought that FMS credits to Egypt were more sal-able in Congress than + arms sales to Saudia Arabia, although the former required US funding and the latter did not.

+

Mr. Christopher felt that until a peace treaty had been + signed, we should not plan on large-scale consultations even on a survey + team to Egypt.

+

Secretary Brown said we could take the line that we want to + do it, but we can wait until after a treaty is signed.

+

Mr. Christopher agreed.

+ +

Mr. McGiffert wondered if that applied to all five + items on the list.

+

Mr. Christopher said that there could be talks about + what the Egyptians might want from us. The first point was certainly + alright. They need to know that it is a good thing to diversify their + sources of supply.

+

Secretary Brown said that when we tell countries to go + elsewhere for their source of arms, they take it as a lack of interest + from us.

+

Mr. Christopher said we should not hold out the hope + that we will be the sole source of arms for Egypt and also provide + money.

+

Secretary Brown said that may be difficult, since the + Egyptians just came out of that kind of relationship. We need to talk to + the Saudis about the level of support for Egypt.

+

Admiral Turner said that it will be difficult to turn Sadat + away from his concept of being a Middle East policeman, but there are + real dangers in our encouraging that role. There is a danger that he + will ignore his domestic problems, ignore the military dissatisfaction + with such a policy, and that he could end up generating the same kind of + problems that we have just seen in Iran.

+

Secretary Brown said perhaps our position should be that he + would be in a better position to play that role after a peace treaty was + concluded.

+

Mr. Christopher said he hoped we would not divert Sadat + from the hard problems of a peace treaty and domestic problems.

+

Mr. McGiffert said he thought it would be bad if + Secretary Brown goes to Egypt and + offers only a few contingency possibilities. That would have a negative + effect.

+

Mr. Christopher said that some APCs could be offered after the treaty is signed with the + numbers to be determined later.

+

Mr. McIntyre noted we already provide $750M in SSA to + Egypt.

+

Secretary Brown then turned to Israel. He noted that the + specific proposals called for security consultations on a regional + basis. This would be something new in our security discussions with the + Israelis. He would also need to talk about the relocation of the air + bases. Our commitment to assist on air base relocation is ill defined. + The President must discuss this with the Israelis, but he could lead the + way.

+

Mr. McIntyre said that opposition [our position] should be that we will make no cash commitments, + but after a settlement is reached we will assess the request and make + recommendations. That is the line he has been taking on the hill—it + implies some additional funding, but that is all. How would we + rationalize that position if we now go forward with new commitments as a + result of this visit?

+

Secretary Brown said he was only talking about 1981. + Obviously, this would not apply before that budget year.

+

Mr. McIntyre said that there are general totals that we + are operating on with regard to 1981, and that we have to tread very + carefully on that.

+

Mr. Christopher said that the air base and other issues + of that sort should be discussed under the general context of the peace + process.

+ +

Mr. McGiffert noted that the $1B figure in the paper is + new. We have never given that to Israel before, although that is in the + air base study.

+

Secretary Brown said we have never talked about $3B in total + aid, even if that is understood to include air bases and other + factors.

+

Mr. Christopher said it would not be desirable now to + make a commitment for $1B for air base relocation. There are already big + numbers there as far as the Israelis are concerned.

+

Secretary Brown said he had not intended to make a commitment + on this, rather he intended to discuss the study and the estimated costs + that came out of it. It would be a mistake to say that we would provide + loans or grants of money to Israel for that purpose.

+

Mr. Christopher said that the words of the Secretary of + Defense are heard as a commitment whether it is 81, 82 or any other + time. Any discussion of the study should be prefaced with a clear + statement that this would involve no commitment as to when or how we + would provide funds.

+

Mr. McIntyre said he would want to [go] to the + President to see how he would deal with the question of budget + levels.

+

Secretary Brown said that he had told Weizman on several + occasions that there would be $1B in FMS credits and $750M in SSA, and not more than that on an + annual basis.

+

Mr. McIntyre said that we should not leave the + impression that that level will continue in perpetuity; however, that is + a subject that is probably left unsaid at this point.

+

Secretary Brown said he was worried about talking security + with these countries without something to offer on his own.

+

Mr. McGiffert wondered how he could possibly be quiet + on the entire list.

+

Mr. Saunders said that there were certain items that + they had requested that certainly could be granted which didn’t cost + money and could be incorporated within the current aid levels.

+

Secretary Brown said he was afraid that such discussion would + not send a positive signal. However, he thought he could avoid making + new financial commitment.

+

Mr. Saunders said he didn’t think it would be so + negative. He thought the general objectives spelled out in the paper + were excellent and provided a good basis for talking seriously with them + about security needs. We could also discuss their specific needs and + relate those to the situation in Oman and Yemen and elsewhere in the + region.

+

Secretary Brown said that that was true as far as the Saudis, + and that it was easier since there were no financial problems there; + however, on the Saudi case there were Congressional problems.

+

Mr. Christopher wondered what you could say to the + Israelis on any of these subjects without making a commitment.

+

Secretary Brown said there are some things on the list that + could be discussed without any new financial commitments. By discussing + the study, we could show we + have done something on the airfield situation. We can assure them that + some work can be done on the airfields without an impact on the Israeli + economy; however, no decision can be taken at this time. He felt that + what was required was a decision memo for the President which had to be + done immediately for him to examine some of the critical specific + issues.

+
+ +
+ 18. Telegram From the Department of State to Multiple Diplomatic + PostsSource: National + Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790060–0555. Secret; + Priority; Exdis. Drafted by + Twinam; cleared by + George Muller (T), Saunders, + J. Brian Atwood (H), Robert M. Maxim (HA), Kreisberg, + O’Donohue, Carol C. Moor (INR/DDC/OIL), Quandt, McGiffert, and Richard Castrodale (S/S–O); approved by Newsom. Sent Priority to Abu Dhabi, + Doha, Jidda, Kuwait, Manama, and Muscat. Sent for information + Priority to Amman, USINT Baghdad, + Bonn, Cairo, London, Moscow, Paris, Sana, and Tokyo. + + + Washington, February 8, 1979, 1500Z + +

33242. Subject: U.S. Posture Toward Persian Gulf States. Refs: A) 78 + Muscat 1611;In telegram 1611 from Muscat, + December 9, 1978, Wiley + recommended the reassessment of U.S. relations with Oman, stating + that the United States should “think in terms of building a larger + community of interests with Oman and of raising somewhat our past + very low official profile.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central + Foreign Policy File, D780509–1004) B) Kuwait 99;In telegram 99 from Kuwait, January 7, the Embassy + endorsed “Wiley’s + well-conceived recommendation” regarding Oman, as elucidated in + telegram 1611 from Muscat, December 9, 1978. (National Archives, RG + 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790009–0338) C) Abu Dhabi + 70;In telegram 70 from Abu Dhabi, + January 9, Dickman offered + his assessment of U.S.-Omani relations: “With all respect for the + views ably set forth by my colleagues in Kuwait and Muscat, I + question whether as a knee jerk reaction to events in Iran we wish + to leap into a closer and more active relationship with the Sultan, + especially in military security matters. My reservations about this + step are derived from more than a feeling that we seem to have a + fatal fascination for absolute monarchs, especially potentially + wobbly ones. I see potential problems for both Qabus and for his + UAE neighbors from such a + US embrace.” (National Archives, + RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790010–1129) D) Cairo + 594;In telegram 594 from Cairo, January + 10, Eilts noted that Sadat + was concerned about the “threat to Arabian Peninsula/Gulf area + stability which might result from Iranian developments.” Eilts concluded that “Sadat is + genuinely worried about situation. He would welcome anything that we + might be willing to do that would strengthen Oman and the Gulf + States.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + D790014–0425) + E) State 3732;In telegram 3732 to multiple Middle Eastern posts, + January 6, the Department noted that if discussion of the Iranian + situation turned to Persian Gulf security, U.S. representatives + could assure host governments of “continuing U.S. interest in and + concern for Gulf and Arabian Peninsula stability.” The Department + also instructed the Embassies that “it would be helpful to ongoing + policy review in Washington if you could try to draw out host + governments somewhat on the precise nature of the threat.” (National + Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790008–01845) + F) Kuwait 147;In telegram 147 from Kuwait, + January 9, the Embassy described the reaction to the Kuwaiti Crown + Prince’s 19-day visit to Saudi Arabia and the Arab Gulf states and + noted that regional security dangers had been discussed during his + visit. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + D790012–1257) G) Kuwait 227;In + telegram 227 from Kuwait, January 15, Maestrone reiterated earlier comments made in + telegram 99 from Kuwait, January 7 (see footnote 3 above), noting: + “None of the Gulf States, except for Saudi Arabia and Oman, is a + viable partner in a security arrangement.” Maestrone also commented: + “Naturally, any action we might undertake to promote a more active + US presence in the Persian Gulf + should be a subject of consultation with Saudis, whose policy + interests are so closely linked with many of ours.” (National + Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790103–0523) + H) Muscat 080;In telegram 80 from Muscat, + January 18, Wiley noted the + comments he had received from his colleagues in the United Arab + Emirates and Kuwait, stating that some sort of common ground between + the two viewpoints should be found. Specifically, Wiley believed that “it is time we + step up our past very low profile in Oman, but I also agree with + Ambassador Dickman that we + should be careful to avoid projecting an image of all out American + military involvement that would make Oman a target for the + nationalist and leftist elements in the area.” (National Archives, + RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790027–0961) I) Abu + Dhabi 188.In telegram 188 from Abu Dhabi, + January 22, Dickman offered + additional observations on the future of U.S.-Omani relations in + response to the comments made by Maestrone (see footnote 8 above) and Wiley (see footnote 9 above). + (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + D790038–0069)

+

1. Secret-entire text.

+

2. We have read with great interest comments of various posts on changing + perceptions among the Arab Gulf states of the regional strategic balance + and implications for U.S. relations with these states. Posts’ views have + been factored into extensive Washington policy view of U.S. posture + toward the general region in the wake of events in Iran, Afghanistan and + South Arabia and the apparent growth of anxiety among friendly moderate + states in the region about the regional security situation. In this + review we have carefully evaluated the U.S. policy posture toward the + Gulf since the British withdrawal in 1971 and the development of the + Gulf states and our relationship with them.

+

3. On the basis of this review we believe that U.S. policy of encouraging + regional cooperation and orderly development of our bilateral relations + with each of the states remains a fundamentally sound policy. In our + presentation and implementation of it, however, we need to reflect + recognition of changing circumstances, which include not just the + weakening of the Iranian contribution to stability in the region, but + also the significant progress + which the Arabian Peninsula Gulf states have made in developing strong + societies and strengthening the trend toward regional cooperation.

+

4. Action addressees should therefore seek an ongoing dialogue with host + governments on the political and security environment in the region and + the U.S. response to it. In these discussions you should stress the + following general themes:

+

—U.S. interest in the region is longstanding and ongoing and we have + watched with great attention the development of the Gulf states over the + last decade and the regional environment in which this has occurred.

+

—We recognize our common interest with the Gulf states in the security + and orderly development of the area and the importance of close + cooperation among the states themselves in furthering this + objective.

+

—We assume host governments have appreciated that U.S. response to + changed circumstances when British withdrew from Gulf in 1971 reflected + a measured effort to develop a sound modern relationship with the area + without assertively seeking the degree of presence which might in itself + have been a destabilizing factor in the region.

+

—We believe that this U.S. posture has made some contribution to enabling + the states of the Gulf to demonstrate their ability to prosper and + progress as independent states and to soundly lay a basis of consensus + for closer cooperation with one another.

+

—In view of the encouraging development on the Arab side of the Gulf and + the changing circumstances in neighboring countries, such as Iran and + Afghanistan, we welcome closer consultation with host governments on + their perception of regional environment and their sense of proper U.S. + response to it.

+

—In this connection (ref E), we seek a closer dialogue with host + governments on their security concerns in an effort to define with + greater specificity the exact nature of the threat they see to stability + in the area.

+

—We tend to share assessment (ref F) that primary route for assuring + stability in the area is continued emphasis on building strong societies + in each of the Gulf states with careful attention to orderly economic + and social progress including respect for internationally recognized + standards of human rights.

+

—In the wake of events in Iran we are confident that host governments + share our impression of the importance of permitting political + institutions to evolve in a way that permits governments to keep in + sensitive touch with and reflect the aspirations of their peoples. We + are aware of the sensitivity of host governments to this aspect of + orderly development; we have + watched with great interest and sympathy efforts of Kuwait and Bahrain + to experiment with representative government and have shared + disappointment of those governments that previous experiments with this + particular type of institution have not been fully successful. With + respect to political institutions we have no particular advice to offer, + and certainly no particular ideology or institution which we seek to + promote, but we do look forward to sharing with friendly governments in + the area views on their efforts and our own to make government more + responsive to the people.

+

—We want to continue to seek to find ways in which U.S. official and + private technology and other assistance might help host governments to + achieve their development goals.

+

—We have been impressed by the development of a consensus for regional + cooperation within the region and it remains our policy to encourage + this trend.

+

—In view of recent events in the region we assume host governments will + carefully consider intensifying their search for the most effective + method of working together in the interest of regional security.

+

—We remain prepared to assist host governments as appropriate in meeting + legitimate defense needs and in considering our response in this area, + we want increasingly to consider implications for regional security + cooperation.

+

—Host governments should be assured of U.S. determination to maintain + capability to preserve a global strategic balance and to + maintain/promote great power relationship which will serve to deter + outside intervention into the Gulf region.

+

—In this connection economic cooperation between U.S. and host + governments, particularly OPEC + governments, can develop in ways that will strengthen the ability of the + U.S. and its industrial world allies to preserve global balance.

+

—In working to strengthen our relations with the Gulf states we want to + stay in close consultation with our allies in the industrial world who + have important interests in the area parallelling our own and also with + Arab states such as Egypt and Jordan which have an avid interest in the + security of the region.

+

5. In follow up to visit of Omani Foreign Minister Zawawi to Washington we are looking + at possibility of encouraging similar ones by Foreign Ministers or other + appropriate Cabinet members of the other Gulf states to pursue our + dialogue at the Cabinet level.

+

6. We will be proceeding shortly to pin down dates for official visit of + Shaikh Zayid of UAE. We will be looking + in the coming months to the possibilities for other official visits from + Gulf leaders and visits to the area by senior USG officials.

+ +

7. For Abu Dhabi and Muscat: You should inquire of host governments as to + their receptivity to visits from Defense Attache stationed in Jidda and + on basis of response and outcome of such visits we will be considering + further desirability of attache presence, resident or non-resident, in + UAE and Oman.

+

8. Info addressees (except Baghdad and Moscow) should brief host + governments on the general lines of U.S. policy response to Gulf states + as laid out above.

+ + Vance + +
+ +
+ 19. Letter From President Carter to Secretary of Defense BrownSource: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, + Staff Material, Middle East, Trips/Visits File, Box 112, 2/9–19/79 + Brown Visit to the Middle + East: 1/79–2/10/79. Secret. Carter’s letter is the final version of Brown’s draft instructions; see + footnote 2, Document 15. An undated + note from Vance to Carter suggesting additional + revisions to Brown’s + instructions is in the Carter Library, National Security Affairs, + Staff Material, Middle East, Trips/Visits File, Box 112, 2/9–19/79 + Brown Visit to the Middle + East: 1/79–2/10/79. + + + Washington, February + 9, 1979 + To Harold Brown + +

The immediate purpose of your trip is to restore and reinforce confidence + in the United States among our friends in the region. In doing so, you + should begin to lay the basis for security collaboration among the U.S. + and key states in the region—Israel, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Jordan. + Consistent with our strategy in the peace negotiations, we should be + aiming for a situation in which Egypt and Israel are not isolated from + the rest of the region.

+

To that end, you should place very high emphasis on the need for the + rapid conclusion of an Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty as the first step + in a wider process of Israeli-Arab accommodation. You should make it + clear that our ability to develop regional cooperation will be severely + handicapped, and perhaps even negated, by continued Israeli-Arab + hostility. That hostility intensifies internal strains in the Arab + countries, contributes to growing radicalization, and opens doors to the + reentry of the Soviet Union. You should, therefore, indicate that the + United States expects a forthcoming attitude from our friends on this + issue in order to facilitate + greater regional cooperation on wider strategic matters.

+

With the foregoing as a key point of departure, you should forcefully + express our recognition of the strategic importance of the region, its + strategic location, its vital resources, and its crucial role in + establishing healthy patterns of internal development and North-South + relations. Make it clear that we see the region to be under serious + threat from Soviet power which is systematically exploiting internal + instability as well as regional conflicts.

+

With or without a grand plan, determined Soviet efforts, as evidenced in + the Horn of Africa, the PDRY, and + Afghanistan, now abetted by turmoil in Iran, could lead to general + disorder or the imposition of dominant Soviet influence, which the U.S. + and its friends cannot tolerate.

+

To counter these threats, the United States sees the need for an + integrated strategy for regional security to which it is prepared to + make a strong political and military contribution. This strategy should + be comprised of several elements:

+

—Rapid progress in bringing peace between Israel and her Arab neighbors, + first and foremost between Israel and Egypt, but in a manner which + progressively draws support from Arab moderates for subsequent peace + negotiations.

+

—New forms of bilateral and multilateral collaboration in security + management, including military assistance, intelligence cooperation, and + contingency planning.

+

—Increased U.S. military presence in the region, possibly including + increased naval presence and new collaboration on basing arrangements. + You should explore reactions to possible forms of enhanced U.S. + presence, without making any specific commitment at this point. Upon + your return, I expect a full report on steps that can be taken to + strengthen our position in the area.

+

—Concerted measures to counter radical forces that now provide a base for + the intrusion of Soviet influence.

+

—Cooperation in oil matters that builds on the common interest of the + U.S., its allies, and the region’s moderate states in security and + economic development.

+

You should emphasize our conviction that a new strategy for peace and + security in the region will require new policies on the part of the U.S. + and the governments of the region, demanding the resolve to effect them + at home and internationally.

+

We will do our part, but will expect in return enhanced cooperation from + each of the states that you will be visiting.

+ +

Saudi Arabia

+

In addition to a review of regional security along the lines indicated + above, you should discuss with the Saudis the nature of the “special” + relationship they say they desire. You should seek their views on + specific security concerns. At their initiative, this could include + discussion of oil field security. You should agree to more systematic + security consultations, including the possibility of some joint + contingency planning directed at threats from Soviet surrogates in the + region.

+

In conversations with Saudi leaders it should be emphasized that it is + vital that American policy have the support of the Congress and the + American people. You should note that it is a reality of our political + system that the success of our cooperation with them on security issues + is dependent in considerable measure on U.S.-Saudi cooperation in the + peace process and on economic issues.

+

With regard to specific arms transfer issues, you should indicate that a + decision on air munitions will be made by me after my conversations with + Fahd. You might also + indicate to the Saudis that, subject to my final approval after the + Fahd visit, we expect to + continue with the modernization program for two Army brigades and four + National Guard battalions. Following the discussions with Fahd, I will review also the issue of + nominal FMS credits for third country + military assistance.

+

Egypt

+

President Sadat believes that Egypt can play a constructive regional role + in support of moderate states and in limiting Soviet influence, provided + a peace treaty with Israel can be achieved and Egypt receives American + support. Egyptian leaders should be encouraged to think realistically in + these terms, consistent with their objective of alleviating Egypt’s + economic problems, and to focus on specific situations, such as Sudan, + Oman, the Emirates, and Yemen where an Egyptian contribution to security + may be possible. We should seek to initiate the development of a close + U.S.-Egyptian security relationship for the post-treaty environment. It + is particularly important that the Egyptians understand that our ability + to sustain a long-term security relationship with Egypt depends upon + peace with Israel.

+

With regard to specific arms transfer issues, you can offer to send a + survey team to survey Egyptian air defense requirements; indicate to the + Egyptians that the United States will review the question of FMS in the light of regional developments; + and that I am prepared to consider favorably the sale of 800 APCs for Egypt in the context of progress + on the Israeli-Egyptian peace treaty. You should make the Egyptians + understand the congressional sensitivity on this point, and reiterate again the connection between + regional security and Israeli-Arab accommodation.

+

Israel

+

In your meetings with Israeli leaders, you should provide assurance that + the U.S. commitment to Israel’s security remains firm. You should seek + to gain understanding of Israeli perspectives of their security + problems, especially those that would arise from a reduced military + presence in the West Bank and Gaza. You should also encourage Israeli + leaders to develop a regional approach to security matters, building on + the common interests of Israel and the moderate Arab states in limiting + hostile Soviet and radical influences within the area. The critical + relationship between the Arab-Israeli peace process and regional + security should be emphasized.

+

On specific bilateral issues, you should:

+

1. Convey the conclusions of the survey for the relocation of two Israeli + air bases from the Sinai, but without commitment as to the extent or + terms of U.S. financial assistance;

+

2. Agree in principle to provide equipment and technical assistance in + overcoming the loss of intelligence and early warning stemming from + Sinai withdrawal, the details to be developed in the course of ongoing + security consultations.

+

3. The air base relocation aside, avoid any commitment in regard to + Israeli requests for FY 1980 financial + assistance in excess of the $1 billion in FMS and $785 million in security supporting assistance.

+

4. You can indicate to the Israelis that I am prepared to consider + favorably the sale of 960 APCs and 200 + Howitzers in the context of progress on the Israeli-Egyptian peace + treaty. You should make the Israelis understand the congressional + sensitivity on this point, and reiterate again the connection between + regional security and Israeli-Arab accommodation.

+

Jordan

+

King Hussein will be seeking both + general assurance of American support and specific commitments to supply + arms of greater sophistication. You should encourage him to adopt a + supportive role toward the peace negotiations, particularly as they turn + to the West Bank/Gaza issues. You should also open the prospect of + greater U.S. assistance in meeting his legitimate security needs in the + future as Jordan becomes more actively involved in the peace process. + You should specifically:

+

1. Discuss Jordan’s security requirements now and during a period of + protracted negotiations about the future of the West Bank, reaffirming + our commitment to continue with military modernization programs which + have already been agreed.

+ +

2. Agree to consider Jordan’s additional defense needs, but without + commitment to a favorable outcome.

+

3. Agree to continue detailed defense consultations through the existing + Joint Military Commission in the spring with regard to Jordan’s future + security requirements.

+

Sincerely,

+ + Jimmy + Carter + +
+ +
+ 20. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense Brown toPresident CarterSource: + Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files, FRC + 330–82–0205, Middle East (Feb 1–23) 1979. Secret; Sensitive. In the + upper-right corner of the memorandum Carter wrote: “Good report J.” Brzezinski returned the report to + Brown under a February 21 + memorandum, commenting: “I thought you would want to see his + [Carter’s] comment.” + (Ibid.) Brown’s memorandum is + also printed in + Foreign Relations, 1977–1980, vol. IX, Arab-Israeli + Dispute, August 1978–December 1980, Document + 178. + + + Washington, February + 19, 1979 + + + SUBJECT + Middle East Trip Report + +

You know from my personal messagesNot found. + For the Embassy in Jidda’s reports on Brown’s visit in Saudi Arabia, see Documents 185 and 186. about the highlights of my meetings with + Sadat, Begin, Dayan, Weizman, Hussein and the Saudi + Princes. I will therefore confine this report to a general assessment + and some suggestions for future action.

+

Conclusions

+

My overall conclusions are these. First, we must press forward as quickly + as possible to an Israeli-Egyptian accord. Time is probably running + against success. To make this step by Sadat digestible to the other + moderate Arabs, we need to do three things besides portraying the treaty + as part of a process designed to achieve a comprehensive peace: be + forthcoming on regional economic development; be forthcoming on arms + supplies, although not nearly to the extent of the announced demands; + and find some form of US military + presence which will provide reassurance without carrying the political + burdens of a presence so intrusive as a US military base.

+ +

These actions will also lay a basis for a greater degree of regional + security cooperation, with US support. + That cooperation will come, if at all, on an evolutionary basis unless + the perception of the threat intensifies. All the countries were + concerned about the events in Iran; but there was no panic and, indeed, + less anxiety than I had expected. None of the leaders thought we should + do more than “wait and see” on Iran for the moment.

+

My second conclusion is that the most likely threats lie in internal + violence supported from across borders or from internal political, + economic, and social instability. The first will hardly, and the second + not at all, be cured by major military hardware, which can however + inhibit direct aggression across borders. We need to promote regional + security cooperation, particularly where there is a threat from a Soviet + surrogate as in North Yemen, and perhaps Oman, from the PDRY. And we need to continue forcefully + to assert our willingness and ability to oppose direct Soviet aggression + in the area. But most important of all, we need to do our best to + forestall development of internal instability. Our influence is + necessarily limited on this score, but the steps outlined above may help + to enhance it. In particular, assistance in sensible economic + development is needed. Several leaders stressed in private that this + took priority over arms, though this wisdom did not extend to moderating + their own long lists of arms requests.

+

My trip had four main objectives. Pursuant to your instructions,See Document + 19. the first was to restore confidence among the + moderate states that the United States understands the dangers to the + region and intends to act to protect its interests. This was achieved. + But there will be backsliding unless we now follow through on the + commitment to play a more active role in the Middle East—in frustrating + Soviet interference, in displaying some modest presence of our own, and + in cooperating more actively with the moderate states in security + terms.

+

The second objective was to stimulate the development of a general + strategy for the region. I outlined the major elements: close + cooperation between the United States and the individual states, + concerted actions among moderate states, bilateral politico-military + consultations about hypothetical contingencies, a potentially greater + US military presence, cooperation on + economic issues (oil) and economic assistance, and, above all, rapid + progress on Arab-Israeli peace.

+

In response, the countries’ leaders acknowledged a commonality of + interest. However, not surprisingly, the Arabs do not see Israel as + having a regional security role, and tend also to criticize each other’s + efforts. Several urged a US military + presence in other countries “which are weak and need it” but see it as a lightning rod in their own (the + exception was Israel, which would welcome such a presence for reasons + both plain and, to us, unattractive). It is quite obvious as well that + each country views US interest in + promoting regional security as a lever to obtain more US arms for itself. This presents + opportunities for the United States as well as problems, for we may be + able over time to establish some degree of implicit linkage between + bilateral arms supply relations and regional cooperation.

+

The third objective was to emphasize the peace process, and its + importance for regional strategy. I did this at each stop. I pressed + hard the argument that sustained progress toward peace would make an + essential contribution to the security of the region. While all + professed dedication to peace, recognized the threat to stability posed + by its absence, and wished to exclude the Soviets from the negotiations, + reactions to the Camp David Agreements were along predictable lines.

+

Sadat and the Israelis are wedded to the Camp David process, but holding + to their positions that progress be on their terms. Each is seeking + maximum reward in US security support as + an incentive for moving forward. Hussein and the Saudis are convinced + that the Camp David process carries more immediate danger than eventual + safety. They appear to have no constructive, practical alternatives and + have difficulty focusing on the threat that stalemate in the peace + process poses to their security. Neither wants to close the door + completely—their desire for our support in security matters precludes + this—but they both seem to be hoping somehow that the moment of decision + will go away. I believe concentration on Gaza with respect to the + autonomy issue would be a good tactic.

+

The final objective was to strengthen bilateral relationships. Overall, I + sought to convey the idea that a comprehensive peace settlement and + other forms of defense cooperation are far more important to regional + security and well-being than additional arms. I made very few + commitments, handling most requests by undertaking to consider them on + my return to Washington or to arrange for US teams to survey requirements or make staff visits in + order to examine the need in greater depth. In some cases, I was frank + in warning them not to expect approval.

+

In the main, however, offers of consultations and joint planning and + intelligence exchange were welcomed but were not enough. We were judged + in this functional area by how favorably we responded to arms requests. + My approach was all right as a stop gap but will not work for more than + a few months. No one was satisfied. Everyone had his list. Saudi Arabia + renewed earlier requests for advanced systems, such as the XM1 tank, without addressing quantities or + timing. Jordan presented a $2 + billion plan for filling shortfalls and for force modernization, including F–16 aircraft and ROLAND missiles. Israel scrapped MATMON + C,Reference is to the military force + development plan of the Israeli Defense Force originally projected + to cover the period from 1978 to 1986. substituting a new + eight-year force development plan for equipment which could cost $6–8 + billion. The new plan does cut back significantly on MATMON C’s planned + force expansion and is said to be 20–25% less expensive, but most of the + savings appear to be in the later years. Egypt listed equipment which + would total $15–20 billion, in effect an “Americanization” of Egyptian + forces.

+

I’m sure none of these nations expected us to respond fully to their + requests. We cannot ignore them, however. I believe we should now + approve military hardware items at a somewhat faster rate (without + increasing dollar levels where credit is involved) than we have in the + recent past for Israel, Jordan and Saudi Arabia. I believe we need to + plan for a sharply increased arms supply to Egypt, including FMS credits, although not to anything like + the extent of Egypt’s full request. The Egyptians have a genuine + self-defense need to reverse the continuing decay of their military + forces flowing from loss of Soviet support. And, with Iran gone, Egypt’s + role in regional security becomes more important; no other country in + the region can play a comparable role. The expanded relationship must, + of course, be paced by the peace talks; our survey teams will tide us + over until May–June. Also, we will face a difficult task in adjusting + Egyptian appetites downward to fit the threat and competing economic + development needs.

+

You also asked that I report on the view of the regional states toward a + greater US military presence. Israel + favors a US presence, preferably one in + Israel, but even one in the Arab states would be all right with them. + Dayan and Weizman raised the + possibility of our taking over the Sinai air bases. Weizman + distinguished between a naval base at Haifa, which he said would not be + antagonistic in an Arab-Israeli context, and other kinds of ground or + air bases which would be.

+

Neither Egypt nor Saudi Arabia wants a base on its soil, although they + might acquiesce in a US base in some + other Arab country. Sadat thinks a US + base would be a sign of Egyptian weakness and showed no interest in a + US presence in the Sinai. The Saudis + did not think direct Soviet military action sufficiently likely to + warrant the political risks to them that, in their view, would follow + from a major US military presence. Some + Saudis thought a US presence somewhere + else in the Gulf was worth considering, but it is by no means clear this + represents a consensus.

+

It may be that, on reflection, one or more of the Arab countries may be + interested in a form of US presence less + intrusive than a military base, + such as periodic aircraft deployments, joint exercises, and the like. It + may be that we can develop arrangements for use of facilities in a + crisis, perhaps with some pre-positioning of critical items. This would + give us some of the military advantages of a base with fewer of its + political burdens. We will learn more about this as our security + consultations progress.

+

There remain two other “presence” questions. First, the possibility of + base facilities in another country, such as Oman. In 1977 Oman agreed in + principle to our use of Masirah, the former British base, but at a very + high cost.According to an undated + information paper on the continuing U.S. effort to seek base rights + at Masirah, drafted on January 11 in OASD/ISA/NESA, direct negotiations with Oman began after the + withdrawal of the RAF on March 31, + 1977. The report contained Wiley’s December 19, 1978, assessment that + negotiations with Oman were “totally stalled” and that “if they are + to be revived, the initiative will probably have to come from our + side.” (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, + Middle East, Subject File, Box 73, Oman: 1–4/79) I did not + get a clear view of Saudi Arabia’s or Egypt’s attitude on such a base, + although I understand Crown Prince Fahd had expressed reservation about the idea in late + 1976. We should examine this further within our government and perhaps + with Saudi Arabia, to see whether the question should now be reopened + with Oman. More importantly, I believe we ought to promote assistance + from moderate Arab states to Oman to replace the capability withdrawn by + Iran. The sooner this is done, the more South Yemen will be discouraged + from seriously considering renewed efforts against Oman.

+

Second is the question of increasing US + military presence off-shore. I believe we should carefully consider + augmenting the Middle East Force (which now consists of 3 ships) and + expanding the facilities on Diego Garcia. This is not for purposes of + reassuring the moderate Middle East states, who showed little interest. + Rather, its justification would rest on broader geo-political grounds or + on improvement in our rapid deployment capability. I will send you a + separate memorandum on this.

+

My impressions of the military capabilities of these countries can be + only very sketchy ones, but I’ll give them anyway.

+

Israel’s forces are very capable, very tough, and very ready. In a short + war with Egypt and Jordan, they should have no trouble winning, but + could take casualties substantial for their small population. I have no + way to judge their expressed strong concern about Syrian and Iraqi + capability (the latter is touted in many of the countries of the region + as the coming military power) but I hypothesize that during the next few + years this would not change the outcome.

+ +

Egypt’s forces have rather good morale, are quite large, and claim to be + ready. I doubt the last, and their denials of equipment unreadiness are + undercut by their expressed concerns about spare parts. They are + competent technically and professionally. I think they’d do well against + anyone in the area except the Israelis, if we help them solve their + equipment problems.

+

The Jordanians show spit and polish, are probably well trained (I saw + only the honor guard!) but their forces are both small and very modestly + equipped. They probably have considerable defensive capability, but + would be wise to stay out of offensive operations. They can make a + useful military advisory contribution in the Peninsula (there are said + to be about 1500 Jordanian military personnel seconded to various + countries in the Gulf and North Yemen).

+

The Saudis, though they are moving ahead toward a professional air force, + seem to me a military zero at this time.

+

Recommendations

+

Our assurances of greater US interest and + involvement are perish-able. We need to follow + through:

+

1. By means of the follow-on security consultations with the four + countries to which I have agreed, we should:

+ + (a) Further explore forms of US + presence—short of permanent bases—which would be politically + acceptable to host nations and militarily useful to the United + States in deterring Soviet adventurism or enhancing our capability + for rapid deployment of US forces in + a crisis. + (b) Lay the basis for multinational regional security cooperation. + We should concentrate on situations where stability is threatened by + Soviet surrogates, in particular North Yemen and potentially + Oman. + +

2. We should modestly step up the pace of our arms supply approvals + within present dollar levels with Israel, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia. In + the case of Egypt, we should substantially increase our program, + post-treaty, both quantitatively and by extending significant FMS credits. We should not, however, lend + our assistance to force structure expansion in any of the four + countries, and we should in particular encourage post-treaty force + structure reduction in Egypt in exchange for our help in modernizing its + forces. In Saudi Arabia we should encourage the development over time of + a more professional army, not based solely on heavy and sophisticated + equipment, but equipped and tailored to the environment and the Saudi + capabilities to absorb. We should recognize that, at least in the case + of the Army, the prospects for real military capability are very + limited.

+

3. We should not encourage at this stage build-up of arms in the Gulf + states. This issue needs further analysis.

+

4. The most serious threat to security is likely to be internal + instability. We should review in depth our assessment of the political, + economic and social conditions in + Saudi Arabia, Egypt and the Gulf states to make sure our policies are + best designed to minimize the development of internal instability in + those countries. This is particularly important in the case of Saudi + Arabia, for reasons that are self-evident. It is also true in Egypt, + where former MOD + Gamasy told me privately he is + worried about the effects on Army morale and attitudes of an eroding + economic position military personnel experience in their personal lives. + Where we have to make a choice we should give priority to economic + assistance designed to promote internal stability over arms + transfers.

+

5. We should plan further speeches and statements—by you and others—built + around the themes of my visit. This declaratory policy will help + maintain momentum and credibility. In doing this, we should recognize + that declaratory policy is no substitute for action and, indeed, can be + counterproductive if not matched with concrete implementing steps.

+ + Harold Brown + +
+ +
+ 21. Action Memorandum From the Director of the Bureau of + Politico-Military Affairs (Gelb), the Acting Director of the Policy Planning Staff + (Kreisberg), and the + Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs + (Saunders) to Secretary of + State VanceSource: National Archives, RG 59, + Office of the Secretariat Staff, Official Working Papers of S/P Director Anthony Lake, 1977–January 1981, + Lot 82D298, Box 5, S/P + Lake Papers— 4/16–30/79. + Secret. Sent through Newsom. + Drafted by O’Donohue and Kreisberg on April 17. O’Donohue initialed for + Gelb. Tarnoff also initialed the + memorandum. In the upper right-hand corner of the memorandum, an + unknown hand wrote: “Paul said PM + will do—he has spoken with Dan already. + 4/20.” + + + Washington, April 19, + 1979 + + + SUBJECT + Proposed SCC + Meeting on Middle East Security + +

The attached NSC memorandum proposes a + schedule of meetings beginning May 1 to deal with Middle East security + policy.Attached but not printed is an + April 13 memorandum from Brzezinski to Vance, Brown, + Schlesinger, Jones, and Turner, with an attached undated + paper entitled “Framework for U.S. Security Policy in the Middle + East,” prepared in anticipation of a scheduled May 1 organizing + meeting of the Special Coordination Committee. Specifically, + the NSC proposes an initial SCC meeting to review security, diplomatic and arms control + issues in the area, to be followed by three PRC meetings chaired by State and Defense. The NSC memorandum also includes a paper for + discussion prepared by the NSC staff + dealing with the framework for US + security policy in the Middle East. (This paper was not coordinated with + either State or Defense and we would not like to have it accepted as the + basis for subsequent policy discussions since it inadequately represents + the range of problems and options.)

+

In our view we do not need an introductory SCC meeting and are dubious about the utility of three + subsequent PRC meetings as defined by + the NSC. Rather we recommend going back + to the NSC, indicating that we see no + need for an initial SCC meeting, + proposing instead one or two PRC + meetings dealing with the following issues:

+

a) in the context of our basic interests and objectives and given Middle + East realities, what further feasible steps might we take to strengthen + our bilateral and regional security relationships in the area, and, + specifically

+

b) are new or different force deployments and other military responses + needed or feasible given our overall force requirements?

+

Since your previous discussions on this were at the VBB luncheons,Reference is to the Vance-Brown-Brzezinski luncheons. we believe that would + be the best forum for conveying to Zbig and Harold our proposed approach + to a review of our Middle East security relationships and force + deployment options. If you do not want to take it up directly with Zbig + and Harold, or if there is no VBB + luncheon in the offing, we could convey your views directly back to the + NSC staff.

+

Recommendation:

+

a. That you inform Zbig or Harold directly of our preference for the less + cumbersome approach outlined above to the Middle East security policy + review, eliminating the need for an SCC + meeting;This recommendation was + disapproved on April 19.

+

OR, b. that you authorize us to convey your views + to the NSC staff and Harold’s + office.This recommendation was approved + on April 19. In an April 20 letter to Dodson, Wisner stated: “we recommend proceeding directly to + one or two PRC meetings on Middle + East security, the chairmanship of which could be shared by State + and by Defense.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy + File, P790064–1994)

+
+ + +
+ 22. Memorandum From Gary Sick, + William Quandt, and + Fritz Ermarth of the National + Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National + Security Affairs (Brzezinski)Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, + Defense/Security, Ermarth, + Box 5, Middle East Security Planning: 5–6/19/79. Secret. Sent for + information. A stamped notation on the memorandum reads: “ZB has seen.” + + + Washington, May 9, + 1979 + + + SUBJECT + SCC on Middle East Security + (C) + +

This is a particularly difficult moment to hold a discussion on + developing a “consultative security framework”. With two potential + partners to that framework, Saudi Arabia and Jordan, the trend of our + relations is in the opposite direction. State and CIA, both of which are skeptical of this + exercise in any case, may be especially reticent because of the current + situation. (C)

+

The success of this meeting will depend in large measure on your setting + the stage in your opening remarks. Without being too abstract or + theoretical, you may want to spell out your thoughts that led to the + suggestion that this meeting be held. The change of regime in Iran, the + peace treaty, current problems in our relations with Jordan and Saudi + Arabia, the Yemen crisis, and our continuing dependence on expensive + Persian Gulf oil are all adequate reasons for taking a fresh look at + security problems in the area. You could add that we are emerging from + the post-Vietnam pattern of looking primarily to regional influentials + to protect our interests. (C)

+

You will want to encourage each of the principals at the meeting to react + to your initial comments and to the paper (Tab A).Attached but not printed is the undated paper + entitled “Framework for U.S. Security Policy in the Middle East,” + which Brzezinski sent to + Vance, Brown, Schlesinger, Jones, and Turner under an April 13 memorandum; see footnote 2, Document 21. In the April 13 + memorandum, Brzezinski + suggested that the first meeting should concentrate on “the sources + of insecurity and instability in the Middle East. How are these + likely to manifest themselves in the near future? “What is the net + effect of the change in Iran and the conclusion of the peace treaty + between Egypt and Israel on our security interests in the area? + “What are the constraints on enhancing our security presence in the + area? “To what extent can we strengthen consultative security + relations among the nations of the Middle East? Who are the prime + candidates for such arrangements?” To add concreteness to the + discussion, we suggest that you raise the current problems we are having + with Saudi Arabia. On the one hand, we want to press the Saudis hard to + live up to their commitments. At the same time, we must be aware that interjecting ourselves + publicly into an inter-Arab quarrel has its disadvantages. Egypt and + Saudi Arabia may decide at some point—as they often have in the past—to + stop feuding and resume normal relations. However, US Congressional and public attitudes may + not be so easily reversed if we have adopted a tough public posture + critical of the Saudis. (S)

+

A second concrete issue for discussion is our military presence in the + region. Defense has done some work on this. State is not enthusiastic. + Schlesinger will probably + support Brown’s approach. (C)

+

To conclude the meeting, you should summarize the main points of the + discussion and recommend that State and Defense take the lead in + chairing follow-on PRCs dealing with the diplomatic and military + discussions of our security presence in the Middle East. (C)

+

If you have time on Thursday or on Friday morning, we would like to meet + with you.Sick, Quandt, and Ermarth met with Brzezinski on the morning of Thursday, May 10. The + conversation generated a number of talking points for the upcoming + SCC meeting. In a May 11 + memorandum, Sick, Quandt, and Ermarth provided Brzezinski with the talking + points. (Carter Library, Brzezinski Donated Material, Subject File, Box 30, + [Meetings—SCC 164: + 5/11/79]) (U)

+
+ +
+ 23. Minutes of a Special Coordination Committee MeetingSource: Carter Library, National + Security Affairs, Staff Material, Defense/Security, Ermarth, Box 5, Middle East + Security Planning: 5–6/19/79. Secret. The meeting took place in the + White House Situation Room. The Summary of Conclusions of this + meeting is printed as Document + 192. + + + Washington, May 11, 1979, 3:30–4:20 + p.m. + + + SUBJECT + Middle East Security Issues + + + PARTICIPANTS + + + State + Secretary Cyrus + Vance + Harold Saunders, + Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian + Affairs + + + + + OSD + Secretary Harold + Brown + David McGiffert, + Assistant Secretary, International Security Affairs + + + + + JCS + General David + Jones + Lt. General William Smith + + + + + Energy + Secretary James + Schlesinger + Harry Bergold, Assistant Secretary, International + Affairs + + + + + DCI + Frank Carlucci, + Deputy Director + Robert Ames, NIO for Near + East and South Asia + + + + + White House + Dr. Zbigniew + Brzezinski + David Aaron + + + + + + NSC + William + Quandt + Fritz + Ermarth + Sam Hoskinson + + + + + ACDA + Spurgeon Keeny, Deputy Director + Alan Platt, Acting Assistant Director, Weapons Evaluation + and Control + + + +

MINUTES OF MEETING

+

Dr. Brzezinski This should be a short meeting, + primarily for planning and organization of further efforts to work on + the problem of Middle East security. We need to focus on how to proceed + with the broader problem of protecting our interests in the Middle East. + We also have the more immediate problem of how to deal with the Saudi + decision on the F–5s and the growing polarization in the Arab + world resulting from the Egyptian-Israeli treaty. Specifically, the + President has signed a letter to King Khalid which we want to look at. (S)

+ +

I’d like to go back to the President’s instructions to Secretary + Brown last February.See Document + 19. In his letter of instructions he called for a + comprehensive effort to develop an integrated strategy for regional + security, with the United States making an important military and + political contribution. There are several elements to this strategy. One + was the continued American commitment to work for an Egyptian-Israeli + peace. Harold Brown was also to + discuss new forms of collaboration on security—intelligence sharing, + contingency planning, and possibly an increased US military presence in the area. We were also supposed to + consider ways of countering radical influences in the area. After + Secretary Brown returned, we + hoped to amplify on what he had accomplished, but events have inhibited + further developments along these lines. There have been some + consultations, but we have had primarily political problems in carrying + out our strategy. (S)

+

Secretary Vance I talked to Sharaf (Jordanian Royal Court + advisor). The Jordanians are already doing joint planning with the + Saudis. (S)

+

Secretary Brown The Jordanians want us to consider ways of + providing airlift support to them. (S)

+

Dr. Brzezinski I propose that we deal first with the + F–5 problem. Then we should discuss + the broader issues, such as the threats to our interests in the region, + and our constraints on responding. We can also discuss the nature of our + military presence in the area. I would like to use this discussion to + set up a program for further meetings. Defense has been doing some + planning, and we need to provide that with some political framework. I + would suggest that Defense hold a PRC + meeting, and that the State also chair one. We should work out the + agendas. (S)

+

On our letter to King Khalid, we + have received word that the Saudis may renege on their commitment to + finance the F–5s for Egypt. Foreign Minister Saud has told us this. We have + recommended to the President that he write to King Khalid. There are some signs that the + King has not made his final decision. I understand that there are some + reservations about this letter. (S)

+

Secretary Vance When I first heard about this, I sent a cable + to Saud in Morocco and urged + him not to take any further action in public.Telegram 116140 to Rabat, May 8. (National Archives, RG 59, Central + Foreign Policy File, P840133–1743) He hasn’t yet responded. + (S)

+

Dr. Brzezinski Let me read the letter. (He reads the + text of the signed letter from President Carter to King Khalid.) The question you should consider is to send + this or not. Let’s not try to edit the letter.The letter was transmitted to the Embassy in Jidda + on May 11; see footnote 4, Document + 192. (S)

+ +

Secretary Vance Sadat made another blast at the Saudis today, + and he included lots of other countries as well. (C)

+

Mr. Saunders At the mini-SCC meeting this morningThe + Summary of Conclusions of this meeting is printed in Foreign + Relations, 1977–1980, vol. IX, Arab-Israeli Dispute, + August 1978–December 1980, Document 253. there was + concern expressed that we get a reply from Saud first. If we write directly to Khalid, this ensures that we will get + a negative reply. Khalid is + probably the most anti-Egyptian of all the top Saudi leaders. Sultan and + Fahd may be more willing to + reconsider and it may be better to go to Sultan to discuss the F–5 problem, and just to raise the broader + issues with Khalid. These two + approaches could go in parallel. We already have a letter from Sultan to + General Graves which arrived on April 27. It discusses the terms of + financing the sale. (S)

+

Secretary Brown We could pursue the issue as a financial + matter. Sultan might still say no. (S)

+

Mr. Saunders We could acknowledge that the deal may be + off, and express our regret, but then go on to discuss the arrangements. + (S)

+

Secretary Vance There is a danger that unless we respond + quickly, Saud may make some + public statement in Morocco. The President got a personal assurance from + King Khalid on this. This is a + matter of a personal commitment.See Foreign + Relations, 1977–1980, vol. IX, Arab-Israeli Dispute, + August 1978–December 1980, Document 248. (S)

+

Dr. Brzezinski I agree with Secretary Vance. This will probably leak, and we + will be asked what we are doing. There is a danger of a Congressional + reaction that could threaten the F–15 program for Saudi Arabia. Kuwait + has already threatened to remove its deposits. (S)

+

Mr. Quandt + If possible, we should try to await the Saudi response to our original + demarche. If Saud says that the + issue is still open, then the letter to Khalid would be unnecessary. If Saud is negative, then the letter + should be sent. (S)

+

Dr. Brzezinski That raises the danger of getting two + nos from Saud and then going + over his head. (S)

+

Mr. McGiffert We have a real problem of financing. + Egypt may turn down the package in any case, and then we would be making + a major issue over nothing at all. (S)

+

Dr. Brzezinski It would be better if Egypt were to + cancel the project, but not in reaction to the Saudi decision. (S)

+

Mr. McGiffert We need to go to the Egyptians quickly to + find out their reaction. (S)

+ +

Secretary Vance I hate to think of a Congressional reaction + if this falls apart. (S)

+

Secretary Brown It will be worse if the Egyptians cancel, + because then Congress will be mad at both the Egyptians and the Saudis. + (S)

+

Secretary Schlesinger I am impressed by what Cy has said. + We need to remind the Saudis of their commitment. I am normally + reluctant to appeal a decision if we are likely to get a no. (S)

+

Dr. Brzezinski We could use the upcoming meeting + between King HusseinAn unknown hand circled the name “Hussein,” drew a + line from the circled name to the space between the paragraphs, and + wrote “Hassan.” and + King Khalid in Morocco. But + there is already risk that the news will leak before that. We could + combine this letter to Khalid + with a letter from Secretary Brown to Sultan which starts with the assumption that + the deal is still on track. (S)

+

Secretary Vance They will have to conclude that we take this + very seriously if we proceed along that course. (S)

+

Mr. Saunders It sounds a little too much as if we cared + only about Saudi money for Egypt. We should express ourselves more + clearly on our concern over the split between Egypt and Saudi Arabia. + (S)

+

Dr. Brzezinski We could put some of that into the + Brown letter. (S)

+

Secretary Vance I already said some of that to Saud. (S)

+

Secretary Brown Sultan has the biggest stake in all of this + and he may be helpful. We can strike a more conciliatory tone with him. + (S)

+

Dr. Brzezinski It is a political fact that a strong + Congressional reaction will hurt the F–15 deal. (S)

+

Secretary Brown I told them that public support was essential + if we were to maintain our relationship. (C)

+

Secretary Vance I think we should go ahead with the letter, + and I agree that Secretary Brown + should write to Sultan as well. (S)

+

Secretary Brown That will mean that we have made three + demarches to our counterparts. (S)

+

Dr. Brzezinski We should do this because it is an + important matter on which to draw the line. Let’s go ahead with the + letters to Khalid and to + Sultan.Reference is to a letter to + Sultan from Brown; see footnote 4, Document 192. (S)

+

On the larger issues, we should discuss the main threats to the security + of the region, some of the recent trends, the political constraints on + us, and the nature of our military presence in the area. (S)

+

They didn’t specifically ask for Secretary Vance I think it is clear + that the basic sources of instability are the Arab-Israeli conflict, + plus inter-Arab tensions. There is also the Palestinian problem, and the basic disparity of + wealth in the region. This provides potential for others to exploit the + situation. (S)

+

Dr. Brzezinski Do you think the Saudis see the threat + this way? (S)

+

Secretary Vance They see it, but they don’t agree with us on + how to handle it. (S)

+

Dr. Brzezinski I think the Saudis see the external + threat as greater than the internal one, and Israel is not their main + concern. (S)

+

Secretary Brown But they saw the situation in Iran where the + regime fell for internal reasons, not external ones. The internal + situation in Saudi Arabia is closely connected to developments between + Arabs and Israelis. (S)

+

Dr. Brzezinski The Saudis seem more confident that they + can handle problems inside their country. The threat comes from outside. + (S)

+

Secretary Vance There is some posturing in all of this. I + think they are really less confident than they appear to be, + particularly at the level of technicians. (S)

+

Mr. Carlucci We don’t see the social ferment within + Saudi Arabia as a current problem. There is relative stability. There is + some problem of subversion, particularly with 130,000 Palestinians in + the country. We don’t know too much about the military. (S)

+

Secretary Vance I’m not sure that the Saudis are so confident + that they can manage their external problems and their internal ones + both. (S)

+

Secretary Brown But the external concern stems not from the + Soviet threat, but from other Arabs. (S)

+

Secretary Schlesinger I agree with Zbig. They’re afraid + of external pressures, and they have lost confidence in the United + States. We couldn’t do everything that they wanted us to do. The effect + has been that the Saudis are turning elsewhere for protection, including + the Soviet Union and the radical Arabs. There is the increasingly + important role of Iraq. The Saudis won’t turn around on this until they + see a US military presence in the area + to deter these threats. (S)

+

Mr. Carlucci There is the question on whether they want + a physical military presence. (S)

+

Secretary Schlesinger They want it, but not in Saudi + Arabia. (S)

+

Secretary Brown They feel that the domestic irritant that + would come from a military presence in that country outweighs the + security game. (S)

+

Dr. Brzezinski What about a naval presence as a + possibility? (S)

+

Secretary Brown Whenever the Saudis have wanted our help they + haven’t asked for carriers. They have asked for F–15s and AWACS. The naval presence is not what + they think of first. (S)

+ +

Dr. Brzezinski I disagree. They didn’t specifically ask + for AWACS or for carriers. But they + were impressed by both when we offered them. The naval presence did + impress them during the Yemen crisis, and it impressed others.See Document + 271. (S)

+

Secretary Brown I’m not decrying the value of a naval + presence, but it is not a substitute for other things. (S)

+

Secretary Schlesinger But we have to develop this + capability. A local display of American power is necessary. They feel it + in their bones. They can’t articulate what they want, but they have to + see that we have the capacity to protect them. (S)

+

Dr. Brzezinski Defense has already had some + consultations with the Saudis. What is the status of work on military + presence? (S)

+

Secretary Brown We have a long list of alternatives. We could + strengthen the Mid East force which now consists of three ships. We + could have more frequent visits of the carrier task forces to the area, + or we could have the non-carrier components of a task force remain in + the Arabian sea. The other sea-based presence would involve a helicopter + carrier and marines. In each case, this would require some draw-down of + our forces committed to Europe or Japan. (S)

+

We could also ask the Saudis and Egyptians about preparing bases in their + countries for uses in certain contingencies. This would involve some + pre-positioning of equipment. Sadat does not want any American bases in + his country, but in an emergency, we might be able to move in. So we + have something of an opening to work with. (S)

+

Secretary Vance Sadat would not let us have bases, but he + would allow us to fix up facilities there, if we would pay for it. He + has talked about Berenice on the Red Sea. (S)

+

Secretary Brown We’ll make recommendations at the meeting of + the PRC.See Document 26. We are now having + consultations with the Saudis. General Lawrence is there now.See + Document 284. We’ve seen some + of their contingency plans, and there is still a lot of work to be done. + The United States and Egypt have also talked about joint strategies, and + we have discussed some contingencies. They have implied that they would + allow us to bring things in quickly in some contingencies. The + Jordanians have also asked for airlift support for their contingency + operations in Saudi Arabia. All these discussions have been on a + conceptual level. With the Jordanians, the joint committee has evolved + toward a planning exercise. So there has been some movement since my + visit in February. (S)

+ +

Dr. Brzezinski Have Oman and the UAE been discussed? (S)

+

Secretary Brown Oman has been discussed with the Saudis. + We’ve also had some air exercises with the Omanis. (S)

+

Secretary Vance We need to get CIA to evaluate the reaction of the Saudis and others to a + permanent US military presence in the + area. We need to have them look at different kinds of forces, not just a + naval presence. This should be done for the PRC. (S)

+

Dr. Brzezinski Let’s look at bases, port calls, + airfields, staging arrangements, task force presence, with and without + embarked marines. (S)

+

Secretary Brown We need to look at not only the Saudi + response, but also possible Soviet counter reactions. (S)

+

General Jones The JCS has + developed lots of options. (C)

+

Dr. Brzezinski The first PRC should be chaired by State. CIA should prepare a report for that meeting, and State + should work on the broader strategy. We need to assess the effect of our + plans on our relations with the countries of the area. We need a + political strategy for carrying this out. (S)

+

Secretary Brown We all see Iraq as a local power with more + importance now that Iran has fallen. We need to review our relations + with Iraq. (S)

+

Secretary Vance We’ve been trying. I’ve gotten some reports + on Iraq. They are changing their positions, but they are cautious with + us. (S)

+

Secretary Brown We don’t need to discuss so much the + modalities of our relations with Iraq, but where we want things to come + out. (S)

+

Secretary Vance I would like to see us resume normal + diplomatic relations if possible. (C)

+

Secretary Brown But what do we want the power relationship, + and the political relationship, to be between Saudi Arabia and Iraq in a + couple of years? The Saudis see that Iraq might move in a more moderate + direction. (S)

+

Mr. Carlucci There is also a possible threat to the + Saudis from Iran. (S)

+

Secretary Vance We also need to look at the consequences of + Iraqi-Syrian affiliation. The Jordanians see some movement in that + direction. (S)

+

Mr. Carlucci They’re doing some joint military + planning. (S)

+

Secretary Vance Sharaf tells me that the Iraqi-Syrian + arrangements are going quite far. (S)

+

Mr. Carlucci + CIA will do an update on this. (S)

+

I think we should have two Dr. Brzezinski The agenda for the + PRC meeting under State’s + chairmanship should include the following items: an intelligence + assessment of the reactions to + different kinds of American military presence in the area. This should + focus on the regional parties as well as the Soviets. They should look + at Iraq’s role, to see if there is some openings in our relations, and + we should also look at the Iraqi-Syrian relationship. We should review + the recent PRC on Saudi Arabia to see + if this decision still stands.See Document 190. Finally, we should + outline a political strategy to enhance our security consultations with + the countries of the area. (S)

+

Secretary Vance Let’s define the region. We’ve been talking + about the Gulf. But should we include Iran and Turkey? If we are + concerned with broad regional problems, Turkey and Iran should be + included. (S)

+

Dr. Brzezinski I think we should focus on the Gulf and + Iran. (S)

+

Secretary Brown From a military point of view, the Gulf and + Turkey are not much related. (S)

+

Secretary Vance Let’s define the area as the Gulf, including + Iran and Egypt, but not Turkey. Sudan may be part of Egypt’s security + problem also. (S)

+

Dr. Brzezinski Mostly we should look at the Arabian + peninsula and Iran. (S)

+

Secretary Vance What about Ethiopia and Somalia? (C)

+

Secretary Brown They are also important. (C)

+

Dr. Brzezinski We should look at our policy towards + Saudi Arabia, Oman, Egypt, Jordan, and see some of the others as + possible problems in the area. (S)

+

Secretary Vance I would like to wait until after I return on + June 3Reference is to Vance’s upcoming travel to the + United Kingdom, Egypt, Israel, Italy, the Vatican, the Netherlands, + and Spain May 20–June 2. to have these PRC meetings. (S)

+

Dr. Brzezinski Over the longer term, what we are + talking about is an increasing American role in the area which + recognizes it as vital to our national interests. (S)

+

Secretary Brown We’ve been acting as if we don’t need a big + presence in the area. First the British were there, and then the + Iranians seemed strong. Now both are gone. So we may need to review our + assumptions. (S)

+

Secretary Vance I’m not sure yet. (C)

+

Secretary Brown But we need to look at the problem. (C)

+

Dr. Brzezinski We’re already beginning to see the Gulf + as a vital region. (C)

+

Secretary Vance Let’s have the meetings in the week of June + 3. (S)

+ +

Dr. Brzezinski I think we should have two in a row that + week. (S)

+

Secretary Vance We also need to talk about how to stop Sadat + from sounding off against the other Arabs. (S)

+

Dr. Brzezinski Maybe the President should call him. + (C)

+

Secretary Vance Let me think about that. I’ll talk to you + this afternoon. (C)

+
+ +
+ 24. Memorandum From Gary Sick + and Fritz Ermarth of the National + Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National + Security Affairs (Brzezinski)Source: Carter Library, Donated Historical Material, Papers of + Walter F. Mondale, + Policy Review Committee (PRC)/Special Coordinating Committee (SCC) Meeting, Box 98, PRC Meeting on Persian Gulf/Middle + East Security Issues, 6/21/1979. Secret. Sent for + information. + + + Washington, June 19, + 1979 + + + SUBJECT + PRCs on Middle East/Persian Gulf (U) + +

On 20An unknown hand crossed out “20” and + wrote “21” above it. and 21An + unknown hand crossed out “21” and wrote “22” above it. June + the PRC will meet under Vance’s and Brown’s chairmanship, respectively, to + discuss foreign policy and military strategy for security in the Middle + East/Persian Gulf area. These meetings follow the SCC of 11 May (Summary of Conclusions and + Minutes at Tab A).See Documents 23 and 192. + (S)

+

These meetings should revolve around three papers tasked to State (Tab + B),Not attached and not printed. This + paper was passed to the pertinent Department heads on June 15. + (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, + Defense/Security, Ermarth, + Box 5, Middle East Security Planning: 5–6/19/79) + DOD (Tab C),Not attached and not printed. This paper was passed to the + pertinent Department heads on June 13. (Washington National Records + Center, RG 330, OSD Files, FRC 330–82–0205, Box 15, Middle East + (17 May–13 June) 1979) and the DCI (Tab D).Not attached and + not found. Nevertheless you can expect Cy and Harold to + deliver their personal perspective as they conduct the meetings. The + State paper is inconclusive and provides little basis for decision. The + DOD paper describes various + dimensions of relevant US military capabilities and compares + several options for increasing US + military presence. Harold is reported by his staff to be readying a + recommendation for increased US presence + which he will deliver at the meeting. (S)

+

Underlying the DOD effort is a sense of + acute anxiety based on a perception of vulnerability: US interests in the area are extremely + vital; the potential threats to them are immediate and powerful; US capabilities in the area, under stress, + are very weak. This sense of anxiety and vulnerability is not present in + State’s contribution. (S)

+

Main Issues

+

1. A Political Strategy for + the Region

+

State’s paper is aimed at discounting the need for increases in US permanent military presence. While + surveying regional politics, it fails to address the fundamentals of + diplomatic strategy and political priority, which was one of the PRC’s intended purposes. State argues that + the quest for a just and comprehensive peace must continue to have the + highest priority in US regional policy. + Other policy issues are neglected, e.g., how far should we go to respond + to Egypt’s evident desire for a tight US-Egyptian security tie? What emphasis should we give to Syria + and Iraq in combating the post-peace backlash? How do we get on with the + Saudis? (S)

+

2. The Need for Increased + Military Presence

+

This is the key issue in both meetings and all three papers. All parties + reflect awareness of great political pressure for increased US deployments, and seem to agree that a + modest increase is advisable. State and CIA clearly go to great lengths, however, to stress the + penalties of adverse local reaction and the case for great moderation. + State prefers to rely on a capacity to surge forces into the area in + time of crisis. (S)

+

Part of the problem is that the “we want you to be strong but not here” + syndrome so evident in the area is easy to cite against any change in + US deployment patterns. Nationalist + objections to US power are more easily + documented than fears about its erosion! Therefore, the potential + benefits from increased presence in terms of respect, confidence, and + self-confidence are not easily measured. (S)

+

There is a “catch 22” danger in attempting to assess the advisability of + increased US presence in terms of local + attitudes. Radical nationalists will never favor it. Our friends fear + that US presence will provoke trouble + for them from which we will retreat, leaving them in the lurch. + Inadequately examined is the likelihood that demonstrated US commitment will breed confidence in and + tolerance of US power, or that, + ultimately, capacity to defend our interests rather than local good will + might be the best test of our policy. (S)

+ +

The DOD paper cites several military + benefits from increased presence: Deterrence and quick reaction, ability + to cover intervention forces, and acquiring local operating experience. + All three factors argue against regarding surge-intervention forces as a + total substitute for local combat presence. (S)

+

3. Military Presence + Options

+

The DOD paper develops three options for + configuring US military presence in the + near term:

+

1) the status quo (prior to the surge of Spring this year);

+

2) a moderate increase through adding several permanent combatants to + MIDEAST Force and upgrading rotational deployments; and

+

3) near-continuous presence without increased carrier deployments (to + avoid dramatic reduction of commitments elsewhere).

+

A fourth, long-term option would keep a carrier capability in the area at + all times. It would require reduced commitments elsewhere, raised force + levels, or home porting US forces in the + area. Table 1 presents options. (S)

+

As a practical matter, any near-term US + force increase must be in the neighborhood of Option 2, which raises the + average level and quality of US forces + in the area. Even the near-continuous deployment called for in Option 3 + would significantly strain our resources and would draw down + capabilities in the Pacific and/or Mediterranean. The Marine Air-Ground + Task Force called for in Options 2 and 3 has not been adequately defined + and needs further staffing in terms of its effect on available + resources. Note that the generalized option put forward by State (p. 14 + of Tab A)An unknown hand crossed out the + letter “A” and wrote the letter “B” underneath it. is + generally consistent with DOD’s Option + 2. (S)

+

DOD elements are reportedly agreed to + advise that Harold recommend an increased US presence. A “majority” (JCS, PA&E, OSD/Policy) + stand behind four major naval deployments a year (where “major” is + defined as a carrier group, a marine unit, or a surface combat group + plus tacair). ISA reportedly wants + something more modest. (S)

+

4. Other Aspects of US Military Capability

+

Both State and DOD see great importance + to US military activity other than + combatant presence in promoting US + interests. These other measures are of two types: arms transfers, + training, and joint planning aid local + self-defense capability. Prepositioning, basing, staging, + over-flight, etc., enhance the capability for US intervention. (S)

+ +

Despite the Iranian experience, US policy + is still to promote capabilities for effective local self-defense. Most + analyses indicate that a major threat in the area, e.g., Iraq attacks + Saudi Arabia, or Soviet intervention, would require the introduction of + US forces from outside the theater. + US + military presence is, therefore, a link—both for + deterrence and escalation management—between local self-defense and + introduction of US forces from outside + the area. US forces on the scene, + moreover, can cover the introduction of forces from without. (S)

+

Policy options relating to US military + assistance and intervention are not systematically addressed in the + DOD paper. But fundamental + questions do arise for the PRC:

+

—How do we shape arms transfers to the area into a coherent policy?

+

—What bases and local infrastructure do we need for a meaningful + intervention capability? How do we get them?

+

—Have we the sea and air lift and forces needed to meet local threats + without jeopardizing NATO + commitments?

+

These are questions of defense policy, posture, and budgets. Because of + the strategic priority we assign to this region, near-term increases in + US military presence will not allow + us to avoid addressing them.

+

5. Indian Ocean Talks

+

Our Summit commitment “promptly” to explore resumption of the Indian + Ocean talks is not inconsistent with a decision to support some version + of Option 2. That option would change the quality + of the US presence in the area to permit + greater capability to conduct operations ashore. However, it would not + greatly change the number of deployments to the region. Any change in + our posture will, of course, be protested by the Soviets as inconsistent + with the levels discussed with them in the earlier rounds of talks.U.S.-Soviet talks on demilitarization of the + Indian Ocean began in June 1977, but broke down in February 1978 + after the Soviet intervention in the Horn of Africa. See Document 123. Our initial discussion + with the Soviets on this issue should start with the assertion that the + situation in the region has changed, to a considerable degree as a + result of Soviet behavior, and that future talks will have to take into + account those changed circumstances. (S)

+ + + + + NEAR-TERM OPTIONS + + + + LONG-TERM OPTION + + + + OPTION 1 + OPTION 2 + OPTION 3 + OPTION 4 + + + + Maintain Previous Permanent + Presence/Deployment Pattern + Moderate Increase in Presence + Near Continuous US Presence without More Carrier + Deployments + Continuous Major Presence + + + Force Elements in Indian Ocean/Persian Gulf area + + 1. MIDEAST Force (3 surface ships) + 2. 3–6 ASW patrol + a/c flying from Diego Garcia. + 3. 3 task group deployments each year (alternating + CVBG/SCTG) + + Option 1 force elements plus some combination of: + + 1. 2–3 more surface ships + 2. Alternate CVBG/MAGTF deployments vice SCTG. + 3. Deploy periodically land-based TACAIR, AWACs, + etc. + + Option 1 force elements plus: + + 1. 5–6 CVBG/MAGTF deployments each + year (220–300 days/yr.) + 2. land-based TACAIR deployed on routine basis. + + + Option 1 force elements plus: + + 1. Continuous IO/PG + deployment of a CVBG + or MAGTF (300–360 + days/yr.) + 2. Land-based TACAIR routinely deployed. + + + + + Quick Reaction Capability to Minor Contingencies + Ashore + Extremely limited, except when CVBG is present. No ground force capability. + Adequate if CVBG/MAGTF are deployed, otherwise + only show of force. + Adequate when CVBG/MAGTF deployed. + Adequate + + + Support for Large Force in Moderate Contingency Ashore + Same + Same + Same + Adequate + + + Capability in Serious Crisis (Iran vs. Iraq, Iraq-Kuwait, + etc.) + Same + Very limited. Initial air strikes and retire from battle + area. + Limited. With land-based MAGTF capable of short + duration, small scale actions + ashore. + Limited. MAGTF would + require TACAIR support to + sustain ground action beyond a few hours/days. + + + + +
+ + + FORCE UNIT DEFINITIONS + + + Surface Combatant Task Group (SCTG)— + Approximately 3 to 5 surface warships, at least one being a + cruiser, the remainder being a mix of guided missile destroyers + (DDG) and frigates (FFG). + + + + Carrier Battle Group (CVBG)— + This is a grouping of approximately 10 ships including: a + carrier (conventional or nuclear); 7 surface combatants (one + cruiser, 5–6 guided missile destroyers and frigates); and two + replenishment ships. Occasionally a nuclear attack submarine + might be assigned in direct support of the battle group. + + + + Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF)— + Not precisely defined. The term is loosely used to refer at a minimum to a Marine Amphibious Unit + (MAU) with transport + helicopters (Defense calls the helicopters “organic air”). A + MAU will have approximately + 1800 combat Marines with 400 support troops transported in 4–5 + amphibious ships. TACAIR is + not ordinarily included as part of a MAU, but Defense has been giving serious thought to + having 6–12 V/STOL Marine “jump jets” in any Indian Ocean MAGTF. Protection for the MAGTF’s ships would have to be + provided by the destroyers of the MIDEAST FORCE. + +
+ +

Outcomes, Your Objectives

+

Although you do not have control of these meetings, you should have some + chance to steer them toward several salient conclusions: If we could get + the following into the record, the process could be counted a sterling + success:

+

1. We recognize that the Persian Gulf region has become a region ranking + barely behind Northeast Asia and Europe in strategic importance. A + serious military threat to this region could easily coincidewith severe + tension in Europe. Our overall defense planning, budgets, and arms + transfer policies must adjust more realistically to these propositions. + (S)

+

2. We are agreed that US military + presence in the Indian Ocean/Persian Gulf area should be increased on + the order of DOD’s Option 2 and the + option outlined by State. We can remain flexible on the details so long + as the principle is clearly established. (S)

+

3. We need a more coherent statement as to how we are planning to balance + the competing priorities to our Middle East diplomacy: The peace + process, amity with the moderates, new openings to some of the radicals, + growing security collaboration with Egypt, and our traditional ties with + Israel. (S)

+

If consensus appears within grasp, then it might be appropriate to + propose that the NSC draft for + circulation a Presidential Directive covering these points. Admittedly + hard policy on all three points will require more work. But devoting + that work to a PD would be more fruitful + than more PRCs or a formal PRM. (S) +

+
+ + +
+ 25. Memorandum From Fritz + Ermarth of the National Security Council Staff to the + President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)Source: Carter Library, Brzezinski Donated Material, Subject File, Box 25, + Meetings—PRC 112: 6/21/79. + Secret. Sent for information. + + + Washington, June 20, + 1979 + + + SUBJECT + Further Points on Middle East PRCs (U) + +

1. These meetings could be among the most significant of this + Administration because they could start the building of long-term + strength in a region of the utmost importance to us but, simultaneously, + the greatest vulnerability. One has the sense we are now getting down to + hard military business. Should a consensus on + increased US military presence be + reached, it should be recorded in some authoritative + way, e.g., a PD, that the + system can act on and that will prevent backsliding. At the same time, + we want to avoid highly publicized drama around actions that are + necessarily modest and incremental. A carefully crafted PD—directing and characterizing increased + deployments, laying down the line on the Indian Ocean Talks, directing + further study of longer-term policy and force posture issues—could + strike the right tone inside the bureaucracy and outside if it leaks. + (S)

+

2. The immediate objective in making a decision on peacetime military + presence in the region is to increase substantially the amount of time + we have deployments capable of projecting power + ashore. The critical difference is not really between options 2 + and 3, as presented by DOD, but between + carrier groups, marine groups, tactical air, on one hand, and surface + combatant groups, on the other. The latter can steam around and look + pretty; they cannot project power ashore. (S)

+

3. This decision must be a step toward the creation of + a US military posture in and + toward the region that is commensurate with our + interests. This will mean yet more study and politicking over + issues of force design, ship-building programs and naval policy, lift + capabilities, basing, and budgets. As these matters move ahead, we shall + be confronting issues such as these:

+

—Should we create a military command to coordinate activities in the area + and speak for its strategic perspective?

+

—Should we beef up Diego Garcia?

+ +

—Should we begin to plan and negotiate for homeporting in Australia, + which is far from the important littorals, but a lot closer than San + Diego?

+

—Should we increase land-based tactical deployments in the Western + Pacific, i.e., in Japan or Korea, so as to free carrier air for the + Indian Ocean?

+

—Should we review policy on carriers? (S)

+

These issues should probably not be broached immediately unless raised by + others because they will only frighten the faint hearted. They will be + faced soon enough. (S)

+
+ +
+ 26. Minutes of Policy Review Committee MeetingsSource: Carter Library, RAC + SAFE39C–17–55–4–7, C03341983. Top Secret. The meeting took place in + the White House Situation Room. + + + Washington, June 21, 1979, 1:30–2:30 p.m. + andJune 22, 1979, 9:15–10 + a.m. + + + SUBJECT + Middle East Security and US + Military Presence (S) + + + PARTICIPANTS + + + State + Secretary Cyrus + Vance** + Warren Christopher + (chaired 6/21) Deputy Secretary + David Newsom** + Under Sec., Political Affairs + Harold Saunders + Asst. Sec., Bureau of Near East. & So. Asian + Affairs + + + + + OSD + Secretary Harold + Brown (chaired6/22) + Charles Dayan* + Deputy Secretary + David McGiffert, + Asst. Sec., Intl. Security Affairs + Dan J. Murphy** + Dep. Und. Sec. for Policy Rev. + + + + + JCS + Lt Gen William Y. Smith Asst. to the Chairman + Lt Gen John Pustay + Asst. to the Chairman + + + + + DCI + Admiral Stansfield + Turner + Robert Ames, NIO for Near + East and South Asia + + + + + Special Trade Representative + Robert + Strauss + Ralph Gerson, Special Asst., Office of STR** + + + + + ACDA + Spurgeon Keeny, Dep. Director + Barry Blechman, Asst. Dir., Weapons Evaluation & + Control + + + + + Energy + Secretary James + Schlesinger + Harry Bergold, Asst. Sec., International Affairs + + + + + White House + Dr. Zbigniew + Brzezinski + David Aaron + + + + + NSC + Fritz + Ermarth** + Robert Hunter* + Gary Sick + * Attended only 21 June + ** Attended only 22 June + + + + +

MINUTES OF MEETING

+

(21 June 1979—Deputy Secretary Christopher, Chair)

+ +

Mr. Christopher opened the meeting by referring to the + discussion paper that State had prepared for the meetingSee footnote 5, Document + 24. and asked if there were any comments on the + agenda.

+

Secretary Brown said there was a question of a division of + labor between the two meetings. He suggested that the PRC examine the specific force levels on + the following day, whereas today’s meeting would take a look at + attitudes of various states and the role of military presence in U.S. + Middle East relations.

+

Dr. Brzezinski wondered if it not might be just as well + to cancel the meeting for this day and have a joint meeting tomorrow in + view of the fact that Secretary Vance could not be present.

+

Secretary Brown said that we need to discuss how the security + issue fits into the political situation.

+

Dr. Brzezinski said all right; there would be no + decisions taken until the following day. He noted that he had to see the + President before 2 o’clock.

+

Mr. Christopher summarized some of the points in the + paper by noticing that the vehemence of the reaction to the Camp David + accords had been greater than he had anticipated. It had now abated + somewhat but not a great deal. Saudi Arabia may possibly try to find + ways around their Baghdad commitments;Reference is to the summit of Foreign Ministers from 18 Arab states + and the PLO which was convened in + Baghdad March 27–31, in order to sanction Egypt for concluding its + peace treaty with Israel. See Foreign Relations, 1977–1980, vol. IX, + Arab-Israeli Dispute, August 1978–December 1980, Document + 242. however, that might be harder to do than had + been anticipated. Saudi Arabia and Iraq were closer together than + before. We need to try and improve our relations with Iran and improve our dialogue with Iraq. + Only some momentum in the peace process will be able to lure people back + into the process.

+

Mr. Saunders noted that the post-Baghdad grouping was + not a natural grouping. The natural allegiances are working in our + favor. He noted that our present cooperation with Saudi Arabia is as + close on issues of security and the practical aspects of our + relationship as it has been for some time. It is not unreal to expect + over time a loosening of the Baghdad grouping and the reemergence of a + relationship between Saudi Arabia, Egypt and other natural allies.

+

Ambassador Strauss noted that the paper prepared by State + has been extremely helpful to him.President + Carter nominated + Robert Strauss as his + Personal Representative to the Middle East peace negotiations on + April 24.

+

Mr. Saunders noted that within the bureaucracy there + was no great difference with regard to the relations among the various + nations and what we hope to see emerge. On the subject of Iraq he noted + that the Egypt/Israel treaty gave Iraq the chance to get together with + other nations in the area and had reduced its isolation.

+

Dr. Brzezinski noted that the paper prepared by State + was all right on an analytical basis, however, he wondered what + recommendations it provided.

+

Mr. Saunders said that it was not a paper of advocacy + rather it was only for discussion.

+

Dr. Brzezinski said we have to ask ourselves what is + the nature of the internal and the external security problem and what + should we do about both. Everyone says that Saudi Arabia has lost + confidence in United States; they see the growth of Soviet power. This + is true not only of Saudi Arabia, it is also true of Oman. Mubarak had + noted the same thing with regard to Egypt’s military situation. We have + a potentially explosive and disintegrating situation. If Bob Strauss can succeed, we can persuade + others to join in the process. The question now is what to do about the + sense of anxiety which exists in the region.

+

Secretary Brown noted that the Arabs are aware that there is + no other power besides the United States which can offset the + Soviets.

+

Dr. Brzezinski said there are certain implications in + the State Department paper with which he probably could not agree. + Specifically, he pointed to the end of page 8 which notes that an + increased U.S. presence would be seen by Moscow not as recouping a loss + but as creating a new and different imbalance which may in turn require + redress. He noted that although he could not argue with the way in which + this was worded, nevertheless, it could be taken to imply that our + policy could do little or nothing + about the security situation with regard to the Soviets.

+

Secretary Brown said you could take that implication even + further and suggest that we accept the fact that the Soviets are going + to be dominant in the region.

+

Dr. Brzezinski noted that the President at Vienna had + spelled out in some detail the vital interests of the United States to + President Brezhnev.The summit in Vienna took place June 16–18. See Foreign + Relations, 1977–1980, vol. VI, Soviet Union, Documents + 199–208. He + specifically mentioned the Middle East as an area of vital interest to + us. Brezhnev replied that it was + the U.S. habit to single out certain areas as vital in their importance + to us in order to justify doing what we wanted to do. However, it is + clear that the Middle East is in fact vital to the United States and it + is not vital to the Soviet Union.

+

Secretary Schlesinger said he wanted to address the + longer term aspects. Without Middle Eastern oil the Free World as we + know it is through. Our great value to the Middle East states is the + protection that we can provide against the Soviet Union. For many years + there was a presumption of U.S. dominance in the region which was + sufficient even without any tangible evidence of instruments of power. + Lately however, after Iran and other events in the region, there is a + growing perception of U.S. weakness which is compounded by the lack of + visible instruments of power in comparison to the overhang of Soviet + power in the region. In view of the changing psychology of the countries + of the region we must preserve our security position. He feared that + unless we establish something akin to a stable balance in the region + that it will slip under Soviet domination. We should have no illusion + about the importance of visible instruments of U.S. power to + counterbalance the presence of Soviet power. Oman wants us to come into + the region partly to replace the protection which they previously got + from Iran. He recalled the long discussions and problems we had with + respect to building a base on Diego Garcia some years ago.Reference is to the expansion of the U.S. Navy + facility on Diego Garcia. Documentation is published in Foreign + Relations, 1969–1976, vol. E–8, Documents on South + Asia, 1973–1976. He has had long talks with + Saudis. Just because the countries of the region don’t ask us to come in + does not mean that they don’t want us there. He had had three or four + hour conversations with Yamani + and asked him what we should do with respect to the security situation + in the region. Yamani had said, + “Don’t expect me to say that we want a U.S. military presence in the + region.” He then asked him about a naval presence. Yamani had replied that he would + expect it to be welcome, however, he could never say that publicly. The + Saudis expect that we will be + able to take action unilaterally to protect them to establish a military + balance in the region. The Saudis would welcome the establishment of a + permanent naval presence by the United States in the region.

+

Amb. Strauss wondered in view of + the extensive communications we have with the region that we could get + nothing better than a wink across the table on an issue of this + importance to us.

+

Dr. Brzezinski said that many in the Arab world fear + that if they ask us to come in the fact would leak and their request + would become known and then we wouldn’t do it and they would end up with + the worst of all possible worlds.

+

Secretary Brown said the Arabs fear the Soviet Union, but in + fact an invasion by the Soviets is not the most likely scenario. In fact + the intervention by the Cubans or internal subversion within some of + those countries is a worse and more realistic scenario. If asked why the + United States is putting military forces into the Middle East, they are + likely to think of their use in terms of the internal threat to their + governments which is greater. They will wonder whether we are planning + to use these forces against the Soviets or against the Arabs for + something like taking over the oil fields. Hence, their reluctance to + say that they wanted U.S. military presence or to be openly in favor of + it. Although we all talk about the Soviet menace, there is no way the + United States can guarantee we will not use these forces against + them.

+

Dr. Brzezinski noted that in order to give assurances + that we will not use these forces against them but against the Soviets + we must move simultaneously on the peace process. However, the United + States should also give a clear statement that we regard the Middle East + as the third vital region in the world along with Western Europe and + Japan. He disagreed with Secretary Schlesinger that we should be seeking balance. He + thought that the correct objectives would be preponderance of U.S. + military capability.An unknown hand + underlined the portion of this sentence beginning with the word + “would.” However, he recognized that we must proceed + sequentially and that we would have to get to a permanent presence via + an increased presence over what we have now.

+

Secretary Schlesinger noted that when we send a carrier + into the region they know that this could be used against them. However, + a permanent presence creates a shift in the balance in the region + vis-a-vis the Soviet Union.

+

Secretary Brown noted that permanent in this case could mean + a presence at all times but not always the same units.

+

Mr. Christopher asked Admiral Turner for his views on the reactions + of the regional states.

+ +

Admiral Turner summarized the paper very briefly which had + been prepared by CIA on the + subject.See footnote 7, Document 24. He noted that with regard + to a military presence the Arab states “want to feel it, not touch it.” + Thus, the closer you get to having an actual U.S. presence in their + ports, on the ground or on their air bases the less they want it.

+

Ambassador Strauss wondered whether it was feasible to + even discuss an option 1 which would be to work out something with the + Soviets on a cooperative basis.Strauss is presumably referring to + the options in the Defense Department paper, summarized in Document 24.

+

Secretary Brown noted that the Soviets have nothing to gain + by cooperating with us in the region. Fighting in that region would not + hurt them unless it lops over into other areas of our relationship. They + have had black eyes in the area before that did not stop them from + coming back and trying again and did not affect their vital + interests.

+

Mr. Christopher said that we have no common interests + with the Soviets in the region which would provide the basis for a + mutual approach. He asked with regard to the internal and external + threats to the Arab states how a U.S. presence would affect the + development of the internal process.

+

Admiral Turner replied that an external naval presence + would not have a heavy influence on the internal threat in Saudi Arabia + for example. It would not for instance deter the PLO from meddling if they decided to do + so. However, an on-shore presence such as the U.S. Air Force on Saudi + air bases would have a much bigger impact on the internal situation.

+

Secretary Brown summarized the relationship as: the bigger + the presence of the United States the greater the advantages and the + disadvantages. An increased presence gives us more capability to deal + with problems but it also is a bigger irritant to the regional states + since they fear it would not be used against the Soviets but against + them. There is no difference among the group on that fact. However, some + of the CIA evaluations with regard to + the reaction of regional states to a U.S. military presence is more + negative than he would have made it in his own evaluation.

+

Secretary Schlesinger said that sequencing is extremely + important. Jumping in totally with a large force would result only in + bad reactions, whereas a gradual increase would build confidence as it + went. Since a naval presence is the least controversial it should be the + first U.S. presence to be introduced. The sensitivities are such that + anything that we do now will + raise their concern. Later he felt that a U.S. Air Force presence in + Oman might be desirable.

+

Secretary Brown noted that despite the talk about sensitivity + to our naval presence we have just completed six months of a very high + level of naval presence in the region and as far as he could tell the + results were positive not negative in terms of regional reaction.

+

Secretary Schlesinger said that with regard to the + thought that U.S. forces might be used internally in the Arab world, if + that served to deter forces which are contrary to our interests that + would be a good result and one to be desired.

+

Secretary Brown noted that our security relationship with + regard to military planning and supply has moved forward rather + effectively. In fact he thought it got more credit in the region than it + really deserved.

+

Secretary Schlesinger interjected that that perhaps tells + us something with regard to their expectations of our ability to + perform.

+

Secretary Brown agreed and added that we need to be able to + respond more quickly to requests preferably from an existing stockpile + of military equipment. Previously we have stayed away from this issue + since we cannot get Congressional approval. We will have to consider + establishing something in the nature of an excess stockpile of U.S. + equipment which could be used for this purpose on short notice if + required.

+

Mr. Christopher wondered what role would be played by + Israel in the event of an Arab conflict or an internal Arab dispute.

+

Dr. Brzezinski noted that for example in the case of a + conflict between Iraq and Saudi Arabia, Israel would become involved at + some stage and relieve the pressure on Saudi Arabia without the + existence of any formal military or political relationship. He believed + that some of the Arab states might subconsciously regard this as a + deterrent on the actions of their enemies but that the thought would + never receive any overt expression. In short, he felt that Israel was a + stabilizing factor in the region. Objectively it was there as an element + in the power equation, however, it is not something that can be talked + about. He noted that it is also essential that the United States beef up + Egypt’s military capabilities and that the Department of Defense is + working on that.

+

Secretary Brown noted that Mr. Perry was just back from a + visit to Egypt where he discovered that the Egyptians have a substantial + technical capability to build their own arms, however they need capital + and managerial help. From what we have been able to tell they seem to + have adopted the worst of both the Soviet and U.S. systems.

+

Dr. Brzezinski noted that there is a developing + relationship between Egypt and China on Defense. Despite Chinese + disclaimers this in fact enlists + China on the side of the Camp David accords. They deny this but that’s + the effect that it has. He believed that all of our actions on the + security side are futile unless there is parallel progress on the Camp + David accords. If there is no progress on the negotiations, United + States forces will acquire a negative cast. We must have progress in the + negotiations sufficient to convince the friendly Arab states that the + Egypt/Israel treaty was in fact a first step of a negotiating process + which over time has the possibility of resolving contentious issues.

+

Ambassador Strauss wondered what time-frame should be + applied to the need for progress.

+

Dr. Brzezinski said about six months. By the end of + this year we should see some progress or else the Arabs will see that we + are engaged in a charade.

+

Secretary Schlesinger said that he is not convinced of + the detrimental effect of a U.S. military presence in the case of no + progress on the Arab/Israel side. A presence does give the impression of + power and does assist in the security of the region. Returning to the + original subject he said that the Saudis are not hypocritical, rather + they are divided internally and are desperately weak. They do not see + their role as telling a superpower how to do its job, but they do expect + and hope for security. They fear that we will not provide it in a + crunch.

+

General Smith commented that a strong military + presence is in the U.S. interest in the region whether things go for the + better or worse in the negotiations.

+

Dr. Brzezinski replied that if internal radicalism + continues to grow in the region our military force is not utilizable to + halt that process.

+

Secretary Brown added that our ability to dominate the Arabs + by force is probably less than they think it is.

+

Secretary Schlesinger noted that there are two general + areas that we are involved in: first, is the negotiations on the Camp + David accord and that is not going well at the moment and is not + received [perceived?] as successful by the Arabs; + the second area is that of security. If we can’t have both tracks going + well at the same time, we should at least have one of them and give them + reason to favor one side over the other.

+

General Smith added that if the Arabs cut off the + oil flow the United States would need force to be able to deal with + it.

+

Dr. Brzezinski said that the radicals will not cut off + the oil instead they will reduce the supply and raise prices. We are + seeing an example of the kind of effects politically that they can have + today in the actions of the Japanese who are avoiding helping Sadat. + Manipulation of the oil supply creates new political attitudes on the + part of Western Europe and Japan who rely on the oil supply and it + reduces their ability to act politically.

+ +

Ambassador Strauss said that if the flow of oil should be + cut off that would be the worst possible case for Israel. If people were + forced to choose oil as opposed to Israel, there is no doubt to how they + would choose. The question is how can that message be transmitted + effectively to Begin.

+

Dr. Brzezinski said the message perhaps could be + relayed indirectly. Mr. Begin + shares antipathy to the Soviets. You could begin talking to him about + the effect of the growth of the Soviet and radical Arab presence and + activities in the region on the Free World. He believes in the concept + of the Free World. He was particularly responsive when the President + talked to him with regard to our collective stake in keeping the Soviets + out of the Middle East. Dr. Brzezinski did not see the danger as having a Soviet + flag flying over Riyadh. Rather the danger is to have a government in + Riyadh that is like the government in Baghdad. Over the last year our + Arab friends have been shaken in their confidence about our reliability. + We have built them up and let them down.

+

Secretary Brown referred to the talks he had with the Arabs + during his visit to the region, noting that all of them were delighted + regarding the security actions which we were taking with respect to the + Soviets.See Document 20. Moreover, our actions during the + Yemen crisis have them believing that we are able to produce on the + security side.

+

Admiral Turner commented that it is dangerous to persuade + them to lean too much on us, only to be disappointed in the end when we + cannot do all that they expect.

+

(22 June 1979—Secretary Brown, Chair)

+

Secretary Brown: A specific item we must take up first is + Congressional notification on additional support for the Saudi F–15s and + for the Saudi National Guard programs. I don’t think there is a problem + here.

+

Secretary Vance: There is a problem. We are talking about + $1.4B, aren’t we? Let’s split the request to lower the cost.

+

Secretary Brown: We can submit the National Guard portion + now. That is about $1.2B.

+

Secretary Vance: That is too much. We might have prospects of + getting half that. What we have heard on the Hill is not encouraging. We + might lose the vote.

+

Secretary Brown: But we cannot tell the Saudis that we cannot + get it through Congress. That would be politically bad.

+

Secretary Vance: It would also be bad were we to lose the + vote.

+ +

Secretary Brown: Why is there such opposition to assistance + to the Saudi National Guard?

+

Secretary Vance: We urgently need more consultations on the + Hill now. Then we can make a final decision after the President’s Tokyo + trip.Reference is to Carter’s trip to Tokyo June 24–29 + to attend the G–7 Economic Summit and to meet with Prime Minister + Ohira. We have to be sure of the votes.

+

Secretary Brown: The attitude on the Hill is that the Saudis + ought to produce more oil. People in the gas lines are beginning to see + a connection between Saudi Arabia and oil. There is probably a growing + reluctance to cast votes that represent a slap at the Saudis.

+

Secretary Vance: White House, State, and DOD people should meet today to plan + prompt approaches to all the key figures on the Hill.

+

Secretary Brown: We are talking about both pieces, the + National Guard and the F–15s.

+

Secretary Vance: + David McGiffert should contact + Frank Moore to start this up.

+

Secretary Brown: Yesterday the PRC discussed political conditions and requirements for + US military presence and actions in + the area. We should discuss actions other than military presence first. + Actions now in train should go forward, e.g., our bilateral security + association with Egypt. These must be reflected in the FY–81 budget proposal. I don’t see much + need to discuss this.

+

Secretary Vance: Agreed.

+

Secretary Brown: Then let’s proceed. We should consider + establishing a special contingency stockpile of equipment to support + time urgent assistance efforts. Should DOD explore this concept?

+

Secretary Schlesinger: This is a good idea, long overdue. + We have been held back by fears of another Vietnam.

+ +

Secretary Brown: Of course Congressional approval will have + to be secured. We are talking about shortening the lead time on + deliveries from years to weeks. DOD + will explore this. As regards US + military presence, the DOD paper lays + out four options—the status quo, moderate increase, a near continuous + US presence without more carriers, + and a continuous major presence. These are four points on a + multidimensional continuum. We want views about where on that continuum + we ought to be. We discussed political pros and cons yesterday. Today we + should get opinions on the appropriate military level. I would like to + end the meeting with a charge to DOD to + explore in detail and recommend action within a narrower part of the + spectrum of possibilities.

+

Dep.Sec. Christopher: The first point is that we cannot + assume political benefits from augmenting our military presence without + considering local sensitivities. This is not just a unilateral US matter. We have to consider reactions in + various parts of Africa and throughout the Middle East and guard against + overloading the political circuits with presence, port visits, and + activities ashore.

+

Secretary Brown: Our carrier task forces have not involved + activities ashore.

+

Mr. Newsom: There has been a requirement for + staging reconnaissance and logistics flights to support carriers. P–3 + flights were deemed necessary for the safety of our carriers. This + required landing rights in Oman and Djibouti.

+

Secretary Brown: Such landing rights are involved in any + case. It does not matter whether we put one, two, or three carriers a + year into the area.

+

Dep.Sec. Christopher: Because of the inevitable impact + ashore, even of naval activities, State believes we ought to concentrate + on improving our capability to surge forces into the area and emphasize + joint exercises with local countries, contingency plans, and + consultation with our Allies to increase their support and involvement. + Our level of military presence should be established flexibly on a + case-by-case basis. A surge capability is the main requirement.

+

Ambassador Strauss: What is meant by a surge + capability?

+

Secretary Brown: This means essentially shortening the time + it takes to introduce military forces into the area from outside. This + is not the same as maintaining a constant military presence in the area. + In some situations, who gets there first is important. In any case, + surge capability is measured in terms of weeks, not days.

+

Secretary Vance: Is there merit in upgrading the airport in + South Egypt, Berenice, as Sadat has proposed?

+

Secretary Brown: This could be quite expensive and might not + give us much additional capability quickly. We want to move aircraft and + supplies more quickly through existing facilities. Sadat has already + offered to make such facilities available on a contingent basis. It + looks like he is trying to get an upgrade of Berenice as the price of + something he has already offered.

+

Gen. Smith: Berenice is too far away anyhow.

+

Dr. Brzezinski: Surge capability is not equivalent to + presence. Enhancing our surge capabilities certainly makes sense. It + demonstrates our interest and our potential willingness to act. Surge + capability is necessary, but insufficient. We must remember + fundamentals. This region is + vital to the US. It is not vital to the + USSR.An unknown hand underlined the three sentences beginning with the + word “We” and ending with “USSR.” This region is insecure and perceives an + erosion of US capability and willingness + to defend it. We must move forward on two tracks, promoting positive + political developments favoring the moderate Arabs, and also + demonstrating our willingness to defend vital US interests. This will take more than a surge capability, + which represents potential for involvement. We must also have increased + real capability on the scene. We must establish presence on the order of + DOD’s Option 2, perhaps, in time, + but not too rapidly, moving toward Option 3.The Defense Department options are summarized in + Document 24. We must accept the + reality of an ambivalent attitude toward our presence on the part of the + Arabs. We must demonstrate to the Arabs that we mean it when we say + their region is vital to us. We must also demonstrate this to the + Soviets. At the Summit the President told Brezhnev that the Middle East is vital to us. Brezhnev scoffed saying, “The US always declares a vital interest where + it wants to do something.” Option 2 is the right way to proceed and is + compatible with increased surge capability. Neither local presence of + the sort we are discussing nor improved surge capability is adequate by + itself. Improved surge capability backs up increased presence.

+

Secretary Brown: In principle, we could either increase + presence or improve surge capability.

+

Dr. Brzezinski: That would not be adequate.

+

Sec. Schlesinger: We must consider the long-term + thrust of our policy. We must recognize that the balance of power in the + area is unfavorable and perceived to be so. Our interests require new + and visible means to respond to major aggression. Our actions will have + to be unilateral at first. We cannot expect people in the area to stand + up and applaud our presence until we have demonstrated our resolve and + capability to be there in strength. If we don’t make the necessary + repairs in the military balance in 5–10 years, the resources of this + area will come under Soviet domination. We must create a situation in + which we are expected normally to be present. Occasional appearances and + surge capability will not do the job. Moving naval forces into the + region, which takes two weeks from Subic Bay, may often generate a + signal we don’t want to send. I favor something between Options 3 and + 4.

+

Dr. Brzezinski: The Soviet Union is building up + permanent facilities at Dalakh. It is inconceivable that we should + hesitate building up our permanent presence when they are doing + this.

+

Secretary Brown: What about the Indian Ocean Talks?

+ +

Mr. Keeny: + ACDA supports State in favoring + concentration on surge capability. In the short term we must consider + local political reactions. In the long run we have to consider the + possible effects of reducing our capability in Europe and the Far + East.

+

Secretary Brown: We have had near continual presence for the + last six months. In the longer run we ought to draw naval assets from + the Mediterranean rather than from the Far East. This would mean one + less carrier in the Mediterranean and one more in the Indian Ocean. In + my judgment, a major conflict with the Soviets would oblige us to take + our carriers out of the Mediterranean anyway, or at least to move them + westwards.

+

Dep.Sec. Christopher: I support Option 2 but in somewhat + different terms than Zbig does. We have to be specific about what we are + going to do and to consider the political costs.

+

Ambassador Strauss: Are we talking about force changes + with prior announcement, or is it a quiet change, observed but + unannounced?

+

Dr. Brzezinski: This is an important question. We can + announce our policy or we can seek to be less vocal about it. I lean + toward the second course. Public statements create reactions to the + statement, quite apart from the action. We must think this through.

+

Secretary Vance: I agree. Dramatic pronouncements, e.g., a + Carter doctrine or the formation of a fifth fleet, would be a + mistake.

+

Mr. Aaron: + Therefore, there should be no debriefs or leaks out of this meeting.

+

Dr. Brzezinski: Leaks are less dramatic and less + binding than pronouncements from the President.

+

Secretary Vance: I agree with David Aaron, no leaks or pronouncements.

+

Dr. Brzezinski: We have to be realistic about the + likelihood of leaks. The problem is what course of action to take. + First, we should decide for sustained deployment of carriers, and, + second, we should explore the possibility of getting a regular anchorage + for them near the Arabian Peninsula or off Somalia. Oman is willing and + Somalia is eager to see us nearby.

+

Secretary Brown: On the matter of surge capability vs. + presence, it should be noted that truly effective intervention + capability requires land forces. They, in turn, require local training + and local prepositioning of equipment. In this sense, real surge + capabilities run into political constraints more rapidly than do naval + deployments, which can be undertaken more or less unilaterally.

+

Admiral Turner: The key political consideration is the + likely reaction of moderate Arab opinion. The moderate Arabs want to be + protected, but they are most concerned about domestic threats and + domestic attitudes. They fear our + military measures will be clumsy and possibly directed against them and + their oil. The degree of local acceptance of US military presence will be crucially influenced by + further success in the peace process. Radicalization of moderate states + is the greatest threat. We need major improvements on the West Bank. + Short of that, even Oman will not accept such things as US anchorages.

+

Ambassador Strauss: What I am hearing is that we have got + to use our political muscle in the peace process before or in parallel + with military measures aimed at the overall security situation.

+

Mr. Keeny: Regarding the Indian Ocean Talks, it + will be difficult to proceed with those talks if we are also + significantly increasing our local military presence. Admittedly this is + not an overwhelming argument against increasing presence, but we have to + consider it.

+

Secretary Brown: Remember that the Soviets are developing a + facility at Dalakh.

+

Mr. Keeny: We may be headed for higher levels of + military presence on both sides, and have to conduct the Indian Ocean + Talks on that premise.

+

Secretary Brown: Our past proposals in those talks surely + preclude Option 3 in the DOD paper, and + may severely constrain what we could do under Option 2.

+

Mr. Keeny: We may have to change our negotiating + position to permit higher ceilings. In any case, it would be unwise to + move on the Indian Ocean Talks, as we agreed at the Summit, until we + have a clear idea what we are going to do about deployments.

+

General Smith: As you know, the JCS have never been enthusiastic about the + Indian Ocean Talks. The real constraints on increased presence and + improved surge capability have to do with our total resources and + commitments elsewhere. We favor augmenting MIDEASTFORCE and increased + periodic naval deployments, augmented by Marines and land-based air if + possible.

+

Dep. Sec. Christopher: In refining deployment plans under + Option 2 we must remember to consider the impact on Africa. We don’t + want military actions to intensify polarization there along US-Soviet lines.

+

Secretary Brown: Reactions in Africa are likely to vary in + different regions. Egypt, an African country, tends to favor increased + US presence.

+

General Smith: I want to repeat that resource + constraints oblige an evolutionary approach.

+

Mr. Aaron: + What are the costs of increased military presence?

+ +

Secretary Brown: We judge the dollar costs to be relatively + modest, on the order of several tens of millions of dollars.

+

Mr. Keeny: I am suspicious of your cost figures. + I’d bet the real dollar costs come out higher.

+

Secretary Brown: You are probably right, but they’re sure to + be small as compared to our stake in Middle East oil.

+

Dr. Brzezinski: Maybe we need another PRC meeting to consider a refinement of + Option 2, including costs, etc.

+

Secretary Brown: I take it from this meeting that DOD is tasked to develop a concrete plan + for augmented presence within the range of Option 2, to include specific + steps, rates of deployment, etc.

+

Dr. Brzezinski: This should then be submitted to the + President, along with possible variations and indications as to the + degree of support for specific actions.

+

Secretary Brown: The President can decide where in the + general spectrum of possibilities he wants our deployments to come + out.

+

Dr. Brzezinski: The President needs some sense of the + tangible costs of his choice.

+

Secretary Vance: The key issue in any deployment policy along + the lines of Option 2 is the rate at which we increase our level of + presence.

+

Secretary Brown: We will develop that.

+

Dr. Brzezinski: So we are talking about a plan within + the confines of Option 2, what it means concretely, what disagreements + there are among us.

+

Mr. McGiffert: Isn’t there some confusion here? As + presented in the paper, Option 2 is relatively specific. Is it the pace + of implementation that is of concern?

+

Secretary Brown: It is a question of pace, of which + combinations of force elements (e.g., carriers, Marines, surface units + and tac air), of possible base requirements, and of the relationship to + surge capability.

+

Mr. Aaron: + Don’t we need shore access for both Marine units and tac air?

+

Secretary Brown: Shore access is not absolutely necessary for + Marines to be deployed to the area.

+

Mr. McGiffert: Options 2 and 3 are comparable in their + impact on our commitments in other theaters. They do differ in their + impact on carrier deployments.

+

Ambassador Strauss: This discussion reinforces the + impression I am getting that we must move more quickly on the peace + talks and get some progress by the end of this year at the latest.

+

Secretary Vance: Progress is definitely needed earlier than + the end of the year.

+

Ambassador Strauss: I have got to step up my plans, then. + I will be moving full steam by 30 June.

+ +

Sec. Schlesinger: We must see deployment decisions + as the first step in a sequence of actions that improve our military + posture in the Middle East/Persian Gulf area. We should tell the + President what the ultimate objective is.

+

Secretary Brown: We can make deployment decisions now and be + more tentative as to what steps might follow later.

+

Sec. Schlesinger: We really do need a longer-term + military strategy for the area and, if he is able, the President would + be advised to decide on one.

+

Dr. Brzezinski: Once we have established a strong sense + of direction, there is nothing wrong with letting some aspects of our + strategy evolve. We may need a specific Presidential Directive that + links increased military effort and increased efforts in the + negotiations. But this is part of a dynamic process that can evolve.

+

Sec. Schlesinger: If it is our view that the + importance of our interests in the area requires a preponderance of + power, something better than an equilibrium with the Soviets, then we + must present that to the President.

+

Secretary Brown: The Soviet Union can react to, and possibly + offset, what we do.

+

Dr. Brzezinski: The President deals with the reality of + the situation, which is the overwhelming importance to the West of this + region. Force ratios must reflect that reality.

+

Sec. Schlesinger: We may by implying military + activities for which we lack the requisite resources. That remains to be + seen.

+
+ +
+ 27. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense Brown toPresident CarterSource: + Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, + Defense/Security, Ermarth, + Box 3, [Indian Ocean]: 2–8/79. Secret. Bartholomew sent a copy of Brown’s memorandum to Vance under a July 19 briefing + memorandum, noting that Vance, Brown + and Brzezinski planned to + discuss it at their scheduled July 20 luncheon. Bartholomew noted: “This memo + accurately reflects the PRC + decisions and we agree with its overall thrust. However, we need an + early State/DOD assessment of the + diplomatic implications and military support requirements essential + to some of Harold’s recommendations (e.g., MIDEASTFOR increases, + land-based tactical air deployments, and marine air-ground task + force). The results of that assessment should be reflected in + Harold’s memo before it goes forward.” (Department of State, Office + of the Secretariat Staff, Cyrus R. + Vance, Secretary of State—1977–1980, Lot 84D241, Box + 1, Vance/Brown/Brzezinski Lunches, 7–9/79) Vance and Brown did set forth plans for + implementing the increased presence outlined in Brown’s memorandum; see Document 30. + + + Washington, July 11, + 1979 + + + + SUBJECT + US Military Presence in the Middle + East/Persian Gulf (U) + +

(S) Three SCC/PRC meetings have been held to review US policy toward the Middle East/Persian + Gulf in light of the fall of the Shah, Soviet activities in Afghanistan, + the Horn and South Yemen, and our increasing dependence on imported + oil.See Documents + 23 and 26. With respect to + regional security issues, the consensus of the meetings was that the + US should strengthen its defense + ties with the moderate Persian Gulf states, continue to assist them in + improving their self-defense capabilities, improve US military surge capabilities, and + moderately increase peacetime US + military presence in the region. This memorandum outlines specific + initiatives which I propose to take within DoD if you approve these + general conclusions.

+

Defense Ties with Regional States

+

(S) To establish closer defense ties with the moderate Persian Gulf + states as a means to improve their self-defense capabilities and to + reduce the political strains caused by the US role in the Egyptian-Israeli peace process and by our + economic differences, DoD, in coordination with the State Department, + will continue efforts already underway to establish regular bilateral + security consultations with selected Persian Gulf states, to be + responsive to the requests of the moderate Arab states for arms and + equipment where it makes sense to do so, and to improve the readiness of + local forces by, for example, participating in exercises with them.

+ +

US Military + Presence

+

(S) To provide a moderate increase in US + peacetime military presence in the region, I plan to: (1) expand the + permanent US naval presence (now three + ships) by two or three surface combatants; (2) increase the number of + routine naval deployments to the region from three to four per year + including, normally, two carrier battle groups (in the past there have + been either one or two such carrier groups deployed each year) and a + Marine air-ground task force (MAGTF); + and (3) deploy, if politically feasible, at least one TACAIR squadron to the region each year + to participate in training and combined exercises with local states. + Before a MAGTF is deployed to the + vicinity of the Arabian Peninsula, political consultations would be held + as appropriate. Of course, additional short-notice deployments may be + required to deal with unforseeable events in the region.

+

(S) The JCS have prepared an + illustrative deployment schedule with notional forces covering the + CY 1980–82 period which is attached + as Appendix A.Appendix A is attached but not + printed. Initially, most of the naval forces will be drawn + from CINCPAC, but we are exploring + ways to provide part of the necessary assets from USCINCEUR and CINCLANT as well. Undoubtedly, such + deployments will have some impact on our Mediterranean and Asian + commitments as well as on fleet readiness. The extent of this impact + will become clearer when we develop specific (as opposed to + illustrative) schedules, including composition of each naval deployment. + With judicious scheduling we should be able to honor the bulk of our + peacetime commitments in Europe and Asia.

+

(S) For the longer term, we in DoD will be studying the feasibility of + moving toward near-continuous or continuous naval presence with major + combatants in the Indian Ocean using more than two carrier deployments + per year. As part of this study, we will be formulating options that + would give the US the capability to + sustain significant combat forces (carriers, MAGTFs, TACAIR) in the region for prolonged + periods. We will also shortly be sending you other ideas with respect to + presence enhancement that might involve less diversion of existing naval + assets.

+

US Surge + Capabilities

+

(S) I have in mind the following measures to upgrade our surge + capabilities: attempting to prearrange necessary clearances from states + en route to the region to permit the US + access and overflight rights in a Middle East/Persian Gulf contingency; + concluding agreements with states in the region which would provide us + access to airfields and ports + in a crisis; exercising these access and overflight rights on a routine + basis in peacetime; upgrading the defenses and capabilities of local + facilities so that the flow of men and supplies can be expedited; + reviewing US strategic and theater lift + capabilities to determine whether the US + can adequately deploy and support a significant combat force in a Middle + East/Persian Gulf contingency; refining our contingency planning for the + region, considering expansion of the facilities at Diego Garcia, + exploring the need and opportunities for pre-positioning equipment and + supplies in the region; and improving operational capabilities through + increased liaison and exercises with local states.

+

Recommendations

+

(S) I recommend you agree to the general conclusions outlined above. In + that case, I would issue policy guidance within DoD to implement these + conclusions as indicated.

+

(S) I also recommend that the increase in US military presence be handled in a low key manner. In + particular, we should avoid a declaratory policy and other actions which + lock us into a particular deployment pattern. Additionally, I recommend + that the Administration brief key members of Congress on a confidential + basis concerning the increase in US + presence and the full range of initiatives which will be implemented to + improve US surge capabilities and + regional self-defense forces.

+

(S) Finally, I recommend that we continue to enlist the cooperation of + our allies to protect our mutual interests in the region. In this + respect, we have already begun a low key process of encouraging support, + and participation where possible, by our NATO allies in efforts to improve regional security.

+

(S) The Joint Chiefs of Staff agree with these recommendations.

+ + Harold Brown + +
+ +
+ 28. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense Brown to the President’s Assistant for National Security + Affairs (Brzezinski)Source: Carter Library, National + Security Affairs, Brzezinski + Material, General Odom File, Box 28, Middle East Command Post: + 7/79–3/80. Secret. + + + Washington, July 31, + 1979 + + + SUBJECT + US Capabilities to Respond to + Limited Contingencies (U) + +

(S) This memorandum responds to your 9 July requestBrzezinski’s + July 9 request is ibid. for a status report on the progress + which has been made in implementing the limited contingency aspects of + PD/NSC–18.PD/NSC–18, “U.S. + National Security Policy,” August 24, 1977, is scheduled for + publication in Foreign Relations, 1977–1980, vol. IV, National + Security Policy.

+

(S) First, by way of background, even prior to August 1977 the US had forces which could be used to + respond to limited contingencies. However, the focus on planning for + limited contingencies in the Middle East/Persian Gulf has increased + substantially since PD/NSC–18 was issued. Competition for limited + resources has precluded additions to our basic force structure, which is + not the limiting factor in our capability for rapid deployment in any + event.An unknown hand underlined the + portion of this sentence beginning with the word “Competition” and + ending with the word “structure.” However, we have designated + specific type units for a rapid deployment force, are refining our + contingency plans, tailoring our training, and programming logistics, + mobility, and support resources for the rapid deployment force so that + it can operate effectively in the Middle East/Persian Gulf and + Korea.

+

(S) I have instructed the Services to program logistics, mobility, and + support for a rapid deployment force consisting of two Army divisions + (one light and one mechanized) along with an armored brigade and combat + support forces, four tactical fighter wings (seven for a Korean + contingency), three carrier battle groups, a Marine Amphibious Force + (MAF), and two tactical airlift wings. These units are being identified + within the existing force structure; many of them also have NATO missions. Although forces programmed + for NATO use can be used to respond to + a limited contingency elsewhere, they will generally need more logistics + (including lift) and military support for use in a rapid deployment + force elsewhere than is currently funded for them.

+

(S) I have directed the programming of support for the rapid deployment + force so that eventually it can operate for at least 90 days in an austere environment. The + Services, however, are having difficulty meeting this goal, given the + many competing demands for resources.

+

(S) The rapid deployment force is capable of responding adequately to a + wide range of non- NATO contingencies. + It is possible, however, to envision major non- NATO contingencies where the rapid + deployment force would have to be reinforced by additional units + committed to NATO , particularly if + Soviet forces invaded the Persian Gulf region through Iran. To meet + large-scale non- NATO contingencies, + the JCS have noted a requirement (based + on a Persian Gulf scenario) for five divisions and nine tactical fighter + wings (as well as the MAF and three carrier battle groups). This would + require either an expansion of the active forces or acceptance of a + somewhat greater risk to NATO . + Additionally, to deploy a force of this size quickly would require, at a + minimum, an increase in our mobility forces and/or substantial + prepositioning in the area.

+

(S) With respect to mobility, DoD is pursuing a range of programs to + enhance the capabilities of our airlift assets.An unknown hand highlighted this paragraph, + underlined “DOD is pursuing a range + of programs,” and wrote a question mark in the right-hand margin + next to the sentence. These programs include: the C–5 wing + modification program; the C–141 “Stretch” program which will raise the + C–141 force’s lift capability by about one third; the purchase of KC–10 + tankers; and modification of civil passenger aircraft to carry cargo as + part of the CRAF program. The naval + forces provide their own lift and are largely independent of foreign + bases for support.

+

(S) The initiatives outlined above, combined with the operating + experience acquired in recent deployments to the Middle East/Persian + Gulf (e.g., the increased naval deployments and the deployment of F–15s + and AWACS aircraft to Saudi + Arabia)See Document + 271. indicate that we have made progress in the + last two years to project forces to respond to limited contingencies. + However, I would emphasize that there are significant problems that have + not yet been solved. Many of these problems are not soluble without + major programmatic efforts such as I described in the PRC meeting on the Draft Consolidated + Guidance.See Document + 26. Specifically, we are particularly concerned + about programmatic difficulties in maintaining continuous combat + presence in the region for immediate reaction and rapidly deploying + mechanized forces to the area.

+ + Harold Brown + +
+ +
+ 29. Memorandum From Gary Sick + of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for + National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, + Middle East, Subject File, Box 68, Middle East: Security: 7–8/79. + Secret. Outside the System. Sent for information. A stamped notation + on the memorandum reads: “ZB has + seen.” + + + Washington, August 6, + 1979 + + + SUBJECT + Unified Middle East Command (U) + +

Background

+

You asked for comments on Bill Odom’s memo.Reference is to a July 24 memorandum that Odom sent to Brzezinski. Odom wrote: “As you + make progress in establishing the policy of an increasing U.S. + military presence in the Persian Gulf, there is a major ‘next step’ + which should be considered: a change in the DOD’s Unified Command Plan to create a unified command + for the Persian Gulf region.” Brzezinski forwarded the memorandum to Gary Sick with a handwritten + notation in the margin that reads: “GS, your comments on the politics of this in the + region? ZB.” (Ibid.) Notations on + Odom’s memorandum indicate that Aaron also read and commented on it. A couple + of words of background are required. At the present time, the Middle + East south of Suez and the Indian Ocean is the “backyard” of both CINCEUR and CINCPAC. For years, they have been + trying to work out some kind of reasonable command structure for the + area without any significant success. Middle East Force, the only + permanent U.S. military presence in the region, as well as the + attache/military assistance programs, have always been under CINCEUR. CINCPAC has been playing a much more important role since + 1974 when we began the policy of periodic task force deployments into + the region at a time when the Suez Canal was closed and the Sixth Fleet + had no ready access to the region. At the present time, we have the + anomalous situation where Middle East Force CINCEUR is responsible only for the Persian Gulf/Red Sea + and adjacent land area; while all the rest of the Indian Ocean is + technically the responsibility of the Pacific Command. Thus, when MIDEASTFOR ships sail out of the + Gulf (which they do routinely) they are technically in CINCPAC’s territory, and when Seventh + Fleet units operate off the Arabian Peninsula they report back to + Honolulu, although MIDEASTFOR + has a “liaison” responsibility. (S)

+

Harold Brown is well aware of this + issue and tasked the JCS on June 22 to + do an evaluation. A preliminary report has been completed within the + JCS which identifies seven possible + options. Although this report has been briefed to the Chairman, it has + still not been reported out of + the JCS. (I have a copy of the original + slide presentation on this report if you want additional details. It is + in Pentagonese and requires a translator.) Any significant alteration of + the present arrangement would involve a battle for turf among the + Services and the existing Unified and Specified Commands. My + understanding is that there is little enthusiasm within the JCS for a potentially bruising territorial + fight and they would prefer simply to leave things as they are for the + moment. The impetus for change will almost certainly have to come from + outside the JCS, either from SecDef or the NSC. (S)

+

Security Relationship with Saudi Arabia

+

One of the most important elements of any new Middle East Command would + be the military relationship with Saudi Arabia and the nations of the + Arabian Peninsula. As you know, Major General Dick Lawrence has recently returned + from a three-month mission to Saudi Arabia and the Arabian Peninsula to + examine this issue.See Document 197. Based on his findings, he is + convinced that a thorough reorganization of the U.S. military + relationship is required. As a result of his conversations, he believes + that the Saudi top leadership is aware that their primary problems are + not lack of hardware but shortcomings in management, planning, + coordination, and command and control. Our present effort in Saudi + Arabia is oriented almost exclusively toward hardware and is constrained + from providing management advice and assistance. (S)

+

Lawrence believes that it is now + time to restructure our military relationship with Saudi Arabia to take + account of the two aspects of our effort—i.e. FMS and advisory/planning assistance. He would propose + giving the organization a new name and a new charter with greater + regional orientation, with cognizance over all U.S. military in the + country. He believes this can be done within existing manpower ceilings. + Lawrence has briefed his + proposal widely in DOD and State (and + to this office). There is a great deal of support for the idea, but it + will require a push from above to get things moving. (S)

+

In my view, this is the place to begin restructuring our Middle East + security efforts. The Arabian Peninsula is the heart of our security + concern, and we should get our house in order there before proceeding to + restructure the next layer of command. In that Dick Lawrence has already briefed + specific recommendations to State and Defense, changes along these lines + would be more easily and quickly adapted than those for a Mideast + command. I will be sending you a memo in the next few days proposing a + strategy for dealing with this issue.Not + further identified and not found. (S)

+ +

Regional Politics

+

The regional reaction to the establishment of a Middle East Command would + depend very heavily on which of the seven JCS options we chose to pursue. If we merely establish a + subordinate command attached to EUCOM + or PACCOM, or if we add this responsibility to REDCOM or create a Washington paper + command, I suspect that the reaction in the region would be muted. This + would amount to nothing more than a bureaucratic restructuring of our + present organization, with the same assets except for a few headquarters + personnel thousands of miles away, it should not be unmanageable on the + political level. I dare say that very few in the Middle East understand + our present command relationship. (S)

+

If, however, we undertook to establish a unified command in the region, or if we made it clear that this + was our ultimate intention, this would be seen as the long-anticipated + “Fifth Fleet” and would arouse intense concern. That should be + undertaken only after the most careful study and advance preparation. + (S)

+

At this point, I would be content to leave the question of a major + command restructuring where it is in the Department of Defense, while we + direct our attention to the subsidiary problem of getting our security + relationship with Saudi Arabia in order.Brzezinski drew a + vertical line in the left-hand margin next to this final paragraph + with a line connecting to his notation in the lower margin that + reads: “ok for time-being ZB.” (S)

+
+ +
+ + 30. Memorandum From Secretary of State Vance and Secretary of Defense Brown to President CarterSource: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, + OSD Files, FRC 330–82–0205, Box 15, Middle East. + Secret. The memorandum is on Department of State + stationery. + + + Washington, August + 17, 1979 + + + SUBJECT + U.S. Military Presence in the Middle East and Indian Ocean + +

Harold Brown’s memorandum of July + 11 outlined the proposed increase in U.S. military presence in the + Indian Ocean area.See Document 27. This memorandum sets forth our plans + for implementing the increased presence. We expect that these plans, + when carefully executed, will enhance respect for U.S. interests and + will reassure our Middle Eastern friends.

+

Matter-of-fact presentation and low-key implementation of our plans will + elicit private, though probably not public, acceptance on the part of + the most moderate states in the region. We can improve the chances for + positive reaction by providing opportunities for joint exercises and + training with U.S. forces. We expect a more favorable reaction from our + Asian and NATO allies so long as our + force commitments to their regions are not significantly reduced. We + should anticipate criticism from the USSR, Ethiopia, Iran, Iraq, the other radical Arab and + African states, and some moderates such as India.

+

Naval deployments will be the least controversial aspect of the proposed + increases. In general, the “over-the-horizon” nature of naval forces is + welcomed by our friends in the region. Four rather than three major + deployments will require some increases in U.S. Navy use of local + facilities for port calls and fuel and for access for maritime patrol + and logistic aircraft.

+

Adding two surface combatants to MidEastForce can be accomplished without + causing undue concern to Bahrain and other regional states by assigning + the additional ships to Commander Middle East Force for command and + control purposes only, by focusing the activities outside the Persian + Gulf, and by not formally increasing our MidEastForce strength or + increasing our day-to-day presence in the Gulf. MidEastForce has, in + fact been augmented off and on since last November, without evidence of + concern by friendly states.

+

The increased support requirements for our expanded activities may + encounter resistance from some littoral states or demands for quid pro + quo in the form of assistance. In general, however, these + problems should be manageable.

+

While more sensitive, the TacAir deployments should be favorably received + if they are clearly tied to joint training exercises with regional + states. In any event, these deployments will require previous + consultations and approval of host nations. There is precedent for such + deployments as the U.S. sent F–15s and AWACs on separate occasions to + Saudi Arabia in early 1979.See Document 271.

+

More controversial will be the Marine deployments. These have the + potential for adverse publicity by those who wish us ill or fear + American intervention. We will have to approach this issue very + carefully, with regard to both timing and the countries involved. We + would suggest to them Marine exercises within the context of joint + exercises. The most likely initial amphibious exercise could be with + Australia, or alternatively, with Saudi Arabia if it were willing.

+

In order to avoid negative reactions, it is important that we consult + with appropriate moderate states and our NATO and East Asian allies, in conjunction with any + announcement of increases in U.S. naval presence. We should also + carefully lay the groundwork with key members of Congress.

+

We should not seek endorsement of proposed naval increases from our + regional friends. This is a U.S. decision. It should be explained as a + logical step to strengthen the position of U.S. and moderate forces in + the region, and as an indication of American concern for the security of + our friends.

+

We will not proceed with consultations until after the NAM Summit in September.Reference is to the Non-Aligned Movement Summit + scheduled to take place in Havana, Cuba, September 3–9. Since + our decisions are likely to leak publicly once consultations take place + with Congress or abroad, we would exacerbate expected NAM criticism of our Indian Ocean military + policy. Our friends in the region would then be forced to acquiesce in + resolutions specifically condemning our decisions.

+

Procedures for Implementation of Policy

+

After the NAM, we intend to proceed + along the following plan of action:

+

1. Inform key members of Congress of our plans.

+

2. Concurrently inform key countries (e.g., Saudi Arabia, India, + Pakistan) of our plans, as well as our NATO and East Asian allies.

+ +

3. If deemed appropriate, make a low-key public announcement of U.S. + plans. No announcement should be made of possible tactical air or Marine + deployments, nor should the additional surface combatants be officially + termed a part of MidEastForce.

+

4. As necessary, undertake consultations with friends in the area + regarding support requirements and joint exercises.

+ + Cyrus R. Vance + Secretary of State + + Harold Brown + Secretary of Defense + + +
+ +
+ 31. Memorandum From William Odom of the National Security Council + Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs + (Brzezinski)Source: Carter Library, Brzezinski Donated Material, + Geographic File, Box 15, Southwest Asia/Persian Gulf—2/79–12/79. + Secret. Marked “FOR DR. BRZEZINSKI ONLY.” A table entitled “East + Europe: Arms Deliveries to Yemen (Aden) and Yemen (Sana)” is + ibid. + + + Washington, October + 2, 1979 + +

Political-Military Planning for the Arabian + Peninsula:

+

Harold Brown’s memo on planning + for the next Yemen crisis and the Arabian peninsula provokes my + comment.Reference is to a September 28 + memorandum from Brown to + Brzezinski in which + Brown noted: “I believe + it would be desirable to do some politico-military anticipatory + planning with respect to contingencies with which we may be faced in + the coming months.” Brown + went on to “suggest we start with the scenario of a renewed PDRY attack on North Yemen and/or + attack on Oman.” Sick sent + the memorandum to Brzezinski + under an October 1 covering memorandum. (Carter Library, National + Security Affairs, Brzezinski + Material, Brzezinski Office + File, Country Chron File, Box 56, Yemen) No matter what + planning we do at the NSC level, we + cannot compensate for inadequacies in “organizational” structure in the + region and on the peninsula. Projecting forces and military equipment + into the peninsula will not necessarily prevent the two Yemens from + getting together, reduce Saudi fear of a strong anti-Soviet North Yemen, + integrate Oman into the peninsula security system, and take advantage of + the anti-Aden tribes in eastern South Yemen. We are wasting valuable + time by not changing the MAAG missions + to emphasize (a) peninsula-wide security planning; (b) military + management assistance vice “military sales”;(c) support of covert actions in South Yemen. We do + not need a bigger MAAG in Riyadh; we + need a properly staffed smaller MAAG + with a different charter, one extending beyond Saudi boundaries. (C)

+

In addition to a new mission for the MAAG, we need to press forward with the Middle East + Command. JCS has the options stopped + cold. They need a prod from above to produce options which (a) take + command of the MAAGs away from EUCOM; + (b) give the new command direct and full control of intelligence and + operations for both local defense and deployments into the region. JCS’s first proposal split command + authority, leaving the MAAG with + EUCOM and the “operations” with + REDCOM in Florida. We must + ensure that a truly unified option is offered. (S)

+

We need a two-prong strategy in the region, particularly on the + Peninsula. First, local defense. Local defense + will not develop through military sales alone. I have spent several + hours with General Lawrence who + recently assessed the region, developed a defense scheme for North + Yemen, and proposed a number of steps to improve Saudi capabilities. His + account is not unlike my assessment a number of years ago on Vietnam. + Our approach, pouring in FMS, not + insisting upon proper management and staffing capabilities within the + host regime, runs the risk of destroying the very regime we want to + save. The U.S. Navy in the Indian Ocean will not prevent such an + outcome. Internal fragility of the regimes on the peninsula is the + primary enemy. F–15s do not compensate for fragility, and they may + contribute to it. (S)

+

I watched the first years of the U.S. assistance effort to Iran. We tried + to develop a proper infrastructure. We soon gave way to the + military-sales-above-all approach. I personally knew several Iranian + officers who began as serious young lieutenants and grew into “corrupt” + colonels 15 years later. The corruption also infected our MAAG. I can only wonder about the MAAG in Riyadh, especially in view of its + proposal for expansion. (S)

+

The second prong should be our force projection into the region. Again, the need for a + unified U.S. command is crucial. It can provide the C3I essential for a smooth operation. If we + depend on EUCOM, we get a refraction + through the prism of a “Central Front” outlook. (C)

+

These views are fully shared in ISA. + Some in the JCS share them but cannot + act on them. They threaten Navy turf and SACEUR’sturf. (C)

+
+ +
+ + 32. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in + BahrainSource: National + Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D7900502–0072. Secret. + Drafted by Countryman; + cleared by Saunders, Roscoe + Suddarth (P), Douglas E. Keene (PM/SAS), Sick, A. Peter Burleigh (H), and + Murray and in DOD/DSAA and JCS; approved by Benson. Sent for information to Abu Dhabi, Amman, + Dhahran, Doha, Jidda, Kuwait, Muscat, USLO Riyadh, Sana, Tehran, the Department of Defense, + DA + WASHDC, DA//DALO–SAC WASHDC, DA//DAMO–SSA WASHDC, DA//DAMA + WASHDC, and USCINCEUR Vaihingen GE. In an + October 25 action memorandum to Benson, O’Donohue and Saunders attached a draft of this telegram, noting + that the Government of Bahrain had again expressed a desire to + purchase one Hawk missile battery and commenting that there was + “military justification for the sale.” Benson approved the telegram on October 29. + (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + P790179–0863) + + + Washington, October 30, 1979, 1926Z + +

283380. Subject: Bahrain’s Request for Hawk Missile System. Ref: Manama + 1512 and related.In telegram 1512 from + Manama, July 19, the Embassy reported threats from Ayatollah Sadiq + Rohani to revive Iranian claims to Bahrain, noting that Rohani’s + statements “are worrisome to GOB.” + (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + D790332–1048)

+

1. Secret-entire text.

+

2. Summary: We are prepared to undertake substantive discussions with the + GOB in regard to its request for + purchase of the improved Hawk missile air defense system.In telegram 153170 to Abu Dhabi, June 14, the + Department detailed new Bahraini requests for Hawk missiles and the + U.S. Government’s dilemma over what to do in light of U.S arms + policy toward the lower Gulf region and new regional developments. + (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + D790270–0625) Our agreement to enter discussions with the + GOB on the I-Hawk is conditioned on + the Bahraini battery becoming associated with the Saudi air defense + network in a manner to be worked out by the Bahrainis and Saudis. We + assume GOB will seek Saudi funding. Our + agreement to discuss the supply of theI-Hawk to Bahrain would be subject + to granting an exception tothe National Disclosure Policy and normal 36 + (B) review proceduresReference is to Section + 36(B) of the 1976 Arms Export Control Act. in-cluding both + Presidential approval and congressional review. End summary.

+

3. Background. The I-Hawk missile system can be employed only in an air + defense role. Its range (approximately 35 kilometers) and mission make + it an [garble—appropriate weapon?] for Bahrain (and other Gulf states) + to use against aerial attack. Over much of the last decade, U.S. policy + has consistently supported cooperation among the moderate Arab states of + the Persian Gulf in defense, education, industrialization and other + fields. The sale of the I-Hawk would serve as a concrete expression of the seriousness of our + intent. Such a deployment, moreover, of a defensive anti-aircraft + missile system will enable us to credibly deflect possible Bahraini + requests for fixed wing aircraft. End background.

+

4. You are authorized to convey the following points to the GOB. We would suggest that you inform both + the Crown Prince/Minister of Defense and the Foreign Minister and leave + to your discretion whether to convey these points to other GOB officials.

+

—We agree to undertake substantive and detailed discussions with the + GOB in regard to its request to + purchase the I-Hawk missile system;

+

—The GOB should be aware that any final + agreement is subject to granting an exception to the National Disclosure + Policy as well as the normal 36(B) review procedures which include + Presidential approval and congressional review;

+

—Our agreement is based on our understanding that Saudi Arabia is + prepared to fund the purchase. We have no policy problem with the sale + but believe that a separate, wholly Bahraini financed Hawk battery + cannot be justified in terms of cost effectiveness;

+

—We envisage the acquisition of the I-Hawk by Bahrain as an important + step in promoting regional air defense cooperation and that it is + sensible only in such a regional context;

+

—We plan to inform the SAG of the + substance of our decision;

+

—We would encourage the maximum possible association of the Bahraini with + the Saudi I-Hawk system—and [garble—would expect?] at a minimum, that + the air defense commands of the two countries would be linked by a + common communications net and by common exploitation of long-range + target acquisition radars;

+

—Such linkage would not deny Bahrain the ability to defend itself + independently from attacking aircraft, but does provide economy in + logistical support of the system and avoid duplication of systems to the + degree possible;

+

—The USG would be involved only in + supplying the missile system and its components to Bahrain;

+

—Although the sale would be under FMS + procedures (because of its dollar value), we would not envision any + large or long-term official presence connected with the sale;

+

—We presume that technicians and training necessary would be contracted + to private American firms, as has been done in Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. + This should be done in the closest possible cooperation with the Saudis + to avoid duplication of efforts and unnecessary expense;

+

—We are prepared to send, on a reimbursable basis, a team of air defense + experts to Bahrain to consult with the Ministry of Defense and to examine the technical + requirements for the establishment of an air defense system once Bahrain + informs us that Saudi financing is firm and that Bahrain and Saudi + Arabia have reached general agreement about associating their two air + defense systems;

+

—If both the GOB and SAG agree, this team could also visit + Saudi Arabia to look into requirements for associating the two + countries’ air defense capabilities;

+

—If the GOB decides to pursue the matter + further, it should request through the Embassy, a letter of offer for + the team;

+

—There are great complexities associated with the deployment and use of + this weapons system. The Hawk missile not only is expensive; it demands + highly-trained officers and men to use it effectively. A [garble—Hawk + missile?] battery consists of two fire units totalling six launchers + supported by radar and computer technicians. Normal staffing is 150–200 + men per battery with several hundred more required for logistical, + administrative and technical support;

+

—One Hawk battery of six launchers costs about dols 30 million. Each missile costs dols 135,000. Each launcher has three + missiles per load. To this must be added substantial + maintenance/logistics training requirements. We believe that the total + package cost could reach dols 70–100 + million depending on the actual equipment eventually acquired by Bahrain + and the degree of Bahraini use of Saudi support facilities;

+

—If, after considering all of the above, the GOB should continue in its desire to purchase the I-Hawk, + it should be aware that theI-Hawk will go out of production in the next + two–three years, and that orders must be placed within the next twelve + months. (FYI: The U.S. will be adopting + a new air defense missile system, the Patriot. End FYI.)

+

5. For Abu Dhabi, Doha and Muscat: If approached by host governments + expressing interest in the I-Hawk, you are authorized to inform them of + the substance of this cable adding that we are prepared to discuss with + them the general subject of their air defense needs in a regional + context, but cannot make any commitment to sell a specific system until + we jointly agree on military requirements.

+

6. For Jidda: The contents of this message have been discussed with + Ambassador West. He will raise + this matter with Prince Sultan when he returns to Saudi Arabia.

+ + Vance + +
+ +
+ + 33. Summary of Conclusion of a Mini-Policy Review Committee + MeetingSource: Carter + Library, National Security Council, Institutional Files, Box 83, + MPRC 016, 11/1/79, Straits of Hormuz. Confidential. The meeting took + place in the White House Situation Room. The minutes of the meeting + were not found. + + + Washington, November 1, 1979, 10–11:30 + a.m. + + + SUBJECT + Mini-PRC on Strait of Hormuz + (C) + + + PARTICIPANTS + + State + David Newsom, Under + Secretary for Political Affairs + Harold Saunders, + Asst. Sec. for Near Eastern & South Asian Affairs + Dan O’Donahue, Dep. Dir. for Politico Military + Affairs + + + + + OSD + David McGiffert, + Asst. Sec. for Int’l Security Affairs + Henry H. Gaffney, Director, Near Eastern & South Asian + Affairs + Colonel G.W. Plummer, Director, Arabian Peninsula + Captain Chris C. Shoemaker, Policy Analysis + + + + + JCS + General John + Pustay, Assistant to the Chairman + Commander Richard S. Shawkey, U.S.N. + + + + + DCI + Robert Ames, NIO, Near + Eastern & South Asian Affairs + + + White House + David Aaron + + + + + NSC + Gary Sick + + +

General Pustay briefed the + mini-PRC on the geography of the + Strait of Hormuz and its vulnerability. The width and depth of the + Strait makes it difficult to block physically, but the fjords of the + Musandam Peninsula provide possible hiding places for isolated terrorist + operations. The most likely contingencies would be emplacement of a + limited number of moored mines or a seaborne rocket attack on a tanker. + The best minesweeping capability in the region is the four new Saudi + minesweepers; the equipment is excellent but Saudi capability to use it + is still very limited.

+
+ +
+ + 34. Memorandum From William Odom of the National Security Council + Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs + (Brzezinski)Source: Carter Library, National + Security Affairs, Brzezinski + Material, General Odom File, Box 43, Security Framework [Southwest + Asia/Persian Gulf]: 2–12/79. Secret; Sensitive. Outside the System. + Sent for information. Brzezinski wrote “good, am proceeding along these + lines. Give me memo ZB” in the upper + right-hand corner of the memorandum. + + + Washington, November + 28, 1979 + + + SUBJECT + Strategy for the Persian Gulf in 1980 + +

I promised some ideas on next steps after the present Iranian + crisis.Iranian students seized the U.S. + Embassy in Tehran on November 4. As a preface, I want to set + forth a short assessment of our present position and possibilities in + region. That is followed by a list of concrete steps.

+

Opportunities and Constraints for a US Strategy in the Persian Gulf Region

+

A number of previous obstructions to an effective strategy are being + overcome offering new opportunities for action. The Indian Ocean Arms + Talks have been removed as a block to U.S. military power projection + into the region.See Document 123. We have loosened up the arms sales + policy a bit. The present Iranian crisis seems to be creating the chance + to begin a serious regional intelligence rebuilding effort as well as a + physical military presence. The time for action, therefore, is at + hand.

+

At the same time two objective factors, however, must be recognized as + constraints in the development of an effective strategy for the region. + First, we have lost Iran for the present. Yet the focus of most of our + thinking is on Iran. The most viable and promising U.S. posture will be + one built with its center on the Arabian Peninsula. Although we cannot + march straight into Saudi Arabia tomorrow, we can keep a Saudi-centric + concept as the basis for each small step into the region. Second, to the + extent possible, we should separate our Arab-Israeli policy from our + strategy for the Persian Gulf. That means, of course, that bases in + Israel and the Sinai are not appropriate for increasing our military + presence in the region.

+ +

The Strategic Configuration of the Region + Today

+

The Persian Gulf itself has become the “forward edge of the battle area” + with the temporary loss of Iran. Our position, if we are to build one, + must rest primarily on the perimeter of the Arabian Peninsula.

+

Iraq, on the north end of this new line of conflict, presents + opportunities to turn this flank. Implicit Iraqi cooperation against + Iran looks more possible each week. Explicit cooperation is, admittedly, + unlikely.

+

Pakistan, on the south end of the line of conflict, is critical for + turning that flank. Not only does it influence Iran, but it is the base + for influencing Afghanistan.

+

Another line of conflict is a circle around South Yemen, Eritrea, and + Ethiopia. Somalia, Oman, North Yemen, and Sudan are key locations for + influencing the competition in this secondary conflict area.

+

The friendly states, particularly Saudi Arabia and Oman, are extremely + weak in two regards. First, they lack the domestic institutions for an + effective military establishment (the confusion in Saudi Arabia during + the Mecca incident is an example).See Documents 201 and 202. Second, they have no effective institutions + for coordinating a peninsula-wide interstate security system. The + Soviets are attacking both of these weaknesses—infiltrating and + developing internal opposition movements—and coordinating the interstate + actions of Soviet client states—Yemen and Ethiopia.

+

What the U.S. Must Do

+

The first step we must take is to create a unified regional command for the Persian Gulf and + Middle East. The headquarters must be near Washington at first, in the + region after we are invited. Earlier arguments about the adverse + political affects of making this organizational step no longer are + compelling, if they ever were.

+

The JCS is still dragging its feet, + obstructing movement on this front, but OSD has demanded a recommendation for a “joint task force” + organization in the near future. I shall review it with Bob Murray (ISA). He has invited me to comment on it.

+

Until we have a “regional” approach in our security/intelligence + organization, we shall stumble along in the fashion of November and + December 1978 and November 1979. Intelligence won’t improve, and our + ability to move into the region will not increase. State is delighted to + keep it that way. We can only do what we are organized to do, and for + the past three years that has been to “send cables,” the only kind of + action State is organized to take.

+ +

The second step is an approach + to Oman, Saudi Arabia, and possibly to Sudan and Pakistan, + asking them what we can do to help. There are + several myths about what these countries will and will not accept from + us, but General Dick Lawrence, + who commanded USMTM in Saudi Arabia, + 1975–77, and who took the team to advise on security in Yemen last + summer, insists that the Saudis will find a way to let us in if we start + by asking them what they recommend. King Khalid likes Lawrence and jokes about his “Lawrence of Arabia.” During his last + visit,See Document + 197. + Lawrence got more exposure to + close-hold Saudi military plans than anyone before. His team wrote a + “national strategy” plan for the Saudis. None existed before; and the + Saudis accepted it unaltered!

+

Oman is asking through various channels for a U.S. move or gesture. The + Omani ambassador has used two of my very close friends, whom he knew at + Oxford in the 1950s, to convey messages and questions about possible + U.S. military assistance. “Does the U.S. ever send assistance without + being asked?” he asked. Clearly he is fishing for a U.S. gesture. + Lawrence insists that a base + is available for the asking in Oman.

+

The point is, we must open a dialogue, regional in scope, but not at all + public, which lets the Saudis, Omanis, and maybe others lead us into + closer security relations. The outcome after a year or two, will be a + regional security system, de facto but not de jure.

+

The third step is acquisition of + bases in the region. I believe you realize the importance of + such bases after the military contingency planning for the present + Iranian crisis. Bases must provide us secure areas for staging. They + must hold stocks of equipment. And they must increase our intelligence + capabilities.

+

We should seek two categories of bases. First, permanent bases, and + second, bases for temporary exercise use.

+

In the first category, two, possibly three, bases could be acquired soon. + Masirah Island, off the Omani coast, is probably available in exchange + for some military assistance. Somalia, of course, would like to make a + similar deal. I know Paul + Henze’s reluctance towards deals with Somalia, but we should + not heed him now. Rather we should drive a tough bargain for Berbera or + another location nearby. A third possibility is Aswan in Egypt. + Naturally this tends to entangle the Arab-Israeli issue with our Persian + Gulf posture, but its southern location makes it worth serious + consideration.

+ +

The second category, temporary basing, could expand on the PASEXBrzezinski underlined the word “PASEX” and wrote + “what is this?” in the right-hand margin. arrangements we now + have with Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, and others. The Emirates, Sudan, and + Jordan are possibilities for + the second category. Each “in and out” exercise helps us learn the + route, know the terrain and facilities, and make our contingency plans + more up to date. This second category, of course, is more a long-range + matter, one to be expanded or contracted as the political climate + allows.

+

The fourth step is occasional + operational deployments of U.S. forces into the region. This + could start with P–3 intelligence flights, AWACS, and other small actions.

+

The fifth step involves intelligence collection and covert action. It goes without + saying that we must step up support to the Afghanistan insurgency.Brzezinski drew a vertical line in the left-hand + margin next to this sentence and wrote “we are.” This helps + us with Pakistan, and it will eventually help us in Iran. We must also + explore the opportunities in South Yemen. Tribes in the east, near the + Omani border, reportedly are crying for help and could tie up South + Yemen’s forces for years. If we do this, the threat to Oman is reduced. + At the same time, we should look into covert opportunities in North + Yemen, Eritrea, Somalia, and elsewhere in the Gulf of Aden region.

+

Covert action in Iran is a separate matter. David Aaron’s little group’s analysis of the options is + relevant but somewhat artificial and misleading about proper choices. + Analytically, the choice is between putting a centralizing movement back + together or supporting the ethnic minorities and + the probable breakup of the Persian state. We must do both, but both are + not enough. We have failed to recruit several hundreds of Iranian + students in the U.S. as agents. We have failed to recruit hundreds of + junior officers in Iran. We are floundering around discussing either the + choice of emigre leaders or the Kurds.Brzezinski + drew a vertical line in the left-hand margin next to this and the + preceding two sentences. That is not the important choice. + Iran’s future depends on who builds a small military organization and + intelligence net the quickest. The Bolsheviks could never have survived + without the few hundred Lettist Rifles.Reference is to a Latvian military formation that fought in the + Imperial Russian Army during the First World War. They had + bolshevized three battalions by June 1917 in Riga. These troops came to + Petrograd in November. They made the difference.

+

The point is, we must put Iran back together as a state, and to do so, we + must dominate the covert action among the centralizing Persians and also among the + tribes—Kurds, Baluchis, etc. No ground can be left to + the radical left. Seize it all!

+

Positive intelligence, of course, must be expanded. It is a precondition + for CIA efforts as well as all other + actions. I only flag it here.

+

Possible Action for You

+

The thinking in ISA, particularly by + Bob Murray, is similar to + what I have suggested above. State, of course, will object. CIA will probably go along. I do not + believe we will get movement unless you and Harold Brown take the lead. The President’s instruction + to look into bases in the region is sufficient reason to take such a + proposal to the President. If you desire to try that, I shall prepare a + memorandum from you to Brown + soliciting his reaction and support.Brzezinski drew a + vertical line in the left-hand margin next to this sentence and + wrote “yes.”

+

Alternatively, you could put the concept to the President, and if he + likes it, he could ask Brown to + propose implementing plans.Brzezinski drew a vertical line in + the left-hand margin next to this sentence and wrote “will do + [illegible]—will do both.”

+ + +
+ +
+ + 35. Interagency Intelligence Memorandum Prepared in the Central + Intelligence AgencySource: + Central Intelligence Agency, History Staff Files. Secret; [handling restriction not declassified]. + Drafted in the Office of Political Analysis, National Foreign + Assessment Center, and coordinated with the Departments of State and + Energy, National Security Agency, Defense Intelligence Agency, and + the Intelligence Staffs of the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine + Corps. A note on the title page reads: “Information available as of + 29 November 1979 was used in the preparation of this + memorandum.” + + + NI IIM 79–10026 + + + Washington, December 1979 + +

NEW REALITIES IN THE MIDDLE EAST

+

[Omitted here is the table of contents.]

+ +

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

+

Since 1973 the United States has become heavily dependent on oil from the + Middle East, and has seen US interests + in the area increasingly affected by events and regional politics that + are not subject to US control. US relations with Israel, the Arabs, and + some of the South Asian states have experienced repeated strains as + these states have pursued their national interests independent of the + great powers. US influence in the area + has declined, and manifestations of anti-American feeling have + increased, in part because the United States is seen as irresolute, but + basically as the result of a historical trend that is not likely to be + reversed.

+

These changed circumstances are primarily the result of dramatic + developments that have occurred during the 1970s: the 1973 Arab-Israeli + war, the rapid increase in oil prices, the revolution in Iran, the + resurgence of a politicized Islam and a rejection of Western culture, + and the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty. Together, these developments have + reoriented the politics, the economics, and to a lesser extent the + military balance of the region. Egypt is isolated within the Arab world, + Iran is militarily weak and nearing anarchy, and the pro-US Arab states often called moderates are + taking a more independent course, seeking new allies in the area, and + cooperating more often with radical, anti-Western Arab governments.

+

The Soviets, of course, have attempted to expand their influence in the + Middle East during this period of fundamental changes, instability, and + increasing difficulties for the United States. They have suffered some + setbacks, but their arms deliveries have enabled them to strengthen + relations with a number of Arab states; their military position in the + area has been maintained; and they are abetting the growing instability + in the region. Soviet gains have come more in the indirect form of the + reduced US role in the area than through + direct expansion of Soviet influence. The greatest potential for + substantial Soviet gains in the near term is in Iran, where continuing + serious instability could give way to a leftist regime more sympathetic + to the USSR.

+

In the increasingly significant Persian Gulf region, recent developments + have left Saudi Arabia and Iraq more important in both Arab and + international politics, and have increased the vulnerability of all + Persian Gulf states to internal disruption and foreign meddling. The + impact of Shia unrest in Iran, Iraqi nationalist aspirations, [3 lines not declassified]. The stability assumed + under the Saudi-Iranian hegemony has collapsed, and the smaller Gulf + states’ search for accommodation with Iraq is likely to restrain their + interest in security cooperation with the United States.

+

Additional and perhaps equally fundamental changes are likely in the + coming year. The leaders of Israel and several Arab states—especially Syria, Morocco, and + Sudan—face serious domestic challenges, and the socioeconomic strains + associated with rapid modernization could stimulate serious unrest in + others, primarily among the traditional monarchies of the Gulf. + Bilateral disputes have the potential to lead to armed conflict in + several areas—including in the Maghreb, the Yemens, and between Iran and + Iraq—but these appear unlikely in the near term to provoke a general + Arab-Israeli war or a direct military clash between the superpowers.

+

The security of Israel and the internal stability of the Arab states most + critical to US interests—Saudi Arabia + and Egypt—seem as nearly assured as is possible for the next year. The + Saudis and Egyptians will remain unreconciled, however, and their + bilateral dispute will continue to impede the United States as it + pursues its two immediate aims in the area: progress in negotiations on + West Bank autonomy, and ensuring the supply of oil for the West.

+

The Egyptian-Israeli negotiations seem all but certain to extend beyond + the time frame originally envisaged, and there is some danger that + domestic politics in Israel or Egyptian frustration with limited Israeli + concessions could lead to tougher demands on either side or even to + suspension of the talks. It is more likely, however, that the two sides + ultimately will reach an agreement that meets their minimum needs but is + not acceptable to the Palestinians, Syria, Jordan, or Saudi Arabia. + These other Arab parties, therefore, are unlikely to participate in + negotiations. This will increase further the tendency of the Arab oil + producers to introduce political considerations into their decisions on + oil prices, production levels, and marketing strategies.

+

DISCUSSION

+

THE NEW REALITIES

+

1. The period from 1973 to 1979 has brought to the Middle East changes + more fundamental than any since Israel and several Arab countries with + their independence in the years after World War II. This period has also + seen a significant increase in the United States’ stake in, and + vulnerability to, the policies of area states. Israel and the key Arab + states of the region now display a heightened determination to pursue + their national interests independent of the superpowers.

+

2. The 1973 Arab-Israeli war irrevocably altered the outlook of the major + actors in the area. The Arabs—despite their weakened military position + vis-a-vis Israel overall—regained their sense of pride and no longer + view Israel as invincible; they view their success as the product of + coordinated political-military action. The Israelis, for their part, + feel less secure in their belief in the superiority of Israel’s + capabilities and the inability of the Arab states to mount a successful + unified attack. This has led to an enhanced state-of-siege mentality. + The Israeli perception of the erosion of US support has magnified this conviction.

+ +

3. Since the early 1970s we have seen the rapid increase in oil prices + and the growth of immense oil wealth among the Arab states, notably + Saudi Arabia; the reordering of the military and political balance in + the critical Persian Gulf area following the collapse of the Pahlavi dynasty; a revolutionary + change with the peace treaty between Egypt and Israel; and a substantial + increase in the margin of Israeli military superiority over the Arabs. + Ironically, these far-reaching changes have occurred during a period of + unprecedented and generally overlooked stability in the leadership of + the Arab world. With the exception of the two Yemens, no Arab state has + experienced a violent change of regime since 1970.

+

4. These developments have given rise to a number of seemingly anomalous + political trends:

+

—Fundamental changes have occurred in the relationships among the + principal Arab states.See also annex A + (Political Reorientation Among the Arabs). [Footnote is in the + original. Annexes A–E are not printed.] The traditionally + most important Arab country, Egypt, has been isolated as never + before.

+

—The eastern Arabs, especially Saudi Arabia and Iraq, have become more + important in regional and international politics. Saudi Arabia’s + increased prominence rests on its central role in international oil and + financial matters, and on its ability to tip the Arab political balance + against Egypt. Iraq’s importance derives primarily from its heightened + military capabilities.

+

—The outlook and role of the Arab moderates—such as Jordan, Morocco, and + Saudi Arabia—have changed, and their policies now are less congruent + with those of the United States. The word “moderation” is increasingly + irrelevant in describing the attitudes of Arabs toward the superpowers, + or toward the desirability of a negotiated settlement of the + Arab-Israeli dispute.

+

5. Over the coming year these trends can be expected to continue—and + perhaps more fundamental changes to occur—as a result of pressures + growing out of several currently dynamic or atypical situations, each + with uncertain ramifications:

+

—Revolution continues in Iran, threatening the integrity of that country + and fostering regional instability that could threaten the security and + stability of other Persian Gulf states.

+

—Ideologies that have a radical impact on area politics (ranging from + Islamic to Marxist) will continue to exert a powerful appeal in the + area. The clash of ideologies is most graphically represented in the + case of Afghanistan, but potentially serious situations exist even in + such currently stable countries as Egypt, where a variety of Islamic groups are testing the security + services and competing for a political following.

+

—The constancy of leadership in the Arab world, virtually unchanged + throughout the 1970s, seems unlikely to endure for long; the leaders of + Syria, Morocco, and Sudan, for example, face especially serious domestic + problems. Similarly, Prime Minister Begin’s problems with his health and his coalition + government suggest we may soon see a change of leadership in Israel as + well.

+

—Continued Arab pressure for Palestinian self-determination and for a + revision of US policy toward the + Palestinians will ensure strains in US + relations both with the Arabs and with Israel.

+

—Israel’s continued military actions in Lebanon and lack of flexibility + in West Bank negotiations will reinforce present political trends in the + Arab world. These factors have the potential to spark wider hostilities + on Israel’s eastern front and to further strain both US-Israeli and US-Arab relations.

+

6. A socioeconomic revolution has been under way in many countries of the + Middle East since the escalation of oil prices began in 1974.See also annex B (Socioeconomic Revolution). + [Footnote is in the original.] This, along with the perennial + problems of frustrated expectations in such countries as Egypt, also has + the potential to further social and political instability in the area. + Such concerns contributed in a major way to the overthrow of the Shah of + Iran, and—although the situations are dissimilar in many important + respects—constitute a latent threat in virtually all oil-producing Arab + states in the Gulf. Their rulers are aware that rapid economic + development, especially with concomitant modernization and + Westernization, may stimulate social and political unrest. Most rulers + also recognize, however, that there is no assured way to avoid this + challenge. Political liberalization and political repression each solve + some problems, but intensify others; vacillation between these + strategies virtually ensures political trouble.

+

7. The altered balance of forces in the Middle East—caused by the peace + treaty between Israel and Egypt, US and + Soviet weapons sales to Israel and some Arab states, the policies of the + Marxist government in South Yemen, and the effective disappearance of + Iran as a stabilizing force in the Gulf—also serves to increase the + prospects of area instability and regional conflicts, despite the + sharply diminished likelihood of war between Egypt and Israel.See also annex C (The Changed Security + Situation). [Footnote is in the original.] The most likely + areas for renewed hostilities having the potential to involve US interests in the coming year include the + dispute between Iraq and Iran; the tension between Morocco and Algeria + over Western Sahara; the conflict involving Israel, Lebanon, and Syria (where war through + miscalculation will remain a possibility); the dispute between the two + Yemens; and the Egyptian-Libyan border problem. Over the next year it is + less likely, but possible, that subversion in Oman or an Israeli + reaction to an Iraqi or Iranian troop movement into Syria could also + result in military clashes.

+

THE PERSIAN GULF

+

8. The area of greatest political uncertainty in the coming year almost + certainly will remain the Persian Gulf, where the collapse of the + Pahlavi dynasty has left + Iran weak and unstable, and where the changes in Iran and in Arab + politics generally have increased the prominence and importance of Iraq. + Under any foreseeable circumstances, US + influence in the region is not likely to regain its former level.

+

9. In Iran, internal turmoil and strife are likely to continue for at + least the next year, with the possibility of more widespread bloodshed + among the religious/political factions and between the government and + ethnic minorities seeking autonomy. Given the disruption of the Iranian + security and military forces, there is little likelihood that the + government of Ayatollah Khomeini will be able to impose domestic order + or deploy sizable forces beyond Iran’s borders in the near future.

+

10. If stability is restored to Iran, it may only be the precursor to + more determined efforts to export the revolution. Khomeini has already + called for all Muslims to attack US + interests throughout the Islamic world, and for revolution in some area + states. Many in Khomeini’s inner circle believe they are the only truly + Islamic leaders in the world and that their revolution must be followed + by others, especially in Egypt, Iraq, and Saudi Arabia. If a leftist + regime were to emerge in Iran, it too would probably be committed to + exporting revolution and might well be aligned with the USSR.

+

11. The revolution in Iran has created new uncertainties for Iraq, + raising especially the possibility that Shia unrest might spread from + Iran to the majority Shia population of Iraq. On the other hand, the + collapse of the Iranian armed forces has left Iraq the dominant military + power in the Persian Gulf. Additionally, Iraq more than any other Arab + state has gained from the reorientation of Arab politics that has + followed the signing of the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty. The Iraqi + leadership shows every sign of attempting to build on these two areas of + strength to expand the influence of its Ba’thist ideology both in the + Persian Gulf and in the Arab world generally. The Iraqis are in no + hurry, believing time will work against Egyptian and US policies and against Iraq’s moderate + opponents in the area.

+

12. The traditional regimes in the Gulf have generally disdained close + contact with the Iraqi Ba’thists but now have little choice but to come + to an accommodation, which will further increase Iraqi regional influence. Although some states + such as Saudi Arabia apparently hope that improved relations with + Baghdad and its involvement in regional security matters will lead to + moderation in Iraqi actions, we believe it unlikely that there will in + fact be any alteration of basic Iraqi aims. If Iraqi influence continues + to grow, any increased identification of the smaller Gulf states with + US interests will become a political + liability and a focal point for extremists.

+

ISSUES OF CURRENT CONCERN

+

13. Apart from the crisis in Iran and the difficulties it has created in + the area, Middle East issues of greatest concern to the US Government in the coming year will + continue to include: progress in the ongoing negotiations on West Bank + autonomy; the supply of oil to the industrial states and the use of oil + as a political weapon; and the security and stability of governments + sympathetic to the United States, especially in Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and + Morocco. The political, economic, and military developments of recent + years bear directly on each of these immediate US interests, and on such additional basic US concerns as the protection of US and Israeli security and the minimizing + of Soviet influence in the region.

+

Negotiations

+

14. The outcome of the ongoing Egyptian-Israeli negotiations on West Bank + autonomy will probably be the most significant independent variable in + determining the course of near-term political developments in the Middle + East. Failure of the negotiations to result in sufficient progress could + jeopardize the present relatively favorable Saudi policy on oil + production levels. Such a failure over time could have much more serious + additional repercussions: stimulating the further growth and spread of + anti-American attitudes and actions in the area (conceivably including + the use of oil sanctions as threatened by the Libyans and Iraqis), + weakening the domestic position of Egypt’s President Sadat (leading + possibly to an eventual Egyptian turn away from close identification + with the United States), and intensifying the pressure on Arab regimes + normally close to the United States to move still closer to the radical + Arabs. Alternatively, success in the negotiations might help slow the + implementation of oil price, production, and marketing decisions + detrimental to US interests, contribute + to the domestic security of pro-US + states in the region, arrest the movement of generally pro-US Arab states toward positions espoused by + the radicals, and help forestall any resurgence of Soviet influence in + the area.

+

15. Progress in the autonomy negotiations to date and political + developments in the West Bank itself provide little hope that the + Egyptians and Israelis by themselves will reach agreement on the + establishment of a genuinely self-governing authority by 25 May 1980—the + target date Prime Minister + Begin and President Sadat set + for themselves in their joint letter to President Carter in March 1979.Reference is to the March 26 letter from Begin and Sadat to Carter included as part of the + documentary package accompanying the Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty + and signed by the three leaders in Washington the same day. The text + of the letter is printed in Public Papers: + Carter, 1979, + Book I, p. 515. Apart from the intractable nature of the + substantive issues involved, delay is almost certain to result from the + serious internal divisions within the Israeli Government and its + negotiating team, the prospect of early elections in Israel, and the + Israeli conviction that time will increase President Sadat’s political + need for an accord, thereby leading him to reduce his demands. Israel in + fact perceives no need for a West Bank agreement except insofar as one + may be necessary to prevent Egyptian backsliding on the peace treaty + already signed, or to protect against new strains in US-Israeli relations. The Israelis see + Egyptian noncompliance with the treaty as a real possibility, and this + may induce limited flexibility in the Israeli position; with US elections approaching within the next + year, however, the Israelis will be less apprehensive and less + influenced by potential American pressures.

+

16. On the Arab side, Egypt will continue to press publicly for progress + on Palestinian issues to relieve Arab political attacks on Cairo and, + ideally, to prompt Palestinian participation in the talks. These goals + motivated the Egyptians at the outset to seek an agreed statement on the + overall aims of the negotiations; ironically, they were also behind + Egypt’s subsequent willingness essentially to sacrifice that strategy + and to accept the Israeli approach of focusing on more specific, + concrete issues. Egypt hopes that this latter strategy will allow at + least some demonstrable progress that will soften the opposition of the + other Arabs.

+

17. The Palestinians, Jordanians, Syrians, and Saudis believe that the + current process will not result in a peace agreement acceptable to them. + None of these Arab parties, therefore, appear likely to support or + participate in the peace process during the next year. In the case of + some, notably Jordan, increased and more regular financial assistance + from the wealthy Arab states provides an important incentive for + avoiding peace negotiations. Over the longer term, substantial Israeli + concessions on the settlements issue and on territorial autonomy, and + US recognition of the Palestine + Liberation Organization are likely to emerge as necessary conditions for + wider Arab participation.

+

18. In the probable continued absence of wider Arab participation in + negotiations, the likelihood will grow that President Sadat will accept + an autonomy agreement essentially on Israeli terms in return for minor + Israeli concessions. Such an accord almost certainly would include various marginal gains for + Arabs in the occupied territories, and Israeli pledges to negotiate more + basic issues with the Palestinians or Jordanians if those parties elect + to become involved. This would enable Sadat to say that he had + accomplished everything possible and that, as a result of Egypt’s + actions, further gains for the Palestinians were available for their + taking; this might satisfy the Egyptians but not the other Arabs. The + result would be an agreement protecting Israeli and Egyptian interests + but leaving the United States accountable to the other Arabs for + achieving real progress on Palestinian issues.

+

19. Given President Sadat’s psychological and political investment to + date in the negotiating process, we believe it less likely that he will + react to the continuing slow pace of negotiations by reversing course + and withdrawing from the talks. It is quite possible, however, that he + may adopt a significantly tougher negotiating stance as the May 1980 + deadline approaches and as he regains Egyptian control of much of the + Sinai.

+

Oil

+

20. Middle East oil-producing states over the next year are unlikely to + increase production significantly, and there is a good chance that their + output may fall. During most of 1979 the Saudis allowed production to + exceed their preferred ceiling of 8.5 million barrels per day. This + increase brought Saudi output to its maximum sustainable capacity of + approximately 9.5 million b/d. Iran is producing + 3.5 million to 4 million b/d, but continued + instability could cause that country’s production and exports to fall + sharply or even temporarily to cease. The Persian Gulf producers with + large reserves—Iraq, Iran, Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates, and Saudi + Arabia—all believe that their long-term national self-interest, + including the important question of how rapidly to deplete their + resource base, dictates that they limit output. All but Iraq have + already imposed ceilings on production. Any near-term production + increases will be small.

+

21. As for oil-pricing policy, Middle East members of the Organization of + Petroleum Exporting Countries are virtually certain to push for (Iraq, + Libya, Algeria, Iran) or agree to (Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Qatar) another increase in prices in + December 1979. Kuwait has become more aggressive in pushing for price + hikes, and Saudi Arabia has lost most of its former ability to limit + increases. Several principal producers—notably Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and + Iraq—have expressed concern about the impact of price increases on the + economies of the industrialized states and on the less developed + countries, but neither consideration is likely to weigh heavily enough + to constrain OPEC as a whole. There is + an apparent belief within the organization that the West can afford + higher prices, and that the LDCs should be afforded relief through special programs. The size of + the December OPEC price increase will + depend heavily on market conditions prevailing just before the meeting, + and could be substantial. There seems to be virtually no chance of a + price freeze.

+

22. Decisions of the Arab states on oil production and price during the + coming year will primarily respond to market forces, but they will be + influenced by political factors as well. The oil weapon—in the sense of + an embargo of the United States such as occurred following the 1973 + Middle East war—is unlikely to be used by the Arabs except in the + circumstances of renewed Arab-Israeli hostilities, the accession to + power of more radical regimes in key producing states, or possibly + US support for an Israeli-Egyptian + agreement ending the autonomy talks in a manner that left the + Palestinians with no significant gains. Some Arab states would be likely + to join Iran in an embargo of the United States if Iran were to take + such action as a result of a US-Iranian + military confrontation.

+

23. The oil weapon is in fact a continuum of possible actions, however, + and oil policy decisions are already being made with political + considerations in mind—despite the ritual protestations of some Arab + leaders that oil and politics are unrelated. The Arabs’ political + leverage will increase as the tight market makes marginal shifts + increasingly critical to importing countries. Libya has already raised + the possibility of cutting back its oil exports to the United States, + and Iraq is expanding exports to France in return for access to French + technology and arms. The political factor will become less important + only if the industrialized states suffer an economic slowdown + sufficiently severe to reduce market pressures.

+

24. Political considerations are virtually certain for the foreseeable + future to remain central to Iran’s decisions on oil pricing, production, + and marketing.

+

Security of States Sympathetic to the United + States

+

25. The important pro-US Arab regimes + that appear to face the greatest threats over the coming year are those + of King Hassan of Morocco and + President Nimeiri of Sudan. In neither case are the regime’s problems + primarily the result of the strains in inter-Arab politics surrounding + the Arab-Israeli issue; each faces political challenges growing out of + economic difficulties and unique security problems with neighboring + states. Because these problems will not go away in the near future, the + continuation in power of both governments is likely to depend primarily + on the ability of the individual leader to demonstrate consistent and + vigorous leadership. During much of 1979 both Hassan and Nimeiri seemed to appreciate + the need to provide such leadership but to be uncertain what policies to + follow. Hassan + wavered most noticeably on how + to deal with his weakening position in Western Sahara, and Nimeiri + shifted between conciliatory and repressive policies toward labor and + student unrest.

+

26. The security of the two Arab states of critical importance to US interests, Egypt and Saudi Arabia, is + (unlike the situations in Morocco and Sudan) directly entwined with the + inter-Arab political disputes that have resulted from the signing of the + Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty. Moreover, their security is directly + related to the two other paramount interests of the United States in the + area—peace negotiations and oil. At present, neither Egypt nor Saudi + Arabia faces a serious external threat, and neither President Sadat nor + the Saud family appears to face + a serious near-term domestic challenge.

+

27. In each case, however, circumstances could develop that would create + a much less stable domestic situation. If the autonomy negotiations + should collapse, for example, Sadat’s position would be much less secure + as a result of the substantial deflation of the Egyptian popular pride + that so far has protected him from the opposition of Egyptian + intellectual, leftist, and Islamic groups. If negotiations end in an + agreement unacceptable to the other Arabs, Sadat’s position may also be + jeopardized by the likely invocation of additional Arab sanctions. In + Saudi Arabia, the anachronistic nature of the political system and the + effects of socioeconomic modernization make it likely that the royal + family at some point will face a challenge from groups within the + society that do not share political and economic power. There is no + basis, however, on which to predict with confidence when such a threat + will materialize.

The occupation in + November 1979 of the Great Mosque of Mecca—the holiest shrine in + Islam—was a violent protest by fundamentalist Sunni Muslims + unhappy with the growing modernization and Westernization of + Saudi Arabia. Although the incident was apparently an isolated + act by religious fanatics, the seizure of the supposedly + well-guarded shrine seems certain to have reinforced an already + strong sense among the Saudi leadership of the country’s basic + weakness and the pressures on the Saudi Government to shun + foreign influences. Social conservatives point to the incident + as an indication that the modernization process has moved too + rapidly and has undermined social cohesion. The strength of the + attackers illustrated the danger posed by the numerous arms + being smuggled into the country and highlighted the weakness of + the Saudi internal security and intelligence apparatus.

+

The initial Saudi effort to conceal the attack and the Saudi + Government’s subsequent repeated false claims that the situation + was under control while fighting was still in progress pointed + to the leadership’s lack of confidence. The incident, combined + with recent events in Iran, Pakistan, and the Yemens, seems + certain to weaken Saudi credibility in the area and to heighten + Saudi fears of foreign—particularly Iranian and + Yemeni—subversion. It could also lead to serious divisions + within the Saudi royal family as its members assess + responsibility for the problem.

+

For the United States, the most disturbing political consequences + of the Mecca siege will be to make it more difficult for the + Saudi Government to maintain a visibly close relationship with + Washington. The Saudis will now have to balance their needs for + US security support with the + fear that too close an identification with the United States + could undermine their status in the Muslim world. [Footnote is + in the original. See Documents 201 and 202.]

+ +

THE SOVIET ROLESee + also annex D (The Soviet Role). [Footnote is in the + original.]

+

28. Soviet objectives in the Middle East region are to gain greater + political leverage, reduce US influence, + increase access to Middle East port and air facilities in order to + support naval deployments in the Mediterranean Sea and Indian Ocean, + further hard currency earnings through arms sales, and increase access + to the energy resources of the area. The USSR’s successes, although significant, have been limited + in recent years by its inability to convert its activities and support + to Arab countries into permanent influence. This has resulted from the + limitations of its political leverage over major states in the region, + from basic Arab antipathy for Communism and suspicion of Soviet + intentions, and from an Arab preference for the hard currency and + civilian technology of the West.

+

29. The Soviets have made a number of gains in the region:

+

—They have established relations with a number of Arab states based on + arms supply.

+

—They are backing a variety of forces in the region that are seeking to + destabilize established governments and replace them with leftist + regimes.

+

—They have reestablished in South Yemen and Ethiopia many of the naval, + air, communications, and intelligence facilities previously held in + Somalia.

+

—Since the mid-1960s, they have deployed and maintained a significant + naval presence in the Mediterranean Sea and Indian Ocean.

+

—They have recently signed a Friendship Treaty with South Yemen, thus + formalizing the presence they have built there over the past year;See Document 290. and they have reached + a new arms agreement with North Yemen.

+

—Their military involvement in Afghanistan and Ethiopia may, in the + future, increase their ability to influence events in neighboring + countries such as Iran, Pakistan, and Sudan.

+

30. The Soviets undoubtedly view the past year’s events in the Middle + East favorably, although they have not been able to convert the new + situation into direct gains for themselves. They are certainly gratified + that the polarization resulting from the signing of the Israeli-Egyptian + treaty has isolated Sadat and strained US relations with the moderate Arab states. But their own + efforts to capitalize on these strains by courting Jordan and Saudi + Arabia have not yet been productive. Their attempts to strengthen ties + to their clients have made little concrete progress, except in the case of South Yemen, + and, to a lesser extent, Libya. Although the Soviets have made + large-scale deliveries of arms to Syria, for example, they have + apparently received no political concessions in return, and their + relations with Iraq remain strained.

+

31. The fall of the Shah and the decline of US influence in Iran were welcomed by the Soviets, although + they have not been able to work out a satisfactory relationship with the + Khomeini regime. The new regime’s rejection of past ties to the United + States and Israel, its withdrawal from the Central Treaty Organization, + and its rejection of a security role in the Gulf region were considered + setbacks to the United States and thus relative gains for the USSR. Iran’s November 1979 moves against + the United States have been perceived as a further gain by the Soviets, + who have renewed hope that the Iranian revolution will assume a shape + and direction favorable to Soviet interests. The Soviets are probably + optimistic that, over the long term, forces that they are backing in + Iran may establish a secular, leftist regime that will adopt a + pro-Soviet policy.

+

32. There are a number of other possible events that could strengthen the + USSR’s relative position in the + area over the longer term. Should Sadat be overthrown, for example, the + strong anti-Sovietism of the current Egyptian regime would probably be + mitigated to some extent. A successful reunification of the Yemens under + the aegis of the South would be an extension of Soviet influence and + would pose a threat to Saudi Arabia’s security. The undermining of any + of the pro-US regimes in the area, such + as Morocco, Sudan, or Oman, would be an important advancement of Soviet + interests.

+

33. Any one of these developments would encourage destabilizing trends in + other Middle East countries, which would benefit the USSR. However, even though disillusioned + with US policies, most Arab states would + hope to avoid moving closer to the Soviets. Arab nationalism and the new + tide of Islamic sentiment militate against dependence on any outside + power, and Arab rejection of Communism as a philosophy is still an + inhibiting factor. The Soviets have little, except arms, with which to + tempt these nations, which prefer Western technology and civilian + products. In general, therefore, the Soviets must hope that US failures will redound to their benefit + or that instability will eventually lead to more pro-Soviet regimes. + Further instability in the area, combined with Soviet influence and + military presence in peripheral countries, may cause some accommodations + to Soviet interests in traditionally Western-oriented Arab states.See also annex E (Key Factors in the Coming + Year). [Footnote is in the original.]

+ + +
+ +
+ 36. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security + Affairs (Brzezinski) to + President CarterSource: National Security Council, + Carter Administration + Intelligence Files, Box I–020, Minutes—SCC—1979. Secret; Sensitive. Sent for action. Brzezinski handwrote the date on + the memorandum. Carter wrote + “Zbig J” in the upper right-hand corner of the memorandum. Henze sent the memorandum to + Brzezinski under a + December 12 memorandum; a handwritten notation on that memorandum + indicates that Brzezinski + hand-carried the SCC Summary of + Conclusions and the memorandum to the President on December 13. + (Ibid.) + + + Washington, December + 12, 1979 + + + SUBJECT + Broadcasting to Muslims (U) + +

The Summary and Conclusions of the SCC I + held on 11 December 1979 to review proposals for expanding and improving + VOA and Radio Liberty broadcasts to + Muslim audiences as well as two CIA + proposals for covert communications assistance to [less than 1 line not declassified].The CIA proposals were not found. + In an undated memorandum to Carter, Brzezinski addressed a question that Carter had relating to CIA financing of the VOA and Radio Liberty broadcasting + effort. Brzezinski + responded: “Without financing the operation, CIA does not feel we can assure + ourselves of control over it.” Carter approved the recommendation that CIA finance the operation. + (Ibid.) [paragraph classification not + declassified]

+

The total yearly cost of all the steps that can be + taken immediately is not greater than $10 million + dollars. Our task forces in the Persian Gulf area are probably costing + this for only a few days’ operation. Longer-range improvements, which + would be funded over two or three years, add up to about $70 million. + (C)

+

I am inclined to think that if we had not let our ability to communicate + with this part of the world decline over a long period of time by + failing to add modest increments of funds regularly, we might not have + to be facing such large outlays of money for augmenting our military + capabilities in the region. The costs of improving our position in the + broadcasting field are extremely modest in comparison, but we have no + time to lose in setting about the job. I plan to have my staff monitor + everything we are doing in this field closely to ensure that momentum is + maintained. (U)

+ +

RECOMMENDATION

+

That you approve the Summary of Conclusions attached at TAB A.Carter + neither approved nor disapproved the recommendation. However, he + wrote underneath the disapproval line: “This is a summary?! I approve the immediate action, but OMB will have to assess for me the + other new expansion projects. J.”

+

Tab A

+

Summary of a Special Coordination Committee + MeetingSecret; + Sensitive.

+

Washington, December 11, 1979

+

SCC Meeting on + Broadcasting and Covert Action—11 December 1979

+

I held an SCC this afternoon to review + proposals of the VOA and BIB for improving and increasing + broadcasting to Muslim audiences. We agreed that VOA should develop immediate plans to + expand broadcasting in Persian. It will also plan increases in other key + Muslim languages as rapidly as possible. VOA and State will give immediate priority to finding a + location for building four South Asian transmitters which you approved + in March 1977. (I have ordered State and ICA to report why action on these has been delayed for more + than 2½ years.) Steps to expand Radio Liberty broadcasts in seven + languages to Soviet Muslims will be taken immediately and urgent efforts + to lease transmitters in the Middle East will be made. Concrete plans + for further expansion of programming capabilities and transmitter power + for both VOA and Radio Liberty will be + developed by an SCC working group. (C) + The meeting also endorsed CIA proposals + for covert broadcasting projects in [less than 1 line + not declassified].In a December 14 + memorandum to Turner, + Brzezinski indicated + that Carter had reviewed the + December 11 SCC recommendations. + (National Security Council, Carter Administration Intelligence Files, Box I–020, + Minutes—SCC—1979) + (S/Sensitive) CIA also agreed to + improve the performance of FBIS. + (U)

+
+ +
+ 37. Summary of Conclusions of a Special Coordination Committee + MeetingSource: Carter + Library, Brzezinski Donated + Material, Subject File, Box 31, [Meetings—SCC 228: 12/13/79]. Secret. The meeting took place in + the White House Situation Room. The minutes are not attached and + were not found. Carter wrote + “Zbig J” in the upper right-hand corner of the first + page. + + + Washington, December 13, 1979, 9–9:55 + a.m. + + + SUBJECT + Iran + + + PARTICIPANT + + State + Warren + Christopher + David Newsom + Harold + Saunders + + + + + Defense + W. Graham + Claytor + + + + + JCS + General David + Jones + General John + Pustay + + + + + CIA + Admiral Stansfield + Turner + Frank + Carlucci + + + Justice + Attorney General Benjamin Civiletti** + John Shenefield** + + + Treasury + Robert + Carswell** + Anthony + Solomon** + Robert Mundheim** + + + + + White House + Jody Powell + Lloyd + Cutler** + Hedley Donovan + Zbigniew + Brzezinski + David Aaron + + + NSC + Colonel William Odom + Gary Sick + + + ** Present for domestic issues only. + + + +

[Omitted here is material on the situation in Iran.]

+

Political-Military Issues:

+

1. Middle East Facilities. Dr. Brzezinski relayed the President’s + concern that Oman, Somalia, Kenya and Saudi Arabia have not yet been + approached concerning the possibility of U.S. facilities in the first + three countries. State noted that they had been preparing a diplomatic + strategy while awaiting DOD’s + recommendation of what would be needed. State, Defense and NSC will meet today to accelerate the + process and draft prospective cables.No + memorandum of conversation of this meeting has been found. + One serious problem is the price. General Jones noted that the improvements in Masirah would + require about $200 million in construction plus about $190 million + further for operational costs over a five year period. That money is not + in the budget. State also pointed out that there is enormous sensitivity + at this moment about possible U.S. military action against Iran. There + was a considerable risk that + going to some of these countries with a general request at this + particular moment risked a quick negative response. Dr. Brzezinski noted that a generalized + request would serve to engage them in discussion without spelling out + particulars which might be difficult to accept on the first round. All + agreed that each of the potential host countries would require a quid + and that it would be expensive. It was noted that there is no FMS credit or ESF money in the budget for any of the three countries in + question.In the left-hand margin next to + this paragraph, Carter drew + an asterisk and an arrow pointing to the bottom of the page where he + wrote: “It is debilitating, once we (or I) decide to proceed on a + plan, for us to begin finding so many ways to delay any action. We + cannot decide at an SCC meeting + what Oman, Kenya, or Somalia will say or demand. You cannot decide + at an SCC mtg how budget demands + will be met. If we run into obstacles in the future we’ll either + surmount them, change the plans or drop the idea. Idle debates among + ourselves don’t help. If you all detect an unpredicted problem after + I’ve made a decision, come directly & immediately to + me—otherwise, carry out my decision, without delay.” (S)

+

[Omitted here is material on the situation in Iran.]

+
+ +
+ 38. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security + Affairs (Brzezinski) to + President CarterSource: Carter Library, National + Security Affairs, Brzezinski + Material, Country File, Box 51, Middle East: 8–12/79. Secret; Eyes + Only. Outside the System. Sent for information. Brzezinski handwrote the date on + the memorandum. Carter + initialed the memorandum, indicating that he saw it. Ermarth sent the memorandum to + Brzezinski under a + December 24 memorandum requesting that Brzezinski sign it. (Carter Library, National + Security Affairs, Staff Material, Middle East, Subject File, Box 68, + Middle East: Security: 9–12/79) + + + Washington, December + 25, 1979 + + + SUBJECT + Improved Prospects of US Access to + Bases in the Middle East (U) + +

The State–DOD–NSC team got on balance a remarkably positive reception on + its recent trip to promote US access to + air and port facilities in the Middle East.The joint State/DOD/NSC team was led by Bartholomew and Murray, and included Ermarth. The team visited Saudi + Arabia, Oman, Kenya, and Somalia December 18–22. (Telegram 325388 to + Jidda, Muscat, Nairobi, Mogadishu, Dhahran, and Paris, December 18; + National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790581–0757) + Christopher reported to + Carter on the team’s + trip in a December 24 memorandum. (Carter Library, National Security + Affairs, Staff Material, Middle East, Subject File, Box 68, Middle + East: Security: 9–12/79) In each country the team stated that + you had sent them urgently to + make our case for improved access (e.g., port calls, air transit, and + on-site storage) to support US naval + presence and surge deployments in crises. (S)

+

The team’s hosts more than echoed our concern about Soviet exploitation + of regional turbulence. They generally welcomed increased US military presence in the area, and, in + varying degrees, were positive about improving our access to facilities. + (S)

+

Displaying familiar timidity in the face of political risk, the Saudis—although not asked to afford us basing + access—gave our team its coolest reception. But they said they would try + to be helpful to us in Oman and Somalia. (S)

+

President Moi of Kenya expressed the most + unqualified support for our efforts and for you personally. He simply + invited us to start work with his government on the access we need, + notably to Mombasa port. (S)

+

Sultan Qabus of Oman was receptive to increased + US use of facilities on Masirah. + Although not stating them as preconditions to next steps, the Omanis + made clear that they see increased US + basing access in the context of additional military assistance and a + more formal US commitment to Oman’s + security. (S)

+

Somalia is the most problematic case because of + the Ogaden insurgency and her vast needs for political, military and + economic support. Siad Barre + stated those needs forcefully, but gave permission to a prompt survey of + the facilities at Berbera. (S)

+

In each case, it was agreed that US + survey teams should visit the facilities in question, as early as + January. No doubt obstacles and conditions will emerge as we proceed on + details. But clearly this trip was a strategic step forward in our + construction of a security framework for the greater Middle East. + Deciding how to proceed with Somalia will require the most careful + examination and your personal attention.Brzezinski wrote in the + margin below this concluding paragraph: “But all in all, it was a + very significant step toward a truly major Carter strategic initiative: the + shaping of a security framework for the Middle East, and esp. the + Arabian Peninsula. ZB.” + (S)

+
+ +
+ 39. Memorandum From William Odom of the National Security Council + Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs + (Brzezinski)Source: Carter Library, National + Security Affairs, Brzezinski + Material, General Odom File, Box 28, Middle East Command Post: + 7/79–3/80. Secret. Sent for information. Brzezinski wrote in the upper + right-hand corner of the memorandum: “WO Discuss with J[asper] + W[elch], and let’s plan an SCC on + it—unless he objects ZB.” The Rapid + Deployment Force was discussed at the January 14 SCC meeting; see Document 40. + + + Washington, January + 7, 1980 + + + SUBJECT + Progress on the RDF (S) + +

You asked for my comments on David’s memorandum about the JCS briefing on the RDF (Tab A).Attached but not printed. In the December 27 memorandum to + Brzezinski, Aaron noted that there had been + “little in the brief that added substantially to the information” + Brzezinski had received + since August. The JCS told + Aaron that Brown had “approved an RDF command arrangement that would + have the commanding general of the RDJTF reporting directly to CINC Readiness Command (CINCRED) at MacDill Air Force Base in Tampa, Florida.” + It was still unclear as to who would command the RDF if deployed in the Middle East + region. Aaron commented: “We + should keep the heat on Harold to ensure that Defense makes these + difficult bureaucratic decisions soon, so they can get the + ‘chair-shuffling’ behind them and get on with the harder task of + formulating specific military objectives and plans for the region.” + Aaron also noted: “The + message throughout the briefing was that the PD–18 requirement for an RDF was essentially new—and that it will take at least + 5 years to have in-hand all the programs needed to break the RDF logistic logjam, e.g., C–X, + Maritime prepositioning ships, etc.” His points are valid, + and I agree that we need to push DOD. I + would, however, analyze the problem differently and offer a different + action plan. (S)

+

The Problem

+

The JCS did not really ignore PD–18See footnote 3, Document 28. for two + years. They were discouraged from addressing it by ISA. Convinced that they would + demilitarize the Indian Ocean, the ISA + staff in Defense had no time or enthusiasm for the RDF. They got lots of encouragement from + State and no discouragement from NSC + regional and security clusters. The services—as distinguished from the + JCS—also need some blame. The + JCS, surprisingly, tried to take + the RDF seriously but could not get + service or OSD support for funding to + meet JSPID requirements. (S)

+

There are three major sets of RDF + issues: (a) the composition of the forces; (b) projection capabilities + (i.e., air or sea lift, or local basing); and (c) command and control. + (S)

+ +

A. Forces. The forces have been picked. The issues + remaining are, first, sufficient funding and personnel to meet readiness + standards, and second, whether to use NATO contingency forces. The obvious solution to the first + is more funding, but the second, creation of new forces, will require + the military draft. We cannot recruit enough manpower to fill units now + in existence. (S)

+

B. Projection.

+

—Airlift is too expensive to buy in large stand-by + formations. The CRAF program is the + answer along with legislative authority to implement it. To be credible, + however, we must exercise CRAF, + mobilizing civil aircraft from time-to-time. (S)

+

—Sealift needs a boost in the roll-on/roll-off + (RO/RO) ship area. I have told you much about Soviet RO/ROs. A good + RO/RO system could pick up an armor brigade on one ship in a few hours + and deliver it to Europe in 4–5 days, 10–12 days to much more distant + regions like the Persian Gulf. The Navy has no real interest in this + “you call and we haul” mission. We could create incentives for merchant + marine RO/RO ships to be mobilized in emergencies like aircraft under + the CRAF program. (S)

+

—Bases in the region and enroute are the third + critical aspect of force projection. First steps in Oman and Somalia + have been taken and the next steps can be expedited. And the enroute + bases (Lajes, Azores, Beja, and Cairo) must be certain—a task for + diplomacy. One enormous caveat: do not stock POMCUS at the regional bases. Some stocks, fuel, ammo, and + equipment, but not the POMCUS type + because the expense is too great and the flexibility in use is limited + to the region. We have gone crazy with POMCUS in Europe. We cannot afford what is now planned, and + we would lose it in a major war before the units arrive. (S)

+

C. C3I, of course, + means more than the REDCOM/JTF which + David mentions. That structure, sitting in Florida, does little to help + us in the Persian Gulf. Brown + instructed the JCS to open the Unified + Command Plan and develop a Middle East regional command, but they dodged + successfully. They have substituted JTF for a change in the UCP. David’s point about the “chair + shuffling” is key. It involves more than decisions, however. It involves + getting Harold to go back to the JCS + with instructions to redesign the UCP, + cutting the Persian Gulf out of EUCOM + and PACOM regional control. (S)

+

General Jones will suffer + enormous pressures if he tries to push through a unified command change. + Brown also would anger senior + military figures in the services if he forced the UCP change. Thus, both the Secretary and + the Chairman are understandably reluctant to create this internal + discontent if they can avoid it. We could take the “heat” for them by + getting the President to send a directive that it be done. (S)

+ +

Actions

+

1. SCC on Forces. + Hold an SCC which addresses the + following questions:

+

—Should forces in the RDF also be liable for NATO or other contingencies? (David’s concern)

+

—Readiness: What funding is required for higher + readiness?

+

—Manpower: How to meet the higher levels? (The + OMB report to Congress on the + military draft, January 15, is relevant here.)

+

2. SCC on + projection. This meeting should address the issues related to + movement of forces:

+

—Airlift, what needs to be done on CRAF and related matters?

+

—Sealift, what are our capabilities and what ways + can we improve them (such as a RO/RO merchant fleet that serves military + purposes analogous to CRAF)?

+

—Bases, what next steps and funds are needed for + regional bases, permanent and temporary, and what to do to ensure + enroute basing?

+

3. On C3I, I + recommend that this not be made an SCC + matter but rather handled by a memorandum to Defense directing the + formation of a Middle East Command. I do not believe you want more + “process” and debate on this matter. All the arguments raised against it + (backlash in the region, etc.) have been undercut by the success of the + Bartholomew-Murray tripSee footnote 2, Document 38. or + overtaken by events in Iran and Afghanistan. Brown’s response can be used for the President to + announce a major “action” in the Persian Gulf region in the next six + weeks. I will prepare a memorandum for this purpose if you desire.

+
+ +
+ 40. Summary of Conclusions of a Special Coordination Committee + MeetingSource: Carter + Library, Brzezinski Donated + Material, Subject File, Box 31, [Meetings—SCC 250: 1/14/80]. Secret; Sensitive. The meeting took + place in the White House Situation Room. The minutes of the meeting + are not attached and were not found. In the upper right-hand corner + of the first page, Carter + wrote “No comment now C.” + + + Washington, January 14, 1980, 10 + a.m.–noon + + + SUBJECT + SCC Meeting on U.S. Strategy for + South West Asia and Persian Gulf + + + PARTICIPANTS + + + State + Under Secretary for Political Affairs, David Newsom + Assistant Secretary Harold + Saunders + + + + + Defense + Deputy Secretary W. Graham + Claytor + Mr. Robert + Murray + + + + + JCS + Chairman, General David + Jones + Lt. General John + Pustay + + + + + CIA + Director Stansfield + Turner + Mr. Robert Ames + + + + + Energy + Secretary Charles + Dayan + + + + + White House + Zbigniew + Brzezinski + David Aaron + + + + + NSC + Colonel William E. Odom + Colonel Leslie + Denend + Henry Owen + Thomas + Thornton + Robert Hunter + Fritz + Ermarth + + + +

Dr. Brzezinski opened the meeting + with an overview of what is happening and what is at stake in the + region. The results of this meeting, he said, are to provide a basis for + a National Security Council meeting with the President later this + week.No NSC meeting was held. See Document + 43. We must deal with the continued deterioration + of the U.S. position in the region. Whatever the Soviet motives for + their actions in Afghanistan, they have created an objective threat and + a dynamic development in the area as serious for our security and vital + interests as Soviet actions in Greece in 1947.On December 25, 1979, Soviet forces invaded + Afghanistan, taking control of cities and military installations. + President Carter addressed + the nation on January 4, calling the invasion a “serious threat to + peace because of the threat of further Soviet expansion into + neighboring countries in Southwest Asia.” For the full text of the + address, which outlined steps the administration would take to + thwart Soviet aggression, see Public Papers: + Carter, 1980–81, Book I, pp. 21–24. It is also printed in + Foreign + Relations, 1977–1980, vol. I, Foundations of Foreign + Policy, Document 136. We must provide the President + with a basis for responding adequately to this change, specifically what + we should do about Pakistan and about the larger Persian Gulf region. + The President believes that there will be lasting strategic consequences. He wants to + reaffirm that there will be no zig-zag in U.S.-Soviet relations on our + side. No warm up is to be expected soon. The mistake in 1968 after the + Soviet action in Czechoslovakia was, in the President’s view, to ease up + on Moscow too early.

+

The President spoke with Aga Shahi + over the weekend and reaffirmed our commitment to the agreement of + 1959.Carter met with Pakistani Foreign Minister Agha Shahi from 3:30 to 4:15 p.m. + on January 12. The memorandum of conversation is scheduled for + publication in Foreign Relations, 1977–1980, vol. XIX, South + Asia. The 1959 U.S.-Pakistani Agreement for Cooperation + pledged the United States, under certain conditions, to assist + Pakistan against external aggression. The problem is how to + define the U.S. commitment under the agreement. If there is major Soviet + aggression, the U.S. will respond within the limits of our + Constitutional authority. The U.S. will not, however, become involved in + border skirmishes. We want our support to help Pakistan to take a firm + stand against Soviet forces in the region even if they are faced by a + Moscow/Kabul/New Delhi axis. In that case, the U.S. will develop a + U.S./Saudi Arabian/PRC/Pakistan/and + eventually Iran axis as a counter.

+

Dr. Brzezinski next declared that + the task before us is how to translate this basic stand by the President + into:

+

—effective military relations with Pakistan and other countries in the + region;

+

—economic assistance to Pakistan in a way that supports our broader + purposes;

+

—a regional web of political relations to counter effectively the threat + created by Soviet moves in Afghanistan.

+

We cannot duplicate NATO in this + region; a more eclectic mix of bilateral, multilateral, and informal + arrangements must suffice.

+

There was a brief discussion of the implications of Dr. Brzezinski’s framing of the overall + context and the tasks to be accomplished. State asked if the U.S. + guarantee to Pakistan against aggression was for only a Soviet attack or + also an Indian attack, adding that this would be a major problem in our + relations with India if it included both. Defense insisted that it must + include both because the Pakistanis cannot shift forces between their + western and eastern frontiers to meet the Soviet aggression without a + guarantee in the east as well as against the Soviets in the west. State + accepted this argument by Dr. Brzezinski and Defense that sooner or later we would + have to face up to Pakistan’s security problem with India. Dr. Brzezinski said that the U.S. + commitment was only against a threat from the north. Dr. Brzezinski asked at this point if + there were disagreements with his analysis of the situation because it carries a number of + assumptions which are key for further decisions. No dissenting views + were expressed. Defense strongly supported the analysis. State added + that we must include the nuclear issue within this policy context. State + also pointed out that we must anticipate the criticism that we are + merely restoring a “cold war alliance” with the rebuttal that such an + alliance is inadequate for the contemporary political and military + realities in the region. Dr. Brzezinski accepted both points, especially that we have + in mind something more than a cold war alliance as we build a new + regional security system.

+

The meeting next turned to specific issues for decision.

+

I. Military Assistance to Pakistan

+

In discussion of the fighter aircraft issue, Graham Claytor reported that the Pakistanis + did not request specific U.S. aircraft but rather asked the United + States to provide what is necessary for them to defend themselves + against the new Soviet threat which includes MIG–23s and MIG–25s. There + was discussion of the value of A–7 fighters for close air support along + the western borders, the extent to which helicopter gunships could + perform the same mission, and whether the A–7s were meant for an air + defense role also.

+

General Jones agreed that + helicopters would be useful but added that A–7s would provide much + greater air ground capability. All agreed that we should encourage the + Pakistanis to use the French Mirage fighter for the larger air defense + problem against the Soviet Union.

+

Tasking: State was asked to:

+

1. determine whether the Mirages will in fact suffice to meet the + threat;

+

2. clarify with the French their willingness to provide Mirages;

+

3. with Defense, consider A–7s for Pakistan, about 30.

+

II. Bases, Political Assurances to Host Nations, + and Increased RDF

+

Bases. Dr. Brzezinski raised the question of a base in Pakistan. + General Jones said “facilities” + (“bases” have a poor political connotation, it was observed) for air and + naval deployments to Pakistan would be a significant advantage. Others + pointed out that such U.S. facilities in Pakistan would drive India into + closer cooperation with Moscow against Pakistan. Most all agreed that + this is possible, but there were differing views on whether we should + take the step and the risks it involves. Dr. Brzezinski added that we should + consider it but not over load our relations with India by taking the + step now.

+

Tasking: State and Defense will develop a paper on + U.S. military “facilities” in Pakistan, describing their purpose, + possible Indian reaction, and what those reactions would entail for the + United States.

+

Military Consortium for Pakistan: State reported + that George Vest and Peter + Constable will be going to Europe for discussions about + British, French, and Saudi + Arabian participation in the military consortium. Dr. Brzezinski added that the Japanese + should also be asked to participate. Newsom and others were less enthusiastic about bringing + the Japanese in. It would be a new step for them. Newsom and Owen suggested we emphasize greater Japanese economic + aid to Pakistan in forms that will release Pakistan domestic funds for + military purposes. There was some question about the Japanese laws + permitting financing of direct military aid to Pakistan. Dr. Brzezinski argued that the Japanese + have greater interests in the area than the U.S. Thirty years after the + war, when they are economically powerful, surely they can contribute to + the security of the Persian Gulf. We should raise the issue with them + even if they do not accept our proposal.

+

Tasking: State will check what the Japanese law + permits. Defense will produce a paper outlining a specific division of + labor among the members of the military consortium, integrating each + country’s contribution to meet the overall Pakistani military needs in + the most efficient fashion possible.

+

Political Assurances to Host Nations: Defense made + clear that the technical survey teams can proceed to Oman and Somalia + without providing their hosts with “political assurances” on what the + U.S. will give for the bases. Work is presently under way to produce a + military-economic aid package for each host country with appropriate + “political assurances.”

+

Tasking: State will provide a paper which sets + forth the assurances for each country, the form in which the assurances + should be given, and what consultations with Congress are + appropriate.Not found.

+

Diego Garcia: It was recommended that we expand + the runways and the storage facilities on Diego Garcia. Conservationists + may lobby against this construction. When Dr. Brzezinski asked whether we actually + need this expansion in light of acquisition of bases in Oman and + Somalia, State and Defense pointed out that it is much better to have a + larger number of small bases to absorb minor setbacks if we must abandon + some bases in the future.

+

Tasking: None.

+

Improved RDF + Capabilities: General Jones made a presentation at this point in which he + pointed out that Soviet military deployments into Afghanistan will + fundamentally change the military threat to our allies on the Persian + Gulf:

+

—Soviet fighter aircraft based in Afghanistan will be able to reach the + Gulf of Hormuz, a wholly new development.

+ +

—Soviet armored ground forces could reach the waters of the Arabian Sea + through Baluchistan in 10 to 12 days if unopposed.

+

—Preferred Soviet land routes to Tehran probably still remain those from + the Caucasus. Soviet heavy military ground forces on this route could + reach the oil field regions in the vicinity of Kuwait in 10 to 12 + days.

+

—Using sealift from the Black Sea, the Soviets could project forces + through the Suez Canal to the Persian Gulf in about 21 days.

+

—One Soviet airborne division, about 8,000 troops, with organic armor + vehicles, could land anywhere in the vicinity of the Persian Gulf in two + to three days if all Soviet airlift is employed.

+

General Jones outlined our + options for rapid short-term measures to meet this changed Soviet threat + by early spring this year:

+

1. Our naval presence in the Arabian Sea will + eventually have to be reduced to one aircraft carrier battle group. We + do not have sustaining power for the two there at present.

+

2. Tactical air power projected into Egyptian and + Jordanian bases can improve our air projection capability. We should + also request that the Saudis “over build” their air fields, something we + can do privately with no political costs, but something which will + greatly enhance their capability to support “fly in” of U.S. fighter + formations.

+

3. Prepositioning of heavy equipment and supplies + backed up by a significant increase in our sealift capability can give + us a much larger and earlier force projection capability into the + region. To achieve this in the next two to three months, General + Jones proposes the following + package:

+

a. Purchase two RO/RO ships which will hold the prepositioned equipment + for one mechanized brigade and ground support equipment for three + fighter squadrons.

+

b. Lease three cargo ships to be prepositioned with dry cargo supplies, + ammunition, water, and fuels.

+

c. Followup supply from the U.S. can be moved through the Suez Canal in + 11 days by SL–7 class sea-land ships. General Jones proposed to lease a fleet of + eight SL–7s, six of which would be kept in use and two of which would be + under conversion to a RO/RO capability.

+

d. The overall cost for this package is estimated at $450 million.

+

The advantages of this proposal are:

+

—The deployment time for getting heavy ground forces through the region + would be cut from roughly 25/28 days to 5/8 days through + prepositioning.

+

—For the first time we would have a followup sealift supply capability in + the SL–7s which travel at 33 knots, a difficult speed for an enemy to + locate and intercept.

+ +

—This capability could be exercised for demonstrations in the region by + late spring or early summer.

+

Tasking: Defense is to submit the proposal in + detail to OMBNot found. and have the results available for + the NSC meeting.

+

Exercises. Dr. Brzezinski insisted that we need ground force exercises + in the area soon in order to improve the local sense of confidence about + American commitment to the region. General Jones agreed that he could speed up the deployment of + two Marine units, one from the Eastern Mediterranean and one from the + Pacific to exercise in Oman and Somalia by March. Airlift of ground + forces from the United States would be extremely expensive. General + Jones prefers not to take + that step but rather only exercise the Marines now. General Jones argued that more importantly, if + we purchase the two RO/RO, which are ready for immediate delivery and + loading, we can use them for exercises in March or April, exercises that + will have a much greater psychological effect for a lesser cost than + projecting airborne units with no armor from the U.S.

+

Tasking: State will give us a paper by Thursday on + the political effects that exercises would have.January 17; not found. Defense will provide a + paper recommending specific exercises.Not + found.

+

[Omitted here is Section III on consultations with India and + Pakistan.]

+

IV. Consultations with North Yemen

+

The danger of an imminent union between North and South Yemen was + discussed. An NSC working group + recommended that we pursue a two-track strategy, U.S. demarches to + President Salih in North Yemen + and a Saudi Arabian demarche to Salih. Most argued this is an unpromising course of + action. Dr. Brzezinski pointed + out that we should consider a much more fundamental political change in + South Yemen. It is clear that U.S. interests in the area could be + greatly damaged by a union of South and North Yemen. Egypt and Jordan + interests would be similarly hurt, not to speak of Saudi Arabia’s + concern. We should, therefore, consider a joint action to bring about a + fundamental political change in South Yemen. A discussion followed on + Saudi capabilities to do this, which were judged wholly inadequate, and + the difficulties of getting Egyptian and Jordanian cooperation.

+

Tasking: State [less than 1 line + not declassified] to consult on preparing a high level mission + to North Yemen to make Salih + aware of the depths of our + opposition to a union of the two Yemens. Dr. Brzezinski suggested that [less than 1 line not declassified] might be an + appropriate person to head such a mission. A NSC-chaired working group will prepare a paper on the Yemen + problem.See footnote 1, Document 294.

+

[Omitted here are sections on refugees, international support for U.S. + policy, the Middle East peace process, and aid to Pakistan.]

+
+ +
+ 41. Memorandum From Jasper Welch and Fritz + Ermarth of the National Security Council Staff to the + President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)Source: Carter Library, National Security Council, + Institutional Files, Box 107, SCC + 254, 01/17/80, Southwest Asia, Persian Gulf & Yemen. Secret. + Sent for information. Printed from a copy that does not bear Welch’s + or Ermarth’s + initials. + + + Washington, January + 16, 1980 + + + SUBJECT + Basing Access and Exercise Issues at Thursday’s SCCJanuary + 17; see Document 42. (S) + +

The SCC needs to make some basic + decisions to guide the crucial next step of political negotiations in + Oman, Kenya, and Somalia for access to basing. If time permits, the + SCC will also take up Harold Brown’s recommendations (sent to + the President on 21 December, but not forwarded to him yet) on a broader + effort to improve transit and overflight rights, and near-term options + for exercises in the region.Reference is to + a December 21 memorandum from Brown to Carter entitled “Access and Overflight Rights in a + Persian Gulf Contingency.” The focus of the memorandum was “the near + term measures likely to be most immediately profitable in improving + access and overflight, but we also discuss longer term actions and + programs.” (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff + Material, Office, Presidential Advisory File, Box 84, Sensitive XX, + 1/80) (S)

+

This memo gives you essential background and a substantive plan for the + meeting, following the distributed agenda (inside cover). (S)

+ +

BASING ISSUES: SOMALIA, OMAN, KENYA, DJIBOUTI

+

Background

+

There is no controversy as to what we are after: Long-term access to + physically improved facilities in these four countries. In military + terms, the important objectives are summarized on the table (Tab A)Tab A, an undated table entitled “Indian Ocean + Facilities and U.S. Access Objectives,” is attached but not + printed. with which you are familiar. On the + technical-military side, there are continuing questions as to the + condition of facilities at Berbera and the cost to improve them, which + the current survey effort will clarify. But they will probably not much + influence our initial bargaining strategy in Somalia (in any case, we + can adjust that if the survey team’s results so indicate). (S)

+

There is no controversy about the next step: Political negotiations + should be conducted in the last week of January, probably by the + Bartholomew-Murray team,See footnote 2, Document + 38. The team returned to the area in early February. See + Documents 49 and 50. to define access arrangements and terms with + the four countries. (S)

+

No fundamental choices confront us with respect to Oman, Kenya, and + Djibouti given our present fairly limited objectives. What problems + there are are treated in this memo below. (S)

+

With respect to the tough issue, Somalia, since the President has already + decided that he’s prepared to take some risks for access there, what we + need now are a basic strategy for handling + Somalia, and opening position, and the tough-mindedness to assure that we are in charge + of the relationship. The operational significance of the latter is a) a + stronger ambassador in Mogadishu, and b) tight discipline among our Horn + specialists to get with the program we decide on. (S)

+

The strategy for Somalia should aim at getting the basing access we want + in Berbera and Mogadishu at minimum cost in aid, security commitment, + and likelihood of entanglement in the Ogaden conflict.Reference is to the Somali-Ethiopian conflict in + Ethiopia’s Ogaden desert. Documentation on this conflict is + scheduled for publication in Foreign Relations, 1977–1980, vol. XVII, + Part 1, Horn of Africa. We want to minimize the + chance that a new US-Somalia + relationship will shackle us tightly to Siad or strengthen Soviet-Cuban + influence in Ethiopia in the long term. We want to leave open the + possibility that this new relationship could be part of a broader effort + to reduce Soviet influence in the Horn. These aims require a stingy + opening position on our part with Siad, and a willingness to walk away + if he gets too greedy. (S)

+ +

These principles have the following operational application to which you + should get the SCC to agree:

+

—The US continues to oppose Somali + involvement in the Ogaden insurgency because it is dangerous for the + Horn, for Africa, and for Somalia.

+

—The US expects that any new US-Somali relationship on security matters + will make Somalia receptive to US advice + and sensitive to US interests with + respect to Ogaden.

+

—Specifically, the US will insist that + none of the weapons or military goods it may supply to Somalia will be + used to support the Ogaden conflict.

+

—While the US is interested in the + security of Somalia against the Soviet-Cuban threat, any commitment the + US may make will be evaluated in the + light of circumstances if called into question by retaliation arising + from the Ogaden conflict. And it will not apply if regular Somali forces + are involved, openly or surreptitiously, in Ethiopia.

+

—In general, US-Somalia relations will be + served if the level of violence in Ogaden is reduced and Somalia + promotes ideas for a fair peaceful settlement.

+

—US military assistance to Somalia will + be keyed to the value of our basing access (not to the military + appetites of Somalia).

+

—The US will insist that Somalia take + concrete steps to improve her relations with Kenya. (S)

+

These positions would be explicitly or implicitly communicated to the + Somalis as we talk about our base access. Note that we do not and + probably cannot insist on complete Somali withdrawal of support for the + insurgency. In any case, we don’t want to do that since it would simply + deliver the Soviets and the Cubans a local victory and deprive us of + future leverage on Ethiopia. (S)

+

In addition to the above communications to Siad, our strategy will have + to involve:

+

—Toughening our representation in Mogadishu (not a topic for the SCC).

+

—Increasing our intelligence on the Ogaden war and Somali + involvement.

+

—Political (covert) action to explore alternatives to Siad (at least as a + source of leverage). (S)

+

We are, to put it somewhat pessimistically, seeking a kind of control + over Somali behavior that the Soviets failed to secure. But by arming + Siad to the teeth they gave him options we shall not give him. (S)

+

The other major questions for Somalia concern military aid and financing. + The consensus of the Bartholomew-Murray team is that we should be operating in the range of Option I (for + openers) in the State/PM paper (Tab + B).Reference is to a paper prepared in + PM entitled “Indian Ocean + Access” which Ermarth and + Welch attached as Tab H to their memorandum. The paper references + the charts on specific countries and provides additional detail and + issues for discussion. Tabs A–F referenced in this memorandum, none + printed, were attached to this paper. Tab B is an undated chart + entitled “Military Assistance Options for Somalia.” And we + should try to get the Saudis to finance more than 50% of the package. + (S)

+

Meeting Plan

+

General

+

You should advise the group that this portion of the agenda is very rich + in opportunities for distraction into trivia. Hence you should summarize + points that seem straightforward or on which there is working-level + consensus, considering them decided unless there are objections. (S)

+

—A political team will visit Oman, Kenya, Somalia, and, if possible, + Djibouti between 24 January and 2 February. (S)

+

—Since we are after extensive, redundant access we shall pursue all + options seriously, unless (as possibly in Somalia) insuperable obstacles + arise. (S)

+

—It is agreed that extensive consultations with our allies, especially + the UK and France, and our friends in + the region should promote patterns of multilateral security cooperation + we can build up in the longer term. (S)

+

—We should encourage Saudi support, but not become hostage to their + timorous ways. (S)

+

Somalia (See Tabs B and + FTab F is an undated chart entitled + “Security Commitment Alternatives.”)

+

—We are agreed that we are after long-term access to both Berbera and + Mogadishu, but that the overall difficulties of the Somali case will + require a step-by-step approach (in which we concentrate initially on + our activities and quids pro quo out no more than two years). (S)

+

—We do want an access agreement that defines the status of our personnel. + Joint US-Somali use of facilities is + agreeable. (S)

+

—You should then turn to the nexus of Ogaden and a security commitment, + laying out the strategy proposed above. The only specific points of view + on this that have surfaced in our debates, (other than the usual + arguments among Horn specialists) is the view of General Lawson that + Berbera and Mogadishu may, in the end, not be worth the trouble. On a + security commitment as such, our position should be that US presence + and a new relationship alone should add considerably to Somali security + if Somalia behaves herself, and that we are willing to give our interest + in Somali security appropriate public expression. (S)

+

—Get agreement to opening discussion on military assistance as per State + Option I (Tab B) and to seeking Saudi assistance. (S)

+

Oman (See Tabs CTab C is an undated chart entitled “Military + Assistance Options for Oman.” and F)

+

Oman is the most important potential host, but poses no serious problems. + (S)

+

—Our objective is long-term access and facilities improvement programs + for Masirah and a port/airfield combination on the mainland (either + Muscat or Matrah, and Seeb). (S)

+

—In initial negotiations we should be prepared to lay out our long-term + (5 year) objectives. But, if the Omanis insist, we should concentrate on + plans and access arrangements over the next two years. (S)

+

—We should open negotiations with military assistance offers in the area + of State’s Option II on (p. 16, Tab C). Saudi financing should be + sought. (S)

+

—Consultation and cooperation with the UK + will be done throughout. (S)

+

—The only (somewhat) contentious issue is the character + of a security commitment to Oman. I think it is now recognized + that it is in our interest to give Oman a solid security commitment. + Most of the difference will be on the Omani side owing to Arab + sensitivities. But if we show reluctance it will undermine our entire + confidence-building effort. We should give a commitment to assist Oman + against external threats and externally assisted internal security + threats (it is hard to imagine a serious purely internal threat in that + country in today’s world—but this should be discussed). We should take + our cue from Oman as to the form and publicity of such a commitment, + within our own legal limitations. (S)

+

Kenya (See Tabs DTab D is an undated chart entitled “Military + Assistance Options for Kenya.” and F)

+

Kenya presents no serious problems requiring SCC debate. In the longer run, a closer US-Kenyan security relationship will + probably lead to greater economic assistance. (S)

+

—We should, in initial negotiations, simply state our near and + longer-term desires for access, and hear Kenyan terms. (S) (See Tab + D)

+ +

—We should express our determination to use possibly improved US-Somalia relations to improve + Somali-Kenyan relations. (S)

+

—A security commitment is not likely to be needed. (S)

+

Djibouti (See Tabs ETab E is an undated chart entitled “Military + Assistance Options for Djibouti.” and F)

+

There are no major policy issues to be resolved on Djibouti unless Somali + problems lead us later to seek greater access there than we now seek, + largely in deference to local and French sensitivities. Basically, we + are asking for expanded routine use (P–3 flights and ship visits) and + some commitment on Djibouti’s part to give us crisis access on a larger + scale. (S)

+

Other

+

—We shall keep the key Congressional committee chairmen apprised of the + access effort, informing them of our objectives and soliciting reactions + before the political negotiating teams next visit the region. (S)

+

—It would be desirable if some of the funds needed for this effort (which + cannot be defined before the survey teams report back) be secured in an + FY80 supplemental. You will want to solicit the views of principals on + the timing of security assistance requests, if time permits. (S)

+

HAROLD BROWN’S RECOMMENDATIONS ON OVERFLIGHT AND TRANSIT + ACCESS RIGHTS

+

Background

+

At the President’s urgent request Harold + Brown prepared a memo on the basing access problems of + our getting into the region, and recommended a comprehensive political + approach to improving our historically uncertain access. This memo was + sent to us on 21 December, and to SecState, the Chairman, and the DCI. We forwarded it to you with a cover + for the President and a summary of Harold’s action recommendation on 8 + January.See footnote 3 above. + Graham Claytor sent you a + “what’s happened” memo on 11 January. All this material is at Tab + I.Attached but not printed. + (S)

+

Harold’s diagnosis and recommendation are sound. The latter call for + efforts with “enroute countries” (principally UK, Portugal, Spain, Egypt) and “receiving countries” + (Saudi Arabia, Oman) to sensitize them to the extraordinary importance + of basing access in crises, to create greater willingness to give it to + us. State is developing specific diplomatic initiatives and time-tables to act on these + recommendations. A State/PM paper + reflective of their initial efforts is at Tab J.Attached but not printed at Tab J is an undated + paper entitled “Diplomatic Strategy for Increasing Access to + Facilities and Overflight Rights in States Enroute to Southwest + Asia.” (S)

+

Meeting Plan

+

—After soliciting comments from principals on the Brown memo, seek agreement to its + recommendations and to prompt State/DOD + efforts to implement them. (S)

+

—Ask whether we should not give particularly urgent attention to those + countries where physical improvement to facilities is required to make + access meaningful. For example, Saudi Arabia should be encouraged to + expand airfields and POL storage as a + “receiving country.” (S)

+

POLITICAL VALUE OF NEAR-TERM MILITARY EXERCISES

+

After a brief discussion of two kinds of exercise options (marines and a + light army brigade), Monday’s SCCJanuary 14; see Document + 40. directed that a paper be prepared on the + political value (and risk) of near-term US exercises. State/PM + undertook to do this with CIA + assistance. At this moment, unfortunately, this task is not fulfilled. + If there is time for the subject at all, I suggest the following:

+

—Retask State/CIA and schedule the + matter for another meeting.

+

—Reiterate interest in marine exercises into Oman, possibly Egypt.

+

—Ask the Chairman to comment specifically on the desirability and + feasibility of a light army (e.g., brigade of the 82nd Airborne) + exercise any time in 1980. (One of his subordinates fears that such an + exercise would reveal more weakness than strength.)

+

—Discuss the value of continuing exercises of tactical air units into the + region. (S)

+
+ +
+ 42. Summary of Conclusions of a Special Coordination Committee + MeetingSource: Carter + Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Trip File, Box 40, Brzezinski, Pakistan and Saudi + Arabia 2/1–5/80: Briefing Book [I]. Secret; Sensitive. The meeting + took place in the White House Situation Room. The minutes of the + meeting are not attached. In the upper right-hand corner of the + first page, Carter wrote: + “Zbig—These are very serious matters. The discussions are necessary + but any proposal for contentious action must be submitted to me + first J.” + + + Washington, January 17, 1980, 9–10:45 + a.m. + + + SUBJECT + SCC Meeting on Southwest Asia and + the Persian Gulf + + + PARTICIPANTS + + State + Secretary Cyrus + Vance + Deputy Secretary Warren + Christopher + + + + + Defense + Secretary Harold + Brown + Ambassador Robert + Komer + + + + + JCS + Chairman General David + Jones + Lt. General John + Pustay + + + + + CIA + Deputy Director Frank + Carlucci + Robert Ames + [name not declassified] + + + + + OMB + Deputy Director John + White + + + + + White House + Dr. Zbigniew + Brzezinski + Hamilton Jordan + Jody Powell + Hedley Donovan + David Aaron + + + + + NSC + Colonel William E. Odom + Captain Gary + Sick + Thomas + Thornton + Fritz + Ermarth + + + +

Dr. Brzezinski explained that the + purpose today is to cover a number of points, not all of them for + decision, but as information and recommendations to the President as a + backdrop for the decision he will shortly be making about our policy + toward Southwest Asia and the Persian Gulf region. He noted the + agreement about the strategic dynamics of the Soviet military move into + Afghanistan expressed at the previous SCC, the consequences for Pakistan and Iran, and also the + importance of Soviet influence in Yemen and Ethiopia.

+

Dr. Brzezinski also added that + the Soviet publication “New Times” has issued a call for all Communist + states and parties to seize new revolutionary opportunities created by + the present political conditions in the world, disturbing evidence of + present Soviet policy directions.

+

Military Assistance to Pakistan

+

Dr. Brzezinski and Secretary + Vance commented that the + President’s meeting with Agha + Shahi went as well as could be expected.See footnote 4, Document + 40. Secretary Brown asked + how we will deal with the situation if the Pakistanis insist they want + $1 billion in aid while we only offered $400 million. Secretary + Vance predicted that they + will take our $400 million and complain, not reject our aid.

+

Dr. Brzezinski asked about the + French willingness to sell the Mirage aircraft to Pakistan. Secretary + Vance reported that the + French will probably supply the Mirage. As a next step, it will be + discussed at the Political Directors Meeting in London on January 24th. + State will push France to make a decision by then.

+

Dr. Brzezinski raised the + question of American A–7 aircraft for Pakistan. It was pointed out that + the Pakistanis did not ask for them. Rather they asked that they be + supplied with aircraft sufficient to protect themselves against the + Soviet air threat, implying, of course, for the need for the US + F–16 or the Mirage. The A–7, as Dr. + Brzezinski pointed out, + would be very useful in a ground support role along the Western + frontier. Furthermore, because the U.S. has a large number, nearly 700, + it can undoubtedly spare 30 or 40. Secretary Brown agreed the Pakistanis might be willing to buy some + A–7s.

+

Military Consortium

+

Dr. Brzezinski asked for + Defense’s proposal for a division of labor among the members of the + military consortium.Reference is to an + international consortium to provide military assistance to + Pakistan. Secretary Brown submitted a paper showing which countries can + produce what categories of military equipment. The issue of who pays + remains to be solved, he added. Secretary Vance noted that according to Agha Shahi, the Saudis promised + Pakistan $800 million for military purchases over a year ago but have + not yet delivered. We should press the Saudis to make the promise + good.

+

Concerning Japan, Vance has + instructed Phil Habib to ask the + Japanese for $400 million for the consortium. They may give less, but + Vance feels we should ask + for that much. We will get little from Britain and France, he continued, + but the French should be willing to sell them aircraft and the British + will certainly be willing to sell tanks and tank guns. Secretary + Brown added that the U.S., + France, and Germany can provide anti-tank weapons, much needed for + insurgency and defense. It was also pointed out that the Pakistanis want + foreign assistance for building a communications infrastructure on their + western front.

+

Dr. Brzezinski asked if we need a + big consortium figure for public and political effect such as $1 + billion. Secretary Brown observed + that one to one and a half billion dollars for equipment spread over + three years could be absorbed + effectively by the Pakistanis; therefore, Dr. Brzezinski’s figure is about right. + Dr. Brzezinski added that we + must avoid a figure which is so high that we are open to criticism that + we are “saturating” Pakistan with arms the same way we did Iran.

+

Dr. Brzezinski added that we need + a military equipment package and a concept for a division of labor which + we can propose to the allies. Secretary Vance suggested that this be done at the upcoming + Political Directors Meeting on January 24. Dr. Brzezinski agreed; we must supplement + our delegation with technical teams sufficiently competent to make + concrete decisions on both funds and equipment.

+

Agreed action:

+

—State will press France on the Mirage aircraft.

+

—The Political Directors Meeting will be reinforced with sufficient staff + to discuss military assistance and funding.

+

—The U.S. will give an exemplary package to the Political Directors as a + proposal for a division of labor.

+

—To fund the consortium, we will press the Japanese for $400 million and + the Saudis for $800 million which, combined with our $400 million, + should be above $1 billion.

+

—Britain and France will be encouraged to supply specific military + equipment.

+

U.S. Assurances to Pakistan

+

Secretary Vance reported that we + are still working out contingency scenarios to define circumstances + under which we would come to Pakistan’s military assistance against + foreign attack. Secretary Vance + promised to have a paper by Friday or Saturday which spells these out in + considerable detail for the President.

+

It was agreed, at Secretary Vance’s suggestion, that this is the + next big decision issue which should be discussed with the + President.

+

Contingency of a Soviet Invasion of Iran

+

Dr. Brzezinski proposed that the + President mention in his speech that the United States has been + committed to the independence of Iran for the past 30 years and remains + so committed today.Reference is to the + President’s upcoming State of the Union address; see Document 45. Secretaries Vance and Brown wondered if this does not so clearly imply our + previous ties to the Shah that it will provoke Khomeini’s public + rejection and fail to achieve the political effect in the region for + which it is intended. Dr. Brzezinski observed that we must simply accept the cost + of a possible Khomeini + statement because our vital interests in the area are so great. + Secretaries Vance and Brown suggested omitting reference to + “30 years.” They accepted Dr. Brzezinski’s alternative language “as we have been” so + that a sentence in the speech might read: “The U.S. remains committed to + an independent Iran today as it has been in the past.”

+

Agreed action: The record of the meeting should + solicit the President’s reaction to this proposal.Carter + neither approved nor disapproved the recommendation. In the margin + below this recommendation, he wrote: “Covered on Meet the Press.” + President Carter was + interviewed on “Meet the Press” on January 20. Responding to a + question about economic sanctions against Iran, he said: “We want a + stable and independent Iran, and we want a secure Iran.” (Public Papers: Carter, 1980–81, Book I, p. + 113)

+

Military Facilities in the Region

+

Dr. Brzezinski expressed concern + that while progress is being made on the technical level in acquiring + military facilities, we are lagging on the political level. We need to + expedite giving political assurances to the host countries. Until we do, + these countries are vulnerable to Soviet pressure to reject our + requests. They have already been exposed in the press as potential + locations for U.S. facilities; some are undoubtedly already being + pressed by the Soviets to reject the U.S. request.

+

Secretary Vance reported that + State is now drafting messages to our ambassadors in these countries + instructing them to discuss political assurances. Hal Saunders added that if the + President mentions these countries in his speech, it might kill their + willingness. Dr. Brzezinski + reemphasized that they have already been fingered in the press. The + danger for us is the gap between political progress and technical + progress. He proposed a Presidential message, a very candid one to Oman + and Somalia, giving political assurances in principle to be followed up + by more specific details at the diplomatic level. Vance and Saunders argued that any assurances must be specific + because we must also consult with the Congress before we are committed + to them. Dr. Brzezinski conceded + that while those points may be legally valid, they do not deal with the + present political vulnerability of the states we want to assist. + Secretary Vance proposed that we + go to these states with messages which make the following points:

+

—We agree in principle to political assurances and therefore want the + technical teams to proceed as rapidly as possible.

+

—Ask the head of state if he objects to the President mentioning publicly + his country in connection with U.S. military facilities.

+

—Promise to consult with the Congress as soon as the details on the + assurances can be worked out.

+ +

—Reaffirm publicly that the United States considers its interests in the + region vital.

+

Agreed Action: A draft of the + message proposed by Vance is + to be cleared later today with the NSC staff.

+

Harold Brown said we need more + flights into Djibouti. They pointed out that we already have access to + Pakistan, but more permanent “military facilities” would be desirable. + It was argued that we should not raise this issue with the Pakistanis + until the military assistance package to Pakistan is worked out in more + detail.

+

Agreed actions:

+

—Ask for more flights into Djibouti.

+

—Postpone discussion of “military facilities” in Pakistan for a few + weeks.

+

—Vance, Brown, and Brzezinski will call about ten key Congressional leaders + to give them a progress report on our efforts to acquire military + facilities in the region. The NSC staff + will provide talking points to ensure that the same message is given to + all ten Congressmen.

+

Enroute Basing and Overflights

+

Secretary Brown said that Defense + has been ready for some time and is waiting for State to go forward, + asking Spain, Morocco, Portugal, Philippines, and others about + contingency overflights and base use. Some argued that to ask now might + ensure a turndown. Dr. Brzezinski argued that it is important to tell these + countries now that we are serious, that we are making plans, and that we + may be asking them in the future but we are not asking for a positive + response at present. General Jones noted that we already have effective access to + countries and need no commitment; furthermore, what we need in each + country is different. In Morocco, for example, we would like to + pre-position fuel. The two most urgent cases are Spain and Morocco. + Secretary Vance insisted that he + needed a chance to check once more on the Moroccan situation before + taking a final position.

+

Agreed action: Pending Vance’s check on the Moroccan + situation, inform Spain and Morocco that we are planning for crises; + vary the message to each according to what we want it to provide. State + and Defense will prepare this message.

+

Military Exercises and Deployments in the + Region

+

Secretary Brown raised Diego + Garcia. There are two issues, present use, and longer term construction + programs. Komer argued that + because Diego Garcia is the only reliable base in the Indian Ocean, we + need to undertake the expansion. General Jones said that it would cost about $500 million spread over the next five years. + Dr. Brzezinski reported that the + British Opposition Leader Callaghan had encouraged the United States to + move fast on Diego Garcia. Secretary Vance cautioned that Margaret Thatcher may look at it differently.

+

Dr. Brzezinski observed that this + will outrage Indira Gandhi. + Komer added that what we are + doing for Pakistan will outrage her even more. All agreed that India’s + sensitivities should not make us hesitate on the expansion.

+

Agreed action: + OMB will look into funding not for this + year but for FY 1982 and later.

+

Next the discussion turned to military exercises. General Jones reported that a Marine + amphibious unit, about 2,000 strong, and a group of four to six ships + can exercise in any number of places in the region, Oman for example, + and Egypt. Followup units, up to a Marine brigade, can also + participate.

+

Dr. Brzezinski declared that an + exercise is needed for its political effect as a demonstration of + American determination to remain in the area. Secretary Vance replied that privately political + leaders in the region will like it, but publicly they will have + problems. He therefore recommended that an exercise be held in Diego + Garcia. Secretary Brown insisted + that such an exercise makes no sense, and therefore would have no + desired political effect, perhaps even an undesired effect. Oman, Saudi + Arabia, and Egypt were discussed as possible exercise sites. Dr. + Brzezinski proposed that we + ask Oman and Saudi Arabia, and if they turn us down, we should ask Egypt + where a positive response is almost assured. Secretary Vance asked that this be delayed ten + days until after the President’s speech.

+

Dr. Brzezinski next raised the + question of a U.S. airborne brigade projected into the region for an + exercise, possibly a combined exercise with Jordan and Saudi Arabia. + This could take place later in the spring or summer. Secretary Vance argued that the political + problems are simply too great for us to attempt this. Dr. Brzezinski agreed that we should not + overload ourselves with this undertaking but that Defense should look + into the costs, planning, and other details.

+

Agreed actions:

+

—State will go forward and seek political assurances on enroute basing + and overflights.

+

—We will wait ten days and seek permission for a military exercise in + Oman or Saudi Arabia, then Egypt if the first two are not + forthcoming.

+

—Gently probe Jordan on the possibilities of a combined US/Jordan/Saudi Arabian exercise.

+ +

[Omitted here is a section on Yemen. This section is printed as Document 294.]

+

Afghanistan Insurgency

+

Secretary Vance reported that + Agha Shahi calls the + insurgency in Afghanistan “a dangerous lightning rod” and, therefore, a + very difficult decision for General Zia. Dr. Brzezinski commented that a massive insurgency at + present is probably not in our best interest. Rather a low-level and + enduring insurgency is essential to keep the Islamic states mobilized + against the Soviets in Afghanistan.

+

Secretary Brown added that + Agha Shahi’s comments were + probably not meant to indicate that Zia will be backing out, but rather to keep the option + open for the future.

+

Afghanistan Refugees

+

State reported that it is possible for the United States to provide + bilateral aid for refugees in Afghanistan as well as aid through the + UNHCR.

+

Agreed action: State was tasked to prepare a plan + for providing at least a small part of their refugee aid through + bilateral channels and present it at the next SCC on refugee support.

+

Dr. Brzezinski observed that the + large degree of consensus on all agenda issues today may negate the need + for an NSC meeting with the President + on the same topics. All agreed and Secretary Vance added that the next issue we + need to discuss directly with the President concerns the contingency + scenarios for Pakistan and the assurances we give that government.

+

[Omitted here is material unrelated to Southwest Asia and the Persian + Gulf.]

+
+ +
+ 43. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security + Affairs (Brzezinski) to + President CarterSource: Carter Library, National + Security Affairs, Brzezinski + Material, General Odom File, Box 43, Security Framework: 1/1–23/80. + Secret; Sensitive. Sent for action. The date is handwritten. + Carter initialed the + memorandum indicating that he saw it. + + + Washington, January + 18, 1980 + + + SUBJECT + SCC Summary of Conclusions on + Southwest Asia and the Persian Gulf + +

I am attaching the record of the SCC + held on ThursdaySee Document 42. as a back-drop for your State of the + Union address and policy toward the Persian Gulf region. We discussed a + comprehensive list of issues on which there was sufficient consensus to + make an NSC meeting unnecessary. We do + need your reactions to some of the agreed actions. Others are important + for your information.

+

You will note from reviewing the report of the meeting that we have + before us a very complicated and difficult agenda. Once your speech has + been delivered, outlining our overall approach, it may be + important—indeed necessary—for someone to go out to have high-level + talks on security matters with the Saudis, Turks, Jordanians, Omanis, + and the Paks. If this program is to succeed and to have any coherence, + it will have to have high-level commitment, visible direction, and be + undertaken with genuine energy. We are dealing with a much more + complicated situation than Western Europe in the late forties. At the + very least, in the light of the fact that my recent trip was kept + secretIn his personal diary, Carter wrote on January 15: “Zbig + had a disappointing meeting with Giscard; [France’s] relationship with the Soviets + will continue as usual, different from what he told me last week.” + (Carter, White House Diary, p. 392) I think a + quick trip by me to Turkey and Saudi Arabia will be necessary. One + simply does not have the necessary “touch” for some of the decisions + that need to be made, and the leaders there need to be directly + convinced that we mean business when we say that we plan to project our + military and political influence into the region on a sustained + basis.

+

No decision on the above is required, but you should give it some + thought. We also need your guidance on the minutes, so that we can + implement effectively, especially after your overall speech defines our + national policy for the entire world.

+
+ +
+ 44. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassies in Oman, + Somalia, and KenyaSource: + Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Middle + East, Subject File, Box 68, Middle East: Security: 1/80. Secret; + Niact Immediate; Nodis. Sent for information + Immediate to the White House. Printed from the copy that indicates + the original was received in the White House Situation Room. Drafted + by David C. Gompert (PM); cleared by + Seton Stapleton (S/S–O), + Bartholomew, William C. + Harrop (AF), Twinam, Kreisberg, Ermarth, and Murray; approved by Newsom. + + + Washington, January 19, 1980, 2232Z + +

15122. For the Ambassador. Subject: Indian Ocean Access.

+

1. (Secret)–entire text.

+

2. We want to get back to host governments at the highest level now to + confirm our serious interest in continuing our discussion of access and + other forms of security cooperation. We are concerned that the + combination of a hiatus in high-level dialogue and press speculation may + have left them vulnerable to political pressures. We want to dispel any + question about this with them and also to affirm our full understanding + that the context of our interest in access is our desire to cooperate + broadly with them in order to enhance our mutual security. We would like + host country agreement for a return of the high-level State/Defense team + in the period February 3–February 10.

+

3. Accordingly, you should immediately approach Sultan Qaboos, President Siad, and President + Moi, (or, in all cases, if early appointment impossible appropriate + senior officials) using the following talking points:

+

A. The President is pleased with the results of our discussions with you + about our mutual security interests and your responsiveness in this + matter. He is seriously interested in pursuing this matter. He hopes + that you agree in general on the need for greater cooperation and on the + need to press ahead with the dialogue.

+

B. In this connection we are studying a number of specific steps which + the U.S. would propose taking to enhance your security. We will also + have more specific ideas regarding our access objectives. We are + prepared to send a high-level team back to the area to discuss these + specific ideas with you and your officials during the period from + February 3–10.

+

C. We will get back very soon with specific dates in this time frame for + each country.

+

4. For Nairobi: We are considering the possibility of sending only one or + two members of the team to Nairobi, given acute Kenyan concerns about visibility and also the + very limited character of our access objectives in Kenya.

+

5. For Mogadishu: You should mention to Siad that we will, of course, + need to discuss our concern about the Ogaden issue when the team is in + Somalia.

+ + Vance + +
+
+ 45. Editorial Note +

In response to the situation in Iran, namely the taking of 66 American + hostages on November 4, 1979, and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, + the administration of President Jimmy + Carter developed a new U.S. policy for the Persian Gulf + region. This new policy began to take shape in late November 1979 among + the National Security Council Staff and the Assistant to the President + for National Security Affairs, Zbigniew + Brzezinski. On November 27 and 28, National Security + Council Staff members sent Brzezinski several memorandums that dealt with broad + Middle East issues and contained ideas for a U.S. response. In a + November 27 memorandum to Brzezinski, National Security Council Staff member + Paul B. Henze wrote that the + United States needed to “display a determination to stick it out and + assert ourselves,” which the administration could achieve “by showing + the kind of determination and strength that will enable our friends to + help us assert ourselves.” (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, + Staff Material, Middle East, Subject File, Box 30, Iran: 11/28–30/79) + The following day, National Security Council Staff member Robert Hunter, + in a November 28 memorandum to Brzezinski, noted that while the Iranian situation had + precipitated a major crisis, there were “also increased opportunities, + especially with greater American public willingness to see us take a + leadership position, a fading of the ‘Vietnam syndrome,’ but also a + sense of greater balance and maturity in the nation about the uses of + power.” Hunter commented that “there will be insistent demands for a + strong, coherent policy, and clear leadership by the President.” He + recommended that Carter deliver + a televised address immediately following resolution of the hostage + crisis. Hunter asserted that Carter should propose:

+

“a series of concrete, specific, steps, including + domestic and international energy efforts; some tailored increase in defense spending and activity; and our + position toward and support for other countries in the region (within the context of respect + for individual national integrity, independence, and respect for Islam). + There should be a clear integration of political, + economic, and military efforts—no one is enough; the interrelationship + is critical.

+

“If enough pieces of a long-range strategy can be ready for use, this + could become a Carter Doctrine for the Middle + East, dealing with the whole nexus of oil-security-U.S. resolve and + leadership issues.” (Ibid.)

+

Also, in a November 28 memorandum to Brzezinski, National Security Council Staff member + William E. Odom noted: “The present Iranian crisis seems to be creating + the chance to begin a serious regional intelligence rebuilding effort as + well as a physical military presence. The time for action, therefore, is + at hand.” (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, General Odom + File, Box 27, Iran: 11/78–11/79)

+

The administration’s belief that a strong statement on the Middle East + was needed took on new urgency following the Soviet invasion of + Afghanistan on December 25, 1979. Brzezinski noted in his memoirs: “I discussed that issue + [a “wider strategic challenge” in the Persian Gulf as a result of the + invasion] at some length with the President.” Brzezinski ”stressed that the issue + was not what might have been Brezhnev’s subjective motives in going into Afghanistan + but the objective consequences of a Soviet military presence so much + closer to the Persian Gulf.” (Power and + Principle, page 430) This exchange likely occured in a 30 + minute telephone conversation between Carter and Brzezinski on December 31. (Carter Library, Presidential + Materials, President’s Daily Diary) After this discussion, Brzezinski commented:

+

“The President’s approach served as the point of departure for a wider + response which, in the course of the next several weeks, took three + forms: (1) the adoption of sanctions directed at the Soviet Union; (2) + the formulation of a doctrine linking the security of the region with + that of the United States and a U.S. effort to shape a regional security + framework; and (3) the acceleration of our strategic renewal, in terms + of both doctrine and defense budget.” (Power and + Principle, page 430)

+

The level of importance to which Brzezinski ascribed the situation and the + administration’s response were evident in his January 2, 1980, + memorandum to the President entitled “Relevance of the Truman Doctrine + to Current Situation.” Brzezinski wrote that he “would like to recall for you + an earlier crisis which in my judgment has some striking parallels with + the present challenge we face in Afghanistan, in that region and + globally.” He then summarized the history and importance of the Truman + Doctrine. Placing the present situation in even starker terms, Brzezinski concluded: “The Soviet + intervention in the present case is both more blatant and more brutal + than in 1947, and the Gulf is unquestionably more vital to Western + interests today than were Greece and Turkey 30 years ago.” (Carter Library, National Security + Affairs, Brzezinski Material, + Subject File, Box 67, Truman Doctrine: 1/80) In a January 3 memorandum + to the President, Brzezinski + outlined a “Strategic Reaction to the Afghanistan Problem,” including + the possibility of selling defensive arms to China. (Carter Library, + Brzezinski Donated Material, + Geographic File, Box 17, Southwest Asia/Persian Gulf Afghanistan: + 12/26/79–1/4/80) Both memoranda are printed in Foreign + Relations, 1977–1980, vol. I, Foundations of Foreign + Policy, Documents 134 and 135. In a memorandum to the President on January 9, entitled + “A Long-Term Strategy for Coping with the Consequences of the Soviet + Action in Afghanistan,” Brzezinski listed possible U.S. actions in the Persian + Gulf region to enhance regional security. The memorandum is printed in + Foreign + Relations, 1977–1980, volume VI, Soviet Union, Document + 256.

+

The President elucidated what would become known as the Carter Doctrine + in his State of the Union speech delivered to Congress on January 23, + 1980. Speaking directly on the Middle East region, the recent Iranian + situation, and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, Carter noted that “we face a broader + and more fundamental challenge in this region because of the recent + military action of the Soviet Union.” He asserted that the “Soviet Union + has taken a radical and an aggressive new step. It’s using its great + military power against a relatively defenseless nation. The implications + of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan could pose the most serious threat + to the peace since the Second World War.” Getting to the crux of the + issue, Carter stated:

+

“This situation demands careful thought, steady nerves, and resolute + action, not only for this year but for many years to come. It demands + collective efforts to meet this new threat to security in the Persian + Gulf and in Southwest Asia. It demands the participation of all those + who rely on oil from the Middle East and who are concerned with global + peace and stability. And it demands consultation and close cooperation + with countries in the area which might be threatened. Meeting this + challenge will take national will, diplomatic and political wisdom, + economic sacrifice, and, of course, military capability. We must call on + the best that is in us to preserve the security of this crucial region. + Let our position be absolutely clear: An attempt by any outside force to + gain control of the Persian Gulf region will be regarded as an assault + on the vital interests of the United States of America, and such an + assault will be repelled by any means necessary, including military + force.”

+

Carter then outlined the steps + the United States was taking to make this doctrine a reality, such as + improving capabilities to rapidly deploy U.S. forces to the region, + preventing conflict in the region, strengthening the U.S. naval presence + in the Indian Ocean, and solidifying the U.S. guarantee of Pakistani + independence. (Public Papers: Carter, 1980–81, + Book I, pages 194–198)

+ +

The full text of Carter’s address + is printed in + Foreign Relations, 1977–1980, volume I, + Foundations of Foreign Policy, Document 138.

+
+
+ 46. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security + Affairs (Brzezinski) to + Secretary of Defense BrownSource: Carter Library, National + Security Affairs, Brzezinski + Material, General Odom File, Box 28, Middle East Command Post: + 7/79–3/80. Secret. An undated covering memorandum, under which the + memorandum was to be forwarded from Brzezinski to Carter for his approval, was prepared, although + there is no indication that Carter received the memorandum, that Carter approved Brzezinski’s recommendation, or + that Brown received the + memorandum. + + + Washington, January + 24, 1980 + + + SUBJECT + Strategic Review of our Unified Command Structure (S) + +

The President desires that you look into the Unified Command Plan as it + relates to the Persian Gulf region and our changing military, + intelligence, and diplomatic requirements. Events over the past two + years make it apparent that our command structure for the region is + fragmented and refracted through European and Pacific headquarters; with + the RDF/JTF under REDCOM, a third headquarters is + centrally involved. The President would like to have your views on the + changes which might facilitate unity of command and coordination of + regional intelligence and military and economic assistance missions. + They should be available by February 28, 1980.

+ + Zbigniew BrzezinskiPrinted from a copy that bears this typed + signature. + +
+ +
+ 47. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense Brown to President CarterSource: + Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Middle + East, Subject File, Box 68, Middle East: Security: 1/80. Secret. + Brzezinski forwarded + Brown’s memorandum to + Carter under a January 29 memorandum recommending that Carter approve Brown’s proposal. Carter approved the recommendation + and added the handwritten notation: “I presume Cy + agrees.” + + + Washington, January + 25, 1980 + + + SUBJECT + Amphibious Deployment (U) + +

(S) As a further measure to increase US + military presence and capability in the Arabian Sea, I propose deploying + an Amphibious Task Force to join the two Carrier Battle Groups (Task + Force 70) presently operating in the region.

+

(C) The proposed Amphibious Task Force would be composed of four + amphibious ships and an embarked Marine Amphibious Unit (MAU). The MAU consists of about 1,700 Marines organized into an + infantry battalion, a helicopter squadron, and a combat service support + group. Their combat equipment includes 22 assault helicopters, 12 + amphibious assault vehicles, and five tanks.

+

(C) The MAU is presently enroute to the + Western Pacific and, ifyou approve the deployment, would depart the + Philippines in mid-February, arriving in the Arabian Sea around the end + of the month. Subsequently (March or later) I anticipate that a + substantially increased Marine amphibious capability would temporarily + augment this force. The III Marine Amphibious Force (MAF) located on + Okinawa, will remain ready to respond to other limited contingencies in + the Western Pacific, with some lift constraints.

+

(S) While operating in the Arabian Sea, we would hope to be able to + conduct exercises with one or more countries in the region. The location + and scope of these exercises can be determined after the facilities + survey team has finished its work and negotiations with potential host + countries have been concluded. Even without the conduct of exercises, I + believe the deployment of Marine forces to the Indian Ocean is a prudent + measure on the basis of both the perception and the fact of increased + US military capability. We should + recognize, though, that taking this step could well commit us to + maintaining some US Marine presence in + the region for the indefinite future.

+

(C) Until the facilities survey team returns and exercise arrangements, + if any, are firm, I would propose no announcement or public discussion of that possible aspect of + the deployment. The only early publicity would be a routine announcement + that an Amphibious Task Force had joined Task Force 70 in the Arabian + Sea.

+

(S) With your approval, I am prepared to direct the deployment. I would + make a routine public announcement early next week, since media + speculation about our sending Marines is already rife and I anticipate + many questions when I testify on the Defense posture and budget next + week.

+ + Harold Brown + +
+ +
+ 48. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense Brown to President CarterSource: + Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, General Odom + File, Box 28, Middle East Command Post: 7/79–3/80. + Secret. + + + Washington, January + 26, 1980 + + + SUBJECT + Rapid Deployment Forces (U) + +

As you know, as part of our efforts to improve our capabilities to + project forces in contingencies, I have directed the JCS to develop specific sets of Rapid + Deployment Forces, and a controlling Joint Task Force headquarters. The + purpose of this memorandum is to keep you abreast of the developments in + this area, specifically RDJTF command + arrangements. (U)

+

The JCS have developed a general + structure for the RDJTF headquarters. + It will be commanded by Major General (Lieutenant General selectee) Paul + X. Kelley, USMC, and will be + established at MacDill Air Force Base by March 1, 1980. It will also + have a liaison staff here in Washington. The Commander of the RDJTF will have an exercise budget under + his control. (C)

+

In peacetime, the RDJTF headquarters + will be subordinate to the Readiness Command, but during contingencies + it will transfer with its subordinate units to an appropriate Unified + Commander (CINC) or will operate + directly under the National Command Authorities, as appropriate. (S)

+ +

As an integral part of its function, the headquarters will assume + planning, coordinating, and implementing responsibilities for military + exercises in the Middle East, as well as planning and execution of + combat operations in the region. This will help us determine the need + for a separate unified command for this critical region. (S)

+

We have made considerable progress to date in our work on the RDJTF and we expect to meet our deadline + of March 1 for the activation of the RDJTF headquarters. I will keep you informed. (C)

+ + Harold Brown + +
+ +
+ 49. Memorandum From Fritz + Ermarth and Jasper Welch of the National Security Council + Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs + (Brzezinski) and the + President’s Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Aaron)Source: Carter Library, Brzezinski Donated Material, Subject File, Box 32, + [Meetings—SCC 264A: 1/80]. + Secret. Sent for information. Copies were sent to Sick, Henze, and Funk. A stamped notation on the memorandum indicates + that Brzezinski saw it. + There is no indication that Aaron saw the memorandum. + + + Washington, January + 28, 1980 + + + SUBJECT + Indian Ocean Access SCC on + (Kenya, Somalia, Oman, Saudi Arabia) (S) + +

Background

+

The primary purpose of this SCC is to + review and approve the instructions to the political negotiating team + going to the four countries next week. The SCC should also review our legislative strategy and timing. + (S)

+

The draft instructions to the political team (at Tab A)Attached but not printed are the undated draft + instructions. are in very good shape, in our view. They have + been extensively worked by the interagency team, including thorough + coordination within State and with OMB. + They provide a good substantive guide to the overall effort and the + issues before the SCC tomorrow.The SCC + meeting took place on January 30; see Document + 50. (S)

+

The principals should appreciate—and you may wish in opening the meeting + to mention—several fundamental points: (S)

+ +

—The Indian Ocean access campaign is at the cutting edge of our effort to + build a security structure in SW Asia in terms of its importance and its + difficulty. It is one of the most visible (unfortunately) and concrete + things we are doing. Its immediate military benefits will be important + but modest. It will not revolutionize our military posture in the area. + At the same time, although Afghanistan has increased both our need for + access and local anxieties about Soviet power, the political impediments + to progress remain severe. For these reasons, we must conduct this + effort ever mindful that 1) it should give us options for dramatic + increases in local presence through surging and exercise activity; and + 2) that it should help create the political basis for regional security + collaboration. (S)

+

—There is a widespread sense among Washington experts, and people in the + area, that it’s “later than we think,” especially on the Arabian + Peninsula, that the forces threatening stability from the PDRY, and within Saudi Arabia and Oman + are more advanced than our strategy accounts for. Because of local + political sensitivities, we stress modest access objectives and low + visibility. But we may have to prepare ourselves to move beyond these + initial conditions quite rapidly, not only in response to overt Soviet + threats, but to deal with heightened internal security problems in Oman + and Saudi Arabia. Moreover, we must recognize that our new relationship + with Somalia will oblige a more comprehensive political strategy toward + the Horn. [5 lines not declassified] (S)

+

The state of play logistically is as follows:

+

—The technical facilities survey teams are still in the area, due to + return by 30 January. Their initial reports have permitted refinement of + our access objectives. The most significant result so far is that + Berbera looks more attractive than we expected, and Masirah somewhat + less so. This does not alter our plans; it merely confirms us in our + original determination to seek diversity and redundancy in access. + (S)

+

—The political team will depart on 1 February because of airline + schedules, proceeding to Nairobi, Mogadishu, Muscat, and Riyadh, between + 3 and 10 February. (S)

+

—Ideally, we wish to nail down the framework of agreement including + concrete next steps (e.g., military-needs survey team to Somalia) and + leave certain details (e.g., status of US personnel) to embassies. We may, however, have to + continue high-level negotiations in some places, most likely Somalia. + (S)

+

Meeting Plan (Very Fast Track)

+

You may find yourself so pressed for time as to be unable to work through + the programmed agenda. If principals have read the draft instructions at + Tab A and been appropriately briefed, it would not be unsafe for you to + proceed as follows:

+ +

—The draft instructions look satisfactory. Do other principals + agree?Brzezinski drew a vertical line in the left-hand + margin next to this and the two following points. (S)

+

—If Siad is not at all forthcoming on Ogaden issues and does not agree to + next steps on access without final agreement on security assurances and + military assistance (which depend heavily on his Ogaden line), the team + should merely agree to report back to Washington. (S)

+

—It is absolutely essential that we keep tight control of publicity on + this effort, especially as it concerns the views and positions of host + countries. Only Public Affairs officers should discuss this with the + press, on the basis of tight guidance, until we move into the public + congressional phase. (S)

+

Meeting Plan (According to Agenda)

+

General and Item I

+

—You should open the discussion as you see fit or along lines suggested + above. Please be aware that the agenda contains items which can easily + divert discussion, e.g., whether we want to pay base access fees in + Oman.Brzezinski underlined the phrase “base access fees + in Oman” in this sentence. On some of these things, the team + can call for instructions when we see what we are up against. (S)

+

—You should ask General Jones for + a brief overview of our access plans and the results of the technical + survey teams, and ask Harold + Brown to comment. This is largely to assure that the + principals are clear and ratify our objectives. Details are found on pp. + 5, 8, and 14 of the draft instructions (Tab A). (S)

+

Kenya

+

—There seem to be no issues to resolve for Kenya. Our main immediate + problem is to control publicity. Over the longer run we’ll have to + develop guidance to explain our access activities to other African + countries. (S)

+

Somalia

+

—You are thoroughly familiar with the problem: to link our position on + Ogaden to what we offer on security assurances and assistance. We think + the instructions are sound on this score. The linkage is made effective + at this point in the relationship by our willingness to walk away if + Siad is not reassuring. (S)

+ +

—Siad will almost surely find our security assistance offer too modest. + He will express an urgent need for help on air defense. Beyond specifics + we propose on p. 9 (Tab A), we’ll deal with this by proposing a survey + of his defensive needs (thus fending off the issue for the moment), and + we indicate a willingness to get carefully into the air defense business + by broaching the possibility of installing air surveillance radar at + Berbera (partly for our own protection). (S)

+

—The team will need license to go to the “high option” on military + assistance (p. 10, Tab A). (S)

+

Oman

+

—A peripheral but valuable move: We should remove Oman from the list of + countries that are “dangerous for Americans.” There is no objective need + for Oman to be so listed, and it is insulting to Oman.Brzezinski + drew a vertical line in the left-hand margin next to this + point. (S)

+

—To Oman, security assurances are more important than military + assistance. We expect no problem in offering what the Omanis have said + they want, a low-profile statement of our interest and commitment. + (S)

+

—The issue of base access fees has caused some controversy at the working + level. State favors our being willing to go up to $10 M because they + expect the Omanis to want base access fees, there is precedent in + Bahrain, and our military assistance offer doesn’t go beyond what we + would want to do for Oman anyway. DOD + is ill-disposed because we have no control over what happens to fee + money (much of it will line pockets in a graft-ridden country). DOD prefers to offer additional effort to + upgrade facilities or infrastructure which will redound to common + benefit. OMB warns that Congress will + object to paying access fees as a “back door” device for supplying + military assistance or aid funds. The right instructions (as in the + draft, p. 15, Tab A) are to be reluctantly willing.Brzezinski + drew a vertical line in the left-hand margin next to the first four + sentences of this point. He drew a vertical line and wrote a + checkmark in the left-hand margin next to the sentence that begins + “DOD prefers to offer” and + wrote a question mark in the left-hand margin next to the last + sentence. (S)

+

Saudi Arabia

+

—The only real issue is a general one: how much we wish to rely on Saudi + Arabia for political and financial support. Our aim is to get as much + support as we can but mainly for the purpose of creating a more + reassuring and cooperative relationship and to decrease Saudi timidity + on security collaboration. The instructions are sound. (S)

+ +

Legislative Strategy

+

—All recognize the need to inform key leaders of our objectives and plans + before the political team depart for the region. (S)

+

—As to the timing of legislative submissions, the most desirable course + would be to wrap up enough of the money issues (military assistance and + facilities improvement costs) to permit covering them in an FY80 + supplemental that includes Pakistan and other steps. Should we not + advance the access negotiations that quickly, we may have to consider an + additional supplemental request, despite Congressional objections to + such incremental approaches. In view of the urgency of the situation, it + would not look good to domestic critics or to local countries were we to + take the leisurely approach of funding initial Indian Ocean access + activities through FY81 ammendment. OMB + is prepared to comment on this. (S)

+

Publicity

+

Please make a point of the third tick under Very Fast Track above. We + must maintain tight control on publicity. No backgrounders except by + Public Affairs officers under tight instructions. (S)

+
+ +
+ 50. Summary of Conclusions of a Special Coordination Committee + MeetingSource: Carter + Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Middle East, + Subject File, Box 68, Middle East: Security: 1/80. Secret. The + meeting took place in the White House Situation Room. Brzezinski sent the Summary of + Conclusions to Carter for + his approval under a January 31 memorandum; Carter initialed his + approval. + + + Washington, January 30, 1980, 9–10 + a.m. + + + SUBJECT + Indian Ocean Access + + + PARTICIPANTS + + + The Vice President’s Office + Mr. A. Denis + Clift + + + + + State + Secretary Cyrus + Vance + Deputy Secretary Warren + Christopher + Mr. David Newsom + Under Secretary for Political Affairs + Mr. Harold Saunders + Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian + Affairs + Mr. Reginald + Bartholomew Director, Bureau of + Politico-Military Affairs + Mr. David Moose Assistant Secretary, Bureau of African + Affairs + + + + + OSD + Deputy Secretary W. Graham + Claytor, Jr. + Ambassador Robert + Komer Under Secretary for Policy + Mr. David + McGiffert Assistant Secretary, International + Security Affairs + Mr. David Ransom + Deputy Director, Near East and South Asia Region + + + + + JCS + Lt General John + Pustay + + + + + DCI + Mr. Bruce Clarke Director, National Foreign Assessment + Center + Mr. Greg Cowan NIO for + Africa + + + + + ACDA + Mr. Ralph Earle II + Director + Mr. James Montgomery Acting Assistant Director, Weapons + Evaluation and Control Bureau + + + + + OMB + Mr. Edward Sanders Deputy Assistant Director for + International Affairs + + + + + White House + Dr. Zbigniew + Brzezinski + Mr. David + Aaron + Mr. Lloyd + Cutler + Mr. Hedley Donovan + Mr. Hamilton Jordan + Mr. Jody + Powell + Mr. Stuart + Eizenstat + + + + + NSC + Colonel William Odom + Captain Gary + Sick + Mr. Thomas + Thornton + General Jasper Welch + Mr. Fritz + Ermarth + + + + +

The SCC reviewed the negotiating + instructions for the team scheduled to visit Kenya, Somalia, Oman, and + Saudi Arabia for the purpose of augmenting US access to military facilities in the region.The instructions are summarized in Document 49. The team is instructed + to recapitulate our view of threats to the region, the commitment of the + US to their security, the need for + improved US access, and to offer various + degrees of military assistance nuanced to local circumstances. In Saudi + Arabia, the team will seek political support and financial help for Oman + and Somalia. (S)

+

Dr. Brzezinski, upon hearing no + objections to the basic instructions, led the meeting through the + instructions for problems of detail. He noted that general and + country-by-country discussion of security assurances must be strong + enough to affirm the President’s commitment to security in the + region.

+

Kenya

+

Dr. Brzezinski, Graham Claytor, and Warren Christopher emphasized the + importance to the President’s regional policies of getting proposed + economic support funding ($10 million) for Kenya. This would require + supplemental appropriations in FY80. If it could not be readied in time + for the Pakistan supplemental, it would be submitted separately, and + moved urgently. (S)

+

Dr. Brzezinski emphasized the + importance of limiting publicity. If the Kenyans felt that a US visit to Nairobi presented too high a + profile, they should have the option of sending a Kenyan team to + Washington. (S)

+

Somalia

+

Dr. Brzezinski observed that the + President had already decided to provide Somalia with defensive + equipment.Documentation is scheduled for + publication in Foreign Relations, 1977–1980, vol. XVII, Part 1, Horn + of Africa. The issues now were levels of assistance + and Saudi financing. To evidence our seriousness and to minimize our + dependence on the Saudis, it was decided that we would offer our + “higher” (but still modest) assistance package, including $40 million + annual FMS credits in FY 80 and FY81, and seek to stand firm on + it.Carter wrote in the left-hand margin next to this + paragraph: “Get Saudis to help as much as possible, but don’t depend + on them.”

+

It was noted that there would inevitably be some risk that Somali support + to the Ogaden insurgency would trigger aggressive Ethiopian-Soviet-Cuban + actions which would call our security assurancesCarter + underlined “security assurances.” to Somalia into question. We would have to be prepared + to take action on Somalia’s behalf in some circumstances. We should make + it clear to Siad Barre that we + oppose the Ogaden war, that an increase in the violence or his use of + regular forces would jeopardize our security ties, and that we would not + respond to an attack he provokes. The offer of security assurances to + Somalia should be as follows: “The US + military presence at Somali facilities will be in itself a tangible + expression of US interest in Somali + independence and integrity. The US would + view any direct threat to Somalia with serious concern, would consult + promptly with the Somali government on an appropriate response, and + would react in accordance with US + constitutional processes.” (S)

+

Dr. Brzezinski noted that, while + Somalia had little political support in the region, it was for the + US a more favorable area militarily + than Pakistan, where we might have more political support but face grave + military problems. He thought we should tell Mengistu that our new relationship + with Somalia would not be directed against Ethiopia. Warren Christopher said that + Ambassador Chapin doubts + Mengistu is sufficiently independent for such messages to make a + difference. (S)

+

Oman

+

All agreed that we should avoid arrangements for access that involve + payment of access fees because they set precedents with other countries, + their results are uncontrollable, and Congress objects. The team should + offer to bring the matter back to Washington if Oman insists on fees, + but should stress the great benefit to Oman, as well as the US, of the substantial improvement to local + military facilities we would be paying for. On the basis of technical + surveys, we should suggest a general cost magnitude for the facility + improvement we are seeking. It will be on the order of several hundred + million dollars over a five year period, far in excess of any plausible + access fees. (S)

+

It was agreed that Oman should be offered $25 million in FMS credits annually in FY80 and FY81; but + we would not now offer a squadron of F–5s. (S)

+

Dr. Brzezinski suggested removing + Oman from the list of Muslim countries ruled dangerous for Americans. + Since State had problems doing this for Oman but not other countries in + the Gulf, it was agreed to tell Oman authorities privately that this was + under review and would soon be done. (S)

+

Saudi Arabia

+

It was agreed that Saudi Arabia should be told in some detail what the + US was offering to the other + countries in the way of security assistance, facilities up-grade, and + security assurances to convince the Saudis of our own seriousness and + willingness to invest in regional stability. (S)

+ +

Legislative Strategy

+

It was agreed that Secretaries Vance and Brown + would call key congressional leaders before the team’s departure for the + region to explain our plans and objectives. (S)

+
+ +
+ 51. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security + Affairs (Brzezinski) to + President CarterSource: Carter Library, National + Security Affairs, Staff Material, Middle East, Subject File, Box 77, + Persian Gulf: 1–10/80, 2. Secret. A January 29 memorandum from + Vance to Carter entitled “Blueprint for + Implementation of Your State of the Union Message” is ibid. + Brzezinski’s memorandum + is also printed in Foreign Relations, 1977–1980, vol. I, + Foundations of Foreign Policy, Document 140, from a copy + with Carter’s handwritten + comments. + + + Washington, January + 30, 1980 + + + SUBJECT + The Skeleton of a Strategy for the Middle East + +

The purpose of our Persian Gulf strategy is to protect our vital + interests there—interests shared with Europe and Japan. Because the + projection of Soviet power and influence into the region is the major + threat to those interests at the moment, countering those is the first + priority strategic task.

+

In effect, we have to complete the third phase of the great architectural + task undertaken by the United States after World War II. We constructed + an alliance in Western Europe; we undertook explicit defense commitments + in the Far East; we built CENTO, a + regional security organization that never really flourished. Now we need + to shape a more flexible framework for regional security in the Middle + East. That regional security framework will have to avoid excessive + formality, adapt to the realities of intraregional conflicts, and + facilitate varieties of participation by concerned friends both in the + region and in the other two central strategic zones, Western Europe and + the Far East.

+

The following outlines a number of steps we are either taking or need to + consider taking in order to fulfill your vision of the security + requirements and American interests in the region. The essence of our + strategy is to strengthen our presence and capability by

+ + + —establishing facilities for U.S. forces; + —strengthening friendly governments and the security cooperation + among them; and + —reducing the influence of the Soviet Union, its surrogates (Cuba, + the GDR) and its friends (PDRY). + +

You are well aware of our work on obtaining facilities in the region and + improving our rapid reaction force capabilities. We plan to strengthen + friendly governments and the security cooperation among them by engaging + in joint efforts to protect Pakistan, support the Afghan rebels, and + reduce the threat of the PDRY against + Oman, North Yemen and Saudi Arabia. In the latter connection, we will + also be cooperating with our European allies, and possibly the + Jordanians and Egyptians, both in operations and contingency plans. Our + long-term objective can be described as a Persian Gulf/Indian Ocean + region with a permanent U.S. naval presence and surge capability, an + Afghanistan whose neutrality has been restored, a strengthened Pakistan, + a more cohesive and cooperative Iran, and an Arabian Peninsula free from + threat from the PDRY.

+

We have taken a number of actions to begin the implementation of our + Persian Gulf strategy. A status report follows.

+

Please indicate whether you would wish an NSC meeting on some of the following subjects, whether some + of them in your judgment should be dropped, and whether you have any + specific or general guidance that you could give us as we continue to + work on the following:

+

Actions Undertaken and/or Ongoing

+

1. Political/Diplomatic:

+ + —The State of the Union Address.See + Document 45. + —Agha Shahi visit to + Washington.See footnote 4, Document 40. + —Reaffirmation of the 1959 Agreement with Pakistan, new definition + of assurances, and consultations with Congress. + —Development of political assurances for states providing military + facilities (Oman, Somalia, Kenya—before SCC). + —Approaches to Spain, Morocco, and others about enroute basing and + overflight support (in progress). + —Christopher trip to + Europe on Afghanistan and East-West relations.Christopher visited London December 31, 1979, + for a meeting with U.K., French, German, Italian, and Canadian + officials. He also visited Brussels January 1 for an emergency + meeting of the North Atlantic Council. + —Brown mission to + China.Brown visited China January 6–13. + + —Clifford mission to India.Clifford + visited India January 30–31. + —Brzezinski/Christopher mission to + Pakistan.Brzezinski and Christopher visited Pakistan + February 1–3 and Saudi Arabia February 3–5. Information on + preparations for this trip is in telegram 22784 to Islamabad, + January 27. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy + File, D800046–0689) Documentation on their meetings in Islamabad + is scheduled for publication in Foreign Relations, 1977–1980, vol. + XIX, South Asia. For Brzezinski’s report on the meetings in Riyadh, + see Document 207. He and Christopher reported on their + mission in the February 6 meeting of the SCC; see Document 208. + +

2. Economics:

+ + —Actions for the Persian Gulf region: + • Economic aid package for Pakistan: bilateral (ready); + multilateral (being negotiated). + • German efforts to reschedule Turkish debt. + • Bilateral refugee aid to Pakistan. + + +

3. Military:

+ + —Bartholomew/Murray mission to Oman, Somalia, + and Kenya for military facilities (in progress).See Documents 49 and + 50. + —Technical teams for base surveys in Oman and Somalia + (there). + —Initial effort to create a military consortium for aid to + Pakistan (Japan, Saudi Arabia, U.K., France, and FRG—underway). + —Bilateral U.S. military aid to Pakistan. + —Military exercises: + • AWACS to + Egypt. + • B–52 flights over Indian Ocean. + • Marine Amphibious Unit enroute to the Arabian Sea may + conduct one or more exercises if local states agree (Oman, + Saudi Arabia, or Egypt), and if you approve. + + —Increased U.S. Naval presence in the Indian Ocean (two carrier + battle groups). + —RDF (forces allocated, JTF in + progress of formation, limited contingency planning). + +

4. Intelligence:

+ + —Special efforts toward Iran. + —[less than 1 line not declassified] + —[less than 1 line not declassified] + mission to Saudi Arabia. + —Several “Presidential findings.” + + +

Actions Under Consideration

+ + 1. Political/Diplomatic: + + —Meeting of the seven foreign ministers on aid to Pakistan + (being scheduled). + + + 2. Economic: + + —7-nation consortium for Pakistan: German lead on + Turkey. + + 3. Military: + + —RDF sea-lift + improvement: rapid acquisition of commercial RO/RO ships and + SL–7 class transports. + —Expansion of Diego Garcia facilities. + —Brigade exercise in Egypt (employing forces now based in + the U.S. 82nd Airborne Division, for example). + —Contingency planning with Jordan and with U.K. and France for a crisis + in Arabian Peninsula. + + 4. Intelligence: + + —Iraq connection. + + +

Additional Steps to Consider

+ + 1. Political/Diplomatic: + + —Western Summit (in addition to the foreign ministers + meeting). + —Propaganda offensives against Cuban and GDR involvement in the Persian + Gulf region. + —Steps to accelerate the West Bank autonomy talks. + —Further high level China/U.S. visit (President to China; + Hua to U.S.). + + 2. Economic: + + —Long-term program of economic aid to Turkey and Pakistan + by Europeans and Japan. + —Alter U.S. position on sanctions toward Iran. + + 3. Military: + + —Form a separate U.S. unified command for the Persian Gulf + region. + —Shift our military assistance groups into training and + management assistance, not just military sales (critical for + all MAAGs on the Arabian peninsula). + —Military facilities in Pakistan. + —French aircraft carrier to replace U.S. carrier in the + Mediterranean? + + 4. Intelligence: + + —[less than 1 line not + declassified] + —[less than 1 line not + declassified] + + +
+ +
+ 52. Memorandum From Secretary of State Vance to President CarterSource: + Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, General Odom + File, Box 28, Middle East Command Post: 7/79–3/80. + Secret. + + + Washington, February + 4, 1980 + + + SUBJECT + Amphibious Deployment to the Indian Ocean + +

Harold has proposed the deployment of an Amphibious Task Force to the + Indian Ocean beginning in mid-February.See + Document 47. He would hope to + conduct exercises after reaching the Arabian Sea at the end of this + month.

+

I concur, with some reservations, in Harold’s basic recommendation that + we make such a deployment.

+

I believe there should be no announcement until after Reg Bartholomew and his team conclude + this round of talks on facilities access with Oman, Somalia, and + Kenya.See Documents + 49 and 50. The Bartholomew team returns to the United + States on February 12th. Any publicity before mid-February regarding + Marine deployments could affect the prospects for success on this + mission. It may be prudent to delay not only the announcement but the + actual departure of the Marines from the Philippines. That way we would + avoid a situation in which there were rumors of preparations for + deploying Marines without our being able to offer a public explanation + for fear of disrupting the talks with Oman, Somalia and Kenya.

+

I believe this deployment should be on the basis of a stop at Diego + Garcia and a circuit of the Indian Ocean and a return to Subic Bay + without at this time anticipating any landings. Until our facilities + mission has completed its work, we are not in a position to say with + certainty whether any exercises in the area are possible.

+

Finally, I believe we should proceed with this deployment without any + presumption of maintaining a continuous Marine presence in the Indian + Ocean. We need to think through the scale and composition of our Indian + Ocean presence over the longer term in general, taking into account the + strains being placed on our presence and readiness elsewhere, including + our carrier levels, Marine deployments, and lift requirements. Any + decisions regarding permanent Marine presence in the Indian Ocean should + await that general review, which I believe we should begin soon.

+
+ +
+ 53. Telegram From the Embassy in Oman to the Department of StateSource: National Archives, RG + 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P880026–0356. Secret; Immediate; + Nodis. + + + Muscat, February 10, 1980, 0918Z + +

369. Pass SecDef and CJCS. Subject: Omani Response to U.S. + Proposals.

+

1. (S-entire text)

+

2. Following is text of Omani response to U.S. proposal, given to + Bartholomew by Zawawi in form of memorandum at end + of second round of discussions evening February 9. Reporting on + discussions and Omani response transmitted septel.These discussions, held between Omani officials and + the joint Department of State-Department of Defense delegation led + by Bartholomew, were the + third part of a regional visit that included Kenya, Somalia, and + Saudi Arabia to discuss regional security and U.S. military access. + See Documents 49 and 50. In a meeting with Saudi Princes Sultan and Saud on February 11, Bartholomew explained that in + Kenya, Somalia, and Oman, the United States “had made specific + proposals for access to ports and airports for three purposes: + support of in place forces, periodic exercises and to support large + forces staging into and through the area on short notice in time of + need.” (Telegram 366 from Riyadh, February 12; National Archives, RG + 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P870047–0899; N800003–0357) In + telegram 353 from Riyadh, February 11, Bartholomew reported: “Oman Government officials + have agreed in principle to all rpt all USG proposals for use of their facilities by our + military.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + P870047–0874) During an audience with Qaboos on February 10, Bartholomew extended an invitation from Carter to the Sultan to visit the + United States, which was accepted “in principle.” (Telegram 397 from + Muscat, February 13; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign + Policy File, D800081–0282)

+

3. Quote: United States/Sultanate of Oman Military Cooperation.

+

1—Introduction:

+

The response of the Sultanate of Oman Government to the United States + proposal is discussed under three headings:

+

A—Access to facilities.

+

B—Cooperation in building Oman’s military capability.

+

C—U.S. commitment to Oman’s security.

+

Access to facilities:

+

2—Short term requirements.

+

A—The request for immediate clearance for surveillance and support + flights is agreed in principle subject to normal request procedure and + to the limitations of fuel and accommodation at this stage.

+

B—The requirements to use Masirah as a diversion airfield for aircraft of + the carrier wing is agreed in principle, subject to normal operating + hours at this stage.

+ +

Other facilities:

+

3—A—The longer term requirements for facilities for visiting aircraft and + ships, improved infrastructure and handling facilities and joint + exercises are agreed in principle, subject to further detailed + discussion.

+

B—In considering the improvement of its defense infrastructure the Oman + Government would like to propose that consideration be given to the + improvement of facilities in the strategically-vital Mussandam + Peninsula; in particular the construction of a small deep water port at + Khawr Naid and the extension and black-topping of the Khassab + airstrip.

+

Military Assistance Programme:

+

4—A—The Oman Government takes note of the U.S. Government offer of $25 + million in the FY 1980 and $25 million + in the FY 1981 and also the intent to + encourage the Government of Saudi Arabia to finance other Omani defence + requirements.

+

B—Whilst appreciating this offer the Government of Oman would like to + propose that the U.S. Government gives consideration in addition to the + provision of a grant in economic assistance to promote the economic and + political stability of Oman, without which the enhancement of purely + military capability would be valueless.

+

C—The Government of Oman would wish to relate this grant in aid to its + five year development plan and would there propose a sum of $100 million + annually for the next five years.

+

Security backing:

+

5—The Government of Oman takes note of the assurances of the President of + the United States in his State of the Union address, but would wish to + see this expressed as a more positive reaction by the United States + Government entering into a formal written agreement. End quote.

+

4. Bartholomew team carrying copy + of document to Washington.

+ + Wiley + +
+ +
+ 54. Summary of Conclusions of a Special Coordination Committee + MeetingSource: Carter + Library, Plains File, Subject File, Box 30, NSC/SCC Minutes, + 1/16/80–2/29/80. Secret. The meeting took place in the White House + Situation Room. The minutes are not attached and were not found. + Carter wrote “Zbig J” in + the upper right-hand corner of the first page. In a February 15 + memorandum to Vance, + Brown, and Turner, Brzezinski noted that Carter had approved the + conclusions of the SCC meeting + subject to the following: “1. The military equipment options for + Pakistan, which Defense is developing, should all be based on a U.S. + contribution of not more than $400 million for the first two years. + 2. F–16s should not be considered + in the options. 3. On any future facilities access missions to the + Indian Ocean, we should make a special effort to avoid publicity. 4. + Similarly, the activities of the MAU in the Indian Ocean area should not be publicized. + 5. Our use of Diego Garcia should be made as routine as possible.” + (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, General Odom + File, Box 43, Security Framework: 2/1–27/80) + + + Washington, February 13, 1980, 4:30–5:30 + p.m. + + + SUBJECT + Security Framework for the Persian Gulf + + + PARTICIPANTS + + + State + Deputy Secretary Warren + Christopher + Mr. David Newsom + Under Secretary for Political Affairs + Mr. Harold + SaundersAssistant Secretary, Bureau of Near + Eastern and South Asian Affairs + Mr. Reginald + BartholomewDirector, Bureau of + Politico-Military Affairs + + + + + OSD + Secretary Harold + Brown + Ambassador Robert + Komer Under Secretary for Policy + Mr. David + McGiffert Assistant Secretary, International + Security Affairs + + + + + JCS + General David + Jones Chairman + Lt. General John + Pustay Assistant to the Chairman + + + + + DCI + Admiral Stansfield + Turner + Mr. Robert Ames NIO for + Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs + + + + + The White House + Dr. Zbigniew + Brzezinski + Mr. David + Aaron + + + + + NSC + Gary Sick + General Jasper Welch + Thomas + Thornton + Colonel William Odom + + + + +

Dr. Brzezinski opened the meeting by explaining that + the purpose today is to take stock of what we have accomplished in a + number of activities related to our Persian Gulf security framework.

+

Next week, we will consider some additional steps we might take. The + following items will compose the agenda:

+ + 1. A review of our political-economic presence in the region + (paper by State). + 2. The longer-term implications of our naval presence after the + hostages problem is solved. (paper by Defense) + 3. Military contingency planning. + 4. Allied military deployments which might help us in the + region. + 5. Taking stock of our en route basing problem. + +

Dr. Brzezinski then proceeded with today’s agenda:

+

I. Pakistan

+

A. Economic and Military Aid. There was discussion + of how next to proceed, whether the Pakistanis want us to go to the + allies on the military consortium, and how specific the Pakistanis are + willing to be on what military aid they will accept. Defense can have a + reasonably complete paper on Pakistani military needs by next week. + Doubt was expressed about whether the Pakistanis would permit us to take + that list to our allies and what the allies response would be without a + direct request from Pakistan. We will of course not approach the allies + until the Pakistanis agree that we should do so. There was also + discussion of the size of military requirements package we should + develop based on the McGiffert + visit.Documentation on McGiffert’s visit to Pakistan is + scheduled for publication in Foreign Relations, 1977–1980, vol. XIX, + South Asia. + Harold Brown believes that we can + develop at least 3 levels—a low of $600 million,Carter + underlined “a low of $600 million” and in the left-hand margin + wrote: “From U.S., a total of Not > $400 mil first 2 years.” + and a couple of higher ones. Dr. Brzezinski encouraged Defense to also prioritize + equipment to the extent possible within each of these three levels. It + was noted that the Pakistanis prefer F–16 aircraftCarter underlined “F–16 aircraft” and in the left-hand + margin wrote: “No, this would be a reversal of what we’ve + decided.” because of the ordnance they will carry, but they + have a number of Mirage aircraft which provides a basis for our refusal + to provide the F–16s.

+

To overcome the impasse in coordinating Pakistani aid in our coordination + of the Pakistan military consortium it was agreed that:

+

—Defense will produce the equipment list options by next week;

+

—State, in the meanwhile, will tell the Pakistanis such a list is coming + and ask that they make approaches directly to our allies, thereby underpinning the U.S. + coordination role when we approach the allies.

+

B. Aid package and security commitment. Christopher observed that we need to + pull things together so that we make only one trip to the Hill for + Pakistan, taking the aid package, security guarantees, and nuclear issue + together. He also added that the Pakistanis remained opposed to our + taking up our current aid package. Perhaps later we could take only the + economic aid element. It was agreed that State will consult and provide + advice about how to proceed on this front. We may be able to go to + Congress in about 2 weeks. Christopher reported that we have told the Pakistanis + that they must make initial approaches to potential donors. We do not + know if they have done this yet. Assuming the Pakistanis cooperate, + Cy Vance will approach the + Europeans in a week or so with specific suggestions for support. We will + raise the matter with the Japanese Foreign Minister when he comes + here.

+

II. Facilities Access. + Bartholomew provided a list of 15 + next steps, some of which need SCC + discussion. First, it is important to get back rapidly to all the + countries with details on executive agreements and on military + construction plans. Second, the country requests for additional + assistance were not made a condition of the agreements but raised as + issues beyond them in every case. It was agreed that all three of these + additional requests need to be vetted and reviewed by a working group + and checked with OMB. Particularly, it + is important that the OMB position be + final.In the left-hand margin next to + this paragraph, Carter + wrote: “On any future mission we must leave the press and/or the + blabbermouths at home.”

+

Third, Oman will require a written agreement. A number of alternatives + were suggested—a letter from the President, a letter from the Secretary + of Defense or State, and an exchange of diplomatic notes. Bartholomew emphasized that Oman is + risking a great deal by making this abrupt turn in policy toward the + U.S. and therefore, we must not fail to meet their request in a + satisfactory form. Most discussants favored an exchange of diplomatic + notes at the Secretary of State level as the acceptable form of the + agreement.In the left-hand margin next + to this paragraph, Carter + wrote: “Oman is making negative statements.”

+

Fourth, a Presidential determination to the Congress on Somalian FMS eligibility must be prepared and a + military requirement survey team dispatched within two weeks. All agreed + that careful consultations with the Congress are important preparations + for this step.

+

Fifth, on briefing other nations, it was agreed to be candid about those + basing agreements in briefing the Chinese.

+ +

It was agreed to get a draft agreement for Oman within 10–14 days. + Defense will also prepare the military construction budget request for + Oman within two weeks.

+

As an additional point, Harold + Brown proposed that he send a note to the Saudis asking + them to go on a parallel track to Oman with financial assistance in + light of our financial and military assistance. In the discussion, it + was pointed out that we are unaware of how much the Saudis are already + doing and whether we want them to increase that or continue it. Dr. + Brzezinski emphasized that + Senators Byrd and Stevens are + very firm in their view that the Saudis must pay for some of this + assistance because our efforts there are primarily for Saudi Arabian + security. It was agreed that Defense will draft a letter to the Saudis + for review by the SCC.

+

On access to Djibouti, no further action is needed.

+

III. Diego Garcia. Defense proposed to use Diego + Garcia as a fueling stop for B–52 recce flights from Guam to the Persian + Gulf and return. This will reduce the number of tankers needed. + Christopher expressed + surprise at this proposal because it is the public image that Diego + Garcia cannot handle B–52s. It was explained that the runways cannot + handle B–52 bombers loaded but B–52s as recce aircraft can land there. + Christopher wonders, in view + of the public perception, what effect these recce flights would have on + the public attitude. Brzezinski + solicited Christopher’s further + comments on foreign policy considerations. Christopher emphasized two. First, we must approach the + British. Second, we must consider the Indian attitude. There was + discussion of the danger of allowing the Indian attitude to become a + veto on B–52 flights to Diego Garcia, a development that would raise + questions about our utility to expand the runways to accept loaded + bombers. It was agreed that:In the left-hand + margin next to this paragraph, Carter wrote: “Using D.G. should be + routine.”

+

—State would approach the British.In the + left-hand margin next to this point, Carter wrote: “ok.”

+

—State will not approach the Indians but rather make an assessment of + what their response would be.In the + left-hand margin next to this point, Carter wrote: “ok.” He also underlined the phrase + “not approach the Indians.”

+

IV. Memorandum on the + Enhanced Sealift Capability

+

A. Harold Brown reported that a + memorandum is en route to the President on this matter. Unless the + President gives him a quick disapproval, he intends to go ahead, by + reprogramming funds, to acquire + the two RO/RO ships and lease some support vessels so that we can have + the capability very soon.

+

B. Turner’s previous proposal that + we consider prepositioning equipment in Egypt was judged not desirable + by Defense. There were more problems than advantages involved.

+

V. + MAU Deployment

+

A. Defense commented briefly on its effort to correct press stories and + to tone down the press attention to this deployment.

+

B. It was proposed that we consider opening discussions with Oman, Kenya, + Egypt, and even Sudan on the possibilities of exercising the MAU in those countries. Christopher suggested that it was + probably unwise to have our first military deployment to Oman, Kenya, + and Somalia be a ground force exercise. Troops on foreign soil are a + particularly neuralgic point with the Congress. When we do that, we must + brief the Congress effectively. Furthermore, it might be best to precede + ground force exercises with less disturbing air deployments to those + countries. Harold Brown added + that because air deployments have already gone to Egypt, Egypt is the + most appropriate first choice for a MAU + exercise. It was observed, however, that the Middle East peace talks may + make that less desirable than an exercise in Sudan. Harold Brown added that it is not + absolutely essential for the MAU to go + ashore, but that this had been our earlier plan. It was agreed that the + Defense team headed by McGiffert + will approach the Egyptians to explore the possibility of a MAU deployment while it is in Cairo on + arms issues.In the left-hand margin next + to this paragraph, Carter + wrote: “Keep all of this out of the press, for a change.”

+

VI. Egyptian Arms

+

On the question of who and when to take the President’s decision to + Egypt, Harold Brown proposed to + prepare options which would be presented to the Egyptian Ambassador in + Washington and also presented in Cairo. He emphasized that it is + essential that the various options be presented by briefers, not simply + by written correspondence. McGiffert or Lieutenant General Graves can go to Cairo + with options to present and explain to the Egyptians. In light of this + discussion, it was agreed that the following sequence would be + followed:

+

—We will tell the Egyptian Ambassador in Washington and then allow + Atherton to inform the + Egyptians in Cairo.Carter circled this sentence and + wrote “no” in the right-hand margin. + At the same time, Atherton will present a short letter + from the President to Sadat and announce that a Defense team will soon + come for talks.Carter wrote “ok” in the right-hand margin and in the margin to the left + of the point he wrote: “To reiterate, I want Americans to present the options to Egypt’s military + unless Sadat objects.”

+

—A week or so later, the Defense team will go to present the options.

+

VII. The Allies military + program response on Afghanistan

+

Harold Brown added this item to + the agenda today for initial discussion. He reports that the bureaucracy + in State and Defense have been unable to state a concrete set of program + steps we want NATO to take, both in + Europe and the Persian Gulf. It is important that we get a U.S. paper + into NATO early and follow it with a + meeting of Permanent Representatives to consider it. It must include + actions for both the Central Front and the Persian Gulf. Otherwise, if + there is delay, the allies may take actions only in Europe and give us + an answer which excludes actions in the Gulf. It was agreed that + Aaron, Komer, and Newsom will meet to pull together a paper on this for + next week.

+
+
+ 55. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security + Affairs (Brzezinski) to + President CarterSource: Carter Library, National + Security Affairs, Staff Material, Middle East, Subject File, Box 68, + Middle East: Security: 2/80. Secret. Sent for action. The memorandum + is mistakenly dated February 15, 1989. + + + Washington, February + 15, 1980 + + + SUBJECT + Near Term Enhancement for Rapid Power Projection (C) + +

Harold has sent you a memo (Tab C)Not + attached. The February 12 memorandum from Brown to Carter entitled “Near-Term + Enhancement for Rapid Power Projections” is in the Carter Library, + National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Defense/Security, + Shoemaker, Box 124, Rapid Deployment Force [2–10/80]. + recommending the following course of action to significantly enhance, in + the near-term, our Middle East/Persian Gulf rapid reaction capability:

+

—Promptly establish a seven ship prepositioned force afloat in the Indian + Ocean composed of two commercially chartered roll-on/roll-off (RO/RO) + ships; three Military Sealift Command (MSC) C–4 cargo ships; and, two + MSC tankers;

+

—Direct the Secretary of Commerce to proceed with the acquisition of + eight SL–7 container ships. (S)

+

The cost of acquiring and operating the seven ship prepositioning force + over FY 80–82 is approximately $290M. + The second part of Harold’s sealift package, the enhancement of our + CONUS surge capability, + consisting of eight SL–7 container ships and possibly two additional + RO/RO ships plus a SEABEE barge ship, could cost an additional $671M in + the Defense budget to acquire and operate over the FY 80–82 period. Acquisition costs of the + SL–7 and the MARAD differential + construction subsidies to current SL–7 owners would total about $585M in + the Commerce Department budget. (S)

+

Funds to operate the first two RO/ROs during FY 80 would be obtained by reprogramming current funds + (Congressional authorization required). Harold also contemplates the + need for an FY 80 defense supplemental + and an FY 81 budget amendment to cover + other acquisition and operating costs. (C)

+

The program Harold recommends has been discussed and approved in + principle by the SCC. While several + decisions have yet to be made that may significantly impact on SL–7 + acquisition costs (e.g., should some or all of the SL–7s be retained as + container ships or should they be converted to the RO/RO configuration) + I agree with Harold that these issues should not delay the basic + decision to enhance our projection force capability. The uncertainties + can be resolved in the near-term and should not prevent the Commerce + Department from undertaking preliminary discussions with the SL–7 + owners. I intend to work closely with OMB, Defense, and Commerce to develop the proper strategy + for financing and acquiring the sealift enhancement ships. (C)

+

I have consulted with OMB on this issue + and we are in general agreement on how to proceed. Jim McIntyre will be providing you a + separate memo stressing the wider budgetary impact of the several + possible courses of action in acquiring and modifying the SL–7 ships. + (Tab D)Not attached and not found. + (C)

+ +

RECOMMENDATION:

+

—That you sign the memo at Tab ANot attached. + The February 19 memorandum from Carter to Brown is in the Carter Library, National Security + Affairs, Staff Material, Middle East, Subject File, Box 68, Middle + East: Security: 2/80. A copy was sent to McIntyre. approving in + principleCarter underlined “in principle” and in the + right-hand margin wrote: “only.” Harold’s proposal to + establish a seven-ship prepositioned force in the Indian Ocean and his + leasing of the two Maine-Class RO/ROs;Carter approved the + recommendation.

+

—That you sign the memo at Tab BNot attached. + The February 19 memorandum to Secretary of Commerce Klutznick is in + the Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, + Middle East, Subject File, Box 68, Middle East: Security: 2/80. A + copy was sent to McIntyre. directing the Secretary of Commerce to + initiate preliminary discussionsCarter underlined “preliminary + discussions” and in the right-hand margin wrote: “only.” with + the owners of the commercial ships currently under consideration by + DOD with a view toward acquiring + these ships on the most favorable cost basis.Carter approved the + recommendation and in the margin below it wrote: “Be cautious—I need + SCC & OMB assessment of need & cost. Can + total cost be borne by reprogramming? J.” (C)

+ + +
+ +
+ 56. Summary of Conclusions of a Special Coordination Committee + MeetingSource: Carter + Library, National Security Council, Institutional Files, Box 109, + SCC 277, 2/22/80, Security + Framework for the Persian Gulf. Secret. The meeting took place in + the White House Situation Room. The minutes are not attached and + were not found. Carter wrote + “Zbig J” in the upper right-hand corner of the page. Odom sent + Brzezinski an agenda for + the meeting along with several papers prepared in the Department of + State and CIA under a February 21 + memorandum. (Ibid.) + + + Washington, February 22, 1980, 3–4:15 + p.m. + + + SUBJECT + Security Framework for the Persian Gulf + + + PARTICIPANTS + + + State + David Newsom, Under + Secretary for Political Affairs + Harold Saunders, + Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern & South Asian + Affairs + Reginald + Bartholomew, Director, Bureau of + Political-Military Affairs + + + + + Defense + Secretary Harold + Brown + Robert Komer, + Under Secretary for Policy Affairs + + + + + JCS + Lt. General John + Pustay, Assistant to the Chairman + + + + + CIA + Director Stansfield + Turner + Robert Ames, NIO for Near + Eastern & South Asian Affairs + + + + + OMB + John + White, Deputy Director + Harry Shaw + + + + + White House + Zbigniew + Brzezinski + David Aaron + + + + + NSC + William E. Odom + Thomas + Thornton + Henry Owen + + + + +

Dr. Brzezinski opened the meeting + by adding two items to the agenda: first, a recent report from Somalia; + and second, post-settlement actions in Iran.

+

[Omitted here is material on Somalia and Afghanistan.]

+

Political and Economic Presence in the Persian + Gulf

+

Dr. Brzezinski pointed out that + the State paperUnder a February 21 + memorandum to Brzezinski, + Seitz sent five papers prepared in the Department of State for the + February 22 SCC meeting. The papers + cover a number of topics, including the “impact of the Iranian + Revolution,” the “economic situation,” the “impact of US security role,” and “balancing + factors,” which included the Middle East peace negotiations and + called for the continued building of U.S. “cultural and + informational programs in the Gulf countries.” (National Archives, + RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P800170–0547) recommends + no actions for decision. He then asked if we are in fact out of phase in + the area in that our + military presence has outgrown our political and economic presence. Or + are we to conclude from the State paper that the two presences are still + in phase, requiring no actions at present? There was brief mention of + Saudi desires to buy more arms, of Secretary Dayan’s visit to the area next week,Dayan visited + Saudi Arabia March 1–4 primarily to discuss energy issues and Saudi + oil production. He reported on his trip in the March 21 SCC meeting; see Document 210. and of how the Brzezinski/Christopher dialogue with the Saudis + can be kept alive. Saunders + suggested that every week or so we can send the Ambassadors a list of + things they can press their governments to do.

+

CIA finds the State paper overly + optimistic about the internal stability of most regimes in the region. + Henry Owen added that the + main determinants of our political and economic presence remain, first, + progress on the Arab/Israeli talks, and second, U.S. energy policy. It + was suggested that the British and French take more action in the + region, but it was also noted that their present activities are growing, + e.g. Giscard’s upcoming visit to + the UAE.

+

It was agreed that next week State will recommend some actions we might + take, such as instructions to our Ambassadors.

+

Sustaining a Military Presence in the Persian + Gulf

+

Harold Brown asked that we defer + discussion of (1) British and French deployment into the region and (2) + enroute basing access to next week.

+

a. Our Naval Presence in the Persian Gulf. + Harold Brown opened this + topic with a brief discussion of our initiatives in sustaining a naval + presence after the hostage problem in Iran is resolved. We will need + three components: (1) ground forces (e.g. the MAU), (2) some air power, and (3) some surface combatants. + He suggested several mixes but added that a MAU and a carrier battle group is the most feasible one + although it strains our resources. He prefers, if possible, to + substitute ground-based air for half of each year. He assumes, for all + approaches, that a MAU will remain + permanently in the Persian Gulf. It could be needed to secure an + air-head or beach-head in a crisis. Doubts were expressed that our right + to facilities would allow six months for a F–15 squadron in Oman. + Bartholomew reported that he + had mentioned “a few weeks” for forces ranging from a battalion to a + brigade in size.

+

Dr. Brzezinski asked Harold Brown about timing, when he + would want to begin one of these approaches. Brown answered that after the hostages are out of Iran + he would recommend withdrawing one carrier battle group. Dr. Brzezinski wondered if this reduction + would be appropriate. We need + to think this through and answer the question “Is this enough for the + strategic problem we confront?”

+

It was agreed that the discussion today is merely a preview for the + President, not a basis for decision. Defense will provide a report, + probably by next week, which will provide a basis for decision.

+

OMB added that given the CPI release today and the additional $16 + billion in the budget above previous estimates we will be under enormous + pressure to trim back spending. He offered these remarks because + Harold Brown underscored that + no matter what approach we take to our military presence in the Gulf, it + will cost more money. Brown + argued that these factors will affect “timing” more than the “substance” + of our naval presence in the Persian Gulf. If we back off those + commitments now, we will lose our credibility. Moreover, the Congress + will force us to spend the money anyway. We cannot expand our + commitments without increasing our resources to meet them.

+

b. A MAU Exercise in + Egypt. State expressed doubt that a military exercise in Egypt + is appropriate in the near future. Although Egypt may be anxious to + accept such an exercise, they should not. Dr. Brzezinski asked if this means that + Egypt might make the wrong decision in State’s view. Newsom replied that indeed Sadat might + not decide correctly. He went on to insist that the MAU and the four ships make port calls + individually in the region, not as a group.

+

Dr. Brzezinski asked if this + would not send the wrong signal. Have we not sent the MAU into the region in order to accustom + the countries in the region henceforth to view a MAU exercise as a normal deployment? + Brown noted that there has + been remarkable little outcry in the region about the MAU. He expected much more. Furthermore, + he said that a decision about an exercise can be postponed until + mid-March.

+

In discussing sites for an exercise other than Egypt, Harold Brown suggested Kenya. Dr. + Brzezinski and David Aaron responded that Kenya is on + the wrong continent to transmit the signal intended by a MAU exercise. Oman was considered before, + and we should keep it under consideration.

+

It was agreed to defer recommending a decision to the President and not + to recommend a negative decision. We will continue considering Egypt, + Oman, and Kenya. A recommendation will be made to the President no later + than mid-March.

+

c. B–52s based on Diego Garcia. Brown interpreted the State paper on + the possible Soviet reaction to B–52s on Diego Garcia as one of + “screams” but no serious effort to prevent us from putting them there. + Turner disagreed. He believes + the B–52s will provoke a greater Soviet reaction than State believes. + Bartholomew added that the + Indian Ocean Arms Talks revealed the deep Soviet concerns about + strategic aircraft in the region. Dr. Brzezinski suggested that a promise not to deploy B–52s might be used as part of + an Afghanistan neutralization package. Turner objected, pointing out the undesirability of + giving up our strategic presence on the weakest air defense approach to + the Soviet Union. Dr. Brzezinski + countered that Soviet aviation based in Afghanistan permits a large + Soviet air presence over the Strait of Hormuz, making a swap with the + B–52s on Diego Garcia possibly a desirable one for us.

+

It was agreed to make a recommendation about a decision next week.

+

[Omitted here is material on Afghanistan, Iran, and Pakistan.]

+
+ +
+ 57. Summary of Conclusions of a Special Coordination Committee + MeetingSource: Carter + Library, Plains File, Subject File, Box 30, NSC/SCC Minutes, + 1/16/80–2/29/80. Secret. The meeting took place in the White House + Situation Room. The minutes are not attached and were not found. + Carter wrote “Zbig J” in + the top right-hand corner of the first page. + + + Washington, February 29, 1980, 3:30–4:40 + p.m. + + + SUBJECT + Security Framework for the Persian Gulf—III + + + PARTICIPANTS + + + State + Deputy Secretary Warren + Christopher + Under Secretary for Political Affairs, David Newsom + Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern & South Asian + Affairs, Harold + Saunders + Reginald + Bartholomew, Director of Political/Military + Affairs + + + + + Defense + Secretary Harold + Brown + Deputy Secretary Graham Claytor + Under Secretary for Policy Robert Komer + + + + + JCS + General David + Jones, Chairman + Lt. General John + Pustay + + + + + CIA + Director Stansfield + Turner + Robert Ames, NIO for Near + East & South Asia + + + OMB + Deputy Director John + White + + + The White House + Zbigniew + Brzezinski + David Aaron + + + NSC + Henry Owen + Jasper Welch + William E. Odom + + + + +

I. Political and Economic + Presence in the Region

+

Dr. Brzezinski noted that none of + the State recommendations appear controversial.See footnote 2, Document + 56. + Harold Brown, however, raised two + caveats. First, the absorptive capacity of countries in the region for + military aid is a critical matter. Saudi Arabia is a terrible offender, + purchasing far more than is needed. Second, our embassy in Saudi Arabia + tends to be an amplifier for the Saudis’ requests.

+

Dr. Brzezinski asked what our + capabilities are to assist with internal security in Saudi Arabia. We + are caught in a historical paradox. The things that will promote rapid + development of the economy and political participation will also bring + crises and probably disintegration of the present system. Our need for + the next decade is internal stability rather than rapid change. Our + policy, therefore, should be to direct Fahd away from buying F–15s toward achieving effective + control of the population and the social forces of change. Should we + develop a strategy in this direction? Internal stability for five or ten + years would be a very good deal for the U.S.

+

Dr. Brzezinski next asked who in + the government is in a position to prepare such planning. Komer said no one is. Christopher added that we are not good + at it, and our laws proscribe many actions required for such a strategy. + [7 lines not declassified]

+

It was agreed:

+

a. To develop a program for internal security assistance to Saudi + Arabia.

+

b. To develop an approach to persuade the Saudis to accept it.Carter wrote + “ok” in the left-hand margin next to these points.

+

Turner added that any approach + should be regional, not just a single country approach, because + terrorists operate across borders. Turner also observed there are a number of reports of + skepticism about the U.S. longer-term determination to stay in the + Persian Gulf; we have not yet persuaded states in the region that our + present policy is serious.

+

Actions recommended by the State paper and approved by the SCC:

+

—Near term visits by senior U.S. government officials to the Gulf and by + senior Gulf state officials to Washington.

+

—Financial and commercial actions:

+

a. Review our present posture with Congress and the IRS on U.S. tax on investment income of + the Gulf countries.Carter drew lines from points a, + b, c, and d and wrote a question mark in the left-hand margin next + to each. Carter wrote to the + left of these notations: “This is not the forum to change tax laws, + etc.”

+ +

b. Consider liberalization of our regulations on taxation of overseas + Americans in bidding on foreign projects.

+

c. Provide a clear set of guidelines for the Foreign Corrupt Practices + Act.

+

d. Take a position on repeal of current boycott language.

+

e. Increase the number of trade exhibits and missions we sponsor in Gulf + States.

+

f. Approve the late April Franchising Mission to the four Emirates.

+

g. Continue planning for the FY 1981 + promotional events, i.e. trade missions and major exhibitions.

+

—Economic and technical assistance: Respond to UAE unofficial approaches on reimbursable technical + assistance, linking this with a concept of a business council or joint + commission that would institutionalize Treasury Department access to + this capital surplus country.

+

—Explore extending technical assistance to Bahrain at a level of $2–3 + million annually.

+

—Saudi Arabia: The problem is not strengthening this relationship but + keeping the variety of our efforts with the Saudis in harmony.

+

II. Military Presence in + the Persian Gulf

+

a. Naval presence. Harold Brown reviewed three options in the Defense + paper.Not found. Option one + includes maintaining one carrier battle group in the Indian Ocean on a + continuous basis, periodic land-based TACAIR deployments; periodic battalion-size exercises, + probably in Egypt and Oman; and frequent B–52 operations. Discussion + centered mainly on an enhanced version of this option.

+

All agreed that we should maintain our present level of two carrier + battle groups until the hostage situation in Iran has been resolved. Dr. + Brzezinski asked if we could + hold the present level as long as the Afghanistan situationCarter + underlined “the Afghanistan situation” and wrote “may be permanent” + in the left-hand margin. remains unresolved and then move to + Option 1.

+

Harold Brown responded that to + keep two carrier battle groups for the remainder of this year will + virtually destroy the Navy’s budget and resource programs. Thus he + recommends that after an Iran settlement, we drop to one carrier battle + group and explore the use of periodic TACAIR deployments to substitute for the second + carrier.

+

General Jones expressed concern + that a dramatic reduction i.e., removing one carrier battle group, will + be the wrong signal in the region at a time when we should be improving + our overall military presence. + Therefore, General Jones + recommends that when one carrier battle group is removed, TACAIR be more or less continuously + deployed in and out of Oman and Egypt. This would make up for the drop + in naval air and at the same time lessen the resource demand on the + Navy.

+

Christopher expressed a + preference for Option 1 and noted that General Jones’s approach sounds too much like + permanent bases in the region for TACAIR.

+

Turner added that carriers won’t + have much impact on the Soviets because of their limited range toward + the north. At the same time we must ask the question how can we take + this decision without looking at the effect on our military presence in + the rest of the world.

+

Brown admitted that keeping one or + two carrier battles in the Indian Ocean would require a drawdown from + the Pacific or Mediterranean. Moreover, another $150 million minimum + operating cost will be incurred per carrier battle group.

+

There was further discussion of General Jones’s proposal to keep TACAIR more or less permanently in the region as a + substitute for the second carrier. Harold + Brown observed that his position was very close to + Jones’s. At issue is only + what time period the TACAIR would + deploy. Christopher and + Turner observed that the + TACAIR might create the + impression of an increased military presence rather than a substitute + for the second carrier battle group. Dr. Brzezinski and Brown added that such an impression is desirable.

+

Harold Brown asked that we + recommend to the President that he make a public statement about our + commitment to keep at least one carrier battle group in the Indian + Ocean. No one else supported this view. Political reasons, both domestic + and foreign, were advanced against it.

+

It was agreed:

+

a. That we maintain the present level of two carrier battle groups until + the Iranian hostage situation is resolved.

+

b. That we accept Option 1 as modified by Harold Brown to include more frequent TACAIR deployments to the region. We + shall request the first TACAIR + deployment in Egypt. It was judged better to delay such a request to + Oman. Harold Brown and General + Jones will try to find + common ground on how much time each year TACAIR should be in the region.

+

b. B–52s to Diego Garcia. General Jones recommended that we approach the + UK quietly to get permission for + B–52 recce flights staged through Diego Garcia. Once that is obtained, + we will tell the Congress just before the mission and try to complete a + mission before it becomes public knowledge. General Jones also asked for permission to fly + B–52s non-stop from + Michigan through the Mediterranean, across Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and + Oman, eventually landing in Guam. Finally, he asked permission to open + discussion with the Portuguese about B–52 staging at a Portuguese base. + Most discussants liked Jones’s + approach in the staging of B–52 recce flights through Diego Garcia. + Christopher preferred that + we only take the first step consulting with the UK, and then review the matter in light of the Iran + situation.

+

It was agreed:Carter wrote “Keep me informed” in the left-hand + margin next to this line.

+

a. To go to the UK for permission for the + B–52 recce flightsSee footnote 3, Document 129. and then discuss the + issue at the next SCC meeting.

+

b. That the non-stop flight from Michigan to Guam be approved if Egypt, + Oman, and Saudi Arabia will grant overflight permission.

+

c. That State will raise the B–52 staging issue with the Portuguese at an + upcoming opportunity.

+

Allied Deployments. Dr. Brzezinski asked Defense if it is + clear what we want from the allies. Harold + Brown replied that our talks with the Australians have + clarified what we want from them, and he recommended that we encourage + the British to go ahead with their planned deployment of two destroyers, + three frigates and three or four auxiliaries to the Indian Ocean in + 1980.

+

Concerning the French, Turner + recommended that we ask the French to allow a carrier to participate in + our Mediterranean fleet activities. This would substitute for drawdown + of a U.S. carrier. Brown reported + that the French have recently turned us down on such a request which + passed through military channels.

+

It was agreed that Defense would draft a message for State to review and + pass to the French at the political level. Dr. Brzezinski may also make an approach + from the White House as a parallel effort.

+

Enroute basing. There were no objections to the + series of efforts under way by State to improve our enroute basing + access for deployments to the Persian Gulf.

+

Oman. Two issues were discussed. First, language + for an agreement on security assurances; second, the form of the + agreement.

+

All agreed that the form should be a Presidential letter.See footnote 2, Document + 66. The language for such a letter was agreed as + follows:

+

“In line with my general view of vital U.S. interests in the Gulf + Region, I want to emphasize that the security and independence of + Oman are of great importance to the U.S. The new cooperative + arrangements which have + been concluded by our two governments are tangible evidence of our + concern in this regard and are a mutual response to threats to the + security of the sovereign nations of the region. Any such threat to + the independence and territorial integrity of Oman would be regarded + by the U.S. with grave concern, and in that event it would be our + firm intention to consult promptly with your government on an + appropriate reaction in accordance with our constitutional process . + . . .Carter wrote “ok” in the left-hand margin next + to this paragraph.

 +

The legal view in State is that this is not a bilateral agreement but + merely a unilateral expression of U.S. intent. It does not, therefore, + fall under the Case Amendment requirements for consulting with + Congress.

+

It was agreed, however, that we shall keep the Congress fully informed of + the details of the letter.

+

Additional assistance for Oman, Somalia, and + Kenya. It was agreed to stand pat on the question of additional + assistance for the present. Harold + Brown asked that we make an exception for certain + helicopter training programs with Kenya.

+

Dr. Brzezinski observed that such + completion was fully within the President’s earlier guidance on + assistance to these countries.

+

MAU exercise. + Christopher asked that we + postpone the issue until next time. Dr. Brzezinski observed that we had decided at the last + meeting that we have already made the decision to have an exercise;See Document + 56. the only question is where, in Kenya, Oman, or + Egypt. The choice should be with State because Defense is indifferent + from a military viewpoint. Christopher said that he might want to reraise the + question of an exercise at all.

+

Pakistan. It was agreed that, because the issue is + urgent, Harold Brown will read + the Pakistan papers over the weekend and that all principals will be + called early next week and asked if they have objections or questions + which will require a meeting. If there are none, State’s recommendations + will stand approved.

+

The next SCCSee Document 62. + will take up the items not discussed on today’s agenda:

+ + 1. Possibly Pakistan. + 2. Further discussion of a MAU + exercise. + 3. The Komer paper on + regional strategy. + 4. Post-settlement Iran. + 5. Afghanistan neutralization proposal. + +
+ +
+ 58. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security + Affairs (Brzezinski)Source: Carter Library Brzezinski Donated Material, Geographic File, Box + 15, Southwest Asian/Persian Gulf—[3/80]. Secret. + + + Washington, undated + + + MEMORANDUM FOR + The Secretary of State + The Secretary of Defense + The Director of Central Intelligence + + + SUBJECT + SCC on Security Framework for the + Persian Gulf (S) + +

The President has reviewed the Summary of Conclusions for the February 29 + SCC meetingSee Document 57. and + issued the following instructions:

+

1. Political and Economic + Presence in the Persian Gulf

+

The financial and commercial actions recommended by State are not + approved in so far as they affect our tax laws. (S)

+

2. Access to Facilities in + Oman

+

The text of a Presidential letter on assurances to Oman was approved as + follows:

+

“In line with my general view of vital U.S. interests in the Gulf + Region, I want to emphasize that the security and independence of + Oman are of great importance to the U.S. The new cooperative + arrangements which have been concluded by our two governments are + tangible evidence of our concern in this regard and are a mutual + response to threats to the security of the sovereign nations of the + region. Any such threat to the independence and territorial + integrity of Oman would be regarded by the U.S. with grave concern, + and in that event it would be our firm intention to consult promptly + with your government on an appropriate reaction in accordance with + our constitutional process. . . . (S)

 +

3. Saudi Arabia

+

Approval is granted to develop a program for internal security to Saudi + Arabia, and to develop an approach to persuade the Saudis to accept it. + (S)

+ + Zbigniew BrzezinskiPrinted from a copy that bears this typed + signature. + +
+ + +
+ 59. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in OmanSource: National Archives, RG + 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800120–0532. Secret; Immediate; + Exdis. Drafted by Vedgar + (PM/ISP); cleared in PM, NEA/ARP, and + S/S; approved by Bartholomew. + Sent for information Immediate to Abu Dhabi, Doha, Jidda, Kuwait, + Manama, and Sana. + + + Washington, March 8, 1980, 1825Z + +

63088. Subject: PM Director’s Talk With + Omani Foreign Minister Zawawi.

+

1. (Secret)-entire text.

+

2. Summary: —In a 2-hour conversation on March 3, PM Director Reginald + Bartholomew and Omani Foreign Minister Zawawi covered the following topics: + Bartholomew informed + Zawawi of the SCC decision not to provide economic + assistance, to consider possible facilities improvement projects in the + Musandam Peninsula, and to provide written expression of our interest in + Oman’s security in the form of a Presidential letter.See Documents 57 and 58. Security assistance, facilities + improvements and regional reactions were also discussed. Zawawi expressed disappointment on + not receiving economic assistance, raised the problem of delays on + FMS cases, and suggested that the + Oman Government handle contracting for facilities improvements. + Proceeding with increased U.S. access to Oman was not conditional upon + resolving these issues. End summary.

+

3. Omani Foreign Minister Qais + Zawawi accompanied by Omani Ambassador Sulaiman met with + PM Director Bartholomew March 3rd. Also on the U.S. + side were PM Deputy Director David + Gompert, NEA/ARP Director Countryman, and PM Special Assistant Edgar (notetaker). The + following topics were discussed.

+

4. “Economic assistance:” Bartholomew informed Zawawi of the SCC + decision not to provide economic assistance which Oman had requested + (dols 100 million annually for + 5-years). Bartholomew explained + that we were sensitive to the importance of having a dimension of the + program which related to civil and economic needs and had taken a very + hard look at the problem. Unfortunately, given broad cuts in economic + and military assistance programs necessitated by budget reductions to + combat inflation, it was not possible at this point to meet their + request. We have, however, maintained the dols 50 million in FMS.

+

5. Zawawi expressed Oman’s + strong disappointment at our response. He argued that the amount + involved was not too great and that it was the minimum required to convince their people that there + would be a significant economic benefit out of the relationship with us. + He argued that if the U.S. were as serious about the situation and as + concerned about the stability of the region as Oman, some solution + should be sought. Oman had responded positively and cooperatively and + wished to see our relationship proceed, and he did not see how he could + go back and explain our decision.

+

6. Bartholomew responded that we + felt that access was a benefit not just to the U.S. but to both of our + countries, just as we felt that helping strengthen Oman was in both our + interests. In this context we had brought their proposals on economic + assistance and doing something in the Musandam back with us and + considered them very seriously, even though we understood they were not + conditions for proceeding with a relationship in the interest of both + sides, including increased access. Our budget constraints are real, but + Oman will feel the impact less than a good many others. We will try very + hard to give our facilities improvements a direct civil pay off.

+

7. Zawawi rejoined that the + question of security was of prime importance and that the assistance was + not a condition to proceeding with the new relationship. Pointing out + that dols 100 million over 5 years was + not a “big deal,” he emphasized the necessity of convincing the people + that our cooperation was not just in the security field. In fact, he + said, (in a comment that may have been facetious) if necessary, they + would lend the money to the U.S. so we could give it back to them + publicly; anything to show the Omani people that they would benefit + economically from the relationship. (Note: —We suspect Zawawi meant to say dols 100 million for each of the next + five years, vice over the next five years).

+

8. “Improvements in Musandam:” Bartholomew explained that the team which had surveyed + Musandam had just returned. In general, we share Oman’s assessment of + the importance of the area. However, in view of slashes in economic aid, + we will have to justify anything we do in military terms. We have the + question under active review and are not now in a position to decide. + Zawawi responded only to + point out that a port or airfield in the Musandam would be of military + significance.

+

9. “Security assurances:” Bartholomew informed Zawawi of our intention to record our interest in the + security of Oman in the form of a Presidential letter to the Sultan, + which might well come in response to the Sultan’s letter which Zawawi was about to deliver to the + President.See footnote 2, Document 60. For the President’s letter, see + footnote 2, Document 66. +

+ +

10. “Security assistance:” Noting that the Omanis now had the report of + the military requirements survey team, Bartholomew asked about their thinking on how they would + proceed. He also noted that C–130’s would not be available by National + Day (November, 1980), but that we would take a sympathetic look to see + what we could do to help get 6 tanks by then.

+

11. Zawawi replied that they + were going to buy (4) C–130’s but would wait until spring of 81 since + training would also take that long. He had been quoted a price of dols 14/15 million for aircraft with + spares. Zawawi then proceeded + to elaborate on the problems of lead times. The two examples he gave + were 175 MM guns and Sidewinders. He claimed that they had been quoted a + lead time of 45–50 months on delivery of 175 MM guns and that they could + buy 130 MM guns from the Soviets for less, with a delivery of 3 weeks. + On Sidewinders, he said they had been quoted a lead time of 24–30 + months. They had an urgent need for the first 50 or 60 within 6 months. + He could get air-to-air missiles from Europe sooner and cheaper.

+

12. Bartholomew replied that he + had been unaware of the problems on the 175 MM gun, but would look into + them. Commenting that lead times were a problem, he explained it would + be part of our new relationship to be as sensitive and responsive as + possible and to expedite these matters. In this regard, he suggested + that it was important to make contact on the political level as well as + the technical level to make sure the systems works. Bartholomew also pledged a full faith + effort to make sure this aspect of our relationship is managed + correctly.

+

13. Further on security assistance, Zawawi expressed the desire of his MOD to see where they stand on FMS, costs, and availability before moving + the list of equipment recommended by the survey team.

+

14. “Facilities improvements:” Zawawi raised the question of whether Masirah would be + improved to accommodate both U.S. and Oman aircraft, and left a paper + describing Omani plans for Masirah.Not + found. + Bartholomew replied that we hoped + to get a preliminary version of a detailed facilities improvements plan + out to them soon.

+

15. Zawawi then said that the + Oman Government would like to handle the contracting for construction, + putting out requests for tender, and acting as the customer, subject of + course to our approval at each step. Bartholomew replied that he would look into this though + he was quite sure it would present difficulties. There are numerous + regulations governing military construction that we would have to + observe.

+

16. “Regional reaction:” Bartholomew asked whether the Omanis wanted to take the + lead on briefing any of the regional states. Zawawi + said he would get a reply back + to us but thought basically they could do most of the briefing + themselves.

+

17. Zawawi commented that + general opinion in the Gulf was officially not very favorable. There was + a great deal of sensitivity to an open and declared relationship with + the U.S. Iraq has called on the Gulf states to turn against any + strategic relationship. The Saudis had stated publicly that there was no + problem requiring an outside presence and had not been responsive on + financing the Oman purchase of Sidewinders.

+

18. Bartholomew answered that if + we manage correctly, our access will become part of the landscape, just + as MIDEASTFOR has become.

+ + Vance + +
+ +
+ 60. Memorandum of ConversationSource: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, + Brzezinski Material, + Subject File, Box 38, Memcons: President, 3–4/80. Confidential. The + meeting took place in the Cabinet Room. + + + Washington, March 4, 1980, 1:15–1:45 + p.m. + + + SUBJECT + Summary of the President’s Meeting with Minister Zawawi, Oman Minister of State + for Foreign Affairs + + + PARTICIPANTS + President Jimmy + Carter + Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski, + Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs + Assistant Secretary Harold H. + Saunders, Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian + Affairs, Department of State + Reginald Bartholomew, + Director, Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, Department of + State + Gary Sick, NSC Staff + + Minister Zawawi, Oman + Minister of State for Foreign Affairs + Timothy Landon, Adviser to Sultan Qaboos + Omani Ambassador Sadek Sulaiman + General William Parris + Mr. Chester Nagle + +

During introductory pleasantries, the President and the Foreign Minister + discussed the Foreign Minister’s recent visit to Georgia where he went quail hunting. As the + meeting began Foreign Minister Zawawi presented the President with a letter from Sultan + Qaboos.In his February 18 letter to Carter, Qaboos commented: “we trust that + the United States will consider adopting a more energetic policy in + our Area and Globally, with the aim of pre-empting further Soviet + attempts at subversion or aggression.” He continued: “We must say + that we feel the Western World has for the past few years been + complacent in the face of the massive Soviet psychological and + subversive effort. We very much hope that you and your Allies in the + United Kingdom and the rest of Europe will be prepared to combat the + Soviet threat, not only in the short-term but also in the + long-term.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + P800057–1182)

+

The President opened the meeting by expressing his + deeply felt gratitude and strong feelings about the relationship + developing between the U.S. and Oman. The President admired the courage + exhibited by the Sultan in standing firm against the very serious + Communist and Soviet threat to the region. The U.S. shares the concerns + of Oman and looks forward to a close relationship. We appreciate the + Omani decision to permit U.S. forces to use facilities in Oman.See Document + 53. This will send a clear signal to Oman’s neighbors + and the Soviets not to interfere in the internal affairs of the nations + of the region. The geographical placement of Oman is of great strategic + importance. The U.S. looks forward to working closely with Oman in its + economic progress. The President thought there was a good opportunity + for U.S. private business relations with Oman, and he specifically + mentioned the possibility of EXIM Bank + credits as a possible means of assisting Oman’s economic + development.

+

Foreign Minister Zawawi said he wished to convey the Sultan’s + best wishes. The Sultan is satisfied with the talks we have had so far + about the cooperation between our two countries, which had discussed + U.S. access to military facilities, and the advantages to the civil + sector in Oman. He hoped that development of airports, ports and other + facilities could be valuable for civil as well as military uses. The + Sultan is also interested in security assurances from the President. The + Sultan is outspoken in his response to the U.S. initiatives. He has + recognized the Soviet threat for many years. The threat is not + Communist, since Oman maintains good relations with China, Romania and + others. It is not an ideological question. Rather, the intent is to + safeguard the integrity and independence of Omani territory. So when the + U.S. approach came, Oman was ready, and now Oman sees a new era of + relations with the U.S. Oman would like to go slow in this process. The + proper way is not to affect the traditions, culture and customs of the + country. It must also be a two-way street. The U.S. has its + requirements, and Oman has its own. We understand the strategic nature + of the region and we wish to cooperate in the interests of Oman’s + security. We are prepared to be + outspoken in forming a relationship with the U.S., while our neighbors + are reluctant to say openly what they may believe in private. These + other states stress the liabilities of open cooperation with the U.S., + but we do it, not them. We want to give you the ability to maintain a + credible military capability, but we would like as little fanfare as + possible. We would prefer as few discussions as possible with others in + the area. The PDRY did not inform Oman + when it accepted a close military relationship with the Soviets, so why + should we inform them of the nature and scope of our relationship with + the U.S.? The Sultan is frank and open in wishing to establish good + relations with the U.S. I am here to confirm this and to stress the + importance of economic assistance which Oman seeks from the U.S. The + Sultan is presently on the campaign trail, visiting towns and villages + throughout the country. He must be seen to show the extent of our + cooperation and what is in it for the people. Internal stability is as + important as external stability. We seek this assurance from you, and we + would like a continuing response from the U.S. Our needs are modest. + Unlike some others, when we presented our military needs, we were + realistic about what we could absorb and did not ask for everything. At + times, the lead time for delivery of military equipment is longer than + we feel is necessary. For example, about a year ago we asked about the + 175 mm. artillery gun. Now your Defense people say we have changed our + requirement to the 155 mm. gun, but that change was made on the basis of + the U.S. recommendation. We can purchase the Soviet 130 mm. from + European sources at a much lower delivery time and at very competitive + prices. We would like to see a quicker response to our minimum and + modest needs.

+

The President asked if the Sultan covered these + points in his letter.

+

Foreign Minister Zawawi said that he did not.

+

Mr. Bartholomew said we were checking on the 175 and + 155 mm. guns.

+

Foreign Minister Zawawi interjected that the artillery was no + longer an issue. He simply raised it as an example of the kinds of + problems which can arise. “We know that when you want, you can respond. + We would not want to wait two years . . .”

+

The President said to let him or Dr. Brzezinski know directly if something + arises which needs attention.

+

Foreign Minister Zawawi said their most urgent requirement is + for Sidewinder Missiles. They would like to see the early dispatch of + these missiles, together with their launchers.

+

The President asked Mr. Bartholomew to let him know about that + case.

+

Foreign Minister Zawawi asked the President if he would not like + to read the Sultan’s letter.

+ +

The President said he would, and opened the letter + and read it. He said it was a very nice letter and he appreciated it. + The President said there were two other items of evidence of the new + closer relationship between us. One was the hospitable reception given + to our military team during its visit to Oman. The other is the + constructive attitude of Oman toward the Camp David negotiations, which + he hoped and trusted would be successful. He asked what are Oman’s + relations with South Yemen.

+

Foreign Minister Zawawi said Oman had received overtures over + the past 6 months to normalize relations, using Kuwait as an + intermediary. Oman saw this gesture merely as a tactic, but they were + willing to go along. They asked the Kuwaitis to set a date and they + would be willing to meet with the South Yemenis. Thus far no + satisfactory date had been found, due to no lack of interest by them or + reluctance on the part of Oman. The PDRY had raised some points, which were not conditions to a + meeting, that Oman should have discussions with the Popular Front for + the Liberation of Oman. This used to be called the Popular Front for the + Liberation of Oman and the Arabian Gulf, but now it has been cut down to + size. Oman no longer sees the PFLO as a threat, but it is unacceptable + for Oman as a sovereign nation to meet with an organization dedicated to + its overthrow. The PDRY has also asked + Oman to pay compensation for damages incurred during the struggle over + Dhofar. Oman has replied that if there were some damages, Oman had not + started that conflict and whatever damages had occurred were deserved. + The Foreign Minister had personally passed that message along to the + Yemenis. He told them that if they wish to normalize relations, they + must show some gesture of cooperation and denounce the activities of the + PFLO. So a dialogue is going on, but this is merely a tactic on their + part and is temporary until they achieve their goal of unity with North + Yemen under South Yemen domination. Oman’s relations with Saudi Arabia + are good. The Saudis are supportive except from time to time when they + offer some suggestions about Camp David, but that is only in + passing.

+

The President said that the Saudis make some + suggestions to us on the same subject—and not just in passing. He asked + the Foreign Minister whether he had personally gone to China to + establish diplomatic relations.

+

Foreign Minister Zawawi said that he had, in 1978. He thought it + had worked well. At the President’s request, he then reviewed his + relations with his Gulf neighbors. With Iraq, Oman has normal diplomatic + relations, though they do not see eye to eye on several issues. Oman + welcomed the Iraqi condemnation of the USSR for its invasion of Afghanistan. The recent Iraqi + proposal opposing any foreign invasions in the region was probably a + ploy or an attempt to focus attention on the future cooperation between our two + countries. There was some prospect that Iraq and Saudi Arabia would get + closer together. Kuwait is an unusual case since they tend to be the + socialists or liberals in the group of governments in the Persian Gulf, + but relations are normal. Oman gets on well with Bahrain, Qatar, and the + UAE. They have been working on an + agreement demarcating the border with the UAE, and it has taken quite a while. On Iran, he was aware + that most of the Iranian diplomats have problems communicating with + their Ministry of Foreign Affairs. He had met with some of them in + Islamabad who were old hands there of five or six years before. These + diplomats talk of a new phase of Iranian history starting now to build + at the roots, with the people. It was his view that this process will + take some time to reestablish any stability in the country. The Foreign + Minister had not personally met with Ghotbzadeh or Bani-Sadr.

+

The President said that he would like to see the + Iranian situation resolved, with the release of the hostages. He + wondered about Oman’s relations with Egypt.

+

Foreign Minister Zawawi said their relations were good.

+

The President said that he viewed this time as an + exciting new phase of our relations with Oman. He hoped the Sultan would + be able to visit.

+

Foreign Minister Zawawi said they had been considering a visit + in December, but now they thought that a visit next February or March + would be more appropriate—and the Sultan specifically hoped to meet with + President Carter at that + time.

+

The President said that the Sultan’s letter + indicated his hopes in that regard. He said he was pleased to see + General Parris here since he had been the head of the Georgia National + Guard when the President was Governor of the state.

+

Foreign Minister Zawawi said that Oman wanted to have some + friends. When he was in Georgia, he had seen some farms and some + remarkable sprinkler systems. He hoped that the U.S. would be able to + assist Oman in this area. He thought that the Corps of Engineers could + be helpful in planning dams, and there was much that could be done in + agriculture. This kind of effort would make it credible for the Sultan + to go ahead with the relationship with the U.S. in future long-term + cooperation.

+

The President said that Secretary Vance had outlined for the Foreign + Minister the budgetary problems which we are now experiencing. The + President will instruct Secretary Vance to work in the closest possible way in the area of + economic development of Oman, including direct aid, EXIM Bank financing, private business + investment, the Corps of Engineers, and technical assistance. Again he + welcomed Foreign Minister Zawawi to the United States and said he looked forward + to the Sultan’s visit and to + the long term close cooperation between our two countries.

+
+ +
+ 61. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense Brown to President CarterSource: + Carter Library, Brzezinski + Donated Material, Subject File, Box 37, Serial Xs [7/80–9/80]. + Secret. A notation on the first page indicates that Carter saw the memorandum. + + + + Washington, March 6, + 1980 + + + SUBJECT + Strategic Review of our Unified Command Structure + +

The JCS and I have reviewed further the + command arrangements for the Persian Gulf region described in my + memorandum of January 26.See Document 48. This memorandum + describes the conclusions I have reached and outlines the proposed + changes to the operational and planning concept contained in the Unified + Command Plan (UCP).

+

As a result of the review I have decided to confirm the current area + responsibilities that have been assigned by the Unified Command Plan to + both USCINCEUR and CINCPAC (the line falls between + Pakistan–Afghanistan and Iran). These commanders are now responsible for + daily interface with the Joint Chiefs of Staff and other Unified and + Specified Commands, as well as with supporting organizations within + their region of responsibility such as State, CIA, DIA, and DCA. In + addition, they now plan and administer security assistance, provide + operational direction, intelligence support, and logistical directive + authority, and are responsible for other services in the region. These + functions, including the administration of overseas base structure, + could not be easily transferred to a CONUS-based commander without serious mission + degradation.

+

Moreover, in the event of hostilities, USCINCEUR and CINCPAC + are staffed and organized to provide expanded logistics, command and + control, civil affairs, and intelligence functional support to the + combat force commanders in wartime. This would include the ability to + act in a support role to a new CINC in + the Persian Gulf. Examples include logistics and (from PACOM) fleet support. Therefore, the + JCS and I see little point in transferring such major + peacetime responsibilities to a new Unified Command as that would + require substantial added staff and equipment to execute the + mission.

+

I intend, however, to assign primary responsibility (in peacetime as well + as wartime) for operational planning for major contingencies in the + Persian Gulf regionThe Persian Gulf region + is defined as Iraq, Iran, Afghanistan, and Pakistan, and all the + countries on the Arabian Peninsula; the countries of Ethiopia, + Djibouti, Somalia, and Kenya on the Horn of Africa; the Red Sea and + the Persian Gulf and adjacent waters. It excludes Egypt, Sudan, + Israel, Jordan, and Syria, which remain in the EUCOM area of responsibility. But + depending on the wartime situation, that could be adjusted at the + time. See attached map. [Footnote is in the original.] to the + Commander, Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force (RDJTF). In addition I will designate the Commander, RDJTF, a Unified Commander for joint + operations in the region, in the event of plan execution. In effect, + this action will create a new Unified Command, if and when needed, that + would report directly to the NCA (President/Secretary of Defense), + through the JCS as our agent, as is the + case for the other CINCs.

+

The review also confirmed the need for assignment of the additional duty + in peacetime as Commander Forward Element of the RDJTF, to the Commander, Middle East + Force. This appointment will require a modest augmentation to the staff + based in Bahrain. The political realities of the region will require a + very low profile for this activity (perhaps a dozen people). These + peacetime missions will include collection of intelligence, liaison with + US representatives in the region, + and establishing forward operating bases to facilitate preparations for + deployments, military exercises, and, if required, combat operations. + This organization will insure unity of command, if RDJTF elements are employed, without + disturbing the services and responsibilities currently provided by + COMIDEASTFOR.

+

I agree with the JCS that these + arrangements and the modifications to the UCP will further improve operational planning for the + Persian Gulf region and facilitate the execution of contingency + plans—without disturbing the wide array of services currently provided + by PACOM and EUCOM. This arrangement would, in my + judgment, be wiser than establishing another Unified Command, + particularly because of the added costs and staff that would be + required.

+

I recognize that these arrangements may in time require further + modification; the JCS and I will review + them in six months. In the meantime, I need your approval for this concept and the appropriate + modifications to the UCP.On March 7, Brzezinski sent Carter a memorandum commenting on Brown’s memorandum. Brzezinski noted that it was + “different from his previous proposal in two ways.” He continued: + “Otherwise, it leaves many of the old problems of dealing through + three commands: logistics, intelligence, and control over attaches + and security assistance.” Brzezinski concluded: “It also introduces new + complications.” Referencing the attached map, he asserted: “The + complexity of the proposal, so graphically apparent from the + attached map, makes me less than comfortable. Therefore, I suggest + you ask Harold to address these issues before you give final + approval to his concept for the Unified Command Structure.” (Carter + Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, General Odom File, Box 28, + Middle East Command Post: 7/79–3/80)

+

Harold + Brown

+

AttachmentSecret.

+ + +
+ +
+ 62. Summary of Conclusions of a Special Coordination Committee + MeetingSource: Carter + Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Office, Meetings + File, Box 20, SCC Meetings: #285 + Held 3/7/80, 3/80. Secret. The meeting took place in the White House + Situation Room. The minutes are not attached and were not found. + Carter wrote “Zbig J” in + the top right hand corner of the page. Odom briefed Brzezinski on the agenda of the + SCC meeting and forwarded + background papers in a March 4 memorandum. (Carter Library, National + Security Council, Institutional Files, Box 110, SCC 285, 03/07/80, Security + Framework) + + + Washington, March 7, 1980, 3–4:45 + p.m. + + + SUBJECT + Followup on Security Framework in the Persian Gulf—IV + + + PARTICIPANTS + + Deputy Secretary Warren + Christopher + Under Secretary for Political Affairs, David Newsom + Assistant Secretary Harold + Saunders + Director, Political/Military Regional [Reginald] Bartholomew + + + + + Defense + Secretary Harold + Brown + Deputy Secretary Graham Claytor, Jr. + Ambassador Robert + Komer + + + + + JCS + General David + Jones, Chairman + + + + + CIA + Director Stansfield + Turner + Robert Earle + + + + + OMB + Associate Director Randy Jayne + + + + + White House + Zbigniew + Brzezinski + + + + + NSC + William E. Odom + Jasper Welch + Gary Sick + + + +

Dr. Brzezinski opened the meeting + with a brief mention of items for next week. We will ask Secretary + Dayan to report to the SCC on his recent trip to Saudi + Arabia.See Document + 210. The Saudi Arabian internal security proposals + should be related to Matt + Nimetz’s activities. The Komer paper will be treated at a mini-SCC early next weekSee Document 63. and + the results presented to the SCC + following. (S)

+

[Omitted here is a section on Pakistan.]

+

MAU Exercise

+

Dr. Brzezinski asked State to + clarify its view on the advisability of a Marine Amphibious Unit + exercise in the Persian Gulf region.

+

Christopher argued that we should + not move too rapidly in order to avoid souring of our relations in the + region. We should not push any one to accept an exercise. The Iraqis, + for example, are pressing the Omanis to avoid a military relationship with the U.S. It is better at + the present time, therefore, that the MAU stay afloat or make port calls, not engage in an + exercise. (S)

+

Brzezinski asked if State’s view + includes all countries in the region, Kenya for example. Christopher replied that it does. + Brown expressed the view that + the two best possibilities are Kenya and Egypt in that order. Brzezinski agreed with Christopher’s overall assessment but + suggested that “to push” is an expression that prejudices the decision. + Should we not ask rather than push? Christopher argued that for the U.S. to ask is to push. + Brzezinski agreed with + regard to Kenya but not in the case of Egypt. Sadat will make up his own + mind. It might give Sadat a boost, although what the Israeli reaction + would be is uncertain. (S)

+

It was argued that although Sadat may be eager for an exercise, it would + isolate him even more in the Arab world, something we cannot afford + because Sadat is too valuable to us. As a challenge to this view, it was + asked if having no MAU exercise would + make him any less isolated or would it improve the possibility for + future negotiations? In response to this question, it was argued that + others in Egypt than Sadat perceive a serious internal threat from the + PLO and therefore put a higher + priority on eventually resolving the PLO problem than on the short run gain that might come from + a larger military relationship with the U.S. (S)

+

General Jones suggested an + alternative approach to exercises in the region, what he called a + stair-step approach. The object is to accustom states in the region to a + MAU presence. Acceptance of the + present deployment is the first step. The second step can be port calls + during which dignitaries come aboard the ship. A third step could + involve port calls with helicopters flying non-operationally. These + early steps will allow a military-to-military relationship to develop + which could be used to prompt local military authorities to ask the + political leadership for a combined exercise with the U.S. Once that + step is achieved, we can give publicity to an exercise, even TV + coverage, which will ratify a public acceptance. The important thing is + a successful long-term presence, not just for an exercise this spring. + In order to execute this approach, Jones asked that the regional commander have authority + to deal directly with the ambassadors in the countries involved in the + region. (S)

+

This approach was well received with three small caveats. First, + Turner is anxious that we not + press Oman early for fear of destroying that relationship. Second, + Newsom wants Washington + clearance on the last step where helicopters will be involved rather + than leaving it to our ambassadors. Third, Christopher prefers to begin with one or two ships at a time not an armada-size port + call. Fourth, State needs some lead time with the helicopter step in + order to inform the Congress.Carter drew a vertical line in the + left-hand margin next to this and the preceding paragraph and wrote + “ok.” (S)

+

[Omitted here are sections on Iran and Afghanistan.]

+

General Jones added a caveat + about the fiscal implications for our Persian Gulf strategy. Harold Brown argued that in one way we + have addressed it, that is, in telling the Europeans and Japanese that + we may shift our emphasis to that region in military programs. Jones responded that this may be true + with regard to one carrier or two carriers in the Pacific Ocean but not + in the fullest sense. (S)

+
+ +
+ 63. Summary of Conclusions of a Mini-Special Coordination Committee + MeetingSource: Carter + Library, National Security Council, Institutional Files, Box 122, + SCM 113, 03/10/80, Mini SCC, + Komer Paper. Secret. The + meeting took place in the White House Situation Room. The minutes of + the meeting were not found. + + + Washington, March 10, 1980, 4:45–6:15 + p.m. + + + SUBJECT + Mini-SCC on the Komer Paper + + + PARTICIPANTS + + + State + Reginald + Bartholomew, Director of Politico-Military + Affairs + Anthony Lake, + Director of Policy Planning + Peter Constable, + Deputy Assistant Secretary for Near East and South Asian + Affairs + + + + + Defense + Robert Komer, + Under Secretary for Policy + Walter Slocombe, Deputy Under Secretary for Policy + + + + + JCS + + Lt. General John + Pustay + + + + + CIA + Robert Ames, NIO for Near + East and South Asian Affairs + + + + + OMB + Donald Gessaman + Harry Shaw + Edward Strait + + + + + White House + David Aaron + + + + + NSC + William E. Odom + Gary Sick + Jasper Welch + + + + +

David Aaron chaired the meeting + and asked Komer to review key + points in his paper.Komer produced the paper for the + February 29 SCC meeting on Persian + Gulf security but discussion of it was deferred until the March 7 + meeting, when it was deferred again. Komer forwarded the undated paper to Brzezinski under a February 28 + memorandum in which he stated that he had “personally” written the + overview and analysis presented. Komer observed: “While much of it will be familiar + and some is at least nominally underway, the paper really pulls + together for the first time most of the strands of a coherent + policy.” In the paper itself, Komer addressed the “various aspects of the problem” + of developing a Persian Gulf Security Framework: deterring direct + Soviet intervention, the type of “security umbrella” the United + States should create in the Persian Gulf/Indian Ocean (PG/IO) region, the construction of a U.S. response + capability, security assistance requirements, “key collateral areas + of risk,” the need for a regional oil strategy to complement the + deterrent strategy, the role of the Allies, and the need for + “programs to deal with the threat of internal instability/subversion + in vulnerable PG/IO states.” He concluded the paper with an + “Action Program,” detailing 8 short- and long-term actions to be + taken by the Department of Defense and 13 actions to be taken + jointly by the Department of State and Department of Defense to + address these problems. The paper and Komer’s February 28 memorandum were attached as Tab + D to Odom’s March 4 memorandum to Brzezinski on the SCC meeting agenda. (Carter Library, National Security + Council, Institutional Files, Box 110, SCC 285, 03/07/80, Security Framework) (C)

+

Komer argued that we need an + overall plan which he tried to provide in the paper. Many of the points + he recommended for action are already in progress, many have been + completed, and a few others are extremely comprehensive and not easy to + address as a security problem alone, such as an energy strategy and the + overall fiscal question of whether the budget will support our apparent + requirements in the region. He then touched briefly on three points for + emphasis:

+

—A rear base area—Plans for a major rear area + support base for a large U.S. force projected into the area have yet to + be developed. The obvious options are Egypt and Israel. Komer preferred Egypt. (S)

+

—Internal security and reform programs—Komer finds this a particularly + important issue, but he notes we are addressing this on Saudi Arabia at + the next SCC.See Document 64. + (S)

+

—Our strategic dialogue with states in the + region—Komer argued + that we have failed to engage in a strategic dialogue with the + Pakistanis, the Saudis, the Emirates, the Iraqis, and the Turks. (S)

+

Next Komer said he would like to + add three additional points for action:

+

—A list of military contingency plans for the region.

+

—Pressing the Saudis and Egyptians toward a rapprochement.

+

—The economic support required to keep Sadat in power. (S)

+

State’s reaction to the paper was essentially favorable, noting most of + the action list is in progress. (C)

+ +

OMB raised serious questions about + force-sizing for any contingency such as the defense for southern Iran. + Following the lengthy discussion, it was underscored that an effective + military posture in the region inevitably will involve large costs. It + was emphasized, in particular, that the political climate has been + fundamentally altered by Soviet military involvement in the region. To + reverse this or to check it from further expansion will require a much + larger U.S. military commitment to the region than is now planned. + (S)

+

David Aaron drew this discussion + out at length because he felt it was important to understand budget + constraints for any strategy that we pursue in the region. This + completed discussion of Komer’s + first and second action points. (C)

+

What follows is a status on each of the action points as reflected in the + discussion:

+

Point 2—Some work has been done, but both State + and Defense should develop papers on a country-by-country basis.

+

Point 3—Elaboration of our declaratory policy + should await the papers written for Point 2.

+

Point 4—Enroute transit/refueling rights are being + pursued by State with Defense support.

+

Point 5—Homeporting facilities—work is in + progress. Defense needs to present specific requirements and bases to + State before dialogue can be opened with relevant countries.

+

Point 6—No action for the present.

+

Point 7—The Turkish military aid package is being + worked on. Should be brought to a SCC + in a few weeks.

+

Point 8—A post-hostage Iran program needs no + additional discussion for the present.

+

Point 9—Next phase vis-a-vis Pakistan and India, + needs a State paper on India and Tarapur for a SCC.

+

Point 10—A FY 1980 + security assistance supplemental, was not discussed.

+

Point 11—Relating our energy needs to our security + needs in the Persian Gulf was discussed briefly, but Komer has no proposals beyond a + dialogue with the Saudis on their security interests being highly + compatible with our energy interests.

+

Point 12—Pressing our European and Japanese allies + to participate in our game plan was acknowledged to be underway.

+

Point 13—Internal security for Saudi Arabia will + be addressed at the SCC on 3/14.The next meeting was on Monday, March 17; see + Document 64. (S)

+ +

Follow-up taskings were:

+

—NSC will provide an overall status + report on who has done what.

+

—State will produce a short strategy paper based on this action and as an + alternative to it.

+

—Defense will spell out more clearly its assumptions for planning in the + region. (S)

+
+ +
+ 64. Summary of Conclusions of a Special Coordination Committee + MeetingSource: Carter + Library, National Security Council, Institutional Files, Box 111, + SCC 289, 3/17/80, Security + Framework. Secret. The meeting took place in the White House + Situation Room. The minutes were not found. Carter wrote in the upper + right-hand margin: “Zbig—Discuss all of this carefully with + John + West + before proceeding. My guess is that Saudis, + Egyptians & Israelis will object to any US basing in their country. J.” + + + Washington, March 17, 1980, 5:30–6:15 + p.m. + + + SUBJECT + Followup on Security Framework in the Persian Gulf—V + + + PARTICIPANTS + + + State + Under Secretary for Political Affairs, David Newsom + Assistant Secretary Harold + Saunders + Director, Political/Military Affairs, Reginald Bartholomew + Counselor, Matthew + Nimetz + + + + + Defense + Secretary Harold + Brown + Deputy Secretary Graham Claytor, Jr. + Under Secretary for Policy, Ambassador Robert Komer + + + + + JCS + General David + Jones, Chairman + Lt. General John + Pustay + + + + + CIA + Director, Admiral Stansfield + Turner + Deputy Director, Frank + Carlucci + Robert Ames, NIO for Near + East & South Asian Affairs + [name not declassified] + + + + + OMB + Associate Director Edward Jayne + + + + + White House + Dr. Zbigniew + Brzezinski + David Aaron + + + + + NSC + William E. Odom + Jasper Welch + Gary Sick + + + +

Dr. Brzezinski opened the meeting + with a brief discussion of the agenda. Dayan’s report will be postponed until the next meeting. + Pakistan should also be discussed at the next SCC. Finally, the issue of TOW missiles for Oman is added to the discussion today. + (S)

+ +

Rear Bases

+

Dr. Brzezinski asked Defense to + report on the follow-up issue from the Komer paper, rear bases.See + Document 63. Following the March 10 + mini-SCC meeting, the + Department of State produced an annotated version of the Komer Action Program to show the + status of each recommendation. The annotated Action Program was sent + by O’Donohue and Saunders to + Christopher under a + March 13 memorandum in preparation for the March 17 SCC meeting, which was originally + scheduled to take place on March 14. (National Archives, RG 59, + Central Foreign Policy File, P870147–0499) + Harold Brown declared that we + definitely need rear base capabilities if we are to deploy to the region + a U.S. military force of any significant size for several months or + more. There are several ways to acquire such support basing. First, + overbuilding Saudi facilities could solve part of the problem, but views + within Defense differ on how much. Second, Egypt is the most desirable + location, and Berenice and Ras Banas are prime candidate bases. There is + no doubt about the need. The real question is how, when, and whether we + can acquire such bases without unacceptable political consequences. + (S)

+

Dr. Brzezinski asked if U.S. + military personnel would be required at those bases. Brown answered that we could man them + with a few U.S. contract civilians and many Egyptians. The Egyptians, he + added, have shown considerable technical capability in logistics and + support activities. Brown next + asked General Jones to comment + on the rear base issue.Carter wrote in the left-hand + margin next to this and the next three paragraphs: “I also do not + want any public failure or rebuff, which I consider almost + inevitable. Past experience indicates that all of this will be in the news before any decisions can + be made.” (S)

+

General Jones pointed out that, + for the contingency of “holding the Soviets,” if this means the USSR pouring division after division into + the area, we cannot do it. At the other end of the spectrum, a very + small contingency, we can operate without a major rear base. For + contingencies in the mid-range between these two extremes, bases are + imperative, particularly for the U.S. Army and ground activities. Like + Harold Brown, General + Jones favors Berenice and + Ras Banas. (S)

+

Dr. Brzezinski pointed out that + there appears to be no request for a decision today beyond authority to + study and propose such basing. Harold + Brown agreed and offered to provide a paper within two to + three weeks for State and CIA reaction. + There was some discussion of basing in Turkey, the Sinai, and other + areas. All were judged impractical or politically too sensitive to raise + now. (S)

+

It was agreed that Defense will produce a paper on rear bases and submit + it for State and CIA reaction before + proposing it to the SCC. (S)

+ +

Overbuilding Saudi Facilities

+

The next military issue, getting the Saudis to build their facilities to + support our contingency plans, is, in Harold + Brown’s view, something we should talk to them about as + soon as possible. We know now that they are not building airfields and + storage areas to the level we might desire. General Jones said that a military-to-military + approach might get better results than an approach at the political + level which makes overbuilding look like a political favor to the + U.S.Carter wrote “Very doubtful” in the left-hand margin + next to this paragraph. (S)

+

There was discussion of how to justify such an effort to the Congress for + bases, which would be built by the Corps of Engineers. In particular, + there would be worry about the threat to Israel of larger airfields. + Harold Brown argued that we + can disaggregate these issues by private contractor construction and by + choice of bases to overbuild, i.e. not those closer to Israel. (S)

+

It was agreed that this issue would be looked at in the context of the + foregoing discussion and the Defense study on rear bases. (S)

+

Guiding FMS + Sales to Saudi Arabia

+

Dr. Brzezinski asked how we are + to do this. Newsom said that we + need to define U.S. needs before we can take such an approach. Brown conceded the point and also noted + the difficulties caused by other foreign sales such as French equipment + in Saudi Arabia. It can only complicate our contingency planning. + (S)

+

Matthew Nimetz pointed out that we + can make progress on this issue only after Ambassador West comes to Washington and we work + out with him Saudi FMS requests and + justification to the Congress. In particular, Nimetz is concerned about explaining + the Saudi absorptive capacity for more and sophisticated weaponry which + we might want to sell for our contingency use. Komer emphasized that there are, + indeed, two concerns here. First, the Saudi absorptive issue and second, + consideration for our use. We will have to work out a way to manage both + within our legal constraints. (S)

+

[2 paragraphs (12 lines) not declassified]

+

Harold Brown said that we must + detach ourselves for a moment and ask ourselves what we are trying to + do. Is it not illegal for us to engage in internal police support + activities for the Saudis? Considerable discussion of this point + followed. The action, police support against terrorism, it was argued, + is legal. If counterinsurgency is our aim, the question is how far to go, argued Harold Brown. Dr. Brzezinski said that this is the same + issue he posed some time ago, how to buy time for the present Saudi + regime.Carter wrote “Discuss w/Cutler & w/West” in the left-hand margin next to + this paragraph. (S)

+

Next there was discussion of how the Saudis would react to our offer. Dr. + Brzezinski said that they + will not like it; our problem is how to sell it to them. State pointed + out that there are [1 line not declassified]. + CIA acknowledged this and argued + that we should, therefore, approach the Saudis at a very low level.Carter + wrote “Who at a low level can make a decision?” in the left-hand + margin next to this paragraph. (S)

+

Dr. Brzezinski ended the + discussion by tasking CIA for a paper + on their programs for the next SCC + which will be circulated and commented on by INR at State. (S)

+

Next Dr. Brzezinski asked + Harold Brown to comment on + DOD’s efforts to support internal + stability in Saudi Arabia. Harold + Brown listed a number of things that we might do:

+

—[2 lines not declassified] (S)

+

—[2 lines not declassified] (S)

+

—The U.S. military advisory effort might go beyond what the CIA proposes in its counterterrorism + programs. (S)

+

—How to coordinate the contingency use of other forces in the region + might be raised, although this is an extremely sensitive subject for the + Saudis. (S)

+

—[2 lines not declassified], something that was + sorely missed during the Mecca incident. (S)

+

State was concerned with the implications for military sales that any + such defense advisory efforts might have. (S)

+

Dr. Brzezinski tasked Defense to + prepare a paper on the above points for the next SCC and to take into account State’s + comments on military sales. (S)

+

TOW Sales to + Oman

+

Dr. Brzezinski expressed the + President’s concern about the long lead time for U.S. TOW deliveries to Oman as they are now + scheduled. Harold Brown explained + that this is a long established and well known delivery rate for U.S. + FMS. If, however, we want to make + an exception for Oman, we can divert from other FMS sales, or we can take the equipment from the U.S. Army. + If we do that, we can deliver the total amount by the end of July 1980, + but the Army will file a complaint about the adverse implication which the Secretary + of Defense will have to waive. The waiver must also be explained to the + Congress. (S)

+

The discussion centered on the psychological impact that rapid TOW delivery would have. Dr. Brzezinski suggested that we split the + delivery, making it half in July and half by the end of the year in + order to sustain the psychological effect on the Omanis for a longer + time. (S)

+

Next, the discussion turned to our need for an FMS stockpile. We are frequently taking sorely needed + equipment away from our own forces for FMS emergencies. Tunisia was a recent example. Both State + and Defense underscored the importance of developing a stockpile which + allows a delivery rate equal to or better than the Soviet delivery rate. + We are measured against the Soviet performance by states in the Persian + Gulf region. (S)

+

It was agreed that Harold Brown + will take steps to speed up delivery by diversion from the Army this + year if the President approves. As soon as the President’s decision is + known, State will notify the Omanis and consult with Congress.Carter + wrote “DoD, Give me a quick analysis & proposal” in the + left-hand margin next to this paragraph. (S)

+
+ +
+ + 65. Summary of Conclusions of a Special Coordination Committee + MeetingSource: Carter + Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, General Odom File, Box 47, + Security Framework: Minutes of Meetings: 1–4/80. Secret. The meeting + took place in the White House Situation Room. The minutes were not + found. Carter wrote “ok J” + in the upper right-hand corner of the page. + + + Washington, March 28, 1980, 11 a.m.–12:30 + p.m. + + + SUBJECT + Followup on Security Framework in the Persian Gulf—VII + + + PARTICIPANTS + + + State + Counselor Matthew + Nimetz + Director, Political/Military Affairs, Reginald Bartholomew + Deputy Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern & South + Asian Affairs, Joseph W. + Twinam + Deputy Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern & South + Asian Affairs, Jane A. Coon + + + + + Defense + Under Secretary for Policy, Ambassador Robert Komer + Assistant Secretary for International & Security + Affairs David + McGiffert + + + + + JCS + Chairman, General David + Jones + Lt. General John + Pustay + + + + + CIA + Director Stansfield + Turner + Deputy Director Frank + Carlucci + NIO for Near East & + South Asia, Robert Ames + [name not declassified] + + + + + OMB + Associate Director, Edward Jayne + + + + + White House + Zbigniew + Brzezinski + David Aaron + + + + + NSC + William Odom + Thomas + Thornton + Henry Owen + Jasper Welch + + + +

Dr. Brzezinski opened the meeting + by adding an urgent item to the agenda concerning our agreements with + Oman. As a result, the Indian/Tarapur issue was not discussed. It will + be treated at a separate SCC. (S)

+

Oman

+

Dr. Brzezinski said there are two + points to be decided. First, whether or not to ask the Omanis for a + troop cantonment as part of our military infrastructure development. + Second, how to deal with economic aid for Oman. (S)

+

On the first issue, Dr. Brzezinski recommended strongly that we not burden the + relationship with one more military infrastructure request. It is the + wrong signal at a delicate time when other outside powers could use it + to embarrass and intimidate Oman. No objections were raised to this, and Bartholomew was instructed not to raise + the cantonment area with the Omanis during his upcoming visit.See Documents 70–72. (S)

+

There was brief discussion of the large number of Congressmen descending + on Oman next week, the Price Codel + from the House and the Biden/Baker/Zorinsky + Codel on the Senate side. Dr. + Brzezinski asked Defense and + State why they had allowed the coincidence of these visits with + Bartholomew’s trip. Defense + has talked to Price and State will discuss it more specifically with + Biden. Oman, it was pointed + out, is not objecting to the Codels + because it has long been Omani policy to encourage more Congressional + attention. As Dr. Brzezinski + pointed out, however, there is an unfortunate coincidence of a surge of + Codel activity and sensitive + bilateral negotiations. He instructed State and Defense to explain the + sensitivity once again to both Price and Biden. (S)

+

The second issue, economic aid, occasioned an extensive debate. The + Omanis are asking that we pave an airfield and improve a port on their + shore at the Strait of Hormuz. If we do not build the cantonment + facilities at Masirah, we could presumably have funds for this request. + They would be difficult to get through Congress, however, because they + come from the military construction budget. (S)

+

For economic aid to Oman, State proposed to reprogram ESF from Sudan and replace it by PL + 480.Public Law 480, also known as Food + for Peace, which President Eisenhower signed into law on July 10, 1954, permits + the sale of commodities to foreign governments on grant or credit + and allows the United States to donate foods to recipient + governments or private voluntary organizations for use in + emergencies. The USDA and AID + administer the program. The only reprogramming alternatives, + in State’s view, are Sudan and southern Africa—Zimbabwe. The Israeli + lobby in Congress probably will oppose reprogramming from Sudan, thereby + forcing the money to be taken from southern African funds. (S)

+

The overall objective of the military construction and ESF is a $100 million package for + Bartholomew to take to Oman + next week. Anything less was judged by all present as likely to result + in a failed mission. (S)

+

Henry Owen tabled another + alternative in which we would offer to establish a U.S./Omani commission + on economic and technological cooperation, analogous to the commission + we have with Saudi Arabia. It would require annually $5 million ESF, AID + Reimbursable Technical Assistance Funds, authorized international + technical cooperation activities of USG + technical agencies (HEW, USDA, USGS, DOT, etc.), and facilities of the + Export-Import Bank and OPIC. This + commission would serve as an umbrella and coordinator for many private + contractual services to Oman. (S)

+

Out of the discussion, three alternatives developed:

+ +

—Commit ourselves to the overall $100 million package of ESF and military construction funds with a + promise of follow-on in FY 1982–83 + appropriations.

+

—Combine the joint commission and reprogramming of the ESF and military construction funds this + year.

+

—Offer the joint commission with only $5 million ESF reprogramming, which is required to launch the + commission. (S)

+

In the discussion that followed, three key points emerged again and + again. First, we cannot be sure of the out-year appropriations in FY 1982–83. Second, we are facing a mood in + Congress which is unsympathetic to most reprogramming activities as well + as larger ESF and military construction + outlays. Third, we are discussing very small sums of money in the + context of a major strategic problem, one of the largest since World War + II. If our arrangements with Oman suffer a setback, we will see our + security framework for the region collapse. An enormous amount is at + stake, therefore, on these comparatively small budget sums. State + emphasized that we must sort out our priorities. If Oman means this + much, then we must take on the Jewish lobby over Sudan, or relegate + southern Africa to a lower priority. DOD, JCS, and CIA all endorsed this view of the gravity + of the choice the President must face. (S)

+

Dr. Brzezinski instructed + Bartholomew, OMB, and Owen to get together with Odom and prepare a separate + memorandum for the President on the choice he must make in this case. It + will explicate the budgetary implications and the political and + strategic consequences for the President. (S)

+

Internal Stability in Saudi Arabia

+

Dr. Brzezinski turned to the + Defense paper on programs that might be provided the Saudi Government. + There are two points to be decided. First, do all agree on the programs, + and second, how shall we approach the Saudis in presenting them. (S)

+

State expressed concern about the program to improve [2 + lines not declassified], it was argued. In rebuttal, Dr. + Brzezinski and Defense + pointed out that circumstances are changing and the power balance within + the royal family is altering. Furthermore, [less than + 1 line not declassified]. We are only deciding whether to make + such things available. (S)

+

Next, State raised questions about the use of [less + than 1 line not declassified] for intelligence and influence. + All agreed that this is a delicate issue into which we should not rush. + Turner argued that we should + manage this matter as we have done it traditionally, [2 lines not declassified]. (S)

+

Dr. Brzezinski tasked Defense to + elaborate in a paper what would be entailed in their recommendation [less than 1 line not declassified]. We can judge with more confidence, + based on that paper, how to proceed. On the [less than + 1 line not declassified], Dr. Brzezinski, Defense, and CIA argued that there is no reason not to explore this + matter, but they agreed that State’s stricture about pushing it on the + Saudis is well taken. (S)

+

Turner raised the question about + rapid reaction forces in the Defense paper. It was pointed out that any + Defense personnel committed to such an effort would be through the + CIA program discussed last week. + This matter is being coordinated extensively at the staff level between + CIA and Defense to prevent + duplications. If later on the Saudis express a desire for something + larger than a small hostage release force, that would have to be dealt + with in Defense channels. We are nowhere near that point at the present. + (S)

+

The method of approach to the Saudis was discussed next. [1 line not declassified] Defense could use the + Lawrence reportSee Document 197. + as a basis for opening a separate dialogue. We have already promised + them the Lawrence report. Or, as + Defense pointed out, it might be part of Harold Brown’s discussion, if he makes a trip to Saudi + Arabia later this spring. (S)

+

All agreed that [less than 1 line not + declassified] should go ahead with its approach to the Ministry of + Interior making as much progress as possible and reporting back to the + SCC on its results. Later, Defense + can, as it has promised the Saudis, give them the Lawrence report and follow up with a + dialogue if the Saudis want it. The results from both efforts will be + reported to the SCC as a basis for + judging next steps. (S)

+

[Omitted here is material on Pakistan.]

+
+ + +
+ 66. Summary and Conclusions of a Mini-Special Coordination Committee + MeetingSource: Carter + Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, + Defense/Security, Ermarth, + Box 5, Middle East/Persian Gulf (Basing): 2–9/80. Secret. The + meeting took place in the White House Situation Room. The minutes of + the meeting were not found. + + + Washington, March 28, 1980, 4:30–6 + p.m. + + + SUBJECT + Oman, Somalia, Kenya Facility Access + + + PARTICIPANTS + + + State + Mr. Reginald + Bartholomew Director, Bureau of + Politico-Military Affairs + Mr. David Gompert Deputy Director, Bureau of + Politico-Military Affairs + Mr. Daniel O’Donohue Deputy Director, Bureau of + Politico-Military Affairs + Mr. Robert Keely Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau of + African Affairs + Mr. Joseph Twinam + Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Political-Military + Affairs + + + + + OSD + Mr. David Ransom + Deputy Director, Near East and South Asia Region + + + + + JCS + RADM. J.A. Lyons Deputy + Director for Political-Military Affairs, J–5 + + + + + DCI + [2 names not declassified] + + + + + OMB + Mr. Randy Jayne Associate Director, National Security and + International Affairs + Mr. Harry Shaw Chief, International Security Affairs + Branch + + + + + White House + Mr. David + Aaron + + + + + NSC + Mr. Jasper Welch + Mr. Fritz + Ermarth + Mr. Gary + Sick + Mr. Rutherford Poats + + + +

Summary and Conclusions

+

Somalia

+

CIA reported indications of a near-term + step-up of military operations in the Ogaden. It was agreed, therefore, + that we cannot take new steps on access negotiations until these + indications are confirmed or discredited. Meanwhile, State will review + options, including “standing pat” on access negotiations. State will also develop diplomatic + options for a demarche to Somalia on the Ogaden situation. (S)

+

Kenya

+

A new proposal was tabled to include a $1 million package of improvements + to an existing Kenyan facility, to facilitate joint ground training with + the Kenyans. It was agreed that such joint training and the facility + improvements were desirable. There was concern on timing because of + political sensitivity at the start of the relationship, and because the + SCC recently deferred a decision to + request on-shore training in the area. The following approach was + agreed, ad referendum to principals in the case + of Defense and JCS:

+

a) Do not raise project with Kenya at this time.

+

b) Keep alive the prospect of joint training with Kenya (it is in the + draft access agreement now with Kenya).

+

c) Raise the project as soon as (1) access agreement is in hand, (2) + Congress has acted on other aspects of construction for FY 81, (3) the other aspects of Kenya + program are in implementation.

+

d) Set aside sufficient funds for the project in FY 81 funds to permit financing in FY 81 if the timing track permits. (S)

+

Oman

+

It was agreed that the team to Oman will include Reg Bartholomew, State; David Ransom, Defense; Major General + Irions, JCS; and Major Gerald Robinson, + JCS. The Churchill team will be on + hand to support. Bartholomew will + present our case on the access agreement after presenting the + President’s letter, the aide memoire on construction,No copy of Carter’s letter, as approved and sent to Qaboos, has been found. A draft + prepared in PM/ISP and sent by Tarnoff to Brzezinski for approval under a + March 21 covering memorandum is in the National Archives, RG 59, + Central Foreign Policy File, P800057–1179. The draft, prepared in + response to Qaboos’ February + 18 letter, incorporated the language agreed on at the February 29 + SCC meeting. See Document 57. For the aide-mémoire on + construction, see Document 72. and + our economic offer. On hearing Oman’s concerns, he will make an + on-the-spot judgment as to whether he and the Churchill team should + begin negotiating technical details, or pitch a generalized fall-back + position on which Oman could agree or reflect further. (S)

+

The aide memoire on construction was approved, except for the amended + section on Musandam, to be sent around for clearance by DOD on 29 March. (S)

+

It was agreed that:

+

a) State will flesh-out the Joint Commission concept for presentation to + Oman and begin planning on implementation.

+ +

b) Delivery commitments stated in the Oman Aide Memoire are valid.

+

c) DOD will provide State with a paper + outlining our approach to contracting in Oman (based on + pre-qualification of bidders).The paper was + not found.

+

d) The President’s letter on security assurances should be in the hands + of the Bartholomew Team by Monday + a.m.March 31. (S)

+
+ +
+ 67. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security + Affairs (Brzezinski) to + President CarterSource: Carter Library, National + Security Affairs, Staff Material, Middle East, Subject File, Box 73, + Oman: 3/80. Secret. A draft of the memorandum is ibid. + + + Washington, March 29, + 1980 + + + SUBJECT + Economic Assistance for Oman + +

We are now at a critical juncture in our negotiations with Oman. There is + a problem—Oman continues to press for an economic element in our + relationship even though we have repeatedly told them that substantial + economic assistance is inappropriate in view of our budget constraints + and their relatively favorable economic situation.

+

When you met with Zawawi you + made this point.See Document 60. But in view of Zawawi’s concern that our + relationship demonstrate an interest in the welfare of the Omani people, + you said we would reexamine what we could do, taking into account Oman’s + need for economic development.

+

The SCC met today and agreed on a + low-cost package (up to $5 million ESF + per year starting in FY 1981) of + technical assistance and other assistance under a Joint U.S.-Oman + Economic Commission (to be established).See + Document 65.

+ +

However, this probably will not be sufficient to satisfy the Omanis’ + perceived need to show their own people a tangible economic benefit from + the U.S. relationship.

+

The SCC identified three options for the + outyears which we would hope to use to demonstrate to the Omanis that we + are embarked on a long-term relationship and one that is sensitive to + their situation. All include the low-cost package starting in FY 1981. They all involve the possibility + of $25 million in ESF and $25 million + in Ex-Im financing for both FY 1982 and + 1983.An unknown hand underlined the + portion of the sentence beginning with “$25 million” to the + end.

+

Option A: We would be committed to such financingAn + unknown hand placed parentheses around “such financing” and wrote a + question mark above the words. with an understanding among + ourselves that it would involve an addition to + currently planned budget levels.

+

Option B: Is the same, but we would find the money + within currently projected budget + ceilings.

+

Option C: We would make no real + commitment beyond the $5 million annually for the low-cost + package, but might indicate the order of magnitude of the economic + assistance and private investment we might envision on the basis of the + work of the Joint Economic Commission.

+

I know you find making commitments in outyears distasteful. However, I + must point out the down side risks of Omani rejection coming on the + heels of the Pakistani rejection.

+

In my judgment, access to the Omani facilities is our single most + important initiative in underwriting your historic commitment to defense + of our vital interests in this region, as outlined in your State of the + Union message. Failure of the Oman negotiations would be a major + international and, I believe, domestic political disaster.

+

Accordingly, I recommend we be prepared to go to Option A or B, if + necessary this round. State, Defense and JCS believe we should go to Option A now. Henry Owen + prefers Option C. OMB believes that + Option C (or less) is adequate for the next round of negotiations since + it meets Oman’s basic need—which is for services, other than cash. + OMB believes the substantial + commitments of Options A and B are unrealistic and undesirable in the + present or presently foreseeable budgetary circumstances, and doubts + that the Congress will support ESF for + Oman beyond that needed for the Joint Commission. Jim McIntyre will be sending you a + memo separately.See Document 68.

+ +

However, the issue that Oman now poses for us is not only a budget one, + since the sums are really small compared to what we are doing for Egypt + and Israel. The issue is political and strategic, we cannot afford a + major setback to our current efforts to shore up a vital area because we + are not prepared to make a commitment regarding our longer-term + intentions.

+

That is why I favor instructing our negotiator (who will meet next with + the Omanis next Wednesday)April 2. See Document 70. to negotiate on the + basis of Option C, but be empowered to fall back to Option A, if + necessary, to avert a strategic and politically damaging rebuff.

+

Your decision:Option + B was checked and an unknown hand wrote “P’s decision” next to it. + An unknown hand wrote “OMB is + deciding what to do” in the margin below the options.

+ + + Option A + _____ + + + Option B + _____ + + + Option C + _____ + +
+
+ + +
+ 68. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security + Affairs (Brzezinski) and the + Director of the Office of Management and Budget (McIntyre) to President CarterSource: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, + Brzezinski Material, + Country File, Box 58, Oman: 4–9/80. Secret. Sent for information. + Aaron initialed for + Brzezinski and sent the + memorandum to Carter under + an April 1 memorandum that recommended Carter approve the approach outlined in the + memorandum, noting that “Jim + McIntyre supports this package.” An unknown hand + circled that sentence and noted Carter’s approval. Carter initialed the memorandum. The memorandum was + in response to a March 31 handwritten note in which Carter noted: “I understood Sat. + that Oman package would be ≈$20 mil in ’82 and ’83. Get with Jim + & give me a complete picture of what is proposed.” + (Ibid.) + + + Washington, April 1, + 1980 + + + SUBJECT + Aid to Oman (U) + +

The maximum package of economic aid to Oman proposed by the SCC was $105 million over the three fiscal + years 1981–83 (composed of $15 million ESF grants to fund the proposed Joint Commission, $40 + million ESF concessional loans, and $50 + million EXIM credits).See Document 66. In + the impending negotiations, Mr. Bartholomew is instructed to offer initially only the $5 + million ESF annually to support the + Commission. This economic aid would be in addition to FMS credits you approved earlier ($50 + million over 1980–81) and US military + construction benefiting Oman internally (over $100 million in 1981, + probably more in later years). (S)

+

Since Saturday,March 29. See Document 67. we have been exploring + ways to reduce the ESF component, + because it will be difficult to absorb within current budget planning + levels and is more likely than EXIM + credits to provoke criticism in Congress. Although EximBank’s budget + will be tight also, John + MooreChairman of the + Export-Import Bank. has told us the Bank could provide all of + the maximum package in the two years 1982 and 1983, except for the $5 + million to be provided annually for the Joint Commission. Accordingly, + it should be feasible to limit the ESF + component to $5 million grant aid in each of FY81, 82, and 83 ($15 + million total), plus $10 million in ESF + loans in each of FY82 and 83 ($20 million total). (S)

+

It may be possible to avoid any increase in the ESF component beyond our minimum offer ($5 million a year + for the Commission): If the initial offer is not sufficient to conclude + the negotiations successfully, Mr. Bartholomew should (and now plans to) seek agreement on + amounts less than envisaged + in our full package before offering that package. This will be + reinforced in a cable that we will send instructing him to limit our + ESF offer to a total of $15 million + per year or, in a more positive tone, to indicate that EXIM credits would make up at least 70% + of our maximum package.Reference is likely + to telegram 89463 to Muscat, April 5. (National Archives, RG 59, + Central Foreign Policy File, D800169–1032) (S)

+

The complete package of offers, including the $50 million in FMS credits you approved earlier for + 1980–81, would be as follows:

+ + + + + ($ millions) + + + + 1980 + 1981 + 1982 + 1983 + + + Initial Offer + + + FMS + 25 + 25 + * + * + + + ESF Grant + — + 5 + 5 + 5 + + + A Possible Middle Outcome + + + FMS + 25 + 25 + * + * + + + ESF Grant + — + 5 + 5 + 5 + + + EXIM + — + — + 25–35 + 25–35 + + + Maximum Offer + + + FMS + 25 + 25 + * + * + + + ESF Grant + — + 5 + 5 + 5 + + + ESF Loan + — + — + 10 + 10 + + + EXIM + — + — + 35 + 35 + +
+

*No commitment has been made beyond 1981, but State will want to continue + FMS at the 1980–81 level and Oman + will expect some continuing FMS.

+

In addition to economic and military aid, Oman will receive a substantial + further injection of funds into its economy from our military + construction expenditures (over $100 million in 1981 but likely to be + several times this eventually). This will provide jobs and other + economic stimulus; and we will be building facilities (improved air + strips, warehouses, water systems, roads, etc.) that will add to Oman’s + infrastructure. Mr. Bartholomew + is instructed to emphasize these benefits in his negotiations. (S)

+

We recognize it is not easy to justify economic aid to Oman at any level. + Oman is a relatively wealthy country (per capita income $4,000) with + excellent prospects for rapid future growth if oil prices continue to + rise. Oman’s current earning from oil exports are, in fact, so large + that the government plans to create a special fund to sterilize its + financial surpluses. Thus, providing ESF aid will be a major departure from past policy of + focusing on the poor and middle income developing countries (except Israel, which has had + a lower per capita income than Oman). (S)

+

Nevertheless, a meaningful level of economic aid (mostly EximBank, as + indicated above) is likely to be necessary to develop our new security + relationship with Oman. Oman’s government has continually stressed the + political requirement for an economic component that shows the Omani + people, in the face of mounting hostile propaganda from Iraq and other + sources, that they benefit directly from the relationship with the + US. Moreover, Oman remains an + underdeveloped country: Its relatively high per capita income is a + phenomenon of very recent years, not yet reflected in its economic + infrastructure or popular well-being. (S)

+

We will consult some Congressional staff and members informally today + about the above, making clear that any commitment to provide economic + aid to Oman would be absorbed within current planning levels. We will + inform Mr. Bartholomew of the + results of this consultation prior to his discussions in Oman. (S)

+

We believe the approach described above offers a good chance of + successful negotiations, while holding the ESF offer within a range that we consider acceptable and + that is below the level proposed by SCC.

+
+ + +
+ 69. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense Brown toPresident CarterSource: + Carter Library, Brzezinski + Donated Material, Subject File, Box 37, Serial Xs—[7/80–9/80]. + Secret. + + + Washington, April 1, + 1980 + + + SUBJECT + Strategic Review of Our Unified Command Structure + +

This memorandum responds to the questions you raised in your review of my + proposal for adjustments in the Unified Command Structure.See Document 61. In a March + 20 handwritten note to Brown, + Carter commented: “Harold—re Persian Gulf Unified Command. The + latest proposal is obviously an improvement, but I have a couple of + questions: A) How quickly could the RDJTF Command take over in time of crisis? How soon + could we have such an exercise? B) Is it logical to exclude Israel + & Egypt etc. from the Persian Gulf Region Unified Command? I + think not. J.C.” (Carter Library, Brzezinski Donated Material, Subject File, Box 37, + Serial Xs—[7/80–9/80]) Upon receiving Brown’s April 1 reply, Brzezinski contended that it did not satisfy all of + the questions and noted as much to Carter in an April 10 memorandum forwarding + Brown’s April 1 + memorandum. In the margin of the April 10 memorandum, Carter wrote: “Zbig—Address your + ?’s directly to Harold J.” (Ibid.)

+

I. How quickly could the RDJTF command take over in time of crisis? In the + event of a major near-term contingency in the Persian Gulf/Southwest + Asia region, the RDJTF could be ready + to deploy within hours and the advance elements would arrive with the + first deploying units. This would be just about as fast as either EUCOM or PACOM could deploy a task force headquarters. (Initially, + the RDJTF would employ the plans + which have been developed by the theater CINCs. However, the new headquarters has already begun the + process of refining these plans and developing additional plans tailored + to the RDJTF concept.)

+

II. How soon could we conduct such an exercise? + From April 10–15, 1980, the RDJTF + will be deployed and commanding troops in the field (in North Carolina, + not the Persian Gulf) as part of a JCS-directed training exercise. Follow-on exercises will + further refine procedures and capabilities.

+

III. Is it logical to exclude Israel, Egypt, Syria, + Jordan, and Sudan from the Persian Gulf region unified command? + A number of factors are involved here. In the case of Egypt and Israel, + their relevance to our strategic position in the eastern half of the + Mediterranean and their accessibility to Sixth Fleet units and forces + from other bases in the Mediterranean area strongly supports retention + in EUCOM’s area of responsibility. + An even more compelling + political consideration, in my view, is that placing Israel and the + front line Arab states within the RDJTF commander’s purview would impose on him highly + visible collateral responsibilities involving possible Arab-Israeli + conflict. This involvement would seriously undercut his ability to work + smoothly with other (mostly Islamic) nations in his primary area of + concern.

+

The case for excluding Sudan is similar, though less clearcut since it is + not one of the major Arab confrontation states. However, neither is it + likely to be a major player in the various national alignments that + define the command’s primary concerns: deterring Soviet penetration and + protecting access to resources in the region. Therefore, in the absence + of a strong contrary rationale, it would appear preferable to leave + responsibility for Sudan unchanged.

+

Jordan and Syria are more borderline cases, but here too we would prefer + not to overburden the RDJTF command + with too many collateral responsibilities when we want it to focus + primarily on extremely demanding PG/IO tasks.

+

However, I would emphasize that “exclusion” of these five nations from + the boundaries of the command does not foreclose either their support or + access to their facilities in a crisis (any more than including them + would guarantee such support or access). Indeed, we can adjust the + command boundaries later to include Egypt, Israel, or other areas, + either for planning in peacetime or during the course of operations, if + circumstances should change.

+ + Harold Brown + +
+ +
+ 70. Telegram From the Embassy in Oman to the Department of StateSource: National Archives, RG + 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P880026–0333. Secret; Niact Immediate; Nodis. + + + Muscat, April 4, 1980, 1330Z + +

890. For the Secretary from Bartholomew. Pass White House for Brzezinski and Aaron. Pass DOD for Komer, + McGiffert and Jones. Subject: Oman Access.

+

1. (S-entire text).

+

2. Talks Wednesday and ThursdayApril 2 and + 3. were very positive in tone and substance and we have made + considerable progress on all elements of our approach. President’s + letterSee footnote + 2, Document 66. (I gave Zawawi copy privately) and our + construction and assistance memorandaSee + Document 72. strongly impressed + Omanis.

+

(A) We already have agreement we sought on construction proposals + (without having to commit to Musandam port)Reference is to the Port of Khasab, in the Musandam region of Oman, + which sits on the Strait of Hormuz. subject to further + technical discussions.

+

(B) Omanis agreed to work out draft access agreement (which they had + earlier rejected) and extensive discussion has substantially narrowed + issues, though problems remain.

+

(C) Omanis have accepted FMS levels for + FY 80 and 81, but want $25 million + per year commitment extended to FY 82 + and FY 83 (to match construction period) + and a commitment to IMET program.

+

(D) On economic assistance, Omanis have dropped push for grant aid now + (but asserted “Oman will keep trying” in future) and reacted positively + to joint commission, but are insisting that “core issue” is US commitment to specific level of + “concessionary” financing for FY + 1981–83, saying joint commission is useless without it.

+

(E) Omanis want all elements—construction; assistance; access—agreed at + same time and linked through single covering agreement or note.

+

3. Believe we have good chance of resolving all of foregoing and leaving + Oman with ad referendum agreement on all elements, or with only few + questions of detail and form remaining. We are in any event solidly on + track with Omanis. Major issues which could block overall agreement at + this point are commitment on financing (para 2D) and Omani + desire for single agreement (para 2E). + I see al-Alawi at 1900 this evening and leave for Salalah 0830 + SaturdayApril 5. for meeting with + Sultan and Zawawi to present + President’s letter (with a second possible meeting in Muscat Saturday + evening) and plan wrap-up session with Zawawi on Sunday. Some highlights and how I plan to + proceed follow below. Any guidance will need to reach me by 0700 + Saturday.

+

4. On construction (para 2A) Omanis + expressed concern about size and visibility of Seeb construction. They + did not seek to alter list of projects, but asked that we emphasize + Masirah and Thumrait. (Point was made on exercises as well.) They made + special point that follow on technical discussions were important as we + proceed and that their general agreement was subject to this continuing + process, as stated in our memorandum. They want to know if we will pay + share of O and MOperation and + Maintenance. costs for common use facilities like runways, + and US role in funding manpower costs of + increased operations, particularly at unusual hours. I am told we can + agree to do both as part of routine operations and do not need to + include it in agreement. Please advise.

+

5. On access agreement (para 2B) Omanis + (starting with Zawawi) balked + hard on notion that they would only be “consulted” on exercises and + major build-up and insisted on Omani agreement. We accepted point and + are working formula (e.g. “consultations and joint decisions”). We have + substantial agreement on major issues of use, duration, personnel + status, visas, simplified clearances, and construction but some problems + remain (e.g., landing fees because of Omani law and commercial control + of airports).

+

6. I recommend I be authorized to extend $25 million FMS credit commitment to FY 82 and FY 83 (para 2C). Though + Omanis could still press for more when time comes, fact they pressed for + this level and we acceded could be used to hold to that level in effect + making it ceiling as well as floor for future. On IMET, I think there are problems in + funding, but al-Ghazali made special point of this relating it to + Omanization which is obviously a major benefit he sees in American + connection. Please advise.

+

7. On specific financing commitment (para 2E) Omanis had Senior Economic Advisor Sharif Lutfy + present to make pitch. After long wrangle, Omanis agreed to set issue + aside for further consideration to permit us to get on to other + questions. But they flatly stated this was “core issue” without which + joint commission was useless leaving economic question unresolved. Since + they want all elements agreed at once, if they hold firm this could + stymie final agreement on other fronts. I plan another hard run at it on Saturday to see if they + flinch at this prospect. If they don’t, I’ll play fallback, starting + with less than whole, to clinch deal and drive them off other issues + that might remain. Even fallback may not have easy going because they + have repeatedly said that they do not consider Ex-Im credit terms + sufficiently attractive (and that they have better alternatives) and + want “real” concessionary loans.

+

8. On form of agreement, Omanis would like single exchange of notes + citing broad bilateral framework of cooperation and covering 3 agreed + annexes—construction, assistance, access (based on our memoranda). They + want to link the elements, give them equal status as + commitments/agreements, and demonstrate broad relationship so focus is + not just on access. As I understand it, this would create problems since + construction and assistance proposals would become formal bilateral + agreements containing out year budget commitments (which would have to + be sent to Congress which looks askance at this). I intend to sound out + al-Alawi tonight on following alternative: a) there would be no single + umbrella agreement, but 3 separate papers: a construction aide-memoire; + an economic and security assistance aide-memoire; the access note and + implementing agreement; b) all three would begin with similar language + citing our discussion on a bilateral framework for cooperation on + economic development, defense capability, and joint development and use + of Omani facilities. This would relate all three, but aides memoires + would not be agreements which must be transmitted in Congress and would + not prejudice question of congressional appropriations as they reflect + only executive decision to seek funds.

+

9. Omanis remain very allergic to public discussion of these issues and + of negotiations and publicity could prejudice outcome.

+ + Wiley + +
+ +
+ 71. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in OmanSource: National Archives, RG + 59, Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs, General Program Country + Files 1980–1984, Lot 86D371, Box 2, Indian Ocean Base Access + Negotiations. Secret; Niact + Immediate; Exdis. Drafted by + Douglas R. Keene (PM/SAS); cleared by + Countryman and Jane E. + Taylor (S/S–O), in DOD/ISA, NSC, and OMB, and in + substance by Nimetz; approved + by O’Donohue. + + + Washington, April 5, 1980, 0157Z + +

89463. For Bartholomew. Subject: + Oman Access: Assistance Issues. Ref: Muscat 0890.See Document 70.

+

1. (S-entire text).

+

2. In response to Omani desire for commitment for FY 82 and 83 FMS levels, + you are authorized to inform Omanis that USG will seek an FMS + financing program for Oman in FY 82 and + 83. Because our budget planning for those years is still in process, we + cannot commit to particular levels at this time. However, we would look + forward to seeking in FY 82–83 levels + similar to those in FY 80–81.

+

3. In regard to Omani request for IMET, + funding problems are acute in both FY 80 + and 81. However, we can offer small FY + 80 program of $20 thousand—considering timing, and fact that no course + reservations or other administrative requirements have been + accomplished, we believe best use of funds would be tour of US military training facilities to assist + in defining Omani training requirements. An FY 81 program for Oman in excess of this amount has been + included in the current interagency effort to reprogram IMET funds to meet Indian Ocean access + requirements. FYI, we are seeking $100 + thousand for FY 81. End FYI.

+

4. Concur in your approach to economic issues (para 7 reftel), trying + lesser fallback positions before resort to final position. Regarding + Omani contention that EXIM bank + credits are not attractive or are uncompetitive, following points might + be made:

+

—EXIM Bank direct project loans are + currently at 8¾ percent interest over a long term (up to 14 years + depending on project). In today’s inflationary environment this is + highly concessional. Commercial interest rates are more than twice as + high. US Treasury is borrowing currently + at 12–16, depending on maturity. European and Japanese credit agencies + are, like EXIM Bank bound to + common-floor interest rates for various types of project credits to + middle income countries such as Oman.

+ +

—We believe it unlikely that another industrial nation could offer + substantial amounts of project financing to Oman from concessional aid + funds in the next year or so. Even if others wish to do so for their own + exports, Oman would still need means to finance its imports from the + United States. For this purpose, we believe EXIM Bank credits are highly attractive.

+ + Vance + +
+ +
+ 72. Telegram From the Embassy in Oman to the Department of State and + the Department of DefenseSource: National Archives, RG 59, Bureau of Politico-Military + Affairs, General Program Country Files 1980–1984, Lot 86D371, Box 2, + Indian Ocean Base Access Negotiations. Secret; Niact Immediate; Limdis. + + + Muscat, April 8, 1980, 2030Z + +

927. From Bartholomew. DOD for ISA. Dept for PM—O’Donohue. + Subject: US-Oman Facilities + Negotiations: Economic and Security Assistance Aide Memoire.

+

1. (S-entire text).

+

2. Below is text of classified aide memoire on economic and security + assistance. Both sides agreed to consult on public announcement of + commission.

+

3. Two and a half hour meeting involving Foreign Minister Zawawi, Senior Economic Advisor + Sharif Lufty and Omani Ambassador to US + Suleiman focused almost entirely + on question of levels of financing of joint commission projects. After + extensive recapitulation by Zawawi of political and economic importance of “high + level of concessionary loans” for FY 82 + and 83 and long hassle, Bartholomew tabled total package of 25 million dollars + per year for FY 82/83 composed of annual + 5 million dollar ESF grant to support + joint commission plus EXIM credits and + ESF loans. Bartholomew related 25 million dollar + level to 25 million dollar FMS level in + FY 80 and 81. Omanis flatly rejected + level as not enough to impress anyone and inconsistent with total + relationship we were trying to build, especially since EXIM credits were not sufficiently + concessionary. Omanis then countered with proposal for 50 million dollar + annual ESF loan which Bartholomew said U.S. could not even + approach. Fifty million dollar package annually for FY 82/83 (including annual 5 million ESF grant and EXIM and ESF + loans) was then tabled to close + out issue. After Omanis pressed, they were informed that proportion of + EXIM would be at least 70 percent + (based on total 100 million dollar package), which set off another long + wrangle. Omanis then countered with insistence that annual 50 million + dollar commitment be open-ended and not tied to FY 82 and 83 alone. Omanis then asked for statement of + US intent to seek to maintain levels + and to increase ESF loan proportion. + Omanis insisted that some prospect for the future was essential to + settle for these levels for FY–82 and + FY–83. Bartholomew agreed to consider point. Zawawi closed discussion by repeating + importance Omanis attach from outset to economic dimension, and said + this was absolutely vital concern for Oman.

+

4. Accordingly, seek Washington approval on following language for + incorporation in aide memoire: “In implementation of such programs, and + in support of the objectives of the Joint U.S.-Oman Commission, the + United States Government is prepared, subject to congressional + authorization and appropriation, to seek in FY’s 82 and 83 a total of 90 million dollars consisting of + Export-Import Bank long term credits on highly favorable terms, and + Economic Support Fund concessional loans. Thereafter, again subject to + congressional approval, the United States would look forward to seeking + levels similar to those in FY 82–83 and + to increase the proportion of ESF + loans. Oman agrees to match the level of ESF loans in each year.”

+

5. On security assistance portion of aide memoire, we plan to incorporate + following language: “When an emergency exists in which an expedited + transfer of defense articles to the Government of Oman is required, the + United States Government is prepared to take such measures as are + possible under U.S. law to effect the transfer and expedite delivery + from available U.S. sources. In determining the availability of sources, + we will give consideration to articles located at facilities being used + by the United States Armed Forces in Oman.” This is a response to long + Omani argument for assured access to materials stored in U.S. facilities + in Oman which we resisted on grounds of legal restraints and policy.

+

6. Aide memoire below incorporates changes in paras 4 and 5 above. Firm + judgment here is that Omanis would balk at moving ahead without approved + fallback on economics and this type of language on future as set forth + in para 4. Zawawi stated several times that he + regarded it as vital to Omani interests and to our overall relationship + to have something respectable. With these changes, believe we can have + assistance aide memoire and construction aide memoire (septel)The Embassy sent the draft construction + aide-mémoire in telegram 928 from Muscat, April 8. (National + Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800174–1081) The + final text, accepted by the Omanis on April 9, was sent in telegram + 975 from Muscat, April 10. (National Archives, RG 59, Central + Foreign Policy File, D800179–1112) + wrapped up tomorrow, and can + settle remaining questions concerning access agreement (septel)The final text of the access agreement, + granting the United States military aerial and sea facilities at + Masirah, Khasab, Thumrait, and Raysut, was initialed by Bartholomew and Zawawi on April 9 and sent in + telegram 971 from Muscat, April 10. (National Archives, RG 59, + Central Foreign Policy File, D800179–0847) expeditiously. + (Cover note to access agreement will be addressed tomorrow.)The text of the cover note to the access agreement, + addressed from Wiley to + Zawawi, and agreed and + initialed by Bartholomew and + Zawawi on April 9, + confirmed that, as a result of the U.S.-Omani negotiations, + “agreement was reached on the use of certain facilities in Oman by + the United States in accordance with and subject to implementing + arrangements as may be agreed from time to time by our two + governments.” (Telegram 976 from Muscat, April 10; National + Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + D800179–1098)

+

7. Action requested: approval of language in para 4.

+

8. Begin economic and security assistance aide memoire:

+

“Aide memoire draft 4/4/80.The Embassy sent + the final text of the aide-mémoire, accepted by the Omanis on April + 9, in telegram 974 from Muscat, April 10. (National Archives, RG 59, + Central Foreign Policy File, D800179–1045)

+

I refer to the recent discussions between our two governments regarding a + framework for bilateral cooperation relating to economic development and + trade, defense equipment and training, and development and use of + facilities in Oman, in order to enhance the ability of Oman to maintain + its defense capability, independence and territorial integrity, and to + promote peace and stability. As a result of these discussions and as + part of this framework, I was authorized to confirm to the Government of + Oman the following measures regarding the provision of security and + economic assistance to the Government of Oman, subject to the annual + authorization and appropriation of funds by the Congress and other + United States laws.

+

The security assistance measures include:

+

—We are now taking the measures necessary to make available $25 million + in FMS financing to Oman for fiscal + year 1980.

+

—Subject to congressional authorization and appropriation, we affirm our + intention to make available an additional $25 million in FMS financing to the Government of Oman in + fiscal year 1981.

+

—These FY 80 and 81 actions will + represent important first steps in establishing a longer term + cooperative security assistance relationship. (The United States has + also approached Saudi Arabia on the question of providing financial + assistance to fund Omani acquisition of military equipment.)

+ +

On equipment, the United States is prepared to respond quickly to Omani + requests for information on any items recommended by the defense + requirements survey.

+

When an emergency exists in which an expedited transfer of defense + articles to the Government of Oman is required, the United States + Government is prepared to take such measures as are possible under U.S. + law to effect the transfer and expedite delivery from available U.S. + sources. In determining the availability of sources, consideration shall + be given to articles located at facilities being used by the United + States armed forces in Oman.

+

With regard to the specific questions raised during the visit of the + Foreign Minister to the United States,See + Document 60. I am pleased to + confirm that my government has moved quickly to respond to the concern + of the Government of Oman and has agreed to the following:

+

—The sale of C–130 or L–100 aircraft

+

—The sale of Sidewinder missiles, of which 60 are to be delivered within + 6 months

+

—The sale of the DSU–31/B fuse for the Sidewinder

+

—The sale of 6 M–60 tanks, with delivery by November

+

—Expedited delivery of TOW missiles and + launchers, with 10 launchers and 220 missiles to be delivered in July, + 1980, and 10 launchers and 220 missiles in December, 1980

+

I also confirm that the United States recognizes the heavy stress Oman + places on economic cooperation and that:

+

—The United States is prepared to institute and participate in a Joint + US-Oman Commission on economic and + technical cooperation. The Joint Commission would be located in Oman and + operate under the co-chairmanship of the appropriate Omani (official) + and the U.S. Ambassador to Oman.

+

—United States Government technical personnel would be stationed in Oman + with the Joint Commission to work with their Omani counterparts as an + integrated Joint Commission staff.

+

—We are prepared to provide up to $5 million in grant Economic Support + Funds annually beginning in fiscal year 1981 and subject to + congressional approval, as our contribution to the operation of the + Commission. As was stated during the recent discussions, the Government + of Oman agrees it will also contribute to the Commission’s + operation.

+

—The role of the Commission would be to serve as a central point for + developing economic and commercial ties between the U.S. and Oman, with particular emphasis on the + transfer of U.S. technology to foster Oman’s development.

+

—As appropriate, the Commission would draw on the resources of AID, the Export-Import Bank, OPIC, and U.S. agencies with + international technical or development roles (e.g., the Departments of + Health and Welfare, Agriculture, Transportation, and US Corps of Engineers) to develop the + coordinated programs to enhance the development of Oman and to + strengthen economic and commercial ties between the two countries.

+

—In implementation of such programs, and in support of the objectives of + the Joint U.S.-Oman Commission, the United States Government is + prepared, subject to congressional authorization and appropriation, to + seek in FY’s 82 and 83 a total of 90 + million dollars consisting of Export-Import Bank long term credits on + highly favorable terms, and Economic Support Fund concessional loans. + Thereafter, again subject to congressional approval, the United States + would look forward to seeking levels similar to those in FY 82–83 and to increase the proportion of + ESF loans. Oman agrees to match the + level of ESF loans in each year.

+

—The Commission would also seek to draw on private U.S. sources of + technology and on private business as well as foundations and + educational institutions.

+

—Within the framework of this Joint Commission, the US Government will be prepared to work with + the Government of Oman in identifying possible economic development + projects for joint financing, drawing on the resources described above. + Such projects could include:

+

(A) Rural area irrigation and water catchment

+

(B) Crop diversification

+

(C) Health services

+

(D) Basic vocational and technical education

+

(E) Coastal and deepsea fishing

+

(F) light industry (based upon labor availability and work force + intensification guidelines approved by Omanis)

+

(G) Highway and road network development

+

(H) Maritime service industries

+

(I) Air service industries

+

(J) Mining

+

(K) Telecommunications

+

The United States confirms its proposal that a special USG team visit Oman to discuss formation + of the Joint Commission and to begin initial discussions to identify + possible projects and programs for consideration, if the Government of + Oman wishes.

+

With further respect to Oman’s economic needs, it is the view of the U.S. + Government that its contemplated military construction program is substantial, and will have a + significant positive impact on the Omani economy.

+

As stated in our recent discussions, the United States has also made + approaches to other friends and allies to urge their political and + economic support for Oman and will keep Oman informed of the results of + these approaches.

+

American Embassy, Muscat

+

April, 1980”

+ + Wiley + +
+ +
+ 73. Summary of Conclusions of a Special Coordination Committee + MeetingSource: Carter + Library, National Security Council, Institutional Files, Box 112, + SCC 302, 4/14/80, Security + Framework. Secret; Sensitive. The meeting took place in the White + House Situation Room. The minutes are not attached and were not + found. An unknown hand wrote “Original given to Les Denend 4/25/80” in the upper + right-hand corner of the page. + + + Washington, April 14, 1980, 10:30–11:30 + a.m. + + + SUBJECT + Followup on Security Framework in the Persian Gulf—VIII + + + PARTICIPANTS + + + State + Deputy Secretary Warren + Christopher + Harold Saunders, + Assistant Secretary Near Eastern & South Asian + Affairs + Lannon Walker, Deputy Assistant Secretary for African + Affairs + Reginald + Bartholomew, Director of Political/Military + Affairs + + + + + Defense + Secretary Harold + Brown + David McGiffert, + Assistant Secretary for International & Security + Affairs + + + + + JCS + Lt. General John + Pustay + + + + + CIA + Deputy Director Frank + Carlucci + Robert Ames, NIO for Near + East & South Asia + + + + + Energy + Secretary Charles + Dayan + Mr. Les Goldman, Assistant Secretary for International + Affairs + + + + + OMB + Randy Jayne, Associate Director + + + + + White House + Dr. Zbigniew + Brzezinski + + + + + NSC + Colonel William E. Odom + General Jasper Welch + Thomas + Thornton + + + + +

Dr. Brzezinski opened the meeting + by listing the three agenda items for today’s meeting.Dodson sent + the agenda for the meeting to Mondale, Vance, Brown, + Dayan, McIntyre, Jones, and Turner under an April 8 covering + memorandum. Dodson sent all + of the background papers produced for this meeting under an April 10 + covering memorandum to the same recipients. All of these are ibid. + In an April 14 memorandum to Brzezinski, Odom reported that a planned paper from + the Department of Defense on “overall basing needs or on a rear base + in Egypt” would not be considered at the meeting. “Komer,” Odom added, “decided + against it. Apparently the costs frightened him, and worries at + State about overloading Sadat deterred him.” (Ibid.) In a separate + April 14 memorandum, Odom informed Brzezinski that Brown “will try to add three questions to the agenda + discussion this morning. 1. U.S. role in Saudi security. 2. Saudi + participation in U.S. regional security. 3. Third country + contributions that the Saudis can make.” (Ibid.) First, how + to proceed with basing access in Somalia in lieu of the Defense basing + paper. Second, Pakistani issues relating to the security framework. + Finally, a brief review of the Afghanistan insurgency. (S)

+

Somalia

+

Dr. Brzezinski proposed to review + our approach to Somalia on basing in light of the Ogaden.Documentation on the continuing conflict in + Ethiopia’s Ogaden desert is scheduled for publication in Foreign + Relations, 1977–1980, vol. XVII, Part 1, Horn of + Africa. He stated three options:

+

—Continue with our present position but with added caution in light of + fighting in the Ogaden.

+

—Slow the process down, allowing it to drag out for several months or + more.

+

—Reconsider the need for basing access in Somalia in light of progress + with Oman and Kenya. (S)

+

Christopher led off by rejecting + the third option. He suggested a merging of the first and second. We + should not add “sweeteners” to our offer to Siad, and we should stay on + a deliberate course. There is the risk, of course, that an all out + conflict in the Ogaden could create dangers for us. However, we are not + acquiring a “base” but rather access to the facilities. Christopher, therefore, expressed an + inclination to move ahead unless Siad insists on asking for a higher + price. (S)

+

Bartholomew reported that “the + ball is in their court.” They are preparing a counter draft. We should + go back to Siad with MilCon + proposals and at the same time hit him hard on the Ogaden. (S)

+

Brown described his position as + close to Christopher’s. We need + more bases in the area so that we are less dependent on any single base. + Thus we should move ahead as rapidly as feasible. We should not “sweeten + the pot,” but we should answer any Somali technical questions, and we + should reaffirm our position on the Ogaden. Brown added that we need to act within two weeks because + Congress is working on MilCon + legislation. We must show some movement or we may find ourselves with no funding for the Somali + facilities. Within the Executive Branch we should also go ahead on an + ESF and FMS package, looking for the funds from other programs of a + lower priority. Finally, Brown + strongly emphasized that we cannot let this effort fail because regional + political costs are too high. Sadat needs our tie to Somalia. It will + help avoid Sadat’s increasing isolation. It will also please the Saudis. + (S)

+

Lt. General Pustay, speaking for + the JCS, expressed strong preference + for the first option. Somalia offers both air and sea facilities. These + are very important for U.S. surge capabilities in the region. He also + emphasized the timing matter with MilCon legislation and the Congress as a reason for acting + rapidly. (S)

+

Christopher expressed agreement + with Harold Brown’s line of + argument. As a small caveat, Christopher said that we should be alert to doubts in + the Congress about this relationship with Somalia. (S)

+

It was agreed that we go forward with technical proposals to Siad Barre and also reaffirm our + position on the Ogaden. The technical proposals will not include “pot + sweeteners.” This should be done within two weeks for both political + reasons in the region and Congressional hearings on MilCon. Finally, work should begin on + the ESF/FMS potential package but without discussion with the + Congress at this time. (S)

+

Pakistan

+

1. Pakistan relation to the security of the Persian + Gulf. Dr. Brzezinski + next raised the question of how US/Pakistani relations affect our position and the security of + the region. He noted that Sadat favors a strong US/Pakistani relationship and that a stronger one is + necessary for sustaining the Afghanistan insurgency. (S)

+

Harold Brown emphasized that + Pakistan’s tie to the Islamic countries is most important. While he and + others would favor a strong tie to India instead of Pakistan, if India + could perform the same services for our interests in the Persian Gulf, + the geographical and political facts are such that it cannot. Therefore, + there is little choice but to seek strong US/Pakistani relations from the view point of security for + the Persian Gulf. (S)

+

Dr. Brzezinski summed up the + various reactions to Brown’s + remarks with the following three points about US/Pakistani relations:

+

—They are extremely important for the security of the Persian Gulf.

+

—They can affect our evolving relations with Iran because of the special + Pakistani ties to that country.

+

—They will affect the scope and duration of the Afghanistan resistance. + (S)

+ +

[Omitted here is material on bilateral relations with Pakistan and the + situation in Afghanistan.]

+
+ +
+ 74. Summary of Conclusions of a Special Coordination Committee + MeetingSource: Carter + Library, National Security Council, Institutional Files, Box 112, + SCC 305, 4/23/80, Security + Framework Followup [I]. Secret; Sensitive. The meeting took place in + the White House Situation Room. The minutes are not attached and + were not found. Carter wrote + “Zbig J” in the upper right-hand corner of the page. + + + Washington, April 23, 1980, 4–4:50 + p.m. + + + SUBJECT + Followup on Security Framework in the Persian Gulf—IX + + + PARTICIPANTS + + + State + Deputy Secretary Warren + Christopher + Harold Saunders, + Assistant Secretary Near Eastern & South Asian + Affairs + Reginald + Bartholomew, Director of Political/Military + Affairs + + + + + Defense + Secretary Harold + Brown + Deputy Secretary W. Graham + Claytor, Jr. + Robert Komer, + Under Secretary for Policy + David McGiffert, + Assistant Secretary for International & Security + Affairs + + + + + JCS + Lt. General John + Pustay + + + + + CIA + Director Stansfield + Turner + Robert Ames, NIO for Near + East & South Asia + Charles Cogan, Chief, Near East + + + + + White House + Dr. Zbigniew + Brzezinski + + + + + NSC + Colonel William E. Odom + General Jasper Welch + + + +

Dr. Brzezinski opened the meeting + with some remarks on the inadequate condition of some of the papersDodson + forwarded all of the background papers for this meeting to Mondale, Vance, Brown, Jones, and Turner + under an April 22 covering memorandum. (Ibid.) and + recommended that they be redone for next week. (C)

+ +

Basing

+

Harold Brown declared that his + basing paper is sufficient for the decisions he wants today.See footnote 2, Document + 73. The facilities we have acquired in Oman and + Kenya provide ASW capabilities and + forward air basing for some contingencies, but they are inadequate for + major ground forces rear staging, and they are also inadequate as + forward bases for contingencies to the north. Our needs, therefore, + include forward basing in Saudi Arabia or other + Gulf states and rear basing preferably in Egypt. + (S)

+

Discussion focused on the wisdom of following up Sadat’s offer of a joint + facility at Ras Banas. State argued that we may overload Sadat by moving + too quickly on this issue. Defense made a strong case for retaining Wadi + Kena and investigating Ras Banas. Dr. Brzezinski asked what the effect would be on our + relations with the Saudis and Israelis if we moved, even slowly, toward + acquiring Ras Banas. Most agreed that the Saudis will complain and the + Israelis will ask why we don’t use their bases instead, but Brown believes neither concern is + paramount for our decision. (S)

+

Specifically, Brown proposed that + (a) we begin talks in the next month, (b) consider the budgetary + implications for FY 1982, and (c) send a + survey team to Ras Banas late this summer in order to have accurate data + for the FY 1982 budget item. (S)

+

Christopher expressed general + agreement with Brown’s approach + as long as we do not move too rapidly. Brown argued that the schedule he proposes is indeed + slow, much slower than the Egyptians desire. (S)

+

It was agreed to follow Brown’s schedule. An NSC working group will clear instructions + for McGiffert’s discussions with + the Egyptians in the next couple of weeks.Carter drew an arrow to + this paragraph and wrote in the left-hand margin: “First, let me + have an estimate of cost.” (S)

+

Harold Brown interjected a related + issue, Defense’s plan for enhanced sea lift through purchase of SL–7 + class transport ships. He made a strong case for their utility. We now + can deliver an airborne division into the region during the first week, + a Marine amphibious force in the second week, and a mechanized Army + division during the third week if we acquire the + additional sea lift. (S)

+

All agreed with the desirability of this acquisition, in particular + because it means a real increase in capability this summer, not a year + or two from now as in the case of forward bases we are now building. + (S)

+ +

Brown said that we can purchase + the ships within his present budget. The only holdup is a report to the + President that the SCC favors the + purchase and OMB concurs. (S)

+

It was agreed to recommend favorably to the + President on the utility of the additional sea lift and to clear the + issue with OMB.Carter + underlined “clear the issue with OMB” and wrote in the left-hand margin: “ok, + but.” (S)

+

Military Deployments and Exercise Schedules

+

The papers on this topic by Defense were not adequate for decisions. They + will be redone for the next SCC. + (C)

+

There was discussion on deployments and schedules which highlighted at + least three issues that need SCC + attention:

+

—Whether to take forces from the Pacific or from Europe to build up our + presence in the Persian Gulf. (S)

+

—When the first Tac Air deployments should go to Oman. (S)

+

—Tac Air deployments to Egypt. (S)

+

They will be treated next week. (C)

+

State and Defense Papers on What the Allies have + Contributed to Our Persian Gulf Security Framework

+

Dr. Brzezinski directed that the + two papers be integrated by State to answer the following questions:

+

—What are the current national efforts of our allies, both European and + Asian, in the region? (S)

+

—What do we believe they should be doing beyond their current efforts? + (S)

+

—How do we propose to initiate bilateral discussions to achieve these + objectives? (S)

+

[Omitted here is material on Pakistan and Afghanistan.]

+
+ +
+ 75. Memorandum From William Odom of the National Security Council + Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs + (Brzezinski) and the + President’s Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Aaron)Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, + Staff Material, Defense/Security, Ermarth, Box 8, Oman: 4–8/80. Secret. Odom added + Aaron’s name by hand to + the addressee line. + + + Washington, April 27, + 1980 + + + SUBJECT + Oman Threat to Back Out of Base Access Agreement + +

Ambassador Wiley’s cable + (attached) reports the Omani reaction to learning about Oman’s support + role in the rescue missionReference is to + the unsuccessful attempt to rescue the American hostages in Tehran. + Documentation is scheduled for publication in Foreign + Relations, 1977–1980, vol. XI, Iran: Hostage Crisis, + November 1979–January 1981. after the fact.Not attached. In telegram 1171 from Muscat, + April 27, the Embassy noted that Zawawi “said our action has undermined basis for + facilities access agreement and OmanGov not now prepared to sign.” + (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + P880025–0924) + Zawawi puts the matter sharply: + his government is now not prepared to sign the initialled text and is + reconsidering the whole matter.

+

Wiley recommends that we send a + Presidential letter at once explaining the rescue mission in its larger + context and soliciting the Sultan’s own views and advice on the regional + situation. Wiley hopes that this + will serve as the basis to begin a damage-limiting dialogue.

+

Gary Sick recommends that we do + much more, specifically that the President send a personal emissary for + two reasons. First, it will reconfirm for the Sultan the special and + personal relationship he seeks. That is, it might change the subjective + mood, which being left in the dark on the rescue mission has created in + Oman. Second, it will give the Omanis a clear report on the details of + the rescue mission, their role, and the larger strategic problems.

+

Gary also argues that such an emissary should go without publicity, that + is, secretly, at least until the mission is complete.

+

The candidates for such a mission are:

+

1. Brzezinski. You obviously would perform both + functions, being close to the President and also knowledgeable of the + region and the details of the rescue mission.

+ +

2. Hamilton Jordan. He apparently is highly + regarded by the Sultan and would be very welcome. He might need some one + to go along with the details of the rescue mission and a strategy + briefing.

+

3. Charles Kirbo. He would have most of Jordan’s advantages + but not carry the same level of prestige as Hamilton.

+

4. The Harold + Brown trio. Brown is supposed to go to Oman in the next few weeks, + but his visit is different in character from what Sick recommends. In fact, without an + earlier visit by a Presidential emissary, Brown mig [omission in the original]

+

5. David + Aaron. David would carry some of the advantages that + you have but in a lower key.

+

Other actions that should be considered:

+

—Ask British intelligence to be helpful in getting our relationship with + Oman back on track. The British are clearly jealous of our entry onto + the scene there. The consistently advise the Omanis to suspect US intentions.

+

—The Saudis should perhaps be informed, but Sick argues that they will not be helpful. The Saudis, + however, might be helpful in holding down criticism of Oman by Islamic + states.

+

—Egyptian and Pakistani intelligence might also help us damage-limit for + the Omanis.

+
+ +
+ 76. Letter From President Carter to Sultan Qaboos bin Said of OmanSource: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, + Staff Material, Defense/Security, Ermarth, Box 8, Oman: 4–8/80. No classification + marking. + + + Washington, April 30, + 1980 + + + Your Majesty: + +

In the aftermath of our attempt to rescue our hostages in Iran, I want to + restate the gratitude of my government and the American people for your + having made available facilities crucial to the conduct of the + mission.An unknown hand put brackets + around the phrase “I want to restate the gratitude of my government + and the American people for your having made available facilities + crucial to the conduct of the mission.” I also want to + reiterate the assurances on security conveyed in my letter of March 29, + 1980.See footnote + 2, Document 66. These assurances were designed specifically to assist you in + limiting adverse consequences to Oman from the rescue mission.An unknown hand put brackets around this + sentence. I encourage your Foreign Minister to consult with + my Ambassador about steps we might take for this purpose. We will work + with you and with other friendly leaders in the region to help blunt any + political attacks against Oman inspired by Iran and encouraged by the + Soviet Union.

+

The rescue mission, had it succeeded, would have soon reduced + dramatically the tensions between the United States and Iran, and it + would have allowed Iranians and other peoples in the region to focus + more clearly on the serious threat to the region created by the + projection of Soviet power and influence. The potential benefits of such + a mission were far too great to allow me not to take the risks it + entailed. Your country and others in the region would have benefited + from the increased stability and reduction of tension. Because the + mission did not succeed, however, we must work together to limit the + adverse consequences and to persevere toward our larger common + objective.

+ +

As you are doubtless aware, your country was not the only one which was + transited by American aircraft in an effort to carry out this + humanitarian rescue mission. I had to consider the operational security + of our forces above all. To assure that responsibility for the mission + would be seen to rest solely on the United States, my government engaged + in no prior consultations with any of its closest friends and allies at + any level about it. This was a unique situation arising from + extraordinary circumstances. It is no reflection upon the trust and + confidence I hold in you. Indeed, my government has shared with you the + fact of our recent activities with regard to Afghanistan, and it is my + hope that collaboration between our governments on that project can go + forward.

+

If you believe it would be useful, I am prepared to send a personal + emissary to elaborate further my commitment to our relationship, to + consult you on steps to advance it, and to explain the details of the + rescue mission.Carter selected Habib as his personal envoy to the Sultan “in order + to elaborate further his commitment to our relationship, to consult + on steps to advance it, and to explain the background to the rescue + mission.” (Telegram 121049 to Muscat, May 8; Carter Library, + National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 58, Oman: + 4–9/80)

+

I realize the heavy burden which I have forced you to share with me in + seeking greater prospects for peace and security in the region. A + relationship of trust and the closest cooperation between us continue to + be of the highest importance to me.

+

Sincerely,

+ + Jimmy + Carter + +
+ + +
+ 77. Memorandum From William E. Odom of the National Security Council + Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs + (Brzezinski)Source: Carter Library, National + Security Affairs, Brzezinski + Material, Country File, Box 63, Persian Gulf: Military Facilities in + Persian Gulf and Indian Ocean, 3–8/80. Secret. Outside the System. + Sent for information. A stamped notation on the memorandum reads: + “ZB has seen.” + + + Washington, May 8, + 1980 + + + SUBJECT + More on a Mid East Command + +

Talking with OSD and JCS staffers yesterday, I was told that + more questions to Brown won’t + produce results.On May 6, Odom sent + Brzezinski a memorandum + on the Persian Gulf Security Framework in which he discussed the Mid + East Command. Odom indicated that he had Brzezinski’s signed memorandum + “asking the two questions of Brown for the President.” (See footnote 2, Document 69.) Odom urged Brzezinski to “strike quickly on + this one. Time is running out for us to get either the operational + advantage or the political advantage of the command change.” + Brzezinski wrote in the + left-hand margin next to this: “OK. I will + send it. Where is it?” (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, + Brzezinski Material, + Country File, Box 63, Persian Gulf: Military Facilities in Persian + Gulf and Indian Ocean, 3–8/80) Defense wants to be told by + the White House to make the change. That takes the heat off Jones and Brown.

+

In checking on the quality of the two Defense papers for the next + framework SCC,These papers were part of a package of background + briefing materials for the scheduled May 12 SCC meeting on the Security Framework that Dodson sent to Mondale, Muskie, Brown, Jones, and Turner on May 9. (Carter Library, National Security + Affairs, Staff Material, Defense/Security, Ermarth, Box 11, Security + Framework: 5/80) one on a deployment schedule and one on an + exercise schedule, I learned that the absence of a command structure for + the Persian Gulf is a major obstacle to both papers. The JCS cannot produce an exercise schedule + without exercise funds. They must take funds from EUCOM and PACOM, neither of which wants to spend a penny in the + Persian Gulf if it can be kept for exercises in Europe and the Pacific + respectively. The same obstacle confronts maintenance of our force + levels in the region, i.e. the deployment schedule paper.An unknown hand wrote “ZB per our discussion this morning” in the left-hand + margin next to this paragraph.

+

I have also learned that the arguments about a new command structure + costing more money are not valid. The REDCOM (Readiness Command in Florida) can be used for + and/or moved to the Middle East/Persian Gulf. At present it is a + remarkably unused unified command. Mobilization functions, given to it last year to keep it + busy, could be as effectively performed by the military services.

+

Perhaps you recall that the RDF still + has no complete list of forces. In other words, it is in large part + notional. The Army element has specific troop lists although some units + are NATO contingency forces, leaving + their mission and their type of training ambiguous. The Air Force + designated units for a command post exercise, but specific squadrons and + support elements are not clearly assigned to General Kelly. The Navy + would not so much as provide force lists for the CPX. Thus, we have not the slightest idea + what naval forces to train for deployment in the region or to count on + for contingency planning. The Navy says they will let us know when the + conflict starts.

+

For your further frustration, let me briefly explain an emerging problem + for air support in the Persian Gulf region. Brown recommended to the SCC that we keep the equivalent of two carriers in the + region. When one of the carriers is not in the Indian Ocean, he intends + to substitute for it land based air in Egypt, Oman, or elsewhere. This + is a very sensible way to achieve the desired military presence level, + but it always depends on at least one carrier projecting air power over + land on the Arabian Sea littoral. In every exercise, however, once + potential Soviet intervention is part of the scenario, the Navy + adamantly demands that their carriers move out of BACKFIRE range. That + pushes Indian Ocean carrier deployments down around Diego Garcia and + makes them of no value as support for ground forces in the region. With + the present command arrangements, Admiral Long in PACOM can order a carrier south + notwithstanding General Kelly’s demands and needs. We may never get the + Navy close enough to provide proper air cover, but a Mid East unified + commander could make it a court-martial offense if they abandon him. + This may seem too hypothetical to be significant, but it is of + sufficient importance to cause at least one unified commander to write + an extremely indicting letter to Harold + Brown on the matter and to hint at retirement and public + protest. The President’s question about when an exercise can be run in + the region has frightened a number of senior officers who believe they + may end up looking silly in the event because the command arrangements + make an effective execution most unlikely.

+
+ +
+ 78. Summary of Conclusions of a Special Coordination Committee + MeetingSource: Carter + Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, General Odom File, Box 44, + Security Framework: 5/1–15/80. Secret; Sensitive. The meeting took + place in the White House Situation Room. The minutes are not + attached and were not found. Carter wrote “Zbig C” in the upper right-hand corner + of the page. Attached but not printed is a May 14 memorandum from + Odom to Brzezinski + recommending that Brzezinski + send the Summary of Conclusions to Carter. Odom noted: “I could compress the Summary of + Conclusions, but I believe the President might profit from exposure + to a more textured account of State’s and Defense’s reluctance to + implement his military presence decision. Also, I believe it is + important to get the five points on a division of labor with the + allies spelled out and endorsed.” + + + Washington, May 13, 1980, 4–5 + p.m. + + + SUBJECT + Follow up on Security Framework in the Persian Gulf—X + + + PARTICIPANTS + + + State + David Newsom, Under + Secretary for Political Affairs + Matthew Nimetz, + Under Secretary for Security Assistance, Science and + Technology + Peter Constable, + Deputy Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern and South Asian + Affairs + David Gompert, Deputy Director, Bureau of + Politico-Military Affairs + + + + + Defense + W. Graham Claytor, + Deputy Secretary + Frank Kramer, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary for + International Security Affairs + + + + + JCS + Admiral Thomas Hayward, Acting Chairman + Lt. General John + Pustay + + + + + CIA + Admiral Stansfield + Turner, Director + Robert Ames, NIO for Near + East and South Asia + Chuck Cogan, Chief of Near East Division + + + + + White House + Dr. Zbigniew + Brzezinski + David Aaron + + + + + NSC + William E. Odom + Jasper Welch + Gary Sick + + + +

Dr. Brzezinski opened the meeting + by adding one issue to the agenda, Somalia base access (S)

+

Defense Deployment Schedule

+

Defense was tasked to produce for this meeting a schedule of deployments + in the region which will meet the “presence level” recommended by Harold Brown earlier this spring for the remainder of + the year. That level includes (a) ground forces of at least a battalion + size, (b) at least two aircraft carriers, or some land based air + equivalent, and (c) the present surface combatant level of naval forces. + (S)

+

Claytor recommended a reduction. + The Marine Amphibious Unit (MAU) now in + the Indian Ocean is departing in the next few days. Claytor proposed not to replace it + until June 25. As a revised “presence level,” he recommended ground + forces in the region only 70 percent of the time. He asked that we + emphasize to the President that the new MPS (Maritime Pre-positioning + Ships) will be in the Indian Ocean by late June. That will allow us to + deploy a mechanized brigade, 12,000 men strong, on 12 days notice. As an + additional reason for not replacing the MAU, Claytor noted + that it cannot exercise in the region. (S)

+

Dr. Brzezinski and David Aaron asked why Defense was not + proceeding with a MAU exercise. It was + pointed out that not only have we made a “presence level” decision but + the JCS has earlier recommended, and + the President has approved, a gradual series of port calls leading to + ground forces exercises later this year. (S)

+

Moreover, the Soviets are, for the first time ever, conducting a small + amphibious exercise on South Yemen’s island of Socotra. While the + Soviets are doing this, we will be taking our amphibious forces out of + the Indian Ocean. Dr. Brzezinski + suggested that this is the wrong signal at the wrong time which + undercuts the U.S. credibility in the region and the President’s + credibility in general. (S)

+

Nimetz argued that it is not a + drawdown but a temporary gap until June 25. Defense argued that we do + not exercise the MAU because of + political problems. The JCS also talked + about the risks of taking forces away from the Pacific and + Mediterranean. At present, Libya is a problem for the Sixth Fleet. Dr. + Brzezinski agreed that a gap + in our MAU deployment may be acceptable + if its reappearance in June is accompanied by an exercise. State agreed + to look into the possibilities in KenyaCarter underlined + “Kenya” and drew an arrow to a note he wrote in the left-hand margin + that reads: “Exercises in Egypt?” although reluctantly. + (S)

+

It was agreed that a cable would be drafted for + clearance, inquiring about exercise possibilities in Kenya this summer. + It was also agreed to recommend a gap in the + MAU or ground forces deployment + until June 25th on a one-time basis. (S)

+

Exercise Schedule

+

Defense presented its exercise schedule, generally describing the BEACON + COMPASS scheme for involving U.S., British, French, and Australian naval forces in exercises in + the Arabian Sea. This is an old and well established series which also + includes Oman and Kenya. The Army and Air Force will have to wait and + see what exercise options open up. (S)

+

Dr. Brzezinski asked about + exercises with Jordan. Defense reported that the issue has been + discussed with Bin Shaker and that both the U.S. and Jordan have + follow-up work to do for some extremely modest combined activities. + (S)

+

Next, Dr. Brzezinski asked State + about getting Habib to explore + an exercise with Oman. State has serious doubts that Oman will accept. + (S)

+

Newsom asked what the purpose of + the military exercise schedule is. It was explained that the initial + NSC tasking had been for an + exercise schedule with a military rationale to improve our contingency + operation capabilities and at the same time to support a political + strategy of building confidence in our security commitments to the + region. The Defense paperFor the papers + discussed at this meeting, see footnote 3, + Document 77. provides neither. (S)

+

Dr. Brzezinski tasked State to + develop a political strategy for the Defense exercise schedule. (S)

+

Allied Efforts to Support the Security + Framework

+

State presented a paper with a comprehensive listing of each NATO country’s military, economic, and + foreign policy activities in the Persian Gulf. Based on this activity + and our own policies for the region, State recommended that we encourage + a division of labor with our allies according to the following + priorities:

+

1. Most important is that our allies increase their commitments to NATO ’s defense. This is the greatest + contribution they can make while the U.S. is building a security system + for the Persian Gulf region. (S)

+

2. Facilitating U.S. enroute access for military contingencies in the + region is the next most helpful thing the allies can contribute. They + should be pressed to provide that access. (S)

+

3. On military exercises and deployments we should encourage our allies + to go through with those they have already planned but not to do more at + this time. (S)

+

4. We should encourage the British, French, and Australians to improve + their rapid deployment capabilities, but we should not encourage them to + go beyond their current plan. (S)

+

5. We should encourage the allies to expand their security assistance to + key regional countries, particularly Turkey, but also Oman, Somalia, Djibouti, and Sudan. We should + encourage them to maintain at least the same level of economic aid to + Egypt, Turkey, and Pakistan and to expand economic relationships with + the smaller countries in the region. (S)

+

Dr. Brzezinski asked what the + major problem is with the allies with respect to this division of labor. + State answered that it is getting them to take up the slack. It was also + pointed out that the Europeans may not clearly understand this division + of labor. Defense responded that Harold + Brown will be briefing on it at the DPC in NATO . There were no dissenting views on the State paper. + It was agreed, therefore, to adhere to this + division of labor for the foreseeable future in asking the allies for + support in the Persian Gulf. (S)

+

Saudi Financing and Security Assistance in the + Region

+

State provided a review of Saudi financing for security assistance for + countries in the region. The most striking conclusion was that of eight + countries where we have asked for Saudi assistance, only one, North + Yemen, has actually received aid. For all other cases the Saudis have + dragged their feet and failed to give tangible support. This is true + even for Morocco where the Saudis were pressing the U.S. to act. + Nimetz argued that we must + face this issue squarely and take it to the Saudis. Newsom suggested, while it may be in + part explained by Saudi bureaucratic ineptness, it may also indicate a + Saudi reluctance to provide direct security assistance and a preference + to provide only economic assistance. (S)

+

Dr. Brzezinski asked if it would + not be useful to produce a set of talking points, setting forth the + comprehensive review of Saudi and U.S. security assistance to the + region, and discuss it with the Saudis. Nimetz strongly supported this proposal. He argued that + until we have a dialogue, we will get nowhere. We tend to sit in our + offices and assume that the Saudis will assist if we ask them, but we + never press them in a vigorous and persistent fashion. Newsom agreed that it might be useful + for Ambassador West to approach + the Saudis on this matter. (S)

+

Dr. Brzezinski tasked State to + produce a draft set of talking points for the next SCC. They should:

+

—Explain the U.S. security assistance to the region.

+

—Provide a view of the threat.

+ +

—Offer a plan for collaboration.

+

—List specific Saudi failures.Carter wrote “ok” in the left-hand margin next to these suggested + talking points. (S)

+ + +

The SCC will review these talking points + at the next meeting and consider Ambassador West as a channel for proposing them and a possible + follow-up by Harold Brown in a + meeting with Saudi Defense Minister Sultan, perhaps in June. (S)

+

Somalia Basing Access

+

State presented briefly two conflicting reports we have on Somali + changing attitudes about granting U.S. military access to facilities in + Somalia. First, there is the report from Mogadishu that the Somali + Politburo has reached a decision setting aside the economic aid level + for the present and making a U.S. security pledge far more important. + This seems to be a green light for proceeding with our access agreement + with Somalia. The Somali Ambassador in Washington, however, reported to + Bartholomew yesterday that + the Politburo decision is a ruse by Siad. The assistance level remains + important. (S)

+

Aaron suggested that we respond + to Siad by offering the same security pledge that we previously tabled + and also offering to conduct an amphibious exercise in Somalia some time + in June as a demonstration of our security commitment. This might + resolve two problems at once: an agreement with Somalia and our need for + an exercise site in the region for the MAU. There were no dissenting views expressed on this + proposal. (S)

+

Dr. Brzezinski, therefore, tasked + State to review this approach and to bring to the next SCC a proposed message to Siad making + these two offers. A recommendation to the President on the matter will + not be made until the SCC has reviewed + that draft message.

+
+ +
+ 79. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security + Affairs (Brzezinski)Source: National Archives, RG 59, + Under Secretary for Political Affairs, David D. Newsom Subject Files, Lot 81D154, Box 14, + President’s Responses to SCC, 1980. + Secret; Sensitive; Exdis. + + + Washington, May 16, + 1980 + + + MEMORANDUM FOR + The Secretary of State + The Secretary of Defense + The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff + The Director of Central Intelligence + + + SUBJECT + President’s Review of the Persian Gulf Security Framework SCC—X (S) + +

The President has reviewed the Summary of Conclusions of the SCC meeting on the Persian Gulf Security + Framework, held on May 13.See Document 78. His reaction and + instructions are:

+

1. That we consider Egypt as a potential location for exercises as well + as Kenya and Somalia. The Department of Defense should prepare a paper + outlining an exercise proposal. The Department of State should comment + and recommend an approach to Egypt.

+

2. Approval of the SCC recommendation of + a direct approach to Saudi Arabia in an effort to increase Saudi + financial support for regional security assistance and to coordinate it + with our own.

+

3. Endorsement of the division of labor concept for coordinating U.S. and + allied contributions to the security of the Persian Gulf region.

+

4. Approval of the gap until late June 1980 in our ground forces presence + in the Indian Ocean on a one-time-only basis. (S)

+

These instructions are in addition to the NSC tasking memorandum of May 14.Reference is to a May 14 tasking memorandum that + Dodson sent to Muskie and Brown. (Central Intelligence + Agency, Office of the Director of Central Intelligence, Job + 81B00401R, Subject Files of the Presidential Briefing Coordinator + for DCI (1977–81), Box 13, Folder + 6, SCC Meeting ME Security (No. + 11)

+ + Zbigniew + Brzezinski + +
+ +
+ 80. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security + Affairs (Brzezinski) to + President Carter Source: Carter Library, Brzezinski Donated Material, + Subject File, Box 42, Weekly Reports [To the President] 136–150: + [4/80–8/80]. Secret. Carter + wrote in the upper right-hand margin of the page: “Zbig—This is + good. I would like brief State, DoD & + OMB comments— J.” + + + Washington, May 16, + 1980 + + + SUBJECT + NSC Weekly Report #141 + +

1. Status Report on the + Security Framework for the Persian Gulf.

+

I have chaired eleven SCC meetings on + security framework issues for the Persian Gulf. Getting results is like + pulling teeth. The complicated interests and issues make progress + difficult; bureaucratic resist-ance makes it more so. State is fearful + of military power projected into the region. Defense is unable to act + expeditiously, lacks funds, especially for operations and exercises, and + cannot break through service rivalries to build a command structure for + the region. Nonetheless, progress has been made. You should get more + political and international credit for it. This memorandum, therefore, + is a status report. (S)

+

The Strategic and Political Context

+

In your State of the Union Address,See Document 45. you declared the Persian + Gulf and Southwest Asia to be the third strategic zone for western + security, interrelated to Europe and Asia because our allies have vital + interests there. At the same time, you set three goals for us for the + year:

+ + 1. To make the Soviets pay a price for invading + Afghanistan. + 2. To get the allies to help us make the Soviets pay a + price. + 3. To build a security framework to protect our vital interests in + the Persian Gulf region. (S) + +

It is frequently asserted that we have no concept or strategy for the + Persian Gulf security framework. Although we have not publicly spelled + it out, I have been developing one in the course of the SCCs. It is truly cross-cutting in its + implications, but its four basic components and their sub-categories + make a solid analytical structure and also tend to fit the division of + bureaucratic responsibilities in the interagency arena. They are:

+ +

I. Military Issues—Defense Leading: This includes + U.S. force capabilities; local defense capabilities, interrelation + between U.S. force projection and local defense; and NATO force implications. (S)

+

II. Foreign Policy Issues—State Leading: This + includes the Middle East peace process; the northern Tier—Pakistan and + Turkey; the Arabian Peninsula; the Horn of Africa. (S)

+

III. Economic Issues—State, Energy, and Treasury + sharing: This includes oil; Western economic assistance; Saudi + financing; Western energy policy; international monetary policy. (S)

+

IV. Intelligence Issues—The DCI leads: We have a number of programs + under way which you are aware of. CIA + is developing a regional approach to integrate the several pieces. + (S)

+

Status Report

+

To provide you with as succinct a summary of progress as possible, I have + arrayed the SCC results for each of the + security framework components in chart form at Tab A.None of the tabs was found. You will find + things very compact there. If you desire more detail, you can review the + tabular forms at Tab B. For a dynamic sense of where we would like to + go, you should review the charts at Tab C. They show timing for various + issues, both past and future. The future projections are for planning + guidance. Meeting the schedule for each, of course, is highly + problematical. (S)

+

Further Goals

+

In order to provide concrete and compelling answers to the questions + about a security framework for the Persian Gulf which flow from your + State of the Union Address, I have set the following to be attained by + fall. Some of them will not be easy, but I want to put them before you + to help give you a sense of direction related to possible concrete + actions:

+

I. Military Issues.

+

—A unified command structure for the region.

+

—Ground forces exercises in the region, demonstrating the viability of + the RDF.

+

—More basing access (rear basing in Egypt, forward basing in the Persian + Gulf).

+

—Institutionalized military and internal stability ties with Saudi + Arabia. (S)

+ +

II. + Foreign Policy Issues.

+

—Progress in the autonomy talks.

+

—Improved relations with Pakistan to the point that a Pakistani deal with + Moscow is out of the question.

+

—Firmer relations with Oman and Somalia.

+

—Diffusion or elimination of the hostage problem. (S)

+

III. + Economic Issues.

+

—A larger economic and security assistance commitment by both the U.S. + and our allies to key states in the region. Pakistan is most + critical.

+

—More influence over Saudi aid within the region.

+

—Progress on the energy conservation front and stability in the oil + market. (S)

+

IV. Intelligence + Issues.

+

—Viable programs in Afghanistan, Iran, PDRY, and the Horn. (S)

+

Possible Next Steps

+

There are a number of ways which might gain you more credit for these + security framework activities. First, you might let Defense and State + know that you are following their performance. Second, you could issue a + Presidential Directive based on the concept. It could give a sense of + direction and policy perseverance to our allies in Europe, to friendly + states in the Persian Gulf region, and to foreign policy pundits in the + U.S. (S)

+

2. National Security + Affairs Calendar (attached at Tab D)

+
+ +
+ 81. Telegram From the Embassy in Oman to the Department of StateSource: National Archives, RG + 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800252–0830. Secret; Immediate; + Exdis. + + + Muscat, May + 23, 1980, 0601Z + +

1484. Department for PM. Subject: + Habib Mission: 22 May + Discussions. Ref: (A) Muscat 1480,In + telegram 1480 from Muscat, May 22, the Embassy summarized the May 21 + meeting between Habib and + Sultan Qaboos, during which + they discussed the failed Iranian hostage rescue mission and a + number of regional and bilateral issues. (National Archives, RG 59, + Central Foreign Policy File, P880025–0881) (B) State + 131748,Telegram 131748 to Muscat, May + 19, is in the National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + P870143–0939. (C) State 129143.In + telegram 129143 to Muscat, May 17, the Department indicated that the + ongoing Washington-based interagency meetings were in the process of + working out “details for initiation of Joint Commission which will + be focal point of our new economic assistance relationship with + Oman.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + D800242–1035)

+

1. (S-entire text).

+

2. Summary: In May 22 meeting with Habib Omanis agreed to signature of Access to Facilities + Agreement and exchange of related documents June 3, noting that mutually + acceptable press guidance would need to be agreed upon. Next steps for + Joint Commission as outlined ref C acceptable. Omanis suggest first + Joint Commission team arrive after June 15. Corps of Engineers team + arrival welcome any time between June 15 and 20. Speeded up military + equipment deliveries welcome with early arrival military training team + for tanks top Omani priority. In response Zawawi’s expression of concern at Israeli settlements + policy Habib answered further + questions on State Middle East peace efforts and reiterated our + commitment to CDA peace process. + Zawawi said he hoped + Secretary Muskie could visit + Oman during any forthcoming trip to the Middle East. End summary.

+

3. On May 22 Habib team, + accompanied by Ambassador Wiley + and DCM Buck, met with Minister of + State for Foreign Affairs Zawawi, MFA Under + Secretary al-Alawi, Palace Office Director Suwaidan, MOD Under Secretary Ghazali and Zawawi’s Office Director Mohammed + Nasser. In cordial and + productive discussions agreement was reached on next steps regarding + access and related agreements. Results follow.

+

4. Access agreements. Zawawi + agreed to early signature of Access to Facilities Agreement, covering + unclassified exchange of letters and provision of the two aides memoire + on military construction and economic and security cooperation.See Document + 72. Because he will be out of Oman from May 26 to May 30 on a visit to Baghdad + and al-Alawi will be out of the country at the same time on a visit to + Cairo, Zawawi suggested + signature between May 30 and June 5. (Zawawi said he would also be away June 5 through June + 12.) The date of June 3 was tentatively agreed. Because the exchange of + notes will be unclassified and because of the need to inform Congress, + it was agreed that mutually acceptable press guidance would have to be + agreed upon prior to signature.

+

5. Joint Economic Commission. Habib outlined next steps we envisaged for the Joint + Commission as described ref C. Omanis posed no objection to fielding of + 3 man initial team and follow-up team. Teams would come after signature + of access agreement and after mutually agreed arrangements regarding + announcement and first meeting of the Joint Commission. Zawawi said that Economic Commission + teams should not arrive until after June 15, when Development Council + Secretary General Dr. Sherif Lutfy returns from leave.

+

6. Corps of Engineers team. Habib + emphasized that it was important to field this team early after + agreement signing ceremony in order to meet congressional budgetary + requirements. Zawawi and + Ghazali agreed and said that Corps of Engineers team arrival anytime in + the period June 15–20 would be welcome. Omani authorities would ensure + that team could begin work on the day following their arrival.

+

7. Military equipment deliveries. Habib reiterated that we are moving ahead on the + delivery of six M–60 tanks and three transporters plus provision of a + military training team (MTT) in July. + General Shutler had brought the LOA’s + for these items. On TOW, we had decided + to accelerate delivery and provide all 20 launchers and 440 missiles in + July rather than in July and December as originally envisaged. The + letter of offer will be coming through Saudi Arabia. Also, Habib said we have now budgeted to + provide a modest amount of military training for Oman using FY80 and 81 + International Military Educational Training (IMET) funds. This would be for training primarily in the + United States and over and above any training provided to Oman by + military training teams in the country under LOA’s such as for the tanks. Zawawi commented that Oman would prefer as much + in-country training as possible. Ghazali added that while arrival of the + tanks in July as promised would be appreciated, the key factor would be + early arrival of the MTT’s to provide + the requisite training. Ghazali expressed interest in using training + facilities in U.S., mentioning specifically staff college training.

+

8. Future military requirements. Referring to the Sultan’s statement + regarding future Omani military requirements (ref A), Zawawi indicated that they would be + likely to be back to us with further details regarding possible + requirements for fixed wing fighter aircraft, helicopter gun ships and + more tanks. Habib replied that + we had reported Sultan’s interest.

+ +

9. Middle East peace. Elaborating in some detail on Sultan’s comments on + Middle East peace of the previous day, Zawawi emphasized Omani Government concern that the + “momentum” of the Middle East peace negotiations should be maintained. + He deplored the negative effects on the peace process of Israeli + settlement policy. Oman would not like to see Egypt fail in its peace + initiative because of Israeli stubbornness, Zawawi said. Habib reiterated USG opposition to Israeli settlement + policy and commitment to the CDA peace + process. Pointing out that USG does not + favor the creation of a Palestinian state on the West Bank and Gaza, he + emphasized that we were committed to continuation of a peace process + leading to “full autonomy as well as a freely elected self-governing + authority for the Palestinians” and “a resolution of the Palestinian + problem in all its aspects.” Present interruption in peace talks was not + an indication of failure but of the fact that we were getting down to + the hard core issues. Omanis expressed concern that failure of Egyptian + initiative in the face of Israeli intransigence would not only make + Egypt more isolated in the Arab world but could affect Sadat’s internal + position and improve the Soviet position in the area. Zawawi emphasized that Sadat’s + success will ultimately depend on the degree of effective U.S. support. + Habib emphasized U.S. + determination to support present negotiations and our expectation that + they would be resumed shortly.

+

10. Muskie visit. Zawawi said he wished to formally + reiterate that his government’s invitation to the Secretary stands. His + government hopes that it will be possible for Secretary Muskie to visit Oman during any + forthcoming visit to the Middle East. He also expressed on behalf of his + government, the Omani people and His Majesty the Sultan, Oman’s best + wishes to President Carter and + the hope that the agreements and arrangements we were about to enter + would prove to be a solid and durable basis for close and cooperative + relations between Oman and the United States for decades. Habib thanked the Minister, affirmed + the U.S. desire for cooperative relations, and noted that His Majesty + the Sultan had a standing invitation from President Carter to visit the United States at a + mutually agreeable date.

+

11. Embassy comments will follow.

+ + Wiley + +
+ +
+ 82. Summary of Conclusions of a Special Coordination Committee + MeetingSource: Carter + Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, General Odom File, Box 45, + Security Framework: 5/16–31/80. Secret. The meeting took place in + the White House Situation Room. The minutes of the meeting are not + attached and were not found. Carter wrote “Zbig J” on the first page. Carter also wrote: “We should be + cautious about becoming involved in the + Somalia/Ethiopia military actions now or future” above the first + paragraph. + + + Washington, May 29, 1980, 4–5:15 + p.m. + + + SUBJECT + Follow up on Security Framework in the Persian Gulf—XI + + + PARTICIPANTS + + + State + David Newsom, Under + Secretary for Political Affairs + Peter Constable, + Deputy Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern and South Asian + Affairs + Reginald + Bartholomew, Director Bureau of + Politico-Military Affairs + + + + + Defense + W. Graham Claytor, + Jr., Deputy Secretary + Robert Komer, + Under Secretary for Policy + + + + + JCS + General David + Jones, Chairman + Admiral James Lyons + + + + + + CIA + Stansfield Turner, + Director + Robert Ames, NIO for Near + East and South Asia + Gray Cowan, NIO for + Africa + + + + + White House + Dr. Zbigniew + Brzezinski + Mr. David + Aaron + + + + + NSC + General William E. Odom + General Jasper Welch + Captain Gary + Sick + + + +

Marine Amphibious Exercise

+

State presented a paperNot found. + recommending that our Ambassadors approach the Governments of Egypt and + Kenya by June 1 to explore the possibility of a combined exercise with + our amphibious force (the MAU) later + this summer. Kenya as an exercise site occasioned no disagreements. + Concerning Egypt, State asked that Defense list in priority all the + requests for military activities with Egypt in the near future. If a + MAU exercise is at the top of that + list, then State supports the June 1st approach. If not, the exercise + should be weighed against tother hings to avoid overloading Sadat + politically with a U.S. military tie.

+ +

Defense replied that an F–4 deployment, a survey team for Ras Banas, and + possibly a request for permission to send nuclear powered ships through + the Suez Canal are the only military activities now planned, and Egypt + desires all of them. This is a very short list, it was agreed, which + should not rule out a MAU exercise.

+

Defense asked for some flexibility in getting a MAU into the Indian Ocean. It will not arrive precisely on + June 25 but perhaps as late as mid-July. The delay is required to permit + a MAU exercise in Spain in late June + and in Tunisia July 6–11. No one objected to this delay, but two + political questions were raised with respect to Spain.

+

First, Dr. Brzezinski asked if + the MAU exercise in Spain could + possibly cause embarrassment during the President’s stopover in Madrid. + Although Defense described it as a long-standing routine exercise, State + was asked to review the matter and render a judgment about the political + advisability of conducting it during the President’s visit.

+

Second, the MAU exercise in Tunisia, Dr. + Brzezinski pointed out, + could be presented as part of our response to the recent Tunisian + request for military aid. State was tasked to give the President a + report on Tunisia early next week which will mention the MAU as part of a reply to the military aid + request.

+

Somalia/Ethiopia

+

Because of recent reports of a possible Ethiopian attack, Somalia, as a + possible MAU exercise site, was + discussed separately. The reassessment of all the intelligence indicates + no imminent attack, and a six-ten week period required for preparations + before an offensive toward Hargeisa-Berbera would be feasible. + Nonetheless, Dr. Brzezinski + added, we need to ask:

+

—Do we go ahead with an agreement now?

+

—Drop the idea of an agreement?

+

—Go into Berbera with a MAU deployment + in order to deter an Ethiopian offensive?

+

After considerable discussion and debate on these questions, it was + decided that the issue must be put to the President. Furthermore, both + Secretaries Muskie and Brown must be present for discussion of + the issue before a recommendation can be made.

+

State argued that we should go ahead with the security agreement. When + Ambassador Petterson is in town next week, we should prepare him to go + back and seek completion of our access negotiations. At the same time, + State argued repeatedly, a MAU exercise + in Somalia is ill-advised before an agreement is signed. It would + encourage Siad to believe he had us hooked and could, therefore, raise + his price for an agreement and + at the same time do as he pleases in the Ogaden. A MAU exercise after an agreement would have + some of the same undesirable consequences. It would also risk U.S. + ground troops being involved against an Ethiopian offensive, a matter + requiring consultations with Congress under the War Powers Resolution. + State insisted that there is no significant new intelligence to alter + our earlier assessment about an Ethiopian threat. It is, therefore, all + right to sign an agreement because the risk of serious hostilities is + not great.

+

Defense argued that we should go ahead with a MAU exercise as soon as possible, even before an agreement + is signed. This would help us with MilCon legislation on the Hill.

+

Dr. Brzezinski argued that it + makes no sense to conduct a MAU + exercise before a security agreement is signed. Thereafter, we cannot, + as State argues, refuse to conduct such exercises and to meet and defeat + any Ethiopian incursion endangering U.S. facilities. If we will not meet + the Ethiopian threat, then we cast serious doubt on our credibility for + dealing with other threats in the region.

+

David Aaron recalled our cautious + approach to the first Ogaden war in 1977. State opposed sending a + carrier to Berbera because it might involve us in a war. Defense opposed + it because they feared the carrier would prove vulnerable to attack. The + consequence was an easy Ethiopian victory. We cannot repeat this + performance. We can distinguish between military actions in the Ogaden + and larger Ethiopian incursions into Somalia. Our criterion for + responding militarily must be when a U.S. facility is in danger. + Aaron also raised the + possibility of a political settlement approach to the Ogaden.

+

Claytor and Dr. Brzezinski agreed that we can draw the + line between actions in the Ogaden and Ethiopian attacks sufficiently + large to threaten our interests in Somalia.

+

State noted that we had to take account of the Soviet naval activities in + the Gulf of Aden if we decide to defend Berbera with air and/or ground + forces. Dr. Brzezinski pointed + out that this would be a rise in the threshold, calling into question + our ability to deal with the Soviet threat anywhere in the world.

+

All agreed that the choices in this case are not easy, that the political + consequences domestically, within the region, and vis-a-vis the Soviet + Union, could be far-reaching, and that Muskie, Brown, + and Brzezinski should discuss + them with the President soon.

+

It was agreed that State will prepare materials for an SCC next week, when Ambassador Petterson + is in town, about next steps in our security relationship with + Somalia.

+ +

Saudi Regional Assistance Financing

+

State presented a draft cable for Ambassador WestUnder a May 28 + memorandum that he signed for Tarnoff, Bremer sent a copy of this draft cable to Mondale, Brown, Jones, Turner, and Brzezinski. (National Archives, RG 59, Bureau of + Politico-Military Affairs, General Program Country Files 1980–1984, + Lot 86D371, Box 2, Saudi Arabia 1980) to use in approaching + the Saudis on their overall assistance to regional military security. It + is impressive because it shows that, contrary to a belief widely held, + particularly in OMB, the Saudis + contribute very little to security assistance. Dr. Brzezinski supported the State + approach, but suggested a slightly revised presentation of the data, + less detail on U.S. country-by-country commitments, greater emphasis on + the overall U.S. figure, and a request to the Saudis for their + country-by-country funding. Harold + Brown, in his June meeting with Sultan, can review the + issue again.See Document + 217.

+

Defense argued that the cable should not be sent; Harold Brown should raise the issue + with Sultan first. Defense further argued that we are getting nowhere + with our dialogue with the Saudis. We need to get past the details of + F–15 fuel pods. Dr. Brzezinski + responded that we are moving toward a more effective dialogue as + evidenced by Secretary Dayan’s + energy talks and Secretary Miller’s talks on monetary affairs. Harold Brown can now add the security + dimension to the dialogue. Defense insisted that the Saudis’ response + will be to ask about the F–15 fuel pods and to chide us about how little + money we put up for regional assistance.

+

All agreed that we must resolve the F–15 issue before we can expect + significant progress on the overall security dialogue. It is, however, + an issue with political dimensions that only the President can decide. + Harold Brown will be raising + it with the President soon.

+

Dr. Brzezinski tasked State, + Defense, and the NSC Staff to revise + the cable to Ambassador West.

+

Next SCC + Agenda

+

Dr. Brzezinski prescribed next + week’s agenda as follows:

+

1. The Somali security agreement issue and instructions for Ambassador + Petterson.

+

2. Follow-up on the F–15 issue with Saudi Arabia.

+
+ +
+ 83. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security + Affairs (Brzezinski)Source: Carter Library, National + Security Affairs, Staff Material, Defense/Security, Ermarth, Box 11, Security + Framework: 6–9/80. Secret. + + + Washington, June 2, + 1980 + + + MEMORANDUM FOR + The Secretary of State + The Secretary of Defense + The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff + The Director of Central Intelligence + + + SUBJECT + SCC Decisions and Taskings + (U) + +

The President has reviewed the notes from the May 29 meeting of the + SCC on the Persian Gulf security + frameworkSee Document + 82. and has approved the following decisions and + taskings:

+

Decisions

+

1. We will proceed with our efforts to conduct ground forces exercises in + Kenya and Egypt.

+

2. The MAU may delay its return to the + Indian Ocean until mid-July. (S)

+

Taskings

+

1. State is to review the timing of the MAU exercise in Spain.

+

2. State is to report to the President on the role a MAU landing in Tunisia can play as a part + of our reply to the Tunisian military aid request.

+

3. State will prepare the discussion paper on our next steps in Somalia + as part of the agenda for the next SCC. + Papers dealing with the potential Ethiopian-Somali military + confrontation will be prepared by Defense and CIA.

+

4. State, DOD, and the NSC Staff will revise the cable to + Ambassador West on Saudi + security assistance to regional states. (S)

+ + Zbigniew + Brzezinski + +
+ +
+ 84. Summary of Conclusions of a Special Coordination Committee + MeetingSource: Carter + Library, National Security Council, Institutional Files, Box 114, + SCC 320, 6/9/80, Persian Gulf + Security Framework. Secret. The meeting took place in the White + House Situation Room. The minutes are not attached and were not + found. Carter wrote “Zbig J” + in the upper right-hand corner of the page. + + + Washington, June 9, 1980, 10:30–11:20 + a.m. + + + SUBJECT + Followup on Security Framework in the Persian Gulf XII + + + PARTICIPANTS + + + State + David Newsom, Under + Secretary for Political Affairs + Matthew Nimetz, + Under Secretary for Security Assistance, Science and + Technology + Reginald + Bartholomew, Director Bureau of + Politico-Military Affairs + Peter Constable, + Deputy Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern and South Asian + Affairs + Lannon Walker, Deputy Assistant Secretary for African + Affairs + + + + + Defense + Deputy Secretary W. Graham + Claytor + Robert Komer, + Under Secretary for Policy + + + + + JCS + Lt. General John + Pustay + + + + + CIA + Director Stansfield + Turner + Robert Ames, NIO for Near + East and South Asia + Gray Cowan, NIO for + Africa + + + + + White House + Zbigniew + Brzezinski + David Aaron + + + + + NSC + General William E. Odom + General Jasper Welch + Captain Gary + Sick + + + +

Dr. Brzezinski opened the SCC with a brief discussion of F–15s for + Saudi Arabia and then turned to a longer discussion of U.S. access to + military facilities in Somalia. (S)

+

Saudi Arms Request

+

The Saudi F–15 issue was kept on the agenda in the event any follow-up + discussion was needed. Komer + reported that it is settled on our side. Brown will raise it with Sultan on June 26th in Europe. + (S)

+

Somalia

+

Dr. Brzezinski announced that the + PRC on Somalia will meet next week + to review our broader policy toward Somalia. In the interim, however, we + will pursue the present policy. Today, in the security framework context, we need to consider + the negotiations as they relate to three factors:

+

—our military need for a base at Berbera;

+

—the nature and likelihood of the Ethiopian and Ethiopian/Cuban military + threat to Berbera;

+

—and U.S. ability to contain and reduce Soviet influence in the region as + a whole. (S)

+

Newsom gave a brief update on the + status of the negotiations. We have had mixed responses from Siad and + from Ambassador Addou. The ball is now in our court. Newsom reassured the SCC that there has been no deviation from + the present policy of seeking an agreement. We are still on that course. + (S)

+

Claytor spoke in the context of + Dr. Brzezinski’s three factors, + asserting that we need the base, and we also need to prevent it from + falling into Soviet hands again. It is as important to preclude Soviet + use of Berbera as it is to gain U.S. access. Claytor said that it would be a + disaster for the U.S. to stand aside and let the Soviets take Berbera + whether we have a security commitment to Somalia or not. Komer added that the Soviet position + in the Horn, Dahlak Island, and Aden, places them in our rear area in + the Persian Gulf region. If Berbera were added to the present group of + Soviet facilities in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden, our security position + would be much worse. (S)

+

A second consideration for the U.S., Komer added, is the need to roll back the Soviets + somewhere in the world. Why not in the Horn? Helmut Schmidt has + encouraged us to do this. (S)

+

Newsom asked if U.S. access to + Berbera will more likely deter or prompt an Ethiopian attack? Komer admitted that either effect + could dominate but that the implications of not seeking access are much + worse than risking an Ethiopian attack while we have access. (S)

+

Dr. Brzezinski elaborated the + dilemma. The Ogaden insurgency will last, and Siad will feel freer to + support the insurgency if we secure Berbera. If we don’t, however, our + passivity itself may prompt an Ethiopian attack. Therefore, U.S. policy + to cope with the dilemma should be to seek access to bases while + refusing any assurance or support of the Ogaden insurgency. That should + confront the Soviets and the Cubans with greater risks in sponsoring an + attack on Berbera. (S)

+

There was a brief review of our initial rationale for seeking military + access in Somalia. In the beginning, Bartholomew argued, it was entirely military. Now an + element of denial to the Soviets has crept in. David Aaron countered that the initial + rationale had been redundancy, i.e. getting as many bases as possible so + that we can absorb a loss more easily. There was also a political + rationale asserted from the beginning by the Vice President, that is, the political value + of occupying a base which the Soviets have been forced to abandon. + (S)

+

There was a brief discussion of the latest intelligence. The likelihood + of a major offensive in the next few weeks is small. Some troop movement + from Eritrea to the Ogaden, however, could be the beginning of a buildup + for an offensive, but that buildup could not be completed before late + July. (S)

+

Dr. Brzezinski queried Defense + about our present capabilities in the region to deal with an Ethiopian, + and possibly a Cuban, offensive. Although Defense was optimistic about + our ability to handle a threat in the Horn, Komer admitted that our carriers can only provide air + defense and limited air-ground support. Anti-tank ordnance for F–14s and + A–7s is not available, a limiting factor in our capabilities. (S)

+

Dr. Brzezinski summed up the + conclusion of the discussion as follows: An Ethiopian/Cuban occupation + of Berbera, in the judgment of all present, would be a major setback for + the U.S. policy in the region. We should, therefore, increase our safety + margin slightly by getting into Berbera before an attack. If this + proposition is valid, then we should stay on our present negotiating + course, seeking access without giving in to Somali demands for greater + security assurances. (S)

+

Komer added that we need to get + other countries in the region to help us with Somalia’s demands. After a + discussion of Egyptian willingness to become involved (Sadat is more + enthusiastic than the Egyptian military), Dr. Brzezinski instructed Defense to + prepare talking points which can be used with Egyptian Minister of + Defense Ali to request combined U.S./Egyptian contingency planning for + Somalia. The talking points will be coordinated with State and presented + to the PRC if that is still needed and + appropriate.Carter wrote below this concluding paragraph: + “Zbig—Make no plans or commitments to defend + Somalia with US forces. We’ll + discuss Friday— J.” (S)

+
+ +
+ 85. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense Brown to the President’s Assistant for National Security + Affairs (Brzezinski)Source: Carter Library, National + Security Council, Institutional Files, Box 114, SCC 327, 7/15/80, Security Framework. + Secret. A copy was sent to Muskie. + + + Washington, July 12, + 1980 + + + SUBJECT + Amphibious Forces for the Indian Ocean (U) + +

(S) On February 29, 1980, the SCC + approved a force posture for the Indian Ocean/Persian Gulf region which + projected that “present levels be maintained” until the hostage crisis + in Iran is resolved.See Documents 57 and 58. The + force posture also included battalion-size-ground forces in the region, + either sea- or land-based, thereafter. Since then, a gap in this land + force presence has been authorized, to end later this month.

+

(S) Subsequent political developments have indicated that the hostage + situation is unlikely to end soon, and we are unlikely for the + foreseeable future to be invited to deploy battalion-size ground forces + to the region. Furthermore, resolution of the hostage crisis will + probably not improve the likelihood of our deploying land-based forces + to the region. This would leave the burden of ground force presence + entirely upon our amphibious forces. (In this connection, it is worth + noting that at any point in time we can get a few hundred ground troops + almost anywhere into the region by air faster than by landing the MAU—which is likely to be many hundreds, + or even thousands, of miles away at sea.)

+

(S) Limited amphibious lift assets dictate that we could not maintain + continuous presence of an Amphibious Ready Group with embarked Marine + Amphibious Unit (ARG/MAU) in the Indian Ocean without seriously + degrading either our Mediterranean and Pacific amphibious presence or + our fleet turnaround (training, upkeep and overhaul) times in the U.S. + Lack of or severe limitations on port visit and exercise opportunities + in the Indian Ocean are a detriment to the training, materiel readiness + and morale of the fighting force. Additionally, all of the above factors + combine to exacerbate our already serious problem of retention of + experienced sailors and Marines.

+

(S) Ideally, we would like to be able to maintain a continuous land force + presence in the Indian Ocean/Persian Gulf region. As long as this + presence is limited to amphibious forces, however, we are constrained by the major factors of + amphibious lift assets, training exercises and port visits. So long as + we continue a major fraction of our present amphibious commitments in + other theaters, then our present lift assets would dictate that the + maximum presence we can sustain over the long term in the Indian Ocean, + Mediterranean and Pacific is 70, 65 and 60 percent respectively. + Additional rationale for these figures and an illustrative schedule are + included in the attachment.Attached but not + printed. The attachment described what would be needed to sustain a + “near-continuous (70 percent) Indian Ocean ARG/MAU Deployment + Schedule” and listed pros and cons for a 70 percent presence and a + 100 percent presence. Actual achievement of maximum possible + presence would depend in part on our ability to maintain the readiness + of the force through exercises and port visits.

+

(S) The Special Coordination Committee is scheduled to discuss our + Security Framework for the Persian Gulf/Indian Ocean Region on July + 15.See Document + 86. Included on the agenda for this meeting is a + DoD-proposed schedule for military deployments and unilateral and + combined exercises in the region for the remainder of CY 1980. The optimum case would have + amphibious forces in the area as much as possible with these forces + conducting frequent training exercises and port visits in order to + maintain their combat readiness. The exercise schedule before the SCC represents a point of departure toward + the achievement of this objective. It is thus essential that amphibious + presence in the Indian Ocean and our exercise and deployment program for + the region be addressed in the same context.

+

(U) I would appreciate your serious consideration of this proposal. I + also recommend that it be discussed at the July 15 meeting of the SCC so that a recommendation can be made + to the President as soon as possible.

+ + Harold Brown + +
+ +
+ 86. Summary of Conclusions of a Special Coordination Committee + MeetingSource: Carter + Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, General Odom File, Box 45, + Security Framework: 7/12–15/80. Secret. The meeting took place in + the White House Situation Room. Minutes of the meeting are ibid. + Carter wrote “Zbig J” in + the top right-hand corner of the page. + + + Washington, July 15, 1980, 3:30–4:40 + p.m. + + + SUBJECT + Follow up on Security Framework in the Persian Gulf—XIII + + + PARTICIPANTS + + + State + David Newsom, Under + Secretary for Political Affairs + Harold Saunders, + Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern & South Asian + Affairs + David Gompert, Deputy Director, Bureau for + Politico-Military Affairs + + + + + Defense + Secretary Harold + Brown + Deputy Secretary W. Graham + Claytor + Robert Komer, + Under Secretary for Policy + + + + + JCS + Chairman General David + Jones + Lt. General John + Pustay + + + + + CIA + Director Admiral Stansfield + Turner + Robert Ames, NIO for Near + East and South Asia + + + + + White House + Dr. Zbigniew + Brzezinski + David Aaron + + + + + NSC + General William E. Odom + General Jasper Welch + Captain Gary + Sick + + + +

Dr. Brzezinski opened the meeting + with a brief preview of the agenda, exercise and deployment schedules, + basing, Harold Brown’s meeting + with Saudi Defense Minister Sultan, and the DCI’s paper on reactions to a possible shift of U.S. forces + to the Persian Gulf.Not found. + (S)

+

Exercises and Deployments

+

Defense presented an exercise schedule for the region for the remainder + of 1980 and explained that we must have exercises both to train our + forces and to support contingency planning in the region. Adjustments to + meet the political constraints can be made. (S)

+

The JCS emphasized that the most + important exercise is an RDJTF + deployment with an Army unit in the region because it would signal a + U.S. willingness to deploy the entire RDF, combining all Marine and Army divisions. (S)

+ +

Dr. Brzezinski also underscored + the political impact of an RDJTF + exercise and proposed to advance it to November or earlier if possible. + (S)

+

State raised a number of questions about the priority list of military + activities in Egypt which puts the RDJTF exercise quite low. Does this mean we will have to + revise the priority list? Will we be asking for another location later + for a second such exercise? (S)

+

Defense explained that the Egyptian priority list could be modified in + this case, and that its rationale is different than our concerns for the + RDJTF in the region. Furthermore, + if we can establish an exercise pattern in Egypt and quietly repeat it, + we will do that. (S)

+

The only other exercise issue concerned Kenya. We cannot meet the Kenyan + request that a MAU exercise there be + completely secret. Defense and Dr. Brzezinski suggested that we should ask Kenya once more + for the exercise and explain to them that they are not the only country + in the region which is hosting U.S. forces deployments. (S)

+

It was agreed that State will query Egypt on the + acceptability of a MAU exercise and an + RDJTF exercise this fall giving + priority to the RDJTF exercise. If + Egypt accepts, that information will be used in another request to the + Kenyans for a MAU exercise in + August.Carter checked the Approve option and initialed “J” + in the right-hand margin. (S)

+

Defense next requested that we reduce the “military presence” requirement + for ground forces in the region from 100 percent of the time to 70 + percent. Both funds and available units, particularly Marine Amphibious + Units (MAU), are strained by the 100 + percent requirement. (S)

+

All agreed to support Defense’s recommendation to + the President for a change in our battalion-size ground force presence + from 100 percent to 70 percent of the time in the Indian Ocean/Persian + Gulf region. That “presence” may be either a MAU or an Army battalion-size element deployed within the + region.Carter checked the Approve option and initialed “J” + in the right-hand margin. (S)

+

Defense Basing Paper

+

Defense explained the rationale of the basing paperNot found. as a presentation of overall + access in the region needed to meet the range of threat contingencies + which the Soviet Union might pose. It includes four kinds of access:

+

1. Enroute access (the Atlantic/Mediterranean route as well as the + Pacific/Indian Ocean littoral route).

+

2. Indian Ocean littoral access to support peacetime presence, TacAir, + and sea control (Oman, Kenya, and possibly Somalia).

+ +

3. Rear staging areas beyond the range of Soviet Tac Air which can + support surges of more than a division of ground forces (Ras Banas in + Egypt).

+

4. Forward basing access required for defense deployments of the oil + producing areas (the eastern side of the Arabian Peninsula and, in some + contingencies, in southern Iran). (S)

+

Defense next explained that early access in the forward areas is critical + for military success in the whole range of Soviet threats. Forward + access admittedly stretches our resources, but it is better to have them + stretched than relaxed by less ambitious access requirements. Our + present approach to basing in the four categories is the minimum + required for any substantial involvement in the region. Forward basing + in the Arabian Peninsula is not possible or wise to acquire now; but it + is possible to proceed on Ras Banas. (S)

+

State was reluctant on the general approach and asked for a study of our + purposes in the areas before proceeding on basing and forces issues. + (S)

+

Defense disagreed. We need far more military analyses by the JCS for dealing with the Soviet threat. + The basing paper only asks for approval to continue with Ras Banas. + Perhaps a strategy study would be appropriate by the end of the year but + not now. (S)

+

Dr. Brzezinski replied that a + study will not necessarily resolve the issues State raised, but that we + can deal with them as they arise, step-by-step, in going forward on the + Defense basing approach. (S)

+

It was agreed to recommend to the President that + we ask for access in Ras Banas.Carter checked the Approve option + and wrote “Subject to approval of assessment below” in the margin, + bracketed the right-hand side of the next paragraph, and drew an + arrow from his handwritten comment to the bracket.

+

If approved, Defense and State will work out a negotiating strategy. In + the meanwhile, Defense was tasked to submit a paper on MilCon funds for Ras Banas, showing + where they will come from. Defense will also prepare a paper addressing + the remaining recommendations in the basing paper. State will comment on + these papers in light of the political dilemmas raised today. (S)

+

There was very brief discussion of Harold + Brown’s meeting with Sultan in Geneva. The “Joint + Security Commission” proposal was accepted by Sultan, and the first + meeting is to be held this fall, preferably in the U.S. or Europe, and + before the election if possible to avoid discussion of F–15 + equipment.See Document 217. (S)

+ +

Defense was tasked to submit an agenda and proposed date for NSC review. (C)

+

[less than 1 line not declassified] Reactions to a Possible Shift of U.S. Forces to the + Persian Gulf Region. + Harold Brown said that he has + found West European leaders less concerned and more willing to accept + our reallocation of Defense resources to the Persian Gulf regionOn July 1, Brown met with Giscard in Paris for two hours “to brief him on U.S. + plans to beef up rapid deployment forces and to acquire Indian Ocean + facilities in Kenya, Oman, and possibly Somalia.” In response, the + French Government was reportedly “seriously considering a call for + demilitarization of the Indian Ocean and Persian Gulf that would + exclude the United States and the Soviet Union from the region.” + Moreover, Giscard was also + said to be “studying the idea of an international conference on the + subject.” (Ronald Koven, “France Considering Call to Demilitarize + Persian Gulf Region,” The Washington Post, + July 6, 1980, p. A14) [2 lines not + declassified]. (S)

+
+
+ 87. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security + Affairs (Brzezinski)Source: Carter Library, National + Security Affairs, Staff Material, Defense/Security, Shoemaker, Box + 123, Persian Gulf Security Framework: 7/80. Secret. + + + Washington, July 22, + 1980 + + + MEMORANDUM FOR + The Secretary of State + The Secretary of Defense + The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff + The Director of Central Intelligence + + + SUBJECT + July 15 SCC on the Persian Gulf + Security Framework (C) + +

The President has reviewed the results of the July 15 SCC meeting on the Security Framework for + the Persian GulfSee Document 86. and directed the following:

+

—Ras Banas. Access to Ras Banas is approved. State + and DOD will develop a negotiating + strategy for obtaining access. DOD will + also prepare a paper on MilCon funds + for Ras Banas, showing where they will come from. Both papers will be submitted to + the President for his approval prior to the beginning of + negotiations.A July 31 memorandum from + Brown to Muskie setting forth a proposed + negotiating strategy for a facility at Ras Banas is printed in Foreign + Relations, 1977–1980, vol. IX, Arab-Israeli Dispute, + August 1978–December 1980, Document 395. (S)

+

—Ground Forces Presence. The Defense Department + request to reduce our ground forces presence in the Indian Ocean area + from 100% to 70% of the time is granted. These forces may either be a + land-based battalion or a MAU. (S)

+

—Ground Forces Exercises in Egypt and Kenya. + DOD will conduct an RDJTF exercise in Egypt and a MAU exercise in Kenya by the end of the + year. In addition, a MAU exercise in + Egypt should be pursued, either this year or early in 1981. State will + query Egypt on the acceptability of both exercises, giving priority to + the RDJTF. Based upon Egypt’s + response, State will then query Kenya again on the MAU exercise, pointing out that Kenya is + not alone in hosting such an exercise. (S)

+

State and Defense will coordinate necessary adjustments in the military + exercise schedule in light of these decisions. Defense will also prepare + a paper addressing as appropriate the remaining recommendations in the + basing paper for further consideration by the SCC. (C)

+ + Zbigniew + Brzezinski + +
+ +
+ 88. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense Brown to President CarterSource: + Carter Library, Brzezinski + Donated Material, Subject File, Box 37, Serial Xs—[7/80–9/80]. + Secret. Carter wrote “cc + Harold J” in the upper right-hand corner of the page. + + + Washington, August 4, + 1980 + +

(S) Following additional JCS review of + the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force (RDJTF) concept, I have just approved two further important + steps toward streamlining the planning and command relationships + involved. As you know, these issues have proved among the most + controversial of all those involved in the development of a credible deterrence/defense posture in + the Persian Gulf/Indian Ocean (PG/IO) area.

+

(S) Originally HQ + RDJTF was charged with responsibility + for planning and executing operations in several areas of the world. In + practice, however, it has had to focus almost exclusively on the PG/IO + because of the urgent nature of the potential demands on us in this + vital area. Therefore, on JCS advice, I + have approved narrowing the mission of HQ + RDJTF to coping with the threat in + the key area. For the foreseeable future, the range of threats in + Southwest Asia seems likely to present the greatest challenges, and it + appears prudent to dedicate HQ + RDJTF exclusively to preparing to + meet them.

+

(S) As foreshadowed in my March 6 memorandum to you,See Document 61. I + have also approved the JCS + recommendation to transfer responsibility for all Southwest Asia + contingency planning to HQ + RDJTF. This step will further clarify + planning responsibilities, although close coordination will be + maintained with EUCOM and PACOM planners, because both EUCOM and PACOM must for the foreseeable future be major supporting + commands for any sizable contingency in that region.

+

(S) However, I agree with the JCS that + HQ + RDJTF should remain under the + operational command of REDCOM, + principally because REDCOM is in a + better position to deal with other unified commands than HQ + RDJTF, and because this ensures a + close relationship with the REDCOM + elements that would have to deploy to support HQ + RDJTF in a contingency. The + Commandant of the Marine Corps was the only dissenter from this JCS recommendation, preferring that HQ + RDJTF report directly through the + JCS. However, I agree with the + Chairman and other three Chiefs that this would not be a viable course + of action, unless the JCS organization + were modified to provide the indispensable support to HQ + RDJTF that REDCOM already can. Such a change in + JCS would require considerable and + expensive duplicative staffing.

+

(S) I view the above measures as additional steps in the evolutionary + process of developing the optimum command and control capability to meet + new needs in the critical Southwest Asia Area—a process which may + eventually lead to certain changes in the Unified Command Plan. + Ultimately it may become more feasible to establish a separate unified + command somewhere in the region.Carter underlined “a separate + unified command” and drew a line in the left-hand margin with two + arrows pointing to it to highlight the sentence. For the time + being no appropriate locale is available; establishing a new unified + command without a land location would in my judgment both call attention + to and exacerbate the political problems connected with too high a U.S. + military profile. Moreover, + so long as the great bulk of the ground and air forces earmarked for the + RDJTF are located here in the + United States, there are strong operational as well as training reasons + for keeping HQ + RDJTF here as well.Under Brown’s + signature, Carter wrote: + “Harold—ok, if you and the JCS + insist. I still have the belief that in a real crisis we would have + to initiate a different and simpler command structure. J.C.” +

+ + Harold Brown + +
+ +
+ 89. Summary of Conclusions of a Special Coordination Committee + MeetingSource: Carter + Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, General Odom File, Box 45, + Security Framework: 8/1–21/80. Secret. The meeting took place in the + White House Situation Room. The minutes are not attached and were + not found. Carter added the + following notation in the top right-hand corner of the first page: + “Zbig—Keep OMB involved in this. + J.” + + + Washington, August 4, 1980, 9:30–10:20 + a.m. + + + SUBJECT + Follow up on Security Framework in the Persian Gulf—XIV + + + PARTICIPANTS + + + State + David Newsom, Under + Secretary for Political Affairs + Reginald + Bartholomew, Director, Bureau for + Politico-Military Affairs + + + + + Defense + Robert Komer, + Under Secretary for Policy + Frank Kramer, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary for + ISA + + + + + JCS + Chairman, General David + Jones + Lt. General John + Pustay + + + + + + CIA + [2 names not declassified] + + + + + OMB + Edward G. Sanders, Associate Director, for National + Security and International Affairs + + + + + White House + Dr. Zbigniew + Brzezinski + + + + + NSC + Brig. General William E. Odom + Major General Jasper Welch + + + + +

Dr. Brzezinski chaired the + meeting which dealt with four agenda items: (1) how to proceed on Ras + Banas in Egypt; (2) additional Defense basing recommendations; (3) + enroute access negotiations; and (4) the role of indigenous forces in + the region. (C)

+

1. Follow-up on + Negotiations and MILCON for Ras Banas

+

a. A Negotiating Approach—Mubarak has come back to + McGiffert’s initial approach + on Ras Banas access with recommended language for a letter of + understanding. State recommends that Atherton go back to Mubarak and propose combining a + public letter of understanding with a more precise secret access + agreement, a formula we used with Oman. This will meet the Congress’s + requirements for an agreement as a precondition for funds. (S)

+

Dr. Brzezinski proposed that a + Working Group draft instructions for Atherton which will serve as an initial negotiating + position with the Egyptians. As soon thereafter as the Egyptians will + accept it, a technical team should go to Egypt to develop more fully + constructions plans. (S)

+

Komer proposed that we get the + Egyptians to accept the local currency costs of the construction. + Although this may reduce our outlays in principle, JCS and State expressed serious doubt that + the Egyptians either can or will provide a great deal in local currency + constructioncosts. (S)

+

It was agreed to recommend to the President that + as a negotiating strategy we follow up Mubarak’s proposed wording for a + public letter with the public letter/secret access agreement formula we + used in Oman. A joint State/Defense negotiating team will proceed to + Egypt as soon as appropriate for access discussions.Carter + checked the Approve option. (S)

+

b. MILCON for Ras Banas—The FY 1982–86 funding is not a problem. + Defense can include that in out-year planning. The troublesome issue is + finding $10 to $12 million P&D funds for FY 1981. Defense proposed to take the necessary money from + either Oman/Somalia/Kenya programs or from Diego Garcia. Both Dr. + Brzezinski and State argued + that the political significance of endangering our MILCON commitments to + Oman/Somalia/Kenya is too great to risk although the amount of money is + relatively small. They suggested that Defense reprogram the money from + elsewhere. State showed some flexibility on funds for Oman and Somalia + but warned that we must be extremely careful. (S)

+

General Jones underscored that + our entire basing effort is very modest. Phase I promises no significant + results before 1983. The strategic significance of skimping in FY 1981 is great and risky. (S)

+ +

All agreed that we should pursue Ras Banas + construction with the utmost speed but not at risk to our agreements + with Oman, Somalia and Kenya. Defense will provide a paper on MILCON + funding for P&D in FY 1981 which + shows sources of reprogramming in light of the constraints imposed by + our commitments to Oman, Somalia and Kenya. (S)

+

2. Defense Paper on Other + Basing Recommendations

+

State expressed concern at the lack of an overall political rationale for + Defense efforts. When we are vague about our purposes in the region, our + efforts to deal with the Soviet threat are believed by some in the + region to be a cover for interference in the internal affairs of states + in the region. (S)

+

Dr. Brzezinski agreed that this + is a valid point and, therefore, tasked State to provide a paper giving + specific comments to Defense on the eleven recommendations and also + providing a general policy paper which clarifies our intentions toward + the region. It should articulate the Carter doctrine for Southwest Asia + and the Persian Gulf in a manner that removes doubt about our concern + over the Soviet threat. It can also be used to explain our security + framework policy in NATO . (S)

+

3. Enroute Access and + Overflight Agreements

+

The basic issue on this topic is whether to pursue agreements more + vigorously or to continue State’s more cautious approach of only + sensitizing governments to our contingency needs rather than seeking + memoranda of understandings. A consensus emerged for a + more active enroute access policy.

+

Further, it was agreed:

+

—To proceed with the Portuguese and to clear up the Lajes and other + enroute access issues.

+

—To make our next deployment through Spain a politically + non-controversial one and then approach the Spanish for more specific + understandings for Persian Gulf contingencies.

+

—To seek memoranda of understandings with the UK, FRG, France, and Italy + and to instruct our ambassadors to raise the issue with Thailand and + Singapore.

+

—To seek more information about the condition of bases in Morocco through + [less than 1 line not declassified] overt + sources of information rather than raise the issue formally with the + Moroccan Government.Carter checked the Approve option + and initialed “J” in the margin. (S)

+ +

4. Defense Status Report on the + Role of Local Forces in our Strategy for the Region

+

Defense explained that this effort is on-going and that it will be + complete in a few weeks. State expressed doubt that any local forces + make much difference for U.S. strategy. Defense explained that there are + rather significant advantages for us through local procurement of air + defense equipment. There are also four Jordanian divisions, and under + some circumstances several Iraqi divisions which could help us + enormously with the Soviet threat. (S)

+
+
+ 90. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security + Affairs (Brzezinski) to + President CarterSource: Carter Library, National + Security Affairs, Staff Material, Office, Meetings File, Box 22, + SCC Meeting: #337 Held 9/2/80, + 8–9/80. Secret. Sent for information. Carter initialed the memorandum. + + + Washington, September + 2, 1980 + + + SUBJECT + Persian Gulf Security Framework + +

Because significant progress has been made in our Security Framework for + the Persian Gulf since my last status report,That memorandum, attached at Tab A, is printed as Document 80. I want to give you an + update. (C)

+

In my earlier memorandum (Tab A), I suggested specific goals which we + should try to attain by fall. Goals were chosen in each of the four + major components of the Security Framework structure. What follows is + the status of progress toward these goals. A more comprehensive summary + of our actions in chart form is at Tab B.Not + attached. + Underlined in red on the charts are improvements + since June 3. (S)

+

Status of Progress Toward Security Framework + Goals

+

A. Military Component

+

—Command Arrangements. We do not yet have a + separate unified command for the region. DOD is still struggling with this controversial, yet + critical, issue.Carter wrote “little progress” in the left-hand + margin next to this point. (S)

+ +

—RDF Exercises in the + Region. You have approved a comprehensive exercises plan for + the region which includes the RDJTF.See Documents 86 and 87. We + have received approval from Egypt to conduct an RDJTF battalion-sized exercise there in + November. A pre-deployment team will begin coordination with the + Egyptians in mid-September. (S)

+

—Basing Access. We have completed formal + agreements with Oman, Kenya, and Somalia.The + access agreement with Kenya was signed on June 26, and on August 22, + the Department of State announced the exchange of diplomatic notes + that incorporated an agreement for increased access to the port and + air facilities in Somalia. (Department of State Bulletin, October 1980, p. 19) We have agreed in + principle with the Egyptians to develop and use Ras Banas. A negotiating + team will travel to Cairo within the next several weeks. We have opened + the subject of access and overbuilding with Saudi Arabia. (S)

+

—Institutionalized Security Ties with Saudi + Arabia. We have proposed, and the Saudis have accepted, the concept + of establishing a Joint Military Commission.See Document 217. + David Jones will discuss the + details during his visit to Saudi Arabia this month. The initial meeting + of the JMC will probably take place in + mid-November. (S)

+

B. Foreign Policy + Component

+

—The Autonomy Negotiations. We are making no + progress here, although we are keeping the talks alive.Carter wrote + “no progress” in the left-hand margin next to this point. + (C)

+

—Improved Relations with Pakistan. These ties + remain tenuous, although it appears that Zia is not prepared to strike a deal with Moscow. + Pak-Saudi cooperation is improving, providing us with an indirect hedge + against Zia’s drifting toward + the Soviet Union. We continue to stand ready to provide equipment to + Pakistan, and there has been some informal interest in Islamabad.Carter + wrote “surprisingly courageous” in the left-hand margin next to this + point. (S)

+

—Better Relations with Oman and Somalia. We have + formally initiated the Joint Economic Commission with Oman and are + preparing to begin the upgrading of Omani facilities, in accordance with + our access agreement.See Document 81. We have signed an access + agreement with Somalia, and the Somalis have withdrawn their regulars + from the Ogaden as a gesture to us. We continue to move cautiously but + positively in our relations with both states. (S)

+ +

—The Hostage Problem. This obviously remains + unresolved, although we have successfully shifted our focus to the + greater danger of Soviet aggression against Iran. (S)

+

C. Economic Component

+

—Security Assistance. We have not made progress in + expanding our aggregate security assistance program in the region. + DOD, State, the DCI, and the NSC all agree that this is a crucial aspect of our security + policy and must be expanded. (S)

+

—Influence over Saudi Aid. We have discussed the + distribution of Saudi aid with the Saudi leadership. The JMC will provide us with an + institutionalized forum for pressing this issue. We are, separately, + encouraging more Saudi assistance to Somalia. (S)

+

—Oil. The oil outlook continues to improve. Prices + are stable, OECD reserves are at + record levels, and consumption in the West is down. We have begun to + fill the strategic petroleum reserve. The Venice SummitReference is to the G–7 Economic Summit which took + place in Venice, Italy, June 22–23. Documentation on the Summit is + printed in Foreign + Relations, 1977–1980, vol. III, Foreign Economic + Policy. and actions by the IEA have helped convince oil producers that we are serious + about our energy policies and have helped stabilize the oil market.Carter wrote “all good” in the left-hand margin next + to this point. (S)

+

D. Intelligence + Component

+

—Comprehensive Regional Program. We continue to + press ahead to integrate our intelligence efforts throughout the region. + (S)

+

Since I last reported to you on the Security Framework, much has been + accomplished. However, much more remains to be done. Recent intelligence + about the Soviet buildup along the Iranian border has heightened our + awareness of our near-term military vulnerabilities in the region. The + effect on the JCS has been more + galvanizing than anything that has happened since Afghanistan. (S)

+

On balance, however, we have made substantial progress in improving our + ability to implement your State of the Union Address.See Document 45. + You may wish, at some point over the next several weeks, to make a + public statement on the security framework in order both to show the + progress we have made and to tie together various security framework + initiatives which have been independently reported in the press. This is + important for two reasons. First, it can show the Allies that you have + developed a clear concept and made considerable progress toward the task you set in January. + Second, it should have a similar effect with the Congress and the + public.Carter wrote “Begin drafting—I may do it” in the + left-hand margin next to this paragraph. (S)

+
+
+ 91. Summary of Conclusions of a Special Coordination Committee + MeetingSource: Carter + Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, General Odom File, Box 48, + Security Framework: Minutes of Meeting: 9/80. Top Secret. The + meeting took place in the White House Situation Room. + + + Washington, September 2, 1980, 10–11:25 + a.m. + + + SUBJECT + Follow up on Security Framework in the Persian Gulf—XVI + + + PARTICIPANTS + + + State + Secretary Edmund + Muskie + Deputy Secretary Warren + Christopher + David Newsom, Under + Secretary for Political Affairs + + + + + Defense + Secretary Harold + Brown + Deputy Secretary W. Graham + Claytor + Under Secretary for Policy, Robert Komer + + + + + JCS + Chairman, General David + Jones + General Paul F. Gorman, Director, Plans and Policy + + + + + + CIA + Director, Admiral Stansfield + Turner + Robert Ames, NIO for Near + East and South Asia + + + + + OMB + Director, James + McIntyre + Deputy Director, John + White + + + + + White House + Dr. Zbigniew + Brzezinski + David Aaron + + + + + NSC + General William E. Odom + General Jasper Welch + Captain Gary + Sick + + + +

Dr. Brzezinski opened the meeting + by listing two major agenda items: (a) the JCS paper on defense of the Persian Gulf and Iran,Not found. and (b) possible Muskie/Gromyko talking points. (S)

+ +

The JCS Strategy + Paper

+

Brown pointed out that the three + strategies, (1) defense on the Soviet/Iranian border, (2) defense of + southern Iran, and (3) defense of the Persian Gulf, are not mutually + exclusive. As our capabilities increase, each becomes more feasible. + (S)

+

General Jones emphasized that + “deterrence” is the substance of the JCS paper. None of our three defense options can stop a + Soviet invasion of the 16–20 divisions. Our upper level of force + projection would be about two divisions in the region. We cannot sustain + more with our present water, POL, and + other logistical capabilities. The JCS + paper is unambiguous in its assertion that we cannot defend Iran on any + line today against a determined Soviet attack. We simply do not have the + forces. (TS)

+

The remainder of the discussion on the JCS paper concerned how to deter even though we lack the + capabilities to defend if deterrence fails. In spreading the conflict + geographically, i.e. “horizontal escalation” as opposed to “vertical + escalation” with nuclear weapons, it was agreed that the Soviets have + nothing abroad that we could take which equals in importance to them + what Iran and the oil producing regions in the Gulf are to the U.S. and + its allies. The problem of deterrence in Iran was also likened to NATO ’s defense of Western Europe in the + early 1950s when we did not have the military capabilities. (TS)

+

Dr. Brzezinski suggested that + Defense should work on a list of “horizontal escalation” options even if + they do not look promising at present. (TS)

+

Muskie interpreted the Defense + paper and the deterrence actions it suggests as a formula for moving + toward World War III. He said that limited options and “signaling” + simply are not credible. The French see Iran only as a “regional” + matter. Neither they nor the Germans are worried about a Soviet invasion + of Iran. If we are to deter, we must achieve that before the Soviets + invade. The signaling steps recommended, in Muskie’s view, are only likely to frighten the Saudis + who are already sufficiently frightened, but uncooperative. Our actions, + unlike the secret Soviet contingency exercises, can be seen publicly in + the region. We may look provocative and provide a basis for precisely + the Soviet intervention we want to deter. (TS)

+

There were differing opinions on the extent to which the Europeans + appreciate the implications of Soviet military and political hegemony in + the Persian Gulf and whether they would be willing or have the + capabilities to do anything militarily to defend Iran. All agreed that + if the Soviets succeed in the Persian Gulf region, Western Europe’s + freedom from the Soviet Union would be lost. The enormity of the + strategic stakes, however, may not be clear to Europeans. (TS)

+ +

Dr. Brzezinski expressed the view + that we must communicate directly to the Soviet leadership that their + entry into Iran will create a direct U.S./Soviet military conflict. We + can do this privately without provoking the reactions that the + “signaling” moves in the region might create. Muskie indicated that two + opportunities for such a communication are before us: first, the + Gromyko letter, and second + the Muskie/Gromyko meeting up in New York.No letter from Gromyko was found. He and Muskie met in New York on + September 25. For a memorandum of conversation of their meeting, see + Foreign + Relations, 1977–1980, vol. VI, Soviet Union, Document + 302. (TS)

+

There was lengthy discussion of this proposal, including doubts about its + credibility and the alternative of trying to raise Western Europe’s + concern to a level appropriate with the enormity of strategy + implications. In the end there was agreement to develop an approach to + the Soviets for review at the next SCC. + (S)

+

Defense’s List of Possible Actions

+

A brief discussion of Defense’s list of possible signaling actions led to + the conclusion that none be recommended for decision today. Those will + be pulled out for review at the next SCC which we could well do within our present security + framework efforts in any case.The Summary of + Conclusions of the September 5 SCC + meeting is scheduled for publication in Foreign Relations, 1977–1980, vol. + XI, Iran: Hostage Crisis, November 1979–January + 1981. (S)

+

In response to a question by Dr. Brzezinski, General Jones said that we could test Turkish feeling about + TacAir deployed to Incirlik. The Turks are asking us about increased + Soviet activity in the Transcaucasus. (TS)

+

McIntyre expressed concern about + the shortages of O&M funds for any increased exercises or + preparatory activities in the region. Defense, he said, will need this + in particular if the list of actions includes TacAir deployments to + Turkey and a RDJTF headquarters + deployment to the region this fall. (TS)

+

Dr. Brzezinski summed up the + meeting by making the following points:

+

1. CIA and DIA will provide a briefing at the next SCC on what we might tell our allies in + Europe and the region about the Sovietthreat. (TS)

+

2. The Aaron/Komer/Newsom/Carlucci group will: (a) develop + talking points for Muskie to + communicate our concerns over Iran to Gromyko, (b) draft a short non-paper which might be + given to Gromyko,Not found. Muskie read the “non-paper” to Gromyko during their September 25 + meeting. and (c) scrub the Defense action list. (TS)

+ +

3. A selected list of Defense actions will be recommended for the SCC on Friday, and Defense will report on + horizontal escalation possibilities. (TS)

+
+
+ 92. Summary of Conclusions of a Mini-Special Coordination Committee + MeetingSource: Carter + Library, National Security Council, Institutional Files, Box 124, + SCM 151, 10/28/80, Mini SCC, + Security Framework. Secret. The meeting took place in the White + House Situation Room. The minutes are not attached and were not + found. Odom sent the Summary of Conclusions to Brzezinski and Aaron under an October 29 + memorandum, noting: “In sum, the Mini-SCC was unusually productive: what promised to be a + Defense-State debate turned into a cooperative effort to address the + toughest issue: resources.” (Ibid.) + + + Washington, October 28, 1980, 4–5:45 + p.m. + + + SUBJECT + Security Assistance for Southwest Asia + + + PARTICIPANTS + + + State + David Newsom, Under + Secretary for Political Affairs + Matthew Nimetz, + Under Secretary for Science, Technology, & Security + Assistance + Reginald + Bartholomew, Director of Politico-Military + Affairs + Peter Constable, + Deputy Assistant Secretary for Near East & South Asian + Affairs + + + + + Defense + Ambassador Robert + Komer, Under Secretary for Policy + Erich vonMarbod, Deputy Director Defense Security + Agency + + + + + JCS + Lt. General John + Pustay, Assistant to the Chairman + Brig. General David Palmer, Deputy Director for + Politico-Military Affairs + + + + + + CIA + Robert Ames, National Intelligence Officer for Near East + & South Asia + + + + + OMB + Edward Sanders, Associate Director for National Security + and International Affairs + + + + + White House + David Aaron + + + + + NSC + Major General Jasper Welch + Brig. General William Odom + Captain Gary + Sick + Major Christopher + Shoemaker + + + + +

DOD Security + Assistance Paper

+

David Aaron stated that the + purpose of the meeting was to examine the security assistance + implications of our Persian Gulf security framework. (S)

+

Komer said that we had not + adequately addressed our security assistance requirements in the region. + We are spending $25–30 billion on improving our own capabilities but + recommending only a ten percent increase in security assistance for the + region. Yet, regional cooperation and capabilities are critical. The + DOD paperThe October 23 Department of Defense overview paper, + prepared in Komer’s office, + sought to “(1) Identify the most useful potential indigenous + military contributions; and (2) Maximize the range of our military + assistance programs so that they can be used optimally to enhance + indigenous capabilities which in turn will enhance the collective + deterrent/defense effort.” (Ibid.) represents a first-cut at + what we really need to spend and the figures presented are probably low. + SecDef and the JCS are both solidly behind the paper. + (S)

+

David Aaron asked how these + figures could fit into the ZBB process. + (S)

+

Komer responded that these are + additive requirements and cannot substitute for any existing program + within the DOD budget. However, the + security assistance recommendation can substitute for add-on U.S. + requirements which would be needed to support an effective Persian Gulf + strategy. The marginal security assistance dollar is probably worth more + than the marginal defense dollar. Moreover, the amounts recommended in + the DOD paper involve relatively modest + outlays. The MAP recommendations simply + face up to the facts of life in the region in that many states are + simply unable to pay for their security needs. (S)

+

Nimetz opined that DOD and State have already prepared our + FY 1982 security assistance budget + and have recommended modest increases, but OMB is opposing this. The budget process will certainly + oppose the new additions unless the pay-offs of such additions are + clearly defined. Nimetz was also + concerned with the skewing of our security assistance in favor of the + Middle East-Persian Gulf area. (S)

+

Komer said that he recognizes the + budget problems and that is why DOD + suggested the SCC route. Security + assistance is a policy issue and the SCC ought to raise it to the President. (S)

+

Bartholomew argued that + insufficient analysis had been done on what it is we want security + assistance to do for us and whether or not additional security + assistance would help us achieve our security objectives. (S)

+ +

Nimetz and Komer argued that we can’t provide + assurances on this score until negotiations are joined which in turn + requires that money be in the budget early. (S)

+

David Aaron suggested that we + need to look at security assistance in relation to the DOD budget and that some sense of ranking + of security assistance programs in an overall national security budget + be developed. All agreed that would be useful. (S)

+

Sanders said the best budgetary approach was to prepare alternative + packages which would be put into the budget presentation. The President + could then decide which of several large chunks to add to his basic + budget. (S)

+

Newsom added that the President + may want to present the package to Congress as a major supplemental. + (S)

+

Komer suggested that he and + Nimetz work together to + create a joint State-Defense issues paper for the budget presentation. + (S)

+

Nimetz suggested that the paper be + limited to recommendations on security assistance and not include the + more general foreign affairs budget. (S)

+

David Aaron agreed and instructed + State and DOD to complete the paper by + November 7. (C)

+

Newsom urged that we develop a + Congressional strategy to show the role that security assistance has in + our overall security posture. (S)

+

Komer agreed and suggested that + we should pursue Persian Gulf initiatives first and at a later time go + for a more global expansion. (S)

+

David Aaron then turned the + discussion to MAP, pointing out that + the President has stood firm on his decision to eliminate MAP and will need strong justification to + change his mind. (S)

+

Nimetz then argued that + concessional credits may be an alternative to MAP. He did not agree that “forgiveness” for states other + than Israel was practical. (S)

+

FMS to Saudi + Arabia

+

The discussion then turned to supply military equipment to Saudi Arabia. + David Aaron made a strong + argument that we are allowing ourselves to become hostage to equipment + requests from Saudi Arabia and other oil producers. He said that we + should have stood firm in denying additional F15 equipment to the Saudis + from the outset. (S)

+

Newsom pointed out that the Saudis + and others can turn to alternative sources for equipment and this limits + our control of their arms acquisitions. (S)

+

David Aaron urged that we look at + military balance implications for each arms sale. (S)

+ +

Komer argued that what we need to + do is have close military relationship with the Saudis so that we can + better focus their equipment requests. (S)

+

[Omitted here is material on India.]

+
+
+ 93. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security + Affairs (Brzezinski)Source: National Archives, RG 59, + Central Foreign Policy File, P870008–0297. Secret. + + + Washington, November + 5, 1980 + + + MEMORANDUM FOR + The Secretary of State + The Secretary of Defense + The Secretary of the Treasury + The Secretary of Energy + The Director, Office of Management and Budget + The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff + The Director of Central Intelligence + + + SUBJECT + Persian Gulf Security Framework (U) + +

My memorandum of June 3 outlined the basic structure of our security + framework for the Persian Gulf and laid out some near-term goals.On June 3, Brzezinski sent a memorandum to these same + addressees summarizing the military issues, foreign policy issues, + economic issues, intelligence issues, and future goals for the + Persian Gulf security framework. (Central Intelligence Agency, + Office of the Director of Central Intelligence, Job 81B00112R, + Subject Files, Box 16, Folder 32: (SCC) Middle East Security Framework) Since then, + we have made considerable progress in a number of areas. Much more, + however, remains to be done. This memorandum provides a summary of our + current efforts, which the President has reviewed, to achieve the + near-term goals presented in the June 3 memorandum. It also outlines the + direction the security framework should take in the future. (U)

+

Current Status of Goals

+

A. Military Component

+

—Command Arrangements. Notwithstanding notable + progress, improvements are still needed. The goal is one command for + both the RDF and all other military activities in + the region, including military assistance. (S)

+

—RDF Exercises in the + Region. The President approved a comprehensive CY 1980 exercises plan for the region which + includes the RDF. We will conduct an + RDJTF battalion-sized exercise in + Egypt this month. A plan for CY 1981 + needs to be developed for interagency review. (S)

+

—Basing Access. We have completed formal + agreements with Oman, Kenya, and Somalia. We have agreed in principle + with Egypt to use Ras Banas. We must continue our efforts to obtain an + access agreement acceptable to both Egypt and the Congress. We also need + to continue discussions with Saudi Arabia on overbuilding and + prepositioning. (S)

+

—Institutionalized Security Ties with Saudi + Arabia. We have reached agreement in principle to establish a Joint + Military Commission with Saudi Arabia.See + Document 217. Less formal + consultations are underway now which we should use as the basis for the + initiation of the JMC. (S)

+

B. Foreign Policy + Component

+

—The Autonomy Negotiations. Little progress is + evident, although we are keeping the talks alive. (U)

+

—Improved Relations with Pakistan. These ties + remain tenuous, although it appears that Zia is not prepared to strike a deal with Moscow. + Pakistani-Saudi cooperation is improving, providing us with an indirect + hedge against Zia yielding to + Soviet pressures. The Zia + meeting with the President helped reaffirm U.S.-Pakistani + relations.A memorandum of conversation + is scheduled for publication in Foreign Relations, 1977–1980, vol. XIX, + South Asia. (S)

+

—Better Relations with Oman and Somalia. We have + formally initiated the Joint Economic Commission with Oman and are + preparing to begin upgrading Omani facilities, in accordance with our + access agreement.See Document 81. We have signed an access agreement + with Somalia, and the Somalis claim to have withdrawn their regulars + from the Ogaden, although our intelligence does not confirm this. We + continue to move cautiously but positively in our relations with both + states. (S)

+

—The Hostage Problem. A solution may be + forthcoming. (U)

+

C. Economic Component

+

—Security Assistance. We have not made progress in + expanding our aggregate security assistance program in the region. + DOD, State, and the DCI all + agree that this is a crucial aspect of our security policy. (C)

+

—Influence Over Saudi Aid. We have discussed the + distribution of Saudi aid with the Saudi leadership. The JMC will provide us with an + institutionalized forum for pressing this issue. We are separately + encouraging more Saudi assistance for Somalia. (S)

+

—Oil. The oil outlook is generally favorable, + although the impact of the loss of Iraqi oil is yet to be felt. Saudi + Arabia and others are helping make up for the Iraqi shortfall. Prices + are stable and consumption in the West is down. We have begun to fill + the strategic petroleum reserve. The Venice Summit and actions by the + IEA have helped convince oil + producers that we are serious about our energy policies and have helped + stabilize the oil market. (S)

+

D. Intelligence + Component

+

Progress is being made in this area. (C)

+

Goals for the Future

+

In addition to the areas outlined above where much remains to be done, we + should develop analysis and come to decisions in the following areas in + the near future:

+

A. Military Component

+

—Budget Issues. We now need to address the budget + implications of the third strategic zone. (C)

+

—Relations with Saudi Arabia. We need to ensure + that the close ties developed over the course of the Iran-Iraq warOn September 22, war between Iran and Iraq + commenced with ground and air attacks on Iranian territory by Iraqi + forces. carry over after the conflict. We also need to + determine a course of action to help us overcome the F–15 issue. (S)

+

B. Foreign Policy + Component

+

—Autonomy Negotiations. It is time to rethink our + basic approaches and develop a more effective scheme. (C)

+

—Post-hostage Iran. Once the hostages have been + released we will need to review our overall policy toward Iran. (U)

+

—Iraq-Iran War. We need to review our policies + toward the war in light of its stagnation and any resolution of the + hostage issue. (C)

+

—Turkey and Pakistan. We need to devote special + attention to improving ties with Turkey and Pakistan. Continued fear of + Soviet incursions in Pakistan, + and the new government in Turkey may provide opportunities for new + initiatives. (S)

+

C. Economic Component

+

—Economic Assistance. We need to seek greater U.S. + economic and security assistance to the region. We also should encourage + our allies to contribute more for both economic and military aid. + (C)

+

—Oil. Continued progress on oil pricing, + availability, and conservation is critical. (U)

+

—Saudi Regional Assistance. We should continue to + seek to influence Saudi aid in the region in support of our security + framework. (C)

+

—General Economic Issues. We should review trade + and financial relations with states in the region and recommend policy + changes that seem appropriate in light of our regional security + concerns. (U)

+

D. Intelligence + Component

+

We should continue to integrate our intelligence efforts throughout the + region into a region-wide program. (C)

+

These issue areas have been selected to help build on the progress we + have made to date. I invite your comments on these near-term goals and + your suggestions of other areas requiring attention by the SCC on the Security Framework. They should + be submitted by November 14.The State and + Defense Department responses are Documents + 95 and 96. Turner responded to Brzezinski on November 18, noting + that “the Agency’s views concerning most of the foreign policy and + economic components have already appeared in various artforms but + may bear selective restatement during SCC discussions.” (Carter Library, National Security + Affairs, Brzezinski + Material, Country File, Box 63, Military Facilities in the Persian + Gulf and Indian Ocean, 9–12/80) Other agency responses are + summarized in Document 97. (U)

+ + Zbigniew + Brzezinski + +
+ +
+ 94. Summary of Conclusions of a Special Coordination Committee + MeetingSource: Carter + Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, General Odom File, Box 47, + Security Framework: Directives: 7/80–1/81. Secret. The meeting took + place in the White House Situation Room. The minutes are not + attached and were not found. Carter wrote “Zbig C” and “encl B cc McIn” in the + upper right-hand corner of the page. + + + Washington, November 7, 1980, 9–10 + a.m. + + + + SUBJECT + Security Framework for the Persian Gulf—XVIII + + + PARTICIPANTS + + + State + David Newsom, Under + Secretary for Political Affairs + Matthew Nimetz, + Under Secretary for Science, Technology, & Security + Assistance + Daniel O’Donohue, Deputy Director for Politico-Military + Affairs + Peter Constable, + Deputy Assistant Secretary for Near East & South Asian + Affairs + + + + + Defense + Secretary Harold + Brown + Deputy Secretary Graham Claytor, Jr. + Ambassador Robert + Komer, Under Secretary for Policy + Frank Kramer, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary for + International Security Affairs + + + + + JCS + Chairman General David + Jones + Lt. General John + Pustay, Assistant to the Chairman + + + + + + CIA + Bruce Clark, Director, National Foreign Assessment + Center + Lt. Colonel John Mattingly, Assistant, National + Intelligence Officer for Near East & South Asia + + + + + Treasury + Deputy Secretary Robert + Carswell + Clyde Crosswhite, Foreign Affairs Officer + + + + + OMB + John White, Deputy + Director + Edward Sanders, Associate Director for National Security + & International Affairs + + + + + White House + Dr. Zbigniew + Brzezinski + David Aaron + + + + + NSC + Brig. General William E. Odom + Captain Gary + Sick + Major Christopher + Shoemaker + + + +

Dr. Brzezinski began the meeting + outlining the two basic issues at hand: the need for increased security + assistance programs in Southwest Asia and agreement for our advisory + efforts. (S)

+

Harold Brown then gave a general + review of the security assistance issue stating that we do not have + sufficient resources to counter Soviet moves in all parts of the world. + Since we have conceded the initiative to the Soviets, they are better + able to concentrate their forces, putting us at a disadvantage. The + forces of regional states, particularly in Southwest Asia, have to be ready to carry more of the + security load. This cannot happen, however, without a more extensive + security assistance program including grant military aid. Moreover, the + absence of such a program will carry great political penalties. + Therefore, the President should support the proposed package to increase + our security assistance for the region. We have to reverse the attitudes + within our own government that security assistance is a burden. (S)

+

David Newsom supported the need + for security assistance with particular emphasis on grant military + assistance because of the economic realities within recipient countries. + (S)

+

Robert Carswell pointed out that + most of the countries in question have debt problems, and we need to + avoid adding to their debt burden. He also pointed out that Congress may + not be receptive to major new increases in economic assistance. (C)

+

Dr. Brzezinski then argued the + basic underpinnings of the requirement. The region is of vital interest + to the U.S. and is facing a highly unstable future. This calls for a + sustained security effort such as we developed in Europe in the late + 1940’s and in the Far East in the early 1950’s and the investment of + U.S. resources. (C)

+

Matt Nimetz pointed out that the + real problem is within the budget. The State Department proposal for + security assistance prepared in the normal budget cycle represented + increases above budget levels, and State is already subject to criticism + from OMB. The enhanced package now + being discussed would clearly not fit into the budget. (S)

+

Dr. Brzezinski agreed and said + that the issue should be shown to the President with the recommendation + that the budget be increased to accommodate our new security + requirements in Southwest Asia. We simply must devote more resources to + this critical area. (S)

+

John White argued that we should + take the recommendations contained in the DOD paperSee footnote 2, Document 92. and add + them to the State program already submitted and then proceed in the + normal way. (C)

+

All disagreed with White’s view, and the meeting developed into vigorous + exchange over this issue. (C)

+

Matt Nimetz said that State will + not be able to accommodate the increases within its current budget, and + if a lump sum addition were made to the State Department budget, it + would be subjected to conflicting priorities within the State + Department. (S)

+

David Newsom stressed that the + President needs to look at this as an add-on above current budget + ceilings. (C)

+ +

Dr. Brzezinski urged that we go + to the President with the position that the SCC has agreed on the need for the enhanced security + assistance program for Southwest Asia costing up to $2 billion ($1B in + budget obligations). The President should then be given the choice of + adding this to the budget or forcing it into current budget ceilings. + Dr. Brzezinski pointed out that, + with the change in administrations, this budget will be viewed as both + an historical legacy and a road map for the future. It is therefore + important that the former position be adopted. This will establish a + clear marker of the importance of Southwest Asia and the commitment of + this administration to its defense. (S)

+

John White argued that we need to + give the President a sense of the priority this enhanced program enjoys + vis-a-vis other budget issues. (C)

+

Harold Brown agreed that some + priority is needed, but because we have a new strategic zone, we need a + new largely additive program. To go the other way is to guarantee that + the program is smothered at birth. (C)

+

Dr. Brzezinski stressed that an + add-on package would represent recognition of the new historical + responsibilities. He further argued that, by adopting the add-on view, + we will provide our best guidance to the next administration. (C)

+

Harold Brown and Robert Komer agreed and emphasized + that the security assistance enhancement program must be specifically + identified as such. (S)

+

John White then argued that we + should do two things:

+

—Provide the President with both the baseline security assistance budget + figure developed by the State Department and the enhancement package + proposed by State and Defense. (S)

+

—Put this enhancement program in the context of other budget enhancement + programs and then the President can choose among them. (S)

+

Bob Komer stressed again that if + we incorporate the enhancement program into the normal security + assistance program figures, it will push more items below the line and + will be lost. (S)

+

John White countered by saying the + solution would be to increase the budget total. (S)

+

David Newsom said that State + Department does not support this view. We need to submit it as a + specific add-on package to support our vital interest in Southwest Asia. + (S)

+

All eventually agreed that if the President + approves the enhancement package, it will have to be largely an add-on + to the current budget. (S)

+

Harold Brown said that the ZBB process does not just work on this + kind of major new policy issue. (C)

+ +

Matt Nimetz agreed and said we + never present policy issues as such, but we need to do it in this case. + If the President approves of the enhancement package, then we can + aggregate items later. (S)

+

John White said that this presents + the President with a “take it or leave it” position on the enhancement + package. (S)

+

Harold Brown agreed, but said + there may be some flexibility in the numbers and in the handling of the + budget issue. (S)

+

John White then said that the + President has a lot of budget problems. He needs this issue presented in + a manner which allows him to choose among several budget add-ons within + the context of a large deficit. (S)

+

Harold Brown pointed out that the + outlays involved are really quite small. (C)

+

Robert Komer argued that we have + never been able to break through the budget problems for Southwest Asia. + We must now seize upon our opportunity to do so. Decisions on this + package are central to the President’s political legacy. (S)

+

David Aaron suggested that we + establish a functional ranking of major programs so that the President + could see where this security assistance enhancement program would fit + in. (S)

+

John White said that we can work + out such a functional array. Then priorities can be listed and the + President can pick among them. (S)

+

Matt Nimetz stressed that the + President has to understand the program is an add-on. (C)

+

Dr. Brzezinski then suggested + that we go to the President with a brief memo laying out the issue for + his decision. He then appointed a group of four to draft a memo for + submission to the President by November 8. (C)

+

David Jones pointed out that + grant military assistance is a key aspect of the enhancement package, + and policy decisions will need to be made. (S)

+

All agreed to defer this until the President’s + guidance is obtained on the enhanced security assistance concept. + (S)

+

Dr. Brzezinski, DOD, and State all agreed on the need for + the enhanced security assistance package. (S)

+
+ +
+ 95. Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the Department of State + (Tarnoff) to the President’s + Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + P870008–0277. Secret; Nodis. A + copy was sent to Komer. + Under cover of a November 18 memorandum, Bartholomew forwarded the Department of State + response to Tarnoff. + + + Washington, undated + + + SUBJECT + Southwest Asian Security Framework + +

The Department of State welcomes the opportunity to comment upon your + memorandum of November 5,See Document 93. which outlines progress + in constructing a security framework for the Persian Gulf and charts a + course for the future.

+

Current Status of Goals

+

A. Military Component

+

—Command Arrangements

+

—Consideration of a regional military command should be undertaken with + indigenous country attitudes and our interests in mind. Most regional + states would refuse to accept a US + headquarters, and some might object to our creating a regional command, + especially if our action were highly publicized. The location of such a + headquarters in the US with perhaps an + advance element afloat might be the best alternative. If centralization + occurs, the emphasis should be on an RDF for worldwide deployment, rather than a specific SWA command.

+

—Security assistance must continue to be closely coordinated with + political initiatives, economic assistance and other policy aspects, + regionally and with individual countries. Thus it is essential that + military assistance establishments continue to operate under the direct + control of the ambassadors. Centralizing DoD security assistance + responsibilities within any one military command presents no problem as + long as the ambassador/MAAG/ODC relationship is maintained. + Centralization of military construction activities under a single + command also should be considered.

+

—RDF Exercises in the + Region. State believes that the tentative CY 1981 exercise plan needs to be reviewed + in light of the Iraqi-Iranian war and our efforts at cooperation with + regional and Allied countries during that war.

+ +

—Basing Access. Our ability to follow through on + facilities improvements promised in connection with the access + agreements with Oman, Kenya, and Somalia will be an important + determinant of the course of our future security cooperation with those + countries. Accordingly, funding of those improvements should receive + high priority. If we reach similar agreements with Egypt, we should + recognize that additional funds will have to be made available for + construction there.

+

—Institutionalized Security Ties with Saudi + Arabia. Overbuilding and overstocking are important goals in + achieving our present concept of force projection. However, the recent + interruption at Saudi initiative of the talks on security cooperation + vividly demonstrates the fragility and complexity of our security + relationship.See Document 227. Though military equipment requests + underlie current strains in our relationship, the latter will continue + to be complicated by Arab-Israeli considerations, Saudi reluctance to be + seen as a U.S. client, and increased Saudi concern about security in the + Persian Gulf region. Our ability to strengthen US-Saudi security ties depends upon how far we are willing + and able to go in meeting Saudi objectives in these areas.

+

—In addition, since we may never achieve Saudi agreement to all of our + support requests, we need to analyze and prioritize our requirements. An + interagency analysis should be conducted of (1) which + overbuilding/overstocking programs are most important to the RDF and (2) which are likely to be most + useful and acceptable to the Saudis, so that we can develop a + comprehensive strategy for approaching them on this subject.

+

B. Foreign Policy + Component

+

One additional aspect of the foreign policy component deserves + mention:

+

—The Iraqi-Iranian war highlights Iraq’s + aspirations to regional dominance and the continuing threat of political + instability in Iran.

+

C. Economic Component

+

—Security Assistance (ESF). Increased levels for SWA countries were proposed during the FY 1982 budget process in addition to some + reprogramming for FY 1980 and 1981. We + also considered ESF elements in the + enhancement exercise.

+

—Influence over Saudi Aid. Saudi economic + assistance to Somalia should be encouraged, but we must avoid increasing + Somali military resources that could lead either to renewed hostilities + with Ethiopia or to an increase of tensions between Somalia and Kenya. + We need to recognize that the + Saudi response to our urgings of aid to other countries will be + influenced by how much we are willing to contribute.

+

—Oil. State believes that the paper’s treatment of + the oil issue is overly optimistic. Unless strong actions are taken + soon, the protraction of the Iran-Iraqi conflict is likely to cause a + repeat of the 1979 events, when market panic turned a small shortfall + into a 140% increase in oil prices. Saudi Arabia has no present surge + capacity to use in moderating prices and the disarray in OPEC undermines price unification + efforts. The present IEA policy of + encouraging stock drawdowns and avoiding abnormal spot market purchases + can be successful only so long as market participants believe that a + resumption of oil supplies from Iran and Iraq will occur at the latest + during the first quarter of 1981. As that belief fades, many companies + and governments suffering shortfalls will enter the spot market and + drive up prices; this is already beginning, and, in fact, Somalia has + been seriously affected by the Iran-Iraq war.

+

—Turkey/Portugal. We have been doing our best to + obtain alternate supplies for Turkey and Portugal, both severely + affected by the Iran/Iraq cutoff. Our informal efforts via the major oil + companies have not yet been successful. Turkey has been able to replace + less than one quarter of its needs, Portugal somewhat more.

+

—Refugees. The influx of refugees into Somalia + from the Ogaden is causing a problem of economic and political concern. + The number of refugees is approaching one million. The US contributions to refugee programs in + Somalia are now at $50 million annually and rising. Polit-ically, the + refugee problem could cause greater tensions in Somalia as the country + struggles to meet its own economic needs while managing this enormous + relief effort. Stemming this flow of refugees and enabling their return + to the Ogaden would relieve this enormous drain on our resources and + prevent what could be serious political consequences for the Siad + Government.

+

Goals for the Future

+

A. Military Component

+

—Relations with Saudi Arabia. As noted above, our + present inability to meet Saudi defense procurement requests has limited + the extent of US-Saudi defense + cooperation. It is likely to do so in the future as well.

+

—Better Relations with Oman and Somalia. We would + note that, although we have concluded an agreement with Somalia, we + still have a long way to go. Congressional apprehensions over Siad’s + continuing activities in the Ogaden present a serious obstacle to + further progress.

+

A revised memo might address two additional subjects:

+

—Role of Indigenous States. A few indigenous + states, such as Egypt, Turkey, and Pakistan, might be able to contribute + significant military capabilities to the defense of Southwest Asia if the political + situation at the time permits. The other regional states could probably + not generate significant offensive capabilities, but with the proper + assistance they could become capable of limited self-defense and could, + in some cases, provide important combat support services. We need to + study the roles of indigenous forces more closely and to coordinate the + conclusions of our study with our military assistance activities and + political realities. We should not fall into the trap of looking at + regional capabilities solely in terms of how they contribute to our + ability to respond to an external or Soviet threat. There are other + roles that indigenous forces can play.

+

—Gulf States. We need to think further about our + relations with the Gulf States, seeking to define better how the + military element of our strategy can contribute to Gulf State security, + while not increasing the security risks for the Gulf States in + cooperating with the US militarily.

+

B. Foreign Policy + Component

+

—Turkey and Pakistan. State concurs that highest + priority should be given to improving ties with Turkey and Pakistan. In + the case of Pakistan, a major improvement in our development and + security assistance program (e.g., an offer to sell, possibly with + FMS credits, high performance + aircraft) may be a necessary step both in improving our security + relations with Pakistan and in deterring Soviet adventurism in the + region. In Turkey, the role of our Allies in providing supporting + assistance will continue to be vital.

+

Several other points should also be discussed here:

+

—Egypt. To promote Egyptian political stability, + we should closely monitor the level of our security cooperation and + should ensure that the accumulation of cooperative arrangements does not + become a threat to President Sadat’s ability to govern.

+

—The Horn. We should, in cooperation with our + European allies and such interested states as Sudan, pursue + opportunities to reduce tensions on the Horn. This will help in our + relations with Kenya, permit greater cooperation with Somalia, and help + overcome the increasingly volatile refugee situation. Our efforts in + this regard will also lessen concern among our allies, in Kenya, and + elsewhere in Africa that our access agreement is emboldening Somalia to + take more aggressive action against its neighbors.

+

—African Influence on Kenya, Somalia and the Indian + Ocean Countries. Other African countries, through the OAU or + the UN, could be pivotal in providing or + withholding international support to African countries providing access + and other means of cooperation to the U.S. This includes not only Kenya + and Somalia, but also Djibouti, Mauritius and the Seychelles. Kenya, as + the incoming President of the OAU, may be the most sensitive to the attitudes of other + African countries. We might think about ways in which we can help Kenya + in its role of OAU President in dealing with major disputes in Africa, + e.g., the Horn, Western Sahara, Chad, Southern Africa, so as to lessen + any perceived conflict between its public non-aligned role and its + desire to cooperate with the U.S. on security matters.

+

C. Economic Component

+

—Economic Assistance. Within the context of + increasing development and security assistance, we need to pay closer + attention to ordering priorities and to defining linkages between policy + goals and assistance activities. In addition to Turkey and Pakistan, the + case of Egypt, which has requested increased development assistance and + more favorable terms for its security assistance, is particularly + urgent.

+

—Oil. We need, on an urgent basis, to develop a + response to oil market pressures caused by the continuing Iran/Iraq + conflict. Particularly within the IEA, + we need to examine ways to trigger the sharing system either generally + and selectively, and ways to impose binding ceilings to ensure that oil + will be available to countries and companies experiencing serious + shortfalls, and to reduce demand pressure on the oil market. Any actions + we take internationally in the IEA + context would necessarily require strong domestic action as well.

+

—General Economic Issues. The review of trade and + financial relations, with which State concurs, should pay particular + regard to those policies, both US and + foreign, which impact negatively upon US + exports and limit our ability to influence developments in the region. + Here, the Arab boycott of Israel and our reaction thereto should be + considered.

+ + Peter TarnoffPrinted from a copy that bears this typed + signature. + Executive Secretary + + +
+ +
+ 96. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense Brown to the President’s + Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, + Defense/Security, Shoemaker, Box 123, Persian Gulf Security + Framework: 11–12/80. Secret. + + + Washington, November + 21, 1980 + + + SUBJECT + Persian Gulf Security Framework (S) + +

(S) Here is my response to your memorandum of 5 November 1980See Document 93. to + review where we stand in our Persian Gulf Security Framework + discussions. While we cannot hope—nor should we try—in the last weeks of + this Administration to shape long-term policy or take new initiatives, + it is imperative that the interagency work begun earlier and the + momentum gained towards establishing a viable strategy for the region be + carried forward. I hope that the following comments will assist in + reviewing the status of the security framework and help lay the + groundwork for additional progress by the new Administration.

+

(U) CURRENT STATUS OF + GOALS

+

A. Military Component

+

—Command Arrangements. (S) The current command + arrangements meet the Joint Chiefs’ objective of developing an + organizational structure that provides sufficient flexibility for + meeting the day-to-day requirements of normal operations, logistics and + intelligence through the existing CINCs and at the same time permitting the efficient and timely + support of rapid deployment forces should their employment be required. + Should our involvement in the region become enough greater, we would + effect a transition of responsibility by introducing the Headquarters, + Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force (RDJTF) into the area to command all forces in the region in + accordance with the RDJTF command + relationships approved this summer. Accordingly, we intend not to + restructure further at this time, but recognize that further + evolutionary development is desirable.

+

—US Military Peacetime + Presence. (S) The President approved an SCC recommendationScheduled for publication in Foreign + Relations, 1977–1980, vol. XI, Iran: Hostage Crisis, + November 1979–January 1981. that for at least the + duration of the hostage crisis the US + military peacetime presence in the Persian Gulf/Indian Ocean region be enhanced to include two + battle groups, an expanded MIDEASTFOR (from three to five ships), an embarked Marine + Amphibious Unit in the region approximately 70% of the time and frequent + TACAIR deployments to the area. + (There is in this connection an urgent requirement for an amphibious + training area in the western Indian Ocean.) This enhanced level of + presence has remained on station throughout the hostage problem, the + Soviet presence in Afghanistan and the Iran-Iraq war. The optimum level + of US presence will require periodic + review, and will require special attention in the aftermath of the + hostage crisis. In the meantime, money is being requested in an FY81 + Amendment or Supplemental to fund a second battle group in the Indian + Ocean through 1981.

+

—Our AWACS and related deployments + have provided us lessons which cut two ways. On the one hand, our + relationship with the Saudis seems stronger because we demonstrated our + reliability in a crisis and the Saudis demonstrated their willingness to + accept a limited US military presence, + and indeed to request it relatively early. On the other hand, the fact + of the F–15 imbroglio even in the face of the continuing Iran-Iraq + conflict has shown that these and other dimensions of our evolving + relationship are tenuous and subject to continuing Saudi reservations. + Given the continuing threat, and the possible political implications of + terminating the deployment, we should maintain the AWACS presence in Saudi Arabia as long + as it is mutually acceptable.

+

—RDF Exercises in the + Region. (S) In the past year, we have conducted a number of + RDJTF-related exercises, both in + CONUS and overseas, to increase + our readiness, rapid deployment capabilities and familiarization with + the region. Planning is now underway by the Joint Staff to develop an + SWA exercise plan for CY 1981. Three items already approved in + principle for the 1980 schedule, but which were postponed for various + reasons, will be carried over to 1981. (These consist of two platoon + exchanges involving Egypt and Saudi Arabia and a one-time B–52 mission + from Diego Garcia. In addition, we still need to reschedule the + communications exercise with Oman which was supposed to take place early + this fall.) Ongoing bilateral US-Saudi + Arabian initiatives should provide opportunities for joint training as + part of the CY 1981 program. Egypt has + hosted two major exercises in the past year (PROUD PHANTOM and BRIGHT + STAR, the latter of which is still underway) and will most likely be + agreeable to more in the future. The focus of an exercise program should + be an orderly development of our defense concept and should provide + useful training, not just large, costly and unproductive troop + movements. Once the plan for calendar year 1981 is approved by the + JCS, it will be forwarded for + interagency review.

+

—Basing Access. (S) We cannot emphasize strongly + enough the crucial importance of adequate and accessible facilities in + the area to credible + deterrence/defense. An overall basing strategy was developed for en + route access and facilities requirements. A paper prepared by DoD + outlines the strategic basing concept for both pre-hostility deployment + and initial defense/reinforcement of the Persian Gulf region. It + includes an assessment of the capacities, availability and usefulness + (to our strategy) of facilities on the Arabian Peninsula and in Egypt. + Assured access to improved facilities in Saudi Arabia and Egypt in + particular is central to our ability to surge into the area in timely + fashion.

+

—We need to continue developing our requirements for Saudi overbuild and + pre-positioning. However, before we can discuss specific military + requirements with Saudi Arabia, we must first gain Saudi acceptance of + our strategic concept for the region (including a mutual understanding + of the threat), their agreement to burdensharing and HNS (particularly POL), and their recognition of the need for US access to their facilities in the early + stages of a crisis. Mutual resolution of the F–15 issue is critical to + the realistic prospect of accomplishing these objectives.

+

—Once we can reach an arrangement with Egypt, we should begin + construction of a major rear-staging facility at Ras Banas and increase + fuel storage at Cairo International. Also, we should ensure that our + access to Oman, Kenya and Somalia is not threatened by failure to carry + out most of the MILCON projects as outlined in our aide-memoire.

+

—We should use the next few months to explore the new possibilities of + increased access to facilities in Bahrain and UAE. Also, we should not be reluctant to seize new access + opportunities that might arise with key countries such as Turkey, + Pakistan and the Sudan. In particular with regard to Turkey, we should + continue to pursue the prospect of creating a “threat-in-being” with + US + TACAIR deployments into eastern + Turkey.

+

—Progress has been made toward gaining a better understanding by key + states, principally the UK and Portugal, + in the area of en route access and overflight rights. Nevertheless, en + route access and overflight rights are far from assured. It is + imperative that we continue to develop alternative access options with + Spain, the FRG, Morocco and countries + along the Pacific route to meet our transit requirements in the event + that approval for the primary routes is not granted.

+

—However, it must be underlined that both local force contributions and + US access to adequate facilities in + all but the oil-rich countries are critically dependent on substantial + added security assistance—much of it on concessionary terms. This is + especially the case with key nations like Turkey, Pakistan and Egypt, + which face severe economic difficulties.

+

—Support Requirements. (S) Considerable work has + been done to analyze logistic requirements, especially the need for + POL and water, to support the surge of US rapid deployment forces to SWA. When completed, these studies will + serve as the basis for our approach to regional states for Host Nation + Support. In addition, we are studying other requirements (ammunition, + spare parts, medical support, etc.) which would be needed to support an + expanded, 6+ division RDF.

+

—Mobility. (S) Adequate strategic mobility is also + indispensable to permit credible deterrence/defense. We have undertaken + a number of initiatives that will improve (or have already improved) our + ability to project forces rapidly to the region. But they are far short + of foreseeable needs. Still underway in DoD is a mobility study + (mandated by Congress in connection with the development of the C–X) + which will be a determination of the optimum mix of mobility assets and + pre-positioning required to support our overall lift requirements, + including those for Southwest Asia.

+

—To increase the capacity of the Navy’s sealift assets, the President + approved a program to acquire and modify eight high-speed SL–7 container + ships. The decision was made as well to acquire specially designed + Maritime Pre-positioning Ships to store equipment and supplies for three + Marine Amphibious Brigades.See Document 55. We must ensure that + adequate funding is requested from Congress for both programs.

+

—Seven Near-Term Pre-positioning Ships were placed on station at Diego + Garcia in July 1980. These ships carry two-weeks equivalent of airlift + by all transport aircraft (MAC and + CRAF II). We now need to complete + follow-on programs for Indian Ocean prepositioning which identify + seaports of debarkation, plans for pre-positioning materiel handling + equipment and offload sites for periodic maintenance requirements.

+

—Local Defense Capabilities. (S) The SCC reviewed a DoD analysis of the + potential contributions (excluding facilities) which PG/SWA countries could provide to complement + US military force capabilities in + countering a Soviet attack in the region, particularly in Iran.See footnote 2, Document + 92. Such a division of labor is perceived as vital + (1) to the execution of a defense plan for the PG/SWA; (2) to maximizing the access and + subsequent use of regional facilities and infrastructure; and (3) to + signal clearly, for deterrence purposes, the resolve of the regional + countries vis-a-vis the Soviet threat.

+

—The analysis underscores the early critical need for security assistance + to improve as soon as possible the military force capabilities of + selected regional states.

+ +

—More specifically, our regional planning requires an overall security + assistance program for the region (calling for approximately $5.5B in + FY82) which: (1) carefully balances increased security assistance + programs for regional states to their absorptive capacities and our + strategic needs; (2) ensures that adequate training is an essential part + of the program; and (3) expands joint exercise requirements with the + regional states.

+

—Until the fruits of such an effort in enhancing indigenous capabilities + are realized, contingency planning for US assumption of some or part of the indigenous tasks needs + to be considered.

+

—Allied Cooperation. (S) Considerable efforts have + been made to get our NATO allies and + Japan to shoulder more European and Northeast Asian regional defense + responsibilities while the US accepts + the major burden for defense in the Persian Gulf. Presentations by + US officials have emphasized the + Persian Gulf threat to NATO interests, + likely US responses, force implications + for NATO of a new theater and the need + for Allies to contribute to this effort. (The recent British and French + support on the Strait of Hormuz patrol were good signs, but the allied + backsliding on the 3% commitment has been a bad omen.) We underscored, + with varying degrees of success, the requirement that they meet a 3% + budget commitment, implement the Long Term Defense Plan, and accelerate + other shorter term programs. We should continue to press the Allies in + these areas. We should continue to explore the feasibility of a + coordinated, US-led defense strategy, + with limited Allied force contributions, to deal with future Persian + Gulf contingencies.

+

B. Foreign Policy + Component

+

—Better Relations with Oman, Kenya and Somalia. + (S)

+

—In order to be better prepared to respond to contingencies and + demonstrate our seriousness to Oman and other regional states, we should + continue efforts to expedite construction at Masirah and on the Musandam + Peninsula.

+

—We must work hard to overcome Kenyan fears of our improving relations + with Somalia. This should include keeping the Kenyans well informed so + that their fears do not become divorced from realities.

+

—Funding is available to support most military construction plans in + Somalia (i.e., improvements for airfield and seaport facilities at + Berbera). Our security assistance program remains constrained, however, + by Congressional requirements for guarantees concerning Somali + activities in the Ogaden region. The latter requires early resolution in + 1981.

+

C. Economic Component

+

—Security Assistance. (S) We need to continue to + pursue vigorously our new initiatives to link increased security + assistance with enhancing regional states’ ability to assist US + forces during a deployment. For this reason, security assistance budget + decisions for FY82 should take into account our overall security + framework.

+

—Oil. (S) On this subject your memorandum appears + to be too sanguine. The oil outlook remains uncertain. Only reduced + Western demand (in part owing to low economic growth) has prevented the + Iran-Iraq war from dramatically tightening the international oil market. + Large consumers such as Japan have so far shown great restraint in not + entering the spot market, but spot prices have ballooned to $40 a barrel + in some instances. Supplies remain very susceptible to cutbacks by + several producers, attacks on Gulf facilities, an attempt to close the + Strait, production problems or cutbacks elsewhere (Libya is in a good + position to squeeze the West), the collapse of Western restraint, more + troubles sustaining high Saudi production rates, or any combination of + the above. Even a continuation of the Iran-Iraq war into next year at a + level that prevents their oil exports from rising above their present + low level would presage a major escalation in fuel prices next year.

+

D. [1 section (2 + paragraphs) not declassified]

+

GOALS FOR THE FUTURE

+

A. Military Component

+

—Budget Issues. (S) “Addressing the budgetary + implications of the third strategic zone” will not only require a large + commitment of resources to mobility and sustainability programs, but + will also involve considerably more SWA-specific spending in such areas as military construction, + pre-positioning, additional C3I, and special equipment relating to local + fuel, water and logistic needs. This is important given our long-term + intention to support an expanded RDF of + at least six divisions. Meeting these requirements will necessitate + several billion dollars in FY81 amendment or supplemental legislation, + as well as an even greater sustained annual commitment of resources over + FYDP 82–86.

+

—Security Assistance. (S) In addition, US security assistance levels for regional + countries for FY82 should grow some $1.8B over initial projections, or + to approximately $5.5B for FY82. Among other things, we want countries + in the area to develop sufficient local air defense capabilities so as + to protect RDF facilities and reduce + the air defense requirement on deploying US forces.

+

—Facilities Access. (S) It is strategically + imperative that we achieve assured access to improve Saudi, Turkish and + Egyptian facilities in particular on a far broader basis than at + present.

+

—Strategic Mobility. (S) Added fast air and + sealift is equally indispensable to our deterrent strategy.

+ +

—Host Nation Support. (S) We must seek expanded + HNS from key area states, including + provision of POL and potable water as + well as logistic support.

+

B. Foreign Policy + Component

+

—Post-hostage Iran. (S) We should begin now to + review our overall policy toward Iran for when the hostages are + released. In doing so, we must recognize that we will be making + decisions during the hostage negotiations that will set limits on our + relations with Iran and will also affect directly our relations with key + Gulf states (and with Saudi Arabia and Iraq, in particular) and, + indirectly, how we are perceived throughout the world. Iran probably + will still not be at all easy to deal with after the hostages are + released. Our review must therefore be based on a very complex set of + calculations and may very well take place in a vacuum of + non-reciprocation from Iran. Accordingly, we may not want to change much + if Iran is not willing to reciprocate.

+

—Iran-Iraq War. (S) The military and political + lessons of the Iran-Iraq conflict are valuable inputs to the development + of US military strategy for the + PG/SWA region. We have undertaken a + review of the events of the war in order to discern these implications + and to verify or revise earlier assumptions which led to the formulation + of the current strategy.

+

C. Economic Component

+

—Saudi Regional Assistance. (S) We expect much of + the Saudis in many areas—oil price and production levels, various + aspects of security cooperation, restrained position on the Iran-Iraq + and Arab-Israeli conflicts and oil revenue recycling to name a few. Each + of these issues is favored and pressed strongly by a particular USG agency. We should take care that these + issues, as well as others such as Saudi assistance to regional states, + are addressed within a coordinated framework of USG priorities for our relationship with Saudi Arabia.

+

—Oil. (S) We should increase the priority of oil + production facility security as a military objective in the context of + RDJTF and other military planning + in Southwest Asia. This may entail some adjustment of force capabilities + to ensure that the unique problems of securing oil facilities—including + anti-terrorist measures, damage control and emergency repairs—can be + dealt with.

+

D. [1 + section, 2 paragraphs (7 lines) not declassified]

+

(U) Looking back, I think we have accomplished a great deal over the past + year. This said, you, more than anyone, realize how much more there is + to be done. Anything we can do before 20 January (or afterwards for that matter) that would + be of assistance in providing for a smooth transition and continued + momentum in this area should be encouraged.

+ + Harold Brown + +
+ +
+ 97. Summary of Conclusions of a Special Coordination Committee + MeetingSource: Carter + Library, National Security Council, Institutional Files, Box 117, + SCC 355, 12/16/80, Security + Framework. Secret. The meeting took place in the White House + Situation Room. The minutes are not attached and were not found. + Carter initialed the + first page, indicating that he saw it. Odom sent the Summary of + Conclusions to Brzezinski + under a December 17 memorandum, indicating that he would collate + responses to the draft PD that + evening. (Ibid.) + + + Washington, December 16, 1980, 3:30–4:30 + p.m. + + + SUBJECT + Persian Gulf Security Framework—XIX + + + PARTICIPANTS + + + State + David Newsom, Under + Secretary for Political Affairs + Reginald + Bartholomew, Director, Bureau of + Politico-Military Affairs + Peter Constable, + Deputy Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern and South Asian + Affairs + + + + + Defense + W. Graham Claytor, + Jr., Deputy Secretary + Robert Komer, + Under Secretary for Policy + + + + + JCS + General David + Jones, Chairman + Lt. General John + Pustay + + + + + CIA + Stansfield Turner, + Director + Robert Ames, NIO for Near + East and South Asia + + + + + + Treasury + William Miller, + Secretary + Robert Carswell, + Deputy Secretary + + + + + Energy + Charles Dayan, + Secretary + Les Goldman, Assistant Secretary for International + Affairs + + + + + OMB + Edward Sanders, Associate Director for National Security + and International Affairs + + + + + White House + Dr. Zbigniew + Brzezinski + David Aaron + + + + + NSC + General William E. Odom + General Jasper Welch + Captain Gary + Sick + + + + +

Dr. Brzezinski asked that the + meeting address two items. First, it should review agency responses to + his memorandum of November 5See Document 93. in so far as they + concern short-term actions which need to be taken. Second, the meeting + should discuss a draft Presidential Directive as possible guidance for + the next administration and as a legacy of President Carter’s major effort in building a + security framework for the Persian Gulf region. (S)

+

A. Short-term actions and + responses to Dr. Brzezinski’s + memorandum of November 5, 1980.

+

Treasury

+

Secretary Miller asked for no + short-term actions but observed that economic and security assistance do + impact on the stability and viability of regimes in the region, + depending on their ability to absorb it. Second, he raised the question + of our efforts to deal with some issues through the Joint Military + Commission which really should be handled by the Joint Economic + Commission. Third, he commented that a number of our dealings with Saudi + Arabia are through different and not always coordinated channels. + (S)

+

Newsom observed that we should + press the Saudis to contribute more to UNRRA than traditionally is the Saudi practice. (S)

+

EnergyFor the + Department of Energy response to Brzezinski’s November 5 memorandum, see Foreign + Relations, 1969–1976, vol. XXXVII, Energy Crisis, + 1974–1980, Document 288.

+

Dayan noted three items: the Saudi + decision to raise its oil prices; late intelligence that Iraqi pipelines + through Syria and Turkey have both been cut by bombing; and that the + OPEC deliberations in Bali + indicate an upward move in oil prices. These developments are likely to + make the spot market very active. We may face a difficult period in the + next month as the spot market prices move to new highs. In explaining + the longer-term economic impact he cited Charles Schultze’s paper which + estimates that a $10 increase in the price of a barrel of oil will push + the CPI up by two to three percent and + take about $10 billionCarter circled “$10 + billion.” out of OECD + country incomes. (S)

+

Dr. Brzezinski asked what + short-term action we might take. Dayan enumerated the steps that we have taken with the + IEA and in other channels to + constrain undesired price activity. (C)

+

Dr. Brzezinski asked if Iran is + exporting oil now. Dayan reported + that two tankers departed Karg Island last week and that the Iran export level is about 200,000 + barrels per day. Minister Yamani, Dayan said, + reports that Iraqi production is about one million b/d and might go above that. (S)

+

Dr. Brzezinski asked when the + Iraqi pipelines would be repaired. Dayan estimated that it would be the end of this month. + The French are helping them with the repairs. (S)

+

Finally, Dayan noted that the oil + inventories by April 1, 1981 will be approximately where they were on + April 1, 1979 with the attendant summer gas shortages entirely possible. + Those difficulties can be mitigated if distribution is managed well. + (C)

+

StateSee Document 95.

+

Newsom raised three short-term + issues. First, the FY 1982 budget + reflects no MILCON money for Somalia. In the case of Kenya it has been + reduced from the promised $36 million to $17 million. Our diplomatic + credibility with Somalia is at stake if we do not restore some MILCON + funds for FY 1982. Second, on Ras Banas, + our negotiations with the last Congress indicate that they will tolerate + MILCON funding without a written agreement with Egypt. Should we + approach the new Congress in early January to reaffirm this or leave it + for the next Administration? Third, a Somali request for air defense + equipment makes it imperative that we provide an intelligence report + about the Ogaden to Congressman Solarz. We would like the DCI to make that ready by January 1st. (S)

+

On Somalia MILCON funds, Komer + agreed that some addition for FY 1982 is + necessary, but we can’t give as much as promised to Somalia or to Kenya. + Dr. Brzezinski asked Defense to + let us know about how they manage the shifts in MILCON funds to meet + this credibility requirement. On negotiations with the new Congress + about Ras Banas all agreed that State and Defense should open + discussions at the first opportunity in January. The DCI was tasked to render a report on the + Ogaden for State by January 1st. (S)

+

DefenseSee Document 96.

+

Komer raised two issues. First, + he proposed that the President send Sadat a letter on nuclear powered + war ships through the Suez Canal. Dr. Brzezinski asked Defense to provide a text for such a + letter because it is consistent with what the President recently told + Vice President Moubarek. (S)

+ +

Second, Komer underscored the + inadequacies of our security assistance in the short-term for the + Southwest Asia/Persian Gulf region. He implored the SCC to make one more effort with the + President in behalf of the Southwest Asian add-on package with + particular emphasis on Turkey, Egypt, and Pakistan. There is no way to + have a credible deterrent with the RDJTF if it has no facilities access in the region. OMB has cut back the original add-on, but + Defense is willing to absorb about $300 million in FY 1982 in order to launch a $911 million + security assistance program for the out years. Komer argued that not only must this + be proposed once more, but there must be more flexibility in our + security assistance funding if the security framework effort is to + succeed. (S)

+

David Aaron noted that the + President was for a security assistance package but on the basis that it + be taken from the Defense budget. Dr. Brzezinski asked how we should relate this issue to the + President. Komer suggested that + the SCC should endorse it, and the + details should go by a separate memo which is now in progress. (S)

+

When Dr. Brzezinski asked who + supports this proposal, all agencies voiced strong support except + Bill Miller who initially + expressed uncertainty about the details. In a brief post-SCC clarification between Miller and Komer, Treasury agreed with Defense + while noting that the additional proposal of $200 million in economic + assistance for Turkey is equally important as security assistance. + Defense and State agreed that we need both, particularly in the Turkish + case. (S)

+

State made the reservation that the additional security assistance will + not necessarily buy military access immediately but that it is crucial, + if we are to have access in the future, that we do this now. (S)

+

General Jones intervened to + report on his recent discussions with the Turkish military where he + learned of Turkey’s enormous energy dependence on oil from Iran. He also + added that close relations with Saudi Arabia are absolutely critical if + our military capability for the region is to be effective. (S)

+

Dr. Brzezinski raised an + additional topic, the Iran-Iraqi war. Should we remain passive as we are + doing at present? Is our response adequate? What are the + implications—economic, military, and political—of our passiveness? + Should U.S. policy toward this war be kept hostage to the hostage issue + with Iran? (S)

+

Komer said that Defense had + studied ways to prevent the Soviet tilt toward Iran but had not found + one. A second tactic would be to seek ways to get both sides from + destroying oil production facilities. His staff had not come up with + promised suggestions. (S)

+

Dayan reported that the French and + the Saudis say that the Soviets are supplying considerable oil to Iran + and spare parts to Iraq. (S)

+ +

Newsom declared that there is no + such intelligence available from U.S. sources. He also added that three + diplomatic issues have been taken on without success thus far: (1) the + Islamic Conference initiative, (2) the Cuban initiative, and (3) the + UN initiative by Waldheim. Muskie will see Waldheim this Thursday about reviving his initiative. + (S)

+

Dr. Brzezinski directed that a + mini-SCC be held tomorrow to review + our options and to provide support for Muskie when he sees Waldheim on Thursday. (C)

+

B. Passing the Security + Framework to the next Administration

+

Dr. Brzezinski distributed a + draft Presidential Directive which repeats the President’s State of the + Union commitment to the region and briefly outlines our strategy for + building a security framework.Not found. The + final version of PD/NSC-63 is printed as Document 98. It then repeats the four + components structure and identifies objectives under each. Dr. Brzezinski described the PD as stating briefly but explicitly what + the President’s policy has been for the security framework in the region + and providing a series of beacons under each of the four components for + the successor administration. He then asked for comments and reactions. + (S)

+

Newsom expressed concern that + listing countries, as the PD might, + should not be made public. He also asked if it might not be better to + render a report to the next administration rather than a belated PD by the President. Muskie would not object to a summary + but would have his own reservations about a PD. Dr. Brzezinski + replied that the President would have his own historic interests in a + PD which transcends Muskie’s views and concerns. (S)

+

OMB supported the PD idea and added that it needs to make the + point about coordination of our many efforts with Saudi Arabia. (C)

+

Miller asked if a PD might not be a red flag to the next + administration. Dr. Brzezinski + responded that we could produce a report, but that it would only be one + of hundreds of memoranda passed on to the next administration. But a + PD for codification of the structure + and process is what is needed. A PD + could summarize and codify what this President has been identified with + in the region in the post-Afghanistan period. (S)

+

Both Claytor and Komer spoke very strongly on behalf of + a PD. Claytor found no downside to this approach. Komer argued that if it is a + reasonably brief document like the draft at hand, not a list of our + accomplishments, it is more likely to survive and to affect the policy + of the next administration significantly. (S)

+ +

There was further discussion as to whether the PD should not list more of the administration’s actions + since last January. State seemed to favor this, supported by Treasury. + Defense and OMB did not. (S)

+

Dr. Brzezinski asked how each + agency stands on the long versus the short version PD. Komer repeated his case for a short version, and + Aaron pointed out that most + of State’s concerns could be taken care of with a short preamble. + (C)

+

Dr. Brzezinski closed the meeting + asking that each agency return with its comments on the PD to be scheduled for tomorrow afternoon. + (C)

+
+ +
+ 98. Presidential Directive/NSC–63Source: + Carter Library, National Security Council, Institutional Files, Box + 24, PD/NSC–63. Secret. Carter signed at the top of the first page. Under + cover of a January 16 memorandum to Muskie, Brown, Jones, + and Turner, Brzezinski transmitted a series of + summary sheets “which provide updates on the various components of + the Security Framework.” He also indicated that the summary sheets + could be passed along to successors, as appropriate. + (Ibid.) + + + Washington, January + 15, 1981 + + + TO + The Vice President + The Secretary of State + The Secretary of The Treasury + The Secretary of Defense + The Secretary of Commerce + The Secretary of Energy + The Director, Office of Management & Budget + The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff + The Director of Central Intelligence + + + SUBJECT + Persian Gulf Security Framework (U) + +

In my State of the Union Address to the Congress in January 1980,See Document + 45. I called special attention to our interests in the + Southwest Asia and Persian Gulf region. Furthermore, in light of the + Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, I declared that:

+ +

“An attempt by any outside force to gain control of the Persian + Gulf region will be regarded as an assault on the vital interests of + the United States. It will be repelled by the use of any means + necessary, including military force.” (U)

 +

Subsequently, I have directed action to protect the Strait of Hormuz and + strengthen our key friends in the region in the face of risks stemming + from the Iran/Iraq war. It is U.S. strategy to meet these commitments + and to defend our vital interests in the region as a whole by:

+

—building up our own capabilities to project force into the region while + maintaining a credible presence there;

+

—developing a broad range of military and related response options in and + outside the region against the Soviet Union, including U.S. force + projection into the region, to compensate for the current Soviet + regional advantage in conventional forces;

+

—making the Soviet Union aware that it will also face a wide range of + economic and diplomatic sanctions on a worldwide basis if it intervenes + in the region;

+

—assisting countries in the region: to deter and diminish internal and + external threats to stability; and to contribute to deterring and + resisting Soviet penetration—political, economic, or military;

+

—diminishing radical influences in the region and enhancing US security by working for progress toward + a comprehensive Arab-Israeli peace settlement;

+

—improving access to facilities in the region while remaining sensitive + to the special historical experience of the region and not placing in + jeopardy our relationships or the internal stability of the countries + concerned by insisting on formal basing arrangements;

+

—taking a regional approach to securing our economic and political + interests rather than basing their defense wholly on drawing a line to + protect specific countries in the region. (S)

+

There has been considerable progress in improving our security posture in + the region and in shaping an effective security framework. To ensure + that this trend continues, I direct that the Persian Gulf Security + Framework be pursued as follows: (C)

+

I. The Military + Component

+

The Department of Defense has principal responsibility for initiatives in + this area consistent with the responsibility of the Department of State. + This component will include greater effort in the following areas:

+

A. U.S. Force Capabilities, including forces, + lift, facilities access, overbuilding and prepositioning of supplies, + exercises, and presence in the region. (S)

+

B. Local Defense Capabilities, improved through + security assistance, advisory programs and enhancement of local + facilities and military capabilities in order to support U.S. force projection and local + defense developed by joint planning, combined exercises, consultations, + and other appropriate means. (S)

+

C. Getting our Allies to Carry More of the Burden + of coalition deterrence/defense in Europe and Northeast Asia, as part of + a rational division of labor, to offset greater allocation of U.S. + resources to the security of the Persian Gulf. (S)

+

II. The Foreign Policy + Component

+

The Department of State has principal responsibility for this component, + which will be carried out in terms of:

+

A. The Middle East Peace Process in which progress + must be achieved as rapidly as feasible. (S)

+

B. Turkey and Pakistan with which improved + security relations are the objective. (S)

+

C. The Arabian Peninsula in which we will assist + the countries concerned to enhance their internal stability and counter + Soviet influence. (S)

+

D. The Horn of Africa, where we seek improved ties + with Somalia and Djibouti and, when possible, with Ethiopia. (S)

+

E. The Allies, in Europe and Asia, from whom we + seek diplomatic, military, economic, and political assistance in meeting + our mutual security objectives in the Persian Gulf region. An early + focus of effort with these Allies and with regional powers will be + establishing relationships to help assure quick and positive processing + of overflight, refueling and stating clearances required for the U.S. to + project and sustain forces in Southwest Asia. (S)

+

III. Economic Issues

+

The Department of the Treasury, State, and Energy will share + responsibility in this area. Economic subcomponents are:

+

A. Oil Policy, to ensure availability of oil at + reasonable prices and to reduce Western dependence on Gulf oil. (S)

+

B. Western Economic Assistance, in which our goal + will be to help address economic problems in the region through + multilateral and unilateral efforts. (S)

+

C. Saudi and Other Gulf States Cooperation in Financing + of Regional Security Needs in which we seek a more + comprehensive, region-wide use of Saudi and other peninsular + capabilities to meet regional security needs. (S)

+

D. Economic Stability which is crucial to both the + internal and external security and to the political stability of states + in the region. It should be an integral component of the security review + process and taken into account + in any U.S. decisions concerning military and/or economic assistance. + (S)

+

IV. Intelligence Issues

+

The Director of Central Intelligence has the principal responsibility for + developing an effective regionally integrated intelligence program which + is fully supportive of the tasks and objectives in the military, + diplomatic, and economic components. (S)

+

Resources Considerations

+

Each agency will be responsible for and will identify the programs in its + area which are required for implementing this directive. In addition, + each agency will propose appropriate priority for these programs. + (C)

+

The Office of Management and Budget will monitor agency programs in + support of this directive, will insure that such programs are + identifiable, and will insure that they are receiving an appropriately + high priority in all agencies. (C)

+

Coordination

+

Interagency coordination for the security framework shall continue to be + accomplished by the Special Coordination Committee. (C)

+ + Zbigniew + Brzezinski + +
+
+ +
+ + Indian Ocean + +
+ 99. Presidential Review Memorandum/NSC 25Source: + Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files, FRC + 330–80–0017, Indian Ocean 092 (Jan–Jul) 1977 2. Secret. Brown initialed at the top of the + page and wrote “4/8” above his initials. + + + Washington, April 7, + 1977 + + + TO + The Vice President + The Secretary of State + The Secretary of Defense + + + ALSO + The Director, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency + The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff + The Director of Central Intelligence + + + SUBJECT + Arms Control in the Indian Ocean Area + +

The President has directed that the Special Coordination Committee review + U.S. policy with regard to possible arms control measures in the Indian + Ocean area preparatory to the meeting of the U.S.-Soviet working group + on this issue.Vance visited Moscow March 27–30 + and discussed demilitarization of the Indian Ocean with Gromyko during a March 29 meeting. + In telegram Secto 3033 from + Moscow, March 29, Vance + indicated that he had “set forth our interest in a serious + exploration of their views, especially on question of eliminating + bases, limiting numbers of ship-days for warships and defining the + precise area to be covered.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central + Foreign Policy File, P840076-0315). For a memorandum of conversation + of the March 29 meeting, see Foreign Relations 1977–1980, vol. VI, + Soviet Union, Document 20. Vance and Gromyko agreed to set up working groups on several + issues, including Indian Ocean demilitarization. (Department of + State Bulletin, April 25, 1977, p. + 401)

+

The initial study of this issue will be prepared by a working group of + the SCC, under the chairmanship of the + NSC Staff. The study should be + completed for SCC review by April 29, + 1977, and should:

+

1. Review past policy studies, summarizing U.S. security interests and + objectives in the Indian Ocean area.

+

2. Identify alternative negotiating strategies available to the United + States, with specific options for an initial negotiating position.

+

3. Make recommendations concerning the composition of a U.S. team to + conduct discussions with the USSR and + the establishment of a working group to support its efforts.

+ +

4. Propose consultative mechanisms to ensure that the views and interests + of U.S. friends and allies are adequately represented in the preparation + and conduct of bilateral discussions with the USSR.

+

In examining alternative negotiating strategies available to the United + States, the study should identify the principal tradeoffs (facilities, + force levels, operating patterns) which will have to be considered in + substantive discussions of this issue with the USSR. Each alternative should be evaluated in terms of its + implications for:

+

—U.S.-Soviet rivalry in the region;

+

—Regional military and political developments;

+

—U.S. and Soviet objectives and capabilities in other areas;

+

—U.S. relations with Allies and other concerned states; and

+

—Crisis management in the Indian Ocean area.

+ + Zbigniew + Brzezinski + +
+ +
+ 100. Paper Prepared by the National Security Council StaffSource: Washington National Records + Center, RG 330, OSD Files, FRC 330–80–0017, Indian Ocean 092 + (Jan–Jul) 1977 2. Secret. Acting NSC Staff Secretary Michael Hornblow sent copies of the + response to Mondale, + Vance, Brown, Warnke, Jones, and Turner under an April 29 memorandum that indicated + the SCC would discuss the response + at the May 4 SCC meeting. See Document 102. + + + Washington, undated + +

RESPONSE TO PRM/NSC–25 INDIAN OCEAN ARMS CONTROL

+

Before the agreed US-Soviet Working Group + on Indian Ocean arms control is convened, the US must decide:

+

—What it would seek to achieve, substantively, in an initial arms control + agreement with the Soviet Union, and

+

—How the Working Group can best be used to further this goal.

+

This paper briefly summarizes the major considerations which the SCC will need to consider in making these + choices. It describes the general historical background and comparative + military presence of the various powers in the Indian Ocean. It examines + the political implications of arms control in the area and identifies + the major elements which will have to be considered in any US–USSR + negotiations.

+ +

Three broad alternative arms control objectives are outlined: (1) + Demilitarization; (2) Limitations short of demilitarization; and (3) A + freeze at approximately current levels. Even if demilitarization is + accepted as our ultimate objective, it may be necessary to consider + something less as a proximate objective for the first round of + discussions with the USSR. SCC guidance on this issue will be + necessary to prepare a negotiating strategy.

+

The proposed composition of the US + Working Group is discussed, and four alternative approaches for the + first meeting are described: (1) A general exchange of views on possible + elements of an agreement; (2) An exchange of views plus a US proposal for immediate adoption of some + confidence building measures; (3) Seek agreement on the general + principles to guide future negotiations; or (4) Use the meeting as the + first round of a formal negotiating process, tabling a US draft outline of a bilateral agreement. + The SCC decision on this issue will + determine the nature of our opening tactics.

+

Annexes include more detailed discussion of the negotiating elements and + military tradeoffs (A) and a discussion of consultative procedures + (B).Annexes A and B are attached but + not printed.

+

I. BACKGROUND

+

A. The Setting

+

Since 1949, the US has maintained a + limited military presence in the Indian Ocean area in the form of a + flagship and two destroyers of Middle East force stationed at Bahrain. + [1 line not declassified] Although a policy + of increased naval deployments was announced in 1964, it was never fully + implementated due to the military requirements and pressures of + Vietnam.

+

Recognition of pending UK withdrawal from + the area, growing nationalism, and the probable future lack of access to + military facilities in the area, led to US promotion of the concept of a British Indian Ocean + Territory composed of a number of strategic islands which could be used + as required for base facilities in the future. The BIOT was created in 1965 by the British + with indirect US financial support, and + a treaty permitting joint defense use was signed in 1966.See Foreign Relations, 1964–1968, vol. XXI, + Near East Region; Arabian Peninsula, Document 42; and Foreign + Relations, 1969–1976, vol. XXIV, Middle East Region and + Arabian Peninsula, 1969–1972; Jordan, September 1970, footnote + 2, Document 37.

+

The establishment of a naval facility on Diego Garcia was proposed in the + late 1960’s but was defeated by Congress in 1969.See Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, vol. XXIV, + Middle East Region and Arabian Peninsula, 1969–1972; Jordan, + September 1970, Document 39. Following the British withdrawal from the area, a + scaled-down version consisting primarily of a communications station and + an 8,000-foot supporting airfield was approved by Congress in 1971,See Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, vol. XXIV, + Middle East Region and Arabian Peninsula, 1969–1972; Jordan, + September 1970, Document 44. and became operational + in early 1973.

+

Soviet military activity in the Indian Ocean began in 1968 and increased + to the extent that by 1974 they regularly deployed about 19 ships on a + daily basis, eight or nine of which were combat vessels. Their force + presence has since stabilized at somewhat reduced levels, but Soviet + capabilities have increased as a result of the expansion of support + facilities at Berbera, and the recent addition of maritime air patrols + operating from airfields in Somalia. Soviet-built facilities at Berbera + include a communications station, port and fuel storage facilities, an + airfield large enough to accommodate any aircraft in the Soviet + inventory, and a cruise missile storage and handling facility. The + growth of Soviet facilities was tied to a large scale military + assistance program, and the continuation of the Soviet presence remains + dependent on the state of Soviet-Somali relations, which are currently + under strain.

+

In October 1973, the United States announced a “return to a policy of + more frequent and more regular” US naval + deployments to the Indian Ocean, following the partial Arab blockade of + the Red Sea during the Arab-Israel war and in view of the Soviet + military buildup in the area.On October 29, + 1973, as a result of the worldwide alert of U.S. forces in the wake + of the October 1973 Arab-Israeli war, the Department of Defense + announced the re-deployment of the aircraft carrier USS Hancock, along with its supporting carrier + group, from the Philippine Sea to the Indian Ocean. (Michael Getler, + “U.S. Aircraft Carrier Sent to Indian Ocean,” The + Washington Post, October 30, 1973, p. A1) Since that + time, we have deployed an average of three or four task groups each year + into the Indian Ocean from the Pacific Fleet, in addition to the three + ships of Middle East Force which remain in the area on a permanent + basis.

+

This change of policy was accompanied by a request for the expansion of + naval facilities on Diego Garcia. Despite prolonged Congressional + opposition, the Diego Garcia expansion program was finally approved in + July 1975, and construction work has been going on since the spring of + 1976.

+

The principal facilities currently in existence or planned for Diego + Garcia include a 12,000-foot runway, petroleum storage facilities, a + dredged basin within the lagoon large enough to accommodate a carrier + task group, a deep-water pier for loading and off-loading oil and other + supplies, a naval communications station, billeting for about 800 personnel, limited storage + facilities, and miscellaneous associated construction for a total of + about $40 million worth of new construction.

+

B. Current Attitudes Toward + Arms Control

+

The possibility of arms limitations in the area has been discussed since + 1970, when Sri Lanka initiated a proposal for an Indian Ocean Zone of + Peace. This proposal has been discussed in the UN General Assembly every year since that time, and an ad + hoc committee composed of Indian Ocean littoral states has been + established to deal with this issue. The objection of most maritime + nations (including the US and USSR) to the Peace Zone proposal is its + implication that littoral nations have the right to impose restrictions + on the use of adjacent waters, contrary to customary international laws + on freedom of use of the high seas.

+

Neither the US nor the Soviet Union has + taken an actively positive attitude towards Indian Ocean arms control. + In 1971 the Soviets asked if we would be interested in a joint + declaration on arms restraint. We replied that we agreed in principle + and asked for more elaboration of Soviet views. Moscow never responded + and there have not been any other direct bilateral exchanges until the + current US initiative.

+

Recently the Soviets have adopted a new public approach to the Peace Zone + issue. This was indicated in Brezhnev’s speech to the 25th Party Congress in February + 1976, and in Gromyko’s address + to the UN General Assembly last + fall.In telegram 4005 from USUN, September 28, 1976, the Mission + referenced Gromyko’s address + to the General Assembly and noted that the Soviet delegation had + released a “Memorandum of the Soviet Union on Questions of Ending + the Arms Race and Disarmament.” The memorandum’s highlights included + Soviet “willingness to explore with other powers reduction of + military activities in the Indian Ocean.” (National Archives, RG 59, + Central Foreign Policy File, D760366–0640) Telegram 4005 is + scheduled for publication in Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, vol. E–14, + Part 2, Documents on Arms Control, 1973–1976. + Moscow views with understanding the desire of the littoral nations to + establish a Peace Zone in the area; however, in the Soviet view the + first step should be the dismantling of foreign military bases in the + region (and the Soviets deny that they have any bases in the area). + Moscow would then be willing to discuss a reduction in the military + activities of non-littoral nations. The Soviet response to our March + 1977 approach in Moscow gave no indication of movement beyond their + public position. See footnote 2, Document 100.

+

Based on Soviet statements to date, it appears that the USSR might prevent serious discussion of + Indian Ocean arms limitations by demanding the elimination of US “bases” such as Diego Garcia, Masirah + and Northwest Cape, while insisting that the Berbera facility belongs to Somalia and is + therefore not in the same category. They might also insist that the + talks be broadened to include some or all of the littoral states, or + they might insist that any agreement insure military “parity” between + their own forces on the one hand and the combined forces of the US and its allies on the other. In short, + if the Soviet Union chose to exploit the discussions solely for + propaganda purposes, there will be opportunities to do so.

+

On the other hand, the Soviets might consider that their long-term + interests would be served by negotiating seriously. In informal and + unofficial conversations, various Soviets have indicated that + discussions could include their use of support facilities at Berbera. + The Soviets may be interested in limiting naval competition in the + belief that the advantages of such a competition might accrue to the + US. They may be unsure of their + position in Somalia, which is subject to political changes, and may see + advantages in trying to negotiate limitations on US facilities at Diego Garcia, on deployments of aircraft + carriers and amphibious forces and a ban on the deployment of SSBN’s in the Indian Ocean. They have + also been put on the propaganda defensive by President Carter’s stated goal of Indian Ocean + demilitarizationCarter publicly stated that the + United States would seek Soviet agreement to “mutual military + restraint” in the Indian Ocean in his March 17 address before the + UN General Assembly. For the + full text of his address, see Foreign Relations, 1977–1980, vol. I, + Foundations of Foreign Policy, Document 29. and may + come to feel compelled to demonstrate more specifically than in the past + their commitment to forestalling big power military rivalry in the + Indian Ocean.

+

C. Comparative Military + Presence

+

The level of military deployments to the Indian Ocean by the US, the USSR and other external powers over the past several years + are shown in Figures 1–3.Figures 2–3 are + attached but not printed. It will be noted that US and Soviet deployments peaked in 1974. + Soviet presence subsequently stabilized at a somewhat lower level and + US presence has declined. The + British presence has ceased to be significant following their well + publicized withdrawal in the early 1970’s, but the French presence + (measured in ship-days) is presently greater than that of either + superpower.

+

Although the Soviets regularly have more ships in the Indian Ocean than + we do, they cannot match the firepower of a US carrier task group when deployed to the area (currently + only once a year). The limited underway replenishment capability of the + Soviet fleet limits its capacity for sustained combat, and the lengthy + deployment periods of their ships make access to ports such as Berbera + attractive as a convenient location for resupply and repair. The heavy reliance of the Soviet + Navy on shore facilities, especially for air support, makes the + evolution of their political relations with Somalia particularly + significant.

+

With the Suez Canal open, the Soviet Union enjoys a marginal advantage in + surge capability since their relatively large fleet in the Eastern + Mediterranean could deploy to the Arabian Sea in less than five days, + while the US could not match them in + numbers or firepower since US attack + carriers today cannot pass through the Canal. The United States can + deploy a carrier task group from the Pacific Fleet to the Arabian Sea in + about [less than 1 line not declassified] + approximately [less than 1 line not declassified] + Soviet units could arrive from their Pacific bases. British and French + forces would require two to three weeks to deploy forces to the Indian + Ocean with the Canal open, or more than a month if it were closed.

+

Neither the United States nor the Soviet Union has stationed ground + combat forces in countries on the Indian Ocean littoral, and neither has + military aircraft permanently stationed in the area. The USSR has conducted occasional TU–95 + surveillance flights into the area from bases in the southern USSR, overflying Iran. In addition, since + April 1975 the USSR has begun sending + IL–38 surveillance aircraft to Somalia with increasing frequency (44 + deployment days in 1975, 103 in 1976, and 118 in the first four months + of 1977). [5 lines not declassified]

+

D. Future US–USSR + Military Presence

+

Current US planning does not call for any + increase in the present level of military deployments to the Indian + Ocean for the foreseeable future. Given current naval force levels, any + increase in Indian Ocean activity requires a comparable reduction in + naval presence in other areas, particularly in the Pacific where we have + only two carriers available on permanent deployment. The current + expansion of Diego Garcia is primarily intended to provide independent + contingency support for US forces in + conditions when littoral facilities might be closed to us. However, the + facilities on Diego Garcia would be valuable for support of a larger + US presence if that were decided at + some future date.

+

Bahrain has reconsidered its request that we terminate our Middle East + Force basing arrangement this June, and has agreed in principle to a + continued, reduced, presence.See Documents 4 and 5. We have also begun discussions with the Government + of Oman regarding continued air access to the former UK base on Masirah Island;See footnote 5, Document + 20. no US personnel + would be stationed there, and fueling and over-night billeting would be + provided by the Omanis for up + to [less than 1 line not declassified]. We also + maintain a small space tracking facility in the Seychelles.

+

The best indicator of long-range Soviet military intentions in the Indian + Ocean is the construction of support facilities in Somalia, and + particularly at Berbera where they have built a large airfield and a + cruise missile storage and handling facility which could provide missile + support for ships, aircraft and submarines. Of particular concern is the + possible future deployment of Soviet missile-armed aircraft in the + region. This would represent a significant change in the combat + capabilities of the Soviet naval units operating in the area and would + be the single development most likely to affect the relative US–USSR + military balance in the near future. The future development of Soviet + military capabilities in the area will depend heavily on the evolution + of their relations with the Somali Government.

+

E. Implications for US and Soviet Regional Interests

+

The one essential US interest in the + Indian Ocean area is to insure continued access to the oil of the + Persian Gulf region. The US is also + concerned that the states in the area develop economically and + politically, free from external pressure. Current US deployments and facilities in the area + are intended to serve these purposes by demonstrating US interest in the area, symbolizing + support for our Allies and friends and by offsetting the Soviet + presence. If Soviet presence should increase, the US would have to seriously consider the + military, political, and budgetary costs of increasing military presence + in the area or risk the political and economic consequences of + permitting a perceived increase in Soviet influence in the area.

+

In addition to a general desire to project its presence and influence + overseas, the Soviet Union has some particular interests in the Indian + Ocean region. Geographically, the nations of the Persian Gulf and Indian + Sub-Continent lie immediately to the south of the Soviet border. An + important sea route between European Russia and the Soviet Far East lies + through the Suez Canal and Indian Ocean. Soviet rivalry with China will + continue to be a major factor in Soviet policy toward this area for the + foreseeable future. The range of geographical and political interests + which have sustained a 20-year courtship of India suggests that the + Soviet leadership will continue to devote political, economic, and + military resources toward the achievement of their objectives in the + region. As the Soviet Navy improves its blue water capabilities, the + Soviets may consider the Indian Ocean to be a lucrative area in which to + exploit these capabilities for their political purposes, particularly if + they sense a US reluctance to meet such + a challenge.

+ +

US-Soviet arms control arrangements in + the Indian Ocean area could serve US + interests if it:

+

—Prevented a US-Soviet military presence + competition with the costs this would entail;

+

—Prevented the introduction of Soviet strike aircraft in the area;

+

—Reassured our Allies and friends by reducing the possibility of Soviet + military predominance in the area;

+

—Improved the US political image by + demonstrating responsiveness to the desires of the littoral states to + prevent great power military competition in their area; and

+

—Possibly if it reduced the military resources which the US would commit to the area.

+

There are, however, limits on what arms control arrangements could be + expected to contribute to stability. Even stringent limits on military + and naval forces would have little effect on the Soviet ability to + provide support to dissident political movements in Africa or elsewhere + in the area. Arms control arrangements based on parity might require the + US to surrender some advantages it + currently enjoys, such as a politically secure base and the deployment + of carrier forces. The Soviet Union is geographically proximate to the + area and, in spite of overflight problems, would be better able to bring + air power or air transported forces directly to bear from its own + territory. Limits on US force presence + in the area would also reduce capabilities for the US to respond to threats not involving the + Soviets, such as another Arab blockade in the Red Sea area or evacuation + of US citizens. Arms control + arrangements in the Indian Ocean might set undesirable precedents for + freedom of the seas, for arms control arrangements in ocean areas more + vital to US security such as the + Mediterranean, and for a Soviet attempt to impose global parity on sea + power, an arrangement which would be consistent with greater US dependence on seapower to protect its + interests and Allies overseas.

+

In any case, for the U.S. it will be essential to maintain close and + continuing consultations with Allies such as Australia and the UK prior to and during the negotiating + process. Background discussions with other friendly nations will also be + important. This is discussed in more detail in Annex B.

+

II. NEGOTIATING + ELEMENTS

+

Cutting across all alternative arms control packages are some basic + negotiating elements which must be considered before presenting a + proposal. These are discussed in detail in Annex A.

+

A. General Elements

+

The Area. The scope of an acceptable definition of + the Indian Ocean is limited by customary usage; but a fundamental + question is whether bases and forces other than on the coasts of + littoral countries should be included and, if so, to what extent.

+ +

Types of Forces. We can focus our arms control + measures on just maritime forces and facilities, or we can choose the + greater risks involved in extending arms control to land-based air and + ground forces and inland facilities and activities. Extension of + coverage to land-based forces and facilities would place at risk US installations in such countries as Iran, + the Seychelles and Australia. It could also prevent US naval and air participation in CENTO exercises.

+

Bilateral versus Multilateral. While we have + proposed US/USSR talks, the Soviets might want to argue that the UK and France should also participate or + their forces be counted against the US + presence. US military presence in the + Indian Ocean is keyed in part to our contribution to collective security + alliances (ANZUS, CENTO). The Soviets could argue that we + should disengage from these alliances or refrain from military + deployments which support them.

+

[1 paragraph (7 lines) not declassified]

+

Nature of Military Presence. Transiting forces + should probably not be included in an agreement, because naval + operations outside the area would be affected. Transits should be + pre-announced and defined by duration and number of allowed port + calls.

+

Crisis Escape Clause. The agreement should contain + provisions which would permit deployments to the area in excess of + treaty limits under certain extreme contingencies.

+

B. Elements Related to + Limitations

+

Surface Ships. Surface ship deployments could be + limited by a variety of means:

+

—Surface combatants could be limited.

+

—Naval auxiliaries could be included as well. While this limit would not + directly control military capability, it could impair Soviet operations + because of their greater reliance on auxiliaries. On the other hand, + Soviet use of naval associated merchant ships would be unrestricted. For + this reason, DOD feels that auxiliaries + and merchant ships used to support a naval presence in the area should + be included in any limits.

+

—If naval associated merchant ships were to be included, this could + inhibit our ability to supply the 7th fleet with oil from the Persian + Gulf.

+

—The duration of deployment could be limited to prevent permanent + presence such as the US + MIDEASTFOR and to inhibit + current Soviet practice of long-term forward deployments.

+

—The number of ship-days per year could be limited.

+

—The average daily level of ship tonnage (over a year’s period) could be + limited.

+

—Some formula could be derived to value ships according to their tonnage + and the resultant figure of merit could be limited.

+ +

Because of the differing character of US + and Soviet deployments—the US deploys + fewer, but larger, combatants than the Soviets—two ceilings appear the + simplest and fairest approach: a ceiling on the number of combatants + would constrain the Soviets more heavily while a limit on combatant + tonnage would constrain the US more + heavily. For example, ceilings at about half current levels would permit + each side a daily average of about five combatants and about 25,000 + tons.

+

—This approach would lower the number of Soviet combatants, but the mix + would remain unchanged.

+

—The US could send about the same number + of ships as at present, but carrier deployments would have to be + curtailed; or carriers deployed and the number of ships reduced.

+

[1 paragraph (10 lines) not declassified]

+

Bases (Support Facilities). Again various types of + limits are possible:

+

—The number of facilities or the type of service performed by facilities + under US or Soviet control could be + limited or banned.

+

—Access to other bases could be limited by, for example, the number and + duration of port calls or aircraft visits.

+

—Both powers might be barred from making use of facilities for routine + maintenance, resupply, or rearmament. (This would not rule out “voyage + repairs” necessary for safe transit to the next port of call.) This + provision would deny Soviet use of the missile handling and repair + facilities in Berbera.

+

—We probably would not want to restrict communications capabilities. This + would allow the US to remain in + Northwest Cape and continue to maintain the communication station on + Diego Garcia and for the Soviets to retain their communications station + in Berbera. Airfields needed to support communication facilities and + verification would be permitted. Use of these fields for other uses + might be restricted.

+

Military Aircraft. Aircraft present the most + complex limitation problem, one that is the least well developed: there + are varied types of military aircraft, ranging from transports through + strike aircraft; aircraft deployments can take many forms—on carriers, + permanent deployment at ground bases, periodic deployment, and + overflights.

+

—Only particular types of aircraft could be limited: e.g. armed aircraft + might be limited, but reconnaissance, surveillance and transport + aircraft unrestricted. An agreement to ban the introduction of + land-based combat aircraft would probably have to be balanced by a ban + on US carrier-based aircraft to be + negotiable.

+

—The number of “aircraft days” could be limited. This would be complex, + however; it might therefore be better to either ban aircraft or leave + them alone.

+

—If aircraft limits included [1 line not + declassified] third world countries would be impaired. On the + other hand, restrictions on Soviet deployment of land-based strike aircraft would be + valuable since such deployments could alter the military balance in the + area.

+

Ground Combat Forces. Since no ground combat + forces are deployed in the littoral areas and are rarely deployed + afloat, we could consider a ban. By banning just combat units, we would + exclude security assistance personnel from restrictions. A Soviet + commitment on this principle would be especially important in view of + Soviet contiguity with the littoral states. However, the Soviets would + probably insist on extending such a ban to afloat combat forces.

+

[1 paragraph (5 lines) not declassified]

+

III. ALTERNATIVE ARMS + CONTROL OBJECTIVES

+

The section describes three general alternative negotiating objectives + for SCC consideration: (1) total + demilitarization; (2) limitation of military presence below current + levels; and (3) a freeze or cap near current levels. These could be + viewed as either long term objectives or as outlines for a near term + treaty with the USSR. A freeze, + reductions of force levels, and demilitarization can also be viewed as + progressive signs in an extended negotiating strategy. In any event, the + alternatives would require further technical development before they + could be presented to the Soviets. SCC + guidance on the general outline of the agreement we seek is needed + before detailed negotiating packages can be developed.

+

A. Alternative + 1—Demilitarization

+

Demilitarization would include:

+

Ship deployment

+

—Neither side could deploy combatants, either surface or submarine, to + the area; auxiliaries and naval associated merchant ships might also be + banned.

+

—Pre-announced transit through the Indian Ocean would be permitted.

+

—The US + MIDEASTFOR would be disbanded + and its ships withdrawn.

+

—Periodic US deployment of task groups + and participation in naval exercises with littoral nations (e.g. CENTO and ANZUS) would not be permitted.

+

—The US would forego the option of + deploying SSBN’s to the area.

+

—The USSR would have to terminate its + naval presence in the region.

+

Bases

+

—Neither side would be permitted to maintain military facilities in the + area though communications facilities might be permitted for + verification purposes.

+ +

—Neither side would be allowed to make use of indigenous naval facilities + except for brief port calls in connection with transit.

+

—The US would be obligated to close its + military facilities at Bahrain and Diego Garcia, though communication + might remain.

+

—The Soviets would not be allowed to make use of their facilities in + Somalia and would be barred from the development of similar facilities + elsewhere.

+

Aircraft

+

—Neither side could introduce land-based or sea-borne aircraft into the + area, though unarmed transports or surveillance aircraft might be + allowed. This would prohibit Soviet use of the military airfield they + have constructed in Somalia. Our aircraft carriers would be permitted + into the area only during transit.

+

Ground Combat Forces

+

—Neither side could introduce military personnel in unit formations into + the region, at sea or in the littoral countries.

+

Discussion

+

In a post-agreement environment, both sides would be expected to continue + to use means other than military forces—political, economic, arms + supply—to further their interests in the area. The use of surrogate + military forces is possible: the Soviets have employed this strategy in + Angola; and the Soviets would likely charge that French forces were a + surrogate for the US. The Soviets, and + some littoral states, would probably pressure France to accede to the + agreement or at least respect its terms. France would probably resist + such pressures.

+

To agree to this option both sides would have to feel confident that + there were no indigenous or external threats to its interests in the + area (aside from the military capabilities of the other) that would + necessitate maintaining forces in the region. One of our major interests + is protection of our essential Sea Lines of Communications (SLOC), especially in view of Western and + Japanese dependence on the oil resources of the Persian Gulf. In a + wartime environment, in which the treaty would be abrogated, the major + immediate Soviet threat to the SLOC + would be aircraft from the USSR.

+

A threat to US interests from other + sources in a demilitarized Indian Ocean would clearly be difficult to + deal with unless we were willing to invoke a crisis escape clause. Such + threats could include interruption of access to or transit of oil, + military action against a friendly state, or situations endangering the + lives of Americans in the region. Threats apart from Soviet forces could + include littoral states or sub-national groupings, e.g., political + terrorists dramatizing a cause.

+ +

US interests also include a peacetime + display of US concern with the political + future of the Indian Ocean area. With demilitarization, we (and the + Soviets) would forego the display of immediate military power (peacetime + presence) for this purpose. This would underline the importance of + France and the major littoral naval powers—Iran, India, Australia and + South Africa. Although it is not clearly evident that the present US and Soviet naval presence has a major + influence on the relationship between these states and their neighbors, + some littoral states might feel threatened by US and USSR withdrawal + and actively seek to increase their armaments. However, this is only one + of a variety of political and economic factors that would influence this + decision.

+

Publicly the reaction of the littoral states to US–USSR demilitarization + would be almost uniformly favorable, especially among the non-aligned + states. Some states such as Iran, Kenya, Saudi Arabia, and Indonesia + might express private concern and would require reassurance that the + US was not lessening its opposition + to the spread of Soviet influence and would remain supportive of their + interests through other means. Australian reaction would depend on the + status of Northwest Cape and the effect on our obligations under the + ANZUS treaty.Reference is to the 1951 ANZUS Treaty for a military alliance + among the United States, New Zealand, and Australia.

+

[6 lines not declassified] are on record as + supporting bilateral US–USSR arms restraint in the Indian Ocean, + but would have a direct concern in the fate of Diego Garcia. The French + would be principally concerned about the effects on their own + deployments.

+

We expect that the above political reactions would be reflected, albeit + to a lesser degree, in the subsequent, less ambitious, alternatives.

+

Pros

+

—This would be a serious step indicating our firm commitment to arms + control and disarmament. It would present the Soviet Union with the + option of either agreeing or bearing the clear responsibility for + blocking progress.

+

—It would probably be applauded by all non-aligned littoral nations.

+

—It would reduce the possibility of confrontation.

+ + +

—There are no apparent immediate military threats to our interests in the + region that require a US presence; some + could develop, however. Our influence and position in the area is + dependent on a mix of political, economic and other factors not only on + US military capability.

+

—Seventh Fleet ships now periodically deployed to the Indian Ocean would + be available for utilization elsewhere. In any emergency situation, we + normally have adequate military resources stationed in the Pacific area + to respond.

+

—The USSR would be prohibited from + developing additional basing facilities in Mozambique or elsewhere in + the area.

+

Cons

+

—By pressing for the very ambitious goal of demilitarization from the + start, we may risk losing the opportunity to conclude a meaningful arms + control agreement.

+

—This step would be a significant departure from the traditional US position favoring freedom of use of the + high seas.

+

—It would limit the political usage of the US Navy.

+

—Our friends in the region might see this as a major step towards + abandoning our interests and our commitments to them.

+

—The Soviet Union would continue to attempt to influence events in the + region and might well use surrogates to intervene, as it did in Angola, + or pressure littoral states with which it is contiguous.

+

—In a wartime situation, the USSR would + enjoy a geographical advantage for the rapid introduction of air forces + from their bases in the southern USSR.

+

—It could leave the field open for an arms race among littoral + states.

+

—A trade of Diego Garcia for Berbera would relinquish US access to a politically secure facility + in return for Soviet access to a facility that is politically + insecure.

+

—Unfriendly littoral states or terrorist groups might feel encouraged to + threaten some of our vital interests such as the free flow of oil from + the Persian Gulf.

+

—Demilitarization could result in demands that other regions be similarly + demilitarized, for instance the Mediterranean.

+

—It could mean the loss of communications stations, such as [3 lines not declassified].

+

B. + Alternative 2—Limitation of Military Presence Below + Current Levels

+

Owing to the numerous types of US and + Soviet military presence and the various ways in which presence could be + limited, limitation agreements + (either in this alternative or in a freeze, as in Alternative 3) could + take a myriad of forms. In the event the SCC chooses this approach, more detailed and complete + packages will be developed for subsequent consideration and + analysis.

+

Reductions options could become attractive for a variety of reasons:

+

—Demilitarization may be too major a step to be accomplished in one + stage. A gradual process of reductions may be necessary to achieve the + long term demilitarization objective.

+

—Demilitarization may prove unattainable. The Soviets might make some + demand that is unacceptable to us.

+

—A freeze (Alternative 3) may not be negotiable with the Soviet Union; it + might insist on some decrease in the capability of our facility on Diego + Garcia.

+

—The US may wish to go beyond a freeze + and to propose significant reductions in the US and Soviet presence while not accepting all of the costs + that would be involved in demilitarization.

+

Given that the agreement necessarily will involve reductions of some + form, both sides will seek certain objectives. For example the Soviets + could be expected to seek:

+

—To limit or prohibit deployments of US + carriers to the region.

+

—To prohibit the deployment of US + SSBN’s to the area.

+

—To limit deployment of afloat ground combat forces to eliminate or place + restrictions on US facilities in Diego + Garcia and elsewhere.

+

—To prohibit the presence of nuclear weapons in the area.

+

The US might seek to:

+

—Prevent the forward basing of Soviet aircraft to the region.

+

—Reduce or eliminate the potential submarine threat to US naval forces and SLOC’s.

+

—Establish limits on the numbers and capabilities of Soviet surface ship + deployments and their supporting infrastructure.

+

—Preclude the introduction of Soviet ground combat forces in the littoral + states.

+

Reduction options must account for many variables: ship deployments, + military facilities, military aircraft, ground combat forces, etc. Not + all of these factors would necessarily be restricted in every reduction + package. However, there is no single, obvious trade-off or series of + trade-offs for an intentively attractive package arrangement. The range + of asymmetries on virtually every aspect of present and projected super + power military presence in the Indian Ocean insures that any attempt to + negotiate a limitation agreement will be complex. For this reason + discrete packages are not presented here. But should the SCC recommend this alternative, a set of + packages will be developed.

+ +

Final selection of a limitations package will require resolution of many + of the problems discussed in Section II: (1) should limits encompass + ground based air and land forces in the interiors of littoral states; + (2) what types of surface ships should be covered and by how much should + current deployments be reduced; (3) how should military bases be + restricted; (4) should submarines be banned, included in the ship limits + or left unrestricted; (5) which types of aircraft should be limited and + to what extent; and (6) should ground forces be banned.

+

C. Alternative 3—Freeze or + Cap Near Current Level

+

Description

+

—Ship Deployments. For example, based on recent + experience, the level of naval activity could be restricted to an + average daily deployment (including auxiliaries) of 18 ships and a + combined displacement of 80,000 tons averaged over one year.

+

—Military Facilities. Both sides could continue to + utilize existing facilities in the region, but would be barred from + constructing new facilities or expanding the capabilities of current + facilities. To overcome Soviet insistence that they do not control any + facilities in the region, this limitation would also apply to the “use” + of indigenous facilities by the ships or aircraft of either party for + more than X days per year.

+

—Military Aircraft. Both sides could deploy + aircraft of current types at current levels at current bases.

+

—Ground Combat Personnel. Neither side could + introduce ground combat personnel in unit formations ashore or + afloat.

+ +

—Submarines. Submarines could be excluded from + restrictions on the grounds that they are difficult to verify, or + included in the ship deployment limits.

+

Discussion

+

This alternative represents the minimum that would be required for a + formal agreement to cap our respective military presence. [2 lines not declassified] The Soviets would + continue to have the use of facilities in Somalia. Both sides could + continue with approximately current deployment pattern. The Soviets + would probably continue to maintain more ships in the area than the + US, but our periodic task group + deployments would exceed the capabilities of Soviet forces. Our + participation in Allied naval exercises would not be affected.

+

This step would probably please those Allies, such as Australia, that + have expressed concern at the possible effects of US moves towards Indian Ocean arms control. + The moderate states which have pressed for an end to the super power + presence in the Indian Ocean might welcome this type of agreement as a + first step towards this goal. We could expect them to press for actual reductions in the great power + presence. The most radical of the states would criticize this agreement + as legitimizing the continuing great power presence in the area and we + should expect that the US would be under + continuing criticism in meetings of the non-aligned. A freeze would not + have any major effect on existing relations among the littoral + states.

+

Pros

+

—Demonstrates to the world some degree of restraint and could be the + first step toward demilitarization.

+

—Would prevent the possibility of a competitive arms race developing in + the Indian Ocean.

+

—Would permit US freedom to deploy forces + at current levels. Judicious use of the limitation on ship day/tonnage + would give us the freedom to increase our forces in the area in an + emergency situation.

+

—Would not harm our bilateral relations with the states of the Indian + Ocean littoral. We would continue to be able to cooperate militarily + with our friends and Allies.

+

Cons

+

—Even this alternative contravenes the principle of freedom of the seas + and could set a precedent that might cause us serious difficulties in + the future.

+

—Friendly states might see the agreement as a weakening of our will to + defend both our own and their interests in the region.

+ +

—If we lose access to facilities in Bahrain, the approach would result in + MIDEASTFOR remaining + permanently without a home.

+

—A freeze option may not be negotiable, given Soviet public statements + that the first step in any Indian Ocean arms control agreement must be + the elimination of US bases.

+

IV. ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES + TO INITIAL WORKING GROUP MEETING

+

This section focuses on what we hope to accomplish at the initial + meeting. Four options are presented: (1) a general exchange of views; + (2) an attempt to reach agreement on a confidence building measure; (3) + a preliminary negotiation to reach agreement on principles to guide + future negotiations; and (4) the first round of a formal + negotiation.

+

Before the meeting, it would be important to have guidance on which of + the objectives discussed in section III we seek to achieve in an initial + arms control agreement with the Soviets. But only for Option 4 would + this guidance be imperative.

+

The final choice among these options will also influence the composition + of our working group. As options 1, 2 and 3 are only preliminary steps, the working group could + consist of representatives from the various US agencies; for example the head of the working group + could be the Director of the Political-Military Bureau of the Department + of State, with representatives from ACDA, OSD, JCS, NSC + and CIA. Because Option 4 would raise + the status of the meeting to a negotiation, it might be appropriate to + appoint a special representative empowered to negotiate a formal arms + control agreement.

+

Finally, the choice among these options will govern the extent to which + we must consult with Allies and others in advance of the first meeting + (discussed in Annex B).

+

A. Option 1

+

General exchange of views concentrating on possible elements of an arms + control agreement.

+

We would view this as an exploratory meeting, avoid making any specific + proposals, but probe Soviet views on a range of issues. These might + include:

+ +

—Bilateral nature of any agreement;

+

—Definition of the geographic area to be covered;

+ +

—What types of military activities might be covered, e.g., ship + deployments, military facilities, military aircraft, submarines, ground + personnel;

+

—Verification procedures.

+

Discussion

+

At present we do not have a clear picture of Soviet views. Before + formulating our own position on the scope of an Indian Ocean arms + control agreement, we need to consider the basic elements of a package. + This approach would attempt to determine if the Soviets are seriously + interested in some form of arms limitations agreement and are not simply + posturing for propaganda purposes. By helping to ascertain the extent of + Soviet demands, this approach could also help us tailor our ultimate + package; it has the advantage of not requiring the US to delineate a specific negotiating + package at this time.

+

B. Option 2

+

General exchange of view plus US proposal + for some form of confidence building measure.

+

In addition to the discussion of elements of a possible package, the + US would propose that both sides + agree to an initial measure which would indicate they are seriously + interested in preventing military competition in the Indian Ocean.

+ +

Such a confidence building measure might entail:

+

—Pre-notification of naval transits and deployments;

+

—Agreement for advance notification of significant changes in deployment + levels;

+

—A declaration that both intend to exercise mutual restraint in their + military activities in the region;

+

—Agreement that neither side will significantly increase its forces in + the area while discussions are underway.

+

Discussion

+

Proposing agreement on a confidence building measure would be a further + test of serious Soviet interest in moving towards an arms control + agreement. Agreement on such a measure could be expressed in a + communique either at the conclusion of the working group meeting or at a + summit meeting.

+

C. Option 3

+

Seek agreement on general principles to guide future negotiations on the + specific elements of an agreement.

+

In this approach, we would indicate to the Soviets that we wish to + conclude an Indian Ocean arms control agreement. Before undertaking + detailed discussions on the elements of an agreement, we believe it best + to agree on several general principles:

+

—The purpose of the negotiations is to restrain or reduce US-Soviet military competition in the + Indian Ocean and to reduce the possibility of conflict;

+

—An agreement should not adversely affect the security interests of + either party or of the littoral states;

+

—All states should have unrestricted commercial and maritime access to + the Indian Ocean region.

+

Discussion

+

This option parallels the initial approach taken in the MBFR negotiations. It has the advantage + of setting general guidelines which we could cite to support our + position in later talks. [2 lines not + declassified] Agreement on these or other similar principles + would be essential for the ultimate success of later negotiations.

+

On the other hand it may be tactically advantageous to seek initial + discussion of the elements of a package. Agreement on general principles + could be deferred to subsequent meetings.

+

D. Option 4

+

Use this meeting as the first round of a formal negotiating process. We + would be prepared to table a draft outline of a bilateral Indian Ocean + arms control agreement. This outline would address:

+ +

—Area to be covered;

+

—Definition and scope of military activities to be covered; e.g., surface + ships, submarines, support facilities, land-based aircraft, ground + forces;

+

—Method of implementation and possible follow-on measure.

+

The substance of this outline would be the result of SCC recommendations on the objectives + discussed in Section III of this paper and further development of + detailed negotiating packages to support our objective.

+

Discussion

+

This approach has the advantage of presenting the Soviets a concrete + proposal which requires their reaction. Tactically, it avoids what might + be a lengthy, inconclusive exchange of views on various elements in a + package. It is the clearest signal we can give of what we are prepared + to achieve in the negotiating process. We would retain the + initiative.

+

On the other hand this approach would require difficult US decisions on the specific elements of an + arms control package. We would have to decide our position before any + meaningful US-Soviet discussions had + occurred. There is also the danger that this approach goes too far, too + fast, and the Soviets would conclude we were only seeking propaganda + advantage by offering a package we knew they could not accept. This + might adversely affect the chances of reaching any meaningful arms + control agreement.

+ +

Figure 1

+

ChartSecret.

+
+ +
+ 101. Memorandum From Gary Sick + and James Thomson of the National Security Council Staff to the + President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)Source: Carter Library, National + Security Council, Institutional Files, Box 85, SCC 012, 05/04/77, Indian Ocean. + Secret. Sent for action. Brackets are in the original. + + + Washington, May 2, + 1977 + + + SUBJECT + SCC Meeting on PRM/NSC–25 + +

You are chairing an SCC Meeting at + 9:30–11:00 a.m. on Wednesday, May 4, to discuss the US approach to Indian Ocean Arms Control + and to the initial working group meetings with the Soviets. The + interagency response to PRM–25 is at + Tab B.Attached; printed as Document 100. At Tab A is a briefing + paper which summarizes what we believe are the key points in the + interagency paper.Attached but not + printed.

+

Background

+

We believe that three issues should be resolved at the meeting: (1) what + are our objectives in an agreement with USSR; (2) how should we use the first working group + meetings to further those objectives; (3) how should the first meeting + be organized—that is, when will it occur and who will represent the + US.

+

Arms Control Objectives. The President has stated + that “demilitarization” is his objective. Will this be our objective for + an initial agreement with the USSR or + will we seek something less ambitious? In Section III, the PRM response suggests three alternatives: + (1) demilitarization; (2) limitations short of demilitarization; (3) a + freeze at roughly current levels. The last two alternatives could be + initial steps toward demilitarization.

+

The Initial Working Group Meeting. In Section IV, + the PRM response proposes four options + for our approach to the first meeting: (1) a general exchange of views; + (2) a general exchange of views plus some proposals for confidence + building measures (pre-announcement of deployment, etc.); (3) a + preliminary meeting to set agreed ground rules for a subsequent formal + negotiation; (4) the first round of a formal negotiation. Only for the + last option would we need a detailed arms control proposal before the + meeting; but clearly we must have a good idea of our objective before we + begin any Working Group meeting.

+ +

Organization. The PRM response proposes that, except for Option 4 above, our + working group could be chaired by the Director of Political-Military + Affairs in State (Les Gelb), + with representatives from CIA, NSC, OSD, + JCS and ACDA. It is proposed that for Option 4 (formal + negotiations), the President appoint a special representative. This + working group should have the responsibility not only for meeting the + Soviets but also for carrying out preparations for the first meeting. + The group should, therefore, be established immediately. The SCC should also discuss the date for the + first meeting that we will propose to the Soviets; this date will + determine the pace of our consultations with allies.

+

What Do We Hope to Achieve in the SCC?

+

The fundamental policy question which needs to be resolved at this time + is: Is demilitarization of the Indian Ocean a + sufficiently realistic goal to justify proceeding with concrete + proposals at this time, or should we instead regard it as a + long-term goal and focus our initial efforts at sounding out Soviet + views on various definitional issues? Once this question is + resolved, the subsidiary issues of organization and approach to the + initial meeting largely take care of themselves.

+

We have prepared two draft Presidential + DecisionsAttached but not + printed. which spell out these two alternatives in terms of + concrete proposals. PD + #1 identifies demilitarization as the eventual goal of US policy and would begin a cautious + long-term process to achieve that goal.

+

PD #1 calls for + the first Working Group meeting to be devoted to seeking Soviet views on (1) a draft mutual declaration of + restraint while discussions are in progress; and (2) a series of + proposed definitional issues which will necessarily arise in the context + of any eventual arms control agreement.

+

—PD #3 recognizes that the Soviets are + reluctant to move very fast on this issue, and it provides an + opportunity to sound them out on a number of the most controversial + elements of an arms control package.

+

—At least at the working level, this is the preferred approach of State, + Defense and ACDA.

+

—This approach sets the stage for a systematic series of discussions, + probably extending over a considerable period of time, which would seek + to define areas of mutual agreement between ourselves and the + Soviets.

+

—It would also allow time for the various bureaucracies to examine in + greater detail the potential tradeoffs involved in any arms control + agreement and to test these views against Soviet reactions at each + step.

+ +

—The proponents of this view (which include the overwhelming majority of + those who prepared the basic study) believe that complete + demilitarization of the Indian Ocean is an unrealistic near-term policy + goal: they are concerned that demilitarization will unduly restrict our + military flexibility; they believe that pushing the Soviets too hard too + fast would result in nothing but a flat rejection by the USSR and a hollow propaganda victory for + the US.

+

PD #2 takes the view + that the President is serious about his call for demilitarization of + the Indian Ocean and that the only way to achieve that objective in + view of Soviet reluctance is by making a strong initiative + ourselves.

+

—By focusing on the outcome of the negotiations and the steps required to + achieve it, the PD attempts to structure + the discussions with the USSR toward + specific objectives rather than generalized discussions of controversial + issues.

+

—This approach reflects the views of a distinct minority that the + difficulties and risks involved in complete demilitarization of the + Indian Ocean have been overstated and that it is primarily a political, + as opposed to a military problem.

+

—It is recognized, however, that there is a risk that the Soviets would + react to a comprehensive proposal of this nature as a propaganda ploy + intended to place them on the defensive and that they might reject it + out of hand. At a minimum, it would be necessary to make our initial + approach on a private and confidential basis as a working proposal, not + as an ultimatum, and indicate to the USSR that all aspects of the proposal would be + negotiable.

+

—If the Soviets agree to pursue this option, it will probably be + necessary to appoint an Ambassador to conduct the actual negotiations, + though the proposed Indian Ocean Panel should be adequate to make the + initial presentation.

+

Structure of the Meeting

+

We recommend that you begin the meeting by identifying the fundamental + policy question outlined above. The two draft PD’s have not been circulated to other + agencies. We prepared them in order to structure our own + thinking and to specify what a feasible outcome of the SCC meeting might be. However, you might + wish to summarize the main points of each + approach during your introductory remarks in order to sharpen + the focus of the meeting and to serve as the target for comments around + the table. We anticipate reactions along the following lines:

+

State/ACDA

+

—A comprehensive proposal calling for complete demilitarization is too + big a bite to take at once, and the Soviets would probably choke on + it.

+ +

—The Soviets have not been particularly forthcoming on this issue to + date, and it would be better to ease into the problem with an initial + exploration designed to elicit general areas of mutual agreement.

+

—The specific elements of a negotiating package (ship levels, bases, + aircraft, etc.) involve complex tradeoffs which should be examined in + much greater detail within the USG + before committing ourselves to a comprehensive negotiating strategy.

+

Defense/CIA(?)

+

—Our presence in the Indian Ocean relates to our overall interests in the + area and predates the Soviet presence by 20 years; we should not + relinquish our military flexibility to respond to contingencies by tying + our force presence too closely to the Soviets.

+

—Our interests revolve primarily about access to oil and support of our + defense commitments in the area (CENTO, ANZUS). We should + not risk losing our ability to defend these interests by giving up the + right to employ military forces in the region.

+

—The Soviet Union has a significant geopolitical advantage in the area + since Soviet strike aircraft can operate directly from bases in the + USSR. Demilitarization would + reduce our ability to respond to a direct Soviet threat.

+

—No arms race is currently going on in the Indian Ocean; both the US and USSR have reduced the level of their military presence over + the past two years. Demilitarization is an extreme response which is + unwarranted under the circumstances.

+

—Demilitarization would establish precedents which might be used against + us in other areas, e.g. the Mediterranean where our interests are much + greater. By agreeing to “parity” in this area, we would be leaving + ourselves open to a Soviet effort to establish naval parity world-wide, + despite our vital reliance on sea lanes for trade and the defense of our + interests—as compared to the USSR + which is essentially a land power.

+

—The structure of the Soviet military presence in the Indian Ocean is + essentially different from our own: they keep a large permanent + presence, we deploy in force only periodically; they do not have + carriers, we do; their “base” facilities in Somalia are politically + insecure, while ours are based on a 50-year agreement with the UK. Consequently, tradeoffs between the two + forces will necessarily be asymmetrical and could cause us to give up + considerably more than the Soviets with no realistic opportunity to + regain a position (e.g. access to Bahrain and Diego Garcia) once we have + relinquished it.

+

Evaluation

+

The above objections present only one side of the case:

+

—Although there is no arms race underway today, our main concern is the + possibility of a significant Soviet buildup in the not-too-distant future (i.e. missile-armed + aircraft staging from Berbera) which would face us with the choice of + significantly increasing our own force presence.

+

—Our forces for responding to such a challenge are extremely slim: two + carriers in the entire Western Pacific for the foreseeable future. + Consequently, it is in our favor to prevent a new stage of military + rivalry by stopping it before it starts. Who else is in a position to + threaten us?

+

—Although a comprehensive package is a lot for the Soviets to swallow at + once, we should remember that this is our initiative and they will be + looking to us for concrete proposals. If we do not seize the initiative, + we could bog down indefinitely trying to work out abstract definitions + with the USSR, e.g. measurement of + naval presence, what constitutes a base, etc. [This has been the fate of + all previous US studies on this + subject.]

+

—Although the interests of the US and + USSR are different, the real + question is whether our interests would be more or less secure in the + absence of Soviet forces. We cannot do anything about the geographical + position of the USSR, but we can raise + the political threshold of intervention through an agreement.

+

—The President has identified demilitarization as our goal. By proposing + a comprehensive demilitarization agreement from the beginning, we are + more likely to get a direct reading of Soviet attitudes than if we + nibble away at the edges of the problem. We could always negotiate a + less comprehensive agreement in the face of Soviet objections, but in + the meantime we would be on record in favor of a comprehensive arms + control arrangement and would keep Soviet feet to the fire.

+

—A proposal for demilitarization underlines the changes of political + attitudes of this Administration in responding to Third World concerns + and could serve to bolster our relations with these nations in other + areas.

+

Other Issues

+

The answers to the remaining questions largely flow from the discussion + above:

+

Should an interagency panel be formed under the + chairmanship of the Director of the Political-Military Bureau at + State to make the initial presentation to the USSR? We anticipate full + agreement.

+

Should our initial presentation be aimed at an + exploration of views or presentation of concrete proposals? + Depends on the answer to the fundamental issue raised above.

+

When and where should our first meeting with the USSR take place? We recommend + early June in Washington.

+
+ +
+ 102. Summary of Conclusions of a Special Coordination Committee + MeetingSource: Carter + Library, National Security Council, Institutional Files, Box 85, + SCC 012, 05/04/77, Indian + Ocean. Secret. The meeting took place in the White House Situation + Room. Brzezinski sent the + Summary of Conclusions under cover of a May 14 memorandum to + Christopher, Brown, Warnke, and Turner. Under cover of a May 12 memorandum, + Brzezinski sent it to + Carter with notes of the + meeting for his approval. Brzezinski noted in the memorandum: “The meeting + left unresolved the question of whether our basic negotiating + objective should be complete demilitarization, a reduced version of + demilitarization which would permit some deployments, or whether we + should aim for a freeze or limitation on deployments to the area.” + Carter approved both the + Summary of Conclusions and the notes. (Ibid.) + + + Washington, May 4, 1977, 9:30–10:20 + a.m. + + + SUBJECT + PRM/NSC–25, Arms Control in the Indian Ocean + + + PARTICIPANTS + + State + + Warren + Christopher + Leslie Gelb + + + + + Defense + Charles W. + Dayan + Gen. George S. + Brown, JCS + Lt. Gen. William Smith, JCS + Lynn E. Davis + + + + + CIA + Adm. Stansfield + Turner + [name not declassified] + + + + + ACDA + Paul Warnke + John + Newhouse + + + + + NSC + Dr. Zbigniew + Brzezinski + William G. Hyland + Gary Sick + James Thomson + + + +

Three basic issues were discussed:

+

1. What are the US + negotiating objectives in conducting talks with the USSR? All agreed that the + concept of demilitarization needed to be spelled out more fully. JCS and CIA felt that the paperSee + Document 100. did not + adequately identify the security risks involved, and they agreed to + provide follow-on papersFor the CIA follow-on paper, see Document 103. discussing this more + fully. It was agreed that the Working Group would conduct a more + systematic evaluation of the three options (demilitarization, + limitation, freeze), including the political and military risks and + benefits of each.

+

2. What tactics should the United States adopt in the + first meeting with the Soviets? It was agreed that the initial + talks should be of an exploratory nature. State and Defense felt that + this should be combined with the possible adoption of some + confidence-building measures. ACDA + felt that confidence-building + measures were not particularly important in the Indian Ocean context and + would prefer initial discussion of some general negotiating principles. + It was agreed that all leaned toward the first option of initial + exploratory talks, with some latitude, taking into account the + implications of confidence-building measures as possibly legitimizing + the Soviet presence in Somalia.

+

3. How will we organize our ongoing effort within the + US bureaucracy? All agreed + that a working group should be formed under the chairmanship of the + Director of the Political-Military Bureau at State. This group would + examine more fully the risks and benefits of each of the major + negotiating objectives in preparation for a subsequent SCC meeting following talks with the + Soviets in Moscow on June 8. The group should also consider the + consultative process with US allies and + other concerned nations.

+

The following issues were left unresolved:

+

—Should our negotiating objective be complete demilitarization?

+

—Should “demilitarization” be defined in some truncated fashion to permit + some US deployments to the area?

+

—Should our objective be a freeze on deployments or some form of + limitations short of demilitarization?

+

These will be considered further in the SCC after additional analysis in the Working Group and + initial discussions with the USSR.

+
+ +
+ 103. Memorandum Prepared in the Central Intelligence AgencySource: Washington National Records + Center, RG 330, OSD Files, FRC 330–80–0017, Indian Ocean 092 + (Jan–Jul) 1977, 2. Secret. Turner sent the memorandum to Dayan under a May 26 covering + memorandum. In it, Turner + noted: “At the SCC meeting on + PRM/NSC–25 on 4 May, I undertook to provide a further + assessment of risks for the President’s consideration. Here it is.” + + + + Washington, undated + + + SUBJECT + Objectives and Risks of Arms Control in the Indian Ocean + +

I. Interests and Military Presence: US and USSR

+

A. The US

+

Ensuring continued access to the oil of the Persian Gulf area for + ourselves and our allies is a vital interest to the US. The main dangers to this access lie in the possibilities + of an Arab embargo or an attempt by a hostile power, great or small, to + interdict the flow. This interest is so vital that it has been the basis + for the maintenance of military capabilities in the Indian Ocean for + possible use in this contingency.

+

The US also has an interest in ensuring + that the states in the area develop independently of external, + particularly Soviet, influence. This requires, in the military sphere, + that the US at least balance Soviet + strength.

+

Lastly, the US has an interest in being + able to influence events in the littoral nations, either to protect + American citizens or to try to counter adverse internal shifts. This + interest produces a military requirement for a visible capacity to + project power ashore, including amphibious, tactical air, and shore + bombardment capabilities.

+

In response to these requirements, the US + maintains a small naval force in the Persian Gulf and, more importantly, + deploys three or four task groups per year from the Seventh Fleet. + Overall Western strength includes small British and relatively large + French forces.

+

B. The USSR

+

The Soviet Union has no interest in the Indian Ocean of comparable + importance to the US interest in oil + supplies. Perhaps its most important interest stems from its desire to + demonstrate a global naval presence. More specifically, the area lies + near the USSR’s southern border; + through it runs an important sea route between European Russia and the + Soviet Far East; and it figures in the USSR’s rivalry with China and close relationship with + India, and its efforts to enhance its influence in the littoral + states.

+

From these interests flow a Soviet military requirement to demonstrate + presence and to be able to counter US + forces. In response to this requirement, the USSR maintains a continuous naval presence, mainly in the + northwestern part of the Indian Ocean.

+

C. Trends in Capabilities

+

Neither the US nor the USSR has been expanding its naval force + in the Indian Ocean in the last few years. Both are modernizing their + navies and, as part of that process, reducing the total of combatants. + Because of higher priorities elsewhere, neither is likely to increase + its deployments in the Indian Ocean, unless the situation changes. One + development that could substantially affect the relative military + balance in the near future would be the basing of Soviet long-range + strike aircraft in Somalia; up to now such aircraft have been sent to + the Indian Ocean only infrequently, and only from home bases in the + USSR. Basing these aircraft in + Somalia would substantially increase the USSR’s ability to conduct military operations in the area. + Another possible change is US deployment of ballistic missile + submarines to the Indian Ocean, an option that the US has held open but not exercised, since + such deployment has thus far been considered of marginal value.

+

II. Objectives and Risks of Arms Control

+

The objectives and risks to the US of + Indian Ocean arms control arrangements will depend greatly, of course, + on the specific terms of those arrangements which might range from a + freeze through partial limitations to demilitarization. In general, + however, the following objectives and risks are involved.

+

A. Possible Objectives

+

—to ensure against a US-Soviet arms race + in the region. The likelihood of such a race is not high, but even a + freeze could block the deployment of Soviet strike aircraft to Somali + bases. An agreement that excluded submarines would be militarily useful + in keeping out Soviet attack submarines, although it would foreclose the + option of US + SSBN deployments, and verification + problems would be severe.

+

—to reduce the chances of a direct military confrontation with the USSR, which is unlikely but not + impossible.

+

—to block or impede future Soviet possibilities of acquiring bases or + rights to facilities, e.g. in Mozambique (see map for facilities now + used by the US and the USSR).Not + found.

+

—to contribute to the general US goal of + arms control and reduction.

+

An agreement would please certain littoral states that want to constrain + or exclude superpower presence. India in particular professes this view, + probably because it would see its relative power enhanced thereby.

+

B. Risks

+

The most important risk of arms control arrangements is that, depending + on the degree of limitation, they would tend to reduce or eliminate + US military capabilities to bring + military power to bear in situations where vital national interests are + involved. Chief among these interests is oil supplies, which could be + threatened by a producer embargo, third parties, or, less likely, Soviet + action. A less critical but more probable case would be the protection + of US nationals or property within any + of the countries in the area, e.g. Uganda, from hostile actions by the + local government or terrorist groups. For these purposes, the US now has capabilities not only for combat + at sea but also for the projection of power ashore; the USSR presently lacks the latter + capability. Even if arms + control arrangements included an escape clause, they would still + increase the political obstacles to our threatened or actual use of + force in any but the gravest of crises.

+

Arms control in the Indian Ocean might also give the impression of a + US withdrawal of interest and + commitment from Asia and Africa, supplementing in this respect + impressions created by the US withdrawal + from Vietnam, withdrawal of ground forces from South Korea, and inaction + in Angola. This perception would dismay certain littoral states that + look to the US for support or + understanding, such as Australia, Pakistan, the Gulf states, and South + Africa.

+

Such arrangements might set troublesome precedents concerning freedom of + the seas and arms control in more vital areas like the + Mediterranean.

+

In general, these factors suggest that, given the disparity of interests + and capabilities, a Soviet-US + arrangement based on parity would have an unequal impact. The US and Western need for secure access to + oil is so tangible and crucial that reductions in military capabilities + would put a vital Western interest at risk to a degree not paralleled on + the Soviet side. These effects would increase with the severity of the + arms control constraints. In addition, the analysis suggests that many + of the objectives are political in nature and could be served, in some + degree, by limited measures, whereas many of the risks are military in + nature and would be least if these measures were limited. Furthermore, + arms control in the Indian Ocean would have little or no effect upon the + major Soviet instrument for advancing its interests in littoral states, + namely, military assistance to revolutionary movements or + communist-leaning governments.

+
+ +
+ 104. Memorandum From Gary Sick + and James Thomson of the National Security Council Staff to the + President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)Source: Carter Library, National + Security Affairs, Staff Material, Middle East, Subject File, Box 25, + Indian Ocean: SCC 6/14/77 on Arms + Limitation (PRM–25): 6/77. Secret. + Sent for action. All brackets except those that indicate text not + declassified are in the original. + + + Washington, June 11, + 1977 + + + SUBJECT + SCC Meeting on Indian + Ocean—Tuesday, June 14, 1977 at 9:30 a.m. + +

At its earlier meeting, the SCC + recommended our initial approach to the USSR on Indian Ocean arms control would be exploratory in + nature.See Document + 102. Based on that guidance, the State-chaired + Working Group has prepared a strategy paper for the initial June 22 + meeting with the Soviets. The paper (without backup position papers) is + at Tab B.Attached but not printed is the + undated paper entitled “First Meeting of US–USSR Indian Ocean + Working Group: Strategy and Objectives.”

+

Your two main objectives in this meeting are:

+

1. To review the strategy paper, highlighting the + key decisions taken by the Working Group, and to get + SCC approval or + modification on the paper as an agreed approach which the delegation + will adopt in Moscow.

+

2. To consider possible Soviet strategies, + including the possibility that they might try to seize the initiative on + this issue, and what we can do to forestall it.

+

In addition:

+

3. You will want to invite State at some point to brief the SCC on the results of the consultations with allies which have taken place + thus far.

+

4. You will want to ask Mr. Warnke to give a brief rundown on the composition of the delegation and any problems he foresees as + Chairman.

+

Tactics

+

We anticipate very little controversy. Each of the agencies has been over + this ground thoroughly at the working level, and there are very few + points of dispute. We see discussion focusing chiefly on the two main + objectives above, with some time at the end devoted to the two secondary + objectives.

+ +

We suggest that you open the meeting with a brief review of the strategy paper, stressing the key decision + points, and then ask for comments, starting with State.

+

—The SCC meeting of May 4 examined the + response to PRM–25 on the Indian + Ocean.See Document + 100. It was decided that we should defer a decision + on our ultimate objective (demilitarization or some form of limitations + short of demilitarization) and that our initial approach to the Soviets + should be exploratory in nature. We would then address the issue of + ultimate objectives after the initial meeting with the Soviets.

+

—Since then, the Working Group, chaired by PM (Reggie + Bartholomew, Gelb’s deputy), has prepared a strategy paper with backup + position papers for use in Moscow next week (June 22).

+

—The paper is a little thin on substance, but that was inevitable since + we decided to keep the first meeting exploratory.

+

—Nevertheless, in order to have something to say in Moscow, the Working + Group made a few key decisions, which need to be identified and + considered:

+

(1) The talks would be bilateral only. We will + resist any Soviet attempt to include discussion of the British or French + presence in the Indian Ocean or any attempt to divert the discussions + into multilateral channels involving the littoral states or the UN Ad Hoc Committee on the Indian + Ocean.

+

(2) We plan to raise only three substantive elements, which would + ultimately be addressed in any agreement: definition of the area; naval + ship deployments; and naval facilities. The paper recommends that we not + raise the issues of land-based strike aircraft and + ground combat forces, although we would be willing to take them + up later if raised by the Soviets. This is probably the most far-reaching decision in the paper, since + everyone agrees that Soviet introduction of strike aircraft is the + single event most likely to upset the military balance in the Indian + Ocean. [If there is no contention on this issue, you may want to raise + it yourself during the discussion. Our evaluation of the problem is at + Tab A.]Attached but not printed is the + undated paper entitled “Ground and Air Forces.”

+

(3) We plan to table no draft agreements at this + meeting, and if the Soviets should present a draft or raise the + possibility of a mutual declaration of restraint, we would take it under + advisement with the understanding that any agreement should be preceded + by substantive discussion of the various elements of a possible arms + limitation agreement.

+ +

Although the paper concludes that we should propose only preliminary + views on substantive elements, it was nevertheless necessary to make + some specific choices:

+

(4) On definition of the area, the paper recommends that we propose the + exclusion of the confrontation countries in the + Middle East (Egypt, Israel and Jordan) from the Indian Ocean + question. However, it intentionally avoids spelling out just how this + could be accomplished. At this point we are primarily interested in + getting Soviet approval of the basic principle, not for specific + language or concrete solutions. [See map next page.]Not found.

+

(5) On limitations of naval ship deployments, the paper recommends that + we propose ship-days as the measure of naval + presence to be limited, since that is the measure most favorable to us. + However, we are willing to consider a mix of ship-days + and tonnage (less favorable to us) as a measure if the Soviets + reject ship-days as anticipated.

+

(6) [1 paragraph (9 lines) not declassified]

+

—Having reviewed these points you could invite comments on the points you + have raised or other comments on the strategy paper.

+

The second general topic for discussion is the + possible Soviet strategy and how we can prepare for it.

+

—The Soviets have nominated a very senior diplomat, Mendelevich, as the + leader of their delegation, assisted by the Deputy Commander of the + Soviet Navy, Admiral Amel’ko. [Bios at Tab C]Attached but not printed. Moreover, + Dobrynin suggested reserving + two weeks for the talks, whereas we are thinking of two or three + days.

+

—Is this merely standard operating procedure by the Soviets, who have + nominated high level delegations for other working groups and who tend + to proceed rather leisurely with such meetings, or should we see this as + a signal that they may intend to seize the initiative by tabling a + formal proposal of their own as they did at the opening of the formal + MBFR talks?

+

—We could take some of the steam out of a possible Soviet attempt to + preempt us by telling them in advance that we see these initial talks as + a necessary exchange of views on the fundamental elements of a possible + arms control agreement and that we believe such an exchange is necessary + before getting into formal negotiations or actual drafting of + agreements. We could either relay this to the Soviet Embassy here or + through our Embassy in Moscow. At the same time, we could propose an + agenda for the discussions on the basis of our strategy paper. [We expect no controversy on + this point, and if approved, the Working Group can have an agreed paper + by COB after the meeting.]

+

—The Soviets may also attempt to embarrass us during the meeting by + drawing attention to the relative disparity of US and Soviet forces in the Indian Ocean at the present + time. The Soviets may have deliberately drawn down their forces in + anticipation of the talks. At the present time they have one diesel submarine and two surface combatants + (light frigates with no missile armament) in the area. They would + normally have one heavy combatant with missile armament in addition to + this. They have a minesweeper and an LST, and one missile patrol boat is under tow on an + apparent transfer to the Pacific Fleet. With support ships, their total presence is 14 ships, as opposed to the + normal 20. They have two IL–38s deployed to Somalia.

+

—The US presence includes the two + destroyers and the flagship of Middle East Force plus a task force from + the Pacific composed of a guided missile cruiser, a destroyer, a frigate + and an oiler. P–3 flights are being conducted from Diego Garcia in + support of the task group. The presence of the task group was planned + more than a year ago and is a routine part of our periodic deployment + pattern. However, it means that our combatant ship + presence will be far higher than the Soviets when we meet in + Moscow.

+

—In addition, on June 22 the Air Force will have just completed a bilateral air exercise with the Iranians which + involved 18 F–14s deploying from Europe, air-to-air refueling by US and Iranian tankers, and 170 sorties in + Iran, including dropping of live ordnance. [This exercise was considered + “non-significant” by the JCS and we + learned about it only a few days before it began, when cancellation + would have caused extreme embarassment with the Iranians. The NSC Staff is currently reexamining the + exercise notification NSAM as a direct result of this.]

+

—We should watch the Soviet presence carefully, and if + they maintain a low level, we should consider reducing the level of + our own deployments as a tacit demonstration of restraint. + However, we should expect to take some propaganda lumps in Moscow on + this issue.

+

With the two main topics complete, you could then conclude the meeting by + asking State to review the results of consultations with allies and asking Paul Warnke to discuss the composition of the delegation [i.e. do we have an + Admiral to match their Admiral?] and any problems he foresees in the + talks.

+
+ +
+ 105. Summary of Conclusions of a Special Coordination Committee + MeetingSource: Carter + Library, National Security Council, Institutional Files, Box 86, + SCC 016, 6/14/77, Indian Ocean. + Secret. The meeting took place in the White House Situation Room. + Brzezinski sent the + Summary of Conclusions to Mondale, Vance, Brown, + Warnke, and Turner under a June 17 memorandum + that indicated Carter had + seen and approved it. Brzezinski also attached a tentative schedule for a + 3-year phased program of Indian Ocean demilitarization, indicating + that it was prepared by the NSC + Staff and approved by Carter. (Ibid.) + + + Washington, June 14, 1977, 9:30–10:45 + a.m. + + + SUBJECT + Indian Ocean + + + PARTICIPANTS + + State + Warren + Christopher + Reginald + Bartholomew + + + + + Defense + Charles W. Dayan + Lynn Davis + Lt. General William Smith (JCS) + Admiral Thomas Hayward (JCS) + + + ACDA + Paul Warnke + John + Newhouse + + + + + NSC + Zbigniew + Brzezinski + Gary Sick + James Thomson + + + + CIA + Robert Bowie + + + +

In preparation for the departure of the U.S. delegation for discussions + in Moscow with the Soviets on Indian Ocean arms limitations for June 22, + 1977,See Document + 108. the SCC + reviewed the following issues:

+

1. Aims. There was significant disagreement about + our objectives in these talks with the Soviets. State, Defense, ACDA, and the JCS all indicated their belief that our objective should be + to keep the situation about where it is today. They noted that the + President continues to use the word “demilitarization” and they felt + that demilitarization would work to our disadvantage, because we have + more to lose than the Soviets. Dr. Brzezinski noted that U.S. policy as stated by the + President is demilitarization, and that necessarily involves more than + simply freezing the situation where it is now. Dr. Brzezinski suggested that + stabilization of the status quo could be a first step involving + significant reductions. If there is serious dissent with this policy, it + should be registered formally for the President to consider.

+ +

2. Scope of Moscow Talks. There was no + disagreement that these initial talks would be exploratory in nature. + However, there was a lack of consensus on precisely what should be + raised with the Soviets.

+

—Should the U.S. raise the question of limiting strike aircraft and + deployment of ground combat forces into the area? All agreed that the + possible introduction of strike aircraft by the USSR would be the single event most + likely to upset the military balance. However, most agencies argued that + the present situation is favorable to us, and discussion of this issue + could lead to expansion of the definition of the area to include + land-based facilities, it could require us to give up carrier + deployments in exchange, and it could complicate our participation in + exercises with our allies in the region. On the other hand, Dr. + Brzezinski argued, the + question of support facilities must be discussed and that will + necessarily lead to a discussion of airfields and land-based air.

+

—Should we indicate a willingness to give up Diego Garcia as part of + demilitarization? Most of the participants (and the allies we have + consulted) felt that the exchange of Diego Garcia for an insecure base + at Berbera would be a poor trade. It was suggested that we not foreclose + the possibility of giving up Diego Garcia but leave the question open to + see how the negotiations proceed.

+

—How do we respond to a Soviet question about what we mean by + “demilitarization” ? It was suggested that we explain to the Soviets + that we see these talks as a dynamic process, starting with some of the + basic or less controversial issues and gradually expanding to cover + other areas. Demilitarization would represent the end of the process and + would involve at least significant reductions in U.S. and Soviet + military presence in the region, though probably not an end to all + military activities by littoral states.

+
+ +
+ 106. Memorandum for the RecordSource: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, + Staff Material, Middle East, Subject File, Box 25, Indian Ocean: + SCC 8/24/77, 8/77. Top Secret. + The meeting took place in the Oval Office. + + + Washington, June 17, 1977, 11–11:20 + a.m. + + + SUBJECT + Meeting with the President on Indian Ocean Arms Control + + + PARTICIPANTS + The President + Paul Warnke, Director + ACDA + Zbigniew Brzezinski + Gary Sick + +

The President asked Mr. Warnke for a progress report on the + CTB negotiations with the Soviets.Reference + is to negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union + aimed at an agreement on a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. The + Partial Test Ban Treaty, signed in 1963, banned testing in the + atmosphere, under water, and in space. He noted that his + “most important” objective in the foreign policy field was to overcome + the perception that he had failed to produce movement toward agreements + with the Soviet Union and that detente was being undermined.

+

Mr. Warnke + asked for the President’s views on what we should attempt to achieve in + our meetings with Soviets. The President said he + was uncertain about exactly what would come out of the talks, but he + felt that we should work for a freeze of the present situation at least + and seek Soviet views about whether some retrogression in military force + presence would be possible. He would be willing to accept + pre-notification of naval visits to the Indian Ocean. Dr. Brzezinski noted + that the President had initialled the notes of the SCC meeting of June 14See Document 105. + and that those notes would provide written guidance for the talks in + Moscow. The President agreed and indicated that + it was his understanding that the US + military had no objection to a freeze of the present situation. All + agreed, though Dr. Brzezinski noted that the JCS objected to the word “freeze” and + would prefer “hold” or “stabilization.” Mr. Warnke said the JCS would prefer to use annual averages of + ship-days in order to be able to mass forces in the event of a + crisis.

+

The President indicated that he believed Diego + Garcia was of minimal strategic importance. However, before we give it + away he would like to know what the quid will be + on the Soviet side. Mr. Warnke + mentioned that some believe the Soviets may propose a trade of Berbera + for Diego Garcia, since + their presence in Berbera is now rather tenuous, and this would be an + uneven exchange. The President suggested that we + might agree that there are some weapons which will not be sent to Diego + Garcia.

+

Commander Sick noted that the greatest threat to the military + balance in the Indian Ocean was the prospect of Soviet introduction of + land-based strike aircraft. The Soviets have built an airfield and + missile facility at Berbera capable of handling such aircraft, though it + has not been used for that purpose to date. It would be useful if a + freeze could be defined to include strike aircraft. The President agreed. Mr. Warnke pointed out that this + might require us to accept restrictions on carrier deployments. Dr. Brzezinski noted that any complete withdrawal of + military forces by the US and USSR would require us to withdraw more + than the Soviets. However, we would be left in a better position in the + end than the Soviets because of our friends in the area. The President agreed, noting that Australia, Iran + and even India were basically friendly to us rather than the + Soviets.

+

[4 lines not declassified] The + President suggested that we might be able to agree on an + exclusion for communications. He would have no objection to Soviet + communications, and since we want to continue to be able to send US ships through the Indian Ocean, we + should be able to communicate with them.

+
+ +
+ 107. Memorandum of ConversationSource: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, + Staff Material, Middle East, Subject File, Box 23, Indian Ocean: + 1–12/77. Secret; Sensitive. The meeting took place in the White + House Cabinet Room. + + + Washington, June 22, 1977, noon + + + PARTICIPANTS + + U.S. + President Jimmy + Carter + Secretary of State Cyrus + Vance + Zbigniew + Brzezinski, Assistant to the President for + National Security Affairs + Philip Alston, + U.S. Ambassador to Australia + Jody Powell, Press + Secretary + Richard Holbrooke, + Assistant Secretary of State for East Asia and Pacific + Affairs + Michael Armacost, + NSC Staff Member + + + + + Australia + Prime Minister J. Malcolm + Fraser + Foreign Minister Andrew + Peacock + Alan Philip + Renouf, Australian Ambassador to the U.S. + A.T. Carmody, Secretary, Department of the Prime Minister + and Cabinet + Sir Arthur Tange, Secretary, Department of Defense + N.F. Parkinson, Secretary, Department of Foreign + Affairs + David Barnett, Press Secretary + + +

President Carter: I would like to repeat what I said + during the arrival ceremony about my gratitude to you for visiting the + United States, and to affirm the importance of our historical ties. In + all my travels, Australia has been one nation about whom I never have + heard an adverse word. As an old submariner, I might add that I know how + much our naval officers loved to stop off in your country. I regret that + I never had the chance, but I hope to.

+

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to the Indian Ocean.]

+

President Carter: There is one other issue we might + discuss before lunch; namely, the Indian Ocean. We are meeting with the + Soviet Union now in Moscow on this question. Paul Warnke’s instructions are to go + no further than to stabilize the current situation before going on to + consider any mutual reductions.An unknown + hand underlined this sentence beginning with “to go no further” to + the end and drew a vertical line in the right-hand margin to + highlight the paragraph. We would hate to see the Soviets + build up their naval strength in the Indian Ocean. For example, we don’t + want them to introduce attack aircraft into the region. This is a + subject we don’t know very well yet. We will be cautious in our + discussions with the Soviets. We will take your views into account in + formulating our policy.

+

Prime Minister Fraser: As you know, we are opposed to any arms + race in the Indian Ocean. But we are also against any arrangements that + would leave the USSR in a dominant + position. We want close consultations with you on this subject. Beyond + this, we are anxious to avoid any arrangements which might conceivably + make it difficult for you to exercise your obligations under the ANZUS Treaty as a result of an Indian + Ocean arms control agreement with the Soviet Union.

+

As I understand it, the French are actively engaged in the Indian Ocean + and interested in this subject. Are their deployments in the Indian + Ocean to be considered separately?

+

President Carter: I discussed this question with + Giscard. In recent + correspondence I suggested that he might wish to raise this issue with + Brezhnev. I have no + inclination to advise him, but it is a relevant subject for their + discussion. Incidentally, the other question I raised was the + comprehensive test ban. In any event I can assure you that we will be + adequately cautious in our + dealings with the Russians on this issue and we will see that we go over + the precise language of any agreement with you before anything is + signed.An unknown hand underlined this + sentence beginning with “we will be adequately” to the + end.

+

Over the past four years, the Soviets have been making progress with + propaganda ploys on disarmament, Indian Oceans arms control, and human + rights in the past. We have tried to take these issues away from them in + a sincere way. When Cy Vance + went to Moscow in March, we agreed to discuss this and a number of other + issues with them seriously and we agreed to meet them halfway.See footnote 2, + Document 99. We don’t know precisely what Soviet + motivations are in raising Indian Ocean arms limitation.An unknown hand drew parentheses in the left- and + right-hand margins next to this sentence.

+

Prime Minister Fraser: There is no great difference between us + on this question, provided we consult closely.

+

Zbigniew + Brzezinski: Generally, I believe it is better + not to get the French involved in these discussions, because the Soviets + in that case would wish a trade-off between themselves and all others. It would be better for the trade-off + to be strictly between these two major powers.

+

Secretary Vance: We will have a much better feel for this + question after this week of talks. The Soviets have a very competent man + heading their delegation.

+

Zbigniew + Brzezinski: For starters, they have described + Berbera as a “watering spot”.

+

Prime Minister Fraser: The Soviet Ambassador in Canberra told + me that Berbera did not even exist.

+

President Carter: The Somalians have also said this. We + have great concern about the entire Horn area of Africa. The situation + there is apparently deteriorating. The Yugoslavs enjoy constructive ties + with Ethiopia, and have been quite helpful. But the most hopeful change + in recent months has been the more assertive and more constructive + attitudes taken by the Saudis. They obviously have a great stake in + peace, since in any serious disturbance they stand to lose the most. + They have been very cooperative.

+

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to the Indian Ocean.]

+
+ +
+ 108. Memorandum From Gary Sick + of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for + National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, + Middle East, Subject File, Box 26, Indian Ocean Talks: Round I + Moscow: 6–7/77. Secret. Sent for information. Brzezinski wrote “good ZB” at the top of the + page. + + + Washington, June 29, + 1977 + + + SUBJECT + Indian Ocean Talks + +

We had five meetings with the Soviet delegation, including one restricted + session in the office of Ambassador Mendelevich which lasted more than + five hours and involved a comprehensive review of every significant + issue.The discussions with the Soviets + took place in Moscow June 22–27. The initial session on June 22 was + summarized in telegram 8997 from Moscow, June 22. (National + Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770223–0299) The + second meeting, a restricted session held June 23, was summarized in + telegram 9055 from Moscow, June 23. (National Archives, RG 59, + Central Foreign Policy File, D770225–0144) Telegram 9157 from + Moscow, June 25, summarized the third meeting, and telegram 157305 + to USUN, July 7, summarized the + fourth and fifth sessions. (National Archives, RG 59, Central + Foreign Policy File, D770228–0235 and D770240–0999, respectively) + Telegram 156073 to Moscow, July 5, covered Warnke’s June 27 briefing to the + North Atlantic Council on the negotiations. (National Archives, RG + 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770238–1287) In each case, + the meetings were positive in tone and conducted in a serious, + businesslike manner without polemics. Ambassador Mendelevich, who has + been the Soviet Deputy Permanent Representative at the UN and the chief negotiator for CSCE, has been assigned full-time to the Indian Ocean negotiations. The apparent + relish with which he approached his task belies the earlier report that + this assignment may have been a punishment for his performance at CSCE. He was meticulously prepared, and + the voluminous notes to which he referred had been written out in his + own hand.

+

The initial Soviet suggestion that the talks last two weeks was clearly a + measure of the importance they ascribe to these talks, as well as a + practical evaluation of the volume of material to be covered (it was a + frantic week). They were miffed at our insistence that the talks be + limited to a single week, and the experienced Soviet-watchers in the + delegation detected evidence of their pique in small gestures, e.g. as + the lack of refreshments at the circus and ballet and a poorly organized + and lunchless trip to the countryside. (The signals were totally lost on + the rest of us, who considered the hospitality lavish.)

+

There was substantial agreement on a number of issues and technical + questions, including the bilateral nature of these talks, their confidentiality, coordination on any + report to the UN, possible + prenotification, need to preserve freedom of navigation and scientific + activities, the nature of transits, and the definition of ship-days and + ton-days as possible measures of naval presence. Differences were + greater on the definition of the area (the Soviets want to include the + waters north and south of Australia), what type of ships should be + included as auxiliaries, and whether support facilities can be defined + in terms of usage. On the latter point, the Soviets insisted that + control of a base was the key factor and minimized their usage of + Berbera to such a degree that Mr. Warnke was led to remark that he was happy to learn that + Berbera was used only for “rest and recreation for tired + fishermen.”Brzezinski placed a vertical line in the left-hand + margin next to this sentence beginning with “such a degree” to the + end.

+

Soviet Position

+

The Soviet position as presented in the course of the talks can be + summarized as follows:

+

—Both the US and USSR have legitimate interests in the + Indian Ocean, theirs to protect the transit route connecting the eastern + and western USSR, ours to protect the + oil shipping lanes.

+

—However, the US presence today (attack + carriers) exceeds our legitimate needs, and we appear to be laying the + groundwork for the deployment of strategic forces (B–52 bombers and + SSBNs) into the Indian Ocean which could directly threaten the USSR.

+

—The asymmetries in the US–USSR position in the Indian Ocean favor + the US in four ways: (1) Our strategic + forces can strike the USSR from there, + while the reverse is not true; (2) We have operational control over our + base (Diego Garcia) while they must rely on facilities which belong to + other nations (Berbera); (3) The US has + forces and access to facilities in areas adjacent to the Indian Ocean + (Subic Bay and Simonstown) which permit rapid buildup of a military + presence, while Soviet bases are “thousands of miles away;” and (4) The + US has allies (France and the UK) which operate military forces in the + Indian Ocean, while the USSR has + none.

+

—Consequently, they strongly implied that the US should be prepared to give up more than the USSR in any agreement, specifically: (1) + Dismantle all bases as a first step; (2) Ban outright the deployment of + carriers, SSBNs and strategic bombers; and (3) “Take into account” the + presence of our allies and adjacent facilities, presumably by accepting + deeper cuts in force presence than the Soviets.

+

Mendelevich made it clear that he was aware of the maximalist nature of + this position and he indicated a willingness to exercise flexibility in seeking an agreement. + For example, on the demand that the US + unilaterally dismantle Diego Garcia as a first step, he commented: “I + realize that is not what you have in mind, and we will give your + statement careful consideration.”

+

Elements of a Possible Agreement

+

The basic Soviet objective in these talks is to prohibit the deployment + of “strategic” US systems (Carriers, + SSBNs and B–52s). In return, they are prepared to accept some + limitations on their own force levels and on usage of regional + facilities, e.g. Berbera.

+

The key issue which will have to be addressed in the September + meetingBrzezinski underlined the words “in the September + meeting.” with the Soviets (whether here or in Moscow) will + be what is meant by “stabilization.” In particular, the Soviets will + want to know whether stabilization will mean stopping the runway + expansion on Diego Garcia and whether “strategic” systems will be + prohibited.

+

My own view (which is not widely shared at State, DoD or ACDA),Brzezinski underlined + the words “My own” and “not widely shared.” is that we have + the ingredients for an effective package which could meet most of the + Soviet concerns while significantly limiting Soviet military + capabilities in the Indian Ocean for now and the future. This package + would be composed of three interrelated elements:

+

1. A ban on all submarine deployments to the + Indian Ocean except for transits. We would give up a future option of + deploying SSBNs while the Soviets would give up an integral part of + their naval presence (submarines) which constitute a significant + potential threat to our sea lanes.

+

2. A ban on deployment of all land-based strike aircraft involving + flights over the waters of the Indian Ocean. We would give up the future + option of B–52 deployments (and exercise deployments of combat aircraft + to Iran) while they would give up the option of missile-armed strike + aircraft to support their naval forces.

+

3. Limits on at least combatant naval deployments by both sides at + approximately the level of 1976, expressed in a combination of ship-days + and ton-days, and limitations on the use of support facilities.

+

We would insist on retaining the right to deploy carriers, but might + accept a fall-back position that we would not send carriers into the + Persian Gulf (where the aircraft could reach the USSR).

+

Next Steps

+

The Working Group should analyze the results of the Moscow talks and + prepare specific options for US strategy + and objectives, to be considered by the SCC in the second + half of July.Brzezinski underlined the words “second half of + July.” The choices in that meeting are likely to revolve + about a “high” option, consisting of a US initiative such as I have outlined above, and a “low” + option, which would either attempt to negotiate a generalized + declaration of mutual restraint or simply to focus on technical data at + the next meeting, responding to whatever the USSR may propose.Brzezinski drew a vertical line in + the right-hand margin next to this entire paragraph.

+

In any event, I believe no action should be taken until + Mr. Warnke has had an + opportunity to report his own impressions of the Moscow talks to the + President.Inderfurth added a handwritten + note following this last paragraph: “Gary is going to prepare a + brief summary of this report for possible inclusion in this + week’s W[eekly] R[eport]. Rick.”

+
+ +
+ 109. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security + Affairs (Brzezinski) to + President CarterSource: Carter Library, National + Security Council, Institutional Files, Box 86, SCC 016, 6/14/77, Indian Ocean. + Secret. Sent for action. Carter wrote at the top of the page: “Zbig & + Paul. Keep our negotiation positions highly confidential. I see good + prospect for a good agreement—even if we have to yield on a few + points. I don’t want this yielding to be the + news—J.C.” + + + Washington, July 11, + 1977 + + + SUBJECT + Meeting with Paul + Warnke + +

You are scheduled to meet with Paul + Warnke at 1:00 p.m. on Monday, July 11, 1977, for 15 + minutes to discuss the results of the Moscow talks on the Indian Ocean. + Other participants in the meeting will be myself and Gary Sick, who was the NSC representative at the talks.

+

Mr. Warnke requested the meeting + as an expression of continued high-level U.S. interest in these talks. + He suggested a brief statement from you indicating your satisfaction in + the serious character of the initial talks. A draft announcement is attached.Attached but not printed. The draft noted that + Warnke had met with + Carter to report the + results of the discussions: “The President expressed his + satisfaction that these initial talks were conducted in a serious + atmosphere, without polemics, and he was encouraged at the prospects + of working out an arms control arrangement in the Indian Ocean which + would recognize the legitimate interests of both parties while + avoiding an escalating arms race in the region.” Mr. + Warnke also intends to raise + with you the comprehensive test ban talks which will resume shortly in + Geneva. A proposed letter of instructions on the CTB talks is being + forwarded to you under a separate memo.Not + found. An unknown hand wrote “Done by D.A. [David Aaron]” in the right-hand + margin next to this paragraph.

+

The Moscow talks succeeded in defining more clearly the nature of the + tradeoffs which would be required for any U.S.-Soviet agreement on the + Indian Ocean. Essentially, the Soviets want us to forego certain + strategic options (deployment of SSBN’s, strategic bombers and carriers which could attack + Soviet territory). In return, they are prepared to accept restrictions + on their own naval activities. In addition, they will press us to “take + into account” the presence of allied forces and base facilities adjacent + to the Indian Ocean in setting limitations on our own forces.

+

The elements of a bargain are there: (1) a ban on all submarine deployments; (2) A ban on the operation of all + land-based strike aircraft in the Indian Ocean area; (3) A freeze on + surface ship deployments and use of regional support facilities at + approximately the level of 1976. This arrangement would respond to + Soviet concerns about deployment of strategic systems while placing + severe limitations on their own naval capabilities in the area by + depriving them of air cover and submarine support. Both sides would pay + a price, but the prospects of an escalating arms race in the region + would be significantly reduced.

+

On the other hand, PRM–10,PRM 10, + “Comprehensive Net Assessment and Military Force Posture Review,” + issued February 18, is scheduled for publication in Foreign + Relations, 1977–1980, vol. IV, National Security + Policy. our net assessment, has identified the + Persian Gulf as being a primary U.S. interest and a potential conflict + area in which the Soviet Union would enjoy considerable advantages + because of its geographic proximity. Moreover, the Soviet focus on our + SSBN’s raises questions as to why + they would wish to circumscribe our options to maintain SSBN survivability. Each of these issues + deserves careful consideration.Carter and Warnke met from 1 to 1:25 p.m. + Mondale, Aaron, and Sick also attended. (Carter + Library, Presidential Materials, President’s Daily Diary)

+
+ +
+ 110. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security + Affairs (Brzezinski)Source: Carter Library, National + Security Affairs, Staff Material, Middle East, Subject File, Box 23, + Indian Ocean: 1–12/77. Secret. + + + Washington, July 14, + 1977 + + + MEMORANDUM FOR + The Secretary of State + The Secretary of Defense + The Director, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency + + + ALSO + The Chairman, Joint Cheifs of Staff + The Director of Central Intelligence + + + SUBJECT + Indian Ocean: Next Steps + +

The President has discussed with Mr. Warnke the results of the initial Indian Ocean talks in + Moscow, June 22–27.See Documents 108 and 109. + The President expressed his satisfaction with the seriousness shown by + the Soviets and his encouragement at the prospect for further progress + on arms control arrangements in this area.

+

The President has directed that the SCC + proceed to develop a proposal on Indian Ocean arms control which can be + presented to the Soviets in September. The Indian Ocean working group, + under the chairmanship of the Department of State, should prepare a + discussion paper outlining alternative proposals which the United States + could table in September. This paper should concisely identify in each + case the elements of a U.S. presentation to the Soviets, consider the + likely Soviet response, and discuss fully the potential risks and + benefits of each approach in terms of its ramifications for U.S. + political and security interests.

+

The paper should be available for the NSC Staff for distribution no later than August 1 for an + SCC meeting tentatively scheduled + for August 4, 1977.The SCC met on August 24 to discuss Indian + Ocean arms control. See Document + 111.

+ + Zbigniew + Brzezinski + +
+ +
+ 111. Summary of Conclusions of a Meeting of the Special Coordination + CommitteeSource: Carter + Library, National Security Council, Institutional Files, Box 88, + SCC 026, 8/24/77, Indian Ocean. + Top Secret. The meeting took place in the White House Situation + Room. The minutes are not attached and were not found. Sick sent the Summary of + Conclusions to Brzezinski + under an August 25 memorandum. (Ibid.) Papers prepared for the + meeting are ibid. + + + Washington, August 24, 1977, 9–10:05 + a.m. + + + SUBJECT + Indian Ocean Arms Control + + + PARTICIPANTS + + State + Warren + Christopher + Reginald + Bartholomew + + + + + Defense + Harold Brown + Lynn E. Davis + + + + + JCS + General George + Brown + Vice Admiral Patrick Hannifin + + + ACDA + Paul Warnke + John Twombly + + + + NSC + Zbigniew + Brzezinski (Chairman) + Gary Sick + (notetaker) + James Thomson + + + + + CIA + Admiral Stansfield + Turner + Robert Bowie + + +

The purpose of the meeting was to define more precisely the U.S. position + to be presented to the Soviets in the next round of Indian Ocean talks. + The following issues were discussed:

+

Objectives. All agreed that our arms limitations + objectives in the Indian Ocean remain as they were stated in our opening + position to the Soviets in Moscow, i.e., that the process is aimed in + the first instance at stabilizing the present level of U.S. and Soviet + military presence in the Indian Ocean and, if that is achieved, to + further consider reductions. General Brown stressed the importance of being able to bring our + forces to bear in the Persian Gulf or other trouble spots in the + future.

+

Working Group Recommendations. The SCC endorsed recommendations by the + Working Group that: (1) the U.S. will not raise the question of possible + limitations on ground combat forces in the next round with the Soviets; + (2) the U.S. will not agree to compensate the USSR for the presence of our allies in the area or for + bases in adjacent areas; and (3) the U.S. will not agree to ban aircraft + carrier operations in the Indian Ocean. The Working Group was further + instructed to continue its work on definition of the geographic area, on the possible exchange of + information with the Soviets, and on a definition of transits.

+

Types of Surface Ships. All agreed that combatants + and auxiliaries would be counted, in separate categories, for purposes + of limitations, subject to the development and acceptance of a + definition of auxiliaries. The Working Group was instructed to develop + such a definition.

+

Levels of Surface Ship Presence. All agreed that + the Working Group should reexamine the entire question of numerical + limits more systematically for consideration at the next meeting.

+

Submarines. No agreement was reached on how + submarines should be handled in the context of an arms limitations + agreement. This issue will be referred to the President by separate + memorandum for decision.

+

Time Limit. It was agreed that the question of the + duration of any agreement needed to be examined.

+

Facilities. Several alternatives proposed by the + Working Group were eliminated, and the Working Group was instructed to + examine possible combinations of the remaining alternatives for + consideration at the next meeting. These alternatives limiting + facilities in the Indian Ocean should be presented in the form of tables + comparable to those used in SALT with particular emphasis on relative + effects of different alternatives for the U.S. and the USSR.

+

Aircraft. Limitations on land-based strike + aircraft were discussed briefly, and the range of alternatives was + narrowed. Decision was deferred until the next meeting, after additional + Working Group analysis.

+

Timing. It was reported that the timing of the + next meeting with the Soviets in Washington was still under discussion + with the USSR. We had tentatively + proposed the week of September 19, but that could be changed if it + imposed too tight a time limit. A follow-on SCC would be held during the next week to consider the + remaining issues and to look at the package as a whole in terms of its + negotiability.

+
+ +
+ 112. Summary of Conclusions of a Special Coordination Committee + MeetingSource: Carter + Library, National Security Council, Institutional Files, Box 89, + SCC 030, 9/14/77, Indian Ocean. + Top Secret; Sensitive. The meeting took place in the White House + Situation Room. The minutes are not attached and were not found. + Sick sent the Summary of + Conclusions to Brzezinski + under a September 15 memorandum, requesting that Brzezinski approve it. Aaron initialed the approval line + for Brzezinski. (Ibid.) + Copies were sent to Mondale, + Vance, Brown, Young, Warnke, General Brown, and Turner. Papers prepared for the meeting are + ibid. + + + Washington, September 14, 1977, 10–11:30 + a.m. + + + SUBJECT + Indian Ocean Arms Control + + + PARTICIPANTS + + State + Warren + Christopher + Reginald + Bartholomew + Leslie Gelb + + + + + Defense + Harold Brown + Charles + Dayan + Walter Slocomb + + + + + JCS + Gen. William Smith + + + + + ACDA + Paul Warnke + John + Newhouse + + + + + NSC + Zbigniew + Brzezinski (Chairman) + David Aaron + Gary Sick + (notetaker) + + + + + CIA + Robert Bowie + + +

The purpose of this meeting was to develop a proposal to be presented to + the Soviet side in the next round of discussions in Washington, + beginning September 26.

+

Working Group Recommendations. The SCC approved the recommendations of the + working group on definition of combatants and auxiliaries, transit, + force majeure and the crisis escape clause, and further agreed that + current data would not be exchanged in the next round of discussions + with the Soviets.

+

Options.Brzezinski summarized the options + for the President in a Septermber 19 memorandum; see Documet 113.

+

The Joint Chiefs of Staff preferred Option I as stabilizing the situation + in the Indian Ocean while avoiding U.S. assurances about deployment of + strategic systems and preserving maximum flexibility for U.S. operations + in the future. We should preserve our ability to get to the Middle East + via the Indian Ocean. Other agencies believed that Option I was too + ambiguous to assure stabilization, was inconsistent with the presentation we made to the Soviets in + Moscow in June and would not be negotiable.

+

The Director, ACDA, supported Option IV + as the only option which was truly negotiable and which best fulfilled + the requirement of stabilization which we had proposed to the USSR as our initial objective. The + Secretary of Defense and the JCS + believed that the submarine ban in Option IV went beyond stabilization + and would constitute a strategic concession to the USSR which would not be in the U.S. + interest.

+

The Secretary of Defense and the Department of State supported Option II + as providing assurances to the Soviets that we did not intend to turn + the Indian Ocean into a major deployment area for strategic systems + while avoiding the difficulties of trying to negotiate specific + numerical limits. Also, by being less explicit, this option would + provide greater latitude in structuring U.S. deployments and could avoid + the necessity of invoking a supreme interests clause in the event our + interests in the area were threatened. Option II, in their view, would + permit us to gain some experience in managing an agreement of this + nature before attempting to establish more explicit limitations. The + JCS believe that Option II goes too + far in providing assurances on strategic systems and would constrain + U.S. operations too severely. ACDA + believes that Option II does not meet the basic Soviet concerns and + would not be negotiable; moreover, its ambiguity would make acceptance + in Congress very difficult.

+

The Secretary of Defense, the Department of State and ACDA all indicated that they could accept + some form of Option III, although it was not their preferred option. The + JCS strongly opposed Option III as + too restrictive and too explicit in its assurances on strategic + systems.

+

The Deputy Director of Central Intelligence indicated that Options I and + II were the most easily verifiable, while Options III and IV were [4 lines not declassified].

+

The Secretary of Defense and the Department of State indicated that they + would be willing to open with Option II, with the understanding that we + could later go on to Option III. ACDA, + while continuing to prefer Option IV, believed that it would be + preferable to open with Option III, retaining Option II as a fallback + position if agreement could not be reached on specific limitations. The + JCS representative thought it might + be acceptable to open with Option I, reserving Option II and perhaps + Option III for future negotiation.

+

It was pointed out that the nature of the U.S. proposal depended on the + interpretation of “stabilization.” On one hand, if we intend simply to + prevent the Indian Ocean from becoming a major arena of U.S.-Soviet + confrontation, then a generalized option (e.g. as I or II) would + suffice. If, however, our objective is to prevent any upward change in + either the quantitative or qualitative level of military deployments to the Indian Ocean, then + explicit limits (e.g. Options III or IV) would be required.

+

Examination of Key Issues

+

A. Land-Based Strike Aircraft

+

The JCS preferred no limitations of any + kind. State and ACDA supported the + first alternative (no deployments to littoral states where there have + been no previous deployments). Defense preferred the second alternative + permitting deployments to the littoral states but restricting operations + over the Indian Ocean. Dr. Brzezinski suggested that we could open with alternative + 1 since it is more restrictive on the Soviets.

+

B. Submarines. To be referred to the President for + decision as agreed at the last meeting.

+

C. Facilities. [2 lines not + declassified] (alternative 4). State and Defense supported a + combination of alternatives 2, 3, and 4. ACDA supported 1, 2, and 4 and would also accept 3 if there + were no submarine ban as they propose. The DCI representative pointed out that there would be + verification problems with alternatives 2 and 3. The consensus of the + SCC (except the JCS) was to support alternatives 2, 3, and + 4, perhaps with the implicit acceptance of the first alternatives as a + later step.

+

D. Surface Ships. The SCC agreed that our initial proposal should be 14 million + annual ton-days for combatants. All except the JCS agreed that we could go down to at least 13 million + tons in the course of negotiations, recognizing that this could place + some constraints on possible future deployments. There was no discussion + or disagreement about the proposed levels of ship-days for combatants + (2800) and limits on auxiliaries (3500 ship-days and 33 million ton-days + per year).

+

Other Unresolved Issues

+

A. Definition of the Area. It was agreed that we + would maintain the same position that we proposed in Moscow.

+

B. Exchange of Information. It was agreed not to + press this issue in the forthcoming round. We would listen to what the + Soviets have to say.

+

Additional Steps

+

It was agreed that each agency would promptly prepare a brief summary of + its views on the preferred option and possible combination of options + for submission to the President.

+
+ +
+ 113. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security + Affairs (Brzezinski) to + President CarterSource: Carter Library, National + Security Council, Institutional Files, Box 89, SCC 030, 9/14/77, Indian Ocean. Top + Secret; Sensitive. Sent for action. Sick sent the memorandum to Brzezinski under a September 17 + memorandum requesting that Brzezinski sign it. All brackets except those that + indicate text not declassified are in the original. + + + Washington, September + 19, 1977 + + + SUBJECT + Indian Ocean Talks + +

The Soviet delegation arrives September 26 for the second round of + discussions on Indian Ocean arms limitations. A decision is required on + the nature and extent of the proposal which we will present to them.

+

The SCC has met twice in the past month + to examine the issues. There is disagreement on every major issue. + Before summarizing the options and the nature of the disagreements, a + brief background would be useful.

+

Background

+

At the present time, we have a military advantage in the Indian Ocean. + Diego Garcia is politically secure, while Soviet use of facilities at + Berbera is politically tenuous. We are able to deploy aircraft carriers + into the area and have established a pattern of exercise deployments of + land-based aircraft to certain littoral states in conjunction with + CENTO and ANZUS exercises, while the Soviets have + never deployed land-based strike aircraft to the region and lack air + support for their naval forces. The present levels of Soviet naval + deployments do not constitute a significant threat to the oil lanes, + and, in a crisis, we could surge substantial forces into the area more + rapidly than the USSR. Thus, an + agreement which effectively stabilizesCarter underlined the + word “stabilizes.” the current situation would formalize a + situation which favors us,Carter underlined the words + “favors us.” both politically and militarily.

+

There is no basis to assume that the present situation will necessarily + continue in the future. Soviet construction of a major runway and + missile storage and handling facilities at Berbera, plus the periodic + introduction of naval reconnaissance aircraft into Somalia, must + prudently be interpreted as a signal of Soviet intentions to develop a + more capable military presence at the mouth of the Red Sea. This + interpretation is strengthened by the history of Soviet port + construction and military + association with North Yemen in the 1950s, South Yemen in the 1960s, and + the extensive use of anchorages in international waters before Berbera + became available in 1972.

+

Likewise, the Soviets have expressed considerable concern about the + possible future U.S. deployment of B–52s and SSBNs into the Indian Ocean + capable of striking the Soviet Union from the south. Consequently, the + basis for any agreement limiting military activities in the region must + rest on an exchange of assurances regarding future activities. [2 lines not declassified]

+

The SCC agreed to reject Soviet requests + to establish specific limits on the operations of U.S. carriers (except + in the context of general limitations on ship deployments) and to reject + their argument that we should “take into account” the presence of our + allies and U.S. bases in adjacent areas.

+

Basic Options and Positions

+

[Each agency has provided brief written statements of its positions on + the options and the desirability of a submarine ban, at Tab B.]Not attached.

+

Option I General Declaration of Restraint:

+

JCS supports.

+

Neither side will substantially alter recent levels of military presence + without due cause; avoid any inference that SSBNs and B–52s would not be + deployed there.

+

Option II General Declaration of Restraint:

+

State/DoD support.

+ +

Ships limited to approximately current levels; [3 lines + not declassified];Carter underlined the preceding + phrase and wrote in the right-hand margin: “ok J.C.” Soviets + will not deploy land-based aircraft to region.

+ +

Option III

+ +

Explicit Agreement:

+

Numerical limits on naval ships [4 lines not + declassified]; use of facilities constructed in the future + limited to routine port calls; specific restrictions on deployment of + land-based strike aircraft (including B–52s); SSBNs permitted under + numerical ship limits.

+

State/DoD would accept as a follow-on to successful negotiation of Option + II.

+

ACDA would accept as opening position + if Option IV is rejected, with Option II as a fallback.

+ + + +

Option IV

+ +

Explicit Agreement:

+

ACDA supports.

+ +

Essentially the same as Option III with the addition of a ban on + submarines and quantitative limits on use of port facilities.

+

Comment

+

In the SCC discussion, I was able to get + agreement from State and Defense that they could accept an approach + based on Option II as the initial objective of our negotiations, with + Option III as the ultimate goal. ACDA + strongly favors a submarine ban (Option IV), but if that is not approved + would “uncomfortably” be willing to accept Option III as our opening + position, with Option II as a fallback. JCS was unwilling to budge from Option I. My own view is + that the JCS position simply represents + a rejection of the concept itself. The issues have been aired + extensively, and further narrowing of differences would require an + NSC meeting.

+

I believe that an approach based on Option II, then moving to Option III, + would be the best of the alternatives available to us. I attach at Tab A + a proposed guidance paper on those lines, with one further modification + designed to bridge the gap between ACDA’s position on submarines and the JCS concern about specific assurances on + strategic systems. Option II calls for [4 lines not + declassified].

+

[The working group discussion paper is attached at Tab CNot attached. if you wish to refer to the + specifics of each option; however, you do not need to read it.]

+ +

RECOMMENDATION: That you approve the draft + guidance at Tab A.

+

Approve.Carter checked this option and initialed. Below the + options, he wrote: “Will be willing to hear arguments if necessary. + J.” The draft at Tab A, not printed, is identical to the final + guidance printed as Document + 114.

+

As amended.

+

Should be considered by the NSC.

+
+ +
+ 114. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security + Affairs (Brzezinski)Source: Carter Library, National + Security Affairs, Staff Material, Middle East, Subject File, Box 26, + Indian Ocean Talks: Round II Washington: 9/20–25/77. Secret; + Sensitive. Sick sent the + memorandum to Brzezinski + under a September 20 covering memorandum, noting that it + incorporated the “guidance for the next round approved by the + President.” + + + Washington, September + 20, 1977 + + + MEMORANDUM FOR + The Secretary of State + The Secretary of Defense + Director, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency + + + ALSO + Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff + Director of Central Intelligence + + + SUBJECT + Indian Ocean Arms Control + +

The President has determined that, for the next round of discussions with + the Soviet Union on Indian Ocean arms limitations, the United States + should table a proposed agreement in the form of a mutual declaration of + restraint, with the objective of stabilizing the military situation in + the Indian Ocean. This declaration should seek at a minimum to insure + that, during an agreed period of about five years, deployment of naval + units into the Indian Ocean would be limited to approximately current levels on each side. The + following guidelines should be observed in the negotiating process:

+

1. We should be prepared to inform the Soviet Union that, for the + duration of the agreement, we do not intend to substantially alter our + current pattern of submarine operations in the Indian Ocean. In return, + we would expect a statement that the Soviet Union would not + substantially alter its own recent pattern of submarine deployments. To + this end, we should seek agreement that neither side will establish, + maintain, deploy or utilize facilities in the region, ashore or afloat, + that have the primary function or are dedicated to the forward support + of deployed submarines.

+

2. We should inform the Soviets that we do not intend to deploy B–52 + aircraft to the area during the period of the agreement. In return, we + should seek a Soviet statement that they will not deploy land-based + strike aircraft to the region.

+

3. We should seek agreement that neither side will initiate construction + of new facilities in the region for its own use beyond those currently + programmed. Facilities constructed by or for littoral states with the + assistance of either party could be used only for occasional routine + port visits of limited duration.

+

4. While favoring a generalized declaration of restraint, we should not + preclude the possibility of a more detailed agreement at some future + date.

+

5. We should inform the Soviet Union that we will be prepared, once + agreement is reached on stabilization, to move promptly to consideration + of possible mutual reductions.

+

6. The recommendations of the working group, as agreed by the SCC, are approved for use in the + forthcoming round as appropriate.

+

The Secretary of Defense should monitor closely the pace of construction + at Diego Garcia and inform the SCC well + in advance of developments which could have a significant impact on the + negotiating process, e.g. commencement of construction on ammunition + storage facilities and extension of the runway beyond 10,500 feet.

+

The U.S. delegation should proceed to develop position papers for the + next round of discussions with the USSR on the basis of the Presidential guidance above. A + further SCC meeting will be called if + required to resolve major areas of disagreement.

+ + Zbigniew + Brzezinski + +
+ +
+ 115. Memorandum From the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament + Agency (Warnke) to President + CarterSource: Washington National Records + Center, RG 330, OSD Files, FRC 330–80–0017, Indian Ocean 092 + (Aug–Dec) 1977. Secret. Copies were sent to Vance, Brown, Brzezinski, Turner, and Jones. Brown + wrote “10/15 HB” in the upper right-hand corner of the + memorandum. + + + Geneva, October 10, + 1977 + + + SUBJECT + The Second Round of Talks on Indian Ocean Arms Control, September + 26–30, 1977 + +

The second round of talks on Indian Ocean arms control was held in + Washington September 26–30.The first round + of talks took place in Moscow June 22–27. See Document 108. Pursuant to your instructions,See Document + 114. the US Delegation + tabled a draft agreement on declarations of mutual restraint. A copy of + the US draft is attached.Attached but not printed is the September 26 + draft.

+

After a week of intensive discussions, it is clear that the Soviets are + receptive to the approach we presented, which would involve immediate + stabilization followed promptly by consideration of possible mutual + reductions. Most of the discussion after the first day concerned + clarification of the US draft, and an + exchange of views on the status quo that would be frozen under the + initial stabilization agreement. While our draft agreement is very + general in nature, in accordance with your guidance we supplemented it + with undetailed statements about our current level and pattern of ship + activities and our programmed construction at Diego Garcia; we also + indicated our willingness to forego deployment of strategic bombers in + the area under conditions of stabilization; and we proposed a ban on the + establishment or use of facilities for the support of submarines.

+

The Soviets replied by indicating, inter alia, + that they would not introduce strike aircraft into the area under a + stabilization agreement. They provided a general description of their + deployments and presence, tailoring it carefully to fit the framework we + had used in describing our activities. Their description of naval and + air deployments was accurate, and they told us a little more than they + had before about their use of Berbera. There is thus a basis for + reaching understanding on the meaning of “stabilization” for each + side.

+ +

I believe that we have made good progress in our discussions with the + Soviets on the Indian Ocean. However, a number of problems remain:

+

—The Soviets persist in seeking to ban all strategic systems, including + SSBNs, from the Indian Ocean area, although they clearly take our + indirect assurances on SSBNs seriously. In this regard we have told them + that we do not intend to alter our current pattern of submarine + operations in the Indian Ocean, or establish forward support for + submarines.

+

—The Soviets have attempted to draw a distinction between aircraft + carriers with “strike” capabilities, which they would like to ban, and + other carriers, which would be permitted. We have told them that all our + carriers are multi-purpose ships, and that it is not possible to + distinguish them according to particular warfare capabilities.

+

—The Soviets have not agreed to ban the establishment and use of support + facilities for all submarines, agreeing only to ban facilities for + SSBNs. We are pressing for a ban on facilities for all submarines.

+

—The Soviets continued to argue that any agreement must take into account + the forces and bases of US Allies in the + area and US forces and bases in the + adjacent areas, although there is some reason to think they will not let + an otherwise acceptable agreement founder on these points. In a private + conversation, Mendelevich asked me if we couldn’t check informally with + the French and tell the Soviets, without commitment, that the French + plan no big buildup in the area. I did not respond. We have continued to + take the position that these issues are outside the scope of the + negotiations and that any agreement would apply only to US and Soviet forces in the Indian Ocean + itself.

+

—The Soviets, so far, appear unwilling to agree that the US should be permitted to complete its + construction program on Diego Garcia, arguing that to do so would be + inconsistent with stabilization. We argue that completion of programmed + construction would have no qualitative effect and should be + permitted.

+

—The Soviets want to ban construction of communication facilities in the + Indian Ocean area which “control” submarines deployed there. Our + position is that communication facilities should be kept outside the + scope of the agreement, since they cannot be distinguished either as to + function or as to geographic application.

+

—The Soviets seem to prefer an exchange of detailed numerical information + as a basis for limitations on naval presence. We have taken the position + that detailed data are unnecessary in the context of a general + stabilization agreement.

+

—The Soviets have proposed that the overall annual number of port visits + by each side should remain the same; but they wish to have the right to reallocate this + number among the ports. This idea is designed to permit them to make + large-scale use of another port if they are forced to leave Berbera. We + have agreed to study this proposal.

+

—The differences on definition of the area that surfaced in Moscow + primarily regarding the waters north and south of Australia still remain + to be resolved. The Soviets have tabled a map showing their definition + of the Indian Ocean and we have agreed to study it.

+

—For our part, we must decide what reductions we would be prepared to + accept in the follow-on negotiations to which we would be committed by + the stabilization agreement.

+

I believe that in our third round of talks, which will be held in the + beginning of December, probably in Vienna, we may be able to resolve + many of these issues.For information on the + December talks, see Document 117. + The next round may very well become a drafting session, which would + result in a narrowing and clarification of the differences between the + two sides.

+

I am concerned, however, about the eventual form and effect of the + statements both sides are making to describe the recent level and + pattern of military activity in the region and which each indicated it + would not exceed or significantly alter under a stabilization agreement. + In my view, these statements should constitute legally binding written + commitments. This approach would avoid future misunderstandings with the + Soviet Union and would help to assure Congress that both signatories + have the same understanding of the agreement and that the entire + agreement is subject to Congressional approval. We have had recent + experience with Congressional sensitivities on this score. I will be + making recommendations to the SCC on + this matter.

+ + Paul C. Warnke + +
+ +
+ 116. Summary of Conclusions of a Special Coordination Committee + MeetingSource: Carter + Library, National Security Council, Institutional Files, Box 89, + SCC 040, 11/09/77, Indian + Ocean. Top Secret; Sensitive. The meeting took place in the White + House Situation Room. Brzezinski initialed at the bottom of the last page. + Carter initialed and + wrote “ok” on a November 15 memorandum from Brzezinski describing the results + of the meeting. (Ibid.) + + + Washington, November + 9, 1977, 3–4 p.m. + + + SUBJECT + Indian Ocean Arms Control + + + PARTICIPANTS + + State + Warren + Christopher + Jerome Kahan + + + + + Defense + David + McGiffert + Lynn Davis + + + + + JCS + Lt. Gen. William Smith + + + + + ACDA + Paul Warnke + John + Newhouse + + + + + CIA + Robert Bowie + John Hibbits + + + + + White House + Zbigniew + Brzezinski (Chairman) + + + + + NSC + Reginald + Bartholomew + James Thomson + Gary Sick + (Notetaker) + + +

In preparation for the third round of discussions with the USSR on Indian Ocean arms limitations + scheduled for December 1–10, 1977, in Bern, Switzerland, the SCC reviewed the following issues:

+

1. US Objective in the + Next Round. Mr. Warnke + felt that the best we could expect from this round would be a bracketed + text of a draft agreement, with a further round required to achieve + agreement. He could foresee the following round might be in February. + Dr. Brzezinski noted that it may + not be in our interest to push too fast. All agreed.

+

2. Working Group Recommendations. The working + group recommended positions on Allies and Adjacent Areas, Aircraft + Carriers, Communications Facilities, Facilities on the Seabed, Soviet + Air Capable Ships, and Soviet Reaction to the Presence of US carriers were accepted by the SCC. The position on SSBNs was changed to + read as follows: “We have determined that we will not specifically ban + SSBNs from the area.” It was agreed in any event that SSBN transits would be permitted as a + minimum.

+

3. Form of the Agreement. State, JCS and Defense supported Option A, the + exchange of unilateral statements of past activities in the Indian Ocean as supplement to the + General Declaration. Mr. Warnke + argued that there was no substantial difference between Options A and B. + Whether we decide on past tense or future tense, unilateral statements + or a protocol, signed or unsigned, in fact the effect is to create + future obligations which are binding. Mr. Warnke was concerned that some latitude be left to + conclude joint protocols on at least certain issues, such as definition + of the area. Several members noted that a joint protocol would require + both sides to accept statements about bases that might be unacceptable. + Others noted that a Soviet statement that they have never operated any + bases in the Indian Ocean would be unacceptable, even in a unilateral + statement, since we would still have to agree to it and answer to + Congress. Dr. Brzezinski stated + that any appended statement should say what is precluded by the + agreement, rather than what has happened in the past. All agreed that we + should remain flexible on this issue for the next round.

+

4. Level of Port Activity. All agreed, after + considerable discussion, that the US + should continue to insist on distinguishing between “usage” and “port + visits” in order to prevent the USSR + from expanding the type of operations they now conduct at Berbera to a + number of other ports on the littoral. However, it was also agreed that + the Soviets should be able to shift their Berbera operations to a + different port in the event they lose access to Somali facilities. They + should not, however, be permitted to construct new facilities for the + primary use of their own forces. The delegation has latitude in the next + round to develop work-able definitional distinctions between “usage” and + “port visits.”

+

5. Supreme Interest Clause. All agreed that the + US should continue to insist that + either side may invoke supreme national interest to withdraw from the + agreement without any advance notification period. Mr.Warnke noted that this agreement is + qualitatively different from SALT and other agreements where we have + accepted a period of advance notification. However, the lack of + notification will be difficult to negotiate and will make the Soviets + place additional emphasis on the importance of US activities in adjacent areas.

+

6. Submarine Support Facilities. All agreed that + the US should press for a ban on all + submarine support activities and construction in the Indian Ocean area, + including subtenders. Mr. Warnke + felt that we might have to fall back on this at some point. Mr. + Christopher agreed, and + noted that this provision would force the Soviets to change their + present pattern of deploying subtenders to the area. He was particularly + concerned that this might lead the Soviets to request a comparable + cutback on our part, e.g. our carrier deployments, which would be a bad + trade. Dr. Brzezinski noted that + we would have time to review the issue again in the event we had to fall + back to a lesser option.

+

7. Definition of the Area. All agreed to hold to + the previous US position. Dr. Brzezinski suggested exploring the + possibility of a compromise + position on the waters south of Australia at approximately 130 degrees + longitude, which would include additional ocean area but no significant + Australian ports.

+

8. Construction at Diego Garcia. All agreed to + hold to the previous US position that + stabilization would include the completion of planned construction. It + was recalled that the Presidential Directive issued prior to the last + round called for the SCC to be notified + by DoD well in advance of developments on Diego Garcia which could have + a significant impact on the negotiating process.See Document 114. + Defense noted that the runway is being constructed in successive + longitudinal strips and that one of these was already in place for the + entire 12,000 foot length. Defense will continue to keep the SCC informed.

+

9. Linkage Between Stabilization and Negotiations on + Reductions. All agreed that we should be prepared to begin + negotiations on reductions within three months after a stabilization + agreement comes into effect.

+

10. Carrier Deployments. Mr. Warnke noted that the present wording + of our assurance on carrier deployments would permit a carrier to + accompany all three task force deployments. In fact, we have in the past + deployed two, but not three, carriers in a single year. He proposed that + our statement be revised to indicate that our past pattern of task group + deployments has included at least one carrier and as many as two in any + one year. All agreed.

+
+ +
+ 117. Memorandum From the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament + Agency (Warnke) to President + CarterSource: Carter Library, National + Security Affairs, Staff Material, Middle East, Subject File, Box 27, + Indian Ocean Talks: Round III Bern: 12/77. Secret. Sent under cover + of a December 27 memorandum from Brzezinski to Carter in which Brzezinski highlighted three points Warnke’s memorandum raised. + Carter initialed both + the covering memorandum and Warnke’s memorandum. + + + Geneva, December 15, + 1977 + + + SUBJECT + The Third Round of Talks on Indian Ocean Arms Control, December + 6–10, 1977 + +

The third U.S.-Soviet meeting on Indian Ocean arms control was held in + Bern, Switzerland, on December 6–10. As in previous rounds, I led the + U.S. delegation and Ambassador Mendelevich headed the Soviet + delegation.

+

The Soviets owed us a response from the last round, held in Washington in + September, at which we had tabled a draft agreement.See Document 115. + Soviet expulsion from Somalia and their consequent loss of access to + Berbera had, however, introduced uncertainties into the question of base + facilities in the Indian Ocean.On November + 13, the Somali Government renounced its Treaty of Friendship and + Cooperation with the Soviet Union and ended Soviet use of naval + facilities at Berbera. We therefore approached the round with + caution, prepared to listen rather than to put forward any new U.S. + positions. I felt personally that there was a good chance that this + round would not turn out to be a particularly significant one.

+

Somewhat surprisingly, however, substantial progress was made during the + round, both in establishing a common framework for seeking a + stabilization agreement and in further identifying similarities and + differences between the two sides’ positions. It now appears that the + Soviets are prepared to work seriously toward an agreement based on our + proposal that both sides essentially freeze forces and facilities at + present levels.

+

The Soviet delegation tabled their own draft,An unofficial translation of the Soviet draft is in telegram 5726 + from Bern, December 6. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign + Policy File, D770454–0133) in response to the U.S. draft + tabled at the last round. Their draft represented a serious effort on + their part to work within the scope of our stabilization concept, though + they would go further in linking stabilization to a reduction phase than + we would. Soviet positions, while still firm and at variance with ours + on some key issues, showed real movement in some areas, as well as a + potential for further modification.

+ +

The Soviets made only brief reference to their expulsion from Somalia, + and did so by way of reinforcing their earlier insistence that they have + no “bases” in the Indian Ocean. It may be that the weakening of their + position in the Indian Ocean lies behind their increased interest in + early agreement and their movement toward the U.S. position on several + specific issues.

+

Ambassador Mendelevich pressed for establishing a semi-permanent Indian + Ocean negotiation in Bern, apparently to be conducted along lines + similar to the SALT and MBFR + negotiations. We rejected this approach as unnecessary and as + impractical for the U.S. side. We agreed, however, to a target date of + February 1 for a fourth round of talks.For + information on the February 1978 talks, see Document 120.

+

While important differences remain between the Soviet and U.S. positions, + I believe the next round could result in a “joint draft text” of a + stabilization agreement, with unresolved issues shown by bracketed + language. One or two additional rounds would then probably be needed + before full accord could be achieved.

+

If a stabilization agreement along the lines we are developing can be + concluded, I believe it would advance our security objectives in the + Indian Ocean area, support our political objectives in the littoral + states, and give impetus to other bilateral arms control efforts. It + would also lead to U.S.-Soviet discussions on possible arms reductions + in the area. It might be possible to have an Indian Ocean stabilization + agreement completed and ready for signature within the next six months, + perhaps at a summit meeting.

+

For any such schedule to be maintained, the Soviets will have to take + some major steps toward us in the next rounds, since the fundamental + elements of our position cannot be altered. However, we must be prepared + to be flexible on a few issues, while holding to our basic position.

+

The following is a brief summary of the current state of play on the + major remaining issues between ourselves and the Soviets:

+

1. Form of Agreement. The Soviets seemed prepared + to consider our approach of a general stabilization agreement, + supplemented by agreed documents, which would be incorporated into the + agreement by reference, describing each side’s recent military + activities in the Indian Ocean area. But they pressed for such + statements to be more specific and quantitative than seems to me to be + necessary or desirable for a stabilization agreement. They have also + suggested some criteria for measuring military activity in the area + which would tend to operate to U.S. disadvantage.

+ +

2. Commitment to Reductions. While accepting the + concept of stabilization, the Soviets continued to seek a commitment, in + the agreement itself, to reductions. We took the position that we were + prepared to commit ourselves to consider mutual reductions in follow-on + negotiations, but that we could not agree in advance either that there + would be such reductions or what form they might take.

+

3. Strategic Systems. The Soviets dropped their + insistence on any sort of special limitations on aircraft carriers or + carrier-based strike aircraft; they seemed content with our position + that we would not deploy strategic aircraft to the area under + stabilization. They continued to press for a specific ban on SSBNs, + which I firmly rejected. In response to our earlier proposal that all + submarine support facilities be banned from the area, they continued to + argue that only SSBN facilities should + be banned and that they should have the right to deploy a conventional + submarine tender.

+

4. Definition of the Area. We agreed that a + definition should be part of the agreement, but continued to disagree + about its eastern boundary—particularly about the waters to the north + and south of Australia. In the next round we will work toward a + definition which is mutually acceptable for purposes of arms control in + the Indian Ocean area.

+

5. Allies and Adjacent Areas. The Soviets sought + to deal with our refusal to have allied forces in the area taken into + account by proposing a “compensation” formula, which would allow + increases by one side to offset increases by an ally of the other side. + We rejected this notion as unnecessary and destabilizing, and argued + instead that a “supreme national interest” withdrawal clause requiring + no prior notice would provide an adequate safety valve. It may be that + we will be able to deal with Soviet concerns over allied forces in the + Indian Ocean and our forces in adjacent areas through a general + non-circumvention clause.

+

6. Facilities. The Soviets, alluding to their loss + of Berbera, reaffirmed their position that they have no land-based + support facilities in the area. They said they must, therefore, be free + to move their floating support units to other ports around the littoral. + We stressed the need to make a distinction between utilization of + facilities and routine port calls, and the importance of preventing a + proliferation of facilities that could be inconsistent with + stabilization.

+

I am sending copies of this memorandum to the Secretary of State, the + Secretary of Defense, the Assistant to the President for National + Security Affairs, the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Director, + Central Intelligence Agency.

+ + Paul C. Warnke + +
+ +
+ 118. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security + Affairs (Brzezinski) to + President CarterSource: Carter Library, National + Security Council, Institutional Files, Box 91, SCC 054, 1/24/78, Indian Ocean—Arms + Control Negotiations. Secret. Sent for action. An earlier version of + the memorandum, including draft guidance for the next round of + talks, is in the Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff + Material, Middle East, Subject File, Box 26, Indian Ocean: SCC 1/24/78: 1/78. + + + Washington, January + 27, 1978 + + + SUBJECT + SCC Meeting on Indian Ocean, + January 24, 1978 + +

The SCC on the Indian Ocean met on + January 24thNo minutes or Summary of + Conclusions of this meeting have been found. to develop + guidance for the next round of talks with the Soviets, currently + scheduled for February 7–17 in Bern, Switzerland.For a summary of the talks, see Document 120. For a summary of the previous round, see + Document 117. The JCS argued strongly that the meeting + should be postponed. However, I concur with the majority view that we + should proceed with the somewhat abbreviated talks as currently + scheduled, with the understanding that Paul + Warnke would use the occasion to deliver a stiff message + of U.S. concern about Soviet activities in the Horn of Africa.

+

All the members of the SCC agreed that + the U.S. delegation should table in this round a revised draft text of + an agreement setting forth the U.S. position. The new text makes no new + concessions to the Soviets, but simply represents a more effective + statement of our position on a number of issues.

+

The JCS and DOD believe that the text of any agreement [1 line not declassified] since this would + establish an undesirable precedent and limit our future flexibility. + [3 lines not declassified] However, they + would be willing to forego inclusion of such a phrase in our position + for this round, and I believe this would be consistent with our strategy + of taking a very tough line in the forthcoming talks.

+

With regard to the deployment of land-based aircraft, all agreed that we + should continue to press the Soviets to provide a description of their + past deployments of bombers, fighter-bombers, and interceptors to the + Indian Ocean area which is as restrictive as possible.

+

During the last round we suggested to the Soviets that it might be useful + to have a clause in the agreement permitting exceptions to restrictions + in the event of evacuation of nationals or natural disasters. State and + ACDA would like to table this + clause with our draft text. The + JCS and DOD are nervous about the size of the loophole that would + be created and prefer to wait until the Soviets have given us their + considered view of the idea. I see no harm in waiting for the Soviet + reply before tabling our text.

+

In the last round we proposed that both sides ban all submarine support + facilities from the Indian Ocean. The Soviets objected on the grounds + that they have had a tender present in the past and it is essential to + support their non-ballistic submarines. The SCC agreed that our present position is inconsistent with + the notion of “stabilization.” Paul + Warnke would like authority to concede this point in the + forthcoming talks. The JCS and DOD believe that we should delay in + conceding this point until we can use it to get an appropriate quid. In + view of the tough line we are taking in this round, my recommendation is + not to concede the point at this stage.

+

Nine other recommendations by the Working Group were essentially + technical in nature and not controversial. They were unanimously + accepted by the SCC, including the use + of the phrase “heavy bombers” in place of “strategic aircraft” to bring + our draft text in line with the wording of the SALT agreement.

+

If you concur, I will issue guidance to the U.S. delegation in accordance + with the recommendations I have made above.Carter checked the + Approve option and initialed below the options.

+
+ +
+ 119. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security + Affairs (Brzezinski)Source: Carter Library, National + Security Council, Institutional Files, Box 91, SCC 054, 1/24/78, Indian Ocean—Arms + Negotiations. Top Secret. + + + Washington, January + 30, 1978 + + + MEMORANDUM FOR + The Secretary of State + The Secretary of Defense + Director, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency + + + + ALSO + Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff + Director of Central Intelligence + + + SUBJECT + Indian Ocean Arms Control + +

The President has determined that the U.S. delegation should proceed with + plans to conduct discussions with the Soviet Union on Indian Ocean arms + limitations in Bern, Switzerland, on February 7–17. However, the U.S. + representative should deliver to the Soviet negotiator in their first + private meeting a strong statement of the U.S. position with regard to + Soviet activities in the Horn of Africa and the related buildup of + Soviet military presence as not conducive to international stability and + efforts to improve relations between the United States and the Soviet + Union. It is inconsistent with the concepts of stabilization and mutual + restraint which underlie our efforts to reach an agreement. The Soviet + side should clearly understand that these activities are a serious + impediment to early agreement on Indian Ocean arms limitations. These + concerns should also be reflected in the record of the plenary sessions. + (S)

+

The U.S. delegation should table in this round a revised draft text of an + agreement setting forth the U.S. position, without the appended + supplementary statement of military activities. In discussing the + various elements of a draft agreement and supplementary statement with + the Soviets, the following guidance should be observed: (S)

+

1. SSBNs. During this round, we should omit any + reference to U.S. deployment of SSBNs in the Indian Ocean from the + proposed text of our supplementary statement, while reaffirming the + verbal assurances we have provided in the past. The advisability of + providing written assurances on SSBNs will be reviewed prior to any + subsequent rounds. (TS)

+ +

2. Facilities. We should press the Soviets to + accept our distinction between a “routine port call of limited duration” + and “utilization” of a facility. (C)

+

3. Land-Based Aircraft. We should continue to + press the Sovietsto provide a description of their past deployments of + bombers, fighter-bombers and interceptors to the Indian Ocean area which + is as restrictive as possible. At the same time, we should begin + consultations with Australia and other friendly nations as appropriate, + seeking their views on how best to deal with this issue in light of its + possible implications for enlarging the geographical scope of the + agreement beyond the water’s edge. (TS)

+

4. Exception for Humanitarian Purposes. The + delegation is authorized to introduce the U.S. draft text of such a + clause at its discretion after receiving a Soviet response to our + suggestion in the last round. (C)

+

5. Submarine Support. The occasional presence of a + Soviet submarine tender in the Indian Ocean is consistent with the + concept of stabilization. However, this point should not be conceded at + this stage. (TS)

+

6. Other Issues. The recommendations of the + Working Group, as accepted by the SCC + meeting of January 24,See Document 118. are approved, + including the use of the phrase “heavy bombers” in place of “strategic + aircraft.” (C)

+ + Zbigniew + Brzezinski + +
+ +
+ 120. Memorandum From the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament + Agency (Warnke) to President + CarterSource: Carter Library, National + Security Affairs, Staff Material, Middle East, Subject File, Box 27, + Indian Ocean Talks: Round IV Bern: 3–4/78. Secret. + + + Washington, March 2, + 1978 + + + SUBJECT + The Fourth Round of Talks on Indian Ocean Arms Control, February + 7–17, 1978 + +

The fourth round of talks on Indian Ocean arms control was held in Bern, + Switzerland February 7–17, 1978. In view of the current Soviet activity + in the Horn of Africa, we did not expect any major progress during this round. This proved to be + the case, but there are indications that, if we elect to pursue the + negotiations, solutions may be found to the principal outstanding + problems.An unknown hand underlined the + portion of the sentence beginning with “if we elect” to the + end.

+

In addition to continuing the negotiations directed toward obtaining a + stabilization agreement, our aim was to make it unmistakably clear that + the United States considers current Soviet activity in the Horn of + Africa and the related increase in Soviet naval forces to be + inconsistent with the substance and spirit of our talks.

+

There is no question that the Soviet Delegation took the point, although + they argued that, based on their estimate of their own naval deployments + in recent years, the current activity is consistent with previous + levels. They stated also that outside events of a largely political + nature should not be injected into these negotiations and that they + could cite U.S. activities in Africa or elsewhere which they regard as + improper.

+

Unless mediation can bring about an early settlement, the situation in + the Horn will continue to present us with some difficult decisions as we + proceed with these negotiations. At the beginning of these talks, the + United States decided to confine any agreement to naval and air presence + because we were unwilling to accept restrictions on our ability to + supply military equipment and to provide military advisors to littoral + states. We wanted also to retain the ability to surge into the area at a + time of political crisis affecting American security interests.

+

However, we have told the Soviets that their use of naval forces to + influence developments in littoral states is incompatible with the + substance of a stabilization agreement and their large-scale supply of + military assistance to Ethiopia inconsistent with the spirit of these + negotiations. At the same time, we wish to retain flexibility in the way + we will use our naval forces in the future. Therefore, we need to + consider carefully how far we should go in linking these types of + activities to the continuation of arms control negotiations.

+

Also, I do not believe that our disapproval of current Soviet military + assistance to Ethiopia should lead us to link these talks in any way to + mutual restrictions on military assistance to the littoral states. Any + agreement that would inhibit our freedom to provide military assistance + to the littoral states should be the result of separate negotiations and + understandings.

+

Another issue that may merit reconsideration is the question of + limitations on land-based aircraft. Because the Soviets have not in the + past deployed strike aircraft in the Indian Ocean area, it has been our + thought that restrictions + on possible future deployment would be in our interest and indeed become + a major U.S. goal in the talks. It now appears, however, that Australian + sensitivity about the way in which an Indian Ocean agreement will apply + to Australian territory may cause us serious political problems. We will + be consulting closely with the Australians on this issue, but should + decide whether the effort to obtain limits on future Soviet aircraft + deployments is of sufficient importance to warrant potential + difficulties with Australia arising from the possible impact on U.S. + aircraft operating from Indian Ocean littoral states.

+

None of the major issues have been resolved. These include Soviet + insistence on barring U.S. strategic forces from the Indian Ocean, the + nature of restrictions on use of Indian Ocean ports and facilities, + Soviet demands that the agreement include some recognition of the + presence of American allies and U.S. forces in adjacent areas, the + format and methodology for describing recent military activity which is + to be stabilized, and the definition of the Indian Ocean boundaries. On + some of these issues, the head of the Soviet Delegation, Ambassador + Mendelevich, indicated in heads of delegations meetings that compromise + is possible. For example, he suggested dealing with the issue of + strategic forces in the preamble and describing the existing situation + as a factor contributing to the stabilization of military activity. On + the question of allied forces, he hinted that a joint appeal for + restraint might be feasible. On Indian Ocean boundaries, he asserted + that compromise between our position and theirs could be worked out, + presumably minimizing the waters off the Australian coast to be + included.

+

From the beginning of these talks, we have felt that an agreement of the + kind under consideration would be in our interest. It would prevent an + accelerated military competition in the area and prevent any significant + increase in Soviet offensive naval capabilities there. Stabilization + would formalize existing U.S. advantages. What we would be foregoing is + any significant future deployment of U.S. strategic forces, that is, + heavy bombers and ballistic missile submarines, while the agreement + continues. Such deployments have not been made in the past.

+

Accordingly, we see no reason to disagree with the most recent SCC assessmentSee Document 118. that negotiating + a stabilization agreement, along the lines we have proposed, is in our + best interests, both politically and militarily.

+ +

In accordance with our instructions, the time and place of a fifth round + of talks was left open for future determination by the governments.

+

I am sending copies of this memorandum to the Secretary of State, the + Secretary of Defense, the Assistant to the President for National + Security Affairs, the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Director, + Central Intelligence Agency.

+

Paul C. Warnke

+ +

Attachment

+

PaperSecret.

+

Washington, undated

+

SUMMARY OF STATUS OF MAJOR ISSUES

+

Supplemental Statements

+

The Soviets have said that they are prepared in principle to agree to the + U.S. suggestion for supplemental statements, but that their final + position would depend on the content of the statements. During meetings + of the experts’ group, there was a useful discussion on how the presence + of naval forces should be expressed. Both sides have agreed to study the + technical issues involved, and their different approaches to exchange of + information, i.e., our preference for broad descriptions and the + Soviets’ for a detailed quantitative description.

+

Facilities

+

The Soviets agreed to consider the U.S. preference for an agreed + definition of a routine port call and took note of the U.S. view that + the agreement should limit both afloat and ashore facilities. They + continue to maintain that they have not had any ashore facilities, but + do agree that their afloat auxiliary ships provide support to their + combatants. Both sides agreed to consider how the utilization of support + facilities, either ashore or afloat, should be limited in the agreement + and reflected in the supplemental statement.

+

Strategic Forces

+

The Soviets suggested a possible compromise that would move the reference + to strategic forces from the operative text of the agreement to the + preamble. Our reaction to this will depend on whether or not the Soviets are prepared to agree to + preambular language that does not state there has been a total absence + of all strategic forces, including SSBNs. The Soviet definition of + strategic forces is not yet entirely clear.

+

Auxiliaries

+

Both sides agree on the definition of a naval auxiliary with regard to + this agreement. The U.S. stated that all naval auxiliaries should be + included in the limitations of the agreement. The Soviet position is + that all auxiliaries should be exempt from the agreement. The Soviets + dropped their previous insistence on a distinction between those + auxiliaries with stationary armaments and those without.

+

Transit

+

Both sides agree that ships in transit should not be counted as part of + the naval presence in the Indian Ocean. The Soviets suggested that ships + in transit be permitted 90 days to complete the crossing; the U.S. + suggested 30 days. The experts’ group considered this issue and the + Soviets are prepared to work for a compromise on this question, as is + the U.S.

+

Definition of the Area

+

The U.S. explained to the Soviets that our problem with the Soviet + proposal to include the waters north and south of Australia in the + agreement stems from the objections of the Australians, who are + concerned that this agreement not adversely impact on their security + interests. The Soviets recognized this as a political problem, but did + not fall off their previous position, although they did state that some + compromise was possible.

+

Diego Garcia

+

The Soviets again argued that continued construction on Diego Garcia + would be inconsistent with stabilization. We reiterated our position + that completing the modest construction program on Diego Garcia and + agreeing not to go beyond this program would be consistent with + stabilization.

+

Allied and Adjacent Areas

+

The Soviets again stated that the presence of U.S. Allies and U.S. forces + and bases in adjacent areas must somehow be taken into account. We + stated that we considered these talks to concern only U.S. and Soviet + forces in the Indian Ocean.

+
+ +
+ 121. Memorandum From Gary Sick + and Reginald Bartholomew of the + National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for + National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, + Middle East, Subject File, Box 23, Indian Ocean: 1–4/78. Secret. + Sent for action. Inderfurth + also initialed the memorandum. + + + Washington, February + 21, 1978 + + + SUBJECT + Indian Ocean—Next Steps + +

Aside from delivering the political message about our views on the Horn, + the two-week session on the Indian Ocean in Bern produced almost + nothing.See Document 120. There was clarification of some + points, and minor progress on a few marginal issues, but nothing of + substance. This is likely to remain true until the Horn situation + settles down. The Indian Ocean negotiations are now at a point where the + peripheral issues have largely been cleared away and only the tough + central issues remain. Further progress on these issues requires a sense + of mutual purpose and mutual accommodation that will be impossible to + achieve so long as the Soviet intervention in the Horn is actively in + progress.

+

Moreover, additional “study” of these questions, when removed from the + pressure of forward progress in the negotiations, is likely to inspire + the worst in bureaucratic in-fighting and hair-splitting to the + detriment of our position. In the absence of any deadline, each agency + will lack the incentive to compromise and instead will devote itself to + constructing rationales in support of its chosen position. By the time + we get back to real negotiations, this could simply make it more + difficult to lever the hardliners out of their entrenched positions.

+

RECOMMENDATION: Consequently, I believe that the entire Indian Ocean + issue should be put on the back burner until things begin to clear up in + the Horn. I suggest that we resist any calls for additional SCC meetings or extensive interagency + study for the time being. If you concur, I can easily discourage any new + initiatives in this area until things begin to look up.

+ +

Yes. Back burner.Brzezinski checked this option, + and Aaron wrote “I agree + DA” and drew an arrow pointing + toward it.

+

Other.

+
+ +
+ 122. Memorandum From Gary Sick + of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for + National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, + Middle East, Subject File, Box 23, Indian Ocean: 1–4/78. Secret. + Sent for information. Quandt + initialed the memorandum in the upper right-hand corner. A copy was + sent to Armacost. + + + Washington, April 14, + 1978 + + + SUBJECT + Talks with Australians on Indian Ocean + +

A high-level delegation of the Australian Ministry of Defense spent three + days in Washington this week for comprehensive talks about Indian Ocean + arms limitations. The basic Australian concern relates to internal + political problems and particularly the concern that, by accepting + limitations on Indian Ocean activities, the United States will in effect + relegate the western coast of Australian—the Indian Ocean coastal + area—to a lesser security status than the eastern part of the country. + (S)

+

This is a hot political issue, and even the appearance of somehow + treating the westerners differently than the easterners for security + purposes, i.e. for purposes of exercises or implementation of the ANZUS treaty, would be internal + dynamite. In addition, the present Government opposed the previous + Whitlam Government’s support of Indian Ocean arms control,Reference is to Australian Prime Minister Gough + Whitlam’s 1972–1975 Labor Party government. and the distaste + of at least their representatives at these meetings for any US-Soviet agreement was quite apparent. + They raised a number of fundamental questions about any potential + agreement:

+

—Since stabilization appears to favor the U.S. rather dramatically, why + are the Soviets willing to go along? (We are offering to forego certain + strategic options in the future which the Soviets obviously find + desirable.)

+

—If both parties can deploy forces within the context of a stabilization + agreement, will there not still be competition and possible conflict + even with an agreement? (A stabilization agreement is not intended to + settle every possible difference in the area, but it should at a minimum + reduce the potential level of confrontation.)

+

—Since there appears to be no present cause for anxiety about the Soviet + presence following the loss of Berbera, does this issue need to be addressed at this time? (At + least until the recent episode in the Horn, the apparent stability in + force levels offered a good opportunity for negotiations, rather than a + time of crisis or escalation.)

+

Les Gelb responded to all of + these points, and in three days of official and private meetings the + US delegation gave a candid and + complete picture of our own policy viewpoint, including those areas + where we have no ready answers, e.g. the best method for limiting + land-based strike aircraft. (S)

+

Although they wavered on occasion, the Australians were not prepared to + be persuaded. It was clear to me, particularly in private conversations, + that they could appreciate some of the military advantages for us—and + even potentially for them—in such an agreement with the Soviets. But + these advantages were too abstract or too distant to compensate them for + the immediate domestic political pain which they anticipate and for + which they have no easy remedy. They readily agreed that their job of + explanation would be made much simpler if the Soviets were showing signs + of getting military access to Gan Island or some other facility closer + to their west coast. Ethiopia is just too far away to seem a real threat + to Premier Court of Western Australia,Reference is to Charles Court, Premier of Western Australia from + 1974 until 1982. who comes through in their comments as a + peculiarly Australian combination of Ronald + Reagan and Bella + Abzug. (S)

+

We ended with the following points of agreement:

+

—We will look closely at possible compensatory moves we could take, e.g. + ship visits to Western Australia, possible exercises, or other evidence + that we are not abandoning western Australia.

+

—We will continue to consult very closely through diplomatic channels, + and at some point we recognize the possible value of a return visit by a + US delegation to Canberra.

+

—We will consider their suggestion that the Vice President might consider + a stop in Western Australia during his forthcoming tripMondale + traveled to the Philippines, Thailand, Indonesia, Australia, and New + Zealand April 29–May 10. On May 10, Mondale summarized his trip in an address delivered + in Honolulu at the East-West Center. For the text of the address, + see the Department of State Bulletin, July + 1978, pp. 22–25. (no commitment was made, of course). (S)

+
+ +
+ 123. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of Defense for + International Security Affairs (McGiffert) to the President’s Deputy Assistant for + National Security Affairs (Aaron)Source: + Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Middle + East, Subject File, Box 24, Indian Ocean: 4–9/79. Secret. An unknown + hand wrote “DA has seen, send to + staff for info” in the upper right-hand corner of the + memorandum. + + + Washington, June 2, + 1979 + + + SUBJECT + Implications of the Interagency Review of US Presence in the Middle East/Persian Gulf for + Resumption of the Indian Ocean Arms Control Talks + +

When the Indian Ocean Arms Control negotiations were suspended + indefinitely in February, 1978,See Document 121. the parties had agreed + in principle to stabilize their respective naval presence in the Indian + Ocean at the ‘levels of the recent past.’ Although the details had not + been worked out, the proposed agreement would also place limits on + deployments of land-based strike air to the littoral states and on the + utilization of naval support facilities in the littoral states for other + than routine port visits. In September, 1977 the US described its past presence in the Indian Ocean as: the + three ship MIDEAST Force maintained in the area on a continuing, + year-round basis; periodic deployment on a yearly basis of three task + groups, at least one of which has included an aircraft carrier; and + additionally, units of the US Navy + occasionally enter the area enroute to making routine port calls in + Australia.See Document 115.

+

A series of events since September, 1977 have altered the strategic + situation in the Indian Ocean/Persian Gulf and have prompted a review of + the level of US presence in the region + which is necessary to maintain US + influence and to protect US interests + from military threats. In the past two years, the Soviets have sponsored + Cuban surrogates in Ethiopia, engineered a coup in Afganistan, and have + increased their influence in PDRY. + US policy toward the region changed + dramatically with the overthrow of the Shah. The US can no longer count on Iran to serve as a regional + policeman. Moreover, the moderate Persian Gulf states criticized the + US for failing to take action to + support the Shah and expressed their concern that the US lacks the commitment and resolve to + oppose Soviet inroads in the region. Finally, initially in response to + the unrest in Iran and later to the PDRY invasion of the YAR, + the US maintained an augmented naval + presence in the region from October, 1978 to June, 1979.

+ +

Given these changed circumstances and the dependence of the West on + Persian Gulf oil, DoD is currently studying options for future US military presence in the Middle + East/Persian Gulf.See Document 24. These options range from no change in + the previous deployment pattern up to permanently deploying carrier or + Marine task groups to the region. A key issue is whether a stabilization + ceiling based on past deployment patterns is adequate to protect US interests in light of recent events. + Under the three task force deployment per year pattern, the MIDEAST + Force would be the only force which the US would have in the region to respond to contingencies for + roughly half the year. The MIDEAST Force, however, has only limited + capabilities to respond effectively to crises ashore. More importantly, + the proposed ceiling would restrict US + flexibility to surge forces into the region and to keep them there for + the duration of a crisis. The Soviets, however, would still be able to + threaten US interests in the littoral + states through the use of arms transfers, subversion, and surrogate + forces without violating the agreement.

+

The PRC on June 13 will center on the + issue of what level of US military + presence is required to protect US + interests in the Middle East/Persian Gulf.The PRC convened June 21–22 to + discuss the defense of U.S. interests in the Middle East/Persian + Gulf. See Document 26. This meeting + may conclude that the US must increase + its naval presence above past levels and that various measures should be + taken to improve US capabilities to + rapidly surge forces into the region. Obviously, a decision to increase + US presence in the Indian Ocean + would be inconsistent with the previous US negotiating position and the joint draft treaty. Such a + decision would not necessarily terminate all prospects for an Indian + Ocean Arms Control Agreement, but it would require that the US negotiating position be changed and that + the stabilization ceilings be re-negotiated. The Soviets, however, may + not be willing to accept fundamental changes to the proposed agreement. + Moreover, the value of an agreement from the standpoint of arms control + would diminish if the ceilings on routine presence were lifted and if + caveats were introduced to permit forces to be surged into the area for + prolonged periods.

+

Given the fact that no agreement has been reached within the US government on the desired level of + US presence in the Indian Ocean, it + would be premature to propose that the Indian Ocean talks be resumed + immediately after the summit.Carter and Brezhnev met in Vienna June 16–18 + to sign the SALT II treaty. An unconditional offer to resume + negotiations would imply that the US + were willing to take up the talks where they left off—that is, with a + stabilization ceiling based on past presence. On the other hand, + extending an offer to resume the negotiations conditioned on a re-negotiation of the + stabilization ceilings could alienate the Soviets and disrupt the + summit. In any event, it would not appear to be in the US interest to agree to resume the + negotiations until a decision is made concerning the nature and level of + US presence which is required to + protect US interests in light of the + changed circumstances in the region. Although this issue will be + addressed at the PRC on 13 June, a + final decision on the matter probably will not be made until after the + summit is concluded.

+ + David E. McGiffert + Assistant Secretary of Defense International + Security Affairs + + +
+ +
+ 124. Summary of Conclusions of a Policy Review Committee MeetingSource: Carter Library, + National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Middle East, Subject + File, Box 26, Indian Ocean Talks: Policy Review Committee 7/18/79 + Meeting: 7/79. Secret. The meeting took place in the White House + Situation Room. Dodson sent + copies of the Summary of Conclusions to Vance, Brown, + Warnke, Jones, and Turner under a July 23 covering + memorandum. In a July 17 memorandum to Brzezinski, Sick provided background information for the PRC meeting, noting that the + participants needed “to agree on what is to be said to Mendelevich + this week and to examine the posture we should take regarding the + longer term future of these talks.” (Ibid.) + + + Washington, July 18, 1979, 4:30–5 + p.m. + + + SUBJECT + Indian Ocean (U) + + + PARTICIPANTS + + State + Warren Christopher + (chairman), Deputy Secretary + Reginald + Bartholomew, Director, Bureau of + Politico-Military Affairs + Peter Constable, + Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Near Eastern + Affairs + + + + + OSD + David McGiffert, + Assistant Secretary, International Security Affairs + + + + + JCS + Lt General John + Pustay, Assistant to the Chairman + + + + + DCI + Admiral Stansfield + Turner + Art Begelman, Analyst, Office of Strategic Research + + + + ACDA + George Seignious, + Director + John Newhouse, + Assistant Director, International Security Programs + Bureau + Amb + Ralph Earle, U.S. + Ambassador to SALT Delegation + + + + + White House + Dr. Zbigniew + Brzezinski + + + + + NSC + Marshall Brement + Gary Sick + + +

The PRC examined the question of how the + U.S. delegation should respond to Soviet Ambassador Mendelevich on July + 20 concerning possible resumption of the Indian Ocean arms limitations + talks. General Seignious + recommended some talking points for Ambassador Earle to use with Mendelevich along the + following lines:

+

(1) although the original talks had shown some progress, they had been + deferred due to turmoil in the region;

+

(2) some of that turmoil related to Soviet deployment levels at the time + of the fighting in the Horn of Africa;

+

(3) other turmoil, not necessarily of Soviet direct responsibility (Iran, + Afghanistan), had altered the situation in the region and had given rise + to perceptions of significant differences between the U.S. and USSR;

+

(4) our efforts to narrow differences with the Soviets at the Summit + concerning regional conflicts were not successful, which argues for a + cautious approach toward renewing the talks; and,

+

(5) we remain committed to the talks and hope that a more stable + situation will emerge which would permit resumption; in the meantime we + would be willing for the heads of our respective delegations to meet + this fall to reassess whether circumstances were more favorable to + resumption.

+

The PRC agreed with this approach. + ACDA will circulate talking points + for review. Dr. Brzezinski + suggested that Ambassador Earle + review the presentation which the President made to Brezhnev in Vienna concerning regional + issues and make the same points to Mendelevich in his discussion.Carter and Brezhnev discussed international and regional issues + on June 17. See Foreign Relations, 1977–1980, vol. VI, Soviet Union, + Document 204. All agreed.Below this paragraph, Carter wrote: “ok JC.” (S)

+
+ +
+ 125. Memorandum of ConversationSource: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, + Staff Material, Middle East, Subject File, Box 24, Indian Ocean: + 4–9/79. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by + Colonel Joel M. McKean. Copies were sent to Sick, Bartholomew, McGiffert, Seignious, Pustay, and Turner. + + + Washington, July 20, + 1979 + + + SUBJECT + Indian Ocean Talks + + + PARTICIPANTS + Ambassador Ralph Earle + II + Chairman, U.S. Indian Ocean Delegation + Colonel Joel McKean, Executive Secretary + Ambassador Lev Mendelevich, Chairman, Soviet Union Indian Ocean + Delegation + Mr. Neverov, Secretary, Ambassador Mendelevich + +

After brief introductory remarks, Earle, pursuant to decisions reached at the meeting of + the PRC on July 18, 1979,See Document 124. + and in accordance with the attached talking points,Not attached. presented the U.S. position + regarding resumption of the talks on Indian Ocean Arms Control.

+

Mendelevich referred to the Vienna CommuniqueThe Vienna Communiqué, released following the signing of the SALT + II Treaty in Vienna on June 18, stated, in part, that the United + States and the Soviet Union “agreed that their respective + representatives will meet promptly to discuss the resumption of the + talks on questions concerning arms limitation measures in the Indian + Ocean.” (Public Papers: Carter, 1979, Book I, + p. 1085) and, after quoting it, stated that the commitment + therein was not being fulfilled. Earle responded that our meeting had been prompt and not + inconsistent with the Communique. He had stated the reasons for U.S. + caution and cited the reasons that the immediate resumption of the talks + would not be appropriate. Earle + repeated that he would consider a meeting in the fall to discuss the + situation further.

+

Mendelevich said he had come prepared to discuss dates for resumption but + would not do so since the U.S. side was not prepared to address this + subject; Mendelevich would discuss the situation from the Soviet + perspective. Citing some progress, he listed agreement on such things as + objectives, military presence, initiating of the talks regarding + reduction once the first agreement is achieved, and principles, and + indicated that the drafting stage could have continued if talks had + resumed. He added that at the end of the fourth round the UN + was informed of substantive + progress and that this progress was ready to be translated into treaty + language.

+

Mendelevich wanted to emphasize that there were mostly positive aspects + and only one negative, the inability to establish a date for the next + round. He referred to a discussion between Vance and Gromyko in September, 1978, in which Vance said that the American side was + soon to fix a date for the resumption of the talks.See Foreign Relations, 1977–1980, vol. VI, + Soviet Union, Document 148. However, time passed + and no date was established. This was the formal side of the Soviet + perception according to Mendelevich and he then proceeded to give what + he called the substantive side.

+

Mendelevich was aware of things such as the perception by the U.S. side + of the Soviet presence in the Indian Ocean. He said this U.S. perception + was wrong, this was not the case. There had been no increase in Soviet + presence in the Indian Ocean. However, even if it were the case, there + could be no U.S. argument since there had been no agreement on a freeze. + Additionally, the increased level would not matter since both sides had + talked about averages for the proposed freeze level. Finally, if there + had been an increase in Soviet presence, Mendelevich rhetorically asked, + why had that round of talks been the most fruitful?

+

Mendelevich suggested that the U.S. presence had increased but that this + did not pose an obstacle for negotiations in the Soviet view.

+

Referring to the littoral and hinterland states, Mendelevich stated that + our negotiations should not be a reason for their suspicions. In fact he + perceived that the littoral and hinterland states’ suspicions had + subsided over the period of the talks thus far. He referred to a first + meeting of the littoral and hinterland states on this issue in July 1979 + in which they proposed the translation of principles reached thus far + into a binding agreement.The meeting of the + Littoral and Hinterland States of the Indian Ocean took place at the + United Nations in New York July 2–13. For a summary of the Final + Document of the meeting, see Yearbook of the + United Nations, 1979, pp. 49–50. The littoral and + hinterland states also referred to the Vienna Communique as a positive + indication that the talks would be resumed. Mendelevich said that + littoral and hinterland states expect a response. The Soviet side is + ready to give a response, the U.S. side is not. Mendelevich held that + nothing should be done about this delicate situation without the sides + informing each other before any action was taken. One possibility would + be for the Soviet side to announce dates that would be acceptable to + them, such as September or October of this year, and that the U.S. side + was not prepared to renew the talks. According to Mendelevich agreement + is within reach. The Soviet side supports the major elements of the + approach and would agree to a step-by-step process. He concluded by stating that if talks do not + continue in the near term, the Soviet side would not feel bound by + anything.

+

Earle said that he understood what + had been said by Mendelevich. More importantly, he was concerned about + the potential for sliding backwards in what Mendelevich had called a + “delicate subject” through unnecessary Soviet actions. He raised the + question of whether we would want to bring to the UN and to the general public the situation + regarding the delay in the talks. Mendelevich interrupted to indicate + that this was not a USSR position but + rather what he would recommend to his government.

+

Earle pointed out that a statement + of Soviet rationale would, in his view, probably necessitate an answer + by the U.S. as to why the U.S. was not prepared to renew the discussions + at this time. He did not see how such an exchange would be helpful.

+

Mendelevich expressed a concern that the fall meeting Earle had suggested could be + interpreted as simply a delaying tactic. Earle assured him that if we were to schedule a meeting + it would be for a useful purpose. Mendelevich said that the next action + was up to the U.S. and that he would await word from Earle.

+

After a brief informal discussion regarding channels of communications, + the meeting was adjourned.

+
+ +
+ 126. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense Brown to Secretary of State Vance and the President’s Assistant for National + Security Affairs (Brzezinski)Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, + Middle East, Subject File, Box 24, Indian Ocean: 10–12/79. Secret. + Brzezinski added the + following notation for Sick: + “GS, revision for V–B–B? ZB.” + + + Washington, November + 3, 1979 + + + SUBJECT + Diego Garcia + +

You will recall our discussion at lunch on October 25 of further + upgrading of the facilities at Diego Garcia.At the Vance-Brown-Brzezinski luncheon on October 25, the principals + decided that a tentative go-ahead for upgrading would be given; the + Department of Defense was tasked with preparing a package to review. + (Memorandum from Robert Gates + to Jake Stewart, October 25; Carter Library, National Security + Affairs, Staff Material, Middle East, Subject File, Box 68, Middle + East: Security: 9–12/79) As part of DoD’s FY 81 budget and FY 81–85 + FYDP, at some level of priority + there will be a program/budget item for funds for such an upgrade to + increase our capability to respond rapidly to an emergency in the + Persian Gulf/Indian Ocean region. It was specifically added in response + to my request to my staff for suggested initiatives to improve our Rapid + Deployment Forces.

+

The funding profile (in millions of FYDP dollars) that I envisage is along these lines:

+ + + + FY 81 + FY 82 + FY 83 + FY 84 + FY 85 + Total + + + + 10 + 40 + 40 + 10 + 0 + 100 + +
+

The primary purpose of the recommended construction would be to increase + the airlift and sealift throughput capability of the island. The + specific projects include adding to the existing aircraft fuel storage + capacity and ramp space, building a pier capable of supporting + roll-on/roll-off ships, constructing a taxiway parallel to the runway + and improving the airfield’s refueling facilities.

+

The Diego Garcia initiative is especially important because the USMC maritime prepositioning program will + require moving Pacific-based Marines and their tactical aircraft long + distances to link up with the equipment on RO/RO ships. Early in a + crisis, we might find countries in the region equivocating about + granting staging rights. The ability to use Diego Garcia for tankers and + some transiting tactical aircraft would then be essential for a speedy + U.S. response.

+

We are obligated under the terms of the US–UK Diego Garcia + Agreement signed in 1976The U.S.–U.K. Diego + Garcia Agreement was signed in London on February 25, 1976. + (Telegram 2945 from London, February 25, 1976; National Archives, RG + 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D760070–1152) Also see footnote 6, Document 26. to + consult with the British on any changes we desire to make to the + capabilities and use of the base. Since the nature of the improvements + listed above are consistent with the island’s generally recognized + purpose, the UK probably would not + object.

+

Other foreign policy consequences of the changes are predictable. The + radical Islamic states and the non-aligned countries such as India, Sri + Lanka and some of the small island nations, are likely to react + negatively. Countries looking for visible signs of U.S. commitment and + presence in the Indian Ocean/Persian Gulf region would react favorably. + Diego Garcia is far enough from the Gulf for such an upgrade not to + cause embarrassment to our friends there. The U.S. position in the + Indian Ocean talks with the Soviets is in such a state of flux that + modest further changes to Diego Garcia probably do not matter.

+ +

We must also anticipate Congressional reaction. While a few senators have + voiced objections in the past to any further expansion on Diego Garcia, + it is unclear what the reaction of the Congress as a whole would be. + Before the FY 81 budget is released we + should consult with the appropriate Congressional leaders about whatever + it contains on Diego Garcia. We should also consult with the UK in accordance with our agreement.

+ + Harold Brown + +
+ +
+ 127. Letter From Secretary of State Vance to Secretary of Defense BrownSource: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign + Policy File, P790177–0259. Secret. Drafted by Robert Burke (PM/ISO) on November 19; cleared by Robert C. + Houdek (AF/I), Woolf Gross (NEA/RA), David Gompert (PM), George Churchill (PM/ISO), and Lake. Churchill initialed the letter; Burke + initialed on behalf of the other clearing officials. A copy was sent + to Brzezinski. + + + Washington, November + 23, 1979 + + + Dear Harold: + +

In line with our luncheon discussion on October 25th,See footnote 2, Document + 126. I wanted to give you my thoughts on the + proposed upgrade of facilities at Diego Garcia which were described in + your memorandum of November 3rd.See Document 126.

+

We are aware of the limited capacity of Diego Garcia to sustain the + increased requirement for logistics and airlift support of our Indian + Ocean military operations. Consequently the Department of State supports + the FY 81 and FY 81–85 FYDP airfield + and port construction at Diego Garcia.

+

We believe we should move forward quickly to consult with the British and + key Congressional leaders before the FY + 81 budget is released. Previous hearings on Diego Garcia suggest that + the Congress will show a lively interest in our rationale for expanding + our facilities and will reopen earlier questions such as whether + improvements to the airfield will enable its use by B–52s.

+

While we support the construction of a pier capable of accommodating the + RO/RO ships, we would like to receive more details about plans for actually prepositioning + USMC equipment on such ships at + Diego Garcia.

+

My staff is ready to work with you to prepare approaches to the British + and to the Hill.

+

Sincerely,

+ + Cy + +
+ +
+ 128. Summary of Conclusions of a Special Coordination Committee + MeetingSource: Carter + Library, National Security Council, Institutional Files, Box 111, + SCC 294, 3/27/80, + Iran/Afghanistan. Secret. The meeting took place in the White House + Situation Room. The minutes are not attached and were not found. + Carter wrote “Zbig J” in + the upper right-hand corner of the first page. Under a March 26 + memorandum, Dodson sent + Mondale, Vance, Brown, Jones, and Turner + a meeting agenda. (Ibid.) + + + Washington, March 27, 1980, 9–10:10 + a.m. + + + SUBJECT + Iran and Afghanistan + + + PARTICIPANTS + + + State + Harold + Saunders + Reginald + Bartholomew + Charles W. + Maynes + + + + + OSD + David + McGiffert + + + + + JCS + Lt. Gen. John + Pustay + + + + + CIA + Bruce Clarke + + + + + Office of the Vice President + Denis Clift + + + + + White House + David Aaron + Joseph Onek* + Jody Powell* + + + + + NSC + Gary Sick + Thomas + Thornton + Marshall Brement + Alfred Friendly, Jr.* + * Present only for Item 1. + + + +

[Omitted here is material unrelated to the Indian Ocean.]

+

2. U.S. Participation in the UN Ad Hoc Committee on the Indian Ocean Zone of + Peace. State summarized the background of the issue. A UN Resolution was voted in 1971Reference is to UN + General Assembly Resolution 2832, adopted December 16, 1971, which + called for the establishment of a “zone of peace” in the Indian + Ocean. and reaffirmed each subsequent year calling for the elimination of all + bases, military installations, logistical supply facilities and any + other “manifestation of great power military presence in the Indian + Ocean conceived in the context of great power rivalry.” An Ad Hoc + Committee was formed to deal with the resolution.UN General Assembly + Resolution 2992, adopted December 5, 1972, established the Ad Hoc + Committee. We have resisted all participation in the + Committee in the past on the grounds that we do not accept the + legitimacy of any group of littoral states defining conditions + restricting the use of the high seas. Several things have changed in the + past year. First, the USSR has + formally joined the Committee and clearly intends to use it as a + propaganda platform against us. The Soviets bitterly attacked U.S. naval + presence and buildup at the last meeting of the Committee.The Ad Hoc Committee held both formal and informal + meetings between February 4 and October 20. Second, the + Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the UN vote condemning it provides the basis for directing the + efforts of the Committee away from the purely naval aspects to a + consideration of the land threat posed by the Soviet Union to the + nations of the area. Third, the Committee has now assumed the + responsibility of a preparatory committee to prepare the agenda and + terms of reference for a major conference on the Indian Ocean which is + to take place in 1981. A number of our friends—including Oman, Somalia + and Kenya who are providing us with military facilities—are represented + on the Committee and will probably be subject to attack by the Soviets + and others for their cooperation with us. We have discovered in the past + that none of the Western or other nations sympathetic to our views is + willing to stand up to the Soviets unless we lead the way. The question + at this time is whether we want to change our position and join the work + of the Preparatory Committee in order to defend our own interests. + (S)

+

The SCC unanimously recommended that the + U.S. join the Ad Hoc Committee with the intention of: (1) making a + strong statement disassociating ourselves with the principle of littoral + states imposing any regime on the high seas; (2) drawing attention to + the fundamental change in circumstances created by the Soviet invasion + of Afghanistan; and (3) opposing the convening of an IOZP conference. + All agreed that the U.S. delegation to the Committee should be a strong + one which is prepared to press vigorously for the U.S. position. (S)

+ +

ApproveCarter checked this option and initialed in the + right-hand margin next to it.

+

Disapprove. Do not join the Committee.

+
+ +
+ + 129. Briefing Memorandum From the Director of the Bureau of + Politico-Military Affairs (Bartholomew) to Secretary of State MuskieSource: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign + Policy File, P800109–1201. Secret. Drafted by David C. Gompert + (PM) and Bartholomew. A notation on the + memorandum indicates that Muskie saw it. Wisner also initialed the memorandum, indicating + that it was received in S/S on June 30. + + + Washington, June 30, + 1980 + +

Diego Garcia

+

In Ankara, my British counterpart and I formalized a new side + understanding (to the 1976 US–UK Agreement)See footnote 3, Document 126. + on the use of Diego Garcia (attached).Attached but not printed is a June 13 memorandum of conversation + detailing Bartholomew’s + discussions with Patrick Moberly, Assistant Under Secretary, British + Foreign and Commonwealth Office. The officials stated that their + respective governments shared the view that the uses of Diego Garcia + that required joint decision included the “installation or storage + of nuclear weapons,” and “combat operations.” Bartholomew and Moberly “agreed + that established procedures governing US intelligence flights from British territory also + apply to Diego Garcia.” Bartholomew “also affirmed that the USG will continue the practice of + consulting HMG prior to any + politically sensitive use of Diego Garcia not covered” in the + discussions. The previous understanding required us to seek + British approval of practically any out-of-the-ordinary use of the + Island. Under the new understanding we need British approval only to + place nuclear weapons there or to use the + facilities to support actual combat + operations.

+

HMG made a hard push to include non-combat operations against third countries on + the list of uses requiring their approval. This was too restrictive for + us, but we did give the British a formal assurance that we would + continue our practice of prior consultation with + them (not approval) on any politically sensitive use of Diego. It’s + clear they consider another Iran rescue mission in this category.

+ +

This new understanding was critical to our plans for expanding our + reliance and capabilities on Diego. Without this substantially expanded + flexibility to operate, we would have had trouble justifying to + ourselves, let alone Congress, the $1 billion expansion program DOD has developed. Nor could we count on + Diego as the main support base for the Rapid Deployment Force, should we + have to surge it into the Indian Ocean.

+

While the temptation is great (especially in DOD) to do some chest-thumping about our success on Diego, + we’ve got to let the word out very gradually. The Thatcher Government is insistent on + this because they would face major criticism if we get much press play + about our massive expansion plans and HMG’s relinquishment of much of their control over our + operations.

+

Another recent factor that will add to British concern is the July 4 + decision of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) to seek the return + of Diego Garcia to independent Mauritius. Reportedly, return of Diego + Garcia has been a previously stated political goal of Mauritius. + Mauritian Prime Minister Ramgoolan was to have made a demand of the + British Government during talks in London on July 7. We doubt, however, + that the OAU interest and Ramgoolan’s demarche will create a significant + problem for either the British or ourselves.

+
+ +
+ + Iraq +
+ 130. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National + Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to President CarterSource: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff + Material, Middle East, Chron File, Box 130, Quandt: 2/23–28/77. Secret. + Sent for information. Attached but not printed is a February 25 + covering memorandum from Inderfurth to Quandt that reads: “The attached is for your + information. What are your thoughts?” Also attached to Inderfurth’s memorandum is a + February 23 memorandum from Quandt and Sick to Brzezinski forwarding an earlier version of the + February 24 memorandum to Carter. + + + Washington, February 24, 1977 + + + SUBJECT + U.S. Relations with Libya and Iraq + +

In response to a recent memorandum from the Secretary of State,Reference is to a February 14 memorandum + from Vance to Carter concerning U.S. + relations with Libya and Iraq. In regard to Iraq, Vance noted that the nation + had broken off relations with the United States during the 1967 + Arab-Israeli war “on the grounds that the U.S. had directly + assisted Israel militarily during that conflict.” He stated that + the Iraqi position concerning the reestablishment of relations + derived from “the memory of U.S. support for the Kurds + (indirectly through Iran) in the last stages of their + insurrection ending in 1975.” Vance explained that U.S. policy “since the 1967 + break has remained that we are prepared to resume relations + whenever the Iraqis so suggest, and without conditions.” + (Ibid.) you asked why we should not initiate proposals + for normalizing relations with Iraq and Libya.

+

We maintain active commercial relations with both nations, and Libya + has recently indicated its interest in establishing normal + diplomatic relations. Iraq is rapidly assuming a more important role + in the economic and political activities of the Persian Gulf area + and has resolved, at least for the moment, the border dispute and + the Kurdish issue which had been a major source of irritation in its + relations with Iran.

+

In both cases, I believe that we should be alert for opportunities to + develop more normal relations. The timing, however, of any U.S. + unilateral move in this direction will be extremely important since + it will be interpreted by other Middle Eastern states as a signal of + our intentions and could have major implications for the success of + our efforts to promote an Arab-Israel settlement. Both Libya and + Iraq are viewed as pariahs by their neighbors. Thus, I would + recommend that any move on our part toward closer ties be carefully + prepared in advance through consultations with our friends in the + area, particularly the Egyptians and the Saudis, and I believe we + should avoid any new moves + in that direction while our Middle East negotiations are in their + present delicate state.In the margin + below the paragraph Carter wrote: “ok, but moves to normalize relations may keep Iraq & Libya + from trying to disrupt Mid E efforts. How can/could we move?” +

+
+ +
+ 131. Memorandum From Secretary of State Vance to President CarterSource: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, + Staff Material, Middle East, Subject File, Box 46, Iraq: + 12/76–5/77. Secret. Carter wrote “cc Cy J” in the upper right-hand + corner of the memorandum. Attached but not printed is an April + 28 covering memorandum from Acting NSC Staff Secretary Michael Hornblow to Tarnoff returning the + memorandum with Carter’s + marginal notes for Vance’s information. Under an April 19 memorandum, + Thornton sent + Brzezinski + Vance’s memorandum and + recommended that Brzezinski sign an attached covering memorandum + to Carter. Brzezinski approved the April + 21 covering memorandum and forwarded it and Vance’s memorandum to + Carter. + (Ibid.) + + + Washington, April + 15, 1977 + + + SUBJECT + Improving Relations with Other Nations + +

On April 5 you asked me to explore ways of improving relations with + Angola, Mozambique, Somalia and Iraq.Reference is to an April 5 handwritten note from Carter to Vance and Brzezinski. Carter wrote: “To Cy and Zbig, + We should move without further delay to probe for better + relations with countries like Somalia, Iraq & even Mozambique & Angola. Let’s meet + soon, inventory our opportunities & obstacles, & decide + on action. J.C.” (Ibid.) I gave you a preliminary report + on April 6 of our present thinking on bettering relations with these + countries and promised to follow up with more complete + proposals.In the April 6 report, + Vance told Carter that he had “sent word + to the Iraqi Foreign Minister that we would be interested in + having discussions with them. We have not heard back from that + feeler.” Vance also + noted that he had endorsed a proposal to meet with the Iraqi + Foreign Minister, but that: “We will have to be careful to + consult the Syrians, whose animosity towards the Iraqis runs + deep.” (Ibid.) This memorandum offers some further + thinking on steps we are considering or undertaking in pursuit of + improved relations with these four nations.

+

[Omitted here are sections on Angola, Mozambique, and Somalia.]

+ +

Iraq

+

Iraq for some time has been seeking to re-orient its economy away + from the Soviet Union and toward the West and generally to reduce + its isolation in the Arab world. Since your election, certain Iraqi + officials—including the Foreign Minister—have indicated to private + American citizens interest in improving the U.S./Iraqi relationship, + but have stopped short of suggesting a restoration of diplomatic + relations. These messages have been conveyed to me at the suggestion + of their Foreign Minister. As I have told you, we have responded + both through U.S. sources and through Foreign Minister Fahmy of Egypt.Carter + wrote in the left-hand margin next to this paragraph: “Why not + ask Iran, Saudi A.—Syria, Israel—or tell them we need to improve + relations with Iraq—to avoid disruption of peace efforts—.” +

+

Should matters develop satisfactorily, we will tell Baghdad that: (1) + we remain prepared to resume diplomatic relations without + conditions; (2) if the Iraqis believe this is premature, we would be + prepared to have a dialogue on more senior, policy-making levels and + would in this connection welcome the assignment of a more senior + Iraqi diplomat in Washington; (3) Iraq might consider sending a + special representative to Washington to discuss our relationship; + and (4) I would be ready to talk privately with the Foreign Minister + at the upcoming U.N. General Assembly, or at any other convenient + occasion.

+

At the same time, we will make clear to the Iraqis that the U.S. will + not support Kurdish resistance activities wherever and whenever they + occur. Memories of our involvement in the last stage of the Kurdish + rebellion against the Iraqi Government remain fresh, and the Iraqi + Foreign Minister has given this as a reason for not restoring + diplomatic relations.

+

Any highly visible move on our part to improve relations with Iraq + could arouse Iranian and Saudi suspicions and complicate our + increasingly warm relationship with Syria. Iraq has been doing its + best to bring down Asad. We + would want to consult with Asad, the Saudis, and the Shah and probably keep + Israel informed, should we move to improve relations with Iraq. We + might also have problems in justifying publicly in the U.S. a move + toward warmer relations with Iraq at a time when Baghdad has been + lending active support to international terrorist activities and has + a poor record on human rights.Carter wrote in the margin + below this paragraph: “Cy—Let’s also monitor endangered + relations with others—Pakistan, Brazil, Philippines, Indonesia, + Peru, etc & let me help if necessary—J.C.”

+
+ +
+ 132. Telegram From the United States Interests Section in Baghdad + to the Department of StateSource: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + D770176–0815. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. + + + Baghdad, May 18, 1977, 0912Z + +

842. Subject: Under Secretary Habib Meets With Iraqi Foreign Minister.

+

1. Summary: Under Secretary Habib had two hour meeting with Iraqi Foreign + Minister Hammadi on May 16. + Habib expressed USG interest in normalizing US-Iraqi relations and explained USG views on a Middle East settlement. + Hammadi expressed + skepticism concerning possibility of achieving a settlement and said + GOI not yet ready to resume + diplomatic relations. Before doing so it would need evidence that + USG not interfering in Iraqi + internal affairs and that USG had + altered in a significant way its policies of hostility toward the + Arabs on Arab-Israeli issues. Habib gave assurance that USG does not and will not interfere in Iraqi internal + affairs. He said that USG policies + were not hostile to the Arabs and were consistent with Arab + development and legitimate aspirations. End summary.

+

2. In response to our approach, USINT was informed by Foreign Ministry on May 15 that + Under Secretary Habib would + be welcome in Iraq. Habib + arrived in Baghdad that same evening. On morning of May 16 Foreign + Ministry Chief of Protocol arranged meeting between Habib and Foreign Minister + Hammadi at noon. + Habib and USINT Principal Officer Wiley attended meeting along with + two note takers from the Foreign Ministry. Foreign Ministry arranged + for TV photographers to film opening of meeting.

+

3. After opening courtesies, Habib delivered Presidential letter to Hammadi for delivery to President + Bakr.In telegram Tosec 40264/108992 + to Vance in Tehran, May + 13, the Department transmitted the text of Carter’s letter to Bakr. + (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, + Middle East, Subject File, Box 46, Iraq: 12/76–5/77) + Habib said that he was + prepared to discuss bilateral relations between Iraq and the United + States and also to have an exchange of views on larger international + issues such as the Arab-Israeli dispute. He emphasized that he was + in Baghdad to listen to Iraqi views as well as to explain USG positions.

+

4. During conversation Habib + repeated several times that USG is + interested in improving relations with the Government of Iraq. It + would be ten years next month since the Government of Iraq had + broken diplomatic relations and USG + believed the time had come to restore normal relations. Habib said USG is flexible on the modalities and + would be willing to + proceed on the Algerian model where the United States and Algeria + had agreed in principle to resume relations with specific dates to + be mutually agreed at a later time. USG is also ready for immediate resumption should the + GOI so desire.

+

5. Habib then said that we + were aware that the GOI had some + concerns over the history of the Kurdish situation. He said that he + wished to give unequivocal assurances to the Government of Iraq that + the USG is not now and will not in + the future support any dissident activities against the Government + of Iraq. This should no longer be an element that affects our + bilateral relations.

+

6. Habib then gave a detailed + explanation of the steps the USG + had undertaken to play a useful role in bringing about an + Arab-Israeli settlement. He said the USG hopes that it will be possible to convene the + Geneva Conference in the fall of 1977 but recognizes that it will be + necessary to lay some groundwork in advance if the conference is to + be successful. He emphasized that the USG is encouraged by the fact that all parties to the + conflict now seem to believe that a peaceful settlement would be in + their interests and also by the fact that all seem to believe that + the USG can play a useful role in + bringing about a successful outcome.

+

7. Foreign Minister Hammadi + thanked Habib for his + presentation and said that the Government of Iraq also believes that + the exchange of views can be useful and is always interested in + listening to what the USG has to + say on these important issues. He then said that the Kurdish problem + is not a “terrifying” issue to Iraq and that the GOI would do whatever is necessary to + face and solve the problem. He made the point that he thought the + Soviet Union would be both more willing and more able to exploit + minority problems in the Middle East than the United States. + Habib asked if there was + any indication that the Soviets were doing that now, and Hammadi replied that there were no + such indications. Hammadi + then said that our assurances on the Kurdish question represented a + welcome change of moral and political attitude on the part of the + United States and was welcomed by the Government of Iraq.

+

8. Hammadi said that the + important question in the minds of the Iraqis was whether the new + United States administration has adopted a new policy on the + Palestine issue. Habib + replied that the USG policy towards + this issue is evolving but depends to a large extent on the views + and attitudes of the concerned parties. He noted PLO refusal to accept the right of + Israel to exist. There should be no doubt that the US will continue to support the + existence of Israel as a state. Regarding Hammadi’s question on Palestine, + the President has said that there should be a homeland for the + Palestinians but we cannot define this further until the modalities + of a settlement become clearer.

+ +

9. Hammadi then asked a series + of questions concerning the policies of the concerned Arab states + towards a settlement and seemed particularly interested in whether + they had reached agreement among themselves. Habib explained that the positions + of all parties are still evolving and there are differences in + emphasis and on some issues there were differences of view.

+

10. Hammadi expressed + skepticism that a settlement would be possible in view of the major + differences between the Arab and Israeli point of view. Habib agreed that there were + substantial differences but said USG was encouraged by the fact that all parties had + accepted the settlement process which is now underway and welcomed + the US effort to facilitate a + settlement. All parties to the conflict now seemed to understand + that a renewed outbreak of war would not serve their interests. + Hammadi continued to + express skepticism that the present process could in fact lead to a + settlement. He said that Israel being militarily the stronger party + would insist on conditions which, if accepted by the Arab + governments, would lead to their downfall.

+

11. After considerable discussion of this issue, Habib returned to the subject of + bilateral relations and said that he was pleased by the intellectual + curiosity Hammadi displayed + in discussing these issues and that it would be in the interests of + both the US and Iraq to normalize + relations so that we would have better access to each other’s points + of view and could continue this type of discussion on a more regular + basis. Before replying directly Hammadi brought up the subject of Gulf security and + said that the GOI believes that the + US must somehow be involved in + current efforts to negotiate a collective security agreement for the + Gulf. Iraq believes that a collective security pact would only + create a new military bloc and that would in turn generate counter + blocs and lead to further conflict. Habib said that the USG was in no way involved in efforts to negotiate a + collective security package in the Gulf, but that he would look into + this subject further after he returned to Washington.

+

12. Hammadi then returned to + the subject of bilateral relations and said that Iraq believes the + US was the main supporter of + Israel and that its creation and support of the state of Israel was + an act of hostility towards the Arabs. He said that the United + States had acted absolutely contrary to the basic interest of the + Arab world by creating an alien state and colonizing it on the Arab + homeland. The GOI did not expect + the US to completely reverse its + policy of support for Israel, but it was still waiting for evidence + of a significant change in the US + policy of hostility towards the Arabs. Iraq also wanted evidence + that the USG had ceased its policy + of interference in Iraqi internal affairs. At this point Habib interrupted to say that he + was giving flat assurances both personally and officially that the + USG was not interfering and + would not interfere in + Iraq’s internal affairs. As for the other conditions, the USG was endeavoring to assist the + countries of the area to find a just and durable solution to the + Arab-Israeli conflict that would respect the interests and concerns + of all sides. The USG cannot accept + the charge that it has been hostile towards the Arab nation nor that + USG policies are inconsistent + with the development and aspirations of the Arab world.

+

13. Habib said that we will + remain ready to take steps to normalize relations whenever the + Iraqis wish to do so, and in the meantime would continue to assign a + senior officer as principal officer of the United States Interests + Section in Baghdad. We would hope the Iraqis would do the same in + their Interests Section in Washington. Hammadi said that he would be interested in meeting + with Secretary Vance at a + mutually convenient time and place. Habib asked if he would be in Paris for the CIEC Conference at the end of May and + Hammadi said he would not + because the Minister of Oil was responsible for these negotiations. + Hammadi also said he + would probably not be in the United States until the United Nations + General Assembly in September but he would look forward to meeting + Secretary Vance at that time + if there was no convenient opportunity prior to then. Hammadi said that Vice Chairman + Saddam Hussein would like to thank the USG for its help in providing medical assistance for + his recent back problems and Habib said that we were pleased to have been of + service.At the request of the Iraqi + Government, a team of American doctors visited Iraq to diagnose + and treat Saddam Hussein’s back problems. The doctors concluded + that he did not need back surgery at the time. (Telegram 742 + from Baghdad, May 4; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign + Policy File, D770156–0339) Earlier in the conversation + Hammadi made a point of + noting that Saddam Hussein was not able to meet with Habib because he is at home + convalescing from his recent illness.

+

14. Comment: The meeting was not marked by any substantial progress, + but the polemics were limited and the atmosphere cordial. The ice + was broken and there is no doubt that the Iraqi Government wishes to + maintain a political dialogue. They are cautious, but we did not + expect any dramatic response from Hammadi. We have indicated our willingness for + improving relations. We need to let it be considered thoroughly by + the leadership and then follow up in appropriate fashion.

+ + Wiley + +
+ +
+ 133. Telegram From the Department of State to the United States + Interests Section in BaghdadSource: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign + Policy File, D770372–0929. Confidential; Immediate. Drafted by + Peck (NEA); cleared by Leo Reddy (S/S) + and Frank Wisner (S/S); + approved by Atherton. + Sent for information to USUN, + Kuwait, Sana, Jidda, Damascus, Amman, Cairo, and Tel + Aviv. + + + Washington, October 13, 1977, + 0100Z + +

245535. Subject: Secretary’s Bilateral With Iraqi Foreign + Minister.

+

1. Secretary, accompanied by Under Secretary Habib and Baghdad PO + Peck, had 45-minute meeting + with Foreign Minister Hammadi + and Iraqi delegation, including UN + PermRep Shahafi, in lounge of + UN on Oct 3. (FYI: This was only bilateral which did + not take place in Secretary’s suite at One UN Plaza, and was held on neutral ground at Iraqi + insistence. A translator was also present at Iraqi request, but he + only translated Hammadi’s + remarks from Arabic to English. End FYI).

+

2. Meeting was reasonably cordial but restrained, with Iraqis + focusing almost exclusively on their perception of principal + obstacles to improved relations: American support for Israel, the + question of a Palestinian homeland, and the issue of refugees. The + Secretary underlined continued U.S. commitment to existence and + security of Israel, but pointed out that we are working hard to + resolve the Middle East problem in a manner acceptable to all the + parties, thereby creating the conditions for a just and lasting + peace in the area.

+

3. The Secretary pointed to the U.S.-Soviet joint statementReleased on October 1; see Foreign + Relations, 1977–1980, vol. VIII, Arab-Israeli + Dispute, January 1977–August 1978, Document + 120. as an indication of the effort being put + forth, and the recognition of the necessity to provide answers to + the complicated question of Palestinian rights and a Palestinian + homeland. He told Hammadi, + who pressed for details, that our views are well known to the + parties concerned, who must themselves make the final decisions at + Geneva.Reference is to the Geneva + Middle East Peace Conference.

+

4. Other issues of significance were Iraqi request for assurances + that the U.S. was not involved in internal affairs or in activities + related to formation of blocs in the Gulf area—assurances which were + crisply and categorically given. The session was inconclusive so far + as any movement toward renewing relations is concerned. Hammadi said there so far had been + insufficient change in U.S. policy to justify renewal but indicated + an Iraqi willingness to meet again, in the U.S. or in Baghdad. The Secretary pointed out + that Mr. Peck was being sent + there in order to permit the dialogue to continue.

+

5. Copy of memcon being pouched.

+ + Vance + +
+ +
+ 134. Intelligence Memorandum Prepared in the Central Intelligence + AgencySource: Central + Intelligence Agency, Office of Support Services (DI), Job 80T00634A, Production Case + Files (1978), Box 4, Folder 47, Government in Iraq. Secret; [handling restriction not declassified]. + Prepared in the Office of Regional and Political Analysis of the + National Foreign Assessment Center. + + + RPM 78–10407 + + + Washington, October 31, 1978 + +

Government In Iraq

+

PRINCIPAL JUDGMENTS

+

In the ten years the Baath Party has ruled Iraq,Michel Aflaq and Salah al-Bitar founded the + Ba’ath Party in Syria in 1946 to pursue Arab nationalist and + socialist agendas. The 1968 coup in Iraq brought the Ba’ath + Party to power. it has brought a relative measure of + stability and unity to a country long known for its instability, + disunity, and high level of political violence. There are elaborate + institutional mechanisms which ostensibly represent the divergent + ethnic and political groups in Iraqi society and politics, but real + power lies with President Ahmad Hasan al-Bakr, Revolutionary Command + Council Deputy Chairman Saddam Husayn, and a few close advisers.

+

—Bakr and Saddam Husayn are in firm control of the country. They use + economic and political carrots-and-sticks to create an impression of + national solidarity and widespread support for the government, but + their power is dependent on their control of the party and the state + security and intelligence organizations, and on the acquiescence of + the military.

+

—The relationship between Bakr and Saddam is one marked more by + consensus on major issues than conflict over who wields power. They + share close family ties and a common perception of the direction + Iraq’s policies should take. Their primary concerns are the + stability of the regime, the unity of the country, and military and + economic independence.

+ +

—Saddam’s position has been strengthened considerably in the past + four years. The ailing President Bakr apparently has willingly + relinquished much of the conduct of government to the younger and + healthier Saddam. Saddam, in turn, has orchestrated major + governmental and party reorganizations which have consolidated his + hold on both institutions and virtually assure his succession to the + presidency.

+

—Institutions like the Revolutionary Command Council (RCC), once the dominant governmental + body, and the Baath Party’s Regional Command, the party’s + policy-making body, have only a limited input in the decision-making + process. They have symbolic importance, however, and could play a + decisive role in any succession crisis.

+

—The party and the government are dominated, for the most part, by + the country’s Sunni Arab minority. Promotions and awards are + frequently dependent more on family and village ties and personal + loyalty than on party service.

+

—Although Communists and Kurds are represented in the Cabinet and the + National Front, their presence is essentially cosmetic. There is no + power-sharing and no room for political dissent.

+

—Saddam Husayn appears to rely on a half-dozen advisers, including + Defense Minister Talfah, his brother-in-law, for advice on economic + planning, military reorganization, and oil affairs. He seems to have + no special consultant on foreign affairs and has developed no + discernible relations of trust with anyone in either the government + or the party.

+

—Bakr and Saddam Husayn have few rivals for power. The opposition—be + it Communist, Kurd, rival Baathist, or military—seems to be in + disarray, unable to mount an effective challenge to Saddam or alter + the present governmental or political structure.

+

[Omitted here is the body of the Intelligence Memorandum.]

+
+ +
+ 135. Action Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for + Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Saunders) to the Under Secretary of State for + Political Affairs (Newsom)Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + P860132–0005. Secret; Nodis + Attachment. Drafted by Draper; cleared by Alan H. Flanigan (EUR/SE). A “P” was handwritten + at the top of the page, indicating that Newsom saw the + memorandum. + + + Washington, January 2, 1979 + + + SUBJ + Improving Relations with Iraq + +

Iraqi strongman Saddam Hussein has clearly indicated, in response to + probes and questions by both the ItalianNot found. and Turkish Prime Ministers,In telegram 8823 from Ankara, December 11, + 1978, Spiers described a + meeting between Turkish Prime Minister Ecevit and Saddam Hussein + wherein Saddam “reportedly indicated a desire to resume + diplomatic relations with the U.S.” (Carter Library, National + Security Affairs, Staff Material, Middle East, Subject File, Box + 46, Iraq: 6/77–12/78) that he is readier than ever before + to resume diplomatic relations with the United States at some future + moment. With Ecevit, Saddam Hussein laid down two conditions for + resumption: that the United States not meddle in internal Iraqi + affairs (while acknowledging that the U.S. has not been involved + with the Kurds since 1975) and that relations be restored at a time + when Iraq would not appear to others to be under U.S. pressure to do + so.

+

This latest initiative comes at a time when Iraq gradually has been + moving away from its heavy dependence on the USSR to a more balanced, less hostile + position both within the Arab world and in its relations with the + West. Iraq has shown a sense of responsibility in its continuing + support for the Shah during this difficult period in Iran.

+

The President showed a keen interest in responding positively to + these apparent Iraqi initiatives. In accord with a discussion you + had with Draper before you + went on vacation, we recommended to the Secretary the kind of + statement we might pass on to Iraqi strongman Saddam Hussein. The + Secretary decided that, rather than using Ecevit as an intermediary + to convey our message, you should get in touch either with the Iraqi + UN Ambassador in New York or + with the head of the Iraqi Interests Section here. We subsequently + recommended to the Secretary that the contact be with the Iraqi + Interests Section head, since we know him to be a reliable reporter + and a high Ba’ath Party official. The Iraqi representative in New + York is in bad odor with Saddam Hussein, having challenged his leadership some years ago, + and is also poor in English.

+

After the foregoing decisions were made, we consulted with Hermann + Eilts in Cairo as to + Sadat’s likely reactions to the response we would make. Hermann + sensed that Sadat would be disturbed, but believed any U.S. response + to the Iraqis could be explained as a cautious effort on our part to + respond to Iraqi signals with a view to putting us in a better + position to influence the Iraqis in various spheres, including in + the peace process. He did recommend, however, that we inform Sadat + in advance of your getting in touch with the Iraqis here and that we + also make clear that we intend to make use of any dialogue that + results from our exchanges with the Iraqis to encourage them to + eschew terrorism and assassination.

+

Attached (Tab 1) is a cable instructing Eilts to inform Sadat of our planned response to the + Iraqis and also giving instructions to Ankara, Rome, and Amman.Attached but not printed. The telegram to + Cairo at Tab 1 reads in part: “We recently received signals of + Iraqi interest in restoration of U.S.-Iraq diplomatic relations. + Consistent with our past policy, we would like to encourage + Iraqi interest in this matter. Although the signals have come to + us through intermediaries, we intend to respond directly.” A + handwritten note at the top of the first page indicates the + telegram was sent on January 2. At Tab 2 are talking + points approved by the Secretary which you would use during your + meeting with Mr. al-Khateeb + in Washington.The talking points at Tab + 2 read in part: “The U.S. is prepared to resume diplomatic + relations with Iraq whenever Iraq is ready to do so. We would + welcome such a step.” Mouhyi + al-Khateeb was the head of the Iraqi Interests + Section in Washington. Since Hermann may have trouble + getting in touch with Sadat in the next few days, we suggest you + meet with Khateeb. Later this week. We will work with your office to + set this up.

+
+ +
+ 136. Telegram From the Department of State to the United States + Interests Section in BaghdadSource: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign + Policy File, D790137–0930. Confidential; Priority. Drafted by + Charles G. Currier (NEA/ARP); cleared by Wat + T. Cluverius (NEA/ARN) and A. Peter Burleigh (NEA/ARP); approved by Crawford. Sent for information + to Abu Dhabi, Algiers, Beijing, Cairo, Damascus, Doha, Jidda, + Kuwait, London, Manama, Muscat, Paris, Rabat, Sana, Tehran, + Amman, Moscow, Islamabad, New Delhi, Tel Aviv, and + Tripoli. + + + Washington, March 24, 1979, + 2126Z + +

73833. Subject: Iraq: An Anglo-American Perspective.

+

1. Summary: During the recently concluded Anglo-American talks on the + Persian Gulf,Held March 15–16, the + Anglo-American talks addressed regional security threats. + Crawford prepared a + summary representing the consensus view of the participants in + the talks, which was distributed in telegram 69172 to multiple + posts, March 20. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign + Policy File, D790130–0863) the participants noted Iraq’s + efforts to be perceived within the rest of the Arab world as + something other than a Soviet puppet. Within the last month or so, + the GOI has made overtures to the + British about warming relations and over the past six months has + been taking a more adroit and active diplomatic role in Arab fora + (e.g., the Baghdad Summit,See footnote 6, Document 12. + mediatory efforts in Yemen).See Document 274. The GOI is, in British eyes “formidable + and relatively efficient.” Iraq is the country most likely to be + affected by events in Iran, given its large Kurdish and Shi’a + populations. The Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty appears to have cost + Sadat and Egyptians much of the support they had among Arab + intellectuals. The Iraqis seem to be consciously trying to fill this + void. In the process they seem to have outmaneuvered Saudi Arabia + and other Arab moderates. End summary.

+

2. Iraq and its policy in the Arab world was one of the principal + topics discussed during the recently concluded Anglo-American talks + on the Persian Gulf. During the last six months Iraq has become + active diplomatically in an effort to improve its standing in the + Arab world. Iraq’s adept management of the Baghdad Summit + Conference, its present intention to push for prompt action to + implement Summit sanctions against Sadat once a treaty has been + signed, and its mediatory efforts in Yemen are examples of this + effort, as is its bid for unity with Syria.Saddam and Syrian President Asad held talks in late January + to discuss unification of Iraq and Syria. (William Bramigin, + “Events in Iran Spur Iraq-Syria Unification Plan,” The Washington Post, January 30, 1979, p. + A12) Iraq’s persistence and the apparently genuine nature + of at least some aspects of the Iraqi/Syrian rapprochement cannot + escape the attention of + other Arab states. In the British view (with which the U.S. + concurred), Iraq wants to be perceived as something other than a + Russian puppet.

+

3. Complementing the increased tempo of Iraqi diplomatic activity in + Arab circles have been its long-standing efforts to improve + commercial ties with the West and, within the last three to four + weeks, efforts to warm its diplomatic ties with the British. Sir + Anthony Parsons of the F.C.O. noted that the U.K.’s Foreign + SecretaryDavid Owen. might visit + Iraq in the next one to two months. In the opinion of the British + participants, the GOI is + “formidable and relatively efficient.”

+

4. The British feel that Iraq is the country most likely to be + affected by the Iranian situation, especially given Iraq’s large + Kurdish and Shi’a populations. While there have been few major signs + of increased Iraqi concern about these groups, both the U.S. and the + U.K. teams expect the GOI will + continue to maintain a close watch over domestic developments and to + steer a course in its relations with Iran that is least likely to + provoke Khomeini and the new government.

+

5. The British noted that the Iraqi Government appears to be + confident as it moves to win from Sadat and the Egyptians a + significant measure of support among the Arab intelligentsia. The + U.K. feels there is considerable evidence that Sadat and the + Egyptians have lost ground among Arab intellectuals. In particular, + the British team noted that as Iraq seems to be returning to the + Arab fold, the other Arab states have been engaging in wishful + thinking about current trends in Iraqi foreign policy. This + increased respectability within the Arab world is one of the cards + the Iraqi Government may be able to play. The other Arab + states—especially the moderates—may be pulled closer to the Iraqi + position by their desire to achieve Arab unanimity.

+

6. The American side agreed that Iraq’s foreign policy has become + substantially more active and effective. It also concurred with the + British that the Arab moderates currently seem to fear Iraq less + than before. One year ago, during the effort to win congressional + approval of the sale of F–15 aircraft to Saudi Arabia, Iraq was + portrayed as one of the enemies of Saudi Arabia. We have not + recently heard Saudi Arabia or any Gulf state—except the UAE—describe the Iraqis as a threat. + The Kuwaitis now appear to view Iraq as quite moderate and some + responsible Kuwaitis have denied that Iraq poses a threat to + Kuwait—perhaps an example of the wishful thinking described above. + The UAE still perceives Iraq as a + continuing threat, however, its leaders seem to feel that the + improvement in Iraqi/Syrian relations is due primarily to events in + Iran and not to any particular moderation of Iraqi views.

+ +

7. In addition to playing a more active role in the Middle East, Iraq + has devoted noticeable attention to the question of stability in the + region. Common opposition to the Egyptian-Israeli treaty contributes + to the maintenance of a strong relationship between Iraq and the + USSR. Nevertheless, being wary + of Soviet encroachment in the Middle East, Iraq will continue to + build its credentials as a member of the non-aligned movement and + may encourage other Arab states to do so as well. To the extent that + it can mobilize Arab opinion against Sadat, Iraq constitutes a + threat to U.S. and European efforts to bring peace to the Middle + East. At the same time, Iraqi interests in maintaining stability in + the Middle East and especially in the Gulf coincide to some extent + with those of the West, as does Iraqi wariness of expanded Soviet + influence in the region. Nevertheless, in the absence of any + dramatic change in the situation, there is little likelihood that + the political gap between Iraq and the U.S. will be substantially + narrowed, though there may be some improvement in Iraq’s relations + with Western European states.

+ + Vance + +
+ +
+ 137. National Intelligence EstimateSource: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, + Brzezinski Material, + Country File, Box 34, Iraq: 1/77–3/80. Secret; [handling restriction not declassified]. A + typed notation reads in part: “The Central Intelligence Agency + and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State + and Defense, and the National Security Agency participated in + the preparation of this estimate. The Director of the CIA issued this estimate; the + National Foreign Intelligence Board concurred, except where + noted in the text.” + + + NIE 36.2–1–76 + + + Washington, June + 21, 1979 + +

IRAQ’S ROLE IN THE MIDDLE + EAST

+

[Omitted here are the foreword and the table of contents.]

+

PRINCIPAL JUDGMENTS

+

Iraq’s Ba’thist leaders are determined to perpetuate themselves in + power, to impose their national, socialist, and secular philosophy + on the country, and to expand the state’s power and ability to wield + influence abroad. Iraq will be a state to reckon with in the Middle + East for at least the five-year period of this Estimate. It has both + the will and the means to pursue radical goals and will complicate + US efforts to fashion a comprehensive Middle + East peace, maintain stability among the Arab states of the Persian + Gulf, and assure adequate oil supplies to the West.

+

The 40-year-old civilian Saddam Husayn is likely to succeed the + ailing President Ahmad Hasan al-Bakr, a military man and Ba’thist of + impeccable pre-1958 revolutionary credentials. We cannot predict + whether the Iraqi military, arbiters of power since the 1930s, will + tolerate a purely civilian regime. However, we would expect + relations between the military and the political leadership to be + less smooth after Saddam’s succession, at least until officers + personally loyal to him occupy the most important command positions. + We do not know enough about the political attitudes of military + officers to do more than indicate that an orderly Saddam succession + is not a sure thing—although it is clearly the most likely + development.

+

Ba’thist power is firmly entrenched, relying on multiple security + services, regimentation of the population through the party and its + associated “people’s” organizations, and summary disciplining of any + who might dare to differ with the regime. The country as a whole is + prosperous because of large and growing oil revenues: it has + achieved a 10-percent annual rate of growth since 1974 without + suffering undue inflation. There are, however, serious economic + problems that will take years to solve; skilled and semiskilled + labor is in very short supply, and agricultural production has + stagnated.

+

The Baghdad regime will continue to feel insecure about Iran until + that country acquires a government with which Baghdad can build a + satisfactory nonconfrontational relationship. The Iraqis also fear + that the Islamic movement in Iran will infect their own Shia + majority, which has long felt mistreated by Sunni-dominated + governments in Baghdad. They are clearly worried that the Ayatollah + Khomeini—who spent 14 years as an exile at the Shia theological + school in An Najaf, Iraq—sees himself as a religious leader whose + influence should extend beyond the borders of Iran. Another concern + is that lack of central government control in Tehran will allow arms + to flow from Iran to Iraqi Kurds. Baghdad will probably have to + continue to use military force to control disaffection in Shia and + Kurdish areas.

+

The regime’s desire to play a leading role in the region and a + concern about unsettled conditions in Iran will, in the near term, + push it toward nonconfrontational relations with many other Arab + states. Although muting their policy of subversion, Iraqi Ba’th + leaders will continue to support the development of party + organizations in other Arab states and spread Ba’thist socialist + doctrine throughout the region.

+

Baghdad will continue to rely on the Soviets for arms and other + technological support, but Iraq is becoming increasingly concerned + about the USSR’s support for such + clients as Ethiopia, South Yemen, and Afghanistan. Should the USSR be drawn into Afghanistan’s + troubles to the extent of providing troops, Iraqi-Soviet relations + would take a sharp downturn. In any event, Iraq will balance its + relations with the Soviets by strengthening ties with Western + industrial states. This policy will include continued commercial + ties with major European states, as well as military purchases from + France and others.

+

Long a price hawk in the Organization of Petroleum Exporting + Countries, Iraq will continue to seek crude oil price rises that run + ahead of world inflation rates. World supply/demand tightness, + expected to continue in the 1980s, will increase Iraqi influence in + OPEC + decisionmaking, and Iraqi production decisions will have much + greater impact on the international oil market. Current production + is about 3 million barrels a day. Although we do not know what level + Iraq plans to achieve in the next five years, we expect it to be + substantially lower than Iraq’s maximum sustainable capacity.

+

The implications for US interests of + the likely course of events in Iraq and of that country’s policies + are not promising. The political framework in which Baghdad’s rulers + operate is largely hostile to US + policies in the region. Iraq will not change its opposition to the + US approach toward the + Arab-Israeli problem unless it sees convincing evidence that a + Palestinian state is going to appear in the West Bank and Gaza, that + Syria is retrieving Golan, and that Lebanese Maronite factions are + no longer being supported by Israel. It will rather use the + opposition of other states to US + efforts with respect to a settlement to try to reduce US influence in the area as a + whole.

+

The current level of relations with the United States is sufficient + to satisfy Iraqi desires for access to US technology. Iraq’s leaders will not feel compelled + to improve political relations with the United States unless they + see progress toward a settlement of the Palestine issue, or they are + jolted by some major Soviet advance in the area such as the + emergence of a leftist government in Iran. The reliance of certain + states on Iraqi oil will put pressure on them to accommodate Iraqi + desires. Pressure on France (Iraq’s principal friend and contact in + the Western world) and Italy to live up to commitments to provide + major nuclear components may be quite strong, with obvious + implications for US nuclear + nonproliferation policy.

+

Despite Iraq’s cooperation with the USSR, the regime is not anxious to see it or the United + States either very active or very successful in the region. + Baghdad’s rulers have long made known their concern about Soviet + actions in the area. In foreseeable circumstances, Baghdad will work + to limit Soviet influence in the Middle East. The emergence—or + perhaps only the threat of such emergence—of a leftist and + Moscow-oriented regime out of the turbulent conditions in Iran would + profoundly upset the Ba’th leaders. Such a development would cause + the leaders to assess their + external relations and could, if other conditions were right, lead + to a major change—on the scale of that in 1975 with IranReference is to the March 1975 Algiers + Agreement between Iraq and Iran following a Kurdish rebellion in + Iraq that Iran had aided. In the agreement, Iraq acquiesced to + Iranian demands to redefine the Shatt al-Arab waterway boundary; + Iran promised to close its borders to Iraqi Kurds and to cease + aid to the rebellion in Iraq.—in relations with the + United States. Such a development looks impossible from today’s + perspective, but the Ba’th regime is, within the bounds of its goals + and requirements, flexible. Such flexibility is not to be confused + with moderation; this is a regime led by extremists and chauvinists, + determined to make the Iraq they run as self-reliant and independent + as possible.

+

Until a year ago Iraq was considered the pariah state of the Arab + world. Its relations with most neighbors were poor because of its + reputation for ruthlessness and its support for terrorism and + regional radical groups. The Camp David accords shocked the Iraqis + into a reassessment of their contentious policies and the adoption + of a new tack: they ended their bitter feud with Syria and provided + strong leadership in organizing an Arab consensus against the peace + terms negotiated by President Sadat. Iraq is riding high in its + newfound role as a regional leader and may move on to assume the + leadership of the nonaligned movement in 1982.

+

Iraq’s rapprochement with Syria has enhanced Baghdad’s ability to + play a major role in the Arab-Israeli conflict and has already + damaged efforts to achieve a comprehensive peace settlement. While + the two countries are not likely to achieve complete unity, their + self-proclaimed goal, cooperation between them on selected issues is + likely to increase.

+

Although the basing in Syria of more than token Iraqi forces is + unlikely because of the probability of Israeli preemption, Iraq’s + likely contribution of expeditionary forces in a war with Israel has + increased to five divisions (from the two divisions which saw combat + in 1973). Iraq has already expanded and improved its armed forces + more than any other Arab state since the 1973 war. Specifically, + Iraq has:

+ + —Doubled its military manpower and its armored forces. + —Increased its inventory of combat aircraft by almost 65 + percent. + —Expanded its air defense forces to nine times the 1973 + level. + +

With the second largest and the best equipped armed forces of any of + the Arab states by 1982, Iraq will, indeed, be a state to reckon + with in the Middle East.

+

[Omitted here is the body of the Estimate.]

+
+ +
+ 138. Telegram From the United States Interests Section in Baghdad + to the Department of StateSource: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + D790323–0610. Secret; Immediate. Sent for information to Abu + Dhabi, Algiers, Amman, Beirut, Damascus, Dhahran, Doha, Jidda, + Khartoum, Kuwait, London, Manama, Mogadiscio, Muscat, Rabat, + Sana, Tehran, Tripoli, and Tunis. + + + Baghdad, July 17, 1979, 0957Z + +

1528. Subj: (C) Passing the Torch: Saddam Is Solidly In Charge. Ref: + Baghdad 1527.Telegram 1527 from + Baghdad, July 17, outlined the changes Saddam made to the + Cabinet after Bakr’s resignation on July 16. (National Archives, + RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790322–1080)

+

1. (S-entire text)

+

2. Summary: President Bakr’s dramatic July 16 abdication was + unexpected, but the smooth succession of Saddam Hussein et al was + not. Health may indeed have been the real reason, but the timing of + Bakr’s exit may be fortuitous in terms of governmental stability at + least in the short run. Number of factors combine to leave Saddam + with a firm grip on a relatively solid regime. End summary.

+

3. Ahmed Hassan al-Bakr was + known to be old (particularly for his age—62) and not terribly + healthy. The general consensus of outsiders’ opinions, however, was + that the old gentleman would totter around for some years to come, + probably with a steadily decreasing role other than the symbolic + leader of the country. Over the past several months, there were + signs of occasional weakness, but nothing of sufficient duration or + impact to lead to a conclusion that he was about to resign.

+

4. The July 16 announcement was therefore a surprise. The extent to + which there was actually a sudden deterioration in Bakr’s health or + in his desire to conserve what is left of it in the quieter role of + dictator-emeritus, is unclear. The pressures of office have indeed + grown, as Iraq has become less and less isolated, and while Saddam + was carrying the major share of the role, even the ceremonial + responsibilities were taking their toll on Bakr’s flagging resources + (Baghdad 1404).Telegram 1404 from + Baghdad, June 28, evaluated Bakr’s health and overall appearance + during a series of recent public events, noting that during a + June 19 press conference following a visit by Syrian President + Asad, Bakr had a + “very noticeable slackness about the face that made him look, + with his glasses on, like a badly dazed Groucho Marx.” (National + Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + D790299–0803)

+

5. The announcement may have been a surprise in terms of its timing + but the handing over of the Presidential and leadership + responsibilities to Saddam was not a surprise in any sense. He had + long since been designated as Bakr’s handpicked successor, and the + passing of the torch has + been as smooth as everyone anticipated. The clear indications that + Izzat Ibrahim had been chosen as Saddam’s successor (Baghdad + 1524)Telegram 1524 from Baghdad, + July 16, observed: “In the midst of the July 14–17 celebrations + [commemorating the anniversary of the July 1958 overthrow of the + Iraqi monarchy], MinInt + Izzat Ibrahim had suddenly emerged more solidly than ever before + in the number three position of the Baath regime. More + importantly, he may have become the heir presumptive to the + deputy chairmanship of the RCC, + once Saddam Husayn inevitably replaces the aging President + Bakr.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + D790328–0158) was the only real sign—in retrospect—that + the announcement of a major change was in the offing but this tends + to reinforce rather than weaken the assessment that Saddam is taking + over a relatively unified and apparently solid regime.

+

6. How long it will stay that way, given low-level rumors of + rivalries and factions is highly problematical. The timing of Bakr’s + departure however, will probably on balance be a stabilizing factor. + While there are a number of serious problems facing the leadership, + in particular the possibilities of increased domestic unrest + resulting from the Kurdish problem and the as-yet unmeasured threat + of active Shia dissidence, the GOI + is at or near the pinnacle of its aspirations. Thus far, it appears + that the threat posed by the Shia majority may not be as major as + early signs of trouble indicated. The recent announcement of + improved relations with Iran should assist in reducing the potential + for unrest to some degree, and there is also a feeling that even + those who are not strongly in favor of the secular Baathi regime + would prefer it to the chaos and anarchy that might result from an + Islamic upheaval a la Iran.

+

7. To the extent that Kurds and Shia can be eliminated from the list + of critical internal threats to the new regime, and the local + Communists in their present decimated condition ignored, the only + real question mark is the military. Whether or not Saddam (a + civilian) can function as Commander-in-Chief with Adnan Khairollah (until recently a + Lieutenant Colonel), as Deputy Commander-in-Chief and MinDef will be determined with the + passage of time. Our preliminary estimate is that the efforts that + Saddam and the party have made to purge and realign armed forces + leadership over the past several years, combined with the + dramatically heightened increase in the threat from Iran, are + probably sufficient to hold the military in line.

+

8. The party itself has always been considered relatively unified, + and the recent upsurge in Iraq’s Middle Eastern—and world—role + should act to keep the militants happy. Saddam takes over a nation + that has gained remarkable international stature in a remarkably + short space of time, is wealthy and growing wealthier, faces an + external threat which, imperfectly, tends to strengthen rather than + weaken support for the + changeover, and has already demonstrated considerable ability in + handling minor difficulties that may occur.

+

9. This latter point, of course, is one of the most significant + intangibles. Saddam Hussein has impressed a lot of people with his + adroitness, shrewdness, and toughness. The so-called Tikriti clan + i.e. the top handful, has moved upwards more or less as a bloc. The + conformity of their views, opinions, objectives and methods may not + be perfect, but it also does not appear to be widely divergent. They + have had experience in working well together and with their enhanced + positions should be able to do so in the future. Thus, in sum, it is + reasonable to anticipate a further period of relative stability in + Iraq. Barring the unforeseen, which in this country takes in a broad + range of possibilities, Saddam Hussein is quite likely to be in + power for a long time.The telegram is + unsigned.

+
+ +
+ 139. Telegram From the United States Interests Section in Baghdad + to the Department of StateSource: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + D800064–0960. Secret. Sent for information to Abu Dhabi, Amman, + Ankara, Beirut, Cairo, Damascus, Djibouti, Doha, Jidda, + Khartoum, Kuwait, London, Manama, Moscow, Muscat, Sana, Tel + Aviv, Tunis, and Tripoli (by pouch). + + + Baghdad, February 4, 1980, 0947Z + + +

231. Subject: Saddam Hussein: Part I—The Man. Ref: CR 79–14508, + August 1979.Not found.

+

1. (S-entire text)

+

2. Summary: For as long as he remains in power, Saddam Hussein will + be the single individual guiding and directing Iraq’s domestic and + foreign policies. This message attempts to analyze him as a person + and as a leader, the first step in determining what these policies + are likely to be.

+

3. It is highly indicative of the nature of Iraq that Saddam, who was + number two for 10 years is still something of an enigma. There is a + marked divergence of views as to what he really believes and stands + for, as opposed—perhaps—to what he says. Some maintain that he is a + rational and pragmatic nationalist; others believe he is a ruthless + and ambitious ideologue. He + may on occasion appear to be the former but is often, and perhaps + more significantly, the latter. End summary.

+

4. An effort to determine accurately whether Saddam is a closet + moderate or a rigid megalomaniac is difficult but potentially + useful. As long as he is in charge (which could well be a long + time), his personality and beliefs will direct the nation. Last + August’s executions eliminated a part of the leadership which + allegedly had his ear, and probably silenced most of those remaining + who might otherwise have offered significantly different viewpoints + or opinions.On August 8, 1979, 21 + officials of the Iraqi Government, including 5 members of the + Revolutionary Command Council, were executed for allegedly + taking part in a conspiracy against the government. (“Baghdad + Executes 21 Officials for an Alleged Plot,” The New York Times, August 9, 1979, p. A4) The + Iraqi system does not provide for meaningful inputs from anyone + outside the very topmost levels of government, and the security + apparatus effectively acts to rule out other possible signs of + divergence. Isolated from the people by the apparatus that he has + helped to create and from his associates by the fate of their + erstwhile colleagues, Saddam is likely to rely increasingly on his + own beliefs and views in running the country. It is axiomatic that + internal and external developments can act to alter or delay + preferred courses of action, if only temporarily, but basic + objectives and means should remain the same.

+

5. As far as we are aware, few U.S. officials have had contacts with + Saddam, but he has not been totally inaccessible. Several diplomats + have relatively frequent dealings with him and a number of + journalists, including two Americans, have conducted lengthy + interviews. Over the past 24 months we have had numerous + conversations with these individuals in an effort to develop an + understanding of Iraq’s undisputed leader. We have carefully watched + his frequent television appearances, studied his speeches, noted his + decisions and actions. On this basis, we believe that a number of + reasonably sound assessments and rational estimates can be made of + certain aspects of his personal beliefs and objectives, and + therefore Iraq’s.

+

6. A man of 42 who has spent many years in exceptionally and + increasingly powerful positions, Saddam appears to be an egoist of + massive proportions. Thoroughly accustomed to adulation, obedience, + unctuous publicity, slavish devotion and servility, he acknowledges + the cheers of the masses with a cool, distant smile and an upraised + royal hand. (Stalking majestically into a building, a cape-like + abaya over his double-breasted suit, he will drop the abaya + backwards off his shoulders without looking to see if there is + anyone to catch it. There is.)

+ +

7. Saddam is a handsome and striking figure, relatively tall (at + about 5′10″), always dressed in an elegant, impeccable Western + manner. In repose, his face is youthful but strong and stern, an + impression heightened by his heavy Baathi moustache. He has a + magnificent smile, however, which transforms his appearance + dramatically to one of openness, friendliness and warmth. He exudes + confidence and self-assurance to the level of arrogance, but always + moves, gestures, and speaks in a slow, measured and almost regal + manner. His speeches, which are generally given without notes, tend + to be highly prolix, convoluted, elliptical and long. They are laden + with personal pronouns, slogans, buzzwords, platitudes and—above + all—ideology. They are usually delivered as if from the throne, + aimed downward to the unenlightened. Saddam is not a gifted speaker; + his delivery is a monotone interspersed with long, frequent silences + during which he stares directly and balefully at the audience.

+

8. In much of what he says and does, it is evident that Saddam seeks + to be a Nasser, or a + Castro, beloved by the + masses. He is seriously lacking in many of the personality + characteristics that would contribute to the development of real + popularity, except perhaps inside Iraq, and does not really have the + necessary common touch even here. Charisma, to Western observers at + least, disappears as soon as he opens his mouth, but it is widely + conceded that he has a strong self-image as a new Salladin,Muslim military leader and first Sultan + of Egypt and Syria who defeated the Crusaders at the Battle of + Hattin on July 4, 1187. to whom comparisons are often + drawn.

+

9. Saddam’s appearance, personality, and mannerisms create a very + impressive leader image. He gives every indication of believing that + he is one, on a scale that probably transcends the present borders + of Iraq. His aspirations seem global, and Iraq has the funds to make + his pretentions worth serious attention.

+

10. Saddam has been an active militant all his adult life. Thrown out + of secondary school for political activities, he has participated + actively in every Baathi coup, including the unsuccessful 1959 + assassination attempt against Kassim.See Foreign + Relations, 1958–1960, vol. XII, Near East Region; + Iraq; Iran; Arabian Peninsula, Document 205. In + this effort, age 22, he was one of the trigger-men and was wounded + (an incident he enjoys recounting, with evident heavy nostalgia for + those days of direct action). He has twice fled the country when + coups failed (1959 and 1963)See Foreign + Relations, 1961–1963, vol. XVIII, Near East, + 1962–1963, Documents 153, 154, 159, 169, and 174. and was + imprisoned in 1964 after discovery of a plot to assassinate + Aref. It should not be + unexpected if, after a lifetime of total immersion in and dedication to the + principles and goals of the Baath Party, Saddam were unyielding and + rigid on these matters.

+

11. During the last few years, however, he has managed to develop a + reputation in some quarters as a rather flexible, relatively + moderate and reasonably pragmatic leader. This seems to have + resulted to a large degree from the impressions generated in + meetings with leaders from other countries, particularly the + moderate Arabs but also Europeans and third-worlders. In + conversations, Saddam evidently comes across as intelligent, + dynamic, capable, shrewd and tough, but reasonable. He has a great + deal of personal charm, knows how to use eye contact and firm + handshakes, can be a good listener (depending upon the subject and + who is speaking) and has a general made highly-favorable impact on + his interlocutors. As Iraq has emerged from its period of virtually + total political isolation, with the clout that comes with oil, + Saddam has emerged as a leader of considerable and growing stature. + His performance in inter-Arab councils, especially his successful + efforts in organizing and directing the Baghdad Summit,See footnote 6, Document + 12. as well as at the Havana NAM,The + Summit meeting of the Non-Aligned Movement took place in Havana, + Cuba September 3–9, 1979. earned praise and enhanced the + image of a seasoned and rational statesman. We believe it is + significant that this is how he is seen by those over whom he has no + direct control.

+

12. The view of Saddam the statesman conflicts rather sharply with + the repressive and often brutal manner in which he deals with any + evidence of internal divisiveness. USINT has earlier referred to him as a good-looking + thug with high-developed sartorial tastes. He is certainly not slow + or stupid, nor is he totally without a certain flexibility, but he + can be a vicious and intemperate despot whenever circumstances + require—if circumstances also permit. This is not a side that is + normally revealed to non-Iraqis, and never in bilateral + conversations, but it may be a better indication of the real Saddam + and the real Iraq he heads.

+

13. There is little question that Saddam believes in running a tight + ship domestically. No dissent of any kind is tolerated. The + government has amply demonstrated its readiness to apply whatever + force is required, without hesitation, to repress any group that it + feels offers a threat to stability: Shia, Communists, Kurds, + whatever. The only thing that has thus far kept Iraq from being a + totally effective police state, as opposed to being just a total + police state (which it is), is the relative ineffectiveness of the + organizations involved. Tariq + Aziz, as theologian and spokesman, put internal + policies in comprehensible terms a short time ago and his words + merit repetition. Speaking to a Western newsman on the possibility of Shia unrest last + June, he said, “if there are those in Iraq who seek martyrdom, the + government is prepared to accommodate them”.

+

14. Any vestigial doubts as to Saddam’s personal views on this + general subject should have been dissipated by the actions taken + against some of his closest personal associates last August. It is + generally agreed that the essence of the crime was more the fact of + questioning his absolute authority than any substance upon which the + questions might have been based. Adnan Hussein, et al, were executed + by a group of volunteers from all over the country who emptied their + Kalishnikov’s into the condemned in the presence of the remaining + RCC members. There were no + further questions.

+

15. If it is possible to secure agreement on what Saddam/Iraq + believes is appropriate inside the country, there is perhaps still + room for discussion as to the ultimate objectives of foreign policy. + While some countries have peripheral interest in the manner in which + Iraq conducts its internal affairs, actions outside the borders + probably have greater potential significance. It is obvious that + Iraq’s ability to control events on the other side of its frontiers + is limited by both internal and external circumstances, and it is + equally obvious that there may be considerable slippage between the + spoken word and the actual objective, but there is still some + utility in examining the logical bases for the relationships between + Iraq and certain definable segments in the outside world.

+

16. In Iraq, it may be that Oriental despotism of the traditional + type is the only way to survive; there is certainly historical + precedence. The fabric of the nation is of recent creation and lacks + cohesiveness in a number of important respects. An Iraqi may view + domestic behavior in a different light than an outsider, but that + particular aspect of Saddam’s personality may be of importance in + considering what can perhaps be expected whenever he has the option + to behave in his normal manner.

+

17. Not well educated himself (his law degree, earned while he was + Vice President, is somewhat suspect), surrounded by equally + inexperienced and uneducated sycophants, but a highly-competent and + shrewd tribal chieftain, Saddam has only his own experiences and + beliefs to guide him. His evident willingness to rely on violence, + which he has employed beyond Iraq’s borders with some frequency, + should be sufficient to give pause to neighbors, and others, who + maintain he is a moderate. Part II will discuss this subject.Part II, telegram 488 from Baghdad, March + 4, evaluated Saddam’s policies and political objectives. + (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + D800119–1216)

+ + Peck + +
+ +
+ 140. Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the Department of + State (Tarnoff) to the + President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)Source: Carter Library, National + Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 34, Iraq: + 1/77–3/80. Secret; Nodis. A + stamped notation on the memorandum indicates that Brzezinski saw it. Brzezinski wrote Sick’s initials on the first + page of the memorandum and drew an arrow pointing to + them. + + + Washington, March + 7, 1980 + + + SUBJECT + Iraq’s “Pan-Arab Charter” + +

You asked in your memorandum of February 26 that Iraq’s proposed + Pan-Arab Charter be analyzed to determine whether we might promote a + positive outcome of any Arab consideration of it.On February 8, Saddam proposed a Pan-Arab + Charter, “which would ‘regulate relations among the Arab + countries’ and their ‘commitments’ to non-Arab states.” The + Charter also called “upon Arab states not to grant ‘any kind of + facility to foreign forces under any pretext’,” and encouraged + “‘resisting and boycotting’ any Arab regime not adhering to this + policy.” (Telegram 39105 to USNATO and IntSum Collective, February 12; National + Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800076–0551). On + February 26, Brzezinski + sent memoranda to Turner + and Vance. His + memorandum to Turner + reads: “After reviewing the elements of President Saddam + Hussein’s proposal for an Arab national charter, the President + noted that we should analyze the charter proposal to determine + whether we might promote a satisfactory outcome through the + Saudis and others.” The memorandum to Vance was similarly worded. + Both memoranda are in the Carter Library, National Security + Affairs, Staff Material, Middle East, Subject File, Box 46, + Iraq: 1/79–2/80.

+

It is important to note that the text of this Charter was presented + in a public speech in Baghdad in which Saddam Hussein acidly + criticized the past and present actions of the Iraqi communists. In + that context, therefore, our analysis shows that, although some of + the Charter’s provisions are directed against both superpowers, it + is aimed principally at the Soviets. This is consistent with the + attitudes taken by the Iraqis towards the Soviets in the aftermath + of the invasion of Afghanistan.

+

At the same time, the Charter strongly rejects any foreign military + presence or bases in any Arab state and calls for resisting such + developments by all available means, including by isolation and + political boycott. If the Charter is ultimately accepted by a + sizeable number of Arab states, this provision of the Charter could + cause problems as we seek access to facilities in Oman and Somalia. + We had expected, however, that Iraq and others would oppose our + understandings with Oman in any event.

+ +

The Iraqis are now trying to convene an inter-Arab summit to approve + the Charter. It seems likely that a majority of the Arab states will + attend, although Syria is now undertaking efforts to convene a + separate conference of the so-called “steadfastness” states, + possibly as a countermove to the relatively positive response Saddam + Hussein has already received to his Charter proposal.

+

Some of the Charter principles are indeed compatible with our longer + range principles (e.g., commitment to international law pertaining + to the use of water, airspace, and zones by any state; resolution of + disputes by peaceful means; affirmation of the principles of + nonaggression, neutrality, and non-alignment, etc.)

+

Next steps

+

In the light of this analysis, we believe any effort we might + undertake to exert influence directly on inter-Arab deliberations + would be risky and could perhaps unravel the generally anti-Soviet + direction the Charter initiative has already taken. At the same + time, it would appear to be to our advantage to work indirectly and + to find occasions to:

+

—reemphasize publicly that the U.S. does not intend to interfere in + any way in the internal affairs of the countries in the region, + whether Arab or non-Arab, and that the U.S. supports the + independence and integrity of all these countries;

+

—make it known that, in view of increasing Soviet expansionism in the + region, we believe that a more united Arab stand is needed to + strengthen the ability of the individual Arab and non-Arab states in + the Middle East to resist Soviet penetration;

+

—explain that our response to the Soviet threat in the region has + been prudent, reemphasizing that the U.S., while seeking to enhance + its capacity to bring military power to bear in the region, does not + seek bases in the area;

+

—continue to seek ways to create a more effective dialogue with Iraq + on events in the Gulf and Southwest Asia.

+ + Peter TarnoffDeputy Executive Secretary Raymond + G.H. Seitz signed for Tarnoff. + Executive Secretary + + +
+ +
+ 141. Article in the National Intelligence + DailySource: + Central Intelligence Agency, Office of Support Services (DI), Job 82T00466R, Intelligence + Publications Files (1980), Box 3, Folder 2, National + Intelligence Daily. Secret. + + + Washington, June + 18, 1980 + +

IRAQ: New Directions

+

Iraq is trying to build a leadership role by + exploiting Egypt’s isolation. Baghdad is playing on the refusal + of most moderate Arabs to support the US peace process and on their doubts about US reliability. Trends in the Arab + world probably will continue to favor the Iraqi effort. A key + question is whether the process will develop a momentum of its + own, permanently changing Baghdad’s orientation. Alternatively, + the still-strong ideological and confrontational aspects of + Iraqi politics could reassert themselves and limit accommodation + with the conservative monarchies. [paragraph classification not declassified]

+

Iraq, traditionally the Arab outcast, has been the beneficiary of + regional developments over the past two years that have weakened its + main competitors—Egypt, Syria, Saudi Arabia, and Iran. President + Saddam Husayn has moved aggressively to exploit this opening. His + goals are to organize the Persian Gulf under Iraqi leadership, + establish Baghdad as the new pole for Arab politics, and create a + nonaligned image. [paragraph classification not + declassified]

+

Adjustments in Policy

+

Iraq’s traditional ideological rigidity and emphasis on subversion + have given way to greater pragmatism and moderation in dealing with + other Arab governments. In addition, close identification with the + USSR is being modified in + favor of a more balanced posture between the superpowers. [paragraph classification not + declassified]

+

To give form to these policies, the Iraqis have:

+ + —Reduced support for terrorist groups. + —Developed closer political and, in some cases, security ties + with Arab monarchs. + —Increased purchases of Western arms and technology from + France, Italy, and Japan. + —Cut oil shipments to the USSR. + —Criticized Soviet policies toward Afghanistan, South Yemen, + and Ethiopia. + —Raised oil production by nearly 1 million barrels per day and + increased sales to Third World countries in return for political + support. + + —Pressed for a new “Arab Charter” that seeks to make Iraq the + center of Pan-Arab opposition to outside meddling. [paragraph classification not + declassified] + +

Implications and Constraints

+

Although present Iraqi policy represents a shift away from the USSR and toward better relations with + Iraq’s moderate neighbors, it also is designed to detach those + governments from their security ties to the US. Baghdad is seeking to promote neutralism on + disputes involving the superpowers, militant Arab nationalism on the + Palestinian question, and more aggressive use of Arab economic + leverage for political purposes. Such militant pan-Arabism, however, + would not necessarily be an effective bulwark against further Soviet + advances in the region. [paragraph classification + not declassified]

+

The pace of Iraq’s policy shift has in any case slowed because of + several developments in the region. These include the collapse last + year of Baghdad’s rapprochement with Syria amid charges of Syrian + involvement in coup-plotting. [paragraph + classification not declassified]

+

The Iranian hostage situation and particularly the Soviet invasion of + Afghanistan have refocused superpower attention on the Gulf, thus + complicating Baghdad’s drive for predominance. The deterioration in + Iraq’s relations with the regime in Iran has been yet another + factor. [paragraph classification not + declassified]

+

Internal unrest, in particular, has acted as a constraint on Saddam + Husayn. Iran has had some success in using Iraqi Shias and Kurds, + who have longstanding grievances against the Baathist regime in + Baghdad. [paragraph classification not + declassified]

+

Of even greater concern to Saddam Husayn, there has been a resurgence + of grumbling within the regime over his monopolization of power. + Ideological opposition over his courting of Arab monarchs and his + turn toward nonalignment almost certainly exists in the inner + circle. [paragraph classification not + declassified]

+

Other more inherent weaknesses in the Iraqi position are also + evident. Previous Baathist attempts to subvert Iraq’s neighbors have + left a legacy of deep mistrust and animosity. Beyond that, Saddam + Husayn’s continued reliance on repression to rule Iraq qualifies his + claim to legitimacy and reduces his attractiveness as an Arab + spokesman. [paragraph classification not + declassified]

+

If Saddam Husayn is to overcome these constraints, he must maintain + stability at home and show patience and restraint toward Arab + moderates. Should he become frustrated and revert to more + traditional heavyhanded behavior, he would quickly revive old + suspicions and greatly reduce prospects for a more fundamental shift + in Iraq’s role in the Middle East. [paragraph + classification not declassified]

+
+ +
+ 142. Telegram From the United States Interests Section in Baghdad + to the Department of StateSource: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + D800308–0401. Secret; Priority; Exdis. + + + Baghdad, June 26, 1980, 1019Z + +

1651. Subject: Meeting With Iraqi Officials: U.S. Emissary to + Iraq.

+

1. (S-entire text).

+

2. June 25 DCM + Jones and I were invited to + lunch by ex-Chief of IraqInt in + Washington, Fadhil Azzawi, + and Chief of Protocol at the Foreign Ministry, Nabil Najim. Such a + social-business meeting on Iraq initiative would be rare event for + any diplomatic mission in Baghdad. For this useful opportunity to + cement relations with the Protocol Chief and continue U.S.-Iraqi + dialogue we must thank Azzawi, and Under Secretary Newsom’s hospitality to him before his departure + from Washington.

+

2. The two-hour meeting covered a wide range of subjects + (septels).In telegram 1663 from + Baghdad, June 26, Eagleton reported that during the June lunch + with Azzawi and Najim, + “the subject of U.S.-Iraqi relations was played back and forth + from a number of angles. We did not waste time discussing + resumption of diplomatic relations, which is not being + considered here at least until after U.S. Presidential elections + and a look then at our position on the Palestine issue. + Azzawi did at one + point say that relations would have been restored months ago had + it not been for the Camp David agreement. We are not so sure.” + (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + D800308–0650) In telegram 1662 from Baghdad, June 26, Eagleton + added that, following discussion of bilateral issues, “the + subject turned to Afghanistan, the Gulf and U.S. presence in the + area.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + D800309–0001) Of particular interest was Azzawi’s handling of the question + raised in Washington earlier this year whether Iraq would be ready + to hold discussions in Baghdad or elsewhere with a senior State + Department representative on U.S.-Iraqi bilateral relations and + regional issues.See Documents 132 and 133.Azzawi + noted that he had asked DAS + Draper to try to ascertain + whom we might have in mind “to head a delegation to Baghdad”. He + seemed to think that the delay in our response might be significant + and related to a “new policy” toward Iraq initiated by Secretary + Muskie. He said “the + ball is now in your court” and asked what we knew about the “new + U.S. policy” towards Iraq.

+

4. I replied that his query regarding the person we might send to + Baghdad had coincided with Secretary Vance’s departure and Secretary Muskie’s arrival. Our original + proposal was based on our belief that higher level contact and an + enlarged dialogue would be beneficial to both countries. A number of + developments in Iraq, including a tendency toward moderation on regional issues, had been + well received in Washington. I was not aware of any “new policy” + under Secretary Muskie and + believed that the U.S. Government was still interested in exploring + ways to improve U.S.-Iraqi relations. The delay in our reply was + normal in view of personnel changes in the Department.

+

5. When I asked Azzawi whom he + might have in mind as an appropriate person and level for a visit to + Baghdad (which I noted would probably be one or two officials rather + than a delegation) he suggested Under Secretary Newsom or possibly Deputy Assistant + Secretary Draper “since both + of them know Iraq and how to deal with Iraqis”. He added that + Assistant Secretary Saunders + would also be an appropriate person.

+

6. Protocol Chief Najim had apparently not been briefed on the + subject, and Azzawi filled + him in as he went along. Furthermore, although Azzawi is obviously interested in + arranging a visit to Baghdad by an American official, he left us + with the impression that a further decision-making stage would be + required within the Iraqi Government after they receive our reply to + their query. Thus, the timing for such a visit might slip, certainly + until after the July 17 National Day and then perhaps through the + mid-summer doldrums. Nevertheless, I believe we should now follow-up + on our initiative by indicating who might visit Baghdad. We could + suggest several possibilities which would permit the Iraqis to + indicate which level they preferred and leave the time open for a + mutually agreeable date. Azzawi indicated that a response to his query could + be transmitted through IraqInt + Washington, USINT Baghdad or + both.

+ + Eagleton + +
+
+ +
+ + Saudi Arabia + +
+ 143. Briefing Paper Prepared in the Department of StateSource: Carter Library, National + Security Affairs, Staff Material, Middle East, Subject File, Box + 81, Saudi Arabia: 5/75–5/77. Secret. Drafted by Cecil, Countryman, and Twinam on January 3, 1977. + Prepared for the transition. + + + Washington, undated + +

SAUDI ARABIA

+

I. Significance of the + Country to U.S. Global Policy and Regional Objectives

+

The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is important to the United States as the + strategically pre-eminent source of energy for the West and because + of its massive financial reserves, its political influence in Arab + and Third World councils, and its strategic location.

+

Saudi Arabia is now the primary source for U.S. imports of crude oil, + providing 22 percent of our imports and 7 percent of our total + consumption. Continued access to Saudi oil is essential if our + economy is to sustain a healthy growth rate while it pursues the + goal of greater energy self-sufficiency. Many of our allies in + Western Europe, as well as Japan, are even more dependent on Saudi + oil. Only Saudi Arabia—with about one-quarter of the world’s + petroleum reserves—can rapidly expand petroleum production, and this + endows Saudi Arabia with more influence over the price of oil than + any other producing country.For + documentation on U.S. policy toward Saudi Arabia as an oil + producer and leader of OPEC, + see Foreign + Relations, 1969–1976, vol. XXXVII, Energy Crisis, + 1974–1980.

+

Because Saudi Arabia is accruing revenue faster than its domestic + needs require, the Kingdom has amassed over $40 billion in foreign + assets. We need to insure that this money is employed constructively + so as not to create instability in international financial markets. + We also need to encourage Saudi assistance to underdeveloped + countries whose needs exceed our own ability to help.

+

This rapid accumulation of over one billion dollars per month of + surplus wealth gives Saudi Arabia increasing influence in regional + affairs. In recent years the Saudis have begun to exploit the needs + of Egypt, Syria, Jordan, and Lebanon for financial aid in a manner + giving Saudi Arabia growing political influence. This is being used + in support of our interest in moderation in the Arab world, but it + could also be used against us—albeit reluctantly and not without + costs to themselves—if the Saudis see our positions diverging too + far. Saudi Arabia has thus become an important factor in the quest for Middle East peace. It + is very unlikely that the Arab “confrontation states” would launch + an all-out war against Israel unless they felt they could count on + Saudi political support and financial assistance.

+

We have a longstanding interest in the security of Saudi Arabia and + the entire Arabian Peninsula. Growing Saudi self-confidence, ability + to provide financial aid, and the development of a modest but modern + defense capability foster a constructive Saudi leadership role in + the security and orderly development of the smaller Arabian + Peninsula states. Saudi Arabia’s policy has been generally + supportive of our interest in Saudi-Iranian cooperation to secure + the oil-rich Persian Gulf.

+

Expanding Saudi political influence, and the Saudi proclivity toward + moderate positions have made Saudi Arabia an increasingly important + source of support for U.S. positions in the U.N. and other + multilateral fora. As protector of the two holiest shrines of Islam, + Saudi Arabia wields great moral suasion among the Muslim nations. It + is rigidly anti-Communist, and uses its influence and financial + resources to resist the spread of radical ideologies within the + Middle East and elsewhere. Recently the Saudis have widened their + regional role to support political order and economic development in + South Asia and among Muslim countries in Africa.

+

II. Political and + Economic Situation in the Country

+

Saudi Arabia is an Islamic monarchy; the King is chosen by consensus + of the senior members of the royal Al-Saud family. King Khalid, who + became Chief of State upon King Faisal’s assassination in March + 1975,Faisal reigned as King of + Saudi Arabia from 1964 until 1975 and implemented a number of + reforms and modernization efforts. He was assassinated by his + nephew on March 25, 1975. has delegated to his + half-brother, Crown Prince Fahd, authority to oversee most day-to-day affairs, + an arrangement which appears to be working satisfactorily. The + energetic Fahd is + responsible for several Saudi foreign policy initiatives, such as + seeking to moderate the Algerian-Moroccan dispute over the Spanish + Sahara and an attempt to wean the People’s Democratic Republic of + Yemen (South Yemen) away from Communist influence by making Saudi + economic assistance available.

+

The regime is paternalistic and absolute, with no political parties + and no elected assembly, but the leadership maintains the tribal + tradition of ready public access to the monarch. There is no + significant organized domestic political opposition. The ruling + family maintains tight control, aided in part by the presence of + royal family members in government, the military, and private + business, thereby insuring that the leadership is broadly based and + well informed of public sentiment. Western-educated Saudis play an important + policy role, particularly in economic matters. Important government + posts have long been open to talented commoners.

+

A major element of the stability of the regime is its willingness to + permit the educated younger Saudi opportunity to play a responsible + role in the nation’s development. This factor plus the gradual + liberalization of Saudi society and the increasing distribution of + the benefits of oil wealth have mitigated public opposition to the + rule of the Al-Saud.

+

Although the prospects for political stability in Saudi Arabia have + remained promising for over a decade, there are possible sources of + future unrest: a high rate of inflation (20–40 percent in some + sectors), corruption and disparities in distribution of wealth, and + clash of traditionalist and modernist views on the pace of social + liberalization, a problem exacerbated by the growth of foreign + presence in the Kingdom.

+

In the last five years the Saudis have displayed a notable growth of + both confidence and skill in their relations with the Arab world and + other neighbors. No longer on the defensive against the + revolutionary Arab governments, the Saudis have carefully used their + financial influence to develop significant leverage over the + policies of Egypt, Syria and other Arab states, have begun to play a + more dynamic and sophisticated role as the natural leader of the + Arabian Peninsula, and have made sound progress toward cooperation + with Iran in the interests of Persian Gulf security. The success of + Saudi Arabia in arranging the recent “Riyadh Summit” to seek + solution to the Lebanese crisis and Syrian-Egyptian + rapprochementArab heads of state + met in Riyadh October 17–18, 1976, to discuss Egyptian-Syrian + rapprochement and ways to end the fighting in Lebanon. + Information on the summit is in telegram 6446 from Amman, + October 20, 1976. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign + Policy File, P850107–2210) was vivid evidence of the + increase of Saudi influence in the Middle East.

+

Economically, the Kingdom is essentially poor in trained human + resources and basic infrastructure. (As recently as 1973, secondary + school enrollment was under 27,000, out of a population of 5 + million.) A Five-Year Plan projecting expenditures of $142 billion + was announced in May 1975. The attempt to implement this plan has + initiated a period of unprecedented economic activity. Many programs + are heavily dependent on foreign labor, both skilled and unskilled. + Although it is apparent that not all goals of the Plan will be met + on schedule, goals in education and health care may be exceeded. The + search for quality education will bring more Saudis to the United + States, beyond the 5000 presently in our colleges and + universities.

+

While government expenditures have grown abruptly in the past few + years, oil revenues continue to be well in excess of the Kingdom’s + absorptive capacity. + The Saudi Government has invested significant amounts of these + surplus revenues in the U.S., mostly in government securities. It is + possible that future funds will go into long-term investment in our + private sector as the Saudi Government seeks to diversify its + holdings. In view of our great need for additional investment + capital, it is in our economic interest to seek to attract + unutilized Saudi funds into the private sector, but there will be + domestic political resistance to doing so.

+

In Saudi Arabia itself, the Kingdom remains oriented toward free + enterprise, although the capital requirements of its own massive + modernization and industrialization program necessitate the active + participation of the Saudi Government in numerous joint ventures. + The Government states that such ventures will eventually be offered + for private ownership.

+

Negotiations are continuing with the Arabian American Oil Company + (ARAMCO) toward the + objective of 100 percent Saudi ownership. The Saudis wish to retain + the owner companies (Exxon, Socal, Texaco, Mobil) to produce and + market Saudi oil. Average ARAMCO + crude production for 1976 will reach the Saudi Government’s limit of + 8.5 million bpd. The question of how much oil should be produced in + excess of that needed to fund the country’s internal development and + foreign assistance programs (estimated at 5 million bpd) is under + constant discussion. Thus the world is faced with the delicate + situation of looking for increased oil supplies primarily to the + major producer with least economic incentive to increase + production.

+

III. Current State of + U.S. Relations and Policy Toward Saudi Arabia

+

The American interest in the stability and orderly development of + Saudi Arabia began forty years ago with the ARAMCO concession. The 1945 meeting + between President Roosevelt and King Abdulaziz Ibn SaudSee Foreign Relations, 1945, vol. VIII, The Near East + and Africa, pp. 2–3. commenced an unbroken + manifestation of official U.S. concern for the Kingdom’s welfare, + and began to build a notable Saudi dependence on the United States + as the major power which could be trusted to guide Saudi Arabia into + the modern world. For over a quarter century our relationship + expanded gradually and soundly, reflecting the measured pace of + Saudi development and our important but limited interest in a nation + with values quite unlike our own. Our direct interest was in + protecting American oil investment and opening promising commercial + markets; and equally important indirect concern was the need of our + NATO allies for Saudi oil.

+ +

Then, some five years ago, the United States became directly + dependent on Saudi oil and our relationship intensified abruptly, + testing the capacity of both of our societies to respond to an + increasing interdependence. Our future national interest in Saudi + Arabia can be limited only by our ability to get our domestic energy + situation in hand.

+

In response to these recent imperatives both the U.S. Government and + our private sector have hastened, along with other industrial + societies, to cope with the abrupt shift of economic power toward + Saudi Arabia. As the role of the major oil companies has diminished + rapidly, the U.S. Government has for the first time become directly + involved in efforts to influence Saudi decisions on petroleum + pricing and production. We have developed a Joint Economic + Commission to facilitate Saudi purchase of U.S. Government expertise + for various development objectives.The + Joint Economic Commission was established in 1974. Documentation + is scheduled for publication in Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, + vol. E–9, Part 2, Documents on the Middle East Region, + 1973–1976. We have sought to encourage + relatively unsophisticated Saudi investment institutions to rely on + the U.S. market and have attracted over $8 billion of Saudi + placement in U.S. Government securities.

+

Our private sector has been equally responsive. ARAMCO while amicably negotiating + the relinquishment of its concession rights has retained a major + future role in the development of and access to Saudi oil. Other + large American companies such as Bechtel and Parsons have joined + ARAMCO in undertaking huge + development projects. Over 200 American companies are now + established in Saudi Arabia; over 30,000 Americans reside there. In + 1976 we anticipate selling over $3 billion of American goods and + services (excluding government-to-government military sales) to + offset partially our $6 billion Saudi oil bill. American financial + institutions are heavily engaged in “recycling” the huge Saudi + financial surpluses, to date placing them mostly in short-term + instruments.

+

In the last few years our longstanding security assistance + relationship has entered the “take-off stage,” reflecting increasing + Saudi capability to absorb modern military equipment and training, a + new Saudi regional defense responsibility in the wake of the British + withdrawal from the Persian Gulf and Saudi ability to buy costly + military equipment and services at no cost to the capital needs of + the civil sector. Total sales of U.S. equipment and services under + FMS have grown from $2.1 + billion in 1966 to a cumulative total of approximately $12 billion + by the end of 1976. Although these figures reflect contracts to be + implemented over the next several years (only about $1 billion of + the $12 billion in equipment and services has been delivered), and + although over half the + total is the value of construction projects managed by the U.S. Army + Corps of Engineers, the acceleration of our involvement in Saudi + military modernization raises major policy issues. Last fall + Congressional opposition to supplying Mavericks and Sidewinders + jeopardized our relationship. Although present U.S. military sales + programs reflect the findings of a careful 1974 USG survey of Saudi defense + requirements, the limited absorptive capacity of the Saudi armed + forces requires that we keep under review the future pace and scope + of our security assistance activities if they are to continue to + serve our long-term interests in Saudi Arabia.

+

Until the 1973 embargo the Saudi role in the Arab-Israel conflict was + essentially reactive rather than one of leadership. Since then we + have successfully sought active Saudi support for U.S. policies on + this key problem, as Saudi Arabia has emerged as a critical factor + in Arab decision making. Similarly we have encouraged a more active + Saudi leadership role in the Arabian Peninsula and greater + cooperation with Iran in securing the Persian Gulf. To date + U.S.-Saudi cooperation on regional political issues has progressed + remarkably well, but the new Saudi posture of leadership makes it + increasingly difficult to isolate our interests in Saudi Arabia + itself from the state of U.S.-Saudi accord on the Arab/Israeli and + other major regional issues. To the extent our interests diverge, we + must anticipate increasing Saudi difficulty in reconciling close + cooperation with the United States with its growing leadership role + in the Peninsula, the Arab World, and of course in OPEC. The Saudis have repeatedly + demonstrated an intense desire to rely on the United States as the + primary supplier of technology and equipment for both civilian and + military development. But the Saudi dependence is not absolute and + other nations seek a share of the present predominant American role. + Should the Saudi leadership come seriously to doubt the + steadfastness of our support, a possibly irreversible unraveling of + our carefully built relationship of mutual confidence could + ensue.

+

IV. Specific Major + Issues Having Impact on Relationship

+

A. A Middle East Peace Settlement. The 1973 + oil embargo demonstrates that the Arab/Israeli problem will in the + final analysis overwhelm the other carefully cultivated aspects of + the U.S.-Saudi relationship though Saudi vested interest in the + latter can serve as a counterforce up to a point.For documentation on Saudi Arabia’s role in the + Arab-Israeli peace process, see Foreign Relations, 1977–1980, vol. + VIII, Arab-Israeli Dispute, January 1977–August 1978, + and Foreign + Relations, vol. IX, Arab-Israeli Dispute, August + 1978–December 1980. The Saudis count on the + U.S. to remove a source of regional instability by bringing the + parties to the Arab/Israeli conflict to a mutually acceptable permanent settlement. They wish + to avoid an outbreak of hostilities because they believe the likely + result would be an Arab defeat leading to the return to power of + radical Arab revolutionary governments hostile to the Saudi regime + and a resurgence of Soviet influence in the area. The Saudis have + exerted a moderating influence on the “confrontation states,” but + their patient willingness to support U.S. policy initiatives in the + Middle East rests on the assumption that we will rapidly resume the + quest for an overall peace settlement. Saudi responsiveness to our + position on oil prices in the recent OPEC meetingAt the OPEC Oil Ministers meeting in + Doha in December 1976, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates + split with the rest of OPEC + over the increase in oil prices, instituting a two-tier price + structure. See Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, vol. + XXXVII, Energy Crisis, 1974–1980, Document 113. + has been linked in public statements to expectation that the U.S. + will bring its full influence to bear to make progress toward a + Middle East peace. They expect real progress in 1977, which to them + translates into U.S. success in bringing Israel to withdraw to the + 1967 borders and to accept the establishment of a Palestinian + political entity outside those borders.

+

If we make progress on the other elements of a Middle East peace + package, the question of the status of Jerusalem will finally come + center stage. The Saudis are likely to be the least flexible of the + Arabs on the future of Jerusalem and will almost certainly insist + that the Israelis agree to Arab political jurisdiction in East + Jerusalem, though they might in the end accept control of the Muslim + religious sites by an international body.

+

B. Oil Supplies. Saudi Arabia has been + strongly supportive of our objective of minimizing oil price + increases. As world demand for oil grows, we must look to Saudi + Arabia for additional production if pressures for future sharp price + increases are to be eased. The Saudis are already producing above + the level needed to meet their own immediate requirements for + revenues, and in terms of their own narrow economic needs there is + no reason to raise production further. On the other hand, Saudi + leaders have been aware of the extent to which their own economic + well-being in a broader sense and that of the world economy in + general requires Saudi production of essential oil. Moreover, their + overriding interest in encouraging U.S. cooperation in other areas, + most significantly the search for Middle East peace, causes them to + be particularly sensitive to our interests in the energy area.

+

On the other hand, the Saudis are not comfortable with their global + economic responsibilities thrust upon them because of their massive + oil reserves. Also, there are influential voices within the SAG urging that production be held + back rather than continuing to generate surplus assets whose value—it is alleged—is + eroded through inflation more rapidly than would be the case if the + oil itself were left in the ground for the benefit of future + generations. In CIEC and + elsewhere, the Saudis have made continued production at levels above + their own financial requirements conditional upon measures by the + industrialized countries to protect the real value of Saudi assets. + It remains to be seen how serious the Saudis really are on this + point. But at a minimum they are demanding that we recognize + politically that their oil production policy may entail certain + problems in terms of financial assets and that we be prepared to + discuss these problems with them.

+

C. Arms Supply Relationship. Saudi Arabia has + chosen to rely primarily on the United States, and on our NATO allies to a lesser degree, to + acquire military training and equipment. The United States is + committed on a government-to-government basis to overseeing the + development of an effective jet interceptor (F–5) force capable of defending the country against + attack; to manage a ten-year program in which Saudi Arabia will + acquire an 18-ship navy, two naval bases, and large numbers of + trained personnel; to managing a multi-billion dollar program of + military construction; to mechanizing two out of four Saudi Arabian + army brigades; and to training the Saudi Arabian National Guard. In + other programs, the Saudis have contracted directly with American + firms to provide an air defense missile system (Raytheon), an air + defense radar network (Lockheed), and a fleet of C–130 military + transport aircraft (Lockheed). Arms acquisition requests are in many + cases based on recommendations made in the 1974 survey of the Saudi + armed forces made by a Department of Defense team.Documentation on U.S.-Saudi military relations + during the Second Nixon + and Ford administrations + is scheduled for publication in Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, + vol. E–9, Part 2, Documents on the Middle East Region, + 1973–1976. The scarcity of trained manpower + necessitates in many programs that considerable numbers of + expatriate personnel assist the Saudis by performing important + maintenance, training, and staff work.

+

Saudi desire for additional military equipment is certain. We have + agreed in principle to provide replacements for aircraft due to be + phased out of the Saudi inventory during 1978–80; and a specific + Saudi request is likely in 1977 for advanced fighter aircraft.

+

This arms supply relationship is subject to criticism by those who + oppose arms sales in principle, and by those who believe arms sold + to Saudi Arabia might at some future date be used against Israel. In + reply to such criticism, we have maintained that Saudi purchases are + reasonable for the defense of a country the size of the United + States east of the Mississippi and having vast resources. We have + considered it unlikely that Saudi arms will be used against Israel. + The Saudis have never shown + an inclination to engage the Israelis in combat, and they would be + reluctant to endanger the future of the many military and economic + programs for which they depend upon the United States by + unauthorized transfer of American supplied military equipment. There + is, however, no absolute guarantee against some unauthorized + transfers in the emotional atmosphere of resumed hostilities. We + should therefore continue to guard against this contingency by + assuring discreetly that the Saudis understand the costs to them of + such action would be high and that transfers of sophisticated + equipment to other Arabs would not be very practical in terms of the + logistical and infrastructure support required. In addition, we must + continue to carefully examine future Saudi military modernization + plans to assure they meet reasonable defense needs and are within + the limited Saudi absorptive capacity.

+

D. The Arab Boycott of Israel.The Arab League boycott of Israel was imposed + in the wake of the 1948 Arab-Israeli war in a concerted effort + by Arab League states to isolate and weaken Israel + economically. The Saudis are strict in applying the + “secondary” boycott against firms blacklisted by the Central Boycott + Office in Damascus. They have made it clear that they will adhere to + this form of economic warfare until the achievement of a permanent + solution to the Arab/Israeli problem. Yet the Saudis have made + certain administrative changes in their manner of implementing the + primary boycott and appear to have tacitly accepted that neither the + U.S. Government nor another American company can refuse to deal with + an American firm because it may have been placed on the boycott + list. The Saudis have assured us that their implementation of the + boycott reflects strictly political motives and does not reflect + religious discrimination.

+

Similarly, the Saudi Government assures us it does not refuse visas + on religious grounds.

+

The Saudis will be watching closely the attitude of the new + Administration toward Congressional initiatives for further + anti-boycott legislation. Should the Administration support or + accept legislation which discourages American firms from competing + for contracts in Saudi Arabia, the Saudis may interpret this as an + anti-Arab bias which will make it politically more difficult for the + Saudis to support the Administration’s efforts to facilitate the + progress of Arab-Israeli negotiations toward a peace settlement. On + the other hand, should the Administration seek a delay in acting on + anti-boycott proposals to allow it sufficient time to study this + complex issue, this would be viewed as indicative of a genuinely + even-handed approach toward the problems of the area.

+ +

V. Human Rights + Considerations

+

Saudi Arabia has not been a focal point for groups interested in + human rights questions. Within the context of Saudi traditions, the + Government considers itself solicitous of the human rights of its + citizens and we have no evidence it practices or condones flagrant + violations such as torture or arbitrary detention. It is + nevertheless evident that Saudi attitudes and practices on many + issues are profoundly different from our own. The state supports an + established creed, Islam, rather than adhering to our secular + concept of the separation of church and state. Though people of all + religious faiths are allowed entry into the country, only Muslims + are permitted public worship.

+

Entry into the proximity of the two holiest sites of Islam, Mecca and + Medina, is forbidden to non-Muslims. Education for women through + college is increasingly common, but the social roles, including + employment opportunities, allowed women are generally limited to + those which can be carried out without coming into contact with men + from outside one’s family. In general, professional associations are + discouraged. Labor unions are non-existent. Although positions of + responsibility may be achieved by demonstrating education and + competency, the feeling persists that one’s true status is + determined by one’s genealogical descent, and cannot be altered + essentially by legal or administrative actions such as + naturalization. Saudi citizenship is awarded to immigrants in rare + cases. Justice tends to be punitive rather than reformative in aim. + There are no democratic institutions as we know them, and the Koran + is still considered the “constitution” of the land. This substantial + divergence in attitudes on many social and religious questions is a + barrier to the development of broad popular support in the United + States for the sort of cooperative relationship our dependence on + Saudi Arabia dictates.

+

VI. Congressional + Attitudes Toward Saudi Arabia

+

The Congressional attitude toward Saudi Arabia is ambivalent. The + importance of Saudi Arabia to U.S. economic and political interests + is increasingly but still inadequately recognized in the Congress. + Congress tends to recognize Saudi moderation on oil and Middle East + political issues, and the potential benefits from the use of its + financial resources to exert positive leverage within the region as + well as in other LDCs. Those who question the desirability of a + growing relationship stress Saudi Arabia’s strict adherence to the + boycott of Israel, accuse it of religious discrimination in visa + issuance (although this is no longer the problem it once was), and + doubt the real need for the military equipment it is purchasing, + which they suspect will ultimately be used against Israel. They also + express concern that U.S. dependence on Saudi oil could be used to + “blackmail” the U.S. to weaken its support for Israel.

+ +

Almost all of the approximately 50 members of the Congress who have + visited Saudi Arabia and talked with its leaders within the past two + years have returned with a greater appreciation of Saudi Arabia’s + moderation and of the positive role it is playing in the region. + Congress remains concerned, however, over Saudi investment + objectives in the U.S., their potential influence over U.S. banks + and financial institutions, and the size of their holdings of USG notes and bonds.

+

The Saudis will continue to look for appreciation for their + moderating influence on oil prices and Saudi cooperation in our + search for a negotiated peace in the Middle East. Our relationship + may be faced, however, with concerted efforts in Congress to + restrict the sale of military items to Saudi Arabia—particularly the + additional Sidewinder and Maverick missiles which the Saudi + Government expects us to provide—and to enact confrontational + anti-boycott legislation.

+
+ +
+ 144. Memorandum Prepared in the Central Intelligence AgencySource: Central + Intelligence Agency, Office of Near East and South Asia Analysis + (DI), Job 76T00412R, + Intelligence Publication Files—Record Copy of Finished + Intelligence Pubs, Box 1, Folder 12, NESA Intelligence Memo: + Saudi Arabia: An Assessment, RP 77–10003, January 1977. Secret; + [handling restriction not + declassified]. Prepared in the Office of Regional and + Political Analysis. + + + RP 77–10003Washington, January 14, + 1977 + +

SAUDI ARABIA: AN ASSESSMENT

+

Key Judgments

+

—Saudi Arabia’s pursuit of a more active foreign policy in 1976 has + significantly increased Saudi influence in intra-Arab affairs and + the Arab-Israeli dispute. The Saudis also now approach diplomatic + relations with the US from a new + perspective, not as clients but as partners.

+

—Saudi Arabia views itself as of major importance to the United + States not only because it controls vital oil resources and can + virtually determine the price of world oil, but because it is the + strongest force for moderation in the Middle East, wielding + considerable influence over the key Arab players in the Arab-Israeli + dispute.

+

—The US is important to Saudi Arabia + because its influence over Israel is the key to the solution of the + Arab-Israeli problem, something of overriding importance to the + Saudis because it is the only practical way to guarantee stability in the area and end + Israeli occupation of Arab territory, including East Jerusalem. The + US is, in addition, a primary + source of the technology and experience Saudi Arabia needs for its + economic development plans.

+

—Saudi Arabia is placing its highest priority on generating momentum + toward a resumption of Middle East negotiations. For this reason, it + has tried to block an OPEC price + increase that might have alienated the US and disrupted diplomatic activity toward a + settlement. Although the Saudis are using oil prices as a carrot to + induce the new US administration to + give equally high priority to Middle East negotiations, they are + probably prepared to be flexible in setting time limits for + measurable progress. But they would likely move to higher oil prices + should the US enact legislation + specifically targeted at their interests.

+

—The Saudis, in particular, are not disposed to compromise their + public adherence to the Arab boycott of Israel, and suspect that the + sponsors of antiboycott legislation are out to damage the US-Saudi relationship to Israel’s + benefit. They will be viewing US + activity on the boycott issue as the acid test of US willingness to preserve its + relationship with Saudi Arabia.

+

—Although Saudi King Khalid is technically the final authority in the + country, virtually all decisions have been made by Crown Prince + Fahd, who is in line to + succeed him. Fahd is a + shrewd leader who has long advocated close ties with the US.

+

—The regime is stable, and as long as the family continues to rise + above its internal divisions in times of crisis it faces no + immediate threats. In the longer term, however, enormous wealth, + rapid economic development, and the resulting social changes could + erode the monarchy’s traditional underpinnings.

+

Discussion

+

Since the October 1973 war, Saudi Arabia has emerged as a significant + force in intra-Arab affairs and, by extension, in the Arab-Israeli + dispute. In the past year, in particular, the Saudis have become + more active in pursuing their basic foreign policy goals—a + reflection of their growing confidence in the considerable economic + leverage they possess over other regimes and of their increasing + willingness to wield that leverage. The goals of Saudi foreign + policy, however, have remained constant.

+

Saudi Arabia would like to see a negotiated solution to the + Arab-Israeli problem that would both return Israeli-occupied + lands—ideally including East Jerusalem—to the Arabs, and remove the + Palestinians as a constant source of instability in Arab countries. + Other goals follow from this, such as the Saudi desire to smooth + over intra-Arab quarrels in order to achieve the unity necessary to + make any progress toward peace. The Saudis would also like to prevent the growth of + radically-oriented governments throughout the Arab world, and + particularly among their immediate neighbors, who pose a greater + threat of infection to Saudi Arabia itself.

+

Finally, Saudi Arabia wants to conduct its foreign relations in such + a manner as to facilitate domestic development programs. This means, + among other things, doing what it can to maintain a healthy + international economic environment—including trying to stem the + growth of inflation—and maintaining good relations with the western + countries that supply Saudi Arabia with the technology it needs.

+

Settlement Efforts

+

The rise in Saudi influence combined with a move toward moderation + and away from Soviet influence on the part of Egypt and Syria—a move + for which the Saudis have been partly responsible—have been the + major factors shaping intra-Arab affairs since 1973. Egypt’s + economy—and hence its domestic stability—is heavily dependent on + Saudi support; Sadat consequently will not cross the Saudis on any + issue about which they feel strongly. Syria can afford to be + somewhat more independent, but the Lebanese warReference is to the first phase of the Lebanese + civil war, which was brought to a halt at the October 1976 + Riyadh summit. See footnote 4, Document + 143. has put major strains on its economy and + Asad too, wants to keep + Saudi financial subsidies coming. With Riyadh, Cairo, and Damascus + forming a united front—however loose—Arab foreign policy is locked + into moderate channels; none of the more radical regimes is strong + enough to be taken into account. The Saudis are determined to keep + it that way.

+

The current Arab effort to generate some momentum toward reconvening + Arab-Israeli negotiations is Saudi Arabia’s highest priority. Riyadh + was largely responsible for setting the stage for such an effort; + realizing that deadlock was inevitable as long as Egypt and Syria + remained at loggerheads and the civil war in Lebanon continued to + poison intra-Arab relations, the Saudis made repeated efforts to + engineer a face-to-face meeting between Presidents Sadat and + Asad, as well as Lebanese + President Sarkis and + Palestine Liberation Organization chief Yasir Arafat. Their eventual success—at the Riyadh + summit meeting last October—was a triumph of Saudi persistence and + willingness to employ their economic leverage.

+

Since the Riyadh conference the Saudis have been active in trying to + patch up two other Arab and regional quarrels that have no bearing + on the Arab-Israeli issue, except in the sense that anything + undercutting Arab unity could hamper settlement efforts. They moved + to mediate between Morocco and Algeria in the Spanish Sahara + dispute—an effort which has + so far gone nowhere, although they have probably not yet given + up—and they smoothed over a potentially nasty quarrel between Iran + and South Yemen when the South Yemenis shot down an Iranian plane + which, they claimed, had strayed into their air space. The incidents + illustrate a significant facet of Saudi foreign policy: Saudi Arabia + is a compulsive mediator, and it is not deterred by the fact that a + problem appears intractible.

+

The OPEC + Decision

+

Having cleared the deck for movement on the Arab-Israeli front, the + Saudis are prepared to subordinate other vital concerns to the + achievement of progress in that arena. Hence their willingness to + take on the rest of OPEC in order + to avoid an oil price hike that might have alienated the incoming + US administration and sparked a + wave of anti-Arab feeling in the US + that could hamper US diplomatic + initiatives.See footnote 8, Document 143.

+

The Saudis had some economic reasons for bucking OPEC as well—they were worried about + the apparent fragility of the West’s economic recovery and afraid + that too great an increase could start another downturn—but these + reasons probably would not have induced them to draw the line at a 5 + percent rise, rather than settling for the 10 percent that might + have formed a basis for a compromise. The Saudis were trying to + deliver a clear signal to the US: + nothing must stand in the way of movement toward an acceptable + settlement, and the Saudis, for their part, were prepared to make + considerable sacrifices to this end.

+

It is probably not true—as some of Petroleum Minister Yamani’s statements following the + OPEC conference seemed to + hint—that the Saudis are looking for a specific quid for their quo + and are prepared to let the price of oil rise if they do not get it. + They want to feel that the Carter administration is placing a high priority on + Middle East settlement efforts; they want to see US diplomatic activity looking toward + the resumption of negotiations; but they are fully aware of such + complicating factors as the Israeli elections, and probably would + not insist on substantial progress toward a settlement before next + summer. Next July’s OPEC meeting + is probably not a firm deadline. Nevertheless, a complete absence of + interest on the part of the US + before July might provoke the Saudis to reassess their stand.

+

Certain “negative” US actions might + also induce the Saudis to retaliate by raising the price of oil. + Chief among these would be the passage of legislation aimed at + making it difficult to do business with Saudi Arabia because of + Saudi adherence to the Arab boycott of Israel. Another would be congressional + disapproval of arms sales to Saudi Arabia.

+

Political Implications of the OPEC Decision

+

[less than 1 line not declassified] diplomatic + reporting make clear that the decision to break with OPEC and hold the line on oil was + very much Crown Prince Fahd’s, with the full support of King Khalid. Both + Yamani and Foreign + Minister Saud oppose the + move; so do most members of the Saudi cabinet and technocrats + responsible for implementing petroleum and development policy. While + Fahd and Khalid are + strong enough to keep the rest in line, they would be highly + embarrassed if the US reacted by + passing legislation directly harmful to Saudi interests. Under such + circumstances, Fahd could + react angrily and reverse his decision.

+

All indications so far, however, are that Fahd is determined to stand by + his decision, despite the storm of protest it has aroused and the + strains it has placed on Saudi relations with fellow OPEC members. Fahd [less than + 1 line not declassified] has placed his prestige very much + on the line on the oil price issue. He has ordered increased Saudi + oil production in order to hold down the price, and turned aside + attempts by key ministers to get him to change his mind.Current Saudi planning calls for production of + 11.5 million barrels per day by mid-1977, rising to 12 million + by the end of the year. The Saudis are aware that company + drawdowns of excess oil stocks will keep prices soft for the + first quarter of this year, by which time Riyadh hopes to + increase capacity sufficiently to maintain the pressure on + prices. [Footnote is in the original.] Our judgment is + that he will hold firm, at least until the Carter administration has been + given a chance to show its hand with respect to Middle East policy, + barring adverse congressional action. One other eventuality could + upset Fahd’s decision: a + veto by King Khalid, presumably in response to pleas by opponents of + the price move who win the King to their side. But Khalid seems to + be very much behind Fahd, + and dissension within the royal family on the issue would probably + have to reach a critical stage to induce him to reverse Fahd’s stand.

+

US-Saudi + Ties

+

The Saudi belief that the US is the + key to a solution of the Arab-Israeli problem is not the only reason + for the Saudi desire to cultivate the friendship of the US. The two countries have a long + history of close relations, dating from the first exploitation of + the country’s oil by the Arabian-American Oil Company in the 1930s, + shortly after the nation was unified by King Abd al-Aziz. Aramco + came close to playing the role of a benevolent colonial authority in + the new country; it gave advice on the structure of government + departments and took a hand in foreign policy. Unlike most such relationships, the experience + was seen as mutually rewarding by both parties, and the Saudis came + away with considerable respect for US technical abilities.

+

In the 1950s and 1960s, Saudi conservatism, Muslim fundamentalism, + and entrenched hatred of communism reinforced Saudi approval of + American foreign policy, apart from US support for Israel. Those were the years when the + Saudis were well out of the mainstream of an Arab world dominated by + Nasir’s Egypt, and Saudi friendship with the US reinforced that isolation. The kingdom was, at that + time, the strongest friend of the US + in the Arab world, and the Saudis were—and are—fond of pointing this + out.

+

The US-Saudi relationship was + strained by the Arab-Israeli war of 1967, but it was only after the + 1973 war—which brought the Arab oil embargo and the enormous surge + in oil prices in its wake—that serious divisions occurred. Popular + opinion in the US tended to lay + blame for oil prices at the door of the “Arabs,” despite the fact + that the most serious jump was due to Iranian pressure and that the + Saudis, even before their break with OPEC, had acted to keep prices down. Suggestions in the + US press that Washington was + planning—or ought to plan—to invade Arab oil fields angered, and + probably also alarmed, the Saudis.

+

But the change since 1973 has been more fundamental. The Saudi + international role has grown since the world first became aware of + the importance of oil to its economy, and since Saudi revenues began + to soar. The Saudis now approach diplomatic relations with the + US from a new perspective, not + as clients but as partners. They feel that the interests of the two + countries are complementary—the Saudis need US technology, the US + needs Saudi oil. They have difficulty understanding how the US can let its attachment to Israel + interfere with such a happy combination of interests. One of the + reasons behind Saudi Arabia’s decision to keep the price of OPEC oil down was to demonstrate to + the US that Saudi Arabia matters, + that it is an ally worth keeping because it is in a position to + either help or hurt.

+

The two-way street between the US and + Saudi Arabia has involved a swap of Saudi oil and surplus funds for + US technology and management + assistance. The Saudis have been accounting for roughly 1.2 million + barrels per day or 22 percent of US + oil imports; as of mid-1976 $12 billion of Saudi Arabia’s foreign + assets of $32 billion had been placed in the US. US exports to Saudi + Arabia have grown from only $500 million in 1973 to $1.5 billion in + 1975, accounting for about one quarter of Saudi imports. In 1976 + alone, US firms secured contracts + worth an estimated $27 billion, to be spread over five to ten years. + Some 28,000 Americans are working in the kingdom on numerous + projects and more than 50,000 will probably be there by 1978. The + US involvement includes:

+ +

—The construction of an entire $50-billion city, port, and industrial + complex in Jubayl on the east coast, led by Bechtel Corporation, and + of a $15 billion complex on the west coast at Yanbu in which Frank + M. Parsons Inc. and Mobil are involved;

+

—About $12 billion in military construction projects under the aegis + of the US Army Corps of Engineers; + and

+

—Participation by Fluor International and Aramco in a $16-billion gas + gathering system.

+

The Boycott Issue

+

The most immediate potential flashpoint in the mutually beneficial + Saudi-US bilateral relationship + is the boycott issue. The Saudis are not disposed to compromise on + their public adherence to the Arab boycott of Israel, for all their + looseness in administering it in the past. They are willing to + “clarify” those secondary and tertiary applications of the boycott + which are largely irrelevant and ineffective and which offend US sensitivities; they would like to + make it legally possible for most US + companies to do business in Saudi Arabia without being penalized by + their own government.

+

The Saudis were well on their way to working out such a formula as + long as they felt that Congress and the administration were + primarily concerned with preventing injustice by one American + against another. They are now beginning to suspect, however, that + the sponsors of antiboycott legislation are out to damage the US-Saudi relationship to Israel’s + benefit. As a result, their initially conciliatory attitudes have + begun to fade. They will be reviewing US activity in the boycott sphere as the acid test of + US willingness to preserve its + relationship with Saudi Arabia; Fahd’s pro-US oil + policy almost certainly hangs in the balance.

+

The Saudis cannot understand US + insistence in making a public issue of the boycott matter. They feel + that their attempts to modify the boycott under the table ought to + be sufficient. They have been pushing other Arab states to ignore + the boycott in the case of international telecommunications + services; they have backed Egypt’s proposal to take firms willing to + invest in Arab countries as well as Israel off the blacklist; they + will go along with substituting a certificate of origin for a + statement that the goods are not of Israeli origin; they will + eliminate restrictions on a prime contractor’s choice of + subcontractors. But they will not back off publicly.

+

Saudi commercial practices are rife with examples of willingness to + turn a blind eye to the boycott. For example:

+

—Philips, the large Dutch electronics and communications + company—despite being on the blacklist—was awarded a $3-billion + telephone system contract in Saudi Arabia, [2 + lines not declassified];

+

—Motorola, which operates a plant in Israel, deals in Saudi Arabia + and throughout the Arab World;

+ +

—A prominent Jewish-owned US + transportation firm has exclusive rights to operate a Ro-Ro (roll + on-roll off) shipping service to Saudi Arabia; and

+

—TWA, the sole US civil-air carrier + to Israel, has the management contract to operate the Saudi Arabian + airline

+

[5 paragraphs (59 lines) not declassified]

+

Longer Term Problems

+

The regime faces no threats of consequence, despite its rigid + conservativism and total lack of representative institutions. Partly + as a result of its ambitious development policy, however, and partly + simply as a result of the sudden influx of vast wealth, the country + is facing a period of sweeping economic change that cannot help but + drag social change in its wake, unsettling the country’s traditional + structures and perhaps, in time, endangering the monarchy.

+

The country suffers from a severe shortage of manpower. Of its + population of perhaps 5 million, at least a million and probably + more are foreigners, and the Saudis can expect a continuing influx + of foreign workers—perhaps half a million in the next five years—if + their development plans even approach the scale proposed. Some will + be unsophisticated manual laborers from North Yemen and the Sudan; + some will be skilled technicians from other Arab countries and the + West. No matter how hard Saudi leaders try to insulate the + population from the influence of “foreign” ideas, new ideas will + come—perhaps demands for the formation of labor unions, which are + now illegal, or attempts to introduce flexibility into the country’s + rather oppressive, religion-dominated social life.

+

Social change is likely to usher in demands for a political role by + wealthy businessmen and educated, middle-class technicians. The + Saudis are determined not to follow the example of Kuwait, where the + National Assembly—until its recent suspension—gave free expression + to radical and antiregime ideas. Rather than toy with similar + democratic experiments, the Saudis will try to grease social + frictions with money, already a key factor in ensuring Saudi + stability. Although far from evenly distributed—a factor aggravated + by the conspicuous consumption of those at the top—Saudi wealth is + virtually bottomless, and should go far to ensure cooperation with + the regime.

+

But money will, in turn, gradually erode traditions spawned by an + ascetic, desert culture. Respect for the ulema—religious + leaders—will eventually diminish; tribal sheikhs will dwindle in + importance; business ties will supplant tribal ties. All this could + have an effect on the monarchy. The king of Saudi Arabia was + originally—and in significant ways still is—a kind of super-sheikh. + Any Saudi can petition him in person or appeal for his judgment in a + dispute. But in the modern + Saudi Arabia, no king is going to be able to maintain that kind of + accessibility indefinitely. As the monarchy grows more remote from + the people, it will be perceived as more absolute; and this is + likely to spur popular agitation for a say in the decision-making + process.

+

A breakdown in mores and customs sufficient to threaten the monarchy + will take time. Any more immediate threat would have to come from + the army and the air force, the only institutions with the power to + mount a coup—and the threat from this quarter seems almost equally + remote. [12 lines not declassified]

+

[1 paragraph (17 lines) not declassified]

+
+ +
+ 145. Telegram From the Embassy in Saudi Arabia to the Department + of State and the Department of DefenseSource: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign + Policy File, D770024–0796. Secret. Sent for information to + USCINCEUR and CHUSMTM Dhahran. + + + Jidda, January 23, 1977, 1242Z + +

585. Subject: Saudi Desire to Acquire F–15 Aircraft. Ref Jidda + 0127.In telegram 127 from Jidda, + January 5, the Embassy reported on a meeting during which Sultan + informed U.S. officials that King Khalid and Crown Prince + Fahd had selected + the F–15 “as the advanced fighter aircraft for the Royal Saudi + Air Force.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy + File, D770004–0659)

+

1. Ambassador and Defense Attache met with MinDef Sultan on Jan 19. Amb + Porter mentioned recent + Saudi references to their interest in acquiring new aircraft. He + added that this subject would be studied by the new administration. + MinDef Sultan replied that + this was not a new subject, since it had been discussed with + SecState Kissinger over a + year ago and an agreement had been concluded.Documentation is scheduled for publication in + Foreign + Relations, 1969–1976, vol. E–9, Part 2, Documents + on the Middle East Region, 1973–1976. + Kissinger had concurred that + it was necessary for the SAG to + replace outmoded aircraft with F–14’s, F–15’s or F–16’s. It was agreed, MinDef said, that SAG would send a committee of aviators + and technicians to the U.S. to examine the aircraft and to determine + which was most suitable for Saudi Arabian needs. This was done. One + month ago the decision was made that the SAG would require the new aircraft a year and a half + from now, and a letter had been prepared requesting them. + Specifically, SAG will request 50 + F–15’s, to include 40 fighters and 10 of two seat configuration for + trainers. He is ready to deliver the letter.

+ +

2. Amb said this information was + helpful and would be useful in briefing the new USG, but requested that Sultan delay + sending us the letter, awaiting further word. Sultan indicated he + had no objection to waiting, but that he would appreciate guidance + as soon as possible. MinDef + Sultan requested that any further word be provided before Feb 1, + since SAG wished to send the letter + some time between Feb 1 and Feb 15. Amb + Porter assured the MinDef of his continued interest in + the matter and said he would reply as soon as possible.

+

3. Comment: From his reference to SecState Kissinger’s visit, it is clear that + MinDef Sultan feels the + USG has made a commitment to + provide the SAG with advanced + fighter aircraft. Indeed, DepSecDef + Clements reinforced that + view during his visit in Oct 76,Clements visited + Jidda October 21, 1976. Documentation on his visit is scheduled + for publication ibid. stating that the SAG could purchase whichever advanced + fighter—including the F–15—they preferred.Saudi Defense Minister Sultan again expressed + his desire to reach an agreement with the United States to sell + F–15s to Saudi Arabia during a January 24 meeting, which the + Embassy described in telegram 696 from Jidda, January 26. + (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + D770028–0540)

+ + Porter + +
+ +
+ 146. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Saudi + ArabiaSource: + National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + D770045–0304. Secret; Priority. Drafted by Twinam; cleared by Sober, Ericson (PM/SAS), and Fifer (DOD/ISA); approved by Atherton. Sent for information Priority to + CHUSMTM and USCINCEUR. + + + Washington, February 8, 1977, + 2013Z + +

28217. Subject: Saudi Desire to Acquire F–15 Aircraft. Ref: Jidda + 585,See Document 145. State 17333,In telegram 17333 to all diplomatic posts, + January 26, the Department referenced Carter’s January 23 statement + on U.S. arms transfer policy and indicated that U.S. officials, + if queried, “may inform host governments that, as President + clearly indicated, it is not repeat not our intention to place + freeze on all arms transfers.” (National Archives, RG 59, + Central Foreign Policy File, D770027–1041). Carter made the statement + during a January 23 interview with AP and UPI correspondents; + see the Department of State Bulletin, + February 14, 1977, pp. 123–124. Jidda 1015.In telegram 1015 from Jidda, February 7, the + Embassy highlighted topics of discussion, primarily related to + security assistance, in advance of Vance’s trip to Saudi Arabia February 19–20. + (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + D770042–1068) For information concerning the visit, see Document 148.

+

We believe it would be better if Saudis decided they could hold off, + at least for a while, in submitting their official request to + purchase F–15s. We appreciate this is a delicate matter and we leave + it up to you how to handle with SAG. At your discretion, you may wish to brief Sultan on + the contents of State reftel. We + do not in the end, however, wish to press SAG in way that makes submission of their letter itself + an issue between us.

+ + Vance + +
+ +
+ 147. Telegram From the Embassy in Saudi Arabia to the Department + of StateSource: National + Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D7700047–0449. + Secret. Sent for information to USCINCEUR and CHUSMTM. + + + Jidda, February 9, 1977, 1511Z + +

1149. Subject: F–15’s for Saudi Arabia. Ref: (A) USMTM 081045Z Feb 77 (Notal)Not found. (B) State 28217.See Document 146.

+

1. CHUSMTM has relayed to us (Ref + A) the following letter from MinDef Prince Sultan to Ambassador Porter. Begin text of unofficial + translation:

+

H.E. U.S. Ambassador, Jidda

+

Greetings:

+

In view of the good relationship that ties the U.S. and Saudi Arabia, + we always desire that most of our arms purchases be from U.S. + production. In the light of this, we request that you convey the + Saudi Government’s desire—delegated to the Ministry of Defense and + Aviation—to discuss with the U.S. Government—represented by the + Department of Defense and the U.S. Air Force—the purchase of fighter + planes (model F–15) produced by McDonnell Douglas company.

+

I request that you transmit this request to the responsible American + officials in the U.S. in order that arrangements be made quickly to + begin discussions between the two committees of Saudi Arabia and the + U.S.

+

Accept my greetings.

+

Sultan bin Abd al + Aziz

+

End text.

+

2. Prince Sultan, you will note, has managed an end-run through + USMTM, to put text of his + letter in my hand so to speak. However I do not consider this + official letter unless or until I receive it. I suggest no repeat no + reaction from Department or DOD + pending further developments.

+

3. For CHUSMTM: I hope you can + manage to avoid any further discussion on this matter with MODA officials.

+ + Porter + +
+ +
+ 148. Telegram From the Embassy in Saudi Arabia to the Department + of StateSource: Carter + Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 67, Saudi + Arabia: 1–8/77. Secret; Nodis. + + + Jidda, February 22, 1977, 0552Z + +

1412. Eyes Only for Under Secretary Habib from Ambassador Porter. Subject: Secretary’s Meeting With Crown + Prince Fahd. Ref: Jidda + 1411.In telegram 1411 from Jidda, + February 22, 0528Z, the Embassy indicated that the text of the + Secretary’s conversation with Fahd would be transmitted separately and noted + that Porter hoped that + the conversation would be given “widest possible circulation.” + (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + D770060–0966) Vance + visited Riyadh February 19–20.

+

1. Summary: Because of its substance and completeness, Ambassador + believes following report of the Secretary’s meeting with Saudi + Crown Prince Fahd on + February 19 deserves special consideration. It would be read by + officials in the Department, other agencies, and even the Congress, + who are responsible for areas where U.S. and Saudi interests meet. + End summary.

+

2. Begin text:

+

After initial formalities, Secretary Vance said that he brought the Crown Prince warm + greetings from President Carter. The President hoped that the Crown Prince + would be able to visit him, and had asked the Secretary to deliver a + Presidential letter to His Royal Highness.Carter’s undated letter to Fahd discussed the + President’s desire to have the Crown Prince visit the United + States and highlighted some of Carter’s thinking on the Middle East peace + process. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Trip + File, Box 41, Vance, + Middle East, 2/14–21/77: Letters)

+

Prince Fahd thanked the + Secretary, and said he looked forward to visiting the United States. + Prince Fahd went on to say + that he very much hoped that the Secretary’s fact-finding visit to + the Arab countries,In addition to Saudi + Arabia, Vance traveled + to Israel (February 15–17), Egypt (February 17–18), Lebanon + (February 18), Jordan (February 18–19), and Syria (February + 20–21). Documentation on his talks in these countries is in Foreign + Relations, 1977–1980, vol. VIII, Arab-Israeli + Dispute, January 1977–August 1978, Documents 6–15. and especially + to Saudi Arabia, would be successful. Although he knew it was only + an initial visit for the Secretary, such visits always expanded the + knowledge of the traveller.

+

The Secretary replied that the President had asked that he make this + visit early in the new administration, to demonstrate to the world + the importance he places on a peaceful resolution of the Middle East + problem. In addition, he wished the Secretary to meet with the heads + of governments of the states most concerned with resolving the + Middle East question, to + receive first-hand exposure to their views, and to inquire what + might be the best procedure to facilitate the peace-making + process.

+

The Secretary went on that he would report to the President on his + return, and that the President was looking forward to meeting with + the Crown Prince and other Middle Eastern leaders. The President + would consider the reports that the Secretary would convey; the + President also hoped to review with foreign leaders his own thinking + on how the United States can be most helpful in facilitating a peace + process.

+

We were therefore hopeful that Prince Fahd could visit the United States on April 12.Fahd met with U.S. officials in Washington in + May; see Documents 150 and 151. President Sadat would be + coming to Washington on the 5th, and Prince Fahd’s visit would be the second + after that one. Other leaders would be coming to Washington + subsequently.

+

The Secretary added that His Royal Highness had perhaps had a chance + to hear from Prince Saud a + short summary of the results of our discussions with other leaders + whom the Secretary had met during his trip. The Crown Prince had + perhaps heard of the difference in views that may have been + expressed over the issues of substance and procedure. He said it + would be of great value to him to receive any views on how the Crown + Prince saw these issues, and how the U.S. might proceed.

+

Prince Fahd said that in any + case the main object of the Saudi Arabian Government was how to + achieve peace and stability in the Middle East. Saudi Arabia asked + itself in whose interest is it that a condition of peace and + stability be postponed? It had concluded that the only beneficiary + from continued Middle Eastern instability was the Eastern camp. Even + Israel itself does not benefit from the present situation—presumably + Israel also wishes the area to be stable and tranquil. Thus the + SAG’s special concern was how + can it help to bring about stability.

+

From the Arab point of view, there is now a sincere desire for peace. + Wars are not to anyone’s benefit. This is the Arab consensus, and + Prince Fahd is told that + the leaders of Israel share the same desire. For that matter, all + the Jews in the world know that any continuation of the present + situation is not in the interests of the Arabs, of the Jews, or of + the world community. Prince Fahd hoped that the United States would spare no + efforts to bring about a necessary, just, and peaceful solution to + the problem. The problem, however, is one that goes back for many + years, and a solution therefore will require the very greatest + efforts.

+ +

Prince Fahd wished to point + out one important matter: i.e., the readiness of the Palestinian + leaders and the Palestinian people to accept peace efforts and a + peaceful solution. In former years no one had perceived such an + attitude on the part of the Palestinians, and we all knew that the + Eastern camp had no interest in seeing this spirit prevail. For it + to be happening now is a signal that the Middle East problem is + becoming susceptible to a solution. Prince Fahd knows the USSR is a very great state, and he + does not presume to think that Saudi Arabia can “fight” it. But he + believes Saudi Arabia can help to convince the states of the area + that the USSR is not interested in + them for altruistic reasons. Saudi Arabia can perhaps open the eyes + of its fellow Arabs to the ideological and economic fallacies which + the USSR seeks to propagate. In + the past the Soviet Union has wanted to create strong points for + itself in the area, and sought to penetrate areas that are weak and + disturbed. Its ultimate object is to maximize its opportunities to + promote its own brand of ideological and economic imperialism. Saudi + Arabian leaders and leaders of Arabic public opinion, in general, + thus fear that if a just solution cannot be found, the Soviet Union + will infiltrate the area by convincing the Arabs that only it can + assure the Arab peoples their rights.

+

Prince Fahd said he also + knew the Soviet Union had interests and aspirations extending beyond + the Middle East, to the Far East, Africa and elsewhere. But with + regard to the Arab region, it was essential to solve the problem + between the Arabs and Israel. Saudi Arabia believed there was no + alternative now to this solution; and this in turn very much raised + the question of the Palestinian peoples rights. The Palestinian + problem must be solved with equity and justice. It is known that + hundreds of thousands of Palestinians now reside in Jordan, Syria, + Egypt, Iraq, and the Gulf states. All of them look to a solution + that would improve their own personal status. Any solution that does + not accomplish this, will not be practical or constructive. Thus, + the extent to which this area will in the future enjoy tranquility + or not, will depend on the extent to which the Palestinians can feel + that they have something known as a Palestinian entity, or a + Palestinian state.

+

The Crown Prince noted that a few years ago no one in the Middle East + dared to speak of a solution that would include Israel as a state + among the states of the Middle East. This is now commonly being said + however, and this condition must be exploited. We cannot let the + opportunity slip. Saudi Arabia hears that the leaders of Israel say + the PLO must declare their + recognition and acceptance of Israel, so that Israel in turn can + discuss peace matters with them. Prince Fahd wished to comment on this + matter: it was a matter of the utmost delicacy, and required the + most careful handling. Ever since 1937, the Palestinian peoples have + been in part out of their country, and they have inculcated their youth with the + conviction of the eventual certain return to their lands. + Palestinian leaders and leaders of Palestinian public opinion know + that if they were now to accord such a degree of recognition of + Israel, they would not last one day.

+

But as far as what is happening now, Crown Prince noted the PLO leaders no longer demand all of + Palestine. They do not demand that Israel be abolished. All that + they ask for is that a Palestinian entity be set up on the West Bank + and Gaza. This is tantamount to recognizing Israel as a state. If + Israel does not accept a Palestinian state and thereby provide + positive support to the Palestinians, the PLO, and Arab leaders, it will be very difficult to + find an appropriate solution. Saudi Arabia, moreover, considers that + there are many Israelis that do not accept an intransigent view, + which primarily serves their own extremists and fanatics. There are + those Israelis that believe in the merit of creating a Palestinian + state, and entity, granting the Palestinian people their rights.

+

The Crown Prince urged that the United States consider well, that if + this year passes or the next, without a well founded prospect in + sight, or without any indication of a possible solution, the results + would be grim. Elements exist that do not want stability to prevail + in the area, and to proclaim that peace efforts have failed. These + prospects are all the more disturbing because such conclusions can + quickly prevail in the minds of people who have been told over and + over again for 25 years that the only friend of the Arabs is + Russia.

+

Prince Fahd said the + Secretary must know that in the Arab equation today there are many + of the components of a positive solution: money, knowledge, and + skilled personnel. The present leaders of the Middle East, moreover, + have much experience, and are the best qualified to lead their + peoples to a goal of stability in the region. Conditions are + propitious, therefore, but if these hopes are disappointed, and if + the Arabs become convinced that there will be no justice for them + and no solution, the area will again become inflamed. The Eastern + bloc will seize the opportunity to infiltrate and what in that case + might the free world do? Would it abandon its friends and its + interests, or might it resort to force? And if it did, what might + come of the use of such force?

+

The Crown Prince considered that what happened in Lebanon was an + example of what might in other circumstances occur throughout the + Middle East. Lebanon was a very small country of no threat to + anyone. Nonetheless, this country had gone through 19 months of + bloody civil war, in which every kind of arms was used. This + bloodshed would not have occurred without interference of the + Eastern bloc, and Prince Fahd wondered what might happen if similar unrest + were being fueled by the Soviets from Morocco to Iraq.

+

Prince Fahd urged that the + United States now should study the matter of the Middle East with + great method and precision. The situation is now good. But if efforts to reach a + solution are frustrated, events will begin to run away with all the + participants, and the consequences will be unacceptable. He urged + the United States leaders to put forward their ideas. He believed we + would be pleased with the reception they received. Doors might + appear closed, but if one knocked, they might open. Prince Fahd knew that the burden which + the friends of the United States placed upon us was onerous. There + was no escaping, however, the burdens of the problem we were living + with. He said Saudi Arabia would always be in touch with the United + States and if anything useful or new came to its attention, it would + contact us. He assured the Secretary that the SAG would always study anything that + the United States put forward very closely. He hoped that we would + be equally frank and meticulous in keeping in touch with him.

+

Prince Fahd reminded the + Secretary that Saudi Arabia could perhaps help to find solutions to + problems between parties to the conflict. Saudi Arabia had always + tried in its own quiet way to bring about stability in the area.

+

Prince Fahd then spoke about + Saudi-US bilateral relations. He + knew that the relations were very strong, and were of considerable + duration. It had been proven moreover, that these ties were not + easily shaken: Saudi Arabia had demonstrated its attachment to this + relationship even in difficult times. He hoped that this + relationship would grow even closer and more useful. Saudi Arabia + also knew that there were those in the area that claimed at least + privately to be good friends of the United States. But in public + they criticized the United States, whereas Saudi Arabia had always + stood publicly by its pro-US + position.

+

Turning to the question of oil, Prince Fahd said that Saudi Arabia and the UAE had taken their pricing decision + for the well-being of the world community. They had sought to check + the rise of inflation, and to do what they could to lighten the + economic burden on the consuming nations. Fahd noted that some of the world + press had hastened to say that Saudi Arabia was bargaining with the + US in adopting this position and + was seeking a quid pro quo. This was untrue. Saudi Arabia had acted + as it did because it was convinced such action was necessary and + good for the free world.

+

Saudi Arabia, moreover, knew that it needed the help of the USA. With + regard to the Kingdom’s military development, for instance, it + wished US-Saudi ties to be based on + the most comprehensive and best possible position. The Prince + reaffirmed the importance that Saudi Arabia attached to developing + the Kingdom’s army, navy and air force under US auspices. He emphasized that Saudi Arabia would + never use its arms to attack others. He wished the Kingdom to be as + strong as its capabilities and requirements indicated. No one, he + noted, could be respected if he could not defend himself—but he + repeated that Saudi Arabia would never commit aggression against + others.

+ +

Prince Fahd also felt that + the Gulf states were confident and secure in Saudi Arabia’s + proximity. They had placed upon Saudi Arabia a responsibility to + defend them should the situation require it. He added that Saudi + Arabia’s military efforts should furthermore be seen in the light of + other regional states that are armed most strongly by the Soviets. + This is why in the Prince’s most recent discussions with former + President Nixon, former + Secretary of State Kissinger, + and former Secretary of Defense Schlesinger, the Saudi side had always expressed + interest in military topics.Prince + Fahd visited + Washington in May 1974. Documentation is scheduled for + publication in Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, vol. E–9, Part 2, + Documents on the Middle East Region + 1973–1976.

+

The Prince noted that in general the US had always expressed its readiness to cooperate with + Saudi Arabia, but that the actual implementation of programs was not + always as prompt as might be desirable. The SAG was repeatedly told that it should take more time, + and train additional manpower to absorb new equipment. In the past, + Fahd admitted, they had + gotten some good responses from the US but he now wanted to work together on a plan of + military preparation and sales that would be agreed to by both + sides. He wished to build up the Saudi armed forces in a long term, + orderly way. The SAG had to know + how it could proceed in future years. If the SAG lacked a well thought out program, + or did not know in advance what steps it should take, it would be + difficult to proceed. Furthermore, its defensive capability would in + no way be appropriate to the country’s vast size and very great + responsibilities. Saudi Arabia would lack the military strength + necessary for it to be respected.

+

The Prince therefore hoped that the USG would give close attention to what degree it could + arm Saudi Arabia with advanced aircraft, such as the F–15. He did + not ask for the USG’s answer now. But he would want to know + to what extent Saudi Arabia could depend on the US.

+

In the meantime, Saudi Arabia would continue to develop its manpower, + but it was important to be able to reassure the Saudi Arabian people + and their armed forces that their government was really determined + to build a modern army, navy and air force. The Prince hoped that + these very delicate matters could be given close attention.

+

Prince Fahd next came to an + important point: he was concerned over what Congressmen and Senators + might do about the Arab boycott. Such actions would have great + influence on the thinking of Saudi Arabia and on Saudi Arabia’s + understanding (iltizamat) towards the US as a government and toward the more than 200 US firms in the Kingdom. Congressional + action would have an effect on the SAG and private Saudi individuals. The Prince sincerely hoped that matters + would never get to the point where our relations would not be as we + both might wish. In whose interest he asked is it that US-Saudi economic relations be harmed? + Why should US companies withdraw + from the market so that European, Japanese and other companies can + replace them? Billions of dollars in sales and in banking + investments were involved, and these benefits could erode and the + door could be opened to others.

+

The Prince added that decisions in Congress on the boycott could be + of the greatest and most far-reaching sensitivity. He urged the + USG to be far-sighted. The + administration should make congressional leaders of anti-boycott + actions aware of the US’s true + interests. Saudi Arabia was ready to cooperate in such an + educational effort. US-Saudi Arabia + friendship was not based on formal ties; like any good friends the + two sides could discuss great and small matters in an amicable tone. + The Prince imagined that some members of Congress who were doing all + they could to combat the Arab boycott did not understand the matter. + Were they to study the US’s + interests and the harm their action could do to the US—and friends of the US—perhaps their position would be + different. He suggested that such congressional leaders visit Saudi + Arabia and discuss matters face to face. He again wished the + Secretary to know to what degree legislative measures against the + boycott could be harmful to the US.

+

The Prince did not say that the members of the Congress out of + deliberate intent wished to hurt US + interest. Ignorance was probably at fault. Therefore, let the + Congressmen come to Saudi Arabia. The SAG would point out to these Congressmen what US interests really were and what were + the interests of America’s friends. Through such discussions, the + Congress could see the issue in wider context. Once again, the + Prince noted that harm to our relations could result if the USG acted against the boycott on the + basis of such congressional decisions.

+

The Prince said he considered that he had spoken long enough. He + expressed his thanks to the Secretary and to President Carter for their thoughtfulness in + inviting him to the US. This was an + excellent step, and would give him an opportunity to meet with + friends, to learn, and to become more personally familiar with the + course of US-Saudi relations.

+

Secretary Vance thanked the + Crown Prince for his enlightening presentation. He especially + appreciated Fahd’s clear + and thoughtful analysis of the strategic implications of various + forces that might come into play, and the consequences of various + courses of action. He asked the Prince’s permission to comment on a + few points—which he said would be brief.

+

He completely agreed with the Crown Prince that no one in the area + would benefit from a failure not to resolve the Middle East problem. + He said he would spare + no effort in working with the Crown Prince and other leaders to find + a just and durable solution. The US + shares the SAG’s concern about the + USSR, and is familiar with the + problems which may result for all of us if Soviet objectives are + attained. We are well aware the Russians have in the past fished in + troubled waters and would continue to try to do so.

+

Regarding the question of the Palestinian people, we have always + maintained there could be no just and durable peace without a + solution to the Palestinian problem.

+

Regarding the question of territories, we supported from the outset + Resolution 242 which calls for restoring lands acquired by Israel in + the 1967 war.Reference is to UN Security Council Resolution 242 + of November 22, 1967. See Foreign Relations, 1964–1968, vol. + XIX, Arab-Israeli Crisis and War, 1967, Document + 542.

+

Regarding the status of the PLO, + this presents a problem—but one which the Secretary hoped would not + be beyond the ingenuity of man to bridge. It is difficult now he + said for us to speak finally on this issue, but we must recognize + that it poses a very substantial difficulty between Israel on the + one hand and the Arabs on the other.

+

The Secretary next asked if he might say that the US was indeed mindful of the courage + and leadership demonstrated by Prince Fahd and other Saudi leaders in their efforts to + promote stability in the area. It was the hope and desire of the + USG to help Saudi Arabia + maintain this stability. The US + takes this action not only because it believes that doing so is in + the interest of the people in the area, but in our own national + interest as well.

+

Regarding peace efforts in general, the Secretary believed there is + an opportunity at this point, and said that we shall strive to the + utmost not to lose this opportunity. We assured the Crown Prince + that we would work in closest consultations with him in our search + for peace. He looked forward to discussing the US view on this matter further with the + Crown Prince when he visited the President.

+

The Secretary then added a few words about our bilateral relations: + he fully agreed with the Crown Prince that US-Saudi relations were strong and deeply rooted. He + recognizes and appreciates the way Saudi Arabia has stood up in + public and defended this relation with us. The US was proud of this relationship and + would do all in its power to strengthen it.

+

On the question of military forces and a plan for the future of our + military relationship, the Secretary informed the Crown Prince that + the US has undertaken a study of the + whole question of sale of military arms. This study would apply not + only to the Middle East but to sales anywhere in the world as far as the US is concerned. The Secretary fully + agreed it was an excellent idea to establish a systematic, long term + plan for Saudi Arabia’s military requirements. The US will begin work on such a study and + will be happy to discuss it with the Crown Prince when he comes to + the US.

+

The Secretary said that the boycott is a complex and difficult matter + in the US. The Congress intends to + hold hearings on this question at the end of this month. He was able + to defer such hearings to the end of the month but Congress insisted + that they should go forward as of February 28. In the meantime, the + Secretary said that we were studying within the Executive Branch how + best to respond in these hearings at which he himself would have to + testify.For Secretary Vance’s March 1 statement + before the House Committee on International Relations on the + proposed anti-boycott legislation, see the Department of State + Bulletin, March 21, 1977, pp. + 267–270. Ambassador Porter could also perhaps discuss this forthcoming + bilateral issue with Saudi officials. The Ambassador’s reports could + become part of the Secretary’s preparations. The Secretary agreed it + would be useful for members of Congress to visit the area. He would + encourage Congressmen to undertake such visits, to come, to see, and + to learn.

+

Finally, the Secretary wished to touch on one other subject. He had + stated previously that the US should + move to convene the Geneva Conference in the last half of 1977.Originally convened on December 21, 1973, + to negotiate a solution to the Arab-Israeli dispute, the + multilateral Geneva Middle East Peace Conference stood in + adjournment since December 29 of that year. For documentation + relating to the Carter + administration’s efforts to re-convene the Conference, see Foreign + Relations, 1977–1980, vol. VIII, Arab-Israeli + Dispute, January 1977–August 1978. He had not + made this proposal of course for the purpose of seeking a delay. He + believed, however, it would be more practical to convene the + conference in the fall of 1977.

+

In the meantime, there was much preparatory work that could be done + so that all should move smoothly and speedily when the conference is + held.

+

In conclusion, the Secretary wished to thank the Crown Prince for his + gracious hospitality. It had been a great pleasure to come to Saudi + Arabia and to meet with the Crown Prince and other Saudi Arabian + leaders.

+

Prince Fahd replied that he + was happy that the Secretary had visited Saudi Arabia; he hoped that + such visits could take place again, because he thought them most + useful.

+

As a closing word, the Secretary asked that the Crown Prince inform + His Majesty King Khalid how pleased the Secretary was to have learned that His Majesty + had come through his recent operation in such a splendid + fashion.

+

Prince Fahd praised God for + His Majesty’s health. He said he had heard that day from Prince + Sultan that the King was sitting up in bed and receiving a few + friends. The King had also taken some coffee, but the doctors would + not allow him to sit in a chair until the following day. The Crown + Prince said that His Majesty had not intended to have an operation + at first, but when he saw it was necessary, he had said he was + prepared to undergo one, two, three, or more operations if they were + needed—in hopes that they would be useful. His Majesty was a brave + and hardy man.

+

The Secretary and his party took their leave.

+ + Porter + +
+ +
+ 149. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National + Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to President CarterSource: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country + File, Box 67, Saudi Arabia: 1–8/77. Secret. Sent for action. + Carter initialed the + memorandum. + + + Washington, May + 21, 1977 + + + SUBJECT + F–15s for Saudi Arabia + +

Saudi Arabia was informed in 1974, after an extensive U.S. survey of + their defense needs, that we were prepared in principle to sell them + an advanced fighter aircraft to replace their aging fleet of 44 + British Lightnings. In October 1976, Deputy Secretary of Defense + Clements told the Saudi + Defense Minister that he considered the F–16 the most appropriate fighter for Saudi Arabia, but + “if you want the F–15, the choice is yours.” The Saudis have + conducted their own extensive study and have informed us on several + occasions that they prefer the F–15. Crown Prince Fahd will wish to have + confirmation of the U.S. commitment during his visit to Washington + next week. The pilot who conducted the Saudi Air Force study will + accompany Fahd on the + visit.

+ +

Secretary Brown recommends + that we agree to supply the F–15, subject to Congressional approval, + with no commitment now on delivery dates.Brown + approved the recommendation in a May 11 action memorandum from + Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security + Affairs Walter Slocombe. (Washington National Records Center, RG + 330, OSD Files, FRC 330–80–0017, Saudi Arabia, + 400–499, 1977, Folder 6)

+

Secretary Vance recommends + (Tab A)Not attached. In a May 19 + memorandum to Carter, + Christopher provided + Vance’s + recommendations. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign + Policy File, P840134–0692) that a commitment should be + made only to consult with the Congress + concerning the possibility of selling an advanced aircraft to Saudi + Arabia, with no commitment on the type of plane, numbers, and + delivery schedules. State believes that it would be virtually + impossible to get Congressional approval of the F–15 because of its + extensive capabilities and complexity. They believe the lightweight + F–16, while still very + controversial, might have a better chance of success. State also + proposes that any such commitment should be preceded by confidential + consultations with key Congressional leaders.

+

There are two fundamental questions: (1) Should we try to persuade + the Saudis to purchase the F–16 + rather than the F–15; and (2) How should we handle this issue with + the Congress?

+

F–15 vs. F–16

+

It is unlikely that the Saudis will be willing to consider + substitution of the F–16 for the + F–15. They want an air defense fighter, and have decided + independently that the dual-engine, all-weather F–15 best meets + their needs. Defense agrees that this choice is justified and is + within Saudi capabilities to operate in the 1980s. The sale of any advanced aircraft will be extremely + controversial, and we could not assure Prince Fahd that Congressional approval + would be forthcoming if he chose the F–16.

+

Ultimately, the question is political. In the wake of the political + events in Israel and the uncertainties which have been injected into + the peace process, as well as the recent U.S. public affirmations of + our special relationship with Israel on arms transfers,On May 12, Carter announced in a press conference that + Israel would be accorded “special treatment” in U.S. arms sales + and would receive advanced armaments. (Public + Papers: Carter, 1977–78, Book I, pp. 866–867) + Crown Prince Fahd will be + looking for a reaffirmation of the U.S.-Saudi security relationship + as tangible evidence of our attitude toward the Arabs. Any evidence + that we are backing away from previous commitments at this point + could have a significant influence on the message he takes back to + Asad and Sadat.

+ +

Consultations with Congress

+

The basic disagreement between Defense and State is whether we should + reaffirm our commitment subject to consultations with Congress + (Defense) or commit ourselves only to consult + with Congress, including advance consultation prior to Fahd’s arrival.

+

Advance consultations on more than a token basis are no longer a + practical alternative in view of the imminence of Fahd’s arrival. Secretary + Vance has informed us + that he feels obligated to touch base with key Congressional leaders + in advance of discussions with Fahd. Subject to your approval, he and Deputy + Secretary Christopher intend + to meet privately with Senators Humphrey, Case and Javits, as well as with Congressman Zablocki on MondayMay 23. to discuss this issue. Secretary + Vance agrees that any + wider consultation with Congress at this point, given the extreme + sensitivity on the Hill to the recent events in Israel, could set + off a major confrontation with Congress while Fahd is in Washington.

+

I recommend that Fahd be + told that we will respect the commitment of the previous + Administration to sell Saudi Arabia an advanced fighter aircraft. We + understand Saudi Arabia’s preference for the F–15. However, in view + of the controversial nature of this proposed sale, we cannot assure + Prince Fahd that it will + receive Congressional approval. For that reason, and to avoid + possible embarrassment to the Saudi Government, we would prefer to + conduct confidential consultations with the Congress in advance of + any formal announcement. We will inform him of the results as soon + as possible.

+

Sidewinders and Mavericks

+

In addition to the F–15 question, Fahd will be looking for a confirmation of President + Ford’s commitment to + King Khalid that every effort would be made in the future to provide + additional quantities of Sidewinder and Maverick missiles. This + issue is fully discussed in Secretary Vance’s memorandum at Tab A (p. 4). Although State + and Defense both recommend confirming the commitment to supply + additional weapons, subject to Congressional approval, we believe + that this could be politically untenable. You will recall the letter + from Representative Rosenthal citing your campaign statement on this + subject.Not found. That + statement, in conjunction with the overall arms transfer policy, + makes a commitment on Mavericks and Sidewinders at this time + undesirable. I suggest that Fahd be informed, perhaps during your private talk + with him, that raising the issue of Mavericks and Sidewinders at + this time would be so + controversial that it could seriously threaten other military + programs for Saudi Arabia, including the advanced fighter. Unless he + considers this to be critical to his defense, we would prefer to + postpone consideration of this request until after the issue of the + advanced fighter has been settled. In the meantime, the Saudis could + be assured that we would maintain their stocks of Mavericks and + Sidewinders at present levels, replacing those which are expended in + training.

+

RECOMMENDATIONS:

+

That Crown Prince Fahd be + informed that we will undertake consultations with the Congress in + the near future on the sale of an advanced fighter aircraft, + identifying the F–15 as the preferred choice of the Saudi + Government.Carter checked the Approve + option for this and the following recommendation. Carter also initialed in the + right-hand margin next to the first recommendation.

+

_____Approve.

+

_____Disapprove.

+

That you approve Secretary Vance and Deputy Secretary Christopher discussing the issue + with Senators Humphrey, + Case and Javits and Representative + Zablocki.

+

_____Approve.

+

_____Disapprove.

+

That you inform Fahd in your + private meeting that consideration of the sale of additional + Sidewinders and Mavericks would best be postponed until after the + issue of the advanced fighter has been settled.

+

_____Approve.Carter checked this option and + initialed in the margin below. According to the President’s + Daily Diary, Carter met + privately with Fahd in + the Oval Office between 10:35 a.m. and 10:55 a.m., May 24. + (Carter Library, Presidential Materials) No memorandum of + conversation of this meeting has been found. Immediately after + that meeting, Fahd and + Carter and U.S. and + Saudi officials met until 12:30 p.m. See Foreign + Relations, 1977–1980, vol. VIII, Arab-Israeli + Dispute, January 1977–August 1978, Document 36. + Carter met privately + with Fahd again on the + morning of May 25. Notes of this meeting are in Foreign + Relations, 1977–1980, vol. VIII, Arab-Israeli + Dispute, January 1977–August 1978, Document + 37.

+

_____Approve. Prefer that this be raised by Secretary Brown.

+

_____Disapprove. Proceed as State and Defense have suggested.

+
+ +
+ 150. Memorandum of ConversationSource: Department of State, Office of the + Secretariat Staff, Cyrus R. + Vance, Secretary of State—1977–1980, Lot 84D241, + Box 10, Vance EXDIS + MemCons, 1977. Secret; Exdis. + Drafted by Twinam; + approved by Twaddell on June 8. The meeting took place in the + James Madison Room at the Department of State. Reddy sent the + memorandum of conversation to Twaddell under a May 27 + memorandum, in which Reddy provided a brief summary of the + conversation. Attached but not printed is a guest list for the + luncheon. + + + Washington, May 24, 1977, 1 + p.m. + + + SUBJECT + Secretary’s Lunch for Crown Prince Fahd + + + PARTICIPANTS + + Saudi Arabia + His Royal Highness Prince Fahd bin Abd + al-Aziz + Al-Saud, Crown Prince and Deputy Prime + Minister + See attached guest list + + + + + United States + The Secretary + See attached guest list + + +

CIEC

+

At the Secretary’s request, Mr. Cooper + outlined U.S. views on the prospects for CIEC.Reference is to the + final Ministerial session of the Conference on International + Economic Cooperation, which was scheduled to take place in Paris + May 30–June 3. He indicated guarded optimism on the basis + of consultations over the last few months with both developed and + developing countries. In cooperation with other industrial + countries, the United States hopes to put together a quite + respectable package.

+

Turning to the four key issues, Mr. Cooper + noted that commodity policy is of uppermost importance to some of + the developing countries and that the United States is sympathetic + to commodity agreements which would stabilize prices. The current + round of discussions on sugar is the first serious commodity + discussion in which the present Administration has been involved and + we foresee coming up with a good proposal to stabilize the world + sugar market. We do not see, for technical reasons, agreements on + each of the eighteen commodities which UNCTAD has identified for consideration, but we are + determined to make a sympathetic effort to make progress on those + commodities where agreement appears feasible. Without prejudicing + the results of technical studies which we are now conducting, we see + perhaps a half-dozen commodities, all tropical, such as tin, rubber, + sugar, cocoa and coffee, in which agreements appears feasible. If we + are able to achieve + agreements on a reasonable number of commodities the United States + is prepared to support a common fund to facilitate their + implementation. Our version of the modalities of such a fund is + rather different from that proposed by the UNCTAD Secretariat but our + consultations suggest some developing countries are finding our + version at least equally attractive. There is hope for success in + this regard later this year or early next year.

+

Mr. Cooper>continued with the + discussion of the second key issue, overseas development assistance. + He noted that a major review of foreign aid is underway in the + United States Government, but without prejudicing its findings, we + think we can support not only substantial increases in the quantity + of our development assistance, but also improvements in its quality. + Mr. Solomon stated that we + are currently discussing development assistance with the Congress, + with mixed reactions.

+

Turning to the external debt issue, Mr. Coopernoted that there is an analytical problem in + the CIEC context since some of the + strongest advocates of debt relief are not the countries with the + worst debt problems. These countries privately admitted that they + see debt relief proposals as a vehicle for resource transfer. + Therefore, we see two different approaches as called for: dealing + with real debt relief problems on a case-by-case basis while + treating the question of resource transfer generally under the label + of debt relief. We are proposing a “special action” program for the + 30–40 poorest countries. This would be a special CIEC “plum” conditional on a + successful outcome of CIEC. + Modalities would vary country to country. In our own case, we + foresee additional economic assistance, especially for Africa.

+

On the issue of energy, Mr. Coopernoted that is the area in which the United + States and Saudi Governments are co-chairmen and that there had been + excellent cooperation between us at the last meeting which had + achieved progress.

+

He noted one difficulty in CIEC is + that the Group of 19The developing + nations participating in the CIEC: Algeria, Argentina, Brazil, Cameroon, Egypt, + India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Jamaica, Mexico, Nigeria, + Pakistan, Peru, Saudi Arabia, Venezuela, Yugoslavia, Zaire, and + Zambia. have a limited scope for negotiating on the basis + of their mandate from the Group of 77.The Group of 77, established at the conclusion of the first + United Nations Conference on Trade and Development in 1964 and + comprised of 77 developing nations. Therefore, we view + CIEC as a place to pull all + the strands of economic international cooperation together, giving + the most promising areas the impetus of ministerial level focus and + then farming them out to appropriate fora for negotiation. For + example, there is a role for UNCTAD in commodities and a role for the IBRD and IMF in economic development discussions. The one key issue which lacks a + forum is energy, and we are open to suggestions as to how best to + pursue the energy dialogue post-CIEC.

+

Minister Yamani noted that from the beginning Saudi + Arabia had been concerned about isolating international discussions + of energy from other economic issues and had wanted a “package deal” + —hence CIEC. At the ministerial + meeting in Paris next week we will be facing the original + problem—how to find a forum for energy discussions which will not + separate this issue from the others.

+

Mr. Solomon and Mr. Cooper addressed the + question of continuing CIEC. Mr. Solomon, noting he was speaking frankly + among friends, explained that the continuation of CIEC discussions in the other three + areas would keep pressure on the industrial countries to reach + positions which were not realizable. On the other hand, the energy + discussions were generally without the same specificity as the + discussions in the other three areas. Mr. + Cooper said + that the new Administration had addressed the idea of continuing + CIEC with an open mind, and in + discussions with both developed and developing countries he had + found “universal disapproval” of this idea. Everyone wanted to wrap + up CIEC. He believed that the + Group of 19 felt under pressure from the Group of 77 which + questioned the legitimacy of the Group of 19 as their + representatives.

+

When Minister Yamani said the problem of the need to link + energy to the other discussions remains unsolved, the Secretary asked for Saudi suggestions. Yamani stated that Saudi Arabia is not prepared + to separate the issue. Movement in the energy dialogue will be + restricted by separation. Prince Saud reviewed the considerations leading up to + CIEC, noting that little + progress had been made over the years in discussing various + international economic issues separately in UNCTAD and various UN fora. CIEC was conceived as the forum which could oversee all + of these related issues and in which the importance of the energy + question could provide momentum for progress on the other + issues.

+

In response to Minister Aba al-Khayl’s + question of why there was need to continue to discuss energy, Mr. Cooper pointed out it would be anomalous to + discuss other international commodities ignoring energy which is in + effect the world’s most important “commodity,” rivaled only by + grains. He noted the need to develop a global view on such questions + as conservation, development of new resources, and the general + supply/demand picture. The United States has no fixed idea on how + best to continue the energy dialogue. Three illustrative examples + would be: (1) a free-standing committee which would be an extension + of the CIEC Energy Commission; (2) + putting the energy dialogue into UNCTAD; or (3) a free-standing committee under some + form of UN/IBRD auspices.

+ +

Dr. Brzezinski noted that CIEC seems to serve two unique and + important functions: it links the economic issues and it provides a + political-economic linkage in the context of the North-South + dialogue. If no one wants to continue CIEC it obviously should end, but he hoped that no + premature conclusions were being drawn.

+

The Secretary indicated he shared this + concern.

+

Minister Yamani suggested that there might be some + way in which the Group of 19 could at the end of the ministerial + meeting call for keeping the option of reconvening CIEC open.

+

Dr. Brzezinski said that this idea might be + expanded to include leaving a body of experts in place to pursue + discussions.

+

The Secretary said the first need seemed to be + to obtain a better view of how the members feel about the future + operation of CIEC.

+

Mr. Cooper noted that in his discussions with the + Europeans, Japan, and a half dozen developing countries all parties, + except the Commission of the European Community which has a special + interest in the continuation of CIEC, wanted to wrap it up. He welcomed Minister + Yamani’s idea of making + provision for a number of CIEC + participants to be able to call for its reconvening, but noted there + is some question about keeping the committees operating. Perhaps + there would be some way to keep the energy committee alive in some + form.

+

Yamani + reiterated the importance of assuring a linkage between the energy + dialogue and the other issues.

+

The Secretary suggested giving more thought to + this question and getting back in touch before the ministerial + session begins.

+

Crown Prince Fahd urged trying to continue the concept + of CIEC by trying to convince all + the participating countries of its benefits. If there are obstacles + to its success, there is no alternative but to try to remove these + obstacles.

+

Yamani + asked what the United States really wants from the energy dialogue. + Mr. Solomon explained that there is a world + concern about quantities and prices of energy. The discussions to + date in the energy committee have not been specific: there has been + no discussion of price. In response to Minister Yamani’s query as to whether the + United States expected OPEC + countries to discuss price in CIEC, Mr. Cooper explained that we would welcome + discussion of the implications of pricing, but would not view CIEC as a bargaining session over oil + pricing. He added that there are other issues, such as conservation + and the exchange of technology in seeking new energy sources which + warrant discussion.

+

Prince Saud suggested that since discussion of + one economic issue leads to another it is important that there be a + forum which links all the issues.

+

The Secretary reiterated the need to reflect + on this problem and be back in touch.

+ +

The Horn of Africa

+

The Secretary noted that the United States had + given much attention and thought to the situation in the Horn of + Africa and had taken certain steps of which Saudi Arabia has been + kept generally informed. For example, we have been in touch with the + Government of Somalia and have sent a mission to discuss economic + assistance. Before going to Europe,Vance traveled to + Europe May 5–21. the Secretary had met three weeks ago + with the Somali Ambassador and military assistance had been + discussed.Documentation on + U.S.-Somali relations is scheduled for publication in Foreign + Relations, 1977–1980, vol. XVII, Part 1, Horn of + Africa. The Secretary had indicated at that + time that he would be prepared to be more specific on his return + from Europe and after the Administration’s review of arms transfer + policy had been completed. He had agreed to meet again with the + Somali Ambassador in the near future. In our view, Saudi Arabia and + the United States have an opportunity in the Horn of Africa and + should work together exchanging views and judgments as to how to + proceed. He asked Crown Prince Fahd’s advice about the desirability of forming a + consortium of Western countries to provide military assistance to + Somalia.

+

Crown Prince Fahd noted his pleasure at being able to + discuss the importance of Africa, which the Soviets and communist + states generally are increasingly trying to infiltrate. He said + Africa feels a great need for assistance, particularly from the + United States. He reviewed at some length his effort to focus U.S. + attention on Somalia during his last visit to Washington in + 1974See footnote 6, Document 148. when Somalia had not + yet formed strong ties with the Soviets, but when Crown Prince + Fahd had sensed + Somalia’s need for economic and military assistance. While Saudi + Arabia had done what it could to help, Somalia eventually felt + itself in circumstances making it imperative to listen to the + Soviets and ties with the communist states developed. Saudi Arabia + had tried to warn Somalia that this trend would be ruinous + eventually; but the Soviets had jumped into the breach with aid, + especially military aid. Saudi Arabia had kept in touch, and a month + and a half ago Prince Saud + had held wide-ranging discussions during his visit to Somalia.

+

Concurrently, a Somali minister and military experts had met with + Crown Prince Fahd in Saudi + Arabia. The Saudis discern new thinking on the part of the Somali + leadership about the desirability of close ties to the Soviet Union + in particular and the communist world generally. President Siad and + other key officials appear convinced of the dire consequences of + continuing a close tie with the Soviets and they are convinced of the need for good + relations with the Arabs generally and Saudi Arabia in particular. + Saudi Arabia has pitched in to try to help Somalia. At the same time + there are elements in Somalia which will pose obstacles to a + reorientation of policy and the present leadership must face the + reality that it will take time and outside help to permit Somalia to + extricate itself from Soviet influence.

+

Crown Prince Fahd continued + that Somalia realizes the Soviets are seeking better relations with + Ethiopia and there are of course problems between Somalia and + Ethiopia. He cited Castro’s + recent failure to bring about Ethiopian/Somalia rapprochement. He + noted Castro is a tool of the + Soviets and that his recent mission is current evidence of Soviet + expansionist aims in Africa. He noted the brutality of the present + Ethiopian regime. He expressed concern about Soviet aims in Angola. + He said the Soviets will try to create in Zaire a base for future + infiltration in Africa and that the situation in Zaire could be + improved if the West rushed to Zaire’s aid. Noting that Castro met with Qaddafi on his + mission, Crown Prince Fahd + suggested that the threat of Soviet infiltration extends to North + Africa.

+

Returning to Somalia specifically, Crown Prince Fahd stressed that there is now + an opportunity for Saudi Arabia and the West to rush to Somalia’s + aid, closing out the possibilities for Soviet intervention in + Somalia and the Red Sea area. It is better to act now than later + because there is a popular feeling in Somalia against the Soviet + tie, but if the Soviets establish complete control, popular opinion + will no longer matter. Saudi Arabia is trying to help Somalia, but + its efforts will be useful only if the United States and other + Western countries join in. Therefore, Crown Prince Fahd expressed pleasure in + learning of the U.S. economic assistance mission, which he said + would boost the morale of the Somali leadership.

+

The Secretary said that the United States and + the Saudi views on the Horn of Africa are similar and he welcomed + the opportunity to continue the discussion, reviewing what we are + doing on a country-by-country basis.

+

After an exchange of compliments, the Secretary and Crown Prince + Fahd moved to the + Secretary’s office for a private meeting.No memorandum of conversation of the private + meeting has been found.

+
+ +
+ 151. Memorandum of ConversationSource: Washington National Records Center, RG + 330, OSD Files, FRC 330–80–0017, Saudi Arabia, + 400–499, 1977, Folder 5. Secret; Noforn. Prepared by Janka; + coordinated by McGiffert; approved by Brown on June 4. The meeting took place at Blair + House. + + + Washington, May 24, + 1977, 4:30–5:30 p.m. + + + SUBJECT + Secretary of Defense meeting with Crown Prince Fahd of Saudi Arabia + (U) + + + PARTICIPANTS + + U.S. + The Secretary + Deputy Secretary Duncan + Governor West, U.S. Ambassador-designate to Saudi + Arabia + Assistant Secretary, ISA + DASD (NEASA), Mr. + Janka + Director, DSAA, + LTG Fish + DASS, Mr. Sober + Military Assistant, RADM Holcomb + + + Saudi Arabia + Crown Prince Fahd + Minister of Foreign Affairs, Prince Sa’ud ibn + Faysal + Ambassador to the U.S., Ali Abdullah Alireza + Saudi Interpreter + + +

Secretary Brown: I am happy to see you in our city + and I trust that your meetings have gone well.

+

Prince Fahd: My meetings with the President and + the Secretary of State were useful and constructive.See footnote 8, Document + 149, and Document + 150. This is the first time I have met with + President Carter, and the + meeting was very constructive and good. I am pleased to be meeting + with you also.

+

Secretary Brown: We, in Defense, are particularly + proud of the opportunity to cooperate with Saudi Arabia in its + development and its security efforts. I am not new to the Department + of Defense, but I am new to the position of Secretary of Defense. + One thing I have been most impressed with is the closeness of + relations between Saudi Arabia and the United States. We will do + everything possible to advance that relationship.

+

Prince Fahd: Please proceed with any matters you + wish to raise and I shall be pleased to listen.

+

Secretary Brown: We would be pleased to hear your + views for the prospects for peace in the Middle East, including the + effects of the recent Israeli elections, as well as the situation in + Lebanon in which Saudi influence on Syria has been particularly + constructive. I would also like to hear your views on the form a + peace agreement might take.

+ +

Prince Fahd: In regard to the matter of peace in + the Middle East, I have already discussed this with the President + and pointed out that peace will depend on a continuity of effort + aimed at maintaining stability in the Middle East. I can also add + that this is the view of the leaders of the Arab world, particularly + of Egypt and Syria. It is consistent with what we understand from + King Hussein and the leaders of the PLO. All Arab parties want the achievement of a just + peace—in an impartial and just way.

+

As you know, there are resolutions approved by the United Nations + Security Council and General Assembly, and these resolutions have + been agreed upon by major countries. We in Saudi Arabia believe that + fighting for a peace that is just and impartial is essential to the + area.

+

We also believe that the present crisis is made up of many things in + its background, but what is important now is a continuity of effort + for achieving a just and impartial peace. This is in reference to + our Arab point of view. On the Israeli side, we cannot say a lot, + but there is now an opportunity for them to find peace in the area. + The Arabs who are looking for solutions are aware that the problems + in our area will not only affect the Middle East, but the world as a + whole. It is important for everybody that we avoid such dangerous + situations if they arise.

+

I have discussed the situation with the President, and I have + discussed all the possibilities for solutions with the President, + and have given him a good view of what the possibilities are in the + Middle East. We believe any solution that is imposed from outside, + which does not involve the Palestinians, will not achieve a peace. + The Palestinian problem is the basic problem of the Middle East + situation. As long as there is an inclination for peace in the area, + we must continue our efforts. The problem has been all along that + Israel was saying it would not accept any peace until its existence + was accepted—that acceptance now exists.

+

Because the Arabs are asking for return of the lands occupied in + 1967, and asking for a settlement for the Palestinians—therefore the + existence of a Palestinian State implicitly involves an acceptance + of borders with an Israeli State. It is very important that Israel, + the Arab countries and the Palestinians, all participate in the + process of reaching a peace agreement based on justice and + impartiality.

+

With respect to the results of the Israeli election, the views of our + countries are similar and emanate from the lack of stability between + the Arabs and Israelis. The results of the elections have created + something new—majority views and actions new to us. One of those + actions is Menachem Begin’s + attendance at festivities opening a new settlement in the occupied + areas and saying that Gaza and the West Bank are a part of Israel. + We do not know whether or not, when he assumes office, such statements will represent his + policy or something different will emerge. We noticed that in the + International Press he has been saying things which are not + satisfactory to the Arabs or other nations. If he (Begin) wants to complicate the + situation, the Arabs will not be responsible.

+

We must ask ourselves; in exactly whose interest are these obstacles + being laid against efforts to obtain peace in the Middle East? We in + Saudi Arabia believe the only beneficiary of a more complicated + situation in the Middle East would be the Eastern camp, because it + is not in the interest of the Soviet Union to see peace and + stability in the Middle East. This is because once you have peace + and stability in the Middle East, there is no further use for the + Soviet Union in the region.

+

I am also convinced that there are also reasonable people still in + Israel who think that having new wars is not in the interest of + Israel, or the region, because wars mean destruction and killing of + innocent people and the destruction of the development process in + the area as a whole.

+

With reference to the Lebanese problem, the efforts of Saudi Arabia + were begun long before the Riyadh summitSee footnote 4, Document + 143. took place. This meeting was held only when we + were convinced that the different parties were ready to work in one + framework. We did this while bearing in mind that there were still + problems between Egypt and Syria and immense problems inside of + Lebanon.

+

We have arrived at very useful results—one of which is obtaining good + relations between Egypt and Syria and another in solving the + problems between the Lebanese President and the leader of the PLO, Yasser Arafat. From time-to-time + there are, of course, some simple problems that arise from nineteen + months of war in Lebanon. There is an Arab committee to solve such + matters which can make it possible for the Lebanese to start + rebuilding their country.

+

Secretary Brown: Your Royal Highness’ account of + these events, and your views, reinforces my belief that Saudi Arabia + is a very important force for peace and stability in the Middle + East. Moreover, Saudi Arabia is a very important influence for + economic stability, prosperity and peace for the entire world. For + all these reasons, the security of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is + very important to the United States. We remain committed to + supplying the equipment and services mutually agreed to as essential + to meeting the defense needs of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.

+

I am sure that you know that there is concern in the U.S. about the + U.S. being the leading arms selling country in the world. As you know, President Carter has indicated that, + consistent with the security of our friends, we want to gradually + lower the sale of arms in the world. It is, in any event, in the + interest of both of our countries to minimize the public controversy + over the level of arms sales. In this context, we fully intend to + carry out our agreements with Saudi Arabia regarding security + assistance. As I said, Saudi Arabia’s security is very important to + the U.S.

+

Perhaps you could give me your impressions of how the security + assistance program is going in general, or in terms of any specific + questions you may have.

+

Prince Fahd: It pleases me to discuss with you the + details of this matter. I discussed it during my last visit in 1974 + with Secretary Schlesinger + and Dr. Kissinger.See footnote 6, Document + 148. Especially with regard to implementing the + details of such an operation.

+

Why is the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia anxious to arm itself? This is a + very expensive process. We would prefer to do away with arms in + favor of constructive programs, but we are convinced that a country + that cannot defend itself will not be respected. Furthermore, we do + not want to attack any one. But all of our neighbors are fully armed + by the Soviets—with armies, navies, and air forces. Therefore, the + question is, at which door do we knock in order to obtain arms? We + don’t want to turn to the Soviets. The Europeans are ready to sell + to us, but we prefer doing business with the U.S.

+

When we want to equip our armed forces with modern equipment, we only + want to defend our mutual interests. How can we be friends with the + U.S. if we cannot defend either ourselves or our mutual interests? + If we do not arm ourselves and an occasion arises in which we must + defend ourselves, how will we do so without arms? We also believe + the Gulf States are relieved to know that Saudi Arabia will help + them against potential aggressors.

+

We believe that the U.S. has mutual interests with Saudi Arabia in + the field of energy and stability; therefore, it is essential that + we arm ourselves defensively—a strong friend is better than a weak + friend. Arming ourselves is a heavy burden, but a burden one can’t + avoid. For example: If the U.S. was not strong enough to defend + itself, nothing could restrain the Soviet Union anywhere in the + world. For these reasons we seek the cooperation of the U.S. in + helping us. Unless we have modern equipment, the Saudi Arabian armed + forces will be demoralized. The officers of the Saudi Arabian armed + forces question why they don’t obtain the arms they need when our + neighbors are getting large quantities from the Soviet Union. It has + been difficult for me to answer our officers, except to say that we are + obtaining such weapons from the U.S. I can also add that some of the + questions addressed to me by our armed forces included such + questions as “do we not have enough money or is it something else + that we can’t obtain the weapons we need?”. Because of these + circumstances, I do hope the U.S. and its officials—civilian and + military—will appreciate these circumstances and provide us what we + need.

+

At the same time we would appreciate if the U.S. will bear in mind + that you are dealing with a friendly country, a country that you + will never have to have questions about. All officials and members + of Congress should, we hope, see this as a special matter where a + friendly country is involved.

+

I would like to mention an issue. We in Saudi Arabia would like to + avoid complications that tend to arise in implementing weapons + programs. It has been mentioned in the Israeli press that there are + Saudi Arabian forces near Israel’s borders and that they might use + U.S. weapons in aggressive moves against Israel. To stop such + speculation, we took our forces from Syria and Jordan. Israel knows + well that Saudi Arabia will not attack. Israel wants to arm itself + because it is afraid of its neighbors. The same conditions apply to + us as our neighbors are fully armed by the Soviet Union. The Soviet + Union would be pleased to find Saudi Arabia weak in its armed + forces.

+

I am happy that there will be new thinking here towards giving + weapons to Saudi Arabia which they can use and absorb. We don’t want + to take weapons from the U.S. and pass them on to anyone else. We + want them only to defend the Kingdom. I have personally assumed the + responsibility for this program and that is why I wanted to say all + this to you. I would like you to help me come up with an explanation + for my officers as to why delays in weapons deliveries are taking + place. The officers ask me the question; why is the government + training us but not giving us the weapons we need? I cannot continue + to hold them off, yet I am fully convinced the reasonable people in + the U.S. do not want the leaders of Saudi Arabia to be + embarrassed.

+

Secretary Brown: I am happy to hear and agree with + what you said. We understand and agree with the needs of Saudi + Arabia for military equipment to be strong and defend itself. We + recognize that Saudi Arabia has very faithfully lived up to + agreements that these weapons are for its own use and security.

+

We intend to live up to our commitments for the sale of military + equipment. For example: For an advanced fighter aircraft to replace + your Lightnings—and Saudi Arabia was offered its choice as to which + aircraft—we are prepared to seek agreement from Congress for + whatever aircraft Saudi Arabia elects to purchase. We think the + Saudi Air Force may want to look again, along with our Air Force, as + to which aircraft is most + appropriate . . . the numbers necessary and some timing and + absorption factors. It may be that the F–16 or F–14 may yet be looked at; but our commitment + to provide Saudi Arabia the aircraft of its choice stands.

+

Moreover, I believe that as a result of your previous meetings with + U.S. officials in 1974, a ten-year plan was set out for modernizing + your armed forces. About three years have gone by since that plan + was initiated. Perhaps it is a good time to review this plan + together and see what modifications might be appropriate. I would + suggest that the Joint Security Commission, which was set up during + your visit, might be a suitable mechanism for joint review. It might + be useful to modify the plan—some items to be increased, some items + to be decreased. For example: The inventory of 400 helicopters + recommended in the plan may no longer be correct. Thus, it may be + useful to update the plan according to what we now agree are the + current needs of the Saudi armed forces. There are many other items, + but this is just one example.

+

Prince Fahd: I forgot to mention that there were + certain needs which were to be provided by American companies who + are now claiming that the U.S. Government instructed them not to + proceed with certain sales. I want Prince Saud to explain to you those + weapons which should be provided, but which were not.

+

Prince Saud: His Highness suggests that some + of our military officers meet with some of your people here + following this meeting.

+

Secretary Brown: I am aware of such problems. General + Fish will visit Saudi Arabia next month . . . next week, in + fact.Fish visited Tunisia, Saudi + Arabia, and Iran June 23–July 3. He met with Saudi defense + officials June 27–30. Under a July 15 memorandum, he sent + Brown a detailed + report, which included an executive summary, a list of follow-up + actions, and topical reports. The report is in the Washington + National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files, FRC + 330–80–0017, Saudi Arabia, 000.1–339, 1977, Folder 2. He + can go over your list of issues now; then, when he arrives in Saudi + Arabia he will be prepared to resolve these problems on the + spot.

+

Prince Saud: That will be helpful. However, I + think it is a bad time to re-evaluate the whole ten-year plan right + now since we have these many detailed problems.

+

Secretary Brown: I am not suggesting changing any of + our commitments, but it may be useful to review your requirements + further out than the 1974 plan.

+

Prince Saud: His Highness has no problem in + reviewing these issues now.

+

Prince Fahd: It is very important that we start + our discussion by sending someone to talk with Prince Sultan.

+ +

Secretary Brown: The discussions can start tonight + and continue next week.

+

Prince Fahd: This is a very important matter and + it will help me with the officers of our armed forces.

+

In concluding, I wish to extend an invitation from your friends in + the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.

+

Secretary Brown: I would look forward to such a visit + since I know that none of my predecessors have ever visited the + Kingdom.

+
+ +
+ 152. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Saudi + ArabiaSource: + National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + D770218–1164. Secret; Immediate. Drafted by Sober; cleared by Julius L. + Katz (EB), Tarnoff, Quandt, Bergold (White House), + Roger R. Gamble (S/S–O) and + in substance by Cooper; + approved by Vance. Also + printed in Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, vol. XXXVII, Energy + Crisis, 1974–1980, Document 126. + + + Washington, June 18, 1977, + 1828Z + +

142372. Subject: Oil Prices: Message From the Secretary to Crown + Prince Fahd.

+

1. Please deliver the following letter from the Secretary to + Fahd:

+

2. Begin text:

+

Your Royal Highness, your recent visit hereSee Documents 150 and + 151. did much to reaffirm + and strengthen the relationship between our two countries. The + President and the others of us who were privileged to meet with you + benefitted greatly from your views and counsel on a wide variety of + issues. We shall wish to keep in close touch with you on the broad + range of matters affecting the common interests of our nations.

+

I would like to raise with you at this time one subject of very high + and continuing importance to both of our countries and also to the + global economy: the question of oil prices. When you were here, the + President expressed our appreciation for the policy of your + government on this subject, and we were extremely pleased to hear + your reaffirmation of the determination of the Kingdom of Saudi + Arabia to continue its course of moderation with regard to oil + prices.

+

Following your visit, there have been some reports to the effect that + your government intends to increase the price of Saudi oil by five + percent within the + coming month, in the context of the forthcoming OPEC meeting. These same reports + state that the eleven members of OPEC which increased their prices by ten percent last + JanuaryReference is presumably to + the OPEC meeting at Doha in + December 1976 when 11 OPEC + members raised the price of oil by 10 percent. See footnote 8, Document 143. + would forego any additional price increase until the end of 1977. We + do not know whether these reports are correct.

+

From our point of view, it appears clear that the interests of the + global economy would be best served by avoiding further increases in + the price of oil. With regard to any possible price increases which + your government might be planning for the remaining months of this + year, we trust that you are also considering the desirability of + achieving an understanding that would call for a period of stability + in the prices of the other producers beyond the end of 1977.

+

I would value greatly your sharing with me your thoughts at this time + on the prospects for oil pricing in the months ahead. As we agreed + during your visit here, continued cooperation between our two + countries on energy matters will remain of the highest importance. + For our part, the President is continuing to press his proposals for + a United States energy program that places special emphasis on the + need for maximum conservation, and we will wish to keep you informed + of the progress of our efforts in this regard. The President has + asked me to convey to you, and through you to King Khalid, his + warmest wishes and his hopes for your good health. I join in these + wishes and hopes. Sincerely, Cyrus + Vance.

+

End text.

+ + Vance + +
+ +
+ 153. Telegram From the Embassy in Saudi Arabia to the Department + of StateSource: National + Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770228–0548. + Secret; Immediate. Sent for information to USLO Riyadh. + + + Jidda, June 26, 1977, 1508Z + +

4503. Subj: Oil Prices: Message From the Secretary to Crown Prince + Fahd. Ref: State + 142372.See Document 152.

+

1. We have received letter from Crown Prince in response to + Secretary’s letter of June 18 (reftel). Text (our translation) follows:

+

Greetings:

+

We have received with pleasure your note dated June 18, 1977. While + thanking Your Excellency for the kind feelings you expressed + concerning our recent visit to Washington and its auspicious + results, we share with you the hope that similar contacts be + continued in the future to solidify the close ties between our two + countries and in support of their common interests.

+

With respect to Your Excellency’s comments in the said note on oil + prices, and the possibility that certain increases could take place + in one state or another in the coming months, we would like to point + out that Saudi Arabia has and is still following with concern the + fluctuating (tadhabdhub in Arabic) oil prices in OPEC producing states. (Saudi Arabia) + believes that such fluctuations do not serve the common interests of + the producing states themselves; that wisdom and moderation call for + an end to this situation, and thence for an attempt to create a + positive dialogue in the light of which a single formula for oil + prices might be reached during the coming period. I had already + mentioned this to H.E. President Carter during the talks I held with His Excellency + in Washington.See footnote 8, Document 149.

+

In our opinion, coordination of oil prices within the framework of + OPEC would achieve the + following results:

+

First: It would end the current fluctuation in oil prices, and + consequently put an end to the imbalance in the supply and demand of + exporting countries.

+

Second: Protect OPEC unity and + survival as a world body promoting the growth and stability of + energy to the advantage of the entire community.

+

Third: Offer chances of stability and steady growth for the economies + of states, developed and developing.

+ +

As Your Excellency is aware, a unified price is definitely in the + interest of consumers, even if this entails an increase in the price + of oil exported from Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, for + this (increase) is based on the absence of an oil price hike by the + others as they had agreed to with effect next July.

+

If we take the weighted average of crude sale (prices) at an increase + of five percent and at a fifteen percent increase, the average would + be higher than ten percent, an additional burden on consumers which + may be removed if the prices of Saudi Arabia and UAE were stepped up.

+

However, the prices—as Your Excellency is aware—are basically subject + to the law of supply and demand. As long as the supply can be + increased considerably beyond present levels only with difficulty, + any increase in demand results in a price hike no matter to what + degree we concentrate efforts toward the opposite direction. We + greatly appreciate Your Excellency’s efforts in opposing increased + consumption of energy, but we seize this opportunity to stress our + concern that demand be reduced. Even if efforts to reduce + consumption succeed, demand for petroleum will continue to be + considerable, as a result of the building up of petroleum reserves + of various kinds. This development came at a time when Saudi Arabia + was striving to block unreasonable increases in prices, and (our) + efforts have been and are still affected by this policy which + increases demand for petroleum, dissipates the advantages of + conserving energy, and weakens the results of Saudi Arabia’s + efforts, perhaps fatally.

+ +

From all the foregoing, Your Excellency will realize that Saudi + Arabia’s role vis-a-vis oil prices stems from its sense of + international responsibility and communal responsibility for the + sake of keeping this vital substance a source of prosperity for man, + his growth and happiness. And thus we join Your Excellency in a + common understanding of the necessity for further stability in the + prices of energy so that it may continue to be a means for the good + of man. And, lastly, we hope that forthcoming efforts may yield good + results to the advantage of all.

+

In closing, I am pleased to reiterate my thanks and appreciation for + the sentiments and valuable views contained in Your Excellency’s + note. Please convey to H.E. President Jimmy Carter the greetings and wishes of H.M. King + Khalid bin Abd al-Aziz, and + it gives me pleasure to share His Majesty’s greetings and best + wishes for H.E. the President and for Your Excellency + personally.

+

Fahd + bin Abd al-Aziz al-Saud

+

Crown Prince and Deputy Prime Minister

+

Riyadh, 9 Rajab 1397H

+

June 25, 1977 A.D. End text

+

2. Text of letter being pouched.

+ + Wiley + +
+ + +
+ 154. Report Prepared by the Ambassador to Saudi Arabia (West)Source: Carter Library, + National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 67, Saudi + Arabia: 9–12/77. Secret. Attached but not printed is a September + 2 memorandum from Sick to + Brzezinski under + which Sick sent West’s + report. Sick also + attached a memorandum to Carter from Brzezinski, for Brzezinski to sign and attach to West’s report. + A notation on Sick’s + September 2 memorandum indicates that Brzezinski hand-carried the + package to Carter on + September 7. Carter + added the following notation on the first page of Brzezinski’s memorandum: + “Fritz—A superb report, J.” Vance added “I agree. Cy” in the margin. An + August 21 covering letter from West to Carter is also attached but + not printed. + + + Jidda, August 1977 + +

SAUDI ARABIA—PRELIMINARY OBSERVATIONS AND + RECOMMENDATIONS

+

INTRODUCTION

+

Based on my first few weeks in Saudi Arabia, certain conclusions have + become clear. None of these are revolutionary or even necessarily + new, but the personal discipline of stating them as simply and + clearly as possible has been helpful to me and hopefully will be of + benefit to others concerned with the problem at hand.

+

Some recommendations likewise are being offered based on these + conclusions. Hopefully, these recommendations coming from a fresh + perspective will have that advantage to compensate in part for the + lack of in-depth knowledge and relative inexperience of the writer + in formal diplomacy.

+

Saudi Arabia is important to the United States and its allies for two + major reasons:

+

1) Saudi Arabia will have effective control for at least the next + decade of the world’s energy situation. Not only is over one-fourth + of the world’s known oil located in its borders, but more + importantly the vast majority of the world’s “cheap” oil is situated + here. Access to that oil on terms that do not wreck the United + States and the free world’s economy is vital to our national + interests.

+

2) Saudi Arabia has a unique opportunity and capacity to provide + economic and political leadership in a form consistent with the + United States’ national and international goals and policies. The + political role is not limited to the influence and leverage it has + in the Mid-East and the peace negotiations there, but also is + equally potent in Africa and other developing nations. The economic + role means in part providing funds which might otherwise have to + come from the United States.

+ +

To give a full picture, it is clear that the present regime in Saudi + Arabia feels the need for close ties with the United States and + probably links their own survival to the maintenance of good + relations with us. They are acutely aware of many of their own + weaknesses and at least some of their vulnerabilities. They know + that they need a strong friend and protector if they are to continue + to control and benefit from the oil treasure which fate has allotted + to them. This awareness on the part of the Saudi regime provides us + with some influence in their policies and conduct, but in no way + lessens the validity of the two major premises as above stated.

+

SAUDI ARABIA—OIL AND ENERGY

+

Peace in the Mid-East has been one of the highest of priorities in + the U.S. foreign policy—and rightly so. However, of equal, and + probably more importance to our national interest, and those of our + allies, is our relationship to Saudi Arabia as it affects our future + supplies of oil and energy.

+

The critical nature of this problem has become increasingly clear to + me in my time here. I feel it important that I express to you the + sense of urgency and concern about this phase of our relationship + which is becoming more obvious to me as the days go by.

+

My concern is based on the general conclusion reached by all of the + current energy studies and projections (C.I.A. et al) that there is + no way, at least for the next decade, that we can eliminate our + dependence on oil imports and maintain a strong, viable economy in + the United States. To our Western allies, the problem is even more + critical. Saudi Arabia is the one country in the world with the + reserves (up to 30% of the world’s total) and the potential + production capacity (at least 15 to 20 million barrels per day) to + insure that the industrialized West can obtain the oil that is + needed at a price that will not wreck our economy.

+

A great deal of attention is given to the size of the Saudi Arabian + oil reserves and their potential productive capacity, but I think + the factor of the production cost of their oil adds a most critical + factor to our necessity of having access to these supplies for + possibly decades in the future. Saudi Arabia will be able to produce + 20 million barrels a day of oil for almost a quarter of a century at + a cost of production that is less than 10% of the North Sea oil or + that of our oil from Alaska.

+

The political consequences of this oil being under the control of + forces unfriendly to the United States are frightening. For example, + consider the political influence that an unfriendly power could have + in a place such as Italy if that power were to offer an oil supply + to them at one-third of what they are now paying in exchange for + certain political moves. On the other hand, I am told that the new + supply of oil from the North Sea will probably not lower the cost of + energy to the average + Englishman. In other words, not only the availability but also the + price of oil is a potent political weapon.

+

It is hard for even an informed observer to realize fully the + implications of oil economics and politics. In my brief period here, + I have begun to sense some of the dangerous, even disastrous + consequences which can happen in this international game with such + high stakes. Any one of many pitfalls along the way can trigger a + chain of events which would make us a bigger loser than I think we + can afford to be.

+

For example, the oil producing and storage facilities in Saudi Arabia + are highly vulnerable to disruption. Since their inception, the + production and gathering facilities have been designed for maximum + economic advantage . . . no attention has been paid to their + physical security. Backup transportation systems are all but + non-existent. I have been told that if the May 1977 pipeline fire + had occurred at a location fifty feet away from the actual rupture, + it could have resulted in a loss of world oil production of at least + five million barrels a day for months. This fact, and possible + consequences, was one of the topics of discussion between Senator + Javits and Sheikh Zaki + Yamani, the Oil + Minister:Javits met with Yamani on July 6 during his + July 6–9 visit to Saudi Arabia. An account of the meeting is in + telegram 4804 from Jidda, July 9. (National Archives, RG 59, + Central Foreign Policy File, D770244–1002)

+

Yamani: “If the fire had + occurred 15 meters closer, it would have cut our production by 50% + for at least six to nine months.”

+

Javits: “And what effect + would that have had on world markets?”

+

Yamani: “It would have been a + disaster. If our production had been cut to, say, 5 million barrels + per day versus our present 10 to 11 million, the shortage would have + been felt throughout the world. The law of supply and demand would + have forced the price in the market place far beyond the OPEC schedule. You would have had a + depression in your country unlike what you have seen since the 1930s + . . .”

+

The Oil Minister may well have been indulging in Arabic + overstatement, but I’m not in a position to dispute his conclusion. + Even more important, it impressed Javits. On our subsequent visit to Dhahran, the + Senator asked Aramco’s Board Chairman Frank Jungers to show him the + site of the fire and that 15-meter difference, which he did.

+

In any event, that bit of dialogue points up just one of the several + dangers to our energy supply in this country. If our energy sources + are jeopardized for whatever reason, the effect on the existence and + individual life styles of both our nation and our allies would be + devastating.

+

Four of the more obvious dangers to our access to Saudi Arabian oil + may be summarized as follows:

+

1) Sabotage and/or internal breakdown like the May fire;

+ +

2) External aggression, i.e., seizure of the oil fields by unfriendly + powers;

+

3) A political-economic decision to limit production to an amount + just necessary to generate funds for present financial needs;

+

4) An overthrow of the existing leadership within the Royal Family by + either a Qaddafi-type coup or a victory by the conservative elements + of the family over the Fahd-Saud faction; or conceivably some combination of + the two.

+

I will not attempt to comment on items (1) and (2) in any detail; + they constitute well-known possibilities which no doubt are under + constant consideration at the policy level by State as well as the + Defense Department. Our programs of assistance to the military and + national guard forces have undoubtedly been a result of the + recognition of these first two dangers. Items (3) and (4), however, + warrant a more detailed discussion. One or two recent developments + make a current assessment of these items even more necessary—perhaps + critically so.

+

Saudi Arabia is presently undergoing an almost fantasy-like + experience similar to A Thousand and One + Nights—the whole country is changing overnight as though + someone had rubbed Aladdin’s lamp and said, “Take this place into + the Twentieth Century.” No country in the history of the world has + ever before had such an influx of goods and services from outside in + such a brief period.

+

The modernization that Saudi Arabia has experienced with its + five-year plan has brought with it pressures for changes.

+

These pressures in turn are creating tensions and frictions at all + levels. What the ultimate effect will be on the present government + cannot be predicted with certainty, but it is important for us to + understand as best we can what may happen and how it affects our + interests.

+

The starting point logically is

+

ROYAL FAMILY—POLITICS AND + POLICY

+

In the murky field of the politics of the Saudi Arabian Royal Family, + there is much speculation, but little real knowledge, though certain + conclusions are generally accepted.

+

The most important of these is that the Royal Family is divided into + two groups: the liberals, headed by Fahd, and the conservatives, whose leader is + generally considered to be Prince Abdullah, the second Deputy Prime Minister and the + leader of the National Guard.

+

King Khaled holds his present position because he was acceptable to + both factions at the time of King Faisal’s death. Prince Mohammed, + his older (full) brother, was passed over because of his + conservatism and fiery temper. Fahd, reportedly the late King Faisal’s choice, had + strong opposition from the conservative wing of the family. Khaled + has done a good job of + peace-keeping in at times difficult situations—he has supported + Fahd in his liberal + views on oil supply, pricing, and assistance to other countries, but + he has tilted toward the Mohammed-Abdullah faction in internal + religious matters and customs.

+

King Khaled’s reported desire to abdicate has, of course, been + strongly opposed by the conservative group who see the ascendancy of + Fahd to the throne and + the increased prominence of leaders like Prince Saud (King Faisal’s son, now + Foreign Minister) as a major setback to their side.

+

The conservatives can be divided into two groups, economic and + religious. The economic conservatives could be compared to the + pre-World War II isolationists in the U.S. in that they fail to + realize how Saudi national interests are linked to the fate of the + rest of the world. The religious conservatives are essentially + patriarchal puritans opposed to modernization beyond obvious + material benefits such as literacy, health, and defense.

+

The economic conservatives espouse a sort of “Iron Law of Petroleum” + which holds that production of five million barrels a day would + suffice to give SAG all the funds + needed to finance their government activities plus assistance to + their beneficiary countries. According to this school, the current + production level of nearly ten million barrels a day (capacity is + now being increased to 16 MBD) + wastes a resource whose value in the ground will increase faster + than portfolios of investments made with excess oil revenues. Hisham + Nazer, Minister of Planning, is the most outspoken supporter of this + position, pleading that inflation is eroding the value of Saudi + investments which soak up their excess cash. The Saudi oil supply is + finite. Its maximum value for the Kingdom will be attained by + holding production down so prices will inflate. On solely economic + grounds, a simple, logical, very compelling argument!

+

The religious conservatives are less articulate, but preach against + the erosion of traditional Islamic values caused by modernization. + Not really diehard fanatics, basically they wish to see the + Kingdom’s wealth used to pour the new wine of western civilization + into the old skin of Islamic religion and culture without rupturing + the wine skin. In other words, western material benefits such as + health care, literacy, et al without western materialism. To this + end they preach strict adherence to the stern doctrines of the Koran + as an antidote to the western values threatening to swamp their + traditional way of life. In the Royal Family, the religious + conservatives, foremost among them the King’s older brother Prince + Mohammad, have recently won the King’s ear and evidently his + sympathy toward their views.

+

Up to now, the western-educated economic conservatives have had no + real alliance, either inside or outside the Royal Family, with the + more parochial religious zealots. However, the interests of the two + groups, which + superficially appear rather far apart, might dovetail enough in the + near future for a new conservative coalition to be formed. The + effects of this coalition would probably stalemate the current + ruling clique of “liberal” Princes headed by Crown Prince Fahd. The ensuing squabbling and + divisiveness could engender even more serious and unexpected + consequences for the Royal Family and consequentially the stability + of the present regime.

+

The over-simplified conclusion, therefore, is that there is within + and without the Royal Family a substantial minority group, the + conservative-isolationist faction. The coalition is loose, somewhat + fragmented—but with a real potential to influence if not take over + the leadership of the country.

+

Any one of several events could coalesce these disjointed groups and + create real problems in US–SAG relations, vis a vis oil and + energy. The two more likely in order of importance:

+

1) A failure of Arab-Israeli peace negotiations coupled with + continued U.S. support of Israelis;

+

2) Stringent implementation of anti-boycott and other legislative and + administrative measures by U.S. which the Saudis would deem contrary + to their interests, and in a sense would be as spurning their + gestures of friendship with the U.S. and their leadership in the + third world. Such embarrassing developments as Prince Saud’s being + denied the purchase of the apartment in New York are certainly not + helpful.An unknown hand wrote a + question mark in the right-hand margin next to this + sentence.

+

The conflict thus generated between a combination of the + conservatives versus the liberal elements could weaken the + government to the extent that its continuation in present form would + be jeopardized.

+

The possibility of some revolt against the existing government cannot + be overlooked. One overriding lesson of history is that absolute + monarchies invariably fall, especially as civilization progresses. + “Civilization” in this instance means education, training, the + development of a middle class society, and pressures to bring women + into wider areas of public life.

+

The SAG has made tremendous strides + in the last decade—but there is still a long way to go. King + Abd-al-Aziz was an + absolute monarch who by the force of personal leadership united + Saudi Arabia and made it a nation. The present King is not an + absolute monarch and the present system can perhaps best be + described as a “constituent monarchy.” The constituency consists + largely of the surviving sons of the late King Abd-al-Azizplus some of his + grandchildren, such as Prince Saud, the Foreign Minister.

+ +

This constituent monarchy has exhibited a social sense and concern + for its subjects which, given the other restraints of tradition in + the country, has undoubtedly minimized the danger of a coup sparked + by students and young intellectuals. The Royal Family has many + strengths, including its numbers, family tribal ties, and the + control of the military forces, making a coup a la Qaddafi somewhat + remote. (The Defense Minister, Prince Sultan, is a full brother of + Fahd, and the head of + the National Guard is Prince Abdullah, a half brother.)

+

However, the most likely danger of a disruption in the continuity of + the present SAG ruling group will + come from some combination of forces set in motion by two basic + trends:

+

1) An acceleration of the internal conservative versus liberal + struggle in the family as Khaled’s departure from the Kingship + becomes closer;

+

2) Unsettling, semi-revolutionary forces begun by the modernization + processes now under way and further sparked by Saudis returning from + education and cultural experiences abroad. The large percentage of + non-Saudis now in the Kingdom—presently estimated to be 30% of the + population—is bound to increase as the SAG’s development plans are implemented, and they + provide another force for change.

+

The tremendous crosscurrents generated by the conservative-liberal + struggle can best be illustrated by an example of the paradoxes of + extremes, which would be laughable if it were not so serious.

+

Sometime ago the Saudi Arabian Government made a decision to + undertake a major reform of its correctional system. A management + consultant firm was employed, and as a result of their + recommendations, proposals have been submitted for the creation and + construction of what has been described as the most modern penal and + correctional system in the world—to cost at least a half billion + dollars.

+

The penal system comes under the Ministry of the Interior. The + Minister, Prince Nayif, and his deputy, Prince Ahmed, are full brothers of + Fahd (the Sudeiri + Seven). Both have assured me that the program was proceeding and the + first contract would be awarded momentarily. (An item of interest is + that the firm which appears to be favored to get the contract is a + consortium which includes Dr. Ellis McDougall. He is a nationally + recognized correctional expert who headed prison reform efforts in + Georgia, South Carolina, and Connecticut.)

+

At almost the same time that I was discussing prison matters with + Prince Ahmed (and trying to + get some U.S. citizens out of Saudi jails), an incident, gruesome by + U.S. standards, was happening. I will relate it in some detail + because it illustrates so well the vivid contrasts now present in + this country.

+

A royal princess, the granddaughter of Prince Mohammed, the King’s + older brother, asked for permission to marry a commoner with whom she had allegedly been + living. Permission was refused. She faked suicide by leaving her + clothes by the Creek, a resort swimming area off the Red Sea north + of Jidda. A full search, including helicopters, was made for + her.

+

Disguised as a man, she and her lover, the nephew of the Saudi + Ambassador to Lebanon, were apprehended as they attempted to leave + the country from the Jidda airport. (During the security search, her + reportedly prominent female characteristics proved her undoing.) A + captain in the Jidda police provided assistance to the eloping + couple.

+

She was publicly executed the next day—shot four times. Her lover was + beheaded (it took nine licks of the sword). The captain was + sentenced to five years imprisonment along with a public flogging + once a month for that period.

+

Prince Mohammed insisted on the execution—said he would kill them + both if they were not executed. Technically the execution was + justified according to the Koran, which punishes sex outside of + marriage by death. However, its infliction on a member of the Royal + Family was unusual, and in fact for such a crime, unprecedented. By + our standards, an almost sadistic feature was added—all of the royal + princesses, including her mother and sisters, reportedly were bused + to the execution and forced to watch.

+

Prince Mohammed was passed over as King by his late father, King + Abd-al-Azizbecause of + his temper and his known conservatism. (He was called “the stormy + one.”) Nevertheless, his influence is great, especially since his + full brother, Khaled, became King. The fact that he personally + insisted on the execution of his granddaughter, who had reportedly + been one of his favorites, is an indication of his power and the + strength and depth of the conservative movement here.

+

This execution brings into focus and illustrates two disrupting + factors which may well change or influence the governmental future + of Saudi Arabia in the next decade, i.e.,

+

1) A revolt by the young intellectuals exposed to Western culture + against the harsh and restrictive rules by Saudi society, coupled + with

+

2) The Women’s Lib Movement—which is now being recognized as creating + a real problem for the SAG.

+

Crown Prince Fahd mentioned + the latter to me in a social conversation a couple of weeks ago. He + said as Minister of Education, he made the decision to educate women + some fifteen or twenty years ago—and there had been trouble ever + since.

+

He related that his favorite niece was in a class this year which + emphasized the advantages of plural marriages and taught the young + girls how to get along with their fellow wives. Near the end of the + course, the professor announced that each girl would be required to + write an essay setting + forth what she had learned about the subject—and that a prize would + be given for the best paper.

+

The Prince said his niece thereupon got up and said, “Professor, I + think we all should walk out right now!” He then commented that one + of the big problems of the Kingdom was that there were about 700,000 + young women who were being educated and that there were not enough + jobs in the teaching and nursing fields to absorb them.

+

Fahd’s seeming inclination + is to relax the restrictions on women, but he is quite evidently + being overruled by the traditionalist-conservative group. For + example, American firms with Saudi contracts have been using female + employees—in fact Northrop even had permission (so they thought) to + hire wives of their male employees.

+

However, within the last month, police from the Ministry of Interior + have been checking closely on female employment, including U.S. + firms. I broached the subject to Prince Ahmed during one of our meetings + and was told politely but coolly that no females could work without + a permit issued by SAG. And there + was no doubt in either of our minds after his reply that none would + be granted. Incidentally, he is not only Fahd’s full brother but also a + political science graduate of the University of Redlands. His + brother, Prince Nayif, has just returned to the country. He does not + speak English and I have met with him only once. I do not have much + hope that Nayif will overrule or modify his brother’s position.

+

Another evidence of the return to traditionalism—and as a possible + aftermath to the Princess’ execution—has been an order by the King + to all of the Royal Family to remain in the Kingdom and to observe + fasting, etc. during the holy month of Ramadan. Historically many of + the members of the Royal Family take European or U.S. vacations + during this period, but King Khaled has decreed otherwise for the + first time this year.

+

All of this goes to underscore a basic fact which is hard for an + American to recognize, much less understand, namely the vast + cultural, social, and political differences between our two + societies.

+

The issue of human rights is a good starting point. We base our human + rights values on Christian concepts formulated by our + Judeo-Christian heritage. Saudi Arabia is one of the few parts of + the globe that has never been exposed to Christianity. Russia had + its orthodox churches, communist China, Christian missionaries. The + northern part of this particular continent has all been exposed to + Christian influence in varying degrees. Even a vast majority of the + continent of Africa has had Christian input one place or another + into the society patterns, with the possible exception of a few + nomadic tribes. However, this central and southern portion of the + Arabian peninsula has received none. Only within the past ten to + twenty years have some of its citizens gone to school outside of + Saudi Arabia and been exposed to basic modern Christian concepts. + The physical location of the Islamic cities of Mecca and Medina successfully restricted + even the minimum Christian influence resulting from foreign trade to + areas in Jidda. As recent as 1900, less than a dozen Europeans had + ever reached Riyadh.

+

Saudi Arabian society ranks the nation-state third in an individual’s + priorities. Their first loyalty without question is to immediate + family. Their second loyalty is to a tribe, and if that tribe is + large enough, possibly to some regional area. Then, and only then, + will a loyalty to Saudi Arabia as a nation emerge. Underlying, and + in a sense an expression of these loyalties, is the Islamic + religion. These loyalties, approved by and a part of that religion, + make changes slow, difficult, and at times seemingly impossible.

+

Almost as apparent as their lack of understanding of human rights is + their inability to conceive of the value of public opinion in the + United States. Even the U.S. educated, highly intelligent SAG officials basically conceive of + the President of the United States as a monarch in terms of his + authority. In fact, they probably consider that the President is in + one sense more of an absolute monarch than the King is here. They + have a constituency made up of 20 or 30 senior members of the + Saud Royal Family and + some dozen religious leaders, but they consider the President + literally to be accountable to no one. Not only do they fail to see + why they should make any effort in any form to improve their image + with such as the American public, but they don’t even make a really + serious effort to improve their image with their own people. (This + fact gives rise to some of the recommendations which I want to + make.)

+

These vast cultural and social differences are well illustrated by a + story told me by an American consultant to members of the Royal + Family. He was complaining loudly and forcefully to two of the half + dozen or so more prominent members of the family who have had + education outside Saudi Arabia about some delays and lack of + decisions that were being encountered with a major project. After + patiently listening for a few minutes, the more senior of the two + princes calmly replied: “We are attempting to move a 17th Century + monarchy into the 18th Century in six months time—that feat took + your ancestors one hundred years. If we ever succeed in reaching the + 18th Century, then you and I will discuss the 19th Century.”

+

SAUDI’S LEADERSHIP ROLE

+

The Saudis are obviously enjoying their emerging role as a regional + and possible world leader. Scarcely a week passes without a chief of + state or cabinet-level official coming here to pay his respects to + the King and Crown Prince (and of course to ask for money). In this + year alone, more than thirty heads of state or foreign ministers + have visited here. In addition, there have been over one hundred + official missions here from other countries.

+ +

Such an influx would create a crisis even for Evan Dobelle, Dot + Padgett,U.S. Chief of Protocol and + Assistant Chief of Protocol, respectively. et al. In + Saudi Arabia, with little staff and virtually no infrastructure, it + is pandemonium plus! The Foreign Minister, Prince Saud al-Faisal, spends between + one-third and one-half of his total time entertaining foreign + dignitaries. To that fact add these difficulties:

+

1) His staff includes less than a half dozen people capable of + typing;

+

2) Only one out of ten duplicating machines is operable;

+

3) No known filing system exists other than an attempt to file by + date;

+

4) The Foreign Ministry Building is seriously infested with termites + that are literally devouring the national records;

+

5) The Foreign Ministry Building has just been structurally condemned + and they are trying to find new emergency headquarters in order to + continue to operate at all;

+

6) The Foreign Minister’s personal working library consists of a + small world globe in Arabic and a recent atlas from England.

+

Several of the other ministries are apparently in better shape as far + as the physical plant goes, but none of them probably has over a + half dozen people that would be considered even reasonably competent + by our standards.

+

Despite these problems, their vast financial wealth and the fact that + they represent the focus of Islam makes them critical in Middle + Eastern peace. I am more than ever convinced that the + Khaled-Fahd-Saud + leadership will at this time do everything in their power to bring + about peace.

+

The nature and extent of their involvement in the PLO question is in itself evidence of + the sincerity of their commitment to peace. Unfortunately, if + present efforts fail despite their all-out contributions, they will, + in my opinion, then support the Arab cause in event of hostilities + with Israel with a holy zeal. This support would include as a + minimum an unlimited financial commitment and would probably + eventually include an all-out utilization of the oil weapon as + well.

+

Looking beyond the Middle East situation, it is obvious that the + Saudis have a fortunate working relationship with many of the + developing nations. Their actions related to the price of oil and + their efforts in OPEC are a matter + of record. What may be less obvious is their special interest and + concern about the political situation in Africa. They are almost + paranoid about Soviet involvement in any area that they feel relates + to their future and will make any commitment which in their judgment + will deter the spread of communism in at least Africa and the + Mid-East.

+ +

While enjoying this new leadership role and the prestige which it + carries, the Saudis recognize their lack of experience, their all + but non-existing government organization and infrastructure, and + their consequent limitations in the formulation and conduct of + foreign policy. They look toward the United States for support, + guidance, and approval, without which they will not have the + self-confidence to move forward as the leader-financier of this + region of the world.

+

Based on my impressions and exposure to date, I have reached the + following conclusions:

+

1) That the future well being, and perhaps even the survival of the + United States and its allies and Saudi Arabia depend upon the + development and continuation of a degree of unity, cooperation, and + common effort paralleled in modern history only by the alliance of + the Allies of World War II.

+

2) That the creation and maintenance of such a relationship is + difficult but not impossible. It cannot and will not happen unless + and until there is a reconciliation or at least a better + understanding of vast cultural, social, and political differences + between the countries. In short, there must be understanding coupled + with patience, tolerance, and forgiveness on both sides.

+

3) That relationship can best be accomplished through the existing + Saudi Arabian government, which is in effect the Fahd-Saud or liberal wing of the + present Royal Family;

+

4) The Royal Family is beset by tensions, rivalries, jealousies, as + well as crosscurrents of economic and religious differences, all of + which could create dangers with respect to present and future + USA–SAG relationships; and

+

5) That the United States must take a positive leadership role in + bringing about the desired relationship between our nations. The + sharing of common goals plus the immediate overriding urgency of + economic survival on the part of the United States, its allies, and + the political survival on the part of Saudi Arabia demand an all-out + effort to establish and maintain strong working ties between our + countries.

+

RECOMMENDATIONS

+

The U.S. Government for its own national interests for the next + decade needs to be a combination of a political counselor, economic + partner and government-reformer to Saudi Arabia. Whether any or all + of those roles can be played successfully, recognizing political + realities as well as the national sensitivities of a proud (and + rich) people, may well be one of the great challenges of our + times.

+

Specifically, at the policy level, I recommend:

+

1) That we encourage and support the Saudi leadership role, + especially in this geographic area. Encouraging them to assume an + increasingly important + leadership role in the Arab-Israeli issue is a vital first step. + They want to look upon themselves as a full partner with the U.S. in + this undertaking. As Prince Saud said to me recently, “The settlement of this + dispute requires two honest brokers—you working on the Israelis and + we doing likewise with the Arabs.” We should, therefore, take every + opportunity by word and deed to show our appreciation to them for + their moderating influence in OPEC + and their financial assumption of the burden and leadership role in + fighting communism in Africa. As a young nation with little + leadership experience, their leaders need constant encouragement in + the form of expressions of appreciation and approval by the United + States.

+

2) Encouraging closer economic ties with the U.S. to include (a) + softening as much as possible the effects of the anti-boycott + legislation;The 1977 amendments to + the Export Administration Act of 1969 (P.L. 95–52), signed by + President Carter on June + 22, discouraged and, in some circumstances, prohibited U.S. + companies from participating in the Arab League boycott of + Israel. (b) amending our present tax laws which are + putting U.S. companies in an untenable competitive position in the + Mid-East market; (c) encouraging more investment by Saudi Arabia’s + public and private sector in the United States;

+

3) Assisting the SAG to implement + needed reforms and changes to curb abuses and minimize the pressures + resulting from inefficiencies, excesses, and abuses;

+

4) Encourage and assist the Saudi Government to present and project a + better image to the Western world where public opinion is so + influential;

+

5) Encourage and assist the Saudi Government to present and project a + better image of its operation and function to its own citizens and + the citizens of this region.

+

A beneficial effect of implementing (4) and (5) will be that it + should constitute a self-policing procedure which will be helpful in + accomplishing the needed changes and reforms.

+

To begin to implement the above broad recommendations working toward + the establishment of the kind of relationship we need with Saudi + Arabia, I have as of now four specific recommendations which I feel + are essential:

+

1) That key political, business, and cultural leaders from the United + States be encouraged to come to Saudi Arabia. One visit here is + literally worth a thousand words. The political and strategic + importance of this country can easily be seen and sensed by even the + most skeptical of visitors. A special effort should be made to + encourage visits by members of the Congress as their understanding and support of our current + Mid-East policy is essential to its success;

+

2) A continuing evaluation of events involving the Royal Family as + they may affect the SAG’s stability + and future policies. This is being done now on a somewhat informal + and, I sense, uncoordinated fashion, but I feel that its importance + warrants a more precise and structured approach. I discussed this + matter with Harold Saunders + during the visit to Taif and this recommendation is already being + implemented.

+

3) Development of a plan to coordinate USIA efforts with the Saudi + Ministry of Information to present through the Saudi media (largely + TV at the outset) programs about the special relationship which + exists between US and SAG. These programs would emphasize + the strengths of present SAG + leadership for such things as a TV special showing Prince Fahd’s visit to U.S. and his + relationship with President Carter, or King Khaled having Dr. DeBakeyDr. Michael DeBakey, President of the Baylor + College of Medicine, was one of the first heart surgeons to + perform coronary bypass operations and pioneered various + surgical techniques. open a heart clinic at King Faisal + Hospital, etc. I would expect Isa + Sabbagh to take a key role in the development of this + idea and would probably want to involve private sector companies + such as Aramco, Mobil, and others.

+

4) The strengthening of the Embassy staff here. Because of numerous + transfers, vacations, home leaves and the like, I have not yet + assessed fully what our needs may be. With the development of a + presence at Riyadh plus the increasing Saudi involvement regionally, + we may need additional people to perform effectively. However, I + will be in a position to discuss our requirements in detail in + October when I return to the Department for consultation.

+

This document has already become too lengthy. I hope it will provide + a basis for discussions out of which will come some constructive + steps toward helping our efforts in this most exciting and + challenging area of the world.

+ + John C. West + Ambassador + + +
+ +
+ 155. Letter From Secretary of State Vance to Secretary of Defense BrownSource: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign + Policy File, P770146–0371. Secret. + + + Washington, August 30, 1977 + + + + Dear Harold: + +

Thank you for your letter of August 15 which forwarded the JCS evaluation of the Saudi request + for sixty F–15 aircraft.In the August + 15 letter to Vance, + Brown indicated that + he concurred with JCS findings + in an evaluation of the Saudi request for 60 F–15s. (National + Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P770146–0373) + Brown also forwarded + the JCS report, which consisted + of a July 18 memorandum to Brown from Major General Philip Shulter and an + appendix entitled “Military Requirement for 60 F–15 Aircraft for + Saudi Arabia and Appropriateness of Delivery in CY 1981.” In the July 18 + memorandum, the Joint Chiefs concluded: “The Saudi request for + 60 F–15 aircraft fills a valid military requirement to modernize + its fighter force, maintain operational force level, and acquire + an all-weather fighter capability.” (National Archives, RG 59, + Central Foreign Policy File, P770146–0374)

+

When I spoke with the Saudi leadership during my recent trip,Vance visited Saudi Arabia August 7–9. For + records of his meetings with Saudi leaders, which mostly + concerned the Arab-Israeli peace process, see Foreign + Relations, 1977–1980, vol. VIII, Arab-Israeli + Dispute, January 1977–August 1978, Documents 74, 75, and 77. I explained + that the F–15 case had to be held until the notification of the + Egyptian non-lethal package had completed the Congressional review + period. The Iran AWACS case will + also be before Congress when it reconvenes.Documentation on the issue of AWACS for Iran is scheduled for + publication in Foreign Relations, 1977–1980, vol. X, Iran: + Revolution, January 1977–November 1979. I + believe we should wait until those cases clear the Congress before + deciding when to move on the F–15’s.

+

There is no question that going forward with notification of the F–15 + sale will generate substantial opposition. We would have to be fully + prepared and consequently I appreciate your offer of additional data + and support. A detailed analysis of the Saudis’ military need for + the aircraft as well as an analysis of the impact of the sale on the + area military balance would be most useful. As you are aware, State + (PM working with NEA) is chairing an interagency study + on Saudi Arabian requirements which would mesh closely with this + effort. I would like to suggest that Dave McGiffert work closely together with Les Gelb and Sid Sober to meld your analysis + with this study, concentrating on expediting a full understanding of + the F–15 sale.

+

Additionally, the Arms Export Control Board on September 9 will hold + a preliminary discussion of the proposal. This will bring to bear + other views which should be of use.

+ +

Because of probable Congressional questions, your analysis should + include discussion of possible alternatives to the F–15 (F–14, + F–16, F–18, or additional + F–5’s).

+

Sincerely,

+ + Cy + +
+ +
+ 156. Memorandum From Jessica Tuchman of the National Security + Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security + Affairs (Brzezinski)Source: Carter Library, + National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 67, Saudi + Arabia: 9–12/77. Secret. Sent for action. + + + Washington, September 29, 1977 + + + SUBJECT + Sale of F–15s to Saudi Arabia + +

In my judgment we stand an extremely slim chance of getting + Congressional approval for the sale of F–15s to Saudi Arabia within + the next six months—and probably longer. Many of those on the House + Committee (Bingham, Wolff, Solarz, Ryan, etc.)Representatives Jonathan Bingham (D-New York), Lester Wolff + (D-New York), Stephen + Solarz (D-New York), and Leo Ryan (D-California), + members of the House Committee on International + Relations. who supported the AWACS, or were only mildly disapproving of it, will be + strongly opposed to this one. I have less first hand knowledge of + the Senate Committee, but I would guess that Case, Javits, Stone + and perhaps Humphrey would + be opposed.Senators Clifford Case (R-New Jersey), + Jacob Javits (R-New + York), Richard Stone + (D-Florida), and Hubert + Humphrey (DFL-Minnesota), members of the Senate + Foreign Relations Committee.

+

As they did on AWACS, members will + question the need for this particular system rather than a less + advanced one. In addition to pointing out that the F–5s we + are now delivering are straining Saudi Arabia’s absorptive capacity, + Congress will want to know why we are selling them F–15 instead of + the F–16. There is no good answer. + Saudi Arabia simply does not face the external threat or have the + geographical conditions that might argue for the necessity of a + two-engine plane. In my view therefore, we should be looking for a + way out of this with the Saudi’s that will not damage our bilateral relations. I would + suggest the following as a first step.

+

Even if we were to go ahead with the sale, we would get—as we did on + AWACS—a request from the + GAO for a cost effectiveness + study comparing the F–15 and the F–16. I suggest that we task DOD for such a study right now. If it is an honest + effort, the study will show that the F–16 is at least as good, if not better than, the F–15 + for Saudi Arabia. (While there would be opposition to an F–16 sale also, it would be less than + to the F–15.) We could then quietly use the results with the Saudis + to try to convince them to alter their request—both as to the kind + of plane, and timing of the sale.

+

If such a study is undertaken it should be completed well ahead of + the Foreign Minister’s visit in late October.

+

RECOMMENDATION:

+

That you sign the attached memorandum to Secretary Brown asking for a comparative + study.Attached but not printed. + Brzezinski did not + sign the memorandum, but added next to this recommendation: + “Jessica—Just call over and get it started. I do not want the + record to show that it started from here.”

+
+ +
+ 157. Telegram From Secretary of the Treasury Blumenthal to the Department of + StateSource: National + Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840081–1901. + Secret; Niact Immediate; + Nodis. Blumenthal was in Dhahran as + part of a Middle East trip that included visits to Egypt, + Kuwait, Iran, and Saudi Arabia. + + + Dhahran, October 28, 1977, 2110Z + +

Blumto 73/1261. For the President + from Blumenthal. Subject: + Prince Fahd-Blumenthal Talk.

+

1. After a courtesy call on King Khalid here this afternoon (October + [28]), I had an hour’s meeting with Crown Prince Fahd. Fahd made a number of points + which I want to summarize briefly for you in this message. I will be + reporting more fully later on this talk and my options here.Telegram 1286 from Dhahran, October 30. + (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + P840081–1893)

+ +

2. On oil pricing, I expressed your deep appreciation for the Saudi + moderate position. I said I was happy to be able to tell Fahd that the Shah had told me + yesterday that Iran would be willing to accept a price freeze at + Caracas if that were the OPEC + decision.Reference is to the OPEC summit conference scheduled + to take place in Caracas, Venezuela, December 20–21. + Fahd welcomed this “very + good news”. He said the Saudi Government was convinced that a price + freeze would be in the interest of the free world. He said they + hoped to convince other OPEC + members to freeze prices—say, for another year. (He was more + positive on this than Yamani + had been with me earlier this afternoon). I thanked him and said + that the decision on oil pricing in December could have a critical + effect in the coming year on the effort of many countries to control + inflation and turn their economies around in a positive way. + Inasmuch as Fahd had also + expressed concern over the dollar, I said an oil price freeze would + definitely be helpful, assuring him that the dollar remains + fundamentally sound. Fahd + reaffirmed that it is not repeat not Saudi policy to use oil as a + political weapon, he explicitly denied contrary reports which he + said had been carried in Soviet/Arabic broadcasts.

+

3. On Arab-Israel problems, Fahd very strongly expounded the need to move ahead + to Geneva, and emphasized the primacy of the U.S. role in the + peacemaking effort. He said the Arabs based their hopes on you. The + Arabs wanted peace, and there was still time to work out a just + solution. This must include, he said, establishment of a Palestine + state on the West Bank and Gaza. Failing that, he said, things would + drift back to a situation which could help only the Soviets. I + assured him of your continuing commitment to do everything we could + to help bring about the Geneva Conference and successful + negotiations between the Arab states and Israel, and I promised that + I would relay his remarks to you. I stated that while we had an + important role to play, you were counting on Saudi Arabia to + continue its own very helpful efforts.

+

4. Fahd made a strong pitch + on the F–15. He affirmed that Saudi Arabia had no intention to use + arms for aggressive purposes. But it must have an adequate air + defense with weapons to match those in the hands of other countries + in area which had been supplied by Soviets. He volunteered that the + F–16 was not an acceptable + substitution. If we did not agree to supply the F–15, Saudi armed + forces would want Saudi Government to obtain replacement from other + sources. He argued that that would be against interests of both + Saudi Arabia and the U.S., noting that if the Saudis made a decision + to buy elsewhere, it would be most difficult to turn back to the + U.S. at a later time. I told him we were proud of our past + collaboration in developing the Saudi armed forces. I noted that you faced a difficult + situation in the Congress on this general subject, but I also + assured Fahd that you would + very carefully consider the questions he had raised.

+

5. It is clear to me that Fahd wished to convey, during this conversation, his + continuing very strong desire for fullest possible cooperation with + U.S. Saudi intention to seek a price freeze at the OPEC meeting in December very greatly + increases the chances that such a freeze will be decided. As for the + F–15 issue, I had the impression that Fahd was voicing his honest concern that we might + not be able to come through, and that he mentioned possible need to + turn elsewhere as a contingent inevitability rather than as a + threat.

+ + Bushnell + +
+ +
+ 158. Memorandum Prepared in the Central Intelligence AgencySource: Central + Intelligence Agency, Office of Support Services (DI), Job 80T00071A, Production Copy + Files (1976–1979), Box 10, Folder 77, Factors Affecting Saudi + Arabia’s Position on an OPEC + Oil Price Increase. Secret; [handling + restriction not declassified]. + + + RPM 77–10409Washington, November 10, 1977 + + + SUBJECT + Factors Affecting Saudi Arabia’s Position on an OPEC Oil Price Increase + +

Any consideration of strategies aimed at persuading Saudi Arabia to + hold the line on oil prices must take into account the following + factors:

+

—Saudi Arabia’s determination to avoid another break with OPEC and its reduced leverage over + OPEC due to technical + production limitations.

+

—The Saudis’ expectation of tangible political results from the + US in Middle East peace + negotiations.

+

—The Saudis’ belief that modest oil price increases are unavoidable + and justified due to market conditions and are a necessary spur to + the development of a “responsible” energy program in the US.

+

—The likelihood that Saudi Arabia, out of concern for the health of + Western economies, will continue to lobby for only minimal price + increases and periodic freezes so long as Middle East peace + negotiations do not collapse.

+ +

Given the above factors and the present climate of pessimism in the + Arab world over the prospects for a Geneva conference, we believe it + highly unlikely that further US + demarches to Saudi Arabia aimed at preventing an oil price increase + at Caracas would be successful.West had + made an oral presentation to Prince Saud on November 9 concerning an OPEC price freeze. See Foreign + Relations, 1969–1976, vol. XXXVII, Energy Crisis, + 1974–1980, Document 137. Prince Fahd told Secretary Blumenthal that the Saudis are + prepared to argue initially for a price freeze but he implied that + the Saudis would be forced to accept some increase because they + could not be sure the other OPEC + members would agree to a price freeze.See Document 157. A revised + US demarche to Saudi Arabia to + hold down any increase in oil prices at Caracas would be an + unnecessary expenditure of political capital because the Saudis + probably would work on their own to hold any price increase to the + 5–10 percent range.

+

Beyond next month, Saudi decisions on oil policy are likely to be + primarily influenced by the course of Middle East peace + negotiations. The Saudis are unlikely to respond favorably to US demarches for further restraint if + they perceive that the US is + unwilling to press Israel to meet basic Arab demands in a + settlement. The Saudis recognize that only they have the kind of + leverage over the West that holds out the hope of budging Israel and + their warnings that they will feel forced to use this leverage have + become more explicit in the past few months.

+

The Saudis see a Middle East settlement as vital to their own + security. They believe the resolution of the Arab-Israeli dispute is + the key to preventing the further spread of radicalism and Soviet + influence in the Arab world; in particular, they want to prevent the + overthrow of Sadat and Asad. + They fear that the fall of the moderate Arab leaders would guarantee + another Arab-Israeli war, threatening Saudi oil and security + interests. Further, they know the reestablishment of radical regimes + in Egypt and Syria would isolate Saudi Arabia as it was in Nasir’s + day, redoubling the likelihood of externally sponsored + subversion.

+

The Saudis might impose, or threaten to impose, an oil production + limitation if there is a sustained period of no movement toward a + peace settlement, coupled with an Arab perception that the US is not sufficiently pressuring + Israel to reach a political compromise. A production ceiling at a + low enough level would have the same economic impact as an embargo + on the US and its allies. Riyadh + would recognize that any reduction in oil supply to the West must be + fine-tuned to avoid world economic and political disaster and yet + hurt enough to achieve the desired political results.

+ +

The serious technical problems that will further limit Saudi + production flexibility after the next year and a half are not a + constraint on the Saudis in the context of current efforts to + achieve a Middle East settlement. The prospects for either progress + in, or the collapse of, negotiations should be clear within the next + several months.

+

While Saudi Arabia, because of technical difficulties, may no longer + be in a position to greatly help the US on oil production and pricing after 1979, it is, and + will remain, in a position to hurt the US.

+

Beyond its ability to pressure Israel for negotiating concessions, + the US has no credible defense + against a Saudi decision to manipulate its oil leverage in support + of Arab political demands. The Saudis, for example, are unlikely to + be impressed by a US sponsored + attempt to form a consortium of oil-consuming nations to pressure + them on oil prices. The Saudis realize that European states are not + in a position to apply economic or political pressure on the Arabs + for fear of jeopardizing their own oil supplies. Further, they would + believe that European nations would not want to be associated with a + US policy that they believe + lacks credibility. The Saudis are equally unlikely to be impressed + by confrontation tactics—such as trying to impose a Western arms + embargo on Saudi Arabia—because they know that European nations such + as France are unlikely to cooperate.

+

In light of the above considerations, we believe that further + unilateral US or multilateral + efforts to impress on the Saudis the damage that would be done to + the economies of the Western and less developed countries by oil + price increases are unnecessary. The Saudis are already aware of all + the arguments that could be made and they fully comprehend the + negative effects of even a minimal rise in oil prices.

+
+ +
+ 159. Telegram From the Embassy in Saudi Arabia to the Department + of StateSource: National + Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770445–0982. + Confidential; Niact + Immediate; Limdis. + + + Jidda, December 1, 1977, 1510Z + +

8145. Subject: Sale of F–15s to Saudi Arabia.

+

1. Summary. On December 1, I met with Prince Sultan ibn Abd al-Aziz al-Sa’ud in his + capacity as Acting Minister of Foreign Affairs in order to confirm + the dates of the visit of President Carter to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. During the course of this + meeting, Prince Sultan expressed considerable petulance over U.S. + foot dragging on supplying the F–15 to Saudi Arabia. End + summary.

+

2. During a general discussion of recent Middle East developments, + Prince Sultan said that Saudi Arabia was as yet unable to + satisfactorily determine the U.S. position on Sadat’s recent moves. + Prince Sultan hastened to add that in his capacity as Foreign + Minister he could express his appreciation for U.S. policy support + in the Middle East, however, as Minister of Defense, he must express + his chagrin with regard to U.S. policy towards arms sales to Saudi + Arabia. Prince Sultan stated that the F–15 case has been in the mill + now for over two years and has yet to be resolved. He pointed out + that it was a U.S. Air Force team that made the recommendation that + Saudi Arabia should have the F–15s.

+

3. I explained to him that any military sales in excess of 25 million + dollars must be approved by Congress. Some time ago, the Senate + Foreign Relations Committee had passed a resolution asking the + administration not to submit any more military sales proposals + during 1977 so that Congress could concentrate on crucial + legislation, such as the President’s energy plan.

+

4. I further pointed out to Prince Sultan that not only was President + Carter coming on January + 3,Carter was scheduled to visit Saudi Arabia + January 3–4, 1978. See Document + 164. but the Senate Majority Leader and the Senate + Minority Leader would also be paying a visit to be followed by + Congressman Zablocki and a large + group of Congressmen. Thus in a very short time, Prince Sultan would + be able to personally express his views not only to the President + but to key congressional leaders. Prince Sultan said that he would + be more than pleased to express his views to these gentlemen.

+

5. I also mentioned that Miss Barbara + Bodine, NEA/POL–MIL was visiting Jidda at the + moment and she followed military procurement for this area. Prince + Sultan said that he would like to see Miss Bodine and we arranged an + appointment for December 3 at 1030 hours.See Document + 160.

+ + West + +
+ +
+ + 160. Telegram From the Embassy in Saudi Arabia to the Department + of StateSource: National + Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770453–1115. + Secret; Immediate. Sent for information Immediate to CHUSMTM and the Department of + Defense. + + + Jidda, December 7, 1977, 0719Z + +

8287. SecDef for ISA, DSAA for Lt. Gen. Fish. Subject: + F–15 for Saudi Arabia.

+

1. In a meeting December 3 with Prince Sultan in his capacity as + Acting Foreign Minister, Ambassador and ARP officer Barbara + Bodine had a wide-ranging discussion of the Saudi + request for F–15’s. Embassy Counselor Sabbagh and POL/MIL + officer Lewis were also at the meeting.

+

2. Prince Sultan said that leaving aside U.S. interest in Europe + which he recognized as vital, it seemed that in the Middle East the + United States had three friends in the following rank order. First + was Israel, second Iran, and third and last Saudi Arabia. Sultan + said that he could not understand why the U.S. gave billions of + dollars worth of arms and other assistance to Israel. If the U.S. + feels that it contributes to stability in the area, then “that + premise is wrong”.

+

3. When it comes to Iran, Prince Sultan said there was a lot of arms + being provided to Iran in an open-ended fashion. He said the U.S. is + providing huge quantities of highly sophisticated weaponry to Iran + and that “it is an exaggerated notion” that the policy of the U.S. + toward Iran would achieve stability and provide protection on the + Gulf for oil. Sultan said he is sure that the U.S. is aware that + Iran purchases military equipment from the Soviet Union, Peoples + Republic of China (sic) and France. “Does this mean that Iran will + be the protector of the area?” he asked.

+

4. “Now it is painful to me to come to America’s number three friend + in the area, Saudi Arabia,” Sultan said. In a brief but animated + review of Saudi-American relations, he said that Saudi Arabia had + faced in the past two decades dire circumstances—military disasters + with Yemen in the early 60’s, near bankruptcy, droughts, and near + famines. “Yet at no time,” he said, “did Saudi Arabia come knocking + at the door of the U.S. in a manner that would embarrass a friend.” + He said that on the contrary, the SAG has undertaken tireless efforts to keep Communism + out of the Arab world and beyond. He recalled that the late King + Faisal spent many sleepless nights worrying about radical influences + in the Arab world and had pursued this goal with such energy that the younger men + around him were exhausted. Prince Sultan said that the same policy + is being followed by His Majesty King Khalid and Crown Prince + Fahd. Yet the response + from the U.S. has not been commensurate with the Saudi effort. He + said the SAG paid for its own + weapons, and used them for its own defense. How could it face its + own people when the U.S. provided it with only 1/10 of what its + neighbors get from other sources and the U.S.? Having said that, + Sultan reaffirmed that the SAG’s + friendship with the U.S. was still constant and “no Saudi who can be + called a Saudi can initiate or condone any animosity toward the + U.S.”

+

5. Ambassador West said that + he was pained when Prince Sultan described Saudi Arabia as America’s + “third ranked friend in the Middle East.” Amb. West said that twice in recent months he has + discussed Saudi-U.S. relations with President Carter. On both occasions the + President said that he considered Saudi Arabia to be among the + closest and best friends the United States has in the world.

+

6. Ms. Bodine told Prince + Sultan that a frequently-asked question is whether Saudi Arabia has + the manpower and capability to absorb this aircraft. Prince Sultan + said that the program for absorbing an advanced fighter aircraft was + based on the 1974 recommendations of the U.S.-Saudi Joint Security + CommissionDocumentation is + scheduled for publication in Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, vol. + E–9, Part 2, Documents on the Middle East Region, + 1973–1976. and that there was no question in + his mind that the Saudi Air Force could absorb and maintain the + F–15.

+

7. Sultan said that he was under great pressure from other members of + the royal family to accelerate the acquisition of an advanced + fighter but that he resisted this pressure preferring instead a + paced and more thoughtful program to insure that a new fighter would + be absorbed smoothly while they phased out the Lightning aircraft. + He said that the Saudi decision was based on a careful review and + test which included the F–14, 15, and 16 by Saudi pilots. The Saudi + Air Force had preferred the F–15.

+

8. Ms. Bodine said that it was + understood that Saudi Arabia had requested the F–15 for its own + defense but a frequently-asked question in the U.S. was whether + these planes might be used offensively. In reply, Prince Sultan said + “How can we attack countries that are twenty times better equiped + than we are?”

+

9. In closing Prince Sultan stated that he was willing to go before + Congress to explain Saudi Arabia’s case for the F–15, “after all, + President Sadat went to Jerusalem and spoke before the + Knesset”.Reference is to Sadat’s + November 19–21 visit to Jerusalem.

+ + West + +
+ +
+ 161. Memorandum of ConversationSource: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, + Staff Material, Middle East, Subject File, Box 81, Saudi Arabia: + 11–12/77. Secret; Nodis. + Drafted by David Korn (S/P). + The meeting took place at the Royal Palace. Vance met separately with + Saud and Khalid + earlier in the afternoon. Memoranda of conversation of these + meetings are ibid. Telegram Secto 12130 from Riyadh, December 14, in which + Vance summarized his + meetings with the Saudi leaders, is printed in Foreign + Relations, 1977–1980, vol. VIII, Arab-Israeli + Dispute, January 1977–August 1978, Document 176. + Vance traveled in + the Middle East December 9–15, visiting Cairo, Jerusalem, Amman, + Beirut, Damascus, and Riyadh. Records of his meetings in the + other capitals are ibid., Documents 167–175. + + + Riyadh, December 14, 1977, 5:15 p.m. + + + SUBJECT + The Secretary’s Meeting with Crown Prince Fahd + + + PARTICIPANTS + + SAUDI ARABIA + HRH Crown Prince Fahd + HRH Prince Abdullah + HRH Prince Sultan + HRH Prince Saud + HRH Prince Turki + Royal Counselor Rashad Pharaon + Ambassador Ali Abdallah + Alireza, Ambassador to US + + + + + UNITED STATES + The Secretary + Under Secretary Philip C. Habib + Ambassador John C. West, Ambassador to Saudi + Arabia + Mr. David A. Korn, S/P + Mr. Isa + Sabbagh, Interpreter + + +

Crown Prince Fahd said it is + obvious to everybody that we are in a very delicate stage in the + history of the Middle East problem. The eyes of the world are on the + Middle East. Everybody is waiting to see the results. Fahd said Saudi Arabia divides + the world into two categories: those who want to see good results + from the current negotiations and those who do not want to see good + results. Fahd said by the + latter he especially meant the Soviet Union. He wanted to make clear + that it is the earnest hope of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia that the + United States will be successful in persuading Israel that now is + the golden moment to solve the Arab-Israeli problem. Such an + auspicious moment may never come again. This is also a golden + opportunity for the United States, Fahd said, since another such time may never come + again.

+

Fahd said that Saudi Arabian + support for Egypt and for President Sadat is old and deep. A few + days before Sadat went on his trip to Jerusalem he visited Saudi Arabia. The + discussion focused on the Geneva conference and Sadat emphasized + that he was going to Geneva irrespective of whether others attended + it. Sadat urged Saudi Arabia to prevail on the Syrians and the + Palestinians to go to Geneva. There was of course, Fahd said, at that time a + difference of opinion between Syria and Egypt on Geneva. The Syrians + wanted everything cleared up before Geneva. The Egyptians said this + was not necessary because Geneva would clarify it all. Saudi + Arabia’s efforts were therefore channeled in the direction of + convincing the Syrians and the Palestinians to go to Geneva. + Fahd said Saudi Arabia + had told the Syrians and the Palestinians that it would not be good + to give a chance to those who wanted to complicate matters. Saudi + Arabia urged them to go. Saudi Arabia’s main concern was how to + bring the two sides together, so as to ensure that all parties + concerned could go to Geneva. Fahd said that the Saudis had suggested to the Arab + parties that they might have a pre-Geneva meeting in Saudi + Arabia.

+

Fahd said that after that + Sadat went back to Egypt and Prince Saud went to Syria to talk with the Syrians about + Geneva. Saud came back with + the impression that the Syrians would like to have a Geneva + conference. The first the Saudis knew about Sadat’s intention to + visit Israel was Sadat’s speech in which he announced that + intention.Sadat delivered the + speech on November 9 before the Egyptian People’s Assembly. See + ibid., Documents 144 and + 145. + Fahd said at first we did + not imagine Sadat would actually go, that he was serious. Saudi + Arabia did not receive any notification from Sadat. However, after + the visit was announced, Saudi Arabia sent a letter to Sadat asking + him to wait a while, not to do anything rash. This was a letter from + King Khalid and it stressed that Saudi Arabia’s desire was to see + fruitful results.

+

Fahd said there were two + ways to view Sadat’s visit to Jerusalem. The first is that it showed + a desire for peace. The second is that it was an impulsive act. + Fahd said the way Saudi + Arabia looks at the visit is that it was an important step and that + it should have good results. Otherwise it will play into the hands + of the enemies of the United States and Saudi Arabia. Fahd said Saudi Arabia has based + its attitude on the desire that Sadat should succeed. We want to + assure you that Saudi Arabia is keenly watching the development of + events because it wants to see Sadat succeed. Saudi Arabia places + great hopes in the United States because it is the one country that + can bring a change in Israel’s position.

+

Fahd said that if Saudi + Arabia had rushed to the support of Sadat it would have upset the + balance in the Arab world. That is why we thought it the better part of wisdom to keep + cool. The Arab world is now in a period of turmoil, debate and + change. Fahd said he hoped + the dust would settle and then Saudi Arabia’s role would become + clearer. Saudi Arabia’s declaration on the Sadat visit, Fahd said, stated the facts. We + did not criticize the visit but did not support it either. We said + we did not know of the visit beforehand and had sent a letter to + Sadat on it but received no reply. Fahd said the Secretary certainly knew that Saudi + Arabia’s relations with both sides are good. It has good relations + with the Palestinians, with Iraq, Syria, Egypt, Jordan and Lebanon. + This is the right policy for Saudi Arabia, Fahd said.

+

Fahd said Saudi Arabia would + be very pleased if the current negotiations produce good results. He + thought Syria would go along if the results were good. The position + of Algeria and Libya is not the same as that of Syria. Neither they + nor the Soviet Union want the current negotiations to succeed. The + Soviet Union sees clearly that the situation in the Arab countries + is not satisfactory from its point of view, and it is also unhappy + about what happened in Somalia.

+

Fahd said that on Somalia he + had long worked for the result that has come about. But, he said, + Saudi Arabia is not pleased over the continuation of the trouble + between Ethiopia and Somalia. Fahd said the Saudis had discussed the problem with + the President of Somalia and told him that war would be + counterproductive in the long run. Fahd said Saudi Arabia feels it must help Somalia + because if Somalia is defeated then it will be a great victory for + the Soviet Union. Fahd said + the Saudis had spoken to the Somalis about Kenya’s fears. The + President of Somalia had assured the Saudis that he had no desire to + create problems for Kenya. Fahd said the Saudis would be happy to receive an + envoy from Kenya to discuss this. Fahd said the Saudis believe that Ethiopia and the + Soviet Union are trying to poison the mind of Kenya against Somalia. + There are those in Kenya who are trying to put it in the communist + camp. Saudi Arabia has heard that contacts have been established + between Ethiopia and the Soviet Union and people in Kenya who want + to put Kenya on the Soviet side. We are sure that nothing will + happen as long as KenyattaJomo + Kenyatta, President of Kenya from 1964 until 1978. is + there, Fahd said. But no + one can know what will happen afterwards.

+

Fahd said the Saudis had + heard that Ethiopia is getting help from Israel. If this is true, it + is too bad. It would really be strange if there were such unusual + bedfellows now. However, Fahd expressed suspicion that the Israelis and the + Soviets may be working together in Ethiopia. Fahd said the Saudis feel that + they have effectively undermined the position of the Soviet Union in + the Horn of Africa. If Saudi Arabia is successful, Soviet presence will have been + considerably reduced. Fahd + said the Saudis know that the Soviet Union is their main enemy in + the area.

+

Fahd again expressed the + hope that Sadat’s initiative would be successful. If not, it would + be a victory for those who attended the Tripoli conference.Arab leaders from Libya, Syria, Iraq, + Algeria, South Yemen, and the PLO met in Tripoli December 2–3 to discuss possible + actions to take against Egypt after Sadat’s visit to Israel. + Egypt responded to the conference’s measures by breaking + diplomatic relations with Libya, Syria, Algeria, and South + Yemen. Sadat’s visit was very important in showing that + the Arabs seriously wanted peace. The visit strengthened President + Carter’s hand. Fahd said it was good to hear + that the Israelis have changed their opinion, but more than that + must be done. Some concrete result must emerge from the Cairo + conference.Reference is to the + preliminary Arab-Israeli peace talks scheduled to take place in + Cairo in December. If the Cairo conference brings about a + declaration of principle on Israeli withdrawal and solution of the + Palestinian problem, then there would be general Arab agreement on + going to Geneva. Fahd said + Saudi Arabia understands why Hussein decided not to go to the Cairo + conference; and Sadat also no doubt understands. Fahd added that he could assure + the Secretary that Sadat knows about Saudi policy and approves + it.

+

Foreign Minister Saud said it + was most important that Israel not take advantage of Sadat’s visit + to Jerusalem to try to legitimize its presence there. Saud said he was pleased with the + Secretary’s assurance that the US + would not move its Embassy to Jerusalem. Fahd said he hoped Israel was + intelligent enough to realize that Sadat’s visit was not an + acknowledgement of the legitimacy of Israeli presence in + Jerusalem.

+

Fahd said that he wanted to + say a word about the price of oil. Saudi Arabia hopes to be + successful in rallying a majority in favor of an oil price freeze + until the end of 1978. But there is a question which greatly + concerns Saudi Arabia in this regard: that is the value of the + dollar. Fahd said he had + taken up this question with the Secretary of the Treasury and had + been told that the US does not want + its friends to be hurt by a drop in the value of the dollar.See Document + 157. + Fahd said he was mentioning + the subject because it will be brought up at the OPEC meeting.See footnote 3, Document + 157. The opponents of an oil price freeze will + argue that since the dollar is going down the price of oil must be + raised. Fahd said Saudi + Arabia hopes the US will pay close + attention to this problem. Saudi Arabia is also concerned about the + drop in the value of the dollar because it affects the value of + Saudi holdings in the United States. Fahd + said he was certain the + US Government would respond + seriously to this problem.

+

Fahd said the other problem + he wanted to raise with the Secretary is that of arms for Saudi + Arabia. Fahd said he + thought that fears that exist in the Congress of the United States + that Saudi Arabia wants arms in order to attack Israel have now been + proven baseless. It has become clear that Saudi Arabia needs arms to + defend itself from its neighbors and from the Soviet Union. Saudi + Arabia’s neighbors are stronger and receive more arms than it does. + Fahd said he wanted to + underscore the urgency of assuring that something is done soon about + Saudi arms requests. The Saudi people and the armed forces need to + see that they have weapons with which to defend their country.

+

Fahd said the states of the + Gulf look up to Saudi Arabia and consider themselves dependent on it + for their protection. If Saudi Arabia lacks arms, the Gulf states + will suffer too. Let us take a simple example, Fahd said. South Yemen has more + arms than the Sheiks of the Gulf. Suppose that South Yemen attacks + one of the Gulf states and that Iraq came to the support of South + Yemen. Iraq has 12 divisions ready to go to battle. Its forces are + stronger than those of Saudi Arabia. If such a thing were to happen + at a time when the US was incapable + of helping Saudi Arabia, the outcome would be terrible. Fahd said for this reason he + wanted to ask the Secretary to convey to President Carter his urgent request that the + US respond quickly to Saudi + Arabia’s plea for arms. An American response will be seen as a + friendly gesture to His Majesty, the Government of Saudi Arabia, and + all the friends of Saudi Arabia.

+

Fahd asked about Mr. + Habib’s visit to the + Soviet Union. Mr. Habib then + reviewed his impressions of his Moscow talks along the lines that he + had earlier that afternoon in the meeting with Prince Saud.No memorandum of conversation of this + earlier meeting has been found. However, Vance provided a summary of it + in telegram Secto 12130 from + Riyadh, December 14. See footnote 1 above.

+

The Secretary expressed his appreciation for Fahd’s explanation of Saudi + policy. The Secretary said he would convey Saudi concerns to the + President. The US fully appreciates + the need for a forthcoming Israeli response to the actions taken by + Sadat. The Secretary said he had already spoken to Begin about this, and he and the + President will have another opportunity to discuss this with + Begin when Begin comes to Washington on + Friday.December 16. For the + memoranda of conversation of Carter’s meetings with Begin December 16–17, see Foreign + Relations, 1977–1980, vol. VIII, Arab-Israeli + Dispute, January 1977–August 1978, Documents 177 and + 178.

+ +

The Secretary said we fully agree that it is necessary to bring about + a just and comprehensive settlement for the Arab-Israeli dispute, + because if we fail the consequences will be dire for all. The US much appreciates all Saudi Arabia + has done in regard to Somalia. We continue to have the problem of + the Horn of Africa under very close review. As of now we are giving + only economic aid to Somalia and that aid is not very large. However + we are considering expanding it. The Secretary said that in regard + to the Crown Prince’s question about Israeli support for Ethiopia, + it is true that Israel has been giving some assistance to the + Ethiopians. We have told the Israelis that we think this is wrong + and we will continue to make clear our views to them. The Secretary + said we know that the Soviet Union has been giving substantial + assistance to Ethiopia. This assistance and the size of the + Ethiopian population give Ethiopia an advantage over Somalia. The + Secretary said he had discussed the problem of the Horn of Africa + during the NATO meeting a week + agoThe NATO Ministerial meeting took place in Brussels + December 8–9. and also with the Foreign Minister of the + Federal Republic of Germany. He had also discussed it with Sadat and + Sadat had said that he had taken the matter up with the Sudanese and + that the Sudanese would give aid to Somalia. The Secretary said he + was sure that President Carter would want to discuss the question of the + Horn of Africa when he visits Riyadh.See Document 164.

+

The Secretary said that on the question of arms for Saudi Arabia, he + had begun discussions with key Members of Congress. He had received + a good response, and events of the last several weeks had helped + change several minds. The Secretary said he thought there was an + increasing awareness in Congress of the importance of approval for + the Saudi arms request. He wanted to point out that there would + nonetheless be some Members of Congress who would continue to be + difficult. But, the Secretary said, the Administration plans to go + forward in January with a proposal to Congress. Fahd said he was pleased to hear + this. Fahd suggested that + any “recalcitrant” Members of Congress be invited to Saudi Arabia. + The Secretary said Congressman Zablocki would be visiting Saudi Arabia shortly at + the head of a large delegation. They would have an important voice + in this question. Fahd said + the Saudis would welcome them. The Secretary said that Senator + Byrd and Senator + Baker would also be + coming and they too could be very important. Fahd said “We will welcome them. + They will come back convinced.”

+

The Secretary said that on the matter of the value of the dollar, + this is very important to the US. He + had discussed it with Secretary Blumenthal and the President before leaving for his + visit to the Middle East. The value of the dollar is a question of + the highest priority to the US + Government.

+

The Secretary said he would again like to express the deep thanks of + President Carter and the + United States Government to the Saudi Government in regard to oil + prices. The Secretary said we are fully aware of what Saudi Arabia + has done to bring others along.

+

The Secretary said he would like to say a few words about South + Yemen. The US has refrained from + doing anything further in its relations with South Yemen since the + Secretary’s last meeting with Prince Saud in August.See + footnote 3, Document + 155. South Yemen seems to have been providing + increasing facilities in support for Soviet shipping in the Indian + Ocean. Since Berbera was denied to them, the Soviets seem to be + turning more and more to Aden. They are also funneling arms + shipments to Ethiopia through Aden. Fahd said Saudi Arabia is aware of this. The + Secretary asked how Fahd + would advise the US to deal with the + South Yemen problem.

+

Fahd said in the past Saudi + Arabia had seen some positive signs coming from South Yemen and had + urged the US to move closer to the + Aden regime. But now in view of the new circumstances we urge you + not to do so. Fahd said + there had earlier been discussions between Saudi Arabia and South + Yemen to improve relations. Certain points were agreed upon during + the visit of the President of South Yemen to Riyadh, and Saudi + Arabia was ready to help South Yemen with money and food, and also + with their refineries. But, Fahd said, after the speech made by the South Yemen + President in the UN in which he + attacked Oman, Saudi Arabia stopped its aid. Fahd said he had sent the + President of South Yemen a memorandum saying that now Saudi Arabia + has doubts about the wisdom of dealing with South Yemen. Saudi + Arabia had already informed Kuwait, Qatar and the UAE of its new attitude towards South + Yemen. Fahd said he had + recently sent another letter to the President of South Yemen and + thus far had not gotten a reply. He had also sent a Saudi envoy to + Aden to explain Saudi concerns but the envoy had not yet + returned.

+

Fahd said Saudi Arabia now + wants to be very cautious toward South Yemen. It will weigh events + and will not move quickly. We will keep you informed of anything new + that develops, Fahd said. + Prince Saud said that if the + United States has any information on aid that South Yemen is getting + from the communists, Saudi Arabia would appreciate having this + information. It would also appreciate having information on + communist aid to Ethiopia that is being channeled through South Yemen. The Secretary + said he would check right away with Washington and we would provide + whatever we have. On the general question of relations with South + Yemen, the Secretary said the US + will consult closely with Saudi Arabia and follow its suggestion + that we proceed slowly. Fahd expressed appreciation for this. He reiterated + that the Saudis had been taken by surprise by the attitude expressed + by the President of South Yemen at the UN.See footnote 9, Document 235. + Either he talks through both sides of his mouth, Fahd said, or he has become a + puppet of the Soviets. Fahd + said Saudi Arabia had heard that perhaps the Soviet Union and South + Yemen had agreed that South Yemen would pay lip service to + improvement of relations between itself and Saudi Arabia and the + Gulf countries in order to get aid from them. Fahd said after the speech by the + President of South Yemen, we concluded that this must be true. + Fahd reiterated that + from now on Saudi Arabia will be very cautious in its dealings with + South Yemen.

+

Fahd said that in closing he + wanted to underscore that Saudi Arabia hopes that the US would keep in mind the need for a + just solution to the Palestinian question. There can be no + settlement without a just solution to the Palestinian issue, + Fahd said. The + Secretary said we fully understand this.

+
+ +
+ 162. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National + Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to President CarterSource: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files, FRC 330–81–0713, Arms + Transfer—Middle East Package, Folder 2. Secret. Sent for action. + Brzezinski + hand-wrote the date on the memorandum. + + + Washington, December 15, 1977 + + + SUBJECT + Arms Sales to the Middle East + +

Attached at Tab ANot attached and not + found. is a memorandum from State asking for your + authorization of Congressional consultations in January on a + proposed arms sales package to the Middle East. The package would + consist of:

+ + + + Country + Aircraft + Number + + + Israel + F–16 + 50–150 + + + Israel + F–15 + 25 + + + Saudi Arabia + F–15 + 20–60 + + + Egypt + F–5E + 40–120 + +
+

In these preliminary discussions the numbers will be left purposely + vague so that attention can be focused on the concept of the package + approach. If the past is any guide these discussions will leak to + the press within hours.

+

The two most important points to be considered in making this + decision are the following:

+

1. If we really want to make the Egyptian and Saudi sales, the + package approach is certainly the least painful way to win + Congressional approval. In the case of the F–15s for Saudi Arabia, + it is probably the only way to do so.

+

2. On the other hand, public opinion and editorial comment may well + be dumbfounded by the spectacle of the US pressing forward with this huge arms sale (the + package is worth more than $8 billion) just as peace appears to be + breaking out. Those we consult on the Hill will be unlikely to feel + this way—they will be more concerned with our arms sales policy per + se, and with balancing Israeli and Arab interests, but I expect that + this reaction may well be prevalent once the decision becomes + publicly known. The Soviets and the European arms suppliers may not + only be taken aback by the announcement of this sale, but may find + in it reason to doubt our credibility in urging them to adopt a + policy of arms sales restraint.

+

I therefore recommend that you direct State to do all the preparatory + work for these consultations—talking points, Q&As, etc.—but that + you reserve final approval until January when we will have a better + idea of what is going to happen in the Middle East.Carter + checked the Disapprove option and wrote in the margin below it: + “I want first to see entire FY1978 arms + sales package. J.”

+
+ +
+ 163. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National + Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to President CarterSource: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff + Material, Middle East, Subject File, Box 81, Saudi Arabia: + 11–12/77. Confidential. Sent for information. A stamped notation + on the memorandum reads: “The President has seen” and Carter initialed it. Sent + under a December 19 memorandum from Sick to Brzezinski in which Sick recommended that Brzezinski forward the + memorandum to Carter. + + + Washington, December 20, 1977 + + + SUBJECT + Letter from Ambassador West + +

Ambassador West’s latest + letter to you makes the following points:

+

1. As reported earlier, Oil Minister Yamani is now absolutely certain that there will be + an oil price freeze at the OPEC + meeting on the 20th. However, when asked if the price freeze would + extend for a full year, he hedged, noting that market pressures + would make a substantial price increase inevitable depending on how + the United States and the European Community cope with their energy + needs and problems.

+

2. Yamani said he had no + assurance that Saudi Arabia would increase its production + substantially. In fact, he felt there was no way they could or would + go to 16 million barrels per day as projected by our CIA report for 1982. There is a tough + internal fight within the Saudi Government about going even to a + level of 10 or 12 million barrels per day.

+

3. This fight is becoming more stringent because of the Saudi + takeover of ARAMCO.Saudi Arabia acquired a 60 percent share in + Aramco in 1974 and took full control in 1980. At the + present time it requires approximately $1 billion in capital + expenditures to increase production by a million barrels per day. + With the takeover, this capital expenditure will probably have to be + included as part of the government budget and will therefore fall + under the Finance Minister or Minister of Planning, rather than + Yamani. Both Finance + Minister Aba al-Khayl and Planning Minister Hisham Nazer are among + those opposed to an increase in production.

+

4. Ambassador West suggested + that Yamani come back + through the United States after the Caracas conference (assuming it + is successful) for a series of interviews and public appearances + which might help your energy program. He believes this would be + useful to US-Saudi relations and + might even stimulate the stock market.

+

5. Ambassador West suggests + that Mrs. Carter make a courtesy call on Queen Efat, King Faisal’s + widow, during the stop in Riyadh. This matter has been handled in the normal + preparations for the trip. Queen Efat will be at the dinner for Mrs. + Carter and no separate call is required.

+

A typed version of his hand-written letter is at Tab A.Attached but not printed are the typed and + handwritten texts of West’s December 2 letter.

+
+ +
+ 164. Editorial Note +

President Jimmy Carter + visited Riyadh January 3–4, 1978, as part of a larger ten-day + international trip that included stops in Poland, Iran, India, + Egypt, France, and Belgium. On January 3, Carter met with Saudi officials on + two occasions in order to discuss the Middle East peace process. For + the memoranda of conversation of these meetings, see Foreign + Relations, 1977–1980, vol. VIII, Arab-Israeli Dispute, + January 1977–August 1978, Documents 183 and 184.

+
+ +
+ 165. Memorandum Prepared in the Central Intelligence AgencySource: Central + Intelligence Agency, Office of Support Services (DI), Job 80T00634A, Production Case + Files (1978), Box 13, Folder 1: Saudi Arabia’s Foreign Policy. + Secret; [handling restriction not + declassified]. + + + RPM 78–10004Washington, January 5, + 1978 + + + SUBJECT + Saudi Arabia’s Foreign Policy + +

Saudi foreign policy goals have remained constant for over a decade. + The manner of pursuing them has changed, however, since the 1973 + Arab-Israeli war and oil embargo. With the ascendancy of Crown + Prince Fahd following the + death of King Faysal in 1975, the Saudis have more actively asserted + themselves in regional politics, using their immense oil wealth as + their principal diplomatic tool. They have found that economic diplomacy has its + limitations; they appear, nevertheless, increasingly self-confident + and willing to use their economic leverage to pursue their goals. + Islamic religious considerations are important in Saudi foreign + policy, and may become more so in the future.

+

Saudi activism and use of economic leverage is most visible in those + areas of most direct concern to them—the Arab confrontation states, + the Horn of Africa, and OPEC. The + Saudis are underwriting arms purchases for Egypt and estimate that + their total military and economic aid to Egypt is approximately $2 + billion yearly. In addition to providing hundreds of millions of + dollars in economic aid to Syria, Jordan, and Somalia, they have + offered to underwrite any military purchases the Somalis can + arrange. The Saudis have used their leverage in OPEC to maintain oil prices at levels + they consider to be moderate.

+

Policy Goals and Constraints

+

Saudi foreign policy for many years has been keyed to protecting the + Saudi kingdom; containing world communism and regional radicalism; + and, protecting and expanding the Islamic religion, for which the + Saudis, as protector of the holy cities of Mecca and Medina, feel a + special responsibility.

+

In pursuing these goals, Saudi policy has sought to:

+

—prevent the growth of radically oriented governments in the Middle + East, and moderate the stance of those that already exist;

+

—facilitate a negotiated solution to the Middle East conflict—thereby + removing the greatest source of instability and tension in the + region. Such a settlement, in the Saudi view, would include return + of Israeli-occupied territory (and East Jerusalem) to the Arabs, and + a solution acceptable to moderate Palestinians;

+

—develop and maintain a “special relationship” with the US, which it sees as the ultimate + protector of the Saudi kingdom from external subversion, and as a + major source of the technology needed for the kingdom’s + development;

+

—maintain a healthy international economic environment that will + facilitate domestic development—a major rationale for moderating oil + prices within OPEC.

+

Major constraints influencing Saudi goals are:

+

—lack of trained manpower, which makes it difficult to staff + ministries at home and diplomatic posts abroad with qualified + personnel, and tends to concentrate all decision-making + responsibilities on the top leadership;

+

—its small population—estimated at about 5–6 million; this makes it + all but impossible for Saudi Arabia to attain a military strength + commensurate with its boundaries, wealth or regional interests.

+ +

Personalities and Special Topics of + Interest

+

Crown Prince Fahd generally + controls the major foreign accounts, such as relations with the + US, oil policy, and the Horn of + Africa, but other senior princes are regularly consulted and + decisions usually represent a consensus viewpoint. In addition to + Foreign Minister Prince Saud, these other senior princes usually + include Defense Minister Prince Sultan, National Guard Commander + Prince Abdallah, intelligence chief Prince Turki ibn Faysal, and royal adviser + Kamal Adham. Important + decisions are always cleared with King Khalid. While Khalid usually + does not take an active part in policy formulation, he can and does + get involved if a particular subject—such as Saudi policy on the + current Egyptian-Israeli peace talks—interests him. A devout Muslim, + Khalid will also assert himself if Islamic considerations are + involved.

+

[5 lines not declassified] The Saudis remain + deeply suspicious that Sadat will sign a separate peace with Israel; + they have repeatedly warned Sadat against making a bilateral + settlement.

+

The government is united, however, on two issues it considers highly + important: sale of F–15 fighter-bombers, and the sale or + third-country transfer of US + equipment to Somalia. The Saudis see the F–15s as a symbol of the + US commitment to Saudi security + and to the “special relationship.” Defense Minister Prince Sultan, + in particular, has made pointed references to Saudi unhappiness that + the US has not already agreed to + their sale. The Saudis would probably see a public US commitment on the F–15s as a + suitable sign of US appreciation for + their efforts to moderate oil prices at the recent Caracas OPEC conference.

+

The Saudis view the conflict in the Horn as a prime opportunity to + remove or lessen Soviet influence in the region. They believe this + should be a joint Saudi-US goal and + should override any US inhibitions + about African territorial integrity. They have urged the US to allow the sale or transfer of + US military equipment to + Somalia.

+

Foreign Minister Prince Saud + recently told Ambassador West that the Saudi government was upset by the + recent Congressional report on energy that suggested the US should permit Iran to secure Persian + Gulf and Saudi oil supplies if they were threatened. The Saudis take + such reports, no matter what the source, as veiled US threats aimed at them.

+

[2 paragraphs (20 lines) not declassified]

+
+ +
+ 166. Memorandum From Jessica Tuchman of the National Security + Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security + Affairs (Brzezinski)Source: Carter Library, + National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 67, Saudi + Arabia: 1–5/78. Confidential. Sent for action. Copies were sent + to Schecter, Pastor, and Sick. + + + Washington, January 27, 1978 + + + SUBJECT + F–15 for Saudi Arabia + +

LesReference is to Leslie Denend. and I + met this morning with Frank + Moore and his staff at their request to discuss the + Saudi F–15 sale. They have been getting indications that AIPAC has mounted a major campaign + against the sale, visiting almost every member already. A copy of + AIPAC’s briefing sheet is + attached at Tab A,Not attached. + FYI. On the other hand, there is + definitely a more balanced view prevailing now on the Hill,Assistant Secretary of State for + Congressional Affairs Douglas Bennet sent Vance a briefing memorandum on + January 27 outlining the congressional factors concerning the + F–15 sale to Saudi Arabia. (National Archives, RG 59, Central + Foreign Policy File, P860124–0987) with more sympathy and + understanding of the moderate Arab cause than has been the case in + the past. (C)

+

After much discussion, the conclusion was that if at all possible, + the sale should not be sent up until early March, for the following + reasons:

+

—We need time to mount a major educational effort on the importance + of the Saudi role in the mid-east peace process, as well as in the + production and pricing of oil. If we are to win this one we must be + able to recruit positive supporters—not just + try to moot the opposition’s arguments as we did on AWACS. (C)

+

—Waiting until March might allow the F–15s to be sent up as part of a package including the Israeli + sales, which would help immeasurably with passage. (C)

+

—After thinking about this for a while, the Senate people realized + for the first time that this issue is likely to + collide with Panama.Reference + is to the ratification debate concerning the Panama Canal + treaties, which Carter + and Panamanian leader Brigadier General Omar Torrijos Herrera + signed in September 1977. Many of the Senators we are + depending upon to make our case on Panama, as well as those for + whose votes we are negotiating, also have strong pro-Israeli + records, and a political base in the Jewish community. Examples: Bentsen, Brooke, + Case, Church, Glenn, + Metzenbaum and Stone.Senators Lloyd Bentsen (D-Texas), Edward + Brooke (R-Massachusetts), Clifford + Case (R-New Jersey), Frank Church (D-Idaho), John Glenn (D-Ohio), + Howard Metzenbaum (D-Ohio), and Richard Stone (D-Florida). They + would be caught in the middle and might only be able to afford + (particularly those who are up for reelection) to give the + Administration one vote or the other, not both. (C)

+

These seem to us to be good reasons to delay sending up the Saudi + sale for about one month. If Panama goes on schedule, the Saudi sale + would still be early in the 20 day pre-notification period when the + Panama vote takes place. There are only two drawbacks to this plan. + First, it has to be made palatable to the Saudis. This shouldn’t be + too hard if we tell them that we are definitely going with it and + when. We should then be able to find some good reasons why it takes + 30 days to prepare the papers. The other drawback is that waiting + until the beginning of March means that the statutory 30 day + consideration period will overlap with the 10 day March recess. This + will be used to try to make us withdraw the sale and resubmit it + later—just as happened last summer with AWACS. (C)

+

RECOMMENDATION:

+

That the Saudi F–15 sale not be sent up to the Hill for approval + until the first week in March (assuming Panama stays on schedule) + and that every effort be made to send it up in a package with the + Israeli and Egyptian sales. (C)

+
+ +
+ 167. Editorial Note +

On January 25, 1978, Secretary of State Cyrus Vance sent Ambassador to Saudi Arabia + John West a telegram + instructing him to meet with Saudi Crown Prince Fahd + ibn Abd al-Aziz al-Saud in + order to inform him that Vance and President Jimmy Carter “have been giving very careful + attention to the question of how to move ahead most effectively on + F–15s.” Vance also requested + that West inform the Crown Prince that the efforts aimed at securing + congressional approval had been complicated “by the pause in the + direct negotiations between Egypt and Israel.” Vance instructed: “Finally, tell + Fahd that I have asked + you to say that the President is prepared to send forward to the + Congress in the very near + future a request for F–15s for Saudi Arabia if that is Fahd’s wish. But we would like + for him to consider the tactical advantages of delaying until the + peacemaking effort regains momentum to provide a more propitious + atmosphere for congressional consideration of our request. I know + Fahd shares our desire + to handle congressional consultations in a manner maximizing the + chances of success; at the same time, we want to minimize the sort + of public controversy which would be embarrassing to the U.S.-Saudi + relationship as well as harmful to the overall atmosphere for the + Middle East peace process.” (Telegram 19647 to Jidda, January 25; + National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + P850071–2631)

+

The following day, President Carter approved a letter to Saudi King Khalid bin Abdul Aziz that, in + part, dealt with the F–15 sale. In the letter, Carter stressed: “I want to repeat + to Your Majesty my personal commitment to assisting Saudi Arabia in + meeting its security requirements. As I told you in Riyadh, we will + move forward as promised with your request for the F–15 aircraft in + order to ensure the earliest feasible delivery. Secretary Vance has already begun + consultations with members of the Senate Foreign Relations + Committee, and you can be assured that we will do our best to + explain to the Members of Congress the contribution that this sale + will make to U.S.-Saudi relations and to stability in the area.” + (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Middle + East, Subject File, Box 81, Saudi Arabia: 1–2/78)

+

On January 29, West cabled the Department of State to report Saudi + reactions to a possible delay in the Carter administration’s submission to Congress of + the F–15 proposal. West reported: “Saud was adamant that a delay was + ‘failure’ and that the President should submit the proposal + forthwith.” West reported that he had also met with Crown Prince + Fahd: “In the last half + of the meeting, Fahd made + these points time and time again (1) that the F–15 issue was a + basic, crucial test of our relationship; (2) that he was personally + embarrassed by the delays thus far and could not willingly submit to + any further such embarrassment; (3) that to impress the President + and the Congress with the extreme urgency of the issue, he wanted me + to take a personal message from him and the King to you and the + President setting forth all of their concerns; he said that he felt + my taking it in person rather than by cable would emphasize this + feeling of urgency; (4) that he wanted the planes and he would not + attempt to tell us what tactics or strategy we should use to get + them.” West noted that both Saud and Fahd placed full responsibility for the success or + failure of the sale on the United States. (Telegram 81 from Riyadh, + January 29; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + P850071–2511)

+

In telegram 24580 to Jidda, January 31, the Department indicated that + Vance had seen “no need” + for West “to return to Washington for consultations at this time. We want to have a + chance to digest the report of your latest conversation with + Fahd and Saud before deciding whether you + should come. You should know that we are working toward trying to + put you in a position to convey a decision to the Saudis in the next + few days, but you should not mention that until you get our further + instructions.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy + File, P850071–2523)

+

In telegram 86 from Riyadh, January 31, West summarized his January + 30 meeting with top Saudi officials, commenting that the discussion + had “reinforced earlier opinion that this is highly emotional issue, + basic to present US–SAG ‘special relationship’ and must be + dealt with promptly and affirmatively to avoid further suspicion + that U.S. is trying to renege on F–15 commitment.” (National + Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P850071–2517)

+
+ +
+ 168. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Saudi + ArabiaSource: + National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + P850071–2524. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Drafted by Quandt and Sober; cleared by Gelb, Saunders, Tarnoff, and Douglas Bennet (H); approved by + Vance. + + + Washington, January 31, 1978, + 2140Z + +

25643. For Ambassador West. + Subject: Presentation of F–15 Sale to Congress. Ref: Riyadh + 086.See Document 167.

+

1. Please see Crown Prince Fahd again at the earliest possible date, and make + the following points:

+

—The President is pleased to inform King Khalid and the Crown Prince + that he has decided to approve the Saudi request for 60 F–15 + aircraft. We see this as an important dimension of the US-Saudi relationship and believe that + it will contribute to the close ties that exist between our two + countries and to the peace and stability of the Middle East.

+

—We want the Crown Prince to understand how we intend to proceed to + insure the best possible climate in Congress for consideration of + this sale.

+

—The Saudis should understand that the present mood in Congress is + distinctly hostile to the sale. We clearly will have an uphill + battle on our hands and we + cannot guarantee the outcome. Because of the importance we attach to + US-Saudi relations, however, we + are prepared to deal with the controversy that this will inevitably + produce.

+

—Secretary Vance has already + begun consultations with leaders in the House and Senate on the F–15 + sale, and Secretary Brown + will do likewise. The President will also speak to congressional + leaders. We will continue these preliminary consultations until + Congress recesses for about ten days beginning February 10.

+

—On a case of this sort, we are obliged to give Congress informal + advance (confidential) notification of 20 days before we send up + formal notification, together with certain supporting information, + of our intent to make a given sale. We intend this advance + notification period to begin when Congress reconvenes in late + February.

+

—After the 20-day informal period, Congress has 30 days during which + to consider the case pursuant to our formal notification. We can + expect that hearings will be held and administration witnesses will + testify in support of the sale.

+

—If Congress does not act to prevent the sale, we will be prepared + promptly to begin detailed discussions with the SAG to enable us to prepare and submit + formal letters of offer and acceptance for its consideration.

+

2. We believe that our informing Fahd of the President’s decision to approve the + Saudi request for F–15s and of the specific timetable for moving + this issue before the Congress is responsive both to Fahd’s desire that we move + promptly and also to the President’s commitment to do so. We trust + that Fahd agrees.

+

3. You should say that, whereas the President wished King Khalid and + Fahd to have this + prompt word of his decision on the F–15s, we wish to keep the + decision secret pending the informal advance notification which will + go to the Congress in late February. We are consequently restricting + the knowledge of the President’s decision to a very small number of + people here, and hope that the SAG + will do likewise. You should add at that point that there is + already, however, intense interest in this subject in the Congress + and the press, and we cannot exclude the possibility that there may + be some premature leak. If that should occur, we will deal with it + in the fashion that seems most appropriate at the time.

+

4. In light of the above, we do not rpt not see the need for you to + come back personally to carry a letter from Fahd to the President and + Secretary. You could tell Fahd that the flavor of intensity and urgency which + has marked your recent discussions with him on the F–15 issue has + come across clearly in the reports you have made of these + discussions, and the President has had this in mind in asking that + you now convey his decision to Fahd regarding the F–15s.

+ +

5. Although it does not seem necessary for you to return to + Washington at this time, we will need your help in our discussions + with the Congress when the F–15 case is submitted to it. We will let + you know more precisely when you should plan to be here to assist + us.

+ + Vance + +
+ +
+ 169. Memorandum From Secretary of State Vance to President CarterSource: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, + Staff Material, Middle East, Subject File, Box 63, Middle East: + Arms: 2/1–15/78. Secret; Nodis. Brzezinski sent the memorandum to Carter under a February 10 + memorandum along with a February 1 memorandum from Department of + State Legal Adviser Herbert Hansell regarding the nature of the + congressional review of the arms proposal. (Ibid.) Carter initialed both + Brzezinski’s and + Hansell’s memoranda. Brzezinski returned a copy of Vance’s memorandum to + Vance under a + February 13 memorandum, indicating that Carter had approved his + recommendation. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign + Policy File, P860067–1261) + + + Washington, undated + + + SUBJECT + Aircraft Sales to the Middle + East + +

I recommend that you approve the sale of 75 F–16s to Israel, 15 F–15s to Israel, 60 F–15s to Saudi + Arabia, and 50 F–5Es to Egypt. These + numbers represent what we judge to be minimally acceptable to the + countries concerned. The Department of Defense and the Arms Control + and Disarmament Agency concur in this recommendation on the basis of + foreign policy considerations. The Arms Control and Disarmament + Agency continues to hold some reservations on the basis of arms + control considerations, as discussed below.

+

The following factors bear on my recommendation:

+

1. Management of the + Arms Transfer Ceiling

+

The total value of this package is approximately $4.8 billion. In + order to manage this large dollar volume within the planned + reductions in the arms transfer ceiling, the Letters of Offer will + be phased over several years, leaving room for other major priority + sales. In the development of our plan for managing the ceiling, we + gave first priority to an aircraft package for the Middle East and + examined carefully the possibility of phasing Letters of Offer. The numbers I have + recommended above will be amenable to our management scheme.

+

2. Arms Control + Considerations

+

The Arms Control and Disarmament Agency continues to hold some + reservations about selling more F–15s in the Middle East, + particularly to Saudi Arabia. They believe that this could lead to + similar demands from other Middle Eastern states and complicate our + efforts to encourage multilateral restraint. However, Paul Warnke has stated that he + appreciates the foreign policy reasons for the sale of the F–15s, + and that he is fully prepared to support the sale provided that a + careful review is made of the present and future configurationCarter underlined this word and wrote “Let Paul + [Warnke] assess” in + the right-hand margin next to this sentence. of the + aircraft to be sold.

+

I would also like to mention the fact that Saudi Arabia and Egypt + could purchase advanced aircraft elsewhere. If they were to do so, + we would have little or no control over their numbers, + configuration, munitions, or deployment.

+

3. Effect on + Negotiations

+

Although some maintain that any new major aircraft sales to this + region are inconsistent with our objective of a peace settlement, I + have concluded that it would be even more complicating to the + current negotiations not to go forward with some part of the + aircraft sales requested by the three countries. Our commitment to + Israel’s security must remain unequivocal and Israel must have + confidence in its security in order to make peace. In particular, + this means an increase in the number of frontline Israeli aircraft + and continued modernization of the air force.

+

Egypt, too, must have the necessary self-confidence to negotiate that + will come with the assurance that we will help it attain a + reasonable defensive capability. When Sadat made the decision to cut + his ties with the Soviet Union, he placed the responsibility on us + to maintain a minimal Egyptian defensive aircraft capability.

+

In the case of Saudi Arabia, I believe the desire to modernize the + air force with F–15s is reasonable. I believe the supply of the + F–15s to Saudi Arabia will not significantly affect the military + superiority now held by Israel in the area—especially in light of + the proposal to supply F–16s and + additional F–15s to Israel. I do not need to reiterate to you the + importance of this sale to our bilateral relations with the + Saudis.Carter wrote “I agree” in the margin below this + paragraph.

+ +

4. Congressional + Notification

+

Harold Brown and I both + believe that these sales should be presented and notified to + Congress as a package.Carter underlined the phrase + “as a package” and wrote “good” in the right-hand margin next to + this sentence. That was the basis on which our + recommendations have been constructed, and such a presentation + should make it easier for Members of Congress to support all three + sales. However, we cannot make this a legally binding package with + Congress, which remains free to reject any part. While we will + emphasize the important interrelationship of the three sales, we + will have to defend each element on a country by country basis and + we will want to avoid seeming to make the Israeli sale conditional + on approval of the other two. Congress would react strongly to such + an effort.

+

Recommendation:

+

Accordingly, I recommend that you authorize me to proceed with the + implementation of these sales:

+

75 F–16s for Israel

+

15 F–15s for Israel

+

60 F–15s for Saudi Arabia

+

50 F–5Es for EgyptCarter + approved the recommendation, initialed “JC” in the lower margin, and wrote “Get Frank + [Moore] & Ham + [Jordan] to help with Congress today (2/13).” An attached draft + statement was not found. Although Brzezinski noted in his February 10 covering + memorandum that he had attached the announcement, he added the + following handwritten notation at the end of the memorandum: “I + am revising it; will submit it later today.” There is no + indication as to when Carter received the announcement. A copy is + attached to Brzezinski’s + February 13 memorandum to Vance (see footnote 1 above). Vance released a statement on + February 14 announcing that the President had approved the sale + of the aircraft to Israel, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia. See the + Department of State Bulletin, March 1978, + p. 37.

+
+ +
+ 170. Memorandum From Secretary of State Vance to President CarterSource: National Archives, RG 59, Bureau of Near + Eastern and South Asian Affairs, Office of Arabian Peninsula + Affairs, Historical Files Pertaining to Saudi Arabia 1973–1990, + Lot 91D410, Box 2, Presidential Letters to S.A. (Reassurances). + No classification marking. Printed from a copy that does not + bear Vance’s initials. + Atherton transmitted + the memorandum to Vance + under a March 13 action memorandum recommending “that you send + the attached memorandum to the President which suggests that he + give West a letter to King Khalid containing assurances of + concern for Saudi security but stopping well short of making a + specific commitment.” (Ibid.) + + + Washington, undated + + + SUBJECT + Saudi Desire for Assurances of Our Support and + Protection + +

Prior to returning for consultations Ambassador West met with Crown Prince + Fahd February 14. + Fahd indicated + intensified concern about the Soviet threat posed through the Horn + of Africa and the Yemen to Saudi Arabia. In addition to expressing + worry about increasing Soviet influence in the Horn of Africa, + Fahd indicated there is + evidence that the more radical elements in the People’s Democratic + Republic of Yemen are gaining control and are planning to cooperate + in the overthrow of the moderate Yemen Arab Republic regime.

+

Fahd requested Ambassador + West to ask you + privately what the position of the United States would be if Saudi + Arabia has to defend itself from Soviet aggression through the Horn + and the Yemen. Ambassador West sought to reassure Fahd about U.S. concern for Saudi + welfare, noting particularly your decision to proceed with the F–15 + sale as evidence of our determination to enable Saudi Arabia to + defend itself. Fahd noted + that the Soviet threat could well manifest itself in infiltration + and subversion rather than open military aggression.

+

John West feels that the + Saudis, while reassured by your action on the F–15 sale, are feeling + increasingly threatened and in need of further assurances of U.S. + support. I am attaching a copy of West’s memorandum on his meeting + with Fahd at Tab 1.Attached but not printed is West’s + undated memorandum to Carter and Vance.

+

As you know, since 1950 your predecessors have sent to Saudi leaders + a number of written assurances of our interest in and support for + the security of the welfare of Saudi Arabia. Such general + assurances, which have stopped short of any specific commitment to + defend Saudi Arabia, have been buttressed by exchange of + intelligence and diplomatic consultations, our military supply and + training relationship, and in 1963 the temporary stationing of U.S. + Air Force aircraft in Saudi Arabia at a time when the Saudi leadership felt particularly + threatened by the civil war in the Yemen Arab Republic.For documentation, see Foreign + Relations, 1961–1963, vol. XVIII, Near East, + 1962–1963. A summary of Presidential assurances + to Saudi Arabia is attached at Tab 2.Attached but not printed.

+

I believe it would be helpful if you would give Ambassador West a letter to King Khalid, to + be delivered through Crown Prince Fahd, containing your assurances of concern for + Saudi security and welfare. A proposed text is attached at Tab + 3.Attached but not + printed.

+
+ +
+ 171. Telegram From the United States Liaison Office in Riyadh to + the Department of StateSource: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + D780178–0938. Secret; Exdis. + Sent for information to Abu Dhabi, Addis Ababa, Algiers, Amman, + UNINT Baghdad, Cairo, Damascus, Dhahran, Doha, Jidda, Khartoum, + Kuwait, London, Manama, Moscow, Muscat, Rabat, Sana, Tehran, Tel + Aviv, Tripoli, and Tunis. + + + Riyadh, April 26, 1978, 1050Z + +

295. Subject: Discussions With Crown Prince Fahd—Growing Soviet Influence and + F–15s.

+

1. Summary: In two and one-half hour conversation with Crown Prince + Fahd April 22, + Fahd spent over one + hour in presenting his very pessimistic view of current world + situation including failure of U.S. leadership, expansion of Soviet + influence, and encirclement of Saudi Arabia. On more than one + occasion he asked rhetorically how Saudi Arabia could but greet + Soviets with friendship if world situation continued to deteriorate. + In this discussion and that of F–15 Crown Prince was clearly seeking + reassurances that world situation and sale of F–15s to Saudi Arabia + were not as bad as some are saying. Ambassador in giving Fahd frank appraisal of + congressional review of F–15s did reassure Crown Prince that + administration remained firmly committed to sale and was doing all + it could to gain the congressional support necessary to proceed with + sale. End summary.

+

2. On April 22 Ambassador met with Crown Prince Fahd in Riyadh to review several + matters of interest. During meeting Fahd delivered long, pessimistic and gloomy review of current + world situation. The Soviet Union was thrusting forward with no + regard for interest of rest of world. Thrusting was no longer covert + but overt. In Africa the people are new to modern life having little + and wanting much. Soviet Union provides what they want. What is to + stop them from admiring Russians or envying their neighbors who are + getting things from Soviet Union? If we say that one day they will + realize the danger, I say that day will come too late.

+

3. A year ago U.S. Representative to U.N.Andrew + Young. said U.S. should not be concerned with + Soviet role in Africa because African people can deal with + situation. It was misleading statement. I have talked with many + African leaders and they are perplexed. What did high U.S. official + mean? He obviously knows U.S. policy and was he saying U.S. would no + longer help Africans? They told me that without U.S. help they were + doomed. Then came Angola, Zaire, and Ethiopia and we see what has + happened as victories for Eastern camp. These have had tremendous + psychological effect. Why can Cubans do so much? Some members of + Congress may not support U.S. action because of Vietnam. That was + years ago. It is absurd for Congress to be so short-sighted because + of Vietnam and Watergate. In Vietnam U.S. did not choose to fight + for all out victory. Watergate was one man and one mistake. How long + will they hang around U.S. neck like weights?

+

4. President Carter must want + U.S. to regain reins of leadership in free world. If U.S. does not + exercise its leadership, it will lose it. Then in two or three years + three-fourths of Africa will be Communist and parts of Mid-East and + Asia will follow. Then what will be U.S. position and what will be + position of America’s friends in area? Saudi Arabia is small state + but good friend of U.S. We hold on to desire for freedom but we are + vulnerable to those with covetous eyes looking in our direction and + to Gulf. What if we cannot resist tide of Communism? What would that + do to U.S. interests? Certain U.S. media say not to worry about M.E. + because Moslems will never embrace Communism. Well, are Libya, Iraq, + Syria, and South Yemen following true course of Islam or are they + following lead and interest of Soviet Union?

+

5. Somalia: What does Soviet Union provide its clients?—information + support, arms, financial aid, etc. What about those friendly to + West? We certainly cannot say our friend takes care of us as the + Soviet Union takes care of hers. Look at Somalia. Events dragged + Somalia into fight. After consulting Washington, Saudis applied + intensive pressure and prevailed on Somalia to withdraw from Ogaden. + On that faith we told Somalis there would be plebiscite in Ogaden + andBarre agreed to abide by outcome. What + is result? No economic or other support. Only just last + weekBarre wanted to stop + in Riyadh on his way back from his official visit in Peking. SAG used excuse of being previously + committed to refuse request because SAG was so embarrassed. SAG had nothing new to say toBarre. Any day there might be + leftist or Communist rebellion or coup to do away withBarre. What would happen if new + government joined Ethiopia in bloc?

+

6. Trouble in Iran: Soviet Union is laughing at situation in Iran + waiting for collapse or maybe abetting the trouble. Then with change + of government more friendly to Soviet Union, Communists would + control all armaments of Shah and they will be turned around and + used against Saudi Arabia. Whole plan is to encircle Saudi Arabia. + It will use its new entrenched position in Africa to harm U.S. + interests. Middle East must choose either to accept Soviet Union or + be crushed.

+

7. Sadat: Sadat did what no one thought Arab leader could do when he + visited Israel. Yet while his visit received momentary applause + which incidentally did not last, it also antagonized many Arabs. If + and when people conclude that Sadat’s efforts have failed, he will + be ousted by person with opposite political persuasions. To avoid + ouster, Sadat must find new policy, i.e. to turn back to Soviets and + stretch forth his hand. Sadat, who had courage to go to Israel, + certainly has courage to reverse his policy toward Soviet Union. If + that happens, Soviet Union will accept his hand because they want + desperately to get back into Egypt. Later they know they can rid + themselves of Sadat. Then what would be position of Saudi Arabia in + Gulf, Lebanon, Jordan or North Africa? Tunisia and Morocco are + surrounded by people who do not believe in U.S. view of world. Saudi + Arabia, too, is surrounded by Syria, Iraq, South Yemen and Ethiopia. + When completely surrounded, Saudi Arabia will have no alternative + but to greet Soviets with rose petals.

+

8. Sale of F–15 aircraft: Faced by all these threats, Saudi Arabia + asked for only 60 planes and look at furor. Should plane sale fail + and Egypt turn back to Soviet Union, what do Saudi leaders say to + the people? Egypt, Iraq, Syria, and others will pour abuse on SAG using all types of media. People + will ask how long can Saudi Arabia continue its close friendship + with U.S. and get nothing in return? Will U.S. apologize later for + having done nothing and thus losing a friendly government? Who will + be in Riyadh to hear the apology? Saudi Arabia can provide solid + basis for American interests in Middle East. SAG has already stood behind U.S. on + many issues. Now, Saudis are perplexed at how long U.S. and + President can let themselves be whipped around by Israelis who + oppose sale to Saudi Arabia. Saudi Arabia has not said Israel has to + move into the sea or reach some other such end. On contrary, it has + said let Israel stay as one of states in area.

+ +

9. Congressional action: I (Fahd) am afraid Congress will reject sale because + Israel knows she can live without more planes. Egypt could too but + not us. Reaction of people will be “to hell with U.S.”. It is so + strange, even calamitous, U.S. factories will lose billions of + dollars that could add to U.S. prosperity. U.S. turning down + billions of dollars that we want to spend in U.S. Our only + alternative is to turn toward England, France and Soviet Union to + buy what we need.

+

10. From bottom of my (Fahd’s) heart, I wish we had never asked for F–15s. What + is happening now is degrading. If I had known before that events + would have unfolded as they are, we would have looked for another + way. The present treatment is shameful to us and to our friends in + U.S. Now we cannot turn back. We are now in most embarrassing and + critical situation. I believe Congress will not approve sale and + then what will we do? I am speaking at length because of our + friendship. We want our friends to know what a predicament we are in + if Congress rejects sale. All our people will be watching.

+

11. Ambassador assured Crown Prince that President does believe U.S. + must reassert its leadership in world. President and others + recognize Soviet threat, particularly threat of encirclement of + Saudi Arabia. U.S. determined to see that nothing will happen to + interfere with independence of Saudi Arabia. Ambassador pointed out + President’s staunch support for close relationship with Saudi Arabia + as recognition that a relationship of words without actions is + meaningless.

+

12. Ambassador said he regretted Crown Prince felt F–15 sale had + become embarrassment to Saudi Arabia and perhaps U.S. He assured + Fahd it was not + embarrassment to President. His support is unwavering. There are + powerful forces in both Saudi Arabia and U.S. that would like to see + special relationship destroyed and it becomes duty of leaders such + as President and Crown Prince to understand motives of these forces + and to work to maintain relationship so vitally important to future + of world. Cost can be high. Because of President’s stand on sale of + F–15s, opponents are saying he will never be re-elected in 1980 yet + President has given not one inch. On contrary, their tactics have + strengthened his resolve. Ambassador said that while no one could + guarantee outcome, he was cautiously optimistic that sale would not + be rejected by Congress.On April 28, + Vance announced that + the administration was that day transmitting to Congress formal + notification of proposals to sell the aircraft to Israel, Egypt, + and Saudi Arabia. On May 3, he testified before the Senate + Foreign Relations Committee laying out the administration’s + reasons for the sales. See the Department of State Bulletin, June 1978, pp. + 38–39.

+

13. Comment: Crown Prince was visibly tired. He seemed almost in a + depressed state. Several factors may explain Fahd’s gloomy assessment of world situation not least + of which is fact that he is overworked and exhausted. He has had no + break in almost a year. Secondly, Fahd has been dealing with at least four seemingly + intractable problems—growth of Soviet influence in area, oil pricing + and production problems, seeming stalemate in Mid-East peace + efforts, and financial issues surrounding Saudi reserves and world + currency fluctuations. All these issues ultimately reach his coffee + cup and there are vocal and opinionated proponents of each + advocating host of alternative courses of action. None of the + subjects are easy to grasp much less resolve.

+

14. Regarding Fahd’s + pessimism on F–15 sale, we learned subsequent to conversation that + Prince Turki al-Feisal, who + has been very active in Washington in Saudi campaign to gain + congressional acceptance of package, has tried to prepare Fahd for possibility plane sale + will fail. While this is sound philosophy, he may have oversold his + case.

+

15. On question of Saudi relations with Soviet Union, we are + continually told by all senior Saudi officials that only alternative + to special relationship with United States is to move to establish + some type of more normal relationship with Soviets. Our assessment + is that most members of royal family remain opposed to any moves + toward Soviet Union but they increasingly talk about option almost + as if they were preparing themselves for eventual dose of bad + medicine.

+ + Gnehm + +
+ +
+ 172. Memorandum of ConversationSource: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, + Staff Material, Middle East, Subject File, Box 81, Saudi Arabia: + 3–5/78. Secret; Nodis. + Drafted by Twinam; + approved by Wisner on + June 5. The meeting took place in the James Madison Room at the + Department of State. + + + Washington, May 18, 1978, 1 + p.m. + + + SUBJECT + Secretary’s Meeting with Saudi Foreign Minister Prince Saud: + Luncheon Session + + + PARTICIPANTS + + Saudi Arabia + His Royal Highness Prince Saudc al-Faisal bin Abd al-Aziz, + Minister of Foreign Affairs of Saudi Arabia + Ali Abdallah + Alireza, Ambassador of Saudi + Arabia + + Sheikh Abdallah + Alireza, Deputy Minister for Economic and + Cultural Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Saudi + Arabia + Dr. Nizar O. Madani, First Secretary, Embassy of Saudi + Arabia + + + + + United States + The Secretary + Andrew J. + Young, Permanent Representative of the + United States to the United Nations + Alfred L. Atherton, + Jr., Ambassador at Large + Richard N. + Cooper, Under Secretary for Economic + Affairs + Lucy Wilson + Benson, Under Secretary of State for + Security Assistance, Science and Technology + Richard M. Moose, Jr., Assistant Secretary of State + for African Affairs + Harold + Saunders, Assistant Secretary of State for + Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs + John C. West, American Ambassador to Saudi + Arabia + William B. + Quandt, National Security Council + William R. + Crawford, Deputy Assistant Secretary of + State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs + Joseph W. + Twinam, Director, Office of Arabian + Peninsula Affairs, Bureau of Near Eastern and South + Asian Affairs (Notetaker) + + +

Summary. The Secretary, in the context of + Saud’s expression of appreciation for the Administration’s efforts + in behalf of the Middle East aircraft sales, put the Congressional + issue in context, noting that the Senate vote was not one against + Israel but essentially recognition of the importance of the moderate + states in determining what kind of place the Middle East will + be.On May 15, the Senate approved + the aircraft sales package for Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Israel. + The President had sent a letter on May 12 to members of Congress + urging approval of the sale, and on May 15 he released a + statement expressing his gratification at the Senate’s action. + See Public Papers: Carter, 1978, Book I, + pp. 896–897 and 916. Prince Saud noted the seriousness with which the Congress + had looked into the basic issues involved. The Secretary urged the + importance of Saudi Arabia’s trying to get Arafat to bring the Palestinians to + cooperate with the UN forces in + Lebanon. Prince Saud + stressed that an announcement of Israeli withdrawal would be helpful + in encouraging such cooperation and the Secretary assured Saud we had Begin’s commitment to move on this + in the next few days. A number of economic issues were discussed, + with Saud expressing concern + that imposition of a fee on crude oil imports as an alternative to a + domestic crude oil tax would be misunderstood abroad and encourage + further OPEC price increase. The + U.S. side suggested that Saudi Arabia add more economic staff to its + participation in the UN Overview + Committee. Prince Saud said + the Saudis would look into this. The Secretary agreed with Saud’s + recommendation that there be more bilateral consultations on + important economic issues prior to key international + conferences.

+ +

(In the course of social pleasantries prior to the luncheon, Prince + Saud expressed to the + Secretary the Saudi Government’s appreciation for the + Administration’s efforts in behalf of the sale of F–15s to Saudi + Arabia.)

+

South Lebanon and UNIFIL

+

The Secretary noted the real problems of morale in the UN peacekeeping forces in South Lebanon + as a result of Palestinian attacks on the forces. As a result there + is real concern that the forces, now up to 5,000 and scheduled soon + to reach 6,000 men, might be withdrawn. The French have expressed + concern. If the UN presence starts + to become unstrung it would be a disaster for all concerned. The + Secretary said we hope Saudi Arabia would use its influence on + Arafat to bring the + Palestinians under control.

+

Ambassador Young noted the + chaotic situation; there are several factions which the Palestinians + have to control. He noted this is the first sustained violation of + the neutrality of UN forces and + establishes, for example, an unfortunate precedent for Africa where + in time there may be as many as 10,000 UN peacekeeping personnel.

+

The Secretary continued that Prime Minister Begin had promised to meet with the + Israeli Cabinet in the next few days to set a date for the + withdrawal of Israeli forces from South Lebanon, but this would of + course be difficult if the continuation of the UN presence appears uncertain. In + response to Prince Saud’s question, the Secretary said we do not + feel Arafat is doing all he + could to bring the Palestinians under control.

+

Prince Saud said that + Israel’s setting a date for permanent withdrawal would help. He + added that the Syrians should be helpful.

+

The Secretary said we have talked to the Syrians.

+

Mr. Saunders noted the + importance of a parallel approach in which we push for a date for + Israeli withdrawal and at the same time work to assure the safety of + UNIFIL.

+

Prince Saud said that from + Saudi talks with the Palestinians they appear to be serious about + cooperating with UNIFIL but that SAG would be raising this question again. He continued + that any apparent conflict between the Cairo AccordsReference is to the November 2, 1969, agreement + between the PLO’s Yassir Arafat and the Lebanese + Government that called for a cease-fire and established an + understanding between the Lebanese Government and Palestinian + guerrillas concerning the allowed level of the guerrillas’ + activity. (James Feron, “Israel: Guerrilla Pact Will Mean New + Peril,” The New York Times, November 9, + 1969, p. E4) and the UN + force mandate in South Lebanon is manageable and that the real + problem is uncertainty about Israel’s intentions to withdraw. Should + Israel announce its withdrawal this would be an important breakthrough and the + announcement should come soon to avoid a deteriorating + situation.

+

The Secretary said we would keep in touch with the Israelis. We + understand the Cabinet would be meeting by May 22. Begin had made a commitment to him + on this question.

+

Ambassador Young noted that + the UN had been generally supportive + of the Palestinian cause. Troops from several nations have suffered + casualties from Palestinian attacks in South Lebanon. It is + important to realize that the UN + peacekeeping force is not so much a fighting force as a moral + authority and it is this moral authority that is being challenged in + South Lebanon.

+

Prince Saud said that Saudi + Government is in complete agreement that the authority of the + peacekeeping force must be upheld.

+

F–15 Sale

+

In response to the Prince’s question, the Secretary said that the + Vice President will address the UN + on the 24thMondale delivered the address to the United + Nations Special Session on Disarmament on May 24. For the text + of his speech, see the Department of State Bulletin, June 1978, pp. 31–35. because the + President is facing an extremely tight schedule, needing to focus on + such difficult domestic issues as the labor bill after having + devoted so much time personally to such issues as the Panama Canal + TreatyThe Senate ratified the 1977 + Panama Canal treaties, which led to the return of the Canal Zone + to Panama, on March 16 and April 18. and the Middle East + aircraft sales.

+

Ambassador Young noted that + because party discipline is not strong in the Congress, the + President had had to deal with numerous individual members of + Congress on the aircraft sales.

+

The Secretary referred to the President’s, Vice President’s and his + own frequent discussions with members of Congress on this question. + He agreed with Prince Saud + that issues of great importance were involved in the Middle East + aircraft issue, but cautioned that the Senate vote in support of the + Saudi sale was not an anti-Israel vote. He said the vote was + essentially recognition of the importance of the moderate states in + determining what kind of place the Middle East will be. In response + to Prince Saud’s comment on how carefully members of Congress had + gone into the issues, the Secretary noted Congressman Studds’ letter + to his constituents explaining the issues in careful detail. + Ambassador Atherton added + that the general public appears to have gone through much the same + sort of thought process as the Congress in evaluating the merits of + the aircraft sales. The Secretary added that editorial support in + the press had been very helpful. He congratulated Ambassador Alireza and his associates on the + good job they had done in convincing people of the importance of the + sale. The Secretary added that even some Congressmen who voted + against the Administration’s proposal did not seem unhappy with the + outcome.

+

Economic Issues

+

At the Secretary’s request, Mr. Cooperbriefly reviewed the international economic + situation, which he described as “middling.” He said the U.S. + economy is progressing very well with employment in good shape and + the growth rate being well managed. He noted that Japanese Prime + Minister Fukuda has indicated + that Japan will be pushing for seven percent growth rate. Europe is + the weak spot with slow growth and unemployment problems leading to + increased government intervention into the economies sector by + sector. The threat of increased protectionism is growing. This will + be the major focus of the July Economic Summit.Reference is to the G–7 Economic Summit, + scheduled to take place in Bonn in July. In addition some + commodity prices, such as Zambian copper, are depressed and it is + difficult to foresee a revival until the overall world economy picks + up.

+

Turning to the U.S. energy picture, Mr. Coopernoted that the President’s energy program has + been before the Congress a year, that three of the five key sections + of the package have been agreed to, and that the fourth, natural gas + price controls, appeared to be within 48 hours of agreement. The + final section is the very controversial proposal of a domestic crude + oil tax designed to raise domestic oil prices to the world price + level in order to encourage conservation. This may be worked out in + the Congress in four to six weeks but we must think about + alternatives if it does not pass.Congress finally passed all five bills that constituted the + National Energy Act on October 15. One alternative would + be to impose an import fee on crude oil at a level which would raise + the average weighted price for all crude consumed within the United + States to that price which would have prevailed had the domestic + crude oil tax been passed. Mr. Cooper>noted that Saudi Oil Minister Yamani had publicly expressed + reservations about U.S. imposition of an import fee and he stressed + that this is only a second-best alternative to the crude oil tax and + that it is being considered at the technical level with no + Presidential decision having been taken.

+

Prince Saud said that + Yamani obviously had + been referring to the OPEC + precedent that whenever industrial countries raised tariffs on oil, + OPEC always increased oil + prices. He cautioned that imposition of a U.S. tariff on oil to + solve a domestic problem would be misinterpreted and misused abroad, + that rather than solving domestic problems it would create other problems + internationally. After Mr. Cooperhad stressed that a U.S. import fee would not + affect world price, in response to Ambassador Atherton’s question whether the + imposition of a tariff by only one country would cause OPEC to raise the world price, Prince + Saud said it would if + that country were the United States.

+

The Secretary noted the importance to the international economy of + our cutting down on oil consumption and the consequent need for the + United States to raise the price of oil consumed in this country one + way or another. Mr. Coopernoted that we are also looking at other + alternatives and will want to consult closely with Saudi Arabia, + recognizing that the OPEC reaction + is very important.

+

Ambassador Young stressed + that it is not certain how the President will finally act but that + in an open society there is a need to discuss all options + publicly.

+

Mr. Cooperadded that there is + of course a link between our problem of increased oil imports and + turbulence in international financial markets.

+

Prince Saud noted that the + Europeans are very anxious about what the United States is doing + about its economic situation. Minister Alireza noted European concern about the dollar. + Prince Saud asked if the + Economic Summit can’t do something to deal with these problems.

+

The Secretary noted the importance of the Economic Summit stressing + that each of the industrialized countries must contribute in its own + way to the improvement of the overall international economy. In so + far as the United States contribution is concerned, the key issues + are whether we can conserve energy and control inflation. We need to + do both as our share in contribution to overall world economic + progress.

+

In response to Prince Saud’s question, the Secretary said we have had + useful discussions with the Japanese who are going to take some + action to accelerate their economic growth. They are considering a + supplemental budget to expand both growth and imports. We believe + the Japanese are making a genuine effort, but it remains to be seen + whether this will be enough.

+

Prince Saud referred to the + problems of the underdeveloped countries, such as Zambia, and said + that nothing really seems to be moving in the UN forum since all of the LDS’s + countries are waiting to see the results of the Economic Summit.

+

Ambassador Young noted the + importance of greater Saudi input in UN economic fora, such as the Overview Committee. He + sketched the way that regional blocs tend to control UN fora with political rhetoric, + constantly chipping away at the real economic interests of the + moderate states.

+

Prince Saud indicated that in + general the Saudis feel that the Soviet Union blocks useful activity + at the UN. It was for this reason + that the Saudis pushed for + the Paris Conference (CIEC). He + added, however, that there may be some utility in the Overview + Committee. Minister Alireza + reiterated that the Saudis doubt that the UN is serious about economic issues and that since the + end of CIEC, the Saudi Government + has looked to UNCTAD in Geneva + for serious treatment of economic issues. He noted how when UNCTAD bogs down the action seems + to shift to the UN where the issues + are subjected to political pressures. He pointed out that even in + Geneva Saudi Arabia must deal with bloc politics in the Group of 77 + and that it is hard to get a consensus. Mr. Coopernoted that the substance on + some economic questions does seem to be shifting to the UN and there is a general problem of + developing countries tending to rely on politically-oriented + ambassadors to deal with these complex issues. He noted the value of + the Overview Committee in both covering gaps in the management of + the overall international economic system and monitoring + developments. He said the Overview Committee is an effort to + institutionalize things like CIEC. + He said it would be useful to have frequent, ongoing dialogues with + the Saudis on these issues.

+

Prince Saud said that the + Saudi Government would look into beefing up the economic side of its + UN Mission and would be happy to + cooperate on all of these questions. He stressed that it would be + particularly helpful to understand before economic meetings what the + U.S. position will be and what specifically the U.S. wants from + Saudi Arabia in the way of cooperation.

+

The Secretary agreed with this last point.

+

Ambassador Young noted the + difficulty of combating Soviet efforts to stalemate UN activities, citing the problem of + keeping the African states lined up beyond [behind?] constructive proposals in the face of Soviet + influence on liberation groups, and he reiterated the need for more + Saudi input into UN economic + matters.

+

Prince Saud said Saudi Arabia + would like to see the UN become of + more practical use.

+
+ +
+ 173. Memorandum From the President’s Deputy Assistant for National + Security Affairs (Aaron) to + President CarterSource: Carter Library, National + Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 67, Saudi + Arabia: 1–5/78. Secret. Sent for information. Carter wrote in the margin in + the upper right-hand corner of the first page of the memorandum: + “I’m not sure how much I want to push the Saudis to increase oil + production. J.” + + + Washington, May + 22, 1978 + + + SUBJECT + Letter from Ambassador West + +

John West has written you a + lengthy letter of congratulations following the vote on the aircraft + package (Tab A).See footnote 2, Document 172. West’s + undated letter is attached but not printed. The letter + makes the following points:

+

1. We should now move to persuade the Saudis to increase their oil + production capacity over the next decade.

+

2. Based on his contacts with high Saudi officials during the + handling of the issue with the Congress and the public, he is + convinced that the Saudis are deeply grateful and consider + themselves in your debt for your steadfastness.

+

3. The Saudi monarchy had committed its full prestige to the sale, + and the favorable vote vindicated their pro-Western policy + approach.

+

4. A favorable decision on increased production is made difficult by + domestic Saudi support for conservation and by cautious Saudi + decisions on oil field maintenance.

+

5. We should avoid any appearance of an “aircraft-for-oil” deal.

+

6. Nevertheless, we should begin a dialogue over the next few weeks. + He specifically suggests raising the issue in the context of + briefings on energy aspects of the Economic Summit, focusing our + attention primarily on Yamani and staff level officials, leading to an + eventual approach to Fahd.

+

7. He will discuss this with Jim Schlesinger before departure and has talked it over + with Cy Vance. He believes + it generally meets with State’s approval.

+

8. He hopes to be able to say hello to you before he returns to Saudi + Arabia on Friday, May 26.

+

We will staff these suggestions with State and Energy and have + recommendations for you later.

+
+ +
+ 174. Memorandum Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency + + + RPM 78–10366 + + + Washington, September 20, 1978 + +

[Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of Support Services + (DI), Job 80T00634A, Production + Case Files (1978), Box 13, Folder 63, [folder + title not declassified]. Secret; [handling restriction not declassified]. 4 pages not + declassified.]

+
+ +
+ 175. Memorandum From Gary + Sick of the National Security Council Staff to the + President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)Source: Carter Library, National + Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 67, Saudi + Arabia: 6–12/78. Secret. Sent for information. Inderfurth initialed the + memorandum. A stamped notation on the memorandum reads: “ZB has seen.” + + + Washington, December 22, 1978 + + + SUBJECT + Cracks in Saudi Facade (U) + +

Crown Prince Fahd’s + indecisive performance at BaghdadReference is to the Arab League meeting in Baghdad November + 2–5. The participating nations released a statement critical of + the Camp David Accords, which had been signed on September 17; + expelled Egypt from the Arab League; and relocated the + organization’s headquarters from Cairo to Tunis. (Telegram 7992 + from Jidda, November 7; National Archives, RG 59, Central + Foreign Policy File, D780460–0171) and Saudi passivity in + the OPEC meetingOn December 17 at the OPEC meeting held in Abu Dhabi, the organization + agreed on a 10 percent weighted average increase in the price of + oil. (Telegram 3319 from Abu Dhabi, December 19; National + Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780524–0491) + President Carter and + King Khalid exchanged letters about a price increase prior to + the meeting. See Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, vol. + XXXVII, Energy Crisis, 1974–1980, Document 176. + are most disturbing outward signs of a deeper malaise currently + afflicting the Saudi Royal Family. (C)

+

King Khalid, although recuperating from his open-heart surgery and + reportedly off for a hunting trip in the desert, clearly recognizes + that his remaining time as King is limited. He has offered to + abdicate but is being persuaded to remain in office until the line + of succession can be established. (S)

+

Unfortunately, Crown Prince Fahd is himself not + well. He is a diabetic and we have had considerable evidence + recently that his condition is worsening. He has gained weight and appears puffy and + unhealthy. Reportedly he has become very difficult to wake up in the + morning and recently has been three and four hours late for + meetings. His concentration is said to be poor and he is meeting + with very few people, in contrast with his rather vigorous schedule + of a year ago. (S)

+

The conventional wisdom is that Prince Abdullah will almost automatically become Crown + Prince when Fahd is + elevated. But Fahd must + himself make the choice when he becomes King, and it is not beyond + the realm of possibility that he would in fact choose his brother + Sultan rather than the dour Abdullah who is leading the opposition to the + Fahd clan. If the Crown + Prince position is given to Abdullah, as now seems likely, there is still the + question of the heir apparent. Sultan is the obvious choice, but he + is being challenged by two surprising contenders, Princes Mishal and + Abd al-Muhsin. Both claim to be older than Sultan, and both have + held government positions in the past. Both, however, are rather + disreputable characters and it remains to be seen whether they can + in fact generate any substantial support within the Royal Family. + Abdullah may simply be + using these two claimants to keep Sultan off balance and thereby + less actively involved in the Crown Prince sweepstakes. (S)

+

In any event, at a time when the Arab-Israel question is in the + balance, when the Arab world is increasingly polarized, when Soviet + influence is on the rise in Ethiopia, Yemen, and Afghanistan, when + Iraq is developing a more complex policy of seeking leadership in + the Arab world, and when the military pillar of Gulf stability in + Iran is crumbling, we are faced with a leadership in Saudi Arabia + which is ill, indecisive, and distracted by the succession struggle. + Furthermore, Saudi Arabia is actually facing the prospect of a + deficit budget for next year, corruption is endemic, and social and + cultural tensions with the imported proletariat which does the dirty + work (or highly skilled work) in the country have resulted in some + unaccustomed riots in the past year. (S)

+

Saudi Arabia is not Iran. Its financial cushion is far more + substantial, its development is better under control, its population + is far smaller. They have faced competition for succession in the + past, and this is actually less bitter than on several previous + occasions, e.g. when they deposed King Saud. But we are also + operating on the basis of some of the same principles which got us + into trouble in Iran. Our intelligence is all of the “official” + variety. We rely primarily on Saudi officials and westerners with a + stake in IranAn unknown hand, possibly + Inderfurth’s, + crossed out the word “Iran” and wrote “the establishment” above + it. for our understanding of what is going on. Our embassy focuses on the + politics of the Royal Family and the Government, and we limit our + military advisors from collecting intelligence. (S)

+

I have talked to several experts in the past few days, one of which + has just returned from a major fact-finding trip to Saudi Arabia. + They assure me that it is business as usual and all’s right with the + world. I am willing to concede that nothing fundamental has changed + within Saudi Arabia, but my concern is that the environment in which + the Saudis live is changing too rapidly for them and they may not + have the latitude for muddling through which has been their + salvation in the past. (S)

+

Sam Hoskinson concurs.Hoskinson + initialed this sentence.

+
+ +
+ 176. Report Prepared by the Ambassador to Saudi Arabia (West)Source: Carter Library, + National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 67, Saudi + Arabia: 6–12/78. Secret. West sent the report to Carter under a two-page + handwritten letter dated December 31. In the letter, West + praised Carter for his + 1978 accomplishments and noted that the attached analysis “is + not supposed to be an all-out comprehensive analysis, but a more + or less personal appraisal of what I consider to be key points + in our relationship.” (Ibid.) + + + Jidda, December + 31, 1978 + +

SAUDI ARABIA—YEAR’S END 1978

+

SUMMARY

+

U.S.-Saudi relations reached an all-time high during 1978, until the + strains of the November Baghdad SummitSee footnote 2, Document + 175. and the December OPEC action on oil pricesSee footnote 3, Document + 175. created tensions causing some + deterioration—the full extent of which is just now being assessed. + Three main factors during the year contributed to the development of + an even closer and more cordial relationship than had heretofore + existed. They were:

+ +

(1) The F–15 sale;See footnote 2, Document 172.

+

(2) The continued personal involvement of the President and his + Administration in the problems of the Middle East, including not + only the Arab-Israel dispute but the security concerns of the region + as well;

+

(3) The Saudi perception of increased Soviet movement in the area + with the resulting reminder to the Saudis that protection by the + U.S. is their only real security and future salvation.

+

Two negative factors were:

+

(1) The strain in the Arab world produced by the Camp David accords + and culminating in the resolutions adopted at Baghdad; and

+

(2) The higher than expected oil price increase at Abu Dhabi.

+

These two negative events underscored the two basic goals of Saudi + foreign policy and their increasingly incompatibility as events + unfolded during the year.

+

The two basic aims of Saudi foreign policy are:

+

(1) To maintain a sufficiently friendly relationship with all other + Arab states, including the radical-rejectionist group, so as to + constitute some semblance of Arab consensus thereby preventing not + only disunity among the states but also preventing the fomenting of + internal unrest in Saudi Arabia by the radical states and groups; + and

+

(2) To maintain a sufficiently friendly relationship with the United + States to insure the protection by the U.S. from foreign + aggression.

+

Maintaining these two goals became increasingly difficult in the last + two months of 1978.

+

COMMENT: One inescapable conclusion must be reached based on past + Saudi performance and especially the experience of the last sixty + days: Saudi Arabia will do everything possible to avoid making any + major decision which might alienate either the U.S. or its Arab + brothers. Given this fact and the present leadership picture here, + we conclude that the Saudis will continue to try to please both + sides. A clear decision favoring one or the other’s interest will be + made only on a crisis basis, and then largely influenced by emotion + on the facts of a given situation, all of which is often based to a + surprising degree on a feeling of personal obligation or commitment + by King Khaled or Prince Fahd.

+

Saudi support for the Camp David accords has been disappointing. The + Saudis have tried, without marked success, to chart a course that + would provide enough support to mollify if not satisfy the U.S. and + at the same time maintain their Arab ties. They will, in my opinion, + continue this tactic + indefinitely even if it is showing evidence of pleasing no one.

+

The Saudis are already defensive, claiming more success than the U.S. + has credited them in moderating the Baghdad meeting and holding oil + prices down. This attitude, and our reaction to it, will be an + important factor in our relations in the immediate future.

+

On the economic side, Saudi support for the dollar has been one of + the most satisfying aspects of our relationship for the past year. + However, the failure of the Saudis to hold the oil price increase to + below 10% has caused shock and disappointment in the Western world, + especially the United States.

+

The Saudis are frightened to the point of panic about the Soviet + threat. The thrust of their foreign policy is based on a deep fear + of the Soviets and their allies. The Arab-Israeli problem is + important but is secondary. The Saudis are concerned about the + perceived threat not only to their oil fields, but to their very + survival. Their fear has been heightened by two recent events:

+

(1) the unrest in Iran, which they consider a part of the overall + Soviet offensive which has the oil of Saudi Arabia and the Gulf as + its ultimate target;

+

(2) A report which they have commissioned on the high cost of future + Soviet oil production. The conclusion of that report is that the + almost prohibitive cost of expanding current Soviet oil production + will make cheap Saudi oil such an inviting target that the Soviets + may well move at an early date to achieve their takeover or control + of Saudi oil.

+

The internal situation remains stable. The precarious condition of + King Khaled’s health and his age mean that there could be a change + in the ruler at any moment, but we think that, in all likelihood, + the transition will be smooth and that Crown Prince Fahd will succeed to the throne + and Prince Abdullah will + become Crown Prince. However, there will probably be some + maneuvering in the Royal Family until the question of who is next in + line for Crown Prince after Abdullah is settled.

+

Further bilateral problems are being caused by periodic resurgence of + conservative Muslim sentiment. This upsurge bears only a superficial + resemblance to the movement in Iran. Its manifestations include + crackdowns on women and foreigners working (without visas) and + expressions of concern by some traditionalists over foreign + influence and customs. However, it does not pose any threat to the + King or his Government, especially since the King is regarded as + head of the community of the Muslim faithful in the Kingdom.

+

Another marked difference between the situation in Saudi Arabia and + Iran is the complete absence of any student unrest here. For 1979, I + would suggest at least three main objects of U.S. policy to + include:

+ +

(1) Securing further Saudi—and through them—Arab support for Camp + David;

+

(2) Insuring continued support for the dollar to include:

+ +

(a) Rejection of any attempts to change from the dollar as + currency for payment of oil;

+

(b) Retention of Saudi monetary reserves in dollar assets;

+

(c) Insuring, at a minimum, that there are no further oil price + increases regardless of fluctuations of dollar; if possible, + forestalling implementation of some of planned phased + increases;

+

(d) Making a strong request to the Saudis to make the + decision—and spend the money—to increase their productive + capacity so as to meet the minimum projected needs of the + Western world in the 1980’s.

+ +

END SUMMARY.

+

INTRODUCTION

+

This is the third informal summary which I have prepared since + arriving here in June 1977.West sent his first informal + summary to Carter in + August 1977. See Document 154. + The discipline of preparing it has been helpful to me and hopefully + the product is worthwhile. It is a personal rather than an Embassy + document, but I acknowledge with appreciation the assistance of key + members of the staff who have read and added their comments and + suggestions.

+

Many significant events occurred in 1978 which affected U.S.-Saudi + relationships. We will review and attempt to assess the major + ones.

+

THE F–15 SALE

+

The most important—and most helpful—event in U.S.-Saudi relationships + this year was the F–15 sale. In fact, this transaction may well be + the most significant single happening in the history of our + bilateral relationship. The planes themselves were recognized early + on as probably the least important part of the equation, but their + symbolic value was beyond calculation. At issue were (1) the + credibility of a U.S. pledge given by three Administrations; (2) the + justification of Saudi Arabia pro-U.S. policies in the eyes of the + remainder of the Arab world; (3) the willingness and ability of the + President and the Congress to withstand the pressure of the + heretofore unbeatable Israeli lobby in the U.S.

+

The firm, uncompromising action by the President and Secretary and + the subsequent approval by the Senate reassured the Saudis that a + promise by the U.S. was reliable and could be depended upon. Saudi + Arabia could and did use this happening to prove to her Arab + brothers that the U.S. is a worthwhile friend and ally. A failure to + approve the sale would have + caused an irretrievable loss of face for the Saudis in the Arab + world.

+

Saudi Arabia had long held the simplistic view that the U.S. + Government and its supporting political system were completely + controlled by the Israeli lobby in the U.S. President Carter’s early statements on the + Mideast problems were received with pleasant surprise and polite + skepticism. No Arab country, including Saudi Arabia, believed that + any U.S. President would take any position in the Mideast contrary + to that of Israel. If such an anomaly actually happened, the U.S. + Congress would immediately nullify or at least neutralize such + action. The F–15 debate, acrimonious and bitter at times, was + beneficial. It proved to the Saudis—and the Arab world—that the U.S. + could and would take and implement a major foreign policy position + contrary to the expressed organized opposition of Israel and its + U.S. lobby.

+

An additional benefit of the F–15 case was the Congressional visits + which were undoubtedly a major factor in the Senate vote. The Saudis + are traditionally hospitable and when they saw that most U.S. + Congressmen and Senators came to Saudi Arabia willing to listen, + they responded by making effective presentations of the Saudi view + and position. This contributed significantly to a better + understanding between our two governments.

+

I think it a fair assessment to say that had it not been for the + favorable action on the F–15 sale, there would have been no Camp + David. The President and this Administration established beyond + question credentials for leadership, fairness and integrity which + will continue to be of lasting value in the tangled problems and + politics of the Mideast. I believe Sadat felt he could trust the + President and the Saudis felt they could support both Sadat and the + U.S. in this endeavor.

+

A word of caution is in order, however. The Saudis recognize the + effort made and the result obtained. They appreciate the political + risk entailed for all who favored the sale. However, to assume that + as a result of that single transaction we can have the Saudis’ + support on any given issue at any future given time by simply saying + “F–15” would be a serious mistake. While a definite obligation is + felt by the Saudis the credit slip is not unlimited or everlasting. + The Saudis in fact are beginning to resent an F–15 obligation or + having it used publicly as a criticism for them not taking the + complete U.S. position, whether it be on the Camp David accords or + oil prices. The proper and effective utilization of the political + capital still remaining from the F–15 requires not only a setting of + priorities but careful advance planning and preparation. A carefully + conceived personal request on a given subject from the President to + King Khaled would be the most effective vehicle. In that situation, + no mention of the F–15 obligation need be made.

+ +

PRESIDENTIAL INVOLVEMENT IN THE + PROBLEMS OF THE MIDEAST

+ +

The continued involvement by the President and key members of the + Administration, especially Secretary Vance, after the F–15 matter was concluded has been + a healthy plus for U.S.-Saudi relations in 1978. As we will discuss + later, the Arab-Israeli dispute is of secondary importance to the + Saudis, their paramount concern being their security from Soviet + aggression. However, the Saudis realize that the Arab-Israeli + dispute is a continuing threat to their good relations with the U.S. + They appreciate therefore the time and effort which the U.S. has + made to bring peace to the Mideast.

+

The President’s personal popularity here at year’s end was at an + all-time high. The personal rapport which King Khaled and Crown + Prince Fahd perceive as + existing between them and the President is a potent weapon which, if + properly used at the right time under the right circumstances, could + conceivably cause the Saudis to make a decision or take a course of + action unpopular with the other Arab states.

+

I have thought for sometime that the commitments made to me by + Fahd at our meeting of + October 24See Foreign + Relations, 1977–1980, vol. IX, Arab-Israeli + Dispute, August 1978–December 1980, Document + 106. with respect to the Camp David accords were a + result at least in part of his concern that the President would at + his luncheon meeting with the King on October 27During a private visit to the United States for + medical treatment in October 1978, Khalid met with Carter at the White House on + October 27, where they discussed the Middle East peace process. + For the substance of the meeting, see Foreign + Relations, 1977–1980, vol. IX, Arab-Israeli + Dispute, August 1978–December 1980, Document + 108. get from His Majesty a sweeping, similar + commitment of support which, of course, would be binding on + Fahd. He wanted to + share in the credit for the commitment, and I think he is now + embarrassed that he was not completely able to make good on it at + the Baghdad Summit.

+

THE SOVIET THREAT AS PERCEIVED BY THE + SAUDIS

+

Events of 1978 further confirmed the Saudis’ fear of the Russians and + their satellites. At each meeting with the Saudi leadership, whether + it be Khaled, Fahd, Abdullah, Sultan, or Saud, the Russian threat is + always mentioned, regardless of the purpose of the meeting or the + prepared agenda. Every action or lack of action of the U.S. is + weighed by the Saudis on the scales of our recognition of the Soviet + threat and our will and capacity to counter it.

+

In the Saudi mind, the events of the past year in the Yemen and Iran + have provided all the additional proof, if any were needed, that the + Soviets are after their oil. The assassination of the President of + North Yemen,See Document + 243. the coup in South Yemen,See Document + 244. the presence of Cubans in the latter, the + attempted coup of October 15In + telegram 5137 from Sana, October 15, the Embassy reported: + “Elements of the military, military police, and national police + apparently attempted a coup d’etat in early hours of morning + October 15. After early success including seizure of airport, + coup failed when armored brigades to north [of the] city + confronted dissident units.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central + Foreign Policy File, D780422–0030) in the former, have + all in the Saudi mind been a part of the ultimate design of the + Soviets. In addition to the tangible, visible evidence of Soviet + intentions, two intangibles are seen as intensifying the danger from + the USSR:

+

(1) Working in Saudi Arabia are nearly a million Yemenis mostly from + North Yemen, virtually all with families in their homeland. The + Saudis say that in the event of a Soviet dominated regime in North + Yemen, the possibility of Fifth Column activities via the Yemen work + force here is very real. The pressure which an oppressive government + could place on the families of Yemeni workers here could create + tremendous internal problems, in the view of the Saudi leadership; + and

+

(2) The Saudis have in hand a preliminary report on a study of the + ultimate cost of oil to the Soviets based on the assumption that + they have to develop their Siberian resources to meet their + increasing demands for their domestic and satellite needs. The + conclusion of this study is that the inefficient Soviet system + cannot afford the cost of increased production from these sources + without severe strains on its economy. The study, therefore, + concludes that the lure of cheap Saudi oil will be a temptation + increasingly hard for the Soviets to resist. This study, now being + circulated and discussed in the highest Saudi circles, has further + increased their fears.

+

The Saudis, as indicated above, seek constant reassurance of our + security commitment to them. However, they are not content to sit + back and count on the U.S. to protect them. They are constantly + working to eliminate Soviet influence from the neighboring Arab + countries. The best example is their conciliatory gesture toward + South Yemen at Baghdad even though from past experience President + Ali Nasir is known to be a confirmed Marxist. They have offered to + resume aid to South Yemen in exchange for a South Yemeni agreement + to refrain from provocative actions against its neighbors. The + Saudis hope ultimately to woo South Yemen away from the USSR and, through aid, make it + possible for the South Yemenis to dispense with Soviet aid and to + rid themselves of the Soviet presence.

+ +

THE INTERNAL SITUATION

+

As of the end of 1978, the internal situation in Saudi Arabia + continues to be remarkably stable. Concern has been expressed in + some quarters in the U.S. that the conditions causing unrest in Iran + are endemic to Saudi Arabia and that there will be an inevitable + spill-over here. In my opinion the differences in the situation here + and Iran are so marked that the chances of an eruption here like + that across the Gulf are remote.

+

First and most important, the Saud family is a unifying rather than a divisive + force in the country. King Khaled is universally loved and + respected. He is a kindly, father figure. He and other key members + of the Royal Family maintain a close relationship with the people. + Every citizen knows he has the right to take a problem or grievance + to the King or a Province Governor’s majlis and receive a hearing. + There is virtually no criticism of the King—even his pending + acquisition of a Boeing 747 airplane fully equipped as a hospital + has not been the subject of any critical discussion. The excesses of + some members of the Royal Family have been frowned upon and + discouraged.

+

Secondly, the average Saudi is well fixed insofar as creature + comforts and opportunities are concerned. There is no student unrest + either within or without the Kingdom. There is unlimited free + education, schools and medical care. Roads, sewerage and water + facilities are being supplied as fast as money and modern technology + can perform.

+

Above all, there are no taxes! Therefore, dissent from the have-nots + is minimal simply because that class is amazingly small. The young + Western-educated Saudis who return from abroad find responsible + government positions or opportunities in the private sector + unequalled in any other society at any time. The rate of return of + Saudi students studying abroad is almost 100%. With the continued + increase both in production and price of oil, and the continued + expansion through exploration of oil reserves, there is no visible + end to Saudi prosperity and the accompanying opportunities it + offers.

+

With respect to a coup involving the armed forces, in every branch of + the military members of the Royal family hold many of the key + positions. They include operational directors, key staff positions, + pilots, ground unit commanders as well as administrative positions. + The fact that the military forces are completely separated with the + National Guard under Prince Abdallah and MODA under Prince Sultan is probably deliberate rather + than coincidental. In addition a third military group, the Coast + Guard and Frontier Force with armor cars, light tanks, etc., is + under the control of Prince Naif, the Minister of Interior. There + are always potential Qadhafis in any military force and the threat + of a military coup can never be ignored. However the chances of a + successful military coup + happening today in Saudi Arabia is in my opinion remote at this + time.

+

While the situation today is stable, there are certain contingencies + that could produce an overnight change. The Kingdom is ruled by King + Khaled, but in effect governed by Crown Prince Fahd. The combination has worked + well and the sudden transition following King Faisal’s assassination + was remarkedly successful with no apparent problems in the ensuing + 4-year period.

+

The precarious condition of the King’s health has focused attention + on the matter of succession. Fahd is the agreed successor to the King and + speculation has centered on the rivalry between Abdallah, presently + number three and Sultan who is number four in the present order of + succession. Abdallah’s stutter is considered by many to be a + substantial obstacle to his being King. Sultan is a vivacious, + clever person and his control of the Ministry of Defense and + Aviation (MODA) gives him a power + base unequalled elsewhere in the Kingdom. Likewise he is of the + Sudayri seven, a full brother of Fahd and therefore a formidable figure from all + aspects. Abdallah on the other hand has the support of the bedouins, + plus the anti-Sudayri group. (The surviving sons of the late King + Abdul Aziz still number about 30, all of whom are consulted on + matters of succession, regardless of whether they are in government. + The “Sudayri seven” are a powerful group. In addition to Fahd and Sultan, they include + Naif, Minister of Interior, Ahmed, his deputy, Salman, Governor of Riyadh, + Turki (recently resigned + as Dep MODA) and Abdul Rahman, a + businessman who has never held public office.

+

The rivalry between Abdallah and Sultan could produce a major + division in the family, especially if Sultan attempted to become + Crown Prince upon the King’s death or abdication and Fahd’s succession to the throne. + The chances of such an open split are in my opinion considerably + less than 50–50. In fact, there are already signs that the decision + has already been made in the Royal Family that Abdallah will be made + Crown Prince with the understanding that, upon his succession to the + throne, Sultan would become Crown Prince.

+

A different picture would be presented if Fahd died or became incapacitated + prior to Khaled’s death or abdication. Of some immediate concern is + the matter of Fahd’s health + and attitude. He is the consummate politician, polite, suave, + persuasive and likeable. There have been reports and criticism of + his indecisiveness, his occasional depressions and his neglect of + important issues. Undoubtedly, he has not found the process of + government an easy one, especially in the last year. He is further + handicapped by not having around him any substantial number of + trusted advisors upon whom he can rely with complete confidence. All + this has made his decision-making process both arduous and + thankless. Decisions have generally been made only after a consensus is reached; and if it + is not, then the decision is simply postponed. The results have been + a general lack of decisiveness and a failure to make the hard but + meaningful decisions.

+

There are other related factors that are cause for some concern with + respect to internal stability and tranquility. These include a + resurgence of religious fervor with an assertion that foreign + influences are eroding traditional values. One of the manifestations + of this attitude has been a renewed enforcement of the regulations + against women working in certain organizations alongside men, and a + denial of work visas and even permits for visas for foreigners.

+

The conflict between the modernizers and the traditionalists is not + new; in fact it is one of the interesting and spirited parts of the + history of Saudi Arabia. A number of religious scholars opposed the + radio until King Abdul Aziz demonstrated that the Koran could be + transmitted by it without demonic distortion. The order that schools + be established for women (made by Fahd as Minister of Education and approved by + Faisal) caused bloody rioting in the streets. In fact, the brother + of the young prince who assassinated Faisal was killed in those + riots. The present leadership recognizes that modern ideas must + inevitably come to the Kingdom, and they are moving ahead as fast as + is necessary to placate the modernizers but at the same time not so + fast as to arouse the active opposition of the traditionalists. They + make a distinction when comparing the situation here to Iran. They + say that the Shah brought Westernization as well as modernization + and herein contributed to his problems.

+

Whether or not this distinction is valid, the current Saudi + leadership is not faced with organized religious opposition. While + there are religious thinkers and religious teachers in Saudi Arabia, + there is no clergy in the sense of Christianity or even of Shi’a + Islam, as it is practiced in Iran. By the time of the death of the + founder of Wahabism, the religious movement had been thoroughly + absorbed in the society. The religious and political realms are + fused, and the ruler of Saudi Arabia is simply the leader of the + community of the faithful. His decrees and laws must conform to the + religious consensus. The important Saudi religious figures do not + have the direct political influence of their Iranian counterparts, + where a religious leader with a reputation for piety and learning + may attract a large number of personal adherents who follow his + guidance in matters of politics as well as religion. The religious + authorities in Saudi Arabia are in effect judges in the shariah + courts dispensing justice according to the Koran as interpreted by + the Wahabi scholars. At a lower level, the muezzins and the Friday + preachers are paid by the Ministry of Religious Endowments and + seldom stray into the political realm.

+

Another group that may someday present a threat to the Royal Family + are the technocrats. The influence of this group is substantial and is increasing steadily. + As of now, they have no political base. There is no indication that + any of this group is anything but completely loyal to the Royal + family. However, the possibility of a change in that attitude is + always there. The technocrats are an interesting group. (I call the + group that includes Finance Minister Aba Al-Khail, Planning Minister + Nazer and Industry and Electricity Minister Gosaibi the “Young Turk + California Mafia”—a term which has been picked up in other + circles.)

+

Aba Al-Khail, the Finance Minister, is the most powerful of the + technocrats. In 1978, he won in a power struggle with Oil Minister + Zaki Yamani over the future + management of ARAMCO. As a + result, when the nationalization is complete, the company will be + run as a department of the government on a government-approved + budget. The importance of this to the U.S. is that it means that any + funds for expansion of oil productive capacity must come from the + Treasury. The funds required are substantial, i.e., roughly + somewhere between one and three billion dollars for each one million + barrel increase in productive capacity. Aba Al-Khail does not + believe in any increase in productive capacity. In the attaining and + exercise of his power, Aba Al-Khail has made enemies, including some + in the Royal family. He has said “NO” to many projects including + some of the pet projects of Princes. He is sometimes described as + the ideal treasurer, a man with long pockets and short arms.

+

The Royal family must of necessity depend upon the technocrats for + the management of the vast resources and the implementation of the + ambitious goals of the Kingdom. At this stage there are no apparent + conflicts between the two although that possibility cannot be + completely discounted at some future time. It is too early in the + country’s emergence and development to make even a tentative + prediction. However, I would predict that the technocrats will + continue to work in close tandem with the Royal Family and + eventually there will emerge a constitutional monarchy with the + technocrat group being the dominant faction.

+

A LOOK AHEAD—1979

+

The year 1979 should see the bilateral relationship between our + countries continue to improve. Immediate short-term U.S. objectives + here should include securing additional Saudi-Arab support for the + Camp David accords; strengthening of economic ties including Saudi + support for the dollar; insuring the continuation of an adequate + supply of oil to meet present and projected future needs at + affordable prices.

+

These objectives are all interrelated and to a substantial degree + mutually supporting, at least from the U.S. viewpoint. Viewed from + the Saudi standpoint, in the short term, they present some + difficulties, both internally and in the Arab world.

+ +

However, the ultimate in Saudi interest in the long + term—survival—depends upon their protective relationship with the + U.S. This fact is known and appreciated by the ruling group here. + Reminders of this dependency are occasionally necessary, but unless + handled with sensitivity and diplomacy, cause resentment.

+

The proposed visit of Crown Prince Fahd to the United States in early 1979 will, in my + judgment, accomplish much and set the tone for good relations + throughout the year.

+ + John C. West Ambassador + + +
+ +
+ 177. Telegram From the Embassy in Saudi Arabia to the Department + of StateSource: National + Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P850027–2567. + Secret; Immediate; Exdis + Distribute as Nodis. Sent for + information Immediate to CHUSMTM Dhahran, USMTM/DCR Riyadh, + USLO Riyadh, and + Dhahran. + + + Jidda, January 14, 1979, 1600Z + +

346. Military addressees handle as Specat Exclusive. USMTM for General Cathey and Colonel Meyer only. Subj: Joint US-Saudi Planning Committee.

+

Summary: In meeting on January 13 Prince Saud made eloquent plea for U.S. commitment to + defense of Saudi Arabia against any direct Soviet threat. He said + that formal request from Crown Prince Fahd to President will be forthcoming in next few + days for establishment of Saudi-U.S. planning committee to make + contingency plans. He urged that plans be formulated right away so + that any meaningful decisions with respect to regional security can + be made during Crown Prince’s forthcoming meeting with President. + End summary.

+

1. I met with Foreign Minister Prince Saud and Intelligence Director Prince Turki for little over an hour on + January 13. Meeting was also attended on Saudi side by Deputy + Foreign Minister Abd al-Aziz al-Thunayan and General Kabbani and on + U.S. side by Deputy-Director USMTM Colonel Meyer, SRF Chief and Pol Counselor.

+

2. Saud referred to upcoming + trip of Crown Prince Fahd + to U.S. and said he thought it was important for us to agree in + advance on at least some of the topics to be discussed by President + and Crown Prince. As far as + Saudi Arabia is concerned, the most important issue is regional + security. We are faced by a clear-cut Soviet policy to penetrate, + destabilize, and spread their influence in the area. They have + recently become more open in their activities. This has been evident + in Angola, the Horn of Africa, Afghanistan, and South Yemen. Their + direct involvement in these areas has been encouraged by a lack of + U.S. response to their initiatives. This situation should be + reviewed and some basic decisions should be made in the meeting + between Crown Prince Fahd + and the President.

+

3. Saud said that analysis is + not what is needed. There have been numerous discussions of the + situation dating from the time of President Johnson. Specialists + have come and spoken with SAG. U.S. + and Saudi Arabia agree on analysis. The need now is to decide on + what has to be done. As far as Saudi Arabia is concerned, the + situation is extremely serious. The Kingdom faces a direct, + immediate threat. The USSR is + involved in South Yemen and it plans to utilize South Yemen to + destabilize the surrounding countries, such as Oman and North Yemen. + The objective is to penetrate this strategic area. They now even + have an important economic reason, and perhaps this explains their + more active involvement in the area.

+

4. Saud went on to say that + Saudi Arabia has a responsibility to meet this threat. SAG is trying to assist YAR over the long-run, by aid to help + build the country’s infrastructure and to promote stability. + However, there is also an immediate threat. In fact, there are two + kinds of immediate threat, i.e. involvement of South Yemen in YAR and terrorist activity in YAR and elsewhere. There are threats + not only inside YAR but in Oman as + well. As far as terrorism in Saudi Arabia is concerned, SAG will have to depend on itself to + counter that. However, there is a limit to Saudi capabilities when + it is facing direct threat from a world power. Saudi Arabia cannot + handle this by itself. It needs a commitment from U.S. to meet + whatever direct threat there is from the USSR. This would be a preventive measure. If the USSR sees that the U.S. is prepared + to meet the threat, then Soviets will not carry through on the + threat, but rather will back away.

+

5. Saud explained that the + purpose of the joint US-Saudi + committee which Prince Sultan had originally proposed would be to + carry the matter from discussion to a joint program. We need a joint + program designed to counter the Soviet threat. The committee could + develop scenarios and options. If joint policy decisions are needed, + they can be made by Fahd + and President during the visit. Joint committee could make the + agenda for the Crown Prince and President. In SAG view, there are three areas in + which help is needed:

+

(1) Measures to help YAR protect + itself against subversion,

+

(2) Steps to provide military equipment needed to meet + contingencies,

+ +

(3) Contingency planning to define U.S. role in event there is direct + involvement by the USSR or any of + its allies in Saudi Arabia, YAR, or + Oman.

+

6. I said that we do not disagree with Saudi Arabia about the nature + of the threat. I said that I wanted to make two points. First, we do + not have formal approval from Washington to set up a committee to + prepare an agenda for the Crown Prince’s talks with the President. + We would of course be happy to talk on an informal basis about + issues that may come up in the talks. Second, under our system of + government, the President would have to have congressional approval + for any commitment that the U.S. might make to Saudi Arabia. The + Saudi leadership has been very helpful in receiving congressional + visits and has certainly been able to get across to many members of + Congress the Saudi viewpoint on the threat faced by Saudi Arabia. + This would of course make it somewhat easier for the President to + get approval for any commitment to Saudi Arabia he found it + necessary to recommend. The President himself understands Saudi + concerns and has shown that understanding in his personal + intervention to develop a better timetable for delivery of F–5 aircraft to YAR.See + Documents 257 and 258. That understanding was also + evident in his decision to authorize the forthcoming visit of the + F–15’s to Saudi Arabia.A squadron of + F–15s visited the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia for a brief time + beginning on January 15. (Telegram 240 from Jidda, January 10; + National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + D790013–0277)

+

7. Saud said he understood + both my points. However, he had hoped that there was some urgency on + the part of the U.S. to tackle the regional security problem in the + Arabian Peninsula. He said he thought it would be useful for a joint + committee to devise possible scenarios and the range of U.S. + responses to these scenarios. It would be useful for us to know the + areas of responsibilities of each side. We need specifics, rather + than generalities.

+

8. Returning to the areas where assistance is needed, Saud said that one way we might + help YAR protect itself against + subversion would be to improve its intelligence collection + capabilities. He said that Saudi Arabia could also use help in this + field. As for military equipment needed to meet contingencies, + Saud said that Saudi + Arabia, and the other countries on the Peninsula as well, wanted to + share in their own defense. It would be a shame not to give them + what they need. Failure to do so would only hasten the day when the + U.S. would have to send troops.

+

9. Prince Saud went on to say + that SAG would be happy to submit + formal request for the establishment of a committee such as he described. In fact, he + would prepare the request as part of an oral reply of Crown Prince + to the oral message sent by the President through me to the Crown + Prince in November.Not further + identified. Carter sent + a message to Fahd on + the Egyptian-Israeli peace process, which was transmitted in + telegram 279224 to Jidda, November 2, 1978. (National Archives, + RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840153–2316) Carter’s message was delivered + by the Embassy to Second Prime Minister Prince Abdallah bin Abd + al-Aziz on November 4, 1978. (Telegram 7860 from Jidda, November + 4, 1978; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + P850040–2678) That reply will be delivered to the Embassy + in a few days time. I said I would forward the Crown Prince’s + message as soon as it was received.West + transmitted the formal request in telegram 890 from Jidda, + January 31; see Document + 182.

+

10. Begin comment: Prince + Saud’s presentation today represents a qualitative change in our + dialogue with the Saudis and involves requests for cooperation + unlike any we have heard before. Beginning in the fall of 1977, we + heard pleas for assistance in countering the Soviet threat in the + Horn of Africa on the grounds that the Soviet presence there + represented a real threat to Saudi Arabia. In July 1978, the plea + became even more urgent but it concerned YAR, which Sultan characterized as Saudi Arabia’s first + line of defense.See Document 248. The plea we heard from Saud today was an earnest plea for + a commitment to the defense of Saudi Arabia itself.

+

11. The atmosphere here has changed. Whereas SAG was reluctant 18 months ago to talk about U.S. + defense of Saudi Arabia or even of the Saudi oil fields, we find + SAG welcoming not just a show + of force in the region as suggested by Prince Sultan six months ago, + but a visit by a squadron of F–15’s in Saudi Arabia itself. We have + seen hints over the past several months that SAG would eventually come to ask for a + U.S. commitment to its defense, and we should therefore not be + surprised that it has finally come. Saud was at his eloquent best. His presentation was + solemn and earnest and reflected the deep concern that the Saudi + leadership feels in the face of events in Iran and in the + Yemens.

+

12. In our view, the Saudi request for a defense commitment is even + more than what it says. It is a test. Refusal to engage in + contingency planning will be interpreted as U.S. impotence or + disinterest in Saudi Arabia. They will wonder if we are prepared to + sacrifice them on the altar of detente. They may even wonder if we + are prepared to drop them as easily as we did the Republic of + China.Reference is to the Carter administration’s + normalization of relations with the People’s Republic of China + and the severance of diplomatic relations with the Republic of + China on Taiwan. They hope, however, that their oil makes them more + important to us and gives them a better claim on our attention. At + the same time, they will scrutinize any contingency planning we do + with them to see if they can discern the depth of our actual + commitment. Any contingency planning that looks inadequate or + unresponsive will be interpreted either as failure in our strength + of purpose or as sign that we have been hypnotized by the siren call + of Mexican oil.

+

13. I feel sure that Prince Saud will press for an answer ASAP, although we can of course await + the formal request from Fahd. I attempted to forestall the request by + telling him that we could wait until we received some + acknowledgement of our first report concerning the committee. + Saud said he would + prefer to get a formal request to us. End comment.In telegram 17130 to Jidda, January 22, the + Department responded to this telegram, posing questions and + outlining proposals on a number of issues pertaining to Saud’s + request. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + P850027–2439)

+ + West + +
+ +
+ 178. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Saudi + ArabiaSource: + National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + P850027–2437. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Drafted by Saunders; cleared by Quandt and Richard Castrodale + (S/S–O) and in draft by + Secretary Brown; approved + by Newsom. Sent for + information Immediate to the White House. + + + Washington, January 16, 1979, + 1410Z + +

11799. For Ambassador West. + Subject: Joint US-Saudi Planning + Committee. Ref: Jidda 0346.See Document 177.

+

(S) Entire text.

+

1. The major issues raised in reftel will obviously have to be the subject of + high-level discussion here. In the meantime, however, we think you + should give Prince Saud an + indication that this message has been received and is being given + serious consideration. Obviously, the subjects raised will be on the agenda both for + Secretary Brown’s visit to + Saudi ArabiaBrown visited Saudi Arabia February 10–12 as + part of a larger 10-day tour of the Middle East. See Documents 15–17, 19, 20, and 184–186. and Prince Fahd’s visit to Washington.

+

2. Please tell Prince Saud, therefore, that Washington welcomes in + principle the prospect of closer consultation on those matters. You + should also say that Secretary Brown will be prepared to discuss these regional + security issues during his February visit to Saudi Arabia, and that + we expect them to be high on the agenda for the conversation between + President Carter and Crown + Prince Fahd.

+ + Vance + +
+ +
+ 179. Telegram From the Embassy in Saudi Arabia to the Department + of StateSource: National + Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790034–1176. + Secret; Immediate; Exdis. + Sent for information to Dhahran, USLO Riyadh, Abu Dhabi, Cairo, Amman, Damascus, + Doha, Khartoum, Kuwait, Manama, Muscat, Moscow, London, Paris, + Tel Aviv, USINT Baghdad, + Department of Defense, and Sana. + + + Jidda, January 23, 1979, 0500Z + +

589. Subj: Saudi Arabia and Regional Security. Ref: Jidda 346 (Notal).See Document 177.

+

1. S-entire contents.

+

2. Summary: Recent events in Iran and in the Yemen are causing the + Saudis to reexamine their position in the region and the status of + their relationships with the United States and the USSR. They prefer to maintain as + close relations as possible with the United States and they have + asked for a defense commitment and contingency planning. This will + be a time of serious probing and testing of United States intentions + by the Saudis. As unpleasant as the notion of an accommodation with + the USSR is to the Saudis, we do + not believe they regard it as unthinkable. If they do not like the + results of their probing and testing, they may reluctantly come to + the conclusion that they have no choice but to come to terms with realities + as they see them. End summary.

+

3. We have read the interesting exchange of telegrams from Muscat, + Kuwait, Abu Dhabi, and Baghdad on Gulf security.Reference is to telegram 80 from Muscat, + January 18; telegram 99 from Kuwait, January 7; telegram 56 from + Abu Dhabi, January 8; telegram 70 from Abu Dhabi, January 9; and + telegram 93 from Baghdad, January 15. These telegrams are in the + National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + D790027–0961, D790009–0338, D790009–0805, D790010–1129, and + D790022–0795, respectively. We have also reflected + further on our meeting with Foreign Minister Prince Saud on Jan 13.See Document + 177. We would like to offer the following thoughts + on current Saudi thinking about the Soviet threat and regional + security.

+

4. The Saudis are more convinced than ever that the Soviets are + embarked on a policy of encirclement to gain control of the Arabian + Peninsula and its oil resources. They firmly believe the study that + shows that the USSR will be oil + short in the mid-1980’s. They also accept the results of a recent + study they commissioned that shows that the cost of development of + oil resources in Siberia over the coming decade will be + astronomical, making the cost of production there many times the + cost of production in the Peninsula and the Gulf. The events in + Afghanistan, the Soviet involvement in the Horn of Africa, and + stepped-up Soviet activity in South Yemen only serve to confirm + their hypothesis about Soviet intentions. Some Saudi leaders even + believe that the Soviets are involved in Iran. All of them believe + that, involved or not, the Soviets will find their ultimate seizure + of Saudi oil much easier as a result of the events there.

+

5. Events in Iran have suddenly and drastically altered the power + arrangement in the Gulf.The Shah left + Iran on January 16, beginning what became a permanent + exile. It is true of course that Iran will not be absent + permanently or even for long as an important actor in the Gulf + arena. The country is too big, too populous, and potentially too + powerful to be excluded from Gulf affairs. Occupying as it does the + whole northern shore, it has too many interests in the Gulf to + ignore it completely. However, while Iran is distracted and weakened + by internal crisis, it probably cannot and will not serve as a + regulating force in the Gulf. Like Oman and the other Arab states in + the Gulf, Saudi Arabia realizes that the two-pillar arrangement + (Iran and Saudi Arabia) has either collapsed or is temporarily + inoperative, and they know that temporary things can sometimes last + a long time.

+

6. If Iran’s power in the Gulf has declined, its influence in the + larger region has diminished even further. Iran had been the + principal supporter of Saudi Arabia’s anti-radical policy in the + Horn of Africa and it was + instrumental in putting an end to the recent troubles in Oman.See Documents 12 + and 13. Now Iran is not able to + play that role and there is even a question about its ability to do + so in the future. The threat of Soviet encirclement has therefore + become even more immediate. The USSR and its allies in South Yemen are in a position to + bring about chaos in North Yemen and to destabilize Oman. Both + YAR and Oman appear to have + internal situations that provide such opportunities. The Saudis fear + that if hostile regimes were established in YAR and Oman they would seek with Soviet encouragement + to promote trouble in Saudi Arabia itself or even to provoke + hostilities with the Saudis. The Saudi leadership is actively + seeking a way to deal with this situation.

+

7. For some weeks now, diplomatic circles in Jidda have been buzzing + with a story of a conflict in the royal family. The story appears to + have originated for the most part from the absence of the Crown + Prince from a number of important functions immediately after the + return of the King to Saudi Arabia in November and from reports that + Foreign Minister Prince Saud + refused to return early from vacation in December when summoned by + the Crown Prince. Some diplomats have speculated that the conflict + involves foreign policy and that some of the royal family believe + that Saudi Arabia should come to terms with the Soviets, move to a + more non-aligned position, and even establish relations with the + USSR. We see no hard evidence + for a split in the family over Saudi policy toward the USSR, and most thoughtful and + knowledgeable diplomats in Jidda say that this speculation has gone + far beyond where the evidence warrants. All the diplomats have + trouble in identifying on which side of the Soviet issue the various + members of the family stand.

+

8. Split in the family or not, we think there has been intense + discussion among the chief foreign policy decision-makers over the + past 16 months concerning Saudi Arabia’s position in the region and + its relationship to the United States and the USSR. The inability in 1977 and 1978 + to find common ground with the United States on the Horn of Africa + and the prospect late in 1977 and early in 1978 that the United + States would not go through with the F–15 sale caused Saudi Arabia + to wonder whether the United States had the interest, will, and + capability to work with Saudi Arabia to oppose the spread of Soviet + influence and to promote stability in the region. Congressional + approval of the F–15 sale reassured the Saudi leadership, but the + agony with which the military support program has evolved over the + last half of 1978 has created new nagging doubts. Hints of the + nature of the discussion among the chief decision-makers may be seen + in talks we have had with + Min Def Prince Sultan, Foreign Minister Prince Saud, and Crown + Prince Fahd, who have + argued frequently over the past year that security of the Arabian + Peninsula is basic to the interests of the United States and who + have attempted to persuade us to cooperate with Saudi Arabia in + promoting that security. Prince Abdallah bin Abd al-Aziz commander + of the National Guard, periodically brings up with us the + possibility that the day may come when Saudi Arabia will have to + move away from the United States but he then dismisses the thought + as unthinkable.

+

9. Our British colleagues in Jidda have concluded that the events in + Iran will cause the Saudis to move closer and to strengthen their + ties with the United States and that they will not try to reinsure + with the Soviets. We agree that they will try to move closer to the + United States but after careful reflection on Prince Abdallah’s + periodic remarks and on our conversation with Prince Saud on Jan 13 we do not think + that the proposal for a joint US-Saudi committee for contingency planning has come out of + the blue but that it was the culmination of a long process of + development. Prince Saud’s presentation was too carefully prepared + and rehearsed, and he was too ready for the contingency of offering + to submit a formal request to the President for the establishment of + the joint committee when we told him we had not been authorized to + establish it. We think the Saudis regard the contingency planning as + an opportunity to test and probe the United States intentions so + that SAG will have a better basis + on which to review and structure its own foreign policy over the + next several years.

+

10. Heretofore, Saudi Arabia has not wanted a direct U.S. commitment + to its defense because it would tarnish its credentials with the + other Arabs. Only last year, Saudi leaders were endorsing statements + of other Gulf states that they would defend the Gulf themselves, + fully believing that the United States would respond anyway when the + chips were down. They now know they cannot intervene militarily + elsewhere, nor can they adequately defend their own territory. In + addition, they are probably not sure of the United States any + longer. They still have the nagging fears about the strength of + United States purpose which have built up over the past year. They + are painfully aware that the United States could not do anything to + save the Shah. In addition, having seen the ease with which the + United States dropped its commitment to the Republic of China, they + may fear that the United States will decide in the interest of + detente to rely on a dubious Soviet commitment to good behavior on + the Arabian Peninsula. They may even wonder if the United States is + not beginning to shift its attention to Mexico as the source of its + energy needs and may therefore decide it can afford to write Saudi + Arabia off. In these circumstances, the Saudi leadership may wonder + if it can still count on the United States coming to the rescue when the crunch + comes. With Iran out of the picture, they may fear that the crunch + will not be too far off and may have decided that they had better + find out now how strong the United States card is.

+

11. We know that accommodation with the USSR is an unpleasant notion to the Saudi leadership, + but we doubt that it is as completely unthinkable as Prince Abdallah + says. We know that the Soviets have had contacts with the Saudis on + the subject, mostly through third parties. We suspect that Iraq has + pressed the idea with the Saudis as a means of enhancing their + credentials with the other Arabs and providing themselves with more + maneuverability in the international arena. If the Saudis are not + satisfied with the results of their testing and probing of United + States intentions, they may well decide that they had better come to + terms with realities as they see them and that it might be best to + move toward a more nonaligned position. This may not necessarily + mean establishment of diplomatic relations with the USSR but it could mean a cooling of + relations with the United States and an acceptance of the Soviet + presence in South Yemen and the Horn of Africa. It could also mean + trade ties with the USSR and an + agreement to supply some of their energy needs, probably at the + expense of the West or Japan. One of the characteristics of the + Saudi leaders is to have someone of lesser rank convey messages that + the top leader finds embarrassing or unpleasant. Prince Abdallah may + have been chosen to convey the unthinkable notion that an + accommodation with the USSR may + become necessary. In that way, the King and the Crown Prince do not + have to be identified with it.

+

12. In these circumstances, three upcoming events may well be more + important than they would seem at first glance: (a) the proposed + formation of the joint United States-Saudi contingency planning + committee; (b) the visit next month of SecDef + Brown; and (c) the proposed + Fahd visit to the + United States in March.

+

13. Activists in the SAG have long + privately deplored the lack of an effective decision-making process. + Consideration has been given to the formation of the Saudi + equivalent to our National Security Council. Recent events including + the exaggerated report of PDRY + incursion into YAR have emphasized + concerns about this shortcoming in the Saudi system. The manner of + formation and the makeup on the Saudi side of the proposed committee + may well be significant. The committee was suggested by Sultan and + stated by him to have Fahd’s blessing (Riyadh 0039).In telegram 39 from Riyadh, January 8, the + Liaison Office reported on a meeting among West, Sultan, and + Saud, during which Sultan raised the idea of establishing a + joint committee on security issues. (National Archives, RG 59, + Central Foreign Policy File, D790024–0531) The Saudi team + is composed of the third generation of the SAG + royal family: two of + Faisal’s sons, his son-in-law, General Humaid, Chief of the General + Staff of the Armed Forces. These individuals are from the new + generation and are U.S. educated. They probably represent the + strongest pro-American sentiment in the SAG. If there has in fact been serious internal + discussion of the Soviet option, they were probably among the most + articulate opponents, since they see no future for royalists in a + 21st century Marxist state. They may well be the point group for + probing United States intentions, and the joint U.S.-Saudi committee + may be the instrument they have chosen. Their uncles may have said + to them, “show us how much we can depend on the United States. The + time is growing short. We need to know.”

+

14. The first test will come with the United States reaction to Saudi + proposals in the committee. The Saudis clearly want specifics, such + as joint contingency plans for possible scenarios affecting SAG security. The next test will + probably be attempted by the Saudis during the Brown visit. The Saudis will want + to know how he will react to joint contingency planning. The + ultimate test will come in the Carter-Fahd + meeting. Can the President give the Crown Prince the specific + assurances which SAG needs to quiet + the cynics and doubters of USG?

+

15. We would like to comment on the conclusion of the Middle East + regional conference of Egyptian Ambassadors that the events in Iran + will cause Saudi Arabia to move closer to Egypt and to depend on the + Egyptians for their defense needs. We believe that Saudi-Egyptian + relations will improve anyway as they learn to talk to each other + again about the Middle East peace process. Since Egypt is a moderate + state, Saudi Arabia will no doubt seek to consult closely with + Egypt, as it has in the past, on the Soviet threat in the Red Sea + and Indian Ocean area. We think, however, that Saudi Arabia would be + very reluctant to see Egyptian troops anywhere in the Peninsula, and + we suspect that it would have to be in the direst of circumstances + before it would accept Egyptian or any other Arab troops on its own + soil. As Deputy Foreign Minister Abd al-Rahman Mansouri told DOD Deputy Assistant Secretary + Robert Murray on August + 1, 1978, Saudi Arabia considers itself the paramount power on the + Peninsula.See footnote 2, Document 249. + When it cannot live up to the requirements of that role, it would + probably prefer to rely on the United States for assistance, rather + than Egypt.

+

16. If, for whatever reason, Iranian troops are withdrawn from Oman, + Saudi Arabia would want to see them replaced by a suitable Islamic + state, preferably from a non-Arab state like Pakistan. As for United + States assistance to Oman, Saudi Arabia would welcome it if it did not dilute U.S. + interest in Saudi Arabia itself. However, it would not want a U.S. + combat role unless there was no other alternative. If the U.S. were + agreeable to a U.S. military assistance program, the Saudis would + probably prefer that it resemble the relationship it approves for + YAR, with suitable + modifications. SAG would want to be + associated with it and appear to be the senior partner.

+

17. We may well be reading out of a cloudy crystal ball, but we are + reporting what the signs seem to say to us at this time.

+ + West + +
+ +
+ 180. Summary of Conclusions of a Presidential Review Committee + MeetingSource: Carter + Library, National Security Council, Institutional Files, Box 72, + PRC 088, 1/23/79, Saudi + Arabia and Southwest Asia. Secret; Sensitive. The meeting took + place in the White House Situation Room. The minutes are not + attached and were not found. Brzezinski sent the Summary of Conclusions to + Carter under a + January 29 memorandum, requesting that he approve it. Carter initialed the + memorandum. (Ibid.) + + + Washington, January + 23, 1979, 10:30 a.m.–12:05 p.m. + + + SUBJECT + Summary of Conclusions: PRC + Meeting on Southwest Asia and Saudi Arabia + + + PARTICIPANTS + + + State + Warren + Christopher (Chairman), Deputy + Secretary + David Newsom, + Under Secretary for Political Affairs + Harold + Saunders, Assistant Secretary for Near + Eastern and South Asian Affairs + + + + + Treasury + Secretary Blumenthal + Anthony + Solomon, Under Secretary for Monetary + Affairs + Fred Bergsten, Assistant Secretary for International + Affairs + + + + Defense + Secretary Brown + Charles + Duncan, Deputy Secretary + David + McGiffert, Assistant Secretary for + International Security + + + + + Office of Management and + Budget + Dr. John White, + Deputy Director + Ed Sanders, Associate Director for International + Affairs + + + Commerce + Stanley Marcuss, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Trade + Regulations + + + + + Energy + Harry Bergold, Assistant Secretary for International + Affairs + + + + + Joint Chiefs of Staff + General David C. + Jones + Lt. General William Smith + + + + + Central Intelligence + Agency + Dr. Robert + Bowie, Deputy Director for National + Foreign Assessment + Robert Ames, NIO for + Near East and South Asia + + + + + White House + Dr. Brzezinski + + + + + National Security + Council + Thomas + Thornton + William + Quandt + Rutherford Poats + + + +

The PRC met to discuss the broad + question of strategy in Southwest Asia (the region from Yemen to + Bangladesh) as well as specific issues relating to Saudi Arabia. + (S)

+

1. Regional Strategy. There was a broad + consensus on the existence of domestic instability in many parts of + this region that either has external effects or could be exploited + by outside forces. While there are many interrelationships, + differences within the region preclude a single strategy except in + the broadest terms. The Indian subcontinent, Iran and the Arabian + peninsula do, however, comprise logical sub-regions. The group + recognized that there was no clear correlation between amounts of + resources expended and positive results; the region is sufficiently + important, however, that we should make a major effort to get + whatever resources we believe are necessary, and we should develop + greater flexibility in applying resources such as security + supporting assistance. Several members commented on the need for + better analysis of the economic problems of the area and how they + relate to political and security factors. The State Department also + offered to circulate a list of current US commitments to the states of the region. (S)

+

[Omitted here is material unrelated to Saudi Arabia.]

+

3. Arabian Peninsula. While our strategy for + South Asia looks to a prominent Indian role, there is no similar + strong point in the Western part of the region where the situation + is potentially more explosive. There is greater concern about US capabilities and commitment and + hence greater need for an active US + role of reassurance. We need to communicate to the Arabs that our + interests in the area are vital and we will defend them. This could + become more than an academic exercise if the Saudis feel that they + must eliminate the threat from the South Yemen regime. It was widely + agreed that the US is now perceived + by many in the area as uncertain of its purposes and failing to be + responsive to the needs and concerns of the area. (S)

+

4. Saudi Arabia. Treasury presented an + analysis of what we want from the Saudis and the leverage we have + over Saudi decisions. Three related Saudi oil/economic decisions are + of great importance to us: continuation of present high-levels of + production to make up for the shortfall in Iranian output and to + reduce upward pressure on + prices; moderation on future oil prices; investment now to expand + productive capacity in the 1980s to 12.5 million bpd and perhaps as + much as 14–16 bpd. The decision to expand production is the most + essential and will require investments in excess of $5 billion just + to get to 12.5 mbpd. Our primary ability to influence these Saudi + decisions lies not in the economic area, where our choices are + limited, but primarily in the political/security area. We must + recognize that the Saudis see the Arab-Israeli conflict in security + terms as well. It is this relationship between Saudi economic + decisions and what we can do in the security area that we should + focus on in preparation for Secretary Brown’s trip and for Fahd’s visit to Washington. We should pay particular + attention to the risks of developing a tight linkage between these + two sets of issues. (S)

+

Congressional support for Saudi Arabia is slipping, largely because + of Saudi actions at Baghdad and in OPEC.See footnotes 2 and 3, Document 175. This may + complicate our ability to meet Saudi security concerns. The Saudis + are particularly anxious now because of events in Iran, the apparent + course of the Egypt-Israel negotiations toward a separate agreement, + and the strengthening of Arab radical forces. Coupled with Saudi + weakness from the standpoint of internal and external security, + these external threats have made the Saudis more reliant upon our + support and more fearful that it will not be forthcoming. (S)

+

5. Capabilities for Action. We need to look at + our economic and military resources for meeting the needs of some of + the countries in the region. A suggestion was made that we might try + to shorten lead times for delivering certain types of military + equipment by advance purchasing. This would help to overcome the + belief that we are unable to respond quickly to meet the requests of + our friends. (S)

+
+ +
+ 181. Intelligence Memorandum Prepared in the Central Intelligence + AgencySource: + National Archives, RG 59, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, + Office of Research and Analysis for the Soviet Union and Eastern + Europe, Program Files for Soviet Middle East materials + 1960–1982, Lot 90D113, Box 6, Finished Intelligence. Secret; + [handling restriction not + declassified]. Prepared in the Middle East Division of + the Office of Political and Regional Analysis of the National + Foreign Assessment Center. + + + RP M 79–10053 + + + Washington, January 26, 1979 + +

THE IMPACT OF IRAN ON SAUDI ARABIA: SECURITY CONCERNS + AND INTERNAL REACTION [classification and handling + restriction not declassified]

+

The collapse of the Shah’s position in Iran and the + recent surge in South Yemeni attempts to subvert North Yemen are + accelerating a Saudi Arabian re-examination of its regional + security position, and the status of its relations with both the + US and the USSR. The Saudis’ requests for a + US defense commitment + [less than 1 line not declassified] to plan security contingencies is designed to test + US intentions and may well + mark a watershed in US-Saudi + relations.

+

If the Saudis consider the US response to their security concerns inadequate, + they probably will move toward a more non-aligned political + posture, and show less willingness to accommodate US interests in the energy field or + to support US-sponsored Middle + East peace efforts. The heretofore unthinkable—reaching some + kind of accommodation with the USSR—also appears to be a possibility. The events + in Iran already appear to be strengthening the position of + conservatives within Saudi Arabia—who ironically are among the + most critical of US policies—and + this could contribute to strains in US-Saudi ties regardless of how the US reacts to Saudi security + concerns. [classification and handling + restriction not declassified]

+

The Soviet Threat and Regional Security [classification and handling restriction not + declassified]

+

Saudi reaction to Iranian developments is heavily colored by the + conviction that the USSR is + successfully engaged in a strategic effort to encircle Saudi Arabia + and the Persian Gulf oilfields, and that the US, ignoring two years of Saudi warnings, does not + appreciate the urgency of the situation or, alternatively, lacks the + will to defend its interests in the region. The Saudis believe there + are both strategic and economic motivations behind the Soviet drive: + to be in a position to threaten Western access to Persian Gulf oil, + and to ensure their own future access to Gulf oil. The Saudis, + particularly Oil Minister Yamani, firmly believe that the USSR + will be short of oil in the mid-1980s. The US Embassy in Jidda reports that the Saudis also accept + the results of a study they commissioned that indicates the cost of + development of oil resources in Siberia over the coming decade will + be astronomical, making it cheaper for the Soviets to buy Saudi oil + than to develop their own.See Document 179. [classification and handling restriction not + declassified]

+

Over the past two years, the Saudis have cited Soviet involvement in + the Horn of Africa, the coup in Afghanistan, and increased Soviet + activity in South Yemen as evidence of Soviet intentions. While most + Saudi leaders do not believe the Soviets were involved in the Shah’s + downfall, they all believe events in Iran have drastically altered + power arrangements in the region and make the threat of Soviet + encirclement even more immediate. The Saudis never cared for the + Shah’s self-proclaimed role as policeman of the Gulf, but they + recognize that he had been a force for stability and anti-radicalism + in the region. The Shah was the principal supporter of Saudi + Arabia’s anti-Soviet policy in the Horn of Africa and his + willingness to commit thousands of troops to Oman in the early 1970s + was crucial to ending a Marxist guerrilla war on the Arabian + Peninsula. [classification and handling + restriction not declassified]

+

The Saudis now worry that the USSR, + through South Yemen, already is in a position to bring about chaos + in North Yemen and to destabilize Oman. They will become more + alarmed as the remaining Iranian troops are withdrawn from Oman. The + Saudis fear that if hostile regimes were established in North Yemen + or Oman, the USSR would encourage + them to promote trouble within Saudi Arabia itself. [classification and handling restriction not + declassified]

+

The US + Connection: How Firm an Ally? [classification + and handling restriction not declassified]

+

Intense discussions among Saudi foreign policy decision-makers over + Saudi Arabia’s position in the region and its relationship to the + US and the USSR have been under way for over a + year. In talks with US officials, + the top Saudi leadership—Crown Prince Fahd, Defense Minister Prince Sultan, National Guard + Commander Prince Abdallah, Foreign Minister Prince Saud, and + intelligence chief Prince Turki—has emphasized the US interest in the security of the + Arabian Peninsula and has tried to promote closer US-Saudi cooperation to that end. + However, the failure of the US to + provide military support last year to the Somalis during the Ogaden + war and US hesitation to go through + with the F–15 jet sale caused Saudi leaders to question US will and capability to oppose the spread of Soviet + influence and to promote stability in the region. [classification and handling restriction not + declassified]

+

Several recent developments have further shaken Saudi confidence in + the US. The Saudis do not specify + what they think the US should or + could have done to save the Shah, but [less than 1 + line not declassified] top Saudi leadership is “bitterly + unhappy” over what it sees as a very inadequate US response to the Iranian crisis. The + Saudis now are deeply worried about how the US would react to a crisis of similar proportions in + Saudi Arabia. [classification and handling + restriction not declassified]

+

In addition, the US Embassy in Jidda + reports that the Saudis, reacting to the change in US policy toward the Republic of China + on Taiwan, wonder if the US will + rely similarly on vague Soviet promises of good behavior in the + Persian Gulf region instead of confronting the “Soviet challenge.” + The embassy also speculates that some Saudis may wonder if the + US sees Mexico as an alternate + source of energy, reducing the need for a close relationship with + Saudi Arabia. [classification and handling + restriction not declassified]

+

The Saudis have acknowledged to US + officials that they cannot defend themselves, North Yemen, or Oman. + Traditionally they have assumed the US would support them in a crisis. They now believe the + threat is looming, and want to test that assumption before it is too + late. [classification and handling restriction not + declassified]

+

Request for Defense Commitment [classification and handling restriction not + declassified]

+

Foreign Minister Prince Saud + and intelligence chief Prince Turki met with the US Ambassador [less than 1 line not + declassified] in Jidda in mid-January.See Document + 177. + Saud asked for specific + US commitments to defend Saudi + Arabia, North Yemen, and Oman from any threat from the USSR or its ally, South Yemen. [3 lines not declassified] that the Saudi + requests are a carefully thought out effort to test US strategic intentions in the region, + and that the US response will + critically influence the direction of Saudi foreign policy for the + next several years. [classification and handling + restriction not declassified]

+

[2 paragraphs (18 lines) not declassified]

+

Saudi Alternatives: Non-alignment or + Accommodation with the USSR? [classification and handling restriction not + declassified]

+

If the Saudis are not satisfied with the results of their testing and + probing of US intentions—and their + expectations are high—they may well decide they must move away from close + identification with the US, towards + a more non-aligned position. We have already seen Saudi Arabia + distance itself from Egypt and the US on the Middle East peace process, and align itself + more closely with the majority of Arab states who argue that the + Camp David accords do not go far enough. They may move even closer + to the rejectionist position. [classification and + handling restriction not declassified]

+

As unpalatable as it would be to the Saudis, they might also decide + they had to reach an accommodation with the USSR. [4 lines not + declassified] The US + Embassy reports that Iraq—with whom the Saudis have recently + improved their relations—may have pressed the Soviet option with the + Saudis. [classification and handling restriction + not declassified]

+

The Saudis obviously have no illusions about Soviet intentions. The + Saudis would deal with the Soviets only because they despaired of + US ability or willingness to + stop the Soviet encirclement of the Kingdom, and as a way to try to + buy time to slow the Soviet advance. [classification and handling restriction not + declassified]

+

A Saudi accommodation with the Soviets would not necessarily mean the + establishment of diplomatic relations. It would probably mean a + cooling of relations with the US and + Saudi acquiescence to the Soviet presence in South Yemen and the + Horn of Africa. It could mean trade ties and perhaps an agreement to + supply some oil, probably at the expense of supplies to the US, Western Europe, or Japan. [classification and handling restriction not + declassified]

+

Internal Reaction to Iran [classification and handling restriction not + declassified]

+

The Iranian revolution is also beginning to have some impact on Saudi + policies closer to home. [5 lines not + declassified] the Saudi Government would view an Iranian + Government headed by Ayatollah Khomeini with “extreme misgivings.” + [classification and handling restriction not + declassified]

+

Of more immediate concern to Saudi security authorities, however, is + the large Shia minority in Saudi Arabia’s Eastern Province of + al-Hassa. Saudi Arabia’s Shias traditionally have been discriminated + against and largely ignored by the Sunni central government. Large + numbers of Shias have found work in the oilfields, and are employed + by ARAMCO; they participated in + labor strikes and unrest which periodically erupted among Saudi oil + workers in the 1950s and early 1960s. [classification and handling restriction not + declassified]

+

Because of the years of discrimination and neglect, Saudi security + authorities admit they know very little about the political thinking + of the Shia minority or how Iranian developments may be affecting + that population. They have discovered that the large numbers of + Shias employed by ARAMCO are widely dispersed + throughout the corporation and have access to all sensitive oil + installations. The security authorities have reviewed security at + the oil installations, concluded it is very weak, and not subject to + quick improvement. [classification and handling + restriction not declassified]

+

Two other recent incidents in Saudi Arabia appear related to Iranian + developments. They take on added significance because they were + non-official and probably caused the government embarrassment. [classification and handling restriction not + declassified]

+

On 19 January, the imam or religious preacher, + at one of Riyadh’s largest mosques delivered a strong public attack + on the Shah of Iran, and on Egyptian President Sadat and Moroccan + King Hassan for their support of the Shah. The imam accused the Shah of being an evil, corrupt, and base + ruler who deserved punishment for having led Iran away from Islam + under the guise of modernization. He described Sadat and Hassan as + equally or more corrupt than the Shah, and called on the Egyptian + and Moroccan people to overthrow them. [classification and handling restriction not + declassified]

+

This is the first incident in memory in which a Saudi mosque has been + used for a violent and public attack on Muslim leaders, particularly + monarchs. Saudi authorities are concerned that the incident not set + a precedent. They are acutely aware that the charge of corruption + can be leveled at many members of the Saudi royal family. Corruption + among some members of the royal family, including senior princes, is + widely known and resented within Saudi Arabia. [classification and handling restriction not + declassified]

+

The imam’s sermon will spur renewed efforts by + the royal family to improve its image. Ex-Deputy Defense Minister + Prince Turki ibn Abd al-Aziz + (not to be confused with the younger Prince Turki, chief of + intelligence), was forced to resign last fall because of blatant + corruption in military purchases, some from major US corporations, and because of a + marital scandal. [6 lines not + declassified]

+

The second unusual incident was an unprecedented attack on US foreign policy in the Middle + East—particularly the Camp David accords—and on President Carter personally by the + editor-in-chief of a leading Saudi Arabic-language newspaper. + Clearly labeled as the editor’s personal views, the editorial on 20 + January was very harsh by Saudi standards, which usually avoid + direct attacks on leaders of friendly countries. It is also + noteworthy because the editor, one of the more reflective and + liberal-minded Saudi journalists, had editorially urged that the + Camp David accords be given a chance last fall when other Saudi + papers were attacking them. In the past, the editor has gotten into + trouble with Saudi government officials for his public stands, but + there appears to have been no official reaction this time. [classification not declassified]

+ +

The mosque and newspaper incidents are significant because they + provide a rare glimpse of “public opinion” in Saudi Arabia when it + differs sharply from official Saudi positions. Saudi leaders are not + immune from such pressures; many, particularly the more + conservative, probably agree with sentiments expressed in both + cases. If the newspaper editor is not censured for his editorial, it + may indicate he has sympathetic protectors among powerful members of + the royal family. [classification and handling + restriction not declassified]

+

Outlook: The Conservative Tide and + Implications for US Goals [classification and handling restriction not + declassified]

+

The internal incidents support our impression that the conservative + tide is running strong in Saudi Arabia and will be strengthened by + developments in Iran, with serious implications for US interests. For political and + economic reasons, we believe Saudi Arabia increasingly sees its + self-interests—or at least the way to pursue common interests—as + diverging from the US, especially on + the issues of high rates of oil production, high levels of spending + on development to recycle petrodollars, and US-sponsored Middle East peace efforts. Saudi + assertions of its self-interest have already begun, but will be + accelerated if the Saudis believe the US is not responsive to their overriding + concern—regional security. [classification and + handling restriction not declassified]

+

Politically, senior conservative princes have been among the most + critical of US peace efforts and of + President Sadat’s unilateral negotiations with Israel; at least one + such prince advocated an immediate cutoff of all Saudi economic aid + to Egypt when Sadat signed the Camp David accords. Ironical as it + may appear to the US, two senior + conservative princes have advocated establishing some level of + relations with the USSR. [classification and handling restriction not + declassified]

+

For different reasons, the young, Westernized technocrats who play an + increasingly influential role on Saudi planning, financial, + monetary, and oil policy are also very critical of US policy when it clashes with their + view of Saudi interests. These technocrats—most of whom were + educated in the US or UK—view Saudi interests pragmatically + and often have the advanced financial or technical training + necessary to back their arguments with senior princes. While these + technocrats might favor a more liberal internal social policy than + their elders, they often are very conservative on issues such as oil + production and the pace of development.

+

Despite the current statements by Saudi leaders of willingness to + fill the shortfall in oil production caused by the turmoil in Iran, + we believe current policy remains that Saudi Arabia should produce + no more than 8.5 million barrels/day on an annual basis, that it should resist US + pressure to spend billions of dollars to increase future productive + capacity, and that the development plans should be slowed + considerably.

+
+ +
+ 182. Telegram From the Embassy in Saudi Arabia to the Department + of StateSource: National + Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790047–0249. + Confidential; Immediate; Exdis. + + + Jidda, January 31, 1979, 1340Z + +

890. Subject: Letter From King Khalid to President Carter.

+

1. (C-entire contents).

+

2. Embassy received on January 31 following letter from King Khalid + to President Carter. + Informal Embassy translation follows.

+

3. Begin text: With my best + regards. I was informed by the Ambassador of the United States, Mr. + John West, of Your + Excellency’s message concerning an invitation to HRH Crown Prince + Fahd bin Abd al-Aziz to + visit the United States and to meet Your Excellency in order to + exchange views regarding the developments which are taking place in + the Middle East region in particular and other matters which are of + importance to both countries in general.

+

4. I have the pleasure to inform Your Excellency that I welcome this + gracious step. It symbolizes the proper relations existing between + our countries—relations which require cooperation and mutual + understanding in all problems and matters. It is especially + important to seek means of supporting our relations and means of + responding to any development which may affect in one way or another + the existing situation in the Middle East.

+

5. Excellency there is no doubt that Your Excellency is fully aware + of the importance of the events which are taking place in the Middle + East region and in other regions of the world. If these events + intensify they will threaten not only our vital interests but world + peace and security. Therefore from our viewpoint the matter requires + a precise evaluation of the situation and a decisive, quick response + to the challenges and dangers around us in order first to isolate + these dangers and then to eliminate them.

+ +

6. Your Excellency may agree with my view that the matter requires + formation of a high-level committee of experts and specialists from + both sides to study the security situation in the region and to + submit the necessary recommendations. These recommendations, in the + form of a well-defined working program, should be submitted to Your + Excellency before your meeting with HRH Crown Prince Fahd so that these + recommendations will enable you to get the full benefit from + meetings with His Highness. In this manner, your meetings will + achieve the desired results, benefit our two friendly countries, and + achieve our aim of strengthening the fruitful cooperation between + our two governments.

+

7. May I extend to you my best wishes for a successful career and for + the continuation of good health, happiness, and well-being. + Likewise, I wish increasing prosperity, success, and comfort to the + friendly people of the United States. God keep and protect you. + Khalid bin Abd al-Aziz al Saud, Riyadh, 29 Safar 1399H (January 27, + 1979.) End text.

+

8. Original letter will be sent by pouch to NEA/ARP.

+ + West + +
+ +
+ 183. Intelligence Memorandum Prepared in the Central Intelligence + AgencySource: Carter + Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 67, Saudi + Arabia: 1–3/79. Secret; [handling restriction + not declassified]. Prepared in the Middle East + Division, Office of Regional and Political Analysis of the + National Foreign Assessment Center. Carter wrote in the upper right-hand corner of + the first page of the memorandum: “Cy—info JC.” Brzezinski sent a copy of the memorandum to + Vance under a + February 5 memorandum, in which he indicated that Carter wanted Vance to see the memorandum. + Inderfurth signed + the February 5 memorandum for Brzezinski. (Ibid.) Attached to another copy of + the intelligence memorandum is a February 2 memorandum to + Carter from + Turner, in which + Turner noted: + “Attached is a thoughtful memorandum on the attitudes of Saudi + leaders towards the United States which I think will be of + interest to you at this time.” (Central Intelligence Agency, + Office of the Director of Central Intelligence, Job 81M00919R, + Executive Registry Subject Files (1977–1979), Box 14, Folder 22, + C–382, Saudi Arabia) + + + RP M 79–10061 + + + Washington, February 3, 1979 + +

SAUDI PERCEPTIONS OF KEY ISSUES AFFECTING SAUDI-US RELATIONS [classification and handling restriction not + declassified]

+

Saudi-US + Relations [classification not declassified]

+

There are two schools of thought within the Saudi Government on + relations with the US. Crown Prince + Fahd epitomizes and is + personally identified with the traditional Saudi relationship with + the US, which most Saudis + increasingly see as a “client” relationship. Fahd has supported the US and its policies on regional + security, oil, and Middle East peace efforts. Fahd appears to identify Saudi + interests with US interests; he puts + great faith and reliance in the US-Saudi “special relationship.” [classification and handling restriction not + declassified]

+

The wisdom of such close identification with and reliance on the + US has come under increasingly + sharp attack from two groups: conservatives who want to minimize the + unsettling Western influences on Saudi society, and young, + Westernized technocrats—both royal princes and commoners—who want to + more aggressively assert Saudi national interests even if they + diverge from US interests. [classification and handling restriction not + declassified]

+

US credibility has declined + dramatically with all Saudi leaders over the past year. [2 lines not declassified] Young nationalistic + Saudis have argued persuasively with their elders that Saudi and + US interests diverge on issues + such as the Camp David accords and oil production policy, and that + Saudi Arabia should, therefore, distance itself somewhat from the + US. [classification and handling restriction not + declassified]

+ +

Comment [classification + not declassified]

+

We expect additional strains in Saudi-US relations on major issues such + as Middle East peace efforts and oil production levels. US attempts to exploit Crown Prince + Fahd’s desire for + close US-Saudi relations in + order to secure pledges on oil and peace are not likely to + produce the desired results. [9 lines not + declassified]

+

[1 paragraph (14 lines) not declassified]

+

[4 lines not declassified] We believe further US pressure + on issues like oil or support for the Camp David talks may + provoke a strong anti-US + reaction among Saudi leaders including Fahd. [classification and handling restriction not + declassified]

+

[heading not + declassified; classification not declassified]

+

Saudi security concerns are the overriding + Saudi foreign policy issue; US + responsiveness to their request for specific defense commitments and + [less than 1 line not declassified] + contingency planning may well determine the course of US-Saudi cooperation for the next + several years. The Saudis are convinced that the Soviet “threat” is + urgent and strikes at the very survival of their regime. The lack of + US responsiveness to Saudi + warnings of Soviet encirclement has caused them to begin a + fundamental reassessment of their relations with the US and USSR. [classification and handling + restriction not declassified]

+

Comment [classification + not declassified]

+

ORPA/ME agrees with recent assessments of the + US Ambassador [less than 1 line not declassified] that the Saudi request for a defense commitment + and [less than 1 line not + declassified] contingency planning is a + deliberate test of the US + commitment to their security. If the US response is considered inadequate, we believe + that the Saudis probably will move toward a more non-aligned + political posture and become less accommodating toward US energy concerns and Middle East + peace efforts. The heretofore unthinkable—an accommodation with + the USSR—is also a + possibility. [classification and handling + restriction not declassified]

+

Recent signs of US + support like the F–15 visit are not enough in Saudi eyes. + [1 line not declassified] National Guard Commander Prince Abdallah—one of + the pro-US senior princes—was + critical of the visit as being an unconvincing show of force, + but just enough to draw criticism of Saudi Arabia from its + “progressive neighbors.” Abdallah reportedly said that rather + than see such “meaningless” shows, he would prefer the US speed delivery of the F–15s + Saudi Arabia has ordered and hasten the training of Saudi pilots + to fly them. [classification and handling + restriction not declassified]

+

Oil Policy and Production [classification not declassified]

+

Saudi policy is to limit oil production in 1979 to an annual average ceiling of 8.5 million barrels/day. + For technical, conservationist and economic reasons, the Saudis do not want to + continue to produce at higher levels to make up for the Iranian + shortfall. The Saudis believe they have done all they can to keep + OPEC price increases moderate; + they consider US pressure to do more + unrealistic and short-sighted. They have expressed resentment over + US statements of unhappiness + about their behavior at the recent Abu Dhabi meeting.See footnote 3, Document + 175. The Saudis do not intend to spend billions + of dollars to install excess productive capacity to meet an + ever-growing world energy demand, particularly in light of the + failure of the US to curtail its + ever-rising demand for imported oil. The Saudis have made clear that + they have done about all they intend to do to meet world demand. + Major oil consumers, especially the US, must get serious about conservation and developing + alternative energy sources. [classification and + handling restriction not declassified]

+

Comment [classification + not declassified]

+

Despite current statements by Crown Prince + Fahd that Saudi + Arabia is willing to compensate for the shortfall in oil + production caused by the turmoil in Iran, we believe current + Saudi policy remains to produce no more than 8.5 million + barrels/day on an annual basis, to resist + US pressure to spend + billions of dollars to increase future productive capacity, and + to slow considerably Saudi development plans. [classification and handling restriction not + declassified]

+

Under US pressure, + Crown Prince Fahd has + indicated willingness to rescind the oil price increases and + production limitations announced in late January by Oil Minister + Yamani. Such a move, + however, would further weaken Fahd’s domestic political position [2 lines not declassified]. US insistence on rescinding + Yamani’s orders has + alienated the Oil Minister and probably has embarrassed and + angered Fahd deeply. It + ultimately may erode Fahd’s willingness and perhaps even his ability + to cooperate with the US.Carter sent a message to Fahd on January 30 + thanking him for the Saudi decision to maintain its oil + production level. See Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, + vol. XXXVII, Energy Crisis, 1974–1980, Document + 185. In telegram 1010 from Jidda, February 1, West + wrote: “Our apparently successful efforts to persuade Prince + Fahd to reverse + the recent Saudi oil pricing decision may well be a pyrrhic + victory. Whatever the economic benefits may be to USG, and in the Saudi view + they are infinitesimally small, we will have exacerbated + existing divisions within SAG and damaged further Fahd’s credibility here.” + (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + P850027–2583) A rescinding of Yamani’s orders—which Saudi + leaders believe are justified and in Saudi national interests—is + likely to cause sharp anti-US + feelings within the government and stiffen opposition to future + cooperation with the US. + [classification and handling restriction not + declassified]

+

Fahd’s + willingness to expend political capital for the US can be expected to diminish + sharply if the US is not + forthcoming in meeting Saudi security concerns, and, secondarily, its concerns on + the Middle East peace issue. [classification and handling restriction not + declassified]

+

Middle East Peace [classification not declassified]

+

The Saudis see the Arab-Israeli issue as directly affecting their own + national security. To be pushed to support a peace agreement that + does not have at least moderate Arab acceptance would, in their + view, increase radicalism in the Arab world or possibly cause + Palestinian retaliation. In either event they see themselves as a + prime target. [classification and handling + restriction not declassified]

+

The Saudis have two “non-negotiable” demands for a general Middle + East peace: that Arab territory—including East Jerusalem—captured in + the 1967 war be returned to Arab control, and that the Palestinians + have the right to self-determination, including the possibility of a + separate West Bank state. Saudi suspicion of the Camp David accords + has hardened along with a suspicion that the US supports a separate Egyptian-Israeli peace rather + than the general Middle East peace it espouses. The Saudis believe + the Camp David accords will lead only to a separate peace and the + isolation of Egypt from the Arab world. Saudi Arabia would then be + forced to further align itself with the more hard-line Arab states, + further straining ties with Cairo and Washington. The Saudis would + like to see the Camp David accords dropped and the peace process + returned to the United Nations, where the Arabs would negotiate as a + bloc, preventing unilateral Egyptian moves for a separate peace. + [classification and handling restriction not + declassified]

+

Comment [classification + not declassified]

+

Egyptian President Sadat’s negotiations with Israel + present Saudi leaders with a dilemma. The Saudis want to remain + on close terms with Sadat, but they see their own security in + the Arab world, and the best means to reach a general Middle + East peace, in Arab consensus, not in unilateral negotiations + like Sadat’s. The Saudis would prefer to avoid having to choose + between Sadat and the majority of Arabs who reject the Camp + David accords as inadequate. [classification and handling restriction not + declassified]

+

During the past year, the Saudis have moved away + from Egypt and the US on the + peace issue. If an Egyptian-Israeli peace is signed that does + not contain strong “linkage” to Palestinian rights of + self-determination on the West Bank and Gaza, we believe the + Saudis probably would go along with the sanctions voted at the + Baghdad Summit last November.See + footnote 2, Document + 175. The Saudis do not act in dramatic ways and + there is flexibility in their position on the peace issue, but + the failure of US efforts to + convince them to support the Camp David accords should make clear that they + will not support what all the Arab world sees as a separate + Egyptian-Israeli peace. Saudi unhappiness with the Camp David + accords has had a spillover effect on other aspects of US-Saudi relations, increasing the + doubts of those who question the wisdom of close Saudi + identification with the US. + [classification and handling restriction not + declassified]

+
+ +
+ 184. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Saudi + Arabia and the United States Liaison Office in RiyadhSource: National Archives, RG 59, + Central Foreign Policy File, P850027–2444. Secret; Niact Immediate; Nodis. Drafted by Bodine; cleared by William H. + Marsh (T), Kreisberg, + O’Donohue, Murray, + Sick, and Leo R. + Wollemborg (S/S–O) and in + substance by John D. Forbes (P); approved by Saunders. Sent for information + Immediate to Dhahran, the White House, Department of Defense, + CHUSMTM Dhahran, and + USMTM + Riyadh. + + + Washington, February 4, 1979, + 0056Z + +

30211. Military handle as Specat + Exclusive. Subject: SecDef + Brown Visit: Joint U.S.-Saudi + Planning Committee. Refs: A) State 17130;See footnote 8, Document + 177. B) Jidda 890 (Notal);See Document 182. C) Jidda 625 + (Notal).In telegram 625 from Jidda, January 23, the + Embassy provided responses to the questions posed in telegram + 17130 to Jidda, January 22, indicating complete approval “of the + proposals outlined” in telegram 17130. (National Archives, RG + 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P850027–2224)

+

(S) Entire text.

+

1. We are aware of the deep Saudi desire to see a clear reaffirmation + of the U.S. commitment to the security and integrity of Saudi Arabia + and to the region, as expressed by King Khalid in his most recent + letter to the President (ref B). We have examined closely the + options available to us within the context of what is possible as + well as desirable. In this regard we appreciate your comments reftel C. There is both great + practical and political merit in intensifying consultations on + security matters.

+

2. With this in mind, Ambassador in scheduled Feb. 4 meeting with + Foreign Minister may confirm our interest in periodic security + consultations and that in this connection we see Secretary Brown’s visit as initiating this + new dialogue which will continue through the Crown Prince’s + Washington visit. (FYI. We expect + Secretary Brown will propose a formal mechanism for + regular consultations, but we prefer to let SecDef develop this in course of + his discussions and therefore prefer that you not preview this to + Saudis beforehand. End FYI.) In + preparation for Brown + discussions, you might suggest that SAG carefully prepare detailed appreciation of their + security perceptions to present to Secretary Brown.

+

3. FYI: We do not envision the joint + committee at this time engaging in the kinds of specific contingency + planning the Saudis may have in mind. Rather, we view the committee + as a high-level consultative mechanism for intensifying the + U.S.-Saudi dialogue on security issues. End FYI.

+ + Vance + +
+ +
+ 185. Telegram From the Embassy in Saudi Arabia to the Department + of StateSource: National + Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P850027–2604. + Secret; Immediate; Nodis. + + + Jidda, February 12, 1979, 1420Z + +

1318. Department pass SecDef, + AmConsul Dhahran, CHUSMTM + Dhahran, USMTM/DCR Riyadh. (S) Secretary Brown’s Meeting With Crown Prince + Fahd.

+

1. S-entire text.

+

2. Summary: In two-hour meeting on night of February 10, Defense + Secretary Harold Brown + outlined for Crown Prince Fahd, Min Def Prince Sultan, and Fon Min Prince + Saud U.S. proposals for + integrated strategy to promote security and stability in the region. + SecDef said U.S. prepared to + make strong political and military contribution. U.S. prepared for + new collaboration in areas of military assistance, intelligence + cooperation, and strategic planning. Secretary Brown proposed consultative + mechanism. Regular meetings at the Minister of Defense level would + take place at least annually, and there would be interim meetings at + lower level. Sub-committees could meet at appropriate levels to deal + with specific topics in depth, including bilateral security + assistance program, US-Saudi + assistance programs for third countries, and intelligence + cooperation. Saudi reaction was positive, but they said they wished to consider proposals + over night before giving response. End summary.

+

3. Defense Secretary Harold + Brown met for over two hours with Crown Prince + Fahd during evening of + February 10. Meeting was also attended by Min Def Prince Sultan, Fon + Min Prince Saud, Ambassador West, Assistant Sec Def David McGiffert, Deputy Assistant Sec Def Robert Murray, Rear Admiral + Hanson, and Embassy Pol Counselor.

+

4. After opening pleasantries, Secretary Brown delivered to Crown Prince letter from + President Carter to King + Khalid.No copy of the letter to + Khalid, as approved by Carter and delivered by Brown, has been found. A draft + of the letter, which briefly outlines the purpose of Brown’s visit, was forwarded by + Tarnoff to Brzezinski under a February 8 + covering memorandum. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign + Policy File, P790046–0328) Secretary Brown then said that President + Carter had asked him to + emphasize how important he considers relations between Saudi Arabia + and the U.S.See Document 19. We consider US-Saudi relations to be key to peace + and stability in this region of the world. President has seen need + for integrated strategy in the area and the U.S. is willing to make + strong political and military contribution to forwarding that + strategy. We have some specific proposals to make along these lines. + These proposals are in the areas of military assistance, + intelligence cooperation, and strategic planning.

+

5. Crown Prince Fahd said + that he would be pleased to hear any proposals and to discuss them, + if not during the current meeting, then at another meeting.

+

6. Secretary Brown said that + he would like to start by giving Crown Prince the U.S. view of the + Middle East to see if SAG and + USG views are the same. He said + that the Middle East was of crucial importance to the United States. + It is strategically located; it has vital resources; and its people + share common interests with us on critical issues. Security and + stability in the Middle East is thus critical for us.

+

7. Secretary then said that we saw several threats to that stability. + The first threat stems from Soviet imperialism. The Soviet efforts + to overturn the international order are a threat to the peace of the + world. The Soviets are strong. Fortunately, we are with our allies + much stronger. We are, for example, clearly superior in economic + power, in technological power, in key areas of military strength, + and in the strength and cohesiveness of our allies. We are very much + aware that this region is a prime target for Soviet encroachments. + The Soviets are exploiting internal instability and regional + conflict. The evidence of Soviet actions in the Horn of Africa, + South Yemen and Afghanistan is a persuasive demonstration of Soviet + ambitions. Soviet propaganda is clear evidence that they aim to + exploit turmoil in Iran and elsewhere. The Soviets, however, are by no means + invincible. They have had serious setbacks in Egypt, Sudan and + Somalia, and they have been excluded from the peace process. The + Soviets have no doubt about American strength and will have no doubt + about our determination in this part of the world. Saudi Arabia + should not doubt either. We will work to check the Soviets. The + Soviets can be checked. We look to Saudi Arabia to share in this + effort.

+

8. Secretary then said that the second source of instability in the + area came from the tensions and inequities of rapid modernization + and social change. In Iran, this contributed to the Shah’s problems. + His regime lost touch with the people. They saw him as anti-Islamic, + alien, even contemptuous of them. He also lost his personal and + political will when faced with violence. Our support for the Shah, + although it was strong and steady, could not overcome those + circumstances. However, there is no reason that the experience of + Iran need be repeated elsewhere in the region. Modernization should + strengthen governments, make them more popular, if it is equitable + and is well-paced. It can give new vitality and expression to + religious beliefs. This is a job for each country. For our part, we + want to continue to work closely with SAG. We should keep in touch on our separate efforts to + promote development in the area. We believe that what our two + countries do now will be crucial to orderly economic development and + modernization. That is a great responsibility and a great + opportunity.

+

9. Secretary said third source of instability in the Arab world was + from those who would pursue radical change with violent means. + Secretary then said that he wanted to be frank. Times have changed. + The Egyptians do not seek to overthrow traditional regimes now as + they did in the 60’s. Saudi security has, from this direction, + dramatically improved since then. (Crown Prince Fahd and Prince Sultan chuckled + at Secretary’s words and readily agreed). Secretary went on to say + that the threats to the states in the Peninsula today are PDRY, conspiracies from Libya, + terrorism which clothes itself in Palestinian garb, and Iraq, which + is still led by rejectionists and radicals. Finally, said the + Secretary, the dispute between Israel, its neighbors and the + Palestinians was profoundly destabilizing. We seek to avoid another + war. This is also in Saudi interest. War profits no one, but war and + the preparation for it, provide the Soviets vast opportunity for + influence and meddling.

+

10. Secretary stopped at this point to ask if Saudis agreed with U.S. + analysis. Crown Prince said he shared U.S. analysis completely. If + there is any difference, it is in emphasis only, not in substance. + He was pleased to hear it. In fact, he said he had been waiting a + long time to hear U.S. say it. He said he now sees indications that + the US and Saudi Arabia are on verge + of new and positive measures. He then invited Prince Sultan and + Prince Saud to comment. + Prince Sultan agreed with + analysis and said that he too had been waiting for U.S. to say it. + It is crucial that U.S. devise strategy to deal with threat of + Soviets and other radical elements focusing on Middle East. Saudis + see a long-range, comprehensive Soviet strategy unfolding before our + eyes, manifesting itself in the events in the Horn of Africa, in + South Yemen, and in Afghanistan. US + needs to develop a counter-strategy based on the weak front-line + states, such as YAR, Oman, and + Somalia. Must also help strengthen military forces of Kingdom. + Prince Saud said he wanted + to withhold his comments until he heard Secretary Brown’s proposals.

+

11. Secretary Brown said that + it was clear that our pictures of the problem were similar with only + differences in stress as the Crown Prince had said. There is some + question whether the USSR is + proceeding according to a comprehensive plan, or whether it is + simply taking advantage of opportunities as they present themselves. + The effect is the same, however, and what we have to do is the same. + Secretary then went on to say that President Carter has been discussing this + problem each week over the past several weeks with his key advisors + including Vice President Mondale, Secretary Vance, Dr. Brzezinski, and himself, (Secretary Brown). President asked that he + tell the Crown Prince that the US + sees the need for an integrated strategy for regional security to + which it is prepared to make a strong political and military + contribution. We are prepared for new forms of bilateral and + multilateral collaboration on security matters, including military + assistance, intelligence cooperation and contingency planning. We + are willing to consider an increased US military presence in the area if it would be + helpful, including increased naval presence and new collaboration on + basing arrangements. We are also willing to consider concerted + measures to counter radical forces that now provide a base for the + intrusion of Soviet influence.

+

12. In pursuing this strategy, we want first to work even more + closely with Saudi Arabia. He said he would be making proposals for + a formal consultative mechanism on security issues. He would also be + responding to Saudi proposals for joint planning and discussing ways + to improve our joint assistance program for other countries.

+

13. Second, we want to promote concerted security measures among + moderate states, such as Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Jordan. Secretary + said he intended to begin a broader security dialogue with Egypt and + to assure President Sadat and King Hussein of the US intention to contain the Soviets. + The President would be grateful if Saudi Arabia could assure them of + this American intention. The President would be grateful also for + Saudis’ views of Oman and the Gulf states, the situation there, and + their ideas of what should be done, and the role the US should play.

+

14. Third, we now have—and we intend to maintain and improve—US military forces to provide an + increased military presence in this vital region. Our military forces are already + substantially superior to those of the USSR. The Soviets generally deploy only 11 combatants + in their Mediterranean squadron. NATO deploys more that 100 combatants, including 23 + US of which two are carriers. + The US could deploy two carrier task + forces to the Gulf in 14 days. A carrier task force is able to + project air and assault power and influence a crisis ashore. The + Soviets have no comparable capability. During the first 30 days of a + crisis, the United States could deploy significantly more aircraft + in the Gulf than could the Soviets. The US also specifically plans its general purpose forces + against the criterion of having to confront a contingency in the + Gulf at the same time as a contingency in Europe. Probably nothing + we can do more seriously indicates our commitment to this region, + for this planning assumption requires us to expend significant + amounts on forces we would not otherwise require or deploy.

+

15. Secretary then repeated that the US was prepared to consider enlarging its military + presence in the region. He asked Crown Prince if Saudis thought this + would be desirable. If so, what form should it take? The Crown + Prince said this was a very sensitive matter and that he would like + to sleep on it. Perhaps he or Prince Sultan could give the Secretary + an answer on February 11.Brown’s February 11 meetings + with Sultan are summarized in telegram 1408 from Jidda, February + 15; telegram 259 from Riyadh, February 18; and telegram 1540 + from Jidda, February 21. (National Archives, RG 59, Central + Foreign Policy File, D790072–0169, D790095–1049, D790092–0836, + respectively)

+

16. Secretary said he understood sensitivity of question and could + understand Crown Prince’s desire to sleep on it. Secretary then said + that, in any event, U.S. cannot go it alone. In order to have public + support, we must act in concert with friendly nations. While the + nature of the arrangements differs from place to place, we are + prepared to make an appropriate American contribution in the Middle + East. However, the degree to which we can increase our security role + will depend in great measure on the degree to which the moderate + states in the area can cooperate with each other. In a similar way, + the ability of the Western Europeans to overcome enmities had + provided the basis for far reaching US support for Western Europe’s security. We have great + many forces in Europe and we are even more committed to Europe in + case of crisis. We justify that to our people on two grounds. First, + the region is vital to U.S. Second, the nations of the region are + prepared to cooperate with each other and with U.S. For example, the + idea of France and West Germany fighting each other today is + unthinkable. Yet, for many years, they did fight each other. In the + Middle East, the first condition is met because the region is + important to us. The second criterion has a way to go. (Fahd, chuckled and agreed that + Arab-Israel question was + still a problem.) However, it is important for us to be able to say + to our people that the peoples of the region will cooperate with + each other and that old animosities are forgotten, especially among + moderate states.

+

17. Prince Saud broke in at + that point to ask what Secretary meant by moderate states. He + understood Secretary to say Egypt, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia. What + other states are moderate? Secretary said that we considered Israel + to be moderate. Saud did not + contest point. Secretary went on to mention Gulf states, YAR, and Sudan. He added that there + were signs that Syria might be gradually moving in that direction. + Perhaps, one day, Iraq might also move in the direction. Crown + Prince Fahd said he thought + that Iraq might become more moderate and sooner than Syria. Prince + Saud wanted to know if + Secretary Brown was going to + Syria on his trip. Secretary said that he had no plans to go to + Syria on this trip.

+

18. Secretary returned to elements of U.S. strategy. He said that, + fourth, U.S. seeks cooperation in oil matters that builds on the + common interest of the US, its + allies, and the moderate states in security and economic + development. Crown Prince said he understood.

+

19. Fifth, said Brown we are + moving to strengthen our position elsewhere in the region. We are + doing everything we can to assure a satisfactory outcome in Iran. + Secretary Brown pointed out + that he had been personally involved in every step of the way, + trying to support a moderate solution. We have substantial programs + for military and economic aid for Turkey. We have granted Turkey + dols 300 million in aid and we + are also working with our West German allies to provide further aid + programs for Turkey. In the Yemen, we have mounted, with Saudi + Arabia, a major new effort to deter further Soviet and radical + threats to the peace. In Pakistan, we recently informed the + Zia government that we + are prepared to sell a broad range of modern military equipment. + Since then we have had further signs that Pakistan is pressing ahead + with a program for nuclear explosives, and this is going to limit + and perhaps prevent our going ahead with arms sales, and may even + require the cut-off of all aid, including economic aid. The wise + counsel of Saudi Arabia to Pakistan on the nuclear issue would be + very welcome.

+

20. We would like to know the Saudi perception of regional security + requirements, and particularly the ways Saudi Arabia believes an + American role would be helpful.

+

21. Sixth, we are pressing forward with the peace process. No + American President has worked harder for a just peace than President + Carter. The negotiations + are difficult, and will not be quickly completed, but we are + committed to them we will continue until they are completed. The + United States, and the President personally, are committed to a full peace, including + the West Bank and Jerusalem, not just a peace between Egypt and + Israel. In our judgement, the Camp David Accords are a vital first + step and need to be quickly translated into an Egyptian-Israeli + treaty as the first step toward a comprehensive peace. We see this + as essential to regional stability. He said the President has asked + him to make clear that our ability to develop and support regional + cooperation will be severely handicapped, perhaps even negated, by + continued Arab-Israeli hostility. We would hope for a forthcoming + attitude from our friends in order to facilitate wider strategic + matters.

+

22. Turning to the US-Saudi + consultative mechanism, Secretary Brown said U.S. was prepared to enhance + significantly our special relationship with Saudi Arabia if Saudi + Arabia wishes. We would like Saudi views on how this should be done. + One immediate step we could take, as SAG has suggested, would be to establish a mechanism + for regular, periodic security consultations between our two + governments. When we set up a joint commission in 1974, it was not + chaired by ministers, it could consider only existing military + programs and it had no fixed time table for meetings. We propose + regular meetings, perhaps annually, at the Minister of Defense + level, and interim meetings at a lower level. In this way we would + be assured of full discussions on the range of security issues at + least every 6 months, more often as necessary. In addition, we could + establish sub-groups that could meet at appropriate intervals to + discuss in-depth specific topics, including bilateral security + assistance programs, US-Saudi + programs of assistance for other countries, intelligence exchanges, + and the like.

+

23. Prince Sultan said that concept of consultative mechanism was ok. + However, the existing military mission plays part of this role + already in that it deals with matters of military assistance to + third countries and military supply to Saudi Arabia. Prince Sultan + then said it was disappointing that there had been so much + correspondence over this matter without results. In any event, he + would discuss matter with Prince Saud during the course of the evening and would + discuss it further with Secretary on February 11. He would give the + Secretary SAG’s decision on + February 11 or 12. If decision is favorable, Prince Sultan suggested + that we make an announcement that we have already held first + meeting. Secretary Brown + agreed that it was good idea to make such an announcement and that + the two staffs could work out the language. Sultan said however it + is done, it will have to be done in such a way as not to give + outsiders a chance to make trouble. We do not want to give third + countries an opening for criticizing our efforts.

+

24. Secretary then moved on to matter of joint planning. He noted + that this had been raised by Prince Saud and Prince Sultan with Ambassador West. He said President Carter had asked him to convey to + Crown Prince our willingness in principle to engage in carefully + defined joint planning with + SAG. Secretary then referred to + four specific questions raised by Prince Saud with Ambassador West. Secretary said detailed + answers required some working out and further consultations but that + he would like to give Crown Prince our initial answers. With respect + to hostilities in neighboring states involving the Cubans, Russians + or East Germans, we, of course, could through close bilateral and + regional cooperation, do much to prevent this kind of thing from + happening. However, it could happen and we agree to engage in joint + planning with SAG against that + possibility. SAG, of course, must + understand that under our constitutional system, joint planning + cannot, as such, involve a commitment to joint action. Secretary + said that he had no doubt that such a threat would create the kind + of situation that would invoke a strong response from our Congress + and would meet the constitutional requirements.

+

25. Secretary said that, in view of the late hour, he proposed + leaving the matter of third country assistance programs for + discussion the next day.

+

26. Crown Prince said that he was pleased with all the subjects + discussed thus far. He had wanted a long time for the U.S. to come + and discuss things in this fashion. He said he would convey the + contents of the discussion to the King. He was certain the King + would be pleased. Now that the U.S. has taken these steps, we can + look forward to executing practical measures in the security field + to counter the Soviet threat and to promote stability in the + area.

+

27. Comment: Saudi reaction to our proposals was restrained but very + positive. Prince Saud, who accompanied Ambassador to dinner for + Secretary Brown, seemed + overwhelmed. He said that perhaps we were offering too much too + fast.

+ + West + +
+ +
+ 186. Telegram From the Embassy in Saudi Arabia to the Department + of StateSource: National + Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790090–0851. + Secret. Sent for information to the Department of Defense, + Amman, Abu Dhabi, Cairo, Kuwait, Manama, Sana, and Tel + Aviv. + + + Jidda, February 27, 1979, 1050Z + +

1677. Subject: (U) Assessment of Visit by Sec Def Brown.

+

1. (S-entire text).

+

2. Summary: Visit by Secretary of Defense Harold Brown was qualified success.See Document 185. + Brown reported to + President Carter on his + trip, which included visits to Tel Aviv and Cairo, in a February + 19 memorandum; see Document 20. + We think that we have passed initial SAG test of US + intentions in regard to defense of Saudi Arabia. We think that + limits of security relationship desired by SAG with U.S. have been defined. However, reports from + Israel on Brown visit there + and reports from Washington on purpose of Brown’s Middle East trip have cast + shadow on what was accomplished in Saudi Arabia. In addition, + answers to questions raised by SAG + on supply and military equipment have negative signals. End + summary.

+

3. Now that Secretary of Defense Harold + Brown has come and gone, we think we ought to look at + what has been accomplished and what has been left unfinished.

+

4. It is no secret that SAG has been + unhappy with certain aspects of its relations with the U.S. + Beginning in the fall of 1977, we began hearing Saudi pleas for help + against what they perceive as a master Soviet plan to encircle the + Arabian Peninsula, particularly Saudi Arabia, and to gain control of + the oil of the Peninsula and the Gulf. The events in the Horn of + Africa bore all the tell-tale signs of that Soviet master plan and + SAG worried that USG somehow did not recognize the + danger. Saudi pleas became urgent and pressing after the events in + the two Yemens in June of 1978.See Documents 243 and 244. They called for a U.S. declaration of + commitment and support for the security of Saudi Arabia, active U.S. + participation in an ambitious program to bolster YAR defenses, and possibly even a show + of force in the YAR or perhaps even + in Saudi Arabia. At the same time, SAG voiced its concerns that the U.S. was suffering + from a Vietnam complex that left it either unwilling or unable to + meet the Soviet threat. These concerns became more pointed in + content and shriller in tone during the course of the summer. As it + became increasingly evident that the Shah’s regime was about to + collapse, Saudi officials expressed their fears candidly about the + U.S. strength of purpose to + European diplomats, and it was common talk in Jidda diplomatic + circles that key individuals in Saudi royal family were discussing + ways of accommodating what they perceived as reality in the + region.

+

5. Meanwhile, we think that the pro-US forces in the royal family were given the task of + testing the US to determine the + truth about US intentions. They + proposed establishment of a joint Saudi-U.S. committee to plan for + contingencies in the Peninsula. Failure to respond positively to + Saudi suggestion would signify that US was not serious about providing for Saudi defense. + An agreement to plan but failure to carry through would signify that + the US was incapable of carrying out + its commitment.

+

6. We think we have passed the initial Saudi test. The visit of the + F–15 squadron to Saudi Arabia in January provided in part the show + of force sought by those responsible for Saudi Arabia’s + security.See footnote 3, Document 177. Secretary Brown’s after-dinner speech at the + Saudi military officers club in Riyadh on February 10 provided the + security declaration they wanted.The + text of Brown’s speech, + in which he reiterated the U.S. commitment to Saudi Arabia’s + territorial integrity, is in telegram 1319 from Jidda, February + 13. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + D790068–0385) The speech was cleverly framed, reiterating + publicly the public and private commitments of former US Presidents in such a way that the + message would be clearly understood, but not serve as a provocation, + in those quarters to which it was directed. Although it was not seen + or cleared by SAG in advance, it + was clear from the remarks of Foreign Minister Prince Saud the following day that the + speech met SAG approval. Secretary + Brown’s development of + the Saudi proposal for a joint Saudi-US planning committee and the further discussions of + the role of committee between Deputy Assistant Secretary Robert Murray on Feb 18 have + responded to the Saudi request for joint planning.In telegram 259 from Riyadh, February 18, the + Liaison Office described a meeting between Brown and Sultan, during which + the two officials discussed the U.S.-Saudi-YAR tripartite military + relationship. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy + File, D790095–1049)

+

7. However, while Secretary Brown seemed to be giving very positive signals to + SAG on the broader, overall + questions, the signals given on the military supply questions were + not interpreted as all that positive by Saudi officials, especially + those in the Ministry of Defense. The answers given on individual + items desired by SAG were + overwhelmingly negative. While Foreign Minister Prince Saud emphasized the positive + achievements of the Brown + visit, he did take note on February 18 of the unsatisfactory replies + on military supplies when he told Murray that if faced by a situation where USG refused to supply Saudi Arabia with desired + military equipment but offered a US + military presence in Saudi Arabia, SAG would be on the horns of a terrible dilemma.

+

8. The Brown visit also served + to establish limits on the type of security relationship desired by + Saudi Arabia with the United States. As expected, the suggestion of + a possible American military presence in Saudi Arabia was further + than SAG wanted to go. Our proposal + to publicize the joint Saudi-US + committee also served the same purpose. As an overwhelmed Prince + Saud told Ambassador + West privately on + February 10, the US seemed to be + offering too much too fast. The limits desired by SAG appear to conform to what SAG officials have told us in the + past: they want a US commitment like + the one that Israel has. They want no treaty, no formal agreement, + no formal organization, but instead a military supply relationship + and a commitment to come to their assistance if attacked by the + USSR or one of its + surrogates.

+

9. Another limit set by the Brown visit and the subsequent talks by Murray and Prince Saud was on the price SAG was willing to pay to get the kind + of security relationship it desired with the US. Prince Saud + made it clear that the US should not + insist that Saudi Arabia support positions that would jeopardize the + kind of relations it wishes to maintain with the other Arab states. + Saudi Arabia favors a comprehensive Arab-Israel peace settlement. It + supports and will continue to support peace efforts toward that end. + It supported the Camp David talks. However, it does not and will not + support the Camp David Accords as a basis for peace, because they do + not include two of the essential elements for a comprehensive peace, + namely self-determination for the Palestinians and a return of + Jerusalem to Arab hands.

+

10. In sum, we think that the Brown visit was a qualified success. We have + clarified and established the limits of the special relationship + desired by SAG with the US in the security field. We have + supplied two of the basic elements they regard as essential in a + security commitment by the US: a + declaration and an agreement for joint contingency planning. We + think that the discussion in the leadership circles about which way + to orient Saudi foreign policy may now enter a new phase in which + the hand of the pro-US forces will + be considerably strengthened.

+

11. However, the success of the Brown visit was not undiluted. The press reports + from Israel and the US that flooded + into Saudi Arabia after the departure on the visit and undoing much + of the good previously accomplished. Reports from Israel that the + U.S. was relying on Israel to take the place of Iran in defending + US interests in the area and + reports in the US that the USG was trying to forge new Middle + East defense arrangement centered on Egypt, Israel, and Saudi Arabia + gave the Saudi leadership pause. They wondered if the US was pushing Saudi Arabia in a + direction that would cause it to become isolated and alienated from + the other Arabs. They also wondered whether the US + was not preparing the + ground to force SAG to support + publicly a separate Egypt-Israel peace and to play a role in OPEC that would cause them not only + foreign policy problems but internal problems as well. While Deputy + Assistant Secretary Murray + told Prince Saud on February + 18 that USG was not proposing + tripartite defense treaty advocated by Senator Jackson,Reference is to a suggestion made by Senator + Henry Jackson that + the United States work toward a “mutual defense arrangement in + the Middle East” among Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Israel, that + “would be powerful enough to deal with any adversary” with the + exception of the Soviet Union. (“U.S. May Not Get Oil From Iran + for Year, Sen. Jackson + Warns, Urging Curbs on Use,” The Wall Street + Journal, February 12, 1979, p. 2) we think + SAG will need to be reassured + further on this point and on the kind of role we expect Saudi Arabia + to play in OPEC as well.

+

12. In addition the negative signals given on the military supply + question must be overcome or the momentum engendered by the visit + will not be maintained. While the US + as a matter of policy is committed to arms restraint, this is not + the time or the place to impose such guidelines. To the Saudis, the + special relationship is intimately related to their perceptions of + adequate supplies of military equipment, and for the moment, the + US is viewed as not being + responsive enough to these needs. The Saudis believe that their + requests are both modest and consistent with the requirements to + strengthen the Kingdom’s ability to defend itself. This is the + continual refrain of MODA + officials and was stated with considerable eloquence by Fon Min + Prince Saud at his Feb 18 + meeting with DAS + Murray. Essentially, the + Saudis have asked only for Lance, Stinger, + additional air munitions, area denial weapons, a speed up in F–15 + deliveries, MER 200 and conformal + pods for the F–15’s and some sophisticated night vision and fire + control gadgetry. They have not asked for AWACS, or new squadrons of advanced fighter aircraft. + None of these military items are going to change the balance of + power in the region nor is their purchase likely to cause serious + discontent within Saudi society. However, if the US fails to respond to these requests, + then we believe that the atmosphere of our bilateral military + relationship will begin to sour and that the repercussions on other + financial, petroleum and political issues are likely to be injurious + to US interests.

+ + West + +
+ +
+ 187. Summary of Conclusions of a Special Coordination Committee + MeetingSource: + National Security Council, Carter Administration Intelligence Files, Box + I020, Minutes-SCC 1979. Secret. + The meeting took place in the White House Situation Room. The + minutes are not attached and were not found. Dodson sent the Summary of + Conclusions to Mondale, + Vance, Brown, Jones, and Turner under a March 19 + memorandum signed by Carolyn Cleveland (NSC). + + + Washington, March 6, + 1979, 9:30–11 a.m. + + + SUBJECT + Sensitive Collection and Covert Action Proposals (S) + + + PARTICIPANTS + + + Vice President** + Denis + Clift + + + + + State + David Newsom, + Under Secretary for Political Affairs + Amb. William Bowdler, + Director Bureau of Intell & Research + + + + + Defense + Charles + Duncan, Deputy Secretary + Daniel Murphy, + Deputy Under Secretary for Policy + + + + + JCS + Lt. Gen. William Smith, Assistant to Chairman + + + + + CIA + Admiral Stansfield + Turner + Frank + Carlucci, Dep. Director + John McMahon, Dep. Director for Operations + Theodore Shackley, Acting Deputy to DCI for Collection + Tasking + Alan Wolfe, Chief, NE/DDO + + + Justice + Attorney General Griffin Bell* + Kenneth Bass, Attorney-Advisor + + + + + OMB + Dr. John White, + Deputy Director + + + + + NSA + Admiral Bobby Inman + + + + + White House + David Aaron, + Chairman** + + + + + NSC + Paul B. Henze, + Notetaker + + + *Not present during first half-hour of the + meeting. + **Not present during final half-hour of the + meeting. + + +

[Omitted here is material unrelated to Saudi Arabia.]

+

The main portion of the meeting was devoted to discussing CIA’s proposals for intensified + intelligence cooperation and covert action with the Saudi Arabian + government and related possibilities for action to preserve our + interests in the Arabian Peninsula. (S)

+

As step parallel and complementary to our [less + than 1 line not declassified] with the Saudis, + establishment of a [1 line not declassified] + was endorsed. State’s concern that we not promise so much that we + generate exaggerated + expectations of returns from the Saudis was noted. It was agreed, + however, that [1 line not declassified]. The + Ambassador will be kept informed of aspects of the [less than 1 line not declassified] process + that have policy implications. The Chairman stressed that a priority + concern on our side should be to exploit this intensified + relationship [1 line not declassified]. + (S)

+

Provision of counterterrorist training to the Saudis was endorsed. + The Attorney-General’s representative said that a new Presidential + Finding would be required and concurred in the text [less than 1 line not declassified]. (S)

+

[1 paragraph (10 lines) not declassified]

+

The principle of providing defensive training for YAR and Omani personnel to enable them + to control infiltration and subversion was endorsed, though the + State representative cited several cautions. CIA was asked to provide a more + detailed proposal for approval at a forthcoming SCC meeting, [2 + lines not declassified]. OMB asked for cost estimates. In light of possible + Congressional concerns, the Chairman asked that possibilities for + overt U.S. military help in this area, as well as CIA-sponsored help, be examined. The + representative of the Joint Chiefs was of the view that CIA is better prepared to assist with + this sort of activity than DOD. + (S)

+

The proposal for radio operations produced a great deal of discussion + but no agreement that benefits from the activity would be + commensurate with all the complications it might entail. CIA will study this question further + before determining whether to submit a more concrete proposal. The + Chairman asked that further efforts focus on questions of + compatibility and control to ensure that an operation of this kind + could be kept from working contrary to U.S. interests. (S)

+

The possibilities of larger-scale paramilitary operations were not + discussed in detail. The Attorney General chided the group for being + overly concerned about congressional sensitivity and thus, he felt, + hesitant about advancing ideas. Other members of the group expressed + disagreement with the Attorney General’s assessment that little + damage had resulted from leaks and exposures. Discussion of the + Arabian Peninsula concluded with agreement that CIA, working with other agencies as + appropriate, would attempt to develop more specific action + proposals. (S)

+

[Omitted here is material unrelated to Saudi Arabia.]

+
+ +
+ 188. Memorandum of ConversationSource: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, + Brzezinski Donated + Material, Subject File, Box 33, Memcons: Brzezinski, 3–6/79. Secret. + The meeting took place in Prince Saud’s office in Riyadh. + Sick sent the + memorandum of conversation to Brzezinski under a March 28 memorandum + requesting Brzezinski’s + approval. Brzezinski + neither approved nor disapproved the request. (Ibid.) Brzezinski, Christopher, and Jones visited Israel, Saudi + Arabia, and Jordan during their trip. For Carter’s instructions for the + mission to Saudi Arabia and Jordan, see Foreign + Relations, 1977–1980, vol. IX, Arab-Israeli + Dispute, August 1978–December 1980, footnote 2, Document + 215. + + + Riyadh, March 17, 1979, 3:30–5:30 + p.m. + + + PARTICIPANTS + + United States + Dr. Zbigniew + Brzezinski + Warren + Christopher + Ambassador John + West + Chip Carter + Michael + Sterner + Gary + Sick + George Cave + + + + + Saudi Arabia + Prince Saud al-Faysal + al-Saud Minister of Foreign + Affairs + Prince Turki + al-Faisal Director of Intelligence + Dr. Rashad Pharaon + Mr. Abd al-Rahman al-Mansuri Note taker + + +

Prince Saud opened the discussion by noting + that this was the first meeting in this room and in fact inaugurated + the entire building. (There was a brief photo opportunity for + members of the press) Prince Saud continued that, especially during these times + of great stress and strain two countries with such good relations as + Saudi Arabia and the United States should share an exchange of + views, we should know what is on each others’ mind. This is the way + to understand each other. It will contribute to the security and + stability of the area. Since the beginning of President Carter’s Administration, the areas + of our mutual relations have expanded into areas not tackled before. + The efforts of President Carter make our relations one of the factors we have + to take into consideration in viewing the problems of the area. The + leadership of Saudi Arabia has tried in every way to contribute to + those relations, including the visit of Crown Prince Fahd to Washington,On Fahd’s May 1977 visit to Washington, see Documents 150 and 151. President Carter’s visit to Saudi Arabia,For the memoranda of conversation of Carter’s meetings with Saudi + officials on the Arab-Israeli peace process during his January + 3–4, 1978, visit to Saudi Arabia, see Foreign + Relations, 1977–1980, vol. VIII, Arab-Israeli + Dispute, January 1977–August 1978, Documents 183 and + 184. and King + Khalid’s meeting with the President in Washington.See footnote 7, Document + 176. There have been many other discussions in + the interim. We have tackled together many problems in this region. + He hoped that with complete trust and guided by our mutual interests + we can look forward to + a fruitful discussion during this series of meetings.

+

Dr. Brzezinski said the President has asked the + four of us to discuss with you matters of common concern. Chip + Carter will later convey President Carter’s invitation to Crown Prince Fahd to visit Washington.Fahd’s trip to Washington did not take + place.

+

It is the President’s very deep conviction that the United States and + Saudi Arabia share a certain common fund of interests. We wish to + underline these common interests and the fact that they are not + shared by all countries: belief in God and religious values, which + affect the way in which we approach things and represent an + important point between us; the feeling of the special relationship + between Saudi Arabia and the United States, a relationship we wish + to maintain. That relationship is also important to achieve justice + and peace for all parties in the Middle East, especially those in + the destructive and tragic conflict between Israel and its Arab + neighbors. The President is absolutely determined to achieve a just + settlement. He is the first U.S. President since 1948 to mortgage + his political future to that issue. One may or not like every step + he has taken, but it is important to remember that he is the first + Democratic President to make such an effort, and you understand that + that is not easy. We are now at a critical juncture for world + affairs and for the region. We face a severe challenge. The + fundamental condition of the world today is turbulence. The key + question of concern for you and ourselves is whether the outcome is + to be shaped by radical power [that] helps the Soviets and hurts + Saudi Arabia.

+

There are two basic threats in the region:

+

(1) The external threat is the Soviet Union. We have been concerned + about the pattern of events which we have observed in recent years + in Afghanistan, Ethiopia, South Yemen, Iran. Each of these may + represent individual events in terms of their internal causality, + but they are externally linked since they create a pattern of + encirclement which constitutes a security threat. To the extent that + we share common interests, this threat represents a threat to the + United States as well.

+

(2) The internal threat is the threat of radicalism. Political + conditions vary from country to country but cumulatively the growth + of radicalism has the same effect, since it produces regimes + practicing similar foreign policies and brings to power similar + types of leadership.

+

The United States is prepared to respond to both threats. If + necessary we are prepared to use our power responsibly. As of + yesterday, the U.S. carrier Constellation arrived on station 200 + miles south of the PDRY. It has on board destructive + power capable of taking care of any hostile air force in the area, + if that should prove necessary. This and other actions prove that we + are prepared to respond quickly—in this case as a result of the + request of the Yemen Arab Republic, supported by Saudi Arabia.See Documents + 268 and 269. We acted + because our interests were threatened, but also on the basis of your + request. The exercise of U.S. power has been hampered in the wake of + Vietnam; however, the Vietnam malaise is now coming to an end. + President Carter is a + president of peace and resolve. He works for peace but is willing to + use power if required to defend his friends. We also wish to promote + moderation, but that is more difficult and must be done indirectly. + We learned in the case of Iran how limited external forces can be + and how dangerous can be the forces released by incompetent + leadership.

+

Our role in the Middle East has three broad aspects:

+

First, we are willing to promote, with those + willing to work with us, a wider consultative security framework. In + saying this, I am not intending to even hint at the concept of an + alliance. We recognize the complexity of issues, the variety of + pressures, and the historic sensitivity of this regime, and we do + not propose the formal bonds of a formal alliance. Rather we are + ready to explore flexible multilateral and bilateral means to + respond to the existing security threat. We need to think seriously + about this concept and would like to have your ideas. This must be a + mutual effort at establishing an appropriate intellectual framework + for cooperation.

+

Second, we are prepared to cooperate with all + Arab states. It is not our objective to split the Arab world. We + recognize that beneath the historic difficulties of the present, + there is an Arab renaissance at work. We welcome this development + and believe that it will contribute to the world as a whole. We are + prepared to work with all the Arab states, and any suggestions that + you might have to improve our relations with Syria or Iraq, for + example, would be welcome.

+

Third, our intent is to promote a process to + shape a comprehensive and just peace in the Middle East. The + Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty will soon be completed.The Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty was signed by + Begin, Sadat, and + Carter in Washington + on March 26. Brzezinski + and Fahd discussed the + state of the Middle East peace process in the aftermath of + Carter’s March 7–13 + visit to Egypt and Israel between 6:30 p.m. and 8:20 p.m. on + March 17. For the memorandum of conversation of this meeting, + see Foreign + Relations, 1977–1980, vol. IX, Arab-Israeli + Dispute, August 1978–December 1980, Document + 218. We worked hard for this, and we see it as the + cornerstone for a comprehensive settlement. The process of getting + to this point was painful, even on a personal basis. Some of us have + been accused of being + anti-Semitic because of our efforts. We have learned some hard + lessons. We have, through experience, come to understand that any + attempt to solve all of the problems at once would simply mean that + nothing gets solved. Frankly, we started with a different idea, but + we discovered painfully that it would not work. I have now learned + with some pain that even getting two parties together at this stage + is extremely difficult. To try to add other parties would guarantee + failure and a continuation of the status quo.

+

We see three results of the peace treaty:

+

1. It will establish the principle of Israeli withdrawal and + dismantlement of settlements. It would not be wise to boast too much + too soon, but this is important as a precedent.

+

2. The process is directed toward a comprehensive peace, as pledged + publicly by President Carter + in his speeches in Cairo and Israel.Carter addressed + the People’s Assembly in Cairo on March 10 and the Knesset in + Jerusalem on March 12. For the text of his speeches, see Public Papers: Carter, 1979, Book I, pp. + 412–414 and 424–428. Once the focus is on the modalities + of elections, the registration of voters and other practical + political problems, these clear-cut issues will make it easier to + mobilize world public opinion. So we are willing, after the signing + of a treaty, to undertake discussions with the Palestinians. We see + the treaty as the only way the Palestinians have a chance to attain + their legitimate rights.

+

3. It will help cement Arab/American friendships. It is impossible to + overestimate the way U.S. public opinion has been affected by + President Sadat’s initiative. All of you have probably encountered + American stereotypes toward Arabs, and perhaps you have been + personally offended by these in the past. That view has now been + shaken to the roots. Today, more Americans believe that the Arabs + are committed to peace than they do Israelis. This provides a sound + foundation for the extension of U.S.-Arab relations.

+

I wish to tell you in utter seriousness that anything which might be + done to increase Sadat’s difficulties economically would have an + adverse effect on our interests in this area. It would make it + harder to shape a strategic design. This is not to imply that Sadat + is our unique friend or that Egypt will somehow replace Iran, + although he is a friend and could play an + important security role. But undermining Sadat would help forces + such as the Soviets. None of us wants to see a pro-Soviet regime in + Egypt, and that would be the result of a change in leadership. + Actions to hurt Sadat would only help the radical forces in the + region. It would also help those rigid Israelis who prefer the status quo of holding onto all the occupied + territories while surrounded by radical states. It would also help anti-Arab elements in the + United States.

+

All of this is said as a friend. We know that the peace treaty is + causing you difficulties, that you are part of the Arab world and + that means that you face pressures. We do not expect unanimity on + all points, and we realize it would be difficult for you to provide + a ringing endorsement of the treaty. However, we want you to + understand the strategic thinking which underlies our own position. + We understand and appreciate your pledge that you will do nothing to + hurt Egypt and the people of Egypt. Our primary interest is to shape + a wider relationship between the United States and Saudi Arabia. He + then invited Mr. Christopher + to add his comments.

+

Mr. Christopher said that he would say many of + the same things but perhaps from a slightly different perspective. + He had liked Prince Saud’s phrase that our relations had expanded + into new areas. We recently saw a degree of security cooperation + which would have been hard to imagine previously: the F–15 sale, + Secretary Brown’s visit, the + accelerated deliveries to Yemen, the Presidential waiver on military + sales for the first time in our history, the offer to send U.S. + F–15s to defend Saudi Arabia air space, the deployment of the + carrier Constellation and others.See + Documents 263, 268, 271, and 275. These events have been seen + for their positive effects, though they have sometimes also been + seen for the distraction they involve. I have heard it said that our + response on security issues, together with our promotion of the + peace treaty, might cause us to lose interest in going forward + toward a comprehensive peace. I think exactly the opposite is the + case. The new U.S. activity in the security area, the confidence it + has given to us—and I hope to you—now make it possible to conclude a + treaty and give new impetus to move forward in the peace process. + Our concept of that process is more specific than it used to be.

+

In the course of seeking this treaty our ideas have changed. It took + longer than we anticipated. We cannot see clearly down the road to + the achievement of West Bank autonomy, but that does not lessen our + interest. We did not come here to sing the praises of President + Sadat, but you should know that he held out for a commitment to + proceed with negotiations on the West Bank and Gaza and it was + agreed that one month after ratification of the treaty, negotiations + would start on the West Bank and Gaza. Jordan is invited to join + these. We also hope that Palestinian members will join the + negotiations. We do not intend to place undue pressure on Jordan to + join in but we hope that they will and that the negotiations will + include Palestinians.

+ +

Our objectives are twofold: First, to define the responsibilities of + a Self-Governing Authority; and secondly, to lead up to elections. + These negotiations are to be completed within one year. These are + concrete precise steps. Sadat fought long and hard for linkage and + got it. There will be many immediate benefits such as family + reunions. The United States will be prepared to talk with the + Palestinians when they are prepared to discuss peace on the basis of + resolution 242. Phase one of the peace treaty provides the precise + means to move toward phase two. The alternative to this practical, + identifiable process is so much worse, that we recommend that you + look long and hard at what is being offered.

+

We need not come here to interpret for you American attitudes, but it + is important to mention the tremendous welling up of support in the + United States for the peace treaty. Significantly, this support is + bipartisan. Senator Baker, in + what may have been an inadvertent comment, pronounced the end of + bipartisanship in American foreign policy. But, Senator Baker is also one of the most + enthusiastic supporters of the peace process. The people in the + United States take great pride in what has been accomplished. The + American people also support what President Carter has done in this area in + the past few weeks by waiving the 30 days requirement which was a + legacy of the Vietnam era. Our response to your request was + supported—such as sending AWACS, + which invited an interpretation of the War Powers Act.The War Powers Act of 1973 (P.L. 93–148; 87 + Stat. 555) limits the President’s authority to commit combat + troops and requires the President to inform Congress of such + action. U.S. operations cannot extend beyond 60 days without + congressional approval. These actions were taken out of a + sense of strength and with the knowledge that they all involve some + domestic risk.

+

As you know we have a tripartite form of government. The Executive is + only one of three branches of government, and the vibrations of + power move back and forth among them. It is important that the + President retain the confidence of Congress, and I would underline + Dr. Brzezinski’s comment + that any action to harm Egypt would have a bad influence on + Congress. That fact has been apparent in the attitudes of the senior + committee chairmen such as Senator Church. Any effort which undermines the peace + process, which penalizes Egypt or which seems to penalize them would + result in effects which are unfortunate and adverse.

+

We value our relations with Saudi Arabia so highly that we thought we + could speak frankly of these matters and explore how we could expand + our relationship. Friendship is a two-way street. We hope that you + want to tender our friendship in response. We note particularly that + your actions over the past year in the monetary field have been responsible and + conservative in the very best sense of that word. We want to keep + our relations that way. So, we came here, in the confidentiality of + this room, to raise issues important to the peace process.

+

Prince Saud responded with thanks for these + presentations and noted that they had no fear of speaking frankly. + That is the only way people who are friends should talk. The + opposite of frankness is deceitfulness. The relations between our + countries are so fundamentally strong that they are not affected by + transitory elements. We think that our relations can withstand + stresses. We are obliged to be frank with you.

+

We have a belief in the relations between our two countries. Many + years ago this Kingdom decided that the cornerstone of its policy + involved good relations with United States. This was a specific + decision by the founder of the Kingdom. He chose to place this + country on the side of the free world and the United States. Some + say that the Saudis were often too much of a good friend of the + United States when U.S. activities worked to our own disadvantage. + We have faced greater stresses in the past that we face today—times + when the United States felt that this Kingdom was not a trustworthy + ally or that it was an anachronistic social order.

+

There was a new beginning with the inauguration of the Carter Administration. Since then + we have achieved many areas of understanding which were not + previously possible. The basic component in that relationship has + been confidence. Stable, constant relations provide the essential + background for our discussions, and with that in mind I would like + to tackle the issues that have been raised.

+

Our discussions recently with Secretary Brown achieved some understanding in the security + area and how to pursue further efforts. I would like to mention some + things about the threat; we share the view of an ever present Soviet + threat. It is indeed external but it uses internal forces to spread + itself through subversion. The Soviets entered this region because + of Israel—into Egypt through the arms supply channel in opposition + to Israel—through cooperation on the high dam using the leverage of + the Israeli problem and the Palestinian problem. They used the + conflicts and contradictions in the area to spread themselves and + they still do. A new model of the threat is now becoming the use of + client states in Africa, Asia and elsewhere to extend Soviet + influence, using political forces for strategic gain. (Dr. Brzezinski interjected client states and + proxy forces.)

+

Continuing, Prince Saud said they have asked + the United States to create a just and lasting peace. The Israeli + problem is not just a political problem. It has deep roots which + cannot be avoided. Why do we want a solution? To bring peace and + stability. A peace which does not resolve the basic issues does not + lead to peace and stability. We hope and pray that it will be brought about and + we hope that this will happen through the efforts of the United + States and President Carter.

+

No country wishes for peace more than Saudi Arabia. Our country is + part of the world and is inexplicably linked to it. We identify + ourselves with the future of the Western world. We are convinced of + this and we need not be persuaded. The cornerstone of our situation + in the Arab world is that we must cooperate with moderate elements. + We have built strong relations with Egypt. We have pursued them and + we believe in them. Egypt is essential to the security and stability + of the region. No country wishes for the success of President Sadat + more than Saudi Arabia. No country would be more hurt by his + failure. Not indirectly but directly. We would like to see Egypt as + the leader of the Arab world, with moderate forces spreading. We + would be harmed if Egypt were isolated.

+

With respect to a peace settlement, there have been many discussions. + Starting with Secretary Vance’s visit last summer,Vance + visited Israel and Egypt August 5–9, 1978, to deliver + invitations to Begin and + Sadat to meet at Camp David. See Foreign + Relations, 1977–1980, vol. VIII, Arab-Israeli + Dispute, January 1977–August 1978, Documents 285–288. there have + been constant talks. We have consistently given our opinion. We have + constantly said that an agreement which does not tackle the central + Palestinian issues or a total settlement would be difficult for the + Arab world to accept. There is a minimum degree of solidarity needed + to have this accepted. We know it is not a single step process. + President Carter said that + the problem would be viewed in its totality. We have no problem + taking it step by step or putting it in stages. We gave our views on + this subject as friends to the United States when you undertook the + heavy burden of leadership.

+

These efforts must tackle the important obstacle which is Israel. The + visit of Sadat to Jerusalem was undertaken to break through that + obstacle. After that there was a transformation in attitudes. When + President Carter was here he + thought that the Sadat visit was a good thing but was a little angry + about not knowing about it in advance and thus not being able to use + it to the utmost.

+

There are limits to what any Arab country can do. We must act + according to our perception—not only one person or two people but + what the entire country of Saudi Arabia can accept. When we hold + that Jerusalem is an important point, we do so not because we are + more religious. It is an important issue to any Muslim country. Arab + opinion, it can be said, is biased against Israel; however, that was + not true in Iran. Yet, the first issue raised by the new Iranian + government was the question of Palestine. Saudi Arabia does not want + to be difficult, does not + want to harm your interests or hurt Sadat. We have constantly + expressed our opinions which we hold because they reflect the + minimum levels required for Arab support. Even though we differ + about the way to achieve a peace settlement nothing we have done in + the past few years could be interpreted to make life more difficult. + Rather we have tried to assist within the limits of our + capabilities. We pray that President Sadat and President Carter will succeed in their + efforts. U.S. relations with Egypt are no threat to Saudi Arabia or + to any other Arab country except perhaps South Yemen.

+

We have certain perceptions of the danger to the approach to peace: + there are two parties, Israel and the Arab world (or Egypt) and we + perceive that the United States gives complete support to Israel + both economically and militarily. Israel increases its demands and + Egypt is forced to make concessions to overcome the obstacles of + Israel. This is our perception, and in the final analysis it is hard + to bring the Arab world to support this. Whether it is true or not + is arguable. Does strengthening Israel actually lead to compromises? + We think our position is correct. The perception exists, which we + cannot hide, that Sadat agreed to more than the minimum acceptable + to the Arabs. Jordan is a country most interested in peace. It is + safe to say that they see themselves incapable of following Sadat, + although they tried at every step.

+

We talked to Sadat and we need to extend efforts to get their views + accepted. There are thirteen moderate countries in the Arab League + all wishing Sadat success. They hope he will bring something that + they can grab and fight for. As Crown Prince Fahd said when the Ambassador + brought in a stiff or stern message, “Give us something we can hold + on to.” We tried to get Arab support. Why does Egypt not go and seek + the support they need, stressing the positive elements of the US/Egyptian partnership? Egypt should + reflect the Arab view, but we see a lack of that. We hope that the + Egyptians will undertake such an effort. After the signing of a + peace treaty it will become more difficult.

+

We would not wish to do anything whatsoever to hint at the punishment + of Egypt. We do not want to see it become a Soviet state. However, + there are some limits on our independent action as members of the + Arab League when a member state signs an independent peace treaty. + There will be actions on the part of the Arab League. These + “technical results” include: (1) suspension of the membership of + that country in the Arab League; (2) removal of the headquarters of + the Arab League from Egypt; (3) the application of Arab boycott + rules to Egyptian companies dealing with Israel. These are not + decisions to be taken, but rather the result of Arab League statutes + and the fact of the Egyptian signing of a peace treaty with Israel. + These are protective measures not sanctions. They apply not just to + Egypt but apply to other + entities as well. They are joint measures in accordance with the + statutes of the Arab League and the Joint Mutual Defense Pact. We + will hold the position that we will not support any effort to punish + Egypt. Rather we will use every effort we can exert to bring about + the understanding that we have with Egypt.

+

With regard to regional security affairs, we talked extensively about + this with Secretary Brown. We + established a joint committee to look at all bases of the threat and + develop a common understanding. We agreed in principle on this, and + Mr. Murray has since come + back for discussions. Thus far it has involved the South Yemen issue + primarily, but we think that is a good exercise. I would like to + express the gratitude of my government for the efforts extended in + the past two months in achieving common understanding and taking the + necessary response to the threat. We work well together. We hope + this cooperation will continue and that this kind of quick response + will govern our actions in the future. We must face up to the + Soviets.

+

These issues will not be solved in one meeting. We appreciate your + presence here not only as a sign that the President wants us to know + your views but that you want to know our views. I may have roamed in + the course of this presentation.

+

Dr. Brzezinski said that Prince Saud had made a clear, concise + presentation. If there was time, the President had asked him to be + as responsive as possible in explaining our position on many other + issues such as SALT, and he hoped that you will not hesitate to + raise these. We agreed with Prince Saud’s final observation that + this has been a good beginning, made up partly of your ideas and + partly our ideas. Given the fact that the concrete test which arose + was certainly not planned, nevertheless, I think that the message + was understood by those to whom it was addressed.

+

I welcome and was heartened by the statement that Saudi Arabia would + not be a party to punishing Egypt and would maintain every effort to + maintain normal relations with Egypt. If you should do anything + tangible beyond those technical issues, it would harm us. We will be + helping Egypt, and that effort would be vitiated.

+

You say that the Arab League reaction is technical or symbolic + (Prince Saud starts to + interrupt)—the movement of the headquarters from Cairo is certainly + a symbolic move. But, it is important that the peace process not be + inhibited by an isolated or weakened Sadat. You are very important + in that regard.

+

Your point that Sadat should use more salesmanship is a good one. We + will tell Sadat to do more to make his case. This effort is not one + of instant miracles but rather shaping a political process to lead + to a particular objective. Prime Minister Begin has been in trouble since his + proposal of autonomy, return of land, and self-government was perceived as leading to + something more than that. It is impossible to predict what the + outcome would be.

+

We cannot guarantee a Palestinian state but it is important that the + Palestinians be engaged more as a partenaire + valable. We will talk to Hussein about this. He may not be + able to participate early in the process, but we hope he will not + block it. That plays into the hands of those in Israel who want to + stay where they are. U.S. relations with Saudi Arabia and Egypt + represent a threat to the hard line elements. The Camp David accords + are built on a twin structure of a peace treaty and then moving on + to negotiations on the West Bank and Gaza. The treaty is just the + beginning of a process but it could gain momentum, especially if the + Palestinians begin participating in growing numbers. This will take + political sophistication, but we see it as an equitable beginning.

+

Prince Saud asked what would happen in the + Arab world in the meantime.

+

Dr. Brzezinski replied that isolation has to be + avoided.

+

Prince Saud wondered how? Arab perceptions + have gone askew at the efforts of Egypt. We thought that Sadat would + take on the Arab mantle, but he has achieved self-isolation even + from his friends. When he was going to Camp David he told us + formally that, “As long as this man (Begin) lives I cannot put my name on any document; + so I go there only to get the U.S. position.” There have been a + series of constant events, surprises. That may move some people, but + that rule does not apply in this part of the world.

+

Dr. Brzezinski said that maybe President Sadat + had not articulated his position enough or had not tried enough. It + was important to remember the progress, however. Two years ago + Israel had said they would never give up the Sinai, they would never + return to the original lines. There are different kinds of peace + settlements. One is a peace dictated by the victors. The alternative + is accommodation, where both sides have to give something. The Arabs + are not a vanquished nation. They performed brilliantly in 1973. + However, Israel also is not defeated, so compromises are required. + After my recent visit to Israel, I am convinced that Begin’s + political problems are real. The anguish there is real. It was + apparent in the Knesset with the great spectacle of political + opposition.

+

Prince Saud wondered whether it would be + possible for the United States to announce the end result of the + peace process.

+

Dr. Brzezinski replied that would kill the + process from the beginning. We would have three choices:

+

—first, we could announce a result fully satisfying to the Arabs in + which case the Israelis would never join the process;

+ +

—secondly, we could announce an outcome favorable to Israel, in which + case the Arabs would not join the process;

+

—thirdly, we could announce an outcome involving serious concessions + by both sides, in which case both sides would probably refuse to + join in.

+

Prince Saud wondered why we could not go to an + international forum; why not further refine the definition of + Resolution 242 in the Security Council?

+

Dr. Brzezinski replied that at this time a + certain measure of ambiguity was needed in order to move forward. He + pointed to the speech by Mr. Peres in the Knesset recently, half of which dealt + with the rights of the Palestinians. He thought this was extremely + important since Peres could + conceivably be the next Prime Minister.

+

Prince Saud said, why not wait until he + becomes Prime Minister?

+

Dr. Brzezinski said he cited Peres’ speech as an example of the + kind of change of attitudes that can occur when one is not too + precise. That is especially true when the objectives are + irreconcilable.

+

Prince Turki noted that Mr. Christopher had referred to the + checks and balances among the three different sections of the U.S. + Government. He thought there was a fourth element—the press. Saudi + Arabia is anxious that its actions not be interpreted in the United + States on the basis of their reporting by the + Washington Post. America has an Ambassador here to find out + what Saudi views are.The U.S. + delegation next met with King Khalid at the King’s Palace from + 5:45 p.m. to 6:10 p.m., followed by a meeting with Crown Prince + Fahd. See Foreign + Relations, 1977–1980, vol. IX, Arab-Israeli + Dispute, August 1978–December 1980, Document + 218.

+
+ +
+ 189. Draft Intelligence Memorandum Prepared in the Central + Intelligence Agency + + + PA M 79–10189 + + Washington, April 16, 1979 + +

[Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of Support Services + (DI), Job 82T00150R, Production + Case Files (1979–1981), Box 6, Folder 141, [folder + title not declassified]. Secret; [handling restriction not declassified]. 14 pages not + declassified.]

+
+ +
+ 190. Summary of Conclusions of a Presidential Review Committee + MeetingSource: Carter + Library, National Security Council, Institutional Files, Box 74, + PRC 102, 4/27/79, Saudi + Arabia. Secret. The meeting took place in the White House + Situation Room. The minutes are not attached and were not found. + Brzezinski sent the + Summary of Conclusions to Carter under a May 1 memorandum recommending + that Carter approve it. + Carter approved and + wrote in the margin: “Zbig—Enumerate for me items of leverage we + might exert on S[audi] A[rabia]. J.” The President added: “p.s. + Supplication is fruitless.” Tarnoff forwarded two undated Department of + State background papers prepared for this meeting, covering a + range of U.S.-Saudi issues, to Brzezinski under an April 25 memorandum. These + papers are in the National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign + Policy File, P790064–1310. A portion of the paper on oil and + other economic issues is printed in Foreign + Relations, 1969–1976, vol. XXXVII, Energy Crisis, + 1974–1980, Document 202. + + + Washington, April + 27, 1979, 3–4:30 p.m. + + + SUBJECT + PRC Meeting on Saudi + Arabia + + + PARTICIPANTS + + State + Secretary Cyrus + Vance (chaired) + Richard + Cooper, Under Secretary for Economic + Affairs + William + Crawford, Deputy Assistant Secretary, + Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs + Ambassador John + West + + + Treasury + Secretary W. Michael + Blumenthal + Anthony + Solomon, Under Secretary for Monetary + Affairs + + + Defense + Deputy Secretary Charles + Duncan + Robert Murray, + Deputy Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern, African and + South Asian Affairs + + + Energy + Secretary James + Schlesinger + Peter Borre, Deputy Assistant Secretary for + International Energy Resources + + + ACDA + Barry Blechman, Assistant Director + + + JCS + Lt General William Smith + + + DCI + Robert Bowie, + Director, National Foreign Assessment Center + Robert Ames, NIO, + Near East and South Asia + + + White House + David + Aaron + + + NSC + Gary + Sick + + + +

The purpose of the meeting was to develop a strategy for managing our + relations with the Saudis over the coming months in order to obtain + as much Saudi support for key issues as we can realistically expect. + The group agreed as follows:

+

1. There was general consensus that the U.S. relationship with Saudi + Arabia is undergoing a period of severe strain and will require + special attention in the months ahead. (S)

+

2. On the peace process, we need to resume a dialogue with the Saudi + leadership about our own plans and intentions. It will be useful to + inform them in advance whenever possible of steps we plan to take, + but we cannot expect them to change their position with regard to + the next stage of negotiations until some progress has been + achieved. An early visit by Ambassador Strauss would be helpful as evidence of our + intention to press ahead vigorously.Carter placed a + vertical line in the right-hand margin next to this sentence. + Carter had appointed + Special Representative for Trade Negotiations Robert S. + Strauss to be his + Special Representative to the Middle East peace negotiations on + April 24. (S)

+

3. Apart from the key issues of peace, security and oil, there are a + range of economic issues which are of interest to the Saudis and + where we might be able to show progress. These include the Saudi + investments in the United States, tax issues affecting ARAMCO, possible restriction of the + foreign tax credit, the payment of interest on Saudi funds deposited + with the Defense Department, the boycott, and questions relating to + development assistance. It was agreed that these issues needed to be + examined on an interagency basis in the context of our overall + relations with Saudi Arabia. Secretary Blumenthal could then discuss them with the Saudi + Minister of Finance, Mohammed Aba al-Khail, probably in Europe, at + an early opportunity.In the right-hand + margin next to this paragraph, Carter wrote: “Let me approve first.” + (S)

+

4. The President’s decision to request supplemental assistance and + credits for Sudan and Oman could be helpful, and the Saudis will be + notified of the decision immediately. (S)

+

5. With regard to the Fahd + visit, we should basically let the Saudis determine the appropriate + time. We should encourage them to go ahead with the visit, but not + apply pressure. A visit in late August or September, after Ramadan, + is probably the earliest realistic date for a visit. (S)

+

6. All agreed that some progress would be necessary on the peace + negotiations and/or security issues before we could weigh in + seriously with the Saudis on increasing their long-term production + capacity. With regard to current production levels, we probably + cannot affect their decision to resume production at the previous + level of 8.5 million barrels per day. However, we should be prepared to object if their + production drops below this level. We should make clear that it is + our understanding that they are reducing production in response to + the resumption of a substantial level of Iranian exports, and we + would anticipate a reconsideration on their part if Iranian + production should again drop off. (S)

+

7. This is not an appropriate time to raise the question of their + relations with the Soviets. (S)

+
+ +
+ 191. Memorandum From William + Quandt and Gary + Sick of the National Security Council Staff to the + President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)Source: Carter Library, National + Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 67, Saudi + Arabia: 4–7/79. Secret. Sent for information. Brzezinski wrote the following + note in the upper right-hand corner of the memorandum: “DA please give me your comment. + This is troublesome. ZB.” + Attached but not printed is a handwritten note to Quandt from Brzezinski that reads: “Bill + Q, We need to have a better strategy than this. How can we press + them? E.g. on F–5s? ZB.” Quandt + added a note to Sick: + “GS—any need to develop this + further? BQ.” + + + Washington, May + 3, 1979 + + + SUBJECT + Our Influence with Saudi Arabia + +

Our ability to make the Saudi leadership take a decision which they + believe is contrary to their basic interests is very limited. We do, + nonetheless, have the capability of influencing their decisions on a + considerable range of issues. Insofar as we are able to influence + Saudi Arabia, we will also be in a position to deal with the most + important member of OPEC. This + relates to your interest in developing a strategy toward OPEC, which we will discuss with + Henry Owen at greater + length. (C)

+

There are basically two ways to influence the Saudis—by positive + inducements or by negative sanctions. No single act will produce + much leverage, but over time our behavior can affect the Saudis in + significant ways. (C)

+

Positive Inducements

+

This is the method we have used most frequently with the Saudis, and + the one which has most often produced results. It is most likely to be the preferred course + of action when we want them to do + something—as opposed to making them stop doing something. (C)

+

1. Presidential Request. A direct and personal + request from the President to Khalid or Fahd which recalls the depth of + our “special relationship” and asks for a specific policy or course + of action will sometimes produce results. Obviously this must be + used sparingly and only for issues of great moment, and there must + be some hint that our relationship will suffer if the requested + action is not taken. (S)

+

2. Security Relationship. Tangible + demonstration of the benefits of the U.S.-Saudi security + relationship, e.g. our response to the Yemen crisis is invaluable in + countering the Saudi impression that our relationship is always one + way, with us asking them for something. We cannot create the + opportunities for such demonstrations of our support, but we should + remain alert to opportunities to enhance our credibility as a + security partner. (S)

+

3. Arms Sales. The Saudis have no major end + items on their present shopping list. The F–15 sale was of course a + major boost to our relationship, but approvals of lesser items of + essentially non-controversial equipment or improvements in + deliveries of FMS items only remove + potential irritants. They go largely unnoticed by the key + decision-makers, who tend to take for granted the efficient + operation of our supply relationship. (S)

+

4. Economic. The items enumerated by Mike Blumenthal at the PRC on Saudi Arabia are a sample of + the kind of secondary issues which provide potential leverage if our + response can be positive and suitably packaged.See Document + 190. These are the kind of items which an emissary + could carry in his pocket to forestall the + “what-have-you-done-for-me-lately” syndrome. They will not have a + major or lasting impact, although they can have considerable + influence on a single decision if properly presented. In general, + our economic relationship is perceived by the Saudis as one where we + are constantly asking for concessions on their part, while we avoid + taking painful decisions. Consistent efforts on a domestic energy + program, moves to support the dollar, and decisions on taxes and + other areas of special interest to Saudi Arabia are areas where we + can most effectively counter this impression. (S)

+

5. Middle East Policy. The Saudis imply that + they would be ready to pay a price if we were to adopt position on + the Palestinian question which is closer to their own. Any movement + by the U.S. toward a dialogue with the PLO, support for an Arab role in Jerusalem, or the + creation of a Palestinian homeland would encourage the Saudis to + significantly revise their policies and draw closer to us on the + political front without + fear of Arab reprisal.Brzezinski placed a vertical + line in the left-hand margin next to the first portion of this + paragraph. In the longer term, demonstration of success + in changing Israeli attitudes toward the West Bank and settlement + policy would give us new bargaining leverage on the political front. + The Saudis previously showed interest in helping to bring the + Palestinians into the negotiating process; they could probably be + persuaded to renew their intermediary role by a serious U.S. offer + to seek Palestinian participation. (S)

+

Negative Sanctions

+

Unless done very carefully or on issues of supreme national + importance such as an oil embargo, threats by the United States tend + to be counterproductive. The Saudis are proud and weak. Their + performance at BaghdadReference is to + the summit meeting of Foreign Ministers from 18 Arab states and + the PLO which convened in + Baghdad March 27–31, in order to consider sanctions against + Egypt for concluding a peace treaty with Israel. See Foreign + Relations, 1977–1980, vol. IX, Arab-Israeli + Dispute, August 1978–December 1980, Document + 242. shows that they are not impervious to rather + crude threats, but in that case the threats were immediately + credible and came from a fellow Arab state. In effect, the + rejectionists at Baghdad were pressing the Saudis to do what they + basically wanted to do in the first place, and their acquiescence + could be rationalized as support for Arab nationalism. Our requests + tend to cut against the grain of their natural inclinations, and + overt pressure tends to make them stiffen rather than bend. As a + general rule, negative sanctions are most effective in persuading + them to stop doing something. (S)

+

1. Arms Sales. We can slow or stop the + delivery of key items of equipment and spare parts for Saudi + military forces. This would be a drastic step. If credible, it would + force the Saudis to consider alternative sources of supply and could + undermine the reliability of our entire security relationship. + (S)

+

2. Public Statements. We have already dropped + hints that Saudi opposition to the peace process could create + unfavorable reactions in Congress and the American public. These + warnings have registered and have probably been taken into account. + The Saudis have shown great sensitivity to criticism in the U.S. + press. This may be a useful way to signal our displeasure if used + skillfully. (S)

+

3. Economic. Economic sanctions are a + two-edged sword which risks hurting us as much as the Saudis. There + is virtually nothing we provide them in goods or services which they + cannot obtain elsewhere, and they have no shortage of retaliatory weapons. We need to look more + carefully at the wider range of how we can use economic measures to + moderate OPEC behavior on oil + prices. (C)

+

4. Military. A threat to use military force to + protect our interests would probably be effective in extremis, when it would be credible. It is of little + value in conditions short of that. Such threats are probably best + handled indirectly, through leaks or inspired articles. Kissinger’s all-out campaign of + November and December 1975 (hints of dire U.S. action in the event + of economic “strangulation,” stories about war games in the U.S. + desert, a sudden carrier visit to the Persian Gulf, and scholarly + articles discussing the advantages of direct intervention) certainly + got Saudi attention, but did not necessarily affect Saudi behavior. + A background of such intangible threats may, however, help to + enhance the attractiveness of whatever carrot we might be able to + offer with the other hand. In general, positive inducements may be + most effective after a period of coolness or tension in our + relations. (S)

+

General Comments

+

In order for the United States to exercise effective influence over + Saudi Arabia on any given issue, four general conditions must be + met:

+

—We must be able to provide a service which is needed or badly wanted + by the Saudis;

+

—The Saudis must be unable to obtain that assistance or equipment or + support elsewhere;

+

—The Saudis must lack the means to make us + provide the service; and,

+

—They must be unwilling to do without our help. (C)

+

Those conditions come closest to being fulfilled in the security + area. They are furthest from being met in the economic sphere, where + the Saudis have considerable resources of their own. On political + issues, there is typically a trade-off between competing interests. + Thus, our present strategy of maximizing our security relationship + as bargaining leverage in the economic and political spheres is + entirely rational. However, by increasing Saudi perceptions of the + benefits we can offer on the political and economic sides, we can + increase our overall influence and make the relationship more + stable. (S)

+

The decisions which we make on our domestic energy program and the + direction of the next round in the peace negotiations are the areas + of most promise in sustaining and expanding the U.S.-Saudi ties over + the difficult months that lie ahead. Influence, however, will not + flow from any single act on our part, but instead is likely to be a + function of the quality of our overall relationship. That requires + continuing attention to + our dialogue with the Saudi establishment, not the search for a + quick fix. (S)

+
+ +
+ 192. Summary of Conclusions of a Special Coordination Committee + MeetingSource: + Central Intelligence Agency, Office of the Director of Central + Intelligence, Job 81B00112R, Subject Files, Box 16, Folder 34, + (SCC) Middle East. Secret. + The meeting took place in the White House Situation Room. + Brzezinski initialed + the Summary of Conclusions on the last page. Dodson sent it under a May 14 + memorandum to Mondale, + Vance, Brown, Schlesinger, Seignious, Jones, and Turner. The minutes of this + meeting are printed as Document + 23. + + + Washington, May 11, + 1979, 3:30–4:20 p.m. + + + SUBJECT + Middle East Security Issues + + + PARTICIPANTS + + + State + Secretary Cyrus + Vance + Harold + Saunders, Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Near + Eastern and South Asian Affairs + + + + + OSD + Secretary Harold + Brown + David + McGiffert, Assistant Secretary, + International Security Affairs + + + + + JCS + General David + Jones + Lt. General William Smith + + + Energy + Secretary James + Schlesinger + Harry Bergold, Assistant Secretary, International + Affairs + + + DCI + Frank + Carlucci, Deputy Director + Robert Ames, NIO for + Near East and South Asia + + + + + ACDA + Spurgeon Keeny, Deputy Director + Alan Platt, Acting Assistant Director, Weapons + Evaluation and Control + + + + + White House + Dr. Zbigniew + Brzezinski + David + Aaron + + + + + NSC + William + Quandt + Fritz + Ermarth + Sam Hoskinson + + + +

1. Saudi Financing of Egyptian F–5s. The SCC reviewed the status of the Saudi commitment to the + Egyptian F–5 program. Defense + received a letter on April 27 from Saudi Defense Minister Sultan + setting forth a schedule of payments. Subsequently, Foreign Minister + Saud informed us that Saudi Arabia was + withdrawing its offer to finance the F–5s.Sultan’s letter was not found. Telegram 718 + from Riyadh, May 7, reported that Saud had informed Daniels that, as a result of + the decisions at the March Baghdad summit, Saudi Arabia would + withdraw funding for the sale of the aircraft to Egypt. See Foreign + Relations, 1977–1980, vol. IX, Arab-Israeli + Dispute, August 1978–December 1980, Document 251. A + Mini-SCC meeting, held + earlier on May 11, discussed specifically the Saudi withdrawal + of funding. See ibid., Document 253. Secretary Vance has sent a cable to + Saud in Morocco,In telegram 116140 to Rabat, May 8, + Vance instructed + Ambassador Parker to + inform Saud that the + United States was “deeply concerned by indication that SAG has reversed its decision at + funding Egyptian F–5 program.” + (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + P840133–1743) but has not yet received a reply. The + President has signed a letter to King Khalid, and after some + discussion, the SCC concurred that + the letter should be sent now.Carter’s letter to Khalid, + conveying his “great concern” over the effect that the Saudi + F–5 announcement could have + on U.S.-Saudi relations, was transmitted in telegram 120410 to + Jidda, May 11. See Foreign Relations, 1977–1980, vol. + IX, Arab-Israeli Dispute, Document 248. In + addition, it was agreed that Secretary Brown should respond to the message from Sultan, + emphasizing our broad concerns with the success of the F–5 program, and discussing the + financial arrangements for the sale.Brown’s letter to + Sultan was transmitted in telegram 123107 to Riyadh, May 15. + (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + D790218–0703) All of the principals were concerned about + adverse Congressional reaction if the Saudis do withdraw their + financial support, particularly in light of the personal commitment + from King Khalid to the President. Congressional reaction could be + particularly sharp, and might hurt the F–15 program for Saudi + Arabia. (S)

+

2. Threats to Saudi Arabia. After some + discussion, the group generally agreed that the Saudis are primarily + concerned by external threats, not by internal social upheaval. + Insofar as the Saudis do face internal security problems, those are + exacerbated by external developments. The most immediate dangers as + perceived by the Saudis stem from inter-Arab conflicts, not from the + Soviets or Israel directly. It was generally agreed that the Saudis + have lost confidence in the US + ability to help them manage their security problems, and that an + important objective in our future plans is to reverse that + perception. (S)

+

3. Nature of US + Military Presence. In considering ways of reassuring the + Saudis and others of our commitment to their security, a number of + options are available: enhancing our naval presence; pre-positioning + equipment on bases in the area; and the rapid capability to respond + to requests for military assistance. Defense has been consulting + with the Saudis and Jordanians about contingency planning in the + region, and a number of options for strengthening the US military presence are under review. These will be + considered at a PRC meeting chaired + by Secretary Brown in early + June.The PRC met June 21 and 22; see Document 26. Christopher chaired the June 21 session, and + Brown chaired the + June 22 session. (S)

+

4. Diplomatic Considerations. Secretary + Vance will chair a + meeting of the PRC in early June to + consider the diplomatic consequences of strengthening the US military presence in the Persian + Gulf region. CIA will prepare a + comprehensive intelligence assessment of likely regional and Soviet + responses to various types of US + presence. Iraq’s growing role as a regional power will also be + analyzed. A political strategy for enhancing our security relations + with key countries in the area—especially Saudi Arabia, Oman, + Jordan, the UAE, and Egypt—will be + discussed. (S)

+
+ +
+ 193. Telegram From the Embassy in Saudi Arabia to the Department + of StateSource: National + Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790255–0376. + Secret; Niact Immediate. Sent + for information to the Department of Defense, the Joint Chiefs + of Staff, USCINCEUR + Vaihingen, Dhahran, USLO + Riyadh, CHUSMTM Dhahran, + CHUSEOPE Riyadh, + DCR Riyadh, DIVENGER Riyadh, PM + SANG Riyadh, CDR + DARCOM Alexandria VA, and + Chief US Army + Engineers. + + + Jidda, June 5, 1979, 1415Z + +

4245. Subject: Crossing the Rubicon: US Military Reorganization in Saudi Arabia. Ref: Jidda + 4125 (Notal).In telegram 4125 from Jidda, May 31, the + Embassy provided information concerning the tentative planning + for the reorganization of the United States Military Training + Mission in Saudi Arabia. Due to the regional and Saudi political + sensitivity this reorganization would entail, the Embassy + desired to be kept involved in the process. (National Archives, + RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790246–1026)

+

1. (S-entire text)

+

2. Summary: The time is ripe to open the question of a new US military relationship with Saudi + Arabia. This Mission believes that SAG would not only be receptive to but in fact, would + welcome a change in the US Saudi + military relationship. As a starting point, this Mission recommends + that the Embassy be authorized to approach SAG at appropriate levels to inform it of our + willingness to consider a new structure and direction in our security + assistance efforts to place them in greater conformance with Saudi + needs and desires. End summary.

+

3. There is a little doubt that the military relationship occupies a + central place in US Saudi relations. + The large and varied programs run by the Corps of Engineers, US Military Training Mission (USMTM) Saudi National Guard + Modernization Program (SANG), the + Saudi F–5 program administered by + AFLC, the SNEP and the SOCP programs make the US security assistance effort in the Kingdom one of the + largest in the world today. If we accept the premise that the + security of Saudi Arabia with its vast petroleum reserves is of + vital interest to the US, then it is + also true that, as a concomitant of that interest, it is necessary + to ensure that the military assistance program in Saudi Arabia is + operated with as much efficiency and effectiveness as possible.

+

4. Although our military assistance effort over the past 25 years has + achieved considerable progress, this Mission has come to the + conclusion that our military assistance program has reached a point + where we should review both the type of organization which should + superintend and direct US military + activities in Saudi Arabia and the direction in which these + activities should be focused. Concurrent with this conclusion is the + growing perception that SAG would + not only be receptive to but, in fact, would welcome a change in the + US military relationship.

+

5. During the Feb visit of Defense Secretary Brown and the subsequent US Saudi security consultations, both + Defense Minister Prince Sultan and Foreign Minister Prince Saud made it clear that Saudi + Arabia wants a new military relationship with the US.See + Documents 185 and 186. No specifics were + mentioned, but at least three reasons underline the current Saudi + attitude.

+

6. First, for its part, the Ministry of Defense still wants a + military organization which symbolizes the deeply rooted and special + nature of US Saudi military ties, + but it now appears to want something more than a program which + essentially monitors and administers FMS cases. The parameters for this new organization + have yet to be determined but some extensive changes and + reorientation of effort will be necessary.

+

7. A second consideration is cost, for it is evident that the Saudis + are concerned that they are not getting sufficient value or service + for every riyal spent. Pressure in this regard has recently been + placed on the Corps of Engineers which has been asked to reduce the + ten percent surcharge on construction contracts to eight + percent.

+

8. An additional motivation for change stems from the Saudi + experience during the recent conflict between the two Yemens. Saudi + inability to intervene effectively, even if desired, on behalf of + the YAR on land or in the air is widely recognized + throughout both MODA and the + SAG. Their self-admitted + situation of understrength units, shortages of essential equipment, + lack of an effective command and control system, and their inability + to plan for their own defense or to conduct combined arms operations + has shaken their self-confidence. Rightly or wrongly, MODA officials blame USMTM, as the principal organization + which administers the current US + military assistance program, for many of the shortcomings in the + Saudi Arabian armed forces. They perceive USMTM’s actions + as purely FMS administration with + too little advice and assistance in the command and control process, + training management, and operational planning matters with little or + no regard for MODA’s real + needs.

+

9. This contradiction is the outgrowth of a difference which exists + between USMTM’s functions as defined in the Feb + 1977 US/Saudi agreement on the + Military Training Mission and the role of USMTM as required by Public Law 95–92.A Memorandum of Understanding was signed in + February 1977 to govern the day-to-day relationship between the + Military Training Mission and the Saudi Ministry of Defense and + Aviation. P.L. 95–92, the International Security Assistance Act, + which Carter signed into + law on August 4, 1977, permitted the maintenance of military + management teams during FY 1978 + in 16 countries. As stated in article 5 of the 1977 + agreement, USMTM’s functions include: a) actual + participation in training instruction of Saudi armed forces + personnel at all levels as a priority mission; b) provision of + advisory services in planning, organization, training, armament, + logistics, and supply; c) provision of studies and recommendations + requested by MODA or initiated by + USMTM; and d) management of + Saudi FMS cases. Under Public Law + 95–92 however, USMTM’s primary function is FMS program management and + administration only. Training and advisory assistance must be + provided primarily by personnel who are detailed to Saudi Arabia for + limited periods of time to perform limited tasks. With the exception + of six officers, all members of the US armed forces assigned to the Kingdom to manage the + assistance program must be assigned on a fully reimbursable + basis.

+

10. As a result of this discrepancy, USMTM is placed in a quandary, as its application of + Public Law 95–92 is at considerable variance with Saudi expectations + of USMTM’s functions as outlined in the 1977 + agreement. To overcome this contradiction and to create a US security assistance organization + which is responsive to Saudi desires, a change in the US law or some US funding to provide for operational, planning, + advice, and training assistance will probably be necessary.

+

11. This Mission does not propose to identify in any great detail + proposals for a future US military + organization in Saudi Arabia. We suggest, however, that a complete reordering of + the current security assistance mosaic, and the creation of one + DOD umbrella organization in + Saudi Arabia is desirable. It is our view, however, that the + establishment of a new US regional + command focused on the Arabian Peninsula is probably premature at + the present time, although circumstances might warrant its + consideration at a future date. Nevertheless, it should be possible + to devise a chain of command to Washington which will foster + improved dialogue and responsiveness between the United States and + Saudi Arabia.

+

12. Any new US military organization + should be structured to carry out activities in three areas. These + are: the administration of Saudi FMS cases; the provision of operational planning advice + and training assistance for Saudi security programs; and the + creation of a joint military program liaison office for handling the + middle level staff work, advisory assistance, and coordination with + MODA required to implement the + US/Saudi military assistance + programs in Yemen, Oman, Sudan, Bahrain, Jordan, and other + countries. Individual project managers for the Corps, SANG, MODA, and possibly other programs could remain, but + they should be under the command/direction of the commander of the + umbrella organization. To the extent possible, logistical support + for all US activities should be + centralized, possibly using the Engineer Logistics Command which + supports the Corps as the basis.

+

13. As a starting point for this new military + organization/relationship, this Mission recommends that the Embassy + be authorized to approach SAG at + appropriate levels to inform it of our willingness to consider a new + structure and direction for our security assistance efforts in Saudi + Arabia. Provided SAG concurs, we + would recommend that a survey team be sent to the Kingdom and, + working under the direction of the US Ambassador, determine what the Saudis really want + and expect in order to reorient the US security assistance effort to conform with our + mutual interests. This team should also look at the relationships + between various US programs with a + view towards realizing economies by consolidation of similar + administrative activities and functions. Once this survey is + complete, it should be possible to formulate the basic framework and + most efficient chain of command for a new US military organization. The proposal can then be + presented by an appropriate high-level US team to the SAG for + consideration.

+

14. This message coordinated with USMTM, COE, PM + SANG and USEOPE.

+ + Daniels + +
+ +
+ 194. Memorandum From Secretary of the Treasury Blumenthal to President CarterSource: Carter Library, National Security Council, + Institutional Files, Box 74, PRC 102, 4/27/79, Saudi Arabia. + Secret. + + + Washington, June + 7, 1979 + + + SUBJECT + Economic/Financial Initiatives Toward Saudi Arabia + +

At the PRC meeting on April 27,See Document + 190. it was agreed to seek early resolution of + some of our more minor economic/financial problems with Saudi Arabia + in an effort to improve the atmosphere for subsequent discussions of + oil and Middle East peace. You asked to review those proposals. I + will be seeing Saudi + Finance Minister Abalkhail in + Paris on June 14, and would plan to convey the following to him + unless you object.

+

Several of the outstanding U.S.-Saudi issues are in the tax area + (outside of petroleum). Some relate to the large U.S. investments of + SAMA, the Saudi central bank, + and some to the creditability of Saudi taxes against the U.S. tax + liabilities of non-oil firms. On all of these matters, I will be + able to either assure my Saudi counterpart of a favorable outcome or + express confidence that such a result will eventuate. There is also + the long-run possibility of a U.S.-Saudi tax treaty, but I do not + plan to push this one now because few benefits are likely to result + for the United States and because submission to the Senate might be + more propitious at a later date.

+

As we discussed, the creditability of Saudi taxes on petroleum + remains a difficult issue. The IRS + will shortly be proposing new regulations in this area to resolve a + number of outstanding questions. They will likely have the effect of + disallowing credits for ARAMCO + unless the Saudis make changes in their tax system. I will discuss + this with Abalkhail, but + because of the complex issues involved, resolution of the situation + will probably require extended negotiations.

+

A second major issue relates to Saudi deposits with DOD for weapons purchases. We have not + been paying the Saudis any interest on these funds, and they have + been demanding for several years that we do so. We have reached + inter-agency agreement on arrangements whereby the Saudis will earn + interest on funds that are clearly excess balances according to + DOD contractual guidelines. + Ambassador West will advise + the Saudis that they will be able to earn interest on these funds + when he returns to Jidda this week. In my discussions with Saudi + Finance Minister Abalkhail + next week, I will also refer to this in seeking to persuade the + Saudis to alter their boycott guidelines to enable U.S. firms to + continue doing business in Saudi Arabia without violating our + laws—but I am not at all sure that they will do so. (It would be + possible for us to be more generous, but this would have several + disadvantages: higher costs to our FY 79 and subsequent budgets, greater risk of + triggering similar requests from other depositors, and potential + public/Congressional criticism that we “were being nice to the + Saudis when they were gouging us on oil”.)

+

A third area of Saudi concern relates to U.S. technology transfer. + The Saudis feel that a number of our laws and regulations, as in the + anti-boycott and tax areas, discourage U.S. firms from doing + business with Saudi Arabia and therefore retard their own economic + progress. In addition to the tax issues mentioned above, I plan to + indicate that OPIC (and perhaps + the Export-Import Bank) will be doing more to help in the near + future. I will also reiterate that we stand ready to use the + U.S.-Saudi Joint Economic Commission, which Minister Abalkhail and I co-chair, to + further encourage technology transfer; the Commission, which is + completely funded by the Saudis, already sponsors 22 projects + (including solar energy and desalination projects) worth about $1 + billion upon completion.

+

I have considered the possibility of suggesting to the Saudis that we + open negotiations on a Trade and Cooperation Arrangement. Such an + Arrangement could include provisions to facilitate trade and + investment between the two countries, though it would contain more + symbolism than substance. At this point, however, I see little + advantage in pursuing any major new initiative of this + type—particularly as it would probably require Congressional + ratification, or at least informal approval.

+

On the oil issue, both Ambassador West in his conversations and I in my conversations + with the Finance Minister intend to follow the approach agreed on + unanimously in the SCC meeting + chaired by Zbig last weekReference is + likely to the June 1 meeting of the SCC which addressed international oil issues. + Documentation on this meeting is in the Carter Library, National + Security Council, Institutional Files, Box 104, SCC 168, 6/1/79, International Oil + Problem.—namely, that it is in our mutual interests to + reduce high international spot prices for oil and that a temporary + increase in oil production by Saudi Arabia would contribute to that + objective, particularly during the interim six months before the + agreed upon 5% conservation measures take effect.

+ + W. Michael + BlumenthalBlumenthal signed “Mike” + above this typed signature. + +
+ +
+ 195. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense Brown to President CarterSource: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, + Brzezinski Material, + Country File, Box 67, Saudi Arabia: 4–7/79. Secret. A notation + in an unknown hand reads: “To GS + for file. No further action necessary.” + + + Washington, June + 18, 1979 + + + SUBJECT + Organization of Military Assistance Efforts in Saudi + Arabia + +

You asked for my comments on the attached cableTelegram 4245; printed as Document 193. In a June 6 memorandum to Brown, Brzezinski indicated that + Carter would like Brown’s + comments on the telegram. (Carter Library, National Security + Affairs, Brzezinski + Material, Country File, Box 67, Saudi Arabia: 4–7/79. + from our Embassy in Saudi Arabia concerning the organization of our + military assistance efforts in that country.

+

The Saudis have realized over recent months that they need to do more + to defend themselves. The recent clash in Yemen caused them to take + a look at their own military capabilities and particularly to seek + ways to improve their top-level planning. With the assistance of + General Dick Lawrence, whom + we sent to help the Saudis in this effort, the Saudis have + identified significant deficiencies in their military capabilities. + They are now considering what to do about it.

+

One possibility is for the Saudis to ask the United States to expand + the nature of its advice (beyond the present “Sears, Roebuck” + approach of equipment deliveries and small-unit training on that + equipment)Reference is to the U.S. + full-service department store Sears, Roebuck, and + Company. so as to initiate more central planning and + operations assistance. I am examining the organizational proposals + mentioned in the Embassy Jidda cable, other proposals we have + developed in DoD, and the laws governing our assistance programs, to + see where we want to make changes and how to go about them. I will + be discussing them with Cy, Zbig, and Ambassador West before they are broached with + the Saudis. I believe we can resolve the matter within three to four + months.

+ + Harold Brown + +
+ +
+ 196. Report Prepared by the Ambassador to Saudi Arabia (West)Source: Carter Library, + National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 67, Saudi + Arabia: 4–7/79. Confidential. Carter initialed the first page of the report, + indicating that he saw it. West sent the report to Carter under a 2-page + handwritten letter dated July 22. In it, he commended the + President on his recent personnel moves and noted Robert Strauss’s trip to Saudi + Arabia. Brzezinski + forwarded both the letter and the report to Carter under an August 10 + memorandum, noting: “The summary on the first page of the + assessment provides a good synopsis of the contents.” (Ibid.) + Strauss made his + first trip to the Middle East July 1–7, during which he met with + Fahd in Riyadh. See + Foreign + Relations, 1977–1980, vol. IX, Arab-Israeli + Dispute, August 1978–December 1980, Document + 271. + + + Jidda, July 15, + 1979 + +

SAUDI ARABIA—THE LESSON OF IRAN—AFTER SIX MONTHS

+

Summary

+

The events in Iran have brought to the Saudi leadership a realization + of two facts: an absolute monarchy is vulnerable and the U.S. and + its Western allies are absolutely dependent on imported oil, of + which SAG is a major supplier. This + realization is causing SAG to be + particularly careful about getting too far ahead of its people. It + is also beginning to regard the U.S.-Saudi special relationship, + generally defined as oil for security, as being somewhat unbalanced + in the U.S. favor and is beginning to expect more consideration and + more concessions from the U.S. in return for oil.

+

Introduction

+

The fall of Iran has made clear to the rulers of Saudi Arabia two + basic facts which are more and more influencing SAG foreign policy:

+

1) The vulnerability of an absolute monarchy, regardless of its + tenure, tradition, or outward appearance of stability and no matter + how numerous, well trained, and well equipped the armed forces and + internal security may be.

+

b) The absolute dependence of the United States and its Western + allies on imported oil, of which SAG is the chief supplier.

+

The appreciation of these basic lessons has already had a noticeable + effect on SAG’s bilateral + relationship with the U.S. They will be increasingly important + considerations in the development and direction of SAG’s policies over the coming months. + It is, in our judgment, imperative that the USG policy not lose sight of these considerations.

+

These lessons from Iran’s fall are in a sense a strange paradox to + Saudi Arabia: the first tells the Saudis how weak they are; the + second how strong they are, + especially in their relations with the western world.

+

Vulnerability

+

The Shah, with the best trained, best equipped armed forces in the + area, fell to a group of untrained and ill-equipped urban + revolutionaries. His U.S. arms together with the friendship they + implied were useless to sustain him in power. Friendship with the + U.S., in fact, was one of the Shah’s most vulnerable points, as it + became a rallying cry for Khomeini and the masses as they toppled + the Peacock Throne.

+

When the Shah fell in February 1979, the question immediately posed + in the highest levels of the U.S. Government was: “Will Saudi Arabia + be next?” That question was likewise being asked, debated, and + studied at every level in Saudi Arabia with a degree of concern + understandably greater than even in the U.S. The question was even + similar in form: “Can it happen here?”

+

A stock reply developed almost immediately to that + question—spontaneously we believe, but so uniform as to constitute + what we began to term as the party line from both government and + private sector individuals: “No, we are different . . . there is no + real conflict between the religious and civil authorities . . . the + Shah was vain and arrogant, insensitive to the masses, while our + rulers are close to the people and responsive to them . . . we have + no political prisoners or secret police, yes, there is some + corruption, but we’re taking steps to correct it.”

+

After a time, one had the impression that the Saudis were trying as + hard to convince themselves as they were to persuade us that “it + can’t happen here.” As the ruling hierarchy began to realize that + “it can happen here,” a resolve began to develop: “We won’t let it + happen here.” That determination, which is basically a strong + manifestation of the survival instincts of the Saud family, has increased and has + begun to shape Saudi policy, both foreign and domestic. The final + bit of evidence, if one was needed, was the assigning of internal + stability as the first priority of SAG policy for the new two-year plan.

+

How will the Saudi concern over its internal security situation + affect its relationship with the U.S.? No one, not even the Saudis, + can give a definite answer to that question now. But here are some + general observations and principles which we believe valid:

+

a) They do not like or trust South Yemen, Libya, and Iraq + (approximately in that descending order). While they will continue + to support the PLO financially, + their sympathy for that group and its leadership has noticeably + cooled since the PLO’s attacks on + the Saudi Royal Family at Baghdad II.See footnote 4, Document + 191. However, the Saudis will avoid at all costs + any breach with other Arab + states, including the RejectionistsSee + footnote 6, Document 17. + and those definitely under Soviet influence.

+

b) The Saudis realize more than ever that the political leadership of + a traditional Muslim society must not get too far ahead of its + people’s religious traditions. They will go to extreme lengths to + avoid any major altercation with religious leaders and will be + particularly careful in the application of Islamic laws and + principles. This may create some difficulties with respect to the + non-Muslim expatriate population and could exacerbate the problem of + U.S. human and civil rights issues (especially concerning the rights + of women) as applied to our bilateral relationship.

+

c) They will avoid, to the extent possible, any appearance of (a) + relying on the U.S. for protection, and (b) of being a U.S. client + state and thereby bowing to U.S. wishes and pressures. This does not + mean that they want any lessening of the U.S. security commitment to + them, but it does mean that they want the U.S. connection to be one + of low visibility. They do not want a U.S. military presence except + in case of direct attack by the USSR or one of its surrogates. They want U.S. military + equipment for themselves and for designated neighbors. However, they + want to maintain a measure of control over Saudi-financed U.S. + military assistance to other Peninsula states, e.g. YAR, Oman, and Bahrain. This means a + say in the amount, timing and composition of such assistance.

+

d) Although still a minority, more Saudis are arguing now that some + accommodation with the USSR may be + necessary, and there seems to be some receptiveness to Soviet + overtures to improve relations. This view still, however, contrasts + sharply with the basic Saudi antipathy for atheism and communism in + general and the Soviet Union in particular. However, it is more + likely today that the Saudis would support bringing the Soviet Union + back into the Middle East peace process if the U.S. is seen as + either unable or unwilling to pressure Israel into making the + concessions they see as necessary for a comprehensive peace. + Response to economic overtures from the Soviet Union are also + possible in the future.

+

U.S. Dependence on Saudi Oil

+

The recent shortfall in world oil supplies resulting from the + disruption of Iranian oil production has underlined for the Saudis + the absolute dependence of the United States and our Western allies + on imported oil. The Saudi leadership increasingly considers that + the special relationship between the U.S. and Saudi Arabia is + unbalanced and that, at + least in the short run, the U.S. needs favorable Saudi oil policies + more than Saudi Arabia needs the U.S. for security. The Saudi + perception of our lopsided dependence on their oil has strengthened + the position within the Saudi hierarchy of those (1) who favor + conservation of oil resources as the investment for Saudi Arabia’s + future prosperity and (b) who argue that Saudi Arabia should gain + more concessions from us in the Middle East peace issues, in supply + of military equipment, in investment restrictions in the U.S., and + in other areas of our bilateral relationship.

+

The Saudis have come a long way from threatening the blunt use of the + oil weapon as in the 1973 oil boycott. Instead of blindly + threatening to cut off all oil supplies to the U.S., the Saudis have + become more aware of their political leverage implicit in questions + of oil pricing and production levels. In this era of short supply, + the Saudis do not have the power to dictate oil prices to fellow + OPEC leaders, but they have + clearly staked out the most moderate position among the key OPEC countries. They have put + themselves in a position where Saudi silence on oil pricing + questions alone would yield center stage to those producers + demanding that no restraints be placed on escalating oil prices. The + Saudis further see themselves as the only country that has the + ability in the short term to increase production enough to make up + for the loss of Iranian supplies as well as provide the quantities + required to fuel continued world economic expansion.

+

The Saudis have for years been telling the industrial leaders of the + West to reduce oil consumption by conservation and the development + of new energy sources. They are now in the enviable position of + being able to sit smugly and hold production to current levels. As + in the question of pricing, a passive policy by the Saudis on + production will have severe economic ramifications for the health of + the world economy. While there is a recognition that continued + prosperity in the West is advantageous to the Saudis (as a + protection of their overseas investments and a counter to communist + expansion), they will increasingly expect concessions from the + United States in exchange for their playing an aggressive role in + solving the current energy crisis. For example, there is, in our + judgment, a strong but unspoken link between the recent Saudi + announcement that they would temporarily increase oil production and + their expectations of progress in the Middle East peace process. If + within the next six months there is no progress in the autonomy + negotiations and recognition of an Arab status for Jerusalem, there + will be exceptionally strong pressures within the Saudi hierarchy + for a return to the 8.5 mbd level of oil production. There will also + be strong pressure for Saudi Arabia to accommodate itself to a + unified and higher price for oil at the December OPEC meeting. Marginal progress in + the peace process may be matched by marginal cooperation in energy + questions.

+ +

In the same light, the Saudis are expected to be less accommodating + to the constant, if sometimes minor, irritations in our bilateral + relations. U.S. refusal to pay interest on FMS deposits, a passive U.S. role in the I.A.M. suit in + a California court against the OPEC countries,In 1978, + the International Association of Machinists and Aerospace + Workers brought suit against OPEC in Los Angeles seeking damages for the oil + embargo of 1973. U.S. insistence on the application of + American human rights standards in a conservative Muslim society + (e.g. the Bendix-Siyanco case where the U.S. appears to be insisting + that the Saudi Government employ women as instructors for their + military),The Bendix-Siyanco case + involved “the disapproval of three female applicants for + positions as English language instructors at the Taif Ordnance + School.” (Telegram 4060 from Jidda, May 29; National Archives, + RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790242–0980) More + information on this case is in telegram 153400 to Jidda, June + 15; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + P850027–2318. revisions in the interpretation of American + boycott legislation, unfavorable U.S. tax regulations affecting + American investments in Saudi Arabia, and the Treasury Department’s + interpretation of the Ribicoff anti-boycott amendment to the 1976 tax + lawReference is to the anti-boycott + provisions (known as the Ribicoff Amendment) of the Tax Reform Act of + 1976, which Ford signed + on October 4, 1976. This amendment denied companies that + cooperated with international boycotts certain tax + benefits. are all examples of the sort of problems that + irritate the Saudis.Carter placed a vertical line + in the left-hand margin next to the portion of the paragraph + from the second sentence beginning with “U.S. refusal” to this + sentence. Until recently, the Saudis were more willing to + work with us on compromises on such issues. Saudi concessions were + seen as part of the special relationship with the U.S. Now they are + quick to point out that those strains in the U.S.-Saudi relationship + which reflect purely American domestic considerations are + Washington’s concerns, not Riyadh’s. In order for the U.S. + realistically to expect continued cooperation on oil, the Saudis + expect the U.S. to find solutions to such irritants without + demanding concessions from them.

+

Conclusions

+

Basic to the understanding of the Saudi system (which is in effect + the Saud family), is the + fact that they are survivors. The human instinct and capacity for + self-preservation has been dominant throughout their 400-year + history. Their current active leadership—Fahd, Abdallah, Sultan, and + Saud—have either through genetic or cultural heritage, or both, + arrived at today’s crises with a full measure of the strong will and + native ability necessary to survive even in today’s complex + world.

+

Therefore, the balancing of strength against weakness by the + Saud family with the + ultimate goal of survival is the interesting scenario unfolding now + in Saudi Arabia. The effects of this scenario on the U.S. are + substantial, should be recognized, and should govern to a great degree our own responses in + our relationship with SAG over the + next few months.

+ + John C. West Ambassador + +
+ +
+ 197. Memorandum From Gary + Sick and Robert Hunter of the National Security + Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security + Affairs (Brzezinski)Source: Carter Library, + National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 67, Saudi + Arabia: 8–11/79. Secret. Sent for information. Hunter initialed + for Sick. In the upper + right-hand corner of the first page of the memorandum, Brzezinski wrote: “push + this—maybe PRC? ZB.” + + + Washington, August 8, 1979 + + + SUBJECT + U.S. Military Relationship with Saudi Arabia (U) + +

In his recent report on Saudi Arabian military forces,Not found. Major General Dick Lawrence proposes a + refocussed and restructured U.S. military relationship with Saudi + Arabia. Briefly, he suggests creating a new U.S. military + organization that would:

+

—replace the current U.S. Military Training Mission (USMTM);

+

—symbolize the genesis of a new military relation with the + Saudis;

+

—have a regional orientation for unity of effort on the Arabian + Peninsula;

+

—be functionally structured along two major tracks: FMS administration, and advisory and + planning assistance with emphasis on the latter;

+

—be staffed with a smaller number of personnel of less visible rank + than the current organization.Brzezinski drew a vertical + line and wrote “yes” in the left-hand margin next to this + point. (S)

+

Lawrence found an underlying + concern within the Saudi Royal Family about the inefficiency, + misplaced focus, top-heavy composition, and large size of the + current U.S. mission in Saudi Arabia. By law USMTM is geared toward FMS administration and cannot + effectively handle the + areas of military advice and planning assistance which the Saudis + now feel are of more vital concern than acquisition of hardware. + This proposal is intended to permit the U.S. to focus on the weakest + aspect of Saudi military development (middle and upper level + management), to deemphasize the military procurement aspect of our + relationship, to lower the visibility of U.S. military presence, to + meet the expressed desires of key Saudi leaders, and to further + strengthen U.S.-Saudi ties. (S)

+

There are three related areas which must be addressed in considering + a restructuring of our security relationship with the Saudis:

+

—Organizational and management problems (e.g. should the Corps of + Engineers report through the head of the U.S. organization in Saudi + Arabia or is it more efficient for them to operate independently as + they do now?).

+

—Political obstacles (e.g. how and when we approach the Saudis and at + what level in such a way as to look responsive to their needs rather + than merely telling them what we plan to do. The question of the + Army vs. the National Guard also poses some delicate problems).

+

—Legal considerations (e.g. how we can best structure an advisory + role consistent with the limitations of the Foreign Assistance Act). + (C)

+

Although Lawrence has + developed strong support for his proposals from EUCOM, the JCS, within OSD, and + among some elements of State, the overlapping and conflicting + bureaucratic interests involved in the three questions above insure + that this proposal will have tough sledding before getting to any + decision. ISA is currently + preparing a paper on this issue which they intend to circulate on an + interagency basis.Not found. + (C)

+

The ISA paper will provide a good + means of maintaining the present interest in the issue and smoking + out any problem areas within the bureaucracy. We will monitor it + closely and keep you informed. If it appears that the issue is + simply being studied to death or being shelved for lack of high + level attention, we may want to consider calling for a PRM. (C)

+
+ +
+ 198. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense Brown to Secretary of State + Vance and the + President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)Source: Carter Library, National + Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 67, Saudi + Arabia: 8–11/79. Secret. Brzezinski wrote Kimmitt’s and Sick’s initials in the upper + right hand corner of the memorandum and drew an arrow pointing + to the initials. + + + Washington, August 10, 1979 + + + SUBJECT + Security Relationship with Saudi Arabia + +

I have reviewed the several pending military assistance requests by + Saudi Arabia—what John West, + in his cables, describes as “irritants” in our security relationship + with that country. I suggest we clear away these irritants prior to + the visits of Prince Sultan or the Crown Prince. None of the + irritants is of such magnitude that removing it to Saudi + satisfaction should be saved for later bargaining. Some of the + irritants, such as LANCE,Reference is + to the February 10 request by the Commander of the Saudi Land + Forces (SALF) for U.S. “consideration for the purchase of the + Lance Missile for the + SALF.” (Telegram 1375 from Jidda, February 14; National + Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + D790070–0553) cannot be removed to Saudi satisfaction in + any case. But by providing firm answers now to these issues that + have been pending for some time, we establish a good atmosphere for + subsequent discussions with Fahd and Sultan on larger and longer-term + matters.

+

There are two principal items about which we can do something + positive. The first is the payment of interest on the trust fund + which we have recently discussed and which I hope can be soon + resolved.

+

The second is our failure to supply more F–5 munitions. I recommend we put the F–5 munitions matter before the + President promptly, asking him to authorize me to tell Sultan that + we are prepared to recommend additional munitions sales to the + Congress in September.Brzezinski underlined this + sentence and placed a vertical line in the left-hand margin next + to the entire paragraph. We promised further sales over + three years ago. The types of munitions proposed are already in + Saudi inventory. A good military case can be made for the additional + munitions. Finally, a major military argument I propose to use in + definitively turning down Sultan’s request for the LANCE is that the + interdiction mission that would be assigned to LANCE can better be + assigned to the F–5; it is obviously + essential to making this argument effectively that we not at the + same time withhold the ammunition.

+ +

I recognize the possible delicacy of the F–5 munitions issue with Congress and that we may have + to invest some significant effort to overcome opposition. However, + there is not likely to be a better time in the next year or so to + propose this sale to Congress than now.

+ + Harold Brown + +
+ +
+ 199. Memorandum From Secretary of State Vance to President CarterSource: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, + Brzezinski Material, + Country File, Box 67, Saudi Arabia: 8–11/79. Confidential. + Brzezinski sent + Vance’s memorandum + to Carter under a + November 6 memorandum, in which he outlined the F–5 munitions package and + recommended that Carter + approve Vance’s + recommendation to authorize “notification to Congress of a $120 + million F–5 air munitions + package for Saudi Arabia.” Carter initialed the November 6 memorandum. + (Ibid.) + + + Washington, October 29, 1979 + + + SUBJECT + Request for Decision on Conventional Arms Transfer Case + +

I. ISSUE:

+

I am recommending that you approve one $120 million Foreign Military + Sales (FMS) case for Saudi Arabia + for notification to the Congress.

+

II. BACKGROUND

+

The proposed sale of additional air munitions, including Sidewinder, + Mavericks, laser-guided bombs (LGBs) and cluster bomb units (CBUs) for Saudi F–5s + will respond to a Saudi request dating back to 1976.Documentation on the request is scheduled for + publication in Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, vol. E–9, Part 2, + Documents on the Middle East Region, 1973–1976. + At that time the quantities of Sidewinders and Mavericks sold to the + Saudis were reduced because of a controversy in Congress. In 1976 + and subsequent years we promised the Saudis that when possible we + would sell additional quantities of F–5 air munitions needed for war reserves and training. + Since 1976 LGBs and CBUs were added + to the package. The Saudis have continued to press us on this issue + which has become a growing irritant in our relationship. DOD believes that the military + justification is strong for the following sale now:

+ + + + 660Carter wrote “ok” in + the left-hand margin next to this figure. + Sidewinders + (sold 1892 to date) + + + 916Carter wrote “850” in + the left-hand margin and drew an arrow to this + figure. + Mavericks + (sold 1650 to date) + + + 3435Carter wrote “1000” in + the left-hand margin and drew an arrow to this + figure. + Laser Guided Bombs + (sold 1,000 to date) + + + 1518Carter wrote “ok” in + the left-hand margin next to this figure. + Cluster Bomb Units + (sold 3,000 to date) + +
+

These amounts are reasonable when measured by standard U.S. Air Force + calculations of war reserves on the basis of a potential threat to + Saudi Arabia from Iraq and South Yemen. The Departments of State and + Defense support the proposed sale in the above quantities since any + reduction would not effectively deal with Saudi expectations. The + amounts are less than the Saudis would like and delivery schedules + will keep their stocks below planned war reserve levels for the next + two years.

+

We have held extensive consultations with Congress on the proposal. + Senator Javits is key. He + has expressed reservations about the number of LGBs in this proposal + but has not indicated whether he will acquiesce in or oppose the + entire sale. We expect hearings and controversy but believe that in + the final analysis Congress will not adopt a concurrent resolution + of disapproval.

+

ACDA has no problem with the + Sidewinders or CBUs, but believe + the number of Mavericks should be 850 instead of 916. ACDA believes we should sell no + additional LGBs and that with these levels of transfers, fully + meeting our original commitments to Saudi Arabia, we will have + effectively dealt with Saudi expectations. ACDA’s full rationale is attached.Not found.

+

This case can be accommodated within the ceiling on conventional arms + transfers and in my view is otherwise consistent with your directive + on arms transfer restraint.Reference is + to PD–13, “Conventional Arms + Transfer Policy,” issued May 13, 1977. See Foreign + Relations, 1977–1980, vol. VIII, Arab-Israeli + Dispute, January 1977–August 1978, Document 33. + It would not cause an excessive economic burden for Saudi Arabia or + stimulate arms races or regional imbalance. In addition, the sale is + consistent with your human rights policy and related + legislation.

+

RECOMMENDATION:

+

I believe that the sale will contribute to U.S. foreign policy and + national security interests, and I recommend approval of the full + sale and notification to + the Congress. Harold Brown + concurs with this recommendation.Carter neither + approved nor disapproved this recommendation but wrote “Numbers + of Maverick & LGB seem + excessive. I support 850 & 1000. Reclama ok if necessary + JC” in the margin below + it.

+

ALTERNATIVELY, that you approve sale of the + full number of Sidewinders and CBUs, but that Mavericks be limited to 850 and no LGBs be + included.Carter neither approved nor + disapproved this recommendation.

+
+ +
+ 200. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense Brown to President CarterSource: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, + Brzezinski Material, + Country File, Box 67, Saudi Arabia: 8–11/79. Secret. Brzezinski’s November 15 + covering memorandum transmitted Brown’s memorandum and requested Carter’s approval of the full + complement of Mavericks and LGBs. In a November 13 memorandum to + Brzezinski, sent + through Albright, Sick + and Kimmitt recommended that Brzezinski “support the Brown reclama.” Aaron added the following + handwritten notation on Sick and Kimmitt’s memorandum: “ZB—Do you want to add that this is + a particularly good time to get this issue resolved in a way + most reassuring to the Saudis who are nervous about the Iran + situation in general and the asset freeze in particular. DA.” A handwritten notation + indicates that Brzezinski’s November 15 memorandum to Carter was retyped to include + Aaron’s suggested + language. (Ibid.) + + + Washington, November 12, 1979 + + + SUBJECT + Saudi Arabia: Munitions for their F–5 Aircraft + +

I understand that you have chosen the option that would allow us to + sell 850 Maverick missiles vice 916 and 1,000 Laser-Guided Bombs + (LGBs) vice 3,435 to Saudi Arabia to equip their F–5 aircraft. You would permit us to + sell the numbers of AIM–9 Sidewinder air-to-air missiles and CBUs that we proposed. However, I + understand that you are open to a reclama on the Mavericks and + LGBs.

+

I strongly recommend you restore the higher numbers of Mavericks and + LGBs Cy and I originally proposed. The Department of Defense + carefully worked out those numbers in a militarily justifiable way, + defensible both with the Congress and with Saudi Arabia. Failure to + provide adequate munitions will only reinforce the Saudi view that we make decisions about + their security needs primarily on political grounds, and thus the + irritant in our relations we are trying to remove will be + perpetuated. (The Saudis would inevitably know the numbers have been + reduced, either through press leaks or Congress claiming credit for + forcing reductions. Also, in explaining the numbers to the Saudis, + DOD would be unable to defend + successfully from a military point of view the lower numbers + proposed.)

+

The cut of Mavericks from 916 to 850 is miniscule, but the higher + number results from a military calculation. To cut it for other + reasons undermines the credibility of our overall case.

+

With regard to LGBs, I understand that ACDA claims that the sale of 3,435 (vice the 1,000 they + recommend) would upset the military balance in the Middle East and + constitute a threat to Israel. I do not believe this to be the + case:

+

—Israel has emphasized acquisition of CBUs (27,330 delivered) vice LGBs (1,500 on order), + because they have a different concept for use of their air force in + the air-to-ground role from the one we have persuaded the Saudis to + use. Israel emphasizes interdiction and suppression of air defense + sites, for which CBUs are + appropriate, and relies on its ground forces to stop attacking + columns. Saudi Arabia is going to have to use air power defensively + against attacking ground forces, which have penetrated Saudi + territory, for which LGBs are more appropriate, because of the small + size of the Saudi ground forces and the vast distances they would + have to travel to meet an attack.

+

—Saudi LGBs would not enter “the balance” in the Middle East. On + Saudi F–5 aircraft, their use is + essentially constrained to within Saudi territory, given the range + limitations of the F–5, especially + with a bomb load. Even from a forward base, such as Tabuk, they can + reach only part way into the Negev. Moreover, to attack Israel would + bring great retaliation back upon them; they would surely lose any + conflict with Israel. Also, we do not believe Saudi F–5s + can be efficiently operated from another country, e.g., Jordan, due + to lack of support personnel and facilities. LGBs cannot be + effectively used on Jordanian F–5s (we have refused + Jordan that capability) nor on any other aircraft in the area. (The + exception is Egypt’s F–4s—but Egypt is on our side, and will remain + so as long as our current policies in that quarter continue to be + successful.)

+

In summary, I believe that 916 Mavericks and 3,435 LGBs are + militarily justified for Saudi Arabia, and would provide an + efficient capability for an air force of modest size. Selling + numbers that are less than militarily justified will continue the + irritant in our relations, impacting other aspects of our + relationship, and lead to further requests.

+

We have consulted thoroughly with Congress on these numbers of + munitions. We did not run into strong opposition to this sale. We + believe it highly + unlikely that anyone in Congress will step forward at this time to + introduce a resolution in opposition to the sale, or to change the + numbers proposed.

+

Cy Vance agrees that the + higher number of Mavericks and LGBs should be notified to Congress. + He tells me that John West + underscored very heavily to him the critical importance the Saudis + attach to these items. West is convinced that, even if Congress were + to reduce the numbers below those proposed (which, as indicated + above, we believe highly unlikely) that would be much better than to + have the number reduced by the Executive Branch.Carter + indicated his approval on Brzezinski’s November 15 memorandum (see + footnote 1 above). In a November 16 memorandum to Vance and Brown, Brzezinski informed them of + Carter’s decision. + (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country + File, Box 67, Saudi Arabia: 8–11/79)

+ + Harold Brown + +
+ +
+ 201. Telegram From the Embassy in Saudi Arabia to the Department + of State and Multiple Diplomatic and Consular PostsSource: National Archives, RG 59, + Central Foreign Policy File, D790536–0257. Secret; Niact Immediate; Exdis. Sent Niact Immediate to Dhahran and + USLO Riyadh. Sent + Immediate to Amman, Abu Dhabi, USINT Baghdad, Muscat, Damascus, Doha, Kuwait, + Manama, Sana, Cairo, and London. + + + Jidda, November 21, 1979, 1345Z + +

8041. Subj: (U) Occupation of Grand Mosque, Mecca. Ref: Jidda + 8039.In telegram 8039 from Jidda, + November 21, the Embassy reported on the situation regarding the + seizure of the Grand Mosque in Mecca. (National Archives, RG 59, + Central Foreign Policy File, D790536–0192)

+

1. Secret entire text.

+

2. Summary: The Grand Mosque in Mecca was seized by a Saudi religious + fanatic, Muhammad Abdallah, 26 years old, a member of the Utayba + tribe. He has approx 300 well-armed persons with him, 13 of which + have been captured by Saudi authorities.

+

The captured group included at least one Pakistani. There is no rpt + no direct relationship with Iran and Muhammad and his followers deny any Khomeini influence + in their actions. There are several thousand pilgrims still in + Mosque despite fact that Muhammad’s forces allowed approx 5,000 to + leave last evening (Nov 20). In addition, several escaped. Saudi + authorities at this time do not consider this seizure to be of major + political significance although they are reacting strongly so as to + be prepared for any eventuality. The fighting between the security + forces surrounding the Mosque and those inside was particularly + fierce last night but today seems to have calmed somewhat as of one + o’clock local time. End summary.

+

3. I was able to get from a knowledgeable Cabinet Minister a complete + up-to-date story on the events surrounding the seizure of the Grand + Mosque at Mecca. The Minister said that just after morning prayers, + a young man named Muhammad Abdallah along with some followers + variously estimated to number from a minimum of 200 to a maximum of + 500 seized the holy Mosque.

+

4. According to Minister, there is a special religious significance + attached to the seizure at this time. As he explained it to me, + Muslims generally believe that there will be a second coming of + Jesus and some believe that there will be a false Jesus preceding + the real Jesus. Still others believe that a Mahdi will appear as a + forerunner to both of these events. Although not specifically set + forth in the Qur’an, the traditional belief is that a Mahdi will + appear on the first day of a new century in Mecca and that he will + remain in Mecca for a time and then disappear later to reappear in + Medina.

+

5. Muhammad Abdallah is well known to the Saudi authorities. He is + reported to be 26 years of age and of imposing appearance and + personality. He attended sharia school in Riyadh for approx three + years but did not finish. He was imprisoned for approx four months + because of activities inimical to govt. When released, he returned + south to his home tribe.

+

6. Following morning prayers on Nov 20, he appeared at the Grand + Mosque and told the imam that he was the Mahdi. His followers then + seized control putting two guards at each of the 26 doors into the + Mosque. Previously, they had been able to bring in trucks loaded + with arms and dates for food. In this seizure, armed sentries were + sent to the roof of the Mosque and into the minarets. The Minister + explained that the Muslim custom on New Year’s Day was to go to + early morning prayers, then visit the elderly members of family in + the surrounding area. Thus there were several thousand (estimated by + the Minister to be as many as 40,000–50,000) people in the Mosque at + that time. After the seizure some of the worshippers engaged + Muhammad and his followers in conversation. One asked if this action + were inspired by the Iranians. Muhammad scornfully and emphatically + said, “no.” One of his followers added that the Iranians were not + true Muslims and had + nothing to do with this action. It is the Minister’s opinion that + these answers were sincere and that the individuals in question + lacked the capacity to mislead.

+

7. The Minister has a personal interest in the incident, since some + 45 members of his family are among those being held in the Mosque. + He said that he has been receiving telephone calls every 15 minutes + from people stationed in houses around the Mosque. He added that he + has been able to hear the sound of firing while talking on telephone + and the firing reached a crescendo last evening but is much quieter + now. Two of the people who escaped from Mosque have come to + Minister’s house. One was there during meeting, although I did not + engage him in conversation. The Minister added that those being held + were not being threatened or mistreated but the biggest problem is a + lack of sanitary facilities which he says are non-existent in the + Mosque.

+

8. The Minister said that last evening 13 of the intruders were + captured, one of whom was a Pakistani. The rest were probably + members of the Utayba tribe. According to the people who were there, + there were a few non-Saudis involved but the great majority were + from the Utayba tribe plus some from the Wadi al-Dawasir.

+

9. The Minister did not think that the action had a great deal of + political significance, although he said he had not had a chance to + assess the full implications. He stated that the members of the + Utayba tribe were very strong fundamentalist Muslims who lacked + sophisticated leadership sufficient to translate their religious + principles into overthrow of a civil government.

+

10. The Minister had heard reports of disturbances at Medina but + stated that he had called several people who had prayed in the + Mosque throughout the day on Nov 20 and had seen no disruptions or + undue incidents. He said that if there were any disturbances, the + police had evidently stopped the troublemakers before they were able + to enter the Mosque. (Separately, we have been given several, + seemingly corroboratory, reports of some minor disturbances in + Medina on Nov 20.)

+

11. I asked the Minister what he thought the results of the takeover + would be, and he replied rather calmly: “Sooner or later they will + be captured and beheaded.”

+ + West + +
+ +
+ 202. Memorandum From Robert Hunter and Gary Sick of the National Security Council Staff to + the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)Source: Carter Library, National + Security Affairs, Staff Material, Middle East, Chron File, Box + 142, Sick: 11/16–30/79. + Secret; Sensitive. Outside the System. + + + Washington, November 21, 1979 + + + SUBJECT + Mecca (U) + +

Latest CIA information this morning + is a report that there may be some Saudi National Guard soldiers inside the Mosque shooting out. If so, the implications of the incident could + go up dramatically. Harold or Cy may have had more on this at the + lunch. (S)

+

In any event, there would be value in [less than 1 + line not declassified] approaching Prince Turki today, to get a sense of what + is happening. (S)

+

If that report is untrue, then the incident can be viewed more in + terms of propaganda. If so, the key to exploiting the Mecca incident + will be what the Saudis say about the people involved: are they + Shia? do they have links to Khomeini? were they inspired by + Khomeini? Our statements (however put out/planted) can only + reinforce (or try to deflect) what the Saudis say. (S)

+

Assuming the Saudis do make some connection, they still have to + consider the consequences of “telling it like it is”: fear of Iran, + divisions within Islam, stirring up internal dissension within + various countries, perhaps even some tensions within Saudi Arabia. + Thus the Saudis may be reluctant to put out the whole story—assuming + that Khomeini/Shias are the moving force. (S)

+

We should consider the following:

+ + —going directly to the Saudis ([less than 1 + line not declassified] Prince Turki is probably the best + channel) rapidly, with our own information on Khomeini’s + destabilizing efforts with various Shia communities; plus + reinforcement of the intelligence on the Iranians infiltrated + into Mecca [less than 1 line not + declassified]; + —seeking advance notification from Saudi Arabia on any + statements they will make on the character of the people holding + the Mosque; + —if the Saudis see a link to Khomeini/Shias, but are reluctant to pin the blame squarely—especially + if it is because of Saudi relations with Iran—we could offer to + intensify our involvement with Saudi Arabia, to do what is + necessary to protect the Saudis against Iran (military + relations, economic discussions, [less than 1 + line not declassified]). (S) + + +

For us, the best outcome would be for the Mecca affair to be pinned + directly on Khomeini. Second best (with far greater consequences) + would be for the onus to be put on Shias, writ large. In the former + case, pressure would be on Shias to demonstrate loyalty to Islam and + against Khomeini; in the latter case, the divisions stimulated + within Islam could have serious implications. But the choice is + probably not up to us. (S)

+
+ +
+ 203. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in + TunisiaSource: + National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + P840167–1944. Secret; Niact + Immediate; Nodis. Drafted by + Constable; cleared + by Rephel (S) and W. Scott Butcher; approved by Constable. Sent for + information Immediate to Jidda and the White + House. + + + Washington, November 22, 1979, + 0313Z + +

302568. Subject: Allegations of American Involvement in Mecca + Incident. For Ambassador Bosworth from the Secretary.

+

1. Appreciate your efforts to reach Prince Saud on allegations of American + involvement in the Mecca incident. Now request you deliver following + personal message from me to Prince Saud.

+

Begin text. Your Royal + Highness:

+

I continue to believe it is a matter of great importance for the + Saudi Government to state unequivocally that rumors or allegations + of American involvement at Mecca are totally without foundation. My + concern is that Interior Minister’s response to reporter earlier + today (when he issued statement on Mosque situation) “There is no + evidence to give rise to belief that incident is connected with + other hostilities”, was not specific in dealing with the allegations + that Americans engineered this behind the scenes.

+ +

2. A clarification by your government could take a variety of forms: + perhaps in answer to a press query or in commentary on Saudi radio. + Certainly you will be the best judge of how to make the + statement.

+

3. I know that Your Royal Highness will feel the deep concern for the + safety of Americans which prompts this personal request. I will + sincerely appreciate your assisting in this clarification. With + highest regards. End text.

+ + Vance + +
+ + +
+ 204. Memorandum From Secretary of State Vance to President CarterSource: Carter Library, Plains File, Subject File, + Box 40, State Deptartment Evening Reports, 11/79. Secret. + Carter initialed the + memorandum. + + + Washington, November 28, 1979 + +

1. Consultations with Saudi Arabia Regarding + Possible Temporary Reduction of US Presence—Dave + Newsom held a meeting this afternoon to examine the + security situation of the 35 plus thousand Americans in Saudi + Arabia, in the wake of the recent Mecca Mosque incident, some signs + of Shia dissidence in the Eastern Province and the generally + unsettled situation in the Moslem world. In addition to Department + officials, the meeting included Dean Brown of the Middle East + Institute and former Ambassador to Saudi Arabia Parker Hart. There was general + agreement that under present circumstances a large or sudden + drawdown of official Americans would have an unsettling effect on + not only the Saudi Government but also the private American + community.Carter wrote “no precipitous + withdrawal” in the left-hand margin next to this + sentence. We concluded that the preferable course of + action at this point is to instruct John West to consult with Prince Fahd about our concerns for the + security of US citizens in Saudi + Arabia and what further appropriate steps should be taken to ensure + their safety. Thereafter, we intend to consult with leaders of the + private American community in Saudi Arabia and their parent + companies in the United States. We will reserve a decision on any + further action towards a temporary reduction of US personnel and dependents pending the + results of consultations with Crown Prince Fahd and the American business + community.

+

2. Occupation of the Grand Mosque, Mecca: Situation + Report—The situation in Mecca has apparently not changed + appreciably over the last 24 hours. A small group of gunmen are + still believed to be holding out in the labyrinthine basement of the + Grand Mosque with an unknown number of hostages. In response to an + urgent Saudi appeal, we have airlifted riot control equipment which + should reach Saudi Arabia by 1800 hours local time November 29.

+

Several prominent Arab leaders have visited Riyadh to give moral + support to the SAG in the wake of + the Mecca episode, including the Amirs of Bahrain, Kuwait and Qatar, + the Vice President of the UAE, + Yasir Arafat and King + Hussein.

+ +

There have been incidents in the Eastern Province, some with + fatalities, between police and Saudi Shiites participating in banned + Moharram rituals. Elsewhere in the Kingdom the situation is + calm.

+

[Omitted here is material unrelated to Saudi Arabia.]

+
+ +
+ 205. Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the Department of + State (Tarnoff) to Secretary + of State VanceSource: Department of State, + Office of the Secretariat Staff, Cyrus R. Vance, Secretary of State—1977–1980, + Lot 84D241, Box 2, Vance/Brown/Brzezinski Luncheons—10–12/79. Secret; Nodis. A stamped notation on the + first page of the memorandum indicates that Vance saw it. + + + Washington, November 29, 1979 + + + SUBJECT + Your Breakfast with the President Friday, November 30, + 1979 + +

[Omitted here is material unrelated to Saudi Arabia.]

+

2. Security of Americans in Saudi Arabia. The + President commented, “no precipitous withdrawal” on your Wednesday + night note about possible US + reductions in Saudi Arabia.November 28. + See Document 204. You may want + to reassure him on this score.

+

John West on Thursday had + serious talks with Princes Fahd and Bandar about the security of the 40,000 + Americans resident there, at which time the contingency of US military action in Iran was raised + by the Saudis. Both Princes indicated that Saudi Arabia would be + supportive of the US if we took + military actions in response to any execution of a hostage or a + threat to do so. Such assertions—along with their feeling that other + Muslim states would agree with the Saudis—have to be treated with + great reserve.

+

Meanwhile, the Saudis are taking vastly increased security + precautions in the Eastern Province, where most Americans are + present, surrounding our Dhahran Consulate General with a + substantial force equipped with heavy automatic weapons. The Saudis + are also strongly controlling planned Shi’a religious processions + during this period.

+

We have instructed John to make it clear in his next exchanges with + the Saudis that our approaches were not dictated by considerations + of US military planning, but rather, by + our need to assure the security of large numbers of Americans at a + time of tension in the region.

+

At this moment we believe we should not carry out any reduction + pending further exchanges and consultations with the Saudis. West’s + urgent objective will be to develop with the Saudis detailed + contingency planning for collecting our people into three regional + safehavens at the first sign of trouble. West will seek firm Saudi + commitments to earmark military and security forces, the provision + of transport, liaison arrangements, etc. What we need is a detailed, + credible contingency plan which stands a good chance of working if a + worst-case scenario begins to develop.

+

We are also asking John to set systematic arrangements for + confidential exchanges with the American business community, + advising him to do this in a way which does not become too visible + and thus inspire misleading speculation.In telegram 8238 from Jidda, November 28, and telegram 8241 + from Jidda, November 29, the Embassy provided details on these + meetings. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy + File, P850027–2275 and P850027–2270 respectively)

+

[Omitted here is material unrelated to Saudi Arabia.]

+
+ +
+ 206. Report Prepared by the Ambassador to Saudi Arabia (West)Source: Carter Library, + National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 68, Saudi + Arabia: 12/79–1/80. Secret. Carter wrote “Good J” in the upper right-hand + margin of the report. West attached his report to a January 11 + letter, in which he noted that his appraisal was “not as + optimistic as some in the past,” and that “frankly, faith in you + is main factor holding our ‘special relationship’ at its present + high level.” Attached but not printed is a January 30 memorandum + from Brzezinski to + Carter forwarding + West’s letter and report. Carter initialed Brzezinski’s memorandum. For West’s previous + appraisals, see Documents 154, 176, and 196. + + + Jidda, undated + +

SAUDI ARABIA—AN ASSESSMENT AS OF JANUARY 1, 1980

+

SUMMARY: The year 1979 has been a difficult one for Saudi Arabia—as + it has for the USG–SAG bilateral relationship. The year + 1980 will not be less difficult for either and could well see a + substantial deterioration in the “special relationship.” Four major + problems, which faced Saudi + Arabia in the last year, seem at this time to have no real solution + in sight, and may get worse in 1980. These are:

+

1) Destabilizing ripple effects of the religious revolution in Iran, + together with similar but unconnected events elsewhere, such as the + Mecca incident here;

+

2) Failure to achieve a satisfactory solution to the Arab-Israeli + dispute;

+

3) Continuation and expansion of the Russian threat; and

+

4) Corruption in the Western sense.

+

Developments in these four areas in 1980 will have an important + effect on the future of the Saud Royal Family and the nature and scope of our + bilateral relationship. USG + capacity for being helpful is limited largely to (2) and (3) above. + However, our actions in these two areas may well be determinative of + the future of the present Saudi Arabian Government. Since the + availability of adequate energy supplies for the free world during + the next decade depends in large part on the continuation of the + present government in Saudi Arabia, the national interests of the + United States are indeed at risk here in 1980. END SUMMARY.

+

INTRODUCTION

+

The year 1979 saw three main events that have had and are having + profound effect on the government and people of Saudi Arabia. They + were:

+

1) The development of a full-fledged religious revolution in Iran, + which not only toppled the Shah from his well-entrenched throne but + sent shock waves throughout the Muslim world;

+

2) Events culminating in the signing of the Egyptian-Israeli peace + treaty;See footnote 7, Document 188. and

+

3) A continuation of the Soviet threat—including the South Yemen + (PDRY) invasion of North Yemen + (YAR),See Documents 261 and + 264. and as this is + written, the direct invasion of Afghanistan.The Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan on + December 25, 1979.

+

THE IRANIAN RELIGIOUS REVOLUTION

+

The shock effect of the Khomeini revolution was felt far beyond + Iran’s borders. In Saudi Arabia, the fall of another monarch was in + itself disturbing to the SAG ruling + family. The fact that the monarch in question was a neighbor across + the Gulf and enjoyed the full support and confidence of the United States was even + more upsetting. The constant broadcasts by Iranian militants over + Radio Tehran calling for the overthrow of “the corrupt Saudi + monarch” has served as an almost daily reminder of the dangers that + can emanate from a fanatical government in a neighboring state.

+

In addition, Saudi compliance with our request to increase oil + production substantially to ease the problems caused by the + disruption of Iranian oil exports, and Saudi willingness to keep + prices well below that of other countries have increased tensions + with other Arab oil-producing states. Likewise, more and more Saudis + are beginning to question the validity and worth of the USG–SAG “special relationship.” The Saud family is being criticized + for its accommodations to USG, + especially in oil production and pricing. More and More Saudis, both + in and out of government publicly and privately are blaming USG for contributing to the Shah’s + demise and are pointing to the close relationship between the Shah + and the U.S. with its parallels to the SAG–USG relationship. + The feeling of probably a majority of Saudis now is that the + U.S.-Saudi relationship is top-heavy in favor of USG. Fortunately the top leadership, + Fahd, Abdullah and Sultan, do not agree + with this sentiment.

+

The full impact of the events in Iran were brought home to the SAG ruling family by the seizure of + the Holy Mosque in Mecca on November 20.See Documents 201 and 202. Even though there was no + connection between the two sets of events, the Mosque incident was a + ringing warning to the SAG that “it + can happen here.” A searching reassessment and re-evaluation of all + SAG policy, foreign and + domestic, has been triggered by the Mecca affair. The results of + this inward and outward look will be reflected in the SAG’s relationship with the United + States during 1980.

+

EGYPTIAN-ISRAELI PEACE TREATY

+

Saudi Arabia was forced by Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty to choose + between its close friend the United States and the rest of the Arab + world (except Egypt). The choice was not easy, in view of the + importance that the U.S. attached to the treaty, but in the end it + was dictated by a reasonably firm conviction that the Camp David + accords would not work because Begin would never make the concessions necessary to + defuse the Palestinian problem. That conviction has been + strengthened by the lack of progress since signing of the treaty. + The tensions have been heightened by President Sadat’s personal + attacks on the Kingdom and its leaders. There is little chance, in + my opinion, for lessening of tensions, at least prior to the + exchange of ambassadors on February 26. This exchange will be a symbolic act of + great annoyance but also of great significance to the Arab world. + Failing drastic eruptions as a result of Israeli-Egyptian exchange + of ambassadors, the tensions will continue to increase as the + autonomy talks go toward their May deadline.Reference is to the ongoing talks on + Palestinian autonomy held between Egypt and Israel as stipulated + by the March 1979 Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty. A deadline for + the conclusion of those talks had been set for May 26. For + documentation on this issue, see Foreign Relations, 1977–1980, + vol. IX, Arab-Israeli Dispute, August 1978–December + 1980. In the unlikely event that the autonomy + talks result in an acceptable solution to the Palestinian problem, + the entire atmosphere will change dramatically for the better + overnight. However, in the event that the autonomy talks do not meet + the deadline, or produce only an agreement not satisfactory to the + Palestinians or the rest of the Arab world, a mini-crisis will then + arise in the USG–SAG relationship.

+

We have, throughout the period of autonomy talks, taken the position + that we would exercise our prerogative as a “full partner” in the + event that Sadat and Begin + were not able to reach a satisfactory solution to both the + Palestinian and Jerusalem problems. The Saudis, therefore, expect us + to take a public position in the negotiating process if a + satisfactory solution is not reached by the May deadline. A failure + to do so would be viewed by the Saudis as a major breach of faith + and an admission that either (1) the U.S. considers the Camp David + accords effectively dead; or (2) at a minimum, that the present U.S. + Administration is powerless to do anything at this time of election + anxieties and rivalries and, therefore, the USG is just shelving an issue so crucial to the area in + order to buy “election” time.

+

THE SOVIET THREAT

+

The biggest single plus in the USG–SAG bilateral + relationship in 1979 was the President’s action when PDRY forces invaded North Yemen. The + expediting, under emergency powers, of planes and equipment to North + Yemen, the sending of the F–15’s, the stationing of the AWACS in Saudi Arabia, the sending + of a military planning team, and the sending of substantial naval + forces into the Indian Ocean, restored in the Saudis’ minds the + credibility and reliability of USG + as a friend and ally in time of need.See Documents 268, 271, and 275. Had this not been done, I do not believe that + the Saudi Government would have increased its oil production as it + did in July,The Saudi Government + announced on July 3 that oil production would be increased. + Telegram 174919 to Alexandria, July 6, transmitted a letter for + Strauss to deliver + to Fahd expressing + Carter’s + appreciation for the increase. See Foreign + Relations, 1969–1976, vol. XXXVII, Energy Crisis, + 1974–1980, Document 223. and maintained its + moderate pricing policies.

+ +

As this is written the events in Afghanistan are still unfolding, but + the President’s firm stand against the Russians will provide added + reassurance to Saudi Arabia that we are their best, in fact, their + only effective protector from Soviet aggression.

+

CORRUPTION

+

The issue of corruption is the greatest single threat to the + continued stability of the SAG + ruling family. While there have been from time to time evidences of + crackdowns on corruption, there are increasing signs, both within + and without the Saudi Government, that the problem has not been + seriously addressed and is getting worse instead of better. The fact + that these attacks have come from many quarters, all accusing + members of the Royal Family of corruption, has begun to have a + cumulative effect on perceptions throughout the society.

+

One of the saving factors is that the wealth of the country is so + enormous that the alleged commissions and other evidences of what—by + Western standards—would be called corrupt practices have not as yet + interfered with gradual improvement in the living conditions of any + Saudi. The Saudi version of the welfare state provides, or + subsidizes, most necessities but disparities in the distribution of + wealth remains—especially between the cities and the villages where + benefits are only now beginning to arrive. However, the condition is + serious and hard to explain. For example, some of the severest + critics of corruption are themselves in a series of enterprises with + various members of the Royal Family, the profitability of which has + been assured by royal influence. Contrasted with our Western concept + of “conflict of interests” this society, indeed societies in the + Third World, goes by what may be described as “compatibility of + interests,” another one is “spread the benefits.”

+

The problem of corruption is a difficult one and I do not know of any + truly effective means that we can use to help correct the + situation.

+

CONCLUSIONS

+

The year 1980 will probably produce even greater strains on the + USG–SAG “special relationship” than did 1979. Two factors + will be determinative of whether the bilateral relationship improves + or deteriorates: (1) Progress on Mideast peace; (2) Effectiveness of + U.S. moves to counter Soviet aggression in the area.

+

Progress on the Mideast peace does not mean a complete or immediate + solution to the Palestinian and Jerusalem issues—although of course + such a result would be a welcome Utopia. The Saudis will be + satisfied with less, especially if they receive our assurances that + we will continue to work for more.

+

The Saudis fully expect the May deadline to pass without a solution + to the autonomy issue. In that event, they expect USG to take a public position on this + point. A failure to do so will mean to the Saudis that we have tacitly approved what they + consider Begin’s stalling + tactics. By implication, this will mean to them that we are + approving what amounts to a separate Egyptian-Israeli peace.

+

I cannot emphasize too strongly how detrimental such a scenario would + be to our bilateral relationship in all of its aspects, including + oil production and pricing. While the Saudis continue to say that + they will not use the “oil weapon,” such a statement is more and + more considered to refer to an oil embargo of the 1973–74 type. + Their accommodations to U.S. needs in terms of both production and + price have been a gesture of support for President Carter and his Mideast peace + efforts. If the time ever arrives (and it may well do so in May + 1980) when the Saudis are convinced that the Administration no + longer has the will or the ability to bring about a lasting Mideast + peace, then the motivation for accommodation to USG needs will be lessened. A + possible—even probable—result by July of 1980 would be a reduction + of production to 8.5 MBD or less, + and movement toward a price change comparable to the “oil hawks” + (including Mexico and Great Britain) namely, a range of $30 per + barrel and upward.

+

The Saudis will be watching closely USG actions to counter aggression in Afghanistan. Any + Soviet moves in Pakistan or Iran will further heighten the already + extreme concern which is felt here. If we can show the same + decisiveness and achieve the same results as in the YAR–PDRY incident of last February, then our bilateral + relationship will be substantially enhanced. The real bottom line in + our relationship is U.S. security in exchange for Saudi oil. When + the Saudis are reminded of their vulnerability to Soviet aggression, + then our response is critical and, if positive, is most + beneficial.

+

RECOMMENDATIONS

+

1) That we reassure the Saudis by both word and deed that we will not + be satisfied with an Egyptian-Israeli peace leaving unsolved the + questions of the Palestinians and Jerusalem. Ambassador Linowitz has the key role and we + are furnishing him some detailed suggestions.

+

2) That we continue to work and consult closely with the Saudis on + how to counter the Russian threat, much as we have done in the past + year. Small gestures, such as expediting arms and equipment to them + would be most helpful as a symbolic, as well as practical, gesture. + (For example, to speed up deliveries of the F–15 by six months would + be very meaningful to the key SAG + military and political figures)

+

3) That we continue to recognize and work patiently with SAG in meeting and solving the + problems of modernization at a pace acceptable to their prevailing + cultural norms.

+ + John C. West Ambassador + +
+ +
+ 207. Telegram From the United States Liaison Office in Riyadh to + the White HouseSource: + Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country + File, Box 68, Saudi Arabia: 2/80. Secret; Niact Immediate; Nodis. Printed from a copy that + indicates the original was received in the White House Situation + Room. + + + Riyadh, February 5, 1980, 1255Z + +

305. For the President and Secretary Vance from Brzezinski. Subject: Meetings in Saudi Arabia.

+

1. Warren Christopher and I + met with Prince Saud for a + working lunch on Monday, February 4. We met again with Crown Prince + Fahd and Prince + Saud for two hours on + Monday evening.In telegram 301 from + Riyadh, February 5, the Liaison Office transmitted Christopher’s brief overview + of these meetings. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign + Policy File, P870047–0869) We spent a further 90 minutes + with Prince Saud on Tuesday + morning. The following are the highlights of these meetings.

+

2. The initial meeting with Saud was very general. We briefed him on our talks + in PakistanSee footnote 7, Document 51. and he gave us his + views on the Islamic Foreign Ministers Conference.The Conference of Islamic Foreign Ministers + took place in Islamabad January 27–29. (Telegram 717 from + Islamabad, January 27; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign + Policy File, D800047–0111) In telegram 801 from Islamabad, + January 29, the Embassy reported that the plenary session passed + a resolution condemning “Soviet military aggression.” In + telegram 831 from Islamabad, January 30, the Embassy commented + on other resolutions relating to Iran, Palestine, and the Horn + of Africa. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy + File, D800050–1060 and D800053–1064) He was particularly + encouraging on the Iranian reaction at Islamabad. According to Saud, + the Iranians initially resisted any discussion of the hostage issue, + but the other attendees had a thorough discussion with them and made + it clear that the regional problems could not be discussed in + isolation from the hostage problem, the Islamic states insisted that + a role be given to the Secretary General, and the Iranians, after + initially resisting, finally got instructions from Tehran permitting + them to join in the consensus. Saud felt that the Iranians were surprised at the + unpopularity of their position and that this would possibly have its + effect in Tehran, despite the fact that the Iranian representatives + at the conference were not at the decision making level.

+

3. Saud viewed the Soviet + action in Afghanistan as “aggression and imperialism,” and he said + that public opinion and government opinion in the region uniformly + oppose the Soviet action and will do whatever is required to resist. + They need confidence that the U.S. will help and they need to + understand what the U.S. is prepared to do. The Islamic Conference agreed to + provide aid to Pakistan, but they will take their lead from the + degree of U.S. commitment.

+

4. Saud was strongly + supportive of the movement to boycott the Olympics,On January 20, President Carter announced that the + United States would boycott the Summer Olympics scheduled to + take place in Moscow. See Foreign Relations, 1977–1980, vol. + VI, Soviet Union, Document 259. noting that the + Islamic Conference had taken its decision on this without serious + debate on the second day. He was very critical of the French, + particularly Francois Poncet’sJean François-Poncet, French + Minister of Foreign Affairs. statement that the + Afghanistan invasion was a problem for the Islamic countries. He + found this “amazing” since Poncet is normally very careful with his + words.

+

5. The meeting with Fahd was + much more substantive. Fahd + was in good form, very friendly, well briefed and very much in + command of the discussion. Although he noted that he had warned the + U.S. of Soviet intentions during the Nixon administration, nevertheless he was surprised + that the Soviets used naked force to accomplish their aims rather + than other means. Fahd said + he had never witnessed a comparable reaction in the Islamic world to + any single act, and he thought the Soviets had not imagined such an + intense and deep response.

+

6. We noted the many economic and military problems facing Pakistan + and the need for other governments to help. Fahd noted that Saudi Arabia had + for many years been giving Pakistan “very good aid,” and that they + firmly believed that Pakistan should be supported to the maximum + possible extent in both the military and economic fields. + Psychologically this is the moment to rally around Pakistan in + opposition to the Soviet threat. If we delay now, future steps will + be more difficult.

+

7. In response to our comment that the President was willing to take + unprecedented moves to support Pakistan, Fahd said they had felt this + change in U.S. policy from the President’s statements and he was + sure the Pakistanis had felt it as well. The people of the world—and + the Soviets—have the feeling that the U.S. “lion was beginning to + stir.”

+

8. Fahd noted that the + reports coming out of South Yemen were very dangerous and + frightening. He provided us a written report on their latest + intelligence as follows: allegedly 10,000 Soviet troops have + recently moved to the PDRY for an + “exercise;” Soviet arms to PDRY + are increasing; it is very likely that there are Soviet soldiers in + the Yemeni fifth province near Saudi Arabia and in Yemeni + territorial waters; some 3000 Cuban troops have gone to Aden; Soviet + military reconnaissance aircraft are flying out of Aden throughout + the region; Soviet materiel + is arriving at a base named Muntaza Nashwan in South Yemen which is + “on the road to Saudi Arabia,” including rocket carriers, guns, + transport trucks, and large crates; huge transport ships are coming + in to a Yemeni port at night. He recognized that some of this + information might not be entirely accurate, but noted that aerial + surveillance would help establish its validity. We promised to + expedite additional coverage, using U–2s and RF–4s. Prince Saud noted that the options of + U.S. RF–4s using Khamis Mushayt or flying from carriers were both + open. Fahd thought it would + be useful for the U.S. to give a clear signal to the Soviets that + the U.S. will not just fold its arms, and telling the Soviets that + we doubt that PDRY needs all this + equipment for its own defense.

+

9. Fahd made a strong pitch + for more prompt delivery of military equipment from us. He noted + they had been waiting more than a year for certain special kinds of + arms and parts. “Delay is no longer valid.” We said we would discuss + this with Ambassador West + and see what could be done to rectify the problem.

+

10. We briefed Fahd on our + efforts to arrange access to military support facilities in the + region, noting that the Bartholomew Mission would soon be here to brief them + on the status of these talks.See footnote 2, Document 53. We + said we had told Pakistan that we would be prepared to conduct joint + air or naval exercises with them if they wished. We would be + prepared to do the same with Saudi Arabia if they thought that would + be helpful with respect to the situation in South Yemen. We said we + are also prepared to conduct large scale military exercises of + marines or airborne forces anyplace in the region. We noted three + specific areas where we hope to cooperate closely with the Saudis: + (1) developing access to facilities in Oman as a means of + counterbalancing the Soviet/Cuban presence in PDRY; (2) developing access to + facilities in Somalia, which, together with Oman, would help create + a strategic position to block Soviet penetration of the region; and + (3) the situation in North Yemen which we find thoroughly + unsatisfactory at present.

+

11. On joint operations, Fahd said they were “giving thought to it” and would + be willing to discuss it with our people. They want to insure that + it will be helpful to their security.

+

12. On Yemen, Fahd noted + that the Prime Minister of North Yemen was in Saudi Arabia two weeks + ago for discussions about the growth of Soviet influence. Two nights + ago, President Salih had + called Fahd and his + conversation indicated a change in his position. He said he was + giving thought to the Saudi proposals and would “not go outside the + framework” suggested by Saudi Arabia. He offered to send the Saudi Ambassador to North + Yemen as a special emissary to discuss the situation. The Ambassador + had just arrived in Riyadh but they had not seen him yet. Fahd recognized that so far this + was just talk, but he was pleased at the apparent transformation of + Salih’s views. They + would wait and see what tangible results emerged. Salih said he had changed his mind + about bringing elements of NDF into his government. The reason for + this change may be that a number of North Yemen dignitaries had + lately visited Salih to warn + him of the dangers that the YAR + would go the way of the PDRY.

+

13. On Iran, Fahd noted that + Yasir Arafat had visited + him last night and Fahd had + encouraged him to play an active role in getting the hostages + released. Arafat said he + would redouble his efforts. Fahd noted that he had appealed to President + Assad in the same terms. + Assad said he was willing + but that there was no one in Iran for him to talk to. Fahd thought that after the + Iranian elections it might be possible to do more.

+

14. Arafat had also told him + that Syria was withdrawing all its forces in Lebanon and regrouping + them in the Bekka Valley. Arafat had just heard this by cable and did not know + the reasons for the move. We said we would check our own information + and stay in touch on this.

+

15. Almost as an afterthought, Fahd raised the Arab-Israeli problem, noting that + the recent backing of the U.S. position on Afghanistan by the + Islamic Conference provided a golden opportunity for the U.S. to win + over the Arab and Islamic world by resolving the Arab-Israel + situation. We assured him that we were fully committed to move ahead + to solve the problem in all its aspects. Fahd stressed the enormous + importance of Jerusalem. He said the problem of the Palestinians + should be put on the front burner.

+

16. Fahd said no one in + Saudi Arabia bore any ill will toward President Sadat, but Sadat has + unfortunately chosen to resort to insults and mudslinging, including + personal attacks on members of the royal family. We replied that we + made no excuses for what Sadat said recently and that we hoped it + would not be repeated. We noted that Sadat had been sorry not to + receive a response to the letter he had written to King Khalid. + Fahd said they had not + answered the letter since they would have to tell the truth and that + might be resented by Sadat. We said we would continue to urge + restraint on Sadat since divisions in the Arab world would only + postpone solutions to the major problems we face.

+

17. Fahd terminated the + discussion with another plea for us to look carefully at the Saudi + arms requests.

+ +

18. Prince Saud, on Tuesday morning, made up for Crown Prince + Fahd’s failure to give + equal time to the Arab-Israel problem.For the portion of the memorandum of conversation of the + February 5 meeting with Saud concerning Arab-Israeli relations, see Foreign + Relations, 1977–1980, vol. IX, Arab-Israeli + Dispute, August 1978–December 1980, Document + 336. He made a long presentation of the importance + of progress on the Palestinian issue if we want a reliable Arab + consensus to face the Soviet challenge. Saudi Arabia trusts U.S. + motives and wants to work closely with us on security issues, but + this is complicated by lack of visible strategy on the autonomy + talks. [omission in the original—We expressed?] our determination to + press ahead as rapidly as possible, and also outlined the basic + strategy which we are following to confront the Soviet challenge in + the region as a whole. We emphasized our interest in building + relations with other Arab states, including Algeria, Libya and + Iraq.

+

19. Warren recalled the efforts we had jointly made two years ago to + persuade the PLO to accept + Resolution 242 and wondered if there was some chance that could be + revived. Saud thought that + it could if we were willing to take the position that the + Palestinian problem could be solved on the basis of + self-determination. With that, the Palestinians might be willing to + take the plunge and, in effect, recognize Israel. We reviewed the + reasons for holding to our formulation and encouraged him to keep + open the possibility of getting some movement from the PLO on 242 as a possible major + contribution to the peace process.

+

20. On aid to Pakistan, Saud + said that Saudi Arabia will provide new aid to Pakistan this year + plus some carryover from a prior agreement. Most of this will be + economic assistance. In addition, Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states + have pledged to provide financial assistance to help with the + refugee problem. This is still being worked out. On defense + assistance, Saudi Arabia had pledged to develop a package of support + once the Pakistanis (and the United States) had made a clear + determination of their needs. Saud thought that the level of aid being considered + by Saudi Arabia and the Gulf was reaching the upper limit, and he + hoped that we would succeed in persuading the Europeans and Japanese + to join in. (On a very confidential basis he gave us more precise + data on the above).

+

21. On Iraq, Saud said that + he thought there was no inhibition on the Iraqis’ part to move + toward relations with the U.S. We asked him to raise this issue with + the Iraqis at the next opportunity.

+

22. We expressed our appreciation for the Saudi decision to maintain + oil production at the 9.5 mbd level, recognizing that this entailed + some sacrifice on their part. Saud replied that the decision touches on their own + domestic opinion, and it is difficult to explain in view of the “contradictions” i.e. the + Arab-Israeli problems. Whatever we could do to remove these + contradictions would help them enormously.

+

23. Finally, Saud briefed us + on his talks with their Ambassador to North Yemen the previous + evening. Their Ambassador had talked to Salih, who recognized the dangers in the course he + had been following. Salih + was willing to respond to the Saudis views concerning the buildup of + Soviet advisors and the training of Yemenis in the Soviet Union. He + was willing to put a stop to all of it. He will not bring members of + the NDF into his government, although he may send some of them as + ambassadors abroad. Salih + said he was willing to discuss any of these issues with the Saudis, + and they were preparing a letter to Salih regarding the joint military program. When + asked whether he believed what Salih was saying, Saud said that Salih had no real alternative unless he was willing + to destroy himself.

+ + Gerlach + +
+ +
+ 208. Summary of Conclusions of a Special Coordination Committee + MeetingSource: Carter + Library, National Security Council, Institutional Files, Box + 108, SCC 269, 02/06/80, + Pakistan/Saudi Arabia. Secret. The meeting took place in the + White House Situation Room. The minutes are not attached and + were not found. Carter + initialed the first page. + + + Washington, February + 6, 1980, 9–10:05 a.m. + + + SUBJECT + Pakistan/Saudi Arabia + + + PARTICIPANTS + + + State + Warren + Christopher + David + Newsom + Matthew + Nimetz + Richard + Cooper* + Peter + Constable + George Vest* + + + + + OSD + Secretary Harold + Brown + W. Graham + Claytor + William Perry* + + + + JCS + General David + Jones + General John + Pustay + + + + + CIA + Frank + Carlucci + + + + + White House + Zbigniew + Brzezinski + David + Aaron + Henry + Owen + Lloyd + Cutler + Hedley Donovan + + + + + + + + + + + + + NSC + Gary + Sick + Thomas + Thornton + Robert Blackwill + + + + + * Present for last ten minutes only + + + +

The meeting was devoted almost entirely to a report by Dr. Brzezinski and Mr. Christopher on their mission to + Pakistan and Saudi Arabia.See Document 207. Dr. Brzezinski noted that the + assessment of the situation by both Pakistan and Saudi Arabia is + graver than ours. They both see Soviet actions as part of a + deliberate strategic challenge to the U.S. and the region.

+

[Omitted here is material related to Pakistan.]

+

In Saudi Arabia, the mission was struck by the change of mood from a + year ago. The Saudi response to our proposals for a closer security + relationship was much more positive. Both the Saudis and the + Pakistanis seem to have reacted very positively to the President’s + State of the Union address and the explicit security commitment + which it announced.See Document 45. The Saudis took an + alarmist view of the situation in the PDRY, including a report of Soviet and Cuban troop + exercising there which we cannot confirm. [4 lines + not declassified]. The Saudis complained about the slowness + and inadequacy of the U.S. response to their requests for advanced + military equipment. They outlined the levels of aid they were + prepared to provide to Pakistan but asked that these numbers be very + tightly held and, if necessary, that the actual levels be revealed + by the Pakistanis rather than us. They were bitter in their + condemnation of Sadat’s attacks on the Saudi leadership, and they + made a very persuasive argument that progress on the Palestinian + issue is critical to progress in security and other fields. (S)

+

Our side raised with the Saudis and the Pakistanis the possibility of + joint military exercises and use of facilities in the region. The + Saudis did not reply directly, but Dr. Brzezinski and Mr. Christopher felt that the attitude was basically + positive. (S)

+

[Omitted here is material related to Pakistan.]

+
+ +
+ 209. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National + Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to Secretary of State Vance and Secretary of Defense + BrownSource: Carter Library, National + Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 68, Saudi + Arabia: 3/80. Secret. + + + Washington, March + 14, 1980 + + + SUBJECT + U.S.-Saudi Military Supply Relationship + +

I would like to draw your attention to the recent cable by Ambassador + WestReference is to West’s discussion of the + U.S.-Saudi military supply program in telegram 1674 from Jidda, + March 12. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy + File, D800130–0237) in which he states that Saudi + Arabia’s recent security assistance requests represent a “litmus + test” of the special bilateral relationship that exists between our + two countries. He believes that responsiveness to the Saudi effort + to obtain their military supply needs is no longer an option; it has + become an imperative. To successive recent high-level U.S. visitors, + such as the President,See Document 164. + DuncanDuncan + visited Saudi Arabia March 1–4. He reported to the SCC on his trip on March 21. See + Document 210. and Christopher,See Document + 207. the Saudi leadership has made it + unmistakable—satisfaction of their arms transfer requests is a + paramount policy issue of overriding importance. West adds that the + option available to the U.S. is not whether, but how to meet Saudi + security needs. He emphasizes that our response therefore must be + constructive, comprehensive and for the long term since it involves + the most vital objectives of U.S. foreign policy and the “privileged + relationship” with Saudi Arabia. (S)

+

I tend to agree with him and this is why I feel we should accelerate + our response to the Saudis, striving to accommodate them as much as + possible, and on an urgent basis. Let us review this situation at + the next V–B–B. (S)

+ + Zbigniew + Brzezinski + +
+ +
+ 210. Summary of Conclusions of a Special Coordination Committee + MeetingSource: Carter + Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Office, + Meetings File, Box 20, SCC + Meeting: #292 Held 3/21/80, 3–4/80. Secret. The meeting took + place in the White House Situation Room. The minutes are not + attached and were not found. Carter wrote “Zbig C” in the top right-hand + corner of the first page. + + + Washington, March + 21, 1980, 4:30–5:45 p.m. + + + SUBJECT + Follow up on Security Framework in the Persian Gulf—VI + + + PARTICIPANTS + + + State + Under Secretary for Political Affairs, David Newsom + Under Secretary for Economic Affairs, Richard Cooper + Assistant Secretary Harold + Saunders + + + + + OSD + Secretary Harold + Brown + Deputy Secretary Graham Claytor, Jr. + Under Secretary for Policy, Robert Komer + + + + + JCS + General David + Jones + Lt. General John + Pustay + + + + + CIA + Director Stansfield + Turner + Robert Ames, NIO for + Near East and South Asia + [name not declassified] + + + + + Justice + Associate Attorney General, John Shenefield + + + Energy + Secretary Charles + Duncan + Assistant Secretary for International Affairs, Les + Goldman + + + + + Treasury + Assistant Secretary for International Affairs, Fred + Bergsten + + + + + OMB + Deputy Director, John + White + Associate Director, Randy Jayne + + + + + White House + Zbigniew + Brzezinski + David + Aaron + + + + + NSC + William E. Odom + Thomas + Thornton + Henry + Owen + + + +

Dr. Brzezinski opened the + meeting with a brief review of the President’s comments on last + week’s SCC discussion.See Document 64 and + footnote 2 thereto. The + President wants us to be prudent in seeking more military access, + avoid publicity, and not press the Saudis. The President also wants + to re-define our approach to the Saudis in the military sphere as an + effort to enhance national defense cooperation, not to stress + internal insecurity. (S)

+ +

[5 paragraphs (25 lines) not + declassified]An undated draft + version of a Presidential Finding was provided to Carter who then made a number + of textual changes. Brzezinski sent this draft, along with a revised + version of the finding that incorporated Carter’s changes, to Carter under a March 25 note + recommending that the President sign the revised finding. + Carter signed the + finding as revised. (Carter Library, Plains File, Subject File, + Box 30, NSC/SCC Minutes, + 1/16/80–2/29/80)

+

[Omitted here is material unrelated to Saudi Arabia.]

+

Secretary Duncan’s report on his trip to Saudi Arabia

+

Dr. Brzezinski opened this + discussion by asking what followup actions Duncan believed necessary. + Duncan answered that he + has listed them in a letter to Dr. Brzezinski.Not found. + For Duncan’s report to + the President on his trip, see Foreign + Relations, 1969–1976, vol. XXXVII, Energy Crisis, + 1974–1980, Document 263. Dr. Brzezinski acknowledged the letter + and reported that papers on these actions will be available by April + 15th and a PRC meeting to discuss + them. (S)

+

Duncan gave a brief summary + of his experiences with the Saudi leadership. They see themselves as + responsible in energy matters while others are not. At 9.5 million + b/d production, they believe they are + using up their resources for inflated dollars. They feel that they + would be better off to hold production to 5 or 6 million b/d. All ministers expressed the view that they + were sacrificing their own interests for the larger interest of the + West. They did not agree that we are compensating them adequately by + providing them a national security blanket. Only Fahd gives us credit on that + score. (S)

+

Their pricing goal with the 9.5 million b/d is + price “stability.” By May they hope to achieve price + “predictability” in the longer term. (S)

+

When told of the President’s plan to impose an import fee on foreign + oil, the Saudis required several hours of persuasion to accept the + view that it is a desirable action. On the SPR, they were adamant that we not increase our demand + at the very time they are trying to flood the market and control the + price. (S)

+

Next Duncan mentioned Senator + Jackson’s hearings, + seven of which have occurred in closed sessions where he repeatedly + asked what we will do if the present Saudi government falls.Jackson chaired the Senate Energy and Natural + Resources Committee. Dr. Brzezinski pointed out that this question is not + helpful; it may even contribute to the demise of the Saudi regime. + Our answer to Jackson should + be two-fold. First, we are doing things to reduce the likelihood of + internal collapse of the regime. Second, we are improving our + capabilities in the region in the event it does collapse. (S)

+ +

Dr. Brzezinski then + emphasized that we must publicly confirm our confidence in the Saudi + Government. The public worry expressed by us is creating a + pernicious upward spiral. All agreed that we should take steps to + give the impression of greater confidence in the Saudis.Carter + wrote in the left-hand margin next to this and the preceding + paragraph: “Maintain privately & publicly our confidence in + SAG regime” and “Reader’s + Digest will hurt.” The April 1980 issue of Reader’s Digest magazine included an article entitled + “Saudi Arabia: The Next Iran?” (S)

+

Duncan argued that it will + take more than assertions. Everywhere he went he heard the same + litany: the Shah, South Yemen, Afghanistan, and Pakistan all add up + to a frightening trend. Dr. Brzezinski answered that this means we must first, + address the sum total of small things we have done to increase our + military presence in the Persian Gulf, and second, emphasize that we + are holding firmly to our present policy toward the USSR. (S)

+

Turner argued that we need + “tangibles” because no one believes we are going to stick to our + present policy. Even the large naval force in the Indian Ocean will + begin to diminish in the near future. All agreed that there is a + problem but emphasized that we must press the two points Dr. + Brzezinski raised. + (S)

+

It was agreed that Hummel be instructed to make both points in + Pakistan because others in the region point to our relations with + Islamabad as an example that we are not holding firmly. (S)

+

As a final note, Cooperreported that Duncan established especially good personal ties + with Yamani. Cooperalso enumerated three + problems which we should try to remove from our relations with + Yamani. First, the + Attorney General’s request for CIDs; second, FTC cases, and three, + tax cases. (S)

+

Next Week

+

Ambassador John West will + meet with the SCC principals next + week when he returns to the U.S. for consultations. Secretary + Duncan will join the + group. (C)

+

The agenda for next week will include:

+ + —Defense paper on internal stability in + Saudi Arabia. + —Follow up on Pakistan. + —Tarapur. (S) + +
+ +
+ 211. Paper Prepared in the Department of StateSource: Carter Library, National + Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, General Odom File, Box 43, + Saudi Arabia: 1–12/80. Secret. Prepared in advance of an April + 12 principals’ meeting on Saudi arms requests; see Document 212. Tarnoff sent the paper to + Brzezinski under + cover of an April 9 memorandum. + + + Washington, April + 9, 1980 + +

SAUDI ARMS REQUESTS

+

The April 2 Mini-PRC on Saudi + Arabian Arms RequestsNo other record + has been found. reached general agreement on:

+ + • Responses to specific requests + • Management of the response with the Saudis and with + Congress + +

Summary

+

The Mini-PRC agreed that positive + responses could be given on most systems requested by the Saudis, + but noted that careful explanation and engagement of the Saudis in a + dialogue on force planning will be necessary if the frustrations and + irritations expressed by the Saudis in the past are to be avoided. + Final Presidential approval and Congressional review are required + where appropriate. In some cases, the responses are informal, with + formal commitments to be made later as PD–13See footnote 8, Document 199. + permits.

+

The issues of absorption or effects on the stability of the Saudi + regime of the sale of these systems were not felt to be major + problems given the extended period of time over which the equipment + could be delivered.

+

Specific Requests (More detail in attached + Fact Sheets)Not attached and not + found.

+

It was agreedAn unknown hand underlined + the word “agreed.” that the following items, which had + been previously approved for sale to Saudi Arabia, should be + examined for accelerated delivery wherever possible, moving Saudi + Arabia up in the production queue even when a substantial portion of + US needs remained to be + filled:

+ + —AN/TAS–4, 5, and 6 night vision devices + —M60 tank product improvement program + —M109 howitzer product improvement program + —155mm Rocket Assisted Projectile (RAP) rounds + + +

It was agreed that the following items should also be approved but + further discussions with the Saudis as to the pace and mode of their + accomplishment are appropriate:In this + paragraph, an unknown hand underlined “agreed,” “should also + be,” and “further discussions.”

+ + —Mechanization of two Saudi Land Forces Brigades + —Blackhawk helicopters + —Commercial alternative to Mark IV Identification Friend and + Foe (IFF) for the I-Hawk (unless an arrangement can be made with + NSA for FMS sale). + +

The Mini-PRC agreed we should + indicate a positive attitude towardAn + unknown hand underlined the phrase “a positive attitude + toward.” providing the following, with further + discussions and final agreement to sale timed to deployment of the + systems with U.S. forces:

+ + —AN/TPQ–36 and 37 locating radars + —Division Air Defense System (DIVADS) + —Infantry Fighting Vehicle (IFV) + —Roland short range air + defense missile system (Saudi Arabia is in the French-German + sales territory, however. We should leave to the Saudis whether + to buy from Europe or seek European agreement to a U.S. sale. In + either case we would support the SAG position.) The Saudis already own the French + Crotale; they may wish to acquire more as an alternative to + Roland. + —Sale of 1200 additional Redeye, in lieu of Stinger (timing is to be tied + to further discussions of how this quantity would fit into Saudi + force structure). + +

The Mini-PRC agreed we should not + approveAn unknown hand underlined + the phrase “should not approve.” the following because of + prior assurances provided to Congress at the time of the F–15 + sale:

+ + —KC–135 tankers to refuel F–15s + —Conformal fuel pods for the F–15 + —Multiple Ejection Bomb Racks to the F–15 + +

It was also agreed we should not agree to an E–3A AWACSAn + unknown hand underlined the phrase “not agree to an E–3A AWACS.” sale. Rather than + a flat rejection, however, we should agree to conduct the requested + airborne surveillance feasibilityAn + unknown hand underlined the phrase “conduct the requested + airborne surveillance feasibility.” study. This could be + coupled with an offer to deploy USAF + AWACS periodically for joint + training with the RSAF. If the + Saudis were interested, we would also offer to study the possibility + of ground data link stations.

+ +

It was also agreed that the General Support Rocket System was not far + enough along in the development and selection process to make a + decision now. We remain prepared to discuss this system further as + development proceeds, however.

+

Finally, on the issue of Saudi financial participation in U.S. + production lines, it was agreed there should be none before a U.S. + production decision was made. Once U.S. Services made a decision, + however, we could consider Saudi participation on a case-by-case + basis where absorption is not a problem. It was also agreed that + there should be no Saudi financial participation in R&D.

+

Management of Our Response

+

With the Saudis

+

The response needs to be conveyed promptly and constructively in + order to strengthen our overall relationship. At the same time we + need to work closely with the Saudis on implementation and to stress + realistic delivery schedules, availability of manpower and adequate + training and contractor support to enhance Saudi absorptive + capacity. We need a strong in-country framework to give continuity + to these efforts to deal with issues before they become political + irritants. Additionally, we want to avoid the perception of a new + dramatic “package” of arms sales at this time. Consequently, + Ambassador West should + informally brief the Saudis on our response on his return to the + Kingdom.An unknown hand + underlined this sentence. + Harold Brown could then + follow-up with Prince Sultan at an appropriate time, placing our + response to these requests in a broad security framework. The timing + of such a meeting would be influenced, inter + alia, by progress in the autonomy talks.

+

With Congress

+

Despite the reasonably comprehensive response we will give to the + Saudis, we are dealing with a number of individual cases.An unknown hand underlined the phrase + “we are dealing with a number of individual cases.” + Implementation will occur over a five or six year period. Few if any + of these cases are likely to result in Congressional notifications + in CY 1980.An unknown hand underlined the phrase “in + CY 1980.” Many are + logical follow-on or replacement sales to equipment we have already + provided. Consequently, if we avoid playing up our response in a + dramatic way, no extraordinary reactions by Congress (or Israel) are + likely. At the same time we should consultAn unknown hand underlined the phrase “At the + same time we should consult.” in the normal course of business to give + Congress an overview of expected cases, both annually as called for + in the Javits report and as + the cases mature. In any event, with the possible exception of + Redeye, the agreed items are not of the type which have been opposed + by Congress in the past.

+
+ +
+ 212. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National + Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to President CarterSource: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country + File, Box 68, Saudi Arabia: 4/80. Secret. Sent for action. + Carter wrote in the + upper right-hand corner of the first page of the memorandum: + “Zbig—Let John West read + Fahd’s rude letter + & then see me J.” An unknown hand drew a line through + Carter’s notation. + Beneath the note, Carter + wrote: “Zbig J.” + + + Washington, April + 12, 1980 + + + SUBJECT + Military Relations with Saudi Arabia (C) + +

I convened an interagency group today to discuss military relations + with Saudi Arabia,Formal minutes of the + meeting have not been found. and specifically the most + recent Saudi arms transfer requests. Attendees included Harold Brown, Warren Christopher, Charles Duncan, Bill Miller, + Stan Turner, David Jones, and Ambassador + John West. (C)

+

John West opened the meeting + by providing his views on the overall relationship. His most + important observation was that the Saudis are expecting a major U.S. + initiative in the event that the autonomy talks do not produce + concrete results by May 26.See footnote 6, Document 206. Sadat + suspended the talks in early May. The group agreed that + John should be prepared upon his return to give the Saudis a better + understanding of our views on this issue, namely that we expect by + May 26 to have made progress sufficiently tangible to continue the + process beyond that date. (S)

+

The group then reviewed the specific Saudi arms requests, which the + Saudis view as the linchpin of our overall security relationship. A + mini-PRC held last weekSee Document + 211. to discuss the Saudi requests recommended + a response (Tab A)Not attached and not + further identified. that John West believes will be favorably received. The group concurred with + the mini-PRC recommendations, with + one exception that requires your decision. (C)

+

During the F–15 debate in 1978, Harold told the Congress that we did + not intend to sell the SaudisCarter underlined the phrase + “did not intend to sell the Saudis.” items that would + significantly enhance the F–15’s capabilities, and he named + specifically: (1) conformal fuel pods; (2) KC–135 tankers; and (3) + multiple ejection bomb racks.Carter underlined each of the + three items. See footnote 11, Document + 216. The majority of the group recommends that + we tell the Saudis that we would be willing to consult with the + Congress on the conformal pods after the + election. This would permit us to give the Saudis some positive news + on an issue of great importance to them, even though we are agreeing + only to consult with Congress, which we hope would be more receptive + because of the increased threat to the region. Harold and Warren Christopher, who were both + heavily involved in the initial F–15 debate, expressed skepticism + about this approach.Carter underlined the names + “Harold” and “Warren” and the phrase “expressed skepticism” in + this sentence. They believe the congressional reaction + still could be very adverse, and that if the decision were to leak, + it could cause political damage. While this is a close, difficult + question, I believe that our relationship with the Saudis is + sufficiently important, particularly during this crucial period, to + warrant giving this cautiously positive response. If you approve, we + would pass the response informally to minimize the chances of a + leak. (S)

+

RECOMMENDATION

+

That you approve notifying the Saudis of our willingness to consult + with Congress early next year on the F–15 conformal fuel pods.Carter approved the recommendation, drew a line + from the Approve line to the lower margin of the page, and + wrote: “You can go this far, but the Saudis must not be misled. + If Congressional approval is doubtful, they should know it. + J.” (S)

+

The group then discussed how to present the response to the Saudis. + It was decided that John + West would give a general briefing on his return and + would encourage Prince Sultan to come here in June to receive a more + detailed response from Harold in the context of the broader security + relationship. The favorable answers to their arms transfer requests + provide an ideal opportunity to engage the Saudis in discussion of + larger issues, and also permit the sounding of cautionary notes + about Saudi absorptive capacity and managerial capability. (S)

+
+ +
+ 213. Telegram From the Embassy in Saudi Arabia to the Department + of StateSource: National + Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P870094–0934. + Secret; Immediate; Nodis. + + + Jidda, May 1, 1980, 1017Z + +

2794. Dept please repeat to White House, USCINCEUR Vaihingen GE, USLO Riyadh, CHUSMTM Dhahran SA, and USMTMDET + Riyadh SA. Subject: Saudi Arms Requests: Meeting With Sultan. Ref: + (A) State 106679;In telegram 106679 to + Jidda, April 23, the Department provided West with the initial + U.S. response to Saudi arms requests, stressing that the United + States “proposes intensified continuing consultations with + SAG on security issues, + especially arms requirements.” (National Archives, RG 59, + Central Foreign Policy File, P870094–0953) See Document 212. (B) Jidda + 1173.In telegram 1173 from Jidda, + February 21, the Embassy referenced the Saudi arms requests, + noting: “If until recently unsatisfied arms transfer requests + were considered irritants by the Saudis, these unfulfilled + perceived needs are now becoming grievances in Saudi eyes.” + (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + D800091–0326)

+

1. (S-entire text).

+

2. Summary: Sultan reacted constructively, in the main, to the + initial USG responses to specific + Saudi arms requests, despite his evident disappointment about unmet + RSAF requirements. For the + latter—including the conformal fuel pods, multiple ejection racks, + and tankers—Sultan proposed an exchange of letters of intent by + which USG agreement in principle to + these sales, subject to congressional concurrence, could be + established. While Sultan was willing to put the AWACS issue aside for the present + time, and had no objection to deployment of USAF + AWACS to Saudi Arabia, he turned + down USAF F–15 visits as + inopportune. He gave qualified acceptance to Saudi participation in + Red Flag exercises with USAF, + however. Other items of discussion included Sultan’s assertion of + necessity to update the bilateral agreement concerning USMTM, his acceptance of the + Lawrence visit,See Document + 215. and his non-committal response on a + possible visit by the Secretary of Defense. Contrast between our + forthcoming responses on land forces requests and our oblique + reactions to Air Force needs was not lost on Sultan, who noted that + if U.S. would not meet RSAF + defensive needs then SAG would be + free to seek other sources of supply. However, on balance the + meeting produced more positive results than anticipated, and + provided the basis for useful continuing discussions with Saudi + defense officials. End summary.

+ +

3. On April 30 the Ambassador met for over two hours in Riyadh with + Prince Sultan, Minister of Defense and Aviation. Major General + Donnelly, Pol–Mil Counselor Marsh, Dr. Gerlach, and Lt. Col. Ryer, AIRA, participated, as + did General Humayd (Deputy Minister, MODA), General Hammad (Chief of the General Staff), and + Lt. Col. Fahd Abdallah + (Director of Operations, RSAF). + The purpose of the meeting was to convey to Sultan the initial + USG responses (ref A) to the + recent SAG requests for arms + transfers (ref B).

+

4. The Ambassador opened the discussion by expressing his conviction, + derived from consultations in Washington earlier this monthSee Document + 212. that the security of Saudi Arabia is of + prime importance to the highest levels of the USG, without exception. Where + differences arose was not whether, but how best, to respond to the + military requirements of the Kingdom.

+

5. In this context, the Ambassador indicated that certain technical + constraints upon the advisory role of USMTM were being eliminated. Sultan interjected that + MODA had under study revision + of the bilateral agreement, now nearly thirty years old, under which + USMTM conducts its + activities. It is necessary to renovate that agreement in order to + reflect more fully the present interests of both sides. (N.B. Sultan + did not specify what revisions were desired). The Ambassador assured + Sultan that the Embassy and USMTM + will be happy to work with MODA on + this matter.

+

6. In an additional prefatory statement, the Ambassador informed + Sultan that Major General Lawrence would visit the Kingdom soon, in order to + make formal presentation to SAG of + the USEOPE report. Sultan said that he welcomed the visit, but added + his hope that Lawrence would + not come with the object of pressing or convincing the Saudis to + accept distasteful situations. Generals Donnelly and Hammad should + jointly arrange Lawrence’s + schedule. The Ambassador concurred.

+

7. Conveying an invitation for RSAF + officers to participate in Red Flag training within the US, the Ambassador underscored the + rarity of such invitations to non- NATO members. While responding with appreciation, + Sultan displayed considerable sensitivity that participating might + imply a lack of technical proficiency on the part of RSAF personnel, or might signify an + obstacle to further acquisitions by RSAF. The US press had + alleged Saudi incapacity to absorb sophisticated weapons systems; + the reverse is the case, and SAG + wishes to accelerate the F–15 program. The Ambassador is welcome to + see for himself how capably the Saudi forces are assimilating their + weapons acquisitions. RSAF pilots have and will + receive training in the US, + including the Red Flag program.

+

8. After this extensive airing of Sultan’s respective viewpoints, the + Ambassador addressed the specific arms questions. On the land forces + items, Sultan received the responses with restrained gratification. + Procedurally, Sultan indicated that USMTM and MODA should + work together on modalities and delivery schedules. His specific + comments were:

+ + (A) That when Stinger is + deployed with US/ NATO forces it should be made + available to Saudi Arabia, whose defense of vital mutual + interests equals the NATO role + in importance; + (B) That Sultan will talk with French Defense Minister Yvon + Bourges, when the latter visits Riyadh May tenth, concerning + Roland and the multiple + launch rocket system (ex-GSRS). Sultan said that SAG preferred to rely on the US as source of its military supply + but has had and now has close security assistance relationships + with France and the FRG; + (C) That SAG remains + interested in Lance, + although it had not appeared on the latest request list. The + Ambassador responded that objective, professional military + judgment in the US holds that + the Lance is unsuitable + for the Saudi inventory, as the Secretary of Defense had advised + earlier. It was left that USMTM and MODA + would discuss this further. + +

9. Turning to the Saudi Air Force requests, the Ambassador explained + our willingness to explore RSAF + needs, to send USAF F–15s and + AWACS to the Kingdom, and to + undertake appropriate consultations with the Congress in early 1981, + respectively. On these subjects Sultan replied vigorously. If + Congress objected to meeting the defensive needs of RSAF, then SAG would consider itself free to seek “other sources” + for its requirements. Visits of USAF F–15s are not rpt not in the interests of the + Kingdom at present—beside this flat turndown, Sultan added the + oblique metaphor that “the temperature is now 40 degrees C, and 42 + degrees C is fatal.”

+

10. As for AWACS, Sultan said that + visits are acceptable. He suggested that the AWACS question be put to one side + for the present. However, he urged, the Secretary of Defense and he + should exchange letters acknowledging SAG’s need for pods, MERs, and tankers, and USG agreement in principle to these + sales, subject to congressional concurrence. Sultan pressed this + point, and the Ambassador gave an unofficial personal opinion that + the Secretary of Defense would not, in all likelihood, be prepared + to enter into such commitments now. We had proposed the USAF visits and an airborne + air-defense surveillance feasibility study. We would thus explore + the requirements and prospects for sale of conformal pods. Sultan + asked to communicate further with the Ambassador about the F–15 + related requests, which was agreed.

+ +

11. At the close the Ambassador reported Secretary Brown’s readiness to include Saudi + Arabia on his Middle East trip next month. Sultan expressed his + personal pleasure over any visit by the Secretary of Defense but + responded that a decision was not his to make. He would consult with + the Council of Ministers and advise the Ambassador promptly.

+

12. Comment: It was clear that the contrast between our forthcoming + responses on land forces requests and our indirect reactions to air + force needs was not lost on Sultan et al. While managing to restrain + display of their disappointment, even dismay, over unmet RSAF needs they consider urgent and + self-evident, their dissatisfaction is unmistakeable. Under these + circumstances, the meeting was remarkable for its absence of + invective and recrimination. Instead, Sultan authorized a + continuation of the dialogue over specifics of the various arms + requests. The Embassy and USMTM + will undertake that dialogue with vigor and will report developments + promptly. End comment.

+ + + + West + +
+ +
+ 214. Memorandum Prepared in the Central Intelligence AgencySource: Central + Intelligence Agency, Office of the Director of Central + Intelligence, Job 82M00501R, 1980 Subject Files, Box 15, Folder + 1, Saudi Arabia. Secret; [handling restriction + not declassified]. A typed notation on the first page + indicates the memorandum was prepared in the Arabian Peninsula + Branch, Near East South Asia Division, Office of Political + Analysis, National Foreign Assessment Center, in response to a + request from the NIO for Near + East South Asia and it was coordinated with the Office of + Economic Research and Office of Scientific Research. Sent to + Turner under cover of + a May 5 note from Helene L. Boatner, Director, Political + Analysis. Boatner wrote that she thought Turner “might find it + interesting reading.” Turner wrote in the margin: “excellent + paper—thanks—have asked to condense [less than + 1 line not declassified] Stan.” National Intelligence + Officer for the Near East/South Asia Robert C. Ames also sent a + copy of the paper to Turner under a May 6 note, upon which Turner wrote: “I like the + conclusion and last part of last paragraph of text.” He added: + “Excellent paper—ST.” (Ibid.) + + + PA M 80–10217 + + + Washington, May + 5, 1980 + +

US ARMS SALES TO SAUDI + ARABIA

+

Conclusion

+

The most likely threat to the Saudi monarchy over + the next several years is not a conventional military attack by + one of its neighbors, but externally inspired subversion or + internal unrest.

+ +

The sale of many of the more sophisticated weapons + requested by Riyadh would not in any case appreciably off-set + the large inherent advantages in manpower (Iran, Iraq) or + technical expertise (Israel) enjoyed by most of Saudi Arabia’s + neighbors.

+

Against South Yemen—the most plausible external + threat in the short term—Saudi deterrent capabilities could be + more than adequately improved by additional training with little + increase in hardware.

+

The overriding rationale, therefore, for meeting + Saudi arms requests is not military but political: to bolster + the “special” US-Saudi + relationship, which has become badly frayed around the + edges.

+

In addition to the obvious political benefits the + US would derive from such + sales, there are some potential political dangers. By promoting + a large defense program over the next five years ($115 billion) + and purchasing more advanced equipment than the Saudi armed + forces can readily absorb, Saudi leaders could lay themselves + open more than they already are to charges of wasting the + country’s resources and increasing Saudi Arabia’s dependence on + the US.

+

On the other hand, Washington runs a high risk of + creating further misunderstandings and hard feelings among Saudi + leaders if it refuses to supply at least some of the more + sensitive and sophisticated equipment they have asked for. This + would be all the more true if the US were to be more responsive to Israeli and + Egyptian arms requests.

+

From our perspective, it is difficult to judge with + any confidence what mix of arms sales might placate the Saudis + and still minimize whatever risk there may be of contributing to + internal discontent.

+

Symbolic Importance

+

The US-Saudi arms supply relationship + has taken on great symbolic importance for Saudi leaders. It is at + once a measure of the US commitment + to Saudi security and a source of prestige. US policy on this issue probably will be an + increasingly important yardstick by which the Saudis measure their + willingness to cooperate with the US. A quick and sympathetic US response, therefore, to the Saudis’ present arms + requests is likely to do much more to strengthen US-Saudi relations than it will to + augment the Saudi armed forces’ limited defense capabilities. + Conversely, a lukewarm response will probably further strain + bilateral relations.

+

Indeed, the slowness of the US in + meeting outstanding Saudi arms requests already is a major irritant + in relations. Rightly or wrongly, Saudi leaders believe that since + the Camp David Accords and the fall of the Shah our “special + relationship” has become increasingly one-sided in favor of American + interests: that Washington has tended to take Saudi support for + granted, and to give insufficient support to special Saudi + concerns.

+ +

This frustration, and even bitterness, results primarily from what + the Saudis view as US unwillingness + to pay an adequate price for Saudi cooperation on oil by pressing + Israel harder on the Palestinian issue. The “favoritism” they feel + Washington shows towards Israel and Egypt in filling arms requests + has only made matters worse. At bottom, their continued harping on + the arms issue reflects their growing frustration with what they + view as US insensitivity to the + changing equities in the relationship and their desire to be treated + less as a client and more as a valued ally, on a par with + Israel.

+

External Threats

+

The overriding political importance of the arms supply issue is + underscored by the fact that Saudi leaders know as well as we do + that the Saudi armed forces could not now, or in the foreseeable + future, withstand a conventional military attack for long, from any + plausible source—except possibly South Yemen—without the aid of + foreign combat forces. No amount of new, sophisticated weaponry is + likely to significantly alter this basic equation over the short- to + mid-term, if ever.

+

The absorptive capacity of the Saudis’ small 31,500-man Army is + simply too limited and the comparative advantages in manpower of + most of their neighbors is too large. Moreover, Saudi military + leaders have shown little interest so far in dealing with one of + their most glaring weaknesses: the lack of adequate training in + command and control, logistics management, maintenance, and strategy + and tactics. This kind of training would do more than anything else + to upgrade the Saudis’ defense capabilities against South Yemen, + their only likely military opponent in the near term.

+

Saudi leaders seem unconcerned about this deficiency probably + because, like us, they see little likelihood of a major armed + conflict with one of their neighbors over the next several years. + Historically, wars between Arab states have been few and relatively + brief, often amounting to little more than border clashes. Because + of pan-Arab constraints on attacking a fellow Arab, the limited + offensive capabilities of most Arab armies and the potential + political risks of defeat, most Arab leaders have traditionally + resorted to subversion rather than military action to unseat an + opponent. Some or all of these constraints exist for potential Arab + opponents of Saudi Arabia. In addition, we judge there is slim + chance that Saudi leaders would use Saudi regular forces in an + aggression outside Saudi Arabia proper.

+

As the strongest adjacent Arab state, Iraq + with its well-trained 200,000-man army could easily overwhelm the + Saudis. Saudi leaders, however, are not particularly worried at + present about a threat materializing from that direction. Over the + past year or so, Riyadh and Baghdad have developed closer ties, + which include some limited military and security cooperation.

+ +

Even if relations turned sour again, there is little reason to + believe that renewed political feuding would lead to a military + clash. Both the attitude of other Arab states and fear of an + American reaction would act as strong constraints on Iraqi + adventurism if Baghdad were so inclined.

+

Because of its new-found revolutionary fervor Iran has emerged as a more serious threat to Saudi + security. But the military threat is more apparent than real. As + long as Iranian leaders remain distracted by internal problems and + perceived threats from the US and + Iraq, and the Iranian military remains in disarray, the Saudis will + have more to fear from Iranian efforts to foment unrest among Saudi + Arabia’s Shia minority than they will from a conventional military + attack from Iran.

+

As for Israel, Saudi military leaders dismiss + the possibility of a direct conflict as remote. Even if another + Arab-Israeli war broke out the Saudis are not about to attack Israel + directly. Instead, they would seek to meet their obligation to the + Arab cause by sending an expeditionary force either to Jordan or + Syria. And they would expect the US + to restrain Israel from striking at vulnerable military + installations and industrial targets inside Saudi Arabia.

+

A border war with South Yemen, on the other hand, is plausible under + certain circumstances. If, for example, the Adeni regime thought it + could inflict an embarrassing reverse on Saudi forces that would + trigger widespread internal unrest or a coup against the monarchy, + Yemeni leaders probably would take the risk. Such an attack in the + near future, however, would achieve neither goal and probably would + result in South Yemen’s increased isolation in the Arab world. Thus, + it seems more likely that Aden will try to undermine the Saudi + regime, if it can, by resorting to subversion and perhaps urban + terrorism. Given the inhospitable terrain and climatic conditions, + it is questionable in any event whether Yemeni forces could mount a + sustained offensive into Saudi Arabia.

+

Finally, a direct Soviet attack is highly implausible because of the + enormous risk of triggering a superpower confrontation.

+

The Greater Threat

+

In our judgment the greater threat to the survival of the Saudi + monarchy is internally or externally inspired subversion, feeding + off domestic discontent. Because of increased popular awareness and + dissatisfaction over corruption, government inefficiency and waste, + and unresponsive political institutions, the huge Saudi defense + budget and the purchase of large quantities of expensive US military equipment—some of dubious + utility—could contribute to internal criticism of the regime and + serve as a rallying point for the discontented.

+

The extent of the contribution is difficult to measure. Certainly it + is not as great as was the case in Iran. Because of the Saudis’ + greater financial resources + and smaller population, the Saudi Government can easily afford both + guns and butter without fueling inflation or creating shortages that + might generate the kind of economic grievances against the regime + that contributed to the downfall of the Shah. Additionally, such + acquisitions probably would have the positive effect of binding the + Saudi military closer to the monarchy, ensuring the continued + loyalty especially of senior officers. A US refusal to sell some of this hardware, moreover, + would simply prompt the Saudis to turn elsewhere, thus circumventing + US efforts to channel Saudi + defense spending into what we view as beneficial directions.

+

On the negative side the purchase of equipment that the Saudi armed + forces cannot readily absorb and that would require additional + US (or other foreign) personnel + to operate and maintain could feed discontent among younger, lower + ranking Saudi officers over what some of them already regard as + incompetence, corruption and excessive dependence on the US by senior Saudi leaders.

+

Political Dilemma

+

The dilemma for the US in trying to + decide what weapons to sell, and what to withhold, is that the + Saudis are placing a high political premium on our responsiveness to + their arms requests. Given the realities of US Congressional resistance to some sales and the Saudi + armed forces’ absorptive problems—which the Saudis are well aware + of—most Saudi leaders might accept with equanimity a US decision to refuse or defer + consideration of some of their requests. But after having gone to + such great lengths to emphasize the importance to Saudi Arabia of a + positive US response, there is a + high risk that the Saudis will view US efforts to persuade them to drop their requests for + some equipment as either patronizing, or worse, indifference to + their sensitivities.

+

In analyzing the list of weapons Riyadh has requested we cannot + determine with confidence the mix of weapons sales that would meet + the Saudis’ genuine military needs, satisfy Saudi leaders + politically, and still minimize any potential harm such sales could + do. The Saudi insistence, above all, on obtaining accessories for + the F–15, which would meet strong opposition from pro-Israeli + elements in the US Congress, + underscores the difficulty. Indeed, the suspicion + arises that some Saudi leaders seem to be courting rejection in + order to demonstrate that the US + is not prepared to grant Saudi Arabia the special status they + believe it deserves. One possibility is that they have + already decided on some action that the US will not like, and by pushing us into saying “no” + here they hope to put us on the defensive and stifle our ability to + object.

+
+ +
+ 215. Telegram From the Embassy in Saudi Arabia to the Department + of State and the Department of DefenseSource: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign + Policy File, D800236–0791. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Sent for information to + CHUSMTM Dhahran, USMTMDET + Riyadh, USLO Riyadh, and + USCINCEUR + Vaihingen. + + + Jidda, May 13, 1980, 0945Z + +

3053. Military addressees treat as Specat Exclusive. Subject: Lawrence Visit—Meeting With Sultan.

+

1. (S-entire text).

+

2. Summary. Efforts of M/Gen + Lawrence to engage in + substantive discussions of non-arms transfer security issues were + thwarted by Sultan’s insistence upon protesting perceived US unresponsiveness to Saudi equipment + requests. Sultan ruled out both discussions on wider security issues + and joint military activity within the Kingdom, such as training and + exercises, until the Royal Saudi Air Force had obtained its + equipment requirements. Sultan confirmed, however, that Saudi + personnel will participate in Red Flag and other training activity + within the US. The highly charged + atmosphere of this session with Sultan revealed the deeply aggrieved + sensitivities of the Saudis over the arms question and the critical + importance of this issue to our relations with SAG. End summary.

+

3. Prince Sultan, Minister of Defense and Aviation, used his meeting + with visiting Major General Richard + Lawrence on May 12 to argue strenuously for US satisfaction of Saudi arms requests. + Sultan has done so with every successive American visitor for over + three months. This time Sultan’s contentions had special conviction, + for the meeting came soon after the US decision declining, in Saudi eyes, to give + unequivocal assent to conformal fuel pods, MERS, and aerial + refueling tankers for the Royal Saudi Air Force (RSAF). Furthermore, Major General + Sabri and Lt. Col. Fahd + Abdallah of RSAF participated in + the meeting and personified Saudi disgruntlement with the military + supply situation. Sultan’s often vehement delivery was for their + benefit as well as for the American side.

+

4. The Ambassador and Gen. Lawrence, accompanied by Major General Donnelly, + Pol–Mil Counselor Marsh, and Lt. Col. Ryer, AIRA, met for two hours + in Riyadh with Sultan, who was flanked by Generals Humayd, Hammad, + Sabri, and Omran, in addition to Sabri and Fahd Abdallah. In opening remarks + the Ambassador said that Lawrence had come to make formal presentation of the + 1979 USEOPE survey report, to have discussions with MODA officials on a wide range of + security topics, and to + obtain Sultan’s views on these matters for transmittal to Secretary + Brown and Under Secretary + Nimetz.

+

5. Lawrence emphasized the + steadfast commitment of the US to + the security of Saudi Arabia and US + interest in various forms of defense cooperation, such as a + continuing dialogue on the spectrum of issues of mutual concern, and + activities such as joint exercises and training. At each attempt by + the US side to discuss matters other + than the unresolved arms requests, Sultan returned to his + preoccupation with that problem.

+

6. In fact, most of the two hour meeting was a heated monologue by + Sultan in which he set forth his exasperation and indignation. Most + of his arguments were familiar, but he gave them even more than his + usual emphasis. He maintained that the US refused to face the facts of genuine Saudi defense + needs, given the encirclement of the Kingdom by adversaries with + designs on Saudi oil fields. Saudi Arabia was the region’s foremost + friend of the US but neighboring + states had “ten times” the arms possessed by the Kingdom. Not only + had this friendship brought the Saudis much criticism from within + the region, but it had not induced the US to respond to Saudi defense requirements either. The + Kingdom needs visible evidence of US + support to offset the political liability of its close association + with us.

+

7. Sultan enumerated the benefits derived by the US from cooperative Saudi policies. In + oil production and pricing the Kingdom had shown itself responsive + to US interests. Unlike certain + NATO countries, Saudi Arabia + constitutes no drain on US defense + resources but seeks only to provide for its own requirements, + incidentally by cash purchases helping to sustain the US economy. Sultan protested that in + return for such dependable self-reliance the Kingdom must cope with + both USG reluctance to provide + modest arms needs and a series of US + media calumnies denigrating the country. Such attacks included + distortion of the Mecca incident into an alleged sign of internal + instability, and disparagement of Islam itself through the showing + of “Death of a Princess.”Reference is + to the television movie “Death of a Princess,” which aired on + Public Broadcasting Service stations across the United States on + May 12. Saudi officials vigorously protested the showing of the + film, “based on the execution of a Saudi princess and her + commoner lover,” in both the United Kingdom and the United + States. The Department of State and Mobil Corporation intervened + in order to air an hour-long panel discussion following the + broadcast. (C. Gerald Fraser, “‘Princess’ Film Discussion to Run + for Hour After Showing Monday,” The New York + Times, May 10, 1980, p. 48)

+

8. Sultan turned down joint contingency planning, joint exercises, + and other kinds of cooperative activity. No American forces, even of + small scale, should be brought into the Kingdom nor should contingency planning occur prior + to actual times of crisis. (French Defense Minister Bourges had + proposed joint exercises to Sultan only the day before, and had met + with a similar refusal). Sultan indicated that Saudi personnel would + go to the US for Red Flag and other + training activity, but in all other instances of proposed defense + cooperation there is a sine qua non—providing RSAF the equipment it needs. Only + after that prerequisite is satisfied will it be prudent or opportune + even to discuss joint planning and exercises.

+

9. Gen. Lawrence will attempt + to hold discussions with the Saudi service chiefs on the USEOPE + report and other topics. Clearly, however, Sultan’s ire about the + RSAF equipment requests + overcame his respect and appreciation for Lawrence’s survey. We conclude, + regretfully, that the meeting was wholly inauspicious for productive + subsequent staff-level discussions.

+

10. Comment. It is unmistakeably clear that Sultan considers the + RSAF requests the major + current test of US good faith in the + defense sphere. His staff and he are affronted by our seeming + unresponsiveness—and Sultan remarked twice during the meeting that + SAG “patience is limited.” (In + this vein, we have heard reports that some RSAF officers are seriously considering urging SAG cancellation of the F–15 purchase + and acquisition of more fully equipped first-line aircraft from + another country). We cannot induce the Saudis to address wider + security concerns nor can we pursue regional defense objectives + requiring their cooperation, until this equipment issue is resolved + satisfactorily. In the aftermath of the Iranian crisis, the invasion + of Afghanistan, and the Mecca incident the Saudis are in search of + tangible US reassurance of + commitment to their security. Their air force requests epitomize the + reassurance they seek. Failure to meet these needs—for the military + equipment and the political support it also represents—can have a + profoundly adverse impact upon our overall relationship. And, as all + concerned are aware, that relationship is already strained because + of other bilateral and regional policy issues. End comment.

+ + West + +
+ +
+ 216. Letter From the Ambassador to Saudi Arabia (West) to + President CarterSource: Carter Library, National + Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 68, Saudi + Arabia: 6–7/80. Secret. The letter is handwritten. Brzezinski sent the letter to + Muskie and Brown under cover of a June 12 + memorandum, in which Brzezinski noted: “The President asked me to + share the enclosed letter and paper with you. It raises some + very serious issues that are germane to our luncheon discussion + on Wednesday.” The luncheon discussion in question refers to a + Muskie-Brown-Brzezinski lunch, during which + arms transfers to Saudi Arabia were discussed. The three decided + “(a) that Multiple Ejection Bomb Racks (MERs) were out for now, + (b) to leave open the issue of conformal fuel pods and (c) that + we would go ahead with KC–130 tankers with booms provided there + were advance intensive Congressional consultations and that + Israel was also offered the KC–130/boom.” (Memorandum from + Tarnoff to Muskie, June 12; National + Archives, RG 59, Office of the Secretariat Staff, Subject Files + of Edmund S. Muskie, + 1963–1981, Lot 83D66, Box 3, 1980 Muskie Breakfast) Carter wrote the following handwritten notation + on the first page of West’s letter: “Zbig—Let Ed & Fritz + & Harold read.” A notation in an unknown hand reads: + “Done.” + + + Jidda, June 3, + 1980 + + + Dear Mr. President: + +

I am enclosing an assessment of our relationship with Saudi Arabia. I + regret that it is so pessimistic. Frankly, I am as concerned as I + have been at any time during my three years here. There is one + positive factor which I purposely did not include in this + paper—namely that I do not believe the Saudis will take any action + which might endanger your reelection prospects. The entire + government leadership, including Fahd, Abdullah and Sultan are outspoken in their support. + They believe that without your reelection, there is no hope for + peace in the Mid-East.

+

For example, I referred in the assessment paper to my meeting with + Prince Abdullah two days + ago. At the close of the meeting, he asked my opinion as to whether + Saudi Arabia was producing too much oil. I replied that I didn’t + think so for we needed a continuation of the present surplus to + stabilize the market. He persisted by saying, “You really wouldn’t + object too much if we cut back, would you?”

+

I replied, “I hope you don’t but if you decide to do so, for goodness + sakes wait until after the election!” He laughed and said, “No, + we’ve got to have President Carter reelected—it means as much to us as it does + to you . . .”

+

Harold Brown’s meeting with + Prince Sultan later this month could be very important.See Document + 217. If we could indicate a favorable response on + the additional equipment requested for the F–15, it would be most + helpful. I have sent Harold in some detail our thoughts about the + meeting.

+ +

Congratulations on winning the renomination—I hope the results of + today’s primariesThe last Democratic + primaries of the 1980 campaign took place in California, + Montana, New Jersey, New Mexico, Ohio, Rhode Island, South + Dakota, and West Virginia. cause Sen. Kennedy to withdraw—at last.

+

Your choice of Sec. Muskie + was superb. I am sending him separately a copy of this + assessment.

+

Faithfully,

+

J. West

+ +

Attachment

+

Report Prepared by the Ambassador to Saudi Arabia + (West)Secret.

+

Jidda, June 1, 1980

+

SAUDI ARABIA—AN ASSESSMENT AS OF JUNE 1, 1980

+

SUMMARY: A major crisis is coming in U.S.-Saudi relations. Indeed, it + has probably already begun, and is simply now increasing in + intensity and severity. Expressions by Saudi government and private + sector leaders indicate a growing concern and uneasiness about the + future of USG–SAG relations. Likewise, recent events + clearly show the beginning of a serious deterioration in the special + relationship. Two reasons emerge: (1) The Saudis see the + relationship with U.S. as one-sided, with the SAG’s actions on oil pricing and + production far outweighing any quid pro quo coming to Saudi Arabia, + and (2) The Saudis are increasingly convinced that Israeli interests + are paramount in USG policy + decisions in the Mideast, a conclusion which strikes at the very + heart of the bilateral relationship as viewed by the Saudis. END + SUMMARY.

+

SAUDI DISILLUSIONMENT WITH THE + “SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP”

+

Since my return from consultations in Washington six weeks ago, I + have noted increasing concern by normally pro-Western Saudis about + the future of the U.S.-Saudi relationship. I have travelled + extensively throughout the country and have talked to a wide + spectrum of people, including numerous members of the royal family + both within and without the government, ministers, deputy ministers, + provincial governors, and Saudi business leaders, most of whom are + Western educated and generally pro-Western in their sentiments. In + addition, I have talked + with U.S. business leaders with long experience and many contacts + here in the Kingdom. The conclusion is unanimous and inescapable: + our bilateral relationship is deteriorating badly.

+

Recent public statements and declarations by Saudi leaders have had a + common theme—dissatisfaction with U.S. policies in the Mideast and + disillusionment with the special relationship. There was official + condemnation of the use of force to attempt to rescue our + hostages.Reference is to the failed + attempt by U.S. forces on April 24 to rescue the hostages being + held in Tehran. Foreign Minister Prince Saud’s speech at + Islamabad which criticized almost equally both the U.S. and the + USSR, Minister of Industry and + Electricity Qusaybi’s address to The Arab-American Society, and Fuad + al Farsi’s articles in the local press all have a similar ominous + note. These three SAG officials, + all products of America’s best colleges and universities, are + sending us a signal loud and clear that all is not well. Perhaps + most significant of all is Crown Prince Fahd’s recent interview in a + Kuwait paper which quoted him as saying that the SAG would not rule out use of the oil + weapon. It is the first such public statement by the Crown Prince. A + careful reading of the statement indicates that it was probably + reluctantly made; however, its significance cannot be + over-estimated.

+

From all of our public and private sources, there has been a nearly + unanimous opinion that U.S.-Saudi relations have clearly worsened in + recent times and are fast approaching a critical stage. There is + general agreement that U.S. policies of the past several months have + taken away much of the Saudi confidence and satisfaction with the + “special relationship.” There is a generally-shared feeling that all + Saudis now feel that the special relationship is one-sided, with the + U.S. receiving far more than it is giving.

+

In virtually every conversation, these typical Saudi questions and + comments are heard: “Why do we continue to produce twice as much oil + as we need just to accommodate the U.S.?” “Why do we continue to + sell our oil at $6.00 to $10.00 per barrel less than other countries + are receiving?” “We do these things for you and yet we receive no + thanks—only continued attacks in your press. What are we receiving + from our friendship with the U.S.?—problems with the Arab world, a + draining of our natural resource (oil) with no compensating concern + for our position, our needs and concerns.”

+

THE ISRAEL FACTOR IN U.S.-SAUDI + RELATIONS

+

The answer which we often give to the above questions is that the + U.S. security system is Saudi Arabia’s primary protection from + Russian aggression, along + with a reminder of the sale of the F–15s and of USG’s + response during the Yemen crisis of early 1979. Those answers are no + longer effective, for events of recent months have weakened our + position as a friend, ally, and reliable arms supplier. We are + forced to conclude that the basic cause of the present deteriorating + status of the U.S.-Saudi special relationship is the Arab-Israeli + problem. This conclusion is particularly serious in that many + influential Saudis have heretofore viewed the U.S.-Saudi “special + relationship” as equal to the ties the U.S. has with Israel. Now, + however, there is a growing perception among Saudis that this + evenhandedness has vanished.

+

There is unanimous agreement among all Saudis with whom we have + talked or with whom we have contact:

+

(1) That the autonomy talks have failed and that the U.S. does not + now have the will or capacity to cause Israel to make the + concessions necessary to solve the Palestinian problem. In the + absence of such a solution, Saudi Arabia’s continued support of U.S. + interests, especially in oil production and pricing, subjects Saudi + leaders to increasing internal pressure and at the same time + isolates Saudi Arabia from the rest of the Arab world (except + possibly Egypt), a position they consider completely untenable;

+

(2) That U.S. foreign policy is Israel-oriented and that no action + will be taken by the U.S. which is considered to be pro-Arab or + anti-Israel. Such a conclusion frightens the SAG political and military leadership + and undermines confidence in the U.S. as a reliable friend, arms + supplier, and military ally. These conclusions are cancerous and + strike at the very heart of our special relationship.

+

The Saudis have contended from the outset of the current peace + process that the Camp David accords would never result in a real + solution to the Palestinian problem. Early on, they responded to our + assertions that autonomy for the Palestinians would be the first + step toward that solution with the rejoinder that there would never + be any real autonomy as long as Begin’s government was in power and unless the U.S. + was prepared to exercise pressure upon the Israelis. Unfortunately, + events since Camp David seem to have proven the Saudis right. With + the passage of the May 26 deadline,See + footnote 3, Document + 212. they are more convinced than ever that a + separate peace has been accomplished between Egypt and Israel; that + Egypt has been effectively removed from the Arab orbit; that the + Palestinian problem has been shunted aside; that Israel is now + moving forward to legalize and finalize its occupation of Arab + territory seized in the 1967 war; and, as a final blow and insult to + the Arab world, that Israel is moving to make its occupation of + Jerusalem a non-negotiable + issue with the Arabs, a step which would be in conflict with U.S. + policy and contrary to the understandings of Camp David.

+

With regard to the present Saudi conviction that U.S. foreign policy + is Israel-oriented, there have been a series of events over the last + months which, in Saudi eyes, have substantiated this belief. These + events include the resignation of Ambassador Young,Reference is to Ambassador to the United Nations Andrew Young’s resignation on + August 15, 1979, due to a controversy that had ensued after he + held a meeting in his apartment with a representative of the + Palestine Liberation Organization. More information on this + episode is in Carter’s + memoirs, Keeping Faith, p. 491. + the repudiation of the UN vote on + Jewish settlements,See Foreign + Relations, 1977–1980, vol. IX, Arab-Israeli + Dispute, September 1978–December 1980, Document + 345. the abstention on the votes on UN resolutions condemning Israel for + its incursions into Lebanon and the expulsion of the three Arab + notables,See Foreign + Relations, 1977–1980, vol. IX, Arab-Israeli + Dispute, September 1978–December 1980, Documents 360 + and 367. and, + most disappointing of all, the failure of the U.S. to respond + affirmatively to all of the SAG’s + recent arms requests.See Documents 213 and 215.

+

With typical Bedouin frankness, Prince Abdullah, the third ranking member of the royal + family, told me on June 1, “Arabs all over the Mideast are now + convinced that your policies are set in Tel Aviv and Jerusalem. + Can’t you do something to give your friends in Saudi Arabia a basis + to deny that charge?”

+

THE LITMUS TEST OF U.S.-SAUDI + RELATIONS: THE SECURITY RELATIONSHIP

+

The Saudis have seized upon their arms requests as the litmus test of + the U.S.–SAG relationship. Well + aware of the open-ended military assistance the U.S. has given to + Israel in recent years and concerned with their own security needs, + the Saudis have included in their military equipment requests many + of the weapons and systems that we have supplied or promised to + supply to Israel. U.S. refusals to grant certain equipment are now + being challenged heatedly, and the same requests are being raised + again and again.

+

A leading case in point concerns supplemental equipment for the + F–15s. The SAG is again insisting + upon the acquisition of conformal pods and multiple ejection racks + (MERs) for these advanced fighters, plus KC–135s to permit aerial + refueling. We have learned that the SAG military was not consulted when the Saudi + government concurred in Secretary Brown’s letter to the Congress in April 1978, saying + that the conformal pods and + MERs would not be included in the F–15 package.Reference is presumably to Brown’s letter of May 10, 1978, + addressed to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, which gave + assurances that the F–15s that the administration wished to sell + to Saudi Arabia would not be equipped with auxiliary fuel tanks + or MERs. (Bernard Weinraub, “Brown Says Saudis Will Accept Curbs on the Use + of F–15’s,” The New York Times, May 11, + 1978, p. A1) This decision has been a source of + frustration and anger within the Royal Saudi Air Force (RSAF), and has been the subject of + considerable discussion among Saudi political and military + leaders.

+

The Saudis feel even more strongly that the restrictions should be + removed in view of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Their + contention is that there is now complete military justification for + this additional equipment but that political constraints (read + Israel) are preventing the U.S. from furnishing these needed items. + The feeling that they are being given only second class + consideration by the U.S. creates bitter resentment and unconcealed + frustration.

+

THE FRENCH CONNECTION

+

Thus far, the Saudi response to these forces has been restrained. + However, the SAG has repeatedly + hinted that its patience with U.S. policies has its limits, and + there are now strong indications that other options are indeed being + actively considered. The French seem to be the leading benefactors, + and the significance of growing Franco-Saudi defense ties (which + have included during the past year a visit by Sultan to Paris and + two visits by French Defense Minister Bourges to Saudi Arabia) + should not be underestimated. The Saudis believe they can get + whatever they want from the French in terms of equipment, advisors, + and support for Saudi political positions. As Prince Sultan remarked + to a local journalist on May 11, “Our friends in France will not + refuse us anything that we might ask from them in the future.”

+

THE ROAD BACK: REASSURING THE SAUDIS + AND THE CONSEQUENCES IF WE DON’T

+

The Saudis, therefore, see themselves buffeted by four forces: (1) + the threat of military aggression by the Soviet Union and/or its + proxies; (2) internal political and military pressures; (3) the + anti-U.S., anti-monarchial tendencies of the Arab world; and (4) the + efforts of the Western Europeans, chiefly the French, to replace the + U.S. as the principal security partner of Saudi Arabia. The end + result of this buffeting is to call into serious question the + U.S.-Saudi special relationship. Thus, the two questions which next + arise are what can be done to preserve this relationship, and what + will be the consequences of continuing deterioration if strong + remedial action is not taken immediately.

+ +

The most obvious answer to the first question is some clear + indication that the U.S. is acting to move the peace talks forward + by securing meaningful concessions from Israel on the core issues of + the Palestinian problem. Failing that, the administration should + make a commitment to explore with the next Congress the furnishing + of the additional F–15 equipment including KC–135s. The consequences + of doing nothing and seeing the continued deterioration of the + relationship has, potentially, both short-term (6 months–2 years) + and long-term (2–5 years) consequences.

+

The major short-term consequences concern oil. The Saudis may have + already started to relinquish their role as a moderate on oil prices + and to allow market conditions to determine the price. This action + could well be followed by a substantial Saudi reduction in oil + production. We do not, however, believe this will occur prior to the + fourth quarter of 1980. We also anticipate that there might be a + gradual termination of the relatively favorable treatment of U.S. + firms in the Kingdom. The accommodation presently being made by + SAG officials to avoid + disruption in U.S.-Saudi business dealings by moderate application + of the anti-boycott laws would begin to disappear.

+

Another short-term consequence, and one which is already underway, is + the Saudi move to other suppliers for military equipment. Recently, + for instance, the Saudis informed us they do not wish to purchase + U.S. M–60 tanks for the next stage of their army mechanization + program. The Saudis have agreed with the French on a mammoth coastal + defense package, and several other arms deals are in the offing. The + net long-term significance of these developments is of crucial + importance, as the SAG appears to + be seeking a new security strategy. This new strategy is still not + well defined but, even so, two elements have emerged. The first + element, noted earlier, is that the Saudis are seeking an + alternative to the U.S. as principal arms supplier—enter the French + connection; the second element is Saudi interest in forming an + alliance with other Islamic countries to pursue a non-aligned + course. This new tack could include exploration of a new + relationship between Saudi Arabia and the USSR in the reasonably near future.

+

The adoption of such a strategy—even if over the long term—would have + a profound and injurious impact on U.S. vital interests. Heretofore, + the U.S.-Saudi special relationship has largely traded oil for + security. For the Saudis to decide that their security is now best + guaranteed elsewhere would deprive us of what is, in the final + analysis, the only card the U.S. can play effectively in a game + where the stakes involved affect, to a significant degree, our + economic and political well being.

+

The U.S. must not, therefore, permit our relationship with Saudi + Arabia to deteriorate further. Instead, we must make the difficult + political decisions + necessary to restore our credibility with the Saudis and the rest of + the Arab world. The Saudis need to be reassured that close + friendship and cooperation with the U.S. need not prejudice their + own vital political and economic interests as they are now + increasingly inclined to believe.

+ + John C. West Ambassador + + +
+ +
+ 217. Report of DiscussionsSource: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of the + Director of Central Intelligence, Job 81B00401R, Subject Files + of the Presidential Briefing Coordinator for DCI (1977–1981), Box 13, Folder 1, + SCC Meeting ME Security + (No. 13). Secret. The Summary of Conversation was included in a + briefing packet for the July 15 SCC meeting (see Document + 86). Brown + arranged to meet with Sultan in Geneva as part of a trip that + also took him to Italy and France. + + + Geneva, June 26, + 1980 + +

REPORT OF DISCUSSIONS BETWEEN SECRETARY OF DEFENSE DR. + HAROLD BROWN AND PRINCE SULTAN BIN ABDUL-AZIZ AL-SAUD, MINISTER OF + DEFENSE AND AVIATION OF SAUDI ARABIA IN GENEVA, JUNE 26, 1980

+

The June discussions lasted seven hours and included four hours of + private conversation between the principals, followed by a working + luncheon at which they were joined by Amb + John West and ASD David McGiffert on the U.S. side + and Amb Faisal Alhegelan and COL + Fahad bin Abdullah on the Saudi side.

+

The atmosphere of the talks was reasonably friendly and both sides + consider them to have been successful. From the U.S. point of view, + the following points and conclusions are worth highlighting:

+

A. It had been sixteen months since the last SecDef-Sultan meeting in February + 1979.See Documents 185 and 186. The overall U.S. objective of building + greater Saudi confidence in the US-Saudi security relationship was achieved. Sultan + welcomed Dr. Brown’s reaffirmation of the U.S. commitment to + modernize and develop Saudi Arabia’s defense forces and to provide + them with the equipment needed to defend the Kingdom against + regional threats. He also welcomed the Secretary’s recognition and + support for Saudi Arabia’s leadership role in the region.

+ +

B. A broad measure of strategic agreement was reached on the nature + of the Soviet threat to the area in the aftermath of the Soviet + invasion of Afghanistan. Dr. Brown congratulated Sultan on Saudi + Arabia’s firm stand against the invasion at the Islamabad Conference + of Islamic states,The Eleventh + Conference of Islamic Foreign Ministers took place in Islamabad + May 17–21. (Telegram 3154 from Jidda, May 18; National Archives, + RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800245–0083) The Saudis + played a key role in keeping the Afghanistan invasion in the + forefront during the conference. (Telegram 3344 from Jidda, May + 28; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + D800261–1002) and it was agreed that both sides would + work to strengthen Pakistan militarily and economically. Sultan + pressed for greater U.S. assistance to Turkey, Somalia, Bangladesh, + Yemen Arab Republic and the Afghani rebels.

+

C. Dr. Brown described U.S. efforts to increase its military presence + in the Indian Ocean area, including greater access to facilities in + Oman, Kenya, Egypt, and Somalia; upgrading and prepositioning at + Diego Garcia; and planning to upgrade air and sea transport + capability. He noted, however, that the U.S. would have difficulty + countering a Soviet thrust toward the Gulf without access to + facilities in the northern Gulf. To Sultan’s relief, the Secretary + stated that the U.S. was not seeking bases in Saudi Arabia, but the + Secretary also asked Sultan to think about the fact that Diego + Garcia was over two thousand miles away and what this would mean if + military action against Soviet forces were required. He thus left a + marker for future, more specific discussions.

+

Sultan made clear that in the Saudi view, the most important thing + the U.S. could do to assist regional stability and security would be + to press for a just and comprehensive solution to the problems of + Palestine and Jerusalem. Beyond that, he said, strengthening Saudi + Arabia and assisting other moderate states in the area would have + more effect than facilities. He did acknowledge that a U.S. presence + in the Indian Ocean, in areas near where the Soviets were, was a + good thing.

+

D. The Secretary asked Sultan for Saudi good offices in improving + U.S. relations with Iraq. Sultan noted that Saudi Arabia and the + Gulf States were working to encourage greater Iraqi moderation.

+

E. The Secretary expressed appreciation for Saudi Arabia’s efforts to + maintain production and price levels at the Algiers OPEC Conference.OPEC members + met in Algiers June 9–11. Other oil producers, he said, + obviously did not understand the damaging effect of high oil prices + on common defense and security efforts.

+

F. The F–15 accessories/aerial refueling issue was defused. The + Secretary said that the U.S. could not make commitments now and that + it would not be possible to move on all the items at once. Sultan + agreed that Saudi Arabia would not push its request for these items + at this time but + insisted it was not withdrawing its request either. It was agreed, + as SecDef later told the press, + that no decisions were imminent, that these requests would remain + under study and that any future decisions regarding them would be + preceded by consultations with the Congress.

+

G. Third country programs were discussed at some length with the U.S. + side urging greater coordination and more frequent consultations, + and the Saudi side exhorting the U.S. to provide more assistance to + specific countries, particularly, Pakistan and Somalia. Sultan by + implication endorsed U.S. efforts to acquire access facilities in + Somalia. Sultan also stated he favored the continuation of a + Jordanian training role in Yemen but at the same time hoped more + Yemenis could receive military training in the U.S.

+

H. Sultan endorsed the Secretary’s suggestion that they meet at least + once a year and that regular high-level military and security + consultations occur in the interim through the establishment of a + joint military (or security) commission. It was agreed that the U.S. + side would follow up with a specific proposal. Sultan acknowledged + the Secretary’s invitation that he visit Washington and said he + hoped to do so in February or March 1981.

+

I. COL Fahad bin Abdullah pushed for rapid conclusion of an AWACSAn + unknown hand underlined “AWACS.” study, followed by U.S. agreement to + sell AWACS to Saudi Arabia. The + Secretary noted that further study of the projected ground based + systems, interoperability, and a command and control analysis would + be required. The AWACS exchange + pointed up that while the U.S. side was able during this meeting to + subsume equipment issues within the broader focus on regional + security and US-Saudi cooperation, + there could be no assurance that equipment issues would not dominate + future discussions.

+
+ +
+ 218. Letter From Director of Central Intelligence Turner to the Ambassador to Saudi + Arabia (West) + + + + Washington, July + 3, 1980 + +

[Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of the Director of + Central Intelligence, Job 82B00162R, Subject Files, Box 11, Folder + 71, Near East/South Asia—General—Jidda—Saudi Arabia. Secret. Two + pages not declassified.]

+
+ +
+ 219. Memorandum Prepared in the White House Situation RoomSource: National Archives, + RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P850112–1436. Secret; + Sensitive. Carter + initialed the memorandum which summarizes telegram 4805 from + Jidda, August 6. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign + Policy File, D800377–0020) Carter’s other comments are illegible, except + for Brzezinski’s first + name. Sent to Vance and + Brown under cover of an August 7 memorandum from Brzezinski, in which he asked + them to “consult on the steps that ought to be taken, and + provide a report to the President by some time next week on how + we should proceed.” + + + Washington, August 7, 1980 + +

THE SITUATION ROOM CHECKLIST

+

1. Opportunity Knocks in Saudi Arabia: + Ambassador West alerts you, + Secretary Brown and Deputy + Secretary Christopher to + what he terms is the political, military and commercial opportunity + of the decade in Saudi Arabia—the Saudi Arabian National Guard + (SANG) medical/health care + project. A U.S. army medical team, which is to return to the U.S. + today, has found it feasible and advantageous for the U.S. to + supervise operationCarter drew a line in the + margin next to this section of the paragraph. of two + newly completed SANG hospitals, + construction of 15 health clinics, provision of medical/health care + delivery and establishment of a SANG medical/health service. The U.S. role would + largely consist of letting and administering the contracts for these + activities, under a government-to-government agreement. U.S. + contractors are ready and eager to undertake the work, and SANG commander Prince Abdallah favors + U.S. direction of the program. However, an October first deadline + for the opening of the two hospitals requires that we expeditiously + draw up and approve a letter of offer and begin congressional + notification within a matter of days. Aside from the $8 billion + which will accrue to U.S. sources over the next decade, the project + would provide us the means for making an incalculable humanitarian + and psychological impact on Saudi society. Another attractive + feature is that while the medical/health services program would meet + both Saudi and U.S. objectives, it could be done without a cent of + U.S. expenditure. West concludes with a plea that this unique + opportunity not be forfeited to the various other nations competing + for it. The lasting + benefits will more than warrant your attention and efforts to + expedite insuance of the FMS + case.Carter wrote in the left-hand margin: “Expedite + this. Keep me informed regularly.” On October 9, West discussed + with the SANG Commander, + Second Prime Minister Prince Abdallah, a U.S. proposal for + providing assistance to the SANG medical/health care project. (Telegram 6202 + from Jidda, October 11; National Archives, RG 59, Central + Foreign Policy File, D800486–0539) On December 22, the Embassy + reported that it had “ascertained” that the SANG staff would “recommend” to + Prince Abdallah that the U.S. proposal be “disregarded” as it + did not “meet the SANG + requirement for a comprehensive government-to-government + agreement encompassing all elements of the planned program.” + (Telegram 7749 from Jidda, December 22; National Archives, RG + 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800606–0882) At a meeting with + Abdallah, December 23, West informed him that he “felt” the U.S. + Government “might reconsider and submit a proposal under FMS,” but “that no complete + assurance could be given until after the new administration took + office on January 20.” (Telegram 7792 from Jidda, December 23; + National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + D800609–0038) (Jidda 4805, PSN 30219) (S)

+
+ +
+ 220. Summary of Conclusions of a Special Coordination Committee + MeetingSource: Carter + Library, National Security Council, Institutional Files, Box + 116, SCC 344, 9/27/80, + Iran/Iraq. Top Secret; Eyes Only. Attached but not printed is a + September 27 covering memorandum from Brzezinski to Carter. + + + Washington, September 27, 1980, 5:30–7 p.m. + + + SUBJECT + Iran-Iraq Conflict + + + ATTENDEES + + + State + Warren + Christopher + David + Newsom + Harold + Saunders + Reginald + Bartholomew + + + + + Defense + Harold + Brown + Graham Claytor + David + McGiffert + Walt Slocombe + + + + + CIA + Stansfield + Turner + Frank + Carlucci + + + + + White House + The Vice President + Denis + Clift + Zbigniew + Brzezinski + + + + + NSC + William Odom + Gary + Sick + + + + + JCS + Gen. Barrow + Gen. Gorman + + + + +

Dr. Brzezinski opened the + meeting by reporting that the President had approved the cable to + Oman which was proposed in the Mini-SCC earlier in the day and that that message had been + sent.Material on the September 27 + Mini-SCC meeting on the + Iran-Iraq war is in the Carter Library, National Security + Council, Institutional Files, Box 123, SCM 147, 09/27/80, + Mini-SCC, Iran/Iraq. The + war began on September 22 when Iraq invaded Iran. The + President believes it is essential to differentiate between actions + which are escalatory and those which are essentially defensive in + nature. Our objective should be to terminate the conflict as soon as + possible, to prevent an increase of Soviet influence, to prevent + other Arab states from joining in the hostilities, to preserve the + territorial integrity of Iran particularly with regard to the Soviet + Union, to protect the hostages, and to work toward the eventual + improvement of relations with all parties. The immediate question is + what to do with respect to Saudi Arabia which has asked for + information which could be useful for offensive purposes and for + other help which could involve a U.S. presence. Can we influence + Saudi Arabia to exercise restraint while adding to the substance of + our security relationship? Additionally, should we consider moving + our naval forces to the Persian Gulf to prevent the parties from + widening the conflict? The Department of State had prepared a + message to Ambassador West + in Jidda which served as the basis for discussion.Attached but not printed is a draft telegram to + West providing instructions as to how to proceed regarding the + Saudi requests.

+

Message to Fahd

+

After some discussion, it was agreed by all members of the SCC that our initial message to + Fahd should focus on + our concern about the Omani cooperation with Iraq and the danger of + escalation and also sound out Fahd about his awareness of and support for the + requests for assistance which we have received through Prince Bandar + and Prince Turki.West met with Turki on September 27. When West asked Turki if the Saudi Government + needed assistance due to the Iran-Iraq conflict, Turki responded that “the + matter was being discussed and that probably some assistance was + needed.” (Telegram 5840 from Jidda, September 27; National + Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + P870094–0793) We will be prepared to respond very quickly + if Fahd indicates that + these requests are endorsed by the highest political levels in the + Kingdom. A copy of the proposed message is attached.

+

Specific Requests

+

In preparation for a quick response to Fahd if that is required, the group reviewed the + requests as we now understand them. Differences of view on each item + are reflected below.

+ +

1. + AWACS

+

Dr. Brzezinski proposed the + following response to the Saudis if this request is validated: “We + are prepared to deploy AWACS as + we did before if Saudi Arabia can assure us it will take no steps + toward supporting Iraq in the present conflict in a way which would + violate Saudi status of neutrality and the SAG will encourage the smaller Gulf states to take the + same posture.” Harold Brown + supported this, but suggested adding the following: “Four AWACS could arrive within 48 hours. + They would require 350 men on the ground and about 12 C–141 flights + to support them.” The JCS also + supported this approach.

+

Mr. Christopher proposed the + following alternative response to the Saudis: “We do not believe it + would be either in SAG or U.S. + interest to provide AWACS in the + present circumstances. Fahd + should recall how conspicuous an AWACS would be, both its actual presence and through + its extensive logistic support requirements.” He believed that the + introduction of a command and control aircraft at this point would + give the impression that we were aligning ourselves with the Arabs + vs. Iran. It would not be consistent with our position of + neutrality. It would be helpful if we could offer alternative means + of providing the kind of early warning information to the Saudis + without such a large U.S. presence. Admiral Turner suggested two alternative + possibilities: (1) E2 aircraft off the carriers, refueling in + Dhahran or other Saudi airfields, then flying reconnaissance in the + Gulf over international waters; or (2) placing one of the U.S. + destroyers with an air traffic control capability in the vicinity of + Dhahran to provide early warning and target location. He agreed with + Harold Brown that each of + these would be “second or third class” in comparison with the AWACS, but could provide some + alternative capability. Harold + Brown said the greatest visibility was not the nature + of the assistance we provided but the way it is portrayed in the + newspapers.

+

2. + HAWK Missiles

+

Secretary Brown outlined three + types of assistance we could provide to the Saudis. We could do any + or all.

+

(1) Provide a command and control team to improve Saudi + communications and control between their own sites. This is + something they badly need to be effective. In some respects, it is + more important than materiel.

+

(2) Provide U.S. training personnel to replace Saudis who would man + operational missile batteries.

+

(3) Send additional missile battalions to replace those on the West + Coast of Saudi Arabia (out of the conflict area) which are now being + moved to the northeast.

+ +

Secretary Brown recommended + (1) and (2) if the Saudis request assistance. We should reserve (3) + since there is no clear evidence they are actually requesting it and + because it would be the highest visibility. The JCS and Dr. Brzezinski also supported + this.

+

Mr. Christopher supported + (2), and opposed increasing the U.S. presence on the ground. He + noted that (1) would make more sense if we decided to provide AWACS since it would enhance the + ability of the two systems to function smoothly together. Secretary + Brown agreed, but noted + that the command and control team would be helpful to them with or + without AWACS since it added to + the effectiveness of the entire system.

+

3. Targetting Data

+

Dr. Brzezinski proposed a + formulation to the Saudis as follows: “We are prepared to continue + to provide the SAG with + intelligence on the progress of fighting between Iran and Iraq and + would be prepared to provide information on Iranian targets if Iran + attacks Saudi Arabia.” Secretary Brown agreed, but preferred to say that necessary + targetting information would be in the hands of U.S. personnel + coming with the AWACS and HAWK command/control groups and would + be available if required. That, of course, presupposes a prior + positive decision on providing AWACS or HAWK + assistance.

+

Mr. Christopher originally + proposed to say that we are not prepared to provide specific + targetting information. He never expressed a final position, but + reserved the State Department position for a subsequent meeting.

+

Admiral Turner argued strongly + for providing the information to Saudi Arabia. He believed the + Saudis would see the proposed Brzezinski formulation as not forthcoming. [1½ lines not declassified] The kind of + information we propose to provide is not particularly sensitive, + since it could be derived from open sources in most cases. This was + a litmus test of our relationship with the Saudis, and we should be + as forthcoming as possible.

+

Secretary Brown disagreed that + the information was not sensitive since it included radar types and + locations and gave locating data on civilian and industrial targets + which was, by its very nature, sensitive. All agreed that the + revelation of U.S. offers of targeting data—however bland—would be + viewed by Iran as extremely serious.

+

U.S. Action vs. U.S. “Neutrality”

+

Mr. Christopher argued that + the U.S. policy of neutrality is clear. We could not remain + consistent with that policy and at the same time assist a party + which is aligned with one side of the dispute. Saudi Arabia has + publicly identified itself with Iraq, and any U.S. assistance of a + tangible and visible nature will be seen as taking sides.

+ +

Dr. Brzezinski maintained + that our policy of neutrality is not an end but a means. We have + adopted a position of neutrality in order to be able to accomplish + certain things, but it is not an end in itself. He agreed that the + Arabs have begun lining up with Iraq. However, we have our own vital + interests to protect, and we cannot renounce our responsibilities in + the interest of maintaining a posture of neutrality.

+

Admiral Turner said that there + was a very real possibility that Iran would launch an attack on the + oil installations on the Arab side of the Gulf as a desperation + measure to draw in the West and attempt to persuade the West to + intervene to stop the Iraqis. We must be concerned with the physical + security of the oil facilities as a first objective.

+

Secretary Brown said that + neutrality is important, but not in comparison to the magnitude of + the interests involved in the oil flow from the Gulf and the + protection of production capacity. Although it could be argued that + a U.S. presence would serve to draw Iran into attacks on Saudi + Arabia and others, it could be argued just as well that a U.S. + presence to assist Saudi Arabia defense itself would act as a + deterrent on the Iranians. He tended to the latter view.

+

The Vice President said that we could not be neutral with regard to + the defense of Saudi Arabia and the Saudi oil production facilities, + but we should be neutral with regard to the conflict between Iran + and Iraq. Our problem was to deal with the first without making it + appear that we were abandoning the other. He felt there was a chance + that the Iraqis would achieve their principal objectives and stop in + the next few days. Then there was a chance of a ceasefire and a + reduction of tension. If we appear to be in cahoots with those + opposing Iran, we provide a pretext for Soviet mischief-making. The + great danger, however, was that Iraq would launch an attack on the + islands from Oman, thereby escalating the conflict.

+

Secretary Brown noted that we + are already providing assistance on the ground to Saudi Air Defense. + In that sense we are not neutral. He doubted that anyone would + suggest that we withdraw our assistance at this point in the name of + neutrality. He recognized that the Soviets could portray our + assistance to Saudi Arabia as helping the Arab side, but he thought + they would be very cautious about that since they are also providing + arms to Iraq. They would also be cautious about identifying us with + the Arabs, which would leave them the less attractive alternative of + appearing to side with Iran.

+

Dr. Brzezinski noted that + Iran may decide to strike at Saudi oil for their own reasons. It is + in the U.S. vital interest to preserve that oil, and he thought + people would understand that basic fact if we took defensive + precautions. If Iran should strike the oilfields, we would certainly + not preserve our neutrality, but we might also be too late to + protect the fields unless we took certain steps in advance.

+ +

Mr. Christopher said that an + Iranian air attack was unlikely to do much real damage. It was more + likely to be a symbolic attack by a few aircraft than a sustained + attack with massive damage.

+

Secretary Brown challenged + this view, pointing to the damage done to Basra by the Iranian air + force. Dr. Brzezinski noted + that if Iran hits Saudi oil fields, our position is gone. In his + view, we have two objectives: (1) to rein in the Saudis from + associating with any escalation of the fighting; and (2) to send a + signal that we consider the oilfields a vital zone.

+

Mr. Christopher said that our + actions would serve as a provocation to Iran and would risk + expansion of the conflict when our objective was to confine it. + Secretary Brown wondered + whether a positive signal (action) or a negative signal (doing + nothing) was more likely to provoke an Iranian attack.

+

Admiral Turner commented that + Iran did not require a “cause” to strike at Saudi Arabia. Its own + desperate position was enough reason to lash out. In the total + humiliation of the position they face soon, they could strike at + Saudi Arabia, attempt to close the Strait, or take it out on the + hostages.

+

Dr. Brzezinski said we owe it + to ourselves to be there to shoot down the planes as they come in. + Not being there is a greater danger than being there.

+

Movement of U.S. Forces

+

Dr. Brzezinski asked whether + we should move our naval forces closer to the Gulf or to the islands + as a means of deterring action by Iraq or others in the southern + Gulf. Secretary Brown said + that our aircraft are already within range, and we have four ships + off Bahrain. He did not think that moving our ships would have much + effect except to risk greater U.S. involvement in any conflict. He + believed that if the Iraqis move to take the islands, we should stay + out of it.

+

Dr. Brzezinski wondered what + would then happen if the Iranians launched strikes against the + islands or against shipping in the area. Secretary Brown replied that we would then + provide escorts for shipping and take whatever steps were required + to protect them.

+

There was no support for a movement of U.S. forces to the Gulf at + this time.

+

Other Support for Saudi Arabia

+

Secretary Brown noted that + there were two other steps which we might wish to take to improve + the defense of Saudi Arabia. The Saudis had not asked for these, but + we should at least note them.

+

1. We could provide a command/control/communications and intelligence + team which would improve present weaknesses in the Saudi command + structure and information handling. This would consist of about 200 + U.S. personnel.

+ +

2. We could deploy a U.S. squadron of F–15s to Saudi Arabia. If it + became necessary to defend against attacks by F–4s, the F–15s would + be far more effective than the Saudi F–5s. This would, of + course, be a considerable increase in U.S. presence and would have + implications under the War Powers Act.

+

In addition, he noted for the record that we should consider what + kind of quids we might want to ask from the Saudis in return for our + assistance. This could provide leverage, perhaps, to get them to + address the question of overbuilding their own facilities, to accept + U.S. freedom to conduct naval patrols in the gulf with support from + Saudi ports, and perhaps even to ask for an increase in oil + production. All agreed we should keep these in mind as we + proceed.

+
+ +
+ 221. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense Brown to President CarterSource: Carter Library, Brzezinski Donated Material, + Subject File, Box 20, Alpha Channel + (Miscellaneous)—[9/80–10/80]. Secret; Eyes Only for the + President; Alpha Channel. A copy was sent to the Acting + Secretary of State. Carter wrote “Good J” in the upper right-hand + corner of the first page of the memorandum. + + + Washington, October 1, 1980 + + + SUBJECT + Assistance to Saudi Arabia (U) + +

(S) The hectic negotiations of the last 5 days have resulted in + constructive results. These not only appear to be pleasing to the + Saudis but also provide an entree to the increased security + cooperation with Saudi Arabia so essential in the long run to the + viability of our military posture in Southwest Asia. Dave Jones, who + worked patiently and with great skill, deserves much of the credit + for this outcome. Briefly, here are the results:

+

—The Saudis requested and we have deployed four AWACS with supporting equipment and + personnel, including emplacement of secure communications.For the Department of Defense statement + announcing the temporary deployment of AWACS aircraft to Saudi Arabia, + at Saudi request, which was read to reporters on September 30, + see the Department of State Bulletin, + November 1980, p. 54.

+ +

—The Saudis asked for rapid enhancement of Saudi air defense + capability. Dave Jones was “authorized to discuss other possible + temporary U.S. contributions to Saudi Arabia’s ground based air + defense” except U.S. combat units (e.g., U.S. Hawk batteries, U.S. + air defense aircraft).

+

—Along these lines, the Saudis requested two U.S. mobile land based + (TPS–43s) radars to augment their three similar radars. We have + agreed and will be shipping the two radars in a day or so. We will + operate them as well as one of the Saudi radars.

+

—The Saudis also asked for rapid enhancement of other items of + command, control, and communications. We have agreed to this in + principle and are sending a follow-on team this weekend to define + their requirements more precisely.

+

—The Saudis are not asking at this time for U.S. combat units such as + interceptor aircraft or I–HAWK + battalions (I doubt if they will do so unless their perception of + the threat changes for the worse).Carter wrote “quite + ok w/me” in the margin next to this paragraph.

+

—The Saudis agreed to participate in a multinational naval patrol in + the gulf should one prove necessary; the follow-on team will deal + with this in more detail.

+

(S) Linked, although not explicitly, to the forthcoming way in which + the Saudis perceive the United States to have responded to their + requests, is the Saudi decision to raise oil production by one-half + million barrels a day (there are indications that this could be one + million a day or even more) and immediately to solicit increases + from other gulf producers sufficient to make up for the loss of oil + from Iran/Iraq.

+

(S) In addition to sending the follow-on team and expediting the flow + of air defense related material to Saudi Arabia, we are within DoD + examining how we might respond quickly in the event a similar threat + to the oil fields or to AWACS + appears to be developing. Threats to AWACS are probably less likely, since their tactics can + assure their safety quite well in the air, and on the ground they + are 150 miles inland. Deployment of F–15s would probably be the most + militarily effective solution. In the interim before their arrival, + we could use F–14s from the fleet, aerial refueled either from the + fleet or from KC–135 tankers based in Saudi Arabia. We are looking + at these and other alternatives.

+ + Harold Brown + +
+ +
+ 222. Summary of Conclusions of a Special Coordination Committee + MeetingSource: Carter + Library, Plains File, Subject File, Box 37, Special Coordinating + Committee (SCC) Meetings, + 10/80–1/81. Secret. The meeting took place in the White House + Situation Room. The minutes are not attached and were not found. + In the upper right-hand corner of the first page, Carter wrote: “Zbig + J.” + + + Washington, October + 3, 1980, 9:15–9:55 a.m. + + + SUBJECT + Saudi Request for Military Assistance + + + PARTICIPANTS + + State + Secretary Edmund Muskie + Deputy Secretary Warren + Christopher + Assistant Secretary Harold + H. Saunders + Reginald + Bartholomew, Director, Bureau of + Politico-Military Affairs + + + + + Defense + Secretary Harold + Brown + Deputy Secretary W. + Graham Claytor + Deputy Under Secretary Walter Slocombe + + + + + Energy + Secretary Charles + Duncan + Assistant Secretary Les Goldman + + + + + JCS + Admiral Thomas Hayward + General Paul Gorman + + + + + DCI + Admiral Stansfield + Turner + Martha Kessler + + + + + White House + Dr. Zbigniew + Brzezinski + David + Aaron + + + + + The Vice President’s + Office + A. Denis + Clift + + + + + NSC + General William Odom + Gary + Sick + + +

[Omitted here is a paragraph on discussions with the British, French, + and West Germans regarding naval planning.]

+

Military Assistance to Saudi Arabia

+

Harold Brown summarized the + situation and proposed follow-on actions. In accordance with the + President’s instructions, we should send a political-military team to Saudi + Arabia.In his memoirs, Brzezinski noted that + Carter had approved + the AWACS deployment to Saudi + Arabia during a National Security Council meeting convened on + September 29 to address the Iran-Iraq conflict. (Power and Principle, p. 453) The minutes + of this meeting are scheduled for publication in Foreign + Relations, 1981–1988, vol. XX, Iran; Iraq, April + 1980–January 1984. A technical air defense team + from Eucom has already been dispatched, but we need a team with + political representation to follow on with more than technical + problems of deliveries and the like. He thought the team should not + be too visible politically, perhaps at the Deputy Assistant + Secretary level. An air defense team was previously scheduled to + visit Bahrain and will arrive imminently. The team to Saudi Arabia + should be able to reinforce what the Saudis now perceive to be a + weakness in their air defense in the Eastern Province and identify + ways that could be improved. They should also carry on with specific + contingency preparations which would permit us to respond smoothly + in the event Saudi Arabia found itself under immediate military + threat. The team should continue the discussions concerning possible + naval cooperation in the event the Gulf is closed or shipping is + threatened. We will also need to work our cooperative relations with + Kuwait, Oman and perhaps other Gulf states who are now interested in + getting the advantages of air defense warning which AWACS provides. It will not be + necessary for the AWACS to + operate outside Saudi airspace, but we may be able to provide + terminals in other countries which would be of assistance in + coordinating air defense on the Arab side of the Gulf. (S)

+

The essential question is how much we want to put into Saudi Arabia. + For six months or more we have been talking about overbuilding Saudi + facilities and other steps which would be of long-term importance to + us in confronting a Soviet threat in the area. Until now, the Saudis + have kept us at arms length, arguing that the Arab-Israel problem + needs to be resolved first. Now they are aware of the threat and + they appear willing to be cooperative. It appears likely that they + would now accept, for example, pre-positioning of some U.S. + equipment, provision of water storage, and some overbuilding. They + will probably be amenable to this while their awareness of the + threat is high. During this period we should try to institutionalize + our dialogue on security matters and attempt to reinforce Saudi + cooperativeness. (S)

+

A further problem is what we may wish to do to counter a possible + “out of the blue” Iranian air attack on Saudi Arabia. We should be + cautious.Carter underlined this + sentence and wrote “I agree” in the margin. (C)

+

Secretary Muskie noted that + until now our posture and intentions have been clear to all—to the + Saudis, to the Congress, to the combatants and to the Soviets. They have understood that + our various steps were taken in the context of a neutral posture on + the conflict, and except for the wild charges coming out of Iran, we + have heard no challenge to our neutral position. AWACS is seen for what it is and + what we say it means. He believed that our neutral position was well + established after his press conference the day before when a number + of questions attempted to test that position.For the transcript of Muskie’s October 2 press + conference in New York, see the Department of State Bulletin, November 1980, pp. + 40–43. He now felt that we faced two concerns:

+

—To consider limiting our steps to whatever is covered by the present + understanding of our position; and

+

—If more is needed, to think very carefully about its implications. + (S)

+

At present, there is no evidence of an imminent attempt to threaten + the sea lanes or the oil fields, although this could change. Both + parties to the conflict appear to want to contain the fighting. We + should be very careful about the temptation to ride in on this + crisis to put in place what we want in terms of the long-term + crisis. What we do cannot be hidden. If we attempt to take long-term + steps while hiding under the cloak of neutrality, this could be seen + as provocative by the Soviets. The Secretary recalled that he had + handed a non-paper to Gromyko prior to the outbreak of the present crisis + which stated our intention not to invade Iran.Muskie + gave Gromyko the paper + at a September 25 meeting. See Foreign Relations, 1977–1980, + vol. VI, Soviet Union, Document 302. If we now + move to build up our capabilities while this crisis is going on, the + Soviets will perceive that we are making preparations to take + advantage of Iranian weakness, possibly as preparations for an + invasion. We need to be very careful to think through the Soviet + reaction. The objective of getting the Saudis to provide military + facilities and to overbuild is something that would have been done + over a longer period of time. The main purpose of his meeting with + Gromyko had been to + stabilize our perceptions of each others’ interests, and that should + not be jeopardized. (Secretary Muskie then left at 9:32 for a previously scheduled + appointment.) (S)

+

Dr. Brzezinski noted that the + Secretary had made some very important points. He did not think + there was any serious difference of views since the Secretary seemed + to be saying that we must take steps to insure that what we do is + not misunderstood in the region and by the Soviets. On that, there + is no disagreement. (S)

+

Dr. Brzezinski then reviewed + the proposed terms of reference for a team to Saudi Arabia, noting + that most of the items had already been approved by the President. + He suggested that an interagency group get together today to work out an agreed set of + terms of references for the team. If serious differences arise, we + could have an SCC meeting at noon + on SaturdayOctober 4. See Document 223. to review the + issues and seek the President’s decision as required. In addition, + we would plan to have a meeting next Tuesday to review the broader + questions associated with our relationship with Saudi Arabia. + Secretary Brown agreed and + pointed out that even discussion with the Saudis about overbuilding + would not provide any early visible actions on our part which could + be misinterpreted by the Soviets or others. (S)

+

Admiral Hayward commented that we had spent nine months now looking + at the situation we would face in developing a viable military + capability in the Middle East. Every study had shown that access to + Saudi Arabia was essential. We should take advantage of the present + circumstances to begin developing the kind of relationship with + Saudi Arabia on security that will be required if we are to + establish an effective military capability in the region. (S)

+

Radars to Saudi Arabia

+

Mr. Christopher inquired + about the proposed transfer of radar equipment to Saudi Arabia and + wondered if that had been specifically approved. Secretary Brown said it consisted of two + mobile TPS–43 air defense radars which the Saudis had requested. In + their talks with General Jones,See Document 221. the Saudis had + asked for two U.S. radars and personnel to man a third which is + presently in storage in Saudi Arabia in order to fill an existing + gap in their air defense. This is a matter of tying the AWACS together with the Hawk + missiles. He had interpreted the President’s approval to move ahead + on AWACS and improvement of Saudi + air defense as authority for General Jones to agree to this specific request from the + Saudis which was fully justified in terms of their air defense + weaknesses. It may be sufficient to provide a single radar and to + assist them in installing the radar they have in storage. Temporary + U.S. manning of radars is entirely consistent with the decision to + provide the airborne radar of AWACS. (S)

+

Approve proceeding to provide TPS–43 radar to Saudi Arabia as + necessary, including U.S. personnel to man at least one of our own + radars and one already in Saudi Arabia, as worked out with the + Saudis by General Jones.Carter checked and initialed + this option.

+

Disapprove.

+ +

U.S. Replacement of Hawk Instructors

+

Mr. Christopher asked what + had happened to the proposal for the U.S. to provide Hawk + instructors to free up Saudi personnel. Secretary Brown said that the Saudis had not + pursued this issue and it was no longer under discussion. (S)

+

Ship Transfer for Middle East Force

+

Secretary Brown said he would + like to put a cruiser from the Task Force into the Middle East Force + in the Gulf in place of a destroyer, which would be removed. These + two ships are not very different in size, but the cruiser has a + better air defense capability which would make it more valuable in + the event we needed to provide some seaborne air defense off Ras + Tanura on short notice. Normally, this kind of transfer would be + something we would do routinely, but he wanted to raise it with the + SCC. (S)

+

Hal Saunders noted that we had + never had a cruiser in Middle East Force, and this would be seen as + a sign that we are changing the composition of the force in the + Gulf. Mr. Aaron said that it + was primarily a question of appearances, and we should make sure we + get the story out right, rather than letting it come out through + sensational leaks. Secretary Duncan thought it would be better to say nothing at + all since it was a routine transfer which would scarcely be visible + to anyone in the Gulf. Secretary Brown disagreed, arguing that it would certainly + leak and we should put out the story ourselves. (S)

+

Approve replacing one Mideastfor destroyer with a cruiser.Carter + checked this option and wrote in the margin: “If announced, do + it in a very routine manner.”

+

Disapprove.

+

Additional Steps

+

Secretary Brown reviewed some + additional steps. He was not proposing these at present, but the + SCC should be aware of the + possibilities. (U)

+

One way to increase air defense capabilities in the Gulf would be to + use F–14s from the Eisenhower, controlled by carrier-based E–2s and + refueling from KC–135s operating from Riyadh. The KC–135s are + presently at Diego Garcia but could be positioned in Riyadh within + hours if necessary. The F–14/E–2 operation could not be sustained + for more than about a week, but it would provide a very quick means + of responding to an imminent threat. Admiral Hayward added that we + may need to place two KC–135s in Riyadh in any event to support the + AWACS. All agreed that such a move + should be reviewed by the SCC in + advance. (S)

+

Secretary Brown also noted + that we could deploy a squadron of F–15s to Egypt, which would put + them within a few hours of Saudi Arabia if required on short notice. + He noted President Sadat’s open invitation for the U.S. to use + Egyptian facilities. Mr. Christopher commented that Sadat had also made a + point of noting publicly that the F–4 deployment was not permanent. + There may be more sensitivity on this issue than appears on the + surface. (S)

+

Finally, Secretary Brown noted + that the greatest weakness of the Saudi air defense was the lack of + command/control/communications to tie it together. He felt this was + the area where we could make the most effective contribution. Mr. + Aaron commented that the + expressed fears that we were turning Saudi Arabia into another Iran + was only justified if we attempted to build up the Saudis to try to + take care of the security problems entirely on their own. That would + put great pressures on manpower and absorptive capacity. Trying to + build them up is more dangerous than if we do it ourselves. (S)

+
+ +
+ 223. Summary of Conclusions of a Special Coordination Committee + MeetingSource: Carter + Library, National Security Council, Institutional Files, Box + 116, SCC 347, 10/04/80, Saudi + Request for U.S. Military Assistance. Secret. The meeting took + place in the White House Situation Room. The minutes are not + attached and were not found. Attached but not printed is an + October 4 memorandum from Brzezinski to Carter, which provided a more succinct summary + of the meeting. + + + Washington, October + 4, 1980, 12–12:50 p.m. + + + SUBJECT + U.S. Assistance to Saudi Arabia + + + PARTICIPANTS + + + State + Secretary Edmund Muskie + Warren + Christopher + David + Newsom + Harold + Saunders + Reginald + Bartholomew + + + + OSD + Secretary Harold + Brown + W. Graham Claytor, + Jr. + David + McGiffert + Walter Slocombe + + + + + Energy + Les Goldman + + + + + White House + Dr. Zbigniew + Brzezinski + David + Aaron + + + + + NSC + General William Odom + Captain Gary + Sick + + + + + JCS + Admiral Thomas Hayward + General Paul Gorman + + + +

Secretary Brown opened the + meeting by describing the five points in the proposed Terms of + Reference (TOR) for the political-military team which the President + had asked to be sent to Saudi Arabia. These were as follows:

+

1. To expand the efforts of the technical team from EUCOM to identify measures of + supply, assistance, and advice and training which would have the + greatest immediate impact on Saudi self-defense capabilities against + air attack.

+

2. To engage in contingency planning with respect to possible + deployment of U.S. active air defense capability, to include F–14s, + F–15s, and HAWK battalions in the + event of an attack on Saudi Arabia. The team would be directed to + identify and discuss with the Saudis those forms of pre-deployment + preparation which would contribute to rapid and effective response. + The team would make clear that we do not regard such deployments as + justified by present circumstances, and any steps on pre-positioning + would require prior approval by Washington.

+

3. To explore in principle with the Saudis the need for and + feasibility of an integrated regional air defense system, linking + Saudi air defenses with those of the Gulf states. The team can + outline possible forms of cooperation, but is not authorized to + confer with other Gulf states on this matter or to agree that the + Saudis should do so.

+

4. To plan for Saudi participation in international naval + freedom-of-navigation patrols, following up Saudi expressions of + support to General Jones. + The team is to emphasize the contingency nature of the planning, + making clear that any decision to institute such activity would have + to be made at the political level and that we are making every + effort to insure that no such activity is needed.

+

5. To explore with the Saudis continuing U.S. and Saudi operational + and logistic planning for future contingencies, to include + prepositioning, Saudi overbuild, and other measures to enhance + possible U.S. assistance in the defense of Saudi Arabia and the + region at Saudi request. However, the team should not initiate discussions on this issue until it has worked + several days on the first four and has made a recommendation to + Washington on whether it would be productive to raise these issues. + (S)

+ +

Secretary Brown stressed that + the TOR do not approve any actions by the U.S. They are intended to + explore a number of issues which we have attempted to raise with the + Saudis over the past year and a half. (S)

+

Secretary Muskie said he + wished to focus on the foreign policy implications of a visit by + such a team. He had a question whether we should not ascertain in + advance whether the Saudis are interested in pursuing these kinds of + options. Ambassador West + thinks any kind of team is a bad idea. The Secretary thought it was + possible we would push the Saudis too hard by riding this war, to + the detriment of other objectives. He had met two times with Prince + Saud who was very + cautious about going beyond what we have already done.Muskie + met with Saud on + September 25 and October 1 in New York. Muskie summarized the + September 25 meeting in telegram Secto 8018 from New York, September 26, and the + October 1 meeting in telegram Secto 8055 from New York, October 2. (National + Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P890018–0480 and + P890018–0484) The Saudis have begun to show concern that + they overreacted in their support of Iraq. (S)

+

The effect of these actions on our relations with Israel had not been + discussed. He was raising this as a red flag. They may see this as + building a close relationship with Saudi Arabia under the pressure + of the crisis and suggest that we are taking advantage of the crisis + to achieve at their expense a security relationship that we have + been unable to do under other circumstances. (S)

+

We must also consider the reaction in Iran. Although the situation is + volatile, it now appears that the Iranians and the Iraqis are + focusing on the other end of the Gulf, and we should not provoke + them to refocus their attention. Ambassador Lang had delivered our + message about AWACS and our + continued neutrality to Ali Agha at the Foreign Ministry.The New York Times + reported that on October 1 the United States had sent a message + to Iran asserting that the deployment of AWACS to Saudi Arabia was + consistent with American neutrality. (Bernard Gwertzman, “U.S. + Reassures Iran On Help For Saudis,” The New + York Times, October 2, 1980, p. A16) Ali Agha + had said it was ridiculous and that Iran violently rejects the U.S. + position. Prime Minister RajaiMohammad-Ali Rajai was Prime Minister of Iran from August 15, + 1980, until August 4, 1981. was quoted in Le Monde as saying he will pay no attention + to U.S. claims of neutrality. (S)

+

This morning, the Secretary had met with Dobrynin to deliver a non-paper on issues not + covered in the previous meeting with Gromyko.See Foreign + Relations, 1977–1980, vol. VI, Soviet Union, + Document 303. + Dobrynin also provided a + non-paper reminding us of our pledge of neutrality and + non-intervention, drawing attention to the numerous statements + regarding possible use of armed force to protect free navigation + through the Strait of Hormuz, citing official U.S. confirmation of the deployment of AWACS and noting that the U.S. + appears to be moving a second carrier to the Gulf area. This was not + understood, and the Soviets ask for prompt clarification giving our + clear and exact views. The Soviet position remains the same, that + the USSR will continue to adhere + to the policy of non-intervention on the understanding that all + others will do the same. There would be far reaching consequences if + others should interfere in the Iran-Iraq conflict or in the affairs + of the nations of the area as a whole. (S)

+

It is important to consider the reactions of Saudi Arabia, Israel, + Iran and the USSR if we are + perceived to be using the cover of neutrality to build a military + posture in the Persian Gulf which may have long-term consequences. + He wondered what, if anything, we need to do to deal with the + immediate crisis, beyond what we have already done. He thought + sending a political-military team would be a very visible act. It + will be leaked. How it will be presented and perceived is a + legitimate question. Sending a team may be harder to rationalize + than sending AWACS. He could not + forget the difficult discussions about Iran’s borders. In the + absence of this war, there would be no question in the area about + what nation was the aggressor in the region (the USSR), and we are in a position to + build a worldwide response against them. But if our acts are seen as + taking advantage of this conflict to build up a military presence, + then it is we who will be on the defensive. The outcome of the + present conflict is uncertain, but if we are seen to contribute to a + particular result, our position will be subject to the test of + credibility. (S)

+

He felt that we should first see if the Saudis want to receive a + team. This will give us time to examine what our long-range goals + are relative to Saudi Arabia. That has not been done since he has + been here. He was aware of no interagency meeting to examine our + plans and goals to establish a military presence in the Persian + Gulf.An unknown hand wrote an + exclamation point in the margin next to this sentence. + (S)

+

Dr. Brzezinski asked if we + knew whether the Saudis wanted a team to visit. Secretary Brown said this had been discussed + with them by General Jones + after the President had said to send such a team, and they are + expecting a team of air defense experts from Washington. The present + technical team from EUCOM does + not meet that expectation. We could, of course, send a purely + military team, e.g. a general from NORAD, if the SCC + decides that political representation is not desirable. We could + defer discussion of the fifth task while we further consider whether + we are committed to resist Soviet penetration of the region. (S)

+ +

Dr. Brzezinski said he did + not object to a broader review of our goals, but he thought that + should be in an NSC meeting with + the President. What we are concerned with at this time is + implementing a series of steps which the President has directed. + (S)

+

Secretary Muskie wondered if + the team should be authorized to talk about cooperation on + freedom-of-navigation patrols of the Strait. Prince Saud had expressed objections in + his meeting in New York. Secretary Brown said that we had all agreed previously to + discuss this with the Saudis, and we have solid indications from + General Jones’ conversations + with the Saudis that they are prepared to discuss it. (S)

+

Secretary Muskie said he was + confused about what the President had directed. He had said we would + do “AWACS period” and then send a + political-military team to see what we could do about further + cooperation. Secretary Brown + said that was precisely what this team was intended to do. None of + its tasks involve approval of any new actions by us, only + discussions with the Saudis in advance of possible contingencies. He + said it would be a tragedy not to discuss the fifth task with the + Saudis, but perhaps it did not have to be done this weekend. If that + was the concern, the TOR had called for further review even before + the issue was raised with the Saudis. The Saudis do expect us to + send a group. (S)

+

Secretary Muskie said he had + trouble with Secretary Brown’s terminology. What did we mean by “expect”? Have + the Saudis requested discussion of all five of these points? Have + the Saudis thought through the risks? Secretary Brown said the Saudis had asked + General Jones in general + terms to discuss the first four, not the fifth. Mr. Christopher wondered if discussion + of these was consistent with U.S. neutrality. Secretary Brown said we were neutral as + between Iran and Iraq, not with regard to Saudi security. Mr. + Christopher noted that + U.S. advanced aircraft in Saudi Arabia would not be seen as + neutrality. Secretary Brown + replied that the discussions on that are entirely contingent on a + prior attack on Saudi Arabia. General Hammad in Saudi Arabia had + specifically mentioned their willingness to consider prepositioning + F–15 materiel in advance of any deployment. (S)

+

Dr. Brzezinski suggested + breaking down the list and examining objections to each part of the + package. Secretary Muskie + said he was aware of that technique. He had often used it himself. + His problem was not with the individual elements so much as the + totality of the package and the perceptions flowing from it. Dr. + Brzezinski asked how he + proposed we proceed. Secretary Muskie said he thought we should start cleanly + through regular channels on the military and political sides and ask + the Saudis what it is they wish to pursue. Secretary Brown noted that General Jones had gone through that with + the Saudis. He wondered if Ambassador West would be more cautious in his approach than + General Jones had been. + (S)

+ +

Dr. Brzezinski said he would + not object to asking the Saudis at the political level whether they + wanted to have such a team to discuss these issues. All agreed that + such an approach was acceptable on the first four items. To raise + item 5 would go beyond what was recommended for the team. (S)

+

A drafting group was to meet immediately following the SCC meeting to draft a message to + West.The draft is attached but not + printed. The message to West was sent in telegram 265582 to + Jidda, October 4. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign + Policy File, P870094–0758) Dr. Brzezinski said he saw no need to + go to the President at this point since a message to West did not + change the original decision. (S)

+
+ +
+ 224. Telegram From the Embassy in Saudi Arabia to the Department + of StateSource: National + Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P900077–1446. + Secret; Niact Immediate; + Nodis. + + + Jidda, October 13, 1980, 1452Z + +

6231. Subject: U.S.-Saudi Military Cooperation—Discussion With + Fahd.

+

1. (S-entire text).

+

2. A long meeting with Crown Prince Fahd on October 13 covered a number of topics, among + them the subject of increasing bilateral military cooperation. There + was insufficient time to deal with this subject in considerable + detail, but the important result was that we obtained Fahd’s approval for moving ahead + in our security dialogue.

+

3. Fahd agreed that it is + advisable to hold expert-level discussions on contingency planning. + I mentioned that such talks would cover items like availability of + landing facilities and fuel, prepositioning of ammunition and other + support for U.S. forces if sent here in an emergency situation. He + said that this was very important, and he would tell Sultan to have + these discussions undertaken. Fahd cautioned that the talks should be conducted + with utmost secrecy.

+

4. Concerning security of shipping in the Gulf, I told Fahd that this meeting was the + first opportunity to inform him about our thinking on this vital subject. We were + consulting with the Saudis and countries allied with us about the + possible need for coordinated naval activity in the Straits and + Gulf, because of our concern about a possible situation in which + harassment of shipping, closure of waterways, deterrence of neutral + shipping due to high war risk insurance, or other contingency + disrupted the normal flow of neutral shipping.

+

5. Fahd responded that the + consultations between the U.S. and maritime nations have had a + salutary effect, e.g. upon the insurance companies. He did not + address the matter of concerted international naval action itself, + but he did volunteer his appreciation for recent U.S. naval actions + positioning vessels closer to the Straits and in the Arabian + Sea.

+

These actions served to bolster the confidence of SAG and the Gulf states, and + demonstrated the critical importance of regional defense. In this + view, he was highly gratified about the AWACS deployment, for that system had an “excellent + reputation” in the Kingdom and among the Gulf states for its + contribution to air defense. He said that the early criticism of the + AWACS at the UN by the Foreign Minister of Iraq was + undertaken without instructions from Baghdad, while on October 11 + the Iraqis had stated that they understood the role of AWACS and the security relationship + between the U.S. and Saudi Arabia. Fahd said that the Iraqis now realize the + fundamental nature of that relationship and its benefits to the + entire region.

+

6. Comment. Our exchange of views on security cooperation was brief + and somewhat discursive, admittedly, but very significant. We have + the Crown Prince’s assent to strengthening our military cooperation, + and, moreover, his intent to see to it that SAG implements his determination to improve the + Kingdom’s preparedness in defense matters. With this significant + mandate—his agreement in principle to the course of increasing + bilateral involvement in regional security measures—we have the + wherewithal to begin military-to-military talks. His admonition that + we must maintain the confidentiality of these discussions is one + that we must observe, or we will jeopardize what we are about to + achieve in the present Saudi readiness for close but discreet + association with us in defense matters. I will be meeting with + Sultan at an early opportunity to go into these aspects of security + cooperation more extensively. End comment.

+

7. Dept pls repeat to USMTMDET Riyadh SA for Major General Donnelly, + and elsewhere as desired.

+ + West + +
+ +
+ 225. Telegram From the Embassy in Saudi Arabia to the Department + of StateSource: National + Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P870094–0677. + Secret; Niact Immediate; + Nodis. Sent for + information Immediate to the White House. + + + Jidda, October 17, 1980, 1029Z + +

6364. White House for Brzezinski. Subject: U.S.-Saudi Military Cooperation + (S). Ref: (A) Jidda 6231,See Document 224. (B) Jidda + 6358,Not found. (C) Jidda + 6203,In telegram 6203 from Jidda, + October 11, the Embassy described a meeting between West and + Abdallah during which the two discussed the AWACS coverage, oil output, and + Saudi air defense. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign + Policy File, D800489–0819) (D) Jidda 6209.In telegram 6209 from Jidda, October 11, the + Embassy summarized West’s meeting with Turki, during which they + discussed U.S.-Saudi military cooperation in the face of the + ongoing Iran-Iraq war. (National Archives, RG 59, Central + Foreign Policy File, D800486–0596)

+

1. (S-entire text).

+

2. Summary: Based on meetings with Crown Prince Fahd (ref A), Minister of Defense + and Aviation Prince Sultan (ref B), and conversations with close + aides and associates including Director of Intelligence Prince + Turki, Director of Operations of RSAF Prince (Colonel) Fahd Bin Abdullah and Prince + (Major) Bandar Bin Sultan (please protect these latter three), we + are satisfied that agreement has been reached and approval secured + for complete USG–SAG cooperation in three key areas: + (1) contingency planning for use of SAG facilities by USG + to include prepositioning of supplies and equipment, stationing of + troops in event of necessity for U.S. intervention, as well as all + other possible contingencies; (2) SAG approval of and assistance with planning for + overall defense of the Gulf to include both military and political + aspects; (3) SAG approval of USG actions including contingency + planning with other Western nations designed to insure that the + Straits of Hormuz are kept open under all circumstances. End + summary.

+

[Omitted here is the body of the telegram.]

+ + West + +
+ +
+ 226. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense Brown to President CarterSource: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, + Brzezinski Material, + General Odom File, Box 28, Middle East Command Post: 4–10/80. + Secret. + + + Washington, October 22, 1980 + + + SUBJECT + Command Relationships in Saudi Arabia (U) + +

(S) This memorandum responds to your request for an outline of the + current command structure and communication routing between AWACS over Saudi Arabia and our + military forces in the Middle East-Persian Gulf region.Not found. These are outlined in detail + at Tabs A and B, respectively.Attached + but not printed are two routing charts entitled “Command + Relationships (Saudi Arabia/Adjacent Waters)” and “Comm/Data + Flow.”

+

(S) Command Structure. In essence, our current + command relationships are those provided in the Unified Command + Plan. Operational control of the deployed AWACS and associated ground radar and support units in + Saudi Arabia is exercised through CINCEUR by his USAF + component commander’s representative in Saudi Arabia (ELF–ONE). + Operational control of naval forces in both the Persian Gulf and the + Arabian Sea is passed from CINCPAC through COMSEVENTHFLT to Commander Task Force 70 (CTF–70). For the air defense mission, + CINCEUR has been designated + the supported commander, with CINCPAC supporting him. Those roles would be reversed + in the event of a maritime mission; e.g., mine clearing or active + protection of shipping.

+

(S) Communication Routing. Air defense + resources currently in the region consist of an integrated air + defense net which includes AWACS, + Saudi and US ground radars, Saudi + Hawk facilities, Saudi and US Navy + fighter aircraft, and a US fleet air + defense cruiser deployed within the Gulf. All these units can + communicate by voice. Additionally, the AWACS can relay radar data to US ships and aircraft of TF–70, as well as to its own + ground processing center, which provides the link to Saudi forces. + Direct communications circuits (via satellite) have been established + between the National Military Command Center (for the National + Command Authorities) and ELF–ONE, AWACS, and TF–70 in the area.

+

(S) Summary Evaluation. Although the current + command relationships are naturally more complex than a + single-CINC operation, both + the JCS and I believe they are working + satisfactorily at the current level of operations. Should our + involvement in the region become markedly greater, we would consider + a gradual transition of responsibility by introducing the + Headquarters, Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force (RDJTF) into the area to command all + forces in the region in accordance with the RDJTF command relationships approved + this summer.See Document 88.

+ + Harold Brown + +
+ +
+ 227. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense Brown to President CarterSource: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, + Brzezinski Material, + Country File, Box 68, Saudi Arabia: 11/80–1/81. Secret; Via + Alpha Channel. A copy was sent to Muskie. + + + Washington, November 5, 1980 + + + SUBJECT + Acceleration of F–15 Deliveries to Saudi Arabia + +

On a number of issues, it is very important to U.S. security for this + Administration to take actions during the transition period that the + incoming Administration (a) may find it much harder to take, and (b) + may even publicly disagree with, but which (c) they and the country + will be glad we have taken. Our relations with Saudi Arabia fall + into this category. As a result of your and my statements, the + Saudis (particularly Defense Minister Sultan) have concluded that + the United States is an unreliable partner in arms supply. Prince + Sultan himself appears to believe that we have gone back on my + commitment to him last June to review all their F–15 enhancement + requests.See Document 217. Sultan has already curtailed + some of our cooperative arrangements—e.g., joint cooperative + planning—and he is reported to be on the verge of further + curtailments, possibly asking for the withdrawal of our AWACS and even of turning away from + the U.S. entirely as Saudi Arabia’s source of aircraft and air + defense equipment and training in favor of the French. (S)

+ +

Our special relationship with Saudi Arabia is already damaged, but + could become more so as a result of these actions. Not only would + our influence over Saudi oil decisions be lessened, but our vital + need to develop assured access to Saudi facilities, including + prepositioning, in order to deter or meet a Soviet threat to the + Gulf, would be set back—perhaps irreparably. Without these Saudi + facilities, our whole Persian Gulf/Indian Ocean strategy would be + undermined. (S)

+

I am responding to a letter sent to me by Prince Sultan; in it, I + indicate to him that our attitude is the same as I conveyed to him + in Geneva in June.Neither Sultan’s + letter nor Brown’s reply + was found. For the June 26 discussion, see Document 217. But this will not solve our + problem. (S)

+

I believe, therefore, that if we are to prevent further deterioration + of our relations with the Saudis over the next few months, it is + necessary to take some additional action almost immediately. The + most promising one that we have been able to find is an acceleration + of deliveries (without any of the additional equipment the Saudis + have requested) of the F–15s already approved by the Congress.See footnote 2, + Document 172. The present delivery schedule + calls for six aircraft to be delivered to the Saudis in the third + quarter of calendar 1981 for training use in the United States, with + nine more to be delivered during the first quarter of 1982 in Saudi + Arabia itself. By diverting some deliveries now scheduled for the + USAF and paying them back + later, it would be possible to deliver the first six aircraft to the + Saudis during the first quarter of calendar 1981. By putting these + in Saudi Arabia we could speed deliveries in-country by a year, + although the first deliveries to Saudi ownership would be + accelerated by only six months. The training and maintenance in + Saudi Arabia itself would have to be done by U.S. military and + civilian personnel. In addition to being seen by Sultan as a + positive gesture and very likely calm him down from the affront, + this would provide us a foot in the door to prepositioning and joint + operations. (S)

+

We could take six F–15s from the normal production line destined for + the USAF and deliver them to Saudi + Arabia in January 1981. A small initial cadre of Saudi F–5E pilots could be expeditiously + trained on these six aircraft in-country at Dhahran rather than + coming to the U.S. The scenario would envisage the following USAF training team:

+ + —one detachment commander. + —seven highly qualified USAF + instructor fighter pilots. + —one maintenance officer with 125–150 maintenance personnel (a + mix of USAF and contractor + people). (S) + + +

This combination of early aircraft delivery and early Saudi training + would provide not only meaningful support to the Saudis at a + critical time in our relationship with them, but also a near-term + enhancement to their air defense capability. (S)

+

Congress has been told about the existing delivery schedule, but no + promise was made to consult before changing it. As part of the same + package that went through the Congress in 1978, Israel was supposed + to get the first of six F–16s in + the fourth quarter of 1981. We accelerated this to the first quarter + of 1980 without consulting the Congress. In this case, I believe we + should notify Congress after we discuss the matter with the Saudis + but before the deliveries are actually made.In a November 6 memorandum to Carter, Muskie recommended that + Carter approve + Brown’s + recommendation regarding congressional consultations. Carter wrote “I called + H. Brown J” in the + upper right-hand corner of the memorandum. (Carter Library, + National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 68, Saudi + Arabia: 11/80–1/81) (S)

+

This is not an alternative to dealing later with the Saudi requests + for conformal pods and aerial refueling for F–15s, let alone the + question of bomb racks. After the decision on acceleration is made, + we still must promptly consider the timing and nature of + consultation with Congress on those issues. (S)

+

Dave Jones had extensive + discussion in Saudi Arabia in September with Sultan which convinced + him we are at a crossroads in our relationship.See Document + 221. The quick response on AWACS and other air defense + assistance created new opportunities, but the strong negative + reaction to the comments on bomb racks has incensed Sultan because + he believes his personal reputation is on the line.In an interview on October 24, Carter was asked about selling + Saudi Arabia equipment for the F–15s, such as bomb racks, that + would give them an offensive capability against Israel. + Carter answered: + “There will be absolutely no change in the assurance given to + the Congress in 1978 by Secretary Harold Brown, acting under my instructions, on + the sale of F–15’s to the Saudi Arabians. In accordance with + those assurances, we will not agree to provide offensive + capabilities for the planes that might be used against Israel, + and that obviously includes bomb racks.” (Public Papers: Carter, 1980–81, Book III, p. + 2431) He needs a quick positive action by the United + States to take him off the hook. This is particularly important to + us because Sultan has been the chief supporter in the Saudi + government of closer military relations with the United States. All + of the Joint Chiefs strongly support quick action. Zbig concurs. + EdReference is to Muskie. agrees with the + need but has some concerns which he will express separately to you + with respect to Israeli and Congressional reaction. (S)

+ +

My own belief is that while the Israeli reaction might risk having + some adverse impact on the autonomy negotiations, we should be able + to give the Israelis a satisfactory explanation of what we are doing + and why. In any event, the prospect of averting a major breach with + the Saudis must take precedence. (S)

+

If you agree, I would propose to have Dave Jones who has developed a positive + relationship with Sultan as a result of his September trip and the + AWACS deployment, convey the + proposal personally to Sultan in the next few days. Dave will leave + on Saturday to visit General Evren in Turkey and could easily divert + into Saudi Arabia during this trip.In a + November 11 memorandum to Muskie, Brzezinski noted that Carter had “approved the + acceleration of F–15 deliveries to Saudi Arabia as described in + Secretary Brown’s + memorandum of November 5.” (National Archives, RG 59, Bureau of + Politico-Military Affairs, General Program Country Files + Concerning Security Assistance (arms) Programs (1980–1984), Lot + 86D371, Box 2, Saudi F–15 1980) (S)

+ + Harold Brown + +
+ +
+ 228. Briefing Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for + Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Saunders) to Secretary of State MuskieSource: National Archives, RG 59, Bureau of + Politico-Military Affairs, General Program Country Files + Concerning Security Assistance (arms) Programs (1980–1984), Lot + 86D371, Box 2, Saudi Arabia 1980. Secret. Drafted by Arietti; cleared by Countryman, Gibney, Twinam, and + Edgar. + + + Washington, December 18, 1980 + + + SUBJECT + Update on U.S. Security Assistance Efforts + in Saudi Arabia + +

We recently met with the head of the United States Military Training + Mission in Saudi Arabia, Major General Charles Donnelly, USAF, who was in Washington for + consultations. During our discussions with General Donnelly, we + discussed the status of ongoing U.S. military programs in Saudi + Arabia.

+ +

F–15 Enhancement Items

+

We understand DOD has completed its + analysis of the F–15 enhancement items.Not found. This study, designed for internal U.S. + Government use only and not to be given to the Saudis, could provide + the technical background for any future consultations with the + Congress on the F–15 items. The final section of the study discusses + the threat to Israel that would be posed by increasing the F–15’s + range. While making clear the more than adequate Israeli capability + to defend against F–15 penetration and to retaliate massively + against the Saudis, the study does point out that with conformal + fuel pods and air refueling capability, the Saudis could reach the + Israeli heartland from their main operating bases. This conclusion + could make winning Congressional assent on the enhancement issue + more difficult.An unknown hand + underlined the portion of the paragraph that begins with “the + study does not point out” to the end and placed a vertical line + in the margin next to this portion of the paragraph.

+

A second DOD study analyzing Saudi + needs for an air defense early warning system is also being + completed by DOD.Not found. This second study is being + funded by the Saudis and will be provided to them after being + reviewed by DOD and State. It + discusses, we understand, the relative merits of an all ground radar + early warning system vis-a-vis a mix of ground and airborne (AWACS) systems.

+

The Current AWACS Deployment

+

General Donnelly reports that the current deployment of four U.S. + AWACS to Saudi Arabia is + proceeding smoothly. In response to our advice, the Saudis have + adjusted the locations of their ground-based radar systems in the + Eastern Province and an improved communications system has been put + into effect.

+

U.S. Contingency Planning and Regional + Security Discussions

+

General Donnelly explained that he had briefed Saudi military + officials on the general outlines of the U.S. concept for air + defense, naval coordination, and joint contingency planning and was + awaiting a Saudi reaction when Prince Sultan directed a Saudi pull + back from talks in reaction to our public statements on the F–15 + enhancement items. These discussions remain in abeyance and it is + unlikely that they will be resumed until the F–15 enhancement item + issue is resolved. These talks did, however, result in one positive + forward step in regional air defense; a Saudi early warning radar + has been deployed to Bahrain.

+ +

Future Saudi Arms Requests

+

The Saudi arms list given to Zbig during his February 1980 visit to + Saudi Arabia contained most of the anticipated Saudi requests for + the near to mid-term.See Document 207. We have put off + final decisions on many of these items on the grounds that they are + not yet deployed with U.S. forces, but the USG will need to take policy decisions as individual + items come into the U.S. inventory.

+

In addition, General Donnelly believes the Saudis will want to + station advanced fighter aircraft at Tabuk, the Saudi military + facility closest to Israel. In his 1978 letter to Congress, + Secretary Brown stated we had + received Saudi assurances that the F–15 would not be stationed at + Tabuk and that the Saudis would not acquire additional advanced + fighter aircraft while preparing for and receiving the sixty + F–15s.In this sentence, an unknown + hand underlined the year “1978” and the words beginning with + “Brown stated we had + received Saudi assurances” to the end of the sentence. In his + letter of May 10, 1978, to the Senate Foreign Relations + Committee, Brown asserted + that Saudi Arabia had agreed on restrictions so that the F–15s + would not be used against Israel. See footnote 11, Document 216. If the Saudis seek + to eliminate the restriction on F–15 basing at Tabuk or move to + acquire a third-country aircraft (perhaps the French MIRAGE), this + will raise further Congressional concern. The next Administration + will need to pay careful attention to this potential problem.

+
+
+ +
+ + The Yemens +
+ 229. Telegram From the Embassy in the Yemen Arab Republic to the + Department of StateSource: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + D770054–1057. Confidential. Sent for information to Cairo, + Jidda, and London. + + + Sana, February 15, 1977, 1405Z + +

677. Subj: President al-Hamdi + on Saudi/Yemeni Relations.

+

1. During my February 13 meeting with President al-Hamdi in Taiz, he described the + current state of Saudi/Yemeni relations as excellent, noting + particularly that Prince Sultan has become especially understanding + of Yemen’s needs and problems. He emphasized that the military + relationship, for example, is moving quite well despite the fact + that at the working levels there are occasional problems which he + said in some cases stem from the Yemeni side and in others from the + Saudi.

+

2. In response to my question about Saudi intentions with regard to + the Yemeni Air Force, al-Hamdi said that so far the Saudis have not + discussed this subject with him although he understands the Saudis + are considering furnishing the Yemeni Air Force with new + helicopters.

+

3. As he has in the past, al-Hamdi expressed the hope that in addition to the + many vehicles which the Saudis have promised and which are now + arriving in Yemen, some of the other heavier equipment (read + artillery) would also arrive quickly. In this connection he said + that a major problem facing the Yemeni Army is training and here + again he hoped that both the Saudis and the Americans will provide + more in this area.

+

4. I told the President that we are pleased to see Yemen and Saudi + Arabia coordinating so closely and consider this cooperation a major + success for moderation and stability in the Arabian Peninsula. + Al-Hamdi replied that he and the Yemeni Government are most + appreciative of US efforts as a + friend working behind the scenes. He noted that in most cases Yemen + and Saudi Arabia prefer to deal directly on most issues but that it + is reassuring that the US is there + ready to help if needed. I assured the President that the US Government has no intention of + getting between two brothers but that as a friend of both we are + prepared to help if necessary.

+

5. Comment: Al-Hamdi’s words only confirm what we have heard from + Foreign Minister Al-Asnaj and + others in the government. Saudi/Yemeni relations continue to move + ahead in the way in which we envisaged when we resumed relations with Yemen back in 1972.The Yemen Arab Republic had broken off + relations with the United States on June 6, 1967, due to the + Arab-Israeli war. Secretary of State William P. Rogers restored + relations following a July 1972 visit to Sana. While we + should obviously continue to monitor the situation closely, it + appears that the channels of communications between the two sides + are now good and for this we can take a great deal of + satisfaction.

+ + Scotes + +
+ +
+ 230. Telegram From the Embassy in the Yemen Arab Republic to the + Department of StateSource: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + D770119–0512. Confidential. Sent for information to Jidda, + London, Amman, Cairo, Moscow, USCINCEUR, COMIDEASTFOR, and CHUSMTM Dhahran. + + + Sana, April 5, 1977, 1200Z + +

1311. Subject: YAR President on + MiG 21s to Yemen.

+

Begin summary. President + al-Hamdi informed me + April 4 that unless he has firm commitment from Saudis re provision + of new aircraft to Yemeni Air Force he will be forced to accept + Soviet offer of MiG 21s, if Soviet + offer materializes. End summary.

+

1. During April 4 conversation (other subjects being reported + septels)In telegrams 1312, 1313, + and 1314 from Sana, April 5, the Embassy reported on Scotes’s discussions on April + 4 with al-Hamdi. Telegram + 1312 described al-Hamdi’s + assessment of the March 22–23 meeting in Taiz of the heads of + state of the two Yemens, Somalia, and Sudan to discuss Red Sea + security issues and how to work together against Israel. In + telegram 1313, the Embassy relayed al-Hamdi’s belief that Somalia “is now seriously + considering making a major change in its foreign policy + alignment away from the Soviets.” In telegram 1314, Scotes noted that he had + conveyed to al-Hamdi that + U.S. policy in the Horn of Africa was undergoing an intense + review, while al-Hamdi + pointed out that the Soviets were making a concerted effort to + strengthen their position in Ethiopia and seek a rapprochement + between Ethiopia and Somalia. In telegram 1345 from Sana, April + 6, the Embassy reported that al-Hamdi had “asked for continued US efforts to impress on Saudis + Yemen’s support for Saudi policies in region in context of full + Saudi support for al-Hamdi’s regime.” The telegrams are in the + National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + D770118–0394, D770119–0474, D770119–0480, and D770119–1177, + respectively. President al-Hamdi took initiative to raise subject of the + possible arrival of MiG 21s in Yemen. Speaking in the + context of this admiration for and support of the current Saudi + policy of weaning PDRY and Somalia + away from the Soviets, al-Hamdi noted that while Saudi leadership is wise + and effective, in its lower echelons the Saudi Government is not of + the same caliber. Al-Hamdi said that in Yemen, for example, the + Saudi Embassy is manned by individuals who, instead of trying to + understand Yemen’s problems and of trying to put these problems into + regional context, see everything in a narrow manner and report in a + similar manner to Jidda.

+

2. Al-Hamdi continued that recently the Saudi Embassy has been + reporting the arrival of major Soviet arms into Yemen when in + reality only a few armored vehicles and spare parts have been + involved—items about which he had spoken to the Saudis over a year + ago when he was in Saudi Arabia on the Haj.The Hajj is the annual Muslim pilgrimage to + Mecca, Saudi Arabia. The Hajj is a religious duty that every + able-bodied Muslim must undertake at least once in his lifetime + as long as he can afford to do so. The Saudi Embassy has + also been reporting the arrival of MiG 21s, which is not the case. Al-Hamdi went on to + say, however, that he must be frank, as he has already been in the + past, and state that if he is unable with Saudi help to provide new + aircraft for the weak Yemeni Air Force, he will be obliged to accept + new aircraft from wherever he can get them including from the + Soviets. Al-Hamdi interjected to stress that Yemen’s arms are + strictly for the purpose of establishing internal security in the + country and not intended for use in any other manner. He stressed + that Yemen is an enemy of no one. He went on to say, however, that + he and his colleagues are working for the establishment of a strong + central government in Yemen and that without a strong army the + extremists on both the left and the right will be encouraged to + continue their attempts at sabotage, cutting of roads and political + assassination. The Saudis should understand this.

+

3. Al-Hamdi stated that the Saudis know if they can present him with + a firm commitment for provision of aircraft for the Yemeni Air + Force, as well as a time table for delivery, he has no intention of + accepting Soviet aircraft. He said he is like a man in the desert + who on the one hand is being promised a glass of orange juice, which + never seems to appear, while on the other being told to refuse a + glass of plain water which is almost in his grasp.

+

4. I told al-Hamdi that the + Saudi Government has recently inquired of the USG about the possibility of supplying + the Yemeni Air Force with F–5s. The USG has this question under study but + no decision has been made and I had no idea when a decision would be + made. I told him that as a friend I had to be frank and tell him + that if the YARG + goes ahead and accepts + MiG 21s it is doubtful USG will ever agree to the sale of + F–5s. I commented that apart from political + considerations, it seemed to me unlikely that the Yemeni Air Force + could absorb at the same time a squadron of Soviet and a squadron of + American aircraft, given the lack of trained personnel in both the + flying and the maintenance areas.

+

5. Al-Hamdi replied by asking the question what would the US do if it found itself in a situation + of immediate need for equipment and had no idea as to when that + immediate need would be filled, if ever. Al-Hamdi went on to say + that he could always turn down the Soviet offer but he had to have + something firm in hand in order to do so and not be simply told that + aircraft will be provided after five years. Al-Hamdi also noted in + an aside that thus far he has no idea when and if the Soviets will + ever deliver on their promises either. He concluded, however, that + if the MiGs are delivered and if he has no other firm alternative, + he will accept them.

+

6. Comment: Al-Hamdi obviously spelling out rationale for eventual + acceptance of MiGs. While no doubt there strong element of pressure + in al-Hamdi’s presentation, + his main concersssn has always been the internal security situation + of Yemen. The loyalty of the armed forces figures highly in his + assessment of that situation. Continued inability to modernize + Yemen’s Air Force remains major preoccupation of Al-Hamdi which we + and Saudis will have to take into consideration as we decide either + to preempt acceptance of MiGs or to live with their eventual + delivery. Further policy comment being made by septel.In telegram 1315 from Sana, April 5, Scotes discussed the + possibility of a Yemeni purchase of MiG–21s, warned that this could “entrench Soviet + military mission in the Yemeni Air Force for next decade,” + requested that a decision on arms sales to Yemen be made as soon + as possible, and asked for guidance on any new policy decisions. + (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + D770119–0515)

+ + Scotes + +
+ +
+ 231. Telegram From the Department of State to Secretary of State + Vance in Paris and + Multiple PostsSource: + Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, + Middle East, Subject File, Box 93, Yemen: Democratic Republic + (South): 2/77–9/80. Secret; Exdis. Drafted and approved by Atherton. Sent to Jidda, + Tehran, Muscat, Sana, Cairo, London, Amman, and Damascus; sent + for information to the Secretary’s delegation and USUN. Vance was in Paris June 22–24 + for the OECD Ministerial + meeting. + + + Washington, June 23, 1977, + 0028Z + +

Tosec 70004/145783. Subject: Atherton Meeting With PDRY + UN Ambassador. Ref: State + 144046.In telegram 144046 to + multiple Middle Eastern posts and London, June 21, the + Department requested that U.S. Ambassadors to Saudi Arabia, + Iran, Oman, North Yemen, Egypt, the United Kingdom, Jordan, and + Syria inform their host governments that the United States + believed “the time has now come for us to take the initiative to + explore whether the South Yemeni Government is prepared to move + toward restoring relations with the U.S. To this end, we are + approaching the South Yemen Ambassador in New York to suggest a + high level meeting either in Aden, the U.S. or elsewhere, for + the purpose of beginning a dialogue looking toward the + reestablishment of U.S.–PDRY + diplomatic relations.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central + Foreign Policy File, D770221–1063)

+

1. At our initiative, Assistant Secretary Atherton met in New York June 22 + with PDRY Permanent Representative + Ashtal.In a June 3 action memorandum to Vance, sent through Habib, Atherton proposed meeting with + Ashtal regarding the + reestablishment of diplomatic relations and informing regional + governments of this initiative. Atherton also attached a draft cable, which the + Department transmitted as telegram 144046 (see footnote 2 + above). An unknown hand initialed Vance’s approval of Atherton’s proposal. (National Archives, RG 59, + Central Foreign Policy File, P840877–0632) + Atherton asked Ashtal to convey to his government + that, in accordance with President’s policy of seeking to improve + relations wherever possible, we would like to enter into a + high-level dialogue with a view to improving relations with South + Yemen looking toward the restoration of diplomatic relations. To + that end, we proposed a meeting of senior officials of our two + governments in Aden, Washington, New York or wherever the Yemenis + found convenient.

+

2. Ashtal noted that during + meeting with PDRY Foreign Minister + in New York during 1975 General Assembly, Secretary Kissinger had indicated he would + send representative to Aden to discuss resumption of relations.Kissinger met with Foreign Minister Muti at the + UNGA on October 1, 1975. (Telegram 236570 to Jidda, October 3, + 1975; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + P850011–2018) For various reasons this had not worked + out, and Ashtal said he + welcomed this renewed initiative for which he thought present + circumstances were auspicious. In response to Ashtal’s question about level of + U.S. representative for proposed meeting, Atherton said we had not decided + precisely but it would be a senior official, possibly Under Secretary Habib who had recently visited + Baghdad for similar mission.Habib met with Iraqi Foreign + Minister Hammadi on May + 16 to discuss the normalization of U.S.-Iraqi relations. See + Document 132. + Ashtal asked about timing + and Atherton said whenever + it was convenient for PDRY but + from our point of view, the sooner the better. Ashtal said he wanted to inform us + that there would be opportunity for high-level contact this fall + since the Chairman of the PDRY + Presidential Council, Salim Rubayya + Ali, would be coming to New York following a visit to + Cuba to address the UNGA on September 29. Meanwhile, he would convey + our suggestion to Aden and was certain he would receive an early + reply. Ashtal indicated his + hope that today’s meeting would be kept confidential. Atherton said this was our + intention. We also would try to keep any high-level meeting + confidential if PDRY so wished but + could not of course guarantee it would not come to public + attention.

+

3. In general discussion that followed, Ashtal noted recent publication of Department letter + to Congress on terrorism which had mentioned PDRY and said this had created a bad + impression with his government. Atherton said we were responding to a congressional + inquiry and had to provide factual information as we knew it.Reference is to a letter and + supplementary materials prepared in the Department of State and + furnished to Javits. The + April 27 letter, made public on May 8, identified South Yemen, + Libya, Iraq, and Somalia as countries that actively supported + terrorist groups. In February, Javits had requested that the Department of + State inform him of what the United States “intended to do to + combat hijackings and other international violence.” (“U.S. Says + Libya, Somalia, Iraq and South Yemen Aid Terrorists,” The New York Times, May 9, 1977, p. + 4) This was the kind of thing that could be discussed + privately between us if we had a better dialogue.

+

4. In response to Atherton’s + query about PDRY relations with + its neighbors, Ashtal said + they were much improved and cited in particular Saudi Arabia, Kuwait + and North Yemen. PDRY wanted to + pursue its own independent national policy and to focus its efforts + on internal economic problems. Ashtal said his government hoped U.S. companies + would become interested in PDRY; + he acknowledged that reestablishment of relations might encourage + such interest. Ashtal then + commented that situation “in our area” was becoming explosive. He + made particular reference to Horn of Africa and situation between + Ethiopia and Somalia.Documentation on + the Ethiopia-Somalia situation is scheduled for publication in + Foreign + Relations, 1977–1980, vol. XVII, Part 1, Horn of + Africa. + PDRY, he said, has good relations + with both and is trying quietly to be helpful. Atherton said U.S. hoped regional + problems could be resolved by regional states without outside power + seeking to take advantage of situation.

+ +

5. Finally, Atherton + described briefly our Middle East peace efforts, citing in + particular Vice President Mondale’s recent San Francisco speechOn June 17, Mondale delivered a speech on U.S. Middle East + peace policy to the World Affairs Council of Northern + California, meeting in San Francisco. For the text, see the + Department of State Bulletin, July 11, + 1977, pp. 41–46. and stressing that we are determined to + continue to work for just Middle East settlement.

+ + Christopher + +
+ +
+ 232. Telegram From the Department of State to Secretary of State + Vance in New YorkSource: Department of + State, Office of the Secretariat Staff, Cyrus R. Vance, Secretary of + State—1977–1980, Lot 84D241, Box 10, Vance NODIS MemCons, 1977. + Secret; Immediate; Exdis. + Drafted by Countryman; + cleared by Sydney Goldsmith (S/S); approved by Sober. Attached but not printed + is an October 5 covering memorandum to Wisner from Reddy, noting that + the “Secretary undertook to send a delegation to Aden in the + next two months to discuss US/PDRY + relations” and that NEA was + preparing a recommendation for Vance concerning arrangements for this mission. + Vance was in New + York attending the UN General + Assembly. + + + Washington, October 4, 1977, + 1958Z + +

Tosec 100096/238800. Eyes only for Atherton. Subject: The Secretary’s Conversation With + PDRY Foreign Minister + Muti’.

+

1. Following is suggested text for reporting to Embassies Jidda and + London Secretary’s PDRY + bilateral.The Department + transmitted the text of this telegram in telegram 245537 to + London and Jidda, October 13. (National Archives, RG 59, Central + Foreign Policy File, D770372–0954)

+

2. Summary: Secretary held talks in friendly atmosphere with PDRY Foreign Minister Muti’ focusing + on absence of formal diplomatic ties as impeding understanding and + furthering of our mutual interests. At close of talks both sides + declared they had decided to restore relations. Secretary agreed to + Muti’s suggestion we send an appropriate level delegation to Aden + within the next two months to discuss further timing and + implementation. We agreed to Muti’s request to keep in confidence + the fact we would be sending a delegation for this purpose. End + summary.

+ +

3. The Secretary met with PDRY + FonMin Muti’ October 3. He was + accompanied by Under Secretary Habib, Sabbagh as interpreter and Countryman of ARP as notetaker. + PDRY + PermRep + Ashtal also sat in. + Secretary began noting he had been looking forward to meeting with + Muti’ and having a chance to talk about improving relations. We have + not had any real communication and it would be of mutual benefit if + we could change this situation by discussing issues which tend to + push us apart.

+

4. Muti’ said he was grateful for meeting and had been looking + forward to it. We have not had relations in the past but he hoped + situation would improve. One of the main reasons for our differences + has been the Palestinian question. The Israeli attack on the Beirut + airport in 1969 was a major reason for the break of relations.The attack took place on December 28, + 1968. For information, see Foreign Relations, 1964–1968, vol. + XX, Arab-Israeli Dispute, 1967–1968, Documents 369, + 370, and 375. During the + intervening period PDRY has kept + current on all positive and negative developments in the Middle East + including US attitude toward + Palestinian question and the Middle East as a whole. He hoped + developments will move toward establishment of a just and lasting + Middle East peace which cannot happen without settling the + Palestinian question. Muti’ hoped US + attitude toward PLO would improve + as PLO has been recognized by all + Arabs as the sole representative of the Palestinians.

+

5. As to our bilateral relations Muti’ said we can always study what + we should do to improve them and go into the timing of + implementation.

+

6. Secretary then gave Muti’ rundown of our current Middle East + efforts focusing on moving toward a Geneva conference. Secretary + stressed that Middle East peace was made an item of highest + importance in the new administration’s foreign policy agenda. There + is general agreement there should be a united Arab delegation + including Palestinians. This is a step forward although considerable + work remains to be done to get agreement how the conference would be + organized.

+

7. Secretary then suggested Muti’ might wish to discuss bilateral + issues which have separated us to see how we might resolve them and + develop a time schedule for further improvement.

+

8. Muti’ then noted things which did not help good atmosphere between + us with Secretary responding accordingly:

+

(A) There have been congressional reports naming PDRY as among countries which + encourage terrorism. PDRY + leadership was surprised to learn this and objected strongly to + inclusion. Secretary read from Department’s April 27, 1977 letter to + Senator Javits which noted + “some public evidence that the PDRY has on occasion allowed its territory to be used as a sanctuary for + terrorists,” emphasizing at the same time our further comment “the + absence of any US representative in + South Yemen and the general restrictions placed on the movements and + contacts of foreigners there makes it difficult for the US to verify the existence and extent + of PDRY support for + terrorists.”See footnote 6, Document 231. + Muti’ then explained that in recent hijackings West Germany and + Japanese Governments had earnestly and persistently appealed to + PDRY to permit terrorists to + land giving PDRY Government no + choice but to accept them.

+

(B) US had issued notice to mariners + that it is not safe to anchor at PDRY ports due to danger of arrest to US citizens. PDRY considered this notice to constitute practically a + blockade. Secretary reviewed details of a 1976 incident in which + American yacht landing in Socotra under emergency conditions had + been seized and its crew imprisoned.Reference is to the arrest of a U.S. citizen, his wife, and + three crew members by PDRY + authorities on April 14, 1976, detailed in telegram 90488 to + Sana, April 15, 1976. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign + Policy File, D760143–0241) Because it took several weeks + of concerted diplomatic efforts by our protecting power, the UK, to secure the release of the vessel + and crew, we had no other choice but to issue this warning.

+

9. Secretary said he would like also to note problem of expropriated + US property as being outstanding + between our two countries. Existence of these various issues points + up need for establishing mechanism to discuss problems in order to + move eventually toward establishing relations.

+

10. Muti’ agreed and said PDRY + would welcome a US visit to Aden in + the next two months to discuss our relations. (In an aside to Under + Secretary Habib, Secretary + asked that we take necessary steps to send such a delegation.)

+

11. At close of meeting Muti’ said his government had decided to + restore relations with the US. The + Secretary said we had made same decision. It was also agreed at + Muti’s request to keep in confidence the fact we would be sending a + delegation to the PDRY.

+

12. For London and Jidda: You should brief host govts on Secretary’s + conversation stressing following points:

+

(A) We believe it is necessary at this point in time to give the + PDRY an alternative to its + present reliance on Communist and radical governments;

+

(B) We will keep British and Saudis informed of our further contacts + with the PDRY and will be + particularly anxious to have their counsel prior to sending a + delegation to Aden.

+ +

(C) We are informing other area posts of the fact of the Secretary’s + meeting with Muti’ noting, however, only that we discussed ways in + which we might improve our current relations. NEA Assistant Secretary Atherton briefed Foreign Ministers + Suwaidi of the UAE and Zawawi of Oman along these + lines.Atherton’s meeting with Suwaidi and Zawawi took place on October + 3. (Telegram Tosec 100095/238803 to Secretary of State Vance in New York, October 4; + National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + D770362–0070) You should stress to your host governments + need to closely hold fact we intend sending a high level delegation + to Aden.

+ + Christopher + +
+ +
+ 233. Briefing Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for + Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Atherton) to Secretary of State VanceSource: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign + Policy File, P770185–1905. Secret. Drafted by David M. Winn + (NEA/ARP). + + + Washington, October 20, 1977 + + + SUBJECT + Weekly Issues Report + +

Yemen Arab Republic

+

Following the assassination of President al-Hamdi on October 11,The Embassy in Sana reported on events in the Yemen Arab + Republic and the issues facing the new al-Ghashmi regime in telegrams + 4016, 4026, and 4027, October 12; telegram 4032, October 14; + telegram 4080, October 17; telegrams 4096 and 4097, October 18; + and telegram 4126, October 19. In telegrams 4026 and 4027, it is + also noted that al-Ghashmi himself seemed to be the prime + suspect in al-Hamdi’s + assassination. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy + File, D770371–0310, D770372–0590, D770372–0902, D773081–0200, + D770381–0030, D770382–0764, D770382–0799, and D770385–0574, + respectively) North Yemen has remained outwardly calm. + Nevertheless, reports Embassy Sana, former armed forces CINC, and now President, al-Ghashmi faces acute security + and political problems in his efforts to consolidate his rule of the + country. He has reported an assassination attempt on himself. Popular confidence has been + undermined by persistent rumors claiming that al-Ghashmi was personally + responsible for the murder of al-Hamdi and his brother. Potential remains for + intra-army conflict. Finally, al-Ghashmi is reported as having little interest or + understanding of economic matters, and little savvy or sense of + organization. Acknowledging that he is anti-Soviet and pro-US, Embassy Sana concluded a recent + assessment, “Nothing we know about al-Ghashmi makes it easy to believe he is quick + enough or adroit enough to stay on top by himself, as Hamdi + did.”

+
+ +
+ 234. Telegram From the Embassy in the Yemen Arab Republic to the + Department of StateSource: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + D770394–1280. Confidential. Sent for information to Jidda, + Cairo, Amman, Mogadiscio, Khartoum, Muscat, Manama, Doha, Abu + Dhabi, Tehran, Kuwait, Dhahran, Baghdad, Tel Aviv, Tripoli, + Addis Ababa, Beirut, Tunis, Rabat, London, the Department of + Defense, COMIDEASTFOR, + and USCINCEUR. + + + Sana, October 27, 1977, 0905Z + +

4220. Subject: President Ghashmi on Internal/External Situation. Ref: + Sana 4215In telegram 4215 from Sana, + October 26, Scotes + summarized his October 25 discussion of Saudi-Yemeni relations + with al-Asnaj. Al-Asnaj informed Scotes that he planned a + “quick trip” to Saudi Arabia in order to “bring Saudi leadership + up to date on current Yemeni developments.” Asnaj also noted “rumors in + town linking Saudis and US to + Ghashmi as the forces behind Hamdi’s death. Asnaj said that for that reason + Saudis and Yemenis must work together to convince the public + that these rumors are not true. At the same time, + over-cooperation might also backfire.” (National Archives, RG + 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770394–0520) (Notal).

+

1. Begin summary: During Oct + 26 meeting, Ghashmi emphasized that internal situation is under + control. Despite some anti-regime activity by leftists in the South. + Acknowledging continued rumors blaming him for Hamdi’s death,See Document + 233. Ghashmi firmly denied them while promising + to continue Hamdi’s policies, particularly close relations with the + U.S. and Saudi Arabia. Ghashmi conveyed impression of confident man. + Given Yemen’s history of intrigue and instability, however, it is + still difficult to state categorically that Ghashmi can succeed in + remaining in power even though it appears for now that he is + determined to consolidate both his political and military positions. + End summary.

+ +

2. On Oct 26, at my request, President Ahmad al-Ghashmi received me in his office at the + military command headquarters. Primary purpose of my call was to + deliver Presidential message (see reftel)Telegram 253882 to + Sana, October 21, transmitted a message expressing President + Carter’s “best + wishes” to al-Ghashmi. + (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + D770390–0718) but also I took occasion to engage in tour + d’horizon with Ghashmi over a variety of internal and external + matters.

+

3. At the onset of the half hour conversation, Ghashmi apologized for + not seeing me more often during the last two weeks, but that press + of work prevented him from doing so. He also admitted that he did + not wish to give the excuse to other Ambassadors to ask for call + because this would have wasted his time. He hastened to add that I + should, however, never hesitate to come to see him whenever I wished + because he considers the US and the + American Embassy as sincere friends of Yemen not bound by usual + protocol.

+

4. I replied that I fully realized his time has been limited and that + I, too, had no desire to impose on him during these difficult days. + I noted jokingly that I was sure he has been besieged by all sorts + of people over the last few weeks offering advice and expressing + their opinions. (He laughingly agreed saying he didn’t realize Yemen + had so many specialists in government affairs.) I continued that as + in the past I was not calling on him to offer advice or to interfere + in Yemen’s affair in any way. The US + Government and people wish to reaffirm their desire to see stability + and prosperity obtain in Yemen and thus my Embassy and I stand ready + to help in any way we can to achieve these goals in cooperation with + Yemen as well as with Yemen’s other Peninsular friends. With the + US, “it will be business as + usual.”

+

5. As an example of our support for Yemen I then went through the + kinds of programs we are presently engaged in in both the + developmental and military areas. I noted several aid projects as + well as the continued deliveries of arms under the terms of the + Yemen-Saudi-US agreement. I also + expressed the USG’s readiness to consider modernization + of the Air Force at such time as the Saudis and Yemenis work out the + details.See Document 230. In this latter regard, Ghashmi + said that Saudis have not yet raised the subject but that he intends + to do so at the appropriate time.

+

6. Ghashmi thanked me for my words of support and stated that he + fully appreciates what the USG and + the American Embassy have done in the past for Yemen and that now + his only hope is that Yemeni-US + relations will even get better. In this context, he added that + Soviet Ambassador has already called on him to express desire for + good relations between Soviet Union and Yemen. But Ghashmi dismissed + this desire as “empty + words.” He continued that Russians “are unhappy with me because they + know what my true feelings are.” Ghashmi also emphasized need for + good relations with Saudi Arabia and stressed that these relations + should be marked with candor and sincerity, where a “yes” means + “yes” and a “no” means “no.” He pledged to work closely with the + Saudis and also expressed understanding that while U.S. does not + play mediating role, it is a friend of both and therefore available + as needed.

+

7. Ghashmi then went on to stress that the internal situation in + Yemen is under control and that the army and government are working + together to ensure security and stability as well as to continue the + programs and policies of the late President Hamid. Ghashmi + acknowledged that rumors persist in the country connecting him with + the death of late President Hamdi. Ghashmi emphasized that his + conscience is “clear before God” and that he is not going to dignify + these charges by rebutting them.

+

8. Ghashmi then told me that investigations continue on the murder of + the President and said that there have already been “many arrests.” + (He noted in an aside that the arrests are being kept secret.) In + this connection, he noted that an effort is being made to see if + there is any link between the resignation of the Minister of Social + Works Ahmad Qasim Dahmash and his subsequent pamphlet attack on the + President shortly before the assassination. In addition he said that + associates of Kibsi, his would-be assassin,An attempt on al-Ghashmi’s life occurred on October 17. + (Telegram 4080 from Sana, October 17; National Archives, RG 59, + Central Foreign Policy File, D770381–0030) have also been + rounded up.

+

9. Ghashmi continued that leftist parties in Yemen are trying to take + advantage of the situation and admitted there has been trouble in + the South, particularly around the town of Damt. He insisted, + however, that the army is ready to repel trouble from any source if + Yemen is attacked or threatened. He denied rumors that the Amaliqa + Brigade (President Hamdi’s brother’s unit) has in any way diminished + its support of the government and characterized it as the “best unit + we have.” He noted, however that the deputy Ali Hubayshi and one + other of the senior officers of the brigade fled to the South after + the assassination of the Hamdi brothers and after they had stolen + almost one million riyals from Abdullah al-Hamdi’s office in Dhamar. + PDRY has been asked to return + these men but thus far no reply has been given. Ghashmi emphasized + that Yemen wants good relations with PDRY but that at the same time it will not be deterred + by threats or subversion coming from PDRY.

+ +

10. Addressing himself to future political developments, Ghashmi + stated that it is necessary to build a governmental system in Yemen + so that rule is not dependent upon one man’s existence. He admitted + that if he had been assassinated last week, Yemen would have fallen + in chaos. He went on to say that he hopes to see the eventual + establishment of a “majlis” as well as other institutions in order + to strengthen the government when it faces crises like those of the + past two weeks. He also observed that no efforts will be made to do + anything about Abdallah al-Ahmar for the time being lest it be + concluded that a reconciliation between al-Ahmar and the central government is the payoff of + a Saudi plot against the late Hamdi. Thus, he saw no change in the + situation in the North for the next few months but at the same time + he expressed confidence that situation there presents no threat to + the central government.

+

11. Expressing deep appreciation for President Carter’s message, he urged me to + convey to President Carter + and the American people his best wishes as well as his assurances + that Yemen values its friendship with the United States and that he + personally will do everything in his power to “double” the extent of + that friendship and of the cooperation between the two + countries.

+

12. Comment: As to be expected, Ghashmi said all of the right things, + particularly re relations with U.S. and with Saudi Arabia, while + also clearly revealing his oft expressed leanings to the right. In + latter connection, it is noteworthy his statement re Saudi Arabia + repeated that of Asnaj to me + yesterday word for word (see Sana 4215), which tends confirm he is + listening to his advisors. In any case. Ghashmi conveyed a strong + sense of a man in control both of himself and of the situation. He + appeared confident of his present position as well as of his plans + for Yemen’s future. The only concern I could detect was over the + possibility of anti-regime activities by PDRY but even here he gave no sign of being unwilling + to deal with them. Looking me straight in the eye he certainly gave + a convincing affirmation of his innocence in Hamdi’s death. Only + time will tell, however, if he can convince both the Yemen Army and + the Yemeni people of this innocence because as he admitted himself, + rumors continue in Sana and all over Yemen blaming him for the + assassination. Nonetheless, so far he has been quite successful and + the top Yemenis, whether in the army or the government have + apparently decided either to bide their time before moving against + him or to support him because of the widespread belief that there is + no one on the political scene at present who can take Ghashmi’s + place. Yet, one has to be realistic and admit that whether Ghashmi + can hold the present consensus together is still problematic, given + Yemen’s long and dolorous history of political intrigue and + instability. But, at this time Ghashmi appears to be determined to + consolidate his + political and military position to face whatever the future may + hold.

+ + Scotes + +
+ +
+ 235. Telegram From the Embassy in the Yemen Arab Republic to the + Department of StateSource: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + D770413–1083. Secret; Limdis. Sent for information to Jidda, Cairo, and + London. + + + Sana, November 7, 1977, 0530Z + +

4394. Subject: YAR Regional + Dilemmas.

+

Begin summary: We are + conducting “business as usual” in Yemen, per instructions, but + questions about ability [stability?] within + Yemen and particularly Ghashmi’s ability to survive deserve + attention from Department. This is true not just in terms of + internal politics of YAR but also + in terms of regional developments in which YAR plays a role. These roles concern PDRY, Saudi Arabia, and Horn of + Africa, and affect directly the efforts of radicals and Soviets in + this corner of Peninsula. We face policy dilemma. Gains made under + Hamdi have been endangered. Our policy should be to watch and wait, + and seek Saudis to level with us. End summary.

+

1. I concur fully with instructions of Department to us to conduct + “business as usual” if at all possible in place like Yemen. I have + conveyed that impression to Yemenis here but privately I am + concerned by after effects of assassination of Chief of State and + possible succession crisis here. The Embassy and I have tried to + convey reasons for our concern to interested parties in Washington + and Jidda. The reasons are prospects of instability here and + questions about Ghashmi’s ability to survive.See Document + 233.

+

2. We will continue to report on latter questions. During Sixties, + Yemen became major and unwanted preoccupation of Middle East + politics and US diplomacy. It + threatened KingdomReference is to the + Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. directly in military terms and + indirectly in terms of broader ideological conflict between + conservative and progressive Arab states. Polarization of Arab world + helped to frustrate any efforts which were undertaken to limit + Arab-Israeli conflicts. + Issue of Yemen was used in broader and rather successful effort to + convince Arabs that Soviet Union was best friend, trading partner, + development model. Yemen actually led to U.S. military deployments + like Hard Surface and diplomatic efforts like Bunker Mission.In February 1963, Ellsworth Bunker + undertook a mission to Saudi Crown Prince Faisal with the aim of + ending Saudi support of the royalists in the Yemeni civil war in + order to bring about Egyptian troop withdrawal from Yemen. In + Operation Hard Surface, approved by President Kennedy in June + 1963, a U.S. air unit was deployed to Saudi Arabia to provide a + limited air defense capability to deter possible Egyptian air + operations over Saudi Arabia. For documentation, see Foreign + Relations, 1961–1963, vol. XVIII, Near East, + 1962–1963. Both of which were extraordinary + moves at time. Finally, fighting here produced death and destruction + on scale which—despite primitiveness of country—still rivals + Arab-Israeli wars.

+

3. In absence of Egyptian Army to occupy country, we do not foresee + scenario in 70’s like one in 60’s. Leftist military regime is + possibility, given proximity of PDRY, and therefore we think bureaucratic temptation to + treat Yemen as unimportant is probably not rpt not justified. For + that reason we have not yet acted on request of Department (arriving + while tanks in streets here and Ghashmi regime focused on + possibility of shoot-out) to investigate alleged desecration of + Jewish cemetery in Taiz and inquire (if we thought it appropriate) + whether anyone here would object to removal to Israel of remains of + locally revered Yemeni Jew who wrote poetry in Arabic.The request is in telegram 249534 to Sana, + October 18. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy + File, D770381–1170)

+

4. On other hand, we put aside questions we had about biding our time + with new regime when—after routine condolence from Secretary—letter + arrived from President Carter to President Ghashmi, congratulating him on + his new appointment as Chairman of Command Council and saying we + looked forward to close and friendly relations.See footnote 4, Document + 234.

+

5. While we can maintain “business as usual” posture, and “welcome + Ghashmi’s assurances that US-Yemeni + relationship will not be affected by al-Hamdi’s unfortunate death,” we will continue to + report on potential threat here. Sana 4331In telegram 4331 from Sana, November 2, the + Embassy reported that threats from the People’s Democratic + Republic of Yemen and internal dissension within the Yemen Arab + Republic Command Council were major sources of concern for the + new al-Ghashmi regime. + Scotes however + believed that al-Ghashmi + had bought himself a few months in power. (National Archives, RG + 59, Central Foreign Policy Files, D770404–0982) was our + assessment of internal security and political situation. Situation + is not matter of Yemen qua Yemen, however. In this cable we will try + to step out of our preoccupation with local politics and trace links + to region.

+ +

6. First point concerns PDRY. Up + until spring of this year this Embassy produced a series of cables + suggesting that variety of forces in area were creating potential + for change in PDRY.Reference is to a series of telegrams from the + Embassy in Sana updating the Department of State on positive + developments in the People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen. These + include telegram 607, February 12; telegram 626, February 13; + telegram 679, February 15; and telegram 700, February 17. + (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + D770051–0370, D770051–0568, D770054–1045, and + D770056–1179) Among these changes were growing strength + of moderate regime in YAR, Saudi + blandishments to Aden, Iranian and British military forces in + renascent Oman, eclipse of Soviets and radical Arabs in MidEast + dispute, failure of Communism to provide for welfare of South + Yemenis or success of revolution in Gulf. We thought that Salim Rubayya Ali was leading most + important military and government factions in search for new ties + with Arab moderates and new start on development. Radicals like + Abd al Fattah Ismail, + with ties to Soviets and party figures, were likely to lose out over + period of time which might leave South Yemen socialist but not + hostile. Key change which we cited was virtual abandonment of policy + of export of revolution—in Oman, YAR, Gulf.

+

7. Pendulum now seems to be swinging in other direction, probably + because of ability of Soviets and determination of Abd al Fattah to + align PDRY with Ethiopia. South + Yemeni equipment is being sent into Ethiopia along with some troops, + while Soviets are replacing old equipment with new. PDRY speech in UN,USUN summarized the October 3 + address by Salim Rubayi + Ali before the UN + General Assembly in telegram 3488 from USUN, October 4. (National Archives, RG 59, Central + Foreign Policy File, D770361–0049)Abd al Fattah speech + day after Hamdi killed, apparent resurgence of subversives in + Southern part of YAR, and new + support for PFLO all bespeak new efforts to export revolution. + Terrorism is another possibility for increase at PDRY instigation. Fact that former + Yemeni Prime Minister Abdallah al-Hajri was killed in London last + springYemeni political leader + Abdallah al-Hajri was assassinated in London on April 10. + (Telegram 1388 from Sana, April 11; National Archives, RG 59, + Central Foreign Policy File, D770126–0246) by same man + who hijacked Lufthansa airplaneA + number of men hijacked a Lufthansa flight on October 13, forced + the plane to land in the United Arab Emirates, and demanded the + release of “comrades” incarcerated in West Germany. (“Hijackers + Force West German Airliner to Mideast, Demanding Freedom for + Terrorists in Bonn’s Jails,” The New York + Times, October 14, 1977, p. 3) and that both + incidents can be tied to South is ominous indicator of what South + could do if it once again set its mind to task.

+

8. We think that Hamdi was going to Aden in mid-October with + agreement of Saudis to try to pull Salim Rubayya Ali back toward Arab orbit, toward new + initiatives toward Oman and reduced involvement with Ethiopians, and + away from terrorism like Hajri murder. Hamdi saw Taiz summit last springSee footnote 2, + Document 230. as forum in which PDRY could reorient its policy, so as + not to be on losing side in Ethiopia and not to side with non-Arab + side against self-determination and long term Yemeni interests in + lower end of Red Sea. This would have been real meaning of new + symbols of Yemen unity—like single flag and national anthem—which + were supposed to have been announced during October 14 + celebrations.October 14 is the + anniversary of the 1963 beginning of the South Yemeni revolution + against British rule. Certainly no PDRY leader could have brought about + reorientation of policy simply because Saudis offered to pay + handsomely.

+

9. For these reasons we have by no rpt no means ruled out possibility + that extremists in PDRY killed + Hamdi, in part to check growth of strong YAR, in part to check Salim’s flirtation with YAR. Strong state in Yemen, economic + dynamism, diplomatic initiatives by populous North and popular + northern President were all threats to party officials in South. + Pull exerted by YAR, plus bounteous + Saudi aid, must have conjured up thoughts of Trojan Horse to + leftists in their Adeni bastion.

+

10. Be that as it may, rapprochement between North and South Yemen + has probably died with Hamdi. Ghashmi isn’t going to be interested. + Saudi reluctance to proceed with aid—while understandable and + probably necessary—may give radicals excuse to push PDRY even farther away from Salim’s + earlier policy of relative moderation and may also mark the + beginning of return to former Saudi policy of political and possible + military confrontation with PDRY.

+

11. What PDRY and its backers do is + of immediate concern for Saudi Arabia. This is second point in + regional implications we trying to trace here. Only reason why + radical state—even one as poor and backward as South Yemen—wants to + topple state as poor and backward as YAR is of course that YAR could again be threat and distraction to Saudi + Arabia. Latter is key to any MidEast settlement which the Libyans, + Iraqis and radicals and South Yemen have long opposed. These + rejectionists with their Palestinian cohorts cannot get at Saudi + Arabia frontally. Yemen, however, provides a backdoor to the + Kingdom. It is not difficult to imagine, therefore, an effort to + move against Saudi Arabia through the destabilization of Yemen, by + any one of he above, either alone or singly. This has already been + tried, thus far unsuccessfully, in Egypt, Sudan and Syria, but + primitive and underdeveloped Yemen may now appear to offer a more + promising opportunity.

+ +

12. The Soviets can be expected to move more circumspectly than their + extremist Arab friends. It must be remembered, however, that for + many years they have pursued an opportunistic and long term policy + in the Middle East. In the short run, the Soviets will doubtless + cooperate with the U.S. for an Arab-Israeli settlement, if it + appears that such a settlement has never changed since the days of + Molotov when he told Ribbentrop that Soviet interests lay to the + south towards the Persian Gulf. If this was true in pre-OPEC days, it is certainly even truer + in these days. In our view at least, the Soviets have hung on in + North Yemen tenaciously over the last few years despite serious + setbacks because they see, as they saw in 1927 when relations were + first established with the Imam, that this Peninsular toehold holds + promise for the future. The Soviets will, therefore, arrange to see + that their friends are helped here and PDRY affords them an excellent surrogate.

+

13. Third point to be made here is that Yemen was also developing + diplomatic role in Horn, role quite out of proportion to its wealth + and power. As noted in para 8 it + was one key to detaching PDRY from + radical foreign policy. Its ties to Sudan and Egypt and Somalia and + Saudis made it part of larger group which sought changes at expense + of Soviets and radicals at lower end of Red Sea. Taiz conference and + plans for further Red Sea conferences were major liabilities for + South Yemenis, who depended on Arabism in their appeals much more + than on socialism. This larger group is now facing blunt challenge + from Soviet Union in form of massive arms shipments to Ethiopia, + shipments we are apparently doing nothing to oppose, even with + words. Somali defeat when PDRY is + strengthened and YAR weakened will + leave situation in Horn very much against our interests and favoring + those of USSR. It could be other + way around if we wanted. Anyway, prospects are that YAR will have to forego any further, + useful diplomatic role in Horn.

+

14. In conclusion, while I do not wish to appear to be investing + Yemen with more importance than it deserves, I want to underscore + the fact that Yemen is a strategic, albeit a small, piece of the + Peninsular puzzle which must be understood and considered seriously + when looking at the region as a whole. We and our friends have come + a long way in Yemen since the mid-60’s. With the assassination of + Hamdi, however, this success is now endangered. Moreover, we are + identified with Saudis and with Ghashmi government when Ghashmi may + not survive and when Saudi purposes and actions here have not been + made clear to us. For the moment, our policy should be, and frankly + can only be, to watch and wait. There is nothing we can now do in + Yemen to influence coming events, except expressing our moral + support for the regime. Our Saudi friends, however, can and must + play a subtle and careful role. The problem is that in the past they + have not always been able + or willing to play such a role. Moreover, they have not always told + us what they were doing because they believe they know Yemen better + than we do. This is a debatable point. Be that as it may, however, I + think we must continue to provide the Saudis with our frank + assessments about and our candid opinions on Yemen, while at the + same time expecting the Saudis to level with us in the context of + our so-called policy of regional cooperation. Only in this way can + we maintain the heretofore successful momentum of weaning Yemen away + from radicalism as the first step toward the eventual and necessary + deradicalization of PDRY. In both + the long and short runs, these goals are of critical importance for + Saudi Arabia and by extension for us, if we wish to protect our + interests in the Peninsula now and in the years to come.

+ + Scotes + +
+ +
+ 236. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Saudi + ArabiaSource: Carter + Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Middle East, + Subject File, Box 93, Yemen: Democratic Republic (South): + 2/77–9/80. Secret; Priority. Drafted by Griffin (INR/RNA); cleared by Twinam and Wisner and in CIA/NIO/NE; approved by Saunders. + + + Washington, December 30, 1977, + 0156Z + +

310045. For Ambassador West + from Harold Saunders. + Subject: Soviet Role in South Yemen.

+

1. You will recall that, during his visit to Riyadh, the Secretary + promised to give the Saudis our current information on Soviet + activities in South Yemen.Vance visited Riyadh December + 14–15. He met with Saud, Fahd, and King Khalid. For Vance’s December 14 meeting + with Fahd, see Document 161. For Vance’s meetings with + Saud and Khalid on + December 14, see footnote 1, Document + 161. You may pass the study in the following + paragraphs to them in whatever way you consider appropriate.

+

A. The Soviet Union, last summer, began increasing its interests in + South Yemen (PDRY) as a + consequence of Moscow’s changing allies in the Horn of Africa. At + that time, the Soviets, in return for limited use of port and + airport facilities and overflight rights were providing military + assistance and modest economic aid. This assistance has included + about 300 military advisers and 500 or so civilian economic + development technicians. We believe the military personnel are engaged principally in + equipment maintenance, providing technical and perhaps some + supervisory services in the fields of agriculture and medicine. The + Soviets also induced the Cubans to send approximately the same + number of personnel, of whom about half are training the PDRY militia and the rest are + civilians. The GDR has provided + assistance to South Yemen, particularly in the field of internal + security.

+

B. In August, the Soviets, evidently anticipating further restraints + on their access to ports and airfields in Somalia and viewing the + relative decline in Soviet interests in YAR, again approached PDRY about obtaining broader use of Aden’s facilities, + under the terms of the proposed base agreement discussed with PDRY. The Soviets would be permitted + to establish offices and workshops ashore and to set up fuel and + water lines within the harbor. The Soviets already have access to + anchorage near Socotra Island and the right to make port calls at + Aden, but this access does not provide the storage, repair, and + aerial resupply options that Berbera offered. There is no evidence + to confirm a recent Kuwaiti press report that the Soviets are + building facilities on Socotra Island. We do not believe that the + South Yemenis have yet accepted the proposed base agreement.

+

C. Following Moscow’s ouster from Somalia,The Somali Government renounced its Treaty of + Friendship and Cooperation with the Soviet Union on November 13, + ending Soviet use of naval facilities at Berbera. the + number of Soviet naval vessels in Aden jumped to about 30, as well + as one Soviet floating dry dock repair facility. A month later, + however, the number of ships in port dropped to the usual level of + about a half dozen, suggesting that the large number of Soviet + vessels observed in mid-November may have been only a temporary + situation arising out of the hurried Soviet departure from Berbera. + In this connection, we can assume that a sizable number of the + Soviet personnel formerly stationed at Berbera have been relocated + to Aden, at least temporarily.

+

D. We think that the Soviets are uncomfortable about relying very + heavily on a regime as unreliable as that of the PDRY, especially after the loss of + their substantial military investment in Somalia. However, to + maintain their current naval operations in the Indian Ocean, the + Soviets need access to docking and repair facilities, and possibly + landing rights for reconnaisance flights and a secure communications + site at Aden.

+

E. The PDRY leadership, for its + part, realizes that the Soviets could not easily find satisfactory + alternative port facilities in the entire Indian Ocean. Iraq and + Mozambique are too far away for convenience and Ethiopia’s regime is + too unstable politically and its ports of too limited access and capacity. Thus, PDRY probably feels that it can drive + a hard bargain in future PDRY-Soviet relations.

+

F. As a result, we believe that Soviet use of PDRY naval and air facilities will be + expanded and possibly will include a communications site north of + Aden. We already note some increased Soviet use of storage + facilities, but we do not anticipate a Soviet military buildup in + PDRY as great as that which + occurred over the past four years in Somalia. In return for expanded + privileges, the Soviets will probably give PDRY more arms and possibly increased, though still + modest, economic aid. We have recently observed new SA–2 + surface-to-air missiles in Aden; these missiles could be part of the + Soviet inducement for greater access to South Yemeni facilities. + There is evidence that the Soviets have arranged to send some PDRY military equipment to Ethiopia + (three MI–8 helicopters, and probably small arms), and will replace + such equipment with new deliveries.

+

G. In addition to interest in PDRY + naval and air facilities for its own needs, the Soviet Union has + also come to depend on Aden as a major staging area for its air and + naval supply link with Ethiopia. Important as the airlift is to + Ethiopia, however, it is still relatively modest. Since the end of + November, the Soviets have sent over 40 flights through Aden to + Ethiopia. All of the Soviet flights to Ethiopia have been via Aden. + The preferred Soviet route, at least for the moment, appears to be + through Iraq via the Gulf to Aden. Most of the Soviet flights have + been military transports carrying what we believe to be aircraft, + ammunition, spare parts, and various other items of military + equipment. In addition, nearly a dozen of the flights have been + passenger aircraft, probably carrying Soviet advisory personnel to + Ethiopia. We estimate that as many as 1,400 Soviet personnel could + have been sent in this fashion.

+

H. The use of Aden as a staging area for the Soviet supply of + Ethiopia benefits both governments. For the Soviets, Aden is a + secure and well equipped facility whose use enables them to deliver + supplies near the final destination and to conserve on scarce fuel + supplies in Addis Ababa. It also offers limited facilities for ship + repair. On the other hand, we believe it would take perhaps six + months for the South Yemenis to refurbish the facilities at Aden’s + port to raise them to the standard of services required by the + Soviet fleet. From the PDRY’s + viewpoint, cooperating in the Soviet airlift provides a + demonstration of its ability to support progressive regimes and + improves its case for greater Soviet aid, while still not allowing + the Soviets too great a presence on PDRY soil.

+ + Christopher + +
+ +
+ 237. Memorandum Prepared in the Central Intelligence AgencySource: Central + Intelligence Agency, Office of Support Services (DI), Job 80T00634A, Production Case + Files (1978), Box 13, Folder 2, Saudi Arabia-South Yemen—New + Chill in Relations. Secret; [handling + restriction not declassified]. + + + + RPM 78–10005 + + Washington, January 5, 1978 + + + SUBJECT + Saudi Arabia-South Yemen—New Chill in Relations + +

Saudi Arabia has reverted to a hard line, less conciliatory policy + towards South Yemen after trying for the past few years to induce a + moderation in Aden’s policies through promises of economic aid. + Associated with this renewed hard line policy is a recent buildup of + regular Saudi military forces along its border of South Yemen and a + regrouping of the old, [less than 1 line not + declassified], Saudi-supported South Yemeni exile + groups.

+

Until recently, Saudi policy towards South Yemen was based on the + belief that Aden’s radical, leftist policies could be best moderated + through inducements of economic aid. [4½ lines not + declassified]

+

Saudi policy under Fahd and + Saud was to promise + substantial financial aid to South Yemen and to encourage other + Persian Gulf states to do likewise. The Saudis agreed to supply + crude oil to Aden’s refinery, and Saudi Arabia and South Yemen + established diplomatic relations for the first time earlier this + year. In addition to a general moderation of its policies, Saudi + Arabia sought three specific responses from South Yemen:

+

—An end to its support for the Dhufari rebellion in neighboring + Oman.Reference is to a rebellion + that began in 1962 in the Omani province of Dhofar against the + Sultan of Oman that lasted until 1976, with sporadic fighting + lasting into 1979.

+

—An end to its support for international terrorists.

+

—An end to aid and support for Ethiopia and a withdrawal of its + advisers from the conflict in the Horn of Africa.

+

Since late last October, however, it has become evident that Saudi + Arabia has reassessed its policy toward South Yemen and that those + Saudi leaders—[less than 1 line not + declassified]—who favor a tougher, less conciliatory policy + towards Aden are again in the ascendancy. Economic aid and crude oil + supplies have been halted, and Saudi financial aid to numerous + development projects has been suspended. Among the causes for this + change in policy are:

+

—Increased South Yemeni support for Ethiopia, in alliance with the + Soviet Union and in opposition to Saudi Arabia’s policy of support + for Somalia.

+ +

—South Yemen’s failure to cooperate with Saudi efforts to reconcile + South Yemen and Oman.

+

—Sharp attacks on Oman at the UN + General Assembly by South Yemen’s President and his declaration of + support for Dhufari rebels.

+

—[2½ lines not declassified]

+

Saudi Military Buildup

+

The most serious aspect of the change in Saudi policy, in the + short-term, is the buildup of regular Saudi military forces at + Sharurah, close to the South Yemen border, which began late last + year. Sharurah is the site of a brief border skirmish between Saudi + Arabia and South Yemen in 1969,See Foreign + Relations, 1969–1976, vol. XXIV, Middle East Region + and Arabian Peninsula, 1969–1972; Jordan, September 1970, + Documents 175 and 176. and periodic clashes since then between + South Yemeni troops and either Saudi army units or Saudi-supported + exiles from South Yemen.

+

[1 paragraph (6 lines) not declassified]

+

[2 lines not declassified] Renewed cross + border attacks by the exile groups would be a nuisance but not a + threat to the regime in Aden. The build-up of regular Saudi forces, + however, is potentially more serious. We assume that, for the + moment, the increase in the strength and readiness posture of the + regular Saudi garrison at Sharurah is a defensive precaution while + Sultan considers Saudi Arabia’s next move toward Aden. At the very + least, the buildup will send an unmistakable message of Saudi + displeasure to South Yemen.

+
+ +
+ 238. Memorandum Prepared in the Central Intelligence AgencySource: Central + Intelligence Agency, Office of Support Services (DI), Job 80T00634A, Production Case + Files (1978), Box 13, Folder 3, Saudi Arabia-North + Yemen—Ambivalent Relations. Secret; [handling + restriction not declassified]. + + + + RPM 78–10006 + + Washington, January 5, 1978 + + + SUBJECT + Saudi Arabia-North Yemen—Ambivalent Relations + +

Saudi Arabia’s ambivalent policies toward the Hamdi government + reflected its mixed feelings about North Yemen in general. While + Crown Prince Fahd dominated + policy towards the Yemens for the past few years, the Saudi + government appeared to recognize that Hamdi was probably the most + moderate national leader they could hope for in Sana and that his + efforts to modernize and strengthen the central government deserved + their support. This fairly enlightened policy of Fahd’s, however, never erased the + other strain in Saudi thinking about North Yemen: deep + suspicion—dating from the prolonged Yemeni civil war of the 1960s + when Saudi Arabia supported the royalists—that any non-tribal + government in Sana could not be trusted because it had too many + close ties with leftists and other opponents of Saudi Arabia. As a + result, while they kept the Hamdi government afloat financially, the + Saudis also kept it weak by never giving it enough aid and support + to defeat or control the independent northern tribes which resisted + any central control from Sana.

+

Several factors color Saudi thinking about the Yemens and have + contributed to their desire to keep their hand in North Yemen’s + internal affairs. Because it is their “backyard,” the Saudis have + always felt free to meddle in North Yemen and have traditionally + used the northern tribes as their instrument. The Saudis also + remember the series of leftist regimes in Sana before Hamdi took + power in 1974 and fear a united North and South Yemen dominated by + the Marxist regime in Aden. Powerful elements in the Saudi + government believe that the best insurance against such an + unpleasant eventuality is to keep the central government in Sana + perpetually weak by supporting the tribes.

+

In retrospect, it is evident the Defense Minister Sultan—a hardliner + who always distrusted Hamdi and strongly supported the tribes—began + to seriously challenge Fahd’s moderate policy last July.In telegram 2662 from Sana, July 13, 1977, + Scotes reported on + the meeting between al-Hamdi and Saudi officials. (National + Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + D770248–1179) [6 lines not + declassified]

+ +

Sultan’s campaign to prove that Hamdi was soft on the Yemeni left + undoubtedly received powerful support from Khalid ibn Sudayri, an + uncle of Crown Prince Fahd + and Sultan. The Sudayris, a powerful tribe long closely aligned with + the House of Saud, have traditionally governed Najran Province, on + the North Yemen border, provided the ambassadors to Sana, and have + been the conduit for Saudi support to the Yemeni tribes. Involvement + of the Sudayris is, and undoubtedly will remain, an inescapable + element in Saudi-Yemeni relations.

+

Hamdi’s Assassination and its + Implications

+

We do not know who, if anyone, was behind the assassination of Hamdi, + but it is widely believed in North Yemen that the Saudis were + involved.In telegram 15 from Sana, + January 2, the Embassy reported the latest information + concerning al-Hamdi’s + assassination and the question of Saudi involvement, noting that + “Embassy Sana is now prepared to go on record as saying that + former YAR President Hamdi was + killed by fellow officers in coup.” The Embassy also reported + that President al-Ghashmi played a part in the assassination, + and that Lieutenant Colonel Ali Abdallah Saleh was one of the + killers. The Embassy commented: “Motive was belief in Hamdi’s + waxing relationship with South and waning one with Saudis.” + (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + P840139–2529) [2 lines not + declassified]

+

[1 paragraph (7½ lines) not declassified]

+

What is more important than who actually killed Hamdi, however, is + the implication of his murder for Saudi-North Yemeni relations. In + late October, Sultan took back control of Saudi relations with the + Yemens from Fahd and his + supporters. Ironically, Sultan may well find that while dealing with + Hamdi was frustrating, he was probably preferable to the period of + upheaval that may lie ahead in Sana.

+

The Saudis appear to be concerned that Ghashmi lacks popular support. + Should they begin to distance themselves from Ghashmi, he will lose + his major pillar of outside support and his downfall might become a + self-fulfilling prophecy for the Saudis.

+

The Saudis, meanwhile, are maintaining close contact with an old + favorite of theirs, Abdallah al-Ahmar. Ahmar, a conservative [less than 1 line not declassified] tribal + leader from the north, is totally unacceptable to the moderate and + leftist portions of the North Yemeni population. Sultan may find + that his tougher policy towards North Yemen does not produce any + more satisfactory results than did Fahd’s more moderate one.

+
+ +
+ 239. Memorandum From Secretary of State Vance to President CarterSource: Carter Library, Plains File, Subject File, + Box 38, State Department Evening Reports, 3/78. Secret. In the + upper right-hand corner of the first page of the memorandum, + Carter wrote: “Cy + J.” + + + Washington, March + 10, 1978 + +

[Omitted here is material unrelated to Yemen.]

+

2. Saudi Views on US-South Yemen Relations. The Saudi Deputy + Foreign Minister has reiterated the Saudi desire that we not take + steps to normalize relations with South Yemen until King Khalid has + had an opportunity to review Saudi policy toward South Yemen. He + summarized current Saudi views by saying they are pessimistic about + the trend of events in South Yemen, believe the more radical + elements in the PDRY regime are + consolidating their power,Carter underlined the phrase + “the more radical elements in the PDRY regime are consolidating their power,” and + wrote in the left-hand margin “I don’t agree, but will yield to + your opinion—This is a good way to insure this will happen,” + with an arrow pointing toward the underlined passage. and + increasingly concerned over the active South Yemen role in the Horn. + The Saudis will find it difficult to understand if we decide to send + a delegation to Aden as previously agreed with the South + YemenisSee Document 232. until we have a firm Saudi + reaction. I have talked to John + West about this and he shares my view that we should + defer a decision.

+

[Omitted here is material unrelated to Yemen.]

+
+ +
+ 240. Memorandum From Secretary of State Vance to President CarterSource: Carter Library, Plains File, Subject File, + Box 38, State Department Evening Reports, 4/78. Secret. + Carter wrote “Cy J” + in the upper right-hand corner of the first page of the + memorandum. + + + Washington, April + 6, 1978 + +

[Omitted here is material unrelated to Yemen.]

+

Saudi Attitude Toward U.S.-South Yemen + Relations. As you know, the Saudis had asked us to defer + any initiative toward improving relations with South Yemen until the + King had reviewed Saudi policy toward South Yemen. On Tuesday the + Deputy Foreign Minister told our Charge in Jidda that Prince Fad now + believes it would be useful for the United States to have an embassy + in Aden.Reference is to an April 4 + conversation between the Chargé and Saudi Deputy Foreign + Minister al-Mansouri during which al-Mansouri indicated that + Fahd also supported + the “idea of resumption of US–PDRY + relations.” (Telegram 2607 from Jidda, April 6; National + Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + D780148–0631) The Deputy Foreign Minister gave an + optimistic appraisal of recent developments in South Yemen that is + at variance with the views Faud had earlier provided to John West, and which John related + at our meeting last month. Therefore I am asking John to confirm + this recent information when he returns to Jidda, and to tell the + Saudis how we intend to proceed.In the + left-hand margin next to this paragraph, Carter wrote: “As you know, I + think we should move toward S. Yemen.”

+

[Omitted here is material unrelated to Yemen.]

+
+ +
+ 241. Memorandum From Acting Secretary of State Christopher to President CarterSource: Carter Library, Plains File, Subject File, + Box 38, State Department Evening Reports, 4/78. Secret. + Carter wrote “Warren + J” in the upper right-hand corner of the first page of the + memorandum. Vance was in + Moscow April 19–23; Christopher served as Acting Secretary in his + absence. + + + Washington, April + 21, 1978 + +

[Omitted here is material unrelated to Yemen.]

+

South Yemen. The Saudis have finally come + around to your view that it would be helpful if we restored + diplomatic relations with South Yemen. We are assessing the timing + and tactics of doing so.In the + left-hand margin next to this point, Carter wrote: “I’m glad we + finally got permission to carry out my ‘views.’”

+

[Omitted here is material unrelated to Yemen.]

+
+ +
+ 242. Memorandum From Secretary of State Vance to President CarterSource: Carter Library, + Plains File, Subject File, Box 38, State Department Evening + Reports, 6/78. Secret. Carter initialed the upper right-hand corner of + the first page of the memorandum, indicating that he saw + it. + + + Washington, June + 17, 1978 + +

[Omitted here is material unrelated to Yemen.]

+

6. Mission to the People’s Democratic Republic of + Yemen—The People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen (PDRY) Government has agreed to + receive the Department’s team late this month for exploratory + discussions. This will be our first opportunity in almost a decade + for extensive exchange of views with the PDRY Government.

+

The team will cast its approach in the context of your general policy + of trying to normalize relations with all countries and our long + term objective of having a constructive relationship with the PDRY. The team will also hold + discussions on a number of key substantive issues on which our views + differ significantly from those of the PDRY leadership. These include human rights, support + for terrorism, cooperation among Arabian Peninsula and Persian Gulf + states in the interests of regional security, and the role of the Soviet Union, Cuba and + other communist states in the region.

+

[Omitted here is material unrelated to Yemen.]

+
+ +
+ 243. Memorandum From Secretary of State Vance to President CarterSource: Carter Library, Plains File, Subject File, + Box 38, State Department Evening Reports, 6/78. Secret. + Carter initialed the + upper right-hand corner of the first page of the memorandum, + indicating that he saw it. + + + Washington, June + 24, 1978 + +

1. YAR President + al-Ghashmi + Assassinated. YAR + President Ghashmi was assassinated this morning. According to our + Embassy, Ghashmi was killed by a bomb while he was receiving a man + purporting to be a South Yemen representative. The visitor, who also + died, has tentatively been identified as the bomber. Sana is quiet + although the military headquarters where the incident occurred is + sealed off from the rest of the city by tanks and troops. Our + Embassy notes that suspicion is focused at the moment entirely on + South Yemen and that Ghashmi’s successor is likely to be chosen from + his immediate entourage.In telegrams + 3054, 3055, and 3057, all from Sana, June 24, the Embassy + reported the details of the assassination and its immediate + aftermath. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy + File, D780263–0904, D780263–1003, and D780263–1039)

+

[Omitted here is material unrelated to Yemen.]

+
+ +
+ 244. Telegram From the Embassy in the Yemen Arab Republic to the + Department of StateSource: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + D780265–1200. Secret; Priority. Sent for information to Abu + Dhabi, Amman, Jidda, Kuwait, London, Manama, and + Muscat. + + + Sana, June 27, 1978, 0900Z + +

3116. Subj: Reported Execution PDRY + President Salim Rubayi + Ali.

+

1. We have no reason to doubt reports reaching us by radio from Aden + that Salim Rubayi Ali and + two others have been executed.Fighting + broke out in Aden days after al-Ghashmi’s murder in Sana. The New York Times reported that on June 26, a + pro-Soviet “people’s militia” led by Abdel al-Fattah Ismail + defeated troops loyal to Salim + Rubayi Ali, who was arrested and executed. + (“South Yemen Chief Reported Slain, But Pro-Red Group Stays In + Power,” The New York Times, June 27, + 1978, p. Al) We doubt that rebellion can continue without + his leadership.Salim Rubayi Ali had been a + moderating influence in Marxist South Yemen. Reference is to his + efforts at softening the People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen’s + Marxist stance and moving toward a rapprochement with North + Yemen.

+

2. It is clear that our major and perhaps only hope of manipulating + South Yemen from within has been destroyed along with Salim. It is + also clear that rivalries within South Yemen were not rpt not + playacting but real and mortal differences within top of leadership + in PDRY.

+

3. Observers in Middle East will draw little comfort from fact that + two Chiefs of State in Middle East who sought to limit cooperation + with Soviets were killed in same week. We believe it inevitable that + any Middle East leader thinking of opposing Soviets will be given + pause by these events, and that Soviets now loom larger in this part + of the world.

+

4. From perspective of Sana, events can be read in two ways. One is + that rebellion will inevitably be followed by purges in army which + will weaken PDRY in any effort it + may wish to launch against YAR. + Repression which will follow murder of only PDRY leader with any popularity will + also stay the hand of Abd al-Fattah + Ismail in his efforts to export revolution. + Alternative view is that al-Fattah has at last cleared last obstacle + to completely radical policy of subversion against Dhofar and YAR and cooperation with Soviets and + Cubans in major military efforts. Yemenis, of course, expect rapid + increase of pressure from South; that is, they subscribe to second + view expressed above. Embassy Sana is divided in its opinion this + subject but, whichever reading of future events is adopted, it is + clear that something, sooner or later, will have to be done to + contain South Yemen and its backers.

+ + Ransom + +
+ +
+ 245. Memorandum From Gary + Sick of the National Security Council Staff to the + President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)Source: Carter Library, National + Security Affairs, Staff Material, Middle East, Subject File, Box + 94, Yemens: Temporary: 6/78. Secret. Sent for + information. + + + Washington, June + 28, 1978 + + + SUBJECT + The Yemen Coup and Assassination + +

Current Situation

+

The facts that we have are scanty, but they seem to be holding up + well. The South Yemenis apparently rigged the assassination of + President Ghashmi of North Yemen, probably for two reasons: (1) to + throw the YAR into confusion and + prevent any military reaction to their own coup which was already + planned; and (2) to discredit PDRY + President Ali and provide at least a superficial motive for removing + him from office. It worked. Subsequently, the party leadership + either staged a coup attempt by Ali, or else took advantage of such + an attempt, to bombard the Presidential palace and execute Ali. The + effect was to leave Abd al-Fattah + Ismail, the hard-line Marxist party chief and + ideologue, as the key power in Aden. In Sanaa, the North Yemenis + have pulled themselves together quickly, have installed an interim + President, and are now considering next steps. (S)

+

What It Does NOT Mean

+

The PDRY was already the most + radicalAn unknown hand crossed out + the words “most radical” and substituted the word “only.” + Marxist state in the Arab world. The change of leadership will not + mean a loss to the free world, only more of the same. Even with the + leftist “pragmatist” Salim Rubaya + Ali in office, the Saudis had given up on Aden as + much as six months ago, considering it a lost cause and beyond the + reach of their moneyed entreaties. A power struggle has been going + on between Ali and Ismail + almost from the day they took collective command of the PDRY. They were both committed + Marxists. The PDRY has been + following a Marxist policy actively and openly for years, including + unblushing attempts to interfere in the policies of conservative + states throughout the area. The Ghashmi assassination was their + first successful murder of a head of state, but not for lack of + trying. They have numerous notches on their sword handles for the + killing of lesser political figures in their own nation and + elsewhere. The change in policy may make them marginally worse, but barring a + relinquishment of their prized nationalistic credentials in the form + of base rights to the Soviets, it is difficult to see how Ismail acting on his own can + surpass his past performance with Ali as partner. (S)

+

What It Will Mean

+

—The Saudis, the North Yemenis, the Shah, and others in the region + will see this as further confirmation of their deepest fears, viz. + the Soviets, having installed their crew in Kabul, having attempted + the same in Baghdad, with Addis in their pocket, have now added + another link in the ever-tighter chain encircling the moderate + Arabs. The regional moderates will press us to do something, and + they may be tempted to try to do something themselves. We have + reliable indications that the Saudis are seriously considering going + to war with the PDRY and are + seeking regional support. (S)

+

—With regard to the Soviets, it is not clear at this point that they + will enjoy any greater access to Aden than before. The Soviets have + been pressing the Adenis for years to give them base facilities—and + have been rejected in each case. Those decisions were taken while + Ismail was in a strong + position in the government and almost certainly reflected a + collective view with strong nationalist overtones. Ismail may prove to be more + susceptible to Soviet blandishments, but that is far from certain at + this stage. (S)

+

What To Look For

+

In measuring the extent of Soviet gains, there are three possible + yardsticks:

+

1. Base Rights. Return of the Soviet repair + ship or floating dry dock to Aden would be a clear indication of a + change in policy. Soviet use of Aden airfields for military (as opposed to transport) flights would be a + major deviation from past PDRY + policy. A significant increase in Soviet or Cuban military presence + would be in the same category.

+

2. Intervention in North Yemen. Active PDRY military intervention across the + border or encouragement of tribal dissidence on a large scale would + reverse the live-and-let-live pattern which has characterized the + uneasy relations between the two Yemens over the past several years. + It could prompt the Saudis to intervene directly.

+

3. Dhofar. A concerted attempt to reignite the + Dhofar rebellion in OmanSee footnote 2, Document 237. + would mark a sharp policy change. (S)

+

These are listed in descending order of probability. The PDRY did not stop supporting the + Dhofar rebels because they lost interest in the export of revolution. They stopped + because they were roundly defeated and had nothing to gain by going + back for another round. With regard to North Yemen, it is not clear + that Aden has enough tribal or political assets to be more than a + nuisance, and the threat of energizing the Saudis into a major + confrontation is not likely to be appealing. There are, however, + more hard core communists of the card-carrying variety in the North + than the Marxist South.An unknown hand + placed a question mark in the right-hand margin next to this + sentence. This, plus the tangled tribal relationships, + will continue to give Aden the ability to interfere in the internal + affairs of North Yemen almost at will, a capability reciprocated by + Northern assets in the South. (S)

+

U.S. Interests

+

Our ultimate concern is the stability of Saudi Arabia. The presence + of a Marxist state on the corner of the Peninsula is not a factor + for stability, but its extreme poverty, total political isolation, + and preoccupation with its own internal power struggles have kept it + from wielding any significant influence beyond the borders of its + equally impoverished neighbor to the north. This is not a desirable + situation, but it must be weighed against the risks in attempting to + change it by force. (S)

+

The PDRY regime is fully in command + of its own government and people so far as we can tell. It will not + topple easily, and it controls a respectable, blooded military + force. The worst possible outcome of this affair in terms of our own + interests would be an intervention attempt by the Saudis which + failed and tended to discredit the Royal Family. There was a lot of + talk in North Yemen and Saudi Arabia in the days immediately + following the Ghashmi assassination about North Yemen launching a + war against the south, backed by Saudi Arabia, with such states as + Iran and Jordan standing at the ready.In telegram 3110 from Sana, June 26, the Embassy reported on + Ransom’s + conversation with al-Asnaj, in which the latter informed Ransom that he planned to + “call on Saudis and Omanis to join YAR in intervention in South Yemen.” (National + Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + D780264–1077) That may have been merely frustration and + rage in the heat of the moment, but it is dangerous in the extreme. + There is no realistic prospect that North Yemen—with or without + Saudi assistance—could in fact bring down the Aden regime. It is + more likely to reveal Saudi (and Yemeni) military shortcomings and + embroil the entire Peninsula in a war no one can win. (S)

+

We and the Saudis have everything to lose in widening the conflict, + and we should not encourage it in any way. The British intend to + issue a formal statement today counseling restraint on all parties. + Although it may not be what Prince Turki and the Shah want to hear, we should take the + same line. (S)

+
+ +
+ 246. Telegram From the Embassy in Saudi Arabia to the Embassy in + the Yemen Arab Republic and the Department of StateSource: National Archives, RG 59, + Central Foreign Policy File, D780269–0119. Secret; Niact Immediate; Exdis. + + + Jidda, June 29, 1978, 1013Z + +

4834. For Assistant Secretary Saunders from Twinam. Subject: Comments on Visit to YAR.

+

1. Mood: In over four hours of discussions with YAR leaders July [June] 27–28Twinam was also scheduled to + visit Aden, but cancelled the visit after the coup and President + Ali’s assassination. He went to Sana to reassure the new + leadership of U.S. support and to press them to continue to + build upon the Yemen Arab Republic’s relationship with the + United States and Saudi Arabia. See Document + 242. I found them trying hard to convey + impression of calm determination to press on with building, and + defending, the country. Beneath the brave front they are obviously + extremely worried about their chances for forging a viable new + regime and about the Soviet threat emanating from Aden. The + possibility of further PDRY + terrorism against YAR obviously is + heavy on their minds, and they do not appear to find relief in the + present disarray in PDRY because + they describe the situation there, and would certainly have us see + it, as consolidation of the Soviet grip on South Yemen.

+

2. What YAR wants: Council Chairman + and Prime Minister made quite clear YAR’s desperate sense of need for US and Saudi support. They obviously + consider our sending someone to Sana with President’s letter of + condolences and support a very significant symbol of US willingness to stand by YAR in time of need, and thus I feel + my visit made real initial contribution to bucking up YAR leadership. In my talks I + emphasized my impression of intensity of Saudi concern for welfare + of North Yemen, and I believe this was fully noted and helped. + Chairman Arashi in + particular, however, made it abundantly clear to me that YAR needs from us and from Saudis more + than mere words and is looking for concrete manifestations of US-Saudi willingness to back YAR. (Of course, as always, North + Yemenis would be happier if US help + were not so closely tied to what they regard as the turgid pace of + Saudi support, but they appear realistic in accepting the fact that + we intend to keep the Saudis out in front in the trilateral + relationship.)

+

3. What YAR intends to do: During my + visit Ransom and I did not + have best opportunity to press on this point, because of need to set + overall tone of visit with Prime Minister Ghani and essentially + formal nature of exchange with Council Chairman Arashi. Foreign Minister + Asnaj, with whom we had + intended to probe YAR intentions + fully, kept being dragged + off to high priority task of investigating Ghashmi assassination in + preparation for Saturday’s Arab League meeting,An emergency session of the Arab League Council + took place in Cairo July 1–2 at the request of the Yemen Arab + Republic, which accused South Yemen of assassinating President + al-Ghashmi. See footnote 6, Document 247. + having to cancel the scheduled meeting with us evening June 27 and + having to send Western Affairs Director al Kibsi and Ambassador to + US Muttawakkil to sub-hosting + luncheon prior to my departure June 28. He was present only during + my meeting with Arashi and, + in accordance with Peninsular protocol, did not participate + independently in discussion, confining himself to interpreting. In + response to direct question, Ghani admitted YAR sees ongoing PDRY + threat primarily as one of terrorism and political subversion rather + than military intervention in YAR. + Both he and Arashi + emphasized YAR’s need to + demonstrate strength in response to Soviet threat from South Yemen. + But neither Ransom nor I + interpreted anything they or other YAR officials said as suggesting immediate possibility + of YAR intervention into PDRY. Arashi asked for US + help in assessing how to deal with the threat. My overall impression + is that YAR has not yet figured out + what to do, is focusing now on this weekend’s Arab League meeting as + forum for making its case against PDRY and building support for whatever action it may + decide to take, and in any event, will look to Saudis for advice, + support and leadership in responding to Ghashmi assassination. We + must bear in mind, however, the intensity of the feeling among + YAR leaders that they must do + something to respond to PDRY, and + we cannot rule out their doing something foolish. Ransom will, of course, be probing + further on this question.

+

4. U.S. response: YAR leaders, + despite their reference to “practical steps” which they would like + to see us take in support, obviously find some advantage at this + stage in being just as vague about the extent of U.S. support + desired as was Saudi Prince Turki al Faisal when he called in Ambassador + West and his British, + French and Iranian colleagues June 25.Reference is to a meeting between Turki and West on June 25. In telegram 4704 from + Jidda, June 25, the Embassy reported that Turki noted that the Saudi + Government “will do everything in its power to maintain the + integrity and security of North Yemen following the + assassination of President Ghashmi.” Turki also asked for assurances of U.S. support + for “actions that maintain the integrity of the YAR.” (National Archives, RG 59, + Central Foreign Policy File, D780264–0193) Both Saudis + and YAR would obviously prefer an + open-ended commitment from us, and undoubtedly over time YAR will seek to use present situation + to push us further into military supply relationship than we have to + date determined to go. At the moment, however, we seem to be in the + fortunate position of having already agreed with Saudis (and + Congress) on a YAR military + modernization program which + has had as yet virtually no tangible impact. We are at point where + effective implementation of presently agreed program, including the + transfer of F–5B’s, is matter of + urgency. If we can get our act together with Saudis, an admittedly + formidable task, we should be able over the next year or so to go a + long way in providing tangible manifestations of our policy of + supporting YAR in cooperation with + Saudi Arabia. At same time, by pressing Saudi leadership to get on + with implementing the YAR military + supply program to which it long ago agreed, we can to some extent + answer the Saudi request for US + support in its as yet unspecified help to North Yemen. In addition + to intensifying efforts to move infantry modernization and F–5B transfer along promptly and + effectively, this would seem to be the time to go ahead with + approval of the F–5E’s for North + Yemen.

+

5. Charge Ransom may wish to + comment on above impressions.

+

6. Department may wish to pass this message to appropriate Middle + East posts and military addressees, including CHUSMTM Dhahran.

+ + West + +
+ +
+ 247. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Saudi + Arabia and the Embassy in the Yemen Arab RepublicSource: National Archives, RG 59, + Central Foreign Policy File, D780280–0127. Secret; Immediate; + Limdis. Drafted by + Bodine; cleared by + Leslie Brown (T), Brian Atwood (H), Richard Ericsson (PM), Ted Borek (L/PM), Crawford, Sick, and Kreisberg and in DOD/ISA and DOD/DSAA; approved by Newsom. Sent for information Immediate to USLO Riyadh. + + + Washington, July 8, 1978, + 0010Z + +

172366. Subject: U.S.-Saudi Cooperation in Support of North Yemen. + Refs: (A) Sana 3215,In telegram 3215 + from Sana, July 1, the Embassy suggested the manpower shortage + within the YAR armed forces + would most likely remain without an increase in military pay, + noting: “Saudis, if they want to see YAR Army maintain manpower base for expensive + equipment purchases already undertaken, are going to have to + consider pay subsidy.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central + Foreign Policy File, D780272–0772) (B) Sana 3216,In telegram 3216 from Sana, July 1, the + Embassy insisted that rather than pursuing a broad program, the + United States “should focus our efforts on anti-tank and + anti-air defenses plus effectiveness of artillery. This should + be done along with plan to support forward elements of YAR Army along PDRY border.” YAR officials also believed that + it was necessary to replace the Soviet military mission in North + Yemen with a contingent of Arab nations familiar with Soviet + equipment, such as the Jordanians, Egyptians, and Pakistanis. + (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + D780272–0787) (C) Sana 3217,In telegram 3217 from Sana, July 1, the Embassy highlighted + some of the ongoing difficulties with the U.S.-Saudi-YAR tripartite military supply + relationship. The Saudi financing of Yemeni purchases of + equipment from the United States and France had been a political + success: “It has, at any rate, provided alternative to Soviet + commitment to security of YAR + and averted large-scale influx of new Soviet weapons. At same + time, it has been administrative disaster and one rpt one of the + reasons why Yemeni Army is weaker now than ever before in last + decade.” The Embassy described the reasons for this outcome, + noting: “This is all prelude to saying that any US desire to see existing program + prosecuted more effectively depends on prior agreement with + Saudis—starting with Sultan and running through MODA—to admit US to new role.” (National + Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + D780272–0793) (D) Jidda 4704.See footnote 4, Document + 246.

+

1. Recent assassination of President Ghashmi and coup in Aden and + resultant potential for increased instability in region suggest a + reexamination of our overall policies and programs in South Arabia. + Of most immediate concern is the defensive capability of North Yemen + and the need to demonstrate tangibly our support for the integrity + of that state. Following is based on Twinam’s consultations with Embassies Jidda and Sana + and the comprehensive suggestions of Embassy Sana in refs A–C.

+

2. For Ambassador West: + Request you seek earliest opportunity to meet with MFA Prince Saud, MODA Prince Sultan, and other SAG officials you deem appropriate, to + convey following points, stating you are speaking under instructions + from Washington.

+ +

(A) We share Saudi concern about recent events in South Arabia—both + North and South Yemen—and would appreciate hearing the Government of + Saudi Arabia’s latest assessment of Yemeni situation and its view of + immediate and longer-term implications for the region.

+

(B) We are impressed by Saudi leadership in rallying support for + YAR in League’s condemning the + Government of the People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen for its role + in the assassination of President Ghashmi and recommending a general + “freeze” in relations against the regime by member states.The communiqué issued on July 2 at the + conclusion of the Arab League Council emergency session, which + was attended by 15 moderate Arab League members, imposed a + “freeze” on political, economic, and cultural exchange with + South Yemen because of its “criminal action” in connection with + al-Ghashmi’s + assassination. (“15 Arab States Plan To Impose Embargo On South + Yemen,” The New York Times, July 3, 1978, + p. 3) Telegram 16308 from Cairo, July 3, reported on the + meeting. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + D7800274–0940)

+

(C) It is our initial impression that the League’s decision to + isolate the PDRY coupled with the + internal divisions still present after and exacerbated by the June + 26 coup have weakened the Adeni regime’s ability to threaten its + neighbors either militarily or politically. USG feels isolation of the PDRY will be more effective in limiting danger to the + region than precipitous military intervention against it. + Intervention, on the contrary, could result in quite the reverse—a + consolidation of PDRY regime’s + support in South Yemen and perhaps even desperate retaliatory action + against North Yemen or Oman, thus beginning a cycle destabilizing to + the entire region. A more active Soviet military role in South Yemen + could result.

+

(D) We are prepared to work closely with the SAG to insure that an adequate defensive posture + against South Yemen is developed and maintained. FYI: You should not rpt not volunteer + following but if SAG raises + question you may reply as follows: If the threat to North Yemen + should become so immediate that the YARG and the SAG + conclude that the stationing of Saudi troops in North Yemen is + called for to provide an adequate defense, we would want to consult + closely with SAG. In this + connection any use of US-origin + equipment would have to be within the meaning of the regional + defense provisions of the military assistance agreement of + 1951,Reference is to the U.S.-Saudi + mutual defense assistance agreement of June 1951. Under the + agreement, the United States agreed to provide military + equipment and training for the Saudi armed forces. The pact also + authorized the establishment of a permanent U.S. Military + Training Mission in Saudi Arabia. which would not embrace + action other than legitimate self-defense.

+ +

(E) An immediate question is the need to demonstrate to North Yemen + the commitment of the US and, more + importantly, Saudi Arabia to its security. It is essential that we + take immediate steps to invigorate our joint military assistance + program with North Yemen in order to make a credible impact on the + perceptions in both North and South Yemen of the YARG’s ability to provide for + legitimate defense. We want to consult closely with appropriate + SAG officials about steps which + should be taken to make program more effective. In addition, we are + urgently examining the feasibility of accelerated delivery dates for + previously approved equipment and the availability of U.S. training + teams to accompany the equipment and assist in its integration into + the Yemeni armed forces.

+

(F) We understand that the Yemeni armed forces are desperately short + of men. The Yemeni Government is not able to compete with salaries + available within Yemen or to migrant Yemeni workers in neighboring + states and is thus not able to attract or retain the number and + quality of personnel needed to develop a credible military force. + Until budget support or military pay subsidy is available, it is + questionable how effective any reorganization or re-equipping effort + will be. Perhaps those states most directly concerned with the + security of Yemen will consider ways to assist the Yemeni Government + with this problem.

+

3. Ambassador West may wish + to consider suggesting to Prince Sultan the creation of a working + level coordinating group consisting of representatives of MODA and USMTM, as well as U.S. Defense Attache and Saudi + Military Mission Chief in Sana. This group could address the + acceleration of the reorganization of the Yemeni armed forces, + immediate and long-term training requirements and the turnover of + U.S. equipment already delivered to Yemen. Based upon the + difficulties we have experienced in moving forward with security + assistance to North Yemen, State and Defense strongly favor creation + of such a group as necessary to achieve an effective program.

+

4. If at some point the Saudis should raise with you possibility of + using U.S.-origin equipment in legitimate self-defense, either in + North Yemen or Saudi Arabia itself, you should remind SAG that U.S. law prohibits the + participation of any USG personnel, + military or civilian, including FMS + contractor personnel in a combat support role. Ambassador should + assure himself of U.S. contractor community understanding of this + fact.

+

5. For Ransom: The above is + provided to you on an FYI basis. + While you should not share any details of Jidda’s instructions with + YARG, you should reassure them + that we are actively engaged with the SAG on how best to assist them in their defensive + needs.

+

6. FYI only: Under Secretary + Newsom, who will be + visiting Saudi Arabia July 17–19 will be interested in SAG views on South Arabia. As our review in Washington of + various options progresses we may have specific proposals for + Newsom to present to the + Saudis in the course of his visit. End FYI.

+ + Vance + +
+ +
+ 248. Message From the United States Military Mission in Saudi + Arabia to the Department of DefenseSource: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, + Staff Material, Middle East, Subject File, Box 92, Yemen: Arab + Republic (YAR) (North): + 4/77–7/78. Secret; Noforn; Specat Exclusive. + + + Dhahran, July 12, 1978, 1120Z + +

69062. Specat Exclusive for + LTG Graves from Von Harbod. + Subject: North Yemen Military Assistance.

+

1. (S/NOFORN) Have been briefed by Ambassador West and Embassy staff regarding + U.S. Mission increasing concern vis a vis situation in North and + South Yemen. Ambassador and Chief USMTM met on this subject with MODA (Prince Sultan) on 10 July in + accordance with instructions from State.See Document 247. As a result + of meeting, closer coordination between U.S. Country Team and Saudis + on policy and planning can be expected. Additionally, believe both + U.S. Mission and MODA have become + convinced that U.S. must take stronger role to insure effectiveness + of any actions decided between our governments.

+

2. (S/NOFORN) At the request of the Ambassador, MODA agreed to the creation of a + working level, coordinating group consisting of representatives of + the Saudi Ministry of Defense, USMTM, U.S. Embassy in Jeddah, U.S. Defense Attache in + Yemen, and the Chief of the Saudi military mission in Yemen to begin + meeting on 29 July in Riyadh. This group is to address the + acceleration of the reorganization of the Yemen armed forces + immediate and long term training requirements, the turn over of U.S. + equipment already delivered to Yemen, and such other matters as are + necessary to achieve an effective program. Prince Sultan agreed to + the meeting of this group. However, he cautioned that he does not + anticipate results unless the U.S. is fully willing to support the + implementation of the recommendations. He would be against this + committee if it is to be just a fact finding committee. He gave as + an example F–5s for Yemen. Quote: Is the U.S. willing to accelerate + delivery, to train North Yemenis, and to raise the U.S. flag in + Sana?

+

3. (S/NOFORN) In this regard, following thoughts are my personal view + of directions you may wish to recommend to ISA policy makers:

+

A. U.S. presence in form of an ODC, + or joint ODC with Saudis, in Sana + is a must if any near term improvements in North Yemen military + forces are desired. Saudis, at this point, are simply not capable of + getting job done alone.

+

B. If USG/SAG decide to take effective joint action, emphasis + should be on near term improvements. This will, in my opinion, + require U.S. training team on the ground in North Yemen in the near + future.

+

C. To this point, planning for introduction of F–5s + into North Yemen Air Force has been of long term nature involving + extensive English language and flying training in CONUS. This approach will not be + effective if USG/SAG decide that near term, politically + visible, actions are required. Suggest that joint USAF/RSAF team in country—perhaps coupled with contractor + maintenance team—should be considered in event near term + introduction of four RSAF + F–5B’s is desired. RSAF instructor pilots and + maintenance personnel on such a joint team could mitigate language + problem. Similar crash programs have been successfully completed by + USAF in past (e.g., in Laos + and Cambodia).

+

4. Best wishes. Eric

+
+ +
+ 249. Memorandum From the President’s Deputy Assistant for National + Security Affairs (Aaron) to + President CarterSource: Carter Library, National + Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Brzezinski Office File, + Country Chron File, Box 56, Yemen. Secret. Sent for action. + Carter initialed the + upper right-hand corner of the first page of the memorandum. + Sick sent the + memorandum to Aaron + under a July 26 memorandum, recommending that Aaron sign it. Sick noted that Denend concurred with the + recommendation. + + + Washington, July + 26, 1978 + + + SUBJECT + Military Relationship with North Yemen + +

We have had a military assistance program with North Yemen for + several years in which we provided equipment while the Saudis paid + for it and monitored + the introduction into the North Yemeni Armed Forces. All parties + agreed that this system has been cumbersome and unresponsive. + (S)

+

A meeting is scheduled for Saturday, July 29, in Saudi Arabia for a + formal review of the program.No record + of the July 29 meeting has been found. However, Murray discussed the Yemen + Arab Republic’s military needs with Sultan in Taif on August 1. + At the meeting, Murray + also reported on his meeting with Salih the evening before. (Telegram 5695 from + Jidda, August 3; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign + Policy File, D780318–0675) At our request, State and + Defense have prepared coordinated guidance for the U.S. participants + which would accelerate the current program, demonstrate U.S. + willingness to cooperate in giving North Yemen a more effective + defense capability, and hopefully prod the Saudis into a more + cooperative posture than in the past.In + a July 19 memorandum, Brzezinski recommended that Vance and Brown prepare draft guidance in + advance of the July 29 meeting in Riyadh. Brzezinski noted: “We should + be prepared to make concrete proposals about how our existing + program can be expedited, how training bottlenecks can be + overcome, and what type of high impact accelerated deliveries we + would be prepared to consider in cooperation with Saudi Arabia.” + (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, + Middle East, Subject File, Box 92, Yemen: Arab Republic (YAR) (North): 4/77–7/78) Duncan provided the Department + of Defense guidance in a July 22 memorandum to Brzezinski and Vance. (Ibid.) The Department + of State response on July 25, which Wisner transmitted to Brzezinski, was in the form of + a draft cable to Jidda, Sana, and Riyadh. (Carter Library, + National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Brzezinski Office File, + Country Chron File, Box 56, Yemen) (S)

+

Most of the guidance simply involves improved management of military + sales which were approved some time ago. However, there is one new + issue. Some time ago, we approved the transfer of four F–5B trainers to North Yemen from Saudi + Arabia. The Yemenis have requested purchase of 12 additional F–5E aircraft to partially replace + their present force of Soviet MIGs. The Saudis have been considering + whether or not they would be willing to pay for these aircraft. We + anticipate that the Saudis will agree on SaturdayJuly 29. to buy the 12 F–5s, + and we would like to be able to respond positively to their request. + (S)

+

The proposed guidance reads: “If Saudi Arabia requests agreement to + proceed with the sale of additional F–5s, you should respond + that the Administration is prepared in principle to give favorable + consideration to providing an appropriate number of aircraft. But as + Saudis are aware, we cannot make a formal commitment until we have + consulted with Congress. Under any circumstances . . . formal + notification could not take place until the Congress returns in + February 1979.” (S)

+ +

RECOMMENDATION: That you approve the draft + guidance accepting a commitment in principle to give favorable + consideration to sale of additional F–5Es to North Yemen. State and Defense concur.Carter approved this recommendation and + initialed in the right-hand margin next to it.

+
+ +
+ 250. Briefing Memorandum From the Acting Assistant Secretary of + State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Veliotes) to the Under Secretary of + State for Political Affairs (Newsom)Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + P780135–0498. Secret. Drafted by Twinam. + + + Washington, August 8, 1978 + + + SUBJECT + US-Saudi Cooperation in North + Yemen + +

Ambassador West, in his July + 6Veliotes crossed out the word “July” and + substituted the word “August.” meeting with Prince Sultan + and Prince Saud, completed the first round of a series of + discussions at the political and military levels with the Saudis on + how we might better work together to strengthen North Yemen’s + defense capability.West met with Sultan + and Saud in Taif on + August 6 and summarized the meeting in telegram 5784 from Jidda, + August 7. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy + File, D780322–1023) We believe these discussions have + been successful in establishing a general understanding which will + permit the US to work with the + Saudis in a manner reflecting the guidance of the recent PRC meeting.Not further identified.

+

The Commander of our Training Mission in Saudi Arabia and the Saudi + Director for Assistance and Cooperation, will be travelling to Sana + in the next few days to brief the North Yemenis on what we plan to + jointly do to move forward the military modernization program. While + the scope of our proposed program, which essentially involves + accelerated and more effective introduction of already approved and + funded equipment, will fall short of meeting Yemeni expectations, it + is consistent with what + North Yemen’s armed forces can realistically absorb in the coming + months. Perhaps more to the point, we believe our proposed action, + including US and Saudi air lift to + accelerate delivery of artillery and anti-aircraft weapons, will + demonstrate in a politically effective manner joint support for the + North Yemeni government.

+

At present we are facing numerous technical problems characteristic + of trying to implement a program such as this in a country like + North Yemen in cooperation with a government like Saudi Arabia, but + no basic policy problems are involved. Down the road we face the + question of whether we will be able to accede to the general Saudi + desire that we put up at least a token amount of the financing of + our participation in training the YAR forces on specific items of equipment, as well as + the issue of how to handle inevitable Yemeni requests for additional + weapons and equipment. As we proceed the ambivalence in the Saudi + attitude toward developing an effective North Yemen military will + undoubtedly resurface and complicate our own efforts. For the + moment, however, we are launched on asserting a limited but direct + US role in North Yemen, related + to introducing specific, Saudi-funded equipment in a way which can + build the Saudi confidence in our desire to cooperate fully with + them while demonstrating to North Yemen that our support is + tangible.

+
+ +
+ 251. Telegram From the Embassy in the Yemen Arab Republic to the + Department of State, the Department of Defense, and the Embassy in + Saudi ArabiaSource: National Archives, + RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780329–0183. Secret; Niact Immediate. Also sent + Niact Immediate to CHUSMTM Dhahran, USMTM Riyadh, and USCINCEUR + Vaihingen. + + + Sana, August 11, 1978, 1520Z + +

3926. Subj: Arms for Yemen.

+

Begin summary: YAR rejects impact package insisting + US agree to much larger program + of deliveries of its own to YAR. + End summary.

+

1. On August 7 when I returned from Saudi Arabia, I realized task + that remained was to sell in YAR + program that had been hammered out over previous several weeks + between Saudis and US. There were, + however, no Saudis in town who could talk to President and, in view + of Salih’s insistence on + much larger US role than program + proposed, I contacted + Foreign Minister Asnaj to + talk about foreign policy aspects of military proposals that would + be brought by Kabbani-Cathey + delegation on 10 August. Asnaj replied in personal letter that he could not + meet with me. Anything having to do with military program would have + to be handled “in headquarters by highest level of YAR Government.” However, within hour + of arrival of note, Ahmad Abdu + Said showed up at my house for lunch to carry message + to Asnaj. He said Asnaj would see President in + evening.

+

2. I told Said that military + delegation was carrying proposal which excellent first step. It + would, by itself, increase key defense capabilities of Yemen in + short time, begin a new Air Force program and provide political + testimony of new US role in Yemen in + highly conspicuous manner. I gave Said no details of the program.

+

3. I said that I hoped friends of the President would explain to him + that an alliance between the United States and YAR or a defense commitment was not + realistic and that while we willing to play a direct role in + implementation, we saw coordination between us, the Yemenis, and the + Saudis as key to success of this program. I said program was keyed + to stages which would test absorptive capacity of YAR Army and as this proven I thought + program could expand to include other types of equipment. I said in + conclusion that I hoped that defense of Yemen would not be viewed by + President entirely as military matter but as one which involved just + as much or more diplomatic weapons. We did not want to escalate + tensions in area with arms race.

+

4. Despite this preparation and highly upbeat presentation I gave + Said, I was apprehensive + at thought that a Saudi representative would not see Salih before military delegation + presented the program. (Salih + Hudayan, Saudi military attache in YAR and key figure for regime, was so + ill that he was evacuated on flight which brought military + delegation.) Fortunately, delegation brought in its tow Ali + Musallim, highly persuasive and experienced secretary to Saudi’s + special committee which deals with Yemen under Sultan’s + chairmanship. Ali arranged for meeting with President for hour + before military delegation appointment.

+

5. When delegation arrived for midafternoon Ramadan appointment, + however, it found YAR President + Ali Abdallah Salih + fasting and sleepless. Musallim said later that President was + strained not only by Ramadan but by pitched battle which renegade + officer Moujahid al-Kuhali had provoked in north of Yemen on that + day and day before. While casualties slight, issues in confrontation + seemed large to Salih who is + convinced Kuhali is working with former paratroop commander + Abdallah Abdal Alim and + PDRY to destabilize YAR.

+

6. USMTM Chief Cathey had prepared very clear and + lengthy Arabic and English briefing book for Yemenis. General + Kabbani was to be briefer but turned matter over to Cathey after very brief + preamble.

+ +

7. Discussion got nowhere fast. Salih said much larger program was needed to face + dangers from the South. He asked Cathey if he had authority to negotiate military + assistance directly with YAR + noting—and Kabbani agreed—that Saudis had acquiesced to such a + relationship. Cathey + explained that direct relationship was in implementation but that + planning would continue in coordinated role between US, Saudi Arabia, and Yemen. Salih bored in on what US would do. Pointing to briefing book + he said “this is Saudi plan. It has already been agreed upon in + past. I thought you had come to discuss new support and new weapons, + to sign new agreements to face the new threat.” Salih said program as proposed + would only invite Soviet reaction, chiefly by doubling or tripling + of Soviet aid to South Yemen which he noted was already far greater + than anyone’s aid to North Yemen. Salih hammered on point that program was financed by + Saudi Arabia. American contribution was negligible.

+

8. After General Cathey had + made several efforts to move to discussion of implementation of + program, Salih clearly + became impatient as he had earlier done with Murray and, to lesser extent, with + myself. I pointed out that present military program involved more + than 150 million dollars from US + plus another 100 million dollars from French. In another portion of + program there was 150 million dollars for military facilities like + the airport in Sana. I noted that aircraft program which beginning + would surely run over 100 million dollars. With upwards of half a + billion dollars already in pipeline, US had concluded that need at moment was not more aid + but to employ in best and most vigorous manner what is at hand. + However, I noted program which we were presenting today fell in + three parts. First was impact package which General Cathey had briefly discussed. + Program also had mid-range and long-range segments which we wanted + to discuss in detail with Yemenis.

+

9. General Kabbani chimed in with agreement but Salih clearly indicated he had no + problems with Saudi aid but did not understand why United States had + refused to help Yemen in this time of need. “The threat is not only + to Yemen but to US as well,” said + Salih. “What will be + position of US if Soviet supported + South attacks the YAR?” “Russians + brought MiG–21’s and new tanks to + our port but we refused to receive them. What is the American + counteroffer to this?” I replied that if YAR looking for practical approach this program was + good first step. I offered on behalf of USG to sit with Yemenis to formally analyze threat from + South and determine what next steps should be. I told Salih + USG was playing the more direct + role which he had asked us to do. I assured him that we would deal + with YARG directly. I said that if + YARG sought alliances and + pacts I did not see such in the future but I pointed to President Carter’s statement as clear and + unequivocal message of support for Yemeni security.Reference is to Carter’s July 18 letter to Salih. In the letter, + Carter congratulated + Salih on his + election as YAR President on + July 17. Carter added: + “On behalf of the government and people of the United States, I + wish to express again my determination to support your efforts + to protect and further Yemen’s security and development.” + (Telegram 181143 to Sana, July 18; National Archives, RG 59, + Central Foreign Policy File, D780294–1172)

+

10. Discussion consumed much more time than record here indicates. + Lengthy speeches by YAR President + Salih and General + Kabbani, plus attempts by General Cathey to explain program in detail, consumed much + time and Salih after hour + and fifteen minutes rather abruptly asked group to continue + discussions with Chief of Staff. Salih left the meeting with Ali Musallim.

+

11. Attempts to continue briefing with Chief of Staff, Ali Shayba, however, didn’t get + much further. Shayba, for + instance, asked repeatedly whether US aim was to get rid of Russia. If so, he added, we + want a replacement. Is there a plan, Shayba asked. When talks had continued through + better part of two hours and with fatigue clearly weighing on Yemeni + and Saudi participants, I wound up meeting with two requests and one + observation. First, I asked for clear YAR approval or disapproval of program which we would + leave with them in draft and explain further in meetings of military + committees that night at 10:00 p.m. I said we needed to know Yemeni + view clearly in order to get on with implementation of this program. + Second, I asked Yemeni friends to distinguish between political + support and requests for equipment. I said we disagreed even with + our closest friends on equipment issues but I wanted Yemenis to know + that we were standing with them. Yemenis should accept that US is sincere in its offer of + assistance and it is genuinely concerned about threat from the + South.

+

12. Observation concerned the Soviets. Addressing Shayba, I noted that he knew them + better than I from his many years of study in the Soviet Union. My + observation was that whatever Soviets had done in Yemen in past, + today their weapons were killing Yemeni officers in South and they + were aligned with regime which, as he admitted, had killed two Arab + Presidents in three days.Reference is + to the assassinations of al-Ghashmi and Salim Rubayi Ali. If Soviets offered more + equipment to YAR that would seem to + be greater danger to Yemen. However, despite this Yemenis should + understand “our aid is not tied to any condition. We do not ask you + to throw out Soviets. That is up to you. We are prepared + unconditionally to work with you to meet threat from the South.” + Shayba reiterated his + desire for—it was increasingly obvious—massive US aid. I replied that worst thing that + could happen would be for + arms race to begin between North and South Yemen. YARG certainly did not want + Soviet-US confrontation in the + Yemens. What we proposed to do instead was try to relax tensions + rather than raise it. Program was first and practical step in that + direction.

+

13. Military meeting that evening—which I did not attend to avoid + discussion of political rather than practical issues—was once again + inconclusive. It lasted until midnight with Yemenis repeating in + dozens of formulations that offer was not enough. Musallim had + indicated beforehand that Yemenis would accept plan if they were + given opportunity to forward their requests for other equipment to + US and Saudi Arabia and Kabbani + pushed this hard during evening meeting. Participants got impression + that Yemenis would accept program although they did not like it. + However, throughout evening Yemeni side continually pushed Americans + to ask what we were going to do for Yemen separate from Saudis.

+

14. Final meeting took place today, Friday, at 3:00, in office of + President. Ali Shayba, with + Deputy Chief of Staff Baradi and Air Force Commander Daifallah + present, scathingly rejected US + program. It was of “no use.” There was “nothing new in it.” The + anti-tank rockets were no substitute for tanks. Radar was hardly + worthwhile if there were not planes to use against attacking foe. + Machine guns and mortars were hardly worth mentioning for army which + had fought as long and as hard as Yemeni one.

+

15. Kabbani interrupted Shayba + repeatedly to argue with some heat that program should be given a + chance. Shayba firmly said on + several occasions that program was such that he did not care if it + came by air or sea. What he wanted was to see what US was going to do. He presented list + of equipment requests (see septel)Telegram 3937 from Sana, August 12, forwarded the new Yemen + Arab Republic military requests. (National Archives, RG 59, + Central Foreign Policy File, D780331–0350) which begins + with five squadrons F–5’s. List is comprehensive and includes + rockets, tanks, and all other equipment which would give North Yemen + a one to one equivalence with South Yemen.

+

16. As Kabbani argued with Shayba, replies of the Yemeni Chief of Staff became + angrier. He clearly questioned good will of US in dealing with Yemen and intelligence in not + understanding threat from South. At length I asked to speak and said + I wanted to thank YARG officers + for their time. I said they had given me answers to two questions I + had asked the day before and finally I wanted them to know that I + would take with me the list of equipment requests which they had prepared to allow my + government to consider it. Americans then left after handshaking all + around.

+

Comment: Yemenis were taken aback by departure and Shayba was clearly angry. Saudis + stayed behind as well they should have since they were the real + objects of Yemeni anger, I believe. Attacks on US are in fact attacks on them. With + rejection of impact package if it wasn’t tied to massive US aid to Yemen, I saw little to do in + meeting. I was unwilling to let YAR + impugn our motives and intelligence. My departure was polite. To + offset any claim of US walk-out I + have asked General Cathey + and military colleagues to be available for dinner which Chief of + Staff had previously set up for this evening. Message they will + carry is that we want cooperate, want proceed, and believe best + first step is to carry out proposed impact package. As I see issue + at moment our aim should be in salvage program. Saudis may of course + turn it around. They were convinced last night—as was I—that it was + in bag. It wasn’t.

+ + Ransom + +
+ +
+ 252. Memorandum From Samuel Hoskinson of the National Security + Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security + Affairs (Brzezinski)Source: Carter Library, National Security + Affairs, Brzezinski + Material, Brzezinski + Office File, Country Chron File, Box 56, Yemen. Secret. Sent for + action. Inderfurth’s and + Bartholomew’s + initials are on the first page of the memorandum. + + + Washington, August 16, 1978 + + + SUBJECT + The Yemens + +

I have reviewed all of the information available in Washington + pertaining to the situation in the Yemens and discussed the problem + at great length with the key Saudi policymakers, involved United + States Government officials in the field, and ranking UK intelligence and FCO officials. This memorandum + presents my resulting assessment of the situation and thoughts on + how we should proceed.

+

The Situation

+

There is little question that the Soviets, and especially the Cubans, + played a direct and critical role in Abl al-Fattah Ismail’s violent + ouster of Salim al-Rubayyi + Ali from the PDRY + Presidency in late June.See Document 244. While there is + some dispute about what may have stimulated Ismail’s move at this time, all + our intelligence indicates (and virtually everyone in the field + agrees) that the Soviets and Cubans decisively intervened to tip the + balance of the fighting in favor of their longstanding ally, + Ismail.

+

The Saudis believe that the Soviets encouraged Ismail to make his fateful move + against Ali and inspired the assassination of North Yemen President + GhashmiSee Document 243. because of the Saudi success in + developing Ali into a moderate nationalist (albeit still Marxist) + alternative to the Soviet-backed Ismail faction who would settle the longstanding + north-south Yemen conflict and keep the Soviets at bay. The British, + and some Americans, believe the Saudi approach had failed miserably + some time ago as Ismail + gradually gained ascendancy over Ali and other potential rivals and + that Ismail’s [Ali’s] ouster from the Presidency in June was + merely the final coup de grace. Thus the + degree of Soviet inspiration behind the events of June remains + somewhat obscure. All agree, however, that once the fighting started + the Soviets and Cubans did throw their local military weight behind + Ismail. The lesson has + not, of course, been lost + on the neighboring Arab states who are fearful that they could be + next and are looking to us for help.

+

Soviet motivation is clear. At a minimum they want to establish and + maintain a secure base of operations in South Yemen which can + provide logistics support for their Indian Ocean fleet and give them + a presence on the Red Sea and Arabian Peninsula. The Saudis + believe—and I agree—that the Soviets also see South Yemen as a base + for expanding their influence elsewhere in the Middle East. North + Yemen is a logical next target for Soviet-Ismail adventurism and neighboring + Oman is vulnerable as well. The threat is also aimed, however, at + Saudi Arabia since the loss to the Soviet orbit of either or both of + these traditionally Saudi-dominated areas would seriously undermine + Saudi political dominance of the Gulf states as well. In the process + there could even be a popular loss of confidence in the ability of + the House of Saud to govern + Saudi Arabia and increased divisiveness within the Saudi ruling + circle.

+

Soviet success in pursuing these objectives will turn to a + considerable extent on the fortunes of Abl al-Fattah Ismail in the months ahead. From + all indications, Ismail is a + true believer Marxist determined to revolutionize his own country + and export the revolution abroad as well. He knows what he wants and + will not be persuaded to settle for less.

+

Ismail, with Soviet and Cuban + help, has only achieved the first step of seizing power in Aden and + pacifying the population there. He still must consolidate his power + throughout the country before he can get down to revolutionary + business in earnest. Best Saudi and American estimates are that this + will take some six to eight months. After that, most observers + believe Ismail—backed by the + Soviets and Cubans—will begin his onslaught on North Yeman and heat + up the Dhofar rebellion again in Oman as well as introduce Communist + “reforms” into South Yemen. In the meantime, Aden will continue to + be a haven for international terrorists and other radicals.

+

Ismail’s strength is his + ruthlessness, almost messianic zeal and, most importantly, the + backing of the Soviets and Cubans. On the other hand, he still faces + some serious obstacles. We know there are still potential rivals + within the regime and disputes within the hierarchy over who should + be named to leadership positions. More importantly, a sizable part + of the army may be disaffected or, at a minimum, not responsive to + government direction. Traditional tribal and religious conflicts, + some of which have been exacerbated, will also complicate Ismail’s life. Finally, the desire + for revenge by the extended families of those killed or purged by + Ismail cannot be + disregarded in a traditional society like this. Unfortunately, in + the opinion of most close observers of this situation, the balance + at this point would seem to be slightly in favor of Ismail consolidating his power base throughout South + Yemen in six to eight months.

+

The situation in North Yemen is mixed as well. North Yemen’s new + President Ali Abdallah + Salih’s greatest strength is his strong backing from the + Saudis who were very instrumental in his rise to power. He is, + however, an impetuous man of very limited experience and + intellectual depth. The Saudis believe they can control Salih but as an ace in the hole + they are frank to say they are maintaining their influence with key + tribal leaders who can bring strong pressure on any regime in Sana. + Salih apparently has + little popular support, especially in the important southern + province which differs ideologically and religiously from the tribal + north. There is also a raft of various leftists, Ba’thists and South + Yemen sympathizers who can stir up trouble in Sana. They are + especially resentful of Salih’s conservatism and close ties to the Saudis. + Our embassy in Sana gives Salih about six months in office but there does not + appear to be anyone much better in the wings.

+

The Saudis at all levels are extremely concerned about the situation + in the Yemens. To a remarkable degree, the Saudis share our + assessments. For them, of course, the problem is more immediate and + they are consequently eager to develop a meaningful program to + counter the threat from South Yemen. At the same time, they seem to + fear the possible consequences of attempting to take on the Soviets + alone. In short, the Saudis will act to protect their interests but + to an extent they fear such actions will anger the Soviets, they + want us as a full partner to shield them against repercussions.

+

The Saudis indicated to me that they want to develop a + multidimensional program designed to put maximum pressure on + Ismail while at the same + time working to reduce the vulnerabilities of North Yemen and Oman. + Parts of this program are still in the conceptual and formative + stage but the major elements are clear. North Yemen’s “defensive” + military posture must be strengthened in partnership with the U.S. + though not to the point where it could also be a threat to Saudi + Arabia. Oman should be assisted militarily as well. Economic + development assistance is another element, although it is not clear + precisely what the Saudis have in mind.

+

[1 paragraph (11 lines) not declassified]

+

Options

+

Assuming that my assessment of the situation is reasonably accurate, + the U.S. has an obvious strong interest in countering this most + recent example of Soviet expansionism. Unlike the + Horn of Africa, the Yemen situation is one where we are well + positioned to draw the line and even reverse an important Soviet + gain. Soviet/Cuban intervention in the internal affairs of + South Yemen is clear-cut, the Ismail regime is already isolated in the Arab world and vulnerable from + within, the threatened neighboring states want our help and we have + vital interests in the political stability of the Arabian + Peninsula.

+

In this situation, there would appear to be three basic alternative + courses of action we could take.

+

1. Limited diplomatic/military aid reaction. + This is essentially the approach we are taking now. It involves a + very limited military supply program for North Yemen in cooperation + with the Saudis and what amounts to little more than diplomatic loss + covering moves. No concerted effort is being made to put pressure on + the Ismail regime, political + or otherwise.

+

The major argument in favor of this approach is that it does not + commit U.S. prestige, but is not totally unresponsive either. The + argument against it is that this is tokenism at best and at worst a + weak response that will only encourage Ismail to press on with his revolutionary program + and the Soviets to engage in similar adventurism elsewhere.

+

2. Maximum diplomatic/military aid/propaganda + pressure on South Yemen. Under this approach we would mount + an international diplomatic and propaganda offensive to expose the + Soviet hand in South Yemen and rally international opinion. We would + work closely with the Saudis on both military aid to strengthen + North Yemen’s and Oman’s defenses against conventional military + attack and subversion and on various forms of economic and + diplomatic pressure on South Yemen. The objective would be to + isolate and put the Soviets and South Yemen on the defense and + thereby, hopefully, neutralize them.

+

The major argument for this approach is that it would go beyond + limited defensive reaction and pressure the Soviets and Ismail. The major argument + against, is that we could well end up with the worst of both worlds + by drawing international attention to the problem only to witness + the Soviets continuing to back Ismail’s effective efforts to undermine both North + Yemen and Oman. In short, Ismail is unlikely to back off and the Soviets, + rather than being defensive, could well choose to press on with + enough success to leave the outcome in doubt or up the ante in + military supply and other support to South Yemen beyond our + political willingness to respond in kind.

+

3. Counteroffensive. This approach, in + addition to the actions undertaken in option 2, would involve us in + a covert action program [less than 1 line not + declassified] to intensify Ismail’s existing internal problems, make life more + difficult for the Soviets and Cubans in South Yemen and if + completely successful lead to Ismail’s downfall.

+

The argument for this approach is that it offers the prospects of + rolling back the Soviets from an area where they have intervened and + thereby regaining the + international respect and influence we have lost as a result of the + Soviet/Cuban thrust in Africa and the Middle East. It may be a long + time before such an ideal opportunity like this arises again. On the + other hand, there would be some inevitable Congressional concern + about “destabilizing” a regime even as odious and illegitimate as + Ismail’s.

+

Obviously each of these options needs to be systematically developed + to understand more precisely what would be involved and the + implications. The Yemen situation is serious enough to warrant such + a study effort.

+

In the meantime, irrespective of what option we select, there is an immediate need for much better intelligence + coverage. The Yemen’s until recently have been of secondary + interest to the U.S. and our intelligence effort has been minimal. + We now need to examine what needs to be done to bring it up to speed + with our changing interests.

+

RECOMMENDATIONSInderfurth placed a + bracket around both recommendations and drew an arrow from the + bracket to the margin below and wrote: “ZB, I suggest you sign the memo at Tab B to + Turner + now. Before signing the proposed PRM, however, I suggest that Sam + consult with Gary Sick + and Bill Quandt. Rick.” + Brzezinski + responded: “OK—Sam is out until 28 August—show to Sick/Quandt now for views. Good + memo.” According to an August 17 covering memorandum, attached + to another copy of Hoskinson’s memorandum, Inderfurth sent the memorandum + to Quandt and Sick on August 17. (Carter + Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Subject + File, Middle East, Box 92, YAR: + 8/78)

+

1. That you commission the PRM at + Tab A to study on a priority basis the three options.Neither Tab A nor Tab B is attached. An undated + and unsigned draft PRM is in + the Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, + Middle East, Subject File, Box 92, YAR: 8/78.

+

2. [3½ lines not declassified]

+
+ +
+ 253. Telegram From the Embassy in Saudi Arabia to the Department + of StateSource: Carter Library, + National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 67, Saudi + Arabia: 6–12/78. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Printed from a copy that was received in the + White House Situation Room. + + + Jidda, August 22, 1978, 1450Z + +

6140. Subj: Letter From King Khalid to President Carter.

+

1. Foreign Minister Prince Saud handed to Ambassador letter from King Khalid to + President Carter on August + 21. Following is Embassy translation.

+

2. Begin text: It gives me + pleasure to send this letter to Your Excellency within the framework + of continuous cooperation between our two friendly countries and of + our common efforts aiming at supporting the forces of moderation in + the area in their opposition to active Communist movements therein, + a matter which receives considerable attention from our country in + particular and from the free world in general.

+

3. There is no doubt that you, Mr President, fully realize the extent + of Communist concentration in the south of the Arabian Peninsula as + well as of what Russia, Cuba, and East Germany are doing in Aden + where they obviously enjoy hegemony and influence. We feel certain + also that you are fully aware of what those countries are actively + doing, through the Aden regime, in pursuit of their objectives which + go beyond the borders of Southern Yemen. These greedy objectives + must be only too clear to Your Excellency as they use North Yemen as + only a passageway leading to their real target.

+

4. Mr President, you may agree with me that at a time when we are + both striving jointly to limit, indeed to put an end to, the + Communist presence in Aden, we must need pay attention to and be + careful about not losing other strategic areas like North Yemen to + the Communist expansion aims in the Arabian Peninsula. You may also + share with me the feeling of concern towards the highly active + Russian-Cuban role in the southern part of the Arabian Peninsula + which sees North Yemen as only a first step.

+

5. Proceeding from this background the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia has + done all in its power to attract North Yemen into the fold of the + forces of moderation. We have done this so effectively that we can + now say that the present regime in North Yemen is ready to dispense + with the Russian arms which North Yemen used to import from Russia + and consequently to do away with the services of the Russian experts + as well as to put an end to the Russian presence in the country as + soon as North Yemen is + provided with convincing alternatives by the moderate and friendly + countries headed by the United States of America.

+

6. In welcoming such modest alternatives the Government of North + Yemen will naturally look at the extent to which Russia is arming + the regime in Aden from both the quantitative and qualitative + aspects. North Yemen will quite naturally have to do this in view of + the fact that Aden is the center which is exporting aggression and + subversive principles into the rest of the Yemen. This consideration + is pressing the Government of North Yemen into emphasizing their + needs in arms, military equipment, and training to a degree which + will ward off the expected danger, made so acute by the status of + military preparedness of the potential enemy. The Kingdom of Saudi + Arabia in this context cannot by itself match the power of that + adversary nor respond fully to the needs of North Yemen in this + field.

+

7. The responsible officials in the Government of North Yemen feel + increasingly the need to have military alternatives, adequate in + quantity and quality, provided to them because of what they quite + rightly anticipate the Soviet Union will do the moment North Yemen + turns away and ceases to seek arms and military equipment from it. + The responsible North Yemeni officials anticipate that the Soviet + Union will immediately stop providing them with any spare parts or + any supportive equipment compatible with the Russian arms and + military hardware which the Soviet Union has been providing North + Yemen. Such a development would inevitably render those arms and + hardware items virtually non-existent. This is what precisely + happened to Egypt and Somalia.

+

8. Thus we find that the need of the Government of North Yemen and + its desire to acquire such quantities of American arms and equipment + as would (a) be commensurate with its fear of Southern Yemen + supported by international Communism, (b) compensate North Yemen for + the arms and equipment it would otherwise have received from Russian + sources, and (c) satisfy North Yemen’s armed forces and their young + Yemeni leaders. All these considerations have their military, + security, political, and psychological considerations. This is + especially so if we bear in mind that at a time when the Kingdom of + Saudi Arabia is doing its utmost to convince North Yemen to replace + its Russian arms and military equipment with American supplies, we + find that the Soviet Union is offering North Yemen new military aid + including aircraft, naval vessels and tanks in quantities which the + Kingdom alone is incapable of matching.

+

9. The Government of North Yemen has submitted a list containing its + urgent requests and requirements which we jointly might not be able to respond to in the + short term.See footnote 4, Document 251. Therefore Your + Excellency may find it agreeable that the United States of America + would join the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia in financing, on a 50–50 + basis, what is possible to provide North Yemen with military + equipment and training, within the framework of the U.S. foreign + military assistance program. This would constitute Your Excellency’s + and your government’s contribution towards driving away the danger + threatening North Yemen and the region. It would come also as an + element unifying our efforts toward stemming the Communist tide and + protecting the common interests of the free world. I need not at + this juncture underscore that the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia would be + prepared to participate in doing anything that might be calculated + to convince Congress and American public opinion (of the need for + all this) in any way, similar to our participation in the F–15 + case.

+

10. The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia believes that within this framework + and at the present state it would suffice that we offer North Yemen + the following:

+ +

(A) Twelve F–5E’s with the arms, + ammunition, and equipment necessary and pertaining thereto.

+

(B) Two transport aircraft (C–130’s).

+

(C) Sixty-four tanks (M–50’s).

+

(D) One hundred armored personnel carriers (M–113’s).

+

(E) The necessary technical support and training personnel for these + arms and types of equipment including an American military mission + consisting of the necessary experts and advisers.

+ +

11. I would be very pleased to receive from Your Excellency a reply + indicating that this suggestion of mine meets with your approval and + emphasizing your desire to work towards its implementation for the + realization of the common objectives which serve the interest of + both our countries, the stability of the region, the upholding of + the forces of moderation and the safeguarding of the interest of the + free world.

+

12. Please accept, Your Excellency, my warmest greetings and + sincerest wishes for your continued good health, well being and + success.

+

/s/ Khalid Bin abd al-Aziz al Saud,

+

Taif, 17 Ramadan 1396 A. H., corresponding to August 21, 1978. End + text.

+ + West + +
+ +
+ 254. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the + Yemen Arab RepublicSource: National + Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780356–0934. + Secret; Niact Immediate; + Exdis. Drafted by A. + Peter Burleigh (NEA/ARP) and + Lane; cleared by + Crawford, Benson, Quandt, Murray, and Thomas G. Martin + (S/S–O); approved by + Newsom. Sent for + information Immediate to Jidda; sent for information to Abu + Dhabi, Addis Ababa, Cairo, Kuwait, Mogadiscio, Muscat, Moscow, + Tehran, the Department of Defense, USMTM Riyadh, CHUSMTM Dhahran, and USCINCEUR Vaihingen. + + + Washington, August 31, 1978, + 2349Z + +

222174. Military addressees handle as Specat Exclusive. Subject: YAR Prime Minister Visit to Washington.

+

1. Yemen Arab Republic Prime Minister Abd al-Ghani met with Acting + Secretary Christopher August + 29 for tour d’horizon with special reference to YAR view of developments in South + Arabia and the evolving YAR–USG bilateral relationship. Also + attending the meeting were Under Secretaries Newsom and Benson, NEA Deputy Assistant Secretary Crawford, DOD Deputy Assistant Secretary for ISA + Murray, Ambassador-designate + Lane and YAR Ambassador Mutawakel. In an + earlier meeting, PM met with + National Security Advisor Brzezinski.According to + an August 28 memorandum to Brzezinski from Quandt, Brzezinski was scheduled to meet with al-Ghani + on August 29 at 2 p.m. (Carter Library, National Security + Affairs, Staff Material, Middle East, Subject File, Box 92, + YAR: 8/78) Others in + attendance were: NSC staffer + Quandt, Crawford, Lane and Mutawakel. Under + Secretary Newsom hosted + luncheon for PM attended by Under + Secretary Benson, Crawford, Murray, Lane and Mutawakel. The following + is a distillation of the main points emphasized by Prime Minister + during these meetings.

+

2. PM expressed his hope that + bilateral YAR–USG relations could evolve into one of + closest possible cooperation in wide variety of fields—military, + economic/developmental, and educational/cultural.

+

3. PM described in some detail the + “Russian conspiracy” on the east and west shores of the Red Sea. In + the Yemens, this conspiracy culminated in the assassination of the + YAR Prime Minister June 24 by + South Yemen:See Document 243. this murder was followed + immediately by the attack on the President of South Yemen, during + which Russian pilots bombed Presidential Palace in Aden.See Document 244. The New York Times reported that the + planes were MiGs of the South Yemeni Air Force. (“3 Marxists + Said to Share Power + in Southern Yemen,” The New York Times, + June 28, 1978, p. A7) These events were the most recent + reminder of what will happen in the region unless counter-steps are + taken by those who oppose Soviet efforts to dominate Arabian + Peninsula. The Russians want foothold in the Peninsula, which they + are rapidly consolidating + in South Yemen. In PM’s view, South + Yemen will move to expand once the pro-Soviet faction now in charge + of the government thoroughly eliminates all rivals in the country. + After that, North Yemen will be their target.

+

4. North Yemen enjoys good and growing relations with all its + neighbors on the Peninsula, especially Saudi Arabia, Oman, UAE and Kuwait. Relations with Saudi + Arabia are especially close and the Saudis have been supportive to + Yemen in a variety of ways, including both budget support and + military cooperation. In this regard, Prince Sultan has played + leading role. YAR wants USG to take more interest in the area, + in helping to promote regional cooperation against the present + danger of Russian-backed South Yemen. In addition, USG should establish more active, + direct bilateral relations with YAR + in several fields—including military. North Yemen wants to be able + to defend itself against any possible adventurism from the + South.

+

5. According to Abd al-Ghani, President Salih has confirmed his willingness to see bilateral + USG–YAR cooperation develop in a gradual way. American arms + are an essential element of that relationship. South Yemen is being + developed into a garrison from which to launch attacks on other + Peninsular states and the Russian presence there is a danger to the + whole area as well as the free world.

+

6. YAR would also like to strengthen + economic and developmental cooperation between our two countries. + YAR Government appreciates the + current level of assistance, but would like to see it increase, both + in terms of private and public sector U.S. involvement in Yemen. + YAR has liberal foreign + investment laws and YAR hopes that + U.S. firms will invest in oil and mineral industries. There is + active consideration being given by YAR to joint ventures with U.S., both Yemeni private + and public sector is ready to participate. Shell is currently + exploring for oil both off and on-shore and YAR would like to see some American firms involved as + well. Competition between such firms would benefit YAR.

+

7. As for cultural and educational cooperation, YAR would like to see it increased + too. YAR is appreciative of current + program but wants it expanded. YAR + has taken step to freeze cultural cooperation with USSR this year; USSR offers 150 scholarships for + higher study each year. YAR would + like to see increased USG activity + in this regard.

+

8. YAR is grateful and appreciative + of the role of the USG, under + President Carter, in its + active participation in seeking Middle East peace. Yemen hopes that + upcoming Camp David conference is success since stability of the + area which will result from peace will result in greater stability + for each country in the region. This is a goal shared by each + Peninsular country except South Yemen.

+

9. Acting Secretary Christopher, thanking PM for this tour d’horizon, stated that he agreed with + PM’s assessment “in every + respect.” He noted that + Secretary Vance would very + much have wanted to meet with PM, + but that Secretary was on his first vacation since assuming + office.

+

10. Christopher informed + PM that USG hoped to increase its funding of participant + exchange grants from 100 in this FY + to 176 in next FY. He emphasized how + important USG considers educational + exchange, agreeing with the PM that + advanced training for Yemenis is essential for the development of + the country. Christopher + noted that the PM is splendid + example of graduate of American university who has served his + nation. USG would like to be even + more forthcoming in this regard and Acting Secretary asked PM to “let us know” if there is more + USG should and can be + doing.

+

11. Regarding military cooperation, Christopher assured PM that USG wants to + move into new era with YAR. USG wants to assist in the + construction of a sound defense system for the YAR. We understand urgency of YAR’s problem and in that respect are + ready to airlift equipment to the YAR in an early and timely fashion, as we have informed + President Salih.See Document + 251. + Christopher emphasized that + this new relationship has to be a phased modernization program for + the YAR military. It has to take + place a step at a time and cannot happen overnight. USG is sure that Yemen shares our view + that equipment must be effectively used.

+

12. Since our military relationship with YAR is essentially three-cornered (Saudi Arabia, YAR and USG), it will require patience and understanding on the + parts of each government involved. Patience will bring progress. + Underlying this step by step process is USG interest in looking at priority items needed by + YAR to promote its + self-defense.

+

13. On economic front, USG wants to + be helpful as well. Yemen is one of few countries where we hope to + increase aid next fiscal year. We want to be supportive of Yemen’s + five-year plan goals. We think we should concentrate on agriculture + and institution-building which will have greatest long-term effect + on overall development of Yemen. As for the private sector, Yemen + should make known what opportunities exist. USG would like to see greater U.S. private sector + involvement in Yemen. At this point, PM specified that in both oil and minerals industries + there may be such opportunities for the private sector. While Shell + has not yet found oil, there have been encouraging reports. Yemen + would like to see American oil firms involved. There may also be + opportunities in copper and iron ore mining.

+

14. In this regard, PM noted once + again how supportive Saudi Arabia has been with budgetary grants. In + addition Saudi Arabia finances projects directly with bilateral investments as well as + through multilateral institutions such as Arab funds and World + Bank.

+

15. Secretary asked PM to describe + some of the prospects and problems of the five-year plan. PM replied that results of first two + years are encouraging although there are several bottlenecks in + Yemen. In first two years, four billion dollars has been invested in + infrastructure projects—mainly roads, agricultural projects, + education and health. YARG would + like now to move in promoting small scale industries in more + effective manner. PM underscored + YAR commitment to active + private sector role. He noted that the major bottleneck is human + resources, a lack of skilled and educated professional people. Thus + the intense YAR interest in + training large numbers of Yemeni youth. Over one million Yemenis now + work in Saudi Arabia and while this does “wonders” for the Yemeni + economy in terms of remittances (ninety-nine percent of Yemen’s + foreign exchange earnings, he said), it also creates problems such + as labor shortages and inflation (since local wage rates must keep + up with those prevailing in Saudi Arabia). As a result, costs of + projects have overrun tremendously. Imported inflation and + twelve-fold increase in wages in three years have led to necessity + to renegotiate most contracts.

+

16. Christopher thanked + PM for his detailed and + interesting summary of Yemen’s situation, noting that USG looked forward to increasingly + close relations. In an atmosphere of mutual understanding and + patience, “we’ll do our part,” Christopher stated.

+

17. During meeting with National Security Advisor, PM was told that U.S. attaches great + importance to the YAR and is + concerned with recent developments in that part of world. PM replied that YARG was thankful for President’s + statement of support for the YAR’s + efforts to develop its economy and defend its territory.See footnote 2, Document + 251. He thought there was an all-out effort to + disrupt stability in Southwestern Arabia.

+

18. Dr. Brzezinski asked + PM about situation in South + Yemen. PM replied that now that + moderate President has been killed, the field there is open to the + far leftists. He expected that by October of this year the three + parties now in existence in PDRY + would be merged into single Marxist party. PM noted that PDRY + military forces are still divided internally but that within one + year he would expect the Marxists to have consolidated their + position. During June fighting, the South Yemeni militia, with + support of Russians and Cubans already present in PDRY, had defeated the PDRY Army.See footnote 2, Document + 244. Border between North and South Yemen is now closed: there is + no fighting along the border but the South has massed troops in some + areas.

+

19. PM noted intense Saudi concern + about developments in South Yemen and said Saudis and YAR are consulting closely and + cooperating in order to defend themselves. Saudis, however, cannot + provide all the military assistance YAR needs and this is why Yemen is looking toward the + U.S. The Russians are helping the extremists in the South + consolidate their position: meanwhile YAR is hoping to work with more moderate elements in + South to lessen the danger of attack on YAR and to increase independence of South Yemenis. Most + Arab countries have a “presence” in South Yemen but relations with + them are are now “frozen” following a decision of Arab League in + early July.See footnote 6, Document 247. The one exception is + Libya which has declared its strong support for PDRY. All other Arab states worry + that South Yemen is becoming more Communist than Arab.

+

20. Brzezinski said that U.S. + has had and will continue to have question of Aden under discussion + with Russians. He asked if YAR had + discussed problems with either Shah of Iran or President Sadat. + PM indicated there had been some + discussions but no joint policies have been worked out. Brzezinski recommended that both + Yemenis and Saudis hold discussions with Iranians and Egyptians. He + reiterated USG’s great interest in stability and peace + in the Peninsula area, saying that the first response to any threat + from South Yemenis should be an Arab response but that if there were + a threat from a major power the USG + would make its concern unmistakably known.

+

21. In closing the conversation, Brzezinski noted that U.S. is considering Saudi + proposals regarding military assistance to YAR and hopes to be forthcoming. USG has deep interest in YAR security, he reiterated.

+

22. During luncheon, Newsom + noted that USG is waiting for + YAR President Salih to indicate whether our + initial arms impact package would be acceptable to him. USG is ready to expedite delivery, by + airlift, of that equipment, most of which is part of trilateral + (Saudi, USG, YAR) agreements made over past three + years. PM responded that, while he + was not privy to detailed military thinking of President, he had + impression that President Salih was waiting for USG response to his list of requests which he had + submitted in reaction to what he considered inadequate USG initial offer.See Document + 251. + Salih is working under + pressure which is both external (South Yemen) and internal (YAR military). He must assure that + YAR has wherewithal to defend + itself against possible aggression from South. He must also be able + to convince YAR military that they can definitely + depend on U.S. sources of supply if they take steps which will + result in cut-off of Soviet supplies and spare parts. In sum, PM thought that President Salih felt that USG offer did not take adequately into + consideration the “new situation” which Yemen faces after events of + June and that package offer was nothing really new. On the other + hand, he had the impression that USG considered Salih’s list excessive: that list contained what + Yemeni military thought they needed to match ongoing buildup in + South Yemen. He made further point that YAR military wants equipment to be in hand and would + not be satisfied with political assurances and support which + civilian officials valued more highly than military. Murray noted that it was not + completely accurate to say that our package offer contained nothing + new, there are new items included. Newsom, Benson and Crawford stated that in USG view this package offer was “first phase” and that + discussion would be ongoing about further equipment deliveries. + USG was ready to get moving + with program if YAR was.

+ + Vance + +
+ +
+ 255. Telegram From the Embassy in Saudi Arabia to the Department + of StateSource: National Archives, RG + 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P850070–2442. Secret; + Immediate; Exdis Distribute + as Nodis. Sent for + information Immediate to the White House. + + + Jidda, September 9, 1978, 1230Z + +

6452. Subject: South Arabia. Ref: State 224270.In telegram 224270 to Jidda, September 4, the + Department instructed West to deliver a message from Carter to Khalid. Carter’s message focused on + the upcoming Camp David Summit meetings and ongoing developments + in Saudi Arabia and expressed Carter’s desire to work with Khalid and + Salih to assist the + Yemen Arab Republic in developing a defensive posture. (National + Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + P840137–1821)

+

1. Summary: In an hour and a half meeting 5 September with King, + Crown Prince, Second Deputy Prime Minister Abdullah, and Foreign + Minister Saud, to deliver President’s message, discussion of Soviet + threat in Yemen overshadowed Camp David topic, indicating deep Saudi + concern and high priority given to this issue. Crown Prince + Fahd asked what USG would do in the event SAG had to intervene in dispute between YAR and PDRY fomented by latter with its Soviet and Cuban + allies. End summary.

+

2. At meeting 5 September at King’s residence at Taif to deliver + President’s message on Camp David (see septel).See footnote 2 above. In telegram 6446 from + Jidda, September 9, the Embassy summarized West’s discussions + with Saudi officials regarding the portion of Carter’s letter dealing with + Camp David. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy + File, P850070–2456) Reference in the message to King’s + letter to President re assistance to YARSee Document 253. soon became main subject of + conversation, in fact consuming about two-thirds of the one and a + half hour meeting.

+

3. I called attention to that part of the President’s letter which + referred to a forthcoming answer to the King’s letter on YAR pointing out that this matter was + receiving serious consideration in Washington. I noted that General + Cathey, our USMTM Chief, had been back in + consultation with DOD officials so + they may have the benefit of his firsthand knowledge of negotiations + and progress, or lack of progress, in furnishing additional + assistance to YAR. I also told the + group that I knew the President was giving this matter his personal + attention on a priority basis despite the pressures of the Camp + David summit, largely because of the importance assigned to it by + SAG. I mentioned that in my + reports emphasizing the importance that SAG assigned to the matter that I had quoted SAG officials, including Foreign + Minister Saud and Defense + Minister Sultan, as saying that the YAR situation had equal, if not greater, urgency than + the Arab-Israeli controversy. Both the King and the Crown Prince + nodded immediate agreement with this statement.

+

4. The King began by referring “to the circle of fire closing in on + us” thanks to the schemes of the Communists. “It is amazing that + they have accomplished so much in such a short time. What has + happened in Ethiopia, Afghanistan and what is now happening in Iran, + should have sounded a shrill alarm into the consciousness of our + great American friends just as it has to us. The situation in + Southern Arabia, if not remedied, would be disastrous to all, to you + as well as us for we have a common interest in facing this common + threat.” He said that if the Shah were overthrown and a left wing + radical group came to power in Iran, then Saudi Arabia would find + itself completely surrounded and at the mercy of the Communist + radical forces.

+

5. At this point Crown Prince Fahd asked if he might elaborate. He said the + following:

+

A. The Soviets, Cubans, East Europeans are still very active in + PDRY.

+ +

B. It is a question of time, indeed short time, before those + Communist “helpers” will have the South Yemenis as well as their + “volunteers” adequately armed, equipped and trained to launch + serious military action.

+

C. This action could be either against YAR or directly against us at our common borders with + PDRY.

+

D. We might be able to withstand a concerted onslaught against us, if + only for a short time.

+

E. We promise you that we ourselves are not interested in starting + any fight and we have no selfish territorial ambitions, but if + PDRY and the Communists start + their aggression, which we all know is aimed at this country and the + source of oil, we will have to fight back.

+

F. “It is very, very important for us to know, directly and clearly,” + said Crown Prince Fahd + reverting to a measured tone, “what will you do in this case to save + the situation? Will you rush to our rescue, as you have done towards + certain friends or will you dally until dust settles on corpses and + charred remains? In short, what will the attitude of the U.S. be if + Saudi Arabia moves—as we shall—to counter this aggression in + whatever form it comes?”

+

G. Crown Prince closed his remarks by saying: “We are being very + frank and pointed because we wish you to be forewarned and not be + surprised by events,” said Fahd, adding, “we are not being alarmists + necessarily but we must bare our minds and our hearts to our genuine + friends who, together with us, have a lot of vital interests at + stake.”

+

6. I replied that this was the identical question the Crown Prince + had posed to me on February 14 and that I had taken this question + back to the President and had discussed it in a meeting with the + President, Secretary Vance, + and National Security Director Dr. Brzezinski.See Document 170. No record of West’s + meeting with Carter has + been found.

+

I reminded him that I had brought a reply from the President when I + returned in April.A draft of the letter + is attached to Document 170 but is not + printed. While I could not recall the exact words of the + letter, I recalled two impressions that I had: first that the + President and his chief advisors were most sympathetic with the + problem which the Crown Prince posed and that USG looked upon Saudi Arabia as a + close friend and valuable ally; that I felt sure that the President + and the administration would be most sympathetic to any request or + need by SAG necessary or vital to + her integrity or continued independence. Secondly, that the letter + itself was, I felt, an extremely strong evidence of the depth and + extent of the USG’s commitment to SAG; that under our system of + government the President could not declare war or commit the forces of USG without prior approval of Congress + in the absence of a mutual defense pact, which we did not have with + Saudi Arabia. However, I felt that the commitment as set forth in + the letter was as strong a commitment as the President and the + administration could make without some formal action by the + Congress. (FYI, letter from + President to King is dated 14 April 1978)

+

7. The Crown Prince then said that it was desirable to familiarize + the Congress to the extent of the threat presently posed by Russian + activities in the area.

+

8. I replied that I agreed completely and had found that the + Congress, once given the facts as they had in the F–15 sale, reacted + in a favorable manner. I added that we had had a visit by two + Congressmen to YAR in the last two + weeks and they stated after the visit their great awareness of and + concern for the threat posed in the Yemens to SAG and USG.On August 21, + Representatives Robert L.F. Sikes (D-Florida) and John James + Flynt (D-Georgia) visited North Yemen and held meetings with + YAR officials. In telegram + 4151 from Sana, August 22, the Embassy described these meetings. + (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + D780343–0149) I added that I hoped that we would have + additional Congressmen to visit both Saudi Arabia and YAR in the coming months and I was + sure that this could be arranged.

+

9. I also added that we were doing a continuous intelligence + gathering and appraisal operation on YAR and had been sharing our findings on a continuing + basis with SAG, including the Crown + Prince.

+

10. The Crown Prince stated that many of the fears that he expressed + in our February meeting as only possibilities were fast becoming + realities and for that reason he had brought the subject up + again.

+

11. I told him that I would report to my government the fact that the + fears and concerns which gave rise to our February conversation were + now upon us in the form of activities in YAR and I was sure the President’s response would be + framed with SAG’s deep concerns + thoroughly understood and appreciated.

+

12. I ended the meeting by saying as a personal observation I felt + that the policy of the U.S. has always been and will continue to be + to stand by our friends and allies in time of need, and we had today + no truer friend and ally in the world than Saudi Arabia.

+

The King and the Crown Prince responded by saying, “al + hamdu-lillah.”

+ + West + +
+ +
+ 256. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National + Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to President CarterSource: Carter + Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Middle East, + Subject File, Box 92, YAR: + 9–12/78. Secret. Sent for action. Carter initialed the first page of the + memorandum, indicating that he saw it. + + + Washington, September 19, 1978 + + + SUBJECT + Military Assistance to Yemen + +

Our strategy for supporting the outcome of the Camp David Summit + requires that we respond to King Khalid’s letter of August 21 + expressing deep concern about the security of North Yemen and + proposing an expanded U.S. military sales program.See Document 253. In + telegram 4628 from Sana, September 19, the Embassy noted that + al-Ghani had informed Ransom that Khalid had requested that the United + States initiate the arms deliveries proposed in the impact + package (see Document 257). (National + Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + D780381–0681)

+

He proposes:

+ + —12 F–5Es (you had previously + approved these in principle as a follow-on item to the impact + package) + —Two C–130 transport aircraft + —100 M–113 armored personnel carriers + —64 M–60 tanks + —Associated training and support by U.S. personnel + +

As indicated in Cy’s memoReference is to + Vance’s September 19 + memorandum to Carter, + wherein Vance outlined + the issues, background, financing, implications, and + recommendations related to the Yemeni request. (National + Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + P840167–0926) these proposals are basically sound and Cy + and Harold recommend approving them subject to some reservations on + the armor mix and financing arrangements. King Khalid suggested that + we fund this roughly $300 million package on a 50–50 basis with + Saudi Arabia, as opposed to the previous arrangement where we + provided expertise, equipment and training and the Saudis paid. + There is no realistic possibility we could share the financing of + the package with the Saudis, but all agree that we should try to be + as forthcoming as possible on other aspects of this proposal.

+

This conclusion has been given added urgency by Secretary Vance’s departure this evening for + the Middle East and talks with Saudi leaders.Vance + traveled to Jordan September 20–21, Saudi Arabia September + 21–24, and Syria September 24. For the memorandum of + conversation of Vance’s + September 21 meeting with Fahd on the Arab-Israeli peace process, see Foreign + Relations, 1977–1980, vol. IX, Arab-Israeli + Dispute, August 1978–December 1980, Document + 65. I agree with Cy that we should respond to the + Saudis as follows (Defense concurs).

+ +

—Approval in principle to provide the equipment the King + suggested

+

—Offer to discuss with the Saudis alternatives to the tanks and + APCs (2–3 year lead time) in + the form of V–150 armored cars with TOW, which could be delivered in the near future

+

—Agree to provide appropriate U.S. training in Yemen for American + equipment

+

As for financing State proposes a commitment to seek up to $50 + million in FMS credits for Yemen + over time.Carter wrote “no” in the + right-hand margin next to this sentence. I concur with + OMB that this proposal has not + been adequately staffed. Yemen is one of the poorest nations in the + world, and a loan on normal FMS + terms would hardly be better than a demand that Yemen carry the + costs themselves. If the Saudis guarantee the loans and agree to + repay them, we are offering only a “gimmick” that will persuade no + one that we are being responsive.

+

Moreover, if the credits are to come out of FY 79, we will either have to reprogram or ask for a + supplemental. Neither is very attractive. On balance, we do not + believe that even a partial response of this nature is likely to + have much effect on the Saudis and it could unfortunately come to + haunt us later. I believe we would be on firmer ground to stress our + willingness to provide training assistance wherever possible but to + be honest about our inability to provide grant financing.

+

RECOMMENDATION

+

That you approve responding to King Khalid along the above lines.

+

ApproveCarter checked this option, initialed, and + added: “If Saudis are helpful on C David agreement. J.” A + response to King Khalid along the recommended lines was sent in + telegram Tosec 100034/239585 to Vance in Amman, September 20. (National + Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780384–0680) + Vance discussed the + situation in South Arabia with Sultan on September 22. He + summarzied his meeting in telegram Secto 10038 from Riyadh, September 22. (National + Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + D780387–1166)

+

Approve but also offer $50 million FMS

+

As amended

+
+ +
+ 257. Memorandum From the Deputy Secretary of Defense (Duncan) to the President’s + Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)Source: Carter Library, National Security + Affairs, Staff Material, Middle East, Subject File, Box 92, + YAR: 9–12/78. Secret. + Attached but not printed is a December 14 memorandum from + Sick to Brzezinski, in which Sick recommended that Brzezinski read only the final + two paragraphs of Duncan’s memorandum. Sick added: “This subject will be reviewed in + its entirety following West’s talks with Sultan and in the + course of the mini-SCC review + of a package of items as mandated in the SCC last night.” Brzezinski added the following + comment: “GS, how can we + expedite? ZB.” + + + Washington, December 13, 1978 + + + SUBJECT + Status of Program for the Yemen Arab Republic + +

The current program emphasis on Yemen is separated in two phases. + Phase I provided for the expedited air delivery of army items + previously purchased by Saudi Arabia for Yemen, i.e., 81 81mm + mortars, 50 50 caliber M2 machine guns with mounts, 2025 Light + Anti-Tank Weapons (LAW’s), 3 fire direction sets and 36 Vulcan 20mm + Air Defense guns. This equipment, with the exception of the Vulcans, + is being airlifted in two aircraft to arrive in Yemen on December 14 + and 15. The Vulcans are scheduled for January–February airlift + delivery after joint US/SAG/YARG consideration of recommendations of a + predeployment survey team which visited Yemen in November 1978. + Phase II is the result of a request from King Khalid to President + Carter in September 1978 + to provide 100 Armored Personnel Carriers, 64 M60 Series Tanks, 12 + F–5E aircraft and 2 C–130H + aircraft.See Documents 255 and 256. The delivery schedules for Phase II are the + matter of immediate concern.

+

It was agreed from the beginning that Congressional notification of + the Phase II Package (required by Section 36(b), AECA)Reference is to the International Security + Assistance and Arms Export Control Act of 1976 (P.L. 94–329; 90 + Stat. 729), which Ford + signed into law on July 1, 1976. would not be initiated + until Congress convenes in January. The following paragraphs + indicate the initial equipment delivery times which were provided to + the Saudis in September 1978, the schedule improvements we since + have communicated (both by Secretary Brown to Prince Sultan during the October 27 White + House meeting and simultaneously by me to Prince Naif during my + visit to Saudi Arabia),Regarding the + October 27 meeting at the White House, see footnote 7, Document 176. For + Duncan’s report to + Carter on his Middle + East trip, see Document 10. and + additional actions taken or issues raised since October 27. The + delivery schedules have not + been provided to Yemen by the USG; + we are not certain whether the Saudis have provided any schedules. + All delivery dates should be calculated from April 1979, the time + when we expect Congressional review to be completed and Letters of + Offer to be signed.

+

M113A1 Armored Personnel Carriers

+

a. Initial Delivery + Offer

+

The original delivery proposal was to provide 100 M113A1’s starting + 35 months after signature of the Letter of Offer.

+

b. Revised Delivery + Offer

+

The revised proposal is to ship 6 to Yemen one month after Yemen + signs the Letter of Offer, together with U.S. Army training + personnel necessary to initiate training in the spring of 1979. + Another 44 will be sent as soon as CADRE training is completed. The + Saudis were requested to transfer the other 50 APC’s + from their own inventory. We will initiate an FMS case to replace the 50 APC’s in the Saudi inventory.

+

c. Outstanding + Issues

+

There is some question as to whether the Saudis currently are willing + to provide the remaining 50 APCs, + or some lesser number. Also, we since have defined a need for APC-type vehicles such as mortar + carriers and light retrievers which should be included, with a + corresponding reduction in the number of M113A1’s needed. On + December 10 we requested the U.S. Office of Military Cooperation in + Sana to coordinate with their Saudi counterparts and ascertain that + the Saudis will provide the full 50 vehicles, including all of the + APC-type vehicles such as the + mortar carriers.

+

M60 Tanks

+

a. Initial Delivery + Offer

+

Deliver 64 tanks starting 18 months after LOA signature.

+

b. Revised Delivery + Offer

+

Reduce delivery period of the first tanks to 12 months by shipping 6 + tanks and personnel to initiate CADRE training early in 1980. This + will allow training to be completed consistent with the delivery of + the remaining 58 tanks.

+

c. Additional Actions + Which Could be Taken

+

AMEMB Sana has suggested by message of December 11 that we contact + the Saudis to ascertain their willingness to divert some tanks which soon will be + delivered to Saudi Arabia from the M60 production line.Reference is to telegram 6196 from Sana, + December 11. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy + File, D780538–0258) State is following up this suggestion + with AMEMB Jidda.

+

F–5E + Aircraft

+

a. Initial Delivery + Offer

+

We have offered to deliver 12 F–5E’s + 26 months after LOA signature.

+

b. Revised Delivery + Offer

+

The delivery period has been reduced slightly to 24 months.

+

c. Actions Which Could + Be Taken

+

DOD currently is forwarding to State + a letter which raises the possibility of diverting 4 F–5E’s from April–July 1979 production + now scheduled for Thailand, and an additional 4 F–5E’s from October–September 1979 + production now scheduled for Jordan. Another alternative is to + approach Saudi Arabia or Iran, or both, to ascertain their + willingness to provide some aircraft and support equipment as a + third country transfer. It should be noted that if the diversion + from production is approved, Saudi Arabia would have to provide + spare parts and support equipment from its own inventory even if the + USG provided the 8 aircraft. + The Saudis have already undertaken to transfer 4 F–5B aircraft (2 seater) to Yemen for + flight training, and we have approved the third-country transfer. + However, no date has been set for transferring these aircraft to + Yemen.

+

C–130 Aircraft

+

a. Initial Delivery + Offer

+

We have offered to deliver 2 C–130 aircraft 12–14 months after LOA signature.

+

b. Revised Delivery + Offer

+

We have advised the Saudis that the most immediate way to improve the + air transport situation in Yemen is to provide the 2 C–130 aircraft + from Saudi inventory, and to replace these aircraft from U.S. + production.

+

c. Outstanding + Issues

+

On November 13 we requested the country team to advise the Saudis + that, if they were willing to execute a direct commercial contract + with Lockheed and the + contract was signed in December, the two replacement aircraft could + be delivered in May and September 1979. We encouraged this + commercial alternative. No Saudi response to this suggestion has + been received.

+

State has sent instructions to Ambassador West to review the Phase II + delivery schedules with Prince Sultan today and to report the + results to Washington.The Department + transmitted instructions to West in telegram 313548 to Jidda and + Riyadh, December 13. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign + Policy File, D780513–0275) As soon as word of Saudi + agreement is received, State will instruct Ambassador Lane in Sana to notify President + Salih of our delivery + plans.

+

I recommend that we arrange for LTG + Graves, the Director of the Defense Security Assistance Agency, to + brief Senator Byrd on the + current status of the Yemen program. The program has received much + more momentum than Prince Sultan apparently indicated. Also, Senator + Byrd may be interested to + find out that part of the perceived delay is due to our agreement + with Congressional leadership to avoid submission of controversial + Section 36(b) notifications while the Congress is out of + session.

+ + CW Duncan + Jr + +
+ +
+ + 258. Memorandum From the Deputy Secretary of Defense (Duncan) to the President’s + Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)Source: Carter Library, National Security + Affairs, Staff Material, Middle East, Subject File, Middle East, + Box 92, YAR: 9–12/78. Secret. + Copies were sent to Christopher and Benson. + + + + Washington, December 20, 1978 + + + SUBJECT + Deliveries to Yemen (U) + +

(S) As requested, I have directed the Army to provide 64 M60A1 tanks + to Yemen on the schedule set forth in my memorandum to you of + December 15, 1978.Presumably a + reference to Document 257. The + delivery schedule for armored personnel carriers and C–130 aircraft + also will be as indicated in that memorandum.

+

(S) We have reviewed the F–5 delivery + schedule again, as requested at today’s Mini-SCC meeting.A mistaken reference to the Mini-SCC meeting held December 19. With + regard to North Yemen, the Summary of Conclusions of this + meeting states: “The program developed by Defense for speeding + up deliveries to North Yemen was reviewed, including expedited + delivery of 64 tanks. DoD agreed to look again at the diversion + of F–5s from Thailand, with the objective of + delaying Thai deliveries as little as possible.” (Summary of + Conclusions of Mini-Special Coordination Committee Meeting, + December 19; Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff + Material, Middle East, Stoddard File, Box 122, Special + Coordination Committee (SCC) + Meetings: 11–12/78) I confirm that the only F–5 aircraft available from production + in the right configuration are the aircraft now scheduled for + Thailand and Jordan. Thailand has 4 F–5Es scheduled for delivery in April–July 1979. These + are advance attrition replacements for the 18 F–5 aircraft Thailand already has. + Jordan has F–5 deliveries beginning + in August, 1979 and continuing, on present schedule, through + January, 1981. These Jordan aircraft are part of a 30-aircraft + purchase under the MAP Program, and + will supplement the 42 F–5s already in the + Jordanian Air Force.

+

(S) There are two options for expediting delivery of 8 F–5E aircraft to Yemen:

+

1. Divert to Yemen the 4 aircraft now scheduled for Thailand in + April–July, 1979, and 4 aircraft now scheduled for Jordan in + August–September, 1979. Pay back the Thailand and Jordan programs in + 24 months.

+

2. Divert to Yemen the 4 Thailand and the 4 Jordanian aircraft, as in + option 1. Pay back Thailand in October, 1979–January 1980. This will delay deliveries to + Thailand for only 6 rather than 24 months, but will require Jordan + to wait 24 months for all 8 aircraft, rather than for only the 4 + aircraft in option 1.

+

(U) Please let me know if you wish the DoD to act on either of these + alternatives.In the lower margin an + unknown hand wrote: “DA + [David Aaron] + approved #2, answer relayed by phone 12/20—WFAR.”

+ + CW Duncan + Jr + +
+ +
+ 259. Telegram From the Embassy in the Yemen Arab Republic to the + Department of StateSource: National + Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790068–0134. + Confidential; Priority. Sent for information Priority to + Jidda. + + + Sana, February 13, 1979, 0641Z + +

963. Subj: (U) USG–YAR Relations.

+

1. (C-entire text).

+

2. Summary: The YARG wants a more + direct relationship with the USG. + The Yemenis are particularly interested in closer military + cooperation, U.S. investment, and the participation of U.S. firms in + exploration for minerals and oil in Yemen. They believe they are now + on the front line of the struggle for control of the Arabian + Peninsula and are entitled to be treated as full partners, not as + dependents of Saudi Arabia. End summary.

+

3. In two recent conversations, YAR + ForMin + Asnaj and Special + Presidential Rep Jughman have + made strong pitch for closer direct USG–YARG relations. + Asnaj said YARG appreciates trilateral arms + program with Saudis but a more direct relationship is needed. Many + Yemenis, including President Salih, believe the USG is behaving like a “puppet” of the Saudis in the + YAR. He knows how possessive + the Saudis feel about the YAR and + is well aware of their conviction that “they know best.” However, + USG has its own interests in + Yemen and in the light of + developments in Iran,Reference is to + the Iranian Revolution that ousted the pro-Western Shah + Mohammad Reza + Pahlavi. the USG should reassess its policy. The Yemen has become + too important for the USG to allow + its policy here to be dictated by Saudi Arabia.

+

4. Asnaj and Jughman proposed stronger bilateral + relationships in three areas—military cooperation, U.S. investment, + and petroleum and minerals exploration. Re military cooperation, + Asnaj said it is obvious + from SecDef + Brown’s remarks in + RiyadhReference is to remarks made + by Brown at the Saudi + Military Officers Club on February 10. Brown reiterated the United + States’ commitment to Saudi Arabia’s territorial integrity + during his speech. (Telegram 1319 from Jidda, February 13; + National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + D790068–0385) that Saudi Arabia itself needs a USG commitment to its defense in + present circumstances—how then can YARG rely on a Saudi commitment for its protection? + What YARG needs, he said, is a + direct USG commitment that USG will support YAR if it is attacked. Ambassador + referred to several statements made by President Carter in last six months, but + Asnaj said more is + needed. Jughman mentioned, as + he has before, that the YARG needs + a quick reaction force which is appropriately trained and armed to + counter the kind of infiltration and subversion which the PDRY is sponsoring. He hoped the + USG would work with the YAR in developing such a force.

+

5. Concerning investment, Jughman and Asnaj said YAR + wants more U.S. investment in the YAR. In this connection, the Exim Bank has an important + role to play; for example, in supporting the YAR’s purchase of Boeing aircraft for + Yemen Airways and the Fuller Company’s bid to construct the 100 + million dollar cement plant near Umran.

+

6. On petroleum/minerals exploration, Jughman and Asnaj said that American companies should be + encouraged to undertake major exploration efforts in the YAR. There are indications of presence + of exploitable minerals, but no major exploration effort has been + undertaken. As an example of the disappointments the YAR has suffered, Jughman recounted in detail the + story of the last minute withdrawal of the Japanese firm Toyomenka + and Santa Fe Drilling from an off-shore exploration project in 1975. + Jughman mentioned that he + had been told by Syrian FonMin + Khaddam during his recent + visit to Damascus that oil had been discovered in the PDRY. If this were true, he said, and + no major minerals exploration efforts were being made in the YAR, the government would be asked why + its friends (i.e., the U.S.) were not undertaking similar activities + in the YAR.

+

7. Asnaj and Jughman said that they were working + constantly with President Salih to convince him that continuation of the + policy of cooperation with Saudi Arabia and the U.S. is in the best + interest of the YAR. Because of their advocacy, + Salih refers to + Asnaj as “Mr. Saudi + Arabia” and Jughman as “Mr. + Camp David.” Salih was in + agreement with this policy but was naturally disturbed by the + Saudis’ direct relations with a whole gamut of Yemeni political + figures, and he was also hearing rumors that the USG was grooming YAR Ambassador to the U.S. Yahya + Maiwakel as his replacement. Asnaj urged USG to + strengthen its direct bilateral relationship with the YAR to reassure Salih that the USG is interested in the Yemen for its + own sake, not just as a buffer state next to Saudi Arabia. Asnaj concluded that an independent + YAR is vital to the United + States because if the two Yemens should unify under leftist-Marxist + domination they could cause a great deal of trouble, both to us and + to the Saudis.

+

8. Comment: The remarks reported above occurred in the same + conversation in which these two men commented on Saudi–YAR relations (reported Sana + 0937).In telegram 937 from Sana, + February 12, the Embassy reported that during a February 7 + conversation al-Asnaj + expressed his frustration concerning Saudi-YAR relations and told Lane that he believed the + Saudis did not trust the YAR + Government and that Saudi Arabia was losing confidence in + Salih. Lane claimed that al-Asnaj’s frustration was due + in large part to the fact that he was the one responsible to + Salih for + Saudi-YAR relations. + (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + D790066–0630) The Asnaj/Jughman + position is self-serving in the sense that they are both identified + with the YARG’s present policy of + close cooperation with Saudi Arabia and the USG; to the extent it succeeds, they will. At the same + time, they are reflecting a strong body of opinion in the YAR that the Yemen is now on the front + lines of the struggle to preserve the oil-rich Arabian Peninsula + from Communist domination, and the USG, which has a vital interest in this struggle, needs + to do more to support them. A “trilateral” relationship is not + enough—they believe they need and deserve to be treated by the + USG as an equal partner, not as + a ward of Saudi Arabia.

+ + Lane + +
+ +
+ 260. Summary of Conclusions of a Mini-Special Coordination + Committee MeetingSource: Carter + Library, National Security Council, Institutional Files, Box + 119, SCM 048, 02/24/78, Mini SCC, Yemen. Top Secret. The meeting took place in + the White House Situation Room. The minutes are not attached and + were not found. Carter + initialed the first page and wrote “OK.” Brzezinski attached a + handwritten note, February 25, to the Summary of Conclusions + that reads: “Mr. President—For your approval. ZB.” Aaron sent a copy of the Summary of Conclusions + to Vance, Brown, Jones, and Turner under a February 26 + memorandum, noting that Carter had approved it. (Ibid.) + + + Washington, February + 24, 1979, 11:40 a.m.–12:50 p.m. + + + SUBJECT + Yemen + + + PARTICIPANTS + + + State + David + Newsom + William + Crawford + + + + + Defense + Robert + Murray + + + + + JCS + LTG William Y. + Smith + + + + + DCI + Stansfield + Turner + [2 names not + declassified] + + + White House + David + Aaron + + + + + NSC + Gary + Sick + Robert + Gates + + + +

The group reviewed the current situation in YemenIn a February 23 memorandum to Carter, Christopher described the + events taking place in Yemen: “We have received reports from + intelligence sources and from the North Yemen Government that + regular army forces of South Yemen have launched a three-pronged + attack along the border and in some places are 20 kilometers + inside North Yemen territory. If these reports are true this + could signify a significant escalation in South Yemen border + harassment against the North. President Salih has sent an envoy to the + Saudis seeking assistance in repelling the attack. While the + North Yemen Government would appreciate our diplomatic support, + it has not sought U.S. military involvement or public action + since in their view this could stimulate even greater Soviet + support for the South.” (Carter Library, Plains File, Subject + File, Box 39, State Department Evening Reports, 2/79) and + next steps in view of requests for assistance from North Yemen and + Saudi Arabia. The following conclusions were reached:

+

1. [7½ lines not declassified]

+

2. In a conversation with David + Newsom during the course of the meeting, the Vice + President suggested that this might be a place to use some muscle. + He wondered about the possibility of some fleet movements by US units and whether a strong riposte + might not destabilize the regime in the PDRY. (TS)

+ +

3. It was agreed that the replacement of Seventh Fleet ships in the + Arabian Sea by Sixth Fleet units via the Suez Canal would be + expedited. We will contact the Saudis about possible port visits of + these units as they enter the area. Secretary Vance would be consulted about any + implications of such movements for the Camp David talks.Carter + wrote “OK” next to this paragraph. (S)

+

4. [7½ lines not declassified]

+

5. Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Murray will return to Saudi Arabia next week to + continue the consultations on security issues which were begun + during Harold Brown’s trip to + the area.See Documents 185 and 186. This issue will serve as the basis for + concrete discussions of next steps. This meeting will also provide + an opportunity to review with the Saudis the results of the visit of + PDRY Foreign Minister to + Riyadh which is scheduled for this weekend and may provide some + insights. (S)

+

6. The State Department will contact the British and French Embassies + and request their views over the weekend, since they both have + better access to PDRY than we do. + (C)

+

7. DOD and JCS will examine the problems associated with support + of the Saudi aircraft in Yemen, particularly what steps might be + required to operate the F–5s out of Sanaa and what + US contribution might be needed. + (C)

+

8. Defense will also contact our military representatives in Yemen + and Saudi Arabia about other types of defensive systems which might + be required by North Yemen. The next SCC meeting will assess which other nations in the + region might be able to assist. (C)

+

9. [2 lines not declassified]

+
+ +
+ 261. Telegram From the Embassy in the Yemen Arab Republic to the + Department of StateSource: National + Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790085–0955. + Confidential; Niact + Immediate; Exdis. Sent for + information Immediate to Cairo, Jidda, USUN, Muscat, and USLO Riyadh. + + + Sana, February 24, 1979, 1642Z + +

1194. Dept please pass to USMTM + Dhahran SA and SecDef WashDC. + Subj: (U) PDRY Aggression Against + YAR. Ref: Sana 1177In telegram 1177 from Sana, February 24, the + Embassy reported on Lane’s meeting with YAR Deputy Foreign Minister al-Kibsi to discuss the + latest developments in the PDRY attacks on the Yemen Arab Republic: “Kibsi + said that in view of assurances given by Anbassador Twinam when he visited YAR shortly after Ghashmi + assassination, YAR expected + USG to help.” Al-Kibsi + recommended that the United States “should consult with Saudis + on appropriate steps to take.” (National Archives, RG 59, + Central Foreign Policy File, D790085–0859) Twinam was in Sana July 27–28; + see Document 246. (DTG 241015Z + Feb 79) (Notal).

+

1. (C-entire text).

+

2. I met with YAR President + Ali Abdallah Salih at + 4:00 p.m., Feb. 24. I was accompanied by OMC Chief Colonel Broman + and DATT + LTC Ruszkiewicz. YAR Special Presidential Advisor + Yahya Jughman acted as interpreter.

+

3. President Salih opened the + meeting by stating that YAR was now + victim of aggression from PDRYSee footnote 2, Document 260. and + he wanted to know what position of USG would be. In response to my questions, Salih said that PDRY forces were attacking all along + the border with mortars, rockets, and aircraft and that they had + occupied the village of Qatabah and the nearby heights. He said + there were no Cubans or other “foreigners” in YAR territory but they were operating + the sophisticated weapons being used against YAR territory. He indicated that + YAR forces were holding their + own but PDRY attacks were + continuing.

+

4. Salih said that purpose of + PDRY attack was to show + Yemenis, both North and South, that Soviets would support their + friends but that U.S. would not. PDRY, he said, was completely in the hands of the + Soviets and attack was designed to test the will of the U.S. as well + as determine YAR capabilities. + President Carter had + promised that U.S. would assist YAR + if it was victim of aggression and he needed help immediately. What + was USG response?

+

5. I asked what had been Saudi response to Junayd mission. Salih said that Saudis had replied + that YARG should get in touch with + U.S. Ambassador in Sana and they would do the same in Saudi Arabia. + Saudis had said that “the Americans carry all the cards.”

+ +

6. Brushing aside question of Saudi assistance, Salih said that he wanted + immediate military aid from the U.S. He mentioned specifically the + deployment of three squadrons of fighter planes, helicopter + gunships, SAMs and naval vessels. I + said that FornMin Asnaj had + expressed some reluctance about direct USG involvement at this time. Salih said in that case, U.S. + planes could be operated by Pakistanis or others and he would need + U.S. help in recruiting such personnel. Salih said that as he had mentioned before, the + trilateral arms program was all very well, but he wanted a direct + military supply relationship with the U.S. He needed an immediate + answer from the U.S. so he would know where he stands. Would the + U.S. help now, or when it was too late?

+

7. I replied that I would, of course, forward his request to my + government immediately. At the same time, I wanted to give him my + frank personal views. Even though I was without instructions, I felt + sure my government would support the YAR in resisting this aggression. However, the + immediate dispatch of American military units to the YAR would be a very serious step. As + he had described the situation in the South, it seemed to me there + was time to make political and diplomatic moves rather than sending + in U.S. forces. Although I did not know exactly what steps my + government would take, I was sure that USG would not be idle. Contrary to my expectations, + President Salih seemed to + accept this. In closing, he left the impression that the important + thing was to expel the PDRY troops + from YAR territory immediately; if + this could be done by diplomatic or political action he was + agreeable.

+ +

8. Comment:

+

A) Given the sense of crisis which had been transmitted to me earlier + in the day by Jughman, + Salih seemed strangely + relaxed during this meeting. Salih seems to be primarily interested in U.S. + military support for political reasons. The kinds of arms he asked + for are not those that could be effectively used in the present + border fighting, but would be extremely useful in demonstrating to + both North and South Yemenis that he has the backing of the United + States. After I remarked that it would be a very serious step for + the United States to send its own military forces to Yemen at this + point, he seemed to accept that this kind of direct military support + was unlikely. However, he is definitely expecting an immediate + answer on what action the USG will + take to support him.

+

B) As we left the meeting, Jughman said YARG + had decided not repeat not to raise question of PDRY aggression at the UN.

+

C) In view of the conflicting and spotty information on the state of + fighting in the border region, and FornMin Asnaj’s reservations we do not + think the situation warrants sending U.S. forces to the YAR at this time. We will, however, be + under great pressure to take this step should the present PDRY attacks develop into a major assault designed to + split North Yemen.

+

9. Recommendation: In order to reassure YARG that we will support them in repelling PDRY attacks, we recommend a) that + the United States urge the Saudis to send a squadron of F–5’s + to Sana as the YARG requested + (Sana 1165)In telegram 1165 from Sana, + February 23, the Embassy reported on Lane’s meeting with al-Asnaj during which the + Foreign Minister informed Lane that the Yemen Arab Republic had sent a + delegation to Saudi Arabia on February 22 to brief Saudi + officials on the fighting in North Yemen. The YAR delegation asked the Saudis to + send a portion of their air force to Sana as a show of political + support and provide defense if needed. Al-Asnaj also noted that if the + Saudis proved unwilling to do so, the Yemen Arab Republic was + poised to ask Egypt for this assistance, and the Foreign + Minister asked that the United States support the Yemen Arab + Republic’s request to Saudi Arabia. (National Archives, RG 59, + Central Foreign Policy File, D790084–0160) and b) that + the USG immediately call the + attention of the Soviet Government to the PDRY aggression and urge them to use their influence to + have the PDRY withdraw immediately + from all YAR territory.

+ + Lane + +
+ +
+ 262. Summary of Conclusions of a Special Coordination Committee + MeetingSource: Carter Library, + National Security Council, Institutional Files, Box 119, SCM + 050, 02/26/79, Mini SCC, Yemen. + Secret. The meeting took place in the White House Situation + Room. The minutes are not attached and were not + found. + + + Washington, February + 26, 1979, 2:15–3:20 p.m. + + + SUBJECT + Yemen (U) + + + PARTICIPANTS + + + State + David + Newsom* + Harold + Saunders + William R. + Crawford + + + + + OSD + Robert + Murray* + Walter B. Slocombe + David + Ransom + + + JCS + LTG William Y. + Smith* + LTC Kenneth + McKim + + + + + DCI + [3 names not + declassified] + + + Justice + John Harmon* + Ken Bass + + + + + OMB + John White* + Ed Sanders + + + + + White House + David + Aaron—Chair* + + + + + NSC + Gary + Sick* + + + +

The group reviewed the situation on the Yemeni border and our + discussions with the Saudis and the Yemenis to date. The following + are the main points:

+

1. It appears that the PDRY forces + have taken the airfield at Bayda on the YAR side of the border and that skirmishes are in + progress in several other areas, including the peninsula near the + Strait of Bab el-Mandeb. Our embassy in Sanaa suspects that regular + PDRY forces are being used to + take territory, which will then be turned over to YAR dissidents with the intention of + establishing a rival regime in the YAR and bringing down the government of President + Salih. (S)

+

2. The Saudis are backing away from providing their own F–5s + for support of the YAR and are now + asking that the United States provide forces. We are unable to + provide F–5s or other military equipment which the + YAR would then operate, and the + Saudis probably realize this. (S)

+

3. A U.S. team headed by Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense + Murray leaves this + afternoon for consultations with the Saudis. The principal objective + of this team will be to get a clear reading of Saudi military and political intentions. + Is the latest change of signals due to the Saudis’ talks with the + PDRY Foreign Minister who has + just completed a visit to Saudi Arabia?See footnote 4, Document + 261. Precisely what would be required to permit the + Saudis to provide effective support to North Yemen? Would they + require U.S. support? If so, we need to know explicitly what the + nature and level of that support would be. The team should not let + the Saudis divert the issue from a Yemeni and Arabian Peninsula + problem to a U.S.-Soviet problem. The Saudis must be willing to + accept a leading role in dealing with the issue. (S)

+

4. The State Department will prepare and coordinate instructions to + Ambassador West + incorporating these views. This cable will be available in Saudi + Arabia by the time the team arrives. (C)

+

At 3:10, a restricted group (marked * above) remained to review the + status of [1½ lines not declassified]. CIA reviewed various proposals which + they will be prepared to submit formally to the SCC on Friday.March 2. No SCC meeting was held that day, but see Document 187. No decisions were + taken at this meeting. (S)

+
+
+ 263. Summary of Conclusions of a Special Coordination Committee + MeetingSource: Carter Library, + National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Middle East, Subject + File, Box 93, Meeting: (2/27/79 SCC): 2/79. Secret. The meeting took place in the + White House Situation Room. The minutes are not attached and + were not found. An attached February 28 covering memorandum from + Brzezinski to + Vance, Brown, Jones, and Turner noted that the President + had approved the recommendations in the Summary of + Conclusions. + + + Washington, February + 27, 1979, 2–3 p.m. + + + SUBJECT + Yemen (U) + + + PARTICIPANTS + + + State + David + Newsom + Harold H. + Saunders + William R. + Crawford + + + + Defense + Harold + Brown + Charles W. Duncan + Walter Slocombe + + + + + JCS + Gen David C. + Jones + LtGen William Y. Smith + + + + + CIA + Frank C. Carlucci + [name not declassified] + + + + + White House + The Vice President + David + Aaron—Chaired + Denis + Clift + + + + + NSC + Gary + Sick + + + +

1. All agreed that the US cannot + respond positively to YAR and Saudi + Arabian requests that we provide our own fighter aircraft for YAR operations nor can we provide [1 line not declassified]. However, it was + agreed that we could take the following actions to support YAR defenses against the PDRY incursion:

+

—We will accelerate deliveries of previously ordered military + equipment (anti-tank, anti-aircraft, ammunition, transport) by + immediate airlift of this equipment.

+

—We will seek an assessment from our Defense Attache presently in the + YAR of the military situation + there and YAR requirements to + contain the PDRY advances.

+

—Defense will examine the extent to which the type of military + equipment required to support the YAR might be obtained from Egypt, Jordan, or other + friendly countries.

+

—The US national vessels proceeding + south through the Suez Canal will call at YAR ports should the Sana Government so request.

+

—In response to a recommendation by our Ambassador, we will offer the + YAR aerial reconnaissance over + the YAR in the area of alleged + combat. The Chairman of the JCS + made clear that there would be no risk in such reconnaissance.

+

2. On the diplomatic front, we will urge the Soviets to restrain the + PDRY.Carter, + Vance, and Brzezinski met with Soviet + Ambassador Anatoliy + Dobrynin on February 27 following the SCC meeting. Noting that “we + believe the Soviet Union has encouraged this altercation,” + Carter informed + Dobrynin that the + United States hoped “the Soviet Union will use its influence to + end the penetration of North Yemen’s borders.” See Foreign + Relations, 1977–1980, vol. VI, Soviet Union, + Document 176. Vance also met separately with Dobrynin on February 27, and + sent the same requests for Soviet intercession. The memorandum + of conversation is in the National Archives, RG 59, Vance Files: Lot 84D241, Box + 9, Nodis 1979, Memorandum of + Conversation for Secretary Vance. Vance informed Ambassador of his démarche in + telegram 47704 to Moscow, February 28. See + Foreign Relations, 1977–1980, vol. + VI, Soviet Union, Document 177. We will consult + with the British and Oman for their assessment of developments in + Yemen.

+

3. With Saudi Arabia, we will:

+

—Urge the Saudis to mobilize Arab opinion for the immediate secession + of hostilities and withdrawal of PDRY forces from North Yemen.

+ +

—Describe the actions indicated above that we will take to help + strengthen YAR defenses.

+

—Seek to clarify Saudi intentions and objectives with respect to the + Yemens.

+

—Seek to determine what actions the Saudis intend to take to + strengthen YAR defenses and what + support they might need from the US + to carry out those actions.

+

—Seek Saudi agreement that we should carry on further discussions + with the Egyptians and Jordanians on whether they would be prepared + to take direct action to support the YAR should the situation deteriorate further.

+

4. The group approved the attached statement concerning US policy and action in regard to the + situation in the Yemens. State will release it if it is not used by + the President in response to a question at his press + conference.Attached but not printed + is a February 27 draft statement entitled “Situation in Yemen.” + Yemen was not mentioned in the President’s 4 p.m. press + conference. Hodding + Carter read the statement, which announced that + the United States would accelerate delivery of arms to North + Yemen, to reporters on February 28. See the Department of State + Bulletin, April 1979, p. + 41.

+
+ +
+ 264. Memorandum Prepared by the National Security Council + StaffSource: Carter Library, + National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, President’s Daily CIA Brief File, Box 17, + 2/23/79–2/28/79. Secret. Carter wrote in the upper right-hand corner of + the first page of the memorandum: “Zbig J.” Mondale also initialed the + memorandum. + + + Washington, February 28, 1979 + +

1. Saudi Arabia Threatens to Intervene in Yemen: + Prince Saud described + to Ambassador West yesterday + the situation in Yemen as very serious. He said the attack on the + YAR was premeditated, + organized, well-equipped, and specifically measured to subvert the + legal regime of the YAR and turn it + into a battleground. Saud + claimed that Cuban troops were involved, although not a great + number, but extensive enough to be serious. He said that Saudi + nationalCarter underlined the words + “Saudi national.” interests are threatened and if the situation continues to + deteriorate within the next two weeks, then Saudi Arabia would + intervene.Carter underlined the phrase + “then Saudi Arabia would intervene.” + Saud asked the U.S. to do + what it could through the USSR to + stop the conflict and if it was not contained, then the U.S. should + do what it could to help the YAR + directly. According to Saud, if that fails to stop the fighting, + then the U.S. should supply Saudi Arabia with what it needs for its + intervention. Saud said that + if West could not get this message through to Washington adequately + by cable, then he should go to WashingtonCarter + underlined the phrase “he should go to Washington.” + personally and present the message as one from King Khalid to the + President. Ambassador West + does not know whether Saud + is trying to test our commitment made by Secretary Brown during his recent visit.See Documents + 185 and 186. In any + case, they appear to take the threat seriously and reportedly have + placed their forces on full alert. West suggests that State consider + allocating appropriate U.S. reconnaissance assets to gauge the + military situation in the border area. He also suggests that we + consult our F–5 production schedules + to see how we can best replenish Saudi stocks if they transfer their + F–5s to YAR + and we should examine the legalities involved in permitting U.S. + contractors maintenance in Sana for Saudi or Yemeni F–5s + flying combat missions. It appears to West that immediate relief can + only come through diplomatic efforts as conventional armaments would + be even less effective against a war of infiltration and + subversion.Carter wrote “Vance consult w/Congress” in + the left-hand margin next to this paragraph. In a February 28 + memorandum to Vance, + Brzezinski + communicated the President’s request. (National Archives, RG 59, + Central Foreign Policy File, P850129–1056) (Riyadh 333 + NODIS,Telegram 333 from Riyadh, + February 28, is in the National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign + Policy File, P840125–1256. PSN 24834, 24809, and + 24813None found.) (S)

+

2. Vance + Makes Demarche to Dobrynin on Yemen Situation: In a meeting + yesterday with Ambassador Dobrynin, Vance said that we are concerned about the recent + incursion by PDRY forces into the + YAR and are disturbed by the + recent escalation of the conflict which has caused a significant + increase in tensions. Vance + noted that we have urged restraint on the YAR leaders and hope the Soviets will urge restraint on + the PDRY leaders. Vance added that we also believe + it is in the interest of the U.S. and Soviet Union to work together + to prevent the conflict from developing further. Ambassador was + informed that he not need make a specific demarche in Moscow on this + matter, however, if an opportunity arises, State has no objection to + his repeating these points + with appropriate Soviet officials. (State 47704 NODIS, PSN + 24666)Carter wrote “I did the same” in the left-hand + margin next to this paragraph. See footnote 2, Document 263. PSN 24666 was not + found. (S)

+

[Omitted here is material unrelated to Yemen.]

+
+ +
+ 265. Telegram From the United States Liaison Office in Riyadh to + the Department of State and the Department of DefenseSource: National Archives, RG 59, Central + Foreign Policy File, D790093–0461. Secret; Flash; Exdis. Sent for information + Immediate to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Sana, and + Jidda. + + + Riyadh, March 1, 1979, 1202Z + +

340. Subject: (S) Saudi Plans re PDRY Attack Against YAR.

+

1. (S) Entire text.

+

2. Summary. Foreign Minister Saud informed us today that Saudi Arabia was making + firm plans to attack PDRY in the + event that (1) diplomatic efforts failed to persuade PDRY to withdraw; or (2) efforts by + YAR (with such assistance as + SAG and USG may provide) were not successful + in causing withdrawal. From comments, attack would be armed + incursion for limited objective of forcing withdrawal of PDRY forces from YAR. Saudi forces would withdraw + immediately thereafter. Specific requests were made of the degree of + support which USG would provide in + the event of such action. Likewise, specific questions were asked + about utilization of USG personnel + in planning and advising YAR and + SAG forces. End summary.

+

3. Foreign Minister Saud in a + meeting this morning informed us of official request that the Saudi + Arabian Government had made a firm decision to institute a military + operation against PDRY in the + event that present diplomatic efforts to persuade PDRY forces to withdraw from North + Yemen were unsuccessful or if YAR + forces continued to be unable to cope with the PDRY invasion. Saud said in answer to a question + that he was telling us of the SAG + decision not repeat not seeking our advice. Saud said that on 27 Feb he + personally informed PDRY Foreign + Minister Muhummad Salih + Muti’ that Saudi Arabia would attack PDRY if they did not withdraw their forces from YAR.

+ +

4. He then posed direct questions about the extent of support and aid + which USG could provide in the + event Saudi Arabia launched its attack. He asked specifically as to + what legal constraints, if any, would apply to U.S. civilian + personnel providing logistical support for the operation: what + advice and assistance would be provided by U.S. military personnel + in the operation.

+

5. Saud stated that he needed + answers as quickly as possible; that the planning for the operation + had already begun; that he would like to have USG military personnel, including + General Cathey, USMTM Chief, consult with SAG military leaders in the planning + process. DASD + Murray replied that U.S. + military personnel could not repeat not give advice or assistance in + the planning of a combat operation without specific permission from + USG. Ambassador said we would + only listen to Saudi explanations. Saud asked that we request such permission + forthwith; he also asked that we seek permission for USG military personnel to confer with + YAR and SAG military personnel and provide + advice on combat operations now going on between YAR and PDRY forces.

+

6. Saud opened the morning + meeting with a statement that the President of PDRY was enroute to Moscow and we + would therefore soon see what the master wanted its servant to do. + He later added that even the conclusion of a mutual security pact + between PDRY and Russia would not + change Saudi Arabia’s plans as, “we are not afraid of the Russians.” + (The latter was, however, said with a slight smile.)

+

7. Saud next stated that he + was sending a letter to President Salih requesting a representative of the SAG military forces be allowed to make + an onsite inspection and evaluation of the military situation in + North Yemen. In our meeting with Saud the previous evening (being reported by + septel),See footnote 3, Document 266. we had pointed out + that our military personnel in Sana had not been permitted to make + on site inspection of the military operations. We subsequently + learned that SAG forces likewise + had been refused permission to visit battle areas. Saud agreed that SAG’s representative (Col. Showayel, + Saudi Mil Rep Sana) could be accompanied by OMC Chief, Col Broman, + who was present at the meeting. The plan is for the two to leave + this afternoon (1 March) and to report back to their + governments.

+

8. Saud then made his + announcement of Saudi intentions and his specific request for U.S. + decisions as above set forth. He stated that he realized the + decisions may take some time but he said the urgency of the + situation required action at the earliest possible time.

+

9. Murray said we would pass + on Saudi requests to USG.

+ + Gerlach + +
+ +
+ 266. Telegram From the United States Liaison Office in Riyadh to + the Department of StateSource: Carter + Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Middle East, + Subject File, Box 93, Yemens: Border War: 2/79–3/4/79. Secret; + Immediate; Exdis. Sent for + information Immediate to the Department of Defense, Jidda, Sana, + and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Printed from a copy that was + received in the White House Situation Room. + + + Riyadh, March 1, 1979, 1347Z + +

343. Embassy Jidda sends. Military addees handle as Specat Exclusive. Subject: + Saud Calls for Direct + Commitment of US Support in + Potential Conflict With PDRY (S). + (Ref: A) Riyadh 0340,See Document 265. B) Riyadh + 0341.In telegram 341 from Riyadh, + March 1, the Liaison Office reported a February 28 late night + meeting among Saud, Turki, West, and Murray. Saud “wanted blanket assurances that USG would provide whatever + logistics and arms supply support was necessary, getting waiver + of all restrictions on President by Congress because of urgency + of situation. We said USG + understood urgency of situation and was prepared to provide + appropriate support.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign + Policy File, D790093–0835)

+

1. Secret-entire text.

+

2. Summary. Following is MemCon + of 1 March meeting in which Prince Saud reiterates Saudi commitment to use its own + forces if necessary against PDRY, + defines military aims and justifications, and seeks US commitment to supply arms and help + in planning. End summary.

+

3. Ambassador West, DAS/ISA + Murray met with Prince + Saud and Foreign + Minister Prince Saud and + Intelligence Director Prince Turki bin Faysal morning of March 1 at MODA headquarters to continue their + discussions on the Yemen situation. Ambassador and Mr. Murray were accompanied by USMTM/Chief MGen Cathey, RADM Lyons of JCS–J–5, + Embassy officer Cave, DATT Col + Hunt, David Ransom, and + LTC George W. Plummer, both of + ISA (NESA) and other Embassy + and USMTM officers. A large + number of Saudi military officers were also present, including Chief + of Staff Gen Humayd, LTG Kabbani of + MODA’s Foreign Assistance and + Cooperation Office; LTG Muhammad + al-Shayah, LTG Asad Zuhayr; LTC + Fahd Abdallah and several + others.

+

4. Prince Saud began the + meeting by stating that PDRY + leader Abd al-Fattah Isma’il is expected to arrive in Moscow tonight + 29 February. The Ambassador asked for the Fon Min’s analysis. FonMin responded simply: “He’s + going to report to his masters.” Then said that if Soviets want to + contain conflict they will ask him to withdraw his forces. + Ambassador suggested that this is perhaps the reason we have not yet + heard any response to + our demarche to Soviet Union on situation in Yemen.See footnote 2, Document + 263.

+

5. Prince Saud continued by + noting that letter is being sent to YAR President Ali Abdallah + Salih to ask for permission for Saudis and US reps to visit battle fronts in + Yemen. Purpose for this visit is to collect all of the information + available on forces and equipment available and report back. Report + should indicate the shortcomings and gaps in the Yemeni inventory + which Saudi Arabia and the US may + supply.

+

6. Mr. Murray responded that + the Sana OMC/Chief, Col Ralph Broman, will accompany the + fact-finding team. The Ambassador asked for the timing of the + proposed mission. Prince Saud said it would leave today. The Saudi MTM Chief Col Seuwayil will carry the + letter to Salih and will + head the Saudi team.

+

7. Prince Saud continued by + saying that the previous evening’s meetingSee footnote 3 above. had indicated + intent on the part of the United States to do everything it can to + supplement Saudi efforts to contain situation, meet any eventuality + in South Yemen threat and, if worse comes to worst, to provide Saudi + Arabia with whatever is needed—to supply what support is needed, + prevent reverses and help Saudi Arabia achieve its military + objectives.

+

8. Mr. Murray responded that + was not fully accurate; important qualifications should be noted. + The first is that we cannot go beyond the law. We must look at the + circumstances. The second is that it depends on the military + requirements. We have to know what you have in mind. We have + received a list of your requirements, and we have basically + supportive attitude but it is not clear how all these requirements + fit into circumstances. However, we are willing to continue the + discussions, and it is probable that MGen Cathey is the one best suited to + continue the dialogue in the first instance.

+

9. Somewhat tersely, Prince Saud declared that Saudi Arabia does not wish to be + caught in vicious circles. “We will cut up our vicious circles and + help you. We will take your people into our confidence. Our + intention is to see the situation through; to use our military + forces to involve ourselves in the fighting with South Yemen if the + fighting continues in North Yemen. We have not yet given you the + details, as you have not said that you are committed. You have made + only qualified commitment.” Speaking in rapid but deliberate tones, + Prince Saud emphasized that + Saudi Arabia is making a direct request to be told quickly if the + US will support Saudi Arabia + within the scope of US law. + Situation moving quickly. In the meantime, Saudi officers will present US officers with operational plans. + These will be discussed with MGen Cathey and any others you may choose. This group + will examine what the possible operational measures will be.

+

10. Mr. Murray asked for + clarification. As this appeared to be a formal request, he wished to + raise several questions. Are you asking for a commitment to support + Saudi Arabia in actual operations? Are these operations + hypothetical? Prince Saud + responded no, adding that we do not deal in hypothetical situations. + Mr. Murray stated that it + was his understanding that the Saudis were approaching the Yemen + situation in three ways. First, they are undertaking efforts to work + out a diplomatic solution. Second, if this fails, then they hope + that the South Yemenis will be expelled through [by] the Yemen Arab Republic. Third, if this fails as well + then Saudi forces will be used to solve the problem. As the first + two options have not yet been exhausted, is not the third option + hypothetical?

+

11. Prince Saud said this was + the right order but we must prepare at same time for all + eventualities. Thus, preparation for the third option is not + hypothetical. It is a reasonable concern which must be met.

+

12. Mr. Murray asked for + further clarification. He asked whether the preparations in the last + instance are preparations for movement by Saudi forces, not into + North Yemen, but into South Yemen? Prince Saud replied affirmatively. He + said that the US knows the + capability of the SAG forces. We + will inform you of the current disposition of the Saudi forces at + the forthcoming combat as we perceive it. We expect you to + contribute your thoughts. Participation by the US is not joining in the planning phase + only but joining in the implementation phase too.

+

13. Mr. Murray considered the + FonMin’s points briefly. + Then he responded that while MGen Cathey can serve as a channel of communication to + the USG, passing on information + received, he cannot give formal advice on behalf of the US Government or advise privately on + Saudi plans.

+

14. Ambassador West said he + wanted to anticipate some of the many questions that will be asked + in Washington about Saudi decision. For instance, someone who + defends his territory is always in a stronger position vis a vis law + and public opinion than someone who attacks the territory of + another. Saud replied that + PDRY had not violated Saudi + borders but had done so in YAR. He + asked rhetorically if USG would + support SAG if it fought inside + Yemen and said that choice of attack across Saudi-PDRY border is military decision, an + easier way to respond to aggression. He noted in passing that border + with PDRY was not internationally + recognized—a benefit of being ruled by the British, according to + Prince Turki.

+

15. Ambassador West asked if + Saudi attack successful in forcing PDRY withdrawal, would SAG withdraw? Prince Saud answered in the affirmative at once, adding that SAG did not intend to occupy territory + or force a change of government in Aden.

+

16. Admiral Lyons noted that Saudi decision would broaden the + conflict. Prince Saud + nodded. Ambassador West + pressed to know if Saudis had definitely made decision. Yes, said + Prince Saud. He added that Saudis were picking up signs of greatly + increased Soviet naval activity in the Bab al-Mandab Straits. Mr. + Murray asked if, in + Saudi view, Cubans will become involved. Prince Saud said equipment placed in + PDRY would allow 13,000 troops + to be introduced. What are the military consequences of this, asked + Murray. That is enough + to face Saudi forces, said Prince Saud plainly. How do you deal with that contingency, + asked Murray. That’s your + problem said Saud. In absence of Cubans, Murray asked, what is your + estimate of forcing PDRY + withdrawal from YAR? We think we + can succeed, said Saud. Would YAR + be helpful, asked Murray. + Yes, said Saud.

+

17. Prince Saud then + suggested an afternoon 1 March meeting with General Cathey to go over Saudi + contingency plans.See Document 265. He asked for + Cathey to contribute his + thoughts as well as listen. Murray said Cathey could not do this; that would require special + USG approval.

+

18. Murray then read over his + notes of commitment which Prince Saud was seeking (see para 7 above). Prince Saud claimed he had not asked us to “prevent + reverses” but to help attain military objective (#)As on the original, presumably indicating an + omission. + SAG. Prince Saud added he was not defeatist in + his thinking. He said issue was basically a military one: “We want + you to provide whatever our requirements are to keep military + operations going.” “US forces?” + asked Murray. “I’m not + counting on US military personnel + since USG won’t even help with + planning,” replied Saud.

+

19. Prince Turki then asked if + US team to Sana could give + YAR and Saudis its views. + Murray said team could + describe situation and suggest some steps that were needed but could + not give tactical advice. Prince Turki concluded by asking—Prince Saud joined him—if Murray and the Ambassador would + ask permission for US advisory team + which could go beyond observations and advise YARG on tactical formations. Prince + Saud also wanted + permission for MGen Cathey + to advise of Saudi plans.

+ + Gerlach + +
+ +
+ 267. Memorandum Prepared in the Central Intelligence AgencySource: Central Intelligence Agency, + Office of Support Services (DI), + Job 82T00150R, Production Case Files (1979–1981), Box 6, Folder + 90, South Yemeni Intentions Toward North Yemen. Secret; [handling restriction not declassified]. + According to an attached March 1 memorandum from the Acting + Chief of the Middle East Division to Carlucci, the Office of + Regional and Political Analysis drafted the + memorandum. + + + RP M 79–10111 Washington, March 1, + 1979 + + + SUBJECT + South Yemeni Intentions Toward North Yemen + +

Our information on the current military situation between the two + Yemens [less than 1 line not declassified], + and the immediate plans of Aden remain unclear. We believe, however, + that South Yemen is committed to the overthrow of the government in + Sana and to the eventual union of the two Yemens under a Marxist + government. [classification and handling + restriction not declassified]

+

This is not a new South Yemeni objective, [less + than 1 line not declassified] it was reaffirmed and given + top priority at a closed session of Aden’s ruling party last + October. A special committee, including the country’s leader, + Abd al-Fattah Ismail, + was set up to plan and direct the subversive effort. A new + Aden-backed organization—the National Democratic Front—was formed to + spearhead the overthrow of North Yemen. The NDF, which allegedly is + doing most of the current fighting, is composed largely of North + Yemeni dissidents, including some prominent military defectors.The National Democratic Front (NDF) was + founded in Sana in February 1976 as an overarching governmental + opposition group. [classification and + handling restriction not declassified]

+

South Yemen’s decision to increase pressure + probably resulted from the perception that North Yemen, under the + spiritless leadership of President Salih, needed only a shove to bring it down. [less than 1 line not declassified], South + Yemeni Prime Minister Hasani told a visiting Palestinian delegation + late last year that Sana was near collapse and Aden had to move + quickly, before a stronger leader emerged in Sana. [classification and handling restriction not + declassified]

+

[less than 1 line not declassified] the + fighting which began last week and is apparently going on entirely + within North Yemen, was triggered by a signal from Aden that the + time was ripe for bringing down the Salih regime. There are several plausible + alternative explanations for the fighting: it may have evolved from + a series of border raids engaged in by both sides which got out of + hand; or South Yemen may intend to punish North Yemen for sponsoring + paramilitary activities, hoping to discourage such action in the + future. [classification and handling restriction + not declassified]

+

Whatever the origin of the conflict, if Aden smells blood and + perceives the military action to be seriously undermining President + Salih’s position—with + bearable political and military costs to South Yemen—we would expect + the Aden Government to maintain the pressure. South Yemen could help + the exiles establish a government of national liberation in the + southern part of North Yemen. The inhabitants of this area are, like + the South Yemenis, largely of the Sunni Muslim sect. The residents + of the northern part of North Yemen, on the other hand, are + primarily Shias. Such a development would almost certainly further + erode Salih’s already + uncertain position. [classification and handling + restriction not declassified]

+

Pressure from the Soviet Union, other Arab states through the Arab + League, a decisive Saudi move to support North Yemen, or a visible + show of support for the regime in Sana by the US might induce South Yemen to back off + for the moment. [classification and handling + restriction not declassified]

+

Aden’s long-term goal of exporting its Marxist system to North Yemen + will remain, however, ensuring continued instability in the area. If + the current military campaign does not result in a change of + government in Sana that is favorable to South Yemen, that country + can be expected to seek other opportunities to subvert the North + Yemeni Government. [classification and handling + restriction not declassified]

+

The Soviet Angle

+

[less than 1 line not declassified] active + Soviet encouragement of current South Yemeni-backed operations + against North Yemen, [less than 1 line not + declassified] the USSR + may be less opposed to PDRY + adventurism than in the past. In the fall of 1978, a number of + reports indicated that the Soviets were reluctant to support South + Yemeni activities because they were concerned that these might + provoke foreign intervention which in turn might lead to a war of + attrition that they would have to support. In addition, they + reportedly felt that this policy was injurious to Soviet interests + because it had provoked tensions with North Yemen and Saudi Arabia + and was giving imperialist forces opportunities to exploit. [classification and handling restriction not + declassified]

+

By the end of 1978, reporting to this effect had ceased, [less than 1 line not declassified] the + Soviets were aware of and prepared to support South Yemeni actions + with respect to North Yemen as long as no direct invasion by South + Yemeni armed forces occurred. No reasons for this apparent shift in + position have been cited. [classification and + handling restriction not declassified]

+ +

The Cuban Perspective

+

[less than 1 line not declassified] North + Yemeni claims that Cuban military personnel are involved in the + current fighting against North Yemen, we would not be surprised if + Cuban advisers were assisting South Yemeni-supported forces behind + the lines in South Yemen. In November the Cubans reportedly agreed + to arm North Yemeni dissidents based in South Yemen. [classification and handling restriction not + declassified]

+

It is highly unlikely, however, that Havana would risk sending Cuban + units or combat support personnel into North Yemen. In Angola and + Ethiopia where Cuba intervened militarily on a large scale, Havana + could argue that it was performing a defensive role in assisting + local forces repel foreign aggression. No such claim could be made + in the case of a Cuban incursion into North Yemen and the Cubans + realize that such a blatantly offensive move would tarnish their + image in the Third World and jeopardize their chances for hosting a + successful nonaligned summit in Havana in September. Moreover, + Havana would probably reason that direct Cuban involvement would + provoke US and other Western + countries into increasing military assistance to the North Yemenis. + [classification and handling restriction not + declassified]

+
+ +
+ 268. Summary of Conclusions of a Mini-Special Coordination + Committee MeetingSource: Carter + Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Middle East, + Subject File, Box 94, Yemens: Meeting: (3/1/79 Mini-SCC): 3/79. Secret; Sensitive. The + meeting took place in the White House Situation Room. The + minutes are not attached and were not found. Carter wrote “OK J” in the + right-hand margin next to the list of participants. Aaron sent the Summary of + Conclusions to Vance, + Brown, Jones, and Turner under cover of a March 2 + memorandum, in which he informed them that Carter had approved the + recommendations from the meeting and noted that implementation + of Carter’s “decisions + should commence immediately.” + + + Washington, March 1, + 1979, 4–5:40 p.m. + + + SUBJECT + The Yemen Conflict + + + PARTICIPANTS + + + State + David Newson + Lucy + Benson + Amb. William + Crawford + James Michel + + + + + Defense + Walter Slocombe + Col. T.O. Williams + + + + + Energy + Bruce Clarke + Denny Ellerman + + + + + JCS + General William Smith + Lt Col Kenneth McKim + + + DCI + Dr. Robert + Bowie + + + + + NSC + Gary + Sick + Robert Kimmitt + + + + + White House + David + Aaron—Chair + + + +

It was agreed to recommend to the President the following steps:

+

1. We should agree to the Saudi request for assistance in planning + appropriate military operations to help defend North Yemen against + the attack by South Yemen. The Chief of our MAAG, General Cathey, would be authorized to + begin consultations with a view towards providing this assistance. + The Defense Department will make the necessary arrangements to + insure that such activity will be fully consistent with the law + regarding military assistance.

+

2. General Cathey will be + instructed that the United States does not contemplate being + involved in any combat operations or activities. We would be + prepared to provide necessary support of a non-combat nature for + Saudi operations for the defense of North Yemen. To this end, we would be prepared, if + necessary, to make the required notifications to Congress under the + War Powers Act.See footnote 10, Document 188. + Carter made + checkmarks in the margin next to this and the next four + recommendations.

+

3. The United States should be prepared to sell replacement equipment + to Saudi Arabia for losses which might be incurred in the defense of + North Yemen.

+

4. The Saudi and Yemen Governments should be advised that any U.S. + assistance will be in response to a YAR request for Saudi and U.S. support in the context + of collective self-defense. We will urge them to take appropriate + steps to notify the UN Security + Council of these actions.

+

5. To prepare for implementation of these steps the State Department + will prepare appropriate guidance for the Embassies in Riyadh and + Sanaa, and Defense Department to General Cathey. State will also prepare + talking points to be used in consultations with the Congress.

+

6. State and Defense will prepare a program to accelerate delivery of + items already programmed for North Yemen beyond the few items which + we have already authorized to be airlifted. Defense will also + develop options for the supply of additional items to North Yemen + from inventories of Egypt and Jordan. In the latter connection, + State will clarify Jordanian intentions to provide some U.S. + anti-aircraft weapons to Sanaa.

+
+ +
+ 269. Message From the United States Military Training Mission in + Dhahran to the Department of Defense, the Department of State, and + the Embassy in Saudi ArabiaSource: + Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, + Middle East, Subject File, Box 93, Yemens: Border War: + 2/79–3/4/79. Secret; Immediate; Exdis; Specat + Exclusive. Sent for information Immediate to the Joint Chiefs of + Staff. + + + Dhahran, March 2, 1979, 1505Z + +

32597. From DASD (ISA) Murray. Subj: Joint Planning With Saudi Arabia.

+

Summary: Saudi move to force PDRY + withdrawal from Yemen, by force if necessary, presents USG with difficult but important + decisions on US security role in + Middle East and support of YAR and + Saudis. Developments in Yemen come at time of strain in our + relations with Saudis. They are hopeful but skeptical of our + willingness to follow up Brown visitSee Documents 185 and 186. with actions in military supply and + security field but acutely aware of our demands on them for + cooperation on peace process, oil, other issues. Incursions of last + two weeks in YAR present Saudis + with threat to their vital interests. I basically agree with their + analysis of threat and think we must take seriously their decision + to intervene by attack on PDRY. + They have explained their strategy to us in detail except for + military plans, which can be generally deduced, however. They are + pressing us for commitment. We must decide whether and how to + encourage or discourage them from military action in PDRY and tailor our support to that + decision. There are alternatives to their military scenario. I feel + we should seek to avert Saudi attack on PDRY in favor of intervention, if necessary, only + within YAR and separate efforts in + fields of diplomacy, economics, political action. Money to support + this strategy and make it successful—and above all to make sure + Saudis are not dealt humiliating defeat—I see us required to provide + additional assurances, specific equipment and other forms of help, + which are outlined below. As Ambassador West departed Riyadh before this cable was drafted, + his comments are needed. End summary.

+

1. You have the reports of our conversations with Saud and Turki on Wednesday and + Thursday.See Documents 265 and 266. Unlike February 18 meeting,Telegram 259 from Riyadh, February 18, + described a meeting between Brown and Sultan, during which the two officials + discussed the U.S.-Saudi-YAR + tripartite military relationship. (National Archives, RG 59, + Central Foreign Policy File, D790095–1049) this time talk + was entirely of actual contingency developing in Yemen, including + Saudi Government’s commitment in principle to military action + against PDRY and request by SAG for US military support. Saudi request raises two serious + policy issues for US: whether to + encourage or discourage Saudi military action against PDRY, and the extent of US military support for SAG.

+

2. Mood in the country, as far as one can judge from our limited + exposure, is one of business as usual, with no apparent expectation + of imminent hostilities, despite recall of all military personnel to + units and placing of armed forces on alert. Mood among the + leadership, however, is more serious. Army and Air Force leadership, + according to General Cathey, + is more active than he has ever seen it, burning the midnight and + weekend oil. Prince Saud was + particularly nervous and drew, at least for our benefit, the most + stark conclusions from current events. He was clearly trying to + convince us that a crisis was at hand requiring dramatic increases + in U.S. support for Saudi Arabia. Crisis comes at a time of unusual + strain in U.S.-Saudi relations. Too many critical issues—oil, the + dollar, peace negotiations, security—are being argued + simultaneously, and in an atmosphere of uncertainty arising from + Iran, the more aggressive Soviet policy demonstrated in PDRY, Ethiopia and Angola, and + continuing Saudi doubts about American willingness to act. The + relationship is made more sensitive by the mutual recognition of + unalterable interdependence.

+

3. Nevertheless, there is a sense of hope and anticipation of U.S. + security assistance arising from the Brown Mission. Secretary Brown brought the President’s decision that the + United States would play a more active role in assuring the security + of the Middle East, and particularly Saudi Arabia, and this was + received at the time in euphoric terms. The euphoria was not + noticeable in our talks this time. The military are disappointed + that there is not a firm American commitment to further arms supply, + and Saud is suspicious about + the U.S. security commitment and the American-Israeli connection. + Nevertheless, there is an eagerness to believe that the President’s + decision reflected a real “sea change” in American policy and that + practical measures would follow. Saud’s request is meant to plumb + the depth of the policy change.

+

4. Yemen is a test case. The remoteness of Yemen, its backward + economy, tribal society, weak government and uncertain politics are + all reasons to mount important policy initiatives elsewhere. + Nevertheless, Yemen is contested ground. The contest has taken a + particularly sharp form in the last few years as Saudi leadership, + now less defensive, has tried to use its new wealth and ambition to + oust the Soviets from both Sana and Aden and give local governments + an Islamic and Western oriented character. The Soviets, smarting + from other reverses in the Middle East, have mounted massive + programs of arms deliveries and political support for radical + groups. The leadership in both the PDRY and Saudi Arabia is insecure. Both governments see + the struggle for Yemen as a + life and death matter for themselves. The Saudis, who have invested + hundreds of millions of dollars in their effort in Yemen, now fear + incursions of the YAR from the + South, backed by an expansionist Soviet Union, sufficient to topple + the Salih regime and perhaps + shift the balance in the Yemens against Saudi Arabia and the West. + Yemen thus becomes a test case of U.S. security policy in the Middle + East even though we might prefer other locations and + circumstances.

+

5. The threat from Aden is real. While allowing for Saudi astigmatism + in the matter of radical states, it is hard to fault their analysis + of threat from PDRY. The Ismail government is openly + devoted to overthrow of governments throughout Peninsula. It + proclaims itself part of world revolutionary movement. It is + Communist in most doctrinaire sense, repressive in Stalinist manner, + supportive of terrorist groups and liberation fronts for Oman and + the Gulf states as well as Yemen. Whatever checks were placed on + these extremist tendencies by local nationalism and self-interest + seem to have been removed by the Soviet and Cuban supported coup + against President Salih Rubaayya Ali last June.See Document + 244. Although we here have only fragmentary + information, much of which is conflicting, fighting by PDRY forces in YAR has now continued for almost three + weeks with no sign of let-up on PDRY side. Tanks, artillery, and possibly some air + strikes have been employed. Four lodgements within YAR across wide front from sea coast + plain through mountains to eastern desert region, suggest something + in excess of usual border fighting. It is also way out of proportion + to any YAR-sponsored activity by + South Yemen exiles in PDRY. Saudis + believe PDRY aim is to topple + regime in Sana for one of their own choosing, with aim of + unification of North and South: at minimum, Saudis believe PDRY will attempt to establish a + rival regime in southern YAR to + bring down Salih in slightly + longer term. We will get more specific information about situation + on ground when qualified observers report but at this point it looks + like conflict has been militarized and escalated, and stage has been + set for set-piece battle to change political complexion of South + Arabia.

+

6. Saudi Arabia has a carefully conceived plan for dealing with the + current crisis. The Saudi plan falls into three stages: to mount a + considerable diplomatic effort to force withdrawal; to strengthen + the YAR to meet the threat itself; + and third, to be put into effect if the first and second stages + fail, an attack by Saudi forces against PDRY itself.

+

A. Saudis have energetically pursued, with considerable success, the + convening of the Arab League, a consensus of Arab opinion (including + Iraq and Syria) against the PDRY, + and the likely tightening of the screws on PDRY through economic sanctions as well as procedures + for cease fire, withdrawal, and observers along the border. The + Saudi ability to press a diplomatic solution rests, in their eyes, + on developing a position of strength from which they can carry out + the third phase if necessary.

+

B. Phase two actions are numerous and varied. Direct financial aid is + being given YAR military and key + officers. Provision of new equipment, both from Saudi arsenals as + well as from US and other sources, + is equally important. The Saudis see the greatest need as aircraft, + air defense equipment, antitank weapons, and artillery. The Saudis + have stated that they are prepared to find third-country nationals + if necessary to man specific equipment if the US is prepared to supply the + equipment.

+

C. Personnel is a key problem in the YAR Army not only from the point of view of skill and + training deficiencies but also from the more elementary point of + view of numbers. The YAR Army has + suffered numerous defections in the wake of assassinations of two + heads of state in less than 18 months, and its ranks have been + leeched even more insidiously by the simple lure of better paying + jobs in the civilian economy in Yemen and in Saudi Arabia. Embassy + Sana has had frequent reports that the number of effectives serving + in the YAR armed forces is + certainly under 15,000 and may be under 10,000 men. To overcome this + need, the Saudis have turned to their erstwhile friends, the tribes + of North Yemen, whose ability to raise large groups of well armed + and formidable warriors is considerable. Tribal efforts, however, + are notoriously mercenary and short-lived, and they cannot use heavy + weapons, but they appear to be making an impressive contribution at + the present moment to the efforts of retaking Harib, Sayda, and + Qataba.

+

D. Phase three in the Saudi view, as far as we are able to discern, + is a carefully designed and limited military operation to attack + PDRY forces from three sides. + Based on circumstantial evidence and local speculation, the + following appears to be Saudi strategic thinking. The first element + in the attack is the YAR effort + along its southern border, with the aim of tieing up as many forces + as possible in the mountainous terrain. The Saudis probably + anticipate an “Omani front” both to seize some territory in eastern + PDRY and tie up PDRY forces there. The SAG military stated possible use of + PDRY dissidents for this + purpose. This leaves the Saudis to attack from Sharura toward + Zamakh, Al-Abr, and Minwakh, plus a drive down into the mouth of the + Hadramaout Valley to a town called Hanayn. This is a thrust of + between 50 to 100 miles from the large forward operating base of the + Saudis at Sharura. It is within the range of Saudi aircraft. Saudis + already have about a 5,000 man force (mostly motorized infantry) at + Sharura and are making arrangements to more than double this number + soon.

+ +

E. The Saudi scheme of operations is, according to Saud, not intended + to result in long-term occupation or dismemberment of South Yemen, + nor is it intended—to judge by Saudi statements—to topple Aden by + direct assault. It is intended, however, to create a situation in + which the PDRY Army and political + leadership might decide to overturn Abdul Fattah Ismail in the aftermath of PDRY defeat and withdrawal from + Yemen.

+

7. The Saudi request for US support + and endorsement should be carefully considered. The decisions we + take on the Saud request may + have far-reaching consequences. On the face of it, Saudi Arabia is + asking for a major commitment from us—a commitment to back up Saudi + military action and, if necessary, to intervene to rescue them from + Soviet/Cuban military reaction. Nevertheless, notwithstanding Saud’s + statement to me that Saudi Arabia had “decided” to intervene + militarily, we see little enthusiasm here for military action, and + the prospects that Saudi Arabia will implement its decision are not + high. The risks are real, however, that events could propel Saudi + Arabia in the direction of intervention, and we should respond to + the Saudi request for American support with this possibility in + mind. Accordingly, we should examine closely the two crucial policy + issues Saud has placed + before us: (1) should we encourage or discourage Saudi military + action against PDRY; and (2) what + should be the extent of US military + support in these circumstances.

+

A. A successful Saudi military action in South Yemen would be a + defeat for the PDRY, a setback of + some proportions for the USSR, and + a significant gain in credibility for the United States (and Saudi + Arabia). It would offset, and perhaps overcome, impressions current + in the Middle East and elsewhere in the world that the friendship + and support of the United States is of little practical value, and + that the United States will not act in the face of Soviet-supported + aggression. It would give practical sustenance to the President’s + new security policy enunciated by Secretary Brown earlier this month. It would + deal a rebuff to Arab radicalism and sound a cautionary note for + other Arab radicals. It would obligate Saudi Arabia to the United + States in a new way.

+

B. Encouraging Saudi military action in PDRY has real dangers however. The Saudi military + effort will almost surely fail, either because of Saudi incompetence + or because of Soviet-Cuban intervention. It is uncertain, even + improbable, that the Saudi attack could achieve its aim of forcing a + rapid PDRY withdrawal from YAR; it is unlikely that the Saudi + military action could be completed successfully before a + Soviet-Cuban counteroffensive had occurred; and it is certain that + the Saudi forces could not withstand a Soviet-backed attack by proxy + forces. A Saudi defeat, as Saud said to me, is “politically intolerable” and + could lead to the eclipse of the Saudi royal family’s leadership, + and a political unravelling + in the Peninsula. Saudi Arabia will look to us to bail them out. But + the United States will be unable to muster the necessary + domestic-political endorsement for US military support for a Saudi invasion of an + independent state. The United States will thus be found wanting when + the chips are down. These real risks appear to weigh more heavily + than the fond hopes.

+

C. Full US support requirements + implied by the Saud request + are enormous. If we encourage Saudi military action, we should also + be prepared to (1) meet urgent equipment requirements of Saudi + Arabia and YAR, for both political + and military reasons, at expense of our own stocks; (2) resupply + combat-attrited expendables and major end items; (3) give the + necessary planning and tactical advice and intelligence support to + enhance operations; (4) politically, work to achieve domestic + political support and, diplomatically, take a very hard line with + the Soviet Union; and (5) prepare for a US military presence in Saudi Arabia and a last-resort + commitment to protect the Kingdom.

+

D. There is also a lesser level of support possible. We could (1) + make general commitment to supply necessary equipment to both Saudi + Arabia and YAR and be generous in + our interpretation of “necessary”; (2) expedite the deliveries of + F–5’s and supply Redeyes under suitable control + arrangements for the YAR; (3) + provide training teams and tactical advice to the YAR in order to raise the proficiency + of YAR forces quickly; and (4) + create a logistics support arrangement, involving US military personnel in country. We + could also develop an action program, in cooperation with Saudi + Arabia, for involving third-country military personnel in support of + the YAR (Jordan and Egypt for + example). So far as we know, however, Saudi Arabia has not been + active as of yet in this. Although telling us they agree in + principle to third-country participation, they have left it up to + the YAR to arrange and haven’t + offered to pay for any costs.

+

8. There are alternatives. Discussion above has focused on options as + conceived by the Saudis; we should think in terms of alternatives to + the risky and difficult attack by Saudi forces on PDRY. First alternative is use of + Saudi forces within YAR, and second + alternative is diplomatic effort which extends far beyond one-month + period which Saudis have so far mentioned informally as limit of + their patience.

+

A. Military commitment within YAR + involves air strikes by Saudi aircraft on PDRY enclaves in Harib, Sayda, Qataba, and Waza’iyah + areas and/or commitment of some Saudi Army units—artillery, + antitank, air defense, local security, and helicopters—in YAR, either in central locations in + Sana (to free YAR units for + movement away from capital) or on major avenues of approach.

+

B. This alternative has several unattractive features to Saudis, + including not only problems they mentioned, i.e., danger of + accidental attacks on local + tribes by Saudi aircraft and inadvertent destruction of villages by + Saudi fire but probably also problem which Saudis did not mention, + [2 lines not declassified]. Other + difficulties with commitment within YAR is that it is not likely to be decisive or quick as + strike directly at PDRY might be, + and it means that fighting will take place on soil of victim rather + than aggressor. It could be wasteful and protracted conflict, + subject to the divisions and personalism of Yemeni politics.

+

C. On other hand, commitment within YAR ranges Saudis alongside YAR in clearly defensive role which would make + diplomatic case more palatable. It would tend to contain conflict in + Yemen rather than widening it. It would be easier to draw in other + forces in pan-Arab peacekeeping or expeditionary force and it would + sustain morale of YAR Government + and fighting capability of YAR + forces. Last and not least, it would be far easier for USG to mount resupply effort for + Saudis and Yemenis and convince domestic and international opinion + of correctness of our role.

+

D. Diplomatic effort should not only be much longer than Saudis now + anticipate but also should be much more far ranging effort than + attempt to get paper decision in Arab League. Saudis have + sophisticated view of economic and commercial pressures which can be + brought to bear on PDRY. + Remittances, shipments of Arab oil to Aden refinery, payments of + Arab aid are most important props of marginal PDRY economy and more important than + Communist aid. Cut-offs would not necessarily be decisive but would + create unrest in population and some potential for division in + leadership over foreign adventure which sacrifices national welfare + for international revolution. Political isolation of PDRY—especially if Syria and Iraq can + be brought along—would strike at Arab credentials of Aden regime. + Condemnation in Arab League is of passing importance by comparison, + as is UN call for withdrawal, but + these could be added to efforts to rally international opinion + against “renegade” regime in Aden.

+

9. Based on foregoing, I recommend the following: respond to Saudi + request for US security commitment + by telling SAG that (1) the United + States is prepared to state, in a public forum, our commitment to go + to the aid of Saudi Arabia, in accordance with our constitutional + processes, if Saudi Arabia is subject to unprovoked aggression; (2) + we strongly discourage an attack directly across Saudi borders on + PDRY but will support efforts, + if necessary to use Saudi forces within YAR to force PDRY + withdrawal, and will do what we can in this regard to supply + attrited expendables and essential major end items; (3) subject to + Saudi undertaking not to attack PDRY directly, we will provide needed military + equipment items, including air munitions, on expedited basis to + ensure SAG can negotiate from a + position of strength; and (4) we are prepared to work jointly with + SAG to examine YAR + military needs and to + further accelerate deliveries of tanks and APC’s now on order.

+

10. In addition, I also recommend the following: A. Diplomatic. An + active diplomatic effort in support of Arab League attempts to + arrange a cease fire and withdrawal of PDRY forces. We could press Soviets urge these actions + on Ismail in Moscow. We + might make available to YAR, for + public release, aerial photographic evidence, if any, of PDRY incursions. Privately and + publicly we should discourage Saudis from phase three intervention + in PDRY.

+

B. Joint planning. Continue discussions now underway with regard to + planning for the defense of Saudi Arabia. This would include + examination of threats, contingencies, responses, and requirements. + Do not agree now to joint planning for offensive operations against + PDRY.

+

C. Intelligence sharing. We should arrange to share intelligence of a + regional and tactical nature. We might do this through the planning + team.

+

D. Tactical advice to YAR. Provide + small number of area-knowledgeable people to form joint team with + Saudis in giving tactical military advice to YAR military, and in developing ways + to improve military capabilities of YAR.

+

E. Increase US naval presence in the + Indian Ocean modestly, as a readily available but over-the-horizon + military force, not intrusive on local political sensibilities but + periodically visible through port calls. Consider the development of + co-located operating bases and periodic deployments of USAF aircraft.

+

F. Agree to expedite delivery of Saudi F–15’s to first quarter of + 1981, as requested. Agree to recommend to Congress this year items + of high value to Saudi Arabia, especially F–5 munitions. Offer to update 1974 survey of Saudi + military forces to assist in long-range planning requirements.

+

G. Expedite the delivery of 12 F–5 + aircraft to YAR, with deliveries by + 1 April, if by that time, Saudi Arabia provides from its own + resources, or acquires from third countries, necessary pilots and + support personnel and equipment. This should have a useful + bolstering effect on Salih.

+

H. Agree to the deployment of Saudi-manned Redeyes to YAR, as alternative to giving Redeyes + to Yemen itself. Expedite the repair and delivery of Redeyes now in + pipeline for Saudi Arabia. Agree to provide additional 318 Redeyes + requested of Secretary Brown.

+

I. Expedite delivery to YAR of 64 + M60 tanks and 50 M113 APC’s for + delivery by May. Agree to provide TOW missiles on expedited basis if Saudi Arabia will + agree to their purchase.

+

J. Undertake with Saudis to develop additional assistance program for + YAR through joint military + survey of YAR requirements. Tailor + suggested equipment to + achieve modest but real improvement in overcoming YAR deficiencies. Concentrate on + training teams and nonsophisticated equipment.

+
+ +
+ 270. Memorandum From Secretary of State Vance to President CarterSource: Carter Library, Plains File, Subject File, Box 39, + State Department Evening Reports, 3/79. Secret. In the upper + right-hand corner of the first page of the memorandum, Carter wrote: “Cy + J.” + + + Washington, March + 3, 1979 + +

1. Yemen—Scattered reports indicate that + fighting between North and South Yemen continues, although a + ceasefire was announced to take effect early today.On March 2, North and South Yemen agreed to a + cease-fire brokered by Syria and Iraq and to consider a mutual + withdrawal of forces, which would be proposed at an upcoming + Arab League Foreign Ministers meeting (see footnote 6, Document + 274). (Marvine Howe, “Yemen and Southern Yemen Agree to a + Cease-Fire,” The New York Times, March 3, + 1979, p. 3)

+

We have stressed our willingness to be as supportive as US law permits in non-combat support of + any Saudi defensive role in North Yemen. We have accelerated by + airlift the delivery of military equipment we previously agreed to + provide the YAR, and also agreed to + new requests for some TOW missiles + and grenade launchers. North Yemen accepted our offer of increased + aerial reconnaissance but declined a US naval visit to the port of Hodeida. Meanwhile the + Arab League Foreign Ministers agreed to meet in Kuwait tomorrow to + discuss the Yemen situation.

+

[Omitted here is material unrelated to Yemen.]

+
+ +
+ 271. Summary of Conclusions of a Special National Security Council + MeetingSource: Carter Library, + National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Middle East, Subject + File, Box 94, Yemens: Meeting: (3/5/79 NSC): 3/79. Secret. The meeting took place in the + White House Situation Room. The minutes are ibid. An unknown + hand crossed out “Coordination Committee” in the heading of the + document and wrote “NSC” above + it. Carter approved the + Summary of Conclusions, writing “OK C” in the right-hand corner + of the first page. Aaron + sent the Summary of Conclusions to Vance, Brown, and Turner under a March 5 covering + memorandum. + + + Washington, March 5, + 1979, 2–3 p.m. + + + PARTICIPANTS + President Jimmy + Carter + + + Department of State + Secretary Cyrus + Vance + David Newsom, Under + Secretary of State for Political Affairs + William R. Crawford, + Deputy Asst. Sec., Bureau of Near Eastern & South Asian + Affairs + William Bowdler, Director, Bureau of Intelligence & + Research + + + Department of Defense + Secretary Harold + Brown + Charles W. Duncan, + Deputy Secretary + Robert Murray, Deputy + Asst. Sec. for ISA + + + JCS + Gen David C. Jones, + Chairman + LtGen William Y. Smith, Asst. to the Chairman + Adm James Lyons, Office of Plans and Policy + + + Vice President Walter Mondale + Denis Clift, Assistant + to the Vice Pres. for National Security Affairs + + + + + DCl + Stansfield + Turner, Director Central + Intelligence + Frank + Carlucci, Deputy Director Central + Intelligence + + + + + White House + Zbigniew + Brzezinski + David + Aaron + Hamilton + Jordan + Jody + Powell + + + + + NSC + Gary + Sick + + + + + SUBJECT + Yemen (U) + +

The President indicated that we should do what we can to assist in + defense of the YAR, short of direct + U.S. military involvement in the Yemens. Our efforts should be + directed primarily [1 line not declassified] + in defense of the YAR. The + following specific steps were agreed: (S)

+

1. We will reconfirm our assurance previously given the Saudis that + we would help defend them in the event of an attack on Saudi + territory. That commitment will not be extended to the defense of + the YAR. The U.S. will be prepared + to assist in the planning of whatever steps or actions are necessary in the defense + of the YAR including the provision + of related support. (S)

+

2. The U.S. will encourage Saudi Arabia [3 lines + not declassified]. We will indicate our willingness to + assist [less than 1 line not declassified] + including U.S. logistic support. (S)

+

3. The Secretary of State will consult with [less + than 1 line not declassified] concerning what assistance + they may be willing to provide. (S)

+

4. The U.S.U.N. Mission will assess the most effective means of + raising this issue in the UN, + bringing in the support of other nations as possible. The YAR should be encouraged to take the + lead, with Saudi backing. (S)

+

5. The Secretary of State will deliver a strong message to the + Soviets, protesting their involvement in the PDRY attack and indicating our firm + backing of the integrity of regional borders, our commitment to + protect the integrity of Saudi Arabia, and the serious effect this + action can have on our relations with the USSR. (S)

+

6. The U.S. is prepared to transfer 12 F–5 aircraft to Saudi Arabia [l line + not declassified]. Alternatively, the [2 + lines not declassified]. The U.S. would be prepared to + provide maintenance and support. (S)

+

7. The U.S. will be prepared to provide replacement of equipment lost + [less than 1 line not declassified] on + the same basis as the assurance previously given to Saudi Arabia. + (S)

+

8. The U.S. will offer to provide immediate deployment of a squadron + of USAF F–15s and AWACS aircraft to Saudi Arabia for + defense of Saudi Arabian airspace. (S)

+

9. A U.S. carrier from the Pacific will be ordered to proceed to the + area. (S)

+

10. SR–71 reconnaissance of the area will be examined, possibly + operating from bases in the region, such as Egypt.

+

11. The DCI will undertake an + assessment of the stability of the Salih Government in the YAR and the prospects for the emergence of alternative + leadership friendly to the Saudis and ourselves. (S)

+

12. We will maintain the lowest possible public posture on our own + activities for now, with no announcement of movements of units. We + should take all necessary steps to make public the Soviet role, + their advance knowledge of the attack and the involvement of the + Cubans and Ethiopians. (S)

+
+ +
+ 272. Paper Prepared in the Central Intelligence AgencySource: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of + Congressional Affairs, Job 81M01032R, Subject Committee Files + (1943–1980), Box 9, Folder 24, Covert Action Pres Find Saudi + Arabia. Secret; Sensitive. The paper was considered at the March + 6 SCC meeting. See Document 187. + + + Washington, undatedUS + +

Proposed Covert Action Program in the + Arabian Peninsula

+

INITIATIVE

+

This proposal derives from a consideration of the deteriorating + situation in the Arabian Peninsula by the Special Coordination + Committee (SCC) on 5 March + 1979.See Document 271.

+

SYNOPSIS

+

This proposal provides options for assisting the Governments of Saudi + Arabia, the Yemen Arab Republic (YAR) and Oman in countering the threat posed by the + aggressive policies of the People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen + (PDRY). A long term subversive + program by PDRY against the YAR has recently escalated into + relatively large scale military incursions. PDRY is receiving substantial + assistance from the Soviet Union, Cuba and East Germany. Failure of + the United States to act could indicate to the Saudis and other area + countries that the U.S. Government was not concerned with their + security and could also lead to the destabilization of YAR. The options involved include:

+ + (1) Defensive training for YAR and Omani military personnel + (2) Support for the YAR + through consultants and advisors + (3) Propaganda Broadcasts [less than 1 line + not declassified] into PDRY + (4) Agent of influence operations against PDRY + +

POLICY

+

It is United States policy to maintain friendly relations with Saudi + Arabia, Oman and the Yemen Arab Republic, and to respond positively + to requests from friendly countries, where appropriate, for + assistance to counter Communist-sponsored insurgencies and + subversion.

+

PROBLEM

+

PDRY has been sponsoring continuing + insurgency in the border area between PDRY and the YAR, and + to a lesser extent along the border between PDRY and Oman. There is historical + tribal irredentism in these areas, which PDRY is exploiting. In late February the insurgency escalated in YAR. Three towns have been occupied, + and the PDRY-backed forces appear + to be moving on major population centers. It is believed that they + intend to cut off the southern portion of North Yemen from the + YAR proper.

+

PDRY is receiving political, + economic and military support from the Soviets, Cuba and East + Germany. The Government of Saudi Arabia believes that PDRY is acting as a surrogate for the + Soviet Union and poses a serious threat to the stability of the + moderate regimes in the Arab Peninsula. The Saudis have indicated + that they will support [less than 1 line not + declassified] efforts of the United States to increase the + ability of YAR and Oman to resist + PDRY aggression. Conversely, + failure of the United States to [less than 1 line + not declassified] at this time could convince the Saudis + that the United States is not interested in their security and lead + to a worsening of the United States position in the Arab + Peninsula.

+

The Saudis have indicated that if PDRY-backed forces do not withdraw, they may open + hostilities against PDRY. However, + their military capabilities to deal with this crisis are limited. + The Arab League is meeting in Kuwait to attempt to resolve the + problem, but it is anticipated that their efforts will prove + unsuccessful. Therefore, without U.S. intervention, the PDRY-sponsored insurgency will + probably succeed, and PDRY may be + encouraged to expand its aggression.

+

At the same time, PDRY itself is + not without vulnerabilities, including: apparent tribal dissidence; + opposition to the Marxist regime’s anti-Islamic policies; separatist + tendencies in the Hadhramaut area; and resentment against the rule + of the North Yemeni President, Ismail, by his South Yemeni subjects. Programs + exploiting these vulnerabilities could substantially diminish, in + time, PDRY’s ability to operate + against its neighbors.

+

ACTION OPTIONS

+

1. Overt Options: Through diplomatic channels, + the United States can protest to the Soviets and their surrogates + regarding PDRY’s activities and + can mobilize other friendly governments to concern themselves with + the deteriorating situation in the Peninsula. A U.S. military option + is also available as a last resort.

+

2. Covert Action Options: CIA proposes the following options, + which would serve both to improve area governments’ capabilities to + resist PDRY aggression and to + reassure them of U.S. interest in their security. [1½ lines not declassified]

+

a. Defensive Training for YAR and + Omani Military Personnel. We would propose training, [less than 1 line not declassified] select + YAR and Omani units to cope + with subversion and destabilization operations run into the YAR and Oman from the People’s + Democratic Republic of + Yemen. Because of the current escalation in the YAR, the initial focus of the program + would be in that country. Training would include, inter alia, + instruction to government administrators on communist tactics; + training of militia leaders in weapons handling and small scale + military tactics; and assistance in the development of + counterpropaganda operations against PDRY. (Note: This option may have little impact if + military activity permanently escalated to the level of conventional + warfare, involving tanks, artillery and tactical air support.)

+

b. [10 lines not declassified]

+

c. Propaganda Broadcasts [less than 1 line not + declassified] into PDRY. + Establishment of a transmitter [less than 1 line + not declassified] for propaganda broadcasting into PDRY is a definite possibility. [7½ lines not declassified] A survey would + have to be conducted to determine technical requirements. We assume + that [less than 1 line not declassified] + approach would be required to reach a wide PDRY audience. We doubt that [less + than 1 line not declassified] currently has the necessary + facilities.

+

The aim of our radio propaganda would be to denigrate the regime of + PDRY President Ismail, condemn its anti-Islamic + policies, and exploit tribal dissidence, separatism and regional + frictions within PDRY.

+

d. Agent of Influence Operations Against PDRY. We propose recruitment and manipulation of + dissident PDRY regional, tribal + and political leaders to foment unrest within PDRY. [2½ lines not + declassified] This activity would require good intelligence + on PDRY, which in turn would + necessitate undertaking new collection operations.

+

RISKS

+

[less than 1 line not declassified] agent of influence activities are low profile and + involve little risk. The defensive training and radio options, + on the other hand, would be readily detected by our adversaries + and, while U.S. involvement would be deniable, they would + constitute a clear signal that the U.S. Government was involved. + If they are successful, particularly the defensive training + option, they could lead to an escalation by the other side. On + the other hand, if they did not produce results, they could + prove disappointing to our allies. This could lead to demands + for intensification of our involvement, for example, for + mounting cross-border paramilitary operations into PDRY as opposed to merely + defensive training activities.

+

As indicated above, the risk of not carrying out + some or all of these options is that the Saudis, YAR and Oman may come to believe + that the U.S. Government is not interested in their + security.

+

ALTERNATIVES TO U.S. ACTION

+

[1 paragraph (6½ + lines) not declassified]

+

COSTS

+

[table not declassified]

+

The sums involved almost certainly will require [less than 1 line not declassified].

+ +

COORDINATION AND REPORTING

+

This paper has not been coordinated outside CIA and, because of time constraints, has received only + limited coordination within the Agency. CIA believes that this proposal, if implemented, + requires a Presidential finding and Congressional reporting under + the provisions of Section 662 of the Foreign Assistance Act.Section 662 of the Foreign Assistance Act + of 1974 that required a Presidential Finding that special + activities of the Central Intelligence Agency in foreign + countries were important to the national security of the United + States. This was repealed in 1991.

+

SCC + DECISIONS

+

There has been no prior SCC decision + on this subject.

+
+ +
+ 273. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the + Soviet Union and the Embassy in Saudi ArabiaSource: Carter Library, National Security + Affairs, Staff Material, Middle East, Subject File, Box 93, + Yemens: Border War: 3/5–12/79. Secret; Niact Immediate; Nodis. Sent for information + Immediate to Sana, Paris, London, and the White House. Printed + from a copy that was received in the White House Situation Room. + Drafted by Bodine and + Sherrod McCall (EUR/SOV); + cleared by Robert L. Barry (EUR), Marshall Shulman (S/MS), Crawford, and Wisner; approved by Newsom. (National Archives, RG + 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840140–2571) Brzezinski traveled to Egypt + with Carter to meet with + Sadat March 7–10. Also printed in Foreign + Relations, 1977–1980, vol. VI, Soviet Union, + Document 179. + + + Washington, March 6, 1979, + 0136Z + +

54819. White House—pass Dr. Brzezinski on aircraft. Subject: Secretary’s Meeting + With Dobrynin. Ref: Moscow + 5258.In telegram 5258 from Moscow, + March 2, the Embassy described ’s meeting with Soviet First + Deputy Foreign Minister Korniyenko regarding the Yemen + situation, during which reiterated the U.S. desire for the + Soviet Union to urge restraint on the People’s Democratic + Republic of Yemen. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign + Policy File, P840176–1010)

+

1. Secretary Vance met with + Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin + March 5. Dobrynin requested + meeting to provide Soviet response to our demarche on Yemen + situation February 27.See footnote 2, Document 263. The + Ambassador’s instructions were to express satisfaction that Soviet + urgings of restraint had resulted in a ceasefire; he was also to + raise the question of U.S. arms shipments to the YAR. The Secretary told him the + ceasefire had not held, and that the fighting had expanded, pointing + out that Soviet logistical support and shipments of military + equipment, including artillery and anti-tank rockets, had + contributed to the present situation.

+

2. The Secretary impressed on Dobrynin the urgency of getting the PDRY forces back across the border + from their deep penetration into the YAR and the importance of restoring the ceasefire. He + indicated that we had obligations to Saudi Arabia and we would honor + those obligations. The Soviet Union should understand that its + actions in Yemen bear on our vital interests in the region. + Dobrynin said there was + no threat to Saudi Arabia, but Secretary indicated that the Saudis + were nevertheless worried. Dobrynin promised to report our views.

+

3. For Jidda: Ambassador may use summary of Vance-Dobrynin conversation in briefing Saudis on our + continuing efforts to persuade Soviets to play a constructive role + in the resolution of this conflict. After briefing Saud on the Secretary’s demarche + to Dobrynin, you should + point out the anomaly of US support + for Saudi Arabia vis-a-vis + PDRY and the press play on his + interview with Hawadis.Reference is to + Saud’s interview printed in the March 3 issue of Al Hawadess, a weekly Lebanese magazine. + Saud asserted: “We + would like to emphasize that the absence of diplomatic ties + between us does not mean we do not recognize the Soviet Union or + the importance of the role played by Soviet international + policy. We have in the past expressed gratitude toward the + positive stands taken by the Soviet Union regarding Arab + questions. (“Saudi Hints at Efforts for Better Soviet Ties But + Not Formal Links,” The New York Times, + March 5, 1979, p. A6) At this particular time, with the + Yemen conflict raging, such statements might be interpreted as Saudi + encouragement in Moscow.

+

4. For Moscow: Above points provided as background. You may draw on + them if the occasion should arise but you need not approach Soviets + on this specifically.

+

5. Addressees will be provided septel factual up-date of Soviet + assistance to PDRY, with emphasis + on post-June ’78 coup arms deliveries and review of current + political and military situation in YAR.Not found.

+ + Vance + +
+ +
+ 274. Memorandum From Secretary of State Vance to President CarterSource: Carter Library, Plains File, Subject File, Box 39, + State Department Evening Reports, 3/79. Secret. Carter wrote “Cy J” in the + upper right-hand corner of the memorandum. + + + Washington, March + 6, 1979 + +

Yemen. We have little news on the fighting. + The Arab League-mandated ceasefireThe + Arab League Foreign Ministers met in Kuwait March 5–6 to discuss + the Yemen situation. The Arab League plan “called for a truce + and a committee of Arab foreign ministers to follow it up. It + also called for mutual withdrawals within a week, stationing of + military observers along the border and opening of talks for + unification of Yemen and Southern Yemen.” (Marvine Howe, “Arab + League Agrees on Plan,” The New York + Times, March 6, 1979, p. A8) which officially + went into effect this morning appears to have some impact: the level + of combat seems to be reduced. The ceasefire calls for (1) an + immediate end to fighting; (2) pullback of forces to internationally + recognized borders within ten days, i.e., by March 16; (3) appointment of military and + political committees to oversee the ceasefire and withdrawal + (composed of Iraq, Syria, Jordan, the United Arab Emirates, Algeria, + Kuwait, the PLO and the Arab League + Secretary General); (4) cessation of propaganda attacks; (5) + eventual re-establishment of commercial and diplomatic ties; (6) + direct dialogue between North and South Yemen at the presidential + level, with Kuwait offering to host such a meeting. The Syrians and + Iraqis jointly took the lead in bringing about Arab League + action.

+

[Omitted here is material unrelated to Yemen.]

+
+ +
+ 275. Summary of Conclusions of a Mini-Special Coordination + Committee MeetingSource: Carter + Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Middle East, + Subject File, Box 94, Yemens: Meetings: (3/7/79 Mini-SCC): 3/79. Confidential. The + meeting took place in the White House Situation Room. The + minutes are not attached and were not found. + + + Washington, March 7, + 1979, 3–4:30 p.m. + + + SUBJECT + Yemen + + + PARTICIPANTS + + State + David Newsom, + Under Secretary for the Middle East + Lucy Benson, + Under Secretary for Security Assistance + Ambassador William + Crawford + + + + + OSD + David + McGiffert, Assistant Secretary for + International Security Affairs + David Ransom, + Deputy Director, NEASA Region + Eric Von Marbod, Deputy Director, Defense Security + Assistance Agency + + + + + JCS + Lt. General William Y. Smith, Assistant to the + Chairman + Colonel Kenneth McKim + + + + + DCI + Dr. Robert + Bowie, NIO + Raymond Andrews, NIO + + + + + White House + David Aaron + (Chairman) + + + + + NSC + Gary + Sick + Leslie G. + Denend + + +

A mini-SCC meeting was called to + follow-up on decisions taken at the NSC meeting March 5.See + Document 271. The following + issues were reviewed: (C)

+

1. Under Secretary Newsom will + brief the Congress this afternoon and tomorrow to convey the + following points: (C)

+

—Status of deliveries to the YAR and + Saudi Arabia including anticipated additional sales, and our intent + to waive the required formal 30-day notification period for three + sales to the YAR which have just + completed the informal notification period. (C)

+

—That if Saudi aircraft enter combat in support of the YAR, it may be necessary for the + United States to replenish Saudi air munitions. (C)

+

—That U.S. forces will not be directly involved in activities in the + YAR but that training connected + with arms sales will go forward as planned. (C)

+

—If questioned on the War Powers Resolution, Newsom will respond that U.S. + forces will not be involved in the YAR. He will indicate that we are very aware of the + resolution and will consult if and when required. (C)

+

2. The Saudis have declined our offer to send F–15s to Saudi Arabia + but have requested the urgent deployment of AWACS. Two AWACS aircraft currently in Okinawa + will move to Saudi Arabia during the next 24 hours. (C)

+

3. Rather than provide U.S.-origin long-range artillery to the YAR, the U.S. will encourage Yemen to + use artillery already in their inventory, seeking ammunition and + support from Egypt if necessary. (C)

+

4. To answer the question posed by Princes Fahd and Saud on the legal implications for + the United States Government if Saudi Arabia were to go to the aid + of the YAR under their defense + pact, State and Defense will review the U.S. statute. (C)

+

5. Should U.S. participation in the Saudi planning effort to assist + the YAR become significant, it may + be necessary to augment the number of people presently available to + General Cathey. (C)

+
+ +
+ 276. Memorandum From Gary + Sick of the National Security Council Staff to the + President’s Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs + (Aaron)Source: Carter Library, National Security + Affairs, Staff Material, Middle East, Subject File, Box 93, + Yemens: Border War: 3/5–12/79. Secret. A stamped notation on the + first page reads: “DA has + seen.” + + + Washington, March + 8, 1979 + + + SUBJECT + Yemen: Your Meeting with the Vice President + +

Since the completion of the Arab League Foreign Ministers meeting in + Kuwait on Tuesday,See footnote 2, Document 274. the + fighting seems to have subsided somewhat. There are reports that the + YAR defense has stiffened, but + that may only reflect a lower level of activity by the PDRY. Nevertheless, there were + reports of PDRY air attacks on + YAR positions yesterday, + suggesting that an effective YAR + counterattack may have begun to materialize. (S)

+

On the political front, an Arab League committee (Jordan, Syria, + Iraq, Kuwait, UAR, Algeria, PLO) is + due to visit the YAR in the next + two days as part of the cease fire supervisory effort. The Kuwait + communique also called for a meeting “at the summit level” between + YAR and PDRY. The YAR leadership says it will meet only after PDRY troops are withdrawn; PDRY wants to meet before. The + withdrawal was to take place in no less than 10 days, i.e. by March + 16. There is a lot of diplomatic activity on that front, and an + early YAR–PDRY summit is not likely. (S)

+

There have been isolated cases of tribal revolt in the North. A small + band attacked a guard post near the Sanaa airport but was driven off + without casualties. Other limited tribal clashes have occurred north + of Sanaa but have reportedly been contained. The Salih government has been badly + undermined, and there is talk of succession, including a possible + seven-man ruling council composed of tribal leaders and political + figures, with Salih + remaining at least titular President. The Saudis are probably + actively involved in the power-brokering, but we will hear of it + only after the fact if past experience is any guide. (S)

+
+ +
+ 277. Summary of Conclusions of a Mini-Special Coordination + Committee MeetingSource: Carter + Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Global + Issues, Oplinger/Bloomfield Subject File, Chron: 3/9–14/79. + Secret. The meeting took place in the White House Situation + Room. The minutes are not attached and were not found. Sent by + Aaron to Vance, Brown, and Turner under a March 14 + covering memorandum. + + + Washington, March + 14, 1979, 11 a.m.–12:30 p.m. + + + SUBJECT + Iran and Yemen + + + PARTICIPANTS + The Vice President + + State + Mr. David + Newsom, Under Secretary for Political + Affairs + Mr. William + Crawford, Deputy Assistant Secretary, + Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs + Mr. James Michel, Legal Advisor + + + + + OSD + Admiral Daniel J. + Murphy, Deputy Under Secretary for + Policy + Mr. David + Ransom, Deputy Director, Near Eastern, + African and South Asian Affairs + Cmdr James Kelly, Iran Desk Officer + + + + + JCS + Admiral James A. Lyons, Assistant Deputy Director for + Politico Military Affairs + Lt. Colonel Kenneth McKim, Staff Officer + + + + + CIA + Mr. Frank + Carlucci, Deputy Director + Mr. Bob Ames, NIO + Near East and South Asia + + + + + White House + Mr. David + Aaron, Chairman + Mr. John Matheny, Vice President’s Staff + + + + + NSC + Captain Gary + Sick + Lt. Colonel Leslie G. + Denend + + +

[Omitted here is material related to Iran.]

+

4. Ambassador West and + General Cathey will be asked + to assess Saudi intentions toward the Yemen situation in light of + recent indications that their policy might be changing. (S)

+

5. The SR–71 flight scheduled for Thursday, March 15 will go as + planned. After the intelligence is developed, specific authorization + will be sought before delivering the material to Saudi Arabia or the + YAR. After the flight, the U.S. will also begin an + exchange of order of battle intelligence with the YAR if they are interested. (S)

+

6. The U.S. will seek to make the case with the YAR that the continued presence of + Soviet advisors in North Yemen is no longer in their interest. + (S)

+

7. All agreed that U.S. participation in support for North Yemen has + moved into a period of consolidation. After having moved quickly to + accelerate the delivery of equipment in response to urgent Saudi and + Yemeni requests, U.S. efforts should now concentrate on support for + acceptable diplomatic initiatives to resolve the conflict and effect + a withdrawal and on our continuing to follow through on equipment + deliveries at a measured pace. (S)

+
+ +
+ 278. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the + Yemen Arab RepublicSource: National + Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790122–0688. + Secret; Immediate; Exdis. + Drafted by Twinam; + cleared by Crawford, + Sick, Murray, Hurlings (S/S–O); approved by Newsom. Sent for information + Immediate to Jidda, USLO + Riyadh, and Moscow. + + + Washington, March 17, 1979, + 0234Z + +

65767. Subject: Soviet Role in YAR.

+

(S) entire text.

+

1. As you are aware, prior to outbreak of recent hostilities it had + been U.S. policy not to urge YAR to + get rid of Soviet military advisors. Thinking behind this policy was + that lingering but declining Soviet presence in YAR might be a force for restraint on + Soviet part in South Arabia and concern that a premature YAR effort to dislodge Soviets could + precipitate a Soviet response threatening YAR stability.

+

2. Evidence since February 23 makes it clear that Soviets have not + been a force for restraint. We understand that YAR has entertained idea of asking + Soviet military advisors out but to our best information has taken + no action in this regard. In terms of YAR Government’s attitude towards Soviets, time may be + right to encourage YAR intentions + in this regard.

+

3. Congress has pressed us on the anomaly of lingering Soviet + advisory presence while we are supplying equipment and training. Our + accelerated delivery of equipment and training seems to meet + conditions YARG had previously stressed for termination + of Soviet role. In addition, as practical matter, we wonder whether + continued presence of Soviets, including possible Soviet offers of + additional equipment, could not interfere with our own efforts to + supply and train YAR armed + forces.

+

4. Before taking any action along these lines however we would + appreciate your assessment on two points. (1) Given YAR sensitivities about “super power” + competition in region, would it be preferable for probe to come from + Saudis rather than from U.S.? (2) Given the apparently delicate + state of political stability in YAR + and the ties which some YAR + military leaders have to the Soviet relationship, would we or Saudis + by suggesting to YAR that the time + has come to move against the Soviet presence run the risk of + precipitating a military coup attempt by pro-Soviet officers? In + this connection, it would be helpful to have update of your + assessment of attitudes in Yemeni military and political groups + about Soviets at this stage.See Document 279.

+ + Vance + +
+ +
+ 279. Telegram From the Embassy in the Yemen Arab Republic to the + Department of StateSource: National + Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790154–0571. + Secret; Immediate; Exdis. + Sent for information Immediate to Jidda, USLO Riyadh, and Moscow. + + + + Sana, March 19, 1979, 1227Z + +

1862. Subj: (S) Soviet Role in YAR. + Ref: State 065767.See Document 278.

+

1. (S-entire text).

+

2. Summary: A direct request to the YARG for immediate expulsion of all Soviet military + advisors at this time would be unwise. YARG officials have said they would like to see the + Soviet military advisors leave but, given the present internal and + international circumstances, we believe this will have to be done + quietly and gradually. A phased withdrawal of Soviet military advisors, as + described below, is less likely to become a controversial political + issue and therefore more likely to be acceptable to the YARG. End summary.

+

3. Despite the pounding that the YAR + Army took from Soviet weapons in the hands of the PDRY during the past three weeks, the + YAR attitude towards the + Soviets remains ambivalent. On the one hand, President Salih, the YARG and many Yemenis believe that + the Soviets supported the PDRY + attack, if they did not actually instigate it, and the YAR Army now knows for a certainty + that the Soviets gave more and better weapons and training to the + PDRY than to the YAR. We have also heard that, although + the Soviet military advisors continued to report for work during the + fighting, they did very little to help the YAR Army or the Air Force, remarking instead that if + the YAR had accepted the Soviet + offers of new equipment, rather than waiting for U.S. aid, they + would have been better able to defend themselves. On the other hand, + we have heard remarkably little public criticism of Soviet behavior. + YARG leaders have repeatedly + claimed that Cubans and even Ethiopians were fighting with PDRY forces inside the YAR, but they have not specifically + mentioned the Soviets in public. Many Yemeni politicians are of two + minds about the Soviets; in strictly Yemeni terms, they would like + to see them go as soon as they are sure the USG will take their place as arms suppliers and + advisors; in pan-Arab terms, however, the political figures are + reluctant at this time to cut all ties with a country that has + strongly supported the Arab position vis-a-vis Israel.

+

4. Internally, President Salih’s position is even weaker than before and all + of his rivals are jockeying for position and for both internal and + external support. A decision to expel the Soviets would be + politically dangerous. In present circumstances, we doubt whether + President Salih has the + power or the courage to take such action.

+

5. We estimate there are currently about 120–150 Soviet military + advisors in the YAR—about 30 with + the Air Force, 12 with the Navy, 6 at the military academy and most + of the remainder with the armored units and artillery. Soviet + advisors to the air defense units were withdrawn by the YAR prior to the recent fighting, on + the grounds that they had already provided all the training the + YAR Army needed on the + equipment it was using, and for some time prior to the fighting, + Soviet advisors needed prior approval from military HQs before + visiting a military unit. At the same time, the initial exposure of + the Yemeni military to our MTTs, which began early this year, has + had a positive effect. We have received numerous compliments on the + friendliness and professionalism of U.S. Army trainers as compared + with Soviet advisors. As our training programs expands, the Yemeni + armed forces will have a growing respect for the competence of our + soldiers and our military system.

+ +

6. If the Soviets perceived that we were determined to force the + government of President Salih to expel all their military advisors + immediately, they might well try to instigate a coup, since we do + not think they will give up their position here without a fight. The + most likely group to spearhead such a coup is the Air Force, + commanded by Major Dayfallah, who is Soviet trained and has + frequently been accused of being pro-Soviet. Chief of Staff + Ali Shayba is also very + close to the Soviets. Some internal elements of the pro-PDRY Democratic National Front might + join this attempt, but it would need more widespread support in the + Army to succeed. Whether or not this support would be forthcoming + would depend on other elements in the YAR political equation, such as the Nationalists and + the Baathis, as well as the tribes. If such an attempt were + successful, we believe the result would be a coalition government + that would include pro-Soviet elements but not be dominated by them. + The attitude of such a coalition government might be more favorable + to the continued presence of Soviet military advisors than that of + the present government.

+

7. Despite the publicity given to our arms supply effort to the + YAR, the fact of the matter is + that the only useful arms we sent while the fighting was going on + was 7,000 LAW anti-tank missiles. As of March 16, we have delivered + 12 105 howitzers, 12 TOWs and a number of grenade launchers, with + associated MTTs, but the planes, tanks and long-range artillery + pieces the YAR particularly wants + and needs have not yet arrived. Until we, the Saudis and/or the + Jordanians actually begin delivering these weapons, and training the + Yemenis how to use them, the YAR + will be extremely reluctant, for both military and political + reasons, to give up the weapons they have and the Soviet advisors + who keep them running.

+

8. We believe the best way to proceed on this problem is on a + step-by-step basis. We understand that the YAR is planning to move the remaining MiG–17s and the Soviet advisors + associated with them to Hodeida, once they have a firm ETA for the + F–5s in Sana. As the F–5s become + operational, the YAR can be + expected to rely more and more on them as its principal air weapon. + In the meantime, the MiGs will probably join the “static display” of + deadlined Soviet aircraft in Hodeida, particularly if the Soviets + continue to refuse to supply spare parts. As the aircraft break + down, the need for Soviet advisors will disappear and they can + quietly be sent home. The same system could be followed with the + tanks: once the M–60s have begun to arrive and YAR troops trained in their use, the + older Soviet tanks and their Soviet advisors could be moved to a + remote location and then retired from service. This might take + longer than in the case of the airplanes because the YAR military is supplied at the moment + entirely with Soviet tanks, but it would remove the Soviet advisors + from the scene and prevent them from interfering with our efforts to supply and train the + YAR armed forces. A suggestion + along these lines to the Yemenis could come more appropriately from + the Saudis or the Jordanians than from us, as was the case with the + F–5s. This keeps the matter in the Arab context + and makes it easier for other Arab states to accept.

+ + Lane + +
+ +
+ 280. Summary of Conclusions of a Mini-Special Coordination + Committee MeetingSource: Carter + Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Brzezinski Office File, + Country Chron File, Box 56, Yemen. Secret. The meeting took + place in the White House Situation Room. + + + Washington, March + 29, 1979, 10:38 a.m.–12:05 p.m. + + + SUBJECT + Current Issues—Yemen and Iran + + + PARTICIPANTS + + State + David Newsom, + Under Secretary for Political Affairs + Ms. Lucy + Benson, Under Secretary for Security + Assistance, Science and Technology + Ambassador William + Crawford, Deputy Assistant Secretary, + Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs + + + + + OSD + Robert Murray, + Deputy Assistant Secretary, Near Eastern, African and + South Asian Affairs + David Ransom, + Deputy Director, Near Eastern and South Asia + Affairs + + + + + JCS + Lt. General William Y. Smith, Assistant to the + Chairman + Admiral James A. Lyons, Assistant Deputy Director, + Politico-Military Affairs + + + CIA + Dr. Robert + Bowie, Director, National Foreign + Assessment Center + John Helgerson, Assistant NIO, Near East and South Asia + + + White House + David Aaron + (Chairman) + + + + NSC + Gary + Sick + Thomas + Thornton + Leslie G. + Denend + + +

The Mini-SCC met to update and + review outstanding issues.

+

Yemen

+

1. During ASD McGiffert’s + attendance at the U.S.-Jordan Military Commission meeting on April 7 + and 8, he will raise the issue of closer U.S.-Jordanian cooperation + in Yemeni training. He will urge the Jordanians to provide training + personnel to assist Yemen with the absorption of newly provided + equipment. (S)

+

2. State and DOD will continue to + press Saudi Arabia and Yemen for early completion of the training of + Yemeni F–5 pilots. (S)

+

3. DOD will circulate draft guidance + for General Lawrence to + visit the YAR for a first-hand + evaluation of the situation and to assess the absorption of new + equipment.See Document 284. (S)

+

4. JCS will work promptly to secure + release of SR–71 photos to Saudi Arabia at Saudi request. No + additional flights will be undertaken unless the Saudis make a + further request. (S)

+

5. DOD will dispatch a five-man + survey team to evaluate the Sana airfield and develop options. The + team will attempt to define the minimum construction necessary to + support the F–5s and other systems stationed there, + using regional assets as much as possible. (S)

+

6. The Embassy will approach the Saudis on the redeployment of the + two AWACS aircraft back to the + U.S., tentatively planned for April 8. If the Saudis request a brief + extension, we should accommodate them. (S)

+

7. DOD will circulate draft guidance + for the routine deployment of the Ranger to + the Indian Ocean, replacing the Constellation + approximately April 14. No replacement is presently planned after a + deployment of about one month. (S)

+

8. In order to meet P–3 surveillance requirements, State/DOD should approach Saudi Arabia first + on the use of commercial facilities for approximately one flight per + week for a month. Oman will also be approached for the use of + commercial facilities on the same terms. (S)

+

[Omitted here is material related to Iran.]

+
+ +
+ 281. Memorandum From Secretary of State Vance to President CarterSource: Carter Library, Plains File, Subject File, Box 39, + State Department Evening Reports, 4/79. Secret. In the upper + right-hand corner of the memorandum, Carter wrote: “Cy + J.” + + + Washington, April + 3, 1979 + +

[Omitted here is material unrelated to Yemen.]

+

5. Yemen: The Kuwaiti sponsored Summit between + the two Yemeni Presidents concluded with a declaration outlining + steps toward unification of the two states.The Arab League-sponsored summit took place in + Kuwait March 28–30. Salih and Ismail signed a unity declaration on March 30. + In telegram 2180 from Sana, April 1, the Embassy provided an + overview of the meeting and commentary on the declaration. + (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + D790150–0912) The declaration allows enough room for + interpretation so that either party may effectively block final + implementation without violating the letter of the agreement.

+

While the principle of unification receives lip service in both the + North and the South, various efforts to achieve this goal have + floundered in past years. It is too early to say whether the Kuwaiti + initiative will meet with any more success, but given the poor + record of Yemeni and other Arab unification attempts, the prognosis + is not favorable.

+

The declaration includes a fair amount of PDRY bombast—including a phrase on the need to + “consolidate the just Pan-Arab struggle against the common enemy + represented in the imperialist-Zionist-US alliance and treason.” We have received apologies + from members of the North Yemen Government explaining the phrase + reflected the Baghdad ConferenceSee + footnote 4, Document + 191. and the skillful maneuvering of the South + Yemeni President. The YAR has + offered to issue a statement on the value North Yemen places on its + relations with the US. We have + instructed our Ambassador to make clear to the North Yemen + Government that the declaration’s reference to the US undermines our ability to assist the + Government of North Yemen and that the proposed statement would be a + helpful antidote.

+
+ +
+ 282. Telegram From the Embassy in the Yemen Arab Republic to the + Department of StateSource: National + Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790197–0376. + Confidential. Sent for information to Jidda, USLO Riyadh, Cairo, and + Moscow. + + + Sana, April 30, 1979, 1142Z + +

2969. Subj: (U) Soviet-YAR + Relations. Ref: Sana 2800.In telegram + 2800 from Sana, April 23, the Embassy reported on an April 22 + meeting between Lane and + Salih in which the + latter “agreed to visit by MG + Lawrence, stressed the + importance of closer US–YAR relations, suggested the + formation of a high level tripartite committee (Saudi/US/Yemeni) to coordinate programs + and activities of mutual interest, and discussed unity with + PDRY, current internal + developments and Yemeni/Soviet relations.” (National Archives, + RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790185–1072)

+

1. (C-entire text).

+

2. In a wide-ranging conversation with Presidential Advisor Abdullah + Asnaj on April 29th, Asnaj + said he wished to elaborate on President Salih’s remarks to the Ambassador + on April 22 on Soviet-YAR + relations. He said the President had intended to convey to the + USG that Yemen’s relations with + the Soviet Union go back many years to a period prior to his entry + into government. This relationship had been very close in times past + and he was not in a position to make a precipitate decision to + terminate that relationship. On the other hand, it was the + President’s feeling that actions had to be taken gradually in the + not too distant future to reduce Soviet presence and to diminish the + relations between the two countries. Asnaj said the President had in mind to ultimately + terminate all Soviet advisors and break diplomatic relations. + Asnaj reiterated in + strongest terms that the President wanted the U.S. to know that he + was sincere in desiring a reduction of Soviet presence in the YAR and that in saying this he was not + trying to play the U.S. against the Soviet Union.

+

3. Asnaj said that he had + discussed the Soviet presence in Yemen with the Saudis on numerous + occasions. He recalled a conversation last summer during the time + when Saudi Arabia was discussing with U.S. and the YAR a new trilateral military + relationship, saying that he had told Prince Sultan that the Saudis + should prepare a timetable for the withdrawal of Soviet advisors in + Yemen. He pointed out that President Salih was new in office and would be amenable to + such a suggestion and that once committed he would follow through. + Asnaj urged Sultan to tie + the phasedown of Soviet advisors to the commitments and deliveries + of military equipment under the new tripartite assistance program. + Asnaj criticized Sultan + as having not taken his advice and as a consequence having never + given President Salih a good + plan for the elimination of Soviet influence in the YAR.

+ +

4. Asnaj said that, to his + knowledge, no Soviet advisors had been withdrawn from the YAR, but there were specific plans + afoot to return some of them to Soviet Union. He would not elaborate + further but pointed out that a number of Soviet advisors were no + longer working in their jobs with the military and that these were + the obvious people to return.

+

5. Comment: This is not the first time Asnaj has discussed actions to reduce Soviet + influence in the YAR. Even though + we have heard such talk on previous occasions, the President has + taken only a few limited actions against the Soviets, including + removal of Soviet advisors from radar sites and the transfer of the + MiG’s and related Soviet + personnel from Sana to Hodeidah. The latter action was taken under + intense pressure by the Saudis which took the form of a refusal to + transfer the F–5’s until all Soviet advisors and + equipment were removed from the airport. We believe Asnaj is much more committed to the + views he ascribed to the President than perhaps the President + himself.

+ + Gnehm + +
+ +
+ 283. Memorandum From Gary + Sick of the National Security Council Staff to the + President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) and the President’s + Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Aaron)Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff + Material, Middle East, Subject File, Box 93, Yemens: Border War: + 3/13/79–5/79. Secret; Sensitive. Outside the System. A stamped + notation on the memorandum indicates that Brzezinski saw + it. + + + Washington, May + 2, 1979 + + + SUBJECT + The Yemen Border War—A Revisionist Perspective + +

The Intelligence Community is significantly revising its views of + what actually happened in the Yemen border war as they go back and + fill in some of the gaps in the information available at the time. + Some of the conclusions of the analysts closest to the issue are as + follows:

+

—There was no unusual Soviet resupply. The flights which were + reported were part of a routine pattern.

+ +

—The fighting was far less intense than we had been led to believe. + There are virtually no signs of destruction in Qa’tabah, for + example, where we had been told there was total devastation.

+

—The force levels on either side amounted to about 3,000 men, with + the YAR enjoying a possibly slight + numerical advantage.

+

—The incident may have started as a result of cross-border raids from + the YAR, prompting a PDRY response.

+

—Only three of the 11 PDRY + battalions were engaged, whereas a major effort would probably have + called for commitment of 6 battalions or more.

+

—There is no evidence of Ethiopians involved in the fighting.

+

—A group of Cuban forces did arrive in Aden on the same day that the + first U.S. airlift flight arrived in Sanaa. There is no evidence of + any foreign personnel crossing the border.

+

—There were significant defections from the YAR military to the south. The YAR Government may not have known what was really going + on.

+

—The so-called National Democratic Force [Front] was a rag-tag collection of about 1,000 political + and military defectors from the YAR + which was never under the direct control of the PDRY and was relatively ineffective + in the fighting. (S)

+

There is no consensus about the motives and objectives of the PDRY. They clearly wanted to see the + YAR regime fall and be replaced + with a leadership more sympathetic to them. They may have expected a + military coup in Sanaa as they won their first battles. It is not + clear that they ever intended to take the Sanaa-Taiz road, although + their appetites may have grown when they experienced such great + success in their initial strikes. They faced a key decision point + after the fall of Qa’tabah and before beginning what could have been + a more costly drive up into the foothills. As it happened, the + tribal forces of the north began to arrive and the political process + by the Arab League began to move into full gear at that point, which + may have led to the PDRY decision + to leave well enough alone. (S)

+

The political process on both sides of the border remains murky, but + analysts have offered the following observations:

+

—The PDRY evidently felt that the + USSR did not provide as much + backing as the PDRY wanted or + expected.

+

—The Soviets may have felt some constraint due to their larger + interests in the rest of the Arabian Peninsula. In that regard, + Saud’s overture to the Soviets in the midst of the battle may have + been calculated.

+

—The Iraqis and Syrians were decisively important in getting the + PDRY to stop fighting. Until + Iraq and Syria weighed in, Arab League efforts were largely futile. The PDRY found itself unexpectedly + friendless.

+

—The Iraqi intervention was a major investment in developing a new + relationship with the Saudis, and it served them in good stead later + at the Baghdad meeting.

+

—The major leverage available to the Saudis was the “American card,” + which they played effectively. (S)

+

All of this being said, the central elements of the problem remain + about as we saw them at the time:

+

—There was a concerted effort by the PDRY to destabilize the Salih regime in the YAR by means of a military attack across the + border.

+

—The attack was conducted with Soviet materiel and at least Soviet + acquiescence.

+

—There was a serious threat of intervention by Cuban forces.

+

—The YAR military was largely + ineffective and threatened to collapse at least locally.

+

—The Saudis regarded the crisis as a major threat to their security + and viewed our participation as a fundamental test of our political + relationship. (S)

+

Thus far, the revision of the record has been confined to analysts at + the working level. There are no present plans to publish a formal + review. (S)

+
+ +
+ 284. Summary of Conclusions of a Mini-Special Coordination + Committee MeetingSource: Carter + Library, National Security Council, Institutional Files, Box + 120, SCC 068, 05/17/79, Mini + SCC, Arabian Peninsula + Security Issues. Secret. The meeting took place in the White + House Situation Room. The minutes are not attached and were not + found. + + + Washington, May 17, + 1979, 3:30–5 p.m. + + + SUBJECT + Security Issues in the Arabian Peninsula + + + PARTICIPANTS + + State: + Under Secretary Lucy + Benson, Security Assistance, Science and + Technology + Harold + Saunders, Asst. Secretary, Bureau of Near + Eastern and South Asian Affairs + William + Crawford, Deputy Asst. Sec., Bureau of + Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs + George Lane, + U.S. Ambassador to Yemen + Daniel O’Donohue, Deputy Director, Bureau of + Politico-Military Affairs + + + + + DOD: + Robert Murray, + Deputy Asst. Sec., Near Eastern African, and South Asian + Affairs + Gen Richard + Lawrence, Commander, U.S. European + Command Operations Planning Element, Saudi Arabia + Henry Gaffney, Director for Near East and South + Asia + David Ransom, + Deputy Director for Near East and South Asia + LtCol William Boice, Aide to General Lawrence + + + + + ACDA: + Henry Blechman, Asst. Director, Weapons Evaluation and + Control Bureau + Alan Platt, Arms Transfer and Economics + Division + + + + + JCS: + LtGen William Smith + Rear Admiral James A. Lyons, Jr., Asst. Director for + Politico-Military Affairs + + + + + DCI: + Robert Bowie, + Director, National Foreign Assessment Center + [name not declassified], Asst. + NIO for Near East + and South Asia + + + + + OMB: + Randy Jayne, Assoc. Dir., Nat’l Security & + International Affairs + + + + + White House: + David + Aaron + + + + + NSC: + Gary + Sick + + + +

The Mini-SCC met to hear Major + General Richard Lawrence’s + report on the findings of his team in Saudi Arabia and North Yemen. + He outlined for the group the major deficiencies in organization, + management and staff in both the Saudi and the Yemeni armed forces. + He proposed a number of changes in present command structure and the + assistance and advisory role of the United States to improve the + military capabilities of both countries. (S)

+

The group agreed that an interagency study was required of the + triangular U.S.-Saudi-Yemeni relationship, to be folded into the + on-going review of security issues in the Arabian Peninsula. The + study should address the question of how much we wish to emphasize + the U.S. role as opposed to the present situation of a U.S. role + which is essentially derivative from Saudi policy. If a greater U.S. + role is required or desirable, how should U.S. participation be + strengthened? How can we profit from the availability of Jordanian + military training and assistance? What would be the political + implications of an increased U.S. role? Does the U.S. military role + need to be balanced by a greater effort in the economic and + political sphere? (S)

+

Based on the findings of this broad review of U.S. objectives and + policy, the specific recommendations for command restructuring in + the field will be examined. (S)

+
+ +
+ 285. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Saudi + ArabiaSource: National Archives, RG + 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790368–0521. Secret; Niact Immediate; Exdis. Drafted by Countryman; cleared by Robert + S. Steven (S/S–O) and + Wheelock (NSC); approved by + Constable. Sent for + information to Sana. + + + Washington, August 14, 1979, + 0108Z + +

211437. For the Ambassador. Subject: Situation in the Yemens. Ref: + (A) State 208981;In telegram 208981 to + Jidda, August 11, the Department noted the Saudi request to + control the distribution of spare parts and ammunition for + F–5s to the Yemen Arab + Republic “but Saudi request to ‘establish the principle of + control’ poses a variety of problems for the US.” The Department concluded, “At + this point we have no alternative but to let the first shipment + of F–5 munitions be delivered.” + (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + D790364–0018) (B) Sana 5675;In telegram 5675 from Sana, August 12, the Embassy reported on + the ongoing unity talks between the Yemen Arab Republic and the + People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen. Although the YAR and PDRY leaders had exchanged various messages, + leading to a series of rumors of a forthcoming unity + announcement, the Embassy reported that Salih “still intends to + proceed toward unity very cautiously.” (National Archives, RG + 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790365–0938) (C) Jidda + 5880.In telegram 5880 from Jidda, + August 12, the Embassy described a meeting between West and + Saudi Deputy Foreign Minister Abd al-Rahman Mansuri that took + place on August 11. West informed Mansuri of the Department of + State’s response regarding Saudi control of ammunition and parts + to the Yemen Arab Republic. (National Archives, RG 59, Central + Foreign Policy File, D790366–0014)

+

1. In your meeting with Prince Sultan August 14 you should convey + increasing US concern about the + situation in the Yemens.

+

2. You should make the following points:

+

—We are concerned about the current political drift in North Yemen, + specifically the apparent weakness of the Salih government, and its + implications for YAR–PDRY relations. We believe Salih intends to spin out the + Yemen unity negotiations but that he needs to feel he has solid + ground from which to resist PDRY + pressures.

+

—We would appreciate learning how SAG intends to proceed in the current situation.

+

—Recent events in the PDRY add to + our concern for the North. It appears fairly clear to us that a + major power struggle is underway within the PDRY leadership. In these + circumstances there could be increased PDRY pressure on Salih to make significant gestures toward unity. + Alternatively, factions in the South could precipitate hostilities + against the North in order to divert attention from or influence, + power struggle in PDRY.

+

—In this connection we were struck by the bellicose language in the + statement following the August 11 extraordinary session of the PDRY’s Supreme Peoples Council, which calls for + “expanding the progressive revolutionary and nationalist forces and + resisting the ferocious and imperialist reactionary onslaughts”.

+

—In these circumstances we believe it is in the interest of both the + U.S. and Saudi Arabia to provide the North Yemen Government with + clear and unambiguous support. To do otherwise could encourage + political uncertainty in the North and provide increased + opportunities to the South.

+

—Over the next few weeks we wish to keep in close touch with the + SAG on events in the Yemens + with a view to exploring how each of us might best work to foster + stability of YAR in order to + discourage PDRY from exploiting + situation.

+

3. If you have already cleared the way with Mansouri (para 8 ref C) you should in addition + raise points in ref A re F–5 + munitions with Sultan making clear that the other points you have + made are in a broader context of concern about the Yemen + situation.

+

4. Would appreciate your providing brief initial telegraphic report + of Sultan’s reaction via Flash precedence August 14.In telegram 5936 from Jidda, August 14, the + Embassy detailed West’s conversation with Sultan regarding + Yemen. West noted that “Sultan seemed genuinely concerned with + situation in PDRY, a concern + emphasized by his request for photographic surveillance and + other intelligence on the situation there. His attitude towards + YAR, however, was almost + blase in contrast.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign + Policy File, D790369–0513)

+ + Vance + +
+ +
+ 286. Telegram From the Embassy in the Yemen Arab Republic to the + Department of State and the Department of DefenseSource: National Archives, RG 59, Central + Foreign Policy File, D790403–0569. Secret; Immediate. Sent for + information Priority to Jidda, USLO Riyadh, USCINCEUR Vaihingen, and Moscow. + + + Sana, September 4, 1979, 1026Z + +

6180. Subj: President Salih + on U.S.-Saudi Military Assistance Program and Purchase of Soviet + Arms. Ref: State 226410In telegram + 226410 to Sana, August 28, the Department agreed that the + delivery of the remaining F–5s to the Yemen Arab + Republic by National Day, September 26, would “be helpful in + reassuring President Salih of dependability of U.S. military + assistance effort. However, before approaching the Saudis on + this matter it would be helpful to know if they share our + assessment of YAR preparedness + to receive and maintain larger number of F–5’s at this + time.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + D790393–1073) (Notal).

+

1. (S-entire text)

+

2. Summary: Ambassador and DCM met + with YAR President Ali Abdullah Salih on September 2. + President said he was very pleased with U.S. military assistance + efforts but called again for more direct U.S.–YAR bilateral relations in military + field. He denied reports that YAR + had concluded new arms deal with Soviet Union. He discussed parade + being planned for September 26 National Day, saying he intended + displaying all new U.S. military equipment, and extended official + invitation for Secretary of Defense or Deputy Secretary of Defense + to visit YAR on this occasion + (reported septel).In telegram 6179 from + Sana, September 4, the Embassy reported that during the + September 2 meeting Salih had issued an official invitation to + Brown or Duncan to attend the YAR National Day celebrations on + September 26. Lane + commented that he believed it would be “highly desirable” for + Duncan to attend, as + it “would give new impetus to our military assistance effort and + would be symbol of direct U.S./Yemen cooperation in the military + field which is so important both to President Salih and to Yemen military + establishment.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign + Policy File, D790403–0515) End summary.

+

3. Ambassador and DCM met with + President Salih at YAR military headquarters in Sana on + September 2. Ambassador delivered his personal greetings and + condolences on the death of President’s brother. Ambassador then + said he would like to review the progress of U.S. military program + in YAR since he had last discussed + this subject with the President two months ago.Not further identified. Ambassador + mentioned various MTTs which had been or are now in country and + referred specifically to recent delivery by ship of arms, ammunition + and spare parts. President interrupted to say he was very pleased + with U.S. efforts. He praised work of U.S. officers and training + teams and said U.S. military assistance program was proceeding well. However, the + “other partner”Saudi Arabia. was + not always cooperative. He therefore wanted closer, more direct, + relationship with USG.

+

4. Ambassador agreed that direct, bilateral relations were important + and said they were being constantly strengthened. Not only did we + have close bilateral relations in the economic field, as witnessed + by our growing aid program, but our direct military relations were + also much closer than they were only six months ago. A trilateral + arms program was by its very nature difficult to administer but + since the Saudis were paying for the arms, they were naturally + interested in how the program was carried out. Salih acknowledged legitimacy of + Saudi interest but said that they should not interfere in the + implementation of the program; for example, once arms, ammunition + and spare parts destined for YAR + had been paid for, they should be delivered directly to YAR, not via Saudi Arabia.

+

5. President Salih then + brought up the subject of story of YAR arms purchases from USSR. He referred to Ambassador’s meeting with + Presidential Advisor Abdullah + AsnajReference is to a + meeting between Lane and + al-Asnaj on August + 27, reported in telegram 5965 from Sana, August 27. (National + Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + D790391–0539) and asked where Ambassador had heard report + of new arms purchase from Soviet Union. Ambassador replied that + rumors were widespread in Sana. Ambassador noted that President had + earlier urged us to ask him or his personal advisors for + clarification of any such rumors we heard and we had therefore come + to him. President said he had not signed any new agreement with + Soviets. As U.S. was aware, YAR had + recently purchased Polish tanks but no other equipment from Soviet + bloc. (He proudly noted twice that these tanks were paid for in cash + from the central bank.) Ambassador specifically asked if President + meant there were no MiG 21s coming + to Yemen. President said that was right. There had not yet been any + military purchases from Soviet Union and there would be none if the + U.S. military equipment, specifically the F–5s, reached Sana + as soon as possible. (Clearly before September 26 National Day). He + had to have fighters; what did USG + expect him to do if they could not get the F–5s he had been + promised? Ambassador said there had not been room to park all F–5s + under cover at Sana airport. President scoffed at this, saying, + quote you bring the planes and I’ll find a place to put them end + quote.

+

6. President Salih said (and + repeated several times during the 45 minute conversation) that there + were those who were trying to destroy U.S.–YAR relations by spreading false rumors and said that + both he and U.S. must work + together to see that these people did not succeed. He specifically + mentioned the Soviet Military Attache as one source. Re travels of + YAR military officers, he + confirmed that both Deputy Chief of Staff Lt. Col. Ali Mansour and + Lt. Col. Abdallah al Hazwarah had been in Europe but said that one + was on vacation and the other had signed a DM 5 million contract for military equipment with the + FRG. Salih also mentioned Hussein ad + Defa’i, former YAR Ambassador to + the USSR, who he said had visited + the U.S. after a trip to London. The fact that these officials were + traveling did not mean that a new deal with the Soviets had been + signed. Ambassador said that it was precisely to find out the truth + about these rumors that he and DCM + had called on the President.

+

7. President Salih then + turned to preparations for September 26 National Day parade. He said + he wanted fullest possible display of U.S. military equipment, + including all repeat all F–5s, the C–130s, and as + many tanks and other equipment as possible. This would underscore + conversion of Yemeni military to U.S. equipment. Salih said he would like to extend + an official and personal invitation to U.S. Secretary of Defense or + Deputy SecDef to attend + September 26 celebrations. He asked Ambassador to convey this + invitation immediately, saying the presence of such a USG official would be important + evidence of new and close US–YAR relations (see reftel).

+

8. Ambassador’s comments: Regardless of who may have visited Moscow + during past month, it appears that President Salih has not yet committed + himself to accept new, more sophisticated arms from the Soviet + Union. On the other hand, he does not repeat not appear to have + entirely dismissed the possibility. He is clearly frustrated by the + non-arrival of the F–5s and the fact that he must rely on + Saudi Arabia for spare parts and ammunition. He refuses to listen to + the explanations, (that I tried again to make) that Sana airport has + not, until very recently, been ready to receive all the F–5s, + and is still not fully equipped to service and support them.

+

9. DCM and I had the impression that + President Salih has decided + to make the September 26 National Day parade the test of Saudi, and + to a lesser extent American, good faith. He wants to put on display + all the F–5s, the two C–130s, and as much of the other + U.S. equipment as possible. If for any reason the aircraft are not + available, he could use their absence as the excuse, or + justification, for a new Soviet arms deal.

+ + Lane + +
+ +
+ 287. Telegram From Secretary of State Vance to the Department of State and the Embassy in + the Yemen Arab RepublicSource: National + Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790456–0495. + Secret; Immediate; Exdis. + Sent for information Priority to Jidda. Vance was in New York + attending the UN General + Assembly. + + + New York, October 5, 1979, + 0322Z + +

Secto 9012. Subject: Meeting + Between Assistant Secretary Saunders and YAR + Deputy Foreign Minister al-Kibsi.

+

1. (S-entire text)

+

2. Summary: Saunders met with + al-Kibsi at the UNGA on October 4. Both noted the importance of + bilateral ties. Al-Kibsi explained that several groups were + competing for influence in Sana and this affected President + Salih’s decision-making + process. Al-Kibsi stressed that Saudi Arabia should be patient in + its relations with the YAR and not + press the border dispute. He felt that senior officials in YAR did not want to see the unity + talks with PDRY succeed and + explained the state of play in the talks. End summary.

+

3. There was an initial exchange of pleasantries. Al-Kibsi + volunteered that because of his Western education, he was viewed in + Sana as pro-US and pro-Saudi. He + intended to be quite frank in this discussion.

+

4. US–YAR bilateral relations

+

Saunders said that the US sees the security of North Yemen as + important, not only in its own right, but because of its impact on + larger regional events. The US + cannot afford to see nations fall due to external threats. The + US is pleased by its growing + relations with the YAR and hopes + that future ties will also be fruitful.

+

Al-Kibsi commented that President Salih appreciated US + efforts to respond to Yemen’s needs during the spring fighting with + PDRY. Salih understood that President + Carter had made a major + effort in waiving the 30 day congressional notification requirement + and rapidly sending military assistance. Al-Kibsi hoped that former + Foreign Minister Asnag had succeeded in alleviating any US concern over the language in the + YAR/PDRY Kuwait communique that had been critical of the + US.See Document 281.

+

5. YAR domestic situation

+

Al-Kibsi stated that the YAR’s + primary objective is economic development and in order to make + progress Yemen needs stability. Many groups in Yemen—Baathists, Army + officers, tribal sheiks, Nasserites—were competing for influence + with President Salih. As a + result of Iraqi intervention in ending the fighting with the South, + there has been an increase + in Baathist influence. President Salih tries to satisfy all of the competing groups + and therefore it is often not clear in which direction the YAR is heading.

+

6. YAR–Saudi relations

+

Al-Kibsi stressed that Saudi Arabia must be patient in its relations + with Yemen. He had said this to Prince Sultan and asked that the + US also make this point to the + Saudis. The Saudis should concentrate on the major issues and ignore + minor irritants. The major issues are domestic stability in the + YAR and the future of YAR–PDRY relations. The Saudis should not press their + border dispute with the YAR, since + no YAR leader could agree to a + solution without being accused of having sold out to the Saudis.

+

7. YAR–PDRY relations

+

In response to a query from Saunders, al-Kibsi said that no one in Sana, + including President Salih, + wanted the unity talks to succeed. However, the constant public + references to unity could make it difficult to draw back from unity. + Al-Kibsi explained that eight joint committees had been formed to + consider various aspects of unification. Most of these committees + had begun their work by reviewing the agreements reached in 1973 + during a previous period of unity talks. Most committees had made + some progress although they had not reached complete agreement. + However, in the political joint committee, the PDRY had refused to begin with a + review of the 1973 agreement. Aden claimed that because the + political agreement had been endorsed in 1973 by both the PDRY and YAR Presidents, it could not be changed. The YAR delegation objected to 15 of the + 18 articles in the 1973 document, including that describing the + Soviet Union as the “only friend” of Yemen. Therefore there was a + deadlock in the political committee.

+

In view of this impasse, the next steps would be crucial. Al-Kibsi + noted that PDRY Prime Minister Ali + Nasser Mohammad was currently in Sana. This visit was unexpected and + had caused the YAR Prime Minister + to cancel a long-planned visit to the UK. Sana did not know the purpose of Soviet Premier + Kosygin’s recent visit to + Aden. If the PDRY insists on rapid + progress towards unity, there is a danger that border fighting could + break out once again.

+ + Vance + +
+ +
+ 288. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the + Yemen Arab RepublicSource: National + Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790478–0512. + Secret; Immediate; Exdis. + Drafted by Countryman; + cleared by Saunders, + Newsom, W. Scott + Butcher (S/S–O), and Raymond + Seitz (S/S); approved by John M. Evans (S). Sent for information + to Abu Dhabi, Doha, Jidda, Kuwait, Manama, and + Muscat. + + + Washington, October 18, 1979, + 2126Z + +

272903. Subject: Secretary Vance’s Conversation With YAR Foreign Minister Makki.

+

1. Secret-entire text.

+

2. Summary: Makki expressed gratitude for U.S. assistance and noted + his government’s desire to improve and diversify bilateral relations + with the U.S. He saw solution of the Palestinian problem as key to + peace and stability in the entire region and urged direct U.S. + negotiations with the PLO. He + discussed in some detail the current status of Yemen reunification + talks. The Secretary expressed U.S. desire to broaden and make more + fruitful our bilateral relations. He and Assistant Secretary + Saunders explained how + our current peace efforts are not incompatible with ultimate Arab + objectives. End summary.

+

3. The Secretary had a useful 45-minute conversation with YAR Foreign Minister Makki October + 12.No other record of this meeting + was found. Under Secretary Newsom, Assistant Secretary Saunders, ARP Country Director + Countryman, and YAR Ambassador Mutawakel also + attended.

+

4. After exchange of pleasantries, Makki began by expressing his + government’s gratitude for U.S. assistance and conveyed his + government’s desire to improve relations and to diversify + cooperation in the economic and military spheres. The Secretary + responded that the U.S. was pleased to have been able to help the + YAR and that we wished to have + deeper, more fruitful relations. He asked that Makki convey to + President Salih our desire + to strengthen relations across the board. Makki then noted the value + of trilateral cooperation, but reaffirmed the need for intensified + bilateral contacts between the U.S. and the YAR in the context of regional cooperation.

+

5. Makki described the solution of the Palestinian problem as the + heart, not only of the search for a Middle East peace, but integral + also to peace and stability throughout the region. He voiced + appreciation of U.S. peace efforts, but hoped that we would change + our policy toward the PLO. Such a + change would facilitate area states’ cooperation with the U.S. + Solution of Palestinian problem would also assist North Yemen with its problems with the + South. He also expressed concern about South Yemen and Ethiopia in + the regional security context.

+

6. The Secretary replied that we would be happy to explore ways of + making more fruitful our bilateral relations with the YAR. On the Palestinian issue, he + declared that there was no essential difference between the U.S. and + Arab commitment to resolve the Palestinian issue in all its aspects. + We did have a different view of how best to move toward a + comprehensive peace. We believe the problem is so complex and + deep-seated that it cannot be solved in one fell swoop overnight. We + have a particular problem with the PLO in that our 1975 agreement with the Government of + Israel states that we will not negotiate with the PLO until it recognizes the right of + Israel to exist and accepts UN + Resolution 242 as a basis of negotiations.Reference is to the memorandum of agreement + between the United States and Israel that was initialed at the + time of the signing of the second Egyptian-Israeli peace + agreement on September 1, 1975. See Foreign + Relations, 1969–1976, vol. XXVI, Arab-Israeli + Dispute, 1974–1976, Document 227. We do not + take lightly our obligation to stand by a commitment. The Secretary + then reviewed the various attempts to solve the problem of dealing + with the PLO. In 1977 we came close + to a solution, but the PLO + Executive Council turned it down.

+

7. Saunders then noted we were + engaged in a first step negotiation involving an attempt to achieve + an Israeli withdrawal from and autonomy in the West Bank and Gaza. + We are thus engaged in a transient short-term operation, whereas the + Arabs continue to look toward a final solution. He emphasized, + however, that our respective goals are not inconsistent. Newsom noted that we now also have + a clear idea from discussions with our Arab friends of what they + think must come out of our efforts in order for them to cooperate. + We hope that when there is further progress toward Middle East peace + that it will be viewed favorably by our Arab friends.

+

8. The Secretary noted we follow with attention and concern problems + of regional security, particularly events in South Yemen and + Ethiopia. One way we can be helpful is to provide aid as we did in + the case of attack on North Yemen by South Yemen. We are also aware + of broader strategic questions and we wish to continue consultations + with our regional friends to adopt constructive methods to preserve + stability and avoid turmoil.

+

9. In response to Newsom’s + question about the intentions of South Yemen, Makki said North Yemen + was seeking to solve its problems with the South via reunification + rather than war. The North is seeking to establish a unified state based upon Islamic + and democratic principles and believes it has had some recent + success in getting the South to accept its point of view. There has + been some progress in economic cooperation, i.e., integrating + five-year plans and agreement to avoid industrial duplication. + Foreign policy remains a major point of difference with the North + insisting that the South bring itself closer to the Arab and away + from the socialist nations. There is also hope that a reunified and + peaceful Yemen will help attract Arab capital for development, but + to this end the South must evidence some flexibility regarding the + formation of mixed companies, the role of private investment, and + the status of former Southern merchants who have fled to the + North.

+

10. At the same time, North Yemen is not confident about the + sincerity of the South in the unity negotiations. Socialism in the + South has become stricter and the North is investigating reports + about the South’s links to the Warsaw Pact. In short, the unity + negotiations could be a Southern trick. On the other hand, the North + sees utility in continuing the negotiations as a way of + strengthening the hand of those in the South who want an + Islamic/Arabic basis for their society and who wish to move away + from the socialist camp.

+

11. In a follow-up talk with Saunders, Makki raised three issues:

+

—Increased military and economic aid;

+

—The Omani Straits of Hormuz security initiative and

+

—Southern Lebanon.

+

12. U.S. military and economic assistance. Makki made a strong pitch + for increased U.S. bilateral military and economic assistance. He + noted that certain countries in the region had benefitted from + increased levels of U.S. aid, whereas our aid to Yemen had remained + constant. He hoped that we might fund directly YAR 5-year plan projects, and help the + YAR with credit facilities. He + asked specifically that we assist Sana University to establish new + faculties and become a kind of regional educational showplace. + Saunders replied that we + wished to be helpful in both the military and economic areas and + that we would be looking into ways to get the most out of our + funding. We should not forget the participation of some of the + YAR’s wealthier neighbors, the + use of Peace Corps volunteers, or putting together multilateral + financial arrangements.

+

13. Saunders described the + Omani security proposal for the Straits of Hormuz as a purely Omani + initiative. While we felt it represented a responsible attempt to + deal with a problem, and while we had no objection to it in + substance, we wanted to make very clear that we had not instigated + it.

+ +

14. Southern Lebanon. Saunders + briefly reviewed events following the adoption of UN Resolution 425United Nations Security Council Resolution 425, + adopted on March 19, 1978, after the Israeli invasion of + Lebanon, called for respect for the territorial integrity of + Lebanon, for Israel to cease military activity against Lebanon, + and for the formation of a United Nations interim force for + Southern Lebanon to oversee the withdrawal of Israeli forces. + (Department of State Bulletin, May 1978, + p. 51) and described the various steps which the U.S. + envisioned as leading toward the re-establishment of peace and + tranquility in Southern Lebanon. The elements of our approach would + include helping to increase the Lebanese forces in the South, + seeking to expand the ceasefire, obtaining mutual assurances from + the parties that they would not attack each other, and that they + would report infractions of the ceasefire to the UN. He also noted the need to get + people back into their homes in Tyre and described possible + initiatives to get the Syrians to secure National Movement + cooperation and turn over Syrian occupied areas to the Lebanese.

+ + Vance + +
+ +
+ 289. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the + Yemen Arab Republic and the Embassy in Saudi ArabiaSource: National Archives, RG 59, Central + Foreign Policy File, D790492–0974. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Drafted by Michael R. Arietti (NEA/ARP) and Countryman; cleared by + O’Donohue, Brzezinski, + Murray, Arthur M. + Giese (T), Jeffrey J. Buczacki (S/S–O), Roscoe S. Suddarth (P), and William T. + Shinn (EUR/SOV); approved by + Vance. Sent for + information to Moscow. + + + Washington, October 27, 1979, + 2132Z + +

281817. Subject: YAR Arms Agreement. + Ref: (A) State 278082,In telegram + 278082 to Sana, October 25, the Department instructed Lane to refrain from + expressing U.S. concern to Salih regarding the “adverse effects of a new + YAR-Soviet arms package” + until the Department had a chance to review with Murray the results of his + trip. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + D790489–0633) (B) Jidda 7478,In telegram 7478 from Jidda, October 25, the Embassy + transmitted Murray’s + comments on the Yemen situation. With regard to Salih, Murray noted: “But his + relations with both Soviets and Saudis, and therefore inevitably + with us, are changing.” He continued: “In sum, Ali Abdullah is + now moving on another policy tack, one encouraged by the left + and by those who suffer poorly the indignities of excessive + (from the Yemeni viewpoint) Saudi influence on Yemen’s internal + politics. If he continues on the present tack, we will soon not + be able to work with him.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central + Foreign Policy File, D790514–0242) (C) Sana 7427;In telegram 7427 from Sana, October 24, + the Embassy reported on Murray’s October 21 call on Salih. (Carter Library, + National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Middle East, Subject + File, Box 93, YAR: + 7–12/79) (D) Jidda 7476.In + telegram 7476 from Jidda, October 25, the Embassy reported on + Murray’s October 25 + conversation with Sultan, in which Sultan expressed his anger + over the possibility of a new YAR-Soviet arms deal. (National Archives, RG 59, + Central Foreign Policy File, D790489–0446)

+

1. Secret-entire text.

+

2. We are concerned by increasing evidence that President Salih despite his denials has + agreed or is on verge of agreeing to accept a Soviet offer of a + major new arms supply agreement.

+

3. The impact of a Soviet arms agreement and the US reaction to it would depend on its + size and scale. Several reports have mentioned Yemeni acquisition of + two squadrons of MiG–21 aircraft, + one squadron of Sukhoy aircraft and an undetermined number of T–62 + tanks. We need more definite information on the scope of the + agreement being considered by the YAR.

+

4. We understand Saudi concerns as well but hope SAG will not overreact. We urge SAG weigh all factors. Stability in + the YAR is one important factor. It + is important that US and Saudi + Arabia coordinate their activities in Yemen and avoid precipitous + actions.

+ +

5. For Sana: At earliest possible opportunity, Ambassador should make + following points to President Salih and other appropriate YAR officials:

+

—The US has undertaken a major effort + to assist Yemen in strengthening its defense capability forces + against the Soviet-supported threat from South Yemen.

+

—The United States is deeply concerned by persistent reports that the + YAR intends to go ahead with + the purchase of significant amounts of additional equipment from the + Soviet Union. These reports indicate that the YAR will buy MiG–21s and T–62 tanks, equipment similar to that we + have already provided. In the spirit of the relationship we have + been trying to build with YAR we + believe USG should be told frankly + what YAR intentions are in this + respect.

+

—When the US agreed to our ongoing + military assistance effort, we made clear that our aid to the YAR was not dependent on the complete + elimination of Soviet military assistance efforts. We recognize that + for many years the YAR military was + equipped primarily with Soviet equipment and that Soviet advisors + provided training. At the same time we have been concerned because + as Salih must be aware the + Soviets have used military aid as the prime means of extending their + influence in the third world.

+

—We would therefore have difficulty understanding if the YAR agreed to a major new military + assistance program with the Soviet Union particularly after that + country provided the means for PDRY to attack the YAR.

+

—Moreover, implicit in the US + agreement to undertake a military assistance program was the + understanding that the YAR would be + making a major effort to absorb US + equipment and would commit manpower and resources to the necessary + training. We would view YAR + acquisition of new Soviet equipment duplicative of what we have + provided as a failure to maintain its part of the bargain.

+

6. For Jidda: As a follow-up to DASD + Murray’s discussion, you + should make the following points to Prince Sultan:

+

—The US shares Saudi concerns over + reports that President Salih + may go ahead with a major new arms purchase from the Soviet + Union.

+

—At the same time, we do not think that Salih’s action reflects an ideological shift towards + the Soviet Union.

+

—We are making clear to Salih + that such an agreement would raise serious difficulties for the + US. We oppose an increase in + Soviet influence in Sana and are concerned that an agreement may + mean an influx of additional Soviet advisors into the YAR.

+

—On the basis of Murray’s + conversations with SAG officials we + have carefully reviewed what course of action we in consultation + with the Saudis might wish + to take. We are making a strong presentation of our views to the + YAR. (Embassy should convey to + the SAG points we are making to + YAR, noting we will + particularly stress point 5).

+

—While we think it important that the US and Saudi Arabia should discourage Salih from going ahead on this + agreement, our actions should seek to avoid further instability in + the YAR that would provide even + greater opportunities for anti-US + and anti-Saudi elements to come to power. With this in mind it is + important at this point that the US + and Saudi Arabia continue to make our ongoing military assistance + efforts in Yemen effective.

+

—We wish to remain in close touch with Saudi Arabia as the situation + develops.

+ + Vance + +
+ +
+ 290. Message From the United States Commander in Chief European + Command to AIGSource: Carter Library, + National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Middle East, Subject + File, Box 93, Yemen: Democratic Republic (South): 2/77–9/80. + Secret; Noforn; Nocontract. Sent for information to CINCUSNAVEUR London, + Sixth Fleet, MIDEASTFOR, + USDAO Prague, USDAO Budapest, USDAO Belgrade, USDAO Hague, and USDAO Copenhagen. + + + Vaihingen, October 30, 1979, + 1655Z + +

20475. Subj: USEUCOM Intelligence Summary Cable (EISC) 174–79. + (U).

+

The 30 October EISC contains three items.

+

1. South Yemen/USSR: Treaty of + friendship. (S/Noforn)

+

2. Other significant developments. (S/Noforn/No Contract)

+

3. Indications and warning status: No change. (U)

+

1. (S/Noforn—all paras) South Yemen/USSR: On 25 October, after 2 days of official talks, + Soviet Party Chief Brezhnev + and South Yemeni Presidium Chairman Ismail, signed a 20-year treaty of friendship. Among + other things, the accord calls for continued mutual cooperation in + the military field. This development underscores Aden’s increasing + reliance on Moscow for economic, diplomatic, and military support. + South Yemen is the only Arab state, other than Iraq, to have such a + treaty in force.

+

The Soviets have been heavily involved in supporting successive South + Yemeni regimes since 1969, and have long sought a treaty to + formalize that relationship. It is not clear why the Yemenis have + waited until now to sign a treaty, but several factors probably + contributed to that decision: the treaty was probably accompanied by + promises of increased Soviet economic or military assistance or + both. Additional Soviet support was needed to shore-up the + domestically threatened Ismail government; and Aden is probably seeking + stronger Soviet assurances of support in the face of an increasing + U.S. commitment to North Yemen and Oman.

+

Apparently responding to South Yemen’s concerns about U.S. + intervention in the region, the Soviets have, since spring, made a + number of public displays of support, including the port call of the + carrier Minsk in June, and the visit of Premier Kosygin in September; they have + also provided new weapon systems, including Hind helicopters, SU–20 + Fitter aircraft, OSA–II guided missile patrol boats, a fleet + minesweeper, BMP and BTR–60 APCs, + ZSU 23–4 air defense artillery, and T–62 tanks.

+ +

As a result of the treaty, we believe it possible that the Soviets + could increase their presence in South Yemen, but we disagree with + recent press reports that there are already 9,000 Cuban and Soviets + in-country; with an increase to 15,000 expected before years end. + [5½ lines not declassified]

+

In the region, South Yemen, probably encouraged by the Soviets, has + been undertaking moderate attempts to improve relations with + neighboring Arab states. The treaty of friendship probably came as a + surprise to these countries, and will probably spoil the + normalization effort, and contribute to continued suspicions of + South Yemen’s Marxist regime. ([1 line not + declassified] J2)

+

[Omitted here is material unrelated to Yemen.]

+
+ +
+ 291. Telegram From the Embassy in the Yemen Arab Republic to the + Department of StateSource: National + Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790533–0044. + Secret; Immediate; Exdis. + Sent for information Immediate to Jidda and USLO Riyadh; sent for information + Priority to Moscow. + + + Sana, November 14, 1979, 1500Z + +

7858. Subj: U.S. Saudi Military Assistance Program in YAR—Meeting With President Salih on November 14. Ref: State + 281817.See Document 289.

+

1. (S-entire text)

+

2. Summary: During meeting with Ambassador and DCM on November 14, YAR President Salih defended his recent + acquisition of new Soviet equipment by saying that he had been + forced to take this action because of failure of U.S. and + particularly Saudi Arabia to provide sufficient arms and to give + total support for arms they had delivered. He insisted that presence + of new Soviet arms would not lead to increased Soviet influence and + that no repeat no more Soviet military advisors would be coming to + the YAR. Salih reiterated his commitment to + the U.S./Saudi program and his interest in strong U.S.–YAR bilateral relations. End + summary.

+

3. Accompanied by DCM + Gnehm, I had one and half + hour meeting with President Salih morning of November 14. After initial exchange + of courtesies, I told President that I would like to review + U.S.–YAR bilateral relations in + military assistance field. I briefly mentioned our initial agreement to provide Phase + II arms, the expedited deliveries in March of this year as a result + of YAR–PDRY border war, and arrival of all F–5s in + time for National Day. I said that DASD + Murray’s visitSee footnotes + 2–5, Document 289. + was in context of these efforts to develop our bilateral cooperation + in military field and to see what more could be done.

+

4. I said that in light of these efforts to assist the YAR in strengthening its defensive + forces against the Soviet supported threat from the PDRY, the United States was deeply + concerned by persistent reports that YAR was acquiring significant amounts of new Soviet + equipment. USG had made clear that + our aid to YAR was not dependent on + complete elimination of Soviet military assistance efforts; we + intended to complete our present military assistance program in the + YAR. Nevertheless, USG was seriously concerned about + these reports for three reasons:

+

A. Additional new Soviet arms would mean an extension of Soviet + influence in the YAR which was not + in the interest of the YAR’s + independence and stability;

+

B. YAR acquisition of such arms + would make it harder to get public support in the U.S. for the U.S. + program;

+

C. Acquisition of Soviet arms similar to those being supplied by the + U.S. would inevitably affect the ability of the YAR to absorb the U.S. supplied + equipment. I then asked the President for an explanation of the + YAR’s current policy.

+

5. Salih replied by first + thanking the USG in general and + President Carter + specifically for the efforts made to assist the YAR in facing the threat from the + PDRY. He insisted that he + turned to Soviet bloc for additional weapons because although the + American weapons were good, they were inadequate to meet Yemen’s + defensive needs. Given the military strength of the South, he needed + several hundred tanks in addition to the 64 M–60s to protect the Bab + al Mandab, Quatabah and Al-Bayda areas. During the Asnaj visit he had asked for a + direct military relationship with the U.S.; this request had been + ignored.Al-Asnaj visited Washington in June, meeting + with Vance on June 11 to + request a more direct military relationship with the United + States. (Jim Hoagland, “N. Yemen Appeals for Military Advisers + From U.S.,” The Washington Post, June 13, + 1979, p. A25) Since the Saudis were paying for all the + U.S. weapons, he had asked them for more; they had refused. + Furthermore, after the Kuwaiti communique of March 30,See Document + 281. the Saudis had deliberately slowed down the + Phase II arms program that had been already agreed upon. Salih said he was convinced that + the shortages of ammunition and spare parts and the slow progress being made in development + of repair and maintenance facilities for the F–5s in Sana were + part of a deliberate Saudi policy following the Kuwaiti declaration, + to keep the YAR totally dependent + on Saudi Arabia.

+

6. I replied that the problems were practical and described several + of the deficiencies on the Yemeni side; ammunition had been damaged + by mishandling, spare parts were not properly stored and accounted + for, etc. Salih acknowledged + some of these failures but insisted that the basic problem was Saudi + unwillingness to wholeheartedly support the program. Under these + circumstances, he said, he had no choice, given his responsibility + for the defense of his country, but to buy additional Soviet arms. + He said (as he had to DASD + Murray) that all newly + arrived Soviet bloc tanks had been sent to southern border, as + defense against PDRY.

+

7. Salih insisted that he had + signed no new “agreement” with the Soviet Union but had purchased + arms and ammunition for cash. He said that his intention was to + replace obsolete equipment of Soviet origin now in the YAR inventory—MiG–21s for MiG–17s + and T–55s for T–54s and 34s. He implied this would be done on a one + for one basis. When I asked how many MiGs were coming, he dodged the + question by saying he was sure that American intelligence had + complete information on this subject.

+

8. In response to my questions, he said he was well aware that + Soviets would give PDRY 40 tanks + for every ten they gave YAR. As for + Soviet support in case of war with the PDRY, he was not counting on it. His army was familiar + with Soviet tanks and would not need training or maintenance + support. As for aircraft, his people were now transitioning to + MiG–21s. He had also purchased + ten years worth of spare parts (sic) so he would not be dependent on + the Soviets in case of emergency.

+

9. Regarding Soviet technicians, Salih insisted that no more would be coming as a + result of his recent arms purchases; he said we could take this as + an official statement from the head of state. In response to my + question, he said that there were no “less than 20 Soviet advisors” + working with the YAR military. When + we questioned this figure, he repeated it and said again that this + number would not increase. (He did admit later in the conversation + that two or three additional experts might come to help assemble the + MiGs but insisted they would be leaving as soon as this job was + done.) We could reassure the USG, + Salih said, that YAR had no intentions of increasing + Soviet presence.

+

10. Salih also insisted that + he remained committed to the successful implementation of U.S. + program and would do whatever was required to make it a success. We + pointed out that sending Yemeni pilots and technicians to Soviet + Union for transition training on MiG–21s would inevitably draw off manpower that could have been devoted to the + F–5 program. Salih brushed this aside and said + he had repeatedly asked USG to + provide additional training in Yemen for Yemenis on F–5s + but nothing had been done. As soon as training program could be set + up, he would supply the students.

+

11. I said that despite President’s assurances, YAR had a limited pool of educated + military. It was hard for USG to + understand why YAR had turned to + Soviets for more aircraft after efforts we had made, and hard to + believe that U.S./Saudi military assistance program would not suffer + as result of arrival of new Soviet arms. Salih repeated that acquisition of + new Soviet equipment would not repeat not slow down implementation + of U.S.-Saudi program and offered to send a special delegation to + the United States to explain why he had purchased arms from the + Soviets. I said I would consult with my government to see if they + thought such a mission would be useful.

+

12. In response to my question about the recent PDRY-Soviet treaty, Salih said that YAR was convinced that there were some + secret clauses that were aimed at his country. They were now trying + to find out what these articles contained. Salih said “we are against the + Communists.” He said he was well aware that the Soviets would back + the PDRY in any dispute with the + YAR. It was for this reason + that he had insisted that the Soviets supply him with ten years + supply of spare parts for the new arms he was buying from them and + that he was not accepting any additional Soviet technicians. + Salih said that YAR had had relations with USSR for 50 years and had not gone + Communist. He was well aware of Communist danger. We reminded him + times had changed and threat of Soviet influence under present + circumstances was much more dangerous than in the past. Salih said he was well aware of + this and that we could assure USG + that he was taking every precaution to prevent it. If U.S. would + guarantee YAR’s security, he would + not need Soviet weapons. If USG + would provide him with all the military assistance he needed, he + would kick out the Soviets completely, with all of their military + equipment. However, USG had not + done so; therefore, he had had to turn to Soviet Union for more + arms.

+

13. In response to my question about Saudi-YAR relations, Salih said they were good. He said that Prince + Turki had arrived that + morning (November 14) to discuss YAR’s recent acquisition of new Soviet arms. Salih said that he intended to + tell Turki that it was the + Saudis’ fault; if Saudis had not deliberately slowed down ammunition + and spare parts deliveries after March 30 Kuwaiti communique, if + they had not insisted on retaining control of F–5 maintenance in Saudi Arabia, and if + they had not refused to supply additional arms to YAR, Salih would not have felt compelled to buy + additional arms from the Soviet Union.

+ +

14. Comment:

+

A. Salih was in a good mood. + After initial exchange of courtesies, he listened to my opening + presentation quietly and calmly. He displayed some nervousness at + the beginning of the meeting but his explanation of what he had done + and why became more forceful and confident as he went along. His + general position was that the Saudis were to blame for his decision + to buy Soviet arms because they had not been sufficiently + understanding and responsive to his needs.

+

B. Despite my efforts on several occasions to make clear to him that + his decision to acquire MiG–21s + could cause a real problem in our future bilateral relations, I am + not sure that he really believes it. I suspect that his offer to + send high level delegation to the United States to explain what the + YAR had done and why was a + spur-of-the-moment idea. Although I doubt whether this delegation + will have any additional information to provide, it might be useful + to accept Salih’s offer to + send them as a way of indicating our concern over his recent + actions.

+

C. Further comments follow septel.In + telegram 7857 From Sana, November 14, the Embassy highlighted + Saudi-YAR tensions due to + the new arms deliveries from the Soviet Union to the Yemen Arab + Republic. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy + File, D790524–0676)

+ + Lane + +
+ +
+ 292. Memorandum Prepared in the Central Intelligence AgencySource: Carter Library, National Security + Affairs, Staff Material, Middle East, Subject File, Box 94, + Yemens: Meeting: (1/15/80): 1/80. Secret; [handling restriction not declassified]. Prepared in + the Near East South Asia Division, Office of Political Analysis, + National Foreign Assessment Center, and coordinated with the + National Intelligence Officer for Near East South Asia, the + Office of Economic Research, the Office of Strategic Research, + and the Directorate of Operations. Brzezinski wrote at the top of the page: “DA, we need a mini-SCC on this today—and add it to + the SCC agenda on Mon. ZB (1/12/80).” A mini-SCC meeting was not held on + January 12. In advance of the January 14 SCC meeting, Hunter and Sick sent Brzezinski and Aaron supplemental materials, + including a copy of this memorandum and a paper summarizing key + policy options, under a January 13 memorandum in which they + noted: “The ad hoc meeting on Saturday + afternoon [January 12] reviewed our objectives and options in + Yemen in preparation for the SCC meeting on Monday at 10:00 a.m.” (Carter + Library, Brzezinski + Donated Material, Subject File, Box 41, [Trips]—Paris: [1/80]) + No record of the ad hoc January 12 meeting was found. For the + January 14 SCC meeting, see + Document 40. + + + PA M 80–10019 Washington, January 11, + 1980 + +

NORTH YEMEN: MOVE TO THE LEFT (S)

+

North Yemeni President Salih, + in his continuing efforts to maintain his hold on power, has moved + his regime substantially to the left. Convinced that Saudi Arabian + plotting with North Yemeni tribesmen is the most immediate threat to + his position, Salih has + attempted to draw closer to Marxist South Yemen. He has also + concluded a major arms agreement with the USSR, and the US + defense attache reports that MIG–21s, T–55 tanks, and artillery + pieces have arrived in North Yemen since November. Salih still claims to fear a + threat from South Yemen, but his maneuvering has severely restricted + his options. He may be coming close to a point of no return in his + relations with South Yemen, the USSR, and Saudi Arabia. The Aden-backed opposition + National Democratic Front, meanwhile, is strengthening its position + in all parts of the country. [classification and + handling restriction not declassified]

+

Since taking power in July 1978, following the assassination of his + predecessor, Salih has had + to contend with continued meddling by Saudi Arabia and South Yemen. + When the South Yemenis seemed more threatening during a brief border + war last February, Salih + turned to Riyadh and obtained strong Saudi political support as well + as financing for US weapons. Now + that he believes Saudi plotting is a more immediate danger, he is + seeking a rapprochement with Aden. [classification + and handling restriction not declassified]

+

When the fighting between the two Yemens ended last year—and with it + the heightened threat of a Marxist takeover in Sana—Saudi policy + quickly reverted to its traditional ambivalence: The Saudis wanted a regime in the + North that was strong enough to fend off the South, but that posed + no threat to Riyadh and was subject to its influence. Traditional + fears that the leadership in Sana might make a deal with South Yemen + also reappeared. To help preserve their leverage, the Saudis + exploited their ability to control the flow of US arms, ammunition, and spare parts + they bought for North Yemen. They also continued their subventions + to pro-Saudi tribes in North Yemen as a means to limit the power of + the central government. [classification and + handling restriction not declassified]

+

Soviet Arms Deal

+

Salih soon became convinced + that he could not rely on the Saudis to supply arms. This, coupled + with his frustrations over Saudi meddling with the tribes, severely + strained Saudi-North Yemeni relations and contributed to Salih’s decision last summer to + accept new Soviet arms as a way to reduce Saudi leverage. The + Soviets, who had been the major arms supplier to North Yemen prior + to 1978, had persistently offered to resume large-scale arms + deliveries. MIG–21s began arriving in November. [4 + lines not declassified] The US Embassy in Sana has already received reports of more + Soviet military advisers in North Yemen; last fall there were + approximately 120 such advisers. [classification + and handling restriction not declassified]

+

The Soviets recently have adopted a much higher profile in North + Yemen. Besides the new arms and additional advisers, two official + delegations and several cultural groups have recently toured the + country. In addition, substantial numbers of Yemeni military + personnel have been sent to the USSR in the last three months for training. [classification and handling restriction not + declassified]

+

Other Signs of Shift

+

The arms deal with the Soviets is the most visible sign of Salih’s move to the left, but + there are others.

+

—Pro-Saudi officials have been replaced with men of more leftist + leanings. These include the current Foreign Minister and Ministers + of Information and Development. Most important, on 3 January, + Salih sacked his + pro-Saudi Director of National SecurityMohammed Khamis.—a strong opponent of closer relations + with the USSR and South Yemen—and + three of the Director’s top aides. [classification + and handling restriction not declassified]

+

—Since talks in Sana in early October between Salih and the South Yemeni Prime + Minister,See Document 287. the number of delegations + traveling between the North + Yemeni capital and Aden has increased sharply. [3½ + lines not declassified] [classification + and handling restriction not declassified]

+

—Salih has recently had a + number of significant contacts with members of the opposition + National Democratic Front. [7½ lines not + declassified] [classification and + handling restriction not declassified]

+

—In recent weeks Sana has taken a more left-leaning foreign policy + stance. It has not, for example, publicly condemned the Soviet + invasion of Afghanistan. It has also taken a more militant position + on the Palestinian question and against the peace process. [classification and handling restriction not + declassified]

+

South Yemen: Tactics

+

South Yemen has used Salih’s + mistrust of the Saudis to limit the North Yemeni President’s ability + to maneuver. President Ismail has urged Salih to dismiss his pro-Saudi advisers for + disloyalty. Ismail + reportedly has also demanded that the Front be brought into North + Yemen’s governmental and military structures as a precondition for + unity. At the same time, Ismail has appealed to Salih’s vanity by promising that once this condition + is met, Salih will become + the first president of a unified Yemen. Salih may well be intrigued by the offer. According + to one report, he has instructed his officials to conclude a unity + agreement with the South Yemeni team now in Sana for negotiations on + a joint constitution. [classification and handling + restriction not declassified]

+

Salih probably has + overestimated his ability to control the unification process. The + National Democratic Front, for example, reportedly continues to + infiltrate both men and arms into North Yemen. Whereas the group was + formerly restricted to regions bordering South Yemen, it now has + extended its organization and influence into the northern tribal + areas. It has avoided a direct confrontation with North Yemen’s army + and seems to have adopted a carrot-and-stick approach toward the + government. It reportedly has cooperated with the government’s + attempts to reduce Saudi influence in the northern border region. + [classification and handling restriction not + declassified]

+

The Front’s appeal has grown partly because of its diverse makeup. + There are nationalist as well as Communist elements within the + group, and several of its leaders were associates of a popular North + Yemeni President assassinated in 1977. Although the Front now is the + willing tool of South Yemen, whether it would remain so once in + power is not clear. In any event, it has become a serious contender + for power in North Yemen. [classification and + handling restriction not declassified]

+

Saudi Arabia

+

Saudi Arabia confronts an unpalatable dilemma in its present + relations with North Yemen. The Saudis have probably concluded that + their ability to deal + with Salih is minimal. A + move to replace him, however, could easily result in expanded South + Yemeni influence or even a takeover. [5 lines not + declassified] [classification and + handling restriction not declassified]

+

Salih, not wanting to lose + the Saudi card completely, has indicated [less + than 1 line not declassified] his acceptance of Riyadh’s + proposal, and a North Yemeni delegation that is to meet with Saudi + leaders in Riyadh on 12 January will probably relay this message. + Salih probably views his + acceptance as one more way to maneuver between the conflicting + pressures, and the Saudis may see it as a temporary solution. In the + meantime, however, the mutual trust necessary for a workable + alliance between Sana and Riyadh has largely evaporated, with a + concomitant rise in the influence in Sana of South Yemen and the + USSR. [classification and handling restriction not + declassified]

+
+ +
+ 293. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the + Yemen Arab Republic and the Embassy in Saudi ArabiaSource: National Archives, RG 59, Central + Foreign Policy File, D800026–0942. Secret; Immediate. Drafted by + Michael R. Arietti + (NEA/ARP); cleared by + Twinam; approved in + P. + + + Washington, January 16, 1980, + 0146Z + +

12142. Subject: Newsom/al-Ayni Meeting. Ref: Riyadh 96.In telegram 96 from Riyadh, January 12, the + Liaison Office informed the Department that Gerlach had conveyed U.S. + concerns over trends and events in the Yemen Arab Republic to + Saud. Gerlach stressed + the U.S. view that “SAG and the + USG should emphasize in our + conversations with YARG the + importance of preserving the independence of North Yemen.” While + Saud indicated that + the Saudi Government agreed with the U.S. position on Yemen, the + government “questions the sincerity of South Yemen especially in + light of the USSR–PDRY treaty.” The Prince noted + that the Saudis were fearful “that we might see the events of + Afghanistan repeated here on the Peninsula.” (National Archives, + RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800021–0158)

+

1. Secret-entire text.

+

2. Summary: During January 14 meeting with Under Secretary Newsom, Ambassador al-Ayni conveyed President + Salih’s desire for + continued cooperation with the U.S. He downplayed the significance + of the purchase of Soviet arms, and underlined the need for a strong + government in Sana. Ambassador Mutawakel stated the dismissal of the + head of national securityDocument 292 and footnote 2 thereto. did not signal a turn to + the left and that there was + no sign of rapid movement towards unity with PDRY. End summary.

+

3. YAR + UN Perm Rep Muhsin al-Ayni, accompanied by + Ambassador Mutawakel, called on Under Secretary Newsom on January 14, 1980. Deputy + Assistant Secretary Twinam, + and NEA/ARP Officer Michael Arietti also attended.

+

4. After initial plesantries al-Ayni explained that, after an absence of five + years, he had recently returned to Sana prior to taking up his + UN post. al-Ayni wished to deliver an oral + message from President Salih—if the US felt + Yemen deserves help and was seriously interested in providing this, + Salih was prepared to go + ahead with cooperation with the U.S.

+

5. Under Secretary Newsom + stated that we regard relations with Yemen as very important. We had + made a special effort, in cooperation with Saudi Arabia, to provide + Yemen military equipment and almost all of the equipment had now + been delivered. Training and maintenance were very important. We, + the Saudis, and other countries had provided training personnel. The + US also has an ongoing economic + assistance program. In view of our efforts the US was very disappointed in the YAR’s recent purchase of arms from the + Soviet Union. We also had the impression that recent personnel + changes in Sana suggest a change in the YAR’s attitude towards the NDF and towards union with + PDRY. The US would be very concerned if union + took place on terms dictated by PDRY or the NDF. Al-Ayni’s visit was timely in that we could + reiterate our interest in the continuing independence of North + Yemen. The US invited specific + YAR suggestions on what we + could do to strengthen our relationship.

+

6. Ambassador al-Ayni + responded that the US should not + make too much of the recent acquisition of Soviet arms. In view of + the disarray in the Yemeni military these arms would not pose a + threat to any quarter. The US should + provide us training to Yemeni officers and additional economic + assistance. Speaking personally al-Ayni commented that the YAR is now at the 11th hour. This is a result of the + failure of past efforts to strengthen the YAR. President Salih is a sincere individual, but he is being + pulled in many directions. A key factor is Saudi Arabia’s attitude. + The Saudis need to understand that it is important that there be a + strong government in Sana. Unfortunately they have not recognized + this in the past and the US should + try to convince the Saudis that this is in their interest.

+

7. Regarding President Salih’s relations with the NDF and PDRY, Ambassador al-Ayni commented that everyone in + Yemen welcomed the recent dismissal of the head of national security + since that organization had treated people badly. He was unaware of + any particular significance to the timing of the dismissal. + Ambassador Mutawakel interjected that the replacement of Khamis did not signal a + turn to the left since his replacement was neither pro-Aden nor + pro-Soviet. However, he speculated that the replacement would please + the NDF. President Salih had + been in touch with elements of the NDF who are the main forces in + some areas of the country. Speaking personally, Mutawakel did not + believe these contacts would work out. He was not aware of any new + steps towards unity and did not think there would be movement in the + short term. Al-Ayni stated + the NDF is a committed Marxist group and that President Ismail is firmly in control in + Aden and growing stronger.

+

8. Newsom said we recognize + that the YAR’s relations with Saudi + Arabia are complex, but it would be tragic if that relationship were + seriously disrupted. The US wished + to work with Saudi Arabia in Yemen, but this did not mean we could + not have a direct relationship with Sana. The US would be very interested in the + results of the meeting between Prime Minister al-Ghani and Saudi + officials. We hoped that it would smooth out current + difficulties.

+

9. Comment: Salih’s message + was delivered orally and was simply a reiteration of his willingness + to cooperate with the U.S. Neither al-Ayni nor Mutawakel appeared prepared to suggest + detailed steps the US might take to + strengthen ties with the YAR. + Al-Ayni appeared to be + speaking personally when he urged we stress to the Saudis that it is + in their interest that the YAR have + a strong government. End comment.In a + January 16 memorandum to Vance, Brzezinski noted that Carter had read a report of + Newsom’s meeting with + al-Ayni, adding that + the President noted that “we should follow up on this.” (Carter + Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Brzezinski Office File, + Country Chron File, Box 56, Yemen)

+

10. For Ambassador West: In + following up on our commitment to consult with the Saudis on the + results of the al-Ayni and + al-Ghani meetings, you should draw on the above, without mentioning + al-Ayni’s personal + comments in para. 6.

+ + Vance + +
+ +
+ 294. Summary of Conclusions of a Special Coordination Committee + MeetingSource: Carter Library, + National Security Council, Institutional Files, Box 107, SCC 254, 1/17/80, Southwest Asia, + Persian Gulf & Yemen. Secret; Sensitive. The meeting took + place in the White House Situation Room. The minutes are not + attached and were not found. Carter wrote at the top of the first page: + “Zbig—These are very serious matters. The discussions are + necessary but any proposal for contentious action must be + submitted to me first J.” Odom sent Brzezinski the Summary of Conclusions under a + January 18 memorandum. A handwritten notation indicates it was + sent to Carter at Camp + David on January 18. At the January 14 SCC meeting (see Document + 40), Brzezinski expressed his belief that the United + States should “consider a joint action to bring about a + fundamental political change in South Yemen.” A working group + chaired by the NSC was then + directed to “prepare a paper on the Yemen problem.” (Carter + Library, Brzezinski + Donated Historical Materials, Geographic File, Box 15, Southwest + Asia/Persian Gulf-[1/80]) The NSC-chaired working group submitted its policy + options to Aaron and + Brzezinski on + January 16. This paper is in the Carter Library, Brzezinski Donated Material, + Subject File, Box 37, [Serial] XX—Sensitive: [1/80–3/80]. For + another extract of this Summary of Conclusions, see Document 42. + + + Washington, January + 17, 1980, 9–10:45 a.m. + + + SUBJECT + SCC Meeting on Southwest Asia + and the Persian Gulf + + + PARTICIPANTS + + + State + Secretary Cyrus + Vance + Deputy Secretary Warren + Christopher + + + + + Defense + Secretary Harold + Brown + Ambassador Robert + Komer + + + + + JCS + Chairman General David + Jones + Lt. General John + Pustay + + + + + CIA + Deputy Director Frank + Carlucci + Robert Ames + [name not declassified] + + + OMB + Deputy Director John + White + + + + + White House + Dr. Zbigniew + Brzezinski + Hamilton + Jordan + Jody + Powell + Hedley Donovan + David + Aaron + + + + + NSC + Colonel William E. Odom + Captain Gary + Sick + Thomas + Thornton + Fritz + Ermarth + + + +

[Omitted here is material unrelated to Yemen.]

+

Yemen

+

Dr. Brzezinski reported that + [less than 1 line not declassified] now + may be the time for a fundamental political change in South Yemen. + [3½ lines not declassified] Dr. Brzezinski then emphasized that + this would require a major political decision with very large + political risks.

+ +

Secretary Vance characterized + this proposal as an “action of the greatest moment.” He argued that + we must know much more about the “strength and cast of characters” + in both YAR and PDRY, and particularly in the + National Democratic Front. He proposed that [name + not declassified] go to the region and report back with an + analysis based on the best and fullest information available. Dr. + Brzezinski suggested + that such a trip might include [less than 1 line + not declassified] and that its task should be (a) to assess + the resources available, (b) to determine what it would take to + alter the situation in Yemen.

+

When Secretary Brown mentioned + that it might be an appropriate contingency response for a Soviet + move into Iran, Dr. Brzezinski countered that there is also a danger + that such an action might galvanize Islamic countries against the + United States, a danger which must be taken into account before + making a decision. Dr. Brzezinski agreed with Secretary Vance’s emphasis on the gravity of + the decision and added that it is an extremely difficult one for a + democratic government to take. Saudi Arabia is so vital to our + interest, however, that we may be forced into it.

+

Further discussion about what we know of the National Democratic + Front, Salih and other + political forces, led [name not declassified] + to underscore a problem if he is to undertake a fact-finding + mission. [1½ lines not declassified] Yet it + would be useless to sit down with [less than 1 + line not declassified] and ask them for options without + making any U.S. commitments. We have done this so frequently in the + past that [less than 1 line not declassified] + now demand that we put our chips on the table. They do not want to + be asked to pose options. They will insist that the United States + tell them the options. Dr. Brzezinski observed that if [less + than 1 line not declassified] needed a “Presidential + finding,” that could probably be secured.

+

In response to Secretary Vance’s further question about what we actually + know, [1½ lines not declassified] that if + [name not declassified] talks to them he + will be asked for (a) some covert actions such as an opening of the + National Front Office outside of North Yemen, (b) military aid [less than 1 line not declassified] (c) + possible security guarantees for North Yemen.

+

Dr. Brzezinski asked that + David Aaron, Robert Komer, and Hal Saunders develop the terms of + reference for [name not declassified] trip + and report them to the SCC for + review.

+

The discussion turned to timing. Dr. Brzezinski repeated the dangers of a fiasco like the + Suez in 1956 but pointed out again the enormous stake for the U.S. + in the region. If the situation in North Yemen deteriorates rapidly + now, the [name not declassified] mission and + plan could not be executed rapidly enough to save the day. [name not declassified] argued that for the + short-term danger, [less than 1 line not + declassified]. Secretary Vance mentioned + that [less than 1 line not declassified] in + the near future. Others thought that [less than 1 + line not declassified] at once to avoid delay. He should + engage in a general discussion [less than 1 line + not declassified] about contingencies but make no + commitments.

+

Agreed actions:

+

—[1½ lines not declassified]

+

—[less than 1 line not declassified]

+

—The David Aaron group will + work out the terms of reference for [less than 1 + line not declassified] trip.

+

[Omitted here is material unrelated to Yemen.]

+
+ +
+ 295. Telegram From the Embassy in the Yemen Arab Republic to the + Department of StateSource: National + Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800039–0862. + Secret; Immediate; Exdis. + Sent for information Priority to Amman, Jidda, London, Muscat, + and USLO Riyadh. + + + Sana, January 23, 1980, 1220Z + +

567. London for Under Secretary Newsom. Subject: Meeting With President Salih. Ref: State 012142.See Document + 293.

+

1. (S-entire text)

+

2. Summary: Ambassador and DCM met + with YAR President Salih for one hour on January 22. + Salih, who was in a + testy mood, blamed U.S. for any problems in bilateral relations. He + had no specific suggestions to make about ways to improve relations + and seemed basically uninterested in the subject. He again defended + his acquisition of Soviet arms and expressed confidence that he and + YAR could dominate Communists + and PDRY in any union between the + two countries. He criticized U.S. press campaign against him and + YAR and said nothing but + platitudes on subject of YAR-Saudi + relations. Salih gave + impression of a man who has made his plans, and, that they did not + include closer relations with U.S. Following this meeting, President + reportedly had lunch at local hotel with visiting NDF leaders. End + summary.

+

3. In response to my request, President Salih received me for about an hour on the morning + of January 22, (on 25 minutes advance notice). DCM + Gnehm accompanied me and + YAR Chief of Protocol was also + present.

+

4. I opened meeting by telling Salih I welcomed this opportunity to review with him + status of our bilateral relations. Referring to January 14 Newsom/al-Ayni meeting,See + Document 293. I said that + USG considered these relations + very important. I then reviewed efforts we had made to assist YAR during past year, particularly in + military field, mentioning specifically arms deliveries in March, + F–5 program (in which Salih’s brother is one of the top + pilots), and our continuing efforts to provide spare parts and + ammunition for U.S. origin arms as witnessed by ship deliveries last + month and further deliveries, including tank ammunition, scheduled + for March. At same time, I said, USG was concerned about certain recent developments. As + Salih knew, we were + concerned about recent Soviet arms deal because it meant more Soviet + technicians in the country and more Yemeni trainees going to the + Soviet Union. I mentioned Senator Percy’s letter to Salih,Not found. to which we have not received a reply, and + said that this was an example of honest concern by a distinguished + and influential American who was a friend of Yemen. Salih acknowledged that Senator + Percy was a friend of YAR and said + that a reply to his letter was on the way. I then asked Salih for his views on YAR–US + relations and ways in which they could be improved.

+

5. YAR–USG relations. Salih replied that as far as he was concerned + relations with USG were excellent; + all the problems seemed to be from U.S. side. He and his government + had done their best to develop and sustain these relations. If there + were any shortfalls or weaknesses it was because of American + hesitations and doubts. Throughout discussion he repeatedly returned + to theme that USG support for him + and his government had not been wholehearted, particularly since the + Kuwait unity declaration of March 30, 1979.See Document + 281. He also referred repeatedly to unfavorable + articles about Yemen and him personally that have appeared in the + American press, beginning with the stories of over a year ago + predicting that he would not last six months, and continuing up to + the January 17, 1980, article in the Washington Star (see Sana + 523).In telegram 523 from Sana, + January 22, the Embassy referenced a recent Washington Star article entitled “North Yemen Reported + Easing Ties to Soviets,” noting: “In our view, this article is a + disaster for U.S.–YAR and + U.S.-Saudi relations and may have totally negated any possible + positive results of Riyadh talks.” Lane concluded: “In short, this article has + seriously damaged chances that we and/or Saudis can repair + relations with Salih and + convince him to reduce his dependence on Soviets.” (National + Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + D800037–1057) Despite these attacks (which he obviously + believes, despite our denials, were inspired by the USG), the YAR has not + responded with a similar campaign against the U.S. He also + reiterated his familiar theme that YAR wants a direct bilateral relationship with the U.S. + He referred in this regard to his letter to President Carter, which was hand carried to + the U.S. last spring by Abdullah + Asnaj.The letter, which was not found, was presumably + delivered by al-Asnaj + during his June 1979 visit to Washington. See footnote 4, Document 291. He + mentioned pointedly that he had sent this letter prior to making the + Soviet arms deal. He noted that when he acquired Soviet arms they + did not arrive via the PDRY. When + I pressed for his suggestions on what we could do to strengthen our + bilateral relations, he referred in vague terms to need for U.S. + military personnel to train Yemenis on M–60 tanks, now that + Jordanians are leaving. He had no other suggestions.

+

6. Soviet influence. Salih + repeated several times during the conversation his earlier arguments + that acquisition of Soviet arms did not mean that Soviets controlled + YAR foreign policy. He said + that arms were simply hardware and that it was Yemenis who were + operating them, that it was Soviet not American arms which had been + used in fighting against PDRY. He + had used them once to kill the Communists in the South and would not + hesitate to do it again. He dismissed subject of Soviet technicians, + saying that there had been 700 in the country eight years ago and + the country had not gone Communist; therefore, the small number + present today constituted no threat. The policy of the YAR has not been affected by source of + arms, neither when he received U.S. equipment nor when he acquired + Soviet arms.

+

7. Afghanistan. Referring to Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, I said + USG was disappointed that + YARG had abstained in UNGA + vote. In our view, Soviet actions marked new step in Soviet foreign + policy that constituted a potential threat to YARG and Salih personally. Initially Salih responded that YAR abstained because that was YAR policy. When I pressed for a + reason why, Salih said that + USG kept saying it wanted an + independent YAR; YARG vote was an expression of his + government’s independence. It did not always have to go along with + the majority. At conclusion of brief discussion of this subject, + Salih said YARG was opposed to Soviet invasion, + but had not made public statement on this subject or voted against + Soviets in UN for special + reasons.

+

8. Unity talks. In response to my questions on progress being made in + unity talks, Salih asked why + I wanted to know, and said that it was not the business of the U.S. + to concern itself with YAR–PDRY unity talks, or indeed YAR relations with any other country + except U.S. I replied that unity was a question for the Yemen people + themselves to decide, but + we are naturally interested, given Soviet domination of PDRY and potential threat this + presented both to YARG and to + President Salih personally. + After some bobbing and weaving, Salih said progress towards unity would depend + largely on USG action. If USG was prepared to undertake direct + military assistance program with YAR and provide the country with all the support and + guarantees it needed, unity might be delayed a long time. If on the + other hand, YARG could not count + on USG backing, unity might come + much sooner. Salih dismissed + suggestions that unity with Communist dominated PDRY could pose any threat to Yemen + independence, citing Yemen’s history as the “graveyard of the + conquerer” and fact that there were only one-half million people in + PDRY. He suggested confidently + that YAR would swallow PDRY, not vice-versa.

+

9. Relations with the Saudis. I repeated Mr. Newsom’s remarks in para 8 reftel, saying that USG hoped for good relations between Yemen and Saudi + Arabia. We wished to cooperate with Saudi Arabia in Yemen but this + did not mean we could not also have a direct relationship. Salih interrupted to say that + YAR relations with Saudi Arabia + were excellent and USG should not + repeat not believe false intelligence reports to the contrary. He + had nothing more to say on this subject.

+

10. Comment: Salih was in a + confident and aggressive mood. In contrast to previous meetings I + have had with him he was sure of himself and less friendly. Several + times during the conversation Salih stressed that good relations between any two + countries was the Ambassador’s responsibility. I tried to explain + that Embassy reported and made recommendations but there were many + people in Washington who influenced policy. Salih persisted and told me not to + believe false intelligence reports and street rumors but to keep in + touch with senior YARG officials + about YARG policies and plans.

+

11. Salih seemed to have no + concerns whatsoever about greater reliance on Soviet weapons, closer + relations with the NDF or unity with the PDRY, being confident that North Yemen’s numbers and + its tradition of independence would triumph over the small number of + Communists in the South. He said that he was still interested in + expanding direct bilateral military relationship with the U.S. but + had no specific suggestions to make. He gave the impression that he + has given up hope of getting what he wants from the U.S., has made + other plans, and doesn’t really care what we do at this point. I + still think there is a chance that a specific offer by us to provide + the kind of training, maintenance and logistical assistance + Salih wants might pull + him back from greater reliance on the Soviets but I am less certain + of this today than I was before the meeting.

+ + Lane + +
+ +
+ 296. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National + Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to President CarterSource: National + Security Council, Carter + Administration Intelligence Files, Box IO 47, Yemen: 15 June 1977—13 March 1981. Secret; + [handling restriction not + declassified]; Top Secret Attachment. Sent for action. + Carter wrote “Zbig + J” in the top right-hand corner of the memorandum. + + + Washington, February 7, 1980 + + + SUBJECT + Covert Action Program for the Yemens (S) + +

Attached is the SCC analysis and + recommendation endorsing the proposed covert action program for the + Yemens. It is a modest scale ($12 million) program [less than 1 line not declassified].Not printed. (S)

+

The strategy would be to build up a moderate political force in North + Yemen to resist Salih’s + drift toward integration with the PDRY while at the same time tackling the root of the + problem—the extremely radical Soviet-backed government in Aden which + has designs against both North Yemen and Saudi Arabia and which + serves as a major military base for the Soviet Union. Our effort + against the PDRY would consist of + building up moderate political opposition to the Ismail regime, encouraging + dissident tribesmen, aggravating divisions which exist within + Ismail’s government, and + putting teeth into these political efforts by selected paramilitary + operations by tribesmen and opposition against key PDRY communications and security + facilities. (S)

+

Our objectives are, in increasing order of difficulty, to reassure + the Saudis by engaging in a [less than 1 line not + declassified] program to deal with a serious threat to + them; to contain the PDRY’s + subversive effort by strengthening moderates in the north and by + keeping the PDRY off balance in + the south; and, finally, to encourage the accession of a more + moderate government in Aden. (S)

+

There are important risks to the program and the SCC has studied them carefully. + Checkpoints for assessment of the program and of PDRY/Soviet reaction are built in. In + sum, the projected reactions of the PDRY, the Soviet Union and their allies consist of + actions which are already either under way or which we judge largely + inevitable. Hence, the risks are essentially the same whether we + proceed with the program or not. If we do not, the PDRY, and the Soviets are likely to + try to keep the threat to Saudi security just below a threshold that + would prompt strong US-Saudi + reaction until it is too late. Conversely, proceeding with the + program not only holds out the possibility of ultimately ending the threat from + the PDRY but also strengthens + Saudi Arabia’s, Oman’s and North Yemen’s capacity to resist PDRY subversion and paramilitary + activity. (S)

+

If you approve the program, we will confirm our willingness to + undertake it [1 line not declassified] you + would sign the appropriate Finding at Annex 4.Carter + underlined the phrase “undertake it [less than + 1 line not declassified],” drew an arrow to the phrase, + and wrote under the paragraph: “[less than 1 + line not declassified].” Annex 4 is not printed. + (S)

+

RECOMMENDATION:

+

The SCC recommends that you approve + the proposed program for the Yemens. I endorse this + recommendation.Carter checked the Approve + option and wrote in the margin: “Zbig—How about the French & + others being encouraged to stabilize the situation—not joining + in our clandestine activities. Saudis need to treat YAR well. Also, we should see who + else can approach either Yemen to prevent + Soviet success. Post-Afghanistan, Arab League members may be + able to help—J.” Carter + added: “p.s. you always want to travel. How about a trip to + PDRY? You may woo them + over to our side.” Carter then drew a line across the page, writing + under it: “In general, having read the memo, I believe we are + much more likely to have success by working with + YAR than against + PDRY. Also, Moslem believers + in S Yemen may be a more important factor than assumed here. J.” + The covert action program was implemented through a number of + Presidential Findings dated March 27, 1980. (National Security + Council, Carter + Administration Intelligence Files, Box IO 47, North Yemen Finding—27 Mar 80 South Yemen + Finding—27 Mar 80)

+
+ +
+ 297. Memorandum From Robert Hunter and Gary Sick of the National Security Council Staff to + the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) and the President’s + Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Aaron)Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff + Material, Middle East, Subject File, Box 93, YAR: 1–3/80. Secret; Sensitive. + Outside the system. A stamped notation on the memorandum + indicates Brzezinski saw + it. Brzezinski wrote in + the margin: “DA your reaction? + ZB 2–27–80.” + + + Washington, February 26, 1980 + + + SUBJECT + Yemen (U) + +

We attended an interagency meeting on North Yemen, today, at which + Ambassador Lane was present. + The meeting was called to find ways of implementing the President’s + directive on seeking a constructive relationship with President + Salih. (S)

+

This effort will produce some ideas about + assistance, and there was no disagreement about doing what we can. + However, it became clear in the meeting—without dissent—that what we + are talking about can’t do the job. The “critical mass” for doing + anything that will have any real impact on President Salih is far higher than we have + any capacity of providing, unless we are prepared to indent for a + major budget supplemental. This would be in the order of + hundreds—not tens—of millions of dollars. (S)

+

[3 lines not declassified] The long and short + of this aspect of the problem is that the Saudis have not sorted out + their attitudes towards the Yemenis. Until and unless they do, there + is little of value we can do that will have + an impact on Salih + (Lane stressed that + Salih is unimpressed + with symbols); and if the Saudis are prepared + to act in a truly forthcoming way, then there is little we need to do independently, at least on the + assistance track. (S)

+

Beyond these observations, our sense is that we are not thinking + through clearly the assumptions behind the President’s directive: + i.e. that a) Salih is + amenable to blandishments from us, of a size that is within our + capabilities; b) we do have some real opportunities to affect Yemeni + policy directly; and c) the Saudis are prepared to sort out their + attitudes and take a line that can itself effectively shape events + in North Yemen. Thus we believe we should do some hard analysis of + these factors before proceeding further—especially in light of the + budgetary implications of our trying at this point to beef up our + relations with Salih. + (S)

+ +

[1 paragraph (5 lines) not declassified]

+

This memo is to forewarn you that the formal proposal that will come + forward through the bureaucracy will not be what the President + wants, for want of options, not lack of willingness to find them. We + will keep a close eye on it. If you want, you could raise it at the + VBB.Reference is to the weekly Vance-Brown-Brzezinski lunch. + (S)

+
+ +
+ 298. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Saudi + ArabiaSource: National Archives, RG + 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800106–0508. Secret; + Immediate; Exdis. Drafted by + Michael R. Arietti + (NEA/ARP); cleared by + Twinam, Walter + Hayden (PM/SAS), Garrison (DOD), Richard Aherne (T), + Sick, and W. Scott + Butcher (S/S–O); cleared by + Newsom. Sent for + information to Sana, Amman, and USLO Riyadh. + + + Washington, March 1, 1980, + 0148Z + +

55179. Subject: US-Saudi + Consultations on the YAR. Ref: + State 42453.In telegram 42453 to Jidda, + February 16, the Department instructed the Embassy that planning + should go forward in order for the United States and Saudi + Arabia to provide follow-on support to the Yemen Arab Republic + if it so desired. The Department instructed West to meet with + Sultan, if possible, in order to stress these points and collect + information regarding ongoing Saudi-YAR talks. (National Archives, RG 59, Central + Foreign Policy File, D800083–0204)

+

1. Secret-entire text.

+

2. In connection with Ambassador Lane’s consultations in Washington, an interagency + meeting on Yemen was held February 26.See Document 297. At this + meeting there was a general consensus on several points:

+

—The situation in the YAR is fluid + and dangerous. President Salih’s flirtation with the left is risky and the + US needs to be alert to the + danger of leftist influence in the YAR. We need to keep in very close touch with the + Saudis about developments in Yemen. Recognizing the political + uncertainty in the YAR, we + nevertheless believe it important that we be prepared to support + effectively and efficiently the military equipment we have provided + as a means of showing, not only President Salih, but other influential Yemeni leaders that + there is an alternative to dependence on the Soviets for military + support. Saudi involvement is essential.

+

4. Action requested: That the Embassy follow through quickly on + instructions contained reftel, + emphasizing proposal for a planning conference in Riyadh to discuss + specifics of a follow-on program and the importance of funding + Jordanian replacement MTT’s to + provide training and maintenance on army equipment and a sufficient + number of Taiwanese personnel to maintain all F–5 aircraft now in Sana.

+

5. FYI: In light of recent reports + from Sana and Jidda, we will want to keep under review + implementation of these steps, but we should raise them immediately + with the Saudis in order to be ready to move quickly depending on + how the situation develops. End FYI.

+ + Vance + +
+ +
+ 299. Telegram From the Embassy in the Yemen Arab Republic to the + Department of StateSource: National + Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800186–0802. + Confidential. Sent for information to Jidda, USLO Riyadh, the Department of + Defense, and USCINCEUR + Vaihingen. + + + Sana, April 12, 1980, 1028Z + +

2566. Subject: Unity and Subversion—the PDRY, the NDF, and the YAR.

+

1. (C-entire text)

+

2. Summary: The impetus towards unity between the YAR and the PDRY appears to have stalled. For a variety of reasons, + the PDRY and the NDF, supported by + the Soviets, are now concentrating on infiltrating the YAR and building up the country with + the ultimate goal of taking over the country from within. The SAG and the USG have not organized an effective program to block + this drive. Unless we do so soon, the continued growth of anti-Saudi + and anti-U.S. feeling within the YAR and an eventual move to the left is inevitable. End + summary.

+

3. The drive for unity between the PDRY and the YAR, + which was kicked off a year ago at the Kuwait summit meeting between + YAR + President Ali Abdullah + Salih and PDRY leader Abd Fatah + Isma’el,See Document 281. has run out of steam. This has + happened for a number of reasons: First, those in the YAR who are opposed to unity with the + present PDRY Government and who + were opposed to President Salih’s moves in this direction during the past + year, have gained strength. Although they may not have convinced + President Salih to give up + the idea of unity entirely, they appear to have exerted enough + pressure on him to halt the drive, at least temporarily. Second, the + pressure for unity from the PDRY + has eased. The so-called “Southerners” in the PDRY leadership, led by Defense + Minister Ali Antar, who was never enthusiastic about unity in the + first place, have gained more influence. One knowledgeable source + says that this group is now talking about unity within five years. + Even the “Northerners”, led by Abd Fatah Isma’el, are reported to be + less enthusiastic about immediate unity than they were a year ago. + We hear that this group is now talking about unity in one or two + years. Although the unity committees continue to meet regularly and + YAR Presidential Advisor for + Unity Affairs, Hussayn Dafa’i, constantly shuttles between Sana and + Aden, what we are witnessing is a reconciliation and rapprochement + between two independent countries rather than a serious effort + towards unity.

+

4. This definitely does not repeat not mean that the Marxists of the + PDRY and their NDF allies have + given up their plans to take over the YAR. As the prospects for meaningful unity have faded, + the NDF has increased its efforts to deepen and widen its influence + throughout the country. The NDF is now using not only assassination + and intimidation but is also establishing quasi-government + organizations in various parts of the country that have + traditionally been outside of the authority of the YARG in Sana. As these organizations + grow in strength and legitimacy, the people are increasingly turning + to them to carry out the normal functions of government. The visits + of NDF leaders and PDRY unity + committees to Sana provide excellent opportunities for these men to + keep in touch with their agents in the YAR.

+

5. At the same time, the Soviets are expanding their offers of + assistance to the YARG. A steady + stream of Soviet weapons of all kinds is now flowing into the + country. We do not know exactly how many additional Soviet + technicians have arrived, but the total number in country may well + be about 300, up from 120 a year ago. At the same time, Yemeni + military men are again being sent to the Soviet Union for training + on these newly arrived weapons. In addition, the Soviets are + pressing the YARG to accept their + offer to train between 200 and 500 Yemeni students in the Soviet + Union. The Yemenis have not sent any new civilian students to the Soviet Union + for the past two years, but they may not be able to resist these new + Soviet offers.

+

6. The U.S.-Saudi response to this Soviet/PDRY/NDF challenge has been weak, confused and + ineffective. Since the delivery of large quantities of U.S. arms a + year ago, our military assistance program has been plagued with + difficulties—the full complement of F–5s did not arrive until + September 1979, combat ammunition for the M–60s is still not in + country, and the Jordanians, who were playing a key role in training + the Yemen armed forces on U.S. origin equipment, have been gone for + three months. Nor has our economic aid program been large enough, + visible enough or effective enough to have a significant political + impact. We have some good projects underway but others are bogged + down. This is partly our fault, because of the incredible slowness + of AID procedures, compounded by + the four month drawdown of U.S. personnel between November 1979 and + March 1980Reference is to the personnel + drawdown that occurred in a number of. Embassies following the + seizure of the Embassy in Tehran. and partly the Yemenis’ + fault because of their bureaucratic inefficiency and lack of high + level understanding and support.

+

7. During this period, Saudi-Yemeni relations, which have never been + warm, disintegrated still further. The Saudis have been worried + about Salih’s flirtation + with the South in the unity talks, were furious that he lied to them + about the Soviet arms deal, and have further exacerbated relations + by taking a very tough position on the border incidents.Reference is to a reported incident on February + 17 between Saudi and YAR + military units along a disputed region along the border of the + two nations. The Embassy reported on this clash in telegram 1355 + from Sana, February 25, and telegram 2004 from Sana, March 19. + (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + D800101–1014 and D800139–0738, respectively) Open + hostility has been avoided because the YARG desperately needs Saudi money, but the distrust + and suspicion between the two countries has grown. The overall + result has been that for the past year the NDF and the Soviets have + been gaining influence within the YAR while we and the Saudis have been losing.

+

8. The personality of President Salih has played an important role in this process. + We have previously speculated on the question of Salih’s intentions—does he have a + long run plan for unity, toward which he is working step-by-step, or + is he simply lurching from crisis to crisis, doing whatever he + thinks is necessary to stay in power? To a certain extent Salih is operating from a politics + of fear; he is afraid that if he does not cooperate with the + Soviets, the PDRY, and the NDF, + they will remove him. On the other hand, he knows from his own + involvement in the Hamdi assassinationSee Document 233. that if he + pushes the Saudis too far, + they may react violently. The Soviets, PDRY and NDF have probably promised to protect him + against the latter threat but Salih may know that he cannot really trust them and + that in any case the Saudis have a long arm in Yemen.

+

9. Conclusion: A year ago, the PDRY + and the NDF, with Soviet acquiescence if not outright support, tried + to bring down the YAR Government by + a frontal assault across the border. They failed for a number of + reasons—the PDRY and the NDF + miscalculated the number of Yemenis who would rise against Salih the moment the attack began, + they miscalculated the Iraqi-Syrian attitude, and the Soviets + probably miscalculated the U.S. reaction. They have learned from + their mistakes. This time they are patiently building support inside + the country. The unity talks continue because neither side wants to + take responsibility for breaking them off, but their main purpose as + far as the PDRY and the NDF are + concerned is to soften up the YAR + for further NDF penetration. The Soviets are assisting this process + by offering President Salih + almost unlimited quantities of arms and by attempting to convince + the YARG that they are the + traditional friends of the Yemenis and can be counted on to assist + the country’s development. The purpose of the Soviet arms deliveries + is not to provide weapons for Salih to use against the PDRY or the NDF but to weaken as much as possible the + joint Saudi-U.S. military assistance program. We and the Saudis have + so far been ineffective in countering this strategy. In fact, the + Saudis have actually contributed to the weakening of anti-Marxist + forces in the YAR by their policy + along the border. Unless we and the Saudis can come up with a + substantial and effective program to counter growing Soviet/PDRY/NDF influence, the continued + erosion of our position seems inevitable.

+ + Lane + +
+ +
+ 300. Memorandum of Notification From the Acting Director of + Central Intelligence (Carlucci) to the Members of the Special Coordination + CommitteeSource: Carter Library, + National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Office, For President + or Brzezinski Only File, + Box 89, Sensitive Foreign Commitments: 1/78–1/81. Secret. Gregg + sent the Memorandum of Notification letter to Brzezinski under a January 15 + memorandum, indicating that the CIA was reluctant to proceed with the + implementation of the program until certain issues had been + resolved. Gregg recommended that Brzezinski initial an attached letter to + Carlucci which noted + that the CIA’s “current + implementation falls within the original finding and that CIA has approval to proceed.” + Brzezinski approved, + and the letter was sent to Carlucci on January 15. (Ibid.) + + + Washington, January 5, 1981 + + + SUBJECT + Implementation of Program of Assistance to the Yemen Arab + Republic Security Service + + + REFERENCE + Presidential Finding on the Yemen Arab Republic Dated 27 March + 1980 + +

1. Background. This memorandum is to notify + members of the Special Coordination Committee that pursuant to + implementation of the 27 March 1980 Presidential Finding on the + Yemen Arab Republic (YAR),See footnote 4, + Document 296. which in part authorizes training + and other support with the aim of creating a broad opposition front + to the National Democratic Front (NDF) to reduce People’s Democratic + Republic of Yemen (PDRY) and + Soviet Bloc influence in the YAR, + this Agency is planning to undertake a program of assistance to the + YAR intelligence service.

+

Since the signing of the YAR + Finding, there has been an evolution in the policy trends of + President Ali Abdallah + Salih’s government. Both discussions with YAR security officials and unilateral + reporting indicate that Salih is increasingly disenchanted with his policy + of rapprochement with the PDRY and + is particularly unhappy over the recent increase in NDF activities. + [7 lines not declassified]

+

—President Salih is deeply + concerned about the security situation in the YAR and feels he must rebuild his + intelligence service in order to cope with the threat posed by + external subversion in general and the NDF specifically.

+

—The Soviet Union has made an official offer of assistance to the + YAR in this regard, and + pro-Soviet elements within the YAR + government are pressuring President Salih to accept the offer.

+ +

—President Salih has a strong + preference for Western, and if possible, American, assistance to + help him rebuild his security service.

+

—If he is unable to arrange such assistance, he will be left with no + effective alternative to the Soviet offer. However, he would + strongly prefer not to accept the Soviet offer, and as a quid pro + quo for U.S. assistance would be willing to cooperate closely with + CIA on targets of mutual + interest—specifically the PDRY and + the Soviet presence in Sana.

+

[10 lines not declassified] Although we remain + skeptical about Salih’s + long-term commitment to a close security relationship with CIA, after consultation with + interested parties, including the U.S. Ambassador in Sana and + officials of the Department of State, it has been decided that it is + in our best interests to respond positively to the YAR request for assistance in training + and reorganizing their intelligence service. It is our view that + undertaking such a program is clearly consistent with the YAR Finding of 27 March 1980.

+

The very early phases of the program will focus on activities which + are solely for the purpose of collecting intelligence, [1 line not declassified]. In later stages the + program will expand to activities which are not solely for the + purpose of collection of intelligence and will fall under the + activities authorized by the 27 March Finding.

+

2. [1 paragraph (16 lines) not + declassified]

+

3. Goals of the Program. The goals of the + program are:

+

—To preclude the Soviet Union from obtaining another foothold in a + sensitive element of the YAR + government.

+

—To reestablish a working relationship between CIA and the YAR intelligence service and in doing so support U.S. + policy objectives in the YAR.

+

—To assist the YAR in establishing + an effective intelligence service capable of dealing with the threat + posed by the NDF, and in doing so limit the influence of the PDRY in the YAR.

+

—To establish programs and contacts which will enable [less than 1 line not declassified] to + influence YAR leadership to adopt + more moderate, pro-West policies.

+

4. [1 paragraph (6 lines) not + declassified]

+

5. Policy Authorization. + CIA believes that this operation is + consistent with the basic spirit and thrust of the 27 March 1980 + Finding on Yemen Arab Republic which in part authorizes provision of + supplies, equipment, funds, training and other support with the aim + of creating a broad opposition front to the National Democratic + Front in order to reduce PDRY and + Soviet Bloc influence in the YAR + and encourage a moderate, pro-West government in the YAR. At the same time it should be + noted that in earlier program proposals it was recognized that at + some point it would be necessary to rebuild and train a YAR security service capable of countering NDF activities. + However, in view of the sensitivity of the operation and the lack of + specific authority for it in the relevant Presidential Finding, + CIA is hereby notifying the + SCC of this proposed activity + prior to implementation.

+

6. [1 paragraph (3 lines) not + declassified]

+ + Frank C. Carlucci + Acting Director + + +
+
+
+ + + +
+ + Index +

References are to document numbers

+ + + + Aaron, David: + Brown Middle East trip (1979), 17 + Brzezinski Saudi Arabia visit (1980), 208 + Indian Ocean demilitarization talks, 109, 112, 123, 128 + Middle East regional security, 23, 63 + Persian Gulf security framework agency review, 97 + Saudi military aid to Egypt, 192 + Saudi oil policies, 210 + Soviet role in the Middle East, 91 + Strait of Hormuz, 33 + U.S. covert action in Iran, 34 + U.S. economic and military aid to Oman, 68, 70 + U.S. military aid to Pakistan, 42, 54 + U.S. military aid to Saudi Arabia, 57, 64, 173, 200, + 222, 223 + U.S. military presence in the Middle East/Indian Ocean + Allied roles, 54, 57, 78 + Amphibious deployment/ground force exercises, 40, 42, 54, 56, 57, 78, 82, 86 + Bartholomew Mission discussions, 49, 50 + Egyptian role, 64 + Middle East unified command proposals, 29 + Oman/Somalia/Kenya bases: + Iranian hostage crisis and, 75 + Special Coordination Committee discussions, + 37, 40, 42, 50, 54, 65, 66, 78, 84 + U.S.-Omani discussions, 70 + + Policy Review Committee discussions, 26 + Rapid Deployment Force, 39, 40 + Special Coordination Committee discussions, 192 + U.S. military aid overviews, 92, 94 + + U.S.-Saudi relations, 187, 190 + Yemen crises, 249 + + Covert action proposals, 294 + National Security Council discussions, 271 + Saudi-Yemen Arab Republic relations, 297 + Sick memoranda, 276 + Special Coordination Committee discussions, 260, 262, 263, 268, 275, 277, 280, 284 + Yemenite War (1979), 283 + + + Aba al-Khayl, Muhammad, 150 + Abd al-Muhsin (prince of Saudi Arabia), 175 + Abd al-Ghani, Abdul Aziz, 254, 256 + Abdallah, Lt. Col. Fahd, 213, 215, 217, 225, 266 + Abdallah Abd al-Aziz al Saud (prince of Saudi Arabia), 165, 175, 176, 219, 225 + Abdu, Ahmad, 251 + Abdullah (prince of Saudi Arabia), 161, + 255 + Abu Dhabi. See Persian Gulf states. + Adham, Kamal, 165 + Administration transition period (1980–1981), 97 + Afghanistan (see also Soviet invasion of + Afghanistan), 34, 35 + African countries (see also specific + countries), 95 + Agha, Ali, 223 + Aherne, Richard, 298 + al-Ahmar, Abdullah, 238 + Ahmed bin Abdulaziz Al Saud (prince of Saudi Arabia), 154 + Albright, Madeleine, 200 + Ali-Rajai, Mohammad, 223 + Alireza, Ali Abdullah, 151, 161, 172 + Alston, Philip, 107 + Ames, Robert: + Brown Middle East trip (1979), 17 + Middle East regional security, 23, 63 + Persian Gulf security framework agency review, 97 + Saudi military aid to Egypt, 192 + + Saudi oil policies, 210 + Soviet role in the Middle East, JCS strategy paper, 91 + Strait of Hormuz, 33 + U.S. military aid to Pakistan, 42, 54 + U.S. military aid to Saudi Arabia, 57, 64, 214 + U.S. military presence in the Middle East/Indian Ocean: + Amphibious deployment/ground force exercises, 40, 42, 54, 56, 57, 78, 82, 86 + Egyptian role, 64, 74 + Oman/Somalia/Kenya bases, 42, 54, 57, 65, 73, 78, 84 + Policy Review Committee discussions, 26 + Special Coordination Committee discussions, 192 + U.S. military aid overviews, 92 + + U.S.-Saudi relations, 190 + Yemen crises, 277, 294 + + Antar, Ali, 299 + Arab-Israeli conflict (see also Camp David + Accords; Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty negotiations): + October 1973 War, 5, 35, 100, 144 + Oil prices and availability and, 9, 158 + People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen and, 235 + Saudi role: + Blumenthal-Fahd discussions, 157 + CIA Intelligence Memoranda, 144, 158, 183 + Presidential Review Committee discussions, 190 + Quandt/Sick memoranda, 191 + State Department briefing paper, 143 + Vance visit (1977) + discussions, 161 + West memoranda, 154, + 176, 206, 216 + + U.S.-Iraqi relations and, 130, + 132, 133, 137 + U.S. policy in the Middle East and, 1 + U.S.-Saudi discussions, 148, + 151, 161, 172, 185, 188, + 207 + U.S.-Yemen Arab Republic discussions, 288 + + Arab League, 254, 274, 276, 281 + Arabian Peninsula. See Persian Gulf. + Arafat, Yassir, 207 + Arietti, Michael R., 228, 289, 293, 298 + Armacost, Michael A., 107, 122 + al-Ashtal, Abdullah, 231, 232 + al-Asnaj, Abdullah, 234, 245, 251, 259, 261, 282, 286 + Atherton, Alfred L. “Roy”: + Middle East Force negotiations, 2, + 3, 5 + Saud U.S. visit (1978), 172 + U.S.-Iraqi relations, 133 + U.S. military aid to Saudi Arabia, 146, 170 + Yemen crises, 231, 232, 233 + + Atwood, Brian J., 18, 246 + Austin, Granville S., 2 + Australia, 107, 120, 122 + al-Ayni, Muhsin, 293 + Azzawi, Fadhil, 142 + + + + + + Baghdad summit (Mar. 1979), 191 + Baghdad summit (Nov. 1978), 174, 180 + + Brown Middle East trip (1979) + discussions, 17 + Policy Review Committee discussions, 26 + West memoranda, 176 + + + Bahrain: + Middle East Force negotiations, 2, + 3, 4, + 5 + U.S. military aid, 7, 32 + U.S. military presence in, 96, + 100 + + al-Bakr, Ahmed Hassan, 132, 134, 137, 138 + Bandar bin Sultan (prince of Saudi Arabia), 225 + Barnett, David, 107 + Barrow, Gen., 220 + Barry, Robert L., 273 + Bartholomew, Reginald: + Indian Ocean demilitarization talks, 121 + + Policy Review Committee discussions, 124 + Special Coordination Committee discussions, 105, 111, 112, 116 + UN Ad Hoc Committee, 128 + U.S.-Soviet meetings, 125 + + Middle East Force negotiations, 5 + Middle East regional security, 63 + Persian Gulf security framework, 95, 97 + U.S. economic and military aid to Oman, 59, 70, 71, 72 + U.S. military aid to Pakistan, 54 + + U.S. military aid to Saudi Arabia, 57, 64, 220, 222, + 223 + U.S. military presence in the Middle East/Indian Ocean: + Amphibious deployment/ground force exercises, 54, 56, 57, 62, 82 + Bartholomew Mission discussions, 38, 49, 50, 51, 52, 53 + Brown memoranda, 27 + Diego Garcia base, 54, + 57, 129 + Egyptian role, Special Coordination Committee + discussions, 64, 74, 89 + Oman/Somalia/Kenya bases: + Special Coordination Committee discussions, + 50, 54, 57, 65, 66, 73, 84 + U.S.-Omani discussions, 59, 70 + U.S.-Somali discussions, 78 + + U.S. military aid overviews, 92 + Vance memoranda, 44 + Zawawi U.S. visit (1980) + discussions, 60 + + Yemen crises, 252 + + Bass, Kenneth, 187, 262 + Begelman, Art, 124 + Begin, Menachem, 35 + Bell, Griffin, 187 + Bennet, Douglas J., Jr., 166, 168 + Benson, Lucy Wilson: + Saud U.S. visit (1978), 172 + U.S. military aid to Bahrain, 32 + Yemen crises, 254, 258, 268, + 275, 280, 284 + + Bentsen, Lloyd, 166 + Bergold, Harry E., Jr., 23, 26, 180, 192 + Bergsten, C. Fred, 17, 180, 210 + Bingham, Jonathan, 156 + Blackwill, Robert D., 208 + Blechman, Barry, 26, 190, 284 + Blumenthal, W. Michael, 157, 180, 190, 194 + Boatner, Helene L., 214 + Bodine, Barbara, 159, 160, 184, 246, 273 + Boice, Lt. Col. William, 284 + Borek, Ted, 246 + Borr, Peter, 190 + Bosworth, Stephen W., 203 + Bowdler, William G., 187 + Bowie, Robert, 17 + Bowie, Robert R.: + Indian Ocean demilitarization talks, 105, 111, 112, 116 + U.S.-Saudi relations, 180, 190 + Yemen crises, 268, 275, 280, + 284 + + Brement, Marshall, 124, 128 + Brezhnev, Leonid, 26, 100 + Brooke, Edward, 166 + Brown, Gen. George S., 102, 111, 112, 119 + Brown, Harold: + Brzezinski Saudi Arabia visit (1980), 208 + Indian Ocean demilitarization talks: + Brzezinski memoranda, 110, 114, 119 + Interagency response memorandum, 100 + Policy Review Committee discussions, 124 + Presidential Review Memoranda, 99 + Special Coordination Committee discussions, 105, 111, 112 + U.S.-Soviet meetings, 115 + + Middle East regional security, 16, 17, 21, 22, 23 + Middle East trip (1979), 15, 16, + 17, 19, 20 + Oil prices and availability, 9, + 96, 210 + Persian Gulf security framework, 14, 58, 79, 83, + 87, 93, 96, 98 + Saudi Arabia visit (1979), 178, 184, + 185, 186 + Saudi military aid to Egypt, 192 + Saudi regional security financing, 82 + Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, 54 + Soviet role in the Middle East, 9, + 91 + U.S. health care project aid to Saudi Arabia, 219 + U.S. military aid to Egypt, 169 + U.S. military aid to Pakistan, 42, 54 + U.S. military aid to Saudi Arabia, 195, 198, 200, 221, + 227 + + Brzezinski memoranda, 58, + 209 + Fahd U.S. visit (1977) + discussions, 149, 151 + Interagency meeting discussions, 212 + Iran-Iraq War and, 96, + 220 + Middle East trip (1979) + discussions, 17, 269 + Special Coordination Committee discussions, 57, 64, 222, 223 + Sultan discussions, 217 + Tuchman memoranda, 156 + + Vance memoranda, 155, + 169 + + + U.S. military presence in the Middle East/Indian Ocean, + 27, 30 + + Amphibious deployment/ground force exercises, 47, 52, 85 + + Brzezinski memoranda, 83, 87 + Special Coordination Committee discussions, + 41, 42, 54, 56, 57, 62, 86 + + Brzezinski memoranda, 58, + 79 + Contingency response capabilities, 28 + Diego Garcia base, 26, + 42, 54, 56, 57, 126, 127 + Egyptian role, 20, 64, 74, 87 + Jones memoranda, 11 + Middle East unified command proposals, 29, 77, 226 + Oman/Somalia/Kenya bases, 20, 41, 42, 54, 57, 73, 96 + Persian Gulf unified command proposals, 46, 61, 62, 69 + Policy Review Committee discussions, 26 + Rapid Deployment Force, 39, 48, 88 + Rapid reaction capability, 55 + Saudi role, 19, 20, 96, 217 + Special Coordination Committee discussions, 192 + U.S. military aid overviews, 94 + Vance memoranda, 127 + + U.S. relations with Pakistan, 73 + U.S.-Saudi relations, 151, 180, 216 + U.S.-Saudi security cooperation, 178, 184, 185, 187, + 217 + Yemen crises: + Covert action proposals, 294 + Middle East trip (1979) + discussions, 16, 17, 20 + National Security Council discussions, 271 + Odom memoranda, 31 + Special Coordination Committee discussions, 260, 263, 268, 277 + + + + + Brown, Leslie H., 246 + Brzezinski, Zbigniew K.: + Brown Middle East trip (1979), 16, 17, + 20 + Indian Ocean demilitarization talks, 109, 110, 113, 114, + 119 + + Carter meeting, 106 + Interagency response memorandum, 100 + Policy Review Committee discussions, 24, 124 + Presidential Review Memoranda, 99 + Sick/Bartholomew memoranda, 121 + Sick/Thomson memoranda, 101, 104 + Special Coordination Committee discussions, 102, 105, 111, 112, 116, 118 + U.S.-Australian discussions, 107, 122 + U.S.-Soviet meetings, 115, 117 + + + Iranian hostage crisis, 75, 90 + Iranian Revolution, 196 + Iraqi Pan-Arab Charter proposal, 140 + Mecca Grand Mosque hostage incident (Nov. 1979), 202 + Middle East regional security, 16, 21, 22, 23 + Oil prices and availability, 90, + 93, 196, 210 + Persian Gulf security framework, 43, 51, 93 + + Agency review, 97 + Brown memoranda, 96 + JCS paper, 14 + Odom memoranda, 34 + Presidential Directive, 98 + State Department papers (1980), 56, 57 + Tarnoff memoranda, 95 + Updates, 43, 51, 58, 79, 80, 83, 87, 90, 93 + + + Propaganda broadcasting, 36 + Saudi military aid to Egypt, 192 + Saudi political situation, 175 + Saudi regional security financing, 72, 79, 82, 90, + 93, 95 + Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, 45 + Soviet role in the Middle East, 91 + U.S. economic and military aid to Oman, 67, 68, 70 + U.S. health care project aid to Saudi Arabia, 219 + U.S.-Iraqi relations, 130, 131 + U.S.-Libyan relations, 130 + + U.S. military aid to Egypt and Israel, 162, 169 + U.S. military aid to Pakistan, 40, 42, 51, 54 + U.S. military aid to Saudi Arabia, 58, 162, 209 + + Brown memoranda, 195, + 198, 200, 227 + Fahd U.S. visit (1977) + discussions, 149 + Interagency meeting discussions, 212 + Iran-Iraq War and, 220 + Sick/Hunter memoranda, 197 + Special Coordination Committee discussions, 57, 64, 222, 223 + State Department paper, 211 + Tuchman memoranda, 156, + 166 + Vance memoranda, 169, + 199 + + U.S. military presence in the Middle East/Indian Ocean, + 43 + + Allied roles, 57, 78, 96 + Amphibious deployment/ground force exercises, 51, 83, 87 + + Brown memoranda, 47, 85 + Special Coordination Committee discussions, + 40, 42, 54, 56, 57, 62, 78, 82, 86 + + + Bartholomew Mission discussions, 38, 49, 50 + Brown memoranda, 27, 96 + Contingency response capabilities, 28 + Covert action, 51 + Diego Garcia base, 26, + 40, 42, 54, 56, 57, 126, 127 + Egyptian role, 64, 74, 87, 89, 90, 93 + Local contributions, 95, + 96 + Middle East unified command proposals, 29, 31, 34, 77 + Oman/Somalia/Kenya bases, 37, 49, 66, 90 + + Iranian hostage crisis and, 75 + Special Coordination Committee discussions, + 40, 42, 50, 54, 57, 65, 73, 78, 84 + Tarnoff memoranda, 95 + U.S.-Omani discussions, 70 + + + Persian Gulf unified command proposals, 39, 46, 51, 69, 90, 93 + + Brown memoranda, 61, 96 + Tarnoff memoranda, 95 + + + Policy Review Committee discussions, 24, 25, 26 + Rapid Deployment Force, 39, 40, 51, 90, 93, 95, 96 + Rapid reaction capability, 55 + Special Coordination Committee discussions, 192 + U.S. military aid overviews, 92, 93, 94, 96 + U.S.-Saudi discussions, 207, 208 + Vance memoranda, 127 + Welch/Ermarth memoranda, 41, 49 + Zawawi U.S. visit (1980) + discussions, 60 + + + U.S.-Omani security consultations, 13 + U.S.-Pakistani relations, 73 + U.S. policy in the Middle East, 11 + + Carter Doctrine, 43, 45, 51, 80, 90, 208 + Policy Review Committee discussions, 24 + Quandt/Sick memoranda, 1 + + + U.S.-Saudi relations: + CIA Intelligence Memoranda, 183 + Presidential Review Committee discussions, 180, 190 + Quandt/Sick memoranda, 191 + Saudi Arabia visit (1979), + 188 + Saudi Arabia visit (1980), + 207, 208 + West memoranda, 154, + 216 + + + U.S.-Saudi security cooperation, 185 + Yemen crises: + Brown Middle East trip (1979) discussions, 17 + Covert action proposals, 294, 296, 300 + al-Ghashmi assassination, 245 + Hoskinson memoranda, 252 + National Security Council staff memoranda, 264 + Saudi-Yemen Arab Republic relations, 297 + Soviet military aid to Yemen Arab Republic, 293 + Special Coordination Committee discussions, 40, 263 + U.S.-Saudi discussions, 207 + U.S./Saudi military aid to Yemen Arab Republic, + 249, 256, 257, 258 + U.S.-Soviet discussions, 263, 273 + + U.S.-Yemen Arab Republic discussions, 254 + Vance memoranda, 289 + Yemenite War (1979), 283 + + + + + Buck, 81 + Buczacki, Jeffrey J., 289 + Burgess, John E., 2 + Burke, Peter, 127 + Burleigh, A. Peter, 12, 32, 136, 254 + Bushnell, 157 + Butcher, W. Scott, 203, 288, 298 + + + + + + Camp David Accords (1978) (see also Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty + negotiations), 12, 19, 137, 181 + + Baghdad summit (Nov. 1978), 17, 26, + 174, 176, 180 + + + Camp David negotiations (1978), 9 + Carlucci, Frank C.: + Brzezinski Saudi Arabia visit (1980), 208 + Middle East regional security, 23 + Saudi military aid to Egypt, 192 + U.S. military aid to Pakistan, 42 + U.S. military aid to Saudi Arabia, 64, 220 + U.S. military presence in the Middle East/Indian Ocean, + 37, 42, 64, 65, 73, 192 + U.S.-Saudi security cooperation, 187 + Yemen crises, 263, 277, 294, + 300 + + + Carmody, A. T., 107 + Carswell, Robert, 94, 97 + Carter, James Earl III “Chip,” 188 + Carter, Jimmy: + Brown Middle East trip (1979), 15, 19, + 20 + Ghashmi correspondence, 234, + 235 + Indian Ocean demilitarization talks, 106 + + Brzezinski memoranda, 109, 110, 113 + Special Coordination Committee discussions, 102, 105, 116, 118 + UN Ad Hoc Committee, 128 + U.S.-Australian discussions, 107 + U.S.-Soviet meetings, 115, 117, 120 + + + Iranian Revolution, 196 + Khalid correspondence, 167, 182, 185, + 192, 253, 255 + Khalid U.S. visit (1979), 188 + Mecca Grand Mosque hostage incident (Nov. 1979), 204 + Oil prices and availability, 163, 196, 210 + Persian Gulf security framework: + Agency review, 97 + Brzezinski updates, 43, + 51, 79, 80, 83, 87, 90 + Carter Doctrine on, 43, + 45 + JCS paper, 14 + Presidential Directive, 98 + + + Presidential elections (1980), 216 + Propaganda broadcasting, 36 + Saudi military aid to Egypt, 23, + 192 + Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, 45 + Soviet role in the Middle East, 10 + U.S. citizen security in Saudi Arabia, 204 + U.S. economic and military aid to Oman, 67, 68 + U.S. health care project aid to Saudi Arabia, 219 + U.S.-Iraqi relations, 130, 131, 132 + U.S.-Libyan relations, 130 + U.S. military aid to Egypt, 162, + 169 + U.S. military aid to Israel, 162, 169 + U.S. military aid to Pakistan, 42, 54 + U.S. military aid to Saudi Arabia: + Brown memoranda, 195, + 200, 221, 227 + Brzezinski memoranda, 149, 162 + Christopher memoranda, 149 + Interagency meeting discussions, 212 + Iran-Iraq War and, 220 + Khalid correspondence, 167 + Special Coordination Committee discussions, 222, 223 + Vance memoranda, 169, + 170, 199 + West memoranda, 173 + + + U.S. military presence in the Middle East/Indian Ocean: + Allied roles, 54, 57, 78 + Amphibious deployment/ground force exercises: + Brown memoranda, 47 + Brzezinski memoranda, 83 + Special Coordination Committee discussions, + 42, 54, 57, 78, 82, 86 + Vance memoranda, 52 + + + Bartholomew Mission discussions, 38, 50, 52 + + Brown memoranda, 27, 41, 47 + Brzezinski memoranda, 38, + 43, 51 + Egyptian role, 64, 74 + Middle East unified command proposals, 226 + Oman/Somalia/Kenya bases: + Brzezinski memoranda, 90 + Habib mission discussions, 81 + Iranian hostage crisis and, 76 + Special Coordination Committee discussions, + 37, 42, 50, 54, 57, 66, 78, 84 + + + Persian Gulf unified command proposals, 46, 51, 61, 69, 90 + Rapid Deployment Force, 48, 88, 90 + Rapid reaction capability, Brzezinski memoranda, + 55 + Vance/Brown memoranda, 30 + + + U.S.-Omani security consultations, 12, 13 + U.S. policy in the Middle East: + Brzezinski memoranda, 51 + Carter Doctrine, 43, 45, 51, 80, 90, 208 + Duncan memoranda, 10 + U.S.-Soviet discussions, 26 + + + U.S.-Saudi relations: + Brzezinski Saudi Arabia visit (1980), 207 + CIA Intelligence Memoranda, 183 + Economic initiatives, 194 + Fahd U.S. visit (1977), + 148, 149 + Fahd U.S. visit proposals (1979), 182 + Presidential Review Committee discussions, 190 + Saudi Arabia visit (1978), + 159, 164 + West memoranda, 154, + 176, 216 + + + U.S.-Saudi security cooperation, 182 + Yemen crises + Covert action proposals, 294, 296 + al-Ghashmi assassination, 243 + Khalid correspondence, 253 + National Security Council discussions, 271 + National Security Council staff memoranda, 264 + Special Coordination Committee discussions, 260, 268 + U.S.-People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen + relations, 239, 240, 241, 242 + U.S./Saudi military aid to Yemen Arab Republic, + 249, 256 + U.S.-Soviet discussions, 263 + Yemen reunification discussions, 281 + Yemenite War (1979), 261, 270, 274 + + + Zawawi U.S. visit (1980), 60 + + + Case, Clifford P., Jr., 156, 166 + Castrodale, Richard, 18, 178 + Carter Doctrine (State of the Union address (1980)), 43, 45, 51, 80, 90, 208 + Cathey, Gen. Charles H., 177, 251, 255, 265, 266, 267 + Cave, George, 188, 266 + Cecil, Charles O., 143 + Central Intelligence Agency (CIA): + Documents not declassified, 174, + 189 + Indian Ocean demilitarization talks, 103 + Intelligence Memoranda: + PA M 80–10019, + “North Yemen: Move to the Left,” 292 + RP M 79–10053, “The + Impact of Iran on Saudi Arabia,” 181 + RP M 79–10061, + “Saudi Perceptions of Key Issues Affecting Saudi-US + Relations,” 183 + + Iranian Revolution, 35, 181 + Iraqi Middle East role, 141 + Iraqi political situation, 134 + Middle East regional security, 17, 35, 181 + Oil prices and availability, 35, + 144, 158, 183 + Propaganda broadcasting, 36 + Saudi Arabia, 144, 165, 181 + Soviet role in the Middle East, 6, + 35 + U.S. military aid to Saudi Arabia, 165, 214 + Yemen crises, 35, 237, 238, + 267, 292 + + Central Treaty Organization (CENTO), 9 + Chinese People’s Republic (CPR), 54 + Christopher, Warren M. + Brown Middle East trip (1979), 17 + Brzezinski Saudi Arabia visit (1980), 207, 208 + Europe trip (1980), 51 + + Indian Ocean demilitarization talks, 102, 105, 111, 112, + 116, 124 + Soviet role in People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen, 236 + Soviet role in the Middle East, 91 + U.S. health care project aid to Saudi Arabia, 219 + U.S. military aid to Pakistan, 42, 54 + U.S. military aid to Saudi Arabia, 57, 64, 149, 212, + 220, 222, 223 + U.S. military presence in the Middle East/Indian Ocean: + Amphibious deployment, 42, 54, 57, 62 + Bartholomew Mission discussions, 38, 50 + Egyptian role, 64, 74 + Oman/Somalia/Kenya bases, 37, 42, 50, 54, 57, 73 + Policy Review Committee discussions, 26 + + U.S.-Saudi relations, 180, 188 + Yemen crises, 231, 232, 241, + 254, 258, 261, 294 + + Church, Frank F., 16, 17, 166 + Churchill, George, 3, 5, 127 + Clarke, Bruce C., 50, 94, 128, 268 + Claytor, W. Graham, Jr.: + Brzezinski Saudi Arabia visit (1980), 208 + Persian Gulf security framework agency review, 97 + Saudi oil policies, 210 + Soviet role in the Middle East, 91 + U.S. military aid to Saudi Arabia, 57, 64, 220, 222, + 223 + U.S. military presence in the Middle East/Indian Ocean, + 41 + + Allied roles, 57, 78 + Amphibious deployment/ground force exercises, 40, 62, 78, 82, 86 + Bartholomew Mission discussions, 50 + Egyptian role, 64, 74 + Oman/Somalia/Kenya bases, 37, 57, 78, 84 + U.S. military aid overviews, 94 + + + Clements, William P., Jr., 145, 149 + Cleveland, Carolyn, 187 + Clift, A. Denis, 17, 50, 128, 187, 220, 222, 263 + Cluverius, Wat Tyler, IV, 2, 4, 7, 136 + Cogan, Charles, 74, 78 + Conference on International Economic Cooperation (CIEC), 150 + Congress, U.S.: + Israel boycott and, 148 + Middle East Force negotiations, 5 + Oman visits (1980), 65 + Saudi Arabia, 143, 160, 161, + 180 + Saudi military aid to Egypt, 23 + U.S. military aid to Saudi Arabia, 16, 17, 149, 156, + 161, 166, 168, 172, 199, + 211 + U.S. military presence in the Middle East/Indian Ocean, + 26, 42, 49, 54, 97, 126 + Yemen crises, 255, 257 + + Constable, Peter D.: + Brzezinski Saudi Arabia visit (1980), 208 + Indian Ocean demilitarization talks, 124 + Mecca Grand Mosque hostage incident (Nov. 1979), 203 + Middle East regional security, 63 + Persian Gulf security framework agency review, 97 + U.S. military aid to Pakistan, 40 + U.S. military presence in the Middle East/Indian Ocean, + 78, 82, 84, 92, 94 + Yemen crises, 285 + + Coon, Jane A., 65 + Cooper, Richard N., 150, 172, 190, 210 + Countryman, John R., 32, 71, 143, 228, 232, 285, 288, 289 + Court, Charles, 122 + Cowan, Gray, 50, 82, 84 + Crawford, William R.: + U.S.-British discussions on Iraq, 136 + U.S.-Saudi relations, 172, 190 + Yemen crises, 246, 254, 273 + + Scotes memoranda, 229 + Soviet military aid to Yemen Arab Republic, 278 + Special Coordination Committee discussions, 260, 262, 263, 268, 275, 277, 280, 284 + + + + + Crosswhite, Clyde, 94 + Cuba, 267 + Currier, Charles G., 136 + Cutler, Lloyd, 50, 208 + + + + Dahmash, Ahmad Qasim, 234 + Davis, Lynn E., 102, 105, 111, 116 + + Denend, Leslie G., 40, 166, 275, 277, 280 + Dhufari rebellion, 237 + Dickman, François M., 8, 18 + Diego Garcia base: + Brown memoranda, 126 + Brown Middle East trip (1979) + discussions, 20 + Indian Ocean demilitarization talks and, 5, 100, 105, 106, + 108, 113, 115, 116, 120 + Special Coordination Committee discussions, 26, 40, + 42, 54, 56, 57 + U.S.-British agreement, 126, + 129 + Vance memoranda, 127 + + Djibouti, 41, 42 + Dobrynin, Anatoly F., 263, 264, 273 + Documents not declassified, 174, 189, 218 + Dodson, Christine, 21, 73, 74, 77, 124, 187 + Donnelly, Maj. Gen. Charles, 213, 215, 228 + Donovan, Hedley, 37, 42, 50, 208, 294 + Duncan, Charles W., Jr.: + Brown Middle East trip (1979), 17 + Indian Ocean demilitarization talks, 102, 103, 105, 112 + Middle East Force negotiations, 2 + Persian Gulf security framework, 93, 97, 98 + U.S. military presence in the Middle East/Indian Ocean, + 26, 40, 73 + U.S. policy in the Middle East, 10, 11 + U.S.-Saudi relations, 62, 151, 180, + 187, 190, 210, 212, 222 + Yemen crises, 257, 258, 263 + + + + + Eagleton, Thomas F., 142 + Earle, Ralph, II, 50, 124, 125 + Earle, Robert, 62 + Egypt (see also Egyptian-Israeli Peace + Treaty negotiations): + Brown Middle East trip (1979), 16, 17, + 19 + Middle East regional security, Brown Middle East trip (1979) discussions, 17, 19 + Political situation, CIA Intelligence Memoranda, 35 + Saudi military aid to, 23, 165, 192 + U.S. economic and military aid: + Brown Middle East trip (1979) discussions, 16, 17, 19, 20 + Special Coordination Committee discussions, 54 + Tarnoff memoranda, 95 + + U.S.-Iraqi relations and, 135 + U.S. military aid: + Brzezinski memoranda, 162 + Vance memoranda, 169 + + + U.S. military presence in: + Brown Middle East trip (1979) discussions, 20 + Brzezinski memoranda, 87 + Odom memoranda, 34, 73 + Policy Review Committee discussions, 26 + Ras Banas base, 86, 87, 89, 90, 93, 96 + Special Coordination Committee discussions, 23, 56, 62, 64, 74, 86, 87, 89 + + + + + Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty negotiations: + Baghdad summit (Mar. 1979), 191 + Brown Middle East trip (1979) + discussions, 19, 20 + CIA Intelligence Memoranda, 35 + Iraq and, 136, 141 + Middle East regional security and, 35 + Saudi concerns, 188, 206 + Special Coordination Committee discussions, 23 + + Eilts, Hermann F., 135 + Eizenstat, Stuart E., 50 + Ellerman, Denny, 268 + Ericsson, Richard, 246 + Ermarth, Fritz: + Brown Middle East trip (1979), 16, 17 + Indian Ocean demilitarization talks, 24 + Middle East regional security, 16, 22, 23 + Saudi military aid to Egypt, 192 + U.S. military aid to Pakistan, 42 + U.S. military presence in the Middle East/Indian Ocean: + Bartholomew Mission discussions, 38, 49, 50 + Oman/Somalia/Kenya bases, 40, 41, 42, 49, 50, 66 + Policy Review Committee discussions, 24, 25, 26 + + Special Coordination Committee discussions, 192 + Vance memoranda, 44 + + U.S. policy in the Middle East, 24 + Yemen crises, 294 + + Ethiopia. See Ogaden War + Evans, John M., 288 + + + Fahd bin Abdul Aziz al Saud (Crown Prince of Saudi Arabia): + Arab-Israeli conflict, 157 + Brzezinski visit (1980), 207 + CIA Intelligence Memoranda, 165 + Oil prices and availability, 152, 153, 157, 161 + Political situation, 143, 144, 154, + 175, 176 + Saudi oil policies, 152, 153, 157, + 161, 206 + Soviet role in the Middle East, 171 + U.S. military aid to Saudi Arabia: + Blumenthal discussions, 157 + Brown memoranda, 227 + Carter-Khalid correspondence, 167 + Porter-Sultan communications, 145 + U.S. visit (1977) + discussions, 149, 151 + Vance discussions, 148 + Vance memoranda, 168 + Vance visit (1977) + discussions, 161 + West discussions, 170, + 171 + + U.S. military presence in the Middle East/Indian Ocean, + 207 + U.S.-Saudi relations: + U.S. visit (1977), 148, 149, 150, 151, 152 + U.S. visit proposals (1979), 182, 188, 190 + Vance discussions, 148 + Vance visit (1977), 161 + + U.S.-Saudi security cooperation, 179, 185, 224, 225 + Yemen crises, 207, 238, 240, + 255 + + Federal Republic of Germany (FRG), 40, + 42 + Fish, Gen. Howard M., 151 + Flaten, Robert, 5 + Flynt, John James, 255 + Forbes, John D., 184 + Ford, Gerald R., 149 + France, 40, 42, + 107, 216 + Fraser, J. Malcolm, 107 + Funk, Gerald P., 49 + + + Gaffney, Henry H., 33, 284 + Gates, Robert, 126, 260 + Gelb, Leslie H., 2, 21, 102, 112, 168 + Gerlach, Frederick, 213, 265, 266, 293 + Gerson, Ralph, 26 + Gessaman, Donald, 63 + al-Ghashmi, Ahmad, 233, 234, 238, 243, 245, 252 + al-Ghazali, Abdullah, 81 + Giese, Arthur M., 289 + Glenn, John, 166 + Gnehm, Edward William, Jr., 171, 282, 291 + Goldman, Leslie J., 73, 97, 210, 222, 223 + Goldsmith, Sydney, 232 + Gompert, David C., 44, 66, 78, 86, 127, 129 + Gorman, Gen. Paul F., 91, 220, 222, 223 + Graves, Lt. Gen. Ernest, 248 + Gromyko, Andrei A., 100 + Gross, Woolf, 127 + + + Habib, Philip C.: + Middle East Force negotiations, 2, + 5 + U.S.-Iraqi relations, 132, 133 + U.S. military presence in the Middle East/Indian Ocean, + 81 + U.S.-Saudi relations, 161 + Yemen crises, 231, 232 + + al-Hajri, Abdallah, 235 + al-Hamdi, Ibrahim, 176, 229, 230, 233, 234, 235, 238, 299 + Hammad, Gen., 213, 215 + Hammadi, Saddoun, 132, 133 + Hannifin, Vice Adm. Patrick, 111 + Hansell, Herbert J., 169 + Hanson, Rear Adm. Thor, 11, 14, 185 + Harmon, John, 262 + Harrop, William C., 44 + Hayden, Walter, 298 + Hayward, Adm. Thomas, 78, 105, 222, 223 + Helgerson, John, 280 + Henze, Paul B., 34, 45, 49, 187 + Hibbits, John, 116 + Hobbs, Richard, 2, 3 + Holbrooke, Richard, 107 + Holcomb, Rear Adm. M. Staser, 151 + Horn of Africa. See Ogaden War + Hornblow, Michael, 100, 131 + Hoskinson, Samuel M., 23, 175, 192, 252 + + Houdek, Robert C., 127 + Humaid, Gen., 179, 213, 215, 266 + Human rights, 131, 143, 154 + Humphrey, Hubert H., 156 + Hunt, Col., 266 + Hunter, Robert, 26, 40, 45, 197, 202, 297 + Hussein, Saddam, 134, 135, 137, 138, 139, 141 + Hyland, William G., 102 + + + Ibrahim, Izzat, 138 + Inderfurth, Karl F. (“Rick”), 16, 108, 121, 130, 252 + India, 42 + Indian Ocean. See Diego Garcia base; Indian + Ocean demilitarization talks; Kenya; Middle East Force negotiations; + Oman; Somalia; U.S. military presence in the Middle East/Indian + Ocean. + Indian Ocean demilitarization talks, 34, + 123 + + Brzezinski memoranda, 109, 110, 113, + 114, 119 + Carter meeting, 106 + CIA memoranda, 103 + Interagency response memorandum, 100 + McGiffert memoranda, 123 + Middle East Force negotiations and, 2, 5 + NSC draft guidance paper, 113 + Policy Review Committee discussions, 24, 26, 124 + Presidential Review Memoranda, 99 + Quandt/Sick memoranda, 1 + Sick/Bartholomew memoranda, 121 + Sick/Thomson memoranda, 101, + 104 + Special Coordination Committee discussions, 102, 105, + 111, 112, 116, 118 + UN Ad Hoc Committee, 128 + U.S.-Australian discussions, 107, 122 + U.S.-Soviet meetings, 108, 115, 117, + 120, 125 + + Inman, Adm. Bobby, 187 + Iran (see also Iran-Iraq War; Iranian + hostage crisis; Iranian Revolution): + Oil exports, 97 + Soviet invasion possibility, 91 + U.S. covert action, 34, 51 + U.S.-Iraqi relations and, 131 + U.S. military aid, 9, 160 + U.S. press statement, 42 + + Iran-Iraq War: + Brown memoranda, 96 + Brzezinski memoranda, 93 + Special Coordination Committee discussions, 97, 220, + 223 + Tarnoff memoranda, 95 + U.S. military aid to Saudi Arabia and, 220 + + Iranian hostage crisis: + Brown memoranda, 85, 96 + Brzezinski memoranda, 90 + CIA Intelligence Memoranda, 141 + Odom memoranda, 34 + Oman and, 60, 75, 76, 81 + Saudi Arabia and, 207, 216 + Special Coordination Committee discussions, 57 + U.S. policy in the Middle East and, 45 + + Iranian Revolution: + Brown Middle East trip (1979) and, + 15, 16, 17 + CIA Intelligence Memoranda, 35, + 181 + Duncan memoranda, 10 + Indian Ocean demilitarization talks and, 123 + JCS paper, 14 + Jones memoranda, 11 + Mecca Grand Mosque hostage incident and, 202, 206 + Middle East regional security and, 18, 179 + Saudi concerns, 176, 179, 181, + 185, 196, 206, 214 + Vance memoranda, 18 + Yemen crises and, 259 + + Iraq (see also Iran-Iraq War): + Iranian revolution and, 35 + Kurdish insurgency, 131, 132 + Middle East role, 35, 136, 137, + 140, 141 + Persian Gulf states relations with, 35 + Political situation, 134, 138, 139, + 141 + U.S. relations with: + Brzezinski memoranda, 130 + Eagleton-Azzawi meeting, 142 + Habib-Hammadi meetings, 132, 133 + National Intelligence Estimates, 137 + Quandt/Sick memoranda, 1 + Saunders memoranda, 135 + + Special Coordination Committee discussions, 23 + Vance memoranda, 131 + + Yemen crises and, 283 + + Islamic Conference (1980), 207, 217 + Ismail, Abd al Fattah, 235, 244, 252, 266, 267, 281, 292 + Israel: + Political situation, 35 + U.S. military aid, 16, 17, 19, + 20, 162, 169 + + Israel boycott, 143, 144, 148 + + + Jackson, Henry M. (“Scoop”), 210 + Janka, Leslie A., 3, 151 + Japan, 40, 42 + Javits, Jacob K., 156, 199, 231, 232 + Jayne, Edward Randy, 62, 64, 65, 66, 73, 210, 284 + Jerusalem, 143 + Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) (see also + Jones, Gen. David C.), 14, 29, 34, 39, 77, 91 + Jones, Gen. David C.: + Brown Middle East trip (1979), 17 + Brzezinski Saudi Arabia visit (1980), 208 + Indian Ocean demilitarization talks, 99, 100, 110, 114, + 115, 124 + Middle East regional security, 21, 22, 23 + Oil prices and availability, 9 + Persian Gulf security framework, 14, 79, 83, 87, + 93, 97, 98 + Saudi military aid to Egypt, 192 + Saudi oil policies, 210 + Saudi regional security financing, 82 + Soviet role in the Middle East, 9, + 91 + U.S. economic and military aid to Oman, 70 + U.S.-Iraqi relations, 142 + U.S. military aid to Pakistan, 42, 54 + U.S. military aid to Saudi Arabia, 57, 64, 212, 221, + 227 + U.S. military presence in the Middle East/Indian Ocean, + 11 + + Amphibious deployment/ground force exercises, 40, 42, 62, 82, 83, 86, 87 + Brzezinski memoranda, 79 + Egyptian role, 64, 74, 87, 89 + Middle East unified command proposals, 77 + Oman/Somalia/Kenya bases, 11 + + Special Coordination Committee discussions, + 37, 40, 42, 54, 57, 65, 73 + U.S.-Omani discussions, 70 + + Special Coordination Committee discussions, 192 + U.S. military aid overviews, 94 + + U.S.-Saudi relations, 180 + U.S.-Saudi security cooperation, 187 + Yemen crises, 260, 263, 268, + 294 + + Jordan, 19, 20, + 284 + Jordan, Hamilton, 42, 50, 294 + Jughman, Yahya, 259, 261 + + + Kabbani, Gen., 177, 251, 266 + Kahan, Jerome H., 116 + Kairollah Talfa, Adnan, 134, 138 + Keely, Robert, 66 + Keene, Douglas E., 7, 32, 71 + Keeny, Spurgeon, 23, 26, 192 + Kelley, Maj. Gen. Paul X., 48 + Kelly, Cmdr. James, 277 + Kenya: + U.S. amphibious deployment proposals, 86, 87 + U.S. bases in: + Bartholomew Mission discussions, 38, 49, 50, 51 + Brzezinski memoranda, 90, + 93 + Special Coordination Committee discussions, 66 + Tarnoff memoranda, 95 + Vance memoranda, 44 + Welch/Ermarth memoranda, 41, 49 + + U.S. relations with, 96 + + Kessler, Martha, 222 + al-Khail, Aba, 176 + Khaldi, Gen., 7 + Khalid bin Abdul Aziz (king of Saudi Arabia): + Carter correspondence, 167, 182, 185, + 192, 253, 255 + CIA Intelligence Memoranda, 165 + Lawrence and, 34 + Political situation, 154, 175, 176 + Saudi military aid to Egypt, 23 + U.S. military aid to Saudi Arabia, 145, 167 + + U.S. visit (1979), 188 + Yemen crises, 155, 253 + + Khalifa bin Zayid, Shaikh, 8 + Khomeini, Ayatollah Ruhollah, 35 + al-Kibsi, 261, 287 + Kimmitt, Robert, 198, 200, 268 + Kissinger, Henry A., 145, 231 + Klutznick, Philip M., 55, 98 + Komer, Robert W.: + Middle East regional security, 62, 63, 64 + Persian Gulf security framework, 95, 97 + Saudi oil policies, 210 + Soviet role in the Middle East, 91 + U.S. economic and military aid to Oman, 70 + U.S. military aid to Pakistan, 42, 54 + U.S. military aid to Saudi Arabia, 57, 64 + U.S. military presence in the Middle East/Indian Ocean: + Amphibious deployment/ground force exercises, 54, 56, 57, 62, 82, 86 + Bartholomew Mission discussions, 50 + Egyptian role, 64, 73, 74, 89 + Oman/Somalia/Kenya bases, 42, 50, 54, 57, 65, 70, 84 + U.S. military aid overviews, 92, 94 + + Yemen crises, 294 + + Korn, David A., 161 + Kornienko, Georgi M., 273 + Kramer, Frank, 78, 89, 94 + Kreisberg, Paul H., 18, 21, 44, 184, 246 + al-Kuhali, Moujahid, 251 + Kurdish insurgency, 131, 132 + Kuwait. See Persian Gulf states + + + Lake, W. Anthony, 63, 127 + Lande, Peter, 2, 3 + Landon, Timothy, 60 + Lane, George M.: + Soviet military aid to Yemen Arab Republic, 279, 282, + 291, 295, 299 + U.S. military aid to Yemen Arab Republic, 261, 286 + Yemen crises, 254, 284 + Yemen reunification discussions, 295, 299 + Yemenite War (1979), 261 + + Lawrence, Maj. Gen. Richard, 29, 31, 34, 197, 215, 284 + Lebanese Civil War, 144, 148, 151, 172 + Lewis, William, 2, 3, 5 + Libya, 130 + Lufty, Sharif, 70, 72 + Lyons, Rear Adm. James A., 66, 82, 266, 277, 280, 284 + + + McCall, Sherrod, 273 + McDougall, Ellis, 154 + McGiffert, David E.: + Brown Middle East trip (1979), 17 + Fahd U.S. visit (1977), 151 + Indian Ocean demilitarization talks, 116, 123, 124, 125, + 128 + Middle East regional security, 18, 23 + Saudi military aid to Egypt, 192 + Strait of Hormuz, 33 + U.S. economic and military aid to Oman, 70 + U.S. military aid to Pakistan, 54 + U.S. military presence in the Middle East/Indian Ocean, + 26, 50, 54, 65, 70, 73, 74, + 192 + U.S.-Saudi relations, 180, 185, 220, + :nl 223 + Yemen crises, 275 + + McIntyre, James T., 17, 55, 68, 73, 91, 93, 98 + McKean, Joel, 125 + McKim, Lt. Col. Kenneth, 262, 268, 275, 277 + McMahon, John, 187 + Madani, Nizar O., 172 + Makki, Hassan, 288 + Mansuri, Abd al-Rahman, 188, 239, 285 + Marcuss, Stanley J., 180 + Marsh, William H., 184, 213, 215 + Martin, Thomas G., 254 + Matheny, John, 277 + Mattingly, Lt. Col. John, 94 + Mauritius, 129 + Maxim, Robert M., 18 + Maynes, Charles W., 128 + Mecca Grand Mosque hostage incident (Nov. 1979), 35, 201, 202, 203, 204 + Mendelevich, Lev, 104, 108, 117, 120, 125 + Metzenbaum, Howard, 166 + Meyer, Col., 177 + Michel, James, 268, 277 + + Middle East Force negotiations, 2, 3, 4, 5 + Middle East regional security (see also + Persian Gulf security framework; Saudi regional security financing; + U.S. military presence in the Middle East/Indian Ocean): + Brown Middle East trip (1979) + discussions, 16, 17, 19, 20 + Carter Doctrine, 43, 45, 51, + 80, 90, 208 + CIA Intelligence Memoranda, 35 + Iranian revolution and, 18, 179 + Komer paper, 62, 63, 64 + Persian Gulf states and, 12, 13, 18 + Special Coordination Committee discussions, 21, 22, + 23, 63, 64, 192 + U.S.-Iraqi discussions, 132 + U.S.-Omani discussions, 12, 13, 60 + Yemen and, 235 + + Miller, G. William, 93, 97, 98, 212 + Mishal (prince of Saudi Arabia), 175 + Moberly, Patrick, 129 + Mondale, Walter F.: + Brown Middle East trip (1979), 17 + Indian Ocean demilitarization talks, 99, 100, 105, 112 + Middle East regional security, 82 + Persian Gulf security framework, 98 + Saudi military aid to Egypt, 192 + U.S. military aid to Saudi Arabia, 220 + U.S. military presence in the Middle East/Indian Ocean, + 73, 74, 77, 192 + U.S.-Saudi security cooperation, 187, 264 + Yemen crises, 263 + + Montgomery, James, 50 + Moor, Carol C., 18 + Moore, Frank, 166 + Moose, David, 50 + Moose, Richard M., Jr., 172 + Muhammad bin Abdulaziz Al Saud (prince of Saudi Arabia), 154 + Muller, George, 18 + Murphy, Adm. Daniel J., 26, 187, 277 + Murray, Robert J.: + Brown Middle East trip (1979), 17 + U.S. military aid to Bahrain, 32 + U.S. military presence in the Middle East/Indian Ocean, + 34, 38, 40, 44, 51, 52 + U.S./Saudi military aid to Yemen Arab Republic, 249 + U.S.-Saudi relations, 190 + U.S.-Saudi security cooperation, 184, 185 + Yemen crises: + Saudi military intervention possibilities, 265, 266 + Soviet military aid to Yemen Arab Republic, 278, 289 + Special Coordination Committee discussions, 260, 262, 280, :nl + 284 + U.S. military aid to Yemen Arab Republic, 254 + + + Musallim, Ali, 251 + Muskie, Edmund S.: + Persian Gulf security framework, 79, 83, 87, 93, + 98 + Soviet role in the Middle East, 91 + U.S.-Iraqi relations, 142 + U.S. military aid to Saudi Arabia, 222, 223, 227, 228 + U.S. military presence in the Middle East/Indian Ocean, + 77, 79, 83, 85, 87, 129 + U.S.-Saudi relations, 216 + + Muti’, Muhammed Saleh, 232 + + + Naas, Charles, 2, 3 + Nagle, Chester, 60 + Najim, Nabil, 142 + Nasser, Gamel Abdel, 81 + National Intelligence Estimates, “Iraq’s Role in the Middle East,” + 137 + National Security Council (NSC), 113 + Nayif bin Abdul-Aziz Al Saud (prince of Saudi Arabia), 154 + Nazer, Hisham, 144, 154 + Newhouse, John, 102, 105, 112, 116, :nl 124 + Newsom, David D.: + Brzezinski Saudi Arabia visit (1980), 208 + Mecca Grand Mosque hostage incident (Nov. 1979), 204 + Middle East regional security, 18, 21 + Persian Gulf security framework agency review, 97 + Saudi oil policies, 210 + Soviet role in the Middle East, 91 + Strait of Hormuz, 33 + U.S.-Iraqi relations, 135 + U.S. military aid to Pakistan, 40, 54 + U.S. military aid to Saudi Arabia, 57, 64, 220, 223 + U.S. military presence in the Middle East/Indian Ocean: + Amphibious deployment/ground force exercises, 54, 56, 57, 62, 78, 82, 86 + Bartholomew Mission discussions, 50 + Egyptian role, 64, 89 + Oman/Somalia/Kenya bases, 37, 40, 50, 54, 57, 78, 84 + Policy Review Committee discussions, 26 + U.S. military aid overviews, 92, 94 + Vance memoranda, 44 + + U.S.-Omani security consultations, 12 + U.S.-Saudi relations, 180 + U.S.-Saudi security cooperation, 178, 187 + Yemen crises: + Soviet military aid to Yemen Arab Republic, 278, 293 + Special Coordination Committee discussions, 260, 262, 263, 268, 275, 277, 280 + U.S. military aid to Yemen Arab Republic, 246, 254 + U.S./Saudi military aid to Yemen Arab Republic, + 250, 298 + U.S.-Soviet discussions, 273 + Yemen reunification discussions, 288 + + + Nimetz, Matthew, 64, 65, 71, 78, 84, 92, 94, 208 + Non-aligned Movement Summit (1979), 30 + North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), 28, 54, 78 + North Yemen. See Yemen Arab + Republic. + + + October 1973 War, 5, 35, 100, 144 + Odom, Brig. Gen. William: + Carter Doctrine, 45 + Iranian hostage crisis, 34, 45 + Middle East regional security, 63 + Persian Gulf security framework, 34, 97 + Saudi oil policies, 210 + Soviet role in the Middle East, 91 + U.S. military aid to Pakistan, 42, 54 + + U.S. military aid to Saudi Arabia, 57, 64, 220, 222, + 223 + U.S. military presence in the Middle East/Indian Ocean: + Allied roles, 57, 78 + Amphibious deployment/ground force exercises, 40, 42, 54, 56, 57, 62, 78, 82, 86 + Egyptian role, 34, 64, 73, 74, 89 + Middle East unified command proposals, 29, 31, 34, 77 + Oman/Somalia/Kenya bases, 34 + + Iranian hostage crisis and, 75 + Special Coordination Committee discussions, + 37, 40, 42, 50, 54, 57, 65, 73, 78, 84 + + Rapid Deployment Force, 39, 40 + U.S. military aid overviews, 92, 94 + + Yemen crises, 31, 34, 179, + 294 + + O’Donohue, Daniel: + Middle East regional security, 18, 21 + Strait of Hormuz, 33 + U.S. economic and military aid to Oman, 71 + U.S. military aid to Bahrain, 32 + U.S. military aid to Saudi Arabia, 64 + U.S. military presence in the Middle East/Indian Ocean, + 64, 66, 94 + U.S.-Saudi security cooperation, 184 + Yemen crises, 284, 289 + + Ogaden War: + Brown memoranda, 96 + Brzezinski memoranda, 90, 93 + CIA Intelligence Memoranda, 165 + People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen role, 235, 237 + Soviet role, 171, 236 + Special Coordination Committee discussions, 50, 66, + 73, 82, 84 + Tarnoff memoranda, 95 + U.S.-People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen discussions, + 231 + U.S.-Saudi discussions, 161, + 171 + Welch/Ermarth memoranda, 41, 49 + + Oil prices and availability: + Arab-Israeli conflict and, 9, 158 + Brown memoranda, 96 + Brzezinski memoranda, 90, 93 + Indian Ocean demilitarization talks and, 100, 123 + Iraq and, 137 + Middle East regional security and, 35 + National Intelligence Estimates, 137 + + Saudi oil field security, 14, + 17, 19, 154 + Saudi policies: + Blumenthal-Fahd discussions, 157 + Christopher-Saud discussions, 207 + CIA Intelligence Memoranda, 35, 144, 158, 183 + Duncan Saudi Arabia visit (1980), 210 + Presidential Review Committee discussions, 180, 190 + State department briefing paper, 143 + Vance-Fahd communications, 152, 153, 161 + West memoranda, 154, + 163, 173, 196, 206, 216 + + Soviet role in the Middle East and, 176, 179 + Special Coordination Committee discussions, 97 + Tarnoff memoranda, 95 + U.S. domestic policies, 172 + U.S. policy in the Middle East and, 1, 9, 26, 35, 143, 180 + + + Oman (see also Persian Gulf states): + Congressional delegation visits (1980), 65 + Dhufari rebellion, 237 + Iranian hostage crisis and, 60, + 75, 76, 81 + Saudi military aid, 54 + U.S. bases in: + Bartholomew Mission discussions, 38, 49, 50, 51, 53 + Brown Middle East trip (1979) discussions, 20 + Brzezinski memoranda, 58, + 90 + Habib mission discussions, 81 + Indian Ocean demilitarization talks and, 100 + Jones memoranda, 11 + Policy Review Committee discussions, 26 + Special Coordination Committee discussions, 40, 50, 54, 57, 65, 66 + Vance memoranda, 44 + Welch/Ermarth memoranda, 41, 49 + Wiley memoranda, 70 + Zawawi U.S. visit (1980) + discussions, 59, 60 + + U.S. economic and military aid: + Bartholomew memoranda, 72 + Bartholomew Mission discussions, 38, 53 + Brzezinski/McIntyre memoranda, 68 + Brzezinski memoranda, 67, + 90, 93 + Odom memoranda, 34 + Special Coordination Committee discussions, 64, 65 + U.S.-Omani discussions, 59, 60, 70, 72, 81 + Vance memoranda, 71 + + U.S.-Omani security consultations, 12, 13, 60 + Zawawi U.S. visit (1980), 60 + + + Omran, Gen., 215 + Onek, Joseph, 128 + Organization of African Unity (OAU), 95 + Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) (see also Oil prices and availability): + CIA Intelligence Memoranda, 35, + 144, 158 + Sick memoranda, 175 + U.S.-Saudi communications, 150, + 152, 153, 157, 161 + West memoranda, 154, 163 + + Owen, Henry D., 40, 56, 57, 65, 208, 210 + + + + Pakistan: + Saudi aid, 207, 208 + Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and, 40 + U.S. military aid, 40, 42, 51, + 54, 185, 207 + U.S. military presence in, 40, + 42 + U.S. relations with, 73, 90, 93, + 95 + + Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), 35 + Palestinian Autonomy Talks (1979–1980), 35, 212, 216 + Palestinians. See Arab-Israeli conflict; + Lebanese Civil War; Palestinian Autonomy Talks + Palmer, Brig. Gen. David, 92 + Panama Canal treaties, 166, 172 + Parker, Richard B., 192 + Parkinson, N. F., 107 + Parris, Gen. William, 60 + Parsons, Anthony, 136 + + PASEX, 34 + Peacock, Andrew, 107 + Peck, Edward, 133, 139 + People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen (South Yemen) (see also Yemen crises): + Rubayyah Ali assassination, 244 + Saudi relations with, 161, 237, 239, + 240 + Soviet relations with, 16, 207, 235, + 236, 244, 245, 290, 291 + Terrorism and, 231, 232, 235 + U.S. covert action, 34 + U.S. relations with, 231, 232, 239, + 240, 241, 242 + + Persian Gulf. See Middle East Force + negotiations; Persian Gulf security framework; Persian Gulf states; + U.S. military presence in the Middle East/Indian Ocean. + Persian Gulf security framework (see also + Oil prices and availability; Oman, economic and military aid; + Pakistan, U.S. relations with; Saudi Arabia, U.S. military aid; + Saudi regional security financing; U.S. military presence in the + Middle East/Indian Ocean): + Administration transition period (1980–1981), 97 + Agency review, 95, 96, 97 + Brzezinski updates, 43, 51, 58, + 79, 80, 83, 87, 90, 93 + Carter Doctrine and, 43, 45 + JCS paper, 14 + Local contributions, 95, 96 + Odom memoranda, 34 + Presidential Directive, 97, 98 + State Department papers (1980), + 56, 57 + + Persian Gulf states: + Iraqi relations with, 35 + Middle East regional security and, 12, 13, 18 + Political situation, 35 + U.S. military aid, 7, 8 + U.S. policy in the Middle East and, 1, 18 + + Pharaon, Rashid, 161, 188 + Platt, Alan, 23, 192, 284 + Plummer, Lt. Col. G. W., 33, 266 + Poats, Rutherford M., 16, 66, 180 + Policy Review Committee (PRC): + Brown Middle East trip (1979), 17 + Indian Ocean demilitarization talks, 24, 26, 124 + Strait of Hormuz, 33 + U.S. military presence in the Middle East/Indian Ocean, + 24, 25, 26, 123 + + Porter, William J., 145, 148 + Portugal, 95 + Powell, Jody, 37, 42, 50, 107, 128, 294 + Presidential Directives, PD/NSC–63, + “Persian Gulf Security Framework,” 97, 98 + Presidential Review Memoranda: + NSC–10, “Comprehensive Net + Assessment and Military Force Posture Review,” 109 + NSC–25, “Arms Control in the + Indian Ocean Area,” 99 + + Propaganda broadcasting, 36 + Pustay, Lt. Gen. John: + Brzezinski Saudi Arabia visit (1980), 208 + Indian Ocean demilitarization talks, 124, 125, 128 + Middle East regional security, 63 + Persian Gulf security framework agency review, 97 + Saudi oil policies, 210 + Strait of Hormuz, 33 + U.S. military aid to Pakistan, 42, 54 + U.S. military aid to Saudi Arabia, 57, 64 + U.S. military presence in the Middle East/Indian Ocean: + Amphibious deployment/ground force exercises, 40, 42, 54, 56, 57, 78, 86 + Bartholomew Mission discussions, 50 + Egyptian role, 64, 74, 89 + Oman/Somalia/Kenya bases, 37, 40, 42, 50, 54, 57, 65, 73, 78, 84 + Policy Review Committee discussions, 26 + U.S. military aid overviews, 92, 94 + + Yemen crises, 294 + + + + Qaboos bin Said al Said (Sultan of Oman), 13, 38, 53, 66, 70, 76 + Quandt, William B.: + Indian Ocean demilitarization talks, 122 + + Middle East regional security, 18, 22, 23 + Saud U.S. visit (1978), 172 + Saudi military aid to Egypt, 192 + U.S.-Iraqi relations, 130 + U.S. military presence in the Middle East/Indian Ocean, + 192 + U.S. policy in the Middle East, 1, + 16 + U.S.-Saudi relations, 168, 178, 180, + 191 + Yemen crises, 252, 254 + + + + Radio Liberty, 36 + Ransom, David M.: + U.S. military presence in the Middle East/Indian Ocean, + 50, 66 + Yemen crises + al-Ghashmi assassination, 244 + Saudi military intervention possibilities, 266 + Soviet military aid to Yemen Arab Republic, 251 + Special Coordination Committee discussions, 262, 275, 277, 280, 284 + U.S./Saudi military aid to Yemen Arab Republic, + 256 + + + Ras Banas base (Egypt), 86, 87, 89, 90, 93, 96 + Reddy, Leo, 3, 133, 150, 232 + Renouf, Alan P., 107 + Rogers, William P., 229 + Rohwer, James, 5 + Rosenthal, Benjamin S., 149 + Rubayyah Ali, Salim, 231, 235, 244, 245, 252 + Ryan, Leo, 156 + Ryer, Lt. Col., 213, 215 + + + + + Sabbagh, Isa K., 160, 161, 206, 232 + Sabri, Maj. Gen., 215 + Sadat, Anwar, 18 + Saleh, Lt. Col. Ali Abdallah, 238 + Salih, Ali Abdallah: + al-Ghashmi assassination, 252 + Soviet military aid to Yemen Arab Republic, 251, 279, + 282, 289, 291, 292, 293 + U.S. military aid to Yemen Arab Republic, 254, 259, + 285, 286 + Yemen reunification discussions, 281, 295, 299 + Yemenite War (1979), 261 + + Sanders, Edward G., 50, 89, 92, 94, 97, 180, 262 + Saud al-Faisal bin Abd al-Aziz (prince of Saudi Arabia): + Arab-Israeli conflict, 154 + Brzezinski visit (1979), 188 + Brzezinski visit (1980), 207 + CIA Intelligence Memoranda, 165 + Fahd U.S. visit (1977), 151 + Mecca Grand Mosque hostage incident (Nov. 1979), 203 + Political situation, 144 + Soviet role in the Middle East, 273 + U.S. military aid to Saudi Arabia, 167, 172 + U.S.-Saudi security cooperation, 177, 184, 185, 188 + U.S. visit (1978), 172 + Vance visit (1977), 161 + Yemen crises, 250, 255, 264, + 265, 266 + + Saudi Arabia: + ARAMCO takeover, 143, 163, 176 + Brown Middle East trip (1979), 16, 17, + 19 + Camp David Accords and, 26 + CIA Intelligence Memoranda, 144, + 165, 181 + Duncan visit (1980), 62, 210 + Economic situation, 143 + French military aid, 216 + Human rights, 143, 154 + Iranian Revolution and, 176, + 179, 181, 185, 196, 206, + 214 + Israel boycott and, 143, 144, 148 + Mecca Grand Mosque hostage incident (Nov. 1979), 35, + 201, 202, 203, 204 + Middle East regional security (see + also Saudi regional security financing), 16, 17, + 19, 35, 181 + Middle East unified command proposals and, 226 + Military aid to Egypt, 23, 165, 192 + Military aid to Oman, 54 + Military aid to Yemen Arab Republic, 229, 230, 262, 291 + Ogaden War, 161, 165, 171 + Oil field security, 14, 17, 19, + 154 + Oil policies: + Blumenthal-Fahd discussions, 157 + Christopher-Saud discussions, 207 + CIA Intelligence Memoranda, 35, 144, 158, 183 + + Duncan Saudi Arabia visit (1980), 210 + Presidential Review Committee discussions, 180, 190 + State department briefing paper, 143 + Vance-Fahd communications, 152, 153, 161 + West memoranda, 154, + 163, 173, 196, 206, 216 + + People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen relations with, 161, 237, + 239, 240 + Political situation: + Brown Middle East trip (1979) and, 17 + CIA Intelligence Memoranda, 35, 144, 181 + Sick memoranda, 175 + Special Coordination Committee discussions, 65 + State Department briefing paper, 143 + West memoranda, 154, + 176, 179, 206 + + Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and, 206, 207, 217 + Soviet relations with, 171, 179, 181 + Soviet role in the Middle East: + CIA Intelligence Memoranda, 165, 181 + U.S.-Saudi discussions, 150, 171, 177, 185, 207 + Vance memoranda, 170 + West memoranda, 176, + 179, 186, 206 + + State Department briefing paper, 143 + U.S. citizen security, 204, 205 + U.S. health care project aid, 219 + U.S.-Iraqi relations and, 131 + U.S. Joint Economic Commission, 143 + U.S. Middle East unified command proposals and, 29 + U.S. military aid: + Blumenthal-Fahd discussions, 157 + Brown-Fahd discussions, 151 + Brown memoranda, 195, + 198, 200, 221, 227 + Brown Middle East trip (1979) discussions, 16, 17, 19, 20, 269 + Brown-Sultan discussions, 217 + Brzezinski memoranda, 58, + 149, 162, 209 + Carter-Khalid correspondence, 167 + CIA Intelligence Memoranda, 165, 214 + Daniels memoranda, 193 + Interagency meeting discussions, 212 + Iran-Iraq War and, 220 + Jones memoranda, 9 + Lawrence-Sultan discussions, 215 + Policy Review Committee discussions, 26 + Porter-Sultan communications, 145, 147 + Presidential Review Committee discussions, 180 + Saunders memoranda, 228 + Sick/Hunter memoranda, 197 + Special Coordination Committee discussions, 57, 64, 84, 91, 220, 222, 223, 284 + State Department briefing paper, 143 + State Department paper, 211 + Tuchman memoranda, 156, + 166 + Vance-Fahd discussions, 148 + Vance memoranda, 146, + 155, 167, 168, 169, 170, 199 + Vance-Saud discussions, 172 + West-Fahd discussions, 171 + West memoranda, 173, + 176, 186, 209, 216 + West-Sultan discussions, 159, 160, 213 + Yemen crises and, 214, + 264, 269 + + U.S. military presence in the Middle East/Indian Ocean + and: + Bartholomew Mission discussions, 38, 50, 51, 53 + Brown memoranda, 96 + Brown Middle East trip (1979) discussions, 19, 20 + Brown-Sultan discussions, 217 + Jones memoranda, 11 + Lawrence visit (1980), 215 + Odom memoranda, 34 + Policy Review Committee discussions, 26 + Special Coordination Committee discussions, 23, 64 + + U.S.-Saudi discussions, 185, 186, 188, 192, 207, 208 + + + U.S. relations with: + Brown visit (1979), 178, 184, 185, 186 + Brzezinski visit (1979), + 188 + Brzezinski visit (1980), + 207, 208 + Carter visit (1978), 159, 164 + CIA Intelligence Memoranda, 144, 183 + Economic initiatives, 194 + Fahd U.S. visit (1977), + 148, 149, 150, 151, 152 + Fahd U.S. visit proposals (1979), 182, 188, 190 + Presidential Review Committee discussions, 180, 190 + Quandt/Sick memoranda, 191 + Saud U.S. visit (1978), + 172 + State Department briefing paper, 143 + Vance-Fahd discussions, 148 + Vance visit (1977), 161 + West memoranda, 154, + 176, 186, 216 + + + U.S. security cooperation: + Brown-Fahd discussions, 185 + Brown-Sultan discussions, 217 + Brown visit (1979) + discussions, 178 + Brzezinski memoranda, 90, + 93 + Brzezinski-Saud discussions, 188 + Carter-Khalid correspondence, 182, 185 + CIA Intelligence Memoranda, 181, 183 + Covert action, 187 + Tarnoff memoranda, 95 + Vance memoranda, 184 + West-Fahd discussions, 170, 224 + West memoranda, 179, + 186, 225 + West-Saud discussions, 177 + West memoranda, 154 + Yemen Arab Republic relations with, 229, 238, 259, 287, 292, 297 + + + Saudi regional security financing: + Brown memoranda, 96 + Brzezinski memoranda, 79, + 90, 93 + Special Coordination Committee discussions, 23, 78, 82, 165, 192 + State department briefing paper, 143 + Tarnoff memoranda, 95 + + Saunders, Harold H.: + Brown Middle East trip (1979), 17 + Indian Ocean demilitarization talks, UN Ad Hoc + Committee, 128 + Middle East regional security, 18, 21, 23 + Saud U.S. visit (1978), + 172 + Saudi military aid to Egypt, 192 + Saudi oil policies, 210 + Strait of Hormuz, 33 + U.S.-Iraqi relations, 135 + U.S. military aid to Bahrain, 32 + U.S. military aid to Pakistan, 54 + U.S. military aid to Saudi Arabia, 17, 57, 64, 168, 220, 222, 223, 228 + U.S. military presence in the Middle East/Indian + Ocean: + Amphibious deployment/ground force + exercises, 40, 42, 54, 56, 57, 62, 86 + Bartholomew Mission discussions, 50 + Egyptian role, 64, + 74 + Oman/Somalia/Kenya bases, 37, 40, 42, 50, 54, 57, 73 + Policy Review Committee discussions, 26 + Special Coordination Committee discussions, + 192 + Zawawi U.S. visit (1980) discussions, 60 + + U.S.-Omani security consultations, 12 + U.S.-Saudi relations, 180 + U.S.-Saudi security cooperation, 178, 184 + Yemen crises, 236, 246, 262, 263, 284, 287, 288 + + Schlesinger, James R., 21, 22, 23, + 26, 190, 192 + Scotes, Thomas J., 229, 230, 234, + 235 + Seignious, Lt. Gen. George M., 124, 125, 192 + Seitz, Raymond G. H., 56, 288 + Shackley, Theodore, 187 + Shahi, Agha, 40, 42, 51 + Shaw, Harry, 56, 63, 66 + Shawkey, Cmdr. Richard S., 33 + al-Shayah, Lt. Gen. Muhammad, 266 + Shayba, Ali, 251 + Shenefield, John, 210 + Shinn, William T., 289 + + Shoemaker, Capt. Chris C., 33 + Shoemaker, Maj. Christopher C., 92, 94 + Shulman, Marshall D., 273 + Shulter, Maj. Gen. Philip, 155 + Siad Barre, Mohammad, 38 + Sick, Capt. Gary: + Brown Middle East trip (1979), 17 + Brzezinski Saudi Arabia visit (1980), 208 + Indian Ocean demilitarization talks, 1, 108, 110 + + Brzezinski memoranda, 113, 114 + Carter meeting, 106 + Policy Review Committee discussions, 24, 124 + Sick/Bartholomew memoranda, 121 + Sick/Thomson memoranda, 101, 104 + Special Coordination Committee discussions, + 102, 105, 111, 112, 116 + UN Ad Hoc Committee, 128 + U.S.-Australian discussions, 122 + U.S.-Soviet meetings, 125 + + Mecca Grand Mosque hostage incident (Nov. 1979), 202 + Middle East regional security, 22, 63 + Oil prices and availability, 1, 163 + Persian Gulf security framework, 97 + Saudi political situation, 175 + Soviet role in the Middle East, 1, 91 + Strait of Hormuz, 33 + U.S.-Iraqi relations, 130 + U.S. military aid to Bahrain, 32 + U.S. military aid to Pakistan, 42, 54 + U.S. military aid to Saudi Arabia, 64, 197, 198, 200, 220, 222, 223 + U.S. military presence in the Middle East/Indian + Ocean: + Amphibious deployment/ground force + exercises, 42, 54, 62, 78, 82, 86 + Bartholomew Mission discussions, 49, 50 + Egyptian role, 64 + Oman/Somalia/Kenya bases, 37, 42, 50, 54, 66, 75, 78, 84 + Policy Review Committee discussions, 24, 26 + Unified command proposals, 29 + U.S. military aid overviews, 92, 94 + Zawawi U.S. visit (1980) discussions, 60 + + U.S. policy in the Middle East, 1, 16, 24 + U.S.-Saudi relations, 154, 184, 188, 190, 191 + Yemen crises, 245, 276 + + Covert action proposals, 294 + Hoskinson memoranda, 252 + Odom memoranda, 31 + Saudi-Yemen Arab Republic relations, 297 + Soviet military aid to Yemen Arab Republic, 278 + Special Coordination Committee discussions, 260, 262, + 263, 268, 275, 277, 280, + 284 + Twinam memoranda, 246 + U.S./Saudi military aid to Yemen Arab Republic, 249, 257, + 298 + Yemenite War (1979), 283 + + + Sikes, Robert L. F., 255 + Slocombe, Walter: + Indian Ocean demilitarization talks, 112 + Middle East regional security, 63 + U.S. military aid to Saudi Arabia, 149, 220, 222, 223 + Yemen crises, 262, 263, 268 + + Smith, Lt. Gen. William Y.: + Brown Middle East trip (1979), 17 + Indian Ocean demilitarization talks, 102, 105, 112, 116 + Middle East regional security, 23 + Saudi military aid to Egypt, 192 + U.S. military presence in the Middle East/Indian Ocean, + 26, 192 + U.S.-Saudi relations, 180, 187, 190 + Yemen crises, 260, 262, 263, + 268, 275, 280, 284 + + Sober, Sidney, 2, 3, 146, 151, 168, 232 + Solarz, Stephen J., 156 + Solomon, Anthony M., 17, 150, 180, 190 + Somalia (see also Ogaden War): + Saudi military aid to, 165 + Soviet relations with, 84, 100, 107, + 108, 113, 171, 230 + U.S. amphibious deployment proposals, 82 + U.S. bases in: + Bartholomew Mission discussions, 38, 49, 50, 51 + Brown memoranda, 96 + Brzezinski memoranda, 90, + 93 + Odom memoranda, 34 + + Policy Review Committee discussions, 26 + Special Coordination Committee discussions, 40, 50, 54, 66, 73, 78, 84 + Tarnoff memoranda, 95 + Vance memoranda, 44 + Welch/Ermarth memoranda, 41 + + U.S. military aid, 49 + U.S.-Saudi discussions, 150 + + South Yemen. See People’s Democratic + Republic of Yemen + Soviet invasion of Afghanistan: + Indian Ocean demilitarization talks and, 123 + Iraq and, 141 + NATO response, 54 + Saudi concerns, 206 + Special Coordination Committee discussions, 40, 42 + U.S. policy in the Middle East and, 45 + U.S.-Saudi discussions, 207, + 217 + U.S.-Yemen Arab Republic discussions, 295 + Welch/Ermarth memoranda, 49 + + Soviet role in the Middle East (see also + Indian Ocean demilitarization talks; Soviet invasion of Afghanistan; + Soviet role in the Yemens): + Brown memoranda, 9 + Brown Middle East trip (1979) + discussions, 19 + CIA Intelligence Memoranda, 6, + 35 + Duncan memoranda, 10 + Iraq and, 136, 137 + JCS strategy paper, 91 + Jones memoranda, 9 + Odom memoranda, 34 + Policy Review Committee discussions, 26 + Quandt/Sick memoranda, 1 + Saudi concerns: + CIA Intelligence Memoranda, 165, 181 + U.S.-Saudi discussions, 171, 177, 185, 207 + Vance memoranda, 170 + West memoranda, 176, + 179, 186, 206 + + Special Coordination Committee discussions, 42, 56, + 84 + U.S. 1980 policy revision and, 45 + + Soviet role in the Yemens: + CIA Intelligence Memoranda, 267 + al-Ghashmi assassination and, 252, 254 + Military aid to Yemen Arab Republic: + CIA Intelligence Memoranda, 292 + Gnehm memoranda, 282 + Lane memoranda, 279, + 286, 299 + Lane-Salih discussions, 291, 295 + Ransom memoranda, 251 + Scotes memoranda, 230 + Vance memoranda, 278, + 289, 293 + + People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen relations, 16, 207, + 235, 236, 244, 245, 290, + 291 + U.S.-Soviet discussions, 263 + U.S.-Yemen Arab Republic discussions, 254 + + Soviet Union (see also Indian Ocean + demilitarization talks; Soviet role in the Middle East): + Saudi relations with, 171, 179, 181 + Somali relations with, 84, 100, 107, + 108, 113, 171, 230 + U.S. policy in the Middle East, U.S.-Soviet discussions, + 26 + + Special Coordination Committee (SCC): + Covert action, 36, 294 + Indian Ocean demilitarization talks, 102, 105, 111, 112, + 116, 118, 128 + Middle East regional security, 21, 22, 23, 63 + Persian Gulf security framework, 42, 54, 56, 57, + 62, 64, 65, 73, 74, 78, 82, + 84, 86, 89, 91, 94, 97, 210 + Propaganda broadcasting, 36 + Saudi oil policies, 210 + U.S. military aid to Pakistan, 40, 42, 54 + U.S. military aid to Saudi Arabia, 57, 64, 84, 91, + 220, 222, 223, 284 + U.S. military presence in the Middle East/Indian Ocean: + Amphibious deployment/ground force exercises, 40, 42, 54, 56, 57, 62 + + Egyptian role, 23, 56, 62, 64, 74, 86, 87, 89 + Oman/Somalia/Kenya bases, 37, 40, 42, 50, 54, 57, 65, 66, 73, 84 + U.S. military aid overviews, 92, 94 + U.S.-Saudi discussions, 208 + + U.S.-Saudi security cooperation, 187 + Yemen crises, 22, 40, 163, + 260, 262, 263, 268, 275, + 277, 280, 284, 294 + + Stapletone, Seton, 44 + Sterner, Michael E., 7, 188 + Steven, Robert S., 285 + Stewart, Jake, 126 + Stone, Richard, 156, 166 + Strait, Edward, 63 + Strait of Hormuz, 33, 65, 223, 288 + Strauss, Robert S., 26 + Sudayri, Khalid ibn, 238 + Suddarth, Roscoe S., 32, 289 + Sulaiman, Sadek, 60, 72 + Sultan Abd al-Aziz al Saud (prince of Saudi Arabia): + CIA Intelligence Memoranda, 165 + Political situation, 175, 176 + Saudi military aid to Egypt, 192 + U.S. military aid to Saudi Arabia, 145, 147, 159, 160, + 213, 214, 215, 217, 227 + U.S./Saudi military aid to Yemen Arab Republic, 249, 250 + U.S.-Saudi security cooperation, 179, 185, 217, 225 + Vance visit (1977), 161 + Yemen crises, 238, 285, 289, + 298 + + Sultan bin Zayid, Shaikh, 8 + Syria, 131, 283 + + + + + Taiz summit (1977), 230, 235 + Tange, Arthur, 107 + Tarnoff, Peter R.: + Iraqi Pan-Arab Charter proposal, 140 + Middle East regional security, 21 + U.S. citizen security in Saudi Arabia, 205 + U.S.-Iraqi relations, 131 + U.S. military aid to Saudi Arabia, 168, 211 + U.S. military presence in the Middle East/Indian Ocean, + 66, 95 + U.S.-Omani security consultations, 12 + U.S.-Saudi relations, 95, 185, 190 + + Taylor, Jane E., 71 + Thibault, Albert, 2 + Thomson, James, 101, 102, 104, 105, 111, 116 + Thornton, Thomas: + Brzezinski Saudi Arabia visit (1980), 208 + Indian Ocean demilitarization talks, 128 + Saudi oil policies, 210 + U.S.-Iraqi relations, 131 + U.S. military aid to Pakistan, 42, 54 + U.S. military presence in the Middle East/Indian Ocean, + 40, 42, 50, 54, 56, 65, 73 + U.S.-Saudi relations, 180 + Yemen crises, 280, 294 + + Thunayyan, Abd Al-Aziz, 177 + Toon, Malcolm, Yemen crises, 273 + Tripoli Conference (1977), 161 + Truman Doctrine, 45 + Tuchman, Jessica, 156, 166 + Turkey, 93, 95, + 96, 185 + Turki ibn Abd al-Aziz (prince of Saudi Arabia), 181 + Turki ibn Faisal (prince of Saudi Arabia), 161, 165, 177, 188, 220, 225, 266 + Turner, Adm. Stansfield: + Brown Middle East trip (1979), 17 + Documents not declassified, 218 + Indian Ocean demilitarization talks: + Brzezinski memoranda, 110, 114, 119 + CIA memoranda, 103 + Interagency response memorandum, 100 + Policy Review Committee discussions, 124 + Presidential Review Memoranda, 99 + Special Coordination Committee discussions, 102, 105, 111, 112 + U.S.-Soviet meetings, 115, 125 + + Middle East regional security, 21, 22 + Persian Gulf security framework, 58, 79, 83, 87, + 93, 97, 98 + Saudi military aid to Egypt, 192 + Saudi oil policies, 210 + Saudi regional security financing, 82 + Soviet role in the Middle East, JCS strategy paper, 91 + + U.S. military aid to Pakistan, 54 + U.S. military aid to Saudi Arabia, 57, 58, 64, 212, + 214, 220, 222 + U.S. military presence in the Middle East/Indian Ocean: + Allied roles, 57, 78 + Amphibious deployment/ground force exercises: + Brzezinski memoranda, 83, 87 + Special Coordination Committee discussions, + 54, 56, 57, 62, 78, 82, 86 + + Brzezinski memoranda, 58, + 79 + Egyptian role, 64, 74, 87 + Middle East unified command proposals, 77 + Oman/Somalia/Kenya bases, 37, 40, 54, 57, 65, 73, 78, 84 + Policy Review Committee discussions, 26 + Special Coordination Committee discussions, 192 + + U.S.-Saudi relations, 183, 187 + Yemen crises, 260, 263, 268, + 271, 277 + + Twinam, Joseph W.: + Middle East Force negotiations, 2, + 3, 5 + Middle East regional security, 18 + Saud U.S. visit (1978), 172 + State Department briefing paper, 143 + United Arab Emirates U.S. military aid requests, 7 + U.S. military aid to Saudi Arabia, 146, 228 + U.S. military presence in the Middle East/Indian Ocean, + 44, 65, 66 + Yemen crises, 236, 246, 278, + 293, 298 + + Twombly, John, 111 + + + + UN Ad Hoc Committee on the Indian Ocean Zone of Peace, 128 + United Arab Emirates (UAE) (see also + Persian Gulf states), 7, 8, 96 + United Kingdom, 40, 42, 126, 129, 136 + United Nations, 100, 128 + U.S. military presence in the Middle East/Indian Ocean (see also Diego Garcia base; Indian Ocean + demilitarization talks): + Allied roles, 54, 57, 74, + 78, 96 + Amphibious deployment: + Brown memoranda, 47, 85 + Brzezinski memoranda, 51, + 87 + Special Coordination Committee discussions, 42, 54, 56, 57, 62, 78, 82, 86 + Vance memoranda, 52 + + + + Bartholomew Mission, 38, 49, 50, + 51, 52, 53, 207 + Brown memoranda, 27, 41, 47, + 126 + Brown Middle East trip (1979) + discussions, 19, 20 + Brzezinski memoranda, 38, 43, 51, + 79 + Carter Doctrine on, 43, 45, 51, + 80, 90, 208 + Contingency response capabilities, 26 + Covert action, 34, 51, 272 + Djibouti bases, 41 + Egyptian role: + Brown memoranda, 96 + Brown Middle East trip (1979) discussions, 20 + Brzezinski memoranda, 79, + 87, 90, 93 + Odom memoranda, 34, 73 + Policy Review Committee discussions, 26 + Ras Banas base, 86, 87, 89, 90, 93, 96 + Special Coordination Committee discussions, 23, 56, 62, 64, 74, 86, 87, 89 + + Enroute basing/overflights, 41, + 42, 89, 96 + Ground force exercises: + Brzezinski memoranda, 79, + 83, 87 + Special Coordination Committee discussions, 40, 42, 78, 86 + Welch/Ermarth memoranda, 41 + + + Indian Ocean naval presence (see + also Indian Ocean demilitarization talks): + Brown memoranda, 27, 96 + Brzezinski memoranda, 51 + Policy Review Committee discussions, 24, 26 + Special Coordination Committee discussions, 23, 40, 54, 56, 57 + U.S.-Saudi communications, 26 + Vance/Brown memoranda, 30 + + + Kenya bases: + Bartholomew Mission discussions, 38, 49, 50, 51 + + Brzezinski memoranda, 90, + 93 + Special Coordination Committee discussions, 37, 42, 66 + Tarnoff memoranda, 95 + Vance memoranda, 44 + Welch/Ermarth memoranda, 41, 49 + + Middle East Force augmentation, 20, 23, 24, 26, + 30 + Middle East Force negotiations, 2, + 3, 4, + 5 + Middle East unified command proposals, 29, 31, 34, 77, + 226 + Oman bases: + Bartholomew Mission discussions, 38, 49, 50, 51, 53 + Brown Middle East trip (1979) discussions, 20 + Brzezinski memoranda, 58, + 90, 93 + Habib mission discussions, 81 + Indian Ocean demilitarization talks and, 100 + Iranian hostage crisis and, 75, 76 + Policy Review Committee discussions, 26 + Special Coordination Committee discussions, 37, 40, 42, 50, 54, 57, 65, 66 + Tarnoff memoranda, 95 + U.S.-Omani discussions, 59, 70, 81 + Vance memoranda, 44 + Welch/Ermarth memoranda, 41, 49 + Zawawi U.S. visit (1980) + discussions, 60 + + Pakistan bases, 40, 42 + Persian Gulf unified command proposals: + Brown memoranda, 61, 69, 96 + Brzezinski memoranda, 46, + 51, 90, 93 + Odom memoranda, 39 + Tarnoff memoranda, 95 + + Policy Review Committee discussions, 24, 25, 26, 123 + Rapid Deployment Force: + Brown memoranda, 28, 48, 88, 96 + Brzezinski memoranda, 51, + 90, 93 + Odom memoranda, 39, 40 + Special Coordination Committee discussions, 40 + Tarnoff memoranda, 95 + + Rapid reaction capability, 55 + Rear bases, 63, 64, 73 + Saudi role: + Bartholomew Mission discussions, 38, 50, 51, 53 + Brown memoranda, 96 + Brown Middle East trip (1979) discussions, 19, 20 + Brown-Sultan discussions, 217 + Jones memoranda, 11 + Lawrence visit (1980), 215 + Odom memoranda, 34 + Policy Review Committee discussions, 26 + Special Coordination Committee discussions, 23, 37, 64 + + + Somalia bases: + Bartholomew Mission discussions, 38, 49, 50, 51 + Brown memoranda, 96 + Brzezinski memoranda, 90, + 93 + Odom memoranda, 34 + Policy Review Committee discussions, 26 + Special Coordination Committee discussions, 37, 40, 42, 54, 66, 73, 78, 84 + Tarnoff memoranda, 95 + Vance memoranda, 44 + Welch/Ermarth memoranda, 41 + + + Special Coordination Committee discussions, 192, 208 + Surge capability, 26, 27 + U.S. military aid overviews, 90, + 92, 93, 94, 96, 97 + U.S.-Saudi discussions, 185, + 186, 188, 192, 207, 208 + Vance/Brown memoranda, 30 + Welch/Ermarth memoranda, 41, 49 + Yemen crises and, 260 + + + U.S. policy in the Middle East: + Brown Middle East trip (1979), 15, 16 + Brzezinski memoranda, 11 + Carter Doctrine, 43, 45, 51, + 80, 90, 208 + Duncan memoranda, 10, 11 + Iranian hostage crisis and, 45 + Jones memoranda, 9 + + Oil prices and availability and, 1, 9, 26, 35, 143, 180 + Policy Review Committee discussions, 24 + Quandt/Sick memoranda, 1 + Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and, 45 + U.S.-Soviet discussions, 26 + + + U.S. presidential elections (1980), 216 + + + Vance, Cyrus: + Brown Middle East trip (1979), 19 + Indian Ocean demilitarization talks + Brzezinski memoranda, 110, 114, 119 + Interagency response memorandum, 100 + Policy Review Committee discussions, 124 + Presidential Review Memoranda, 99 + Special Coordination Committee discussions, 105, 112 + U.S.-Australian discussions, 107 + U.S.-Soviet communications, Gromkyo discussions, + 100 + U.S.-Soviet meetings, 115 + + Mecca Grand Mosque hostage incident (Nov. 1979), 203, + 204 + Middle East Force negotiations, 3, + 5 + Middle East regional security: + Persian Gulf states and, 18 + Special Coordination Committee discussions, 21, 22, 23 + + Oil prices and availability, 152, 153, 161 + Persian Gulf security framework, 58 + Saudi military aid to Egypt, 192 + United Arab Emirates U.S. military aid requests, 7 + U.S.-British discussions on Iraq, 136 + U.S. citizen security in Saudi Arabia, 204, 205 + U.S. economic and military aid to Oman, 59, 70, 71 + U.S. health care project aid to Saudi Arabia, 219 + U.S.-Iraqi relations, 130, 131, 133 + U.S. military aid to Bahrain, 32 + U.S. military aid to Egypt, 169 + U.S. military aid to Israel, 169 + U.S. military aid to Pakistan, 42, 54 + U.S. military aid to Saudi Arabia, 146, 155, 167, 168, + 169, 199 + + Brown memoranda, 198, + 200 + Brzezinski memoranda, 58, + 149, 209 + Fahd discussions, 148 + Saud discussions, 172 + Saudi Arabia visit (1977) + discussions, 161 + West-Fahd discussions, 170 + + + U.S. military presence in the Middle East/Indian Ocean, + 44 + + Amphibious deployment/ground force exercises, 42, 52 + Bartholomew Mission discussions, 50, 52 + Brown memoranda, 27 + Brzezinski memoranda, 58 + Diego Garcia base, 26, + 42, 126, 127 + Egyptian role, 74 + Oman/Somalia/Kenya bases, 42, 50, 59, 70, 73 + Policy Review Committee discussions, 26 + Special Coordination Committee discussions, 192 + Vance/Brown memoranda, 30 + + U.S.-Omani security consultations, 13 + U.S.-Saudi relations: + Brzezinski Saudi Arabia visit (1980), 207 + CIA Intelligence Memoranda, 183 + Fahd discussions, 148 + Fahd U.S. visit (1977), + 150 + Presidential Review Committee discussions, 190 + Saud U.S. visit (1978), + 172 + Saudi Arabia visit (1977), + 161 + Security cooperation, 178, 184, 187 + West memoranda, 154 + + + Yemen crises, 233 + + Covert action proposals, 294 + al-Ghashmi assassination, 243 + National Security Council discussions, 271 + Soviet military aid to Yemen Arab Republic, 278, 289, 293 + Special Coordination Committee discussions, 260, 263, 268, 277 + U.S. military aid to Yemen Arab Republic, 247, 254, 256, 285, 288 + + U.S.-People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen + relations, 231, 232, 239, 240, 242 + U.S./Saudi military aid to Yemen Arab Republic, + 298 + U.S.-Soviet discussions, 263, 264, 273 + U.S.-Yemen Arab Republic discussions, 254 + Yemen reunification discussions, 281, 287, 288 + Yemenite War (1979), 270, 274 + + + + + Veliotes, Nicholas A., 250 + Vest, George S., 40 + Voice of America (VOA), 36 + Von Marbod, Erich, 92, 248, 275 + + + Walker, Lannon, 73, 84 + Warnke, Paul C.: + Indian Ocean demilitarization talks: + Brzezinski memoranda, 109, 110, 114, 119 + Carter meeting, 106 + Interagency response memorandum, 100 + Policy Review Committee discussions, 124 + Presidential Review Memoranda, 99 + Special Coordination Committee discussions, 102, 105, 111, 112, 116 + U.S.-Soviet meetings, 115, 117, 120 + + + Welch, Maj. Gen. Jasper: + Middle East regional security, 63 + Persian Gulf security framework agency review, 97 + Soviet role in the Middle East, 91 + U.S. military aid to Pakistan, 54 + U.S. military presence in the Middle East/Indian Ocean: + Allied roles, 54, 57, 78 + Amphibious deployment/ground force exercises, 41, 54, 57, 62, 78, 82, 86 + Bartholomew Mission discussions, 50 + Egyptian role, 64, 74, 89 + Odom memoranda, 39 + Oman/Somalia/Kenya bases, 41, 49, 54, 57, 65, 66, 73, 78, 84 + Special Coordination Committee discussions, 64 + U.S. military aid overviews, 92 + + + West, John C.: + Brzezinski Saudi Arabia visit (1979), 188 + Documents not declassified, 218 + Fahd U.S. visit (1977), 151 + Fahd U.S. visit proposals (1979), + 182 + Iranian Revolution, 176, 179, 185, + 196, 206 + Mecca Grand Mosque hostage incident (Nov. 1979), 201, + 206 + Oil prices and availability, 163, 176, 196 + Saud U.S. visit (1978), 172 + Saudi oil policies, 154, 163, 173, + 196, 206, 216 + U.S. health care project aid to Saudi Arabia, 219 + U.S. military aid to Saudi Arabia, 173, 176, 186, 209, + 216 + + Fahd discussions, 170, + 171 + Interagency meeting discussions, 212 + Iran-Iraq War and, 220 + Lawrence-Sultan discussions, 215 + Special Coordination Committee discussions, 223 + Sultan discussions, 159, + 160, 213 + Vance memoranda, 167, + 168 + + U.S.-Saudi relations, 154, 161, 176, + 186, 190, 216 + U.S.-Saudi security cooperation, 170, 177, 178, 179, + 185, 186, 224, 225 + Yemen crises: + National Security Council staff memoranda, 264 + Saudi Arabia and, 186, + 255 + Saunders memoranda, 236 + U.S. military aid to Yemen Arab Republic, 246, 253, 257 + U.S.-People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen + relations, 239 + U.S./Saudi military aid to Yemen Arab Republic, + 250, 285, 298 + Yemenite War (1979), 266 + + + White, John: + Brown Middle East trip (1979), 17 + Saudi oil policies, 210 + Soviet role in the Middle East, 91 + + U.S. military aid to Saudi Arabia, 42, 56, 57 + U.S. military presence in the Middle East/Indian Ocean, + 94 + U.S.-Saudi relations, 180, 187 + Yemen crises, 262, 294 + + Whitlam, Gough, 122 + Wiley, Marshall W.: + Middle East regional security, 18 + Saudi oil policies, 153 + U.S. bases in Oman, 20, 53, 70, + 75, 81 + U.S. economic and military aid to Oman, 70, 72 + U.S.-Iraqi relations, 132 + U.S.-Omani security consultations, 12 + + William, Col. T. O., 268 + Winn, David M., 7, 12, 233 + Wisner, Frank G.: + Diego Garcia base, 129 + Middle East regional security, 21 + Saud U.S. visit (1978), 172 + U.S.-Iraqi relations, 133 + Yemen crises, 232, 236, 249, + 273 + + Wolfe, Alan, 187 + Wolff, Lester, 156 + Wollemborg, Leo R., 184 + + + Yamani, Ahmed Zaki, 26, 144, 150, 163, 176 + Yemen Arab Republic (North Yemen) (see also + Saudi military aid to Yemen Arab Republic; Yemen crises): + al-Ghashmi assassination, 243, + 245, 252 + al-Hamdi assassination, 176, + 233, 234, 235, 238, 299 + Saudi military aid (see also + U.S./Saudi military aid cooperation below), 229, 230, 262, + 291 + Saudi relations with, 229, 238, 259, + 287, 292, 297 + Soviet military aid: + CIA Intelligence Memoranda, 292 + Gnehm memoranda, 282 + Lane memoranda, 279, + 286, 299 + Lane-Salih discussions, 291, 295 + Ransom memoranda, 251 + Scotes memoranda, 230 + Vance memoranda, 278, + 289, 293 + + + U.S. military aid: + Brown Middle East trip (1979) discussions, 16, 17 + al-Ghani U.S. visit discussions, 254 + Hoskinson memoranda, 252 + Lane memoranda, 259, + 286, 299 + Lane-Salih discussions, 291 + Ransom memoranda, 251 + Scotes memoranda, 230 + Special Coordination Committee discussions, 263, 280, 284 + Vance-Makki discussions, 288 + Yemenite War (1979) and, + 261, 262, 268, 275 + + + U.S./Saudi military aid cooperation: + Aaron memoranda, 249 + Brzezinski memoranda, 256 + Carter-Khalid correspondence, 253 + Duncan memoranda, 257, + 258 + Scotes memoranda, 234 + Vance memoranda, 247, + 285, 298 + Veliotes memoranda, 250 + Von Marbod memoranda, 248 + + + Yemen crises (see also People’s Democratic + Republic of Yemen; Yemen Arab Republic; Yemenite War (1979)): + Arab League and, 254, 274, 276 + Brown Middle East trip (1979) + discussions, 16, 17, 20 + CIA Intelligence Memoranda, 35, + 237, 238, 267, 292 + al-Ghani U.S. visit discussions, 254 + al-Ghashmi assassination, 243, + 245, 252 + al-Hamdi assassination, 176, + 233, 234, 235, 238, 299 + Hoskinson memoranda, 252 + Indian Ocean demilitarization talks and, 123 + National Security Council discussions, 271 + National Security Council staff memoranda, 264 + Odom memoranda, 31, 34, 179 + Policy Review Committee discussions, 17, 26 + Rubayyah Ali assassination, 244 + Saudi Arabia and (see also Yemen + Arab Republic (North Yemen), Saudi military aid and U.S./Saudi military aid + cooperation): + Carter-Khalid correspondence, 253 + + Christopher memoranda, 241 + Daniels memoranda, 193 + Hoskinson memoranda, 252 + Military intervention possibilities, 245, 264, 265, 266, 268, 269, :nl + 275 + Odom memoranda, 179 + Sick memoranda, 245 + Soviet military aid to Yemen Arab Republic, 289, 293 + State Department briefing paper, 143 + Vance memoranda, 239, + 240 + West memoranda, 186, + 255 + + Saunders memoranda, 236 + Scotes memoranda, 229, 230, 234, + 235 + Sick memoranda, 245 + Special Coordination Committee discussions, 22, 40, + 163, 260, 262, 263, 268, + 275, 277, 280, 284, 294 + Treaty of friendship, 290 + Twinam memoranda, 246 + U.S. covert action proposals, 272, 294, 296, 300 + U.S.-Saudi discussions, 170, + 185 + U.S.-Saudi security cooperation and, 177 + U.S.-Soviet discussions, 263, + 264, 273 + Vance memoranda, 242 + Yemen reunification discussions: + CIA Intelligence Memoranda, 292 + Lane memoranda, 299 + Lane-Salih discussions, 295 + Saunders-al-Kibsi discussions, 287 + Scotes memoranda, 235 + Vance-Makki discussions, 288 + Vance memoranda, 281, + 285 + + + Yemenite War (1979), 261, 262, 267, 270, 274, 276, 283 + + Saudi military intervention possibilities, 245, 264, + 265, 266, 268, 269, 275 + + Young, Andrew J., 112, 172, 216 + + + + + + Zablocki, Clement J., 159, 161 + Zawawi, Qais bin Abdul Munim Al: + U.S. bases in Oman, 53, 59, 70, + 81 + U.S. economic and military aid to Oman, 59, 67, 70, 72 + U.S.-Omani security consultations, 12, 13 + U.S. visit (1980), 60 + + Zuhayr, Lt. Gen. Asad, 266 + + +
+ + + diff --git a/volumes/frus1977-80v20.xml b/volumes/frus1977-80v20.xml index 6c014b17d..9dcb482a3 100644 --- a/volumes/frus1977-80v20.xml +++ b/volumes/frus1977-80v20.xml @@ -1,110 +1,59859 @@ - - - - - - Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume XX, - Eastern Europe - Foreign Relations of the United States - 1977–1980 - Volume XX - Eastern Europe - Carl Ashley - Mircea A. Munteanu - Adam M. Howard - - - United States Government Publishing Office - Washington - 2015 - frus1977-80v20 - - -

Released in 2015 as print volume and PDF online at history.state.gov

- - - - - - - - - Foreign Relations of the United States - 1977–1980 - Volume XX - Eastern Europe - - - Editor: Carl Ashley - - - Editor: Mircea A. Munteanu - - - General Editor: Adam M. Howard - - - United States Government Printing Office - Washington - 2015 - DEPARTMENT OF STATE Office - of - the Historian Bureau - of Public Affairs For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, - U.S. Government Printing Office Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free - (866) 512-1800; DC area (202) 512-1800 Fax: (202) 512-2250 Mail: Stop IDCC, - Washington, DC 20402-0001 - -
- Press Release -

- Office of the HistorianBureau of Public - AffairsUnited States Department of StateNovember 30, 2015 -

-

The Department of State released today Foreign Relations of the United States, - 1977–1980, Volume XX, Eastern Europe.

-

This volume is part of a Foreign Relations subseries that documents the most - important foreign policy issues of the Jimmy Carter administration. The focus of - this volume is on U.S. policy toward the Communist countries of Eastern Europe, - except Poland.  Documentation on Poland will be published in a separate - volume.

-

The volume illustrates the Carter administration’s efforts to transform the - long-standing U.S. policy of differentiation between Eastern European nations by - including human rights performance in its policy assessment. This allowed for a - warming of relations with countries that exhibited internally liberal policies, - even if its foreign policy continued to be viewed as subservient to Soviet - interests. The administration continued to support Romania as a Communist-bloc - critic of the Soviet Union, despite strained relations over a series of - high-profile defections, and planned for support of Yugoslavia’s integrity and - sovereignty after the death of Josip Broz Tito. U.S. relations with Bulgaria, - Czechoslovakia, and the German Democratic Republic remained distant throughout - the administration, but the modified policy of differentiation led to the return - of the Crown of St. Stephen to Hungary. The administration also expanded - broadcasting toward Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, especially following - the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.

- -

This compilation was compiled and edited by Carl Ashley and Mircea Munteanu. The - volume and this press release are available on the Office of the Historian - website at http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1977-80v20. Copies - of the volume will be available for purchase from the U.S. Government Printing - Office online at http://bookstore.gpo.gov (GPO S/N 044-000-02674-1; ISBN - 978-0-16-093115-4), or by calling toll-free 1-866-512-1800 (D.C. area - 202-512-1800). For further information, contact history@state.gov.

-
- - - - - - + + + + + + Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume XX, + Eastern Europe, 1977–1980 + Foreign Relations of the United States + 1977–1980 + Volume XX + Eastern Europe + Carl Ashley + Mircea A. Munteanu + Adam M. Howard + + + United States Government Publishing Office + Washington + 2015 + frus1977-80v20 + + +

Released in 2015 as printed book.

+ + + + + + + + + Foreign Relations of the United States + 1977–1980 + Volume XX + Eastern Europe + + Editor: Carl Ashley + Mircea A. Munteanu + General Editor: Adam M. Howard + + United States Government Publishing Office + Washington + 2015 + DEPARTMENT OF STATE Office of the Historian Bureau of Public Affairs For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, + U.S. Government Publishing Office Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free + (866) 512-1800; DC area (202) 512-1800 Fax: (202) 512-2250 Mail: Stop IDCC, + Washington, DC 20402-0001 + +
+ + About the Series +

The Foreign Relations of the United States series presents + the official documentary historical record of major foreign policy decisions and + significant diplomatic activity of the U.S. Government. The Historian of the + Department of State is charged with the responsibility for the preparation of + the Foreign Relations series. The staff of the Office of + the Historian, Bureau of Public Affairs, under the direction of the General + Editor of the Foreign Relations series, plans, + researches, compiles, and edits the volumes in the series. Secretary of State + Frank B. Kellogg first promulgated official regulations codifying specific + standards for the selection and editing of documents for the series on March 26, + 1925. These regulations, with minor modifications, guided the series through + 1991.

+

Public Law 102–138, the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, established a new + statutory charter for the preparation of the series which was signed by + President George H.W. Bush on October 28, 1991. Section 198 of P.L. 102–138 added a new Title IV to the Department + of State’s Basic Authorities Act of 1956 (22 U.S.C. 4351, et seq.).

+

The statute requires that the Foreign Relations series be + a thorough, accurate, and reliable record of major U.S. foreign policy decisions + and significant U.S. diplomatic activity. The volumes of the series should + include all records needed to provide comprehensive documentation of major + foreign policy decisions and actions of the U.S. Government. The statute also + confirms the editing principles established by Secretary Kellogg: the Foreign Relations series is guided by the principles of + historical objectivity and accuracy; records should not be altered or deletions + made without indicating in the published text that a deletion has been made; the + published record should omit no facts that were of major importance in reaching + a decision; and nothing should be omitted for the purposes of concealing a + defect in policy. The statute also requires that the Foreign + Relations series be published not more than 30 years after the events + recorded. The editors are convinced that this volume meets all regulatory, + statutory, and scholarly standards of selection and editing.

+

Sources for the Foreign Relations + Series

+

The Foreign Relations statute requires that the published + record in the Foreign Relations series include all + records needed to provide comprehensive documentation of major U.S. foreign + policy decisions and significant U.S. diplomatic activity. It further requires + that government agencies, departments, + and other entities of the U.S. Government engaged in foreign policy formulation, + execution, or support cooperate with the Department of State historians by + providing full and complete access to records pertinent to foreign policy + decisions and actions and by providing copies of selected records. Most of the + sources consulted in the preparation of this volume have been declassified and + are available for review at the National Archives and Records Administration + (Archives II) in College Park, Maryland.

+

The editors of the Foreign Relations series have complete + access to all the retired records and papers of the Department of State: the + central files of the Department; the special decentralized files (“lot files’’) + of the Department at the bureau, office, and division levels; the files of the + Department’s Executive Secretariat, which contain the records of international + conferences and high-level official visits, correspondence with foreign leaders + by the President and Secretary of State, and the memoranda of conversations + between the President and the Secretary of State and foreign officials; and the + files of overseas diplomatic posts. All of the Department’s central files for + 1977–1981 are available in electronic or microfilm formats at Archives II, and + may be accessed using the Access to Archival Databases (AAD) tool. Almost all of + the Department’s decentralized office files covering this period, which the + National Archives deems worthy of permanent retention, have been transferred to + or are in the process of being transferred from the Department’s custody to + Archives II.

+

Research for Foreign Relations volumes is undertaken + through special access to restricted documents at the Jimmy Carter Presidential + Library and other agencies. While all the material printed in this volume has + been declassified, some of it is extracted from still-classified documents. The + staff of the Carter Library is processing and declassifying many of the + documents used in this volume, but they may not be available in their entirety + at the time of publication. Presidential papers maintained and preserved at the + Carter Library include some of the most significant foreign-affairs related + documentation from White House offices, the Department of State, and other + federal agencies including the National Security Council, the Central + Intelligence Agency, the Department of Defense, and the Joint Chiefs of

+

Some of the research for volumes in this subseries was done in Carter Library + record collections scanned for the Remote Archive Capture (RAC) project. This + project, which is administered by the National Archives and Records + Administration’s Office of Presidential Libraries, was designed to coordinate + the declassification of still-classified records held in various Presidential + libraries. As a result of the way in which records were scanned for the RAC, the + editors of the Foreign Relations series were not always able to determine whether attachments to + a given document were in fact attached to the paper copy of the document in the + Carter Library file. In such cases, some editors of the Foreign Relations series have indicated this ambiguity by stating that + the attachments were “Not found attached.’’

+

Editorial Methodology

+

Documents in this volume are presented chronologically according to time in + Washington, DC. Memoranda of conversation are placed according to the time and + date of the conversation, rather than the date the memorandum was drafted.

+

Editorial treatment of the documents published in the Foreign + Relations series follows Office style guidelines, supplemented by + guidance from the General Editor and the Chief of the Editing and Publishing + Division. The original document is reproduced as exactly as possible, including + marginalia or other notations, which are described in the footnotes. Texts are + transcribed and printed according to + accepted conventions for the publication of historical documents within the + limitations of modern typography. A heading has been supplied by the editors for + each document included in the volume. Spelling, capitalization, and punctuation + are retained as found in the original text, except that obvious typographical + errors are silently corrected. Other mistakes and omissions in the documents are + corrected by bracketed insertions: a correction is set in italic type; an + addition in roman type. Words or phrases underlined in the original document are + printed in italics. Abbreviations and contractions are preserved as found in the + original text, and a list of abbreviations and terms is included in the front + matter of each volume. In telegrams, the telegram number (including special + designators such as Secto) is printed at the + start of the text of the telegram.

+

Bracketed insertions are also used to indicate omitted text that deals with an + unrelated subject (in roman type) or that remains classified after + declassification review (in italic type). The amount and, where possible, the + nature of the material not declassified has been noted by indicating the number + of lines or pages of text that were omitted. Entire documents withheld after + declassification review have been accounted for and are listed in their + chronological place with headings, source notes, and the number of pages not + declassified.

+

All brackets that appear in the original document are so identified in the + footnotes. All ellipses are in the original documents.

+

The first footnote to each document indicates the sources of the document and its + original classification, distribution, and drafting information. This note also + provides the background of important documents and policies and indicates whether the President or his major policy + advisers read the document.

+

Editorial notes and additional annotation summarize pertinent material not + printed in the volume, indicate the location of additional documentary sources, + provide references to important related documents printed in other volumes, + describe key events, and provide summaries of and citations to public statements + that supplement and elucidate the printed documents. Information derived from + memoirs and other first-hand accounts has been used when appropriate to + supplement or explicate the official record.

+

The numbers in the index refer to document numbers rather than to page + numbers.

+

Advisory Committee on Historical Diplomatic + Documentation

+

The Advisory Committee on Historical Diplomatic Documentation, established under + the Foreign Relations statute, monitors the overall + compilation and editorial process of the series and advises on all aspects of + the preparation of the series and declassification of records. The Advisory + Committee does not necessarily review the contents of individual volumes in the + series, but it makes recommendations on issues that come to its attention and + reviews volumes as it deems necessary to fulfill its advisory and statutory + obligations.

+

Declassification Review

+

The Office of Information Programs and Services, Bureau of Administration, + conducted the declassification review for the Department of State of the + documents published in this volume. The review was conducted in accordance with + the standards set forth in Executive Order 13526 on Classified National Security + Information and applicable laws.

+

The principle guiding declassification review is to release all information, + subject only to the current requirements of national security as embodied in law + and regulation. Declassification decisions entailed concurrence of the + appropriate geographic and functional bureaus in the Department of State, other + concerned agencies of the U.S. Government, and the appropriate foreign + governments regarding specific documents of those governments. The + declassification review of this volume, which began in 2013 and was completed in + 2014, resulted in the decision to withhold 1 document in full, excise a + paragraph or more in 6 documents, and make minor excisions of less than a + paragraph in 26 documents.

+

The Office of the Historian is confident, on the basis of the research conducted + in preparing this volume and as a result of the declassification review process + described above, that the documentation and editorial notes presented here provide a thorough, accurate, and + reliable record of the Carter administration’s policy toward Eastern Europe.

+ + Stephen P. Randolph, Ph.D. + + The Historian + + Adam M. Howard, Ph.D. + + General Editor + + Bureau of Public Affairs + November 2015 + + + +
+ +
+ + Preface +

Structure and Scope of the Foreign + Relations Series

+

This volume is part of a subseries of volumes of the Foreign + Relations series that documents the most important issues in the + foreign policy of the administration of Jimmy + Carter. As with previous volumes in the Foreign + Relations series, this volume provides only a snapshot of the global + character of Cold War politics. Therefore, this volume is best read in + conjunction with other volumes in the subseries, in order to better understand + how policies toward Eastern Europe fit into the full breath and scope of the + Carter administration’s policies in the Cold War. The most important volumes in + the subseries include Foreign + Relations, 1977–1980, vol. VII, Poland, 1977–1981 (which also + covers the first year of the Reagan administration up to the imposition of + martial law in Poland in December 1981); Foreign Relations, 1977–1980, vol. VI, Soviet + Union; Foreign + Relations, 1977–1980, vol. XXVII, Western Europe; Foreign Relations, 1977–1980, + vol. I, Foundations of Foreign Policy; and Foreign Relations, 1977–1980, + vol. XXVIII, Organization and Management of Foreign Policy.

+

Focus of Research and Principles of Selection for Foreign + Relations, 1977–1980, Volume XX

+

The focus of this volume is on the Carter administration’s policy toward the + Communist governments in Eastern Europe, specifically Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, + the German Democratic Republic, Hungary, Romania, and Yugoslavia. Albania is not + included as the lack of any meaningful diplomatic relations with Albania meant + there was no separate policy toward that country outside of the general policy + toward Communist regimes in Eastern Europe. Also covered in this volume is the + formulation of policy toward broadcasting to Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union + as an extension of the administration’s policy toward that region. Poland is + covered in a separate volume by virtue of the August 1980–December 1981 crisis. + Eastern and Central European countries not dominated by Communist regimes, such + as Finland and Austria, are covered in the Western Europe volume.

+

Documentation in the volume covers the Carter administration’s formulation of + foreign policy toward Eastern Europe as a whole, broadcasting in Eastern Europe + and the Soviet Union, and toward individual countries. Policies toward Eastern + Europe remained defined by the nature of the relationship between the United + States and the Soviet Union. The Carter administration continued some of the + policies implemented by the Nixon and Ford + administrations, specifically the policy of differentiation between Eastern + European countries, which it codified on September 13, 1977 under PD/NSC–21. It did, however, modify that policy + substantially, by including human rights as an aspect to the differentiation + policies. This allowed for a warming of relations with countries that exhibited + internally liberal policies, even if its foreign policy continued to be viewed + in Washington as subservient to Soviet interests.

+

The Carter administration also continued the previous administration’s policies + toward modernization of broadcasting capabilities of Radio Free Europe/Radio + Liberty (RFE/RL) into Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. While a decision on + modernization had been taken in 1976, and reapproved at the beginning of + Carter’s administration, implementation of the decision faced bureaucratic + hurdles. Pressure from the Federal Republic of Germany to consider relocating + RFE/RL from Munich added to the complexity. As the relationship with the Soviet + Union deteriorated following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the + administration redoubled its efforts to modernize the Radios, increase their + efficiency, and expand their audience, especially in Muslim regions of the + Soviet Union and the Persian Gulf.

+

As PD/NSC–21 made clear, relations between the + United States and Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, and the Germany Democratic Republic + remained limited. Relations with Czechoslovakia were governed by the ongoing + negotiations over the return of the Czechoslovak share of Nazi Germany gold, + which the Allies had set aside to return to Prague, but which was held back + until negotiations were finalized over compensation for nationalized property. + While the administration was willing to settle the negotiations quickly on + parity with previous settlements, congressional insistence on full dollar + restitution prevented a full agreement from being reached. Congressional threats + to pass legislation forcing the administration to vest the gold, sell it and + reimburse U.S. citizens from the proceeds before returning the remainder to + Czechoslovakia placed a great deal of pressure on the Czechoslovak Government. + Eventually, Prague agreed to pay full dollar restitution and interest to the + parties.

+

The greatest beneficiary of the administration’s reassessment of the policy of + differentiation was Hungary. PD/NSC–21 included + Hungary alongside Romania and Poland in the group of Eastern European nations to + which the United States offered preferential treatment. Secretary of State + Cyrus Vance pushed strongly for an + administration decision on the return of the Crown of St. Stephen, the Hungarian + Royal Crown, to Budapest. Despite Assistant to the President for National + Security Affairs Zbigniew Brzezinski’s + initial opposition to the idea, Vance + succeeded in obtaining the President’s agreement to begin negotiations with the Hungarian Government. The return of + the Crown marked a turning point in U.S.-Hungarian relations.

+

U.S-Romanian relations were focused on two competing tracks. The first, + emphasizing the importance of maintaining Romania as a Communist-bloc critic of + Soviet policies, sought to provide Bucharest with the needed diplomatic and + economic support to maintain its foreign policy independence. Romanian President + Nicolae Ceausescu’s visit to + Washington in 1978 served to underscore the importance the administration placed + on his continuing to play that role. The second track was the management of + reactions to the deteriorating human rights record of the Romanian regime. + Congressional pressure and threats to derail Romania’s Most Favored Nation + status caused a flurry of diplomatic activity, with Department of State + officials facilitating meetings between Romanian diplomats and congressional + staffers to defuse the crisis. A series of defections of Romanian intelligence + officers, most notably Romania’s spy chief Ion Mihai Pacepa, further tested the + relationship.

+

Policy toward Yugoslavia was dominated by planning for Yugoslavian President + Josip Borz Tito’s death and + succession. Yugoslavia maintained its strategic importance to the United States. + The administration believed that Tito’s + death would offer an opportunity for the Soviet Union to reestablish its + influence in the country or attempt to overtly or covertly undermine the + post-Tito leadership and change + Yugoslavia’s foreign policy orientation. The seeds of the economic collapse and + the political impasse that eventually led to the collapse of Yugoslavia in 1990 + were already discernable by 1980, and the Carter administration took extensive + efforts to secure a viable, united, and independent post-Tito Yugoslavia.

+

Acknowledgments

+

The editor wishes to thank officials at the Jimmy Carter Library, including + Brittany Parris and James Yancey, but especially Ceri McCarron, who provided + invaluable professional and personal support during the research at the Carter + Library. Special thanks are due to the Historical Staff of the Central + Intelligence Agency, and to officials at the Department of State, the Department + of Defense, the National Security Council, and the National Archives and Records + Administration facility at College Park, for their valuable assistance. Michael + McCoyer, the Joint Historian with the Central Intelligence Agency was + instrumental in locating relevant sources in the CIA files, and coordinated the declassification effort for these + materials.

+

Research for this volume was a collective effort by several people in the Office + of the Historian, including David Zierler, Carl Ashley, and Mircea A. Munteanu. + Carl Ashley began the compilation of the volume under M. Todd Bennett, then Chief of the Europe and General + Issues Division, and made the initial selection for the regional compilation and + the Hungary compilation. Mircea A. Munteanu compiled the volume and annotated + the documents under the supervision of David C. Geyer, Chief of the European + Division, and Stephen Randolph, then General Editor of the Foreign Relations series. Chris J. Tudda coordinated the + declassification review under the supervision of Carl Ashley, Chief of the + Declassification Division. Stephanie Eckroth and Vicki Ettleman did the copy and + technical editing under the supervision of Renee Goings, then Chief of the + Editing and Publishing Division, and Mandy A. Chalou, Chief of the Editing and + Publishing division. Do Mi Stauber Indexing Services prepared the index.

+ + Mircea A. Munteanu + + Historian + + +
+
+ + Contents + + + About the Series + III + + + Preface + IX + + + Sources + XV + + + Abbreviations and Terms + XXII + + + Persons + XXVII + + + Note on U.S. Covert Actions + XXXV + + + Eastern Europe + + Eastern Europe Region + 1 + Radio Free Europe, Radio Liberty, and Voice of + America + 162 + Bulgaria + 240 + Czechoslovakia + 286 + German Democratic Republic + 354 + Hungary + 424 + Romania + 526 + Yugoslavia + 748 + + + Index + 999 + + + + +
+
+ + Sources +

Sources for the Foreign Relations + Series

+

The 1991 Foreign Relations statute requires that the published record in the Foreign Relations series include all records needed to + provide comprehensive documentation on major U.S. foreign policy decisions and + significant U.S. diplomatic activity. It also requires that government agencies, + departments, and other entities of the U.S. Government engaged in foreign policy + formulation, execution, or support, cooperate with the Department of State + Historian by providing full and complete access to records pertinent to foreign + policy decisions and actions and by providing copies of selected records. U.S. + foreign policy agencies and Departments—the Department of State, National + Security Council, Department of Defense, Central Intelligence Agency, and the + Jimmy Carter Presidential Library—have complied fully with this law and provided + complete access to their relevant records.

+

Research for Foreign Relations volumes is undertaken + through special access to restricted documents at the Jimmy Carter Presidential + Library, and other agencies. While all the material printed in this volume has + been declassified, some of it is extracted from still-classified documents. The + staff of the Jimmy Carter Library is processing and declassifying many of the + documents used in this volume, but they may not be available in their entirety + at the time of publication.

+

Sources for Foreign Relations, + 1977–1980, Volume XX

+

The files at the Jimmy Carter Presidential Library, in Atlanta, Georgia, are the + single most important source of documentation for those interested in U.S. + foreign policy toward Eastern Europe during the Carter administration. Foreign + policy research in the Carter Library centers around two collections: National + Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, + and National Security Affairs, Staff Material. Additionally, the Country files + in the Brzezinski Donated Material + provided important documentation.

+

The most important collections at the Carter Library were the Brement Subject File in the Europe, USSR, and + East-West Collection of the National Security Affairs, Staff Material holdings, + as well as the Brzezinski Office File, + and the National Security Council Institutional Files. The administration’s + policy toward the Radios (RFE/RL and VOA) was detailed extensively in Paul Henze’s files (the Horn/Special + Collection), as were numerous intelligence related matters regarding the covert + action program directed at Eastern Europe. These files were supplemented by the Carter Administration + Intelligence Files at the National Security Council.

+

The editor also had access to files at the Central Intelligence Agency, the + Department of Defense, and the National Security Council. The files of the + Central Intelligence Agency, particularly the National Intelligence Council + Registry of National Intelligence Estimates, Special National Intelligence + Estimates, and National Intelligence Analytical Memoranda files, were essential + for intelligence reports and assessments on which the Carter administration + based its policy decisions.

+

In addition to the paper files cited below, a growing number of documents are + available on the Internet. The Office of the Historian maintains a list of these + Internet resources on its website and encourages readers to consult that site on + a regular basis.

+

The following list identifies the particular files and collections used in the + preparation of this volume. The declassification and transfer to the National + Archives of the Department of State records is in process, and some of these + records are already available for public review at the National Archives.

+

Unpublished Sources

+ + Department of State, Washington D.C. + + Lot Files. These files have been + transferred or will be transferred to the National Archives and + Records Administration in College Park, Maryland. + INR/IL Historical Files + Bureau of European Affairs + Office of Eastern European Affairs, Bulgaria Desk, + Personal Files of Retired Ambassador to Bulgaria, Raymond L. + Garthoff, 1960–1980, Lot 80D218 + Office of Eastern Europe and Yugoslavia Affairs, Hungarian + Holy Crown—Crown Follow-up 1979 and Prior Years 1945–1980, + Lot 85D389 + Office of European Security and Political Affairs, + Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) + 1973–80, Lot 89D288 + + + Bureau of Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs + 1979—Human Rights and Country Files, Lot 82D103 + 1980—Human Rights and Country Files, Lot 82D177 + Chron and Official Records of the Assistant Secretary for + Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs, Lot 85D366 + + + Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Office of Analysis for the + Commonwealth and Eastern Europe + Office Subject Files, 1967–1985, Lot 92D404 + Office Subject Files, 1965–1980, Lot 92D412 + Office Subject Files, 1958–1978, Lot 92D468 + Office Subject Files, 1953–1983, Lot 93D401 + + + + Office of the Assistant Legal Adviser for European Affairs + Country Files, 1940–1986, Lot 89D336 + + + Office of the Secretariat Staff + Cyrus R. Vance, Secretary of State—1977–1980, Lot + 84D241 + Lawrence S. Eagleburger, Under Secretary of State for + Political Affairs, Ambassador to Yugoslavia, Under Secretary + of State for Management (1967–1984), Lot 84D204 + Mr. Matthew Nimetz, Counselor of the Department of State, + Under Secretary of State for Security Assistance, Science, + and Technology, January 1977 thru December 1980, Lot + 81D85 + Ambassador at Large and Special Representative of the + President for Nonproliferation Matters (S/AS), Gerard C. + Smith, 1977–1980, Lot 81D287 + Official Working Papers, S/P Director Anthony Lake, + 1977–Jan 1981, Lot 82D298 + Records of the Office of the Deputy Secretary, Warren + Christopher, Lot 81D113 + S/S Memoranda for 1979, Lot 81D117 + + + Office of the Under Secretary for Security Assistance, Science, + and Technology + Chron Files, Speeches, and Papers of Lucy W. Benson (1979) + and Matthew Nimetz (1980), Lot 81D321 + + + National Archives and Records Administration, + College Park, Maryland + + Record Group 59, Files of the Department of State + Central Foreign Policy + File + + + + + Jimmy Carter Presidential Library, Atlanta, + Georgia + + Brzezinski Donated Material + National Security Affairs + Brzezinski Material + President’s Daily Report File + President’s CIA Daily Brief File + President’s Correspondence with Foreign Leaders + File + Trip Files + VIP Visit File + Subject File + Name File + General Odom File + Brzezinski Office File + Cables File + + + Staff Material + Office File + Staff Secretary File + Europe, USSR, and East/West + Global Issues + Horn-Special + International Economics + Defense/Security Files + + + + National Security Council + Institutional Files + + + Plains File + + + National Security Council, Washington D.C. + + Carter Administration Intelligence Files + Subject Files + + + + + Central Intelligence Agency, Langley, + Virginia + + Office of the Director of Central Intelligence + Job 05S00620R + Job 80M01542R, Executive Registry Subject Files + (1978) + Job 81B00112R, Subject Files + + + Office of Support Services, Directorate of Intelligence + Job 80T00634A, Production Case Files (1978) + Job 82T00150R, Production Case Files + + + + + + + +

Published Sources

+ + Brzezinski, Zbigniew. Power and Principle: Memoirs of + the National Security Adviser, 1977–1981. New York: Farrar, Straus, + Giroux, 1983. + Carter, Jimmy. Keeping Faith: Memoirs of a + President. New York: Bantam Books, 1982. + _______. White House Diary. New York: Farrar, + Straus, and Giroux, 2010. + Cold War International History Project Bulletin, + Issues 10–13. Washington: Woodrow Wilson Center. + Congressional Quarterly. Congress and the Nation, + 1977–1980, vol. V. Washington: Congressional Quarterly, Inc., + 1981. + Current Digest of the Soviet Press. + Chicago Tribune. + Fingar, C. Thomas, ed. Yugoslavia: From ""National + Communism’’ to National Collapse, U.S. Intelligence Community Estimative + Products on Yugoslavia. Washington: Government Printing Office, + 2006. + Garthoff, Raymond L. A Journey Through the Cold War: A + Memoir of Containment and Coexistence. Washington: Brookings + Institution, 2004. + Kaiser, Phillip M. Journeying Far and Wide: A Political + and Diplomatic Memoir. New York: Scribner, 1993. + Kalugin, Oleg. Spymaster: My Thirty-two Years in + Intelligence and Espionage Against the West. London: Smith Gryphon, + 1994. + Keesing’s Contemporary Archives, 1977–1981. London: + Longman, 1977–1981. + Mastny, Vojtech and Malcolm Byrne, eds. A Cardboard + Castle? An Inside History of the Warsaw Pact, 1955–1991. Budapest: + Central European University Press, 2006. + Newsom, David D., Witness to a Changing World, + Washington: New Academia, 2008. + The New York Times. + Paczkowski, Andrezej and Malcolm Byrne. From Solidarity + to Martial Law: The Polish Crisis of 1980–1981. Budapest: Central + European University Press, 2007. + United Nations. Yearbook of the United Nations, + 1977–1980. New York: United Nations Office of Public Information, + 1978–1981. + United States. Department of State. Bulletin, + 1977–1980. + + ________. National Archives and Records Administration. Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Jimmy Carter, + 1977–1980. Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, + 1978–1981. + Vance, Cyrus. Hard Choices: Critical Years in America’s + Foreign Policy. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1983. + The Washington Post. + Weiser, Benjamin. A Secret Life: A Polish Officer, His + Covert Mission, and the Price He Paid to Save His Country. New + York: Public Affairs, 2004. + + + +
+
+ + Abbreviations and Terms + + AGERPRES, + Agenţia Naţionalã de Presã (Romanian national news + agency) + Amb, + Ambassador + AmEmbassy, + American Embassy + ASD, Assistant + Secretary of Defense + BIB, Board for + International Broadcasting + BOP, balance of + payments + C, Confidential; Office + of the Counselor, Department of State; Carter + CA/VO, Visa Office, + Bureau of Consular Affairs, Department of State + CDU/CSU, Christian + Democratic Union of Germany/Christian Social Union of Bavaria (West + Germany) + CEMA, Council for + Mutual Economic Assistance + Cherokee, a + special telegraphic channel established for highly sensitive Department of + State messages + CIA, Central + Intelligence Agency + CINCUSAFE, + Commander in Chief, U.S. Air Forces, Europe + CINCUSAREUR, + Commander in Chief, U.S. Army, Europe + CINCUSNAVEUR, Commander in Chief, U.S. Naval Forces + Europe + CNO, Chief of Naval + Operations + Col, Colonel + Comecon, Council + for Mutual Economic Assistance + CP, Communist + Party + CSCE, Conference on + Security and Cooperation in Europe + CSSR, Czechoslovak + Socialist Republic + CU, Bureau of + Educational and Cultural Affairs, Department of State + D, Office of the Deputy Secretary of State + DAC, Development + Assistance Committee (Organization for Economic Cooperation and + Development) + DAS, Deputy Assistant + Secretary + DCA, Defense + Cooperation Agreement + DCI, Director of + Central Intelligence + DCM, Deputy Chief of + Mission + DDI, Deputy Director + of Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency + DECA, Defense and + Economic Cooperation Agreement + Del, + delegation + DepASD, Deputy + Assistant Secretary of Defense + DepSec, Deputy + Secretary + DepSecDef, + Deputy Secretary of Defense + DeptOff, + Department of State Officer + DIA, Defense + Intelligence Agency + DirGen, Director + General + DIRNSA, Director, + National Security Agency + dissem, + dissemination + DOD, Department of + Defense + DPC, Defense Planning + Committee (NATO) + + DR, Daily + Report + E, Office of the Under Secretary of State for + Economic Affairs + EC, European + Community + EDT, Eastern Daylight + Time + EE, Eastern + Europe + EEC, European + Economic Community + EmbOff, Embassy + Officer + ENMOD, + Environmental Modification Convention + EUR, Bureau of + European Affairs, Department of State + EUR/EE, Office of + Eastern European Affairs, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of + State + EUR/RPM, Office of + NATO and Atlantic Political-Military Affairs, Bureau of European Affairs, + Department of State + E–W, East-West + Exdis, exclusive + distribution + ExIm, Export-Import + Bank + FAA, Foreign + Assistance Act + FAM, Foreign Affairs + Manual + FBIS, Foreign + Broadcast Information Service + FCO, Foreign and + Commonwealth Office (United Kingdom) + FDP, Free Democratic + Party (West Germany) + FM, Foreign + Minister + FMS, foreign military + sales + FonMin, Foreign + Minister + FRC, Federal Records + Center + FRG, Federal Republic + of Germany (West Germany) + FY, fiscal year + FYI, for your + information + GA, General Assembly + (United Nations) + GDR, German + Democratic Republic (East Germany) + GNP, gross national + product + GOB, Government of + Bulgaria + GOC, Government of + Czechoslovakia + GOH, Government of + Hungary + GOP, Government of + Poland + GOR, Government of + Romania + GOY, Government of + Yugoslavia + H, Bureau of Congressional Relations, Department of + State + H/C, + hand-carried + HIRC, House + International Relations Committee + HSB, Harold S. + Brown + HSWP, Hungarian + Socialist Workers’ Party + IBRD, International + Bank for Reconstruction and Development + ICA, International + Communication Agency + ICBM, + intercontinental ballistic missile + ICJ, International + Court of Justice + ICRC, International + Committee of the Red Cross + IEA, International + Energy Agency + IMET, International + Military Education and Training + + IMF, International + Monetary Fund + INR, Bureau of + Intelligence and Research, Department of State + INR/DRR/RSE/FP, Soviet Foreign Political Division, Office + of Research and Analysis for the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, Bureau of + Intelligence and Research, Department of State + INR/IL, Office of + Intelligence Liaison, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of + State + IO, Bureau of + International Organization Affairs, Department of State + IOC, International + Olympic Committee + IREX, International + Research & Exchanges Board + ISA, Office of the + Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs + J, Jimmy (Carter’s initial) + JC, Jimmy + Carter + JCS, Joint Chiefs of + Staff + KOB, Worker’s Defense + Committee (Czechoslovakia) + KW, kilowatt + L, Office of the Legal Adviser, Department of + State + L/PM, Office of the + Legal Adviser for Politico-Military Affairs, Department of State + Limdis, limited + distribution + LRTNF, long-range + theater nuclear forces + M, Office of the Under Secretary of State for + Management + MAP, Military + Assistance Program + MBB, + Muskie-Brown-Brzezinski (Meeting Group) + MBFR, Mutual and + Balanced Force Reductions + MC, Military Committee + (NATO) + memcon, memorandum + of conversation + MFA, Ministry of + Foreign Affairs + MFN, most-favored + nation + miladdees, + military addressees + MOD, Minister of + Defense + MOFA, Ministry of + Foreign Affairs + MOU, Memorandum of + Understanding + MP, Member of + Parliament + NAC, North Atlantic + Council + NAMSA, NATO + Military Supply Agency + NARA, National + Archives and Records Administration + NATO, North Atlantic + Treaty Organization + NEM, New Economic + Mechanism + Niact, night + action + NIC, National + Intelligence Council + NIE, National + Intelligence Estimate + NIO, National + Intelligence Officer + Nodis, no + distribution + Notal, not to + all + NSA, National + Security Agency + NSC, National + Security Council + NTM, national + technical means + NYT, + The New York Times + + OECD, Organization + for Economic Cooperation and Development + OMB, Office of + Management and Budget + OSD, Office of the + Secretary of Defense + OSD/ISA, Office of + the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs + OSR, Office of + Strategic Research, Central Intelligence Agency + PAO, public affairs + officer + para, + paragraph + PermRep, + Permanent Representative + P.L., Public + Law + PM, Prime Minister; + Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs, Department of State + PM/ISO, Office of + International Security Operations, Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs, + Department of State + POL, political + POL/MIL, + political/military + PRC, Policy Review + Committee; People’s Republic of China + PriMin, Prime + Minister + PRM, Presidential + Review Memorandum + reftel, reference + telegram + Rep, + Representative + RFE, Radio Free + Europe + RG, record + group + RI, Rick + Inderfurth + RL, Radio + Liberty + RPP, Republican + People’s Party (Turkey) + rpt, repeat + S, Secret; Office of the Secretary of State + SACEUR, Supreme + Allied Commander Europe + SALT, Strategic Arms + Limitation Talks + SC, Security Council + (United Nations) + SCC, Special + Coordinating Committee + SCC(I), Special + Coordinating Committee on Intelligence + SecDef, Secretary + of Defense + SecGen, Secretary + General + Secto, series + indicator for telegrams from the Secretary of State while traveling + Secy, + Secretary + septel, separate + telegram + SFRC, Senate Foreign + Relations Committee + SHAPE, Supreme + Headquarters Allied Powers Europe + S/P, Policy Planning + Staff, Department of State + SPD, Social + Democratic Party of Germany (West Germany) + Specat, special + category + SRSG, Special + Representative of the United Nations Secretary General + S/S, Office of the + Secretariat Staff, Department of State + S/S–I, Information + Management Section, Office of the Secretariat Staff, Department of + State + S/S–O, Operations + Center, Office of the Secretariat Staff, Department of State + SSOD, United Nations + Special Session on Disarmament + Stadis, + distribution within the Department of State only + SU, Soviet + Union + SWAG, Special + Activities Working Group + SYG, Secretary + General of the United Nations + + T, Office of the Under Secretary of State for + Security Assistance; after August 22, 1977, Under Secretary of State for + Security Assistance, Science, and Technology + TDY, temporary + duty + telcon, telephone + conversation + Tosec, series + indictor for telegram to the Secretary of State while traveling + TOW, tube-launched, + optically-tracked, wire-guided missile + U, Unclassified + UDI, Unilateral + Declaration of Independence + U.K., United + Kingdom + UKG, United Kingdom + Government + UN, United + Nations + UNGA, United Nations + General Assembly + UNSC, United Nations Security Council + UNSSOD, United + Nations Special Session on Disarmament + UNSYG, United + Nations Secretary-General + U.S., United + States + USAFE, United + States Air Forces Europe + USBER, United + States Mission Berlin + USCINCEUR, + United States Commander-in-Chief, European Command + USDel, United + States Delegation + USDELMC, United + States Delegation to the NATO Military Committee + USEUCOM, United + States European Command + USG, United States + Government + USICA, United + States International Communication Agency + USMission, + United States Mission + USN, United States + Navy + USNATO, United + States Mission to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization + USNMRSHAPE, + United States National Military Representative, Supreme Headquarters Allied + Powers Europe + USSR, Union of + Soviet Socialist Republics + USUN, United States + Mission to the United Nations + USYG, Under + Secretary General (United Nations) + VOA, Voice of + America + VP, Vice + President + w/, with + WC, Warren + Christopher + WH, White House + WMC, Warren M. + Christopher + WP, Warsaw Pact + WR, Weekly Report to + the President + WSJ, + The Wall Street Journal + XMB, Export-Import + Bank + Z, Zulu time (Greenwich Mean Time) + ZB, Zbignew + Brzezinski + + + +
+
+ + Persons + + Aaron, David, + Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs + Aczel, Gyorgy, + Hungarian Deputy Prime Minister from 1970 until 1980; Chairman of the + National Cultural Council from 1980 until 1982 + Aggrey, O. + Rudolph, U.S. Ambassador to Romania from November 1977 + until July 1981 + Albright, + Madeleine, Congressional Relations Officer, Press and + Congressional Liaison Office, National Security Council, from March 1978 + until January 1981 + Andrei, + Stefan, Romanian Minister of Foreign Affairs from March + 1978 until December 1985 + Andrews, Nicholas + G., Director, Office of Eastern European Affairs, + Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State, from 1977 until 1978; + Deputy Chief of Mission, U.S. Embassy in Warsaw, from 1979 until 1981 + Arafat, + Yassir, Chairman of the Palestine Liberation + Organization + Axen, Hermann, + Member of the SED Politburo, German Democratic Republic (East + Germany) + Barnes, Harry G., + Jr., U.S. Ambassador to Romania from March 14, 1974, + until November 10, 1977; Director General of the Foreign Service, Department + of State, from December 22, 1977, until February 8, 1981 + Barry, Robert, + Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs + Barre, Siad, + President of Somalia + Bartholomew, + Reginald, member, National Security Council Staff + for Soviet Union and East Europe Affairs from November 1977 until April + 1979; Assistant Secretary of State for Politico-Military Affairs from July + 1, 1979, until January 20, 1981 + Benson, Lucy + Wilson, Under Secretary of State for International + Security Affairs from March 28, 1977, until January 5, 1980 + Bergland, + Robert, Secretary of Agriculture + Bijedic, + Dzemal, Prime Minister of Yugoslavia from July 30, 1971, + until January 18, 1977 + Blackwill, Robert + D., member, National Security Council Staff for + Western Europe Affairs from September 1979 until January 1981 + Bloomfield, + Lincoln, member, National Security Council Staff for + Global Issues from June 1979 until August 1980 + Blumenthal, W. + Michael, Chairman, White House Council on Economic + Policy and International Economic Policy from 1977 until 1978; Secretary of + the Treasury from January 23, 1977, until August 4, 1979 + Bogdan, + Corneliu, Director of North American Affairs, Romanian + Ministry of Foreign Affairs + Borg, C. + Arthur, Executive Secretary, Department of State, from + July 12, 1976, until April 15, 1977 + Bowdler, William + G., U.S. Ambassador to South Africa from May 14, + 1975, until April 19, 1978; thereafter Assistant Secretary of State for + Intelligence and Research until December 17, 1979; Assistant Secretary of + State for Inter-American Affairs from January 4, 1980, until January 16, + 1981 + Bowman, + Richard, Major General, USAF; Director of European and + NATO Affairs Division, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for + International Security Affairs, Department of Defense + Brement, + Marshall, member, National Security Council Staff for + Soviet Union and Eastern European Affairs from May 1979 until January + 1981 + + Brezhnev, + Leonid, General Secretary of the Communist Party of the + Soviet Union + Brody, + Clifford, Desk Officer, Bureau of Human Rights and + Humanitarian Affairs, Department of State + Brown, George + S., General, USAF; Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, from + July 1, 1974, until June 20, 1978 + Brown, Harold, + Secretary of Defense + Brzezinski, Zbigniew + K., Assistant to the President for National Security + Affairs + Burtica, + Cornel, Romanian Minister of Foreign Trade + Byrne, Thomas + R., U.S. Ambassador to Czechoslovakia from June 23, + 1976, until November 15, 1978 + Callaghan, + James, Prime Minister of the United Kingdom from April + 5, 1976, until May 4, 1979 + Carlucci, Frank + C., U.S. Ambassador to Portugal from January 24, 1975, + until February 5, 1978; Deputy Director of Central Intelligence from + February 10, 1978, until February 5, 1981 + Carter, Hodding, + III, Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs + from March 25, 1977, until June 30, 1980 + Carter, Jimmy, + President of the United States + Ceausescu, + Nicolae, General Secretary of the Communist Party of + Romania; President of the State Council; President of Romania + Chnoupek, + Bohuslav, Czechoslovak Minister of Foreign + Affairs + Christopher, Warren + M., Deputy Secretary of State + Civiletti, Benjamin + R., Attorney General from August 16, 1979, until + January 20, 1981 + Clark, Joan + M., Director of the Office of Management, Department of + State, from April 10, 1977, until March 20, 1979 + Clarke, Bruce + C., Deputy Director of the National Foreign Assessment + Center, Central Intelligence Agency + Claytor, W. Graham, + Jr., Secretary of the United States Navy from + February 14, 1977, until July 26, 1979; Acting Secretary of Transportation + in 1979; Deputy Secretary of Defense from August 24, 1979, until January 16, + 1981 + Clift, A. + Denis, Assistant to the Vice President for National + Security Affairs + Cooper, Richard + N., Under Secretary of State for Economic and + Agricultural Affairs from April 8, 1977, until January 19, 1981 + Deal, Timothy, + member, National Security Council Staff for International Economic Affairs + from January 1977 until April 1979 and from January 1980 until January + 1981 + Denend, Leslie + G., member, National Security Council Staff for Global + Issues from July 1977 until June 1979; Special Assistant to the Assistant to + the President for National Security Affairs from January 1980 until January + 1981 + Derian, Patricia + M., Assistant Secretary of State for Human Rights + and Humanitarian Affairs + Dinu, Stefan, + Vice Admiral, Romanian Director of Military Intelligence + Dobrynin, Anatoli + F., Soviet Ambassador to the United States + Dodson, + Christine, Deputy Staff Secretary of the National + Security Council from January 1977 until May 1977; thereafter Staff + Secretary until January 1981 + Donovan, + Hedley, Senior Adviser to the President from 1980 until + 1981 + Duncan, Charles W., + Jr., Deputy Secretary of Defense from January 31, + 1977, until July 29, 1979; Secretary of Energy from August 24, 1979, until + January 20, 1981 + Eagleburger, Lawrence + S., Deputy Under Secretary of State for Management + from May 14, 1975, until February 26, 1977; U.S. Ambassador to Yugoslavia + from February 1977 until January 1981 + + Eizenstat, Stuart + E., Executive Director, White House Domestic Policy + Staff; Assistant to the President for Domestic Affairs and Policy + English, + Glenn, member, U.S. House of Representatives + (D-Oklahoma) + Ermarth, + Fritz, Defense Coordinator, National Security Council, + from September 1978 until November 1980 + Esztergalyos, + Ferenc, Hungarian Ambassador to the United + States + Ferguson, Glenn + W., President of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty + Fischer, + Oskar, German Democratic Republic Minister of Foreign + Affairs + Fish, Howard + M., Lieutenant General, USAF; Director of the Defense + Security Assistance Agency, Department of Defense, from August 1974 until + August 1978 + Gates, Robert + M., Special Assistant to the Assistant to the President + for National Security Affairs from April 1979 until December 1979 + Genscher, + Hans-Dietrich, Vice Chancellor of the Federal + Republic of Germany and Minister of Foreign Affairs + Gierek, + Edward, First Secretary of the United Worker’s Party of + Poland + Giscard d’Estaing, + Valéry, President of France + Glenn, James + H., Office of Eastern Europe Affairs, Bureau of European + Affairs, Department of State + Glitman, Maynard + W., Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for + International Security Affairs from 1976 until 1977 + Goldberg, Arthur + J., Ambassador at Large and U.S. Representative to + the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe and Chairman of the + U.S. Delegation from September 23, 1977, until July 27, 1978 + Goodby, James + E., Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European + Affairs; U.S. Ambassador to Finland from April 11, 1980, until August 18, + 1981 + Gotsev, + Lyuben, Head of the Fourth Department, Bulgarian + Ministry of Foreign Affairs + Greenwald, + Jonathan, staff member, Bureau of Human Rights and + Humanitarian Affairs, Department of State + Gromyko, Andrei + A., Soviet Minister of Foreign Affairs + Gronouski, John + A., Chairman, Board for International + Broadcasting + Habib, Philip + C., Under Secretary of State for Politico-Military + Affairs from July 1, 1976, until April 1, 1978; Secretary of State ad + interim from January 20, 1977, until January 23, 1977 + Haig, M. Alexander, + Jr., General, USA; Commander-in-Chief, U.S. European + Command, and NATO Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, from June 1974 until + June 1979 + Hansell, Herbert + J., Legal Adviser of the Department of State from + April 8, 1977, until September 20, 1979 + Hanson, Carl + Thor, Vice Admiral, USN; Director, Joint Chiefs of + Staff, from June 22, 1979, until June 30, 1981 + Harriman, + Averell, former Governor of New York + Harris, Patricia + Roberts, Secretary of Housing and Urban Development + from January 23, 1977, until August 3, 1979; thereafter Secretary of Health + and Human Services until January 20, 1981 + Hartman, Arthur + A., Assistant Secretary of State for European and + Canadian Affairs from January 8, 1974, until June 8, 1977 + Henze, Paul, + Intelligence Coordinator, National Security Council, from January 1977 until + December 1980 + Holloway, James L., + III, Admiral, USN; Chief of Naval Operations from + July 1, 1974, until July 1, 1978 + Honecker, + Erich, General Secretary of the Socialist Unity Party of + the German Democratic Republic; Chairman, Council of State + + Horelick, Arnold + L., National Intelligence Officer for the Soviet + Union and Eastern Europe, Central Intelligence Agency + Hormats, + Robert, member, National Security Council Staff for + International Economic Affairs from January 1977 until November 1977; Deputy + Assistant Secretary of State for Economic and Business Affairs from 1977 + until 1979 + Hornblow, + Michael, Acting Staff Secretary of the National Security + Council from January 1977 until May 1977 + Hoskinson, Samuel + M., Intelligence Coordinator, National Security + Council, from January 1977 until May 1979 + Hunter, + Robert, member, National Security Council Staff for + Western Europe Affairs from January 1977 until August 1979; member, National + Security Council Staff for Middle East and North Africa Affairs from + September 1979 until January 1981 + Huntington, Samuel + P., member, National Security Council Staff for + National Security Planning from February 1977 until August 1978 + Husak, Gustav, + General Secretary of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia; President of + Czechoslovakia + Hyland, William + G., member, National Security Council Staff for Soviet + Union and Eastern European Affairs from January 1977 until October + 1977 + Inderfurth, Karl + F., Special Assistant to the Assistant to the + President for National Security Affairs from January 1977 until April + 1979 + Ionescu, + Nicolae, Romanian Ambassador to the United States + Jagielski, + Mieczyslaw, Polish Deputy Prime Minister + Jakubec, + Jaroslav, Czechoslovak Deputy Minister of Foreign + Affairs + Jaroszewicz, + Piotr, Prime Minister of Poland from December 18, 1970, + until February 18, 1980 + Jenkins, C. + Ray, Special Assistant to the President from 1980 until + January 1981 + Johanes, + Jaromir, Czechoslovak Ambassador to the United + States + John Paul I, + Supreme Pontiff of the Catholic Church and Sovereign of Vatican City from + August 26, 1978, until September 28, 1978 + John Paul II, (Karol + Wojtyla), Supreme Pontiff of the Catholic Church and + Sovereign of Vatican City from October 16, 1978 + Jones, David + C., General, USAF; Chief of Staff, United States Air + Force, from July 1, 1974, until June 20, 1978; Chairman, Joint Chiefs of + Staff, from June 21, 1978, until June 18, 1982 + Jordan, + Hamilton, Assistant to the President from 1977 until + 1979; thereafter White House Chief of Staff until May 1980 + Kaiser, + Herbert, Deputy Chief of Mission, U.S. Embassy + Romania + Katz, Julius + L., Assistant Secretary of State for Economic and + Business Affairs from September 23, 1976, until November 29, 1979 + Kimmitt, + Robert, member, National Security Council Staff for + Global Issues from January 1977 until June 1977 + King, Robert + R., member, National Security Council Staff for Soviet + Union and and East Europe Affairs from July 1977 until August 1978 + Klutznick, Philip + M., Secretary of Commerce from January 9, 1980, + until January 19, 1981 + Komer, Robert + W., Under Secretary of Defense for Policy from October + 24, 1979, until January 20, 1981 + Kostic, Petar, + Yugoslav Minister of Finance from May 16, 1978, until May 16, 1982 + Kosygin, Alexei + N., Chairman, Council of Ministers of the Soviet Union, + from October 15, 1964, until October 23, 1980 + Kreps, Juanita + M., Secretary of Commerce from January 23, 1977, until + October 31, 1979 + Kulikov, + Viktor, Commander-in-Chief of the Warsaw Treaty + Organization + + Lake, W. + Anthony, Director of Policy and Planning, Department of + State + Lance, Thomas + Bert, Director of the Office of Management and Budget + from January 23, 1977, until September 21, 1977 + Larrabee, + Stephen, member, National Security Council Staff for + Soviet Union and East Europe Affairs from September 1978 until January + 1981 + Lazar, Gyorgy, + Prime Minister of Hungary + Ljubicic, + Nikola, General, Yugoslav Minister of National + Defense + Losonczi, Pál, + President of the Hungarian Council of State + Luers, William + H., Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European + Affairs + Luns, Joseph, + Secretary-General of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization + Macovescu, + George, Romanian Minister of Foreign Affairs from 1972 + until 1978 + Maksic, + Malivoj, Yugoslav Counselor to the President for Foreign + Policy Questions + Markovic, + Dragoslav, President of Serbia from May 6, 1974, until + May 5, 1978 + Mathews, Jessica + Tuchman, member, National Security Council Staff for + Global Issues from January 1977 until June 1977 + Maynes, Charles + W., Assistant Secretary of State for International + Organization Affairs from April 14, 1977, until April 9, 1980 + McAuliffe, Eugene + V., Assistant Secretary of Defense for International + Affairs from May 6, 1976, until April 1, 1977 + McGiffert, David + E., Assistant Secretary of Defense for International + Affairs + McIntyre, James + T., Deputy Director, Office of Management and Budget, in + 1977; Director from March 24, 1978, until January 20, 1981 + McGovern, George + S., Senator (D-South Dakota) + Meehan, Francis + J., U.S. Ambassador to Czechoslovakia from May 30, 1979, + until October 20, 1980; U.S. Ambassador to Poland from October 27, 1980, + until February 13, 1983 + Mikulic, + Branko, Secretary of the League of Communists of Bosnia + and Herzegovina from 1969 until 1978 + Miller, G. + William, Chairman, Federal Reserve Board, from March + 1978 until August 1979; thereafter Secretary of the Treasury until January + 20, 1981 + Minic, Milos, + Yugoslavian Minister of Foreign Affairs from December 16, 1972, until May + 17, 1978 + Mladenov, + Petur, Bulgarian Minister of Foreign Affairs + Mondale, Walter + F., Vice President of the United States + Moore, Frank + B., Assistant to the President for Congressional + Liaison + Moses, Alfred + H., Special Adviser to the President from 1980 until + 1981 + Muskie, Edmund + S., Secretary of State from May 8, 1980, until January + 20, 1981 + Newsom, David + D., U.S. Ambassador to Indonesia from February 27, 1974, + until October 6, 1977; Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs from + April 19, 1978, until February 27, 1981 + Nicolae, Nicolae + M., Romanian Ambassador to the United States + Nimetz, + Matthew, Counselor of the Department of State from April + 8, 1977, until March 19, 1980; Under Secretary of State for International + Security Affairs from February 21, 1980, until December 5, 1980 + Odom, William + E., Lieutenant General, USA; Military Assistant to the + Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs + Owen, Henry + D., Special Representative for Economic Summits; + Ambassador at Large and Coordinator for Economic Summit Affairs from October + 20, 1978, until January 21, 1981 + Pacoste, + Cornel, Romanian Deputy Minister of Foreign + Affairs + + Pekic, Dusan, + Lieutenant General, Deputy Chief of Staff of the Yugoslav Armed + Forces + Percy, Charles + H., Senator (R-Illinois) + Pesic, Branko, + Yugoslav Deputy Secretary of Foreign Affairs + Polansky, Sol, + Deputy Chief of Mission, U.S. Embassy East Berlin, until 1979 + Popov, + Blagoja, Chairman of the Executive Council of + Macedonia + Powell, Joseph + L., White House Press Secretary + Puja, Frigyes, + Hungarian Minister of Foreign Affairs + Quandt, William + B., member, National Security Council Staff for Middle + East and North Africa Affairs from January 1977 until August 1979 + Ranghet, + Boris, Counselor and Chargé d’Affaires, U.S. Embassy in + Romania + Reinhardt, John + E., Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs from + April 22, 1975, until March, 22, 1977; Director of the Information Agency + (renamed International Communications Agency on April 1, 1978) from March + 23, 1977, until August 29, 1980 + Rentschler, + James, member, National Security Council Staff for + Western European Affairs from September 1978 until January 1981 + Resor, Stanley + R., United States Representative to the Mutual and + Balanced Force Reductions Talks, North Atlantic Treaty Organization, from + 1973 until 1978; Under Secretary of Defense for Policy from August 14, 1978, + until April 1, 1979 + Ridgway, Rozanne + L., Counselor of the Department of State from March + 20, 1980, until February 24, 1981 + Roberts, + Walter, Executive Director of the Board for + International Broadcasting + Rosen, Mosses, + Chief Rabbi of the Romanian Jewry; President of the Federation of Jewish + Communities of Romania + Saunders, Harold + H., Assistant Secretary of State for Intelligence + and Research from December 1, 1975, until April 10, 1978; Assistant + Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs from April 11, + 1978, until January 16, 1981 + Schaufele, William E., + Jr., Assistant Secretary of State for African + Affairs from December 19, 1975, until July 17, 1977 + Schecter, + Jerrold, Press Officer and Associate Press Secretary, + Congressional Liaison Office, National Security Council, from January 1977 + until February 1980 + Scheel, + Walter, President of the Federal Republic of Germany + from July 1, 1974, untl June 30, 1979 + Schmidt, Carl + W., Deputy Director, Office of Eastern Europe Affairs, + Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State + Schmidt, + Helmut, Chancellor of the Federal Republic of + Germany + Schultze, Charles + L., Chairman, White House Council of Economic + Advisors + Seitz, Raymond G. + H., Deputy Executive Secretary of the Department of + State + Siena, James + V., Assistant Secretary of Defense for European and NATO + Affairs + Spiers, Ronald + I., Deputy Chief of Mission, U.S. Embassy in London, + from 1974 until 1977; Assistant Secretary of State for Intelligence and + Research from January 28, 1980, until October 4, 1981 + Stoessel, Walter J., + Jr., U.S. Ambassador to the Federal Republic of + Germany + Strougal, + Lubomir, Prime Minister of Czechoslovakia + Tarnoff, Peter + R., Executive Secretary, Department of State, from April + 4, 1977, until February 8, 1981 + Thatcher, + Margaret, Prime Minister of the United Kingdom from May + 4, 1979, until November 28, 1990 + Thomson, + James, Defense Coordinator, National Security Council, + from April 1977 until January 1981 + + Tito, Josip + Broz, President of Yugoslavia until May 4, 1980 + Treverton, Gregory + F., member, National Security Council Staff for + Western European Affairs from January 1977 until August 1978 + Tsvetkov, + Boris, Bulgarian Deputy Foreign Minister + Turner, + Stansfield, Director of Central Intelligence from March + 9, 1977, until January 20, 1981 + Vance, Cyrus + R., Secretary of State from January 23, 1977, until + April 20, 1980 + Vest, George + S., Assistant Secretary of State for Politico-Military + Affairs from April 29, 1974, until March 27, 1977; Assistant Secretary of + State for European Affairs from June 16, 1977, until April 14, 1981 + Von Staden, + Berndt, West German Ambassador to the United States + until 1979; Coordinator of German-American Cooperation in the Foreign + Chancellery from 1979 until 1983 + Vrhovec, + Josip, Yugoslav Minister of Foreign Affairs from May 17, + 1978, until May 17, 1982 + Woessner, William + M., Director of the Office of Central Europe, Bureau + of European Affairs, Department of State + Young, Andrew + J., United States Representative to the United Nations + from January 30, 1977, until August 15, 1979 + Zhivkov, + Todor, First Secretary of the Central Committee, + Communist Party of Bulgaria; Chairman of the State Council + + + +
+ +
+ + Note on U.S. Covert Actions +

In compliance with the Foreign Relations of the United + States statute that requires inclusion in the Foreign + Relations series of comprehensive documentation on major foreign policy + decisions and actions, the editors have identified key documents regarding major + covert actions and intelligence activities. The following note will provide + readers with some organizational context on how covert actions and special + intelligence operations in support of U.S. foreign policy were planned and + approved within the U.S. Government. It describes, on the basis of declassified + documents, the changing and developing procedures during the Truman, Eisenhower, + Kennedy, Johnson, Nixon, Ford, and Carter + Presidencies.

+

Management of Covert Actions in the Truman Presidency

+

The Truman administration’s concern over Soviet “psychological warfare’’ prompted + the new National Security Council to authorize, in NSC 4–A of December 1947, the launching of peacetime covert action + operations. NSC 4–A made the Director of + Central Intelligence responsible for psychological warfare, establishing at the + same time the principle that covert action was an exclusively Executive Branch + function. The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) + certainly was a natural choice but it was assigned this function at least in + part because the Agency controlled unvouchered funds, by which operations could + be funded with minimal risk of exposure in Washington.NSC 4–A, December 17, 1947, is printed in Foreign Relations, + 1945–1950, Emergence of the Intelligence Establishment, Document + 257.

+

The CIA’s early use of its new covert action + mandate dissatisfied officials at the Departments of State and Defense. The + Department of State, believing this role too important to be left to the CIA alone and concerned that the military might + create a new rival covert action office in the Pentagon, pressed to reopen the + issue of where responsibility for covert action activities should reside. + Consequently, on June 18, 1948, a new NSC + directive, NSC 10/2, superseded NSC 4–A.

+

NSC 10/2 directed the CIA to conduct “covert’’ rather than merely “psychological’’ + operations, defining them as all activities “which are conducted or sponsored by + this Government against hostile foreign states or groups or in support of + friendly foreign states or groups but which are so planned and executed that any + US Government responsibility for them is not evident to unauthorized persons and + that if uncovered the US Government + can plausibly disclaim any responsibility for them.’’

+

The type of clandestine activities enumerated under the new directive included: + “propaganda; economic warfare; preventive direct action, including sabotage, + demolition and evacuation measures; subversion against hostile states, including + assistance to underground resistance movements, guerrillas and refugee + liberations [sic] groups, and support of indigenous + anti-Communist elements in threatened countries of the free world. Such + operations should not include armed conflict by recognized military forces, + espionage, counter-espionage, and cover and deception for military operations.’’ + NSC 10/2, June + 18, 1948, is printed ibid., Document + 292.

+

The Office of Policy Coordination (OPC), newly established in the CIA on September 1, 1948, in accordance with + NSC 10/2, assumed responsibility for + organizing and managing covert actions. The OPC, which was to take its guidance + from the Department of State in peacetime and from the military in wartime, + initially had direct access to the State Department and to the military without + having to proceed through the CIA’s + administrative hierarchy, provided the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) + was informed of all important projects and decisions.Memorandum of conversation by Frank G. Wisner, + “Implementation of NSC–10/2,’’ August 12, + 1948, is printed ibid., Document 298. In + 1950 this arrangement was modified to ensure that policy guidance came to the + OPC through the DCI.

+

During the Korean conflict the OPC grew quickly. Wartime commitments and other + missions soon made covert action the most expensive and bureaucratically + prominent of the CIA’s activities. Concerned + about this situation, DCI Walter Bedell Smith + in early 1951 asked the NSC for enhanced policy + guidance and a ruling on the proper “scope and magnitude’’ of CIA operations. The White House responded with two + initiatives. In April 1951 President Truman created the Psychological Strategy + Board (PSB) under the NSC to coordinate + government-wide psychological warfare strategy. NSC 10/5, issued in October 1951, reaffirmed the covert action + mandate given in NSC 10/2 and expanded the + CIA’s authority over guerrilla + warfare.NSC + 10/5, “Scope and Pace of Covert Operations,’’ October 23, 1951, is printed + in Foreign + Relations, 1950–1955, The Intelligence Community, Document + 90. The PSB was soon abolished by the incoming Eisenhower + administration, but the expansion of the CIA’s + covert action writ in NSC 10/5 helped ensure + that covert action would remain a major function of the Agency.

+

As the Truman administration ended, the CIA was + near the peak of its independence and authority in the field of covert action. + Although the CIA continued to seek and receive + advice on specific projects from + the NSC, the PSB, and the departmental + representatives originally delegated to advise the OPC, no group or officer + outside of the DCI and the President himself + had authority to order, approve, manage, or curtail operations.

+

NSC 5412 Special Group; + 5412/2 Special Group; 303 Committee

+

The Eisenhower administration began narrowing the CIA’s latitude in 1954. In accordance with a series of National + Security Council directives, the responsibility of the Director of Central + Intelligence for the conduct of covert operations was further clarified. + President Eisenhower approved NSC 5412 on March + 15, 1954, reaffirming the Central Intelligence Agency’s responsibility for + conducting covert actions abroad. A definition of covert actions was set forth; + the DCI was made responsible for coordinating + with designated representatives of the Secretary of State and the Secretary of + Defense to ensure that covert operations were planned and conducted in a manner + consistent with U.S. foreign and military policies; and the Operations + Coordinating Board was designated the normal channel for coordinating support + for covert operations among State, Defense, and the CIA. Representatives of the Secretary of State, the Secretary of + Defense, and the President were to be advised in advance of major covert action + programs initiated by the CIA under this policy + and were to give policy approval for such programs and secure coordination of + support among the Departments of State and Defense and the CIA.William M. Leary, + editor, The Central Intelligence Agency: History and + Documents (The University of Alabama Press, 1984), p. 63; for text + of NSC 5412, see Foreign Relations, + 1950–1955, The Intelligence Community, Document 171.

+

A year later, on March 12, 1955, NSC 5412/1 was + issued, identical to NSC 5412 except for + designating the Planning Coordination Group as the body responsible for + coordinating covert operations. NSC 5412/2 of + December 28, 1955, assigned to representatives (of the rank of assistant + secretary) of the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, and the + President responsibility for coordinating covert actions. By the end of the + Eisenhower administration, this group, which became known as the “NSC 5412/2 Special Group’’ or simply “Special + Group,’’ emerged as the executive body to review and approve covert action + programs initiated by the CIA.Leary, The Central Intelligence Agency: + History and Documents, pp. 63, 147–148; Final + Report of the Select Committee To Study Governmental Operations With + Respect to Intelligence Activities, United States Senate, Book I, + Foreign and Military Intelligence (1976), pp. + 50–51. For texts of NSC 5412/1 and NSC 5412/2, see Foreign Relations, + 1950–1955, The Intelligence Community, Documents 212 and 250. The membership of the + Special Group varied depending upon the situation faced. Meetings were + infrequent until 1959 when weekly meetings began to be held. Neither the CIA nor the Special Group adopted fixed criteria + for bringing projects before the group; initiative remained with the CIA, as + members representing other agencies frequently were unable to judge the + feasibility of particular projects.Leary, The Central Intelligence Agency: History and + Documents, p. 63.

+

After the Bay of Pigs failure in April 1961, General Maxwell Taylor reviewed U.S. + paramilitary capabilities at President Kennedy’s request and submitted a report + in June that recommended strengthening high-level direction of covert + operations. As a result of the Taylor Report, the Special Group, chaired by the + President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs McGeorge Bundy, and + including Deputy Under Secretary of State U. Alexis Johnson, Deputy Secretary of + Defense Roswell Gilpatric, Director of Central Intelligence Allen Dulles, and + Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Lyman Lemnitzer, assumed greater + responsibility for planning and reviewing covert operations. Until 1963 the + DCI determined whether a CIA-originated project was submitted to the + Special Group. In 1963 the Special Group developed general but informal + criteria, including risk, possibility of success, potential for exposure, + political sensitivity, and cost (a threshold of $25,000 was adopted by the + CIA), for determining whether covert action + projects were submitted to the Special Group.Ibid., + p. 82.

+

From November 1961 to October 1962 a Special Group (Augmented), whose membership + was the same as the Special Group plus Attorney General Robert Kennedy and + General Taylor (as Chairman), exercised responsibility for Operation Mongoose, a + major covert action program aimed at overthrowing the Castro regime in Cuba. + When President Kennedy authorized the program in November, he designated + Brigadier General Edward G. Lansdale, Assistant for Special Operations to the + Secretary of Defense, to act as chief of operations, and Lansdale coordinated + the Mongoose activities among the CIA and the + Departments of State and Defense. The CIA units + in Washington and Miami had primary responsibility for implementing Mongoose + operations, which included military, sabotage, and political propaganda + programs.See Foreign Relations, 1961–1963, volume X, + Cuba, 1961–1962, Documents 270 and 278.

+

President Kennedy also established a Special Group (Counter-Insurgency) on + January 18, 1962, when he signed NSAM No. 124. The Special Group (CI), set up to + coordinate counter-insurgency activities separate from the mechanism for + implementing NSC 5412/2, was to confine itself + to establishing broad policies aimed at preventing and resisting subversive + insurgency and other forms of indirect aggression in friendly countries. In + early 1966, in NSAM No. 341, President Johnson assigned responsibility for the direction and + coordination of counter-insurgency activities overseas to the Secretary of + State, who established a Senior Interdepartmental Group to assist in discharging + these responsibilities.For text of NSAM No. 124, + see ibid., volume VIII, National Security Policy, Document 68. NSAM No. 341, March 2, 1966, is printed ibid., 1964–1968, volume XXXIII, Organization and + Management of U.S. Foreign Policy; United Nations, Document + 56.

+

NSAM No. 303, June 2, 1964, from Bundy to the Secretaries of State and Defense + and the DCI, changed the name of “Special Group 5412’’ to “303 Committee’’ but + did not alter its composition, functions, or responsibility. Bundy was the + chairman of the 303 Committee.For text of NSAM + No. 303, see ibid., Document 204.

+

The Special Group and the 303 Committee approved 163 covert actions during the + Kennedy administration and 142 during the Johnson administration through + February 1967. The 1976 Final Report of the Church Committee, however, estimated + that of the several thousand projects undertaken by the CIA since 1961, only 14 percent were considered on a case-by-case + basis by the 303 Committee and its predecessors (and successors). Those not + reviewed by the 303 Committee were low-risk and low-cost operations. The Final + Report also cited a February 1967 CIA + memorandum that included a description of the mode of policy arbitration of + decisions on covert actions within the 303 Committee system. The CIA presentations were questioned, amended, and + even on occasion denied, despite protests from the DCI. Department of State + objections modified or nullified proposed operations, and the 303 Committee + sometimes decided that some agency other than the CIA should undertake an operation or that CIA actions requested by Ambassadors on the scene should be + rejected.Final Report of + the Select Committee To Study Governmental Operations With Respect to + Intelligence Activities, United States Senate, Book I, Foreign and Military Intelligence, pp. + 56–57.

+

The effectiveness of covert action has always been difficult for any + administration to gauge, given concerns about security and the difficulty of + judging the impact of U.S. initiatives on events. In October 1969 the new Nixon + administration required annual 303 Committee reviews for all covert actions that + the Committee had approved and automatic termination of any operation not + reviewed after 12 months. On February 17, 1970, President Nixon signed National + Security Decision Memorandum 40,For text of NSDM + 40, see Foreign + Relations, 1969–1976, volume II, Organization and Management of + U.S. Foreign Policy, 1969–1972, Document 203. which + superseded NSC 5412/2 and changed the name of + the covert action approval group to the 40 Committee, in part because the 303 + Committee had been named in the media. The Attorney General was also added to + the membership of the Committee. NSDM 40 reaffirmed the DCI’s responsibility for the coordination, control, and conduct + of covert operations and directed him to obtain policy approval from the 40 + Committee for all major and “politically sensitive’’ covert operations. He was + also made responsible for ensuring an annual review by the 40 Committee of all + approved covert operations.

+

The 40 Committee met regularly early in the Nixon administration, but over time + the number of formal meetings declined and business came to be conducted via + couriers and telephone votes. The Committee actually met only for major new + proposals. As required, the DCI submitted + annual status reports to the 40 Committee for each approved operation. According + to the 1976 Church Committee Final Report, the 40 Committee considered only + about 25 percent of the CIA’s individual covert action projects, concentrating + on major projects that provided broad policy guidelines for all covert actions. + Congress received briefings on only a few proposed projects. Not all major + operations, moreover, were brought before the 40 Committee: President Nixon in + 1970 instructed the DCI to promote a coup d’ + etat against Chilean President Salvador Allende without Committee coordination + or approval.Final Report of the + Select Committee To Study Governmental Operations With Respect to + Intelligence Activities, United States Senate, Book I, Foreign and + Military Intelligence, pp. 54–55, 57.

+

Presidential Findings Since 1974 and the Operations + Advisory Group

+

The Hughes-Ryan amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act of 1974 brought about a + major change in the way the U.S. Government approved covert actions, requiring + explicit approval by the President for each action and expanding Congressional + oversight and control of the CIA. The CIA was + authorized to spend appropriated funds on covert actions only after the + President had signed a “finding’’ and informed Congress that the proposed + operation was important to national security.Public Law 93–559.

+

Executive Order 11905, issued by President Ford on February 18, 1976, in the wake + of major Congressional investigations of CIA + activities by the Church and Pike Committees, replaced the 40 Committee with the + Operations Advisory Group, composed of the President’s Assistant for National + Security Affairs, the Secretaries of State and Defense, the Chairman of the + Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the DCI, who retained responsibility for the planning + and implementation of covert operations. The OAG was required to hold formal + meetings to develop recommendations for the President regarding a covert action + and to conduct periodic reviews of previously-approved operations. EO 11905 also + banned all U.S. Government employees from involvement in political assassinations, a prohibition that was + retained in succeeding executive orders, and prohibited involvement in domestic + intelligence activities.Executive Order 11905, + “United States Foreign Intelligence Activities,’’ Weekly + Compilation of Presidential Documents, Vol. 12, No. 8, February 23, + 1976.

+

Approval and oversight requirements for covert action continued to be governed by + the Hughes-Ryan amendment well into the Carter administration, even as the new + administration made alterations to the executive branch’s organizational + structure for covert action.

+

President Carter retained the NSC as the highest + executive branch organization to review and guide U.S. foreign intelligence + activities. As part of a broader NSC + reorganization at the outset of his administration, President Carter replaced + the Operations Advisory Group (OAG) with the NSC’s Special Coordination Committee (SCC), which explicitly continued the same operating procedures as + the former OAG.The broader NSC reorganization sought to reduce the number + of NSC committees to two: the Policy Review + Committee (PRC) and the Special + Coordination Committee (SCC). The SCC’s + jurisdiction included all intelligence policy issues other than annual + budget and priorities reviews; the SCC also had jurisdiction over other, + nonintelligence matters. Presidential Directive 2, “The National Security + Council System,’’ January 20, 1977, Carter Library, Vertical File, + Presidential Directives. See also Zbigniew + Brzezinski, Power and Principle: Memoirs of + the National Security Advisor 1977–198 (New York: Farrar, Strauss, + Giroux, 1983), pp. 59–62. Membership of the SCC, when meeting for the + purpose of reviewing and making recommendations on covert actions (as well as + sensitive surveillance activities), replicated that of the former OAG—namely: + the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs; the Secretaries of + State and Defense; the Director of Central Intelligence; the Chairman of the + Joint Chiefs of Staff; and the Attorney General and Director of the Office of + Management and Budget (the latter two as observers). The designated chairman of + all SCC meetings was the Assistant to the President for National Security + Affairs. Carter formalized the SCC’s replacement of the OAG in EO 11985 of May + 13, 1977, which amended President Ford’s EO 11905 on “United States Foreign + Intelligence activities.’’Executive Order 11985, + “United States Foreign Intelligence Activities,’’ May 13, 1977, Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, Vol. + 13, No. 20 (May 16, 1977), pp. 719–720. In practice, the SCC for + covert action and sensitive surveillance activities came to be known as the SCC + (Intelligence) or the SCC-I, to distinguish it from other versions of the + SCC.

+ +

The SCC’s replacement of the OAG was reaffirmed in E.O. 12036 of January 24, + 1978, which replaced E.O. 11905 and its amendments. E.O. 12036 also reaffirmed + the same membership for the SCC-I, but identified the Attorney General and the + Director of the Office of Management and Budget as full members of the + Committee, rather than merely observers.

+ +

Also in the first days of the Carter administration, the SCC-I established a + lower-level working group to study and review proposals for covert action and + other sensitive intelligence matters and report to the SCC-I. This interagency + working group was chaired by the Deputy Assistant to the President for National + Security Affairs (David Aaron), or in his + absence, the NSC Director for Intelligence + Coordination. The working group was named the Special Activities Working Group + (SAWG). The SAWG was active in early Carter administration reviews of ongoing + covert action, and remained active through at least 1978. NSC officials in mid-1978 sought to downgrade or + abolish the SAWG and replace it as needed with ad hoc working groups. Internal + NSC reviews at the end of the Carter + administration state that the SAWG gradually fell out of use. By late 1979, the + means for debating, developing, and guiding certain covert actions was an + interagency working group chaired by Aaron at the NSC. This group + was referred to by several names during the late Carter administration, + including the Deputy’s (or Deputies) group, the Aaron group, the interagency group, the Black Chamber, and the + Black Room.

+

The Carter administration made use of a new category of presidential findings for + “world-wide’’ or “general’’ (or “generic’’) covert operations. This continued a + practice initiated late in the Ford administration in response to the + Hughes-Ryan requirement for presidential findings. The worldwide category + covered lower-risk operations that were directed at broad policy goals + implemented on a worldwide basis as assets allowed. These operations utilized + existing assets as well as existing liaison contacts with foreign intelligence + or security services, and in some cases also consisted of routine training or + procurement undertaken to assist foreign intelligence partners or other agencies + of the USG.A new type of document —known as “Perspectives’’—provided more + specific tasking guidance for these general, worldwide covert activities. + Perspectives detailed the themes to be stressed in furtherance of a particular + policy goal. Riskier operations required their own presidential finding or + Memorandum of Notification (see below). Perspectives were drafted by the CIA and cleared by the Department of State, so + that the CIA could vet the operational + feasibility and risks of the program while State could assess the diplomatic + risks and verify that the program was consistent with overall foreign policy + goals. At least initially, Perspectives did not require further coordination + with the OAG, SCC, or the President. Once an agreed-upon Perspectives document + was finalized by CIA and the Department of + State, it was transmitted to the field, and posts were required to make periodic + reports on any achievements under the Perspectives guidelines. Beginning in + 1978, actions in this worldwide category were authorized by the President as + specific line-item additions to a previously existing “world-wide’’ finding, + though Perspectives were still used to provide additional details.

+ +

Another new document used during the Carter administration was the “Memorandum of + Notification’’ (MON). MONs were initially used to introduce higher-risk, + significantly higher-cost, or more geographically-specific operations under a + previously-approved worldwide or general objective outlinedExecutive Order 12036, “United States Foreign Intelligence + Activities,’’ January 24, 1978, Weekly Compilation of + Presidential Documents, Vol. 14, No. 4 (January 30, 1978), pp. + 194–214. Since E.O. 12036 governed foreign intelligence activities, all + references in the E.O. to the “SCC’’ were effectively references to what was + known in practice as the SCC (Intelligence), or SCC-I. in a + Perspectives document. Like Perspectives, MONs had to be coordinated between the + CIA and the Department of State, but they + also required broader interagency coordination within the SAWG or SCC. MONs + subsequently came to be used for significant changes to any type of finding, not + just worldwide ones. Entirely new covert actions continued to require new + presidential findings. The Hughes-Ryan amendment stipulated that Congress be + notified of new findings “in a timely fashion,’’ but did not specify how much + time that meant. During the Carter administration, the CIA typically notified Congress of new covert initiatives within 48 + hours, including those outlined in Perspectives or MONs.

+ +

In October 1980, the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1981—also + known as the Intelligence Oversight Act of 1980—scaled back the Hughes-Ryan + amendment’s provisions for congressional oversight of covert action. While the + requirement to notify Congress about presidential findings remained in place, + the new Act limited the committees of Congress that had to be briefed to the two + intelligence committees, and also explicitly clarified that this requirement to + keep the committees “fully and currently informed’’ did not constitute a + requirement for congressional approval of covert action or other intelligence + activities. Moreover, the new Act stipulated that if the President determined it + was “essential to limit prior notice to meet extraordinary circumstances + affecting vital interests of the United States,’’ the President could limit + prior notice to the chairmen and ranking minority members of the two + intelligence committees, the Speaker and minority leader of the House, and the + majority and minority leaders of the Senate—a group that came to be known as the + “Gang of Eight.’’ If prior notice of a covert action was withheld, the President + was required to inform the two intelligence committees “in a timely fashion’’ + and provide a statement of the reasons for not giving prior notice.PL 96–450, Sec. 407 (October 14, 1980). See also the + description of the Hughes-Ryan amendment and its replacement by PL 96–450 + in: Richard A. Best, Jr., “Covert Action: Legislative Background and + Possible Policy Questions,’’ Congressional Research Service, RL33715, + December 27, 2011, pp.1-2; and L. Britt Snider, The Agency + and the Hill: CIA’s Relationship with + Congress, 1946-2004, Washington: Center for the Study of + Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency, 2008, pp.280–81.

+ + +
+ + + +
+ + Eastern Europe + +
+ Eastern Europe Region + +
+ 1. Presidential Review Memorandum/NSC–9Source: + Carter Library, National Security Council, Institutional Files, Box + 27, PRM–9 [1]. Secret. Hyland forwarded the memorandum to + Brzezinski for signature + on January 29, stating it had been thoroughly coordinated with the + Department of State and the Department of Defense. (Ibid.) On + January 5, two weeks prior to the inauguration, the + President-elect’s team held a “mini” NSC meeting to discuss the foreign policy agenda for + the administration. Included in the Summary of Conclusions of the + meeting was a recommendation that a comprehensive review of Europe + be held prior to the NATO + Ministerial meeting scheduled to take place in London May 10–11. + Carter approved the Summary of Conclusions of the meeting. (Carter + Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Brzezinski Office File, Subject Chron File, Box 78, + Brzezinski, Chron + to/from President: 1/77) + + + Washington, February + 1, 1977 + + + TO + The Vice President + The Secretary of State + The Secretary of Defense + + + ALSO + + The Secretary of the Treasury + The United States Representative to the United Nations + The Director, Office of Management and Budget + The Chairman, Council of Economic Advisors + The Director, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency + The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff + The Director of Central Intelligence + + + SUBJECT + Comprehensive Review of European Issues (U) + +

The President has directed that the Policy Review Committee, under the + Chairmanship of the Department of State, undertake a broad review of US + policy concerning key European issues. The review should be completed no + later than March 1, 1977.

+ +

The review should address the following issues:The memorandum also covered European relations, NATO, and economic issues. Scheduled + for publication in Foreign Relations, 1977–1980, vol. XXVII, Western + Europe.

+

[Omitted here is information unrelated to Eastern Europe.]

+

4. Eastern Europe: This section should analyze the + situation in the area in terms of general trends—political, economic and + social stability. The status and outlook in each country for relative + internal liberalization and external independence should be examined. In + particular, there should be a discussion of how the US should approach + the area and the countries involved; whether and how we should + differentiate among the countries in trading or political relations, + e.g., treat them more or less uniformly, or primarily as a function of + the policy toward the USSR, or on the + basis of other criteria, e.g., should US policy be more forthcoming + toward Eastern European countries that are relatively more liberal + internally (e.g., Poland and Hungary), or relatively more independent + from Moscow (e.g., Romania). This review should include an examination + of the role of RFE/RL. This analysis should also address the GDR in the context of US-German and Berlin + policies, as well as Eastern Europe.

+

5. Security Issues: East-West: An analysis should + be made of East-West relations in Europe, probable trends, tradeoffs, + and issues or contingencies that might arise. It should examine the + constraints on further progress, the main elements of an East-West + agenda and priorities of US policy. This analysis should include an + examination of Soviet policy and objectives in European security. In + particular, the following sub-issues should be covered:

+

(a) MBFR: As a + follow up to the priority work being undertaken in PRM/NSC–6,PRM/NSC–6 ordered a review of + U.S. policy toward MBFR. Scheduled for publication in + Foreign + Relations, 1977–1980, vol. V, European Security, + 1977–1983. an analysis should be included in this + study of the role of mutual force reduction (including MBFR) in East-West relations, its + priority, objectives, prospects, as well as possible US initiatives.

+

(b) CSCE: This + section should describe the status, and examine the utility of CSCE, particularly for increasing + East-West contacts and effecting changes in the human rights area. It + should analyze the role of CSCE in the + overall East-West relationship and its priority in US policy during and + beyond the Belgrade Conference.

+

(c) Berlin and Germany: This section should + describe the present situation in terms of the Quadripartite Agreement, + the inter-German relationship, possible Soviet-GDR moves, and the efficacy of current Allied consultative + arrangements; an examination should be made of whether the Three Western + Powers and/or the FRG should undertake + any new initiatives to + improve the situation; analysis also should include the FRG-Soviet relationship in broader + European security terms.

+ + Zbigniew + Brzezinski + +
+
+ 2. Editorial Note +

In a February 9, 1977, memorandum to the National Security Council’s + Special Coordination Committee (SCC), + Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs + David Aaron reported on a + January 26 meeting of the Special Activities Working Group (SAWG) to + discuss and review all approved covert action programs and other + sensitive activities. Aaron + reported that for each activity, the group considered a) relevance to + U.S. policy objectives; b) + achievements; c) risks; d) budgetary costs; e) alternative courses of + action; and f) consequences of termination. The group did not seek to + identify new possibilities for covert action. The SAWG also “assumed + that the SCC and the President wish to + limit USG involvement in covert special + activities to the greatest extent possible consistent with U.S. interests.” On covert support for + publishing materials targeted at the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, + the group found that the program was generally desirable, and in the + U.S. interest to continue. + “However,” Aaron wrote, “issues + were raised which suggest the need for a more searching examination of + the scope and mode of operation. For instance, there has been no recent + comprehensive review of the policy objectives of this program, even + though the internal political situations in Eastern Europe and the + USSR have changed in some + important respects.” (National Security Council, Carter Administration + Intelligence Files, Box I–022, SCC + Meetings, 1977–1978, SCC (i) 24 + February 1977)

+

On February 21, Samuel Hoskinson + of the National Security Council Staff, forwarded a memorandum to + Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs Zbigniew Brzezinski with the agenda + for the upcoming SCC meeting on + intelligence activities. Concerning the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe + publication program, the prepared talking points recommended that + Brzezinski stress the need + to do more in the area and that new ideas for what the U.S. Government could do were necessary, + especially in the area of respect for human rights. (Ibid.)

+

Following the February 24 SCC meeting, + Brzezinski sent President + Jimmy Carter a memorandum on + February 28, seeking approval of the SCC + recommendations to continue several Soviet Union and Eastern Europe + programs, including the book publishing program. On the Soviet and + Eastern European program, Brzezinski wrote: “Given the growing importance of the + human rights problem throughout this whole area, I feel this program + should probably be expanded.” Brzezinski also informed Carter of Secretary of Defense Harold Brown’s recommendation for this + program. Carter approved the continuation of the program. (Ibid.) On + March 4, Brzezinski informed + Brown, Secretary of State Cyrus + Vance, and Acting Director of Central Intelligence E. + Henry Knoche of Carter’s decision to continue the book and publication + program for the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe subject to a review as + to scope and mode of operation. (National Security Council, Carter + Administration Intelligence Files, Box I–020, Minutes of SCC Intelligence Working Group 1977)

+
+
+ 3. Paper Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency for the Special + Activities Working GroupSource: + National Security Council, Carter Administration Intelligence Files, + Box I–022, SCC Meetings 1977–78, + SCC (i) 24 February 1977. + Secret; Sensitive. The date is handwritten. Hoskinson forwarded the paper, + which was prepared at the request of the Special Activities Working + Group, to Brzezinski under a + February 21 covering memorandum at Tab E of Brzezinski’s briefing book for the + February 24 SCC + meeting. + + + Washington, February + 4, 1977 + +

USSR + AND EAST EUROPE

+

SYNOPSIS: The Agency’s covert action program + against the USSR and Eastern Europe is + intended to sustain pressure for liberalization of the domestic and + foreign policies of the Soviet Union and the countries of Eastern + Europe, and to lessen Soviet domination of Eastern Europe. It is + designed to complement broader overt U.S. government programs such as the broadcasts of Radio + Liberty and Radio Free Europe as well as the educational, cultural, + technical and scientific exchange programs; plus a growing number of + activities in the private sector—both in the U.S. and Europe.

+

The program’s objectives are pursued by supporting the dissidents in the + USSR and EE, specifically in their struggle for elementary civil + liberties. Owing to the inherent intolerance of the communist regimes + to any form of dissent, this + struggle—whether over freedom of religion or freedom to emigrate—is + inevitably a political one.

+

The program promotes the free movement of information and ideas through + the publication and internal distribution of books and periodicals + containing information denied Soviet and East European Bloc citizens by + their regimes. During 1976 some 170,000 books and periodicals were + infiltrated into the USSR or handed to + Soviet citizens abroad. An additional 145,000 books and periodicals + reached Eastern Europe. These items range from samizdat (writings which could not be published in the USSR which are smuggled to the West, + published and clandestinely re-infiltrated into the Soviet Union) to + translations of Western authors. They deal with a wide range of + politically important subjects such as recent history (including the + historical ‘fiction’ of Alexandr Solzhenitsyn), non-Marxist economics + and sociology, as well as literary works.

+

The program also seeks to support the dissidents fighting for human + rights in the USSR and Eastern Europe + by generating publicity for their cause, and by exposing and protesting + human rights violations in these countries. The dissidents themselves + are unanimous that such publicity is essential to their survival. + Examples of such activity in 1976 include publicity efforts conducted in + support of Soviet dissenters Vladimir Bukovskiy, Yuriy Orlov (chairman + of a small committee organized to monitor Soviet compliance with the + CSCE accords) and Andrey + Tverdokhlebov, the imprisoned secretary of the Moscow chapter of Amnesty + International.

+

The eight activities which comprise the program are mutually supporting + and inter-related. These are:

+ + 1. A book and periodical distribution activity which distributes + proscribed literature (primarily in Russian and the Eastern European + languages) to Soviet and Eastern European citizens, either in the + West (to visiting diplomats, trade delegations, cultural groups, + tourists, etc.) or in the East (where they are smuggled in by + tourists or sent to exchange students and other resident Westerners + who then pass them along to target personalities). (FY 77 $1,200,000) + 2. A literary advisory activity which uses specialists in Russian + literature to select materials meriting publication for subsequent + distribution in the Soviet Union, and publish them through one of + several proprietary outlets. Some 10–12 books in Russian and Polish + are published annually. (FY 77 + $250,000) + 3. A Russian language newspaper published in Paris which seeks to + support and stimulate dissidence among Soviet intellectuals. (FY 77 $350,000) + 4. A human rights activity which uses a small number of activists + in Western Europe to publicize Soviet and Eastern European abuses of + human rights. (FY 77 + $105,000) + 5. A Russian emigre organization (National Alliance of + Solidarists—NTS) which engages in procurement, publication and + clandestine distribution of + literature and socio-political commentary in the Russian language, + and in some political activity in the USSR. (FY 77 + $200,000) + 6. A Czech-language quarterly magazine aimed at Czechoslovak + intellectual dissidents. (FY 77 + $125,000) + 7. A literary institute in France which publishes a monthly Polish + language magazine and selected books directed at Polish + intellectuals and youth. (FY 77 + $115,000) + 8. A Ukrainian emigre group which in addition to promoting the + cause of Ukrainian national identity, seeks to encourage the many + national minority groups to unite with the Russian dissidents in + their struggle for national and cultural identity. (FY 77 $245,000) + +

POLICY:

+

This program is consistent with U.S. + policy toward the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe in recent years.

+

GAINS:

+

—The dissident movement in the USSR, + whose prospects were viewed with considerable pessimism by many + observers as recently as a year ago, has shown remarkable tenacity and + vitality. The activity of dissidents fighting for greater civil + liberties in Poland and Czechoslovakia, has greatly increased in the + past year. Testimony is available from internal dissidents and from + recent emigres interviewed in the West that the operations which publish + and distribute literature and periodicals are effective in terms of + reaching their targets and sustaining the existence and growth of + democratic movements in the countries involved.

+

—Prominent dissidents such as Leonid Plyushch, Andrey Amalrik and + Vladimir Bukovskiy who have been expelled or allowed to emigrate in the + past year have been active and effective in dramatizing the situation of + their fellow dissidents in the USSR, + and in generating publicity and mobilizing public support in the West + for the cause of human rights in the USSR and Eastern Europe. This activity, especially when + done by professed Marxists such as Plyushch or the Czech emigre Jiri + Pelikan has been a factor contributing to the strong stance taken by the + French and Italian communist parties for the cause of human rights in + the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe.

+

RISKS:

+

—The growth of dissidence in Eastern Europe, especially + in Poland, could reach crisis proportions insoluble by the regime + and intolerable to the USSR. It + has been argued that this could lead to Soviet intervention and + repression. If such a crisis occurs, we believe it will be primarily + owing to grave economic and other factors little affected by our + covert action program to support human rights.

+

—Many of these operations are “covert” action in name + only. U.S. Government, and indeed + CIA, support for the + instruments involved is widely known to or suspected by friend and foe alike. Nevertheless, cover + mechanisms of private sponsorship are necessary fig leaves which + permit other Western governments to tolerate the activity of these + instruments on their soil. Accusations of CIA sponsorship have often been made by the East and + have had a negligible effect on the effectiveness of the operations. + Official U.S. Government + acknowledgement of such sponsorship or authoritative leaks, however, + would be embarrassing to our Western European allies and could well + force dismantling of some of the publishing and distribution + operations.

+

—The impact of these operations on bilateral relations + between the U.S. and the USSR is negligible. As noted, the + USSR already knows about most + of them. More important, ideological warfare is consistent with the + Soviet Union’s perception of detente.

+

—Operational activity intended to coordinate and + sustain publicity and protests on human rights violations is much + more discreet and selective. In this area, exposure of the role + played by CIA assets could involve + the loss of support from some segments of the Western + public.

+

—Some of the publications and human rights publicity + generated in West Europe filter back to the United States and are + picked up by U.S. media. We see no + impropriety here, since no false propaganda or deception is + involved.

+

COSTS:

+

—The total budget for FY 1977 is + $2,650,000. Of this amount, book distribution receives over [number not declassified] of the budget. + Publishing accounts for approximately [number not + declassified], and human rights publicity approximately [number not declassified]. In terms of targeting, + approximately [number not declassified] of the + funds go to the operations against the USSR, with the remaining [number not + declassified] directed primarily to the Czech and Polish + operations.

+

—In the past few years there has been a reduction in the resources + available to this program (in FY 1974 + the budget for essentially the same operations was almost $4,000,000). + Despite cost economies, inflation is taking an inevitable toll on the + level of activity possible on a fixed budget.

+

ALTERNATIVES:

+

—Some of the book distribution effort could be funded and administered + openly by the U.S. Government, perhaps + in the same manner as the radios. That should work well in the United + States, and could be tried on a pilot basis to supplement the existing + covert program. However, it would probably not be possible to continue + or adequately replace the present covert distribution mechanism in + Europe, which involves discreet contact with Soviet, EE, and foreign nationals, and the + contravention of customs regulations in the East.

+

—The periodicals in Czech and Ukrainian which we publish or subsidize + could receive overt U.S. Government + funding. In such a case, the + Ukrainian and Czech magazines could move to the U.S. if necessary, and would probably continue to be + effective. The Polish journal and the Russian newspaper cannot be moved + from [less than 1 line not declassified], and it + is doubtful that they would be permitted to continue operation in [less than 1 line not declassified] if U.S. proprietorship were acknowledged.

+

—Activity to stimulate and coordinate publicity and protests of human + rights violations could be left to the initiative of private + organizations and individuals, but we believe this would involve a + significant loss of momentum and continuity.

+

—There is no likely alternative U.S. + funding for [less than 1 line not declassified]. + If our covert subsidy was terminated, [less than 1 + line not declassified] would survive on a reduced scale but its + operational effectiveness would be greatly impaired.

+

CONSEQUENCE OF TERMINATION:

+

—Termination of the entire program would have a negative effect on the + prospects and morale of the dissident movements in the USSR, Poland and Czechoslovakia. It would + probably be interpreted by the dissidents and by the regimes as a U.S. policy decision to subordinate support + for human rights in those countries to bilateral policy + considerations.

+
+ +
+ + 4. Executive Summary of a Paper Prepared by the Policy Review + CommitteeSource: Carter + Library, National Security Council, Institutional Files, Box 27, + PRM–9 [1]. Secret. Sent to + Brzezinski under a March + 1 covering memorandum from Borg. On March 2, Michael Hornblow, Acting Staff Secretary of the + National Security Council forwarded the paper to the members of the + Policy Review Committee. (Ibid.) On March 4, Treverton sent Brzezinski a memorandum analyzing + the study paper. Treverton + wrote that the full report was “long and loose” but that some parts, + “for instance the section of Eastern Europe—is quite good.” + Referring specifically to the Eastern Europe section and the four + alternatives proposed by the paper, Treverton argued that “the difficulty with much of + the discussion, even the four broad alternative approaches, is that + it is very political in character. There is, for instance, little + mention of the looming problem of Eastern European debt with Western + financial institutions. That would bear on our ability to implement + any approach.” (Ibid.) + + + Washington, undated + +

Presidential Review Memorandum/NSC–9

+

COMPREHENSIVE REVIEW OF EUROPEAN + ISSUES

+

[Omitted here is discussion of U.S.-West + European relations, NATO, economic + issues, and East-West security issues (MBFR, SALT, and CSCE).]

+

V. Eastern Europe

+

This PRM response analyzes four possible + options for US policy toward Eastern Europe:

+

A. Differentiate more sharply in favor of Eastern + European countries which demonstrate greater foreign policy + independence from Moscow. In effect this means increasing the + preferential status of Romania at the expense of Poland, Hungary, and + the others. Since there are limits to how much further we can go with + Romania, and given the unlikely prospect that the others will soon show + foreign policy independence, this option by itself could result in US + immobilism toward Eastern Europe.

+

B. Be more forthcoming toward Eastern European + countries that are relatively more liberal internally. In + effect this option favors Poland and Hungary over Romania and the + others. While this approach would be the clearest signal of our belief + in human rights, it would inhibit our flexibility to pursue a close + relationship with countries (e.g., Romania) which do not meet our human + rights criteria but whose activities serve our interests in other + ways.

+

C. Give preference to Eastern European countries that + are either relatively liberal internally or relatively independent + internationally, but limit our ties with those that are neither. This option + widens the range of favored countries to all but Czechoslovakia, the + GDR, and Bulgaria. We would seek to + “reward” the more liberal and independent countries and to encourage + further development of those trends. With the three retrograde regimes, + our aim would be to encourage liberalization and autonomy by holding out + the carrot of an advantageous relationship with us; the problem is that + U.S. leverage with them is + minimal.

+

D. Abandon any implicit rank-ordering, and seek to + expand contacts and relations across the board in Eastern Europe to + the extent possible and feasible. This approach would seek to + cut the link between certain basic US actions—e.g., the extension of + most-favored-nation trade status and access to credits—and Eastern + European behavior. It is based on the assumption that greater internal + liberalization and foreign policy autonomy in Eastern Europe are more + likely to come about as a result of increased contacts with the US than + because we have made greater liberalization and/or autonomy + preconditions for expanding contacts. This approach is designed to set a + firm basis for increased US influence over Eastern European policies + over the long term. But it is vulnerable to the criticism that we would + be “rewarding” and “legitimizing” repressive regimes.

+

On two unique cases:

+

—Our bilateral objective with the GDR over the next few years + should be to increase our presence, our contacts, and our knowledge. + This should be done in a way which is consistent with our broader policy + interests concerning the FRG, Berlin + and European security.

+

—Towards Yugoslavia our primary objective should + remain to encourage Yugoslavia’s continued independence of the Soviet + Union and to give the Soviet Union no reason to think that armed + intervention or a bid for predominant political influence would not have + the gravest effect on East-West and US-Soviet relations. And we should + continue to reserve all our options in response to such Soviet + action.Not included in the Executive + Summary, but included in the larger body of the paper, is an + analysis of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty. The paper concluded + that Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty are important to U.S. foreign policy, that their mission + is consistent with the Helsinki Agreements regarding free flow of + information, and that the radios have become “considerably more + effective in responding to the interests of listeners in recent + years.” A larger study on Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty and Voice + of America was prepared by the Ford Administration and submitted to + Congress by the Carter administration. See Document 45.

+
+ +
+ + 5. Intelligence Memorandum Prepared in the Central Intelligence + AgencySource: Central + Intelligence Agency, Office of Support Services (DI), Job 78T02549A, + PPG Production Case Files, Box 3, Folder 15, RP–77–10060: Dissident + Activity in East Europe: An Overview. Secret; [handling restriction not declassified]. The report was + prepared in the Office of Regional and Political + Analysis. + + + RP 77–10060Washington, April 1, 1977 + +

DISSIDENT ACTIVITY IN EAST EUROPE: AN + OVERVIEWIn a June 16 memorandum, + Brzezinski forwarded + parts of the report to President Carter. Brzezinski noted that, “given the timeliness of this + topic” he thought Carter would be interested in excerpts from the + report. He underlined the paragraphs referring to each Eastern + European country in part and noted the country in the margin. Carter + initialed the covering memorandum indicating he saw it. (Carter + Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 22, Europe: + 1/77–12/78)

+

To those who think history unfolds in cyclical + patterns, the recent events in Eastern Europe have an ineluctable + logic. Twenty years ago or so it was the street upheavals in East + Germany, the Poznan riots in Poland, and the Hungarian revolution. A + decade later it was the “Prague Spring” and then the food riots in + Polish coastal cities. And now, there is again very serious trouble + in Poland and a recrudescence of unrest and dissident activity in + Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Yugoslavia and, to a lesser extent, + Hungary and Romania.

+

The underlying causes remain essentially + unchanged:

+

—All of the regimes in Eastern Europe are, to varying + degrees, repressive and do not command the loyalty of their + people.

+

—The geopolitical ties to the USSR are at war with strong nationalist sentiment and + the emotional and cultural pull of the West.

+

—The economic performance of the regimes is + deficient.

+

But there are new elements contributing to the current + problems in Eastern Europe. Foremost among them is the USSR’s detente policy. It + has:

+

—Promoted and therefore made legitimate the idea of + increased interchanges with the West.

+

—Resulted in a series of agreements, notably those + involving increased contacts between the two Germanies and the + Helsinki accord that reduced the isolation of the East European + people (particularly its elites) and raised expectations of more to + come.

+

—Fostered an atmosphere that has made it more difficult + for the regimes to deal with their internal control problems in + authoritarian ways abhorrent to Western sensibilities.

+ +

—Increased Moscow’s stake in order, stability, and + quietude in Eastern Europe even while it increased pressures from + the West that tend to be destabilizing.

+

The flowering of Eurocommunism in Western Europe is + another new and troublesome problem for the East European regimes + and Moscow—not only because its leading proponents have given verbal + aid and comfort to East European and Soviet dissidents but, more + important, because it has appeal within the + ruling parties in Eastern Europe.

+

The Soviets and East Europeans must also be concerned + that President Carter’s + statements on human rights and particularly his exchange of letters + with Soviet dissident spokesman Andrey Sakharov, give evidence of a + new policy that is designed to cause trouble for the USSR in its own backyard. Even if the + Soviets believe that is not Washington’s intention, they will be + worried that the effect will be the same. Moscow’s misgivings in + this regard will be in proportion to its concerns about the degree + of unrest in Eastern Europe. Given the history of the postwar + period, Moscow may well have a bias toward alarm. But in view of the + prevailing situation in Poland, even an outside observer would + conclude that Moscow has cause for concern.

+

[Omitted here is a map of Eastern Europe.]

+

The Dissidence: Where Things Stand

+

—The situation in Poland is by far the most + volatile in Eastern Europe. A major blow-up could come at any time. The + popular mood has remained tense and sullen since the outbreak of + workers’ unrest last summer, although the regime has taken steps to + dissipate the discontent. Dissatisfaction is rooted in economic problems + that the regime cannot solve nor significantly ameliorate any time soon. + Moreover, the dissatisfaction of the Polish people extends beyond the + economic and into fundamental questions regarding the competence and + legitimacy of the entire system and its leaders. Under these + circumstances, Poland’s professional intellectuals and dissidents have a + good deal to work with. They established a Workers Defense League, + raised funds for the families of workers jailed after the June rioting, + and are now calling for an amnesty and an investigation of police + abuses. Not surprisingly, while the Polish dissidents have given some + verbal support to the Czechoslovak Chartists, they have been preoccupied + with their own problems and opportunities in Poland.

+

The authorities who beat a hasty retreat before the workers’ wrath last + summer have, since last fall, handled the intellectuals with kid gloves. + The leadership is acutely aware that they face a volatile situation and + that a direct confrontation, with the potential creation of martyrs, + must be avoided. The regime is trying to prevent the growth of + cooperation between the workers and the dissident groups, and Gierek has released some workers and + promised an amnesty for others, even while he has refused to undertake the investigation the + Workers Defense League hopes will provide a focus for more fundamental + criticism.

+

—The problem in East Germany is somewhat analogous + to that in Poland in that it also involves popular unrest. It is + different in that disquiet has not manifested itself in violence or + overt acts of hostility to the regime. The temper in East Germany seems + to be less churlish than in Poland and far less volatile. There is no + evidence that any of the dissident groups are united.

+

The Honecker regime is greatly + concerned about the attraction of the West, particularly West Germany, + for the East German population. Three out of every four East German + homes receive, and presumably watch, West German television. Millions of + travelers from the West enter East Germany every year. Against this kind + of “subversion,” Honecker’s + attempts to create an East German nationalism + have faltered, and the regime’s classical means of control seem almost + irrelevant.

+

The Helsinki accords have made life ever more difficult for the East + German regime. Acting under its provisions, large numbers—perhaps tens + of thousands—of East Germans have applied for exit visas to emigrate to + the West. The regime is taking steps to discourage such applications, + and it is doubtful that it will allow many East Germans to emigrate no + matter what the pressures from the West. No one knows the degree of + skepticism or cynicism with which such applications are made, but + disillusionment and resentment toward the regime could prove to be a + problem.

+

We have seen some signs of increased restiveness among workers manifest + in complaints about working conditions, wages, and hours. It is hard to + tell how serious this is. So far, we see little evidence that the regime + feels itself under great pressure from the workers. A worsening of the + economic situation could lead to unification of the various groups + dissatisfied with the regime’s policies.

+

Last fall, the regime had some trouble with clergy in the Lutheran church + and with a few outspoken dissident intellectuals. The latter have not + been overtly sympathetic with the Czechoslovak Chartists, nor have they + brought organized sustained pressure on Honecker. The regime’s carrot-and-stick tactics have + been relatively successful in keeping things quiet within the + intellectual community.

+

—The Czechoslovaks have taken center stage among + East European dissident intellectuals by their direct challenge to + regime practices regarding civil rights, as outlined in “Charter 77,” a + manifesto which was prepared early last fall but not propounded until + January. The Chartists—a mix of well-known oppositionists who were + active in the political arena during the “Prague Spring” and a + surprisingly large number (more than 600) of other intellectuals and + technocrats—clearly have the + authorities worried. One Czech [less than 1 line not + declassified] has reported that nervous colleagues have been + watching what the Chartists say, particularly on ideological questions, + since they went public. One reason the regime is concerned is that the + Chartists represent, in a figurative sense, the plight of a vastly + larger number of people (perhaps as many as half a million), who were + purged after 1968 and whose political and other rights remain severely + circumscribed. As apostles of the aborted effort to give socialism a + “human face,” many of the Chartists consider themselves forerunners of + the Eurocommunism of the 1970s. The government has harassed the + Chartists and has arrested several, but has not initiated a + thoroughgoing crackdown. One of the Chartists’ leading spokesmen, Jan + Patocka, died shortly after interrogation last month (he was not + physically abused), but his funeral took place without incident, and as + far as we know there was no popular reaction to his death.

+

—The small number of Romanian dissidents have been + deeply divided by personal feuds and different goals, but some common + ground has been found in Charter 77. The dissidents consist mainly of + unknown artists and intellectuals who do not command national prestige. + Novelist Paul Goma’s “open letter” in support of the Chartists and a + Romanian version of the Czech manifesto are the only recent evidence of + vitality. The dissident’s letter strongly criticized party leader + Ceausescu’s personal role and + his authoritarianism. In Romania, they make clear, the problem is not + the Soviets, but Ceausescu + himself. This personal attack may account for Ceausescu’s vitriolic speech blasting + the dissidents, but the Romanian leader did not follow up with harsher + measures. On the contrary, Goma was allowed to see the party number-one + man on cultural affairs, and there were even suggestions that some of + Goma’s work might be published. Goma has not backed off and joined by a + hundred-odd known sympathizers who signed his manifesto, he continues + his struggle.

+

—Dissidence in Hungary has elicited no signs of + serious concern from the regime. A small number of intellectuals have + publicly supported the Chartists, but thus far they have not criticized + conditions in Hungary. Ironically, while party leader Kadar’s soft line + has been successful at home, it has caused him some troubles with + colleagues in Eastern Europe and perhaps the USSR as well. He is in a strong position as long as the + Hungarian dissidents behave themselves and Hungary continues to be one + of the quieter countries in Eastern Europe.

+

—There is little active dissent in Bulgaria, still + Moscow’s most dependable and ideologically conformist ally. Some passive + resistance and unhappiness with living standards is evidenced by + occasional work slowdowns and a widespread apathy, but this is nothing + new. The aged top leadership will inevitably need to be replaced before + long, and this might provide a new climate that would stimulate + dissent.

+ +

—Opposition to the political establishment in Yugoslavia is unorganized, and factionalized, but is + nevertheless worrisome to the Tito regime. Evidence of dissatisfaction, and the + employment of harsh measures to suppress it, would bring into the open + the regime’s repressive character and make it more difficult for the + leadership to argue that Yugoslavia is qualitatively “different” from + other communist states. The regime’s attitude toward dissent is colored + by its abiding concern regarding the nationalities problem; all dissent + is seen as potentially destabilizing.

+

Although such well-known personalities as Milovan Djilas and Mihajlo + Mihajlov have long spoken out against government policies and communist + practices, the intellectuals and students now criticizing passport + policies and supporting the Chartists are not known to the general + public.

+

The government has responded cautiously to dissident accusations that it + is ignoring the human rights provisions of Helsinki. But it quickly + expelled three West Germans who tried to publicize the issue in + February, and is making strenuous behind-the-scenes efforts to keep + dissent under wraps. The regime is also showing the stick to Yugoslav + protesters. Two signers of the petition on passport policy have + reportedly lost their jobs, and more punitive actions may be taken. The + Constitutional Court rejected their appeal on 24 March. Belgrade’s + immediate concern is to limit adverse international publicity, as this + would seriously embarrass the regime in view of Yugoslavia’s role as + host of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) review meetings.It was + agreed at Helsinki in August 1975 that the 35 participating nations + would meet in two years to review implementation of the act’s + provisions. A preparatory meeting of experts is scheduled to be held + on June 15 in Belgrade to decide on the dates and agenda for the + main follow-up meeting, at, or below, the foreign minister level, + which also is to be held in Belgrade this fall—possibly starting in + early October and lasting up to three months. [Footnote is in the + original.] It has circulated the word that it may pardon some + well known dissenters such as Mihajlov before the meeting as a gesture + of Yugoslavia’s good intentions on the human rights front.

+

The Dissidents

+

There have always been individuals in Eastern Europe, even in quiet + times, who have called themselves or have been called “dissidents,” and + have come forward to criticize the existing socio-political order. In + recent months nascent dissident organizations in two countries of + Eastern Europe, Poland and Czechoslovakia, have come into the open. The + Workers Defense League in Poland, by the very act of adopting a name, + has sent a signal that it aspires to, if it is not in fact, a corporate + organization. The Charter 77 group in Czechoslovakia has not been quite so adventuresome; + indeed, because organizing or joining political groups is illegal, the + Chartists have denied that they constitute a political organization. How + close the League and Charter 77 have the attributes of real + organization—active membership, coherent structure, recognized + leadership and thought-out programs, strategies, and tactics—we do not + know. Elsewhere in Eastern Europe the dissidents tend to be small, + loosely organized groups of dissatisfied persons, whose political + philosophy in many cases comes close to social democracy, but who + frequently have varying views, interests, and objectives.

+

By and large, the leading figures and spokesmen for the dissidents are + individuals who have had a history of fighting for increased freedoms. + No new charismatic figure has emerged. But a large number of new people + who have not previously been identified as dissidents have signed + letters and petitions in Czechoslovakia and Poland. The emergence of + such people must be of concern to the regimes. One danger in instituting + a harsh crackdown on the petition signers is that these new people who + have come forward will be turned into hardcore activists.

+

There is evidence of some contacts among East European dissidents, but it + is doubtful that there has been much consultation or coordination of + tactics. Not surprisingly, the dissidents are not only preoccupied with + their own problems, but also must be aware of their limited power to + influence political developments elsewhere in Eastern Europe. More + important are the practical difficulties that stand in the way of a + coordinated effort.

+

Still, there is no question that, despite the problems of communication + and the like imposed by operating in closed societies, a dissident + movement now exists in Eastern Europe. It finds expression in the open + support given to the Czechoslovak Chartists by dissident groups in + several East European states. The East European dissidents have also + learned from one another, and particularly from their Soviet + counterparts. The Soviet dissidents have led the way in showing how the + Western media, especially under the conditions of detente, can be used + to embarrass the regime and to promote the activities, and even + well-being, of the dissidents. More than that, Sakharov and others have + shown that it is possible to speak out and be heard and still + survive.

+

The Soviet dissidents, for their part, have gone on record that they + share a common cause with like-minded individuals in Eastern Europe. + Sakharov, for example, recently noted that his efforts “are part of a + struggle throughout the world, a struggle that seems especially + important at this moment when in Czechoslovakia, Poland, and other + countries of Eastern Europe the movement is reaching a new level.” A + statement signed by 62 Soviet dissidents, released in early March, + specifically expressed support for the Chartists, and the so-called + Helsinki monitoring group in the + USSR has also praised the efforts + of the East European dissidents.This + paragraph concluded the pages forwarded by Brzezinski with his June 16 + memorandum to Carter. See + footnote 2 above.

+

The impact of such statements is to buttress the concept of a common + cause among the dissidents and to encourage them to believe that they + are not alone in their efforts. Such expressions of mutual support may + also persuade the Soviets, who are not known for their objectivity on + such matters, that a “plot,” involving a network of dissidents of + several countries and possibly with outside support, is in + existence.

+

The Question of Popular Support

+

It seems safe to assume that there is a reservoir of popular sympathy, if + not support, for the dissidents. After all, they stand in opposition to + the regimes, and we have reason to believe that the people of Eastern + Europe, in varying degrees, are disenchanted with both those who rule + them and the system in which they live. We know that the dissidents, + most of whom are members of the intelligentsia, have tried to reach out + to the wider community. In Poland, the Workers Defense League was so + named precisely for this reason. In Czechoslovakia, the Chartists have + been trying to speak to the interests of the working class; a letter + released in late March talked about the trouble that Czech workers had + in making a living and other working class themes. (Ironically, at the + same time the Czechoslovaks were deemphasizing human rights in favor of + more prosaic concerns, the Poles were headed in the opposite direction. + In late March, another organization—“Movement for the Defense of Human + and Civil Rights”—was created in Poland. Was this an admission that the + direct overtures to Polish workers by the League was a failure? Or + perhaps too dangerous?)

+

Whatever our presumptions about the likelihood of shared attitudes + between the dissidents and the people, the fact is that there is little + evidence that the people have either tangibly supported the dissidents + or are prepared to do so. The dissidents themselves make no great claims + of having the allegiance, loyalty, or support of the worker or other + groups. There has been no significant student agitation, one key + barometer of unrest. The dissidents have not, for the most part, + attempted to establish direct personal contacts with various segments of + the population by such means as speeches in factories and the + dissemination of circulars. Such actions, of course, would be considered + incitement and thus subject to punishment.

+

Many East Europeans, recalling the events in Hungary in 1956 and in + Czechoslovakia in 1968, would doubtless believe it futile to show + support for the dissidents, even assuming that an issue would come to the fore around which they + could rally. Popular engagement is, of course, further limited by the + lack of a free media and the efficiency of the organs of control.

+

But the absence of overt popular support for the dissidents does not + necessarily mean that the East Europeans will permanently accept the + status quo. Nationalist sentiments appear not to have diminished, and + many East Europeans do not identify their interests with those of the + Soviets, nor with their own rulers. This is understood in Moscow and in + the East European capitals, and it is why the Communist leaders are + always nervous about internal order.

+

Goals

+

It seems unlikely that any group of dissidents has developed a serious + long-range, defined strategy aimed at achieving fundamental or + revolutionary political changes. While the dissidents are, almost by + definition, visionaries, they are also aware of their limited resources, + the lack of active popular support, and, most important, the + ever-present threat posed by the Soviet Union and its troops. They try + to modify the strictures which prevail so as to gain elbow room to push + for eventual change. This is not an inconsequential objective, for if + the dissidents succeeded in expanding the limits of permissible + political activity, they would be creating the preconditions for more + fundamental change. This is one reason the regimes feel they cannot give + ground by recognizing the kind of broad “rights” the dissidents assert, + even if, in practice, they are willing or are compelled to tolerate + their activities.

+

In no instance are the dissidents explicitly or overtly pressing for a + change in the system of government or adopting anti-party or anti-regime + positions. They have focused instead on the failure of the several + regimes to observe specific human rights which all have formally + acknowledged both in internal legislation and international treaty. The + Chartists, for example, are championing a full range of human rights, + including the right to have work commensurate with education and + training, access to educational institutions, freedom of religion, the + right to voice minority opinions, and freedom of movement.Some of these “rights” are speaking to the plight of + large numbers of party members purged after the 1968 Soviet + invasion, who have had trouble finding good jobs and whose children + frequently cannot get into universities. [Footnote is in the + original.] Most of the dissidents, including the East Germans + and the Yugoslavs, have stressed the right to travel, partly, we + suspect, because there is a significant constituency for this right + among the technical and educated elites.

+

The Chartists and other groups evidently hope that the pressure they and + the West are bringing to bear on human rights may prove irresistible. + They are probably hoping that Moscow will allow the East Europeans to make concessions in the + field of human rights rather than put at risk the USSR’s relations with the West.

+

Only time and experience will define how far the dissidents can go, but + for the moment they can claim at least one victory. The Polish regime + recently sent new instructions to writers and publishers easing + censorship and explicitly saying that criticism of party and government + people was permissible—within limits. The dissident intellectuals have + long thought that the Soviets would allow the regime more latitude than + it realized and that it could be pressed into according more freedom to + the intellectual community.

+

The US Impact

+

Except for the letter sent by the Czechoslovak dissident Kohout to + President Carter, there is little + hard information on what the East European dissidents make of + Washington’s recent pronouncements and actions regarding human rights. + There is, of course, a danger that hopes and expectations will be raised + to unrealistic, and even dangerous, levels. But we have no evidence that + this is the case, nor is there any evidence that the dissidents have + changed their tactics as a consequence of the new attention to human + rights in Washington.

+

We suspect that the dissident opinion contains a + certain cynicism regarding the US commitment to human rights if it comes + into conflict with US equities regarding the USSR. The dissident activity in East Europe had begun well + before President Carter was + elected, or took office. It has waxed and waned since the end of + January, in part as a consequence of the amount of attention it has + received from the Western media. The dissidents almost certainly regard + the President’s statements as a new plus; publicity in the West and the + kind of pressure on the regimes that is implicit in Washington’s + statements, are vital to the dissidents’ hopes of bringing about + change.

+

There is no evidence, circumstantial or otherwise, that President + Carter’s remarks have had a + significant impact on how the East European regimes are dealing with + their dissidents. The regimes have been responding to developments, + almost on a day-to-day basis, within the framework of a general approach + dictated by the particularities of their own internal situation and the + inclination of their leaders. In all the regimes, continuity rather than + discontinuity has been characteristic. Hence, the Czechoslovaks and East + Germans have tended to be tougher than the Poles or the Hungarians. And + the policies of the Romanians and the Yugoslavs have been somewhere in + the middle.

+

There is little reason to doubt that the US administration’s position on + human rights has been a cause for some concern in the East European + capitals. The Yugoslav leadership, for example, must be concerned that + their violations will undermine the kind of support they think they need to fend off the Soviets in + the post-Tito period. Belgrade + believes it must, for reasons of internal stability, be tough on + dissidents, but at the same time it has given signals that it may free + some well-known dissidents, clearly to strengthen its standing in the + West as a “different” Communist state. Ceausescu had some very harsh things to say in public + about the human rights statements of “certain politicians,” but the + Romanians, too, need the US, and the fact is, for all of Ceausescu’s fulminations, the handful + of Romanian dissidents have been treated with a light hand. The problem + is different for Gierek and + Kadar, both of whom favor a more tolerant approach to the dissidents. If + President Carter’s statements, + and the internal situation in the USSR, causes Moscow to impose a tougher line on dissidents + across the board in Eastern Europe, then Kadar and Gierek will have trouble—particularly + Gierek, who is up against a + highly volatile and unpredictable situation in Poland.

+

Eurocommunism

+

There is an important relationship between Eurocommunism and the current + unrest in Eastern Europe. Support from the West European Communist + parties, which espouse those ideas that have come to be called + “Eurocommunism,” has helped the dissidents by enabling them to argue + that there is no necessary contradiction between Marxism and + Western-type political freedoms. Some of the dissidents may well believe + that Communism with a “human face” is possible, although others are + probably using Eurocommunism opportunistically, perhaps as a cover for + the more profound changes they want.

+

The East European regimes could handle this, but what gives them—and + Moscow—real concern is that Eurocommunist ideas, particularly as they + relate to autonomy from the USSR, have + attraction for people inside the apparat. In a sense, Eurocommunism + threatens to bridge the conceptual gap between the dissidents and the + establishment.

+

The European Communist party conference in Berlin last June, during which + Eurocommunism proponents forcefully put forward their views, evidently + caused considerable ferment within some of the Warsaw Pact countries. At + the December Warsaw Pact ideological conference it was, reportedly, + noted that the Berlin document has led to confusion, sympathy for + Eurocommunist ideas, and the need to combat the “spread of a deviant + concept of proletarian internationalism.”See + CIA/OPR Research paper, Soviet Policy and European + Communism, October 1976, [classification + and handling restriction not declassified]. [Footnote is in + the original.]

+

Eurocommunism was high on the agenda at last month’s Warsaw Pact + ideological meeting in Sofia. We do not know what, if anything, was + decided. [less than 1 line not declassified] at + an earlier meeting the Soviets + raised the idea of supporting splinter groups within the offending + parties. That Moscow would even talk about such a major step suggests + the depth of its concern. We do know that the Soviets tried to prevent + the Madrid meeting of the three leading Western European Communist + parties last month, evidently because they feared that it would produce + more outspoken criticism of the repression of Soviet and other + dissidents. The communique of the Madrid meeting was soft on the human + rights issue, perhaps as a consequence of Soviet pressures.

+

United Leaderships?

+

Except for Poland, the dissident problem has led to little or no observed + political fallout within the East European leaderships. A number of + personnel changes were made in Warsaw last December, and it looks as + though Premier Jaroszewicz will + lose his job sometime this year. Even the Polish problem is not strictly + one of “dissidence,” but rather concerns fundamentals of economic and + political mismanagement.

+

With the possible exception of Romania, where Ceausescu runs something close to a one-man show, there + are divisions or differing tendencies along a “liberal-conservative” + continuum. One would expect to see some exacerbation of these + differences as a consequence of the dissident activity. But the evidence + to support that expectation is not very strong. We know that there have + been longstanding and deep divisions in Yugoslavia over internal + security policies, including the way to handle dissidents, but it is not + clear how, or if, the divisions have come into play during the recent + flare-up.

+

In Czechoslovakia, the leadership is divided between hard liners and more + pragmatic conservatives led by party leader Husak, but these differences do not appear to have + affected in any major way the regime’s handling of the Chartists. Both + factions, whatever their inclinations at the outset, must have realized + the implications of Charter 77, and neither would be inclined to pursue + a soft policy like that of Gierek + in Poland. Although Husak + successfully resisted hardline pressure for trials of people responsible + for the “Prague Spring,” he has also shown an ability to pursue a + conservative tack when necessary. The hard liners probably prefer a + decisive crackdown on the Chartists, but if so they have not yet had + their way. Moscow has a good deal to say about tactics on such problems + in Czechoslovakia, and the chances are good that it has supported the + tough, but not harsh, stand taken by Husak.

+

In East Germany, the regime is not completely united on how to deal with + dissidents; for example, in the Biermann caseWolf Biermann, a popular dissident singer and poet, who was in + trouble with the regime for many years, was not permitted to return + to the GDR following a tour to West + Germany last fall. [Footnote is in the original.] there is + evidence that the “hawks” + won out. The extent of differences within the leadership is hard to + measure, however, and probably varies from case to case depending on the + circumstances.

+

Within the Polish leadership there has been some pushing and shoving on + how to react to the dissidents; those favoring a moderate response have + thus far been on top. A high-ranking Polish official claims that + Poland’s fastest rising political star, the new Central Committee + economic secretary and former foreign minister Stefan Olszowski, has + argued for continued tolerance for a degree of dissident activity. + Proponents of a harsher course have been noted in the upper managerial + levels of the media. The Politburo as a whole recently indicated its + support for the moderate course by criticizing the past performance of + the media.

+

The East European leaders have differed among themselves on the + appropriate way to deal with the dissidents. According to one account, + strong differences with regard to approaches to the dissident problem + were expressed at the Warsaw Pact summit last November. Kadar reportedly + was extolling his own conciliatory approach, implicitly as an example + for others (“after all, there is no great dissident problem in Hungary, + comrade”), but it seems more likely that he was on the defensive, + holding out against Honecker and + others who want a tough line across the board in Eastern Europe and + believe that anything less is dangerous.

+

The Soviets

+

Moscow is obviously concerned about the unrest in Eastern Europe. A + blowup anywhere in Eastern Europe has important implications for the + stability of the regime affected, for its ties to the USSR, and even for the internal + tranquility of the USSR. Moscow’s + first concern must be Poland, where, as we have indicated, the situation + is both volatile and unpredictable. Worse, there is no quick or easy fix + for what ails Poland, and there is little that Moscow can do to help, + except, perhaps, by sending in large amounts of economic assistance. + This the Soviets have been unwilling to do, possibly because of their + own economic needs or because they are not certain that such aid would + help that much, or because they are not persuaded that the situation in + Poland has reached critical proportions. Whatever the case, the Soviets + have, at least until now, been willing to go along with Gierek’s moderate approach to Polish + dissidents and also to Poland’s economic problems.

+

In East Germany, Moscow has supported Honecker’s efforts to get on top of the problems caused + by the Helsinki accords and the increased Western influence on the East + German population. But the problem for Honecker, and Moscow, is that the steps he has taken to + promote an East German identity, for example, by eroding the special + status of the GDR’s capital, East Berlin, are not likely + to significantly ameliorate the yearning of many East Germans, + particularly those in the technical and professional classes, to travel + or emigrate to the West. Detente in central Europe has created internal + pressure on Honecker that will + not go away unless detente goes away. Honecker can impose measures that will significantly + curtail the GDR’s contacts with the + West and will dampen the expectations of the East German people for a + Western “life style,” but such measures would quickly add up to a + significantly changed atmosphere between the two Germanies and in Europe + as a whole. Neither Honecker nor + the Soviets want this to happen, and therefore they have adopted + palliatives rather than remedies in dealing with the unrest in East + Germany. This could change if the East German situation gets worse, and + that is why the Soviets must be watching events there closely and must + be concerned that dissident activity and unrest elsewhere in Eastern + Europe will adversely affect East Germany.

+

The variety of approaches in Eastern Europe to the dissident problem is + prima facie evidence that Moscow has foregone imposing any set line on + its allies. The Soviets feel uncomfortable with the more permissive + approaches of the Hungarians and Poles, but they have permitted both + Kadar and Gierek to fashion their + tactics to fit their own circumstances. Moscow’s forebearance is + dependent on:

+

a) Confidence that, whatever their deviations from the Soviet model, + Kadar and Gierek are essentially + good Communists who will not be metamorphasized into social-democrats + and who will not forget the special relationship with the USSR.

+

b) A measure of stability and order in Hungary and Poland. Kadar’s most + powerful argument for his policies is also the simplest: that it works, + i.e., that Hungary does not have a dissident problem, and is still a + Marxist state faithful in its own way to the USSR. Gierek clearly + argues from a weaker base and is compelled to make the case, not without + merit, that if things are bad in Poland now, they would be a good deal + worse if he tried to crack down on dissidence. If they get worse anyway, + Gierek will be in deep + trouble with Moscow.

+

There is evidence that Moscow’s attitude toward the problem of dissidence + in Eastern Europe may be changing. For one thing, the Soviets have + become tougher with their own dissidents since the first of the year. + This makes it easier for Moscow to call upon their allies to take a + harder line. As a result, permissive approaches are pushed further from + the norm and hence less acceptable.

+

There are reports the Soviets leaned on both the Poles and the Hungarians + at an ideological conference in Sofia early last month. So far, we see + little evidence of a toughening line on the dissidents in either + country, or for that matter, in Czechoslovakia or East Germany.

+

One report claims that the Soviets have told the Poles that they must + adopt more orthodox economic policies. The Soviets clearly have grounds for complaint. They have + never been comfortable with Poland’s crazy quilt of socialism and + private enterprise. In December, Gierek announced a series of socio-economic reforms + whose purpose is to strengthen the private sector of the economy. This + surely has not gone unnoticed in some circles in Moscow. But it would be + very difficult for Gierek to + renege on his public promises, and Moscow could buy itself a real + problem if it forces him to do so.

+

Short-Term Prospects

+

The odds favor continuity over the next few months. Poland will continue + to be highly volatile and there could be a blowup similar to last + summer’s or even worse. But Gierek and company, knowing the stakes, made policy + adjustments and will probably muddle through. Honecker will continue to feel the + pressures from the West and to be aware of the basic restiveness of the + East German people, but he is not likely to do anything drastic (e.g., + significantly cut back the interchange between the two Germanies) that + would seriously threaten public order in East Germany. The dissidents in + Czechoslovakia, Romania, Hungary, and Yugoslavia will step up their + activities with an eye to the Belgrade review conference, but the + respective regimes ought to be able to cope with them with little + trouble. The dissidents in those countries are not likely to get more + popular support over the next three to six months than they enjoyed in + the past three months.

+

This assessment could turn out wrong if:

+

—Mischance, misfortune, or miscalculation intrude. + While Gierek appears to have + learned from the bad mistakes he made last year, this does not mean he + will not make another. The sudden death of dissident spokesman Jan + Patocka in Czechoslovakia illustrates the sort of unexpected event that + could narrow the gap between the dissidents and the population, although + this has not occurred thus far in Czechoslovakia.Anniversaries also sometimes prove difficult for the + various regimes. For example, oppositionists in Yugoslavia can be + expected to counter or denigrate the regime-sponsored extravaganza + planned to celebrate Tito’s + 85th birthday on May 25. Among other such anniversaries which could + serve as a focal point are June 17 (the 1953 East Berlin uprising), + August 13, (Berlin wall erected in 1961), and August 20 (the + Soviet-led invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968). [Footnote is in the + original.] Moreover, the Soviets and some of the East + European leaders are more nervous and sensitive than normal about the + situation in Eastern Europe. They could overreact to trouble.

+

—The dissidents press their case beyond the + permissible. So far, the dissidents have acted with + considerable restraint, and even finesse. They have not forced the regimes into taking harsh actions, but + they could change their tactics and engage in activities (overt or + covert agitation, propagandizing among workers, acts of violence, civil + disobedience, etc.) that + would compel the regimes to make tough decisions on how to respond. + Under such circumstances, the chance of miscalculation and overreaction + increases.

+

—Economic conditions grow significantly worse. A + bad harvest this summer leading to food shortages might draw a quick and + strong reaction from consumers. In some countries, economic expectations + have been high: clear-cut evidence that those expectations will not be + realized any time soon could cause trouble. This may be especially true + in East Germany; the average worker there is better off than his + counterparts anywhere else in Eastern Europe, but his expectations are + consequently higher and his standard of comparison is the West, not the + East.

+

—The Soviets force the East Europeans to get much + tougher on the dissidents and on economic policies. There is + some, but not yet persuasive, evidence that this may already be + happening in Poland and Hungary. If it does occur, the odds of serious + trouble in Poland and elsewhere in the next several months would go up + appreciably.

+

—There is a widespread perception of change in + Washington’s attitude toward dissent in Eastern Europe. If + US-Soviet relations seem to be deteriorating and the US is seen to be + pushing Moscow on human rights issues, the Soviets might respond by + ordering a crackdown on dissenters in Eastern Europe and their ties to + Western newspapers, etc. At the same time, the dissenters might be encouraged by the seeming resolution of + the US to press their case harder and more forthrightly. This could be a + dangerous mixture. If there is a perception that the US has backed down + or significantly modified its stand on human rights, some dissenters + might be disillusioned and become more subdued, but others might be + inclined to force the issue on both superpowers + before Belgrade.Attached but not printed is a + chronology of key events relating to dissidence in Eastern Europe + from 1976 to March 1977.

+
+ +
+ + 6. Summary of Discussion of a Policy Review Committee MeetingSource: Carter Library, Brzezinski Donated Material, + Subject File, Box 24, [Meetings–PRC + 12: 4/14/77]. Secret; Sensitive. The meeting took place in the White + House Situation Room. + + + Washington, April 14, 1977, 3–4:30 + p.m. + + + + + SUBJECT + Europe + + + PARTICIPANTS + + + State: + Secretary Vance + Arthur + Hartman + + + + + Defense: + Harold Brown + Charles W. + Duncan + Gen. William Smith + Maynard + Glitman + + + + + Treasury: + C. Fred Bergsten + + + + + CIA: + Stansfield + Turner + Robert Bowie + + + + + CEA: + William Nordhaus + + + + + + NSC: + Dr. Zbigniew + Brzezinski + David Aaron + William G. + Hyland + Robert + Hunter + Gregory F. + Treverton + Henry Owen + + + + + OMB: + Bowman Cutter + + + + + Commerce: + Frank Weil + + + + + ACDA: + Leon Sloss + John Newhouse + + + + +

[Omitted here is discussion of the London Summits, consultations with + Western Europe, European Communism, and CSCE.]

+

5. Eastern Europe

+

There was discussion of the relative merits of PRM-response option (3)—bias toward Eastern European states + that are either somewhat liberal internally or somewhat independent of + the Soviet Union—versus (4)—efforts to expand contacts across the board + without a ranking.In an April 13 memorandum + to Brzezinski, Treverton reported that the PRM–9 responses had been overtaken by + preparations for the London Summits. With regard to the Eastern + European portion of the PRM + response, Treverton stressed + that what the administration needed was “a coherent policy where one + has not existed.” The PRM response, + Treverton continued, was + “not bad,” listing four possible approaches: 1) “Bias toward Eastern + European states that act with some independence of Moscow;” 2) “Bias + toward those that are somewhat more liberal internally;” 3) “Bias + toward those that are either relatively independent or liberal;” and + 4) “Efforts to expand US contacts across the board to the ‘minimum + floor’ now existing only with Poland, Romania, and Yugoslavia.” + (Ibid.) + Brzezinski argued strongly for + (3); it provides a standard, recognizing our interest in “polycentrism” and pluralism in the + region. Others agreed, although several pointed out that there might be + specific reasons for expanding contacts with the GDR. Brzezinski agreed but suggested that the U.S. should look closely at what specific + interests were advanced by those contacts. There was specific discussion + of Hungary; before consideration can be given to returning the Crown, a + judgment about the domestic political cost will be required. Vance noted a general consensus on a + policy approach between options (3) and (4) and suggested the need for + individual country follow-on studies.

+

In closing, Vance mentioned the + need for a review of RFE and RL program content. The Board for + International Broadcasting will be encouraged and aided in undertaking + such a review.

+ + Zbigniew + Brzezinski + + +
+ +
+ 7. Editorial Note +

On April 22, 1977, Gregory + Treverton of the National Security Council Staff sent a + memorandum to Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs + Zbigniew Brzezinski + regarding the April 14 Policy Review Committee meeting on U.S. policy toward Europe. (See Document 6.) Treverton wrote that the Policy Review Committee meeting + was disappointing and more focus on the issues was necessary. He + suggested “sharply focused” follow-up studies for four distinct issues: + “the U.S. approach to European unity and + possible economic competition; European Communist parties; CSCE; and possibly Eastern Europe.” + Treverton attached two draft + memoranda for Brzezinski. The + first, informed President Jimmy + Carter that Brzezinski and Secretary of State Cyrus Vance were dissatisfied with the + discussion at the April 14 meeting and that both recommended several + short follow-up studies to be discussed at a second Policy Review + Committee meeting. The second was a draft Presidential Review Memorandum + requesting the four follow-up studies be completed by June 15. (Carter + Library, National Security Council, Institutional Files, Box 27, PRM–9 [2]). Brzezinski initialed the memorandum to Carter, only to change his mind later + and indicate on the Treverton + memorandum that he intended to discuss the issue with the President + orally. (Ibid.)

+

Brzezinski signed the tasking for + follow-up studies related to PRM–9 on + April 22. The tasking requested that the Policy Review Committee “under + the chairmanship of the Department of State, continue its review of U.S. policy toward Europe by focusing on the four key + issues. The basis for that review should be four short, sharply-focused + papers, clearly setting out the issues and alternative U.S. approaches, together with their + implications.” Specifically on Eastern Europe, the Policy Review + Committee was directed to “spell out the practical differences between + PRM–9 response option 3—bias toward + Eastern European countries that are either somewhat liberal internally + or somewhat independent of Moscow—and option 4—an effort to improve + relations across the board with no prior ranking. How would different + countries be affected differently by the two approaches? What are the + implications of the two approaches for our approach to human rights, + trade and U.S. relations with the Soviet + Union? The review should also identify any special cases—for instance, + perhaps, the GDR—and suggest what might + be gained by expanded contacts with them.” (Ibid.)

+
+ +
+ 8. Paper Prepared in the Central Intelligence AgencySource: National Security Council, + Carter Administration Intelligence Files, Box I–029, USSR-Cuban Intervention in Africa, 9 + Jan 1978–7 Jul 1978. Secret; Sensitive. A typed notation under the + subject line indicates the paper was approved by the Department of + State on May 17. See Note on U.S. + Covert Action for further information on “Perspectives” + papers. + + + Washington, undated + + + SUBJECT + PERSPECTIVES—Human Rights in the USSR and Eastern Europe + +

1. In recent weeks the tempo of dissident activity and harsh official + reaction has accelerated throughout Eastern Europe. The pre-Christmas + exchange of imprisoned Soviet dissident, Vladimir Bukovskiy, for Chilean + Communist leader Luis Corvalan received international media coverage and + focused renewed attention on the human rights scene. Since the exchange, + the Orlov Committee, organized to monitor Moscow’s compliance with the + Helsinki Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), and other Soviet dissidents have + endured a rash of arrests, interrogations and house searches where the + KGB has planted false evidence. In January a group of Czech + intellectuals and Prague Spring leaders issued a legalistic human rights + manifesto, “Charter 77;” Prague reacted immediately with police + harassment. These events provide an appropriate peg for reviving world + interest in the human rights + movement in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe and for updating covert + action themes in support of this goal.On + April 22, the Department of State also approved a “Perspectives” + paper on Soviet interference in other countries’ affairs. The + “Perspectives” guided worldwide media assets to “remind audiences of + Moscow’s continued meddling in East Europe’s internal affairs,” from + Hungary in 1956 to Czechoslovakia in 1968. The paper continued: “The + 600,000-man Red Army still stationed in Czechoslovakia, Hungary, + Poland and East Germany is a daily reminder of the potential danger + in adopting policies not sanctioned by Moscow.” (National Security + Council, Carter Administration Intelligence Files, Box I–029, USSR-Cuban Intervention in Africa, 9 + Jan 1978–7 Jul 1978)

+

2. The Soviet human rights movement has suffered important losses in the + past year. Moscow has expelled some of the most effective dissident + leaders, like mathematician Leonid Plyushch and now Bukovskiy, or + harassed them into emigrating, as in the case of Andrey Amalrik. Life + has become even more difficult for the dissenter who is unprotected by + publicity and its attendant constraints against official reprisals. The + latest form of reprisal is physical violence, disguised as random street + crimes. In April, dissident historian Konstantin Bogatyrev died from + massive wounds inflicted by “unknown assailants.” Most of his friends + believe the attack was KGB-inspired, and, according to several sources, + the KGB threatened Bogatyrev’s doctor. More recently, Nobel Peace Prize + winner, Andrey Sakharov, and others observing a protest vigil on Soviet + Constitution Day (5 December) were assaulted by KGB-infiltrated + bystanders. This tactic of physical assaults may have spread to other + countries. In Czechoslovakia, for example, former politician Dr. + Frantisek Kriegel was assaulted by masked men following his involvement + in anti-government protests.

+

3. An effective countermeasure for these tactics is publicity. So far the + human rights movement has survived official reprisals but would probably + not survive a total, Stalin-style crackdown. Such a crackdown has not + occurred in part because Soviet authorities remain sensitive to the + pressures of world opinion. Addressees are asked to tap media assets, + liaison and other local contacts to continue the campaign to keep + dissidence alive in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe.

+

4. The following State Department-approved themes are intended as updated + guidelines for your covert action efforts:

+

A. Continue to insist that CSCE means + something, particularly Basket Three which eases regulations concerning + the practice of religion, travel and the flow of information. Point out + areas where the Soviet bloc signatories might demonstrate closer + compliance. Encourage, for example, broader dissemination of printed + material, Western newspapers, books, bibles, etc., to the East European + population. Press for increased cooperation among mass media + organizations and publishing houses. Publicize instances where + sensitivity over charges of violating CSCE has prompted + conciliatory gestures, e.g., the easing of restrictions against Western + journalists. Point out that the Soviet and East European governments + will have to comply more closely with the human rights provisions of the + Helsinki accords or lose face—and propaganda points—this summer when the + 35 CSCE signatories reconvene in + Belgrade.

+

B. Downplay the deleterious effects of the recent wave of emigrations and + expulsions. Stress that important dissident leaders, notably Andrey + Sakharov, one of the founding fathers of the human rights movement, are + still active inside the Soviet Union. The Orlov Committee has received + international attention since its establishment last May and continues, + despite official harassment, to compile and publicize evidence of Soviet + violations of the Helsinki accord. Remind audiences that the dissident + movement has produced a number of strong leaders. In the past, new + personalities have emerged to carry on the struggle after leaders like + Solzhenitsyn have been expelled.

+

C. Continue to publicize the evidence of human rights violations which + recent emigres provide. Remind audiences that dissidents like Amalrik + and Bukovskiy have not lost credibility by leaving the Soviet Union.

+

D. Continue to publicize the extreme measures taken against dissidents: + harsh prison sentences, psychiatric abuse, and the recent phenomenon of + street violence. Focus on key individuals like the ailing Mustafa + Dzhemilev, imprisoned for his efforts on behalf of displaced Crimean + Tatars, Sergey Kovalev and Andrey Tverdokhlevob, sentenced for their + activities in the Moscow chapter of Amnesty International, and the + members of the Orlov Committee such as Aleksandr Ginzburg and Lyudmila + Alekseyeva, who continue to be harassed by the KGB.

+

E. Expose Moscow’s increasing independence [dependence] on the more devious tactics against dissidents, + designed to paralyze the human rights movement over the long term + without attracting significant publicity. Soviet officials continually + interfere with communications between dissidents and the outside world: + by intercepting mail, jamming phone conversations and harassing would-be + interviewers from the Western press. A customs regulation instituted + last July substantially increased the duty on gifts sent to the USSR and thus undercut the financial + support which religious groups, families of political prisoners and + “refuseniks” (dissidents, usually Jews, who have been denied emigration + visas and subsequently fired from their jobs) receive from abroad. More + recently, the KGB has taken to planting evidence, e.g., foreign + currency, to incriminate such dissidents as Aleksandr Ginzburg and + members of the Kiev and Leningrad branch of the Orlov Committee. Remind + audiences that such measures, though less dramatic than imprisonment and torture, also violate + the spirit, and frequently the letter, of the Helsinki accords.

+

F. Generate publicity on the key human rights issues in other East + European countries. In Czechoslovakia, for example, focus on the Charter + 77 manifesto and the official reprisals against its authors. Polish + workers who demonstrated against the June announcement of price + increases have been fired and some arrested; some of their defenders, + members of the Workers Defense League, have subsequently lost their + jobs. The German Democratic Republic continues obstructing reunions of + families separated by the East/West border; recently East Berlin imposed + exile on dissident balladeer Wolf Biermann. According to recent reports, + the health of veteran critic of the Yugoslav regime, Mihajlo Mihajlov, + imprisoned under particularly harsh conditions, is deteriorating + rapidly.

+

G. Encourage CP contacts, where feasible, + to view objectively human rights violations in the Soviet bloc. Several + West European parties have already demonstrated varying degrees of + independence from the CPSU. In 1976 they reacted sharply to Plyushch’s + account of psychiatric abuse and to films of Soviet labor camps. More + recently they denounced Prague’s reprisals against the Charter 77 + group.

+

H. Appeal to local and international professional and religious + organizations to speak out on behalf of persecuted colleagues in the + USSR and Eastern Europe: authors, + artists, engineers, historians, clergy, etc. Where feasible, urge these + groups to promote professional contacts with their Eastern + colleagues.

+

I. Persuade agents of influence and liaison contacts that their + governments could make a contribution to human rights everywhere by + speaking out on behalf of dissidents—especially those governments with + strong socialist credentials or those which have protested human rights + violations in non-socialist countries. Stress the importance of many + voices, representing differing systems, working to influence Soviet and + Eastern European leaders in a matter of international concern.

+
+ +
+ + 9. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security + Affairs (Brzezinski) to + President CarterSource: Carter Library, National + Security Affairs, Brzezinski + Material, Country File, Box 22, Europe: 1/77–12/78. Top Secret; + Codeword. Drafted by Inderfurth on June 23. Printed from an uninitialed + copy. + + + Washington, June 24, + 1977 + + + SUBJECT + Prospects for Eastern Europe + +

The Intelligence Community recently published a report entitled + “Prospects for Eastern Europe.”Dated June 10, + the memorandum was prepared by representatives of the CIA, State/INR, and DIA under the + auspices of the National Intelligence Officer for Soviet Union and + Eastern Europe. (Ibid.) Brzezinski included copies of the National Intelligence Daily from June 21, June 22, and + June 23, which had published the entire interagency memorandum in + three parts. Carter initialed the June 21 copy, indicating he saw + it. The estimates provided in that report are interesting and + I have summarized them below:

+

—Unrest is likely to grow in Eastern Europe over the next three years. + Destabilizing factors include detente, slower economic growth, and + dissident activity.

+

—Poland will be the most volatile of the East European states. A blow-up + there, which might bring down Gierek and even conceivably compel the Soviets to + restore order, cannot be ruled out. (I have included an additional note + on the possibility of Soviet intervention at the end of this memo.)

+

—The situation will be less volatile in East Germany, but the Honecker regime is going to have a + harder time balancing its economic need for closer ties to the West with + the unsettling effect those ties have on the East German people.

+

—In the rest of Eastern Europe, the tension is not likely to get out of + hand. Nowhere will dissident activists by themselves seriously challenge + the regime.

+

—Under economic pressures, all of the East European countries will show + more interest in expanding their trade with the West. Despite + misgivings, the Soviets will acquiesce or even encourage such expansion + because they are increasingly reluctant to subsidize the East European + economies.

+

—East European leaders will continue to give ground, sporadically and + reluctantly, on human rights issues of interest to the West. The + prospects are fair for a slow evolution toward less authoritarian + methods of rule in East Europe. I should note here that the Defense + Intelligence Agency (DIA) does not agree with this part of the + estimate. According to DIA, the + necessity for tight centralized party control, the likelihood of growing + unrest, constraints imposed by the USSR, and the example of Soviet treatment of dissent all + argue against these developments.

+

—The US is not likely to have a major impact on how the internal picture + develops in any of the East European countries. But the East Europeans + will attach more importance to developing relations with the US.

+

I mentioned above that the Soviets might feel compelled at some point to + restore order in Poland. A recent CIA + report entitled “Probable Soviet Reactions to a Crisis in Poland”Dated June 1977. (Ibid.) assessed this + possibility. The report noted that there have been three + political-economic crises in Poland over the past 20 years—all without + Soviet armed intervention. Here is the key assessment in that + report:

+ “The Soviets, of course, have the military capability to invade and + occupy Poland (Tab A).Attached but not + printed is a map of Poland and the surrounding area. The map listed + major Soviet military units from which Moscow could draw in the + event it deemed Soviet intervention necessary, including 10 + motorized rifle divisions and 10 tank divisions in the German + Democratic Republic; 3 motorized rifle divisions and 2 tank + divisions in Czechoslovakia; 4 motorized rifle divisions, 3 tank + divisions, and 1 Airborne division in the Baltic military district + of the Soviet Union (comprised of the Baltic States and + Kaliningrad); 2 motorized rifle divisions, 8 tank divisions, and 1 + Airborne division in the Belorussian military district (comprised of + Belarus); and 8 motorized rifle divisions and 3 tank divisions in + the Carpathian military district (comprised of the western part of + Ukraine). Soviet units in Hungary were not added to the map. + The Kremlin evidently prefers, however, to have the Polish leadership + make minor concessions to the people to reduce public frustration. + Polish regimes have thus far successfully used such tactics. At the same + time, they have preserved the leading role of the party, while + initiating and executing the transfer of party authority. There is + currently no evidence to conclude that either the Soviets or the Poles + intend to alter this pattern. A crisis could come in the event that + ameliorating tactics failed to pacify the public, or in the event that + the economic situation became sufficiently untenable that austerity + measures would have to be strictly enforced.” +
+ +
+ + 10. Memorandum From Gregory + Treverton of the National Security Council Staff to the + President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)Source: Carter Library, National Security Council, + Institutional Files, Box 27, PRM–9 + [2]. Confidential. Sent for information. Brzezinski wrote at the top of the + memorandum: “RI, GFT—good memo—push + for a paper and meeting. ZB” and + indicated that the memorandum should be returned to Treverton and Inderfurth. + + + Washington, July 15, + 1977 + + + SUBJECT + Policy Toward Eastern Europe + +

This memorandum is a response to your request, sent along by Rick,Inderfurth. for the status of policy toward + Eastern Europe. Eastern Europe was one of four PRM–9 (Europe) follow-on studies we commissionedSee Document 7. See also + footnote 1, Document 11. (the + others were CSCE, European Communism, + and general approach toward Western Europe). I think only two of those + four—Eastern Europe and CSCE—should go + forward for PRC consideration. The + Western Europe response raises some interesting longer-term issues, but + they are not the sort that require, or are ready for, immediate + decision. Similarly, the European Communism is a good description of our + current approach, and I doubt that we can say much more in a general way + until we have a better analytic base for understanding the implications + of those powers sharing power in Western Europe. More specific, + short-term decisions—for instance with regard to France or Italy—should, + I think we all agree, be handled in frameworks more restricted than + PRM processes.

+

However, the Eastern Europe and CSCE + studies should be brought rapidly to PRC consideration and then, I think, to Presidential + decision.Brzezinski wrote “agree” in the left-hand margin + next to this sentence. We badly need Presidential + determinations in both cases. DavidAaron. and Bob Robert + King. talked about the timing of a PRC meeting on CSCE, and Bob and I met with George Vest today. We agree that the meeting should be + soon, but after the preparatory conference in + Belgrade ends so that Sherer can participate. That will probably mean + the very end of July.Brzezinski underlined “the very + end.” We will continue to consult with State. A meeting on + Eastern Europe might be coupled with CSCE, but CSCE probably + will require a meeting itself. + If so, we should point toward a PRC + meeting on Eastern Europe somewhat later. We may need some additional + study on Eastern Europe, though I doubt that another round of studies + would produce much better results. A sharply-focused agenda paper might + serve as well. To that end, I prepared and sent to State a suggested set + of questions on both CSCE and Eastern + Europe; that paper is attached.

+

Attachment

+

Paper Prepared by Gregory + Treverton of the National Security Council + StaffConfidential.

+ +

Washington, undated

+ +

PRM 9 + FOLLOW-ON: CSCE AND EASTERN + EUROPE

+

POSSIBLE ISSUES FOR PRC CONSIDERATION

+

CSCE

+

The PRM follow-on draftFollow-up Study to PRM/NSC–9: CSCE. + (Department of State, Bureau of European Affairs, Office of European + Security Political Affairs, Conference on Security and Cooperation + in Europe, (CSCE)—1973–80, Lot + 89D288, Box 1, PRM–9) is too + general and too rhetorical to serve as a basis for fruitful PRC discussion, let alone decision. But + there are decisions to be made, many of them tactical but most the sort + that can only be taken by the President. The President’s prestige is + clearly on the line at Belgrade; what we do there cannot be perceived as + falling off our commitment to human rights, much less as cutting a deal + with the Soviets. At the same time, CSCE is three baskets, not one, and there is little to be + served by turning the meeting into a confrontation.

+

Issues that should be considered:

+

Basic Purposes

+

No one disagrees that our basic objective is maximum review of + implementation without confrontation. But that raises the issue: how compatible are those objectives? That in turn + raises specific questions:

+

—presuming there will be some closed-session review of implementation, do + we raise specific cases at all, only a few for illustrative purposes + shunning the most controversial (Orlov, Shcharanskiy),Yuri Feodorovich Orlov, founder of the Moscow + Helsinki Group, arrested and sentenced to ten years in prison in + 1977. Anatoly Borisovich Shcharansky (Nathan Sharansky), spokesman + for the Moscow Helsinki Group and leading refusenik, was arrested on charges of espionage in 1977 + and sentenced to 13 years in prison. or many including some + of the controversial ones?

+ +

—what do we say to the press and to non-governmental organizations + outside the conference? We cannot be silent, yet blurring what goes on + inside the conference with what is said outside could provoke the + confrontation we all say we want to avoid. (The Soviets have been quite + clear in indicating that they are prepared to retaliate if need be.) Can + we reach an understanding with the Soviets that will not be perceived + here as a sell out?

+

—a related issue, as important, is how we deal with members of Congress + who will go to Belgrade as representatives of the CSCE Commission. So far our relations + with the Commission at the working level are good, and many of the + Commission’s interventions have been useful (for instance, Dole pushed + us in a direction quite opposite from what I might have expected). Yet + in the fall, senior members of Congress will be independent actors no + matter what our treaty with the Commission.

+

—should our preparations include a fairly detailed self-criticism, not + just in Basket III but in others as well?

+

—what level representative makes sense for the opening session: Christopher, Young (as the President has once + suggested), or a lower level?

+

Balancing the Baskets

+

The general question is what can be done to make our approach seem less + biased toward Basket III? For instance:

+

—are there possibilities in the area of CBMs, even though the Soviets + have shown little interest up to now (and others have worried that CBMs + agreed in the CSCE framework will + foreclose more valuable stabilizing measures in MBFR)?

+

—what dangers are there for us in a thorough review of implementation of + Baskets I and II (for instance, in raising Jackson-Vanik)?

+

—should we take such a dim view of the “Brezhnev proposals”See + Foreign + Relations, 1969–1976, vol. XXXIII, SALT II, 1972–1980, Document + 154. On February 2, Brzezinski also sent a memorandum to Vance and Brown with a history of the SALT negotiations, emphasizing the + exchanges that had taken place from 1974 to 1977. (National Security + Archive, The Carter-Brezhnev + Project, Electronic Briefing Book, Document IV–20) as we have + up to now? Why?

+

Relations with Allies

+

—how much coordination with allies (and neutrals) makes sense? Until now + our preparations have presumed that very close cooperation was + an—perhaps the—imperative. There is no gainsaying + the importance of close and frank coordination. But we do not want to go + to the point of diminishing + returns: it may be better for us all, and make for less tension among + us, if for some aspects (review of implementation, for instance) we seek + not an identity of action, but parallel action within an agreed + framework (“themes”).

+

—are different kinds of consultations necessary? They may be, not as a + substitute for the NATO process but in + addition to it. What we hear from the Canadians, and in a less direct + but stronger form from the Germans, is a political worry. That must be responded to in a political + forum, not in the NATO context that + emphasizes process over substance. If there are real differences of + view, or real fears among the Allies about Belgrade, those need to be + surfaced, not papered over. There may be value in some sort of + consultation at the foreign minister or political director level.

+

New Proposals

+

—the main issue is clear and we are on the right side of it. The choice + is between trying to pre-empt Soviet grand designs and scoring points on + the one hand, and, on the other, trying to structure a continuing CSCE process with incentives for the East + to participate. Yet there remains the tension between our current + (proper) emphasis on constructive proposals and the need to convey a + sense of political initiative on our side. Our proposals as a package + look less trivial than do many of the constituent proposals. This may be + an area in which unanimity within the Alliance is not imperative (for + instance, there may be no harm in supporting a proposal like the Belgian + one for a human rights court, presuming the Belgians are still + interested.Brzezinski placed a checkmark in + the left-hand margin next to this sentence.

+

—how do we respond to grandiose Eastern proposals—for instance, for a + non-first use of force? Again, there need be no reason to be fearful. We + can convey to the Soviets our belief that CSCE is not the forum for such proposals. But at the same + time we should be prepared to turn those proposals, if made, to our own + purposes, to make of them something we could accept (even if the East + could not).

+

CSCE in + Context

+

—how does CSCE relate to our bilateral + (or other multilateral) initiatives (this issue is flagged in the + follow-on draft)? Should we step up those initiatives in the months + before Belgrade, play them down or continue as is?

+

—more generally, are there ways, as yet unrecognized, that CSCE needs to be made to fit better with + our general approach to human rights, or to relations with Eastern + Europe and the Soviet Union (for instance, would move forward with MFN + for Hungary be supportive, neutral or adverse with regard to our CSCE objectives, and vice versa).

+

Eastern Europe

+

The primary defect with the current PRM + follow-on draftSee Document 11. On June 17, Vest and Paul Kreisberg, Acting Director of the + Office of Policy Planning at the Department of State, forwarded a + memorandum to Christopher + through Nimetz with the + Department’s draft of the Eastern Europe follow-up study requested + by the NSC on April 22. (National + Archives, RG 59, Office of the + Secretariat Staff, Official Working Papers, S/P Director Anthony + Lake, 1977–Jan 1981 Lot 82D298, Box 2, S/P-Lake Papers—6/16–30/77) is that it washes out + the difference between alternatives. With only several small exceptions + it does not seem from the draft to matter whether we pursue Option III + (bias toward countries that are either somewhat liberal internally or + somewhat independent of the Soviet Union) or Option IV (efforts to + expand contacts across the board). It may be that the “flatness” of the + options reflects the reality of our limited influence in the region. But + the existing draft also contains hints of bureaucratic compromise.

+

There are two other main defects in the current draft:

+

—there is too little richness to the set of policy instruments discussed. + This is obviously related to the general criticism. But supposing we + wanted to take an initiative in relations with Poland, there certainly + is a richer menu of alternatives, if perhaps not an absolutely very rich + one, than is conveyed by the response. The response tends to collapse + all instruments into three: MFN, and + claims settlements and consular agreements where applicable.

+

—the response needs to have a sharper sense of the domestic political + context. For instance, returning the Crown is probably a non-starter; + and it almost certainly is at the current moment and in relation to the + upcoming Belgrade conference. Similarly, talking about what we might do + to develop further our relations with Poland and Romania—a good topic + and one for which some possible actions should be listed—ought to be + cast against the difficulty we have, at least in the case of Romania, of + doing even as much as we have in the past.

+

Suggested issues:

+

Basic Approach

+

—There is consensus that we seek to foster internal liberalism and + external independence from Moscow in Eastern Europe. But there is + disagreement, perhaps even fundamental, over how. Option III implicitly + says that good behavior ought to be rewarded, while Option IV suggests + that changes we seek can only occur over the long run with increasing contact between East and + West. These follow-on studies may be no place to return to first + principles, but without it the policy alternatives seem too abstract. + Worse, the draft turns what looks like a basic disagreement into + something that appears in the end not to matter: Options III and IV, + with very different premises, seem to have quite similar policy + implications.

+

—how does our policy toward Eastern Europe relate to our policy toward + the Soviet Union? Again, the question is a basic one, but it at least + needs to be raised. In a period of strain in U.S.-Soviet relations, should we freeze relations with + Eastern Europe (as a signal to Moscow) or make special efforts to move + them (as a signal to Eastern Europe)? Or if it is fair to characterize + our posture toward the Soviet Union as Option IV (subject to + Congressional limitations), then does it make sense to pursue another + policy with respect even to the closest Soviet satellites?Brzezinski + highlighted this paragraph in the margin.

+

Differentiations Among Countries

+

—what are the different policy instruments that might be used to + differentiate among Eastern European countries on some agreed basis? + What are possible initiatives, country-by-country, that might be + employed?

+

—to put the same question the other way around, is any attempt to + differentiate among countries likely to be swamped by several major + actions, such as returning the Crown or awarding MFN?

+

—given a general approach, to what extent should specific actions on our + part be conditioned on commitments by the + countries (on family reunification, emigration or other issues), as + opposed to using those actions as rewards for + good performance? Is there much practical difference between the + two?

+

—is there a case for special treatment of the GDR? If so, what is it? The draft tends to argue that given + the GDR’s pivotal position and given + the paucity of our information about it, we should expand our contacts + with it no matter what general approach we take to Eastern Europe. Is + that convincing? How would we expand our contacts with the GDR? And what would we gain?

+

—Yugoslavia is omitted from this draft. On what basis? How do choices + about policy toward Yugoslavia—economic, political and military—bear on + our general policy toward Eastern Europe?

+ +

Coordination with Western Europeans

+

—how much do particular policy options depend on coordination with + Western Europeans? How much cooperation is possible in particular areas? + Are there areas in which our choices could threaten existing Western + European policies or arrangements (for instance the FRG’s ransoming of ethnic Germans)?

+

—how can we better understand, and perhaps begin to influence, the + Eastern debt situation? The draft’s idea of a State/CIA/NSC working group seems a good one.

+

—are there relations between Eastern and Western European Communist + parties that we can and should influence, positively or negatively?

+
+ +
+ 11. Paper Prepared in the Department of StateSource: Carter Library, National + Security Council, Institutional Files, Box 27, PRM–9 [2]. Confidential. Sent under + cover of a July 20 memorandum from Tarnoff to Brzezinski forwarding all four requested follow-up + studies related to PRM/NSC–9. + + + Washington, undated + +

PRM + 9—EASTERN EUROPE

+

The Eastern European Section of PRM/NSC + 9 discussed alternative policy approaches to our goal of promoting + greater internal liberalization in East European societies and enhanced + East European independence from the Soviet Union. This follow-up paper + examines the practical differences between the last two policy options + suggested in the original study:

+

—Option III—Give preference to Eastern European + countries that are either relatively liberal internally or relatively + independent internationally, and limit our ties with those that are + neither.

+

—Option IV—Abandon any implicit rank-ordering, and + seek to expand contacts and relations across the board in Eastern Europe + to the extent possible and feasible.

+

In sum, the practical consequences of Options III and IV would be very + similar for Romania and Poland where we would continue our present + forthcoming policies, and for Hungary where we would recommend return of + the Crown and the seeking of MFN/credits authority under certain conditions. Both options + require at least some normalization of particular aspects of our + relations with Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia and the GDR before otherwise deepening bilateral relations or + seeking congressional authority for MFN/credits eligibility. In general, however, Option IV is + disposed to more flexibility with these three countries while Option III + would require a showing of prior progress on human rights or foreign + policy autonomy. The GDR is a special + case under both options; resumption of diplomatic relations came so late + that things began at a very low level. Option IV is inclined toward a + somewhat quicker deepening of relations with the GDR following conclusion of an acceptable + consular convention.

+

Effect on Romania, Poland and Hungary

+

Under either Option III or Option IV, a number of our policy lines would + be the same or similar for Romania, Poland and Hungary. In + particular:

+

Romania: We would continue to encourage Romania’s + independent posture by a responsive position on Exim credits, CCC credits, disaster + assistance, cooperation in space and nuclear matters, exchange of + high-level visits and close consultation bilaterally and in multilateral + forums.

+

We would continue to use the need for annual Congressional review of + Romania’s MFN status—pending + modification of the Jackson/Vanik amendment—to induce Romanian + cooperation in allowing emigration, especially of divided family + members, to the US and Israel and, because of our human rights policy, + to encourage Romanian restraint in domestic human rights matters.

+

Poland: We would continue to support Poland’s + relatively moderate position in its internal regime by extension of + appropriate Exim and CCC credits, + general economic cooperation, political consultations and exchange of + high-level visits.

+

We would strengthen and heighten our insistence on better Polish + performance on divided family cases, and would continue to encourage + Poland to exercise the restraint it has generally shown in human rights + matters.

+

Hungary: We would give recognition to the + creditable record which Hungary has established in its treatment of its + people and its domestic differentiation from the Soviet Union (greater + freedom for economic enterprise, good performance on divided families, + passable relations with organized religion, lesser strictures on travel, + access to information and cultural pursuits).

+

Accordingly, after consultation with Congress and pertinent domestic + interest groups, we would recommend returning the + Crown of St. Stephen as a national treasure belonging to the + Hungarian people. If Hungary is prepared to provide appropriate + assurances regarding emigration + under Jackson/Vanik, we would also recommend + negotiation of a trade agreement incorporating MFN and making Hungary eligible for + USG credits. If Hungary + will not provide such assurances, we would then have to consider the + possibility of modification or suspension of the Jackson/Vanik amendment + with respect to Hungary.

+

Effect on Bulgaria and Czechoslovakia

+

Under both options—as under the provisions of NSDM 212See Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, vol. E–15, + Part 1, Documents on Eastern Europe, 1973–1976, Document + 8.—several aspects of our bilateral relations with + Bulgaria and Czechoslovakia would need to be nearly normalized before + considering MFN and credits for each + country. The following normalization steps would be envisaged:

+

—Bulgaria: We would encourage the Foreign + Bondholders Protective Association to complete its negotiations with the + Bulgarian Government on behalf of US holders of defaulted pre-war + Bulgarian dollar-denominated bonds.

+

—Czechoslovakia: We would seek, as a matter of + primary importance, to renegotiate a settlement of nationalization + claims acceptable to the Congress in order to meet our responsibility to + US citizen/claimants, many of whom are now advanced in years. We would + complete negotiation of a cultural and scientific exchanges agreement + and put into effect the consular convention which has already been + negotiated.

+

Given these normalization steps, Bulgaria and Czechoslovakia would press + for MFN and credits. However, the + policy question of extending MFN/credits eligibility to Bulgaria and + Czechoslovakia (or the GDR) is not + expected to arise until the Jackson/Vanik amendment has been modified. + This does not appear an early prospect given the present course of + US-Soviet relations and attitudes on the Hill. Bulgaria and + Czechoslovakia, like the Soviet Union (and the GDR), reject giving the assurances on emigration which are + required by the Jackson/Vanik amendment. Modification of Jackson/Vanik + may come about later in the wake of improved US-Soviet relations and + practical progress on the emigration problem. In that event, the trade + agreement negotiated with the Soviet Union in 1972—and providing MFN and credit eligibility for the Soviet + Union—could then come into effect without further negotiation.

+

Under Option III, following modification or suspension + of Jackson/Vanik, we would require—beyond such normalization steps + as described above—some evidence that Bulgaria and Czechoslovakia + (and the GDR) had made notable progress toward greater + internal liberalization or greater autonomy from the Soviet Union + before granting them MFN and + credits. As greater autonomy is extremely unlikely in + Czechoslovakia (and the GDR) where + Soviet troops are present and Soviet security concerns great, or in + Bulgaria which draws marked economic benefits from the Soviet + connection, our decision would turn on indications of greater + liberalization.

+

Proponents of Option III would maintain that to fail to differentiate + clearly in our treatment of Eastern European countries according to the + degree of repressiveness of their regimes would be inconsistent with our + commitment to human rights in general and CSCE objectives in particular. It would suggest an + indifference to the plight of the different peoples, which could cause + us serious domestic political problems and even loss of support for + continuation of the detente process. Finally, it would represent a + failure on our part to utilize the benefits of improved relations with + the US to encourage those regimes with better records and to inhibit + those who do worse. Option III proponents would hold that withholding + our cooperation could, over time, induce improved performance from the + more repressive regimes along the lines of our CSCE objectives. Since it is likely that US policy can have + only marginal effects on the human rights practices of such regimes, the + Option III approach would at a minimum make clear our continued + disapproval in the absence of such improvement.

+

Under Option IV, following modification or suspension + of Jackson/Vanik, we would proceed without delay to negotiate trade + agreements making MFN and credits + available to both Bulgaria and Czechoslovakia, provided that the + normalization steps noted above had been virtually completed and + their behavior on human rights matters was not offensive.

+

Those favoring Option IV would point out that changes in the character or + behavior of Communist regimes—including their behavior in human + rights—are most likely to come in the context of an evolutionary process + of detente rather than as a result either of US proffered cooperation + (as a carrot) or of US pressure (as a stick), especially in the absence + of a similar strategy on the part of our Western European allies. They + would emphasize that the basic impulse for greater attention by the + respective regimes to human rights comes from the indigenous populace + and that the US position should play a supporting role. To make that + role effective will entail steady and persistent pressure over time and, + if US influence is to be effective even in a supplementary role, the US + must be more engaged, more present, and more important to the regimes. + It can achieve this additional involvement through expansion of cultural + and scientific exchanges and other official and private exchanges, and + through greater emphasis to trade promotion. In their view, an enlarged + stake in the US relationship and the interplay possible with a greater US presence could act to + induce greater responsiveness by the regimes to human rights + concerns.

+

There also is a possible middle course but it would be + feasible only after the problem of extending MFN credits eligibility to these + countries has been overcome in the Congress and once the terms + on which we are prepared to extend MFN + and credits prove acceptable to the regimes in question. In particular, + before granting MFN and credit + eligibility, we would insist that such normalization steps as described + above had been carried out; that gross violation of human rights be + eliminated; and that at least some concrete progress in the human rights + area be achieved. Beyond this, we would not insist on far-reaching + internal liberalization before seeking MFN and credit eligibility and engaging ourselves more + actively in the economic area.

+

For example:

+

—Bulgaria is a tightly controlled country with + bothersome press coverage. But (largely because of its tight control), + it has no visible dissident problem. And it has been and is being + reasonably responsive on divided families. Thus, absent Jackson/Vanik, + we might consider MFN/credits for Bulgaria.

+

—Czechoslovakia—Few would hold that the US should + be prepared to grant Czechoslovakia MFN/credits under current + conditions: active repression of human rights advocates, restrictive + divided families policies, attempted precensorship of foreign + journalists, and sharp and intensive press attacks on the US human + rights position.

+

The German Democratic Republic as a Special + Case

+

The GDR is unique in that it is not a + traditional national state, as are the other members of the Warsaw Pact, + but an outgrowth of the Soviet desire to maintain direct control over a + substantial portion of the former German Reich. Further aspects of the + GDR’s special position in Europe + are the fact that Berlin is located in the center of its territory, that + the GDR exerts a negative influence on + the situation in West Berlin, and that the GDR is a significant industrial and military power whose + potential is of great importance to the Soviets and the other Warsaw + Pact allies.

+

US/GDR diplomatic relations were + established in 1974 as part of a package of East-West agreements + affecting German matters and general European security. In agreeing to + establish relations, the US deferred its prior demands for an acceptable + consular convention and for the satisfactory resolution of claims + emanating from World War II.

+

When we established relations, we stipulated three objectives: (a) to + resolve outstanding humanitarian cases; (b) to conclude a satisfactory + consular convention; and (c) to obtain a claims settlement, including + GDR recognition of Jewish claims. + Given the complexity of claims issues and the fact that it is US registration procedures which are + delaying commencement of talks, we have not made a claims settlement a + condition for specific current movement in relations.

+

Given the Belgrade CSCE meeting and the + keen East German interest in developing its new relationship with the + US, especially in the trade area, the GDR recently has undertaken to clear up all outstanding US + humanitarian cases. However, the consular agreement, which otherwise is + virtually completed, has been tied up over GDR insistence that the text include specific definition of + East German nationality.

+

Both Options III and IV would still require completion + of a consular agreement before more significant steps could be taken + with the GDR. As with Bulgaria + and Czechoslovakia, we would require that gross violations of human + rights be eliminated and that at least some concrete progress be + achieved in the human rights area. Both options also + would exclude MFN/credits eligibility for the GDR prior to conclusion of a + satisfactory consular convention.

+

The difference between the two options is that Option + III would also require progress in the claims talks as a condition + for further movement, while Option IV would be prepared to move + toward progress in other areas before movement on a claims + settlement, the completion of which is liable to take + years.

+

Proponents of Option III acknowledge the political + and industrial importance of the GDR + and share the Option IV wish for the gradual development of more normal + relations with the East German government and people. Incremental + movement to that end would be acceptable. But they believe that it would + be unwise to move to structure or formalize our cultural, scientific or + commercial relations, or to engage in political-level visits, before the + consular convention were concluded and until progress also were made + toward an acceptable claims agreement. This is because of our previous + deferral of the consular and claims issues and the domestic political + ramifications of the claims issue.

+

Implementation of Option IV with the GDR would be based on three assumptions: + (a) that both because of its strategic and its industrial potential, the + GDR is a nation which deserves + significant American attention; (b) that the East German desire for + recognition and the need for increased trade with the West provide us + with a certain amount of leverage; and (c) perhaps most importantly, + that with a regime as suspicious and frightened as that of the GDR, taking the initiative to establish a + broader basis from which to conduct relations will over the long run pay + more dividends than a policy of demanding prior concessions for each + forward step. Option IV, while also conditioning further programs in + conclusion of a consular convention would represent a somewhat more + flexible strategy, accepting on a limited basis some of the more “normal” aspects of relations such + as increased cultural exchanges, reasonably normal commercial relations + and political level visits without expecting major concessions from the + GDR first. Humanitarian concerns + and developments in Berlin would of course continue to play a role in + determining the pace of the development of relations.

+

Option IV would thus not mean any major steps forward with the GDR nor connote any effort by the United + States to replace Soviet influence or destabilize the GDR. It would represent, in view of the + GDR’s strategic importance to us, + an effort to move the bilateral relationship along faster so as to: + provide the basis for a long-term US presence in the GDR; develop a better understanding of it; + and, by giving the GDR’s + technologically based industry some stake in the Western market, give + the GDR an additional stake in not + raising the temperature in Berlin.

+

Implications for trade policy

+

Option III advocates would stress the leverage on + human rights issues that resides in the decision to expand Eastern + European trade. They would observe that Eastern European regimes place + the highest value on increased economic efficiency and improved living + standards as virtual requisites for relatively stable political + situations. These regimes and their peoples see expanded economic + relations with the West, including the US, as a major avenue toward + those priority goals. But, from the US side, it is pointed out, Eastern + European trade is unlikely to be a significant factor in US foreign + trade. The GDR is the only country that + now has significant market possibilities in the West for its engineering + and high technology exports. Consequently, before opening the doors to + expanded trade via MFN/credits, the US should exert the leverage + involved to require greater liberalization by the more restrictive + Eastern European regimes. The US can afford to wait.

+

Option IV adherents observe that with the more + massive imports of oil the US faces a mounting and continuing problem in + achieving a reasonable balance in its foreign trade. While not a large + item in US foreign trade, Eastern European trade can make some + contribution to the balance of payments (and US employment), as our + trade balance with Eastern Europe has been and is likely to continue to + be favorable. Expanded trade also creates a tangible and increasing + stake in continued good relations with the US and develops broadened + contacts and points of influence which, over time, will make these + countries more conscious of and + attentive to our interests, including our human rights concerns.

+

This follow-up paper has taken account of the problem of Eastern European + indebtedness discussed in the original PRM–9 study. Nonetheless, we believe the problem of Eastern European indebtedness may + have increasingly important implications, both for our Eastern European + policy, and, more generally, for East-West relations. Accordingly, we + recommend that the NSC task State, + CIA, Treasury and other pertinent + agencies to do a further follow-up study on the Eastern European + economic situation in general and the indebtedness problem in + particular. The study should take account of possible Soviet policy + options; appropriate consultations with our allies in the OECD and other Western institutions; and + our policy in the IMF. It should set + forth appropriate policy recommendations.

+

Implications for US-Soviet relations

+

Conduct of our policy toward Eastern European countries bears on our + Soviet relations in (a) its effects on the US-Soviet bilateral + relationship and (b) its effects on the Soviet position in Eastern + Europe.

+

The Soviets are of two minds about US relations with Eastern European + countries. They are apprehensive about the expansion of the US presence + in Eastern Europe for two reasons: because it could tend to dilute + somewhat Soviet influence and control, which are priority Soviet foreign + policy objectives; and because it could tend to deflect the political + and economic development of the Eastern European countries in a + non-Soviet direction with long-range implications for the Soviet + position and security interests in the region. While these prospects are + hardly imminent, the Soviets still fear that the US (and Western) + influence could contribute to destabilization of some or all of the + region, facing the Kremlin with costly policy choices in the European + area and in the world at large. On the other hand, Moscow also + recognizes that the potential for Eastern European instability stems + primarily from resentment from overly tight Soviet control and from the + powerful desires throughout Eastern Europe for an improved economic + situation and a higher standard of living which the Soviet Union itself + cannot provide. The Soviets are also mindful of the political costs of + attempting to deny to Eastern Europe the fruits of detente that the + Soviet Union itself seeks. Finally, Moscow reluctantly recognizes that + Eastern Europe would be less of an economic burden or more of an + economic asset if its economic development were spurred by the Western + connection.

+

Consequently, the Soviet Union accepts the development of limited Western + economic ties in Eastern Europe as a mixed blessing or mitigated curse, + relying on close monitoring of that development and the limitations + imposed by Eastern Europe’s economic needs and potential to prevent the + destabilizing influence it fears.

+

With regard to the effects of US policy in Eastern Europe, the Soviets + would probably not be unduly concerned whether we pursued either Option + III or Option IV, calculating that the impact in Eastern Europe would not be very great. On + balance, the Soviet Union would probably consider the net effects on + Eastern European stability in the short run either to roughly balance + out or to be of manageable proportions. They could be somewhat more + apprehensive over the longer-term effects of the expanded US contacts + and presence inherent in Option IV, worrying particularly over their + effects in the GDR. On the other hand, + the greater emphasis on human rights and autonomy implicit in Option III + is of very great concern to the US. Moreover, Option III also aims at + the development of such expanded contacts and presence in the + longer-term.

+

West European Attitudes

+

Our West European allies have by and large pursued the Option IV approach + to relations with Eastern Europe for some time. France has led the way + in seeking to improve relations with East European countries while the + FRG spent most of the early + seventies in restabilizing its diplomatic presence and normalizing + long-suspended relations. However, it is unlikely that the allies would + have strong views one way or the other concerning the US pursuing Option + III or IV in its relations with Eastern Europe. Whatever we do, the + allies would be unlikely to change their own approach.

+
+
+ 12. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security + Affairs (Brzezinski) to + President CarterSource: Carter Library, National + Security Affairs, Brzezinski + Material, Brzezinski Office + File, Subject Chron File, Box 91, Export Controls: 1977. + Confidential. Sent for action. While no drafting information appears + on the memorandum, it was forwarded to Brzezinski for signature by Benjamin Huberman on + August 4 and retyped on August 15. + + + Washington, August + 15, 1977 + + + SUBJECT + Export Control of US Technology + +

Growing trade from West to East over the past five years has heightened + concern over technology transfer, especially to the Soviet Union. The + adequacy and appropriateness of export controls have been increasingly + called into question by the responsible Executive Agencies, the Congress + and the business community. Some—such as State, Commerce, and + business—argue that export controls are too stringent. Others—DOD and Congress—maintain that the controls are not + sufficiently tight. To provide the basis for sound policy guidance on + this complex and important issue, I recommend that you authorize a + PRM directing a review of our + policy on the export control of US technology (Tab I).See Document 13.

+

The PRM will provide you options for + decision on key aspects of technology transfer policy, such as + objectives, criteria, control measures, and organizational arrangements. + The review will also provide the basis for Executive Branch reports on + technology transfer mandated by recent legislation and for consistent + Executive Branch testimony in upcoming Congressional hearings.

+

While there is interest in a comprehensive review of all aspects of + technology transfer, all agencies agree that this PRM should focus on the control of + technology, particularly to the Communist countries. The other key + aspect of technology transfer is in the North-South context. Here the + issues are promotional rather than restrictive in nature and involve + considerations vastly different from those in the East-West context. + Accordingly, I propose to treat the question of North-South technology + transfer separately and will be submitting a directive on this for your + approval.

+

RECOMMENDATION

+

That you authorize me to sign the PRM at + Tab I on the export control of US technology.Carter approved the recommendation and wrote “ok—Add [Stuart] Eizenstat. J” at the top + of the memorandum. Another note indicates it was done on August + 18.

+
+ +
+ + 13. Presidential Review Memorandum/NSC–31Source: + Carter Library, National Security Council, Institutional Files, Box + 3, Unclassified/Declassified PRM + and PD/NSC Documents. + Confidential. + + + Washington, August + 18, 1977 + + + TO + The Vice President + The Secretary of State + The Secretary of Defense + + + ALSO + The Secretary of the Treasury + The Secretary of Commerce + The Secretary of Labor + The Secretary of Energy + The Director, Office of Management & Budget + The Chairman, Council of Economic Advisers + The Director, Arms Control & Disarmament Agency + The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff + The Director of Central Intelligence + The Assistant to the President for Domestic Affairs and + Policy + The Director, National Science Foundation + The Director, Office of Science & Technology Policy + The Chairman, Nuclear Regulatory Commission + The Administrator, NASA + + + SUBJECT + Export Control of US Technology + +

The President has directed that the SCC + review our policy on the export control of US technology transfer to + Communist countries. The review should develop options for Presidential + decision concerning objectives, criteria, control measures, + organizational arrangements, and possible legislative initiatives + regarding export control. The review should provide the basis for + reports on these matters called for by recent legislation and recommend + guidelines for US participation in the upcoming review of the COCOM + list.

+

The review should include:

+

• An examination of existing policy, criteria and current mechanisms for + control of technology transfer and an evaluation of the degree to which + the objectives of such control have been attained.

+

• An assessment of the military, political, and economic implications for + the US and its allies of technology transfer to the various Communist + states and an evaluation of how trade-offs among these factors are and should be made. To + place this assessment in perspective, an evaluation should be carried + out of the implications for US of technology transfer to other + industrial and Third World countries.

+

• An evaluation of which technologies, and in what form, are most in need + of control, together with development of criteria and recommended + procedures for carrying out such control.

+

• An analysis of the policies of COCOM and non-COCOM supplier states + regarding the transfer of technology to Communist states, including the + likelihood of obtaining cooperation by other key supplier countries.

+

• An assessment of the advantages and disadvantages of establishing + varying standards of export control for specific Communist states, + together with development of criteria and procedures for applying such + control.

+

• Identification of the interaction between export control and US + policies on related issues (non-proliferation, arms transfers, and + North-South technology transfer).

+

The review should draw on existing PRM + responses and other studies. It will be chaired by Ben Huberman on + behalf of the NSC and OSTP staffs. It + should be submitted for discussion by the SCC by November 1, 1977.No + Presidential Decision was drafted out of the PRM. The PRM report, finalized in March 1978, called for the + creation of an NSC Technology + Transfer group to deal with technology transfer issues and + coordinate administration policies. The PRM recommended that the policy continue as set, + evolving toward increasing control over sensitive technologies and + associated end products. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, + Staff Material, Europe, USSR, and + East/West, Putnam Subject File, Box 30, East-West Economic + Relations: 3–8/1978) In an August 14 memorandum to several agencies, + Ben Huberman of the National Security Council Staff circulated an + action plan for implementation of PRM 31. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, + Brzezinski Material, + General Odom File, Box 40, + PRM–31 [Technology Transfers to + Communist Countries]: 3/74–8/78)

+

There will be a follow-on interagency study dealing with the use of US + technology transfer as a positive influence in North-South + relations.

+ + Zbigniew + Brzezinski + +
+ +
+ + 14. Summary of Conclusions of a Presidential Review Committee + MeetingSource: Carter + Library, National Security Council, Institutional Files, Box 16, + PD–21. Secret; Sensitive. The meeting took place in the White House + Situation Room. + + + Washington, August 23, 1977, 4:15–4:50 + p.m. + + + SUBJECT + Policy toward Eastern Europe + + + PARTICIPANTS + + + State + Warren + Christopher + Matthew + Nimetz + Richard Vine + + + + + CIA + Stansfield + Turner + Robert Bowie + + + + + Defense + Harold Brown + Walter Slocombe + General George + Brown (JCS) + + + + + NSC + Zbigniew + Brzezinski + David Aaron + Robert + Hunter + Gregory F. + Treverton + + + +

1. Christopher indicated the + purpose of the meeting was to refine the choice between the two options + discussed at the previous PRC meeting + on Europe:See Document + 6. Option 3—giving preference to those Eastern + European countries that are either relatively liberal internally or + relatively independent internationally; and Option 4—abandoning any + implicit rank ordering and seeking to expand contacts and relations + across the board to the extent feasible.

+

2. Brzezinski emphasized U.S. objectives, arguing that Option 3 + would not cause Eastern European states to become + more independent or liberal but that overt support for countries that + have achieved a measure of one or the other + would shore up their positions. By contrast, + Option 4 would conduce merely to attempt to promote good relations and + might diminish the special stake that Romania, Poland and Hungary have + in their relations with the United States. Secretary Brown noted that pursuit of U.S. objectives should be limited by the + need not to provoke something like the Hungarian uprising of 1956. + Brzezinski agreed that our + objectives should be pursued by working through existing + governments.

+

3. Nimetz noted that the previous + NSDM on Eastern Europe had established such a firm rank order and + time-table that it prevented taking advantage of opportunities that + arose. Christopher suggested + that there might be times when the U.S. + would want to move forward in + relations with a particular country in advance of + demonstrable progress on their parts along either of the two criteria. + Vine suggested that our interests in limiting the GDR’s mischief in Berlin might call for a + more forthcoming U.S. attitude.

+

4. Aaron and Nimetz stressed that the main point was + to underscore the special status of Romania, Poland and Hungary, not to + prevent limited improvements in relations with the other three + countries. Brzezinski outlined + the three areas of U.S. policy: + atmospherics (visits), economics (MFN) + and scientific and other exchanges; all agreed that those instruments + are very limited. Aaron thought + it might be preferable to rank concrete manifestations of policy, not + countries. Secretary Brown + agreed, noting that, for instance, a port visit by the U.S. Navy in Bulgaria should not be ruled + out.

+

5. In the end there was general support for the following reformulation + of Option 3: the U.S. would give + demonstrably greater support for those countries that have achieved a + measure of independence or internal liberalization (Romania, Hungary and + Poland). Within that context, it would be appropriate to develop a + scenario for returning the Crown of St. Stephen to Hungary. However, + Option 3 would not preclude improvements in U.S. relations with the other three (Bulgaria, + Czechoslovakia and the GDR), provided those improvements were tangibly and + demonstrably in the U.S. + interest. Negotiations of claim agreements could continue, but + the results would have to be assessed on their own + merits, case by case. Efforts could continue to normalize our + relations with the GDR, bringing them + into line with Czechoslovakia, provided that effort did not dilute the + basic differentiation.

+

6. There was general agreement that our European Allies, especially the + FRG, have somewhat different + interests in Eastern Europe than our own. No purpose would be served by + exhorting them to adopt a posture identical to ours.

+

7. There was consensus that our policy toward Eastern Europe and toward + CSCE should have parallel + objectives. Both should promote modest steps toward re-joining the two + halves of Europe, not as a threat to the Soviet Union but as an + improvement in the security and life quality of all Europe.

+ +
+ +
+ + 15. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security + Affairs (Brzezinski) to + President CarterSource: Carter Library, National + Security Council, Institutional Files, Box 16, PD–21. Secret; + Sensitive. Sent for action. Carter initialed the memorandum indicating he had + seen it. The memorandum was drafted by Treverton on August 24 and redrafted on September 2 + to incorporate Aaron’s + suggestions. + + + Washington, September + 9, 1977 + + + SUBJECT + Policy Toward Eastern Europe + +

The PRC met on August 23 to review our + policy toward Eastern Europe.See Document 14.

+

The meeting resulted in a general agreement that the United States basic objectives in Eastern Europe are: (1) to + enhance the international independence of the region’s states; and + (2) to increase their ability to organize their societies in ways + different from the Soviet Union. There are, of course, limits + to our capacity to realize these aims; for example, we do not want to + take actions which might provoke another Hungarian uprising. On the + other hand, our ability to influence events in Eastern Europe is very + limited; what we can do is demonstrably support those countries that + have achieved a measure of international independence or internal + liberalization.

+

As a result of the discussions, it was agreed to give preference to those + countries that have met these criteria (Poland, Romania and + Hungary).Brzezinski underlined “Poland, Romania and Hungary” + in this sentence. This approach would imply moving forward + with a scenario for returning the Crown of St. Stephen to Hungary. (A + recommendation for your approval will be prepared by the Department of + State.) U.S. relations with the other + three countries (Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia and the GDR) would remain limited until they had + demonstrated progress toward one of the criteria. Negotiations to + “normalize” formal diplomatic relations (consular relations, claims + settlements, and the like) could continue with those countries, but the + results would have to be justified on their own merits. Other specific + steps to advance U.S. relations with + those countries (a port visit by the U.S. Navy to Bulgaria was one step mentioned in the PRC) would have to be justified on similar + grounds—as tangibly advancing specific U.S. interests.

+

Warren Christopher expressed + concern that any general policy would not unduly limit our flexibility + to act when opportunities arise, and you may want to hear Cy’s view. I + believe the draft Presidential Directive (Tab A)Not attached. A + handwritten notation below the recommendation reads: “signed + 9/12/77.” See Document 16. takes + that concern into account. Any greater flexibility would dilute the + basic differentiation which I believe serves our fundamental objectives; + a more flexible general posture would leave those who implement policy + free to pursue their natural affinity for better relations with host + governments, whatever their stripe.

+

We all agree that over the long term, our policy toward Eastern Europe + and CSCE serve parallel objectives. + Both should promote, in a modest way commensurate with our influence in + the region, the re-joining of the two halves of Europe,Brzezinski + underlined “re-joining of the two halves of Europe” in this + sentence. not as a threat to the Soviet Union but as a means + of enhancing the security and way of life of all Europe.

+

RECOMMENDATION:

+

That you sign the Presidential Directive at Tab A.

+
+ +
+ + 16. Presidential Directive/NSC–21Source: + Carter Library, National Security Council, Institutional Files, Box + 16, PD–21. Secret; Sensitive. + + + Washington, September + 13, 1977 + + + TO + The Vice President + The Secretary of State + The Secretary of Defense + + + ALSO + The Secretary of the Treasury + The United States Representative to the United Nations + The Director, Office of Management and Budget + The Chairman, Council of Economic Advisors + The Director, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency + The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff + The Director of Central Intelligence + + + SUBJECT + Policy toward Eastern Europe (C) + +

The President has directed that policy toward Eastern Europe should be + based on the objectives of working with governments of the region to + enhance their independence internationally and to increase their degree + of internal liberalization. To that end, the United States will + demonstrably show its preference for Eastern European countries that are + either relatively liberal internally or relatively independent + internationally.

+

For the principal countries of the region (excluding Yugoslavia), this + policy will reflect the following general guidance:

+

—Poland and Romania will continue to receive preferred treatment with + regard to visits by government officials, and in handling economic + issues and various exchange programs. We should examine ways to + ameliorate the Polish debt situation, should it continue.

+

—Relations with Hungary will be carefully improved to demonstrate that + its position is similar to Poland and Romania. The United States will + indicate its willingness to return the Crown of St. Stephen, providing + the Hungarians will give acceptable assurances about its continuing + display. Subsequent to the return of the Crown, the United States will + enter into negotiations for a trade agreement with Hungary, including a + provision for a waiver of the Jackson-Vanik amendment, provided Hungary gives adequate + assurances consistent with the spirit of the Jackson-Vanik + provision.

+

—Relations with Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia and the GDR will remain limited until there is demonstrated + progress along one of the two dimensions mentioned above. No particular + initiatives toward any of the three will be taken, nor will there be + indications of willingness to grant MFN. That does not preclude continuing efforts to put formal + bilateral relations in a somewhat more normal basis: e.g., through US + naval port visits to Bulgaria, or through negotiations with Bulgaria + over outstanding bond debts, with Czechoslovakia over nationalization + claims and with the GDR over a consular + convention and claims. The results of such negotiations must be + justified on their own merits, and must not dilute the basic + differentiation. Any other specific steps taken to improve U.S. relations with those three countries + must tangibly and demonstrably advance specific U.S. interests.

+

This policy is aimed at producing stability, progress and the enhancement + of security throughout the region, pointing toward reconciliation + between both halves of Europe.

+ + Jimmy + Carter + +
+ +
+ 17. Memorandum From Paul Henze + of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for + National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, + Horn/Special, Box 1, Chron File: 10–11/77. Secret; Outside System. + Sent for action. + + + Washington, November + 18, 1977 + + + SUBJECT + Stepped-up Covert/Overt Activities Targeted at Eastern Europe and + the USSR + +

Last February, when State expressed reservations about continuation of + CIA’s meager covert operations + directed at the USSR and Eastern Europe, you suggested State + study overt possibilities while, meanwhile, CIA consider modest expansion of selected activities.See Document 2. At the + May 10 SAWG meeting, Aaron + stressed that Brzezinski + wanted “to see movement on this program, not necessarily expansion + of only covert things, but also new overt initiatives.” Representing + the Department, INR Director + Harold Saunders said + that the Department “found themselves really not in favor of + expansion, either covert or overt.” Aaron directed the Central Intelligence Agency and + the Department to prepare papers on the subject dealing with the + covert and overt areas and coordinate them with the NSC Staff, highlighting the policy + issues. (National Security Council, Carter Administration + Intelligence Files, Box I–020, Minutes—SCC Special Activities Working Group, 1977)

+

State did nothing. CIA, suffering from + internal confusion, was slow to move but during the course of the summer + came up with a number of proposals for expansion. Five CIA papers were reviewed by the SCC/SAWG + on 5 October 1977.On October 25, Aaron approved the summary of the + October 5 SAWG meeting, which recommended that “proposals on + expansion of book publication and distribution to Eastern Europe and + the USSR will be recommended, with + some refinements, for approval by the SCC.” The SAWG also recommended that CIA proposals for covert action on + certain human rights initiatives and Soviet nationalities be + rewritten and that the Department of State clarify U.S. policy affecting these proposals. + (Ibid.) + CIA was asked to do further work on + three but two proposals dealing with expansion of existing programs for + publishing and distributing books and periodicals for Eastern Europe and + the USSR were put in final form and + submitted to the SCC on 26 October, + when they were approved.On October 25, + Henze informed Brzezinski of the agenda for the + upcoming SCC meeting, dealing with + items on which a decision was not taken at the October 6 SCC meeting, including approval of the + expansion of book publishing and distribution programs for the + Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. (Ibid.) + CIA is going ahead with this expansion. + State continues to be unenthusiastic about it.

+

The recently appointed Deputy Assistant Secretary for East European + Affairs, Bill Luers, was present + at the 5 October SCC/SAWG meeting and took it upon himself to promise a + serious State investigation of possibilities for overt activity targeted + against Eastern Europe and the USSR. + This was the first he had heard of your request to State last winter, by + the way, which confirms our impression that State’s persistent arguing + against covert programs on the basis that these things could be done + overtly is, in practical terms, nothing more than a tactic for bringing + everything to a halt. Luers, + however, is not of this view. He is an admirer of what CIA has done over the past 25 years, an + enthusiastic supporter of RFE/RL and deeply knowledgeable of Eastern + Europe. He would seriously like to see State energize the government to + broaden activity. He also shares our view, which few others in State do, + that the covert programs should be continued and expanded—not curtailed + or abandoned in expectation that something might + eventually be done overtly.

+ +

You will recall I told you I planned to work closely with Luers to encourage him. I spent an + hour with him yesterday (17 November) reviewing what he has managed to + do so far. He is less gung-ho than he was when he took on this + responsibility in early October, because he has found roadblocks in his + path at every turn—but he intends to persist, and I believe we should + continue to help him.

+

One of the principal roadblocks is INR, + which is making an enormous production of the simple things Luers wants to do, as exemplified by + the attached paper (TAB A)Not + attached. addressed to the SCC/SAWG which INR sent to me this week. It asks for + SCC Working Group review and + authorization for what Luers is + trying to do—simple exploratory actions. It is also filled with a whole + series of negative statements about existing CIA programs and appears, at several points, to be, in + effect, a protest against the fact that the SCC has already authorized expansion of publishing and + distribution activity. State’s profound lack of enthusiasm for all + activity in this field comes through almost every line of this paper. (I + have marked certain striking passages in red.) As a foretaste of future + State negatism, we are told that State has doubts about any use of + emigre organizations and is doing a review of what policy toward + nationalities should be. (I hear that State—perhaps even Luers—feels that nothing should be + done in respect to non-Russian nationalities at all. But it remains to + be seen whether they will take this negative a position formally.)

+

I told Luers yesterday that I saw + no need to have an SCC/SAWG review of the actions he wishes to + take—these are not covert activities. I said your request last winter + that these “overt options” be explored constituted all the clearance + needed at the NSC level. I added that + the kinds of things he wants to look into have been open to exploration + for nearly 30 years. The fact that no one outside of CIA has ever taken much initiative does + not prove that it cannot be done—but it naturally leaves one doubtful + that much will be accomplished. Nevertheless, I reiterated, you were + very eager to see this effort made and I was ready to support it. + Luers will try and may even + succeed in getting something going—but I doubt very much that he will be + able to develop anything that could be regarded as a substitute for much + that CIA is doing covertly.

+

Some specific thoughts on his proposed initiatives (pp. 3–4 of TAB + A):

+ + a. USIA: I see no legal barriers to some increased USIA activity, + though it obviously can go no farther than “gray” areas and cannot + engage in covert funding or covert distribution. + + b. I do not think the BIB should be involved at all; it has enough + to do keeping the radios going. Perhaps in years ahead, it might + take on publications tasks . . . but these were all segmented out of + the radios when they went under the BIB. Putting them back would invite congressional + problems. + c. State, especially under its external + research authorization, could undertake some activity legally, I + believe—but without some imaginative person to push it continually, + I doubt that it could add up to much. + d. It may be possible for the National Endowments for the Arts and + the Humanities to engage in marginal activity directed toward + Eastern Europe and the USSR (I + have a very constructive relationship with the Arts Endowment, as + you know) but they have legal restrictions and the problem that they + are basically domestically oriented, not foreign affairs operating + agencies. + e. American publishers might do something . . . but talk is not + likely to be matched by much money. + f. Other private funding sources need to be explored—something can + be turned up, I am sure, but it will take a lot of consistent + work. + +

The most hopeful thing Luers had + to say was that he thought he had a good chance of getting Abe Brumberg + detailed to him for a period of several months (perhaps longer) to work + on this problem. Having a dynamic and motivated man such as Abe working + on these tasks is about the only hope there is that anything could be + done.

+

I propose that we not have an SCC/SAWG discussion + of this subjectIn the December 15 SAWG + meeting, Aaron again stressed + to the Department of State representatives that the White House + “expected initiative from the State Department in + exploring overt and private possibilities for support of + activities directed at the USSR and Eastern Europe.” He reminded the + Department that it had agreed to produce proposals as early as May, + and “questioned whether State was allocating enough energy to this + effort,” asking that they focus on generating new activity. He + continued: “If new activities proved viable, then they might + eventually replace or take over some of the CIA operations.” (National Security Council, Carter + Administration Intelligence Files, Box I–020, Minutes—SCC Special Activities Working Group, + 1977) and that I send INR a + short memorandum stating that we consider review of State’s (i.e. + Luers’) proposed initiatives + unnecessary since they already have all the authority they need to do + so.

+

Do you AGREE

+

DISAGREE?Brzezinski did not mark either option. However, on + December 6, Henze sent a + memorandum to INR Director + William Bowdler stating + that Brzezinski “has + reviewed your paper and has concluded that the subject does not + require new action by the SCC/SAWG at the present time.” Stressing + that CIA operations were undergoing + separate review, Henze wrote + that “the exploration of possibilities for new or increased overt + activity can be conducted by the State Department without any + necessity for new policy authorization.” Henze also noted that the White House, through + Aaron, had reiterated + that point in the October 5 SAWG: “At this stage at least, the + explorations which the State Department is undertaking should not be + directed toward finding alternate sources of support or funding for + existing CIA activities, but should + concentrate on new or parallel activities which could be overtly + supported by the U.S. Government, if + reliable funding arrangements can be made, or financed through + private sources.” (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff + Material, Horn/Special, Box 1, Chron File: 12/77)

+
+ +
+ + 18. Paper Prepared by the National Security Council Staff for Eastern + European AffairsSource: Carter + Library, National Security Council, Institutional Files, Box 131, + [NS Files-3] Carter NS 7707862–7801072 [1]. No classification + marking. Sent under a December 21 covering memorandum from the + Soviet/Eastern Europe NSC Staff to + Brzezinski, which dealt + with U.S. policy toward the Soviet + Union. Brzezinski wrote + “King” at the top of the + paper, indicating that it should be returned to Robert King. Portions of this + paper (see subsequent footnotes) were included in “NSC Report for 1977: A Critical + Self-Appraisal,” January 12, 1978, which Brzezinski sent to Carter on + January 13, 1978. (Carter Library, Plains File, Subject File, Box + 28, NSC Weekly Reports, + 7–12/77) + + + Washington, undated + +

ANNUAL REPORT

+

EASTERN EUROPE

+

At the end of 1976 US relations with the countries of Eastern Europe were + at a generally low ebb. The previous Administration tended to see policy + toward these countries as a corollary of that followed toward the USSR. The effects of the leaking of + Helmut Sonnenfeldt’s commentsReference is to + remarks made on December 14, 1975, by Counselor to the Department of + State Helmut Sonnenfeldt at a gathering of the European Chiefs of + Mission in London. When Sonnenfeldt’s remarks leaked to the press in + January 1976, critics charged that the United States condoned Soviet + domination of Eastern Europe. See Foreign + Relations, 1969–1976, vol. E–15, Part 1, Documents on + Eastern Europe, 1973–1976, Document 14. on Eastern + Europe had not been completely erased, and President Ford’s comments on + Eastern Europe during the television debateReference is to the October 6, 1976, Presidential debate between + President Ford and Governor Carter in which Ford, responding to a + question as to whether signing the Helsinki Agreement codified + Soviet domination of Eastern Europe, stated “there is no Soviet + domination of Eastern Europe, and there never will be under a Ford + Administration.” See Public Papers: Ford, + 1976–1977, vol. III, p. 2416. further reinforced the + feeling that little concern and attention was devoted to Eastern + Europe.Brzezinski highlighted this paragraph in the + margin.

+

The goals toward the countries of this region were established in the + course of the PRM–9 reviewSee Document 1. of + Relations with Europe and were established in PD–21See Document 16. + which established that policy toward Eastern Europe should be aimed at + enhancing the international independence and internal liberalization of + these countries and that the US should show its preference for countries + moving in that direction. This implies preferred treatment for Poland + and Romania, which had received special attention in the past, and for + Hungary. Relations with Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, and the GDR are to + remain limited until progress is demonstrated in international or + internal policy. Yugoslavia remains a special case deserving particular + attention.

+

American interest in Poland was reaffirmed by the President’s visit and + the Poles were given further evidence of US concern by the credits for + agricultural purchases that were granted and further steps were taken to + help them in dealing with their economic problems.Brzezinski + highlighted this paragraph in the margin.

+

Among the specific goals that were enumerated was the return of the Crown + of St Stephen to Hungary to be followed by the negotiation of a trade + agreement granting MFN.Brzezinski + highlighted this sentence in the margin. The decision was + made to return the Crown, satisfactory details were worked out for the + transfer, and a Presidential delegation accompanied the Crown and relics + to Budapest for the ceremony. The effect on the Hungarian population and + government has been and will continue to be extremely favorable for the + United States. The one criticism that can be leveled is the way in which + it was carried out. The leaking of the decision to return the Crown, of + course, created problems. The fact that a public announcement did not + follow the leaks in the press gave ammunition to domestic opponents of + the return and led some to conclude that the decision was being + reconsidered when in fact it was only a question of working out a + suitable time. Postponing the public announcement also caused some + problems with the hill and gave Congressional opponents the opportunity + to raise the issue with the courts. At the same time, however, the delay + allowed Hungarian-Americans to supply input into the scenario for return + and this may have had beneficial domestic political consequences.

+

Initial steps have also been taken to prepare a draft of the trade + agreement with Hungary. Returning the Crown has been the focus of + attention but progress should be made early next year on the agreement. + The Hungarians have already been informed of the assurances they will be + required to provide under Jackson-Vanik and this should be settled + before negotiations begin.

+

The one country in Eastern Europe which seems to have been neglected is + Romania. In the past they were given very favorable consideration, but + under the present Administration they appear to have slipped in + importance.Brzezinski highlighted this sentence in the + margin. Poland is the first East European country to receive + a visit from the new President; the US is returning the Crown to + Hungary; Ceausescu’s visit is + scheduled after that of Tito. + Although Romania’s human rights record is in need of improvement, it is + the Warsaw Pact state that has + clearly demonstrated the greatest degree of independence from the Soviet + Union.

+

In the coming year there will probably be several opportunities for + furthering the goals that have been set for Eastern Europe—negotiation + of the trade agreement with Hungary (though we may have problems with + the timing of this since it will require Congressional approval and + other administration priorities and the approach of mid-term elections + may cause delays); the visit of Romanian President Ceausescu; and possibilities to expand + trade relations and economic cooperation.

+
+ +
+ 19. Memorandum for the RecordSource: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of the Director of + Central Intelligence, Job 05S00620R, Administrative Files, Schedules + of Daily Activities, DCI and DDCI + (Turner Files), Box 3, + Folder 92, DCI + Stansfield Turner: File + Cabinet 9, Drawer 2—Covert Action (1 of 2), 27 Jan 76 to 12 May 80. + Secret. + + + Washington, March 1, + 1978 + + + SUBJECT + Conversation with Dr. Brzezinski, 28 February 1978 + +

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to Eastern Europe.]

+

4. Along with Bob Bowie we had considerable discussion on the + desirability of increasing [less than 1 line not + declassified] in FY 78. + Brzezinski approved the idea + of taking it up in the SCC. What he + would like is to try to put some distance between the covert action + proposal and [1 line not declassified]. Could + we:

+

a. Have a new Presidential Finding to “promote political change” in the + Eastern European and Soviet Union areas; and [1 line + not declassified]

+

b. Get the State Department or USIA to undertake this on an overt + basis?

+

c. [2 lines not declassified]

+

5. Before we take this up with the SCC, + we need a more definitive statement as to:

+

a. Where the [dollar amount not declassified] is + actually being spent today.

+ +

b. What kind of groups does it go to? Are they mainly emigre groups? + Brzezinski noted one by a + man named [name not declassified] that he thought + was good.

+

c. Does some of it go to Western European groups as opposed to emigre + groups?

+

d. We also need to be as specific as we can as to how the additional + funding would be employed, again with emphasis on whether it’s to emigre + groups or established Western European groups.

+

[Omitted here is information unrelated to Eastern Europe.]

+ + Stansfield + Turner + Director + +
+ +
+ 20. Memorandum From Paul Henze + of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for + National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, + Horn/Special, Box 2, Chron File: 3/78. Secret; + Sensitive. + + + Washington, March 14, + 1978 + + + SUBJECT + Russian and East European Book Program—CIA Report + +

Admiral Turner has sent you a memo + (TAB B)Dated March 13. Not attached. + reporting that the SCC recommendations + of last fall on expansion of Russian and East European book publishing + are being implemented. A total of [dollar amount not + declassified] is going to be allocated to increased book + publication and distribution in 1978 (FY). State has approved the main lines of the Agency program + and there seems, as of the moment, to be no difficulty in carrying out + the CIA program.

+

This represents very effective performance by CIA at a time of stress and confusion in the DDO.In a March 23 memorandum to Brzezinski, Henze described the “persistent” and “mistaken” philosophy of using covert action only as a last + resort. “Stan + Turner,” Henze wrote, “gives the impression + of greater covert capabilities than CIA actually possesses. This may be in part + because he is reluctant to admit the damage his personnel policies + have done to the DDO.” Scheduled for publication in Foreign + Relations, 1977–1980, vol. XXVIII, Organization and + Management of Foreign Policy. I have drafted a + little memo from you to the + Admiral giving them a pat on the back. It also establishes a requirement + for reporting to us on what has been accomplished as of 1 September so + the program can again be reviewed this coming fall.

+

RECOMMENDATION:

+

That you sign the attached Memorandum (TAB A).Attached but not printed. The draft memorandum reads: “I am pleased + to note from your memorandum that this program has moved ahead + successfully. It represents good fulfillment of the SCC recommendation of 26 October 1977, + approved by the President on 1 November 1977. I would like to have a + progress report on this program by 1 September 1978 so that we can + review its scope for 1979.” There is no indication that Brzezinski signed the memorandum. + An unidentified handwritten note at the bottom of the covering + memorandum indicates that action was suspended.

+
+ +
+ 21. Paper Prepared by William + Odom of the National Security Council Staff for the + East-West Planning GroupSource: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, + Office, Unfiled Files, Box 130, East-West Planning Group: 1–8/78. + Secret. In his March 20 covering memorandum to Brzezinski, Samuel Huntington, and Reginald Bartholomew, Odom wrote: “The attached paper is + an effort to provide an analytical framework for a discussion of + East Europe in the context of U.S.-Soviet relations on March 21. It is a product hastily + done this past week with the idea of treating another major area in + the context of U.S.-Soviet relations + the way we discussed China at the last meeting. Is there an ‘East + European card’? If so, how can it be played?” + + + Washington, undated + +

EAST EUROPE IN THE CONTEXT OF U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS

+

The United StatesThe West European states are + not given separate attention in this discussion of U.S. policy options for two reasons. + First, space in a short paper does not allow. Second, the U.S., if it moves firmly in either + direction of cooperative or competitive relations with the Soviet + Union, can force the Europeans to follow the general trend. + Admittedly, in the middle ground, where there is a more even mix of + competition and cooperation, this is less true, but some of the + implications for the West European role in those cases are + discussed. [Footnote is in the original.] has four general + options in its approach to the Soviet Bloc. First, it can pursue a more + cooperative“Cooperation” can be thought + of in three broad categories: 1) economic, technological, and + cultural; 2) political; 3) arms control. In the matrix here, the + first category is the major kind of cooperation meant in defining + the options. The discussion following should clarify the + relationship to political cooperation. [Footnote is in the + original.] relationship with both Moscow and the East European states. Second, + it can pursue a more cooperative relationship with Moscow while not + emphasizing a cooperative approach to Eastern Europe. Third, it can + pursue a cooperative relationship toward Eastern European states while + de-emphasizing the cooperative approach to Moscow. Fourth, it can + de-emphasize cooperation with both Moscow and Eastern Europe. These + analytical distinctions can be arrayed as follows:

+ + + + Similar Policies toward Moscow and East Europe + Different Policies toward Moscow and East Europe + + + More Cooperative + 1/Toward Moscow and East Europe + 2/Toward Moscow but not East Europe + + + Less Cooperative + 4/Toward Moscow and East Europe + 3/Toward Moscow but not East Europe + +
+

Our real policy choices, to be sure, are not so tidy. This framework, + nonetheless, can help us think about some of the causal relations within + the real choices. To some extent, we have pursued all of these variants + at one time or another in the last three decades. Although they are set + down with excessive sharpness here, that sharpness clarifies an inherent + ambivalence about goals in U.S. policy. + On the one hand, there is a desire to loosen the Soviet grip on East + European states; on the other hand, there has been a recurring desire + for detente with Moscow. Even in the high time of the cold war, the + United States was reluctant to go all the way in helping an East + European state escape the confines of the Warsaw Pact. In the high time + of the most recent detente period, the U.S. did not wholly ignore differences between Moscow and + East Europe that were exploitable for loosening Soviet control, but it + did go quite far in giving the impression that we would not work very + hard toward loosening the grip, presumably because that could deny us + the larger fruits of cooperation with Moscow.

+

A number of arguments for and against can be provided for each of the + four options in the matrix. The following ones should be taken merely as + suggestive pros and cons for starting the discussion.

+

1. Emphasize cooperation + with both Moscow and East Europe.

+

The justification for this approach could be that it tends to loosen + authoritarian control in all members of the Soviet Bloc by setting in + motion economic, social, and finally political change, which presumably + will benefit the West. This approach assumes that political factors are + driven by economic and social considerations even to the point of + systemic transformation, albeit in a slow evolutionary process.

+

The objection to this approach is that political factors can and probably + do set firm limits to the evolutionary process. Furthermore, the economic and technological + assistance gained through cooperation may allow the Soviet leadership to + avoid, delay, and limit reforms which otherwise might be forced on an + unwilling Soviet leadership. In other words, this approach is more + likely to block than facilitate evolutionary change.

+

2. Emphasize a more + cooperative relationship with Moscow while not emphasizing a cooperative + approach toward East Europe.

+

This is what many understood—wrongly or rightly—to be the Sonnenfeldt + doctrine. Its assumption is that interests in the world order, if + commonly shared by Washington and Moscow, take precedence over detaching + East Europe from the Soviet Bloc. Its proponents might argue that + cooperation with Moscow must come first, loosening up that regime, which + is a pre-condition for significant political liberalization in East + Europe.

+

Its critics could argue that it, like the first approach, merely allows + Moscow to evade reforms through exploiting Western economic and + technological assistance and at the same time to prevent significant + loosening of its hegemony in East Europe. It makes the Washington-Moscow + relationship look like a super-power coalition against which an East + European state like Romania, for example, has an increasingly difficult + time playing its maverick role. Nor can the neutrals be sure that their + policies will not be the victim of a Moscow-Washington understanding. + Finally, the West Europeans find that they can take European security + less seriously because the U.S.-Soviet + relationship ensures it. West Europeans are left free to pursue whatever + policy lines they choose without as much concern for building a NATO policy consensus.

+

3. Emphasize cooperation + with Eastern Europe but not with Moscow.

+

The case for this policy would be that it promises to exacerbate Soviet + control problems by creating alternative sources of support for East + European regimes over a long evolutionary period. At the same time, it + would deny the USSR the benefits of + economic and technological assistance and whatever relief that could + provide the leadership. The Politburo would face not only growing + independence in East Europe but also sharpened dilemmas between + political control and efficient use of human and material resources + within the Soviet economy.

+

The objection to this approach might be that the fruits of + cooperation—especially economic interaction—would not stop in East + Europe but would filter through to Moscow in any event. Furthermore, + economic assistance to East Europe would alleviate some of the tensions + created there by consumer dissatisfaction and inefficient resource + allocations. Finally, it + could sharpen the Soviet fear of political evolution in East Europe and + perhaps bring greater Soviet repression.

+

4. De-emphasize cooperation + with both the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe.

+

The rationale of this option could be that denying—or merely impeding—the + flow of economic assistance and technology transfers sharpens the reform + issues in the Soviet political system more quickly and critically than + would increasing economic interaction. Thus, by reducing the role of + Eastern Europe as a conduit of technology to the Soviet Union, the + U.S. could increase the internal + Soviet pressures for change. At the same time, this approach should + reduce the Soviet capabilities and pursue a competitive foreign policy + with military and economic means.

+

Among the arguments against this approach, it may be insisted that U.S. policy cannot significantly restrain + the diffusion of technology and economic interaction in the world, and, + therefore, the Soviet Union will find other sources, notwithstanding + U.S. reluctance to provide them. + Such a competitive stance by the U.S. + might also prompt a more aggressive Soviet use of its military power in + winning the diplomatic and political leverage in non-European areas. + Moscow might also pursue a less moderate role in European affairs by + creating periodic crises and indulging in spoiling diplomatic tactics + wherever possible.

+

The security policy corollary to these four + options

+

Each of these options is based on different assumptions about the nature + of change in the Soviet Bloc. Changes inevitably are accompanied by + uncertainties, uncertainties which both Eastern and Western political + leaders desire to reduce or eliminate. In other words, they want + predictable change as long as it is also controllable for their own + purposes. Military power provides one of the more important means for + dealing with the political uncertainties and for controlling and + limiting processes of political change.

+

The policy options that promise more economic change in the Soviet Bloc + (1, 2, and 3) are also the options that will most likely prompt and allow the + Soviet leadership to maintain a dynamic and comprehensive military + establishment. That kind of Soviet policy in turn is most likely to + stimulate larger U.S. military programs. + If de-emphasizing cooperation and economic interaction (Option 4) is + effective, it should make it more difficult for the USSR to support large military outlays, + and it should constrain the Soviet capability for projecting its + military power abroad.

+

U.S. military power for the + non-cooperative approach (Option 4) could eventually be a limited + security posture, something like minimum deterrence, but initially it might require an + intimidating military posture. If the U.S. is prepared to stand aside and let change within the + Soviet Bloc take its course, then military forces are necessary only for + preventing disorderly developments from spilling into Western Europe. + If, however, the U.S. wants to have some + influence on the direction of change in the Bloc, then a larger military + backdrop is needed for U.S. policy in + Europe, both East and West.

+

For Option 3, a stronger military posture is required if it is to be a + serious strategy for loosening the Soviet grip. A large NATO military backdrop during the Czech + crisis of 1968 could conceivably have kept the uncertainties for the + Politburo sufficiently high to have produced a compromise between Dubcek + and Moscow of long-term durability allowing the Prague spring to yield + fruit in the fall. The deployment of U.S. forces in Southeast Asia, the general disrepair in the + U.S. forces in Europe, and the + willingness of the Johnson Administration to reassure Moscow by taking + Soviet military observers along the FRG-Czech border so that they could verify the absence of + NATO military activities—all of + these things contributed to Soviet confidence that the U.S. had neither the military means nor the + intention to influence the course of events in Prague. Had the U.S. made even moderate military gestures + such as slightly increasing routine military exercises, the Soviet + decision to send forces into Czechoslovakia might never have been + made.

+

Today there are again signs of change and transformation in East Europe. + In particular, we have seen the continuation of the working class + movement in Poland, and perhaps surprising to some observers in the + West, dissidence in East Germany has reached distressing levels for the + SED leadership.

+

In the case of Poland, can the present U.S. policy of economic and diplomatic support for Warsaw + turn the processes of change to the purposes of the West? Or are we + simply helping the Soviets avoid the price of more open and perhaps + violent means of repression? Is it true, as some intelligence analysts + recently argued, that Moscow is unaware of the explosive situation in + Poland? Or is Moscow aware that we are aware and willing to bail the + Poles out with credits? It seems difficult to conclude that the forces + of change are necessarily favoring the West.

+

The East German case is not only more complex but of much greater + consequence. It is not primarily about a state in Eastern Europe but + about Germany as a whole. Moscow seems bent on exploiting Bonn’s Ostpolitik to draw the FRG back into the traditional German “middle” position, + ambivalent about both East and West Europe. Without suggesting that a + new Rapallo is at hand, it is nonetheless possible to argue that Bonn + finds itself uncomfortable with the West and without recompense in the + East. This is the result of three interacting developments:

+ +

—The re-emergence of German economic and military power without + corresponding political power (or responsibility).

+

—The crisis in Ostpolitik which has failed to + produce the kind of results promised either in inter-German relations or + in relations with Moscow.

+

—Uncertainties and pressures created by U.S. policy toward Moscow and Europe, both security policy + and economic policy.

+

There are at the same time signs of dissent and broader unrest in the + GDR than many have believed before, + but Soviet force deployments there make it virtually inconceivable that + unapproved deals between the two Germanies can be more than ephemeral + episodes.

+

Both of these cases, Poland and East Germany, force us to review once + again Eastern Europe in the context of U.S.-Soviet relations.

+
+ +
+ 22. Minutes of a Meeting of the East-West Planning GroupSource: Carter Library, National + Security Affairs, Staff Material, Office, Unfiled Files, Box 130, + East-West Planning Group: 1–8/78. Secret. Sent under an April 5 + covering memorandum from Samuel + Huntington to Brzezinski, Bartholomew, Odom, Shulman, Luers, Robert Bowie, and Arnold Horelick. + + + Washington, March 21, + 1978 + +

EAST-WEST PLANNING GROUP MEETING

+

MINUTES OF MARCH 21, 1978

+

A paper prepared by Colonel Odom + served as the point of departure for discussing Eastern Europe in the + context of US-Soviet relations.See Document 21. In light of the previous + meeting at which China had been discussed in this same vein, Colonel + Odom posed two issues: Is + there an “East European card”? If so, how can it be played?

+

In the ensuing discussion, a number of objectives of and constraints on + U.S. policy toward Eastern Europe + were raised. Specifically, it was suggested, U.S. policy should do three things:

+

1. Encourage greater autonomy, through multilateral means whenever + possible.

+

2. Ease the repressiveness of many East European regimes.

+ +

3. Direct efforts toward moderate change while avoiding frontal + confrontation.

+

It has been the U.S. practice to favor + regimes in Eastern Europe if they balance greater autonomy with the + retention of stability, even though the domestic policies of these + regimes are hardly compatible with American political values. The + delicacy of the autonomy/stability balance means that we cannot play an + “East European card” as we might with China. We must understand why we + are doing what we are doing, even if we can not do much. Because the + balance is delicate, we must keep our “tight-rope” act in mind and not + demand too much clarity in an ambiguous situation.

+

U.S. policies will inevitably contribute + to occasional confrontational situations between Eastern Europe and the + SU. We will help to exacerbate both + Eastern European-Soviet and internal East European tension. There will + be sporadic periods of tension vis-a-vis Eastern Europe as a permanent + backdrop to U.S. policy-making.

+

The paper prepared for the meeting did not set down specific goals for + U.S. policy. A simple matrix of + possible U.S. interactions with the + Soviets and East Europeans presented four different mixes of cooperation + and competition. Some illustrative pros and cons for each mix were used + to call attention to the key assumptions underlying policy rationale for + each. The brevity of the paper was useful in stimulating review of + alternative US/SU/East European + relationships, but most discussants thought it made the assumptions + appear too stark, and without the nuance that, as it turned out, most + thought characterize US-East European relations.

+

Viable, coherent policy alternatives toward Eastern Europe were felt to + be difficult to develop because of both domestic and international + constraints. Although it was agreed that at the extremes of policy + Western Europe is obliged to follow the U.S. lead, it was also felt that we are presently in the + middle ground and therefore much less influential in shifting the mix of + cooperation and competition. For example, European East-West trade is + much larger than US-East European trade. Consumerism is a much larger + issue in East Europe than in the SU, and + East European politics are more sensitive to economic pressures. The + relatively small US-East European trade will thus probably be translated + into low political influence where consumerism is concerned.

+

Eastern Europe also has a “Western orientation” or “Western linkage” + which must be taken into account and which the Soviet Union lacks. These + historical and cultural ties vary in strength. The Western orientation + of East European countries, arranged in a descending rank order is: East + Germany; Poland; Czechoslovakia; Hungary; Romania; and Bulgaria. This + Western orientation acts to increase Western influence in East European countries and to limit policy + options developed by the West. Western orientation, rather than + consumerism, could turn out to be the most important long-term factor in + US-Soviet relations where the East Europeans are concerned.

+

Events in Eastern Europe have some impact on Soviet foreign and domestic + policy. For example, experiments in Poland and Hungary will influence + the Soviets. Criticisms of the Soviets by the West European Communist + parties have had resonance in Eastern Europe. We should be conscious of this indirect effect and should + take it into account in our policy.

+

The comment was made that if one reviews the trends from Eastern Europe + for the last five to ten years from a Soviet perspective, they all seem + bad. And the Soviets are not facing up to the problem, by one + interpretation. By another, the squeaky wheel is getting the grease. It + was suggested that it might be useful to try to identify those things + that are likely to get immediate Soviet attention; i.e., to identify the + ceiling above which Soviets won’t tolerate interference. There was + general agreement that the action or reaction (i.e. use of force) line + was getting fuzzier, but none doubted that the Soviets would act when + they deemed it necessary.

+

The fuzziness, or blurring of Soviet perceptions of what actions would be + tolerated, was viewed as good. The Soviets are still going to be + vigilant in areas where they feel the US is pushing greater autonomy for + Eastern Europe. All agreed that US policies had to include initiatives + that would fall within the fuzzy area and succeed by not ruffling Soviet + feathers.

+

There was disagreement about the types of initiatives that would meet + this criterion. Some felt that the Soviets would not allow any move by + the Eastern European countries that would slacken the Soviet control of + their economies or planning processes, and that any help given to + Eastern European economies would eventually filter back to the Soviet + Union and work to the US’s detriment. Another body of opinion held that + the Soviets would welcome the movement of some of their East European + problem children (in the economic sense) into an international framework + that would impose some economic discipline without excessively + increasing the autonomy of Eastern Europe. IMF membership for Poland was given as an example, but + doubt was expressed that either Warsaw or Moscow could permit genuine + IMF discipline to interfere with + Polish central planning and CMEA regional trade schemes.

+

A similar disagreement concerned the linkage between technology transfer, + economic growth, and military capability. Some argued that there was a + direct linkage, i.e., that more technology transfer led to more economic + growth and inevitably to greater military capabilities; others that military investment + decisions depended more on the international context than on the + availability of new technology from the West.

+

A final area of discussion was how to handle the inevitable + confrontations between the US and the SU + in Eastern Europe. There was general agreement that we should be more + ambiguous about our exact course of action than we have been in the past + (specifically at the time of Czechoslovakia), and that we should allude + to the political costs of possible Soviet actions. Using Radio Free + Europe more advantageously in such endeavors was mentioned. The + possibility of increasing ethnic interactions (i.e., playing on the + Western orientation) and using any influence gained therefrom was also + suggested.

+

Several items not directly related to the day’s topic of discussion were + mentioned:

+

1. Most thought it very useful to have a short period of general + conversation before focussing on the agenda item. It was tentatively + agreed to use the time while lunch was being eaten for this purpose.

+

2. Topics suggested for future meetings included: U.S. relations with the GDR, including the impact of U.S. intra-agency organizational structure on policy + development; the Exim Bank, and + particularly opinions on the Stevenson initiatives;Senator Adlai Stevenson III (D-Illinois) scheduled a + number of hearings in the Senate in support of an expansion of the + role of the Export-Import Bank. ethnicity and national + minorities in the USSR and Eastern + Europe; and the relationship of technology transfer to economic growth + and military power in East-West relations.

+
+ +
+ + 23. Memorandum for the Special Coordination CommitteeSource: National Security Council, + Carter Administration Intelligence Files, Box I–020, Minutes SCC Intelligence 1978. Secret; + Sensitive. There is no evidence that the program was specifically + discussed in the SCC. The Summary + of Conclusions of the May 16 meeting, approved by Aaron on May 22, make no mention of + the Publication and Distribution program. (Ibid.) + + + Washington, May 14, + 1978 + + + SUBJECT + Annual Review of Ongoing Covert Action Activities as Required by + Executive Order 12036Executive Order + 12036 assigned responsibility for special activities or covert + action to the CIA and required + an annual review by the SCC of + ongoing special activities. (Section 1–306 (a)) + +

[Omitted here is information unrelated to Eastern Europe.]

+

SOVIET AND EAST EUROPEAN BOOK DISTRIBUTION

+

1. STATUS:

+

The ongoing program for distributing uncensored literature to the Soviet + Union and East Europe was last reviewed by the SCC in February 1977 and approved by the President on 5 + March 1977. Following the SCC review, + CIA was directed to submit + proposals for expanding the program, which resulted in an augmented + budget for FY 78 of [dollar amount not declassified]. These funds provide for the + publishing and distribution of books and periodicals, support to emigre + organizations for the same purpose, and human rights publicity. An + important accomplishment of the modest latter program was continued + publication of a newsletter to help coordinate activities of human + rights groups in Western Europe. Distribution statistics from the major + book distribution activity for the six month period 1 December 1977–30 + May 1978 show an increase of 40% over the same period of last year. + Projected over a 12 month period we estimate a total distribution of + 245,000 books by this one activity, as opposed to 175,000 in the + previous year. Financial assistance is being given to a major Russian + emigre publishing house, and one time assistance was given to a + Russian-language periodical to help it organize its financial status and + find outside backing; this was successful. A publishing asset will put + out 10 books in Russian and Polish in FY + 78, up from 6 in FY 77. As a result of + these and other initiatives, including the economic stimulus provided to + the Russian publishing market by the increased purchases of our book + distribution project, we expect a significant increase in the + publication of important books by the end of FY 78. Feedback from individuals in the East, travelers and recent emigres confirms + the program is having a strong impact.

+

2. PLANS:

+

The virtually insatiable demand in the Soviet Union and East Europe for + proscribed literature, inflation and the decline of the dollar’s + purchasing power constitute major challenges for the program. The FY 79 budget of [dollar + amount not declassified] does not mitigate these pressures, + hence it is proposed to augment the FY + 79 allocation by [2 lines not declassified] + through reprogramming of funds within CIA. For FY 80, the program + is budgeted at [dollar amount not declassified]. + This figure includes [dollar amount not + declassified] for book distribution; [dollar + amount not declassifed] for book publishing, [dollar amount not declassifed] for periodicals; [dollar amount not declassified] each to Ukrainian + and Russian emigre organizations for publishing and distribution; [dollar amount not declassified] for human rights + publicity; and [dollar amount not declassified] + for developmental activities.

+

[Omitted here is information unrelated to Eastern Europe.]

+
+ +
+ 24. Excerpt From the President’s Daily Brief + + + Washington, August + 31, 1978 + + +

[Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, President’s Daily + CIA Brief, Box 12, 8/30/78–9/6/78. + Top Secret. For the President Only. 2 pages not declassified.]

+ +
+ +
+ + 25. Memorandum From Robert + King of the National Security Council Staff to the + President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)Source: Carter Library, National Security Council, + Institutional Files, Box 16, PD–21. Secret; Eyes Only. Sent for + information. Larrabee + initialed the memorandum for King. + + + Washington, September + 1, 1978 + + + SUBJECT + Your Request for a Memorandum Detailing Policy in Eastern + Europe + +

RegReginald + Bartholomew. passed on your request to him and + Bill Quandt for a memo on + policy in the two areas. Reg asked that I handle Eastern Europe + separately.

+

1. Stages of U.S. + Policy Toward Eastern Europe. Since January 1977 there have + been three stages in U.S. policy. + Initially there was a period of caution as the new administration began + a general policy review. From January until the beginning of September, + no new initiatives with any of the East European countries were + undertaken, although previous European relationships were + maintained.

+

A more active and decisive stage became evident toward the end of the + summer of 1977. The PRM–9 review of + European issues included a section on Eastern Europe, and the final + PRC meeting on that aspect of + European policy was held at the end of August. The President signed + PD–21 on September 13See Document 16. which set the administration’s + policies—we would seek to work with East European governments to enhance + their international independence and increase the degree of internal + liberalization. In concrete terms this policy involved continuing to + give preferential treatment to Poland and Romania, improving relations + with Hungary through returning the Crown and negotiating a trade + agreement under appropriate conditions, but relations with Bulgaria, + Czechoslovakia, and the GDR would + remain limited until there is some progress in either independence or + liberalization although steps might be taken to put relations with these + three countries on a more normal basis.

+

Since the enunciation of that policy one year ago, our efforts have been + focused on carrying it out. The highlights have included the President’s + visit to Poland, the granting of $500 million in CCC credits to Poland + for the purchase of U.S. grain, + returning the Crown of St. Stephen to Hungary, negotiation of a U.S.-Hungarian Trade Agreement, including MFN, and welcoming Ceausescu here for a State visit.

+

With the Ceausescu visit and + ratification of the Hungarian Trade Agreement the specific policy + initiatives in PD–21 have been completed and we now seem to be entering + a period marked by a less active policy for Eastern Europe. State + Department East Europeanists are pushing to negotiate a Claims/Gold + agreement with Czechoslovakia and may want to consider discussions on + MFN with Bulgaria. There is some + interest in maintaining the momentum that we have built up to deal with + other outstanding issues toward the East European countries. The + difficulty, however, is that those countries with whom we could achieve + progress in our bilateral relations—Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, and the + GDR—have not exhibited the + international independence or the internal liberalization that would + justify such actions.

+

With Poland, Romania, and Hungary we have now about reached the limit of + what we can or would want to do. We should continue to work with Poland + on the debt problem, but beyond granting the Poles an additional large + CCC credit this year (and in future years) there is little more that we + can do. We are similarly limited with Romania and Hungary. High level + visits represent the most we can do in continuing to emphasize our + interest in the region. A Gierek + visit possibly in 1979 was mentioned during the President’s Warsaw stop, + and the Romanians are anxious to host the President in Bucharest. The + Hungarians would like to see Kadar in Washington, but such a visit would + create problems with Hungarian-Americans who are still smarting from the + return of the Crown. An invitation for a Kadar visit would best be + issued after 1980, with an official visit by Secretary Vance to Budapest and possibly one by + the Vice President as interim measures.

+

2. Your Role in Policy Formulation. You have + clearly played the dominant role in formulating our policy towards + Eastern Europe. Your background, expertise, and interest have given you + a much stronger and more authoritative voice in this area. Furthermore, + Eastern Europe is not a major focus of policy concern, thus other policy + players are not willing to spend their political capital to challenge + you in that area.

+

You have been largely responsible for conceptually framing the approach + to Eastern Europe, but you have also been active in initiating and + implementing specific actions (return of the Crown and Polish CCC + credits). Your role as the strongest advocate for increasing from $300 + to $500 million the total amount of CCC credit for Poland last December, + however, resulted in a certain degree of criticism. Because of your + Polish background, there was some muted feeling that you were playing + favorites. In the context of the President’s visit and the importance of + Poland, this was unjust. It would be useful in the future, however, to + appear less of an advocate on controversial matters which involve Poland. The European Bureau of + State and the Department of Commerce can take the lead, and they will + lead boldly if they have your support. If it becomes necessary to + reschedule the Polish debt there will be strong opposition from Treasury + and EB at State to a policy giving Poland benefits other debtor + countries do not enjoy. This issue is one on which you should avoid + taking the lead if possible.

+

3. Reflections on the Decision-Making Process: My + comments on the decision-making process are probably not unique to + Eastern Europe, although as an area of lower priority the problems with + the process may be more evident than in the areas of higher risks and + concerns.

+ + —Interagency papers that have formed the basis for decisions, + generally drafted in segments by several different agencies, have + tended to be too long and poorly integrated. They may be useful in + helping the working-level elements of various agencies to understand + the problems, but they do not seem to be helpful at higher levels in + informing and channeling discussion. + —The policy options tend to be less sharply defined than might be + desirable. The working level tend to round off the edges and fuzz + the sharpness of options in the search for consensus. + —While the policy process is never orderly and subject to neat + timetables, there tends to be too little time before decision + meetings to digest papers and even agenda, with the result that + principals are less well prepared than would be desirable. + +

The drafting of policy and options papers by a single agency with ample + opportunity for other agencies to comment and register dissents would + seem to be more useful and orderly mechanism.

+

4. Basic Documents. Appended to this paper is a + copy of PD–21, the principal statement of general policy toward Eastern + Europe.Not attached.

+
+ +
+ + 26. Paper Prepared in the Central Intelligence AgencySource: Central Intelligence Agency, + Office of Support Services (DI), Job 80T00634A, Production Case + Files (1978), Box 9, Folder 11, Dissidence in Eastern Europe (A + Research Paper), Secret/NF, Copies 23,51. Secret; [handling restriction not declassified]. The paper was + prepared in the Eastern European Division, Office of Regional and + Political Analysis. Paragraph classification and handling + restriction marks are handwritten. The paper included country + studies for Poland, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, and Romania. A + note on the paper indicates: “Hungary and Bulgaria are omitted, + since neither has exhibited significant dissent. Hungary remains + virtually untouched by dissidence” while dissidence in Bulgaria + “came to light only in March 1978 with the appearance of a + ‘Declaration 1978’ which claimed to speak for dissent group, ABD. + Whether such a group exists or what ABD means is not + known.” + + + RP 78–10293Washington, September + 1978 + + +

Dissidence in Eastern Europe

+

Key Points

+

• The new wave of dissidence in Eastern Europe last year, although now + considerably diminished, shows no signs of vanishing. It has been most + intense in Poland and Czechoslovakia, somewhat less so in Romania and + East Germany. (U)

+

• The dissidents, few in number, are generally outspoken, nonconformist + intellectuals. They have developed and sustained their causes and have + attracted some popular support, particularly in Poland, where those who + protest are relatively well organized and well led. (U)

+

• The East European regimes, however, have kept the domestic impact of + dissident activity within bounds. They have made it clear that a price + must be paid for active dissidence—loss of job, harassment, physical + abuse, police detention, or a jail sentence. There is no evidence that + the dissidents’ causes have been taken up by influential party or + government officials. (C)

+

• The formulation of regime policy toward dissent could, however, become + a serious source of discord within local leaderships, particularly as a + new generation of leaders displaces the old. The toleration of any + measure of dissent will remain a risky course, both for the national + leaders and for their relations with the USSR. (U)

+

[Omitted here is the Table of Contents.]

+

Dissidence in Eastern Europe

+

The Roots of Dissidence

+

The authoritarian systems in Eastern Europe invite dissent by continuing + to place a wide range of human endeavor within a political straitjacket, by refusing to tolerate + criticism, and by insisting that whatever change takes place be + initiated by an inherently conservative, bureaucratic structure. Above + all, the formal repudiation of the most onerous Stalinist controls has + made possible the systematic expression of dissent. (U)

+

The roots of dissident activity reach back into the mid-1950s and the + search for new political, social, and economic blueprints initiated by + Khrushchev’s denunciation of Stalinism. Many of today’s dissidents + either participated in, or are spiritual heirs of, those efforts to + revise ideology and the Stalinist system that was built in its name. The + present-day dissidents, unlike the earlier “revisionists,” do not + consider ideological reform as the key to systemic reform, but they do + seek, as did their predecessors, to expand the range of individual + freedoms allowed by the authorities. (U)

+

In the early days of de-Stalinization, dissent against various aspects of + the Stalinist system was generally tolerated and even officially + encouraged. Candid discussion and innovative proposals were permitted + both for their cathartic value and as proof that Stalinism had been + rejected. Over time, some of this activity became officially + unacceptable. “Dissidence” that went beyond the bounds set by local + Stalinist leaders still clinging to power or that led to “radical” + demands for freedoms was banned. (U)

+

In some instances, the advocates of reform became involved, willingly or + accidentally, in scheming against local Stalinist leaders by political + moderates, which was made possible by the concurrent political struggles + in the Soviet Union. In Poland, for example, revisionist Marxists like + Leszek Kolakowski publicly battled against dogmatism and helped bring to + power in 1956 a “reformist” party leader, Wladyslaw Gomulka. Similarly, + the fight by Hungarian writers to end censorship in late 1955 was + closely linked with the efforts by backers of reformer Imre Nagy to + bring down Stalinist party leader Matyas Rakosi. (U)

+

The spontaneous ferment of de-Stalinization was also at work in East + Germany and Czechoslovakia in the mid-1950s, albeit more subdued. In + East Germany, a young Marxist philosopher, Wolfgang Harich, led a small + group of party members in advocating economic and political reforms, + “true independence” (that is, an escape from Soviet hegemony) for East + Germany, and eventual reunification of the two German states. Unlike + developments in Poland and Hungary, however, the actions of the East + German dissidents were of little consequence. Harich made his move too + late (after the suppression of the Hungarian uprising when there was a + general turn to orthodoxy) and did not make common cause with party + chief Ulbricht’s opponents in the Politburo. (U)

+ +

Efforts after 1956 to suppress revisionism, and to tighten the allowable + bounds of de-Stalinization, gave rise to the first readily identifiable + dissidents, since many of the “revisionists” refused to abide by the new + restrictions. In Poland, where revisionism had run the deepest and where + many revisionists were for a time allowed to air their views in official + publications, Gomulka—initially considered a reformer—gradually followed + a more conservative course. By 1963 Gomulka’s retrenchment in the + cultural and ideological spheres prompted writers and other + intellectuals to react with what have become classic dissident tools. + (U)

+

In early 1964 well-known Polish intellectuals published the “Letter of + 34,” in which they protested censorship and other controls on book + publication. Jacek Kuron and Karol Modzelewski, two young Marxist + scholars who had studied under Kolakowski, subsequently circulated a + 90-page open letter criticizing Gomulka personally and calling for the + creation of a “true socialist state.” In May 1965 the Warsaw branch of + the Writers’ Association demanded that censorship be abolished. In + October 1966 Kolakowski commemorated the 10th anniversary of Gomulka’s + rise to power with a public condemnation of “repressions and lack of + democracy in Poland.” In reprisal he was expelled from the party. Other + writers who protested Kolakowksi’s expulsion were, in turn, also + expelled. Gomulka’s increasing problems with the dissident intellectuals + came to a head in early 1968, when a ban on staging a classic Polish + drama with anti-Russian overtones led to a writers’ “revolt” and to + student riots. Amidst an ensuing party factional crisis, Kolakowksi and + others were forced to emigrate, and many student leaders, including + Kuron and a newcomer to dissident activity, Adam Michnik, were jailed. + (U)

+

While Gomulka was tightening up in Poland, Czechoslovakia’s Stalinist + leader Novotny, under the pressure of Khrushchev’s second round of + de-Stalinization and the weight of a stagnating Czechoslovak economy, + belatedly undertook the de-Stalinization that he had avoided in the + mid-1950s. As in that earlier period, the general feeling that dogmatism + was being rejected, albeit in a hesitant way, encouraged spontaneous + talk of revisionist policy alternatives to prevailing neo-Stalinism. + Much of the pressure on Novotny to go further than he wanted came from + Slovak intellectuals and journalists, whose public criticisms and calls + for reform came to be viewed as “dissidence.” More important, these + dissident acts were probably encouraged by Slovak party leaders who + wanted to force Novotny to redeem a Slovak nationalism that had been + labeled bourgeois during the Stalinist purges. (U)

+

Novotny, beginning in 1963, presided over a relatively widespread + de-Stalinization that countenanced substantial revisionist discussion, + startling freedoms in the arts, and permitted, at least for a time, + considerable frankness in + the media. It was during this period that such revisionist theoreticians + as Zdenek Mlynar developed theories of how to build a “democratized” + Communism, ideas that were to be put in practice in 1968. The period + also had its outright dissidents who fell victim to Novotny’s periodic + efforts to retrench or at least to set limits to de-Stalinization. + (U)

+

In 1966 Novotny began to take a tougher stance toward nonconformist + intellectuals, especially the writers. In so doing, he was following the + lead of the Soviets, who in February of that year had tried and + convicted the nonconformist writers Sinyavskiy and Daniel. These trials + sent shock waves through the Soviet and East European intellectual + community and marked the beginning of sustained dissidence in the Soviet + Union. (U)

+

The East German regime also responded to the pressure of Khrushchev’s + second de-Stalinization with moderation of its cultural policies, but + with greater hesitation, abrupt policy shifts and considerably less + domestic effect than in Czechoslovakia. For example, the nonconformist + East German songster Wolf Biermann, who was criticized and stripped of + party membership in early 1963, was allowed to publish his poems and + perform his songs in 1964 and, in late 1965, was abruptly banned from + performing and was labeled an anti-Communist. Another victim of this + regime ambivalence was Robert Havemann, an eminent scientist who was + prohibited from teaching in 1964 and then retired in 1965 because of his + outspoken views. (U)

+

Many revisionist ideas were put into effect in Czechoslovakia during the + “Prague Spring” of 1968. Perhaps surprisingly, this institutionalization + of reform ideas did not lead to greater dissident pressures for similar + changes elsewhere in Eastern Europe. The Soviet-led Warsaw Pact quashing + of the Czechoslovak “experiment” in August was protested by dissidents + in other East European countries, but it also stifled hope that popular + agitation for a “humane” type of Communism would bear fruit. That hope + has been rekindled by the convergence of circumstances during the past + two years. (U)

+

New Stimuli to Dissident Activity

+

The 1975 Helsinki accord and efforts of the East European regimes to show + a measure of compliance with its human rights provisions raised some + popular expectation that authoritarian controls might be loosened, and + stimulated dissident efforts to that end. There was a widespread + anticipation among East Germans in the summer of 1976, for instance, + that because the accord signified “international recognition” of East + Germany, the regime could not, or would no longer, block foreign travel + on the grounds that travel was predicated on such “recognition.” (U)

+ +

Even more important, the decision to review implementation of the + Helsinki agreement in Belgrade in 1977 prompted some dissidents to + conclude that a Communist desire to show a good record in Belgrade might + make regimes susceptible to pressures for internal reforms. Other + dissidents were well aware that Moscow intended Helsinki to signify only + Western recognition of Soviet hegemony in Eastern Europe. As a result, + they apparently emphasized the human rights commitments of the accord as + a way of inducing the West to reconsider its support for the agreement + or at least to force the Soviets and their allies to observe human + rights as a price of Western recognition of Soviet hegemony over the + area. (U)

+

The calculation that pressure might lead to some changes for the better + was fortified by what many dissidents saw as important Soviet + concessions regarding national independence made to the “Eurocommunists” + at the Berlin conference of European Communist parties in June 1976. For + example, the East German dissident philosopher Robert Havemann, who + considers himself a Eurocommunist of the Spanish variety, seized upon + the conference as a vindication of his longtime advocacy of a Communist + system that included domestic pluralism and a “true” sovereignty in + foreign affairs. Some Polish dissidents also concluded that the time was + ripe for the East Europeans to strive for greater autonomy from Moscow. + Indeed, public, that is to say, dissident pressure was seen as an + effective way to lead the regime toward seeking “true sovereignty.” + (U)

+

The vigorous US human rights policy enunciated in early 1977 gave some + impetus to dissident activity and emboldened persons to speak out who + otherwise might have remained silent. Many dissidents probably welcomed + the US position because they believed it would help expose the + vulnerabilities of the East European regimes with regard to human + rights. Those who were already actively pressing a cause and considered + international attention important for both its success and their own + protection no doubt calculated that the US human rights policy would + serve these ends.This was not the unanimous + view, however. Other dissidents apparently were wary of the American + policy and, recalling what they consider past US inconsistency + toward Eastern Europe, were skeptical that Washington would press + its objective with consistency or determination. Those who consider + themselves Communist reformers rejected the helping hand of a + “capitalist” state for ideological reasons; others felt vulnerable + to charges of being “agents of imperialism.” [Footnote is in the + original.] (U)

+

East European dissidents were also encouraged by publicity and support + from West European media, politicians and government leaders, public + organizations, influential intellectuals, and maverick Communist parties.For some dissidents, support by Eurocommunists has + not been consistent enough. Thus, a prominent Czechoslovak dissident + publicly acknowledged Eurocommunist support, but said that it “could + be more effective and courageous.” He called on the West European + Communist parties to publish political material by exiled East + Europeans and to establish direct contacts with dissidents in the + East. [Footnote is in the original.] This support has + generally been a consequence of the US initiative, of a naturally keen + interest in developments close to home, and of domestic and regional + political pressures. Some, particularly East European, emigres may have + seen in the US-led, Western human rights campaign evidence of a new, + more confrontational policy toward Eastern Europe, which they welcomed. + (U)

+

Against this international backdrop, region-wide trends and developments + in individual countries gave a direct stimulus to dissidence. By + mid-1976 many dissidents were undoubtedly aware that all of the Warsaw + Pact countries faced difficult economic problems, and probably + calculated that the regimes were thus more vulnerable to pressures for + concessions. (U)

+

The economic factor was most important in Poland, where the workers’ + riots in June 1976 dramatized popular dissatisfaction and revealed the + regime’s political weaknesses. Polish dissidents had already become more + active by late-1975, when they were successful in modifying + government-proposed changes in the constitution. In September 1976 they + seized upon the issue of the release of imprisoned rioters to show the + need for political reform.Polish leader + Gierek’s talk, in the + immediate wake of the riots, about the need for “democratization” + probably helped some dissidents to believe that chances for reform + were good. As time passed, however, the regime talked less about the + need for political changes. [Footnote is in the original.] + This attracted popular support and, in turn, helped stimulate other + dissident activity in Poland and, perhaps, elsewhere in Eastern Europe. + (U)

+

In Czechoslovakia, the well-publicized Charter 77 manifesto was triggered + by the publication in the Czechoslovak press in the fall of 1976 of the + UN human rights covenants. + Czechoslovak dissent, in general, has been fed by the despair of those + reformers who had been purged and ostracized since 1968. Many of these + persons may have gained new hope that the stagnating economy would impel + the leadership to rehabilitate, among others, purged economic and + managerial functionaries. In East Germany, Rudolf Bahro’s wide-ranging + critique in August 1977 of the “system’s” deficiencies examined at + length the country’s economic shortcomings. (U)

+

Who Are the Dissidents?

+

The dissident activists in Eastern Europe have traditionally come from + the educated, articulate stratum of society, a broadly defined intelligentsia. They are + politically dedicated, idealistic men and women of all ages whose zeal + and commitment make them willing to pay the substantial personal price + that the regimes exact for openly nonconformist behavior. (U)

+

The broad spectrum is evident in the Polish dissident ranks, which + includes academicians, lawyers, writers, journalists, retired + non-Communist politicians and soldiers, Catholic priests, and university + students. In East Germany, the voices of dissent have been + scientists-turned-political philosophers, popular entertainers, writers, + and frustrated emigrants. Czechoslovak dissidents, largely those persons + who helped generate or implement the reform ideas of 1968, include + philosophers, writers, dramatists, entertainers, and politicians. In + Romania, aside from a few writers and scholars and a group of Baptist + clergy, the majority of dissidents have been would-be emigrants or, more + recently, members of discontented national minorities. (U)

+

While the dissidents have had some success in expanding their numbers, + they have generally failed to enlarge their circleAn unknown hand underlined “failed to enlarge their + circle” in this sentence. of political activists beyond a + small portion of the intelligentsia and have been unsuccessful in + politicizing other segments of the population. [classification not declassified]

+

The most success at attracting a broader following has been evident in + Poland. One dissident group initially championed a cause—help for and + the release of jailed workers—that garnered considerable popular + support. This and another dissident organization have enlisted students + into dissident work and may have won popular good will through efforts + to counsel people about their everyday problems. The second group also + claims to have financial backing and considerable moral support from + private farmers (an important class in Poland where three-quarters of + the farms are in private hands) and retired, probably World War II, + military veterans.An unknown hand underlined + “financial backing and considerable moral support from private + farmers,” “and retired,” and “military veterans” in this sentence + and wrote “STATE MEMCON” in the + left-hand margin next to it. Some of the changes that Polish + dissidents advocate are looked on favorably, if passively, by liberal + members of the Communist Party establishment. Despite considerable + effort, however, the Polish dissidents have not enlisted much worker + support. The influential Catholic Church, moreover, has not backed them, + even though some Catholic priests, seeking to win greater religious + freedom, are also dissidents. [classification not + declassified]

+

Despite the rapid increase in the number of Czechoslovak dissidents, they + continue to be mostly drawn from the intelligentsia. In Romania, Goma’s + “following,” swelled from seven to 300 in less than six months. This was largely illusory, + however, because most persons subscribed purely as a device to get out + of the country. (U)

+

There are a number of reasons why dissidents fail to attract meaningful + support. The vast majority of East Europeans obviously considers the + personal cost of participation far too high and believes there is only a + slim chance that dissident activity can produce change. Political apathy + and anti-intellectualism among workers and a frequent aloofness among + intellectuals are the major factors that have kept these two key + segments of society apart. The regimes naturally exploit and encourage + these attitudes. Liberals within the establishment intelligentsia may + sympathize with certain dissident objectives but, more than likely, they + consider many of the goals and methods unrealistic, if not dangerous. + Those dissidents who have long been open critics are sometimes viewed, + justifiably or not, as gadflies, whose failure to produce change is + proof of their futility. (U)

+

Frequent personal and philosophical differences among dissidents have + weakened their overall cause. This diversity and disunity helps in part + to explain why some in the regimes are relatively tolerant of + dissidents; a fragmented movement cannot draw wide support. (U)

+

What Do They Want?

+

The dissidents seek a variety of changes in the existing systems of rule + in Eastern Europe. Some advocate sweeping reforms that would in fact + constitute revolutionary changes in the way the Communist systems + function. While none of the dissidents challenge outright the leading + role of the party, as this would make them vulnerable to charges of + treason, some of the dissidents, notably those associated with one of + the leading Polish groups, incline strongly toward West European + Christian democratic views. Those pressing for the broadest changes + include most Polish dissidents, some East Germans, and many Czechoslovak + Chartists. Their political platforms typically embrace the following + demands: (U)

+ +

• A “real” multiparty system or some formal mechanism for greater + interest group representation within a one-party system (usually, + but not always explicitly, within a so-called Communist + framework).

+

• The abolition or significant relaxation of censorship.

+

• The reduction of centralized, bureaucratic controls, especially in + the economic and government administrative spheres.

+

• Greater independence from the USSR. Nonetheless, most dissidents recognize, however + reluctantly, the imposed necessity of some type of close + relationship with the Soviet Union.

+

• Respect for human and civil rights already delineated in domestic + laws and international accords signed by East European governments. + (U)

 + +

Aside from the “programmatic” dissidents, there are those who seek more + modest changes. Thus, the Romanian Goma speaks out for a + de-Stalinization patterned after what he calls the “livable life” in + Hungary and Poland. Many of the Czechoslovak dissidents want + rehabilitation—not necessarily of their political views, but of + themselves and their families—and the opportunity to live a more normal + life. Then there are the more narrowly focused “one issue” dissidents + such as the East German writers, who want more freedom to write what + they wish, and the Romanian Baptists, who want more freedom to preach. + Finally, there have been some, such as many signatories of Romanian + writer Goma’s manifesto, who have taken to dissent as a device to + facilitate emigration. (U)

+

Several prominent dissidents—the East Germans Havemann and Biermann, the + Hungarian Agnes Heller, and the Czechoslovak Zdenek Mlynar—consider + themselves ideological brethren of the Eurocommunists. Others—such as + the Poles Kolakowski and Michnik—are skeptical that Eurocommunism will + turn out to be different from the Communism practiced in the Warsaw Pact + states. Nonetheless, all have welcomed the Eurocommunists’ support in + the struggle for more independence from the Soviets. (U)

+

The dissidents frequently differ on ways to bring about change. The East + German Bahro, for example, appeals to “men of conscience” within the establishment to work for change. Some + Polish dissidents believe popular pressure on the leadership can induce + it to initiate reforms. Other Poles do not believe the system can reform + itself and have tried to establish a de facto pluralism by founding, + without regime approval, publications, groups, and societies that speak + to and on behalf of specific interest groups. The Polish dissidents so + far claim to be satisfied with these small steps which they feel will + slowly erode regime control. They have shunned violence, realizing that + this would give the regime cause for repression and would dissipate the + limited public support they now enjoy. (U)

+

Some dissidents have formed secret organizations to avoid regime + reprisals. A secret Polish group,An unknown + hand wrote “STATE MEMCON” in the + left-hand margin next to the first two sentences in this + paragraph. [6 lines not declassified]. + In East Germany, the anonymous manifestos that appeared early this year + claimed to represent the views of amorphous groups but, more than + likely, were the work of a very few individuals. [classification and handling restriction not declassified]

+

Such secret groups can presumably exist for a long time because their + members pay little or no personal cost for belonging. They could also play an important role + during a period of political transition, when uncertainty and change are + in the air. Generally, however, anonymous dissent has little impact, if + only because there is a tendency among the population to view it as a + possible police provocation. (U)

+

There has thus far been little active cooperation and almost no advance + coordination among dissidents in different East European countries. The + few known instances of such contacts across national boundaries have + usually been instigated by Polish dissidents. [less + than 1 line not declassified] group has periodic contacts with + dissidents in the USSR.An unknown hand highlighted this sentence in the + left-hand margin. The most brazen and ambitious effort at + cooperation occurred in August 1978, when Polish and Czechoslovak + dissidents met in southern Poland to discuss possible joint actions and + then issued a communique.The Poles + apparently consider this as the first in a series of cooperative + efforts. They have also been trying to encourage Hungarian dissident + intellectuals to become outspoken and to use samizdat publications to express their views. [Footnote is + in the original.] [classification not + declassified]

+

Nonetheless, many dissidents see disadvantages in such personal contact. + It is difficult to arrange, and may expose dissidents to serious legal + charges, such as conspiracy. Any attempt at coordinated actions across + national boundaries would arouse deep suspicion in Moscow and induce + Soviet pressure on the East Europeans to crack down. Existing evidence + that dissidents respond to or imitate the activities of dissidents + elsewhere in the region most often indicates only that they are well + informed of each others’ activities by Western media broadcasts. (U)

+

Impact of Dissent

+

The dissidents have not altered in any fundamental way the East European + regimes’ style of rule, nor have they induced the governments to adopt + more conciliatory domestic policies. If anything, there has been a + shift—slight in Poland, pronounced in Czechoslovakia—toward tougher + internal controls. Indeed, the dissidents seem to have brought upon + themselves varying degrees of harassment and repression. Nor has + dissidence helped generate serious political discord within the party + leadership that could provide the vehicle for political change.An unknown hand underlined this sentence and + wrote “1” in the left-hand margin next to it. The “1” corresponds to + a handwritten note at the bottom of the page that reads + “ANALYSIS.” [classification not + declassified]

+

Nonetheless, the mere existence of dissidence has been an embarrassment + to regimes that insist on making a show of unanimous popular support and + try to conceal the repressive features of their system. At least initially, dissent confronted the + regimes with a challenge that had to be assessed and kept within + bounds.An unknown hand underlined this + phrase and wrote “2” in the left-hand margin corresponding to + “VARIOUS STATE CABLES” at the bottom of the page. It has + probably caused some differences within leaderships over tacticsAn unknown hand underlined this + phrase. to be used in muzzling dissent, although these + differences have not been obvious or persistent. The more organized + dissidents—those in Poland and Czechoslovakia—probably created some + strains, albeit limited, between the regime and segments of the populace + by strengthening endemic popular antipathy toward such institutions as + the police, bureaucracy, and the censor. The dissidents frequent use of + legalistic tactics in challenging regime practices has made the + authorities, in turn, more attentive to legal procedures in dealing with + the dissidents. [classification not + declassified]

+

The dissidents’ protests against repressive and restrictive regime + policies—including tough police countermeasures that substantiated the + initial allegations—provided an issue that, within the context of the + Helsinki review process and the US emphasis on human rights issues, + placed the East European regimes on the defensive in foreign affairs. + How best to throttle dissent reportedly caused some differences for a + time between the Soviets and East Europeans.An unknown hand underlined “reportedly caused some + differences for a time between the Soviets and East Europeans” in + this sentence. The Soviets have clearly been inclined toward + a more heavy-handed approach than most of their East European + allies.An unknown hand wrote + “ANALYSIS” in the margin below this and the next four + paragraphs. [classification and handling + restriction not declassified]

+

Some of the East European regimes clearly saw dissent as a potentially + troublesome obstacle to their desire to maintain or expand economic and, + in some cases, political relations with the United States. Consequently, + the regimes’ handling of dissident activity appears in some limited ways + to have taken the US human rights interest into account. The Polish + decision in February 1977 to grant amnesty to workers jailed the + previous summer in connection with disturbances over proposed price + increases was announced less than a week after the United States + expressed concern for Soviet and Czechoslovak dissidents. The move was + an unexpected capitulation to dissident demands, and was probably + intended to enhance Warsaw’s image in Washington and reduce the + possibility that the dissident question might intrude on bilateral + relations. To be sure, Poland has consistently handled its dissidents + more subtly than most other East European states, but the regime’s moves + probably reflected more its concern with domestic political factors than a wish to please the United + States. [classification not declassified]

+

Similarly, the Hungarian regime’s decision not to punish 30 would be + dissidents who in February 1977 supported the Czechoslovak Chartists may + have been taken in the hope that this would deter the creation of a + dissident movement that could have an adverse impact on relations with + Washington. Budapest clearly hoped that the new US administration would + be more inclined than its predecessors to return Hungarian national + treasures and grant Hungary most-favored-nation trading status. The + Hungarian decision to invite American religious leader Billy Graham to + Hungary in late 1976 was unquestionably intended to draw attention to + Budapest’s relatively moderate domestic policies at a time of sharply + increased dissident activity elsewhere in Eastern Europe. [classification not declassified]

+

The Romanian regime was acutely concerned that US attention to human + rights could impede renewal of its most-favored-nation status. More + importantly, Bucharest was worried that this might set back its “special + relationship” with Washington that has been of major political use in + fending off the Soviets. As a consequence, the Romanians—except for a + brief crackdown in the spring of 1977, when they apparently feared that + there would be a dramatic increase in dissidence—have encouraged + dissidents to emigrate. The Ceausescu regime has not shown, however, an inclination + to adopt more enlightened domestic policies, and remains perhaps the + most repressive in Eastern Europe. The regime has privately played down + agitation for increased cultural and linguistic rights by the Hungarian + minority, calling it a Moscow-inspired, Budapest-engineered tactic to + tar Romania’s image. [classification not + declassified]

+

The Czechoslovak Government, despite its interest in settling several + longstanding bilateral issues with the United States, has not moderated + in any way its “hard-line” inclinations and has almost completely + ignored US sensitivities when dealing with its dissidents. [classification not declassified]

+

Western publicity and support for dissidents has been largely responsible + for whatever successes and impact the dissenters have made. Media + coverage of their activities, when relayed back into Eastern Europe, has + provided important, if indirect lines of communication between + dissidents within a country and across national boundaries. This + coverage has bolstered morale and has often been the only way for the + dissidents’ cause to be publicized within their own country. As a + consequence, most dissidents have made a special effort to funnel news + to the West. Most frequently, their “connections” have been friends and + colleagues who have emigrated: Poles in London and Paris, Romanians in + Paris, East Germans in West Germany, and Czechoslovaks in Rome and + Vienna. [classification not declassified]

+ +

OutlookAn unknown + hand wrote “ANALYSIS” next to this section title.

+

Although dissident activity in many East European countries has declined + considerably since early 1977, it is likely to persist throughout the + region. Many of the factors that propelled the recent surge of dissent + will still be at work. Economic problems may worsen and provide + dissidents with renewed hope that some of their proposals for political + reform will be heeded by regimes weakened by or preoccupied with + dissatisfied consumers. While such hopes may be misplaced, the + combination of dissident pressures and a sluggish economy could create + acute domestic instability. [classification not + declassified]

+

The situation is especially acute in Poland, where intense popular + dissatisfaction over consumer supplies is likely to continue over the + next several years, and where dissidents see their job of pressing for + political change as a long-term endeavor. In Czechoslovakia, recent + dissident activity has been tied to the 10th anniversary in August of + the Soviet-led invasion, but it will continue to exist at least as long + as the regime fails to come to terms with the large number of people who + were purged after 1968. The dilemma for the Prague regime—how to + rehabilitate people without rehabilitating their ideas—is complex, and + may be unsolvable without changes in the leadership. In Romania, the + direct link between dissidence and emigration that was established last + year should help perpetuate dissent in a country where a spartan and + harshly totalitarian life makes emigration particularly attractive. [classification not declassified]

+

Other factors that could perpetuate and intensify East European + dissidence include:

+ + • A difficult leadership succession problem in the USSR that engenders either hope for + moderate policies or fear of orthodoxy. + • Continued political sparring between the Soviets and the + Eurocommunists. + • The second Helsinki accords review conference to be held in + Madrid in 1980. This will remain a factor even though the + dissidents’ expectations may have been reduced by the limited + accomplishments of the Belgrade review conference. + • The continued unsettling effect of Western contacts with, and + presence in, the region. The area’s economic needs argue against any + cutback in Western ties. + • Uncertainties surrounding the succession to Tito in Yugoslavia. [classification not declassified] + +

On the personal level, the camaraderie of the struggle, the excitement of + matching wits with the authorities, and the hope that is renewed by even a small success will + also propel dissident actions. [classification not + declassified]

+

The authorities may calculate, perhaps with reason, that time is on their + side in the contest. The psychological and personal financial price that + dissidents have to pay is difficult for most to bear for a sustained + period. Their failure to get results not only adds to their personal + discouragement, but makes it difficult to maintain popular interest. + [classification not declassified]

+

At least in Poland, however, the dissidents can already claim to have + accomplished much, and are working to secure more. If they continue to + be allowed relative freedom, their activity could give rise to the claim + that a new norm of what is allowable has been wrested from the regime. + This, in turn, could encourage other dissidents in Eastern Europe to + emulate the Poles, a prospect that could be destabilizing for the area + as a whole. A prolonged period of active Polish dissent would increase + the risk that chance and miscalculation could lead to violence and + possibly to a Soviet intervention. [classification not + declassified]

+

At present, East European dissidents can be seen most properly as a small + hard core of political “radicals” who do not have the popular support or + political leverage to force a change in any of the East European states + or to effect a national uprising. Unlike many of the “revisionists” and + dissidents of the past, they do not have access to the official media, + and are not operating in an environment of acute political discord. The + motive force for abrupt political change has most frequently been + political factionalism within the establishment (Nagy versus Rakosi; + Gomulka versus Ochab; the Slovaks versus Novotny). Dissidence, when it + preceded such change, was an indicator of existing political disarray + and, frequently, a tool of factional maneuvering. If history is any + guide, dissidence will come to play an important role in forcing + political change only when it combines with economic problems that + acutely affect the consumer and at a time of political upheaval within + the ruling elite. [classification not + declassified]

+

[Omitted here are the country-specific Table of Contents and country + studies for Poland, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, and Romania.]

+
+ +
+ + 27. Memorandum From Stephen + Larrabee of the National Security Council Staff to the + President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, + Brzezinski Material, + Brzezinski Office File, + Subject Chron File, Box 59, Administration’s Policy: NSC: 1978. Secret. Sent for + information. + + + Washington, October + 25, 1978 + + + SUBJECT + Priorities, Emerging Issues and Initiatives + +

EASTERN EUROPE

+

1. Basic Priorities

+

Relations with Romania, Poland and Hungary have visibly improved. This + improvement has underscored our desire to move forward with countries + that have either edged away from the Soviet Union in foreign policy or + have shown a significant degree of internal liberalization. In contrast + to past, East European countries have been treated as countries in their + own right, not just as appendages of the Soviet Union.

+

2. Emerging Issues

+ + —The major emerging issue is the question of CCC credits to + Poland; a PRC meeting to discuss + this issue is to be held in next weeks. + —The question of the Czech Gold/Claims issueSee Document 98. + is also looming on the horizon again; State has a number of task + forces working on it at present. The main problem remains getting + Senator Long to sign on. + —There is a need to put relations with Romania back on an even + keel in the aftermath of the Pacepa affair; your meeting with + Stefan Andrei at the end + of September was an important step in this direction.In July, Major General Ion Mihai Pacepa, the + Director of the Romanian Foreign Intelligence Directorate, and a + close adviser to Ceausescu, defected to the West while in West + Germany. He was granted asylum in the United States and was + placed in protective custody. See Document + 208. + —We should also pay heed to maintaining the momentum in U.S.-Hungarian relations begun with the + return of the crown. + +

Beyond this, there are a number of more general issues which should + receive some systematic attention:

+ + —how to deal with an increase of nationalism and dissent in + Eastern Europe, especially Poland, which may emerge in the aftermath + of Pope John Paul’s + investiture and if there is a succession crisis in the Soviet Union. In general, East + Europe is likely to be less quiescent than it has been in the first + 2 yrs of the Administration. + —growing instability in GDR.See Document + 126. + GDR has failed to stabilize to the + degree expected after signing of Basic Treaty in 1972. Unrest by + intellectuals is only part, if most visible, aspect of problem. + Church-State friction has escalated, and may continue to do [so] in + aftermath of Pope’s investiture, even though GDR is predominantly Protestant; youth + has become increasingly restless, and there has been increased + evidence of worker discontent as economic situation has deteriorated + over last few years. In short, despite orthodoxy of Honecker regime and strong ties to + Moscow, GDR remains a country to + watch. + +

3. New Initiatives

+ + —return Czech Gold + —visits to Hungary, Poland and Romania by high-level U.S. official, possibly Vice President + or Secretary of State, within context of trip to other + countries/region (such as Middle East). + —Gierek visit to U.S. + +
+ +
+ + 28. Memorandum From Director of Central Intelligence Turner to the President’s Assistant for + National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, + Horn/Special, Box 3, Chron File: 12/78. Secret. Henze forwarded the memorandum to + Brzezinski on December + 18. In his covering memorandum, Henze wrote: “The results are impressive. They are + typical of what can be done when long-established, professionally + run programs are given the opportunity to expand and the best + judgment of the people who are running them is taken as the basis of + judgment for what can be done.” Regarding the future plans for the + program in the coming years, Henze concluded: “By about 1981 it may be back at + the level it was at 10–15 years ago. Its effectiveness is likely to + be greater than it was then since the material available to be used + is better and the receptivity in the target countries + greater.” + + + Washington, December + 15, 1978 + + + SUBJECT + Progress Report on Publishing and Distributing Literature to the + Soviet Union and Eastern Europe + + + REFERENCES + A. My Memorandum of 13 March 78; Subject: Support for Russian + Emigre Publishing HouseSee footnote 2, Document + 20. + B. Your Memorandum of 18 March 78; Subject: Support for Russian + and East European Book PublishingNot + found. + +

1. Paragraphs 2–5 below summarize the use of the [less + than 1 line not declassified] earmarked specifically for an + increase in book publishing and distribution to the USSR and Eastern Europe.

+

2. The [less than 1 line not declassified] funds + were made available to our major book distribution mechanism in February + 1978. While all the funds were obligated prior to 1 October 1978, the + full impact on actual distribution cannot be measured accurately until + well into FY 79, as some of the books + purchased are still in the distribution pipeline. Since our operational + mechanism was largely in place, it was possible to utilize [less than 1 line not declassified] directly for + the purchase and distribution of books. Two preliminary indicators of + the effectiveness of the effort are: (A) 212,000 items were distributed + from 1 July 1977 to 30 June 1978 (115,000 to Soviets; 97,000 to Eastern + Europeans) as compared with a total of 175,000 for the same period the + previous year—an increase of 37,000 (21%); and (B) 122,000 items were + distributed in the period 1 January–30 June 1978 as compared with 90,000 + in the 1 July–31 December 1977 period—an increase of 32,000 (35%). [less than 1 line not declassified]

+ +

3. Further to paragraphs 3–5 of Reference A, in the spring of 1978 we + provided the first subsidy [less than 1 line not + declassified] to a prominent Russian-language publishing house + [less than 1 line not declassified]. With + these funds it was possible for them both to keep in business and to + plan the publication of approximately 12 titles of philosophical works + much in demand in the Soviet Union. [less than 1 line + not declassified]

+

4. Increased funding has allowed an increase in publication of + Russian-language books to provide a wider choice of materials available + for infiltration into the Soviet Union. Two major works have now + appeared, and four additional titles are in the process of being + published. Three or four more titles will appear by the end of the year, + including the initial volume of what is to be a major historical series. + At the same time, in order to exploit more fully increased political + activism in Poland, eight additional titles are in various stages of + publication in the Polish language. Five volumes have already appeared + and have been distributed. The demand for written materials in Poland is + high, [2 lines not declassified] which + facilitates distribution. Russian and Polish editions of works of + current importance in Western thought are now being given active + consideration. [less than 1 line not + declassified]

+

5. Although tighter controls exist in Czechoslovakia than in Poland + (especially during the tenth anniversary of the invasion) many + manuscripts have been smuggled out of Czechoslovakia. The additional + funds were used to publish more of these materials in a Czech-language + journal and to publish an additional issue of this journal. Part of the + funds were also used in an effort to increase internal distribution. + [less than 1 line not declassified]

+

6. [6 lines not declassified] that our literature + is distributed widely in both East Europe and the USSR.

+

7. The preparation of this report was delayed because of the need to + collate information received through a number of outside contacts—[1 line not declassified].

+

All portions of this document are SECRET.

+ + Stansfield + Turner + +
+ +
+ + 29. Memorandum From Paul Henze + of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for + National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, + Horn/Special, Box 3, Chron File: 1/79. Secret. Sent for + action. + + + Washington, January + 23, 1979 + + + SUBJECT + CIA’s Soviet and East European + Book and Publications Program (S) + +

[name not declassified] of CIA has just sent me (without going + through Turner) an extremely + interesting report prepared by [name not + declassified] on the book distribution program targeted at the + Soviet Union (TAB B).Attached but not + printed is a January 22 memorandum from [name not + declassified] to Henze to share with Brzezinski. The memorandum noted: “The program is + moving forward in a most positive way [text not + declassified]. Thanks to your ability to keep the funds + flowing.” The report was not attached and not found. On October 18, + 1978, two days after Cardinal Woytyla was elected Pope, [name not declassified] had called Henze to tell him that “among the + recipients of [name not declassified] book + mailings to Eastern Europe had been Cardinal Woytyla.” Henze informed Brzezinski that [name not declassified] had been sending the Cardinal + “considerable quantity of material in both Polish and English, including Kultura and Kronika + articles” and that [name not declassified] + received a postcard from the Cardinal thanking him for the mailings. + (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, + Horn/Special, Box 2, Chron File: 10/78) It demonstrates that + the Soviet program is maturing and showing increase of effectiveness in + depth. [name not declassified] principal theme is + the way in which responses from the Soviet Program are beginning to + exhibit the same patterns as the East European program did at an earlier + period in its development. The report provides encouraging evidence of + the sophistication and refinement of this program and demonstrates that + we have here an undertaking on which we can build and expand almost + indefinitely. I recommend you leaf through the first few pages and note + the passages I have underlined in red. (S)

+

In the light of this highly positive report, it is distressing, as I + mentioned to you in a recent Evening Report,In a January 19 Evening Report to Brzezinski, Henze reported that Turner had accepted [text not + declassified] in the Soviet and East European book program + for the 1980 fiscal year. (Carter Library, National Security + Affairs, Staff Material, Horn/Special, Box 6, Evening Reports File: + 1–6/79) to discover that Turner has accepted OMB’s unimaginative dictum on this program—ruling out any + further expansion in 1980 or beyond. A program such as this contributes + as much to our national defense as any of our weaponry—besides which its + costs are chicken feed. The SCC + endorsed your recommendation for continued expansion in the summer of + 1977See Document 17. and + this recommendation has never been altered. To smoke out Turner (who has probably not actually + given this program any serious thought) I recommend you send him the + attached memorandum (TAB A)Attached but not + printed is an undated draft memorandum from Brzezinski to Turner requesting a report on the + accomplishments to date of the Eastern Europe Book Publishing and + Distribution Program and a summary of plans for future + implementation of the effort. asking for a status report. + When that comes ([name not declassified] will + ensure that it makes the points we need made) we can take up the issue + of reprogramming funds to cover continued expansion. (S)

+

RECOMMENDATION

+

That you sign the attached memorandum to Turner (TAB A).Although a + signed copy of the memorandum has not been found, a subsequent + memorandum indicated it was sent on January 26. See Document 32.

+ +
+ +
+ 30. Paper Prepared in the Department of StateSource: National Archives, RG 59, Office of the Secretariat Staff, + Official Working Papers, S/P + Director Anthony Lake, + 1977–Jan 1981, Lot 82D298, Box 11, Classified Correspondence, 1979, + M–Z. Confidential. Sent under a February 7 covering letter from + Anthony Lake to Ronaldo + Sandenberg, Special Adviser to the Foreign Minister for Political + and Economic Affairs in the Bilateral Area in the Ministry of + External Affairs of Brazil. + + + Washington, undated + +

EASTERN EUROPE, THE SOVIET UNION AND FOREIGN POLICY + AUTONOMY

+

I. Soviet/East European + Political Framework

+

1. The Kremlin considers a stable, obedient East European buffer zone, + reasonably free of Western influence, to be essential to Soviet + security. This applies especially to the GDR.

+

2. While relatively quiescent in the aftermath of the 1968 Czechoslovak + invasion, East Germany and the regimes of East Europe remain potentially + unstable and politically unpopular. Moreover, the Soviets are well aware + of the ultimate contradiction between East European nationalism and Russian control. Moscow + therefore has shown limited tolerance for either “destalinization” or + “desatellization.”

+

3. In this situation, the Russians also are continuing to press for + tighter economic integration in Comecon and military integration in the Warsaw Pact. + Moreover, the Soviets seem intent, as a counter to increased East-West + contacts, on tightening up internal discipline in Russia and in Eastern + Europe.

+

4. Nonetheless, the actual exercise of control over the countries of + Eastern Europe has not proven to be easy for Moscow. Beyond the broader + forces of nationalism, East European instability has become an + increasing possibility. This is due to the expansion of East-West + relations, and, in particular, to the economic factor, CSCE, China and the effects of + “Eurocommunism” and ideological ferment.

+

5. The Economic Factor. East Europeans are + straining to pay for higher-priced oil and other imports from the USSR as well as Western advanced + technology, raw materials, and semi-manufactures necessary to modernize + and expand their industries. Their export earnings are far from + adequate. Thus far, the very large growth in imports from the West has + been financed by massive hard currency borrowing. East European and + Soviet hard currency indebtedness has risen sharply, and the debt + service ratios of several countries are being watched closely by + creditors. The post-1973 Western inflation/recession has contributed + further to the surge in East European hard currency trade deficits. + Unless East European exports can be greatly increased, trade will + stagnate and it will be difficult for these countries to satisfy rising + consumer expectations. This could produce further political instability + in some East European regimes which have tried to gain popular support + through the satisfaction of consumer demand.

+

6. CSCE. The + Helsinki Final Act provisions on human rights have had considerable + psychological impact in Eastern Europe, stirring Soviet and East + European leadership concerns. They were cited, for example, not only by + the “Charter 77” dissidents in Prague but also by the vast majority of + the estimated 100,000 or more East Germans who have sought to emigrate + legally to the West.

+

7. China. The enhanced international role of China + and Peking’s independent stand in the communist world poses serious + problems for Moscow. Deepening Chinese relations with the U.S., Western Europe and Japan have + generated some Soviet concerns. The USSR is thus all the more likely to oppose most efforts at + political innovation in Eastern Europe as threatening to its own + interests.

+

8. “Eurocommunism”/Ideological Ferment. The stands + of the Italian, French and Spanish communist parties, and the positions + of the Yugoslav and Romanian regimes, have had a marked effect on + intellectuals and more independent-minded party members in Eastern + Europe. These developments, + together with the obvious irrelevance of the ruling ideology—both + morally and in terms of pragmatic governing—are likely to be an + important source of continuing tension in the Soviet Union and in East + European states. This ferment so far has been limited largely to + intellectuals and generally presents no genuine security problem. + However, Soviet worry about how such ideas could infect East European + ruling parties has contributed to Moscow’s rigid attitude toward CSCE implementation.

+

9. These factors of economic decline and frustrated political + “possibilities” have increased the sense of popular dissatisfaction with + East European regimes. As a result, the next decade may see a rise in + social and political tensions there. These occasionally may take the + form of civil disturbances. The most likely pattern will be one of + increased pressure on the party leadership by elite groups, both within + and outside of the party, to permit some devolution of power to more + “modern” elements in society. Such long-term political dynamics will be + viewed with great concern in Moscow.

+

10. With Eastern Europe, and at home, Soviet leaders are faced with a + conflict between the CPSU imperative of hegemony and the rising demands + of equality. Brezhnev’s response + has been a pragmatic combination of holding to a firm line where + possible (e.g., East Germany, Czechoslovakia, and Bulgaria) and grudging + acceptance of gradual reform or autonomy where necessary (e.g., + Poland/Hungary; Romania/Albania). The CPSU has taken a similar tough + approach domestically. Toward East European regimes—as with Soviet + society—the Soviet leadership has preferred, where necessary and + possible, to shift the terms of debate and conflict from political to + economic matters. In the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, consumerism + and economic aid constitute major expressions of this strategy. Soviet + aid to Poland, following the June 1976 price riots, is a case in + point.

+

11. From a Soviet standpoint, this policy suffers from two basic defects. + First, it has no natural terminal point. Gradual appeasement of East + European demands—on economic issues, liberalization, or foreign policy + autonomy—inevitably feeds rather than satiates East European appetites. + Secondly, with its own major economic—and potential energy—problems, the + USSR has neither the capacity nor + the desire to divert scarce economic resources from internal Soviet + requirements to the needs of more developed East European economies. + Moreover, it is Western technology that is most relevant to East + European and Soviet economic needs.

+

12. These two factors have important ramifications for Soviet/East + European relations and consequent Western policy. The dynamic feature of + this relationship offers long-term hope to East Europeans and poses a + long-term threat to tight Soviet control. It also suggests the possibility of occasional eruptions + when East European hopes and Soviet fears collide.

+

13. The development of East-West trade and appropriate Western technology + transfers has enormous relevance and appeal to the coming educated + generation of East Europeans. In time, expansion of East-West economic + relations could lead to shifts in trade patterns and to some reduction + of East European economic dependency on Moscow; this has occurred to + some extent already in Romania and Poland. On the other hand, all East + European states remain fundamentally dependent on the USSR for markets and for the supply of + oil (except Romania) and other raw materials. However tight the future + Soviet economic and petroleum pinch, Moscow is unlikely to permit this + basic political reality to change. Finally, East European indebtedness + and bleak export prospects pose serious obstacles to sustained Western + commercial credits, and Western countries have other high priority + demands on their limited resources.

+

14. Soviet leaders are determined to maintain overall control in East + European politics, through military force if necessary. But they also + seek to fend off East European pressures for change with partial + concessions. How this balance evolves could be a major factor for Europe + in the 1980’s.

+

II. East European Foreign + Policies

+

15. Against the above analysis, this section describes the endeavors of + East European states to delineate nationally-based foreign policies. + Those efforts occur primarily in their private bilateral consultations + with Moscow prior to multilateral Warsaw Pact and CEMA conferences, where the Soviets + expect and generally obtain obeisance. The same approach is used + concerning East-West conferences, such as MBFR and CSCE, where the + limited East European influence must be exercised in private bilateral + meetings with the Russians.

+

16. With the exception of Yugoslavia, Albania and Romania, Soviet control + over East European foreign policy clearly is the norm. Nonetheless, + there are some variations relating to particular East European national + concerns.

+

YUGOSLAVIA

+

17. When considering foreign policy autonomy in Eastern Europe, + Yugoslavia must immediately be put into a category separate from the + Warsaw Pact member countries. Yugoslavia’s foreign policy is made + exclusively in Belgrade. Non-alignment, which sets Yugoslavia apart from + both the major alliance systems in Europe, remains the key pillar of + Yugoslav foreign policy. On East-West issues, including CSCE, Yugoslavia seeks to play a + moderating role and to maintain an arms-length balance between the U.S. and USSR. On + North-South economic issues, Yugoslavia champions the interests of the + developing countries and supports demands for a New International + Economic Order, while promoting dialogue between developed and + undeveloped countries. On global political issues, Yugoslavia attempts + to exercise a moderating influence but invariably goes along with the + non-aligned consensus. Within the non-aligned movement, Yugoslavia has + shown great concern over Cuban efforts to push the movement toward + closer affinity with the USSR and + other Communist countries.

+

18. Belgrade seeks to maintain good relations with all countries, + particularly the major powers, and has generally managed to do this. In + the past two years, Tito has + visited the USSR and the U.S., as well as China, France and Britain. + Tito’s efforts to improve + relations with these countries are intended in large part to insure + Yugoslavia’s continued independence and territorial integrity after his + departure from the political scene. The recent Yugoslav effort to + improve relations with China—including the recent visit of Hua Kuo-feng + to Belgrade—has had an adverse effect on Yugoslav-Soviet relations, + despite repeated assurances by Yugoslavia that its relations with one + country were not directed against any other country.

+

19. As in the conduct of foreign affairs, the Yugoslav leadership insists + on maintaining independence in its domestic policies, which are devised + to meet the country’s rather singular needs and traditions. A particular + form of federalism has developed to accommodate the diverse political + and regional characteristics of Yugoslavia. From a rigidly Stalinist + state in the immediate post-war period, the domestic system in + Yugoslavia has evolved into the most liberal in Eastern Europe, with + considerable freedom of movement and emigration, access to foreign + publications and radio broadcasts and relative tolerance of cultural + expression. Significant restrictions exist, however, on freedom of + political expression and activity.

+

20. In the economic sector the Yugoslavs practice a kind of “market + socialism” not found elsewhere in the communist world; the concept and + practice of “self-management” are particularly unique. Belgrade + maintains ties with both CEMA and the + EC. Foreign investment—within + limits—is encouraged in Yugoslavia.

+

21. Although the leadership is now preparing for the post-Tito era, with all its attendant + uncertainties and imponderables, Yugoslav leaders insist that + long-successful policies—non-alignment and self-management—will be + continued after Tito and that + the Yugoslav commitment to independence, territorial integrity and + sovereignty will not be altered.

+

ROMANIA

+

22. Romania is the only Warsaw Pact member state which has been able to + reduce significantly its economic and political dependence on the Soviet Union, assert + policies that are opposed by other Pact members and assume an + independent international role. Since the early 1960s the Romanians have + gradually established political and economic ties to the United States, + Western Europe, the non-aligned movement and other independent communist + entities—especially Yugoslavia, China and the Eurocommunists—as a + counter to Soviet leverage. In the process Bucharest has pursued a + number of independent positions, inter alia:

+

—willingness to conclude a trade agreement with the U.S. and comply with the Jackson-Vanik + amendment;

+

—opposition to economic integration within CEMA and military integration within the Warsaw Pact;

+

—non-participation in the Czechoslovak invasion;

+

—support for the rights of all communist parties to pursue their own + course;

+

—membership in such organizations as the IMF and participation in the “Group of 77”; and,

+

—retention of diplomatic ties with Israel and playing an intermediary + role in regional crises, most notably in the Middle East, where + Ceausescu helped facilitate + Sadat’s visit to Israel.

+

23. In 1978 Romania strengthened its ties to those states which are + perceived as major counters to Moscow. The most dramatic part of this + campaign was the unprecedented visit of Hua Kuo-feng to Bucharest. The + Hua visit set the stage for a heightening of Soviet-Romanian tension, + which culminated in Ceausescu’s + public criticism of Moscow in the aftermath of the November Warsaw Pact + summit. In five major speeches, Ceausescu indirectly rebuked the Soviet Union for + seeking increased military expenditures by Pact members and for attempts + to improve Pact command and control mechanisms that would negate + Romania’s sovereign control over its armed forces. Couching his critique + in highly nationalistic terms, Ceausescu sought to rally the population behind him once + again in defiance of Moscow.

+

24. Appeals to Romanian nationalism and independence are used by + Ceausescu both to counter + Soviet designs and to offset public disenchantment with Romania’s + standard of living and authoritarian political system. Foreign policy + independence has been effective in bridging some of the gap between the + population and the regime.

+

POLAND

+

25. Poland was the first among the Warsaw Pact countries to develop a + positive relationship with the U.S. and + to resume cultivation of traditionally close ties with such Western + countries as France, Britain and Italy. This has led to a Western + presence in Poland which far exceeds that which exists in most other Warsaw Pact countries. Despite + the occasional strains it has produced in its relations with the Soviet + Union, the Gierek regime has + given every indication of continuing its moderate, pragmatic approach to + Poland’s cooperation with the West. The regime continues to pursue a + course of relative restraint toward vocal political dissidents; it + continues at least an outward conciliation toward the thriving Roman + Catholic Church, which has been greatly strengthened by the accession to + the Papacy of John Paul II; and, + in the interest of stimulating improved economic performance, it has + shown some desire to encourage private farmers who cultivate about 80 + percent of all arable land.

+

26. Moscow has grudgingly tolerated these deviations because it wants, + above all, stability in strategically located Poland, and knows that + cruder forms of interference or repression could lead to an upheaval + that would necessitate an unwanted military intervention. In return, + Poland faithfully supports Soviet foreign policy objectives, as well as + the Soviet economic integration goals in Eastern Europe. Although only + half of Poland’s trade is with CEMA + countries, its interests in the area as a market for its products and + dependence on Soviet raw materials are genuine. Warsaw’s support of + major Soviet foreign policy goals also derives from an historically + based fear that Moscow might one day revise its attitude on the German + question, to Poland’s disadvantage.

+

27. The major question-mark surrounds Poland’s economic situation, which + has deteriorated in recent years due to five successive bad harvests; + stagnation in Western export markets; and a failure to date of major + investments in Western capital equipment to pay off. As a result, + Poland’s external hard currency indebtedness has grown markedly. + Generous Western public and commercial credits have been granted but + future prospects for Poland’s external economic picture are cloudy and + Warsaw faces some tough political and economic choices ahead.

+

HUNGARY

+

28. Having gained power in the Soviet invasion of 1956, Hungarian party + leader Kadar consolidated his position in the early 1960s and has since + displayed skill and pragmatism in promoting Hungary’s national + interests, without violating essential Soviet desiderata. He has thus + achieved a rather firm political base and a measure of popularity. Kadar + has in more recent years departed from orthodox Bloc patterns in such + key areas as:

+

—the ten-year-old economic reforms (New Economic Mechanism), which + provide for a variety of incentives and other market forces to + operate;

+ +

—a measure of accommodation with the Roman Catholic and Protestant + churches; and

+

—a relatively relaxed political-cultural atmosphere, including the + cultivation of ties with Hungarians living abroad.

+

29. While remaining a loyal Soviet ally, Kadar has for the past two years + used the CSCE umbrella to pursue a + deliberate but low-keyed foreign policy aimed at improving relations + with the West.

+

To this end, Kadar has:

+

—visited four West European countries in less than four years (Austria, + Italy, West Germany and France);

+

—taken a moderate attitude toward West Europe’s Eurocommunist and + socialist parties; and

+

—promoted ties with the U.S. Hungary’s + relatively liberal internal and emigration policies have facilitated the + U.S. granting of MFN status and the return of the Crown of + St. Stephen, the symbol of Hungarian national independence.

+

30. Unlike most other Warsaw Pact countries, Hungary has eschewed + criticism of Romania and Yugoslavia for receiving Hua or for Ceausescu’s refusal to sign several + documents submitted at the recent Warsaw Pact summit in Moscow. In such + international organizations as the UN + and in other public fora, Budapest has increasingly pursued matters of + vital or major significance to Hungarian national interest, while not + antagonizing the Soviet Union.

+

GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC

+

31. East Germany is of course a special case in East Central Europe. The + GDR’s communist political system + and highly cautious political leadership reflect the continued, + anomalous position of the East German state. The GDR remains wholly dependent on an + occupying force of twenty Soviet divisions. The Berlin Wall remains a + grim reminder of the regime’s unpopularity. Despite widespread + diplomatic recognition from the international community, the Four Powers + (U.S., UK, France and USSR) retain their post-war rights and + responsibilities for Germany and Berlin. While quiescent since the 1971 + quadripartite agreement, Berlin, located at the center of Europe, + remains a potential East-West flashpoint.

+

32. In the absence of a meaningful separate East German nationalism, the + Honecker regime has sought to + bridge the gap between party and population through policies aimed at + boosting the standard of living. East Germans, for example, are + permitted to use Western currency to purchase Western goods in GDR specialty shops. “Consumerism” has + helped generally to meet some of the population’s rising + expectations—generated in part by West German TV broadcasts which cover 80 percent of East + Germany—for a better material life. More recently, Honecker has sought other bases of + support, particularly in the Evangelical (Lutheran) Church, which has + been promised sweeping concessions that include access to media + broadcasts. If these are implemented, the Church could emerge as one of + the most influential in Eastern Europe. The regime will want to ensure + that it confines the Church’s role strictly to + clerical—non-political—matters.

+

33. East German foreign policy is tied to Soviet foreign policy, + including an increased presence in Africa. To the extent they diverge, + the GDR tends to press Moscow to adopt + more rigid policies in the East-West sphere in order to avert increased + Western contacts. The East Germans are particularly concerned that their + CSCE Basket III human rights + commitments could arouse public expectations which, when unfilled, could + lead to popular discontent. This foreign policy posture reflects the + GDR policy of Abgrenzung, or separation, of the two German states.

+

34. There have been times when Moscow’s Western policy was seen as + contravening East Germany’s fundamental need to assert its sovereign + state identity. In the opening phases of detente, it thus tried to slow + down or resist what it viewed as Soviet concessions to the FRG without sufficient benefits to the + GDR. More recently, there are + indications that the GDR is less than + enthusiastic—given its growing economic problems—about Soviet proposals + for increased military spending by Warsaw Pact members. For the most + part, however, these challenges have been and are contained by Moscow + which, with 400,000 troops in the GDR, + still clearly sets the main directions of East German foreign policy + activity.

+

BULGARIA

+

35. Bulgaria is usually considered the Soviet Union’s most loyal ally, + and Bulgarian leader Zhivkov the + most reliable associate. We know of no instance in which the Bulgarians + have opposed Soviet objectives in foreign policy, even when these + objectives may run counter to Bulgarian foreign policy interests.

+

36. This is particularly evident in the instances of Balkan cooperation + and the Soviet exploitation of the Bulgarian-Yugoslav dispute over + Macedonia:

+

—The Bulgarians have rejected various initiatives of other Balkan + countries to promote multilateral commerce and cooperation, apparently + because of Soviet opposition;

+

—There also is little doubt that the intensity of polemics and the state + of Yugoslav-Bulgarian relations over Macedonia is influenced, if not + dictated, by Moscow’s desire to increase political pressure on + Yugoslavia.

+ +

37. More recently, Zhivkov has + traveled to Africa and promoted Bulgarian relations with selected + African countries in an effort to further Soviet aims in Africa. + Finally, there are indications that the Bulgarians have sought to + improve their relations with Albania—again acting as a Soviet proxy.

+

38. Party leader Zhivkov’s long + tenure in office and his close relationship with the Kremlin have been + accompanied by the appearance of a stable regime—perhaps in some + respects the most stable in Eastern Europe over the past 20 years. + Intellectual dissidence—in contrast to Czechoslovakia, Poland, GDR, and, even, Romania—has been minimal + and easily controlled. There has been no worker unrest of significance + and political factionalism has not threatened Zhivkov’s position. However, Zhivkov has recently carried out + changes in the Party and State leaderships which might have been + motivated in part by real or potential opposition to his policies. More + likely, these changes were carried out to improve economic performance + and efficiency and to install younger, more vigorous leaders. Until + recently, the Bulgarian leadership was one of the oldest in Eastern + Europe.

+

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

+

39. Since 1969, in order to accommodate Moscow, the Czechoslovak regime + has been one of the most internally repressive and externally + sycophantic in Eastern Europe. Under the close aegis of Moscow, + Czechoslovak leaders have been carrying out the most widespread purges + in Czechoslovak Party history and maintained tight controls over all + aspects of Czechoslovak life—including punitive measures against + political/human rights dissidents who sought to have the regime honor + its commitments to the CSCE Final Act. + The Prague regime’s domestic repressions at times seem to be an + embarrassment to other East European regimes and even the Soviets in + their relations with the West. Although both the Soviet and Czechoslovak + leaderships reportedly have considered alternative courses of action to + present hardline policies in Czechoslovakia, there are no indications + that these policies will be modified. Realization of its vast + unpopularity has made the Czechoslovak regime even more unimaginative + and reluctant to undertake independent action (such as meaningful reform + to improve the economy). It has, as a result, followed the Soviet + foreign policy line wherever possible in order to prove its loyalty to + Moscow. Perhaps more than any other regime in Eastern Europe, Prague has + tried to buy political apathy through outright concessions to material + wants (e.g., weekend cottages, travel abroad, automobiles).

+

40. Soviet domination of Czechoslovakia appears virtually complete, with + the Prague leadership at times more subservient in following Soviet + foreign policy than even Moscow would seem to wish. Prague has acted as a proxy for Moscow + in propaganda attacks on the West in general and the U.S. in particular, particularly when for + tactical reasons the Soviets preferred to be either silent or moderate + in their commentaries. In the past, Prague has played a considerable + role in Soviet foreign policy strategy by acting as a penetration agent + among developing countries, particularly because the Czechoslovaks were + more acceptable than the Soviets to these countries. This role has + diminished over the past years, in large part because Prague’s economic + difficulties at home have made it impossible for it to play such a role + and also because other East European regimes have acted as penetration + agents in various regions—e.g., East Germany in Africa. Finally, the + cautious attitude of the Prague regime in borrowing from the West and + also in pursuing cultural contacts have generally resulted in limiting + Czechoslovakia’s ties with the West.

+

ALBANIA

+

41. Albania’s xenophobic, isolationist foreign policy is unique among the + communist regimes in Europe. The Tirana regime has refused to + countenance any improvement of relations with the U.S. and several other Western countries + until all its demands have been realized. It also continues its + unrelenting struggle against the “social imperialism” of the USSR and, more recently, against + China.

+

42. Albania has been quite selective in its establishment of diplomatic + and trade relations with other countries, particularly in Western + Europe. Despite the cessation of economic assistance from China—Tirana’s + last benefactor—there are at present no signs that the Albanians intend + to modify their intransigent ideological policies. Albania has hinted at + its interest in increasing commercial and perhaps other links with some + Western and Third World countries. Tirana’s relations with neighboring + Greece have improved somewhat since the break with China. But there has + been no such improvement with neighboring Yugoslavia, whom the Albanians + revile as revisionist and fear as a larger neighbor with a substantial + Albanian minority population. The Albanians have also refused + multilateral Balkan cooperation endeavors, insisting that such endeavors + be conducted on a bilateral basis.

+

43. The Tirana regime is the most repressive in Eastern Europe, and the + Albanian standard of living continues to be the lowest in Europe. Any + hopes that it would improve in the near future evaporated with the + cessation of Chinese economic assistance. The regime has carried out + incessant strident propaganda campaigns which rail against foreign + influences, urge the population to greater sacrifice and economic + effort, and demand strict ideological conformity with the policies of + the leadership.

+
+ +
+ 31. Memorandum From Secretary of State Vance to President CarterSource: + Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, + Box 50, Presidential Determinations: 5/78–7/79. No classification + marking. Brzenzinski forwarded the memorandum to the President on + March 16. (See Document 33.) + + + Washington, February + 26, 1979 + + + SUBJECT + Presidential Determination to Provide Financial Assistance to + U.S. Voluntary Agencies + Assisting Political Refugees from Eastern Europe + +

The American voluntary agencies assisting in the resettlement of + political refugees coming from the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe to + the United States are having serious financial difficulties. These + agencies depend heavily on financial assistance from the Department of + State. Due to a sharp increase in the number of refugees being cared for + and resettled during calendar year 1978 (from a projected 17,000 to an + actual figure of approximately 24,000 refugees) as well as inflation and + the decline in the value of the dollar, funds appropriated for the + European refugee program for calendar year 1978 were exhausted during + the fall.

+

The agencies have continued to care for, process, and resettle refugees + at their own expense, despite a funding shortfall totalling nearly $8 + million. (Details of the shortfall are shown in the attached + table.)Neither attachment was + attached. As a result, the voluntary agencies accumulated + substantial debts and have had to curtail services; some may soon be + forced to cease accepting responsibility for new refugees, irrespective + of the rate of refugee flow. Such a development would pose a threat to + U.S. foreign policy and humanitarian + concerns, for these agencies have been unique and faithful partners in + U.S. refugee efforts throughout the + world dating back to the end of World War II. It is in our national + interest to ensure that these agencies are able to continue their + important work, at a time when Soviet and Eastern European emigration + continues at extraordinary high levels.

+

The Department of State has been moving on two fronts to resolve the + financial problems of the agencies, working closely with representatives + from OMB and the NSC. First, the supplemental budget + request for fiscal year 1979 will provide funds to make up the + October-to-December shortfall. The Administration has asked the Congress + to treat the refugee supplemental on an urgent basis, separately from + the government-wide supplemental. (During the week of February 20, OMB will present you an upward revision in the supplemental + for refugees, requested by the Department based on the latest + information on refugee flows and careful analysis of the appropriate + U.S. response.)

+

Second, to provide immediate alleviation to the hardest-hit voluntary + agencies, and to meet the pre-October shortfall, I am here proposing the + provision of $1.13 million from the Emergency Refugee and Migration + Assistance Fund, for which a Presidential Determination is required. All + of this amount will be used for payments equivalent to resettlement + grants at the standard 1978 contract rate ($250 per capita) to the + voluntary agencies who resettled European refugees, without U.S. compensation, before October 1. The + attached table shows the funding shortfalls, by voluntary agency, during + 1978. Only the pre-October amounts will be met by this drawdown. The + October-to-December shortfall will be met through the FY 1979 supplemental.

+

Our efforts to use the Emergency Fund for this purpose have been delayed + because of certain steps taken on December 15 by Senator Inouye for the + Senate Appropriations Committee. At that time, in the course of + objecting to a proposed reprogramming action, Senator Inouye asked the + GAO to determine whether the Emergency Fund could be used as here + proposed. Accordingly, we suspended further action on use of the fund + until the GAO ruled. We received its ruling on February 9. The GAO has + fully approved the proposed use of the Emergency Fund to meet the + pre-October shortfall of the voluntary agencies.

+

The current balance of the Emergency Fund is $3,290,000, sufficient to + cover this proposed drawdown.

+

Recommendation

+

That you sign the attached determination which will make available up to + $1.13 million through the Department of State to American voluntary + agencies to meet their expenses incurred during 1978 prior to October 1, + in resettling refugees as part of the European portion of the United + States Refugee Program.No decision is noted + on the document.

+
+ +
+ 32. Memorandum From Paul Henze + of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for + National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, + Horn/Special, Box 3, Chron File: 3/79. Secret; Sensitive. Outside + the System. Sent for action. + + + Washington, March 15, + 1979 + + + SUBJECT + CIA’s Book and Periodical + Distribution Program for Eastern Europe and USSR + +

Stan Turner has provided a report + (Tab 2)Not attached. in response to + your memorandum to him of January 26, 1979 (Tab 3)See footnote 6, Document + 29. requesting a status report on the book program. + The report provides striking evidence of the effectiveness of this + program (I have marked in red certain key passages which I recommend you + leaf through if you have time) and demonstrates that the program has + made highly productive use of the extra funds which you directed be + allocated to it nearly two years ago.

+

The report reveals, however, that the program is being curtailed in + FY 1980, by cancelling an increase + of $1.5 million which was originally planned. Leveling off (actually + slightly reducing) a program such as this after it has gained momentum + from expansion is especially unwise and not cost-effective. Funds + projected for a FY 1981 increase ($1.5 + million) may also not materialize, for the FY 1981 budget process is likely to entail as much + squeezing as we have been through on FY + 1980. I am told by highly reliable sources in CIA that there is no good reason to cut this program; they + made an effort to keep it expanding. They, and I, have the suspicion + that Turner, knowing your + interest in it, sacrificed it to OMB’s + bookkeepers. Whatever the motivation, I do not believe we should let + this excellent program “plateau off”. Funds added to it are among the + most productive CIA spends for covert + action. In fact, this program constitutes a large part of what is left + of CIA’s covert action program and they + constitute most of what we are doing against our highest-priority + target—Eastern Europe and the USSR. I + have prepared a short memorandum from you to Turner requesting that funds be reprogrammed to permit + continued expansion in FY 1980.

+ +

RECOMMENDATION:

+

That you sign attached memorandum (Tab 1).At + Tab 1 is the undated, draft memorandum. A notation on the draft + indicates that Brzezinski + signed it on March 20. In the memorandum, Brzezinski commented: “The Soviet + Union and Eastern Europe are our highest-priority targets for + sustained covert action impact. Money to permit continued expansion + of this entire program during FY + 1980 should be found through reprogramming.” Turner responded on April 9, + writing that the Agency “will remain alert to the possibility of + reprogramming to provide additional funds” for the program. However, + Turner cautioned that + “Fiscal Year 1980 is a very austere budget and, at this point in + time, we cannot identify funds available for such reprogramming.” He + added “Will keep looking—” to the memorandum. (Carter Library, + National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Horn/Special, Box 3, + Chron File: 4/79)

+
+ +
+ 33. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security + Affairs (Brzezinski) to + President CarterSource: Carter Library, National + Security Affairs, Brzezinski + Material, Subject File, Box 50, Presidential Determinations: + 5/78–7/79. No classification marking. Sent for action. Reginald Bartholomew initialed for + Brzezinski. + + + Washington, March 16, + 1979 + + + SUBJECT + Determination to Assist Refugees from Eastern Europe and the + Soviet Union + +

In the memorandum at Tab B,Not attached. See + Document 31. + Cy Vance recommends you + determine that it is important to the national interest that up to $1.13 + million from the U.S. Emergency Refugee + Fund be made available to the voluntary agencies resettling refugees + from Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union who entered the United States + before October 1, 1978. OMB concurrence + is at Tab C.Attached but not printed is a + March 6 memorandum from Edward Sanders of the Office of Management + and Budget to Dodson.

+

Primarily because of the sharp increase in Soviet emigration during 1978, + funds appropriated to the Department of State were insufficient to + provide the normal level of Federal assistance to voluntary agencies + resettling refugees accepted by the United States. Although the agencies + continued to process and resettle refugees at their own expense, the + debts incurred could curtail the ability of some agencies to continue + to accept refugees. As Cy + points out, this situation threatens a vital link in our refugee + program.

+

Because the flow of refugees has remained high, similar funding + shortfalls are anticipated in FY 1979. + State intends to handle these through a supplemental budget request.

+

RECOMMENDATION

+

That you sign the determination at Tab A.Not + attached. The Presidential Determination was not found.

+
+ +
+ 34. Memorandum From Paul Henze + of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for + National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, + Horn/Special, Box 3, Chron File: 4/79. Secret; Sensitive. Sent for + action. + + + Washington, April 24, + 1979 + + + SUBJECT + Soviet/EE Book Program (S) + +

Stan Turner won’t give an inch on + adding money for the book program, so our effort to get him to reverse + his decision to cut back on the program for FY 1980 (and not continue the expansion approved two years + ago by the SCC) has to be chalked up as + a failure. (S)

+

In the attached memoAt Tab A is Turner’s April 9 memorandum to + Brzezinski. See footnote 4, Document + 32. he says no funds can be found but + says they will keep looking. (S)

+

My own sources at the Agency indicate that funds are not really this + tight (the Iranian debacle and other shifts have caused a good deal of + budgetary adjustment and money could be found!) + but Turner has made this an issue + on which he is unwilling to give in to you. I am told that further + effort to press him on this now will probably only solidify his + position—so the advice is to press during the summer for allocation of + FY-year-end funds. [name not declassified] who is immediately + responsible for this program and a strong supporter of it, promises me he will remain alert for + possibilities and will signal us when he thinks pressure from you could + have a good effect. I see no alternative but to content ourselves with + this for now—since cuts now contemplated do not start until 1 October. + (S)

+

Do youBrzezinski did not mark either option. AGREE + DISAGREE ?

+
+ +
+ 35. Memorandum Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency for + Marshall Brement of the + National Security Council StaffSource: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Brzezinski Office File, Country + Chron File, Box 12, Europe: 1979. Secret. Brement forwarded the memorandum to + Brzezinski under an + August 6 covering memorandum noting it was prepared at his request + and that Brzezinski should + read it. A stamped notation on the first page of the covering + memorandum indicates that Brzezinski saw it. + + + Washington, August 6, + 1979 + + + SUBJECT + Summary of Memorandum Entitled “Preconditions for Instability + Begin to Accumulate in Eastern Europe” [classification not declassified] + +

A veteran analyst of East European affairs at CIA takes a look at recent developments in the area, + speculating on whether the conditions preceding past crises are being + recreated. [classification not declassified]

+

On the economic front, the conditions that have allowed the East European + regimes to give their publics steadily rising standards of living no + longer exist. The regimes will thus soon be deprived on one of the + principal arguments in support of their legitimacy. With growth rates + falling, investment plans cut back, and prices rising, it probably will + not be long before economic expectations are dashed, with all that + implies for increased public restiveness. [classification not declassified]

+

All the East European members of the Council for Economic Mutual + Assistance are aware that their systems of economic management are + inadequate, and all are talking about, experimenting with, or actually + implementing changes. Experimentation of this sort inevitably leads to + greater tensions between those within these regimes who are convinced of the need for change + and those who feel threatened by it. [classification + not declassified]

+

Some East European leaders have indicated that they do not believe Soviet + economic leadership is sufficiently sensitive to their needs. Nor do + they believe that their international organizations are facilitating the + pursuit of solutions to their economic problems. One consequence, + therefore, of their economic problems has been the encouragement of + peculiarly national solutions and the strengthening of centrifugal + tendencies. [classification not declassified]

+

For a model, the East European CEMA + regimes may be looking to Hungary, which has the most advanced program + of economic reform. They do not appear to be looking to the independent + national Communist states of the Balkans, though they may envy the + political ability of these states to seek solutions without + subordinating their interests to those of the USSR. Relations between the independent Communist states + and the USSR are, at best, not + improving. [classification not declassified]

+

Nationalism, which probably remains the strongest motive force in Eastern + Europe, received a boost from the visit of John Paul II to Poland.June + 2–10, 1979. The visit will have convinced the Soviets that + their position in Eastern Europe remains dependent of the willingness to + enforce their writ militarily. The visit will also have strengthened the + hands of those in Eastern Europe and the USSR who, already concerned about ideological contamination + through detente, urge more vigorous vigilance and repression of + non-conformists. A heavier air of renewed repression has already arrived + in East Germany and Czechoslovakia. The people’s political expectations, + which had been raised by the Conference on Security and Cooperation in + Europe, may soon also be dashed. [classification not + declassified]

+

At the same time that conditions in Eastern Europe are becoming more + tense, Soviet General Secretary Brezhnev nears the end of his gradual decline. The + Soviet succession process has probably begun; given the advanced age of + Eastern Europe’s leaders, succession processes there could coincide. + (U)

+

In sum, then, the author argues that the classic pre-conditions for a + crisis are either in place or can be seen on the horizon. Major + demonstrations of popular dissatisfaction could occur in the not too far + distant future. But because many of the preconditions have just begun to + develop, the situation is probably not yet quite ripe for the next major + turn of events. [classification not + declassified]

+
+ +
+ 36. Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the Department of State + (Tarnoff) to the President’s + Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, + Box 22, Europe: 1/79–1/81. Secret. + + + Washington, January + 31, 1980 + + + SUBJECT + U.S. Relations with Eastern Europe + in 1980 + +

The attached paper on U.S. policy toward + Eastern Europe in the year ahead was reviewed by the Interagency Group + on Europe on January 24. The NSC, + Treasury, Commerce, Agriculture, ICA, + Defense, CIA, USTR and the + Export-Import Bank participated in this review. We have also consulted + in a preliminary fashion with our allies at NATO and in Eastern European capitals concerning their + future policies toward Eastern Europe.

+

At the Interagency Group meeting, there was general agreement on the + analysis contained in the paper and the central policy + recommendation—that we continue an activist policy in Eastern Europe + designed to preserve the gains we have made in the last three years and + to promote the goals of PD 21—domestic liberalization and/or foreign + policy independence. It was generally agreed that we would have to + adjust our specific actions and initiatives to take account of the + reactions of individual Eastern European countries to the situations in + Afghanistan and Iran.

+

Since the Interagency Group meeting, the Soviets have evidently increased + pressures on Eastern European countries to follow Moscow’s foreign + policy lead. The Czechoslovaks postponed a planned Genscher visit referring to the “complicated + international situation.”In telegram 309 + from Prague, January 24, the Embassy reported that the Czechoslovak + Government had postponed the Genscher visit. (National + Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign + Policy File, D800041–1098) After hearing several times from + the Hungarians that they wanted a visit to the U.S. by Parliamentary President Apro to go ahead despite + U.S.-Soviet tensions, the Hungarians + notified us on January 30 that the visit would have to be postponed + because of “pressing parliamentary business at home.In telegram 461 from Budapest, January 30, the + Embassy reported that Antal Apro was postponing his visit to the + United States for “unforeseen domestic political duties.” Noting + that the Foreign Ministry and Parliament were given only short + notice of the cancellation, the Embassy concluded: “We can only + assume with a high degree of certainty that Hungary only reluctantly + postponed the visit” and that “the Russian lid on Eastern Europe is + being screwed tighter.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + D800053–0746) In both these cases, the Soviets appear to be + acting to reign in Eastern + European desires to conduct business as usual with the West. This argues + for a policy of trying harder to maintain the ground we have gained + recently in our relations with Eastern Europe.

+

The area-wide measures and country-specific measures recommended in the + attached paper are designed to implement this goal. The Interagency + Group agreed to all of them with the following exceptions which require + further consideration or policy guidance.

+

—Export Controls.See + Document 13. There was general + agreement in the IG that the ability to differentiate between export + licensing treatment for the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact countries + of Eastern Europe would be a valuable foreign policy tool in encouraging + ties with Eastern European countries which display independence in + foreign and domestic policy. Any foreign policy controls on U.S. exports to the Soviet Union imposed in + response to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan clearly should not + automatically be applied to Eastern European countries—particularly + those whose support for the Soviet action has been weak or withheld. + However, it was recognized that it would be futile to try to decide on + the applicability of security controls to Eastern European countries + before the nature of these controls has been decided upon.

+

One possible way of differentiating between the Soviet Union and the + countries of Eastern Europe would be to maintain existing controls for + them while tightening up for the Soviet Union. For some countries in + Eastern Europe we might go further and institute a liberal policy of + COCOM exceptions for Eastern European countries with appropriate + end-user controls. In any case, our ability to gain Western European + agreement to more stringent security controls on exports to Eastern + Europe is bound to be strongly resisted. This issue might best be dealt + with in the SCC discussion of export + controls on the Soviet Union once a policy on security controls has been + decided upon.

+

—Yugoslav Military Sales. Steps are being taken to + implement “a more forthcoming” military sales policy responsive to + Yugoslav requests. DOD is reexamining + the systems the Yugoslavs have expressed an interest in with a view to + releasing more, but problems of availability and constraints against + transfer of sensitive technology limit what we can do. The NSC, State and DOD will have to keep the military sales program under + continuing review to insure that we respond as promptly and fully as + possible to Yugoslav interests.

+

—PL 480 for Yugoslavia. We are reviewing with + Agriculture and IDCA the possibility of a modest PL 480 program for + Yugoslavia which would permit it to acquire U.S. soybeans for cattle feed. Even a small grant or loan + would ease Yugoslavia’s balance of payments problem and help to boost private creditor + confidence. If it proves impossible to allocate significant PL 480 funds + to Yugoslavia within existing allocations, a budget decision might be + needed. An alternative might be a small one-time ESF grant of $5–7 + million under the proposed ESF Contingency Fund.

+

—Romanian Access to Hampton Roads. Permitting + Romanian vessels to call at Hampton Roads instead of Baltimore for coal + would greatly reduce Romanian transport costs and be seen as a + significant political gesture at a time when Bucharest fears Soviet + economic pressures. There is strong Navy objection to allowing any + Warsaw Pact vessel into the Hampton Roads area for security reasons. We + are asking Secretary Brown to + review Navy’s objections to see if they are of overriding + importance.

+

—Possible Membership in the IMF. This may also need further thought. Given + current Soviet pressures on Eastern Europe, we think it highly unlikely + that the Polish leadership would take the step of joining the IMF, although this might help bolster + shakey creditor confidence. We will be consulting with Poland’s Western + creditors to determine whether eventually this or some other steps such + as a non-IMF stabilization program is + required to correct the deteroriating Polish financial position.

+

—Cultural Agreement with the GDR. Some IG members questioned the + appropriateness of concluding a cultural agreement with the GDR at this time while others argue that + such an agreement is inherently in our interest and should be pursued. + We will continue to review this question in light of the evolution of + Berlin’s position on Afghanistan and Iran. Should the GDR be particularly shrill in its + criticism of the U.S., we would not + conclude a cultural agreement.

+

Peter + Tarnoff

+ +

Attachment

+

Paper Prepared in the Department of StateSecret. A version of this paper was sent to all + European posts in telegram 34197, February 7. (National + Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign + Policy File, D800066–0951)

+ +

Washington, undated

+ + SUBJECT + U.S. Relations with Eastern Europe + in 1980 + +

Deteriorating US-Soviet relations and Soviet efforts to enforce + conformity in Eastern Europe threatened the improving trend in US + relations with Eastern Europe in 1979. The Soviet invasion of + Afghanistan raises the question of whether we should continue a policy + of trying to strengthen relations with individual Eastern Europe + countries which follow Moscow’s foreign policy line.

+

We do not believe that the invasion of Afghanistan should cause us to + revamp our basic policy toward Eastern Europe.In telegram 9408 to USNATO and Bonn, January 12, the Department informed + European posts that U.S. policy + toward Eastern Europe in the wake of the Soviet invasion of + Afghanistan was under review, but that the Department was leaning + toward continuing a policy of differentiation among the Eastern + European countries. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800021–0454) In + telegram 419 from Prague, February 1, the Embassy recommended that + the policy of differentiation should be based on “realistic criteria + and a judgment of how much each country can resist Soviet pressure” + since “the effects of Soviet pressure will be to force another + downturn in relations with EE.” + (National Archives, RG 59, Central + Foreign Policy File, D800057–0015)

+

—There is no evidence that Moscow’s Warsaw Pact allies were consulted + about Afghanistan or have contributed anything except propaganda support + and diplomatic support at the UN.In telegram 29487 to all diplomatic and + consular posts, February 2, the Department provided guidance on how + to respond to the ongoing Soviet propaganda campaign justifying + their invasion of Afghanistan. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + D800058–0925)

+

—No amount of pressure on Eastern Europe—short of military threats or a + policy of economic denial which could lead to massive unrest—would + induce Moscow to alter its policy elsewhere in the world.

+

—We have substantial interests of our own in Eastern Europe and + abandoning the area as a Soviet sphere of influence would be playing + into the Kremlin’s hands.

+

—Pursuing an activist policy in Eastern Europe is a way of getting at + Soviet sensitivities.

+ +

—Our allies are determined to continue activist policies in Eastern + Europe; a hard-line US policy towards these countries would not be + supported by our allies and could lead to increased resistance to steps + against the Soviet Union.

+

—A policy of cutting back our ties with Eastern Europe would ease Soviet + efforts to enforce conformity in foreign and domestic policy and leave + the Romanians and Yugoslavs further isolated.

+

—At the same time a policy of business as usual with Eastern European + countries regardless of their position on issues of importance to us + such as Afghanistan or the US hostages in Iran would undermine our + credibility with the governments and peoples concerned.

+

These factors argue for an activist policy of engagement with Eastern + Europe, designed to preserve the gains we have made in the last three + years and to promote the goals of PD–21—domestic liberalization and/or + foreign policy independence. Such a policy would:

+

—Respond to the interest of the Eastern Europeans—as already expressed to + us in recent days on a number of occasions—in finding ways to prevent + U.S.-Soviet differences from + adversely affecting their relations with us and with the West as a + whole;

+

—Preserve, to the degree possible, the progress (in trade, claims + negotiations, family reunification, etc.) we have achieved in our + relations with the Eastern European countries;

+

—Reassure the West Europeans by demonstrating that we remain sensitive to + their special stake in good East-West relations and their desire to + continue an activist policy in Eastern Europe;

+

—Remind Moscow that we do not concede Eastern Europe as their sphere of + influence and that we have interests and influence in Eastern Europe + that we intend to continue to assert actively.

+

In following such an overall policy approach, it will be necessary to + adjust our specific actions and initiatives, depending on the public and + private reactions of the individual Eastern European countries to the + situations in Afghanistan and Iran. Our actions should be tailored to + move us closer to our longer-term objective of strengthening Eastern + European independence from the Soviet Union. Our planned actions are + reversible, can be implemented or withheld to match the changing + situation and, while pegged to 1980, have meaning for the longer term. + We intend to make it plain to the governments of the individual Warsaw + Pact countries that we want to pursue a differential policy but our + ability to do so will inevitably depend to a considerable degree on + their behavior regarding the issues of Iran and Afghanistan and their + willingness to improve relations with us despite Soviet pressure to cut + back. We have already told the Bulgarians, East Germans, Czechoslovaks, + Poles and Hungarians that excessive rhetoric on Afghanistan will have a + negative effect on the climate of our bilateral relations.

+ +

The area-wide measures we recommend in pursuit of + such a policy are:

+

—Differentiate between U.S. export + licensing treatment for the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact countries + of Eastern Europe. [N.B. A decision on the implementation of such a + policy must await a final decision on a new area-wide export control + policy.]All brackets are in the + original.

+

—Inform Eastern European governments that any diversion of grain or + technology to the Soviet Union would lead us to immediately cut off such + exports to them.On January 4, 1980, + President Carter cancelled + the sale of 17 million tons of grain to the Soviet Union in response + to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Faced with a projected + shortage of grain, the Soviet Union sought to obtain replacement + grain from the world market. As sales of U.S. grain to Eastern Europe were not affected, the + administration stressed to Eastern European Governments that any + diversion, transshipment, or replacement of grain to the Soviet + Union would be dimly viewed in Washington.

+

—Consult with the West Europeans, as appropriate, in NATO, the OECD, the European Community, and bilaterally, to pursue + our shared objectives throughout Eastern Europe and to focus + particularly on policies that would support Yugoslav and Romanian + independence.

+

—Reaffirm US policy of encouraging trade and financial ties with CEMA countries other than the USSR in view of the fact that some + members of the US banking community are uncertain about our policy.

+

The country-specific measures we would take in + pursuit of this policy would depend to an important degree on the given + country’s behavior concerning Afghanistan and Iran. Therefore, a brief + discussion of each country’s reaction to these two issues precedes the + catalog of measures which might be taken.

+

YUGOSLAVIA

+

Yugoslavia has strongly and publicly condemned the Soviet invasion of + Afghanistan and worked with a number of nonaligned countries to obtain a + UN General Assembly resolution + censuring the Soviets. Tito has + publicly opposed the taking of the hostages in Iran, and the Yugoslavs + are cooperating quietly in working on the Iranians to secure their + release.

+

We should intensify our efforts to strengthen all aspects of our + relations and encourage our NATO + allies to do likewise. Over the near term, we should give priority to + the following steps:

+

—Military Sales. Improve our responsiveness to + Yugoslav requests for purchases of military hardware.See Document + 285.

+ +

—Political Support. Give visible demonstration of + our support for Yugoslavia’s independence via high-level visits and a + continuation of Sixth Fleet port calls. The Secretary’s visit should be + rescheduled as soon as possible, bearing in mind the factors arising + from Tito’s death or prolonged + serious incapacitation, and consideration given to an early stop by a + ranking Yugoslav official. A possible brief stop by the President in + Yugoslavia in conjunction with his participation in the Economic Summit + in Venice would be extremely useful. Furthermore, the implications for + Yugoslavia of the Afghanistan invasion give even greater weight to our + recommendation that the President attend the eventual funeral ceremonies + for Tito and that we seek a + strong, coordinated allied expression of support for Yugoslavia + following Tito’s death. We will + strengthen our effort to deter and punish anti-GOY terrorism in the U.S. + and abroad.

+

—Economic Relations. Continue to make clear to the + European Community our support for a prompt Yugoslav-EC economic agreement which strengthens + Yugoslavia’s ties with the West but which does not require Yugoslavia to + grant reverse preferences to the Community.In telegram 12675 from Brussels, July 13, 1979, the Embassy + reported the text of the Haferkamp-Cooper exchange related to the EC/Yugoslavia trade + agreement. Wilhelm Haferkamp, the Commissioner for External + Relations and Vice President of the European Commission, wrote that + he noted “with satisfaction that the United States recognizes the + great importance of strengthening Yugoslavia’s relationships with + the West and that you welcome the prospect of an EEC/Yugoslavia + economic agreement.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790322–0304) In + telegram 18781 from Brussels, October 23, the Embassy reported: + “Yugoslavs showed an unexpectedly urgent desire to conclude new + economic cooperation agreement with EC, apparently because of fear of Soviets and less + concern with non-aligned image” during discussions with the EC negotiating team visiting Belgrade + earlier that month. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790489–0909). The + agreement came into force July 1, 1980.

+

—Grant the Yugoslav airline (JAT) landing rights in Chicago and Los + Angeles, if a formal request is received.

+

—Give increased high-level attention to the visit of Foreign Trade + Secretary Rotar in mid-March.

+

—Consider including Yugoslavia in the PL–480 program.

+

—Continue to seek additional funding for S&T exchanges in accordance + with our earlier promise to Yugoslavia.

+

ROMANIA

+

Apart from an indirect reference by Ceausescu in his speech to the Romanian Party Congress + in November, Romania has issued no public statement condemning the + taking of the American hostages. Media coverage has been very sparse and + limited to factual reporting. On the other hand, the Foreign Minister + has told us that in late November Ceausescu + conveyed a message to Khomeini in an effort to bring about a resolution + of the hostage problem.See Document 219. See also telegram 8127 from + Bucharest, December 3. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + P840163–2001)

+

On Afghanistan, Romania has once again played a maverick role within the + Warsaw PactSee Document 221. by issuing public statements + indirectly but strongly condemning the Soviet action in Afghanistan, by + not speaking out in defense of the Soviets in the UN Security Council debate and not + participating in the UN General Assembly + vote, and by continuing to refrain from recognizing the new Afghan + regime.

+

We should increase our efforts to support Romania’s independent actions + by strengthening our relations on bilateral and international issues, + and encourage our NATO allies to do + the same. Romania’s status within the Warsaw Pact and CEMA creates both problems and + opportunities.

+

—Reschedule the Secretary’s visit.

+

—Invite Foreign Minister Andrei + for an official return visit to Washington within the following six + months.

+

—Give special attention to the CSCE bilateral discussions, + including the Special Experts’ Group on military security. The U.S. side should be led by a senior + Department official since Romanian delegation will be headed by a Deputy + Foreign Minister. We should arrange high-level meetings for the Deputy + Minister on non-CSCE issues as + well.

+

—Show our interest in and, when possible, give our support to Romanian + initiatives in international organizations, especially those that relate + to peaceful settlement of disputes and good neighborliness.

+

—If there is any supplemental allocation of CCC credits, high priority + should be given to Romania’s outstanding request.

+

—Encourage visits by a group from DOD’s + Army War College as well as a visit by White House Fellows (in conjunction with visits + to other countries in the area).

+

—Reallocate unused FY 80 fisheries allocation by drawing on fishing quotas + previously reserved for the Soviet Union.

+

—Reexamine Romania’s request for commercial access to + Hampton Roads. [N.B. While this would be desirable for foreign + policy reasons, JCS objects strongly on + security grounds. This question should be reviewed by OSD.]

+

—Grant approval for Romanian government trade offices in Atlanta and + Houston.

+ +

—Provided the Romanians properly implement the current cultural + agreement, expand ICA exchanges with + Romania using funds reprogrammed from the Soviet Union.

+

POLAND

+

Poland has been modestly helpful on the hostage issue through private + demarches to the Iranians and public statements on the primacy of + diplomatic immunity and inviolability. On Afghanistan, its apparent + efforts to get by with the minimum acceptable to the Soviet Union were + overshadowed by its defense of Soviet action in the General Assembly + debate.

+

Consistent with Poland’s exhibition of some restraint on Iran and with + our general policy objectives in Eastern Europe, we should, over the + near term, give consideration to the following steps with Poland:

+

—Proceed with the next round of CSCE discussions tentatively + scheduled for Washington in March.

+

—Invite higher-level participation in the U.S.-Polish Roundtable, also + planned for Washington in April, perhaps making explicit our desire for + a Frelek visit.

+

—Propose a visit to Poland and another Eastern European country by DOD’s National Defense + University.

+

—Propose a visit to Poland and another Eastern European country by the + White House Fellows, whose trip to the Soviet + Union has just been cancelled.

+

—Should further P.L. 480 funds become + available, consider including Poland in the program. [N.B. This will + require a country-specific Presidential Decision.]

+

—Ensure continuation of U.S.-Polish S&T exchanges by seeking new + Congressionally-authorized funding for FY–1982.

+

—Expand modestly ICA exchanges with + Poland using funds reprogrammed from the Soviet Union.

+

—Increase Poland’s fishing allocation by using + quotas previously reserved for the Soviet Union.

+

—Depending upon the reaction of the Western Europeans we are consulting + with, encourage Poland to join the IMF/IBRD. + [N.B. This requires further discussion within the government and + consultation with allies.]

+

—Encourage private U.S.-Polish + cooperation in health, particularly the Project Hope involvement in the + Lodz Hospital project.

+

HUNGARY

+

Hungary has coupled expressions of understanding for Iran’s alleged + historical grievances against the U.S. + with lower-key denunciations of + the holding of diplomatic hostages as a violation of international + law.

+

After initially reacting to the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan with + some restraint, the Hungarians have joined the chorus of those + supporting it.

+

Depending upon the evolution of the Hungarian position, we should + consider the following steps:

+

—If and when the Hungarians are able to do so, reschedule the visit of + the Hungarian Parliamentary delegation headed by Parliament President + Apro.

+

—Utilize reprogrammed funds from exchanges with the USSR to expand + exchanges modestly with particular emphasis on academic and + cultural exchanges.

+

—Go ahead with the CSCE Consultations slated for this spring.

+

—Propose a visit to Hungary and another Eastern European country of a National Defense University group.

+

—Signal our continued receptivity to high-level + visits (below Kadar) and consider sending a senior official(S) + to Hungary.

+

—Propose a visit to Hungary and another Eastern European country by the + White House Fellows, whose trip to the USSR has just been cancelled.

+

—Send a VIP to open the “American Now” exhibit provided that the + Hungarian position on Iran/Afghanistan does not get worse.

+

—Assure State and Commerce participation at the Assistant Secretary level + in the second annual governmental U.S.-Hungarian Joint Economic + Committee meeting in Washington this spring.

+

BULGARIA

+

The Bulgarians were among the least forthcoming of the Eastern Europeans + on the question of the hostages in Tehran and the treatment of the issue + in the media has been slanted and objectionable. The Bulgarian + Government and media jumped on the Soviet Afghan bandwagon early and + have faithfully defended the Soviet actions. At the same time, the + Bulgarians have continued to stress their interest in improving + bilateral relations.

+

With Bulgaria, we should

+

—Consider supporting initiatives by Bulgaria to join the GATT.

+

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

+

The Czechoslovak UN representative made + some positive statements in voting for the initial Security Council + resolution on Iran. Otherwise, the media treatment has been slanted and + unsympathetic. The statements of the Czechoslovak Government and media + treatment of the Soviet + invasion of Afghanistan have been vigorously supportive of the + Soviets.

+

On January 24, the Czechoslovaks postponed the late February visit of + FRG Foreign Minister Genscher, citing the international situation + created by the NATO TNF decision and + by the “unconcealed threats” contained in the President’s State of the + Union speech.

+

—We should keep under active review the tabling of a + new proposal on a claims settlement with Czechoslovakia which would also result in the return to + Czechoslovakia of 18.4 million metric tons of Nazi-looted gold. This + would finally compensate the American claimants and also open avenues to + increase U.S. access to Czechoslovakia. + (There are indications that Czechoslovakia may want to resolve this + issue quickly, and the present price of gold could enable us to obtain a + significantly higher settlement. Because of recent repressive actions by + the Czechoslovak Government in the area of human rights and their + position on Afghanistan, however, it is currently not possible for us to + proceed on this issue.)

+

GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC

+

The GDR position on Iran has been one of + non-demonstrative support for the observance of international law while + its media has sympathized with anti-US sentiment in Iran and warned of + US military retaliation. Concerning Afghanistan, the GDR has praised the Soviet invasion as + necessary in light of CIA-backed + counterrevolutionary activity based in Pakistan. As a new member of the + UN Security Council, the GDR joined the Soviet Union in voting + against the resolution condemning the invasion of Afghanistan.

+

The GDR’s position on Iran and + Afghanistan should be balanced against our stake in maintaining the + progress made recently in important areas of bilateral relations (e.g., + humanitarian cases and US claims). Depending on future GDR steps in these areas, it would seem + appropriate to continue our current deliberate pace toward handling + GDR issues, with final actions on + all individual issues being reviewed in light of the conditions at that + time. We should

+

—Continue to send diplomatic and protocolary signals of displeasure with + GDR support for the Soviets.

+

—Proceed with CSCE consultations at a + lower level.

+

—Fulfill our promise to permit a GDR + Embassy branch commercial office in New York City in return for a + reciprocal option for a U.S. office.

+

—Depending upon the outcome of the export licensing policy review, + continue US participation in the Leipzig Fair in 1981.

+

—Proceed with the negotiation of a cultural agreement. [N.B. Some IG + members feel that negotiation of a cultural agreement with the GDR + at this time would conflict + with our aim of signalling to the GDR + our displeasure over its support for the Soviets in Afghanistan. Others + however, feel that such an agreement is inherently in our interest and + should be pursued.]

+

We will continue to monitor carefully the public statements and actions + of the Eastern European countries concerning Afghanistan and Iran, + modulating our implementation of the steps suggested above in accordance + with these statements and actions.

+
+ +
+ 37. Memorandum From Paul Henze + of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for + National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, + Horn/Special, Box 4, Chron File: 4/80. Secret. Copies were sent to + Griffith, Brement, and + Larrabee. Brzezinski wrote at the top of the + memorandum: “Good memo. Consult with MB [Marshall Brement] and LB [Lincoln Bloomfield] on possible + implementation? Which steps? Which memos? ZB.” + + + Washington, April 17, + 1980 + + + SUBJECT + Dissidence in Eastern Europe and the USSR—Are We Doing Enough? (U) + +

Dissidence in this paper is used to mean not + simply actions by regime critics who achieve prominence, but the entire + range of activity, some obvious, some extremely unobtrusive, which + generates pressures for freedom of thought and expression, human rights + and the advantages of a pluralistic society. (U)

+

On the demonstrative and declarative level the record of the Carter + Administration is second to none in the past fifteen years. The + President has personally identified himself with prominent Soviet + dissidents such as Bukovsky, Shcharansky and Sakharov and during his + visit to Poland insisted on contact with both dissident and church + figures. Other Administration officials, most notably yourself, have + repeatedly met, endorsed and communicated with dissidents in the USSR and Eastern Europe. The “spies for + dissidents” exchange you arranged last yearOn April 27, 1979, Powell + read a statement announcing that Carter had commuted the sentences + of convicted Soviet spies Valdik Enger and Rudilf Chernyayev, who + would be departing the country. Powell also announced that the Soviet Union had + released five Soviet dissidents, including Alexander Ginzburg, all + of whom were now in the United States to be joined shortly by their + immediate families. (Public Papers: Carter, + 1979, Book II, p. 731) + was one of the most politically + astute moves the U.S. Government has + ever made on behalf of Soviet dissidents. The Administration’s human + rights policy has generated worldwide debate on human rights on which + dissidents in Communist societies have capitalized. Our participation in + the Belgrade CSCE meetings under the + vigorous leadership of Arthur + Goldberg underscored our commitment to principle and + highlighted Soviet efforts to avoid honoring commitments they accepted + in 1975. The Administration took early decisions which will soon expand + the power of VOA and RFE/RL. (U)

+

Other programs for communicating with Eastern Europe and the USSR have been modestly expanded. (S)

+

Allocation of resources—both manpower and money—to programs encouraging + dissidence and serving the needs of dissidence has not been + proportionateBrzezinski highlighted this + sentence in the margin. to the high level of attention the + Administration has given this field in statements and demonstrative + actions. There have been other problems in respect to performance and + procedure. No new operational instrumentalities have been created for + implementing human rights policies, sustaining research effort and + channeling and coordinating human rights initiatives on a self-propelled + basis. (C)

+

Human rights have been overly politicized domestically as a result of + priority assigned by the State Department to more energetic pursuit of + human rights issues with non-Communist Latin American and African + countries than with Communist-ruled states. As a result human rights is + in danger of becoming a negative concept among conservatives both in the + U.S. and abroad. The subject needs + to be brought into better balance. (C)

+

Our most valuable instruments for communication with Eastern Europe and + the USSR are the big radios. New + investment in transmitters has not been matched by comparable investment + in programming. Though budgetary allocations for broadcasting have risen + each year, they have not been sufficient to offset inflationary + increases in both the U.S. and Europe + and the declining value of the dollar. As a result manpower rejuvenation + and expansion of programming and research support have continued to be + postponed. The effect is evident in decline in Radio Liberty + listenership in the USSR. New + investment for programming improvement is urgently needed. This has been + strikingly demonstrated as we have taken up the question of broadcasting + in Muslim languages, where Radio Liberty’s current level of performance + is only a fraction of its potential. The same is true to a lesser extent + for VOA. (C)

+

Book and publication programs for Eastern Europe and the USSR, like the radios, provide the basic + seed and fertilizer on which dissidence is nourished. These programs were at a low ebb in + 1977, at a far lower level of real-dollar input than they had been ten + years earlier. They have received modest increases each of the past four + years but are still, at a total expenditure of less than $5 million per + year, funded at levels which do not enable them to exploit the new + opportunities for penetrating the Communist world with ideas and + information which are constantly developing.Brzezinski highlighted + the two sentences above in the margin. + Samizdat and tamizdat + available for republishing and distribution into Eastern Europe and the + USSR are becoming available at a + much faster rate than they are able to take advantage of because of + limitations of funds and manpower. (S)

+

Realization of the importance of Islam, national self-assertion among the + Muslim peoples of the USSR (as well as + Christian peoples such as the Balts, Ukrainians and Georgians) and the + ferment and feedback generated by events in Iran and the Soviet invasion + of Afghanistan, (inter alia the resultant + suppression of dissidents of which the Sakharov exile is only the most + flagrant example) are developments which have highlighted new + opportunities. Existing resources are inadequate to meet these + opportunities. Existing manpower working on these subjects is + insufficient to do all the research and operational planning that is + required. (C)

+

RECOMMENDATIONS:

+

Programs for exploiting dissidence in Eastern Europe and the USSR (and perhaps Cuba as well?) are, + comparatively, in terms of the continuing effect they generate within + Communist societies, the most cost-effective activity the U.S. Government undertakes. (U)

+

• While maintaining and refining its verbal commitment + and demonstrative public actions in behalf of dissidents and human + rights in these countries, the Administration should urgently + consider immediate increases in resources allocated to + these activities. At a minimum they merit classification as + essential national security operations subject to real + annual increase of 3–5% on a par with defense outlays.Brzezinski wrote “reprogramming of books” in the + margin. (U)

+

• The creation of one or more semi-autonomous + institutions for sustained implementation of human rights goals, with perhaps a combination of governmental + and private funding, should be urgently studied. (C)

+

• Expansion and refinement of radio programming by + all instrumentalities available—VOA, + RFE/RL—should be undertaken at a steady tempo. (U)

+ +

• Plans should be made for future expansion of radio + transmitters to counter continued Soviet increases in + transmitter power and efforts to jam our transmissions. The long + lead-time required for building transmitters makes this essential. + (C)

+

• Expansion of publication and distribution + operations should also be undertaken. Even modest increments of + funds enable existing publication and distribution projects to perform + at a much higher level of efficiency. E.g., publishing 6,000 rather than + 3,000 copies of a Ukrainian dissident book costs much less than the + initial cost of the original 3,000. (S)

+

• A tape-cassette distribution program should be + developed to augment existing book and magazine programs; there is + increasing evidence that cassettes are popular and effective in the + Communist world. (S)

+

• Substantively, areas and peoples who are poorly served by current or + even planned publication and distribution programs include:

+

—The Baltic States, especially the Lithuanians.

+

—The Ukrainians.

+

—The Caucasus, including the Georgians, Armenians and Muslim peoples. + (C)

 +

• Religion, not only Islam, should be given higher + priority for planning new operations. E.g., the potential of persistent + Orthodox tradition in the Ukraine and among Russians as a focal point + for anti-Communist nationalism (or nationalism that regards Communism as + irrelevant) needs to be examined. (C)

+
+ +
+ 38. Editorial Note +

The Polish economic situation grew dire over the course of 1980. On July + 1, the Polish regime raised food prices nationwide, sparking a series of + strikes that quickly swept the country and forced the Polish Government + into crisis mode. The Embassy in Warsaw reported on July 31 that “the + labor unrest which has now persisted in Poland for more than four + weeks—strikes, stoppages, and slow-downs—may already have cost the + Polish Government as much as 50 billion Zlotys ($1.7 billion) in yearly + pay increases in addition to a three to four percent increase in + domestic inflation.” Ad hoc committees, the Embassy reported, “have been + formed in many individual plants and have bargained with management and + governmental representatives, pressing worker demands,” further discrediting government-sanctioned + labor unions. The Polish regime’s policy toward the emerging groups, the + Embassy wrote, “is still being formulated—painfully. The government + must, of course, consider that from the Soviet viewpoint, such + organizations are not only dangerous but virtually intolerable.” + (Telegram 7483 from Warsaw, July 31; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + D800366–0451)

+

By mid-August, the economic and political situation in Poland had + deteriorated further. On August 12 the Embassy reported that, among the + effects of the ongoing labor unrest were “a review of what the role of + the trade unions should be; a drop in [First Secretary of the Polish + United Worker’s Party Edward] Gierek’s stature; increasing resort by workers to job + actions to defend their standard of living thereby causing pressures to + mount within the Party for a tougher policy toward the working class; + and emerging differences of opinion among the leadership.” (Telegram + 7960 from Warsaw, August 12; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800388–0471) Strikes + in Gdansk and Szczecin began on August 14 and 18, respectively. The + workers formed strike committees and issued lists of demands, including, + for the first time, the demand that workers be allowed to form trade + unions independent of government control. By August 24, Gierek tried to appease protestors by + firing several high-ranking members of the government and Party + apparatus, including Polish Prime Minster Edward Babiuch and Party + ideologue Jerzy Lukazewicz. The Embassy reported on August 24: “These + personnel changes are the most significant and sudden since 1970.” + Although Gierek survived, his + prestige suffered, the Embassy reported. Concerning the strike + committees in Gdansk and Szczecin, the Embassy concluded: “Their + solidarity seems too strong just now to be affected by Party promises of + free elections of trade union representatives on the shop floor. We + anticipate they will have further tough negotiations with the Jagielski commission but believe that + they will find the commission more flexible than before.” (Telegram 8427 + from Warsaw, August 24; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800404–0720)

+

Concerns about developments in Poland prompted the White House to send a + message to British Prime Minister Margaret + Thatcher, French President Valéry Giscard d’Estaing, West German Chancellor + Helmut Schmidt, and other + close allies on August 27. In his message to Thatcher, sent directly from the White House to the + Cabinet Office, Carter wrote: “what is going on in Poland could + precipitate far-reaching consequences for East-West relations, and even + for the future of the Soviet Bloc itself.” “The best outcome,” Carter + continued, “would involve accommodation between the authorities and the + Polish people, without violence. Such an accommodation could well + transform the character of the + Polish system.” Noting that Secretary of State Edmund Muskie had met with his French + and West German counterparts to discuss Poland, Carter suggested that + “it is extremely important for us to keep in touch as the situation in + Poland develops.” (Telegram WH0642 to Thatcher, August 27; Carter Library, Brzezinski Donated Material, Subject + File, Box 20, Alpha Channel—Miscellaneous—7/80–8/80) In a similar + message sent to Pope John Paul + II, the President thanked the Vatican for “the wise approach + which you and the hierarchy of the church in Poland have been taking + toward recent events.” (Telegram 230027 to Rome, August 29; National + Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy + File, P870047–0341)

+

Ambassador to Poland William + Schaufele wrote on August 29: “Every day this week I have + toyed with making an up-to-date assessment of the Polish situation but + have delayed as new developments pile up and send me back to the drawing + board.” Noting that there had been no violence associated with the + strikes, Schaufele wrote: “If + the striking workers can maintain this discipline, the source of any + violence would have to be a decision by the government physically to + force them back to work or to remove them from the factories, shipyards, + and other work places. And that would have grave implications for the + future. It is still our view that some of the militia would follow + instructions to use force but it is highly doubtful that the army would. + And the magnitude of the strike movement would stretch militia manpower + very thin.” (Telegram 8625 from Warsaw, August 29; National Archives, + RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + D800414–0126)

+

On August 31, First Deputy Prime Minister of Poland Mieczyslaw Jagielski and Solidarity + leader Lech Walesa signed an agreement at Gdansk guaranteeing, among + other things, the right of Polish workers to form independent trade + unions and to conduct strikes. The Embassy in Warsaw reported the + signing on September 1, and concluded that, while “the overall trend in + Poland today seems to be back to work,” the next period “requires the + same prudence and responsibility. Both the party and the new labor + organizations will be jockeying for power, and the inevitable friction + that will result will demand of both sides as much forbearance as they + have shown to date.” (Telegram 8667 from Warsaw, September 1; National + Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy + File, D800416–1014) Documentation on Poland is scheduled for publication + in Foreign + Relations, 1977–1980, volume VII, Poland, 1977–1981.

+
+ +
+ 39. Memorandum From William + Odom of the National Security Council Staff to the + President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, + Staff Material, Unfiled File, Box 130, [East/West] 9/80. + Confidential. Sent for information. Brzezinski forwarded the memorandum to Carter who + wrote “Very interesting. J” at the top of the first + page. + + + + Washington, September + 3, 1980 + + + + SUBJECT + East-West Relations: A Formula for U.S. Policy in 1981 and Beyond + + +

I want to offer some perspectives on the current + state of East-West relations and an integrating formula for putting both the resources and a clear + sense of strategic direction into our policies toward the Soviet Union + in the next four years. You will recognize much of the analysis, but I + hope the framework is helpful for tying rhetoric to actions and programs + in a comprehensive fashion. The inspiration for this memo comes in part + from Sam Huntington’s recent + paper on U.S.-Soviet relationsNot further identified. which he wrote + for Hedley Donovan, but it also + stems from my own efforts in strategic doctrinal changes, the Persian + Gulf Security Framework, and East-West technology transfers. We have + accomplished a great deal over the past three years, and I would like to + maintain the momentum and include additional areas and programs.

+

The East-West Balance

+

In early 1977 you told Sam and me to “tell us how we are doing in the + world vis-a-vis the Soviets.” PRM–10 + Comprehensive Net AssessmentCarter signed + PRM–10, calling for a + “Comprehensive Net Assessment and Military Force Posture Review” on + February 18, 1977. (Carter Library, National Security Council, + Institutional Files, Box 3, Unclassified/Declassified PRM and PD/NSC Documents) was the reply. It treated + military and non-military categories as well as all major regions of + U.S.-Soviet competition.

+

1. The military balance was judged as “essential + equivalence” and the trends as adverse. That + judgment looks sound in retrospect.

+

2. In the non-military categories of technology, economics, diplomacy, + and political institutions, the U.S. was + ahead although the critical military-related technology gap was closing + in several areas. In retrospect this judgment has been vindicated.

+

3. In the major regions outside Europe, Soviet prospects were judged best + in Africa and the Persian Gulf region. The Caribbean was cited but + without alarm. In retrospect, the record is mixed in Africa; Iran as a crisis point was predicted; + we were too optimistic about the Caribbean; and Southeast Asia has been + more volatile than anticipated. In East Asia, our normalization with the + PRC faces the USSR for the first time ever with a + China-Japan-U.S. tie of good + relations.

+

4. In Europe, PRM–10 emphasized the + certainty of political uncertainty in both Eastern and Western Europe. + That judgment remains valid. The emergence of a more traditional German + Ostpolitik, exploited by Moscow in the + traditional manner, signals growing difficulties in West-West relations, + i.e., within the Alliance. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan has given + unambiguous evidence of the strategic interaction between the Persian + Gulf region and European-Soviet relations: Soviet power projection that + affects the oil states of the Persian Gulf tends to reinforce the + accommodationist politicizing forces in Western Europe and thereby + exacerbates U.S.-European relations + vis-a-vis Moscow and the Persian Gulf.

+

The Transition from Era I to Era II in East-West + Relations

+

Critics within the U.S. and abroad have + complained that the U.S. has not pursued + a steady or consistent course in U.S.-Soviet affairs. The President, in particular, is believed + by many to be responsible for this. It is, in their view, all his + fault.

+

To some extent, the apparent inconsistency is real. Soviet power + projection has been used more extensively in the last few years than + even informed policy and intelligence circles believed it would be. + “Changing” U.S. policy, therefore, has + been “catching up” U.S. policy. + Consistent policy outputs are impossible when the inputs differ + substantially from those anticipated.

+

To a larger extent the inconsistency is only apparent. It looks that way + because the foreign policy and press elites themselves are split on + fundamental assumptions about U.S. + foreign policy. They are awakening to and becoming disturbed by the + transition from the first era in East-West relations—1945 to the + mid-1970s (U.S. dominance and Pax + Americana)—to the second era—the 1980s and 1990s (the nature of which is + still being defined, as Soviet military power makes itself felt). But + they are reacting to this awakening in quite different ways. At least + three fissures divide foreign policy and media elite views, and perhaps + even the broader public, as they assess the incipient realities of Era + II.

+

First, there are fundamental differences over the political utility of military force. At the strategic nuclear + level, some believe “assured destruction” is enough. Others believe + force balances and capabilities make a political and diplomatic + difference. At the conventional level, some argue that our Vietnam + experience shows that conventional military power is greatly overrated. + Others say that Vietnam proves the importance of using conventional military power + effectively, of not squandering it where our interests are small.

+

The second fissure is East-West versus North-South + primacy, between those who view East-West relations as still + the cornerstone of U.S. foreign policy + and those who believe that North-South relations rival if not exceed + East-West relations for the cornerstone role.

+

The third fissure concerns economics—the growing + incongruities between economic power on the one hand (Europe, + Japan, and Saudi Arabia) and military security + responsibilities on the other hand (the U.S. carries them all). It is only vaguely recognized, but + it has enormous potential to evoke an “isolationist—internationalist” + dichotomy in security policy prescriptions.

+

These fissures prevent a foreign policy consensus on East-West relations + and mean that in the 1970s, and perhaps into the 1980s, no U.S. policy toward the USSR can have broad and constant support. + The domestic need to accommodate both sides of each fissure, + particularly in Congress for budgets, inevitably creates the impression, + if not the reality, of a wavering U.S. + policy toward the Soviet Union and our allies. Thus, blaming the + President is far from an adequate explanation.

+

The primary task for U.S. foreign and + defense policy in the early 1980s, therefore, is to complete the + transition to Era II peacefully and to give that era a definition and + direction appropriate to changed realities. Success will depend in part + on closing the three fissures, and a compelling formula articulated by + the President will help close these. Only their closure will provide the + liberal consensus necessary for a sustained realistic policy.

+

A U.S. Policy for + Era II

+

Era II may or may not be dominated by the U.S. A return to the Cold War is not possible because + regaining the military preponderance of that time is not feasible. Were + it feasible, a Cold War balance would be the best choice because it was + a period relatively secure from general war. A return to detente of the + early 1970s is equally infeasible. The Soviets would demand higher terms + and be no less aggressive in projecting power into the disputed regions. + Even if the Soviet leaders personally desired a relaxation, the + centrifugal forces within the USSR, in + the Warsaw Pact, and in client states elsewhere would make it too risky. + They are trapped in their own expansive dynamic which limits fundamental + choices.

+

Neither the containment policy nor the detente policy alone is adequate + to deal effectively with the new level of Soviet power. A more + comprehensive approach is essential. The U.S. must neither rely largely on military power nor + passively “contain” Soviet power. The U.S. must engage the USSR + competitively.

+ +

Huntington defined four elements + of a policy toward the USSR on which + “competitive engagement” can be built.

+ + a. Maintenance of military deterrence. + b. Containment of Soviet expansion where deterrence fails. + c. Offers of politically conditioned economic benefits. + d. Reduction of Soviet influence over client states, bloc states, + and minority nationalities in the USSR. + +

A number of things have been accomplished over the past three years to + provide the programs and policies for “competitive engagement” over the + next four years. When they are specifically related to the four elements + of the policy, a clear view of how to proceed in East-West relations + begins to emerge. That follows for each element.

+

a. Maintenance of military deterrence through military + pre-eminence.

+

The doctrinal changes marked by the “strategic” PD–41, 50, 53, 57, 58, + and 59Presidential Directive (PD) 41, + “U.S. Civil Defense Policy” was + signed by Carter on September 29, 1978, and directed that Civil + Defense capabilities be used to enhance deterrence and stability in + conjunction with strategic offensive and strategic defensive forces. + PD–50, “Arms Control Decision Process”, was signed on August 14, + 1979. It directed that any new proposal or modification in arms + control negotiation posture be tested against several criteria + including whether it contributed to achieving defense and force + posture goals. PD–53, “National Security Telecommunications Policy,” + was signed November 15, 1979, and established policies for national + telecommunication during and after a national emergency. PD–57, + “Mobilization Planning,” was signed March 3, 1980, and directed that + mobilization scenarios be coordinated among interested Federal + agencies. PD–58, “Continuity of Government,” was signed June 30, + 1980. PD–59, “Nuclear Weapons Employment Policy,” was signed July + 25, 1980. It established that the most fundamental objective of + U.S. strategic policy was + nuclear deterrence. U.S. strategic + nuclear forces were required to deter nuclear attacks not just on + the homeland, but also on forward bases, allies, and friends, and + contribute to the deterrence of non-nuclear attacks. (Ibid.) + provide the direction our military programs must take to maintain + deterrence in the 1980s. The gap between our political objectives and + our military capabilities must be reduced. This can be accomplished + through simultaneous improvements in our force posture and meaningful + arms control agreements.

+

—Force Improvements. We must address our military + deficiencies in a three-pronged attack which includes:

+ + —The Budget. Not only must the budget be + increased, but Defense, FEMA, and the DCI must let the strategic PDs guide their program + choices. To date, they have yielded little to the new + doctrine. + —Organization. All three agencies must be + reorganized to improve “factor productivity,” with particular + emphasis on the Pentagon. The President tried to reorganize DoD once, but the effort failed. He + succeeded with FEMA. He must succeed in the next term with + DoD. + —Manpower. We must also solve the military + manpower problem. That probably means a return to the military + draft. + + +

The objective of these measures may not be “military superiority” but it + should be “military pre-eminence” for the US and its allies, in terms of + both nuclear and conventional forces.

+

—Arms Control. Arms control, too, plays a part in + the military balance. Arms control, however, is headed for indefinite + dormancy in the 1980s unless it is tied symbiotically to our defense + policy. PD–50 prescribed the process that can achieve that symbiosis. + ACDA, State, and even ISA at Defense + have failed to see this merit in the directive. Yet it is precisely arms + control that is at risk without the PD–50 approach.

+

SALT I and II were developed to support + our assured destruction defense policy of the 1960s. In the 1970s, that + policy became inadequate. ACDA and State drifted into the position of + seeing arms control as a surrogate for a defense policy. Now we are + hesitantly awakening to the defense policy problem in Europe. We cannot + move with confidence into TNF and SALT + III negotiations because we are in transition with our defense policy. + That is not the only defense policy problem for arms control. ASAT + negotiations move on although we have not the slightest idea of our + force goals for space. No military service has responsibility for them. + The same is true for CTB. We have not developed our defense requirements + for nuclear weapons development and production of nuclear materials. Yet + we are on a CTB track that enjoys no interagency consensus.

+

Two major PD–50 tasks must be launched to extract us from this disastrous + course on which arms control now proceeds toward self-destruction. + First, an across-the-board assessment of all negotiations vis-a-vis one + another is essential. Second, a somewhat more narrow review of the + TNF/SALT III sector is needed to + clarify what kind of SALT III can + assist our national security in an unambiguous and objective way. To do + that, we must also review the whole of our strategy + and force structure for the defense of Europe. Both efforts + should be complete by next spring. To make these serious endeavors, the + President will have to reconfirm his commitment to the PD–50 process + within the agencies.

+

b. Containment of Soviet expansion where deterrence + fails.

+

We must devote special attention to the three interrelated strategic + regions of Europe, East Asia, and the Persian Gulf. The Caribbean region + is also overdue for our security attention as is Southeast Asia.

+

We have major work to accomplish in each area, notwithstanding much that + has already been accomplished. NATO, + as mentioned in connection with PD–50, needs a reassessment of our + strategy for its defense. The Persian Gulf Security Framework effort + must be kept on track, a separate unified command being one of the first + steps next year. For the Caribbean we must begin a similar security + framework effort. In East Asia, + the nature of military ties with China will need further definition.

+

In addition to these regional activities, some key functional area + reviews must be accomplished:

+

—A successful policy of containment depends on capable conventional force + projection. We have a modest beginning in the RDF.

+

—Security Assistance policy needs significant revision, budgeting, and + perhaps changed legislation.

+

—Our intelligence capabilities in each region must be improved and + expanded with all the speed possible.

+

—Military training assistance and advisory policy needs repair.

+

The most difficult area in the 1980s may prove to be Europe, West-West + relations. Overcoming the lag between our own recovery from the hopes of + the early 1970s and Europe’s recovery from its present illusion of + divisible detente, will not occur without political trauma. How to + defend Europe effectively cannot be dodged as it has been for three + decades. And until that is decided, arms control within that theater + will be difficult to implement in a way that is not politically and + militarily injurious to the West. The LTDP was a modest beginning which + must be turned into a major revolution in the 1980s.

+

c. Offers of politically conditioned economic benefits + to the East.

+

The Soviet Union and East Europe will continue to look to the West as a + source of reprieve from their economic plight. The West must exploit + that need with offers of economic assistance based on rigorous and + measurable political conditions.

+

With the new COCOM policies,In telegram 50188 + to multiple posts, February 24, the Department explained that “the + ‘no exceptions’ policy advocated by the U.S. for exports to the USSR would not apply to Eastern Europe or the PRC.” Because the policy + differentiated between countries of the Soviet bloc, “there may be a + greater temptation to divert exports within the Warsaw Pact. COCOM + participating governments, including the U.S., should carefully examine the potential for + diversion from Eastern Europe to the USSR.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + D800096–1230) we have begun to control more effectively the + strategic technology transfers. The next step is East-West trade + coordination. Credits and trade must be coordinated on an alliance + basis. Such a step logically follows from our COCOM policy. Otherwise, + the “alternative supplier” problem will continue to deny us the + political advantages of our greatest edge over the Soviets—economic + advantage. In the “process know-how” proposal to COCOM we have already + moved slightly toward trade coordination. That is why Europe resists it. + The diplomatic efforts now in progress to prevent the FRG (Kloeckner) and France (Creusot-Loire) + from taking our ARMCO and ALCOA deals with the Soviet Union can be the + seed from which East-West trade + coordination grows. If the Germans believe that Soviet markets are + critical for their machine exports, then we can retaliate by denying + them our import market. We have strong laws that allow the President to + force Europe to choose between the US as a trading partner and the + Soviet Bloc as a market. Once the allies are whipped into line, we can + dictate the political terms of East-West trade.

+

The Soviets deeply fear a Western united economic front. If we do not + present them with one in the 1980s, the incongruities between security + burdens and economic power in NATO + will create a political backlash in the US which will destroy public + support for US troops in Europe. The Mansfield Amendment was merely a + hint of what can come if the Europeans continue to get without paying + for, because we choose not to tax them.

+

To move from the rhetorical to the operational, we + should use the post-Afghanistan policy with our allies to lay the + basis for East-West trade coordination at the Economic Summit in + Canada next summer. Once the Soviets see an emerging united + economic front, we will have important opportunities for our economic + diplomacy.

+

d. Reduction of Soviet influence over 1) client states, + 2) bloc states, and 3) national minorities in the USSR.

+

It is time to reduce the spheres of Soviet influence, and the + opportunities are large. We have the beginnings of a policy for the + three non-Russian areas of Soviet influence.

+

—Client States. In Southwest Asia, in the Horn of + Africa, in Southern Africa (Angola), in Yemen, in the Caribbean, and in + Southeast Asia we can and should bring some reverses to the Soviet + projection of power. This will involve more vigorous support for + anti-Soviet movements afoot in all areas.

+

—Bloc States. We already have a policy for East + Europe of encouraging its autonomy vis-a-vis the USSR. We must help + Poland consolidate recent gains.

+

—Minorities in the USSR. We can do more on the nationality question + within the USSR. The human rights + policy is, of course, already a weapon in our arsenal. In an age of + nationalism, there is nothing permanent about Soviet “internationalism” + and Soviet borders—something we can imply and encourage others to say + explicitly.

+

A competitive approach to spheres and areas of Soviet influence will make + further Soviet projection of power more difficult. A passive containment + approach will permit Soviet consolidation of recent gains and new + efforts to expand further.

+

The Soviet Union, however militarily strong it is becoming, suffers + enormous centrifugal political forces. A shock could bring surprising + developments within the USSR, just as + we have seen occurring in Poland. The dissolution of the Soviet Empire is not a wholly fanciful + prediction for later in this century. US policy should sight on that + strategic goal for the longer run. When it comes, Era II will be at an + end, and we can anticipate Era III.

+

To sum up, through a strategy of “competitive engagement” the President + can, I believe, heal some of the fissures in our foreign policy and + media elite opinion on the three key assumptions for US military, + foreign, and economic policy. In a second term he will be freer to stand + above the day-to-day criticisms that have heretofore made a steady + course difficult to follow, particularly funding programs and pursuing + adequate legislation. He also has the enormous advantage of several + inchoate policy developments (as outlined above) that will allow him, + rather than the Soviets and our allies, to define the nature of Era II + in East-West relations. Basic steps have already been taken in each of + the four elements of “competitive engagement.” As policy slogans form + each element, the following are possibilities:

+

a. Maintenance of military deterrence.

+

US “military pre-eminence” is the essential basis for deterrence and + security. We shall acquire it and maintain it with our allies.

+

b. Containment of Soviet expansion where deterrence + fails.

+

“Three interrelated security zones” are the basis for containing Soviet + power projection.

+

c. Offers of politically conditioned economic + benefits.

+

“Reciprocally advantageous East-West trade” is our goal, but trade is not + compatible with threats to our security and foreign policy + interests.

+

d. Reduction of Soviet influence over client states, + Bloc states, and non-Russian minorities in the USSR.

+

“Resistance to Soviet internationalism” is encouraged wherever states and + nations find it oppressive and unwanted.

+
+ +
+ 40. Memorandum Prepared in the Central Intelligence AgencySource: Central Intelligence Agency, + Office of Support Services (DI), Job 85T00287R, Production Case + Files, Box 1, Folder 198, Likely Consequences in Eastern Europe of + the Polish Events. Top Secret; [codeword not + declassified]. Prepared in the Office of Political Analysis + and Office of Economic Research and coordinated with the National + Intelligence Officer for the USSR/Eastern Europe. + + + PA M80–10385C + + + Washington, September + 5, 1980 + +

LIKELY CONSEQUENCES IN EASTERN EUROPE OF THE POLISH + EVENTS

+

SUMMARY

+

Over the short to medium term (several months to a + year) the Polish regime’s granting of political concessions to + striking workers will have a greater effect on the regimes than on + the populaces elsewhere in Eastern Europe. The regimes will seek to + head off any developments similar to those that took place in Poland + by using persuasion, assuagement, and—if necessary—intimidation. If + Moscow does not force wholesale retraction of the concessions the + regime in Warsaw has granted, workers elsewhere in Eastern Europe + eventually might raise demands similar to those the Poles have. If + the Soviets intervene to prevent the implementation of the + concessions, other East Europeans are unlikely to take the risk of + emulating the Polish workers. (C)

+

Impact on the Regimes

+

[1 paragraph (11 lines) not declassified]

+

Over the short term, the regimes probably will be prepared to make + limited concessions—such as increasing the availability of consumer + goods, offering limited wage increases to certain workers, and perhaps + delaying price increases. At the same time they will increase the + workload of party cadre who monitor and seek to direct public opinions + and will tighten security. They may also revamp the party-controlled + trade unions in an effort to head off criticisms and demands for change. + Nervous leaders, however, might over-react to any signs that people are + even considering imitating the Polish workers. Harsh political measures + or the use of force could precipitate the very thing they wish to + avoid—labor unrest and other forms of popular demonstrations. (C)

+

East European leaders would become even more concerned if the Polish + regime proves unwilling or unable within the next several months to + retract some of its concessions. Internally the regimes would most + likely continue and intensify their efforts to persuade, assuage, and + intimidate. The economic costs of assuaging the populace might, however, + soon present a burden that the five countries would be unable and/or unwilling to bear. They + would therefore begin—or in the case of the East Germans step + up—pressure on the Polish regime to curb the workers. At the same time + the East Europeans would probably ask the USSR to provide them with greater economic assistance. The + Soviets might comply but would demand a political price—more tightening + of internal security and greater allegiance to the Soviet foreign policy + line. (C)

+

Impact on the Workers

+

We assume that the populaces in Eastern Europe have listened to Western + broadcasts and know of the outcome in Poland. We also assume that many + East Europeans were vicariously buoyed to learn that a Communist regime + was forced to make major concessions to striking workers. It is + unlikely, however, that any of the East European populaces will react + over the next several months by emulating the Polish workers. In + Romania, where there have been a number of minor worker disturbances + over this summer, significant numbers of workers might go on strike, but + they are likely to press for strictly economic benefits—not for trade + unions or other political concessions—and the Ceausescu regime would be able to + contain such strikes. (C)

+

Despite the victory of the Polish strikers, workers elsewhere in Eastern + Europe will be reluctant to challenge regimes that they + perceive—probably correctly—as more likely than the one in Poland to + reply with prompt and harsh repression. Even in the near term, however, + the events in Poland may give rise to greater worker assertiveness + within the framework of established grievance procedures. In some cases, + moreover, circumstances could precipitate localized strikes. Such + strikes, however, are not likely to reach anything like Polish + proportions or to acquire a comparable political content. There is a + less glaring disparity between popular expectations and standards of + living in the rest of Eastern Europe than in Poland. The workers in the + other countries also lack the leadership, self-discipline, and + solidarity that their Polish counterparts developed during years of + strike experience. Nor can they look for support from vocal and + organized political dissidents and an independent and politically + influential church. (C)

+

Longer Term Implications

+

While the short term effects will be limited, over the next several years + the impact of the events of the past several weeks could result in more + substantial changes in Eastern Europe. Most regimes will be forced in + any case to make adjustments that will impede or rule out attempts to + boost economic efficiency. Efforts to provide more consumer goods and + hesitancy in implementing economically necessary austerity policies + would further exacerbate economic and financial problems and delay for + years the implementation of economic reform measures that would inevitably be painful. A + prolonged period of economic stagnation—of level or slowly declining + living standards—seems in prospect, as all the economies of Eastern + Europe face austerity imposed by energy problems, demographic + developments, and the requirement of improving external hard currency + financial positions. (C)

+

Politically, the deteriorating economic situation could lead to disputes + within the leadership and the populaces could gain the impression that + the regimes are not united and are indecisive. This perception might + tempt workers and political dissidents to become more assertive and + perhaps to cooperate with one another. Under such conditions, the + victory of the Polish workers could become an example other East + European work forces might seek to emulate. They would still be taking a + great risk, however, for they would have less reason to believe that + their regimes would necessarily follow the Gierek regime’s example or that Moscow would tolerate + another “Polish Summer.”See Document 38. (C)

+
+ + +
+ 41. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassies in All + NATO CapitalsSource: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + D800453–1198. Confidential; Priority. Drafted by Gilmore; cleared by + Bridges, Parris, and Barry; + approved by Ridgway. Sent + for information Priority to Belgrade, East Berlin, Bucharest, + Budapest, Moscow, Prague, Sofia, Warsaw, Helsinki, Madrid, + Stockholm, and Vienna. + + + Washington, September 20, 1980, 0753Z + +

250846. Subject: Poland and Eastern Europe: Analysis and Policy + Implications. Ref: State 238732.In telegram + 238732 to multiple posts, September 8, the Department provided a + draft of the paper and requested comments on the analytical section + as well as policy recommendations for each individual Eastern + European country. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + D800428–0391)

+

1. (C-entire text)

+

2. In an effort to analyze the likely effect on the USSR and Eastern Europe of the + developments in Poland and to evaluate their implications for U.S. policy, we circulated our initial + assessment (reftel) to our posts in + Moscow and Eastern Europe for their initial thoughts and comments. This message represents a + refinement of our assessment in light of the responses from the field. + We have cast paras 3–6 of this message in the form of talking points + which the action addressees may share with host governments on a + confidential basis. Action addressees may also draw on the substance of + paras 7–9In telegram 253501, September 22, + the Department corrected this sentence to read “draw from substance + of para 7.” (National Archives, + RG 59, Central Foreign Policy + File, D800453–1198) which discuss U.S. policy in light of the recent events in Poland.

+

3. The present situation in Poland:

+

—Events in Poland have not yet run their course and the question of + whether the workers are ultimately successful in achieving a major + liberalization of Polish society will have a significant bearing on the + impact of these events on other Eastern European countries.

+

—Although Polish workers have already won some signal victories, e.g., + securing agreement in principle to an independent trade union structure, + acknowledgement of the right to strike, access by the church to the + media, and apparently some relaxation in censorship, the new Polish + leadership seems certain to try over time to pare back some of these + concessions. Nevertheless, in the short run, the situation in Poland + seems likely to stabilize and the gains of the workers seem likely to be + preserved.

+

4. Impact of Polish developments on Eastern Europe:

+

—The unique characteristics of the internal situation in Poland reduce + the chances of any immediate, direct spillover of Polish developments + into other parts of Eastern Europe—let alone the USSR.

+

—At least some of the other Eastern European Governments are likely to + heighten the degree of vigilance toward dissidents and be more alert to + the possibility of discontent among workers. At the same time, they are + likely to pay more attention to agricultural performance and supplies of + foodstuffs and consumer goods.

+

—Several Eastern European Governments are likely to pay increased + attention to the possibility of structural economic reforms—perhaps + along Hungarian lines—as a way of dealing with worsening economic + problems.

+

—Over the longer term, developments in Poland are likely to have a + significant impact. The workers’ gains, especially if they are to some + degree consolidated and institutionalized, will serve as an example of + the kinds of evolutionary change which may some day be possible + elsewhere in the area.

+

5. Reaction from Moscow:

+ +

—Poland’s reforms, if implemented, could threaten the party’s monopoly on + political power, and Moscow is concerned that elements in other Eastern + European countries might emulate Poland. Therefore, the Soviets are + likely to press the Poles to roll back—to the degree possible—the + concessions made to workers on the right to form independent trade + unions and the right to strike.

+

—While the Soviets seem certain to heighten their efforts on ideological + vigilance, they are unlikely, at least for the present, to pressure the + Poles or the other Eastern European countries to curtail their economic + ties with the West.

+

—The Soviets are able and ready to provide Poland with some economic + assistance, as the recently announced agreements indicate. Soviet hard + currency balances are up, and so long as Polish developments remain + within bounds acceptable to Moscow, the Soviets are likely to provide + carefully measured assistance. It is unclear at this point how far + Soviet leaders will find it possible or desirable to go.

+

—The Soviets also seem prepared to tolerate a degree of economic + experimentation, perhaps along the lines of Hungary’s new economic + mechanism, although they will caution against reforms which affect the + political structure of the state.

+

—Polish events point up particularly clearly the increasing difficulties + of the Soviet Union in resolving the problems in its economic and + political relationships with Eastern European countries.

+

—Domestically, the Soviets have taken steps such as the jamming of VOA, BBC and Deutsche Welle to insulate + their population from information on developments in Poland.See Document 79. + Although there are certain parallels between Soviet and Polish economic + problems, we see little prospect of Soviet workers raising demands for + fundamental reform of the Soviet system.

+

6. Impact of Polish events on Europe as a whole:

+

—Detente and CSCE. In view of the low + key posture of Western European Governments with regard to the Polish + crisis and Soviet hopes of preserving the structure of detente in + Europe, it seems unlikely that the Polish developments will lead to a + more pugnacious Soviet stance at Madrid.

+

—It would be shortsighted, however, to attribute the “successful” outcome + in Poland as evidence of Soviet restraint in Europe or as a triumph of + detente.

+ +

—The Soviets will be at great pains to avoid weakening the position they + gained in post-1945 Europe, and they will not exclude the use of armed + force as a means of preserving their “alliance” in extremis.

+

7. U.S. policy:

+

It is clear, based on our assessment of the Eastern European reaction to + events in Poland, that the principal implication for the United States + in the future is to continue our policy of differentiation. With each + Eastern European Government our policy actions must take into account + that government’s policies toward us; at the same time we must tailor + our policy initiatives to the peculiar situation found in each of these + countries. We should be alert to the needs of the Eastern Europeans and + prepared to respond to them rapidly and concretely, and with appropriate + subtlety, in view of the sensitivity of the USSR.

+ + Christopher + +
+ +
+ 42. Editorial Note +

The crisis in Poland reached a tipping point in December 1980. On + December 2, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) issued an Alert Memorandum noting that the Soviets + were increasing preparations for an invasion of Poland: “Recent military + activities in and around Poland are highly unusual for this time of + year. We are aware of preparations for an imminent unscheduled joint service exercise + involving Soviet, East German, Polish, and possibly Czechoslovak forces” + which “could also serve as cover for an intervention.” While cautioning + that Soviet preparations did not denote an imminent invasion, the Agency + concluded that intervention was increasingly likely. (Carter Library, + National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 65, Poland: + 11/80–1/81) The memorandum is scheduled for publication in Foreign Relations, + 1977–1980, volume VII, Poland, 1977–1981. The following day, + President Jimmy Carter sent + Soviet General Secretary Leonid + Brezhnev a Hot Line message assuring the Soviet leader + that the United States was not intent on taking advantage of the Polish + crisis to change the balance of power in Europe. The White House also + issued a public statement warning of “unprecedented building of Soviet + forces along the Polish border” and Soviet statements of “alleged + ‘anti-Socialist’ forces within Poland.” The White House warned: “We know + from postwar history that such allegations have sometimes preceded + military intervention.” They continued: “Foreign military intervention + in Poland would have most + negative consequences for East-West relations in general and U.S.-Soviet relations in particular.” (Public Papers: Carter, 1980–1981, Book III, pages + 2771–2772)

+

On December 4, the CIA received an + urgent message from a highly valuable and well placed source in the + Polish General Staff, Colonel Ryszard Kuklinski. Kuklinski informed the + CIA that the Soviets had decided to + invade Poland with 15 divisions, 2 Czechoslovak divisions, and 1 East + German division on December 8. (Benjamin Weiser, A + Secret Life, pages 219–221) Despite Kuklinski’s information, + the final decision on Soviet intervention had been delayed until after a + special meeting of the Political Consultative Committee (PCC) of the + Warsaw Pact scheduled to take place in Moscow on December 5. At the + meeting, Polish First Secretary Stanislaw Kania, informed the other + Eastern European leaders that the Polish leadership had instituted a + group working on imposing martial law in Poland, arresting the + leadership of Solidarity, and creating an armed militia of party + functionaries. While the Warsaw Pact leaders cautioned Kania of the + danger of having the situation further deteriorate, it was agreed that + the Polish leadership should still attempt to resolve the situation on + its own. (From Solidarity to Martial Law, pages + 141–161)

+

On December 7, the National Security Council met to discuss the situation + in Poland and U.S. reactions. President + Carter approved the text of cables to be sent to the United Kingdom, + France, the Federal Republic of Germany, and other U.S. allies, as well as the United Nations + Secretary General and NATO Secretary + General. Following the meeting, the White House issued a statement: + “Preparations for possible Soviet intervention in Poland appear to have + been completed. It is our hope that no such intervention will take + place. The United States Government reiterates its statement of December + 3, regarding the very adverse consequences for U.S.-Soviet relations of Soviet military intervention in + Poland.” (Public Papers: Carter, 1980–1981, Book + III, page 2785)

+

On December 8, Bureau of Intelligence and Research Director Ronald I. Spiers briefed Western + Ambassadors in Washington on the U.S. + assessment of the Polish situation. In telegram 326216 to multiple posts + December 9, the Department of State informed all NATO capitals that Spiers told the Ambassadors that the + Soviets had completed preparations and military intervention could + happen without further notice. Spiers reported: “Military signs are sufficiently + ominous that whatever steps can be taken to affect Soviet decision + making should be taken now.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800587–1069)

+

By December 11, the Soviet leadership had decided to wait for a Polish + solution to the crisis. In a meeting of the Soviet Politburo, chief Soviet ideologue and chairman + of the special Soviet Politburo commission on the Polish events Mikhail + Suslov reported on the December 5 PCC meeting: “Most importantly, the + Polish comrades understand the great danger that hangs over Poland, and + they recognize the great harm of the actions of the anti-socialist + elements who represent a great threat to the socialist gains of the + Polish people.” Kania, concluded Suslov, “noted that the Polish United + Workers’ Party, the Polish people, its healthy forces, its armed forces, + the organs of State Security and police, which support the PUWP, will be + able to deal with and normalize the situation by their own means.” + Brezhnev’s speech at the + meeting, Suslov told the Politburo, “contained all the necessary + instructions for the PUWP and the Polish comrades.” (From Solidarity to Martial Law, pages 167–168)

+

In his December 19 NSC Weekly Report to + the President, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs + Zbigniew Brzezinski + reported: “The same Soviet clandestine source who provided the report + detailing Soviet invasion plans now reports that the invasion has been + postponed for the ‘indefinite future.’ The principal reason for the + postponement, according to the sources, was the effectiveness of the + Western counter propaganda campaign which convinced the Kremlin the West + would retaliate ‘massively’ with political and economic sanctions.” + (Carter Library, Plains File, Subject File, Box 30, NSC Weekly Reports, 6–12/80)

+ +
+ +
+ 43. Telegram From the Embassy in Poland to the Department of + StateSource: National + Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign + Policy File, D800586–1050. Confidential; Immediate; Exdis. Sent for information to + Belgrade, East Berlin, Bonn, Bucharest, Budapest, London, Moscow, + Paris, Prague, Sofia, Vienna, USMission West Berlin, Munich, and USNATO. + + + 12334 + + + Warsaw, December 9, 1980, 1558Z + +

12334. Subject: Poland: Post-Intervention U.S. Policy.

+

1. (C-entire text.)

+

2. Summary: In considering the U.S. + response to Russian/Warsaw Pact intervention in Poland, the guiding + principle should be to distinguish between the Russians and the EE’s. The former, not the latter, should be made to bear the + brunt of the negative consequences of intervention, in continuation of + our goal of dividing the East, not driving it together. The basic + reality, arguing for differentiation, is that the entire EE area is in a permanent, low-grade crisis + in which Russian interests and the interests of the client states tend + to diverge. As regards the Polish regime, our approach should be that it + was forced against its inclination and better judgement by the Russians + to do their bidding. The alternative to differentiation, a general + anathema on Russians, EE’s and Polish + Party people of every stripe is the easier option, but experience shows + it will not carry very far before counter-pressures develop. The West + [as] a whole, and the U.S. in + particular, will be faced with tough decisions in the economic aid field + in a post-intervention situation. I would not rule out carefully + conditioned offers of assistance, or short-term food relief measures, as + a way of looking—and being—constructive, re-entering the Polish scene + and retaining flexibility from which to acquire marginal area of + influence. End summary.

+

3. I know the Department has under consideration the question of our + response to Soviet intervention in Poland.See Document 44. This is a many + faceted issue. I submit some thoughts on how we might deal with the + Polish authorities and the other EE’s, + in distinction to the Russians.

+

4. Much will depend on the circumstances, and several scenarios can be + envisaged. The Russians will, as in Czechoslovakia in 1968, claim that + they and other Warsaw Pact forces have responded to a Polish invitation. + They may actually be able to provide some substantiation of the claim + or, as in 1968, they may simply declare an invitation as a fact and + proceed from there.

+

5. The main consideration is that, whatever the Russian stage management + turns out to be, it is they who are responsible. The others go along, + more or less willingly. We should be guided accordingly. The Russians + should be made to bear the negative consequences of intervention, so far + as the U.S. reaction goes. We should + distinguish between them and their Warsaw Pact allies to the extent + possible. The objective should continue to be, as in our + post-Afghanistan policy, to seek to divide, not to unite the Eastern + group.

+

6. There are difficulties in this suggested approach. It would not be + easy, for example, to operate on the premise that the East German and + Czechoslovak regimes have been dragged into intervention in Poland, in + light of their anti-Polish actions and statements in the past several + weeks. Hungary and Romania have been fairly restrained by comparison, + and I judge Bulgaria too. In the event of intervention they will all be subject to heavy Russian + pressure to support the action, if not actually participate in it. There + may be shading of tone, but I suspect they will be fine ones in the + general chorus.

+

7. Nevertheless, it is important in our long term interests to proceed on + the assumption of distinction between the Russians and the others. The + reason, in my view, is that it is demonstrable that the whole Eastern + Europe empire is in a permanent, low grade crisis in which Russian + interests and those of its clients tend to diverge on many points. It is + a crisis the central feature of which is economic mismanagement. It is + not a crisis which is bound to drive people to the barricades, though it + will, I suspect, keep them in a constant state of disaffection. The + Polish trouble, even if it is liquidated, will on this view reappear at + some future point in other places in other forms—just as 1956 and 1968 + were unable to exorcize the demon.

+

8. Our approach to the Polish authorities in a post-intervention + situation will be particularly important. Again, much will depend on the + actual circumstances. Perhaps there will be an invitation from some + Polish quarters for Warsaw Pact “fraternal assistance.” Perhaps Polish + security or military forces will act to put down worker resistance by + force. I suggest our basic approach should be that the Poles, + specifically the Polish Party, were forced into such actions against + their better judgement through massive Russian pressure and + intimidation. Such a line has a basis in fact. The Party, up to this + point, has shown notable readiness to try to find compromises with the + new union movement. Admittedly, it has had few options, but the fact + remains that is has not had recourse in the past months to massive + repressive methods. We would certainly not wish to endorse in any way + Polish figures sharply identified with intervention or repression, but + rather put the stress on “healthy forces” in the party which have tried + to devise Polish solutions for Polish problems.

+

9. I would not pretend that this suggested course is easy or likely to + produce quick results. The easier way in fact is to lump everyone + together, Russians, EE’s, Polish Party + people of every stripe, in one general anathema, draw the ideological + battle lines sharply and settle down to a long, cold winter in the + trenches. The difficulty with this course is that experience tells us it + does not last long. Usually sooner than later, counter-pressures + develop. Allies will begin to get itchy about selling large diameter + steel pipe. Joint projects for Siberian development will start dancing + like sugar plum fairies. The Ostpolitiker will start sighing for the + German nation. Our farmers will want to sell their grain again. And, on + other levels, we will all gradually wend our way back to the reality that we need the Russians + pretty badly, chiefly in arms control.

+

10. If that is where we are headed in the post-Polish intervention + period, be it in one, two or however many years, we should be sure we do + not make it tougher for the EE’s than we + do for the Russians. I and, I suspect, others who have been involved in + US-Czechoslovak affairs feel that we transferred some [of] our policy + rage at the Russians over 1968 to the injured party, Czechoslovakia. We + should try to avoid that policy pothole in a Polish 1980, or 1981.

+

11. I realize that history cannot be telescoped. We could not have + adopted the attitude to Kadar in 1956 that we did in 1966, or even more + in 1976. Polich [Poland] has to take its natural + course, and it is often inevitably slow. I would not go so far as to + suggest that we should be on the alert for Kadar equivalents in any + Polish variation on the Russian intervention theme, but we should be + careful not to paint ourselves too firmly into too many corners too + quickly. Before anyone yells “quisling,” it would be well to reflect on + the irony that Kadar, of all people, would be the last best hope left in + EE of a mildly progressive internal + regime if the present Polish strivings collapse.

+

12. I have pointed to economic mismanagement as the root cause of + low-grade crisis through EE, and it is + in the economic area that we and others would face particularly + sensitive decisions in a post-intervention scene. That is, assuming that + the Russians/EE’s do not retreat into + the bunker of strict autarky but continue to be interested, as I tend to + think they must be, in developing economic relations and limited + cooperation with the West.

+

13. It would not be easy for a USG, or + other Western countries, to extend economic assistance to a + post-intervention Polish regime, yet Poland in the aftermath of + intervention would need economic assistance even more desperately than + it does now. We could adopt the position that that is a Russian affair, + and let it go at that, but I hardly think that simply washing our hands + of it will satisfy public opinion, particularly American Polonia. I + would not exclude our making carefully conditioned offers of assistance + as a way of re-entering the Polish situation and making our presence + felt. This leaves it up to the other side, Polish or Russian, to turn us + down, and the onus would be on them while we would look—and actually + be—constructive.

+

14. Immediate food aid, as distinct from broader economic assistance, + would become particularly acute in a post-intervention situation. I + believe we would find ourselves under public pressure, on broad + humanitarian grounds, to try to help the Polish people in what would + doubtless be a time of distress. Although I have reservations about short-term CCC aid under + current conditions (Warsaw 11704)In telegram + 11704 from Warsaw, November 19, Meehan discussed the evolving situation and Poland + and addressed the Polish request for CCC credits: “Granting + additional CCC assistance might be justifiable on humanitarian + grounds, but I find it difficult to produce a convincing foreign + policy rationale—and the humanitarian case does not demand immediate + decision.” Meehan concluded + that any short-term CCC credits “would be marginal to the great mass + of the problem” and suggested that a decision on offering the + credits be held in reserve. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + D800554–0379), I doubt that we would have any alternative but + to grant some kind of food assistance post-intervention, either + bilaterally or through multilateral programs and channels.

+

15. The guiding thought in all the above is simply, to repeat, we should + work to divide the East, not drive it together. It is not always easy to + translate that principle into practical action courses. But in general + it reduces itself, even—one might say especially—in highly charged + situations such as post-intervention Poland would be, to retaining + flexibility and continuing to seek marginal areas of influence.

+ + Meehan + + +
+ +
+ 44. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassies in + Bulgaria, Czecholslovakia, Yugoslavia, Poland, Hungary, and the Soviet + UnionSource: National + Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign + Policy File, D800599–0343. Secret; Immediate; Stadis. Drafted and approved by + Barry. No final version + of the paper quoted in this telegram was found. + + + Washington, December 16, 1980, 2247Z + +

332554. For the Ambassador from Barry. Subject: US Policy Toward Eastern Europe + Following a Soviet Intervention in Poland.

+

1. (S-entire text.)

+

2. The following is a draft of a paper now being prepared to deal with + the question of our policy response in Eastern Europe to a Soviet + intervention in Poland. We need to get this upstairs by COB December 17 + and would appreciate any substantive comments you have to make in the + meantime. Please restrict distribution to yourself and the DCM + and slug any replies Stadis—EUR only. Please do not refer to it in other + communications.

+

Begin text:

+

—It was easy to rationalize our decision last January not to impose + sanctions against the Warsaw Pact countries of Eastern Europe for the + Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.See footnote 5, Document 39. + Furthermore, the policy of differentiation which we enunciated at the + time worked—the countries of Eastern Europe clung eagerly to their + relations with the US and Western Europe despite public and private + Soviet complaints that we were trying to divide them from their allies. + The policy which we have pursued over several administrations has + encouraged diversity and evolutionary change in Eastern Europe. In fact, + it has contributed to the independence in foreign policy which has + created such problems for Moscow in Romania respectively, and to the + domestic pluralism in Poland and the economic reform in Hungary which + have already brought those countries some way back toward Western + models.

+

—We should not lose sight of the fact that the economic and political + forces which brought about the situation in Poland are also at work in + the rest of Eastern Europe. The very fact that the East Germans, for + example, are so afraid of Western influence and presence should point us + in the direction of getting more involved in Moscow’s back + yard—discreetly, but in concrete ways—rather than reducing our ties and + influence. Our objective should be to divide the East, not drive it + together by intentionally apportioning more blame to the raped than the + rapist, as we have been accused of doing with Czechoslovakia after the + 1968 invasion.

+

—Yet we should be under no illusion that it would be possible to continue + our policy without change in the wake of a Soviet-sponsored Warsaw Pact + intervention in Poland. In the first place, some of the Warsaw Pact + countries would no doubt participate in an intervention in Poland, thus + distinguishing this from the case of Afghanistan. Secondly, both Soviet + pressures and the grave deterioration in East-West relations in the wake + of a Polish intervention would create new divisions in Europe and limit + Eastern European freedom of action. Thirdly, public opinion here and in + Western Europe would demand some actions against a Polish Government + which suppressed the independent trade unions by force or East European + Governments which participated in an intervention in Poland. US unions, + for example, would no doubt take matters in their own hands and refuse + to handle Polish ships and aircraft.

+ +

—While we must consider an appropriate policy response concerning Eastern + Europe in advance and discuss it with our allies, we need to be careful + not to lock ourselves into a policy response which might turn out to be + incorrect in the event. We must recognize that intervention in Poland is + the doing of the Soviet Union clients. They will respond with varying + degrees of enthusiasm, with the GDR + certainly and Czechoslovakia probably egging Moscow on, Bulgaria + reticent, Hungary obviously reluctant and Romania perhaps dissociating + itself. While some Eastern European military units may go into Poland, + they will probably only have a symbolic role to play as was the case in + Czechoslovakia in 1968. There is also the question of the general + scenario under which any intervention might take place and the strong + possibility that it will be under the guise of “Warsaw Pact maneuvers” + or some kind of invitation—perhaps genuine—from the Polish Government. + Our policy response in Eastern Europe will have to take all of these + factors into account.

+

—There is an important tactical point as well. Our allies are prepared to + agree that a strong policy response is required vis-a-vis the Soviet + Union. They are probably prepared even to sacrifice some important + economic interests to make such a policy response. However, they will + not be prepared to agree that the same or similar measures should be + automatically applied to Eastern Europe—for all the reasons above plus + others. The most serious objections would come from the FRG, as Schmidt would certainly not be ready to sacrifice the + future of inner-German relations as part of a response to Soviet + intervention in Poland. The question of specific steps to be taken in + Eastern Europe could sidetrack the discussion of measures to be applied + to the Soviet Union, and over the longer term, a US effort to bring the + Europeans along on sanctions against Eastern Europe would run into + considerable resistance and play into the hands of Soviet efforts to + divide the US from its allies. We must, in this regard, keep well in + mind the fact that the Western Europeans have gone considerably farther + than we in building economic and political relations with Eastern + Europe.

+

—A similar general consideration to be borne in mind is that of + reversibility. If the cause of sanctions against Eastern Europe is + Soviet/Warsaw Pact intervention in Poland, what would be the logical + cause of removing these sanctions? Withdrawal of Soviet troops from + Poland? A Polish Government “acceptable to the Polish people”? In other + words, whatever measures we impose will be with us for a long time + unless we want to run the risk of being perceived as inconsistent in our + policy.

+

—These considerations argue for moving ahead slowly and cautiously in + planning our policy response in Eastern Europe. While we should look at + the range of political and economic steps open to us and calculate their + costs and benefits, we should not be “drawing up lists” and seeking allied agreement to them. In our + consultations with others, we ought to confine ourselves to general + observations along the above lines rather than trying to get specific as + we are on the Soviet case. Our public posture in the event of a Warsaw + Pact intervention ought to be to place the blame squarely on the Soviets + while acknowledging that our attitude toward Eastern European + participants cannot help but be affected by the nature and enthusiasm of + the support they provide to Moscow in any actions taken against + Poland.

+

General Considerations

+

—As a general rule of thumb, we believe that our policy response toward + Eastern European participants ought to concentrate on refusing to do + things in the political and economic area rather than imposing sanctions + or embargos which will be difficult to lift in the future.

+

—Obviously our political relations with Warsaw Pact participants will + worsen after an intervention and we will want to take steps—in the + UN, at Madrid, and in US and allied + public statements—taking them to task for their violation of Polish + sovereignty while making it clear that we hold the USSR—not the peoples or Governments of + Eastern Europe—to blame.

+

—It will be very much in our interest to measure our response in terms of + the amount of intervention; thus, a token participation by an EE country would logically call for a + lesser response than what we did vis-a-vis Moscow.

+

—While not imposing a ban on high-level contacts with Eastern + Europe—which make Moscow uncomfortable—we will want to hold back for + several months.

+

—Yet we would want to continue and even expand where possible less + visible cultural exchanges and mutually beneficial scientific and + technical exchanges.

+

—We would not want to extend to Eastern Europe our policy of terminating + or suspending US-Soviet bilateral agreements. This would mean keeping + MFN in place for Poland, Hungary + and Romania as well as bilateral civil aviation and maritime + agreements.

+

—However we would no longer be able to differentiate between the USSR and the rest of the Warsaw Pact + (except Romania) in the area of technology transfer. Assuming Romanian + opposition to intervention in Poland, we would want to develop a really + meaningful differentiation in the US Government and in COCOM.

+

—We would not propose an embargo on grain sales to Eastern Europe, as + neither the Allies nor the American farmer would support such a move. At + the same time we would shift to a “cash-and-carry” policy where + appropriate to place maximum burden on the Soviet economy to feed + Eastern Europe. We would also continue to warn that any diversion of US grain to the USSR or substitution of US grain for + domestic products shipped to the USSR + would lead to extension of the embargo.

+

—We would not suspend Export-Import Bank financing for Eastern Europe. + (In any event US and European private banks which make up 70pct of the + debt exposure would drastically cut back on new loans and we would + encourage them to limit their activities to roll-over of outstanding + debt. Similarly, US business interest in large projects in Eastern + Europe would decline.)

+

—Against the background of the overall policy approach, there follows a + country-by-country discussion of policies toward each Eastern European + Government.

+

Poland

+

—Here we face the most serious dilemma. The Polish Government is likely + to become heavily involved in any intervention scenario, and Kania or + his successor will be pursuing a repressive policy. Yet neither the US + Government nor the US people—Polonia in particular—will want to punish + the Polish people for being invaded. Poland’s already disastrous economy + will decline still more precipitously in the face of passive resistance + by an angry populace. We want the Soviets to pick up the bill, and we + don’t want US grain to feed a Soviet army of occupation. Yet the Poles + will need food, and a number of Americans will want to provide it.

+

—American labor will probably take matters into its own hands if the past + is any guide. Dock workers boycotted ships bound for Poland during the + August strikes, and they will do no less if Solidarity is crushed and + its leaders imprisoned. The US Government would hardly want to argue + against such action, or against similar boycotts of Polish airliners. + Yet we would recommend against an embargo on grain sales which would be + unpopular, superfluous and difficult to lift in the future.

+

—CCC is another matter. Our very sizeable exposure in Poland has been a + political gesture, tied to our support for conciliatory Polish policies + toward the workers. On financial and economic grounds, we would want to + cut back our exposure. This would also force the Soviets to supply hard + currency for new grain purchases. This points to a policy of no new CCC + credits, but continued grain sales (assuming no diversion to the USSR) and eventual lifting of a + longshoreman’s boycott, on a cash-and-carry basis.

+

—On other economic measures, we suggest a formal turn-down of the Polish + request for further concessional economic assistance. We presume our + allies would react similarly, and that this combined with the shrinkage + of private credit would force Poland to default and to request rescheduling. We would insist + on a multilateral approach and tough financial and economic conditions + designed to get the Soviets to bear as much of the burden as + possible.

+

—While supporting an end to any kind of economic assistance to the Polish + Government, many Americans will support private assistance to the Polish + people provided it can be monitored to insure against diversion to the + USSR. We should support Catholic + Relief, CARE, Project Hope and other private organizations ready to act + as transmission belts for assistance. UN + agencies probably would not get involved because of the Soviet + angle.

+

—In other areas we would suggest:

+

—Letting EXIM financing seek its + natural level—which will be very low given Poland’s financial + problems.

+

—Ending any especially favorable treatment on fish allocations.

+

—Dropping any effort to fund cooperation in science and technology, which + would mean that the cooperative program would grind to a halt for the + present.In telegram 12654 from Warsaw, + December 18, the Embassy endorsed the arguments in the paper and + expressed strong support for continuing a policy of differentiation + among Eastern European states. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + D800601–0996)

+

Romania

+

—Romania is another special case. Ceausescu appears to have made a genuine effort to head + off Soviet intervention and he may not even lend rhetorical support to + any action. If he does not, our aim should be to find new ways of + supporting Romania—consonant with their wishes—and providing incentives + for continued foreign policy independence in the fact of growing Soviet + pressure. Some suggestions:

+

—Scheduling a high-level visit to Romania if the Romanians want one.

+

—Supporting Romania’s bid to host the next CSCE review conference, if we can work out a way not to + offend our Belgian allies who have put forward Brussels as a site.

+

—Acting quickly on Romania’s request for a COCOM-controlled aileron drive + assembly for the fighter they are producing with Yugoslavia.

+

—Establishing a meaningful differential in US export control regulations + and COCOM to permit prompt gray-area exceptions for Romania.

+

—Approving some $100 million of Romania’s $450 million request for CCC + loan guarantees.

+ +

—Supporting Romania in the IMF/IBRD, particularly the power station loan + coming up this month.Bucharest was not among + the addressees, and no response from the Embassy in Romania was + found.

+

GDR

+

—The East Germans have clearly been urging intervention on Moscow. While + they may not be given much of a military role because of the incendiary + effect this would have in Poland, they will certainly join in Soviet + action in some fashion.

+

—The East Germans are the prime candidates for retaliatory measures. Yet + we have very little going with them in the first place. And the West + Germans, who do, will not want to do anything for fear of giving Moscow + an excuse to squeeze Berlin and the inner-German relationship.

+

—Aside from the general extension of a COCOM no-exceptions policy to + cover Eastern Europe, we believe that the most appropriate response in + dealing with the GDR would be:

+

—A marked cooling of political relations across-the-board.

+

—Refusal to discuss MFN or conclusion of + a cultural agreement for the foreseeable future.

+

—Encouragement of restriction of private credits to the GDR and an active policy of discouraging + US business from involvement in major projects involving the GDR.No + response from the Embassy in East Berlin was found.

+

Czechoslovakia

+

—Czechoslovakia will presumably be required to support actively a Soviet + intervention and may even play a military role larger than the GDR. The Western Europeans will be less + sensitive about steps taken against Czechoslovakia than about those + taken against the GDR. Our own + relations with Czechoslovakia are not good and there are few areas where + we could take meaningful action aside from our general technology + transfer policy.

+

—One area of importance is the claims/gold negotiation. We have asked for + a $105 million settlement and the Czechoslovaks have offered less than + half of that. In the wake of Soviet intervention the prospects for a + negotiated settlement would be very poor. Our response could be to + insist on a settlement at or near the US proposal and, if this is not + forthcoming, report to the Congress that no negotiated settlement is in + sight. This would lead to passage of legislation vesting the gold and investing it in + interest-bearing securities which could be used to pay off the US + claimants.

+

—Other possible steps include:

+

—Refusal to discuss MFN.

+

—Refusal to discuss signature of the US-Czechoslovak Cultural + Agreement.

+

—Pressures on US firms not to engage in large projects with + Czechoslovakia.In telegram 4597 from + Prague, December 17, the Embassy reported its agreement with the + general thrust of the paper, but stressed that the United States + should make a best effort to finalize negotiations on the + Gold/Claims agreement. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + D800600–0376)

+

Bulgaria

+

—Bulgaria is likely to be a lukewarm supporter of Soviet action in + Poland. They would certainly lend their rhetorical support and possibly + even a small military unit but they would take refuge in the thought + that Poland is far away and Bulgarian interests not at stake.

+

—There are two specific steps we could take with Bulgaria to express our + displeasure.

+

—Refusal to pursue further the Bulgarian initiative to discuss MFN.

+

—Indefinite postponing of the signing of the US-Bulgarian Maritime + Agreement.In telegram 3315 from Sofia, + December 17, Ambassador Perry cautioned that the paper did not + address U.S. policy in case of an + internal crackdown by the Polish regime. Perry recommended that the + Department not “‘set’ policy responses so that possible nuances of + the situation can be ignored.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + D800599–0886)

+

Hungary

+

—Hungary is likely to be the least enthusiastic supporter of Soviet + action in Poland next to Romania. They have evidently been pressured by + the Soviets, East Germans and Czechoslovaks to take a more outspoken + stand on Poland and would certainly go along formally with any kind of + Warsaw Pact action. Yet their heart would certainly not be in it and + they would fear greatly for Hungary’s increasingly beneficial image as a + country adhering only formalistically, where possible, to the alliance + with Moscow. We have made more progress in our relations with Hungary + over the last years than with any other EE country and it would be contrary to our interests to + penalize an obviously reluctant partner in a Warsaw Pact undertaking by + taking steps we will not be able to reverse.

+ +

—Aside from a political cooling, the only concrete step we suggest taking + toward Hungary is to cancel a proposed visit by a DOE delegation set for + early next year.In telegram 6534 from + Budapest, December 17, Ambassador Bergold agreed with the premises + of the paper and stressed that the policy of differentiation had + served well U.S. policy in the past + in Hungary and had “encouraged Hungary’s diversity and evolutionary + change within the bloc.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + D800599–1057)

+

Yugoslavia

+

—We should move immediately to reassure the Yugoslav leadership (and to + warn Moscow) that our policy of support for Yugoslavia remains firm and + steady. Political, and perhaps military, consultations will help to + determine Yugoslav desires and to demonstrate our resolve to friend and + foe alike.

+

—Yugoslavia has already expressed its opposition to Soviet intervention + in Poland and would be expected to follow through after a Soviet move by + attempting to mobilize nonaligned and Third World sentiment against the + intervention. While at present there is no evidence pointing toward a + direct Soviet/Pact military threat against Yugoslavia, the Yugoslav + leadership would be apprehensive about Soviet intentions and would + welcome and perhaps seek out expressions of U.S. political and military support. At the same time the + leadership would be extremely sensitive to any signals which might + provoke Moscow. While we need not subordinate our interests to those of + the Yugoslavs, we should attempt to consult with the GOY prior to announcing those steps we + have decided to take with regard to Yugoslavia.

+

Those steps would include:

+

—Publicly reiterating U.S. policy of + support for Yugoslavia’s independence, territorial integrity and + unity.

+

—Suggesting immediate political, and if the situation warrants, military + consultations to discuss further steps.

+

—Consulting with key allies to encourage similar actions.

+

—Taking steps to hasten delivery of pipeline military items, accelerating + projected military training programs, and reviewing previously denied + high technology weapons requests.

+

—Considering reprogramming to meet possible GOY requests for FMS + credits.

+

—Intensifying measures against U.S. based + anti-GOY terrorism.

+

—Being prepared to offer currency swap arrangement to bolster Yugoslav + reserves if commercial bank lending dries up in the aftermath of Soviet + invasion;

+ +

—Making a number of small but symbolic gestures in areas such as civil + aviation, trade preferences (GSP), and eligibility for aid + procurement.

+

—Renewing invitations for postponed visits by high-level Yugoslav nuclear + power delegation and Foreign Trade Secretary Rotar.In telegram 10083 from Belgrade, December 17, the + Embassy noted that the Department had taken into account its + previous recommendations (see Document + 300) and that it had nothing new to add to its previous cable. + (National Archives, RG 59, Central + Foreign Policy File, D800599–1100)

+ + Muskie + +
+
+ +
+ + Radio Free Europe, Radio Liberty, and Voice of America + +
+ 45. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security + Affairs (Brzezinski) to + President CarterSource: Carter Library, National + Security Affairs, Brzezinski + Material, Subject File, Box 9, Board for International Broadcasting + (RFE, RL, VOA): 2–12/1977. + Confidential. Sent for action. Hyland sent a draft to Brzezinski under an undated covering memorandum. See + footnote 3 below. + + + Washington, January + 31, 1977 + + + SUBJECT + Report to Congress on the United States International Broadcasting + Program + +

The Fiscal Year 1977 Foreign Relations Authorization Act requires the + submission to Congress not later than January 31, + 1977, of a Presidential report on the United States + international broadcasting program.

+

In response to this Congressional requirement, the Ford Administration + issued NSSM 245NSSM 245, signed August 3, + 1976, directed the Departments of State and Defense, as well as + OMB, USIA, and BIB to undertake a study on the + requirements for modernization of the broadcasting capabilities of + the U.S. Government. See Foreign + Relations, 1969–1976, vol. E–15, Part 1, Documents on + Eastern Europe, 1973–1976, Document 18. to + investigate those measures that might be taken to improve the + effectiveness of US-funded international broadcasting and to analyze the + impact that such measures would have on current and future US-funded + information exchange programs. NSSM 245 was completed but the Ford + Administration never submitted the report based on this study to + Congress because of an interagency dispute on the recommended number of + new transmitters.In an undated memorandum to + Brzezinski, Hyland reported that State, + Defense, the JCS, USIA, BIB, and the CIA recommended during the Ford administration the + acquisition of 16 new 250KW transmitters for the modernization of + U.S. Government broadcasting in + Europe but that OMB insisted that + only 12 new transmitters were necessary. The disagreement was never + resolved and the final report to Congress was never issued. + Hyland recommended that + the conclusions of the report be forwarded to Congress despite + OMB opposition. (Carter + Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 9, Board for + International Broadcasting (RFE, + RL, VOA): 2–12/1977)

+

Because of the pending Congressional deadline, I recommend that you + submit a letter to the Congress noting that a report was prepared by the + previous Administration but that you intend to submit your own views and + recommendations on this subject (by the end of February). This will + permit the new Cabinet officers and the Directors of OMB + and USIA to reconsider the + report and submit any disagreements for your resolution. OMB concurs.

+

RECOMMENDATION:

+

That you sign the letters at Tab A to the Speaker of the House and the + President of the Senate.

+

That you authorize me to request a new review of the report of the + previous Administration.The President + approved the recommendation and signed the letters to the Speaker of + the House and the President of the Senate on January 31. (Ibid.) The + final report, sent to Congress on March 22, recommended the purchase + of 16 new additional transmitters for RFE/RL and VOA broadcasting in Europe as well as + 12 additional VOA transmitters for + broadcasting to Asia and Africa. (Public Papers: + Carter, 1977, Book I, p. 478)

+
+
+ 46. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security + Affairs (Brzezinski) to the + Director of the Office of Management and Budget (Lance)Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, + Brzezinski Material, + Brzezinski Office File, + Subject Chron File, Box 65, Brzezinski, Chron: 2/5–10/77. No classification + marking; Urgent. Printed from an uninitialed copy. + + + Washington, February + 5, 1977 + + + SUBJECT + Broadcasting to the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe + +

I tried to reach you by phone today, but you took the President at his + word regarding family life!

+

I hope we can talk urgently about the following item: I feel very + strongly that one of the cheapest ways that we can preserve the peace + and enhance our political objectives is to try to produce internal + evolution in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. It is much cheaper + than piling up armaments. Precisely because of that, I feel very + strongly that there should be no reductions in the plans for the RFE–RL + transmitters. If anything, their activity should be stepped up and in + the longer run we might save billions.

+ +

I will call you about this on Monday,February + 7. but I would like you to have this.

+
+ +
+ 47. Memorandum From Paul Henze + of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for + National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)Source: National Security Council, Carter Administration + Intelligence Files, Box I–026, Subject File F–R, Radio Free + Europe/Radio Liberty, 14 March 1977. Confidential. There is no + indication when Brzezinski + discussed this issue with the President. Attached but not printed is + a summary prepared by the BIB on + its relationship with the RFE/RL and its proposals for consolidation + and cost cutting. + + + Washington, March 10, + 1977 + + + SUBJECT + International Broadcasting Issues—Comments, Questions and + Answers + +

The following may be useful to you in discussing these matters with the + President:

+

1. The BIB, by + law, is charged only with sponsorship of Radio + Free Europe and Radio Liberty. The ambitions of certain BIB board and staff members + notwithstanding, it could not extend its responsibilities—to take over + VOA, e.g.—without new + legislation.

+

2. The first priority with the BIB is to get a new chairman for it and to + appoint new members replacing those whose terms are running out. David + Abshire has already resigned as Chairman and two members’ terms, those + of Foy Kohler and John P. Roche, run out on 30 April.

+

3. An important criterion for selecting a new chairman for BIB is to get a man who will work flexibly + and openly with the Carter Administration and who will be dedicated to + strengthening the effectiveness of RFE/RL. John Gronouski appears to us to have these qualities. + Frank Stanton, whose appointment is being advocated by Senators + Percy and McGovern and certain BIB staff members (e.g. Walter Roberts) is the principal + advocate of a scheme for putting RFE/RL and VOA under BIB control and + for expanding the BIB as a + semi-autonomous entity for controlling all U.S. international radio broadcasting. These are very controversial proposals + which no department or agency endorses.

+

4. The BIB has + been successfully established over the past three years and is a good + formula for sponsorship of RFE/RL [less than 1 line + not declassified] but it has developed a tendency to become an + extra layer of management with its own continually increasing staff. The + radios feel that it interferes too much in day-to-day + operations and tends to pre-empt decisions that are more + properly left to the RFE/RL board of directors (chaired by John Hayes, + of the Washington Post-Newsweek radio/TV empire).

+

5. The BIB has an + important but limited role to play. It should not become involved in management of the radios. It should not get into jurisdictional disputes with other + U.S. Government elements, trying to + take over VOA, e.g. Its staff should be + kept lean and confine its efforts to true + oversight/review functions, as required by law, and to representing RFE/RL with the Congress.

+

6. In the form in which it has existed up until now, the BIB has been dominated by David Abshire, a + Nixon appointee, who also heads a research center at Georgetown + University. Foy Kohler has played a positive role in the BIB, but he has pressed to have too many + positions in the radios filled by retired FSO’s and USIS people. We need + younger, more vigorous people for these demanding jobs. John P. Roche + has been disappointing as a BIB member. + The two other BIB members, John T. + Murphy, President of AVCO Broadcasting in Cincinnati, and Thomas H. + Quinn, a young Washington lawyer with no visible qualifications for the + job, were originally appointed for two years and (unfortunately) + reappointed for three more last year. The prime reason for appointment + of Murphy was that he was proposed by Senator Taft, while Quinn was a + protege of Senator Pastore. (Congress simply played favorites here, but + there was apparently no effort by the Executive Branch to propose more + effective people.) We could certainly find better people than these two + to serve on this Board, but for the time being emphasis must be on + filling the two vacancies that occur as of 30 April when Kohler’s and + Roche’s terms run out.

+

7. Griffith, whom we are proposing to replace + Kohler, is an ideal choice from the viewpoint of both knowledge of the + radios, in depth, and knowledge of Eastern Europe and the USSR.

+

8. Since one of the most important functions of the Board is to serve as + the radios’ interface with Congress, we feel a former + Congressman would be useful on the Board—preferably one with an + interest in international affairs. Also, since only three BIB members can belong to one political + party, the Congressman should be Republican. We + now have clearance from Frank + Moore’s office to offer the other BIB vacancy to Peter H.B. Frelinghuysen, + former Congressman from the 5th District of New Jersey, who decided not to run at the end of + the 94th Congress and has retired to private life. (If he turns out not + to be interested we have two other possibilities, both former House + members: Clark MacGregor of + Minnesota and Edward Biester of Pennsylvania.)

+

9. There is considerable Congressional interest in + BIB. In the House, Dante + Fascell, who controls their appropriations, tends to take the deepest + interest. In the Senate, Senators Humphrey, Percy and McGovern, among others, have been strong supporters. + Though Senators Percy and + McGovern have written the + President advocating appointment of Frank Stanton as BIB Chairman, there is not much reason to + believe that any Congressional group would want to challenge (or could + effectively challenge) strong Presidential leadership in matters + relating to the BIB or international + broadcasting in general.

+

10. There is also not much reason to expect any serious challenge in + Congress to Executive proposals for increased funds + for new transmitters for all the radios (including VOA) and for more modest + sums to permit RFE/RL to hire younger editors + from among recent emigres and to expand broadcasting in Soviet + minority languages—aims which are very much in accord with + basic Administration foreign policy objectives and our championing of + human rights.

+

11. Over the years, the costs of these radios have increased at a far + slower rate than costs of weaponry or costs of intelligence-collecting. + It can be argued that they are, nevertheless, of major significance for + achieving our national security objectives even though they cost—all + together—only a minute fraction of what we spend on a single weapons + system. As we try to bring our national security expenditures into + better balance, we should consider investing more in international + broadcasting. If the Administration makes a strong + case, Congress is likely to support it.

+

12. You are quite right in feeling that matters + relating to the BIB and to RFE/RL + should not be permitted to get mixed up with broader questions + relating to VOA. It may be + useful, nevertheless, to review some background on the VOA “problem” and to brief the President + on this subject when you have the opportunity.

+

13. Over the past year or so a good deal of agitation, both within and + outside of VOA, has developed for + “independence” or “autonomy”. Some people advocate setting up the VOA on the same basis as the BBC. Others + want to put it under the BIB. Some + apparently envision melding RFE/RL and VOA into a single international broadcasting service. Much of the thinking behind these proposals is fuzzy + and the implications have not been well thought through.

+

14. It is alleged that VOA’s broadcasts have suffered from governmental interference which has both (a) kept it from + broadcasting completely on certain delicate topics and (b) forced it to + take particular lines on subjects the State Department or the White House felt strongly about + at particular times. The arguments tend to be over very fine points and + tend to cancel each other out. Considering the challenges VOA has had to face over recent + years—coping with the Vietnam withdrawal, Watergate, problems of + domestic dissidence—a strong case can be made that it has carried out + its mission extremely well. (During the past 7½ years it has been headed + by Ken Giddens, an Alabama Republican broadcasting executive who has set + an all-time record for tenure in his job and seems to have performed + very well.)

+

15. In any event, there are strong arguments against reaching conclusions + on the basis of the unusual circumstances which have existed during the + past few years. A case could be made also that the strongest proponents + of “autonomy” for the VOA and of + placing VOA under BIB along with RFE/RL, tend to make “best + case” assumptions about the way the world is going to develop during the + next decade or two and “worst case” assumptions about the way the U.S. Government is going to operate. + According to their contentions, the VOA + is always in danger of being misused by the White House, the State + Department or some other element of the U.S. Government for short-term, tendentious, partisan or + other narrow purposes. Only an “independent” VOA can allegedly broadcast objectively (whatever that is + supposed to mean). This is very specious + argumentation. If VOA could + broadcast with objectivity during the difficult Watergate period (I + listened to it continually during this time; its performance was + outstanding), the greatest period of strain the U.S. Government has experienced since + the Civil War, why shouldn’t we expect it to operate effectively in + the future when we have no reason to expect such strains again + soon?

+

16. The 35-year history of the VOA + provides very little evidence of tendentious + broadcasting or misuse by particular Administrations. It may + have been overly polemic in the 1950’s (more so than RFE at times) and slow to report news of + major interest to its listeners; more often it was accused of being + dull. But critics of radio stations usually run the full gamut of + possible accusations and extreme criticisms are seldom a very good + standard for judging impact. During the past 10–15 years, VOA has settled into a pattern of very + competent broadcasting of news, entertainment and features about + American life that clearly appeal to listeners and keep them well + informed. (I have listened to VOA + steadily during my time abroad over the past eight years and consider + that it is doing an excellent job of what can reasonably be expected of + it.)

+

17. Why shouldn’t the VOA be under direct U.S. Government management and present itself as the + Voice of the U.S. Government and, + ipso facto, the American people? Whom, really, would an + “independent” or “autonomous” VOA + represent? Why shouldn’t the VOA + reflect American policies and explain American government positions? + Obviously, it should not be + narrowly propagandistic, but why assume that a properly led U.S. Government is going to want it to be? + Why should the U.S. Government abdicate + responsibility for managing a major information instrument in a world + that wishes to have American positions and American values explained to + it and wishes to be informed on what is happening in the United + States?

+

18. An Administration which divested itself of control over VOA might well find that it had created + more problems for itself than it had eliminated. There is the danger + that VOA could drift into an adversary + position against the government; this is probably less serious danger + than decline in effectiveness and relevance.

+

19. None of this is to say that VOA + could not benefit from some improvements. Tight + budgets and strict adherence to civil service requirements have resulted + in broadcast staffs that tend toward the elderly and unimaginative. + There is a case to be made for broadcasting in more languages, for there + is now hardly any corner of the world where cheap radio receivers are + not within reach of practically everyone. There is, also a case for + reviewing VOA’s position in our + governmental structure and for taking a fresh look at the way in which + it is given policy and administrative guidance. But this should be done + objectively and by persons free of the partisan views that have grown up + around some of these questions in the past few years.

+

20. All of the U.S. Government’s + international broadcasting instruments have been essentially marking time during recent years. Technically, they are all behind their + competitors. A program for strengthening them needs to be put + into effect immediately. They have all been kept under such tight + budgetary restrictions that they have not been able to experiment with + more creative programming approaches or more appealing ways of + delivering news and information. They need to be given the means of + doing so. Both technically and substantively, they need to be infused + with new dynamism. Technical developments which are now on the + horizon—direct satellite broadcasting, e.g.—may provide the means of + greatly increasing the impact of our international broadcasting + instruments a few years from now. We should rejuvenate them so that they + can take full advantage of what technological breakthroughs may + offer.

+
+ +
+ 48. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security + Affairs (Brzezinski) to + President CarterSource: Carter Library, National + Security Affairs, Brzezinski + Material, Subject File, Box 9, Board for International Broadcasting + (RFE, RL, VOA): 2–12/77. + Confidential; Outside System. Sent for action. Carter wrote at the + top of the document: “To Ham[Hamilton + Jordan]—O.K. with me. Check w/ State first. JC.” + + + Washington, undated + + + SUBJECT + Appointment of New Chairman of Board for International + Broadcasting + +

Appointment of a new Chairman of the Board of International Broadcasting + (BIB—the RFE/RL sponsoring + organization) should take place as soon as possible to forestall + possible controversy over this organization. The outgoing Chairman, + David Abshire, and certain other Board and Staff members are maneuvering + to control new appointments and are drawing Senators Percy and McGovern into arguments with the Administration over who + should serve on the Board and how it should operate.In a May 4 memorandum to Brzezinski, Henze reported that Percy had introduced an amendment + to have VOA set up autonomously, as + well as other changes to the USIA/CU + reorganization which, Henze + suggested, amounted to implementation of the Stanton report. + Henze recommended that + the White House make clear to key Senate and House members its + opposition to the Stanton report. (Carter Library, National Security + Affairs, Brzezinski + Material, Brzezinski Office + File, Subject Chron File, Box 112, Radio Free Europe/Radio + Liberty/Voice of America: 1977) This has resulted over the + weekend in distorted stories (Tab A)Attached + but not printed in both the New York + Times and Washington Post attacking + Professor William Griffith of MIT, whom I have suggested be appointed a + Board Member.Brzezinski forwarded a memorandum to Jordan on June 17 that recommended + the nominations of Rita Hauser and William Griffith to membership in + the BIB Board. (Carter Library, + National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Brzezinski Office File, Subject Chron File, Box 64, + Board of International Broadcasting: 1977) Although Griffith was not + nominated, Hauser’s nomination was announced on November 14. Frank + Markoe, Jr., was nominated to replace Foy Kohler who had resigned + earlier. (Public Papers: Carter, 1977, Book + II, p. 2024) The newspaper stories do not mention our + choiceAn unidentified hand, possibly + Jordan, circled the words + “our choice” and wrote in the margin “whose?” Carter submitted + Gronouski’s nomination + to the Senate on June 8. (Public Papers: Carter, + 1977, Book I, p. 1073) as Chairman, John Gronouski, but advocate + appointment of Frank Stanton as Chairman.

+ +

Stanton is the author of an extremely controversial set of proposals for + changes in U.S. Government information + programs.In a March 18 memorandum to + Carter, Brzezinski described + the report as advocating the fragmentation of U.S. information policy by, among other + things, abolishing USIA and setting up the Information and Cultural + Affairs Agency under the Department of State, and establishing a + separate Board to govern VOA + activities. The Board would eventually be merged with the BIB, leading to the merger of VOA and RFE/RL. (Carter Library, + National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 9, Board for + International Broadcasting (RFE, + RL, VOA): 2–12/77) Making him Chairman of the BIB would be, in effect, to endorse his + program. The ultimate effect of this program would be to take + international broadcasting out of the control of the Administration.

+

To nip this controversy in the bud, I recommend that + you announce as soon as possible the appointment of Gronouski.In a March 14 memorandum to Carter, Jordan reported his discussion with + Vance regarding + Gronouski’s nomination + as BIB Chairman. Jordan indicated that, while + Vance preferred Stanton, + he had no objection to Gronouski. Jordan also stated that Senators McGovern and Percy continued to support + Stanton, but would be hard pressed to oppose Gronouski’s nomination. Carter + wrote at the top of the memo: “CC: Ham[ilton Jordan], Zbig. What are the key + elements of the Stanton Report? J.” (Ibid.) It will be + difficult for anyone to make a case against him. He is a natural choice + as a prominent Democrat and a man with previous experience (Ambassador + to Poland, e.g.) which fits him for the BIB job. I am confident that he will work with the + Administration to get the BIB + restructured in an intelligent way. Once he has been appointed we can + proceed to the two other vacancies for which I recommend Professor + Griffith and former Congressman Peter Frelinghuysen of New Jersey.

+
+ +
+ 49. Editorial Note +

On March 15, 1977, the Department of State sent a circular telegram to + all Eastern European posts and Moscow and Bonn informing them of the + ongoing debate about relocating Radio Free Europe (RFE) and Radio Liberty (RL) from their headquarters in Munich to + the United States. The telegram asked for the post’s analysis of the + relocation, in terms of reaction by both the government and the audience + in their respective countries. The Embassy in Bonn, specifically, was + also asked to assess West German perceptions of the U.S. commitment to Europe in case of a + relocation, as well as the effect on West German commitment to maintain + transmitters and any RFE/RL crew on German soil. (Telegram 57405 to + multiple posts, March 15; National Archives, RG 59, Central + Foreign Policy File, D770089–0757) For Bonn’s response, see Document 50.

+

The Embassy in Budapest responded on March 21 in telegram 885 that it + expected little change in the attitude of either the Hungarian + Government or the Hungarian population to a relocation of RFE to the United States. The Embassy + concluded that the lack of significant hostility toward RFE on the part of the Hungarian + Government meant that its attitude toward the radio would change + minimally. (National Archives, RG 59, + Central Foreign Policy File, D770095–1232) Hungary, however, was a + special case.

+

The Embassy in Bucharest noted on March 22 in telegram 2100 that the move + would “seriously damage both ‘rapport’ with its audience, and quality of + its broadcast and research product.” The Embassy concluded that such a + move might also “make RFE even more of + a contentious bilateral issue by highlighting U.S. responsibility for RFE broadcasting.” Ambassador Barnes concluded there was “no political merit to any + such move.” (National Archives, RG 59, + Central Foreign Policy File, D770098–0042)

+

Like the Embassy in Bucharest, the Embassy in Warsaw was also adamantly + opposed to the idea of moving RFE to + the United States. They wrote: “The opposition of the Polish regime to + RFE/RL is based above all on the RFE’s + demonstrated ability to respond quickly to events in Poland and to + broadcast back into the country a true and usually balanced account of + what is happening here.” The transfer to the United States would impair, + the Embassy believed, the ability of the Radios to respond quickly to + developments in the country. Just as importantly, “Poland’s + intellectuals and other listeners would see a shift of the radios to the + United States as signifying a reduction of US interest in Poland and a + retreat under Soviet pressure.” (Telegram 2066 from Warsaw, March 24; + National Archives, RG 59, Central + Foreign Policy File, D770101–1072)

+

Like the others, the Embassy in Sofia also concluded that a move to the + United States would damage the timeliness and flavor of RFE reporting. It also stressed that the + Government of Bulgaria would interpret the move as a victory for its + “unremitting public and private hostility to RFE,” a conclusion, the Embassy suggested, that might also + be shared by many in the Bulgarian public. The Embassy also suggested + that a move would be interpreted by the Bulgarian Government as evidence + that West Germany “has seen the light” in no longer permitting RFE/RL to + operate from their soil, as well as, at least partial acknowledgement + that RFE/RL were “not fully consistent with Helsinki [Accords].” + (Telegram 625 from Sofia, March 23; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + D770099–0837)

+

The Embassy in Prague, however, believed that a move, if properly + explained in advance, could provide tangible benefits. (Telegram 811 from Prague, March 29; National + Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy + File, D770108–0439)

+

In telegram 4013 from Moscow, March 25, the Embassy wrote that “there is, + of course, nothing the Radios could do that would reconcile the Soviet + authorities to their existence.” The Embassy further suggested that the + Soviets would see the move as a sign of weakness, and would not relent + in their propaganda against the Radios. They reported: “Moscow would + portray the move to the States as resulting from the effectiveness of + Moscow’s ‘principled stand’” and would “be encouraged to step up their + efforts to attain this goal” of shutting down the Radios. While the + Embassy did not believe that target audiences in the Soviet Union + considered the physical location of the Radios, it did suggest that the + use by Radio Liberty of recent émigrés, “including people with a + reputation in the Soviet Union” was very effective. A move of the + Radios, the telegram concluded, would make the use of émigrés much more + difficult. (National Archives, RG 59, + Central Foreign Policy File, D770104–0140)

+
+ +
+ 50. Telegram From the Embassy in the Federal Republic of Germany to + the Department of StateSource: + National Archives, RG 59, Central + Foreign Policy File, D770107–0817. Confidential; Limdis. Sent for information to + Moscow, Warsaw, Prague, Budapest, Bucharest, Sofia, London, Paris, + Munich, and USNATO. + + + + + + Bonn, March + 29, 1977, 1737Z + +

5571. Subject: Possible Move of RFE/RL to U.S. Ref: State 57405.See Document 49.

+

Begin Summary: The Embassy views a possible relocation of a major portion + of RFE/RL’s activities to the U.S. as + fraught with substantial political danger and no discernible benefit. + End summary.

+

1. The Embassy’s replies to the Department’s questions in the reftel follow:

+

2. A. Q: How would a major relocation of the Radios affect FRG perceptions of the U.S. presence and commitment in Europe?

+

A: The FRG is very sensitive to any + indication of change in the U.S. + commitment to Europe. The FRG welcomes + a large U.S. presence in Europe—and in + the FRG—because it sees such a presence + as a visible sign of the U.S. + commitment. Relocation to the US of any major U.S. + facility or activity would give + rise to some fears, both privately and publicly expressed, that the + U.S. is withdrawing to “Fortress + America.” While the reaction to a move by the Radios to the U.S. would be less than, for example, a + decision to reduce dramatically the U.S. + troop presence in the FRG, there would + nevertheless be a negative reaction in the FRG to the move and questioning of the U.S. commitment to Europe.

+

B. Q: Would a move at this time be perceived as a backing down from our + Helsinki commitments in the face of increased Soviet and East European + attacks against the Radios?

+

A: Yes. The attacks on the Radios made by Communist states have risen + dramatically since the signing of the Helsinki Accords. If we were to + relocate to the U.S., or make any other + substantial change, such as reduction in broadcasting hours or + alteration of broadcast content, we should expect speculation that the + change was caused by pressure from the East. We should also expect the + Communist states to further this impression through their propaganda + activities. If a decision to relocate were announced during the Belgrade + Conference, the speculation that the move was made as a result of + Eastern attacks would be much higher than if the announcement were made + at another time.

+

C. Q: How would such a move affect FRG + internal politics, and might the relocation become a domestic political + issue? To what effect?

+

A: The FRG has just undergone a long, if + not major, debate over the effect that an administrative consolidation + of the two German radios which broadcast to the East will have over the + content of broadcasts to the Soviet Union. The conservative opposition + accused the government of trying to throttle criticism of the USSR through the consolidation move. It + is probable that a similar debate would erupt over relocation. The + CDU/CSU would undoubtedly accuse + any SPD Government of being behind a + relocation of the Radios from the FRG. + If we said that this was not the case, the CDU/CSU would question our judgment in moving the Radios + from Munich. Thus, relocation could be an embarrassment to the + government. Having said that, we do not believe that it would become a + major domestic issue in the FRG.

+

D. Q: Would a move reduce the FRG + resolve and commitment to international broadcasting?

+

A: Yes. Those people in the FRG who + support the Radios regard them as the “front line” of Western + broadcasting efforts. They realize that if RFE/RL were to disappear + tomorrow, Eastern attacks on Deutsche Welle and Deutschland Funk would + increase in intensity. There would be a natural reaction “to give up the + fight, especially since the Americans do not care any more.” + Furthermore, given the extremely overcrowded situation in the European + airwaves, we could not expect the same support from the FRG which we currently receive in defense + of the Radios’ frequencies.

+ +

E. Q: Would a move make it difficult to maintain the necessary RFE/RL + skeleton equipment and personnel, including transmitters, in the FRG?

+

A: Yes (with emphasis). The FRG receives + some benefits (payroll, etc.) from the employment of Radio personnel in + the FRG, principally Munich. The + transfer of these employees to the U.S. + removes some of the immediate benefits that the presence of the Radios + in the FRG brings to the FRG. At the same time, if we leave + transmitters and a skeleton staff in the FRG, the Germans remain politically liable for the Radios. + We have recently upgraded the transmitting we do from the FRG through the importation of ten new 100 + KW transmitters for Biblis and + Lambertheim. We may further upgrade our transmitting facilities at + Holzkirchen. We have received full cooperation and support from the + FRG, including customs exemptions + for the transmitters in this endeavor. If we wish to continue these + operations from German territory, we must recognize that we will have + more than a skeleton operation in the FRG, even with the transfer of the bulk of Radio personnel + from Munich.

+

3. Comment: There are people in the FRG + who support the Radios and there are people who do not. Generally + speaking, the spectrum of opinion is about the same as in the U.S., with the important exception that a + much larger percentage of the German population is aware of and has + strong opinions about the operation of the Radios. There are undoubtedly + pressures on the German Government to reduce its support for the Radios. + Some of these pressures are from the Communist nations. Others are from + factions within the FRG, most notably + the left wing of the SPD. There are + high ranking officials in the FRG + Government who would be much more comfortable if the Radios were located + somewhere else. However, it is noteworthy that, during the past few + years when the FRG has dramatically + improved its relations with the USSR + and Eastern Europe, official German support for the Radios has never + slackened. Since we should expect the Communist nations to continue to + attack the radios and their presence in the FRG, no matter how small that presence is, we should resign + ourselves to the expectation that Eastern European attacks on the Radios + in the FRG will not lessen if major + portions of their activities are moved to the U.S. German resolution to defend the Radios may.

+

4. Quite aside from questions deriving from their presence in the FRG, the Embassy would like to express its + agreement with observations of + our Embassies in Eastern Europe.See Document 49. It is difficult to see + how relocation to the U.S. would not + adversely affect the quality of broadcasting. Furthermore, while we are + not expert, we question the estimated savings to the Radios. For + example, Radio management in Munich claims that the projected savings + disappear as the $/dm exchange rate rises to 2.70. We recommend that the + Department look long and hard at the estimated savings.

+ + Stoessel + + +
+ + +
+ 51. Telegram From the Embassy in the Federal Republic of Germany to + the Department of StateSource: + National Archives, RG 59, Central + Foreign Policy File, P840084–1444. Secret; Priority; Nodis. + + + + + + Bonn, June + 17, 1977, 1128Z + +

10177. For the Secretary. Subject: Schmidt’s Visit to Washington; His Concern About + RFE/RL.

+

1. At a luncheon he gave for new Ambassadors July 15, I talked with + Chancellor Schmidt privately + about his trip to Washington in July.Documentation on discussions between Carter and Schmidt is + scheduled for publication in Foreign Relations, 1977–1980, vol. XXVII, + Western Europe.

+

2. He said he looked forward to another general review with the President + of most of the subjects they had touched on in London.Scheduled for publication in Foreign + Relations, 1977–1980, vol. XXVII, Western + Europe. The nuclear question, of course, would be one + of the items. He hoped the seven-nation study would go well, but was + concerned about difficulties the French might cause. Schmidt also noted briefly that the + human rights issue, which he thought had been “cleared up” in London, + seems to have arisen again. However, he hoped things would calm down and + that Belgrade would go reasonably well. (He was not specific in his + remarks, but he may have been referring to recent high-level US + statements on human rights. A James Reston column carried in the Paris Herald Tribune June 16 + cites German concerns in this regard and was written after Reston had + seen the Chancellor.)

+

3. The main thing on Schmidt’s + mind, however, was RFE/RL and the US intention to install new, more + powerful transmitters at the site near Munich. He said this was a matter + he planned to take up with the President. He regretted that he had not + been consulted about the decision on the transmitters and said he had + ordered that issuance of the required FRG license for installation of the transmitters be held up + pending his personal review. It was possible, he said, that he would not + approve the license.

+

4. Schmidt said he was placed in + an uncomfortable position by RFE/RL; the stations were on FRG territory, but he had no control over + the content of their broadcasts. While he had not been pressed recently + by the Soviets on the subject, it was likely that Brezhnev would raise it when he came to + Bonn in the fall. Schmidt said he + had told the previous US administration that he expected the stations to + be phased out within two or three years, but things seemed to be going + in the opposite direction.

+

5. I told Schmidt that we attached + great importance to RFE/RL. The location of the transmitters in Germany + was the most effective in terms of reaching the target audiences and I + thought it would have most unfortunate implications if the operations of + the Radios were limited. I stressed the President’s personal interest in + RFE/RL and said I was sure he would wish to consider Schmidt’s views carefully. Schmidt said he understood the mission + of the Radios but wondered if it might not be feasible for the + broadcasts to be carried out somewhere else than in the FRG.

+

6. Comment: There have been earlier intimations of Schmidt’s reservations about RFE/RL, + but his comments to me are more specific than anything we have had + before.In telegram 10621 from Bonn, June + 27, Stoessel reported that + Chancellery aide Jürgen Ruhfus recounted Schmidt’s displeasure at not being consulted on the + decision to modernize and expand the transmitters in West Germany. + Ruhfus, however, “was not sure what the Chancellor’s official + position on this subject would be during his conversations with the + President because there was considerable disagreement within the + coalition about what should be done regarding the Radios. He said it + was uncertain that Schmidt + would want to risk the domestic political turmoil that could follow + if the Radios were to be removed or their activity reduced at his + request.” (National Archives, RG 59, + Central Foreign Policy File, P840084–1442) I seriously doubt + if he would go so far as to deny the license for the new transmitters or + push for removal of the stations from the FRG, since such actions would expose him to a storm of + criticism from the opposition. However, it is clear he is irritated by + the lack of consultation concerning the transmitters and that it is his present intention + to raise the question directly with the President.

+

7. In addition to readying our positions on the Radios in anticipation of + a possible discussion when Schmidt is in Washington, it occurs to me that it might + be useful in defusing the situation if the President could communicate + directly and informally with Schmidt about it before their meeting. If the President + has occasion to telephone the Chancellor on other matters, a brief + reference to the radio/transmitter problem and an expression of + readiness to discuss the Chancellor’s concerns frankly could be + helpful.

+ + Stoessel + +
+ +
+ 52. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security + Affairs (Brzezinski) to + President CarterSource: Carter Library, National + Security Affairs, Brzezinski + Material, Brzezinski Office + File, Subject Chron File, Box 112, Radio Free Europe/Radio + Liberty/Voice of America: 1977. Secret. Printed from an uninitialed + copy. A notation at the top of the first page indicates that this + memorandum was retyped for Brzezinski on July 1. In a June 21 memorandum, + Brzezinski asked + Hyland to prepare a + memorandum for Carter on Schmidt’s position on RFE/RL modernization as + reported in telegram 10177 from Bonn, June 17. (Ibid.) + + + Washington, undated + + + SUBJECT + Chancellor Schmidt’s + Complaint About RFE/RL ExpansionThe + Department of State prepared a memorandum on the subject, which + it forwarded to the White House on June 29. (Memorandum from + Tarnoff to Brzezinski, June 29; Carter + Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 9, Board + for International Broadcasting (RFE, RL, VOA): 2–12/77) + +

In the attached cable, Ambassador Stoessel reports that Chancellor Schmidt indicated he would raise the + issue of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty with you.See Document 51. + Schmidt expressed irritation at + not being consulted about the expansion of transmitter facilities near + Munich (which you approved and sent to Congress in March) and more + general unhappiness about having the radios broadcast from German soil + but with no German control of content.

+

The issue is an old one:

+ +

—The transmitter expansion program was cleared with and necessary + licenses requested from the FRG + ministry of post and telecommunications, though there is no evidence + that Schmidt or Genscher were specifically consulted by U.S. officials.

+

—Schmidt’s concern over his lack + of control of RFE/RL content may be exacerbated by his qualms about + aspects of East-West relations, including human rights problems.

+

Schmidt seems to have put the + radios on the agenda for his visit to Washington. I believe we should + try to respond to his concerns while stressing the importance we attach + to the radios and to their location in the Federal Republic.On July 8, Vance forwarded a briefing memorandum to Carter in + preparation for the meeting with Schmidt. Vance suggested that, in the event Schmidt raised the issue of RFE/RL, + Carter should respond that the administration regards RFE/RL as + essential to informing the people of Eastern Europe and the Soviet + Union, and that a reduction or withdrawal of the transmitters and + radios would be perceived by Moscow and the United States public as + a retreat in the face of Soviet pressure. (Carter Library, National + Security Council, Institutional Files, Box 63, PRC 023, Schmidt Visit)

+

You could also admit that RFE/RL sometimes operated in the past as though + they were autonomous even of the U.S. + Government, and your reconstitution of the Board for International + Broadcasting (the RFE/RL parent) is designed to correct that. You should + also add the strong U.S. interest in the + continued effectiveness of these radios.In + telegram 12578 from Bonn, August 2, Ambassador Stroessel reported: + “Chancellor raised subject of RFE/RL operations in FRG in general and new transmitters in + particular with President in private conversation at the White House + evening of July 13” and, according to accounts by the West German + Ambassador to the United States and MFA State Secretary Schueler, “the President listened + to Schmidt’s presentation + with interest and said he would give further consideration to the + subject.” (National Archives, RG 59, + Central Foreign Policy File, D770276–0284) A memorandum of + conversation of the Carter-Schmidt discussion on RFE/RL was not + found.

+

Finally, it is noteworthy that Schmidt would be strongly opposed by the CDU if he tried + to take action, and the FDP (his + coalition partner) might not support him.This sentence was added by Brzezinski in an earlier draft. (Carter Library, + National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Brzezinski Office File, Subject Chron File, Box 112, + Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty/Voice of America: 1977)

+
+ +
+ 53. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the + Federal Republic of GermanySource: National Archives, RG 59, + Central Foreign Policy File, D770303–0775. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Seymour and + Klingaman; cleared by Andrews, Woessner, Luers, Vine, Roberts, Dodson, and Goldsmith; approved by Vest. + + + + + + Washington, August 23, 1977, 0048Z + +

200014. Subject: RFE/RL Holzkirchen Modernization. Ref: Bonn 12578.Telegram 12578 from Bonn, August 2, + precipitated a series of exchanges between the White House and the + Department of State on how to handle the issue of RFE/RL + modernization. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770276–0284) In an + August 2 memorandum to Brzezinski, Treverton and Hunter cited the telegram as evidence of the growing + perception in Bonn that Carter was willing to reduce the visibility + of the Radios. Treverton, + Hunter, and Henze argued that Carter should + clarify his position with the West German Government. (Carter + Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 9, Board for + International Broadcasting (RFE, + RL, VOA): 2–12/77) For the Ambassador.

+

1. The Department and White House have reviewed this question on the + basis of your report (reftel) + concerning discussions during Chancellor Schmidt’s July 13–14 visit.In an August 6 memorandum to Brzezinski, Tarnoff wrote that, while Schmidt would like closer + consultations and, ultimately, the removal of the transmitters from + FRG territory, “it is unlikely + that he would go so far as to deny the license or push for the + stations’ removal from the FRG.” + Tarnoff asked the White + House to authorize the Department to instruct Stroessel to take up + the RFE/RL issue with West German State Secretary Schueler and + inform him that “the President had reviewed the Holzkirchen + transmitter question and determined that the replacement of the four + underpowered transmitters with four new 250 KW transmitters is necessary to our overall + broadcasting effort to Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union.” (Ibid.) + On August 9, the White House tasked the Department of State with + drafting and submitting to the White House for clearance a note + verbale. (Memorandum from Dodson to Tarnoff, August 9; Carter Library, National Security + Affairs, Brzezinski + Material, Subject File, Box 9, Board for International Broadcasting + (RFE, RL, VOA): + 2–12/77)

+

2. You are instructed to seek an appointment with State Secretary + Schueler as soon as possible to make a presentation based on the + following aide-memoire. You are authorized to draw on its text in making + your points orally. You should leave the aide-memoire with Schueler and + report his reaction.In telegram 13721 from + Bonn, August 23, Meehan + reported that Schueler was on vacation until August 29. (National + Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign + Policy File, D770303–1317) In accordance with subsequent + instructions, Meehan + delivered the aide mémoire to Schueler on August 29. (Telegram 14136 + from Bonn, August 29; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + D770312–0131)

+

3. Begin text.

+

Aide Memoire

+ +

President Carter has given + thorough consideration to the question of replacing the four 10 KW transmitters at Holzkirchen with four + new 250 KW transmitters, as he had + promised Chancellor Schmidt he + would do during their talks in Washington July 13–14, 1977. The + President has concluded that replacement of the transmitters is + necessary to our overall broadcasting effort to Eastern Europe and the + Soviet Union. This conclusion is based on the results of a recent + detailed study of the U.S. international + broadcasting effort, which revealed that the current overall capacity of + 400KW would be eleven percent belowIn + telegram 203257 to Bonn, August 25, the Department revised the text + of the aide mémoire, changing “current overall capacity of 400 + KW would be eleven percent + below” to “the current overall capacity of Voice of America, Radio + Free Europe, and Radio Liberty would be eleven percent below.” + (National Archives, RG 59, Central + Foreign Policy File, D770308–0934) the minimum level required + for effective broadcasting into Eastern Europe and the USSR, even if all governments in the area + were to cease jamming, which some have shown little indication of + doing.In accordance with instructions in + telegram 203257 to Bonn (see footnote 5 + above), the text here was changed from “which some have shown little + indication of doing” to “which some have shown no indication of + doing.”

+

We have further concluded that Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty play a + very important role in the exchange of information and the support of + Western and democratic values. The audiences for these stations in the + Soviet Union and Eastern Europe have come to depend in varying degrees + on their broadcasts for a balanced and comprehensive view of + international developments.

+

Our request to upgrade the Holzkirchen facility is a continuation of a + process to modernize Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty facilities in + Europe. As far as Germany is concerned it goes back to the late + nineteen-sixties when authorization was granted by the Federal Republic + to replace four older and lower-powered transmitters at Lampertheim with + four 250 KW transmitters. Budgetary + restrictions prevented our replacing the transmitters at that time. A + formal request to upgrade the Holzkirchen plant was made on February 24, + 1976 and on June 9, 1976 FRG + authorization was given to build six 100 KW transmitters in Holzkirchen. This authorization was + subsequently reduced to the replacement of four existing 10 KW transmitters by four 100 KW transmitters. However, on the basis of a + Presidential studyIn accordance with + instructions in telegram 203257 to Bonn (see footnote 5 above), the text here was changed from + “however, on the basis of a Presidential study” to “on the basis of + the aforementioned study.” of Voice of America and Radio Free + Europe/Radio Liberty technical deficiencies requested by Congress in the + summer of 1976, completed in December 1976, and sent to Congress in March 1977, we asked + that the license for the four 100 KW + transmitters be upgraded to four 250 KW.

+

The United States wishes to emphasize that there will not be any increase + in the number of frequencies or transmitters. It was with this + consideration in mind that, following discussions with the Ministry of + Post, the United States agreed to revise its original request made in + February 1976 for six 100 KW + transmitters to the current pending application for four 250 KW transmitters.

+

The United States requests that the Federal Republic agree to license the + four 250 KW transmitters as soon as + possible. End text.

+ + Christopher + +
+ +
+ 54. Memorandum of ConversationSource: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, + Staff Material, Europe, USSR, and + East/West, Hunter/Rentschler Trips/Visits File, Box + 22, 9/25–28/77 Brzezinski + Trip to Europe: 2–10/77. Secret; Sensitive. The meeting took place + in the Chancellor’s office. For the West German version, see Akten zur Auswärtigen Politik der Bundesrepublik + Deutschland (AAPD), 1977, Band II, 1. Juli bis 31. + Dezember, Document 261. pp. 1267–1270. A + note on the memorandum indicates that for the first seventy minutes, + Brzezinski and Schmidt met alone. + + + Bonn, September 27, 1977, 7:05–9:15 + p.m. + + + SUBJECT + Dr. Brzezinski’s Meeting + with Chancellor Helmut + Schmidt + + + PARTICIPANTS + Helmut Schmidt, Chancellor + of the Federal Republic of Germany + Juergen Ruhfus, Assistant Secretary for Political Affairs + Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski, + Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs + Walter Stoessel, US + Ambassador to the FRG + Gregory F. Treverton, + NSC Staff Member + +

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to RFE/RL.]

+

Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty

+

The Chancellor raised one final issue, saying it did not need to be + discussed then. He said emphatically that he was not satisfied with the + operations of RFE and RL, nor with his dealings with the radios. + “If you want to broadcast propaganda, fine, but do it from your own + soil.” Dr. Brzezinski said he + was compelled to respond. The radios are part of a larger US presence in the FRG. Their purpose is not propaganda, but + the promotion of better East-West relations. One of the reasons that + Gierek is able to steer the + course he has is that the population behind him receives Western + ideas.

+

The Chancellor repeated that his did not like the radios operating from + his soil. German law is not applied to them, and he said he did not know + what they did. They are covered by no US-German treaty; instead they are + a relic of occupation. He said he was greatly suspicious of them and + felt they often had dealings with the German secret service. He said + that within two to three years, either the radios’ operation should be + governed by some formal agreement or should cease. He mentioned that he + had talked to the President about the radios; the US response since then + showed that “you don’t understand my situation.” The radios cooperate + with the opposition parties. There are so many negative aspects: foreign + policy, internal security, domestic politics.

+

[3 lines not declassified] They are supported by + Congressional appropriations and supervised by a Board for International + Broadcasting. The Chancellor asked if technically the broadcasts do not + originate from Spain and Portugal. Dr. Brzezinski said that was true, that they came from there + as well as other locales including Germany. He noted the radios’ strong + support in Congress. New arrangements might be possible over several + years, but if the FRG took a rash + action that would touch off a major debate.

+

The Chancellor said he had told Henry Kissinger two years before that the + radio operations from Germany had to cease. At that point there was less + Congressional interest. He reiterated that the radios are outside the + law, their operations unknown to him. Dr. Brzezinski asked if the US armed forces network posed a + similar problem. The Chancellor responded that it too was not controlled + by German law but was less of a problem since it broadcast in English. + It might be regarded as covered, in a general way, by the Status of + Forces Agreement. But he could not accept forever a situation in which + RFE/RL work closely with his political opponents. When Dr. Brzezinski asked how, the Chancellor + responded that the radios shared analyses—more or less good—with his + political opponents. Dr. Brzezinski said that should not happen; the radios + should not be linked to domestic politics.

+

Dr. Brzezinski said that if + history could be replayed, perhaps the radios should be elsewhere. But + they are useful as a joint effort, to compensate for the absence of more + normal means of communicating with the peoples of the East. The + Chancellor replied that the radios had played a subversive role in the + 1968 Czechoslovakia crisis, but Dr. Brzezinski said he was not sure; only in 1956 was he + certain their role had been as the Chancellor described. The Chancellor + asked Dr. Brzezinski to look at the records of + his meeting with Kissinger and the agreement to phase out the radios in + three years. That would indicate how seriously he takes the issue.

+

The Chancellor said he had even thought of taking his intelligence + service out of Munich—at a cost of billions of dollars—to break the + contact with the radios. Dr. Brzezinski said there should not be such contact; the + radios are supposed to be very controlled. The Chancellor responded that + it is hard to control such contacts because they are covert. He said the + US would never accept, say, a French station broadcasting from the US + into Quebec. Not, Dr. Brzezinski + agreed, unless the US also wanted to liberate Quebec. He felt the + radios’ content was no longer as hard line as it had been. However, the + Chancellor said he had read some ugly reports. More generally, many of + the refugees who came a quarter of a century ago are not good. They are + very much Cold Warriors and sometimes attack, or even murder, newer + immigrants. Dr. Brzezinski noted + that we have comparable problems with Yugoslav immigrants, now perhaps + with Cubans.

+

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to RFE/RL.]

+
+ +
+ 55. Telegram From the Embassy in the Federal Republic of Germany to + the Department of StateSource: + National Archives, RG 59, Central + Foreign Policy File, D770447–1140. Confidential; Priority; Exdis. Sent for information to + Munich and West Berlin. + + + + + + Bonn, December 2, 1977, 1736Z + +

20064. USBER for Ambassador Stoessel. Subject: RFE/RL: Visit of + BIB Chairman Gronouski.

+

Summary: Foreign Office officials confirmed to visiting BIB Chairman Gronouski their support for approval of Holzkirchen + modernization and RFE/RL amalgamation applications. The Foreign Office + would present this position in discussions with the Chancellery. While a + veto by Chancellor Schmidt could + not be excluded, these officials were cautiously optimistic about prospects for + approval.In telegram 20853 from Bonn, + December 16, Stoessel + advised Vest that approval + for the transmitter modernization would not be given before the end + of the Belgrade Conference and even then the full request might not + be granted. “The present German analysis,” Stoessel reported, “was that the + increased power we were seeking would enable transmissions from + Holzkirchen to extend beyond its present target area into Central + Asia, where nationality problems are of particular concern to the + Soviet Government.” Stoessel advised Vest to stress in his upcoming meeting with West + German Foreign Ministry Political Director Klaus Blech “the + importance the USG attaches to + early and favorable action on our application for upgrading the + transmitters at Holzkirchen.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + P840086–0527, P800023–0911) Vest raised the issue on December 20 with Blech who + reported that the Foreign Ministry had recommended approval of the + U.S. application. (Telegram + 304575 to Bonn, December 22; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + P840086–0683) The Chancellery would soon be instructing the + Foreign Office to begin consultations with the Embassy on these and + other issues involving the Radios. FRG + officials expressed some concern over cosmetics of prospective move of + RFE/RL presidency from Washington to Munich and Gronouski agreed to look at matter + from that perspective. Wide-ranging discussions also dealt with + accreditation to Olympic Games, jamming, program content and possible + change in nomenclature of Radios. End summary.

+

1. Board for International Broadcasting (BIB) Chairman Gronouski and BIB + Executive Director Roberts + visited Bonn November 28 and 29 to discuss RFE/RL affairs with FRG officials. Gronouski briefed Chancellery + (Political Director Ruhfus) and Foreign Office (State Minister Von + Dohnanyi; Deputy Assistant Secretary Meyer-Landrut; and Deputy Director + of Office charged with Radio Affairs Bauch) officials on his perception + of Radio’s functions and matters of current interest. Principal comments + of Gronouski and German + officials are summarized below:

+

2. Holzkirchen modernization: Gronouski outlined work of Eisenhower Commission, noting + recommendation to upgrade outmoded transmitter equipment at Holzkirchen + and other stations. This recommendation predated present administration + and was a technical imperative if Radios were to transmit effectively. + President Carter had agreed with this recommendation and result had been + his March 22 request to upgrade transmitters.

+

Foreign Office officials (Meyer-Landrut and Bauch) confirmed that + Ministry supported request to modernize Holzkirchen. The Foreign Office + would discuss with the Chancellery the political questions involved and + would urge approval. While the Chancellor had reservations about an + increasing presence of the Radios in Germany, they were cautiously + optimistic that approval would be forthcoming. They cautioned, however, + that approval could take some time and they counseled patience. At one point, Meyer-Landrut + said, “we will get it, just be patient.”

+

Ruhfus said the Foreign Office would be instructed to consult with the + Embassy on Holzkirchen and other outstanding issues involving the + Radios. The Chancellor had a strong personal interest in the Radios and + reference was made to his discussions in 1974 with Secretary Kissinger + and in 1977 with President Carter. Ruhfus realized that a prompt + response was required and he hoped a solution could be found “more in + line with our situation here and our sovereignty.” He did not indicate + what the Chancellery decision might be though he generally maintained a + positive approach toward the Radios, noting that their value as a source + of info in Eastern Europe had again been brought home to him during his + visit to Poland with the Chancellor.

+

Begin comment: Meyer-Landrut later told us the suggestion of Foreign + Office-Embassy consultations had been his idea and Ruhfus had readily + agreed. As noted above, Meyer-Landrut supports approval of the + Holzkirchen application. End comment.

+

State Minister Von Dohnanyi was in general more reserved on Holzkirchen. + While it might be desirable from a technical standpoint, politically it + represented an increase in radio presence which ran counter to the + Chancellor’s desires. The matter must therefore be handled delicately. + Though there were basically no differences in our foreign policy, + including our approach to detente, there were shadings of emphasis which + affected broadcast policy toward the East. The Radios were now operating + in a new era of German sovereignty and this, too, had to be taken into + account. This made the FRG very + cautious and it would be necessary to review the matter carefully.

+

Begin comment: Von Dohnanyi’s unhelpful approach is not indicative of + Foreign Office policy. As a Parliamentary State Minister, Von Dohnanyi + has no line responsibility within the Ministry and is not in the + decision-making chain on this issue. Nonetheless, he is an important + figure in the SPD and his opinion may + be more reflective of Party sentiment. If his views are widespread + within the Party—and we have no evidence that they are—it will have an + impact on the Holzkirchen decision. End comment.

+

3. RFE/RL amalgamation and Vorbehalt (reservation clause): Bauch believed + the Postal Ministry would issue a new license for the merged corporation + within a few weeks. There were no problems here. He hoped working-level + action on the reservation clause (Vorbehalt) could be concluded this + week or next. (The final draft would basically resemble the 1955 RFE and RL + letters to German Foreign Office). There would then be a meeting with + the Postal Ministry. If the Chancellery did not express an interest in + clearing the wording—and Bauch did not expect that they would—the text + would be approved and communicated to the Embassy.

+ +

4. Movement of Presidency to Munich: Gronouski explained that the prospective shift of the + Presidency from Washington to Munich by upgrading the position of + Executive Vice President would permit tighter policy and administrative + control over radio output. This would help insure its conformity with + established policy guidelines. We realized, however, that political + sensitivities in the FRG might be + better accommodated by a de facto shift in which the Munich position + would assume broader functions while retaining the same title. The + reaction of FRG officials varied. + Ruhfus agreed on the need for tighter control of radio broadcasting. He + believed the shift could be an effective means of accomplishing this if + it were a de facto arrangement that did not give the impression of an + increase in radio presence. This could be the subject of further + consultation with the Embassy.

+

Von Dohnanyi reacted somewhat negatively to the proposed shift. He agreed + it had advantages from a management perspective but, more importantly, + felt it ran counter to Schmidt’s + desire to reduce the Radio’s presence in the FRG. The matter would have to be closely examined and his + preliminary reaction was not favorable. At Von Dohnanyi’s request, + Gronouski agreed to postpone + BIB action on the matter until the + FRG had had an opportunity to + review it.

+

Comment: As noted above, Von Dohnanyi does not have line responsibility + for Radio affairs. End comment.

+

5. RFE/RL accreditation to Olympic Games: Meyer-Landrut asked about the + status of Radio accreditation to the Moscow Games. He noted that this + was a matter of public discussion here and suggested that a pooling + arrangement between VOA and RFE/RL + might be successful in meeting Soviet objections. Gronouski replied that this was one of + many ways in which the issue might be handled. It was, in any case, + important that the Radios have the right to be present in Moscow. The + Olympics were an international, non-political event and RFE/RL as a + serious, professional broadcasting organization must be permitted to + take part in their coverage. Gronouski noted that Deutsche Welle might also have + problems and that a joint position prior to the IOC meeting in Athens might be helpful to both stations. + Meyer-Landrut indicated this might be worth pursuing though he made no + commitment.

+

6. Name change: Meyer-Landrut, during an office meeting with Gronouski and again more forcefully at + a social occasion, suggested that a change in the name of the Radios + might be beneficial. More neutral nomenclature would sit well with + Western critics and would also be helpful to the Poles who apparently + jammed broadcasts only under Soviet pressure. It might also be useful to + non-jamming countries such as Hungary and Romania in dealing with Moscow + on this issue. Gronouski + responded that some thought had been given to a name change and the + matter might well be further explored. We would, however, want some informal indication from the + East that a change would produce a favorable reaction.

+

7. Jamming: In response to a question from Roberts, Meyer-Landrut said he did not anticipate + concrete results on jamming to emerge from the CSCE follow-on. It was, however, important to build up + pressure from within against Eastern European countries which engaged in + jamming. Roberts agreed and + suggested the possibility of coordinated action in Belgrade to exert + more pressure. Meyer-Landrut was non-commital.

+

8. Program content: Throughout discussions Gronouski stressed interest in being informed by FRG of any broadcasts of political concern + to them. In this connection, Meyer-Landrut observed that the FRG’s own review of RFE/RL’s broadcasts + had unearthed nothing objectionable. Gronouski noted that BIB monitors programs and reviews frequent monitoring + reports from Embassies in broadcast areas. Tapes of all broadcasts were + available and could be reviewed upon request. FRG officials expressed appreciation for offer and for + Gronouski’s oft-repeated + concern that broadcast content not be problem for FRG.

+

9. Suggestion of VOA–RFE/RL merger: + Ruhfus, in a reference to Schmidt’s sensitivities regarding Radios, offered “personal + view” that merger of VOA and RFE/RL + could alleviate some of FRG’s concerns. + VOA was official US organ and in + view of close US–FRG relationship its + presence in Germany, along with that of RFE/RL, could be more easily + justified vis-a-vis Eastern European critics.

+

10. On two occasions, FRG officials + raised the question of the longwave frequency being handled in one + package. Gronouski noted that + the longwave frequency fell outside BIB’s responsibilities.

+

11. This message approved by Chairman Gronouski.

+ + Stoessel + +
+ +
+ 56. Telegram From the Embassy in the Federal Republic of Germany to + the Department of StateSource: + National Archives, RG 59, Central + Foreign Policy File, D780223–0450. Confidential; Immediate; Exdis. Sent for information to + Munich. + + + + + + Bonn, May + 26, 1978, 1737Z + +

9678. Subject: RFE/RL: Holzkirchen Modernization. Ref: (A) Bonn 7988, + (Bonn 7217).In telegram 7988 from Bonn, + April 28, the Embassy reported that the working level at the + Chancellery was preparing a positive recommendation to the + Chancellor for approval of the U.S. + Government application. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780184–0465) In + telegram 7217 from Bonn, April 18, the Embassy reported that the + Foreign Office had recommended approval of the full U.S. Government Holzkirchen + modernization application to the Chancellery. (National Archives, + RG 59, Central Foreign Policy + File, D780166–0296)

+

1. Chancellor Schmidt has approved + the Holzkirchen modernization application.

+

2. The Foreign Office (Joetze) informally and privately advised us on May + 26 that Schmidt had approved the + full Holzkirchen modernization request as well as the new license + reflecting the amalgamation of RFE/RL. Joetze noted that he was giving + us informal working level notification and that formal notice would + likely come next week. Continuing, he said the decision had not been + easy for the Chancellor. In view of what he described as the + Chancellor’s sensitivities on this matter and the fact that we had not + yet been formally advised of approval, Joetze strongly suggested that + the President not refer to this decision during his meeting with + Schmidt.Schmidt + visited Washington for the meeting of the North Atlantic Council May + 30–31. While he did not rule out the possibility that + Schmidt himself would advise + the President of his decision, he thought it highly desirable that + initial reference to the approval not come from the US side.On June 9, State Secretary Van Well formally + notified the Embassy in Bonn that the West German Government gave + final approval to the U.S. + Government application. (Telegram 10663 from Bonn, June 9; National + Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign + Policy File, D780242–0241)

+ + Stoessel + +
+ +
+ 57. Memorandum From Paul Henze + of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for + National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, + Box 9, Board for International Broadcasting (RFE, RL, VOA): 1/78–4/79. + Confidential. Sent for action. Bartholomew and Inderfurth both initialed the memorandum indicating + they saw it. Brzezinski + checked his approval of all 5 suggestions, subject to marginalia + comments noted below. + + + Washington, July 28, + 1978 + + + SUBJECT + RFE/RL and Budget Cuts + +

I gave you a brief report (in an evening report) last week on OMB pressures which seem to be building up + against RFE/RL.In a July 21 Evening Report + to Brzezinski, Henze wrote that Ferguson was told “OMB was recommending to President that + broadcasts in non-minority languages be severely curtailed, that + RL as a whole be considered as + potential trade-off to Soviets for better behavior and that OMB expects tighter budgets for RFE/RL + for future years!” Henze + commented: “Something is badly out of phase here—as I said to + Ferguson; these views go + directly contrary to your views and to the net weight of almost all + SCC and Presidential decisions + regarding Soviets in recent weeks.” (Carter Library, National + Security Affairs, Staff Material, Horn/Special, Box 6, Evening + Reports File: 6–8/78) I now have some documentation and the + results of extensive discussion of this problem with John Gronouski and Glenn Ferguson at lunch on 26 July. As + you would expect, they are very concerned. They regard OMB as prejudiced against the radios and + inclined to take only its own counsel on policy considerations. The + report of Glenn Ferguson’s + meeting with OMB officials on 21 July + 1978, provided by the BIB (TAB A)Tab A is not attached. lends substance + to these contentions; note the paragraphs marked in red on page 2, where + OMB advocates cutting out of + minority languages and the comments about bargaining off the radios to + promote better relations with the USSR.

+

The same day that Ferguson was + meeting with OMB, Ralph Walter was + writing to me from Munich on the budget problem. His letter is attached + at TAB BTab B is not attached. with + the most important passages marked in red. He sees a budget-cutting + exercise as completely out of harmony with the positive thrust we have + built up in the radios during the past 18 months and estimates that it + will do serious, fundamental harm. He maintains that cutting the radios’ + budget is absurd, in light of the small amount of money involved, at a + time when we are trying to make fundamental, long-term improvements in + the radios and when the need + for them is obvious in view of heightening tensions within the Soviet + Bloc and heightening tensions in our own relations with the Soviets.

+

Chto delat’?“What to + do?”—Gronouski and + Ferguson understand the need + to work rapidly to build up more active and solid support for the radios + in Congress. So does Jan Nowak, who is working wisely and well on this + objective. Within the executive branch we need to call OMB to heel. The idea of cutting out + nationality broadcasts at the very point when we are working to develop + a long-range program for increased U.S. + Government attention to this field is incongruous. I suggest we take a + number of steps, systematically, to persuade/press OMB to be less arbitrary in its approach + to radio budgeting. The best defense is to go on the offensive; I + suggest:

+

• As part of our current Soviet nationalities exercise in the + SCC we should get strong + endorsementBrzezinski underlined “strong + endorsement” and wrote in the margin “from whom?” An + unidentified staff member (possibly Bartholomew or Inderfurth) answered by writing “SCC.” for the concept of + expanding broadcasting to non-Russians, expanding research to back + it up, and expanding personnel so that all these tasks can be + performed effectively and sustained over time.

+

•  That we arrange for the BIB to + prepare strong documentation on the policy significance of the + radios, drawing on State and our own staff as sources of policy + guidance, and authorize them to present this as justification for + increased budgetary requests for FY + 1980 and further increases in subsequent years.

+

•  That you speak to McIntyre + on the importance of the radios, getting backing from the President + if you consider it desirable.Brzezinski wrote “give me a + brief” in the margin below this recommendation.

+

•  That I have a formal session with key senior staffers of OMB sometime in September, before the + 1980 budgetary process goes into the home stretch, to brief them on + our approach to the radios and the policy importance we attach to + them.

+

•  That we supplement what is being done in respect to Congress by + BIB, by the radios and by Jan + Nowak and others, by discreet efforts of our own.

 +
+ +
+ 58. Intelligence Information Special Report Prepared in the Central + Intelligence AgencySource: + National Security Council, Carter Administration Intelligence Files, + Box I–026, Subject Files F–R, Romania. Secret; [handling restriction not declassified]. Henze forwarded the report to + Brzezinski under a + September 22 covering memorandum. In his memorandum, Henze noted that in August, Noel + Bernard, Romanian Bureau director at Radio Free Europe, was invited + to visit Romania, and that the RFE + leadership sought approval for the visit. In light of the report, + Henze recommended that + Bernard’s visit be indefinitely postponed. Brzezinski approved the + recommendation. + + + Washington, September + 21, 1978 + + + + + COUNTRY + Romania + + + + + DATE OF INFO + April 1978 to July 1978 + + + + + SUBJECT + Efforts by Romanian President Ceausescu to Damage or Undermine Radio Free + Europe + + + SOURCE + [1 paragraph (4 lines) not + declassified] + +

1. Romanian President Ceausescu, + on returning from his trip to the United States on 18 April 1978, during + which Radio Free Europe (RFE) + infuriated him by coverage that included live broadcasts of the playing + of an outdated Romanian anthem and a press conference during which + Ceausescu was required to + deal with facts that had been kept hidden from the Romanian people, + ordered that the Directorate General of Foreign Intelligence (DGIE) draw + up a study of the occasions on which RFE had presented the Romanian Government and especially + Ceausescu in an unfavorable + light. The study was to deal also with methods used by RFE for collecting information (as RFE data were often very timely and + accurate) and with the role played in the process by the American and + West German Embassies [in Romania].These and + following brackets are in the original. The study would serve + as a basis for lodging a protest to the United States at some time in + the future. Ceausescu asked at + the same time for talking points that might be used with West German + Chancellor Helmut Schmidt, + President Walter Scheel and + Chairman of Social Democratic Party Willy Brandt in asking that RFE be compelled to quit the territory of + West Germany. Some of these points, he added might be useful in Paris, + where, he added, there was special need to put an end to the broadcasts by RFE commentators Monica Lovinescu and Virgiliu Ierunca. + Perhaps he would go on to ask the Spanish Premier and Portuguese + President that the relay stations in those countries be dismantled. An + entire diplomatic campaign was not to be excluded, he said. (Source + Comment: The importance that Ceausescu and the Romanian Government attach to RFE is reflected in the fact that a daily + bulletin on RFE content is prepared by + AGERPRES; Ceausescu receives one of the dozen + copies made of the bulletin.)

+

2. Ceausescu after reflection + levied additional requirements for the campaign against RFE. Suggestions were needed, he declared + to Source, for luring one or more RFE + employees to Romania with the idea that on their return home they would + denounce RFE as a tool of the United + States and the CIA. But while working + to discredit RFE + Ceausescu wanted to make + simultaneous efforts to influence RFE + to take a softer line toward Romania. Ceausescu suggested that it might be feasible to + organize a roundtable discussion between RFE staffers and true-blue (meaning DGIE-directed) Romanian + intellectuals in the hope that RFE + would begin to look with more sympathy on Romanian activities.

+

3. According to General Alexandru Danescu, Deputy Minister of Interior, + an opening for practicing suasion occurred in early July 1978 when a + sportswriter (name unknown) for Romanian TV on his return from a trip to + Germany came to Danescu to say that in Germany he had met Noel Bernard, + RFE Romanian Desk Chief, whose wife + he had known in the past. Bernard had mentioned to the journalist his + interest in making a trip to Romania, in whatever guise—official or not, + with public announcement or not, even using another name. Foreign + Minister Stefan Andrei was + advised, and the matter was discussed by Danescu and Andrei with Ceausescu, who said that the journalist should be sent + back to Germany to tell Bernard that he had learned that the Foreign + Ministry concurred in Bernard’s visit and that if Bernard would tell him + when he intended to come and in what manner the journalist would arrange + the rest of the trip with the Foreign Ministry. The journalist was to + return to Germany in August and it was hoped that the Bernard trip would + take place at an early date. Events since then are not known.

+

4. RFE coverage has also stirred + Ceausescu to violence in the + past. According to First Deputy Minister of the Interior Nicolae + Doicaru, at least two actions were ordered in Paris. One concerned a man + named [Serban] Stefanescu, who had been given permission to emigrate + from Romania after having walked in front of the Intercontinental Hotel + in Bucharest carrying placards denouncing Ceausescu; the President on being informed said that a + man that foolish could only be stopped by killing him, so it was easier + to kick him out of the country. On reaching France, however, Stefanescu + began demonstrating in front of the Romanian Embassy for his mother to be allowed to + depart Romania. When RFE began to carry + items concerning the case, Ceausescu became indignant and ordered Doicaru to have + Stefanescu put out of action, repeating his standard admonition that the + man should not be killed and that the perpetrators should not appear to + be Romanians. Two men were dispatched to Paris. Stefanescu’s habits were + observed, with the decision being made to grab the man and throw him + down a subway stairwell that he passed daily. This was in fact done and + Stefanescu was not heard from again.

+

5. The other Paris case Source heard about from Doicaru involved Monica + Lovinescu, the commentator (mentioned in Paragraph One above) whom + Ceausescu was still trying to + silence as of spring 1978. Lovinescu’s sin was to concentrate her + criticism on Ceausescu, a tactic + that always evoked a strong reaction from him. He earlier ordered + Doicaru to harm her physically. Doicaru on this occasion used two Arabs. + [In November 1977] they entered her apartment, a struggle ensued and + Lovinescu fell to the floor in a way that made the assailants think she + was dead. They fled. Ceausescu + berated Doicaru for the laxness of the operation when Lovinescu came + back on the air.

+

6. On an earlier occasion, Doicaru said that Ceausescu had given indications of how to deal with one + of his most acid critics at RFE in + Munich, Emil Georgescu. Ceausescu + said the man’s teeth should be knocked out so that he could not speak on + the radio and that this could perhaps best be done with a traffic + accident. Doicaru used the two men who had proved their mettle with + Stefanescu. They went to Munich, studied Georgescu’s movements, left for + Austria to rent two cars with alias documents, and then returned to + Munich to await Georgescu at a curve previously selected. One of the + cars was used to ram Georgescu, and the other to flee the scene. + Georgescu did not speak on RFE for four + months after that. Although RFE had + mentioned the accidents that had befallen Stefanescu and Lovinescu, + nothing was said about Georgescu’s accident. Ceausescu declared his pleasure to Doicaru. The incident + had a sequel. Georgescu’s wife not long thereafter called her mother in + Romania and said that Georgescu had been hurt in an accident caused by + Romania but that this was the wrong tactic; he might stop his broadcasts + in return for something like granting his mother-in-law permission to + leave the country but he would not be deterred by threats to himself. + The call was intercepted and Ceausescu was advised. Let her go, he ordered, and the + mother-in-law was told she was being put through by phone to Munich to + announce her imminent arrival. Georgescu subsequently turned to + practicing law.

+
+ +
+ 59. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security + Affairs (Brzezinski) to the + Director of the Office of Management and Budget (McIntyre)Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, + Brzezinski Material, + Subject File, Box 9, Board for International Broadcasting (RFE, RL, VOA): 1/78–4/79. + Confidential. Drafted by Henze and forwarded to Brzezinski for signature under a September 19 + covering memorandum together with a detailed brief on the RFE/RL + FY 1980 budget. (Carter Library, + National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Brzezinski Office File, Subject Chron File, Box 112, + Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty/Voice of America: + 1978) + + + Washington, September + 22, 1978 + + + SUBJECT + RFE/RL FY 1980 Budget + +

The Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL) broadcasting operation, + which is funded through the Board for International Broadcasting (BIB), is a key instrument for implementing + our policies toward the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, an important + element in the President’s human rights program and a symbol of the + permanent American commitment to free flow of information and ideas.

+

RFE/RL suffered in the early 1970’s from mismanagement and declining + technical effectiveness. When the President approved 11 new 250–KW transmitters for this operation in March + 1977, the basis was provided for a process of technical modernization + and rejuvenation which has gained steady momentum. Germany recently gave + approval for construction of four of the new transmitters and plans for + construction of seven in Portugal have already been developed. We were + lucky this year in being able to fill senior management positions in + Munich with outstanding men (Ferguson and Walter) who are working harmoniously with + John Gronouski, BIB Chairman, who gives an enormous amount + of his time and energy to this job.

+

By the time the new transmitters are ready to go on the air in 1981, + these men expect to have created:

+ + • A vigorous broadcasting staff with a preponderance of new, young + people + • Expanded research in support of broadcasts + • More efficient and rational administration, and + • Modernized studio and programming techniques. + +

The new transmitters will double the power of RFE/RL; other improvements + should double the effectiveness.

+

One special aspect of this effort derives from the fact that the SCC recently approved a broad program for + increasing U.S. Government knowledge of the non-Russian peoples of + the Soviet Union whose rapid rate of population increase will soon make + them the majority. RFE/RL has a unique capacity to contribute in this + area and one of our objectives is to improve both research and + broadcasting by recruiting more young people of non-Russian + nationalities and training them well.

+

I know that Gronouski and + Ferguson have been + explaining their approach to your senior staff and making a strong case + for the modest budget increases they feel they need in FY 1980 if we are to get full value out of + the increased transmitter power of RFE/RL. This operation has been in + existence for a long time, but it should not be looked upon as a routine + feature of our foreign information program. I am satisfied that the + BIB, under Gronouski, is doing a more careful job + than ever before of examining broadcasting requirements. What the BIB is asking for RFE/RL is modest, but a + 7–8% increase in FY 1980 is necessary to + enable them to do the job we have set for them.

+ + Zbigniew + Brzezinski + +
+ +
+ 60. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security + Affairs (Brzezinski) to the + Director of the Office of Management and Budget (McIntyre)Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, + Brzezinski Material, + Subject File, Box 9, Board for International Broadcasting (RFE, RL, VOA): 1/78–4/79. + No classification marking. The closing is handwritten. Henze forwarded a draft to + Brzezinski under a + November 30 covering memorandum and commented: “OMB did its detailed homework + sloppily, cutting positions that had already been eliminated and + misreading amounts requested for travel, recruitment and training of + new personnel and certain other items.” He concluded: “OMB has recommended cutting the very + items most needed to enable the reorganization of RFE/RL to be + effective.” (Ibid.) + + + Washington, December + 1, 1978 + + + SUBJECT + BIB (RFE/RL) FY 1980 Budget Request + +

In reference to your Overview summary of the Foreign Information and + Exchange portion of the FY 1980 Budget + (as well as BIB Chairman John Gronouski’s letter to you of + November 16, 1978 commenting on your office’s proposals for reduction in + the BIB’s budget request), I am + disturbed by the concluding statement on page 3 of the Overview which + states:

+ +

“The above ranking reflects the Division’s belief that activities + of ICA, which are designed to build + long-term mutual relationships worldwide, are more important and + represent a better investment than BIB activities which are unilateral and geographically + limited.”

 +

This is not a valid reflection of the Administration’s policy toward + ICA and BIB operations. They are not competitive but complementary. + BIB requests should not be + subjected to sharper reductions than those of ICA. Major elements in the BIB are sums for non-recurring staff rejuvenation, funds + for program improvement, for acquisition of AP news service and for + money which the President approved in March 1977 and which is now well + underway.

+

I hope you and your colleagues will take the foregoing into consideration + as you review the budgets of the above.

+

Regards,

+ + Zbigniew + Brzezinski + +
+ +
+ 61. Memorandum From Paul Henze + of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for + National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Brzezinski Office File, Subject + Chron File, Box 112, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty/Voice of + America: 1–9/79. Confidential. Sent for action. Copies were sent to + Quandt, Sick, Thornton, + Funk, Odom, and Ermarth. Bartholomew and Inderfurth initialed the + memorandum, indicating they saw it. + + + Washington, February + 6, 1979 + + + SUBJECT + The President’s Comments on Persian-language Broadcasting and + Related Issues (U) + +

The President’s impatience as expressed in his comments on Vance’s report that Persian-language + broadcasting (Tab B)Attached but not + printed. Newsom met with + ICA and VOA to discuss the need to strengthen + broadcasting to Iran in response to both the Shah’s recent departure + and an increase in Soviet propaganda broadcasting to the region. + Inderfurth informed Sick + and Henze on February 5 that, + in a February 2 Evening Report to Carter, Vance informed the President of + the discussions and of ICA’s plan + to begin Persian broadcasting “in about six weeks.” The President, + Inderfurth noted, + responded: “We should have prepared for this 3–4 months ago—make + this SOP in the future.” The memorandum asked Sick and Henze to follow up on the + Presidential comment. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, + Brzezinski Material, + Agency File, Box 9, ICA, + 1–5/79) will be started by VOA “in about six weeks” + is understandable, but the President is unrealistic in his expectation + that we would be much better off if we had started preparations for + these broadcasts “3–4 months ago.” Effective foreign-language + broadcasting requires two essentials: a good, trained staff and an + audience. The creation of these essentials requires a great deal more + time than 3–4 months. Three or four years is more likely to be the + optimum time for such an accomplishment. (C)

+

It is better to be late with Persian-language broadcasts than to go on + having none at all, but we must not expect rapid impact. With all the + disparate tendencies and confusion evident among Iranians today, it will + not be easy for VOA to organize a good + staff. VOA’s basic guidelines will not + permit very exciting broadcasting or much attention to internal Iranian + developments. The Iranian audience already has a rich selection of + Soviet regular and clandestine broadcasts in Persian, Azerbaijani and + Kurdish and BBC has long had a reputation for reliability and relevance + among Iranians who want more objective news. VOA broadcasts in Persian will be entering a crowded + spectrum with far less power than the Russians use. (I did a good deal + of short-wave listening during my recent visit to Turkey—getting VOA or BBC in any language, even in + English on which both services put major emphasis, is difficult; the new + Moscow English-language service, in impeccable BBC accents, booms in + over the whole area.) (C)

+

Ken Giddens, Director of the VOA + 1969–77, tells me that he undertook a campaign to inaugurate + Persian-language broadcasts in the early 1970’s but was overruled by + State policy people and OMB + budget-cutters. We have short-changed our international broadcasting + operations for years. The President’s approval early in this + Administration of a transmitter expansion program for VOA and RFE/RL was a good initiative but + we must not deceive ourselves about it: it only enables us to make up + part of the lag that resulted from several years of neglect. We are still lagging and, unless we launch a new + transmitter-building program soon, we will be in a worse predicament + vis-a-vis the Soviets by the late 1980’s than we are in the late 1970’s. + Meanwhile our efforts to rejuvenate staffs and make broadcasts more + effective have been slowed by budgetary parsimony as well as + reorganizations and managerial problems. (U)

+

I suggest we capitalize on the President’s concern to task ICA and State with a review of + language-priorities and potential troublespots where we might in coming + years find ourselves in the same predicament as we do in Iran now. I + suggest we also seize this opportunity to start what Congress may in any + case task the Administration with doing this year: surveying transmitter + needs for the mid-1980’s and beyond and developing plans to meet them. I + attach a memorandum from you to Reinhardt and Vance. (C)

+ +

RECOMMENDATIONS:

+

A. That you sign the memorandum at Tab A to ReinhardtThe memorandum was + retyped to address only ICA + Director Reinhardt. In a + February 9 memorandum, Brzezinski asked Reinhardt to undertake a review of programming and + resource allocation and report his finding by March 7; he also asked + that transmitter needs for the next decade be reviewed and a + proposal submitted by May 1. (Ibid.) and Vance. (C)

+

B. That you brief the President on the realities of the challenge we face + in international broadcasting.Inderfurth circled “the challenge + we face in international broadcasting” and wrote “ZB, If you sign the memo at Tab A—which + is a good initiative—I will write an + appropriate DR item for the + President. Rick.” (C)

+
+ +
+ 62. Memorandum From Paul Henze + of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for + National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Brzezinski Office File, Subject + Chron File, Box 112, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty/Voice of + America: 1–9/79. Confidential. Sent for information. Brzezinski wrote at the top of the + memorandum: “I never seen an outfit in which there is more stupid + infighting. I’m getting tired of it. ZB.” + + + Washington, May 4, + 1979 + + + SUBJECT + Tensions between RFE/RL and BIB + (C) + +

The calm and good sense which have characterized the relationship between + BIB and RFE/RL was too good to + last. It has been disrupted by a new bout of scheming by the BIB Staff in which Gronouski, unfortunately, has let + himself become entangled. (C)

+

You will recall that Glenn + Ferguson some time ago named Bill Buell Vice President in + charge of the radios’ Washington Office with the aim of having him + concentrate on congressional relations. Though this action was taken in + consultation with, and with the blessing of, Gronouski, it was resented by + Walter Roberts and his staff. + Buell arrived here from Munich a couple of weeks ago and took up his duties. When the BIB met last + week the Staff introduced a new draft regulation which requires that any + radio contact with Congressmen or Congressional staffs must be cleared + in advance with the BIB Staff + Director—i.e. Walter Roberts. + Gronouski supported the + draft but proposed it be studied with implementation to be deferred + until the BIB meets again in the + summer. Ferguson, Walter and + Buell are angered by the regulation and by the way it was introduced. + They feel Gronouski has been + hoodwinked by Walter Roberts, + Tony Shub, etc. (C)

+

Testifying before the SFRC last week on + the radios’ FY 1980 budget, Ferguson and his team found themselves + confronted by an extraordinary set of detailed operational questions, + some of them of a why-haven’t-you-stopped-beating-your-wife nature which + they feel had to have been planted with the Committee Staff by the + BIB. (C)

+

Ferguson called me from New York + this afternoon to tell me how upset he is about all this and these same + problems (including a good deal more detail) were the main topic of Bill + Buell’s personal visit to me this afternoon. (C)

+

I am surprised that Gronouski + would let himself be manipulated by Walter + Roberts into causing strained relations with Glenn Ferguson and his team—who are by + far the best management group the radios have ever had in their entire + existence. And as you and I know well (you emphasized this point in your + meeting with Ferguson last + June), one of the most important things the radios can do to strengthen + themselves is to expand relations with key Congressmen and Senators and + gain understanding there. That they are setting out to do this with a + clear sense of purpose and a good chance of success is what disturbs the + petty bureaucratic mind of Walter + Roberts. (C)

+

I plan to call Gronouski and + express concern that the problem has arisen. I hope I can gently talk + him out of going ahead with this draft “regulation”. If not, I plan to + talk more frankly to him about the unwisdom of letting Walter Roberts harass the competent + management we have succeeded in getting into the radios (and it has been + your and my doing, as much as anybody’s!) and the need to find other + employment for Roberts if he + cannot desist from his petty intriguing. One of the most serious aspects + of these strains is that so much suspicion and bad blood is developing + between Roberts and the Ferguson-Walter-Buell team that it may + never be possible to overcome it. (C)

+

In any case, we simply cannot permit the radios—which have been restored + to a remarkable condition of good health—to be reduced by the BIB Staff into a Byzantine mess again. . . + In the longer perspective, what all this proves is that the BIB and its Staff are themselves a largely + unnecessary layer of management and oversight. When we have built up solid congressional backing, + we should move to have them eliminated, relying to the radios’ + long-established corporate and management structure as sufficient. + (C)

+
+ +
+ 63. Letter From Paul Henze of + the National Security Council Staff to the Director of the International + Communication Agency (Reinhardt)Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Agency File, + Box 9, International Communication Agency: 6–8/79. Confidential. + Copies were sent to Vance + and McIntyre. In a June 1 + memorandum to Brzezinski, + Henze outlined the VOA position on language allocation + and transmitter needs and recommended that the ICA proposals be approved. (Ibid.) On + June 5, Robert Gates + returned the June 1 memorandum to Henze and suggested that, given Brzezinski’s prior approval of + guidelines on VOA, he deal directly + on those issues with Reinhardt. (Ibid.) + + + Washington, June 13, + 1979 + + + Dear John, + +

Since the pressure of SALT and summits + has prevented him from doing so, Zbig has asked me to give you our + reactions to the two excellent studies you prepared in response to his + request of February 9, 1979.See footnote 3, Document 61. In a March 7 + memorandum to Brzezinski, + Reinhardt outlined + VOA language priorities. + Tarnoff wrote to + Brzezinski on March 24 + that the Department of State agreed with the position adopted by + ICA on expanding VOA language broadcasting with the + exception of expanding Mongolian programming since “Russian + broadcasts to the Soviet Far East remain an effective means of + reaching the Mongolian population.” (Carter Library, National + Security Affairs, Brzezinski + Material, Agency File, Box 9, International Communication Agency: + 6–8/79) In his May 1 memorandum to Brzezinski, Reinhardt forwarded the requested VOA transmitter study, including + recommendations for building additional transmitters. (Ibid.) + We have reviewed them carefully and considered the choices they present. + Let me sum up our conclusions. (U)

+

We find your recommendations for technical expansion of VOA during the 1980’s reasonable and + justified in terms of basic foreign policy priorities.An updated version of these proposals were discussed + at an SCC (I) meeting on December + 11. See Document 70. We endorse them + fully. We would like to see you incorporate these plans in your budget + projections for FY 1981 and beyond. The + political issues involved in setting up new transmitters for + broadcasting to south and central Asia should be systematically assessed + as soon as possible so that negotiations can get under way and serious + technical preparations can begin. Please assess these questions with the help of the Department + of State and give us a status report by September 1, 1979. (C)

+

We find your conclusions in respect to expansion of broadcasting time and + broadcasting staff realistic and recommend you also provide in current + budget planning for the modest expenditures this expansion will entail + over the next two or three years. (U)

+

On language priorities, we welcome your plans for further expansion of + the Persian service which you have recently inaugurated. Attention + should be given to the need to adjust broadcasting hours to improve + prospects of attracting an optimum audience in Afghanistan and Soviet + Central Asia as well as in Iran itself. (C)

+

In respect to new languages, we concur in the priority of Azeri, but as + next priorities we propose Amharic, Pushtu and Tamil rather than + Mongolian and Lingala. The potential audience for Mongolian seems too + small. Broadcasts in Lingala would undoubtedly be useful but the need + for better communication with Ethiopia, where Soviet influence is + continually becoming more predominant, is greater. (C)

+

We have noted from your current broadcast schedule that VOA is still beaming 35 hours per week to + the three countries of Indo-China, with 64 million people, while only 21 + hours per week go to the whole Indian subcontinent, with a population + between 800–900 million. I should think there would be a case for + reducing broadcast time in Vietnamese, if necessary, to permit more + broadcasting in the native languages of the Indian subcontinent. Exactly + what mix of Indian languages would be best should separately be + evaluated but we clearly ought to do more than we are now doing. (C)

+

I will be happy to meet with you and your staff to discuss any of these + plans further.Reinhardt responded on June 21, suggesting that the + ICA would proceed with the + NSC suggestions. (Carter + Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Agency File, Box 9, + International Communication Agency: 6–8/79) (U)

+

Very sincerely,

+ + Paul B. Henze + +
+ +
+ 64. Memorandum From Paul Henze + of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for + National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Brzezinski Office File, Subject + Chron File, Box 112, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty/Voice of + America: 1–9/79. Confidential. Sent for action. + + + Washington, August + 15, 1979 + + + SUBJECT + VOA Expansion (U) + +

You will recall that we directed VOA to + re-examine its language priorities and readjust its output to support + basic U.S. foreign policy objectives a + few months ago. Tom Tuch, deputy director of VOA, have me a brief rundown today of where things stand. + Persian-language broadcasts were resumed in April and now go out ½ + hourDavid + Aaron circled “½ hour” and wrote “ridiculous!” at the + top of the memorandum. of original programming per day. There + is not much evidence of impact yet in either Iran or Afghanistan. An + additional hour of Persian will be added this winter. In addition, + additional resources are being allocated to Chinese-language + broadcasting and an hour of English to the Caribbean is being added + during FY 1980. (C)

+

Next priority is Azeri, but it is being put off until 1981 because of + budgetary stringency. Cost of adding Azeri (with impact in both Iran and + USSR) is $250,000 per year and 8 + slots. ICA says it cannot reprogram + during FY 1980 to do this. (C)

+

In light of what we know the Soviets are doing in the area immediately to + the south of their borders, we seem to be going at expanding our own + impact in a very leisurely way. If all we need is $250,000 to start + Azeri, it seems to me it would be very much in our national interest to + do it. We also need to push VOA into + doing something about building new and more powerful transmitters in the + South Asian area (approved in March 1977), for whatever they are + programming, their signal is weak and they are not competing with the + vastly more powerful broadcasts out of the USSR. (C)

+

At some point, it seems to me, we need to make the effort to get a little + more zip and pep into this whole effort. But the present time may not be + opportune. (U)

+

I stand ready to propose ways of raising these issues whenever you want + them raised. What is your advice?—

+

LET IT RIDE

+ +

Generate a Proposal for finding MONEY for Azeri sooner David Aaron + approved the recommendation.

+

PUSH the transmitter problem David Aaron approved the + recommendation.

+

TELL VOA/ICA to be more adventuresome in seeking extra funds (C)David + Aaron approved the recommendation. He added a + handwritten comment at the bottom of the page: “Also push and above + all Persian facilities. DA.”

+
+ +
+ 65. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security + Affairs (Brzezinski) to + President CarterSource: Carter Library, National + Security Affairs, Brzezinski + Material, Brzezinski Office + File, Subject Chron File, Box 112, Radio Free Europe/Radio + Liberty/Voice of America: 1–9/79. Confidential. Sent for + information. Carter initialed the memorandum, indicating he saw it. + In an August 15 memorandum to Brzezinski, Henze reported that, at his request, the CIA had undertaken a study of Soviet + clandestine broadcasting. Henze recommended that Brzezinski inform the President of the conclusions + of the memorandum to underscore the importance of strengthening + RFE/RL and VOA broadcasting. + Brzezinski asked + Henze to draft a + memorandum for the President. Henze forwarded the draft to Brzezinski for signature on + September 5. (Ibid.) + + + Washington, September + 7, 1979 + + + SUBJECT + Soviet Propaganda Broadcasting (U) + +

CIA has recently put more effort into + studying Soviet propaganda radio. Here are some of the results. There + has been an enormous increase in recent years in both quantity and + quality of broadcasts and transmitter power. Soviet stations, e.g., + broadcast 62 hours per week to the Arab world. An improved + English-language service, which deliberately imitates the BBC, blankets + the whole eastern hemisphere with transmitter strength much greater than + VOA or BBC. By relaying broadcasts + through Cuba, the Soviets have added 55 hours a week to their previous + schedules in Spanish, Portuguese, Arabic and English. Most interesting, + perhaps, are the changes they have made in clandestine broadcasts. They + have dropped broadcasts in Spanish, Italian and German to concentrate on + Turkey and Iran. Two stations broadcasting to Turkey have increased their transmission time twice + during the past year and a half: in February 1978 and again in June + 1979. Both put out a highly agitational, anti-American line. The main + Soviet clandestine station directed at Iran continues the same + mendacious, inflammatory commentary that exacerbated the situation there + last winter, broadcasting in both Persian and Azerbaijani. It probably + uses the same transmitters as Radio Baku, which also broadcasts in + Kurdish. Another Soviet-backed station transmitting from Libya to Iran + echoes similar agitational themes. The Soviets also seem to have a hand + in several clandestine stations in Arabic that broadcast from places + such as Aden. (C)

+

In view of the continuing expansion and intensification of Soviet + broadcasting efforts, we need to consider further expansion of our own. + Given the modest costs, it is money well spent. Both VOA and RFE/RL are preparing proposals for + more broadcasts directed at the Middle East and the Muslim areas of the + Soviet Union. (C)

+
+ +
+ 66. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security + Affairs (Brzezinski) to the + Director of the International Communication Agency (Reinhardt)Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, + Brzezinski Material, + Brzezinski Office File, + Subject Chron File, Box 112, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty/Voice + of America: 10–12/79. Confidential. In a September 25 Evening Report + to Brzezinski, Brement reported that Ambassador + Dick Davis, who was running a task force looking at overseas + reporting, told him that the U.S. + Government was “not doing nearly enough to get across to our VOA audiences in the USSR and Eastern Europe that the + dollars spent by the Soviets in Cuba, Vietnam, and elsewhere are + coming out of the pockets of Soviet and Eastern European consumers.” + Brzezinski marked the + paragraph and wrote in the margin “Give me a clear tasking memo to + ICA.” (Ibid.) Brement forwarded a draft to + Brzezinski on September + 29. (Ibid.) + + + Washington, October + 1, 1979 + + + SUBJECT + Broadcasts to USSR and Eastern + Europe (U) + +

In my view, one of the most important themes that we should be conveying + to VOA audiences in the USSR and Eastern Europe, particularly at + this time when there is considerable focus on Soviet/Cuban activities + throughout the world, is the fact that the resources spent by the + Soviets in Cuba, Vietnam and elsewhere are coming right out of the + pockets of consumers in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. For example, Moscow provides petroleum + to Havana at a substantial discount and pays the Cubans five times the + world price for sugar. The net effect is a direct lowering of the + standard of living of Soviet citizens.On + October 12, Brement notified + Brzezinski that + Reinhardt had not yet + responded to his October 1 memorandum and suggested a follow-up + reminder. In an October 15 memorandum to Reinhardt, Aaron added that the NSC had received “a reliable + intelligence report stating that many Soviet citizens in high + positions within the Party were ‘griping about Soviet foreign aid + and foreign involvement’” and “resent it for what they see as its + negative impact on the quality of life in the USSR.” (Ibid.) (C)

+

I believe that for foreign policy reasons it is very important to get + this message across to your many VOA + listeners, and would therefore appreciate receiving, by c.o.b. October + 5, assurances from ICA that this theme + is being given the attention it deserves in your broadcasts. (U)

+ + Zbigniew + Brzezinski + +
+ + +
+ 67. Editorial Note +

On November 14, 1979, the Department of State sent telegrams to Bonn, + Moscow, and all Eastern European posts regarding recent discussion on + Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty asset relocation from Europe to the + United States. The Board for International Broadcasting authorization + bill for fiscal year 1980 had been amended in the Senate to require the + Board to study possible relocation of staff from Munich to the United + States under 50, 25, and 10 percent scenarios. The Department informed + the posts of the conclusions of the Board’s study. The 50 percent + scenario, the Board concluded, would be “severely damaging to the unique + character of RFE/RL” and would be particularly true for the Eastern + European language services. The Board found even a 25 percent scenario, + in which the Eastern European services would be moved to the United + States, prohibitively damaging to the quality of programming, as “these + services are most dependant on close interaction with their audiences.” + A 25 percent scenario in which Radio Liberty would be moved to the + United States was found to undo programmatic gains achieved by the + ongoing consolidation of the two Radios. Finally, a 10 percent scenario + in which part of Radio Liberty—either the Russian or the other nationalities sections of + Radio Liberty—would be moved to the United States was found by the Board + to be “totally unacceptable” in separating “from one another the + broadcasters in various languages to a single country (the U.S.S.R.).” The Board for International + Broadcasting study concluded: “While recommending against relocation + models based on arbitrary percentages, it is the Board’s judgment that + financial savings could be realized, and RFE/RL programming enriched, by + a program-oriented reallocation of resources.” Carried out on a + voluntary basis, this reallocation would restore balance in programming + and “improve the quality and diversity of RFE/RL programming.” (Telegram + 296198 to multiple posts, November 14; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + D790525–0156)

+

Responding to the Department’s telegram on November 16, the Embassy in + Bucharest stressed that Radio Free Europe was Romania’s “major source of + meaningful information and commentary, not only on external, but also on + internal developments.” (Telegram 7717 from Bucharest, November 16; + National Archives, RG 59, Central + Foreign Policy File, D790527–0825)

+

The Embassy in Warsaw echoed the same concerns on November 19, stressing + that “we consider it essential to keep the Polish broadcast service in + Munich.” The Embassy continued: “Only thus can the ‘European presence,’ + and the capability of quick (telephonic) communication between listeners + in Poland and the station be maintained. Eliminating these operating + conditions would, we are convinced, result in a drastic loss of listener + interest and confidence in RFE.” + (Telegram 11506 from Warsaw, November 19; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + D790532–0502)

+

The Embassy in Hungary offered a stark reminder of the effectiveness of + the Radios, writing on November 19: “We have recently been reminded of + the efficacy and value of the Radios in their alert reporting of a + protest by 250 Hungarian intellectuals over the Prague trials.” The + Embassy concluded: “As one of the protesters has told us, within days + ‘everyone in Hungary’ knew of the existence of the protest from RFE. We should consider carefully before + we tamper with our most effective challenge to the monopoly of Communist + governments over information.” (Telegram 5869 from Budapest, November + 19; National Archives, RG 59, Central + Foreign Policy File, D790532–0968)

+

The Embassies in Moscow and Sofia also emphatically opposed any + relocation. (Telegram 26076 from Moscow, November 20; National Archives, + RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + D790534–0943, and telegram 2961 from Sofia, November 21; National + Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy + File, D790535–0915)

+ +

From Prague, the Embassy summed up frustration felt by posts with the + discussion of relocation of the Radios: “The question is, since the + USG has developed an efficient and + influential voice in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union at a modest + cost, why should we continually study ways to save relatively small + amounts of money when the proposed solutions will all adversely affect + the utility of that rather valuable resource?” (Telegram 4057 from + Prague, November 20; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790534–0053)

+

Strongly recommending against moving the Radios, the Embassy in Bonn + stressed that “implementation of any kind of relocation plan beyond + transfer of a few low-level positions would stir political controversy + in the FRG, with ensuing tensions in + FRG–US relations.” Any move—be it + complete or partial—would have the same effect, the Embassy reported in + telegram 20671 from Bonn, November 19. Relocation would open Schmidt to attack from the right for + abandoning the Radios, as well as from the left by Social Democratic + Party elements seeking to completely remove the Radios from German soil. + Without discussing the financial aspects of the move, the Embassy + concluded “that the negative political implications are so substantial + as to throw considerable weight into the balance.” (National Archives, + RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + D790533–0171)

+

In a November 27 letter to Board for International Broadcasting Executive + Director Walter Roberts, + Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs George Vest detailed the Department’s + position in the Radio relocation debate: “Our Embassies have concluded + that the relocation to the U.S. of 50, + 25, and 10 [percent] of RFE/RL personnel would have an adverse political + and psychological impact on US interests in the Federal Republic of + Germany, the USSR, and the five + Eastern European countries.” Vest also stressed the assessment of the Embassy in Bonn + that relocation would become “a contentious domestic political issue” in + West Germany, and that both Moscow and Bonn believe any relocation would + lead to “intensified Soviet pressure for the complete removal of the + Radios from the Federal Republic.” The Department of State informed the + Embassies in Bonn, Moscow, and the Eastern European capitals of the text + of the letter in telegram 310750 to multiple posts, December 2. + (National Archives, RG 59, Central + Foreign Policy File, D790556–0447)

+

The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979, the ongoing hostage + crisis in Iran, the boycott of the Moscow Olympics, and the increasing + popular unrest in Poland all gave added weight to the usefulness of the + Radios. However, facing financial crisis, Washington continued the + pressure to find budget cuts. On June 25, 1980, Board for International + Broadcasting Chairman Gronouski + informed Secretary of State Edmund + Muskie of the Board’s decision to transfer 45–60 people from Munich to the United + States and about 20 more to other places in Western Europe. Gronouski requested Department + guidance with respect to two questions: “A. Would moving the three + Baltic language units to the United States be inconsistent with the + foreign policy interests of the United States? B. Would relocation of + the three Baltic language units to the United States (involving no more + than eighteen of the more than 1000 Munich-based RFE/RL employees) have + adverse political implications in the countries affected by the move?” + The Department asked Bonn, Moscow, and Eastern European posts for their + assessments of the plan. (Telegram 174184 to multiple posts, July 2, + 1980; National Archives, RG 59, Central + Foreign Policy File, D800317–1197)

+

The Embassy in Moscow responded on July 11, stressing that “the potential + for wedge-driving between the US and the FRG—if the Soviets should conclude that a partial + relocation was being made in response to German nervousness—is even + greater under present circumstances than was true last year.” (Telegram + 10948 from Moscow, July 11, 1980; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + D800333–0170)

+

The Embassy in Bonn concluded that a move of the Baltic services to the + United States would “(1) be inconsistent with our foreign policy + interests in Germany, and (2) would have adverse political implications + here.” (Telegram 13057 from Bonn, July 11, 1980; National Archives, + RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + D800332–0403)

+

The Embassy in Warsaw recommended that the Department weigh “what appear + to be the limited economies available through a move of the Baltic units + against the risk of arousing new apprehensions about the stations’ + ‘withdrawal from Europe’ among a much wider sector of the RFE/RL + audience than that directly affected.” (Telegram 6729 from Warsaw, July + 8, 1980; National Archives, RG 59, + Central Foreign Policy File, D800327–1150)

+
+ +
+ 68. Memorandum From the Director of the International Communication + Agency (Reinhardt) to the + President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, + Brzezinski Material, + Brzezinski Office File, + Subject Chron File, Box 112, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty/Voice + of America: 10–12/79. Confidential. Brzezinski forwarded the memorandum to Carter under + a handwritten note that reads: “I have been pressing VOA for this since early fall.” Carter + initialed the memorandum, indicating he saw it. + + + Washington, November + 26, 1979 + + + SUBJECT + VOA Broadcasting + +

With reference to your memorandum of November 16,On November 8, less than a week after the U.S. diplomats were taken hostage in + Tehran, Brzezinski asked the + ICA to include in the VOA broadcasts to the Middle East + information about the treatment of Muslims in the Soviet Union + including “references to the Soviet policy actively discouraging + religious belief and practice.” Brzezinski also requested a report to Carter on what + VOA was doing along those lines + and what augmentations to VOA + programming were being implemented. (Ibid.) In a November 15 + memorandum to Brzezinski, + Reinhardt reported that + ICA was “studying various + approaches to augment present programming and broadcasting.” (Ibid.) + On November 16, Brzezinski + signed a memorandum to ICA + requesting a concrete report for the President, which should be + submitted by November 26. (National Security Council, Carter + Administration Intelligence Files, Box I–023, SCC Meeting Folders, 79–80, SCC (i) Meeting on Broadcasting and + Related Issues, 11 December 1979) On November 28, Brzezinski wrote Reinhardt that the November 26 + ICA proposals appeared to have + potential and reemphasized the need to urgently implement VOA programming to Muslims. In a + handwritten note, Brzezinski + added that he “needs periodic updates for the + President.” (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Brzezinski Office File, Subject + Chron File, Box 112, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty/Voice of + America: 10–12/79) we have undertaken on a priority basis the + identification and use of appropriate additional materials on the + treatment of Muslims in the Soviet Union. The initial focus of our + effort, beyond our ongoing news reporting, will be a special VOA series examining the status of Islam + beyond the Islamic heartland.

+

This series, to be produced for broadcast in DecemberBrzezinski + underlined “in December” and wrote an exclamation point in the + margin. will focus on the quality of life within minority + Islamic communities around the world. It will be organized around topics + such as:

+

—the size and growth of Islamic communities;

+

—the degree of Islamic integration into the surrounding cultural, + political and economic environment;

+

—their sense of freedom and security;

+ +

—their right to practice their religion and official and unofficial + restrictions thereon;

+

—participation in the worldwide Islamic resurgence;

+

—how they are influenced by urbanism and modernization in + technologically advanced environments;

+

—the perceptions of these minority Islamic communities held by their + non-Islamic neighbors and similar issues.

 +

Such an approach will be most effective, in our judgment, because: (a) it + will be credible; (b) it will be more than a solitary program; (c) it + will permit us to compare and contrast the treatment of Muslims in the + Soviet Union with their more favorable conditions elsewhere; and (d) it + will provide a format for discussing some aspect of Soviet treatment of + the Muslims in each of the programs.

+

The series will initially consist of eight or more ten-minute programs. + It will be broadcast primarily in languages that reach the Islamic + heartland—e.g., Arabic, Indonesian, Turkish, Persian, Urdu as well as + French and English—but in Uzbek, Serbo-Croatian, Georgian, Chinese, + Swahili, Hausa, Hindi and Tamil as well. We are consulting with a wide + range of authorities to develop material for the instant series; that + research will lead to other VOA program + possibilities as well. Among those to be consulted:

+

Sheikh Ahmad Zaki, Imam of the Islamic Center of Chicago; Dr. Muhammed + Abdul-Rauf, Director of the Islamic Center Mosque in Washington, D.C.; + Fazl Al-Rahmam, Professor of Islamic Thought, University of Chicago; + Professor John Esposito, Professor of Religion, College of the Holy + Cross, Worcester, Mass.; Professor Jaroslav Stetkevych, University of + Chicago; Dr. Muzammil Siddiqui, Muslim World League; Imam Khalil Al-Min, + World Community of Islam; Imam Muhammed Hirri, Shiite Imam, Detroit, + Michigan; Mr. Leo Orleans, The Library of Congress; Ms. Kirkland of the + University of Chicago; Professor Alexandre Bennigsen, University of + Chicago and Paris, France; Dr. Murray Feshbach, Foreign Demographic + Division, Department of Commerce; Professor Gail Lapidus, Political + Science, University of California, Berkeley; Professor Teresa + Rakowska-Harmstone, Carlton University, Canada; Professor Edward + Allworth, Columbia University; Professor Michael Rywkin, City University + of New York (CUNY); Professor Steven Burg, Oberlin College; Professor + Mobin Shorish, University of Illinois; Ms. Ann Sheehy, Radio Liberty + analyst.

+

VOA correspondents abroad will also + develop material in the major regions to be covered.

+

The material developed for the VOA + series will also be utilized as appropriate in other USICA media:

+

—The VOA programs will inform + coverage on the Agency’s Wireless File for use by our posts + abroad.

+ +

—We will identify certain programs/interviews which might be recast + as video programs. Such video tapes would be made available to + selected posts for local use with specific audiences.

+

—On a longer range basis, the material will also be adapted for use + in the Agency’s publication Al Majal, a + monthly Arabic-language magazine published for Near East and North + Africa countries.

+

—Problems of Communism, in addition to an + early 1980 article by University of Chicago Professor Alexandre + Benningsen on how Soviet Muslims see the Muslim world outside the + Soviet Union, will incorporate continued coverage of the Islamic + peoples of the Soviet Union and China.

 +

As we develop these concepts, we will continue to look for additional + ways to communicate effectively to our audiences the state of the Muslim + minority in the Soviet Union.

+
+ +
+ 69. Editorial Note +

On December 5, 1979, Representative Elizabeth Holtzman (D-New York), + Chairman of the Subcommittee on Immigration, Refugees, and International + Law, called for National Security Council Staff member Paul Henze to resign in a letter to + President Jimmy Carter. The + letter was released to newspapers and drew attention to comments made by + Henze during the August 15 + meeting of the Board of International Broadcasting (BIB) in Washington. At the meeting, while + discussing the future of Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty (RFE/RL), + Henze referenced the May 1 + interview broadcast on the Romanian service of Radio Free Europe with + Valerian Trifa, a Bishop of the Romanian Orthodox Church in the United + States and Canada. Trifa had been accused of being a member of the + Romanian Fascist Party Iron Guard during World War II and responsible + for instigating the Jewish pogrom in Bucharest in 1941 and was under + investigation by the Justice Department. Holtzman asserted that + Henze had characterized + concern about the Trifa interview as “silly” and that it “certainly + isn’t serious from the point of view of the White House.” Holtzman also + directed the Subcommittee staff to investigate the matter. (Carter + Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Horn/Special, Box 4, + Chron File: 12/79)

+

In his August 17 report to Assistant to the President for National + Security Affairs Zbigniew + Brzezinski on the meeting, Henze made no mention of the incident regarding Trifa. + He detailed his impressions of the contrast between the Board for + International Broadcasting and the Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty + Corporate Board, his impression that the Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty + relocation “has been blown out + of all proportion to its real importance by the BIB Staff in conjunction with a few congressional + staffers,” and the challenges faced by the Radios in obtaining + additional funds for their budget in a Zero Base Budget environment and + pressure for budgetary cuts across the board. Henze also sketched out his idea of + combining the Board for International Broadcasting and the Radio Free + Europe/Radio Liberty Corporate Board into “a public corporation with + half Presidential appointees, half public members representing a wide + spectrum of interests and talents,” an idea which would allow for the + removal of “bothersome BIB Staff.” + Henze wrote: “This has not been discussed with [Board for + International Broadcasting Chairman] Gronouski yet, but there is + increasing evidence that he would be ready to go along.” + Henze concluded: “Do not say + anything until you and I have had a chance to review all this further.” + (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Brzezinski Office File, Subject Chron File, Box 112, + Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty/Voice of America: 1–9/79)

+

In an October 1 memorandum to Brzezinski, Henze + discussed the ongoing conflict, referencing a memorandum on BIB–RFE/RL cooperation circulated by + BIB staff to Congress and + government agencies. The memorandum accused Radio management, and + especially Glenn Ferguson of + “free wheeling by the radios on the Hill.” Ferguson was also the target of an article by Jack + Anderson in The Washington Post in which his + compensation was made public. (Jack Anderson, “One Happy Ending for + ‘Boat People,’” The Washington Post, September 7, + 1979, page C13) Henze wrote: “The + present crisis is not going to go away. We can solve it only by moving + to solve the basic contradictions in the present management and + supervisory structure of the radios.” Henze suggested that the administration combine the + Board for International Broadcasting and the Radio Free Europe/Radio + Liberty Corporate Board into one entity. Gronouski, Henze + suggested, should be offered a different position within the + administration—either at the Department of Labor or the Department of + Education. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Brzezinski Office File, Subject Chron + File, Box 112, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty/Voice of America: + 10–12/79) On October 2, Henze + followed up with another suggestion for Gronouski’s next appointment: head of the Voice of + America after Peter Strauss resigned, an idea which Brzezinski promised to pursue. + (Ibid.)

+

Representative Holtzman’s investigation brought Henze’s comments at the Board for + International Broadcasting meeting in August front and center. Henze wrote Brzezinski on December 7 defending + himself against the charges. He stated that the attack was carried out + by “elements in the BIB Staff and their + collaborators among congressional staffers” who were “frustrated because + their scheme for crippling the radios by moving them from Europe to the U.S. (allegedly in the name of economy) has fared badly.” + The “selective citation” of his remarks, Henze added, “neither reflects the + context nor the spirit of what I said.” Henze argued that that the Board for + International Broadcasting staff had been carrying out an ongoing + vilification campaign against the management of the radio, against + himself, and, most importantly, against Brzezinski. The ongoing “dywersja” (Polish: diversion), + Henze wrote, undermines the + basic purpose of the stations. He continued: “The stations are an asset + to U.S. foreign policy and an important + service to the peoples who live under Communist domination.” What is at + stake, Henze concluded, is the + maintenance of “professional independence and integrity of Radio Free + Europe and Radio Liberty.” (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, + Staff Material, Horn/Special, Box 4, Chron File: 12/79)

+
+ +
+ 70. Summary of Conclusions of a Special Coordination Committee + (Intelligence) MeetingSource: + National Security Council, Carter Administration Intelligence Files, + Box I–020, SCC Meetings, 1978–1980 + Minutes and PRC Minutes, Minutes + SCC 1979. Confidential. Drafted + by Henze. The meeting took + place in the White House Situation Room. + + + Washington, December 11, 1979, 4–5:30 + p.m. + + + SUBJECT + Broadcasting and Related Issues (U) + + + PARTICIPANTS + + + State + David Newsom, + Under Sec. for Political Affairs + **David Mark, Dep. Dir. INR + *Morris Draper, Dep. Asst. Sec. Bureau of NE & So. + Asian Affairs + + + + OSD + W. Graham + Claytor, Jr., Dep. Sec. + Ronald H. Stivers, Asst. Dep. Under Sec. for Policy + Review + + + + JCS + Lt. General John Pustay, Asst. to the Chairman + + + + Justice + John Shenefield, Acting Asst. + Kenneth Bass, Office of Legal Counsel + + + DCI + Frank Carlucci, + Deputy Director + [4 names not declassified] + + + ICA + *John Reinhardt, + Director + + + VOA + *Hans Tuch, Acting Assoc. Dir. + + + OMB + John White, Deputy Director + + + BIB + *John A. + Gronouski, Chairman + *James Critchlow, Planning and Research Officer + + + White House + Zbigniew + Brzezinski, Chairman + + + NSC + Paul B. Henze, + Notetaker + + + + *Present only for first portion of meeting. + **Present only for second portion of meeting. + +

The meeting was called to review proposals for + improving broadcasting to Muslim audiences. The Chairman opened + the meeting by stressing the urgency of the + problem and the President’s concern about it. He + said that events of the past year had highlighted serious deficiencies + in this area but efforts to correct them had been proceeding too slowly. + He cited delay in implementing an earlier decision to inaugurate Azeri + broadcasting over VOA as an unfortunate + example. The Deputy Secretary of Defense noted that the United States + would be allocating billions of dollars to set up quick reaction forces + and was even now spending sums far greater than the cost of broadcasts + to keep naval task forces steaming around the Persian Gulf. The Chairman + suggested that our defense outlays would not have to be so high if we + had not neglected effective communication with key groups such as + Muslims. There was general agreement among all present that urgent steps + were needed. (U)

+

Before reviewing specific proposals of VOA and BIB for Radio + Liberty, the group reviewed the present status of + Persian-language broadcasts over the VOA. VOA was + praised for having already expanded Persian but there was unanimous + consensus that what was now being done—1½ hours per day in total + broadcast time—was inadequate for a crisis situation which was likely to + continue for months if not years. After discussion of personnel + recruiting, transmitter allocation, possible reduction of lower-priority + languages and the significance of VOA + English-language broadcasts for Iranian and other Muslim audiences, it + was decided that the specifics of how to expand Persian broadcasts as + soon as possible would be taken up by the SCC Radio Working Group which will report back to the + SCC as soon as possible. The aim + will be at least to double + VOA’s capacity to communicate in + Persian, both in terms of program content and transmitter power. (C)

+

VOA’s paper offering + five option “packages” for expanding broadcasting to Muslim + audiences was then discussed.Dated + December 4. (National Security Council, Carter Administration + Intelligence Files, Box I–023, SCC + Meeting Folders, 1979–1980 and Attorney General Actions, SCC(i) Meeting on Broadcasting and + Related Issues, 11 December 1979)

+ + + •Package I, priority expansion of + broadcasting in Persian, Azeri, Urdu, Bengali, + Uzbek and Turkish, was unanimously endorsed. (U) + •Package II—construction of four new 250 KW shortwave transmitters for + broadcasts to South and Central Asia, had been approved, it + was noted, by the President in March 1977. VOA explained that ambassadorial reservations about the + willingness of the Sri Lanka government to permit construction had + delayed action. The Chairman said that a delay of more than 2½ years + in implementing a Presidential decision was unfortunate and asked + that a detailed report of actions taken or attempted be prepared by + State and ICA. He directed that + urgent diplomatic steps be taken to secure approval for beginning + construction as soon as possible and said the status of the effort + should be reviewed at frequent intervals by the SCC Radio Working Group, with any + impasse being referred back to the SCC for resolution. (C) + •Package III—expansion of + additional Muslim-language broadcasts—Hausa, Swahili, + Indonesian, Hindi and Arabic—was unanimously endorsed. (U) + •Package IV—adding four + 250 KW shortwave transmitters to + existing VOA facilities in + England, to provide replacement for obsolescent + transmitters in Germany and Morocco, was endorsed unanimously. These + transmitters will improve VOA’s + capabilities toward Eastern Europe and the USSR as well as the Near East. The Chairman noted that + the political situation in Morocco made it especially desirable that + VOA have an alternative for its + transmitters there. (C) + •Package V—further + increases in Persian, Azeri, Urdu, Bengali, Turkish and + Arabic to capitalize on South Asian and British + transmitters, when available, was also unanimously endorsed. + (U) + +

The Chairman observed that improving broadcasts did not involve only more + programs and more transmitters, but better content in + broadcasts. The whole Islamic World is going + through a rennaissance, he said, and we must find ways of responding + to it. The Director of ICA + said that his agency was giving high priority to getting improved + research and information input by contacting academic specialists. He + said that his agency did not believe that improvements in communication + with Muslim peoples should be confined to broadcasts but that all of ICA’s + techniques of communication should be employed. The group + agreed and the Chairman advised ICA to + plan urgent expansion in other fields as well. Though this meeting was + concerned only with Muslim areas, the Chairman added, the current crisis had revealed deficiencies in our ability to + communicate with other parts of the world as well which also needed + attention. (U)

+

The Committee then turned to the BIB proposals. The BIB Chairman made an introductory + statement which stressed Radio Liberty’s enormous + potential for impact on the 50 million Soviet Muslims and the + meager resources which had been applied to + this task to date: only 46 people in all, including secretaries and + researchers, for only 3½ hours per week of original programming in 7 + languages. Though the expansion was not as easy as for East European or + Russian, he said that initial + exploratory work left him confident that people for broadcasting staffs + could be found, researchers hired and trained and available research + materials much more effectively exploited. News and programming-support + offices in the Middle East were also needed. The four expansion packages + offered by BIB were then discussed:

+ + •Package I—immediate + steps to improve content and depth of RL broadcasts in Uzbek, Tatar, Kazakh, Azeri, + Tajik, Turkmen and Kirgiz—was endorsed unanimously. + (U) + •Package II—improving + broadcast impact in the target area by leasing transmitters in + the Middle East was also unanimously endorsed, in + principle. There was a good deal of discussion of the political + ramifications as well as the concrete technical possibilities of + leasing in various countries. The Chairman concluded by directing + that opportunities in Israel, Egypt, Jordan and Saudi Arabia be + urgently explored and that State facilitate BIB efforts in every way possible. The BIB Chairman reported promising + conversations with a high Israeli official and there was general + agreement that possibilities in Israel should be the first to be + explored. The Chairman cited the RFE experience in broadcasting to Poland from Germany + as negating worries that broadcasts transmitted from Israel would + not be effective with Muslim audiences. The Chairman suggested that + BIB might want to explore + transmitter leasing opportunities farther afield but felt that the + four countries named should be urgently explored first. The SCC Radio Working Group will monitor + progress on this effort closely and report back to the SCC on new problems or opportunities. + (C) + •Package III—an extension of Package I—more comprehensive measures for improving and + expanding RL’s Muslim-language + broadcasts to 5½ hours of original programming per week was + endorsed unanimously with the understanding that it would be + practical only if Package II could be successfully implemented or + transmitter power augmented in some other way. In discussion of this + package, BIB representatives + stressed the need for a solid information and research base to + enable RL to carry out its unique + mission: in-depth coverage of internal affairs and the special + ethnic and cultural interests of its audiences, in contrast to + VOA’s primary mission of + providing U.S. and international + news and commentary. (C) + •Package IV—a proposal for building four 250 KW transmitters somewhere in the Middle East + was deferred for later consideration, pending the results of the + leasing effort. The Chairman emphasized that this deferral was + “without prejudice” and could be taken up again whenever BIB thought it opportune. (U) + +

The Chairman then turned to FBIS and noted that the services it provides, though + excellent have been shown during the past year of crisis in the + Middle East, to be neither fast nor comprehensive + enough. He mentioned the inadequacy of our knowledge of how and + through what channels distorted information about the Great Mosque + incident in Mecca had + traveled.On November 20, Islamic + terrorists seized the Grand Mosque in Mecca and declared one of + their leaders as Mahdi (redeemer of Islam). The Saudi Arabian forces + retook the Mosque after heavy fighting on November 27. Rumors that + the United States was behind the incident sparked protests in + Pakistan on November 21, where the U.S. Embassy in Islamabad was burned down and two + U.S. citizens were killed. On + November 24, Iranian leader Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomenei accused the + United States and Israel of being behind the attack and called for + Muslims to rise up and defend Islam. On December 2, a Libyan mob + attacked and burned the Embassy compound in Tripoli. [1 line not declassified] Questions of specific + priorities can be reviewed by the SCC + Radio Working Group. (U)

+

In conclusion of this portion of the meeting the Chairman asked the + OMB representative to give high + priority to working out plans for meeting the needs for budgetary + augmentation which the expansion plans endorsed by the Committee would + require, noting that in some cases needs for new funding would be + immediate while in others they could be phased over two or three years. + (U)

+

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to Voice of America.]

+ +
+ +
+ 71. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security + Affairs (Brzezinski) to + President CarterSource: National Security Council, + Carter Administration Intelligence Files, Box I–023, SCC Meetings Folders, 1979–1980 and + Attorney General Actions, SCC(i) + Meeting on Broadcasting and Related Issues, 11 December 1979. + Secret; Sensitive. Sent for action. Brzezinski wrote the date on the document. Carter + wrote “Zbig. J” at the top indicating he wanted the memorandum + returned to Brzezinski. + + + Washington, December + 12, 1979 + + + SUBJECT + Broadcasting to Muslims (U) + +

The Summary and Conclusions of the SSC [SCC] I held on 11 December 1979 + to review proposals for expanding and improving VOA and Radio Liberty broadcasts to Muslim audiences [1 line not declassified] are attached for your + approval. (S/S)

+

The total yearly cost of all the steps that can be + taken immediately is not greater than [dollar amount not declassified] dollars. Our task + forces in the Persian Gulf area are probably costing this for only a few + days’ operation. Longer-range + improvements, which would be funded over two or three years, add up to + about [dollar amount not declassified]. (C)

+

I am inclined to think that if we had not let our ability to communicate + with this part of the world decline over a long period of time by + failing to add modest increments of funds regularly, we might not have + to be facing such large outlays of money for augmenting our military + capabilities in the region. The costs of improving our position in the + broadcasting field are extremely modest in comparison, but we have no + time to lose in setting about the job. I plan to have my staff monitor + everything we are doing in this field closely to ensure that momentum is + maintained. (U)

+

RECOMMENDATION

+

That you approve the Summary of Conclusions attached at TAB A.Tab A is attached but not printed. Carter neither + approved nor disapproved the recommendation and wrote in the margin: + “This is a summary?! I approve the immediate + action, but OMB will have to assess + for me the other new expansion projects. J.” Brzezinski informed Vance, McIntyre, Turner, Reinhardt, and Gronouski of this decision in a + December 13 memorandum. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, + Brzezinski Material, + Brzezinski Office File, + Subject Chron File, Box 112, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty/Voice + of America: 10–12/79) In a December 14 memorandum to Brzezinski, Reinhardt reported: “As a result + of the SCC meeting on December 11, + we are prepared and resources permitting” planned to increase + Persian broadcasting to six hours, as well as other increases in + broadcast times to countries with large Islamic populations. + (National Security Council, Carter Administration Intelligence + Files, Box I–023, SCC Meetings + Folders, 1979–1980 and Attorney General Actions, SCC(i) Meeting on Broadcasting and + Related Issues, 11 December 1979)

+ +
+ + +
+ 72. Memorandum From Paul Henze + of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for + National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)Source: National Security Council, Carter Administration + Intelligence Files, Box I–023, SCC + Meetings Folders, 1979–1980 and Attorney General Actions, SCC(i) Meeting on Broadcasting and + Related Issues, 11 December 1979. Confidential. Sent for action. + Copies were sent to Brement, + Larrabee, Sick, and + Odom. + + + Washington, December + 19, 1979 + + + SUBJECT + Broadcasting to Muslims—Need to Push OMB to release funds (U) + +

I had a good Radio Working Group yesterday afternoon. All participants + are eager to move to implement the program which has already been + advertised in the New York TimesAttached but not printed. David Binder of The New York Times published an article two + days earlier discussing the December 11 decisions to expand + broadcasting to Soviet Muslims in light of the ongoing hostage + crisis in Iran and the ferment in the region. Binder detailed the + ongoing debates between the White House, the ICA, and the OMB on the need for more transmitters to reach Soviet + Muslims and identified Henze + as both a CIA employee and the + former CIA Chief of Station in + Turkey. (David Binder, “U.S. Wary of + Islamic Upheaval, to Increase Broadcasts to Moslems,” The New York Times, December 17, 1979, p. + A16) The leak prompted Brzezinski to call for an FBI investigation into the + matter. Henze wrote two + memoranda to Brzezinski on + December 18, the first detailing his discussion with Binder, the + second suggesting the administration take a more proactive position. + Henze argued: “On the + issues which Binder raises, we risk letting the impression develop + that we are up to something illicit if we go on saying nothing. The + Administration should be getting credit for taking initiative on + Muslim broadcasts after decades of neglect (Persian stopped being + broadcast under Eisenhower in 1958!).” (Carter Library, National + Security Affairs, Staff Material, Horn/Special, Box 4, Chron File: + 12/79) —with one exception: OMB. It is dragging its feet. It has been reluctant to give + ICA all the money it says it needs + for VOA and even more reluctant to + authorize new positions. It has allocated no money to BIB for RFE/RL—with John White maintaining + that the SCC decisions, as he + understands them, do not permit giving any funds for improving broadcast + content until transmitters have actually been rented. This means that + you wait to hire people and improve research and monitoring until you + have the transmitters ready and then you wait another six months to + broadcast effectively while you build up programming. This is a recipe + for sapping initiative and inflicting unnecessary delay on ourselves to + save pennies. . . (C)

+

I have prepared a strong memorandum from you to McIntyre attached at TAB AAttached but not printed. According to an attached + activity sheet, the memorandum was returned to Henze on December 26 for revisions. + There is no indication that it was subsequently sent to McIntyre. and recommend you + sign it immediately. (U)

+
+ +
+ 73. Memorandum From Stephen + Larrabee of the National Security Council Staff to the + President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, + Brzezinski Material, + Brzezinski Office File, + Subject Chron File, Box 112, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty/Voice + of America: 10–12/79. Confidential. Sent for action. + + + Washington, December + 28, 1979 + + + SUBJECT + Proposed Radio Liberty Broadcasts to Soviet Muslims (C) + +

Attached at Tab AA December 22 memorandum + from Tarnoff to Brzezinski is attached but not + printed. is a memo from State outlining their strategy for + implementing the December 11 SCC + decision authorizing them to investigate the possibility of leasing + transmitter time in Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Israel and possibly Jordan for + Radio Liberty programs beamed at the Soviet Muslim populations. (C)

+

There are existing short-wave transmitters powerful enough to reach + Soviet Central Asia in Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Israel. Jordan has no + short-wave transmitters capable of reaching Soviet Central Asia and + therefore has been dropped from consideration. (C)

+

State argues—correctly in my view—that we ought to make our first + approach to the Saudis in order to capitalize on their strong sense of + responsibility for Muslim peoples and to offset any Saudi reaction, + should we later turn to the Israelis. While there may be some reluctance + on the part of the Saudis, State believes that a well-prepared approach, + explained as an information effort aimed at oppressed co-religionists + could overcome these hesitations. They recommend that the BIB send a senior representative to talk + to the Saudis and explore the possibility of leasing transmitter time. + (C)

+

If the Saudis prove unwilling, State recommends approaching Egypt next. + They caution, however, that Egypt may be wary of agreeing to another + highly visible bilateral project at a time when they are trying to mend + their fences with the Soviets. (C)

+

State thinks Israel should be approached only as a last resort, and that + the decision should be reconsidered if this is the only option. They + feel any broadcasts from Israel could be exploited by the Soviets to + blunt the impact of our effort directed at the Muslim populations. In + particular, the Soviets could portray the broadcasts as evidence of a + joint US-Zionist conspiracy. Embassy Tel Aviv shares this concern. It feels that the potential + advantages do not outweigh the negative consequences which they see as + following from such cooperation with Israel. (C)

+

While Embassy Tel Aviv’s and State’s concerns have merit and deserve + careful consideration, it is questionable in my view whether they are of + sufficient weight to require abandoning the whole project in Israel. For + many years it was argued that RFE + broadcasts to Poland could not succeed if they were broadcast from West + Germany. However, in the end locating the stations in Munich did not + really impair the effectiveness of RFE’s Polish broadcasts. While the two situations are not + entirely comparable, the RFE experience + does suggest that the location of the transmitters is less important + than the content of the programming. (C)

+

At any rate, we need not make this decision now. Our first priority + should be to investigate the possibilities of leasing transmitters from + the Saudis and Egyptians. If this fails, we can assess the pros and cons + of approaching Israel later. At the very least, prior approach to Saudi + Arabia and Egypt will cushion their reaction if we do eventually decide + to approach Israel. (C)

+

State has been in touch with the BIB, + which is prepared to move ahead along the lines indicated above and to + send a mission to the area in the coming weeks. (C)

+

RECOMMENDATION: That you approve the basic + approach outlined above.

+ +

ApproveBrzezinski approved the recommendation and wrote at + the top of the memorandum “Move fast.” As amended + Disapprove

+ +

Brement concurs.

+
+ +
+ 74. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security + Affairs (Brzezinski) to Vice + President MondaleSource: Carter Library, National + Security Affairs, Brzezinski + Material, Brzezinski Office + File, Subject Chron File, Box 112, Radio Free Europe/Radio + Liberty/Voice of America: 10–12/79. Confidential. Larrabee forwarded the memorandum + to Brzezinski on December 28 + and noted he had coordinated it with Henze. (Ibid.) + + + Washington, December + 28, 1979 + + + SUBJECT + Broadcasting to the Moslem World (U) + +

In answer to your query at the PRC + yesterday,On November 23, Robert Gates asked Gary Sick and + Paul Henze to prepare a + memorandum for Brzezinski’s + signature answering a query from Mondale about U.S. + actions to counter Soviet propaganda in the Persian Gulf. Henze provided Brzezinski a draft memorandum on + November 26. In his covering memorandum, Henze asked Brzezinski to engage Mondale as a supporter of a more assertive U.S. approach to international + broadcasting. (National Security Council, Carter Administration + Intelligence Files, I–023, SCC + Meeting Folders, 1979–1980 and Attorney General Actions, SCC(i) Meeting on Broadcasting and + Related Issues, 11 December 1979) Aaron signed the memorandum on Brzezinski’s behalf on November + 27, reporting that severe budget limitations imposed on RFE/RL and + VOA prevented progress. (Ibid.) + On December 27, Mondale + again asked about broadcasting to Muslim audiences. all the + participants, with the exception of OMB, are moving to implement the decisions taken at the + December 11 SCC on broadcasting to the + Moslem World and approved by the President. To date OMB has:

+

—released funds for VOA’s most urgent + needs but been reluctant to provide funds for the expansion of Hausa, + Swahili, Indonesian, Hindi and Amharic (the latter is particularly + important)

+

—allocated no money to BIB for RFE/RL to + improve the content and depth of Radio Liberty broadcasts in Uzbek, + Tatar, Kazakh, Azeri, Tajik, Turkmen and Kirgiz on the grounds that + funds for such steps could not be released until arrangements for + transmittal rental have been accomplished. Improvements in these + language services are needed now, however, in order to have better + broadcasts ready when the transmitters are rented. Moreover, RL must begin to hire new people for these + languages, a difficult task which will take months and which should be + begun as soon as possible. (C)

+

Recent developments in AfghanistanOn December + 25, Soviet airborne troops began arriving in Kabul, Afghanistan. On + December 27, Soviet Army and KGB troops attacked the Presidential + Palace in Kabul and killed Afghani President Hafizullah Amin. + Concurrently, Soviet ground forces began crossing the border into + Afghanistan. have underscored the importance of moving + rapidly to implement the December 11 SCC decisions, particularly funding for VOA and RL + programming needs. I think a + memo from you to Jim McIntyre + would help to overcome OMB + footdragging. (C)

+
+ +
+ 75. Memorandum From Paul Henze + of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant to + National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, + Horn/Special, Box 4, Chron File: 1/80. No classification marking. + Sent for action. Copies were sent to Brement, Larrabee, Sick, Hunter, Thornton, Odom, Ermarth, and Griffith. + + + Washington, January + 11, 1980 + + + SUBJECT + Money for Radio Expansion (U) + +

One month ago today the SCC endorsed proposals for expanding broadcasting to + Muslims and the President approved these actions two days later. But, as + the New York Times reported from Munich yesterday + (TAB A),Attached but not printed at Tab A is + John Vinocur, “Radio Liberty Stressing News to Soviet Moslems,” The New York Times, January 10, 1980, p. + A13. + Radio Liberty still hasn’t received a penny of the + money needed to do the job. OMB’s bookkeepers pinch pennies, question the intent of the + SCC actions and think up reasons + why the money shouldn’t be provided.

+

Your credibility and mine with the radios and the BIB is suffering. Does the Administration + really mean what it says? Is the President really behind expanded + broadcasts? Do SCC and NSC decisions not apply to OMB?

+

Particulars: The NYT gave both VOA (TAB + B)Attached but not printed at Tab B is + Graham Hovey, “Voice of America Aims More Programs at Moslems,” The New York Times, January 10, 1980, p. + A12. and RL (TAB A) attention + yesterday. The piece on VOA talks about + what it is going to do and sounds pretty good, + but it all has to be done yet and impact demonstrated. RL, which is probably even more eager to + move than VOA, tells it how it is: + pitifully limited output now because Soviet Muslim broadcasting has been + kept on a starvation diet for years; enormous potential for expansion; + frustration. Bill Reese, who is quoted in the article, is a feisty Jerry + Funk type. He is the man I described to you after my visit last summer + as bringing a whole new potential into the Caucasian and Central Asian + field. A former Peace Corps volunteer in Turkey, he conducts daily programming meetings + in Turkish and has RL’s motley team of + (mostly aging) Tatars, Uzbeks, Azerbaijanis, Kazakhs, Tadzhiks, Turkmen + and Kirgiz motivated as they have never been before.

+

John White of OMB has refused to return + my calls since before Christmas. I finally got through to Ed Sanders, + Deputy Associate Director for International Affairs, yesterday and told + him I was preparing a report for you on implementation of the radio + decisions and wanted to know what OMB’s + problem was. He said White didn’t agree with the SCC decisions as I described them. White + understood the SCC to have decided that + the radios didn’t need any money until they secured new transmitters. I + said he was wrong. I repeated for the umpteenth time that even without + new transmitters they needed to beef up broadcasting by hiring new + people, developing new news research and programming resources to be + able to highlight Middle Eastern developments—and if they did get new + transmitters, they needed to have all these other things done to make + effective use of them. He said they thought they could reprogram, cut + something else out. I said the SCC had + not even considered that “option”. We wanted no cuts in Polish or + Romanian to be able to broadcast to Azerbaijanis and Uzbeks. This was + not in the national interest. Again, for the umpteenth time, I said the + problem was that all radio broadcasting had been shortchanged for years + and everything needed to be expanded.

+

The truth is that OMB has not reversed the $2.2 million cut it made this + fall, over our strong objections, in RFE/RL’s FY–81 budget; RFE/RL is already + running short this year and currently faces the necessity of firing 40 people!

+

The Administration’s program for expanding radio broadcasting will soon + be exposed as hollow rhetoric unless ample funds are assured. (VOA has been allocated some extra funds by + OMB, but far less than is needed to + accomplish what they are under orders to do.) Given the insignificant + amount of money required (compared to defense outlays)—the entire SCC package of 11 December is well below + $10 million—all of this penny-pinching agony is idiotic. There is no + question about popular and congressional support for what we want to + do.In a January 23 letter to Carter, + AFL/CIO President Lane Kirkland decried the insufficient funds made + available to broadcasting to the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. + (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, + Box 9, Board for International Broadcasting (RFE, RL, VOA): 2–9/80) In a + February 1 memorandum to Dodson, Henze + suggested a reply to Kirkland should stress the December 11 SCC decisions for immediate actions + and emphasize that funds are being made available. David Aaron concurred with + Henze’s recommendations + and added a note that reads: “we share the sense of urgency” + expressed by the AFL/CIO President. (Ibid.) I continue to get + letters and calls praising us for the decisions that were leaked by Binder on 16 December. There + have been no negative responses whatsoever. When we originally faced + communications challenges in the 1950’s, we simply made sizable sums of + money available and gave the people we put in charge of radio operations + the green light. The money was spent well. We have no reason whatsoever + to believe that the competent management of RFE/RL will not spend every + penny that is made available to them now with full effectiveness. If we + really mean what we say, we should assure them of $20 million over the + next year and tell them to rush ahead. The results will be + impressive.

+

One of the most serious shortcomings of this Administration, when it is + able to formulate good ideas and take decisions, has been its incapacity + to perform, to implement, to carry out what it says it wants done. We + seem to have another striking instance of it in the broadcasting + field.

+

RECOMMENDATION

+

Since your effort to get the Vice President to pressure OMB to honor the SCC/Presidential + decisions on broadcasting has produced no results, the only course left + open, if we are not to tell BIB/RFE/RL to abandon the effort, is for you + to take up the issue with McIntyre, getting beforehand whatever bolstering you + feel you might need from the President himself.

+
+ +
+ 76. Memorandum From Leo Cherne to the President’s Assistant for + National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, + Horn/Special, Box 4, Chron File: 4/80. No classification + marking. + + + New York, March 28, + 1980 + + + RE + Board for International Broadcasting + +

Public Law 93–129 which created the Board for International Broadcasting + in 1973 did so because Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty had been + reconstituted as a privately organized Delaware Corporation with its own + corporate board of directors, corporate chief executive and professional + and engineering staff. Since the work of the Radios was to be openly funded by the U.S. Government, it appeared essential that + a presidentially-appointed board of five members, assisted by a small + professional staff, assure the Congress and the President that the + mission was properly performed; the moneys properly spent; the + engineering equipment and technology be equal to the task; and that the + RFE/RL broadcasts meet the highest standards of “quality, effectiveness + and integrity”.

+

The request that I consider nomination to the BIB as its Chairman,Leo Cherne + served under Presidents Nixon and Ford on the President’s Foreign + Intelligence Advisory Board, first as a member and then as chairman. + After Carter’s election, PFIAB was disbanded, and Cherne became + President of the International Rescue Committee in New York. His + name was considered for the chairmanship of the BIB, but Cherne turned down the offer. + On May 15, Schultzberg published an article in The + New York Times discussing the approach by Henze and Brzezinski to Cherne and Paul + Seabury to join the BIB Board as + well as the opposition from Senate Foreign Relations Committee + members. (A.O. Sulzberger, Jr., “U.S. Overseas Radio Stirs Dispute Again,” The New York Times, May 15, 1980, p. + A17). led to a short but intensive assessment of the reality + which presently prevails, as well as the contribution, in character and + magnitude, such a responsibility would entail.

+

The conclusions reflected in this memorandum owe much to considerable + detail, candor, and important judgments which I received from able and + distinguished people who presently or previously have carried + substantial responsibility in the areas this memorandum discusses. My + study was partial and too brief but, in my opinion, sufficient for me to + form certain judgments about the problems which confront the Radios and + particularly the private and public boards, their officers and + staffs.

+

Though I suspect there are such instances, I’ve been unable to identify a + noteworthy occasion when the BIB + adversely affected the operation of the Radios. Nor have I found an + occasion when that Board was of any significant assistance to the + operation of the Radios. It may be that advocacy needed for the large + increase in transmitters or their location in recent years is such an + instance. This is only one of a number of many such questions time and + propriety did not permit adequate inquiry. On those questions for which + I sought answers, my conclusions are as follows.

+

The BIB and its staff are essentially + incapable of performing their assigned mission. The factors involved in + this negative conclusion include the following:

+

No board of five advisory members, meeting four times a year, or twice + that often, can more than casually assess operations of the magnitude + performed by RFE/RL.

+ +

The membership of BIB has at no time + contained more than one or two people with special or recognized + capacity to perform such complex studies.

+

The Board’s present and projected membership is not of the stature which + would compel high respect by RFE/RL, its staff and, especially, its + corporate board and officers.

+

The exceptional stature and experience of the RFE/RL Board further + intensifies the disparity in quality, depth, and competence, between the + two Boards and virtually assures reluctant and minimal cooperation.

+

Although it is intended that BIB + concentrate on certain defined areas of “oversight” and the Board of + RFE/RL concentrate on “operations”, these distinctions are largely + artificial. More importantly, one purpose cannot be pursued without + “invading” the other.

+

Since the part-time membership of BIB is + clearly inadequate to its task, more than normal or desirable authority + resides in its staff.

+

That staff, especially its chief members, has become the most significant + part of the problem. Of five professionals, two appear to have a + potential for useful contribution. The Executive Director of BIB’s staff and at least one of the staff + assessing program content and quality maximize the friction (inherent in + the present arrangement) between the two Boards and unnecessarily burden + both.

+

The distance of both Boards from the main sites of broadcasting + operations further complicates the oversight functions.

+

It is difficult to imagine a laboratory more suited than is the BIB to the proof of several of Parkinson’s + propositions.

+

Quite presumptuously, but with deep conviction, the following steps (not + easy to accomplish quickly) are recommended:

+

The next Chairman of BIB must, whatever + the resistance from his colleagues who may cherish their distinction and + tasks, move to bring the existence of the Board for International + Broadcasting to an end. In the interim, in order to improve cooperation + between the Boards and assist the Chairman of BIB to perform the responsibilities assigned by law to + BIB, all or a large part of the + Board’s present staff must be replaced promptly. It may not be necessary + to fill more than two of the five positions if this diagnosis is + correct—the position of executive secretary and the staff member + concerned with financial oversight. To fill the other vacant positions + risks creating a greater number of people with a vested interest in + perpetuating their positions.

+

The most important purpose which should be pursued by the chairman and + executive director, should be the designing of the means to terminate + the Board’s existence, with the approval of Congress and in such a way + as to satisfy the Congress that its serious purpose will, in fact, be better performed by the + existence of one Board—the Board of RFE/RL.

+

The difficulty which flows from the fact that the RFE/RL Board is a + “private” Board must be overcome. I offer several not carefully thought + out alternatives.

+

1) Can the RFE/RL structure, and especially its officers and Board, be + made quasi-public with the responsibility to report to Congress and the + President? The present operation is, in fact though not in form, + quasi-public.

+

2) Should the RFE/RL Board elect a five-member committee of its members + with those members appointed to the BIB + by the President subject to Congressional approval? Redundancy of + membership is vital if this approach is to work so long as the BIB continues to exist.

+

The formation of such a five-member committee of the Board of RFE/RL has + an additional virtue. The present full Board of RFE/RL has exceptional + experience, competence and stature. It is, however, too large to + function as an effective board of directors. The present size and range + are suggestive of an aggregation of consultants covering the very wide + scope of the expertise required to guide the Radios.

+

3) Should the GAO and OMB assume a large + part of the necessary oversight and accounting?

+

This memo closes with several questions. My inquiry was insufficient to + examine them.

+

1) Does the present arrangement and the present functioning of RFE/RL + provide a broadcasting capability sufficiently responsive to U.S. needs in a radically changed + world?

+

2) Are we still over-reacting to the sensitivity about government abuse + of the Radios which flowed from the period of intense concern with our + intelligence activities?

+

3) Do the Radios fill the new target needs—ethnic, religious, geographic + and political—so large a part of present and future foreign policy + concerns?

+

4) Can our national needs be fully served by ably run broadcasting + instruments, staffed by gifted journalists seeking to preserve a + reputation for accuracy, objectivity and independence? Each makes an + important contribution to credibility. At what cost, in a very new + time?

+ + Leo Cherne + +
+ +
+ 77. Memorandum From Paul Henze + of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for + National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, + Horn/Special, Box 5, Chron File: 6–7/80. Confidential. Copies were + sent to Brement, Larrabee, and Odom. + + + Washington, June 13, + 1980 + + + SUBJECT + Expanding Radio Broadcasting + +

It is exactly six months today since the President + approved the recommendations of the 11 December 1979 SCC on expanding broadcasting to Muslim + audiences.

+

Not much has happened as a result. VOA + has expanded some of its broadcasts but it took the sharp attack in the + Post a few weeks ago to jolt ICA/VOA into facing up to the task of + broadcasting to Afghanistan seriously—and it will still be weeks (or + months) before Dari broadcasts are on the air. I am asking ICA/VOA for a report on just what has been + added since last December—for what they say they are going to do and + what they accomplish often involves a large gap. The press, as you know, + is increasingly focusing on this problem.

+

With RFE/RL the picture is much worse. Not a penny has been allocated to + expanding Muslim broadcasting staffs and no new transmitters have been + leased or otherwise secured. The transmitter-search effort is still + bogged down. If the purpose of Binder’s NYT article was to cause enough + commotion about this subject to stymie progress, it has been achieved. + BIB and OMB have been in league to tie the whole issue up in + bureaucratic haggling while they pursue “relocation” (which would hardly + contribute anything to increasing the radios’ effectiveness). Latest + from Munich is that BIB has now ordered + the radios to prepare to relocate all the Baltic services back to the + US. This speaks poorly for Gronouski’s skill as a politician and judge of ethnic + issues—for the Balts are going to be up in arms. I find, in fact, that + Lithuanians already raised this issue in a meeting with Steve and + DavidStephen + Larrabee and David + Aaron. earlier this week. A fine reward for + the Balts in the 40th anniversary year of their takeover by the + Soviets—move RL’s Baltic services back + to the US.

+

I was glad to see R. Evans place the BIB + maneuvers against the radios in the context of detentists trying to + maintain their position—for there is a lot of validity to this + accusation. The WSJ raised it too. The problem (as far as RFE/RL are concerned) is not + policy as such, but lack of power. With VOA it is more policy and lack of quality and judgment in + certain respects. All these issues need to be aired—and it increasingly + looks as if they will be, publicly, if Freedom House, the Georgetown + Center holds meetings on them. I have the feeling that the Evans and + Osnos pieces in today’s Post may spark further + journalistic investigations.

+

RL’s lack of power is depressing. At the + IREX/ICA seminar I attended last Friday (and already reported to you on + briefly) there was a great deal of discussion of radio listening in + Central Asia by the four American grantees who had just returned. But + none cited RL—its broadcasts are too + weak in signal to be heard with any dependability by Central Asians. . + .

+

While we fiddle, the Soviets expand. Look at the attached piece ICA has recently issued on expansion of + Moscow’s World Service in English.Not + attached.

+

Chto Delat’?—Frankly, I don’t know. I despair of + this Administration’s capacity to face up to these issues now. We could + hold another SCC—if you want to get out + front. Short of that, I plan simply to continue calling attention to the + problem, pressing where we can to get something done, bit by bit. But we + can’t expect much from RFE/RL until they get some money and stop being + harassed by BIB on tangential issues. + They have squeezed out what they can from presently available resources. + They have a whole list of good Central Asians, etc. ready to hire . . . + but instead they have to spend their time drawing up plans to move the + Balts back to New York. . .

+
+ +
+ 78. Memorandum From Paul Henze + of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for + National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Brzezinski Office File, Subject + Chron File, Box 113, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty/Voice of + America: 1980. Secret; Sensitive. Sent for action. Copies were sent + to Albright, Brement, and Sick. On August 11, + Brzezinski wrote in the + left-hand margin of the first page: “Paul, let me know what the + others say on the 3 options. OK on the letter to Roberts. ZB.” + + + Washington, August 7, + 1980 + + + SUBJECT + BIB and RFE/RL Muslim-Language + Broadcasts + + + REFERENCE + Walter Roberts’ Letter to + you of August 1, 1980 (U) + +

Walter Roberts’ letter to you of + August 1, 1980 (Tab A)Dated August 1; + attached but not printed. The letter addressed the impasse reached + by RFE/RL in their negotiations for additional transmitter + facilities. (See Document 73.) Roberts wrote that the delay in + negotiations in Egypt meant that two transmitters initially destined + to be installed in Portugal but now slated for Egypt in order to + bolster transmitting power to Central Asia might end up in Portugal + after all, delaying the expansion of transmitting power to Central + Asia by 18 months. Brzezinski forwarded the letter to Henze on August 4, asking for a + brief report on the situation. He also asked that Henze draft a response to Roberts under his own + signature. is a clever stratagem to put you over the barrel + on problems which the BIB has handled + badly. The main reason why the BIB has + made no progress in working out an agreement with the Egyptians for + transmission time and/or facilities is the leaking of our plans for + expanding Muslim broadcasts. These leaks, you will recall, came + immediately after SCC decisions were + taken last December (Binder in NYT, December 16, 1979).See footnote 2, Document + 72. This story, taken up and repeated over and over + again in subsequent months, by Moscow among others, embarrassed the + Egyptians and naturally aroused doubts in their minds about the wisdom + of doing business with an organization such as the BIB. [2 lines not + declassified] It is not surprising under such circumstances + that the US Embassy in Cairo now concludes that BIB-sponsored broadcasts from Egypt should be given low + priority because they could become controversial domestically for Sadat. + If the purpose of Shub’s original leak to Binder was to frustrate the + expansion plan and keep it from being implemented, it has come close to + being achieved. (S)

+

Walter Roberts’ letter is specious + in several respects. He poses the issue of broadcasting from Egypt + solely in terms of building transmitters there. The SCC-approved plan was to investigate renting or leasing time on existing + transmitters—with the issue of building new ones left open. The aim was + to get added impact immediately, not to spend + months/years building new transmitters before broadcasting was actually + expanded. If transmitters are to be built, it is + obvious that there are closer locations to the target area to build + them—[2 lines not declassified]. A + transmitter building scheme should be separately reviewed and approved + by the SCC and the President, not dealt + with in an informal letter from Walter + Roberts to you. (S)

+

In some circles concerned with the radios (Barthelemy, Lisann, some + people in congressional staffs) a great deal of opposition to building + transmitters in Egypt has developed and there is + a minor storm brewing on this issue. Jan Nowak has picked up a good deal + on it. It is typical of the kind of acrimonious argumentation which + develops around all radio issues and which the BIB Staff exacerbates instead of trying to resolve. (C)

+

You recall OMB’s stubborn refusal last + winter to make funds available to RFE/RL for program expansion so that + the radios could be ready with expanded programming as soon as more + transmitter time was secured. Your efforts to get OMB to release funds did not succeed. No + money has ever been allocated. The BIB + Staff has colluded with OMB and + congressional staffers to frustrate the large scale effort mounted by + Jan Nowak and others (including the radios themselves) to circumvent + OMB and the BIB by getting concerned Congressmen to + include additional funds in this year’s appropriations for the radios. + All these efforts have failed. OMB and the BIB have entangled themselves in an impossible bureaucratic + circle: no money for programming until transmitters are available; no + transmitters because leaks alarm the Egyptians; no serious effort to + develop possibilities in other countries; no transmitter building + program because that costs too much money; no expanded broadcasting. The + KGB could not have devised a better scheme to keep us from achieving + Presidentially approved action plans! (C)

+

Meanwhile energy has been diverted by the sordid smear campaign the + BIB Staff launched against Leo + Cherne, Paul Seabury, you and me—which goes on and on, as you can see + from the Pravda piece of July 28, 1980 (Tab B).Not attached. The White House announcement of + intention to reappoint Gronouski + in the midst of this has made a travesty of our whole effort. Domestic + politicking takes priority over serious foreign policy purpose. The + BIB Staff, under Gronouski, works to undermine our + efforts to make the radios more effective. Both Gronouski and the Staff have in recent months put 25 + times as much effort into harassing the radios with relocation schemes + than they have put into executing plans for expanded Muslim-language + broadcasts. In effect, Walter + Roberts’ letter says to you: “If you want expanded Muslim + broadcasts, arrange it for us; otherwise we can’t do it.” He has never + sought or shown any receptivity to our advice on relocation schemes. + (U)

+

Can anything constructive be done? I am skeptical. + One approach would be to tell Atherton to tell Sadat that BIB broadcasts have high priority and we + want the Egyptians to make time available. Sadat might or might not + accept this argumentation. He would certainly expect us to do something + about leaks [less than 1 line not declassified] + has permitted us to set up. Experience offers no basis whatsoever for + believing that we can keep Tony Shub from telling Binder anything we try + to arrange with Sadat—successful or otherwise. Given other problems and + opportunities we have in Egypt, I am not sure that the BIB aims—given their small chance of + success—are not really fairly low in priority. So I recommend against + making an issue of this with Sadat. (S)

+

What is your inclination?Brzezinski did not check either + option, but wrote in the margin: “I basically agree, but would it be + an issue?”

+

AGREE DISAGREE

+

[1 paragraph (17 lines) not declassified]

+

But we can’t let the BIB off on this so + easily and leave them free to concentrate on relocating pieces of the + radios to the U.S. and reducing their + effectiveness. The need for expanded Muslim-language + broadcasts is greater than when we took the decision in + mid-December. The invasion of Afghanistan has generated ferment + among Soviet Muslims which is going to continue indefinitely and which + opens up unexpected opportunities for greater receptivity for + informative news and commentary from the outside world. The spillover + potential of such broadcasts in Iran and Afghanistan is also great. So + why not order the BIB to proceed + rapidly to lease time on transmitters in places other + than Egypt and, at the same time, to develop plans for building transmitters in locations closer to the + target areas? The BIB is not the best + instrument for pursuing this kind of program—for the BIB Staff obviously contains subversive + elements who want to frustrate, not further, American policy objectives. + Moreover, the BIB members themselves + have little skill or talent for pushing this kind of thing. But if we + don’t do this—what do we do? The radios, which + continue to function well in spite of BIB and have great unrealized potential, are largely at the + mercy of the BIB. One could try to draw + the radios directly into exploring expansion—they are much more likely + to do an effective job than BIB. + (C)

+ +

How does this kind of approach strike you?Brzezinski did not + check either option, but wrote in the margin: “I don’t get + this?!”

+

FAVORABLY_____ UNFAVORABLY_____

+

As to more immediate tactics: I do not recommend + that you answer Walter Roberts’ + letter at all. He has avoided direct communication with me for nearly + six months. Gronouski has + likewise avoided contact and has been saying scurrilous things about you + in Polish ethnic circles. I suggest I send a brief note (Tab C)Not attached. to Roberts acknowledging his letter to you + and proposing a meeting to review the problems caused by the failure of + the BIB to implement the decisions on + expansion of Muslim broadcasting we took eight months ago. I would not + expect to accomplish much by such a meeting—Roberts may even refuse to come. But it would at least + give us the opportunity to keep these people under pressure. (U)

+

Keep in mind the fact that anything we do—and in particular anything I + do—in respect to the BIB is bound to + result in further attacks in the press and through congressional staffs + and further allegations [1 line not + declassified]. I am not willing to enter into a new phase of this + without speaking out to defend myself. (U)

+

In the medium to longer range we are not without allies. The commotion + the BIB Staff generated against Leo + Cherne, on balance, was counterproductive for it. At the moment morale + in the radios and among all of us who would like to see the radios freed + to maximize their potential is sagging. But if the Senate fails toBrzezinski underlined “fails to” and wrote in the + margin: “what is the evidence?” confirm Gronouski’s reappointment (likely I + suspect) the BIB Staff’s current + resurgence of arrogance will be of brief duration. Meanwhile the Freedom + House study of the radios will be progressing and the Reagan campaign is + getting interested in them and in the BIB. Even if there is not a great deal we can accomplish + now, radio jeszcze nie zginielo. (U)English translation of Polish: “Radio is not dead + yet.”

+

I have expended as much emotion on these problems as I intend to for the + foreseeable future. If you wish to turn the problem over to someone else + for independent assessment and action planning, I will not be in the + least offended. In any event I will welcome advice from other concerned + staff members on what might be done. (U)

+
+ +
+ 79. Memorandum From Stephen + Larrabee of the National Security Council Staff to the + President’s Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Aaron)Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, + Brzezinski Material, + Subject File, Box 9, Board for International Broadcasting (RFE, RL, VOA): 2–9/80. + Confidential. Sent for action. In a brief memorandum to Carter the + same day, Aaron reported that + VOA was being jammed by the + Soviets and noted that the last time this happened was prior to the + invasion of Czechoslovakia. (Ibid.) Carter initialed Aaron’s memorandum, indicating that + he saw it. + + + Washington, August + 20, 1980 + + + SUBJECT + Jamming of VOA (U) + +

As of 9:00 a.m. this morning the Soviets began jamming VOA (in Russian, Ukrainian and Armenian) + as well as BBC and Deutsche Welle. This is the first time that the + Soviets have jammed VOA since they + ceased jamming it in August 1973. (Radio Liberty of course has continued + to be jammed.) As far as can be ascertained at the moment, RFE broadcasts to Eastern Europe not + previously jammed—i.e., Poland, Rumania and Hungary—have experienced no + increased interference or jamming. (C)

+

The last time that the Soviets resumed jamming of VOA was in August 1968 just after the + invasion of Czechoslovakia. (Prior to that, VOA had not been jammed since 1963.) The Soviet action most + likely reflects the Soviets’ fear of the impact on their own population + of news about the unrest in Poland. The fact that Deutsche Welle is also + being jammed reinforces the view that the Soviet action is primarily + related to Poland (rather than Afghanistan or some other event). + Moreover, given the Ukraine’s close historical ties and geographic + proximity to Poland—as well as its strong indigenous nationalism—it is + no accident that the Soviets have begun jamming VOA’s Ukrainian service as well. (C)

+

The Soviet action is an important development. It is a clear violation of + the Helsinki Accords and attests to their intense concern about the + impact of news about the Polish unrest on their own population. The + Soviets would not undertake such a move lightly, since it will affect + their relations not only with us but with other West Europeans, + particularly the West Germans. Moreover, it is likely that the jamming + will endure well beyond the duration of the unrest in Poland. (C)

+ +

Attached at Tab A is a statement condemning the Soviet action, which I + asked State to draft.Not attached. The + Department released the statement on August 20 and sent it to Moscow + as guidance in telegram 221806 to Moscow, August 20. (National + Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign + Policy File, D800398–0167) It has been cleared by Christopher. BBC has already issued a + statement and I think we should release ours immediately. State agrees. + I also think it should be released by State. Al Friendly concurs.

+

RECOMMENDATION

+

That you approve release by State of the attached statement.Aaron + approved the recommendation. On September 19, ICA Director Reinhardt sent a memorandum to + Brzezinski on the status + of Soviet VOA jamming as well as + VOA attempts to counter Soviet + actions. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, + Box 9, Board for International Broadcasting (RFE, RL, VOA): + 2–9/80) (U)

+ +
+ +
+ 80. Memorandum From Paul Henze + of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for + National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, + Horn/Special, Box 5, Chron File: 10–12/80. No classification + marking. Copies were sent to Larrabee, Brement, and Griffith. + + + Washington, November + 13, 1980 + + + SUBJECT + Radios—Seabury Memorandum to Reagan Transition Staff + +

Paul Seabury has sent me a copy of a brief memorandum he wrote to the + Reagan Transition Staff on the evening of election day recommending an + approach to the RFE/RL–BIB + problem.Printed below. Paul Seabury was + a professor of Political Science at University of California, + Berkeley, and a specialist in foreign policy and + intelligence. Combined with the Freedom House report which + should be released any day now, it gives the new Administration a good + workable set of proposals for coping with this problem which has proved + beyond the capacity of the present Administration.—We have at least + achieved these two results from our otherwise abortive effort to draw + Leo Cherne and Paul Seabury + into radio activities last spring.Henze and Brzezinski contacted Seabury and + Cherne about serving on the BIB + Board in the spring of 1980. See footnote 2, + Document 76. This curiously dialectic process may + in the long run turn out to be more effective than the solution we aimed + at and failed to bring about.

+ +

Attachment

+ +

Memorandum From Paul Seabury of the University of + California, Berkeley, to Monroe Browne of the Ronald Reagan + Transition StaffNo + classification marking.

+ +

Berkeley, California, November 4, 1980

+ + + RE + U.S. OVERSEAS BROADCASTING + +

The new Administration should establish a Presidential Commission to + review and report on the state of U.S. + overseas broadcasting activities. Priority should be given to broadcast + stations targeted on the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe: Radio Liberty + and Radio Free Europe.

+

These stations play an enormously important role by conveying to people + in those areas a continuous and objective view of political and social + reality which their Soviet rulers seek to deny them. As an earlier + Presidential Commission on this subject reported in 1973, the Radios

+ . . . by providing a flow of free information and interpretation, + have enabled the people to whom they broadcast to remain informed and to + judge for themselves which policies may contribute to . . . genuine + improvement of peaceful relations.Presidential Study Commission on International Radio Broadcasting + Report (1973). [Footnote is in the original.] +

Such a review should focus upon three topics: budget, program content, + and administrative oversight. Of the three, the latter is the most + urgent and immediate.

+

Budget. While the stations maintain a high caliber + performance, they have been seriously injured by budget cuts at a time + when inflation and the declining value of the dollar on international + exchange have severely constrained them. This issue is all the more + acute if one assumes the need for a significant expansion of broadcast activities, especially in the Soviet Union and especially + toward minority areas such as Muslim regions.

+

Program content. The popularity and credibility of + RL/RFE in recent years has been due to their high caliber reportage of + news from within the Soviet-dominated world, which is “looped back” in + radio programs. As currently constituted, the radios are not information organs of the U.S. government in the sense that VOA is. They have a special mandate, and the operative + constraint is that their programs are not incompatible + with the aims of U.S. + policy.

+

As evidence of the awesome outward thrust of Soviet power accumulates, + the question now arises as to whether the program content of RL/RFE + should pay greater attention than now to matters directly related to + East-West relations. Soviet domestic propaganda, since the Afghanistan + war began, more than ever has sought to place the blame for increased + international tensions on the West, and the U.S. in particular.

+

Last year, for example, East-West relations were discussed only .8 + percent in Russian and 4 to 10 percent in other languages. Nearly all + news and discussion focusses upon intra-bloc events in the Communist + world. The value of this emphasis is undeniable: the radios provide + reportage on current reality in the world which the listener knows first + hand; they offer a means to make an enlightened comparison between open + and closed societies; they demonstrate through individual experience the + hypocrisy and unreliability which are hallmarks of official + communication in a communist state. In particular, they provide a + crucial feedback look for Samizdat communications + without which dissidents would remain hopelessly isolated.

+

The question now is whether these invaluable functions of the radios + should be supplemented by a more vigorous exploitation of East-West + relations, to countervail Moscow internal propaganda. (This question is + not unrelated to the question of whether current VOA broadcasts to the U.S.S.R. have been (as Solzhenitzyn and + others have charged) vapid and inconsequential.)

+

Oversight. Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty for + twenty years were separate and largely supported by the Central + Intelligence Agency. Now they are funded by Congress and governed by a + Board of Directors composed of private citizens. This board, in turn, + has been overseen since 1973 by a five-member Presidentially appointed + Board for International Broadcasting.

+

This clumsy structure has been an invitation to struggle for the + privilege of supervising the Radios. The reason for this Rube Goldberg arrangement originally was + that, on the one hand, a private board would enhance the credibility of + the Radios, in assuring listeners that they were not CIA + creatures; a Presidential supervisory board, the BIB, would serve to confirm the Radios’ + accountability to Congress.

+

In practice, this oversight structure has led to protracted conflict + between the two boards and to well-confirmed charges that the + Washington-based BIB interferes + constantly in day-to-day operations of the Radios. Both the chairman of + the BIB and the BIB’s staff director have repeatedly made + it clear that they regard such direct supervision as part of their + mandate. Moreover, they have repeatedly exerted pressure, both on + Capitol Hill and in the White House, to block appointments of new board + members not sharing their view of their prerogatives.

+

This impasse cannot be permitted to continue indefinitely. It distracts + the attention of Radio executive personnel from their central tasks, and + has had a demoralizing effect on broadcasting personnel.

+

Thus a Presidential Commission should directly address the question of + ways to resolve this administrative impasse. But the Commission also—by + enlarging its agenda to include the Voice of America—could also chart + new guidelines for U.S. informational + activity overseas for the difficult years of the 1980’s.

+

I wish in closing to draw attention to a detailed report recently + completed by Freedom House on the subject of RL/RFE. This document has + been withheld from publication until after the elections. It was + prepared with the assistance of Leo Cherne, John Richardson, Howland + Sargeant and myself.

+ +
+
+ +
+ + Bulgaria + +
+ 81. Editorial Note + +

On May 12, 1977, Bulgarian Communist Party (BCP) General Secretary + Todor Zhivkov removed + Bulgarian Politburo member Boris Velchev, the putative number two man in + the Bulgarian leadership, from all Party and government posts. Velchev’s + fall came as a surprise to the U.S. + Embassy in Sofia—and to the entire diplomatic community—as he had been + generally regarded as among the most likely to succeed Zhivkov to the leadership when the + Bulgarian leader retired or died. Speculation in Sofia was extensive as + to the reasons for Velchev’s dismissal. The fall was due to a power + struggle between Zhivkov and + Velchev, brought on by policy differences especially on the Macedonia + question. (Telegram 1030 from the Defense Intelligence Agency, May 14, + 1977; National Archives, RG 59, Bureau + of Intelligence and Research, Office of Analysis for the Commonwealth + and Eastern Europe, Office Subject Files 1953–1983, Lot 93D401, Box 10, + Bulgarian Communist Party 1977)

+

In telegram 1004 from Sofia, May 13, the Embassy posited that Velchev’s + firing must have been approved by Moscow, and may be a consequence of + his refusal to agree to a softening of relations with Yugoslavia. + (Ibid.) However, in telegram 1015 from Sofia, May 16, the Embassy + reported its sources “flatly discounted reports” that Velchev’s removal + was caused by differences between him and Zhivkov regarding policy toward Yugoslavia. Velchev’s + removal on May 12 and that of several of his protégées, the Embassy + stated, was a consequence of his refusal to accept a demotion to + Chairman of the National Assembly—a largely honorific position—an offer + made several weeks before the May Plenum, as well as disagreements + regarding appointments in the Party apparatus. (Ibid.)

+

Two new appointees to the BCP Central Committee Secretariat—Dimitur + Stanishev and Petur Dyulgerov—the Embassy reported, further solidified + Zhivkov’s control over the + Bulgarian Party and Government. The new appointees were young, owed + their career and loyalty to Zhivkov, and had no independent power base. They joined + other rising “superstars” of the Central Committee Secretariat—including + newly appointed Minister, Politburo member, and Zhivkov’s daughter, Lyudmila Zhivkova. + (Ibid.)

+
+ +
+ 82. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in + BulgariaSource: National + Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign + Policy File, D770215–1017. Confidential; Immediate. Drafted by + Brown; cleared by Carol + Owens (CU/EE); approved by Andrews. + + + + Washington, June 16, 1977, 2217Z + +

140378. Subject: Zhivkova Visit—Conclusion. Ref: State 138102.In telegram 138102 to Sofia, June 16, the Department + reported on Zhivkova’s visits to New York for the opening of the + Thracian Gold exhibit at the Metropolitan Museum of Art, to San + Francisco, and to Los Angeles as well as her first days in + Washington. (National Archives, RG + 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770212–1000)

+

1. Remainder of Washington tour was as impressive as first leg of visit. + Highlight was Zhivkova’s attendance (accompanied by interpreter only) at + White House reception for American artists afternoon of June 14. Mme. + Zhivkova was on time (a first during the visit), and was escorted from + the West Wing into the Reception Room by Vice President and Mrs. + Mondale. She met with + several artists and cultural leaders and was introduced to the President + and Mrs. Carter by Assistant Secretary (CU) Duffey.On August 31 Carter + signed a letter thanking Zhivkova for her gift of a book entitled + The Kazanluk Tomb. (Carter Library, White + House Central Files, Countries, Box CO–13, CO 24 + 1/20/77–1/20/81) Zhivkova told the President her trip was + very well organized and she was enjoying it very much. She thanked him + for the opportunity of bringing the Thracian exhibit to the US and + signing the US-Bulgarian cultural agreement.In telegram 136816 to Sofia, June 13, the Department reported that + the United States and Bulgaria signed a Comprehensive Agreement on + Exchanges and Cooperation in Cultural, Scientific, Educational, and + Technological fields in Washington. Assistant Secretary of State for + Educational and Cultural Affairs Joseph D. Duffey signed the + agreement on behalf of the United States. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + D770211–0386) The President responded by saying he was happy + she was able to visit this country and asked Zhivkova to give his best + wishes to “her father.” Clearly pleased, she said she hoped the + President would visit Bulgaria “soon.” Next day’s Post and Star style + sections reported on reception noting about 70 attended, including + Warhol, Wyeth, Nancy Hanks, several art critics and collectors, and + others, including Johnny Cash. Mme. Zhivkova’s presence was not + reported.

+ +

2. Prior to White House reception Zhivkova and party toured and were + visibly impressed by Air and Space Museum, Hirshhorn, and National + Gallery. Informal and enjoyable luncheon hosted by National Gallery + curator was in special area of gallery restaurant, where Zhivkova + enjoyed exceptionally large chocolate sundae. Musical extravaganza at Wolf Trap called “Fat Tuesday” + about New Orleans at Mardi Gras time was enjoyed by all and was not + marred by expected rain. Zhivkova, however, preferred Ibsen.

+

3. June 15 schedule was less hectic, with call on Acting Secretary + Christopher at 10:15 (being + reported septel).See Document 83. + Noon tour of Library of Congress and luncheon with Daniel Boorstin, and + afternoon of shopping. Boorstin agreed to put on exhibit of Bulgarian + manuscripts at some date in near future which pleased Bulgarians very + much. Evening reception hosted by Popov at Shoreham Americana Hotel (to which Zhivkova + arrived one-half hour late) was attended by Ambassador Reinhardt, Assistant Secretary + Vest, Nancy Hanks and about + 200 others (including several Bulgarian Orthodox priests, a first at an + Eastern European reception here as far as we are aware). Nothing was + scheduled morning of June 16 beyond last-minute shopping for educational + toys. Zhivkova, Damyanov, Minekov and Petrov were seen off at Dulles by + EUR/EE Director Andrews at 12:45 p.m. for Concorde + transatlantic flight. Others were taking jumbo jet later in the day.

+

4. Entire visit went quite smoothly, and Zhivkova was clearly impressed + by the program, the level of reception the hospitality and the + “attention” paid her. Generally speaking, she did not have much of + substance to discuss (memcons with + Reinhardt and some others + being pouched) and did not herself raise matters outside her area of + responsibility. We learned from interpreter, however, that Zhivkova + regarded meeting with Acting Secretary as extremely valuable and + substantive. In any event, we believe the Zhivkova visit has given + impetus to the relationship—the degree to which it will really help + depends on Zhivkova’s report on her return to Bulgaria and on the + Bulgarian ability and will to take specific measures to improve our + relations.

+ + Christopher + +
+ +
+ 83. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in + BulgariaSource: National + Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign + Policy File, D770216–0295. Confidential; Priority. Drafted by + Brown; cleared by + Andrews; approved by + Oxman. + + + + Washington, June 16, 1977, 2218Z + +

140379. Subject: Zhivkova Call on Acting Secretary Christopher.

+

1. Mme Zhikova, accompanied by Ambassadors Popov and Damyanov and interpreter, called on Acting + Secretary June 15 for half hour discussion. Bulgarian TV crew filmed her + arrival and the first few minutes of meeting.

+

2. Following usual courtesies, the Acting Secretary expressed pleasure + over presence in New York of Thracian exhibit and signing of + Cultural/Scientific Exchanges Agreement. He hoped that these events + would presage more exhibits and exchanges, not only in the cultural but + also the scientific field. Zhikova responded that the Bulgarian side was + also gratified by the exhibit and signing. She pointed out that from her + viewpoint the exhibit opening and the agreement signing were not pure + coincidence, and expressed hope that future exchanges will maintain the + same high moral and spiritual standards as symbolized by the Thracian + treasures exhibit.

+

3. The Acting Secretary expressed USG + appreciation to the GOB for its + assistance in resolving divided families cases. He noted that the + reunification of families has not only personal importance to the + individuals involved but symbolic importance for our bilateral + relations. The Acting Secretary specifically expressed thanks for the + resolution of the difficult Marev case.In + 1967, Spas Iordanov Marev and his wife, Ivanka Atanasova Mareva, + defected while on vacation in Istanbul, leaving behind two + daughters, ages 1 and 3. After making their way to the United + States, the Marevs petitioned the Bulgarian Government repeatedly to + allow the children to join them but their requests were denied. In + August 1976, the Marevs began a public protest in front of the + Department of State demanding the reunification of their family. + (Telegram 201670 to Sofia, August 13, 1976; National Archives, + RG 59, Central Foreign Policy + File, D760313–0543). On February 16, Christopher met with Bulgarian Ambassador to the + United States Popov and + stressed the importance of resolving the Marev case quickly. Given + the “interest to both Secretary Vance and himself” in the case, Christopher told Popov that a “very heavy burden + would be placed on US-Bulgarian relations if this case continued.” + (Telegram 38061 to Sofia, February 18; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + D770060–0003) The imminent visit of Lyudmila Zhivkova added + additional pressure, and the Bulgarian Government agreed to allow + the children to emigrate by the end of May. (Telegram 1144 from + Sofia, May 31; National Archives, RG + 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770193–0336; telegram 1223 from + Sofia, June 7; National Archives, RG + 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770202–0751; and telegram 1316 + from Sofia, June 17; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + D770216–1183) Zhivkova stated that she was happy to note the + positive development of US-Bulgarian relations in recent years. She was certain that + relations will continue to follow an ascending line, and stated that we + have a duty as nations to compensate for what has been missed in + bilateral relations thus far. The Acting Secretary assured her that the + US would do what it could to improve relations.

+

4. The Acting Secretary broached East-West relations, noting that the US + is actively working on detente with the USSR, which has importance for the atmosphere of US-Eastern + European, and specifically US-Bulgarian, relations. He expressed hope + for progress in relations with Moscow. Zhivkova agreed that a working + relationship between the superpowers is the only reasonable alternative + and will define the world’s future. She said she rejected the notion + advanced by “some specialists” that by curbing arms and military + technology we curb the development of science. She emphasized that human + progress can be a reality only when all resources are focussed on the + development of humanity in general and the “individual” in + particular.

+

5. Ambassador Popov interjected a + question about MFN.While Poland, Romania, and Yugoslavia all enjoyed + MFN status, Bulgaria’s + prospects were dim. PD–21, which expanded the differentiation to + include internal liberalization (thus allowing for the extension of + MFN status to Hungary) placed + Bulgaria, together with Czechoslovakia and the German Democratic + Republic, among the countries where no favorable trade benefits + would be extended until concrete steps toward a more independent + foreign or domestic policy were undertaken. See Document 16. The Acting Secretary noted that he + had no news to report on MFN front, but + pointed out that overall developments, and improving relations, can + facilitate progress in that field also. He added that the MFN issue is rooted in the + administration’s relations with Congress. Zhivkova noted her belief that + intensified cultural relations will lead to improved relations in other + areas as well.

+

6. The Acting Secretary agreed that an exchange of peoples and ideas can + influence commercial ties. In that regard, he noted that he may attend + the main Belgrade Conference on CSCE + follow-up. He explained that the US attaches great importance to + implementation of the Final Act, and gives equal weight to each of the + Baskets. The US has no intention of provoking a confrontation and does + not wish to put any one “in the dock” in Belgrade, but seeks a careful + review and assessment of progress under the Final Act. He hoped that the + GOB would regard the approach as + constructive. Zhivkova stated that the GOB would make a statement at Belgrade on the importance of + examining all three Baskets. She noted that the Third Basket now seemed + the most “popular”, but asserted that “Basket Three will remain empty if + Basket One and Two are not filled.”

+ +

7. Zhivkova ended discussion by extending her gratitude for the + hospitality and attention which she and her delegation had + received.Setting up Zhivkova’s visit + presented the Department with the challenge of finding an + appropriate host, given her official cabinet-level position of + Director of the Committee of Art and Culture and her unofficial + status as daughter of Todor + Zhivkov. (Telegram 289982 to Sofia, November 26, + 1976; National Archives, RG 59, + Central Foreign Policy File, D760440–0718) In telegram 760 from + Sofia, April 13, the Embassy cautioned that failing to find an + appropriate host would turn the prospective visit “from an asset in + our relations to a liability.” “Without wishing to be alarmist” the + Embassy continued, “there exists potential for a needlessly + embarrassing incident if Mrs. Zhivkova were to decline the + invitation to come to Washington from New York because of the manner + in which we had ‘invited’ her without taking into account her status + in the power structure of her country.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + D770129–0473) On May 6, the Department informed the Embassy that + Nancy Hanks, Chairwoman of the National Endowment for the Arts, + would act as the official host, and that Mrs. Mondale was prepared to receive + Zhivkova at the White House. (Telegram 104082 to Sofia, May 6; + National Archives, RG 59, Central + Foreign Policy File, D770160–0424) She noted that regardless + of the brevity of her visit she has a sufficient impression of the US to + know that she will continue to work towards improved relations. Acting + Secretary expressed US pleasure over the visit, passed Secretary + Vance’s greetings to + Zhivkova, and said that both he and the Secretary appreciate the real + contribution Zhivkova has made to US-Bulgarian relations.

+ + Christopher + +
+ +
+ 84. Telegram From the Embassy in Bulgaria to the Department of + StateSource: National + Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign + Policy File, D780309–1109. Confidential. Sent for information to + USUN. + + + + Sofia, July + 27, 1978, 1200Z + +

1511. Subject: Secvisit: 33rd UNGA. + Ref: State 184758.Telegram 184758 to all + diplomatic posts, July 21, requested that the Department be informed + of the level, dates, and duration of attendance of high-level + delegations to the 33rd + UNGA. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + D780301–0764)

+

1. As we have earlier reported Foreign Minister (and Politburo member) + Petur Mladenov plans to + attend the UNGA in New York September + 25–28.In telegram 183096 to Sofia, July + 19, the Department reported to the Embassy that on July 13 Himmirsky + informed the Department that Mladenov would travel to New York for the UNGA and “would like to meet with the + Secretary between September 25 and September 28.” Himmirsky also + said that, if the Secretary “were not in New York but were available + in Washington during that period, Mladenov would be willing to see him in Washington.” + The Department reiterated its support for such a meeting, but + stressed that the Secretary’s schedule for New York had not been + finalized. (National Archives, RG + 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780297–0352) The discussion + created the impression on the Bulgarian side that a meeting between + the two Ministers had been agreed on. (Telegram 1436 from Sofia, + July 18; National Archives, RG 59, + Central Foreign Policy File, D780295–1104) On July 27, Garthoff + reported that he had clarified “that the proposed Mladenov-Vance meeting in September was not + fully and finally set.” “We are off the hook” he continued, but + concluded that “I am sure Mladenov is counting on the meeting. I of course + strongly hope and expect that the meeting will take place.” + (Telegram 1510 from Sofia, July 27; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + D780309–1097) Further details will be provided later.

+

2. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs has specifically requested a meeting + between Mladenov and Secretary + Vance. The Bulgarians have + also indicated, here and in Washington, that if a meeting in New York is + not feasible at that time, Mladenov would appreciate a meeting in Washington.

+

3. Embassy strongly recommends that the Secretary see Mladenov. Mladenov is the only Eastern European Foreign Minister + who has not had an opportunity to meet with the Secretary. Moreover, + gradually improving Bulgarian-American relations and expressed Bulgarian + official interest in + consideration for MFN on the basis of + existing American legislation make such a meeting very much in US + interest.In telegram 1870 from Sofia, + September 8, Garthoff again recommended a meeting between Vance and Mladenov at the UNGA and forwarded the Bulgarian + request for a response by September 15. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + D780367–0620) In telegram 231290 to Sofia, September 12, the + Department informed the Embassy that the Vance-Mladenov meeting had not been approved. (National + Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign + Policy File, D780371–0734) On September 13, the Department informed + the Embassy that “the chances of such a meeting would be virtually + nil even with another strong recommendation from the Ambassador” and + that Nimetz would be willing + to meet with the Foreign Minister sometime between September 26 and + 28. (Telegram 232045 to Sofia, September 13; National Archives, + RG 59, Central Foreign Policy + File, D780372–1226) In telegram 1934 from Sofia, September 15, + Garthoff reported that “Tsvetkov was visibly crestfallen” at being told that + a bilateral with Vance was + not possible and turned down a meeting between Nimetz and Mladenov. (National Archives, + RG 59, Central Foreign Policy + File, D780375–0992)

+

4. Embassy has no indication of likely Bulgarian Chief of State or Head + of Government attendance at UNGA, and + considers it unlikely. Without raising the question, we will of course + report any change in this situation.

+ + Garthoff + +
+ +
+ 85. Telegram From the Embassy in Bulgaria to the Department of + StateSource: National + Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign + Policy File, D770270–1157. Confidential. Sent for information to + Belgrade, East Berlin, Bucharest, Budapest, Moscow, Prague, and + Warsaw. Herz also met with Todor + Zhivkov on June 28. (Telegram 1634 from Sofia, July + 29; National Archives, RG 59, + Central Foreign Policy File, D770272–0120) + + + + Sofia, July + 28, 1977, 1335Z + +

1630. Belgrade also for CSCE + Del. Subject: Exit Interview With the + Foreign Minister. Ref: A) State 167342;In + telegram 167342 to Sofia, July 18, the Department instructed + Ambassador Herz not to raise the issue of a new chancellery site + with Zhivkov during his + farewell call on the Bulgarian leader. Rather, Herz was to commend + the Bulgarian leader for improvements on family reunification cases + and express appreciation for the success of the Zhivkova visit to + the United States. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + D770256–0629) B) State 153477;In + telegram 153477, July 1, sent to posts in countries that were part + of the UN Committee on + Decolonization (Committee of 24), the Department expressed the hope + that a vote on Puerto Rican independence may be avoided in 1977. + (National Archives, RG 59, Central + Foreign Policy File, D770235–0100) C) Sofia 1246;On June 10, the Embassy in Sofia reported in + telegram 1246 that the Bulgarian Government had informed its + Consulates in the United States that all affidavits of support for + Bulgarian citizens wishing to travel to the United States would no + longer be acceptable unless notarized by the Bulgarian Embassy in + Washington. The Embassy reported that it had informed the Foreign + Ministry that such policy would contravene Article 35 of the + Consular Convention the two countries signed in April 1974. + (National Archives, RG 59, Central + Foreign Policy File, D770207–0700) D) Sofia 1580;The Embassy reported in telegram 1580 from Sofia, + July 21, the talking points Ambassador Herz planned to raise with + Bulgarian Foreign Minister Mladenov in his upcoming conversation. As part of + the discussion, Herz informed the Department, he planned to present + Mladenov with a list of + unresolved cases of family reunification. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + D770259–0995) E) State 175102;In + telegram 175102 to Sofia, July 26, the Department instructed the + Ambassador to stress with Zhivkov and Mladenov the “many bilateral US-Bulgarian exchanges + on CSCE implementation [which] + have proved mutually beneficial.” Herz was also instructed to + emphasize with the Bulgarian leadership the “importance we attach to + further bilateral efforts to implement the Final Act” before the + main CSCE meeting in Belgrade. + (National Archives, RG 59, Central + Foreign Policy File, D770266–1272) E) State 153477;See footnote 3 + above. F) Sofia 1455.In telegram + 1455 from Sofia, July 7, the Embassy reported that it had delivered + the Puerto Rico démarche to the Bulgarian Government and that it had + thanked Bulgaria for the helpful role it “(claims to have) played” + on the question in 1976. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + D770242–1011)

+

1. In accordance with instructions, I used farewell protocol call on + Foreign Minister Mladenov July 27 + for review of some pending bilateral matters and especially of CSCE implementation. Ambassador Gotsev, Chief of Fourth Department, + attended. In view of nature of the occasion, Mladenov was extremely affable and (with exception of + complaint about MFN “discrimination”) gave positive or + soft responses to all points which required responses. He did not, for + instance, in connection with CSCE + Basket III discussion, refer to RFE.

+

2. In discussing bilateral relations I began with positive comments on + family unification authorized ref A, remarking I would return to that + subject in connection with CSCE. I + noted recent positive developments such as Zhivkova visit, opening of + Thracian exhibit in New York, and prospects for agricultural cooperation + exemplified by Shopov visit. Then I referred pointedly to Puerto Rico + issue (ref B and F), noting that within its possibilities Bulgaria had + tried to be helpful last year on a subject we regard as internal US + matter, and therefore one which could have disturbing effect on our + relations. I also referred in positive terms to Bulgarian willingness to + enter into early negotiations with Bondholders Protective Council.

+

3. Next I took occasion to follow up on the demarche with Vice Minister + Tsvetkov (ref C) on subject + of authentication of documents, explaining (when Mladenov said he “had not seen my + note”) that we had not yet made any formal representations because we + simply could not believe that Bulgaria would place itself deliberately + in violation of our consular agreement. I had to bring this matter to + Mladenov’s attention because + my friendly demarche to Tsvetkov + June 9 had been without effect and recently some affidavit + authentications by our Consul had again been refused. It would be + unfortunate if my successor as one of his first items of business had to + charge Bulgaria with breach of an international agreement. Mladenov undertook to look into matter + immediately, saying Bulgaria always scrupulously fulfills its + international obligations.

+

4. Next I presented verbatim the remarks on CSCE as per para 2 ref E, + with one change: Instead of saying “We believe further implementation + efforts on your part will contribute towards creation of a more positive + atmosphere at the main meeting” I said “We believe further + implementation on your part and our part”, to remove note of + sanctimoniousness and possible impression of arrogance contained in the + original phrase, and particularly because there are further positive + steps which we intend to take and to which I was later able to refer. + Mladenov clearly took in the + link between our desire for “constructive and non-polemical” meeting and + need for more Bulgarian efforts at implementation.

+

5. Going into specifics I said on divided families that while great + strides had been made, there remain some cases of urgent humanitarian + concern (ref D) where delay or inaction must be due to misunderstandings + or administrative mix-ups. I then handed Mladenov two lists, one containing seven “approved” + cases from the 1975 list which for various reasons are stymied, the + other containing fourteen new cases. I singled out one case from each list to illustrate the + varied nature of difficulties. Mladenov said categorically that any difficulties must + be administrative since the political decision had been taken to let + such people go.

+

6. In this connection, Mladenov + made a rather revealing remark about the Marev case which, he said, had + required an extraordinary effort because of “existing laws and + regulations”. He had had to have personal discussions with the Minister + of Justice and the “Attorney General” and since the laws did not allow + the case to be resolved expeditiously, “we had to make some alterations” + in order that such “private cases” should not impair relations. (I read + this to mean that with Mladenov’s + help the party overrode the Ministries of Interior and Justice.)

+

7. Next I referred to what more we might do in the field of visits, in + accordance with para 3 (a) ref E, + followed by remarks about Basket II as per ref D,In telegram 1580 from Sofia, July 21, the Embassy + reported that with respect to Basket II, “much remains to be done” + and “restrictions on appointments and access remain significant + problems and greatly hamper trade expansion.” (National Archives, + RG 59, Central Foreign Policy + File, D770259–0995) and remarks about deficiencies in Basket + III implementation, notably with regard to publications (despite the + cosmetic changes made by the Bulgarians), also as per ref D. Finally I + said that with respect to facilitation of travel we are currently + carefully considering steps we might take to reciprocally facilitate + both private and official travel, as per para 3 (b) ref E.Telegram + 175102 to Sofia, July 26, instructed Ambassador Herz to “limit your + remarks to statement that USG is + currently carefully considering steps we might take to reciprocally + facilitate both private and official travel.” (National Archives, + RG 59, Central Foreign Policy + File, D770266–1272)

+

8. The positive remarks that Mladenov made in reply were of the kind suitable to the + occasion of leave-taking. He thought it was fair to say that “never, + since World War II” have relations between Bulgaria and the US been + better. (Comment: This is of course not saying much since for ten years + they were worse than with any EE country + other than Albania, and the Bulgarians began moving toward normalization + only about four years ago, probably at the prodding of the + Russians.)

+

9. On CSCE, Mladenov said he welcomed our statement about the + utility of bilateral consultations and of our general attitude toward + the main Belgrade meeting. In usual manner he stressed Basket I, + admitted shortcomings in Basket II (“not everything can be rectified + immediately”) but counter-charged with respect to MFN; and with respect to Basket III said: + “We are making progress on divided families, but do not think they are + the main content of Basket III.” He said Bulgaria is not unconcerned about Basket III, and + what I had said under instructions would be given full + consideration.

+

10. Then he said something of a more general nature. He reminded me that + in recently expressing thanks (at Ruse) for hospitality shown to his + daughter, Zhivkov had talked to + me not as President but “as a father”. If existing “discriminations” + could be removed (MFN), he foresaw a + much higher level of interchanges of all sorts, not only in business; + and he felt that contacts during the last three years had served to + remove many misunderstandings and demonstrated that good things can come + from high Bulgarian and American officials meeting and talking + together.

+

11. I interpret this last remark to mean that the Bulgarians, while not + wishing to be too explicit for fear of a rebuff, are looking for some + sort of high-level contact between Zhivkov and the President or between Secretary Vance and Zhivkov. Zhivkov + has several times referred favorably to his “meetings with President + Ford” at HelsinkiZhivkov met with President Ford + during the signing ceremonies for the Helsinki Accords. (Telegram + 1989 from Sofia, September 13, 1975; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + D750318–0459) (where there was only the most perfunctory + contact), and there is no question in my mind that he and Mladenov are eager for the kind of + legitimation that such a real meeting would involve. At the same time, + they also have in mind the occasions, which still rankle, when President + Ford and his Secretary of State visited Belgrade and Bucharest, + practically overflying Bulgaria, without stopping here.President Ford visited Bucharest and Belgrade + following the signing of the Helsinki Accords August 2–3, 1975, and + August 3–4, 1975, respectively. In Romania he met with President + Ceausescu. In Yugoslavia + he met with President Tito + and Prime Minister Bijedic. + See Foreign + Relations, 1969–1976, vol. E–15, Part 1, Documents on + Eastern Europe, 1973–1976, Documents 36–38 and 73–74.

+

12. This is my reading of the Bulgarian attitude. As for our own + interest, there are two aspects: one is what we might expect to get out + of a high-level visit here. Certainly we cannot expect any substantial + change in Bulgaria’s overall orientation. The other aspect is more + complicated. It is not that the Bulgarians have anything urgent to talk + with us about at a high level, but they know that their country is the + only one in Europe with which we maintain diplomatic relations that has + not been visited by an American President, Vice President or Secretary + of State. So the second aspect involves, in their view, the removal of + what they see as a “discrimination”.

+

13. I think it would be inappropriate for me to make a recommendation on + this matter so shortly before my departure from Sofia. One thing, + however, I can recommend. Foreign Minister Mladenov will be at the UNGA starting September 25. I believe it would be helpful + in getting my successor off to + a good start here if Secretary Vance could reserve a quarter hour for a bilateral with + Mladenov in New York.

+ + Herz + +
+ +
+ 86. Editorial Note +

On September 7, 1978, Georgi Markov, a Bulgarian playwright and defector + who worked as a broadcaster for the British Broadcasting Corporation + Bulgarian language service and with Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty was + taken to hospital after collapsing in Central London. From his hospital + bed, Markov reported that while waiting for a bus on Waterloo Bridge, he + felt a sharp pain in his thigh, turned around, and saw a man picking up + an umbrella and quickly walking away. (Telegram 232700 to Sofia, London, + and Munich September 14; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780373–1039) Markov + died three days later in a London hospital. Following another similar + attempt on Vladimir Kostov, a Bulgarian dissident in Paris, Markov’s + body was exhumed and his death was declared a homicide. (Telegram 14971 + from London, September 15; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780379–0009) The + Embassy in Bulgaria was informed on October 11 that the Central + Intelligence Agency had advised the Department of State that the method + of delivery of the poison in the Markov and Kostov cases was identical. + (Telegram 257014 to Sofia, October 11; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + D780415–0915) The pellet used in the Kostov attempt was recovered + intact.

+

Speculation on Bulgarian Secret Police involvement was rife in the + Western press. The Bulgarian Government made several protests over + treatment of Bulgaria in the media in the United Kingdom, Italy, the + Federal Republic of Germany, and Spain. Bulgarian Foreign Minister + Mladenov raised the issue + with British Minister of State for Foreign Affairs Lord + Goronwy-Roberts, when he + visited Bulgaria. (Telegram 2268 from Sofia, October 27; National + Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy + File, D780444–0578)

+

In his book Spymaster, former KGB General Oleg + Kalugin alleged that the Bulgarian Secret Police requested help from the + KGB for the Markov assassination on direct orders from Bulgarian General + Secretary Todor Zhivkov. Kalugin + suggested that it was the KGB who developed the ricin poison, the + delivery method, and trained the Bulgarians in the use of the umbrella + weapon. (pages. 203–212)

+
+ +
+ 87. Telegram From the Embassy in Bulgaria to the Department of + StateSource: National + Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign + Policy File, D780451–0481. Confidential; Limdis. + + + Sofia, November 1, 1978, 1000Z + +

3204. Subject: Markov Affair and Bulgarian-American Relations.

+

1. In a frank discussion at a private luncheon meeting, the Ambassador + noted to Ambassador Gotsev, head + of the MFA Fourth Dept (who will be + accompanying Deputy Foreign Minister Tsvetkov to the US), that the Markov affair had + generated real disquiet and concern in Washington. He noted that during + his recent consultations the subject repeatedly arose and weighed quite + negatively against other positive achievements in improving + Bulgarian-American relations.

+

2. Gotsev was very attentive and + reacted principally by sober silence. He asked whether it had influenced + the decision not to hold a meeting of Foreign Minister Mladenov with Secretary Vance. The Ambassador replied that he + did not know what considerations Secretary Vance might have had in mind, and that there were real + scheduling problems, but that he did know that the matter did figure in + the consideration of some senior officials who may have had a voice in + the decision that a Vance-Mladenov + meeting could not be arranged at this time.In telegram 284347 to Sofia, the Department commended Garthoff for + “the deft manner in which the Ambassador discussed this matter with + Gotsev” and suggested + that officials in Washington “plan to mention it to Tsvetkov in similar fashion during + his visit.” (National Archives, RG + 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780461–1109) + Gotsev made no comments on either + the Markov affair itself nor on American or other Western press + treatment of it, in marked constraint to earlier reported protests to + several Western countries over press reactions.In telegram 2268 from Sofia, October 27, the Embassy + reported that Bulgarian officials complained to the British, + Italian, and West German Governments over press treatment of + Bulgaria regarding the Markov affair. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + D780444–0578)

+ + Garthoff + +
+ +
+ 88. Briefing Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for + European Affairs (Vest) to the + Counselor of the Department of State (Nimetz)Source: + National Archives, RG 59, Bureau of + European Affairs, Office of Eastern European Affairs, Bulgaria Desk, + Personal Files of Retired Ambassador to Bulgaria, Raymond L. + Garthoff (1960–1980), Lot 80D218, Box 1, Bilateral US-Bulgaria + Relations. Confidential. Drafted by Glenn; cleared by Schmidt, Gilmore, Fried, Brown, and Kaplan. A handwritten notation indicates + that the meeting was rescheduled from November 15 to November 14. + This copy of the briefing memorandum is not initialed by Vest and there is no indication + that Nimetz saw it. The + conversation, which was reported to the Embassy in telegram 293671 + to Sofia, November 18, covered the situation in Cyprus and + Bulgarian-Yugoslav relations. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + D780476–0141). Tabs A and B are attached but not + printed. + + + Washington, undated + + + SUBJECT + Your Meeting with Bulgarian Deputy Foreign Minister, Boris Tsvetkov, Wednesday, November + 14, 4:45 p.m. + + + PARTICIPANTS + + + US + The Counselor + Ira Wolf, C + Carl W. Schmidt + Director, EUR/EE + James H. Glenn + (Notetaker) EUR/EE + + + + + + BULGARIA + Deputy Foreign Minister Boris + Tsvetkov (phonetic: tsVETkawv) + Director, Department IV, Ministry of Foreign Affairs + Lyuben Gotsev + (phonetic: GOTTseff) + Ambassador to the United States Konstantin Grigorov + (phonetic: greeGORov) + First Secretary of Embassy Krassin Himmirsky (phonetic: + heMEERskee) (Interpreter) + + + + +

BACKGROUND

+

Bulgarian Deputy Foreign Minister Boris + Tsvetkov is visiting Washington from November 14–17 at + the invitation of Assistant Secretary Vest.Vest invited Tsvetkov to visit the United States + on May 10 for consultations on bilateral and international issues, + to include discussions on CSCE. + (Telegram 119286 to Sofia, May 10; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + D780199–1196) While in Washington, Tsvetkov also met with Vest (telegram 292505 to Sofia, November 18; + National Archives, RG 59, Central + Foreign Policy File, D780475–0128), and Lake (telegram 306650 to Sofia, December 5; National + Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign + Policy File, D780500–0999). A brief protocol meeting with Christopher dealing with family + reunification cases took place on November 15. (Telegram 291363 to + Sofia, November 16; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + D780472–1005) + Tsvetkov is one of six Deputy + Foreign Ministers. He is responsible for relations with the United + States, Western Europe, and Canada as well as international + organizations, disarmament matters, and economic affairs. Tsvetkov will meet briefly with the Deputy Secretary and + hold talks with a number of officials in the Department and other + executive agencies. (His schedule is at Tab A) Biographic sketches of + Tsvetkov and the other + Bulgarian participants in the meeting are at Tab B.

+

KEY ISSUES

+

1. International Issues

+

Essential Factors—Although significant Bulgarian + foreign policy decisions are fully coordinated with Moscow, it is our + policy and interest to treat Bulgaria as a sovereign state responsible + for its own actions. Tsvetkov + will be interested in your comments on US-Soviet relations, SALT, and Cyprus, which the Bulgarians + regard as essentially an extension of the Balkans. You may wish to ask + him about Bulgarian-Soviet relations and the situation in the Balkans + including recent Bulgarian approaches to Albania.

+

Bulgaria and the USSR remain the + closest of allies, but lately we have received indications that the + USSR may have decided to curtail + substantially its former ample subsidization of the Bulgarian economy. + Bulgaria participated in the first Inter-Balkan Conference in Athens in + 1976, but since then has refused, presumably at Soviet behest, to agree + to a second multilateral meeting.In telegram + 2553 from Sofia, December 23, 1977, Garthoff suggested that, even in + the absence of Soviet opposition to a multilateral Balkan + conference, Sofia was not interested in participating in such a + meeting. (National Archives, RG 59, + Central Foreign Policy File, D770479–0959) The Embassy in Bucharest + agreed. Ambassador Aggrey + noted after a discussion with Romanian Deputy Foreign Minister + Vasile Glica: The Bulgarians “have entered specific reservations + about multilateral cooperation in CSCE context, and expressed view that issues and + problems between Balkan states should be discussed on bilateral + basis.” (Telegram 9237 from Bucharest, December 28, 1977; National + Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign + Policy File, D770483–0926) Taking the line that Balkan + problems can best be resolved on a bilateral basis, the Bulgarians have + recently exchanged high-level visits with Greece, Turkey, and Romania. + Bulgarian-Yugoslav relations continue to be strained over the Macedonian + issue. Since the PRC stopped economic + aid to Albania last July, Bulgarian propaganda has focused selectively + on Albanian condemnation of the PRC + while ignoring continued Albanian vilification of the USSR. Recently, Bulgaria has indicated to + Albania that it would welcome closer relations, but Albania apparently + fears that Bulgaria is acting simply as a Soviet stalking horse.

+

Points to be Made

+

—US-Soviet relations—Our relationship is basically + competitive, but both sides recognize the need to avoid deterioration + and to expand areas of mutually beneficial cooperation.

+ +

—SALT—Differences between the US and Soviet positions have + been narrowed over time. Nevertheless, some distance between us still + exists on key issues. We cannot predict when a SALT agreement will be signed.

+

—Cyprus—We believe that the Cyprus problem must be + resolved under UN auspices by the + parties directly involved, the Greek and Turkish Cypriots.

+

—We support UN + SYG Waldheim in his efforts to mediate + the dispute and will help him in every possible way.

+

—Bulgarian-Soviet Relations—How would you + characterize the present Soviet view of E–W relations?

+

—Balkan Cooperation—What is your Government doing + to enhance the multilateral project for cooperation in the Balkans?

+

—Albania—What direction do you think Albania’s + foreign relations will take now that the Chinese have ended their + economic aid?

+

2. Bilateral Relations

+

Essential Factors—Since the advent of detente, + improvement in US-Bulgarian relations has occurred. We have negotiated a + number of agreements with the Bulgarian Government, and several + high-level visits have taken place, including visits by the Secretaries + of Commerce and Agriculture.The last U.S. Cabinet-level official to visit + Sofia was Secretary of Agriculture Butz in 1976. Progress has + been made in resolving divided family cases, although markedly less in + the past year. Now, however, the GOB + appears to be attempting to cut off further discussions of divided + family questions with the US and other Western embassies. On November 9 + our Embassy was told that there are no outstanding humanitarian issues + facing the GOB and that the Foreign + Ministry will accept for discussion only cases involving US citizen + sponsors and spouses and minor children (defined as under 16) of US + citizens.

+

Last summer the Bulgarian Government retained a New York law firm to + advise it on what it would have to do to obtain MFN. The firm’s report may have sobered Bulgarian + expectations somewhat. Tsvetkov + may allude to MFN although the + Bulgarians do not wish to appear in Moscow to be taking an initiative. + Our position is that we would be prepared to discuss the process for + obtaining MFN in detail with GOB officials, should they be interested + in such discussions.

+

The GOB has been unable or unwilling to + assist Embassy Sofia effectively in finding another chancery site. The + lease on the present building expired last June, and the GOB has informed the Embassy that it must + move as soon as possible. Thus far, the Bulgarian Government has not shown an acceptable new + building or site to the Embassy. We have informed Ambassador Grigorov + that we expect substantially better cooperation from the GOB on the chancery problem before we will + sign a lease for two lots in the Van Ness Center which the Bulgarians + have selected as a new chancery site.

+

Points to be Made

+

—The resolution of divided family cases will be extremely important in + determining the extent to which we will be able to continue to improve + relations. This issue has considerable resonance in the American public + and the Congress. We urge you to cooperate with us in the speedy + resolution of the remaining cases, especially the Slavova case. (This + case involves the wife and children of Atanas Slavov, a Bulgarian emigre + writer who lives in New York City.)

+

—Our Embassy has not received much cooperation from Bulgarian Government + officials in resolving the chancery problem. We, on the other hand, have + materially assisted Ambassador Grigorov in his attempts to find a new + chancery site here. We believe such cooperation must proceed on a + reciprocal basis.

+

—(If Tsvetkov raises MFN) We do not believe that the + possibilities for increased trade under present conditions have been + exhausted. We would be prepared to discuss our requirements for granting + MFN tariff status and how they + might apply to Bulgaria. N.B. Mr. Vest will deal with the question of the recent attacks + on Bulgarian emigres employed by BBC and RFE in a separate meeting with Mr. Tsvetkov.Vest raised the Markov + affair privately, at the end of his meeting with Tsvetkov. He expressed Washington’s + concern over the incident and urged the Bulgarian Government to + cooperate fully with the investigation. (Telegram 294433 to Sofia, + November 21; National Archives, RG + 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780479–0881)

+
+ +
+ 89. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in + BulgariaSource: National + Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign + Policy File, D780499–0186. Confidential. Drafted by Glenn and Gilmore; cleared by + Schmidt; approved by + Vest. + + + + Washington, December 3, 1978, 2024Z + +

305798. Subject: (C) Assessment of Tsvetkov Visit.

+

1. (C-entire text)

+

2. Immediate benefits. The most immediate benefits of Tsvetkov’s visit were the clarification + of each side’s position on various issues and the establishment of + personal contact between officials of the two foreign affairs + establishments.Tsvetkov participated in two + roundtable discussions at the Department. The first, chaired by + Vest, discussed + international issues, in particular détente and the CSCE process, but also disarmament, + the Middle East, and U.S. + normalization of relations with the People’s Republic of China. The + second roundtable, chaired by Vine, discussed Southern Africa and + Balkan developments, as well as bilateral relations, trade, chancery + sites, and divided families. The Department reported the discussions + in telegram 291476 to Sofia, November 16. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + D780472–1195) Both sides gained a clearer understanding of + each other’s terms for improving relations, i.e., the importance we + attach to progress in resolving divided families cases and the + importance the GOB attaches to improved + economic relations (the “spine” of bilateral relations, to cite the word + Tsvetkov used at Commerce) + and to simultaneous progress in all aspects of relations. Such progress, + Tsvetkov implied, would + assist in the resolution of divided family cases. The fact that a Deputy + Foreign Minister had talks in Washington was also a symbolic plus for + the GOB.

+

3. Closer consultations—The GOB clearly + desires closer consultations as indicated by Tsvetkov’s invitation to Vest to visit Sofia within the year and Tsvetkov’s apparent approval of a visit + early next year of a team headed by EUR + DAS + Goodby to review CSCE implementation and to discuss + preparations for Madrid. We hope that a by-product of the visit will be + enhanced access for Embassy Sofia officers to GOB officials.

+

4. Dialogue on conditions for MFN? The + GOB obviously would like to obtain + MFN tariff status. Tsvetkov’s signal during Round-Table II + that the GOB is interested in MFN, and the Deputy Secretary’s indication + that we would be willing to discuss our laws and policies pertaining + thereto, may have set the stage for subsequent GOB efforts to establish a dialogue on this issue. However, + Tsvetkov and his colleagues + must have realized that we do not contemplate any early movement on + MFN.

+ +

5. Chancery site—The prospects for movement in this area may have been + enhanced. Although Tsvetkov + exaggerated the condition of the Bulgarian Chancery and Ambassador + Grigorov’s residence (the roof did not fall in during Grigorov’s + reception for Tsvetkov), the + GOB is concerned and therefore + anxious to obtain a lease on two lots in the Van Ness Street + International Center. The GOB now + should have no doubt about our concern over its cooperation with Embassy + Sofia in resolving the Chancery problem there. Tsvetkov described the Chancery problem + as “technical”, not “political”, hopefully indicating thereby that the + GOB will soon take steps to resolve + the problem.

+

6. Bulgarian concerns—Gotsev + commented in private that the GOB + really dislikes our position on divided families and our linkage of the + US and Bulgarian Chancery problems. Tsvetkov indicated during the second round-table session + that it seemed as though we began every discussion by referring to + divided families. We have the impression that the Bulgarians may have + decided to go slow in resolving divided family cases, an area of clear + interest to us, until we have demonstrated a willingness to move ahead + in areas of interest to them.

+

7. Many thanks to Embassy Sofia for its assistance in arranging Tsvetkov’s visit. We hope that it will + help make your work easier.

+ + Vance + +
+ +
+ 90. Memorandum From the Chief of the National Foreign Intelligence + Center, Central Intelligence Agency ([name not + declassified]) to the Deputy Director of the Bureau of European + Affairs, Department of State (Gilmore)Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of Support + Services (DI), Job 82T00150R, Production Case Files, Box 6, Folder + 63, Could Bulgaria Go the Way of Romania?. Confidential. The + salutation is handwritten. Telegram 555 from Bucharest, January 27, + is attached but not printed. In the telegram, the Embassy reported + on a meeting between the Deputy Chief of Mission and the French + Counselor. The French diplomat, discussing the results of Brezhnev’s visit to Sofia, + suggested that Bulgaria might be in position similar to early 1960s + Romania, when increasing disagreements with Moscow over the + direction and pace of development led Bucharest to distance itself + from Soviet policies. The Embassy concluded that, if disagreements + between Sofia and Moscow existed, they would be evident in Bulgarian + policy toward the Balkans. + + + RP M 79–10075 + + + Washington, February + 6, 1979 + + + SUBJECT + Could Bulgaria Go the Way of Romania? [classification not declassified] + +

Dear Harry,

+

1. The notion that Bulgaria might strike out on a course independent of + the Soviet Union is a titillating one. Geographically separated from the + USSR and with no Soviet troops + stationed on its soil, the country would seem to be in a felicitous + position to do so. One can further argue that, economically faring no + better and receiving no greater economic help than Moscow’s other East + European allies, Bulgaria would seem to have been ill-rewarded for its + fealty to the USSR over the years. Its + current disagreement with the USSR + over the future direction of its economic development would be a motive + for striking out on its own now. [classification not + declassified]

+

2. A number of factors, nevertheless, argue that the Zhivkov regime would have less + inclination to dispute the Soviets than had the three Balkan communist + states who now shun Soviet hegemony. The Bulgarian leadership was placed + in power by the Soviets; it did not assume power by virtue of its only + military prowess (Albania & Yugoslavia), nor did it achieve power + only after purging those leaders the Soviets imposed upon them + (Romania). The Bulgarians have no latent territorial disputes with the + USSR (Romania). To the contrary, + Russia has usually been seen as a protector of the Bulgarian state + against its traditional enemies (Romania, Turkey, Greece). The USSR is now probably viewed as its + protector against the Serbs who—when viewed from Sofia—are probably seen + as coveting Pirin Macedonia. [classification not + declassified]

+ +

3. The advice the Soviets are giving the Bulgarians—to devote greater + attention to agriculture and light industry—is good advice. And it may + be recognized as good advice, even though it would not have been so seen + in 1961 when it was offered to the Romanians. In the early 60s, we + should recall, it was an article of ideological faith that every + communist state should go through a process of forced industrialization + comparable to that which the USSR went + through. When the Soviets then counseled the Romanians not to seek + all-round industrial development, they seemed to be saying that Romania + should not aspire to the developed-nation status that the Soviets were + willing to accord almost all the other states of Eastern Europe. Romania + had a good raw materials and energy resources base, which must have made + the advice seem all the more ill-intentioned. [classification not declassified]

+

4. Autarchic economic development has long since been recognized in + Eastern Europe as a goal too expensive to be pursued. Bulgaria, with its + poor resource base, must appreciate that it is among the least qualified + to pursue it. Bulgaria has already attempted a speedy industrialization + on the basis of Soviet support and of heavy borrowing in the West. It + must now appreciate that there are limits to what the Soviets can, or + should, be expected to do in support of Bulgarian industrialization, and + it is deeply in hock to the West. In sum, the wellsprings of the + Bulgarian drive for industrialization are probably not nearly as strong + as those that impelled Romania into a confrontation with the Soviets in + the early 1960s. [classification not + declassified]

+

5. We must, finally, face up to the circumstance that it is the + Bulgarians, not the Soviets, who are currently the demanders. Does it + follow that, because the Soviets will not give the Bulgarians all they + want, the Bulgarians will basically modify their policy on alliance with + the USSR? Is there no chance that the + Soviets will yet make concessions of the sort that have satisfied the + Bulgarians before—e.g., the third metallurgical complex? To whom would + the Bulgarians turn instead of the Soviets? Have they not done about as + much as they can in terms of borrowing and trading with the West? Does + it not make more sense that what we are witnessing is a negotiating + process in which the Bulgarians are presenting maximum demands and are + prepared to settle for considerably less? [classification not declassified]

+

6. This line of analysis, of course, places me in that group of American + analysts “satisfied with the eternal status quo,” and I do not feel + comfortable there. But as I survey the balance sheet of possible stimuli + for Bulgaria’s standing pat or striking out on a more independent + course, the bottom line favors the former, in my judgment. We must also + remember, I think, that, as not all the peoples of the Balkans were + dissatisfied with Ottoman rule, so it may just be that some now see their primary interests as + being served through close alliance with the USSR.In telegram 1244 from + Sofia, June 4, the Embassy observed: “Bulgarian-Soviet relations lie + at the heart of Bulgarian foreign—and internal—affairs.” The Embassy + concluded: “close Bulgarian-Soviet relations stem from a very + substantial congruence of perceived political and economic + interests, ideological and personal leadership ties, all resting on + a long tradition of historical and cultural association. The + Bulgarian leaders establish their own internal and external policies + based on Bulgarian interests as they see them—and in most cases they + see such interests best served by close association with the Soviet + Union and support of Soviet policies. This fact gives a greater + strength to their cooperation and alliance than is true of the + bilateral relations of most if not all of the other Soviet allies + with the USSR.” (National + Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign + Policy File, D790252–0784) [classification + not declassified]

+ +
+ +
+ 91. Telegram From the Embassy in Bulgaria to the Department of + StateSource: National + Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign + Policy File, D790248–0379. Secret; Priority; Limdis. Sent for information to + Belgrade, East Berlin, Bucharest, Budapest, Moscow, Prague, and + Warsaw. + + + + Sofia, June + 1, 1979, 0805Z + +

1233. Subject: (S) Bulgarian Approach on Closer Relations With US. Ref: + Sofia 1185.In telegram 1185 from Sofia, May + 25, the Embassy reported on the bilateral discussions between + Garthoff and Mladenov during + their May 23 meeting. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790240–0793) In + telegram 1187 from Sofia, May 25, the Embassy reported the + international issues portion of their discussion, including SALT II, China, and the Middle East. + (National Archives, RG 59, Central + Foreign Policy File, D790240–0762). For the account in his memoirs, + see Raymond Garthoff, A Journey through the Cold + War, pp. 319–321.

+

1. (S-entire text.)

+

2. Summary: Bulgarian Foreign Minister Mladenov’s comments on Bulgarian-American relations + reported reftel are regarded by the + Bulgarian side as an important political approach to the US for closer + relations. This approach was personally authorized by President/Party + Chief Todor Zhivkov, and + following the meeting Mladenov + remarked to a senior MFA official that: + “I hope the Americans realize that I have extended my hand, and grasp + it.” While not intending to depart from close alignment with the Soviet + Union, Bulgaria wishes to play a more independent role, and specifically would like to + upgrade relations with the US. End summary.

+

3. Following the Ambassador’s meeting with Mladenov reported reftel, Ambassador Gotsev (Chief of MFA + Fourth Department responsible for relations with US and Western Europe) + arranged a private luncheon tete-a-tete with the Ambassador. In an + unusually open and frank discussion, Gotsev emphasized the Bulgarian leadership’s desire to + raise substantially the level and range of its relations with the US. He + stated that Mladenov, himself a + member of the Politburo, had in advance discussed with President + Zhivkov his meeting with the + Ambassador, and had been authorized to seek closer political and + economic ties with the US. Mladenov considered the Ambassador’s return to + Washington for consultations at this juncture as the best opportunity to + make an authoritative probe of the American reaction, and he was + awaiting with interest whatever the Ambassador would be able to bring + back by way of a response. Following his meeting with the Ambassador, + Mladenov had told Gotsev: “I hope the Americans realize + that I have extended my hand, and grasp it.”

+

4. Gotsev commented that the US + was of course the most important country in the world. Bulgaria enjoyed + very close ties with the Soviet Union, and had no wish to change that + relationship. At the same time, some of the Bulgarian leaders, including + Zhivkov as well as Mladenov, wished to increase the role + which Bulgaria herself plays in world affairs. They had no illusions as + to the limited role which a small country could aspire to. Nonetheless, + Bulgaria’s role in the Balkans could be of some significance to the US + as well. Moreover, while Bulgaria had been extending its political + contacts and economic ties with other Western countries, in particular + the FRG and increasingly Japan, this + had not so far developed with respect to the US.

+

5. Gotsev stated that some members + of the Bulgarian leadership were frankly skeptical as to whether the US + shared an interest in improving relations. Also, some members of the + leadership through their own particular experience represented in effect + “a (West) German lobby” and a “Japanese lobby”—there was no “American + lobby” yet. He commented that whenever a major trade deal with a Western + partner was being decided upon by the leadership, Zhivkov would ask about the quality of + technology compared with that of the US; while differences obviously + existed among various advanced countries, the basic benchmark was + normally taken to be the US.

+

6. Gotsev stated that despite + Bulgaria’s close economic relations with the Soviet Union, and with + other members of Comecon, there is + a potential for increased economic ties with the West—and preferably + with the US. The Bulgarian leadership was not at all satisfied with the + stagnation of Bulgarian-American trade at a relatively low level and + limited scope.

+ +

7. Gotsev stressed Bulgarian + interest in obtaining MFN treatment + from the US. He expressed the hope which the Bulgarian leadership has + that with SALT II and the development + of American-Chinese political and now economic ties it would prove + possible for Bulgaria to acquire MFN + status. He stated that Bulgaria wishes to gain MFN before Czechoslovakia or the German Democratic + Republic. Moreover, he commented, Bulgaria in fact had no emigration + problem with a Jewish minority or other group. Such essentially minor + differences as divided family cases could rapidly be resolved.

+

8. Gotsev noted (as had Mladenov) that the Bulgarians had taken + a number of concrete steps suggested by the American side, such as the + settlement of the claims of American bondholders, and there were none of + the other obstacles that might stand in the way: no Bulgarian gold in + the US, no unsatisfied claims, or other such issues. Yet the American + side had made clear last year that it was not prepared at that time to + move on MFN.See Document 89.

+

9. The Ambassador noted that Romania and Hungary had qualified for MFN on the basis of existing legislation. + He agreed with Gotsev that there + were no specific intrinsic obstacles in the way of reaching agreement. + Was Bulgaria prepared and interested to seek an MFN solution on the Hungarian pattern?PD–21 established the yardstick by which improved + relations, including extension of MFN, would be either an independent foreign policy from + the Soviet Union (i.e. Romania and Yugoslavia) or a policy of + internal liberalization (the Hungarian model). See Document 16. The Ambassador noted + that he was of course aware that after the Morse report, and the visit + by Deputy Foreign Minister Tsvetkov and Gotsev himself to Washington last fall, there had been a + distinct falling off of Bulgarian private expressions of interest in + taking steps toward MFN. The Ambassador + then stated that he wished to ask directly an undiplomatic question: had + Bulgaria consulted with the Soviet Union in 1978 before hiring an + American law firm to investigate MFN + prospects, and before expressing the interest which Gotsev himself and other Bulgarian + officials had expressed to the Ambassador with respect to the “Hungarian + solution” and Bulgarian interest in MFN?

+

10. Gotsev replied that the + expressions of interest in MFN were + based on the judgment of the Bulgarian leadership that obtaining MFN status from the US, for economic and + political reasons, would serve Bulgarian interests. At the same time, + they wished to proceed discreetly and deliberately. While prepared to + justify their interest, they did not want to display this interest and + then have it rebuffed by the US, in front of the other Socialist + countries. Gotsev emphasized that + Bulgaria also could not appear + to be taking the initiative in raising the issue, although in fact they + had done so. He said specifically some version of what he termed “the + Hungarian variant” was not rpt not out + of the question. Gotsev then + continued by commenting that the Bulgarian reading from the Ambassador’s + own statements after his return from consultations in the fall of 1978, + and their assessment based on the conversations (with Tsvetkov and himself) in Washington, as + well as the Morse report suggested the time was not ripe to pursue the + matter. Now, they hoped the changed international circumstances to which + he had alluded might make it appropriate—if not immediately, at least in + some time frame they could take into account in making their own + decisions.

+

11. Gotsev also noted the + importance of decisions taken in the course of developing the next + five-year plan. He said that if some projects and investments could not + be undertaken with American firms, or with other Western countries, they + would have to depend on Soviet assistance. (While not specifically + stated, Gotsev implied both that + heavier reliance on Soviet economic assistance was for one or another + reason less desired, and perhaps not always forthcoming.)

+

12. Gotsev remarked that the + Bulgarians had very little to offer the US in a concrete way. They had + already made a number of steps, and frankly had little left to bargain + with. But the specific matters which the Ambassador had raised with + Mladenov, for example, could + all easily be taken care of. There were, however, those in the + leadership who felt that without reciprocal moves or signs of a more + forthcoming American view that the Bulgarian side had already made + perhaps more concessions in advance that it should have. In addition to + MFN, Gotsev (as had Mladenov) stressed the importance of higher level + political contacts and higher level American visits to Bulgaria. While + the Bulgarians certainly did not expect, for example, a visit by the + American President at any time in the near future, they would hope to + have cabinet-level visits—perhaps first the Secretary of Commerce, and + in due course the Secretary of State. More immediately, they very much + hoped that the US would respond to their repeated invitations and + expressions of interest in early visits and regular consultations + picking up from the Tsvetkov + visit. They very much hoped that Assistant Secretary Vest could visit Bulgaria this year. + In addition, the Foreign Minister—and not he alone—was well aware that + he was the only Eastern European Foreign Minister who had not yet had + the opportunity to meet with Secretary Vance.

+

13. As to other possibilities for an American sign of interest in + developing closer relations, Gotsev remarked that the one concrete step which would + have some symbolic as well as intrinsic value would be an increase in + the Bulgarian fishing quota in American waters. He hoped that the + Ambassador could bring back some good news in that respect. The Ambassador replied that he + would certainly look into the possibility further, but reiterated—as he + had to the Foreign Minister—that regrettably this was a matter beyond + the decision of the State Department and quotas were determined in + accordance with available supply, conservation needs, and specific + reciprocal tradeoffs with other countries responsible for waters of + interest to American fishermen. Gotsev indicated that he realized this fact, but he + hoped that nonetheless perhaps something could be done—perhaps reducing + slightly the quota reserved for American fishermen. The Ambassador noted + that would present a domestic political problem of some size.

+

14. Gotsev stated that Mladenov had expressed satisfaction + with his exchanges with the Ambassador on other (than bilateral) world + developments. Specifically, he said that he “got the message” (sic) on + (the American view of) the Macedonian issue. Gotsev stressed that Mladenov scarcely ever had such frank discussions with + Ambassadors, and never with an American Ambassador. He had high + confidence in the Ambassador. In response, the Ambassador replied that + he always found interesting and useful such discussions with the Foreign + Minister, and this comprehensive recent one in particular. He + appreciated the Minister’s other comments, and believed they do indeed + have good rapport and mutual understanding. Gotsev said that the Minister was looking forward to + talking with the Ambassador after his return.

+

15. Comment: Foreign Minister Mladenov’s three-hour review of the development of + Bulgarian-relations with the Ambassador, followed by the evidently + orchestrated informal elucidation by Ambassador Gotsev, is a clear signal and request + for an American response. Gotsev + said explicitly what a Communist Foreign Minister (and Politburo member) + could not say in such a direct and open way. They do not expect + far-reaching or immediate American moves on such major issues as MFN, but they do want to know whether the + United States is receptive to the Bulgarian interest in enhancing our + relations. They indicated (Gotsev + explicitly) that one reason for Bulgarian interest is to establish a + more independent, though not necessarily less Soviet-aligned, and albeit + still modest, Bulgarian role in world affairs.

+

16. As the Ambassador is returning imminently to Washington, he will give + his personal comments and recommendations on the questions posed by the + Bulgarians reported above and in the reftel during his consultations.

+ + Garthoff + +
+ +
+ 92. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in + BulgariaSource: National + Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign + Policy File, D790443–0890. Confidential; Immediate. Drafted by + Gilmore; cleared by Vest, + Frasure, and Bremer; approved by Raphel. + + + Washington, September 28, 1979, 0130Z + +

255319. Subject: Vance-Zhivkova + Bilateral.

+

1. (C-entire text)

+

2. Summary. Secretary held bilateral talks with Bulgarian UNGA delegation head Lyudmila Zhivkova + September 26. Bulgarian participants were Ambassador Grigorov, Permanent + Representative to the UN Yankov, and + interpreter. US participants were Counselor Nimetz, Assistant Secretary Vest, Ambassador-designate Perry and EUR/EE Deputy Director Gilmore + (notetaker). Both sides expressed a desire to improve relations, and the + upcoming visit of Assistant Secretary Vest and the CSCE + consultations in November were seen as concrete steps in this direction. + Zhivkova invited the Secretary to visit Bulgaria at a time convenient to + him, and the Secretary expressed the hope that he could accept it at + some point. End summary.

+

3. After an exchange of pleasantries including references by Mme. + Zhivkova to her brief social meetings with President and Mrs. Carter and + Vice President Mondale, during + her June 1977 visit here, Mme. Zhivkova expressed satisfaction that she + had been given the opportunity to conduct Bulgaria’s first official + UNGA discussions with the + Secretary. Welcoming the opportunity to hold bilateral talks with GOB representatives, the Secretary + expressed appreciation for Foreign Minister Mladenov’s statements to Ambassador Garthoff about the + GOB’s desire to improve bilateral + relations.See Document 91. The Bulgarian Government and the Embassy in + Sofia renewed calls for a bilateral between the two Foreign + Ministers in 1979. Grigorov called on Assistant Secretary Vest June 29 to discuss the state + of relations between the two countries. Stressing the improvement in + relations, Vest promised “he + would do everything possible to arrange a meeting” between Vance and Mladenov. (Telegram 173956 to + Sofia, July 5; National Archives, RG + 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790307–1001) On July 31, the + Embassy in Sofia also recommended a meeting, stressing that “a + Vance/Mladenov meeting is long overdue.” + (Telegram 1802 from Sofia, July 31; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + D790347–0263) However, as the meeting was being scheduled, the + Embassy informed the Department that Mladenov was to accompany Zhivkov to Vietnam, Laos, and + Cambodia. (Telegram 2193 from Sofia, September 12; National + Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign + Policy File, D790421–0279) He also welcomed the GOB’s action to resolve divided family + cases. The Secretary indicated that Ambassador-designate Perry, a + colleague in whom he had great confidence, would be discussing with the GOB specific ways in which we might + improve relations.

+

4. Zhivkova expressed GOB’s satisfaction + that US-Bulgarian relations had improved and deepened since the + signature of Helsinki Final Act. She stated that there are no “weighty” + outstanding issues between the US and Bulgaria, and indicated that a + Bulgarian representative would come to the US soon to sign a document + resolving financial problems which date back to the 1930’s. (N.B. + Zhivkova was apparently alluding to a final settlement with US holders + of Kingdom of Bulgaria bonds.) US and Bulgarian leaders, said Zhivkova, + owe it to their peoples to develop bilateral relations further. The + GOB is conscious of the fact that US is a huge country and a great + power with vast resources and human potential. Bulgaria, although very + small, has a rich historical and cultural heritage. A crossroads between + East and West, Bulgaria survived 500 years under Ottoman bondage and has + become a developed and vigorous country. Every country must make its + contribution to a better future for the world and the contribution of + Bulgaria, as a small country, must be qualitative rather than + quantitative. Bulgaria, said Zhivkova, is ready to make its contribution + to all aspects of relations including trade and scientific-technical and + cultural cooperation.

+

5. The Secretary agreed that the US and Bulgaria should strive to find + more common ground in their relations. He expressed support for + continuing US-Bulgarian contacts in the CSCE context and noted that we will hold CSCE consultations with Bulgaria this + fall.

+

6. One area of relations which remains to be settled, said Zhivkova, is + that of trade and economic cooperation. Relations in this area should be + put on a stable basis, and the issue of MFN should be considered in this context. The Secretary + asked Ambassador-designate Perry to explore on his behalf concrete ways + of improving relations in this sphere.

+

7. Zhivkova welcomed Ambassador-designate Perry to Sofia. She noted that + the GOB has recognized Ambassador + Garthoff’s work in improving relations by giving him the award of the + Madara Horseman, First Class.For his account + of the award, see Raymond Garthoff, My Journey + through the Cold War, p. 323. The Secretary thanked + Zhivkova for honoring Ambassador Garthoff, observing that this award + reflected Bulgaria’s desire to improve relations.

+

8. The Secretary expressed particular satisfaction that Assistant + Secretary Vest, his “strong + right arm”, would be visiting Bulgaria next month. Zhivkova welcomed the + Vest visit as an expansion + of contacts between the US and + Bulgaria and expressed the hope that contacts such as this would lead to + the further development of relations.

+

9. On behalf of Foreign Minister Mladenov, Zhivkova invited the Secretary to visit + Bulgaria at a time convenient to him. The Secretary thanked her for the + invitation and expressed the hope that he would be able to accept it at + some point. Noting that Bulgaria would celebrate its 1300th anniversary + as a state in 1981, Zhivkova indicated that a visit to Bulgaria then + would enable the Secretary to join in the celebration. Bulgarian UN Ambassador Yankov quickly added that if + the Secretary could come sooner, then so much the better.

+ + Vance + +
+ +
+ 93. Memorandum From Stephen + Larrabee of the National Security Council Staff to the + President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)Source: Carter Library, National Security File, + Brzezinski Material, + Country File, Box 6, Bulgaria: 1/77–1/81. Confidential. Sent for + information. Copies were sent to Brement, Blackwill, Rentschler, and Griffith. Brzezinski wrote at the top of the + memorandum: “Let’s explore a single initiative as a test. ZB.” + + + Washington, October + 29, 1979 + + + SUBJECT + Meeting with Lyuben Gotsev + (U) + +

Attached is the memcon of the meeting + which Marshall and I had on + Friday, October 26, 1979 with Lyuben + Gotsev,Brzezinski had approved the + meeting with Gotsev on + October 24. Head of the North American Section of the + Bulgarian MFA. As I suspected he would, + Gotsev did raise the issue of + a meeting between Lyudmila Zhivkova and the President and expressed + disappointment that the President had not been able to see her. He also + made a strong pitch for MFN, arguing + that recent progress on family reunification and visas had removed any + remaining obstacles to Sofia obtaining MFN. (C)

+

I had the impression from the meeting with Gotsev that the Bulgarians do genuinely desire an + improvement in relations and that they feel that they have met us more + than halfway with the recent resolution of the family reunification + problems, etc.—a view shared by George + Vest as a result of his recent trip to Sofia. (C)

+ +

While granting Sofia MFN is clearly out + of the question in the immediate future, we should give serious + consideration to what else we might do to encourage Bulgaria’s interest + in improved relations. Despite Bulgaria’s close ties to the Soviet + Union, the prospects for some change over the long run may not be as + dismal as often assumed. The rejuvenation in the Bulgarian leadership + which has taken place since 1976 combined with a prolonged succession + crisis in the Soviet Union could induce Bulgaria to pursue a moderately + more flexible policy in areas where this does not fundamentally + contradict Soviet interests. This was the case in 1964 at the time of + Khrushchev’s ouster (when Bulgaria came close to normalizing relations + with Bonn and took a number of other uncharacteristically independent + initiatives in the Balkans) and it is not inconceivable that a similar + development could occur in the immediate post-Brezhnev period. (C)

+

In short, while we should have no illusions about the degree of + Bulgaria’s dependence on the Soviet Union, we should not write off + Bulgaria entirely. We should do what we can to encourage Bulgaria to + broaden its ties with the West and test Sofia’s willingness to improve + relations with the United States (perhaps by including Bulgaria in a + trip by a Cabinet official at some point). (C)

+ +

Attachment

+

Memorandum of ConversationConfidential. The meeting took place in Brement’s + office.

+

Washington, October 26, 1979, 11–11:50 a.m.

+ + SUBJECT + Summary of Meeting with Lyuben + Gotsev (U) + + + PARTICIPANTS + Marshall Brement + Stephen Larrabee + Lyuben Gotsev, Head, North + American Section, Bulgarian MFA + Krassin Himmirsky, First Secretary, Bulgarian Embassy + Elena Bobtodorova, Interpreter + +

Gotsev opened the meeting by + stating he wished to concentrate on bilateral relations. He proceeded to + review the state of US-Bulgarian relations, pointing to progress in the + resolution of 20 of the 35 pending family reunification cases in the + last several months and progress in visa applications. He stated that the meeting + between Foreign Minister Mladenov + and Ambassador Garthoff in May was an important indication of + Bulgarian’s interest in improving relations with the United States.For Garthoff’s meeting with Mladenov, and his subsequent + discussion with Gotsev, see + Document 91. Assistant Secretary + Vest’s visit this week had + also contributed to the improvement of relations.Vest’s + travel was reported in telegram 2682 from Sofia, October 26. + (National Archives, RG 59, Central + Policy File, D790511–0120) Bulgaria wanted to see this + process strengthened, but it often had the impression that the United + States was not really interested in such a development. (C)

+

Gotsev then made a strong pitch + for MFN, arguing that with the recent + resolution of many family reunification cases there were no longer any + meaningful obstacles to Bulgaria receiving MFN. He asked how we saw the prospects for Bulgaria + receiving MFN. (C)

+

Gotsev also pointed to the current + visit to the US of Lyudmila Zhivkova, daughter of Bulgarian President + Todor Zhivkov and a member of + the Politburo, as an indication of Bulgaria’s interest in improving + relations. Mme. Zhivkova had met with Secretary Vance at the UNGA in New York and had met with Secretary Harris, Mrs. Mondale, and John Reinhardt in Washington.See Document 92. No + records of Mrs. Zhivkova’s meetings with Secretary Harris, Mrs. Mondale, and USICA Director Reinhardt were found. In a + memorandum to Brzezinski + dated October 6, Tarnoff + recommended that Joan Mondale meet Zhivkova at the White House since it + would be viewed in Sofia as “another favorable response to its + recent moves to improve relations with us.” (Carter Library, + National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 6, Bulgaria: + 1/77–1/81) The NSC forwarded the + memorandum with its concurrence to Denis Clift on October 9. (Ibid.) He + regretted, however, that Mme. Zhivkova had been unable to be received by + the President despite the many attempts by the Bulgarian Government to + get an appointment. (C)

+

In response, Messrs. Brement and + Larrabee stated that Foreign + Minister Mladenov’s meeting with + Ambassador Garthoff and the progress in the resolution of family + reunification cases had been duly noted in Washington. We were + encouraged by this trend and hoped it would continue. As to a meeting + between Zhivkova and the President, we pointed out that the President + was extremely busy; that he normally met only Heads of State, even of + our closest allies; that October was the busiest month of the year for + him; and that the request had come at the last moment. Under such + conditions, it was hardly realistic to expect that it would be granted. + Moreover, there had only recently been a slight improvement in + relations. Before a meeting with the President could be realistically + considered, relations would have to develop further. We stressed that + the US would like to see a positive development of relations, but that + this would depend upon concrete steps that the Bulgarian Government was willing to undertake in the + coming months and years. (C)

+

On MFN Messrs. Brement and Larrabee pointed to the fact that there were certain + legislative requirements which had to be met in order for Bulgaria to + qualify for MFN. In our view, all + possibilities had not been exhausted within the existing framework. + However, we were prepared to discuss with Bulgaria what requirements + would have to be met in order to qualify for MFN. (C)

+

Returning to the question of bilateral relations, Gotzev noted the + apparent US lack of interest in improving relations with Bulgaria. In + his view the Bulgarians had been forthcoming on issues of concern to the + US, but the US seemed to be making a change in its policy conditional on + a change in Bulgaria’s relations with the Soviet Union. The US should + recognize that these ties were deep and long-standing, and he argued + that we should not make a disruption or cessation of these prerequisites + for an improvement of US-Bulgarian bilateral relations. Bulgaria was an + independent country and US-Bulgarian relations should stand on their own + merits. Concluding, he noted that Secretary Vance would be visiting Yugoslavia and Romania in + December and expressed the hope that Bulgaria could be included in his + travel plans in the near future.Vance was scheduled to visit + Bucharest and Belgrade in mid-December 1979. The trip was canceled + at the last minute, however, due to the developing Iran hostage + crisis. (C)

+

In response, Messrs. Brement and + Larrabee said that the US + recognized Bulgaria’s strong ties with the Soviet Union and that we did + not make a cessation of these ties a prerequisite for improved relations + with the United States. Our main concern was that the Bulgarians pursue + a policy which accorded with their own national interests. This did not + mean that we expected Bulgaria to break all ties with the Soviet Union. + We understood that these ties were deep and long-standing. Nonetheless, + we hoped that there could be more common ground on a number of issues + between our two countries in the future and that if this occurred, it + would have a positive effect on bilateral relations. (C)

+
+ +
+ 94. Memorandum From the Former Ambassador to Bulgaria (Garthoff) to + the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Vest)Source: National Archives, RG 59, Bureau of European Affairs, Office of Eastern + European Affairs, Bulgaria Desk, Personal Files of Retired + Ambassador to Bulgaria, Raymond L. Garthoff (1960–1980), Lot 80D218, + Box 1, Policy Toward Bulgaria 1978–80. Secret. The date is + handwritten. Copies were sent to Nimetz, Barry, Schmidt, + and Gilmore. Printed from Garthoff’s copy. + + + Washington, December + 28, 1979 + + + SUBJECT + Some Departing Observations on American Policy + Toward Bulgaria and Eastern Europe + +

As I reflect on my recent service as Ambassador to Bulgaria,Former Ambassador Garthoff departed Bulgaria on + October 9, 1978. He was replaced by Jack Perry on October 17. + I wish to offer several comments on our policy approach to Eastern + Europe, and specifically to Bulgaria. While I believe our general + objectives are sound, the guidance on specific policy implementation + seems to me too constricting.

+

Policy Guidance

+

American policy toward the Communist countries of Eastern Europe has not + changed basically for some years, and the gradual evolutionary change + which has occurred has generated very little public (or, for that + matter, internal governmental) debate—save for the brouhaha over the + so-called “Sonnenfeldt doctrine” in 1976.

+

Some of us did consider that the policy established by the last + Administration and codified in NSDM 212NSDM + 212 of May 2, 1973, outlined U.S. + policy toward Eastern Europe, creating a ranking among the Eastern + European regimes. For the text of NSDM 212, see Foreign + Relations, 1969–1976, vol. E–15, Part 1, Documents on + Eastern Europe, 1973–1976, Document 8. (May 2, + 1973) was excessively rigid and constraining. “With regard to the + Eastern European countries generally,” it stated, “progress in the + economic area should be made contingent on satisfactory political + conduct on international issues involving our interests and on a + demonstrated willingness to solve outstanding bilateral political + problems.” Progress on bilateral relations alone was not regarded as + sufficient. But there was a further “chain” linkage:

+

The NSDM laid down a clear rank ordering of the Eastern European + countries in the eyes of the US Government, irrespective both of + “political conduct” and of resolution of bilateral problems by each + country. For commercial + agreements (recognized as the principal “carrot”), a set order of + priority was prescribed: Romania, then Hungary, then Czechoslovakia, and + then Bulgaria. (Settlement of the claims of American bondholders was + also called for, and was the only specific prerequisite for MFN and Export-Import Bank loans.) + Similarly, cultural and scientific exchange agreements (where not + already established) were required to reflect the same rank order: + Hungary, then Czechoslovakia, and only then Bulgaria.

+

NSC Presidential Directive 21, or PD–21, + (September 13, 1977) under the present Administration, established “a + new order” for our relations with countries of Eastern Europe. Rather + than explicitly linking progress in bilateral economic and good + relations to “satisfactory political conduct on international issues,” + the new approach was keyed to the twin aims of enhancing international + independence and increasing internal liberalization. “To that end,” the + Directive read, “the United States will demonstrably (sic) show its + preference for Eastern European countries that are either relatively + liberal internally or relatively independent internationally.” In + addition, a new order of priorities was set: The first group comprised + Poland and Romania, with Hungary to be raised to that same level; as the + second group: “Relations with Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia and the GDR will remain limited until there is + demonstrated progress along one of the two dimensions mentioned above.” + No “initiatives” would be taken toward these three, and any steps to improve relations with any of them + “must tangibly and demonstrably advance specific US interests.” Also, + finally, there were to be no “indications of willingness to grant MFN.”

+

The objectives of encouraging greater external independence and greater + internal liberalization were newly articulated as basic policy, although + they had for years underlain our policy toward the area. On the other + hand, while no longer listing individual countries in set priority + order, a distinction between the three for whom we would “demonstrably” + show a “preference,” and the other three, was sharply drawn.

+

A quite different note was struck by Secretary Vance on January 7, 1978,Vance was in + Budapest on January 7 to attend the ceremonies organized for the + official return of the Crown of St. Stephen to Hungary. when + publicly asked: “Is there any difference between the policy of this + Administration and the policy of the previous Administration towards the + nations of Eastern Europe? And if there is a difference, would you care + to elucidate it?” The Secretary replied: “The current Administration is + seeking to improve its relationships with the countries of Eastern + Europe. Each of us will have to approach this with our own national + interests involved. I think that the best way to deal with these problems is to have face-to-face + discussions where we can discuss the differences and the common + interests. We shall pursue these on the basis of dealing on a + case-by-case basis, country by country, on the various issues and common + concerns which we have.”

+

The distinction in PD–21 has not officially been made public, although + some news accounts have given its gist. Later public statements of + American policy toward Eastern Europe have been consistent with PD–21, + but have not disclosed its key elements either with respect to + objectives or to differentiation between two categories of countries, + favored and disfavored by the United States. These public statements + have also been consistent with Secretary Vance’s rather different case-by-case approach. (The + most comprehensive authoritative public statement of policy was the + testimony of Deputy Assistant Secretary Luers on September 8, 1978, before the House + International Relations Committee, distributed also as a State + Department pamphlet, “Eastern Europe: An overview.” Also important was + Assistant Secretary Vest’s + statement before the House Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East on + July 12, 1979, which explicitly reaffirmed that the Luers statement “remains valid as a + comprehensive account of U.S. policy and + objectives toward the region.”)

+

The annual development, both by the posts and through Washington + coordination among interested agencies, of “U.S. Goals and Objectives,” for the Ambassador to each + country provides a useful opportunity for some clarifications of policy + guidance, but only up to a point. Differences over the question of + active promotion of MFN for Bulgaria, + for example, led to this minimalist implementation guidance statement: + “If Bulgaria requests, explain U.S. + legislative requirements for MFN.”

+

The Foreign Service Inspection Report on The Conduct of + Relations with the Countries of Eastern Europe (May 1979), + based on an inspection of the operations of the EUR/EE Office in the Department and the + diplomatic posts in Eastern Europe, concluded that: “While the strategy + [of PD–21]Brackets in the original. + is basically sound, it does appear to preclude U.S. Missions in Sofia and Prague from exploiting certain + opportunities to pursue U.S. interests, + and therefore should be reviewed.” The Department was advised to “seek + amendments to the Directive if it now appears too restrictive.”

+

Policy Toward Bulgaria, 1977–1979

+

PD–21 was issued on the very day I flew from Washington to Sofia to + assume my mission. I was not made aware of drafts while being briefed in + Washington in July to September; I was aware of the general trend of the policy line from a + discussion with Dr. Brzezinski + (but not of the sharp division of countries into two groups nor of the + confining language on MFN for + Bulgaria).

+

In 1978, I was advised by STADIS + message (State 179410 of July 15, 1978)In + telegram 179410 to Sofia, July 15, 1978, the Department informed the + Embassy that consideration was being given to negotiating a trade + agreement, including possible MFN + status, with Bulgaria. Despite the lack of a decision to do so, and + with no timetable in mind for the negotiation, the Department + suggested that the Embassy begin addressing certain questions that + would need to be addressed in case negotiations were to begin. + (National Archives, RG 59, Central + Foreign Policy File, D780290–1284) of consideration of + possible movement on the issue of MFN + for Bulgaria, and replied (78 Sofia 2016, and with a series of “open” + messages relevant to such a review, including 78 Sofia 2010, 2011 and + 2012).In telegram 2010 from Sofia, + September 25, 1978, the Embassy addressed Bulgarian policies toward + foreign travel by Bulgarian citizens, and the process of obtaining a + passport and exit visa from the country. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + D780391–0752) In telegram 2011 from Sofia, September 25, 1978, the + Embassy reported on the status of CSCE implementation in Bulgaria, describing it as + unsatisfactory. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780391–0870) In + telegram 2012 from Sofia, September 25, 1978, the Embassy reported + on the status of human rights and minorities in Bulgaria. (National + Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign + Policy File, D780391–0867) In response to telegram 179410 (see footnote 6 above), the Embassy surmised + in telegram 2016 from Sofia, September 25, 1978, that Bulgaria was + interested in seeking MFN status in + order to gain increased access to the U.S. market. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + D780392–0104) Earlier I had reported active Bulgarian + interest (78 Sofia 1228, 78 Sofia 1063 and 78 Sofia 1182).In telegram 1228 from Sofia, June 26, 1978, the + Embassy reported on the discussions between David Morse, partner at + Surrey, Karasik, Morse, and Seham law offices in New York, and + Bulgarian officials. Morse was asked by the Bulgarian Government to + prepare a memorandum on what Bulgaria would need to do to obtain + MFN. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + D780265–0185) Telegram 1063 from Sofia, June 6, 1978, reported the + discussions between Luers + and Tzvetkov which also touched on the outlook for MFN for Bulgaria. (National Archives, + RG 59, Central Foreign Policy + File, D780235–1063) In telegram 1182 from Sofia, June 20, 1978, the + Embassy reported on the meeting between Luers and Bulgarian Deputy Foreign Trade Minister + Ginev. (National Archives, RG 59, + Central Foreign Policy File, D780257–0202) Consultations in + the Department in September/October 1978, however, made clear to me that + Washington did not deem the season appropriate to + pursue the matter, despite Bulgarian interest and even possible + responsiveness to legislative requirements. The Bulgarians understood + this in part from my more cool attitude on the subject, and certainly + after their own reconnaissance in the Tsvetkov-Gotsev + consultations in Washington in November 1978.

+

Foreign Minister Mladenov + personally made a pitch for overall improved relations, including their + desire for MFN, in discussions with me + before my return for consultations in June 1979 (79 Sofia 1185, 1187 and 1233).See Document 91. In + telegram 1185 from Sofia, May 25, the Embassy reported that, in his + meeting with Garthoff on May 23, Mladenov made a strong pitch for MFN for Bulgaria. (National Archives, + RG 59, Central Foreign Policy + File, D790240–0793) Telegram 1187 from Sofia, May 25, reported their + discussion of international issues. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + D790240–0762) We were also given a broad hint that the + Bulgarians had not yet consulted with Moscow on their desire to obtain + MFN possibly even on the Hungarian + model (79 Sofia 1233).

+

Since my return, the matter has again been raised by the Bulgarians in + discussions in general with you, I understand, and in particular during + Deputy Assistant Secretary Barry’s visit and the recent visit here of Deputy Foreign + Trade Minister Ginev (State 319388).In + telegram 319388 to Sofia, December 11, Schmidt informed the Embassy of the results of + Deputy Foreign Trade Minister Ginev’s visit to Washington, which + focused on MFN and GATT. Schmidt suggested that the + Bulgarians, while interested in MFN, were unwilling to take the initiative out of concern + over Soviet reaction. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + D790570–0651)

+

The Issue

+

The purpose of this review is simply to highlight what I see as a + possible failure on our part to serve our own interests (and for that + matter the aims of PD–21), owing to the effects + of its confining strictures on our policy toward Bulgaria, above all + against pursuing any line of action involving a grant of MFN. I am aware that other + factors—especially attitudes on the Hill (or at least perceived + attitudes), and the woeful tangle of policy implementation concerning + MFN for China and the Soviet + Union—may have counseled not raising the clearly secondary matter of our + relations with Bulgaria.

+

Nonetheless, I believe there is a good case to be made for seeking to negotiate a trade agreement with + Bulgaria involving MFN. First of all, + there is literally no other way the U.S. could wean Bulgaria even a few degrees + away from the USSR than to encourage + her to take the Romanian/Hungarian path to MFN qualification. (And, on a more long-term calculation, + by increasing trade we can reduce somewhat Bulgaria’s heavy economic + dependence on the USSR.) As I have + reported, Bulgarian relations with the Soviet Union, while destined to + remain close, are not those of a puppet—and economic differences exist + (79 Sofia 1244).In telegram 1244 from + Sofia, June 4, the Embassy noted that while the two countries were + close, Bulgaria was not a Soviet puppet but rather a junior partner + which saw its interests very closely related to its larger ally. The + Embassy also stressed that there were instances in which the + interests of the two countries diverged, and that the United States + could use those opportunities to move Bulgaria toward a more + balanced position. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + D790252–0784)

+

From the standpoint of “demonstrated progress” toward “relative” + independence, we should not expect or, therefore, even try to effect any major change in Bulgaria’s + relationship with the Soviet Union. (Again, see the analysis in 79 Sofia + 1244). But neither have we seen such a move in the case of Hungary. In + terms of the other criterion, relative internal liberalization, Bulgaria + is not democratic or liberal, but it is less + repressive than the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia and probably Romania, + and I would argue not really demonstrably less liberal than Hungary in + many respects (see 79 Sofia 2379,In + telegram 2379 from Sofia, October 1, the Embassy submitted its + annual Country Report on Human Rights practices for Bulgaria. + (National Archives, RG 59, Central + Foreign Policy File, D790449–0146) and the earlier cited + series 78 Sofia 2010, 2011 and 2012). While Bulgaria has not proceeded + as far in economic “reform” as has Hungary, the Bulgarians are + moving—and are soliciting our advice (e.g., see 79 Sofia 0561 and + 2377).In telegram 561 from Sofia, + March 9, the Embassy reported that, in his address to the U.S.-Bulgarian Economic Council, Deputy + Prime Minister Andrei Lukanov + asserted that Bulgaria was embarking on a process of + decentralization and modernization, and outlined the expectations of + the Bulgarian Government for the economy over the next five years. + (National Archives, RG 59, Central + Foreign Policy File, D790112–0922) In telegram 2377 from Sofia, + September 1, the Embassy reported Garthoff’s farewell call on + Lukanov, in which the Deputy Prime Minister discussed Bulgarian + foreign trade and economic outlook. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + D790448–1018) Even in creeping affluence, Bulgaria has 6.1 + automobiles for 100 population—nearly as many as Hungary’s 7.6 and more + than Poland’s 4.5 or Romania’s 1.6. In art and music, there is a great + freedom and accomplishment. The general standard of living is advancing, + and compares favorably with Romania.

+

Bilateral Relations

+

Bulgaria has been working to improve its relations with the U.S. The Bulgarian leaders have also been + making some effort to “earn” MFN. They + have resolved favorably the vast majority of divided family cases—only + some 14 currently remain (out of twice that number still unresolved only + a few months ago). Moreover, they quietly and fully resolved the + sensitive case on which we placed greatest emphasis over the past two + years (Slavova). Their record on divided families is almost up to the + Hungarians, and much better than the Romanians. They agreed on October + 8, literally on the eve of my departure—a “going away” present, the + Minister of Finance told me—finally settling on favorable terms the + claims of private American bondholders, removing the last unresolved + problem of this kind. Bulgaria is, incidentally, the first Eastern European country to resolve its foreign + bondholders claims before a settlement involving + extensive MFN. We have, operating + satisfactorily, the whole panoply of normalized contacts and relations—a + consular agreement (1975), a cultural exchange agreement (1977, renewed + in 1979), reciprocal elimination of travel restrictions on accredited diplomats (1977), a + scientific exchange agreement (1978), and an agricultural agreement + (1979).

+

There are no obstacles in bilateral relations—no unsettled claims, no + prisoners, no gold or crowns. (There are also no Jewish or other + minorities discriminated against on emigration nor clamoring to leave.) + There is no Congressional or public lobby opposed in particular to + Bulgaria.

+

There are many aspects of Bulgarian internal and external policy which we + find objectionable, but not necessarily more than for Poland, Romania, + Hungary or China—or a number of non-communist countries to whom we + accord nondiscriminatory MFN trade + status.

+

There are other areas of bilateral and international Bulgarian + cooperation worth noting. In interdiction of narcotics trafficking, for + example, there is close U.S.-Bulgarian + cooperation (unlike our situation with the USSR). Bulgaria apprehended, and returned to the Federal + Republic, German radical terrorists (unlike Yugoslavia). Bulgaria has + refrained from providing direct military or police assistance and + advisors in Africa and the Middle East (unlike East Germany). + Incidentally, I several times commented to Bulgarian leaders that it + could not contribute to improving our bilateral relations if they were + to embark on such programs; whether that had any effect I do not + know.

+

Concluding Comment

+

MFN is the only real matter which I see + prejudiced by PD–21—and the only area where I see opportunity for a + useful American initiative to serve the purposes + of PD–21. That is why I have dealt with it at such length. (I have + larded the text with references, rather than repeat relevant information + and arguments, in an effort to be brief.)

+

I hope you and the Secretary will find occasion to consider one way or + another possible modification to the Directive or of its + application.

+
+ +
+ 95. Telegram From the Embassy in Bulgaria to the Department of + StateSource: National + Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign + Policy File, D800469–0660. Secret. Sent for information to Belgrade, + East Berlin, Bonn, Bucharest, Budapest, London, Moscow, Paris, + Prague, Vienna, Warsaw, West Berlin, and USNATO. On a copy found in the Human Rights Bureau + files, Hugh Simon (HA/EUR) wrote + “Excellent Cable HS.” (National Archives, RG 59, Bureau of Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs, + 1980—Human Rights and Country Files, Lot 82D177, Box 3, Bulgaria + 1980) + + + Sofia, September 30, 1980, 0918Z + +

2607. Subject: Questions About Bulgaria.

+

1. S-entire text.

+

2. What follows is an attempt, as I end my first year in Sofia, to set + down the most important current questions about Bulgaria, from the + viewpoint of American interests, and to give my frankest answers.

+

3. First, how solid is Bulgarian loyalty to Moscow?

+

4. Very solid. I see no sign of important change on the horizon, in this + respect. By and large, the relationship works well for Bulgaria’s + leaders, and the people accept it more readily than any other people in + Eastern Europe.The Embassy reiterated the + strength of the Soviet-Bulgarian relationship in telegram 2352 from + Sofia, September 4. While acknowledging that the ties between the + two countries were very strong, the Embassy wrote: “there are + elements of Bulgarian national pride which are not satisfied by the + relationship with Moscow.” The Embassy concluded: “US interests are + best served by recognizing a Bulgarian identity apart from its + ideological fealty to Moscow.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + D800425–0542) Nevertheless it is good to remember that no + relationship is eternal, that Bulgarians are less attached to Russia + than is commonly supposed, and that there are strains in the + relationship (e.g. on economic issues, on Soviet policy towards other + East European countries, on defense spending, on some foreign policy + issues such as Bulgaria’s Balkan policy) which could grow with time. And + I do not believe the Soviets have any infallible, ironclad system of + keeping Bulgaria loyal. Still, it would be wishful thinking to expect + any early deviation from the familiar pattern of loyalty to Moscow, and + I expect this pattern to continue for years.

+

5. Second, how secure is Zhivkov’s + position?

+

6. Very secure. He seems in excellent health, in full vigor, and benefits + now from very long experience. In particular, he is senior enough and + canny enough to cope with any changes in the Kremlin. (He seems to be in + the process of decorating each Soviet Politburo member, one by one, and + observers here say his bets are placed on all possible winners in the + succession sweepstakes.) I am not aware of the existence of meaningful + opposition factions, although Lilov seems a strong number two and a potential successor. The + younger men in the leadership seem able, relatively flexible, often well + qualified technically (especially the economists), and of course quite + loyal to Zhivkov. There may be + some personnel changes at the April Party Congress, but I would be + surprised to see any major change in policy or direction. I think + Zhivkov has shaped a system + he can control—and can control the country with—until he dies or is + incapacitated. So far I see no thought given to a succession.

+

7. Third, how well will the economy function in the next five years?

+

8. Not badly, as far as overall growth is concerned, and probably better + comparatively than most of the countries of Eastern Europe. This is a + guess by a non-economist, but the leaders have several things going for + them: (a) Starting from such a low base in 1944, the Communist regime + has been able to keep standards of living gradually rising to the + general (repeat general) satisfaction. This should continue, although + there are pockets of dissatisfaction. (b) Bulgarians are by and large an + accepting people, not rebellious, and in their Balkan way they manage to + get by all right even if supplies are limited and quality is low: they + grumble, but they carry on. (c) The planners are using their heads. The + Bulgarian new economic mechanism, somewhat like its Hungarian namesake, + has aspects of rationality which may take some of the edge off the + “Soviet model” insofar as Bulgaria is concerned. (d) Agriculture seems + to be working tolerably well, although distribution is lousy. (e) There + is enough corruption around—hard currency stores, winking at illegal + currency exchanges, bribes, semi-accepted ways of beating the + system—that almost everyone is coopted into the system by being engaged + in beating it. (f) By toning down their desires for all-round + industrialization, and accepting specialization within CEMA, the Bulgarians strike me as showing + signs (in contrast to, say, Romania) of living within their means. Now + all of the above could go sour, and I am not saying there will not be + difficulties. In fact the rising price of oil, and the need for the + USSR to continue to favor Bulgaria + in providing raw materials, is a fruitful field for disappointment and + possible friction with Russia. But in contrast to Czechoslovakia and + Poland, where any growth rate at all seems to be a pretty big deal + nowadays, the Bulgarians—a small country, only very recently + industrialized—has some hope of meeting its goals without undue + strain.

+

9. Fourth, how secure is the Party’s position? Are there any alternative + centers of power?

+

10. With Moscow’s continued support, and ruling out unexpected disaster + such as a real economic failure, I believe Party control is quite firm. + I do not believe the Communist regime has very deep roots into the + populace, however; many if not most Bulgarians accept their rulers + precisely to the extent that they have a personal stake in the system. + It is well to remember that + while Russia always enjoyed great popularity among the Bulgarian people, + the country was in the Austro-Hungarian or German sphere of influence + for a good part of its history since 1878, and the people overwhelmingly + accepted alliance with Germany in the two World Wars. In Czechoslovakia, + I felt that the Czechs were a Western people being held prisoner by the + East; in Bulgaria, I feel that the Bulgarians are a Balkan people who + would swing with the wind if Moscow ever loosened its hold. But so long + as Moscow’s hold is secure, the position of the Communists is also + secure. As for alternative centers of power, there are none now in + existence to compare with the Catholic Church in Poland, or with the + potential for independence among workers in Poland or Hungary. On the + other hand, there is not the fell hand of enforced uniformity that I + gather one feels in Romania. The Orthodox Church is used by the regime, + but its independent existence keeps some thoughts alive of alternatives + to Communist rule. Even the puppet Agrarian Party serves something of + the same purpose. I suppose the answer is that if events ever loosened + the Party’s hold even somewhat, then the inclinations of the Bulgarians + of pluralism would rapidly grow and spread. In this sense—and in the + sense that it rules without the consent of the governed—the position of + the Communist Party here is firm, but fragile.

+

11. Fifth, how sound is the society?

+

12. I see a great deal of sickness, and hypocrisy, and disillusion. In + contrast to Prague, where I felt making the best of a fairly bad deal, + but they do not believe in the system or in their part in it. Corruption + is widespread, and cuts deeply. High living by the big shots is widely + known and resented. The workers are to a large extent bought off, + because—in a country which has largely industrialized itself over the + last thirty years—they have privileges, and their pay is comparatively + good. A huge proportion of this country moved to the towns and cities + since 1944, and whatever the shortcomings, they are finding life one + hell of a lot better than it was in a Balkan village before. As for the + intellectuals, they are also bought out by being treated well by the + regime—Zhivkov has been very + clever at this—so that any potential dissident is usually headed off + with a sinecure or a reward. Bulgaria is a rather old-fashioned country, + with a lot of family life still going on, and in this sense it is still + sound. But much is changing, and fast, and the system is based on + deception and corruption. In this sense, the stability of the society is + also becoming more fragile.

+

13. Sixth, how good, and reliable, are the armed forces?

+

14. Bulgarians have been good fighters in history, they are patriotic, + and the soldiers would probably obey orders and acquit themselves + tolerably well. Their equipment is spotty, and the tasks they could + carry out are limited. In a general conflict, if they were to drive + towards the Straits, they would + probably, in my judgment, perform tolerably well—especially with Soviet + help—in a fairly quick, sustained effort. But there are long histories + of hatred with their Balkan neighbors, and if the Bulgarians were + fighting Yugoslavs, or Greeks, or Turks, or Romanians, on the other + fellow’s soil, I would expect their opponents to outfight them man for + man. I would have doubts about the reliability of the Bulgarian armed + forces in major tasks that took very long and that went very far beyond + their own frontiers. But if the Soviets assigned them limited + objectives, to be accomplished with decent equipment over a short time + span, I suspect they would do rather well. (This is the opinion, of + course, of a diplomat and not a military expert.) A footnote to this is + that I suspect there are strains over military expenses, both within + Bulgaria and with the USSR. I believe + Zhivkov is sincere, at least + in part, in his constant speaking about the crying need for reducing + arms, and one element of this, I think, is the burden that arms + expenditures are on a small economy like Bulgaria’s.

+

15. Seventh, are there any variations possible in Bulgaria’s foreign + policy?

+

16. Not many, not soon. The conventional wisdom is that while Sofia may + complain about not getting enough Russian oil at the right price, or + about having to increase military expenditures, it is perfectly happy to + follow the Soviet lead in foreign policy in toto. (I carry in my + billfold, as constant reminder of where we stand in this respect, + Foreign Minister Mladenov’s + statement of last January in Moscow that Bulgarian and Soviet policy was + identical “even to the nuances.”) Conventional wisdom is not far from + right, I fear, although it stands to reason that the Bulgarians differ + from the Russians sometimes on foreign policy issues, especially those + that affect Bulgarian interests, and I assume that behind the scenes + they are at least occasionally giving the Soviets their views. I can + give some examples of hypothetical areas of divergence, but I cannot + cite a single solid example of a difference on the record between Sofia + and Moscow, in foreign policy. (But least the reader infer too much from + that statement, let him try to think of open foreign policy—repeat, + foreign policy—differences between Moscow and Budapest or Warsaw, not to + mention Prague or East Berlin.) I assume that Afghanistan has caused the + Bulgarians a good deal of discomfort, although their behavior has been + loyal. They follow the Soviet line towards the Italian and Spanish + Communist Parties, but I wonder if at times they would rather not have + to do so. Most importantly, Bulgarian aims in the Balkans do not always + coincide with Soviet aims, and we have evidence that the Bulgarians + would like to cooperate more in Balkan multilateral endeavors than the + Soviets have so far allowed. As for Yugoslavia, while outsiders often + assume that Sofia is merely Moscow’s catspaw, I think the Bulgarians + have their own aims and + problems in their relations with Yugoslavia, and they do not by any + means always coincide with those of the Russians. And in dealings with + the West, the Bulgarians are more open and lenient about Western + influence, cultural or economic, than the Soviets are happy to see, as I + understand the situation. All of the above being said, I still cannot + point to any open difference in Soviet and Bulgarian foreign policy, and + do not expect to see any. I do believe, however, that this strict + loyalty has a price, both in bilateral stresses and strains, and also in + the amount Moscow must pay for Bulgaria’s continued loyalty. I have a + feeling—which I cannot prove—that Moscow will have to pay a higher price + for this loyalty as the years go by.

+

17. Eighth, are there any openings for the West?

+

18. Not too many, but more than most people think. The fact is that + Bulgaria has been neglected, largely written off, and the West has + invested very little here in money, or effort, or people. I am probably + the wrong one to bring it up, but the quality of Western Ambassadors + here has not always been topnotch, because Sofia is not considered an + important enough post. (This was not always the case in the past: The + British in particular have sent some first-rate diplomatists to the + Balkans, including Sofia.) Nowadays some countries find it hard to get + good quality young diplomats to agree to a tour in Sofia, so bad is its + reputation. (I do not believe this is true of our Service.) And along + the line, the quality of trade shows, cultural presentations, + intellectual exchanges, and the like tends to be lower than with most of + the other East European countries. For us and some of the other Western + countries—especially the Germans, who have great opportunities here—this + is a mistake, for Bulgaria has more to offer than its stereotypes say. + Among the intellectuals, in business circles, in terms of popular + interest, an opportunity is there for the West to have more influence. + Especially in trade, the opportunity for a higher volume—with all the + political consequences that entails—is clearly present. The reader will + write all of the above off as a case of localitis, and I suppose my only + answer is, “Come and see.” In plain hard terms of realpolitik, there are + opportunities in Bulgaria which we should be exploiting.

+

19. Ninth, are any changes needed in US policy?

+

20. No, I believe we are on the right track. We have shown more interest + in Bulgaria in recent years, partly because we discovered it was there, + partly because the Bulgarians came out of their shells. In the wake of + Polish events, the going may become trickier, but I think we should + still go as far towards improving relations (I know the term is vague, + but I hope its meaning is clear) as the Bulgarians are willing to go. I + hope we will not try to fit Bulgaria into some formula that places them + carefully in relationship to Czechoslovakia or the GDR or Poland. Bulgaria is Bulgaria, and I + hope we will deal with it on its own terms. The loyalty to Moscow is firm, as I have said, but + Bulgaria’s pride in its own identity as a nation is also firm, and I + believe the manifestations of this pride are growing. (Next year’s + 1300th anniversary of Bulgarian statehood—an anniversary the Soviets + still have kept their distance from—is important in this respect.) In + the field of trade, I would hope the US Government—whose powers are + limited, of course, in the area—would do more to encourage US interest: + I think the potential is considerable and if the MFN thing is raised by the Bulgarians, we + should of course be willing to talk sympathetically. Meanwhile some more + high-level visits would pay a good return on the investment of time. But + in general, I would say our policy, of responding to a limited amount of + opportunity, has been correct, and remains so.

+

21. Tenth, finally, how important to US interests is Bulgaria?

+

22. Not very. Not so long as conditions remain about as they are now, + with the present leadership in place and with loyalty to Moscow the sine + qua non of Bulgarian policy. I would add only that Bulgaria’s + geophysical position is quite important, and since she is the only + non-contiguous-to-Russia member of the Warsaw Pact, her position is + somewhat vulnerable. As I have said, I see signs that the price of + keeping Bulgaria totally loyal to Moscow is rising, and by the same + token I see the potential for Western influence susceptible of increase. + If Moscow goes on the defensive, to put it bluntly, Sofia becomes a + prime target. And since we should be thinking ahead, perhaps more + attention to Bulgaria now would be justified.

+ + Perry + + +
+
+ +
+ + Czechoslovakia + +
+ 96. Telegram From the Embassy in Czechoslovakia to the Department of + StateSource: National + Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign + Policy File, D770026–0701. Confidential; Priority; Exdis. + + + Prague, January 25, 1977, 0815Z + +

235. Subject: Charter 77—Implications for US-Czechoslovak Relations. Refs + A. Prague 0211 B. Prague 0074 C. Prague 0219 D. USNATO 0294.For references A, B, and C, see footnotes + 3, 4, and 5, respectively. Telegram 294 from USNATO, January 19, reported on the + January 18 POLADs meeting on preparations for the CSCE Belgrade preparatory meeting. + (National Archives, RG 59, Central + Foreign Policy File, [no film number])

+

1. Efforts of the Czechoslovak regime to suppress the dissidents who have + banded together under “Charter 77” in order, inter alia, to focus world + attention on their demands for basic human rights will inevitably affect + US-Czechoslovak relations. So far, the direct impact of this + regime-dissident confrontation on the United States has been confined + mainly to crude and close surveillance of visiting Washington Post + correspondent Michael Getler (ref A),Telegram 211 from Prague, January 21, reported the decision of + Ambassador Byrne to lodge an + official protest with the Czechoslovak Ministry of Foreign Affairs + concerning the ongoing harassment of Washington + Post reporter Michael Getler. Czechoslovak officials did + not deny the surveillance, suggesting that increased criticism of + Czechoslovak policies in the Western press made increased vigilance + necessary. (National Archives, RG + 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770023–0025) evident + commencement of harassment of US Fulbright Prof. Begnal, and slight + increase in surveillance of some Embassy personnel. Our difficulties + regarding Czechoslovak media and in attempting to improve Embassy + contacts remain about the same as before the Charter 77 affair began. If + the intimidation campaign continues, however, and especially if criminal + charges are filed against more people for the sin of seeking rights + specified in Czechoslovak law, it cannot help but directly conflict with + broad US interests in championing human rights everywhere and in seeing + that progress is made in this field at Belgrade 77.

+

2. During the past year, we made some significant, albeit limited, + progress in improving relations with Czechoslovakia—in achieving an + agreed text of a scientific cultural exchanges agreement, ending travel + restrictions on official personnel, gradually strengthening our culture + exchange program, etc. This progress led the Embassy a short time ago to + suggest ways to move ahead toward renegotiation and final settlement of claims/gold (ref B).In telegram 74 from Prague, January 7, the + Embassy reported that, with the completion of all minor steps for + improvement of relations between the United States and + Czechoslovakia, Washington must again tackle the claims/gold issue. + The Embassy stressed that fast action was needed to maintain the + momentum in improving U.S.-Czechoslovak relations, and delay in proposing a new + settlement would lead to a worsening of relations between the two + countries. (National Archives, RG + 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770006–1331) The claims/gold issue + was the major remaining obstacle to normalization of relations + between the United States and Czechoslovakia. The conflict stemmed + from claims against Czechoslovakia by U.S. citizens for nationalized property in + Czechoslovakia following World War II. The settlement of the claims + issue was a prerequisite for the return to Czechoslovakia of 18.4 + tons of Nazi-looted gold, due to the GOC on the basis of the Paris Reparation Agreement of + 1946 by the Tripartite Commission (United States, United Kingdom, + and France). The United States held 8.7 tons, with the balance being + held in London. The last agreement was initialed in 1974, but was + blocked by an amendment introduced by Senator Russell B. Long + (D-Louisiana) to the 1974 Trade Act. The amendment required + congressional approval for any agreement on the claims/gold + issue. We also were inclined to move as quickly as possible + to sign the scientific/cultural exchanges agreement and its + implementation programs. Moreover, we were prepared fairly soon to + notify the GOC of a reduction in prior + notification time for their merchant ships to enter US ports and to + recommend favorable and prompt USG + consideration of bilateral agreements with Czechoslovakia in the civil + air and textile fields. Of special short-term significance, we were + ready to urge the Department to start active preparation for the planned + visit to Washington, perhaps in April, of Deputy Foreign Minister Spacil + at Assistant Secretary Hartman’s + invitation.

+

3. At this point, however, I think it would be wrong to play + “business-as-usual” by moving ahead promptly in areas of our bilateral + relations mentioned above. It is clear that the GOC wants to play that way. For example, on January 10 the + Acting Director of the MFA Sixth + Department told me at a reception at the Ministry that the text of the + exchanges agreement had been sent the previous day by Foreign Minister + Chnoupek to other agencies of + the Czechoslovak Government for their consideration; MFA efforts to expedite approving the + agreement for signature seem to be coming substantially ahead of the + “three month” schedule originally indicated. In a possibly related move + to improve US–GOC ties, the Minister of + Foreign Trade told Economics Counselor on Jan. 20 he was eager to meet + Secretary Kreps (ref C).In telegram 219 from Prague, January 21, the + Embassy reported that Czechoslovak Foreign Trade Minister Barcak was + interested in meeting Secretary Kreps. The Embassy recommended that, because of the + anti-Western campaign in Czechoslovakia, as well as the ongoing + trials and arrests of dissidents, such a high-level meeting was + inopportune. (National Archives, RG + 59, Central Foreign Policy File, [no film number])

+

4. Rather than play along with the GOC, + I propose that for the time being we move forward only in those areas + that are of direct and important interest to the US (such as the Civil + Air Agreement) and forego + further action on the others, until we see more clearly what evolves out + of the Charter 77 confrontation. We should let the GOC know that as a matter of principle we + cannot remain indifferent to appeals of any citizenry asking for + international support in a struggle for elementary human rights. If the + situation for the dissidents greatly worsens here, I believe that we + should seriously consider indefinitely postponing the Spacil visit or + even withdrawing the invitation.

+

5. In addition, the Embassy proposes:

+

A. Port security—that we delay indefinitely informing GOC of reduction in notification time.

+

B. Civil aviation—that we continue to support PanAm’s wishes as we reach + agreement on conditions for extending the Bilateral Air Transport + Agreement which formally expired December 31, 1976. Current unwritten + “gentlemen’s agreement” for interim extension must eventually be + replaced by formal extension. We recommend that this be done, in spite + of Charter 77 issue, in order to protect PanAm’s landing rights and its + commercial investment here.

+

C. Textiles—that we be in no hurry to replace our bilateral agreement + with a consultative mechanism, even though we originally proposed this + change. However, given the technical nature of the change, we should not + delay action on this step unduly.

+

D. Scientific/cultural exchanges: We have about one month to watch + development of Charter 77 issue before decision is required on whether + to go ahead with negotiating the exchanges implementation program and to + sign agreement and program. Human rights issues are highly relevant to + this agreement, so we suggest Department continue to prepare for + implementation negotiations as originally scheduled, i.e. possibly some + time in March, but be prepared to postpone them at last minute, if + political considerations require.

+

E. Claims/gold: Here again we suggest Department proceed with groundwork + for renegotiation, as proposed in ref B, but not become locked into any + time framework. Congressional consultations should stress that in + reaching USG substantive negotiating + position we are not committing ourselves to timing. In considering when + to propose opening renegotiation, we will want to consider not only + issue of human rights of Czechoslovaks, but also the rights of the + U.S. claimants and the possibility + that in current situation GOC may be + more amenable to accepting tougher settlement terms than previously.

+

6. At the same time, we must take into our calculations that the GOC may retaliate for a “go-slow-approach + on our part by slowing or temporarily halting its processing of divided + family cases.

+

7. The Department may also want to consider making the human rights issue + in Czechoslovakia an item for discussion in the NATO + Council and seek to coordinate + an allied attitude toward current relations with this country—with + special attention to how the NATO + democracies respond to the Charter 77 struggle as the Belgrade CSCE review gathering draws nearer. We + note (ref D) that discussion of dissident activity in USSR and EE is already on agenda for Council’s February 7 + meeting.

+ + Byrne + +
+ +
+ 97. Memorandum From the Counselor of the Department of State + (Nimetz) to Secretary of + State VanceSource: National Archives, RG 59, Office of the Secretariat Staff, + Mr. Matthew Nimetz, Counselor + of the Department of State, Under Secretary of State for Security + Assistance, Science and Technology, January 1977 thru December 1980, + Lot 81D85, Box 1, MN Chron—Official—July–December 1977. + Confidential. The Department also reported on the meeting with Long + in telegram 159627 to Prague and Rome, July 9. (National Archives, + RG 59, Central Foreign Policy + File, D770245–0254) + + + Washington, July 6, + 1977 + + + SUBJECT + Czechoslovakia Claims/Gold + +

Kempton Jenkins and I called on + Senator Russell Long on June 28 to obtain his “blessing” to resume our + negotiations with the Czechs for the settlement of outstanding claims + and the return of Nazi-looted gold which we currently hold.Senator Long wrote in a March 22 letter to Vance that, because of + Czechoslovak intransigence on renegotiating the initial 20 million + settlement of the claims, “my personal view is now that a settlement + of twice $20 million would still not be half + enough.” Long suggested that the United States unilaterally + settle the claims by selling the Czechoslovak gold on the open + market. (National Archives, RG 59, + Office of the Assistant Legal Adviser for European Affairs, Country + Files, 1950–1986, Lot 89D336, Box 11, Czech: Gold 74–78) Vance wrote Long on April 12, + informing him that the administration’s review of policy toward + Eastern Europe would also cover the issue of the Czechoslovak gold + and that either he or Under Secretary for Economic Growth, Energy, + and the Environment Richard + Cooper would contact the Senator to discuss the + Czechoslovak issue. (Ibid.)

+

He did not accept our recommendation that we attempt to obtain from the + Czechs a $32 million lump-sum settlement (50 cents on the dollar using + Long’s calculations; 60 cents using ours). This amount had been floated + last year in private negotiations by a US businessman, apparently with Long’s blessing.Reference is to private messages passed to the + Czechoslovak Government (GOC) by + David Scott, chairman of Allis-Chalmers and of the U.S. section of the U.S.-Czechoslovak Economic Council + during his June 1976 trip to Prague. Scott, reportedly with approval + from Senator Long, informed the Czechoslovak Government that the + 1974 agreement would have to be renegotiated and that, in order to + obtain congressional approval, at least $32 million should be paid + to U.S. claimants. While the GOC initially dismissed the + suggestion, the Embassy subsequently reported that GOC officials moved from stating that + changes to the 1974 agreement would be “inadmissible,” to Foreign + Minister Chnoupek’s statement + that Prague was ready to start “renegotiations” on the gold/claims + issue. (Telegram 3517 from Prague, December 14, 1976; National + Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign + Policy File, D760461–0368, and telegram 3518 from Prague, December + 14, 1976; National Archives, RG 59, + Central Foreign Policy File, D760461–0686) Long forcefully + expressed his view that we should settle the problem by selling the + Czech gold held in the US ($40–50 million) and paying off the American + claimants. He reiterated his view that because the Czechs seized our + property we have every right to seize theirs. He was not convinced by + any of our standard arguments, to wit, that legal custody of the gold is + shared jointly by us, the UK, and France, that many of the claimants are + elderly and would be happy with partial settlements now while they are + still alive, and that the time is favorable for obtaining a reasonable + settlement with the Czechs.

+

I have asked L to examine the legal restraints on our disposing of the + gold unilaterally. I will explore with EUR the political effects of this as well as other possible + actions in light of Long’s extremely negative reaction to our + proposal.The Bureau of European Affairs + drafted a response from Vest + to Nimetz that recommended + against seizing the gold. The memorandum was forwarded for signature + on July 15. (National Archives, RG + 59, Office of the Assistant Legal Adviser for European Affairs, + Country Files, 1950–1986, Lot 89D336, Box 11, Czech: Gold 74–78) No + memorandum from the Legal Adviser was found.

+
+ + +
+ 98. Memorandum From Secretary of State Vance to President CarterSource: + Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, + Box 18, Evening Reports (State): 7/77. Confidential. The memorandum + was attached to a July 12 Evening Report from Vance to Carter. President + Carter wrote the + following instructions for Vance at end of the memorandum: “Try to let me know + what the Czechs will now accept. Then let me talk to Long. + J.” + + + Washington, undated + + + SUBJECT + Czechoslovak Claims/Gold Issue + +

In response to your question, here is a history of the Czechoslovak + claims/gold issue.In an Evening Report dated + July 6, Vance informed + Carter that the Department had approached Senator Long on June 28 in + order to obtain his “blessing” for resuming negotiations with the + Czechoslovak Government on the claims/gold agreement. Vance informed Carter that Long + was opposed to a settlement figure of $32 million and was strongly + in favor of vesting the gold. Vance concluded: “In view of Long’s opposition and + recent unfriendly Czech behavior, at this point we plan to do no + more than look into the legal avenues open to us.” Carter wrote on + the memorandum: “Give me a brief (2 page) memo on history.” + (Ibid.)

+

Except for East Germany, Czechoslovakia is the only East European country + with which the United States has not concluded a claims agreement + providing for compensation for the nationalized properties of U.S. citizens.

+

Two previous agreements, negotiated and initialled ad + referendum, have not come into force. Under the more recent + agreement in 1974, Czechoslovakia would have paid $29 million (40¢ on + the dollar on outstanding principal) to U.S. nationals. This figure would include $8.5 million + credited as paid in 1953 and compares favorably to agreements reached + between the U.S. and Poland, Romania, + and Hungary and to agreements reached between other Western governments + and Czechoslovakia. The U.S. would have + consented to the return to Czechoslovakia of 18.4 tons of Nazi-looted + gold held pursuant to the Paris Reparation Agreement of 1946 by the + Tripartite Commission (U.S., U.K., France). (The U.S. holds 8.7 tons of this with the rest in London.)

+

Senator Long, as Chairman of the Finance Committee and floor manager of + the Trade Act of 1974, was responsible for the rejection of this more + recent agreement. The Trade Act’s Section 408 (introduced by Senators + Long and Gravel) requires that the claims agreement be renegotiated and + submitted to the Congress for approval before the gold can be returned. + Senator Long has vocally expressed dissatisfaction with the State + Department’s handling of this matter although a number of Senators and Congressmen supported the + 1974 agreement which we negotiated.

+

Our basic goal remains to obtain compensation for U.S. claimants, many of whom are elderly and of limited + financial means. Most of them would have been satisfied with, or + acquiesced in, the 1974 agreement. In addition, we cannot expect any + significant improvement in U.S.-Czechoslovak relations until we conclude a claims + agreement. The Czechoslovak Government has made this clear by refusing + to finalize the Consular Convention negotiated in 1973 and by delaying + the opening of a U.S. Consulate in + Bratislava.

+

In June 1976, David Scott, President of Allis-Chalmers and the head of + the U.S. Section of the U.S.-Czechoslovak Economic Council, + informed Czechoslovak officials that Long would approve a $32 million + lump sum payment (in addition to the $8.5 million already credited as + having been paid in 1953). Czechoslovak officials rejected this + proposal. However, they said adjustments to the agreement we had reached + in 1974 were possible, and later indicated to us that the amount was + “negotiable”. Nevertheless, Scott reported to Long that the + Czechoslovaks were “intransigent”, and the Senator then wrote to me + proposing that the U.S. Government seize + the gold to satisfy outstanding claims. Meanwhile, Czechoslovak + officials have again stated privately and publicly their willingness to + confer with us on this issue.

+

On June 28, senior State Department officials sought Long’s “blessing” to + resume negotiations with the Czechoslovaks in which we would attempt to + obtain from them the $32 million lump sum settlement (50 cents on the + dollar using Long’s calculations; 56 [60?] cents + using ours) which Long had previously indicated would be + acceptable.See Document 97. Long forcefully expressed his view + that the easiest method to settle the problem would be to sell the + Czechoslovak gold held in the U.S. + (worth approximately $45 million) and pay off the American claimants. He + was not convinced by our arguments that we are restrained by law (Paris + Reparation Agreement) and that such an action would severely damage + U.S.-Czechoslovak relations.

+

We are examining both the legal restraints on our disposing of the gold + unilaterally and the political effects of this (vis-a-vis the French and + British as well as the Czechoslovaks). In addition, we are examining our + next steps in light of Long’s extremely negative reaction to our + proposal.

+
+ +
+ 99. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in + CzechoslovakiaSource: + National Archives, RG 59, Central + Foreign Policy File, D770368–0619. Confidential; Exdis; Priority. Drafted by + Andrews; cleared by + Luers; approved by + Anderson. The meeting took place in New York at the annual meeting + of the UN General + Assembly. + + + Washington, October 8, 1977, 0111Z + +

242479. Subject: The Secretary’s Conversation With Czechoslovak Foreign + Minister Chnoupek on October 6.

+ +

Participants

+

US Side:

+ +

The Secretary

+

Nicholas G. Andrews + (notetaker)

+ +

Czechoslovak Side:

+ +

Bohuslav Chnoupek, Foreign + Minister

+

Jaromir Johannes, Ambassador to the US

+

Eduard Kukan, Counselor in Washington

+

Mr. Suja, Chef de Cabinet to the Foreign Minister

+

Mr. Kovarik, interpreter

+ +

1. Summary: Chnoupek said + US-Czechoslovak relations have not moved substantially forward in five + years and the main problem is the claims/gold issue. The new views + conveyed by Ambassador Byrne are + very different from the previous ones and Chnoupek wondered if the Ambassador was speaking + officially. The Secretary said we wish to improve relations and cited + claims/gold and Czechoslovak treatment of US journalists and the Charter + 77 group as matters which have brought about the present situation. He + assured Chnoupek that Ambassador + Byrne is authorized to try + to resolve the claims issue and has the full confidence and support of + the USG. He mentioned the visit of the + Deputy Minister of Foreign Trade and the Cultural/Scientific Agreement + as positive steps and Chnoupek + agreed. Chnoupek said he would + meet again soon with Ambassador Byrne. He presented the Czechoslovak view on human + rights. The Secretary said the US is not approaching the Belgrade + Conference in a spirit of confrontation but in order to review seriously + the extent of progress achieved and to discuss new initiatives. + Chnoupek warned that if the + human rights area is singled out for debate, a constructive dialogue + would be impossible. He said the Czechoslovak delegation is prepared for + a constructive discussion. End summary

+ +

2. The Secretary opened by expressing his pleasure at the opportunity to + talk of matters of mutual interest and to improve the relationship + between our two countries which is the objective we both share.

+

Chnoupek thanked the Secretary for + receiving him and mentioned that he has not had an opportunity for + almost three years to have a discussion on bilateral relations at this + level. In the Czechoslovak view and, he thought, in the US view, the + development of relations is not in keeping with the general trend. Among + the Socialist countries, he said, Czechoslovakia has to rank in the last + place. In substance, we are in the same place as we were five to six + years ago. At that time, the work done with American colleagues did not + lead to the desired results. He admitted there have been some positive + steps during the most recent period. He had a one and one-half hour talk + with Ambassador Byrne on + bilateral relations and they went into considerable detail. They + evaluated all the positive steps but also said that the main problem + remains unresolved, namely the property and financial claims.In telegram 2615 from Prague, September 15, the + Embassy reported the conversation between Ambassador Bryne and the + Czechoslovak Foreign Minister. The discussion covered bilateral + relations, including treatment of the United States in the + Czechoslovak press. Chnoupek + told Byrne that, while he + understood U.S. dissatisfaction with + the treatment, he “could not see any hope for amelioration in the + near future, as press was province of ideologues, not government.” + (National Archives, RG 59, Central + Foreign Policy File, D770335–0022) See also footnote 3, Document 97.

+

Noting the discussions on claims in the 1960’s Chnoupek mentioned Secretary Rogers’ + visit to Czechoslovakia during which it was agreed to resume talks. + After hard negotiations, Czechoslovakia believed it had concluded a very + reasonable agreement which was roughly in keeping with those the US + reached with other Socialist countries. The agreement was initialled but + not concluded. Chnoupek said + there has hardly been any practical possibility for a political dialogue + since then. The last visit to Prague was by an Assistant Secretary + (Hartman). Trade was not at + all up to the possibilities. Czechoslovak exports according to one joke, + is as high as Polish exports of ham. Imports are low. Tariffs for + Czechoslovak goods are four times higher. There is no opportunity to + obtain credits.

+

3. Returning to the claims question, Chnoupek said he has seen a large number of official, + semi-official and unofficial people who have expressed views on this + question. In the last three years, he has almost lost sight of what are + official views and what are unofficial views, citing conversations with + Congressman Vanik and Senator Jackson. He said that in their recent talk + Ambassador Byrne had stated + certain new views. He expected that these would represent the official + stand of the US Government. But if he understood the Ambassador + correctly, he was giving his own reasoning about what a settlement would + look like based on his + discussions in Washington. Therefore, Chnoupek said he was not clear whether the Ambassador + was talking officially or taking soundings. Chnoupek said he also told Ambassador Byrne that the new suggestions differ + a great deal from what was agreed in the past. The new ideas represent + 50–60 of the principal whereas the previous agreement was about 41. The + latter was approximately the percentage agreed upon in settlements with + Bulgaria, Hungary and Poland. The only higher percentage seems to be the + one with Yugoslavia at 44. Czechoslovakia would be an exception and it + would not look well for the government. It would mean a renegotiation, + and Chnoupek said he would have + to go again to the government and the Parliament to seek approval. He is + very afraid that renegotiation would be very difficult, if possible at + all. According to his instructions from the government, he has freedom + of action in regard to time limits and frequency of payments but not in + the total sum. He concluded by saying he would be glad to hear the US + official stand and Czechoslovakia is interested in normalizing and + developing relations.

+

4. The Secretary said he will answer the specific question but also say + something on the broader perspective. We do wish to improve the + relations between our two countries. The Secretary said Chnoupek could convey that as the + conviction of President Carter + and the entire administration. He said there are principally two matters + that have brought about the present condition in bilateral relations. + One is the claims question and the return of the gold. The other arises + out of and is connected with Czechoslovak treatment of US journalists + and the Charter 77 movement. The Secretary said he would be less than + frank if he did not make this clear.

+

5. The Secretary said Ambassador Byrne is authorized to begin discussions with Chnoupek to try to resolve the claims + matter so that relations can progress. He noted that the 1974 Agreement + had been rejected by Congress and that Congress must approve a new + agreement under our laws, or otherwise it will have no force and effect. + Congress has said that the total sum must be substantially raised or + there will not be an agreement. The Secretary realized that this made + things very difficult for Chnoupek but without this substantial increase it would + be impossible to get congressional approval. He said Ambassador + Byrne has been given + authority to discuss these matters with Chnoupek and that he has our full confidence and support + in working out a settlement, if that is possible. He is speaking on + behalf of and with the full backing of the government. The Secretary + said he hoped discussions can go forward because without progress our + relations will be affected. Secondly, the Secretary said we are familiar + with the problems this has raised. We hope the future will bring some + changes in these matters and will remove some of the obstacles. He noted + the forthcoming visit of the + Deputy Minister of Foreign Trade and the new agreement reached in the + scientific and cultural exchanges field. He saw those as positive + factors and hoped we can move in that direction. He said we want to move + forward but must deal with the two problems.

+

6. Chnoupek said he will meet + again soon with Ambassador Byrne. The claims issue was the main problem in bilateral + relations. He said he is grateful the Secretary mentioned the visit of + the Deputy Minister of Foreign Trade on the occasion of the meeting of + the Economic Council and hopes he will have access to appropriate + officials.Jakubec visited the United States in October 1977 to + attend the U.S.-Czechoslovak + Economic Council meeting. The Department reported his October 28 + meeting with Vest in + telegram 259591 to Prague, October 29. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + D770399–0115) The Secretary said he will. Chnoupek said the Czechoslovak side has + tried to come forward to meet the US side on the scientific and cultural + agreement. As for the journalists and Charter 77 Chnoupek said he has discussed those + matters with everyone he has met. The discussion of internal affairs was + a matter of reciprocity. When the US presents a list of articles about + the US taken from the Czechoslovak press, Czechoslovakia has a list of + articles about it taken from the US press. Sometimes, as in the case of + Charter 77, it becomes a concentrated issue. Chnoupek said it is a question of which came first, the + chicken or the egg. He referred to dreadful articles in the US press + calling Ambassador Johannes a KGB spy. The Secretary said he had missed + them. Chnoupek wondered what the + US wants when the “official press”, not to speak of Radio Free Europe, + speaks of a normalized Czechoslovakia. He said the ideological struggle + will be continued and the US will not praise Czechoslovakia as a + Communist country. The US follows a different road and Czechoslovakia + believes in different goals. In the bilateral dialogue, ethical norms + should be observed. Chnoupek + apologized for bringing all this up in the first meeting but said it was + necessary to clarify matters and this had been the first chance in three + years for such a discussion. He said he would report the Secretary’s + views immediately to the President and to the government.

+

7. The Secretary thought that in human rights matters the Belgrade + Conference can be, and he thought will be, a constructive dialogue. The + US is not approaching it in a spirit of confrontation, or with a view to + engaging in polemical rhetoric against any other country; but we are + approaching it in a spirit of serious review of where progress has been + made, when progress has not been made and to develop guidelines to help + us make progress in the future. The Belgrade Conference is a forum in + which there can be discussion of new initiatives. The Secretary hoped a + better understanding and a strengthening of relations will come out of the conference. The + initial reports from the US delegation is that that is the spirit on + both sides.

+

8. Chnoupek said the Secretary’s + position was also the Czechoslovak position in substance. Czechoslovakia + sees the Final Act as a comprehensive whole and does not want to extract + individual sections, such as human rights, for debate. If that happens, + there will be a big battle. He spoke of his years in propaganda work and + the different views on both sides on this matter which would make it + impossible to speak of a constructive dialogue. He referred to his sharp + discussion on human rights with Netherlands Foreign Minister Van der + Stoel earlier this year. Chnoupek + concluded that the Czechoslovak delegation at Belgrade is prepared for a + constructive discussion. Chnoupek + said they had made a good beginning and the Secretary said he hoped to + see Chnoupek again.

+ + Christopher + +
+ +
+ 100. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in + CzechoslovakiaSource: + National Archives, RG 59, Central + Foreign Policy File, D770384–0432. Confidential; Immediate. Drafted + by Glenn; cleared in + substance in EUR and cleared by + Kornblum, Brody, Schmidt, Nimetz, and Shulman; approved by + Luers. Sent for + information Priority to Munich. Sent for information to Belgrade for + the USCSCE delegation. + + + Washington, October 19, 1977, 1611Z + +

250945. Belgrade for USCSCE Del, Munich + for Gilmore. Subject: Major Charter 77 Figures Reportedly Convicted and + Sentenced. Ref: Munich 2963.Telegram 2963 + from Munich to Prague, October 7, reported that RFE management had informed the + Consulate that four Charter 77 activists (Havel, Pavlicek, Lederer, + and Ornest) were to be tried for anti-state activities in Prague + starting October 17, and requested that reporting on the subject + also be sent to Munich for information. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + D770366–0499)

+

1. According to Reuters reports received here, trial of major Charter 77 + activists (Vaclav Havel, Frantisek Pavlicek, Jiri Lederer, and Ota + Ornest) on charges of anti-state activity, subversion, and contact with + such exiles as Pavel Tigrid and Jiri Pelikan began on October 17. + Defendants were originally apprehended for, inter alia, assisting in the + distribution in the West of Czechoslovak literature banned by the + regime. Reuters states that sources close to the defendants report that + the four defendants were + convicted and sentenced on October 18. Reportedly two of the four + received prison terms and two suspended sentences.

+

2. During an Eastern European Embassy reception on evening of October 17, + EUR/EE Deputy Director raised + subject of the trial with Czechoslovak Ambassador Johannes, who, + claiming that he had only seen US press reports, said trial was not + connected with Charter 77.

+

Department officer said he thought this would be hard for the American + public to believe in light of fact that most of the defendants were + prominent figures in the Charter 77 effort. He indicated we were + concerned by implications of the press reports we had seen and noted his + view that such events could not help but have a negative effect on the + atmosphere of our bilateral relations. Johannes reacted rather sharply, + saying that the trial was an internal Czechoslovak action and that the + US should not interfere in such matters. In response, Department officer + said we had no intention of interfering in Czechoslovakia’s internal + affairs; he had simply wished to point out how such actions would + undoubtedly be perceived in this country.

+

3. Septel contains text of + contingency press guidance prepared for Department’s noon press briefing + on October 18, and the exchange between the spokesman and reporters + which took place. Action addressees may draw on this guidance as + required.The Department forwarded press + guidance in telegram 250946 to Prague, October 19, following the + speedy trial and conviction of the four Charter 77 leaders. + (National Archives, RG 59, Central + Foreign Policy File, D770384–0430) Additional press guidance was + forwarded to Prague and Belgrade in telegram 251229, October 19. + (National Archives, RG 59, Central + Foreign Policy File, D770384–0917)

+

4. Action requested: The Ambassador should, as soon as convenient, convey + to the Czech Government the following:

+

—The trial and the convictions of four Czech citizens reported in the + press appears inconsistent with the provisions of the CSCE Final Act regarding the freer and + wider dissemination of information of all kinds.

+

—Moreover, three of the individuals tried had been directly associated + with efforts to support full compliance with the Helsinki Final Act.

+

—This trial taking place during the opening phase of the Belgrade + Conference raises questions about the seriousness and intent of the + Czech Government regarding the objectives of this conference and the + Final Act itself.

+

—We raise this issue in the spirit of the Helsinki Final Act fully + realizing that judicial proceedings are essentially an internal + matter.

+ +

—Yet since the reported activities of these individuals so directly + relate to the objectives of the CSCE + Conference we believe it essential that the authorities in + Czechoslovakia understand that we expect adverse reactions from the + American people and that these events are likely to have a negative + impact on the atmosphere in our bilateral relations.In telegram 3072 from Prague, October 21, the + Embassy reported that Ambassador Byrne delivered the démarche on the trial and + conviction of the Charter 77 activists in Prague on October 18 to + the Foreign Minister. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D773089–0398) On + October 22, during a speech in Los Angeles at a Democratic National + Committee fundraiser, President Carter told the audience that the recent conviction + of Czechoslovak dissidents created “serious problems” in the + relationship between the two countries. (Public + Papers: Carter, 1977, Book II, p. 1896) During a White + House press conference on October 27, President Carter responded to a question + about South Africa’s human rights violations by once again referring + to Czechoslovakia’s conviction of dissidents. Carter suggested that + trade policy and cultural exchanges could be curtailed when another + country violated policies that were important to the United States. + (Public Papers: Carter, 1977, Book II, p. + 1916)

+ + Vance + +
+ +
+ + 101. Briefing Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for + European Affairs (Vest) to the + Director of the Policy Planning Staff (Lake)Source: + National Archives, RG 59, Office of + the Secretariat Staff, Official Working Papers, S/P Director Anthony Lake, 1977–Jan 1981, Lot + 82D298, Box 11, Classified Correspondence, 1978. Limited Official + Use. Drafted by Glenn; + cleared by Schmidt. Luers initialed the memorandum for + Vest. No record of the + meeting has been found. The Ambassador’s first name was corrected by + hand in the subject line. In a handwritten note, presumably to Leo + Reddy, the Secretariat Staff Director, S/P staff assistant Mary Ann Casey remarked: “LR—PK + [Phillip Kaplan] will ask desk do memo. TL says ok if desk sits in + w/PK. PK will ask desk & let + you know. TL wants reschedule appt for next week or week after so + won’t conflict w/for. pol. report. + Pls let PK know new date. I will meet on whatever new date is. MAC.” + (Ibid.) + + + Washington, January + 26, 1978 + +

Your Meeting with Czechoslovak Ambassador + Jaromir Johanes, + Friday, January 27, 2:30 p.m.

+ + PARTICIPANTS + The Director, S/P + Phillip S. Kaplan, S/P + James H. Glenn, + EUR/EE + Jaroslav Johanes, + Czechoslovak Ambassador to the United States + +

SETTING

+

Ambassador Johanes recently + indicated to Jim Glenn, EUR/EE, at a reception that he would + soon begin a series of courtesy calls on various high-level officials of + the Department of State and of other executive agencies. His call on you + is the first of this series. Since requesting an appointment with you, + he has requested similar appointments with Secretaries Blumenthal and Kreps.In + telegram 49472 to Prague, February 25, the Department informed the + Embassy that Ambassador Johanes, having failed to secure a meeting with + Secretary Blumenthal or + Secretary Kreps, decided to + cancel his appointments at Treasury and Commerce. (National + Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign + Policy File, D780088–1267) He has not indicated an interest + in discussing any specific subject during these calls. We do not expect + that he has anything new or extraordinary to discuss with you. Rather, + we speculate that he simply wants to extend his personal contacts with + U.S. officials, or that he is + testing us to determine if we are willing to extend to him the same + degree of access to U.S. officials which + we have been pressuring his Government to extend to our Ambassador to + Czechoslovakia, Thomas R. + Byrne.

+

ISSUES

+

1. Human Rights and the + Implementation of the Helsinki Final Act

+

Essential Factors: The Czechoslovak Government + last October convicted and sentenced four dissidents, including three + signatories of Charter 77. Two + received prison terms of three or more years for subversion involving + alleged efforts to send written materials out of the country and to have + materials published abroad. Although Czechoslovak authorities maintain + there was no connection between that trial and Charter 77, the three + Charter signatories were directly associated with efforts of the Charter + 77 Movement to encourage full compliance by Czechoslovakia with all + provisions of the CSCE Final Act. + Earlier this month, the Czechoslovak court rejected the appeal of the + three Charter signatories and lessened by one year the sentence of the + other defendant, who had pleaded guilty at the trial and subsequently + publicly apologized for his “crimes.”

+

We have received information that a Charter 78 may be disseminated in the + near future. This new Charter reportedly will examine the compliance of + the Czechoslovak Government with the CSCE Final Act, the International Covenants on Civil and + Political and on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, and the + Czechoslovak Constitution.

+

We regard human rights as a key issue in our bilateral relations and, + both here and in Prague, have made our position on this subject clear. + (See, for example, the attached report of my conversation last fall with + a Czechoslovak Deputy Foreign Trade Minister.)Attached but not printed. In telegram 259591 to + Prague, October 29, 1977, the Department reported the discussion + between Jakubec and Vest on October 18, 1977. The two + officials discussed the status of bilateral relations between the + two countries and the effect of human rights, especially the recent + trials and convictions of dissidents in Czechoslovakia, on the + future of relations between the two countries. (National Archives, + RG 59, Central Foreign Policy + File, D770399–0115) Pending indications as to how the + regime’s treatment of dissidents may evolve, we are going slow on any + initiatives to improve relations. For example, we are delaying signing a + cultural and scientific exchanges agreement, negotiated in 1976. The + regime’s treatment of dissidents—and its overall image here—will + determine whether we will be able to take positive action both on the + exchanges agreement and on other bilateral issues.

+

We also object to the Czechoslovak Government’s policy on the issuance of + visas to U.S. journalists. It flatly + refuses to issue visas to a few journalists and demands that others + pledge not to attempt to contact dissidents while in Czechoslovakia + before it will issue them visas. We consider this policy to be + inconsistent, to say the least, with the provisions of the CSCE Final Act regarding the treatment + of, and working conditions for, journalists. We take every useful + opportunity to express our concern and displeasure to the Czechoslovak + Government on this issue.

+ +

2. Claims/Gold

+

Essential Factors: We negotiated an ad referendum agreement on this long-standing + issue in July, 1974, involving satisfaction of the claims of U.S. citizens against the Government of + Czechoslovakia in return for the return to Czechoslovakia of its share + of the gold confiscated by the Nazis before and during World War II. + Senator Long’s desire for a higher settlement than we had obtained led + to Section 408 of the Trade Act of 1974 requiring renegotiation of the + agreement. The Czechoslovak Government is opposed to giving us as much + as Senator Long would like. Ambassador Byrne in mid-September, 1977, began quiet, informal + discussions on this issue with Czechoslovak Foreign Minister Chnoupek. The Secretary in his UNGA meeting with Chnoupek in late September emphasized + that Ambassador Byrne has the + Department’s full confidence and support in working out a settlement but + stressed that a successful resolution of the claims/gold issue would not + of itself normalize our bilateral relations. He indicated that + improvement in relations would also require a change in the human rights + situation in Czechoslovakia and in the manner in which the Czechoslovak + Government implements the CSCE Final + Act.See Document + 99.

+

Ambassador Byrne hopes in the + near future again to discuss this issue with Chnoupek and then to send us his thoughts on what amount + might be acceptable to all concerned. As in the case of the exchanges + agreement, the regime’s treatment of dissidents may delay whatever + progress is possible in resolving this issue.

+
+ +
+ 102. Memorandum for the FilesSource: National Archives, RG 59, Office of the Assistant Legal Adviser for + European Affairs, Country Files, 1950–1986, Lot 89D336, Box 11, + Czech: Gold 74–78. Confidential. Drafted by Glenn on March 22; cleared by + Schmidt. + + + Washington, undated + + + SUBJECT + Ambassador Byrne’s Meeting + with Senator Long, March 2 + +

United States Ambassador to Czechoslovakia, Thomas R. Byrne, in the Department on consultation, met + with Senator Russell Long (D., La.) on March 2 to discuss the linked + issues of the return of the gold in the custody of the Tripartite + Commission for the Restitution of Monetary Gold (looted by the Nazis + during World War II) and the resolution of claims of U.S. citizens against the Czechoslovak + Government for the nationalization of their properties after World War + II.In telegram 483 from Prague, + February 23, Ambassador Byrne informed the Department that, during his trip + to Washington for consultations, he would like to focus on the + “major bilateral issue with the Czechoslovaks and the sine qua non + for any eventual normalization of our relations, claims/gold.” + Byrne reported that he + was ready to discuss concrete steps forward both at the Department + and during his consultations on the Hill. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + D780084–0073)

+

The United States and Czechoslovakia negotiated an ad + referendum agreement in 1974 providing for payment of + compensation to U.S. claimants in return + for release by the U.S. of the + Czechoslovak gold. Senators Long and Gravel, allegedly at the behest of + some U.S. claimants dissatisfied with + the amount of compensation provided for in the agreement, in effect + repudiated it by amending the Trade Act of 1974 to provide for + Congressional approval of any claims settlement agreement with + Czechoslovakia before the U.S. could + release its holdings of Czechoslovak gold. Since 1974, Senator Long’s + position on appropriate compensation of U.S. claimants has changed several times.Following receipt of telegram 483 from Prague, + February 23, Schmidt prepared + a briefing memorandum for Luers on the history of the Czechoslovak gold/claims + issue and the involvement of Senator Long. The memorandum suggested + that it was essential for Ambassador Byrne to “obtain at least a ‘ballpark-figure’ + commitment from Long” before negotiations with Czechoslovakia were + to start again. (National Archives, RG 59, Office of the Assistant Legal Adviser for + European Affairs, Country Files, 1950–1986, Lot 89D336, Box 11, + Czech: Gold 74–78) Last summer, Long supported Ambassador + Byrne’s idea to discuss the + claims/gold issue with the Czechoslovaks to learn whether it would be + possible and appropriate to present them with a new proposal. Ambassador + Byrne held discussions with + Czechoslovak officials and returned in late February on consultation to + attempt to obtain a commitment on a “ball-park” figure from Senator + Long.

+ +

At their meeting, Senator Long told Ambassador Byrne that he wants a 100% settlement, + which the Czechoslovak Government would almost certainly reject out of + hand. In lieu of a 100% settlement, Long wants the U.S. Government unilaterally to vest the + Czechoslovak gold in its possession and to use the proceeds to satisfy + U.S. claimants. Long said this + should cause the Czechoslovaks no real problem since, once this issue + was out of the way, the road would then be clear for them to receive + MFN and USG credits. According to Long, the value of MFN and credits for Czechoslovakia would + far exceed the value of the lost gold. Such action would violate + international law and our treaty obligations and would create serious + difficulties with Great Britain and France, our fellow Tripartite + Commission members, which have already agreed to the return of the gold + to Czechoslovakia. Advised of the likelihood of such difficulties, Long + recommended linking British and French acquiescence in vesting the gold + to the status of the Concorde, implying that an amendment to a tax bill + could effectively ban the Concorde. Long also reiterated that he would + like to talk with the Secretary about this claims/gold issue.

+
+ +
+ 103. Memorandum From Robert + King of the National Security Council Staff to the + President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)Source: Carter Library, National + Security Affairs, Brzezinski + Material, Country File, Box 17, Czechoslovakia: 1/77–1/81. + Confidential. Sent for action. Aaron wrote at the top of the memorandum “ZB—The idea is [to] reward them[?] for + their [?] position [at] Belgrade.” + + + Washington, March 27, + 1978 + + + SUBJECT + State Department Suggestion to Make a New Proposal to the + Czechoslovak Government on the Claims/Gold Problem and Implement an + Exchanges Agreement + +

At Matt Nimitz’s suggestion, a memo is being circulated in State that, if + cleared, would be sent to Secretary Vance by George + Vest recommending that the US present a new proposal to + the Czechoslovak government to resolve the Claims/Gold issue and that a + program document be negotiated which would permit the signing of the + exchanges agreement with Czechoslovakia that was negotiated in 1976. Since the memo is being + circulated in draft form at present, now is the time to make our views + known before Secretary Vance is + asked to approve these steps.Not + found.

+

With regard to the Claims/Gold issue, an agreement + was initialled in 1974 calling for 41% payment on the claims, after + which the US would return gold seized from Czechoslovakia by Nazi + Germany and subsequently taken by the US, Britain, and France in 1945. + Senator Long rejected the 1974 settlement as being too low. In talks + with Ambassador Byrne (our man + in Prague who was here in early March for consultations), Long said the + Czechoslovaks should pay 100% plus interest and if they refuse, the US + should vest the gold and pay the claims.See + Document 102. This, however, + would cause problems with the British and French who are members of the + Triparte Commission for Restitution of Monetary Gold, and it would also + create difficulties under international law. The Trade Act of 1974 + requires any agreement on the Claims/Gold Issue to receive Congressional + approval. Since Long’s refusal to accept the 1974 agreement, no movement + has taken place on the question. State would like to initiate + discussions with the Czechoslovak government in an attempt to secure an + agreement on a higher settlement figure, which would then be presented + to Congress for approval.

+

There are several thousand US claimants. The longer the issue remains + unresolved, the lower the value of their claims. Both claimants and + Congress have been critical of inaction on the issue since 1974. + Although the Claims/Gold Question is an obstacle to better + US-Czechoslovak relations, resolving it will not automatically lead to + an improvement in relations. In this case, there are valid domestic + reasons for attempting to solve it.

+

The decision to negotiate an exchanges agreement + with Czechoslovakia was made by Kissinger in 1975 following the Helsinki + conference. (Agreements with Hungary and Bulgaria were negotiated and + entered into force in 1976.) Negotiations with Czechoslovakia were + completed in December 1976, but the accompanying implementing program + document was not completed because of criticism of the Czechoslovak + government’s actions against the Charter 77 group. State now proposes + that the implementing program be negotiated so that the exchanges + agreement can come into force. The justification is that such an + agreement will enhance our ability to establish contacts with + Czechoslovak citizens, which are currently very limited. It would + require probably two months to complete negotiations, and State would + like to sign the agreement by June in order to use funds in the fiscal + 1978 budget set aside for the + program. State would handle negotiations and the signing in a low-key + fashion in Prague in order to prevent its being seen as an endorsement + of the Husak regime.

+

On balance there seem to be valid reasons to initiate new negotiations on + the gold/claims question since American claimants are suffering from our + inaction. Even if an agreement is reached it will require some time to + achieve. Furthermore, it will not reflect endorsement of the Husak regime. The exchanges agreement, + however, would reflect favorably on the Husak government and its supposed advantages to the US + are, at best, marginal.

+

Recommendation:

+

That we make new proposals to the Czechoslovaks on the Claims/ Gold + Question, but that we not sign the exchanges + agreement at the present time.Brzezinski checked the “Disagree” + box without further comment.

+ +
+ +
+ 104. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in + CzechoslovakiaSource: + National Archives, RG 59, Central + Foreign Policy File, D780241–0880. Confidential. Drafted by + Glenn; cleared by Wolf; + approved by Nimetz. + + + + Washington, June 9, 1978, 1332Z + +

146533. Subject: Czechoslovak Ambassador Johanes’ Meeting With the Counselor.

+

1. Czechoslovak Ambassador Johanes, at his request, met with the Counselor on June 7 to + discuss bilateral relations before leaving for two weeks of + consultations and leave in Prague. Ira Wolf, C, and the Czechoslovak + Desk Officer sat in. Following is a summary of the discussion.

+

2. General state of relations. In response to Johanes’ statement that he wanted to understand the + obstacles to improved relations, Nimetz said that the US wants to have good relations + with all states. No two are alike, the USG approaches them on an equal basis. US/EE relations are improving. There are + problems, but the USG tries to resolve + them, including those with Czechoslovakia. Effort and good will on both + sides are required. Other + states are responsive to US gestures, but the US perceives little + interest in Prague in improving relations. Czechoslovak media attacks on + the President and the country, the GOC’s human rights policy, its treatment of Western + journalists, its handling of the normalization program, and its policy + on visas for former Czechoslovak citizens such as Vosicky lead to bad + feeling and make progress impossible. Nimetz said he was pessimistic that much could be done + to improve relations in the next few months. Perhaps in the fall or + early next year, relations could be improved. He emphasized that the US + would like to improve relations and wants both a claims settlement + agreement and a cultural exchanges agreement. The public’s attitude + toward Czechoslovakia is favorable, as it has been since 1918. The + GOC’s attitude is the problem.

+

3. In response, Johanes said the + GOC’s perception is completely + different, that it wants to improve relations but the US is unwilling + to. His discussion with George + Vest on June 5 (septel)On June 5, Ambassador + Johanes met with + Assistant Secretary for European Affairs George Vest. Vest informed Johanes that the bilateral + relations between the two governments were “characterized by + differing perspectives on such issues as divided families and + dissidents” and that, because of their present state, no improvement + was likely to occur. On the claims/gold issue, Vest informed the Czechoslovak + Ambassador that “even if we had an agreed proposal ready to present, + we would not now do so due to the state of relations.” (Telegram + 143296 to Prague, June 6; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + D780237–0846) convinced him that the US does not want + improved relations. Johanes + denied that the problems Nimetz + mentioned were really obstacles to improved relations. The GOC is prosecuting dissidents only when + they violate Czechoslovak law. On the other hand, in some countries + allied to the US, people are shot on the street. The GOC’s policy on visas for former + Czechoslovak citizens has greatly improved; almost everyone can now + visit Czechoslovakia. The GOC’s media + treatment of the US simply reflects the US media’s treatment of + Czechoslovakia. Johanes mentioned + that, 1½ years ago, he complained about an article in the New York Times + attacking Husak (Gaulaiter Husak). In his two years + here, he has seen nothing positive about Czechoslovakia in the US press. + Re Helsinki, Johanes said that + the GOC knows that problems exist in + the US, but they do not influence the GOC’s desire to improve relations. A foreign policy + requiring another state to take specific actions before relations can be + improved is childish; the GOC rejects + such requirements. Other Western countries which value human rights have + found it possible to improve relations with Czechoslovakia. Why not the + US? The GOC does want a cultural + exchanges agreement with the US, in accord with the Helsinki Final Act. + The GOC was told that the agreement + could not be signed before August, 1978 due to public opinion, but + Johanes wondered if the + elections in November are also a factor.

+ +

4. Nimetz told Johanes that the 10th anniversary of + 1968 is not the only difficulty. The problem is the general atmosphere + in Czechoslovakia and its hostility to the US and to US journalists. + Nimetz said he personally + would like nothing better than to be able to begin spending time in + improving relations with Czechoslovakia.

+

He reiterated that there is no impediment on the US side to improved + relations, citing his own participation in arrangements to return the + Crown of St. Stephen to Hungary and in negotiations to extend it MFN tariff status. The key was that the + USG thought that Hungary had worked + out problems in a constructive way. Even Bulgaria and East Germany have + found it possible to improve relations with the US. Czechoslovakia + could, too. Relations cannot become much worse.

+

5. Pavel Vosicky case. Nimetz + raised Vosicky’s case as an example of GOC actions which harm relations. Nimetz explained that Vosicky wants to + visit his dying mother but has been unable recently to obtain a visa. + The GOC, on humanitarian if no other + grounds, could have given Vosicky a visa. Its refusal has produced a + markedly negative reaction in the USG + which contributes to a further deterioration of relations.

+

6. Claims/Gold. Johanes said the + GOC is eager for a settlement; + American claimants need the remainder of their compensation. He said the + GOC thought the 1974 Agreement was + a good one; even the State Department said so until recently. The 1974 + Agreement provided for roughly the same percentage settlement as those + the USG has negotiated with other + EE states. Johanes stressed that the Czechoslovak + people do not accept the USG’s refusal + to release the gold and it is difficult to explain why the USG refuses when France and Britain have + agreed to do so. Johanes noted + that the UK and Czechoslovakia do not yet have a claims settlement + agreement yet there is no dispute over the gold. Although it disliked + the idea, the GOC agreed in 1974 to the + USG’s desire to link the issues. + Johanes emphasized that the + GOC regards this issue as most + important. Until it is resolved, it will be impossible to improve + relations.

+

7. Nimetz responded that the State + Department’s attitude to the 1974 Agreement is academic; the Congress + requires renegotiation and any agreement must be acceptable to the + Congress. This will take some time. The USG is working on its position. Clearly, the 1974 Agreement + is no longer adequate. The price of gold has increased, and the dollar + has depreciated. The claims settlement agreements with other EE states were negotiated years ago. The + settlements were worth much more then. The GOC loses nothing on the gold. The American claimants lost + their properties and deserve compensation. Nimetz asked if the GOC + wants to discuss the issue. Johanes said yes, that Ambassador Byrne had said he would return to + Czechoslovakia last year with a new proposal but had made only a vague statement about the + need for additional compensation. Nimetz reiterated that the USG does not yet have a position.

+

8. Access. Johanes complained that + the Secretary had been unable to see him this week despite his promise + to Foreign Minister Chnoupek in + New York last week that he would do so. Johanes also complained that both Blumenthal and Kreps have refused to see him. He + contrasted their refusal to the willingness of senior GOC officials to meet with Ambassador + Byrne at his pleasure. + Johanes said there seemed to + be more opportunities in Prague than in Washington for discussions with + USG officials and wondered whether + anti-GOC attitudes were not being + created here. Nimetz informed + Johanes that the Secretary is + extremely busy and cannot meet with most Ambassadors. Nimetz added that, even when + arrangements to return the Crown to Hungary were underway, the Secretary + had been able to meet only once with the Hungarian Ambassador. Nimetz said Johanes should not take the Secretary’s inability to + meet with him as a slight.

+ + Vance + +
+ +
+ 105. Telegram From the Embassy in Czechoslovakia to the Department of + State and Multiple Diplomatic PostsSource: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780328–1038. + Confidential. Sent Priority to the Department. Sent to Belgrade, + East Berlin, Bonn, Bucharest, Budapest, London, Moscow, Paris, Rome, + Sofia, Vienna, Warsaw, USNATO, + West Berlin, USUN, and + Beijing. + + + + Prague, August 11, 1978, 1110Z + +

2142. Subject: 10th Anniversary of Czechoslovak Invasion—Current + Developments. Ref: Prague 1911.Telegram + 1911 from Prague, July 20, provided the Embassy’s assessment of the + situation in Czechoslovakia on the evening of the tenth anniversary + of the 1968 Soviet invasion. The Embassy concluded that no “great + change in Czechoslovak domestic or foreign policy or in bilateral + relations” can be expected “during the rest of this year.” (National + Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign + Policy File, D780310–0616) A similar assessment was provided by the + Central Intelligence Agency on August 17, in an Intelligence + Memorandum entitled “Czechoslovakia Ten Years After.” (Central + Intelligence Agency, Office of Support Services (DI), Job 80T00634A, + Production Case Files (1978), Box 3, Folder 74, Czechoslovakia: Ten + Years After)

+

1. Summary: With the anniversary of 1968 Soviet intervention less than + ten days away, the most prominent visible sign that Czechoslovaks are + aware of it is in frequent references to 1968 events in regime propaganda. Dissident activity + appears to be confined to preparing statements for release and reviving + underground cultural activities. End summary.

+

2. Activities of Charter 77 supporters. It still appears as if the main + objective of human rights activists in marking the 10th anniversary will + be issuance of declarations reaffirming fidelity to calls for greater + freedom that distinguished the 1968 Dubcek regime. The declaration + stemming from recent meeting of Charter 77 and Polish human rights + activists near the CSSR-Polish border + is a case in point (Prague 2096).In + telegram 2096 from Prague, August 8, the Embassy reported that + members of Charter 77 and the Polish Committee of Workers’ Defense + (KOR) drafted a statement on the ten-year anniversary of the Soviet + invasion. The Embassy concluded that, while the document was + primarily interesting as evidence of direct contacts between Charter + 77 and KOR, it would “presumably cause security officials in both + countries some additional heartburn.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + D780325–0650) But perhaps most interesting event this week + has been commencement of so-called “living room theatre” production of + the Shakespeare classic Macbeth, organized by playwright Pavel Kohout + and starring Pavel Landovsky and Vlasta Chramostova—all of whom are + denied the possibility of openly pursuing their professions as a result + of identification with 1968 reforms and Charter 77. On August 7 and 8, + “rehearsals” of the play took place in apartments of Charter supporters. + Embassy P&C Admin. Secretary and wife of PAO attended first session; DCM and wife attended the second. In both cases, they were + only non-Czechoslovaks invited. Kohout told DCM those involved in the play were trying to continue + their professions in this way despite efforts of the regime to deny them + work opportunities. Kohout added that there would be no more + performances like these until after 10th anniversary. In September, he + expects such living room performances to occur on a more or less regular + basis. Meanwhile, as Embassy had expected (reftel) he and other Charter 77 proponents plan to depart + Prague this week to remain in country homes until the end of the + month.

+

3. Regime preparations. The Husak + regime appears to be approaching the 10th anniversary with increased + confidence of being able to cope with any contingency that may arise. + Accent is on business as usual, with major attention at the moment to + formal opening of new Prague metro lines on August 12. On the other + hand, we hear security forces have been put on alert until the end of + the month. Efforts are going forward to ensure that Charter 77 + personalities will be generally dispersed on August 20–21. And MFA is tightening visa controls, + particularly with regard to non-accredited foreign journalists, who will + probably be few and far between here for remainder of August. Austrian + DCM Karas say 3 Austrian + correspondents have already been refused entry to cover the anniversary. + NY Times correspondent Andelman, who is accredited here, has just arrived from Belgrade but has been + instructed to return there until New York strike situation is clarified. + Time magazine stringer Stichova tells us EE correspondent Aikman, also accredited here, is expected + to be in Prague next week and may prepare a cover story on the + anniversary.

+

4. Media coverage meanwhile focuses on campaign to denigrate all aspects + of 1968 policies, except the January Central Committee Plenum (at which + Dubcek replaced Novotny) and repeat shrill accusations against the main + actors in Prague Spring. Rude Prova tends to concentrate currently on + alleged damage to the economy which resulted in 1968–69 from the Sik + reforms and to praise subsequent policy followed under the Husak regime, which has brought + Czechoslovakia to its present supposedly enviable state of prosperity + and stability. Weekly Party press has moved increasingly from attacks on + pro-reform individuals and organizations to accusations that 1968 + reforms were stimulated and supported by the West in hopes of breaking + Czechoslovakia away from its allies; Herman Kahn, Henry Kissinger and + Zbigniew Brezinski are cited + as chief proponents of this strategy. These latter pieces are extended + versions of noteworthy Yuri Zhukov commentary that appeared in Moscow + Pravda and was reprinted here August 8, showing Soviet approval and + probably close coordination of this line. Comment: While the regime + takes its precautions, the Czech masses seem to be paying scant + attention to the approaching anniversary. Prague’s Wencelas Square, most + likely site for any protest manifestation, is thronged with tourists and + shoppers, but so far reveals no sign of any special security + precautions. In spite of rumors of recent explosions at Party buildings + in Bratislava, neither we nor our NATO + colleagues have been able to find any significant evidence to suggest + that August 20–21 will pass other than quietly.In telegram 2256 from Prague, August 23, the + Embassy reported that the anniversary passed without any significant + event, describing the event as a “hard-liner affair.” Official + propaganda, the Embassy reported, used the occasion “to politic + against any sort of economic reform.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + D780345–1196) In telegram 2282 from Prague, August 25, the Embassy + reported that it received information that “four students marked the + anniversary of the invasion by placing a bouquet of flowers on the + monument in Wenceslas Square and observing a moment of silence. The + bouquet was promptly removed by police and the students’ + identification cards were checked. This is the only such event on + August 21 of which Morevec was aware.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + D780349–1036) We think our FRG colleague is probably correct in his expectation that + the regime will formally greet the anniversary, but have no clue yet as + to the precise form this will take.

+ + Byrne + +
+ +
+ 106. Telegram From the Embassy in Czechoslovakia to the Department of + State and Multiple Diplomatic PostsSource: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780417–1198. + Confidential. Sent to Belgrade, East Berlin, Bern, Bonn, Bucharest, + Budapest, London, Moscow, Paris, Rome, Sofia, Warsaw, Munich, USNATO, and West + Berlin. + + + + Prague, October 11, 1978, 1525Z + +

2811. Subject: Husak Regime + Tightens Internal Control. Ref: (A) Prague 2595 Notal; (B) Prague 2782.Telegram 2595 from Prague, September 22, reported + the meeting between Czechoslovak Party Secretary Jan Fojtik and + Polish First Secretary Edward + Gierek in Poland. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + D780390–0706) Telegram 2782 from Prague, October 6, reported + “unusual willingness of GOC to + permit emigration, particularly of people who have evinced + disaffection with system.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + D780412–0226)

+

Summary: Czechoslovak and Polish police have, for the first time, + prevented a meeting of Charter 77 and KOR human rights activists. + Moreover, Czech police have not only beaten and incarcerated Charter + spokesman Sabata but have also begun generally to tighten surveillance + over nonsanctioned cultural activities of Charter 77 supporters in + Prague. This message reports developments symptomatic of the current + crackdown. End summary.

+

1. Addressees will be aware of reports that Czechoslovak and Polish + authorities prevented planned third meeting of Charter 77 and KOR + (Workers Defense Committee) reps weekend of October 1–2 and Charter + spokesman Jaroslav Sabata was detained and beaten.

+

2. We have obtained copy of bulletin no. 41 of Committee for Protection + of Unjustly Persecuted (Prague 1339 Notal),In telegram 1339 from + Prague, May 24, the Embassy reported increased police brutality + against Charter 77 members, either as a new hardening of the GOC line on dissidence, or as a result + of the visit Soviet leader Leonid + Brezhnev was scheduled to make to Prague. (National + Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign + Policy File, D780219–0272) small offshoot of Charter + movement. Bulletin gives account of events based on report by Vaclav + Havel, who was among Chartists attempting to meet with Poles, and other, + unidentified, sources.

+

3. That account says meeting was supposed to take place October 1 on + trail of Czechoslovak-Polish friendship in Krkonos mountains. (This is + approximately same area as that where first meeting was held.) Area was + full of uniformed and plainclothes police from both countries who + checked papers of everyone entering area. Six Chartists, including + Sabata and Havel, and a student attempted to reach rendezvous by various + means. Some were detained by police, while others withdrew when they saw + meeting was impossible. Chartist Jiri Bednar was detained and questioned several hours in tourist + kiosk, from which he says he saw Polish police round up KOR members Jan + Litynski, Adam Michnik and Piotr Naimsky. Detained Czechs were held in + various places for up to 59 hours and most then released. Sabata, + however, was held first in village jail and punched about by uniformed + police, then reportedly was transferred to Ministry of Justice jail in + Hradec Kralove. There he is said to have been officially charged with + violating two articles of penal code relating to using force and verbal + abuse against public officials. This account leaves unclear whether + Sabata still in detention, but rumors in Prague as of October 6 say he + is. Account concludes by denying that Sabata in any way resisted police + and stating he is being persecuted. It proclaims development of + cooperation between Czechoslovak and Polish human rights supporters + cannot be stopped.

+

4. Comment: Whether or not meeting of Polish and Czechoslovak Party + Ideological Secretaries last month (ref A) led to this cooperative move + against dissidents, such cooperation is obviously under way. Report + cited above also says police were allegedly also watching other border + tourist areas suitable for meeting, but we suspect police had enough + information from Charter leaks to pinpoint actual rendezvous. Beating of + Sabata could have been action of undisciplined rural police, but placing + of formal charges against him almost certainly was directed from Prague. + It suggests authorities have become sufficiently concerned about + developing Charter-KOR ties to shift to heavyhanded efforts to + intimidate potential participants in future border meetings. End + comment.

+

5. In other Chartist activity, Pavel Kohout has renewed his quest for + permission for self and wife to make short visit to Western Europe and + the United States, but so far has received no travel documentation. His + daughter Teresa tells us Kohout and wife would like to depart the week + of October 16 for Switzerland (where Kohout may wish to visit another + daughter presently studying in Geneva, as well as his Swiss publisher). + Comment: Kohout has been telling friends he hopes to return to Prague + after forthcoming visits to the West, but we doubt he will be able to do + so in light of longstanding warnings from Party officials that if he + leaves, he cannot return.

+

6. Teresa Kohoutova indicates police have begun to intimidate those + involved in recent productions of Macbeth. She was taken from a family + dinner party October 5 for three hours’ interrogation, including threats + to desist from further non-sanctioned acting. She reports Vlasta + Chromastova, talented former actress who has been playing Lady Macbeth + in Kohout’s version of the Shakespeare classic, has also been + interrogated at length. Moreover, police recently broke up a performance + of the play, and when it was rescheduled, blocked would-be audience from + attending it.

+ +

7. We understand artist Karel Havlicke and wife, who applied for + emigration permission some weeks ago, have been told they will “never” + receive exit documentation, but this appears not to have been a formal + statement. If Havlickes are, in fact, refused exit permits, it will run + counter to trend we thought developing (ref B) of regime’s increasing + resort to emigration as one way to cope with dissidents.

+

8. Comment. We see numerous signs at present of increasing activism by + internal security agents. The beating of Sabata and apparent overall + tightening of controls over machinations of Charter 77 personalities are + the most dramatic evidence of this trend. We believe it is mainly + increased politicizing of the Charter 77 movement—especially the August + 10th anniversary statement calling for withdrawal of Soviet troops and + recent efforts to coordinate human rights appeals with Polish and other + Eastern European activists—that has led to the current crackdown. We + wonder whether much-publicized tightening of internal security controls + over foreign representatives in Washington, resulting for example in + protracted delay of visa issuance to GOC LOS delegate Richard Kral, may also be contributing to + a strengthening of internal security measures here.

+ + Byrne + +
+ +
+ 107. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in + CzechoslovakiaSource: + National Archives, RG 59, Central + Foreign Policy File, D790262–0653. Confidential; Immediate. Drafted + by Glenn; cleared by + Schneider and Schmidt; + approved by Vest. Sent for + information to Belgrade, East Berlin, Bonn, Budapest, Moscow, Sofia, + Vienna, Warsaw, Bucharest, Munich, and USNATO. In telegram 1724 from Prague, May 31, the + Embassy reported the arrests of several prominent Charter 77 + members, possibly preemptive to the Papal visit to Poland. (National + Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign + Policy File, D790245–1053) Following the arrests, the Department of + State’s Bureau of European Affairs tried to hold off any official + protests pushed for by the Department’s Bureau of Human Rights and + Humanitarian Affairs, in the hope that dissidents would be released + shortly after the end of the Papal visit. When formal charges were + brought against the majority of dissidents arrested, the Department + moved ahead with formal protests. (Telegram 140848 to Prague, June + 1; National Archives, RG 59, Central + Foreign Policy File, D790249–0810) + + + + Washington, June 9, 1979, 1741Z + +

148769. Subject: (C) Protest to Czechoslovak Ambassador Over Arrests of + Dissidents. Refs: A) Prague 1850; B) Prague 1819 (Notal).In + telegram 1819 from Prague, June 6, the Embassy reported the arrests + of dissidents as “the GOC’s most + serious action against individuals connected with the Charter 77 + movement since the beginning” and “a palpable change for the worse + in the GOC’s already deplorable + policy toward dissidents.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + D790257–0002) In telegram 1850 from Prague, June 8, the Embassy + reported that all arrested individuals were connected with the + Committee for the Defense of the Unjustly Persecuted (CDUP), an + offshoot of Charter 77, and that of the 16 people arrested 6 were + released shortly after, while 10 remained in detention and faced + charges. (National Archives, RG 59, + Central Foreign Policy File, D790259–0925)

+

1. (C-entire text)

+

2. EUR Assistant Secretary Vest called on Czechoslovak Ambassador + Johanes on June 8 to protest + the May 29 arrest of Czechoslovak dissidents. HA Deputy Assistant + Secretary Schneider and Czechoslovak Desk Officer were present. + Following is a summary of the discussion.

+

3. Noting that he was speaking in the context of our efforts to improve + bilateral relations, Vest cited + the recent arrests and protested them as violations of the dissidents’ + human rights and as inconsistent with the principles of the Helsinki + Final Act. Vest said that, as + publicity increases, these arrests will negatively affect congressional + and public opinion and cannot help but have an adverse effect on + bilateral relations.

+

4. Johanes said he was unaware of + the arrests since local media had not yet carried anything about them, + but he personally rejected the protest as constituting interference in + Czechoslovakia’s internal affairs. Johanes said only a person who violates the law is + imprisoned in Czechoslovakia and that the law and the courts are an + internal affair. The + Czechoslovak Government does not like interference in Czechoslovakia’s + internal affairs. Johanes + mentioned a number of letters he had recently received on behalf of a + prisoner in Czechoslovakia serving a three-year sentence and wondered if + this letter-writing campaign was not the concoction of persons + interested in harming relations.

+

5. Vest noted that the + signatories of the Final Act shared common objectives. When a country’s + laws and practices conflict with these objectives, all signatories are + properly concerned. Such conflicts in Czechoslovakia will entail certain + consequences in the United States. The point is that the Czechoslovak + Government must act with these consequences in mind.

+

6. Schneider supported Vest’s + statement and added that the USG would + be willing to examine closely any conflicts between its laws and + practices and the Final Act which the Czechoslovak Government cared to + raise.

+

7. Ambassador Johanes observed + that none of the Charter 77 dissidents has been jailed for having signed + the Charter or having exercised their right of free expression. If the + Czechoslovak Government recently arrested some dissidents, they had + violated the law.

+

8. Johanes said that the Final Act + also provided for free trade, yet the US had not yet extended MFN tariff status to Czechoslovakia. The + Final Act was intended to dispose of the remnants of World War II, yet + the US still refused to return Czechoslovakia’s gold. Johanes added that the US Government + maintains relations with many countries around the world which have poor + human rights records, in many cases much worse than + Czechoslovakia’s.

+

9. In response to Vest’s request, + Johanes said he would inform + the Czechoslovak Government of our protest and inquire about the + arrests.

+

10. Action requested: The Ambassador should make an approach along the + lines of the above to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.Ambassador Meehan delivered the démarche to Jablonsky on June + 13. Describing the meeting as “frank and brisk,” Meehan reported that Jablonsky + began their discussions by rejecting Vest’s démarche to Ambassador Johanes, describing it as “an + unsubstantiated attack and gross interference in [Czechoslovak] + internal affairs.” Meehan + reported that he stressed that “human rights is a key feature of our + foreign policy and a matter of great concern to Congress and the + public.” (Telegram 1958 from Prague, June 15; National Archives, + RG 59, Central Foreign Policy + File, D790270–0556)

+ + Christopher + +
+ +
+ 108. Intelligence Assessment Prepared in the Central Intelligence + AgencySource: Central + Intelligence Agency, Office of Support Services (DI), Job 80T01330A, + Production Case Files OPA (1979–1980), Box 2, Folder 10, The + Czechoslovak Leadership: An Intelligence Assessment. Confidential. + The report was prepared in the USSR-Eastern Europe Division, Office of Political + Analysis, and coordinated within OPA and with the Offices of + Scientific Intelligence, Economic Research, and Central Reference + and the National Intelligence Officer for Soviet and East European + Affairs. + + + PA 79–10354 + + + Washington, August + 1979 + +

The Czechoslovak Leadership [classification not declassified]

+

Key Judgments

+

Gustav Husak has been + strengthening his position and will probably remain the leader of the + Czechoslovak Communist Party for at least the next several years.

+

Current trends within the party leadership appear to favor those with a + relatively moderate, pragmatic outlook over their more conservative, + ideologically minded counterparts.

+

These developments suggest that there will be a gradually increasing + movement toward economic innovation and a tendency to bargain harder in + economic dealings with the Soviet Union to the extent allowed by + Czechoslovak dependence on Soviet oil.

+

Strict internal political controls will continue, however, and + Czechoslovak foreign policy will remain closely aligned with Moscow.

+

[less than 1 line not declassified]

+

A Stable, Cautious Leadership

+

The top ranks of the Czechoslovak leadership have changed little since + the years immediately following the 1968 Warsaw Pact invasion, which + ended Alexander Dubcek’s liberal experiment and left Gustav Husak with the task of + reimposing strict Communist control. Husak has led the Czechoslovak Communist Party (KSC) + since April 1969 and has served as President of the Republic since May + 1975. The federal, Czech, and Slovak Premiers and the First Secretary of + the Slovak Communist Party (KSS) have held office since January 1970 or + earlier. All but one of the KSC Presidium’s 13 members and candidate + members have served on that body since May 1971 or before. [classification not declassified]

+

The paucity of personnel changes has been matched by a dearth of + innovation in policy. The political composition of the leadership ranges + from cautious pragmatists through conservative ideologues. Hobbled by internal rivalries, devoid + of popular support, reluctant to risk Soviet displeasure, and presided + over by a moderate conservative with neither the political strength nor + the inclination to undertake bold new ventures, the regime ranks among + the most cautious in contemporary Eastern Europe. [classification not declassified]

+

To characterize individuals within the leadership is a risky undertaking. + Information on internal debate is scarce and often suspect. Individual + positions on specific issues may reflect regional interests, personal + rivalries, or momentary considerations, rather than basic political + outlook. As in other East European countries, terms like “moderate,” + “conservative,” “pragmatist,” and “ideologue” can be applied only in a + relative sense. [classification not + declassified]

+

With these qualifications, it is useful to distinguish between two basic + points of view within the party hierarchy. One is more conservative, + prone to think in terms of ideology and protective of the status quo. + Its dominant concern is to avoid a repetition of 1968, when relaxation + of controls permitted the growth of forces that threatened the party’s + monopoly of political power. Adherents of this view regard with + suspicion any inclination toward leniency, either toward current + dissidents or toward those who supported the 1968 liberalization. + Presidium members subscribing to this outlook include Vasil Bilak, + Antonin Kapek, Karel Hoffmann, Alois Indra, and Milos Jakes. [classification not declassified]

+

Other Presidium members are believed to hold more moderate, pragmatic + views. They are more open to innovation, at least in the economic + sphere, and would probably not oppose some political relaxation if the + overall political climate in Prague and Moscow were to allow it. + Adherents of this view include Josef Kempny, Lubomir Strougal, Jozef Lenart, and Peter Colotka. [classification not declassified]

+

General Secretary Gustav Husak + probably finds this division both a strength and a weakness as it + affects his leadership: a strength because it tends to prevent any + potential rival from amassing preponderant support; a weakness because + it impedes the formulation of policy. Husak has faced challengers from both camps during the + past decade, but the number of potential rivals is greater among the + conservatives. Husak, + accordingly, has tended to side with the moderates, and it is they who + have benefited from the strengthening of his position in recent years. + [classification not declassified]

+

Intraparty Debate: Husak Dominant

+

Gustav Husak was not the Soviet + Union’s first choice in August 1968 to lead Czechoslovakia back to + orthodoxy. As deputy premier from April through August, he had fully + supported the reformers’ Action Program, which Moscow deeply distrusted. + Immediately after the invasion, however, Husak began cultivating the confidence of the Soviet leaders. His greatest + service was to persuade the KSS to repudiate the clandestine KSC + Congress of 22 August 1968, which had condemned the invasion, endorsed + Dubcek, and otherwise defied Soviet wishes. Elected KSS First Secretary + and a member of the KSC Presidium, Husak adopted positions designed to ingratiate himself + further with Moscow. His longstanding espousal of federalization also + assured him the support of his fellow Slovaks. By April 1969, the Soviet + Union considered him sufficiently reliable to succeed Dubcek as KSC + First Secretary. [classification not + declassified]

+

Although Husak had won a degree of + Soviet confidence, he was not given free rein. Aware that reprisals + against supporters of the late reforms would be highly unpopular, he + reportedly favored greater leniency than Moscow was willing to allow. As + “normalization” proceeded, Husak’s attempts at moderation were overruled, presumably + with Soviet approval, by a coterie of conservatives, the most militant + being Vasil Bilak and Antonin Kapek. The hardliners succeeded in + securing the ouster of some 300,000 party members by the end of 1970 and + have since managed—against Husak’s publicly stated preference—to block any meaningful + rehabilitation. [classification not + declassified]

+

Discord between Husak and the more + conservative Presidium members has not been confined to the issue of + purges and rehabilitation. In recent years, debate over economic policy + has moved increasingly to the fore. At the 15th Party Congress in April + 1976, both Husak and Premier + Lubomir Strougal called for + innovation in this area. Their proposals disturbed ideological + hardliners, one of whom, Milos Jakes, responded with a warning that the + need to maintain effective party control must be paramount over other + considerations. [classification not + declassified]

+

The prospect of economic innovation is repugnant to the conservatives for + two reasons. It raises again the issues of the early 1960s, which paved + the way for Dubcek’s liberalization, and it holds implications for cadre + policy that the ideologues must regard as threatening: if the party is + to preside over a major economic reorganization, then the criteria for + evaluating members must be substantially revised. Instead of ideological + orthodoxy and political reliability, which have prevailed since 1970 and + have created the conservatives’ political base, members must be judged + primarily for their managerial efficiency and technical expertise. As + these criteria are progressively applied, the position of the + conservatives will weaken, to the benefit of Husak and the moderate pragmatists within the + leadership. [classification not declassified]

+

Calls for economic innovation and exhortations to improve the performance + of party cadres were conspicuously juxtaposed in statements by party + leaders during the months following the 15th Congress, when strenuous + behind-the-scenes debate apparently took place. The issue came to a head at the KSC Central + Committee plenum in December 1977, when Husak reportedly was again challenged by hardline + opponents. Although information on the episode is sketchy, subsequent + developments strongly suggest that the outcome represented a victory for + Husak and the moderates. [classification not declassified]

+

The results of the plenum first became apparent in a series of personnel + changes. Jakes, who had directed the purges of the early 1970s as + chairman of the Central Control and Auditing Commission, was removed + from that position and elected secretary of the KSC Central Committee + and candidate member of the Presidium. Nominally, this represented an + advancement. In real terms, however, Jakes’s fortunes probably suffered. + He lost his key role in cadre affairs and was made responsible for + agriculture, where he has no experience and which could prove a perilous + assignment. Moreover, two men whose views are unlikely to coincide with + his were elected to the Secretariat at the same time: Mikulas Beno, an + economist with close ties to Husak, and Jindrich Polednik, a youth leader who has + stressed the need for economic improvement in a way that appears + consistent with moderate thinking. [classification not + declassified]

+

Developments continued to favor the moderates through 1978. In March, the + Central Committee removed from the Secretariat Cestmir Lovetinsky, a + hardliner who had led the party’s cadre department since 1975. + Lovetinsky’s cadre duties were assigned to Beno, and another loyal + Husak supporter, economist + Josef Haman, replaced him as a member of the Secretariat. Husak also used the March plenum to + endorse an experiment in economic management devised by Finance Minister + Leopold Ler. This controversial movement toward economic reform had + apparently been approved over conservative opposition at the December + plenum. [classification not declassified]

+

Another indication of Husak’s + strength was a reaffirmation of support from Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev during the latter’s + visit to Prague in May 1978. Brezhnev’s increased esteem for Husak had already become apparent in + May 1975, when Soviet Politburo member Andrey Kirilenko spoke of the + “close and personal” relationship between the two. During the May 1978 + visit, Brezhnev awarded Husak the Order of the October + Revolution and referred to him as the “leading representative of + Czechoslovak Communists.” Brezhnev then presented the Order of Lenin to Bilak, + whom he described as “a loyal colleague of Comrade Husak.” The continuing role of the + conservatives was thus acknowledged, but their subordinate position was + made clear. [classification not declassified]

+

Most signs indicate that Husak + will remain the dominant figure within the Czechoslovak leadership for + at least the next several years. At 66, his health is good. [4 lines not declassified; classification not + declassified]

+ +

Recent developments within the party continue to favor Husak and the pragmatists. The December + 1978 plenum called for an exchange of party cards, the first since 1970, + to take place this year. It stated that in evaluating members, + “fulfillment of economic tasks” would be linked with the “assessment of + political commitment.” This represents a clear departure from the + preoccupation with ideology that prevailed throughout the preceding + decade. With Husak supporter + Mikulas Beno directing cadre affairs on the Secretariat and Jakes + removed from the Central Control and Auditing Commission, the + conservatives will be hard put to prevent the exchange from being used + to weaken their position in the party. [classification + not declassified]

+

Political developments outside the party also favor Husak. By maintaining a relatively high + standard of living, he has kept the population tranquil since massive + arrests ended student demonstrations in August 1969. The public has + adopted a mood of cynical materialism, refusing to involve itself in a + political situation it is powerless to change. A hard core of dissidents + remains active, causing the government some embarrassment, but the + dissenters have so far failed to evoke a significant popular response. + The regime has kept the dissidents off balance by encouraging selective + emigration while maintaining strict repression at home—an example of the + latter being the pending trial of 10 human rights activists arrested in + May 1979. [classification not declassified]

+

Husak’s success in limiting the + effectiveness of the dissident movement has doubtless contributed to the + strength of his position. He is unlikely to expose himself to + conservative charges of laxity toward dissent or risk alienating his + supporters in Moscow by adopting a more tolerant approach. In the near + term the changes now under way could lead to tighter political controls + as Husak and the moderates strive + to keep the new policies in hand. [classification not + declassified]

+

Two possible developments damaging to Husak would be a rise in popular discontent because of + worsened economic conditions or a loss of Soviet support. Recent events + have drawn increased attention to these possibilities. During a visit to + Prague in May 1979, Soviet Premier Aleksey + Kosygin criticized Czechoslovak “sluggishness” in + planning and implementing cooperative projects. Premier Strougal countered with the complaint + that the requirements Moscow was levying for the construction of nuclear + power equipment represented a considerable burden to Czechoslovakia’s + engineering industry and would reduce its capacity to manufacture + products for hard currency sales in the West. Strougal made the same point publicly + during the June summit meeting of the Council for Mutual Economic + Assistance (CEMA), where a cooperative + agreement on the production of nuclear power equipment was signed. + Implicit in his remarks was the warning that diversion of resources to nuclear engineering + will eventually adversely affect the Czechoslovak consumer. [classification not declassified]

+

These events suggest that the leadership in Prague has adopted a more + assertive tone in its economic dealings with Moscow. They also + underscore the problems the leadership will face in attempting to + maintain a standard of living high enough to preserve the passive mood + of the population. Nonetheless, the recent developments appear to pose + no immediate threat to Husak. + Although it will be increasingly difficult for the regime to continue to + meet the rising expectations of consumers—a point underscored by recent + steep increases in the price of gasoline and certain other goods—living + standards are unlikely to worsen so abruptly as to provoke a sharp + change in popular attitudes, so long as other factors influencing public + opinion remain constant. Moreover, any sign of increased popular + discontent would strengthen Prague’s argument for economic concessions + from Moscow. Husak could also + take advantage of Czechoslovakia’s high credit rating to alleviate the + situation through hard currency loans, a course he has so far + avoided.Czechoslovakia has the lowest + ratio of debt service to merchandise exports to non-Communist + countries of any of the East European countries. In 1978, + Czechoslovakia’s debt service ratio was an estimated 20 percent, + compared with 77 percent for Poland, roughly 40 percent for East + Germany, and about 30 percent for Hungary. [Footnote is in the + original.] [classification not + declassified]

+

Moscow is unlikely to halt its support of Husak in the near future. Two days after Strougal’s outspoken address at the + CEMA meeting, a Soviet delegation + visiting Prague praised Husak as + “the acknowledged and esteemed leader of the Czechoslovak Communists.” + Even if Brezhnev were succeeded + by a leadership ideologically more akin to the Czechoslovak hardliners, + the new Soviet rulers would hardly wish to compound the uncertainties of + their own transition by summarily ousting the leader of one of their + most stable East European allies. The succession period in Moscow should + tend to strengthen Husak’s + tenure, at least in the near term. [classification not + declassified]

+

On the other hand, divisions within the Czechoslovak leadership are + likely to sharpen further if, as seems probable, the moderates are + behind the new firmness toward Moscow. To forestall conservative + criticism and minimize tensions with the Soviet leadership, Prague’s + moderates are likely to continue espousing Soviet positions on + noneconomic matters. This tendency could retard the improvement of + relations with the West. [classification not + declassified]

+

Contenders for the Succession

+

Husak’s eventual successor will + almost surely come from the current leadership. Factors influencing the + selection will include to various degrees nationality, performance in office, popular + acceptability, Soviet preferences, and political trends at the time of + succession. [classification not declassified]

+

Leading conservative contenders include Bilak, Kapek, Indra, and perhaps + Jakes. Bilak, 62, ranks second in the KSC hierarchy and is believed to + have the support of hardliners within the Soviet leadership, + particularly in ideological circles. Nonetheless, most observers give + him little chance of succeeding Husak because of his nationality. Born in Ruthenia, he + would be considered a Slovak, and it is virtually a political necessity + that the next KSC leader be a Czech. Moreover, Bilak is unpopular with + Czechoslovaks of all nationalities because he supported the 1968 + invasion and has pursued a consistently hard line on rehabilitation. + [classification not declassified]

+

After Bilak, the most prominent conservative is Antonin Kapek. As first + secretary of the Prague KSC committee, Kapek heads the party’s most + powerful regional organization. Like Bilak, he enjoys strong backing + from Soviet conservatives, and he maintains close contacts with the + Moscow municipal party organization. An ultraconservative, Kapek + flaunted his pro-Soviet sympathies immediately after the invasion and + has been associated with the most hardline elements of the KSC. His + selection as Husak’s successor + would be unpalatable not only to the population at large, but to much of + the present Czechoslovak leadership. [classification + not declassified]

+

Alois Indra, 58, chairman of the Federal Assembly, was Moscow’s choice to + head a “revolutionary government” in August 1968, but the scheme failed + in the face of Dubcek’s massive popular support. Indra suffered another + setback in December 1971, when he “resigned” from the KSC Secretariat to + assume his present, largely ceremonial position. Indra is politically + astute and could count on Soviet support, but his long absence from + full-time party activity and his unpopularity stemming from 1968 are + considerable obstacles to his becoming head of the party. [classification not declassified]

+

Jakes, 56, has been considered a potential rival to Husak since the early 1970s, when he + directed the purges as chairman of the Central Control and Auditing + Commission. His appointment as a party secretary and candidate member of + the Presidium in December 1977 appeared to be a major step in a rapidly + advancing career. As noted above, however, Jakes’s loss of + responsibility for cadre affairs may represent a considerable setback, + and he will find it difficult to achieve distinction overseeing + Czechoslovak agriculture. His best chance for the succession would + probably be as a compromise candidate in the event of a deadlock among + more senior conservative contenders. [classification + not declassified]

+

If the trends described above continue, Husak’s successor is more likely to be a moderate than a + conservative. The foremost candidates on this end of the spectrum are Josef Kempny and + Lubomir Strougal. [classification not declassified]

+

Several factors give Kempny, 59, an edge over other contenders. He enjoys + the confidence and support of Husak, who has secured his appointment to a succession + of key party positions. Aside from Husak, Kempny and Bilak are the only full Presidium + members who are also party secretaries. Kempny bears no stigma from + 1968; as mayor of Ostrava, he managed to win Soviet confidence without + antagonizing his own countrymen. He also boasts a wide range of + experience. A construction engineer by training, he assumed + responsibility for ideological affairs in 1969 as a KSC secretary and + chairman of the party’s ideological commission. He was intensively + involved in cadre work as chairman of the Bureau for Party Work in the + Czech Lands in 1970–71. Since then, he has been chairman of the Central + Committee’s economic commission, and oversight of the economy has also + been his primary responsibility on the Presidium. Kempny’s Presidium + responsibilities may have increased after the December 1977 plenum. + While losing some of his more specialized economic duties, which are now + performed within the Secretariat, he retained general oversight of the + economy and reportedly received in addition the key areas of defense and + security. [classification not declassified]

+

Against these assets, certain liabilities must be counted. If the + political tide were to turn, Kempny’s close association with Husak could work to his disadvantage. + Moreover, his longstanding responsibility for economic policy renders + him vulnerable because of continuing problems in that sphere. Kempny + reportedly was attacked along with Husak at the December 1977 plenum, and rumors of his + imminent departure circulated in late 1978. There has been no subsequent + evidence, however, that he is in trouble. [classification not declassified]

+

The other leading moderate contender for the succession, Lubomir Strougal, suffered a reverse + similar to Indra’s when he was appointed Premier in January 1970; the + appointment cost him his position as KSC secretary and chairman of the + Bureau for Party Work in the Czech Lands—a role to which Kempny + succeeded. Strougal is still + young (55), however, and politically adroit; like Indra, he has managed + to retain considerable influence while having little day-to-day + involvement in party affairs. As a contender to succeed Husak, he has two principal + liabilities. Having been Premier for nearly a decade, he must, like + Kempny, bear a large share of the blame for the poor state of the + economy. He may also be less acceptable to Moscow than other candidates. + As acting premier in August 1968, Strougal condemned the occupation, an act of defiance he + later recanted. As noted above, he was host during Kosygin’s visit to Prague in May when + disagreements arose over economic issues, and he stated Czechoslovakia’s + grievances publicly at the + CEMA summit in June. Although this + role will increase Strougal’s + popularity with the Czechoslovak public and enhance his stature among + moderates within the leadership, Moscow may try to ensure that Husak’s successor represents a + viewpoint more amenable to Soviet wishes. [classification not declassified]

+

The possibility of a dark horse cannot be excluded. Sentiment must be + strong in both Prague and Moscow for removing the shadow of 1968 from + Czechoslovak political life. It is also highly desirable that the next + party leader be competent in economics, an area where the current + leaders have proved deficient. These considerations suggest the + possibility of a younger contender with a technical background. One such + candidate is party secretary Josef Haman, 46, who was elected to his + present post in March 1978. A graduate of the Leningrad Institute for + Finance and Economics, Haman was active in the party’s youth movement + before occupying a series of administrative posts. He served in the + Central Committee’s economic department and economic commission in + 1971–73, then joined Husak’s + staff in the office of the KSC General Secretary. He became head of the + office of the President in 1976. A recent indication of Haman’s standing + was his selection in May 1979 to deliver the keynote speech at the + annual ceremony commemorating Czechoslovakia’s liberation; in recent + years this honor has been reserved for younger members of the leadership + whose stars are on the rise. Haman, like Kempny, could eventually find + Husak’s patronage a + liability, but in the event of a factional struggle over the leadership, + his relative newness to the political scene would be a powerful asset. + [classification not declassified]

+

Policy Implications

+

If these trends continue, Gustav + Husak will probably remain the General Secretary of the + Czechoslovak Communist Party for at least the next several years. + Developments within the party will tend to lessen the influence of the + conservative ideologues, while increasing that of the moderate + pragmatists. When Husak + relinquishes some or all of his functions, his successor will probably + come from the latter group. [classification not + declassified]

+

These developments within the leadership will have a gradual but + significant effect on policy. Strict political controls will continue. + Economic experimentation will proceed, probably at an accelerating pace. + Czechoslovakia will continue to cultivate Western markets for its + exports and will bargain harder in its economic dealings with Moscow. + Overall foreign policy, however, will remain closely aligned with that + of the Soviet Union. The pace of improvement in relations with the West + will remain limited and, for the near term at least, may even slow down. + [classification not declassified]

+
+ +
+ 109. Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the Department of + State (Tarnoff) to the + President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)Source: Carter Library, National + Security Affairs, Brzezinski + Material, Country Files, Box 17, Czechoslovakia: 1/77–1/81. + Confidential. A copy of the memorandum indicates it was drafted in + EUR by Johnson and Glenn and cleared by Nimetz, Vest, Barry, Walker (S/P), + Crook (L/EUR), Schmidt + (EUR/EE), Peters + (EB/IFD/OMA), Weston (H), and in the Department of Treasury by + Solomon and the Department of Commerce by Jenkins. (National Archives, + RG 59, Office of the Assistant + Legal Adviser for European Affairs, Country Files, 1950–1986, Lot + 89D336, Box 11, Czech: Gold 1979– ) + + + Washington, September + 21, 1979 + + + SUBJECT + Proposal to Negotiate a New Claims Settlement with + Czechoslovakia + +

The Department of State has prepared a new proposal for an agreement with + Czechoslovakia to settle the outstanding claims of American citizens and + to effect the return of the Nazi-looted gold to the Czechoslovak + Government as mandated in Presidential Directive 21.See Document 16. We + plan to present the proposal to the Czechoslovaks early this fall after + consulting with interested Members of Congress and the claimants.A meeting between Department officials and + congressional staff members took place on Capitol Hill three days + later. (Memorandum of conversation, September 26; National Archives, + RG 59, Office of the Assistant + Legal Adviser for European Affairs, Country Files, 1950–1986, Lot + 89D336, Box 11, Czech: Gold 1979– )

+

We believe that moving now to resolve this longstanding issue is in the + best interest of the claimants and our own foreign policy interests and + has reasonable prospects for success. The several thousand American + claimants who will benefit from the agreement have been waiting for just + and adequate compensation for their nationalized properties for more + than thirty years. Many of them are elderly and of limited financial + means and, in their contacts with the Department of State, they have + stressed their need. Representatives of Czechoslovak-American + organizations also support the negotiation of a new claims settlement + agreement as soon as possible. We do not anticipate significant domestic + political opposition to such action and we will be able to defend the + negotiation of a new agreement strongly since it is clearly in the + interest of the claimants and in our own national interest.

+

We are also being urged to move promptly by the British Government which + is understandably impatient to bring into force its own 1964 claims + settlement with Czechoslovakia which is contingent on the return of the + gold. On September 11, the British informed the Department that they are seriously + considering a proposal to return the portion of the Czechoslovak gold + they hold to facilitate resolution of their claims, a development which + would clearly weaken our bargaining position.The Department reported the British response to + Senator Long’s proposal to vest the Czechoslovak gold unilaterally + in telegram 240364 to Prague, September 12. In its response, the + United Kingdom stated: “After full consideration in London, we have + concluded that this proposal, if carried out, would be illegal under + the terms of the Paris Agreement as was explicitly recognized in + 1974 by all three governments represented on the Tripartite + Commission.” The British stressed, “we very much hope that you will + not try to proceed with this form of action and that it will be + possible for you instead to make a renewed effort to resolve your + claims against Czechoslovakia by negotiation.” (National Archives, + RG 59, Central Foreign Policy + File, D790418–0244)

+

In considering the timing of a proposal we have borne in mind the + generally poor human rights record of the Czechoslovak Government and + the May 29 arrests of the Charter 77 activists.See footnotes 1 and + 2, Document 107, for more + information on the arrest of Czechoslovak dissidents. We do + not believe that we should defer making a proposal on these grounds. In + fact, given the apparent differences within the Czechoslovak leadership + on the issue of whether to proceed with the trials of the Charter 77 + activists, we believe that prompt tabling of a claims/gold proposal + might help to tilt the balance against those arguing for harsh + punishment. In any event, we expect the claims/gold negotiations to drag + out for a considerable time given our tough proposal, and we can adjust + the pace—and even suspend the negotiations if necessary—in order to + react to the outcome of the trials. We will of course make our + disapproval of any trials of Charter 77 activists very clear to the + Czechoslovaks in both the bilateral and CSCE contexts when and if such trials occur.

+

Section 408 of the Trade Act of 1974 directed that the 1974 ad referendum claims settlement agreement with + Czechoslovakia be renegotiated and submitted to Congress for its + approval. All of the Members of Congress with whom we have spoken or + with whom the issue has been discussed, including Senator Long who was + chiefly responsible for the Congressional repudiation of the 1974 + agreement, clearly favor moving ahead to resolve this matter. We believe + that we will be able to negotiate a new agreement providing enough + compensation for the American claimants to be acceptable to Senator + Long. Treasury and we plan to consult with key Members of Congress, + including Senator Long, before tabling the new proposal and to continue + consultations with them throughout the negotiations. Now that the + US/PRC claims settlement agreement + has been accepted by Congress and a US/PRC + trade agreement has been + signed,The U.S. Government and the Government of the People’s + Republic of China reached an agreement on the settlement of claims + of U.S. citizens against the PRC on May 11. Under the terms of the + agreement, the PRC paid $80.5 + million to settle all claims. we do not anticipate + Congressional opposition to negotiations with the Czechoslovak + Government. Given the substantial increase in the price of gold since + 1974 and the more than $175 million which will accrue to the + Czechoslovaks with the return of the gold, we may nevertheless encounter + the criticism that any settlement short of 100% is too low.

+

The Czechoslovak Government has recently expressed interest in + renegotiating the 1974 ad referendum agreement. + Premier Strougal informed our + Ambassador on July 3 that his Government does not insist on the terms of + the 1974 agreement and that “everything is possible” with regard to + renegotiation.The conversation between + Ambassador Meehan and Prime + Minister Strougal was + reported in telegram 2201 from Prague, July 3. (National Archives, + RG 59, Central Foreign Policy + File, D790302–0782) Acting Foreign Minister Knizka was more + specific on August 15 when he indicated to the Ambassador that the + Czechoslovaks might be willing to go as high as a fifty percent + settlement.Ambassador Meehan met Acting Foreign Minister + Knizka on August 15 to follow up on the visit by Congressman Vanik’s + delegation to Prague. In telegram 2844 from Prague, August 16, the + Embassy reported that the Czechoslovak Government was considering a + settlement figure between CZK47–50 on the dollar. Knizka told + Meehan “percentage is + not all important; good relations with the US and trade and MFN were the important things to + GOC.” He also stressed that the + GOC was willing “to show + goodwill” on cultural projects as well as planning to “propose an + exchange of instruments of ratification of consular agreement.” + (National Archives, RG 59, Central + Foreign Policy File, D790372–1121) This new-found willingness + of the Czechoslovak Government to consider a substantial improvement in + the terms of the 1974 agreement suggests that we now have the best + opportunity in five years to reach an agreement acceptable to all + parties.

+

Our new proposal will be substantially more advantageous to American + claimants than the 1974 agreement and even provides for a higher + percentage return than the recent PRC + claims settlement. It will provide for:

+

—A total settlement of approximately $51 million, including the $9 + million we obtained from the sale of vested Czechoslovak steel mill + equipment, or 70 percent of the outstanding principal of $72.6 + million.

+

—A down-payment of $20 million and five annual payments of approximately + $4.4 million each.

+

—The return of the 18.4 metric tons of Czechoslovak gold in the custody + of the Tripartite Gold Commission for the Restitution of Monetary Gold + upon receipt of the down-payment of $20 million. Approximately 45 percent of the gold, worth + about $80 million at current prices, is physically in the United + States.

+

—The retention of the 1974 ad referendum + agreement’s other provisions, including payment in full, in + installments, of Czechoslovakia’s surplus property debt to the USG of approximately $4.9 million; the + release of two blocked US bank accounts in Prague containing + approximately 7.2 million Czechoslovak crowns; and the agreement of the + Czechoslovak Government to begin negotiations with the US Foreign + Bondholders Protective Council on defaulted bonds within six months of + the effective date of the agreement. We will also continue to resist + attempts by Czechoslovakia to link the agreement in any way to the + granting of MFN or the extension of + credits.

+

The 1974 ad referendum agreement provided for + total compensation of $29.5 million, or approximately 41 percent of the + outstanding principal. Our new proposal would provide for compensation + of 70 percent of the outstanding principal. For purposes of comparison, + we have settled with other Eastern European countries as follows: + Poland, 39 percent; Romania, 37 percent; Hungary, 41 percent; Bulgaria, + 63 percent (Bulgarian assets vested in the US were substantial, and the + Bulgarian cash payment was only $4 million); and Yugoslavia, 91 percent + (Yugoslavia also had substantial assets in the US and was looking for + friends at the time of the settlement in 1948). The recent PRC settlement of 42 percent involved a + total payment of $80.5 million on an outstanding principal of $190 + million.

+

Treasury concurs in our proposal to negotiate a new claims settlement on + these terms.

+ + Peter + Tarnoff + + +
+ +
+ 110. Report Prepared in the Bureau of Intelligence and Research, + Department of StateSource: + Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, + Defense/Security—Molander, Box 77, Human Rights (Czechoslovakia) + [10/79]. Confidential. Prepared by Stoddart and Costolanski; + approved by Baraz. According to a stamped notation, the report was + an “advance copy” for “personal use prior to approval for wider + distribution.” + + + Report No. 1249 + + + Washington, October + 11, 1979 + +

THE HUMAN RIGHTS MOVEMENT IN + CZECHOSLOVAKIA

+

Summary

+

The Charter 77 movement—approaching the third anniversary of its + establishment—has successfully focused attention on the human rights + violations in Czechoslovakia and on the repressive policies of the + regime. In doing so, it has gained considerable sympathy and support in + the West, as well as among other dissidents in Eastern Europe and the + USSR.

+

From the outset, the Charter movement has had to cope with formidable + obstacles:

+ + —constant harassment and intimidation from a regime taking its cue + from Moscow; + —divisions within its membership over tactics and strategy; + and + —difficulties in gaining popular support for its goals. + +

Despite recent efforts by the regime to suppress the movement, Charter + activists vow to continue their human rights struggle. However, + prospects for the future look bleak; there is little chance that Charter + efforts, by and of themselves, will improve the human rights situation + in Czechoslovakia.

+

Background

+

Charter 77 was established in January 1977. Its spokesmen asserted that + there was no intention to constitute a political organization or to + function as a political opposition to advance reforms or changes. The + signatories of the Charter claimed to have banded together as a form of + “citizens’ initiative,” which they said was common in both East and + West. Its first manifesto, “Charter 77,” criticized the regime’s failure + to honor the human and civil rights provisions in the Czechoslovak + Constitution, the Helsinki Final Act, and three UN Human Rights Covenants which had been ratified by the + government and had become part of Czechoslovak law.

+ +

The Charter stated that the authorities had the duty to abide by + international agreements and Czechoslovak law, and that many basic human + rights existed only on paper. It sought to engage the regime in a + “constructive dialogue” by drawing attention to specific violations of + civil and human rights, suggesting solutions, submitting proposals to + further and to guarantee those rights, and acting as a “mediator in + conflict situations.”

+

It claimed—correctly—that among the rights consistently violated by the + regime were:

+ + —the right to work at one’s profession, regardless of political + convictions; + —the right for children to be educated, regardless of the parents’ + political convictions; + —freedom of expression; + —freedom of religion; + —freedom of assembly; + —freedom to participate in public affairs; + —equality before the law; and + —freedom to travel abroad. + +

The Charter accused the Ministry of Interior and its police of illegal + wire taps, physical surveillance and harassment, house searches, + confiscation of personal property, mail censorship, use of networks of + informers, and suborning of courts and employers. Investigative and + judicial agencies were said to have repeatedly flouted Czechoslovak law + and the Constitution in conducting politically-motivated trials.

+

Original signatories of the Charter numbered 244; at present, the + movement claims more than 1,000. The three leading positions, those of + designated spokesmen, have thus far been held by nine persons. Although + this rapid turnover has been attributed to deliberate annual rotation, + regime harassment and intimidation have taken their toll. One of the + original spokesmen (Jan Patocka) died following intense police + interrogation. Four spokesmen have been arrested. Another has been + hospitalized after an assault by police thugs.

+

Since its establishment, the movement has issued 26 documents. The + contents range from appeals to cease the harassment of Charter + supporters to an analysis of problems of economic consumption and + corruption in Czechoslovakia.

+

Charter Accomplishments

+

Despite unremitting harassment and intimidation, the movement has + survived—no mean feat considering the overwhelming power posed against + it. Charter leaders vow to continue their struggle for human rights, + whatever methods the regime uses against them.

+

Charter activities have focused Western attention on the repressive + character of the Czechoslovak regime and its violations of human rights, as well as its economic + problems. The regime’s crackdown on the signatories has:

+ + —opened a new breach—if only temporarily—between Moscow and its + allies in Eastern Europe on the one hand and West European Communist + parties on the other; + —set back Prague’s attempts to gain wider international + acceptability and to improve relations with various Western + governments; and + —may have caused some embarrassment to Moscow during the latter’s + attempts to pursue detente with the West and, particularly, the + US. + +

Western reaction may have also contributed to divisions within + Czechoslovak leadership on how best to deal with dissidence—whether to + moderate harsh policies to blunt Western criticisms or to charge Western + governments and media with blatant interference in Czechoslovakia’s + internal affairs. This is the charge made by Moscow and other East + European regimes in the debate over human rights.

+

Aware that they could not publicize their goals and documents within + Czechoslovakia, Charter activists have sought to have their documents + published or broadcast in Western media. They have hoped thus to have + them receive maximum publicity both in Czechoslovakia and abroad. The + Charter’s success in gaining the support of Western governments and + media has perhaps been its single greatest accomplishment.

+

The Charter movement has also enlisted support from other dissidents in + Eastern Europe and in the USSR. For + instance, in early 1977, dissidents in Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland, + Romania, and the USSR sent messages of + support for the aims and purposes of Charter 77.

+

Little is known about the contacts which the Chartists have carried on + with other East European dissidents. However, formal contacts were + established with the Polish Committee for Social Self-Defense (KOR). + Meetings were held in August and September 1978, at which it was + announced that efforts would be made to coordinate activities and + establish permanent working groups to further human rights. A third + meeting planned in October 1978 was broken up by coordinated action of + the Czechoslovak and Polish police.

+

Recently, support from Polish activists has become apparent: a Krakow + student group allegedly plans to stage a hunger strike in support of the + ten arrested Chartists prior to the opening of their trials, while + members of KOR plan to conduct similar strikes in Warsaw churches. In + early July, KOR made public a letter by a group of Polish Catholics to + Czechoslovak Cardinal Tomasek asking him to defend the ten Chartists, + four of them Catholics.

+

Charter Failures and the Regime’s Tactics

+

The Charter movement, however, has not been able yet to secure actual + improvements in human rights in Czechoslovakia. In some respects, the regime is more repressive + today than it had been in late 1976. There has been no “constructive + dialogue” or role for the Charter as “mediator in conflict situations.” + At no time has the movement posed a threat to regime stability (although + this was not, of course, its stated intention). The movement has also + been troubled by internal divisions and lack of popular acceptance. Most + important of all, however, has been the regime’s repression of the + dissidents.

+

Although there may be disagreement among Czechoslovak leaders over how to + deal with dissidence, there was never doubt that the regime would deny + the Chartists any role in the political process. After publication of + the Charter 77 manifesto, the regime immediately resorted to harassment + and intimidation; it conducted a massive propaganda campaign denouncing + the Charter and its signatories—without allowing the contents of that + manifesto to be published or revealed at the “spontaneous” meetings of + intellectuals, officials, and workers convened to sign anti-Charter + petitions.

+

After a time, the intensive harassment and propaganda campaign abated + somewhat—perhaps because the regime realized that its tactics served + more to call attention to the Charter and to human rights than to + discredit the movement. Nevertheless, Charter spokesmen and activists + continued to be subjected to heavy surveillance and harassment. Their + drivers licenses have been confiscated; telephones tapped or removed; + and their homes have been searched and materials confiscated. They have + been repeatedly detained and interrogated, denied employment, and + exposed to kidnappings and assaults by police thugs. In addition, the + regime has tried to weaken the movement by forcing or inducing Charter + supporters to emigrate. Informers have been infiltrated into the + movement, not only to keep the authorities informed about Charter + activities, but also to sow dissension within the movement. Among the + most repressive measures taken by the regime are:

+ + —trials and imprisonment of four dissidents in October 1977 for + terms of 14 months to 3½ years on charges of subversion (during the + Belgrade CSCE review conference, + while the subject of human rights was being debated at + length). + —the round-up and preventive detention of some 40 activists on the + eve of Brezhnev’s May 1978 + visit to Czechoslovakia. Similarly, that summer—as the 10th + anniversary of the invasion neared—the regime warned various + Chartists to leave Prague or face detention. + —the late May 1979 arrests of ten activists of the movement on + charges of subversion. The reasons for these arrests are not known, + but perhaps reflect renewed determination by the police to wipe out + political dissidence before the 1980 CSCE review meeting in Madrid. Two of the arrested are + Charter spokesmen. All ten are activists in the Committee for the + Defense of the Unjustly Prosecuted (VONS), a sub-group of the + Charter, founded in May 1978. VONS has issued more than 100 + statements, giving details about the arrests, trials, and sentences + of Charter 77 + supporters. The trials of the activists were reportedly planned for + July, but apparently have been postponed twice—to give the public + prosecutor more time to prepare his case. The trials are now said to + be scheduled for late October. + —the September 10 police raids carried out in several Czech cities + against Catholic priests and laymen. Between six to twelve Catholic + activists are reported to have been arrested and charged with + circulating samizdat Catholic literature and + with impeding state control of religious activity. There is yet no + information that the Catholics are associated with the Charter + movement, but the operation itself comprises perhaps the harshest + measure against Catholics in some 25 years, and reflects the + determination of the regime to crack down on all dissidents. + +

The Czechoslovak samizdat movement, the so-called + Padlock Press, has not been subjected to nearly as much harassment as + the Charter movement. The regime may view the underground literary + movement as much less a threat than the Charter movement.

+

Popular Acceptance Lacking

+

The Czechoslovak population has avoided active commitment to Charter 77. + While there is little doubt that the overwhelming majority of + Czechoslovakia’s 15 million inhabitants privately sympathize with the + aims and goals of the Charter movement, few are willing to identify + publicly with it—thereby inviting regime reprisals. The 1968 invasion + apparently reinforced the belief that any political activity not + sanctioned by the regime is fruitless.

+

Even among the 1,000 signatories that are claimed, a solid social base is + lacking. There are only a few workers, peasants, or Slovaks. The vast + majority appear to be intellectuals, with the movement itself + concentrated in Prague.

+

The professions of some 750 signatories are known: two-thirds claim to be + members of the intelligentsia; the remaining one-third are registered as + workers, artisans, or manual laborers. Even these figures are + misleading, since some manual laborers or workers are in fact + intellectuals forced into menial positions in order to survive. Charter + 77 is thus the product of the Prague intelligentsia—with a considerable + number of this intelligentsia comprising communists ousted from the + Party for their opposition to the present regime.

+

The Slovak Factor

+

The reasons for the failure of the Charter to obtain Slovak support may + be more complex than mere communications difficulties or geographic + distance from Prague. Traditional Czech-Slovak animosities evidently + play a role: some Slovaks, reportedly reject any association with the + Charter on the grounds that it is a Czech-conceived stratagem intended + to weaken Party leader and President Husak, a Slovak. While such a reaction is narrow and chauvinistic, the + Charter’s establishment in Prague undoubtedly is a factor in the Slovak + reaction to it.

+

Political dissidence in Slovakia has not been as marked as in the Czech + lands of Bohemia and Moravia—at least, as far as is known. This may + reflect the somewhat more moderate treatment of former Dubcek reformers + and supporters in Slovakia. Children of Slovaks purged from the Party + since the invasion, for instance, appear to have more opportunities to + higher education than those elsewhere, particularly in Prague. Given + their minority status in Czechoslovakia, the Slovaks may also feel the + need to band together against the Czechs and, therefore, Slovak + officials may be less inclined to take harsh actions toward their + bretheren. The purges which followed the 1968 invasion and the fall of + Dubcek in April 1969 appear to have been less severe in Slovakia than in + the Czech lands.

+

The Slovaks may also feel that their political and economic status within + Czechoslovakia has improved since 1968, when federalization was + enacted—the only surviving major feature of the Dubcek reform period. + Accordingly, they would seem to have less reason to oppose a regime + headed by a Slovak. On the other hand, many Czechs are known to resent + bitterly the present federal structure, which they feel has the minority + Slovaks in dominant Party-Government positions.

+

Other Shortcomings

+

Some non-communists reportedly question the motives of various leading + activists in the movement. Particularly the ex-communists are distrusted + and viewed as using the Charter movement as a vehicle from which to + attack those communists in power. The ex-communists are criticized as + opportunistic and insincere, since they now espouse the civil and human + rights which they had ignored while holding Party positions.

+

Although some factionalism evidently existed within the Charter movement + in its early stages (e.g., between ex-communists and anti-communists, + Catholics and atheists), the divisions deepened as the membership grew + and became more diverse. The first three spokesmen—philosopher-professor + Jan Patocka, playwright Vaclav Havel, and former Foreign Minister Jiri + Hajek—were well known in Czechoslovakia and abroad, and commanded + respect and authority. (Neither Patocka nor Havel was communist; both in + fact had been persecuted by the regime. Hajek, a professor, served as + Foreign Minister under Dubcek; he was among the first of the reformers + to be purged after the invasion.)

+

Factionalism became more of a problem for leaders of the Charter after + Patocka’s death in March 1977. Younger members were said to favor more + aggressive, confrontational tactics, while Hajek and others counselled that the movement should + remain within the “strict confines of legality.” Disillusionment with + increasing factionalism may have been a main factor in Hajek’s decision + to resign as spokesman—although the view that the position should rotate + annually was obviously a factor. Those spokesmen who later came to + represent the movement have not been able to use their influence to + resolve differences—in part, because of their lesser prominence at home + and abroad. While acknowledging divisions, some Chartists dismiss them + as of little consequence, underscoring instead the common goal of the + struggle for human rights.

+

Organizers of the Charter clearly recognized that concentrating the + movement in the capital city of Prague would be a disadvantage, but they + had little choice. They sought to avoid police attention by limiting + their contacts outside Prague; some who played a prominent role in the + establishment of Charter 77 had been under police surveillance and any + travel outside the city would have been duly scrutinized. Moreover, such + travel would have given the impression that a “conspiracy” was underway + or that attempts were being made to found an “organization,” for which + Ministry of Interior approval is necessary and would never have been + granted.

+

Prospects

+

Prospects that the movement will accomplish its goals remain as bleak as + ever, since:

+ + —The regime has all the necessary levers of power and coercion at + its disposal, and will not hesitate to use them if threatened. It + also sees no reason to consider any “dialogue” with the Chartists, + since this could open a Pandora’s box. Prague takes its cue from + Moscow, where the attitude toward human rights dissidents is also + one of hostility and repression. As a result, Prague can feel + confident it has Soviet support for its policies against + dissent.Prague would hardly have + conducted the October 1977 trials of the four dissidents without + Moscow’s approval—coming as they did at a most sensitive time + during the CSCE review + conference. Similarly, it is unlikely that Prague would try + those Chartists now under arrest without informing Moscow + beforehand and gaining its understanding and approval. [Footnote + is in the original.] + —The failures that have plagued the Charter movement from the + outset (above all, the lack of popular support) have not been + reversed, with little prospect for improvement in the foreseeable + future. The movement is likely to remain concentrated in Prague, + with the intelligentsia its hard core and driving force. + +

Despite these bleak prospects, the movement deserves respect, admiration, + and sympathy for its ability to survive thus far and for its willingness + to confront the regime in the face of overwhelming odds.

+
+ +
+ 111. Memorandum From Stephen + Larrabee of the National Security Council Staff to the + President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)Source: Carter Library, National + Security Affairs, Brzezinski + Material, Country File, Box 17, Czechoslovakia: 1/77–1/81. + Confidential. Sent for action + + + Washington, October + 22, 1979 + + + SUBJECT + Trial of Czech Dissidents (U) + +

The trial of six of the ten Czech dissidents began today. Only family + members of the defendants were allowed inside the courtroom. (C)

+

The beginning of the trial raises the question of how we should respond. + You indicated on my Evening Report of October 16thIn an Evening Report dated October 16, Larrabee informed Brzezinski that rumors were + circulating in Prague that the dissidents would be put on trial + October 22. Brzezinski + marked the paragraph and wrote “Our Ambassador should come home for consultations” in the margin. (Carter + Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Staff Evening Reports File, Box + 24, 10/16–19/79) that you felt our Ambassador, Frank Meehan, should be called back + for consultations. In principle, I agree; but I suggest that we wait + until the end of the trial to see how it is conducted and what the + sentences are before recalling Meehan. State concurs. (C)

+

There are two reasons for this:

+

—Our reaction will in part depend on the severity of the sentences;

+

—There may be other trials (either of the remaining Chapter 77 members or + of the priests arrested several weeks ago. (C)

+

In the meantime, I would recommend that we do the following in + response:

+

—Postpone the scheduled visit by Deputy Assistant Secretary Barry to Prague, planned for November + 5–6;Brzezinski wrote “Yes” in the margin next to this + paragraph. The Department informed the Embassy in Prague of the + decision in telegram 277453, October 24. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + D790488–0336)

+

—Publically condemn the trials as a violation of the Helsinki Final + Act;Brzezinski wrote “Yes” in the margin of this + paragraph

+

—Postpone the tabling of the Czech gold claims proposal and let the + Czechs know privately the reasons for our decision.Brzezinski + placed a question mark in the margin next to this paragraph + (C)

+ +

Again, we may wish to recall Meehan, but I recommend that we wait and see how the + trial develops before taking any precipitous action. (C)

+

RECOMMENDATION: That the decision whether to + recall Meehan be taken at the + end of the trial.Brzezinski did not approve or + disapprove the action but wrote in the margin “Wouldn’t we be better + off if he came home now—and then returned? I am not sure about the + gold at this time.”

+
+ +
+ 112. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to NATO and the Embassy in + CzechoslovakiaSource: + National Archives, RG 59, Central + Foreign Policy File, D790491–0026. Confidential; Immediate. Also + sent for information to Belgrade. Drafted and approved by Barry; cleared by Larrabee, Gilmore (EUR/EE), and Gharrison (EUR/RPM). + + + + Washington, October 27, 1979, 0015Z + +

279993. Subject: (U) Dissident Trial—US Response. Ref: A) State 277357; + B) Prague 3720.In telegram 277357 to + Prague, October 24, the Embassy reported the comments made by + Department Press Spokesman Hodding Carter at the October 24 press + briefing regarding the trials of Czechoslovak dissidents. (National + Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign + Policy File, D790488–0250) In telegram 3720 from Prague, October 22, + the Embassy recommended that the Department be prepared to take a + position once the sentences were handed down. (National Archives, + RG 59, Central Foreign Policy + File, D790483–1159)

+

1. (C-entire text).

+

2. The following are the steps which we are taking in response to the + outcome of the trial of the six dissidents in Prague.In telegram 3752 from Prague, October 24, the + Embassy reported that the defendants were found guilty and sentenced + to time in prison ranging between 2 and 5 years. The Embassy also + reported that the sentences for Uhl, Havel, and Benda were lighter + than requested by the prosecutor and an appeal by the prosecution + was not excluded. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790487–0513) In + telegram 3765 from Prague, October 24, the Embassy described the + trial as “a new low in Czechoslovak jurisprudence” and that the + defense lawyers had been timid and ineffective. (National Archives, + RG 59, Central Foreign Policy + File, D790487–1133) We believe these steps will impress the + Czechoslovak Government with the seriousness of our concern.

+ +

A. Return of Ambassador Meehan + for consultations. We are asking Ambassador Meehan to return to Washington at his early convenience + for about one week of consultations to discuss US-Czechoslovak relations + in light of the trial.In telegram 279940 to + Prague, October 26, the Department wrote to Meehan “We have decided that it + would be useful to consult with you on where we go in our relations + with Czechoslovakia in the wake of the dissident trial” and that, + after delivering a démarche on the trial to Czechoslovak + authorities, Meehan should + return to Washington. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790490–1051) In + telegram 3799 from Prague, October 29, the Embassy reported that the + Ambassador briefly discussed the trials with Jablonsky on October 26 + at the Austrian National Day reception and set up an appointment at + the Foreign Ministry for October 30. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + D790495–0258) During the October 29 press briefing, the Department + publicized that Meehan had + been recalled for consultations. (Telegram 282873 to Prague, October + 30; National Archives, RG 59, + Central Foreign Policy File, D790496–0986) The next day, the Foreign + Ministry canceled Meehan’s + meeting with Jablonsky and Meehan left Prague without making an official + démarche. Embassy Chargé Morton was called to the Foreign Ministry + on October 30, where Sixth Department Director Jancik stressed that + cancelation of the Meehan-Jablonsky meeting was due to USG statements on dissident trials. + Reporting on the conversation in telegram 3860 from Prague, November + 1, Morton suggested that, based on the tone rather than content of + the presentation as well as reports from other Western Embassies in + Prague, the Czechoslovak “MFA is + clearly unhappy about effects of trial.” Morton also noted that + while other Western diplomatic representatives “were out in less + than 15 minutes,” following their meeting at the Foreign Ministry, + “drafters of protest to US obviously emptied their files in + searching for grievances to repeat.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + D790500–0586)

+

B. Press statement. The Department spokesman issued a strong statement + condemning the trials and the unreasonably harsh sentences on October + 24.The statement was sent to the + Embassy in telegram 277357 to Prague, October 24. The statement + condemned the trials and the sentences given the dissidents and + stressed that the Department would continue to speak out against + violations of human rights “wherever they occur.” The statement + concluded: “The human rights of Czechs and Slovaks and their freedom + to exercise these rights have obviously been a matter of interest to + some of Czechoslovakia’s neighbors who have had more than a little + influence over the ‘internal affairs’ of that country, in particular + during the past eleven years.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + D790488–0250)

+

C. Protest to Czechoslovak authorities. DAS + Barry called in Czechoslovak + Ambassador Johanes on October 25 + to express strongly held US views about the trial.Barry called + Ambassador Johanes on October + 26 to deliver the U.S. protest on + the dissident trials. The Department reported the conversation in + telegram 279131 to Prague, October 26. Barry told Johanes that the harsh sentences given the + dissidents would affect the consultations the Department was having + with Congress on a new claims/gold proposal. (National Archives, + RG 59, Central Foreign Policy + File, D790490–0591) A week earlier Barry had cautioned Ambassador Johanes that Czechoslovak human + rights behavior would affect the attitude in Congress toward any new + proposal made by the Department on the claims/gold issue. (Telegram + 274486 to Prague, October 19; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + D790480–0963) Ambassador Meehan was instructed to follow up in Prague.

+ +

D. Visits. We cancelled the visit to Prague of DAS + Barry scheduled for November 5 + and 6 and informed the Czechoslovak Government in Washington and Prague + that the cancellation was a result of the trials.

+

3. For USNATO. Please advise the + NAC of the steps we have taken and + report steps taken by others.In telegram + 3928 from Prague, November 7, the Embassy reported the reactions + from other Western countries to the dissident trials in + Czechoslovakia, noting that while some meetings were to go on as + planned, several Western governments had canceled or postponed + travel to Prague. The Embassy reported that visits were “hostage to + likely reaction pending trial of four more dissidents. Consensus of + NATO Chiefs of Mission is that + regime has decided internal considerations heavily outweigh foreign + policy.” (National Archives, RG 59, + Central Foreign Policy File, D790517–1106)

+ + Christopher + +
+ +
+ 113. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in + CzechoslovakiaSource: + National Archives, RG 59, Central + Foreign Policy File, D800091–0872. Confidential; Priority; Exdis. Drafted by Johnson; cleared + in draft by Crook and by Schmidt and Larrabee; approved by Barry. + + + + Washington, February 21, 1980, 1910Z + +

46720. Subject: Claims/Gold Proposal. Ref: (A) Prague 517; (B) 79 State + 240364.Telegram 517 from Prague, + February 11, is unrelated to the subject of this telegram. (National + Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign + Policy File, D800073–0665) Telegram 240364 to Prague, September 12, + 1979, reported the U.K. Government + position that Senator Long’s proposal of vesting and selling the + Czechoslovak gold was illegal. The Department also reported that the + United Kingdom had become impatient with the length of time the + United States was taking to resolve the claim issue and was + interested in proceeding with its own settlement. (National + Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign + Policy File, D790418–0244)

+

1. (C-entire text)

+

2. Despite the generally inauspicious circumstances prevailing now, the + Department is considering the desirability of moving on the Czechoslovak + claims/gold question in the near future. We are contemplating tabling by + next month in Prague the claims/gold proposal which has been under + consideration with the following revisions:

+ +

—A 100 [percent] cash settlement of the remaining principal value of the + claims ($66.5 million);

+

—Simultaneous delivery of the gold (now worth $420 million)

+

—Full cash settlement of the surplus property debt ($8 million). (If a + concession became necessary during the course of the negotiations to + obtain a high settlement for private claimants, we would be willing to + consider accepting some or all of this government debt in crowns.)

+

3. In the changed conditions of 1980, raising the ante to this level may + not be unreasonable. We believe there is at least a slight chance the + GOC would agree to negotiate on + such a proposal. We considered Deputy Foreign Minister Jablonsky’s + reaction to the Ambassador’s suggestion (ref A)Ambassador Meehan met with Jablonsky on January 30 to discuss + the state of U.S.-Czechoslovak + relations. The Department cabled the Embassy with some informal + suggestions as to how the Ambassador might probe Czechoslovak + willingness to settle the claims/gold matter in light of the growing + value of the Czechoslovak gold. (Telegram 25629 to Prague, January + 29; National Archives, RG 59, + Central Foreign Policy File, D800052–0743) Ambassador Meehan reported his conversation + in telegram 400 from Prague, January 31. Jablonsky, Meehan reported, did not + immediately reject the suggestion that Czechoslovakia might need to + pay $64 million representing the full amount of claims, but rather + he asked if MFN would be part of + that package. (National Archives, RG + 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800059–0498) a positive + sign in this direction. A further indication of possible GOC flexibility was reported by Paul Lyet + of Sperry Rand. Lyet said that at a February 12 dinner with Ambassador + Johanes and other Embassy + officers, Johanes informed Lyet + that several American lawyers had asked him why Czechoslovakia refused + to settle the claims. Johanes + said that he told them responsibility for making a proposal lay with the + State Department. He asked Lyet rhetorically what the American claims + were—$75 million? Then, with appropriately expansive gestures, he said, + “we’ll settle for 100 cents on the dollar.” Even in the much more likely + event they refuse, we would have at least attempted to carry out our + responsibilities to the claimants and our mandate from Congress.

+

4. We believe the following factors argue for going ahead now:

+

—(1) The astronomical price of gold has unquestionably improved our + bargaining position. Proposing a 100 [percent] cash settlement of the + claims and having some reasonable expectation of achieving it is no + longer unrealistic;

+

—(2) The prospect of having $385–500 million in ready hard currency + should be very appealing to the GOC + with its troubled economy and the imminent prospect of increased hard + currency energy expenditures;

+ +

—(3) The half billion dollar gold prize is again sparking interest in the + U.S. in vesting—for example, the + Merrigan investment initiative—and we can reasonably expect this + pressure to grow;

+

—(4) The British are continuing to press for our agreement to the + delivery of the gold so that they can get on with their own claims + settlement. Unless we are able to demonstrate some movement in the near + future, they may seriously propose that the Commission order the + delivery of the gold held by the Bank of England to enable HMG to bring + into effect the 1964 UK-Czechoslovak agreed minute (ref B).

+

—(5) Although we have legitimate reasons for failing to make a new + proposal after Congress repudiated the 1974 Agreement, our position is + vulnerable to attack from the interested parties. The claimants say we + have done nothing to advance their interests since 1974, and that + inflation has seriously eroded the value of any settlement. Congress can + point to the clear mandate it gave in 1974 to renegotiate the 40 + agreement. And the Czechoslovaks can say that they have demonstrated + their intention to fulfill their legal obligation to the owners of the + nationalized property by twice agreeing to pay compensation. They can + also point to our failure to return to the bargaining table despite our + unilateral repudiation of both ad referendum agreements;

+

—(6) It would be more difficult to prevent Congress from mandating the + vesting of the gold than it was to defeat the 1976 lawsuit. If vesting + legislation were enacted, we would have considerable difficulties with + the French and British Governments, and our relations with + Czechoslovakia would be poisoned for years to come; and

+

—(7) Assuming that the GOC did not + reject the proposal out of hand, we would be able to point to continuing + negotiations to deflect congressional proposals to vest the gold, as + well as “separate peace” proposals from the British.

+

5. We see the following objections to proceeding as recommended above, + but we do not believe any of them to be overriding:

+

—(1) The chances of achieving a 100 [percent] cash settlement in the very + near future are admittedly not great. Only Yugoslavia, among the Eastern + European countries, paid anything approaching this amount. (It is + interesting to note, however, that the primary reason for the high + percentage of the Yugoslav settlement, which was reached in 1948, was + the fact that we held Yugoslav monetary gold valued in excess of our + claims against the GOY);

+

—(2) Reopening the negotiations with the Czechoslovaks at this time could + be seen as a signal that we intend to proceed with “business as usual”, + despite Czechoslovak support for the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and + continued repression of dissidents;

+

—(3) Tabling this proposal could raise unrealistic expectations among the + claimants. If these expectations are not fulfilled, they could lead to increased pressures for + Congress to vest the gold with the consequent adverse legal and + political results; and

+

—(4) The Czechoslovaks could regard the proposal as insulting, and our + already bad bilateral relations would become even worse.

+

6. Despite the problems and objections, we believe it prudent and + desirable to move ahead at this time. If we are to do so, however, we + need to get cracking now. We would appreciate the Embassy’s + comments/counter proposals on the foregoing.In telegram 648 from Prague, February 22, the Embassy responded + that it agreed fully with the Department’s assessment of the + situation and proposed next moves. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + D800093–0016)

+ + Christopher + +
+ + +
+ 114. Action Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for + European Affairs (Vest) to the + Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Newsom)Source: National Archives, RG 59, Office of the Assistant Legal Adviser for + European Affairs, Country Files, 1950–1986, Lot 89D336, Box 11, + Czech: Gold Working File. Confidential. Sent through Counselor + Ridgway; drafted by + Johnson; cleared by Schmidt + and Barry and in E, H, EB, + L/EUR, and Treasury. Barry + initialed the memorandum for Vest. According to a stamped notation, Newsom saw the memorandum on May + 5. + + + Washington, April 30, + 1980 + + + SUBJECT + Circular 175 Authority: Claims/Gold Agreement with + Czechoslovakia + +

ISSUE FOR DECISION

+

Whether to authorize our Ambassador in Prague to negotiate and conclude + an agreement with Czechoslovakia settling nationalization claims and + other financial issues.

+

ESSENTIAL FACTORS

+

Despite the more than 30 years which have passed since World War II ended + and the Communists seized power in Prague, unresolved financial disputes + from that era continue to bedevil our relations with Czechoslovakia. We have not been able + to conclude a satisfactory agreement on compensation for the claims of + American citizens and corporations whose property was nationalized + during the early post-war period or on several other related financial + issues. The Foreign Claims Settlement Commission has adjudicated the + value of the claims in 1958 as $72.6 million in principal and $41 + million in interest. In return, we have refused to consent to the + delivery to Czechoslovakia of the remaining portion (18.4 metric tons) + of its share of the Nazi-looted monetary gold which the Allies recovered + at the close of the war. We have also maintained blocking controls on + approximately $1.4 million of Czechoslovak assets in the United States + and have refused to consider granting MFN status to Czechoslovakia.

+

The Gold

+

We are a member of the Tripartite (U.S., + U.K., France) Commission for the + Restitution of Monetary Gold, established by multilateral agreement in + 1946 to marshall all monetary gold found in Germany and to allocate it + among the countries whose gold was looted by the Nazis. Unanimity is + required for the Commission to effect delivery of the remainder of the + share it allocated to Czechoslovakia in 1947 and we have so far not + consented to such action. The French would like to see the gold + delivered, having settled their claims in 1950. The British are even + more interested since under a 1964 UK-Czechoslovak agreed minute, + settlement of British claims will begin only after the gold is + delivered. The British have, in fact, been pressing us rather actively + during the past year to get on with a settlement.

+

Past Claims/Gold Negotiations

+

Serious discussions with the Czechoslovaks on these issues have taken + place intermittently since 1949 and twice we have reached ad referendum agreements. In both cases, however, + Congress objected to the claims settlement as too low. Most recently, a + 1974 settlement for $29 million or approximately 40 cents on the dollar + (typical of our settlements with other Eastern European countries) was + repudiated by section 408 of the 1974 Trade Act added at the insistence + of Senators Long and Gravel. The Trade Act also requires that any future + agreement be approved by Congress. Our efforts to resume negotiations + since that time have regularly been thwarted by a souring of the + political atmosphere caused by repressive measures of the Czechoslovak + Government against its dissident citizens. We had obtained interagency + agreement last fall to propose a claims settlement of $51 million (70 + percent of the adjudicated principal with no interest).See Document 109. + We did not go forward with the + proposal at that time because of the trial of six dissidents in Prague + in October.

+

With the rise in the price of gold to its present level (at $500 per + ounce the Czechoslovak gold is worth about $300 million), our + negotiating leverage has increased substantially as has the pressure on + us from the claimants for a good and rapid settlement. It now should be + within the realm of possibility to obtain a claims settlement which will + be acceptable to the claimants and to Congress and to reach a + satisfactory resolution of the other issues involving USG financial interests. Such an outcome + would move our bilateral relations with Czechoslovakia out of their long + stagnation and increase our policy options in dealing with that + country.

+

Our Proposal

+

We intend to propose to the Czechoslovak Government that we renegotiate + the provisions of the 1974 ad referendum + agreement relating to the amount to be paid by Czechoslovakia in + settlement of U.S. claims and that we + leave the other provisions as agreed in 1974. We would initially propose + that the Czechoslovak Government make a lump sum claims payment of + $105.1 million (100 percent of the outstanding principal and interest + awarded by the Foreign Claims Settlement Commission). The central + elements of the proposal are described in the attachment at Tab 2.Tab 2 is attached but not printed.

+

Our initial proposal of $105 million will be much higher than our opening + position in the negotiations which led to the failed 1974 agreement ($26 + million), although commensurate with the increase in the value of the + Czechoslovak gold. It also exceeds the settlement levels with other + Eastern European countries. There are several reasons for a high opening + position. Initially, it seems clear that Congress will not approve a + settlement which is not much more favorable to American claimants than + the failed 1974 agreement, particularly in light of the greatly + increased value of the gold. Our proposal will give us negotiating room + to reach an eventual settlement acceptable to Congress. Moreover, this + proposal responds to Congressional suggestions that we should seek + interest on the value of U.S. citizens’ + claims.The Department of the Treasury + suggested using the demand for interest as a means to improve the + U.S. negotiating position and + ensure that Congress would have its concerns about interest + addressed when the agreement went to the Hill for approval. The + Treasury position was reported in telegram 72571 to Prague, March + 19. (National Archives, RG 59, + Central Foreign Policy File, D8000140–0224) In telegram 1037 from + Prague, March 24, Ambassador Meehan responded that such a position “verges on the + unreal” and “could throw the previous basis of negotiation out the + window.” “We think” Meehan + wrote, Czechoslovakia “would receive the 105 million figure as a + naively exaggerated bargaining tactic or else as a signal we are not + serious about negotiating.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + D800170–0605)

+ +

Because of the level of our proposal, there is a risk that the + Czechoslovaks will not be willing to enter into meaningful negotiations; + however, we believe that the substantial increase in the value of the + gold provides an incentive for the Czechoslovak Government to consider + our proposal seriously and to make a reasonable response. Moreover, the + Czechoslovaks will expect us to present an initial position that will + allow some bargaining room.

+

If the Czechoslovaks do reject our proposal to resume negotiations, we + will have in any event sought to satisfy the mandate of section 408 of + the Trade Act to renegotiate the 1974 Czechoslovak Claims Settlement + Agreement. However, such an outcome could also result in increased + pressure from the claimants and from Members of Congress for the U.S. Government to vest the gold to satisfy + U.S. claims.

+

Congressional and Public Consultations

+

We consulted extensively last fall with interested Members of Congress on + the terms of a settlement. With the important exception of Senator Long, + all of the Members consulted indicated they would be willing to support + a settlement in the range of 50%. Since our present proposal meets even + Senator Long’s expressed requirement for “100 cents on the dollar,” we + believe that he will not block a settlement at or near this figure. + Similarly, we have discussed the terms of a possible settlement with a + number of the claimants or their representatives. They would be + delighted to receive anything close to 100% of the principal value of + their claims. The claimants, many of whom are elderly, are anxious for a + settlement, and many are disgruntled with our failure to obtain one + since 1974. Individuals who were active in obtaining Congressional + disapproval of the 1974 agreement are now lobbying for legislation to + use the gold to compensate the claimants directly and we understand some + Members of Congress are prepared to introduce such legislation.Congressman Lester L. Wolff (D-New York) + introduced H.R. 7338 on May 13, which directed the Secretary of the + Treasury to “take full possession of all Czechoslovak gold located + in the United States, if a settlement agreement is not submitted to + Congress or such agreement has not been approved by Congress, within + 60 days of enactment of this act.” The proceeds of the sale would be + invested in U.S. and foreign + securities, and all interest accrued from the investment deposited + into the Czechoslovak Claims Fund for payment of claims. The bill + also directed the Secretary of State to negotiate with the United + Kingdom and France on the vesting of Czechoslovak gold in the United + Kingdom, to be used in conjunction with the vested gold in the + United States for payments to claimants. The bill was referred to + the House Committee on Foreign Affairs. A joint hearing was held by + the Subcommittee on International Economic Policy and the + Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East on August 19. In telegram + 229046 to Prague, August 28, the Department reported: “most of the + subcommittee members present were clearly sympathetic to the + concerns of the claimants” and that “the administration’s + presentation regarding the desirability of a negotiated settlement + and the legal and political problems which the bill presented did + not appear to have had much effect.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + D800410–1048) Taking such a step without the agreement of the UK and France—who have + told us unambiguously they would oppose it—would clearly violate + specific U.S. international legal + commitments.

+

If we can establish with the Czechoslovak Government that a basis exists + for fruitful negotiations, we will conduct more comprehensive + consultations with a broader range of the claimants. Immediately prior + to tabling our new proposal, we will advise Senator Long and several + other Members of Congress with particular interests in this issue of our + plans. We will also consult with them periodically during the course of + the negotiations. Such consultations will be critical, since the + approval of Congress would be required under the terms of Section 408 of + the Trade Act of 1974 in order for the agreement to enter into effect, + and related legislation would be required to authorize the Foreign + Claims Settlement Commission to adjudicate claims arising after 1958. A + legal memorandum on the agreement is attached at Tab 1.Tab 1 is attached but not printed.

+

RECOMMENDATION

+

That you authorize our Ambassador in Prague to negotiate and conclude a + claims agreement with Czechoslovakia as described above, subject to + concurrence by EUR, L, EB, H and other + appropriate bureaus and agencies.Newsom approved the recommendation + on May 6.

+
+ +
+ 115. Memorandum From Stephen + Larrabee of the National Security Council Staff to the + President’s Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Aaron)Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, + Brzezinski Material, + Country File, Box 17, Czechoslovakia: 1/77–1/81. Confidential. + Aaron forwarded the + memorandum to Brzezinski + with a handwritten note: “ZB—Note see p. 2.” + + + Washington, July 21, + 1980 + + + SUBJECT + Revised Claims/Gold Proposal for Czechoslovakia + +

I. Background

+

State had planned to table a proposal for a settlement of the Claims/Gold + issue in October 1979, but its efforts were suspended at that time due + to the trial of 6 Czech dissidents. In May of this year State proposed + renewing its efforts to settle the issue with a revised proposal which + included:

+

—A 100 percent cash settlement of the remaining principal value of the + claims ($66.5 million);

+

—Simultaneous delivery of the gold (now worth $420 million);

+

—Full cash settlement of the surplus property debt ($8 million). (C)

+

At that time I sent a memo to Zbig informing him of State’s intention, + which was forwarded to Madeleine + for comment. (Tab A)Tab A, a May 19 + memorandum from Larrabee to + Brzezinski is attached + but not printed. The memorandum was forwarded to Madeleine Albright on May 20 by + David Aaron. After + Madeleine looked into the Congressional situation, she recommended going + forward, and Zbig approved the recommendation. (Tab B)Tab B, a May 22 memorandum from Albright to Brzezinski and Aaron, is attached but not + printed. (C)

+

II. Rationale

+

The main reason for moving forward now—even in an + election year—is that a bill (HR 7338) was introduced into the House + by Congressman Wolff on May 13 to vest the gold—despite efforts + by State to head it off. The essence of the Wolff bill is that the + Secretary of the Treasury would be instructed to sell any of the gold + allocated to Czechoslovakia which is in the custody of the United + States, invest the proceeds in interest-bearing securities, pay the + American claimants from the interest, and return the principal to + Czechoslovakia after the claims are settled. (C)

+

Such action would be contrary to the Tripartite Agreement signed with the + British and French in 1946 which stated that the gold would be returned to Czechoslovakia upon + agreement between the three partners. Moreover, under the Wolff Bill the + claimants would have to wait 14–25 years to get their money, whereas + under State’s proposal, once the issue had been settled, they could get + their money immediately. (C)

+

III. Domestic + Implications

+

State’s decision to move forward was taken after close + consultation with Congress and the Czechoslovak-American + community. Among those in Congress concerned with the issue, + there was considerable sentiment that State should finally get the issue + settled. The Czechoslovak-American community, particularly the + Czechoslovak National Congress, also supported an equitable settlement + of the issue because many of the claimants were getting old and were + about to die. (C)

+

In short, while an election year is obviously not the most propitious + time to table a proposal, our hand was forced by Wolff.See footnote 5, Document + 114, for background on the Wolff bill. However, + unlike the return of the Crown of St. Stephen to Hungary, in State’s + view, this is not an issue which is likely to stir up a hornet’s nest + domestically.Aaron highlighted this passage with + an arrow in the margin. He wrote at the bottom of the memorandum: + “ZB—Question is: Will Wolff bill + pass this year? If not, why press it now? I think we should slow + this down. DA.” Brzezinski + responded: “DA. Slow it down. I tend to feel the same way. ZB.” (C)

+

Our proposal envisages a settlement of about 160 + percent of the original principal, thus allowing us to show + firmness to any domestic critics. (It should be noted in this regard + that claims settlements with China and other East European countries + were considerably less: Poland—41%; Romania—39%; Bulgaria—63%; + Peking—42%. Moreover, our present proposal with Czechoslovakia is + considerably better than the 1974 proposal, which envisaged a 41% + settlement.) (C)

+

No thought is being given to improving relations with + Prague (though a settlement would clear the decks for such an + improvement if and when it became politically desirable). Lastly, any + settlement is far down the road. The Czechs have reacted negatively to + our proposal because it is high and so out of line with other + settlements, and they are not likely to agree even to begin negotiations + for some time. (C)

+
+ +
+ 116. Telegram From the Embassy in Czechoslovakia to the Department of + StateSource: National + Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign + Policy File, D800566–1066. Confidential; Priority. Sent for + information to Belgrade, East Berlin, Bucharest, Budapest, Moscow, + Sofia, Warsaw, and USCINCEUR, + CINCUSAFE, and CINCUSAREUR. + + + + Prague, November 26, 1980, 1404Z + +

4344. USCINCEUR, CINCUSAFE, and CINCUSAREUR for POLADs. Subject: + Czechoslovakia at the End of 1980—An Overview.

+

1. (C-entire text.)

+

2. This is a background report which may be useful in briefing the + transition team. For more extensive discussion of certain areas we + recommend reference to Prague A–4, “Czechoslovakia Isn’t Working,” and + Prague A–16, “Czechoslovak Looks Inward.”

+

3. The outstanding impression of Czechoslovakia today as it has been for + a decade, is of an apathetic, disengaged population ruled by a nervous, + unselfconfident regime. The regime, imposed by Soviet pressure in 1969, + has never been able to convince the people, the outside world or, + seemingly, itself of its legitimacy. The trauma caused by the crushing + of the Prague Spring of 1968 has kept the regime fearful of innovation + and unwilling to take any step that might cause Moscow to raise an + ideological eyebrow. This attitude has contributed heavily to the + stagnation which now afflicts the economy.

+

4. After the brief orgy of liberalization in 1968 the people have + retreated into mass apathy, appearing to concern themselves entirely + with consumer spending, recreation, and work avoidance. Politics, + including the small manifestations of intellectual dissidence, leaves + the masses cold and Party membership is seen by most simply as a means + of advancing careers. The regime, fearing outbursts of popular + resistance a la Poland, has been reluctant to raise the currently + subsidized prices to world levels and has so far kept action on + improving work discipline to exhortation. It has since the Polish + disturbances chosen to give in to workers’ demands in unpublicized local + labor disputes rather than risk confrontation.

+

5. The Czechoslovak economy is sick. The strong industrial plant with + which Czechoslovakia emerged from World War II is now by any standards + obsolete and energy inefficient. Dependent almost entirely on imports + for raw materials and energy, it has had to adjust to sharp rises in + prices, even for goods supplied by the USSR, supplier of almost all of Czechoslovakia’s oil and + much of its other raw materials. At the same time its industrial + products have become steadily less competitive in both world and CEMA markets. The above-noted fear of + policy innovation, unmotivated work force, and obsolete plant create + almost unsuperable problems for economic policymakers, made no easier by + traditional GOC reluctance to borrow + heavily abroad. Problems are such that as of this date neither the 1981 + economic plan nor the 1981–85 five-year plan has yet been completed. A + set of measures to invigorate management of industry within the scope of + a central plan is to be put into effect in January 1981, but no observer + expects any revolutionary improvement to result. On the agricultural + side, it has had to turn to the West for feed grains in fairly sizable + amounts and must scrabble to fulfill demand for meat.

+

6. Czechoslovak trade, which accounts for over 30 percent of national + income, is being sucked increasingly into the mire of the Comecon economies. The causes are + Czechoslovak dependence on Soviet energy sources. Competitive inability + to earn sufficient hard currency to diversify sources, and increasing + Soviet success in promoting economic integration. Fifty percent of + Czechoslovakia’s exports of machinery and equipment (traditional hard + currency earners) are already going to the Soviet Union and an + additional 30 percent to other Comecon countries. This trend is not contrary to the wishes + of many Czechoslovak planners, who would rather see their country as an + equal partner in a second-rate economic grouping than a second-rate + country in world markets. The consequence is a decline in Czechoslovak + opportunity for economic maneuver, just as the country has already lost + its opportunity for political maneuver in the international arena.

+

7. The economic slowdown of the past two years has been accompanied by + stiffened internal political controls. The current leadership is + intensely aware of the potential social impacts of economic decline and + its self-imposed policy limitations. It is putting the people, + especially real or potential dissidents, on notice that it is prepared + to ensure its survival over the difficult times ahead.

+

8. In foreign policy Czechoslovakia continues to be the most fervent + supporter of Soviet policies and frequent mouthpiece for Soviet views, + as it has been at the Madrid CSCE + review. It pursues an activist policy, marked by many exchanges of + visits, acts as a Soviet surrogate in certain Third World areas, and has + some foreign aid responsibilities, most notably in Indo-China and + Afghanistan.

+

9. Our bilateral relations with Czechoslovakia remain basically + deadlocked pending resolution of the longstanding claims/gold issue. Our + refusal to grant Czechoslovakia MFN + rankles. Scientific exchanges continue but cultural exchanges are down + to a trickle; across the board, lack of an exchange agreement leaves us + with no means of enforcing reciprocity. Arranging normal contacts with + officials remains extremely difficult. Heavy-handed anti-American + propaganda fills the media almost constantly, poisoning the atmosphere. Seemingly pointless + harassment, bureaucratic delay, and general obstruction of American + tourists by Czechoslovak authorities led the Embassy in July of this + year to request the Department to issue an advisory warning travelers of + possible difficulties. On the positive side, however, the Czechoslovaks + have worked steadily to resolve divided family cases, reducing the + Embassy’s list of immediate (nuclear) families awaiting reunification in + the West to two cases involving three individuals.

+

10. While the Czechoslovak side must bear the brunt of the blame for the + propaganda atmosphere, the US side is not blameless. Czechoslovak + officials perceive statements by US officials as part of a + discriminatory policy, which makes a scapegoat of this country to + further US policy goals with other countries whose human rights + practices seem no less worthy of criticism. Quite clearly at the + Belgrade CSCE Review Czechoslovakia + served as a surrogate for the Soviet Union in receiving criticism from + US delegates. With some justice GOC + officials point out that positive factors, such as family reunification + progress, tend to be ignored.

+

11. The outlook for bilateral relations is not bright. We are attempting + to negotiate a claims/gold settlement before pending legislation + requires us to seize the gold we hold and invest it to pay the claims, + but can have no great assurance of success.The agreement on Czechoslovak payment of claims for expropriated + U.S. citizens was initialed on + November 6, 1981, in Prague Congress passed a resolution approving + the deal on December 15 and President Reagan signed it on December + 29. As part of the deal, the Czechoslovak Government agreed to pay + $81.5 million to the claimants. Should that issue be + resolved, some modest progress would be possible: The dormant Consular + Convention would take effect, an exchanges agreement might be signed, + permitting a modest increase in our information programs. As long as the + Jackson-Vanik provisions of the Trade Act remain law, we foresee no + early possibility of giving Czechoslovakia MFN and, failing that, no likely surge in agricultural + trade. Our interests in Czechoslovakia are simply too few to provide an + impetus for much improvement in bilateral relations.

+

12. The outlook is not, however, completely dark. In spite of 35 years of + Soviet hegemony and an ever-increasing integration of the economy into + the Soviet sphere, the Czechoslovak people remain Western oriented. The + ties of emigration remain strong, with hundreds of thousands of + Americans claiming Czech and Slovak ancestry. VOA and other Western radios, plus Austrian and West German + TV, have large, regular audiences and any Western cultural attraction + has a real sell out. In fact, this is a basic problem the regime + faces—35 years of unremitting + Communist propaganda have failed to change the Western orientation and + basic values of the people.

+

13. Maintaining this Western orientation has over the years been our + major policy thrust in Czechoslovakia. We have never been able to get + any of post postwar regimes to exert independence of Moscow, but neither + has Moscow ever been able to develop confidence in the loyalty of the + Czechoslovak people to Soviet aims. Without such confidence the Kremlin + cannot count on Czechoslovakia as a strong left flank for Warsaw Pact + forces facing NATO forces in West + Germany. We assume that future policies toward Czechoslovakia will be + basically designed to deny it that confidence.

+ + Morton + +
+
+ +
+ + German Democratic Republic + +
+ 117. Telegram From the Embassy in the German Democratic Republic to + the Department of StateSource: National Archives, RG 59, + Central Foreign Policy File, D770174–0968. Confidential; Priority. + Sent for information to Belgrade, Bonn, Bucharest, Budapest, London, + Moscow, Paris, Prague, Sofia, Warsaw, West Berlin, and USNATO. + + + East Berlin, May 16, 1977, 1540Z + +

6051. Subj: US/GDR Relations: GDR Proposals for Major Expansion. Ref: + Berlin 6050The reference is in error. + Telegram 6050 from East Berlin, May 16, addressed logistical and + bureaucratic matters. The reference is likely to telegram 6040 from + East Berlin, May 12, which also reported on the meeting with Foreign + Minister Fischer. (National + Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign + Policy File, D770167–1049) (Notal).

+

Summary: During May 12 meeting with Charge, Foreign Minister Fischer expressed GDR readiness to expand US–GDR relations noting that CSCE Final Act provided solid basis for + such expansion. GDR favored high-level + periodic political consultations, increased trade, and cultural + contacts. He asserted all humanitarian cases had been resolved, and + urged “reciprocity” in granting of visas for journalists. Charge noted + that “non-paper” aide memoireIn telegram + 6044 from East Berlin, May 16, the Embassy forwarded a translation + of the aide mémoire. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + D770173–0574) which Fischer handed over would be carefully studied and + responded to as appropriate. We favored development of constructive + relationships wherever possible. We were pleased by progress in + humanitarian cases, although our records show that not all cases have + been resolved, and hoped we could see progress also in emergency family + reunification matters. On Consular Convention, our view was that we were + waiting for response from GDR side, and + we would also like to have some response from them to our suggestion for + talks on claims negotiations. Fischer took issue with our view on status of Consular + Convention negotiations, but said he would ask his Consular as well as + claims people to be in touch with Embassy. He was opposed to double + accreditation to US FRG-based + journalists to GDR. End summary.

+

1. In meeting May 12 with Charge, GDR + Foreign Minister began presentation by stating that there was a need to + accelerate development of relations between the US and GDR. He noted that CSCE provided a solid basis for an + expansion of contacts and that US and GDR had been in contact on some non-CSCE related issues. He asserted the + GDR had made a variety of proposals + to US, adding that the state of relations at the present time was really not consistent with + what seemed to be possible. He said a regular exchange of views at + different levels would enable both sides to resolve problems and at the + same time to draw “a balance” in relations. It was their desire to do + whatever was possible to give “a constructive impulse” to the expansion + of US–GDR relations.

+

2. Turning to the aide memoire, which he described as a “non-paper”, + Fischer read selectively from + it. The GDR was proposing, [Fischer] said, regular political + contacts between competent representatives of both countries; for + example, it would be possible for the Foreign Minister to hold such + consultations in the second half of 1977 in connection with the UNGA in Washington. The May 18 signing of + the ENMOD TreatyThe Environmental Modification Convention (ENMOD), formally known as The + Convention on Prohibition of Military or any Other Hostile Use of + Environmental Modification Techniques, which banned the use of + military and hostile techniques for weather modification, opened for + signatures in Geneva on May 18, 1977, and entered into force October + 5, 1978. The United States signed the convention on May 18, 1977. + The Senate ratified the convention on January 17, 1980. could + be another such occasion. Further steps could be taken in arriving at + agreements, and Fischer asserted + it would not be necessary to elaborate on this point.

+

3. Another area is trade relations, Fischer said, where the possibilities are much greater + than the present levels would indicate. There were also possibilities + for expanded commercial and business relations and an exchange of + appropriate information. Along the same lines, the GDR still retained its interest in opening + a trade office in New York.

+

4. One should not exclude the expansion also of cultural exchanges. Both + sides know what has been done until now, and know more can be done. The + GDR, Fischer said, is ready to do more, not only in “purely” + cultural exchanges. There could also be exchanges on language training, + textbooks, and an agreement between news agencies of both countries.

+

5. In humanitarian cases, the US knows the principled position and + practice of the GDR. Each side of + course is free to decide how it wishes to resolve such cases. As far as + the GDR is concerned, as Ambassador + Sieber had informed Under Secretary Habib,In a meeting with + Habib on April 26, + Sieber conveyed a message for Vance from Fischer (on Honecker’s behalf) that “requests made to GDR authorities by official + representatives of the US for authorization of marriages between + GDR citizens and US citizens, + as well as for emigration (uebersiedlung), have been carefully + examined. All these requests have been approved.” (Telegram 94855 to + East Berlin, April 27; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + D770148–0715) there were no open questions in this area.

+

6. Fischer suggested both sides + might also consider easing the procedures for granting visas, and went + on to say that activities of journalists could also be alleviated. In this regard, he asserted, the + GDR is “generous”. It had granted + accreditation to an AP correspondent in Copenhagen, and had given him a + one year visa. Fischer suggested + there should be reciprocal action in granting visas, which would apply + first to accredited journalists.

+

7. Fischer concluded that there + were further details and proposals in the aide memoire which he would + not dwell on. In the interest of implementing CSCE there were a number of possibilities inherent in the + situation that should make it possible for an expansion of relations; + for its part, the GDR is prepared to do + so.

+

8. Charge thanked Fischer for his + presentation and said that careful attention and study would be given to + the aide memoire. The US also favored the development of constructive + relations wherever possible, and the Charge was pleased to hear the + GDR desired to expand relations + with the US. While we would respond later in detail to the aide memoire + after we had had a chance to study it carefully, Charge said he wished + to make several preliminary comments in response to the Foreign + Minister’s remarks. First of all, it would be useful to know what the + Foreign Minister meant when he referred to further progress in treaty or + “agreement” matters. Fischer said + he had in mind such things as the Fisheries Agreement, Postal Agreement, + a Consular Convention, etc.

+

9. Charge noted that, with respect to the Consular Convention, it was our + impression, as Charge had recently told Geyer (who was present), that + the ball was in the GDR court. After + the last round of negotiations, we had presented a counter-draft to the + GDR side and had heard nothing + official from them since. Conclusion of a Consular Convention would + contribute significantly to the further development of our + relations.

+

10. Fischer said, “You know our + position.” We don’t feel we have to give you an answer because the US + side has not responded to GDR proposals + which, in the GDR’s view, represented a + compromise between the positions of the two countries. However, since + the US side wished to pursue the matter further, he saw no reason why + responsible officials from the MFA’s + Consular section could not meet with Embassy officials in the near + future to see what possibilities might exist for the next round of + negotiations. Charge said that while our viewpoint might be different + about who owes whom a reply, we would be pleased to get together with + the MFA’s Consular division.

+

11. Charge also noted he had suggested some time ago, in connection with + our interest in a claims settlement, that a State Department lawyer + would be willing to come to Berlin for the purpose of gaining a better + understanding of pertinent GDR + regulations and for informing GDR + officials about US procedures and practices in claims matters. Conversely, we would be + prepared to receive an appropriate GDR + official in Washington for such discussions. As of now, we have heard + nothing about this suggestion. Fischer replied that the absence of any mention of + claims in their aide memoire did not mean that they had intended to + exclude the subject; but it was a matter of their “physical capacity” + since they were involved in negotiating claims settlements with a number + of countries. They remain interested in being in contact with us, + Fischer said, and he would + ask a responsible officer to talk with us about “preparations for + negotiations.” Charge said he thought this could be a useful step.

+

12. Charge went on to note that, since the Foreign Minister had mentioned + the matter of journalists, he had a comment to make. As the Foreign + Minister knew, US journalists had expressed an interest in being + accredited to the GDR as well as to + other countries where they might be resident. Until now, there had been + no movement in this area.

+

13. Fischer responded, saying that + the GDR wanted to facilitate the + activities of journalists, but he wondered whether it would be right to + grant double accreditation. The present arrangement, with accreditation + for an AP correspondent in Copenhagen, is better than giving double + accreditation to American journalists in Bonn or West Berlin. Were the + GDR to do so, he was afraid that + some FRG politicians would take it as a + demonstration of the “Old Germany”, and the GDR was not prepared to give anyone such an idea. They were + ready to accredit US journalists who are in Western Europe but not those + in Bonn or West Berlin. Perhaps the time will come one day when US + correspondents in the FRG might also be + accredited to the GDR, but both + Fischer and the Charge would + probably be older and grayer by then.

+

14. On humanitarian cases, Charge noted we were pleased by progress we + had noted recently. It was a good step forward, as a result of Amb. Sieber’s statement to Mr. Habib that all outstanding cases have + been satisfactorily resolved, we had checked our files and our records + were somewhat different and Charge had asked our Consular section to be + in touch with the MFA’s Consular + section on the matter, and therefore Charge would not bother the Foreign + Minister with the details. We would, at the same time, hope that cases + involving emergency family reunification will also be resolved + satisfactorily. Fischer made no + comment on emergency family reunification cases and said that, as long + as Embassy and MFA Consular section + officers were in touch on other cases he saw no need to respond.

+

15. Meeting closed with Charge reiterating we would be in touch as + appropriate with MFA once we had had + opportunity to study “non-paper” thoroughly.

+ +

16. Embassy’s comments on “non-paper” aide memoire follow septel.In + telegram 6127 from East Berlin, May 23, the Embassy commented that + the aide mémoire was “tendentious and disingenuous,“ and contained + nothing new. The Embassy recommended that, though prospects in the + cultural area appeared to be improving, there was no reason to + accede to East German desires for regular, high-level political + consultations. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + D770183–0708)

+ + Polansky + +
+ + +
+ 118. Telegram From the Embassy in the German Democratic Republic to + the Department of StateSource: National Archives, RG 59, + Central Foreign Policy File, D770303–0045. Confidential; + Immediate. + + + East Berlin, August 22, 1977, 1902Z + +

6885. Subject: Presentation of Credentials to Chairman of State Council + Honecker. Ref: A. Berlin + 6858,The reference is in error. + Telegram 6858 from East Berlin, August 22, reported the status of + the grain harvest in the German Democratic Republic and the + challenges faced by the East German Government. (National Archives, + RG 59, Central Foreign Policy + File, D770301–0794) Reference is likely to telegram 6855 from East + Berlin, August 19, which reported the conversation between Bolen and + Foreign Minister Fischer. See + footnote 6 below. B. State + 196718.Telegram 196718 to East Berlin, + August 18, provided the text of the oral presentation to be made by + Bolen in his meeting with Honecker. Bolen was instructed to stress, among + other things, that progress in bilateral relations depended on a + fruitful and quick resolution of the Consular Convention between the + two countries. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770316–1129, + D770298–1285)

+

Summary: In a fifty-minute meeting following the presentation of my + credentials today, Chairman of State Council Honecker repeatedly stressed the GDR’s desire to move forward in developing + good bilateral relations with the United States. In this connection he + emphasized the need for good US-Soviet relations as a factor in + developing US–GDR cooperation. He hoped + the dialogue between the US and the Soviet Union on SALT and other such matters would + continue. Honecker supported the + Foreign Minister’s forthcoming comments (ref A) on outstanding bilateral + issues of interest to us, including humanitarian cases, claims and Consular Convention. The + Chairman raised the issue of the substantial US trade surplus with the + GDR, alluded to Jackson-Vanik and + expressed hope ways could be found to increase GDR exports to the US. Honecker was pleased about the Secretary’s willingness + to meet with Foreign Minister Fischer at the UNGA + and agreed that this meeting could be helpful in bringing about progress + on a range of issues of interest to both countries. End summary.

+

1. I met with Chairman of State Council Honecker August 22 to present my letter of credence and + letter of recall of Ambassador Cooper. In a brief formal ceremony I expressed + appreciation for Honecker’s + kindness in receiving me so soon after my arrival three days ago. I + conveyed greetings from the people and Government of the United States. + I expressed our hope and expectation that relations between the United + States and the GDR will be broadened + and deepened in the months and years to come. I told Honecker it would be my task and my + pleasure to work toward that goal. I expressed appreciation for the warm + welcome I had received and indicated my desire to work with him and + other leaders to move our relations forward.

+

2. Honecker in a brief response + welcomed me to the GDR and requested + that I convey greetings to the people and Government of the United + States. He said the GDR wanted to + develop good relations with the United States. He wished me success in + my missions.

+

3. After the formal ceremony, Honecker invited me to his office for a private chat + which lasted about fifty minutes. Also present were Secretary of Council + of State Eichler and Deputy Foreign Minister Grunert. Honecker began the meeting by + reiterating the GDR desire to develop + good relations with the United States. He noted that such relations + would be mutually beneficial to our countries and would contribute to + better overall East-West relations. He also commented on US-Soviet + relations, CSCE, the GDR May 12 aide memoire on US–GDR bilateral relations, trade imbalance, + and cultural cooperation.See Document 117 and footnotes 2 and 3 + thereto.

+

4. US-Soviet relations. Honecker + emphasized repeatedly the need for good US-Soviet relations. He hoped a + peaceful dialogue between the US and the Soviets on SALT and other matters would continue in + the interest of peace. He said there was no point in debating the merits + of capitalism vs. socialism. There was “simply no alternative to + peaceful coexistence.” US–GDR relations + would flourish better in an atmosphere of detente. He saw this as very + important.

+ +

5. I called Honecker’s attention + to President Carter’s July 21 + speech on US-Soviet relations.Carter spoke + on July 21 at the 31st Annual Meeting of the Southern Legislative + Conference in Charleston, South Carolina. While acknowledging the + deep philosophical and cultural differences between the Soviet Union + and the United States, Carter expressed his conviction that the + Soviet Union and the United States would continue to reach + agreements in areas of mutual interest. If the Soviet strategic + buildup could be controlled, Carter said, “then we are prepared to + limit our own strategic programs.” The President also stressed that + the administration’s commitment to human rights was neither a ploy, + nor targeted at any one country, and that U.S. policy remains the “sincere expression of our + deepest beliefs as a people.” (Public Papers: + Carter, 1977, Book II, pp. 1309–1315) I noted our + desire for strategic arms limitations, reduction in and freeze on new + technology which would provide balanced security for both sides. I told + Honecker we were seeking a + comprehensive test ban on nuclear weapons and desired to move forward on + MBFR. I also mentioned the Indian + Ocean talks and the Secretary’s forthcoming meeting with Foreign + Minister Gromyko on SALT. I told Honecker we welcomed President Brezhnev’s depiction of President + Carter’s speech as positive, and his willingness to seek solutions. I + expressed the belief there was good reason to hope for continued + development of detente.

+

6. I also told Honecker we + recognized the difference in political systems which stems from history, + different beliefs and values; certain competition would continue between + the two systems. Nevertheless, there were overlapping interests; it was + important for both sides to build on these common interests in order to + develop cooperation between East and West based on mutual respect and + equality.

+ +

7. US–GDR bilateral relations. Honecker mentioned the GDR May 12 aide memoire containing his + government’s proposals for further developing relations with the United + States. I noted that Foreign Minister Fischer had called this aide memoire to my attention in + our meeting on August 19.Bolen reported on + his conversation with Fischer + in telegram 6855 from East Berlin, August 19. The discussion covered + human rights, the issue of claims between the two countries, as well + as progress on the cultural convention. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + D770300–0700) + Honecker said the GDR wanted to move forward in implementing + these proposals, which were consistent with the Helsinki Final Act.

+

8. I told Honecker that I had + discussed overall US–GDR relations with + Ambassadors Cooper and Sieber, + senior officials in the Executive Branch, and Members of Congress. I was + aware there had been important step by step developments of our + relations. I reiterated the administration’s desire to build on this + record and to broaden and deepen relations. This desire for better + relations was grounded in our wish to develop more stable and beneficial + relations between the peoples of the East and West and to move forward + on the current agenda on East-West relations. I told Honecker that good US–GDR relations are an essential ingredient in this + effort.

+

9. I informed Honecker that I had + given my views on ways to move our bilateral relations forward in an + earlier conversation with Foreign Minister Fischer. However, in view of their importance, I felt it + necessary to repeat them in part.

+

10. Humanitarian cases. I expressed appreciation for the progress in + resolving humanitarian cases involving American citizens and their + relatives in the GDR.In a meeting with Habib on April 26, Sieber delivered a message from + Fischer to Vance stating that “all requests + made to the GDR authorities by + official representatives of the U.S. + for authorization of marriages between GDR citizens and U.S. + citizens, as well as for emigration (uebersiedlung) have been + carefully examined. All these requests have been approved.” + (Telegram 94855 to East Berlin, April 27; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + D770148–0715) I told Honecker this progress had been noted with favor in the + Congress and among the American public; it had created a better + atmosphere for the future development of our relations. I stressed the + importance American people attach to ethnic and family ties and + expressed the view that emergency visitation cases to the US involving + GDR citizens should be processed + quickly. This would be helpful in maintaining the favorable impression + already created and support further development of our relations. + Honecker indicated he + understood the importance the US attached to this matter. The Foreign + Minister’s views on the handling of cases of this kind had his total + support. The GDR was prepared to + cooperate. Honecker added that he + would like to see more Americans visit the GDR; “we need more American tourists.”

+

11. Claims. I told Honecker about + my conversation with the Foreign Minister on claims settlement and my + proposal that officials meet to discuss claims procedures in our + respective countries. The central purpose of this proposal would be to + work out principles and procedures which would facilitate future + negotiations. Honecker said he + agreed with this proposal.

+ +

12. I also raised the Jewish claims issue with Honecker. I told him that talks with + the Conference on Jewish Material Claims should continue with a view to + finding a solution. Such talks would find a favorable echo in the + Congress and the public. Honecker + said the GDR had not broken off the + talks. Perhaps the earlier GDR offer to + the conference had been misunderstood. He noted that talks had been + conducted with the Committee on Anti-Fascist Resistance Fighters and + suggested that they should continue. He then launched into a long + historical review of his persecution by the Nazis, noted that he had + witnessed the persecution of Jews, and asserted there was no discrimination of Jews in the GDR; they were free to practice their + religion. He commented on the post-war difficulty in developing the + GDR economy and said the creation + of the GDR was a form of compensation. + Comment: I gained the impression that Honecker was prepared to continue the dialogue with the + conference, but was concerned about limited GDR means to meet the conference request.

+

13. Consular Convention: I emphasized that the Consular Convention was of + key importance. I wanted to underscore this issue. I told him we see the + Consular Convention as basic for good relations between states. + Conclusion of a Consular Convention would contribute to positive + development of our relations. As I had indicated earlier we seek + positive development; since the American public and the Congress attach + great importance to consular protection, it was necessary to have a + Consular Convention. I noted this matter had been discussed with the + Foreign Minister and stressed the importance of putting this matter + behind and providing a basis for regularizing our relations. One + possible compromise solution to the nationality question had been + presented to the Foreign Minister. Honecker said he supported the Foreign Minister’s + comments and hoped for an early conclusion to a consular agreement: “We + should devote our best efforts to finding a solution.”

+

14. Trade. Honecker raised the + question of the trade imbalance between the US and the GDR. Imports from the US amounted to 1.4 + billion mark; US imports from the GDR + totaled only 50 million mark. Honecker referred to the “legislation” and expressed the + hope that our economic counselors would find a way to expand trade. I + noted the current growth in the expansion of trade between the US and + the GDR. We appreciated the grain trade + and would remain a reliable supplier. I referred to my talks in New York + with American business firms, including banks. I informed him that the + GDR enjoyed a good reputation in + the American business community. Contacts between the GDR trade organizations and American firms + were increasing. We encourage these developments as the best way to + proceed at this time. I noted the GDR + trade and economic councils were operational. I mentioned my talks with + the Department of Commerce and our desire to continue private and + official participation in the Leipzig Fair, and to send technical sales + seminars to the GDR to discuss sales + potentials. I also mentioned that we were prepared to review GDR requests for representation of other + trade organizations in the United States, depending on the state of our + relations.

+ +

15. Cultural. Honecker also took + the initiative in expressing the desire for expansion of cultural + exchanges with the United States. In this connection he noted that the + GDR was sending the world-famous + Dresden art exhibit to the United States at great expense to the GDR. I told him we favor expanded + exchanges in academic, scientific, cultural and sports fields. I expressed regret that some of + our proposals for cultural presentations in the GDR in 1977 had not materialized. I hoped we could + implement these proposals in early 1978. In the meantime, our officials + could work toward a cultural agreement that would stimulate future + exchanges in the cultural field.

+

16. Secretary’s meeting with Foreign Minister Fischer. I informed Honecker that Secretary Vance is prepared to meet with Foreign Minister + Fischer at the UNGA if this could be worked out on their + respective schedules. I stressed the importance of progress in the next + few weeks in developing our relations to insure a fruitful meeting + between the Secretary and Foreign Minister Fischer and to provide a backdrop for further + development of relations. Honecker agreed and said he was pleased to have such a + “dynamic Ambassador from the United States.” He stressed his willingness + to cooperate in developing our relations. He wished me a successful + mission and said his door was always open. He concluded the meeting by + reiterating the GDR desire for good + relations with the United States and the importance of continuing the + detente process between the Soviet Union and the United States as a + factor in the development of US–GDR + relations.

+ + Bolen + +
+
+ 119. Telegram From Secretary of State Vance to the Embassy in the German Democratic + RepublicSource: National + Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign + Policy File, D770359–0487. Confidential; Priority. Sent for + information to the Department of State and Bonn. + + + New York, October 1, 1977, 1948Z + +

Secto 10027. Subject: Fischer Bilateral With Secretary.

+

1. Centerpiece of 45-minute bilateral between GDR Foreign Minister and Secretary September 30 was a + US–GDR Consular Convention, with + Fischer proposing a cultural + agreement, too. They also touched upon US-Soviet relations, which both + agreed had improved over the past ten days, and GDR–FRG relations, which + Fischer, claimed were “better + than their reputation”.

+

2. Referring to the Consular Convention as “the rock that might be moved + from the road”, Fischer said that + nationality was the key problem. “We cannot,” he said, “have dual nationalities without + citizenship.” Recognizing, however, that we had made a Consular + Convention “a prerequisite for other relations,” he said that he found + the Secretary’s proposal of an agreement with a separate exchange of + letters on the difficult nationality question “reasonable and workable”. + Such “separate papers that would be a constituent part of the agreement” + offered the possibility of success. Both agreed to ask their staffs to + work out the details.

+

3. In closing, Fischer volunteered + that his meeting earlier in the day with FRG Foreign Minister Genscher had “not been the + first but the first of a constructive nature”. The two, he said, had + discussed seeking accommodation on outstanding issues in a “businesslike + manner”.In telegram 16595 from Bonn, + October 5, the Embassy reported the information received on the + bilateral meeting from the West German representative to the Group + of Four. (National Archives, RG 59, + Central Foreign Policy File, D770363–0936) The GDR, he concluded, will do all it can to + improve its relations with the FRG + because of their importance to Europe as a whole, but, he warned, “this + does not mean that the GDR will change + the priorities of its foreign policy”.

+

4. Full memcon follows septel.No + separate memorandum of conversation or telegram was + found.

+ + Vance + +
+ +
+ 120.Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the + Federal Republic of GermanySource: National Archives, RG 59, + Central Foreign Policy File, D770363–0861. Confidential; Immediate. + Drafted by Gray; cleared by Woessner and in L/M, L/EUR, and SCA/SCS; approved by + Goodby. Sent for + information to West Berlin, East Berlin, London, Moscow, Paris, and + USNATO. + + + Washington, October 5, 1977, 2142Z + +

240076. Subject: Consular Convention With GDR.The negotiations on the + Consular Convention between the United States and the German + Democratic Republic reached an impasse on the handling of consular + access to German nationals and the definition of German nationals. + Dubbed the “nationality question,” it sought to preserve West German + access on consular matters in the United States to all German + nationals, including those from East Germany. The West German + Government maintained that there was one German citizenship—not East + and West German citizens—and that Bonn’s representatives retained + the right to represent German nationals abroad. In an oral message + delivered to Vest on October + 31, Von Staden stated “We + have never had any doubts that the United States will support us in + the questions pertaining to German citizenship” given that “the + continuation of German citizenship is one of the elements of the + unsolved German question.” The Federal Republic of Germany’s + concern, Van Staden continued, was that Washington not commit, + during Consular Convention negotiations, to the thesis of two German + nations. (Telegram 261674 to Bonn, November 2; National Archives, + RG 59, Central Foreign Policy + File, D770402–0620) Ref: A) Secto 10027 (Notal);See Document 119. B) State 211371 (Notal);In + telegram 211371 to East Berlin, September 2, the Department + instructed Polansky to + approach Klobes and discuss draft language for separate statements + on the question of German nationality as well as possible dates to + begin negotiations on other issues concerning the Consular + Convention. (National Archives, RG + 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770320–0268) The nationality + question revolved around East German attempts to define, within the + Consular Convention, a separate East German nationality. In his + inaugural address to the Bundestag, West German Chancellor Brandt + coined the “two states, one nation” policy to deal with the + nationality question. The U.S. + Government adopted the same policy after it recognized the German + Democratic Republic on September 4, 1974, and supported the Federal + Republic of Germany as the sole legitimate successor of the German + state. C) Bonn 16114;In telegram + 16114 from Bonn, September 29, the Embassy reported the reaction of + the West German Government to the proposed unilateral declarations + on nationality to be delivered at the signing of the Consular + Convention between the United States and the German Democratic + Republic. Von Braunmuehl, the West German representative in the Bonn + Group, stressed that the U.S. + position on the nationality question was critical to the West German + Government, and asked that the U.S. + Government find a way to stress that the Consular Convention did not + represent U.S. acquiescence to the + East German position (i.e. two German nations). The declaration, Von + Braunmuehl stressed, should be drafted in such a way as to prevent + its use by the German Democratic Republic in arguing that the United + States had accepted its position and, consequently, facilitate its + use by the Federal Republic of Germany to argue the contrary. + (National Archives, RG 59, Central + Foreign Policy File, D770355–0541) D) State 227612 (Notal).In + telegram 227612 to East Berlin, September 21, the Department + provided the Embassy with draft language on the nationality + question. The proposed language, which was for “background purposes + only and is not repeat not authorized for release to GDR” stressed that nationality cannot + be defined in a Consular Convention, that it is a matter for each + state to decide who are its nationals, and that any such definition + would have no binding effect on a third state which may hold + different views. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + D770344–0105)

+ +

1. On basis of broad agreement reached on separate repeat separate + exchange of letters on nationality issue (ref A) Department is prepared + to proceed with initial + Polansky approach to Klobes + on Consular Convention (ref B). Before doing so, however, Embassy Bonn + should inform Von Braunmuehl of broad agreement reached between + Fischer and Secretary and of + our intent to proceed with approach to Klobes and, with reference to his + earlier expressed concerns (ref C), should reassure him along following + lines.

+

A. We will provide the FRG a separate + bilateral assurance (preferably oral), as requested by Genscher in his September 30 breakfast with + Secretary, that U.S. practice respecting + rights of FRG Consuls in providing + protection for German nationals will not change as a result of the + Consular Convention.In a meeting at the + United Nations on September 30, Vance and Genscher discussed the + situation in the Middle East, SALT, MBFR, U.S.-Soviet relations, FRG-Soviet relations, and the ongoing + U.S.–GDR negotiations on a Consular Convention. Stressing + that the United States had a special responsibility for Germany, + Genscher asked Vance that the United States make + “the most unequivocal statement by the US endorsing the FRG concept of German sovereignty.” + Vance agreed and told + Genscher that the United States would + provide the West German Government with a separate assurance that + the exchange of notes between the United States and the German + Democratic Republic would not affect the West German concept of + sovereignty. (Memorandum of Conversation, September 30; Department + of State, Office of the Secretariat Staff, Cyrus R. Vance, Secretary of + State—1977–1980, Lot 84D241, Box 10, Vance + NODIS + MemCons, 1977) This + assurance will not repeat not provide a right of first access by FRG Consuls to persons present in the + U.S. on the basis of GDR documentation. A request by the FRG for a USG assurance on this latter point has previously been + rejected.

+

B. Recognizing the FRG’s concerns that + we not give the GDR ammunition that it + could throw back at the FRG, we will + delete all but the first sentence of para. 6A of the draft US statement (ref D).

+

C. With regard to the concerns expressed in paras. 5 and 6, ref C, we + will reserve our position to the extent of adding “and cannot be taken + as representing, in whole or in part, the views of my government on this + issue” to the end of para. 7, ref. + D.

+

2. FYI. Department agrees with EmbOff’s position para. 5, ref. C and does not believe + reservation on nationality can be linked to retained responsibilities + for Germany as a whole. In general, Von Braunmuehl’s contention that + nationality is an essential element of statehood is unpersuasive, since + there are numerous contemporary examples of multi-national states (e.g., + UK, Soviet Union, CSSR, Yugoslavia), + nations that are divided into two or more states (e.g., China, Korea) + and nations that are stateless (e.g., Macedonia). In particular, such a + linking of nationality and statehood seems to fly in the face of past + German argumentation on behalf + of the “concept of the nation” which clearly differentiates between the + two in order to preserve a rubric for the unity of the German people. + End FYI.

+

3. Report Von Braunmuehl’s reaction ASAP.Von + Braunmuehl’s reaction was reported in telegram 16784 from Bonn, + October 7. Referencing the Vance-Genscher bilateral + meeting at the United Nations, Von Braunmuehl told the Embassy that + the West German Foreign Ministry prepared a statement with + suggestions for the U.S. unilateral + declaration to be delivered at the signing of the U.S.–GDR Consular Convention. The West German draft stressed + that the German nationality question remains an unresolved issue + between the Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic + Republic and that the U.S. signing + of the Consular Convention with the German Democratic Republic did + not prejudice the FRG position. + (National Archives, RG 59, Central + Foreign Policy File, D770370–0454) In telegram 246330 to multiple + posts, October 13, the Department informed the Embassy of a revised + draft that would be submitted for discussion in the Bonn Group. The + draft stressed that the signing of the Consular Convention between + the United States and the German Democratic Republic “cannot affect + the dispute regarding the issue of German nationality.” (National + Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign + Policy File, D770376–1168)

+ + Christopher + +
+ +
+ 121. Report Prepared in the Bureau of Intelligence and Research, + Department of StateSource: + National Archives, RG 59, Bureau of + Intelligence and Research, Office of Analysis for the Commonwealth + and Eastern Europe, Lot 92D468, Office Subject Files, 1958–1978, Box + 5, Ceausescu and Kadar: A + Contrast in Personalities and Policies 1978. Secret; Noforn. + Prepared by Robert Rackmales; approved by Paul K. + Cook. + + + Report No. 954 + + + Washington, April 11, + 1978 + +

THE PROSPECTS FOR DOMESTIC STABILITY IN THE GDR

+

Summary

+

During 1977 the East German leadership moved with fair success to counter + the popular unrest and intellectual dissent that made 1976 a rough year. + The flood of requests to emigrate to West Germany was halted, critical + intellectuals were largely silenced, and church-state relations were + restored to a reasonably normal condition. The regime’s demonstrated capacity to react to + challenges with a shrewd mixture of toughness and flexibility makes it + unlikely that the GDR will be unable to + handle domestic problems in the future.

+

Domestic tensions in the German Democratic Republic gradually subsided + last year. The confrontations of 1976—with church authorities, critical + intellectuals, the increasing number of GDR citizens submitting requests to emigrate to the + West—were mitigated. The tactics used by the Honecker regime to suppress or disperse its critics at + times aroused international censure (in October 1977, Amnesty + International issued a report sharply critical of the GDRIn its + 1977 report (accessed online), Amnesty International alleged that + there were several thousand political prisoners in East Germany in + the 1976–1977 period covered by the report, many of whom were being + released to West Germany in exchange for goods.). On the + whole, however, the East German leadership could feel at year’s end that + its international image had not suffered irremediable damage and that + its relations with the West had remained on a more or less even + keel.

+

The basic question posed by the events of the past two years is: did 1977 + see merely a temporary halting of a tendency toward increasing domestic + instability, or did the reduction in tensions reflect the continuation + of a long-term trend toward a more stable East Germany?

+

While domestic instability in any of the East European Warsaw Pact states + could hamper prospects for continued East-West detente, nowhere would + the threat of serious international repercussions be greater than in the + case of the GDR. The carefully crafted + accommodations regarding Berlin and inter-German relations that made + possible the Helsinki accords and have reduced international tensions in + Central Europe to their lowest level since the early 1930s would be + unlikely to survive a major upheaval in East Germany.

+

Changing Perceptions of GDR Stability

+

Several months after the construction of the Berlin Wall in 1961, the + consensus of Western observers was that the strength of the latent + anti-regime forces in East Germany was on the increase. Nevertheless, + the decade that followed turned out to be one of relative economic, + political, and social stability in the GDR. By 1970—the last full year of Walter Ulbricht’s + rule—US observers noted, in contrast to the earlier view, that the + average East German seemed to have become resigned to the system imposed + on him and had developed a certain sense of pride in the economic + development of East Germany.

+

The impression of a growing and more broadly based stability—one resting + on more than an efficient security apparatus and the ultimate threat of + Soviet intervention—was further strengthened following the smooth political succession from an + aging and increasingly nationalistic Ulbricht to Erich Honecker. Honecker, while working within a + leadership group virtually identical to that over which Ulbricht had + presided, introduced some notable changes of emphasis. Honecker’s less strident, more + down-to-earth, and increasingly consumer-oriented approach proved to be + reassuring to both his domestic and his foreign audiences. While many of + his changes were more of style than of substance, a further lowering of + tensions was evident. After several years of Honecker’s leadership, US observers noted further + improvement in the GDR’s domestic + stability—most East Germans had come to terms with the Communist regime + and accepted the reality of Communist rule. Political analysts saw the + trend of recent years toward accommodation between the ruled and the + rulers as having given the regime increased confidence in its legitimacy + and as having strengthened the faction in the party which favored + securing the cooperation of the people by tactics of persuasion and + reward instead of relying on the discredited policies of coercion and + arbitrary rule.

+

New Challenges Arise

+

In the mid-1970s, however, signs of new strains in the East German body + politic began to accumulate. While the results of West Germany’s Ostpolitik, superpower detente, and the series of + international agreements that followed in their wake permitted the + GDR to achieve its long-sought goal + of diplomatic recognition by the Western powers, the ferment that they + caused within East Germany turned out to be substantial. The + developments that appear to have had the strongest domestic impact + included:

+ + —the GDR’s heavily publicized + adherence to the Helsinki Final Act and to other international human + rights covenants; + —the vast increase in West German travel to the GDR and in the audience for FRG television broadcasts in East + Germany following the conclusion of the Basic Treaty between the two + German states in 1973; and + —the ideological challenge to orthodoxy posed by the Eurocommunist + parties. + +

By the summer of 1976 the symptoms of the unrest provoked by these events + and trends were unmistakable:

+ + —Requests by East Germans to emigrate to the FRG, many explicitly citing the + Helsinki Final Act, reached more than 100,000. + —Critical intellectuals, such as physicist Robert Havemann and + songwriter Wolf Biermann, became more outspoken and received greater + attention in Western, including Eurocommunist, media. + —Church-state relations underwent their sharpest decline since the + 1950s after the suicide of an East German clergyman. + +

The political tensions raised by these developments did not constitute an + immediate threat to the GDR’s internal + stability. Even before the + regime’s countermeasures (see below), there was no evidence to suggest + that collective political protest—violent or otherwise—was in the + offing. Summing up the situation during its most acute phase, an East + German writer told a Western journalist: “There isn’t going to be an + explosion here. But there is tension now and a feeling that something is + going on that has not yet run its course.”

+

The Regime Responds

+

Employing a broad range of tactics, from repressive to conciliatory + depending on the nature of the perceived threat, the Honecker regime, beginning in late + 1976, attempted with considerable success to dampen the effects of these + developments. At one extreme, the expatriation of Biermann and the + placing of Havemann under house arrest gave notice of the limits of + official tolerance. Dozens of members of the GDR’s cultural elite followed Biermann into exile during + 1977. On the other hand, the regime’s stance vis-a-vis the church was + far more conciliatory. The West German Frankfurter + Allgemeine Zeitung noted in late 1977 that “relations between + the state apparatus and the church have calmed strikingly” and + attributed the change to a desire on the part of the regime to “relax + tensions.” Somewhere between those two tactics were the selective + harassment and denials of applications of prospective emigres who cited + the Helsinki Accords as the basis for their requests (family + reunification requests continued to be processed at the same rate as in + previous years).

+

As a result of the regime’s counter-campaign, the ferment that + characterized 1976 was reduced in scope and intensity. A Western + journalist noted that the tensions that had gripped East Germany in 1976 + “appeared spent” by late 1977, leaving behind an impression of “lethargy + and gloom.” There was such continued evidence of unrest as antisocial + behavior by youth; a serious clash between youth and police during + GDR national day celebrations in + East Berlin was the most striking exception to the generally quiet + domestic scene in 1977. There was also an apparent deterioration of + labor discipline; some workers reportedly demanded a portion of their + salaries in hard currency. But the dominant mood of the populace at the + beginning of 1978 was one of political apathy and of seeking refuge in + material compensation and private family interests.

+

The “Manifesto” Episode

+

Although its direct relationship to GDR + domestic stability is moot, the purported opposition “Manifesto” + recently published in West Germany sheds some light on the two external + factors that most impinge on the GDR’s + internal stability—the Soviet Union and West Germany.

+

The document was published in two installments by Der + Spiegel in its first two issues of 1978. The magazine reported + that the “Manifesto” had been + compiled by members of a “League of Democratic German Communists,” + supposedly consisting of “middle and senior level” party members. The + existence of such a group, either inside or outside the party, was + termed “extremely doubtful” by the West German Foreign Office, a view + shared by the vast majority of Western observers.

+

While the impact of the “Manifesto” within East Germany appears to have + been minimal, the controversy following its publication and the + retaliatory closure of Der Spiegel’s office in + East Berlin threatened, for a time, to disrupt FRG–GDR relations. Both + sides, however, tried to head off that outcome and to underline their + determination to continue a policy of cooperation. Thus, when Chancellor + Schmidt offered to send a + personal emissary, State Secretary Hans Jurgen Wischnewski, to East + Berlin in late January for talks with top GDR officials, Honecker promptly accepted. While the details of + Wischnewski’s discussions are not known,A + report of Wischnewski’s conversations in East Berlin is in Akten zur Auswärtigen Politik der Bundesrepublik + Deutschland 1978, 1 Januar bis 30 Juni, Document 37, pp. 210–218. he appears to have + succeeded in restoring inter-German relations to their status quo ante.

+

Conclusions and Prospects

+

During the decade after the Berlin Wall, Western observers initially + tended to overstate the dangers to the GDR regime of popular opposition. Gradually, they began to + minimize the continuing vulnerability of the regime to internal unrest. + The events of the past two years suggest that neither approach is + necessarily a guide to estimating the prospects for the continuing + stability of the GDR in the 1980s.

+

The GDR has special vulnerabilities but + also certain advantages in dealing with them.

+

East Germany’s vulnerabilities are well known:

+ + —The absence of a firm national identity makes the goal of regime + legitimacy more difficult to achieve in the GDR than elsewhere in East Europe. + —The constant contrast with West Germany is damaging to the + regime’s image and to popular morale. + —The GDR is the most exposed of + the East European states to Western media influence because most + East German citizens regularly watch FRG television. + —The highly visible Soviet military and political presence + constantly nourishes strong anti-Russian popular sentiments dating + from World War II and before. + +

Tending to offset these vulnerabilities are the advantages that the + GDR derives, in many cases, from + the same set of circumstances:

+ + + —The lack of national legitimacy forces the regime to compensate + by closely monitoring popular attitudes and by seeking—when it is + not constrained by ideological or domestic security + considerations—to be responsive to popular grievances. + —The competition with the FRG has + induced the regime to cater to the consumer (the country already has + the highest standard of living in Eastern Europe) and to emphasize + economic incentives and productivity. + —East Germans recognize that their access to millions of West + German visitors and to Western television are benefits that are not + enjoyed by other East Europeans and that could be cut off if the + regime felt greatly threatened by internal unrest. Thus, they have a + considerable stake in not “rocking the boat.” + —The Soviet presence is a reminder both of Moscow’s ability to + intervene in the event of serious internal disruption in East + Germany and of the threat that instability in the GDR would pose to the balance of power + and peace in Europe. + +

These two sets of factors, combined with the GDR leaders’ demonstrated capacity to react to challenges + with a shrewd mixture of toughness and flexibility suggest that the + regime will continue to be able to handle domestic problems.

+

Political control, however, will not narrow the psychological chasm which + separates the leadership from the populace. Only a major reduction in + restrictions on travel to the West or a dramatic loosening of + ideological controls—neither of which the leadership feels secure enough + to undertake—could reduce the mistrust with which regime and citizenry + view each other. Popular disaffection will probably continue to surface + from time to time in the form of youth disturbances or sporadic worker + unrest.

+
+ +
+ 122. Memorandum of ConversationSource: National Archives, RG 59, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Office of + Analysis for the Commonwealth and Eastern Europe, Office Subject + Files, 1967–1985, Lot 92D404, Box 8, GDR–US (Political) 1977–1978. Confidential. Drafted by + Gray on June 8; cleared by Vest and Woessner; approved by Anderson on June 16. The + meeting took place in the Secretary’s office. + + + Washington, June 6, 1978, 11 a.m. + + + SUBJECT + US–GDR Relations + + + PARTICIPANTS + + + GDR + Foreign Minister Oskar + Fischer + Ambassador Rolf Sieber + Ambassador Harald Rose, MFA + Manfred Niklas, MFA + Paul Ringleb (interpreter) + + + + + US + The Secretary + Assistant Secretary George + Vest + William M. + Woessner, Director, EUR/CE + Victor Gray, EUR/CE (notetaker) + Harry Obst (interpreter) + + + +

After initial pleasantries concerning the Dresden exhibit,Fischer was + in New York for the UN Special + Session on Disarmament and traveled to Washington to meet with + Vance. On June 1, the + Smithsonian’s National Gallery opened an exhibit entitled “The + Splendor of Dresden: Five Centuries of Art Collecting.” (Telegram + 3590 from East Berlin, May 26; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + D780223–0261) the Secretary raised the subject of the + consular convention, saying that without progress in this area, + meaningful progress in our general relations would be very difficult. He + reminded Fischer that, when the + two last met in September, he (the Secretary) had proposed separate + statements on the nationality question and was now puzzled by the lack + of progress, given Fischer’s + agreement to that proposal.See Document 119. + Fischer replied that he too was + puzzled. Separate statements were indeed a good idea but should not + present the other party with a problem it could not digest. Fischer said that he had understood in + September that each party would address its own problem. He had also + understood that the U.S. had no treaties + with other countries containing nationality clauses. Since then, he + said, he had learned that the U.S. had + such treaties with the U.K. and Japan. + He then produced a text, which, + he said, was based on the language in those treaties, saying that it was + “a compromise but acceptable.” Fischer hoped that the Secretary would also find this + text acceptable and said it was a propitious date for reaching a + solution on this issue, since it was the anniversary of the UK–GDR consular convention. The “compromise,” + he said, would involve the GDR’s + acknowledging that the U.S. maintains + its position on nationality. (Comment: A later reading of the + “compromise” text indicated that Fischer meant here U.S. + nationality not German nationality.) “We would not,” he said, “want to + hurt your ally and we would not want to be embarrassed ourselves.” The + Secretary said that he would study the proposal “promptly” and would + provide the GDR with an answer “before + he left next week.”

+

Turning to Africa, the Secretary said he had noticed in the press that + GDR Minister of Defense Hoffmann + had recently visited Africa. He asked Fischer for his views of developments in Zaire. + Fischer said that Hoffmann’s + visit and the events in Zaire were two different things having nothing + to do with each other. He noted that the events in Zaire had started + while he (Fischer) was in + Belgium. He had received many questions there about whether there were + GDR troops in Zaire. It was + obvious, he said, that he would not have wanted to have his official + visit to Brussels harmed by having troops in Zaire at the same time. + Fischer said that he + “assumed” that the Secretary receives his information not only from the + press and added that events in Zaire are “an internal affair in which + the GDR is not involved.” Nobody from + outside, he said, should be involved in Zaire. “That goes for us and for + others.” Claiming that he could not tell the Secretary what is + happening, he repeated that, if there is trouble in Zaire, it is + internal. External activities can only hurt. He reminded the Secretary + that GDR has no official relations with + Zaire but that that fact is not related to recent events. The Secretary + then referred specifically to reports that the GDR was involved with the training of Katangan Gendarmes + who had invaded Shaba. Fischer + responded with: “These reports will not gain truth by their being + repeated.” “We have trained nobody and will not,” he added. “In + general,” he said, “we have been concentrating on economic assistance + and the training of cadres in the economic and education areas.” This he + said “applies to all of Africa and to other third world countries.” “You + may, he concluded, “take that as authentic.”

+

With regard to CSCE and human rights, + the Secretary said that he was pleased with recent progress concerning + divided families. We hoped, he said, that this progress will carry over + to other cases, specifically those of the Wilhelmi family and Gundrun + Koch. The Secretary also said that he would welcome consultation that + would lead to progress and less acrimony. He proposed, therefore, that + Assistant Secretary Derian meet with her counterpart in + the GDR. In this regard, the Secretary + noted that Derian would soon be + in Europe and that such a meeting would be helpful. Fischer said that he had absolutely + nothing against such a meeting and was, in fact, for it. Fischer allowed that he was not a + consular officer and was only interested in divided family cases to the + extent they cause “problems.” So far, he said, these cases had “lacked + sufficient mass” to attract his attention. His consular officers are + addressing and solving these cases and, he added, “work on the basis of + binding political decisions.” In closing, Fischer noted that the Secretary had raised only two + names.

+

Returning to the consular convention Fischer said that he is against linkages that “bind our + legs so that we can not walk.” He was mentioning this, he said, in + relation to the consular convention, since, if we were linking problems, + he would hope that the Secretary would carefully examine his + “compromise” proposal on this problem. Saying that he owed it to himself + and to the Secretary, he added that he had the feeling that their talk + in September had not been understood by their staffs. He had, he said, + left in September with the feeling that they had “found a solution that + would not involve one party expecting the other party to do something it + could not do.” That solution, which he termed “a face saving solution,” + would have involved both sides doing what was “feasible.” Unfortunately, + he said, things had then broken down. The Secretary said that he, too, + had thought they had a solution, according to which each side would + state its position on nationality. He hoped that, after examining + Fischer’s compromise + proposal, we would put “this matter aside once and for all,” to which + Fischer replied: “We are not + treading on your feet, please don’t tread on ours.”

+

In response to the Secretary’s question as to whether he had any other + issues to raise, Fischer brought + up the matter of a cultural agreement. In the cultural area, he said, we + have a “vivid exchange.” He asked why this could not be carried forward + on a “contractual basis.”

+

The volume of our trade compared to our overall relations, Fischer said, is almost negligible. In + the trade area, he claimed, there were lost opportunities. Foreign Trade + State Secretary Beil, he said, had confirmed to him there are great + opportunities not only in grain sales but in general. There were, + however, some barriers, namely MFN, + credits and the GDR’s fishing quota. + That quota Fischer noted was + “zero point zero.” Removal of such barriers and expansion of trade would + have good effects on our bilateral relations and in the European + context. We had to consider, he concluded, not only our bilateral + relations but the “radiance” of those relations in Europe where we have + “greater responsibilities than normal.” “Frankly,” Fischer said, “you could get along + without relations with us and so could we. But that would be + irresponsible because of the impact on the European climate.” “I have tried to be as + precise as possible,” Fischer + concluded, “perhaps a bit brutal but nevertheless realistic.” The + Secretary responded that we, too, believe in realities and realize that + our relations can have a positive or negative effect on Europe. We hope, + he said, that that effect will be positive, since we favor detente. We + realize, he said, that we have differences but we should seek more + common ground in the future.

+

Fischer then said that he wanted + to raise two additional economic items. To be in a better position to + realize the trade opportunities about which he had just spoken, + Fischer said that the GDR needed a trade post in New York. Beil, + he said, had left the U.S. with that + very strong impression. Fischer + then asked about the possibility of long-term multiple-entry visas for + business and commercial travelers. At the Secretary’s request, Assistant + Secretary Vest informed + Fischer that the question of + trade offices had been under review for some time.The idea of the East German Government opening a + trade bureau in New York was brought up during Beil’s visit to + Washington. Cooper told Beil + that the United States was unwilling to consider allowing the German + Democratic Republic to open an official trade representation without + an agreement on the Consular Convention. However, the Department was + willing to consider allowing East German companies to open trade + offices. (Telegram 140489 to East Berlin, June 16, 1977; National + Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign + Policy File, D770215–1088) At the moment, he said, we were + not in a position to allow the opening of new offices, since our general + relations have “not sufficiently developed.” Vest then told Fischer that we had recently begun the + process which would lead to the granting of six-month multiple-entry + visas to GDR business travelers. + Fischer asked if that process + might be carried out faster.

+

Concluding their conversation, the Secretary said that it had been useful + to talk directly. He said he would again examine Fischer’s proposed text and review the + other matters raised by him. He also said that he looked forward to + Assistant Secretary Derian’s + visit to Berlin.See Document 123. + Fischer told the Secretary that + he proposed to characterize US/GDR + relations to the press as “normal but capable of development.” The + Secretary did not disagree.

+
+ +
+ 123. Telegram From the Embassy in the German Democratic Republic to + the Department of State and Multiple Diplomatic PostsSource: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + D780411–0170. Confidential; Immediate. Sent to Warsaw, Belgrade, + Bonn, Bucharest, Budapest, Geneva, London, Moscow, Paris, Prague, + Sofia, West Berlin, and USNATO. + + + East Berlin, October 7, 1978, 1421Z + +

6566. Subject: Visit of Assistant Secretary Derian to East Berlin: Meeting With Deputy Foreign + Minister Nier. Geneva Pass Assistant Secretary Derian.

+

1. Summary: Assistant Secretary Derian’s October 6 meeting with GDR Deputy Foreign Minister Nier fell into three + categories: (1) a general discussion of US and GDR policy approaches to human rights; (2) US–GDR relations, with Nier providing some + answers to issues raised by Ambassador in September 19 meeting with + GDR Foreign Minister Fischer, and (3) a brief discussion of + preparations for 1980 Madrid CSCE + meeting. On human rights, Assistant Secretary Derian outlined to Nier the domestic + basis and reasons for the importance of human rights in US foreign + policy; she noted it was not directed against any government or form of + government and that it was not intended to interfere with detente. It + should be seen as an effort to discuss humanitarian problems rationally. + Nier welcomed Ms. Derian’s + visit, expressed the GDR’s hope for + better US–GDR relations, and stated + that, with respect to human rights, the yardstick for measuring + performance must be determined in each country. On US–GDR bilateral relations, Nier said (1) the + GDR would receive Congressman + English to discuss narcotics + issues, (2) preparations were underway to hold “Reflections USA” in + Leipzig in the fall of ’79 and that they would look favorably on a 1980 + showing at the Berlin TV tower, (3) the GDR would be prepared to hold claims discussions next + January–February, and (4) the GDR had + gone as far as it could on the Consular Convention but would look at any + new US counterproposals. The Ambassador noted that Ms. Derian’s visit was an expression of US + interest in developing better relations and welcomed Nier’s remarks on + specific items of US–GDR business. + Nier, in conclusion, referred to the “constructive atmosphere” which had + prevailed during the talks and expressed the hope Ms. Derian could come back to Berlin. We + think Asst Sec Derian’s visit + was positive in tone and content, and useful to both sides. End + summary.

+

2. Asst Sec Derian, accompanied + by the Ambassador, DCM, Political + Section Chief and Staff Assistant Heaphy, met with Deputy Foreign Minister Nier, Krabatsch and + Geyer at the MFA October 6 for + approximately 1½ hours.

+

3. Nier opened the meeting by welcoming Ms. Derian to Berlin and stating that such meetings could + contribute to promoting and developing bilateral relations. He said the + GDR attaches great importance to + developing relations with the US; in that connection he noted with + satisfaction President Carter’s + comments about the US interests in developing relations during the + presentation of credentials by Ambassador Grunert on October 2.After Grunert presented his credentials on + October 2 at the White House, Carter expressed his support for + finalizing a Consular Convention and with the German Democratic + Republic and mentioned the issue of the flow of narcotics from East + Berlin to the West, stressing his interest in cooperating on the + issue. (Telegram 250621 to East Berlin, October 2; National + Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign + Policy File, D780403–0504) We have made progress in past + years, Nier stated, but not all possibilities in the bilateral field + have been exhausted. The development of US–GDR relations will contribute to detente and peace and + security in Europe.

+

4. Ms. Derian replied, stating + that the US shared many of these same values—we are making progress in + the development of our relations and noted President Carter’s expressed interest in + developing these relations. Ms. Derian said that she had a new task to fulfill in the + State Department in her present capacity; there are many + misunderstandings about this US human rights policy. She said that it + might be well to note first of all what US human rights policy does not + mean: It is not directed at any government or type of government. We are + concerned with human rights because the United States is a signatory of + the UN Charter, the Declaration of Human + Rights, and the Helsinki Final Act, and because American values must be + reflected in US foreign policy.

+

5. Ms. Derian stated that we have + held discussions with all countries [with] which we have diplomatic + relations, such talks were always held in the strictest confidence. Only + in one instance had there been a breach of confidence, and that had not + come from the US side. Ms. Derian stated that the US recognizes that the issues + involved are delicate and complex, there will always be difficulties. + She noted that the US has problems at home, citing such examples as + unemployment, appearance of injustice (Wilmington Ten). She stated that + she would be interested in any GDR + views on the situation in the US. The US human rights policy stems from + the American people and it is vitally important to have a clear + understanding in all countries of our basic policy. This policy is + complex in application. The central theme is simple: it is based on + honest humanitarian concerns; it is just what it claims to be. It is not an interference with + detente and we have no intention of misusing this policy.

+

6. Turning to US–GDR bilateral + relations, Asst Sec Derian + stated that we have a hopeful feeling and that we share Nier’s expressed + views. She noted developments in the cultural field, meetings between + Foreign Minister Fischer and + Secretary Vance, and the recent + meeting between President Carter + and Ambassador Grunert. Ms. Derian stated that she is pleased with the progress on + divided families, adding we need to speed up the process so that in + emergency cases these can be resolved more quickly.

+

7. Nier expressed thanks for Ms. Derian’s comments. He stated that when the + representatives of two governments sit at the same table, they must + operate on the basis of principles which govern the relations between + governments. One must distinguish in this connection between internal + questions and international questions. The Helsinki Final Act + constitutes an important basis for these relations: it contains a number + of norms which guide relations between nations with different social + systems, including respect for the sovereignty of nations and + non-interference, including in the matter of human rights. The GDR considers the Final Act as a unified + whole, and treats it as such. The aims and results of the Final Act + should be to ensure peace and detente and to guarantee security of + nations. The Final Act must be treated as a whole and as the basis for + bilateral relations.

+

8. Nier stated that human rights are embodied in the laws and other + documents of the GDR. The principal + human right is the right to peace. If peace is not secured, then the + other rights have no value. Such questions as the right to work, + equality of women, minority rights are of course important in daily + life. “Some circles,” Nier continued, argue that the US has declared + human rights as the only guideline for its foreign policy without taking + other factors into consideration. This could result in one country + defining what is just and unjust. That is a matter for each nation’s own + decision. As soon as it relates to relations between two countries, then + the suspicion will be raised that you are attempting to interfere in the + internal affairs of other countries, and this is not in the spirit of + the Final Act. This could only lead to a situation which would threaten + detente. The yardstick for measuring performance must be determined in + each country. An essential element of human rights is peaceful + coexistence among nations.

+

9. Nier stated that the GDR’s relations + with other countries does not depend on whether there is unemployment in + the other country or whether someone has been convicted. That does not + mean, he said, that the GDR is + indifferent to such problems, only that it is an internal matter and + intervention on such matters is inadmissable. The situation is different + of course, he continued, in cases where there are massive violations of human rights such as + Chile, Nicaragua, South Africa, and other countries (Ms. Derian added Argentina to the list), + and these cases violate concrete provisions of the UN Charter, the Human Rights Declaration + and other documents, and it is a vital concern for other nations to take + joint actions to insure that human rights are protected.

+

10. Ms. Derian stated that she + finds the remarks of Mr. Nier very interesting. On the question of + peace, she stated that technology had made our world very small and that + we must all strive for peace. We need good communications and + understanding among nations and that is why we are pleased to be able to + discuss an important aspect of our policy, one about which there is + misunderstanding. Ms. Derian + stated that human rights is not the only policy of the United States, it + would be naive and arrogant if a country should base its policy on a + single concept. It would also be arrogant for a nation to believe that + it alone had the knowledge and ability to discuss issues relating to + human rights. That would mean that such a country had no right at all. + Such a policy would be suspect and dangerous. The world has grown so + small, people move so much today and ideas flow from one country to + another, that all nations are bound together through trade, marriage, + etc. We must consequently talk about human problems as well as those + relating to commercial, political and military issues. We now have the + framework in which we can discuss these problems without anger or + rancor.

+

11. Nier replied that he could agree with many of the points Ms. + Derian had made, it is a + small world and because of technological, economic and other + developments, countries cannot exist by themselves and cooperation is + necessary. Just because of the close interconnection of nations, it is + especially important to exercise the utmost caution in relations among + peoples. It is necessary to take into consideration national differences + and the rules that govern relations between governments and peoples. We + must be able to discuss these points without giving offense to one + another. We wish to be able to live with nations with different systems. + So long as there are nations with different systems, we must try to live + with one another.

+

12. Ms. Derian replied that this + had nothing to do with human rights: The GDR has its system, the US its own. Nier responded that it + is not sufficient only to take note of different systems but also to + respect them. We must take into account that each nation has a right to + self-determination.

+

13. Ms. Derian noted that in + preparing to come to East Berlin, she had been informed that the + constitutions of the US and the GDR + contain many of the same provisions. She noted that she had become + somewhat of an expert on aspects of the Argentine constitution and this + provides for more rights than the constitution of either the GDR or the US. Nier observed that there is a difference + between a constitution reality. Ms. Derian continued that the point is all govts recognize + the need for these statements.

+

14. Ms. Derian referred to Nier’s + distinction between internal matters and external matters and gave the + example of a neighborhood in which everyone kept a neat garden in front + of their house. She stated that if someone wanted to keep goats in their + garden, or dump their garbage there, the people in the neighborhood + would have to get together and talk about the problem peacefully. Nier + replied that relations between nations are not the same as relations + among neighbors. However, accepting Ms. Derian’s vivid example, Nier said that the GDR tries to keep its own garden neat, but + that if its neighbor wants to raise goats in his garden or dump garbage + in it, that is none of the GDR’s + business. Ms. Derian said that + he should know that goats will go into the next garden to which Nier + replied then they would have to build a wall.

+

15. Nier at this stage changed the subject and said he would like to + raise some bilateral issues in connection with some questions raised by + the Ambassador in his September 19 meeting with Foreign Minister + Fischer.In telegram 6144 from East Berlin, September 20, + Bolen reported that he had advised Fischer of White House and congressional interest in + drug trafficking from East Berlin. Other issues discussed included + cultural exchanges, the visit of Assistant Secretary Derian, the Consular Convention, + trade, and the settlement of claims. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + D780390–0160) Ms. Derian might also find his comments of interest: + Narcotics problems—Nier stated that the GDR has no narcotics problem of its own and it was up to + the US to judge whether it had one. He stated that the GDR is ready to cooperate in this area and + is prepared to exchange information. Experts in the Ministry of Health + are prepared to discuss these matters with US experts. Ms. Derian noted that Congressman + English was planning to visit + East Berlin to discuss these matters.During + his November 14 visit to East Berlin, English stressed the importance Congress and the + administration placed on stopping drug trafficking and pressed the + East Germans on establishing an informal information exchange on + known traffickers. (Telegram 7417 from East Berlin, November 17; + National Archives, RG 59, Central + Foreign Policy File, D780473–0704) Nier replied that his + government had nothing against this. Consular Convention—Nier stated + that he would only like to recall the remarks Foreign Minister Fischer had made to the Ambassador and + that Grunert had made to President Carter on this question: The GDR is in favor of concluding a Consular Convention with + the US. The GDR’s interest and + willingness to sign such an agreement has been demonstrated through the + several compromise proposals that it had made. “We have gone to the + limit of what is possible.” In order for there to be any progress, Nier stated, we should + not have proposals merely turned down with no counterproposals. “If the + US side has any proposals of its own, we are prepared to consider + them.”Meeting with East German + officials in East Berlin on June 16, Woessner stressed that including a definition of + nationality in the Consular Convention “caused us difficulties not + only in and of itself, but also because of the question it raised + concerning Berlin.” The East Germans responded that a Consular + Convention could only be signed when “both parties recognized that + both have citizens and could represent their interests.” (National + Archives, RG 59, Bureau of + Intelligence and Research, Office of Analysis for the Commonwealth + and Eastern Europe, Lot 92D404, Office Subject Files, 1967–1985, Box + 8, GDR–US (Political) + 1977–1978) Claims—Nier began by noting that it was not the + GDR’s fault that it had taken 30 + years from the end of WWII to begin discussing these problems. The + GDR experts had considered this + matter, he continued, and Professor Kleier, the Chief of the Office for + the Protection of Property, is prepared to continue the talks with US + experts at the end of January or the beginning of February 1979. + Culture—Nier stated that cultural relations between the US and GDR had developed favorably. Ms. Derian noted the beauty of the Dresden + exhibit. Nier replied that the GDR + could not send such an exhibit each year but was pleased at the good + reception the exhibit had had. Nier noted that the Ambassador had made + several suggestions for cultural activities. He agreed to the + performances of the Jubilee Singers for May 1979 and also at the Dresden + Music Festival and in Karl Marx Stadt. He said preparation was underway + for the exhibition of “Reflections USA” in Leipzig in the fall of 1979 + and that they would view “positively” having “Reflections” exhibited at + the TV Tower in Berlin in 1980 but that they needed detailed proposals. + In conclusion, he said that there are new possibilities for developing + relations between the GDR and the + US.

+

16. The Ambassador stated that the presence of Asst Sec Derian was an indication of our + interest in developing better understanding and cooperation with the + GDR in a bilateral and in a CSCE context. He stated that such + consultations can lead to better understanding, point up problems, + identify common interest which can contribute to bilateral cooperation, + peace and security. Ambassador expressed appreciation for the responses + to questions he had raised with Foreign Minister Fischer. He noted in particular the + offer of cooperation in narcotics control, the importance of this issue + had been highlighted by the fact that the President had raised it during + the presentation of credentials of Ambassador Grunert. We are pleased + about GDR willingness to receive + Congressman English as this could + contribute to solving the drug problem and to development of bilateral + relations as well. On the Consular Convention question, the Ambassador + acknowledged that this is one of the unresolved issues impeding the + normalization of relations. He + said the US appreciates the GDR’s + positive approach to this problem and stated that the US would continue + to study the problem and would “go back to the drawing board.” He added + that with good will and determination it should be possible to resolve + the nationality question, preferably without referring to it at all in + any exchange of letters.

+

17. The Ambassador stated that the claims issues are important to us and + their solution would contribute to bilateral relations. The US had + positively assessed the March meeting of experts, the Foreign Claims + Settlement Commission is working within a short time frame and + negotiations should start in 1980. Ambassador said that he would convey + the offer of a meeting to hold talks to authorities in Washington but, + as an informal comment, expressed the hope that these talks could be + held earlier. The Ambassador agreed that bilateral cultural relations + had broadened and deepened, and he expressed appreciation for the fact + that the Jubilee Singers would be able to perform in May next year. He + expressed the hope that the photographic exhibit, “Reflections, USA” + could be held in the Berlin TV Tower as well.

+

18. Nier said that he wanted to make a comment in the support of + frankness that had so far prevailed. He stated that one must not give an + opportunity to the mass media to poison the “constructive atmosphere” + which had prevailed during the talks. This would not serve either + detente or the solution of problems. Nier noted that there had been some + speculation in the mass media and that the GDR had had experience with abuse of this nature. He stated + that he had no objection to informing the media of the fact that the US + and the GDR had discussed matters of + mutual interest. Ms. Derian + stated that if she is obliged to make any statement to the press at all, + it is to the effect that she had had frank discussions on matters of + mutual interest. Ms. Derian + stated that as we prepare for the Madrid Conference, we must talk and + that such discussions can ease tensions. Nier replied that the GDR was prepared to contribute to the + preparations and hopes to find useful ways to develop cooperation among + nations. He noted that he had just returned from Madrid and the Spanish + Government had already started its preparations for the conference. In + conclusion, Deputy Foreign Minister Nier expressed the hope that Assist + Sec Derian could come back to + Berlin when the weather was better.

+

19. Cable has been cleared in draft by Ms. Derian.

+ + Bolen + +
+ +
+ 124. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the + German Democratic RepublicSource: National Archives, RG 59, + Central Foreign Policy File, D790045–0942. Secret. Drafted by Gray; + cleared by Larrabee, Kaplan, + Brown, and in HA, EUR, L/EUR, INR, H/EUR, EB, DOD, + ICA, CIA, DOE, Agriculture, Treasury, and the FBI; approved + by Goodby. Sent for + information to Bonn, Budapest, Bucharest, Belgrade, Moscow, Prague, + Sofia, West Berlin, and USNATO. + + + Washington, January 22, 1979, 1638Z + +

17173. Subject: U.S. Goals and Objectives + in the GDR. Ref: (A) 78 Berlin + 7741;In telegram 7741 from East Berlin, + December 8, 1978, the Embassy reported on U.S. goals and objectives in the German Democratic + Republic for the 1981 fiscal year. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + D780507–0857) (B) 78 State 287307.In telegram 287307 to all diplomatic posts, + November 11, 1978, the Department cabled instructions for updating + the posts’ goals and objectives statements for the 1981 fiscal year. + (National Archives, RG 59, Central + Foreign Policy File, D780466–0695)

+

1. (S-entire text) Summary: The GDR + Interagency Group met January 9 to assess the present state of our + relations with the GDR and to consider + the statement of U.S. goals and + objectives in the GDR submitted by the + Embassy (ref A). This cable contains a report of the general policy + discussion, which centered on the pace of the development of our + relations, the maneuverability of the GDR vis-a-vis the Soviet Union and CEMA, the value of and prospects for + trade, GDR activities in Africa, and + the paucity of our knowledge about East German society. It was agreed to + continue the present measured pace of our relations, with a slight + increase in cultural and exchange activity aimed at increasing the + “transparency” of East German society. It was also agreed that further + movement in the trade and cultural areas would be possible after the + conclusion of a Consular Convention, the prospects for which appear + improved. The Embassy-submitted goals and objectives statement was + approved with some modifications. The revised, interagency approved + goals and objectives statement, the format for which was revised January + 17, will be sent septel. End + summary.

+

2. Deputy Assistant Secretary Goodby, who chaired the meeting, opened by commending + the Embassy for its excellent goals and objectives submission (ref A) + and outlining the current state of US–GDR relations and the prospects for their development. + Berlin, he said, remained the key albeit unspoken factor in those + relations. Other important factors are our concerns for security and + stability in Central Europe and for humanitarian improvements within the + GDR. There are no immediate + prospects for MFN, but, even in its + absence, there should be a modest growth of trade. Following a Consular + Convention, for which there was + now some hope, we might take some small further steps such as granting + permission for new GDR Trade Offices in + New York and an expansion of cultural relations. Our general stance, he + said, has been to maintain a low profile, with some maintaining that the + less we do with the GDR the better. + Others such as the Embassy, however, have argued for a more activist + policy, a position supported by even some West Germans.

+

3. Noting that our relations with the GDR were marginal compared to those with the FRG, Woessner (EUR/CE) advised that we continue to proceed + slowly with the GDR, taking one step at + a time, the Consular Convention being the first. This did not have to + mean, he added, that we ignore the GDR + or present it with a hostile face.

+

4. Brown (EUR/SOV) asked how + rapidly the GDR wished to proceed with + the relationship. Woessner + replied that the GDR wants to move very + rapidly, the motivating drive being the desire for increased access to + Western trade and technology. He was not persuaded, however, that the + GDR’s aspirations in this regard + were realistic. Gray (EUR/CE) postulated that, through a slight westward + shift of its trade patterns, the GDR + might also be seeking greater maneuverability vis-a-vis the Soviet + Union, particularly greater satisfaction in the economic sphere of its + own national interests. Goodby + added that this was precisely the impression he had gotten from GDR Foreign Trade State Secretary Beil and + from certain West Germans. Kaplan (S/P) + interjected that such maneuverability was illusory and, to the extent + that it was achieved, might not always be in directions compatible with + U.S. interests. The key factors + inhibiting maneuverability for the GDR + were, he added, the central importance of the GDR for Moscow’s policy toward Germany and Central Europe, + the GDR’s paranoia about possible + “infection” from the West and the fact that the Soviets, who fear the + development of a “quadrilateral entente” (the US, Europe, Japan and + China), are more fearful than ever about Germany on its Western flank. + However exaggerated these Soviet and the GDR fears, they render prospects for East German + maneuverability marginal. Noting that these margins are important, + Barkley (EUR/CE) said it might be wise to engage the GDR, if only to test how fast and how far + the GDR wants and is able to go. + Greenwald (HA) added that + another contributing factor to an increased opening to the West by the + GDR might be its continued desire + for increased political legitimacy and respectability. Such increased + legitimacy for the GDR, Brown suggested might be one reason why + the Soviets might allow the GDR greater + leeway vis-a-vis the non-FRG West. + Others include trade, a preoccupation with China, and a desire to lessen + the GDR’s dependence on the FRG.

+

5. Concluding on the basis of the foregoing discussion that it appeared + that the FRG, the Soviets and the + GDR wanted to move the US–GDR + relationship forward, Goodby + asked why the US did not want to do so. Is there nothing in such forward + movement for us but trade? Neets (Agriculture) replied that, while the + GDR agricultural market is not + great, it is active and capable of growth and currently represents the + largest part of US trade with the GDR. + Asked by Woessner how close we + were to reaching the growth limits of that market, he said that, while + we have made great strides, it will be more difficult to obtain a larger + share as long as the Soviets continue their present levels of supply. + Porter (Commerce) noted that overall trade turnover had increased an + estimated 15 percent over 1977, with a sharp increase in GDR industrial exports from $16.7 million + to an estimated $36 million. The GDR, + she concluded is learning more about the US market, while the quality of + GDR goods is becoming better known + to American firms. With MFN, trade + would probably expand significantly, with more turn-key contracts going + to the US. Most of these contracts would otherwise go to other countries + in the West. By way of example, she pointed to the estimated $300–400 + million in GDR business that currently + goes to US offshore subsidiaries each year. In this regard, Woessner noted that the British and + French had long competed fiercely for the GDR market, divorcing such competition from political + considerations. Touching briefly on the GDR’s indebtedness, Goodby asked if we could do a study of the question. + Gray replied that indebtedness is supposed to be discussed in an ongoing + CIA study of the GDR economy. He said he would check on the + status of that study.

+

6. Turning to a consideration of the GDR + as a CEMA/Warsaw Pact member, Goodby noted that not all the cards were in the Soviets’ + hands. Larrabee (NSC) added that the GDR’s importance to the Soviet Union + stemmed primarily from its security role. While the GDR is also of great economic importance + to the East, over the last few years there had been a decline in its + trade with CEMA, though there were + recent signs that the GDR was making + efforts to try to reverse this trend. With regard to foreign policy, he + detected few meaningful signs of East German independence, except at + times in relations with the FRG. Farlow + (INR) agreed, saying it was hard to + accept the assumption that the GDR + enjoyed any meaningful independence or was any more liberal than most + other East European countries. The GDR, + he added, tends to act on two foreign policy levels. Publicly, the + GDR’s leaders tend to take milder, + less polemical positions than they do in private discussions with their + allies. Their position on China, he said, was a good example, being more + restrained in major public pronouncements compared to some other East + European statements, but more outspoken in less publicized allied + discussions—as during the recent Sofia Ideological Conference of + Communist Parties. Gray noted, however, that the GDR was in the forefront of those publicly + backing Vietnam and that the GDR press had carried a number of + East German-authored diatribes against Chinese. He also noted that + others like Hungary had adopted a rather slavish pro-Moscow foreign + policy line, while pursuing their own national interests.

+

7. Porter observed that, as its most advanced member, the GDR is an important technology supplier to + CEMA. For this reason alone, the + Soviet Union would not allow the strained economic fabric of the GDR to tear. The GDR, however, has been finding it harder to obtain raw + materials from CEMA and to meet + contracts for finished products. This was producing greater tension in + the relationship. Kaplan added that the “resentment factor” should not + be underestimated. Eastern Europeans resent the GDR, because it is CEMA’s + richest member, it is the only one to enjoy it and, most importantly in + their eyes, it is German. Gray agreed but observed that resentment + worked both ways, with East Germans recalling the nature of the Soviets’ + arrival in and occupation of East Germany and probably feeling that + their economy could advance far more rapidly if not linked to that of + the Soviet Union. For the latter reason there is probably a desire among + even the SED leadership to eke out more independence in the economic + sphere. Blacklin (DOE) noted that resentment by its other CEMA partners tended to force the GDR to rely more heavily on the Soviet + Union. CEMA in general, he added, is + experiencing problems in obtaining needed energy resources, and the + GDR, with only lignite, is + particularly vulnerable. This, he said, has created opportunities for + Western sourcing.

+

8. Noting that it has been nearly impossible to determine whether + particular disturbances in and around Berlin have been undertaken as a + result of Soviet or GDR instigation, + Woessner observed + nevertheless that Berlin provided a peculiar, particularly strong bond + between the Soviets and the East Germans. Kaplan agreed, but doubted + whether the Soviets allowed the GDR + much independent play on Berlin. The way to deal with Berlin problems is + with Moscow, not the GDR.

+

9. Greenwald said that, toward the + end of internal liberalization, we should make a greater effort to open + up East German society through exchanges and wider distribution of + Western publications. Larrabee + added that there were other reasons for trying to increase the + transparency or porosity of GDR + society, not the least of which were to keep open a Western option for + the GDR and to improve our very + imperfect knowledge of the GDR. Neets + said that there was already sufficient knowledge about the GDR, most of it readily available in the + FRG. That, according to Gray, was + part of our problem; namely that most of our knowledge about the GDR came to us filtered through West + German perceptions. Our own direct study of the GDR is limited because most academic observers of Eastern + European Communist affairs are + Slavicists who tend to ignore the GDR. + It would be well, he said, to encourage exchanges that would foster + American expertise in East German affairs. Larrabee agreed, and said it should be possible to + upgrade our activities in this area within the limits of PD–21. Milton + (ICA) added, however, that our + presentations and exchanges programs had grown satisfactorily without a + cultural agreement. Since such an agreement could later be used to limit + our activities in the GDR, ICA would prefer to avoid signing one, + unless it were demonstrated that we had reached the limits of growth in + the absence of an agreement. All agreed.

+

10. Responding to Goodby’s + request for a discussion of GDR + activities in Africa, Larrabee + suggested that, while the GDR has + interests of its own in Africa, in the military-security sphere the + GDR often appears to be acting as a + Soviet surrogate and that the way to moderate its activities there is + through the Soviet Union. Goodby + said that the GDR was in Africa not + only as a Soviet surrogate and that its military activities, restricted + so far to advisors, have not been great. The ORPA/EE + rep agreed that the surrogate role had + been overplayed and reported that only small numbers of GDR military personnel have been detected + in Africa. The ORPA/EE + rep added that the GDR, which had long pursued its own + interests in Africa, is also trying to develop the continent as a + market. Farlow (INR) said that what was + significant was not that the East Germans had been in Africa for a long + time but that their [interests] correlated with and reinforced Soviet + interests. A division of labor with the Soviets was evident, with GDR military aid down and economic aid up + in 1978. Suggesting possible GDR + support for terrorists, he said that we should monitor East German + activities throughout the Third World, urging moderation when necessary. + All agreed that this “monitor/moderate” formula was preferable to a + neutral dialogue that could be interpreted as acceptance or even + approval of an East German presence in Africa or elsewhere in the Third + World.

+ + Vance + +
+ +
+ 125. Memorandum of ConversationSource: National Archives, RG 59, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Office of + Analysis for the Commonwealth and Eastern Europe, Office Subject + Files, 1967–1985, Lot 92D404, Box 6, US (Political) 1979–1980. + Confidential. Drafted by Edminster; cleared by Bolen; approved by + Trattner. The meeting took place in the Deputy Secretary’s + office. + + + Washington, March 29, 1979, 9:30 a.m. + + + SUBJECT + US–GDR Relations + + + PARTICIPANTS + The Deputy Secretary + David B. Bolen, Ambassador to the GDR + David K. Edminster, Deputy Director, EUR/CE + +

The Deputy Secretary opened the conversation by asking Ambassador Bolen + to summarize his hopes for the US–GDR + relationship and discuss the problems in that relationship.See Document 124. The + Department cabled a revised text to the Embassy on February 3 in + telegram 28968 to East Berlin. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + D790052–0616) The Embassy cabled its implementation plan in telegram + 620 from East Berlin, February 6. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + D790056–0899)

+

Ambassador Bolen said there were obvious problems stemming from the long + period when the two countries had no relations with each other: there + was still a certain residue of negativism on both sides. Despite this, + he had good access to the GDR + leadership and we are able to talk frankly with them, even on the + political level. He mentioned in this connection Ms. Derian’s having been received by the + GDRSee + Document 123.—a thing which had + surprised some people.

+

For the future, the Ambassador thought we had significant opportunities + to expand our relations with the GDR in + ways which would help us to realize some of our objectives there with + regard to: e.g., GDR behavior with + respect to Berlin, Africa and the Middle East; human rights; cooperation + in narcotics matters. The Ambassador was convinced that neither the + Soviets nor the FRG had any serious + objection to an expansion of US–GDR + relations; he mentioned in this connection his conversations with the + FRG Permanent Representative to the + GDR, Gaus, who had assured + Ambassador Bolen that he saw no problems from the standpoint of his + government.No record of the meeting was + found

+

With regard to the Consular Convention, Ambassador Bolen commented that + we had achieved a breakthrough following his meeting of January 22 with Hermann Axen,In telegram 382 from East Berlin, January 24, Bolen + reported his January 22 conversation with SED Politburo Secretary + Hermann Axen. During the + conversation, Axen stressed + the need to improve economic and cultural relations between the two + countries and that “the United States must acknowledge that the + GDR has citizens.” If the + U.S. Government would officially + recognize that fact, Axen + told the Ambassador, “we take these few words and put them down on + paper we can drink a glass to this right away.” Bolen assured + Axen that the U.S. Government “clearly recognize + GDR citizenship and that GDR Consuls have a right of access to + GDR citizens” and that “there + exists a basis for resolution in the U.S. proposed mirror-image statement.” (National + Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign + Policy File, D790036–0713) See also footnote + 6 below. which had resulted in Ambassador Grunert’s + presentation of new language on the nationality issue which was + acceptable to us, the UK, and the FRG, + but which was still causing problems for the French.In late 1978, having failed to reach an agreement + on issuing a statement on nationality, the Department proposed a new + solution to the issue. Dubbed the “Circle of People” approach, the + proposal sought to clarify, in mirror statements, that each country + would have access to its citizens held under arrest in the other + country. Goodby delivered + the proposal to Grunert on November 3, 1978, in a tour d’horizon + meeting at the Department. (Telegram 280985 to East Berlin and Bonn, + November 4, 1978; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780455–0667) As + the Department prepared to make its proposal known to the East + German Government, the French representative in the Bonn Group + raised objections to the statements, suggesting that the text + conferred recognition to the East German Government of an East + German nationality. Reporting on the French concerns, Stoessel noted that the French + representative also “indicated to us privately that Paris takes a + dim view of the protracted bilateral US–FRG discussions of the text.” (Telegram 21614 from + Bonn, November 24, 1978; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780484–1108) The + Department of State reply in telegram 300497 to Bonn, November 28, + 1978, instructed Stoessel + that the matter should be dropped unless the French bring it up. + (National Archives, RG 59, Central + Foreign Policy File, D780489–0629) The Ambassador thought + that if we could not bring the French around in the near future the only + sensible alternative was to break the linkage we had hitherto maintained + between the conclusion of the Consular Convention and the development of + US–GDR relations in other + areas.

+

With regard to MFN, Ambassador Bolen + said he was not arguing that we should necessarily grant it to the + GDR now but that we ought not to + reply to this primary GDR concern with + a categorical no; we ought to make them understand that their actions on + various issues in which we are interested, including human rights + matters and claims, could have a positive influence on the prospects for + MFN.

+

Mr. Christopher observed that, + while the GDR was perhaps doing as much + as it could, its present performance could not match the Soviet record. + Jackson-Vanik was pretty specific. We did not expect any repeal of it + but we did think that we could find ways of bringing China and the + USSR through it. The GDR, however, could not match up on the + basis of general performance and certainly not if one included their + record on emigration in the equation.

+ +

Ambassador Bolen conceded that emigration from the GDR remained a serious problem. He thought + the record had improved, however, and cited the following figures: + 1970—540 family reunification cases; 1977—3,500; 1978—4,600. Between + 1974 and 1978, he added, there were 190 family reunification cases + involving Americans. The Embassy had made representations in 118 of + those cases, 85 of which have been resolved positively.

+

Mr. Christopher conceded that the + record might be better than he knew but said that he still had the + impression that it was very difficult to get out of the GDR. Ambassador Bolen stressed that he + talks to the Foreign Minister personally about humanitarian cases and + leaves lists with the Minister of cases which we wish urgently to have + cleared up. The GDR had made some + effort to meet our desires on this score.

+

In conclusion, Mr. Christopher + observed that the important thing was that our relations with the GDR were on an upward trend—perhaps only a + very gentle rise, but upward nonetheless.

+
+ +
+ 126. Memorandum Prepared in the Central Intelligence AgencySource: Central Intelligence Agency, + Office of Support Services (DI), Job 82T00150R, Production Case + Files, Box 6, East Germany: The Chilly Winds of Spring. + Confidential. The memorandum was prepared in the Office of Political + Analysis and coordinated within OPA and the Office of Economic + Research. Copies were sent to the NSC, the Department of State’s INR and EUR Bureaus, + and the Departments of the Treasury and Defense. + + + PA M–79–10210 + + + Washington, May 3, + 1979 + +

EAST GERMANY: THE CHILLY WINDS OF SPRING (U)

+

East Germany recently has initiated a number of + repressive measures against dissident intellectuals, some consumers, + and Western correspondents. The official pretext was unfair + treatment by the Western press of such issues as East German + hard-currency shops and the quality of everyday life in East + Germany. The government’s actions were no doubt intended to address + more deep-seated problems, such as its failing ability to manipulate + the populace in support of its policies. And they were further + intended to send a message to West Germany that, detente and ostpolitik notwithstanding, East Germany has + no intention of modifying its foreign and domestic policies. The + government probably felt the need to send such a message to the West + because of recent speculation in the Western press, fueled in part + by the statements and travels of West German Social Democratic + parliamentary leader Herbert Wehner, that a process of German reunification may be + in its infancy. [classification not + declassified]

+

The Regime’s Measures

+

East Germany now requires that its citizens convert hard currency into + bank certificates before these funds can be used to purchase quality + goods in special shops (Intershops). The change acknowledges that the + two-currency economy that has developed in East Germany, with the West + German mark being the preferred currency, had to be curtailed. The + dual-currency system makes special benefits available to those who can + acquire foreign funds—many times through transactions outside the + official economy. The persons thus rewarded by the system are, by and + large, not those the regime wishes to be rewarded—workers and party and + government officials. The change in the system was not as restrictive as + many East Germans feared, but it will bring home to those who profit + from the dual system that the privileges they enjoy are strictly at the + sufferance of the regime. [classification not + declassified]

+

The new measures are designed to reduce the growing number of informal + contacts between East and West Germans. The West German media, which + reaches a substantial number of East Germans through radio and + television broadcasts, has long been a nuisance to the authorities + because of their accurate descriptions, collected from local residents, + of economic, social and political conditions in East Germany. To reduce + these contacts, the regime has enacted controls requiring Western + journalists to provide the authorities 24 hours notice and a detailed + itinerary of travel plans outside East Berlin. Other restrictions + include a ban on interviews with East German citizens without prior + government approval and a requirement that, “in carrying out their + journalistic work, journalists must abstain from slandering or defaming + the GDR, its state organs, and its + leading figures, as well as states allied with the GDR.” These restrictions are more severe + than those of any other East European state, including the Soviet Union. + [classification not declassified]

+

The restrictions on foreign travel by dissidents have prevented several + regime critics, including East Germany’s most prominent author, Stefan + Heym, from traveling to West Germany to attend lectures and conferences. + The government also has devised a new legal scheme, apparently to be + applied on a selective basis, for punishing authors who publish their + work in the West. According to this newly devised legal principle, a + citizen who publishes in the West and receives compensation is guilty of + violating foreign currency regulations, the penalty for which is a 10 + year prison term. This law probably is the basis of the recently + instituted criminal proceedings against Robert Havemann, a prominent + critic. The measures against dissidents will not halt their activities + or the feed-back of information into the country about them, but they + will have an inhibiting effect. [classification not + declassified]

+ +

The Timing

+

There are probably several reasons why the regime chose to act at this + time, despite the risk to its efforts to expand economic ties with the + West. At the root is its determination to maintain its identity as a + separate German state capable of controlling its internal affairs. The + regime may have believed that this had to be emphasized at this time to + the West Germans, whose ostpolitik is credited by + some for the conditions the East Germans find uncomfortable. + Inter-German intercourse has increased at the economic and personal + level to a point where some West German quarters could speculate last + month about the possibility of eventual German reunification. Such + speculation is intolerable to the regime, which this year will celebrate + the 30th anniversary of the creation of the East German state, because + it raises the fundamental question of the permanence of that state and, + thus, the obligation of its citizens to give it their allegiance. [classification not declassified]

+

The measures were, no doubt, cleared with the USSR, which has ruled out German reunification. The + political concessions made by East Germany to the West—and West Germans, + in particular—in the 1970s have, in part, been in support of the USSR’s policy of detente with the West + and improved relations with West Germany. The USSR may not be loath to see speculation on the + reunification question because it emphasizes to the East German + leaders—and to the Poles—their ultimate reliance on the USSR for the perpetuation and integrity + of their state, and, thus, their obligation to follow Soviet dictates. + But the Soviets would not wish reunification to become a credible notion + in East Germany, where it strikes a responsive chord with the public + and, perhaps, even with some in the bureaucracy. The Soviets could even + have been responsible for the timing of the East German moves. [classification not declassified]

+ +

A further impetus for instituting repressive measures now is the + country’s deteriorating economic situation. Faced with a serious balance + of payments problem with the West, the regime has critical resource + allocation decisions to make, and the result could be a conscious reduction of economic growth, with + all that would mean in terms of greater austerity for the public. This + could lead to a partial abandonment of the regime’s consumer-oriented + policy, which has been the basic theme of its appeals for popular + support. Before such a reversal became obvious to the public, the regime + would presumably wish to remind the people of the powers of the state to + enforce public discipline.According to a + sources list, the memorandum was based on the following telegrams: + telegram 2158 from East Berlin, April 20, (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + D790184–1205); telegram 2176 from East Berlin, April 21, (National + Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign + Policy File, D790185–0678); telegram 7089 from Bonn, April 19, + (National Archives, RG 59, Central + Foreign Policy File, D790180–0326); telegram 2249 from East Berlin, + April 25, (National Archives, RG 59, + Central Foreign Policy File, D790191–1118); and telegram 2265 from + East Berlin, April 25, (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + D790191–0838). [classification not + declassified]

+
+ + +
+ 127. Memorandum of ConversationSource: National Archives, RG 59, Bureau of Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs, + 1979—Human Rights and Country Files, Lot 82D103, Box 4, Germany—East + 1979. Confidential. Drafted by Greenwald on May 9. The meeting took place in + Derian’s + office. + + + Washington, May 3, 1979, 3 p.m. + + + PARTICIPANTS + Dr. Kurt Nier, GDR Deputy Foreign + Minister + Patt Derian, Assistant + Secretary of State for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs + + + ALSO PRESENT + Ambassador Grunert, GDR + Ambassador to U.S. + Ambassador Bolen, U.S. Ambassador + to GDR + Joachim Elm, Planning Staff, GDR + Foreign Office, Berlin + GDR Interpreter (nu) + Gisela Marcuse, Language Services + Jonathan Greenwald, HA/HR + (Notetaker) + + + SUBJECT + Human Rights Questions including CSCE, Divided Families, GDR Restrictions on Journalists and Dissidents, GDR Educational Policy, Jewish + Claims + + +

Ms. Derian and Dr. Nier expressed + pleasure at seeing each other again so soon after their discussions in + Berlin in October.See Document 123. + Dr. Nier said that he had spent the morning in + consultations with U.S. representatives, + headed by Deputy Assistant Secretary Goodby, on many questions important to bilateral + relations.In telegram 112470 to East + Berlin and Bonn, May 4, the Department reported that during their + meeting the previous day, Nier told Goodby that the German Democratic Republic agreed + with the April 16 U.S. proposal on + the nationality issue in the Consular Convention. (National + Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign + Policy File, D790202–0894) He could say that in some areas we + have come forward a step. The Consular Convention has visibly neared + conclusion. Ms. Derian expressed + satisfaction.

+

Dr. Nier said that a further step has thus been + taken that can produce a positive effect upon other areas. The agenda + had not yet been completed. There would be a chance to continue with Mr. + Goodby the following + day.See Document + 129. His program also called for meetings with + other figures in the Department and the Executive Branch and the + Congress. It was an intensive program but one that he welcomed because + he hoped and was persuaded that it would produce not just an exchange of + views, but also concrete results.

+

Ms. Derian + said that she had tried during the conversation in Berlin to lay the + groundwork for an understanding of U.S. + human rights policy, in particular for an understanding of why + development of bilateral relations required that account be taken of + that policy. She had sought then to keep the discussion general. Today + she would like to speak more specifically.

+

Ms. Derian + said she knew that Mr. Goodby + had passed over a copy of our divided families’ representation list. It + was a smaller list than we have with some other countries, but it is + very important for the people involved. The U.S. has also talked with the GDR about measures for expediting the handling of emergency + visitation cases. This is one of the first things we raise because it is + so important for the families.

+

Ms. Derian + said she was sure Ambassador Grunert had called attention to the wide + reporting in the press of the new restrictions the GDR had recently placed on journalists. + These restrictions had come as a surprise to the U.S. They were inconsistent with CSCE since they involve more restriction on the free + exchange of ideas. This type of thing, when coupled with the new + restrictions placed on Havemann and Heym, creates great interest in the + U.S. Together they are serious + barriers to the development of our relations. We hear about them from + members of Congress and from the public. These steps give rise to an + impression that things are not going well between our two states, that + the CSCE Final Act is not being + implemented. Thus tensions grow when things appeared to be going along + well between our countries, just at the time of such an important and + positive step as the Consular Convention.

+

Ms. Derian + said she wanted also to ask a question with regard to Jewish claims. She + understood that the private American concerned with this question, + Benjamin Ferencz, had proposed that the GDR export goods to the U.S. with the proceeds earmarked for compensation. She + wondered how the GDR would react to + this idea. She asked this question somewhat out of the context of the + rest of her remarks because she understood that Mr. Ferencz may have + some Congressional interest in special legislation to facilitate this + but does not wish to pursue the idea unless there was GDR interest. She realized it was not + possible for Dr. Nier to answer this question immediately, but she hoped + he would think it over. If the idea appears interesting to the GDR, Mr. Ferencz could be advised.

+

Ms. Derian + said the last topic she wished to raise concerned military education in + the schools. There was growing concern that part of the curriculum + appears to deal with attitudes toward the West, that the teaching + promotes hatred for the West among young people. This is out of step + with CSCE. She wondered whether there + was a reason for this. On one hand, the GDR seeks to improve relations; on the other hand, children are taught hatred. This + along with her points about journalists, Havemann and Heym were what she + wished to convey. She said she had heard that Havemann’s wife and + six-year old daughter were subjected to tight controls; Heym could not + travel out of the country. These are unusual and unexpected measures + that create tensions. She would appreciate an explanation.

+

Dr. Nier said he would have to begin with a + clarification of what are properly questions relating to bilateral + relations and what are internal matters and therefore not appropriate to + bilateral discussions. He had explained the basic GDR position on Helsinki Final Act + implementation in Berlin and again this morning. The GDR does not consider that the Final Act + deals only with family reunification or humanitarian cooperation. It has + three baskets, and success in further implementation is only possible if + the Final Act is considered in its entirety. Overall there are many + positive results. There can be no doubt that the GDR is prepared to continue along the way + of implementation in cooperation with other participating states, but + there will always be the need to keep all aspects of the Final Act in + mind.

+

Dr. Nier said he had also explained the GDR’s fundamental position on human rights + in Berlin. Nothing has changed or can change in this position. He had + already spoken to one question, that of family reunification, this + morning. He had referred to the GDR’s + regular practice with the U.S., which + was a generous one. More than 100 cases had been resolved. Other cases + are under review and will be decided on the basis of GDR laws and regulations. He had to + mention that GDR citizens, GDR laws, and internal GDR affairs were involved. But there was + no basis to doubt the GDR’s generous + practice in this area.

+

Dr. Nier said he had also discussed the competence + of foreign journalists in the morning. The new regulations were fully in + accordance with the Final Act. Every state has the right to enact its + own laws and to safeguard its own interests in so far as there is no + conflict with international law. Every state, the GDR included, has the right to prevent any + interference in its internal affairs. The GDR knows how to exercise this right. Foreign + correspondents are afforded every opportunity to do their work and to + engage in objective reporting. So long as they act in a professional and + serious manner and comply with their Helsinki Final Act obligations, + they will be given every support and opportunity to do serious + reporting. There were individuals, however, who tried to abuse their + work for interference in internal affairs. They will be prevented from + doing so because the GDR knows how to + protect its interests, as do all states. He said that an important part + of the Final Act is the recognition that noninterference in internal + affairs is recognized as one of the leading principles that should guide + relations between states. He repeated that there was no reason to + express concern about the + regulations. A serious, professional correspondent who acts in the + spirit of the Final Act to promote understanding, peace and friendship, + has received in the past and will receive in the future all necessary + support.

+

Dr. Nier said that two questions had been asked + that could not be discussed. He had in mind what had been said about + Havemann, Heym and education. These were matters fully within the + internal competence of the GDR. They + involved domestic laws. The GDR did not + concede anyone else the right to say anything about them. The GDR was not in agreement with much that + happened in other countries. To the extent that those events were based + on internal legislation, however, the GDR would not interfere. If someone violates laws in a + country, this can not be discussed by other countries. The GDR, for example, was concerned that in + some countries children do not enjoy the full right to education, + vocational training, and adequate career opportunities. The GDR regretted this deprivation of young + people’s rights, but such a matter could not be the subject for + government to government relations. The GDR educational system enjoys international esteem. It + reflects high standards of academic excellence and is also marked by a + spirit of peace, humanism and understanding that flows from the state’s + general policy.

+

Ms. Derian + said she wished to ask a question of clarification. She believed Dr. + Nier might have answered one of her questions obliquely, but she wished + to be certain she understood. Was he saying that GDR children are taught to have a high + regard for peace and for people of other countries and that reports we + have that children are taught an attitude of hostility are + incorrect?

+

Dr. Nier said that if anyone alleges that GDR children are taught hatred for + children in Western countries, it is a defamation and a slander of the + GDR’s policy. The GDR’s basic educational principle is the + solidarity of youth everywhere in the world, be it Vietnam, Africa or + elsewhere. Such reports, from wherever they come, are, simply put, a + slander. He asked to be excused for his frank response.

+

Ms. Derian + asked whether the GDR distinguished + between what children are taught about other children and what they may + be taught in a military context. Dr. Nier responded that there is simply + no teaching of hostility. All GDR + education is based on love for peace, solidarity, friendship, and + understanding among peoples. Of course the GDR also teaches that peace must be defended and secured. + If there are classes in this context in which young people are + acquainted with national defense, this has nothing to do with reports of + the sort Ms. Derian had + mentioned.

+

Dr. Nier said he would reiterate again, however, + that these were matters of internal competence. Sovereign states should + base their relations on matters that pertain to bilateral affairs in + accordance with principles contained in documents like the Final Act and + the UN + Charter. If the objective is to + develop relations, which he repeated is what the GDR desires, they should be guided by + efforts to contribute to detente and should concentrate on such matters. + He explained that he had said in the morning that the U.S. and the GDR should act in areas where progress is possible. This + was basic to further development of relations. There will naturally be + questions on which it will not be possible to agree, but these matters + should not become obstacles to the progress that was possible.

+

Ms. Derian + noted that Dr. Nier had to leave momentarily for an appointment at the + Commerce Department. She felt it was important, however, to cover two + points. She said that the U.S. and the + GDR have parallel objectives. Dr. + Nier had spoken twice about the Final Act being a single entity that + should not be divided up. But it is not possible to speak at the same + time about all its aspects. Issues have to be addressed one at a time, + and human rights is part of the Final Act.

+

Ms. Derian + said that the two countries were trying to make a new relationship. She + feared she had failed to transmit the message that as steps are taken + that build that new relationship, humanitarian matters, policies that + affect people, were essential to our ability to move ahead. She + understood the GDR position, but + progress in the human area was necessary if we were to move ahead. Of + course the GDR could say for years that + all of these were internal matters, but if we want to go ahead, they + must be addressed. She noted that there is a well-known board game where + players are occasionally told, “return to go”. Perhaps relations were + sometimes like that, but the U.S. wants + to move ahead.

+

Ms. Derian + said she was grateful for the opportunity to talk with Dr. Nier again. + It was frustrating just to begin and then to have to stop. She recalled + that Dr. Nier had, in the Berlin conversation, commented that all + countries had constitutions and seemed to discount them as not of much + significance. She asked if that were also the GDR’s view of the Final Act.

+

Dr. Nier said that he had not meant to give that + impression, that the GDR’s constitution + was filled with life and was not just words. The GDR had the same feeling about the Final + Act. But this could not happen with just this or that part of the + document. He believed there had been progress in the past few years. The + situation should be compared with 1975 when the Final Act had been + signed. The present situation in Europe reflects forward movement + between states with different social systems. There was no reason why + more progress could not be made, but there was a need to prepare + carefully and thoroughly so that we could go forward. Ambassador Grunert spoke up and said he would be interested in + ongoing discussions.

+
+ +
+ 128. Memorandum From Stephen + Larrabee of the National Security Council Staff to the + President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)Source: Carter Library, National + Security Affairs, Brzezinski + Material, Country File, Box 24, German Democratic Republic: + 1/77–1/81. Confidential; Outside the System. Sent for information. + Copies were sent to Jennings, Bartholomew, and Dodson. + + + Washington, May 3, + 1979 + + + SUBJECT + Attendance at Reception for GDR + Deputy Foreign Minister Nier (C) + +

I am puzzled by the rationale behind your refusal to allow me to attend + the reception for GDR Deputy Secretary + Nier. I have no great love for the East Germans, and personally I would + just as soon not go. Professionally, however, I + think I should go. (C)

+ + —Nier is a Deputy Foreign Minister. He is here at our invitation + to put the finishing touches on a Consular Convention, which we made + a precondition for any expansion of relations, and to sign several + other bilateral accords. The GDR + has accepted our compromise language on the nationality issue. + (C) + —He is seeing Mat Nimetz + and I understand that Nimetz + will be at the reception. (C) + +

But there is a more fundamental point. Regardless of what we may think of + the GDR, it is an important actor in + world affairs. It is the ninth leading industrial power in the world and + most powerful country, militarily and economically, in Eastern Europe. + At the same time, it is part of a larger equation—the “German + problem”—which has been, and to a large extent remains, a source of + instability and tension in Europe. Its relations with the USSR and the FRG directly impact on our relationships with both + countries. And its actions affect our interests in Berlin in important + ways. (C)

+

Moreover, while the GDR remains strongly + supportive of Moscow’s politics and internally orthodox, there are signs + of ferment and change, and it would be short-sighted to underestimate + their potential impact on Central Europe over the long run. (C)

+

These factors give us an interest in maintaining a dialogue with the + GDR and learning more about it. We + can’t do this, however, if we shun even the most informal contact with + its diplomats. I am not suggesting that I should spend every Friday + evening dining with the DCM at the Sans + Souci, but I am suggesting that I should have some (low-level) contact with the GDR and that there may come a point when + such contact will prove useful to us.Brzezinski underlined + “there may come a point when such contact will prove useful to us” + and wrote in the margin “yes, but not yet for the NSC. ZB.” (C)

+

Of course, I will abide by your decision and not attend the reception. I + simply wanted to suggest some factors which should be taken into + consideration in the future. (C)

+ +
+ +
+ 129. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassies in the + German Democratic Republic and Federal Republic of GermanySource: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + D790207–0903. Confidential; Immediate. Drafted by Gray; cleared by + Edminster and in INM; approved by Vine. Sent for information to + Paris, London, West Berlin, and USNATO + + + Washington, May 8, 1979, 0011Z + +

115852. Subject: Goodby-Nier + Consultations: May 4 Developments.

+

1. (C) Entire text.

+

2. During May 4 plenary session, Deputy Assistant Secretary Goodby and GDR Deputy Foreign Minister Nier initialled German and + English text of separate exchange of letters on Consular Convention. + Text is same as para 4 reftelNot + further identified. See footnote 3 + below. except that final, non-substantive sentence of one of + two letters has been changed by adding new final sentence which reads: + “I am authorized to declare that your letter and this reply constitutes + an agreement between our two governments.” Three-man U.S. team will arrive Berlin May 9 to begin + negotiation of final technical details of Consular Convention, which + negotiation we hope to have finished in time for May 17–21 visit of + GDR State Foreign Trade Secretary + Beil. Neither side intends to publicize fact that we have discussed + Consular Convention until such time as agreement is ready for signing. + FYI: We anticipate signing in + Washington. End FYI. We will give + FRG promised note at time of + signing the Consular Convention and before public announcement of + signing.

+

3. Nier and Postmaster General Bolger signed Parcel Post Agreement May 4. + Agreement contains U.S. fallback + language in Article 1 which + protects our interest with regard to Berlin. That language reads as + follows: “This agreement applies to all areas for which the Governments + of the U.S. and GDR exercise postal responsibilities.”

+

4. On May 4 GDR Embassy gave us a note + agreeing to our proposal of April 16 for the reciprocal exemption of + taxes on diplomatic properties.See footnote 3, Document 127. In this + regard Nier was told by Goodby + that we would expect favorable treatment of requests that will be + forthcoming through our Embassy for the conversion of our leases in East + Berlin from short-term to long-term. FYI: GDR note misquoted + U.S. note April 16 replacing “U.S. Embassy to the GDR” with “U.S. Embassy in the GDR.” + Note was returned to GDR Embassy May 5 + by Department officer who pointed out “grammatical” error and asked that + note be resubmitted by May 7 with proper quotation of U.S. note. We have every expectation that + this will be done. End FYI.

+

5. Goodby told Nier that USG is now prepared to discuss a + scientific-cultural agreement with the GDR and gave him a copy of our agreement with Bulgaria as + our preferred model. Nier explained that GDR prefers separate agreements but agreed to examine US + model which consists of an umbrella agreement and a detailed biennial + implementation agreement. Nier was told that we would be prepared for + detailed discussion in the early fall.

+

6. Nier was also told that we are now prepared to approve the GDR pending request for new trade offices + in New York upon the signature of the Consular Convention Agreement. It + was proposed that, if Consular Convention can be signed between now and + May 17, that announcement of this step could be made at the time of + Beil’s visit. The offices consist of two foreign trade enterprise + offices (Unitechna, Jenoptik) and a branch of the GDR Embassy Commercial Section. With + regard to the latter, Nier was told that, in accordance with the agreed + minute of 1974, we would expect that we would be given the option to + open an office of our own at a time and place of our choosing. Nier did + not object.

+

7. Nier was presented with our Double Taxation and Agricultural Agreement + with Hungary as models for such agreements with the GDR. Nier undertook to provide us with + models of the types of shipping, health, legal assistance and customs + agreements the GDR would like to sign + with the U.S. He was told that we would + be unable to reply definitively on a shipping agreement until such time + as an overall maritime policy study being conducted by a White House + Task Force is completed but was assured that the GDR’s views should be factored into that + study when received. Nier said that the GDR had proposed Health and Customs Agreements in order to meet U.S. narcotics concerns expressed in Berlin by U.S. Customs Director Corcoran and + Assistant Secretary Falco. Goodby said that we were not really interested in a + Customs Agreement but would prefer to expand our narcotics control + cooperation on the current informal basis. He also said that health + matters are normally treated by us in scientific cultural agreements. + When Nier pointed out that a separate agreement would be needed to + satisfy the needs of the GDR’s separate + Health Ministry, Goodby promised + to look carefully at the model that would be provided by the GDR.

+

8. Also raised by the GDR in a + perfunctory manner were MFN, overflight + rights, military attaches, fishery quotas, an agreement on the return of + cultural objects and a GDR film week in + the U.S. On MFN and fishery quotas, both sides repeated their standard + positions. We refused to discuss attaches and told Nier to expect a + negative response to the GDR’s note on + overflights. He accepted this with equanimity. He was told that, with + regard to a film week, ICA has already + been in touch with the “appropriate American institution”, the American + Film Institute, which would be pleased to establish contact with the + GDR’s Cultural Attache. On the + return of cultural objects, Nier presented us with a draft note, which + would require the two sides to return objects listed in an unattached + annex and to “repatriate to each other cultural property which may be + found henceforward and which has its permanent and rightful repository + in the territory of one of the two nations.” We promised to examine this + proposal carefully and, in this context, renewed our plea for the return + of the Feininger paintings.

+

9. Nier also proposed exchanging notes agreeing to regular political + consultations at “senior levels”, stating that this could be Goodby-Nier level. While viewing this + in a dim light, we agreed to examine the proposal. Without specifying + individuals, Goodby proposed + receiving a GDR delegation this summer + for CSCE consultations followed by a + political level U.S. trip to Berlin in + the fall and a higher level CSCE + consultation in Berlin in the spring. Nier expressed general + agreement.

+

10. With regard to CSCE, Goodby gave Nier a new list of divided + family cases and protested restrictions on journalists. Our protest, he + said, would be made public in President’s report to the CSCE Commission.

+

11. Claims were only touched upon briefly, with Goodby turning over copies of fifty + cases mailed earlier by USFCSC and making a strong pitch for settlement + of the Jewish claims.

+

12. Nier met for ten minutes with Deputy Secretary Christopher, with both assessing + positively the resolution of the Consular Convention nationality issue. + In other meetings, Assistant Secretary Derian elaborated on human rights issues, Under + Secretary Newsom did so on the Middle East and + Counselor Nimetz did so on CSCE and East-West issues.

+

13. French and German Embassies have been briefed in detail on the above. + U.S. Bonn group rep should do the same.

+ + Vance + + +
+ + +
+ 130. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassies in the + German Democratic Republic and the Federal Republic of GermanySource: National Archives, + RG 59, Central Foreign Policy + File, D790295–0852. Confidential; Niact Immediate. Drafted by Niles; cleared by Vine; + approved by Vest. Sent for + information Immediate to Paris and London; and for information + Priority to Moscow and USNATO. + + + + Washington, June 30, 1979, 0020Z + +

168723. For Ambassador Bolen From Assistant Secretary Vest. Subject: Signing of US–GDR Consular Convention. Ref: A) Berlin + 3657; B) Berlin 3644;Telegram 3657 from + East Berlin, June 29, urged the Department to reconsider postponing + the signing of the Consular Convention based on the points made by + the Embassy in telegram 3644. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + D790294–0897) Telegram 3644 from East Berlin was not found. + C) State 167957;In telegram 167957 to East + Berlin and Bonn, June 29, Vest informed Bolen that, “after careful + consideration” the Department decided to postpone signing the + Consular Convention in light of the Volkskammer decision. (National + Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign + Policy File, D790295–0684) D) USBER 1381; E) USBER + 1385.In telegram 1381 from West Berlin, + June 29, the Mission recommended that the Department postpone + signing of the Consular Convention to show that the U.S. Government took the East German + decision to elect Volkskammer members in East Berlin seriously. + (National Archives, RG 59, Central + Foreign Policy File, D790295–0265) Telegram 1385 from West Berlin + was not found.

+

1. Confidential (Entire text)

+

2. For Berlin. On basis refs A and B, we have again considered question + of whether we should proceed with scheduled July 3 signing of US–GDR Consular Convention in light of June + 28 GDR action on election of East + Berlin Volkskammer deputies.In telegram + 3615 from East Berlin, June 28, the Embassy reported that the + Volkskammer (Chamber of Deputies) approved an amendment to the 1976 + election law removing all differentiation between deputies from East + Berlin and the rest of the German Democratic Republic, as well as + allowing for the direct election of deputies from East Berlin to the + Volkskammer. Previously, East Berlin deputies were nominated by the + city assembly. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + D790293–0138)

+ +

3. While we appreciate your point in refs A and B regarding consistent + approach by the three powers in responding to GDR action, we do not wish our decision on Consular + Convention contingent upon actions by other allies.

+

4. Consequently, you should advise Deputy Foreign Minister Nier on July 2 + that we will not be able to proceed as planned with the July 3 signing + of the Consular Convention due to unexpected complications. This + approach would be entirely consistent with your June 14 presentation to + Nier (Berlin 3370 and State 151160) during which you advised him that we + were prepared to proceed with a July 3 signing provided no [unfo]reseen + complications intervened.In telegram 151160 + to East Berlin, June 12, the Department informed the Embassy that + while the U.S. Government would + prefer to sign the Consular Convention in Washington, the Department + would agree to a Berlin signing by Nier and Bolen if the East German + Government continued to press for Berlin as a venue. (National + Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign + Policy File, D790266–0861) In telegram 3370 from East Berlin, June + 15, the Embassy reported Bolen’s meeting with Nier the previous day. + Bolen informed Nier of the U.S. + Government position on the signing and expressed hope that “no + unforeseen developments would interfere with date for signing of + Consular Convention.” Nier agreed to sign the convention on behalf + of the German Democratic Republic on July 3. (National Archives, + RG 59, Central Foreign Policy + File, D790270–1053) If Nier asks when we will be able to sign + the Consular Convention, you should advise him that this will depend + upon further developments. FYI we have + in mind shortly after seating of European Parliament July 18 if there + are no further incidents. End FYI.

+

5. For Bonn. Embassy should advise other Bonn group members at earliest + opportunity of our decision to postpone signing of the Consular + Convention.

+

6. Department does not plan to make any public announcement of + postponement of signing. However, we assume that this will soon become + public knowledge, and if subject comes up at noon press briefing we will + acknowledge that signing has been postponed. We do not plan to expand + upon the reasons for the postponement nor to speculate as to when the + Convention may be signed. Posts should use similar line in responding to + press inquiries.

+

7. For Bonn. Exchange of notes and two non-papers (see State 119080)In telegram 119080 to Bonn, May 10, the + Department instructed the Embassy to inform the West German + Government that the Department agreed that the signing of the U.S.–GDR Consular Convention take place in Bonn. (National + Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign + Policy File, D790213–0491) should obviously be postponed + until further notice.

+ + Christopher + +
+ +
+ 131. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Human Rights + and Humanitarian Affairs (Derian) to the Assistant Secretary of State for European + Affairs (Vest)Source: National Archives, RG 59, Bureau of Human Rights and + Humanitarian Affairs, 1979—Human Rights and Country File, Lot + 82D103, Box 4, Germany—East 1979. Confidential. Drafted by Greenwald; cleared by Niles, + Clark, and Kornblum and + in HA and HA/HR. + + + Washington, July 9, + 1979 + + + SUBJECT + The GDR’s Backward Steps on Human + Rights + +

Summary

+

The GDR appears to be going through a + period of intellectual ferment characterized by an open break between + the regime and some of its most prestigious writers. The Government has + responded with expulsions from the writer’s union and perhaps more + ominously with a series of laws late last month all tending to + discourage East Germans from contact with the West. There have been some + positive signs, most notably, as pointed out by Embassy Berlin, the East + German public has been treated to the rare sight of something of an open + debate within the GDR cultural + establishment on the role of literature and writers. On the whole, + however, the trend here and in the related matter of foreign + journalistic activity is retrograde. It is particularly unfortunate that + the areas affected are those where the GDR had been most liberal, namely the relatively easy + access to Western ideas and the Western media.

+

We seek a constructive dialogue with the GDR on human rights. One tactic that has appeared to offer + some prospect is initial concentration not on the areas in which the + GDR has hitherto been most nervous, + the Wall and issues related to free movement of people, but on those + areas where the GDR has been relatively + tolerant. It is this area, however, the freer movement of ideas, that is + now under attack.

+

Our ability to make a difference in the internal debate that is occurring + in East Berlin is very limited. The GDR + will continue to be influenced far more decisively by its own perception + of its security problems, whatever advice the Soviet Union is providing, + and its judgement of the special needs of its relationship with the + FRG. Nevertheless, there are + several reasons for us to find an appropriate means to state our views. + The GDR does have an interest in + improving relations with the U.S. It + should be aware of the negative impact that recent actions can have and weigh this in its + calculations of gains and losses before it continues on its course. + Again, it is useful for us in our efforts to establish the credibility + of our desire for a long-term human rights dialogue to demonstrate the + ongoing nature of our interest in and concern for such issues.

+

Background

+

The present situation has been building for some months. How much it + represents a planned policy, how much a response to a series of + incidents, is difficult to estimate. The larger issues, as Embassy + Berlin points out in its most interesting Berlin 3652In telegram 3652 from East Berlin, June 29, the + Embassy described the ongoing and very public debate taking place in + the German Democratic Republic surrounding the expulsion of nine + East German writers from the Writers’ Union. The debate, the Embassy + suggested, contributed to growing awareness of instability in the + East German cultural community. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + D790298–0907), center, however, around a concrete aspect of + the modern German reality: “. . . the red thread running through most of + the speeches is the Western media and its exploitation by and of GDR dissidents.” The seriousness with + which the GDR approaches these issues + is suggested by the recent article in the West German Weekly, “Die + Zeit,” which characterized the impact of FRG media on virtually all facets of East German life as + “the electronic reunification of Germany.”

+

Against this background, the series of steps taken by the GDR since mid-spring suggests a renewed + effort to give teeth to First Secretary Honecker’s separation (Abgrenzung) policy, to manage the GDR’s integration into European and world politics and its + relations with the FRG in a fashion + that keeps the society sufficiently isolated from Western influences to + maintain internal stability and satisfy the ever anxious Soviets. These + steps include:

+

—New restrictions on the activity of Western (primarily FRG) correspondents in East Berlin and the + GDR, including a requirement for + permission to interview any GDR citizen + and to announce intended internal travel 24-hours in advance.

+

—Expulsion of FRG correspondents for + illegal interviews with GDR citizens in + violation of the new regulations and refusal of permission under the + regulations for correspondents to cover or exercise any journalistic + activity with respect to the trial of prominent dissident Robert + Havemann on currency charges.

+

—Denial of permission to several leading writers including Stefan Heym + and Rolf Schneider to travel to the FRG + for routine literary functions.

+ +

—Prosecutions and investigations against leading dissidents such as + Havemann and Heym based on currency charges stemming from their + publication of writings in the FRG.

+

—Expulsion of Heym and eight other writers from the Writers’ Union.

+

—Most recently, on June 28, adoption of a series of laws apparently aimed + at further isolating Western journalists and providing the state with + new legal weapons to use against East Germans who maintain contact with + the Western media or with other institutions in the FRG; these laws include an addition to the + criminal code on “treasonable provision of news” (Landesverraeterische Nachrichtenuebermittlung) that subjects + to imprisonment for two to twelve years whomever “passes, gathers on + their behalf or makes available” to a “foreign power, a foreign power’s + institutions or representative, or to a foreign organization as well as + to the helpers of a foreign organization” material described as “news + that is not subject to being kept secret” but that is subjectively + determined to be not in the interests of the GDR. Whoever “takes up contact with or offers himself to + work with these organizations or persons or in other fashion supports + these organizations or persons” may be imprisoned for one to ten years. + Another law appears directed at the sending of manuscripts or recordings + to the West.

+

Human Rights Dialogue with the GDR

+

Our efforts to establish a solid basis for ongoing discussion of human + rights with the GDR have been hampered, + as with so many other issues, by the newness and low level of relations. + I attempted to explain the humanitarian basis of our concern and our + non-ideological approach during my visit to East Berlin in October, + 1978.See Document + 123. I dealt more specifically with several issues, + including family reunification, pressure on dissidents such as Havemann + and Heym, and anti-Western propaganda in the schools when I had a second + meeting with Deputy Foreign Minister Nier in Washington in May.See Document + 127. + Jim Goodby also laid the basis + for detailed discussion of certain Helsinki Final Act issues including + family reunification and the restrictions on journalists when he + conducted CSCE consultations in + November, 1978 and during Dr. Nier’s May visit.See Document + 129.

+

I have discussed with Ambassador Bolen and given considerable thought to + the best means to build on these initial efforts and accustom the GDR over time to dealing with us on human + rights-related issues. On + balance the GDR has a very restrictive + record on movement of people, symbolized by the Berlin Wall. This is + attributable to the attraction of FRG + society, which creates emigration pressure and strain on the state’s + stability unmatched in Eastern Europe. The GDR has had, however, a relatively good record on movement + of ideas. The country is open to Western broadcasts, and there have been + many and widely used channels for GDR + intellectuals to play their views back into East German society by means + of contact with Western media and publishing houses. This is also a + factor, of course, of the unique geographical and political situation of + divided Germany. It would be extremely difficult at the present stage to + engage the GDR directly on the former + type of issues since these could be seen as affecting its very + existence. I would hope, however, that we could over time encourage the + GDR to build on its relatively good + record on access to the spoken word and to foster a more liberal + domestic climate by relaxing its attitude toward internal circulation of + the printed word and the Western contacts of its intellectuals.

+

The recent series of events outlined above demonstrates graphically how + sensitive these subjects are. Consistency and credibility for our human + rights concerns, however, would appear to make it important to respond + to the GDR measures. I would be modest + in our assessment of what we might achieve in the short run though I + doubt that our intervention would injure people like Heym and Havemann + who count for their protection in part at least on their standing in the + West. Over the longer run, however, I would hope that it would assist us + in establishing more firmly some of the guide lines for our relations + and in identifying areas in which we can have realistic hopes that the + GDR will be able to liberalize its + internal controls.

+

Tactics

+

I realize that discussion of any of these issues with the GDR at the present time must be considered + in connection with the serious Berlin status issue created by the + simultaneous decision June 28 to permit direct election of East Berlin + representatives to the Volkskammer. Because of that violation of the + Four Power status of the city, I understand that we will be holding back + on a number of aspects of our bilateral relations such as the signing of + the Consular Convention. We can not make this the subject of a direct + demarche to the GDR because + quadripartite matters are discussed only with the Soviet Union, not the + GDR. It would be anomalous and + perhaps would offer the GDR indirectly + an opportunity to seek discussion of Berlin issues with us were we now + to make a formal demarche on human rights. It might also provide a + confusing signal as to what were our immediate reasons for holding back + on the bilateral relationship. On the other hand, because we will not be + going forward for the time being with bilateral steps, we can make some instructive human rights + points without risking loss of any immediate practical benefits. The + alternative to a formal demarche would appear to be informal discussion + as opportunities present themselves in Washington and East Berlin.

+

Recommendation:

+

That you and I and our assistants and Embassy Berlin look for appropriate + opportunities in official contacts with representatives of the GDR Embassy to make the following points + informally:

+

—We have been observing with concern recent developments involving what + appear to be increasing restrictions on the activities of foreign + journalists in East Berlin and on GDR + intellectuals.

+

—Some of these matters were raised more formally when Deputy Foreign + Minister Nier visited the Department in May. As you know, we consider + that we have a legitimate basis to raise these matters because the + ability of American journalists to carry on their profession appears to + be affected and because the Helsinki Final Act commits both our + countries to encourage the freer flow of ideas between East and + West.

+

—Apart from this, however, I would note to you informally that these + actions have a serious negative impact upon the way in which the GDR is viewed by important segments of + American society. This makes it much more difficult to gain support for + steps to build our bilateral relationship in a manner that would be in + our mutual interest.

+

—It is disappointing that this backward movement appears to be taking + place in an area—access of GDR citizens + to Western media and of GDR literary + figures to their very interested Western readership—where the GDR had hitherto created a much more + favorable impression. The new criminal code laws in particular appear to + be directed at chilling the type of human and professional contacts and + flow of information that CSCE aims at. + You should be aware of the harm this sort of thing does the GDR in the United States.

+

An instruction Telegram for Embassy Berlin is attached for your + approval.Attached but not printed. + Vest approved the draft, + which was sent to East Berlin on July 17 in telegram 184716. In the + telegram, the Department authorized the Embassy to make only an + informal approach on human rights to prevent any “confusing signal + as to our motives for holding back on signature of the Cultural + Convention and other bilateral steps.” The Embassy was further + instructed to stress that East German actions in the area of human + rights will “have a serious negative impact upon the way in which + the GDR is viewed by important + segments of American society.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + D790324–0505)

+
+ +
+ 132. Memorandum From Stephen + Larrabee of the National Security Council Staff to the + President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)Source: Carter Library, National + Security Affairs, Brzezinski + Material, Country File, Box 24, German Democratic Republic: + 1/77–1/81. Confidential; Secret attachment. Sent for action. A copy + was sent to Brement. + + + Washington, August + 24, 1979 + + + SUBJECT + US–GDR Consular Convention + (U) + +

State has informed us that they intend to proceed with the signing of the + US–GDR Consular Convention in + Berlin on September 4th (Tab A).Attached + but not printed at Tab A is an August 21 memorandum from Tarnoff to Brzezinski. The ceremony + will be brief, low key and without press attendance. (U)

+

We made a signing of the Consular Convention a precondition for any + normalization of relations. The Convention was finally concluded in May + after the GDR backed off their position + on the nationality issue. It was scheduled to be signed on July 3, but + the date of the signing was postponed in order to indicate our + displeasure at the GDR’s attempt to + unilaterally change the status quo in Berlin by instituting the direct + election of East Berlin deputies to the Volkskammer. (C)

+

Once the Convention is signed we will permit the GDR two foreign trade offices in New York and a branch + office of the GDR’s Embassy Commercial + Counselor in New York City. In return, we will be allowed to open a + trade office in the GDR at a site and + time of our choosing (possibly Berlin). At present, however, we have no + plans to open such an office. (C)

+

All things considered, I think we should go ahead with the signing, + keeping the ceremony very low key.Brzezinski underlined “very low + key” and wrote “yes” in the margin. The Convention is in our + interest as much as theirs. It ensures protection of US citizens and + does not imply any major expansion of relations. Moreover, we have gone + the furthest of all the allies in showing displeasure at recent GDR actions over Berlin. (After some + initial reservations, the French went ahead with a visit by FM Francois-Poncet to East Berlin at the + end of July, and despite the initial outcry in West Germany over the + GDR move, the FRG proceeded with high-level talks on + disarmament, as scheduled, at the end of July.) We made our point by + postponing the talks and we have little to gain by drawing this out + further. However, in light of + current GDR policies—both external and + internal—we should make no effort to expand our relations. (C)

+

RECOMMENDATION: That State be authorized to sign + the agreement on September 4th.Brzezinski approved this + recommendation. (U)

+ +
+ +
+ 133. Report Prepared in the Bureau of Intelligence and Research, + Department of StateSource: + National Archives, RG 59, Bureau of + Intelligence and Research, Office of Analysis for the Commonwealth + and Eastern Europe, Office Subject Files, 1967–1985, Lot 92D404, Box + 7, East German Political Dilemmas 1979–1980. Confidential. Drafted + by Farlow; approved by Norbury. + + + Report No. 1238 + + + Washington, September + 12, 1979 + +

(U) EAST GERMANY’S NEW HARD LINE

+

(C) Introduction and Summary

+

The German Democratic Republic has established a set of political control + mechanisms designed to halt spreading popular restiveness and to preempt + the emergence of more serious discontent in the future. These + controls—aimed generally at Western influences and specifically at + dissidents, foreign journalists, and grumbling citizens—have had a + general chilling effect on the society and heightened its sense of + alienation from the regime.

+

The discontent is rooted most immediately in the erosion of the regime’s + ability to meet consumer demands—demands that the Honecker regime itself intensified by + its shift to “consumerism” in the mid-1970s. The current problems + indicate that without political liberalization or growing consumer + concessions, accommodation between citizens and state will remain + difficult. The ruling Socialist Unity Party (SED), increasingly aware of + its political dilemmas, is falling back on the course that comes + naturally to it—hard-line domestic controls that limit Western + influences, cow the population, and no doubt win plaudits from + Moscow.

+ +

The extent to which the control mechanisms will be applied remains to be + seen. Their very announcement, however, is a setback for Honecker, who had been noted for a + degree of political flexibility and concern for popular demands. At the + same time, though, the new hard line has been sequenced in such a way as + to minimize disruption in FRG–GDR ties so that the basic framework of + detente does not suffer.

+

East Germany’s economic plight is not unique to Eastern Europe. But the + SED has even less to fall back on than some of the other ruling + communist parties in the region—either in foreign policy independence or + in manipulation of traditional nationalism. Thus the political toll + ultimately could be more severe. At the moment, the discontent is not + overt and Honecker seems + relatively secure. But should Honecker’s new hard line not forestall the emergence of + mounting discontent within the GDR, + Moscow will be forced to make hard choices on the GDR’s political leadership and Soviet + underwriting of the country’s economy.

+

Honecker’s + Political Dilemmas

+

(U) When Erich Honecker succeeded + Walter Ulbricht in 1971, the new leader tried to reach an accommodation + between the regime and the population. Honecker, while not weakening the SED’s monopoly of + power, sought to modify some of Ulbricht’s more strident domestic + policies. He did this by, inter alia:

+ + —reorienting economic policy toward a rapid improvement in the + standard of living, in part by allowing citizens to have access to + Western money and consumer goods; + —tolerating a marginally more open intellectual and artistic + expression, sometimes looking the other way when East Germans + published critical works in the FRG; and + —seeking, more recently, a rapprochement with the Evangelical + (Lutheran) Church, the one major institution outside the SED. + +

At the same time, Honecker made it + quite clear, by maintenance of rigid security controls, that his regime + was not engaged in political liberalization, that Western influences + would be contained, and that travel to the West would remain + restricted.

+

(C) Honecker’s approach was not a + panacea for the population, but it was a welcome respite that allowed + individuals to indulge a bit in material values. By the late 1970s, + however, it had become apparent that these policy shifts were quietly + generating a new set of problems.

+ + —Consumerism, rooted in legalized access to West German currency, + had begun to create a two-class system of “haves” and “have-nots,” + i.e., those with and those without Western money; this produced + growing resentment among the latter because hard currency was often + the only means of obtaining necessary goods and services. + + —Critical intellectuals increasingly turned to the West to publish + their works or to make known their views, many of which called for + fundamental changes in the GDR. + —The Evangelical Church, immediately after receiving unprecedented + concessions from the state, launched an offensive against the + regime’s plans to introduce military training in the high + schools. + +

And the SED seemed generally unable to break through a growing malaise + typified by apolitical youth, apathetic workers, and petty corruption + and crime.

+

(C) The main catalyst in this process was the intensified coverage of + East Germany from within by FRG media, + especially West German TV, which reaches 80 percent of the GDR. With West German reporters focusing + on negative developments, grumbling citizens and outspoken + intellectuals/artists soon found a public forum for their discordant + views. This FRG media penetration, + compounded by 10 million annual West German visitors, negated Honecker’s goal of a systematic + delimitation between the two social/cultural systems—his much-vaunted + policy of Abgrenzung.

+

(C) These problems did not pose an immediate threat to the political + system or Honecker’s personal + position. But looking a few years ahead, Honecker must have heeded the gloomy projections on the + economic front and the political danger they entailed. The GDR’s bleak economic outlook—mounting + balance of payments deficits with both Moscow and the West and a likely + unwillingness by the Soviets to continue their heavy subsidization of + the GDR—pointed to the need to cut back + on imports, boost exports, and reduce consumption growth. At the same + time, the regime would have to come to grips with low prices for retail + goods which encourage the population to consume. Honecker realized that the position of + the East German consumer, while remaining high by East European + standards, inevitably would suffer.

+

(C) In this context, restiveness could be expected to grow, stimulated by + the almost daily barrage of negative TV coverage by the FRG. Thus, the relative stability that the + regime “bought” in the mid-1970s threatened to dissipate by the early + 1980s. Honecker and the SED + decided on a preemptive strike before matters got worse.

+

The Clampdown: Early Signals

+

(C) Honecker signaled the + possibility of a tougher domestic line in June 1978 when the SED revised + Walter Ulbricht’s status from that of non-person to “great proletarian + revolutionary.” Ulbricht, the “father” of the GDR, was a firm Stalinist who pushed East German political + institutionalization and economic modernization with fervor. His + tendency, toward the end of his career, to stress the superiority of + German socialism irritated Moscow. When he objected to Soviet detente + overtures to Bonn and to the West in general, he was removed from + office.

+ +

(C) But from the population’s vantage point, Ulbricht remained synonymous + with hard-line communism. Thus, his rehabilitation was not merely an + attempt to define his place in East German history. It was also intended + to signal that there might be a return to Ulbricht’s policies in the + face of mounting socioeconomic problems and political dissent.

+

(U) This signal was reinforced by the sentencing in July 1978 of Rudolf + Bahro and Nico Huebner—two of the GDR’s + most noted dissidents—to jail terms of 8 years and 5 years, + respectively. These were harsher tactics than Honecker had used in the earlier cases + of folk singer dissident Wolf Biermann—who was stripped of his + citizenship while in the West—and physicist/philosopher Robert Havemann, + who had been placed under house arrest following his protest of the + Biermann matter.

+

(U) The July sentencings were more reminiscent of Ulbricht’s handling of + the revisionist Marxists (centered around Wolfgang Harich), who in 1957 + were given jail sentences for suggesting an ideological “third way” + between East and West for the GDR. + Bahro had published in West Germany a political treatise, The Alternative, calling for a purified Marxist + system in the GDR. Huebner, an East + Berlin draft resister, had used West German media to ventilate his view + that the military draft of East Berliners was illegal because all of + Berlin remained demilitarized under postwar four-power agreements. This + opinion flew in the face of East German claims to sovereignty over East + Berlin.

+

(C) These early signals, however, did not continue into the fall of 1978, + probably because the regime wanted to conclude inner-German transit + agreements that would net the GDR at + least an additional $1 billion in much-needed hard currency over the + next 10 years. A crackdown of major proportions probably would have made + the FRG think twice about concluding + the agreements. With their signing in November 1978, both sides expected + a lull in relations while an agenda of new negotiations was being + forged.

+

(U) The GDR was hit by disastrous winter + storms in early 1979 which so disrupted the economy that economic + performance for the entire year has been adversely affected. The country + continued to experience seriously sluggish growth rates into the spring, + and the provision of some basic consumer supplies remained disrupted. + Western visitors reported that complaining by the population was the + most intense in recent memory.

+

The Clampdown Phased In

+

(U) The signals of June 1978 turned into a torrent of restrictions in the + spring-summer of 1979:

+ + + —A decree, announced on April 5, required citizens holding Western + currency to convert it into non-transferable coupons in order to + purchase Western goods in Intershops. + —New regulations, published on April 14, required permanently + accredited foreign journalists to obtain permission for interviews + and to notify the authorities on the details of all planned trips + outside East Berlin. + —In April, dissident writers, including noted novelist Stefan + Heym, were denied visas for travel to the West. + —An FRG television reporter was + expelled in May for recording a statement by Heym without obtaining + permission. + —Both Heym and Havemann were tried and fined for alleged violation + of GDR currency regulations in + accepting royalties for Western publications that had not been + cleared by the GDR. + —Nine dissident writers, including Heym, were expelled in June + from the GDR Writers Union for + “anti-communist agitation.” + —A revision of the penal code, effective on August 1, broadened + the definition of political crimes (inter + alia, by proscribing actions deemed “harmful to the + interests of the state”) and expanded considerably penalties for + conviction thereunder. + +

(C) It will take some time to discern how some of these + restrictions—draconian in principle—are applied. For the moment, the + regulations requiring conversion of hard currency into non-transferable + coupons are proving cosmetic in that the coupons are effectively + transferable. But it is clear that the Honecker regime now has a wider set of options in + dealing with recalcitrant behavior and in rooting out Western + influences. The penal code provisions are particularly chilling because + the charge of treason can be lodged against individuals who convey + detrimental information about the GDR—even unclassified—to “foreign organizations” (i.e., Western + media).

+

Dissidents and Journalists Targeted

+

(C) Dissidents in the GDR have been + particularly hard hit by the crackdown. The regime has decided to curb + them as well as their de facto publicity + agents—foreign journalists. Although relatively small in number and + without a broad popular following, most of the critics are Marxists who + damn the SED for prostituting Marxist ideals, a fact that evidently has + made the regime nervous. In espousing a more “humanistic socialism” that + can encompass greater pluralism and freedoms, the East German dissidents + come close to the spirit of Eurocommunism and have generated some + backing from that quarter. Probably pushed by such party ideologues as + Hager and Naumann, Honecker may + have come to fear that these arguments might win favor among youth, + technocrats, and others—perhaps serving to instigate a wider political + unrest that would filter down to the mass level.

+

(U) The initial steps to repress dissent generated an unexpected though + shortlived “public debate.” The regime actions against Heym and Havemann triggered a series of + protests from individuals. A group of eight dissident writers sent a + letter to Honecker criticizing + his cultural policies. The government counterattacked via Neues Deutschland by printing letters and + speeches by pro-regime writers and officials that publicized the + existence of the dissent and directly attacked some of the critics for + carrying on a “hate campaign against socialism,” collaborating with the + “enemy mass media,” and being “washed-up types” out of touch with “real + socialism.” This foreshadowed the expulsion of Heym and others from the + Writers Union for “anti-communist agitation.”

+

(C) The expulsions—which reportedly were not unanimously approved by the + Writers Union membership—fueled the GDR’s cultural crisis. Even such pro-regime persons as Writers + Union President Hermann Kant and Academy of Arts President Konrad Wolf + admitted at a June meeting of the GDR + Cultural League that there were serious problems with some aspects of + East German cultural policy. Nevertheless, the dissidents soon fell into + disarray and were generally dispirited by the turn of events. Even such + a stalwart personality as Heym indicated that he had little taste for + more battles with the regime, especially given the implications of the + penal code revisions.

+

(U) Honecker couched his + justification for the cultural actions in highly ideological terms:

+ “Artistic creation in socialism and for socialism is taking place not + at some remote distance from the ideological struggle between the two + big social systems of our era but right in the middle of it. In this + field, as you know, the struggle has exacerbated. This was last but not + least a result of the attempts of the capitalist mass media to interfere + in the internal affairs of our country and to poison the atmosphere. . . + . It is informative in this context, however, that in the FRG precisely those people who are doing + all they can for the preservation of capitalism, eloquently defend every + one who allegedly wishes to improve the real socialism of the GDR.” +

(C) The GDR’s repressive moves + apparently have paid off, at least for the moment. Critical + intellectuals have been silenced, journalists’ contacts have tended to + dry up, and in general, citizens are more cautious about contacts with + Westerners. It will likely be some time before the dissidents reemerge + with the same force they manifested in the spring of 1979.

+

(C) Youth: Another Source + of Concern

+

Perhaps of longer term concern to the regime than the highly publicized + dissidents is its failure to capture the allegiance of the vast majority + of youth. Numerous observers of the East German scene have been struck + in recent years by the erosion of family cohesiveness in the urban + centers and the increasing manifestation of anti-social, apolitical behavior by younger people. + They have been captivated, not by German “socialism,” but by the culture + and lifestyles of their Western peers. Unable to travel to the West and + resigned to an ersatz emulation of Western ways, younger people have + increasingly sought solace in alcohol, drugs, rowdyism, and petty + crimes.

+

While East German youth are basically apolitical, some of them are + intrigued by West German coverage of East German dissidents, and the + more educated are aware of the dissidents’ ideas. It is conceivable that + some could one day be converted to an anti-regime “cause” cloaked in + Marxist revisionism. But, more immediately, East German youth are more + likely to be concerned about Honecker’s new efforts to limit Western influences; they + no doubt worry about the consequences of maintaining their Western + contacts and encounters.

+

The regime fears a recurrence of youth riots—such as broke out + spontaneously at a rock concert at Alexanderplatz on October 7, 1977. + The Alexanderplatz riot manifested anti-police and anti-state attitudes + and demonstrated that frustrations among East German youth can give rise + to violence and conflict. Thus, it is not surprising that the Honecker regime has stepped up its + socialization efforts in the schools, most recently by introducing + military training in high schools.

+

(C) International + Considerations and Ramifications

+

There is no evidence that East Germany’s new hard line was instigated + directly by the USSR. But Moscow no + doubt encouraged and perhaps even guided the sequencing of the SED’s + moves so that the broader dimensions of detente were not seriously + disrupted. The Soviets reportedly have been wary of GDR–FRG + relations creating a momentum that could not be easily controlled. At + the same time, Moscow has been concerned that Honecker’s emulation of West German + consumer standards had led to a corrosive ideological influence. This + could be tolerated when it promoted GDR + stability but became more disturbing when it threatened future unrest by + setting goals that could not be achieved.

+

The Soviets probably blessed the new restrictions on the grounds that + FRG–GDR–USSR detente + relationships were sufficiently institutionalized that Ostpolitik would not be derailed. Thus, the GDR–FRG + relationship would be momentarily cooled, Western penetration would be + cut back, but Soviet Westpolitik would go on.

+

That calculated gamble, thus far, has been correct. There does not appear + to have been a serious rupture in inner-German relations—in fact, FRG–GDR + talks have just resumed—nor have the events jolted the West German + citizenry. Generally, West Germany has tended to interpret the East + German events as a not-so-unusual political “spasm” which everyone hopes + will prove more restrictive in theory than in practice. While the FRG’s CDU/CSUChristian Democratic Union/Christian Social + Union. [Footnote is in the original.] opposition may seek to + turn all this into a political issue in the 1980 campaign, even the + conservatives have made only perfunctory statements of condemnation. The + return to active political life after the summer lull may, however, + spark opposition protests.

+

(C) Prospects

+

The irony of the GDR’s political + situation, on the eve of its 30th anniversary (October 7), is that—more + than most other East European states—it is still a regime with few + options in creating a legitimizing formula. With 400,000 Soviet troops, + the GDR can hardly move far from Soviet + control. Moreover, the political use of German nationalism would raise + the specter of reunification and run against the regime’s efforts to + create a separate socialist national identity. Recurrent, somewhat + halfhearted, attempts to portray the GDR as the repository of all “progressive” aspects of the + German past have yet to win out with the population over the allure of + pan-German nationalism. With “consumerism” on the decline, there is + nothing left to fill the vacuum.

+

For the time being, coercion appears to be an effective compensation for + the social maladies and political liabilities. The Honecker regime, while weakened in + comparison with a few years ago, remains in control; there are no signs + that the Soviet are ready to dispense with Ulbricht’s successor. A + continuing economic deterioration, however, could heighten frustrations + that might lead to sporadic strikes by workers and other demonstrations + by students and disillusioned consumers. Also, it could very well be + that a blowup elsewhere in Eastern Europe might have a “domino” effect + in the GDR, acting as a catalyst to + latent discontent. In such a context, Moscow would be forced to make + some hard choices on whether to retain Honecker and whether to provide new subsidies to a + sagging East German economy. All in all, it will not be a particularly + festive 30th anniversary in the GDR.

+
+ +
+ 134. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security + Affairs (Brzezinski) to + President CarterSource: Carter Library, White House + Central Files, Countries, CO–26, CO 54–1, 1/20/77–1/20/81. No + classification marking. Sent for action. Aaron initialed the memorandum for Brzezinski. The President signed + the letter on April 21, and the package was sent to the Senate on + April 28. + + + Washington, April 18, + 1980 + + + SUBJECT + Consular Convention With the GDR + +

Attached at Tab BAttached but not + printed. is a letter from Cy transmitting the Consular + Convention with the German Democratic Republic, which was signed at + Berlin on September 4, 1979, with the recommendation that you transmit + it to the Senate for ratification.

+

A Letter of Transmittal to the Senate is at Tab A.Attached but not printed. Speechwriters have + cleared the text.

+

The signing of the Convention represents an important step in the + broadening and improving of our relations with the German Democratic + Republic. At present there is no bilateral consular agreement between + the United States and the German Democratic Republic. The convention + establishes firm obligations on such important matters as free + communication between a citizen and his consul, notification of consular + officers of the arrest and detention of their nationals and permission + for visits by consuls to nationals who are under detention.

+

The Convention was worked out in close consultation with other Allied + Powers and the Federal Republic of Germany. It does not affect the + current legal regime in Berlin.

+

In the current difficulties over Afghanistan we have sought to + distinguish between USSR and the + Eastern Europeans and to maintain relations with the latter. This step + will not only conform to that policy it will also be mildly reassuring + to our allies, particularly the FRG, + which is concerned that the crisis over Afghanistan will cast a pall on + relations with the GDR.

+ +

RECOMMENDATION

+

That you sign the Letter of Transmittal at Tab A.The Senate ratified the Consular Convention on July + 2. The Department of State forwarded the instrument of ratification + to the White House for the President’s signature on July 15, under a + covering memorandum from Tarnoff to Brzezinski. The instrument of ratification was + forwarded to the President on August 6 for his signature. (Carter + Library, White House Central Files, Countries, CO–26, CO 54–1, + 1/20/77–1/20/81)

+ +
+ +
+ 135. Telegram From the Embassy in the German Democratic Republic to + the Department of StateSource: National Archives, RG 59, + Central Foreign Policy File, D800521–0800. Confidential; Priority. + Sent for information to Warsaw, Belgrade, Bonn, Bucharest, Budapest, + London, Madrid, Moscow, Munich, Paris, Prague, Sofia, West Berlin, + USNATO, and USCINCEUR. + + + East Berlin, October 31, 1980, 1614Z + +

5267. USCINCEUR for POLAD. Madrid + for USDEL + CSCE. Subj: One Year Later: GDR Popular Mood Darkens. Ref: Berlin + 5229.In telegram 5229 from East Berlin, + October 30, the Embassy reported increasing pessimism in the German + Democratic Republic over events in Poland and increasing concern on + the part of the East German leadership with regard to popular + unrest. The telegram concluded that the East German leadership would + continue to overreact to Polish developments. (National Archives, + RG 59, Central Foreign Policy + File, D800518–0738)

+

1. (C-entire text) Summary: This message helps to flesh out the + description in reftel of the mood of + discouragement and pessimism pervading the GDR population. It shows that there has been a distinct + shift in popular attitudes over the past sixteen months. Parts of the + report were included in abbreviated form in reftel. End summary.

+

2. FSO Wayne Merry recently transited the GDR en route to his new post in Moscow. He revisited many + of his former contacts during the period Oct. 15–28. The Ambassador + asked him to compare popular attitudes then and now. Merry’s report + follows.

+

3. Sampling of views: During a two-week unofficial visit to Berlin and + the GDR, the reporting officer + conducted an intense series of conversations with East German contacts + developed during his 1977–79 tour as a political officer at Embassy + Berlin. These contacts represent fifteen households located in East + Berlin and in five communities in the southern and western GDR. Consisting of pastors, lawyers, academics, + intellectuals, and a few workers, most of these contacts are very + politically aware and are in a position to reflect not only their own + views but also those of their professional clientele and communities. + All of the conversations dwelt both on the East German popular mood in + mid-October and changes in that mood in the year since the reporting + officer’s previous visits. What follows is a distillation of the most + politically significant themes.

+

4. Poland dominated every conversation: The future of Poland was almost + synonymous with a palpable fear that deterioration of East-West + relations could lead to war. Most contacts believed that the Soviet + Union probably would eventually use military force against Poland, that + the GDR Armed Forces would be compelled + to participate, and that the Polish workers and army would resist + fiercely. All felt that such a conflict would at best lead to the total + breakdown of detente in Europe and the freezing of internal reform in + Eastern Europe for a generation, and at most to a general conflagration. + None of the contacts believed that the GDR leadership would have any substantive say in these + events but would simply be led into them by the Soviet Union; none + believed that the GDR or its Armed + Forces would disobey Moscow’s orders. While admiring the courage and + audacity of the Polish workers, most contacts feared that the Polish + workers’ movement lacked sufficient self-control and realism to stop + short of provoking Soviet military intervention. All contacts were + extremely depressed at the prospect of another German invasion of + Poland, even if only in the Soviet wake. However, it was the broader + question of what a Polish war could lead to for Europe and the world + which caused the most pessimism. While there was considerable hope + expressed that sober counsels would prevail in East and West, there was + little optimism that the deteriorating world situation could be + controlled.

+

5. Inner-German deterioration: The deterioration in inner-German + relations was linked by everyone to the Polish situation and to fears in + Moscow and East Berlin of destabilization within the Soviet Bloc. Most + contacts believed that Honecker’s + recent hard-line attitude toward Bonn was the result of direct orders + from the Soviet Union and reflected also a dominance in SED + decision-making by an internal security-minded faction led by Paul + Verner. Most contacts believed that the new GDR foreign currency exchange requirements would + significantly reduce human contacts between the two German states for + the foreseeable future, and that access to West German people, products + and literature would decline sharply. No one felt that Western influence + in the GDR could really threaten the + stability of the regime or that East German workers would follow the + Polish example. Most believed that the hardening of GDR and SED politics reflected, in addition to Soviet directives, + a feeling of insecurity and ineffectiveness within the GDR leadership.

+

6. Poorer GDR economic performance: This + ineffectiveness was most apparent in the economic field where a decline + in the quality and availability of moderate-priced consumer goods was + quite evident after a one-year absence. All contacts believed that this + deterioration was genuine and would be of long duration, reflecting the + basic inefficiency of the East German economy and the poor planning and + economic leadership of the regime. Most assumed that the worsening of + inner-German ties would lead to even poorer economic performance in the + future due to reduced access to Western technology and lower worker + motivation as Western consumer goods become more scarce. In general, + most contacts saw a difficult period ahead for the East German economy + and especially for the average working family.

+

7. GDR domestic political climate: + Internal political policies of the regime appear to have tightened in + the past year but not to the point of affecting people’s day-to-day + lives. None of the reporting officer’s contacts were in any way + reluctant to meet with him openly. The change was more one of a loss of + confidence in the ability of a free-thinking individual to coexist with + the GDR system without encountering + serious problems in the future. The emigration of many prominent + cultural and dissident figures to the West in the past year was + mentioned frequently as a reflection of the increasing inability of the + East German system to accommodate any publicized differences of opinion + on political and social questions. The departure of Guenter Kunert and + Rudolf Bahro were particularly cited as having deprived East German + society of figures of moral and intellectual stature. Partly as a + consequence of this loss of confidence, the reporting officer observed a + sharp increase among his non-church contacts of interest in the + possibility of following these writers to the West.

+

8. Comment: When the reporting officer arrived in East Berlin in mid-1977 + the popular mood was one of cautious but genuine optimism about the + future of East-West relations, broadening of ties with West Germany, and + East German economic, political and cultural prospects. By the time of + his departure in mid-1979 this optimism had considerably eroded but + there still existed a general view that the coming years would be ones + of progress and gradual improvement in these areas, albeit more slowly. + By mid-October 1980 this optimism had collapsed. In its place is a + general negativism about the future of life in the GDR and a genuine dread that Europe may + once again be on the road to war. Even those individuals who believe + that their own lives will not be significantly worse in the years to + come foresee a more difficult life for the average East German and + considerable social problems for the society in the near future. It is + the reporting officer’s impression that this broad pessimism would be even more intense and + more focused on the internal GDR + situation and relations with the West if informed East Germans were not + so preoccupied with what may happen in the next weeks or months across + their Eastern border.

+ + Okun + + +
+
+ + +
+ + Hungary + +
+ 136. Memorandum From the Director of the Office of East European + Affairs, Department of State (Andrews) to the Assistant Secretary of State for + European Affairs (Hartman)Source: National Archives, + RG 59, Bureau of European + Affairs, Office of Eastern Europe and Yugoslavia, Hungarian Holy + Crown—Crown Follow Up and Prior Years 1945–1980, Lot 85D389, Box 1, + Political: US-Hungary, Crown Follow up, 1978. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Schmidt and Gerth. Sent through + Armitage. + + + Washington, March 24, + 1977 + + + SUBJECT + Should We Return the Crown of St. + Stephen? + +

The Issue

+

For years the US has taken the public position that the Crown of St. + Stephen is the property of the Hungarian people and that its return can + only be considered “in the light of substantial improvement in our + relations with Hungary.” At the same time, we have been concerned about + opposition to return of the Crown by Hungarian-Americans. Substantial + improvement has occurred recently in US-Hungarian relations. An + independent initiative to urge return of the Crown is developing within + Congress.On February 15, Congressman + Charles Vanik wrote a letter to Vance stressing Hungarian performance on human + rights and family reunification issues and recommending that MFN for Hungary be considered and that + the Crown of St. Stephen be returned to Budapest. On February 15, + Vanik sent a handwritten note to Carter recommending that “the time + has come to return the Crown of St. Stephen to the Hungarian + people.” (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, + Europe, USSR, and East/West, + Hunter Subject File, Box + 14, Hungary: Crown of St. Stephen: 4–6/77). Carter responded on + February 24, informing Vanik that the administration will carry out + an assessment of the issue. (Ibid.) We, therefore, need to + address the issue now.

+

Our Conclusions

+

We believe that the time has come to return the Crown to Hungary. The + arguments weigh heavily in favor of doing so now. There will inevitably + be some opposition expressed here to an announcement that we are + returning the Crown, no matter how skillfully it is done. But we believe + such opposition is neither deep-seated nor widespread, even among + Hungarian-Americans, and that any dust will settle quickly. The factors + supporting return of the Crown now—as outlined below—are such that it will be difficult for + opponents to justify that we should continue to retain another country’s + symbol of nationhood.

+

A. An early return of the Crown will enhance our + position and our influence in Hungary. Aside from MFN, this issue, which has been pending + for over 30 years, is the only major unresolved bilateral problem we + have with Hungary. Return will strengthen our hand with the Hungarian + Government and undoubtedly will generate substantial good will from a + nation and people which continues to harbor considerable friendship for + the United States.

+

B. Return will buttress the framework of expanded + bilateral relations we have developed with Hungary during the past + five years, thereby increasing Hungary’s stake in maintaining this + relationship and detente as a whole. Return of the Crown, which + really is a relic of the Cold War, would be fully consistent with our + efforts to broaden and continue detente. This step would be especially + timely during a period in which overall East-West relations are buffeted + by the winds of the human rights debate. Furthermore, we believe that + achievement of this Hungarian objective would provide an important + additional inducement for them to defend with the Soviets their improved + relations with us.

+

C. Return to the Hungarian people of this paramount + symbol of the Hungarian nation and its independence will concretely + support our long-range goal of encouraging greater autonomy in + Eastern Europe. Already a leader within the Warsaw Pact in + developing its own distinct national paths in economic management and in + its consumer-oriented “goulash Communism”, we believe evolution toward + increased Hungarian national identity would be supported by the Crown’s + return.

+

D. Bilateral relations have improved substantially, + thus meeting our stated condition for reviewing the issue of + return. US-Hungarian relations have improved markedly since + Cardinal Mindszenty left Embassy Budapest in late 1971. We have + concluded consular and claims agreements; a cultural/scientific + exchanges agreement is just about ready for signing.On April 6, during his visit to Budapest, Hartman signed the “Agreement on + Cooperation in Culture, Education, Science and Technology” with + Rudolf Ronai, President of the Institute of Cultural Relations. The + purpose of the agreement was the “promotion of cooperation between + institutions of higher learning of the two countries, the exchange + of scholars and artists, and the translation, publication, and + presentation of artistic works of each country in the other,” as + well as cooperation in scientific programs and projects. (Department + of State Bulletin, April 25, 1977, p. + 426) With an eye on the Crown as well as on the Johnson + Act,The Johnson Act of 1934 prohibited + the sale in the United States of bonds and securities of and by any + nation in default. Hungary has taken special pains to do + everything it can to clear away all outstanding + financial issues, including payment last December of its sole remaining + debt arrearage to the USG.

+ +

Hungary’s attitude toward family reunification is the most liberal in the + Warsaw Pact. It has also been the Eastern front-runner in the CSCE implementation. Hungary’s media + treatment of the United States, even during the present period of + Eastern reaction to human rights criticism, is by and large restrained + and lacking in the stridency exhibited by other Communist nations. + Vietnam and the Hungarian role in the ICCS are now behind us. The + outstanding problem of MFN will not be + resolved without legislative action on our side or Hungarian abandonment + of an important Soviet policy position. Thus, aside from MFN, our continued possession of the Crown + and other coronation regalia is the only major problem separating us + from achieving “normalized” relations with this Communist state.

+

It is evident therefore that, unless we expect a basic + change in Hungary’s foreign policy alliance with the Soviet Union, + Hungary has done virtually all that can be expected to bring about + that substantial improvement in US-Hungarian relations which we have + related to return of the Crown. Our policy and position over + the past four years has, in effect, encouraged positive action on the + part of the Hungarians and created a feeling of anticipation within the + Hungarian Government that we will now follow through and return the + Crown. Although they appeal to each important U.S. visitor to Budapest, the Hungarians have consciously avoided making the Crown a + public issue. However, if no action is taken by us within the next + twelve months on this question (frequently likened to another country + holding on to the Liberty Bell), an adverse reaction within the + Hungarian leadership is certain to grow.

+

Hungary and Human Rights

+

With current attention focused on human rights, Hungary presents a + substantial contrast to most of its allies. The Communist regime there, + as elsewhere, is a far cry from being democratic, but internally and + externally, Kadar now runs the least restrictive regime of any in + Eastern Europe. He has been more successful than any other Warsaw Pact + leader in satisfying the social needs of his people and in tolerating + pluralism. The confidence Kadar has gained among Hungarians was + demonstrated by his ability to increase meat prices without conflict + last summer immediately after the Polish riots.

+

Hungary’s sole known contribution to this winter’s dissident movement was + by a small group of intellectuals who sent a letter of solidarity to the + Charter 77 group. The Hungarian Government pointedly took no action + against the signatories. (The report at Tab ANot attached. provides revealing evidence + that the Hungarian regime is prepared to continue this tolerant line and even to stand up against + the Soviets in its defense.) This pragmatic attitude is shown + repeatedly, such as in Hungary’s relatively liberal travel and + emigration policy, its cessation of jamming of RFE and other Western broadcasts, and its general openness + to Western information (including recent telecasting of several + unprecedented East-West debates). Hungary’s leaders have also achieved a + modus vivendi with the Catholic Church and + the Vatican which probably goes as far as anywhere else in Eastern + Europe.

+

If, as a complement to our policy of speaking out on gross violations of + human rights, it is useful to respond to positive trends, then return of + the Crown to Hungary at this time could be justified further on those + grounds.

+

Opponents and Supporters

+

While we have long assumed that some vocal Hungarian-Americans would + object to return of the Crown, we have been inhibited in our efforts to + assess their views more precisely lest we stir up opposition before we + were ready to move.

+

The Freedom Fighters Federation remains the major organization opposing + return. The public position of such organizations usually is that the + Crown should not be returned until Soviet troops leave and free + elections are conducted. Privately, their bottom line seems to be: Don’t + return the Crown as long as Kadar, “the betrayer of the 1956 + Revolution”, is no longer in control. However, it is extremely + difficult, if not impossible to get a clear reading of the + Hungarian-American attitude, particularly since we are not really able + to judge the degree to which the organization’s leaders reflect the + views of their constituents. In Congress, supporters and sponsors of + periodic resolutions opposing return consist primarily of signers of + perennial “Captive Nations” resolutions such as Derwinski (R, Ill.), + Crane (R, Ill.), Frank Horton (R, N.Y.), Rousselot (R, Cal.) and + Dole.

+

We are certain the Crown would not be an issue as far as the overwhelming + majority of the American public is concerned. If presented in the right + terms, we believe they would support return as a moral act of returning + an object which does not belong to us. (See, for example, the persuasive + Washington Post editorial at Tab B.)Not attached. Reference is to “A Cold War + Relic,” The Washington Post, May 14, 1974, p. + A22 As for the Hungarian-Americans, in recent years, no doubt + partly stemming from the evolution of more liberal Hungarian policies, + we have begun to see that this ethnic community is by no means united in + opposition to the Crown’s return. Several influential figures, including + Ferenc Nagy, the last Prime Minister of non-Communist Hungary, and + Zoltan Gombos, publisher of the + largest American-Hungarian newspaper, have told us they favor return. As + part of this trend, US media reporting last fall of the 20th anniversary + of the Hungarian revolution reflected a general recognition of the + achievements of the Kadar regime and of its relative acceptance by the + Hungarian people.

+

Recently, movement to return the Crown has begun to emerge in Congress, + backed by Vanik (whose Cleveland suburban district includes many + Hungarian-Americans), Frenzel (R, Minn.), Frank Thompson (D, N.J.) and + Bingham (D–L, N.Y.). At a dinner we attended last month at the Hungarian + Ambassador’s, Vanik, Frenzel and Thompson announced to all present that + they were willing to gather supporters on the Hill for a resolution + urging the President to return the Crown. Following the dinner, Vanik + wrote to the Secretary and Frenzel to the President (letters at Tab + C).Representative Bill Frenzel wrote + Carter on February 22 urging return of the Crown to Hungary “without + strings and without bargaining.” (National Archives, RG 59, Bureau of European Affairs, + Office of Eastern Europe and Yugoslavia, Hungarian Holy Crown—Crown + Follow Up 1979 and Prior Years 1945–1980, Lot 85D389, Box 7, The + Crown of St. Stephen) Jack Armitage talked to Bill Frenzel + this week and learned that Derwinski recently told him he would not have + a real problem with a return; Horton, however, was true to form in + stressing his opposition. Horton asserts that return of the Crown would + be contrary to President Carter’s + position on human rights, a charge, as indicated above, we think could + be rebutted.

+

How it Should be Done

+

So as not to stir up opposition, return of the Crown should be effected + by a clean stroke and with no pre-event publicity, if possible, though + we will want to consult with a few key members of Congress. You will + find Clayton Mudd’s letter (attached at Tab DNot attached.) worth reading with regard to + modalities.

+

Following receipt of a green light from the White House, we would have to + proceed quietly and on a very closely-held basis to begin the + preparatory process which ultimately would lead to the Crown’s return. + For example, we will need to develop a logistical plan, which involves + numerous complex questions (e.g., how to move these fragile and + priceless objects, and how to pay for the move). Also, under any + circumstances, EE officers should soon + inspect the condition of the Crown and regalia and their containers, a + precaution which has regularly and discreetly been taken as part of our + custodial obligations, but which we have not done since December + 1973.

+ +

Recommendation

+

In the light of the enhancement of US interests which would ensue, of the + substantial recent progress achieved in US-Hungarian relations, and of + the consequent growing expectation of the Hungarian Government, we + believe the time is ripe to begin our action on the Crown.

+

We should begin to move soon. As Ambassador McAuliffe aptly observed in his 1975 recommendation + concerning return, the Crown is a “wasting asset”—the longer we hold it, + the less benefit we will gain when we finally do relinquish it.In telegram 3098 from Budapest, September 24, + 1975, the Embassy described the Hungarian Crown and regalia as “the + touchstone of relations” between the United States and Hungary and + recommended “the Department to conduct a thorough and basic study of + U.S. policy with respect to the + continued retention of the Crown.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + D750331–0134)

+

I recommend, therefore, that, in the context of the PRM–9See + Document 7. review, we seek White + House authorization to study the modalities of return of the Crown. We + would be pleased to discuss this question further with you, either + before or after your visit to Budapest.Hartman indicated + neither approval nor disapproval.

+ +
+ +
+ 137. Memorandum From Robert + Hunter of the National Security Council Staff to the + President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)Source: Carter Library, National + Security Affairs, Staff Material, Europe, USSR, and East/West, Hunter Subject File, Box 14, Crown of St. Stephen, + 2/76–3/77. Confidential. + + + Washington, March 28, + 1977 + + + SUBJECT + Crown of St. Stephen + +

The current flap derives from an article in yesterday’s Times on an interview with Rep. Vanik, presumably from the Plain + Dealer a day or so before. He had indicated that the + Administration was studying the question of returning the crown.On March 27, The New York + Times reported that Vanik had suggested in an interview on + March 25 that he “believed he and his colleagues could assemble a + majority in both the House and the Senate to approve both” MFN and the return of the Crown to + Hungary. (“U.S. is Urged to Return + Hungary’s Ancient Crown,” The New York Times, + March 27, 1977, p. 10)

+

Vanik recently wrote to Vance on + this question and on MFN.See footnote 2, Document + 136. + Vance replied that the issue of + the crown would be addressed in the context of overall improvements on + US-Hungarian relations. This has been the line for some time, including + press guidance at State today on Sunday’s article.

+

FYI: The desk/office have proposed to + Hartman (last week) that the + issue be looked at again, with a view to seeing whether it would be + possible to return the crown. State understands the domestic political + aspects, and promises that nothing will go forward—or be said—without + White House clearance. Hartman + will be stopping in Budapest on the way back from Moscow. State was + trying to reach Vanik, today, to ask that he do nothing further until + Hartman returns.

+

It is important not to indicate to Vanik that a + review may be in prospect.

+

Vanik also made sympathetic noises at the Hungarian Embassy a few weeks + ago. Rep. Frenzel was also there and + has written the President. State got only courtesy copies, not request + for reply.

+

On a related point, Vanik is also concerned about MFN for Hungary. The position is that + Hungary has been good on family reunification. But a restrictive law + remains, which prevents the President from certifying that Hungary can + be given MFN under Jackson-Vanik. + Hungary will not accept a waiver as “internal interference.” The + Vance + letter to Vanik indicated these + problems and said we were looking at ways to deal with the + situation.

+

Lowenstein says the problem is one of finding out Hungarian-American + opinion on the crown without stirring up a fuss. You + might ask Vanik’s advice on this point.Brzezinski + met with Vanik on March 28. According to a March 28 memorandum from + Jerry Schecter to + Brzezinski summarizing + the discussion, Brzezinski + told Vanik that Hartman was + to visit Hungary the following week and that Vanik “should do + nothing more than say ‘I have presented my views on the subject and + the matter will be looked into” if pressed on the Crown. Brzezinski also advised Vanik that + the Department of State was looking into MFN for Hungary given Hungarian refusal to accept a + waiver for compliance with the Jackson-Vanik Amendment. (Carter + Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Europe, Soviet + Union, and East/West, Hunter + Subject File, Box 14, Crown of St. Stephen, 2/76–3/77)

+ +
+ +
+ 138. Telegram From the Embassy in Hungary to the Department of + StateSource: National + Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign + Policy File, D770126–0793. Confidential; Priority. + + + Budapest, April 12, 1977, 1319Z + +

1164. For EUR only. Subject: Secretary + Hartman’s Visit to Budapest. + Ref: State 081127.In telegram 81127 to + Budapest, April 11, the Department instructed Hartman to excerpt and transmit to + the Department the sections of his discussions with Nagy dealing + with the Crown of St. Stephen and MFN status. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + D770125–1097)

+

1. Following are Crown and MFN portions + of Hartman-Nagy discussions as + excerpted from airgram forwarded to Department (reftel).

+

2. The Crown

+

A) Nagy said U.S.-Hungarian relations + were now almost normal. Both sides are willing to discuss any matter + arising concerning the two countries. The general atmosphere is good. + Many questions have been settled between the two countries. We have + indeed come a long way. He noted the exchange of high-ranking officials + between the two countries and stressed that Hungary wishes to continue + to normalize relations.

+ +

B) Nagy gave a tactful history of Hungarian patience with respect to the + Crown. He said that during the past year the Hungarian Government, from + some things that had been said and how they had been said, looked at + U.S. remarks as something akin to a + promise to soon return the Crown. To raise a warning signal would be + foolish, even nonsensical, but still, Nagy said, time is running out. He + hoped resolution of this problem would not take too long because, given + the present state of U.S.-Hungarian + relations, people in high places might not understand and might lose + their patience.

+

C) Secretary Hartman agreed with + Nagy’s positive assessment of American-Hungarian relations. He said the + new administration had not yet addressed such problems as the Crown but + this is understandable in view of the many pressing international and + domestic problems it has had to cope with at the outset. With respect to + the Crown, Hartman said the + generally improving relations between Hungary and the U.S. should be helpful. He added that the + U.S. is aware of the importance that + Hungary attaches to this issue.

+

3. MFN

+

A) Even more than the question of MFN, + Hungary, according to Nagy, is worred about the long-term reliability of + the U.S. as a trading partner. Trade + union pressures and congressional action continually threaten existing + trade arrangements, so much so that Hungarian exporters are afraid that, + once they enter into a business relationship with the U.S., the rules of the game will change. + This is too risky for the constructive development of trade relations. + Then, of course, there is the time limitation on any commercial + agreement between the U.S. and + Hungary.

+

B) With respect to trade, Secretary Hartman said it would be worthwhile to talk to one + another about current problems to see whether there are means to deal + with them. He called attention to the free trade philosophy of the new + administration and referred briefly to the President’s recent decision + on the importation of shoes which should permit the continued + development of Hungarian shoe exports to the U.S. Nagy asked Secretary Hartman what he meant by his proposal that Hungary and + the U.S. discuss economic matters. There + is a Hungarian proposal on the table, he said. The U.S. should withdraw its exception under + Article 35 of the GATT. What does the U.S. wish to do now? Nagy contended further that U.S. law does not forbid withdrawing the + GATT reservations. Hartman said + that the whole question of MFN and GATT + would have to be looked into on his return to Washington.

+ + Mudd + +
+ +
+ 139. Telegram From the Embassy in Hungary to the Department of + StateSource: National + Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign + Policy File, D770142–1140. Confidential; Priority. + + + Budapest, April 22, 1977, 1056Z + +

1303. Subject: Annual Policy Assessment—Part I.Parts II and III of the Annual Policy Assessment + were transmitted in telegram 1361 from Budapest, April 27. (National + Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign + Policy File, D770147–0255) Ref: (A) State 038338, (B) State + 038356, (C) State 041169.In telegram 38338 + to all diplomatic posts, February 19, the Department forwarded the + Policy Planning Staff’s FY 1979 + Broad Trends forecast as general guidance to posts for preparing the + Mission’s policy and resource assessment reports. (National + Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign + Policy File, D770060–0457) Telegram 38356 to all diplomatic posts, + February 19, provided further guidance for annual policy and + resource assessments. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770060–0449) In + telegram 41169 to all European posts, February 24, Hartman further clarified the + Bureau’s expectations with regard to the policy and resource + assessment report. With regard to Eastern Europe, Hartman requested that posts give + their views “on the overall approach the US should adopt in its + relations” and whether there should be any differentiations between + the countries and if so what those differentiations should be based + on. (National Archives, RG 59, + Central Foreign Policy File, D770063–1159)

+

1. U.S. interests in Hungary: Hungary is + a small state with limited resources. Our direct bilateral economic, + commercial, and consular interests here are modest. However, I believe + Hungary is important to U.S. in context + of U.S. relations with countries of + Warsaw Pact. Interplay of internal developments between and among + European Communist states is obviously important factor in long-term + evolution of Communist world and its relationship with U.S. Hungary’s different economic system + (NEM), political tactics it uses to + secure acceptance of its policies, and its moderate approach to CSCE issues are factors contributing to + improvement of lot of Hungarian people; they also have an impact on + other Communist countries as well. We have an interest in seeing Hungary + developing into a more independent entity, more responsive than ever to + well-being and legitimate self-interest of its people. Hungary is + located strategically in center of buffer states bordering USSR. Soviet forces stationed here, + although presently outside scope of MBFR negotiations, are strategically related to military + balance in Central Europe. Along with Hungarian forces they pose + counter-weight to Western forces in Italy and, under certain + circumstances, a potential threat to Yugoslavia and Romania. Hungary has + taken an advanced position within the Warsaw Pact on CSCE and human rights and has been + [garble—working?] actively to improve relations with U.S. Because of former it has been subject + to criticism from its allies. As S/P forecast stresses (paras 6 and + 9, reftel A), it is in U.S. interest to encourage continuation of + these policies. Few would argue against view that it is in U.S. interests to nurture Hungarian + awareness of and pride in its Western cultural heritage and to expand + cooperation with West so that humanism, liberal ideas, and pluralistic + ideals continue to permeate Hungarian society to detriment of Moscow + influence. I believe that, to extent that Hungary develops profitable + relations with U.S., its unquestioning + responsiveness as a Soviet ally will be proportionately reduced. I + estimate that, barring a sharp turndown in U.S.-Soviet relations, Hungary will continue to pursue + relatively liberal policies over next few years as it has since + 1975.

+

2. Overview: Over past two years Hungary has shown a noticeable interest + in improving relations with U.S. + Bilateral relations have progressed at a steady rate, reflecting pace + and level that Hungary is prepared to accept in its special relationship + with USSR. Improvement in our + relations has been marked by signing of a cultural/scientific agreement, + expansion of USIA activities, settlement of all outstanding financial + obligations to U.S. (including payment + by GOH of World War I flour debt and + agreement on settling blocked forints account problem), a series of + high-level visits by leaders of two countries, progress on a number of + divided family cases, a constructive bilateral approach on CSCE, an agreement on reciprocal visa + facilitation for diplomats and officials, removal of all internal travel + restrictions on official Americans, and improving Embassy contacts with + Hungarian counterparts. GOH + strengthened its position in past year by improving somewhat its balance + of trade, adroitly carrying off price rises on meat and other consumer + items, and by tactfully ignoring letter of support sent by 34 Hungarians + to Charter 77 signers. Dropping hard-liner and pro-Soviet Arpad Pullai + from HSWP Secretariat during year also + strengthened Kadar’s hand and was large step towards ensuring that his + successor is likely to be someone of Kadar’s stripe. Despite this + significant forward movement U.S.-Hungarian relations in the future will be conditioned by + the following factors, most of them outside realm of bilateral + relations.

+

(A) U.S.-Soviet relations: U.S. relations with Hungary are dependent + on the state of relations between Moscow and Washington. If, for + whatever reason (e.g. demise of Brezhnev, return to Cold War, etc.), U.S. relations with Soviet Union + degenerate, U.S. relations with Hungary + would also suffer, as testified to by current minor dampening during + human rights debate and in aftermath of Secretary’s visit to + Moscow.Vance traveled to Moscow March 27–30, and presented + the Soviet leadership with a U.S. + proposal for arms reduction. See Foreign Relations, 1977–1980, vol. + VI, Soviet Union, Documents 16–23.

+ +

(B) Human rights issue: Hungary has no dissident problem even remotely + similar to that afflicting other EE + countries. This derives as much from general support by intellectuals of + Kadar’s policies as it does from Hungarian penchant for distinguishing + themselves wherever possible from their WP allies. Kadar’s decision not to take action against a + group of 34 intellectuals who signed a petition in support of Charter + 77, however, seems to have caused some strain with his allies. At recent + Sofia Conference of CP Secretaries + Hungary was apparently criticized by several parties for its tolerant + attitude towards dissent. Hungarians are wary of human rights issue. + They fear that U.S. may push issue with + USSR to point of hardening Soviet + relations with U.S.In telegram 926 from Budapest, March 22, the + Embassy reported that Hungarian officials were “increasingly + concerned about future of detente in light of heavy stress laid by + the President, Secretary Vance, and others on human rights issue” and that, + in the Hungarian assessment, Soviet reaction to the administration + human rights policy may spark a turndown in relations with West. + (National Archives, RG 59, Central + Foreign Policy File, D770098–0075) In telegram 989 from Budapest, + March 25, the Embassy reported: “the emergence of a party line, + without doubt emanating from Moscow, on Soviet views about future of + detente and East-West relations.” Its Hungarian contacts, the + Embassy concluded, paint a picture of a “grim, remarkably insecure, + almost paranoid Soviet Party leadership, worried to death about what + it perceives as a genuine threat or challenge to its power, and + incredible as it may seem, believing that the U.S. stand on human rights is + deliberate strategy designed to overthrow the Soviet regime.” + (National Archives, RG 59, Central + Foreign Policy File, D770103–0150) Reaction in Hungary to + such an eventuality would be to detriment of Hungary’s relations with + U.S. which Budapest has so + assiduously cultivated for past two years.

+

(C) Implications of developments elsewhere in Eastern Europe: A Soviet + decision to use force in post-Tito period to restore Moscow hegemony over Yugoslavia + could not fail to have an impact in Hungary harmful to U.S.-Hungarian relations. This would be + true particularly if, as in Czechoslovakia in 1968, Hungarian troops in + token or in other form were asked to participate in the pacification of + Yugoslavia. Even if only Soviet troops now stationed in Hungary were + used in such an adventure in Yugoslavia, the atmosphere in Europe would + be so poisoned that a turndown in U.S.-Hungarian relations would be inevitable.

+

U.S.-Hungarian relations might also be + affected by developments in other Eastern European countries. Hungarians + have been seriously worried over past months re course of events, + particularly in Poland and, to lesser extent, in Czechoslovakia. + Hungarian leadership is keenly aware that food riots or other widespread + disorders in Poland, given Hungary’s Polish connection (1848 and 1956), + could stimulate similar disorders in Hungary if economic situation were + to deteriorate. Current plans for consumer income growth are relatively + modest and reasonable, but + highly dependent on factors outside GOH + control. Deteriorating economic conditions might force Hungary to trim + radically its relatively liberal internal policies. Similar concern re + dissidence in Czechoslovakia is prevalent, but I doubt to same degree as + concern re Polish situation.

+

(D) Challenge to Soviet position in EE: + It has long been recognized as an integral part of USG + EE policy that in context of gradually + increasing independence of these states, U.S. policy must be particularly circumspect in order that + Moscow’s leadership does not become so alarmed as to lead to a + destabilization as happened in 1956. Thus, U.S. policy must be cautious and conditioned by Budapest’s + own estimate of the outer limits of Soviet tolerance of its + activities.

+

3. Issues, objectives and courses of action: As S/P suggests in its trends paper, I assume that there will + be substantial forward momentum in U.S. + relations with Soviet Union. If there is, we should be able to take + advantage of developing opportunities to resolve our three main + problems, all of which require Department decision: (a) Crown, (b) + USG property, and (c) MFN. Progress on these issues would have + favorable impact on general course of U.S.-Hungarian relations.

+

(A) Crown: For over a year now, Hungarians have made known their growing + expectation that Crown would soon be returned, tempering their + approaches with tacit understanding that 1976 was an election year. I + believe that USG should make a decision + now to return the Crown to Hungary and that we should convey this + decision to Hungarians in carefully conditioned language which would + leave us an escape route in event of breakdown in East-West detente or + some other unexpected but equally untoward event. Retention of Crown is + now more of an obstacle than an asset in U.S.–GOH relations and + threatens to retard their further development.

+

(B) Property: Although GOH has indicated + a willingness to undertake serious discussions to resolve property + problem,The U.S. Government owned several buildings in Budapest in + excess of its needs and sought to sell them to the Hungarian + Government while building modern office space for its staff. + Washington also requested payment for property expropriated by the + Hungarian Government. + USG has not been able to move forward + with negotiation proposals because FBO failed to respond favorably to + repeated Embassy requests for an assessment of property’s value. I + believe it is essential to develop a coordinated USG position, one clearly designed to + produce concrete results and based on a professional estimate of + property values and many options open to us for settling our present and + future needs. I am convinced that a favorable approach on Crown, as + suggested above, would provide + a climate of sufficient good will to bring about a resolution of this + problem during period when modalities for return of Crown are being + discussed. But we must move now on getting an FBO property assessment to + take advantage of present climate.

+

(C) MFN: Ambiguity exists as to whether + GOH can meet our requirement for + assurances about liberal emigration policies. In very near future we + should establish USG’s position + concerning what it wants from GOH. We + should then move at a deliberate pace to ferret out GOH intentions and capabilities. Depending + on how situation develops, we may not wish to attempt to resolve this + question until issues of Crown and U.S.-owned property in Budapest have been resolved or are well + on way to resolution.

+

4. I strongly believe that bilateral relations with each Communist + country should be left to find their own level. Attempts to establish + priorities between countries can only have a stultifying effect on our + relations in Eastern Europe. Decision should be made on basis of facts + obtaining in each country, with Department interjecting during decision + process any overriding factors which may in particular instance cause + regional considerations to prevail over bilateral ones. Such a policy + should allow USG to achieve greatest + progress traffic will bear in each country. Moreover, dropping pecking + order would not require U.S. to + legitimize repressive regimes, since we would decide in “bilateral” + context not to carry out any measures which in fact have that effect. It + is bad enough already that consideration of Soviet attitudes already + restricts our decision-making re Eastern European countries. We should + not add to our troubles.

+

5. Courses of action:

+

(A) Political:

+

(1) Return Crown in manner likely to facilitate resolution of family + reunification and property questions but without direct linkage.

+

(2) Encourage high-level exchanges between U.S. and Hungarian officials to include Foreign Minister + Puja and Secretary.

+

(3) Monitor Hungarian CSCE + implementation.

+

(4) Further expand contacts between Embassy and Hungarian organizations, + including HSWP.

+

(B) Military:

+

(1) Attempt to induce Hungarian acceptance of invitations to field grade + officers to visit army units in U.S. + and, in reciprocal fashion, U.S. + officers to visit Hungarian units.

+

(2) Solicit earlier advance notice and greater detail in notification of + military maneuvers in Hungary. Seek to have Hungarian representatives + attend Western maneuvers to which they are invited and to have GOH invite U.S. observers to Hungarian maneuvers.

+ +

(C) Economic:

+

(1) Establish a U.S. position on what we + require from GOH in way of MFN assurances on emigration policy.

+

(2) Continue to encourage exchange of senior economic policy officials, + including Havasi and Biro, between U.S. + and GOH.

+

(3) Promote exchange of views between American economists and officials + and their Hungarian counterparts.

+

(4) Encourage expansion of American-Hungarian trade, business contacts, + and joint ventures, with special attention to agriculture and livestock + development.

+

(5) Undertake additional market-oriented reporting.

+

(6) Annual participation in one of Budapest trade fairs.

+

(7) Conclude double taxation agreement.

+

(8) Attempt to facilitate activities of U.S. businessmen in Hungary by seeking GOH cooperation in providing trade + directories of potential contacts, getting GOH to agree to expand number of direct contacts with + Hungarian firms, and by obtaining multiple entry visas for + businessmen.

+

(D) Informational, cultural, and scientific:

+

(1) Continue building exchanges and cultural and scientific program in + accordance with recently concluded Cultural/Scientific Agreement and + program document.

+

(2) Continue to explain U.S. foreign + policy to media leaders through regular briefings and distribution of + background materials and policy statements.

+

(3) Expand program of distribution of information materials in political, + cultural, academic, and economic fields.

+

(E) Consular:

+

(1) Continue present effort to resolve divided family cases by quiet + diplomacy.

+

(2) Seek Hungarian agreement that multiple entry visas of one-year + duration be issued to official personnel of each government whose duties + require them to travel frequently on TDY to host countries.

+

(3) Where feasible, develop other proposals to facilitate visa issuance + and eliminate or reduce visa fees.

+

(4) Where necessary, obtain GOH + cooperation in protection and welfare services to American citizens.

+

(F) Administrative:

+

(1) Obtain FBO team immediately to advise on value and disposal of U.S. Government excess properties in + Budapest.

+

(2) Begin negotiations, by early September at latest, for indemnification + of UST for nationalized properties, resolution of squatter problem, and sale or other disposition + of excess property in Budapest, obtaining in compensation buildings for + Embassy needs.

+

(3) Make vigorous and persistent representations to GOH in order to obtain more responsive + treatment from diplomatic service directorate to Embassy’s + administrative needs, especially acquisition of rental of living + quarters for Embassy staff.

+ + Mudd + +
+ +
+ 140. Memorandum From William + Hyland and Robert + Hunter of the National Security Council Staff to the + President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)Source: Carter Library, National + Security Affairs, Brzezinski + Material, Country File, Box 27, Hungary: 1–12/77. Confidential. Sent + for action. Brzezinski wrote + “see comments on p 2. ZB” in the + margin with an arrow pointing to the subject line and returned the + memorandum to Hyland and + Hunter + + + Washington, April 29, + 1977 + + + SUBJECT + The Crown of St. Stephen + +

We met ThursdayApril 28. for an hour + with Representative Mary Rose Oakar and about six Hungarian leaders on + the Crown of St. Stephen.

+

They are deeply concerned about the Vanik story on a possible return. The + Congresswoman assumed that this had been inspired by the + Administration.

+

They indicated all the reasons for not giving it back; for not giving it + to the Vatican; and for only giving it back when Hungary is “free” (for + some this meant the withdrawal of Soviet troops; for others, also + holding free elections).

+

We indicated that we knew of no U.S. + intention to give back the Crown. This was not being considered at a + high policy level; there has been no study. But we could not say that it + would never be given back, though of course it + would be appropriate, if consideration were given to doing so, to + consult with Congress beforehand. This would be consultation with all elements of Congress, including + Representative Vanik and others of his persuasion.

+ +

They asked for four things:

+

1. A history of how the Crown was acquired (Bob Murphy was the + intermediary)—which they believe could help them for juridical reasons, + if it was not war booty. We said we would try, but that in any event a + promise made like that 30 years ago was not really relevant.

+

2. To see the text of the cultural agreement with Hungary. We said we + would send it.

+

3. To have a simple statement from the Administration that it is not our + intention to give back the Crown. We said that we could not pledge that, + and would have to refer it.

+

4. Representative Oakar also wants Administration backing for her bill + requiring the approval of Congress before the Crown could be given + back.On April 26, Oakar introduced H.R. + 6634, a bill “to require that the Hungarian Crown of Saint Stephen + and other relics of the Hungarian royalty remain in the custody of + the United States Government and that they not be transported out of + the United States, unless the Congress provides otherwise by + legislation.” The bill was discussed in subcommittee, but was never + submitted to a vote on the House floor. We temporized, but + she may come back again.

+

We therefore refer the issue back to you for guidance. Do you want to put + out such a statement? Would you be willing to have the Administration + support her bill?Brzezinski marked the paragraph + and wrote at the bottom of the page, “No—there’s no point in + blanket, timeless negative commitments of ‘I’ll never beat my wife’ + variety!”

+

We do not support either course of action: but it will be hard to get out + of the first one.

+

Could we have your further thoughts before proceeding?

+

(Hyland thinks it is senseless to + play around with the Crown: raising the issue of returning it would just + do political harm, and actually doing so would gain us nothing with the + Hungarians.)

+

RECOMMENDATION

+

1. That you approve the memorandum at Tab INot attached. Brzezinski + signed the memorandum to Vance on May 2, requesting that the Office of the + Historian at the Department of State prepare an unclassified + memorandum on the manner by which the Crown of St. Stephen came into + U.S. possession at the end of + World War II. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff + Material, Europe, USSR, and + East/West, Hunter Subject + File, Box 14, Hungary: Crown of St. Stephen: 4–6/77). The Department + forwarded to Brzezinski a + study prepared in the Office of the Historian on May 24. + (Ibid.) asking State for a history of the Crown’s acquisition + and an accounting; and

+

2. That you give us your views on how to proceed.

+
+ +
+ 141. Action Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for + European Affairs (Hartman) to + Secretary of State VanceSource: National Archives, + RG 59, Bureau of European + Affairs, Office of Eastern Europe and Yugoslavia, Hungarian Holy + Crown—Crown Follow Up 1979 and Prior Years 1945–1980, Lot 85D389, + Box 1, Political: US-Hungary, Crown Follow-up, 1978. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Boutin, Gerth, and + Nimetz on May 18; cleared + by Armitage, Hansell, + Katz, and Jenkins. Sent through Nimetz. A handwritten note on the + document indicates that it was forwarded to Vance on May 26. + + + Washington, undated + +

Moving Forward with Hungary: The Crown of + St. Stephen

+

We have been giving considerable thought to the appropriateness of + returning the Crown of St. Stephen to Hungary. Congressman Vanik’s + recent speech suggesting return of the Crown provoked some sharp, + adverse reaction from Congresswoman Oakar, who has a strong ethnic + constituency, and from Congressman Horton. However, Vanik’s position + also has support and we believe that domestic reaction, even in the + Hungarian-American community, will not be entirely negative.

+

The President is generally aware of the problem: he promised Vanik a + reply after the Crown issue was reviewed. We have prepared the + attachedAt this point the word “draft” + is crossed out in pen. On May 18, Nimetz informed Andrews he fully agreed with the recommendations in + the memorandum to the President, but that he rewrote the draft in + order to shorten it. (National Archives, RG 59, Office of the Secretariat Staff, Mr. Matthew Nimetz, Counselor of the + Department of State and Under Secretary for Security Assistance, + Science, and Technology, January 1977 thru December 1980, Lot 81D85, + Box 1, MN Chron—Official—January–June 1977) memorandum to the + President in part as a way to pull our thoughts together on the issue of + policy toward Hungary. However, there seems to be some divergence of + views on the NSC staff regarding the + Crown’s return and we have made no effort yet to sound out Brzezinski.

+

The Hungarians have also been exploring how they might obtain MFN treatment from us. They may be willing + to conform (as Romania did) to Jackson-Vanik requirements. We intend to + move forward cautiously in this area, bearing in mind the possible + impacts on US-Soviet relations and prospects for change in + Jackson-Vanik.

+

Recommendations:

+

That you sign the attached memorandum to the President.Attached but not printed. A significantly revised + version was signed by Vance + on June 3. See Document 142.

+

ALTERNATIVELY, that you agree to meet with a small + group including Warren + Christopher, Matt + Nimetz, myself and several others to discuss this problem and especially how best to + approach the White House, the Congress and interested public groups.

+ +
+ +
+ 142. Memorandum From Secretary of State Vance to President CarterSource: + Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, + Box 27, Hungary: 1–12/77. Secret. Nodis. + + + Washington, June 3, + 1977 + + + SUBJECT + Strengthening Relations with Hungary—The Crown of St. Stephen + Issue + +

The Crown of St. Stephen, the paramount symbol of Hungary’s nationhood + and Western Christian tradition, and other coronation regalia have been + in our safekeeping since they were given to us by the Crown Guard at the + end of World War II. We have publicly acknowledged that they are + property of the Hungarian nation. Our policy that the Crown’s return + will be addressed in light of improvement in bilateral relations has + encouraged Hungary to move ahead with us in anticipation that we will + follow through in good faith. Today only three major issues separate us + from the firm working base of “normalized” relations—the Crown, most + favored nation status and consolidation of USG-owned property in Budapest. So far the Hungarian + leadership has made informal requests for the Crown. If we take no + action during the current year, they may make a formal demand—and the + United States has no legal grounds to refuse.

+

The Communist regime in Hungary is a far cry from being democratic, but + over the past few years, Hungary has developed into the most internally + liberal country in the Warsaw Pact: a tolerant attitude toward + dissidents, good church-state relations and a modus + vivendi with the Vatican, openness to Western information, a + relatively liberal travel and emigration policy, and an innovative, + decentralized economic system. Party Leader Janos Kadar has so far + successfully defended this position against Warsaw Pact hardliners.

+

Domestic Political Aspects

+

Congressional attitude is split on the Crown. Several (e.g., Vanik, + Frenzel, Thompson, Bingham and Fenwick) believe the time has come to return the Crown. Vanik, who + has a substantial Hungarian constituency, has suggested the idea of a + joint resolution favoring return. Opponents of return include Horton and + Oakar, sponsor of a recent bill requiring that the Crown not be returned + without Congressional authorization. We have not yet conducted a survey + of the leadership in Congress, but we believe the domestic political + problem is manageable: that there would be a brief, limited flurry of + protest but no sustained opposition.

+

Some Hungarian-American groups oppose return of the Crown, charging it + would bestow “legitimacy” on the Kadar regime. For most Americans, + return of the Crown would not be an issue, and return would probably be + supported as a moral act. As Congressman Frenzel said, “It’s theirs’ + it’s right to return it to them.”

+

We believe that the presence of the Crown in Budapest would serve as a + continued national inspiration to the Hungarian people and that this + would soon be recognized here, even by opponents of its return. + Furthermore, such steps as consultations with Congress (and a possible + joint resolution supporting return), Congressional participation in the + transfer of the Crown in a public ceremony in Budapest, and a Hungarian + commitment to place the Crown on permanent public display would mitigate + initial adverse reaction.

+

CONCLUSION

+

I strongly support the early return of the Crown to the Hungarian people + because:

+

—U.S.-Hungarian relations have improved + substantially, meeting our stated condition for considering the Crown’s + return.

+

—Morally and legally it is indefensible to continue to withhold from the + Hungarian people their most important symbol of nationhood.

+

—Return of this symbol of Hungary’s independence and Western, Christian + tradition will concretely support our long-range goal of encouraging + greater autonomy, national identity and Western orientation in Eastern + Europe.

+

—Support for return is emerging in Congress and domestic opposition is + limited.

+

—It would be in our interest to return the Crown in a generous gesture by + a new Administration, rather than in the context of Hungarian + demands.

+

—The prospect of the Crown’s return would facilitate a favorable + resolution of the complex property problem in Budapest.

+

—There is no countervailing reason for holding on to it—we cannot expect + the emergence of a non-Communist government in the foreseeable future, + and it would be inappropriate to seek to “trade” the Crown for something + we want.

+ +

If you concur that return of the Crown is appropriate, we will consult + with the leadership in Congress (in the House, O’Neill, Rhodes, Zablocki + and Derwinski, who has already indicated he would offer only token + opposition; in the Senate, Byrd, Cranston, Baker, Sparkman and Case). + Unless we encounter unexpected, strong Congressional opposition, we + would then go ahead immediately with quiet “hypothetical” talks with the + Hungarians about how transfer could occur.

+

Recommendation:

+

That the Crown of St. Stephen be returned to Hungary this year and that + the State Department take the necessary action to effect its transfer + along the lines I have outlined.

+
+ +
+ 143. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security + Affairs (Brzezinski) to + President CarterSource: Carter Library, National + Security Affairs, Brzezinski + Material, Country File, Box 27, Hungary: 1–12/77. Secret. Sent for + action. Carter initialed the memorandum at the top right corner to + indicate that he had seen it. + + + Washington, June 14, + 1977 + + + SUBJECT + Hungary: Crown of St. Stephen + +

At Tab ASee Document + 142. is a memorandum from Secretary Vance, strongly recommending that the + United States return to Hungary the “Crown of St. Stephen”—that nation’s + regalia which has been in our possession since the end of World War II. + He recommends consulting with the Congress, and then talking with + Hungary about the Crown’s return.

+

He lists a number of foreign policy advantages, including:

+

—we have previously tied return of the Crown to improved relations; + relations have improved to some degree;

+

—returning the Crown would encourage Hungarian autonomy and national + identity;

+

—the remaining property issues we have with Hungary could be solved more + easily; and

+

—it is better to take an initiative to return the Crown, before it is + formally asked for by the Hungarian Government.

+ +

Issues

+

—Domestic: Congressional opinion is divided. + However, there would be a strong negative reaction from the most vocal + elements of the Hungarian-American community. This could be partially + dealt with through consultations with Congress and through the method of + return: a public ceremony in Budapest, a commitment from Hungary to + display the regalia publicly, and perhaps even sending it back on August + 20, St. Stephen’s Day.

+

—Foreign Policy: the advantages listed by + Secretary Vance must be seen in + a broader perspective:

+

—returning the Crown would show our “good faith” as we approach the + CSCE meetings;

+

—since there is consideration in both the Administration and Congress + about extending MFN to Hungary, also + returning the Crown would be a strong sign of our interest, that could + be seen as a shift of our overall East European policy;

+

—on the other hand, we still have not decided on a basic strategy for + Eastern Europe. Returning the Crown before that process is completed + foreshadows decisions you may want to consider, concerning trade, + political relationships and policy toward the USSR. (An overall strategy will be considered in the + context of follow-up to PRM–9, due on + June 15.)See Document + 7.

+

RECOMMENDATION

+

That you delayIn a + June 12 memorandum to Brzezinski, Hyland and Hunter described the Vance memorandum as “one sided and lack[ing] + perspective” and recommended that the decision be delayed until the + broader decision on policy toward Eastern Europe is addressed in the + context of PRM–9. Returning the + Crown at this time, they argued, would raise questions about the + administration’s message to East Europeans: Was Hungary being + rewarded for being more liberal or was the United States putting the + “seal of legitimacy on Kadar?” (Carter Library, National Security + Affairs, Brzezinski + Material, Country File, Box 27, Hungary: 1–12/77) a decision + on returning the Crown of St. Stephen until our overall East European + strategy is decided, on an expedited basis:Carter checked his approval of Brzezinski’s recommendation to delay a decision and + defer returning the Crown and wrote in the margin “Don’t heat up + now—J.” Brzezinski informed + Vance of the President’s + decision in a June 15 memorandum. (Ibid.)

+

Delay decision, pending consideration of East European strategy

+

Begin consulting with Congress in order to return the Crown (Secretary + Vance’s recommendation)

+

Do not return the Crown at this time

+
+ +
+ 144. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security + Affairs (Brzezinski) to + President CarterSource: Carter Library, National + Security Affairs, Brzezinski + Material, Country File, Box 27, Hungary: 1–12/77. Secret. Sent for + action. A stamped notation reads: “The President has + seen.” + + + Washington, August 3, + 1977 + + + SUBJECT + Hungary: Crown of St. Stephen + +

Cy Vance’s memorandum (Tab + A)Dated July 28. Attached but not + printed. sets out a scenario for returning the Crown of St. + Stephen to Hungary by September 15, before the + opening of the CSCE Conference about + September 27. Return of the Crown would highlight Hungary’s generally + good human rights record. Cy suggests that the crown be returned by a + distinguished government or public figure, such as the Vice President or + Governor Harriman, accompanied by + members of Congress.

+

Cy also recommends that + Ambassador Kaiser, while + presenting his credentials in early August, inform the Hungarian + President that we will return the Crown, under conditions to which the + Hungarians apparently are prepared to agree.

+

Under this scenario, we would consult with members of Congress but only + after + Kaiser has made the necessary + arrangements with the Hungarian Government.

+

However, I believe the arguments for deferring a + decision on the return of the Crown are still compelling.In a memorandum for Brzezinski dated August 2, + Hyland, Treverton, and Hunter recommended that he oppose + Vance’s proposal. + Arguing that the return of the Crown be “a central element—one of + few major instruments we have—of a strategy + toward Eastern Europe,” they stressed that since domestic opinion is + divided, “there are no kudos to be had for return and some flak to + be taken.” A comprehensive review of Eastern Europe will be held + later in August, they concluded, and a decision should be joined + directly to that review, and “measured directly against a refined + sense of the domestic implications.” (Carter Library, National + Security Affairs, Brzezinski + Material, Country File, Box 27, Hungary: 1–12/77) (Your last + guidance and Ham’s comments on the issue are attached at Tab B.)Jordan’s written recommendation is not attached and was + not found. Inderfurth + transmitted Jordan’s + recommendation with an undated note to the President and informed + Carter that Jordan favored + option 3 and that “from a domestic political point of view, it is + not worth the trouble it would cause at this point in time.” + (Ibid.) Domestically, there is still little to be gained by + return and something to be lost in the reaction from vocal elements of + the Hungarian-American community. The Vatican, as Cy notes, still does not regard this as an + opportune moment to return the Crown.

+

On foreign policy grounds, return of the Crown + would be a major signal to Eastern Europe. Our PRM review of European policy has made clear that our + policy instruments in Eastern Europe are extremely limited. Doing + something for Hungary on CSCE grounds, + and doing so before the Belgrade meeting, may itself be a good idea, but + returning the Crown is also bound to be seen as a much larger signal, + which should be deliberate and well-timed. It might be wise, for + instance, to include the announcement as an item in your UN speech (the third week of September)—and + precede this decision by the needed Congressional consultations. This + should take precedence over Phil Kaiser’s presentation of + credentials.

+

RECOMMENDATION

+

That you defer a decision on returning the Crown until our overall + Eastern European strategy is decided:

+

Delay decision, pending consideration of Eastern European strategy, + perhaps until your UN speechCarter checked his approval of this recommendation + and wrote at the bottom of the page, “Why not ask Hungarian + officials to make a proposal as to how Crown would be received and + displayed if it is returned. Make no + commitment. Keep confidential. J.C.” Brzezinski relayed Carter’s instructions to + Vance in an August 4 + memorandum. (Ibid.)

+

Begin consultations with the Hungarian Government in order to return the + Crown before CSCE (the Secretary’s + recommendation)

+

Do not return the Crown at this time

+
+ +
+ 145. Telegram From the Embassy in Hungary to the Department of + StateSource: National + Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign + Policy File, D770283–0669. Confidential. + + + Budapest, August 5, 1977, 1349Z + +

2644. Subject: Ambassador’s Conversation With President Losonczi.

+

1. President Losonczi began our + private conversation after my formal presentation of credentials, August + 4, by expressing his pleasure over recent improvement in our relations. + He referred specifically to the Scientific and Cultural Exchange + Program, to the settlement of claims and debts, and to progress on + family reunifications.

+

2. He then went on to talk at considerable length about detente, the + Helsinki Accord and the two special Hungarian-American problems—the + Crown and MFN—and I responded briefly + to the points he raised.

+

3. Detente. Losonczi emphasized + that the recent improvement in our bilateral relations had been due in + no small part to the detente in the U.S.–USSR relationship. + Good bilateral relations between us could make a positive contribution + to the atmosphere of detente, but it was essential that there be a + continuation of a meaningful detente policy between the two super + powers. He talked at considerable length on this point, leading up + inevitably to an expression of concern over the present state of + Soviet-American relations with a not-too-subtle blaming of American + actions for that situation. He hoped that there would be a change.

+

4. In reply, I stated that President Carter’s policies were aimed at the establishment of a + detente relationship with the USSR + based on the enlightened self-interest of both sides. It would be unfair + and unrealistic to impugn the motives of the President. There should be + no doubt about President Carter’s + positive and constructive attitudes toward American-Soviet relations. He + had no interest in reviving the Cold War. On the contrary, he wanted a + realistic relaxation of tensions. In order to fully appreciate President + Carter’s position, I urged + President Losonczi to read the + full text of President Carter’s + recent speech in Charleston, South Carolina.Remarks at the 31st Annual Meeting of the Southern Legislative + Conference on July 21. (Public Papers: Carter, + 1977, Book II, pp. 1309–1315) In spite of Moscow’s + polemics, in recent weeks there have been some favorable developments in + U.S.-Soviet relations as evidenced, + for example, by the progress in negotiations for banning nuclear testing + and in the renewal of the 1972 Agreement for Cooperation of Science and + Technology.

+ +

5. Helsinki. After expressing satisfaction that agreement had been + reached on the agenda for the Belgrade meeting, President Losonczi stated that it was essential + to think of the Helsinki Accords as a whole; that it was a mistake to + concentrate interest on only isolated parts of the agreement. Proper + evaluation of its implementation required a broad-gauge approach. I + replied that the U.S. was committed to + the effective implementation of all three Baskets, but that this did not + mean that, depending on circumstances, different signatories to the + accord would not feel compelled to emphasize different aspects of what + was a rather lengthy document. I pointed out that we were pleased with + the performance of the Hungarian Government in implementing the Helsinki + Accord as was evidenced by the comments made in the Executive Branch’s + report to the CSCE Commission. The + continuing dialogue between the top officers of the Hungarian Government + and our Embassy during the past year was productive and contributed to + and reflected the improved relations to which President Losonczi had referred.

+

6. The two issues.

+

A. MFN. In reply to a rather impassioned + plea for the granting of MFN, I + followed the line taken by State 182700.Telegram 182700 to Budapest, August 3. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + D770278–0728) We shared a common desire to increase our + bilateral trade; we recognized Hungarian efforts in this area; and we + were looking forward to the opening of the National Bank’s + representation office in New York, and to the Hungarian Economic Days + planned later this year. When mentioning our satisfaction that we had + begun useful discussions about our trade agreement, I reminded the + President of the important role Congress plays in this area as well as + other areas of international interest. I also referred to the recent + visit of Mr. Nyerges to Washington and the discussions which were now + scheduled to take place in Geneva in September.

+

B. The Crown of St. Stephen. There was a powerful but dignified plea for + its return. The President left no doubt about how strong were the + Hungarian feelings that the time had come for the Crown to come home. In + reply I said that Hungary’s concerns on this were well known and + understood in Washington. That was all I could say at this time.In telegram 182833 to Budapest, August 4, the + Department informed Kaiser + that the President had not taken action on Vance’s July 28 memorandum + suggesting a scenario for returning the Crown, and instructed him to + remain noncommittal on the subject. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + P840070–0723)

+

7. Comment. I was received with what seemed to be genuine warmth. Serious + talk was interspersed with light banter. The President was clearly + pleased over the recent improvement of American-Hungarian relations, and was emphatic about + the contribution the Hungarians had made to that improvement. There was + real concern about the course of Soviet-American relations. The + strongest feelings, however, were reserved for the two bilateral issues + that interest them most at this time. Failure to reach satisfactory + solution of these two issues, but particularly on the Crown, would have + an adverse effect on U.S.-Hungarian + relations, and almost certainly sour the present friendly + atmosphere.

+ + Kaiser + +
+ +
+ 146. Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the Department of + State (Tarnoff) to the + President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)Source: Carter Library, National + Security Affairs, Brzezinski + Material, Country File, Box 27, Hungary: 1–12/77. Secret; Nodis. + + + Washington, September + 22, 1977 + + + SUBJECT + Returning the Crown of St. Stephen + +

Your memorandum of August 4 requested that we ascertain Hungarian wishes + concerning return and display of the Crown, without making any + commitment to return it.See footnote 5, Document 144. Carter’s + decision was transmitted in telegram 194954 to Budapest, August 17. + (National Archives, RG 59, Central + Foreign Policy File, P840070–0724) In response to such a + query, the Hungarian Government informed Ambassador Kaiser last month that: 1) it would be + happy to work out the details of the transfer once our decision had been + made and we had indicated how we intended to return it; and 2) it would + place the Crown on public display in an appropriate edifice in Budapest, + without restriction on foreigners or Hungarians who wish to see it (Tab + 1).Tab 1 is telegram 2916 from + Budapest, August 26, which reported that Nagy assured Kaiser that if the United States + returned the Crown, the Hungarian Government would “receive it with + the dignity and honor appropriate to this unique national and + cultural treasure.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + P850050–2281) We believe this latter statement constitutes + acceptable assurances about the Crown’s “continuing display” as set + forth in Presidential Directive/NSC–21See Document 16. as a precondition for us to indicate + to the Hungarians our willingness to return the Crown.

+ +

Deputy Prime Minister Aczel + reiterated to Dr. Billy Graham that Hungary wants to put the Crown on + public display and added that, if the United States decided to return + the Crown, the Hungarians would receive it in whatever way would fit the + President’s requirements.This conversation + was reported in telegram 3097 from Budapest, September 9. (National + Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign + Policy File, D770327–0356) Telegram 3099 from Budapest, September + 10, judged Graham’s visit to have “exceeded his expectations,” and + to be a “highly valuable event in bilateral relations.” (National + Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign + Policy File, D770328–1231)

+

We believe that we should inform the Hungarian Government before the + Belgrade CSCE Conference gets under + way of our willingness to return the Crown under appropriate + circumstances. Telling the Hungarians that we are taking this important + step both because of improved bilateral relations and Hungary’s positive + attitude toward CSCE implementation + should favorably affect Hungary’s attitude at Belgrade and after. The + President’s decision can be conveyed in one of the following + manners:

+ + —By the President in a bilateral meeting with the Hungarian + Foreign Minister at UNGA; + —By a Presidential oral message to the Hungarian President, + delivered by Ambassador Kaiser; + —By the Secretary to the Hungarian Foreign Minister during their + UNGA bilateral. + +

A Presidential bilateral with the Hungarians would be so unusual as to + provoke undesirable press speculation about the substance of the + meeting—and might lead to disclosure of our plans before an acceptable + scenario of transfer has been arranged. A Presidential oral message + delivered by Ambassador Kaiser + could be used to convey our intention right now. Since there is no + pressing reason to inform the Hungarians immediately, we prefer using + the Secretary’s bilateral with the Hungarian Foreign Minister + (tentatively scheduled for October 1).

+

In New York the Secretary will also note that the Hungarian Government + has already stated its intention to us to place the Crown on public + display in an appropriate place. He will add that Ambassador Kaiser has been asked to work out with + the Foreign Minister an appropriate scenario of transfer that would + permit the Crown’s return by the end of 1977.

+

At that point we would send Ambassador Kaiser guidance, along the lines of the Secretary’s July + 28 memorandum to the President for his scenario talks with the + Hungarians. (Tab 2)Attached but not + printed. See footnote 2, Document + 144. Once we have Hungarian agreement to a suitable + scenario, we would consult with key Congressional leaders and inform the + Vatican.

+ +

In working out the scenario of transfer with the Hungarian Government, it + will be important to indicate to the Hungarians at an early date whom + the President will appoint as head of the US delegation and to suggest + exact dates for the ceremony of return that would be convenient to that + individual. The Secretary’s memorandum to the President of July 28 + suggested that the Vice President or Governor Harriman would be appropriate.

+ + Peter + Tarnoff + +
+
+ 147. Memorandum of ConversationSource: Department of State, Office of the Secretariat + Staff, Cyrus R. Vance, + Secretary of State—1977–1980, Lot 84D241, Box 10, unlabeled folder. + Secret; Nodis. Drafted by + Andrews; approved by + Anderson on October 11. The meeting took place at the UN Plaza Hotel. + + + New York, October 1, 1977, 10:50–11:20 + a.m. + + + SUBJECT + The Secretary’s Conversation with Hungarian Foreign Minister + Puja October 1—The Crown + of St. StephenVance and Puja also discussed SALT, the Middle East, and MFN for Hungary. (Carter Library, + National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Europe, USSR, and East/West, Hunter Subject File, Box 14, + Hungary: Crown of St. Stephen, 7–10/77) + + + PARTICIPANTS + + + US + The Secretary + Matthew Nimetz, + Counselor + Philip Kaiser, American Ambassador to Hungary + George Vest, + Assistant Secretary for European Affairs + Nicholas Andrews, + Director EUR/EE + (notetaker) + + + + + Hungary + Frigyes Puja, + Foreign Minister + Ferenc + Esztergalyos, Hungarian Ambassador to the + US + Imre Hollai, Hungarian Ambassador to the UN + Tibor Keszthely, interpreter + + + +

The Secretary said we believe it is very important to continue to + strengthen the relationship between our two countries. We believe that + matters are moving in a constructive fashion and we would like to see + this process continue. We realize that a very important factor is the + return of the Crown. We + wish to take that step. The question is when and how. We believe we + should try to finalize this at an early date. We will be giving the + necessary instructions to Ambassador Kaiser so that we will be able to move forward.

+

Puja said that in the Hungarian + evaluation of bilateral relations, we have basically solved all except + two issues. The first is the Crown and treasures, and he is happy to + hear that the US has decided to return it. As the Secretary is aware, it + is a very important, sacred relic of the Hungarian nation. That is why + they have placed great emphasis on its return. Undoubtedly, such an act + will greatly influence the feelings of the people of Hungary toward the + United States. The Secretary said we should keep this very tightly and + an announcement should only be made at the appropriate time by mutual + agreement. Puja said this was + taken for granted. Hungary has never made propaganda out of it.

+
+ +
+ 148. Memorandum From Robert + King of the National Security Council Staff to the + President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)Source: Carter Library, National + Security Affairs, Brzezinski + Material, Country File, Box 27, Hungary: 1–12/77. Secret. Sent for + information. Brzezinski + wrote at the bottom of the memorandum, “Give me a history of the + Crown, how it was stored before the war, what annual + honors—religious or political—was it paid, etc?” King replied on October 12, + summarizing two lengthy studies prepared by the Office of the Legal + Adviser, one in 1971 and the other in 1977. (Ibid.) The 1971 study + is in the Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, + Europe, USSR, and East/West, + Hunter Subject File, Box + 14, Hungary: Crown of St. Stephen: 2/76–3/77. The June 15, 1977, + study is in the Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff + Material, Europe, USSR, and + East/West, Hunter Subject + File, Box 14, Hungary: Crown of St. Stephen: 4–6/77. + + + Washington, October + 5, 1977 + + + SUBJECT + State Department Actions on Returning the Crown and Granting + Hungary MFN + +

In consultation with Ambassador Kaiser from Budapest, who is here until this weekend, + State is drafting a lengthy cable of instructions on the procedures for + return of the Crown.See Document 150. It will specify the assurances which + the Hungarians must give on the display of the Crown, our views on the kind of ceremony at which + it should formally be handed over, a draft public announcement, and a + draft joint US-Hungarian statement to be issued when it is returned. At + my suggestion, the date for return and the individual to head the + delegation will be left open, but State will send a memo with its + suggestions. This cable will come to the NSC for clearance.

+

A cable is also being drafted directing Ambassador Kaiser to undertake with Foreign + Minister Puja a discussion of the + assurances that must be received from the Hungarian government in order + to satisfy Jackson-Vanik requirements.See + Document 149. (This cable will + also require NSC clearance.) He will + attempt to get these assurances by the first of November. Meanwhile, + agency assignments for a draft trade agreement with Hungary have been + made and are to be completed by mid-October. Interagency clearances and + consultations are to take place afterward with a view to starting + negotiations with the Hungarians on the trade agreement in December.

+ +
+ +
+ 149. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in + HungarySource: National + Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign + Policy File, D770383–1338. Confidential; Exdis. Drafted by Gerth; cleared by Luers, Schmidt, Nimetz, Johnston, Hormats, Hansell, King, and Stahnke; approved by Christopher. + + + Washington, October 18, 1977, 1600Z + +

249694. For Ambassador from the Deputy Secretary. Subject: Hungary and + MFN.

+

1. As you know, during Foreign Minister Puja’s meeting with the Secretary in New York on October + 1,See Document + 147. + Puja once again expressed the + Hungarian Government’s interest in considering the possibility of MFN for Hungary. In response the Secretary + said that you would be discussing this matter in detail with the Foreign Minister in Budapest.Kaiser + met with Puja on October 27. + In telegram 3749 from Budapest, October 28, he reported that, with + regard to U.S. immigration + requirements, Puja “indicated + his satisfaction that they seemed less demanding than had previously + been the case.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770396–1113) In + telegram 3818 from Budapest, November 2, Kaiser reported that, in his conversation with + Puja that day, the + Hungarian Foreign Minister said he had not yet been able to secure + the agreement of the Hungarian leadership to the proposed U.S. language on assurances prior to + their departure for Moscow, but that he would reply to the U.S. proposal as soon as they return. + (National Archives, RG 59, Central + Foreign Policy File, D770403–0639) As a result, and in part + as a follow-on to the technical trade talks begun in June in Washington + with Hungary’s senior trade negotiator, Janos Nyerges, you are + instructed to seek detailed discussions with key Hungarian authorities + to explain the emigration provisions of the Trade Act of 1974 and to + obtain sufficient additional information about Hungary’s emigration law, + its application of this law, methods of dealing with bilateral + emigration problems, and Hungarian emigration to third countries + including Israel to prepare a comprehensive report that will serve to + answer executive and congressional questions on these topics.

+

2. You should explain to the Hungarian Government that we have noted with + favor the positive humanitarian spirit with which Hungary is addressing + family reunification matters and also that we have carefully considered + the recent statements made by various Hungarian officials (such as + Ambassador Bartha’s statement in May to Charge Mudd)In telegram 1907 from Budapest, June 9, the Embassy + reported on a conversation with Bartha regarding divided family + cases. Bartha assured Mudd that Hungary would resolve all + outstanding family reunification cases because “resolution of these + issues is an integral part of Hungary’s approach to human + relations.” (National Archives, RG + 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770207–0441) on emigration + as well as the formulation on emigration contained in the Hungarian + proposal for implementation of CSCE in + bilateral relations. You should state that, if in the course of these + discussions an authoritative spokesman of the Hungarian Government + (e.g., Foreign Minister or Prime Minister) were to make an appropriate + statement indicating that the emigration practices of Hungary will + henceforth lead substantially to the achievement of free emigration, we + are prepared to move into negotiation of a trade agreement following + completion of the discussions.

+

3. You should indicate to the Hungarian Government that the necessary + content of such a statement has been very carefully considered by the + White House to insure that, as a conclusion to your discussions on + Hungarian emigration practice, it would serve as a satisfactory basis + for the President to report to Congress that he has received assurances + as required by the Trade Act. If the Hungarian Government prefers to + make this statement in confidence, rather than publicly, the text of the statement will be treated + within the U.S. Government with the + utmost confidence.

+

4. To meet the intent of Congress the statement must address emigration + across the board (not only family reunification), it must apply to + emigration to all countries, and it must speak to future practice. We + consider that the following statement, in the context of discussions + indicating that Hungarian law and administrative practice do not in fact + preclude emigration, would be appropriate:

+

Quote: I am authorized to state to you on behalf of my government that + Hungary will satisfactorily solve any emigration problems which may + arise. Unquote. This statement may be coupled with references to + traditional Hungarian policy or to the Helsinki Final Act if the + Hungarian Government prefers. (Here we note Bartha’s phrase—Budapest + 1907 “Resolution of these issues is an integral part of Hungary’s + approach to human relations”). The term “emigration problems” could be + adjusted to “problems of the type we have been discussing” or to + “humanitarian problems” if the context clearly shows that the parties + are talking about emigration.

+

4. If the Hungarian Government wishes to propose other language, that + must be referred to Washington to insure that it would meet the + requirements of the law.

+

5. If necessary in order to assist in your discussions of Jackson-Vanik + and Hungarian emigration as well as provide guidance if the Hungarians + wish to discuss further the language of the statement, we are prepared + to send a Department representative who is directly familiar with + Section 402 of the Trade ActSection 402 of + the 1974 Trade Act outlines the requirement for freedom of + emigration from bloc countries seeking to receive MFN. and the Romanian + talks.

+

6. Circular 175 authorityCircular 175 refers + to regulations developed by the Department of State to ensure the + proper exercise of treaty-making power. Typically, a Circular 175 is + an action memorandum seeking authority to negotiate, conclude, + amend, extend, or terminate an international agreement. has + been obtained for negotiation of a trade agreement. We are now preparing + a draft trade agreement.

+ + Vance + +
+ +
+ 150. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in + HungarySource: National + Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign + Policy File, P840070–0726. Secret; Priority; Nodis. Drafted by Gerth; cleared by + Andrews, Luers, Vest, and Tarnoff; and in S/S approved by Nimetz. + + + Washington, October 26, 1977, 0044Z + +

255571. For Ambassador. Subject: The Crown of St. Stephen.

+

1. During their October 1 meeting at UNGA the Secretary, in accordance with the Presidential + Directive/NSC–21, informed + Hungarian Foreign Minister Puja + of our willingness to return the Crown and asked you to work out the + details of the return with Puja.See Document 147.

+

2. You should seek an early appointment with Puja to work out the transfer scenario.In an October 7 memorandum to Brzezinski, Tarnoff outlined the Department’s + proposed scenario for the return of the Crown. (Carter Library, + National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 27, Hungary: + 1–12/77) In your talks you should keep in mind the following + essential conditions:

+

—That various segments of the Hungarian public, including the Roman + Catholic Cardinal Primate, participate in ceremonies in which the Crown + is returned.

+

—That the Crown will be displayed publicly and appropriately in an + historical location not associated with the Communist Party on a + permanent basis.

+

—That the Crown will be treated with respect.

+

In addition, we wish to arrange a ceremony which will emphasize the + national, religious and cultural nature of the Crown. We will seek to + underline the fact that the American people are returning to the + Hungarian people a national treasure which rightly belongs to the + Hungarians. We would plan to secure a public statement from the + Hungarian Government to the effect that Hungarians from all over the + world are welcome to visit Hungary and view the Crown.

+

3. Our detailed guidance for your scenario talks follows:

+

A) Place of return—Budapest. The USG + transported the Crown and regalia from Europe and believes it fitting to + effect the return in Hungary.

+

B) US delegation—The President, as Chief of State, will appoint a senior + USG official to head the American + delegation. We will ask distinguished Senators and Representatives to be + participants, as well as a senior State Department official.

+ +

C) Date of return—In order to meet the scheduling requirements of the + proposed head of the US delegation, we wish return to take place on + Saturday December 3 or Sunday December 4. We will confirm the exact date + later. Our delegation chief, who will be accompanying the President, + would break off from the Presidential party upon completion of the + Warsaw visit (the morning of December 2 or 3) and would fly directly to + Budapest. The remainder of the American delegation would travel directly + from Washington to Budapest.

+

D) Hungarian participants—We wish to return the Crown, as property of the + Hungarian nation and people, to the Head of State or his designated + representative. (FYI: Because of + domestic political sensitivities here we must avoid handing the Crown + over to Kadar himself or to anyone associated exclusively with the + party. End FYI.) We would expect senior + representatives of the Hungarian Government, the National Assembly and + mass organizations would participate. The Cardinal Primate and leaders + of the major Protestant denominations and the Jewish community should be + active participants. While we do not wish to encourage Hungarian + Socialist Workers Party participation, we realize it is an important + national organization and we will not object to the presence of its + representatives.

+

E) Nature of the public ceremony—The ceremony of the return should be a + solemn public event at an appropriate venue (Parliament, the Royal + Palace, Coronation Church), designed to underscore the historical, + cultural, religious and national tradition of the Crown as well as the + “people-to-people” aspect of the return. We expect that remarks at the + ceremony will be confined to pre-agreed statements which refer only to + traditional US-Hungarian ties, friendship between our two peoples and + desire to continue to development of better bilateral relations.

+

F) Media participation—We anticipate that the return ceremony will be a + subject of international media interest and we wish to ensure that + press, radio and TV representatives (including VOA) will be able to report the event from Budapest.

+

G) Transportation of the regalia from the United States—In order to + provide the utmost security for the regalia during transfer, we would + plan to send the Crown and regalia aboard a US Air Force airplane + together with the delegation. The plane would arrive approximately 24 + hours prior to the ceremony of the return, both to provide a rest period + for the US delegates and to allow for the possibility of poor landing + conditions at that time of the year.

+

H) Public announcement—A joint communique announcing the return of the + Crown should be made by the White House and Hungarian authorities just + prior to the departure of the Crown and delegation for Budapest. Text of + the suggested joint communique follows: Quote (title) “The President of the United States of + America has determined that it is appropriate and fitting that the Crown + of St. Stephen and other Hungarian coronation regalia, which have been + in the custody of the United States since the close of World War II, be + returned to the people of Hungary. For this purpose the President has + designated (name) as his personal representative to lead the delegation + of members of the Executive and Legislative Branches of the American + Government who will return the Crown. (Para) The return of the Crown will take place in Budapest + at (time and venue), (name), personal representative of the President of + the Presidential Council of the Hungarian People’s Republic, will head + the group of distinguished Hungarians who will receive the Crown. + (Para) The Government of the + Hungarian People’s Republic will place the Crown of St. Stephen and the + coronation regalia on permanent public display in the (venue) at + Budapest for Hungarians everywhere and foreigners alike to see. + Unquote.

+

6. Leaders of the American-Hungarian Federation have informed Ambassador + Esztergalyos that + Hungarian-American opposition to the return of the Crown could be + reduced were the GOH to make some + gesture(S) to Hungarians abroad, such as letting it be known that an + amnesty has been declared for political prisoners in Hungary and that + any Hungarian abroad would be granted a visa to see the Crown. While + these two ideas are not absolute requirements, we believe the GOH should fully consider them and the + kind of post-return relationship they wish with Hungarians and persons + of Hungarian descent who reside outside Hungary.

+

7. Finally, we have heard vague rumors from the American-Hungarian + community to the effect that the Hungarian regime may hold on to the + Crown and coronation regalia for a time, then transfer them to the + Soviets. While we do not set much store by these reports, we would + nevertheless appreciate Embassy’s views on the likelihood of this + development.

+ + Vance + +
+ +
+ 151. Telegram From the Embassy in Hungary to the Department of + StateSource: National + Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign + Policy File, P840070–0933. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. + + + Budapest, November 2, 1977, 1626Z + +

3819. Subject: Crown of St Stephen. Ref: (A) Budapest 375 (B) State + 255571.Telegram 375 from Budapest was + not found. For telegram 255571 to Budapest, see Document 150.

+

1. FonMin + Puja informed me today that, in + response to his report to the Hungarian Government of our last + conversation, the government has agreed with our plans for the return of + the Crown. Puja said that the + government had agreed to the proposals we had outlined to him, including + a joint communique and pre-agreed statements at the return ceremony.

+

2. Puja said that the government + also agreed with our tentative scheduling suggestions. He added that the + Government of Hungary would like to fix both the date and the name of + the chief U.S. delegate as soon as + possible.

+

3. Finally, Puja asked me to meet + with Deputy Minister Nagy Nov 3 to arrange the details of the return. I, + of course, agreed to do so.In telegram 3840 + from Budapest, November 3, the Embassy reported Kaiser’s conversation with Nagy and + Bartha regarding additional details on the return of the Crown of + St. Stephen. (National Archives, RG + 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840070–0927)

+

4. When Puja asked whether we + could be more definite on specific dates, I told him that for reasons + not connected with the substantive question of the return of the Crown, + it is not possible for us at this time to agree definitely on a date or + to identify the chief U.S. delegate.

+

5. Comment: Puja was extremely + pleased with developments. He had secured in record time the approval of + the government leaders for our proposals before they left for Moscow + last Saturday. He wants us to work out the details as quickly as + possible and we will be pressing ahead on this. End comment.

+

6. Prior to meeting with Puja, the + DCM and I met with Ambassador + Bartha to outline in greater detail the return scenario we envision. I + made to Bartha all rpt all the points + in para 3 of State 255571 and gave him + the text of the suggested joint communique. I also emphasized to him the + importance of the opinion of Hungarian-Americans and passed to Bartha + the suggestions for an amnesty and a public statement to the effect that + Hungarians abroad would be granted visas to see the Crown. I also sought assurances from Bartha + concerning the permanent public display of the Crown in Budapest. For + obvious reasons I was not as specific as the language in para 3c of reftel concerning the date and U.S. delegation head.

+

7. Bartha’s personal response was as follows. (He explained he must now + seek the government’s approval before he can respond officially.)

+

A. Place of return: Full agreement with U.S. plans.

+

B. U.S. delegation: Full agreement. Would + appreciate concrete information.

+

C. Date of return: Full agreement. Would appreciate confirmation.

+

D. Hungarian participants: Full agreement to participation of Cardinal + Private, Protestant leaders, and leaders of Jewish community. He + suggested representatives of women’s and youth organizations. We told + Bartha that we wanted as little party involvement as possible. Bartha + said he understood completely. He added that, for planning purposes, + there is no thought being given to attendance by any prominent party + leader.

+

E. Nature of public ceremony: Full agreement. Bartha said he does not + have government approval but he believes that Parliament is the correct + venue.

+

F. Permanent display: Bartha told me that the Crown will be displayed in + a manner similar to the display of the British Crown Jewels in London, + with one exception: No admission will be charged. It is the plan of the + Hungarian Government to put the Crown on public permanent display as + soon as possible. In reply to my allusion to the possibility that the + Crown would be given to the Russians, Bartha assured me in unequivocal + terms that there is no such possibility: “I can assure you that that + question is utterly ridiculous. The Russians have their own jewels. + These jewels are treasured relics of the Hungarian nation. We have been + struggling for a long period to get them back. We will not now give them + away. In fact, we have a law which requires that the Crown remain in + Hungary.” In reply to question from DCM, Bartha stated that this law is still in force. He agreed + specifically to our reporting these assurances to Washington.

+

G. Media participation: Full agreement with participation by foreign and + domestic (press, radio, television) media representatives.

+

H. Joint communique: I gave Bartha the text of our joint communique and + Bartha agreed with its thrust. He or Nagy may suggest some change in the + wording.

+

I. Remarks at return ceremony: Bartha thought, on a personal basis, that + the remarks should be short. They should give a brief historical + background of the Crown and allude to its role in the future as a factor + in improved bilateral relations.

+ +

8. Bartha assured me that Hungarians from all over the world would be + welcome in Hungary to view the Crown. He said there were no political + prisoners in Hungary so the question of a political amnesty is + difficult. Bartha said that the Government of Hungary looks upon the + Crown’s return and its continued presence in Budapest as a gesture to + build bridges among Hungarians throughout the world.

+

9. Bartha stressed the importance of fixing a date. He said our timing is + good and the Hungarian Government would like to effect the return before + Christmas.

+

10. Comment: We now have all elements of our maximum position on the + table and a favorable reaction to them from the Hungarian working level. + We also have an official favorable response to our plans from the + highest level of the Government of Hungary.

+

11. The last step is official approval of our specific scenario. We + foresee no major problem in obtaining it after we have reviewed the + details with Nagy.

+

12. It seems clear that the Hungarian Government is willing to do + everything it can to meet our requirements, and that it would welcome a + visit by a high-ranking U.S. official in + connection with the Crown’s return. It would be most helpful if we could + fix the date and chief U.S. delegate as + soon as possible. If it becomes necessary to change the President’s + travel plans, and therefore our present plans for returning the Crown, + would it be possible for a major figure in the administration, such as + the Secretary, to schedule a brief stop in Budapest some time before + Christmas in connection with travel to Europe for some other reason, + such as the NATO Ministerial?

+ + Kaiser + +
+ +
+ 152. Editorial Note +

The decision to return the Crown of St. Stephen to Hungary leaked quickly + within the administration of President Jimmy + Carter. On November 1, 1977, Robert R. King of the National Security Council Staff + reported to Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs + Zbigniew Brzezinski that + employees of the United States Information Agency already knew of the + decision, and that the decision was perhaps even more widely known + throughout the United States Government. (Carter Library, National + Security Affairs, Staff Material, Europe, USSR, and East/West, Hunter Subject File, Box 14, Hungary: Crown of St. + Stephen: 11/77) Concerned that the information would soon leak to the + press and prompt a negative + reaction in Congress, King + recommended making a preemptive announcement of the decision to return + the Crown. (Ibid.) Administration officials informed congressional + leaders and concerned members of Congress of the decision to return the + Crown on November 3. (National Archives, RG 59, Office of the Secretariat Staff, Mr. Matthew Nimetz, Counselor of the + Department of State, Under Secretary of State for Security Assistance, + Science and Technology, January 1977 thru December 1980, Lot 81D85, Box + 2, Evening Reading)

+

Following notification by administration officials, Representative Mary + Rose Oakar (Democrat-Ohio) wrote to President Carter to express her “deep sorrow and + disappointment” at the decision to return the Crown and urged him to + re-consider. Oakar cited the “tremendous religious and national + significance that the Crown has for the people of Hungary,” and claimed + that many members of the Hungarian-American community were vehemently + opposed to the Crown’s return. She further argued that returning it to + the Communist regime contradicted the administration’s stated aim of + promoting human rights. Raising questions about the administration’s + handling of the matter, Representative Oakar urged Carter to reconsider + his decision. (Carter Library, White House Central Files, Countries, Box + CO–30, CO 67, 1/20/77–1/20/81) Frank + Moore, Assistant to the President for Congressional + Liaison, responded to Oakar on behalf of the President on November 7, + indicating that the President would take her comments into + consideration. (Ibid.)

+

The House Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East, chaired by + Representative Lee Hamilton (Democrat-Indiana) held a special hearing on + the Crown of St. Stephen and United States-Hungarian relations on + November 9. International Relations Committee Chairman Clement J. + Zablocki (Democrat-Wisconsin), also participated in the hearing. + Representatives Oakar and Frank Horton (Republican-New York) and + representatives from several Hungarian-American organizations testified + against the President’s decision. Representative Oakar called on + Congress to conduct an investigation and urged adoption of H.R. 7983, a + bill that would prohibit the return of the Crown without explicit + congressional approval. Counselor of the Department of State Matthew Nimetz testified on behalf of + the administration. During the hearing, former Hungarian Prime Minister + Ferenc Nagy and General Béla Kiraly—the commander of the Hungarian + National Guard during the 1956 Revolution—supported the President’s + decision. Since “emotions ran high” neither Hamilton nor Zablocki wanted + to pursue the matter, Nimetz + wrote Secretary of State Vance + in a November 9 Evening Report after the hearing. Nimitz also reported + that he had assured Zablocki he would be consulted about the details of + the return. (National Archives, + RG 59, Office of the Secretariat + Staff, Mr. Matthew Nimetz, + Counselor of the Department of State, Under Secretary of State for + Security Assistance, Science and Technology, January 1977 thru December + 1980, Lot 81D85, Box 2, Evening Reading)

+

Vice President Walter Mondale met + with Representative Oakar and a group of Hungarian-Americans on November + 9 in the Roosevelt Room at the White House. President Carter also “dropped in.” (Carter + Library, Presidential Materials, President’s Daily Diary) No record of + the conversation was found, but in the prepared talking points for the + meeting, Brzezinski suggested + that Carter stress the decision “was made on the basis of the marked + improvement in Hungarian American relations” and “Hungary has a good + record of implementing the provisions of the Helsinki Final Act.” + (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Brzezinski Office File, Country Chron File, Box 17, + Hungary, 1979–1980) Oakar wrote the President on November 10 that she + would “continue to work with the Hungarian people and draw up a list of + conditions you requested,” conditions under which Oakar and + Hungarian-American organizations would support the return of the Crown. + (Carter Library, White House Central Files, Countries, Box CO–30, CO 67 + 1/20/77–1/20/81) On November 29, Oakar wrote the President again, + stating that return of the Crown should only take place after withdrawal + of Soviet troops stationed in Hungary and the holding of free elections. + Oakar emphasized that Hungarian-American organizations would “oppose + vigorously” any return that is based on lesser conditions. (Carter + Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Europe, USSR, and East/West, Hunter Subject File, Box 14, Hungary: + Crown of St. Stephen: 12/77)

+
+ +
+ 153. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant (Jordan) to President CarterSource: Carter Library, Chief of Staff Files, + Hamilton Jordan’s + Confidential Files, Box 34B, Hungary—Crown of St. Stephen. Personal + and Confidential. Carter initialed the memorandum indicating that he + saw it. + + + Washington, undated + + + RE + RETURN OF THE CROWN TO HUNGARY + +

I hope that you will review the attached memorandum from Pat + Caddell.Dated November 9, attached but + not printed. The memorandum is not from Pat Cadell, but from John + Gorman of Cambridge Survey Research and analyzes the effect of + voters from East European backgrounds. A 20-point swing in Carter’s + favor, Gorman wrote, would have given Carter a win in California, + Illinois, and New Jersey. A swing in the other direction would have + cost Carter New York, Ohio, Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin. The survey + concluded that “without the significant support of East European + voters in the 1976 election Jimmy + Carter would not have been elected President.” + Jordan also forwarded the + attached memorandum to Brzezinski. (Ibid.)

+

I have checked around on the support for the return of the Crown as well + as the opposition to it. There is no way to discern scientifically how + Hungarian Americans feel about this issue. But basically, my feeling is + that those who have feelings about it oppose the return of the Crown + overwhelmingly. Former government officials and educated Hungarians may + have a more enlightened view of this matter, but the average Hungarian + American is opposed to this action because the alleged benefit to the + people of Hungary has not been explained and is difficult to explain. + Their reaction to our return of the Crown is + emotional and not an enlightened view. I wish you could have + stayed at the meeting to hear the former Mayor of Budapest describe what + the Crown means to him.See Document 152. It was emotional and + very touching.

+

We mislead ourselves to think that the Hungarian-American community is + closely divided on this issue. It is not. If it were, you would not have + had members of Congress and the leaders of all of the Captive Nation + organizations protesting this decision.

+

It is one thing for us to suffer domestically with a group of people in + pursuit of a major policy that is important to us and the world (the + Mideast, for example). It is quite another for us to suffer politically + for an action that has very little—if any—redeeming features. We are alienating the Hungarian community in this + country in hopes of gaining some intangible benefit from the Communist regime in Hungary. + The political trade-offs do not seem acceptable to me.

+

Our policy in the Middle East has cost us the support of American Jews in + states like New York, California and Florida. The Panama Canal treaty + has hurt us in the South with conservatives. I would argue that these + issues are worth the political costs.

+

But now, we have hurt ourselves in the industrial states of the Midwest + through an action that has very little benefit. We have taken a position + on an emotional issue that will cost us dearly in the future with + Hungarian-Americans and other Eastern European groups. These people who + are immigrants and the families of immigrants will not forget easily or + quickly what we have done.

+

With the Panama Canal treaty upcoming and the prospects for a SALT II treaty good, it seems ridiculous + to sacrifice the moral and political authority of your Presidency for + such an issue. We should husband our political capital and spend it + sparingly and wisely. At a time when we are low in the polls and + involved in many important controversial issues, + we have expended our political capital unwisely on this issue.

+

You have so many things to do and many pressures on you. I hate to + present this problem to you in such a way, but if the people responsible + for your foreign policy decisions don’t develop some political sensitivity, we are going to be in trouble on + the big issues that matter.

+
+ +
+ 154. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security + Affairs (Brzezinski) to + Secretary of State VanceSource: Carter Library, + National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 27, Hungary: + 1–12/77. Confidential. + + + Washington, November + 18, 1977 + + + SUBJECT + Hungarian-Americans’ Suggestions on the Return of the Crown + +

I met yesterday afternoon with a group of Hungarian-Americans to discuss + the Crown of St. Stephen.Brzezinski actually met with + leaders of the Hungarian-American community on November 15 at 5:30 + p.m. Brzezinski made changes + to the initial draft of the memorandum, forwarded by King for signature on November 16. + In the last paragraph, Brzezinski added a period after the word “scenario” + and took out the third line which read “as the President requested, + timing the return to take place at the end of his visit to Europe.” + (Ibid.) Although they had reservations on its return, they + offered suggestions on the manner in which it could be transferred that + would help minimize the negative repercussions and maximize the positive + impact. A number of their suggestions have already been included in the + original scenario, but others are new and would be useful for us to + consider. Following is a summary of all their comments.

+

1. That steps be taken to strengthen human rights in Hungary. Among the + items of concern here are increased freedom for the religious press, + restoration of religious orders, release of any imprisoned clergy, and + granting licenses to clergy who have been denied them in the past. The + group suggested asking the Hungarian Government to declare amnesty for + those who left Hungary for non-criminal reasons, or who were convicted + on political and religious grounds.

+

2. That the Hungarian churches play a role in the presentation and + guarding of the Crown and that religious symbolism be maintained.

+

3. That there be free and open access to the Crown.

+

4. That people-to-people aspect be emphasized in the return. The group + suggests that the US delegation include a broad representation of + Americans and that the role of Government officials be minimized.

+

5. That the Crown be exhibited in the US prior to its return to + Hungary.

+

I realize that many of these items have already been taken into + consideration, but you might consider the new ones in revising the + scenario. Some of the suggestions may be difficult or unwise to include. + The proposal to display the + Crown here before its return should be given consideration, and I would + appreciate your reactions.See Document 156.

+ + Zbigniew + Brzezinski + +
+ +
+ 155. Memorandum From the Counselor of the Department of State + (Nimetz) to Secretary of + State VanceSource: National Archives, RG 59, Office of the Secretariat Staff, + Mr. Matthew Nimetz, Counselor + of the Department of State, Under Secretary of State for Security + Assistance, Science and Technology, January 1977 thru December 1980, + Lot 81D85, Box 1, MN Chron—Official, July–December 1977. + Confidential; Exdis. + + + Washington, November + 23, 1977 + + + SUBJECT + Crown of St. Stephen + +

We should now make a firm decision on the date for the Crown’s return + and, if possible, the head of the delegation. The reasons for my + recommendation are as follows:

+

—We need about two weeks to carry out necessary technical preparations + for delivering the Crown (the examination of the items by National + Gallery experts will take place next week at Fort Knox). The Hungarians + need time for their preparations.

+

—Lee Hamilton is coming under pressure from Congresswoman Oakar for a + vote on her bill when Congress returns next week. He can easily defeat + the bill in sub-committee, but prefers to dispose of it without a vote. + He has asked us to announce a date and a head of delegation by Wednesday + to counteract this pressure. We should help Hamilton and Zablocki by + removing the heat from them.

+

—As we continue to delay an announcement on the timing and circumstances + of return, Hungarian-American groups have more opportunity to protest + our decision and possibly embarrass the Administration.

+ +

We have spoken to the U.S. Catholic + Conference leadership and hope to have some expression of support from + them. (Separate memo will follow on this.In + a memorandum to Vance dated + November 23, Nimetz reported + his conversation earlier that day with Father Brian Hehir and Ed + Doherty of the International Affairs Office of the U.S. Catholic Conference. (Ibid.) On + November 29, Hehir and Doherty returned to discuss their effort to + obtain a positive statement from the church. Nimetz reported: “Although Hehir + had earlier assured me that he would be able to obtain this support, + in a poll of key Catholic Bishops, completed this afternoon, the + majority opposed the issuance of a strong supportive statement. + Father Hehir was apologetic, but indicated that the lobbying against + support was strong, whereas there is no lobby in the Church favoring + return.” (Ibid.)) In addition, we are trying to stimulate a + positive statement from the Vatican.On + November 11, Brzezinski + wrote Vance: “Just a + reminder arising out of this morning’s breakfast: Could you initiate + efforts to obtain Papal approval in some overt form for the + initiative on the Hungarian crown.” (Carter Library, National + Security Affairs, Staff Material, Europe, USSR, and East/West, Hunter Subject File, Box 14, Hungary: Crown of St. + Stephen: 11/77)

+

For these reasons, as well as the President’s most recent written comment + that he did not want to return the Crown timidly, I believe we should + seek a White House decision on the date—whether it be in December or + January.

+
+ +
+ 156. Memorandum From Secretary of State Vance to the President’s Assistant for National Security + Affairs (Brzezinski)Source: Carter Library, National + Security Affairs, Staff Material, Europe, USSR, and East/West, Hunter Subject File, Box 14, Hungary: Crown of St. + Stephen: 12/77. Secret; Exdis. + Printed from an uninitialed copy. King forwarded the memorandum to Brzezinski under a December 1 + covering memorandum. (Ibid.) + + + Washington, November + 29, 1977 + + + SUBJECT + Hungarian-Americans’ Suggestions on the Return of the Crown + +

We are sympathetic to several of the suggestions from the group of + Hungarian-Americans described in your memorandum to me of November + 18.See Document + 154.

+

Our reactions to the specific comments made to you are as follows:

+

1. Take Steps to Strengthen + Human Rights in Hungary

+

We are taking a close look at the state of religious freedom in Hungary + and will prepare an unclassified summary study of use to interested + Americans. We will also be asking Embassy Budapest to seek clarification + from the Hungarian Government on questions which have been raised here + relating to freedom of religion.

+

During Phil Kaiser’s initial discussions with the Hungarian Government on + the Crown,Reported in telegram 2916 from + Budapest, August 26. See footnote 3, Document + 146. he commended for Hungarian consideration the + July suggestion of some Hungarian-American leaders to the Hungarian + Ambassador that a general amnesty for political prisoners would generate + more support here for return of the Crown. The Hungarians replied that + they have no political prisoners (we have been unable to identify any) + and that the question of such an amnesty was thus difficult. However, + they did not reject the idea.

+

2. Role of Hungarian + Churches in the Crown’s Return

+

It has been an essential condition throughout our discussions with the + Hungarian Government that the Crown be received by a delegation broadly + representative of the Hungarian people and that it include prominent + religious leaders of the Catholic, Protestant and Jewish faiths, + including the Cardinal Primate. The Hungarian Government readily + accepted these suggestions and has assured us that the Cardinal Primate will be invited to be + an active participant in the ceremony of return. They have also added + that no thought is being given to attendance by any prominent Party + leaders. The Hungarian Government has also assured us that the Crown + will be treated in a manner fitting to its national, cultural and + religious symbolism.

+

As to the question of a church role in guarding the Crown, ever since + enactment of a Hungarian law in 1498 during the reign of King Laszlo II, + custody of the Crown has rested solely with non-ecclesiastical persons. + In July 1976, Cardinal Lekai, the Primate of Hungary, informed our + Charge that the Catholic Church in Hungary would very much welcome the + return of the Crown, which he considered to be the country’s most + precious symbol. He added that both the Church and the State were + carefully preserving and restoring Hungary’s historical treasures and + that the historical past of the country would be respected, taught and + studied. While the Hungarian Government may consult the Hungarian + churches concerning the presentation and guarding of the Crown, we + believe that this matter is best left for discussion between the + Hungarian Government and the various Hungarian church organizations.

+

3. Free Access to the + Crown

+

The Hungarian Government has assured us, at the highest levels, that the + Crown will be promptly placed on permanent exhibition in an appropriate + historical location in Budapest and that the population of Hungary, + Hungarians everywhere and foreigners alike, will be welcome to view it. + Such open, permanent display will be in marked contrast to past + practice, which provided for only rare public display of the Crown.

+

4. Emphasize the + People-to-People Aspect of the Return

+

We fully agree that the “people-to-people” aspect of return is very + important. The Hungarian Government appears to have accepted our + suggestion in this respect without reservation. We believe that the US + delegation should include prominent Americans from various walks of + life.

+

With regard to the suggestion that the role of US Government officials be + minimized, we believe that Members of Congress, as elected + representatives of the American people, should be included in the + delegation along with at least several Executive Branch representatives + and that full consideration must be given to a Government official as + the delegation head. Tip O’Neill wrote me strongly suggesting that House + members be included. The US Catholic Conference of Bishops has asked + whether they might make some suggestions for the delegation.

+ +

5. Exhibit the Crown in the + US Before Return

+

While there may appear to be certain domestic benefits in placing the + Crown on public display here prior to its return, we believe that it + would not be in the interest of the United States to do so.

+

Public display of the Crown at one or more locations in the United States + would:

+

—be inconsistent with our longstanding policy of denying the use of the + Crown in the United States for any public purpose;

+

—upset the Hungarian people and government, both of which deny our right + to display it;

+

—precipitate renewed media interest and possible demonstrations against + the return;

+

—increase the chances for accidental or intentional damage to the Crown + and regalia;

+

—detract from the drama and impact of the ceremony of return in Budapest; + and

+

—from a legal standpoint, require the concurrence of the Hungarian + Government and resolution of the question of indemnity.

+

We also understand that the Vice President has expressed objections to + the idea of public display in the United States and that President + Mellon of the National Gallery of Art told J. Carter Brown that he did + not want the Gallery to display the Crown.

+

Moreover, to demonstrate more fully our interest in the expressed + concerns of American Catholics, I will be meeting during the week of + November 28 with officials of the National Conference of BishopsSee footnote 2, + Document 155. and Phil Kaiser will call on Cardinal + Lekai.In telegram 4161 from Budapest, + November 30, Kaiser reported + his conversation with Cardinal Lekai the day before. Lekai asked + Kaiser to report to + Washington that “I support the return of the Crown, the Catholic + Church supports the return of the Crown, and the Hungarian people + support the return of the Crown.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + P850050–2274)

+
+ +
+ 157. Memorandum From Robert + King of the National Security Council Staff to the + President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)Source: Carter Library, National + Security Affairs, Brzezinski + Material, Country File, Box 27, Hungary: 1–12/77. Confidential. Sent + for action. Brzezinski wrote + “good” on the memorandum and noted “he did” in the upper right + corner, indicating that Vance had raised the issue with the President at the + breakfast meeting. According to the President’s Daily Diary, Carter + met with Mondale, Vance, and Brzezinski from 7:30 to 8:43 a.m. + on December 2. (Carter Library, Presidential Materials, President’s + Daily Diary) No substantive record of that meeting was + found. + + + Washington, December + 1, 1977 + + + SUBJECT + Secretary Vance’s + Intention to Raise the Crown of St. Stephen at Breakfast + Tomorrow + +

According to the staff of State Department Counselor Matt Nimetz, Secretary Vance plans to raise the Crown at your + breakfast meeting tomorrow at which time he will bring with him a memo + in response to your memo to him of November 30 (Tab A) asking for + written assurances from the Hungarian government regarding permanent + display of the Crown and the question of religious participation in the + return ceremony.Attached but not printed. + Brzezinski notified + Vance: “The President + would appreciate an update regarding the assurances we are seeking + from the Hungarians. He requests that these assurances be in + writing, and that they cover—among other items—the issue of the + permanent display of the Crown and the question of the nature and + scope of religious participation in the return ceremony.”

+

Vance’s response to your memo + will be along the following lines:

+

—The Hungarian government has already given us high level assurances + (both before and after we informed them of the decision to return the + Crown) that the Crown will be placed on permanent display.Brzezinski + wrote in the margin next to this paragraph: “We want them in + writing.” Although these assurances were given orally to our + ambassador in Budapest, the Hungarian government has taken steps to + implement them and is now considering two possible sites for permanent + display. We have proposed, and the Hungarians have agreed in principle, + that a joint statement will be issuedOn + December 15, the Department of State released the Joint Communiqué + and the exchange of letters between Kaiser and Puja detailing the understanding reached by the two + governments on the return of the Crown. For the full text, see + Department of State Bulletin, January 1978, + pp. 32–33. when the decision to return the Crown is publicly + announced which specifies that the Crown will be placed on permanent + public display. Since the Hungarians will commit themselves in this joint statement, + requesting confirmation in writing would be undiplomatic and + unnecessary.

+

—The U.S. proposals on the ceremony for + transfer of the Crown call for participation of representatives of + Hungarian religious groups, including the Cardinal, and the Hungarian + government has accepted these proposals. Ambassador Kaiser met with Cardinal Lekai just a + few days ago and confirmed to him our desire that he participate in the + ceremony and he affirmed his willingness and intention to do so (see + report of this meeting at Tab B).Tab B is + telegram 4161 from Budapest, November 30. See footnote 5, Document 156. The Vatican has informed + the Cardinal that it considers the return of the Crown to be a bilateral + affair between the U.S. and Hungary and + expressed its disinterestedness and neutrality on the question. While + Lekai expressed his willingness to issue a statement or write an article + in a Hungarian Catholic publication welcoming the return of the Crown, + it is unlikely that we will get any kind of public statement from the + Vatican or the American Catholic Conference (see Ambassador Kaiser’s cable about approaching the + Vatican for a statement at Tab C).Tab C is + telegram 4162 from Budapest, November 30. (Carter Library, National + Security Affairs, Staff Material, Europe, USSR, and East/West, Hunter Subject File, Box 14, Hungary: Crown of St. + Stephen: 12/77)

+

Vance reportedly plans to propose + that we fix January 7th as the date for the return of the Crown and + request concurrence from the Hungarian government. Once the date has + been agreed upon, a public announcement should be issued. The arguments + for this course are: (1) to prevent public speculation that the + President has reconsidered his decision to return the Crown; (2) to help + Congressmen Zablocki and Hamilton who are being pressed by Congresswoman + Oakar to bring to a vote her resolution requiring Congressional approval + of any decision to return the Crown. If the President’s decision is + announced, they can argue that it is too late for Congressional + action.

+

I agree with this position. The public announcement that the Crown will + be returned on a specific date will close the issue. The longer we + postpone an announcement of the date, the more it will encourage + opposition on the grounds that the White House is undecided or has + backtracked because of public reaction. This is the time for a bold + step—we should not return the Crown timidly.

+
+ +
+ 158. Memorandum From Secretary of State Vance to President CarterSource: + Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Europe, + USSR, and East/West, Hunter Subject File, Box 14, + Hungary: Crown of St. Stephen: 12/77. Secret; Nodis. Vest sent the memorandum to Vance under a covering memorandum + dated December 1. (National Archives, RG 59, Bureau of European Affairs, Office of Eastern + Europe and Yugoslavia, Hungarian Holy Crown—Crown Follow Up 1979 and + Prior Years 1945–1980, Lot 85D389, Box 1, The Crown + 1977) + + + Washington, December + 1, 1977 + + + SUBJECT + The Crown of St. Stephen + +

You have asked us for an update of the written assurances we are seeking + from the Hungarians in connection with the return of the Crown.See footnote 2, + Document 157. I can report that they have agreed to + our proposal for a joint communique in the name of the two + Presidents.In telegram 3976 from + Budapest, November 15, Kaiser + reported that Puja had + informed him of the Hungarian Government’s agreement to issue a + joint communiqué as part of the ceremony for the return of the + Crown. (National Archives, RG 59, + Central Foreign Policy File, D770422–0676) It will specify + what the Hungarians have agreed to do with respect to the public + ceremony, permanent public display of the Crown, and concerning + foreigners who wish to return to Hungary to see the Crown. The Hungarian + Government’s acceptance of the communique will serve as a written + guarantee of these essential elements.

+

Concerning the nature and scope of religious participation in the return + ceremony, the Hungarian Government has assured us that leading Hungarian + religious figures will be included in the ceremony. The Hungarian + Cardinal told us this week that he will be an active participant. Senior + Foreign Ministry officials have expressed agreement to our request that + Hungarian Protestant church leaders and leaders of the Jewish community + also participate in the ceremony.

+

I believe it is both appropriate and important that we now set a firm + date for the return of the Hungarian Crown. Further delay could allow + the political climate to become worse:

+

—Clem Zablocki and Lee Hamilton have been urging us to return the Crown + at the earliest possible date. They were helpful at the hearings on the + Crown, and Hamilton is trying to avoid a formal vote in his European + sub-committee on Congresswoman Oakar’s bill against the return. Even + though her bill would be defeated, a vote could be embarrassing for the + Administration and politically difficult for Hamilton and others. Hamilton has told us that + announcement of a date will allow him to head off this vote.

+

—Only Congresswoman Oakar (and Congressman Horton to a lesser degree) is + still actively opposing your decision. Oakar is alleging that the + Administration is even reconsidering its decision to return the Crown. + Many influential Senators and Congressmen have publicly supported your + decision and expect us to act promptly and assertively on this. (These + include Humphrey, McGovern, + Griffin, Pell, Biden, Charley Wilson, Vanik, Bingham, Whalen, Frenzel + and Fenwick.)

+

—Cardinal Lekai of Hungary has given us his strong support and will issue + a public statement. He told Ambassador Kaiser the following: “I support the return of the + Crown, the Catholic Church supports the return of the Crown, and the + Hungarian people support the return of the Crown.”See footnote 5, Document + 156. However, the Vatican and the US Catholic + Conference are not willing to issue supportive statements, and there is + no advantage in waiting any longer for them.See footnote 6, Document + 157.

+

—Setting a date now would not only defuse the opposition but would allow + us to get started on choosing a delegation (Tip O’Neill has written me + already about Congressional involvement) and on the technical steps both + here and in Budapest.

+

Therefore, I recommend that we return the Crown on January 7, the day + after your visit to Brussels. One or more members of your party could go + to Budapest for the ceremony, meeting the rest of the US delegation + there. If you approve, we will inform the Hungarian Government that we + are prepared to return the Crown on January 7, subject to agreement on a + joint statementIn a memorandum dated + December 2, Brzezinski + forwarded Vance’s proposals + for Presidential approval. Carter approved the January 7, 1978, date + for the return and approved Brzezinski’s recommendation that Vance seek more specific + assurances, “perhaps through an exchange of letters” on the handling + of the return and display of the Crown. Carter wrote in the margin + “a) We should consider Jan 6th also (same day I’m in Brussels); b) + Will they agree that Cadinal Lekai will participate in accepting + Crown? (in statement); c) Date of proposed announcement?” (Carter + Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 27, Hungary: + 1–12/77). Brzezinski + forwarded Carter’s second and third comments to Vance in a December 2 memorandum. + (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Europe, + USSR, and East/West, Hunter Subject File, Box 14, + Hungary: Crown of St Stephen: 12/77) (draft attached).Attached but not printed. For the final text, + see Department of State Bulletin, January + 1978, pp. 32–33

+
+ +
+ 159. Telegram From the Embassy in Hungary to the Department of + StateSource: National + Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign + Policy File, D770461–0966. Secret; Exdis. + + + Budapest, December 12, 1977, 1228Z + +

4285. Ref: (A) SecState 292670; (B) Budapest 3749.Telegram 292670 to Budapest, December 8, provided + Kaiser with instructions + for his meeting with Kadar. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + D770455–0720) Telegram 3749 from Budapest, October 28, reported + Kaiser’s meeting with + Puja the day before and + their discussions on MFN. See footnote 3, Document 149.

+

1. Summary: During an hour and fifty minutes meeting at Party + headquarters December 8 with First Secretary Janos Kadar a wide range of + subjects was covered, including the state of our bilateral relations, + the President’s decision to return the Crown, Hungary’s economy and + MFN, and the prospect for widening + Hungarian-American contacts. End summary.

+

2. After going through the pleasantries of how I was finding Budapest and + whether my family was here with me, Kadar warmly welcomed me as the new + U.S. Ambassador to Hungary.For Kaiser’s personal recollection of the content and + atmosphere at the meeting, see his memoirs, Journey Far and Wide, pp. 287–290. He commented + that the role of an Ambassador was significant because it was through + his eyes that his home country saw Hungary’s society. It was essential, + therefore, for Ambassadors to be as objective as possible and to report + fully and frankly. He, Kadar, put a premium on a realistic approach to + both international and domestic affairs.

+

3. Kadar then expressed his satisfaction over the improved state of our + relations at which point I read the oral message from the + President.On December 7, Brzezinski approved on Carter’s + behalf the following oral message: “I wish to take this opportunity + to express my satisfaction at the recent positive developments in + relations between our two countries and peoples. It is my desire and + intention to continue building on these relations to the mutual + benefit of our peoples and in support of those principles and goals + embodied in the Final Act of the Conference on Security and + Cooperation in Europe.” (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, + Staff Material, Europe, USSR, and + East/West, Hunter Subject + File, Box 14, Hungary, Crown of St. Stephen 12/77) The text was + transmitted as part of the instructions in telegram 292670 to + Budapest. See footnote 2 above. + He was grateful for the message and used it as his lead for a lengthy + exposition on Hungarian policies and attitudes which lasted for over an + hour (including interpretation).

+

4. He started by noting that although Hungary was a member of one + alliance and the United States the leader of another, that did not mean + that effective and meaningful bilateral relations should not be developed. He wanted to make + clear that Hungary was an independent country with its own domestic and + international policies although, of course, it was loyal to its + alliances. He always read with amusement stories that said that while + Hungary was a “satellite” on international affairs, it was freer + domestically where its policies were more liberal than any other Eastern + European country. Hungary had its own traditions, history and culture + with its own national interests. These factors, plus the “size of our + country, our location on the map and the nature of our economy” were the + main criteria in the international and domestic policies that Hungary + pursued.

+

5. He then spoke at great length about the Hungarian economy, stressing + that it was by far the most important aspect of Hungarian life today. He + is pleased with the progress that had been made and is determined that + this progress continue. This depended, he pointed out, on expanding the + country’s foreign trade. Forty-five percent of Hungary’s GNP derived from that trade and it had to + be increased if the standard of living was to be raised. For every + increase of one percent in GNP, Hungary + required a one and a half percent increase in exports. At present, + Hungary’s foreign trade was divided roughly sixty percent with the East + and forty percent with the West and for the foreseeable future that was + probably the right proportion. The main Western trading partners were + the traditional ones: Germany, Italy and Austria. American trade, + unfortunately, was “just a trickle” and he hoped that situation could be + changed.

+

6. He talked at some length about the unfairness of the lack of MFN and the inhibiting effect it is having + on our future relations, although he was pleased that several joint + enterprises with American companies had been launched and others were in + the planning stage. He saw no ideological obstacle to this kind of + collaboration because Hungarian industrial enterprises were practically + independent.” More than once he stressed that the most important + political element to Hungarian life was the way in which it handled its + economic development.

+

7. He then turned to a once-over-lightly review of Hungarian-American + relations since World War I, ending up with the story of the Crown. He + understood fully, he said that successful bilateral relations depended + on mutual understanding of the differences in the domestic policies and + attitudes of the two countries involved. Whereas for the Hungarians the + issue of the Crown was simple—Hungarian people knew it belonged to + them—he realized why it was more complicated for the Americans. He very + much appreciated the President’s decision to return the Crown. He said + that he was always confident that this issue would be resolved one day + because we had succeeded in resolving the more complicated Mindszenty + issue. He particularly understood and agreed with the President’s emphasis on the + fact that the return of the Crown was a people-to-people act. The + Hungarians were ready to receive it in this spirit. When I broke in to + urge him to clear the communique and the letter we had proposed as + rapidly as possible, he said that although we both desired quick action, + “the Hungarian Government also had its procedures” and therefore it + might be early next week before we had an official Hungarian response. + (1& . . . 3, 5: Ambassador Bartha told me later in the day that + after my meeting with Kadar the latter had phoned the Foreign Ministry + to press them on the two documents.)

+

8. He then asked me to tell President Carter that he appreciated the oral message and had no + difficulty in being responsive to it. The Helsinki Accords provided a + basis for improved relations among all the signatory countries and the + Hungarians had found its provisions compatible with their own historical + experience and outlook on life. They mean to continue to implement those + provisions in reasonable order.

+

9. He concluded his remarks by recalling his meeting in Moscow with + Governor Harriman in 1963 when + the Governor was there to sign the Test Ban Treaty. He remembered in + great detail that evening at the sports stadium when Harriman came in with Khrushchev and + was introduced to Kadar. He mentioned his discussion with Harriman on the Mindszenty issue and + the Hungarian position at the United Nations.No record of this conversation was found. See Foreign + Relations, 1961–1963, vol. XVI, Eastern Europe; Cyprus; + Greece; Turkey, footnote 4, Document 28. He spoke + warmly of the Governor, stating no man understood East-West relations + better than he and asked me to convey his greetings to him.

+

10. After quipping that I could report that the Governor’s story of that + evening in Moscow coincided on every detail with Kadar’s own, I + responded to the main points he had raised.

+

11. I pointed out first of all the significance of the President’s + decision on the Crown. It was not only right morally but it was an act + of political courage and explained why. I mentioned too that both the + President and Secretary Vance + had always recognized that the Crown was Hungarian property and that in + spite of some domestic opposition felt that the time had come to return + it to the Hungarian people. I said that this act reflected the + President’s general approach to East-West relations and spelled out the + points made in State 292670: That the President was committed “to + cooperation and not confrontation,” as evidenced by his determination to + reach a SALT Agreement, to pursue + MBFR to a successful conclusion + and to prevent proliferation of nuclear weapons. Because of the President’s technical + knowledge of the nuclear problem no Chief of State had a better + appreciation of the full significance of the nuclear threat. I pointed + out that Averell Harriman and + Marshall Shulman typified the kind of advisers that the President had on + Soviet-American relations, and emphasized that Secretary Vance had long since been known for + his constructive, moderate approach to East-West relations. I suggested + that if he hadn’t already done so, Kadar should read the President’s + Charleston speechReference is to President + Carter’s speech on U.S.-Soviet + relations at the annual meeting of the Southern Legislative + Conference in Charleston, South Carolina, July 21. For the text of + the speech, see Public Papers: Carter, 1977, + Book II, pp. 1309–1315. to get a realistic exposure to the + President’s views on world affairs. He said he was familiar with it.

+

12. In regard to MFN, I emphasized that + the Executive Branch of the government was in favor of granting it to + Hungary, but we had to meet the requirements of the 1974 Trade Act.See Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, vol. XXXI, + Foreign Economic Policy, 1973–1976, Document 223. + We thought that this could be done to the mutual advantage of both + countries without adversely affecting either nation’s self-esteem. As + Kadar undoubtedly knew, we had made our first proposal for meeting the + political requirements of the act and we were waiting for the GOH’s response. We hoped we could solve + the political aspects of the matter fairly soon so that we could proceed + to negotiate a trade agreement. To my surprise, he asked whether MFN was linked with the Crown. I made it + clear that there was no linkage. (Comment: I am puzzled by this + question, but perhaps it results from the fact that when we told Foreign + Minister Puja about the + President’s decision to return the Crown we also made our first proposal + about MFN. Budapest 3749).See Document 149 and footnote 3 thereto.

+

13. I also commented on the importance of extending our bilateral + contacts. We were pleased with the cooperation between members of our + Embassy and officials of the Foreign Office and other government + departments. We would now like to develop similar relationships with + members of the Party. When Senators McGovern and Biden and Counselor Nimetz were here they had a chance to + talk with Mr. Gyenes and Mr. Berecz, top Party officers, and this had + proved very useful. In fact, we had invited Mr. Berecz to visit the + United States and we hoped that he would be able to accept.

+

14. We also desired to increase our contacts between the private + individuals of our two countries and between organizations, particularly + in the fields of education, science and technology and culture. I saw no + reason why our exchanges should not be on a scale similar to those of Poland and the Soviet + Union. His response was positive in regard to all the above contacts and + exchanges. He stated in his direct simple way these “exchanges were + reality.”

+

15. Finally, I said that in addition to bilateral issues, I hoped that + our dialogue would also deal with important international issues of + common interest. I recalled that when Secretary Vance had seen Foreign Minister + Puja in New York, the + Secretary discussed at some length Middle East developments and progress + in the SALT negotiations, as well as + bilateral subjects.

+

16. Before the conversation ended, Kadar asked me again to be sure and + convey his appreciation to the President for the decision to return the + Crown and to emphasize that he foresaw increased cooperation between our + two countries. We could accomplish a great deal on a realistic basis, he + added. We could live normally with each other, and we don’t have to + announce our achievements in “bright neon lights.”

+

17. Comment: A. Although Kadar has the complexion of a man of his actual + years—it is slightly blotchy and puffy—the vigor of his movements and + the liveliness of his mind belie his age. He walks with an attractive + strut which reminds one of a confident athlete. He articulated easily + and with animation in spite of the fact that the only other person + present was a woman interpreter. This is in contrast with his public + speaking style which is apparently rather diffident. One is struck by + his poise. He has the dignity of a man who has gone through severe + trials and emerged on top, but has learned the appropriate lessons from + his earlier experience. He is a smoker. He consumed about five + cigarettes. Early in our meeting two scotch and sodas were brought in + which we imbibed at about the same speed in the course of our + conversation.

+

B. Perhaps the most striking aspect of our substantive discussion was his + emphasis on the economic side of Hungarian life. More than once he + referred to the political importance of Hungary’s economic progress. + There is not only pride in what has been achieved, but determination to + effect a steady improvement in the standard of living. He appreciates + the fact that the achievement of this objective requires important + economic ties with the West.

+ + Kaiser + +
+ +
+ 160. Editorial Note +

At noon on December 15, 1977, the Department of State released the text + of the U.S.-Hungarian Joint Communiqué + and exchange of letters setting forth the understanding between the two + governments regarding the return of the Crown of St. Stephen. The day + before, while transmitting the final text agreed in Budapest, the + Embassy reported: “The communique contains the language we wanted on + every point which was discussed” and that the Hungarian Government would + “release the communique, Puja’s + text, and the essential points of the Ambassador’s letter. Reference to + Cardinal Lekai’s participation will be included in these points.” + (Telegram 4319 from Budapest, December 14; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + D770465–0686)

+

Three days earlier, on December 12, Representative Mary Rose Oakar wrote + to Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs Zbigniew Brzezinski regarding media + speculation on the return of the Crown and complained she had received + no reply to her November 29 letter to President Jimmy Carter outlining her conditions + for its return. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff + Material, Europe, USSR, and East/West, + Hunter Subject File, Box 14, + Hungary: Crown of St Stephen: 12/77) Robert + King of the National Security Council Staff had received + Representatives Oakar and Frank Horton on November 29 and accepted a + letter to the President outlining conditions under which the return of + the Crown would be deemed acceptable by the Hungarian-American + community. The two Representatives also expressed their concern that + Congress be informed of any decision regarding the return of the Crown. + King reported his meeting to + Brzezinski in a November 29 + memorandum. (Ibid.)

+

On December 15, the day of the official announcement of the return of the + Crown, Brzezinski wrote Oakar + that the President’s “decision to return the Crown of St Stephen to the + Hungarian people has been made on the basis that this important historic + relic belongs to the Hungarian nation. In making that decision he is + fully aware of its symbolism.” Brzezinski also outlined the conditions under which the + United States agreed to return the Crown, included in the Joint + Communiqué and exchange of letters. (Ibid.)

+
+ +
+ 161. Letter from Representative Mary Rose Oakar to President CarterSource: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, + Staff Material, Europe, USSR, and + East/West, Hunter Subject + File, Box 14, Hungary, Crown of St. Stephen, 12/77. No + classification marking. A stamped notation on the letter indicates + that it was received at the White House Congressional Liaison Office + on December 19. Hunter + forwarded the letter to Brzezinski under a December 20 covering memorandum, + recommending that, in light of his December 15 letter to Oakar, no + response was necessary. + + + Washington + December 15, 1977 + + + Dear Mr. President: + +

I am outraged by the State Department’s announcement today that the Holy + Crown of Saint Stephen will be returned to Hungary on January 6th and + 7th of next year. Deceit and deception have characterized the entire + handling of this issue by your Administration. Just as this decision + shows gross insensitivity to the plight of the people in Hungary, so the + manner in which the issue has been handled shows a total lack of concern + for the millions in America and throughout the world who feel so + strongly about the Crown and object to its return.

+

On November 9, I, along with several other Members of Congress, + personally heard you tell the Hungarian-American leaders I brought to + the White House that you wanted them to list the conditions under which + they felt return of the Crown would be acceptable, and that you would + listen closely to what they had to say.See + Document 152. Believing you to + be a man of your word, these men and women who represent thousands of + concerned citizens carefully and thoughtfully composed messages to you + on the conditions they felt should be imposed upon return of the Crown. + Also in response to your request, on November 29 I personally delivered + to your representative, Mr. Robert + King of the National Security Council staff, a letter to + you in which I summed up the views on the Crown that were unanimously + expressed to me by the Hungarian-American community.

+

I never received a reply to this letter from you.Brzezinski + signed a letter to Oakar on December 15. See Document 160. Because the Crown was not returned + during Secretary Vance’s trip to + Europe in early December as had originally been planned, I began to + believe that you were indeed going to listen to our views before making + a final commitment on the Crown. Earlier today, just an hour or two + before the State Department’s announcement, a member of my staff called + Mr. King to ask when I could + expect to receive a reply to my letter. She was told that no reply could + be sent yet because the Hungarian government had not yet replied to messages of the United States + regarding conditions for return of the Crown that you insisted upon. He + said that my letter thus could not be answered, because you did not have + the information needed to answer it.

+

About four hours later, at approximately two o’clock, I received by + special messenger from the State Department copies of correspondence + between the American Ambassador to Hungary and the Hungarian Foreign + Minister stating the very conditions that just a few hours ago + supposedly were not known. Just yesterday, George Boutin, an economic + officer of the Department of State, outright denied the news account in + the Washington Post calling for the Crown’s return on or about January + 7th and 8th. He said details on the Crown’s return still had not been + made between our two countries.

+

These statements, obviously, were false, and so apparently were the + statements you made concerning your desire to listen to and consult with + Hungarian-Americans on this issue. Hungarian-Americans and others + concerned about the safety of the Crown were never consulted in the + first place when, according to the State Department, a review of U.S. policy on the Crown was undertaken + during the late spring and summer of this year. To my knowledge, no one + outside the Administration, even those who pointedly asked about the + Crown, was ever told that a review of this policy was underway. It is + clear that even the cryptic announcement made by the State Department on + November 3 would not have been made but for a leak of the decision to + the media.

+

It is also clear that since that announcement and our November 9 meeting, + the Administration has conducted what amounts to an elaborate charade, + speaking in terms of concern for the views of those opposed to return of + the Crown, but going ahead with your plans as if we did not exist. While + you were under no obligation to accept the views we offered, you could + have kept your word and at least listened, and you could have at least + provided us with truthful answers to our questions. The events of today + show that you did neither. For the second time in a little over a month, + I have, as a Member of Congress, heard of an important Administration + decision on a matter on which I repeatedly expressed great concern, from + a State Department functionary after members of the press had the same + information. And in both instances, the substance of the message was + contrary to what I had been told repeatedly by the Administration on + earlier occasions.

+

To me, this is a very sad day for our country and for all of the + oppressed people of the world. I had fully supported the human rights + policy you enunciated at the beginning of your Administration, believing + it to be consistent with the highest traditions of American foreign + policy. Now, it is clear that your human rights policy is nothing more + than empty rhetoric, and + freedom loving people everywhere today feel the pain of this + realization.

+

Sincerely,

+ + Mary Rose Oakar + +
+ +
+ 162. Telegram From the Embassy in Hungary to the Department of + StateSource: National + Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign + Policy File, D780012–0202. Confidential; Exdis; Immediate. A summary of the return ceremonies + was transmitted in telegram 228 from Budapest, January 13. (National + Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign + Policy File, D780021–1184) + + + Budapest, January 7, 1978, 1408Z + +

105. Subject: SecState Visit—Secretary-FonMin Meeting Jan 7. Uncleared Memcon of the Secretary’s Meeting With FonMin + Puja.

+

Begin summary: The Secretary and FonMin + Puja discussed emigration + assurances and MFN; the favorable + effect the return of the Crown will have on bilateral relations; and + other current topics in bilateral relations (property settlement and + cultural exchanges). The Secretary also briefed Puja on the Middle East and the two + exchanged views on the Belgrade CSCE + meeting, MBFR, and East-West relations + in general. The Secretary invited Puja to visit him in Washington if Puja comes to New York for the Special + Session on Disarmament. Puja + extended an invitation to the Secretary for an official visit to + Budapest. End summary.

+

1. Secretary Vance and FonMin + Puja met for one hour Jan 7. + Additional Hungarian participants: Deputy Minister Nagy; Ambassador + Esztergalyos; Office Director + Bartha, and American Desk Officer Revesz. U.S.: Ambassador Kaiser, Counselor Nimetz, Luers, + King, and Wilgis.

+

2. The Crown: Puja thanked the + Secretary for the important role he had played in the President’s + decision to return the Crown. He said that it was a courageous step + which would give further momentum to U.S.-Hungarian relations in that it eliminated a + long-standing obstacle. Hungary is ready to develop bilateral relations, + and the fact that it is a small country while the U.S. is a world power does not exclude good + relations. Cooperation is not only possible, but a necessity, and will + serve the cause of peace in + general. The Secretary informed Puja that the press coverage of the Crown’s return in + the U.S. had been both positive and + extensive. The return is a real step forward in public perception of the + state of bilateral relations. It will facilitate further steps, which + the USG is prepared to take.

+

3. MFN: Puja referred to the Hungarian proposed language of Dec + 16,In order for Hungary to receive + MFN, the administration sought + to receive assurances that the Hungarian Government would continue + to interpret its emigration law—considered strict in its + letter—liberally. In telegram 4358 from Budapest, December 16, 1977, + the Embassy reported that the Hungarian Government proposed changes + to the U.S. draft statement. For + initial instructions on MFN + provided to Kaiser, see Document 149. Rather than the U.S.-requested promise that cases would + be solved in a satisfactory manner, the Hungarian Government + proposed the U.S. language be + replaced with: “Concerning cases of emigration, both parties + undertake to act in accordance with the letter and spirit of the + Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe.” + (National Archives, RG 59, Central + Foreign Policy File, D770469–0765) as well as the Hungarian + procedural proposal.In a December 16, 1977, + conversation, reported in telegram 4358 from Budapest, Nagy informed + Kaiser that, on + procedure, “assurances should be made publicly in the form of a + joint communique issued upon the occasion of a meeting at ‘higher + level,’” later clarifying that to mean at the Foreign Minister + level. (Ibid.) From the U.S. + reply it can be seen that both sides take a positive approach on the + question of emigration assurances and the two positions are growing + closer. As to procedure, the GOH agrees + to exchange letters on assurances, as long as the exchange of letters + deals not only with MFN but also with + other issues. The GOH is prepared to + table a draft, in which reference would be made to the Secretary’s visit + and other issues. While the competent authorities still must be + consulted on the question of publication of the letters, Puja personally had no objection. On + the assurances themselves, Puja + referred to the U.S. insertion of the + Universal Declaration on Human Rights (UDHR) into the Hungarian + language. Puja noted that this + Declaration was adopted by the UN in + 1948, when Hungary was not a member. Those Socialist countries who were + members abstained. In light of this history, the GOH would prefer to refer to a more recent + document, such as the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. Hungary + has ratified and signed the Covenant; the U.S. has signed but not ratified. In that this Covenant + refers to the UDHR, the GOH hopes its + use would present a practical solution.

+

4. In reply the Secretary agreed that an exchange of letters between + Ambassador Kaiser and the Foreign + Minister covering the assurances would be an acceptable way to proceed. + He personally thought that references to additional subjects would be + satisfactory and he would favor + publication. He would send instructions to Ambassador Kaiser concerning further discussions + of this matter.In telegram 15152 to + Budapest, January 19, the Department informed Kaiser that, after reviewing the + Puja proposals, it + believed “that reference to International Covenant on Civil and + Political Rights likely to produce unhelpful controversy in U.S.” The cable instructed Kaiser to propose to the Hungarian + Government that the language in the assurances statement provide “an + obligation to ‘act promptly, constructively, and with good will’ + concerning emigration cases” in the letter and spirit of the + Helsinki Final Act. The telegram also informed Kaiser that the Department had no + objections to the Hungarian Government proposal of also including + other subjects in the letters. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + D780029–0464)

+

5. On the language itself, the Secretary explained his initial reaction + that reference to the Covenant of Civil and Political Rights would be an + appropriate way to deal with the U.S. + desire to refer to the UDHR. The U.S. + would consider the Hungarian proposal and send instructions to + Ambassador Kaiser.

+

6. The Secretary referred to the limited number of outstanding family + reunification cases and expressed the hope for their early resolution. + Puja replied that the GOH is studying these cases which were + only raised recently, and would continue to maintain a liberal policy in + these matters.

+

7. High level meetings: Puja then + repeated a hope expressed by Prime Minister Lazar that the leaders of the two countries could meet + soon.In telegram 103 from Budapest, + January 7, the Embassy reported Vance’s meeting with Prime Minister Lazar. The two discussed bilateral + relations, the return of the Crown, and MFN for Hungary. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + D780012–0162) Vance also met + with the President of the Hungarian National Assembly, Antal Apro, + on January 6. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs: Staff + Material, Europe, USSR, and + East/West, Hunter Subject + File, Box 14, Hungary: Crown of St Stephen: 1/78) Discussions on a + possible meeting between Vance and Kadar had taken place in late December + 1977, and in telegram 4421 from Budapest, December 22, the Embassy + reported that, despite using “oblique” language, the “message was + clear: The GOH would appreciate the + Secretary requesting a meeting with Kadar.” (National Archives, + RG 59, Central Foreign Policy + File, D770477–0938) The Department replied in telegram 305669 to + Budapest, December 23: “We do not repeat not wish to request a + meeting between the Secretary and Kadar. Our strong inclination is + to avoid such a meeting if possible.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + D770478–0850) The Embassy reported in telegram 4440 from Budapest, + December 23, that the Hungarian Government understood and that “it + is possible the Hungarians will let the matter stand that way.” + (National Archives, RG 59, Central + Foreign Policy File, D770479–0823) He then extended a formal + invitation to the Secretary to pay an official visit to Budapest.

+

8. The Secretary accepted Puja’s + invitation, with a date to be set at some time in the future. On higher + level meetings, the Secretary said that he would discuss this question + with the President and be back in touch.

+

9. Property negotiations: Puja + referred to progress and expressed hope for resolution. The Secretary + noted our pleasure at the progress which has taken place and said that a solution to + this problem would be useful in light of our relations.

+

10. Cultural exchanges: Puja + expressed the hope that the cultural agreement would be “filled.” He + said Hungary follows an open door policy and is ready for exchanges. The + Secretary replied that the USG feels + strongly the importance of cultural exchanges and is pleased at the + progress being made.In telegram 4293 from + Budapest, December 12, 1977, the Embassy reported that U.S. and Hungarian negotiators reached + an ad referendum agreement on textual changes to the “Agreement on + Cooperation in Culture, Education, Science and Technology” for the + 1978–1979 period. The agreement was signed by Assistant Secretary + Hartman on April 6, + 1977. (National Archives, RG 59, + Central Foreign Policy File, D770463–0438)

+

11. Puja visit: The Secretary said + he hoped Puja would come to the + Special Session on Disarmament and that, if he did, he would come to + Washington to meet with the Secretary.

+

12. Middle East. Puja requested a + briefing on the U.S. view of the Middle + East. The Secretary replied that Sadat’s visit to Israel was a major + breakthrough in that it helped to remove distrust which has been a + principle obstacle to negotiations. The Israeli reaction was real and + spontaneous, and there has been a fundamental change in the perceptions + of both sides. Difficult problems remain and must be solved by long and + hard negotiations. The initial discussions have not dealt with the most + serious problems. The upcoming meetings between Foreign Ministers and + Defense Ministers will be a proper forum to carry on discussions.

+

13. The U.S. hopes to make progress + through the establishment of a set of principles designed to create a + framework for further negotiations.

+

A. Nature of peace: There is a difference of views on this principle, but + it is a subject on which agreement can be reached.

+

B. Withdrawal from occupied territories: The Secretary did not discuss + this principle other than to mention it.

+

C. Resolution of the Palestinian question in all respects: This principle + is the most difficult. He referred to the President’s Aswan formulation + to which we do not yet have the reaction from all parties. We have + received privately generally positive reactions. Drafting is still ahead + of us, but this new formulation is a start and can serve as a basis.

+

14. The Secretary said that during his upcoming 2–3 day visit to + Jerusalem beginning Jan 15, he would press hard for a resolution of the + above principles. He added that the U.S. + believes that a comprehensive settlement is the only solution. A + piecemeal settlement would not last long. We hope that a general + agreement on the above set of principles would be sufficiently broad to allow those nations + who presently abstain from the negotiations to rejoin them. The U.S. does not believe the forum of the + ultimate discussions is a matter of great consequence. They can take + place in Geneva or some other city.

+

15. Puja said the GOH sees the Arab world as split into two. + He agreed that the Palestinian question is the most difficult one to + solve. Hungary rejects extremist solutions, such as the Iraqi solution. + The right to self-determination is the nucleus of the Palestinian + problem. Hungary is interested in a global settlement because any + complication in the Middle East leads to East-West confrontation.

+

16. CSCE. Puja noted the large number of proposals on the table + and asked U.S. views on how to proceed. + The Secretary replied that we believe progress has been made and that, + through the constructive review which has taken place an important + principle has been established. It is now important that we agree on a + date for a follow-on meeting. A final document for the Belgrade meeting + should be rather general in nature, thus taking care of many of the + proposals.

+

17. Nimetz added that we believe + Belgrade has been very successful. It is part of a longer term process; + in the interim period bilateral exchanges of views and concrete steps + have been and should be taken. The U.S. + would like to conclude the meeting on schedule, mid- or late February. + Specific proposals which cannot be agreed upon should be left to + discussions in other forums. The tone of the final document should + reflect the positive atmosphere of Belgrade, but should not hide our + differences of views. In conclusion Nimetz said the U.S. + delegation would return to Belgrade with instructions to seek a general + and positive final document.

+

18. Puja said that Hungary wants + to end the conference by mid-February and prefers a short and noble + final document. The GOH will pursue + proposals that remain on the table in bilateral channels.

+

19. MBFR. Puja referred to reports that the FRG is preparing a new proposal and asked + for the Secretary’s views. The Secretary said it is important to make + progress in MBFR, which has languished + too long in a state of uncertainty. There are two current questions: + Data exchange and the relation between Phase I and II. On data exchange, + we hope to solve this question. Resolution would not only create a + better atmosphere but it is important that both sides have facts about + the other. The allies realize that the relation between the two Phases + is a major concern to the Warsaw Pact. The Allies have not reached any + conclusion about any new initiative, although this is under + consideration.

+

20. Puja said the GOH believes some progress has been made + in MBFR; that the negotiations are + worthwhile and that both sides have made concessions. While there is a + strong divergence of views on percentage reductions, the GOH believes this is the way to proceed. + While the Socialist + countries have stronger conventional forces in the reduction zone, the + fire power and tactical nuclear weapons of the West must be considered + in any reduction. Agreement on any initial percentage reduction would + create confidence and provide a basis for further steps. At the same + time, Hungary, as an observer, does not play an important role.

+

21. SALT: The Secretary said the U.S. believes that progress can be made on + MBFR independent of SALT. In SALT, we believe we are making real progress and that it + may be possible to reach agreement with the Soviets in the + not-too-distant future. Puja + underlined the importance of SALT for + East-West relations in general and therefore, Hungary.

+

22. CBM’s: The Secretary expressed the hope for progress on CBM’s, noting + their importance for the U.S. Congress. + In this we feel that pre-announcement of maneuvers are particularly + important, especially since troops from the USSR can be introduced into Central Europe quickly. + Puja claimed that undetected + large troop movements are not possible.

+

23. The meeting concluded with Puja reiterating appreciation for the return of the + Crown. He said the road is now open to the solution of other outstanding + problems.

+ + Kaiser + +
+ +
+ 163. Memorandum From Secretary of State Vance to President CarterSource: + Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, + Box 50, PD 6/77–4/78. Secret. + + + Washington, March 22, + 1978 + + + SUBJECT + Trade Agreement with Hungary + +

In Presidential Directive/NSC–21See Document + 16. you directed that, following return of the Crown of + St. Stephen, the United States negotiate a trade agreement with Hungary + provided that Hungary gives adequate emigration assurances. Since the + Crown’s return we have obtained these assurances and have negotiated and signed a trade + agreement which meets the requirements of the Trade Act of 1974.In telegram 557 from Budapest, February 8, + the Embassy reported the beginning of negotiations with the + Hungarian Government on MFN and the + initial meeting between the two negotiating teams. (National + Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign + Policy File, D780058–0974) On March 2, King reported to Brzezinski that the negotiations were successful and + that the agreement would be signed in a matter of days. (Carter + Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 27, Hungary: + 1/78–1/81) The Agreement must be approved by Congress.

+

The Trade Agreement

+

The agreement, which provides for reciprocal extension of + most-favored-nation tariff status, will improve the competitive position + of US exports to Hungary. It will also pave the way for the extension of + Exim Bank and CCC credits and for + increased sales of US goods. The agreement contains strong safeguards to + protect US markets against sudden increases of imports from Hungary. + STR, Commerce and Treasury participated actively in negotiation of the + agreement. Agriculture and Labor have also approved the text.

+

Emigration Assurances

+

The assurances received from Hungary rest on several separate + elements:

+

—our review of Hungarian emigration and more than a year of detailed + discussions with Hungarian officials about their emigration law, + practice and handling of individual problem cases;

+

—Hungary’s generally positive record on emigration; and

+

—a recent exchange of letters in which Hungary has confirmed the + constructive nature of its future emigration policy (Tab 1).Tab 1 is the exchange of letters between Hungarian + Foreign Minister Puja and + Ambassador Kaiser. See also + footnotes 2–4, Document + 162.

+

We have determined that, although Hungary’s emigration law is formally + strict, its emigration practice is the most liberal in the Warsaw Pact. + As a result in Hungary we have few divided family cases. Hungary’s laws, + including that on emigration, do not discriminate against its Jewish + population. See Tab 2 for further information.Not found. In telegram 4048 from Budapest, November + 21, 1977, the Embassy reported the conclusions of airgrams A–70 and + A–71 from Budapest detailing the Embassy’s understanding of + Hungarian emigration law, policy, and practice. The Embassy + concluded that the law was strict, but sufficiently flexible to + allow the Hungarian Government to carry out a liberal emigration + policy, that the U.S. Government had + developed an effective method for handling family reunification + problems, that prospective emigrants did not suffer from + discrimination, and that emigration to Israel was not a problem. + (National Archives, RG 59, Central + Foreign Policy File, D770431–0262)

+

The Hungarians have agreed that the exchange of letters containing + confirmation of their future emigration policy may be made public. I propose that you append these + to the documents which you must submit to Congress for its approval of + the agreement.

+

Congressional and Public Attitudes

+

Key Congressmen, including Jackson, Ribicoff, Javits, Vanik and Frenzel, + and the Senate Finance and House Ways and Means staffs have reacted + favorably to the agreement and the emigration assurances. We have + encountered no opposition among Hungarian-American organizations, and + the leaders of the American Jewish community have been positive.

+

Timing

+

Representative Vanik has urged that the Administration submit the + agreement to Congress by the end of this month, in order to insure its + consideration during this session.

+
+ +
+ 164. Editorial Note +

On March 27, 1978, Assistant to the President for National Security + Affairs Zbigniew Brzezinski + forwarded a memorandum to President Jimmy + Carter recommending that he sign the necessary documents + for waiving the Jackson-Vanik Amendment requirements and submitting the + Hungarian trade agreement to Congress. (Carter Library, National + Security Affairs, Staff Material, Europe, USSR, and East/West, Larrabee Subject Chron, Box 64, [Eastern Europe]: + 12/78–12/80) Carter signed the documents on April 7. (Carter Library, + National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 50, Presidential + Determinations: 6/77–4/78)

+

On April 14, the U.S. House of + Representatives Trade Subcommittee of the House Ways and Means Committee + held hearings on the Hungarian trade agreement. Telegram 96847 to + Budapest, April 15, informed U.S. + Ambassador to Hungary Philip Kaiser that “congressional questioning was + wide and ranging, but not contentious” and generally supportive of the + agreement. Administration spokesmen included Counselor of the Department + of State Matthew Nimetz, + Kaiser, and William + Barraclough, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Commerce for International + Trade Policy. (National Archives, RG 59, + Central Foreign Policy File, D780162–0145) The House Ways and Means + Committee approved the agreement on April 27 and sent it to the full + House for a vote. (Telegram 108345 to Budapest, April 27; National + Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy + File, D780181–0537) The Subcommittee on International Trade of the Senate Finance + Committee took up the matter on May 9 and approved the agreement on June + 20. (Telegram 156979 to Budapest, June 21; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + D780257–0839) The Senate adopted the measure on June 27. (Telegram + 164324 to Budapest, June 28; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780267–1010) Following + an exchange of notes between the United States and Hungary, the + Agreement of Trade Relations Between the United States of America and + the Hungarian People’s Republic entered into force on July 7, 1978. (29 + UST 2711)

+
+ +
+ 165. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security + Affairs (Brzezinski) to + President CarterSource: Carter Library, National + Security Affairs, Brzezinski + Material, Subject File, Box 50, Presidential Determinations: + 5/78–7/79. Confidential. Sent for action. Tabs A through C are + attached but not printed. + + + Washington, May 30, + 1979 + + + SUBJECT + Extension of Jackson-Vanik Waivers + +

Cy Vance has forwarded a package + recommending that you (1) extend your general waiver authority; and (2) + continue the waivers for Hungary and Romania for another 12 months. (Tab + C) Treasury, Commerce, STR, and Agriculture concur.The “Recommendation for Extension of Waiver + Authority” is printed in Public Papers: Carter, + 1979, Book I, pp. 978–979. (C)

+

This is a routine action. However, failure to renew your waiver authority + would mean that the United States would no longer be able to extend + MFN on a reciprocal basis to any + East European country or to the Soviet Union or China. Failure to + continue the Hungarian and Romanian waivers would severely damage our + relations with these two countries and undermine the policy set forth in + PD–21 regarding Eastern European countries. (C)

+

Under the Trade Act Presidential action on both these issues is required + by June 3. (C)

+

RECOMMENDATIONS:

+

1. That you sign the transmittal message to the Congress at Tab A which + forwards your recommendation on the general waiver authority and the continuation of the + waivers for Romania and Hungary.The + President’s message is printed in Public Papers: + Carter, 1979, Book I, p. 978. (C)

+

2. That you sign the Presidential Determination at Tab B that the further + extension of the waiver authority granted by subsection 402(c) of the + Trade Act will substantially promote the Jackson-Vanik objective of free + emigration.Carter signed the waivers. + See Presidential Directive 79–10 printed in Public + Papers: Carter, 1979, Book I, p. 979. (C)

+

OMB concurs.

+
+ +
+ 166. Memorandum of ConversationSource: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, + Brzezinski Material, + Brzezinski Office File, + Country Chron File, Box 17, Hungary: 1979–80. Secret. Drafted by + Larrabee. The meeting + took place in Brzezinski’s + office. + + + Washington, July 16, 1979, 3:15–4 + p.m. + + + SUBJECT + Summary of Dr. Brzezinski’s Meeting with Hungarian Deputy Prime + Minister Istvan Huszar (U) + + + PARTICIPANTS + H.E. Istvan Huszar, Deputy Prime Minister, Hungarian People’s + Republic + H.E. Janos Nagy, Deputy Foreign Minister, Hungarian People’s + Republic + H.E. Ferenc Esztergalyos, + Ambassador to the United States + Mr. Gyorgy Banlaki, Interpreter + + Dr. Zbigniew + Brzezinski + Mr. Stephen Larrabee, + Notetaker + +

Dr. Brzezinski opened the meeting by welcoming DPM + Huszar to the United States.On July 9, + Larrabee informed + Brzezinski that Huszar + was traveling to the United States at the invitation of Secretary of + Commerce Kreps. Kreps requested that the President + briefly meet with Huszar. Larrabee recommended that, in light of the + President’s busy schedule, Brzezinski meet with the Hungarian official instead, + with a Presidential “drop-by,” if his schedule permits. Brzezinski disapproved both + recommendations. (Ibid.) However, on July 16, Tarnoff forwarded a Department of + State briefing paper for Brzezinski’s meeting with Huszar. In his memorandum + to Brzezinski forwarding the + paper, Larrabee stated that + Vance was sick and could + not meet with Huszar as scheduled. (Ibid.) He said that he + had spoken earlier to the President (who was making a speech in Kansas on energy). The + President had specifically told Dr. Brzezinski to tell DPM Huszar how happy he was to have a + Hungarian statesman visiting the White House. (U)

+

DPM Huszar thanked Dr. Brzezinski. He informed him that on + Friday he had met with First Secretary Kadar to discuss his upcoming + trip to the United States. During the meeting Kadar had asked him to + convey his best regards to President Carter. Huszar then added that he fully understood the + busy schedule which the President had and asked that Dr. Brzezinski convey to him his best + regards. (U)

+

Dr. Brzezinski stressed the importance that the United + States attached to relations with Hungary, both symbolically and + substantively. The US felt that relations had been developing well. The + return of the Crown had been important symbolically in contributing to + the improvement of relations. (U)

+

DPM Huszar agreed. He felt that relations were + developing well. The return of the Crown and the Coronation Jewels had + had an important impact on relations. He understood that Dr. Brzezinski had also played an + important role in the decision and he wished to thank him for his + contribution. (U)

+

Dr. Brzezinski said that he was pleased to have played + a role and noted that perhaps his ethnic background had been helpful. + (U)

+

DPM Huszar then gave Dr. Brzezinski a gift of a coin + commemorating the return of the Crown. (U)

+

Dr. Brzezinski stated that he had been to Hungary + several times. He had been impressed with the Hungarians’ sense of + history and the importance that they attached to history. He had been + particularly pleased to see a monument to General Bem. (U)

+

DPM Huszar noted that Bem was a common national + hero. The Hungarian people referred to him as Father Bem. He then turned + to political relations, noting that he could not say very much new, but + that this was good. (U)

+

Dr. Brzezinski interjected that it was often more + important who said it, not whether it was old or new. (U)

+

DPM Huszar commented that political relations were + improving and that meetings between officials of the two countries were + becoming more frequent. He was glad that Representatives and Senators + were visiting Hungary in increasing numbers. In this connection he noted + that he was the third Hungarian Prime Minister to visit the United + States. Continuing, he stressed that he wanted to say that the Hungarian + Government was officially prepared to raise the level of political + relations. He had come to the United States with this specific task. + Beyond this, however, he had no specific agenda; there were no + agreements to be signed. He was glad to have the opportunity for an exchange of views on ways to + remove obstacles to improve relations. The United States and Hungary + should have relations appropriate and worthy of the two countries. + (C)

+

Turning to the economic area, Huszar stressed that US and Hungarian firms + should be encouraged to deal with each other. He hoped that the visit + would lead to concrete gains in this regard. He was happy that he had + had an opportunity to meet people in the government at the political + level as well as the financial and monetary circles. In general, there + had been no change since the visit of US officials. Noting that the + Hungarian Government was crossing its fingers that SALT would be ratified, he said that + Hungary hoped that the ratification would have a beneficial impact on + the MBFR discussions in Vienna. + (C)

+

Huszar then returned to the subject of bilateral relations. It was a + source of great satisfaction to the Hungarian Government that a lot had + transpired in relations between the two countries. The trade agreement + had brought its first results. Hungarian exports had grown by two thirds + over the last year. Imports had increased, but to a lesser extent. Talks + at the recent Joint Economic Commission meeting had been useful and + constructive. Noting that interest in American firms and markets on the + part of Hungarians had increased, he said that the Hungarian Government + hoped to see the active involvement of American firms and companies; + however, the US occupied only eighth place in Hungarian trade with + capitalist countries. (C)

+

In response, Dr. Brzezinski said that he would like to make + three points. First, the United States was also prepared to move further + on the political level. There were always practical scheduling problems, + but he wanted to register the basic point that we were ready to move + forward. He suggested that the appropriate authorities in both countries + stay in touch in order to find the right moment for announcing this + publically. (C)

+

Noting that bilateral relations were moving well, Dr. + Brzezinski said he + would like to make two additional points on wider issues. The first was + in regard to SALT. The United States + attached considerable importance to SALT and the impact that this could have on US-Soviet + relations and detente. If the Senate were to refuse to ratify SALT it would be a setback for detente. + The Senate would not ratify the agreement unless it was sure that it + could be verified. In order to verify the agreement, the United States + had to engage in verification activities and overflights over Turkey. + Whether or not to permit such activities over Turkey was a decision for + the Turkish government alone. However, the Turks would not give this + permission if the Soviet Union regarded it as an unfriendly act. + Therefore, positive Soviet acquiescence was needed. This was not the + same as Soviet permission, Dr. Brzezinski emphasized, because it was not the Soviet + right. The question was one of + acquiescence. The Soviets did not seem quite to understand this. They + seemed to equate the verification activities with more traditional forms + of intelligence gathering. The United States felt there was a + fundamental distinction and that a more sophisticated Soviet attitude on + this question would be an important contribution to detente. Precisely + because Hungary had a fundamental interest in US-Soviet detente, the + Hungarians had an interest in this question and could make a + contribution to detente if they could influence the Soviets in a + positive direction on this question. (S)

+

Dr. Brzezinski stated that his last point was motivated + by his desire to widen and make more firm US-Soviet detente. Contrary to + his reputation, he strongly believed that unless US-Soviet detente was + broadly based and genuinely reciprocal, the American people would + eventually reject it. He then turned to the question of instability in + the Third World. To the end of this century, many parts of the world + were going to be in turmoil. This was not our doing, nor was it the + Soviet’s doing. This was a result of internal dynamics in many of the + countries involved. However, he wished to emphasize that if this + turbulence was exploited by one side or the other, it could undermine + detente. The US was particularly concerned by the Soviet use of Cubans + as proxies in certain areas of the Third World. This use of the Cuban + military was bound to have an impact on American attitudes, and in fact + the impact was already beginning to be felt. It was always more + difficult to start something like that than to terminate it. We did not + expect the Soviet Union to turn it off like a faucet, but we would hope + that the Soviets would be sensitive to our concerns, whether in Africa + or Latin America. We had been sensitive to Soviet concerns so far. But + the Soviet side had to understand the need for restraint. This was why + in Vienna that we told the Soviets that it was not our purpose to use + our relations with China against the Soviet Union. We understood Soviet + concerns and we realized any attempt to use China against the Soviet + Union would create problems for detente. However, if present trends + continued, there would be a strong reaction in the United States. The + Presidential elections had a way of surfacing these visceral attitudes. + He mentioned this, he said, because we recognized the larger interest + which Hungary had in East-West cooperation and coordination. (S)

+

Dr. Brzezinski concluded the + meeting by taking DPM Huszar on a tour of the Oval Office. (U)

+
+ +
+ 167. Telegram From the Embassy in Hungary to the Department of + StateSource: National + Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign + Policy File, D800032–0785. Confidential. Sent for information to + Belgrade, East Berlin, Bucharest, Moscow, Prague, Sofia, Warsaw, and + USNATO. + + + Budapest, January 16, + 1980, 1226Z + +

214. Subject: US Goals, Objectives and Resource Management (GORM) for + FY 1982: Ambassador’s Policy + Statement. Ref: A. CERP 0001, B. State 310299.In telegram 310299 to all diplomatic posts, + December 1, 1979, the Department updated the reporting requirements + for the Embassies’ annual review sent to Washington, effective + beginning fiscal year 1982. The Department reported that annual + reports were no longer required unless certain conditions warranted + such a report. Among those conditions: “the Ambassador or Bureau + believes [a report] necessary, including a change in circumstances + affecting relations with that country.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, [no + film number])

+

1. (C)-entire text.

+

2. Present state of relations: At the beginning of 1980, U.S. policy toward Eastern Europe is + undergoing its stiffest test since the issuance of PD–21 in September + 1977.See Document + 16. The Department is addressing the issue of what + our policy would be in light of the response of Eastern Europe to the + Iranian and Afghan crises and the convincing display of the power of the + Soviet Union these two crises provoked to impose discipline on the + Governments of Eastern Europe on issues of crucial importance to the + Soviets. I endorse the Department’s preliminary position as outlined in + State 9408.In telegram 9408 to USNATO and Bonn, January 12, the + Department provided initial guidance on United States policy toward + Eastern Europe in the wake of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. + (National Archives, RG 59, Central + Foreign Policy File, D800021–0454) See Document 36 and footnote 6 thereto.

+

3. The differentiated policy called for in PD–21 will be particularly + difficult to maintain at a time of East-West tension and polarization. I + do not expect the Hungarian regime to adopt positions distinctive from + those of the Soviet Union on Iran and particularly on Afghanistan. The + Hungarians are well aware of the high price the subservience of their + foreign policy to Soviet goals and propaganda will exact, if not in + terms of specific issues in our relations, then in the overall + deterioration in the East-West climate, to which Hungary is particularly + vulnerable. The delay in ratification of SALT II makes the immediate outlook for East-West relations + even more bleak.

+

4. Up to the time of these crises, we achieved step-by-step progress in + our bilateral relations with Hungary. We have:

+ +

—Successfully concluded the program document to the cultural and + scientific exchange agreementThe “Agreement + between the Government of the United States of American and the + Government of the Hungarian People’s Republic on Cooperation in + Culture, Education, Science and Technology” went in effect May 21, + 1979. (30 UST 1502) and secured a satisfactory site for our + first major independent cultural exhibit in Hungary.

+

—Deepened our economic cooperation through an EXIM/National Bank Agreement, a Double Taxation + Agreement, The United States and + Hungary signed an exchange of notes on the “Avoidance of Double + Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with Respect to Taxes + on Income” in Washington on February 12. The Senate approved the + agreement on July 9 and President Carter signed the instrument of ratification on + August 7. (Carter Library, White House Central Files, Countries, Box + CO–30, CO 67, 1/20/77–1/20/81) The agreement entered into force + September 18, 1979. (30 UST 6357) a successful first meeting + of our Joint Economic and Commercial Committee, and implementation of a + bilateral MTN agreement.Telegram 6432 from + Budapest, December 28, 1979, reported that the United + States-Hungarian Tariff Agreement went into effect January 1, 1980. + (National Archives, RG 59, Central + Foreign Policy File, D790596–0235)

+

—Continued to urge the GOH to resolve + outstanding family reunification problem cases, which have been kept to + a minimum.

+

—Made progress toward a property settlement; and

+

—Maintained a high level political dialogue through successful visits: + Codels O’Neill, Brademan, and Vanik and Assistant Secretary Vest to Hungary and Deputy Prime + Minister Huszar to the United States.See + Document 166 for a memorandum of + conversation between Huszar and Brzezinski. Further substantial (although + unspectacular) progress on such projects as the provision of Consular + services to increasing numbers of Americans and Hungarians, markedly + increased distribution of ICA + materials, and the opening of offices in Budapest by Dow Chemical and an + American bank underlined our growing practical interaction with Hungary + and consequent decrease in Hungary’s dependence on the Soviet Union.

+

5. We still have problems: Some family reunification cases persist in + spite of our general success in this area; a serious dispute over patent + rights or the violation of them; slow development of our share of the + Hungarian market following the extension of MFN; too slow progress in our property negotiations; + discouragingly limited contact with Party officials; and above all at + this time, unacceptable criticism in the Hungarian media of the U.S. and our policies reflecting a + comprehensive identification with Soviet policies.

+

6. The Hungarian regime, for its own reasons, continued to follow + policies which will redound to our long-term benefit; an international + approach to economic + problems, including economic reform; toleration of limited internal + dissidence and criticism; and reasonably settled church/state relations + which permit, inter alia, increased interaction with American religious + institutions.

+

7. The next two years: It is not possible at this time to predict how + long the deterioration in East-West relations will last, but this trend + will undoubtedly dominate our relations with Hungary for the first part + of this period. We should expect our ability to make progress in + bilateral relations with Hungary will be affected even though the + Hungarians have already told us that they hope the present international + scene will not hurt our bilateral relations.

+

8. We should take into account other specific developments which may also + have some influence on our policies:

+

A. Party Congress: The Hungarian Party Congress will be held in + March.See Document + 168. The outlook is that the leading political + personality in Hungary, Janos Kadar, will remain in power and that his + policies, most notably economic reform and relatively relaxed domestic + policies, will be reaffirmed and continued. The main themes of Hungary’s + foreign policies, including its loyal support of the USSR, will also be reaffirmed. If the + examination of Hungarian policy which will take place at the Congress + results in any major changes leading away from internal liberalization + or produces such changes in the Hungarian relationship with the Soviet + Union as an increased military role for Hungary within the Warsaw Pact, + our policies will need reassessment. In this regard, we should examine + the Hungarian posture in case instability develops in Eastern Europe as + a result of some crucial development such as Tito’s death.

+

B. Economics: Hungary is attempting both economic reform and + stabilization at the same time. Reform opens up possibilities which we + should be alert to pursue to increase Hungary’s integration into the + West and encourage its development of a decentralized and market + oriented economy. Trade and possible membership in the IMF are obvious areas of possible + cooperation. Stabilization means that the Hungarian regime will be less + capable of responding to the needs of the Hungarian people for a better + standard of living. Both elements introduce elements of potential + political instability into a overall stable situation. For the + foreseeable future, Hungary will be following a policy of relative + economic austerity, which will hamper our efforts to increase our + exports and may undercut to some extent the political acceptance by the + Hungarian people of the present regime.

+

C. CSCE: The Madrid Conference is + scheduled for November. On balance, I believe we should continue to plan + to consult with the Hungarians + to explore areas of cooperation which are in the U.S. national interest. At the same time, we should clear + up a few lingering aspects of our relations which date from the past: + remove personnel ceilings on our respective Embassies and agree on the + issuance of multiple-entry visas for businessmen. We welcome the + Hesburgh Commission’s mandate to examine the INA and hope that the + present section 212 (a) 28 will be rewritten to permit more flexibility, + thereby reducing both a political irritant as well as our Consular work + load.

+

D. Complexion of relations: With the signing of the Trade Agreement in + 1978 and implementation of the steps which flowed from this development + (EXIM facilities, for example) the + emphasis on economic relations has shifted to practical hard work + directed toward increased trade and economic cooperation. Implementation + rather than striking new advances is what we should expect. On the other + hand, we should be able to look forward to cooperation in the cultural + field to an extent unprecedented since the end of the war now that we + have established the framework. The new result of these two developments + is that the emphasis in our current work may shift from economic to + cultural.

+

9. Political work will continue to be difficult. A dialogue through high + level visits remains our best tool here. In this connection, the desire + of Kadar to visit the U.S. must be + addressed after the elections of November 1980. This may be the dominant + issue in our relations in 1981.

+

10. Our highest administrative priority will be a property settlement. + For the first time in several years an administrative issue may well be + at the forefront of our relations.

+

11. Hungary in a regional and global context: Global issues—Iran, + Afghanistan, SALT II—are bound to have + an adverse effect on our relations with Hungary and may eventually + dominate them if the present downward trend in the East-West climate + continues. I expect Hungary to remain in the middle of the Eastern + European pack. They will try hard to preserve the progress they have + made with the U.S. in the economic + field, because it is in their long term interest as well as ours. At the + same time they will continue to identify closely with the Soviet Union, + with some nuances which are not really that important to us, but of some + significance to the more “progressive” elements in the society. The + Hungarians would not want to risk a sharp Soviet reaction which would + sweep away completely the relative economic independence they have + worked so hard to achieve.

+

12. Resources: The nature of our relationship with Hungary has changed + substantially over the past two years, but the resources of the Embassy + have not kept up with this change, especially in personnel. We have + greatly expanded our ICA work and have + prospects of an even greater expansion in cultural exchanges. We need an + additional person in the field. + Both our political and economic work have increased to the point where + with existing staff we can handle little more than day-to-day + operational work. We do not have the resources to report in depth on + significant developments affecting Hungarian internal economic and + political policies, as well as our bilateral relations. We are forced + practically to ignore analysis of the highly significant labor and + religious scenes. We need an additional political officer and an + additional economic officer if we are to more than scratch the surface + in our analysis of Hungarian political, social and economic + developments.

+ + Kaiser + +
+
+ 168. Intelligence Assessment Prepared in the Central Intelligence + AgencySource: Central + Intelligence Agency, Office of Support Services (DI), Job 81T00208, + Production Case Files (1979–1980), Box 2, Folder 24, Hungary on the + Eve of the 12th Party Congress. Secret; + [handling restriction not declassified]. + The assessment was prepared in the Office of Economic Research and + coordinated with the Office of Central Reference and the National + Intelligence Officer for the USSR + and Eastern Europe. + + + Washington, March + 1980 + +

Hungary on the Eve of the 12th Party Congress [classification not declassified]

+

Key Judgments

+

At the 12th Congress of the Hungarian Socialist Workers Party, scheduled + to begin on 24 March, First Secretary Janos Kadar will seek endorsement + of current policies rather than undertake new ones.

+

As Hungary enters the 1980s, Kadar must draw heavily upon the reserves of + popular trust he has established during 23 years of rule. Public + confidence in Kadar’s leadership, probably unparalleled in other Warsaw + Pact countries, rests upon his responsiveness to the demands of + Hungarian consumers and to his use of compromise and moderation rather + than repression to maintain political control. Compromise and moderation + have been particularly evident in Kadar’s handling of intellectuals and, + in recent years, in his relations with the Catholic Church.

+

Major challenges confront Kadar in the area of economic policy. To + improve Hungary’s hard currency balance of payments, the regime will continue to curtail + economic growth and allow the standard of living to stagnate. It will + also continue to implement an economic reform plan that entails + relaxation of central controls and greater reliance on market forces. + Prices, which are flexible and in many cases market determined, are to + be generally responsive to world price changes. Enterprises have + received greater freedom to determine wages and discharge workers; they + will retain a substantial portion of their profits but will no longer be + immune from bankruptcy.

+

In the conduct of foreign policy, Kadar has managed to secure from Moscow + a degree of latitude that surpasses that of any other Warsaw Pact state + except Romania. He has done this by adhering closely to the Soviet line + on issues the USSR considers most + important while cultivating better relations with the West, particularly + in the commercial sphere. Kadar appears to retain the confidence of + Soviet leader Brezhnev, who said + in Budapest last May that recognition of the “specific features” of each + country had become the “norm” in Soviet-Hungarian relations.

+

Notable benefits have come from improved relations with the United + States. The Kadar regime gained politically from the US decisions to + return the Crown of St. Stephen—the symbol of Hungarian nationhood—and + to grant Hungary most-favored-nation trading status.

+

The months ahead will test Kadar’s ability to maintain both his domestic + and foreign policies. Complex economic problems will confront those + charged with implementing reform; public apprehension and resentment + over stringent economic measures will tax the ability of the regime to + maintain popular confidence; if the international situation continues to + deteriorate, Kadar may find it increasingly difficult to accommodate + Soviet sensitivities while maintaining positive relations with the + West.

+

[1 line not declassified]

+

[Omitted here is the body of the assessment.]

+
+ +
+ 169. Memorandum From Timothy + Deal of the National Security Council Staff to the + President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)Source: Carter Library, National + Security Council, Institutional Files, Box 111, SCC 291, 3/20/80 Iran/Afghanistan. + Confidential. A stamped notation at the top of the page indicates + that Brzezinski saw the + memorandum. + + + Washington, March 19, + 1980 + + + SUBJECT + SCC on March + 20: Hungarian Grain + +

The SCC asked for an assessment of + reports that Hungary is selling grain to the USSR and might replace it with US grain. We have confirmed + that the Soviets have asked Hungary for 800,000 tons of wheat. The + Hungarians told us they will meet this request from domestic supplies. + (C)

+

After the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, we informed East Europe + Governments that diversion of US grain or controlled technology to the + USSR would adversely affect + bilateral relations and jeopardize additional purchases from the US. In + the case of Hungary, we also said we would take into account any + significant change in the pattern of Hungarian grain imports from the US + and Hungarian exports to the USSR + which might indicate surrogate purchases for the USSR. (C)

+

State has prepared an options paper (attached)The undated paper, entitled “East European Grain + Sales to the Soviet Union,” is attached but not printed. for + SCC consideration. The + Implementation Group reviewed it at today’s meeting. The paper sets + forth three options: (1) continue present policy; (2) request East + European countries not to sell grain to the USSR from domestic supplies above traditional export levels + and avoid diversion of US grain; (3) seek commitments from NATO allies and other Western grain + exporters on the establishment of quantitative limits on grain exports + to each Eastern European country. (C)

+

After extended debate, agencies recommended that the SCC approve Option 1, as amended in the + discussion. State will present this position in the meeting. Under + option 1, we would: (a) continue to urge Eastern European countries to + avoid diversion of US grain to the USSR or use grain to replace exports to the USSR; (b) not object to sales of grain to + the USSR from domestic supplies; (c) + monitor carefully Hungarian and Eastern European grain trade with the US + and other cooperating countries; and (d) urge West European governments + not to make extraordinary + shipments of grain to Hungary and other East European countries. (C)

+

I recommend you support Option one for the following reasons:

+

—We have no evidence that Hungary or other Eastern European countries are + diverting grain to the USSR although + there are still numerous possibilities for swaps or transshipments.

+

—It would be exceptionally difficult to define “traditional” or “normal” + Hungarian or East European trade with the USSR. For example, in the past five years, Hungarian grain + exports to the USSR have ranged from + 137 to 854 thousand tons.

+

—Option 2 would require a greater degree of cooperation from Hungary than + we would expect from our allies and third world countries.

+

—Western grain exporters will not agree to quantitative limits on exports + to East Europe as proposed in Option 3.

+

—We have a strong a political stake in treating East Europe differently + from the USSR so long as these + countries limit their involvement in Afghanistan or in other future + Soviet ventures. (C)

+

Whatever option the SCC chooses, State + should reemphasize to the Hungarian government that we consider this a + critical issue and that efforts by Hungary or other East European + countries to circumvent our controls will have a serious, long-term + impact on overall relations.On March 21, + Brzezinski informed the + Secretaries of State, Defense, Agriculture, the Treasury, Commerce, + and the Director of Central Intelligence that the President had + “approved the recommendation of the SCC as follows: We should deal with the Hungarian case + on its own merits, without attempting to expand it into a universal + set of guidelines. We should inform the Hungarians that we consider + sales of 800,000 tons to the USSR + this year to be excessive by about 200,000 tons and inform them that + sales in that amount—as well as diversion of high technology + items—would be seen by the U.S. as + unfavorable and would be taken into account in our future sales of + grain and other items to Hungary.” (Carter Library, National + Security Council, Institutional Files, Box 111, SCC 291, 3/20/80 + Iran/Afghanistan) (C)

+
+ +
+ 170. Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the Department of + State (Tarnoff) to the + President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)Source: Carter Library, National + Security Council, Institutional Files, Box 111, SCC 293, 3/25/80 Iran/Afghanistan. + Confidential. Deal forwarded + the memorandum to Aaron on + April 2, informing Brzezinski that the Department had not included hard + numbers in the discussion with the Hungarians to protect the + Hungarian source who had provided the information to the USDA. + (Ibid.) + + + Washington, March 29, + 1980 + + + SUBJECT + Hungarian Wheat Sales to the USSR + +

The Department of State has implemented the approved recommendation of + the SCC meeting of March 20, 1980, by + calling in Hungarian Ambassador Esztergalyos on March 28 and informing him as + follows:In telegram 83534 to Budapest, + March 29, the Department informed the Embassy of the discussion + between Barry and the + Hungarian Ambassador the day before. The points outlined in the + March 29 memorandum to Brzezinski were delivered to Ambassador Esztergalyos as a non-paper. + (National Archives, RG 59, Central + Foreign Policy File, D800158–0779) In telegram 1732 from Budapest, + the Embassy suggested that the Hungarians “definitely have the + message and understand our position” but that “from our viewpoint, + we believe that we should not continue to hit the Hungarians on + wheat diversion until we have more evidence that we should be + concerned.” (National Archives, RG + 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800168–0763)

+ +

—We attach importance to the limitations we have placed on sales + of both grain and high technology to the USSR. We have explained to your government and to many + others that diversion of such items to the USSR would be viewed most unfavorably by us.

+

—On high technology exports, we have purposely continued sales to + Eastern European countries because we have wanted to recognize their + special needs and their noninvolvement in the invasion of + Afghanistan.

+

—On grain, we understand that the Soviet Union has asked to buy an + abnormally large amount of grain from Hungary this year, up to + several hundred thousand tons above the shipments in the most recent + years. We believe shipments of this magnitude would be somewhat + excessive. They would be viewed unfavorably by the US and taken into + account in our own future sales of grain to Hungary because such + Hungarian shipments would undercut our policy of reducing the total + of our grain shipments to the Soviet Union.

 + +

In addition, we have instructed our embassies in Canberra and Ottawa and + our mission in Brussels to inform host governments and the Commission of + our approach to the Hungarians on grain exports as soon as we have advised them that the demarche + has been made in Washington.

+ + Peter + Tarnoff + + +
+ +
+ 171. Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the Department of + State (Tarnoff) to the + President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)Source: Carter Library, National + Security Affairs, Brzezinski + Material, Country File, Box 27, Hungary: 1/78–1/81. Confidential. No + memorandum of conversation was found. Stephen Larrabee, of the NSC, forwarded the briefing paper to David Aaron under a May 28 covering + memorandum outlining the main points. (Ibid.) Attached biographic + material is not printed. + + + Washington, May 27, + 1980 + + + SUBJECT + Briefing Paper for Mr. Aaron’s Meeting with Hungarian Deputy Foreign + Minister Janos Nagy, Wednesday, May 28, 1980, at 4:30 p.m. + +

I. PARTICIPANTS

+ + + + Americans + Mr. Aaron + + + + + Hungarians + Janos NAGY, Deputy Foreign Minister (Phonetic: + NODGE) + Ambassador Janos PETRAN, Chief MFA Department V + Ferenc + ESZTERGALYOS, Hungarian Ambassador to the U.S. (Phonetic: + Ess-ter-GUY-oash) + + + +

II. INTRODUCTION

+

Nagy is responsible for Hungary’s relations with the West. He will be + named very shortly to be State Secretary, the number two position in the + Foreign Ministry. Petran is Hungary’s chief CSCE and disarmament negotiator, and has just been named to + head MFA Territorial Department V, + which conducts Hungary’s relations with the U.S., Canada, the U.K., the FRG and Benelux. Nagy and Petran are heading a Hungarian + delegation to the U.S. for annual + consultations on CSCE.Nagy also met with Counselor Ridgway and Under Secretary + Nimetz. In telegram + 142884 to Budapest, May 31, the Department informed the Embassy of + Ridgway’s discussions + with Nagy, which focused on East-West relations, high-level visits, + trade, economic, and cultural relations. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + D800266–0800) The Department transmitted the memorandum of + conversation between Nimetz + and Nagy on June 3, to Budapest in telegram 145697. The conversation + focused on East-West relations, bilateral relations, Yugoslavia, and + CSCE. (National Archives, + RG 59, Central Foreign Policy + File, D800272–0403)

+

Hungary continues to stand out among Warsaw Pact countries in terms of + its relatively relaxed domestic situation, commitment to economic + reforms, and forthcoming attitude toward CSCE implementation. In the post-Afghanistan period Hungary + has continued to stress detente and CSCE. The Hungarians welcome our policy of continuing to + seek further improvements in U.S.-Hungarian relations.

+

III. ISSUES

+

A. Afghanistan and + East-West Relations

+

—U.S. opposition to the Soviet invasion + of Afghanistan arises from a sincere desire to further the cause of + international peace and stability. The Soviets’ use of force against a + small country threatens the security of all nations and raises serious + questions about their future intentions.

+

—The actions we have taken against the Soviets, therefore, are not + intended to affect Eastern Europe. We continue to sell grain and + controlled technology to Hungary. While our export licensing controls + have been extended, we will continue to grant exceptions to specific + restrictions for exports to Hungary and other Eastern European + countries.

+

—However, as we have pointed out to Hungarian officials on a number of + occasions, continued access to U.S. + grain and sensitive technology will depend on Hungary’s willingness to + respect our concerns regarding their end use.

+

B. Iran

+

—Although we appreciate Hungary’s private statements strongly + disapproving of Iran’s holding of diplomatic hostages, we are + disappointed by Hungary’s public statements which tend to emphasize + Iran’s alleged grievances against the United States and imply that the + hostages are strictly a bilateral issue.

+

—We are actively pursuing all opportunities for discussion with Iran that + could lead to an honorable resolution of the crisis. We are convinced + that economic sanctions supported by nations committed to the peaceful resolution of disputes + will have a constructive impact, contributing to the resolution of the + crisis.

+

—We believe that Hungary shares an interest in the release of the + hostages, which would contribute to the easing of tensions and would + create a safer environment for diplomats of all nations. Active steps by + Hungary to secure the hostages’ release would be deeply appreciated by + our government and people.

+

+ C. Bilateral Relations

+

—We are pleased with the great progress we have made in our bilateral + relations over the past three years. It is no exaggeration to say that + the President’s decision to return the Crown of St. Stephen to the + Hungarian people and the signing of the Trade Agreement in July 1978 + marked the beginning of a new era in U.S.-Hungarian relations.

+

—We remain committed to improving relations with Hungary on the basis of + mutual respect and advantage.For an + attached political overview of Hungary, see Document 172.

+ + •It reflects our mutual desire to expand economic and commercial + relations. + •It reflects our mutual desire to implement the provisions of all + three baskets of the Helsinki Final Act. + + + + Peter + Tarnoff + + +
+ +
+ 172. Paper Prepared in the Department of StateSource: Carter Library, National + Security Affairs, Brzezinski + Material, Country File, Box 27, Hungary: 1/78–1/81. + Confidential. + + + Washington, May + 1980 + +

Hungary—Political Overview

+

Foreign Affairs

+

Hungary is allied with the USSR and + consistently backs Soviet positions on major international issues. + However, on matters of lesser significance to the Soviet Union and of + direct importance to Hungary, Hungarian foreign policy displays + independent and sovereign aspects. One such area arises out of Hungary’s + heavy dependence on foreign trade and its desire for Western technology. + Accordingly, since 1977 Party First Secretary Kadar has made official + visits to Austria, West Germany, Italy and France, and Hungary has + developed an extensive set of primarily economically-oriented relations + with Western countries, including the U.S. Western countries, in turn, utilize Hungary’s + forthcoming attitude toward the Helsinki Final Act to engage in + constructive dialogues with Hungary on all three Baskets of CSCE, including its humanitarian and + cultural provisions. (U)

+

Hungary has followed what it calls a “principled” policy in regard to + Iran. This couples expressions of understanding for Iran’s grievances + against the United States with low-key denunciation of the holding of + diplomatic hostages as a violation of international law. After initial + hesitation, Hungary has followed the Soviet line on Afghanistan, with + emphasis on the arguments that the Soviet intervention was “lawful” + under agreements between the USSR and + Afghanistan and that the latter had the right to request “self-defense” + aid from its neighbor. (U)

+

U.S.-Hungarian relations have improved + dramatically in the past several years. The two most important elements + in this improvement were the return of the Crown of Saint Stephen to the + Hungarian people on January 6, 1978, by a Presidential delegation headed + by Secretary Vance, and the + entry into force on July 7, 1978, of a trade agreement establishing + MFN tariff treatment for the + exports of both countries. The trade agreement negotiations entailed + discussions and understandings with Hungary on questions of emigration + in compliance with the Jackson-Vanik provisions of the Trade Act of + 1974. (U)

+

Although there have been no major outstanding political issues between + the U.S. and Hungary since conclusion of + the Trade Agreement in 1978, deteriorating U.S.–Soviet relations have made more difficult the task of maintaining and building on + the recent progress in U.S.–Hungarian + relations. Although both sides have signaled a desire to maintain + positive aspects of the bilateral relationship, Hungary has quietly + exhibited some nervousness about being placed in an embarrassing + position relative to the Soviet Union by being ostensibly favored by the + U.S. in the framework of our + differentiated policy toward Eastern Europe. Hungary also is concerned + about the degree to which U.S. + export-control measures directed against the Soviet Union may impinge on + it. We, in turn, have concerns about the potential diversion of U.S. grain or technology to the USSR. (C)

+

Domestic Affairs

+

The Communist Party leadership retains control over political life. + However, through its “alliances” policy the Party encourages + participation of Communists and non-Communists alike in building + “socialist” Hungary under the maxim, “who is not against us is with us.” + (U)

+

Party First Secretary Janos Kadar has gained a large degree of acceptance + among the political elite and the public, and Hungarians credit the + government with having achieved substantial improvements in living + standards, a relaxed cultural atmosphere, and political and economic + stability over the years since 1956. (U)

+

In 1968 Hungary introduced an economic reform called the New Economic + Mechanism (NEM) which is in large part + responsible for Hungary’s relative domestic prosperity. The NEM provides for a large degree of + enterprise and managerial autonomy in making production and pricing + decisions. In mid-1979 Hungary began to implement a series of measures + to revitalize this mechanism to make the economy more efficient and + internationally competitive. The new measures have already entailed + major consumer price increases which, coupled with energy conservation + stringencies, portend a pause in the increase in living standards. + (U)

+

Although the Hungarian Government does not encourage religion, it + tolerates it. It is at peace with Protestants and Jews, and has reached + a modus vivendi with the Vatican and with the + Catholic Church in Hungary. Laszlo Cardinal Lekai was recognized in 1976 + as head of the Catholic Church in Hungary, the first primate since + Cardinal Mindszenty. (U)

+

Hungary permits a significant degree of freedom of travel for its + citizens to Western countries. Some 355,000 Hungarians (out of a + population of 10.6 million) currently visit the West annually. Hungary’s + record on permitting emigration is modestly positive. (U)

+

The Twelfth Congress of the Hungarian Socialist Workers Party in late + March endorsed Hungary’s unique (in communist terms) economic reform + measures while reiterating Hungary’s allegiance to its alliance with the + USSR and support for Soviet + foreign policy positions. Billed as a “working Congress,” this quinquennial meeting + addressed primarily domestic concerns. In a thematic context which both + emphasized and called for more trust between Party and people, the + Congress in effect ratified the Kadarist domestic course, including new + economic reform measures. (C)

+
+ +
+ 173. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in + HungarySource: National + Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign + Policy File, D800424–0288. Confidential; Priority. Sent for + information to Madrid. Drafted by Longo; cleared by Bridges and + Barry; approved by + Ridgway. + + + + Washington, September 6, 1980, 0128Z + +

237207. Madrid for Zimmerman, CSCE + Del. Subject: Hungarian Ambassador’s + Meeting With the Counselor.

+

1. (C)-entire text

+

2. Summary: Meeting with Counselor Ridgway following home leave consultations in Budapest, + Hungarian Ambassador Esztergalyos + confirmed Hungary’s intent to maintain and extend positive bilateral + relations. Esztergalyos expressed + concern about the President’s reference to Hungary’s human rights + practices in his nomination acceptance speech,Referring to human rights in his August 14 speech + accepting the nomination of the Democratic Party, Carter said, “ask + the former political prisoners who now live in freedom if we should + abandon our stand on human rights. Ask the dissidents in the Soviet + Union about our commitment to human rights. Ask the Hungarian + Americans, ask the Polish Americans, listen to Pope John Paul II.” He continued: “As + long as I am President, we will hold high the banner of human + rights, and you can depend on it.” (Public Papers: + Carter, 1980–1981, Book II, p. 1536) and exchanged + views with the Counselor at some length on CSCE-Madrid topics. The Counselor praised careful + management by both sides of the bilateral relationship and took note of + Esztergalyos’ remarks about + the President’s comment. The conversation touched also on economic and + business topics. End summary.

+

3. Bilateral relations. Esztergalyos said his home leave consultations confirmed + that in Hungary’s view, nothing has changed for the worse in bilateral + relations and Hungary’s aims and goals remain as before. He had been + gratified to see his colleagues in Budapest on the same wavelength as + himself concerning the positive nature of the relationship. Ridgway responded that a well-managed, + realistic approach by both sides had yielded positive results. Neither + side has exaggerated expectations, and a careful, case-by-case approach to issues was and + is useful. Regarding larger international issues, use of measured + language to describe differences is helpful and is noted. Ridgway noted that she retains the + same favorable impression of U.S.-Hungarian relations as during her visit to Budapest last + June,Ridgway traveled to Budapest June 15–17. In telegram + 3374 from Budapest, June 19, the Embassy reported Ridgway’s conversation with + Ministry of Foreign Affairs State Secretary Nagy on June 16. Nagy, + the Embassy reported, “stated that the long term continuation of + tension between the U.S. and USSR will cause Hungary problems. If + Hungary is forced to withdraw into ‘its own world again,’ it will + not be helpful to either Hungary or the U.S.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800301–1122) In + telegram 3350 from Budapest, June 19, the Embassy reported Ridgway’s meeting with Puja. The discussion with the + Foreign Minister, the Embassy reported, focused on the Iranian + hostage crisis, NATO-Warsaw Pact + relations, and Afghanistan. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + D800301–1026) and that she had been particularly favorably + impressed by the quality and content of her talks with Janos Nagy and + other Hungarian officials in Washington last May and in Budapest.

+

4. Ridgway continued that we + should keep it this way regarding items on the bilateral agenda. + Esztergalyos responded that + the U.S. and Hungary have molded a good + businesslike relationship in which candor is also important. Each side + realizes that problems should not be left for time to heal since, + instead, they can grow worse. Ridgway acknowledged that smaller problems, left + unresolved, can grow into bigger ones. She noted favorably both + governments’ conscientious handling of + the chemical patents disputes, and recent resolution of the old question + of Embassy personnel ceilings. She expressed hope that another old + question of USG properties in Budapest + would be taken care of, and said she thought we have now found a way + constructively to discuss that issue. Esztergaylos replied he thinks a + solution can be found.

+

4. The President’s statement. Esztergalyos said he had been surprised to see President + Carter’s reference to human + rights in Hungary during his nomination acceptance speech (“...ask the + Hungarian-Americans.”). He volunteered that he had not called Budapest’s + attention to the comment lest it precipitate a sharp reaction there. + Likening the comment to “thunder from a blue sky,” Esztergalyos said it could raise + questions in certain circles both in Hungary and the U.S. that Hungary has bowed to pressure + from the United States in its human rights practices. Esztergalyos denied that this had been + the case. He said he personally could accept the remark as an + election-year comment, but hoped that the President does not truly believe that progress with Hungary + has been made because of U.S. pressure. + “I know the whole story back 10–15 years, and I know our people—that’s a + most sensitive point.” Pressure leads to a negative reaction. Esztergalyos worried that the + President’s remark would give encouragement to circles in Congress which + oppose abolition of the requirement for annual review of Hungary’s + most-favored-nation tariff status, and to certain Hungarian-American + circles. Esztergalyos said the + latter would pose problems “not for Hungary, but for the Department.” + The Counselor took note of the Ambassador’s comments, recalling that an + Hungarian Embassy officer had earlier raised the question in EUR/EE.

+

5. CSCE/Madrid. The Counselor asked about the Hungarian delegation’s + position at Madrid. Ezstergalyos replied that:

+

(A) Hungary does not want to see Madrid become a “mudslinging forum” + since this “would kill the whole process.” It would be better to have + discussions without illusions.

+

(B) Disarmament will be a main issue in the political field. Hungary is + willing to accept that Madrid should not be used as a disarmament forum, + but hopes for a kind of post-Madrid mandate to discuss this key + issue.

+

(C) Hungary also seeks how to resolve larger common European projects + such as energy, water resources, communications, and transportation + issues. Progress in such areas pays not only economic but political + dividends in contributing to reduction of tensions and to greater + understanding. Esztergalyos said + the idea would not be to institutionalize such project discussions since + institutions come to fend for themselves, but a start could be made at + Madrid. He cited the Hamburg scientific forum as having shown an + interest and willingness to start.

+

6. The Counselor said that the U.S. + regarded the Hamburg experience as very important for Madrid. While the + public may focus on the CSCE biennial + reviews, day-by-day gradual progress is the real CSCE “process.” There had been a vigorous + exchange of views at Hamburg. While there had been no agreement on + implementation, there had been a candid discussion and a final document. + The U.S. looks at Madrid in the same + way. We have no desire to be confrontational, but we should be candid, + thorough, and have a full review. We will focus on balance of all + aspects of the Final Act.

+

7. Esztergalyos agreed that all + three baskets are a unified whole. He emphasized that actual fulfillment + of individual Helsinki commitments is a bilateral task between + participants. He noted that it is helpful that the November conference + convenes only after the FRG and US + elections. Otherwise there would be pressure for electoral + publicity-plays. The Counselor responded that the Final Act was signed + for the U.S. by a Republican + administration and has been implemented for several years by a + Democratic one, and that U.S. views on + CSCE transcend party lines.

+ +

8. Economic and business topics. Esztergalyos reported his consultations included an + extensive discussion with Deputy Prime Minister for Economics Marjai on + US-Hungarian business relations. Esztergalyos reported Hungary’s main economic task is to + increase efficiency and productivity and that 1979 through early 1981 is + the crucial period. He noted favorably that Hungary has gotten its + debt-service ratio down to about 20 percent.

+

9. Ridgway noted that although as + a matter of policy the U.S. does not + seek to achieve bilateral trade balances, congressional and other + inquiries do arise. She hoped that in future years the mix of bilateral + agricultural versus industrial trade will evolve to a more stable + situation. Esztergalyos responded + that Hungary has a major interest in entering into long-term + relationships with U.S. firms, including + some Hungarian investments in the US, and in altering the basic + structure of bilateral trade. He noted that last year for the first time + Hungarian industrial exports exceeded agricultural ones, and said + Hungary wants to import more industrial goods than agricultural and raw + materials.

+

10. Particular business issues.

+

(A) Chemical patents dispute. Esztergalyos said he had heard that a Hungarian court + ruling had recently gone against the Chinoin Chemical enterprise. He + said this proves what the Hungarian Government has consistently + maintained: that Hungarian courts and procedures are objective and do + not automatically favor the Hungarian party. Esztergalyos said it is logical that as commercial + relations expand, particular problems will arise but it is important + that—as was done regarding the chemical patents disputes—both + governments work to promote solutions between the disputing firms and + enterprises and not permit things to become politicized.

+

(B) Rockwell/Raba. Esztergalyos + said it appears clear that in its MFN + testimony last July Rockwell was trying to inject politics into a purely + competitive question. It resents seeing Raba get a foothold in the + United States with products as good as its own. Esztergalyos labeled as significant + Rockwell’s inability or unwillingness to answer Senator Ribicoff’s + question on how much business from it Raba’s new role is taking away. He + said Rockwell has been invited several times to Hungary to discuss + business prospects, including with Raba, but that sometimes companies + seek to “win by political ways.” He said it was good to see that + Congress and STR, on the contrary, look at things objectively.

+

(C) Occidental. Esztergalyos + reported that Occidental’s Armand Hammer may come to Hungary in the fall + to review a number of prospective projects with Deputy Prime Minister + Marjai and others.

+

11. Comment. Discussion was cordial and ran for 1¼ hours. There were no + particular surprises except that Esztergalyos raised the President’s comment, which he + did in low key and ostensibly on his own and without instructions. Embassy will have + received a memcon of discussion in + EUR/EE on that topic on August + 21.Not found. In his August 14 speech + accepting the Democratic Party’s presidential nomination, Carter + accused the Republicans of wanting to move away from his policy of + emphasizing human rights: “Ask the former political prisoners who + now live in freedom if we should abandon our stand on human rights. + Ask the dissidents in the Soviet Union about our commitment to human + rights. Ask the Hungarian Americans, ask the Polish Americans, + listen to Pope John Paul II. + Ask those who are suffering for the sake of justice and liberty + around the world. Ask the millions who’ve fled tyranny if America + should stop speaking out for human principles. Ask the American + people. I tell you that as long as I am President, we will hold high + the banner of human rights, and you can depend on it.” (Public Papers: Carter, 1980–1981, Book II, p. + 1536) End comment.

+ + Muskie + +
+ +
+ 174. Telegram From the Embassy in Hungary to the Department of + StateSource: National + Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign + Policy File, D800431–1060. Confidential. Immediate. Printed from a + corrected copy. + + + Budapest, September 10, 1980, 0840Z + +

4840. Subject: Poland and Eastern Europe: Analysis and Policy + Implications. Ref: State 238732.See footnote 2, Document 41.

+

1. (C-entire text)

+

2. We concur in the general thrust of the analysis presented in the + referenced message on how events in Poland may affect the USSR and Eastern Europe. As it pertains + specifically to Hungary, we agree with the estimate that Poland’s + uniqueness, for the various reasons stated, makes it unlikely that there + will be any dramatic spillover effect over the short term. While + Hungarians follow events in Poland with keen attention, they invariably + express the view that “Hungary is different”. This, of course, is merely + another way of stating that “Poland is different”. Our interlocutors + stress:

+

—The relative strength of the Hungarian economy and the attention + Hungarian leaders have long given to supplying the consumer sector.

+ +

—The well managed and productive agricultural sector.

+

—The general, popular acceptance of the Hungarian Party’s leadership.

+

—The scant politicization of Hungarian labor.

+

—The absence of links between workers and the small group of intellectual + dissidents.

+

—The cooperative (to the point of appearing co-opted) role of Hungarian + religious leaders.

+

—The relatively successful national alliance policies of Kadar’s regime + which have given even non-Communist Hungarians a sense of national pride + and participation in the country’s life.

+

3. Many Hungarians with whom we have talked look at the Polish events + through a local prism. The prism is small and reflects mostly economics. + Hungarian officials are not confident that events in Poland have run + their course, and that is naturally worrisome. Any argument picturing + what has happened this summer in Poland as being solely about free trade + unions is doubly worrisome because that, standing alone, could combine + political danger and economic ruin. Here they would rather see Polish + events in the context of economic reform, as a vindication of Kadar and + the economic reform program as elaborated and pursued since 1968.

+

4. Although Poland in some ways provided the political backdrop against + which Hungarian reform was first made possible, Poland has been regarded + here as a foot-dragger. The importance of the Party and government + keeping its word is often heard and the Polish record of broken promises + to the workers held up in comparison to what is claimed a perfect + Hungarian record of promises kept. Communication with the workers and + keeping faith with them is seen as the foundation for the Hungarian + economic reform model which has at least these six major components:

+

(A) A commitment to economic growth, not export led but with a vigorous + East and West export component.

+

(B) A modernized planning system which is both precise and flexible and + does not fully allocate all resources.

+

(C) Less centralized control and more authority for local enterprise + management.

+

(D) An increased role for consumption, being critical not only for public + support, but, of equal importance, for expanding capital formation.

+

(E) Allowing initiative to develop at all levels, through the profit + motive and profit sharing.

+

(F) Allowing the market to play a significant role in resource allocation + and pricing.

+ +

5. The Hungarians think this model is adaptable to most of their + partners, at least for those to the north. In their optimistic moments + they believe the Poles may now have opened the way and the Soviets will + have to swallow reform in the EE + countries, even if it contains heresies against Leninism, because the + alternative options are just too costly. The Hungarians will probably + try to push their model to their EE + friends as they like to think the others live in envy of them and they + want recognition that Hungary has indeed been the pace-setter.

+

6. However, we very much doubt the larger EE countries, to whom Hungary would like to appeal, will + take that much notice of her. Hungary is a fine place for a holiday and + it’s true the shops are comparatively full, but what strikes the + economist is smallness of scale. Moving away from the command economy + was less complex, could be undertaken with a leadership that truly + enjoys much public support, and even so is incomplete after 12 years. + The Hungarian accomplishment has taken place during years of economic + growth at home and in the export sector has been supported by solid + OECD growth. The years of the 80s + will probably not be big growth years and reform, even with 12 years of + foundation, may not save the Hungarian economy, much less make it a + model for others.

+

7. The leadership still appears bent on going ahead with planned economic + reforms, but the adverse economic environment could affect the speed and + manner in which they are implemented. Hungary is attempting to cope with + mounting economic difficulties by seeking to increase hard-currency + exports, decrease consumer goods purchases from the West, and reduce + consumption. A period of zero or negative economic growth with little + improvement in the standard of living, could seriously impair the + regime’s standing in a society that has derived political stability from + the steady growth afforded the consumer sector. Hungary’s outlook is + thus clouded by serious economic and political uncertainties.

+ +

8. Over the longer term, we agree that the events in Poland cannot but + have some impact on Hungary and other countries in the region. This will + be particularly true if the Polish liberalization succeeds (especially + in the area of free trade union development); but it would also be true + in the case of a major reversal. We have had reports that workers in + some factories “discussed” the Polish situation, but this activity did + not extend to work stoppages or demonstrations. Particularly if the + Poles succeed, we believe it possible that Hungarian workers may + similarly demand a more democratic trade union structure. We suspect, + however, that the workers here will carefully weigh the potential + economic and social costs before engaging in any agitation. The memory + of 1956 remains strong in Hungary and will continue to act as a brake on + worker-initiated activity or reforms not closely concerted with the + party and governmental leadership.

+ +

9. Finally, while the government and party can be expected to prevent the + formation of any coalition of dissidents and workers, we do not believe + that the regime will feel compelled to increase internal vigilance or + otherwise seek to insulate the populace from Western influence. + Throughout the Polish events, the Hungarian media followed a deliberate + policy of keeping the public informed of the main elements of the + situation.

+

10. Policy implications: We believe that the policy recommendations + outlined for both the region and Hungary specifically are valid. We see + no need to alter our basic policy of differentiation (para 6–A). Indeed, the GOH seems to have gotten over its + post-Afghanistan jitters and decided to go ahead with a full range of + contacts with the West. While our policies may need to be tuned to meet + the requirements of an evolving Polish situation, we see no need to make + any major readjustment in our approach here.

+

11. We agree we should continue to maintain the useful political dialogue + established in recent years with the Hungarians through increased + high-level visits. There are also new areas, such as energy, that can be + usefully exploited to maintain the momentum of an active, differentiated + policy toward this country. We agree we could be more aggressive in + expanding exchanges and cultural programs. We are less certain, however, + that international institutions can be effectively utilized—at least for + the present—to influence Hungarian behavior. Despite indications of + renewed interest in IMF membership, + Hungary is not yet a member. The ILO enjoys little influence on + Hungarian internal policies. In sum, we agree that the Hungarian + situation should be watched in the light of the Polish events to assure + we take advantage of opportunities for US policy initiatives but our + assessment for now is that we are on the right track.

+ + Bergold + +
+ +
+ 175. Telegram From the Embassy in Hungary to the Department of + StateSource: National + Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign + Policy File, D800566–0890. Confidential; Immediate. + + + Budapest, November 26, 1980, 1420Z + +

6196. Subject: Official-Informal. EUR/EE only; three copies only. For Bridges from + Kuchel.

+

1. (U) Transition: Peter, we are most grateful for the background + informationIn telegram 307509 to + Budapest, November 19, the Department informed the Embassy of the + transition papers proposed by the Bureau of European Affairs + following Reagan’s election. While Hungary did not figure as a + separate topic, EUR/EE requested + that Budapest send suggestions of what might be included in a + separate paper if one was requested. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + D800553–0952) In telegram 6142 from Budapest, November 21, the + Embassy cabled a brief overview of U.S.-Hungarian relations, concluding that it did not + see any “pressing or immediate issues in Hungarian-American + relations that warrant isolated attention.” (National Archives, + RG 59, Central Foreign Policy + File, D800557–0751) you have been giving us on the + composition and interests of the foreign affairs transition teams. The + Ambassador and I find it extremely helpful to have your comments which + both amplify and lend a little chiaroscuro to the wireless reports.

+

2. (C) We hope that the following appraisal of the current situation in + Hungary and US-Hungarian relations will be useful in preparing your + briefing paper on Hungary for the transition staff.

+

3. (C) Kadarism—Under Janos Kadar Hungary has forged a unique position in + Eastern Europe. During the past twenty-five years, Kadar has brought + Hungary out of the depression of a failed revolution and into a period + of sustained stability and general prosperity at home. The essence of + Kadar’s policies has been substantial, if sometimes nuanced, support for + Soviet foreign policy goals in exchange for a measure of latitude to + pursue internal reforms and a relatively relaxed social policy. The + success by Eastern European standards of the new economic mechanism in + achieving prosperity at home and the politically adept implementation of + Kadar’s National Alliance policy has allowed the Hungarian Communist + Party to achieve a level of legitimacy that few would have imagined in + 1956. By achieving compromises with religious institutions, permitting + individual travel to the West every three years and generally allowing + Hungarians of all persuasions to work within the system, Kadar has + earned the acquiescence, if not the support of most of Hungary’s + population. Kadar’s famous dictum “Those who are not against us are with + us” remains the basis of the Hungarian Party’s approach.

+ +

4. (C) Hungary in the 1980’s—Although Hungary’s economic performance and + management has been better than in most Eastern European countries, the + nation will confront serious problems in the next decade, over many of + which the Hungarians have no control.

+

—As elsewhere in Eastern Europe, Hungary faces the prospect of + significantly decreased economic growth in the 1980’s. Hungary is + particularly vulnerable to international economic pressures, worldwide + inflation and the rising cost and uncertain availability of energy) + since it depends on imports for 80 percent of its raw materials and now + exports 50 percent of its GNP (25 + percent of its trade is with the West).

+

—As a result, the next five-year plan projects only a 7–9 percent + increase in personal income. Over the last decade, however, the + Hungarian populace has been accustomed to steady, perceptible increases + in the standard of living. The political cost of a modest, albeit + realistic, economic strategy designed to preserve rather than improve + existing lifestyles will be a major factor in the Hungarian leadership’s + calculations over the next five years. An austere economic policy could + also hinder the Party’s ability to implement fully the economic reform + program.

+

—The Helsinki Final Act and relaxed East-West atmosphere of the 1970’s + served as an umbrella by which Hungary promoted its economic, political + and cultural ties with Western Europe and the US. Any additional chill + in East-West relations forcing a cutback of these relations will have + serious implications for Hungary.

+ +

—The uncertainties surrounding the Soviet succession and the possibility + of the passing of the now 68 year old Kadar also raise questions about + the long-term outlook of Hungary. “Can Kadarism survive Kadar?” remains + an important question. Kadar has changed the perspectives of a + generation of Hungarians and his overall approach has been widely + accepted. But many of his policies are more stylistic adaptations of + Communist policy rather than substantive institutional changes. For the + moment Kadar appears healthy enough. Most Hungarians, however, prefer + not to think about what might happen when he goes.

+

5. (C) Implications of Polish events—The Hungarian Party has reviewed the + internal situation in the wake of Polish events. It has congratulated + itself on the efficacy of Kadar’s economic reform policies but has also + taken steps to promote a more aggressive, public role for Hungary’s + controlled trade unions. Underlying the Party’s professions of + confidence (bordering on smugness) that it has the situation under + control is a genuine fear that the Polish example could present a + political alternative and challenge to the Party. The Hungarian populace + seems to be impressed that the Polish workers have so far “got away with + it” by creating their own unions and base of power. The 1956 experience, + however, continues to condition the Hungarian perspective toward the Soviet Union. Many continue to + believe that in the end the Soviets will not countenance the Polish + challenge to Communist ideology and control. The longer Lech Walesa and + his colleagues maintain their power, the greater the Polish example will + influence Hungary.

+

6. US-Hungarian relations—The return of the Crown of St. Stephen in + January 1978 paved the way for a steady expansion of US-Hungarian + relations. The 1978 Trade Agreement, extension of MFN, the Cultural Agreement and a steady + exchange of high level visitors have resulted in a significant increase + in bilateral contacts across the board. The Hungarians have responded to + our own policy of differentiation in Eastern Europe following the Soviet + invasion of Afghanistan. With the exception of the postponement of a + parliamentary delegation’s visit to the US in February, the bilateral + agenda has been almost completely carried out to mutual advantage. The + Embassy has been able to expand contacts significantly in the Hungarian + community and we have begun exploring new areas of cooperation such as + increased military contacts, energy development and narcotics control. + The Hungarians worry about the possibility of continued stalemate or + further deteriorations in US-Soviet relations. This is compounded by the + tenseness created by the fluidity of the Polish situation. Nevertheless, + Hungarians continue to emphasize their desire to see the bilateral + agenda expand and contacts with the U.S. + increase. The future, barring a catastrophic East-West confrontation + such as Soviet intervention in Poland, two areas deserve the attention + of the new administration:

+ +

—High-level visits: Over a year ago the Hungarians noted the possibility + of a Kadar visit to the U.S. We have had + recent indications that the Hungarians will soon raise the question + again.In telegram 5775 from Budapest, + October 31, Ambassador Bergold reported on his conversations with + the British Ambassador to Hungary and with Hungarian officials on + the results of the visit by British Foreign Secretary Lord + Carrington to Budapest. Hungarian State Secretary Janos Nagy, + praising the positive effects of the Carrington visit, told the + Ambassador that, following the U.S. + elections, he would like to discuss “the evolution of + Hungarian-American relations, looking toward the possibility of high + level visits in each direction within the next several years.” + (National Archives, RG 59, Central + Foreign Policy File, D800529–0185) Depending on the + circumstances, a Kadar visit could serve not only to promote bilateral + relations with Hungary but also to demonstrate our interest in Eastern + Europe as a whole. They would also be pleased to have President Reagan + visit Hungary if he were to make at least one other stop in the + Bloc.

+ +

—Improve economic relations: Trade between the U.S. and Hungary now totals about $250 million per year + (with a U.S. trade surplus). The + Hungarians hope that bilateral trade will surpass $500 million by 1985, + bringing the U.S. from its current + eighth position among Hungary’s + Western trading partners to fourth behind the FRG, Austria and Italy. Economic factors hindering + increased commercial exchanges include a lack of dependable availability + of parts and servicing for U.S. + equipment and Hungary’s need to conserve foreign exchange. Policy issues + influencing trade expansion include the annual U.S. review of MFN status + which Hungarians see as an impediment to long term trade development and + the U.S. failure in some cases to act + expeditiously on export license applications not involving strategic + items.

+

Conclusion. Without losing sight of the overall geopolitical realities + which condition Hungary’s relationship with the U.S., we can say our policy of differentiation has paid + dividends. Hungary continues its internal economic decentralization and + increased use of market economy techniques. Its record of CSCE compliance, while still requiring + improvement, is second to none within the Soviet Bloc. The opportunity + for average Hungarians to travel to the West and be exposed to Western + culture at home continues to increase. All of these factors are in the + long-term interest of the United States. Encouraging their development + should continue to be at the core of our policy toward Hungary.

+

[Omitted here is information unrelated to Hungary.]

+ + + Bergold + +
+ + +
+ 176. Telegram From the Embassy in Hungary to the Department of + StateSource: National + Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign + Policy File, D810019–0324. Confidential; Priority; Exdis. + + + + Budapest, January 13, 1981, 1602Z + +

153. Subject: Ambassador’s Meeting With Mr. Gyula Horn, HSWP. Ref: Budapest 0131.In telegram 131 from Budapest, January 12, the + Embassy reported the conversation between Bergold and the State + Secretary of the Hungarian Foreign Ministry, Janos Nagy. Bergold + reported that Nagy was optimistic about the Reagan administration, + and believed relations would return “to a more predictable and + reliable atmosphere in East/West relations associated with the early + and middle seventies.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + D810017–0314)

+

1. Horn and I had agreed to meet January 13 for a general review of the + international situation. Horn is Deputy Head of the HSWP International Department; he + specializes on Western countries and is advertised by many of our Hungarian contacts as the real + “comer” on the Central Committee Staff.

+

2. I went over much of the same ground that I covered with Nagy yesterday + and found Horn, if anything, more au courant than Nagy about Washington + developments, particularly the Haig testimony before the Foreign Relations Committee. + Horn said the HSWP had been very + worried about a Reagan victory up until the debate which seemed to them + to show Reagan’s position as more responsible than Carter’s and he added + that their positive feelings about the Reagan administration have + increased as they have read various statements of the President-elect + and his Cabinet-designates since the election.

+

3. Horn divided his comments into the following five areas:

+

—East/West relations—Horn emphasized what he called the subjective + factors here, which he thought gave some opportunity for an improvement + in US/Soviet relations, although he + conceded that Afghanistan and probably Poland would prevent those + relations from getting very much better in the near term. He said the + Soviets had become so disenchanted with Carter and Brzezinski that their very removal + from the scene is positive in that the Soviets will no longer be able to + dwell on them as personalities and will have to face new personalities + and hopefully “pay more attention to the issues.” He thought the + evolution of US/Soviet relations would + take up most of 1981 given the US “structural impediments” (our + political system) and what he called Soviet preoccupation with “border + issues”.

+

—(A) SALT—Horn said the Soviets will be + looking early on for some signals about what the U.S. intends to do on SALT even though they and all other Warsaw Pact members + acknowledge and understand that SALT + II will not be ratified in its present form. He pointed to the need for + some re-statement by the new administration of President Carter’s assurances of a year ago that, + pending ratification of SALT II, the + configuration of U.S. strategic forces + would not violate the terms of the draft treaty.

+

—(B) TNF—Horn characterized US/Soviet + technical talks in Geneva as a complete failure. He said he and others + had accepted what he called the “Genscher explanation” of the + TNF modernization decision made by NATO in December 1979, namely that the modernization was + needed to fill a gap in the FBS, both land-based air in Europe and + elements of the Sixth Fleet, which might be needed for deployment in the + Third World contingencies. However, he said it must be recalled that TNF + are “strategic” for the Warsaw Pact and that their modernization will + almost certainly drive the Soviets toward cruise missiles and perhaps an + ABM system to protect the SS–20 and oncoming SS–36. He said that this + spiraling process would enhance the power of the military in the Soviet + Union and would have a deleterious effect on openings of pluralism and + “democratic socialism” in the East European countries.

+ +

—Madrid—Horn said that Hungary found the outcome in MadridFor information on the CSCE Conference in Madrid, see Foreign + Relations, 1977–1980, vol. V, European Security, + 1977–1983. to be surprisingly good given the + sulphurous atmosphere that prevailed before the conference actually + began. He admitted the true test was yet to come. Although Hungary does + not expect many of the 83 proposals on the table actually to be passed, + they do hope for two things: (1) that a continuation of the Helsinki + process is assured with another meeting scheduled within several years + or some variant of the Finnish proposal for an even more permanent + process, and (2) that some sort of a disarmament conference follow + Madrid although they were not very particular about its form. He did + feel the French proposal was totally negative.

+

—Differentiation—Horn said he hoped that the Reagan administration would + not view the Communist world as a monolithic bloc. He thought the Carter + administration with its policy of differentiation was basically on the + right track but could have made even more headway. He referred to a + portion of General Haig’s + testimony this weekGeneral Alexander Haig, Ronald Reagan’s + Secretary of State-designate, testified before the Senate Committee + on Foreign Relations during his confirmation hearings beginning + January 9, 1981. which he interpreted to be a much more + realistic viewpoint about China than had characterized anything that + Brzezinski had said on the + subject. Horn emphasized that Hungary wishes to make even more advances + towards opening up the system and sees the Polish situation as an + opportunity in that direction rather than a threat to the process.

+

—Poland—Horn said the Warsaw Pact Summit meeting of December 5 had turned + a new corner with respect to the Brezhnev Doctrine; it was decided not to use force but + to allow the Poles to work out their own admittedly very difficult + economic problems. He characterized the bringing of Soviet and bloc + forces to a higher defense condition as political rather than military. + Horn said he believed that the Polish situation was also distinct from + Hungary 1956 and Czechoslovakia 1968, in that it seemed that the + interests of the Soviet Union, the other Warsaw Pact states, the U.S., and NATO were coming to an almost identical position, namely + that nobody wanted to see tensions rise in Poland and everyone wanted to + see the Poles work out their own problems, giving them a helping hand + where appropriate. He said he thought it was inconceivable that the + Soviets would actually invade Poland because such an action could do + nothing to resolve the Polish economic problems. He was, however, + worried about Solidarity and its search for “monopolistic power”.

+ +

4. Comment: Horn is a bright and articulate person whose command of + English is really getting + quite good although we used Miklos Revesz, MFA desk officer, as interpreter for part of this + conversation. Given his interest in getting to know the new people in + Washington, I urged Horn to accept an ICA travel grant this spring or summer and he said he would + let us know. I think he actually reflects the concerns of this small + nation in the Warsaw Pact which still hopes to do business with both + sides. He is alternatively optimistic and pessimistic with optimism + slightly winning out.Horn took a much more + pessimistic note in a early November conversation with visiting + EUR/EE director Peter + Bridges, concentrating on the dangers developments in Poland posed + for East-West relations in general and U.S.-Hungarian relations in particular. See telegram + 5910 from Budapest, November 6, 1980. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + D800534–0484) He and others in Budapest will be looking for + an early statement of the Reagan administration policy towards this part + of the world, as distinct from policy towards the Soviet Union. Horn is + much more worried about Poland than he let on and I think his remarks + about the monopolistic philosophy of Solidarity reflect concern that the + Polish Party is having trouble penetrating and breaking away pieces of + Solidarity.

+ + Bergold + +
+
+ +
+ + Romania + +
+ 177. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security + Affairs (Brzezinski) to + President CarterSource: Carter Library, National + Security Affairs, Brzezinski + Material, President’s Correspondence with Foreign Leaders File, Box + 16, Romania: President Nicolae + Ceausescu, 2/77–12/78. Secret. In telegram 43644 to + Bucharest, February 26, the Department reported that Carter and + Pungan discussed Romania’s position on several international issues, + including CSCE and disarmament, as + well as Romanian desires for improved relations with the United + States. (National Archives, RG 59, + Central Foreign Policy File, P850052–1843) During his visit, Pungan + also met with other U.S. officials, + including, on February 22, Secretary of Commerce Juanita Kreps to discuss economic + issues concerning U.S.-Romanian + trade, especially the possibility of eliminating the annual review + of Romania for MFN. (Telegram 46496 + to Bucharest, March 2; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + D770072–0554) + + + Washington, February + 22, 1977 + +

MEETING WITH VASILE PUNGAN (Romania) Wednesday, + February 23, 1997 4:00 p.m. (30 minutes) The Oval + Office

+ +

I. PURPOSE

+

To receive a message he is carrying from President Ceausescu, and to review the status and + future of American-Romanian relations.

+

II. BACKGROUND, + PARTICIPANTS & PRESS PLAN

+

A. Background: Mr. Pungan (age 50) occupies the + position of chief of the group of Presidential counselors; he combines + both domestic and international relations as a special advisor. Outside + of the formal party structure he ranks as Ceausescu’s senior advisor and trouble-shooter. He has + been used as a contact with both Presidents Nixon and Ford. He speaks + passable English, was formerly Ambassador to London (1966–72), and + served in the Embassy here (1959–62). He is close enough to Ceausescu that he can take up almost + any subject and speak with assurance. The current rumor is that he will + become the Foreign Minister.

+

His mission is to make an early contact with your administration in order + to reconfirm the “special” relationship that we have developed with + Romania over the past decade. This relationship, symbolized by visits to + Romania of Presidents Nixon and Ford, and return visits by Ceausescu, has served the interests of + both sides: for us it underscores our willingness to deal with East + European countries, independent of the impact on Moscow, and to encourage those + countries which have had the temerity to take autonomous stands on + foreign policy; for the Romanians, we serve as a partial counterweight + to the Soviets, and as a demonstration that independence is reciprocated + by mutually advantageous relations, especially in commerce, and by + enhancing the voice of Romania in international councils.

+

Thus, by receiving Ceausescu’s special emissary early in your term, you + are demonstrating a basic continuity and our willingness to continue + a reasonably close relationship.

+

Beyond this general aspect, Pungan will be probing for a willingness to + invite Ceausescu to Washington, + probably later in the year if he visits Canada.

+

He will leave Washington for New York and then join Ceausescu, who is currently touring + West Africa.

+

B. Participants: Mr. Pungan will be accompanied by + the Romanian Ambassador Nicolae + Nicolae; Vice President Mondale, Secretary Vance, Zbigniew + Brzezinski, and a notetaker.

+

C. Press Plan: The meeting has not been announced in advance; after the meeting, Jody Powell could simply say that you + received Mr. Pungan as an emissary from President Ceausescu, and that you discussed + Romanian-American relations.

+

III. TALKING POINTS

+

American Romanian Relations

+

Economic: The main concern of the Romanians is + that the new Administration continue the policy of its predecessor in + granting a waiver under the Jackson-Vanik amendment that requires free + emigration as a condition for Most Favored Nation treatment. As a result + of a carefully negotiated understanding, Romania permits a small + emigration of Jews to Israel, which satisfies the letter of the law. + Since this waiver is granted under a Presidential finding, Pungan will + probably seek an indication that you will continue this policy. (In + fact, emigration has fallen off, but Israel is not yet concerned because + it does not appear to be a result of any internal crackdown.)

+

Technology-Nuclear: The Romanians are negotiating + with Canada for a nuclear reactor, and are seeking assurances that we + will grant licenses to American parts; they understand our + non-proliferation problems, though Ceausescu recently told our Ambassador that Romania + could make nuclear weapons if it wished at any time (an exaggeration), + and that no one could foresee where technology would lead in ten years. + In any case, the Romanians have been clearly forewarned about our + reservations concerning a full fuel cycle or manufacture of heavy + water.

+ +

1. I want to assure President Ceausescu of the willingness of my administration to + develop mutually advantageous relations with Romania; we respect + Romania’s position of independence and this is the basis on which we can + continue, as in the past, with a beneficial relationship.

+

2. Trade is one of the main points in our relations, and we expect it to + continue under the conditions worked out to comply with our laws on Most + Favored Nation treatment.

+

3. As for the export of technology, we regard it as politically + significant that Romania has turned to the West for the purchase of a + nuclear reactor; we will not place obstacles in the way of dealing with + Canada, but as our Ambassador has already told your President, we are + determined not to permit the export of technologies that would + facilitate weapons development.

+

4. I hope that President Ceausescu + has an occasion to visit the US later in the year.

+

International Issues

+

Romania has developed an independent position on the Middle East + question, breaking with the Soviet line in 1967 and refusing to denounce + Israel. Subsequently, however, a more even-handed position has emerged, + and occasionally the Romanians put themselves forward as possible + intermediaries; for example, they might offer to carry messages to the + PLO. In fact, we have used them as an indirect channel to get our views + across on the assumption that whatever we say they will repeat to the + Arabs.

+

Somewhat similarly, the Romanians offer their services in relaying + messages to the North Koreans, and even the Chinese, since they try to + take a semi-independent stand on the Sino-Soviet dispute.

+

Since Ceausescu is traveling in + Africa, anything you may want to say about the situation in southern + Africa may also be taken into account in his discussions there.

+

Finally, of course, the Romanians are deeply concerned with the politics + of the Soviet bloc, East-West issues such as the Helsinki agreements, + MBFR, and disarmament issues in + general; Romanian representatives are often helpful in giving us frank + assessments and have cooperated in preparing for Helsinki.

+

Romanian relations with Moscow have improved since Brezhnev’s visit in November. They are + always fragile, however, and depend on Soviet restraint in not pressing + for greater Romanian integration in the Warsaw Pact.

+

1. I would appreciate hearing your analysis of how you believe European + security issues may develop. For our part we are serious about making progress in arms + control—specifically SALT, mutual + force reductions in Central Europe and a test ban. Moreover, we want the + preparatory conference in Belgrade for the review of the Helsinki + Accords to yield real progress; we would welcome your suggestions on how + these issues could be advanced, in particular, what the situation will + be in Yugoslavia after Tito.

+

Human Rights

+

In the last week, the Romanians have found themselves confronted by the + first sign of public dissent by their intellectuals. A well known + Romanian novelist Paul Goma issued an open letter signed by eight + others, not as well known outside Romania. The letter expressed + solidarity with the Czech Charter 77, and an appeal to the Government + for human rights. Ceausescu + responded immediately with a strong denunciation (without naming names). + But the protestors have not been arrested (as erroneously reported in + the Western press). On the other hand, the Romanians claim they are + granting free emigration (more than 5,000 in January–February), but the + real figure for 1976 was about 3,000.

+

Almost certainly this subject will not be raised + by Pungan, but you may wish to advert to it.

+

1. The defense of human rights is a matter of principle with this + country, and we will not hesitate to speak our mind when the situation + warrants it.

+

2. We are not linking our concerns to specific policies nor embarking on + a moralistic crusade, but it is best that there be no misunderstanding + of our intentions.

+

Attached is an advance copy of Ceausescu’s letter (Tab B[A?]).Dated February 18, attached but not printed. On + March 23, Brzezinski + hand-delivered Carter’s signed response to Ambassador Nicolae. (Carter Library, National + Security Affairs, Brzezinski + Material, Subject File, Box 33, Memcons: Brzezinski: 1–9/77) The text of + the letter was transmitted to the Embassy in Bucharest in telegram + 65360, March 24, with instructions that the Ambassador seek an early + appointment with Ceausescu to + review the points made in Carter’s letter. (National Archives, + RG 59, Central Foreign Policy + File, P850052–1846)

+

Additional background and briefing material from the Department of State + is at Tab B.Attached but not printed is a + February 21 memorandum from Christopher to Carter.

+
+ +
+ 178. Telegram From the Embassy in Romania to the Department of + StateSource: National + Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign + Policy File, D770123–0556. Secret. Sent for information to Belgrade, + East Berlin, Budapest, Moscow, Prague, Sofia, Warsaw, Bonn, Athens, + Ankara, Tel Aviv, Paris, West Berlin, USNATO, USUN, and + pouched to Munich. + + + + Bucharest, April 8, 1977, 1015Z + +

2608. Subj: PARM—Annual Policy and Resource Assessment— Part I. Ref: A. + Cerp 0001; B. State 38356.In telegram 38356 + to all diplomatic posts, February 19, the Department issued + instructions for the format of the annual policy review and resource + assessment. (National Archives, RG + 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770060–0449)

+

A. U.S. interests in Romania

+

We define the principal long term U.S. + interests as:

+

—Maintenance and enlargement of Romanian independence from the Soviet + Union.

+

—Reduction of restrictions on human rights.

+

These interests are not new. What I see as new is a willingness to pursue + both of them with greater energy, despite some greater risks. They need + to be seen in the context of a still broader U.S. interest, valid not only in Romania but throughout + Eastern Europe, of undermining Soviet control—carefully, but consciously.

+

B. Overview

+

Current policies have helped promote these interests. The successes are + there: Two way trade is up. Substantial numbers of family reunification + cases are solved, useful high level visits take place, new agreements + are signed. We are in for a rough period, however, as we try to promote + simultaneously both our principal interests, with only one of which + Ceausescu is in accord.

+

Romanian-Soviet relations—For the past decade or so, Romanian leaders for + their own reasons have pursued a policy of relative independence from + the Soviet Union. They have shown themselves adept at sensing the limits + of Soviet tolerance, while at the same time maneuvering adroitly to + expand them. We do not foresee a basic change in this policy, in spite + of a heavily publicized “rapprochement” with the Soviets beginning in + mid-1976, nor do we foresee an internal economic crisis of such + magnitude that Ceausescu would + have no place to turn except to the Soviet Union, paying whatever cost + in terms of Romanian independence the Soviets demand. A post-Brezhnev succession struggle would + undoubtedly cause considerable uneasiness here, but we would also expect Ceausescu to try to take advantage of + Soviet internal problems to expand his maneuvering room as in the + immediate post-Khrushchev era.

+

Eastern European context—We see Romania as the least likely of the + Eastern European countries to be affected by the ups and downs of U.S.–USSR + relations. Leaving aside a serious post-Tito disintegration of Yugoslavia, Romania is also less + likely to be influenced by the general effervescence of a restive + region. Except for Bulgaria, however, it is also potentially the most + susceptible in Eastern Europe to internal ferment because so relatively + little has taken place and the sparks could come from outside. We + definitely agree with the S/P assumption + that planning be done for a broadening of U.S. relations with the countries of Eastern Europe, so as + to position ourselves to take advantage of opportunities as they arise. + At the same time we assume the USSR + and some individual countries like Romania will, perhaps almost in + rhythm with CSCE, resort to a policy + of increasing ideologicalization to “protect” their peoples against + hostile influences.

+

Romania’s international role—We anticipate no diminution of Romania’s + active and often frenetic pursuit of cordial relations with all + Communist countries and parties, Balkan cooperation, courtship of the + Third World, strengthened ties with the countries and economic + institutions of the developed West, disarmament, a new international + political/economic order, the role of “honest broker” in such crisis + situations as the Middle East or Korea—all designed somehow to raise the + cost to the Soviets of any drastic behavior toward Romania, to obtain + both increased quantities of raw materials or access to markets to + dispose of manufactured products, and to establish Romania’s credentials + as a “developing” country eligible for trade preferences and easy + credits.

+

Internal factors—With his overriding goal of perpetuating himself in + power, Ceausescu has built a + highly centralized system in which he exerts total control subject only + to very general limits. For the next year or two, we see practically no + chance of his being unseated in a party power struggle or of being + forced from office by explosive discontent among the populace. His + internal approach is based more on his perception of how Romania should + be governed than on worries about Soviet pressure. Nonetheless we + believe, even if Ceausescu + doesn’t, that present controls could be substantially relaxed without + risking either Soviet intervention or spontaneous internal combustion. + There is no doubt that Romania’s rapid pace of industrialization has + strained the social fabric, produced large inefficiencies and + misallocation of resources, and produced a potentially serious energy + crisis. Ceausescu’s + post-earthquake policy of meeting and exceeding five year plan goals + while at the same time recouping the losses and providing for unplanned needs in such areas + as housing will place even more burdens on the populace. Nevertheless + barring another natural disaster, we do not expect that these strains + will reach a crisis point during the assessment period. For one thing, + Romanians traditionally accept their fate and improvise to get by from + day to day. For another, even with its inefficiencies, the Romanian + economy is still the fastest growing in Eastern Europe. The hard + currency debt position is manageable. There has been a gradual + improvement in the standard of living which provides some room for + maneuver. As in his dealings with the Soviets, Ceausescu is aware of the limits to + which he can push the people and is sufficiently flexible to back off in + the face of serious economic discontent.

+

Human rights—This is a trickier area to predict than the economic one if + only because dissidence is so recent a contemporary Romanian phenomenon. + Small though it may also be, we anticipate Ceausescu will continue to be plagued by it so long as + there is any continuing CSCE process + and his dexterity will be put to a greater test because dissidence + challenges the legitimacy of his regime. Ceausescu’s natural tendency will be to tighten + controls, if only because he probably believes relatively few in Romania + are prepared to do that much about their rights.

+

Romanian-U.S. relations—Our leverage so + far has been small. It derives from Romania’s own desire for + independence from the Soviet Union as well as for access to advanced + Western technology and financial institutions. It also serves Ceausescu’s personal and national + ambitions to have, and to be seen to have, a close working relationship + with a series of U.S. Presidents. The + foregoing does not imply that Ceausescu needs us to survive. He clearly does not. Many + of his political goals are already being met in Romania’s relationships + with other countries, and he can obtain many of the economic benefits he + seeks from other Western countries with equal or greater ease. Our + relationship in many ways has been more symbolic than substantive, but + that is beginning to change and will change still more—and our leverage + may increase—if Congress votes reconstruction aid for Romania. + Day-to-day relations on most levels are reasonably businesslike, + sometimes cordial as well, but in other ways have become considerably + more difficult and frustrating because of a tighter internal situation. + In areas which Romania considers peripheral (e.g. the exchange program), + it only half-heartedly will go along with many of the things we would + like to do, while in areas in which there are real conflicts of + interests (e.g. human rights/humanitarian questions) extracting positive + and continuing action requires the use of a considerable amount of our + limited leverage. The interplay between our human rights concerns and + Romanian internal restrictiveness assures continuing tensions between + us. While our long term + interest is enlargement of human rights, we may be lucky to be able just + to help modify the restrictive tendencies.

+

Romanian leverage on the United States is so far not great. Romania has + no raw materials or industrial products which are vital to the U.S. economy. While some Romanian petroleum + and petroleum products are presently being shipped to the New England + area, this is a small fraction of our total imports which could readily + be purchased elsewhere. The Romanian market for U.S. exports at present is small, but it could grow + appreciably in the next few years. Their greatest leverage is in their + knowledge that we also have an interest in their independence.

+

C. Objectives, issues, and courses of action

+

1. Objectives

+

We see the following as key U.S. + objectives for the next one or two years:

+

—An active but candid relationship with the Romanian leadership based on + mutual respect and understanding of each other’s interests.

+

—Expanded contacts and mutual involvement between individuals, + institutions, and bureaucracies of both countries in order to widen and + solidify the regime’s stake in successful cooperation with the West.

+

—Improved Romanian performance on the human rights issues embodied in + Helsinki Basket III and the Jackson/Vanik Amendment.

+

—Moving economic-commercial relations faster toward the one billion + dollar 1980 goal, especially through increased U.S. penetration of the Romanian market with our industrial + goods.

+

These objectives are basically similar to those contained in last year’s + policy assessment (76 Bucharest 2230), but, unlike last year, we do not + see them in any particular order of priority since they are closely + interrelated and mutually reinforcing.

+

2. Issues

+

“Pecking order”—We believe that it is no longer useful to maintain a set + “pecking order” in our relations with the countries of Eastern Europe + other than in terms of our inherent interests. We should position + ourselves so that if there is an opportunity for moving ahead anywhere + we could do so. This, we realize, will call for more flexibility than we + usually have allowed ourselves. We believe that, because of the U.S. presence already established in + Romania and the extensive though admittedly often erratic opportunities + which that affords, our bilateral relationship will continue to be one + of the most active in Eastern Europe, with or without a “pecking + order.”

+

Foreign policy independence v. internal liberalization—There seems to be + no set formula in Eastern Europe for prescribing the necessary + inter-relationship between these two factors. Thus during Ceausescu’s regime, a period of + relative foreign policy independence from the Soviet Union, there has + been only one period of substantial internal relaxation (68–70), + although the scene still much more relaxed than in the 50’s. As to our + own relations with Romania or any other East European state, we see no + need to prescribe a set formula either. It is in our interest to + encourage both independence, especially national independence, and + liberalization for their own sakes, but also because they erode Soviet + control. We should not be overly “rewarding” or ignoring one kind of + behavior over another but rather be using our influence to work toward + each, recognizing that in a country like Romania liberalization will + come harder. We need to keep reviewing our operational definition of + “internal liberalization” which has been focused almost entirely on + emigration and only marginally on the right of dissent, minority rights, + religious freedom, and freer exchange of information. So far we have + correctly in our judgment made no sustained effort to modify the other + repressive features of Romania’s internal regime other than through our + support of RFE. Given the limited + leverage we are likely to have on this most sensitive of areas a + carefully calculated approach, using CSCE to the maximum, is the most realistic one. Ceausescu knows well the U.S. concerns in this area but is not going + to give much on his own restrictive approach. If dissidence increases + here and repression too, we may need to speak out about Romanian + practices as we now do about Soviet ones. Frequent and candid contacts + at all levels of the type we have had in the past are the best guarantee + of keeping things in perspective. It is worth thinking in this context + of the leverage the possibility of a meeting with the President later + this year might have on Ceausescu.

+

U.S. immigration/emigration policy

+

Because of Jackson/Vanik and CSCE we + intercede forcefully in individual emigration cases and in general for + freer movement. On the other hand, we are forced to work within the + bounds of an immigration law which is both restrictive in spirit and + letter. To many Romanians, the U.S. + position on human rights translates into a U.S. endorsement of their “right” to leave Romania and to + live in the United States. Some of these people are not qualified for an + immigrant visa with consequent embarrassment to us. This contradiction + has caused us to establish such expedients as the Rome TCP program + which, although it does allow us to process many additional (but not + all) types of cases, does not eliminate the basic dilemma which is + reconciling our humanistic traditions with our unemployment situation. + There is a comparable contradiction between our advocacy of unrestricted + travel and our barring of CP members. We + applaud the President’s decision to study these problems, and hope a new + consensus, which will obviously require legislation, can be reached soon. Coordination of our policies + with those of other Western countries is also worth undertaking.

+

A related issue is that of emigration of Romanian Jews to Israel or + Romanian Germans to the FRG. We are + expending more of our limited leverage on the Jewish emigration question + than on any other single item and the Israelis are understandably + perfectly content to let us continue to carry the ball. We believe that + more balance has to be achieved and our efforts should at most equal + those of Israel or any other third state.

+

[Omitted here is more specific discussion of U.S. goals and the likely reactions of the Romanian + Government.]

+ + Barnes + +
+ +
+ 179. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in + RomaniaSource: National + Archives, RG 59, Bureau of + Intelligence and Research, Office of Analysis for the Commonwealth + and Eastern Europe, Office Subject Files, 1965–1980, Lot 92D412, Box + 2, Romania—CSCE. Confidential; + Priority; Exdis. Drafted by + Silins; cleared by Armitage and in S/S; approved by Nimetz. + + + + Washington, May 6, 1977, 2321Z + +

104105. Subject: Human Rights in Romania—Nimetz/Nicolae + Meeting May 5. Ref: Bucharest 3132.In + telegram 3132 from Bucharest, April 28, the Embassy reported on the + increasingly repressive nature of the Romanian regime. Barnes suggested that the ongoing + crackdown and anti-Western media campaign was decided by Ceausescu himself and that, with + regard to Ceausescu’s + internal policies, the U.S. ability + to influence a positive outcome was very limited. (National + Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign + Policy File, D770148–1290)

+

1. Summary: Counselor Nimetz told + Ambassador Nicolae that current + Romanian crackdown, if continued, would likely become public irritant in + US-Romanian relations. Counselor also said Carter-Ceausescu meeting be most difficult to + arrange under present circumstances, but might be considered at + appropriate time. Nicolae + presented lengthy exposition of Romanian viewpoint, implying that US is + seen as undermining Romanian internal discipline. End summary.

+

2. Counselor Nimetz called in + Ambassador Nicolae alone May 5 + to express administration concern at recent Romanian crackdown on + dissidents and anti-US press campaign. Deputy Assistant Secretary Armitage and Desk Officer + Silins also participated. Meeting lasted just over one hour.

+

3. Counselor said we are troubled and distressed by events of recent + months in Romania, particularly by what appears to be purposeful anti-US + press campaign and arrest and imprisonment of persons such as Goma, + Georgescu and Ton who appear to be doing nothing more than speaking in + support of Helsinki principles. Counselor noted that both he and + Armitage had testified before House International Relations Committee in + support of earthquake aid and, in response to several questions on human + rights in Romania, had painted generally favorable picture and said we + know of no imprisonments. So far the present situation has not become a + major public issue, and we have not made any public statements. + President Carter and Secretary + Vance have made clear the US + is not interested in interfering with or overturning other governments, + but have made it equally clear US must speak out when clear violations + of human rights are involved. We would not want to have public issue on + human rights in Romania unless absolutely necessary, but with MFN renewal process, earthquake aid + appropriation, and Belgrade Conference coming up, questions are bound to + arise, and it will be difficult to avoid comment. We are confused by + these latest Romanian actions because we do not perceive threat to the + Romanian leadership, which appears popular and strong. Nor do we believe + the US has caused any affront to Romania which would justify the anti-US + press campaign. We hope the situation can be cleared up so as to avoid a + public debate; hence this private talk.

+

Armitage added that some of those arrested have expressed a desire to + leave Romania; obviously the reaction in the US will be different if + people are allowed to leave than if they received harsh sentences.

+

4. Nicolae replied that Romanian + interest in good relations with the US remains high. President Ceausescu had reaffirmed this to + Nicolae during his recent + consultations in Bucharest. GOB also + appreciates US offer of earthquake aid. However, it is important to keep + in mind Romanian interests. As Foreign Minister Macovescu had explained to Ambassador + Barnes, GOR was surprised at “unpleasant attitude” + of US newspapermen, which caused certain articles to go beyond criticism + to insult.In telegram 2473 from Bucharest, + April 4, the Embassy reported on the recent anti-American campaign + in the Romanian media and the meeting on April 3 between Barnes and Macovescu on the subject. Macovescu explained that Romania + felt the need to strike back as a result of negative stories in the + U.S. press and negative RFE reporting and commentary. + Macovescu accused the + U.S. Government of intentionally + planting anti-Romanian stories in the U.S. press, and accused the U.S. press of focusing on negative aspects of the + post-earthquake recovery and attacking President Ceausescu personally. (National + Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign + Policy File, D770187–0096, D770116–0953) Even “sensitive + matters” had been reported on, such as alleged killing of woman by Ceausescu motorcade. Nicolae maintained this report was + false. Continuing his lengthy rebuttal (partly in Romanian), Nicolae touched on US press reports + that Romanian people are being forced to work weekends; reference to + “concentration camps” in Romania (by which he presumably meant short + article which referred to “labor camps”); RFE broadcasting of Goma’s telephone number; and US + emphasis on specific human rights cases, as opposed to general + principles. Thrust of his presentation was that in order to meet + development goals, which are precondition for Romania’s ability to deal + equal terms with other countries, including “Socialist” ones, GOR must act very prudently in mobilizing + population. By implication, US is making internal discipline more + difficult to maintain. Further, Romania cannot accept any interference + in internal affairs. Which can take various forms and be interpreted in + different ways by different countries (i.e. USSR).In a March 7 + intelligence information cable, the CIA reported that, in late February, the Romanian + Foreign Ministry instructed all Romanian missions abroad not to + issue visas to U.S. legislators + unless authorized by the Foreign Ministry and refrain from any + contact with U.S. Senators + investigating human rights issues. (National Archives, RG 59, Bureau of Intelligence and + Research, Office of Analysis for the Commonwealth and Eastern + Europe, Office Subject Files, 1965–1980, Lot 92D412, Box 2, + Romania-US (General)) Keeping in mind Romania’s geographic + position, Romanian leadership remains confident but must also be + prudent.

+

4. In part of conversation he emphasized was “unofficial,” Nicolae said he knew something about + Ton’s status but not the others mentioned. Ton, he said, had done + something “very bad for relations between the Romanian Baptist Church + and the Romanian authorities”: he sent a letter to RFE “explaining various cases.” Other + Romanian Baptists, not the GOR, had + removed Ton as pastor in Ploiesti for this reason. However, Ton is at + present not rpt not under arrest; he is + being allowed to conduct religious services at “some churches” in + Bucharest. Nicolae also stressed + the general point that if some persons had been arrested in Romania, + which was possible, it was because they had clearly violated Romanian + law by doing something more than simply criticizing GOR, which was not illegal. Therefore, + such arrests were an internal matter, not a proper subject for + international debate.

+

5. Counselor responded that US also recognizes need to be prudent in + these matters and sympathizes to some extent with problem Romania faces. + We are not attempting to interfere in Romania’s domestic affairs, nor + are we discussing the legal aspects of the cases mentioned; rather, our + concern is with the possible problem in our relations caused by arrests + of persons for supporting Helsinki principles or for religious activity. + US press is not controlled by anyone; general earthquake coverage was + highly sympathetic. Perhaps GOR is too + sensitive about press items. On other hand, deliberate selection of + negative items about US, even + if taken (as Nicolae claimed) + from US press, reflects GOR policy and + is interpreted accordingly by Romanian people. Nicolae said there is no place for + anti-Americanism in Romanian policy, but the “increasing presentation of + realities in capitalist countries is because of increasing presentation + of Romanian realities in Western press.”

+

6. Nicolae said it was important + to look to the future course of relations between Romania and US. In + this connection, it was important to arrange a meeting in the near + future between Presidents Carter + and Ceausescu, so they could + discuss issues directly. Ceausescu is very interested in meeting Carter, + preferably in Romania, where he could get some first-hand impressions. + Counselor replied that first months of new administration are difficult + time to arrange such travel, but perhaps it could be discussed at an + appropriate time. Under present circumstances, in view of events such as + arrest of a Baptist pastor and professor who had studied in US, it would + be impossible to propose such a visit. Counselor and Armitage both + pointed out that our intent in this meeting was to be sure that + President Carter’s views on human + rights were clearly understood and to underline that it was important + for our relations that handling of cases of those arrested for defense + of Helsinki obligations be restrained. Otherwise, public confrontation + might ensue. We asked that Nicolae convey this message to President Ceausescu with whom US leaders had + enjoyed such good relations.

+ + Christopher + +
+ +
+ 180. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security + Affairs (Brzezinski) to + President CarterSource: Carter Library, National + Security Affairs, Brzezinski + Material, Brzezinski Office + File, Country Chron File, Box 45, Romania: 1977. No classification + marking. Sent for action. Hyland forwarded it under a covering memorandum to + Brzezinski on May 26. + Printed from a copy that does not bear Brzezinski’s initials. + + + Washington, undated + + + SUBJECT + Romanian Trade: Presidential Waiver + +

The Trade Act of 1974, as amended by the Jackson-Vanik provision, + requires a Presidential waiver to extend Most Favored Nation (MFN) treatment and government sponsored + credits to any “socialist” country. Your determination and waiver must be received by + the Congress by June 2, 1977. There are two decisions: (1) a general + recommendation to continue the Presidential waiver authority, as + provided for under the law; this permits you to grant MFN to a communist country if you find + that doing so will promote the objectives of the law, i.e., freer + emigration; and (2) a specific waiver of the law as applied to Romania + so that the US-Romanian Trade Agreement of 1975 will continue in + force.

+

In the past it has seemed clearly in our national interest to exempt + Romania from the Jackson-Vanik provisions, which were directed against + the USSR. Recently, however, there has + been some growing concern that Romania was not permitting emigration and + was hardening its internal repression. Fifty-five Congressmen sent you a + letter indicating such concerns.Not + attached. Nevertheless, emigration to Israel continues at a + rate (undetermined) that is satisfactory to the Israeli government, + which concluded a secret arrangement with Romania. And emigration to the + US has actually increased in the years since the waiver was first + granted.

+

Secretary Vance recommends that + you extend the waiver to Romania for another 12 months, and that you + also recommend the general extension of the waiver provision (Vance memo is at Tab C).Not attached.

+

RECOMMENDATION

+

1. That you sign the Presidential determination at + Tab A, that extends the general waiver + provisions.Carter signed PD 77–14 on + June 2. (Public Papers: Carter, 1977, Book I, + p. 1057)

+

2. That you sign the specific waiver for Romania and the + message to the Congress at Tab B.The President signed the specific extension + of the waiver for Romania on June 2. (Public + Papers: Carter, 1977, Book I, pp. 1055–1056)

+
+ +
+ 181. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security + Affairs (Brzezinski) to + Secretary of State VanceSource: Carter Library, + National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Brzezinski Office File, Country Chron File, Box 45, + Romania: 1977. Secret. + + + Washington, July 27, + 1977 + + + SUBJECT + Visit from the Romanian Ambassador + +

Prior to going home on leave, the Romanian Ambassador called on me to say + goodbye. He raised two specific points:

+

—He expressed concern that out of the $20 million US relief funds for + Romania, only $7 million have been “handed over”. Can something be done + to expedite this?On July 29, Treverton sent a memorandum to + Brzezinski with an + update on the situation for aid to Romania. He reported that + Representative Clarence Long was holding the supplemental + appropriation bill in the Appropriation Committee, despite having no + objections to it, and urged Brzezinski to call Long. (Ibid.) On August 4, + Treverton again wrote + Brzezinski, urging a + call to Speaker O’Neill to ask the Speaker to intervene with Long. + Treverton wrote: + “Romania has been extremely cooperative in the CSCE Preparatory Conference; it was, + in several cases, a more fervent advocate of Western positions than + were the Allies themselves.” (Ibid.)

+

—He expressed a very strong hope that President Ceausescu could come and visit with + President Carter. He pleaded for + this year, but obviously would be satisfied with something next year. In + my view, a visit by Ceausescu + would be useful. How do you feel about it? Should we put in a + recommendation for the President?

+ + Zbigniew + Brzezinski + +
+ +
+ 182. Report Prepared in the Bureau of Intelligence and Research, + Department of StateSource: + National Archives, RG 59, Bureau of + Intelligence and Research, Office of Analysis for the Commonwealth + and Eastern Europe, Office Subject Files, 1958–1978, Lot 92D468, Box + 6, Eastern Europe Misc. 1977–1978. Secret; Noforn; Orcon. Drafted by + Rackmales; approved by Mautner. + + + No. 843 + + + Washington, August + 18, 1977 + +

CEAUSESCU’S LEADERSHIP POSITION

+

Summary

+

Romanian President and party boss Nicolae + Ceausescu has concentrated more power in his own hands + than has any other Warsaw Pact leader; his control of the party and + state apparatus is seemingly unassailable. There have been indications, + however, of a steady erosion in the extent of support he enjoys both + within the party and among the population at large.

+

Ceausescu’s handling of the + aftermath of the earthquake which struck Romania in March—he completely + dominated the relief and reconstruction activities—highlighted and + increased the gap between him and the rest of the party leadership. + Since then, his intensification of an already blatant personality cult + and his failure to modify unpopular economic policies have further + alienated a dissatisfied public. The June 13 riot at Bucharest’s “August + 23” stadium and the coal miners’ strike in western Romania in early + August reflect a considerable degree of popular frustration and + anger.

+

Although no immediate challenge to Ceausescu’s leadership position is likely, his isolation + probably will grow, further hampering effective policy formulation and + implementation. Within the next few years the resulting pressures could + pose serious problems for Romania’s political stability.

+

Ceausescu’s Leadership Style

+

Ceausescu remains Eastern Europe’s + most unusual Communist leader, integrating nationalism and Marxism in a + uniquely Romanian blend. His domestic policies in recent years (he has + ruled Romania for 12) increasingly have departed in significant ways + from prevailing Soviet and East European norms. These deviations, while + less publicized than his foreign policy initiatives, may be of greater + importance in the long run for Romania’s stability and policy + orientation.

+ +

Broadly speaking, the new internal political actions introduced by + Ceausescu fall into four + interrelated categories:

+

—promotion of a “cult of personality” on a scale unparalleled in + Eastern Europe since the 1950’s;

+

—frequent shifts of personnel between party and state organs, and + between Bucharest and the rest of the country;

+

—gradual dilution of the prestige and authority of key party organs, + such as the Central Committee; and

+

—blurring of party and state functions and the creation of new mass + organizations with vaguely defined mandates.

 +

Ceausescu’s mastery of political + maneuver has enabled him to manage these changes so as to concentrate + more and more power in his own hands.Ceausescu is now + President of the Socialist Republic of Romania, General Secretary of + the Romanian Communist Party, President of the Council of State, + Chairman of the Socialist Unity Front, Chairman of the Defense + Council and Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces, Chairman of the + Supreme Council of Economic and Social Development, and Chairman of + the Ideological Commission of the Romanian Communist Party. + [Footnote is in the original.] The centralization and + personalization of decisionmaking in Romania has reached the point where + Ceausescu overshadows not + only the other members of the leadership but also the party and state + institutions themselves. Most observers agree, however, that the decline + of the prestige and effectiveness of these institutions has not been + accompanied by a corresponding increase in popular or party support for + Ceausescu or his + policies.

+

Such support was at its peak following Ceausescu’s courageous defiance of the Soviet Union at + the time of the 1968 invasion of Czechoslovakia and the subsequent + dramatic opening to the United States symbolized by President Nixon’s + visit to Bucharest in August 1969. The enthusiasm that these gestures + evoked in Romania facilitated Ceausescu’s drive to consolidate his personal power, but + the gradual stabilization of Romanian relations with the two superpowers + since 1970 has reduced the role of nationalism as a means of winning + popular allegiance.

+

As patriotic euphoria has declined, increasing public disillusionment + with Ceausescu’s economic + policies has surfaced. Living standards in Romania rank well below those + in the other East European countries. The level of personal consumption + is estimated to be 50 percent lower than that in neighboring Bulgaria, + and the absence of adequate health care is reflected in an infant + mortality rate that is the highest of any Warsaw Pact country. These + shortcomings are the result partly of historical factors (Romania at the + end of the Second World War faced particularly severe problems of rural + over-population and general economic backwardness), but it is the + regime’s investment policy + favoring maximum expansion of heavy industry at the expense of the + consumer which is increasingly seen as the major cause of the lagging + standard of living.

+

Against this background, the earthquake that struck Romania last March + provides a useful focal point for an assessment of Ceausescu’s leadership.

+

Ceausescu’s Leadership in Action

+

Ceausescu faced his most dramatic + leadership test in years when an earthquake measuring 7.2 on the Richter + scale struck Romania on March 4, 1977. More than 1,500 persons were + killed and 35,000 families made homeless; Bucharest and some provincial + centers were damaged extensively. The extent of the disaster drew all + elements of the party and government leadership into relief and + reconstruction activities, but it was Ceausescu who directed and completely dominated the + process. No other official was delegated meaningful authority or + permitted to receive public recognition for his contribution.

+

When the earthquake struck, Ceausescu was in Nigeria completing a five-country + African tour; thus the initial emergency actions were taken by others. + Ceausescu, who was on the + scene within 18 hours, lost no time in publicly criticizing “certain + responsible factors for shortcomings in the organization of urgent + acting to eliminate the effects of the earthquake.” Privately, according + to a clandestine report, Ceausescu angrily reproached most of the top party + leaders, accusing them of being “utterly confused” after the earthquake + struck. The earthquake’s initial effect on the leadership was, + therefore, not to promote solidarity in the face of disaster, but to + increase the gap between Ceausescu and his colleagues.

+

Ceausescu’s subsequent management + of the relief effort provided further evidence of his ingrained distrust + of party institutions. On March 5, it was announced that the nine-man + Permanent Bureau of the party’s top-level Political Executive Committee + (Polexco) would “function as command center” for all earthquake-related + activity. That decision was never implemented; instead, the full 34-man + Polexco, acting as a “political staff,” met daily to “lead and organize + the struggle against the effects of the earthquake.”The reason for the change is unclear, but it + probably reflects Ceausescu’s + known dislike for anything that smacks of collegial leadership. + [Footnote is in the original.] The language of the Polexco + daily communiques left no doubt, however, that on key decisions the + Committee merely rubber-stamped Ceausescu’s “recommendations.”

+ +

The Cult of Personality Intensifies

+

The earthquake provided Ceausescu + with an unparalleled opportunity to display his complete dominance of + party and state activity. The press provided saturation coverage of his + highly visible control of relief and rescue operations, which extended + to personal supervision of (and sometimes participation in) individual + rescue operations. Praise of Ceausescu’s “titanic” leadership reached a new pitch of + intensity. The eulogies even took on quasi-religious overtones, as when + the Foreign Minister announced that the “miracle” of recovery from the + earthquake did not come from heaven but from “the great force of + mobilization and action of our party Secretary General Nicolae Ceausescu whose example in + those tragic days has already entered the heroic history of our + people.”

+

Attempts were also made to include Ceausescu’s wife Elena (appointed to the Permanent + Bureau in January) in this glorification campaign. The increasingly + prominent role played in recent years by Mrs. Ceausescu, who by most evidence is the + most unpopular member of the leadership, has been a political liability + for her husband.An unflattering portrayal + of a character thought to represent Elena in a 1971 novel by Paul + Goma caused the book’s rejection and completed Goma’s alienation + from the regime. Ceausescu’s + three children—Valentin, Zoe, and Nicu are—less prominent, and + therefore less unpopular than Elena, but their personalities and + penchant for high living are further liabilities for Ceausescu. [Footnote is in the + original.] Evidently her appointment on March 10 to head a + “National Committee of Assistance” to coordinate internal and foreign + donations was not well received. Nothing further has been heard about + the committee or about Mrs. Ceausescu’s role in earthquake assistance.

+

Popular Discontent in Post-Earthquake Period

+

Ceausescu’s political exploitation + of the catastrophe clearly alienated the Romanian elite. For the average + Romanian, however, political issues remain secondary to pocketbook + issues, and in the aftermath of the earthquake the latter took on added + significance and sensitivity.

+

Any hopes the public may have had that the trauma would prompt a + fundamental reevaluation of economic priorities were disabused within a + few days. Even before the full extent of economic loss could be + assessed, Ceausescu emphasized + that the five-year plan targets would have to be met “in accordance with + the initial provisions.” Subsequently, however, the need to give a + psychological boost to a weary and disillusioned population was + recognized, and in May the regime announced a program of wage and + pension increases designed to put more money in consumers’ pockets. The + program as a whole has nonetheless been greeted with skepticism because + of uncertainty over the extent + of real gain for the consumer. More seriously, the proposed pension law + changes, while increasing pension payments, contained provisions + adversely affecting certain categories of pension recipients.

+

In early August, Ceausescu was + forced to interrupt a vacation to rush to the scene of a strike by coal + miners angered by provisions of the new pension law. Reportedly, + Ceausescu, who was greeted + with open hostility by the miners, agreed to change some of its more + onerous provisions, and the strike ended.

+

The August strike was the second overt expression of popular discontent + since the earthquake. On June 13 a mass riot at Bucharest stadium, + triggered by public anger at the overselling of tickets to a pop concert + and soccer match, had taken on a clearly anti-regime cast. These two + unrelated incidents indicate that popular frustration has reached the + point where traditional Romanian passivity toward political authority + can no longer be taken for granted.

+

Conclusion

+

After 12 years of rule, Ceausescu’s élan appears undiminished. His handling of the + earthquake crisis and its aftermath demonstrated anew the qualities of + decisiveness, energy, and tactical skill which have long been hallmarks + of his style. The initial period of confusion was very brief, and while + some have questioned the emphasis placed on cosmetic aspects of the + relief program, there is no denying the impressive results achieved.

+

Offsetting these accomplishments was Ceausescu’s seeming unwillingness or inability to modify + characteristics of his rule which threaten further erosion of his + support within the party and among broad strata of the population.

+

—The increasingly blatant cult of personality is viewed with + cynicism or embarrassment by many Romanians.

+

—Mistrust permeates the top ranks of the country leadership, while + the circle of Ceausescu + supporters constantly narrows.

+

—Rigid adherence to unpopular economic policies, aggravated by + ineptness in their implementation, continues.

 +

As yet, there is no immediate, visible threat to Ceausescu’s overwhelming dominance of + the levers of power. His skill in maneuvering potential critics out of + positions of influence appears to have prevented formation of + alternative leadership clusters. A new confrontation with the Soviets, + should one occur, could once again permit him to rally Romanians behind + the banner of nationalism.

+

Over the longer term, however, Ceausescu’s failure to reverse what looks like a gradual + but steady erosion in his political backing could increasingly isolate + him, making effective policy formulation and execution more and more difficult and threatening the + stability of his regime.

+
+ +
+ 183. Editorial Note +

On August 25, 1977, Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin visited + Bucharest for discussions with Romanian President Nicolae Ceausescu. The Embassy in + Bucharest reported in telegram 6444, September 1, that while the + Romanian media had been “singularly uninformative on substance of + talks,” according to the Israeli Ambassador to Romania, the two leaders + had begun “getting through to each other if only in terms of personal + rapport” despite serious disagreements between them on the Middle East + issue. “Each side restated its well-known positions” the Embassy + reported, and, although “no offer was made by Ceausescu to mediate nor was he so + asked by Begin,” the two sides agreed to stay in touch with one another + on the issue. (National Archives, RG 59, + Central Foreign Policy File, D770316–0847)

+

Telegram 6719 from Tel Aviv, September 8, provided further details on the + Ceausescu-Begin meeting + reported from Bucharest. In his conversation with U.S. Ambassador to Israel Samuel Lewis and + the Deputy Chief of Mission following his return from Romania, Prime + Minister Begin recounted that Ceausescu “claimed [Egyptian President Anwar al-] Sadat + told him earlier this year that he is ready for a direct meeting between + representatives of Egypt and Israel. Begin asked if Sadat meant he was + ready to meet with him (Begin). If so, Begin said he was prepared. + Ceausescu thought a meeting + at such a high level was not yet in the cards, but that the initial + contact would have to be between ‘representatives’ of the two countries + at a lower, unspecified level. When Ambassador asked whether Begin + understood that ‘ball remained in the Romanian court’ to arrange + meeting, response was that it remained in the Egyptian court.” (National + Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy + File, D770325–0731)

+

Talk of a Romanian mediation effort in the Middle East was not without + basis. Bucharest was the only Eastern European Communist country to + maintain diplomatic relations with Israel following the 1967 War, + despite pressure from Moscow and the Arab countries to isolate Israel. + Bucharest had also been involved in back-channel diplomacy in 1967 in + Vietnam (see Foreign + Relations, 1964–1968, volume V, Vietnam, 1967, Document + 411) and in the initial stages of the Sino-American + rapprochement from 1969 to 1970. (See Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, volume XXIX, Eastern + Europe; Eastern Mediterranean, 1969–1972, Document 199; and + Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, volume XVII, + China, 1969–1972, Documents 20, + 94, and 96)

+
+ +
+ 184. Memorandum of ConversationSource: Department of State, Office of the Secretariat + Staff, Cyrus R. Vance, + Secretary of State—1977–1980, Lot 84D241, Box 10, unlabeled folder. + Confidential; Nodis. Drafted by + Silins; cleared by Glaspie; approved in S/S on September 21. The meeting took place in the + Secretary’s office. + + + Washington, September 14, 1977, 3:50–4:35 + p.m. + + + SUBJECT + Middle East + + + PARTICIPANTS + + + U.S. + Secretary Vance + Deputy Assistant Secretary William Luers + Ints M. Silins, EUR/EE + (Notetaker) + + + + + Romania + Ambassador Nicolae + Nicolae + Third Secretary Petre Anghel (Interpreter) + + + +

SUMMARY: Romanian Ambassador Nicholae briefed the + Secretary on Prime Minister Begin’s talks with President Ceausescu in Romania August 25–29. The + Romanian account of these meetings shows that Romania pressed Begin to + adopt a more reasonable position on solutions in the Middle East; the + Romanian position has similarities to our own. The Romanians believe the + Israelis may eventually show some flexibility but have no particular + evidence for this conclusion. The Secretary said we will keep in touch + with the Government of Romania on Middle East Issues and would welcome + any suggestions on approaches to a peaceful settlement. END SUMMARY

+

Ambassador Nicolae called, on + instructions, on Secretary Vance + to present a detailed report on Israeli Prime Minister Begin’s visit to + Bucharest during August 25–29. Ambassador Nicolae read his account from a written report, which he + said was based on a stenographic record of conversations between Prime + Minister Begin and President Ceausescu.

+ +

1. The Romanian + Position

+

Ceausescu had presented the + Romanian position on conditions necessary for a just and lasting peace + in the Middle East. These include: (a) Israel’s withdrawal from the + occupied territories; (b) recognition of the legitimate interests and + aspirations of the Palestinians, including the right to create an + independent state; (c) assurance of the independence and integrity of + all states in the region. Ceausescu had expressed concern with some Israeli + actions; namely, illegal settlements in the occupied territories, and + Israeli involvement in Lebanon. Ceausescu said that Israel must revise its position and + recognize the national rights of the Palestinian people, lacking which, + no lasting solution is possible. He said that it is necessary to break + the vicious circle around relations with the PLO by a clear statement of + the right of self-determination of the Palestinian people. He added that + the establishment of a Palestinian state will not satisfy all + Palestinian demands; there is also the problem of compensation for + losses suffered by Arabs who were resettled in other countries.

+

Ceausescu said that no one can + imagine a solution in the Middle East without participation by the PLO + at Geneva on an equal footing and with full rights. He said that + conditions are now most favorable for progress toward peace, and he + particularly emphasized that responsibility rests with Prime Minister + Begin and with Israel for not taking advantage of these favorable + conditions. Ceausescu noted that + Israel hangs on to old and rigid positions, and it is a grave mistake + not to meet the flexible positions of the Arab states. Ceausescu said the situation may change + at any time with grave consequences for peace.

+

Ceausescu pointed out that the + framework offered by the UN cannot be + ignored. Israel has to recognize the UN + role, including that of the Committee on Special Rights of the + Palestinian People.

+

Ceausescu noted that Romania does + not want to assume the role of mediator but seeks to make its + contribution to peace in the Middle East along with other states.

+

2. Begin’s Position

+

Prime Minister Begin repeatedly underlined that it is his desire and that + of Israel to achieve peace and avoid another war in the Middle East—this + is the sole motive for his actions. There are no preconditions for a + reconvened Geneva Conference, and all problems should be subject to + negotiations. Begin offered no new ideas on the framework of the + negotiations but explained the content and sense of proposals he had + made during his visit to the United States.

+

Begin said Israel would not oppose the inclusion of Palestinian + representatives in a Jordanian delegation, if they are not known PLO + members. Begin said that a single Arab delegation would not be justified + since peace treaties must be negotiated and signed separately.

+ +

Begin pointed out that the policy of non-recognition and rejection of the + PLO is motivated by the fact that the Palestinian national charter calls + for the destruction of Israel.

+

Israel apparently plans an overall settlement through the conclusion of + peace treaties. Begin did not mention the possibility of partial + solutions during his meetings with Ceausescu. The essential content of these peace + treaties, according to Begin, should be cessation of the state of war. + Begin said that territorial problems and settlements in the occupied + territories should not be obstacles to peace, everything being + negotiable. Begin said the Israeli position on the delimitation of + frontiers is dictated entirely by national security reasons and is not a + pretext for territorial aggrandizement. The final borders are to be + jointly established only through negotiations and reflected in the peace + treaties. The establishment of diplomatic and other relations must be an + integral part of the peace treaties—but this is a problem for the + negotiations, not a precondition.

+

Begin attached great importance to the contacts at Foreign Minister level + at the UN this fall. Israel would have + preferred direct contacts, but in any case some progress can be made + toward a conference.

+

With regard to the problem in southern Lebanon, Begin said he does not + want any Lebanese territory and would do anything to avoid the outbreak + of another war, but Israel cannot be indifferent to the fate of the + Christian minority in the region.

+

3. Romanian Conclusions

+

The Romanian Government considers that Prime Minister Begin’s visit was a + good opportunity to set forth the Romanian position toward establishment + of peace in the Middle East. Efforts should be intensified to convince + Israel to revise its rigid position. During the talks, the Romanian side + got the impression that, despite Begin’s rigid statements, the Israeli + Government might be considering the possibility of revising its + positions. Begin did not reject the possibility of a peaceful solution + to the Palestinian question, but said that it would be hard to do this + as long as the PLO does not renounce the idea of destroying Israel. + Begin said that he would think over the comments and analysis made by + President Ceausescu.

+

If only for this reason, the Romanians consider the visit useful. It was + never expected that Begin would revise his positions in Bucharest or + find the solution to the Middle East problem while there. The opinion of + the Romanian Government is that Begin’s intransigent statements do not + represent the final word. The possibility of an understanding is not + closed, but it is necessary for all countries to help bring the + respective positions closer together so that the Geneva Conference can + reconvene and a solution be found for PLO participation.

+ +

Ambassador Nicolae conveyed + President Ceausescu’s thanks for + the briefing he had received on the Secretary’s Middle East visit,In telegram 197399 to Bucharest, August 19, + the Department forwarded Secretary Vance’s summary of his trip to the Middle East to be + used in a briefing for Ceausescu. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + D770299–0562) No report of when the Embassy in Bucharest briefed + Ceausescu on the trip was + found. and he conveyed the hope that exchanges will continue, + including a meeting between Secretary Vance and Romanian Foreign Minister Macovescu at the UN.

+

Secretary Vance expressed his + great appreciation for the report on Prime Minister Begin’s visit. He + said it was useful that such a conversation took place and that it was + good for Begin to hear as many views as possible. The Secretary said + there are many similarities between the US and Romanian positions on + what is required for a settlement in the Middle East. The statements + made by Prime Minister Begin in Romania are in line with what he said to + us here. There are two crucial issues, however, on which we see no + flexibility on the Israeli side: the West Bank and the question of a + Palestinian entity or state. We agree there must be some Palestinian + participation at Geneva; otherwise, there can be no lasting settlement. + It is, therefore, both a procedural and a substantive question. We hope + that at the UNGA we can help move the + positions closer together and bring about a Geneva meeting no later than + December.

+

The Secretary said that we look forward to keeping in touch with the + Romanian Government on the Middle East and would appreciate any + suggestions Romania might offer. The parties to the conference will have + to make the final determination themselves, but they will need help.

+
+ +
+ 185. Telegram From the Embassy in Romania to the Department of + StateSource: National + Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign + Policy File, D770380–1259. Confidential. Also sent to + Budapest. + + + Bucharest, October + 17, 1977, 1035Z + +

7631. Subj: GOR’s Campaign for + Multi-Year MFN. Ref: Bucharest + 6891.In telegram 6891 from Bucharest, + September 19, the Embassy reported on a September 14 conversation + between Barnes and Patan. + Despite understanding the challenges multi-year MFN for Romania would have to + overcome, Patan made clear “GOR + will persist in discussing here and in D.C. the desirability of + multi-year review and continue to explore modalities, direct and + indirect, for attaining their objective.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + D770340–0145)

+

1. Summary: During Counselor Nimetz’s visit in Romania, he met with three high-level + GOR officials who, each in his + fashion, issued a clear signal that the Romanians intend to launch a + full-blown campaign for the eventual achievement of multi-year Most + Favored Nation treatment. President Ceausescu has clearly put this issue at the head of his + list of priorities in terms of US–GOR + economic relations. The point man in this campaign will be Deputy Prime + Minister Patan who is scheduled to visit Washington, October 27–November + 3. The culmination of this phase of the campaign would logically occur + with the Ceausescu visit. + Meanwhile we need to think out how best to achieve our own interests. + End of summary.

+

2. The Government of Romania’s serious intent to attempt to achieve the + extension of Most Favored Nation treatment for longer than one year at a + time was clearly and repeatedly expressed in conversations held with + Counselor Nimetz in the course of + his visit to Romania, October 10–12. Foreign Minister Macovescu said that it was politically + important to avoid an annual debate in Congress which tends to be + treated as an open invitation for a debate focusing on any topic whether + or not it has any direct bearing on US–GOR economic relations. He said that if it appears now to + be politically impractical or unwise to attempt to separate out the + Romanian case from the 1974 Trade Act, some provision should be found + which would permit that the congressional review take place only every + three years. Noting that the Foreign Minister was even more familiar + with the MFN issue than he was, the + Counselor pointed out that emigration performance was bound to be + important, especially in coming months, as we assess it on a bi-annual + basis. Anything GOR could do to make + this performance attractive, + especially with regard to emigration to Israel, would be helpful.In telegram 7677 from Bucharest, October 18, + the Embassy reported on Nimetz’s discussions of bilateral issues with Gliga + and Macovescu, including the + proposed Ceausescu visit to + Washington, other high-level exchanges, arms control, and scientific + and cultural exchanges. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + D770382–0169)

+

3. RCP CC Secretary for International Affairs Stefan Andrei noted October 10 that U.S. was surely aware both of Rom desire + for more ample relations and of President Ceausescu’s desire to get away from the annual review of + the MFN clause; the President’s + argument that we need a more stable basis for the whole relationship + strengthened this desire, Andrei + said. Counselor replied that it is difficult to be optimistic about + short-term prospects. Multi-year review would be a serious matter in the + Congress, as most recent annual extension had not been, and it would be + necessary to lay the groundwork very carefully. Acceleration of the + process of good relations between the two countries and a demonstration + to our public that progress on human rights is possible here would be + the kinds of developments needed. It is important to continue to consult + on these matters.In telegram 7726 from + Bucharest, October 19, the Embassy reported that Andrei told Nimetz that Communist parties in + the West are in the process of establishing an independent line, + with the strongest parties having a special role. (National + Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign + Policy File, D770385–0502)

+

4. In Nimetz’s meeting with Deputy + Prime Minister Patan on October 11, Patan stressed the peculiarity of + the Romanian fate, pointing out that it was the single country which had + concluded an arrangement under the provisions of the Trade Act of 1974 + for Most Favored Nation treatment. By doing so, Romania had set a sort + of example for those states which were and remain highly skeptical that + any satisfactory accommodation on this issue can be reached with the + United States. Patan stressed that the example set by the GOR should be a more positive model. There + are diplomatic representatives in Bucharest, who, having advised against + the GOR entering into the agreement + with the USG concerning MFN, are now saying, quote, I told you so, + end quote.

+

5. In October 12 meeting, FornMin Macovescu was somewhat less elliptical in comments on + annual review process.Nimetz also discussed international + issues with Macovescu during + their meeting. In telegram 7602 from Bucharest, October 14, the + Embassy reported Macovescu’s + assertion to Nimetz that the + joint U.S.-Soviet declaration + preoccupied Romania, and that Bucharest was wary of any agreements + between the superpowers which might infringe on its sovereignty. + (National Archives, RG 59, Central + Foreign Policy File, D770378–0592) In telegram 7655 from Bucharest, + the Embassy reported Macovescu’s summary to Nimetz of the Romanian position on the Middle East + and his conversations with Israeli Foreign Minister Dayan. (National + Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign + Policy File, D770380–1259) As Foreign Minister he wished to + give the political viewpoint, he said: It is important from all points + of view to avoid the kinds of things that happen during the annual renewal. If discussion were + normal, on the substance of U.S.-Romanian economic relations, this would be fine, but what + is actually discussed is neither to Romania’s advantage nor to that of + the U.S. Romania is not afraid to + confront serious issues but needs to know what it is doing so far. On + Transylvania, quote, we know whom we should discuss it with, end quote, + and have all sorts of arguments at our disposal, but the U.S. Congress is not the place to talk + about rights or non-rights in Transylvania. Both the U.S. and Romania can live without such + discussion and, after all, we entered into the trade agreement from + other motives.In his September 29 meeting + with Vance in New York at + the UNGA, reported to Bucharest in + telegram 238769, October 4, Macovescu had made a similar pitch. The Romanian + Foreign Minister pressed for de-coupling issues such as human rights + and emigration from the review of “a trade agreement.” Vance suggested that multi-year + review could be discussed, but that too would require legislation. + (National Archives, RG 59, Central + Foreign Policy File, D770362–1086)

+

6. Counselor responded that U.S. citizens + are free to raise any topic which interests them in such congressional + hearings, but that what Macovescu + had called the Transylvanian problem is not a problem for us; it is a + Romanian domestic affair. Like Mexican-Americans and other Americans of + foreign descent, Americans of Hungarian descent sometimes like to + consider the cultural affairs of their country of origin their own, but + we do not consider that this has political significance. During the last + renewal period there were not many questions on the topic in the + Congress. From time to time members of Congress are given papers and + speeches to read, but these should not be overrated; at times we have + the impression that only the GOR reads + them. Cultural diversity in the sense defined by the Helsinki Final Act + is a valid topic of discourse, but this is a very general proposition. + Using the example of putting Spanish on the ballot and in the schools of + New York City, Counselor noted that Americans are used to discussing + these issues and expressed view that Hungarian-American thinking should + not be considered at any other level.

+

7. Macovescu concluded discussion + by noting that Romania has a public opinion, too, and while it may not + be as “tough” as ours, GOR officials + can still be asked uncomfortable questions—such as what possible link + there is between Transylvania and a trade agreement—in Parliament. + Transylvania is not a problem for Romania, but it may be a problem in + bilateral relations; it would be wrong to ignore issues which seem small + today but which may be important tomorrow, “in both directions.”

+

8. Counselor indicated in his conversations that these issues would + continue to be studied in Washington, and GOR interlocutors expressed appreciation for his willingness to listen and for + frank responses, showing that he was thinking seriously about the + problem.

+

9. Comment: Romanians clearly saw Counselor’s visit as Bucharest opener + for process leading up to Ceausescu’s visit in the spring, and Patan’s upcoming + trip will be opener in U.S. just as + clearly, multi-year MFN review will be + the repeat the central issue in preparing successful Presidential visit. + Macovescu’s frank references + to Transylvania also suggest political context in which Romanians see + these matters, and Department may wish to consider next steps in U.S.-Hungarian relations in this context as + well as broader Soviet-EE framework.

+

10. As Ambassador discussed with Counselor, we feel it important to keep + bearing in mind our own interests—both political and commercial—in + achieving a more solid long term relationship with Romania. Patan’s + visit should be used to further the process of helping GOR to understand the context in which + multi-year MFN might become possible. + In fact the pre-Ceausescu visit + period needs to be thought of in terms of how we can best make use of + the Romanian push for a revised MFN + status.

+ + Barnes + + +
+ +
+ 186. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security + Affairs (Brzezinski) to + President CarterSource: Carter Library, National + Security Affairs, Brzezinski + Material, President’s Correspondence with Foreign Leaders File, Box + 16, Romania: President Nicolae + Ceausescu, 2/77–12/78. Confidential. Sent for + action. + + + Washington, November + 15, 1977 + + + SUBJECT + A Presidential Letter for Romanian President Ceausescu + +

Ambassador Rudolph Aggrey, the + new US envoy to Romania, will be leaving shortly to take up his post in + Bucharest. I think it would be appropriate when he presents his + credentials also to deliver a letter from you to Romanian President + Nicolae Ceausescu.Aggrey + suggested the letter during a meeting on November 11 with Aaron. King edited a Department of State version and + forwarded it to Brzezinski + on November 14. Aaron wrote + on King’s memorandum to + Brzezinski: “ZB—I think this is worth doing so that + we have our channel.” Brzezinski approved the + recommendation. (Ibid.)

+ +

Ambassador Aggrey is replacing + Harry Barnes, who has been + a particularly effective envoy and has established excellent contacts + with Romanians at all levels. There have been intelligence reports that + at least some high level Romanian officials interpret Aggrey’s assignment to Bucharest as a + sign of declining American interest in Romania. Using Aggrey as the channel to deliver a + Presidential letter will both reaffirm interest in Romania and underline + your confidence in him.

+

At the present time, it is important that we make gestures to the + Romanians to reaffirm our interest in their foreign policy.On October 17, King sent a memorandum to Brzezinski recommending a brief + meeting between Carter and Patan, who was to travel to Washington + for the Joint U.S.-Romanian Economic + Commission November 1–3. King wrote: “A Presidential meeting with Patan would + be an important political gesture at present. Our latest actions + have probably raised doubts in suspicious Romanian minds about our + interest and concern with their affairs,” pointing to the upcoming + visit by Carter to Poland and the return of the Crown of St. Stephen + to Hungary. Recommending disapproval, Aaron wrote “ZB—I + disagree. This is not worth the President’s + time at this stage.” Disapproving the recommendation, Brzezinski highlighted Patan’s + position as Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Trade and + wrote in the margin “The P. is not an Asst. Sec. of State!” (Carter + Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 66, Romania: + 1/77–5/78) On November 2, Patan met with Vice President Mondale for 15 minutes and was + briefly received by the President. (Carter Library, National + Security Affairs, Brzezinski + Material, Brzezinski Office + File, Country Chron File, Box 45, Romania: 1977) Although + much could be done to improve its internal policy, Romania is still the + Warsaw Pact state which shows the greatest foreign policy autonomy from + the Soviet Union. We are in the process of reaffirming our interest in + Poland (through your visit) and Hungary (through returning the Crown and + then negotiating a trade agreement), but the only sign of our interest + in Romania is a visit to Washington by Ceausescu next spring for which we are still not able to + give the Romanians a date despite their frequently expressed wishes to + fix a firm time.

+

Shortly after your inauguration, President Ceausescu sent a special envoy with a personal letter + for you expressing the desire to maintain good relations. It would be + useful and appropriate for us to send him a message on this + occasion.

+

RECOMMENDATION

+

That you sign the letter to President Ceausescu at Tab A.Carter + approved the recommendation and, after revising the text, signed the + letter on November 15. Several drafts, including one with Carter’s + revisions, are attached but not printed.

+
+ +
+ 187. Memorandum of ConversationSource: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, + Brzezinski Material, + Subject File, Box 36, Memcons: President: 11–12/77. Top Secret. The + meeting took place in the Oval Office. Brzezinski forwarded a copy of the memorandum to + Vance on November 28. A + summary of the meeting was also transmitted in telegram 283125 to + Bucharest, Tel Aviv, Cairo, and Damascus, November 26. (National + Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign + Policy File, P840072–0448) + + + Washington, November 23, 1977, 9:30–10 + a.m. + + + SUBJECT + Summary of the President’s Meeting with the Romanian Foreign + Minister + + + PARTICIPANTS + The President + The Vice President + Mr. Philip Habib, Under + Secretary of State for Political Affairs + Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski, + Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs + Mr. William B. Quandt, + NSC Staff + The Honorable George + Macovescu, Foreign Minister of Romania + His Excellency Nicolae M. + Nicolae, Ambassador from Romania + +

Foreign Minister: President Ceausescu sends his best regards.

+

President Carter: I am very proud of our friendship with + him.

+

Foreign Minister: I have a message for you from my + President. (The Foreign Minister hands the President a letter.)Ceausescu sent Carter a letter designating Macovescu as a special envoy on + “some considerations on the situation in the Middle East and on the + continued development of Romanian-American relations.” (Carter + Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, President’s Correspondence with + Foreign Leaders File, Box 16, Romania: President Nicolae Ceausescu, + 2/77–12/78)

+

President Carter: It’s a pleasure to have you here. You have + made a long trip. We are looking forward to next spring when we hope to + have President Ceausescu with + us.

+

Dr. Brzezinski: We hope to find a time in the late + spring for his visit.

+

President Carter: It will be a pleasure to have him here. We + have a strong friendship with your country and we are proud of our good + relations.

+

Foreign Minister: We feel that our relations have + developed well, and President Ceausescu wants to extend this. He considered this to be + a good time to send me here with some ideas on the Middle East, + especially after the visit of President Sadat to Jerusalem. In the last + three months, President Ceausescu + has met with Prime Minister Begin and then with President Sadat. He + talked at length with both of them. You have also talked to them. I + would like to tell you about our interest in the Middle East. We have no special interest, no + strategic or economic interests in the Middle East. We do trade with the + Arabs and with Israel but we have no special interests. Our main + interest is in peace. We consider our security to be in danger if peace + is not reached. We want peace and understanding in the Middle East and + we are working hard for it but we are not mediators in the Middle East. + We try to provide an open channel for the two parties to use, so that + they can transmit ideas, can see each other’s point of view, and we + sometimes add our own, but we are not mediators.

+

President Ceausescu saw both Begin + and Sadat, and now they have met each other.Ceausescu visited Egypt + May 11–12 to hold bilateral discussions with Egyptian President + Anwar Sadat. In telegram 8153 from Cairo, May 13, the Embassy + reported that the primary purpose of the Ceausescu visit seemed to be bilateral and economic + issues, and that there was little evidence that Ceausescu was carrying any special + message from either the Soviets or the Israelis. (National Archives, + RG 59, Central Foreign Policy + File, D770170–0772) Begin visited Bucharest August 25–30. See Document 183. Our estimation is that + this is an important step for peace and for understanding, but I have + travelled many times between Jerusalem and Cairo and I know how deep the + lack of confidence between the parties is. Now a first step has been + taken toward building some confidence and we think it is a good step. + The next main step is to go and convene the Geneva Conference, but the + parties needed to help prepare it directly, and we think that has been + done. There are now some differences in the Arab world.

+

President Carter: I’ve noticed!

+

Foreign Minister: We see a dramatic situation, and + my President believes it is the right time to help Sadat. Sadat has + support at home and support from Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Sudan, Morocco, + Jordan, and Tunisia. In fact, this represents a majority of the Arabs. + Against him is Assad, and some others like Algeria and the PLO.

+

I can say that President Ceausescu + has sent a message through an emissary to President Assad and to + Arafat. He sent Mr. Poungan, + but we have no news yet of his meetings. If we receive news, we will + tell you.In telegram 416 from Bucharest, + January 19, 1978, the Embassy reported Aggrey’s conversation with Andrei. Andrei informed Aggrey that Ceausescu had decided to send Pungan to Cairo and + Jerusalem, and that asked Vance meet with Pungan confidentially in either one + of the two cities. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P850101–2417) + Vance responded in + telegram Secto 1055, January 20, + 1978, that a meeting in either city would be impossible and that he + would prefer not to meet during the trip, but rather brief the + Romanian Ambassador in Washington upon his return. (National + Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign + Policy File, P840148–1549) Vance and Pungan met January 24 in Washington. See + Document 190. Our interest is + to try to calm the situation. We understand the Syrian and PLO position + but we want them to calm down. Now is the right moment to go for peace. + If we lose time, there will be dangers.

+ +

President Carter: President Ceausescu has played a constructive role in getting the + meeting started. This shows the confidence that the two parties have in + your Presidents. I thought that President Sadat and Prime Minister Begin + would get along well, and that seems to have been true.

+

I have been disappointed by the negative attitude of President Assad. We + have tried to encourage Assad to be moderate. He personally has + refrained from attacking Sadat, but his government has been very + negative. He had some news this morning that Sadat has asked the PLO to + leave Egypt. Your officials have relations with Arafat and we do not. Arafat has also been reticent to attack + Sadat, but others have been very critical. I agree with you and + President Ceausescu that the time + has come to move toward a comprehensive peace. We are pleased with + Jordan’s statement and if + Syria were more positive, Jordan + would be able to go further. The Lebanese attitude also depends on + Syria. What do you suggest doing next?

+

Foreign Minister: My President has some + suggestions. He thinks that it is important to try to convince Begin to + respond to Sadat with flexibility. Sadat has played his big card. This + is the right time for Israel, with your help, to take steps to show + flexibility and to move on to the Geneva Conference. We have to go to + Geneva in the near future. We can’t lose momentum. Secondly, my + President felt that it would be a good idea to send Vice President + Mondale or Mr. Vance to Egypt to talk to Sadat and + then to travel in the area to show your continued interest in the + region. Third, my President feels that the time has come for you to talk + to the PLO. Even Mr. Begin does not reject this idea.

+

President Carter: Perhaps you already know that we have a + public agreement that was signed between Mr. Ford and the Israeli + Government, and was reaffirmed by me that states that we will not meet + with the PLO unless the PLO abandons its insistence on the destruction + of Israel. We have asked Arafat + to accept Resolution 242, and he can add a statement of his concern that + the Palestinian question is not included in 242, because 242 only talks + of refugees, and then we would be glad to meet directly. But I can’t + break a promise as long as the PLO calls for Israel’s destruction.

+

Foreign Minister: I understand. But even Sadat + used to say No for a long time and now he has gone to Jerusalem. We need + more flexibility. You should tell the Israelis that you want some + contacts and then the PLO will become more flexible. We know them well + and they are in difficult positions. They don’t know how to react. It is + also time for you to discuss with the Soviets how to reconvene the + Geneva Conference as co-chairmen. We might send an invitation to the + parties or do this through the United Nations. We think it is best to + talk to the Soviets and to keep them in a positive frame of mind.

+ +

President: We are in close touch with the Soviets. + I think that there are two or three people now, President Assad and + President Brezhnev. We are ready + to move rapidly through the UN to call + for the Geneva Conference. We can do this once we have an agreement with + the Soviets on the format, and indications from Assad that he will + attend. I would be reluctant to exclude Syria if they want to cooperate. + In a few days, we will have information from the Israelis and the + Egyptians. Then we can judge our role. I have talked to Prime Minister + Begin, but I have not yet heard from President Sadat. They were both + tired after the visit. President Ceausescu could help with President Assad. After your + emissary has met with Assad, we would like to know anything you learn + about how we might best approach the Syrians. I have been pleased with + the Soviet attitude as expressed in the joint statement. They could, of + course, obstruct a Geneva Conference but we see no evidence that that is + their intention. They have played a constructive role as compared to the + past and are now eager to move to overcome the problem we have with + Syria.

+

Foreign Minister: Concerning the substance of my + trip, my President was very happy that you would agree to see me. The + main point is to make clear that we need to help President Sadat. If he + falls or if he is isolated, there can be no peace in the Middle East. + His trip to Jerusalem was an important step.

+

President Carter: What is your relationship to Saudi + Arabia?

+

Foreign Minister: We have had none. We see each + other sometimes and talk, but we have no diplomatic relations. They are + not prepared for them.

+

President Carter: We have had good cooperation from the + Saudis. They help Egypt, and we don’t want to see that disrupted. Most + of the world admires Sadat for his move and we hope that the meeting he + had will be a success.

+

Foreign Minister: He sees himself as a strong + leader who can afford to make this kind of move.

+

President: He is a strong leader and he has proved + it. I am glad to see that you are taking constructive steps and that + they are fully in line with our own. I hope that we will keep exchanging + views.

+

Foreign Minister: This has been our first mission + since the Sadat trip.

+

Dr. Brzezinski: Has Mr. Poungan gone to see Arafat?

+

Foreign Minister: Yes, he left two days ago.

+

President Carter: We look forward to hearing the report. We + have good relations with Assad and I like him. I think he is a fine + man.

+

Foreign Minister: Our direct bilateral + relationships are good and President Ceausescu looks forward to his visit here.

+

President: I look forward to meeting him.

+ +

Foreign Minister: If the Vice President could come + to Romania, or Secretary Vance + before Ceausescu’s visit, it + would be very good. It should not be linked to a visit to the Middle + East.

+

President: The Vice President does not need much + encouragement to travel.

+

Vice President Mondale: I went to Romania in 1968, and I met + the Foreign Minister at that time and we had a good talk.

+

President Carter: It is hard to keep him here.

+

Vice President: I’ll become an expert on + Romania.

+

Foreign Minister: It would be good to have you in + our country.

+
+ +
+ 188. Memorandum of ConversationSource: Department of State, Office of the Secretariat + Staff, Cyrus R. Vance, + Secretary of State—1977–1980, Lot 84D241, Box 10, unlabeled folder. + Secret; Nodis. Drafted by + Luers; approved in + S/S on November 30. The meeting + took place in the Secretary’s office. + + + Washington, November 25, 1977, 11:30 a.m. + + + SUBJECT + Meeting with Foreign Minister + + + PARTICIPANTS + + + US + The Secretary + Philip Habib Under + Secretary for Political Affairs + Alfred Atherton, NEA Assistant Secretary + William Luers, + EUR Deputy Assistant + Secretary (notetaker) + + + + + ROMANIA + Foreign Minister George + Macovescu + Ambassador Nicolae + Nicolae + + + +

Summary of Actions

+

The Secretary told Macovescu he would work on setting a date for the + Ceausescu visit and report + back to the Foreign Minister soon.

+

The Secretary asked that the Romanians keep us + up-to-date on the PLO thinking over the next few weeks.

+

Macovescu + renewed his invitation to the Secretary and to Mr. Habib to visit Romania. No commitments + made on these.

+ +

Middle East

+

Foreign Minister Macovescu said he had promised the President he + would provide us news from the report of one of Romania’s officials + (Pungan) who had visited Damascus.See Document 187. The report is that + President Assad intends to keep to his stand on the Sadat visit. The + Syrians are making an analysis to determine the consequences of the + visit and cannot say exactly what the outcome will be. Assad is still in + favor of the Geneva conference and believes this is the way to have a + global solution in the Middle East but he is preoccupied that the way + Sadat is moving will not lead to Geneva. He is worried about a separate + agreement.

+

The Foreign Minister, in referring to the PLO, + said that Arafat is still angry. + He has learned that the PLO Central Committee decided to attack Sadat + but keep the criticism within certain limits. The Secretary asked whether the Romanians have specific knowledge + that the criticism was to be within certain limits or is that just the + Romanian impression from observations. Macovescu confirmed that the + Romanians have knowledge that the PLO Central Committee agreed to + establish certain limits on the criticism. The Secretary then said he had heard from UN Secretary General Waldheim that the PLO in the UN had in the last 48 hours played down the + attacks on Sadat. The Foreign Minister said his + Ambassador at the UN had given him + similar reports but also that the PLO representatives at the UN were expressing disturbance about being + possibly left out of a Geneva conference.

+

The Secretary asked whether the PLO said how they + planned to proceed from now on with regard to the Sadat visit. Minister + Macovescu said no. Mr. Habib asked whether the + Romanians sense any change in the PLO position as to whether they must + be invited as the PLO to a conference. Macovescu replied that he had + no recent word from Damascus or Beirut but the PLO representative in New + York had said several weeks ago that the PLO would not reject the idea + of going to Geneva as part of an Arab delegation.

+

The Secretary asked what the PLO reaction has been + to the Iraqis and Libyans and how recent events have affected those + relations. Minister Macovescu said he had no reading on that + subject. The Secretary said that the US + Ambassador will talk to the Syrians in Damascus today to get their view + on how they see the situation developing.

+

Macovescu + said, in summation, that the Syrians and the PLO expect to have a + conference on the Middle East in the near future and they fear a + separate settlement. They even think that the US may be behind the + development of a separate settlement between Israel and Egypt. Mr. Habib said that had the PLO + and the Syrians accepted the earlier proposals of the US we and they + would be in Geneva by now. Macovescu replied that the Syrians and + Palestinians are now analyzing that situation. Mr. Habib suggested + that the Romanians could be helpful in influencing that analysis. Macovescu + then reiterated what he had told President Carter that since the PLO and the Syrians want a + conference that US should press the Israelis for some concessions to + Sadat to bring the conference about.

+

The Secretary said that it is our view that we + should continue to strive for a Geneva conference and discourage + separate agreements. This Administration has stood for a comprehensive + negotiated settlement and continues to do so, realizing that within a + comprehensive settlement separate peace arrangements would be possible. + The Secretary said that it is difficult now to + determine how this new element (the Sadat visit to Israel) will affect + the timing of the preparations. The Secretary + said that he is strongly in favor of having such a conference well + prepared in advance.

+

Macovescu + replied that he was very glad to hear that the US still favors a Geneva + conference and a comprehensive settlement; that there are rumors that + the US was behind the Egyptian-Israeli meeting and that the US supported + separate settlements. The Secretary replied + forcefully that the US for years has been saying that we wanted the + parties to the dispute to talk to each other. Naturally we feel that the + Sadat visit to Jerusalem was a major step in this direction which we + fully favor. But this does not change our position that we favor a + Geneva conference which will deal with the matter comprehensively. The + Secretary asked that the Romanians do what + they could to kill the rumors to the contrary.

+

Reception of Ambassador Aggrey

+

The Secretary thanked the Foreign Minister for the + warmth of the reception given to Ambassador Aggrey in Bucharest and the speed with which his + credentials were accepted. Macovescu thanked the Secretary for the message conveyed by Ambassador Aggrey and made some general remarks + about disarmament issues and the fact that the Belgrade conference is + now into its second phase. He said “the show is now over” as they move + to work on new proposals and to drafting the final communique at + Belgrade.

+

Human Rights—Goma

+

The Secretary said he would like to raise a + delicate matter. He asked what the facts were behind this mornings press + reports of the remarks of Romanian writer (Paul) Goma (who had recently + left Romania). Macovescu replied + that he had known about this in advance. The Foreign Ministry had + learned of the PEN Club invitation to Goma and it was finally agreed that he should be given a + visa to travel abroad for one year. The Foreign + Minister said he guessed that Goma would “speak up” once he + departed. He said, “We are not scared. One person cannot hurt us.”

+

The Secretary then asked about the facts of the + case as Goma alleged them in his press conference.Romanian dissident writer Paul Goma departed + Romania in November 1977 for France on a one-year tourist visa. Once + in Paris, Goma held a press conference accusing the Romanian + Government of inhumane treatment of dissidents, of firing over 4,000 + miners as a result of the 1977 unrest in Valea Jiului, and alleging + that the Romanian secret police had threatened him. He suggested + that the assault on Radio Free Europe Romania desk reporter Monica + Lovinescu the previous week by unknown assailants was a Securitate’s + attempt to intimidate him and other dissidents. (“Rumanian Dissident + Makes Plea in Paris,” The New York Times, + November 25, 1977, p. 2) + Macovescu + said that it is difficult to say. He, Macovescu, does not know all + the facts of the case but the Secretary should + understand that Goma is not a big writer in Romania and he is a liar. + Macovescu does not believe Goma. “It is not a + problem for us.” Macovescu said that we can talk together in + general about improving human rights in Romania and improving the + general situation to provide better conditions for the Romanian people + but let’s speak frankly, “We cannot make a problem of Mr. Goma.” The Secretary did not reply to this last remark of + the Minister.

+

Middle East

+

The Secretary said he would like to return to a + discussion of the Middle East. He asked whether Romania would continue + to be in touch with the PLO. Macovescu replied they would + not be in touch on a continuing basis but would do so whenever the need + arose. The Secretary said that from our + standpoint, we would like an updated reading of PLO views as the + situation develops over the coming weeks. Macovescu said he would take + these US interests into account. He then reiterated that action from the + US side would be helpful in determining events. He said that the + Americans are a courageous people and should be capable of turning + policies around and moving toward a real Middle East settlement.

+

The Secretary asked whether the Romanians had any + discussion about the expulsion of the PLO from Cairo. Macovescu said that + they had no discussion on the subject but that they know the PLO + representatives who were allegedly expelled are still in Cairo. Macovescu + said that he knows that the relations between Arafat and Sadat were and still are + good and he does not believe that these relations have significantly + changed.

+

The Secretary asked how Arafat’s relations were with the rest + of the PLO, particularly with regard to the rejectionist element. Macovescu + replied that he still believed + they were “O.K.” and that the left wing of the PLO headed by Habash is + not a real problem. Mr. Habib said that rejectionist element, not the + “left” element, is the most serious and wondered whether the + “rejectionists” influenced Arafat + toward continuing rejection of Israel’s right to exist.

+

Macovescu + said that Arafat will accept the + right of Israel to exist.

+

Date of Ceausescu Visit

+

The Secretary said we were looking forward to the + visit of President Ceausescu and + we will try to have a date very soon. Macovescu replied that this is + very important.In December, the Department + of State recommended that some visits by foreign dignitaries + scheduled for the first half of 1978 be rescheduled for the second + half of 1978 or early 1979. The memorandum was forwarded to + Mondale by Clift on December 13, with his + concurrence. Disagreeing with the recommendation, King wrote “Ceausescu and + the Romanians are going to be very upset over + this. He has already been told the first half of 1978 and proposed + April. To put this off is going to cause real problems for us, since + the Romanians are already having doubts about our interest in them. + I will do a more formal protest memo if that is required.” (Carter + Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, VIP Visit File, Box 12, + Romania: President Ceausescu, + 4/12–13/78: Cables and Memos, 12/13/77–4/10/78) + Ceausescu is planning to go to + London around that period (late spring 1978) and would like to prepare + his schedule. Also, he would like to begin preparations on the substance + of the trip. The Secretary agreed that he would + move forward to get a date very soon.

+

[Omitted here is discussion of Vance’s visit to Latin America.]

+

Continuing Contacts

+

The Secretary thanked the Foreign Minister for + coming to Washington to discuss the Middle East and stressed the + importance of maintaining these contacts. The Foreign + Minister said that he had discussed this desirability with Mr. + Habib. Mr. Habib replied that the Romanians have been very kind to + keep open their invitation to him to visit Bucharest, but the Secretary + kept him so busy he could not go. Macovescu said that Mr. Habib was + always welcome and he renewed his invitation to the Secretary to visit whenever he could. The Secretary thanked the Foreign Minister.

+
+ +
+ 189. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in + RomaniaSource: National + Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign + Policy File, D780043–0777. Confidential. Drafted by Silins and + Fromowitz; approved by Andrews. + + + + Washington, January 28, 1978, 0204Z + +

23063. Subject: Inter-agency Group Meeting on Romania, Jan. 20.

+

1. Summary. Inter-agency group meeting to begin preparations for the + Ceausescu visitIn telegram 20 from Bucharest, January 4, the + Embassy conveyed Aggrey’s + conversation with Macovescu + on December 30 and reported growing Romanian concern that the date + of Ceausescu’s visit was not + settled. (National Archives, RG 59, + Central Foreign Policy File, D780006–0538) In telegram 9383 to + Bucharest, January 13, the Department informed the Embassy that the + NSC had proposed April 12–13. + (National Archives, RG 59, Central + Foreign Policy File, D780019–0362) On January 21, telegram 459 from + Bucharest reported Ceausescu’s acceptance of the dates and conveyed the + Romanian request that the visit might be announced at an early date. + Aggrey suggested that + while “timing of Ceausescu + visit to U.S. has been conditioned + by timing of that of another Eastern European visitor”—President + Tito visited Washington + in March 1978—he hoped that “announcement of Romanian President’s + visit could be scheduled or made in such a way as to avoid obvious + link or priority consideration.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + D780037–0064) was held on January 20, chaired by Nick Andrews of EUR/EE. Participants included a wide + range of Department bureaus as well as representatives from Commerce, + Treasury, USIA, CIA, DOD, and EXIM-Bank. Discussions dealt with international, economic, + political, human rights, nuclear and other issues. A communique and + other documents for signing during the visit were considered. End + summary.

+

2. Andrews identified the dual + U.S. objectives for Ceausescu’s visit: to reinforce + Romania’s independent foreign policy line and, perhaps even more + important, to get some positive movement in the broad area of human + rights. The important question was to identify specifically what we want + to get from the Romanians. Representatives from S/P and HA recommended that we seek progress on emigration + cases and other human rights issues before the Ceausescu visit, and then perhaps + include some reference to these concerns in a joint declaration or + statement issued during the visit. It was pointed out that it is + difficult to identify at this time specific human rights concerns that + the Romanian authorities can be asked to resolve, since dissident writer + Paul Goma and most others of the “passport-oriented” group of dissidents + have left Romania. Andrews said + we will have to identify those human rights issues which merit the + President’s attention and which he should raise with Ceausescu. In this context, Andrews noted that EUR/EE is working on a specific human + rights action plan for Romania and would welcome suggestions from HA or + other bureaus. The question of what incentives the U.S. + could offer Romania in seeking improved human rights performance was + also raised, but without conclusive answers.

+

Multilateral issues. Andrews + commented that given Ceausescu’s + interest in international issues, at least one perhaps one-and-a-half of + the two meetings between the two Presidents would be devoted to such + topics as international security issues including SALT, East-West relations, the Middle + East, nonproliferation, and the new international economic order. The + upcoming UN Special Session on + Disarmament (SSOD) was identified as a + particularly appropriate topic that the President might raise. President + Ceausescu might also be + expected to express an interest in MBFR.

+

4. Trade agreement renewal/MFN waiver. + Andrews said these issues + will be major focus of Romanian concern before and during visit. There + was general agreement that the GOR + should be disabused now of any lingering expectation that a formula for + multi-year MFN can be found in time for + the visit (or, for that matter, this year). Reference was made to + Senator Stevenson’s talk with Ceausescu and his blunt linkage of any revision of Title + IV of the Trade Act with progress in U.S.-Soviet relations.Senator + Adlai Stevenson met with President Ceausescu at Ceausescu’s mountain retreat in Predeal on January + 10. In telegram 302 from Bucharest, January 17, the Embassy reported + Stevenson’s comment to Ceausescu that the Jackson-Vanik amendment to the + Trade Act was a consequence of U.S.-Soviet relations. The Senator “indicated that + relationship of Eastern European countries with Soviet Union + continued to appear to be impediment to the U.S. desire to pursue kind of natural relationships we + would like to have with other Eastern European countries.” (National + Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign + Policy File, D780024–0722) Despite such evidence that the + GOR at highest levels should by now + have understood the US difficulty with revising Title IV. It was agreed + that Pungan’s VIP visit will provide another useful opportunity to pour + cold water on any Romanian hopes to use the Ceausescu visit as a vehicle to pry out multi-year + MFN. Andrews also urged all present to make sure that, in + conversations with the Romanian Embassy, they or their principals remain + very firm on this issue. There will also be some GOR targets in economic area (such as + creation of bilateral cooperation projects) for which Romanians will + push, but in which USG cannot play a + major role. We will have to repeat this message at a high level. It was + also recognized that since we have gone about as far as we can in the + economic/commercial area (export controls, MFN, credits, GSP, government support for cooperative + ventures), we can expect major problems in fending off the inevitable + Romanian requests for much more.

+

5. On Decree 223, it was suggested that if the renewed assurances of + Romanian action do not translate into settlement offers in a reasonable time (once we have + presented the cases to Patan), we should warn the Romanians that we may + have to raise this during the visit.

+

6. World Bank/Human rights. Following a discussion of how we have so far + used this linkage with Romania, it was agreed that any negative US + action before the visit on a World Bank loan for Romania would + antagonize the GOR to such an extent + that it would completely undermine the chances of using Ceausescu’s visit itself to advance our + human rights goals. Nevertheless, we will explore this linkage further + in the context of the human rights action plan currently being + revised.

+

7. Exchanges. It was pointed out that even the exchange program had a + human rights aspect. For example, some American scientific organizations + have complained that travel restrictions prevent Romanian scientists + from carrying out their exchange activities. OES recommended that the + difficulties with the NSF exchange agreement be raised with Pungan + during his visit to the US in February.

+

8. Consular. A Circular 175 request is still pending for a dual-national + agreement with Romania. Efforts will be made to complete this process + quickly so that negotiations can begin.

+

9. Nuclear. It was agreed that it is important to complete action on the + Romanian request to purchase highly-enriched uranium fuel for their + research reactor and the related question of additional assurances + before the April visit. Also pending is the Romanian request to purchase + US heavy water manufacturing technology. In this connection, the example + of Argentina raises some important questions. It was agreed that an + update was needed on the status of Romanian-Canadian negotiations for + heavy-water power reactors. Commenting on the possibility that the + Romanians might ask to sign a nuclear cooperation agreement, OES said + that the benefits to the US of such an agreement were not readily + apparent. However, if there were to be a joint declaration or communique + issued during the time of the visit, a reference to the need for nuclear + safeguards and to nonproliferation might be useful.

+

10. Documents to be signed. Commerce suggested that we exchange economic + information during the Ceausescu + visit. The updating the December 1973 Joint Statement of Presidents + Nixon and Ceausescu was also + suggestedOn December 5, 1973, Nixon and + Ceausescu signed a Joint + Statement of Principles following their meeting at the White House. + (Public Papers: Nixon, 1973, pp. + 997–999) and it was noted that the Romanians can be expected + to want to sign a number of documents during the visit. Andrews commented that from the US + point of view perhaps it would be best to limit ourselves to simply + issuing an unsigned joint communique, in the event we cannot get the + language we want in a statement of principles or a signed + communique.

+ +

11. Action requested: Embassy is requested to provide Department with + best estimate of what will be on Romanian agenda for the Ceausescu visit.In telegram 748 from Bucharest, February 3, the + Embassy responded to the Department’s request with a preliminary + list of topics, including the Middle East, China, MFN, and emigration. (National + Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign + Policy File, D780066–0160)

+ + Christopher + +
+ +
+ 190. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in + RomaniaSource: Department + of State, Office of the Secretariat Staff, Cyrus R. Vance, Secretary of + State—1977–1980, Lot 84D241, Box 9, Vance + Nodis + MemCons, 1978. Secret; Priority + Exdis. Drafted by Draper; + cleared by Andrews and in S; + approved by Saunders. Sent + for information Priority to Tel Aviv, Cairo, and + Damascus. + + + + Washington, January 31, 1978, 1736Z + +

25196. Exdis distribute as Nodis—Cairo pass Atherton. Subject: + Secretary’s Meeting With Romanian Emissary Pungan.

+

1. Romanian Emissary Pungan met with the Secretary for an hour on January + 24. President Ceausescu had + wanted him to pass Romanian views to the Secretary and to learn what the + U.S. thought about the present + Middle East situation. Pungan’s presentation reflected the Romanian + analysis of recent messages to Ceausescu from both Sadat and Begin, as well as a long + meeting which Pungan had with Begin in Jerusalem on January 22.

+

2. Pungan said that Ceausescu was + deeply engaged in the Middle East problem, but not of course as a + mediator, having strongly supported the Sadat initiative and having + advised both Egypt and Israel that conditions for a settlement as a + result were better than ever. Ceausescu, however, was very concerned over the present + situation caused by the break-off of the Jerusalem Political Committee + talks. He felt that it was essential that channels of communication + between Egypt and Israel remain open. For that reason, he considered it + important that the Security Committee resume meetings right away since, + if it did not, it might kill + all prospects of resumption of talks in the Political Committee + framework.

+

3. Pungan reiterated throughout this conversation—as he said he did to + Begin—the Romanian view that there were “circles” hoping for a failure + of the Israeli-Egyptian negotiations, including the Soviets. It was + important, therefore, that Romania and others wanting progress in the + present negotiations do their best to get them going again.

+

4. Turning to the Sinai aspect of the negotiations, Pungan said that + Romania had advised both parties to find a formula for using the air + fields in common for civilian purposes including tourism, while + preserving Egyptian sovereignty over the area. The Sinai settlements + problem was far more difficult. Romania had judged that Egypt would do + virtually anything, but would never accept any derogation from its + sovereign authority. The Romanians had suggested to Egypt that those + among the settlers willing to stay under Egyptian administration be + allowed to remain, but with no extraterritorial Israeli military + protection.

+

5. The Secretary said that he had made similar suggestions. He sensed + that two of the air fields would not present a problem in the end, and + that Gamasy and Weizman had demonstrated some confidence, which Sadat + did not share, that the problem of the third air field could be resolved + satisfactorily. As for the settlements issue, the Secretary said he + thought it would have to be resolved by the Heads of Government. If + compromise proved impossible, one or the other might have to give in. It + was the sorest of all Sinai issues, and its difficulty was compounded by + press treatment of it. Sadat could not risk being humiliated, while + Begin has made a case that the settlements were vital to Israeli + security. For his own part, the Secretary said he did not believe the + security argument was convincing. Pungan said that for Sadat, + sovereignty was an issue of principle, which could not be tampered with + if he was to keep constructive good relations with key Arab states. He + noted that Sadat had offered large DMZ’s, and this might be a way out of + the problem. The Secretary said we had taken virtually the same + line.

+

6. Pungan and the Secretary agreed that the Palestinian issue was the + most delicate and difficult problem in the negotiations. The Secretary + explained how we had been trying to use the second agenda item in + Political Committee talks to develop a basic negotiating framework for + the West Bank/Gaza and Palestinian problems. Pungan said the Romanians + sensed that Israel wanted to confine any future negotiations within the + narrowest possible limits, involving only Palestinian residents in the + occupied territories in a limited self-rule role. Romania believed, + however, that it was necessary to involve representatives of the entire + Palestinian community in the Middle East, including the PLO, in an exercise in + self-determination. One problem is that no one knows for sure whether + the PLO and the Palestinian diaspora would in the end accept or reject + something less than a fully independent state, for example. The + Palestinians were not monolithic, he said. He went on to speculate that, + in an initial period, the West Bank and Gaza might develop their own + administration and a degree of autonomy, and there would also be changes + in basic Arab-Israeli conditions. Who could say for sure whether the PLO + and others might find the new situation unacceptable. He concluded that, + even if the parties came to an agreement on all other issues, a Middle + East settlement will not work unless it deals satisfactorily with the + basic Palestinian issue.

+

7. The Secretary said that we had made clear the need for Palestinian + participation in the determination of their future, as in the Aswan + statement. There has to be some consent of the governed to what is going + on. The only real answer for the question of Palestinian representation, + however, would be for the Arab confrontation states to come up with some + ideas and suggestions, including perhaps names, acceptable to Israel. He + agreed that the Israelis wanted to deal only with the West Bank/Gaza + aspect and acknowledged that the overall Palestinian issue had to be + resolved in the context of a larger settlement. That broader issue was + greater than who represented the Palestinians on the West Bank and Gaza. + Pungan argued that it was easier to deal with the basic problem by + broadening participation at the beginning. The Secretary said + conceptually this was correct, but practically it was not easy.

+

8. The Secretary noted that Jordan + felt the refugee problem should be tackled in smaller steps, dealing + initially with the 1967 refugees and displaced persons, and then moving + on.

+

9. Noting that the Romanians believed that the Arabs should now elaborate + some concrete proposals in lieu of making demands and statements of + principles, Pungan asked whether the West Bank/Gaza under a UN administration would be practical for an + interim period. The Secretary said he had proposed this last spring to + all parties, but met with a mixed reception. The Israelis were + particularly wary of anything with a UN + role.

+

10. The Secretary and Saunders + said that the total Middle East problem was so complex and so difficult + to digest that there was virtually no choice but to try to break it down + into its component elements and deal with them individually.

+

11. Pungan said another problem was wider Arab participation, with + Jordan in the first instance. + He had met with both Assad and Arafat shortly after Sadat’s Jerusalem visit. Assad gave + him the impression that he was not as opposed to Sadat’s efforts as had + been portrayed. He would wait and see the results, but he felt the + initiative was not well + prepared. Assad made clear he would not close the doors to Syrian + involvement in a settlement. Even Arafat, Pungan added, was not 100 percent against the + Sadat effort. Pungan did not rule out the possibility that Syria, at + some future stage, and even the PLO as well, would accept a formula for + their participation. Continuing, Pungan argued that it was not enough to + wait for such events; all concerned should prepare the ground. Ceausescu had suggested that perhaps + another meeting, possibly organized under the UN, could be convened in another city which could provide + the cover for bringing in others, including the Soviets.

+

12. The Secretary commented that the time may come when this would be + feasible, but he first wanted to see some progress in the committee + talks, and on a declaration of principles. Syria clearly would not go to + a meeting in Cairo, nor would the Soviets. He agreed with Pungan that + Egypt should at least keep the Syrians and even the Soviets informed of + what they have been doing. Pungan said the Soviets will not go to + Geneva, for example, merely to put their signature on a settlement + already negotiated without their participation. The Secretary said that + he, too, tried to keep the Soviets generally informed.

+

13. The Secretary observed that the PLO had been hurting its cause + recently. He noted the murder of the PLO rep in London showed the strains within the PLO.

+

14. Pungan was gratified that both Sadat and Begin had made comparatively + temperate speeches after the Jerusalem break up. It was important that + diplomacy through the press be calmed and that the sharp public rhetoric + end. This was the thrust of Romanian advice to Begin and Sadat. He was + also encouraged by the two parties leaving open a future reconvening of + the Security Committee. The Secretary said that his guess was that the + Security Committee might be convened within the next seven to fourteen + days; he was less optimistic about a reconvened Political Committee + meeting. It depended upon the atmospherics, and he noted there were + ideas for rotating meetings between Cairo and Jerusalem, or even meeting + in the Sinai buffer zone.

+

15. Summing up, the Secretary said that, in most respects, the Romanian + and U.S. analysis and approach to the + problem were similar; there were some differences in our respective + views of the Palestinian issue and the PLO. The Secretary thanked Pungan + for coming to Washington to share with him Ceausescu’s views.

+ + Vance + +
+ +
+ 191. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in + RomaniaSource: Department + of State, Office of the Secretariat Staff, Cyrus R. Vance, Secretary of + State—1977–1980, Lot 84D241, Box 10, Vance + EXDIS + MemCons, 1978. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Draper; cleared + by Luers and Nimetz; approved by Atherton. Sent + for information to Cairo, Damacus, Jidda, Tel Aviv, and + Amman. + + + + Washington, February 16, 1978, 0212Z + +

40781. Subject: Secretary’s Meeting With Romanian Emissary Pungan.

+

1. Romanian Emissary Pungan met with the Secretary on February 14 for an + hour to exchange views on the outcomes of Sadat’s visits to the U.S. and Romania.Sadat visited Romania February 11–12. In telegram + 977 from Bucharest, February 14, the Embassy reported that the + Syrian Ambassador wondered aloud if the Romanian/Egyptian communiqué + “represented new resolve of Egypt to ‘abandon’ bilateral talks with + Israel in favor of wider discussion.” While Syria would not + participate in a Cairo meeting, he added that “it had not ruled out + meeting under Waldheim’s auspices.” The Embassy also noted that + Sadat’s time in Romania was very limited, making any meeting with a + third party highly unlikely despite rumors of a senior PLO + representative being in Bucharest at the same time. (National + Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign + Policy File, D780067–0878)

+

2. The Secretary said that Sadat had arrived in a gloomy mood, believing + that Israel had not reciprocated his Jerusalem initiative. He was + questioning whether progress could be achieved. After his talks with the + President, with members of Congress, and with citizen groups, he left + Washington reassured. He reached basic agreement with us that the peace + process should go forward and he agreed to do his part. The White House + statement following the President’s final meeting with Sadat set out our + fundamental positions on all major aspects of the negotiations, + including the applicability of 242 to all fronts, resolution of the + Palestinian problem in all its aspects, and the view that Israeli + settlements were contrary to international law and constituted an + obstacle to the peace effort.

+

3. Continuing, the Secretary said that Sadat had also agreed that + Atherton should go to the Middle East to help stimulate progress on a + declaration of principles, among other things.

+

4. The Secretary then described the administration’s decisions announced + earlier in the day for the provision of aircraft to Egypt, Saudi Arabia, + and Israel. The decisions reflected long-standing commitments in + principle made to Israel and Saudi Arabia. All parties will receive less + than they would have liked except the Saudis.

+ +

5. Pungan said that Sadat had arrived in Bucharest in a good mood, + mentioning the encouragement he received in his visits to Washington, + London, and Bonn. He was pleased with the White House statement as well + as President Carter’s other + statements. He was highly pleased with his meeting with Peres, Pungan + said, indicating that it had given him, Sadat, a better insight into the + differing internal forces in Israel.

+

6. On the other hand, Pungan said, Sadat remained deeply concerned + underneath his good spirits that useful progress would not be achieved + as rapidly as he needed it. He made clear it would put him in a bad + position, both internally and in terms of his relations with other Arab + States. Ceausescu, impressed with + Sadat’s arguments, believes everything possible should now be done to + encourage Israel to agree to a declaration of principles acceptable to + Sadat. This could open a new phase, permitting Sadat to improve his + relations with other Arabs and possibly open the way to their joining + the process. Pungan said that Sadat was in much need of other Arab + gestures.

+

7. Pungan then conveyed Ceausescu’s concern that a declaration of principles + might—implicitly or indirectly in references to withdrawal or the Sinai + settlements—undercut Sadat’s need for undisputed sovereignty over the + area. The Secretary said there was nothing in the proposed declaration + which could affect the Egyptian position in this regard, and noted that + five of its six general paragraphs had already been largely agreed by + Egypt and Israel.

+

8. Pungan said that the Romanians were considering how they might be + helpful. He mentioned the Waldheim idea (i.e., for a New York meeting), + and the Secretary noted that Waldheim still held that option open. The + question was not forums; it was all-important to move forward on a + declaration of principles. Regarding the Romanian’s basic question, the + Secretary added, we would be talking to Dayan on the 16th to explore + what might be done about the remaining issues. Atherton would continue + the efforts in his Middle East Mission. At the moment, the Secretary + said, he didn’t know what else could be brought to bear on the problem + or to convince Begin that time was short.

+

9. Pungan said his own idea was the U.S. + should talk to the Soviets. The Secretary said he had talked with + Dobrynin earlier in the day, + had given him a detailed description of the Sadat meetings, and had + asked that the Soviets remained open-minded and flexible about a + declaration of principles. Dobrynin pressed for specifics of our thinking on an + interim regime for the West Bank and Gaza. The Secretary said it was a + good exchange and that Dobrynin + appeared interested. Romania, he continued, could be helpful by also + urging the Soviets to be open-minded and flexible, and not to put + obstacles in the present path. Pungan mused that Romania might consider + encouraging the Soviets to ease up on the Arabs and allow them to make + their own decisions about + gestures to Sadat. He said Dayan had been invited to visit + Bucharest.

+

10. Pungan said that he did not rule out a helpful Syrian gesture to + Sadat. When the Secretary questioned this, Pungan said that he had + reached this conclusion on the basis of the last Romanian meetings with + Assad. Assad could eventually move to the point where Hussein is now, he + conjectured, although slowly and step-by-step. The Secretary commented + that this would be helpful, and noted that Atherton would be visiting + Damascus during his Middle East trip.

+

11. Pungan said that the Romanians were apprehensive about unexpected + explosions in the area as well as the unpredictable nature of Sadat’s + diplomacy. They were concerned with Begin’s habits of talking to the + press and allowing Israeli points of view to become ironclad through + premature public disclosure. The Secretary agreed. With Sadat, we had + made clear the need to consult in advance and not to be faced with such + unexpected steps as the Egyptian delegation’s withdrawal from the + Jerusalem talks. In Israel there was a disposition to put to the Cabinet + all important issues, and this resulted in almost instant leaks. We had + urged the Israelis to discuss sensitive issues in the Defense Committee, + which has only five or six Ministers.

+

12. Pungan noted that the Romanians had the impression that the people on + both sides in the Military Committee did not believe the security + argument for the Sinai settlements was important. The Secretary said + that—in the end—these were basically political questions which had to be + resolved at a political level.

+

13. Before turning to certain bilateral issues, the Secretary thanked + Pungan for this exchange and said he would communicate any further + information, if it developed, through Ambassador Nicolae.

+

14. The Secretary and Pungan briefly discussed the Soviet position + regarding the Basket III formulation at the Belgrade Conference on + European Security and Cooperation. They noted that a date had been set + for special U.S.-Romanian consultations + under the disarmament program. The Secretary mentioned the French idea + for a “new forum,” noting he wasn’t sure what they intended or whether + they had worked it out fully in advance.

+

15. Pungan concluded the meeting with a request that the U.S. develop an appropriate financial + facility for handling U.S. exports to + Romania before Ceausescu’s + Washington visit. This could be an important new step in U.S.-Romanian relations.

+ + Vance + +
+ +
+ 192. Briefing Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for + European Affairs (Vest) to + Secretary of State VanceSource: National Archives, + RG 59, Bureau of Intelligence + and Research, Office of Analysis for the Commonwealth and Eastern + Europe, Office Subject Files, 1965–1980, Lot 92D412, Box 2, + Romania—Ceausescu Visit. + Confidential. Drafted by Silins; cleared by Andrews and Fromowitz, and in + EUR/PP, C, S/P, and HA/HR. Luers initialed the memorandum for + Vest. The date is + handwritten at the top of the first page. + + + Washington, March 21, + 1978 + + + SUBJECT + State Visit of Romanian President Ceausescu—A Preview + +

I. Setting and + Objectives

+

Ceausescu’s visit is a logical + complement to Tito’s trip in + March as a step forward in U.S. + relations with Eastern Europe. Both countries are important to us + because they have successfully preserved their independence from the + USSR. Both regard good relations + with the United States and the PRC as + vital to their security.

+

Our long-standing policy of improving relations with Romania was + reaffirmed by the President in PD–21, which directed that the United + States accord favored treatment to those Eastern European countries + which are relatively autonomous in foreign policy or relatively liberal + internally.See Document 16. Our interest in supporting Romanian + independence continues undiminished.

+

At the same time, the visit provides an opportunity for discussion of + human rights issues and for encouraging further Romanian action on + humanitarian problems such as divided families and binational + marriages.Derian met with Pungan on February 14, and discussed + human rights, an ongoing cause of tension between Washington and + Bucharest. Derian raised + U.S. concern regarding + emigration from Romania, as well as the rights of the Hungarian + minority. Emigration, Derian + told Pungan, was directly related to the ability of the U.S. Government to extend MFN status to Romania under the + Jackson-Vanik Amendment. The Carter administration took a new + direction regarding human rights, “and it is only fair to explain + our concerns to the GOR and to + point out that these factors affect our decisions and our relations + with other countries,” Derian told Pungan. (Telegram 43849 to Bucharest, + February 18; National Archives, RG + 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780077–0269) We have made + significant progress in recent years but there is more to be done. We + want to urge some liberalization of Romania’s tight internal policy, + while aware that Ceausescu + considers internal discipline a prerequisite for the maintenance of + Romania’s independence from Moscow, its territorial integrity and + economic growth. To achieve further progress, we must persuade Ceausescu that U.S. interest in + human rights affairs in no way signifies a lessening of U.S. support for Romanian independence and + territorial integrity.

+

Ceausescu’s approach to global + issues in his talks with the President must be seen against the backdrop + of uncertainty during the mid-1970’s. During that period, Ceausescu’s perception of drift in + U.S. policy and the Chinese + succession crisis led him, as insurance, to seek a mini-reconciliation + with the USSR in 1976, at what he saw + as the low point of U.S. and Chinese + resolve. With new Administrations in place in China and the U.S., Ceausescu has again distanced himself from the Soviets + on key issues, including the Middle East, CSCE and Eurocommunism. In his talks with the President, he + will be looking for a firm U.S. + commitment to play a major stabilizing role in global affairs on both + political and economic issues and to develop vigorous relationships with + countries like Romania.

+

Similarly, Ceausescu’s approach to + bilateral issues will be colored by the current stage of U.S.-Romanian relations. These have entered + a period in which both countries are paying more attention to practical + problem-solving than exciting new initiatives. Some of the early + enthusiasm has been dissipated. New tangible evidence we can give of our + interest in Romania is limited. Our increased attention to other Eastern + European countries, especially Poland and Hungary, has diminished in + Ceausescu’s eyes Romania’s + special relationship with the U.S. While + the visit itself will serve to reassure Ceausescu, he will press for economic advantages to + which the Romanians attribute political significance. These will include + most-favored-nation tariff status (MFN) + on a long-term basis, credit on favorable terms, easing of export + controls, and increased U.S. Government + support for U.S.-Romanian industrial + cooperation, including projects in third countries.

+

In this setting, we believe the best way for the President to set the + stage for the talks is to begin by taking Ceausescu into his confidence on the U.S. approach to major global issues. These + would include our world-wide support for human rights, U.S.-Soviet and U.S.-Chinese relations, SALT, and MBFR, our + approach to Eastern and Western Europe and the CSCE process, North-South relations, nuclear + nonproliferation, Africa and the Middle East. Ceausescu may also wish to discuss the + role of the nonaligned and, since he is planning a trip to Korea, he may + have some ideas here as well. In its policies toward the Middle East and + many aspects of the Belgrade CSCE + conference, Romania has acted constructively and stood apart from the + Warsaw Pact consensus. It is in our interest to reinforce such Romanian + actions on their own merits. But cultivating Ceausescu’s desire to play an important and moderate + role on international issues has another benefit. It makes it easier for + us to influence Ceausescu + favorably on issues, such as human rights, where he sees us as the demandeur.

+ +

II. Key Issues

+

1. Human Rights: + Ceausescu will be prepared to + discuss human rights, and we will recommend that the President outline + our general policy and the values we support. We will recommend that the + President make clear the importance to the Administration and the + Congress of favorable and prompt action on emigration and marriage + requests, including emigration to Israel, particularly if Romania wishes + eventually to obtain most-favored tariff status on a long-term + basis.

+

There is disagreement within the Department on how to approach three + subjects: Romanian treatment of the Hungarian minority, human rights + considerations with respect to loans from international financial + institutions, and the Rauta case. We are seeking to resolve this + disagreement.In telegram 79839 to + Bucharest, March 28, the Department noted ongoing disagreement + between EUR and HA concerning the + level at which issues such as the treatment of the Hungarian + minority and the family reunification case of Romanian defector + Constantin Rauta should be raised. HA supported the position that + these issues be raised by the President, or, failing that, by the + Secretary of State. EUR supported + the position of keeping these issues in discussions at lower levels. + Furthermore, the administration was coming under pressure from + Congress—66 members of Congress had sent a letter to the White House + indicating their concern with violations of human rights in Romania. + (National Archives, RG 59, Central + Foreign Policy File, D780135–0900)

+

2. Credits: The Romanians have long been pushing + for large-scale credits on near-concessional terms for economic + development. Despite previous rebuffs, Ceausescu may well raise this subject with the + President. We cannot meet such a request, but in order to encourage + Romanians to respond to our interests, we are asking the Export-Import + Bank to study the possibility of a line of credit and perhaps expansion + of the Cooperative Financing Facility (CFF) in addition to + project-linked loans.

+

3. Export Controls: + Ceausescu may complain at the + restrictions imposed on exports of high-technology U.S. goods to Romania. An inter-agency + review of our export control policy with respect to Romania is now + underway. We are considering recommending some liberalization of + commodity (as opposed to technology) exports, which appears to be + possible without jeopardizing our strategic interests.In preparation for Ceausescu’s visit, an interagency group was formed + to look into the possibility of loosening export controls toward + Romania. The Department of Commerce and the Department of State + supported some limited liberalization of export controls for + commodities, while the Department of Defense continued to oppose for + fear that such controlled technology might end up in Soviet hands. + EUR hoped that by Ceausescu’s visit a definitive + answer on policy toward Romania regarding export controls might be + announced. (Telegram 47748 to Bucharest, February 24; National + Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign + Policy File, D780087–0883)

+
+ +
+ 193. Intelligence Information CableSource: National Archives, RG 59, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Office of + Analysis for the Commonwealth and Eastern Europe, Office Subject + Files, 1965–1980, Lot 92D412, Box 2, Romania—Ceausescu Visit. Secret; [handling restriction not declassified]. + Carlucci forwarded the + cable to Brzezinski on April + 13. (Ibid.) + + + DB–315/04475–78 + + + Washington, March 31, + 1978 + + + COUNTRY + Romania + + + SUBJECT + Appraisal of Situation: Goals and Problems of Ceausescu’s Romania on the Eve of + his Fourth Visit to the United States (DOI: March 1978) + + + SOURCE + [1 paragraph (5 lines) not + declassified] + +

INTRODUCTION:

+

1. This is an assessment of Romania’s political situation on the eve of + President Ceausescu’s visit to + the United States. It focuses primarily on internal political factors + within the economic and social framework of the country and also + discusses foreign policy and military considerations. Trying to assess + those problems with which the regime will have to deal over the next + five years, this paper is necessarily weighted toward the negative side + rather than toward the regime’s past accomplishments. For example, + instead of discussing the considerable improvements in living standards, + the paper focuses on the mounting pressures from rising expectations. + Similarly, there are important segments at all levels who believe in the + system and have no desire to change it. This paper, however, while + acknowledging this group’s existence, concentrates on the factors which + have the potential to force the regime off its current course in the + next few years.

+

2. The denouement of the leadership situations in Yugoslavia and the + Soviet Union may affect Romania in decisive ways but is not discussed + here as our knowledge of these situations is conjectural.

+

Summary and Conclusions:

+

3. President Ceausescu runs a + highly centralized power system with its main objectives being to + maintain as high a degree of independence from the Soviet Union as is + possible and reach a competitive level of industrialization as fast as + possible. It is symbolized by a personality cult so intense that a + Soviet diplomat in Bucharest recently said that his country had + witnessed nothing quite like it even under Stalin. At the same time, both Ceausescu and his wife have several + relatives in the power structure. The regime is stable. Short of his + accidental death, Ceausescu seems + likely to be around for the foreseeable future. At 60, he is the + youngest East European leader, is in apparent good health, and has no + known political opposition. The population is kept on a short leash, + even by East European standards, although Romanian leadership could + substantially relax present internal controls without risking Soviet + retaliation. It is evidently Ceausescu’s belief that, to attain difficult development + goals, the population must be strictly controlled. As a result, there is + little freedom of expression, people are afraid to deviate from the + official line, officials avoid responsibility, and people are generally + cynical.

+

4. Internal problems are those brought about by rapid industrialization + at the price of insufficient supplies in the consumer sector. Social + tensions are rising and muted, but serious dissatisfactions exist among + the workers, the national minorities (especially the Magyars), and the + intellectuals. Although these problems are real, the regime will be less + and less able to count on a docile population, and Ceausescu may have to rearrange his + priorities. There is no indication that any one problem will become a + danger to the regime’s continued existence in the next few years.

+

5. Well known for its flexible foreign policy, Romania has been + successful at establishing political and trade relations with an + unusually diverse group of countries in its attempt to obtain support + from all directions for its relatively independent views from the Soviet + Union. Romania is a weak link in the Warsaw Pact alliance as it + participates in Warsaw Pact activities to a minimal extent, it has only + limited loyalty to its alliance with the Soviet Union, and its armed + forces are relatively untrained.

+

6. Ceausescu is an able tactician + who, without changing his goals, has shown a certain amount of personal + flexibility in handling difficult situations. He will probably attempt + to solve crises on a case by case basis and, where there is a conflict, + by removing the symptoms rather than altering Romanian external or + internal objectives in any substantive way. Whether he is successful + will depend in part on external factors over which he has no control and + on a race between attaining industrial development and the demands of a + population rapidly growing in sophistication.

+

ECONOMICS:

+

7. While skillful in producing impressive statistics (Romania has claimed + the highest rate of production increases in Eastern Europe for years), + in terms meaningful to the population, Romania is also the poorest East + European nation, except for Albania. For example, its level of personal consumption is only + two-thirds the level of Bulgaria and one-half that of East Germany. + Housing is cramped (especially since the earthquake in March 1977), + wages are among the lowest in Europe, high-quality consumer goods are + extremely scarce, and there is no letup in sight at least through the + next five year plan (1985) when Romania is supposed to leave the ranks + of the “developing” nations.

+

8. Romania’s forced draft industrialization has brought the country to an + economic crossroad. The country is entering a new era of tightening + resource constraints. It can no longer throw more labor, or capital, at + economic problems and hope to solve them. It is running out of both. + Depending mostly on labor intensive methods, it has a labor shortage (a + program to transfer office workers to “productive” work in factories and + fields was begun last year). Although it is an oil producer, Romania has + recently become a net energy importer, mainly because its in-ground + crude oil and gas reserves are 20 percent depleted leaving only about a + 10-year supply. [Headquarters comment: Using + current technical procedures and equipment, it is difficult to extract + any more than 25 percent of the reserves contained in a deposit.]Brackets in the original. It must + switch from extensive to intensive development, that is, it must + increase efficiency and generally improve the ingredients in the + economic formula.

+

9. There is evidence that the leadership is recognizing these problems, + as it has announced some measures of decentralization and improved + quality controls. It will take some time, however, before the speeches + are translated into concrete directives at the factory level. A problem + in implementing any changes is the lack of a consultative mechanism with + the workers. Although government and party personnel changes announced + on 8 March appear to be aimed mainly at the economic sector, it seems + doubtful that substantive reforms will take place in the near + future.

+

10. It is not at all clear, however, that the leadership is ready to deal + with the important strains in the country’s social fabric brought about + by rapid industrialization. Since the beginning of World War II, the + population has been told to make personal sacrifices for the benefit of + the collective good. These sacrifices continue, as Romania has an + extremely high rate (one-third of its national income) of reinvestment. + Although living standards have improved, Romanians generally give credit + not to government policies but to improvement of world living conditions + in general. Many have relatives in the West and know that, by + comparison, life in Romania is primitive. Although Romania is a net food + exporter, shortages of staple foods are constant, and we have heard + about villages stopping meat-exporting trucks near the border. Although education is free and + medical and social services are cheap, it is often difficult to overcome + the necessary bureaucratic obstacles without bribing each petty and not + so petty official in the chain leading to the service in question. + Because housing and services are inexpensive, Romanian workers can often + save some money. But frustration rises as money income outpaces supplies + of popular consumer goods. Salary increases scheduled during the rest of + this five year plan then will be two-edged swords. It appears as if the + new policies discussed above would, if implemented, first cause a drop + in real productivity and wages, which would only increase popular + frustrations.

+

11. Last year’s Jiu Valley worker unrest, with which the general + population sympathized, points out that there is a limit to the workers’ + passivity. Their success will not be lost on workers of other industrial + complexes in the country.

+

12. While Romania was primarily a rural country before and immediately + following World War II, its work force has been rapidly changing over to + industry (74 percent of the working population worked in agriculture in + 1950 while only 35 percent did so in 1976); along with industrialization + comes heightened political awareness and realization that there are more + similarities than differences between the current system and its Ottoman + and monarchist predecessors. As seen by many workers, high party and + government officials appear to enjoy the same privileges as their + predecessors. When these officials’ homes or offices are in buildings + formerly occupied by members of the royal family, the basic lack of + social progress is blatant.

+

13. Every day the Romanian population suffers total immersion in + statistics put out by the media which are designed to prove the success + of party policies and to show the country’s economic achievements. An + increasing number of people are wondering when they will begin to + benefit directly from these improvements. The regime cannot spur + economic growth indefinitely at the expense of the population’s standard + of living without creating a deep well of frustrations.

+

14. The factors discussed above are converging, and Ceausescu may be forced to reorder his + priorities to give the consumer a better break if violence is to be + avoided before Romania joins the ranks of “developed” countries.

+

DISSIDENCE:

+

15. The recent appearance of a former high Romanian Communist Party + official to publicize the situation of the minorities in Romania is a + reminder that, internally, Romania is not quite the maverick it often + appears to be. As Jean-Francois Revel wrote in a recent issue of + “Foreign Affairs”: “Derussification is not democratization. . . The most + totalitarian of all the popular democracies of Eastern Europe is + Romania, which as a + nation-state is the one that least follows Soviet foreign policy. + Nonalignment is a concept that has to do with the will of the leadership + to be all-powerful and not with the will of the people to be free.” The + brief existence of an intellectual dissident group, and several work + stoppages last year are symptoms of serious domestic discontent. That + there are not more “dissident” activists is probably because of fear, + the efficiency of the security organs, and the passivity of the Romanian + character, and not because of harmonious internal conditions. In a + society where listening to Radio Free Europe (RFE) is against the law (one which is unevenly applied as + 61 percent of Romanians do listen to RFE) and can be punished by a fine of up to 5,000 lei + (about two and one-half times the average monthly salary), there is no + place for a phenomenon such as Warsaw’s illegal “flying universities.” + Without determined leadership or cooperation among the various groups, + however, dissidents will continue to have limited impact.

+

INTELLECTUALS:

+

16. According to its own measures, Romania has an overbalance of + intellectuals, that is, persons with no vocational or directly + productive skills per se. The regime views its people primarily as + productive units and believes that it is the individual’s first goal to + serve the needs of society as perceived by the leadership. Historians + (there is no place for philosophers outside the strict confines of Party + dialectics) and artists, who both depend on the state for their + salaries, are kept busy with propaganda projects designed to justify + official policies and exhort the working population to greater effort. + Some intellectuals are reportedly doing solid work in their fields; + however, since creative prose can be dangerous to the author, many + writers turn to translating foreign classics into Romanian. Among the + things that the intellectuals share with the general population are + their repugnance for Ceausescu’s + personality cult, for nepotism at many levels of the hierarchy, and for + the privileges enjoyed by high Party and government leaders.

+

17. As a group, intellectuals are passive; their dissidence quotient is + low. They seek to accommodate themselves to the current ruling class’s + whims and dictates in such a way as to ensure a safe and comfortable + life.

+

MINORITIES:

+

18. The Hungarian minority in Romania (which will be referred to as + Magyars hereafter), comprising roughly 10 percent of the population, is + the largest national minority in Europe. There are also about one-half + million Germans but only enough Romanian Jews to fill a good-size + stadium. These two groups are less vocal, however, preferring to + emigrate or otherwise solve their problems with the help of influential + external sovereign sponsors. The Magyars, not encouraged to emigrate by Hungary which would have + great difficulties absorbing them, wish to retain the manifestations of + their ethnic origins in their everyday life while also enjoying equal + opportunities. They strongly believe that not only are their human + rights being denied but that it is Romanian policy to eradicate them as + a distinct group. Although many Magyars were purged from government + positions during late Party leader Gheorghiu-Dej’s strict nationalities + policy in the 1950s, Ceausescu is + being more cautious. The objective, creating a unified state in which + national differences are either forgotten or at least minimized in favor + of unswerving allegiance to Romania, remains the same. But there are + still several Hungarian-language newspapers and periodicals, a large + number of locally published books, and state-subsidized theaters, radio + and television programs. In Transylvania there are Hungarian-language + primary and secondary schools, and some university courses are taught in + Hungarian. Nevertheless, the trend is toward integration of Magyar with + Romanian institutions, dispersal of Magyars to non-Magyar areas, and + importation of ethnic Romanian workers for new industries being opened + in Transylvania.

+

19. To the extent that people are being moved successfully, the plan is + working. Once practically 100 percent Magyar, the Transylvanian capital + of Cluj is now only 40 percent Magyar, and Hungarian-language street + signs have disappeared. As Magyar families are forced to move to other + areas to find work, their children will increasingly grow up in a + Romanian environment. Magyars, however, are proud of their heritage, + resent the minimal role allowed their ancestors in official Romanian + history, and in fact tend to believe that they come from a superior + culture. As they do not particularly hide this feeling, they get little + sympathy from Romanians, some of whom still nurse a sense of grievance + over 19th and 20th century Hungarian attempts to “Magyarize” ethnic + Romanians. Some have fresher and personal bitterness over the harsh + treatment accorded to Romanians during World War II before Romanian + jurisdiction over Transylvania was reestablished in 1945.

+

20. As gradually as Ceausescu + tries to move on this issue, he will run into problems. After a lifetime + of personal sacrifices and seen against the backdrop of an entire + population which has just been told (during the December 1977 Party + Conference) that life will be at least as difficult for another eight + years, the Magyars must carry the extra burden of their nationality. + But, given the low quality of life anywhere in Romania, even the Magyars + (unless they receive help from outside) will probably continue to give + priority to personal economic survival over the flourishing of their + culture.

+

FOREIGN POLICY:

+

21. It is in this field that Romania is best known. The most basic + reality for Romanian policymakers is the country’s geographic location + on the Soviet Union’s + southern border. But, except for its periodic polemics with the Soviet + Union over Bessarabia and North Bukovina (annexed by the Soviet Union in + 1940), all of Romania’s foreign policy efforts have been aimed at making + everyone forget or overlook its “little brother” relationship to its + northern neighbor and its membership in the Warsaw Pact Treaty + Organization.

+

22. Although Romanian diplomats can be found pursuing their nationalistic + policies in many international forums, they seem to have concentrated + their efforts on establishing relations with Peking, Washington, and the + Third World in order to balance Romania’s relations with the Soviets. In + the Third World, they have succeeded in carving a niche for Romania as a + quasi-nonaligned state without, however, being able to gain formal + acceptance to the nonaligned movement (NAM). Although there seems to be + growing disillusionment on the part of African countries over their + relations with Romania, as well as with the quality of Romanian goods + received, there is no indication that Romania intends to cool its ardor + in seeking Third World friends and markets. In fact, it is renewing its + campaign to become a full member of the NAM in preparation for NAM + meetings scheduled this year and next, and it is allocating a larger + ratio of its foreign trade to the Third World. Interestingly, trade + figures also show a projected larger share for the East European + Economic Organization (CEMA). + Increases in both the Third World and CEMA will be at the expense of trade with the + industrialized countries, reflecting probable Romanian disappointment + that its opening to the West has not paid off in economic terms as + rapidly as it had hoped.

+

23. Having apparently played a role in arranging the first U.S. contacts with the People’s Republic of + China in 1972, Romania has kept its taste for middleman situations, most + recently having played a role in Sadat’s visit to Israel. There were + some apparently unfounded rumors in Bucharest earlier this year that + Ceausescu was exploring the + possibility of stepping into the Moroccan-Algerian Sahara problem, and + there are similar rumors now concerning the Cambodian-Vietnamese + conflict. Romania takes obvious pride at having good relations with all + countries regardless of their politics, and Ceausescu has a well-known penchant for wishing to build + up his own and his country’s prestige (which in Gaullist fashion he + probably does not separate) by involving himself in such go-between + roles. Given these two ingredients, Ceausescu may be given somewhat more credit than he + deserves in the face of scarce information on these situations.

+

24. Along with its semi-independent foreign policy, Romania has an + extreme aversion to being overlooked on such questions as MBFR and is very active at disarmament + and other international forums (for example, recently at Belgrade), and + at promoting its ideas behind a smokescreen of fighting for the rights of the small countries in the + face of the overbearing nature of the great powers.

+

25. At the same time, the Romanian leadership is always conscious of the great power factor in any + situation which somehow touches Romania. The regime is quick to point to + the problems of others and even quicker to blame its own failures on + external or uncontrollable events such as the 1975 flood or the 1977 + earthquake. This leads to occasional overinterpretation of real or + imagined signals, to blaming the Ottoman Empire for countless current + Romanian problems, to imagining that visiting American scholars and the + few Romanian dissidents are spies, and to seeing the Soviet hand in the + current Hungarian minority problem. Admittedly, there are historical + precedents for the last example.

+

MILITARY:

+

26. In keeping with Romania’s wish to be as independent as her + politico-geographical situation permits vis-a-vis the Soviet Union, it + participates as little as possible in Warsaw Pact activities. There are + no Soviet troops on Romanian soil; neither do Warsaw Pact troop + maneuvers take place in Romania. In the same way that the Soviet Union + would like Romania to be more fully integrated into CEMA, so has it been trying to move + Romania closer to its military alliance. That the Soviet Union is not + trying harder is probably a reflection of the Soviet view of the current + and foreseeable threat on its southern flank. Should the Soviet + perception of this threat change, there is no question that Romania + would have little choice but to play the game according to Soviet rules. + Although there would be initial armed resistance to a Soviet invasion of + the type seen in Hungary in 1956 or Prague in 1968, the regime would be + forced to give Soviet troops transit rights if the Soviet Union believed + it needed to send troops to Yugoslavia or Bulgaria. Depending, on the + circumstances, however, it seems probable that the USSR would transit Romania only as a last + choice, preferring instead to overfly Romania, to take the Black Sea + route, or to go through Hungary. At the same time, Romania would + probably be more agreeable to a transit request if the final destination + were Bulgaria rather than Yugoslavia, with whom it has more in common + and whose own relative independence from Moscow is an important prop to + Bucharest’s go-it-alone attitude in foreign affairs. If the Soviet Union + wanted to station troops on Romanian soil against a foreign + (non-Romanian) threat, however, Romania would probably accede. Such an + occupation would not be popular, but, as it has done before through + countless occupations (and in a way as it is doing now under Ceausescu), the people would + concentrate on surviving rather than on fighting back. That Romania has + been able to become and remain a national entity is more a result of the cleverness of its diplomats + than of the might of its armies.

+

27. To a large extent, the relative loyalties of the armed forces tend to + reflect those of the population but, as it receives more ideological + indoctrination, probably at a somewhat higher level of intensity. Since + loyalty to the country is highest, the regime has skillfully promoted + Ceausescu and the Party as + synonymous with Romania. Loyalty to the Warsaw Pact is the weakest link + in the loyalty chain.

+

28. In terms of ability, the technical services (that is, Navy, Air + Force, and Air Defense) are far better trained than the Army, + essentially a vast labor pool which receives little training above the + small-unit level. It is the assessment of the Bucharest Embassy Defense + Attache that any Warsaw Pact operation would be far better off without a + Romanian Army unit during a combined operation.

+

29. Mistrust of the minorities is reflected by their status in the armed + forces. There are very few minorities represented in the officer corps, + for example. Enlisted men from ethnic groups are almost automatically + placed in engineer units where they are little more than unskilled labor + troops.

+

30. [less than 1 line not declassified] the + Ambassador has read this report [less than 1 line not + declassified] he considers it “a comprehensive statement which + highlights the main problems and current areas of potential conflict in + the Ceausescu regime’s management + of Romania.” In the Ambassador’s view, however, “the report’s skepticism + concerning Romanian achievements and possibilities is somewhat + overdrawn, and it leans toward the lowest available estimates of quality + of life/standard of living in Romania (i.e., vis-a-vis Bulgaria, + Yugoslavia and the USSR, where other + estimates show Romania equal or ahead). This penchant extends also to + judgments on politics . . . ” where, the Ambassador believes, “there is + an underestimation of Ceausescu’s + potential, and that of his regime, for development in both the political + and economic/social spheres.”)

+

31. [less than 1 line not declassfied]

+

32. [less than 1 line not declassified]

+
+ +
+ 194. Paper Prepared in the Central Intelligence AgencySource: Central Intelligence Agency, + Office of Support Services (DI), Job 80T00634A, Production Case + Files (1978), Box 2, Ceausescu’s Romania: A Situation Report. + Confidential. The paper was prepared in the National Foreign + Assessment Center. + + + RP M 78–10144 + + + Washington, April 5, + 1978 + + + SUBJECT + Ceausescu’s Romania: A + Situation Report + +

1. As head of state and Secretary General of the ruling communist party, + President Ceausescu is very + obviously the supreme national leader of Romania today and we are not + aware of any individual or faction within the leadership that could + challenge his position. The personality cult that enshrines him is + rivaled only by that of North Korea’s Kim Il-song.In preparation for the trip to Washington, the + CIA also circulated a + biographic research paper in March, entitled “Nicolae Ceausescu: Romania’s + Maverick Leader.” The paper described him as possessing “shrewdness + and flexibility in anticipating potential political crises and + circumventing them.” “However,” the paper continued, “a recent + psychiatric evaluation depicts him as possessing an unshakable + belief in the wisdom of his decisions, an intense attachment to his + goals, and a conviction that he alone knows what’s best for his + country.” (National Archives, RG 59, + Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Office of Analysis for the + Commonwealth and Eastern Europe, Office Subject Files, 1958–1978, + Lot 92D468, Box 5, Hungary Jan–June 1978)

+

2. Ceausescu keeps leading party + and government functionaries under control and off balance by means of a + periodic rotation of top personnel, which can affect even his closest + associates. Although these arbitrary shifts, as well as the elevation of + his wife, Elena, to high party posts, have caused resentment within the + hierarchy, the grumbling is likely to remain within bounds.

+

3. In contrast to its outward-looking and independent foreign policies, + the regime maintains perhaps the most authoritarian domestic controls + among Warsaw Pact states. Bucharest’s tactics in dealing with the small + manifestation of dissidence that formed around author Paul Goma last + year was to isolate individual dissidents and allow them to emigrate. + The movement has since collapsed.The Office + of Research and Political Analysis at the CIA disseminated a report arguing that “resumption of + wide-scale political dissident activity appears dim.” (Central + Intelligence Agency, Executive Registry, Job 80T00634A, Box 2, + unlabeled folder)

+

4. Instances of workers’ unrest, including a slowdown in a major coal + mining region in August, represented a potentially more serious challenge to Ceausescu’s authority.Rumors of labor unrest in the Jiu Valley, a major + coal mining region of central Romania, surfaced in August 1977. In + telegram 5847 from Bucharest, August 5, 1977, the Embassy reported + Ceausescu’s unplanned + “working visit” to the area to quell the growing rebellion. + Ceausescu’s visit “is + very much in keeping for him to rush to the scene of trouble to put + out the fire.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770282–0284) On + November 11, 1977, the Embassy reported in telegram 8323 from + Bucharest, that Ceausescu was + back in the Jiu Valley, noting the “gross emphasis on the role of + Ceausescu personally—not + the Party, not the Government, not other leaders” in resolving the + labor issues in the region. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + D770417–0427) In telegram 2413 from Bucharest, April 11, the Embassy + reported it received credible information that over 4,000 miners and + their families had been relocated from the Jiu Valley back to their + original areas, mainly the economically depressed Dobruja. (National + Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign + Policy File, D780157–0903) Early this year there were also + reports of restlessness among Romania’s approximately two million + Magyars. This minority is disturbed over alleged cultural and + educational discrimination and what the Magyars perceive as a systematic + Romanian effort to gradually assimilate all national minorities.During his meeting with Andrei in Bucharest, March 31, + Vanik discussed the issue and emphasized that he understood Romanian + concerns with demonstrations against Ceausescu during his visit to the United States, but + believed the numbers would be small and it would not interfere with + the protocol of his visit. Andrei told Vanik that “agitation by Hungarian + emigrants as well as by Hungarians here in Romania is ‘fed from the + outside.’” (Memorandum of conversation, March 31; National Archives, + RG 59, Bureau of Intelligence + and Research, Office of Analysis for the Commonwealth and Eastern + Europe, Office Subject Files, 1965–1980, Lot 92D412, Box 6, U.S.-Romania Political + Relations)

+

5. Ceausescu has reacted to these + symptoms of popular discontent with an extensive reorganization of the + state security apparatus. He personally assumed the security portfolio + on the party secretariat. This, together with other high-level personnel + changes in the Interior Ministry suggest that he wants to avoid a + repetition of future instances of unrest.

+

6. The main problems currently facing Romania continue to be in the + economic domain. The long-term goal, of course, is to turn the country + into a modern industrialized communist state. Ceausescu hopes to achieve this + objective within an integrated, centrally oriented framework.

+

7. In 1977, the economy experienced almost unprecedented difficulties + mainly as a result of energy, labor and hard currency shortages. Natural + causes—including a devastating earthquake and a drought that adversely + affected agricultural output—compounded the difficulties. As a result, + economic growth was the lowest in years.

+

8. Earlier this year Ceausescu + announced a program aimed at redressing the country’s economic problems. + While retaining the full mechanism of centralized planning, the scheme + hinted at greater self-reliance for enterprises in order to promote + efficiency and productivity. The program threatened to make government assistance dependent on an + enterprise’s ability to show a profit. We believe that the policy of + “self-financing,” as announced by Ceausescu, if implemented, would place enterprise + managers in a precarious position. The central authorities demand + increased productivity, even though the workers’ capability of providing + it is already strained. There are indications, however, that when it is + implemented, the program may turn out to be less drastic than originally + presented.

+

9. Workers’ unrest last year was caused by the requirement to perform + overtime work without pay, a reduction in retirement benefits and + experiments with the unpopular productivity-wage linkage. Under the new + program, underfulfillment of production targets by enterprises would + result in wage cuts for workers. Despite the regime’s hopes to the + contrary, this could again foment instances of unrest.

+

10. In an effort to facilitate the program, Ceausescu undertook a major reshuffle of the hierarchy + last month. The shifts involved mainly the top officials of the + planning, foreign trade, finance and industrial construction sectors. + The scope of the transfers, which included some of Ceausescu’s closest associates, + suggests that he is making an all-out attempt to put the economy on a + better footing.

+

11. Ceausescu’s principal foreign + policy objective is to retain as much independence from Moscow as + possible, given geopolitical realities. In line with this goal, + Ceausescu has been trying to + build a “special relationship” with Washington as he believes that + closer political and economic ties will help Romania fend off pressures + from the Soviets for closer integration with the Warsaw Pact and CEMA. At the same time, Ceausescu seeks to keep balanced + relations with all of the major powers, and his visit here next week is + expected to be followed by a trip to China later this spring. He + probably also plans to go to Moscow this year although apparently no + date has been set.

+

12. Ceausescu recently named + Stefan Andrei his new foreign + minister, replacing the ailing George + Macovescu. The appointment is not likely to alter basic + Romanian foreign policies. Andrei + has been Ceausescu’s personal + foreign policy advisor for some years, and he is expected to accompany + him to Washington.

+

13. Ceausescu is anxious to retain + his country’s active participation in world affairs, but Romania’s + recent foreign policy performance has been unspectacular. Bucharest has + been unsuccessful in making an imprint on the CSCE proceedings and its suggestions were not reflected in + the final document. The Romanians probably would like to play a leading + role in the non-aligned movement, but are finding it difficult even to + put a foot in the door.

+

14. Ceausescu has a deserved + reputation as a behind-the-scenes arbitrator of international disputes + and did help arrange the Sadat-Begin meeting last winter. Although the recent Israeli action in + Lebanon was an embarrassing setback for Ceausescu’s efforts, he is apparently continuing his + conciliatory attempts in the Middle East. Ceausescu has hinted that he will deliver a North Korean + message to President Carter and + he has expressed an interest—apparently without the express + encouragement of either side—to improve relations between Washington and + Peking. In sum, he relishes a role as mediator which, he believes, gives + him prestige as an international statesman.

+

15. As far as we are aware, Ceausescu is unconcerned that he might, for whatever + reason, leave the political scene and there is no clearcut candidate to + succeed him. [5 lines not declassified]

+
+ +
+ 195. Editorial Note +

On April 5, 1978, Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs + George Vest, Assistant + Secretary of State for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs Patricia Derian, and Director of + Policy Planning Anthony Lake + forwarded an action memorandum to Deputy Secretary of State Warren Christopher requesting + decisions on a number of human rights issues prior to the arrival of + Romanian President Nicolae + Ceausescu. Sent through Counselor of the Department of + State Matthew Nimetz, the + memorandum asked, among other issues, for a decision on how to raise the + sensitive case of Constantin Rauta’s request for family reunification + with Ceausescu’s party. (See Document 196.)

+

Constantin Rauta was part of the advance party preparing for Romanian + President Nicolae Ceausescu’s + visit to Washington in December 1973, when he defected to the United + States. Rauta, a diplomatic courier at the time he defected, requested + that the United States facilitate his attempt to trade his classified + pouch for permission for his wife and young child to immigrate to the + United States. U.S. officials persuaded + Rauta that such an attempt was impractical and that the pouch should be + returned to the Romanian Government. Ceausescu considered Rauta’s defection a personal + affront, and the Romanian Government refused to allow Rauta’s family to + emigrate.

+

The focus placed on human rights by the Carter administration offered + Rauta new traction. In telegram 196804 to Bucharest, August 18, 1977, + the Department informed the Embassy of the increasing interest in the + Rauta case of Representatives Charles Vanik, Joshua Eilberg, Bill + Frenzel, as well as Senators Abraham Ribicoff, Henry Jackson, Paul + Sarbanes, Jacob Javits, and Edward Kennedy. (National Archives, RG + 59, Central Foreign Policy + File, D770299–0146) The Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs Bureau + pressed for an official démarche on the Rauta case. Romanian Ambassador + to Washington Nicolae Nicolae, + told newly appointed U.S. Ambassador to + Romania Rudolph Aggrey upon his + arrival in Bucharest, “as a friend and colleague” that, in Nicolae’s opinion, the case was + “heavily political here, that it is political to the very highest level, + and that he saw no possibility of securing a reversal of the GOR’s stand.” Nicolae added that “any decision to reunite this family + will be considered a reward and encouragement to others for treason, and + will be taken only for the most pressing political reasons, at the + highest level.” (Telegram 9067 from Bucharest, December 19, 1977; + National Archives, RG 59, Central + Foreign Policy File, D770472–0250)

+

The Department of State continued to debate the issue internally. In + telegram 305730 to Bucharest, December 23, 1977, Nicolas Andrews, Director of Eastern + European Affairs in the Bureau of European Affairs, informed the + Embassy: “We have given very serious consideration to Bucharest 9067. + There have been conversations between us and Patt Derian’s office, between + George Vest and Patt Derian, and so forth.” Andrews continued: “There is strong + pressure from D/HA (and of course Rauta) to do something now. Romania’s + poor reputation in human rights matters (beating up and detention of + Goma, beating up of Baptists, continuing American-Hungarian propaganda + on Transylvania, the ‘reprisals’ against the Jiu Valley miners, Goma’s + statement in Paris, etc.) is not made up for by its adequate emigration + record (especially to the US and FRG).” + (National Archives, RG 59, Central + Foreign Policy File, D770479–0302) While Assistant Secretary of State + for European Affairs George Vest + was “not overly optimistic about the Romanian reaction” to a démarche, + he considered that the case’s “potential to prejudice the normal + development of our relations with Romania if left unresolved” made + sending a note imperative. (Telegram 309076 to Bucharest, December 29, + 1977; National Archives, RG 59, Central + Foreign Policy File, D770484–0036) The démarche, which was sent to + Bucharest in telegram 2366, January 5, was discussed by Ambassador + Aggrey with Deputy Foreign + Minister Cornel Pacoste on + January 6. (National Archives, RG 59, + Central Foreign Policy File, D780009–0162) Pacoste refused to accept the note, denied that Rauta + was a humanitarian case, and told the Ambassador that “he did not + understand U.S. persistence + (“insistence”) in this case and was surprised that U.S. Government is officially pressing for + its solution.” (Telegram 109 from Bucharest, January 6; National + Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy + File, D780010–1118)

+

As preparations for Ceausescu’s + visit went forward, the Rauta case was brought up repeatedly in all + high-level discussions between U.S. + and GOR officials. Counselor of the Department of State + Matthew Nimetz discussed the + issue on January 10 during his meeting with Romanian Ambassador + Nicolae. (Telegram 7567 to + Bucharest, January 11; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780017–0020) Assistant + Secretary of State for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs Patricia Derian raised the issue on + February 14 with Ceausescu + adviser Vasile Pungan, suggesting that failure to resolve the matter + would force the U.S. Government to bring + up the case during Ceausescu’s + visit. (Telegram 43849 to Bucharest, February 18; National Archives, + RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + D780077–0269) By late March, the Department concluded that pursuing the + Rauta case on humanitarian grounds was unlikely to succeed. “We are + willing to suggest to the right Romanian officials the possibility of a + quid pro quo for the release of the Rauta family,” the Department + informed the Embassy in telegram 79845, March 28. “We see no other way + to break the present stalemate” Deputy Assistant Secretary of State + William Luers wrote. + Representative Charles Vanik’s visit to Bucharest on March 31, Luers concluded, “offers a good + opportunity to make the first try. Vanik has shown a personal interest + in the Rauta case. More important, he has good bargaining chips, if he + is willing to use them in this way.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + D780135–0178) Vanik discussed the Rauta case with Romanian Foreign + Minister Stefan Andrei, without + any success. (Telegram 2146 from Bucharest, April 1; National Archives, + RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + D780142–0921)

+

On April 4, Helen Thomas, UPI White House correspondent, asked the + President’s personal secretary, Susan Clough, to bring a letter from the + Holy Cross Romanian Orthodox Church to the President’s attention. The + letter asked the President to intervene on behalf of Rauta’s family with + the Romanian Government, “perhaps during the upcoming visit of Romanian + President Nicolai Ceausescu.” + Carter forwarded the letter to his Assistant for National Security + Affairs, Zbigniew Brzezinski + commenting “Zbig—I’d like to help.” (Carter Library, National Security + Affairs, Brzezinski Material, + VIP Visit File, Box 12, Romania, President Ceausescu, 4/12–13/78: Cables and Memos, + 12/13/77–4/10/78) Robert King, + of the National Security Council Staff, was instructed to prepare, in + cooperation with the Department of State, a paper for the President’s + use on the Rauta case. King + responded to the memorandum on April 7, detailing the Rauta case and the + Romanian sensitivities, as well as the numerous instances in which the + case was discussed with the Romanians. King wrote: “Bill + Luers and I have discussed the problem and we agree” that + the best U.S. Government strategy to get + permission for the family to emigrate “is to offer to make some kind of + underhanded deal with the Romanians—to approve an exchange of something the Romanians want in + return for the exit visas.” King + continued: “If the President were to raise this specific case with + Ceausescu it would have + serious repercussions and I strongly advise + against doing so.” King also + recommended that Brzezinski + advise the President not to raise the Rauta issue with Ceausescu. Brzezinski disapproved the recommendation. (Ibid.)

+

On April 10, King forwarded to + Brzezinski a memorandum for + President Carter’s briefing book + for the Ceausescu visit. The + memorandum recommended that the issue be raised late in the visit and + that it be raised in a tête-à-tête between Carter and Ceausescu. Most importantly, “the best + way to approach the issue is not on humanitarian + grounds and not by appealing to Ceausescu’s sense of justice” the + memorandum stated. Rather, the President should “explain that the Rauta + case has introduced discord in our relationship and express your desire + that it be resolved so that such obstacles do not stand in the way of + the further development of our relations.” (Ibid.) That same day, + King also informed Brzezinski that Deputy Secretary of + State Warren Christopher had + approved a recommendation that Secretary Vance would raise the Rauta case privately with Romanian + Foreign Minister Stefan Andrei. + (See Document 196 and footnote 7 thereto.) + Brzezinski signed King’s memorandum on the Rauta case + and sent it to Carter on April 11.

+
+ +
+ 196. Action Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for + European Affairs (Vest), the + Assistant Secretary of State for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs + (Derian), and the Director + of the Policy Planning Staff (Lake) to the Deputy Secretary of State (Christopher)Source: National Archives, RG 59, Office of the Secretariat Staff, + Official Working Papers, S/P + Director Anthony Lake, + 1977–Jan 1981, Lot 82D298, Box 3, S/P-Lake Papers—4/1–15/78. Confidential. Drafted by + Andrews, Sillins, + Brody, and Kaplan; + cleared by Luers, Fuerth, + and Wolf. Luers initialed + the memorandum for Vest; + Brody initialed for + Derian. The undated + memorandum was sent under a covering memorandum through Nimetz on April 5. In his + memorandum, Nimetz + recommended that Vance raise + the Hungarian minority issue with Andrei, that there was no need to raise the IFI + issue, and that the Rauta case not be brought up during the + Ceausescu visit. + (National Archives, RG 59, Office of + the Secretariat Staff, Mr. Matthew + Nimetz, Counselor of the Department of State, Under + Secretary of State for Security Assistance, Science and Technology, + January 1977 thru December 1980, Lot 81D85, Box 1, MN + Chron—Official, January–June 1978) Nimetz forwarded Christopher’s decisions to Vance under an April 10 covering + memorandum. (Ibid.) + + + Washington, April 5, + 1978 + + + SUBJECT + The Ceausescu Visit—Human + Rights Issues + +

ISSUES FOR DECISION

+

How three humanitarian issues should be taken up during President + Ceausescu’s visit. Decisions + are needed well before Ceausescu’s arrival on April 11.

+

BACKGROUND

+

We agree that the President should raise the subject of human rights with + Ceausescu, making reference + to obligations in the Helsinki Final Act assumed by all signatory states + to respect human rights and discuss such matters with one another. The + President should urge Ceausescu + directly to take favorable and prompt action on present and future + emigration and marriage requests including emigration to Israel, + particularly if Romania wishes the Administration to seek Romanian + MFN status from Congress on a + multi-annual basis. Since human rights problems are already an important + item on our bilateral agenda, there is disagreement within the + Department over the degree to which and whether the following three + additional and sensitive human rights issues should be raised with the + Romanians during this visit.

+

THE THREE ISSUES

+

A. Hungarian Minority

+

The Romanian Government is periodically accused of officially sanctioned + discrimination against the approximately 1.7 million ethnic Hungarians in Romania, such as + restrictions on schooling in the Hungarian language, employment + discrimination, and strong efforts to assimilate Hungarians into the + Romanian culture. American-Hungarian organizations are sensitive to this + issue. Sixty-six Members of Congress wrote to President Carter on March 22 stating their + concern and specifically asking that he raise the matter with Ceausescu.

+

Recent media attention has focused on detailed written criticism of the + official Romanian policy towards ethnic Hungarians. The author was + Karoly Kiraly, an ethnic Hungarian still in Romania who formerly held a + high position in the Romanian Communist Party.

+

For Romania, the Hungarian minority issue raises sensitive territorial + questions. Most ethnic Hungarians live in Transylvania which was not + incorporated into modern Romania until after World War I. Romanian + authorities fear that the real motivation behind the recent public + debate in Hungary over this issue is an irredentist attempt. They are + also concerned that the USSR may be + stirring it up to pressure Romania because of its independent foreign + policy. It has assumed increasing importance in Romanian-Hungarian + relations since Ceausescu and + Kadar referred to it publicly for the first time in June 1977. It + continues to be discussed at high levels between the two governments. In + a speech March 16, Ceausescu + criticized shortcomings and deficiencies in Romanian policy toward the + Hungarian and German minorities and put forward specific remedial + actions.

+

Department officials (Nimetz et + al) have raised the issue with visiting Romanian officials, most + recently with Deputy Foreign Minister Gliga on March 17.In telegram 74362 to Bucharest, March 22, the + Department informed the Embassy of the Nimetz-Gliga conversation on the treatment of the + Hungarian minority in Romania. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + D780127–0309) We put the issue in the context of our global + support for minority rights, reiterated our firm support for Romanian + territorial integrity, and made clear that we are not proposing specific + solutions but felt we had to raise the matter because of Administration, + public and Congressional interest in humanitarian matters set down in + the Helsinki Final Act.

+

Ceausescu may well preempt the + issue by raising it with the President and explaining the situation as + he sees it. If so, it would be an opportunity for the President to + express his satisfaction that the issue has come up and to explain the + concern which exists in the United States in this regard.

+

OPTIONS

+

1. The President Raises + Issue with Ceausescu

+

Should Ceausescu not raise the + issue, the President on his own would raise it to make clear at the + highest level the seriousness with which the U.S. views this aspect of human rights.

+ +

In doing so he could note that the U.S. + seeks a continuing official dialogue on such questions rather than any + U.S. involvement in Romania’s + internal affairs. He could emphasize that if U.S. public debate on this issue is erroneous or + ill-informed, such debate is still a legitimate consequence of the + U.S. democratic process. The U.S. Government, however, would be better + informed as to allegations of discrimination if there were a better + bilateral discussion of the matter. (HA supports.)

+

2. The Secretary Raises + Issue with the Foreign Minister

+

If the President has not raised the issue during his general discussion + of human rights and emigration issues with Ceausescu, he could note his concern about certain + delicate human rights problems and indicate his wish that those be + discussed at the Foreign Minister level.

+

If the issue is left for the Secretary, we would try to have the + Romanians raise it. In response to their presentation, the Secretary + would explain the interest which exists in the Administration, Congress + and the public domain for a fair and just solution to existing + problems.

+

If the Romanians do not raise it, the Secretary could ask the Foreign + Minister to comment on the Hungarian minority issue as one of the human + rights issues embodied in the Helsinki Final Act. In either case, he + could stress that the U.S. strongly + supports Romanian territorial integrity, opposes irredentism, and has no + wish to see this issue troubling the relations among the United States, + Romania and Hungary.

+

The Secretary’s approach would serve to bring strong U.S. interest in this matter to Ceausescu’s attention. It would not + fully address the concerns of the Congressmen that the President raise + the matter. (EUR and S/P support, as does HA if the President + does not raise it.)

+

3. Issue is not Raised by + the President or Secretary

+

Choosing this option signifies recognition that the Romanians and + Hungarians have this issue on their agenda at a high level; that + Ceausescu recently made + recommendations to correct Romanian policy toward minority problems; and + that the United States has little or nothing to gain from involving + itself directly in an issue between two Communist governments.

+

Recommendations:

+

1. That the President raise the issue with Ceausescu. (HA supports.)

+

2. That the Secretary raise the issue with the Foreign Minister. (EUR and S/P support, as does HA if the President does not raise + it.)Christopher approved Option 2 on April 8, and wrote + in the margin: “Suggest that President state that he has asked + Secy of State to raise certain + human rights matters. WC.”

+

3. That the issue not be raised by the President or Secretary.

+ +

B. Loans to Romania from + International Financial Institutions

+

Recently, and in accordance with current legislative requirements, we + have advised Romanian officials of our obligation to take human rights + considerations into account in determining our position on loan + applications to international financial institutions (IFIs) like the + World Bank. However, we have not advised the Romanians that the U.S. is contemplating specific negative + action against them in the IFIs. It is widely understood that Ceausescu maintains a tightly + controlled internal political system. There is lack of consensus in the + Department on the degree to which there is a pattern of violations of + human rights in Romania serious enough to warrant such action.

+

The U.S. encouraged Romania to join the + World Bank and the IMF, in keeping with + our interest in lessening Romania’s economic and political dependence on + the USSR and Communist economic + organizations. This stems from Administration policy (in accordance with + PD–21) to make legitimate efforts to accord Romania favored treatment + in, among other things, economic matters. We are required by the Harkin + Amendment (1977)The Harkin Amendment to the + Fair Trade Act prohibited the United States from offering economic + assistance to countries that grossly violated human rights. + and PD–30PD–30, signed by Carter on + February 17, 1978, established that promoting the observance of + human rights would be a major objective of U.S. foreign policy. to consider Romania’s human + rights policies in the IFI context.

+

OPTIONS

+

1. The President Raises + Issue with Ceausescu

+

This would signal the most serious intent to reflect upon the human + rights situation in Romania and our need to consider this in decisions + for positive votes, abstaining or voting against Romanian loan + applications in the IFIs. The President could raise this issue in a calm + fashion without suggesting that the United States is on the verge of + abstaining or of a negative vote in the IFI and could make clear he has + an open rather than closed mind on the subject. (HA supports.)

+

2. Secretary Raises Issue + with the Foreign Minister

+

This could be taken up as one of the “delicate problems” mentioned by the + President (see above). The Secretary could explain the requirements of + U.S. law and stress our wish to + continue supporting Romanian IFI loan applications. (S/P supports, as does HA if the President + does not raise it.)

+ +

3. Issue is not Raised by + President or Secretary

+

This course would avoid difficulties in our relations and maintain + consistency with PL–21. The Romanians have already been informed at a + high level of U.S. legislative + requirements. The U.S. has other levers + (for example, the MFN/emigration hearings) with which to exert pressure + on human rights issues. (EUR + supports.)

+

Recommendations:

+

1. That the President briefly raise the issue with Ceausescu. (HA supports.)

+

2. That the Secretary raise the issue with the Foreign Minister. (S/P and HA support.)Christopher + approved Option 2 on April 8.

+

3. That the issue not be raised during the visit. (EUR supports.)

+

C. The Rauta Case

+

Constantin Rauta was a Romanian official with intelligence + responsibilities who defected just before Ceausescu’s official visit to the U.S. in December 1973. Rauta is now an + engineer at the Goddard Space Flight Center. He was traveling as a + diplomatic courier and asked U.S. + officials to help him trade his classified pouch for Romanian permission + for his wife and young son to join him in the United States. We + convinced him of the impracticality of such an exchange given the + imminent arrival of the Romanian President and the pouch was returned + unopened to the Romanians.

+

The principal Romanian objection to allowing Mrs. Rauta and the child to + emigrate is that the family’s reunification would be seen as a reward to + a traitor and would encourage similar defections. Ceausescu is reportedly familiar with + all the above aspects of the case, apparently regards Rauta’s defection + as a personal affront and is the only person who can decide the fate of + Rauta’s wife and child.

+

Our representation on humanitarian grounds have been stubbornly rebuffed + by Romanian officials who insist that because Rauta is a traitor, this + is not a human rights matter. They may maintain that our raising it in + this context only confuses matters. We do not accept that view but are + prepared to resolve this issue on any practical basis. Prospects are not + bright in the near future but we intend to persist.

+

OPTIONS

+

1. The President Raises the + Issue with Ceausescu

+

This would signal the strongest interest in resolving this longstanding + case and our understanding that only Ceausescu holds the key to unlocking this case. Raising the issue with + Ceausescu could make him + uncomfortable and may not immediately secure the release of Rauta’s + family.

+

This would give the Romanian President an understanding of the U.S. view that, three years after the + granting of MFN, there should be + progress in even the most difficult of the divided family cases with + Romania. A number of longstanding cases will have been resolved in the + weeks before Ceausescu’s arrival + here, clearly as a result of a Romanian attempt to put its best face + forward. Indications are that there is little high-level Romanian + receptivity to bargaining for the Rauta family’s release. A high-level + U.S. reaffirmation to Ceausescu that the Rauta matter is a + humanitarian issue which can be resolved will maintain the momentum we + have generated in pressing the case with Romanian authorities. There has + been no confirmation to us that the Romanian President is even aware of + our heightened concern for the Rauta wife and child. (HA supports.)

+

2. Secretary Raises the + Issue with the Foreign Minister

+

This course would also make clear very strong U.S. interest in resolving this case, without producing a + confrontation during the Ceausescu visit. It could be taken up as one of the + “delicate problems” referred to by the President. (S/P support this option, as does HA, if the + issue is not raised by the President.)

+

3. Issue is not Raised by + the President or Secretary

+

We have already raised this issue at high levels this year. Our + Ambassador raised it with Deputy Foreign Minister Pacoste in January and delivered a + note. We raised it with Presidential Counselor Pungan in Washington. + Just recently, on March 30, our Ambassador made a strong pitch to Pungan + to find some solution and Congressman Vanik made an equally strong pitch + to the Foreign Minister on April 1 at our prodding. (EUR supports.)

+

Recommendations:

+

1. That the President confirm U.S. + interest in the Rauta affair as humanitarian and seek Ceausescu’s agreement to allow the wife + and child to join Mr. Rauta here. (HA supports.)

+

2. That the Secretary raise the issue with Andrei. (S/P supports, + as does HA, if the President does not raise.)Christopher + approved Option 2 on April 8.

+

3. That the issue not be raised. (EUR + supports.)

+
+ +
+ 197. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security + Affairs (Brzezinski) to + President CarterSource: Carter Library, National + Security Affairs, Brzezinski + Material, VIP Visit File, Box 12, Romania, President Ceausescu, 4/12–13/78: Cables and + Memos, 4/11–22/78. No classification marking. + + + Washington, April 11, + 1978 + + + SUBJECT + Visit of Romanian President Ceausescu + +

Romania has been singled out as one of the East European countries in + which we have a special interest. This stems largely from its foreign + policy. Since the early 1960s Romania has institutionalized a degree of + independence from the USSR that is + unique in Eastern Europe.

+

Romanian autonomy from the Soviet Union is a disruptive factor within the + Warsaw Pact and it tends to increase Soviet uncertainty about the + protective glacis along its western frontier. Furthermore, the + institutionalization of Romanian autonomy increases the possibility and + provides a role model for other East European countries which might seek + to achieve similar status.

+

For the last fifteen years, the US has followed a policy of supporting + Romanian autonomy principally through political gestures. Romania was + the first communist country to be visited by an American president + (1969), and a number of high level visits have been exchanged. Ceausescu was last here in 1975.President Nixon visited Bucharest August 2–3, + 1969. President Ford visited Romania August 2–3, 1975, following the + signing of the Helsinki Accords. Ceausescu visited the United States on October 24, + 1970, December 3–6, 1973, and June 11, 1975.

+

In 1975 we signed a Trade Agreement extending Most Favored Nation + Treatment to Romanian exports.President + Ford signed the Presidential Determination extending MFN to Romania on April 24, 1975. See + Foreign + Relations, 1969–1976, vol. E–15, Part 1, Documents on + Eastern Europe, 1973–1976, Document 33. While this + did not bring a substantial increase in trade (as the Romanians hoped it + would), some modest gains have been evident. More important, however, is + the symbolism of giving Romania a status in its trade with the US that + the USSR and most other countries of + Eastern Europe have not achieved.

+

During the Nixon and Ford Administrations Romania was accorded a favored + place in our policy towards Eastern Europe. In the reassessment of our + East European policy last year, we have somewhat altered that situation. + On the basis of internal liberalization and/or external independence from the Soviet Union, we + placed Poland and Hungary in a status equal to that of Romania.

+

Ceausescu’s main purpose in this + visit is to secure a renewed US endorsement of Romania’s foreign policy + and to establish a personal relationship with you. At present, however, + there are few concrete actions that we can or would wish to take that + will reaffirm our interest in Romania. In bilateral relations there are + no outstanding important issues that require solution. Ceausescu will probably request + concessionary credits, which we do not wish to grant. (Romania’s level + of development is advanced by third-world standards and granting such + credits would create an undesirable precedent.)

+

The best way in which we can reaffirm our interest in Romania is through + sharing with Ceausescu our views + of the current major international questions. If Ceausescu leaves feeling support for + his country and that you have taken him into your confidence on world + problems, the visit will be a success. Accordingly, you should + particularly discuss the following three questions with him:

+

1) The Middle East

+

2) The Soviet/Cuban role in Africa

+

3) China and Sino-Soviet Relations

 +

The principal difficulty in our relations falls in the area of emigration + and human rights. Generally the Romanian Government’s treatment of its + population remains among the most restrictive in Eastern Europe. The + most frequent justification for this is that in order to follow an + independent foreign policy, a strict internal regime is required. On + occasion the Soviets have attempted to foment internal disruption, and + this has reinforced the government’s determination to prevent + difficulties. Freedom of expression and movement are limited, as is the + right of emigration.

+

Since MFN was granted to Romania under + Jackson-Vanik terms, emigration to the US has gradually increased. In + anticipation of Ceausescu’s + visit, a number of family reunification cases were recently resolved. + The Romanians have been slow to grant approval, but they have been + willing to grant exit visas to individuals with family in the United + States. In fact, our emigration laws are such that some of those + permitted to leave have not been closely enough related to US residents + to come directly to the US.

+

Since MFN was granted in 1975, however, + emigration to Israel has dropped off. (In 1977 it was only 1334, + although in 1974 the figure was 3700.) In part this reflects the decline + in the size of the Jewish population in Romania (it now stands at about + 40,000—down from 500,000 in 1945) and the fact that Jews remaining in + Romania are an older age group. The Romanian Government explains the + decline on these grounds. There + are, however, important restrictive emigration procedures that are a + factor in discouraging Jews from applying for exit visas.

+

Jews seeking permission to emigrate must go through an elaborate + pre-application process that is used to discourage those wishing to + leave, and applications are frequently rejected at this stage with no + means of appeal. The Israeli Embassy in Bucharest becomes involved only + after a passport has been issued and permission to emigrate has been + granted. Since Israel’s political interests are considered more + important than the small number of Jews who might wish to emigrate + (Romania is the only communist country with which diplomatic ties still + exist), the Israeli Government has not been willing to stake a strong + stand on Jewish emigration with Romanian officials. This is why the + Jewish community counts on us.

+

We attach three memoranda that are germane:

+ +

1) Secretary Vance’s + memorandum to you on the visit (Tab A).See Document 198.

+

2) A paper on the case in which you expressed interest; you might + bring it up when talking to Ceausescu alone (Tab B).At Tab B is an April 11 memorandum from Brzezinski to Carter on the + Rauta case. See Document + 195.

+

3) A memorandum from Arthur + Goldberg, on Romanian performance in the human rights + area. It basically points out that the record is a mixed one (Tab + C).See Document + 199.

+ +
+ +
+ 198. Memorandum From Secretary of State Vance to President CarterSource: + Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, VIP Visit + File, Box 12, Romania, President Ceausescu, 4/12–13/78: Cables and Memos, 4/11–22/78. + Secret. + + + Washington, April 7, + 1978 + + + SUBJECT + Visit of Romanian President Ceausescu + +

I. OBJECTIVES

+

Our objectives will be:

+

—To reaffirm our support for Ceausescu’s efforts to ensure Romanian independence;

+

—To urge more positive Romanian action on humanitarian problems such as + divided families, binational marriages and Jewish emigration; more + broadly, to encourage increased Romanian respect for human rights;

+

—To encourage Romania to adopt more liberal domestic economic and + political arrangements;

+

—To recognize that Ceausescu is + playing an active, constructive and independent role in international + affairs;

+

—To reassert the U.S. interest in + fruitful relationships with the communist countries in the Soviet + Union’s European borderlands.

+

Ceausescu will be seeking:

+

—Assurance concerning the firmness and consistency of U.S. world leadership;

+

—Reaffirmation of the importance the U.S. + attaches to Romanian independence from the Soviet Union, a vigorous + bilateral relationship with Romania, and an active Romanian role in + world affairs; and

+

—Economic benefits from the U.S. to + cement both the economic and political relationship.

+

II. SETTING

+

Our bilateral relationship with Romania is advantageous for both sides, + but the approach of the post-Tito and post-Brezhnev period provides the real setting for Ceausescu’s visit. This time of + uncertainty, with implications far beyond Europe, sets the agenda for + Ceausescu’s visit to + Washington as it does for his visit to Peking in mid-May.

+ +

Tito’s visit to Washington helped + strengthen U.S.-Yugoslav relations for + the post-Tito period. Like + Tito, Ceausescu is an independent communist, + a regional leader in the Balkans, a partner for the United States and + China in Eastern Europe, and a sometimes helpful mediator in + international transactions. At 60, Ceausescu has many good years ahead of him. His visit + therefore presents an opportunity to reinforce an American role in + Eastern Europe for the uncertain years ahead.

+

In so doing, we will be building on a solid base. After a decade of + steady effort, our relations with Romania are good. Ceausescu is coming to Washington ready + and willing to keep them that way and to move them further forward. He + clearly aspires to as much of Tito’s mantle as can be made to fit. The degree of + recognition he gets from us will be, for him, an important measure of + his prospects. Because recent activities in our relations with + Yugoslavia, Poland and Hungary may have led Ceausescu to question whether our attitude toward + Romania has cooled, he will be hypersensitive to the warmth and protocol + aspects of his reception here.

+

At the same time, Ceausescu is not + easy to deal with for the United States. Nurtured in the dangerous + politics of the interwar communist movement, he runs a unitary state and + a tightly centralized economy with a degree of direct personal control + unmatched on the continent. In this respect, his regime differs markedly + from Tito’s. Relying heavily on + police power, the Romanian regime severely limits civil and political + liberties and discourages emigration. To obtain significant movement on + humanitarian problems—such as family reunification—normally requires a + combination of external pressure and economic inducement.

+

The country’s economic strategy continues to stress heavy industrial + development at the expense of the consumer, and to achieve it through + annual reinvestment of a third of Romania’s national income. The + results, in material terms, have been impressive. Romania has one of the + world’s highest growth rates and is an eager international trader. The + standard of living remains one of Europe’s lowest, but it continues to + rise, if slowly.

+

Nevertheless, there are signs that the limits of this “traditional + communist” type of development are being reached. A batch of economic + reform principles was announced in February, followed in March by + numerous personnel changes at the top. The two main thrusts—more + economic “self-management” and greater Party control—point in opposite + directions. Ceausescu may begin + to realize that the economic efficiency Romania needs to maintain + acceptable growth rates and reasonable prospects of economic + independence from the USSR will soon + require decentralized management and greater flexibility. He may fear, + however, that a loosening of central control over the economy might spill into the social and + political arena. This he is clearly determined for now to avoid.

+

Ceausescu’s claim to pursue an + independent policy is well founded. In 1968, he publicly condemned the + Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia, thereby acquiring perhaps his + greatest measure of personal popularity at home. He chose to maintain + diplomatic relations with Israel after the 1967 war when even + Yugoslavia, following the Soviet lead and Arab pressure, broke them off. + And even more vigorously than Tito, Ceausescu + has pursued economic and political relations with most of the world’s + countries.

+

In substance, Ceausescu’s brand of + foreign policy is the same as Tito’s. Huddled across the Soviet Union’s land route to + the Eastern Mediterranean and the Adriatic, Romania and Yugoslavia are + each other’s most essential partners in foreign affairs. Both are + intermittently gripped by alternating fears of Yalta and the Cold War, + of U.S.-Soviet collusion and U.S.-Soviet collision.

+

Both countries therefore work for “participatory diplomacy” on a global + scale, for negotiations involving all states, great and small, in + peaceful settlement of disputes and especially in disarmament. They are + currently embarked, almost in tandem, on exchanges of high-level visits + with the U.S. and the PRC in recognition of the fact that the + post-Watergate and post-Mao period is over and that the preparation for + the post-Brezhnev period has + begun in earnest. Their anxiety about the direction the USSR might take after Brezhnev accounts for the special + efforts both have been making to shore up the bilateral and multilateral + framework of their independence in the European context.

+

At the very least, Ceausescu will + come to Washington seeking continuation of U.S. support for Romanian foreign policy independence, + sovereignty, and territorial integrity, which has been consistent + through three Administrations. He will also bring a heavily economic + agenda, partly because Romania sees economic ties as a way of anchoring + political ties.Brzezinski highlighted the previous two sentences in + the margin. However, his economic agenda also has a genuine + importance of its own in U.S.-Romanian + relations, especially given his drive to turn Romania into a more + modern, competitive economy. Ceausescu sees the U.S. + as an enormously promising Western trading partner, a rich source of + modern technology, agricultural products, industrial raw materials, as + well as advanced management techniques.

+

There is bound to be a gap between what Ceausescu wants and what we can give in the economic + realm. He will be pressing for credits at near-concessionary rates; + multi-year most-favored-nation tariff status (MFN); liberalization of U.S. export controls; and a stronger Administration push to U.S.-Romanian economic cooperation. We are + constrained in what we can do in all these areas, and we are bound by + law, as well as policy, to keep the mixed Romanian human rights record + in mind.

+

A full and candid review of major global issues, in a way that shows + Ceausescu that his country’s + positions and interests are important to us, will go a long way to + substitute for our inability to meet his economic desires. As much as + any other aspect of the visit, our treatment of the global agenda will + determine the health of the U.S.-Romanian relationship in the months and perhaps years to + come. Ceausescu sees his + relations with us in a global perspective. The quality of U.S. foreign policy leadership is a vital + component in his own struggle, hard on the Soviet border, to maintain + Romanian independence.

+ +

III. KEY ISSUES

+

1. Trade and Emigration

+ +

U.S. Objectives: + To encourage improved Romanian emigration performance while expanding + U.S.-Romanian trade.

+

Ceausescu’s + Objectives: To obtain most-favored-nation tariff status on a + long-term basis without annual Congressional hearings, and to obtain + renewal of the three-year trade agreement.

+

Essential Factors: Romania obtained + most-favored-nation tariff status (MFN) + and access to U.S. Government credits in + 1975 under the terms of the Jackson-Vanik Amendment, which links them to + emigration performance and provides for annual Congressional hearings. + Although emigration to the U.S. has + steadily improved, reaching about 1,250 last year, Romania discourages + emigration and has erected cumbersome bureaucratic procedures to deter + emigrants. A decline since 1976 in emigration to Israel has aroused + concern here.

+

Two-way trade totalled just under $500 million in 1977, slightly in our + favor, and continues to grow. Both sides have generally endorsed a goal + of $1 billion by 1980.Brzezinski highlighted the first + two sentences of this paragraph and wrote in the margin “2X/3 + yrs.” + Ceausescu will argue that to + reach this goal, we need the stability provided by MFN on a long-term basis. He may also seek + your commitment to renewal of the U.S.-Romanian Trade Agreement, which expires August 3. However, + Congress wishes to hold hearings in May or June on both MFN extension and trade agreement renewal. + For the latter, a formal Presidential determination is also required. + There is no prospect in the immediate future of changing the + Jackson-Vanik Amendment to grant Romania MFN on a long-term basis, although improved Romanian emigration performance might make + this possible in the future.

+

Points to be Made: (President should raise)

+

—Assure Ceausescu that the + Administration recognizes the importance of renewal of the trade + agreement, which is vital to continued expansion of our economic + relations.

+

—Urge continued improvement in emigration to the U.S. and express concern at the recent decline in + emigration to Israel, noting that the Administration and Congress are + interested in both. Our two governments must continue our dialogue on + these questions.

+

—Explain that while we understand the advantages of longer-term MFN status, we have concluded that it + would be unwise to propose legislative action to modify the Trade Act + this year. However, it may be possible in the future to work out a + solution to accord MFN status for a + longer period.Brzezinski highlighted each of the first three + points in the margin.

+

—Tell Ceausescu that prospects for + long-term MFN would be greatly improved + by better emigration performance, particularly to Israel.

+

2. Economic Relations

+

U.S. Objectives: + To reassure Ceausescu that we are + interested in continuing to expand economic relations with Romania + despite our inability to move ahead as quickly as the Romanians desire + in certain areas.Brzezinski underlined “expand + economic relations” in this paragraph.

+

Ceausescu’s + Objectives: To obtain a Presidential commitment that U.S. export controls will be relaxed; that + Romania may receive concessionary credits; and that the U.S. Government will take an active role in + establishing cooperative industrial projects between American firms and + Romanian enterprises.

+

Essential Factors: The U.S. has played an increasingly important role in Romania’s + attempt to reduce Soviet economic leverage on Romanian actions. Since + 1969 two-way trade has expanded by more than ten times from a meagre + base of about $40 million to almost $500 million last year.Brzezinski + wrote “10X/10 yrs” in the margin. Important stimulants to + this expansion were the granting of MFN + tariff status to Romanian exports on August 3, 1975 and Romania’s + inclusion in the U.S. scheme of + generalized tariff preferences (GSP) for developing countries, which has + allowed duty-free entry of many Romanian goods since January 1, + 1976.

+ +

a) Credits. Senior Romanian officials have + recently indicated that creation of a special American “financial + facility” for Romania will be one of Ceausescu’s major goals. They are seeking credits on + easier terms than those offered by either the Export-Import Bank or + Commodity Credit Corporation export credit programs, which have been + used extensively by the Romanians. The Romanians argue that as a + developing country—and one so recognized by both the World Bank and the + United States—they are entitled to receive “soft” loans. We have pointed + out that concessionary credits, such as PL–480 loans, are intended only + for the very poorest LDC’s and not for middle-level countries like + Romania with a per capita GNP of $1450 + (World Bank estimate). Furthermore, under current U.S. legislation Romania is not eligible + for PL–480 loans. (Although the communist-country restiction in the + Foreign Assistance Act can be waived by Presidential action, such a + waiver must be “vital to the security of the U.S.”)

+

Points to be Made (if Ceausescu raises):

+

—Express our interest in expanding trade with Romania, as demonstrated by + the active export credit programs conducted by Exim Bank and the Commodity Credit Corporation; express + hope that Minister of Machine Building Avram’s talks on April 11 with + Exim Chairman Moore and Ceausescu’s own discussions with Secretary Bergland will lead to even more + productive use of these programs.

+

—Although the United States has provided concessionary credits to the + poorest developing countries, Romania cannot be considered eligible in + light of its very impressive economic development.

+

—Recall that the provisions of U.S. law + and the Administration’s policy require us to review general questions + of human rights in considering specific credit applications.

+

b) Export Control. The Romanians complain that our + export controls are a significant barrier to expanded trade, + particularly in high-technology fields such as computers and + electronics. They are impatient with the delays and stringent conditions + on the export of equipment and technology desired for cooperation + projects with American firms, and in particular for an existing joint + venture with Control Data Corporation to manufacture computer + peripherals.

+

Points to be Made (if Ceausescu raises):

+

—We are treating Romania as liberally as possible within the restraints + required by our export control legislation and our security + interests.

+

—Acting Secretary of Commerce Harman, with whom Ceausescu will meet Wednesday + afternoon, will provide more information on the administration of our + export controls.

+

c) Cooperation Projects. The Romanians have sought + direct U.S. Government involvement in + establishing cooperation projects with U.S. + firms. Despite considerable + facilitative assistance by the Department of Commerce in locating + appropriate American partners, there have been few success stories. The + reasons for this include: asymmetry of economic systems; insufficient + information from the potential Romanian partner; Romanian toughness in + business negotiations; and, most importantly, skepticism by U.S. firms that the likely benefits warrant + the required investment of time, money and effort to put the deal + together. In an effort to wrap up some cooperation projects which could + be announced during the visit, the Romanian Minister of Machine Building + (Ioan Avram)Brzezinski underlined the Minister’s name. + and a host of other officials have been visiting U.S. firms for the past week.

+

Points to be Made (if Ceausescu raises):

+

—As part of our policy to forge even closer economic ties with Romania, + we wish to see U.S. firms engage in + mutually beneficial cooperative projects with Romanian enterprises.

+

—Our government will continue to facilitate contacts with U.S. companies wherever possible, but in + our system there are limits to what U.S. + officials can do. It will be up to the Romanian side to convince its + potential American partner that the proposed cooperation project is + truly of mutual benefit.

+

3. Middle East

+

President Ceausescu will look + forward to your assessment of the present situation, including the + prospects for Israeli-Egyptian negotiations and for dealing with the + Palestinian issue. He has recently been in touch with Dayan and others + and will want to give you his views.

+

4. US-Soviet Relations and + Detente

+

U.S. Objectives: + To give an overview of the present state of US-Soviet relations, + including SALT.

+

Ceausescu’s + Objectives: He will be interested in your assessment of the + present state of US-Soviet relations (including the prospects for SALT agreement) in the light of recent + developments. He will be concerned about a period of chill in US-Soviet + relations and the implications of this for Soviet policies in Eastern + Europe.

+

Essential Factors: Bucharest’s independent + policies—which Ceausescu has been + careful to keep within well-defined limits—are an irritant which Moscow + has learned to tolerate grudgingly, though not necessarily to accept as + a permanent or desirable state of affairs.

+ +

Points to be Made:

+

—Give Ceausescu our assessment of + progress toward a SALT agreement.Brzezinski underlined “SALT agreement.”

+

—Review some of the points of disagreement between us and the Soviets, + and express our particular concern at the Soviet and Cuban military + presence in Ethiopia.Brzezinski underlined “Soviet and + Cuban military presence in Ethiopia.”

+

—Make clear that in seeking good and stable relations with the Soviet + Union, we will not do so at the expense of the national interests of any + third country.

+

5. Global Human Rights

+

The Ceausescu visit affords you an + opportunity to explain our global human rights policy, including U.S. policies in the UN and other international + organizations.

+

Point to be Made:

+

—Discuss U.S. global human rights policy, + explaining that it represents an essential aspect of U.S. values and diplomacy and is not + designed to interfere in the internal affairs of other nations.

+

6. + CSCE

+

U.S. Objectives: + To maintain close US-Romanian cooperation on CSCE issues. In particular to encourage the Romanians to + improve their performance on human rights matters.

+

Ceausescu’s + Objectives: To cultivate U.S. + support for specific Romanian objectives in the CSCE process, in particular in the + military security and economic fields. Ceausescu is likely to raise the issue.

+

Essential Factors: The Romanians have + traditionally sought to use CSCE to + enhance all-European cooperation. Romania was disappointed at the + inconclusive results from the Belgrade meeting.The Belgrade meeting of the CSCE was the initial follow-up + meeting on the implementation of the 1975 Helsinki Accords. The + meeting began on October 4, 1977, and adjourned on March 8, + 1978. + Ceausescu will be seeking U.S. support for highly visible means of + demonstrating the continued vitality of the CSCE process. We have sought to work closely with the + Romanians on CSCE issues, on the + understanding that they give serious consideration to our human rights + concerns. This cooperation has worked to our advantage both in CSCE and on bilateral issues.

+ +

Points to be Made:

+

—Note our belief that the Belgrade meeting at least provided a firm basis + for continuation of the CSCE process. + Express satisfaction with the close cooperation between the U.S. and Romanian sides.

+

—Ask Ceausescu how he believes the + CSCE process should develop in the + period leading to the Madrid meeting.The + Madrid meeting of the CSCE was the + second follow-up meeting on the implementation of the Helsinki + Accords; it opened on November 11, 1980, and adjourned September 9, + 1983. Note the importance of patient and persistent effort + over the long term to ensure concrete results.

+

—Point out that human rights issues require further scrutiny by CSCE states. Express satisfaction that + Ceausescu has been willing to + discuss human rights matters frankly and urge further progress in + Romanian human rights practices, including specific emigration cases, + under Basket 3.

+

7. US-China Relations

+

U.S. Objectives: + To obtain Ceausescu’s insights + into recent developments in Chinese relations.

+

Essential Factors: Since the late 1960’s, China + has been an important part of Ceausescu’s international balancing act. Ceausescu plans to visit Peking in + mid-May, and Hua Kuo-feng, who has not left China since taking power, is + expected to visit Bucharest later this year. The Chinese understand the + delicate game Ceausescu must play + with the USSR and are likely to + moderate their attacks on the Soviets while Ceausescu is in Peking.

+

We will want to be forthcoming in giving our views on US–PRC relations but must assume that + anything we say on China may reach both the Chinese and the + Soviets.Brzezinski highlighted this paragraph in the + margin.

+

Points to be Made:

+

—Note Ceausescu’s valuable role in + helping the U.S. reestablish a dialogue + with Peking in 1970–1971 and that we will soon be visiting Peking again. + Express the hope that he will convey these points to the leadership in + Peking:

+

• You recognize the historic and strategic importance of our relations + with China. The goal of this Administration is normalization within the + framework of the Shangai Communique. (S)

+

• You agree with Premier Hua’s observation at the recently-concluded + National People’s Congress that the U.S. + and China share quite a few points in common in world affairs. You + believe it is important for us + to have authoritative discussions with the Chinese at the highest levels + in order to consult about these matters of mutual interest. (S)

+

• The current expanse of U.S.–PRC contacts in such fields as scientific + and technological exchanges, trade, and tourism helps create a favorable + environment for normalization. We hope to enhance these dimensions of + our relationship with China in the months ahead. (S)

+

• You seek an improvement in relations with China because it is in our + interest to do so. But, normalization is not directed against any Third + Country. We simply believe that China plays a positive role in + maintaining the global equilibrium, and we wish to consolidate our + relations with China to enhance the prospects of peace in Asia and + elsewhere. (S)

+

—What will be the agenda of Ceausescu’s discussions with the Chinese? (S)Brzezinski highlighted this paragraph in the + margin.

+

—Whom does he expect his interlocutors to be? (S)

+

—How does he view the future evolution of Chinese foreign policy? (S)

+

8. Korea (If asked)

+

U.S. Objectives: + To emphasize our desire for a reduction of tensions on the Korean + peninsula.

+

Ceausescu’s + Objectives: To pass on the views of North Korean leaders and to + obtain our views as to the prospects for a negotiated settlement of the + Korean issue.

+

Essential Factors: A high-level North Korean + official visited Bucharest last month, and there is a good possibility + that Kim Il-song has asked Ceausescu to carry a message to Washington. If that is + the case, Ceausescu may offer to + carry a reply back to Kim Il-song whom he will probably visit in May in + connection with his visit to the PRC.

+

Points to be Made:

+

—State our opposition to talks with North Korea in the absence of the + South, as Kim Il-song has urged for some time.

+

—Explain our view that a serious direct dialogue between North and South + Korea is necessary to bridge past hostilities and to move toward the + eventual goal of reunification.

+

—Note that those countries like Romania which wish to encourage a + reduction of tensions on the peninsula can contribute by developing + contacts of their own with both Koreas. (Romania currently shuns all + diplomatic and commercial contact with South Korea.)

+ +

9. North/South Economic + Issues

+

U.S. + Objectives: To assure President Ceausescu that the U.S. welcomes a continuation of a positive + North/South dialogue and to urge a constructive Romanian role.

+

Ceausescu’s Objectives: To convince the U.S. of the need for establishment of the New International + Economic Order espoused by the “Group of 77”; to persuade the U.S. to be more forthcoming on the G–77’s + proposals which they believe would promote the development of the LDC’s + like Romania; and to convince us that Romania is playing a moderating + role in the G–77.

+

Essential Factors: Romania is the only Soviet Bloc + country that is a member of the G–77.Brzezinski underlined + “only Soviet bloc country” and “the G–77” in this paragraph. + By strengthening Romania’s ties to the developing countries through + active participation in the Group of 77, Ceausescu has sought to limit his country’s dependence + on the Soviet Union and CEMA, and to + balance its relationship with the West. Romania was an early proponent + of the New International Economic Order. It has supported G–77 demands + that the developed countries—East and West—make + concessions to the developing countries. Romania, however, has not + played a leadership role in the G–77 generally or in meetings on + specific issues.

+

Points to be Made:

+

—Assure Ceausescu that the U.S. continues to be willing to discuss any + issue of the N/S dialogue so long as negotiations + on specific issues are confined to specialized forums relatively free of + political debate.

+

—The U.S. looks forward to the ECE + regional meeting of the UN Conference on + Science and Technology for development in Bucharest this June and the + World Conference on this subject in Vienna in 1979. We hope, however, + that they will not result in the creation of new international bodies + but will utilize existing UN + institutions for any proposed program of action.

+

—Express U.S. views on the appropriate + role of the UN General Assembly’s + “Overview Committee.”

+

—(If raised by Ceausescu.) Explain + the U.S. position on resumption of + negotiations on a Common Fund.

+

10. + UN Special Session on Disarmament + (SSOD)

+

U.S. Objectives: + To assure Romania that we regard the UN + role in disarmament as important, and to note our belief that SSOD objectives should be reached by + consensus agreement.

+ +

Ceausescu’s + Objectives: To express his support for the UN as a disarmament forum. He will probably + raise this issue and may ask if you plan to attend the SSOD.

+

Essential Factors: Representatives of the U.S. and Romania met in Washington in + mid-March to discuss preparations for the SSOD scheduled for May 23–June 28, 1978. The Romanian + delegation pressed for a larger role for non-nuclear states (e.g., + Romania) in disarmament discussions and hoped that the SSOD would give the UN a more active role in disarmament. We + agreed there could be improvements in multilateral disarmament + mechanisms but argued that there must be a continuing and experienced + disarmament negotiating body, and that disarmament agreements must be + based on consensus. Substantively, the U.S. is actively engaged in reviewing policy issues for the + SSOD.

+

Points to be Made:

+

—The recent US-Romanian talks on the SSOD were candid, and fruitful for the U.S. Despite some difference in the views + of our two countries, it is very important to achieve consensus agreement on the final documents produced in the + SSOD.

+

—(If asked): The U.S. has adopted a + strong and positive approach to the Special Session. We hope the meeting + will generate broad agreement on principles and priorities, and thus + give an impetus to progress on disarmament issues of pressing concern. + We are conducting an extensive review of a broad range of disarmament + issues for the SSOD.

+

11. Africa

+

Particularly in view of your recent visits to Nigeria and Liberia, + Ceausescu will want to hear + your views of developments on the continent, especially on movement + toward majority rule in Southern Africa and toward the peaceful + settlement of the Ethiopia-Somalia dispute.

+

12. Hungarian Minority in + Romania

+

Recently, 66 members of the Congress wrote you a letter expressing their + concern about Romanian treatment of the Hungarian minority and + requesting that you raise the issue with Ceausescu.Brzezinski highlighted this + sentence in the margin. See Document + 196. We have received an indication that Ceausescu may raise it himself because + of his fear of Hungarian irredentist aspirations and will seek to + explain Romanian policy toward minorities.

+

Points to be Made: (If Ceausescu raises)

+

—Express your satisfaction that the issue has come up and appreciation + for Ceausescu’s explanation.

+ +

—Note the concern felt in the United States on this subject, in the + Administration, Congress and the Hungarian-American community. Point out + our readiness to engage in a frank dialogue on this and any other human + rights issues.

+

—Stress U.S. support for Romania’s + independence and territorial integrity.

+
+ +
+ 199. Memorandum From the Ambassador at Large (Goldberg) to President CarterSource: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, + Brzezinski Material, VIP + Visit File, Box 12, Romania, President Ceausescu, 4/12–13/78: Cables and Memos, 4/11–22/78. + No classification marking. In an April 10 covering memorandum + forwarding the Goldberg + memorandum to Brzezinski, + King noted that Joyce + Starr, the NSC Staff member who + handled human rights questions for White House Counsel Robert + Lipschutz had requested the memorandum, since the Department of + State’s HA bureau was dissatisfied with the coverage of human rights + issues in Vance’s briefing + memorandum. King explained: + “Starr was asked by HA to ask Goldberg for such a memo to circumvent the State + Department consensus.” King + recommended against forwarding the memorandum to Carter; Inderfurth concurred, adding + “particularly since you are forwarding the Rauta memo.” Brzezinski disapproved King’s recommendation. + (Ibid.) + + + Washington, undated + + + SUBJECT + Visit of Romanian President Ceausescu + +

This memorandum, requested by the White House, is designed as a talking + paper, relating to CSCE and the + Belgrade meeting, to supplement the memorandum submitted by the + Secretary of State to the President.See + Document 198. On April 11, Vance sent a separate memorandum + to the President specifically on human rights. The memorandum, + summarizing the decisions made by Christopher on April 8 (see Document 196), briefed the President on the Hungarian + minority issue in Romania, the Rauta case, and the Romanian loans + from the World Bank. Vance + suggested that he raise these issues directly with Andrei, and that Carter tell + Ceausescu he had asked + Vance to do so. (Carter + Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, VIP Visit File, Box 12, + Romania, President Ceausescu, + 4/12–13/78: Cables and Memos, 4/11–22/78)

+

I. HUMAN RIGHTS

+

The Romanians at Belgrade were notably silent about the subject of human + rights and fundamental freedoms (Principle VII of the Final Act). This + is scarcely surprising in light of the fact that, although they pursue a somewhat independent + foreign policy, they are most repressive at home. Their lack of respect + for human rights and fundamental freedoms follows a Stalinist + pattern.

+

Although acknowledging Romania’s independent stand on some foreign policy + issues, I, nevertheless, pointed out aspects of Romania’s shortcomings + with respect to human rights in the course of one of my interventions at + the Belgrade meeting. It is interesting that the Romanians did not reply + to this criticism. But it is also interesting to note that at no point + did they attempt to defend the manifold shortcomings of the Soviet Union + in the human rights area.

+

II. HUMAN CONTACTS & + HUMANITARIAN PROVISIONS

+

With respect to the humanitarian provisions of the Final Act (Basket + III), Romania has a mixed record of compliance.

+

The Romanians have permitted substantial emigration (several hundred + thousands) of Jews from Romania since World War II. However, during the + period of April 1977 to March 1978, emigrants declined 14% from the + comparable period of the preceeding year (1559–1345). There are only + 50,000 Jews remaining in Romania and the government says those still + there are largely old, infirm and unwilling to leave. Jewish sources say + that the decline is due to formidable bureaucratic obstacles making it + extremely difficult for Jews and, for that matter, anyone else to + emigrate.

+

The Chief Rabbi of Romania, Rabbi + Rosen, asserts that Romanian Jews are permitted a + reasonable degree of freedom to exercise their religious beliefs. + Without in any way denigrating Rabbi + Rosen, a distinguished clergyman and fine humanitarian, + there is substantial evidence to the contrary. The great exodus of Jews + proves that there was and is no future for them in Romania. Moreover, + Baptists have provided convincing documentation of religious persecution + of a sweeping character, and the same is true of other Christian + denominations.

+

A substantial Hungarian minority group likewise has publicized through + Western media large-scale ethnic repression. The principal source for + this information is surprisingly a prominent leader of the Romanian + Communist Party, albeit of Hungarian origin.

+

Romania has the highest unsettled number of binational marriage cases + with the U.S. of any country in Eastern + Europe, even though there has been some reduction in those outstanding + during 1977 as contrasted with 1976 (71 to 54). Settlement of family + reunification cases with the United States has improved somewhat in the + last year (21% increase over 1976), but Romanian procedures on + emigration cases generally have not improved as a result of CSCE.

+

I would believe it entirely appropriate that the President raise these + human rights issues with President Ceausescu, both on the merits and in light of Romania’s + professions of fidelity to the Helsinki Final Act.

+ +

III. CBMs

+

As did many of the smaller nations at CSCE, the Romanians saw in confidence building measures a + means of enhancing their own security vis-a-vis the larger powers + surrounding them, particularly the Soviet Union. The Romanians tabled a + CBMs resolution which included proposals for notification of major + military movements, air and naval maneuvers, banning of multinational + maneuvers near borders, and banning the establishment of new nuclear + sites. The Romanians noted to us in general terms that they were putting + forward many CSCE ideas as trial + balloons.

+

They recognized that some of their proposals were the subject of + negotiation in other fora, the U.N. Special Session on Disarmament, the + Geneva and Vienna negotiations, SALT, + etc. However, the Soviet refusal after the New Year to discuss security + issues other than in their proposed “special joint consultations” which + commanded no support, made any discussion academic. The Romanians have + made it clear that the Soviets, and not the Allies, are to blame for any + lack of progress in the CBMs field. They also viewed the Allied CBMs + resolution, which emphasized improvement of the Helsinki CBMs, as + evidence of an Alliance commitment to moving forward in a realistic + fashion.

+

If President Ceausescu raises + CBMs, the President might assure him of our continuing commitment to + CBMs for the next CSCE Conference. I + would caution, however, that the Romanians were in favor of a + post-Belgrade CBMs working group. We viewed that possibility unfavorably + as it would have institutionalized CSCE between the conferences in a field where the Soviets + would have made proposals useful only for the propaganda value to + them.

+

Further, our NATO Allies were also cool + to the Romanian proposal. To include provision for such a working group + without equivalent substance in other important areas, such as human + rights, would produce a seriously unbalanced document. The U.S. pointed out that since no agreement in + principle had been achieved on any of the substantive security measures + discussed in Belgrade, there was no basis for work by experts on CBM + matters. It also warned that parcelling out work to experts groups where + substantive argument was stymied could threaten the coherence of the + CSCE process. In any event, as I + have mentioned, the Soviets denied consensus to the Romanian and similar + proposals offered by the Yugoslavs, Sweden and others.

+

IV. FOLLOW-UP

+

The Romanians argued vigorously for a firm commitment to ensure + perpetuity for the CSCE process + (periodicity). Again, the Soviets denied consensus. We were able to + negotiate a satisfactory compromise incorporated in the concluding + document. The next Belgrade-type meeting will take place in Madrid in 1980. Also, the + concluding document calls for further meetings thereafter and reaffirms + a unanimous commitment to the CSCE + process. The language would seem to meet Romanian concerns about + periodicity.

+
+ +
+ 200. Memorandum of ConversationSource: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, + Brzezinski Material, + Subject File, Box 36, Memcons: + President: 4/78. Secret. The meeting took place in the White House + Cabinet Room. + + + Washington, April 12, 1978, 11:15 a.m.–12:45 + p.m. + + + SUBJECT + Summary of the President’s First Meeting with President Nicolae Ceausescu of Romania + + + PARTICIPANTS + President Jimmy + Carter + Cyrus Vance, Secretary of + State + Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski, + Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs + O. Rudolph Aggrey, + Ambassador to Romania + George S. Vest, Assistant + Secretary of State + Jerrold Schecter, NSC Staff Member + Robert R. King, NSC Staff Member + Mrs. Huffman, Interpreter + President of Romania, Nicolae + Ceausescu + First Deputy Prime Minister, Gheorghe Oprea + Foreign Minister, Stefan + Andrei + Presidential Counselor, Vasile Pungan + Minister of Machine Building Industry, Ion Avram + Ambassador to the United States, Nicolae M. Nicolae + Interpreter, Mr. Celac + Notetaker, Mr. Mateescu + +

The President welcomed President Ceausescu and suggested discussing + international issues first and bilateral issues during the second + meeting.

+

President Ceausescu expressed pleasure with the visit and + hoped that the talks would contribute to better relations between the + two countries. He invited President Carter to visit Romania.

+ +

The Middle East

+

The President suggested that the Middle East be + discussed first since Israeli Foreign Minister Dayan had just visited + Bucharest and both countries follow complementary policies on this + issue. He mentioned that Romania played an important role in bringing + about the Sadat visit to Jerusalem,See Document 183. On February 4, 1978, while + describing his meeting with Egyptian President Anwar al-Sadat, + Carter wrote in his diary: “Sadat described the sequence of events + since our last April meeting. He said he asked [President Nicolae] Ceausescu of Romania if Begin was + for a genuine peace, and if he was strong enough to implement one. + Ceausescu thought the + answer to both questions was yes.” (Carter, White + House Diary, p. 169. Brackets are in the original.) + William Quandt, the + National Security Council Staff member directly involved in the + Middle East peace process, also recounted in his memoirs Ceausescu’s role in assuring Sadat + that Begin would “negotiate in good faith with Egypt.” (Quandt, Camp + David, p. 144) but since that visit the process has + stalled and there is a need to restore momentum.

+

The President said that there has been some + progress in influencing the views of Prime Minister Begin, but he is + still not willing to accept that Resolution 242 applies to the West Bank + and Gaza. It is our view that any Israeli settlements in these areas are + contrary to international law. Begin was asked to permit no settlements, + but he was not willing to accept this view. There is still a possibility + for progress, but it will be difficult. We will appreciate any help + President Ceausescu can offer in + the weeks ahead. We have benefitted from the information and assessments + he has given and we welcome the Romanian views on how we should + proceed.

+

President Ceausescu also emphasized the importance of the + Middle East situation, approved the US role in the Sadat initiative, and + agreed that Israel has not fully responded. Begin’s interpretation of + Resolution 242 is not accepted even by some political figures in Israel, + a number of whom Ceausescu has + recently met.

+

At present, the first step must be to secure the speedy withdrawal of + Israeli troops from Lebanon in order to prevent further hostilities and + create conditions for direct Israeli-Egyptian talks to resume. Ceausescu told this to Dayan, but the + US should do more to encourage proper Israeli action. Although he is + personally opposed to the use of pressure, in this case it is not + detrimental and should be used.

+

The next step is for Israel and Egypt to work out a declaration of + principles. The Egyptian proposals are generally acceptable to Israel, + but agreement on formulations must be worked out. The US should + encourage both sides in this regard.

+

The Palestinian issue is perhaps the major obstacle to a settlement, and + progress must be made before the talks can be widened to include Syria and Jordan. The + Palestinians must be given an opportunity to determine their fate. The + Begin proposals on this issue are far from acceptable.

+

Also related is the problem of the PLO. The Palestinians must be + represented in the negotiating process, and the PLO is the only + organization which can speak for the Palestinians. The Romanian + President said that Dayan was not unyielding on recognizing the PLO. + Just before leaving Romania a representative of the PLO told Ceausescu of the organization’s wish + for direct talks with the US. Ceausescu feels that the PLO is following a policy that + will permit recognition of Israel’s right to exist.

+

The present framework of the Egyptian-Israeli talks do not permit the + participation of Syria, Jordan, and the Palestinians, thus it would be + useful to consider convening a Geneva conference to permit wider + participation, including that of the USSR. Both Begin and Dayan have indicated a willingness to + consider that possibility.

+

The President said that there were certain + differences of view with the Romanian assessment. The US does not + support complete Israeli withdrawal since some border modification would + be useful, and we do not favor an independent Palestinian state. The US + has long sought to convince the PLO to renounce its committment to the + destruction of Israel and accept UN + Resolution 242, but we have found no evidence that the PLO is willing to + modify its position.

+

Israel has put forward proposals on the West Bank that are inadequate. + The next step is for Egypt to make a counter-proposal in order to + determine precisely where differences exist. We also feel that + formulations can be found to bridge the differences over the statement + of principles. We wish to encourage progress, but our influence over + Israel is overestimated.

+

The President asked Secretary Vance to comment on these + issues. The Secretary said that our experience has been that the + Israelis are much more rigid on the PLO question than Ceausescu indicated—Begin in + particular, but also Dayan. We fully agree that a way must be found to + widen the circle to include other states in direct negotiations in order + to achieve a comprehensive settlement. Agreement on a set of general + principles would be a first step in this direction.

+

The President said that US and Romanian goals in + the Middle East are the same—peace and Israeli withdrawal. We are not + discouraged since there is greater evidence of progress today than a + year ago.

+

President Ceausescu reiterated his concern that a way be + found for the PLO to participate in the negotiating process. He also + repeated the assurances of PLO willingness to talk with the US.

+ +

US-Soviet Relations

+

The President then reviewed US relations with the + Soviet Union, noting progress has been made. He expressed the hope that + Secretary Vance’s visit to + Moscow this month and Foreign Minister Gromyko’s later visit to Washington will lead to a + summit meeting with Mr. Brezhnev. + Many past differences have been resolved in the SALT talks but others remain, which we + hope can be dealt with soon. In addition, progress has been made on + agreements to ban the testing of all nuclear devices, limit the buildup + of military forces in the Indian Ocean, prevent the destruction of each + other’s satellites, and control conventional arms sales. The Soviets + have negotiated in good faith, and we are pleased with the progress thus + far.

+

One important problem in US-Soviet relations is the Soviet intrusion into + Angola and Ethiopia by means of Cuban soldiers. Soviet actions in Africa + have roused suspicion of Soviet intentions, thus difficulties in the + minds of Congress and the American People. We hope the USSR will not become involved in Eritrea, + but we will not permit these differences to interfere with the SALT negotiations.

+

We look forward to Brezhnev’s + visit here. No date has been set thus far since the Soviet leader + probably wants to be certain that an agreement will be ready for + signature. We hope this will not be delayed.

+

President Ceausescu said that he welcomed progress toward + the solution of problems between the US and the USSR, and the conclusion of a SALT agreement will have a favorable + influence on international affairs. Other problems remain, however, + which cannot be solved by the superpowers alone. Relations between the + US and the USSR must not be achieved + at the expense of other states, large or small.

+

Problems in the area of nuclear weapons, and in conventional weapons as + well, are not a matter for the US and USSR alone, though they have the largest arms stockpiles. + Other countries and groups of countries (including the People’s Republic + of China) are also increasing their weapons and must therefore play a + greater role in disarmament.

+

The President expressed the desire to discuss + China, preparations for the Madrid meeting, the Korean question and the + Pacific at subsequent meetings. He appreciated the discussions. Copies + of the President’s book Why Not the Best and a + book of satellite photographs were given to President Ceausescu, who expressed thanks.

+
+ +
+ 201. Memorandum of ConversationSource: Department of State, Office of the Secretariat + Staff, Cyrus R. Vance, + Secretary of State—1977–1980, Lot 84D241, Box 10, Vance + EXDIS + MemCons, 1978. Confidential; + Exdis. Drafted by Luers; approved in S/S on April 19. The meeting took place + in the Madison Room at the Department of State. + + + Washington, April 12, 1978, 1 p.m. + + + SUBJECT + Lunch with President of Romania + + + PARTICIPANTS + Cyrus R. Vance, Secretary + of State + Zbigniew Brzezinski, + National Security Adviser + + Nicolae Ceausescu, + President of Romania + +

SUMMARY. During lunch Secretary Vance and Dr. Brzezinski discussed with President Ceausescu the status of the North-South + dialogue and how most effectively to include the socialist countries, + particularly the Soviet Union, in that dialogue; the future leadership + of the Soviet Union and U.S. relations + with China. In the latter discussion President Ceausescu urged early normalization and + indicated that China would play a much more important role in world + affairs. Secretary Vance and Dr. + Brzezinski explained the + domestic situation and the need for pursuing priorities in U.S. foreign policy. END SUMMARY.

+

Secretary Vance asked President + Ceausescu his views on how to + proceed on the North-South dialogue. Ceausescu said that the current situation does not hold + much hope, that developing countries need to play a larger role and the + socialist countries in particular should be more deeply involved. + Secretary Vance agreed. + Ceausescu said that + developing countries are not playing a sufficient role. He knows because + Romania is a developing country. He said that the United Nations + mechanism is good for discussion of North-South issues but needs + improvement. If we wish to overcome the present economic crisis it is + necessary that all countries work actively to improve not only their + production capacity but their satisfaction of consumer needs. Secretary + Vance observed that the most + pressing item in the North-South agenda is the establishment of the + Common Fund because of its symbolic and its substantive nature.

+

The Secretary then asked what the President would recommend as ways of + achieving greater participation from the socialist countries in the + North-South dialogue. President Ceausescu said that the socialist countries, + particularly the Soviet Union, have underestimated the problems of the developing countries. + Romania has had many debates with the Soviets on this point. The Soviets + see it as a heritage of colonialism and not a problem of development. + There is some validity to the Soviet position but it is his view that + the Soviet Union will eventually play a more active role on the + North-South problems. Secretary Vance asked how this could be achieved. Ceausescu replied that when these + matters are discussed by the United Nations it is a helpful way to + involve the Soviets and socialist countries. Secondly, when the + developing countries play a more substantial role in the development of + concrete programs and initiatives, the socialist countries will be put + in a situation in which they must respond.

+

Secretary Vance said that he + thought that the United Nations should be used to stimulate socialist + country participation and he thought perhaps the capital “Overview + Committee”On December 19, 1977, the + UN General Assembly passed + Resolution 32/174 establishing a Committee of the Whole—the + “Overview Committee”—with the mandate to look at the world economic + situation as a whole, and to review and encourage progress being + made elsewhere in the North-South dialogue. would be a good + vehicle. He believed that if the developing countries were to press the + Soviets and other socialist countries into a more constructive role, it + would be more acceptable to the Soviets than if the United States were + to do so, since the Soviets could consider our efforts a source of + confrontation.

+

Ceausescu replied that the + developing countries want to keep the issue in the United Nations and it + would be desirable for the developed countries to support developing + countries’ initiatives. The developing countries need help from the + developed countries, particularly in modern technologies but they need + also to work more effectively among themselves. Ceausescu then said the United States + for its part will have to look to world needs. General Motors, for + example, can no longer expand production for American consumers but must + project its technical and production capacity to finance world + needs.

+

Soviet Leadership—Dr. Brzezinski then asked the President for his estimate of + the younger leaders around Brezhnev and what policies they might follow. Ceausescu replied in gest that he did + not see many young people around Brezhnev. Then he added, more seriously, that there are + some relatively younger people who will have to play a role but it was + difficult to talk about individuals. Dr. Brzezinski asked the President who had struck him as + particularly effective in the second rank in the Soviet leadership. + President Ceausescu repeated that + it was hard for him to talk about individuals. He asked, rhetorically, + who could have predicted five years ago that Hua would become the leader + of China. Dr. Brzezinski said, + of course, no one can predict but the question is will the next leadership in the USSR look to widening cooperation with + the West or will it become more nationalistic and expansionist. This is + a very important question that does not relate just to personalities. + President Ceausescu expressed his + conviction that the general trend in the world is toward cooperation and + toward raising living standards. No leadership, he added, can ignore the + aspirations of the large masses of its people to satisfy their + needs.

+

China—Secretary Vance asked whether the President believed China was + prepared to play a more constructive role in the world. He said the + Chinese had told him when he was visiting there that they would have to + be very sparing in their role in Third World development. President + Ceausescu replied that one + should realize that China has its own problems. It is one third of the + world and has limited capacity to help those beyond its borders. Yet, he + added, China will play an increasingly important role in world + affairs.

+

Secretary Vance agreed saying + that he hopes they will also play a more active role in the United + Nations where they have at times appeared to withdraw from debates. Dr. + Brzezinski said that the + Chinese have displayed in their history periods of withdrawal and + rejection of the world and other periods of projection and deep + involvement. Hua’s recent speech implies a broadly gauged ambition to a + development program based on technological development which suggests a + much greater and a long-term Chinese involvement in the world.

+

Ceausescu replied that China’s + present plans will lead it to become a very powerful country. As to + Chinese reservations expressed in the U.N., the United States must + realize that the Chinese cannot accept a certain degree of “dictat” + within that body. Also it is not by chance that Chinese recently signed + an agreement with the European Community to insure an adequate flow of + modern technology since it was unable to get the assurances from other + quarters. On that note, President Ceausescu urged that the United States move toward + complete normalization of relations with China.

+

Secretary Vance said that + President Carter and the United + States are committed to complete normalization of relations with China + on the basis of the Shanghai communique. Ceausescu said that a long time has elapsed since that + communique. Secretary Vance + agreed. He said that action must be taken in the not too distant future + but the timing must take into consideration the other pressing matters + currently on our platter in foreign relations. Ceausescu said that the decisive role + in normalization rests with the United States and some of these problems + should not be solved at the expense of others.

+

Secretary Vance said that the + first item on our agenda is Panama, both because of our relations with + Panama and because of our relations with the entire developing world. + Ceausescu replied that he + thought the treaty was very + important but it should not prevent the United States from tackling + important problems such as those of the Far East and China. In fact, + approaching these together would be complementary.

+

Secretary Vance agreed but said + the United States has many things before it such as the numerous + problems of Southern Africa, SALT + negotiations with the Soviet Union and the whole situation of economic + issues including the multilateral trade negotiations. He said one of the + criticisms of the President is that we are trying to do too many things + at once. President Ceausescu said + he had no intention of entering into a criticism of the United States + domestic affairs. Dr. Brzezinski + replied that a unique form of American hospitality is to invite + criticism.

+

Dr. Brzezinski then said that in + relation to China, Soviet relations with China are good in form and bad + in substance, while U.S. relations with + China are good in substance and bad in form. Dr. Brzezinski said that he prefers the + United States’ approach to relations with China. Ceausescu said that this may be true + but it should not stop the U.S. from + solving problems. He cited a well known Romanian proverb (sic!) that + “one should never put off for tomorrow what one can do today”. He added + that the favorable conditions of today can also be lost tomorrow. Dr. + Brzezinski said that + normalization with China in of itself is not enough but we must seek a + wide communality of interests which are more important and which we are + at the present time trying to establish. Ceausescu replied that there is already an area of + common interest. Dr. Brezezinski replied that there was indeed such an + area and it is the same common interest that we have with Romania. + Ceausescu repeated that these + problems should not impede normalization with China.

+

Dr. Brzezinski said that the + problem is fundamentally domestic. Elements particularly in the + Republican Party are worried about any decisions affecting the future of + Taiwan. President Ceausescu said + that the Republican Party could hardly be blamed for the present + situation with regard to our relations with China. He said Americans + will not oppose but most surely support a policy directed toward wider + cooperation with China. He speculated that, for the Democratic Party, + normalization of relations with China would in the long run be positive + not negative. Secretary Vance + said he agreed. Dr. Brzezinski + said he agreed also as long as we get Panama, SALT and the energy program out of the way first. Secretary + Vance stressed that + normalization does not have to be put off indefinitely.

+

Concluding Toasts—Secretary Vance said that he was deeply honored + to have President Ceausescu in + the Department of State again. He looked forward to meeting with the + Foreign Minister and other ministers.Vance met with Foreign Minister + Stefan Andrei following + the lunch with Ceausescu. See + Document 202 and footnote 2 + thereto. A summary of the meeting was sent to the President in his + Evening Reading on April 12. (Telegram Tosec 40003/94668 to Bucharest, April 13; National + Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign + Policy File, P840163–0169) He said that President Ceausescu had commented that our + relations have made good progress and that we should now work on broader + issues to seek wider cooperation. Secretary Vance agreed with this and said we will continue to + benefit greatly from President Ceausescu’s advice and leadership. He looked forward to + working with President Ceausescu + in the months and years ahead.

+

President Ceausescu replied that + he was pleased to be for the third time having lunch in this same room + in the Department of State and to be here at this time with Secretary + Vance. He welcomed the + opportunity to exchange with Secretary Vance views on some critical matters. President + Ceausescu said that Romania + attached particular importance to its relations with the United States + and will do everything within its power to move forward on the basis of + the principles which he has enunciated. He said events of the past year + have included some complex problems and these call for even broader + cooperation by large and small countries alike and that the middle and + small size nations have an important role to play. He said that he hoped + that relations, already well expanded with the United States, could + develop further and he hoped that Secretary Vance, Dr. Brzezinski and their colleagues would collaborate to + achieving this end. He expressed his thanks to Secretary Vance for making him and his + colleagues feel at home and called for good cooperation.

+
+ +
+ 202. Memorandum From Robert + King of the National Security Council Staff to the + President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)Source: Carter Library, National + Security Affairs, Brzezinski + Material, Country File, Box 66, Romania: 1/77–5/78. + Confidential. + + + Washington, April 12, + 1978 + + + SUBJECT + Bilateral Meetings with Romanian Officials Today + +

At the Vance/Andrei + meeting today,The memorandum of + conversation was sent to Bucharest on April 18 in telegram 98602. + (National Archives, RG 59, Bureau of + Intelligence and Research, Office of Analysis for the Commonwealth + and Eastern Europe, Office Subject Files, 1965–1980, Lot 92D412, Box + 2, Romania—Ceausescu + Visit) the following issues were raised:

+

1. MFN—Andrei expressed concern about annual + renewal of the Jackson-Vanik waver. Vance said that no change in the Trade Act is possible + this year, but revisions may be possible later.

+

2. Emigration—Romania’s record on emigration to + the US and to Israel was discussed at considerable length, with + Vance emphasizing the link + with MFN. Andrei responded with enthusiasm (the only case of + animation that I saw today) in explaining Romania’s policy. The major + problem was Jewish emigration, and Andrei reaffirmed his country’s willingness to deal with + the issue constructively. The discussion of emigration took up a third + to half of the Vance-Andrei meeting. The issue was + thoroughly discussed and more treatment of it is unnecessary. A list of + outstanding cases of emigration to the US was given Andrei.

+

3. Export Controls—Andrei expressed concern that licensing agreements + require long periods for approval and are frequently turned down. + Vance agreed to expedite the + issuing of decisions.

+

4. Credits—the Romanians expressed appreciation + for our willingness to make available larger credits through the Ex-Im + Bank, but expressed interest in concessionary terms. Vance indicated that we could not + grant such credits because of Romania’s advanced level of development, + but he agreed to look into the possibility of such credits.

+

5. The Rauta Case—Vance met privately with Andrei following the general meeting. His intention was + to raise the Rauta case, and I assume it was discussed. He did not plan to raise other + issues. I hope to confirm tonight that Rauta was raised.No substantive record of the conversation between + Vance and Andrei on the Rauta issue was + found. Telegram 96030 to Bucharest, April 14, confirms that a + private meeting took place and that “the subject, according to a + note from the Secretary to Assistant Secretary Vest, was the Rauta case.” + (National Archives, RG 59, Central + Foreign Policy File, D780161–0599) In a memorandum to Derian for her April 12 + participation in the Vance-Andrei + meeting, Clifford Brody + reported that “King, + consistent with his view that the Rauta affair not figure in the + visit at all, asked me to ask you not to raise the case in the + meeting.” He continued that “King has not been helpful in transmitting our + concerns till now” and that “everyone feels + Vance does not know + the Rauta details well-enough to advocate its solution + effectively.” (National Archives, RG 59, Bureau of Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs, + Chron and Official Records of the Assistant Secretary for Human + Rights and Humanitarian Affairs, Lot 85D366, Box 3, + Romania)

+

The meetings with Ceausescu (Blumenthal, Bergland and Sid Harmon of Commerce) were largely + uneventful. Bergland did a good + job of explaining our global policy on agriculture but Ceausescu indicated his interest in + self-sufficiency and importing US agricultural technology rather than + products. Blumenthal’s meeting + was a non-event. Harmon expressed the desire for increased trade and + cooperation and was apologetic for our export controls and inability to + grant multi-year MFN.

+

Bilateral issues that should be raised tomorrow. + The major issue that has not come up yet is our global policy on human rights. The President should raise this, + although the emigration issue has been covered and further discussion of + it is unnecessary.President Carter raised + the issue of emigration briefly in his private meeting with + President Ceausescu. See Document 203.

+
+ +
+ 203. Memorandum of ConversationSource: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, + Brzezinski Material, + Subject File, Box 36, Memcons: + President: 4/78. Secret. The meeting took place in the Oval Office. + Brzezinski forwarded the + memorandum of conversation to Vance on April 18. (Department of State, Office of + the Secretariat Staff, Cyrus R. + Vance, Secretary of State—1977–1980, Lot 84D241, Box + 9, Vance + Nodis + MemCons, 1978) + + + Washington, April 13, 1978, 10:30–11:30 + a.m. + + + SUBJECT + Summary of the President’s Private Meeting with President + Nicolae Ceausescu of + Romania + + + PARTICIPANTS + President Jimmy + Carter + + President of Romania, Nicolae + Ceausescu + Mr. Celac, Interpreter + +

(Note: This summary is based on the Romanian notes. The President’s + remarks were translated into Romanian and then translated back into + English.)

+

The President said he would like to have a few + minutes to talk privately on any matters that President Ceausescu would like to raise. + Relations between our countries are very good and we have established + good rapport personally. Before the larger talks, it might be useful to + exchange views on matters of special interest.

+

President Ceausescu reiterated his appreciation for the + progress in relations between the two countries and expressed + satisfaction with the visit and talks thus far. He agreed that a good + personal relationship has been established and expressed the hope that + it will continue. He noted that the two have communicated previously + through special channels and he felt that it would be useful to continue + such contacts in addition to those through the two embassies when + problems arise in the future.

+

The President agreed, suggesting that they might + exchange personal letters without waiting for a crisis or special + problems.

+

MFN and + Emigration

+

President Ceausescu agreed. He mentioned his meeting that + morning with a group of US Senators at which the question of MFN was raised. They came to the + conclusion that some improvements could be made in the process by which + annual renewal of MFN is handled which + would not require that the matter be raised before Congress each year. A + more permanent solution can possibly be worked out later.

+ +

The President said that this problem was also of + concern to him, but change in legislation would be necessary in order to + extend MFN for more than one year. This + law was directed particularly against Soviet restrictions on Jewish + emigration. (He noted that in the past 4 or 5 months emigration of Jews + from the USSR was double the figure + for the previous period.) Since the law was not directed against Romania + he hoped that Congress would be forthcoming in granting a new annual + extention for Romania. It would be better to do this on a longer-term + basis. There will be no problem of continuing MFN for Romania under existing legislation, however, if the + Congress and I feel that the human rights situation in Romania gives no + cause for concern. We have no intention to interfere in Romania’s + internal affairs, but we recognize that there is a strong interest in + this country in family reunification and Jewish emigration which applies + to countries seeking MFN. He asked + President Ceausescu to inform him + if this created particular difficulties.

+

President Ceausescu said that in practical terms there is + no problem with Jews leaving Romania. There are close contacts with the + Israeli government and it no longer considers this to be a problem. One + cannot speak of a “family reunification” problem since the war has been + over for some time and few cases exist of families separated by war. The + question is more one of mixed marriages, and such cases generally + receive favorable resolution. The wishes of the parents and other + factors occasionally make it impossible to grant permission, however. + Perhaps an interim solution to the MFN + problem would be to have committee discussion but avoid debates in the + plenary sessions of Congress. It appears that the sponsor of the + Jackson-Vanik Amendment is also thinking along this line.Vanik met with Ceausescu during his one-day stop in Bucharest, + March 31. In telegram 2148 from Bucharest, April 1, the Embassy + reported that Vanik told Ceausescu that “1978 was campaign year and 1979 + would provide better opportunity to institute different review + process for Romania’s MFN renewal.” + (National Archives, RG 59, Central + Foreign Policy File, D780142–0238) In telegram 2149 from Bucharest, + April 1, the Embassy reported Vanik’s conversation with Andrei, in which the Representative + said that “single-year renewal essential this year because there is + no time to change procedures, especially in election year, but he + hoped change in law permitting committee decision on better handling + of renewal would be possible next year.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + D780143–0268)

+

The President said it is the desire of this + administration to continue MFN for + Romania and to enhance trade. If in any private communications you wish + to provide information that will help in this regard, it will be used + for your country’s benefit. As in the past I will do everything I can to + inform the Congressional leaders of the good attitude taken by Romania + in order to continue receiving MFN + treatment. I believe that it is in our mutual interest to increase + trade.

+ +

Africa

+

The President expressed concern about the + increased use of military force and of Cuban forces by the USSR in Africa.

+

President Ceausescu said that Romania has frequently + spoken out against foreign troops on the territory of any independent + state. We do not at all welcome the presence of Cuban troops in Africa, + although formally it was requested by the respective governments. It + would be much better if they were not there.

+

China

+

The President expressed interest in President + Ceausescu’s forthcoming + meetings with the Chinese leaders. We would like to see our relations + with China normalized. Our exchange of information through our liaison + office has been adequate, but we wish to improve our relations.

+

It might be useful if, with Chinese knowledge, you could send me a + private letter after your visit and with your views about further steps + we might take to improve relations with China. We need your good offices + in improving that relationship.

+

President Ceausescu said that the normalization of + US-Chinese relations is proceeding with some difficulty. It might be + good to think of giving a fresh impetus to the process of normalization + through establishing full diplomatic relations. This will require a + solution to the Taiwan question by putting into practice something the + US has already done, i.e., recognizing Taiwan as an integral part of + China and therefore a matter for China alone to resolve. Considering the + rapid rate of change in international affairs, it may be of special + importance to have diplomatic relations with China. China plays and is + bound to play an increasingly important role in international life, to + say nothing of China’s economic potential which would give the United + States great opportunities.

+

The President said that the major obstacle is the + Mutual Defense Treaty with the Republic of China, and the People’s + Republic has not been prepared to state that the dispute over Taiwan is + to be resolved solely by peaceful means. If we could find a solution to + that problem, we could take rapid action in our relations with China. + The Chinese leaders share our wish to see this problem solved, and if + that can be done, we shall recognize the PRC.

+

President Ceausescu said the Chinese leaders have stated + on more than one occasion that they seek a peaceful resolution to the + Taiwan problem and I think that is their intention. If the US withdraws + there will be no need to resort to force, considering the close ties + between the people of Taiwan and China. Giving a specific commitment to + the US, however, would be difficult. It was apparent in my talks with + the Senators this morning + that the US itself is reluctant to give such guarantees on similar + matters that regard it directly. The same is true with China. Thus + things should be resolved without creating additional artificial + problems in order to achieve normalization.

+

The President said it is our policy to work toward + normalization, and we shall do so.

+

President Ceausescu asked if he should inform Chairman + Hua of the substance of our talks on these matters. I will certainly + inform you of his views and how the Chinese leaders see future + developments.Andrei met with Ambassador + Aggrey at the Foreign + Ministry on June 12 to brief him on Ceausescu’s Asia trip. Andrei asked Aggrey that “account be held in full confidence and + not discussed with other Bucharest diplomats” and “noted with a + smile” that he would meet with the Soviet Ambassador following his + presentation to Aggrey. + Aggrey added: “I did not + ask whether he would receive same briefing, but I doubt it.” + Aggrey reported that, + based on the Romanian account, the visits to China, North Korea, and + Cambodia were successful although the visit to Vietnam and Laos less + so. (Telegram 4075 from Bucharest, June 13; National Archives, + RG 59, Central Foreign Policy + File, D780250–0932) I think, however, it is urgent to resolve + these problems, and you are in a position to bring about their speedy + solution.

+

The President said that we desire to do this. We + do not try to use our relationship with the USSR against China, nor vice-versa. We wish to be friends + with both countries, and this is a course that Romania has followed so + well.

+

President Ceausescu said that this is a wise course. He + said that continuing the present state of affairs generates a certain + degree of suspicion with the Chinese leaders. Thus more expeditious + steps toward normal relations would demonstrate a willingness to carry + out that policy.

+

Korea

+

President Ceausescu then raised the People’s Democratic + Republic of Korea and Korea in general. During my visit to the Far East + I will also visit the PDRK as well as Vietnam, Campuchea, and Laos. Our + relations with North Korea are very good and I personally have a + friendly relationship with President Kim Il-song. He asked me to convey + to you some of his thoughts with regard to a resolution of the Korean + problem. They wish to reach a state of improved relations with the US on + the basis of your commitment to withdraw American troops from South + Korea. They believe that initiation of direct talks on that problem + would be most useful. They have given assurances that they will consider + US interests in South Korea, and they envisage that reunification would take the form of a + federation which would maintain the existing social system in the two + parts of the peninsula.In telegram 163243 + to Bucharest, June 27, the Department instructed Aggrey to thank Andrei for the report on Ceausescu’s trip to Asia, and to + brief him on the conclusions of Brzezinski’s trip to China. Regarding Korea, the + Department suggested that “the Romanians, rather than taking a + neutral position, are largely seeking to advance North Korean + position. For that reason we see little to be gained from entering + into a detailed dialogue with them on the subject.” The telegram + instructed Aggrey to tell + Andrei that “if the + GOR is interested in promoting + improved relations between North and South Korea, it may wish to + make its views known through direct contacts with the Republic of + Korea as it already does with the DPRK.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + D780266–0541)

+

In Kim Il-song’s opinion the main obstacle is President Park Chung Hee. + The North Koreans characterize his regime as Fascist and its policies + are clearly pro-Japanese. They would agree to deal with any other + president in the south that is agreeable to the US such as Yan Bo-sim (a + former President of South Korea, 1960–1962) whom they know to have good + relations with the United States. Yan Bo-sim is no communist, and he is + presently counselor of the New Democracy Party in the South. Of course, + that is only an example, but any personality willing to promote a more + democratic regime in the South who would also be agreeable to the US + will be acceptable for the North.

+

I present all of this to you in order to give you a picture of how Kim + Il-song sees a way to solve the existing problems and open the way to + new relations with that part of the world.

+

The President said it is not my responsibility nor + that of Kim Il-song to determine who shall be president of South Korea. + That is a decision for the people there, and they have elected President + Park in free elections. Will Kim Il-song have a direct meeting with + representatives of the US, North Korea, and President Park?

+

President Ceausescu answered that they will not deal with + President Park for the reasons mentioned. Regarding the democratic + elections in South Korea, I have been told that the other candidates for + the presidency were arrested and were not even able to run for office. + The North Koreans believe that if the US no longer supports Park, + internal forces in South Korea will be able to resolve the problem in a + democratic way. Nevertheless, the North Koreans are ready to talk with + the US, and they will talk with any democratically chosen leader after + Park has been replaced.

+

The President replied that North Korea has + historically taken that position. The possibility that President Park + might be overthrown or changed is very slight. We do not interfere in + South Korea’s domestic affairs and we will not change the government by + force or intervention. Unless Kim Il-song is willing to meet with + representatives of the current government there will be no opportunity for such a meeting; the US + will not meet representatives of the North without representatives from + the South.

+

President Ceausescu said that since the US has relations + with South Korea it would be wise to also have direct contacts with the + North.

+

The President replied that we are there on the + basis of a UN resolution. We favor + reunification of Korea and military representatives have been meeting at + the 38th parallel, but the US is not the dominant political factor + there. We are there to keep a fragile peace and we cannot claim the + political leadership of South Korea. To undertake political negotiations + with North Korean leaders in the absence of President Park would be to + assume a false posture.

+

The PLO

+

President Ceausescu then turned the conversation again to + a possible meeting of US and PLO representatives. Although this is not + now on the agenda, it is important if a new impetus is to be given to + the peace process in the Middle East. They will meet with the US either + secretly or publicly. I have been specifically assured that the PLO has + already mustered a majority within its organization to support such a + useful meeting.

+

The President recalled that he had stated the US + position in talks the previous day,See Document 200. but indicated his + willingness to exchange ideas as the situation develops. Our current + desire is for Egypt to propose a new solution and then have Egypt and + Israel work together in resolving their differences. At this stage the + insertion of the PLO into the process would be a complicating factor. + Perhaps later it would be more reasonable.

+

President Ceausescu said he was not referring to PLO + participation in general, but only to its participation in talks on the + Palestinian question.

+

The President felt that Egypt would not be willing + to have the PLO involved even on that problem at present, and Israel + certainly would not. King + Hussein would probably take the same view.

+

President Ceausescu suggested that President Sadat wishes + the PLO to participate in the discussion of the Palestinian problem but + not the discussion of Egypt’s problems. He felt that Hussein is of the + same opinion; so is President Assad.

+

The President agreed that Assad may hold that + view, but not Hussein.

+
+ +
+ 204. Memorandum of ConversationSource: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, + Brzezinski Material, + Subject File, Box 36, Memcons: + President: 4/78. Secret. Drafted by King. The meeting took place in the Cabinet Room at + the White House. + + + Washington, April 13, 1978, 11:30 + a.m.–noon + + + SUBJECT + Summary of the President’s Second Meeting with President Nicolae Ceausescu of Romania + + + PARTICIPANTS + President Jimmy + Carter + Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski, + Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs + O. Rudolph Aggrey, + Ambassador to Romania + George S. Vest, Assistant + Secretary of State + Jerrold Schecter, NSC Staff Member + Herbert J. Hansell, Legal + Adviser to the Department of State + Robert R. King, NSC Staff Member (Notetaker) + Mrs. Huffman, Interpreter + + President of Romania, Nicolae + Ceausescu + First Deputy Prime Minister, Gheorghe Oprea + Foreign Minister, Stefan + Andrei + Presidential Counselor, Vasile Pungan + Minister of Machine Building Industry, Ion Avram + Ambassador to the United States, Nicolae M. Nicolae + Mr. Celac, Interpreter + Mr. Mateescu, Notetaker + +

The President was pleased with the private + discussions with President Ceausescu just prior to this meeting. He briefly + summarized some of the matters that had been raised: He will propose + renewal of MFN for Romania, and though + it cannot be granted for more than one year at a time, we will seek to + minimize public discussion; the two presidents will inform each other of + the results of their international visits without violating the + confidence of other states (Ceausescu’s forthcoming visits to China and Korea were + mentioned in this context); both sides understand each other’s views on + the division of Korea; and oppose the intervention of foreign military + forces.

+

President Ceausescu said there have been delays and + rejections granting permission for technology licensing for Romania. + Agreements with US firms are thwarted by delays and problems, + particularly involving electronics and nuclear matters.

+

The President asked George Vest + to respond. Mr. Vest said this matter had been discussed + earlier with Ceausescu by Under + Secretary of Commerce Harmon, + and Secretary Vance and Foreign + Minister Andrei had also + considered it. The [Assistant] Secretary said he would look into the + problem in order to expedite the handling of such requests from the + Romanians.

+

The President expressed his desire to be helpful + and said he would send Ceausescu + a letter on this subject after it has been looked into.In a letter to Ceausescu on April 22, Carter informed the Romanian + leader that he had looked into the issue of export control for + Romania and found Romania received “the most favorable treatment + possible” under U.S. law. He also + stated that he tasked agencies responsible for approvals to make + special efforts to speed up the process for all countries, including + Romania. The same day, Brzezinski sent a memorandum to the Secretaries of + Commerce, State, Defense, and Energy informing them of Carter’s + letter and his instructions. (Carter Library, National Security + Affairs, Brzezinski + Material, President’s Correspondence with Foreign Leaders File, Box + 16, Romania: President Nicolae + Ceausescu, 2/77–12/78)

+

President Ceausescu said he would write only if there + were problems, but he hoped it would not reach the presidential + level.

+

The President said a letter would be sent in the + next week. He indicated an interest to work with the Romanians in + preparation for the Madrid CSCE review + in order to avoid disappointment similar to that over Belgrade.

+

President Ceausescu expressed interest in cooperation to + create a better climate for Madrid. He also noted the importance of + consultation in the next weeks on the UN + Special Session on Disarmament (SSOD). + Contacts have already taken place, but further ones would contribute to + a positive result.

+

The President expressed hope for the success of + the SSOD, and noted that a number of + government leaders will attend the session. He expressed a willingness + to share ideas with the Romanians.

+

Ceausescu + asked for better cooperation in dealing with underdevelopment and + establishing a new international economic order.

+

The President said this problem has come up in + discussions with other leaders, who have suggested a more constructive + forum for an exchange of ideas between the industrial and developing + countries. The structure of the Group of 77 does not seem conducive to a + constructive dialogue. If these issues can be dealt with through less + rhetoric and more communication, it will result in progress.

+

Ceausescu + suggested that the UN would provide a + suitable framework.

+

The President said it was an appropriate time to + consider meeting the needs of the developing countries. He considered + the exchange a fruitful one and is desirous to strengthen ties between + the two countries. The + discussion of human rights was useful. Although the two countries have + different perspectives, they share similar goals.

+

President Ceausescu expressed thanks for the talks and + the visit and hoped that relations will further develop. Other questions + remain to be discussed, but they can be tackled when the President + accepts the invitation to visit Romania.

+

Following the talks at 12:00 the two presidents were joined by their + wives for the signing of the Joint Declaration.See Public Papers: Carter, + 1978, Book I, pp. 743–745.

+ +
+ +
+ 205. Action Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for + European Affairs (Vest) to + Acting Secretary of State ChristopherSource: National Archives, RG 59, + Office of the Secretariat Staff, Records of the Office of the Deputy + Secretary, Warren + Christopher, Lot 81D113, Box 5, WC—Official Chron—1978. Secret; Roger + Channel. Luers initialed the + memorandum for Vest. Drafted + by Schmidt; cleared by + Luers. The date is + handwritten at the top of the first page. The word “Acting” is + inserted by hand before Secretary. + + + Washington, August + 18, 1978 + + + SUBJECT + US-Romanian Relations: Next Steps + +

The Romanians will be upset over the Pacepa case for some time.Lieutenant-General Ion Mihai Pacepa, First + Deputy of the Director of Foreign Intelligence Branch of the + Securitate, State Secretary in the Ministry of Interior, and + Ceausescu’s counselor for + National Security and Economic Development, defected to the United + States on an official trip to West Germany in August. He was the + highest-ranking Eastern European defector during the cold war. In + September 1978, the Romanian Government indicted Pacepa for high + treason, condemned him to death, and placed a $2 million bounty on + his head. The death sentence was overturned in 1999 by the Romanian + Supreme Court. It will affect the tone and frequency of their + contacts and exchanges with us. Ceausescu’s image as a man in control of his internal + affairs is shaken and his natural paranoia about his advisers is + heightened.

+

As unfortunate as this event surely is, Ceausescu is now in a phase of high international + posture with his recent speech once again declaring Romania’s + independent foreign policy line, his cool meeting with Brezhnev, and the visit of Chairman Hua. (We and INR have sent you separately an analysis + of Ceausescu’s current + international posture.) Our conclusion is that Ceausescu needs his relations with the + US as much, if not more than he did before. It is in our interest to + play to that reality and trust that in time they will get over the + Pacepa affair.

+

The Romanians have come back again on Pacepa (Tab A),Attached but not printed at Tab A is telegram 5749 + from Bucharest, August 16. demanding that he be extradited. + We believe that, because of the conjunction of the Pacepa case and + Ceausescu’s current exposed + position in international affairs, it would be advisable, via some + specific positive steps, to reiterate our continued commitment to + improved US-Romanian relations. We propose the following:

+

Instruct Ambassador Aggrey to + tell Andrei that the President is + prepared to send a special emissary to Romania soon. The Romanians like + the idea of special emissaries (you recall Pungan).

+

The emissary would:

+

—Report candidly on Pacepa, stressing that we had no part in his decision + to defect.

+

—Report on the Camp David Summit (which Ceausescu would welcome because of his earlier role in + the Middle East talks), and seek a full briefing on Hua’s visit.

+

—Present concrete evidence of our continued interest in bilateral + economic cooperation by informing the Romanians of USG approval of certain pending export + license cases of special interest to them.

+

—Tell Andrei that you are looking + forward to meeting with him at the UNGA, especially to discuss various international + issues.

+

We also have a Vance-Ceausescu letter, now awaiting NSC clearance, on the Middle East Summit + which reiterates the President’s personal interest in good bilateral + relations.

+

Who to be the special emissary?

+

There are two good candidates for special emissary: Christopher and Nimetz. Both will be in the area in the + coming weeks on other business.

+

The Deputy Secretary would be the highest level official (other than + Secretary Bergland) to visit + Romania in this Administration.During his + visit to Bucharest May 23–24, Secretary of Agriculture Bergland met with Manea Manescu, as + well as several other Romanian officials. The Embassy transmitted a + summary of his meetings and discussions on May 25, in telegram 3594 + from Bucharest. (National Archives, RG 59, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Office of + Analysis for the Commonwealth and Eastern Europe, Office Subject + Files, 1965–1980, Lot 92D412, Box 6, Romania-US—Econ) As special emissary, he would thus + underscore the high importance of our concern. A visit could be tied in + with his planned trip to Greece.

+

Matt Nimetz knows Romania well and + the Romanians like and trust him as a result of their frequent contacts. + His reputation as Counselor and “trouble shooter” would enhance his role + as special emissary. He could make the visit in connection with his trip + to Cyprus.

+

Recommendations:

+

1. That you agree to send a special emissary in early September who would + be authorized to discuss US-Romanian relations and brief Ceausescu on the Camp David Summit, as + outlined above.

+

Approve Disapprove

+

Nimetz + Christopher approved sending Nimetz as a Special Emissary to + Bucharest and added: “If convenient on his Cyprus trip.” + Christopher +

+

Other

+

2. That you authorize the special emissary to tell Andrei that you want to meet with him + at the UNGA, with specific timing to + be worked out later.

+

Agree Christopher approved a meeting between the Secretary + and Andrei at the UNGA. He deleted “you want” and + added: “Secretary would be glad to meet with him should he wish such + a meeting.” Disagree

+
+ +
+ 206. Memorandum From Stephen + Larrabee of the National Security Council Staff to the + President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)Source: Carter Library, National + Security Affairs, Brzezinski + Material, Country File, Box 66, Romania: 6/78–3/79. Secret; + Sensitive. Sent for action. + + + Washington, September + 22, 1978 + + + SUBJECT + Possible Meeting with Romanian Foreign Minister Stefan Andrei + +

During Matt Nimetz’s recent visit + to Romania, Romanian Foreign Minister Stefan + Andrei expressed an interest in meeting with you + personally when he is in the States next week for the opening of the + UN General Assembly.

+

Andrei is presently scheduled to + meet with Secretary Vance on + September 26 in New York. However, a number of factors suggest that a + meeting with you might also be useful.

+

—Ceausescu’s deep concern over the + impact of the Pacepa affair on U.S.-Romanian relations (as Christopher’s memo to the President on Nimetz’s visit makes clear, Tab I)See footnote 6, + Document 207.

+

—Romania’s more exposed position since the Hua visit.

+

—Recent indications of Soviet chagrin over Ceausescu’s policy. (Brezhnev was highly critical of Ceausescu at the Crimean meetings with + East European leaders in July and allegedly told Kadar that he intended + to intensify contacts with other Romanian leaders.)In telegram 5542 from Bucharest, August 9, the + Embassy reported that the Romanian media described the Crimea + meeting between Brezhnev and + Ceausescu as “‘an + exchange of views’ in a ‘sincere’ atmosphere, perhaps the least + flattering terms in Romanian interparty rhetoric.” (National + Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign + Policy File, D780325–0657) Brezhnev also criticized Ceausescu during his meeting with Todor Zhivkov, stating that + Ceausescu’s policies were + moving Romania out of step with the rest of the Warsaw Pact + countries. (Information on conversation of the Secretary General of + the CC of the CPSU (Leonid I. + Brezhnev) with the Bulgarian Head of State (Todor Zhivkov) in Crimea, August + 14, 1978, Bulgarian Central State Archive (TsDA), Sofia, Fond 378–B, + File 495)

+

A meeting with Andrei would give + you an opportunity:

+

—to reassure Andrei of the + President’s interest in good relations with Romania and his intention + not to let the Pacepa affair interfere with the improvement in relations + that has taken place over the last few years;

+

—to get a firsthand report of Hua’s visit and sound out Andrei on the Romanian regime’s + intentions vis-a-vis China; and

+ +

—to explore possible ways in which Romania could play a constructive role + in the Middle East after Camp David.

+

I realize that the Romanians tend to want high-level treatment more than + is always justified. However, for reasons outlined above, the + relationship could legitimately stand a little stroking at this point + and a meeting with Andrei would + provide a useful opportunity to do this. I discussed this matter + informally with Matt Nimetz + shortly after his return and he concurs with this view.

+

If you do decide to see Andrei, + the meeting should be arranged quietly in order not to alert other + foreign ministers who will also be in New York and who might want + similar treatment.

+

RECOMMENDATION:

+

That you meet with Andrei when he + is in the States at a time to be arranged.Brzezinski approved, + adding in the margin “if he wants to come here. I will not go to + NYC.” Bartholomew wrote under + the recommendation: “ZB: Steve makes + a good case. But frankly, seeing you may simply give Andrei & the Romanians another + crack (at you) on pushing on Pacepa. Better to let Vance turn the page on all this in + his N.Y. meeting with Andrei. + And you have real and ample grounds to plead scheduling problems, + and I don’t in any event think Andrei will take it amiss. RB.” See Document 208.

+
+ +
+ 207. Report Prepared in the Department of StateSource: National Security Council, + Carter Administration Intelligence Files, Box I–026, Romania—JEC. + Secret; Sensitive. Sent under an undated covering memorandum from + Tarnoff to Brzezinski. Gates forwarded the memorandum to + Brzezinski and wrote: + “Zbig—Regarding page 4: Given what the Romanians did to those RFE broadcasters (the CIA report last week), I would not + trust them at all—especially in light of Ceausescu’s personal sense of betrayal concerning + Pacepa and his apparent weakness for revenge.” Brzezinski forwarded the + memorandum and the note to David + Aaron adding “DA Stress to Carlucci the need to protect Pacepa’s safety.” Aaron wrote “Done” on the + note. + + + Washington, undated + +

The Romanian Defector Case

+

The Counsellor of the Department of State, Matt Nimetz, visited Romania on September 8 as a Special + Emissary to discuss the case of Ion Mihai Pacepa, the Deputy Director of + Romanian Intelligence, who defected to the West in August. The Romanians + have been particularly upset by this defection because of the close + personal relationship Pacepa had with President Ceausescu.In telegram 5568 from Bucharest, August 9, Aggrey reported that Andrei had called him to a meeting + in the Black Sea resort of Neptun to “convey President Ceausescu’s urgent request that + U.S. return to Romania, General + Mihai Pacepa” and that, in Ceausescu’s opinion, “should the CIA keep Pacepa this could not be + considered a friendly gesture and would not be of a nature to permit + improvement of our bilateral relations. Romania will draw the + lessons it should from our response.” After conveying Andrei’s message, Aggrey commented: “Decision not to + honor Ceausescu’s request is + likely to seriously impair progress in our bilateral relations, + especially in important humanitarian and consular areas. It may well + produce serious general degradation for considerable period.” + (Department of State, INR/IL + Historical Files, Box 11, Bucharest) They say that in light + of the current very positive state of US-Romanian relations and the + April 1978 visit to the United States by Ceausescu, it is impossible for them to understand our + accepting this defector and initially demanded that we return Pacepa to + Romania through extradition or otherwise.

+

Despite the Romanian concern, we do not believe that the defection will + affect our basic relationship with them in the long term. Romania has a + strong need for special ties to us as they pursue a foreign policy + independent of the Soviets, and the Nimetz trip proved highly useful in demonstrating our + continuing interest in maintaining just such a relationship.

+

In Bucharest, Nimetz made the + following points to Foreign Minister Stefan + Andrei:In telegram 6321 from + Bucharest, September 8, Aggrey reported Nimetz’s conversation with Andrei on Pacepa and other + intelligence issues. (Ibid.) Andrei responded to Nimetz presentation the evening of September 8, when + he joined Nimetz and + Aggrey at dinner. + Aggrey reported in + telegram 6322 from Bucharest, September 9, that the Romanian + Government had dropped the extradition demand, but was requesting + that Pacepa not be allowed to remain in the United States. + (Ibid.)

+ +

—The U.S. Government believes that this + matter should not interfere with the steadily improving tone of + US-Romanian relations.

+

—We will refrain from publicly exploiting Pacepa’s presence in the United + States.

+

—Pacepa came to the United States of his own volition. No clandestine + relationship existed between Pacepa and the U.S. Government before he presented himself to us in + Bonn.

+

—Extradition would not be possible in this case, and if Romania pursued + extradition it would only lead to unfortunate publicity.

+

—The only proper course, and the one best suited to maintaining our + excellent relationship, is to close the book on this entire matter.

+

—There are no indications that Pacepa’s family knew anything about his + plans. We hope that treatment of his wife and daughter will not compel + Pacepa to raise the matter of their treatment publicly, which inevitably + would have an adverse impact on our bilateral relations.

+

In order to signal to the Romanians that we were following a course of + “business as usual,” Nimetz + briefed them on a wide range of issues including the Middle East, China, + US-Soviet relations, Southern Africa and disarmament. Nimetz also discussed bilateral issues + and listed the positive economic decisions we have made since the + Ceausescu visit (approval of + a large number of export control cases, an ExIm loan approval, the Romanian fishing allotment, and CCC + credits).The Embassy in Bucharest + reported on Nimetz’s + bilateral discussions in telegram 6402, September 12. (National + Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign + Policy File, D780370–1015)

+

Andrei, after consulting with + Ceausescu, responded as + follows, emphasizing that this was a personal and confidential message + from Ceausescu to you:

+

—President Ceausescu shares + President Carter’s desire to + maintain the dialogue between the two countries and the momentum of the + developing relationship.

+

—To eliminate this impediment to progress, it is necessary that Pacepa + not be allowed to remain in the United States. Although extradition + would be awkward, the United States is not required to permit Pacepa to + remain in this country.

+

—Pacepa has already created problems with his provocative and misleading + information. This has been designed to injure Romania’s relations with + the United States, Germany, and the West in general. Certainly there are + other forces (he meant, but did not name, the Soviet Union) who are + interested in the deterioration of relations among the US, FRG, and Romania.

+ +

Andrei concluded by stating that + Ceausescu told him to + reiterate the full strength of the Romanian President’s desire for a + political decision to continue to strengthen the cooperation between our + two countries, and to find means to deal with the Pacepa matter in a way + that does not do harm to our foreign relations or those of Romania.

+

Andrei then made the following + personal comments:

+

—Without specifically mentioning the Soviet Union, Andrei left no doubt that the Romanians + believe Pacepa is serving Soviet interests and was probably directed to + defect by the Soviets. ([2 lines not + declassified] This is a typical Eastern European reaction to + discredit officials who defect.)

+

—He repeated several times that Pacepa had been in charge of security for + Ceausescu on many official + visits. Pacepa could, and would, seek to embarrass Ceausescu and harm Romanian interests + with many countries.

+

—Andrei emphasized his and + Ceausescu’s shock that the + United States would give sanctuary to this traitor, given the excellent + relations developed by the two Presidents and the improved relationship + between the two governments. A way should be found to get him out of the + United States.

+

[1 paragraph (2 lines) not declassified]

+

Secretary Vance will tell + Andrei in New York next week + that Ceausescu’s message has been + passed to the White House and will reiterate our belief that the Pacepa + case should be put behind us so that our relations with Romania may + continue to expand and improve.See footnote 5, Document 208. The meeting + between Vance and Andrei scheduled for September 29 + was canceled and apparently rescheduled for October 2; see Document 209. On September 29, Nimetz and Andrei met to discuss the Pacepa + case over breakfast at the Romanian Mission to the United Nations. + The Department reported the conversation to Ambassador Aggrey in telegram 252848 to + Bucharest, October 4. Nimetz + told Andrei that “in his + personal view, it was very significant that the U.S. Government had responded in this + sensitive matter by agreeing to facilitate, at the request of + another government, the departure of a person who we had taken in. + He knew of no similar case. The Romanian side therefore should + consider this as very significant.” Andrei responded that a decision on the issue could + only be taken by Ceausescu. + (INR/IL, 980643000018, Box + 11, Bucharest) No response to the offer was found.

+

In addition, with Pacepa’s consent, we will explore with the Romanians an + arrangement whereby Pacepa would voluntarily leave the United States. + [1 line not declassified] In return, the + Romanians would permit Pacepa’s + wife and daughter to join himOn September + 22, Nimetz forwarded to + Christopher a draft + memorandum for the President reporting on his trip to Bucharest. In + the covering memorandum, Nimetz informed Christopher that his plan was to raise the issue of + Pacepa’s resettlement in a private meeting with Andrei following the bilateral with + Vance, provided “the + Romanian Government permitted his family to join him and assured his + safety.” (National Archives, RG 59, + Office of the Secretariat Staff, Mr. Matthew Nimetz, Counselor of the Department of + State, Under Secretary for Security Assistance, Science, and + Technology, January 1977 thru December 1980, Lot 81D85, Box 1, MN + Chron—Official—July–December 1978) and would give assurances + with respect to Pacepa’s safety.During his + September 8 conversation with Andrei, Nimetz informed him that the United States had + information of plans by the Romanian intelligence services “to + physically eliminate several persons residing in the United States.” + “It is imperative” Nimetz + told Andrei, “that control be + placed over these present and planned activities and that they be + stopped forthwith. You can be assured that my Government will take + all necessary measures to protect our citizens. If these plans are + not abandoned, the most serious consequences for our relationship + must be expected.” On September 1, prior to his departure, Nimetz forwarded the talking points + in this report to Christopher for approval. (National Archives, RG 59, Office of the Secretariat Staff, + Mr. Matthew Nimetz, Counselor + of the Department of State, Under Secretary for Security Assistance, + Science, and Technology, January 1977 thru December 1980, Lot 81D85, + Box 1, MN Chron—Official—July–December 1978.) The talking points + were sent to Bucharest in telegram 226364, September 7. (INR/IL, 980643000018, Box 11, + Bucharest)

+

[1 paragraph (2 lines) not declassified]

+ +
+ +
+ 208. Memorandum of ConversationSource: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, + Brzezinski Material, + Subject File, Box 33, Memcons: + Brzezinski: 9/78–2/79, + Top Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Larrabee. The meeting took place in Brzezinski’s office at the White + House. + + + Washington, September 30, 1978, 7:30–8:10 + p.m. + + + SUBJECT + Summary of Dr. Brzezinski’s Meeting with Foreign Romanian Minister + Stefan Andrei + + + PARTICIPANTS + Foreign Minister Stefan + Andrei + Mr. Mitran, Secretary to Mr. Andrei + + Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski, + Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs + F. Stephen Larrabee, NSC (Notetaker) + + +

After expressing his appreciation for Dr. Brzezinski taking the time to meet with him, Mr. + Andrei noted that President + Ceausescu had received the + news of the meeting between Dr. Brzezinski and Andrei with pleasure. Mr. Andrei then handed Dr. Brzezinski a letter from President Ceausescu in answer to President + Carter on the Middle + East.In a letter dated September 23, + Ceausescu praised the + agreements reached at Camp David between Egypt and Israel, but + restated the Romanian position that peace in the Middle East could + only be achieved by inclusion of all involved parties, including the + Palestinians. Ceausescu noted + that the accords did not oblige Israel “to withdraw not only from + the Sinai, but from the West Bank, Gaza, and Golan [Heights] as + well, respectively from all Arab territories occupied in the wake of + 1967 war.” Ceausescu also + called for resumption of the Geneva Talks on the Middle East and + assured Carter that Romania would continue to “bring its active + contribution to the instauration of a climate of lasting peace and + full security in this area.” (Carter Library, National Security + Affairs, Brzezinski + Material, President’s Correspondence with Foreign Leaders File, Box + 16, Romania: President Nicolae + Ceausescu, 2/77–12/78)

+

Remarking that unfortunately time was limited due to the necessity of + responding to Gromyko’s latest + SALT proposal, Dr. Brzezinski stated that President + Carter had asked him to + transmit his greetings to President Ceausescu and to tell President Ceausescu how much he valued his + relations with the (Romanian) President. President Carter recalled President Ceausescu’s perceptive comments on + international issues.

+

Mr. Andrei then gave Dr. Brzezinski a book dedicated to + Ceausescu’s visit to the + United States and said he would convey to President Ceausescu President Carter’s remarks. He stressed that + Romania was determined to work for the development of U.S.-Romanian relations in the spirit + agreed at the Ceausescu-Carter + meeting and that the RCP had highly evaluated the meeting between + President Carter and President + Ceausescu. Noting that his + desire was to see an improvement in relations, Mr. Andrei said that it was in this spirit + that he wished to raise three problems presently affecting bilateral + relations.

+

The first was related to the defection of Ion Pacepa. This had created no + little tension. Andrei noted that + Romania had asked for Pacepa’s extradition, but that it understood the + difficulties which this would present. Romania believed nonetheless that + a decision not to allow Pacepa to remain in the U.S. would help U.S.-Romanian relations. Mr. Andrei stated that Pacepa had been working for some time + for the CIA and that he had been + involved in financial scandals in the Federal Republic. He repeated that + Romania would like to see Pacepa’s stay in the United States voided.

+

The second problem raised by Mr. Andrei related to (unspecified) employees in the U.S. Embassy in Bucharest who he claimed + had been inciting Romanian citizens not to return to Romania while they + were abroad, particularly people in the field of science and technology. + Mr. Andrei noted that Romania had not made these actions + public nor had many party members been informed of details of the + actions because the Romanian leadership did not wish to overcharge the + atmosphere or create an incident. However, the Romanians would like to + see such actions stopped.

+

The third issue raised by Mr. Andrei concerned economic relations, which he noted were + generally developing quite well. However, it would be most helpful if + the processing of export licenses could be accelerated. He also noted + that President Carter’s letter + had been well received.See footnote 2, Document 204.

+

Dr. Brzezinski then responded to + the points raised by Mr. Andrei. + He began by stressing the importance that the U.S. attached to relations with Romania and the respect + which the U.S. had for President + Ceausescu. The U.S. considered Ceausescu an important international Statesman and a + friend. Dr. Brzezinski + emphasized that relations between Romania and the United States were + good and that it was in this perspective that he wished to speak.

+

On the question of economic relations, Dr. Brzezinski pointed out that President Carter had ordered an acceleration of + the processing of export licenses and he asked Mr. Larrabee to check on this. Dr. + Brzezinski then raised the + case of Dr. Vlad Georgescu, who had been invited to spend a year at the + Woodrow Wilson Center but whose visa had yet to be approved.Earlier on September 30, Larrabee sent Brzezinski a memorandum with + talking points for his meeting with Andrei on the Pacepa case, export licensing, and + Vlad Georgescu, a Romanian scholar and dissident who was invited by + the Woodrow Wilson Center on a one-year fellowship in Washington and + whose exit visa was being denied by the Romanian Government. The + meeting with Brzezinski was + intended to follow a meeting with Vance in New York the previous day but it had been + canceled at the last minute. (Carter Library, National Security + Affairs, Brzezinski + Material, Country File, Box 66, Romania: 6/78–3/79) Mr. + Andrei said that the case had + been raised during his conversation with Counselor Nimetz the preceding day; he would + discuss this with President Ceausescu when he returned to Romania.In telegram 257186 to Bucharest, October 11, the + Department reported the discussions on bilateral issues between + Nimetz and Andrei in New York on September 29. + (National Archives, RG 59, Central + Foreign Policy File, D780415–1130) The private discussion on Pacepa + was reported in telegram 252848 to Bucharest. See footnote 5, Document 207.

+

Regarding Mr. Andrei’s complaints + about alleged agitation on the part of employees of the U.S. Embassy in Bucharest, Dr. Brzezinski said he was skeptical of + such reports and would be very surprised if they were true. It was + possible they arose out of some misunderstanding. He promised to look into the matter.In telegram 257771 to Bucharest, October 11, + the Department reported allegations made by Andrei that U.S. Embassy employees were encouraging Romanian + citizens to emigrate and asked the Embassy to investigate. (National + Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign + Policy File, D780416–0508) The Embassy response in telegram 7264 + from Bucharest, October 13, stated that the allegations were + “without foundation.” Aggrey + wrote: “It is my strong impression that Andrei’s complaint was prompted by two different but + related considerations: hypersensitivity of Romanian security + establishment and GOR top level to + US-Romanian consular relations in wake of Pacepa defection” and + Embassy officials’ contact with Romanian citizens, especially Vlad + Georgescu and Ecaterina Rauta. Aggrey continued: “These are sensitive cases for + GOR, especially at this time. + However, contacts involve legitimate US interest in persons who + decided on their own, prior to contact, that they wish to travel to + US.” Aggrey recommended that + the Department inform the Romanian Government that the complaint was + carefully investigated and found to be without merit. The Ambassador + also recommended that the Romanians be informed that “it would not + be supportive of progress in bilateral relations both sides seek for + current sensitivities to result in restrictions on or obstacles to + normal conduct of consular operations.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + D780419–0034) He assured Mr. Andrei, however, that this was not a deliberate policy + on the part of the U.S. government, + which he stressed does not engage in such activities as a matter of + policy. He would check on it and asked Mr. Larrabee to investigate the charges and report his + findings to him. If the charges proved to be true—which he doubted would + be the case—he would call a halt to such activities.

+

Dr. Brzezinski then turned to the + case of Ion Pacepa. He pointed out that Mr. Andrei could not be serious about the charges. The + Romanians could not charge that Pacepa was a CIA agent and then at the same time ask for his + extradition. They could not have it both ways. He was sure that Romania + did not turn over its agents, and the Romanians could not realistically + ask the U.S. to do something which they + themselves would not do. Dr. Brzezinski stressed, however, that the U.S. was prepared to arrange for Pacepa’s + resettlement in a third country with his family. He assured Mr. + Andrei that the U.S. had not enticed Pacepa to defect. In + his view, the best way to handle the case was quietly and he emphasized + that the U.S. had no intention of + exploiting the case, which should not be allowed to become an irritant + in Romanian-U.S. relations.

+

Dr. Brzezinski next raised the + case of several employees of Radio Free Europe (former Romanian + citizens) in Munich who were beaten up under strange circumstances.In telegram 3597 from Munich, November 22, + 1977, the Consulate reported the attack in Paris on RFE Romanian broadcast freelancer + Monica Lovinescu. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770433–0070) See + also footnote 1, Document 207. + Mr. Andrei replied that he knew + nothing about the case. Dr. Brzezinski noted that as Foreign Minister, it was quite + possible that Mr. Andrei did not + know about such incidents which + were normally carried out by other branches of the government, but that + the U.S. nonetheless wished to see them + stopped. Dr. Brzezinski + stressed, however, that these issues were relatively minor points. The + really important point was that U.S.-Romanian relations remain good and that both governments + should not let subjective irritants affect relations.

+

Mr. Andrei replied that in the + case of the agitation of the employees of the U.S. Embassy in Bucharest, he had purposely not raised the + issue with the U.S. Ambassador because + he did not want to cause an incident and unnecessarily disturb + relations.

+

Dr. Brzezinski then briefed Mr. + Andrei on the recent SALT discussions with Mr. Gromyko, noting that the U.S. and the Soviet Union were very close + to an agreement. The Soviets had made proposals and the U.S. had made counterproposals. While + certain issues related to the Backfire and cruise missiles still + remained unresolved, the two sides had significantly reduced differences + and an agreement was close.

+

Mr. Andrei then briefed Dr. + Brzezinski on the recent + visit of Chinese Party Chairman Hua Kuo-Feng to Romania. He stressed + that the visit was part of a general opening up on the part of China, + not just economically but politically, militarily and scientifically. A + PRC diplomatic offensive would be + coming up. Hua realizes that China is lagging behind and that it must + modernize. During the course of the visit Hua constantly asked Andrei detailed technical questions. + How was this made, how much did this cost, etc. In regard to the Soviet + Union, Mr. Andrei noted that the + PRC’s policy toward the USSR had not changed.

+

Dr. Brzezinski remarked that + Gromyko had been very + concerned about the Chinese-Japanese Friendship Pact and had also been + very concerned about Chinese contacts with Europe.See Foreign Relations, 1977–1980, vol. VI, + Soviet Union, Document 149.

+

Mr. Andrei replied that Romania + had informed the Soviets about Hua’s visit; it was not discussed at the + Crimea, however. The Soviet Union was particularly nervous because the + visit had been preceded by the signing of the Chinese-Japanese Treaty. + Mr. Andrei underscored the + importance the Romanians attached to preserving their independence. They + had not fought to exchange one master for another.

+

Dr. Brzezinski asked whether Hua + had said anything about U.S.-Chinese + relations.

+

Mr. Andrei said no, that the issue + had not come up. If it had, the Romanians would have informed the United + States. Relations with Albania, the non-aligned and Vietnam, inter alia, + were discussed.

+ +

Dr. Brzezinski asked whether Mr. + Andrei felt the U.S. should establish diplomatic relations + with Vietnam. He noted that Vietnam had dropped all conditions. They + were now ready to accept the U.S. + position and establish relations in U.S. + terms. How did Mr. Andrei think + that the Chinese would react to the establishment of relations between + the U.S. and Vietnam?

+

Mr. Andrei replied that he could + not speak for the Chinese. In his (personal) opinion, the Chinese had + not always acted wisely toward the Vietnamese. He did think, however, + that Vietnam would eventually reach an independent position. He also + noted that President Ceausescu + had urged Vietnam to establish relations with the United States.

+

Dr. Brzezinski then asked about + the situation in Cambodia and some of the stories of inhuman conditions + there.

+

Mr. Andrei noted that many of + these stories were true. The present leadership in Cambodia was not the + leadership Vietnam had hoped for. The regime was strong, however, and an + independent intermediary would be needed to help settle the dispute. In + conclusion, he emphasized that the situation was very complex, both + internally and externally.

+

Dr. Brzezinski again pressed Mr. + Andrei about the + establishment of diplomatic relations with Vietnam. Did he think it was + a good idea?

+

Mr. Andrei replied yes, he did. + While he could not speak for the Chinese, he felt they should realize + that it was not good to have Vietnam dependent on one power. The + establishment of relations with the U.S. + was not an anti-Chinese move and the Chinese should recognize this.

+

Dr. Brzezinski expressed the hope + that at some point he might be able to visit Bucharest. Mr. Andrei assured him he would be welcome. + Mr. Andrei then stated that he + had a request from President Ceausescu. The Romanians would welcome a short visit of + Secretary Vance or the President + when they were in Europe or the Middle East.

+

Dr. Brzezinski said he would bear + it in mind and would support such a request. He then thanked Mr. + Andrei for the opportunity to + discuss the various issues in such an open and frank manner.

+
+ +
+ 209. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in + RomaniaSource: National + Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign + Policy File, D780414–1133. Confidential; Priority, Exdis. Sent for information to + USUN. Drafted by Schmidt; cleared by Nimetz; approved by George H. + Mitchell in S. + + + + Washington, October 10, 1978, 2314Z + +

256604. For the Ambassador. Subject: The Secretary’s October 2 Meeting at + UNGA With Foreign Minister + Andrei.

+ +

Romanian Participants

+

Stefan Andrei, Foreign + Minister

+

Teodor Marinescu, Ambassador to the United Nations

+

Mircea Mitran, Special Assistant to the Foreign Minister + (Interpreter)

+

US Participants

+

The Secretary

+

Matthew Nimetz, Counselor

+

Carl Schmidt, Director, EUR/EE (notetaker)

+ +

1. Summary—Andrei stressed the + importance which President Ceausescu attaches to good US-Romanian relations and to + elimination of issues which impede their further development. Andrei said the fact that the US + allowed Pacepa to come here has created tensions, and he requested the + US to cease all “covert activities” against Romania. The Secretary said + we understand Romania’s concerns but we must now put this case behind + us. Andrei said Romania would + continue to strive to solve emigration problems in a humanitarian + spirit. He said some progress had been made in resolving export license + problems, but Romania wished to accelerate the process. The Secretary + indicated we had worked hard to make progress in this area and cited + recent consideration of a license for the Rom-Control Data joint venture + as a positive example. Andrei + appealed for more liberal treatment of Romanian exports. The Secretary + accepted in principle an invitation to visit Romania. He reiterated the + strong interest of the US in continuing to expand relations with + Romania, and expressed appreciation for Romania’s cooperative efforts on + various international issues. The Secretary and Andrei briefly reviewed the status of + the Camp David Accords, and issues involving Lebanon and Greece-Turkey. + End summary.

+

2. Introductory comments—Andrei + said he was aware how very busy the Secretary was, and therefore he was + especially grateful that he had made time available to meet. President + Ceausescu had asked him to convey, through the + Secretary, greetings of friendship to President Carter and best wishes for health and + success. Ceausescu recalled with + pleasure his most recent visit to the United States. Andrei gave the Secretary a book, on + behalf of Ceausescu, + commemorating the visit. The Secretary expressed appreciation and said + the President continues to talk about his meetings with President + Ceausescu and their + importance for relations between the two countries. The President + strongly believes that it was a most positive and constructive visit. He + had asked that his own warmest regards be conveyed to President + Ceausescu.

+

3. Bilateral relations—Andrei said + that, in a meeting with President Ceausescu just before leaving for the UNGA, he had directed Andrei to make clear that he intends to + carry out all of the understandings reached during his US visit both + with respect to bilateral cooperation and to international issues. + Ceausescu, Andrei said, attaches great importance + to good US-Romanian relations and to their further development. Based on + Ceausescu’s desire to create + the best conditions for development of relations and to eliminate + matters not consistent with this approach, Andrei said, he wished to present several issues in + which he would request our cooperation in eliminating. He would talk + openly as the Secretary and the President had talked with President + Ceausescu during his visit. + Andrei said the two countries + should not allow certain issues to cast a shadow over our good bilateral + relations. President Ceausescu + was convinced that President Carter would appreciate the constructive manner in which + these matters were being raised.

+

4. The Pacepa case—To be frank, Andrei said, the fact that the US Government has given + the right of entry and stay to Pacepa has created certain tensions, + especially in light of the personal, friendly relations established + earlier between the two Presidents. It was GOR’s view, based on its information, that Pacepa had + worked for the CIA for several years. + However, Andrei said, the US had + a different view on this question. Romania requested that the US cease + all types of such activities vis-a-vis Romania. It was not through such + covert actions, Andrei said, that + good bilateral relations had developed. Nor was it through covert + activities that Romania had contributed to establishment of US–PRC relations, to the negotiations to end + the Vietnam war, to direct contacts between Begin and Sadat and to a + general resolution of the Middle East conflict. Andrei said he was persuaded that the + Secretary understood these considerations.

+

5. The Secretary, in response, said the US understands Romania’s concerns + regarding the Pacepa case. President Carter believes strongly that we must now put this + matter behind us. Also, the Secretary said, he wished to reiterate his + strong interest and that of the President in continuing the excellent + relations which had developed between the US and Romania. With regard to + the Minister’s reference to cooperation on various international issues, the Secretary + said, this had been extremely helpful to us. We appreciated these + efforts and we would like to continue the beneficial exchange of views + through our Embassies on such issues as the PRC and the Middle East.

+

6. Divided families—Andrei + referred to emigration and said Romania had strived to solve emigration + problems in a humanitarian spirit and would continue to do so in the + future. The Secretary said he appreciated the Foreign Minister’s + initiative in mentioning this issue. As we had made clear in the past, + it was very important to us that humanitarian problems be addressed and + solved in a satisfactory way.

+

7. Trade—Andrei said he had + recently discussed with Nimetz + Romania’s interest in resolving export license problems. Some progress + had been achieved but Romania would still like to accelerate the process + for license approvals. Also, Romania would like to see more liberal + treatment of its exports to the United States. The Secretary said we had + worked hard to move forward in export licensing. We recognize the + importance of joint ventures and our recent decision concerning another + license for the Control Data Corporation joint venture was a good + example of our efforts in this regard.

+

8. Visit by the Secretary—Andrei + said President Ceausescu wished + to renew his invitation to the Secretary to make at least a brief visit + to Romania. Such a visit would have a positive impact on our relations + by helping to clear away issues which have arisen. It would also be a + visible sign that we were overcoming them. No less important, Andrei said, a visit would provide an + opportunity for a full discussion of international issues. Ceausescu would like to discuss with + the Secretary issues concerning the Middle East, Europe, and elsewhere. + The Secretary said he was pleased to accept the invitation in principle. + He would have to leave the question of timing to later, however, since + at the moment he was very occupied with follow-up to the Camp David + Summit and other matters.

+

9. International issues—Andrei + expressed appreciation for President Carter’s message following the Camp David Summit and + asked about the current situation. The Secretary said the follow-up + steps were moving as expected. Negotiations on the Sinai Agreement, + chaired by the US, would begin in Washington on October 12. He was + confident negotiations would move rapidly; there could be an agreement + between Israel and Egypt as early as mid-November. Responding to + Andrei’s questions, the + Secretary said King Hussein was + torn between joining in the negotiations on the West Bank and Gaza or + staying out to see what would develop. Hussein would have to be careful + but, the Secretary said, he believed he would begin to participate in a + careful and measured way. Regarding Palestinian refugees, the Secretary + said the US believes a meeting of all the concerned parties should be + convened to resolve the + problem. There has been too much talk and too little action. The + Secretary also expressed concern about the situation in Lebanon, noting + that the problem should be addressed in a comprehensive rather than + fragmented way. Andrei referred + to Greek-Turkish problems, and the Secretary noted that he had just seen + Cypriot President Kyprianou.See Foreign + Relations, 1977–1980, vol. XXI, Cyprus; Turkey; Greece, + Document 55. All the parties were in agreement that + a solution must be found regarding Cyprus. The Greek-Turkish dispute + concerning the Aegean was very difficult, the Secretary said, and he + suggested that Romania join with others in urging the two countries to + find a lasting resolution to these issues.

+

10. The Secretary and Andrei met + for almost 30 minutes. Immediately following their meeting, Counselor + Nimetz continued the + discussion of international issues with Andrei.No record of the + separate conversation was found. + Nimetz briefly described the + status of SALT negotiations, and + responded to several additional questions from Andrei concerning the Camp David + Accords and the Lebanese situation.

+ + Vance + +
+ +
+ 210. Editorial Note +

On November 22–23, 1978, the Warsaw Pact’s Political Consultative + Committee (PCC) met in Moscow to approve a report by Unified Warsaw Pact + Forces Commander in Chief Marshal Viktor + Kulikov and adopt a joint declaration on several aspects + of international affairs. The meeting in Moscow sought to reach + agreement on increased defense expenditures by Pact members to + countermand Soviet perceptions of an emerging imbalance of power between + the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the Warsaw Pact. Speaking at + the meeting, increasingly frail Soviet General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev cautioned that + “imperialism has now acquired an ally—today’s China.” Brezhnev continued: “They have already + begun to feed today’s China, to supply it with weapons, and to push it + toward hostile excursions against the socialist countries.” Setting out + Soviet expectations for the meeting, Brezhnev added “The NATO countries coordinate their actions carefully in the military sphere. And it + would be unforgivable if we did not do everything to ensure precise + coordination among the Warsaw Treaty countries on defense issues.” + (Mastny and Byrne, A Cardboard Castle?, pages 418–421)

+

Even before the meeting started, Romanian President Nicolae Ceausescu’s foreign policy + goals came at odds with the consensus of the other Warsaw Pact leaders. + In telegram 28013 from Moscow, November 16, the Embassy reported that, + according to a Romanian diplomat, the documents to be adopted at the + Moscow meeting were still being worked on and that if Bucharest had its + way “any documents adopted will be relatively non-polemical, + non-offensive, and generalized.” Disagreement, the telegram continued, + “exists primarily between the Soviets and Romanians on a number of + topics to be mentioned in the conference documents,” including “the + Middle East, Vietnam, and relations between socialist states.” (National + Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy + File, D780475–0330) The declaration, the Embassy in Moscow reported in + telegram 29052, November 27, focused primarily on disarmament and was + “less polemical than has been case in recent Soviet commentary on these + subjects.” The Embassy reported: The declaration was “also noteworthy + for what it omits. This is particularly true of its failure to attack + the Camp David Accords. If any doubt existed that Romania was + responsible for this deviation from the Soviet line, it was removed when + the other six PCC participants issued their supplemental declaration.” + (National Archives, RG 59, Central + Foreign Policy File, D780488–0757)

+

After the end of the Moscow meeting, the members of the Warsaw Pact + except Romania published a statement on the Middle East attacking the + Camp David Accords and restating their support for the Bagdad + Conference, the Arab League summit which denounced Sadat’s separate + peace with Israel and excluded Egypt from the organization. Romania’s + strong support for the Camp David Accords, despite Ceausescu’s previous reservations about + a limited Egyptian-Israeli understanding without inclusion of the other + parties, made it impossible to issue a unified Warsaw Pact statement. + Its publication without Romanian support underscored the tensions + between Bucharest and the other members.

+

A much stronger disagreement revolved around the presentation made by + Kulikov on the status of + Warsaw Pact forces, and especially on the proposal for agreement on + increased rights of the Pact’s Supreme Commander in war time. Following + Ceausescu’s return from + Moscow, the Romanian Communist Party Politburo met on November 24 to + discuss the results of the meeting. Describing for the Politburo the + Moscow meeting, Romanian Prime Minister Manea Manescu portrayed + Kulikov’s report as a result + of Soviet “militarist circles” created “for the purpose of justifying the arms race, the + so-called need to allocate high investments, to change the armaments in + all of the sectors [of the economy] as soon as possible, and to involve + the economic potential of all [Warsaw Pact] countries taking part in + this arms race.” (Minutes of the Political Executive Committee of the + Romanian Communist Party, November 24, 1978; Romanian National Archives, + CC RCP Chancellery Files, 89/1978. Published by the Cold War + International History Project) While agreeing to continue living by its + commitments under the 1955 Charter, the Politburo decided to continue to + oppose what it saw as Soviet attempts to interfere in its internal + affairs through demands for increased control, and to publicize its + positions on military matters and increase of military expenditures, an + unprecedented airing of Warsaw Pact internal disagreements.

+

Ceausescu “orchestrated public + explanation and support from RCP Political Executive Committee and + delegations from all social categories beginning with workers,” the + Embassy in Bucharest reported in telegram 8461, November 27. “Amid + cheering reminiscent of 1968 post-Czechoslovak invasion atmosphere,” + Ceausescu’s performance, the + Embassy wrote, “will do [him] no harm with Romanian population.” + (National Archives, RG 59, Central + Foreign Policy File, D780488–0150) Ceausescu’s December 1 speech, reported by the Embassy + in telegram 8603, December 1, “placed Romania’s differences with Warsaw + Pact allies on formal public record in a context designed to demonstrate + maximum national unity behind him.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + D780496–0373)

+

In telegram 8758 from Bucharest, December 7, the Embassy described + Ceausescu’s actions as the + result of “serious policy differences with Romania’s formal allies.” + Ceausescu, the Embassy + continued, was likely “under considerable pressure in the weeks leading + up to the Warsaw Pact summit.” Ceausescu’s decision to go public, the Embassy reported, + was a calculated gamble to elicit: “a) sympathy and support from the + West, China, and others; b) genuine Romanian national unity around + Ceausescu; and c) a chance to + expand substantially Romania’s maneuvering room on foreign policy at one + blow rather than by the usual small incremental steps.” The Embassy + concluded that Ceausescu “may see + an old and sick leadership in Moscow and the start of a succession + struggle there, a Soviet Union deeply absorbed in SALT negotiations with the United States + and profoundly concerned by a revitalized and outward-looking China, and + a collection of East European states, who, to a greater or lesser + extent, are reluctant allies of the Soviets and which may + not-so-secretly share some of Romania’s points of view. In such a + situation, small states can move decisively and successfully against big + ones, and Ceausescu has moved.” + “Any statement or other clear indication of U.S. support for Romanian independence would be especially effective and + appreciated at this time,” Aggrey suggested. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + D780505–0012)

+

In the context of increasingly public disagreements between Bucharest and + Moscow, the Carter administration faced the challenge of responding to + the increased Soviet pressure on Romania at a time when its own + relations with Bucharest were strained by the Pacepa affair in + particular and human rights disagreements in general. While Corneliu Bogdan, Director of the + Foreign Ministry Directorate for the Western Hemisphere, was in + Washington to negotiate a new cultural exchange agreement, the idea of a + high-level visit to Romania to underscore Washington’s support + crystallized. Since Secretary of Commerce W. Michael Blumenthal was in Moscow as part of a + European tour, the Assistant to the President for National Security + Affairs, Zbigniew Brzezinski, + informed him of President Carter’s desire that he visit Bucharest. (Telegram WH81569 + to Moscow, December 5; Carter Library, National Security Affairs, + Brzezinski Material, Subject + File, Box 7, Backchannel Messages: Europe: 12/78–5/78) The next day, + Brzezinski notified + Blumenthal by backchannel + message that “the President very willingly approved my recommendation + that you be asked to go,” and that “the Romanians understand and welcome + the political point of your visit and will be receiving you as a + Presidential emissary in this light.” Brzezinski also notified Blumenthal that Stephen + Larrabee of the National Security Council Staff would be + joining his party in Bonn prior to the departure for Bucharest. (Carter + Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 66, Romania: + 6/78–3/79) In telegram 308284 to Bonn, Moscow, and Bucharest, the + Department informed Secretary Blumenthal that his visit to Romania was a show of + support for Bucharest’s “constructive role in international affairs,” + and that the White House, would make a “low key announcement of visit at + the regular press briefing Thursday, December 7.” (National Archives, + RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + P840139–1696) For the announcement, see Public Papers: + Carter, 1978, Book II, page 2187.

+
+ +
+ 211. Memorandum From Stephen + Larrabee of the National Security Council Staff to the + President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)Source: Carter Library, National + Security Affairs, Brzezinski + Material, Country File, Box 66, Romania: 6/78–3/79. Secret. Sent for + information. Printed from an uninitialed copy. + + + Washington, December + 10, 1978 + + + SUBJECT + Summary Report on Secretary Blumenthal’s Trip to Romania, December 8–9, 1978 + (U) + +

Secretary Blumenthal is preparing + a report for the President on his trip to Romania and his discussions + while in Bucharest.Secretary Blumenthal’s report has not been + found. Blumenthal did + prepare a memorandum of conversation of his meeting with Andrei during the December 8 + reception. Andrei discussed + the Warsaw Pact meeting describing it as “extremely difficult” + because of the differences between Bucharest and Moscow on defense + budgets, relations with the PRC, + and the Camp David Accords. Concerning Soviet pressure on Romania, + Andrei told Blumenthal that the Romanians + “judged the risk to be small. Militarily, he said, ‘we are not + Czechoslovakia’ and ‘we have made certain preparations and would be + ready.’ Economic pressures, if they occur, would cause some + difficulty but Romania could handle them.” (Ibid.) However, I + thought it might be useful for me to give you a brief summary of the + trip and some of my own impressions. (U)

+

Bonn, December 7–8

+

Shortly after arriving, I was called to the American Embassy to brief + Secretary Blumenthal on the + background and purpose of his trip to Romania. Initially he was a bit + concerned about how the trip would be viewed in Moscow and its impact on + the improved atmosphere in US–Soviet relations which had been evident + during his talks with Brezhnev + and Kosygin several days + previously. He felt that some mention should be made of the economic + aspects of his trip, as this was his main responsibility. Moreover, the + Romanians themselves had suggested that the trip should be billed as an + exchange on economic as well as political matters.In telegram 308520 to Moscow, Bonn, and Bucharest, + December 7, the Department forwarded cleared Bucharest remarks for + Blumenthal. The + statement stressed that he was visiting Romania at President + Carter’s direction to + reaffirm “the importance we attach to Romania’s independence and to + U.S.-Romanian friendship.” The + visit was also to highlight “the value we place on the constructive + role that Romania plays in international affairs.” (National + Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign + Policy File, P840139–1710) Blumenthal responded to the White House in telegram + 22376 from Bonn, December 7, suggesting some changes. (National + Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign + Policy File, P850104–2477) He also suggested some changes in + the text of his arrival statement, including the elimination of the word + “independent” in the first + paragraph of the text.In telegram 30118 + from Moscow, December 7, Ambassador Malcolm Toon reported urging + Blumenthal to drop the + words “Romania’s independence” from the opening paragraph of his + Bucharest statement, since that phrase might strike the Soviets as + “signaling US intent to split Romania away.” (National Archives, + RG 59, Central Foreign Policy + File, P850061–1892) I resisted this change, arguing that (1) + it would weaken the initial impact of his statement; (2) the statement + had been cleared by you and I therefore could not make such changes. He + thereupon suggested calling you personally, which he did. You know the + results. (C)

+

After briefing the Secretary on the purposes of his trip and giving him + the general background to recent developments within the Warsaw Pact, I + attended several meetings at the West German MFA, which the American Embassy had set up. The first was + with Dr. Kuehn, Director for Soviet Affairs in the Foreign Office. The + discussion, conducted in German, centered on Soviet-West German + relations, their present state and future development. While useful, the + conversation provided no new key insights but rather served to confirm + already held impressions. The same was true of my meeting with Dr. + Joetze, Director for East-West Affairs in the Foreign Office. That + evening, I had dinner with Dick Smyser, the DCM at the Embassy and a good friend of Bill Griffith’s, + who had served on the NSC twice under + Kissinger. I departed the following morning for Bucharest. (U)

+

Bucharest, December 8

+

After making his initial arrival statement, which was well received by + the Romanians, Secretary Blumenthal held a half-hour meeting with Romanian + Foreign Minister Stefan Andrei. + This was more of a protocol meeting than anything else and served + essentially as a forum for Blumenthal to make some of the talking points, though in + abbreviated form. (My notes of the meeting are at Tab C.)Tab C is attached but not printed. The Embassy in + Bucharest reported the conversation to the Department of the + Treasury in telegram 8829, December 12. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + D780511–0990) (C)

+

The real substantive discussions took place in a private tête-à-tête meeting between Andrei and Blumenthal during cocktails before dinner. The Secretary + has prepared a report of this discussion for the President, which you + should see. The Secretary showed this report to me, and with his + permission, I have included the highlights here for you (Tab D). + (C)Tab D is attached but not printed. + See footnote 2 above.

+

During the pre-dinner cocktails, while Andrei was talking to Blumenthal, Mitran, the former DCM in Washington and now Andrei’s special assistant, pulled me aside for a + private discussion. His main purpose was to hammer home the point that has been made by almost + every Romanian official in the past two weeks: the need for a + reconsideration of the NATO commitment + to a 3 percent increase in defense spending, because this is being used + by the Soviet Union to justify increases in the Warsaw Pact defense + budget. In response to a question about Ceausescu’s reference in his December 1st speech to + “counter revolutionary activity” of some socialist states—which many in + the West saw as an indication of an attempt by Moscow to form a fifth + column in Romania—Mitran said that this was a reference not to Romania + but to the Soviet Union’s use of Vietnam as a proxy against China. He + also voiced concern about “alarmist” Western press reports which only + served to make things worse for Romania. This was not Czechoslovakia, he + emphasized. The Romanians knew what they were doing; they were not about + to commit suicide. They knew the limits. However, within these limits + they intended to stand firm.Responding to + December 8 reports in the Austrian daily Kronen-Zeitung suggesting that the Czechoslovak Ambassador + in Bucharest was engaged in an effort to overthrow Ceausescu at Soviet behest, the + Embassy in Bucharest reported in telegram 8859, December 13, that + there was no evidence to support the story. Nevertheless, the + Embassy expected the story to continue to surface. (National + Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign + Policy File, D780517–1037) (S)

+

It was obvious that our discussion, like Andrei’s conversation with Blumenthal, had not occurred by chance but had been + carefully planned, and that as “your” representative, I had been singled + out by Mitran for a message he hoped would be conveyed directly to you. + (C)

+

The official meeting with Andrei + was followed by another official meeting with Cornel Burtica, the Minister of Foreign + Trade, and a team of financial experts.In + telegram 8890 from Bucharest, December 15, the Embassy reported on + the meeting with Burtica. + (National Archives, RG 59, Central + Foreign Policy File, D780517–1167) The discussion, much of it + quite technical, revolved around economic matters. Burtica made a strong pitch for MFN on a permanent basis and more US + credits, arguing that the best guarantee of independence was a strong + economy. He also asked for expediting export licenses. Blumenthal made no commitments but + simply reiterated the basic desire of the US to expand economic + relations with Romania in areas where this was mutually beneficial. He + also gave Burtica a briefing on + President Carter’s inflation + program and its relationship to the stability of the dollar—a matter of + great interest to Romania since 70 percent of Romanian foreign trade is + in dollars. The Secretary also gave Burtica a rundown of his recent trip to the Middle East + and expressed his concern about developments in Iran. Interestingly, + Burtica said that Romania + agreed with the US position regarding the Shah. It did not want to see + anarchy or a vacuum in Iran and favored a stabilization of the Shah’s position. In fact, they were + trying to help by giving Iran some diesel oil, which it had requested. + (S)

+

Meeting between Blumenthal and Ceausescu, December 9

+

The next day the Secretary met with Ceausescu for a discussion which lasted about one and a + half hours. Besides myself, present were Romanian Foreign Minister + Andrei and US Ambassador + Aggrey. My notes of the + discussion are at Tab B.Attached but not + printed. The Embassy reported on the conversation in telegram 8808 + from Bucharest, December 10. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + D780509–0095) After Blumenthal presented the talking points, Ceausescu made a long speech in which + he: (C)

+ + —noted the improvement of Romanian-US relations recently, and + expressed his strong desire to see relations further broadened, + especially in the economic field. (However, he only obliquely + referred to MFN, in part because + this had been so extensively covered by Burtica in his talks with Blumenthal the day before); + (S) + —made a strong pitch for increased efforts towards disarmament + both in SALT and MBFR. In this regard, he called for a + re-examination of the decision taken at the May Summit to increase + NATO defense expenditures by 3 + percent; (S) + —called for a global solution to the Middle East talks and + appealed for a convocation of the Geneva conference with the + participation of Jordan, Syria and the Palestinians. This would + diminish the danger of Egypt’s isolation, which he saw as + increasing; (S)Ceausescu made the same points + in his September 23 letter to President Carter which was delivered by + Foreign Minister Andrei + to Brzezinski on + September 30. See footnote 2, Document + 208. + —noted Ethiopia’s willingness to grant Eritrea a degree of + autonomy within the framework of a unified Ethiopian state, and the + desire of the Ethiopian leadership to expand economic relations with + the US; (S) + —reiterated his country’s firm determination to continue to pursue + an independent policy, while remaining a member of the Warsaw Pact. + (S) + +

General Assessment

+

The visit was an important symbol of US support for Romania’s independent + policy and was greatly appreciated by the Romanians. While the symbolic + significance of the visit was in many ways more important than the + substance of many of the meetings, the trip offered a useful opportunity + to gain a clearer understanding of the dimensions of the dispute and the + issues that contributed to it. (C)

+

Unfortunately, there was little time to discuss the events of the past + weeks with the US Ambassador or the Embassy staff, whose substantive + reporting has been of a generally high quality. Such discussions at some + point would be quite useful. In fact the Ambassador expressed his desire for me to extend + my stay for this purpose. While this proved impossible this time, a + field trip at a later date—perhaps combined with stopovers in Warsaw and + Budapest—is worth considering. (C)

+

The Romanians were obviously very appreciative of the trip and US support + generally. (Indeed, as Blumenthal stepped off the plane on arrival, Mitran, + Andrei’s Special Assistant, + acted like a cheshire cat who had just swallowed a canary.) The visit + received substantial press treatment, though the Romanians were careful + not to overdo it. Despite his initial reservations, the Secretary proved + to be an effective and skillful envoy. He was open and businesslike in + his presentations and quickly established good rapport with all his + discussion partners. I was particularly impressed with his quick + learning curve and his intuitive political judgment. (C)

+

How the Soviets will react to the visit is difficult to determine at this + point. While its symbolic significance will hardly be lost on them, I + doubt that they will react too strongly publicly. Privately, they will + probably take the Romanians to task for it. But whatever their + irritation, it is hardly going to affect their basic attitude toward + outstanding US-Soviet bilateral issues such as SALT. They will continue to give these priority while + trying to paper-over differences with Romania. (C)

+

The Romanians clearly feel it is in their long-run interest to be able to + demonstrate as broad a range of support as possible, even if this + intensifies Moscow’s momentary ire. They have made a carefully + calculated gamble and are confident that they can handle the situation. + They do not, however, intend to push too hard. But they are determined + to maintain, and where possible expand, the bounds of autonomy. (C)

+

Within this framework, they are likely to look to the US for concrete + signs of support, especially in the economic field, as a means of + reducing their dependence on Moscow and decreasing their vulnerability + to Soviet pressure. We ought therefore to think carefully about the + degree of support and encouragement we are willing to give them and its + potential impact on other relationships, particularly those with Moscow. + (C)

+
+ +
+ 212. Telegram From the Embassy in Romania to the Department of + StateSource: National + Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign + Policy File, D790010–0944. Secret. Sent for information to DIA, Belgrade, East Berlin, Bonn, + Brussels, Budapest, London, Madrid, Moscow, Paris, Beijing, Prague, + Rome, Sofia, USNATO, and + Warsaw. + + + + Bucharest, January 9, 1979, 0622Z + +

138. Subject: Romanian Vulnerabilities and Soviet Leverage.

+

1. Introduction. There has been considerable speculation in recent weeks + since Ceausescu’s well-publicized + policy differences with Romania’s Warsaw Pact allies as to the kind and + extent of leverage the Soviet Union can exert on Romania to influence + Romanian behavior and where Romania’s vulnerabilities lie. We have + focused particularly on the middle range between totally ignoring + Romanian “deviations” to outright Czechoslovakia-style military + invasion. Following is an initial Country Team attempt to compile and + assess areas, actual or potential, where Soviets could exert leverage on + Romania. We would appreciate comments, particularly from Washington + Intelligence Community.In telegram 10206 to + multiple posts, January 13, the Department informed the Embassy that + it found the telegram stimulating and will be discussing it with + members of the Intelligence Community. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + D790018–0920) In telegram 23994 to Bucharest, January 29, the + Department reported that following the January 18 meeting chaired by + the NIO for the Soviet Union and + Eastern Europe, the judgment of the Intelligence Community was that + “barring radical new external events that could change the Soviet + calculus of cost and benefit, it is unlikely the Soviets would + accept the costs entailed by measures drastic enough to bring + Ceausescu to heel.” + (National Archives, RG 59, Central + Foreign Policy File, D790045–0130)

+

2. Political

+

A. Assassination of Ceausescu

+

As symbol of Romanian defiance of Soviet desires, one could argue that + physical removal of Ceausescu + could well serve Soviet interests. However, we consider such a move + alone as unlikely since there is no clear indication of what leader or + leaders would come to power under these circumstances and there is no + guarantee that a post-Ceausescu + leadership would be any more amenable to Soviet influence than he is. + Nevertheless, assassination could be a viable option as part of an + overall Soviet plan to invade Romania and/or to install a pro-Soviet + faction in the Romanian leadership as was done in Czechoslovakia. We + note that, while we may not take a possible assassination attempt + against Ceausescu too seriously, + apparently he does, since he is known to demand thorough and rigorous + personal security at all times.

+ +

B. Formation of a Pro-Soviet Faction

+

We must assume that one continuing goal of Soviet policy here is to + identify and encourage Romanians in such key organizations as the Party, + military, and security services to adopt pro-Soviet views and prepare + for or engage in pro-Soviet activities, albeit clandestinely. Although + neither we nor our Romanian sources can identify even incipient + pro-Soviet individuals, factions, or cliques does not mean they do not + exist: Case of General Serb a few years ago may have involved something + of the sort and recent brouhaha in Western and Czechoslovakia media + concerning Ambassador Hanak’s activities here suggest option is by no + means dead in all scenarios. In a true crisis situation, we would expect + such persons to surface, probably joined by the opportunists spawned by + any society ready to sell themselves in return for money or power. There + is some indication that Soviets would seek to exploit fertile ground + among some “pragmatic” Romanians who see no material advantage in terms + of rising internal standards of living stemming from Romania’s + independent foreign policy and who point to countries like Hungary and + even Bulgaria where foreign policy obedience to Soviets has brought a + degree of material benefits in return. Still, we believe that + anti-Sovietism is so deeply ingrained in Romanian populace and + particularly those holding leadership positions that a pro-Soviet group + would have little influence and could be sustained in power only at the + point of a Soviet gun.

+

C. Internal Subversion

+

Soviets could seek to foment gross dissatisfaction with Ceausescu’s internal policies and its + conversion into political action, resulting in internal chaos of type + Iran is presently experiencing. Potentially, Romania is particularly + vulnerable to economic disruption and to dissidence among the some two + million ethnic Hungarians living mostly in Transylvania. Yet to date, + while there is considerable complaining about shortages of goods and + glacially rising living standards as well as audible grumbling among the + Hungarians about perceived second-class status, there is no indication + that this discontent has reached point where it will spill over into + overt organized political action, or any real indication that Soviets + are seeking to foment such discontent in spite of near-universal + Romanian belief to the contrary. Engendering internal chaos or ethnic + hatreds is dangerous strategy with unforeseen outcomes, especially in + Communist countries with common land borders with Soviet Union, which + has its own problems in just these problem areas, and we doubt Soviets + would go very far down this road even though Romania could be torn apart + on either count. We do not see how a Romania in shambles would serve + Soviet interests, except as a prelude to invasion.

+ +

D. Discrediting and Isolating Ceausescu

+

We see this “containment strategy” as most likely Soviet course of + political action, first signs of which began appearing after Hua + Kuo-feng visit here in August and intensified in wake of Warsaw Pact + summit imbroglio in late November. Ceausescu is vulnerable to attacks from “orthodox” + Communists on his leadership style, cult of personality, his pretensions + to world leadership, widespread corruption among his underlings, foreign + policy “deviations,” defections of key personnel, and a variety of other + real and imagined items. Soviets and their friends have already expended + some effort in this direction, both in bilateral whispering campaigns + attacking Ceausescu’s + “demagoguery” and his “erratic” personality and in such multilateral + fora as recent Sofia ideological meeting on “real socialism” where + Romanians and a few others from Eurocommunist parties were isolated from + “mainstream” of the over 70 parties represented there. This effort could + easily increase and could go so far as to include intensive pressure in + interparty fora to condemn Ceausescu as an ideological deviationist as well as to + rally pro-Soviet friends in Third World to discredit Romanian efforts in + this arena. Further, since every political leader undoubtedly has some + skeletons in his personal closet, it is reasonable to assume that + Soviets know or could find out what some of them are and publicly air + them, to Ceausescu’s severe + personal and professional embarrassment. A concerted campaign of + disinformation and ridicule could fill in any missing links. Net result, + however, could well make Ceausescu even more stubborn and tenacious on policy + level without seriously threatening his hold on power. At level of + ideology and dogma, Romanian defensive positions are already well + prepared by years of dogged insistence on confirming and reconfirming + common foreign policy “principles” with all and sundry “Socialists.” On + another level, given centuries of experience in Balkan politics, we have + full confidence in Romanians to hold their own in any back-alley + in-fighting, aided and abetted by such parties as Chinese, Spanish, and + Japanese. In short, while such a campaign would be extremely unpleasant, + Ceausescu and company could + live with it, and probably win an even greater measure of Western and + Third World sympathy to boot. Nor do we believe that it would be in + Soviet interest to carry campaign to point that Ceausescu is painted as either an + unredeemable pariah or a hopeless buffoon since he does, after all, rule + a country which is of some strategic importance to Soviet Union and some + influence and reputation with variety of countries and parties, + including ruling parties, across face of globe.

+

3. Economic

+

The various steps that the Soviet Union might consider, supposing it were + interested in bringing pressure to bear on Romania, are:

+

1. Reducing imports and exports, either overall or selectively;

+ +

2. Launching a propaganda campaign designed to undermine confidence in + Romania’s financial and economic reputation. Such a campaign could be + focused on the international community and/or on the Romanian population + itself;

+

3. Undertaking to encourage, solicit or force allied or friendly + countries to join in economic actions against Romania.

+

A. Trade

+

Two-way trade between the Soviet Union and Romania constitutes some 17 + percent of Romania’s total trade activity. Although this figure is + large, reflecting the fact that the Soviet Union is Romania’s largest + single trading partner, it is not so large that complete disruption of + two-way trade would necessarily result in anything other than + short-term, if dramatic, dislocations. It is generally agreed that the + global figures mask special situations and sensitivities: Romania + imports no Soviet petroleum but is dependent to a large extent on the + USSR for coking coal and iron ore. + The trend, however, has been one of decreasing dependency in general and + specific declines in percentage terms of these two raw materials. Since + this is a key point, a bit of elaboration is probably useful.

+

The effect of a complete cutoff of trade between the two countries would + force Romania to undertake a crash program, supplementing its existing + policy of diversification of sources for imports of raw materials. + Existing commodity markets are such that coal and iron ore, for + instance, could be picked up quite quickly, although most probably at a + premium price if deliveries had to be made urgently. Over the longer + run, it is doubtful that the prices Romania would have to pay for these + raw materials would be substantially higher than those paid now to the + Soviet Union since they are pegged to Western market prices. The placing + of Romanian exports would probably be somewhat more problematic. + Something like a billion and a half dollars worth of goods are involved. + In the short run, that loss could be swallowed. In the longer run, it + could have, among other effects, that of inducing the production of + goods more acceptable in other markets.

+

A real possibility is selective cuts in trade such as simply holding up + shipments of replacement parts for Romanian factories which use + predominantly Russian-manufactured machinery. This kind of thing could + be done without much fuss and give rise to a whole set of important, if + temporary, dislocations.

+

B. Disinformation

+

The functioning of any economy is based on a set of relationships imbued + with a certain level of credibility. This fact of economic life is + particularly evident in the financial world, where rumors of currency + devaluation or looming bankruptcy can have a positively self-fulfilling + effect. The same thing + applies to less sensitive areas of economic life, particularly in a + country devoted to the suppression of economic facts, and thus to the + creation of myth, rumor and unhealthy ignorance. The effects of a policy + effectively denying the general populace much hard information on + economic reality is at least two sided: Untutored pessimism concerning + the future is chronic in the Romanian masses; on the other hand, and + illustrative of a general advantage of manipulation of news, the GOR, through clever publicity of the + Pitesti refinery accident, has induced savings in consumption well + beyond those merited by the magnitude of the accident. This raises a + general point about the ability of anyone to engage in effective + disinformation activities: Overuse and abuse, the effect of any increase + in the level of any campaign would be hard to predict. Romanian’s since + [sense?] of truth and language has been + brutalized to such a degree that the utility of further brutalization of + fact or language might well be triflingly marginal.

+

This observation also would bear on any disinformation campaign launched + by other Socialist states: having criticized Romania’s system of + economic development and management so severely (albeit privately) and + for so long, credibility is low. The vast and even hopeless + mismanagement of their own economic affairs also tends to make listeners + rather skeptical.

+

C. Joint Action

+

The possibility of inducing other COMECON members to join in economic sanctions, whether so + labelled or not, does not seem very real at this point. It should be + noted, however, that the effect of serious cuts in trade between all + members of COMECON and Romania + would be positively devastating. The notion that it is not a realistic + possibility is based in logic, not information. There is no doubt that + the lack of symmetry in relations between members of COMECON, particularly between the + USSR and all other members, + collectively or individually, is gross, increasing and constitutes a + most difficult and sensitive issue. Illustration: Poland’s reaction to a + suggestion or directive that it cut coal supplies to Romania is highly + unpredictable. It would run into political imponderables, such as are + involved in all relations between super and small powers, as well as + bump up against one of the inherent weaknesses of the non-market economy + system, i.e., the system is turgid, slow to react and in general + inflexible. Poland could certainly place the coal elsewhere, but how + well could it get along without the Romanian imports it currently + receives in return? While Bulgaria might go along with trade cuts, total + or selective, the reaction of all other states, who may frequently have + been “silent partners” in Romanian dissenting positions within COMECON and WP conferences, might be nastier than generally imagined + and begin a process of unravelling of intra-COMECON bilateral trade arrangements and balances that would be difficult to control. + The Romanian disease might spread—even dangerously—as an effect of + measures to quarantine it. Less hypothetically, there has been no + indication of EE reluctance to continue, + or even to expand economic exchanges with Romania in post-Warsaw Pact + summit period of negotiations of trade protocols.

+

The other (non-EE) client states of the + Soviet Union typically have only token economic relations with Romania. + Other states with considerable Soviet influence most probably would not + agree to cutting back on mutually beneficial economic relations.

+

In economic terms, trade is the single area in which potentially + effective levels exist. Financial arrangements between Socialist + countries appear to provide little room for leverage. This is so because + financial accounts are typically settled over a medium-term period of + not more than [five] years, and there is a good + deal of attention to balancing as one goes along. This is certainly so + in Romania’s case. The remaining area, economic cooperation, has been + one of particular sensitivity to Romanians for the last 20 years. For + all practical purposes, Romania has refused to undertake joint + manufacturing ventures which would make any part of their economy + permanently dependent on inputs from any other Socialist country. In + some cases, they have entered into such ventures, but only with + agreement that the arrangement be temporary, pending the development of + Romania’s ability to produce the item independently (articulated busses + from Hungary, etc.). If there is a single weakness in the Romanian + economic scene which is truly remarkable, it is this urge to autarchy. + Romania’s true enemies would egg them on in their mania of producing + everything from widgets to BAC 1–11s, RR motors, and kitchen + utensils.

+

The ambivalent effect of economic boycotts are well known. In the case of + economic boycott of Romania, selective or total, there surely would be + strange political effects, too. In the short term, for instance, the + FRG would probably fill a large + part of any economic gap. It is close, it is highly responsive + economically, and might harbor some sort of sympathy. Would the Soviets + favor renewal of greater German economic/political influence in this + part of the world? The Chinese would feel compelled to put up more than + posters on liberty wall. China trade is big now, and presumably could be + swelled, at least temporarily, to fill unanticipated gaps in deliveries + of, for example, coal.

+

4. Science and Technology

+

A. Training

+

The Romanians and the Soviets have a history of cooperation in S&T + area dating from end of WWII. Many thousands of Romanian scientists and + technicians were trained in the USSR + and indeed, Romanian industrial development owes much to Soviets in this + regard. However, since the mid-60’s the Romanians have moved towards the + West for the technology they + need and for a number of years (five or six) were sending a considerable + number of Romanians to the U.S. and + other Western nations for education and training. This has now tapered + off, though there is a steady flow of Romanians who go to U.S. and elsewhere on short visits in a + number of technological rather than scientific areas. In short, the + Romanians no longer rely on the Soviets for training or technology and + in some areas are their peers.

+

B. New Technology

+

There is no P&T area (except military weaponry) where the Romanians + have not protected themselves from Soviet leverage by developing ties + with other non-CEMA countries. In + nuclear area, Romanians have opted for Canadian type reactor (CANDU) + which uses natural uranium for fuel. Romania does have some uranium. + Deal with Canadians provides + for fuel and heavy water. Thus, Romanians have effectively insulated and + isolated themselves from USSR and + other CEMA nations which are building + the Soviet light water reactor. This is not to say that Romanians do not + benefit from their S&T agreement with Soviets, only that it is not + critical enough for the latter to use as an effective lever.

+

5. Military

+

A. On the extreme end of the spectrum, the Soviet Union has the military + capability to intervene in Romania, depose Ceausescu, and install a regime subservient to Soviet + interests. However, we consider such a course of action as highly + unlikely except under the gravest of circumstances. Ceausescu has shown himself to be a + master of judging limits of Soviet tolerance and not exceeding them, and + we have no reason to expect that in the future he will either so grossly + violate these limits or so lose control of internal events as to trigger + a Soviet military takeover. Further, for years Romanians have diligently + been seeking to up the CTT to Soviets of any blatant misbehavior toward + Romania—hyperactivity in UN and other + international fora, courtship of Third World, close and increasing ties + with the West, excellent relations with all shades of Communist and + other “progressive” forces, doctrine of a people’s war against “any” + foreign aggressor. How much of this is bluff is impossible to gauge, and + how effective all of this would be in deterring Soviets in a real crunch + is open to question. Nevertheless, Romanian message is quite clear—there + would be no free ride for Red (or any other) Army into Bucharest, and + costs of such action in terms of wider interest would outweigh any + limited benefits attained thereby.

+

B. In a Yugoslav-Bulgarian agitation or Yugoslav invasion scenario, + Soviet units could move rapidly via the Odessa-Varna ferry route. + However, first commitments would probably be airborne and air + transportable units which can move on short order to any point in + Balkans. Important point in this scenario is that while Soviets have + more open capability to avoid transitting Romania, they probably would + not. If moving to aid + Bulgarians against Yugoslavs, why not kill two birds with one stone and + roll the tanks over Romania? In this case, logistics support troops must + be stationed in Romania which would amount to occupation force.

+

C. While Romanian military pledges undying allegiance to Ceausescu, and while he has a good + track record in capturing and keeping military support in internal + politics, possibility that Soviets can establish faction in military + favorable to their interest should not be excluded. It may be harder to + find pro-Soviets in military than in party, but, on other hand, decades + of close cooperation have left their mark, and Romanian military + weakness in any confrontation scenario will presumably incline some + officers to join where they cannot resist. The emergence of a pro-Soviet + faction is of course most likely in case of military intervention, but + could also take place as result of severe discreditation campaign + against Ceausescu.

+

D. In military/economic sphere, Ceausescu would not hesitate to throw most of the + military into an economic endeavor such as mining if shortages and + strikes emerged. He has a sizable labor force potential in the + military.

+

E. Romania is vulnerable in its military supply relationship with Soviet + Union. Romania’s weapons and equipment inventory are all Soviet except + for some Shanghai class patrol boats. If the Soviet Union and other + Warsaw Pact country suppliers closed the valve, Romanian military + capability to conduct and sustain any type of operation would be sorely + limited. For example, MiG aircraft (and the Romanians reportedly have + the latest MiG–23’s) require huge inventories of spares [garble—across + board?] the entire system (aircraft plus control radars plus weapons). + The Soviets can effectively control utilization through their supply + systems. The Romanians now seek to overcome this dependency. Hence come + efforts to produce ground support aircraft (Jurom), tanks (improved + version of Soviet T–55’s), artillery, small arms and ammunition with + Yugoslavia. At best, however, Romanian efforts amount to “improved + obsolesence.”

+

6. Conclusion

+

A. Although Romania and Ceausescu + are vulnerable on such questions as ethnic Hungarian discontent and + internal economic disruption, we currently see no indications that the + Soviets are using these vulnerabilities to try to influence Romanian + behavior. Likewise we do not believe other Romanian vulnerabilities such + as military supply dependence on Soviet Union and relative isolation + within that portion of world Communist movement controlled by Soviets, + can be translated into effective leverage for the Soviets to influence + Romanian behavior. Consequently, Soviet expressions of displeasure and + anger over Romanian bearbaiting probably ring rather hollow to Ceausescu. He must realize that, with a few exceptions, there is + relatively little that Soviets can do to exert the kind of intolerable + pressure to which Romanians must bend.

+

B. Finally, not even the most hard-line Soviet ideologist can claim that + Ceausescu is other than an + orthodox Communist who is in no way “soft on capitalism,” and that he + and his Communist Party are not in total control of all aspects of + Romanian life, as Dubcek and his colleagues were not. Kinds of things + Ceausescu espouses in his + foreign policy “deviations”—disarmament, a more equitable distribution + of world resources, Third World causes—are items which Soviets can + hardly disavow and in fact do vow. Ceausescu’s genius is in exploiting gap between Soviet + rhetoric and actual behavior.

+

C. While this is clearly uncomfortable and annoying to Soviets, it is not + yet dangerous enough to them that they have begun—at least as far as we + can see—to take steps (plotting assassination or a military invasion, + forming a pro-Soviet faction, fomenting unrest among the Hungarian + minority or intentionally severely disrupting Romania’s economy) that + could lead to Ceausescu’s + downfall. The reason for this, we believe, is that Ceausescu has been careful not to + confront Soviets on a question they would see as vital to their national + security (e.g. leaving the Warsaw Pact). It could be, however, that + Ceausescu’s recent further + tilt toward China (a country about which the Soviets are paranoid) and + his advocacy of no increase in Warsaw Pact defense expenditures have + moved him perilously close to areas which the Soviets do see as vital to + their national security.

+

D. Also it should not be forgotten that Ceausescu also needs the Soviets, both as ultimate + military guarantor for maintaining a Communist system in Romania and as + an object to bait in international arena to increase his domestic + political position as a Romanian nationalist leader.

+

E. Consequently, we forsee no basic change in this relationship, even + given periods of rather intense strain such as the present, barring a + gross and unlikely miscalculation by either side.

+ + Aggrey + +
+ +
+ 213. Telegram From the Embassy in Romania to the Department of + StateSource: Department + of State, INR/IL Historical + Files, Box 11, Bucharest. Secret; Roger Channel. + + + + Bucharest, June 8, 1979, 0827Z + +

3629. Subject: Vulnerability of Ceausescu Regime to Destabilizing Forces or Events. Ref: + State 38873.Not found.

+

1. (S-entire text).

+

2. Summary: We conclude that Ceausescu administration in Romania is facing no + challenge so severe as to threaten regime stability now or in immediate + future and that so far it has demonstrated the requisite flexibility to + defuse successfully those pressing problems that require response. + Principal internal stains stem from total centralization of party/state + power and forced-draft program of rapid industrialization, but to date + (except in isolated instances) economic discontent has not been + translated into overt protest or other political action, and we do not + expect that it will do so. Conflict could arise if, in 1985 when Romania + is supposed to attain “medium-developed” status thereby vitiating regime + demands for continued sacrifice, relaxation of tight controls and + provision of visible and significant material benefits does not ensue. + Groups with ability to cause most significant internal disruption are + the sizeable ethnic Hungarian minority and an increasingly + class-conscious industrial + proletariat, followed by a sullen internal security apparatus. Several + social problems may also force themselves into forefront, including + redefinition of tradeoff between personal competency and political + reliability for rising professional/technical group and resolution of + centuries-old abysmal situation of gypsies. Finally, we see no + significant external forces or actors which presently affect Romanian + internal affairs, although Hungary and Soviet Union could exert + destabilizing influences. In unlikely event of outright Soviet military + invasion, all bets are off. End summary.

+

Internal Political and Social Strains

+

3. Principal internal strains faced by Ceausescu regime stem from centralization of state and + party power and forced-draft program of rapid industrialization which + GOR has been pursuing for at least + fifteen years and which is designed to make Romania a “medium-developed” + nation by 1985. Willful political decision was made to forego any rapid + increase in living standards and material consumption in favor of + accumulation and reinvestment (approximately one-third of national income in 1978), and this + decision has been pursued relentlessly. Regime believes, possibly + correctly, that necessary concomitant is what Ceausescu terms “order and discipline”, + i.e. maximum party/state direction of the process and control over + social forces unleashed by modernization process to avoid any disruption + of maximum national effort required for rapid development in a hostile + world. Net result is a paternalistic authoritarian state whose official + rhetoric is heavily flavored with appeals to all to produce and + over-produce for the sake of the country and future generations, and + whose repressive apparatus stands ready and is occasionally used to + coerce recalcitrants into line.

+

4. While inefficiencies, misallocations, and uncertainties of + industrialization program have triggered massive grumbling, apathy, + malingering, passive sabotage and corruption among Romanian populace, + except in such isolated instances as the Jiu Valley coalminers strike in + August 1977, economic discontent has not to date been translated into + overt protest or other political action. In spite of some indications to + contrary (see labor section, para. + 17), we do not believe it will do so in foreseeable future, at least to + point of endangering regime stability. Part of explanation lies in + “Romanian character” formed over centuries. Tradition of democracy as we + know it, or of citizen initiative and individual action, is very weak + here; on contrary, Romanians have learned the hard way to accommodate to + demands of whatever regime is in power and to do the minimum necessary + to keep the authorities off their backs. It is the ability of Romanians + to outwit, distort, and subvert government edicts that makes life human + and livable under this and previous regimes. In short, this is a nation + of survivors, not heroes.

+

5. Massive economic failure caused either by domestic mismanagement, + which we view as unlikely, or by external factors would create a new and + much more explosive situation, especially if living standards actually + began to drop instead of rising as they are now, albeit at a snail’s + pace. More pertinently, a GOR failure + to start providing workers and others with respite from constant + government pressure upon and supervision over individual lives as well + as visible and significant material benefits in 1985, the year Romania + allegedly attains its “medium developed” status, could also lead to + important instability unless GOR could + convincingly put blame on external forces or circumstances such as a + world-wide economic crisis.

+

6. Neither population growth nor urbanization constitute significant + stress factors now or in foreseeable future. The former is low in spite + of active GOR encouragement of bigger + families, and the latter is rigidly regulated through an effective + system of internal migration controls by a regime determined to avoid + hazards of uncontrolled growth.

+ +

Ceausescu’s Leadership Style

+

7. During the fourteen years Nicolae + Ceausescu has been in power, he has centralized decision + making in his own person, extended party/state control over all sectors + and aspects of Romanian life, consolidated his own position so that + today he is the unchallenged master of the entire party/state apparatus, + moved systematically to prevent any rival groups or persons emerging as + viable contenders for power, and established a cult of personality + unrivaled within Warsaw Pact area in its extent and intensity since + Stalin. Such a picture has led some observers (e.g. RFE Background Report 212, September 27, + 1978)In a September 27, 1978, + Background Report on Romania, Patrick Moore of Radio Free Europe + argued that Romania was facing a crisis of leadership, compounded by + Ceausescu’s preference + for fast, immediate solutions rather than more considered responses. + (Open Society Archives, Records of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty + Research Institute, Publication Department, Background Reports, Box + 52, Folder 5, Report 56. HU OSA 300–8–3–52–6–56, Budapest, + Hungary) to conclude that Ceausescu has thus isolated himself from Romanian + reality, is insensitive to changing conditions, and may therefore be + unable to cope successfully with future destabilizing forces and + events.

+

8. We do not agree. We view Ceausescu as an extremely able and pragmatic politician + who has shown the requisite flexibility, including concessions and + backtracking when necessary, to defuse potentially explosive situations + (e.g. Jiu Valley), maintain power, overcome opposition, and advance his + own policies. Strategies to meet new challenges are today being + incorporated into preliminary planning for Quinquennial Party Congress + scheduled for late 1979. Role he has defined for himself is the classic + one of enlightened but absolute despot, and Romania has had + predominately despotic governments since time immemorial, although many + rulers were neither enlightened nor Romanian. We are reliably informed + that Ceausescu really does read + position papers, absorb details of projects, and listen to advice. + Persons out of favor are not purged, killed, disgraced, or otherwise + turned into martyrs, but are isolated in some honorific job with no + important functions (General Ion Ionita, Emil Bobu) or are otherwise + buried in the system (Trandafir Cocirla, Constantin Babalau); indeed, it + is not unusual to find such persons eventually returning to important + positions after serious reverses in their careers (e.g. new Party + Secretaries Ilie Radulescu and Dumitru Popa). Ceausescu’s blend of fervent + nationalism coupled with foreign policy independence and activism is + still widely endorsed by most Romanians even if it may be wearing thin + for some. Personal popularity in Western sense of public opinion ratings + of a leader’s performance is not a relevant consideration here except + within extremely broad limits, and Ceausescu’s personal standing among populace [garble] + could plummet drastically without seriously affecting either his basic acceptability as despot + or his ability to govern. He is honest, works extremely hard, is + omnipresent, engages in frenetic activity (sometimes we suspect for its + own sake), all of which creates an image of concern, of things + happening, and of forward movement. Countless mass rallies and + provincial trips promote what Ceausescu terms “socialist democracy” and are designed + to give important groups and citizenry in general a sense of + identification with regime and Ceausescu personally, while total control is retained. + Ceausescu has carefully + nurtured a number of separate and sometimes competing systems to provide + information from grass roots to him, result of which is that he is + probably as well informed as any ruler can be within limitations of a + 24-hour day. Yet he has also institutionalized a mechanism whereby + ordinary citizens can address petitions for redress of grievances + directly to him, thereby furthering the useful image that he is just and + will see that justice is done if only a way can be found to bypass the + stupid and perhaps venal advisors around him who keep the “truth” from + him. Finally, he has successfully implanted belief among all Romanians, + perhaps also wearing a little thin, that price for Romania’s foreign + policy independence from Soviets is internal orthodoxy: While we view + this as a myth and believe Ceausescu could liberalize substantially without + incurring Soviet wrath, such a premise is extraordinarily helpful in + muffling dissent and insuring the “order and discipline” he feels + necessary to achieve his ambitious economic goals. Some senior advisors + (e.g. PM Verdet, FonMin + Andrei) are now privately + expressing a variant, arguing that present controls must be maintained + until economic development has been attained, and implying that + realization can take place thereafter.

+

9. Withal, Ceausescu has his + weaknesses, but we do not consider them either singly or in combination + as overly dangerous to stability of his regime. He is vain; he can make + shoot-from-the-hip snap judgments and decisions which adversely affect + achievement of goals he seeks to accomplish; reliability of information + on domestic developments and policy alternatives he is provided depends + on candor of his advisers, a trait his style does not encourage; his + toleration of son Nicu’s aberrations vividly illustrates adage that, in + this society of alleged equals, there are those who are more equal than + others. In his major departure from pragmatic politics, he fervently + believes in creating the new Communist man—a person technically + competent to perform in a modern economy but ideologically motivated by + the tenets of “revolutionary communism”. This is a tough task anywhere, + and more so here where Romanians have historically been generally + indifferent to ideologically based doctrines of human behavior; while + the education system and the creative arts have suffered, most Romanians + do not take this element seriously and have shrugged it off as a + personal idiosyncrasy of their otherwise quite rational ruler.

+ +

A Post-Ceausescu Romania

+

10. In any political system heavily centralized around a single strong + leader, question inevitably arises as to effect of the leader’s + disappearance. This is particularly acute for Communist systems in which + there is no agreed mechanism for transferring power from one leader to + the next. In Romania, we believe that such a transition would be less + difficult and destabilizing than in most other similar systems. While + admittedly Ceausescu has made no + provision for his own succession and there are no heir apparents, there + is a group of a dozen or so third-string leaders (there is no second + string) of approximately same age (around 54), outlook and experience + whom we would expect to form a genuine, albeit temporary, collective + leadership, using RCP Political Executive Committee (POLEXCO) as a + framework and pledged to carrying out the policies of the fallen leader + and to honor his memory. Mrs. Ceausescu would be a member of this group but, in spite + of her undeniably immense influence today and probably ambitions for + tomorrow, we would not expect her to inherit her husband’s mantle since + we consider her power derivative rather than autonomous. She is also + loathed by nearly all other major power actors. Eventually a new strong + leader would emerge from this group and would probably become something + like the new despot. We believe that this person is today a full or + candidate member of POLEXCO and that anyone who is not stands no real + chance of winning succession sweepstakes. We have pointed out earlier + (Bucharest 1224)In telegram 1224 from + Bucharest, February 26, the Embassy reported on the prospects of the + Romanian Communist Party leadership. The Embassy suggested that + outside of accidents or unexpected illness, the top echelon of the + party leadership was likely to remain in power for the foreseeable + future. “If they are removed,” the Embassy concluded, “it will be + because of political reasons, most likely associated with the + relative favor they enjoy with Ceausescu, rather than because of death or + sickness.” (National Archives, RG + 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790088–0028) the remarkable + homogeneity, relative youth, and excellent health of present 41 members + of POLEXCO (with a couple of exceptions), and we conclude that, barring + political accident, most of these persons will hold significant + positions for the next fifteen years. This is striking stability at the + top leadership level. Who, specifically? With due regard for hazards of + prediction, we suggest, Ilie Verdet, Virgil Trofin, Paul Niculescu, and + Cornel Burtica as most likely + with Ion Iliescu and Gheorghe Pana as our favorite dark horses.

+

Opposition Forces

+

11. There are no opposition forces to current regime, either in country + or expatriate, of any importance. There are probably some individuals, + including some in relatively high party/state positions, who may not be + totally enchanted with each and every policy of Ceausescu and who would do some things differently if + they had the opportunity, but we consider it highly unlikely that any of + these persons could or would mount a challenge to Ceausescu. There are no expatriates of + political significance, and it seems to be rule here that expatriation + rapidly causes loss of whatever influence the person may have had within + Romania (e.g. dissident author Paul Goma, now neutralized and sputtering + impotently in Paris). Only individual of real stature not part of + current regime or neutralized by it is former Prime Minister Ion + Gheorghe Maurer who, at 77 and in fragile physical (but not mental) + health, is universally considered to be too old to play a major role in + Romania’s future.

+

Security Forces

+

12. Security forces in Romania consist basically of regular military, + para-military internal security + (Securitate), and uniformed police (militia). Regular military is most + important and seems to accept party control and civilian supremacy as + embodied in POLEXCO and Ceausescu. Military are deeply involved in internal Romanian + affairs and play a substantial and visible role in economic and social + life—harvesting crops, supervising construction of Danube-Black Sea + Canal and Bucharest metro, indoctrinating a largely conscript army in essentials of + nationalism/patriotism. We have looked in vain for evidence of + military’s political role and its influence upon internal decision + making, but we assume it must be substantial albeit perhaps passive. + Lack of hard information in this area is probably single biggest gap in + our knowledge of Romanian internal political dynamics.

+

13. Internal security forces, as distinguished from professional + military, constitute one of few potential elements of institutional + disloyalty and therefore instability. Ceausescu’s principal power rival in mid-1960’s, + Alexandru Draghici, headed this organization; after Ceausescu’s triumph, with support from + uniformed military, Draghici’s supporters were replaced by Ceausescu loyalists and entire + organization has suffered a continuing and notable diminution in its + power since then, accelerated in last year by Pacepa defection. + Nevertheless, internal security forces should be considered armed and + dangerous. Ceausescu still does + not trust this organization—nor is he pleased with its work, as shown by + relatively frequent and sharp Presidential criticism—and it is kept on a + short leash. In spite of general anti-Soviet bias of most Romanians, + including security officials, and constant stress on organization’s role + in preventing internal subversion, Securitate resentment at erosion of + its pre-Ceausescu status of a + state within a state, coupled with greatly reduced opportunities for + personal plunder of its members, could provide elements which Soviets or + some future Romanian contender for power could potentially mobilize and + use, although any such attempt would likely result in major and active + conflict with the military. Similarly, and decision by Ceausescu, unlikely as it seems now, to “unleash” the + Securitate would be an invitation to conflict.

+

14. Militia as an organization is not now and is unlikely to be in the + future a significant power group. Nevertheless, given fact that every + hamlet in Romania has its town policeman or two, often the only + governmental authorities permanently on the scene, acquiescence by + militia in government policies is essential for internal + administration.

+

Mass Media

+

15. All Romanian mass media are totally under party and, therefore, + Ceausescu control and + consequently constitute no destabilizing threat. Because of the + resulting towering dullness, incompleteness, and distortion, however, + Radio Free Europe (RFE) has won here + the highest percentage of listenership in any East European Country and + is the USG program with single most + significant impact on Romania. RFE’s + power to make Romanians aware that there are viable alternatives to + present regime policies, even within a Communist system, as well as its + news broadcasts on domestic events not covered by Romania media, + terrifies Ceausescu regime + concerning RFE’s potential to + instigate, focus, and mobilize anti-regime discontent, and causes + Romanian officials even now to regard RFE as a major destabilizing force. To an extent they are + right.

+

Labor Groups

+

16. Official labor organizations are totally tame and are under complete + party/state control; their only real function is to act as moderately + important transmission belts of orders and policies from top down. There + is no threat here, even under extreme circumstances.

+

17. Nevertheless, as Marx correctly noted and Jiu Valley miners have + demonstrated, industrial workers have potential for militancy. GOR’s industrialization program is now two + decades old, and first influx of workers in new industries who were + fresh-from-the-farm peasants dazzled by bright city lights are beginning + to be replaced by their less rustic children who could form a classic + industrial proletariat. GOR officials + are increasingly aware of this situation, but regime has yet to develop + effective policies to deal with it although year-old “new economic + mechanism,” still only partially implemented, is designed in part to + meet some worker concerns. Grievances of kind familiar to Western trade + union leaders do already exist, and ad hoc organizations could spring up + to seek their redress, as in Jiu Valley affair and more recent “free + trade union” (SLOMR) incident. As shown by both examples, however, + GOR would have quickly and + efficiently to defuse situation and destroy any incipient organization + capable of serving as vehicle for expression of complaints of workers + and others. While we therefore believe that in immediate future GOR + will face from labor sector no + challenge that it cannot control, regime may be in race with time to + complete industrialization/development program and begin disbursement of + substantial material rewards before embryonic worker militancy flowers + and spreads as it has, for example, in Poland.

+

18. Scientists, academicians, technicians, sub-managers, career + bureaucrats, and other professionals are crucial to success of Romania’s + modernization effort. Aware of this, regime has been generally + successful in providing them with status, facilities, promotion + opportunities, and material rewards. Nevertheless, there are indications + that at least some of these persons feel their talents are underutilized + and insufficiently recognized, especially in a situation in which + political reliability is still a more important criterion for + advancement than individual competence in situations where one of these + two elements is missing. Consequently, while Romania’s late start at + intensive modernization-cum-industrialization has probably postponed the + conflict between technocrats and apparatchiks generally predicted for + this type of society, as emphasis switches more and more to quality + rather than quantity this problem could become more acute. June 7 + appointment of Elena Ceausescu as + President of National Council of Science and Technology will not + help.

+

19. Peasants traditionally have constituted most exploited and most + explosive element in Romania (e.g. 1907 Peasant Revolt), but postwar + industrialization program has changed situation radically and sapped + countryside of its destabilizing potential. Agricultural labor force now + consists preponderantly of women and old men, as young male (and many + female) workers have been absorbed by industry. Further, conditions in + the countryside today are light years better than they have ever been, + with schools, health care, decent housing, roads, electricity, and + potable water systems extended into all areas of the country.

+

Youth and Students

+

20. Communist Youth Organization (UTC) and Communist Students Association + (UASCR) are all-encompassing organizations controlled by the adult party + for which they serve as a principal training and recruitment ground. In + spite of some differences in style and outlook, they have shown little + tendency to strike out on their own as party youth movements have in + other countries; they probably could not do so here even if they wanted + to. Nor have we detected any inclination to form ad hoc groups outside + UTC/UASCR framework around specific issues or personalities. As a rule, + Romanian youth/students are not a volatile element as compared to + similar groups elsewhere. Concerned about career opportunities and a job + assignment system rigorously based on academic achievement, most + Romanian students have neither time nor energy to become involved in + non-conformist activities + which could jeopardize their entire future. Further, Romanian system can + generally absorb and reward its high school and university + graduates—especially those trained in technical/scientific skills, as + most are—so that there are no more than isolated problems of the + unemployed, and therefore restless, intellectual.

+

Religious Groups

+

21. Leadership of all fourteen recognized denominations follow rule of + “rendering unto Caesar”, except that in Romania Caesar’s share is + significantly larger than elsewhere. In return, religious leaders + become, de facto, coopted into the ruling establishment and are + therefore unlikely to challenge it seriously. Moreover, Romanian + Orthodox Church, which is the overwhelmingly dominant denomination, has + no tradition of militancy on temporal issues and an unbroken record of + accommodating itself to whatever government is in power. Dissidents + within established denominations, particularly Baptists and other + proselytizing neo-Protestants, do have some potential for causing + disruption and are more difficult to coerce or buy off, but GOR, often acting through official + denomination leaders, has been successful so far in confining religious + dissidence to limited and generally harmless manifestations. While there + are a few unrecognized and therefore technically illegal denominations, + they exert little influence and have not been so grossly persecuted as + to engender a revenge mentality. Largest group in this category is Greek + Catholic (Uniate) Church, which was officially abolished by GOR in 1948 and forceably merged into + Orthodox Church; although scattered pockets of sub rosa Uniates still + exist, they are quiescent and show no tendency to attempt to reclaim by + force what was taken from them. Finally, in spite of fact that legion of + Archangel Michael/Iron Guard, the principal grass roots organization + Romania has produced this century, combined religious mysticism with + jingoistic nationalism and fascist ideology, we view this organization + as a product of 1930’s whose conditions are unlikely to be duplicated + again; attempts by “court poet” Adrian Paunescu to parlay similar + elements into a political mass movement nominally loyal to Ceausescu have met with limited success + at best (of 77 Bucharest A–81).Airgram 81 + from Bucharest, July 25, 1977. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + P770121–0954)

+

Ethnic Minorities

+

22. Hungarians. Major unrest and insurrection among Romania’s two million + ethnic Hungarians is the single most important possible source of + domestic strife, as ethnic conflict between Serbs and Croats could tear + Yugoslavia apart. History of Romanian-Hungarian conflict, size of Hungarian minority, its + concentration in geographical center of country, its distinct language + and culture, its ties to separate religious denominations, and its + psychological perception of being discriminated against by Romanian + majority provide potentially combustible ingredients of which GOR is keenly aware. We detect no serious + effervescence in Hungarian areas at present, no embryonic “liberation” + or other organized movement, and no charismatic leaders capable of + fanning grievances into political flames. We further doubt that + spontaneous combustion would take place, barring a major and unlikely + change in present circumstances such as a gross reversal of GOR’s minority policy. Nevertheless, a + relatively rapid deterioration could occur, especially if such outside + actors as the Governments of Hungary and Soviet Union were actively + involved.

+

23. Germans. Ethnic German community, while numerically significant + (circa 350,000), is not now a factor for instability. Once a source of + Hitler’s SS divisions as well as an effective and active FLT column for + Nazi Germany, German community was shattered by wartime losses and + immediate postwar repression including deportations, and today is + dispirited, demoralized, and interested primarily in emigration to West + Germany. As long as issuance of emigration passports continues at a + substantial rate, as it has for last two and a half years, there should + be no problem.

+

24. Gypsies. As elsewhere, Gypsies in Romania constitute a true + underclass—loathed by all other elements in society, ignored by outside + world, relegated to most menial tasks, and butt of real and serious + discrimination. None of this is qualitatively new in centuries-old saga + of Gypsies and their wandering, and record of Ceausescu regime toward them is + probably as good as any previous Romanian Government. There is no overt + sign of restiveness in Gypsy community or of political mobilization to + correct grievances, but it is doubtful if any non-Gypsy, including + GOR leaders, has any real idea of + what Gypsies are doing or thinking. There is not even any good estimate + of their actual numbers, although there is a universal belief that + birthrate among Gypsies is significantly higher than among any other + ethnic group. Consequently, while we see little present danger to regime + from Gypsies, we do see an increasing social problem which will probably + get worse before it gets better (if it does).

+

Interactions

+

25. While interrelationships of policies and groups is a complex social + and political phenomenon, we wish to note three points which strike us + as especially significant: (a) there is a close tie between religious + affiliation and ethnic membership; (b) unlike such Communist countries + as Poland, there is no discernible worker-intellectual linkage here; and + (c) GOR will not tolerate existence of + any organization, irrespective + of origin, not totally under party/state control, especially if it could + serve as vehicle for expression of accumulated grievances of diverse + groups (e.g. “free trade union” group), and on past record it will move + quickly, efficiently, and ruthlessly if necessary to destroy it before + it can take root and spread.

+

External Influences

+

26. There are many external influences on formulation and execution of + Romania’s “independent” foreign policy, but very few lap over into + internal policy or affect domestic stability. Internally, only Hungary + and Soviet Union could play important roles, but there is no compelling + evidence that they are doing so.

+

27. Hungary and Transylvania are linked together by history, race, and + culture (as Transylvania is also similarly linked to classic Romania), + and interest of Hungarian Hungarians in situation of their ethnic + brethren is as natural as Romanian interest in Bessarabia, a region + heavily populated by ethnic Romanians which is now the Moldavian SSR of + Soviet Union. Given centuries of Romanian-Hungarian conflict and + repeated shifts in ownership of Transylvania, however, Romanians + interpret this Hungarian interest as a thinly veiled lust for recovery + of this “lost” territory, probably at Soviet instigation. Realization + that Hungary internally is now in many ways a more attractive place to + live than Romania adds to Romanian concern about Hungary’s appeal to + Transylvanian Magyars and the “subversive influences” emanating from + Budapest. While we agree that GOH could + exert a serious destabilizing force if it desired, we see present Kadar + regime as essentially cautious on this issue, generally limiting + official actions and keeping Hungarian nationalist firebrands under + control.

+

28. All Romanians claim to see Soviet hand behind any internal + disruption, but hard evidence is lacking. Still, as our study on Soviet + leverage in Romania (Bucharest 138)See Document 212. concluded, one goal of + Soviet activities within Romania must be identification and recruitment + of individuals who could if necessary form a puppet regime imposed by + the Red Army. Soviet Union has unquestioned military ability to + subjugate Romania and has demonstrated in Hungary and Czechoslovakia, + the political will to do so if it became convinced that vital security + interests were seriously threatened by events in Romania. A Soviet + invasion, unlikely as it seems now, would create so totally different a + situation here as to render this analysis of regime stability + inoperative.

+ + Aggrey + + +
+ +
+ 214. Memorandum From Stephen + Larrabee of the National Security Council Staff to the + President’s Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Aaron)Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, + Brzezinski Material, + Country File, Box 66, Romania: 4/79–3/80. Confidential; Outside the + System. + + + Washington, undated + + + SUBJECT + Request by Romanian Ambassador for Meeting + +

Ion Besteliu, DCM at the Romanian + Embassy, called me today to ask for an urgent + appointment with you on either Thursday or Friday. He wishes to + discuss with you the problems Romania is currently facing on the Hill + regarding an extension of the MFN + Waiver.On June 22, hearings took place + in the Trade Subcommittee of the House Ways and Means Committee on + Carter’s recommendation to extend MFN to Hungary and Romania. While MFN for Hungary was not met with any + opposition, extension for Romania faced opposition from several + subcommittee members as well as Jewish groups convinced that + Romanian Jews were not given fair opportunity to emigrate. In + telegram 161636 to Bucharest and Budapest, June 23, the Department + warned: “It appears that MFN for + Romania faces serious challenge.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + D790325–0974) In telegram 161619 to Bucharest, June 23, the + Department informed the Embassy that, as a result of the events June + 22 hearing, Vanik had requested that Romanian Ambassador Ionescu meet with him and leaders + of the B’nai B’rith organization to discuss the matter of Jewish + emigration from Romania. The Department also reported that Vanik had + suspended the hearing before B’nai B’rith testified in opposition of + the waiver. (National Archives, RG + 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790325–1024)

+

Nimetz testified before the Vanik + trade subcommittee on Friday on behalf of an extension of MFN for Romania and Hungary. The Hungarian + portion went O.K. but there was considerable opposition to an extension + of MFN for Romania, particularly from + Congressman Schulze who introduced a disapproval resolution which was + referred to Vanik’s sub-committee. The main problem is that the B’nai + B’rith and several other Jewish groups who originally supported an + extension, have received some information about current emigration to + Israel which has caused them to withdraw their support. While this + information appears to be wrong, this support is crucial for obtaining + MFN for Romania.

+

Vanik is very concerned about the mood on the Hill and is prepared to do + battle on behalf of an extension as are influential members of the House + Foreign Affairs Committee such as Derwinski, Findley, and Hamilton. + Vanik is working with the Romanians and Jewish groups in an effort to + work out a solution. However, if we cannot get the Jewish groups on board, he feels + MFN for Romania may be doomed.

+

There is a time constraint, however. A resolution of disapproval can be + held within a committee no longer than 30 days after it has been + introduced. Vanik intends to hold hearings on July 9, after talking to + the Jewish groups, and then report to the Full Committee on July 11. He + hopes to get a favorable report out of the Full Ways and Means + Committee, and call for a debate on the House Floor about July 17. The + main thrust of the strategy is for Vanik to take the initiative rather + than Schultze. At the same time + we are pressing the Romanians to allow more Jews to emigrate to Israel + and to simplify emigration procedures generally.

+

RECOMMENDATION

+

That you authorize me to set up a meeting between you and the Romanian + Ambassador tomorrow or Friday.“Tomorrow or + Friday” is crossed out and replaced in handwriting with “Tuesday, + July 3.”Aaron approved the + recommendation. A note below reads: “DA appointment set for Tuesday, + 3:30 pm.”

+
+ +
+ 215. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in + RomaniaSource: National + Archives, RG 59, Bureau of + Intelligence and Research, Office of Analysis for the Commonwealth + and Eastern Europe, Office Subject Files, 1965–1980, Lot 92D412, Box + 3, MFN Waiver/Controversy 1979–80. + Confidential; Immediate; Exdis. + Sent for information Priority to Budapest and Moscow. Drafted by + Bradtke; cleared by Schmidt, + Vest, and Larrabee, and in S/S; approved by Nimetz. + + + + Washington, July 2, 1979, 2326Z + +

171577. Moscow for DAS + Robert Barry. Subject: MFN for Romania: Nimetz’ Meeting With Bogdan; Bogdan’s Meeting With Jewish Representatives, July 2. + Ref: State 168581.In telegram 168581 to + Bucharest, June 29, the Department reported Nimetz’s conversation with + representatives from several Jewish organizations. Nimetz emphasized that the + “administration views possible failure to renew MFN as very serious matter which would + undermine a decade of effort to build up U.S.-Romanian relations.” He also stressed that failure + would “mean that no other country would be willing to submit itself + to uncertainties of waiver process.” Noting that “continued MFN for Romania is in grave danger + unless the GOR is prepared to be + cooperative,” the Department instructed Aggrey to seek an appointment at the earliest + opportunity with Romanian officials, and “make clear that loss of + MFN is now real possibility. + Romanians should harbor no doubts that if Jewish organizations in + the U.S. oppose MFN for Romania, there will be + insufficient support left in Congress to prevent passage of + Schulze’s disapproval recommendation.” (Ibid.)

+

1. (C-entire text)

+

2. Counselor Nimetz met July 2 + with visiting MFA Counselor for North + America Bogdan and Romanian + Ambassador Ionescu (who cancelled + planned return to Bucharest). Nimetz described the concerns of American Jewish + organizations over declining emigration and urged the Romanian + Government to face this as a practical problem. Nimetz said that Jewish organizations + are concerned that Jackson-Vanik is not working.Nimetz was + informed of Jewish-American concerns with the extension of MFN to Romania as early as June 7. + Representatives of the American-Jewish Committee, the + Anti-Defamation League, the B’nai B’rith and the National Jewish + Community Relations Advisory Council, were particularly alarmed by + what they saw as a cumbersome pre-screening process that led to + intimidation of applicants. In telegram 147765 to Bucharest, June 9, + the Department instructed Aggrey to meet with Pacoste and stress U.S. concerns regarding Jewish emigration. + (Ibid.) Trade has increased but the kind of emigration which + interests them is not going up. Jewish groups believe that the problem + is intimidation in the application procedures. Having raised these + concerns, they are in a position where they cannot easily back off + without some tangible results. Nimetz noted that he had told representatives of the + Jewish groups that distribution of applications by the Joint + Distribution Committee would prove very difficult for the Romanian + Government. He asked Bogdan + whether a Romanian could be at the JDC office to expedite applications. Nimetz urged Bogdan to be prepared to negotiate with + the Jewish groups.

+

3. Bogdan said that he had come to + the U.S. on a fact-finding mission and + did not have instructions on how to resolve the problem which had + arisen. He expressed puzzlement with motivation of American Jewish + groups and their timing in raising emigration issue. Noting that he had + spoken with Rabbi Rosen and with + Romanian emigration authorities, Bogdan said he could see no Jewish emigration problem. + He had been assured by Romanian officials that only in the case of + German emigration are there any problems or attempts to spread out + applications. Bogdan said that he + had also spoken with the Israeli Ambassador and did not believe that the + Government of Israel was prompting Jewish organizations to raise the + emigration issue. As for using the JDC to distribute applications, + Bogdan said personally he + believes such an idea is unacceptable. No foreign or international + organization could play such a role in Romania.

+

4. Nimetz offered two explanations + for actions of Jewish groups: First, a heightened concern with general + question of Jackson-Vanik in view of possibility of MFN for the Soviet Union; and second, the + reports from Jews who have left Romania of intimidation at pre-screening + process. He again urged Bogdan + not to be overly concerned with the motivation of the Jewish groups and + instead to focus on practical aspects of solving the problem.

+

5. Bogdan said he would try to + find “a reasonable solution” but that he is troubled by the escalation + of demands and what might be next. He mentioned possibilities of + fact-finding trip by U.S. Jewish groups + or presentation of lists through JDC or other bodies. Bogdan commented that, whatever happens + to MFN, it will not have negative + effect on the Jews in Romania.

+

6. In closing, Nimetz stressed the + urgency of the situation and asked Bogdan to be in touch after Bogdan’s meetings later in the day with representatives + of American Jewish organizations.

+

7. House Trade Subcommittee staff member David Rohr, who participated as + “observer” in subsequent meeting at Romanian Embassy on July 2 between + Romanians and representatives of American Jewish organizations, gave + Department the following account of the meeting. (The Jewish + organizations were represented by Al + Moses of American Jewish Committee, Mark Talisman of + Council of Jewish Federations and Welfare Fund, and George Specter of + B’nai B’rith International. Moses acted as spokesman in place of B’nai B’rith + International President Jack Spitzer, who is now in Geneva.)

+

8. Rohr said Moses made following + three-part proposal to the GOR to + remedy their concerns re Jewish emigration:

+ +

9. (A) Rabbi Rosen would make a + public statement in Romania similar to that which he made in synagogues + in 1975 to the effect that those persons who wish to apply for + permission to emigrate from Romania may do so. Statement would indicate + where persons should go to initiate the process, how it works, etc. + (Rohr said implicit in this was that application forms would have to be + available to those desiring to fill them out.)

+

10. (B) GOR would agree that while + applicants’ requests for permission to emigrate were being processed by + GOR authorities, applicants were + free to contact Israeli Embassy to begin visa application procedure. + (Moses told Nimetz following meeting with Romanians + today that this step was designed to provide permanent monitoring + mechanism of number of pending cases. The GOI would maintain a list, + which it would share with either the USG or directly with American Jewish groups. Moses said he already had discussed + this aspect of the proposal with GOI Embassy in Washington.)

+

11. (C) Concurrent with its acceptance of steps (A) and (B), GOR would provide American Jewish + organizations with numerical accounting of how many Jews it expected + would be departing for Israel in the next few weeks and months.

+

12. Bogdan, who Rohr said did all + the talking for GOR side, responded by + saying he would have to transmit the Jewish organizations’ proposal + directly to President Ceausescu. + Bogdan said he was all too + aware of the time pressures, and hoped to have a response for Moses in the nearest future. At one + point in the discussion, Rohr said, Bogdan indicated it might be possible for the GOR to revert back to the procedures in + effect in 1975 with regard to application for emigration (which + presumably would mean dropping pre-screening).

+

13. Rohr said that Moses and + Talisman were pleased by Bogdan’s + reaction to their concerns and their proposal. They had indicated to + Rohr after the meeting that they had dropped the notion of having the + Joint Distribution Committee serve as a “good offices” intermediary + because of the negative signals they had received in the past few days. + He also said that Moses had + promised the Romanians that if an understanding were reached as they had + proposed, the Jewish groups would not publicize it here, which they + recognized might embarrass the GOR in + some fashion. Rohr said that at no time during the meeting did the + subject arise of Jewish emigration to the United States per se.

+

14. At end of day Bogdan came by + alone to brief Nimetz on + developments. He confirmed essence of proposal reported by Rohr in + paras. 8–11 above. While cautious, he said he would be reporting them + favorably to Bucharest.

+ + Christopher + +
+ +
+ 216. Memorandum of ConversationSource: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, + Brzezinski Material, + Subject File, Box 33, Memcons: + Aaron, David: 1–12/79. + Confidential. The meeting took place in Aaron’s office at the White House. Earlier that day, + Larrabee sent a briefing + paper outlining Romanian concerns and providing Aaron with talking points for his + meeting with Bogdan. + Larrabee recommended that + Aaron stress the + administration’s strong commitment to MFN for Romania, and that, irrespective of right or + wrong, support of Jewish-American groups was vital for congressional + approval. Aaron initialed the + memorandum indicating he had seen it. (Ibid.) The memorandum of + conversation was approved by Aaron on July 7. He instructed his staff to “Keep it + here. Don’t send it out.” (Ibid.) + + + Washington, July 3, 1979, 3:30 p.m. + + + SUBJECT + Summary of David Aaron’s + Meeting with Ambassador Corneliu + Bogdan, Director of the North American Division in + the Romanian Foreign Ministry (U) + + + PARTICIPANTS + Mr. David Aaron, Deputy + Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs + Stephen Larrabee, NSC Staff (Notetaker) + Ambassador Corneliu + Bogdan + Ion Besteliu, Political Counselor, Romanian Embassy + +

Mr. Aaron + opened the meeting by welcoming Amb. + BogdanThe meeting with Bogdan took the place of the previously scheduled + meeting between Aaron and + Ionescu. Bogdan, who had been Ambassador to + Washington from 1967 until 1978, was sent by Bucharest to + troubleshoot the MFN situation. On + June 28 Larrabee informed + Aaron’s office that + Bogdan was coming and was + seeking an appointment with Aaron to discuss the situation. (Carter Library, + National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 66, Romania: + 4/79–3/80) and saying it was nice to see him again. (U)

+

Amb. Bogdan stated that Mr. + Aaron presumably knew why he + was here. He did not want to unduly bother Mr. Aaron, but hoped that he could receive + the Administration’s support regarding MFN. (C)

+

Mr. Aaron + underscored that the Administration supported MFN for Romania and had worked hard to obtain it. He + emphasized, however, that there was a concrete problem which had to be + resolved. He pointed out that to be successful with the Congress the + Administration needed the support of the interested American groups. + (C)

+

Amb. Bogdan stated he did not want + to cover the same old ground. He was not certain why the groups had + raised the issue. The fate of the Jews in Romania would not be affected + by MFN one way or the other. (C)

+ +

Mr. Aaron + stated that it was his impression that the groups were concerned that + the numbers were dropping. Basically, he thought they wanted to support + MFN but they were continually + receiving reports about procedural problems, etc. (C)

+

Amb. Bogdan replied that the + Romanians were going to propose a formula which they hoped would help. + He insisted, however, that they could not accept any third party + intermediary. Rabbi Rosen (leader + of the Jews in Romania) would make a statement saying that the Jews who + wanted to leave are not intimidated, etc. This statement would be + publicized. Some sort of monitoring system, perhaps similar to that of + SALT (i.e., national means), could + be established. He pointed out that Senator Jackson had an entire office + doing this type of work and that the Romanians were ready to do it as + well. (C)

+

Mr. Aaron + suggested that the best way to prove the present procedures were no bar + to emigration was to reform them. He asked why Jews making an + application could not notify the Israeli Embassy at the same time. + (U)

+

Amb. Bogdan replied that it did not + look feasible, but he did not elaborate why. He insisted, however, that + there was no intention on the part of the Romanian Government to keep + the Jews from emigrating. (C)

+

Mr. Aaron + stressed in response that the Romanian Government would have to do + something about the procedures. The Administration would work hard, but + he pointed out it could lose if the groups interested in Jewish + emigration failed to support MFN. + (C)

+

Amb. Bogdan suggested that the + concerns of the Jewish groups could be allayed by the formula he had + outlined. (U)

+

Mr. Aaron + returned to the question of procedures, insisting that some change had + to be undertaken and that there was a need for some sort of real action. + The groups interested in Jewish emigration had backed off from some of + their original ideas, but there was a need to respond to their concerns. + He felt that Rabbi Rosen’s + statement might not be enough; something more would have to be done. + (C)

+

Amb. Bogdan replied that he did not + know what more the Romanian Government could do. He stressed, however, + that the Romanian side was ready to try to meet the concerns of the + Jewish groups. (U)

+

Mr. Aaron + stated that he would not argue the case for others. This was not his + role. He reiterated the seriousness of the situation and the need to + find a way to resolve it. (C)

+

Amb. Bogdan said that he intended + to stay in the States for the duration of the struggle rather than + returning to Romania as he had originally intended. (C)

+ +

Turning to another subject, he noted that the Romanian Government was + grateful for the briefing by Mr. Barry on the Summit.In + telegram 4026 from Bucharest, June 26, the Embassy reported on + Barry’s June 22 meeting + with Andrei to brief the + Romanian Foreign Minister on SALT + II and the Carter-Brezhnev + Summit in Vienna. The Embassy reported that, following the + presentation of the U.S. position, + Andrei told Barry that he wondered “if briefing + which Soviets might provide would be as helpful.” The Romanians also + raised GOR concerns regarding + Soviet views of Chinese participation in SALT III, effects of SALT II on Western European disarmament thinking, and + possibility of movement on other disarmament issues. Barry also met with Andrei on June 23, prior to his + departure from Bucharest. At that meeting, the Embassy reported, + “Andrei reiterated GOR support for SALT II Treaty as a good step toward + other disarmament measures, goal of which is to stop arms race, cut + military budgets, and effect troop reductions.” (National Archives, + RG 59, Central Foreign Policy + File, D790288–0202) This had been highly appreciated. One + point needed clarification, however. This concerned MFN for the Soviet Union. It looked like + it would not be possible to give MFN to + the USSR this year. At the same time + the US might feel that it could not delay MFN for China. Bogdan felt that part of the Jewish preoccupation with + MFN for Romania was related to + this. (C)

+

Mr. Aaron + replied that the President was still considering the question of MFN for the Soviet Union and had not made + up his mind. At this point it was simply too early to tell what the + President would do. The Administration had not linked the two (MFN for China and the Soviet Union). It + wanted to proceed forward with both. However, the point of decision had + not been reached. (C)

+

Amb. Bogdan stated that he believed + some of the Jewish concern was related not just to Romania, but to the + Soviet Union. He then turned to the question of MBFR, noting that it was his + understanding that there had been no real progress in Vienna. He did not + understand why the starting level of troops was such a problem. (C)

+

In reply, Mr. Aaron noted that at Vienna Gromyko had noted that the differences + between the troop levels of both sides was 150,000. Defense Minister + Ustinov had corrected him, saying that the difference was 180,000.See Foreign Relations, 1977–1980, vol. VI, + Soviet Union, Document 204. (C)

+

Mr. Aaron + noted that this was a large discrepancy. The problem was that we + couldn’t agree on the starting point. If we couldn’t agree on the + starting point, it would be hard to know how many troops had been + withdrawn. In short, if we couldn’t agree on where we were, how could we + agree on where we were going? He noted that SALT was easy to verify in comparison to MBFR. (C)

+ +

Amb. Bogdan stated that he had + attended a 10-member conference in Geneva at which Jules MochFormer French politician, and member of the French + Government in the Fourth Republic, as well as former French + Representative to the UN Commission + on Disarmament from 1951 until 1960. had said that the + question of troops was not difficult to verify. (C)

+

Mr. Aaron + replied that we might have agreed until we had run into this + discrepancy. The Soviets hoped that we would set aside the question of + data; however, this was an extremely important issue politically. + (C)

+

Amb. Bogdan reaffirmed his + intention to stay in the States until the question of MFN had been resolved. (C)

+

In closing, Mr. Aaron said that he hoped he would be able to + see Amb. Bogdan again before he left. (U)

+
+ +
+ 217. Editorial Note +

On July 6, 1979, Matthew Nimetz, + Counselor of the Department of State, met with Romanian Ministry of + Foreign Affairs Director for North American Affairs Corneliu Bogdan and Romanian Ambassador + to the United States Nicolae + Ionescu as well as with representatives of + Jewish-American organizations. The Romanian officials informed Nimetz that they had reached an + understanding with the Jewish-American organizations on Jewish + emigration. The agreement, reported to Bucharest in telegram 177424, + July 9, provided that the Chief Rabbi of Romanian Jewry would issue a + statement to the community noting that it was “the policy of the + Romanian Government to act expeditiously on applications of Jews who + seek to be reunited with family members outside of Romania,” that + Bucharest would “supply a list of Romanian Jews who make application and + the date the applications are filed,” and that Romanian Jews who wished + to emigrate could also write Israel to seek letters of support for their + case which Jewish groups would use to make a list of people wishing to + emigrate. Based on the understanding, Alfred Moses of the American Jewish Committee told + Nimetz that the Jewish + organization would now support extension of most-favored-nation status + to Romania. While cautioning that the understanding was not an agreement + with the United States Government, Nimetz noted that the administration was “pleased with + and actively supports the steps + taken by the Romanian Government to clarify its policy on emigration.” + (National Archives, RG 59, Central + Foreign Policy File, D790311–0328)

+

On July 10, the Trade Subcommittee of the House Ways and Means Committee + met to discuss Representative Richard Schulze’s resolution of + disapproval of President Jimmy + Carter’s recommendation to extend most favored nation + status to Romania (H. Res. 317). Schulze “argued that Romanian foreign + policy independence was not relevant to the MFN waiver and that terminating waiver would be signal to + Romanians and to any other Communist countries that violations of human + rights will not be tolerated.” By a vote of 13–7, the subcommittee + agreed to report the resolution unfavorably for discussion in the full + committee. (Telegram 178408 to Bucharest, July 11; National Archives, + RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + D790312–0816)

+

On July 19, the Senate International Trade Subcommittee held its own + hearings on MFN renewal. Reporting on + the hearings in telegram 187329 to Bucharest, July 19, the Department + noted that the subcommittee staff “expects that Senate Finance Committee + will issue ‘nasty statement’ but that there will be no rpt no resolution of disapproval.” + (National Archives, RG 59, Central + Foreign Policy File, D790330–0017)

+

Bogdan and Ionescu met with Deputy Secretary of + State Warren Christopher on July + 20 to discuss MFN and other bilateral + questions. Noting that the MFN problem + seemed to be on its way to a positive outcome, Christopher told the Romanian + officials that “it had been a difficult exercise” and cautioned them + that “next year is an election year and Congress can be expected to + scrutinize MFN renewal carefully.” He + also informed the Romanian Government that the Secretary was considering + a trip to Romania in early fall. (Telegram 189034 to Bucharest, July 21; + National Archives, RG 59, Central + Foreign Policy File, D790332–0725)

+

On July 25, the House of Representatives voted 126–271 to reject + Schulze’s resolution of disapproval paving the way for MFN for Romania.

+
+ +
+ 218. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in + RomaniaSource: National + Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign + Policy File, [no film number]. Confidential; Immediate; Exdis. Drafted by Schmidt; cleared by Barry; approved by L. Paul Bremer. + Sent for information to USUN. + + + + Washington, October 4, 1979, 0343Z + +

259744. Subject: Vance-Andrei Bilateral at the UNGA: Bilateral Issues.

+

1. (C-entire text)

+

2. Summary. Secretary Vance met + with Romanian Foreign Minister Andrei in New York on October 2 for approximately 50 + minutes. Andrei was accompanied + by UN Ambassador Teodor Marinescu, + Special Assistant Marcel Ghibernea, and First Secretary Ion Goritza + (interpreter). US participants were Counselor Nimetz, Senior Advisor to the Secretary + Philip Habib, Assistant + Secretary Maynes, EUR Deputy Assistant Secretary Barry, and EUR/EE Director Schmidt (notetaker). On bilateral matters, Andrei said Ceausescu was satisfied with the continued development + of our relations. He raised only two bilateral issues—further expedited + issuance of US export licenses and access to Norfolk for Romanian ships + loading Virginia coal—and requested the Secretary’s personal support on + both. The Secretary’s planned visit to Bucharest was discussed briefly + and the Secretary said he wished to propose firm dates in December + within the coming week. Multilateral issues discussed (see septels)International issues discussed were reported + in telegram 260883 to Bucharest, October 5. (National Archives, + RG 59, Central Foreign Policy + File, D790456–0655) In telegram 262360 to Bucharest and Seoul, + October 6, the Department reported that in the course of their + bilateral meeting, Andrei + informed Vance that, while + in Bucharest, the North Korean Prime Minister asked the Romanian + Government to inform Washington that Pyongyang’s “public position on + the trilateral proposal [a meeting among USG–ROK–DPRK representatives] was not their last word + and that they were ready to explore the question further should the + USG wish to do so.” (National + Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign + Policy File, D790458–0444) included CSCE, the Middle East, Southeast Asia, and the Romanian + UNGA initiative on peaceful + settlement of disputes. End summary.

+

3. Andrei said he had been + requested by President Ceausescu + to extend his greetings to President Carter and express his satisfaction with the continued + development of US-Romanian relations both in the bilateral and + international spheres. The positive developments were consistent with + the 1977 [1978] Joint Declaration,The 1978 Joint Declaration agreed on during + Ceausescu’s trip to + Washington. See footnote 3, Document + 204. and were in the interest of both countries and of worldwide + peace. The Secretary noted that the President wished to extend his + greetings to Andrei and to + President Ceausescu and to stress + our desire to work with Romania on bilateral matters and on solving + pressing international problems.

+

4. Secretary’s visit. Secretary Vance said he looked forward to visiting Bucharest and + would ask his staff to work out proposed dates within the coming week + for a visit either at the beginning of December or immediately after a + meeting he would attend in Brussels later that month. Andrei said he was authorized by + Ceausescu to fix the visit at + any time except during the November 10–25 period. He explained that + Ceausescu wished to meet with + the Secretary during his visit but would be busy with the Romanian Party + Congress during the period he had specified in November. Andrei said he was certain the + Secretary’s visit would contribute significantly to US-Romanian + relations and to bilateral cooperation on international issues. He + proposed, and the Secretary agreed, that an important area for an + extensive exchange of views during the visit would be the “new economic + order” and other North-South issues.

+

5. Trade and export licenses. Andrei said he had only two bilateral matters to raise + with the Secretary. Both were economic and on each he wished to request + the Secretary’s personal support. The first was the matter of US export + licenses. For the first months of 1979, the US had enjoyed an active + balance of trade with Romania, and his government did not see this as a + problem. (Nimetz noted that in + 1978, Romania had enjoyed a trade surplus with the US, which had aroused + some questions during the congressional review of MFN.) On the other hand, Andrei said, he requested the + Secretary’s continued support in efforts to expedite the issuance of US + export licenses. Romania was grateful for what had been done already in + this regard, in the spirit of President Carter’s letter to President Ceausescu, and would like to see these efforts continue. + Andrei indicated that a list + of pending license requests would soon be transmitted to Counselor + Nimetz via the Romanian + Embassy. In response to the Secretary’s query concerning the status of + this question Nimetz said the + problem had been more in the length of time required to process license + applications rather than in large-scale denials of licenses. The + executive branch had made serious efforts to expedite processing of + applications, and good results had been achieved. He indicated that we + were well disposed to continue these efforts. He said there had been no + recent requests from Romanian Embassy here to expedite specific + applications, but we would be glad to act on such a list when it was + received.

+ +

6. Access to Port of Norfolk. Noting that he had already discussed the + question with Nimetz and + Assistant Secretary Vest,The conversation among Assistant Secretary + Vest, Counselor + Nimetz, and Romanian + Foreign Minister Andrei, + which took place October 1 in Washington was reported on October 4 + in telegram 260381 to Bucharest. Andrei stressed the Romanian desire to receive + deliveries of the coal purchased in the United States at Hampton + Roads (or the Norfolk Harbor) rather than Baltimore. They also + discussed the CSCE process and + developments in the Middle East. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, [no + film number]) + Andrei explained his interest in + an arrangement which would permit Romanian ships to load coal at the + Port of Norfolk. He said that the Romanian contract for purchases of + coal from Island Creek, Virginia, called for long-term deliveries, + perhaps extending as much as 50 years. The inability of Romanian ships + to load the coal at Norfolk already added some $2 million per year to + their costs. Andrei stressed that + Romania was ready to accept whatever conditions or controls the US might + want to place on its ships in order to gain access to Norfolk.On June 12, 1977, the Romanian Government + signed a multi-year contract with Occidental Petroleum for coal from + the Island Creek mine in Virginia. (Telegram 4383 from Bucharest, + June 14, 1977; National Archives, RG + 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770212–0906) Bucharest sought + access to the Hampton Roads port in order to reduce the + transportation costs associated with the delivery of coal to + Romanian ships. In a conversation with Nimetz on May 7, 1979, Pacoste expressed the hope that the United States + would reconsider its access ban of Warsaw Pact vessels to Hampton + Roads for Romanian vessels, and that the Romanian Government “would + be willing to comply with any restrictions if access can be + granted.” (Telegram 2844 from Bucharest, May 10, 1979; National + Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign + Policy File, D790219–0142)

+

7. Nimetz noted that we already + had carefully examined this problem in response to earlier Romanian + requests. As a result, he was more pessimistic about this problem than + about US export licenses. The port security regulations extended to all + Warsaw Pact countries and had been in effect for some twenty years. + Secretary Vance said he could + readily see how it would be more costly to ship the coal by rail from + the mine to Baltimore rather than directly to Hampton Roads. He said + that while he could make no promises that a way could be found, he would + discuss the Romanian request with Defense Secretary Brown. Andrei expressed appreciation and added that it would be + very difficult for Romania to have the coal shipped from Norfolk on + non-Warsaw Pact ships, especially since Romania only recently had + constructed special cargo ships for this and similar purposes.

+ + Christopher + +
+ +
+ 219. Editorial Note +

On October 12, 1979, the Department of State informed the Embassies in + Romania and Yugoslavia that Secretary of State Cyrus Vance was happy to accept the + standing invitation to visit the two countries and planned to do so in + December. (Telegram 267704 to Bucharest and Belgrade, October 12; + National Archives, RG 59, Central + Foreign Policy File, D790469–0222) Romanian Foreign Minister Stefan Andrei had transmitted the + invitation through Counselor of the Department of State Matthew Nimetz during their May meeting + in Bucharest. In a June 5 memorandum to Vance, Nimetz + recommended a visit, suggesting it “could be very useful in coaxing the + Romanians to reform some of the bureaucratic practices that lead to + continuing human rights difficulties.” Vance approved the recommendation on June 7 and wrote + “OK. In the fall” in the margin. (National Archives, RG 59, Office of the Secretariat Staff, + S/S Memoranda for 1979, Lot 81D117, + Box 1, Principal Memo File, Apr–May–Jun)

+

In the early morning of November 4, Iranian supporters of Ayatollah + Khomeini occupied the grounds of the U.S. Embassy in Tehran and took U.S. citizens there hostage. Initially organized as a + protest against the Carter administration’s decision to allow the Shah + of Iran to enter the United States for cancer treatment, the protest + quickly evolved into a political tool used by Khomeini to secure and + expand his control over the revolution. Vance, convinced that the release could be secured via + diplomacy, focused on coordinating the diplomatic efforts to secure the + release of the hostages.

+

Official reaction in Romania to the taking of the hostages was initially + muted. According to Embassy reports, the government-controlled press ran + only two stories in November on the hostage situation. The low-key + statements, the Embassy suggested, were typical of Romania’s way of + dealing with difficult issues in the press. (Telegram 7719 from + Bucharest, November 19; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790537–0083) In + telegram 302493 to Bucharest, November 22, the Department reported on + the November 20 meeting between Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for + European Affairs Robert Barry and + Romanian Deputy Chief of Mission Boris + Ranghet. Barry + told Ranghet that given Romania’s + desire to continue to improve relations with the United States, “it was + difficult to understand why Romania had not taken any steps to express + publicly its condemnation of the events in Iran.” Barry also stressed that “this was a + case in which Romania would be expected by the US public and US + Government to take a stand.” Failure to do so, Barry told Ranghet, “would be interpreted by the United States as + inconsistent with the GOR’s oft-expressed desire to improve + bilateral relations.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790537–0054)

+

On December 1, U.S. Ambassador to Romania + Rudolf Aggrey met with + Andrei at his request to + deliver two démarches on the Iranian situation and repeat Washington’s + request for immediate, public action. In telegram 8080 from Bucharest, + December 1, Aggrey reported his + meeting with the Romanian Foreign Minister. Andrei, Aggrey + wrote, answered that “it was not true that Romania had not been + ‘vigorous’ in this instance.” Although he had no authorization to + provide details, Andrei noted, + “President Ceausescu was + proceeding not just in the sense of Romania’s respect for international + law and the Vienna Convention, but in the spirit of the Joint Statement + he and President Carter had signed.” The Foreign Minister assured the + U.S. Ambassador that he would seek + authorization from Romanian President Nicolae Ceausescu to brief Aggrey on Romanian activities. (National Archives, + RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + D790554–0100) On December 3, Andrei described for Aggrey “in the strictest confidence” the Romanian + efforts in Tehran on behalf of the hostages. On Ceausescu’s initiative, Andrei had passed to Ayatollah + Khomeini, through Romanian contacts with Arab States and organizations, + the Romanian Government’s appeal to release the hostages without any + delay. Asked if the Iranians had listened to the Romanian message, + Andrei told Aggrey that “it is our understanding + that things are moving toward a solution, but we do not know what + compromise might be the key and we have no assurances.” (Telegram 8127 + from Bucharest, December 3; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840163–2001)

+

The ongoing hostage crisis caused the postponement of Vance’s trip to Bucharest and + Belgrade, and Ambassador Aggrey + informed Romanian Deputy Foreign Minister Cornel Pacoste on December 4 of the postponement. In + telegram 312957 to Bucharest, December 5, Vance instructed Aggrey to seek an appointment with Andrei and find out more information as + to the impact the secret Romanian message had in Tehran. (National + Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy + File, P840163–2006) Aggrey + reported on his December 10 meeting with Andrei in telegram 8401 from Bucharest, December 11. + After informing Andrei of + President Carter and the + Secretary of State’s appreciation for Romanian efforts on behalf of the + hostages, Aggrey, “speaking + personally” added that “the fact of the confidential Romanian demarche + was not generally known within our government [meant that] Romania’s + efforts could not be appreciated by all of the influential people in + Washington who were assessing what our friends were doing to help.” + (National Archives, RG 59, Central + Foreign Policy File, P840163–1998)

+

Almost two months into the crisis in Iran, the Soviet leadership approved + the introduction of Soviet combat troops in Afghanistan. The Soviet Army and special KGB combat + units were airlifted to Kabul on December 25. Soviet ground troops + crossed the Afghan border on December 27. The invasion, ostensibly at + the request of the Afghan Government, resulted in the assassination of + Afghan President Hafizullah Amin, and the installation of a new regime + led by Babrak Karmal. Writing in his diary on December 28, Carter noted + that he was “determined to make this action as politically costly [to + the Soviets] as possible. I sent messages to our allies, key nonaligned + leaders, plus all the Muslim countries—urging them to speak out strongly + against the Soviet action.” Carter added: “I also sent on the Hot Line + the sharpest message I have ever sent to Brezhnev, telling him that the invasion of Afghanistan + would seriously and adversely affect the relationship between our two + countries.” (Carter, White House Diary, December + 28, 1979, page 382) Over the next few months the President recalled the + U.S. Ambassador from Moscow, asked + the Senate to suspend consideration of the SALT II Treaty, imposed a embargo on new grain sales and + transfers of technology to the Soviet Union, announced the U.S. boycott of the 1980 Olympics in + Moscow, and increased the Defense budget request to Congress.

+

In telegram 333360 to multiple posts, December 28, the Department + requested that a Presidential message be delivered to each head of state + concerning the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. The Embassy in Bucharest, + the telegram instructed, was to stress that Soviet actions were in + direct “violation of the sovereignty of an independent country” and that + they were in “direct conflict with Romania’s strong commitment to the + right of all nations to full independence, sovereignty, and + non-intervention in internal affairs.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + P840163–1258) On December 29, during the New Year’s reception for the + Diplomatic Corps, Ceausescu told + U.S. Chargé d’Affairs a.i. Herbert Kaiser that Romania would “do + whatever it can to help resolve peacefully the Afghan problem and to + obtain the withdrawal of Soviet troops.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + P840131–2293) On December 31, Carter sent a letter to Ceausescu detailing the decision taken + at the December 12–14 NATO Ministerial + meeting in Brussels, including the reasons behind the decision to + modernize long-range theater nuclear forces. The letter also thanked + Ceausescu for his + government’s involvement in attempts to release the hostages in Iran. In + a handwritten postscript, Carter added “I am sure you share our deep + concern about the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Please keep me + informed on your views regarding this matter.” (Carter Library, National + Security Affairs, Brzezinski + Material, President’s Correspondence with Foreign Leaders File, Box 16, + Romania: President Nicolae + Ceausescu, 1/79–6/80) The text of the letter was + delivered by the Embassy on January 2 to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Bucharest. (Telegram + 13 from Bucharest, January 2, 1980; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + D800006–0006)

+

In telegram 75 from Bucharest, January 4, the Embassy reported the public + pronouncements of Ceausescu and + the government-controlled media in Romania. While seeking to avoid + explicit condemnation of one or more of the parties involved, the + Embassy wrote, the reaction to the Soviet invasion was “sharp and + pronounced. President Ceausescu’s + initial public reaction on December 29 was unusually rapid and his + reference to Afghanistan unusually pointed.” The Embassy concluded: “The + continued priority given the same theme in his New Year’s message and + the lengthy, authoritative editorial underline the high degree of + Romanian concern.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800009–0653) In + telegram 173 from Bucharest, January 9, the Embassy offered an analysis + of the pressure likely faced by Bucharest. Noting that Romania was the + only Warsaw Pact member not to endorse the Soviet invasion or recognize + the Karmal regime, the Embassy wrote that “the pressure from the Soviet + Union and the Warsaw Pact is likely to intensify as international + tensions grow. And yet, for Ceausescu and his colleagues, closer allegiance to the + Soviet Union conflicts directly with their objective to achieve and + maintain Romania’s relative independence and would undermine an + important basis of Ceausescu’s + acceptance by the vast majority of Romanians.” The Embassy concluded + that although “Ceausescu has + demonstrated an almost surprising willingness to continue to nurture + publicly relations with the United States” he might be forced toward + “more circumspect behavior” or “some gestures towards the Soviet Union. + But all may not be what it seems.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + D800015–0843)

+
+ +
+ 220. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security + Affairs (Brzezinski) to + President CarterSource: Carter Library, National + Security Affairs, Brzezinski + Material, President’s Correspondence with Foreign Leaders File, Box + 16, Romania: President Nicolae + Ceausescu, 1/79–6/80. Confidential. Sent for + action. + + + Washington, January + 22, 1980 + + + SUBJECT + Designation of David Newsom as a Presidential Emissary to Romania + (C) + +

State recommends that David + Newsom be designated as Presidential Emissary to + RomaniaThe recommendation was made in a + memorandum from Tarnoff to + Brzezinski dated January + 19 and forwarded to Brzezinski by Larrabee on January 21. (Ibid.) and that he + stop-off in Bucharest on his return from London to deliver a + Presidential Message to Ceausescu. The message is at Tab A.Attached but not printed. It has been + cleared with the speechwriters. (C)

+

I support this recommendation. Ceausescu has condemned the invasion of Afghanistan in + several recent speeches, and Romania was the only Warsaw Pact country + not to vote against the Resolution in the General Assembly condemning + the invasion. At the same time Ceausescu is understandably nervous about the + implications of Soviet actions in Afghanistan, particularly in light of + Tito’s deteriorating health, + and he has requested a high-level U.S. + visit as soon as possible.In telegram 253 + from Bucharest, January 12, the Embassy reported that the Romanian + Government hoped to welcome a visit by a high-level U.S. official to Bucharest in light of + the international situation. The Embassy reported: “President + Ceausescu and especially + Andrei feel let down by + the postponement of the Secretary’s visit in December and the + abortion of Counselor Nimetz’s visit last week. Although they appreciate the + sound reasons for these changes, these do not compensate for the + psychological loss of support a high-level US mission to Bucharest + at a time of strained relations with the USSR. They remember the success of former Treasury + Secretary Blumenthal’s visit + here in December 1978.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + D800021–0413) (C)

+

A visit by Newsom as Presidential + Emissary would quietly demonstrate our support for Romania in a low-key, + non-provocative manner and would provide an opportunity for us to + present our views on Iran and Afghanistan directly to Ceausescu. It would also serve as an + indirect signal to Yugoslavia of our continued interest in stability and + security in the Balkans generally. (C)

+

RECOMMENDATION: That you sign the Presidential + message at Tab A.Carter signed the letter + on January 24. See footnote 3, Document + 221. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, President’s + Correspondence with Foreign Leaders File, Box 16, Romania: President + Nicolae Ceausescu, + 1/79–6/80)

+
+ +
+ 221. Telegram From the Embassy in Romania to the Department of + StateSource: National + Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign + Policy File, P870105–0306; N800002–0439. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Newsom recounted the meeting with Ceausescu in his memoirs, + describing Bucharest in January as “one of the drabbest cities I + have ever visited.” (Newsom, + Witness to a Changing World, p. + 319) + + + + Bucharest, January 28, 1980, 1637Z + +

680. Subject: Newsom Discussions + With Romanian President Ceausescu. Ref: State 24016.In + telegram 24016 to Bucharest, January 27, the Department provided + talking points on Middle East issues. Saunders informed Newsom that because of opposition to Sadat and + Begin, the U.S. Government requested + postponement of UN Security Council + deliberations on a resolution dealing with the Palestinian question + and that Yassir Arafat seemed + to have decided against forcing a debate. The Department instructed + Newsom to stress in his + discussions with Ceausescu + that the United States remained committed to finding a solution, and + that the ongoing negotiations on autonomy offer the best chance for + success. The Embassy concluded: “We urge that no initiative be taken + to revive discussion of a resolution to supplement [UNGA Res.] 242 in the next several + months.” (National Archives, RG 59, + Central Foreign Policy File, P870105–0315)

+

1. Secret-entire text.

+

2. Summary: Under Secretary Newsom January 28 presented letter from President + Carter to President CeausescuSee Document 220. Carter’s January 24 + letter was delivered to Newsom in London prior to this trip to Bucharest. In + it Carter commended Ceausescu + for speaking forcefully against the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. + See Document 219. and had lively + two hour session, during which President Ceausescu expressed continuing criticism of Soviet + invasion of Afghanistan while indicating personal puzzlement over + motives for their actions, other than presumed Soviet reaction to + foreign backing of Afghan rebels. In lively give and take discussion + Ceausescu: (1) was skeptical + that U.S. counter actions to Soviets or + sanctions in Iran would have desired effect; (2) expressed confidence in + prospects for Yugoslav stability post-Tito: (3) felt U.S. + should “do a lot more” re Palestinian issue and, despite counter + arguments, promoted idea during current Camp David negotiations of + parallel initiative involving Soviets, and relating to Palestinian + rights; (4) emphasized Romanian hopes for continuation of CSCE, specifically stressing military + disengagement and nuclear missiles issue; (5) cautioned U.S. about promoting relations with China + at expense of Soviets or other nations. Ceausescu was careful throughout to balance criticism of + Soviet invasion of Afghanistan with reiteration of his general + principles of detente and caution to U.S. not to aggravate situation through its reaction to + Afghan and Iranian situation. End summary.

+

3. Under Secretary Newsom had two + hour discussion with President Ceausescu on January 28, accompanied by Ambassador + Aggrey + and Suddarth.Roscow Seldon “Rocky” Suddarth, Newsom’s Executive + Assistant. + Ceausescu was joined by Foreign + Minister Andrei, interpreter, and + note taker. Major points of discussion are summarized below.

+

4. Newsom opened discussion by + presenting President Carter’s + letter which interpreter read to Ceausescu, who expressed regards and best wishes to + President Carter and indicated + Ceausescu has been working on + reply to President’s letter regarding AfghanistanOn December 29, 1979, Carter approved a letter to + several world leaders, including Ceausescu, concerning the Soviet invasion of + Afghanistan. On December 31, in another letter concerning the NATO dual-track decision, Carter + added a handwritten postscript again expressing concern about + Afghanistan and inviting Ceausescu to inform him of his views. See Document 219. The December 31 letter was + transmitted in telegram 420 to Bucharest, January 1. (National + Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign + Policy File, D800005–0442) which he will send soon.No response specific to Carter’s December 29 + letter on Afghanistan was found. In telegram 1033 from Bucharest, + February 7, Aggrey reported + his conversation with Andrei + earlier that day regarding Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko’s visit to + Bucharest. Andrei informed + the Ambassador that Ceausescu + told Gromyko that Romania + saw Afghanistan as the greatest cause of international tension, that + an urgent solution was necessary, and that such a solution would be + cessation of all outside support for anti-government forces and + withdrawal of Soviet troops. Andrei also reported that Gromyko said Soviet troops would + be withdrawn once outside support ceases. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + D800066–0451) On March 12, the Embassy in Islamabad reported in + telegram 2311 that it received information of a possible mediation + offer from Romania between Pakistan and the Soviet Union in order to + reach an accommodation on Afghanistan. The offer had been made by + Pungan while visiting Pakistan in February. (National Archives, + RG 59, Central Foreign Policy + File, D800132–0761) In telegram 2123 from Bucharest March 14, the + Embassy responded that Romania would like to broker the Afghan + problem. The Embassy wrote: “While it is clearly not in a position + to settle the dispute, Ceausescu is in his own inimitable way trying to act + as a middleman in order to serve Romania’s national interests, world + peace, and his own ego—all of which are in this instance + compatible.” (National Archives, RG + 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800130–0957)

+

5. General discussions: Ceausescu + while being specific on several points, continued his well-known + approach of articulating Romania’s application of non-aligned principles + to general world situation. He indicated that international situation + has worsened as a result of a process begun long ago and that great + powers, including China, should make efforts to retrieve the situation + by pursuing detente, and taking into account independence and + sovereignty of all states. Ceausescu enumerated following factors resulting in + deterioration: (1) slow progress of SALT II; (2) Camp David has created impression on Soviets + they are being ignored in Mid-East peace process; (3) situation in + Afghanistan, partly result of fact that U.S. in the past only paid attention to military rather + than social and economic matters in Iran.

+ +

6. Afghanistan: Ceausescu was + careful to emphasize that in citing above factors, he was trying to find + causes but not rpt not justify Soviet + actions in Afghanistan. He indicated he fails to understand why USSR sent troops. Ceausescu felt that outside support for + anti-regime forces in Afghanistan was a factor in Soviet decision to + intervene. He believes that a US-Soviet agreement could be reached + perhaps, on the basis of Soviet withdrawal on one hand and cessation of + outside support for anti-regime forces on the other. Ceausescu indicated current US action + against Soviet Union is not rpt not + moving process towards a solution; on the contrary, it could aggravate + tensions and have unpredictable results. In reply, Newsom mentioned that President + Carter wants to continue + detente in areas where constructive action is possible, such as chemical + warfare, CTB and CSCE. US response, + however, reflects strong public reaction to Afghanistan situation in + which Soviet invasion has made major change in balance of influence in + that area. US President cannot exclude possibility that Soviets have + ambitions in South West Asia wider than in Afghanistan and US, as a + great power, must insure it has strength to meet such challenges. + Newsom emphasized that we + would like to find non-military means of resolving problems but we + cannot be indifferent to the fact that others are using military force. + No strong nation can afford to be unprepared in such situations.

+

7. Yugoslavia: Ceausescu was + relatively up-beat regarding prospects for Yugoslavia. He said “I do not + believe that Yugoslavian situation gives rise to worries,” indicating + that the good Yugoslav social order has good prospects for maintaining + Yugoslav independence, which he implied would be case even following + Tito.

+

8. European security: Ceausescu + stressed Romania’s desire to strengthen European security with + particular emphasis on continuing CSCE. He mentioned specifically that Romania wants a solution + to problems of military disengagement including problem of “nuclear + missiles.” Newsom indicated US + support for CSCE and stressed in + larger context that President has not withdrawn SALT II Treaty.

+

9. Iran: Ceausescu reiterated + Romanian view that sanctions are not most effective means of resolving + [garble], chiefly because they will aggravate difficult Iranian internal + economic situation. Newsom + explained that President Carter, + because he chose to seek a peaceful resolution, felt the need to use all + UN machinery and such action was + also important to maintain support from an angry US public opinion for + his Iranian policy. Newsom + stressed US had postponed formal implementation of sanctions until + Islamic Conference is concluded, that we welcome apparent election of + Bani-Sadr;Abdulhassan Banisadr was + invested as President of Iran on February 4, 1980. if it + appears we can make immediate + progress on release of hostages, implementation of sanctions could be + reviewed.

+

10. China: Ceausescu welcomed + US-China relations but cautioned that they not be to detriment of + relations with USSR, stressing need + for collaboration if not friendship and avoidance of confrontation. He + also stressed that US-China relationship should not be at expense of + interest of other peoples, implying Kampuchea. In reply, Newsom took note of his concern but + pointed out that US public and Congress want stronger US relations with + China and do not believe we can delay this development simply because + our relations with Soviet Union are deteriorating. Consequently, our + policy to China may seem more positive under present conditions than is + the case, given US-Soviet relations.

+

11. Mideast: Ceausescu spent + considerable proportion of discussion on Middle East negotiations and + criticism of Camp David and U.S. role. + While supporting Egyptian-Israeli steps in Camp David, he said that + “present Camp David course has no chance for success, at least + concerning the Palestinian problem.” He said that U.S. “could do a lot more on this issue” + and that a representative movement towards comprehensive peace is + necessary not only for stability in Middle East but also for securing + normal supply of oil. He decried fact that Jordan, Syria and PLO have + been left out of process. With respect to possibility of amending 242 to + add concept of “Palestine rights”, which Andrei raised with Under Secretary yesterday,In telegram 643 from Bucharest, January 27, the + Embassy summarized the conversation between Andrei and Newsom which took place earlier + that day. (National Archives, RG 59, + Central Foreign Policy File, P870105–0322) In telegram 645 from + Bucharest, January 28, the Embassy expanded on the points made by + Andrei in his + conversation with Newsom. + The Embassy concluded that“ Romanians clearly seek to pursue as much + of a traditional non-aligned policy as their geographic and + political position will permit” and that Newsom’s discussions with + Andrei showed the extent + of strain that remains in Soviet-Romanian relations. (National + Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign + Policy File, D800048–0954) + Newsom used talking points in + reftel with Ceausescu. Romanian President listened + intently but adhered to position that some parallel action to on-going + Camp David negotiations is necessary. He indicated some way must be + developed to assure Palestinian participation and suggested that this a + sphere where an initiatve could be developed with Soviet participation + despite problems of Afghanistan. He also suggested idea of Geneva type + international conference resumption. (Andrei later told Newsom Romanian idea was for post-Camp David conference + to resolve issues not yet resolved.)

+

12. In reply, Newsom spoke about + U.S. approach and our desire for + achieving sufficient results in autonomy negotiations to attract + Palestinian participation. Ceausescu listened patiently but evinced skeptism over + results with a Romanian expression roughly equivalent to “inshallah”. Sensing his intense + interest in the subject, Newsom + promised to keep Ambassador Aggrey informed as appropriate regarding progress of + Ambassador Linowitz’ negotiations, so that GOR could be informed.

+

13. Given Ceausescu’s great stress + during discussions on non-interference of great powers with small + nations, Newsom could not resist + temptation to indicate that we are not in a position, regardless of + impression of U.S. power, to force or + order another nation to do what it does not consider to be in its + interest. We have the difficult and lonely task of persuading Israel to + grapple with complex autonomy issues as well as questions of settlements + and status of Jerusalem and to achieve sufficient results to bring + Palestinians into negotiations. Ceausescu interrupted Newsom’s presentation to point out that Romania also is + addressing these problems with the Israelis and Arabs.

+

14. Comment: We did not detect any significant change in Ceausescu’s well-known position on + international issues during discussions. His criticism of Soviet + behaviour in Afghanistan came through strongly, although carefully + couched in terms of non-alignment and balanced but implied criticism of + U.S. security measures in reaction + to Afghan situation. Only new elements were Ceausescu’s suggestion that U.S. acquiesce to an initiative regarding Palestinian + rights which would involve the Soviets and his stress on CSCE issue of military disengagement with + specific reference to nuclear missiles. Ceausescu received Under Secretary graciously and + engaged in a lively give and take on the major current international + issues. He seemed genuinely pleased with letter and consultation. We + believe he has a better idea of current U.S. policy assessments which could be helpful in + permitting him to chart accurately the course of cautious non-alignment + which he is pursuing despite proximity to the Soviet Union.

+ + Aggrey + + +
+ +
+ 222. Editorial Note +

On February 24, 1980, Nicolae Ion Horodinca, a Romanian intelligence + officer, together with his wife and infant son, drove to a U.S. Army barracks in the Washington area + and asked for asylum. The Department informed the Embassy in Bucharest + in telegram 50348, February 25, of a February 24 Washington Post article describing the event. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800098–0113) Mrs. + Horodinca returned to the Romanian Embassy in Washington after her + husband’s defection, where she was immediately recalled to Bucharest. In + telegram 56600 to Bucharest, March 2, the Department informed the + Embassy that after meeting with her, Department and Immigration + officials were satisfied that she was returning to Bucharest on her own + free will. (National Archives, RG 59, + Central Foreign Policy File, P870105–0275) On her way to the airport, + however, Mrs. Horodinca collapsed, was taken to a hospital, and + subsequently decided to remain in the United States.

+

On March 4, the Embassy in Bucharest reported in telegram 1749 that + Acting Foreign Minister Constantin Oancea had called U.S. Ambassador Rudolph Aggrey to the Foreign Ministry + to deliver a démarche decrying U.S. + Government actions at the airport and accusing Washington of unduly + pressuring Mrs. Horodinca to remain in the United States. (National + Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy + File, P870105–0256) In telegram 1750 from Bucharest, March 4, Aggrey reported that during his + conversation with Oancea, Romanian President Nicolae Ceausescu had called the Foreign Ministry to + transmit a personal message to President Jimmy Carter. Ceausescu’s message issued a personal request to Carter, + asking him “to take steps to assure that the Romanian Ambassador and/or + another Romanian diplomat be given access to [Mrs. Horodinca] and + allowed to speak with her immediately. She should leave the hospital and + be brought to Romania immediately. If what we request is accorded we + will take no public notice of this incident. If we do not receive a + satisfactory reply today we will have to make public all of the + pressures that the US exerted upon Mrs. Horodinca as well as other acts + of a similar character taken by the U.S.” (National Archives, RG + 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P870105–0251) Romanian Ambassador + Nicolae Ionescu met with + Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs Zbigniew Brzezinski and Secretary of + State Cyrus Vance on March 5 to + further protest what the Romanian Government saw as U.S. Government actions to force Mrs. + Horodinca to change her mind. The Department reported in telegram 59850 + to Bucharest, March 5, that both Brzezinski and Vance had stressed to Ionescu that the recent developments were a surprise, + that the U.S. Government would respect + Mrs. Horodinca’s decision whatever it may be, and that the Romaninan + Government should not allow the incident to cloud the otherwise + improving relationship between the two countries. (National Archives, + RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + P870105–0291)

+

As a result of Horodinca’s defection, Romanian officials recalled all + officers from the United States. The defection also reinforced Romanian + perceptions of a diminishing special place in U.S. foreign policy and a belief that the Central Intelligence Agency + wanted to sabotage the U.S.-Romanian + special relationship. (Intelligence Information Cable, March 25; Carter + Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Brzezinski Office File, Country Chron File, Box 45, + Romania: 1980) Forwarding the report to Brzezinski on March 28, Stephen Larrabee of the National Security Council Staff, + recommended that Washington reduce some of the suspicion by rescheduling + Vance’s visit to Bucharest + as part of the high-level consultations on which Ceausescu placed great emphasis, and by + receiving Deputy Prime Minister Cornel + Burtica at the White House during his April visit to + Washington. (Ibid.)

+
+ +
+ 223. Memorandum From Stephen + Larrabee of the National Security Council Staff to the + President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)Source: Carter Library, National + Security Affairs, Brzezinski + Material, Country File, Box 66, Romania, 4/79–3/80. Secret; Outside + System. Sent for information. A copy was sent to Kimmitt. A stamped notation + indicates Brzezinski saw the + memorandum. + + + Washington, March 14, + 1980 + + + SUBJECT + Romanian Request for Military Supply Relationship (S) + +

As I noted in my Evening Report (Tab B),Dated March 4. Attached but not printed. the Romanians have + again approached us about entering into a military supply relationship + with them. Our military attache, acting on instructions, met with + Romanian MOD Chief of Intelligence, + Admiral Dinu (see cable at Tab + A)Not attached. The Defense Attaché in + Bucharest reported his conversation with the Romanian officer in a + March 6 telegram to the Defense Intelligence Agency at the Joint + Chiefs of Staff. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff + Material, Europe, USSR, and + East/West, Box 29, Romania 6/77–10/80) on March 5 to hear + what the Romanians had in mind. In essence, Admiral Dinu reaffirmed the approach the + Romanians had made several years ago when they had provided the U.S. with a list of desired equipment.In a March 14 memorandum to Vance, Vest + and O’Donohue described the Romanian approach and offered background + information on the initial approach the Romanians made in 1975. The + discussions on establishing a military supply relationship ended in + 1976 when the Romanians were told the United States faced legal + constraints in establishing such a relationship with a Warsaw Pact + country. (National Archives, RG 59, + Office of the Under Secretary for Security Assistance, Science and + Technology, Chron Files Speeches, and Papers of Lucy W. Benson (1979) and + Matthew Nimetz (1980), + Lot 81D321, Box 6, Matthew + Nimetz, Chron, March 11–31, 1980) During a port visit + of the USS Biddle to Romania in November + 1978, Deputy Minister of Defense Vasile Ionel also brought up the + issue. (National Archives, RG 59, + Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Office of Analysis for the + Commonwealth and Eastern Europe, Office Subject Files, 1965–1980, + Lot 92D412, Box 6, Romania-US—Cult/Sci/Tech) Admiral + Dinu stated that as far as he + knew, the earlier request was still open and that the Romanians would + like technical assistance regardless of licensing arrangements which + would enhance their defense capability. He acknowledged the difficulty + in establishing such a relationship. What he sought was simply an + indication that the U.S. might be + willing to help. (S)

+

Our attache limited himself to describing the difficulties involved but + made no commitment one way or the other. (S)

+

Dinu’s approach most assuredly had + high-level backing and could not have been undertaken without Ceausescu’s approval. At present, + DoD is not ready to ask Brown to take any specific action. In + addition to the political implications and difficulties, there are major + legal and financial problems associated with transferring such + technology to a Warsaw Pact country. Indeed, because of our emphasis on + human rights, the difficulties today are even greater than they were + several years ago when the Romanians first made the approach. + Nonetheless, the Romanian offer remains interesting, and I do not feel + we should entirely shut the door on the Romanians.Brzezinski + wrote at the bottom of the memorandum: “DA, shouldn’t we have a + mini-SCC on this?” David Aaron wrote in response “OK, + schedule it.” (S)

+
+ +
+ 224. Memorandum From Stephen + Larrabee of the National Security Council Staff to the + President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) and the President’s Deputy + Assistant for National Security Affairs (Aaron)Source: + Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Office, + President’s Advisory Board, Box 84, Sensitive XX: 4/1–11/80. Secret; + Outside System. Sent for action. A copy was sent to Kimmitt. Aaron wrote at the top of the first + page: “ZB—Very interesting and + delicate. Bob [Kimmitt] + should emphasize no leaks. DA.” + + + Washington, April 4, + 1980 + + + SUBJECT + Romanian Interest in Military Supply Relationship (U) + +

As you know, the Romanians recently raised with our air attache in + Bucharest the question of establishing a military supply relationship + with us (Tab A).See Document 223. With an eye to an eventual + mini-SCC, I met with Barry and Siena the other day to discuss our response and to get a + sense of the views of the various agencies and services. (S)

+

There was general agreement that the initiation of a military supply + relationship with Bucharest would be a sticky wicket and that we should + proceed very cautiously. While Romania and Yugoslavia share similar + views on many issues, especially resistance to Soviet hegemony, there + are significant differences which make the establishment of a military + relationship with Romania more difficult—and more risky:

+ + —Romania remains a member of the Warsaw Pact, albeit a reluctant + one; the danger of technology transfer therefore is higher. + —The bulk of the Romanian officer corps was trained in the Soviet + Union and unlike Yugoslavia, they have no familiarity with U.S. weapons systems or procurement + procedures. + —The political situation in Romania is shaky. While Ceausescu has a firm hand on the + reigns of power at the moment, there is considerable latent disenchantment with his increasingly + capricious and irrational rule—as well as the deterioration of the + economy over the last few years. Should Ceausescu die or be removed, a return to a more + orthodox foreign policy, one more closely attuned to Soviet + interests, cannot be entirely excluded. + —Romania maintains a harsh internal system and has a poor human + rights record (in comparison to Yugoslavia’s), a fact which would + provoke opposition in Congress. (C) + +

At the same time there was a general consensus that we have an interest + in encouraging the Romanians to diversify their arms supply and reduce + their dependence on Moscow. The group felt that we should therefore not close the door + entirely—especially since the succession struggle in the Soviet Union + may offer an opportunity for Bucharest to increase its freedom of + maneuver. At a minimum we could quietly and discreetly discuss with the + Romanians how our procurement system works and apprise them of the major + legislative requirements without making any specific commitments. This + might help to prevent some of the problems that have arisen with the + Yugoslavs (whom we briefed too late in the game) while at the same time + keeping the door slightly ajar for sales at a later date should + circumstances prove propitious. (S)

+

We should be sure, however, that any moves with Romania do not jeopardize + our military relationship with the Yugoslavs, and before proceeding too + far, it would be wise to obtain Belgrade’s reaction to our establishing + a military supply relationship with Bucharest. While the Yugoslavs would + probably support efforts to aid Romania (with whom they themselves are + cooperating to build a joint fighter, Orao) they might feel that such + efforts on our part might expose them to increased Soviet pressure and + thus prefer we not sell arms to Bucharest. At any rate, at some point we + should discreetly seek their views. (S)

+

At the moment no agency or service has a firm view on how we should + proceed. PM/EUR is working on a memo to Vance setting out the political, legal and legislative + implications of the establishment of any military supply relationship + with Bucharest, which should be ready in several weeks. Defense has + prepared a memo (Tab B) outlining US and COCOM restraints.Attached at Tab B is a undated and unsigned + Department of Defense memorandum from the Office of International + Security Affairs prepared for the Deputy Assistant Secretary of + Defense for European and NATO + Affairs. The memorandum outlined the DOD position regarding a military supply relationship + with Romania suggesting that sales of dual-use items on the + Commodity Control List and the COCOM International list could be + sold to the Romanian military without congressional approval, but + that congressional notification was advisable. The memorandum + further informed Siena that + the USG had asked COCOM partners to + extend a more flexible treatment to Romania, but that no consensus + had been reached. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff + Material, Office, President’s Advisory Board, Box 84, Sensitive XX: + 4/1–11/80) I will keep you informed as work proceeds. (S)

+

After State has finished its memo to Vance, I think the issue should be raised at a VBB and + then a mini-SCC should be held.Brzezinski underlined “VBB and then a mini-SCC” and wrote: “OK. ZB. (good memo).” (C)

+
+ +
+ 225. Memorandum Prepared in the Central Intelligence AgencySource: Central Intelligence Agency, + Office of Support Services (DI), Job 85T00287R, Production Case + Files, Box 1, Folder 91, Romania: A Situation Report. Confidential. + The memorandum was requested by the Department of Commerce. It was + prepared in the Office of Political Analysis and coordinated with + the Office of Economic Research. + + + PA M 80–10166 + + + Washington, April 7, + 1980 + +

ROMANIA: A SITUATION REPORT

+

Summary

+

Romania, as it has developed under the direction of + state and Communist Party chief Nicolae + Ceausescu, has become an anomaly among Communist + countries. It combines such “orthodox” attributes as full membership + in the Soviet alliance system, party domination of domestic + political life and a highly centralized economy, with a freewheeling + and relatively independent foreign policy and a one-man dictatorship + that in its personalization and concentration of power harks back to + Romania’s pre-war, monarchical past. There are signs that Ceausescu’s authoritarian and + austere domestic policies are wearing thin with the Romanian public + and that his independent-minded foreign policies are in danger of + becoming hostage to Romania’s mounting economic problems. Ceausescu has thus far managed to + keep his programs intact despite external and internal pressures by + dint of his remarkable ability to gauge both the limits of Soviet + tolerance and the extent to which his people will bear privations. + His political and diplomatic skills will increasingly be put to the + test as Romania enters the 1980s.

+

Foreign Policies

+

Ceausescu’s principal foreign + policy objective is to achieve as much independence from Moscow as + possible, given Romania’s geopolitical realities. The basic strategies + employed by Bucharest in pursuit of that goal are to resist those Soviet + policies that promote dominance over Romania, while avoiding any action + so antagonistic to Moscow as to provoke retaliation, and to cultivate + relations with as many non-Communist countries and independent-minded + Communist parties as possible to counter Soviet pressure. By taking this + course, Romania has succeeded in gradually extending the limits of + acceptable autonomous activity, but it has also come into conflict with + Soviet policy preferences. Romanian-Soviet relations, as a result, have + come under some strain, particularly during the past two years.

+

Since Romania’s leaders proclaimed their country’s foreign policy + independence in the early 1960s, one of their major preoccupations has + been to ward off Soviet + pressure for further integration into the Warsaw Pact and the Council + for Mutual Economic Assistance (CEMA). + Ceausescu has often stated + that military blocs are an anachronism and has actively campaigned for + the simultaneous dissolution of both NATO and the Warsaw Pact. Romania has not participated in + joint Pact exercises with combat troops since 1962 and does not allow + such exercises on Romanian soil. Romanian resistance to greater military + integration within the Pact reached its high point in November 1978 at a + meeting of the Pact’s Political Consultative Committee in Moscow, where + Ceausescu opposed Soviet + attempts to force an increase in the defense budgets of member states + and to centralize control over Pact military forces. Bucharest has + subsequently assumed a more accommodating stance toward Moscow on + military issues, but has not retreated significantly from the stands it + took at Moscow.

+

Romanian opposition to economic integration within CEMA is also long-standing. Indeed, it + was the primary issue over which Romania first broke with the Soviets. + Last summer, at a major CEMA + conference in Moscow, Romania fought—with only limited success—Soviet + attempts to give the organization supranational powers in the areas of + decision-making and conducting negotiations with international + organizations. Bucharest further distanced itself from its CEMA partners this year by concluding a + major trade pact with the EC—in direct + defiance of the Soviet preference for a multilateral approach toward + relations with the EC.

+

The Romanians have also clashed with the Soviets on a variety of + international issues they consider threatening to their foreign policy + autonomy, including the Vietnamese invasion of Kampuchea and the Soviet + intervention in Afghanistan. Bucharest’s opposition to the Vietnamese + takeover in Kampuchea derives at least in part from Romania’s close + relations with China—the ousted Pol Pot regime’s principal ally. + Bucharest has opposed the Soviet move into Afghanistan because of the + obvious implications this latest demonstration of Moscow’s willingness + to intervene in a friendly or allied regime holds for Romania. The + Romanians also fear the resultant deterioration in East-West relations + will be detrimental to Romania’s interests. Ceausescu, who advocates a negotiated solution to the + crisis, is apparently coming under pressure to fall into line with the + Soviets on this issue.

+

Romania is highly vulnerable to a variety of Soviet pressures, including + economic pressure. The USSR supplies + about a third of Romania’s total consumption of iron ore and, along with + Poland and Czechoslovakia, about half its coking coal. As a result of + Romania’s worsening energy crisis and hard currency shortage, the + potential for Soviet leverage has probably grown. Moscow has agreed to + sell Romania a small amount of crude oil for hard currency—approximately + one million tons—in 1980 and + may be dangling offers of increased future deliveries before the + Romanians. We have no evidence to date, however, that Moscow has made a + concerted effort to apply the economic levers at its command.

+

Romania’s growing dependence on foreign oil—it now imports about half its + crude oil needs—may be forcing a change in Bucharest’s Middle East + policy. Ceausescu has + traditionally pursued an “even-handed” approach toward the major + disputants in the region. Through his efforts to mediate their + differences he has earned a reputation as an effective behind-the-scenes + arbitrator of international disputes—a role he clearly relishes. + Ceausescu helped arrange the + historic Sadat-Begin meeting in 1977 and is now seeking to bridge + differences between Egypt and the other Arab states. There are signs, + however, that Romania may be tilting slightly—at least in its + rhetoric—toward the more militant forces in the region, possibly out of + concern to retain access to Middle Eastern oil.

+

Bucharest has actively courted Third World countries in order to gain + political and economic support for its independent policies. Romania is + particularly interested in playing a role in the Nonaligned + Movement—with which it now has guest status—but is unlikely to increase + its influence substantially as long as it is a member of the Warsaw + Pact.

+

Ceausescu has also sought closer + relations with the West to buttress Romania’s defense against Soviet + domination. He clearly believes that the “special relationship” he has + sought to develop with Washington is especially valuable—both + politically and economically—in this effort. Economic cooperation + protocols signed in March with the Occidental Petroleum Corporation + illustrate the benefits Romania hopes to derive from this + relationship.

+

Domestic Policies

+

Ceausescu’s independent and + nationalistic foreign policies strike a responsive chord at home, where + anti-Russian feeling runs high. Indeed, domestic political + considerations have probably been a major motivating factor in many of + Ceausescu’s anti-Soviet + actions. Ceausescu’s domestic + policies of rapid industrialization and authoritarian internal controls, + however, have been decidedly unpopular.

+

As a result of the regime’s emphasis over the past decade on capital + accumulation and investment, the standard of living has remained the + lowest among Warsaw Pact states while the economy’s growth rates are the + highest. As domestic reserves of energy and other key raw materials have + become depleted, however, even the rate of economic growth has begun to + falter.

+

In the face of mounting economic difficulties, the regime has initiated a + number of belt-tightening measures. Prices have been increased over the past two years for + energy and various consumer goods and an energy conservation program has + been implemented that sharply limits public consumption.

+

Ceausescu has sought to improve + economic performance by launching a program to reform economic + management. The program seeks to spur productivity by tying workers’ + salaries and bonuses more closely to enterprise profits and to increase + production efficiency by phasing out success indicators that reward + managers for lavish material expenditures. Ceausescu is also trying to mobilize public support for + his economic programs by creating an aura of mass involvement in the + political process. These strategies are flawed, however, by Ceausescu’s reluctance to yield + essential control over economic and political decision-making.

+

Public reaction to these measures so far has been restrained, but the + regime is undoubtedly concerned that consumer discontent could erupt and + touch off disturbances in other troubled sectors of Romanian society. + Workers have shown some restiveness, essentially over bread and butter + issues. A widespread slowdown by disgruntled coal miners occurred in the + summer of 1977, and sporadic incidents of industrial unrest have come to + light since then. Tensions between the Romanians and their large + Hungarian minority have boiled over occasionally, though the Magyars + seem quiet at the moment. Small dissidence movements have also emerged + among Romanian intellectuals and certain religious groups in recent + years, but have not posed a significant problem for the regime. The + chances of general disturbances seem remote, but the regime has betrayed + its nervousness by the quickness with which it has moved during the past + year to squelch the smallest manifestations of dissent.

+

Ceausescu’s dominance of the + Romanian political scene, which was reaffirmed last November at the 12th + Congress of the Romanian Communist Party, has been demonstrated during + the past year by the extensive personnel changes he has overseen on both + the national and local levels, under the rubric of “cadre rotations.” In + the latest round—in late March—the most prominent winner was his wife, + Elena, who was elevated to the post of First Deputy Prime Minister. A + member of the party’s prestigious Permanent Bureau, Mrs. Ceausescu is thought by some to be the + most powerful political figure in Romania after her husband.

+

Through periodic cadre rotations—which keep party and government + functionaries off balance and under control—and manipulation of the + bureaucratic structure, Ceausescu + has amassed enormous power. He now rules the country through a small + group of loyal lieutenants and appears able to bypass the regime’s + traditional power centers.

+

Ceausescu’s autocratic ruling + style and the personality cult that enshrines him and his wife appear to + have provoked some resentment within the bureaucracy, possibly reflected in the stinging attack + leveled against him by an aged party veteran at the party congress in + November. There is no evidence, however, of any organized opposition to + Ceausescu or of any serious + disagreement—within the apparatus—to the basic thrust of his + policies.

+

[1 line not declassified]

+
+ +
+ 226. Memorandum of ConversationSource: Carter Library, Donated Material, Papers of + Walter F. Mondale, Box + 67, Foreign Countries—Romania, (1980). Secret. Drafted by Larrabee. The meeting took place in + the Vice President’s office in the West Wing of the White + House. + + + Washington, April 23, 1980, 1:15 p.m. + + + SUBJECT + Vice President’s Meeting with Romanian Deputy Prime Minister + Cornel Burtica (U) + + + PARTICIPANTS + The Vice President + Phillip Klutznick, + Secretary of Commerce + O. Rudolph Aggrey, U.S. Ambassador to Romania + H. Allen Holmes, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European + Affairs + Denis Clift, Special + Assistant to the Vice President + Frank Tumminia, Officer in Charge of Romanian Affairs, Department + of State + F. Stephen Larrabee, NSC Staff Member (Notetaker) + Cornel Burtica, Romanian + Deputy Prime Minister + Nicolae Ionescu, Romanian + Ambassador to the U.S. + Boris Ranghet, Counselor, + Romanian Embassy + Ion Timofei, Interpreter + +

The Vice President opened the meeting by welcoming + Deputy Prime Minister Burtica to + Washington. He informed him that the President was aware that Burtica was carrying a letter from + President Ceausescu and that the + President had asked him to bring Burtica by to deliver the letter.Ceausescu’s + letter, dated April 17, stressed Romania’s desire to strengthen + security, collaboration, and stability in Europe through the CSCE process. Ceausescu also expressed his belief + that a solution to the Middle East could only be reached after + Israeli withdrawal from the occupied territories and the creation of + a Palestinian state. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, + Brzezinski Material, + President’s Correspondence with Foreign Leaders File, Box 16, + Romania: President Nicolae + Ceausescu, 1/79–6/80) (U)

+ +

Deputy Prime Minister Burtica thanked the Vice President. He said + that he had had good discussions with Secretary Klutznick, who was an old friend of + Romania. He had also had productive discussions at State and with + STR.Telegram 109956 to Bucharest, April + 26, reported the April 22 conversation between Christopher and Burtica at the Department. + Burtica, the telegram + reported, “raised bilateral issues of U.S. export controls, access for Romanian vessels to + Hampton Roads, and multi-year MFN.” + After renewing Romania’s request for access of its vessels to + Hampton Roads, Burtica was + informed that the administration had reviewed the issue intensively + but that it was not possible to agree to the Romanian request. The + two officials also discussed the hostage crisis in Iran, the Middle + East, and Afghanistan. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800206–0636) The + conversation between Klutznick and Burtica on April 22 was reported in telegram 114649 + to Bucharest, May 1. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + D800216–0360) (At this point the meeting was interrupted, and + the Vice President took Deputy Prime Minister Burtica in to see the President, who + accepted the letter and asked Minister Burtica to convey his greetings to President Ceausescu.)The President met with Burtica in the Oval Office from 1:20 to 1:25 p.m. + (Carter Libary, Presidential Materials, President’s Daily Diary, + April 23, 1980) (C)

+

Resuming the discussions again, the Vice President + stated that the President would respond to President Ceausescu’s letter through our + Ambassador in BucharestIn telegram 137585 + to Bucharest, May 24, the Department instructed Aggrey to request a meeting with + Andrei and deliver + Carter’s response to Ceausescu. Carter assured Ceausescu that, despite + deteriorating U.S.-Soviet relations, + he was “determined to maintain a dialogue with the countries of + Eastern Europe and to pursue a differentiated approach to each of + them,” and in particular with Romania. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + D800255–1010) and that he, the Vice President, would report + his conversations with Burtica + directly to the President. Burtica’s visit, in his view, was an indication of the + good relations between Romania and the United States. Recalling + President Ceausescu’s visit to + the United States in 1978, he said that the United States took a great + deal of satisfaction from the strengthening of bilateral relations which + had occurred in the interval. As far as trade was concerned, he noted + that he had been one of the original authors of MFN for Romania. This, in his view, was a symbol with some + substance and an indication that we were now on a good course. (C)

+

Deputy Prime Minister Burtica thanked the Vice + President very much, stating that the Romanians too were highly + appreciative of the development of good relations between the two + countries. Since President Carter’s meeting with President Ceausescu, relations had developed considerably. The + current session of the Joint Commission was a good example of the way in + which both countries could cooperate. He stressed, however, that both + countries needed to find new possibilities for expanding cooperation. + After the granting of MFN, commercial + exchanges had developed favorably, but it was unwieldy to have to review the question of MFN each year. The Romanians wanted to see + a solution of the MFN question on a + permanent basis, as in the case of China. (C)

+

The Vice President noted that the U.S. favored this as well. The question was + really one of timing. There was considerable positive feeling toward + Romania, but the question was really when we should move. (C)

+

Burtica + emphasized that the Congressmen with whom he had met felt that the time + was appropriate to move on the question of MFN. He had found considerable good feeling toward Romania + in Congress, particularly as a result of Romania’s independent stand on + Afghanistan. Senator Jackson in particular was positively disposed + toward granting MFN on a permanent + basis.Burtica’s conversation with members of Congress, + including Senator Jackson, was reported in telegram 121462 to + Bucharest, May 8. “While discussing this year’s MFN waiver” the Department reported, + “DPM Burtica never confronted + Jackson on the issue of multi-year MFN. We do not know if this was by design or simply + inadvertence, but Jackson was prepared to tell the Romanians that no + chance existed for change in the trade legislation or procedures to + permit multi-year MFN.” (National + Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign + Policy File, D800227–1123) (S)

+

At this point Secretary Klutznick interjected that Senator Jackson was + favorably disposed to yearly renewal not multiyear renewal. (C)

+

The Vice President commented that perhaps the + attitude in Congress was changing and that we ought to look into this. + The Vice President also noted that when Ceausescu came in 1975 he had gotten into a tiff with + Senator Jackson and that Jackson had found that Ceausescu was not easily pushed. + (S)

+

Burtica + replied that in the meantime Senator Jackson had been in Romania and had + come away with a positive impression. (C)

+

The Vice President promised that the U.S. would take another look at the + question of granting MFN to Romania on + a permanent basis. (S)

+

Turning to economic relations, Burtica commented that Romania + had a large number of very important negotiations, especially with + General Electric.In an undated memorandum + (drafted on March 28) from Vest to Clift, Vest + summarized U.S. support for General + Electric’s proposal to supply the Romanians with two turbine + generators for their nuclear plant at Cernavoda. (Carter Library, + Donated Material, Papers of Walter F. + Mondale, Box 67, Foreign Countries—Romania, + (1980)) If this deal were to be concluded, it would extend to + the year 2000. The Romanians basically agreed on all points except + counter-trade. Burtica stressed + that such a deal would be easier to conclude if MFN was granted on a permanent basis. This created + uncertainties. (S)

+

The Vice President asked if Burtica meant that Romania needed + access to U.S. markets. (C)

+ +

Burtica + responded that Romania had to be able to pay for what they had to buy in + the United States and that was why they needed MFN. Romania also had an important joint venture with + Control Data Corporation. (C)

+

The Vice President joked that the Minister was + very smart; Control Data was from Minnesota. (C)

+

In referring to contacts with U.S. firms, + Burtica noted that the two main problems were with + MFN and export licenses. (C)

+

Secretary Klutznick replied that the U.S. had the issue of licenses under + review. (U)

+

Turning to international affairs, Burtica said that he would + briefly like to inform the Vice President about Ceausescu’s views on a number of + important world problems. Romania was concerned about the deterioration + of the international situation and felt that we should do everything + possible not to allow it to further deteriorate. There were a number of + factors which had contributed to this. However, he stated that he did + not want to apportion blame. It was important, he stressed, that we try + to resolve matters by political means. In regard to CSCE, Romania felt that everything had to + be done to ensure that the Madrid Conference took place. He then noted + that there were a number of steps which could be taken to improve the + atmosphere. The Romanians hoped that SALT II could be ratified. They also felt that theater + nuclear weapons should be withdrawn before they were installed. (C)

+

Burtica stressed that Romania did + not want an imbalance in Europe, but rather wanted to see new steps + toward military disengagement in Europe as well as steps toward a + reduction of armaments and defense spending. Regarding Afghanistan, he + emphasized the need for a political solution, a cessation of foreign + support for anti-government forces, and a withdrawal of Soviet troops. + He stressed that the problem in Afghanistan could not be solved by + pressure tactics. The Soviets would not yield to pressure. Only a + dialogue could lead to a solution. (C)

+

Regarding Iran, Burtica said that + Romania wanted to see a reduction in tensions. Economic sanctions would + only lead to greater rigidity, both in Afghanistan and Iran. President + Bani-Sadr, he said, was having problems with the students. The Ministry + of Foreign Affairs, however, was taking a more realistic position. The + Romanians believed that pressure simply fed the most extremist forces. + (C)

+

Burtica then turned to the + question of a new economic order, noting that Romania desired to + cooperate with the American side to find practical solutions. Such + cooperation was necessary because otherwise conflicts in the region + would increase. (C)

+

The Vice President thanked Minister Burtica for his observations. He stated + that the United States was very interested to see GE get the contract. This would help to + strengthen and broaden the bilateral relationship. As far as Madrid was + concerned, the United States wanted to see the follow-up conference on + security and cooperation in Europe (CSCE) go forward and was planning to attend the Madrid + session as scheduled. The Vice President regretted that it had been + necessary to defer SALT II, noting + that after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan there was no way we could + have obtained ratification. He assured Minister Burtica, however, that as soon as it + was politically feasible the Administration would try to get the SALT II Agreement ratified. (C)

+

The Vice President then turned to the question of + TNF, pointing out that for nearly fourteen years the question had been + quiescent. However, recently the Soviets had begun deploying the SS–20, + which was a MIRVed, mobile, highly accurate missile, at a rate of + several a month. They had also begun deploying the BACKFIRE bomber which + was a theater nuclear weapon. As a result, NATO had no choice but to take the decision which it took + at the December 12th Ministerial. (C)

+

The Vice President stressed that we continued to + attach importance to MBFR and hoped to + eventually see a Phase I Agreement. As far as Afghanistan was concerned, + he noted that the U.S. position was well + known and that there was no need to repeat it for Minister Burtica. Iran was a heart-breaking + situation. The hostages were innocent victims and their captivity was a + violation of international law. The United States had been patient and + restrained. We had had repeated talks with Iran. The Iranian government + had repeatedly been unwilling or unable to deliver on its commitments + and the situation was becoming almost intolerable. As a consequence, we + had asked our friends to join with us to impose sanctions under the + UN Resolution. We were trying to + force the Iranians to see the folly of their ways. However, it was + becoming increasingly clear that the Iranians had no intention of + letting the hostages go and were determined to humiliate the United + States. He assured Deputy Prime Minister Burtica that he would report the Minister’s views to the + President. He then asked the Minister to give his views on what would + happen in Yugoslavia after Tito + died. (C)

+

Minister Burtica stressed that in the Romanian view there + would be no major changes. The Yugoslavs had achieved a system that + maintained a balance and satisfied the needs of the different republics. + Sometimes the various nationalities quarreled among themselves, but they + were united against any outside threat. The real problem in the long run + would be whether a genuinely collective leadership would emerge or + whether there would be a return to one-man rule. (C)

+

The Vice President commented that it was hard to + see how anyone could possibly replace Tito. (C)

+

Minister Burtica agreed, but noted that in China people had + thought that it would be hard to replace Mao. In Yugoslavia some + personalities would be found. + In this connection, he cited the example of Stane Dolanc. Dolanc was an + extremely able and good politician. Before he became Executive Secretary + of the Presidium, no one had known him. However, he had done an + excellent job. Thus, in Minister Burtica’s view, it would be possible to find some + personality eventually who could lead Yugoslavia. He did not think that + the Soviets would intervene directly in Yugoslav internal affairs + because the Soviets knew that the Yugoslavs, like the Romanians, would + not sit idly by and allow themselves to be occupied. (S)

+

The Vice President concluded the meeting by + thanking Minister Burtica for his + visit and conveyed President Carter’s best wishes to President Ceausescu. (U)

+ + +
+ +
+ 227. Memorandum of ConversationSource: Carter Library, Donated Material, Papers of + Walter F. Mondale, Box + 35, Vice President’s Trip to Yugoslavia for Tito Funeral, 5/5/80–5/8/80: + Background—Bilateral Meetings. Secret; Nodis. Following Tito’s death on May 4, Mondale traveled to Belgrade to attend the funeral + as Carter’s representative. Clift forwarded the memorandum to Dodson on May 13 for further + distribution. + + + Belgrade, May 7, + 1980 + +

Vice President’s Meeting with President + Ceausescu from Romania, + Wednesday, May 7, 1980, Belgrade, Yugoslavia

+

Vice President: Mr. President, the loss of + Tito is a great blow for + Yugoslavia. It is our hope that Yugoslavia will continue to be a strong + and independent nation.

+

President Ceausescu: Every action taken by Tito is lasting and durable. We + believe the same policies will be further developed in the future.

+

Vice President: That is our hope. I met with + President Kolisevski this afternoon,See + Document 290. and I reaffirmed + U.S. support and renewed the + President’s pledge to work with Yugoslavia.

+

President Ceausescu: We do not consider there is any + particular problem with either Yugoslav policy or security. We really + believe the Yugoslav leaders will continue to promote the same policies + developed by Tito.

+ +

But, in international life today there are many complicated issues. I see + a serious deterioration of the international situation at present. What + should be done to stop this course toward tension and strain and to + search, instead, to solutions?

+

Vice President: Mr. President, when we came into + office, I doubt that any Administration was more interested in detente + than our own. We worked on SALT, + MBFR, CTB, and liberalization of + trade with the USSR. But it has proven + difficult to maintain this policy. With the invasion of Afghanistan, + attitudes in our country were poisoned. If we were to bring the SALT II treaty to a vote now it would be + defeated.

+

I cite Afghanistan as the central problem in the world today. But, your + point is valid. We have to seek a more stable, secure world. The + independence your government has shown is important. The President + appreciates your advice. He asked that I meet with you and convey his + appreciation for the independence you have shown as a responsible actor + on the international scene.

+

President Ceausescu: The fact is that many problems have + accumulated in the world. If SALT II + had been ratified last year, this might have influenced a number of + events. Of course, events in Afghanistan have contributed to a worsening + of the situation. Those events are only part of a longstanding process. + I believe that in Afghanistan a political solution is necessary, not a + course leading to further tension. A political solution pre-supposes a + cessation of force, with no more outside forces and with withdrawal of + Soviet troops. My view is that under present circumstances efforts + should be made to have contacts and talks, first between the USA and the + USSR. It is necessary to take care + to observe the independence of all peoples and the renunciation of + force. I believe that account should be taken of statements by the + Soviet leadership that they are ready to withdraw forces if there is a + cessation of activities by outside forces.

+

We have to prepare carefully for the European Security Meeting in Madrid + this year. In my opinion we should do everything possible to overcome + the present state of tension in the world. To be frank, I have the + impression that the United States and the Soviet Union have engaged + themselves in policies that further divide the two countries. And, it is + not for me to emphasize the important role the US and USSR have in international life. It is + also a fact that an increasing number of states have equality and + independence. My main concern is that the current situation might get + out of hand and reach a point where it would be difficult to step + back.

+

Vice President: Afghanistan is important, and we + are trying to get the Soviets to reconsider. They have used vague + language on withdrawal, language similar to that they used in + Czechoslovakia 12 years ago. One searches in vain for a single + justification of the Soviet invasion. As a result the tension is regrettably there. I will + report your views to President Carter.

+

President Ceausescu: Please convey my greetings and best + wishes to President Carter.

+

I understand the present problems are complex and complicated. Under the + circumstances, the USSR can’t use + Afghanistan for a broader objective. I don’t wish to offer any guarantee + on behalf of the USSR (laughter). + However, I have discussed this with Gromyko, and he says the USSR should be believed that it has no other + intentions.

+

Vice President: I don’t believe it.

+

President Ceausescu: It must be proven by the facts. + There must be respect for the independence of Afghanistan. If + Afghanistan’s neighbors could be counseled, it would be helpful to + arrive at an understanding.

+

Vice President: If I understand you, you are + saying the Soviets should get out, others should get out and leave it to + the Afghans.

+

President Ceausescu: The Soviets do declare they are + ready to withdraw under such conditions.

+

Vice President: They use weasel words. They want a + government compliant to Soviet wishes if the USSR is to withdraw.

+

President Ceausescu: Since 1921, the Soviets have had + influence and have had a military mission in Afghanistan. We want to + work to find solutions.

+

Vice President: We do not support the idea of a + government hostile to the USSR, but it + has to be a government that does not have an occupying Soviet army.

+

President Ceausescu: The situation is a little bit more + complicated. Without Iran we would not have had Afghanistan. We have a + situation where certain forces, religious forces are moving around, + taking strength in the feudal country of Afghanistan. The entry of + Soviet troops was a result of this Islamic movement supported by outside + forces. Another reason for the troop entry was the potential danger for + a similar movement in one of the Soviet republics adjoining Afghanistan. + This is why all outside support should cease.

+

Vice President: I appreciate having your views, + Mr. President.

+
+ +
+ 228. Memorandum From Stephen + Larrabee and Robert + Kimmitt of the National Security Council Staff to the + President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)Source: Carter Library, National + Security Affairs, Staff Material, Freedom of Information/Legal, Arms + Transfers/Country File, Box 29, Romania: 6/77–10/80. Secret. Sent + for action. + + + Washington, June 10, + 1980 + + + SUBJECT + VBB: Military Supply Relationship with Romania (S) + +

As you know, the Romanians recently raised with our Air Attache in + Bucharest the question of establishing a military supply relationship + with us.See Document + 223 and footnote 3 thereto. Both State and Defense + have completed internal studies of the issue. Defense favors moving + ahead with a modest relationship, while State is divided. Nimetz and EUR feel we should let the Romanians down gently;In a May 12 memorandum to Christopher, Nimetz recommended that the United + States consult with its Western Allies before making a decision on + establishing a military supply relationship with Romania. Nimetz cautioned that congressional + opposition would be fierce given Romania’s human rights record and + that establishing such a relationship with a Warsaw Pact country + would “send very strange signals to the Western Europeans whom we + continually exhort to increase their defense efforts to meet the + Warsaw Pact buildup.” Nimetz + cautioned that “Romania doesn’t have the dollars to buy very much; + nothing we provide will change the scenario if the Soviets invade” + and that “a Western European supply relationship might be more + effective and less controversial for a start.” (National Archives, + RG 59, Office of the Under + Secretary for Security Assistance, Science and Technology, Chron + Files, Speeches, and Papers of Lucy W. + Benson (1979) and Matthew + Nimetz (1980), Lot 81D321, Box 6, Matthew Nimetz, Chron, May + 1980) + PM agrees with Defense. Christopher also feels we should + consult with the allies before making any decision.In a May 6 memorandum to Christopher, Vest and Bartholomew sought a decision on + the Department’s position. Stating that Romanian motives for seeking + a military supply relationship remained unclear, Vest and Bartholomew estimated that the + Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and tension in the Warsaw Pact toward + Bucharest might have increased Romanian anxiety. (Ibid.) Christopher decided on Allied + consultations prior to responding to Bucharest. Defense, + however, argues we should make our own decision and then talk to the + allies. (S)

+

There are thus two issues:

+ + —do we wish to initiate a military supply relationship with the + Romanians + —do we consult with the allies before or after making our decision + (S) + + +

We strongly feel that we should not rush into this and that we need to + better understand the political, legal and legislative implications of + establishing any military supply relationship before we proceed + further.Larrabee made a similar point in an April 23 + memorandum to Brzezinski + briefing him for an upcoming Vance-Brown-Brzezinski lunch. The resignation of Secretary + Vance on April 28 forced + the cancelation of the VBB meeting. (Carter Library, National + Security Affairs, Brzezinski + Material, Subject File, Box 32, Luncheon Meetings (BBV): + 1–4/80) There are a number of reasons for advocating + caution:

+ + —the danger of technology transfer from Romania to the USSR is higher than was the case with + Yugoslavia + —the bulk of the Romanian officer corps was trained in the Soviet + Union and, unlike the Yugoslav officer corps, they have no + familiarity with US weapons systems or procurement procedures + —despite Romania’s current independent stand, a return to a more + pro-Soviet policy cannot be excluded if Ceausescu were to die, or be removed + —Romania maintains a harsh internal system and has a poor human + rights record, a fact which will provoke opposition in Congress + (S) + +

We also think that it would be good to sound out our allies, particularly + to determine if they have also been approached by the Romanians on this + matter. However, given the delicacy of the matter and the danger of + leaks, we strongly feel that this should be done only + within the Quad framework. + Vest is leaving for a Quad + meeting on Monday,June 16. The Quad refers + to the formalized meeting of the political directors of the United + States, United Kingdom, France, and East German Foreign + Ministries. and the issue could be raised at that time. Based + on his soundings—as well as the papers prepared by State and Defense—we + could then proceed to hold an SCC. + (S)

+

We recommend therefore that at the MBB, + you

+ + —emphasize the need to proceed cautiously + —weigh in for consulting the allies, but only within the Quad + framework (S)The Muskie-Brown-Brzezinski meeting took place + June 11. In a memorandum to Denend and Aaron later that day, Brzezinski informed them that + the MBB had decided to “inquire + what the Romanians have specifically in mind. No need for prior + consultations with the Allies on this subject.” (Carter Library, + National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Freedom of + Information/Legal, Arms Transfers/Country File, Box 29, Romania: + 6/77–10/80) + +
+ +
+ 229. Telegram From the Embassy in Romania to the Department of + StateSource: National + Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign + Policy File, D800299–0016. Confidential; Immediate. Sent Immediate + to Budapest. In telegram 4941 from Bucharest, June 16, the Embassy + summarized the remainder of Ridgway’s visit to Romania, and described the + atmosphere of the meetings and receptions. (National Archives, + RG 59, Central Foreign Policy + File, D800294–1042) + + + Bucharest, June 16, 1980, 1415Z + +

4940. Budapest for Counselor Ridgway. Department please pass—upon concurrence of + Counselor, who has not seen message and may wish to comment further—to + AmEmbassies Amman, Belgrade, Berlin, Cairo, Damascus, Kabul, Madrid, + Moscow, Prague, Sofia, Tel Aviv, Warsaw, USMission + USNATO. Subject: Counselor Ridgway’s Meeting With Foreign + Minister Andrei.

+

1. (C-entire text)

+

2. Summary. Counselor Ridgway’s + meeting with Foreign Minister Andrei reviewed issues in the Middle East, Afghanistan, + Iran, European security and CSCE, + East-West relations and general bilateral matters. Andrei informed Ridgway of the Islamic Conference + committee’s desire to meet with anti-government forces in Afghanistan to + work out a cease-fire with condition that Soviet troops withdraw and + that a provisional government be formed from members of current + government and insurgents. Little substantive change in Romania’s + positions was indicated on any issue discussed. Meeting was cordial and + candid.In preparation for the visit to + Bucharest, the Embassy submitted in telegram 4506 from Bucharest, + June 3, a draft of the “substantive toast” Ridgway was to deliver at a + reception on June 13, marking 100 years of diplomatic relations. The + draft contained language celebrating “continued positive development + of our bilateral relationship, to our common effort to see the + spirit of human genius used for the betterment of mankind.” In + reviewing the text, Ridgway + highlighted this passage and wrote her Special Assistant, John King: + “John—Check with someone other than [Romanian desk officer] Frank + Tumminia about this. . . I’d hardly say that an essentially + Stalinist society is one to which we ought to join our efforts to + find something ‘common’ for the betterment of mankind. We somehow + keep forgetting what we’re dealing with. R.” (National Archives, + RG 59, Counselor to the + Department, Subject Country Files and 1980 Briefing Books, Box 3, + Pol 2—Romania) End summary.

+

3. On June 13 Counselor Ridgway + met for 90 minutes with Foreign Minister Stefan Andrei. Accompanying the Counselor were the + Ambassador and Special Assistant John King. With the Minister were + Constantin Oancea, Deputy Foreign Minister; Nicolae Turturea, Acting + Director, Inter-American Affairs; Mircea Raceanu, OIC, North American + Affairs; and Radu Matescu, interpreter.

+ +

4. At a separate introductory meeting earlier in the day, Counselor + Ridgway and Minister + Andrei exchanged letters from + Presidents Carter and Ceausescu on the occasion of the + centennial of US/Romanian relations.In + telegram 4475 from Bucharest, June 3, the Embassy reported that the + Romanian Foreign Ministry had delivered an unofficial draft of + Ceausescu’s message to + Carter. (National Archives, RG 59, + Central Foreign Policy File, D800271–0597) + Andrei opened second meeting by + expressing satisfaction with improvement in US/Romanian relations over + past 15 years as indicated by large number of exchange visits by + officials of the two countries and by progress in several fields, + especially trade. He also expressed appreciation for Department’s + support for MFN renewal.

+

5. Bilateral relationship. Ridgway noted growing tradition of exchange visits and + regretted President Carter’s + inability to stop in Bucharest during his forthcoming trip. Schedule + permitted only one stop in Eastern Europe and Romania could appreciate + importance of a visit to Yugoslavia at this time.Carter visited Yugoslavia June 24–25. On June 10, + Vest sent Ridgway a briefing memorandum + indicating that the Romanians would seek assurances that the special + relationship between the United States and Romania, and between + President Carter and + Ceausescu in particular, + remained strong, especially in light of Carter’s decision to only + travel to Yugoslavia. (National Archives, RG 59, Counselor to the Department, Subject Country + Files and 1980 Briefing Books, Box 3, Pol 2—Romania) After + asking Andrei to convey President + Carter’s “high esteem” to + President Ceausescu, she said the + former hoped to make a trip to Bucharest in the future to reciprocate + Ceausescu’s April 1978 visit + to Washington. She also noted that President Carter’s inability to visit Romania this time in no way + should imply a lessening of the importance the US attached to relations + with Romania or of Ceausescu’s + role in European politics. Andrei + made careful notes and said he would directly inform President Ceausescu.

+

6. Middle East. Drawing on the Secretary’s June 9 speechMuskie + delivered the speech, entitled “The Middle East: Outlook for Peace,” + at the Washington Press Club on June 9. The speech was published in + Department of State Bulletin, July + 1980. + Ridgway reviewed US position on + search for peace under Camp David aegis, stressing our continuing faith + in success of the process. There had been progress despite difficulty of + issues, especially Palestinian autonomy question. US believes any + initiative to alter UN Resolution 242 or + to undermine Camp David process must be opposed. The so-called “European + initiative” can be useful if it meets all of our concerns and falls + within the Camp David guidelines. The US is trying to get Israel and + Egypt back to the negotiations on the remaining difficult issues with + minimum delay to limit prospect of counterproductive outside + initiatives. Andrei said Romania + was happy to see Camp David process accomplish as much as it had, but + that it seems to have exhausted its possibilities since it had not + provided for a comprehensive peace involving Israeli withdrawal from all occupied + territory and had not provided a solution for the problem of the + Palestinians. Romania believes an international conference should be + called under UN auspices with the US and + USSR as co-chairmen and bring + together all parties to the conflict, including the PLO. As envisioned, + the conference would not deal with problems solved by the Camp David + process but only outstanding issues. A comprehensive solution should not + be restricted by the guidelines of UN + Resolution 242. Problems in the region must not be allowed to get out of + hand in the wake of the raging conflict in Lebanon, conservative Islamic + resurgence in IGCN and other disturbing developments. Israel must stop + using the PLO excuse to resist solutions. Andrei said he recognized that the US could not look for + solutions outside the Camp David process at least until after the + elections in November, but did respond in that session to Ridgway’s question whether Romania + contemplated any initiative now that the May 26th deadline had + passed.

+

7. Afghanistan. Ridgway provided + Andrei with current + information on Afghanistan situation and reviewed US position. She + expressed appreciation for Romania’s stand against Soviet invasion and + hoped Romania would support efforts to find a solution. Andrei then reviewed deterioration in + international relations and increasing world tension because of + continuance of some problems and struggle for domination of one country + over another. He said Romania considers Soviet invasion of Afghanistan + as climax of this entire process. He reiterated Romania’s position that + invasion was not justified on any grounds. “You can’t make a country + happy by military force.” Noting the difference between Ceausescu’s and Gromyko’s recent statements on + Afghanistan, he emphasized again that Romania remained categorically + against the invasion since military action of any type endangered + international cooperation. This applied to the doctrine of “limited + sovereignty” and intervention by one Socialist country in another. The + struggle for independence is a major aspect in international affairs and + it must be accommodated. He said a quick solution in Afghanistan must be + found by negotiation of Soviet troop withdrawal together with + international guarantees of non-interference by outside states in + Afghanistan. Romania thus welcomes formation of the special committee by + the Islamic Conference as it could lead to a political solution. + Pakistan Foreign Minister Agha Shahi told him during his visit to + Bucharest June 9, that the committee had already tried to contact + Soviets, Babrak government and the insurgents. In this respect, Shahi + emphasized that contacting Babrak regime did not imply recognition of + it. Shahi said the COEE hopes to arrange a cease-fire between government + and anti-government forces based on condition of withdrawal of Soviet + troops from Afghanistan. Next step, in committee’s view, would be + formation of a provisional + government from members of present government and representatives of the + insurgents, allowing Afghans to work out their internal problems free of + outside influence. Andrei + commented at this point that Romania considers it fundamental to get the + Soviet Union to withdraw its troops and to guarantee non-interference in + Afghanistan by all states, including Islamic countries, while internal + decisions are being worked out. This should be done, he added, from the + political base existing before the invasion. In this context, Ridgway noted Deputy Foreign Minister + Groza’s statement in Washington that Romania would not only oppose the + importation of revolution, but the importation of counter-revolution as + well.

+

8. Iran. Ridgway expressed US + hopes that Romania could support efforts to free the hostages, despite + its known position that economic sanctions are not feasible. The US + believes sanctions will have a constructive effect and open other + opportunities for discussion of the hostage issue with Iran. All nations + have an interest in freeing the hostages and creating safer conditions + for their diplomats. She added that the US attempt to rescue the + hostages was humanitarian in impetus, not military. Andrei reiterated Romania’s desire to + see the hostages freed as soon as possible since it would lessen + international tensions. He noted however that economic sanctions could + be turned against the US by hostile forces in Iran.

+

9. European issues and CSCE. Andrei noted that the greatest danger + to world peace lies in Europe, and that any war there would be nuclear. + Romania wished to strengthen security and reach a balance between the + two sides through reductions in armed forces and military budgets. The + theater nuclear force deployment decision should be delayed and + negotiations started immediately for reduction by both sides of + medium-range weapons. Stressing the need for balance, Andrei said the negotiating process + should seek ultimately to reduce tension and reestablish detente. This + in turn would help the situation in Afghanistan and give impetus to the + withdrawal of Soviet troops. It would also create conditions for a + successful Madrid CSCE review meeting, + which in turn would revitalize the Helsinki spirit and improve the + international climate. In this respect Romania believed additional + bilateral consultations with the US might be helpful in preparing for + the Madrid meeting. Andrei + suggested such consultations in Bucharest in July or early August, with + perhaps yet another consultation after the summer. Ridgway agreed to take his suggestion + back to Washington. On TNF, Ridgway said NATO + intended to go through with its decision, pointing to the fact that + three offers to the Soviets to negotiate arms reductions had gone + unanswered. Since NATO missiles had + yet to be produced, the TNF decision had a built-in delay on deployment + which could be used to negotiate. Ridgway confirmed the American desire to safeguard the CSCE process as the only one that brings all European + nations together. The US would try to shape the Madrid meeting to + achieve that objective and not destroy the process.

+

10. East-West relations. Describing US-Soviet relations as “poor,” + Ridgway noted that this + applied only to the Soviets and that the US pursues a different policy + toward East European countries, particularly Romania. Andrei expressed appreciation for the + wisdom of this policy but regretted the downward spiral of US-Soviet + relations and the deepening of mistrust between the two nations over so + many issues (Ethiopia, Angola, C[amp] David Agreements, NATO, TNF decision, and postponement of + SALT process). Noting that the + East-West framework was dependent on the world situation, Andrei again argued for the + safeguarding of the CSCE process and + the improvement of the international climate.

+ + Aggrey + + +
+ +
+ 230. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in + RomaniaSource: National + Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign + Policy File, P870104–0590. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Sent for information + Immediate to the White House. Drafted by Courtney and Barry; cleared by O’Donohue, + Kramer, Larrabee, Schmidt, and in PM and T; approved by Bartholomew. + + + + Washington, June 19, 1980, 2210Z + +

162131. Subject: US-Romanian Military Supply Relationship. Ref: USDAO + Bucharest 060740Z March 80.See footnote 3, Document 223.

+

1. S-entire text.

+

2. We have given careful consideration to the question of establishing a + military supply relationship with Romania. It has been decided at a high + level that we should respond to Admiral Dinu’s request (reftel) by going back to the Romanians in a low-key way to + ask that they be more specific about their interest in establishing such + a relationship.

+

3. Several factors have changed since 1975–76 when the Romanians made a + similar request. The most restrictive provisions of the Battle ActThe Mutual Defense Assistance Control Act, + also known as the Battle Act, restricted export of certain strategic + and military items to countries allied with the Soviet Union. + are no longer in force, and the US has a growing interest in supporting Romania and its policies of + independence. Nevertheless, Romania’s membership in the Warsaw Pact and + probable opposition in the Congress are serious obstacles.

+

4. Before deciding on next steps, we would like to have greater + confidence than we now have that Admiral Dinu’s request represented a serious and continuing + Romanian interest in a military supply relationship. Accordingly, at the + Ambassador’s discretion the Defense Attache should make an appointment + with Admiral Dinu and convey the + points in para 5.

+

5. Talking points:

+

—Careful consideration has been given in Washington to the approach you + made on March 6 concerning the possibility of US military sales to + Romania.

+

—As was the case in 1975–76, any such sales to a member of the Warsaw + Pact raise legal and political questions, although some legal obstacles + have since been relaxed.

+

—We want to approach the matter with a constructive attitude, although we + would not want to raise expectations that could not be fulfilled.

+

—Before considering the Romanian request further, we would appreciate + having a firm indication that the Government of Romania remains actively + interested in pursuing the question of US military sales.

+

—If it is, we would like to have specific ideas of the kinds of articles + you might wish to purchase. We could not provide such items as major + weapons systems or sensitive military technologies, but we would be + prepared to hear other requests.

+

If the Romanian interlocutor responds by referring to the list handed + over in 1975, the Defense Attache should answer as follows:

+

—We will report your interest to Washington.

+

—You should be aware, however, that the 1975 list contained a number of + items which involve sensitive military technology or major weapons + systems.

+

6. Begin FYI. Following, for Embassy’s + background, is list given us in 1975:

+

Portable radar station for tactical reconnaissance;

+

Grenade thrower—adaptable for man-portable armaments;

+

Marksman passive device—for aim at the target—for gun, stun gun and + machine gun;

+

Launching device for portable anti-aircraft missiles and portable + anti-aircraft missiles designed for air defense against low speed and + low level flying attacking aircraft; self-propelled anti-aircraft + missile launchers and + anti-aircraft missiles for close-in defense against low flying attacking + aircraft;

+

Portable missiles system and portable missiles designed for use against + tanks and armored personnel carriers;

+

Light mortar—caliber 120mm.—and the 120mm. shells (explosives, flash and + smoke);

+

Two barrels aircraft cannon;

+

Coastal minesweeper—designed in a magnetic structure;

+

Stereoscopic rangefinder for anti-aircraft artillery;

+

Technical equipment for medium tank. End FYI.

+

7. This is a joint State-Defense message.The + Embassy reported the July 1 meeting between the Defense Attaché and + Dinu in telegram 5390 + from Bucharest, July 2. Dinu + explained that Bucharest was still interested in a military supply + relationship on the basis of the 1975 list. Dinu also “enquired how eventual + Romanian-US military sales agreement would be finalized, posing + question of a possible signing of documents at the highest level.” + (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Freedom + of Information/Legal, Arms Transfers/Country File, Box 29, Romania: + 6/77–10/80)

+ + Christopher + +
+ +
+ 231. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in + BucharestSource: Carter + Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 67, Romania: + 4/80–1/81. Secret; Priority; Nodis. Sent for information Priority to the White + House. Drafted by Courtney, Farber, and Tumminia; cleared by + Bartholomew, Barry, Kreisberg, Siena, and Larrabee and in T; approved by + Nimetz. + + + Washington, July 30, 1980, 1937Z + +

202085. Joint State-Defense message. Subject: US Military Exports to + Romania. Ref: Bucharest 5390.In telegram + 5390 from Bucharest, July 2, the Embassy reported on the July 1 + meeting between Dinu and the + Defense Attaché. The Embassy reported: Dinu “expressed his satisfaction with the meeting + and the fact that the U.S. response + had not been a categoric ‘no.’” See footnote + 4, Document 230.

+

1. (S-entire text)

+

2. The meeting on July 1 between the DATT and Rear Admiral Dinu appears to have been a useful + exchange. We believe it important to have an early second exchange to + clarify more precisely what we have in mind.The decision to approach the Romanians to seek clarification was + taken at a July 23 MBB meeting. + O’Donohue forwarded Secretary Muskie a briefing memorandum on the status of the + Department’s position on military exports to Romania on July 22 + recommending that the Defense Attaché approach the Romanians again + seeking clarification. Muskie wrote in the margin “Clear cable and after + Romanian response talk to Congress.” (National Archives, RG 59, Office of the Secretariat Staff, + Subject Files of Edmund S. + Muskie, 1963–1981, Lot 83D66, Box 6, Folder 1) + We are particularly concerned that the Romanians not build unrealistic + expectations and that our exchanges reflect a careful and constructive + approach.

+

3. Our strategy at this stage is to give the Romanians a general + understanding of the kinds of equipment the US might be willing to + license for sale and the kinds the US is not prepared to license, and to + seek Romanian reactions to this approach. Begin FYI. Shortly we will inform the Yugoslavs, who approached + us, that the US would approve an export license for the export to + Yugoslavia of a US aileron drive system to be installed in the wings of + the Romanian version of the Jurom jet fighter. This should not repeat + not be conveyed to the Romanians at this time. End FYI.

+

4. Accordingly, at the Charge’s discretion, the Defense Attache should + convey the following points to Admiral Dinu. Begin text:

+

—We found the exchange which took place on July 1 to be useful.

+

—In view of the interest in having further exchanges on this subject, we + wish to outline in greater detail to you our general approach.

+ +

—We are pleased that Romania and the United States have developed, in a + gradual and prudent fashion, a military relationship that includes + high-level military visits, ship visits, and other interchanges.

+

—We are willing to consider making strictly limited exports of US + military equipment to Romania on a case-by-case basis. While we are not + prepared to consider sales of military equipment on a + government-to-government basis (that is, under the US “foreign military + sales” program) we could approve exports of some commercially-available + US-manufactured munitions list items exclusive of major defense + equipment or sensitive military technologies.

+

—These limitations would mean that most if not all items on the list + provided to us in 1975 would be unavailable. The US might, however, be + prepared to entertain specific license requests for some items under + such headings as, for example, certain radars, communications equipment, + light cargo-personnel vehicles, light aircraft, selected non-weapons + components for the Jurom jet fighter, and other non-sensitive military + equipment. US approval of export licenses would be subject to COCOM + concurrence.

+

—Exports from the US of weapons or sensitive military technologies will + not be possible for the foreseeable future. No US Government credits + would be available for such exports to Romania.

+

—Exports to Romania of commercially-available munitions list items would + not involve the conclusion of agreements between Romania and the United + States.

+

—As a condition of export approval, we would require assurances from + Romania that equipment sold to it not be transferred or otherwise made + available to third parties.

+

—Our willingness to consider such exports to Romania despite its + membership in the Warsaw Pact reflects the positive trends in + US-Romanian relations and would depend on the continuance of such + trends.

+

—Before proceeding further on this matter, we would appreciate receiving + your government’s views on the approach we have outlined. We are + particularly concerned that both our governments have similar + perceptions of what is possible and what is not.

+

—If you inform us that Romania is interested in this approach, we will + then carefully assess all factors and inform you of our final decision. + In the meantime we would be prepared, as indicated in the July 1 + meeting, to receive specific requests from Romania.

+

—If exports are approved, the US would plan no formal announcements, but + you should expect eventual public disclosure of Romanian purchases of US + equipment. The administration would also need to inform appropriate + congressional leaders before sales were made.

+ +

—In dealing with diplomatic or congressional queries, we will take the + position that US willingness to consider exports of certain + commercially-available non-sensitive munitions list items to Romania + would not mark a significant new departure in US military export policy. + End text.

+

5. If the Embassy believes it would be helpful to the Romanians, the + Defense Attache may also convey the following factual information on the + procedures for making purchases of US munitions list items. Begin text. + The US Government does not act as an intermediary for commercial + munitions sales. Romania must deal on its own with US manufacturing + firms. Once the terms of a sale had been worked out between Romania and + the firm concerned, the firms would request US munitions licenses from + the Department of State. Prior to requesting an export license, a firm + may seek an advisory opinion to determine, before negotiating a sale, + whether a munitions license would likely be approved. If Romania desires + names of US firms which produce certain specific items of equipment, + Romania could make inquiries to the Defense Security Assistance Agency + (DSAA) in Washington. Romania could also consult the Department of State + (PM) regarding possible release of + specific munitions list items. End text.

+

6. In addition to receiving a report of the meeting with Admiral + Dinu, we would also + appreciate having your assessment of how future exchanges with the + Romanians on this issue should be handled. Admiral Dinu appears to be a channel trusted by + Ceausescu, but if the + Romanians express continued interest we believe it may be essential to + have an exchange in political channels to ensure that there are no + misunderstandings. In telegram 7097 from + Bucharest, August 30, the Embassy reported the August 29 meeting + between Dinu and the Defense + Attaché: “While Dinu conveyed + the impression of being personally pleased by the DATT’s response, + Dinu sought to place the + onus of further movement on the U.S. + with his persistent request for an indication as to which item the + US might favorably consider.” Noting that when the Defense Attaché + suggested that further conversations might take place in political + channels Dinu did not + respond. The Embassy recommended that “if the Department still + considers it necessary to be more fully informed of Romanian + intentions, we could wait for Dinu to convey the response of his superiors.” + (National Archives, RG 59, Central + Foreign Policy File, P870104–0582) Dinu did not follow up on the discussion.

+ + Muskie + +
+ +
+ 232. Paper Prepared in the Bureau of European Affairs, Department of + StateSource: National + Archives, RG 59, Counselor to the + Department, Subject, Country Files and 1980 Briefing Books, Box 3, + Pol 2—Romania. Confidential. Drafted by Becker and Bradtke, cleared + by Bridges and Barry, + approved by Holmes. The paper was prepared as part of the briefing + material for Ridgway’s + December 16 meeting with Bogdan. + + + Washington, December + 15, 1980 + + + SUBJECT + Uncertainties in Romania + +

Over the past several weeks we have seen further indications of a growing + mood of uncertainty in Romania which reflects Ceausescu’s difficulty in coping with + the country’s increasingly difficult economic and political problems and + his concern that developments in Poland might find an echo in + Romania.

+

There are signs that President Ceausescu is having an increasingly difficult time + managing affairs in Romania. While he has demonstrated considerable + skill in maneuvering Romania through difficult periods in the past, the + current situation—domestic and international—presents particular + problems for him. There are also reports from intelligence sources + indicating that he may be suffering from slightly debilitating medical + problems and/or, increasingly, the meglomania which is an outgrowth of + his own cult of personality. In any event, it seems clear that Ceausescu’s erratic involvement in mid + and low level personnel matters and economic planning decisions has + become even more pronounced. As Soviet political pressures build over + Poland, Ceausescu may also + encounter difficulties in managing Romania’s foreign affairs.

+

Ceausescu’s reaction to the Polish + crisis has been a mixture of predictable toughness and unusual + conciliatory gestures. Although sharply critical of the Polish Party for + not maintaining adequate control over developments, Ceausescu has repeatedly stressed his + opposition to any outside intervention in Poland’s affairs. Addressing + his domestic audience, Ceausescu + has stressed the need for Romania’s workers to stay within the + established party and trade union system when dealing with problems and + raising grievances. While exhorting the workers to redouble their + efforts to increase production and meet planned needs, Ceausescu has made clear that open + dissent will not be tolerated, and worker slow-downs and stoppages since + the beginning of the Polish strikes have been dealt with quickly, though + apparently not harshly. In an unusual effort to suggest an atmosphere of + responsiveness to the population’s needs, the Government has on two recent occasions sought + comment from the general public on proposed legislation affecting + housing and food distribution. In an analogous move, the official trade + unions have published for comment the issues to be discussed at the + quinquennial trade union conference early next year.

+

The future of Romania’s economy seems more uncertain than at any time in + the last decade. Ceausescu’s goal + of turning Romania into a developed country by 1985 is now clearly + unattainable. Romania no longer has the raw material and manpower + reserves which fueled the double digit growth rates of the past decade. + In particular, Romania’s oil production is declining, and net oil + imports, estimated at $1.2 billion in 1980, are an increasing drain on + the economy.

+

Nevertheless, Ceausescu continues + to emphasize investment and rapid growth. This policy only exacerbates + Romania’s most serious problem, its growing balance of payments deficit, + which was $1.7 billion in the first six months of 1980, more than the + total deficit for all of 1979. Romania’s hard currency debt also jumped + by more than $2 billion in the last six months.

+

Unable and unwilling to introduce real economic reforms, Ceausescu has resorted to shuffling + personnel and tinkering with the economy. The 1981–85 Plan has undergone + a series of revisions and has still not been approved. Measures + supposedly aimed at decentralizing decision-making and creating worker + incentives have had little impact—except to increase confusion and + cyncism among workers and managers. At the same time, we have also seen + evidence that the GOR is being forced + to make shifts or cutbacks in some programs to save hard currency, + reduce spending and be somewhat more responsive to consumer needs. These + actions seem designed more to prevent a spread of the “Polish virus” to + Romania than to serve a part of a coherent approach to Romania’s + economic problems.

+

For the average Romanian, the effects are clear. A journalist-defector + recently observed to us that shortages in the stores are unprecedented, + even for a communist country. For the first time in Romania’s 2,000 year + history, the country is no longer able to supply its population with one + of its major staple food items, Romanian cheese. Our Embassy reports + that given the low quantity of most food and consumer goods available + and inadequate housing, it is safe to say that the standard of living of + the average Romanian is in slow decline. (Romania presently stands only + ahead of Albania in standard of living in Europe.)

+

The same defector told us that the mood of the Romanian intelligentsia is + pessimistic. Those who have any awareness of events outside Romania see + no hope for economic or political improvements in Romania as long as the + Government maintains its over-exaggerated push for foreign trade and + industrialization at the expense of the consumer sector. Consequently, increasing numbers of + intellectuals and Government officials are considering getting out. This + may help account for the recent rash of Romanian defections.

+

We have no hard evidence of increased Soviet pressure on Romania to + change its position on Poland, and Romania has refrained from the kind + of polemics manifested by the East Germans and Czechoslovaks. Pressure + on Ceausescu is likely to mount + considerably if the Soviets intend to intervene in Poland. Most + curiously, we have seen two separate reports of statements Ceausescu allegedly made in private to + the effect that were the situation in Romania as precarious as in + Poland, he would be prepared to invite the Soviets in to stabilize the + situation.

+

We should be more alert than usual when it comes to demonstrating our + support for Romania’s independent position in the Warsaw Pact. + Indications on any front of our support for Romania’s continued + independent foreign policy course could be particularly important in + helping it maintain its precarious political equilibrium in the coming + months. Tangible evidence of U.S. + interest in and support for Romania will be particularly important if + the Soviets should intervene militarily in Poland and the Romanians + should decline to participate in or endorse the intervention.

+
+ +
+ 233. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in + RomaniaSource: National + Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign + Policy File, D800603–0381. Confidential; Priority. Sent for + information Priority to Madrid for the CSCE delegation. Sent for information to Warsaw, + Moscow, and USNATO. Drafted by + Becker; cleared by Bridges, Barry, and in HA; approved by Ridgway. + + + + Washington, December 19, 1980, 0454Z + +

334596. Madrid for CSCE—Greenwald and Davidson. Subject: + Counselor’s Meeting With Bogdan.

+

1. C-entire text.

+

2. Summary. During a tour d’horizon with Counselor December 16, the + Director for the Americas in the Romanian Foreign Ministry, Corneliu Bogdan, stressed Romania’s + firm commitment to the continuation of the Helsinki process and urged + the U.S. to keep an open mind about the + venue of the follow-on conference. Bogdan believed the Soviets do not want to interfere in PolandIn telegram 320368 to Bucharest and Belgrade + December 4, the Department instructed Aggrey to call on Andrei to discuss the situation in Poland, stressing + that a Soviet intervention in Poland would have wide-ranging + consequences on U.S.-Soviet + relations. The Department also instructed Aggrey to ask Andrei for the Romanian view of the + situation in Poland, and assure the Romanian Government of “our own + continuing strong support for Romania’s independence, sovereignty, + and territorial integrity.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + P870123–0417) In telegram 9896 from Bucharest, December 4, Aggrey reported that he had + delivered the U.S. position earlier + that day, and that Andrei + promised to pass the information to Ceausescu and discuss the Romanian position with the + Ambassador as soon as possible. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + P870104–0553) On December 6, Aggrey met with Andrei who informed him that he had just returned + from the meeting of the Warsaw Pact countries Party leaders and + Foreign Ministers in Moscow. “The general consensus,” Andrei told Aggrey, “was that Poland’s + problems should be solved by the Polish people. At present, there is + no intention of another Warsaw Pact state’s military forces + interfering in the internal affairs of Poland.” However, Aggrey reported, Andrei warned that “if the + situation in Poland reaches a point of unreasonable conflict” + between the government and protestors, “such an eventuality could + lead the regime to invite the Soviet Union to intervene,” something + neither the United States nor Romania wanted to see. (Telegram 9971 + from Bucharest, December 6; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + P870104–0550) and observed the situation there appears to be + calming down. The Counselor reviewed the U.S. position on Poland, and welcomed Romania’s + constructive contribution at Madrid. The Counselor observed that next + year’s most favored nation (MFN) + hearings will probably focus more on Romania’s emigration procedures + than on the numbers involved since the current rate of emigration is + relatively satisfactory. Bogdan + disclaimed any current interest in a new Mid-East initiative. Discussion + of human rights, the IBRD loan, and + Romania’s domestic situation will be reported separately.In telegram 336127 to Bucharest, December 20, the + Department reported Bogdan’s + discussions with Ridgway on + the internal situation in Romania. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + D800605–1009) Bogdan also met + with Vest on December 22 and + discussed Poland, CSCE, human + rights, and bilateral relations. (Telegram 337804 to Bucharest, + December 23; National Archives, RG + 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800607–1136) End + summary.

+

3. The Director for the Americas in the Romanian Foreign Ministry, + Ambassador Corneliu Bogdan, + accompanied by Romanian Ambassador to the US, Ionescu, and Embassy Counselor + Ranghet called on the + Counselor December 16 to review the international situation and discuss + outstanding bilateral issues. EUR + DAS + Barry and the Romanian country + officer also participated in the meeting and luncheon which followed. + Conversation focused on Poland and CSCE and on the Middle East, next year’s MFN’s hearings, human rights, and + Romania’s application for an IBRD loan + for a power project. The last item is reported by septel.

+

4. Poland. Bogdan reiterated + Romania’s well-known opposition to any form of outside interference in + Poland’s internal affairs. He emphasized that the presentation by Foreign Minister Andrei to the Ambassador earlier in the + previous week was the best statement of the Romanian position and + remained valid. He also observed that the past several days had been + marked by constructive calm; he expected the Gdansk commemoration would + not get out of hand and lead to a pretext for intervention. He was + reassured by DAS + Barry’s report that the Gdansk + observances had been orderly and non-provocative. Bogdan refused to speculate on the + effect of a possible Soviet intervention and would not be drawn into a + detailed discussion of the specifics of a Romanian reaction in that + event. Nor would he volunteer any suggestion how he would like the + United States to show its support for Romania in the aftermath of a + Soviet intervention in Poland; but he stressed the need for close + consultations prior to the US taking any action affecting Romania, + including the issuance of a statement of support for Romania’s + independent position.

+

5. Bogdan refused to comment on + Foreign Minister Andrei’s trip to + Moscow prior to the Warsaw Pact summit meeting.In telegram 9846 from Bucharest, December 3, + Aggrey reported that + Andrei was in Moscow on + December 2 for four hours to meet with Brezhnev. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + D800576–0767) He claimed Andrei dealt solely with bilateral issues. He allowed + that Romania’s role in the Warsaw Pact summit had been a moderating one, + “as it always is”, but insisted that Romania had not arranged the + meeting or sought in any way to be a moderator between the Soviet Union + and Poland in the present crisis.

+

Middle East

+

6. DAS + Barry asked the status of + Romania’s “initiative” on the Middle East to convene an international + conference to carry forward the accomplishments of the Camp David + Agreements. Barry noted that the + GOR had decided in late summer to + postpone taking any action until after the US elections, and urged that + the GOR still not initiate any action + until the new administration had an opportunity to review the situation + in the Middle East.

+

7. Bogdan claimed that the + Romanian “initiative” had never been more than an “idea” floated to see + if the apparent impasse in the Camp David process could be broken. At + present Romania does not want to undertake any moves in the Middle East + because they could lead to still more turmoil.

+

8. The Counselor expressed appreciation for Bogdan’s remarks, noting that the Iraq/Iran war and the + corollary arguments among the Arab States which had grown out of it + could contribute to a possible breakup of larger political blocs in the + area and have a general destabilizing effect. Bogdan agreed + and said Romania wished to do what it could to keep the conflict in the + Middle East and between Iraq and Iran from widening into a broader + conflict which could ultimately involve a US-Soviet confrontation, which + Romania always wishes to avoid.

+

CSCE

+

9. Ambassador Bogdan expressed + satisfaction with the first session of the Madrid Conference. He + reiterated Romania’s desire for a generally balanced discussion of all + three Baskets. He stressed the importance Romania places on its proposal + to host the next follow-on conference. Bogdan asked the U.S. to + keep an open mind on the invitation and make no decision until the + second session at Madrid is under way. Bogdan also proposed holding bilateral consultations on + CSCE during the first week of + February.

+

10. The Counselor expressed the US awareness of the importance Romania + attaches to hosting the next follow-on conference. She assured Bogdan that no decision would be made + until after the new administration has come into office. She took + Bogdan’s request for + bilateral consultation under advisement.

+

11. Speaking “unofficially”, Bogdan saw no possibility for agreement on new proposals + during the second session at Madrid. He hoped for agreement on follow-on + meetings by expert groups, however.

+

12. The Counselor raised with Bogdan the question of participation by observers from + non-government organizations (NGO) and private individuals and groups at + a CSCE follow-on meeting were it to be + held in Bucharest. Yugoslavia’s refusal to allow observers from these + groups had led to considerable difficulty in the United States. The + NGO’s and individuals concerned with the CSCE process became highly critical of the United States + engaging in a process (i.e. Helsinki) in which freedom of expression was + severely curtailed. As a further consequence, the press had been very + critical of the Belgrade meeting and popular support in the US for the + entire CSCE process had suffered. The + situation at Madrid, however, was quite different, the Counselor + observed. The Spanish had set aside space for the various groups to + caucus and demonstrate, consequently they have not been frustrated but + have remained in Madrid or returned to their home countries, including + the US, believing the Madrid Conference has provided them a forum to air + their grievances. Our impression has been that the entire CSCE process has gained support in the US + as a result.

+

13. Bogdan listened carefully + & thought for a moment before responding that there would of course + be some difficulties because it would not be possible for Romania to + agree to permit every individual or group to enter the country in an + observer status. On the other hand, he said, his government had taken + this point into consideration before issuing the invitation, and he was sure that + satisfactory arrangements (not specified) could be worked out.

+

14. Ambassador Bogdan noted that + the new alignment in the Senate would mean extra work during the MFN hearings. He believed, however, that + the Romanian Embassy knew the key Senators and Congressmen involved and + he hoped the hearings would go well. The Counselor saw the consistently + high number of Romanians permitted to emigrate over the past year as a + positive development. She believed, however, that this year much more + attention would be focused on the process and procedures involved in + emigration from Romania. Reports of harassment, bureaucratic delays and + even physical abuse would be carefully reviewed and would play a major + role in committee hearings.In a December 16 + briefing memorandum prepared by EUR, Ridgway was + asked to stress that “concerned Americans and Congressional leaders + are focusing increasingly on the process involved and not just on + numbers.” On the copy of the memorandum circulated in the Human + Rights and Humanitarian Affairs Bureau, Derian underlined “Americans and Congressional + leaders” and wrote in the margin: “Back to the old ways. Not that + USG is concerned but vague refs + to ‘Americans’ as in: Oh, please, do this or that to help us—too + bad.” (National Archives, RG 59, + Bureau of Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs, 1980—Human Rights + and Country Files, Lot 82D177, Box 16, Romania–Nov thru Dec + 1980) This point was carefully noted by the Romanians.

+ + Muskie + +
+ +
+ 234. Action Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Human + Rights and Humanitarian Affairs (Derian) and the Acting Assistant Secretary of State for + European Affairs (Holmes) to the Deputy Secretary of State (Christopher)Source: National Archives, Bureau of + Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs, 1980—Human Rights and Country + Files, RG 59, Lot 82D177, Box 16, + Romania—Nov thru Dec 1980. Confidential. Drafted by Bache, Simon, + and Bradtke; cleared by Bridges, and in HA, L/HR, EB, and S/P. Sent through Ridgway. Barry initialed for + Holmes. + + + Washington, December + 18, 1980 + + + SUBJECT + World Bank Power Loan to Romania + +

SUMMARY

+

There is a disagreement between HA and EUR, EB, and S/P on how the + U.S. Executive Director of the World + Bank should vote on the IBRD’s Fourth + Power Project for Romania. HA believes the U.S. should abstain on human rights grounds or, if we vote + in favor, should follow up this vote with a high-level demarche. EUR, EB, and S/P believe we should vote in favor, and at some + appropriate time address the issue at a lower level.

+

ANALYSIS OF ISSUES

+

In March 1979, you decided to have the U.S. Executive Director vote in favor of a World Bank loan + to Romania which did not meet basic human needs (BHN). (See Action Memo + of March 15, 1979, copy attached at Tab A.)Tab A is an action memorandum to Newsom from Acting Assistant Secretary of State for + Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs Mark Schneider, Vest, and Lake dated March 15, 1979. + Newsom had approved the + recommendations on March 20. In telegram 69437 to Bucharest, March + 20, 1979, the Department instructed the Embassy to raise the issue + of U.S. votes at the World Bank in + support of Romanian loan applications in connection with Romanian + performance in human rights. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + D790152–0595) The Embassy reported Aggrey’s March 26, 1979, conversation with Andrei in telegram 1905 from + Bucharest, March 27. Aggrey + raised the question of World Bank loans and suggested a Romanian + goodwill gesture in the area of human rights would be an important + consideration. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + D790141–0218) At the same time, you approved a demarche to + the Romanians based on the premise “that our commitment to human rights + extends to MDB matters, that we also have legal requirements and that + additional reports such as the one by Amnesty International could in the + end force us to withold support from MDB loans.” You decided that we + would hold a series of discussions with the GOR on human rights issues and that we would monitor the + practical results of this + process carefully, with a view to determining our future position on MDB + loans. We identified the areas of greatest U.S. concern as “alleged abuse of psychiatry and penal + labor to control dissidents, charges of restrictions placed on the + cultural life of the Hungarian minority, difficulties experienced by + some religious groups and the continuing issue of the so-called Jewish + economic criminals.” We also decided to take into account the extent to + which the GOR cooperated with Amnesty + International or other private groups in reviewing the trends in the + human rights situation. In view of the upcoming IBRD vote on a non-basic human needs loan + for Romania, we now need to review the situation in Romania and decide + how to instruct the U.S. Executive + Director to vote on December 23.

+

PROJECT DESCRIPTION

+

The loan is for $125 million to the Investment Bank of Romania to support + a three year segment of the Romanian Government’s 1980–85 investment + program in electrical energy. It is a heavy infrastructure project that + includes hydroelectric generating plants, heat generating plants, heat + networks, and power transmission lines. The proposed IBRD loan would finance about 4% of the + total cost of the project segment, and about 22% of the foreign exchange + cost. The project is part of a longer term effort to reduce energy + dependence on imported oil.

+

HA, EUR, EB and S/P all agree that the project does not meet “basic human needs” (BHN) criteria.

+

The Human Rights Situation in Romania

+

Romania pursues a policy of internal orthodoxy on economic and political + issues, with very strict limits on the exercise of civil and political + rights and economic decision-making. The society operates within + strictures determined by a centralized authoritarian state.

+

Those who are politically active beyond the limits set by the Government + or who publicly proselytize for religious converts are likely to be + harassed or arrested on trumped-up charges. There are no reliable + estimates of the number of political prisoners in Romania. There are + allegations that some, including dissident labor union members, are + confined in psychiatric hospitals.

+

Freedom of speech, the press, and assembly are sharply limited. All + publications are government controlled. Persons belonging to recognized + religions may attend religious services freely. However, evangelical + groups have difficulties with the authorities whenever they seek to + proselytize outside of church buildings or when they oppose laws which + they believe violate their faith.

+

Romanians can travel freely throughout their country. However, few + Romanians are allowed to travel abroad. Leaving or attempting to leave the country without + official permission is a crime. The government discourages emigration + through social, economic and administrative penalties. Nonetheless, the + number of recent immigrants from Romania to the U.S. has increased seven fold in the past five years, + exceeding 2,700 people in FY 1980. The + large majority of these cases involved family reunification.

+

The Romanian Government is willing to talk about human rights violations, + both bilaterally and within the CSCE + context. Romania has allowed some visits by international bodies to + discuss human rights abuses, including Amnesty International in early + 1979, a group of U.S. religious leaders, + and a Congressional study group on the situation of the Hungarian + minority. It has stalled on the visit of the International Human Rights + Law Group. Romania has participated in a Human Rights Roundtable in + Bucharest in February with U.S. + officials and private citizens and is expected to repeat this in + Washington in 1981.

+

HA Position:

+

Since our 1979 demarche and several follow-up discussions between senior + U.S. and Romanian officials on the + human rights situation, there has been little, if any, improvement in + the areas of greatest U.S. concern. + There are still reports of the abuse of psychiatry for political + purposes. Amnesty International’s 1980 Annual Report describes several + cases of psychiatric abuse which took place in 1979. Political prisoners + continue to be subjected to hard labor, and according to the Amnesty + Annual Report, political prisoners are beaten and mistreated with the + tacit approval of prison authorities. The Hungarian minority is subject + to regular discrimination in the society at large. This conclusion is + supported by the Congressional staff study which visited Romania this + year. In our view, despite legislation to prevent such discrimination, + the government has failed to take effective remedial action. Members of + Evangelical groups have been jailed, harassed or intimidated by the + authorities when they sought to proselytize outside of church buildings + or opposed highly restrictive laws which curtail religious freedom. + Romanian immigration to the U.S. has + increased, but only after each immigrant endures a year or more of + severe social, economic and administrative penalties. Potential + dissidents are often removed from Romania in this manner. There has been + progress in the status of so-called Jewish economic criminals—they have + received pardons. Despite an earlier commitment to allow the visit of a + U.S. private legal group + (International Human Rights Law Group) to look into allegations of human + rights violations, the Romanian government refused the group entry in + 1980.

+

Amnesty International’s just published Annual Report (1980) documents + continuing serious human rights violations in Romania in particular, imprisonment, forced + labor, and psychiatric confinement for political and religious + dissidents, and for those seeking to emigrate or to form free trade + unions.

+

A vote for the World Bank loan at this time would appear to be + inconsistent with the human rights situation in Romania and our + legislation on the MDBs. A positive vote would also make our previous + demarches appear pro forma, given our laws and + the prevailing human rights situation. Moreover, it would appear to be + inconsistent with our posture at Madrid. At the current session of the + Madrid CSCE conference, the U.S. delegation called attention to human + rights abuses in Eastern Europe, including Romania.

+

For the foregoing reasons, HA recommends abstention on the IBRD loan to Romania. However, if because + of current political events in Poland, it is not a propitious time for + such a vote, HA would propose that an affirmative vote on the loan be + followed by a high-level demarche similar to the one made to the + Romanian Foreign Minister in March 1979. The demarche, while recognizing + positive Romanian efforts, would emphasize our continuing expectation + that the Romanian government work to improve the human rights situation + for its citizens, particularly in those areas outlined in our March 1979 + decision. The demarche would be supportive of recent statements by + C and EUR to Romanian MFA + American Director Bogdan. It + would also express U.S. willingness to + move ahead on planning for a Human Rights Roundtable as we and the + Romanians had agreed earlier this year at the Roundtable held in + Bucharest.

+

Raising our human rights concerns at the level of the Foreign Minister + would convey the importance with which we view these concerns. It would + reinforce our Counselor’s representations by elevating to an + appropriately high level on the Romanian side our seriousness of + purpose. It would further demonstrate a coordinated effort on the part + of the USG to further its human rights + policy. Because the cable at Tab A has no specificity as to when a + demarche will be made, at what level, or whether the specific areas of + greatest U.S. concern will be raised, it + represents a significant departure from our 1979 position.

+

EUR, EB, S/P Positions:

+

During the Carter Administration, the United States Government has voted + in favor of every loan for Romania which has come before the IBRD Board. This includes almost $400 + million in loans which do not fall in the “basic human needs” category. + Now is not the time to change our policy and abstain on such loans for + Romania. With the threat of a Soviet invasion hanging over Poland, we do + not want to signal a lessening of our support for Romania. On the + contrary, our efforts should be directed towards measures which will + strengthen Romania’s + willingness to resist Soviet pressures to participate in or approve of + Soviet actions in Poland.

+

More broadly, EB also feels that it is important to support projects + which increase the world’s overall energy supply and which can + contribute, as this project can, to helping Romania maintain its energy + independence from the Soviet Union.

+

We recognize that Romania’s human rights record is poor, but we see no + signs that it is worse today than in the past when we voted in favor of + other non-BHN loans for Romania. In fact, there are small signs of + improvement. In the area of emigration, in particular, Romania’s record + has continued to improve. Other positive steps have taken place + precisely in those areas which we identified in 1979 as of greatest + concern. Most notably,

+ + —There have been no cases confirmed by the Embassy of psychiatric + abuse within the last three years and a Romanian emigre doctor, who + was the source of many reports of abuses, has withdrawn his + allegations. + —A Congressional staff study delegation, which was invited to + visit Romania to study the Hungarian minority situation, and toured + the Hungarian areas extensively, found there was no evidence of a + government policy of discrimination. + —The so-called Jewish economic criminals were amnestied this year, + and those who requested to emigrate have been granted permission to + do so; and + —Two free trade union activists were released from jail within the + past month. + +

While one can debate whether these developments constitute rapid enough + progress, one must also keep in mind that repression and authoritarian + government in Romania did not begin in 1945.

+

We have expressed our human rights concerns to the Romanians here and in + Bucharest, and will continue to do so. Most recently, on December 16, + Counselor Ridgway and Deputy + Assistant Secretary Barry + specifically raised our legislative requirements on IBRD loans with Director of the Americas + Bogdan (Tab B).Attached at Tab B, but not printed, is telegram + 333465 to Bucharest, December 17. Ambassador Aggrey also made a major demarche in + Bucharest in November on six specific cases.On October 24, + Aggrey reported in + telegram 8780 from Bucharest that he had delivered a démarche on + human rights to Bogdan on + five human rights cases. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800509–0875) On + November 6, during Bridges’s visit to Bucharest, the démarche was + once again brought to the attention of Bogdan. In telegram 9189 from Bucharest, November 8, + the Embassy reported Bogdan’s + conversation with Aggrey and + Bridges. Concerning human rights, Bogdan responded that the two countries should seek + to minimize differences and reach practicable solutions to + individual cases. Stressing that the issues were in no way related, + but that “solving it would help,” Bogdan also commented on the ongoing demonstrations + in front of Romania’s UN Mission in + New York and its Embassy in Washington. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, [no + film number]) Aggrey again + asked Bogdan about a response + to the démarche on December 12. In telegram 10166 from Bucharest, + December 12, Aggrey reported + that Bogdan “revealed, + confidentially, one of the problems had been the hostile + demonstrations at the Romanian UN + Mission and a view among some authorities in Bucharest that the + protection was not what it might have been.” Bogdan noted the demonstrations had + been moved, “and with that in mind” he promised “to look into the + matter once more” but requested that the U.S. Government “continue to monitor the + demonstrations.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + D800591–1193) As part of our continuing human rights dialogue + with Romania, we will follow up with the Romanians to ensure that they + do not interpret a favorable vote in the IBRD as approval of their human rights practices. However, + in view of these recent demarches and the current situation in Eastern + Europe, we do not believe that a positive vote in the IBRD should be conditioned upon another + human rights demarche at the Foreign Minister level. At a time when the + Romanian Foreign Minister Andrei + is providing us with important and sensitive insights into Soviet + intentions regarding Poland, we believe that asking Ambassador Aggrey to step up the human rights + dialogue with him would be a mistake.

+

Therefore, EUR, EB, and S/P recommend that the U.S. Executive Director be instructed to + vote in favor of the loan for Romania.

+

L Comments

+

There are serious human rights violations in Romania. Nonetheless, it is + possible to maintain that Romania is not engaged in a consistent pattern + of gross violations of internationally-recognized human rights. Such a + conclusion would have to rely heavily on the small signs of improvement, + the inconsistency in GOR human rights + performance, and the GOR’s efforts + within Romania and within the Soviet bloc to increase respect for human + rights. The credibility of this position depends in large part on the + Department’s assessment of whether U.S. + attempts to persuade Romania to do better and to resist return to past + patterns of violations are having effect.

+

Recommendation

+

That you approve:

+

—Option One, an abstention on the loan. (HA favors)

+ +

—Option Two, a positive loan vote combined with a demarche in + Bucharest.Newsom added an asterisk at this point and handwrote + at the bottom of the page: “at the Vice Foreign Minister level. + Revise telegram to stress that this was not an easy choice in view + of continuing human rights problems.” (HA favors as second + choice.)Newsom initialed his approval on December 22. The + Department informed the Embassy in telegram 339063 to Bucharest, + December 24, that the Department believed “it is important that we + continue to make clear to the GOR + at a high level that our commitment to human rights extends to MBD + matters, that we have legal requirements, and that we remain + concerned about the human rights situation.” On a copy of the cable, + Derian underlined the + statement and wrote in the margin: “Which we did NOT meet on this.” (National Archives, RG 59, Bureau of Human Rights and + Humanitarian Affairs, 1980—Human Rights and Country Files, Lot + 82D177, Box 16, Romania—Nov thru Dec 1980) Aggrey reported his conversation + with Deputy Romanian Foreign Minister Maria Groza in telegram 10536 + from Bucharest, December 31. Aggrey wrote: “Groza said she understood the + situation and appreciated my demarche. She believed future human + rights problems affecting our bilateral relations would be + considered by the GOR in the light + of the background I had outlined.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + D810001–0652)

+

—Option Three, a positive vote, with no Foreign Minister level demarche. + (EUR, EB, and S/P favor.)

+
+
+ +
+ + Yugoslavia + +
+ 235. Memorandum From Vice President Mondale to President CarterSource: Carter Library, Donated Material, Papers of + Walter F. Mondale, + Overseas Assignments Trip Files, 1977–1980, Box 12, Vice President’s + Trip to Portugal, Spain, Austria, Yugoslavia, and England: + Objectives, 5/4–10/1977. Secret. Carter wrote at the top of the + memorandum: “Fritz—Read notes. J.C.” Tabs A–E are attached but not + printed. + + + Washington, May 10, + 1977 + + + SUBJECT + Objectives During Visit to Europe for Talks with Vorster and + European Leaders + +

We are in the final preparatory stage for my forthcoming visit in your + behalf to Portugal, Spain, Austria, Yugoslavia and the United + Kingdom.

+

As currently scheduled, I will depart for Lisbon this Saturday for + meetings with President Eanes and Prime Minister Soares on May 16; talks + with King Juan Carlos and Prime Minister Suarez in Madrid on May 17; and + with Chancellor Kreisky in Vienna on May 18.

+

The talks with South African Prime Minister Vorster are set for Vienna on + May 19 and 20. I will then travel to Belgrade on the afternoon of May 20 + for meetings on May 20–21 with President Tito and members of the Yugoslav leadership; then to + London on May 22 to debrief Prime Minister Callaghan and Foreign Secretary Owen on the Vorster meetings.

+

There are three basic elements to the visit, each of priority importance + to your foreign policy objectives. My purpose will + be:

+

—to demonstrate in Portugal and Spain the United States’ support + for their return to democracy;

+

—to convey to Prime Minister Vorster your policy toward Southern + Africa including the United States’ views on the role South Africa + must play in current efforts to resolve the Rhodesian and Namibian + problems, and on the approach South Africa must take within its + society if our relations are not to suffer;

+

—to emphasize to President Tito the importance your Administration places on + Yugoslavia’s independence, political unity and territorial + integrity.

 +

I do not plan to become a negotiator on contentious issues in any of my + meetings, but I do anticipate an in-depth discussion with Vorster. The + following paragraphs summarize principal issues I expect to be raised during the visit, review + the approach I plan to take, and request your guidance.

+ +

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to Yugoslavia.]

+

Yugoslavia. I believe the Yugoslavs are looking + forward to this visit because of the early restoration of high-level + US-Yugoslav contacts it will bring. My primary objective in Yugoslavia + will be to convince President Tito and leading members of his government of your + support for Yugoslavia’s independence, sovereignty and territorial + integrity.On October 16, 1976, during a + campaign press conference in Kansas City, Missouri, then Governor + Carter stated that he would not go to war in Yugoslavia even if the + Soviet Union was to invade that country. While his statements did + not generate much attention at the time, he was asked about them + during the October 22 Presidential Debate. Carter defended his + assertion, suggesting that he would not go to war unless U.S. security was directly threatened. + The statement became a campaign issue, even eliciting the first + appearance of Ford’s Secretary of State Henry Kissinger on CBS’s “Face the Nation” program on October 24, + where Kissinger compared Carter’s remarks with those of Dean + Acheson’s remarks about South Korea just prior to the North Korean + invasion in 1950. (Don Oberdorfer, “Kissinger Assails Carter on + Yugoslavia Statements,” The Washington Post, + October 25, 1976, p. A6) I will state that the US respects + Yugoslavia’s place in the non-aligned movement. At the same time, we + believe Yugoslavia must respect our interests in multilateral as well as + bilateral relations if our relationship is to prosper.

+

By the time of my visit, we hope to have negotiated a satisfactory + solution to the most contentious issue in our bilateral relations—that + of the impasse of an export license for the Westinghouse-supplied + nuclear reactor destined for Yugoslavia. We hope the Yugoslavs will give + us the assurances we require on reprocessing and disposition of fuel. I + will state that we will want to assure dependable supplies of fuel and + equipment while taking necessary steps to avoid nuclear weapons + proliferation, and I will confirm that Yugoslavia will be welcome to + join the nuclear fuel cycle evaluation effort.Carter wrote in the margin below this paragraph: + “Let Tito know ours is a + multinational concern—we are not singling out + Yugoslavia for special stringency.”

+

The Yugoslavs have indicated their belief that we are not forceful enough + in prosecuting Yugoslav emigre terrorists. Prior to my departure, I will + discuss this issue with Attorney General Bell so as to be able to assure + Tito that we are determined + to prevent and punish terrorists; that we are giving high priority to + the bombing of Yugoslavia’s Embassy last JuneThe Yugoslav Embassy in Washington was bombed the + night of June 9, 1976. The Washington Post + reported on June 10 that an anonymous caller claimed responsibility + for the attack in the name of the Pan-Epirotic Federation of America + and Canada, stressing however that the bombing was not sanctioned. + The organization, the Post reported, denied + any involvement. (Douglas Feaver, “Yugoslavs Protest Embassy + Bombing,” The Washington Post, June 10, 1976, + p. C10) and that we will vigorously prosecute those who have committed terrorist + activities. In this connection, I will note with satisfaction that the + TWA hijacking case has been successfully prosecuted.On September 10, 1976, Croatian nationalists + hijacked a TWA flight from New York to Chicago and diverted it to + Paris. The hijackers released the hostages on September 12, after + discussions in Paris with U.S. + officials. (“TWA Hijackers Allow Hostages to Leave Plane,” The Washington Post, September 12, 1976, p. + A1) On May 5, four of the hijackers were found guilty of air piracy + and conspiracy. (“Croat Nationalists Guilty in Hijacking,” Chicago Tribune, May 6, 1977, p. + 7)

+

Prior to my arrival in Belgrade, Admiral Holloway will have just concluded a visit to Yugoslavia + for talks in the framework of our limited military cooperation and + exchanges with the Yugoslavs.Admiral + James Holloway, Chief of + Naval Operations, visited Yugoslavia May 14–16 for discussions with + Yugoslav military leaders. In telegram 4634 from Athens, May 18, + Holloway described his + visit to Yugoslavia as “warm and cordial,” marked by consistent + expressions by the Yugoslav military leadership of their desire for + closer relations with the United States. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + D770176–0808) While stating your priority policy of reducing + the level of international arms sales, I will inform the Yugoslavs that + we are prepared to continue US-Yugoslav military exchanges and + consultations, and to consider some of Yugoslavia’s proposals for + military equipment purchases.

+

Of importance, the visit to Belgrade should give me the opportunity to + talk to some of the government’s upcoming leaders, people we can expect + to have increased dealings with in coming years.

+

I will plan to focus my discussions on international issues on the + Belgrade CSCE meeting, the Middle + East, and our African policy. I believe that if I am candid with + Tito about the nature of my + talks with Vorster,Mondale met with South African + Prime Minister Balthazar Johannes “John” Vorster in Vienna May 19–20 + for talks on Rhodesia. this may well produce a positive + ripple effect in terms of Yugoslav consultations with other members of + the non-aligned movement on our African policy.Carter wrote in the margin of this paragraph: “OK—I + don’t know whether Tito is a + racist—He may be.” + With your agreement I will base the agenda for my + talks with Tito on the + issues outlined above.Carter + approved the recommendation.

+

I am attaching at Tab A proposed letters for your signature to President + Eanes, King Juan Carlos, Chancellor Kreisky, Prime Minister Vorster and + President Tito. With your + approval I will plan to present the letters during my talks with each of + these leaders.Carter approved the + recommendation.

+
+ +
+ 236. Memorandum of ConversationSource: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, + Brzezinski Material, + Subject File, Box 34, Memcons: + Mondale: 5/77–6/79. + Secret; Nodis. The meeting took + place at the White Palace. Clift forwarded the memorandum to Dodson on June 1 for distribution + to Brzezinski and Vance. (Ibid.) + + + Belgrade, May 21, 1977, 11 a.m. + + + PARTICIPANTS + + + Yugoslavia + President Josip Broz + Tito + Edvard Kardelj, Member, Presidency + Stevan Doronjski, Vice President + Milos Minic, Vice + President, Federal Executive Council + Dimce Belovski, Ambassador to the United States + + + + + U.S. + Vice President Walter F. + Mondale + Assistant Secretary of State George Vest + David Aaron, Deputy + Assistant to the President for National Security + Affairs + A. Denis Clift, + Assistant to the Vice President for National Security + Affairs + + + +

President Tito greeted the Vice + President; the Vice President gave him a letter from President Carter;In + a letter dated May 11, Carter assured Tito of his administration’s commitment to resolving + the outstanding issues surrounding the building of the Krsko Nuclear + Reactor, reaffirmed U.S. support for + Yugoslavia’s territorial integrity, and invited Yugoslav Presidency + member Edvard Kardelj to Washington. (Carter Library, Brzezinski Material, President’s + Correspondence with Foreign Leaders File, Box 21, Yugoslavia: + President Josip Broz Tito, + 5/77–5/79) + Tito read the letter noting the + reference to the Kardelj visit; and Tito said it was a very nice letter from the President. + The Vice President then gave Tito a letter from Governor Harriman;Not found. + Tito thanked the Vice President + and said he would read that letter later.

+

V.P.: Governor Harriman has sent you his best wishes. All Americans + respect you Mr. President, and we respect Yugoslavia’s independence and + territorial integrity. We hope this meeting will mark improved relations + between our countries. We respect your role as a leader of the + non-aligned movement, and we hope that this meeting will be the start of + much improved relations.

+

Tito: + Thank you, Mr. Vice President. I believe your visit is of great + importance to both our countries. I think this is a good opportunity to + exchange views on issues of interest to both sides. I think our + relations are, on the whole, good. There are no conflicts between our + two countries.

+ +

Yugoslavia is entirely independent from both blocs. We are a founding + member of the non-aligned movement, and we are deeply interested in the + non-aligned. The movement rests on principles of importance, principles + we think should be applied throughout the world.

+

There are hot points in the world, in Africa, for example, that threaten + to turn into something bigger. There is, first of all, the Arab-Israeli + conflict, then Southern Africa—it is a different category with the + problems of South Africa, Rhodesia and Namibia. There are conflicts + between the non-aligned. India and Egypt have bad relations. There are + problems in Ethiopia. I read today of an attack by Rhodesia on + Mozambique.

+

V.P.: One of the points I want to make clear, Mr. + President, is our respect for the non-aligned movement. We respect your + independence and your foreign policy.

+

These past two days pressed my country in the forefront of the issues you + have mentioned, I met with Prime Minister Vorster in Vienna. I made + clear that we expect an independent Rhodesia, with majority rule, with + elections by 1978. We want an independent Namibia under the outlines of + Resolution 385, with elections by the people and withdrawal of South + African forces. I said that we reject their policy in South Africa, and + that failure to make progress on all three of these issues would result + in deteriorating relations. In that regard, we directly objected to + incursions by Rhodesia into Mozambique and Zambia.

+

Under President Carter, the U.S. has a more direct policy, a policy of + clarity and strength on the issues of independence, and we wanted the + South Africans to know clearly our views so that they don’t + miscalculate.

+

Tito: What + was his answer?

+

V.P.: He didn’t like it. I think that is why I got + sick (laughter). He said he would support independence for Rhodesia in + 1978. He also agreed to meet with the Contact Group on Namibia by the + end of the month. There may be hope there. The thing we are worried + about is the interim arrangement for Namibia.

+

Within South Africa itself, Prime Minister Vorster gave us the line about + how the Africans are happy, the coloreds are happy, the Indians are + happy. They all played football together. It is a slow story.

+

Tito: It + is very important about the football.

+

V.P.: Actually it’s soccer, rather, rugby. What we + wanted to do, Mr. President, was to make clear we mean business. If they + want to get along there must be progress. There must be true + independence. In our country in the past, unfortunately, we have not + made this an issue, but we have made it an issue now.

+ +

On the Middle East, President Carter is trying to set an environment by having talks + leading to a reconvened Geneva Conference. He has met with the Arab + leaders, and this week he will meet with Crown Prince Fahd. When the + Israelis have organized their new government, he hopes to meet with the + new Israeli Prime Minister.Menachem Begin’s + party, the Likud, won the May 17 elections in Israel. Begin was + confirmed as Prime Minister on June 21, 1977. President + Carter has had good talks + with President Sadat, King Hussein, and President Asad, and I am sure + the talks with Fahd will go well.Egyptian + President Anwar Sadat traveled to Washington April 3–6. King Hussein + of Jordan traveled to Washington April 24–27. Carter met with Syrian + President Hafez al-Assad in Geneva May 9. But, of course, the + issues are very difficult.

+

Tito: + Unfortunately, I am a pessimist after the Israeli elections. I am afraid + it will be more difficult. The one who has come up in Israel is the one + for war.

+

Only the U.S. can put a brake on it, no + one else. We must insist on a peaceful solution. We think the Geneva + Conference shouldn’t be convened because of the coming to power of the + new leaders in Israel. This will only lead to a worsening of relations + with the Arabs. As the Israelis are militarily superior, they might try + to take advantage of their military superiority. It would create a + difficult situation for the U.S. + President Sadat, who has succeeded thus far in appeasing Israel, might + find himself in a difficult political situation in Egypt if there is + confrontation.

+

V.P.: You are right.

+

Tito: Much + depends on the Israelis.

+

V.P.: There is a hope that the parties can get + together. We have been pressing for such a result. President Carter is reluctant to reconvene the + Geneva Conference until we have essential pieces in place; otherwise, it + would fall apart. Secretary Vance will be going back to the Middle East shortly to + discuss the situation with each leader, and the President will be + meeting next week with Fahd. Our theory is that we have to have action + this year if we are going to have positive action at all.

+

Tito: You + are right in saying that it is necessary to put some of the pieces in + place before reconvening the Geneva Conference. On the other side, what + is bad is that we are not witnessing the coming together of the opposing + sides. There is an opposite process; they are going further apart.

+

V.P.: President Carter’s impression, based on his talks with the Arab + leaders was that the situation was developing nicely. With the Israeli elections, we don’t + know. We are aware of Likud’s previous statements, but we don’t know + what position he will take.

+

Kardelj: The Arabs have been evolving in a + positive sense, including Syria and the Palestinians. But what has + happened in Israel might turn things upside down.

+

V.P.: President Carter had an excellent meeting with Asad, and I am sure + this will be true with Fahd. Now it will depend on whether progress is + possible with Israel. The President has said there has to be a + Palestinian territory and that the Arabs have to evolve a process for + peace. It is difficult to commence this process considering the ancient + animosity of the Arabs and the Jews.

+

Tito: For + Israel, the essential thing is for the Palestinians and the other Arabs + to declare that they recognize Israel’s right to exist.

+

V.P.: Correct, that is a part of it. Setting aside + the PLO, we believe the other Arabs would be inclined to do so. We don’t + know about the PLO. . . .

+

Kardelj: After they have something in their hands. + . . .

+

V.P.: Those are the rumors we hear. . . .

+

Minic: We + have been told so by the PLO directly.

+

V.P.: We are hopeful. President Carter hopes to have progress. As you + have observed, it is a hot spot and outside help is needed because of + the animosity.

+

Tito: + There is big hatred in the region. It is unstable. Since 1947 Israel has + occupied territories and not complied with UN resolutions.

+

V.P.: We objected to the most recent Israeli + settlements.

+

Kardelj: We assume the US will tell Israel not to + continue to lie.

+

Tito: In + 1967, I told the Arabs, I told Nasser that they had to recognize Israel, + that they couldn’t throw Israel into the sea. They didn’t like it, but + they accepted it.

+

V.P.: We will press them.

+

Tito: We + don’t know how the situation will develop. That is why I am not + optimistic.

+

V.P.: What do you, Mr. President, think of the + situation in Ethiopia and Somalia?

+

Tito: + Ethiopia sent a delegation to Yugoslavia two years ago after the + revolution. We had talks and advised them to have a federation with + Eritrea. Nothing happened. They came again at a high level. I told them + again that federation was the best possible solution. Succession would + not be acceptable; it would cut Ethiopia off from the sea.

+ +

As far as Somalia is concerned, I had a visit from their President. He + said he is ready to have confederation with Ethiopia.

+

In Djibouti, the situation is dangerous. I sent our Assistant Foreign + Minister with messages urging the parties to reach a peaceful solution. + In terms of the internal situation, fighting is going on. Both sides are + stubborn. We have let the Ethiopians and the Eritreans know that we do + not agree with succession. However, I am not optimistic.

+

Minic: + After the Ethiopian revolution, when the Emperor was overthrown,Ethiopian Emperor Haile Selassie was deposed + on September 12, 1974. Ethiopia applied for assistance. We + agreed to provide economic and military assistance within the limits of + our possibilities. It is a progressive regime and we thought it + important to maintain Ethiopia as a non-aligned country. The policy of + some Arab countries, supporting the succession of Eritrea, is the wrong + policy. The Ethiopian regime is assuring us that they are determined to + remain non-aligned. We are of the opinion that we have to support + Ethiopia because the government assures they are determined to remain + non-aligned. We are trying to encourage the government to find a federal + solution for Eritrea, not war. We are trying to press the Arab countries + to change their policy and to influence Ethiopia along these same lines. + Neither Ethiopia nor the Arabs are ready to accept such suggestions.

+

Tito: It + is difficult to say what consequences there will be if the situation + continues on its present course. If such a thing were to develop, we + would have to keep the conflict from spreading. We should all try to + contribute.

+

Kardelj: What is in question is the policy of + detente itself. All of these conflicts inevitably involve the two world + blocs. Africa is possibly a confrontation ground.

+

V.P.: Mr. Kardelj, our fondest hope is that that + will not happen. We want majority rule in Rhodesia and Namibia. We want + progress in South Africa. Where there is profound social injustice, + there is room for caprice. We want the U.S. and the Soviet Union to stay out of there. That is the + policy we want to pursue; we do not have designs for hegemony.

+

Kardelj: But it is possible that this will have to + be the result of US-Soviet negotiations. It is in U.S. interests that non-aligned countries + remain non-aligned.

+ +

V.P.: We have commenced efforts to move forward on + detente with the Soviet Union. The talks in Geneva are going very well. + We would like to see progress on MBFR. + We would like to see a broadening of people-to-people contact. The + Russians haven’t included wars of liberation in their definition of + detente. I would hope, incidentally, that we could get to the subject of + the Belgrade meeting before these talks are over.

+

Kardelj: It is not a good position to consider + wars of national liberation outside the framework of detente.

+

V.P.: We want to get along with the Russians, but + we found they are not perfect. Mr. President, your interpreter is great. + She never takes a note. I think if we put her in charge we could solve + all our problems; she is always perfect.

+

Mr. President, would you please give me your views on CSCE?

+

Tito: If I + have a suggestion to give, it is that you don’t introduce matters that + lead to confrontation—one is human rights. It is a question that is + discussed too much. If the debate on human rights were to be confined to + the US and USSR that would be okay, + but other countries are being drawn in.

+

Yugoslavia is an open country. Millions of our people work outside of + Yugoslavia; there are many tourists. We have a few people in jail; this + is held as a human rights violation. There are just a few people who + work against us. We have our laws and we must apply them. We don’t want + this held against us in Belgrade. We want to go forward, not backward, + after Helsinki. Yugoslavia has signed an agreement with Italy and we + have solved other problems with our neighbors. I know there are + injustices, but what is injustice? We should try to move along the lines + set in Helsinki. I would hope you will convey these views to President + Carter.

+

V.P.: I will do so, we want to consider all three + baskets to the fullest extent possible and in a non-confrontational + manner. We want to keep the dialogue on a firm track, a + non-confrontation track.

+

Turning to another issue, because of your leadership in the non-aligned + movement, I wanted you to know we will try to get North-South dialogue + going through CIECThe Conference on + International Economic Cooperation, also known as the North-South + Conference, met in Paris from December 1975 until June 3, + 1977. on a constructive, hopeful basis. At the London Summit, + we pressed for a hopeful dialogue permitting progress by the poorer + countries of the world. We are proposing case-by-case commodity + agreements; a common fund to keep commodities in a normal market range. + We have proposed increasing contributions to the World Bank. Our hope is + that the CIEC Conference in Paris will provide the basis for a much more + constructive discussion.

+ +

Tito: The + question of assistance to the LDCs is important; unfortunately, the + progress is slow.

+

V.P.: We are increasing our assistance from $2.4 + billion to $8 billion over three years. Mr. President, some of the + demands of the poorer countries we don’t find possible to accept.

+

Tito: I + feel the greatest obstacle is that of the international companies which + contribute to fluctuations in prices—copper and other raw materials.

+

V.P.: It is terrible.

+

Tito: I + think a great responsibility lies with the international companies.

+

Minic: We + have studied the positions taken at London carefully. Some are positive, + but still the positions of the group of 19 and the group of 8 at Paris + are far apart. It is difficult to know whether the Paris conference will + be successful. We shall try to do whatever we can in order to achieve at + least partial results. You know the group of 19 has to be careful so as + not to be denounced by the group of 77—which is actually 110 nations. If + the group of 8 comes closer to the group of 19, success will be achieved + in raw materials, investment and financial matters.

+

V.P.: On another issue, Mr. President, I am aware + of the fact that we have had an irritating delay with regard to the + Krsko reactor. Our Nuclear Regulatory Commission has now approved the + license, and I hope you will find this a helpful step.

+

Tito: We + are satisfied with this solution. It would have been unpleasant for a + small country like Yugoslavia to have invested so much and not to have + it work out.

+

V.P.: Absolutely. I hope that this will be a + symbol of cooperation between our countries across the whole range of + issues.

+

Tito: As + far as bilateral relations are concerned, we had some agreements with + Ford and Kissinger, certain agreements on some kinds of arms. Now + military purchases have stopped. I must tell you openly and frankly that + the discussion about the TOW missile + did not please us. There was a great fuss about this, propaganda and the + suggestion that Yugoslavia was being armed by the U.S. We produce 85 percent of our own arms. + We want to avoid a big fuss. We aren’t asking for sophisticated weapons, + but we don’t want obsolete equipment. I would hope we could avoid + misunderstandings.

+

V.P.: I know Admiral Holloway has just visited and met with your military + leaders.See footnote 6, Document 235. We will look into this + aspect of our relations.

+
+ +
+ 237. Editorial Note +

On May 31, 1977, the Central Intelligence Agency confirmed that U.S.-manufactured M–47 (Patton) tanks were + present in Ethiopia. Further circumstantial evidence suggested that the + tank shipment to Ethiopia originated in Yugoslavia. Secretary of State + Cyrus Vance reported the + evidence to President Jimmy + Carter in an Evening Report dated June 22. Noting that + the tanks had been delivered to Yugoslavia in the 1950s under a Military + Assistance Program (MAP) grant, + Vance added that the Export + Control Act required congressional notification in cases of unauthorized + transfers of military equipment. “If the intelligence is confirmed,” + Vance reported, “we will + approach the Yugoslavs and make the required report to the Congress in a + timely fashion.” Carter wrote in the margin “Why not simply ask the + Yugoslavs?” (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box + 18, Evening Reports (State): 6/77) The next day Vance reported to Carter that the + Department of State had authorized U.S. + Ambassador to Yugoslavia Lawrence + Eagleburger to broach the subject with the Yugoslav + Government. (Ibid.)

+

Although the Military Assistance Program with Yugoslavia was terminated + in 1959, the Yugoslavs had agreed not to transfer “to any other nation, + title or possession of any military equipment, materials, information, + or services” acquired from the United States “without the prior consent + of the Government of the United States of America.” (Telegram 145552 to + Belgrade, June 22; National Archives, RG + 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770223–0965) Eagleburger, who arrived in Belgrade + on June 16 and presented his credentials on June 21, requested + permission to deliver a strongly worded démarche suggesting that + Yugoslav actions cast doubt on “stated GOY desire to expand military-to-military cooperation, and + particularly military sales. More fundamentally, it raises serious + questions about GOY credibility on a + range of existing bilateral undertakings with the USG, as well as future agreements.” + (Telegram 4238 from Belgrade, June 23; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + D770225–0333)

+

On June 24, Eagleburger informed + Yugoslav Foreign Secretary Milos + Minic that the U.S. + Government had information that M–47 tanks supplied to Yugoslavia may + have been transferred to Ethiopia in violation of U.S.-Yugoslav agreements. Eagleburger requested that the + Yugoslav Government confirm if U.S. + tanks had indeed been transferred to Ethiopia. (Telegram 4263 from + Belgrade, June 24; National Archives, RG + 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770226–0826) While waiting for + Minic’s response, the Embassy + reported its own analysis of the reasons for Belgrade’s transfer of + weapons to Ethiopia. The most likely explanation, the Embassy wrote, was + that Yugoslav “enthusiasm for a + socialist brother got the best of them.” Yugoslav position in the + Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) offered Belgrade the opportunity to expand + “non-Soviet, ‘progressive’ influence” to Ethiopia. Another probable + reason was the low state of relations between the United States and + Yugoslavia prior to Vice President Walter + Mondale’s visit in May. Eagleburger wrote: “Given their obligation to a + non-aligned and socialist state, their irritation with us, and an + estimate that they had little to lose” as military sales from the West + were not forthcoming, Belgrade probably decided to transfer the tanks + without regard if the transfer was discovered. (Telegram 4316 from + Belgrade, June 27; National Archives, RG + 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770229–0316)

+

Minic met with Eagleburger on July 8 to confirm that + the Yugoslav Government had, indeed, transferred 70 M–47 tanks to + Ethiopia. Minic suggested that + the equipment had been decommissioned by the Yugoslav military and was + about to be sent to scrap yards when a decision was made to provide it + to Ethiopia. He stressed that the Yugoslav and U.S. military authorities should establish direct contact + to clarify responsibilities arising from the old agreements. According + to Eagleburger, “Minic appealed for USG’s understanding,” expressed his + government’s hope that Washington not allow the incident “to have a + negative impact on all fields, including military cooperation,” and + stressed that Yugoslavia takes very seriously its obligations under + international agreements and has always lived up to them. (Telegram 4603 + from Belgrade, July 8; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770243–0661) On a copy + of the cable forwarded to him by Brzezinski, Carter noted “My inclination is not to + embarrass the Yugoslavs.” (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, + Brzezinski Material, Country + File, Box 86, Yugoslavia: 1–9/1977)

+

Visiting Belgrade in mid-July, Deputy Secretary of State Warren Christopher told Minic that U.S. law required the administration to notify Congress of + the equipment diversion matter. However, Christopher informed the Yugoslav Foreign Minister, the + administration had decided to do so in a classified letter so as to + minimize the chances of the instance leaking to the press: “We + attempting to handle problem with restraint, not because we do not + consider it a very serious matter—as we do—but because we set great + store by our relationship.” (Telegram 4930 from Belgrade, July 21; + National Archives, RG 59, Central + Foreign Policy File, D770260–0639) Christopher informed Chairman of the Senate Foreign + Relations Committee Frank Church (Democrat-Idaho) and Speaker of the + House Thomas O’Neill (Democrat-Massachusetts) of the Yugoslav diversion + on August 6. (Telegram 184571 to Belgrade, August 6; National Archives, + RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + D770282–0535)

+
+ +
+ 238. Memorandum From Gregory F. + Treverton of the National Security Council Staff to the + President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)Source: Carter Library, National + Security Affairs, Brzezinski + Material, Brzezinski Office + File, Country Chron File, Box 56, Yugoslavia: 1977. Secret. Sent for + information. Brzezinski sent + a copy of the memorandum to Vance on August 15 and underscored his hope that + Tito would “get some of + these points across to Brezhnev.” (Carter Library, National Security + Affairs, Brzezinski + Material, Brzezinski Office + File, Subject Chron File, Box 122, Vance, Misc. Communication with: + 7–8/77) + + + Washington, August 4, + 1977 + + + SUBJECT + Summary of Your Meeting with Yugoslav Ambassador Belovski, August + 3, 1977 + +

For your information, the following is a summary of the main points made + in the meeting:

+

Tito’s + Trip

+

Belovski said that Tito would be + gone for nearly a month; he was uncertain whether the Soviet Union + portion was an official visit or a vacation. In any case, he said it was + important for the Yugoslavs to “normalize” their relations with Moscow. + In the last year the Soviet approach has included many “old” + aspects—talk of “brotherhood,” invitations to bloc meetings despite + clear Yugoslav indications that it will not participate, military + approaches—and a persistent tendency to retain Yugoslavia as a member of + the “family.” You agreed that Yugoslavia was doing just what a country + that wanted to retain its independence and territorial integrity should + do.

+

Korea

+

In response to your question why Tito was going to North Korea, the Ambassador said: (1) + the Yugoslavs had been frankly impressed by the sincerity of the North + Korean desire for peace on the peninsula (an argument he repeated); and + (2) North Korea had opted for non-alignment, which was important to + Yugoslavia not because of the U.S. but + because of the Soviet Union and the PRC. When you asked why Belgrade did not recognize Seoul, the + Ambassador evaded, with vague talk of their original cease-fire proposal + and their desire to see the UN force + withdrawn.

+

You indicated that there had been no change in our plans for withdrawal + from Korea. You indicated that we would be prepared to open + communications with the North, provided the South Koreans were involved. + There are two Koreas and the North must recognize that; the way to proceed would be to + get both admitted to the UN and begin to + involve them in an international framework which might lead to peace on + the peninsula.

+

U.S.-Soviet + Relations

+

You referred to the Charleston speech on U.S.-Soviet relationsFor the + text of the President’s speech at the 31st Annual Meeting of the + Southern Legislative Conference on July 21, in Charleston, South + Carolina, see Public Papers: Carter, 1977, + Book II, pp. 1309–1315. reiterating that those relations + cover a wide front, comprising many different negotiations in different + phases. That is normal for countries that are in many respects rivals + but which recognize their global responsibility to cooperate. You + described the relations as “steady, stable and evolving,” with SALT the only substantial disagreement. + You agreed with the Ambassador that a breakthrough in one set of + negotiations—for instance, CTB—might help across the board, but you also + suggested that the effect should not be exaggerated. Differences on + other issues are real, not atmospherics or a reflection of our approach + to human rights.

+

You suggested to the Ambassador that it is important that the Soviets + understand that we want cooperation on a broad front. We do not see + separate issues as linked. At the same time, to create a false sense of + agreement would be to court the danger of backlash. We are committed to, + and speak about, detente, but it cannot be a selective detente.

+

The Ambassador believed this Administration was more genuine in its + commitment to detente than its predecessor, but he wondered how it could + escape the current impasse. You said there was no reason to be + impatient. We want to move but will not make unilateral concessions, and + you suggested that Tito might + convey that message to the Soviets.

+

You indicated that Congressional and public opinion is solidly behind the + President and that, if anything, stagnation in U.S.-Soviet relations works to the advantage of those who + oppose detente. There is no rush to move forward; quite the contrary, + delay may make it harder to do so; a SALT agreement along the lines we proposed four months ago + would have passed the Senate easily then, now it will not be so simple. + The more impediments the Soviets throw in the relationship, the more + anti-SALT sentiment grows in the + United States. More generally, the Soviets have been unwise in their + SALT strategy; in January 1976 + they could have had an agreement they would now regard as good, but not + now.

+

We want a SALT agreement that is real + and sustaining. If there is no agreement by October, we will see how the + parties behave once the interim + accord lapses. If the Soviets take actions that are inconsistent with + that accord, the mood in Congress will press the U.S. to respond. The situation could be reminiscent of the + early 1960s, and the result might be again to widen the gap between + U.S. and Soviet nuclear + capabilities, since the U.S. stands on + the verge of a new era of weaponry. Once we plunge into that weaponry it + might again take years for a new balance to emerge. We want a SALT agreement that is a wedge for better + relations, both political and military. We will not be silent about what + we stand for, just as we do not expect the Soviets to abandon their + ideology.

+

Bilateral Relations

+

The Ambassador said Tito believes + that the President is an honest man and that the Mondale visit had laid a very “clean” + platform for relations. Tito + would convey both impressions to the Soviet Union. In response to your + mention of the tank transfer,See Document 237. the Ambassador called + it an “administrative failure” which his government wanted to correct. + Yugoslavia would stand by its commitments; it wants to build a + substantive basis for closer cooperation, including in the military + field. You indicated your agreement and hoped that the Presidents could + meet soon.

+

China

+

You responded briefly to the Ambassador’s question by indicating that we + are serious about normalizing relations, building on the Shanghai + communique. At the same time there are historical and psychological + legacies—and domestic factors—that both sides must take into account. + The Shanghai communique does that on our part; the Chinese must do + likewise.

+

The Ambassador asked if you would come to Yugoslavia. You responded + affirmatively, saying that you were thinking about a trip to Europe in + the fall and that it might include Yugoslavia.

+
+ +
+ 239. Letter From President Carter to Yugoslav President TitoSource: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, + Brzezinski Material, + President’s Correspondence with Foreign Leaders File, Box 21, + Yugoslavia: President Josip Broz + Tito, 5/77–5/79. No classification marking. The + initial draft was prepared in the Department of State and sent to + the White House by Tarnoff + on July 29. Treverton and + Hunter reworked the draft + at Brzezinski’s request. + (Ibid.) Brzezinski forwarded + the letter for signature to the President on August 5, noting that + he and Vance thought a + letter to Tito “in advance + of his trip to Moscow, Pyongyang, and Peking” would be “useful.” + (Ibid.) The letter was transmitted to Belgrade in telegram 184567, + August 6, with instructions to deliver it to Tito. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + D770282–0270) Eagleburger + delivered the letter to Minic + on August 9. (Telegram 5378 from Belgrade, August 9; National + Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign + Policy File, D770286–0413) + + + Washington, August 5, + 1977 + + + Dear Mr. President: + +

Vice President Mondale has told + me about the warmth of your hospitality during his recent trip to + Yugoslavia, and has given me a full report on his talks with you. Your + insights are very helpful to me.

+

I understand that you will soon be travelling to Moscow, Pyongyang, and + Peking—a trip which will be of great importance to everyone who seeks + greater international understanding. I would welcome hearing from you + after your trip, to gain your own assessment of the situation in the + three countries you are visiting, and to learn of their leaders’ views + on world problems.

+

This is a particularly important time in U.S.-Soviet relations. Despite the tenor of much public + commentary in recent months, I am encouraged by the progress we have + made in bilateral discussions with Soviet officials in a number of + areas, including the limiting of military forces in the Indian Ocean and + the ending of nuclear testing. I am committed to building on what has + been done so far, in order to reduce the risks of war, place firm limits + on the nuclear arms race, and create an enduring basis for U.S.-Soviet relations. I hope you will + assure Soviet leaders of my commitment. We are prepared to move forward + with the Soviet Union on a broad front, on the basis of mutual interest, + reciprocal action, and a common commitment to strengthening peace.

+

Clearly, gaining a new SALT agreement + is of great importance. Many difficulties remain; but I am prepared to + work closely with Soviet leaders to reach an agreement that will truly + provide greater security in the years ahead. The forthcoming conference + to review the Helsinki agreement, which you are hosting this fall, is + also of major importance. We want to make this a constructive meeting, + in order to strengthen the basis for security and cooperation in + Europe.

+ +

With regard to China, we are committed to moving forward on the basis of + the Shanghai Communique. Secretary Vance will be in Peking shortly before you arrive, and + will be exploring ways in which normalization of relations can proceed. + I consider our approach to China to be central to our global policy. + Both the United States and the People’s Republic share parallel + interests: namely, to prevent third countries from establishing + positions of dominance where we both have legitimate concerns. At the + same time, our desire to improve relations with China is not intended to + increase problems and difficulties for any other nation. Rather, I + believe that normalization will enhance the prospects for an enduring + peace and security in Asia and elsewhere, and will encourage Chinese + participation in international arenas in a useful and constructive + way.

+

I am particularly concerned with stability in Northeast Asia, and with + the peaceful resolution of problems which divide South and North Korea. + We have decided to carry out a phased withdrawal of American ground + combat forces from the Republic of Korea in a manner which will not + endanger stability on the peninsula. We remain firmly committed to the + security of the Republic of Korea and we are taking steps to ensure that + no one mistakenly believes there has been any reduction in our + resolution to uphold that commitment. At the same time, we seek ways to + lessen tension and establish a framework for a durable peace on the + Korean Peninsula. To that end, we are prepared to meet with all of the + parties most immediately concerned to explore how best to resolve + outstanding issues. Such a meeting would, of course, have to include the + governments of both North and South Korea.

+

I look forward to hearing from you, and know that I would benefit from + your observations on these and other critical issues. I would also be + deeply pleased if you could visit me in the United States early in 1978. + This would give me a chance to meet and talk with you about world + problems, and about ways we can continue to promote the close relations + which exist between our two countries.

+

Sincerely,

+ + Jimmy + Carter + +
+ +
+ 240. Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the Department of + State (Tarnoff) to the + President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)Source: Carter Library, National + Security Affairs, Brzezinski + Material, Brzezinski Office + File, Country Chron File, Box 56, Yugoslavia: 1977. Secret; + Sensitive + + + Washington, August + 31, 1977 + + + SUBJECT + Military Sales to Yugoslavia + +

As requested in NSC memorandum 5468 of + August 23,On August 23, the White House + tasked the Department of State, the Department of Defense, the Arms + Control and Disarmament Agency, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the + Central Intelligence Agency to review an interagency study on U.S. options for arms transfers to + Yugoslavia. The memorandum requested that substantive comments on + “major problems or necessary additions” as well as a clear + indication of which option the agencies favor be forwarded to the + White House by August 31. (Ibid.) On August 30, ACDA notified the + White House that it supported either option II or III of the + interagency study. On September 1, the CIA responded that it had no substantive comments on + the paper. In telegram 5865 from Belgrade, August 30, the Embassy + reported its own strong support for option III. (National Archives, + RG 59, Central Foreign Policy + File, D770313–0596) The Department of Defense response is Document 241. the State Department + has reviewed the interagency study on this subject.Following Admiral Holloway and Vice President Mondale’s visits to Yugoslavia, + Brzezinski requested a + interagency memorandum to review U.S. options on military sales to Yugoslavia based on + Yugoslav requests. The full study, forwarded by the Department of + State to the White House on August 19, discussed four possible + alternatives: “1. Curtail the Relationship; 2. Maintain the Status + Quo; 3. Expand the Relationship Moderately with emphasis on + political impact; and 4. Expand the Relationship Substantially, with + emphasis on force modernization and improvement.” The study + concluded that options 2 and 3 most closely matched U.S. interests, and that option 3 would + “be an unmistakably favorable indication to the Yugoslavs about + U.S. intentions.” While option 4 + “is most consistent with the U.S. + strategic interest in maintaining Yugoslavia’s ability to protect + its independence,” it “could add stress to U.S.-Soviet relations” and “would tend to commit us to + supporting the Yugoslavs in the event of conflict.” (Carter Library, + National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Brzezinski Office File, Country Chron File, Box 56, + Yugoslavia: 1977) Provided that the outcome of the September + mission to BelgradeA U.S. team met September 14–15 in + Belgrade with Yugoslav officials to discuss the uses and disposition + of MAP military equipment + previously provided to Yugoslavia. The Embassy reported in telegram + 6256 from Belgrade, September 17, that “our objectives and concerns + have been met.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + D770339–0574) is satisfactory and that we receive necessary + assurances concerning unauthorized retransfers of US-origin equipment, + the State Department recommends that a refined version of Option III + (Expand the relationship moderately, with an emphasis on political + impact) set the general direction of future US policy.

+ +

We should signal to the Yugoslavs our interest in improving and modestly + expanding the current arms transfer relationship. Any such forthcoming + message, however, should (a) not raise false Yugoslav expectations, + especially with regard to the level of technology we will transfer; (b) + not impose a significant political cost on the US if the Yugoslavs are + unresponsive; and (c) not put the US in the position of pressing arms on + an uninterested recipient.

+

Accordingly, the Yugoslavs should be informed in substance that:

+

—we want to contribute to the security of an independent and non-aligned + Yugoslavia;

+

—the maintenance and improvement of the arms transfer relationship, in + our view, would contribute to that objective;

+

—nevertheless, both sides must recognize that there are limits on the + amount and kinds of arms which can be transferred. These constraints + include:

+ + +

—a shared reluctance to undertake USG financing;

+

—limits on the level of technology which can be transferred;

+

—shared interest in not jeopardizing broader political relations + (i.e., US-Soviet and Yugoslav-Soviet relations);

+

—need to assure that the systems are defensive and could not threaten + our security nor that of our friends and allies.

+ +

These constraints, which would include a ban on the transfer of offensive + air and naval systems, will limit the arms transfer relationship with + Yugoslavia. They are consistent with the PD–13 guidelines.Presidential Directive 13, signed by President + Carter on May 13, 1977, + limited the sale and transfers of conventional weapons to cases that + are deemed clearly in the national interest of the United + States.

+

Limited procedural improvements also should be proposed. For example, we + could designate Ambassador Eagleburger as the focal point for US action on arms + transfer requests and invite the Yugoslavs to name a counterpart in + Belgrade. If the Yugoslavs demonstrate a strong preference for having + such exchanges in Washington, similar arrangements could be made between + the State Department and their embassy. A formal consultative mechanism, + however, should not be offered.

+

Since our purposes are primarily political, the State Department should + have the lead in determining the timing of this initiative, as well as + that of responses to specific Yugoslav arms requests.

+

The State Department also recommends that it be asked to conduct an + interagency study to develop specific guidelines to facilitate our + responses to subsequent Yugoslav requests.

+ + Peter + Tarnoff + + + +
+ +
+ 241. Memorandum From the Deputy Secretary of Defense (Duncan) to the President’s Assistant + for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Brzezinski Office File, Country + Chron File, Box 56, Yugoslavia: 1977. Secret. + + + Washington, September + 14, 1977 + + + SUBJECT + Military Sales to Yugoslavia (U) + +

(S) I have reviewed, as have Secretary Brown and General Brown, the interagency study of US Arms Transfers to + Yugoslavia.See footnote 3, Document 240. We have concluded that a + policy of moderate expansion of US arms sales to Yugoslavia, generally + as described by Option III of the study, best satisfies US and Yugoslav + interests. A policy based on Option II would serve these interests less + satisfactorily. The choice of either Option I or Option IV, as stated in + the study, currently is not warranted.

+

(S) US interests in Yugoslavia are centered on preserving its + independence and territorial integrity and fostering its professed role + as a nonaligned nation. The possibility of Tito’s death in the near future makes the risks to US + interests more imminent. An expanded US-Yugoslav arms sales relationship + will assure the Yugoslavs of US support and enhance the position of + those Yugoslavs who wish to look to the West for support against Soviet + pressures. US sales diminish to some degree the heavy Yugoslav + dependence on the Soviet Union for military equipment, and they develop + a framework which would be the basis for greatly expanded support should + we choose to respond to a Yugoslav request for major assistance.

+

(S) In addition to the factors noted in the study we must assure + ourselves that the Yugoslavs will not make unauthorized transfers of US + equipment and that Yugoslavia will assume a truly nonaligned role. The + manner in which our policy is carried out should make clear its + connections with these factors.

+

(S) Implementation of an increased military sales program should give + proper consideration not only to the expansion of the relationship but + also to the constraints which exist. Specific US transfer actions would + of course require evaluation on a case-by-case basis in consideration of + the guidelines of PD–13, the security and proper use of US equipment, + and US force requirements. In general, materiel should come from excess + stocks or from production, utilizing existing lead-times so as not to interfere with US + force requirements. Yugoslav limitations are also significant. Although + we do not understand fully their failure to purchase many items which + have been offered, it is clear that they have severe budgetary and + political constraints and a measure of unsureness as to their needs and + how best to meet them. These factors are likely to persist regardless of + changes in US policy, and they will play significant roles in governing + the rate and direction of expansion of sales. We must not outdistance + the Yugoslavs in our efforts to expand the relationship.

+

(S) A US policy based on Option III is appropriate for Yugoslavia’s + present domestic and international political situation. It is also the + policy likely to best serve US interests in post-Tito Yugoslavia. This policy can be + carried out in ways which avoid excessive Soviet reactions. Yet it also + increases the credibility of Yugoslav deterrence. This can be + accomplished by demonstrating US and general international interest in + Yugoslav independence and by providing a measure of increased military + capability, both of which will heighten Soviet reluctance to risk an + embarrassing, prolonged and costly military intervention in + Yugoslavia.

+ + CW Duncan Jr + +
+ +
+ 242. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security + Affairs(Brzezinski) to + President CarterSource: Carter Library, National + Security Affairs, Brzezinski + Material, Brzezinski Office + File, Country Chron File, Box 56, Yugoslavia: 1977. Secret; + Sensitive. Sent for action. Treverton forwarded this memorandum to Brzezinski on September 17 noting + that it had been delayed partly to await the outcome of the mission + to Yugoslavia to discuss the M–47 tank re-transfer and “partly + because Defense liked the study so much it nearly expired winding + its way ever upward in the Pentagon.” (Ibid.) + + + Washington, September + 20, 1977 + + + SUBJECT + U.S. Arms Transfers to + Yugoslavia + +

In conversations with both the Vice President and CNO + Holloway, Yugoslav officials + indicated their interest in expanding their arms purchases from the + United States. (U.S. sales totaled + $689.5 million in the period 1950–63, but dropped to under $500,000 per + year in the mid-1960s.) + Specifically, the Yugoslavs expressed interest in the MK–44 torpedo and + raised again the question of the Harpoon missile which we had previously + declined to sell.

+

At my request, an interagency study addressed the general issue of our + military sales relationship with Yugoslavia (Tab A).At Tab A, attached but not printed, is the + interagency memorandum on military sales to Yugoslavia. See footnote 3, Document 240. + There is consensus that the relationship should be + expanded moderately, with emphasis on political impact (agency + comments are at Tab B).At Tab B are the + comments from the Department of State, the Department of Defense, + ACDA, and the CIA. See Documents 240 and 241. I believe that course of action will serve + our basic objectives: (1) underscoring both to the Yugoslavs and to the + Soviets our interest in an independent Yugoslavia; (2) marginally + reducing Yugoslavia’s dependence on the Soviets for weaponry, thus + enlarging its room for maneuver; and (3) building a relationship with + the military, certain to be a key shaper of post-Tito events.

+

The Yugoslav transfer of old U.S. M-47 tanks to Ethiopia this summer stands as a + caution. Belgrade’s explanation of it as an administrative + mistake is disingenuous, but I believe the risk of + such a re-transfer in the future can be minimized. Our team + just returned from Belgrade where it reiterated the non-transfer + provisions that apply to U.S.-supplied + equipment, reviewed Yugoslav inventories and received fresh assurances + from the Yugoslavs that re-transfer would not recur.

+

We can expect, and must demand, that Belgrade live up to its non-transfer + commitments. At the same time, however, if we modestly + expand our arms sales, the objectives in doing so are + long-term. To have value, the military relationship must be + sustained even though the Yugoslavs will continue to take actions we + dislike—actions in Third World groupings, permission for Soviet military + passage through Yugoslavia. In the past, the sales relationship has been + turned off and on with each Yugoslav action that Washington disliked or + approved. The result has been to confuse the Yugoslavs and drain any + benefit from the existing military relationship.

+

RECOMMENDATION:

+

That you approve a moderate expansion in the U.S. arms transfer relationship with Yugoslavia.Carter wrote “OK JC” at the top of the memorandum indicating his approval. + Brzezinski notified the + Department of State, the Department of Defense, ACDA, the JCS, and the CIA of the President’s decision on September 22. + (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Brzezinski Office File, Country + Chron File, Box 56, Yugoslavia: 1977)

+

Substantively, that would imply:

+ +

—informing the Yugoslavs of your decision but also making clear its + limits. You could mention the decision to Kardelj when he visits on + September 30, and Harold Brown + could reinforce it when he goes to Yugoslavia at about the same + time.See Documents + 244 and 245.

+

—first candidates for sales would be ship defense systems identified by + the U.S. Navy (not including Harpoon). The TOW missile, previously offered to them, might be + re-offered.

+

—no credit is sought, or would be granted, so only + the normal procedures for notifying Congress would be involved. No offensive systems would be transferred, and the + relationship would be consistent with PD–13. Of course, + increases in sales to Yugoslavia would add to global U.S. totals, but the Yugoslav total will be + modest even in an expanded relationship.

+

Procedurally:

+

—State would chair an interagency group to develop procedures for + responding to Yugoslav requests. That group would include Defense and + intelligence representatives to make sure that transfers did not entail + risks of technology leaks.

+

—Ambassador Eagleburger might be + designated the focal point for helping the Yugoslavs better understand + U.S. arms transfer procedures.

+
+ +
+ 243. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security + Affairs (Brzezinski) to + President CarterSource: Carter Library, National + Security Affairs, Brzezinski + Material, VIP Visit File, Box 15, Yugoslavia: Presidency Member + Edvard Kardelj, 9/28/77–10/5/77: Cables and Memos. Secret. Sent for + action. Carter initialed the memorandum indicating he had seen it. + Later in the day, Brzezinski + sent another memorandum to Carter forwarding Department of State + talking points on détente and the Oversees Private Investment + Cooperation program with Yugoslavia. Carter initialed Brzezinski’s covering memorandum + indicating he had seen it and wrote at the top “We may follow up on + N/S Korea.” (Ibid.) + + + Washington, September + 29, 1977 + + + SUBJECT + Your Meeting with Yugoslav Presidency Member Edvard Kardelj, + September 30, 10:30 a.m. + +

The memorandum from Warren + ChristopherMemorandum from + Acting Secretary of State Christopher to the President, September 27. (Carter + Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, VIP Visit File, Box 15, + Yugoslavia: Presidency Member Edvard Kardelj, 9/28/77–10/5/77: + Briefing Book) (in the accompanying briefing book) + effectively presents the issues for this meeting.

+

The most critical question for Kardelj (addressed as Mr. KarDELL) is + continuing uncertainty about our commitment to Yugoslavia’s independence + and integrity. While efforts throughout the year have erased most of the + deep concern over your comments in the final television debateSee footnote 2, + Document 235.—though it came up again on Tito’s China visit—reasserting our + concern and commitment is very important. Our new offer of an arms + supply relationship will help considerably.The phrase “arms supply relationship will help considerably” is + underlined by an unknown hand, possibly Brzezinski. The Department of State talking points + submitted by Christopher + recommended that Carter inform Kardelj of the U.S. Government’s decision to expand + the arms sales program moderately. See footnote 2 above. You + will be breaking the news to him (points summarized in the State memo). + We are also resuming the processing of FMS cases and requests for export licenses.

+

Yugoslav concern is heightened by the role the Russians are playing. When + Brezhnev came to Belgrade + last year, he tried to bully Tito into moving closer to the Soviet orbit. Tito stoutly resisted, and circulated + the memoranda of conversation to key party leaders to make the point. On + Tito’s trip to Moscow, + however, Brezhnev tried the + opposite approach: surrounding him with warmth and affection. Yugoslavs + who are intensely suspicious of the Soviet Union believe this is + designed to be used as a weapon following Tito’s death: that the Tito “line” was friendship for Moscow, and his + successors should be bound by it. In fact, [less than 1 line not + declassified] indicates that Tito stonewalled Brezhnev on the latter’s requests for port facilities, + overflight rights, and landing rights.

+

While, if time permits, it would be valuable to discuss broader aspects + of international relations with Kardelj, he will be most interested in + the bilateral aspects of our relations, in order to pin down U.S. concerns.

+

Of special significance for him also will be Yugoslavia’s leadership of + the non-aligned movement. There is also their proposal and support for + next year’s UN Disarmament Conference. + And Yugoslavia is proud (and a bit uneasy) to be hosting the CSCE review conference, opening on + October 4. (FYI: on the basis of + Yugoslav heavy-handedness in dealing with representatives of + Non-Governmental Organizations at the June preparatory conference, we + have urged them to seek advice from the Finns and Swiss—who hosted + CSCE in the first round. + Otherwise, we fear ugly incidents. This matter will be raised with + Kardelj in other meetings.)

+

Kardelj has a long (6 or 7 page) letter for you from Tito, covering his trip to Moscow, + Peking, and Pyongyang, as you had suggested in your letter to him.See Document 239. + An English translation of Tito’s letter, dated September 22, was attached at + Tab B of Brzezinski’s second + memorandum to Carter on September 29. (See footnote 1 above.) Tito informed Carter that in his discussions with + Brezhnev, the Soviet + leader stressed Soviet interest in disarmament and the SALT II negotiation process. + Describing his meetings in Pyongyang, Tito recounted Kim Il Sung’s proposal that a peace + treaty be negotiated between the People’s Democratic Republic of + Korea and the United States or that tripartite negotiations among + the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, the Republic of Korea, + and the United States begin, but only after South Korean President + Park Chung Hee was removed from power. Regarding Sino-Soviet + relations, Tito described + his impression following visits to Moscow and Beijing that neither + country was prepared to make any concession which would alleviate + the tensions and that the relationship was bound to continue on its + present course. On October 6, Carter signed a letter to Tito thanking him for his insights + and inviting him to Washington in 1978. (Carter Library, National + Security Affairs, Brzezinski + Material, Brzezinski Office + File, Country Chron File, Box 56, Yugoslavia: 1977) Kardelj + will reportedly say that Tito + would like to come here in January or February.

+

The Yugoslavs are also concerned about the record of violence by emigre + groups against their missions in this country, and have repeatedly + accused us of not taking appropriate action. (Except for the TWA + hijacking, no case has been solved, and at times the FBI has been + uncooperative.) If this comes up in other meetings, Kardelj will be + given strong assurances about our concern and commitment.

+

Kardelj’s latest book, Trends in the Development of the + Political System of Self-Management Democracy, has just been + published. State summarizes it as follows:

+ +

While not destined to be an international best seller (the Yugoslavs have + announced their intention to publish it in “world languages”) or + anywhere as controversial as Santiago Carrillo’s recent work,Santiago Carillo, Secretary General of the Spanish + Communist Party, together with French Communist leader Georges + Marchais and Italian Communist leader Enrico Berlinguer, launched + the Eurocommunist movement on March 2, 1977, at a meeting in Madrid. + His book, Eurocommunism and the State, was + published in 1977 and repudiated Marxist-Leninist revolutionary + dogma in favor of participation by Communist parties in the + democratic electoral process. Kardelj’s “study” is noteworthy + for a number of reasons. It is an extension of a major speech he made + June 13th to the 30th Session of the Presidium of the League of + Communists of Yugoslavia (LCY), in which he coined the term + “self-managing pluralism” to define the Yugoslav system. The speech and + the resultant book were endorsed by the Presidium “as the basis for the + activity of the LCY in preparation for the 11th Party Congress,” which + is scheduled for spring of 1978. The study presents a sort of master + plan for the future development of the Yugoslav political system as it + approaches the level of democracy that they feel the economic system has + already achieved. Kardelj’s “study” does not provide for a Tito-like role and thus his approach + can be seen as an attempt to provide a stable and mature system that + will not be shaken by the passing of Tito. However, although the upcoming Party Congress is + widely regarded as being the main event which will establish, at least, + the immediate succession to Tito, the official problem to be solved by the Congress and + the main problem addressed by Kardelj is the achievement of a higher + degree of political democracy.

+

Kardelj is typically philosophic in his comments and does not attempt to + define the exact form of a future, trying “to indicate only some points + of departure for determining our practical tasks concerning the + harmonization of the political system with the system of production and + social-economic relationships, and the further development of + self-management-democratic forms.” He does address a number of topics of + interest, i.e. human rights, Eurocommunism, and other political systems, + both East and West, finding them all wanting in comparison to + “self-managing pluralism.” There are not, however, the racy critical + references to the Chinese or Soviet systems rumored to be present in + early drafts of the book.

+

I have included a copy of President Tito’s speech this Tuesday in the briefing book.An English translation of Tito’s September 27 speech to the + Central Committee of the League of Communists of Croatia, is in the + Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, VIP Visit + File, Box 15, Yugoslavia: Presidency Member Edvard Kardelj, + 9/28/77–10/5/77: Briefing Book.

+
+ +
+ 244. Memorandum of ConversationSource: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, + Brzezinski Material, + Subject File, Box 35, Memcons: + President: 9/19–30/77. Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Treverton. While the White House + memorandum of conversation notes that the meeting took place in the + Oval Office, a Department of State memorandum of the conversation + drafted by Luers places the + meeting in the Cabinet Room. (Ibid.) + + + Washington, September 30, 1977, 10:40–11:25 + a.m. + + + SUBJECT + Summary of the President’s Meeting with Edvard Kardelj, Member of + the Presidency of the Socialist Federal Republic of + Yugoslavia + + + PARTICIPANTS + The President + The Vice President + Warren Christopher, Acting + Secretary of State + Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski, + Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs + Lawrence Eagleburger, US + Ambassador to Yugoslavia + William H. Luers, Deputy + Assistant Secretary for European Affairs + Gregory F. Treverton, + NSC Staff member + [Notetaker]All brackets are in the + original. + + Edvard Kardelj, Member of the Presidency of the Socialist Federal + Republic of Yugoslavia + Dimce Belovski, Yugoslav Ambassador to the United States + Emil Ludviger, Member of the Federal Executive Council and Federal + Secretary for Foreign Trade + Dragan Bernardic, Assistant Federal Secretary for Foreign + Affairs + Svetozar Starcevic, Director of the Political Department, Federal + Secretary for Foreign Affairs + Borislav Lazarevic, Chef de Cabinet for Mr. Kardelj + Radivoje Petkovic, Minister-Counselor, Yugoslav Embassy + Vladimir Matic, Political Counselor, Yugoslav Embassy + Branka Jojic, Interpreter + +

Mr. Kardelj opened the meeting by thanking the President for his + invitation and for taking the time for the meeting. He handed the + President the original of a letter from President Tito, indicating that the President + had already been informed of the letter’s contents. The President said + he read the letter that morning. He was honored to have Kardelj in + Washington. He said that he and his colleagues had been reviewing + Kardelj’s book, and he congratulated him on his role as a statesman and + author. Kardelj said he was not sure he deserved the compliments; he and + others in Yugoslavia had done what they had to.

+

The President expressed gratitude for the reception given to the Vice + President in Yugoslavia, saying that it and this visit confirmed the friendship of the two + nations. He looked forward to President Tito’s visit this spring, and he thanked Kardelj for + delivering the letter. He found President Tito’s report very helpful. He noted that the Yugoslavs + were eager to have the US begin discussions with North Korea, and he + reminded Kardelj that he had told President Tito of our commitment to the South Koreans not to begin + those discussions without them. We want a peaceful solution and would + like to explore with the Yugoslavs how progress might be made, while + assuring the South Koreans of our commitment. He again thanked Kardelj + for the report and said he would study it with great care.

+

Tito’s + Trip

+

Kardelj said much of what President Tito wrote would be familiar to the President. He + emphasized that the North Koreans want a peaceful solution. With regard + to China there was not much new to report. President Tito had the impression that the + Chinese were aware of their differences with the US. At the same time + there was some coincidence of interests. They wanted better relations + with Washington; of course, however, there were conditions, including + Taiwan. Apart from that, one way or another, the Chinese wanted to + cooperate. He said the welcome that the Chinese had given President + Tito had greatly exceeded + their expectations; it was much warmer than they had expected. That + seemed a sympton of a deep change in Chinese policy, the beginning of an + opening to the world. In that sense, the attention given to Tito was not meant for him alone.

+

President Tito had found it + interesting that the Chinese had apparently decided to accelerate their + economic development, especially in the industrial sector. They had + introduced material incentives quite at odds with previous policy.

+

Kardelj thought the Chinese could be a very positive force in + international affairs in the future. Of course, the Yugoslavs realized + that China’s attitude toward them was a function of the Chinese attitude + toward the Soviet Union. Yugoslavia wants good relations with China, not + to become their advocate with the Soviets, but rather because of the + positive, independent role in world affairs.

+

In his discussions in the Soviet Union, President Tito did not encounter serious + difficulties. The two parties preserved their positions unchanged, and + the well-known differences continue to exist. The Soviet Union dislikes + both Yugoslavia’s non-alignment and its internal system, but it + understands that those will not change, and it is prepared to develop + its relations with Belgrade. Yugoslavia desires similar development; its + location, both geographic and strategic, requires special efforts at + good relations with the Soviet Union, despite differences with it. That + is necessary for peace in Europe. Yugoslavia will maintain its own ideas about non-alignment + and internal structure. Kardelj felt the Soviets now understood that, + and thus relations had improved. Within this general framework, the + Soviets seemed preoccupied with their relations with the US—with detente + and disarmament.

+

The President thought that perhaps because of Tito’s discussions in Moscow, the + Soviets had been more cooperative in recent weeks in SALT and other discussions, and he asked + Kardelj to tell President Tito + that relations had improved. US-Soviet discussions had been freer and + more productive. There had been progress in SALT and on CTB; no final agreements had been concluded, + but the US was encouraged by progress. The US had talked with the + Soviets about building a constructive attitude at Belgrade. The + President hoped that the terms of the Final Act and compliance with it + would be discussed openly and freely, but without aggravating + difference. We will be forceful but not in a way which will disturb + detente. The Belgrade conference is important to us, and we appreciate + the good influence of President Tito in bringing us together for common purposes.

+

The President stressed that the unity and strength of Yugoslavia, as well + as its non-alignment, are very important to world peace; they are + important to us as well. He said he was eager to have constant exchanges + of views with the Yugoslavs, and he hoped that Kardelj would not + hesitate to contact him when he could aid relations.

+

The President said that the US wanted to move toward peace, to diminish + armaments levels in the world and the threat posed by nuclear weapons, + to extinguish the flames of war. Yugoslav advice and cooperation would + be important.

+

Kardelj said he was happy to hear the President’s views because he also + felt that the big and small nations should participate equally in + solving major global problems. Yugoslavia supports detente and + recognizes that US-Soviet relations are decisive for world peace. But + for efforts to succeed, other nations, including the non-aligned, must + participate. Yugoslavia wants to contribute to developing less + confrontation and more cooperation in the world.

+

In that context, Kardelj welcomed the President’s statement that the US + not only sought arms limitation, but wanted to reduce arms. He + reiterated that all countries should participate; at the same time, the + balance of power is important to global strategy, and especially to + Yugoslav independence. Still the effort should be made to move to lower + levels of arms. Kardelj was unsure whether Yugoslavia’s influence on the + Soviets, or President Tito’s + own, had been important. But President did what he could to make steps + toward US-Soviet understanding, an understanding valid for disarmament + and for other fields. Perhaps the Soviets did react to President + Tito’s comments in their + discussions with the President.

+ +

Kardelj hoped there would be more Soviet-American efforts but stressed + that in discussing problems, the US and the Soviet Union should talk + with the non-aligned nations. All nations should take part if they have + an interest—for instance, in southern Africa. There is distrust, and it + is not easy for parties to accept cooperative efforts. Yet those efforts + are still positive; the more that non-aligned and other nations take + part, the more chance there is of reaching solutions. In particular, the + superpowers ought to act to increase the strength of non-aligned + nations. There are always tensions and the possibility of local wars. If + the major blocs appear to be behind those tensions, then arms pour in, + aggravating local tensions. Thus, the non-aligned nations should + participate in the attempt to preserve peace. Kardelj indicated that + President Tito wanted to know + the President’s view on non-aligned nations and their role.

+

US Global Policies

+

The President indicated that he had to leave soon but wanted to make + several points before he did. He first asked Kardelj for his assessment + of the Middle East, the controversy between Ethiopia and Somalia, and + other areas of tension. He said that Yugoslav views were important, and + he wanted to hear them, particularly on the Middle East.

+

The President recognized that some policies of the United States would + create problems for the Yugoslavs. He hoped that Kardelj would be able + to resolve those difficulties in his conversations at the State + Department. It is hard to change the policies, but he wanted to diminish + the problems caused for the Yugoslavs by them.

+

He expressed the hope that US investments in Yugoslavia would grow. We + would like to build plants and other facilities in Yugoslavia. However, + there is a problem with US policy on investment guarantees. He and + Congress prefer that those guarantees go to the poorest nations. + Yugoslavia had done so well that it was difficult to justify extending + guarantees to it. The US would do the best it could, but if guarantees + could not be given, the President wanted the Yugoslavs to understand + that there was no anti-Yugoslav motivation.

+

With regard to arms transfers, the President said that the US would like + to supply some of Yugoslavia’s needs; the Secretaries of State and + Defense would be prepared to discuss that subject further. The United + States is attempting to work with arms suppliers to reduce overall + transfers. One means of doing so is to induce consumers to reduce their + purchases. But the US is prepared to sell some weaponry to Yugoslavia, + and we will talk further with the Yugoslavs. However, those discussions + are within the context of a general promise—applying to all countries—to + the American people to cut overall transfers each year. We will work + with the Yugoslavs.

+ +

With regard to atomic power, the President stressed that the US is + committed to nuclear energy but also to prohibiting transfers that could + be used in nuclear explosions. There is no doubt that Yugoslavia is + trustworthy and shares the same goals as the United States. Yet as the + US develops laws, it may find that the rules governing sales of nuclear + equipment are not as flexible as some might like. The President + indicated that we would try to meet Yugoslav needs but that there might + be difficulties from time to time. Again, the President hoped that + problems could be discussed frankly and that any constraint would not be + interpreted as a blow to our friendship for Yugoslavia. We will be as + flexible as we can within the law, and the President suggested that + Kardelj discuss these issues further with US Cabinet officers.

+

Middle East

+

The President asked for Kardelj’s assessment of the Middle East, saying + that he wanted Kardelj brought up to date and was interested in his + views.

+

Kardelj said he had read the US statement issued that day and thought it + was a step toward peace.In statements + issued following Carter’s meeting with Syrian Foreign Minister Abd + al Halim Khaddam, and with Jordanian President of the Royal Court + Abddul Hamid Sharaf and Jordanian Foreign Minister Hassan Ibrahim, + the White House stressed that it had “agreed on the importance of + working to reconvene the Geneva conference by the end of the year.” + (Public Papers: Carter, 1977, Book II, + pp. 1677–1678) In the Yugoslavs view, the Palestinians are + the central issue. From the start their status has been a major cause of + war. At present the Palestinians seem radical to Israel, but it is hard + to keep up with their position. Yugoslavia has close contacts with the + Palestinians and thinks they are ready to change. However, it is + difficult for them to move without first having a guarantee of some + rights. QaddumiFarouk Kaddoumi also known + as Abu al-Lutf, Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) + leader. was recently in Yugoslavia and, knowing that Kardelj + was coming to the US, asked what the US meant by “homeland.”

+

Kardelj thought that the Palestinians were ready for peace; the + Palestinian issue is a hard one, but the Palestinians seem ready to + recognize Israel and the Israeli borders at the end of the first war. It + is hard to see how relations between Israel and the Palestinians could + be regulated, but if there were a long-term solution, then it should be + possible to settle relations. The Palestinians would have access to the + Mediterranean through Israel. Kardelj stressed that it would be + important to have an independent Palestine; any other arrangement would + be a hotbed in the Middle East, something that is up to the US to make + Israel understand. Kardelj thought that with any Israeli concession the + Palestinian position would soften.

+ +

Finally, Kardelj noted that all Arab states have recognized the PLO as + the representative of the Palestinian people. In his press conference, + the President had mentioned the possibility of a flexible solution.In a press conference on September 29, Carter + stressed that if the PLO were to accept UN Resolution 242 and the right of Israel to exist, the + United States would begin negotiations with the PLO on the + Palestinian question. (Public Papers: Carter, + 1977, Book II, pp. 1687–1688) Kardelj thought that + might work but believed it important that the PLO be represented.

+

The President said that the US was willing to talk with the PLO, even + with Arafat, but that first the + PLO had to agree—as had all other states of the region—to negotiate on + the basis of UN resolutions 242 and 338. + As long as the PLO refuses to do that it is impossible for the US to + talk directly with it. The President said he knew the PLO trusted the + Yugoslavs and suggested that the Yugoslavs might use their good offices + to get the PLO to make a declaration that it agreed with the principles + of those UN resolutions. If the PLO + wanted to add language indicating that something more than a refugee + problem was involved—indicating, perhaps, the need for a homeland—that + would be okay with the United States. But so far the PLO has rejected + even that course. The US had signed, and the President indicated he had + confirmed, an agreement with Israel that PLO acceptance of 242 was a + prerequisite for US dealings with that organization. The President said + he would appreciate any Yugoslav help. He looked forward to reports of + Kardelj’s talks with Cabinet officers.

+

The President presented Kardelj a book of satellite photographs, + indicating that he thought one was of the Yugoslav coast. He said the + photos were available to Yugoslavia any time they would be useful. + Kardelj presented the President with a gift from President Tito for the President’s birthday. The + President expressed his thanks to Kardelj and to President Tito. Kardelj said that any time the + President could come to Yugoslavia, it would be a pleasure to welcome + him.

+

[At 11:25 a.m., the President and the Vice President left; other + participants remained and the meeting continued.No memorandum of conversation for the remainder of + the meeting was found.]

+
+ +
+ 245. Memorandum of ConversationSource: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, + Staff Material, Europe, USSR, and + East/West, Larrabee Subject + File, Box 68, Yugoslavia: Military: 11/77–12/78. Secret. Drafted by + Commander Eric A. McVadon on November 3; approved by David E. McGiffert on November 16. + The meeting took place at the Federal Secretariat of National + Defense. + + + Belgrade, October 13–14, 1977 + + + SUBJECT + Secretary Brown’s Meetings + in Limited Sessions with Yugoslav Federal Secretary of National + Defense Ljubicic + + + PARTICIPANTS + + + Yugoslavia + Federal Secretary of National Defense, General of the Army + Ljubicic + Chief of the General Staff, Colonel General Potocar + Assistant Chief of the General Staff for Operations, + Colonel General Radakovic + Lieutenant Colonel General Stojicic + Colonel Grkovic + + + + + US + The Secretary + US Ambassador to Yugoslavia Eagleburger + ASD/ISA, Mr. McGiffert + Army Attache, Embassy Belgrade, Colonel Bartos + (notetaker) + + + +

FIRST LIMITED MEETING

+

This initial private meeting at 0940 on 13 October immediately preceded + the first plenary session.A memorandum of + conversation of the first plenary session, which consisted of a + general presentation of U.S. policy + on arms transfers to Yugoslavia, is ibid. Following his meeting with + Ljubicic, Brown met with Yugoslav Vice + President of the Presidency Stefan Doronjoski. (Ibid.) The + purpose of this meeting, limited to the principals and a few of their + assistants, was to permit a free discussion of broad strategic issues + and to provide General Ljubicic + with an opportunity, if he chose, to be very candid with the + Secretary.

+

General Ljubicic opened the + meeting by stressing the significance the Yugoslav Government attaches + to the visit of such an important individual as Secretary Brown to Yugoslavia; that he has + expectations of the relationship between the two countries expanding. + However, he pointed out that cooperation of one power does not exclude + cooperation with another power + and that such cooperation should not be directed against another power. + He then continued into the standard explanation of the Yugoslav + nonalignment policy. Secretary Brown replied that his + influence in the USG should not be + overestimated. Brown pointed out + that the US military relationship was part of a general relationship + which had as its objective the support of Yugoslav independence. + Brown hoped that his presence + in Belgrade would be the beginning of an increased military + relationship. Brown invited + Ljubicic to the US for a + reciprocal visit. Ljubicic + quickly accepted the invitation.

+

After stating that the time for the Ljubicic visit would be worked out, Brown pointed out that US-Yugoslav military arms negotiations + have had difficulties in the past primarily because of trying to + determine what procedures should be followed. Brown said that sometimes the US has + had a long list of Yugoslav requests to which it has not responded + promptly. However, when the US responded positively, the US has not + heard from the Yugoslavs. Brown + said that the US should respond “Yes” or “No” to the Yugoslav requests + promptly, but when the US responds “Yes” to the Yugoslav requests, the + Yugoslavs should buy. Brown + emphasized the point by stating, “If you don’t want to buy, don’t ask us + to sell. In return, the US will not take too much time coming up with an + answer.”

+

Brown then turned to the subject of Yugoslav tank + transfers to Ethiopia. He said that he was referring to this subject to + put it behind both countries; that by law the Congress had to be + notified; that every effort was made not to embarrass the Yugoslav + Government in public; that the issue is closed. Ljubicic responded + that the tank issue was unpleasant; that it was a Yugoslav mistake in + administration; that he was glad that the tank difficulty had been + overcome; that the tank issue should not affect other arms negotiations; + that it was a one-time failure in thirty years. Ljubicic, however, defended the + Yugoslav action as follows: He said that the tanks were ready for scrap; + that the US officials were advised of this, but the GOY received no answer nor did the USG express any interest. He repeated that + the Yugoslavs made a mistake on the issue and that he was not trying to + justify the mistake. He pointed out, however, that when the Yugoslavs + provided tanks to Ethiopia, Soviet military instructors were not in + Ethiopia but only in Somalia; that at that time the Ethiopians were more + involved with nonaligned countries and less with the Soviet Union. Now + there are Russian tanks and Russian military instructors in Ethiopia; + the country is more under Russian control. Brown + interjected that the problem was solved.

+ +

At this point Ljubicic said that arms negotiations procedures + could be worked out and asked Brown about SALT II. + He wanted to know where the US is in SALT and where it expects to go. Brown replied that in SALT + II the US was interested in reduction of the strategic forces on each + side, in reducing the rate of new weapon deployment and development in + equality and stability to preclude either side from being tempted to + launch an attack, in precluding either side from developing systems + aimed at the vulnerabilities of the other side. Brown said that this last point was + probably the most difficult. Also, he pointed out that the problem of + that which each side defines as a strategic system and counts in the + strategic aggregate continues to complicate the negotiations. Brown said that the US is concerned + over the rapid build-up of Soviet ICBM’s with MIRV’s. As a result of this Soviet build-up, the US + sees US ICBM’s becoming vulnerable as + Soviet ICBM numbers and accuracy + increase. Brown said that the US + has strategic bombers that can takeoff before the Soviet missiles land, + and the US also has SLBM’s which are not vulnerable. Despite this he + still considered the Soviet ICBM + build-up as destabilizing. Brown + said that he wonders as he views the building of new Soviet ICBM’s and the enlargement of air defense + and civil defense systems whether the Soviets really plan to survive a + thermonuclear war. He said he viewed such an idea as unrealistic, but if + the Soviets believe they can, then it is a very dangerous situation. + Brown said that from the US side, the main impediment to an agreement + stems from the inability to establish agreeable limits on the Soviet + buildup of ICBM number and capability + and the inclusion of Soviet Backfire bombers which the US believes to be + strategic because they can reach the US. The Soviet side contends the + Backfire is not strategic and does not want to include it in the + strategic aggregate. From the Soviet viewpoint, US cruise missiles + present a serious impediment to an agreement.

+

Brown then + proceeded to outline the cruise missile issue. He said that there were + two general kinds of cruise missiles: those launched from an aircraft + and those which are land-based or sea-based. He said that the + air-launched cruise missile was needed to penetrate Soviet air defense. + He said that, if air defenses are formidable, air-launched cruise + missiles are needed to penetrate them, since it is difficult for a + bomber to do so. Turning to the sea-based or land-based cruise missile, + Brown said that these systems + present a political-military problem because they might be based in or + near Europe. The issue of the sea-based and land-based cruise missiles + is further complicated by the fact that the Soviets have deployed SS–20 + MRBM’s with MIRV’s opposite NATO + countries. The Soviet Union does not consider this system strategic because it does not have enough + range to reach the US and, therefore, believes it should not be limited + in SALT; Brown then pointed out the inconsistency of Soviet + arguments when attempting to limit US land-based and sea-based cruise + missiles and at the same time deploying the SS–20 MRBM’s.

+

Brown + indicated that the US and the Soviets were close to a SALT II agreement; however, in this + agreement, the resolution of some issues would be postponed. Brown said at Vladivostok a strategic + aggregate of 2400 was agreed upon, but now both sides have reduced their + number and are negotiating at between 2160–2250. Brown emphasized that this is not a + concession because the agreed number would be equal for both sides.

+

Brown + mentioned other proposals under negotiation: (1) 1200–1250 ICBM/SCBM + MIRV’s with a sub-limit of 800–850 land-based ICBM’s with MIRV’s. (2) The agreement would extend until + 1985. (3) There would be a limit on the deployment of sea-based and + land-based cruise missiles beyond 600 kms. All tests beyond 600 kms + would be air-launched. (4) The limit on air-launched cruise missiles + would be 2500 kms, but this would be for a three-year period. (5) The + limits on the mobile missiles would apply to deploying and testing the + missile but not to testing the launchers. (6) Some sort of assurance of + limitation on Backfire bombers, possibly involving production rate, + refueling and training. Ljubicic asked a question to clarify the 2500 + kms limit. Brown said that it would apply for + three years to air-launched cruise missiles. Ljubicic was satisfied with + the explanation. Brown, continuing to comment on + SALT, said that the bombers and + cruise missiles are less destabilizing than ICBM’s as it takes longer for them to get on target; i.e., + about eight hours. Ljubicic commented that SALT II agreement appears to protect the + interests of the Soviet Union and the US; for example, a 600 kms cruise + missile from [less than 1 line not declassified] + would be militarily significant to Yugoslavia, so from the Yugoslav + standpoint there would be no difference in the 2500 or 600 kms limits. + Brown said that the 600 kms and the 2500 kms + cruise missile limits make a difference to the Soviet Union.

+

Ljubicic + then asked if there was an attempt to reduce the stock of [less than 1 line not declassified]. Brown replied that this issue is not included in + SALT and explained the omission of + forward-based systems as nonstrategic systems in SALT. Brown cited Soviet SS–4, SS–5, and SS–20 missile systems + and US aircraft that are forward-based as excluded in all negotiations. + He said that such systems could be included in a separate forum or a + SALT III agreement. Ljubicic + told Brown that he did not ask + about systems that threaten Russia, but that he is talking about stocks + of nuclear weapons that threaten Yugoslavia. He said that he would like + to see detente enlarged to all countries, to make the world more secure. + Brown said that he understood.

+ +

Ljubicic + then asked Brown if he thought + Yugoslavia could produce a 300 kms cruise missile. Brown said it could be produced in the + future easily. Ljubicic (jokingly ?) asked Brown if he would provide assistance to + produce such a weapon. Brown said “No.” Then Brown said that it is still not clear + whether a cruise missile is a good means to deliver a nuclear weapon. + Ljubicic said that he was against a monopoly of any + kind. Brown retorted that proliferation is worse.

+

Ljubicic + asked what Brown could tell him + about the neutron bomb. He said that SALT as it concerns Yugoslavia is a ratio or balance + between big powers; that it is concerned with strategic weapons systems + and does not contribute to general disarmament in the conventional + sphere; that new conventional armament is taking place: new Soviet + bombers, tanks, satellite bombs, meteorological warfare. It was in this + context that Ljubicic asked about neutron bombs. Brown replied + that some of the things that Ljubicic mentioned are ideas and some are more than + ideas. Brown said he thought that + nuclear weapons should be limited at as low a level as possible but that + this level must be balanced. He added that the US can compete in all + areas; that the Soviets have concluded that they can compete better in + military areas and the US, therefore, must be prepared to respond to + this Soviet emphasis by taking appropriate action. Ljubicic said that, + when Tito talked to Brezhnev, Tito concluded that Brezhnev was genuinely interested in detente. Brown then went + through an explanation of the effects of neutron bombs. He talked about + how the blast effect is reduced and how the radiation is increased, + making a comparison with an ordinary nuclear weapon. He pointed out that + the bombs were designed mainly for use against large tank columns; that + the use of such bombs would force tank columns to disperse, thus + reducing the effectiveness of large tank formations. Brown said that such weapons would not + reduce the threshold of nuclear war and would not be used unless there + was an invasion. He emphasized US political control and the impact of + the weapon on the prevention of war. Ljubicic agreed that he saw + the military justification for such a weapon, but added that if war + started such a weapon could be used on small countries. He recalled a + conversation of the subject of neutron bombs with the Soviet Minister of + Defense, Ustinov, who said that now that the Americans were developing + such a weapon system, Ustinov would have to assure development of such a + weapon for the Soviet Union. Brown said that use of tactical + nuclear weapons is a political question. Each country has to decide for + itself whether such weapons increase or decrease the chances of nuclear + warfare.

+

Brown said + that because of the sensitivity of the Yugoslav-US relations, the + demands of the Western press, and presence of many reporters in the city covering CSCE he planned to provide background + information to the reporters at a press conference in order to make sure + that the inevitable news stories were accurate. Ljubicic agreed. + After an exchange of pleasantries, the meeting broke up.

+

SECOND LIMITED MEETING

+

The second private meeting between SecDef and General Ljubicic took place at 0840, 14 October in the Defense + Secretariat.The second plenary session, + which followed the unscheduled + private meeting on October 14, consisted of a Yugoslav presentation + of military cooperation with the United States and Yugoslav + expectations. (Ibid.)

+

SecDef began + by explaining that he requested the meeting after Mr. + Bernardic expressed to Ambassador Eagleburger the concern of the Yugoslavs over the + results of the first plenary session. SecDef did not want such issues to remain unanswered, nor + that the US side be misunderstood. He stressed that he viewed his visit + as the beginning of a process and did not plan to reach final agreements + during the visit. He repeated his exposition of the previous day + concerning the recent decision by President Carter to increase military sales to Yugoslavia of + defensive weapons but not to transfer sensitive technology. This + decision was taken concurrently with the President’s decision to reduce + arms sales worldwide, and the significance of these two decisions should + not be overlooked. He explained that the purpose of this visit was to + describe the new Presidential decision and to begin the process of + putting it into effect. It will be a lengthy process requiring more + meetings, probably at a lower level. The Secretary said that he hoped to see General Ljubicic in the United States when such + a trip would be convenient.

+

Brown said + that further staff meetings will be necessary and the specifics of + individual weapons will result from such meetings. That will take time. + Concerning the new procedures, there must be full understanding on both + sides in order to overcome past problems. We must understand Yugoslav + needs for equipment in order for US to meet the needs. The Secretary + explained that the Yugoslav Embassy in Washington will still play an + important role. Many past problems resulted from absence of a single US + point of interest. The various agencies involved—American contractors, + American military services, our Defense Security Assistance Agency, the + Embassy in Belgrade—do not always know what the others are doing. He + suggested that we should initiate the new process by sending an expert + from Washington who is thoroughly familiar with our procedures to advise + our Embassy and Yugoslav officials and, if the Yugoslavs wished, the + Yugoslav defense attache in + Washington, Col Vuckovic, could + accompany the experts to help get the new process underway.

+

The Secretary said that when General + CemalovicColonel General Enver + Cemalovic was commander of the Yugoslav Air Force and Air Defense + Forces. meets with General FishLieutenant General + Howard M. Fish was + Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security + Affairs) for Security Assistance and Director of the Defense + Security Assistance Agency until March 1978. in Washington on + 17 October, we will discuss various candidate systems in which General + Cemalovic expressed interest—air defense systems, air-ground anti-tank + weapons, and other Air Force systems. General + Ljubicic interjected + that the aircraft engine would also probably be discussed, to which Secretary Brown agreed.

+

The Secretary said that certain weapons are + consistent with Yugoslav interests and with our new arms transfer policy + concerning sensitive technology. He pointed out examples, specifically + Harpoon, in which the US said “No” not only to Yugoslavia but also to + others who were either friendly but not Allies, or were Allies, and + cited Kuwait, Bahrain, United Arab Emirates, the Philippines, and the + Republic of China. He said that we want to be clear that we are not + singling out Yugoslavia for negative treatment.

+

Secretary Brown said that the definition of sensitive + technology depends upon time. In some cases our policy prevents transfer + now. In those cases, SecDef proposed + that we would first discuss Yugoslav needs and when those needs must be + filled, and then discuss alternatives, since some alternatives may not + be sensitive enough to prevent their future release.

+

The Secretary assessed overall US-Yugoslav + relations as improving in economic, political, cultural, and in military + areas since the Mondale visit. + He described the purpose of his visit as beginning and advancing the + consultation process in order to advance military relations as progress + is made in other areas. He completed his statement by expressing the + hope that he has cleared up any misunderstandings, but noting that the + US is still unable to transfer all systems desired by the Yugoslavs. General Ljubicic thanked SecDef for his information. He recognized the impossibility + of much progress in an initial meeting. He stated that if the US offered + many things now, Yugoslavia probably could not absorb them all. However, + he considered that the list could contain more equipment that it did. + General Ljubicic stated that the + Yugoslavs understand US regulations and our organization and will try to + adapt to us. He continued that one responsible for the Defense of his + country must consider why it is impossible to acquire necessary + equipment. Certain time is required, and patience will be required. He + acknowledged that more was + expected than was offered, but that this fact in no way decreases the + significance of Secretary Brown’s + visit. It opened the door and more will come later. The Secretary agreed and responded that we should move forward + now and try to resolve problems which exist.

+

General Ljubicic stated that regarding procedures, the + American expert can come. He added that Yugoslavia does not want to + create problems with the administration and Congress, and that there are + people who oppose cooperation with Yugoslavia. SecDef concluded the meeting + with the observation that the modest expansion of military relations and + arms transfers will be generally popular and approved by the American + people and Congress.

+
+ +
+ 246. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense Brown to President CarterSource: + Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Agency File, + Box 4, Defense Department: 10–11/77. Secret. Carter wrote at the top + of the first page: “Good report J.” + + + Washington, October + 20, 1977 + + + SUBJECT + Report on Trip to Yugoslavia and Italy + +

Last week I went to Yugoslavia to begin the process of modestly + increasing our military relationship with the GOY, to Bari in southern Italy to attend the NATO Nuclear Planning Group meeting, to + Rome to meet with senior Italian officials, and to the Sixth Fleet at + sea in the Mediterranean. I believe we accomplished a number of positive + objectives, and also avoided negative effects. Ambassadors Gardner and + Eagleburger, as well as our + senior military commanders in NATO, + contributed substantially to that result.

+

Yugoslavia. I was warmly treated throughout the + visit: the Yugoslavs were clearly interested in promoting a better + relationship. I met principally with Defense Minister Ljubicic and a few colleagues, but also + paid calls on two other members of the ruling hierarchy (Doronjski and + Djuranovic). Tito was in + Paris.

+

Each side’s litany provided the framework for the discussion. On our + side, this was an expression of support for the independence, territorial integrity, and + non-alignment of Yugoslavia. On their side, it was their desire for + improved relations without prejudice to their cherished non-alignment + and national unity.

+

They implied they were more afraid of an attack by BulgariaCarter underlined “Bulgaria.” than by the + Soviet Union. But if they were overmatched, they were (they said) + prepared to retreat to the mountains, as in World War II, and fight on + as guerrillas. On the political side, they would not admit that their + internal ethnic differences created political instability, but they were + at least willing to recognize the potential for such trouble. They noted + that Albania and Bulgaria both claimed Yugoslav territory.

+

They asked about SALT, including cruise + missiles, and I gave quite a detailed explanation. Ljubicic remarked that, while a SALT agreement might benefically limit + systems by which the US and Russia threaten each other, it would not + necessarily make the smaller countries more secure. He asked about + reduction of [less than 1 line not declassified]. + I responded that that issue was not included in SALT although eventually forward-based + and other non-strategic systems would probably be dealt with in SALT or some other forum. Ljubicic asked about the neutron bomb + and I explained its military purpose.

+

As to an enhanced military supply relationship, I outlined our desire to + be forthcoming within certain limits (e.g. defensive weapons only, no + sensitive technology) and stressed the need for better procedures to + avoid the misunderstandings of the past. I gave a few illustrations of + weapons which we would be willing to provide and which we would not be + willing to provide. By pointing out that you had endorsed enlarging the + US-GOY relationship while at the + same time ordering a world-wide reduction in our arms transfers, I noted + our special interest in them.

+

While they welcomed the US attitude in general, the Yugoslavs expressed + disappointment as to specifics. I believe this concern was somewhat + alleviated by my emphasizing that our visit was designed to start a + process rather than to result in definitive decisions. They indicated + that their principal interests lay in high technology anti-armor, + anti-air and anti-landing (helicopter and airborne) weapons. While we + can modestly expand our relationship, the process will not be easy + because Yugoslavia’s desires will frequently involve systems too + sensitive for release. Most of their arms purchases (they say they make + 75 percent themselves) are from the USSR. They buy about 550 million a year from the U.K.; our own sales are no more than a + couple of million a year.Ermarth wrote in the margin next to + this paragraph: “10/31 DOD informed + NSC that 550 should have read 50.”

+ +

I invited Ljubicic to visit the US + sometime next year and he quickly accepted. We will use that visit as a + target against which to manage plans for improving the military + relationship. The next steps will be a visit to the US (now underway) by + the Chief of the Yugoslav Air Force and a visit to Belgrade by US + experts to explain FMS procedures.

+

[Omitted here is Brown’s report + on the NATO Nuclear Planning Group and + his conversations in Rome.]

+
+ +
+ 247. Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the Department of + State (Tarnoff) to the + President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)Source: Carter Library, National + Security Affairs, Brzezinski + Material, VIP Visit File, Box 15, Yugoslavia: President Tito, 3/6–9/78: Cables and Memos. + Confidential. The memorandum was requested during an interagency + meeting at the Department of State on February 7 held to discuss the + status of preparations for the Tito visit. (Telegram 36703 to Belgrade, February + 11; National Archives, RG 59, + Central Foreign Policy File, D780063–0954) + + + Washington, February + 10, 1978 + + + SUBJECT + Tito Visit: Export License + for Nuclear Fuel for Krsko + +

As before the Vice President’s visit to Belgrade last May, the most + serious issue in our relations on the eve of the Tito visit is the dispute over nuclear + exports to Yugoslavia. At that time a compromise was worked out + permitting the Nuclear Regulatory Commission to license the export of + the Krsko nuclear reactor on the basis of, inter alia, Yugoslav + agreement to negotiate with us on the conditions governing use of fuel + in Krsko. The current issue involves the precise nature of U.S. approval rights over retransfer and + reprocessing.

+

Yugoslavia, which is a party to the NPT, a cooperating member of the + IAEA, and a participant in INFCE, has consistently indicated its + willingness to accept universally applicable safeguards which result + from new international agreements. The Yugoslavs, however, have resisted + what they regard as U.S. attempts to + impose additional, unilateral and discriminatory conditions on existing + agreements. They have also said they are unwilling to “tie their hands” + with regard to a future reprocessing option. (We are aware of no current + Yugoslav plans to recycle or reprocess.) Furthermore, the Yugoslavs have + been extremely sensitive to any + proposed conditions which do not already apply to other recipients of + U.S. fuel. They have in particular + focused on U.S. willingness to ship fuel + to India—a non-NPT party with a “bad record”—and argue that Yugoslavia + should in no case be asked to provide more, in the way of assurances, + than did India.

+

Although the existing agreements on Krsko give the U.S. most of the assurances required + immediately by our pending nuclear legislation, they fail to provide us + with prior approval rights over reprocessing of U.S. fuel and they cover retransfer of only the first fuel + core. We have been seeking additional Yugoslav assurances which not only + satisfy these immediate criteria but which also would be consistent with + the legislative requirements for new agreements, i.e., U.S. approval rights over disposition of + any fuel used in a U.S.-supplied reactor. We have explained to the Yugoslav + Government that since we expect to continue to cooperate with Yugoslavia + in nuclear energy programs, we would prefer to resolve the entire issue + now rather than to work out a “quick fix” on U.S. fuel only and then have to renegotiate that agreement + within the 18 month time limit of the legislation. Furthermore, an + agreement on U.S. fuel only would be + more difficult to sell to the NRC. Should the Yugoslavs resist our + proposed long-term solution, however, it may be necessary to work out a + compromise combining approval rights on U.S. fuel with a provision for exclusive use of U.S. fuel in the Krsko reactor.

+

Following discussions in Washington in late December, we will resume + negotiations in Belgrade February 16–18 in the hope of resolving this + issue before Tito’s arrivalDuring a meeting in Belgrade February 17–18, + the U.S. negotiating team met with + the Yugoslav team and reached a tentative understanding on dealing + with the nuclear fuel issue for the Krsko reactor. (Telegram 1407 + from Belgrade, February 21; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + D780079–0755) A final agreement consisted of an exchange of letters + among the Department of State, the Yugoslav Foreign Ministry, and + IAEA covering the disposition of spent fuel from the Krsko plant. + (Telegram 49293 to Belgrade, February 25; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + D780087–0054). However, the Yugoslavs—who have already + indicated that Tito will + personally make the final decision on what additional assurances can be + given—may decide to raise this problem in the Presidential talks in + March.

+ + Peter + TarnoffDavid Anderson + signed for Tarnoff above + this typed signature. + + +
+ +
+ 248. Memorandum From Robert + Hunter of the National Security Council Staff to the + President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)Source: Carter Library, National + Security Affairs, Brzezinski + Material, Brzezinski Office + File, Country Chron File, Box 57, Yugoslavia: 1–3/78. Confidential. + Sent for action. + + + Washington, February + 15, 1978 + + + SUBJECT + Tito Visit: Economic + Cooperation + +

Larry Eagleburger proposed the + setting up of a government-to-government economic commission with + Yugoslavia,Noting the successful + development of relations between the United States and Yugoslavia + during the first year of the Carter administration, Eagleburger proposed the creation + of a joint economic/trade commission chaired at the Assistant + Secretary level to better coordinate U.S. policy in the economic field. (Telegram 8574 from + Belgrade, December 5, 1977; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + D770450–0304) to replace the current non-governmental one, as + part of Tito’s visit. We asked + State, Commerce, and Treasury for a recommendation. (See Tab II.)Attached but not printed is a December 28, + 1977, memorandum in which Brzezinski requested the opinion of the Department + of State on the idea of establishing a Joint Economic Council with + Yugoslavia. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Brzezinski Office File, Country + Chron File, Box 57, Yugoslavia: 1–3/78) Hunter initially proposed setting up both a Joint + Economic Council and a Joint Defense Council, but both Brzezinski and Aaron opposed the idea of a Defense + Council. (Ibid.)

+

They have recommended that there be two working groups, instead—one here + and one in Belgrade—which could meet alternatively every few + months.Tarnoff forwarded the Department’s concurrence in a + memorandum to Brzezinski on + January 16. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Brzezinski Office File, Country + Chron File, Box 57, Yugoslavia: 1–3/78) Commerce Assistant + Secretary Weil would co-chair the one here; and Eagleburger there. This course was + chosen because:

+

—the nature of the Yugoslav economy does not require the same kind of + apparatus as for Poland, Romania, or the Soviet Union;

+

—the Yugoslavs would probably prefer having an arrangement different from + that of other states; and

+

—once meetings start at a high level, they cannot then be downgraded.

+

We sought a further judgment on this point, especially in view of Larry’s + initial recommendation. State says that he now concurs, and thus so do + I.

+ +

RECOMMENDATION:

+

That you approve the memorandum for Secretary Vance at Tab I.Attached but not printed is a February 17 + memorandum in which Brzezinski informed Vance that “your recommendation for two U.S.-Yugoslav Economic/Commercial + Working Groups” was approved and noted that “while this approach may + be discussed and agreed with the Yugoslavs now, public announcement + should be reserved for President Tito’s visit to Washington.”

+ +
+ +
+ 249. Telegram From the Embassy in Yugoslavia to the Department of + StateSource: National + Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign + Policy File, D780086–0612. Secret; Immediate. + + + + + + Belgrade, February 24, 1978, 1600Z + +

1570. Subject: Tito Visit—The + Bilateral Relationship.

+

Overview:

+

1. Tito’s visit to the U.S. culminates more than a year of + substantial improvement in most areas of our bilateral relationship. The + Yugoslavs were quick to perceive in the foreign policy of the Carter + administration a more positive approach than they felt had existed in + previous years toward the development of good bilateral relations and + toward a number of international issues important to them, such as the + nonaligned movement, North-South dialogue, and problem areas in the + Middle East and Africa. This perception, reinforced by concrete steps + demonstrating the importance both sides attached to a strengthened + relationship and expanded cooperation—notably the Mondale, Kardelj and Brown visits and the Presidential + correspondence—generated a momentum that has led to what is widely + regarded by Yugoslavs as the best state of U.S.-Yugoslav relations since World War II. Against this + positive background, however, two major issues—ExImBank operating + procedures and Krsko fuel supply—remain unresolved on the eve of the + Tito visit, while a third + important issue—military cooperation and sales—awaits tangible + implementation.

+

Political:

+

2. The tone of political relations with Yugoslavia has improved + profoundly in the past year. Issues now regarded by the Yugoslavs as minor irritants would have been + treated in a more serious light before this period. The Yugoslavs + recognize that in pursuing a political dialogue at all levels the U.S. has sought an enhanced, mature, + cooperative relationship without papering over matters on which we do + not agree. The Yugoslavs have shown a willingness to respond to this + approach. The personal correspondence between Presidents Carter and Tito on key international issues has been an important + element in creating an atmosphere of confidence and cooperation at the + senior levels of government. The Yugoslavs must also be aware that + Tito’s visit to Washington + is, significantly, the first by a Communist country leader during the + Carter administration.

+

3. The response on the party level has been longer in coming. However, + the LCY’s acceptance of a joint invitation from the Democratic and + Republican National Committees to send a delegation to the U.S. in the fall promises the possibility + of an even larger extension of the political dialogue.

+

4. Our recent actions in the U.S. with + regard to the apprehension and legal prosecution of emigre terrorists + have temporarily mitigated a major and traditional problem in our + relations.

+

5. Nevertheless, our political relations still are fragile and any of a + host of unforeseen developments could adversely affect their positive + movement—grievous decisions emanating from the Belgrade Nonaligned + Meeting this year, an upsurge of anti-Yugoslav emigre activity in the + U.S. (especially during the + Tito visit), fallout from + the CSCE Conference, the misreading of + an incident similar to the “overflights” occurrence. An important + objective of the political dialogue is to help insure that we are able + to weather such occurrances.

+

Economic/Commercial:

+

6. It is in the economic and commercial area—perhaps more than any + other—that we can give concrete expression to the overall general + improvement in our bilateral relations. At the same time, however, it is + also the economic area in which disappointments over unfulfilled promise + can be greatest, and in which we now face a severe bilateral problem—the + current impasse over ExImBank’s operating procedures in Yugoslavia.

+

7. The present state of the Yugoslav economy and Yugoslavia’s economic + balance between East and West provide both foreign policy and commercial + incentives for us to capitalize on the current status of our bilateral + relations. Committed [to] continuing a high rate of economic growth + domestically (GNP and industrial + production rose by 7 percent and 9.4 percent, respectively, in 1977), + Yugoslavia has had to rely on increasing imports of foreign equipment + and technology, and has had to borrow heavily abroad to pay for them. + Now, increasingly concerned by their growing economic reliance on the + Soviet Union (the USSR accounted for 16.4 percent of total + Yugoslav trade in 1977) and alarmed by their burgeoning trade deficit + with the Common Market (2.4 billion dollars in 1977), the Yugoslavs are + clearly receptive to expanded trade and economic cooperation with the + U.S.

+

8. U.S. trade with Yugoslavia—which, + according to U.S. statistics, amounted + to somewhat less than 700 million dollars and was nearly balanced in + 1977—is still in the developing stage but with a clear potential for + future growth. While Yugoslavia has been traditionally oriented to West + European suppliers and, for both political and economic reasons, has + channeled a substantial part of its trade to the East, there is + widespread interest in U.S. products and + equipment because of their reputation of quality and advanced + technology. In the past several years, U.S. companies have been increasingly active in exploiting + market opportunities both through direct sales and joint ventures with + Yugoslav partners. The U.S. is currently + second among all countries in the number of joint ventures (17) and + first in total equity participation (168 million dollars). Recently + concluded joint ventures involving Dow Chemical and General Motors have + received considerable attention and have been cited as the kind of + cooperative arrangements that contribute to Yugoslavia’s economic + development. Westinghouse is the supplier for Yugoslavia’s first nuclear + power plant at Krsko, and is bidding actively on two major hydro and + thermal power projects. General Electric and GM are presently setting up + business offices in Belgrade.

+

9. Against this background, the current impasse over ExImBank’s operating + procedures in Yugoslavia assumes major significance. The Bank has been + an important source of financing U.S. + equipment sales to Yugoslavia, and its current overall exposure here is + close to one billion dollars. For large industrial projects requiring + long-term loans, in particular, ExIm + financing has been a key ingredient. Having informed ExIm that they could no longer furnish + “superguarantees from the National Bank, the Yugoslavs are currently + considering whether they can accept as a basis for discussion ExIm’s proposals for a solution based on + joint commercial bank guarantees, foreign exchange assurances for loans + over five million dollars, and governmental guarantees in exceptional + cases. In the meantime, the Yugoslav authorities have informed their + banks and enterprises that ExIm + facilities are not currently available for financing imports from the + U.S. Having reached the point of + confrontation, the issue represents a major irritant in our bilateral + relations on the eve of the Tito + visit, and resolution of the problem will be difficult unless the + Yugoslavs are prepared to break off their intransigent—albeit + principled—position and demonstrate the same willingness to negotiate + which ExIm has shown.

+

10. The bilateral air agreement signed in December 1977 has settled our + major civil aviation difficulties with Yugoslavia, at least for the moment. Although JAT received + increased frequencies and capacity rights in the agreement, the + Yugoslavs are likely to press for additional U.S. gateways (such as Chicago or Los Angeles) in the + future.

+

11. There are no major outstanding bilateral agricultural trade problems + at this time. Although the two-way trade balance in agricultural + products still favors Yugoslavia, it narrowed appreciably last year to + about 10 million dollars, due to increasing imports of soybeans and + soybean meal. If the GOY accepts the + CCC credits for soybean purchases currently being offered, then the + agricultural trade gap should close in 1978, even though our imports of + hams are expected to increase.

+

12. The establishment of joint U.S.-Yugoslav economic working groups, which we have proposed + to the Yugoslavs as part of the Tito visit, should provide a useful inter-governmental + mechanism to address economic and commercial problems on a regular + basis.

+

Nonproliferation: Nuclear License for Krsko:

+

13. The trilateral agreement with the IAEA and GOY for the supply of nuclear equipment and material for + the Krsko nuclear plant being built here by Westinghouse does not + conform to the criteria for nuclear exports now required by the USG and contained in pending + antiproliferation legislation. In December 1976, the Department moved to + rectify this and asked the GOY to grant + the U.S. approval rights on retransfer + and reprocessing. The GOY has refused + to accept any new conditions unless internationally agreed. The + Yugoslavs claim that the U.S. request + infringes national sovereignty, could impede their economic development, + and is unfair given Yugoslavia’s record on nonproliferation. To avoid + delaying the project, an equipment export license was issued last May in + return for the GOY’s commitment to + negotiate the conditions for the fuel export. Negotiations held on + February 17–18 produced a possible solution. However, the GOY may not have time to react before the + Tito visit. If Tito raises this issue, and he + probably will, we suggest a reply along the following lines:

+

—Place Krsko in the broader context of U.S. international policies on disarmament and + nonproliferation.

+

—Note that the USG and GOY objectives in nonproliferation are + identical.

+

—Note that USG nonproliferation policies + are nondiscriminatory and that the U.S. + is not asking more from GOY than from + other nations.

+

—Praise spirit of cooperation shown by Yugoslav side during + negotiations.

+

—Hope that a mutually satisfactory resolution will be found before the + fuel should be exported, autumn 1978.

+

Scientific Cooperation:

+

14. There are clear indications that the decline of bilateral scientific + cooperation will be raised during the Tito visit. On November 24, 1977, Finance Minister Cemovic wrote to + Secretary BluementhalNot found. + asking that U.S. Federal annuitants in + Yugoslavia be paid in dollars (at current rates 12 million dollars + annually) thus freeing dinars to support scientific and cultural + cooperation. A president of the Academy of Sciences and Arts is included + on the official delegation. Indeed, the subject has rarely passed + unmentioned in high-level visits and, given the rate at which the + scientific cooperative program is winding down, and our stock of dinars + is dwindling, this is probably the last chance for saving the joint + program. We recommend replying as follows:

+

—The Cemovic request is being given serious consideration.

+

—The existence of U.S.-owned excess + dinars was a special circumstance that has come to an end.

+

—The USG is exploring possibilities for + continuing cooperation.

+

Military Cooperation:

+

15. An important U.S. objective in + Yugoslavia is to develop closer contacts with the Yugoslav armed forces + (JNA) than we have now. The JNA and the LCY are Yugoslavia’s two + strongest and most durable politically-related institutions, and the + political influence of both has increased in the last six years. JNA’s + ties to the political center have been increased by a strong LCY + organization within the JNA. In his Dec. 22, 1977 Army Day toast, + Tito called on the military + to continue its role of helping to preserve the unity of the nation, an + unnecessary reminder that the military is certain to be a determining + factor in the post-Tito era. In + fact, under less than stable post-Tito conditions, the military could become the strongest + element in determining the succession and charting the country’s future. + Tito, as Supreme Commander + of the JNA since its creation during World War II, has long been + involved intimately with this formidable all-Yugoslav institution.

+

16. In pursuit of our objective and complementary to the other facets of + our bilateral relationship, we have been attempting to enhance + military-to-military cooperation. This cooperative effort comprises + several components: (1) maintaining a regular series of ship visits to + Yugoslav ports, and seeking to have an NPW visit at a favorable time; + (2) beginning a program of ship repairs in the Yugoslav shipyard at + Tivat; (3) seeking a mutually acceptable solution to overcome the + barriers, mostly financial, which now prevent JNA officers (the future + military leaders of Yugoslavia) from receiving professional U.S. military training; (4) establishing a + military cooperation working group to examine periodically all our + activities; (5) high-level visits; and (6) military equipment sales. Of + all these, the last two are of most immediate interest to the Yugoslavs, and the last may be the + key to a successful relationship.

+

17. With the number of high-level visits last year and proposed for this + year, the pace has never been so high. In 1977 SecDef + Brown and CNO + Holloway came to Yugoslavia and + Yugoslav Air Force C/S Cemalovic visited the U.S. This year visits are being planned for USAF C/S + Jones to Yugoslavia and + Yugoslav DefMin Ljubicic and Army + C/S Potocar to the U.S. These visits + afford opportunities to instill confidence in U.S. strength and intentions and to develop personal + relationships between the leaders of the respective defense + establishments. In addition, from the Yugoslav side, the sales question + is always high on the discussion list, and thereby has become an + important element of the confidence equation.

+

18. Beginning with dependence on the Soviets from 1945 to 1948, the + GOY has turned alternately to East + and West for its military equipment and training. After the massive + U.S. grant military assistance + program of the 1950’s, the GOY chose + not to renew the assistance agreement. Once again the Soviets became + Yugoslavia’s main foreign military supply source. It still is, although + the GOY has built a domestic military + industry providing the JNA with between 65 and 85 percent of its + military needs. However, after the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in + 1968 the GOY started looking beyond the + USSR toward Western Europe and the + U.S. for other foreign sources. A + sore point with the U.S. has been the + GOY’s desire for equipment of + sensitive (and often classified) technology and the USG’s reluctance to provide this sort of + equipment to the Yugoslavs. However, USG policy decisions in the last few years, the most recent + in 1977 by President Carter, have + encouraged a modest sales program increase including the consideration + of sophisticated equipment on a case-by-case basis. Nevertheless, the + only major items on which we have been forthcoming have been those which + do not contain the latest technology. While it may take years to reduce + the Yugoslav dependence on the USSR in + many areas, this is a Yugoslav goal, and we, together with other Western + nations, should do what we can to assist. Consequently, we have + recommended that a policy decision be taken to free at least one major + item of Yugoslav interest. Up to now the totality of turndowns on + sophisticated equipment must evoke a sorry image in the Yugoslav view. + To alter this impression we must demonstrate that we are more than + willing to support a qualitative change in the relationship.

+

Consular:

+

19. A continuing source of concern in the area of Consular relations is + the absence of agreement concerning U.S. + access to detained Americans who are dual nationals. In 1972 the Embassy + attempted to negotiate an agreement, in the spirit of Article 36 of the + Vienna Convention, which would + guarantee Consular access to American citizens who are also considered + to be Yugoslav citizens. The GOY turned + the U.S. proposal down primarily for two + reasons: (1) Yugoslav citizenship and nationality laws do not permit + foreign Consular access to Yugoslav citizens who happen to have another + nationality; and (2) if such an agreement were signed other countries + (Canada, Australia, France, etc) would demand the same arrangement. In + 1974 the GOY circulated a so-called pro + memoria to all diplomatic missions in which it declared that such + agreements would be “contrary to the constitutional principle of the + equality of Yugoslav citizens before the law. . .” The GOY did promise to “take into account” the + fact that a person detained also possessed another nationality.

+

20. In the Embassy’s view, only a carefully drawn and executed agreement + on receiving-state responsibilities regarding notification and access in + the case of limitation of personal freedom of sending-state nationals + will assure the interests of both governments in this troublesome and + potentially poisonous area of our Consular relations. Cases of this + nature continue to arise, straining our otherwise good relations, and + efforts should now be made to remove this problem area in the near + future.

+

Cultural and Informational Activities:

+

21. Cultural and information programs have also played a major role in + the development of bilateral relations. Exchange activities, + particularly the Fulbright and International Visitors programs, + strengthen ties between the two countries. Complementing activities of + the Embassy, U.S. Information Centers + (USIC) in Belgrade, Zagreb, Ljubljana, Skopje and Sarajevo offer another + means for advancing U.S. interests in + Yugoslavia. With resident American officers, these centers provide not + only an American presence in the community, but a unique outlet in five + of the six Yugoslav Republics for American ideas.

+

22. As Yugoslavia enters the transitional period leading to the + post-Tito era, we can act to + put the United States into a position of influence by intensifying + cultural and information contacts and exchanges, and by expanding them + into areas of the society which have been all but untouched until now + (such as the LCY, SAWPY, social scientists and regional political + groupings).

+ + Eagleburger + +
+ +
+ 250. Telegram From the Embassy in Yugoslavia to the Department of + StateSource: National + Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign + Policy File, D780089–0117. Secret; Niact Immediate; Exdis. According to another copy, Eagleburger drafted and approved + the telegram. (Ibid.) + + + + + + Belgrade, February 26, 1978, 1356Z + +

1584. Subj: The Tito Visit in + Perspective.

+

1. Very little that affects the future of the foreign policy of the + United States can be predicted with confidence. But (as in so many other + things), Yugoslavia is an exception to the rule. We can be absolutely + positive of one thing, and reasonably certain of another:

+

—The certainty: Despite all the evidence to the contrary, Josip Broz Tito will not live forever. + Indeed, it is unlikely that he will still be around when the Carter + administration leaves office.

+

—The probability: There will follow in the wake of Tito’s demise a period of internal + uncertainty and international tension in the heart of Europe, with the + ever-present danger that uncertainty will degenerate into civil war and + tension escalate to crisis.

+

2. These two factors—The certainty of Tito’s death and its potential consequences—must lie at + the heart of our thinking about the substance of our bilateral + relationship. And since the Tito + visit will inevitably influence the development of that relationship, + these factors are relevant to the trip as well.

+

3. The key question is not so much what we will do when or after + Tito passes (important as + that is), but what we can do beforehand to put ourselves in a position + to have as much influence as possible on the course of events in the + post-Tito period.

+

4. Under a worst-case scenario Tito’s death could unleash immediately, or within a + reasonably short period, a clash among Yugoslav nationalities, or a + vying for power among the residual leadership, or both, that would + result in massive instability. And who could predict with confidence + what the Soviets might, under such circumstances, be tempted, “invited,” + or feel compelled to do?

+

5. I make no claim that these events will come to pass. Indeed, I believe + it improbable that they will. Certainly there are other less horrendous + scenarios that are more within the realm of the possible. But some + degree of uncertainty and instability, even if only of a very temporary + nature, is virtually certain. And it is during that period of + uncertainty and—if the crisis passes uneventfully—the + institution-building that will follow after, that the US can have its + greatest and most productive + impact. But we will be in no position, at that late date, to influence + events or forestall mistakes unless we have taken full advantage of + whatever time we still have to build the bridges of understanding, + confidence, and—most important—common interest, that will give us + meaningful access to the forces that will shape post-Tito Yugoslavia. Those who will lead, + when the old man is gone, must not be left to feel isolated from the + West, or that the Soviet Union is the only nation whose interests must + be taken into account.

+

6. Nor should we lose sight of the fact that the chances are relatively + good after Tito, for a slow + transformation from what must now be classed as a repressive (yet by no + means highly repressive) regime. Tito has moved Yugoslavia a long way from the Stalinist + state it once was; indeed the process of liberalization over the course + of the past 30 years has been remarkable. But so long as he remains, the + pace of further improvement in the rights enjoyed by Yugoslavs—whether + human or political—will be strictly limited. He is too much a product of + his past, too much a victim of the cult of hero-worship that has grown + up around him, ever to permit much more freedom than now exists. But the + seeds have been planted, and there will be substantial elements in the + society, after Tito departs, + that will want to move toward something more akin to the realities—if + not the forms—of Western democracy. They will need support, + encouragement, advice and guidance. And we ought to be among the first + to whom they turn, out of a confidence born of the experience of having + known and worked with us in the time before Tito exited.

+

7. These not-so-long-term aims are far easier to describe than to + achieve. But if they make sense, then our objective ought to be to + define and implement programs that will build a web of relationships + which will create, first, a better understanding of the interests and + actions of each side, followed by growing shared interests, the loss of + which would be painful to both parties, and, eventually, access to + critical elements of the society that have thus far been largely closed + to us (e.g., the Party and the military).

+

8. We should, therefore, take full advantage of the opportunities the + Tito visit offers to + establish that web of relationships. The work is already well begun; the + months of the Carter administration have seen a steady improvement in + our relations to a point where they are as good as they have been since + the end of World War II. The visit should be seen as an affirmation of + that progress and a commitment to its continuance. Tito should return home convinced that + the United States is a friend, that we understand the imperatives of + Yugoslavia’s peculiar international circumstance, and support its + independence and nonalignment, even though we will sometimes disagree on + the specific positions that circumstance and Yugoslav prejudices + dicate.

+ +

9. During the visit we should:

+

—Listen with respect to Tito’s + thoughts on the world scene (we might even learn something), give him a + clear picture of what is on our mind, and seek to influence him on + specific problems where he and Yugoslavia have significant influence, + e.g., disarmament, the Middle East, Korea. Tito rightly considers himself a world figure and + statesman and we ought to let him know we share his high opinion of + himself. President Carter’s + letters have had an enormously positive impact and he should indicate + that the practice will continue.

+

—Recognize Yugoslavia’s role as a leader of the nonaligned and use the + opportunity of this visit to demonstrate US understanding of the + strength and importance of that movement. At the same time, we should + underline that: (a) recent shifts in U.S. policy on a number of issues of central importance to + the nonaligned warrant, even more than before, a more positive and + balanced attitude on their part toward the United States; b) as + consultation between us grows, so can there be a growing degree of + cooperation in resolving Third-World issues and in fostering economic + development.

+

—Give him and his advisors a sense that we are trying our best to resolve + the few bilateral issues (Krsko and ExIm guarantees) that stand between us, while at the same + time reminding them that compromise is a two-way street.

+

10. All of the above is important in setting the stage for post-visit + progress on the development of ties that link Yugoslavia more closely + with the United States. Foremost among these is substantial room for a + mutually profitable expansion of trade and investment. The Yugoslavs are + anxious to reduce their heavy reliance on the Soviet Union and to + compensate where they can for their serious trade imbalance with the + Common Market. They see the US as their most promising alternative, and + we should do all we can to encourage and foster a shift in our + direction.

+

11. Of almost equal importance, but far less amenable to easy solution, + is the development of improved U.S. + defense cooperation with Yugoslavia—particularly arms sales. Over the + past several years our sales have been virtually nonexistent; our + contacts with the Yugoslav military (a critical element in the + post-Tito transition period) + only slightly better. President Carter’s decision to permit a “modest” expansion of our + sales program, and Secretary Brown’s subsequent visit to Belgrade, marked a new phase + in the relationship—one which has already led to some new sales and a + marginal improvement in our relations with the military. But the program + is still plagued by bureaucratic inertia and distrust on both + sides—factors which a successful visit should make it easier to + resolve.

+

12. And finally, the visit can give a major impetus to the development of + contacts between political leaders of both countries. The Republican and Democratic National + Committees have invited a delegation of Yugoslav Communist Party leaders + to visit the US later this year—a first. But the invitation took great + effort to arrange, and mutual suspicion, I suspect, will be high. The + Tito visit should make each + side more respectable in the eyes of the other, thereby encouraging the + development of a real dialogue and a continuing exchange.

+

13. The question of suspicion may, in the last analysis, be the real + roadblock that must be overcome if our relations are to prosper over the + longer term. Yugoslavia is led, after all, by a generation of Communists + who fought a war and died for their beliefs; men who, soon afterward, + only reluctantly and after great soul-searching chose to accept Moscow’s + excommunication rather than change their ways; men who for a long time, + in their heart-of-hearts, longed to be reaccepted into the body of the + faithful (but on their own terms). And we, in their eyes, are the + bulwark of capitalism, the fortress of economic exploitation, and the + last defender of a dying colonialism.

+

14. Admittedly, times have changed. Unlike whichever Louis it was, the + Yugoslav leadership has learned something. But it has forgotten very + little. The emotional pull of the Soviets has lessened, the growth of + Eurocommunism has reduced the sense of isolation. The United States does + not post the ever-present military threat the Soviets do; we can be + used, we are generally respected and often envied, but we are not widely + trusted. In the end the saving element is that they are all better + Yugoslavs than Communists. As such, their own interests as they perceive + them will guide their decisions (which makes them very like all the rest + of us). It is our job, then, slowly to persuade them of the community of + our interests. We have made a remarkably good start over the course of + the past year; the task now is to transform a promising beginning into a + lasting success.

+ + Eagleburger + +
+ +
+ 251. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security + Affairs (Brzezinski) to + President CarterSource: Carter Library, National + Security Affairs, Brzezinski + Material, VIP Visit File, Box 15, Yugoslavia: President Tito, 3/6–9/78: Briefing Book. + Secret; Sensitive. The date is handwritten. + + + Washington, March 3, + 1978 + + + SUBJECT + Meetings with President Tito + +

The memorandum from Cy Vance (Tab + A)See Document + 252. sets out effectively the background, setting, + and issues for your meetings with President Tito. A suggested arrival statement and talking points + for your toast are at Tab B;Attached but + not printed. For the remarks at the welcoming ceremony and the + toasts delivered at the State Dinner, see Public + Papers: Carter, 1978, Book I, pp. 473–480. your + latest letter to Tito at Tab + C;Attached but not printed; dated + February 24. In the letter, Carter proposed an agenda for + discussions including East-West relations, arms control and + disarmament, the Middle East, Africa, North-South relations, and + global economic issues as well as any other reflections Tito might have on his recent trip + to the Soviet Union, China, and North Korea. Carter also expressed + support for achieving “a substantial and well-balanced document” at + the conclusion of the CSCE meeting + in Belgrade. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Brzezinski Office File, Country + Chron File, Box 57, Yugoslavia: 1–3/78) his latest letter to + you at Tab D;Attached but not printed. In + the undated letter, sent February 12, Tito addressed the Palestinian issue, the Horn of + Africa, and the CSCE conference in + Belgrade. He also stressed his belief of the importance of adopting + a substantial and comprehensive document at the conclusion of the + Belgrade CSCE conference. + (Ibid.) and Reston’s article on his interview with Tito at Tab E.James Reston, “At 85, Tito Still Looks to Future and Worries About the + Present.” (The New York Times, March 3, 1978, + p. A1) The Yugoslavs have also suggested issuing a joint + statement at the end of the visit, as has been customary on past + Tito visits. State is + currently negotiating an appropriate statement with the Yugoslavs, which + we will forward to you before the meetings.

+

In your recent letter to him, you suggested discussions on East-West + relations, disarmament, the Middle East, Africa, North-South relations, + the global economy, and Tito’s + trip to the Soviet Union, China, and North Korea. We have not yet had a + response to your letter soliciting his comments on this proposed agenda, + but will send it to you immediately if and when it arrives.

+

The Yugoslavs have made clear that Tito will want to talk about major issues with you, + preferably leaving bilateral issues to discussions at the ministerial level. However, he + may raise with you the question of the Krsko reactor.In telegram 1359 from Belgrade, February 17, + Eagleburger reported his + conversation with Malivoj + Maksic, Tito’s National Security Adviser, in which the two + discussed how the meetings between the two Presidents should be + organized, and whether the Foreign Ministers would participate in + the meetings with the Presidents or have parallel meetings. + Eagleburger concluded: + “Tito clearly prefers to + focus on international problems, leaving bilateral issues to + others.” (National Archives, RG 59, + Central Foreign Policy File, D780076–1117) In telegram 1582 from + Belgrade, February 25, Eagleburger reported his February 25 meeting with + Maksic, in which the + Yugoslav official stressed Tito’s desire for private meetings with Carter and + informed Eagleburger that + Tito would not get into + details on bilateral matters, but would concentrate on international + issues such as détente, CSCE, + disarmament, the Middle East, China, North Korea, and the + Non-Aligned Movement. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + D780088–0200)

+

The Yugoslavs have repeatedly said that the exchange of letters between + you and President Tito have + deeply impressed him, and it is clear they have done a lot to improve + relations between our two countries. The Yugoslavs were particularly + struck that in a recent letter you praised Tito’s leadership of the non-aligned movement,In his January 31 + letter, Carter discussed the deteriorating situation in the Horn of + Africa due to increased Soviet and Cuban involvement in the area. + Carter asked Tito to use his + influence in the Non-Aligned Movement and his good offices to + convince the Ethiopian Government of the need for a negotiated + settlement. He also asked Tito to convey to the Soviet Government the growing + U.S. unease about Soviet and + Cuban involvement in the Horn. (Carter Library, National Security + Affairs, Brzezinski + Material, President’s Correspondence with Foreign Leaders File, Box + 21, Yugoslavia: President Josip Broz + Tito, 5/77–5/79) something no U.S. Administration had done before.

+

In your most recent exchange of letters, you discussed the Middle East, + the Horn of Africa and CSCE. His reply + (tabbed in the book) was only general on the first two issues, but + sought your assistance in moving Belgrade to a successful conclusion, an + appeal he also addressed—unsuccessfully—to Brezhnev. (Your response is also tabbed in the book, and + you may wish to refer to it.)

+

Issues

+

In addition to material in the State Department book, there are the + following issues:

+

Krsko. The basic issue is well set out in Cy’s + memo: as part of our own non-proliferation program and in accord with + the Act, we seek commitments from the Yugoslavs about disposition of + U.S.-supplied equipment and + fuel—commitments additional to the original Yugoslav agreement with the + IAEA. We offered a package which would meet our requirements, and + negotiations seemed to be going well. However, this week at the IAEA the Yugoslavs called our + proposals unacceptable and said Tito would ask you for a “waiver.”As reported in telegram 2025 from Vienna, March 2, + the Yugoslav negotiating team at the IAEA held that the United + States should reacquire the spent fuel from Yugoslavia’s Krsko + reactor. The Yugoslavs, the Embassy reported, told the IAEA that + Tito would raise the + matter with Carter. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + D780095–1047)

+

—If Tito raises the issue in a + general way, I suggest you applaud the Yugoslav record on + non-proliferation; explain our concerns and legislation, thus making + clear that we are not discriminating against Yugoslavia; express + appreciation for their willingness to negotiate and that you look + forward to a successful conclusion.

+

—If Tito asks for a waiver, this + is the situation: the Non-Proliferation Act contains no “waiver” + permitting you to authorize shipments of fuel to a country that does not + meet the immediate conditions of the Act. There is, however, a + theoretical loophole which gives EURATOM and the IAEA two years to meet + the immediate conditions of the Act. Since Yugoslavia’s agreement is + with the IAEA, that might be made to apply. But to use + that loophole for Yugoslavia would create an impression that the Act + is being dismantled as soon as it was signed. And it would put + you in confrontation with the NRC, which is strongly opposed and feels + that Yugoslavia supply agreement with us should not be through the IAEA + in the first place. If Tito asks + for a waiver, I suggest you explain that there is no waiver provision in + the act that would apply, point out the effect on our entire + non-proliferation program, and suggest that Vance discuss the question with Foreign Minister + Minic.

+

Science and Technology Cooperation. During the + past five years, we have had a science and technology cooperation + program with the Yugoslavs, to which each side committed $7 million over + that period. Our part has been financed out of our dinar holdings, which + will not continue to be large enough to finance this program, in + addition to the usual expenses of our Embassy in Belgrade.

+

The Yugoslavs have proposed, therefore, that we begin paying Yugoslav + annuitants (from Social Security, etc.) in dollars instead of dinars, in + order to free up extra dinars for the science and technology program. + Treasury objects, on the grounds that that will swell the pool of dinars + to excess, and that the proposal falls outside the intent of Congress, + if not the law itself governing U.S.-owned foreign currencies.

+

I have asked State-Treasury-OMB to + propose an alternative—such as a direct appropriation of approximately + $1.5 million a year to this program, which the Yugoslavs value highly. As soon as I have their + proposal, I shall forward it to you for approval.In a March 6 memorandum to Carter, Brzezinski informed the President + that OMB, the Department of the + Treasury, and the Department of State disagreed on the possible way + forward for the Science and Technology program. While OMB recommended allowing the various + agencies to seek funding based on their own priorities, the + Department of State recommended seeking a $7 million appropriation + to fund the program for another five years, an option Brzezinski also supported. Carter + approved the appropriation, noting in the margin that it should be a + “regular budget item—no special budget request.” (Carter Library, + National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, VIP Visit File, Box 15, + Yugoslavia: President Tito, + 3/6–9/78: Cables and Memos)

+

Demonstrations. As you know, the Yugoslavs are + very much concerned about the prospect of demonstrations during + Tito’s visit. Two permits + have been granted: one to a small group of Serbs, and another to a + larger group of Croats. Justice and State continue to work on the + problem, but at time of writing no way had been found to shift the + demonstrations from in front of the White House. I will continue to + pursue this issue; in any event, everyone is on notice that there can be + no repeat of the incident when the Shah was here.

+

North Korea. The Yugoslavs have reported that + President Tito continues to be + interested in a possible role as go-between us and Pyongyang. In + addition to the material in Cy’s memo, I believe you should know + that:

+

—North Korean intransigence is responsible for the current diplomatic + impasse. It is Pyongyang that maintains it is the “only legal sovereign + government” on the Peninsula, insists that its friends and allies + foreswear all contact with Seoul, rejects a renewal of serious, + substantive discussions with the Republic of Korea, and refuses to + contemplate the wider involvement of both Koreas in the international + community through dual membership in the UN on a provisional basis, pending progress toward + reunification.

+

—Pyongyang’s position is increasingly out of phase with international + realities. More than 50 countries recognize both + Koreas—54 to be exact. Both Koreas sit alongside + each other in a growing number of UN + Specialized Agencies, despite the North’s refusal to countenance dual + membership in the UN itself. Though + Pyongyang seeks to keep alive the fiction that South Korea is + illegitimate, it must come to terms with the fact that the ROK is not + merely a going concern, but has become a major world trading power which + in a few years time will qualify for membership in the OECD on the basis of its industrial + prowess.

+

—Some of the Communist countries—most notably the East Germans—have + apparently acknowledged that any long-term movement toward reunification + must progress through a prolonged period of “peaceful coexistence” in which North-South + relations are institutionalized and regularized, i.e., the German + formula.” This is a salutary development. Others should chime in, + Tito included.

+

—Yugoslavia’s position is itself somewhat curious. Belgrade wishes to + assume the role of go-between. Yet it has not carved out a policy toward + Korea that reflects the dominant movement toward international + recognition of the reality of two Koreas.

+

I recommend, therefore, that you emphasize the following points:

+

—Our belief that North Korea’s diplomatic stance is increasingly + anachronistic.

+

—We are serious about implementing our troop withdrawal plan, but have no + intention of responding to North Korean suggestions to discuss the + Korean problems in forums which exclude the South. Our attitude toward + contacts with Pyongyang will depend on the willingness of its allies to + make reciprocal contacts with Seoul.

+

—Our conviction that a prolonged period of institutionalized peaceful + coexistence is the only plausible route toward reunification. In that + context the diplomatic objective should be the reduction of tensions + between the two Koreas and a resumption of the North-South dialogue.

+

—Ask whether Honnecker’s veiled suggestions in Pyongyang that the North + consider a two-Koreas policy comparable to arrangements worked out by + the two Germanys reflects Soviet thinking on this subject. Inquire about + North Korean reactions to Honnecker’s proposals.

+

—The Yugoslav policy of shunning direct commercial relations with Seoul + appears to be inconsistent with the diversification of relations by + South and North Korea which Tito + has asked us to accept.

+

Post-Tito + Contingencies. The Four-Power Political Directors have been + working for some time on a general contingency paper in the event of + Soviet pressure following Tito’s + death. This paper seeks to identify the military supply needs of the + Yugoslav military—for several contingencies—and Western ability to + provide those supplies. It also surveys diplomatic efforts that could be + made in support of Yugoslavia under those circumstances. The paper does + not contemplate any form of direct Western military involvement. It will + be discussed at the next Four-Power Foreign Ministers’ meeting, but this + will not lead to any joint commitments, nor has + the paper been discussed in any way with other countries, including + Yugoslavia.

+

Overflight. Last week, there was another + overflight incident, when four U.S. + aircraft from Italy briefly violated Yugoslav airspace. We have no + indications that the Yugoslavs detected the violation; but the State Department has informed + the Yugoslav Ambassador about it.During a + meeting with Belovski on February 28, Vest reported that a Navy F–4 jet had + unintentionally penetrated Yugoslav airspace earlier that day. + Vest assured Belovski + that the airplane had been grounded and its equipment was being + checked, and that the United States took the incident very + seriously. (Telegram 52219 to Belgrade, March 1; National Archives, + RG 59, Central Foreign Policy + File, D780092–1189) You will recall that we were falsely + accused of overflights last fall, but dealt successfully with the + incident by sending a senior Admiral to Yugoslavia to compare technical + data, and by showing our deep concern. There is now an “informal” + procedure—to avoid setting a precedent that could cause problems during + a succession crisis—by which we let the Yugoslavs know when there will + be naval air activity in the Adriatic.

+

Economic Cooperation. In his Reston interview (not + in the part carried in the Times), Tito emphasized economic cooperation with us. In the + last week, we have agreed with the Yugoslavs to set up two working + groups, at the Deputy Assistant Secretary/Ambassador level, on economic + cooperation—one group in Belgrade and one here. This will be announced + in the joint statement at the end of the visit.

+

Kardelj. You may want to recall the visit of Mr. + Kardelj last fall. At the moment, he is very seriously ill (cancer, + reportedly), and you may want to inquire after him.

+

Detente. The Yugoslavs repeatedly say that detente + between the U.S. and Soviet Union has + possibilities of condominium, unless broadened to include “smaller + powers”—i.e., Yugoslavia. You might go into Yugoslavia’s role (and that + of other smaller powers) in CSCE, + areas like diplomacy on the Horn, Tito’s role in dealing with both East and West, and his + leadership of the non-aligned movement.

+

Horn of Africa. We would welcome more Yugoslav + initiative on the Horn of Africa. We hope the Yugoslavs can capitalize + on the relationships they have in Addis Ababa, a) to influence + Mengistu’s government to pursue a more balanced and more truly + non-aligned policy; and b) to cooperate in a settlement with the Somalis + which will preserve Ethiopia’s territorial integrity—but at the same + time avoid needless humiliation of the Somalis. If an Ethiopian-Somali + settlement is to last, some arrangement for a broader ceasefire policing + operation appears to us to be needed. It would be best to have this set + up under OAU auspices; but if the OAU finds it difficult to work out + arrangements, we would like to see more experienced countries—such as + Yugoslavia and India—offering their help and serving as catalysts.

+

China. You may wish to explore with President + Tito the possibility of his + acting as a channel to Peking, much as the Romanians were used at an + earlier stage:

+ +

—We are pleased to see the developing relationship between Peking and + Belgrade. We think this is an important relationship and one that + deserves to be broadened.

+

—We are committed to the process of normalization and would consider it + useful if Tito could convey the + earnestness of our intent to Peking.

+

—We consider the improvement of our relations with Peking to be a matter + of historic and strategic importance.

+

—We believe that mutual efforts are necessary to create the environment + in which the normalization process can be completed. Such mutual efforts + include not only an expansion of the commercial and economic relations + with Peking in order to foster political attitudes in this country that + would favor normalization, but a broadening and deepening of our + consultations with Peking about world affairs as well.

+

—To this end, perhaps Tito could + indicate to the Chinese that we do not wish to use our relationship with + Peking to get at the Russians. We do not seek to manipulate the + Sino-Soviet dispute to our advantage. Rather, we believe that an + improved relationship with Peking is simply in the American + interest.

+

—But to convince our domestic skeptics that an improved relationship with + Peking is in our interest, perhaps Tito would be willing to indicate to the Chinese that it + would be helpful to us were the Chinese to discuss with us rather than + preach to us on such issues as:

+ +

—Korea and the possibility of cooperative measures to promote a + peaceful and just evolution of the situation on the Peninsula.

+

—Africa and ways in which we might pursue separate yet reinforcing + ways of preventing outside powers from establishing positions of + dominance on the Continent.

+

—Global strategic matters and ways in which US efforts to promote + arms control and disarmament can take into account the Chinese + position and encourage the Chinese to participate in our + efforts.

+ +

—In short, we see China as a significant actor on the world scene, we + consider that we have many parallel strategic interests with China, and + we wish to act upon these parallel interests in order over a period of + time to encourage the Chinese to play a constructive role in the + addressing of man’s many problems.

+

Non-Aligned Movement. President Tito will want to talk with you about + the Non-Aligned Movement. It would be useful to seek his moderating + influence on a particular question—the next meeting of the Movement in + Havana in 1979, when Cuba wants a signal success:

+

—Historically, the position of the US Government to the Non-Aligned + Movement has been one of distance at best, and hostility at worst.

+ +

—We may not like Non-Aligned criticism of the United States, but we + recognize that, in the long term, an independent movement of non-aligned + states which view the world differently from both the United States and + the Soviet Union, is in our interest. Therefore, we hope to communicate + on a regular basis with the Movement.

+

—Since we now have an interest in an independent, non-aligned movement, + we are concerned that the next Chairman of the Movement is Cuba, a + country which is so closely aligned to the Soviet Union. Indeed, Cuban + troops are presently being used to further Soviet goals in Africa and + may even be taking orders from Soviet military officials there.

+

—In discussions of “imperialism” at the next Non-Aligned conference in + 1979, we wonder whether Cuban and Soviet imperialism will be discussed + with as much vigor—if at all—as “U.S. + imperialism.”

+

Welcoming Ceremony. It will be televised live to + Yugoslavia, in six languages.

+

First Meeting. Tito has indicated he would like to meet alone with you + at the start of the first meeting (Oval Office). No subjects have been + advanced.

+

Security: Update. Friday night, the Yugoslav + Consulate in San Francisco was fire-bombed. Warren Christopher talked with the Yugoslav Ambassador + to note that the FBI is vigorously investigating it, and that we are + acting to protect other Yugoslav installations—though so far only + through the local police.

+
+ +
+ 252. Memorandum From Secretary of State Vance to President CarterSource: + Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, VIP Visit + File, Box 15, Yugoslavia: President Tito, 3/6–9/78: Briefing Book. Secret; Nodis. Carter underlined scattered + words and phrases throughout the memorandum. The memorandum was + attached as Tab A to Brzezinski’s March 3 memorandum; see Document 251. + + + Washington, undated + + + SUBJECT + State Visit to the United States by President Josip Broz Tito of Yugoslavia, + March 7–9, 1978 + +

I. OBJECTIVES

+

President Tito is paying his + third visit to the United States—probably his last. Our objectives are + to honor him as one of the towering figures of his era; to build + stronger and broader ties with Yugoslavia which will carry us through + the post-Tito transition period; + to discuss a wide range of global issues in hopes of reaching closer + understanding; to discuss a few bilateral issues in hopes of resolving + them. There are no crises in our relationship at present.

+

During the talks, we should reaffirm our steadfast support for + Yugoslavia’s independence from Soviet domination and for its unity and + territorial integrity. We should indicate that we respect Yugoslavia’s + policy of nonalignment and Tito + as a founder of that movement. We should also encourage further the + process of bilateral consultations at the highest level as well as more + active contacts at every level.

+

Tito will want to discuss mainly + global issues: East-West relations, detente, the Belgrade CSCE meeting, disarmament, Eurocommunism, + nonalignment and world economic issues. He will also wish to discuss the + Middle East, the Horn of Africa, China, Korea, and perhaps other world + trouble spots. On bilateral matters, he may raise the nuclear fuel + export license for Krsko (KERSH-ko) power station, ExIm Bank financing, bilateral military + exchanges including progress in our new arms transfer relationship.

+

II. SETTING

+

Defying generalization, Yugoslavia is Balkan, Mediterranean and Middle + European in essence; with a history going back through the Roman era but + a state only in this century; Roman Catholic, Orthodox and Moslem; + bearing the marks of both the Turkish and Austro-Hungarian Empires, as + well as indigenous kings and despots; a contemporary state poised strategically and politically + between East and West, and playing a world role far beyond what size or + power would dictate.

+

Site of the spark that ignited the First World War, Yugoslavia arose out + of that war as a state welded—or patched—together from pieces of the + Kingdom of Serbia, of the crumbled Turkish Empire and of defeated + Austria-Hungary. Little more than twenty years later it fell victim to + German and Italian invasion, and was torn by Civil War between the + communist-led Partisans under Tito, the Mihailovic forces built from remnants of the + pre-war regime and the Ustashi forces in the Nazi puppet “Independent + State of Croatia”. In vicious and tragic fighting against the occupiers + and each other almost 2 million Yugoslav lives were lost—about half at + the hands of other Yugoslavs.

+

Marshal Tito came out of the war + an authentic national hero, able to form in Yugoslavia the only post-war + communist regime in Europe not imposed by Soviet arms or subversion. + But, good communist that he was, Tito worked closely with Moscow until forced to + demonstrate that he was an even better nationalist. The historic break + with the Soviets in 1948–49 has profoundly affected Yugoslavia’s course + for the 30 years that have followed.

+

An outcast in the communist world after 1949, and threatened by Soviet + power, Yugoslavia found the United States prepared to support its + independence with military and economic assistance programs totalling + $2.9 billion from 1949 to 1965. With the security this offered, + Tito embarked on policies + which have largely formed today’s Yugoslavia and which explain its + importance as a country. Internally, he set in train political and + economic trends which have made Yugoslavia a maverick in communist + theory and practice. While still a one-party state, Yugoslavia no longer + comes close to the totalitarian communist stereotype of a highly + centralized system characterized by virtually total suppression of + individual rights. Externally, Tito joined with India’s Nehru and Egypt’s Nasser to + create the nonaligned movement, thereby giving focus to the growing + number of newly-independent and underdeveloped states seeking a voice in + the post-war world. Sole survivor of the three and, by now, the only + remaining national leader of the Second World War generation, Tito stands as an elder statesman and + leader of the nonaligned and the third world.

+

The economy—and the underlying economic philosophy—start from premises + which are unorthodox in communist practice. Unlike the rest of communist + Europe, industrial property is not state-owned or managed via a + government bureaucracy. Rather, industrial and economic activity is + carried on through a “workers’ self management” system which at least in + theory places ownership of enterprises in the hands of those who work in + them (except in agriculture, a percentage of which is in private hands, + and in retail marketing and small manufacturing, some of which is privately-owned). These + enterprises operate under a broad economic policy and planning mandate, + but with substantial independent management authority which they share + with the workers’ self-management organs (having a voice in selection of + managers, production, investment and wage policy) within each + enterprise. This unique system, coupled with Eastern Europe’s only real + banking system and active participation in international markets, has + given Yugoslavia a dynamic industrial quasi-market (albeit somewhat + inefficient) economy which is, in many respects, far removed from the + statist economies of its Eastern European neighbors.

+

As a self-proclaimed leader of the nonaligned movement, Yugoslavia + participates actively in a host of international bodies and often seeks + the role of spokesman or mediator on issues which concern the nonaligned + and the third world. Yugoslav positions on most international questions + reflect both the leadership’s philosophical proclivities and their sense + of what will reinforce Yugoslavia’s position in the nonaligned movement. + While these motivations more often than not lead Yugoslavia to positions + different from ours, there have been some recent signs of a tendency to + play a moderating role between opposing positions, such as the Middle + East and the Horn of Africa. This is illustrated in Yugoslavia’s recent + actions on Middle East developments. Without dropping their + long-standing support for the Arabs, the Yugoslavs have moved + significantly to express openly the view that the existence of Israel + must be accepted and assured. Tito has recently lent his personal prestige to this + position in messages to Arab leaders.

+

In the contemporary dynamics of today’s world, with East-West issues at + the surface at the CSCE in Belgrade, + with Eurocommunism near the surface in Western Europe, and with an array + of issues facing us all in the Middle East, Africa and elsewhere, + Yugoslavia will inevitably retain an importance and, thus, have an + interest to the United States well beyond its nominal place in the + world.

+

Whether Yugoslavia’s importance will survive Tito’s departure from the scene—a prospect which must be + considered despite his remarkable longevity—will depend on both internal + and external forces. Yugoslavia’s leaders have had to contend with + nationalist strains among the ethnic and religious groupings, as well as + with wide disparities among the republics in economic development. + Tito’s passing will remove + the greatest single symbol of national unity and could threaten the + nation’s stability. It is difficult to predict what the Soviets might be + tempted to do in such a situation in the interests of bringing + Yugoslavia back into communist conformity. Clearly the Yugoslavs are + totally committed to preserving their independence. Equally clearly, + their leaders are aware of the risk of Soviet interference, and believe + that Western interest, engagement and commitment to Yugoslav independence could be their best + insurance against Soviet meddling in a time of transition.

+

In this context, a stable structure of U.S.-Yugoslav relations in the present may well help to + insure a future which the Yugoslavs desire and which would serve our + interests.

+

III. KEY ISSUES

+

1. Bilateral Relations

+

U.S. Objectives: + To convince President Tito that + the US supports Yugoslav independence from Soviet domination; that we + seek a cordial relationship with Yugoslavia; that we are interested in + Yugoslavia’s economic well being; and that we are prepared to continue + expansion, consistent with PD–13, or our military sales + relationship.

+

Yugoslav Objectives: To indicate that Yugoslavia + is trustworthy and sincere in its dealings with the US; that it + maintains a balanced foreign policy through its commitment to + nonalignment; and that Yugoslavia firmly desires to avoid economic or + military dependence on the Soviet bloc.

+

Essential Factors:

+

Bilateral relations have improved significantly in the past year with the + visits to Belgrade by the Vice President and the Secretary of Defense, + and to Washington by Kardelj. We seek to continue this process by + developing ties which will survive the post-Tito transition. The Yugoslavs are quite willing to + credit your Administration for this new relationship; they see in + Washington a policy and a view which are more open, relaxed, confident + and tolerant of the views of others.

+

US-Yugoslav economic relations have generally been good in recent years. + Two-way trade has expanded to almost $700 million, and the US is + Yugoslav’s fourth largest trade partner (after the USSR, the FRG and Italy). Yugoslav exports to the US enjoy either + MFN or preferential (GSP) tariff + treatment. American investment in Yugoslavia—the first Communist nation + to welcome foreign capital—has grown to about $150 million and there are + now some 20 joint ventures, including a $750 million petro-chemical + complex being built jointly by Dow Chemical Co. and its Yugoslav + partner. Yugoslavia wants to expand trade with the US, in part because + of its very large trade deficit with the EEC, in part because the Soviet Union’s share of its total + trade has grown uncomfortably high. Recently, a dispute over Yugoslav + guarantees for ExImBank loans threatens to maim ExIm’s important loan and guarantee + program which has stimulated US firms to invest in Yugoslavia’s economy. + This dispute is still being negotiated by ExIm Chairman Moore, bearing in mind Yugoslav laws and ExIm’s needs.

+ +

Since Secretary Brown’s visit to + Belgrade in October, our arms sales have expanded markedly although the + total figure remains relatively small. FMS sales for FY 78 could + reach $10 million or a little more compared to $267 thousand in FY 77. While various items are still being + reviewed, six Yugoslav requests for advanced or sensitive weapons have + been denied. The Yugoslavs have expressed disappointment that we refuse + to sell them high technology or to provide data on weapons still being + developed.

+

Points to be Made:

+

—We welcome the improvement in relations which has occurred over the past + year and we seek further ways to strengthen ties.

+

—The exchange of letters and briefings in recent months has been helpful + and we value Tito’s views.

+

—We look forward to more active exchanges across the spectrum of our + relationship, including visits to the U.S. by Yugoslav legislative representatives and political + leaders.

+

—We continue, as in the past, to support Yugoslavia’s independence, unity + and territorial integrity, and we respect its commitment to + non-alignment.

+

—We strongly support the expansion of U.S. trade and investment ties with Yugoslavia.

+

—On the Exim guarantee problem (if + Tito raises), assure him + that Chairman Moore is anxious + to solve the problem, as indicated by the flexibility he has displayed, + and suggest that discussions be resumed as soon as possible so that this + issue does not affect our excellent trade relations.

+

—We welcome the establishment of a bilateral working group (below the + Cabinet level) to discuss the whole range of economic questions on a + regular basis.

+

—We are pleased with the expanded cooperation in military sales and feel + that it reflects the improvement in overall relations between our two + countries.

+

—Since the visits of Secretary Brown and General Cemalovic, arms transfers have + increased significantly, and we expect this encouraging trend to + continue. As a result of these meetings and the following discussions + between technical experts of both countries, several advanced weapons + systems have been offered to and accepted by Yugoslavia.

+

(If they raise the question of denial of certain high technology + systems):

+

—There are obvious constraints on both countries in this relationship, + but the important thing to emphasize is the progress we have made and to + work for improvement.

+ +

—We have offered several first line systems to Yugoslavia, and the + denials were not discriminatory, given restraints we have placed on arms + transfers.

+

2. Terrorism

+

U.S. Objectives: + To seek to minimize the impact of anti-Yugoslav emigre activity on our + bilateral relationship; to affirm publicly and privately that the U.S. supports neither the methods nor the + goals of anti-Yugoslav terrorists; to gain Yugoslav support for + effective international measures to eliminate terrorism in all + forms.

+

Yugoslav Objectives: To urge more effective U.S. action to prevent anti-Yugoslav acts + by emigre terrorists and to prosecute those responsible.

+

Essential Factors: The activities of anti-Yugoslav + emigres in the U.S. have bedevilled our + relations for years, and the prospect of massive demonstrations against + Tito could seriously + undermine whatever gains derive from the visit. The number and + seriousness of anti-Yugoslav acts over the past two years are alarming, + but in two cases the perpretrators were convicted and given stiff + sentences. On the international level, Yugoslavia acknowledges the + seriousness of the problem but has been reluctant to break stride with + the nonaligned majority and the radical Arabs by agreeing to tough + measures.

+

Points to be Made:

+

—We support neither the separatist goals nor the terrorist means of + anti-Yugoslav extremists.

+

—(if necessary) We deeply regret the presence of demonstrators during + this visit, but urge that their importance not be exaggerated. We have a + highly diverse population, and the “anti” voices often ring loudest. But + the vast majority of Americans support good relations with Yugoslavia + and feel great respect for President Tito.

+

—We are actively concerned about the number and seriousness of + anti-Yugoslav incidents in this country and will make every effort to + catch the perpetrators.

+

—The seriousness of this issue on the international level requires + effective action by the entire world community without regard to the + alleged motives of the terrorists.

+

—Our position is not politically motivated; we oppose terrorism in all + forms and for whatever alleged purposes.

+

—We seek Yugoslav support for effective UN action to suppress international terrorism.

+

3. Nuclear + Non-proliferation and the Krsko Fuel License

+

U.S. Objectives: + To convince Tito that our + efforts to obtain additional assurances covering the export of fuel for + the Krsko (KERSH-ko) reactor do + not discriminate against Yugoslavia; to seek Tito’s support for our + non-proliferation objectives.

+

Yugoslav Objectives: To ensure that Yugoslavia’s + access to nuclear technology is not restricted by the nuclear “have” + nations and to urge prompt approval for the Krsko fuel export + license.

+

Essential Factors: The IAEA Agreements under which + the U.S. agreed in 1974 to supply + Yugoslavia with a reactor and fuel for the Krsko Nuclear Power Station + do not meet all the criteria contained in the legislation on nuclear + exports, specifically, US approval rights over retransfer and + reprocessing of US-supplied equipment, US supplied fuel, and non-US fuel + used in the Krsko reactor. We have therefore been seeking these + additional U.S. approval rights. The + Yugoslavs, who are adherents to the NPT and cooperating members of the + IAEA, have indicated their willingness to accept universally applicable + safeguards and controls which result from new international agreements, + but they have resisted what they regard as unilateral U.S. attempts to impose discriminatory + conditions on existing arrangements. They have also said that they are + unwilling to “tie their hands” with regard to a future option to + reprocess. (We are aware of no current Yugoslav plans to recycle or + reprocess.) In May 1977 we approved the export of the Westinghouse + reactor,The Nuclear Regulatory + Commission approved the export license application for a + Westinghouse reactor on May 20, 1977. (Telegram 116633 to Belgrade, + May 20, 1977; National Archives, RG + 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770180–0624) in order not + to delay the Krsko project, on the basis of Yugoslav commitments not to + retransfer U.S.-supplied equipment and + to negotiate the disposition of spent fuel. Following two rounds of + negotiations, we appear to be close to agreement on additional + assurances covering U.S.-supplied fuel + and on a Yugoslav commitment to continue to negotiate on any non-U.S. fuel used in Krsko. (We believe that + such an arrangement would result in NRC approval of the pending fuel + license.) Since Tito has been + personally involved in this issue, final Yugoslav agreement will depend + on his approval.

+

Points to be Made:

+

—Place Krsko in the broader context of U.S. international policies on disarmament and + non-proliferation, and note that U.S. + and Yugoslav objectives on non-proliferation are virtually + identical.

+

—Note that our non-proliferation policies are not discriminatory and that + we are not asking more from Yugoslavia than from other countries.

+ +

—Praise the spirit of cooperation shown by the Yugoslav side during the + recent negotiations.

+

—Indicate that our negotiations appear to be close to mutually + satisfactory resolution which should provide more than adequate time for + the first shipment of fuel to be exported this autumn.

+

4. East-West Relations and + Europe: CSCE, U.S.-Soviet Relations, SALT, Eurocommunism, (MBFR)

+

U.S. Objectives: + To assure Tito that we continue + to pursue detente and meaningful arms restraints with the Soviet Union; + that we support the CSCE process and + the improvement of East-West relations; to explain our policy on + Eurocommunism.

+

Yugoslav Objectives: To argue for more + understanding and accommodation between the U.S. and USSR, + particularly on disarmament issues, with the goal of reducing bloc + confrontation in Europe; to urge greater U.S. tolerance for West European communist parties.

+

Essential Factors: Politically and strategically + balanced between East and West, Yugoslavia is a potential victim of any + great-power confrontation, and therefore seeks to keep both superpowers + at arms length. But it sees itself as a potential bridge of + understanding and its importance grows in times of lower tension. In the + longer view, the Yugoslavs may envisage for themselves a pace-setting + role in a restructured Europe without “blocs,” in which communists have + a more prominent role in the West and dissent and diversity are more + broadly tolerated in the East.

+

Points to be Made:

+

—We recognize and appreciate the great efforts which Yugoslavia, and + Tito personally, made in + hosting the Belgrade CSCE meeting. We + understand Yugoslavia’s disappointment at the outcome, and regret that + the consistent efforts by both of our delegations could not produce a + substantive concluding document. We believe, however, that the Belgrade + meeting has been a success and that its results will benefit + detente.

+

—While we do not seek confrontation with the Soviets or others, we feel + that all aspects of the Helsinki Final Act, including human rights + questions, are legitimate subjects for international discussion. We are + pleased that our two delegations were able to work so closely together + in Belgrade.

+

—U.S.-Soviet relations continue to + represent a mixture of competition and cooperation. We seek a SALT II Agreement which is fair to both + sides, and are pleased with the progress on other arms control questions + (e.g., Comprehensive Test Ban). Our goal is the actual reduction of + nuclear weapons and their eventual abolition.

+ +

—On MBFR (if Tito raises), we and our allies want + to see progress toward reducing the opposing forces in Central Europe; + any agreement should enhance political and military stability in Europe, + and should be equitable; we will continue to keep Yugoslavia informed + about the progress of the Vienna Talks.

+

—On Eurocommunism, as we have said many times, we will not interfere in + the domestic electoral processes in this matter. We do have certain + concerns, however, about the possibility that communist participation in + Western governments could weaken Western unity and harm the European + balance.

+

5. Multilateral Political + Issues: Nonalignment, UN Special Session + on Disarmament, Puerto Rico

+

U.S. Objectives: + To voice understanding and respect for Yugoslavia’s policy of + nonalignment; to encourage the Yugoslavs to take U.S. views into account as they develop their own positions + on multilateral issues; to avoid unnecessary irritations on matters of + importance to us (e.g., Puerto Rico); to endorse the UN Special Session on Disarmament.

+

Yugoslav Objectives: To convince us that + nonalignment makes sense for Yugoslavia and many other countries; that + the success of the movement does not harm U.S. interests; to urge that we consult more actively with + the nonaligned in our own policy deliberations.

+

Essential Factors: Nonalignment is a fundamental + component of Yugoslav foreign policy and is regarded as indispensable to + preserving Yugoslavia’s independence and world status. The Yugoslavs + feel that the U.S. has previously been + either indifferent or hostile to the movement, but they see in your + Administration’s approach to Third World issues a welcome shift toward + greater understanding for nonaligned views. Meanwhile the movement + itself is showing signs of strain under the pressure of radicals within + the movement and open conflicts between member nations. Yugoslavia seeks + to maintain internal cohesion within the movement and to remain in the + mainstream. Belgrade is hosting the Nonaligned Foreign Ministers meeting + this summer in preparation for the 1979 Nonaligned Summit in Havana, and + is apparently working with others to maintain the relatively + constructive and non-confrontational stance adopted at the Colombo + summit in 1976. The UN Special Session + on Disarmament next June was largely a Yugoslav initiative which we + supported. As President of the last regular General Assembly, the + Yugoslav Deputy Foreign Minister will preside at the Special Session. On + Puerto Rico, we sought an affirmative Yugoslav vote on the most recent + motion in the UN Decolonization + Committee to defer the question of Puerto Rico for another year, but the + Yugoslavs abstained, as they did in the previous two years.

+ +

Points to be Made:

+

—We respect Yugoslavia’s policy of nonalignment, and seek the views of + the nonaligned on matters of mutual interest.

+

—We look forward to bilateral consultations on multilateral matters, + including the Special Session of Disarmament, and we will make a strong + and positive contribution to the success of the session.

+

—In the spirit of our improving relationships, we should both avoid + actions which cause difficulty for the other. In this connection, the + status of Puerto Rico is a United States domestic question and we hope + that Yugoslavia will use its influence within the nonaligned movement + and in other multilateral fora to see that it is not discussed as an + international question.Cuba and other + socialist countries were attempting to use the Puerto Rico issue + against the United States in the UN + Special Committee on Decolonization. The U.S. Government maintained that as long as Puerto Rico + could vote for independence, the issue was an internal matter and + the UN had no + jurisdiction.

+

6. International Economic + Issues, North-South Dialogue

+

U.S. Objectives: + To assure President Tito that we + welcome a positive North/South dialogue, including the negotiation of + key economic issues in appropriate functional fora and the discussion of + global relationships in the new UNGA + Committee of the Whole.

+

Yugoslav Objectives: To stress the political need + for greater sharing of economic benefits by industrialized countries + with LDCs and to urge us to be more forthcoming on specific LDC demands; + perhaps to press for more frequent bilateral consultation on North/South + issues.

+

Essential Factors: Yugoslavia and President + Tito in particular have been + historic leaders of the “Third World.” They can justly claim a large + measure of the responsibility for initiating the variety of multilateral + economic discussions which we today call the North/South dialogue. + Yugoslavia’s leadership among LDCs on economic issues has decreased as + its own economy has developed and as the number of LDCs in the G-77 has + increased. While the Yugoslavs publicly support the demands for a New + International Economic Order, they have been willing to compromise and + can thus play a useful role as a moderator of extreme views.

+

Multilateral discussions are going forward in many fora (the MTNs in + GATT, Common Fund in UNCTAD, etc.), but the main focus now is on the new + UN General Assembly Committee of the + Whole, which will “oversee” the North/South dialogue. An organizational + meeting of the Committee took place February 13–17, and the first + substantive meeting is scheduled to take place in May.

+ +

Points to be Made:

+

—The U.S. supports an international + economic system of progress and cooperation based on equity, growth and, + above all, justice.

+

—The U.S. is willing to discuss any issue + of the North/South dialogue so long as negotiations are confined to the functional fora where they + can be considered by technical experts in an atmosphere relatively free + of political debate.

+

—In our view, the UNGA Committee of the + Whole got off to a good start by agreeing at its organizational meeting + in February to discuss specific issues in a global economic context and + to avoid intervention in the ongoing negotiations in functional + fora.

+

—It is very important for the new Committee of the Whole to demonstrate + that nations can examine the economic issues which affect us all in a + spirit of cooperation, rather than confrontation.

+

7. Middle East/Horn of + Africa

+

President Tito will be interested + in your latest assessment of developments and the prospects for + resolving the disputes in these two trouble spots. He will want to hear + your presentation before responding, and would like to discuss both + questions in some detail, following the lines of his recent letters to + you.

+

8. Southern Africa

+

U.S. Objectives: + To gain Yugoslav support for U.S. + efforts to work toward a peaceful and just solution in Southern + Africa.

+

Yugoslav Objectives: To urge more direct pressure + on Pretoria and Salisbury to bring about majority rule; to encourage + more active U.S. contact with the + “liberation” forces.

+

Essential Factors: As one of the last “colonial” + issues, Southern Africa is obligatory as a topic “for the record.” + Yugoslavia has long had close ties with the African liberation movements + and strongly supports majority rule. It has been impressed and pleased + with U.S. recent efforts toward this + goal, but Tito will urge that we + do more.

+

Points to be Made:

+

—We oppose racism and apartheid in all forms and are pursuing policies + which we hope will lead to peaceful and just solutions to problems of + Namibia, Zimbabwe (Rhodesia) and South Africa.

+

—The recent proximity talks on Namibia in New York, while not conclusive, + registered some progress; further talks are expected.

+

—We regard reports from Salisbury of an internal “settlement” to be + premature.

+ +

9. China/Korea

+

U.S. Objectives: + To appear responsive to Tito’s + desire for frank exchanges on China and Korea; to seek his views on both + countries; to convince Tito that + we are seriously interested in seeing the Korean problem moved toward + resolution but not at jeopardy to our South Korean allies.

+

Yugoslav Objectives: To convey Tito’s impressions from his visits to + China and North Korea last summer and to seek current US views; to urge + that the U.S. deal directly with North + Korea to try to unstick the Korean question; to act as go-between in + exchanges between the U.S. and North + Korea.

+

Essential Factors: + Tito was enthusiastically + welcomed in both countries last summer and Tito later wrote to you about his visit. He is now + interested in hearing our views on Chinese domestic developments, on + Sino-Soviet relations and on US-China relations. Concerning Korea, he + wrote to relay Kim Il-song’s proposals for direct US-North Korean + contacts or for tripartite (US, North and South Korea) talks, on + condition that South Korean President Park be removed from office. + Tito has argued that Kim is + more realistic than he seems and that we should respond in kind. + Yugoslavia’s affinity for the North Koreans derives largely from + Pyongyang’s participation in the nonaligned movement. For our part, we + see no indication that North Korea’s position has changed and we see the + proposal for direct contacts as an effort to undermine our relations + with the ROK. Interestingly, however, two of Pyongyang’s staunchest + supporters—East Germany and the USSR—have recently hinted that the North should show some + flexibility, in answer to our efforts to reduce friction.

+

Points to be Made:

+

—The Chinese, with the conclusion of the Fifth National People’s + Congress, have moved further toward restoring the vitality of their + government and party following Mao’s death.The Fifth National People’s Congress was in session from 1978 until + 1983. On March 1, 1978, the Congress adopted the 1978 Constitution + of the People’s Republic of China, which restored some judiciary, + political, and citizen rights removed by the 1975 + Constitution.

+

—Despite some evident reduction in hostility, we expect no significant + change in Sino-Soviet relations. The Chinese have frequently reaffirmed + that their general line remains unchanged; and both sides have continued + routine polemics.

+

—On our own relations with China, we are continuing to work toward our + goal of full normalization, but there have been no significant developments since your visit + to China last fall. The central question remains the problem of Taiwan, + which is an issue with significant domestic aspects in each country.

+

—On Korea, we believe that our publicly stated policy contains certain + elements of flexibility, and we continue to watch for some sign of + movement from the other side. We remain firmly committed to the security + of South Korea, and we will not take actions which would result only in + tactical gain for the North at the expense of the South.

+

—We have seen signs that some of the states which traditionally support + the North may have suggested that Pyongyang consider a more flexible + approach to the resolution of questions which contribute to the tense + atmosphere on the peninsula.

+

—Has the North’s approach to the situation changed in any way? For + example, would they be willing to support moves toward contacts between + their supporters and the South in exchange for reciprocal moves on our + part, as we have proposed?

+

—What measures could supporters of both Koreas take to stimulate a + resumption of the dialogue between North and South Korea?

+
+ +
+ 253. Editorial Note +

At 10:30 a.m. on March 7, 1978, President Jimmy Carter welcomed Yugoslav President Josip Broz Tito to the White House + with an arrival ceremony on the South Grounds. In his welcoming remarks, + Carter called Tito “a remarkable + man,” someone “who has understood for a long time our own Nation’s + commitment to détente and the true significance of this misunderstood + word.” Carter also underlined that “the independence and the territorial + integrity of Yugoslavia is one of the basic foundations of world peace + now and in the future.” In his remarks, Tito stressed the “continuing, successful, and + comprehensive development of relations” between the two countries in + “the already established principles of independence, sovereignty, mutual + respect, and understanding.” (Public Papers: Carter, + 1978, Book I, pages 473–475)

+

Following the welcoming ceremony, Carter and Tito, as well as the Yugoslav and U.S. delegations, met in the Cabinet Room + for the first scheduled meeting between the two Presidents. No record of + the conversation has been found. The Department summarized the visit in + telegram 67384 to Belgrade, March 16. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + D780116–1326) The Yugoslav side prepared a transcript of the conversation which was found in the Archives + of Yugoslavia, Belgrade, + Serbia. A copy of the original document and an English translation are + available at the Woodrow Wilson Center’s Cold War International History + Project (CWIHP), from which the excerpts provided below were drawn.

+

The first of two conversations between the two leaders started in the + Cabinet Room at the White House at 11:15 a.m. and lasted until 12:40 + p.m. and included several U.S. and + Yugoslav officials. (Carter Library, Presidential Materials, President’s + Daily Diary)

+

The conversation between the two Presidents focused on international + affairs, specifically, the situation in the Horn of Africa, the Middle + East, and North Korea. Tito told + President Carter: “Just prior to + my arrival with the delegation to the U.S., I received messages from some heads of states in + which they express their positions, and are asking me to convey them to + you.” Tito continued: “I have + accepted the invitation to visit the U.S. with great pleasure because I wanted an exchange of + opinions about the current international situation as well as convey my + impressions about some countries that I visited.”

+

President Carter began by + summarizing the administration’s position on the crisis in the Horn of + Africa and calling for Somali troops to withdraw from the Ogaden as well + as stressing that Ethiopian, Cuban, or Soviet troops should not cross + the border into Somalia. Carter told Tito: “Our country is refraining from sending arms, be + it to one or another party. When the conflict ends, when the border is + back to its original place, Soviet and Cuban troops should be withdrawn + from that territory.”

+

On the basis of his extensive relationship with Ethiopian Emperor Haile + Selassie and with Somali President Siad + Barre, Tito + described his understanding of how the situation reached a flash point. + The revolutionary Government in Ethiopia “visited Yugoslavia three + times,” Tito explained, and + discussed the situation in Ethiopia with the Yugoslav leadership. “We + advised them to go for an autonomous federation,” Tito recounted, but “they replied that + it was not yet time and that this would have to be resolved by military + means.” Tito continued: + “Similarly, Siad Barre was also + in Yugoslavia and I spoke with him about the question of Ogaden. He also + said that it would be good for it to be federation, i.e. autonomy, but + that Ogaden should be part of Somalia.” Tito also stressed that it was Belgrade’s understanding + that other African countries were opposed to Somalia’s invasion of + Ethiopia, and feared that a Somali victory “would set a precedent and + that the war would spread throughout Africa, because there isn’t a + single country there that does not have some border issue.”

+

“We believe,” Tito concluded, + “that it is necessary to resolve the question of Eritrea and Ogaden, but + within Ethiopia—to create an autonomous region within a federation. But + this would require the support + of the United Nations and of the Great Powers—first and foremost the + U.S.” Tito told Carter “I received your [January 31] letter + about our actions in the Horn of Africa. [see footnote 8, Document 251] I think that what you have asked is + entirely correct, albeit not to be mediators but to continue further + with our activity to contribute to a peaceful resolution of the issue + there as soon as possible. We have already decided earlier that our + Minister of Foreign Affairs, after our return from the U.S., will go to Ethiopia and Somalia.” + Tito promised to inform the + administration of the results of the Yugoslav diplomatic mission to the + two countries.

+

Carter stressed that the United States was “worried about the permanent + or occasional presence of the Soviet and Cuban troops in that region” + and that he hoped Soviet and Cuban forces would withdraw as soon as + peace was established. Carter continued: “I hope that the Soviet and + Cuban troops will agree that the UN and + the Organization of African Unity should be included in the resolution + of that conflict, because we don’t want that part of the world to be a + battlefield between ourselves and the Soviet Union.” The two Presidents + also discussed Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security + Affairs David Aaron’s diplomatic + Mission to Ethiopia. Tito + promised to continue the dialogue on the issue of the Horn with Moscow, + saying that “I believe that the Soviet Union should hear our opinion + about this question.”

+

The two Presidents also discussed at length the situation in the Middle + East. While noting that some progress had been made—such as Egyptian + President’s Anwar al-Sadat’s November 20, 1977, visit to Israel—Carter + suggested that important problems still needed to be resolved: “First: + withdrawal from the occupied territories; second: securing the borders; + third: the right [of Israel] to existence as a nation; fourth: the + orientation toward a peaceful solution to all problems; fifth: the + Palestinian question.” Carter told Tito that “we don’t think that a separate solution + between Israel and Egypt [alone] could be a lasting solution; we want an + all-encompassing solution to this problem.”

+

For his part, Tito suggested that + he had not agreed with Sadat’s visit to Israel since Sadat “did not + consult with other Arab states that are at war with Israel.” “Of + course,” Tito continued, “he did + not ask me either, but that is how he operates, that is his style. We + have distanced ourselves from this approach; we have been silent. It is + true that this act was very courageous, but also very risky, and what + happened, happened because no one supported him.” Tito also stressed that, despite his + disagreement with Sadat’s actions, he had given his support to the + Egyptian leader, because of the need to find a solution to the crisis in + the Middle East. Tito also + informed Carter of the contents of a letter he received from President + Sadat on the situation in the Middle East and that he was planning a + response to the Egyptian leader upon his return from Washington.

+ +

Regarding the situation in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, + Tito informed the President + that North Korean leader Kim Il-song had asked him to convey a message + on his behalf. “There is nothing new in this message beyond what I had + already conveyed to you,” Tito + told Carter, referencing his September 22, 1977, letter. (See footnote 5, Document 243.) “The most + important point is that they want to have a dialogue, but not in the + presence of the South Korean President Park Chung-hee.” Kim Il-song had + given his assurances, Tito + informed Carter, that the North had no desire to “impose their system + into South Korea.” “If there would be a meeting,” Tito continued, “not at the top level + but at the level of delegations of both countries, they could discuss + that question [of UN representation]. + That way, it would be possible to discuss the situation in much more + detail, and what needed to be done would become clearer. Of course, the + U.S. should provide its delegation + as the third party.” “That is good advice,” responded Carter, suggesting + that Secretary of State Cyrus + Vance and Foreign Minister Milos Minic could further analyze the proposal. “I will + inform Kim Il-song about it,” Tito offered, “but I need to know if you agree with my + proposal.” Carter answered: “It would definitely be better for us and + for South Korea that our delegations meet at the lower level; later we + shall see.”

+

According to the English translation available in the CWIHP, the meeting + concluded at 12:35 p.m.

+
+ +
+ 254. Memorandum of ConversationSource: National Archives, RG 59, Office of the Secretariat Staff, Ambassador at + Large and Representative of the President for Nonproliferation + Matters (S/AS), Gerard C. Smith, 1977–1980, Lot 81D287, Box 2, + Yugoslavia 1978. Secret. Drafted by Johnson; approved in S/S on March 23. The meeting took place + in the Secretary’s Conference Room. + + + Washington, March 8, 1978, 11 a.m. + + + SUBJECT + The Secretary’s Meeting with Yugoslav Foreign Secretary Minic + + + PARTICIPANTS + + + U.S. + The Secretary + The Counselor + Lawrence + Eagleburger, U.S. Ambassador to Yugoslavia + George S. Vest, + Assistant Secretary for European Affairs + Richard Holbrooke, Assistant Secretary for Asian and + Pacific Affairs + Raymond Albright, Vice President of the Export-Import + Bank + William H. Luers, + Deputy Assistant Secretary for European Affairs + Louis V. Nosenzo, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Oceans, + International Environmental and Scientific Affairs + Nicholas G. + Andrews, Director of the Office of Eastern + European Affairs + Darryl N. Johnson, Country Officer for Yugoslavia + Michael Petrovich, Interpreter + + + + + YUGOSLAVIA + Milos Minic, Vice + President of the Federal Executive Council and Federal + Secretary for Foreign Affairs + Dragan Bernardic, Assistant Federal Secretary for Foreign + Affairs + Dimce Belovski, Yugoslav Ambassador to the United + States + Svetozar Starcevic, Director of the Office of North + American Affairs + Vladimir Sindjelic, Minister-Counselor of the Yugoslav + Embassy, Washington + Vladimir Matic, Political Counselor of the Yugoslav + Embassy, Washington + Zvonimir Petnicki, Interpreter + + + +

Korea. After opening remarks, Secretary Vance asked Secretary Minic for clarification of President + Tito’s comment to the + President the previous day suggesting contacts with North Korea.See Document + 253. He wanted to clarify that these contacts would + involve the North and South Koreans as well as the United States. + Minic replied that this + understanding was correct. He continued that President Tito, before his departure for + Washington, had received a detailed message from President Kim Il-song, + but it contained no new ideas and largely repeated those which President + Tito had relayed to Carter + last fall.Letter from Tito to Carter, September 22, + 1977. See footnote 5, Document + 243. The major obstacle to conversations was still + South Korean President Park. During Tito’s visit to + Pyongyang, Kim had emphasized his willingness to hold talks with both + the United States and South Korea, but not with President Park. + President Carter’s reply had said that the U.S. was not in a position to change Park. Therefore it is + necessary to give thought to some new approach. In his recent message, + Kim had again insisted on the removal of Park. The suggestion for + lower-level talks was President Tito’s own initiative and President Carter was the first person to whom he + had suggested it. If this is acceptable to the U.S., Tito would + begin a dialogue to see what the North Koreans would accept. At present + the situation is blocked, and the question is how to unblock it. This is + Tito’s suggestion. Kim’s + stand is known and his first reaction will no doubt be negative. But + there may be some flexibility which the Yugoslavs will seek to + explore.

+

Secretary Vance emphasized that + we would not take part in any talks without the South Koreans being + present. Minic reiterated that + the Yugoslavs understood this and noted that the North Koreans wanted + direct talks with the U.S. to replace + the armistice agreement. This subject was also discussed in detail in + Peking, and the Chinese indicated that they would not interfere in the + Korean situation. A solution depends entirely on the Koreans, they said. + Tito discussed the matter at + length with Chairman Hua Kuo-feng and Minic himself with Foreign Minister Huang Hua. He asked + whether the U.S. agreed that the + situation was blocked.

+

Secretary Vance replied that we + would consider the Yugoslav proposal and that we had no difficulties + with it, as stated. He expressed his opinion that the South Koreans + likewise would go along. The result therefore, depends upon Kim Il-song. + Minic said that the Yugoslavs + would be very satisfied if Kim recognizes the realities of the situation + and the need to break the deadlock. Assistant Secretary Holbrooke said + that perhaps the Yugoslavs could pursue the idea with the North Koreans + while we consult with the South Koreans. He agreed that the idea was + worth pursuing.

+

Science and Technology. Turning to bilateral + matters, Secretary Vance thanked + Minic for his letter on the + question of cooperation in science and technology. He said he had + followed up on the funding requirements to continue the program and told + Minic that the President had + now agreed that we would seek a $7 million appropriation (to cover a + five-year period) on a matching basis.In a + January 30 letter delivered by the Yugoslav Embassy to the + Department of State, Minic + suggested that the U.S. Government + pay annuitants in Yugoslavia in dollars to free up dinars for the + program. (Telegram 48421 to Belgrade, February 24; National + Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign + Policy File, D780088–0797) See also footnote + 10, Document 251. This appropriation would be a part of the regular State + Department budget, and the program would be administered by the State + Department. Minic said this was a + satisfactory solution and he emphasized the importance of the program + for mutual understanding, particularly for Yugoslavia as a developing + country. Secretary Vance said we + agree on its importance, and will be pleased if we can continue it by + this means.

+

Economic Matters, Exim Bank. On the question of loans and + “super-guarantees”, Minic said + that he was glad to see the representative of the U.S. EximBank in the meeting and suggested + that perhaps this was the moment when the two sides could reach + agreement.The Yugoslav Government + advised the ExIm Bank that it + would no longer be able to provide “super-guarantees” by the + Yugoslav National Bank on ExIm + loans to Yugoslav businesses. Tarnoff informed Brzezinski of the emerging dispute between the + ExIm Bank and the Yugoslav + Government in a February 11 memorandum. (Carter Library, National + Security Affairs, Brzezinski + Material, VIP Visit File, Box 15, Yugoslavia, President Tito, 3/6–9/78: Cables and + Memos) Before coming to Washington, Minic said he had held detailed talks + with the Prime Minister, the Finance Minister and the Vice Premier about + this problem. The situation now is that the U.S. has made a proposal which is not acceptable in its + present form to the Yugoslav side. He outlined the Yugoslav position as + follows:

+

Cooperation with ExIm has been very + significant. Until a year ago 50% of U.S. loans were through ExIm. Now the percentage has dropped to thirty but the + government of Yugoslavia is very interested in continuing its + cooperation with ExIm. However, the + new Constitution and the law of associated labor had introduced reforms. + Under these provisions the Government of Yugoslavia and the National + Bank do not have the right to issue “super-guarantees”. In order to + reinstitute this procedure, a change of the law and perhaps an amendment + to the Constitution would be necessary. Individual banks, a group of + banks or a consortium of banks could give guarantees. Or a new bank for + Export and Import which Yugoslavia is establishing to deal with + questions of foreign trade and financing could give guarantees. The + government can say that any bank or group of banks can get the required + amounts of foreign exchange to meet its obligations on the basis of its + dinar holdings. In the Yugoslav view, this should be sufficient to meet + the requirement for guarantees. All European banks have agreed to this + system and no longer require a “super-guarantee”. He urged that we do + everything possible to resolve this problem. After this visit, the + Secretary of Finance will send a written proposal to ExIm giving a detailed response.

+

Minic added that the Yugoslav side + had a very positive reaction to the formation of working groups on + economic cooperation to be headed by Assistant Ministers and + Ambassadors. He said that economic ties with the United States had not developed + sufficiently. Trade with the Soviet Union last year was approximately + $2.5 billion. With the FRG, trade was + approximately $2 billion, but was not balanced, with Yugoslavia having a + huge deficit of $1.2 billion. In the past the deficit had been largely + made up by revenues from tourism and remittances from Yugoslavs working + in Germany. But this past year there was a short-fall of $200 million. + With Italy trade was over $1.5 billion, and was well developed but also + unbalanced. With the U.S. the long-term + aim is to expand trade and the U.S. + should be among those in the first rank of Yugoslav trading partners. + The present deficit situation with the EEC cannot continue in its present form. The difficulties + with the EEC already transcend tolerable limits. Its trade with + third countries is highly protectionist, especially on agricultural + products. It is a very difficult situation in which Yugoslavia can cover + only thirty percent of its trade through exports. The U.S. market is fair but difficult for + Yugoslav exporters. Exchanges in recent years have been more or less + balanced. There have been talks with the EEC, but the first round did not give grounds for optimism. + Yugoslavia’s aim is to expand economic ties with the U.S., and ExIm should seek to help in this process.

+

Secretary Vance said that we + welcome Yugoslavia’s objective of expanding economic relations with the + U.S. and we agree with it. He + thanked Minic for his proposal on + ExIm and said that he would + discuss the matter further with Mr. Albright and President Moore and would be back in touch. The important thing, + he said, is to find a solution to this question. Minic reemphasized his wish that the + U.S. government promote the + long-term expansion of trade and finance and added that U.S. businessmen know well the Yugoslav + laws which encourage foreign investment. Expansion remains the important + thing, including industrial cooperation.

+

Krsko Fuel License. Minic called on Assistant Secretary Bernardic to discuss + the Krsko question. He noted that Bernardic and Assistant Secretary + Vest had met the previous + evening and that Bernardic had presented the Yugoslav suggestion for an + interim agreement pending adoption of an international convention on + nuclear export controls.No separate record + of the meeting was found. In telegram 67708 to Belgrade, March 16, + Andrews informed the + Embassy that the discussion took place, but that “Bernardic did not + go into any more detail than he did at the Vance-Minic meeting.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + D780117–0865) Bernardic said his talks with Vest had been very useful but he + emphasized that these were not negotiations, which must be left to + Ambassador Kljun and U.S. officials who + deal with this question. Their conversation was intended to move the + effort forward. He said that the situation is now very fluid with some + important matters not clearly defined, including the agreements with the IAEA, and the + implementation of the new U.S. law on + nuclear exports. Also, he said, the INFCE will continue its work over + the next two years or more and a UN + Conference on Nuclear Energy will be convened. It is important that any + arrangement made now be consistent with agreements already concluded or + to be concluded. The Yugoslavs thought it premature to go for a + long-term agreement at this time and therefore suggested a temporary + agreement for four or five years to provide the fuel and to await the + conclusion of an international convention. Under this arrangement + Yugoslavia would clearly reaffirm its commitments under the NPT as well + as bilateral and international commitments. When these are summed up, + they would cover all matters of concern to the U.S. side. Such a solution would meet the requirements of + the Yugoslav situation. Yugoslavia was among the first signers of the + NPT and was in the front line of those countries fighting for it. + Between the industrialized and nonaligned countries there is need to + understand the needs of each and to meet the special requirements in + this case. We should be able to work out an interim solution; we should + examine the concrete situation and should seek to help the + negotiations.

+

Mr. Vest replied that this + Yugoslav approach differs significantly from that discussed earlier, and + that he had not had a chance to consult with the experts on the subject. + He said it would also have to be acceptable to the Nuclear Regulatory + Commission and in harmony with our new legislation. We will pursue this + matter. Secretary Vance said + that the plan for continuing discussions was a good one, but that the + subject is very difficult because of the strict limits of our law. We + will do all we can within those limits and without discrimination + against others with whom we deal on this question. Minic said he also agreed that the two + sides should meet soon to continue their discussions. (The Yugoslavs + will give us their proposal in writing.)

+

Emigre Matters and Terrorism. + Minic said that the Yugoslavs are + pleased to note that the present Administration is acting more + energetically on this question. During President Ford’s visit to + Belgrade in 1975, Minic had given + a pro memoria paper to Secretary Kissinger on all of these matters. Now + there was a new paper which brought the information up to date. The + problem basically is that there are too many acts by the same small + groups of people which remain unsolved and unpunished.

+

Secretary Vance said that this is + a matter of great importance to us and that since the Carter + Administration came into office we have seen the resolution of the TWA + hijacking and of the break-in at the Yugoslav UN Mission. (He noted that in these matters we were + following actions initiated during the prior Administration.) He + continued that we also feel very strongly about the broader question of + international terrorism and + that we supported efforts in the UN and + elsewhere to find effective measures to combat it. We hope that we can + work together with Yugoslavia to put teeth into these measures. + Minic said he agreed on the + problem, and in the UN there had been + some efforts. But there were differing views. The main issue concerned + the “national liberation” movements. It is difficult among the + nonaligned to get agreement if the effect is to inhibit the struggle by + those involved in “national liberation” movements. If the political + causes which give rise to these kinds of disturbances were resolved the + broader issue could also be resolved. In that case, we would be left + with the other problem, which is a common threat to mankind. He + suggested that the U.S. talk with other + nonaligned countries, and offered to be of assistance in arranging these + contacts. Secretary Vance said + we agreed that such consultations would be useful and we will seek them + with other nonaligned countries as well as with Yugoslavia.

+

Minic said that he thought all + bilateral matters had been covered and that the two secretaries should + tell the two Presidents that they need not deal with them, but could go + on to other international questions. Secretary Vance agreed.

+

Horn of Africa. Noting that there were some + additional time remaining, Secretary Minic said that he would like to follow up on some of + the topics discussed the previous day by the two Presidents. On the Horn + of Africa, he said that he would be received by both Mengistu (of + Ethiopia) and Siad Barre (of + Somalia) on his forthcoming visit. He said he hoped both would not be + angry because of President Tito’s comments in his interview with James Reston. + Regardless of this, Yugoslavia has very good relations with both, and + both want Yugoslavia’s full support in their dispute. The Yugoslavs have + told them that they cannot agree that war can solve their problems, and + that these and similar questions must be resolved by peaceful means. The + Yugoslavs had thought much about this question, and others including + President Carter had also + expressed their concern. Yugoslavia has a diplomatic dialogue with both + countries, but feels that no solution is possible until the military + situation changes. It now appears that the military situation is + changing so a solution may be closer. It should be on the basis on the + principles outlined by the two Presidents in their previous meeting. It + is best that neither side be victor nor vanquished but resolve the + matter fairly through negotiations. Yugoslavia has informed five or six + countries about its plan and has asked for parallel approaches. All + would be informed of the results. Concerning the U.S., it would be very good to implement the understanding + between Mr. Aaron and President + Mengistu and send a new Ambassador to Ethiopia as soon as possible. This + should go together with further efforts to bring about the withdrawal of + Soviet and Cuban forces. Minic + asked that we consider candidly + why Ethiopia was pushed to seek aid from the other side. The withdrawal + of US aid had been a big blow. Ethiopia was a very poor country, with a + per capita income of about $50 per year. Thus it needed aid wherever it + could get it. The US should also encourage Ethiopian nonalignment. + Mengistu was strongly committed to nonalignment, but there are many + younger people near the top who may not be. The important thing now is + to maintain a dialogue.

+

Secretary Vance thanked Minic for Yugoslavia’s assistance on + Mr. Aaron’s recent trip to + Ethiopia. He agreed that the solution to the conflict would have to come + through negotiations and noted that Soviet and Cuban troops would have + to be withdrawn. He expressed concern about the apparent ineffectiveness + of the OAU mediation effort, which had largely fallen through. He was + not sure that the OAU could handle the problem, and asked what the role + of outside powers should be if the instrument the Africans prefer to use + cannot be effective.

+

Minic replied that the OAU is in a + period of crisis, and that its problems parallel those of the current + conflict. He agreed that the OAU should assume responsibility for + solving the problem. Outside interference is “most obnoxious”. Friendly + advice and influence are not out of line, but the OAU should play the + main role. Yugoslavia is in contact with Foreign Minister Garba of + Nigeria, who understands the problem very well. (Secretary Vance said that we are also in close + contact with Garba.) Garba has asked for patience, but the Yugoslavs + believe that the OAU cannot do much and others should try to help. + Minic will carry messages + from Tito to Siad Barre and Mengistu and to + President Numayri of the Sudan, who is also very concerned. Minic promised to inform us of the + results of his visit.On April 14, Belovski + met with Newsom to deliver a + letter from Minic to + Vance on his trip to + Ethiopia, Somalia, the Sudan, and the Soviet Union. The meeting and + letter were reported in telegram 98712 to Belgrade, April 18. + (National Archives, RG 59, Central + Foreign Policy File, D780165–1072) Vance responded to Minic’s letter on May 12, thanking Minic for the information on his + mission to the Horn of Africa and describing his talks in Moscow + with Foreign Minister Gromyko. The Department forwarded the text of the + letter in telegram 122712 to Belgrade, May 13. (National Archives, + RG 59, Central Foreign Policy + File, D780204–0269)

+

Secretary Vance said that it will + be worthwhile to talk with the Sudan, which has offered to mediate. + Garba has indicated that he will call on the ad hoc committee to meet + with the entire OAU board. We should press for a solution along the + lines discussed by President Carter and Tito, + and he would look forward to Minic’s report.

+

Minic said he hoped India could + play a role, and Foreign Minister Vajpayee will become more active, if + Prime Minister Desai agrees. Vance said he had also discussed this matter with + Vajpayee during the President’s visit to India.

+ +

Middles East. Regarding yesterday’s talks + Minic wanted to make it clear + that although President Tito + indicated that he would not have supported President Sadat’s recent + initiative if Sadat had sought his view, there was no dispute about + Egypt’s right to choose the means it felt would be most effective. + Yugoslavia did not comment at the time but felt that the initiative + would not work. They foresaw that one result would be that a group of + Arab countries would form a “rejection front” and would look for support + from the Soviet Union. This has indeed happened. Tito told those who met in Tripoli to + adopt a moderate approach, but they did not and the extremist statement + which resulted from that meeting was “ridiculous”. After waiting for the + situation to settle down, those countries have been in touch with + Tito and have exchanged + messages. Tito advised that the + solution could not come through extreme opposition to Egypt or in an + extreme reaction by Egypt. But Sadat “very emotionally” broke relations + with all those countries. Yugoslav efforts now are directed at + overcoming the problems between the other Arabs and Egypt. Yugoslavia + advised that the “rejectionists” meet again to adopt a more realistic + position. He asked what can be done if the direct Egypt-Israeli talks do + not produce a result. The situation is very dangerous. Yugoslavia does + not share the opinion that this would bring about the downfall of Sadat, + since he has great support in Egypt. But it is possible that he will + then draw on this support to turn to a harder line. He will say that he + has done all he possibly can and taken great risks but that Israel has + not been responsive. He may also say that the U.S. did not give enough support to his efforts. Then the + whole issue will be back to the starting line. Minic asked if in our view there was + any other approach and inquired about the possibility of a preparatory + conference for a Geneva Conference which would include all likely + participants. He said that this idea has not yet been discussed with + [us?] but Yugoslavia believes that UN + Secretary General Waldheim’s recent initiative was a good one, though + premature. Is there any third road to a solution, he asked, and what is + the current status of the joint statement between Secretary Vance and Soviet Foreign Minister + Gromyko last October?The United States and the Soviet Union issued + a joint statement on the Middle East on October 1, 1977. The + statement proposed guidelines and procedures for Arab-Israeli + negotiations of a comprehensive peace settlement in the Middle East + and called for an international conference in Geneva. (Department of + State Bulletin, November 7, 1977, pp. + 639–640) Was it still valid, were the Soviets still + interested in playing a role?

+

Secretary Vance said that the + joint statement with Gromyko + stands and the Soviets agree that it remains valid. Minic noted that the Yugoslavs had + expressed support for the statement on the day it was issued. Vance said that the statement is being used as a basis + for negotiating a Declaration of Principles among the relevant states. + There is nothing inconsistent between the statement and our mediating + role. Unfortunately, the parties are still far apart on the questions of + the Palestinians and the Gaza Strip. It is still too early to say that + direct negotiations have failed and we feel that we should continue to + support this approach. In this connection we invited Prime Minister + Begin, and President Sadat agrees with this. (The Secretary said that we + would inform Yugoslavia about the results of the Begin visit.)In telegram 114888 to multiple posts, May 5, + the Department provided talking points for briefing of host + governments on Begin and Dayan’s visit to the United States. + (National Archives, RG 59, Central + Foreign Policy File, D780192–0898) In telegram 3633 from Belgrade, + May 12, the Embassy reported Eagleburger’s conversation on May 10 with Yugoslav + Foreign Ministry Assistant Secretary Komatina, in which the + Ambassador briefed the Yugoslav official on the visit. (National + Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign + Policy File, D780203–0446)

+

We must pursue the present course until its succeeds or fails, and we + should know soon about the outcome. If it fails we believe that the + Waldheim proposal for a wider meeting within the context of the United + Nations but separate from the Geneva Conference, is a worthwhile + possibility. It should, however, be seen as a preparation for the Geneva + Conference. The Secretary said that he had discussed this question last + week with Secretary General Waldheim. Minic said he agreed with this assessment and Vance said that he did not see a third + alternative as being necessary yet.

+

Secretary Minic then said that he + had been very satisfied with this discussion and felt that this personal + contact was very useful and helpful. He suggested that in addition to + the messages between the two Presidents, he and Vance write to each other if there are + matters which they feel can be dealt with at that level. Secretary + Vance said that is an + excellent idea which he wholeheartedly supports. Minic then invited Secretary Vance to come to Yugoslavia as he had + previously promised and Secretary Vance said that is a promise he intended to carry out + with great pleasure.

+ +
+ +
+ 255. Editorial Note +

On March 9, 1978, President Jimmy + Carter and Yugoslav President Josip Broz Tito met again from 9:34 to + 11:04 a.m. in the White House Cabinet Room. (Carter Library, + Presidential Materials, President’s Daily Diary) This time Secretary of + Defense Harold Brown also joined + the U.S. delegation, while Vice + President Walter Mondale was + absent. No transcript of the + conversation has been found in U.S. + archives. The Yugoslav Government prepared its own memorandum of + conversation, available in the Archives of Yugoslavia, Belgrade, Serbia. + A copy of the document and its translation are available in the Woodrow + Wilson Center’s Cold War International History Project (CWIHP). The + excerpts below are taken from the CWIHP translation.

+

Noting that the March 8 discussion between Secretary of State Cyrus Vance and Yugoslav Foreign + Minister Milos Minic was + successful, Carter suggested continuing their discussion of + international issues, unless President Tito felt it necessary to clarify some of the remaining + bilateral issues. Tito replied: + “I would like to talk about the issues of détente as one of the key + issues in the relations between the U.S. + and the Soviet Union.” “I have been convinced,” Tito stated, “that you are making + efforts from your side toward détente.” Noting that more trust was + necessary to improve the relationship between the two superpowers, + Tito assured Carter that he + would “report to Brezhnev the + general impression I got from you about the issues of international + problems and détente, including my opinion that it would be necessary + for the two of you to meet and have a dialogue among yourselves.” + Informing Tito of the + outstanding invitation to the White House he had extended to Brezhnev, Carter added: “I would be + grateful, Mr. President, if you could influence him so that he accepts + the invitation and visits the U.S.”

+

The two leaders discussed the developing situation in Somalia, as well as + their respective positions vis-à-vis the situation in Rhodesia and + Namibia. The United States and United Kingdom had carried out joint + negotiations on the Rhodesia problem, Carter informed Tito. Carter continued: “There are + good contacts with the presidents of the so-called Frontline States and + with the members of the United Nations. We cannot recognize the + so-called internal settlement of the problem if it is not in the line + with the Anglo-American negotiations. We hope we will be able to help + the national leaders to meet in the near future.” Carter expressed his + hope that, when the new Rhodesian Government was formed and recognized, + it “will refuse the involvement of the foreign forces, which should not + interfere with the internal issues of Rhodesia.”

+

Turning to the upcoming Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) Foreign Ministers’ + conference in Belgrade, Tito + informed Carter that the Yugoslav Government remained very active in its preparation as well as the + preparation for the NAM summit in Havana, which he hoped would + contribute to a constructive conference. “Now we have a situation in + which non-aligned countries are at war with one another,” Tito declared, making reference to the + Horn of Africa and the situation in South East Asia. Tito continued: “There is an important + issue for the Non-Aligned countries to deal with: preventing the split + of the non-aligned countries into ‘right’ and ‘left,’ into ‘progressive’ + and ‘non-progressive’ countries.” Tito concluded: “We all must work to prevent that from + happening. There are such tendencies from several sides,” alluding to + Cuba, “and we will not allow this to happen.” As Carter expressed his + concern that Havana might not be the most appropriate venue for the next + NAM conference, Tito replied: + “We are concerned about Cuba too, but what can we do?” He continued: “If + we allowed a split into ‘progressive’ and ‘non-progressive’ countries, + we would face quarrels internally and externally.” “That is why the + Conference of Foreign Ministers in Belgrade is important,” Minic interjected, “because many are + concerned about how the Conference in Havana will proceed, because they + are concerned that Havana may direct the Non-Aligned Movement in a + different direction.” The Belgrade conference, Minic concluded, should “achieve a + platform that cannot be changed.”

+

The conversation then shifted to the relationship between the Soviet + Union and the United States. Minic stated that “it seems that the Soviet Union has + come to believe that U.S.A. is not in + any hurry to conclude SALT, but is + seeking to postpone [agreement].” “We hear” he continued, that the + Soviet leadership believed that this is “a calculating move to prolong + the arms race, and this is a great burden on the Soviet Union. Since the + U.S. economy is far stronger than + the Soviet economy, it is easier for the U.S. to endure the [arms] race and, according to President + Tito’s talks with Brezhnev, there is a serious [Soviet] + interest that race be stopped so that Brezhnev can focus on the internal problems, which are + quite severe.” The Middle East situation, which the Soviet bureaucracy + saw as a ploy by the United States to limit Soviet influence in the + region, was described by Minic as + another reason for Soviet distrust of the United States. Lastly, + Minic suggested that U.S. policy on human rights added to Soviet + apprehensions: “In talks with them, we see that they perceive it as a + calculating move to destabilize the East European countries.” Minic concluded: “Much will need to be + done to dispel Soviet belief that this action is aimed at destabilizing + Eastern European countries.” Human rights, Carter responded, could + easily be solved during a meeting with Brezhnev.

+

What “worries us tremendously,” Carter noted, “is the issue of enormous + increase in armament of the Soviet Union, which is constantly increasing + military expenditures, three to four percent above inflation, while our military budget is + smaller than 18 years ago.” Carter continued: “This worries not only us, + but also China and Western Europe. We believe that the Soviet commitment + to increase its conventional and nuclear weapons [stockpiles] is much + larger than what is required for self-defense.” Carter concluded that, + while “there are world problems, world issues, which connect the United + States with the Soviet Union,” these issues are “stronger than the + disagreements, the differences that divide us.” He told the Yugoslav + delegation: “We are very grateful that you are ready to relay our + opinion to the Soviet Union, and that you have passed to us their + opinions.”

+

The meeting ended with an appeal from Tito for a halt in the U.S. development of the neutron bomb. “I think the bomb is + wrong,” Tito declared. “The + Soviet Union and the U.S. have nuclear + weapons, and these are very powerful weapons,” he continued. “Regarding + the N bomb, the Soviet Union can make it within a short period of time, + but it costs a great deal, it is a burden on its economy. I think that, + if there was to be a war and the neutron bomb were to be used, nuclear + weapons will be used immediately after. I am certain of that, because + neither side will allow itself to be defeated. This all leads in the + direction of mutual self-annihilation,” Tito concluded. Carter countered that the United States + had not yet made the decision as to whether to produce the bomb, and + that it was a weapon limited to a defensive character. “The Soviet S–20 + bombs are much more dangerous,” Carter added, “and the S–20 also worries + Western Europe, not just us.” Carter concluded: “The Soviet Union has a + large number of various weapons which are much more dangerous and have a + greater impact and range than the Neutron bomb.” The meeting ended at + 11:04, when Carter escorted Tito + to the South Lawn for his departure.

+

In the joint statement released by the two governments at the conclusion + of the visit, the discussions were described as “extensive and useful,” + held in “a spirit of mutual regard, candor, and friendship” and that the + meeting reinforced “the already strong foundations of the US-Yugoslav + relations.” The joint statement also referenced that the two Presidents + had emphasized “the decisive importance of the development of energy for + the economic growth of all countries, and of the developing countries in + particular, and they believe therefore that nuclear energy for peaceful + purposes should be made accessible to all countries without + discrimination.” (Public Papers: Carter, 1978, + Book I, pages 485–488)

+
+ +
+ 256. Telegram From the Embassy in Yugoslavia to the Department of + StateSource: National + Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign + Policy File, D780312–0778. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Drafted and approved by + Eagleburger. (National + Archives, RG 59, Office of the + Secretariat Staff, Lawrence S. + Eagleburger, Under Secretary of State for Political + Affairs, Ambassador to Yugoslavia, Under Secretary of State for + Management (1967–1984), Lot 84D204, Box 9, Ambassador Outgoing Cable + Chron, April–August, 1978) + + + + + + Belgrade, July 30, 1978, 1213Z + +

5561. Subj: Tito and Harriman Meeting.Harriman + also met with Vrhovec to + discuss the Non-Aligned Movement (telegram 5557 from Belgrade, July + 29; National Archives, Central Foreign Policy File, D780312–0204) + and the status of US-Yugoslav bilateral relations. (Telegram 5696 + from Belgrade, August 3; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + D780319–0299)

+

1. Governor Harriman, accompanied + by Ambassador Eagleburger, was + received July 28 by President Tito at his private retreat on the island of Vanga. + Following an hour and fifteen minute conversation between the Governor + and the President, attended by Ambassador Eagleburger and Tito’s Chef d’Cabinet Bauderina, President Tito hosted a luncheon for the + Governor and Mrs. Harriman, + attended by Ambassador and Mrs. Eagleburger, Mr. Bauderina and a few other Yugoslav + guests.

+

2. During the meeting preceding lunch the discussion included + nonalignment, Soviet-US relations, China, and US-Yugoslav relations. + Highlights of the conversation on each of these subjects follows:

+

3. Nonalignment. Governor Harriman + complimented President Tito on + his speech to the NAM conference,The + Foreign Ministers of the Non-Aligned countries met in Belgrade July + 26–30. In a July 21 memorandum to Carter, Brzezinski recommended that the + President sign a message to Vrhovec, who served as Chairman of the Conference. + The message had been privately requested by the Yugoslavs earlier, + to “strengthen the hand of the moderates in dealing with the Cubans + and their friends during the meeting.” Brzezinski suggested that, while the message might + not have much of an impact on the outcome of the meeting, it would + “reinforce our position that we believe the Non-aligned [Movement] + can be a constructive force in world affairs.” (Carter Library, + National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Brzezinski Office File, Country Chron File, Box 57, + Yugoslavia: 4–12/78) Carter approved the message. (Ibid.) The + message was transmitted to Eagleburger on July 24 in telegram 185993 to + Belgrade. (National Archives, RG 59, + Central Foreign Policy File, D780302–1013) saying it showed + what “real nonalignment is,” and asked for the President’s evaluation of + the current state of the NAM, and Cuba’s role therein. President + Tito said that the + nonaligned are now faced with efforts to dilute the concept of + nonalignment as established in 1961. The Cubans will be nominally at the + head of the movement for the three years following the Havana Summit and + Yugoslavia is working hard now to assure that Castro will not “dominate” + the NAM during that period. He asked rhetorically “where was Cuba in 1961 when we began + things?” and added that the effort by “some” to turn the NAM into a + “third factor between the blocs, but supporting one bloc, could only + make the world situation worse.” Yugoslavia did not intend to let that + happen. Tito went on to say that + Castro will not succeed in his attempts to split the movement into what + Cuba describes as “progressive” and “reactionary” factions, and that + Yugoslavia had strong allies in its battle against Castro’s attempts to + take over the movement. These allies, he said, include Algeria, + Tanzania, India, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, Zambia, and “many others.” “We + are not afraid,” he said, “and we are ready to do battle.”

+

4. In response to a Harriman + question on Soviet and Cuban activities in Africa, Tito said that “some intervention” in + African affairs may be a necessary evil, given the current state of + relations on the continent. But no African country will let its policies + be changed by the presence of foreign elements within the country. + President Tito noted that he was + particularly pleased that in the speeches given at the opening session + of the NAM Conference this week in response to his address, the + spokesmen from each of the four continents went out of their way to + stress the need for NAM unity and to pay tribute to Yugoslavia for its + leading role within the movement.

+

5. US-Soviet relations. Governor Harriman noted that US-Soviet relations had deteriorated + in the period since the Governor had seen President Tito in Washington last March. The + Governor said he wanted to reassure President Tito, however, that President + Carter remains firmly + committed to both SALT and a CTB. He + added that Secretary Vance has + developed a very good relationship of mutual confidence with Foreign + Minister Gromyko and that he + believes that this personal relationship will be a great asset in the + months ahead. He went on to explain to President Tito the severe impact that the + Shcharanskiy trialAnatoly Borisovich + Shcharansky, human rights activist and spokesman for the Moscow + Helsinki Group was considered one of the founders of the Refusnik + movement in the Soviet Union. In 1977, he was arrested on charges of + spying for the United States and sentenced to 13 years in a labor + camp. Released in 1986, he emigrated to Israel. has had on + Congress and public opinion in the United States and that as a + consequence the President’s room for maneuver would continue severely + restricted in the absence of some conciliatory move on the part of the + Soviets. The Governor asked whether President Tito saw any way for the US and the + Soviets to move to free themselves from their present difficulties.

+

5. President Tito replied that he + had heard that there was a possibility of an exchange of the two Soviet + spies arrested in New York for Shcharanskiy, and that if this exchange + went forward it might at least serve to remove the case as a cause + celebre. Governor Harriman said + that he also understood + that such an exchange might be a possibility but did not know whether it + would in fact take place.

+

6. President Tito said “I + continue to hope that the United States is ready to put the issue of + human rights in its proper perspective and emphasize attempts to resolve + the main issues that exist between the US and the USSR. That is the impression I got from + President Carter when I visited + Washington, and I hope it is still his intention.” Governor Harriman commented that the + Shcharanskiy case—a direct Soviet provocation and personal insult to the + President—has deeply provoked the American public. Did President + Tito have any suggestions on + how we might proceed now, given the impact of the Shcharanskiy case? + Tito said that the United + States must understand that Soviet prestige is intimately involved in + the Shcharanskiy and Ginzburg cases.Vitaly + Lazarevich Ginzburg, Soviet journalist, author, and human rights + activist. He was imprisoned several times in the 1960s and released + and expelled from the Soviet Union in 1979. The Soviets are + intent upon showing the US and the dissidents that the latter cannot be + “used” in discussions of other issues. The Soviets are doing this for + both internal and international reasons. They have decided to be “more + determined” in their opposition to the United States; they intend to + show that the Soviets will not, when pushed on the issue of dissidents, + retreat. They mean to demonstrate to the United States that it must stay + out of the internal affairs of the Soviet Union.

+

7. Governor Harriman pointed out + that despite the differences over human rights the Soviets continue to + be ready to negotiate on SALT and have + for the first time put forth a constructive MBFR proposal. Moscow is, in other words, indicating its + desire to move ahead in the area of arms control, which is of interest + to both countries. This is true, said Tito, but Moscow considers US involvement with the + dissidents as interference in its internal affairs and will not accept + it. Shcharanskiy, Ginzburg, and the other dissidents are, so far as + Moscow is concerned, citizens of the Soviet Union, and only they can + decide the manner in which they will be judged under their laws. + “Personally I feel that the Soviets are not unrealistic in their view + that no one can play in their internal affairs. Frankly, the + administration’s most serious mistake was to have put such extreme + emphasis on human rights at the Belgrade Conference” (CSCE). Every large country, said + Tito, will always insist + that it has the right to decide its own affairs. So far as US public + opinion is concerned, Moscow believes that has always been anti-Soviet + and therefore changes in degree are unimportant. The Soviets are not + particularly impressed with administration arguments about its public + opinion problems.

+ +

8. Governor Harriman said that + President Carter has consistently + and recently made it clear that neither he nor the United States + Government wants to intervene in the internal affairs of the Soviet + Union. But, with regard to the Shcharanskiy case, there is no way that + the administration can change its present position. The Soviets need to + make some gesture.

+

9. President Tito returned again + to his reference to the Belgrade. CSCE, saying that the administration’s initial approach to + human rights was “unfortunate.” Washington failed to recognize that the + Belgrade CSCE was to address issues of + European security; those security issues should have been the focus, + rather than the overwhelming emphasis on human rights. Tito said there is no question that + human rights are important, but there should be some “balance.”

+

10. What is needed now, Tito + said, is to find some way to “freeze the controversy” so that the US and + the USSR can devote themselves to + basic issues. Perhaps the administration, while continuing to maintain + the importance of human rights, could emphasize the need to resolve + basic differences between the two countries that affect the + possibilities for peace.

+

11. China. Governor Harriman + recalled that President Tito had + once told him that the Chinese had called him a “revisionist bandit,” + but relations now have greatly changed. He asked for the President’s + view of China. Tito said he had + some impressions from his recent visit to Peking, and would know more + following Hua Kuo-feng’s visit to Yugoslavia in August. He indicated + that as far as he was concerned there is no question that the new + Chinese leadership is actively searching for ways to open itself to the + world; they know they cannot develop without contact with the outside; + they are a poor country and greatly in need of technological and + industrial development and vast improvement in their agricultural + situation. They are interested in Western technology to make up for + their backwardness; additionally, they are intent upon creating a modern + army since they recognize that numbers are no longer the “essential + factor.” “The Chinese want—and they are absolutely right—maximum + security. And they want to know the world better.”

+

12. Tito said that during his + visit to Peking he had reproached the Chinese leadership with regard to + their policy in Africa. He said that the PRC was so intensely anti-Soviet that it was prepared to + support whatever African regime found itself threatened by the USSR or allies of the USSR. This is, said Tito, “unprincipled.” But at the same + time he recognized that it was inevitable, since Peking views the USSR as its “first and main enemy.”

+

13. President Tito said that he + would hold extensive talks with Hua Kuo-feng when the latter is in + Belgrade. The Chinese have indicated they are interested in studying Yugoslavia’s agricultural + system, its industrial development and its system of self management. + The Chinese may try to introduce at least some aspects of the self + management system in an attempt to stimulate production.

+

14. Governor Harriman noted that + he was sure that any thoughts President Tito might have on China following the August Hua + Kuo-feng visit would be of great interest to President Carter. He hoped the President would + pass anything of interest on to Washington. Tito replied that he would do so “gladly.”

+

15. US-Yugoslav relations. Governor Harriman said that it was his impression that our + bilateral relations were at a new high point. President Tito said that was correct; they are + very good and improving every day. President of the National Assembly + Markovic had reported to him + on his recent visit to the United States, and had indicated his great + satisfaction with it.On July 19, Mondale met at the White House + with Dragoslav Markovic, + President of the Yugoslav Assembly, who led a delegation of Yugoslav + Assembly members to meet with U.S. + Government and legislative officials in Washington. Markovic and Mondale discussed the state of + U.S.-Yugoslav relations. Carter + briefly stopped by to greet the delegation. The Department informed + the Embassy of the discussion in telegram 192091 to Belgrade, July + 29. (National Archives, RG 59, + Central Foreign Policy File, D780312–0046) Prior to the Mondale-Markovic meeting, Vance, joined by Harriman and Vest, met with the Djuranovic and + Vrhovec in New York on + May 25 to discuss the Non-Aligned Movement and exchange views on the + state of the international system. (Department of State, Office of + the Secretariat Staff, Cyrus R. + Vance, Secretary of State—1977–1980, Lot 84D241, Box + 9, Vance + Nodis + MemCons, 1978) There are + no major problems between our two countries and many small matters have + also been settled. There are a few small issues (unspecified) still + between us, but they are of no significance. Tito said that he had a very good + impression of President Carter + when he met with him. He recognizes that President Carter had initial problems with the + Congress but considers him “a sincere, honest, devoted leader who wants + to accomplish much.”

+

16. The President then said: “The United States must understand that if + we sometimes are critical it is only because we mean the US well. We + have learned to live together as friends despite the fact that one or + the other may be critical on occasion. With some other countries, + however, where on its face it appears that Yugoslavia has very good + relations, it is a fact that in reality the relations are not good. And + you know who I mean.” (This is obviously a reference to the Soviet + Union.)

+

17. Tito recalled that in his + first meeting with Governor Harriman when the latter was Ambassador in Moscow during + the war, the Governor had told him of Stalin’s highly critical + anti-Tito remarks. Tito said it is an interesting fact + that whenever Stalin dealt with him, he was kind, he made a great fuss, + etc. But he (Tito) knew the true + reality. Governor Harriman replied that Stalin was a very + insincere man. “You, Mr. President, were the first to expose him and + that destroyed his ambitions for domination of the World Communist + Movement.” Tito replied + “Absolutely. Had we not said ‘no’ to him when we did, other difficulties + would have arisen for us and the rest of the world, and God knows where + we would now be.”

+

18. Governor Harriman then asked + President Tito about his + relations with Chairman Brezhnev. + Tito replied that they were + very good, “but I think many things are being done to us despite + him.”

+

19. In reply to an observation by Governor Harriman that it was his feeling that Brezhnev appeared to be in the middle + of opposing forces within the Politburo and not strong enough to contain + them, Tito replied that that was + his belief as well. Tito said + that he believes Brezhnev to be + well intentioned but clearly weakened by ill health. Suslov is the force + that is difficult for Brezhnev to + control.

+

20. Comment: It was Governor Harriman’s impression that, in comparison with the last + meeting between the two in Washington in March, President Tito had deteriorated substantially in + alertness and vitality. (This is a view that Ambassador Eagleburger shares from his own + observation of President Tito + during the March visit to Washington.) This was most evident in the + early stages of the discussion, but the President became more animated + as the conversation proceeded. In fact, at one point when Bauderina + attempted to break off the discussion so that the participants could go + to lunch, Tito remarked, “Not + yet, I still have more I want to talk about.”

+

21. As the lunch began Tito was, + again, quiet and detached. But as the conversation turned to + reminiscences he showed an increasingly lively interest and a keen sense + of humor.

+ + Eagleburger + +
+ +
+ 257. Memorandum From Robert + Hunter of the National Security Council Staff to the + President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)Source: Carter Library, National + Security Affairs, Brzezinski + Material, Brzezinski Office + File, Country Chron File, Box 57, Yugoslavia: 4–12/78. Confidential. + Sent for action. Jessica Tuchman + Mathews concurred. + + + Washington, August + 22, 1978 + + + SUBJECT + FMS Credits for Arms Sales to + Yugoslavia + +

In authorizing moderate expansion of our arms transfer relationship with + Yugoslavia last September, the President specifically excluded FMS credits.See Document 242 and footnote 4 + thereto.

+

There are now indications that the Yugoslavs will ask for limited FMS financing (State estimates no more + than $10 million in FY 1980).

+

The State Department memorandum at Tab IINot + attached. asks for a decision in + principle to permit such financing—while understanding the + limited funds available and the need for Congressional consultations. + (Normal budget procedures would still have to be followed.) State argues + that the prospects for selling two $10 million-plus systems + (unspecified) would be enhanced if the authority were available; and + that our ability to respond positively on the financing question would + enhance the fall visit here of the Yugoslav Defense Minister. It would + improve our ties to the military, and underline our commitment to + post-Tito Yugoslavia.

+

State argues that the limitation on credits was placed in the + Presidential Decision because we did not expect to be asked. I recall + that we also wanted to keep the program low-key, in view of the + still-tentative nature of our improving relations.

+

Now, however, I agree it would be valuable to take this extra step. This + does not seem to be sufficiently important to require the President’s + personal approval.Inderfurth wrote “DR information only?” in the margin. + Aaron replied “Yes” + underneath.

+

Defense and ACDA agree with the State memo.

+

Recommendation:

+

That you concur with the extension of FMS financing to Yugoslavia in + principle, and sign the memorandum at Tab I.Aaron wrote + “I agree” and signed for Brzezinski an August 22 memorandum to Vance, informing the Department of + State of the recommendation to permit the extension of FMS financing for Yugoslav arms + transfers. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Brzezinski Office File, Country + Chron File, Box 57, Yugoslavia: 4–12/78)

+
+ +
+ 258. Memorandum of ConversationSource: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, + Staff Material, Europe, USSR, and + East/West, Larrabee Subject + File, Box 68, Yugoslavia: Military: 11/77–12/78. Secret. Drafted by + McVadon on October 2; approved by Siena on October 10. The meeting took place at the + Pentagon. + + + Washington, September 26, 1978, 9:45–11:05 + a.m. + + + SUBJECT + Secretary Brown’s Plenary + Meeting with Yugoslav Defense Secretary Ljubicic + + + PARTICIPANTS + + + Yugoslavia + Federal Secretary for National Defense, General of the + Army Ljubicic + Ambassador to the US Belovski + ColGen Kadenic, Chief of Center of High Military + Schools + LtColGen Kadejevic, Chief of the Department for Education + and Training + MajGen Popovic, Chief of the Department for Procurement of + Armament and Military Equipment + Col Popovic, + Interpreter + Col Vuckovic, Military, + Air and Naval Attache + + + + + US + The Secretary + Under Secretary for Policy Resor + Assistant Secretary (ISA) + McGiffert + Deputy Assistant Secretary (Eur & NATO) Siena + LTG Graves, Director, DSAA + MG Bowman, + Director, European & NATO Affairs + RADM Hanson, + Military Assistant to the Secretary + Mr. Babione, OUSDR&E + Mr. Bader, Deputy Director, European & NATO Affairs + Col Roche, Defense + Attache, Belgrade + Mr. Guild, DSAA Assistant for Yugoslavia + Cdr McVadon, ISA + Assistant for Yugoslavia + + + +

After warmly renewing acquaintances, Secretary + Brown asked General + Ljubicic to assess the last + year of the relationship and suggested that this was also a time for + progress. General Ljubicic said he welcomed this visit, his first + to the US; and characterized Brown’s 1977 visit to Belgrade as contributing not only + to military cooperation but also to all fields of US-Yugoslav + relations.See Document 246. (During his toast at dinner that + evening he invited Brown back to + Belgrade.) He said the visit by General Jones in May was very helpful and visits like it permit + US officers to see the “Yugoslav reality” and to meet senior Yugoslav + officers. Ljubicic recalled that + he and Brown said in Belgrade + that the military relationship + could not expand to its fullest overnight, but he said there has been + progress.

+

Brown + acknowledged the value of personal visits, but noted that Yugoslavia’s + specific requests for military equipment were a very important aspect of + the improving relationship. He said that in response to Yugoslav + requests the USG has given approval + except when there were overriding policy considerations, such as the + involvement of sensitive technology. Brown stressed that the US favored this cooperation for + political and military reasons, not for economic benefits. He explained + that he believed an independent, unified and strong Yugoslavia + contributed to world peace.

+

Ljubicic + stated firmly that Yugoslavia would remain independent and nonaligned + and was a factor contributing to the stability of the balance of power + in that area of the world. He cited signs of unrest between the big + powers and said that deterioration of US-Soviet relations affected + Yugoslavia. Yugoslavs, he said, did not want the balance upset. He + expressed confidence in US statements supporting a strong and nonaligned + Yugoslavia, but noted that we must be concerned with the details that + make it so. (This is the closest Ljubicic came to a complaint about US reluctance to + release certain weapons to Yugoslavia. He left the complaining to a + member of his entourage; and even that separate meeting of MG Popovic + and LTG Graves lacked the expected polemics. Popovic renewed the + requests for all equipment which had been denied, reviewed the status of + many current actions, and expanded their shopping list moderately. He + added, inter alia, requests for consultations and + information on Stinger, Viper, hydrofoil vessels, and postgraduate and + specialists training in armaments, munitions and quality control + fields.) Ljubicic described a + “distrust” of the US in Yugoslavia because Yugoslavs have known pressure + from both sides; the distrust should be eliminated because good + relations were sought sincerely, not for “technical” reasons.

+

Brown + acknowledged that US-Soviet relations were central to many situations in + the world. He commented that “everyone says he is peace-loving,” but + that US actions have shown that we have sought independence and + stability for all nations. US relations with Yugoslavia were important + regardless of the nature of US-Soviet relations, Brown explained. He said that a secure + Yugoslavia was important not only as a matter of friendship but also for + self-interest. Brown pointed out + that steady improvement in the relationship was the goal and that the + “wild swings” of the past should not recur. Brown reflected that a secure Yugoslavia would have the + effect of improving relations between Yugoslavia and its neighbors.

+

Ljubicic + then described unfavorable aspects of Yugoslavia’s relations with its + neighbors. He said relations with Greece were declining, although Yugoslavia had no + territorial dispute with Greece, only a desire that the Macedonian + minority in Greece have the same rights as other Greek citizens. (This + unexpected revelation could have been a sop to Ambassador Belovski—a + Macedonian—who was beside Ljubicic or as a preface to comments later in the visit + indicating concern about possible establishment of a NATO headquarters in Greece.)

+

Ljubicic + said the Italian government failed to curb the increasingly active + opponents of the recent Italian-Yugoslav agreement on borders. He + complained of Italian troops disposed toward Yugoslavia, of their + intercepts of Yugoslav military communications, and of Italians + “entering into” Yugoslav military communications. Ljubicic characterized it as a small + quarrel between neighbors, but said there was no reason for Italy and + Austria to do this. He said greater cooperation with Austria, Greece and + Italy were sought and that the Yugoslavs were ready to offer proof that + there is no reason for suspicion. He then described the dispute with + West Germany over the issue of extradition of the captured terrorists. + Turning to the US, he noted Yugoslav appreciation for US attitudes on + Yugoslavia and the contacts and communications between President + Carter and Tito. He said this diminished + distrust, but some forces existed in the US which could undertake + actions against Yugoslavia under some conditions.

+

Brown + reaffirmed Ljubicic’s appraisal + of the Carter-Tito contacts and + said Carter had sought Tito’s + advice in delicate situations. He agreed on the value of cooperation in + countering terrorism. He said that a recent conversation with the + Italian Minister of DefenseItalian Minister + of Defense Attilio Ruffini traveled to Washington September 11–12 to + sign an MOU on defense procurement + at the Pentagon. Ruffini met with Brown on September 11, and discussed the need for + greater industrial collaboration, improvement of community relations + where bases are located, and assistance for security services. + (Telegram 240901 to Rome, September 21; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + D780388–0266) convinced him that the Italians wished to + cooperate in countering terrorists. He expressed the belief that the + Greeks had no fear of a military threat from a strong Yugoslavia. + Brown reflected that some + residue of distrust existed from earlier decades, but that it was + decreasing and should not be important for the future.

+

Ljubicic + said that Stane Dolanc would visit Greece to clarify questions and + establish normal relations. He told Brown that he appreciated Brown’s views on Italy and Greece and that he would + invite the Italian and Greek defense ministers to Yugoslavia. Regarding + electronic reconnaissance, he said, smiling, that the US should provide + the devices to Yugoslavia so they could listen.

+ +

Brown said + that curiosity was universal, and that if countries stayed away from + other countries territories, listening need not be seen as + unfriendly.

+

Ljubicic, + with a serious expression, said that Yugoslavia would not use such + equipment to conduct reconnaissance against these countries. He then + said that, if the Soviet Union were excluded from the Middle East, + Soviet efforts would be more intense in areas around Yugoslavia. He + suggested that already the Soviets somehow were behind Bulgarian actions + that irritate Yugoslavia.

+

Brown said + that Yugoslavia’s military needs were recognized and asked about the + status of the evaluation of the TF–30 engine for possible use in the + Yugoslav Eagle aircraft. Ljubicic recited the history of the Yugoslav + request for a high technology engine (but gave no hint on the progress + or possible outcome of the evaluation). He said that Yugoslav experts + should come to the US as part of the evaluation, because, if the engine + were selected, the US and Yugoslavia would need to enter into + large-scale cooperation. In response to a question from Brown on the type of cooperation he had + in mind, Ljubicic said, if the + TF–30 suits their needs, they would like to build it. They would + purchase several engines, and then buy the license and documentation to + permit production in Yugoslavia with US assistance. Brown, in + questioning further whether the Yugoslavs were suggesting that they + produce the entire engine themselves, explained that some components + were difficult to make and that there were difficulties with US policy. + He said there were many components which the US would consider for + Yugoslav manufacture and that assembly and testing of the engine could + be considered. He explained that even these possibilities would require + careful review in the USG and an + exception to policy which only the President could grant. Brown asked that Ljubicic put together the specifics of + their request for consideration by the USG.

+

Ljubicic + asked if the group from Yugoslavia could have all the data on the + engine, whether anything is secret. Brown said all information would + be made available. (Senior Defense Security Assistance Agency + representatives explained later to General Popovic and Major Stankovic, + the assistant attache who deals with FMS, that requests for information beyond the limits of the + present export licenses must be submitted to the Department of State for + USG consideration, but that the + answers would be given as quickly as possible.)

+

Brown said + the USG would have to see how many + components could be manufactured in Yugoslavia. He said that turbine + blades were very difficult to make. Ljubicic said that the + Yugoslavs were making turbine blades with the British, who are satisfied + with Yugoslav practices. Ljubicic + said that entering into arrangements for production of the Orao II + aircraft—not just the engine—would open up a big field and produce a significant increase in + bilateral cooperation. Brown did + not answer this point, but noted that the group of Yugoslav aircraft + engine experts was to arrive soon and that he wanted to press forward + for the present with that aspect of the TF–30 question.

+

Brown said + he wished to know the GOY decision on + the US proposal for a joint US-Yugoslav Defense Working Group. He + recalled that they (Brown and + Ljubicic) had met twice with + a year’s interval. He suggested that more frequent meeting of the staffs + could lead to progress, but would not substitute for meeting between the + Secretaries. The Defense Working Group would promote cooperation in + areas requiring attention to detail. Ljubicic replied, “We fully + accept your suggestion to establish this commission.” Experience with + other countries had been successful with groups headed at the “assistant + state secretary” level, or at the level the US side wished, he + explained. He said the group could meet when necessary, but at least + once a year, with the first meeting in Belgrade, or in Washington if the + US wished. Brown said that the first meeting should be in + Belgrade before the end of the year. Ljubicic said, “I quite + agree.”

+

Brown + raised the subject of disposal of old US-origin military equipment. He + explained that the USG has decided that + Yugoslavia need not purchase the reversionary rights on MAP equipment. This decision, he + continued, meant also that the USG need + not ask other countries receiving US MAP if they were interested before allowing Yugoslavia to + dispose of the equipment. He emphasized that a written request to the + USG was required before the GOY disposed of the equipment.

+

Ljubicic + said that the Yugoslavs were grateful to the USG and people for the MAP + equipment and that he was satisfied with the “solution” just explained. + He said Yugoslavia made one mistake: “the tanks to Ethiopia.” He + speculated that if they had asked maybe more could have been given to + Ethiopia. Belovski laughingly interjected, + “Jointly!” Ljubicic said the equipment was obsolete and + plans were to scrap it. Brown noted that his remarks on equipment + disposal were not a criticism, only an explanation of procedures. Ljubicic + assured him that the Yugoslavs did not want to cause problems with the + US Congress or anyone else.

+

Brown asked + if Ljubicic had other things to + raise. Ljubicic said he would not burden Brown with the long list of equipment + requested (Brown agreed the list + was very long); however, he (Ljubicic) had a few questions. He asked about rocket + fuels and explosives. Brown said he thought the Thiokol and Octogene + problems had been resolved. Ljubicic said that Admiral + Mamula, the chief of their navy, would come to the US at the “beginning + of next year” to clarify navy needs. Brown said he would be very + welcome. Assistant Secretary McGiffert reminded Ljubicic of an October deadline for the + Sparrow missiles associated with the antiship missile defense system. Ljubicic said they were + interested in rockets fired from submarines (probably reference to + ASROC).Anti-submarine rocket (ASROC) is + an all-weather, all sea conditions, anti-submarine rocket. + Brown + mentioned again that production will stop on the version of the Sparrow + missile which has been offered. Ljubicic said they would like + to have an Air Force team visit Yugoslavia to discuss air-to-ground + missiles. He said his longest list of items is in the field of + electronics but that could be discussed by General Popovic and his + counterpart.

+

Brown + proposed that they adjourn, but Ljubicic said he wanted to + explain their position on credits. He said they would not ask for “state + credits”; if credit were necessary, commercial credit would be obtained + for individual items purchased from individual firms. If credit were not + available, he said, they would pay cash. Brown recalled that in the + discussions in Belgrade credits had been prohibited but that now the + policy had been changed so modest credits for Yugoslavia could be sought + from Congress for the next fiscal year. He said that if commercial + credits were preferred, however, the US would not press a government + loan on them. Ljubicic said this question had been decided in + Belgrade, but that, if bigger arrangements were entered into, they would + reconsider. Brown said they would talk more about the loan + question at lunch, and the meeting ended. (The question was not raised + at lunch, but Major General Bowman raised the issue several days later. Ambassador + Belovski took the lead in responding and said it was not worth the + effort this year; they would wait until they really needed some + money.)The discussions were continued + in Belgrade on December 11–12 by Deputy Assistant Secretary of + Defense for European and NATO + Affairs James Siena and + Assistant Federal Secretary of National Defense for the + Military-Economic Sector Colonel General Dusan Vujatvic. The two + agreed on a memorandum of understanding on the formation of the + Joint Committee for Military-Economic and Scientific-Technical + Cooperation in the Field of Military Technique and discussed several + weapons systems the Yugoslav military expressed interest in. (Carter + Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Europe, USSR, and East/West, Larrabee Subject File, Box 68, + Yugoslavia: Military: 11/77–12/78) See Document + 261.

+
+ +
+ 259. Memorandum From Robert Putnam of the National Security Council + Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs + (Brzezinski)Source: Carter Library, National + Security Affairs, Brzezinski + Material, Subject File, Box 32, Luncheon Meetings (BBV): 7–12/78. + Secret; Sensitive. A copy was sent to Bartholomew. + + + Washington, November + 2, 1978 + + + SUBJECT + Intelligence Exchanges with Yugoslavia—Possible VBB Lunch + Topic + +

Yugoslav Defense Minister Ljubicic + raised the issue of military intelligence exchanges with Harold Brown during their private talks + in September.On October 7, the Department + notified the Embassy in Belgrade of the issues that came up in + private discussions between Secretary Brown and Yugoslav National Defense Minister + Ljubicic including the + Yugoslav idea of intelligence sharing between the two countries. The + Department informed the Embassy that Brown had agreed to “exchanges of information on the + Soviets and said we would follow up through intelligence channels.” + (Telegram 256055 to Belgrade, October 7; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + D780411–0986) + Brown agreed, and said we would + follow up through intelligence channels. The intelligence side of DOD is now reviewing the problems this + would pose and some in OSD are known to + be a bit skeptical. (We have already asked that the matter be referred + to you before any final decisions are taken.) This memorandum suggests a + course of action for moving ahead with an appropriately cautious policy + on these exchanges.

+

The benefits of the exchanges would be primarily political:

+ + —We can demonstrate support for Yugoslav efforts to remain + independent of Soviet advances + —We might expand our contacts with the Yugoslav military, which + could be useful in the post-Tito period. + —We might gain otherwise unavailable useful + intelligence, if the exchanges are genuinely mutual. + +

The risks, to which some in OSD call + particular attention, involve military and intelligence + considerations:

+ + —The likelihood of KGB penetration of the GOY means that any information we pass is likely to + surface in Moscow. + —Therefore, we cannot give the Yugoslavs any really useful + information. + —Therefore, we are unlikely to get any useful information in + return.Aaron highlighted the three points above and + wrote on the margin: “ZB—No + worse than an exchange with the FRG.” + + +

We need also to reflect on probable Yugoslav motives and possible Soviet + reactions.

+

The relevant NSC staffers (Hoskinson, Hunter, Thomson) + are inclined to believe that these exchanges might be constructed in a + way that would minimize exposure of sources and methods, while offering + the prospect of significant political benefits. Ambassador Eagleburger says his only concern is + “with how we proceed, not whether we should do so”, but he urges great + caution and careful political supervision. (His views are in a cable at + Tab A.)In telegram 7623 from Belgrade, + October 17, Eagleburger + expressed concerns “about what the Yugoslavs really intend” and + nervousness about moving too far too fast as the military + relationship was still in its infancy. “If the Yugoslavs really want + formally to exchange (emphasis on exchange) intelligence information + on the Soviets,” he argued, “then they are even more uncertain of + their Eastern Big Brother than I had thought.” Although he agreed + that the Departments of State and Defense should pursue Ljubicic’s offer, Eagleburger urged that the + approach “be supervised at the political level in State and DOD (and, it goes without saying, this + Embassy).” (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Brzezinski Office File, Country + Chron File, Box 57, Yugoslavia: 4–12/78)

+

Because this issue involved balancing political, military, and + intelligence interests, it needs eventually to be addressed in an + interagency forum that can review all aspects, not just the intelligence + issues. Because bureaucratically, the action at the moment is with the + Deputy Undersecretary for Policy (Intelligence), normal NSC–ISA + channels are not adequate for addressing the problem.

+

Therefore, I recommend that you raise this issue directly with Harold Brown, preferably at a VBB + luncheon.

+

You could tell Brown that:

+ + —in principle, you endorse his offer to Ljubicic. + —you understand there may be some intelligence reservations about + the nature of the proposed exchanges. + —we need to factor in the political implications before making a + judgment about how to proceed. + —once DOD has had a chance to + prepare the groundwork, it might be useful to have interagency + consideration of how to implement the offer. + +

You could ask Brown to have + Resor convene—or offer to + have the NSC convene—a small + interagency working group with representatives from State, CIA, NSC, + and the relevant offices in DOD. + Working from the DOD paper, this group + would draw up guidelines for the exchanges that would minimize exposure + of sources and methods, while maximizing the political and intelligence + returns to the U.S. (Hoskinson is a bit skeptical about the + need for an interagency group and feels you may simply wish to review + the eventual DOD decision yourself.) + You might also want to touch base with Admiral Turner.Aaron wrote on the + bottom of the page “ZB—You should + ask Resor to contact me on + this & I can work it out with our staff & State with or + without a mtg.”

+ +

Recommendation

+

That you speak to Harold Brown, Cy + Vance (beginning at a VBB + lunch), plus Stan Turner, about + setting up an interagency working group to review plans for intelligence + exchanges with Yugoslavia.Brzezinski did not check either + box. At the November 3 VBB lunch, Vance, Brown, + and Brzezinski agreed that + Defense should coordinate with Newsom on responding to the Yugoslavs. (Department + of State, Office of the Secretariat Staff, Cyrus R. Vance—1977–1980, Lot + 84D241, Box 1, Vance/Brown/Brzezinski Luncheons—4–12/78) In a November 7 + memorandum to Aaron, Putnam + provided a scenario on how the interdepartmental coordination among + Aaron, Resor, and Newsom would work for setting up a + policy recommendation on the subject. Putnam also recommended that + the DCI be informed either by + Aaron or Brzezinski as “the DCI is apparently acting on the + assumption that he is a player on this issue.” Aaron approved the scenario, and + suggested that Putnam get Carlucci involved. (Carter Library, National + Security Affairs, Staff Material, Office, Outside the System File, + Box 51, Chron: 11/7–30/78)

+ +
+ +
+ 260. Memorandum From the Deputy to the Director of Central + Intelligence for Collection Tasking ([name not + declassified]) to Director of Central Intelligence TurnerSource: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of the + Director of Central Intelligence, Subject Files (1978), Job + 80M01542R, Executive Registry Box 14, Folder 14, Y–2: Yugoslavia. + Secret. Sent via the Deputy Director of Central + Intelligence. + + + Washington, November + 17, 1978 + + + SUBJECT + Yugoslav Intelligence Exchange + +

1. Action Requested: For your review and + consideration of the recommendation provided in Paragraph 7 below.

+

2. Background:

+

a. In a 26 September meeting with Secretary Brown, Yugoslav Defense Minister Ljubicic raised the possibility of a + US-Yugoslav intelligence exchange on the Soviet Union. The Secretary + agreed in principle, having been alerted in advance that the matter + might be surfaced. Secretary Brown subsequently accepted your offer to undertake an + assessment of the pros and cons of such an exchange. This memorandum, + therefore, provides some background, addresses the relevant issues, discusses the options available + to you, and makes a recommendation for further action. Attached are some + biographic sketches of the key Yugoslav players.

+

b. There is some precedent for an intelligence exchange with the + Yugoslavs:

+

—Following Yugoslavia’s expulsion from the Cominform in 1948, a program + of exchange of military intelligence was developed between the United + States and the Yugoslav Defense Ministry. This arrangement was cancelled + by the Yugoslavs in August 1955 as a result of Belgrade’s normalized + relations with Moscow.

+

—[1 paragraph (13 lines) not declassified]

+

—On 29 August 1968, following upon the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, + Secretary Rusk told the Yugoslav Ambassador that the US was closely + watching the situation and offered to check out any information that the + Yugoslavs developed regarding a Soviet build-up of forces. A few days + later, a senior Yugoslav official in Belgrade did request confirmation + of reported Soviet moves. When the US Embassy responded with a summary + of information on Soviet deployments in Hungary and Bulgaria, an offer + was made to provide more detail. The Yugoslavs demurred, saying that + they would prefer to continue to exchange information as they had in + this instance. The State Department does not equate this arrangement + [1 line not declassified]. From 1968 until + the 1973–74 period, however, the Yugoslav military attaches were + responsive to queries from their US counterparts, which may be + attributed to individual rapport at certain posts. US-Yugoslav + differences over arms sales and the Toth affair (American convicted by + the Yugoslavs for alleged espionage) may have contributed to the + cessation of this limited cooperation, but there was no specific word on + the subject from the Yugoslavs.

+

—On 4 October 1978, coincident to the Yugoslav approach regarding an + intelligence exchange, the Department of State provided the Yugoslav + Foreign Ministry with an assessment of the Soviet leadership.In telegram 6654 from Belgrade, September 12, + Eagleburger reported his + conversation with Knezevic at a reception in Belgrade. After hearing + from Knezevic of the “GOY’s + ‘serious’ concern about what is going on in Moscow,” Eagleburger reported his offer to + the Yugoslav official for an “exchange of views about what is going + on in Moscow among the leadership.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + D780371–0143) This stemmed from a proposal by Ambassador + Eagleburger to Rajko + Knezevic, Director of the Office for Eastern Europe in the Foreign + Ministry, that the US and Yugoslavia exchange information on the Soviet + leadership and was made in response to Knezevic’s expression of Yugoslav concern with this + question.In telegram 250569 to + Belgrade, October 2, the Department provided Eagleburger with the Department’s + analysis on the situation in Moscow. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + D780403–0615) Subsequently, a Foreign Ministry official + (Budimir Loncar) advised the Ambassador that the information provided + had received close attention and that he would discuss the paper + “privately” with him some day soon.Eagleburger briefed + Loncar on October 4 on the substance of the information provided by + the Department on October 2. On October 18, following a discussion + on other issues, Eagleburger + noted that “Loncar took me aside out of earshot of his North + American desk assistant to say that the info we provided [on October + 4] is extremely interesting and has received close attention. As a + next step in the process, Loncar said he would see me ‘privately’ + some day soon to discuss the paper.” While unsure if the Yugoslavs + “will give us more than the map coordinates for Moscow,” Eagleburger undertook to tell + Loncar that “we hope the exercise can be repeated from time to + time.” (Telegram 7686 from Belgrade, October 18; National Archives, + RG 59, Central Foreign Policy + File, D780436–0800)

+

3. Considerations:

+

a. One factor in considering a resumed intelligence exchange is a + determination of what the US could provide and what the US is likely to + receive in return:

+

[2 paragraphs (40 lines) not declassified]

+

b. There are other factors to be considered beyond the potential + intelligence value. One is the possible improvement in US-Yugoslav + relations in that an exchange would signal a positive US attitude. In + the over-all context of US-Yugoslav relations, however, such an exchange + may not loom large in Yugoslavia’s estimation compared to matters such + as arms sales or the Joint Defense Working Group now being established. + On the other hand, it was Ljubicic who raised the issue. Another possible + advantage to the US is the useful contacts that would be developed + within the Yugoslav military establishment from which we might benefit + in more troubled times. Also, US-provided information might sharpen the + Yugoslav perception of the Soviet threat. Finally, a Soviet perception + of closer ties might act as a deterrent to precipitous Soviet actions + against Yugoslavia.

+

c. Against this possible benefit to the US are the potentially negative + factors to be considered: Key among these is the security implications + since it would be through a “leak” that other negative factors would be + operative. Utmost care would be required to make certain that + intelligence passed to the Yugoslavs would not in fact divulge sources + and methods. While the Yugoslavs are not likely to provide the USSR with any information, a Soviet + penetration of the Yugoslav government cannot be ruled out. [2 lines not declassified]

+ + —Another security aspect is that in passing intelligence + requirements to the Yugoslavs, the US would tend to reveal its + intelligence gaps. + + —Should any intelligence exchange arrangement be surfaced to the + USSR, moreover, it could + result in a Soviet estimate of greater US-Yugoslav collusion and + result in a negative Soviet attitude with unpredictable effects but + possibly including Soviet efforts toward destabilization in + Yugoslavia in the post-Tito + period beyond those which the USSR + may now contemplate. Such a concern would weigh heavily in Yugoslav + consideration of undertaking the exchange agreement and may, in + fact, limit the degree of that exchange. + —It also must be noted that the Yugoslav intelligence service is + believed to engage in acts of assassination against Croatian + elements around the world. At a time when the US is fostering the + ideal of human rights, a new arrangement, if it became known, would + appear to be in contradiction to that ideal. + —Also not to be overlooked is the unknown motivation behind this + Yugoslav initiative and the possibility that the Yugoslavs + subsequently could cite this arrangement to their own + advantage. + +

d. On balance, it probably would be to the advantage of the US to + participate in an intelligence exchange with Yugoslavia. Such an + exchange would provide an opportunity to obtain intelligence difficult + to gain from any other source. Moreover, an intelligence exchange might + benefit US foreign policy interests. This is a determination, however, + which others should address. From an intelligence point of view, we see + no overriding obstacles providing that the exchange arrangement is + closely monitored.

+

4. Modality of Exchange: We would agree with + Ambassador Eagleburger’s + assessment that the arrangement for any intelligence exchange is of + particular importance.

+

a. [4 lines not declassified]

+

b. Belgrade would be the preferred locale for the exchange and the DAO + the logical instrument to effect it. Such an arrangement would have the + advantage of postponing immediate decisions on what to provide by + referring the question to Washington. Specific actions would be required + before release of information:

+ + —The originating agency should approve the release of any of its + reports used as a basis for information to be passed. + —NFAC and DIA should make an + assessment of the net gain to be derived in providing the general + type of information that would be passed. + —The US Ambassador in Belgrade should have final approving + authority on the passing of specific information. + —Approval should be obtained from national-level authorities of + both countries to insure that information exchanged has highest + level official sanction. + —Intelligence exchanges should be conducted on a reciprocal + basis. + +

c. Long term commitments should not be made and the exchange arrangements + should be continued only as long as they prove to be in the best + interests of the US.

+ +

d. [5 lines not declassified]

+

5. Options: In light of the above considerations, several options are + available:

+

a. Advise the State and Defense Departments that from an intelligence + point of view there is no objection to an intelligence exchange + providing that arrangements for such an exchange assure the protection + of sources and methods, as above.

+

b. Advise those Departments that the intelligence value to be gained from + such an exchange could be offset by the potential disadvantages, + including security implications, which would weigh against entering into + such an agreement.

+

c. Advise the concerned Departments that preliminary findings suggest + that there could be a substantial intelligence advantage to be derived + from an exchange, that we have no objections if sources and methods are + protected, and that larger foreign policy considerations should be the + subject of NSC consideration.

+

6. Staff Position: This memorandum has been + coordinated with NFAC, the Operations Directorate and the State and + Defense Departments, as well as with the NSC Staff.

+

7. Recommendation: Accept Option “c” to ensure + full consideration of the problem and policy-level support of any + intelligence exchange that develops.Turner approved this + recommendation on November 20 and wrote on the bottom of the last + page: “Another advantage, and one that dominates my thinking, is + that we will establish mil-to-mil contacts that may prove invaluable + in post-Tito period. + Stan.”

+
+ +
+ 261. Memorandum for the RecordSource: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, + Staff Material, Europe, USSR, and + East/West, Larrabee Subject + File, Box 68, Yugoslavia: Military: 11/77–12/78. Secret. Drafted by + McVadon on April 7, 1979; approved by McVadon. + + + Belgrade, December + 11–12, 1978 + + + SUBJECT + First Meeting of the US-Yugoslav Joint Committee for + Military-Economic and Scientific-Technical Cooperation in the Field + of Military Technique + + + PARTICIPANTS + + + United States + Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense James V. Siena, US + Chairman + Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Richard Vine + MG John R.D. Cleland, Vice Director, J–5, OJCS + MG Richard C. Bowman, Director, European and NATO Affairs, OASD/ISA + RADM Taylor Brown, + Deputy Director, International Programs, OUSDR&E + Mr. Richard Violette, Director of Operations, DSAA + Mr. Harry Dunlop, Political Counselor, Embassy + Belgrade + Colonel William Roche, Defense Attache, Embassy + Belgrade + Mr. Irwin Pernick, PM/SAS, State + Commander Eric McVadon, Assistant for Yugoslavia, + OASD/ISA + + + + + Yugoslavia + Assistant Secretary of Defense for the Military Economy + Colonel General Dusan Vujatovic + Mr. Mitrovic, FSFA (11 December only) + MG Sveta Popovic, Head, Department of Procurement of + Armament and Military Equipment + Mr. Mirko Zaric (position not given) + Colonel Bozidar Ilic, Army + Colonel Vladimir Gabaj, Navy technical matters + Colonel Vrbica, Army + Colonel Vid Voh, Air Force + Colonel Djordje Jaukovic, Air Force procurement + Colonel Raicevic, Navy technical matters + Captain Petar Krunic, Navy + (Other unidentified military officers sat in from time to + time) + + + +

(S) This memorandum supplements the attached minutes provided by the + Yugoslav Federal Secretariat of National Defense and received in March + 1979.Attached but not printed. See footnote 5, Document 258. It + includes only those items that may be of reference value for future + Committee proceedings or for determining better the precise nature of + Yugoslav military equipment requests.

+

First plenary session:

+ +

—Colonel General Vujatovic, the Yugoslav chairman, recalled that the + initiative for forming the Committee came from Ambassador Eagleburger speaking for the USG.Eagleburger proposed the creation + of a Joint Military Working Group at the same time as the Joint + Economic Working Group. (See Document 248 and + footnotes 2–5 thereto.) In a June 14, 1978, memorandum, + Hunter informed Brzezinski that “State, Defense, + and Embassy Belgrade propose broaching with the Yugoslavs the idea + of setting up a joint military working group—as we had suggested + before the Tito visit.” + Hunter, with Les Denend’s concurrence, + recommended that State be allowed to approach the Yugoslavs with the + idea, noting that “the group would not be primarily concerned with + arms sales—though that might come up.” (Carter Library, National + Security Affairs, Brzezinski + Material, Brzezinski Office + File, Country Chron File, Box 57, Yugoslavia: 4–12/78) The + Department of State was notified of White House approval of the + recommendation on June 16. (Ibid.) He observed that in the + exchanges of draft documents neither government had seen a need to + change the essence (of what was to become the final draft MOU). Vujatovic commented on the roles of + the Federal Secretariats for National Defense and Foreign Affairs (FSND + & FSFA) in preparing the Yugoslav MOU-related documents, but he stated (rather pointedly it + seemed, considering the presence of the FSFA representative) that once + the document was agreed upon, the work would be done by the FSND, and + that the composition for the future of the Yugoslav side would depend on + the nature of the work of the Committee and the matters to be + discussed.

+

—In further introductory remarks, General Vujatovic said that there was a + great need for the Yugoslavs to update weapons and equipment. They have + strived, he said, to develop resources to build for themselves as much + as they can, starting with small arms and some light weapons. For the + most sophisticated equipment they must rely on foreign suppliers, with + an effort to obtain, “frankly, as much dispersion as possible,” even + with the technical problems that diversity of origin produces. He + recalled oscillation in the military supply relationship with the US and + said that he had heard criticism of excessive Yugoslav reliance on the + Soviets. However, those complaining had not offered alternatives. He + said that his government understood that the US was ready to support and + supply Yugoslavia, “as Yugoslavia is today.” One facet of that US + support was readiness to discuss “trade in arms and equipment.” He hoped + that complaints of too much from the Soviet Union could be overcome. He + recalled that there were US fears that technology or weapons would be + transferred to someone else, but that had happened only once, to + Ethiopia—a transfer that was not harmful to the US, in the Yugoslav + view. He alluded, without elaborating, to American “suspicions” that + “would be overcome in the talks.”

+

General Vujatovic said that to a large extent US and Yugoslav interests + were common. “The US wishes,” he said, “for Yugoslavia to remain as it is.” There should be no + apprehension or misgivings, and Yugoslav defenses should be + strengthened. He stressed that arms are not a subject for grant or aid, + but for “normal economic relations.”

+

—Deputy Assistant Secretary Siena, the US chairman, responded that the presence of the + US delegation reflected a growing beneficial relationship between the + two countries, based on mutual interests and respect. He said that the + US respected Yugoslavia’s position and recalled SecDef’s remarks to Secretary Ljubicic concerning Yugoslav + independence, territorial integrity and national unity. Our efforts in + the security field, he said, were directed toward that policy.

+

—In outlining the US view of the Committee, Mr. Siena described it as a forum for + regular contacts and a way to avoid the regrettable previous + oscillations, but not as a replacement for established procedures. The + Committee would review those established procedures to see how they were + working.

+

After describing briefly the importance of the US Congress in the matter + of arms transfers, Mr. Siena + explained that US policies regarding sensitive technology transfer, + coproduction and third-country transfers were an effort by President + Carter to introduce worldwide + some measure of restraint. He said that we were engaged in an effort to + reconcile those policies with the US desire to assist Yugoslavia, and + that the reconciliation would not always please the Yugoslavs. Mr. + Siena asked General + Vujatovic to accept that when unfavorable decisions were taken they were + not a consequence of suspicion, but rather from trying to balance the + relationship with the other policies to which he had referred.

+

—Mr. Siena and General Vujatovic + agreed at this early point in the meetings that there were no problems + in the substance of the draft MOU, that + a working group would be named for further drafting, and that the agreed + MOU would be initialed by the two + of them in Belgrade, with subsequent formal approval by both governments + later. Some items in the MOU were + discussed:

+

—Regarding the frequency of the Joint Committee meetings, Mr. Siena said that although the US had + suggested meeting twice a year to keep close to the problems, annual + sessions and a provision for extraordinary sessions took care of that + concern.

+

—Mr. Siena explained that to get + USG agreement, the MOU should state explicitly that Committee + actions would be governed by national policies, as well as national + legislation. General Vujatovic said that his legal people contended that + there were no policies not backed by legislation. The problems of + finding mutually satisfactory wording was left to the working group. + (Comment: The final draft of the MOU + used the words “national legislation, regulations and procedures.”)

+ +

—In response to a question, General Vujatovic explained that the Yugoslav + use of the term “military-economic” included production, licensing, + coproduction, technical training, etc. The working group was tasked to + ensure that the MOU language made this + meaning clear and precluded confusion with the broader meaning in + English of the word “economic.”

+

—Addressing another concern we voiced, Major General Popovic confirmed + that the Committee would not replace existing procedures and channels + for the handling of arms sales requests in either country. (Comment: The + final draft of the MOU said the + Committee would “review and follow-up development of the . . . + cooperation between the two countries and the requests and orders placed + by the authorities of one side to another . . . .”)

+

—General Vujatovic sought and received confirmation that the US SECRET + classification for the MOU meant that + the material would not be made available in the US to the public or the + press. Mr. Siena explained that + it would be necessary to notify the Congress on a classified basis of + the MOU and that proposed major weapons + sales over $7M must be reported to the Congress. That notice to Congress + would be public. General Vujatovic asked if it were possible simply to + divide the sale into, for example, ten contracts of $6M each; and Mr. + Siena told him that was not + possible. General Vujatovic said that Yugoslav law prohibited the + publication of such information and that purchases had been made from + the UK, France and Sweden without publication of the information. + (Comment: The final draft MOU says that + when Congressional notification of a proposed sale is necessary that the + two governments “will agree how to proceed and will agree on the + security classification of the proposed sale.”)

+

—Mr. Siena noted that provisions + in the US draft concerning the transfer of technical data had been very + carefully developed and were words with which the USG was very comfortable. General + Vujatovic replied that the Yugoslav draft retained the essence and the + working group could agree on a text. (Comment: This is the section on + which we have recently approached the GOY, at ACDA’s insistence asking that language be added to + explicitly prohibit unauthorized third-country transfers of items + produced from US-origin data and technical information.

+

—General Vujatovic and Mr. Siena + named the members of the drafting working group. Yugoslavia: MG Popovic, + Col. Ilic and Col. Gabaj. US: MG Bowman, Mr. Violette and Mr. + Pernick.

+

[Omitted here is discussion about specific weapons systems.]

+
+ +
+ 262. Memorandum From Secretary of State Vance to President CarterSource: + Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Brzezinski Office File, Country + Chron File, Box 57, Yugoslavia: 1–8/79. Secret. The memorandum is + not initialed by Vance. + + + Washington, January + 2, 1979 + + + SUBJECT + Request for an Arms Transfer Policy Exception for a Jet Engine for + Yugoslavia + +

I. ISSUE

+

The Government of Yugoslavia (GOY) has + requested United States Government approval to explore with Pratt & + Whitney Aircraft (P&W) the co-production and assembly of the + TF30–P–414 jet engine in Yugoslavia. Such an arrangement would require + that you authorize an exception to the arms transfer policy of May 19, + 1977 on the grounds that approval of the program will promote our + national security interests.

+

II. DISCUSSION

+

The US has been seeking to build more durable relations with Yugoslavia + in anticipation of the post-Tito + era. Our success depends upon our ability to establish strong links with + the leading individuals and institutions, key among which is the + Yugoslav military.

+

The Yugoslavs produce about 75 percent of their military needs. For the + remainder, which includes nearly all sophisticated equipment, they + depend primarily on the Soviets. The Yugoslavs have been diversifying + their sources of supply and have sought to purchase from us a number of + new items. Most important among these would be a new engine for the + Eagle II (Orao II) all-purpose, supersonic fighter aircraft which + Yugoslavia plans to build during the mid-1980s. After several exchanges + with us about which engines might be available for this plane, the + Yugoslavs settled on the P&W TF30. The GOY is also considering several West European and Soviet + Engines.

+

We authorized P&W to discuss direct sales of the engine with the + GOY, consistent with your approval + last year of a moderate expansion in our arms transfer relationship with + Yugoslavia with emphasis on political impact. The Yugoslavs are very + interested in the TF30 but their decision will depend largely upon our + willingness to permit joint production of the engine; they probably are + not interested in a straight sale. The GOY requests detailed commercial and technical information + regarding both direct purchase and co-production by January 15, + 1979.

+ +

The GOY plans to produce up to 200 Eagle + II’s. P&W estimates that it would gross, either through direct sale + or co-production, an average of approximately $1.5 million per engine. + If the co-production scheme is approved, the first of the engines would + be completed in 1985 and the last around 1988.

+

Factors for Approval

+

—Given Yugoslavia’s strategic location, its influence in the Third World, + the eventual post-Tito + transition, and Yugoslavia’s determination to reduce its dependence on + the USSR, we should continue to + support its desire to increase cooperation with the West.

+

—The Yugoslav military is one of the most important all-Yugoslav + institutions in the country and will be a decisive factor in the + post-Tito era. One of our + important goals has long been to increase our access to the military at + all levels. Technical assistance to the GOY for TF30 co-production would provide us with a key + instrument to pursue this goal and would tie the Yugoslavs to a Western + supply source for years.

+

—If successful, the TF30/Eagle II program would reduce military reliance + on the USSR—a Yugoslav Air Force + objective—and eliminate Yugoslavia’s total dependence on the Soviets for + high performance aircraft.

+

—The TF30 is a sophisticated engine but none of its technology is + classified.

+

—The engine co-production arrangement would be consistent with our policy + not to transfer offensive systems to Yugoslavia.

+

Factors for Denial

+

—Current US arms transfer policy, PD/NSC–13, prohibits the licensed manufacture of significant + combat equipment such as the proposed jet engine in non-exempt + countries.

+

—Yugoslavia’s role as a leader and spokesman for the Non-Aligned Movement + has often led the GOY to take positions + opposed to ours in international forums.

+

—However improved its human rights record may be in recent years, + Yugoslavia has an autocratic, one-party political system with a strong + internal security element and several hundred political prisoners.

+

—Approval of this co-production arrangement could lead to similar + co-production requests from other non-exempt countries more closely + oriented to the West.

+

Recommendation:

+

I recommend that you grant an exception to our arms transfer policy + guidelines to authorize the co-production arrangement on the grounds + that it would be in the national security interest of the United + States.

+ +

To restrict possible retransfer of the engine and to protect its + technology, I further recommend that approval be made subject to the + following written conditions:

+

1. That third-party transfers of the engine, any of its components, or + technology thereof on the part of Yugoslavia would be prohibited.

+

2. That development of any advanced versions of the engine involving + technology beyond the level authorized must be approved by the United + States Government prior to initiation.

+

The Department of Defense and ACDA concur in my recommendation.Although there is no indication on this copy + of the memorandum when Carter saw and approved it, the Department of + State reported the Presidential decision in telegram 12672 to + Belgrade, January 17. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790024–0137) The + approval of the exception for Yugoslavia leaked to the press + immediately and Aviation Weekly called the + White House to seek confirmation of the story. (Telegram 15555 to + Belgrade and Madrid, January 20; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + D790028–0244) The magazine featured the news in its January 29, + 1979, issue. (Telegram 30079 to Belgrade, February 3; National + Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign + Policy File, D790054–0244)

+
+
+ 263. Memorandum From Robert + Hunter and Jim + Rentschler of the National Security Council Staff to the + President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)Source: Carter Library, National + Security Affairs, Brzezinski + Material, Country File, Box 86, Yugoslavia: 1–12/79. Confidential. + Sent for action. Sent through Madeleine + Albright. Copies were sent to Owen and Mathews. + + + Washington, May 8, + 1979 + + + SUBJECT + Aid to Yugoslavia (U) + +

As you know, Senator Kennedy has introduced legislationSenator Edward Kennedy (D–Massachusetts) drafted an + amendment to the FY 80–81 + Development Assistance Authorization Bill, but did not introduce it + on the Senate floor. See footnote 2, Document + 264. The text of the amendment, reported by the Department + in telegram 109909 to Belgrade, May 1, called for a $20 million + appropriation to be used by the President for relief and + reconstruction assistance to Yugoslavia. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + D790198–0941) calling for $20 million in aid to Yugoslavia + after its devastating earthquakeOn April + 15, 1979, at 7:30 a.m. local time, an earthquake measuring 7.0 on + the Richter Scale struck 15 km from the Montenegro coast causing + extensive damage. + (damage in Montenegro, for + example, was equal to a year’s gross product). In the absence of + Administration support—or even comment—the SFRC did not approve it, though Kennedy’s office believes + the SFRC would respond to the + Administration, and Kennedy will go to the floor in any event, where he + believes he will get support. It would not be surprising if our + non-response were made an issue on the Senate floor—a position we should + seek to avoid on a humanitarian matter. (C)

+

At State, Vest and Newsom believe we should support this + expenditure; Vance does not, + simply on budgetary grounds: i.e. the President’s desire not to raise + the budget. There is also a question about a supplemental which + Henry Owen flags: at what + point does the Congress start whittling away at other things in the aid + field? (C)

+

Our belief—which Vest shares—is + 1) that the Congress will judge whether or not to set this aid off + against other aid appropriations independently of the position the + Administration takes on this item; and 2) the Yugoslavs will never + understand why we refused to support it. Even a “no comment” will not be + understood. Belovski has been calling around town in support. (C)

+

In view of the genuine humanitarian purposes—plus the importance of the + Yugoslav relationship—we believe that State’s decision should be + reconsidered. As a result, we recommend that you talk with Cy Vance, and urge him to give a + positive response. (C)

+

RECOMMENDATION:Brzezinski neither + approved nor disapproved the recommendation.

+

That you call Cy Vance along the + above lines. (U)

+

Yes No

+ +
+ +
+ 264. Telegram From the Embassy in Yugoslavia to the Department of + StateSource: National + Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign + Policy File, D790211–1130. Confidential; Immediate; Limdis. + + + + + + Belgrade, May 10, 1979, 1041Z + +

3453. Subj: Yugoslav Earthquake: Reconstruction Assistance. Ref: State + 111949.In telegram 111949 to Belgrade, + May 2, the Department informed the Embassy of Senator Pell’s + introduction of the Kennedy amendment to the FY80 Aid Authorization + Bill and the discussions on the amendment that ensued including the + position of the administration that it took no position pending a + review of Yugoslav needs. The Department informed the Embassy that + the SFRC concluded discussion on + the amendment with an agreement to wait for the administration’s + position, and that “Committee now considers the ball to be in the + administration’s court and that although Kennedy is prepared to + propose amendment on Senate floor, he will not do so without + administration support.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + D790201–0097)

+

1. C-entire text

+

2. It was not too many years ago that I too was struggling with tight + budgets and cursing Ambassadors for their inflated clientitis. Thus, I + have been uncharacteristically reluctant to weigh in on the debate over + what, if any, reconstruction assistance the USG should provide in the wake of the Montenegrin + earthquake. But further silence only means I am not doing my job.

+

3. Certain facts are clear:

+

A. The consequences to the Yugoslav economy of the earthquake, while not + disastrous, will be severe. And this comes at a time when the Yugoslav + economy is already under heavy pressure, with a serious trade imbalance + for the year inevitable, inflationary pressures intense, investment + funds shrinking, and hard currency availabilities greatly reduced.

+

B. The earthquake’s effect on Montenegro (Yugoslavia’s poorest republic), + on the other hand, is close to disastrous. Tens of thousands are, and + will remain for months, in temporary shelter; much of the Republic’s + infrastructure (highways, hospitals, schools, water systems, etc.) has + been destroyed or damaged; tourist facilities along the Montenegrin + Adriatic coast are a shambles; industrial facilities throughout much of + the republic have been put out of commission for months to come.

+

C. The quick and effective emergency aid provided by the USG was widely and gratefully noted by + people throughout Montenegro and Yugoslavia. We were compared favorably + with others (particularly the USSR) + who reacted slowly or not at all during the emergency phase.

+ +

D. The Kennedy Amendment received widespread publicity throughout the + country and triggered a second wave of grateful public and private + comment. As a result, substantial US reconstruction assistance is + considered by most Yugoslavs, despite our best efforts to the contrary, + to be virtually a fait accompli.

+

4. These then are the circumstances in which we find ourselves. Failure + to provide any reconstruction assistance in the face of these facts + would inevitably entail some consequences. But I do not want to + exaggerate. If we do no more:

+

A. It will not mean an immediate deterioration in our bilateral + relationship. The GOY’s interest, at + least for now, in close ties with the US is based on factors of such + importance that it will not be seriously affected by what we do about + earthquake assistance.

+

B. It will not much affect the economic difficulties the Yugoslavs will + face this year, or the rapidity of Montenegrin recovery. Whatever we + might have done would have been so small in comparison with total needs + that the economic impact would have been minimal.

+

5. The case for providing some help, then, must rest on other grounds. + And most of those grounds are so well known in Washington that they need + not be dwelt on here. They range from the political arguments about the + importance of Yugoslav-US relations in the sensitive period prior to + Tito’s passing, through the + humanitarian considerations that are so much a part of our makeup, and + the fact (well known here) that Yugoslavia’s neighbors Romania and Italy + have been recent recipients of major US earthquake assistance, to the + fact that Yugoslavs of every variety will simply not understand, after + the Kennedy Amendment publicity, what led the USG to oppose (and that is how it will be seen) giving aid + to Montenegro.In telegram 123994 to + Belgrade, May 15, the Department notified the Embassy that the + administration’s official position with respect to Senator Kennedy’s + amendment was that while the issue had been closely examined in the + Department of State and the administration remained sympathetic to + the needs of Yugoslavia and had examined various alternatives, “none + of them seem currently feasible because of budgetary restrictions. + We will therefore not send up any proposal of our own, but we will + not oppose the initiative of Senator Kennedy.” (National Archives, + RG 59, Central Foreign Policy + File, D790220–0092)

+

6. But, important as I believe all those arguments to be, there is an + additional factor that I worry about, and Washington ought to worry + about. It is the question of confidence, which is, I recognize, a + nebulous quality. But it will probably prove to be the single most + important element in the minds of the Yugoslav leadership both now and + after Tito as they chart their + future course. I find it difficult to believe that Yugoslav confidence + in our ability or willingness to put our money where our mouth is when + the chips are really down will be much enhanced if we refuse now to help in a small way + when we have helped so many others so many other times.

+

7. I recognize budgetary considerations are an overwhelming problem and + admit that I can do no more than argue that important as they are, this + is more important. While I cannot pull money out of a hat, I can wonder + what ever became of the 35 million dollars in aid funds previously + programmed for Pakistan and suggest that—if a supplemental is not + possible—reprogramming from less essential programs (there must be some) + should at least be considered.

+

8. Of one thing I am certain. We are presently in the worst possible + posture. We have refused to take a position “pending review of + Yugoslavia’s needs,” yet, so far as I am aware, no review is underway. + Nor do I believe we should be conducting a review—at least with the + Yugoslavs—so long as there is any question about our willingness to seek + funds when the review is completed. Once we go to the Yugoslavs for + information on their needs they will inevitably assume that we intend to + do something.On May 16, Eagleburger met with Pesic to discuss possible U.S. long-term reconstruction + assistance. Reporting the conversation in telegram 3697 from + Belgrade, May 18, the Embassy noted Pesic’s emphasis on expectations of the Yugoslav + public, fueled by press reports of Senator Kennedy’s amendment, that + aid would be made available. The Embassy reported: “Pesic pointed out great importance + of an affirmative U.S. + administration position on aid issue, not only in providing badly + needed assistance, but also in ‘creating the atmosphere’ in which + other countries would be making similar decisions.” (National + Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign + Policy File, D790229–1230)

+

9. So, much as I fear the Department may take me up on it, I recommend + that if we are not going to do anything we tell the Yugoslavs precisely + that, and soon and in Washington.

+ + Eagleburger + + +
+ +
+ 265. Telegram From the Embassy in Yugoslavia to the Department of + StateSource: Carter + Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 86, + Yugoslavia: 1–12/79. Confidential; Immediate; Limdis. Printed from a copy that + was received in the White House Situation Room. The telegram was + forwarded by Rentschler to + Brzezinski and Aaron on June 2. In his covering + memorandum, Rentschler wrote + that “this ‘Eaglegram’ provides eloquent (nay, de + profundis) point to the substance of our own pitch on + behalf of U.S. reconstruction + assistance. I think we will be making a bad mistake if we do not + take Eagleburger’s counsel + to heart.” (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Brzezinski Office File, Country + Chron File, Box 57, Yugoslavia: 1–8/79) On June 6, the Department of + State informed the White House that the ExIm Bank would be approving a $90 million credit to + Yugoslavia for reconstruction. (Carter Library, Donated Material, + Papers of Walter F. Mondale, + Box 72, Foreign Countries–Yugoslavia, (1979)) + + + + + + Belgrade, June 1, 1979, 1148Z + +

4053. For the Acting Secretary Christopher from Ambassador Eagleburger. Subj: Yugoslav Earthquake: Reconstruction + Assistance. Ref: A) Belgrade 3453;See Document 264. B) Belgrade 3521;In telegram 3521 from Belgrade, May 11, the + Embassy sent the Department a Yugoslav-provided list of schools and + hospitals damaged by the earthquake and in need of reconstruction + assistance. (National Archives, RG + 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790217–0879) C) Belgrade + 3697.See footnote 4, Document 264.

+

1. (C-entire text)

+

2. In ref A I argued as persuasively as I could—but apparently not + persuasively enough—for a favorable USG + decision on reconstruction assistance for Yugoslavia in the wake of the + Montenegrin earthquake. In ref B we listed specific schools, hospitals + and other public facilities identified by the GOY as in need of assistance.

+

3. In ref C I reported that Yugoslav Deputy Secretary for Foreign Affairs + Pesic had come as close to + begging for help as a Yugoslav will ever come. He also asked whether a + Montenegrin parliamentary delegation visit to Washington would be + “helpful” in assisting the USG to make + a decision. I have received no response to the Pesic appeal or question, and still owe + him an answer.

+

4. I have spent two years here trying to build a sense of confidence and + trust in the US so that when the inevitable crisis occurs we will not be + considered irrelevant or impotent, but rather be able to play a + stabilizing role and protect our very considerable political and + economic interests. Frankly, a decision to provide no assistance—or + continued silence in the face of the Yugoslav appeal—will go a long way + to undercut the psychological progress we have made. Some may think that 20 million dollars is too + high a price to pay to avoid that, but I do not.

+

5. The Pesic conversation + introduced an additional consideration: The GOY fear that if we fail to do anything it will have a + major impact on what others are willing to do. Nor are the Yugoslavs far + wrong, the Canadian Embassy, for example has told us that Ottawa is + waiting to see what “other Western countries” do before it decides + whether to give any economic reconstruction assistance. So, our decision + will have an impact beyond the narrow parameters of what we ourselves + are prepared to do.

+

6. The forthcoming visit of Mrs. Mondale is yet another new factor. She is scheduled to + visit Montenegro June 14 to meet with senior Republican officials and + tour the coastal region hardest hit by the earthquake.Joan Mondale visited Yugoslavia June 11–15 for the + opening of the America Now art exhibit in + Belgrade and a tour of the areas affected by the earthquake in + Montenegro. In telegram 152031 to Belgrade, June 13, the Department + provided talking points for Mrs. Mondale on U.S. + policy toward reconstruction aid. Mrs. Mondale was to stress that the administration was + working actively with Congress to find a way to participate in the + reconstruction efforts in Montenegro, on the basis of the “broad + base of friendship between the Yugoslav and American peoples.” + (National Archives, RG 59, Central + Foreign Policy File, D790266–1018) I do not see how she can + visit the area and remain totally silent on what we plan to contribute + to economic relief efforts. If it is not possible for Mrs. Mondale to announce that the + administration is prepared to support a specific appropriation, then the + next best course would be a statement that the administration accepts + the principle of long-term reconstruction assistance to Yugoslavia but + is currently evaluating the appropriate level (this, of course, commits + us to something, and to working with the Yugoslavs in deciding how much + that something is). Should even that be impossible, then I strongly urge + that the Yugoslavs be told we can do nothing before Mrs. Mondale arrives, to wait until after + her departure would be insulting to the Yugoslavs and unfair to Mrs. + Mondale.

+

7. So, in my view, we can avoid a decision for only a little while + longer. And as the decision is thought about I hope two factors will be + kept in mind.

+

A) If the USG decides it cannot assist + it should be remembered that the Yugoslavs will—since they know about + the Kennedy Amendment—view it a negative administration decision in the + face of congressional willingness to help.

+

B) When Tito dies, and for some + time thereafter, we will surely be searching for ways to show our + support for those Yugoslavs who want to stand against: 1) Soviet + pressures; 2) those who would return the country to a more repressive + and centralized internal system acceptable to the East; 3) nationalist forces ready to tear the + country apart. And when that time comes we will, I predict, regret any + earlier lost opportunities—such as the one now before us—to demonstrate + that we can be counted upon.On June 4, + Aaron wrote on Rentschler’s covering memorandum + forwarding the telegram to him and Brzezinski (see footnote + 1 above), that “Christopher will try to get the dough from the cots + and blankets fund. SSA, AID, and supplementals are out.” Brzezinski asked if a memorandum + from him to Vance would be + necessary. Aaron’s response + is illegible. On September 13, Carter signed Presidential + Determination 79–16, providing $10 million for economic assistance. + The justification for the decision noted that the assistance “would + help the Yugoslavs overcome the economic difficulties caused by the + earthquake.” The justification also noted that “in so doing, it + would support Yugoslavia’s continued political independence. Of + equal importance, such assistance would demonstrate that the United + States can be relied upon in time of need.” (Carter Library, + National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Brzezinski Office File, Country Chron File, Box 57, + Yugoslavia: 1–8/79)

+ + Eagleburger + +
+ +
+ 266. Memorandum From Robert + Kimmitt, Marshall + Brement, and Steve + Larrabee of the National Security Council Staff to the + President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)Source: Carter Library, National + Security Affairs, Staff Material, Europe, USSR, and East/West, Larrabee Subject File, Box 68, Yugoslavia: Military: + 1/79–1/80. Secret. David + Aaron wrote at the top of the memorandum: “Not such a + big deal.” + + + Washington, July 11, + 1979 + + + SUBJECT + VBB: Arms Sales to Yugoslavia (S) + +

We recommended that this issue be discussed at the luncheon because of + our belief that our emerging military supply relationship with + Yugoslavia is at a critical juncture, and because State and Defense + appear to be handling this issue in much too routine a fashion. Our hope + is that your raising the issue will be a signal to Vance and Brown + that careful attention should + be paid to decisions that they will face shortly.The issue was discussed at the VBB lunch on July + 12. In a memorandum later that day, Robert Gates informed Larrabee, Brement, and Kimmitt that Brzezinski tasked Larrabee to clarify what decisions were needed by + the principals. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, + Brzezinski Material, + Brzezinski Office File, + Country Chron File, Box 57, Yugoslavia: 1–8/79) (S)

+

The basic policy guidance on this issue is that we wish to enhance our + military supply relationship with Yugoslavia, with emphasis on the + political impact. Since that policy was articulated in 1977, + wide-ranging discussions have been held with the Yugoslavians. The + results of those discussions—proposed arms sales—are now upon us. The + two most pressing sales are (1) DRAGON shoulder-fired anti-tank missiles + and (2) MAVERICK air-to-ground missiles. (S)

+

DRAGON: We have agreed to provide 1000 of these + missiles, and discussions are continuing concerning cost, test sets, and + other technical details. Apparently, however, the 1000 missiles + earmarked for Yugoslavia have recently been discovered to be defective, + and the Army is looking at whether it would be willing to provide 1000 + functional missiles from its already depleted stocks. The Army may say + no to this idea, but HaroldSecretary of + Defense Harold Brown. + can overrule them. We believe that not providing the Yugoslavians with + 1000 functional missiles could do irreparable damage to our emerging + relationship, and we recommend that you ask Harold to + look into this issue, with an eye toward nipping in the bud any + suggestion that we transfer the defective missiles instead.In a July 13 memorandum to Brzezinski, Larrabee recommended that Brown ensure that the 1,000 Dragon + missiles committed to Yugoslavia “should be functional, not + defective, even if this means taking them out of the Army + inventory.” (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff + Material, Europe, USSR, and + East/West, Larrabee Subject + File, Box 68, Yugoslavia: 8/78–12/79) (S)

+

MAVERICK: The interagency consideration of this + sale is nearing completion, and State is preparing to go to Congress for + appropriate consultations. While we believe that such consultations are + necessary because of congressional interest in both Yugoslavia and + MAVERICKs, we strongly believe that only Church and Zablocki should be + contacted because the potential for a leak would be exacerbated by wider + discussions (a proposed sale of TOW + anti-tank missiles fell through recently because of premature disclosure + of the sale).In his July 13 memorandum to + Brzezinski, Larrabee noted that “Vance should be aware that + Lucy Benson is prepared + to go ahead with the sale of Mavericks.” Larrabee also recommended that “Vance should formally inform the + President” and that “we should limit consultations with Congress as + much as possible in order to prevent leaks which could seriously + damage relations with Yugoslavia.” Brzezinski asked for draft memoranda to Brown and Vance with White House guidance. + (Ibid.) + We recommend that you ask Vance to limit the congressional consultations. + (S)

+ +

Also, although our State and Defense counterparts do not all agree with + us on this point, we believe that the President should be apprised of + the fact that his policy guidance has resulted in a program that is at a + significant stage of development. You might want to discuss with + Vance and Brown how the President might be + informed.Carter was informed of the + decision in an Evening Report from Vance. In a July 18 memorandum from Larrabee and Kimmitt to Brzezinski recommending that no + guidance for Brown and + Vance was necessary, + Robert Hunter commented + that the President “Noted OK in the margin” of the Evening Report. + (Ibid.) (C)

+
+ +
+ 267. Telegram From the Embassy in Yugoslavia to the Department of + StateSource: National + Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign + Policy File, D790418–0416. Secret; Priority; Exdis, Noforn. Also sent Priority + to DODASD/ISA. Sent for information + to CNO, CDA, CSAF, USCINCEUR, CDRUSASAC, CJCS, and + USNMRSHAPE. + + + + + + Belgrade, September 13, 1979, 1004Z + +

6799. Military handle as Specat + Exclusive. State for Under Secretary Newsom. ASD/ISA for Asst Secretary McGiffert. Subject: (S) The + US-Yugoslav Military Relationship. Ref: 78 Belgrade 9176.In telegram 9176 from Belgrade, December 20, 1978, + Eagleburger detailed + several instances in which the costs of military equipment quoted to + Yugoslav officials ended up being significantly higher. Eagleburger wrote that “the + evolving US-Yugoslav military relationships are not at a point where + ‘mini-shocks’” like the ones described in the telegram “can be + absorbed with no set-backs.” “The Yugoslavs have a healthy case of + paranoia” he continued, and “I fail to see why we have to try to + prove to them that we are both malicious and incompetent.” + Continuation of the FMS programs + with Yugoslavia, the Ambassador concluded, would hinge on minimizing + any more mistakes. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + D780528–1027)

+

1. S-entire text

+

2. I have, since returning from the US last month, reviewed the progress + (or better, the lack thereof) in the US-Yugoslav military relationship. + It is not a pretty picture, as the case studies detailed later in this + cable will show. In fact, we have done so badly that I have come to + doubt that the USG is capable of + managing the program we set for ourselves several years ago; instead, I + fear that we are on the way to convincing the Yugoslav military either + that we were never serious or that we are incompetent. In either case, + we risk damage not only to our + effort to develop a relationship with the Yugoslav military but to our + broader bilateral interests as well. Either we take steps now to get our + act together or we should withdraw from the effort before further damage + is done.

+

3. What has upset me most is our consistent failure to handle the + potential Dragon purchase with even a modicum of competence. Paragraph + 9, et. seq., details this sad story. Suffice it to say here that we have + quoted wildly different prices to the Yugoslavs at least twice, offered + Dragons that we then found were faulty, emphasized that we needed a + GOY decision soon so that we would + not have to reopen the production line (and thereby charge a + substantially higher price), and then told them we would have to restart + production (at a substantially higher price). The tragedy is that the + Dragon buy was the first major opportunity for us to put our money where + our mouth was and so far we have messed it up to a fare-thee-well.

+

4. The Dragon case is not the only mess we have made of things. In + addition we have now lost, after more than two years of screwing around, + a sale of dollars 1.7 million worth of 155 mm illuminating rounds. + And—at least so it appears from here—we and the Yugoslavs seem to be + well on the way to substantial misunderstanding about an air defense + radar system that has been under discussion for some months. Just who—we + or the Yugoslavs—has been most responsible for the confusion is not + clear.

+

5. I do not contend that we know all the facts on any of these cases. + There may well be extenuating circumstances that will explain why we + have performed so miserably. But that is really beside the point: What + is important to the GOY is that we are + unable or unprepared to respond to Yugoslav requests in a timely and + effective manner. We are flunking the reliability test, and for the + Yugoslavs—in terms of their concerns about the future—a passing grade is + a sine qua non.

+

6. Nor will I argue that the Yugoslavs have been without blame for the + sad state in which we now find ourselves. They too have been less than + efficient, as the air defense radar system case shows but it takes + substantial ingenuity for a nation of 220 million people that prides + itself on its tradition of efficiency to match the ineptitude of a + Balkan nation of 22 million. We, alas, have succeeded.

+

7. The next meeting of the joint military working group is now + tentatively scheduled for mid-October in Washington. So it is time to + face up to some hard choices. Unless I can be assured that steps have + been taken to get a firm grip on the management of our military program + with Yugoslavia it is time to call off the noble but so far unsuccessful + experiment. Either we tell the Yugoslavs at the October meeting that we + are distressed at the way things have been going, that we know much of + the fault lies on our side, that we will not permit things to continue as they are, and + that steps have been taken at an appropriately high level in Washington + to ensure that we do in fact do better, or we tell them frankly that we + are simply not equipped to handle the kind of sales program they want, + that they would do better to look to our NATO Allies for the equipment they seek, and that we will + do what we can to encourage our Allies to respond positively.In her September 19 reply, Benson informed Eagleburger that she was convening + an interagency meeting to review the status of the Yugoslav program + and would draw up an action program and time table for the ongoing + programs. Benson also + requested suggestions for the agenda by September 21 as well as + Eagleburger’s further + views on the issue. (Telegram 244365 to Belgrade, September 19; + National Archives, RG 59, Central + Foreign Policy File, D790437–0659) In telegram 7015 from Belgrade, + September 19, Eagleburger + wrote that “our major problem is management” and that “the services, + in particular the Army, need to put someone at the helm who has not + only the responsibility, but also the authority to oversee and + manage security assistance for Yugoslavia.” (National Archives, + RG 59, Central Foreign Policy + File, D790434–0173)

+

8. The following are summaries of the histories of several of our less + than successful sales efforts, they are based on the facts as we know + them here, and thus may be less than complete. I hope that Washington + will not waste time drawing up defensive briefs on each, as has + sometimes been the case when we earlier leveled complaints. The time is + past when such efforts are of any use.

+

[Omitted here is the summary of the negotiation of the sale of the Dragon + Missile System to Yugoslavia up to September 1979.]

+ + Scanlan + +
+ +
+ 268. Memorandum From Stephen + Larrabee of the National Security Council Staff to the + President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) and the President’s Deputy + Assistant for National Security Affairs (Aaron)Source: + Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Europe, + USSR, and East/West, Larrabee Subject File, Box 68, + Yugoslavia: Military: 1/79–1/80. Confidential. Sent for action. + Copies were sent to Kimmitt + and Brement. + + + Washington, September + 18, 1979 + + + SUBJECT + Military Sales to Yugoslavia (U) + +

Attached is a blistering cable from Larry Eagleburger, our Ambassador in Belgrade, regarding our + inept handling of our Yugoslav military relationship and its serious + political implications.See Document 267. I feel it deserves + your attention. Even allowing for Eagleburger’s non-diplomatic style, the message is + unmistakably clear and well-documented: we have seriously mismanaged + military sales to Yugoslavia to the point where we risk damage not only + to the ties to the Yugoslav military, which we have so carefully sought + to nurture over the past two years, but to our broader bilateral + interests as well. Indeed, Eagleburger feels that the point has been reached where + we have to get our act together or withdraw from the relationship + entirely. (C)

+

While slightly, but only slightly, overdramatized, Eagleburger’s analysis is basically + valid. Much of the problem lies in cost overruns, some of which could + (and should) have been avoided, others of which could not have been. Be + that as it may, the fundamental point is that we have given the + appearance of incompetence and ineptitude, which has seriously + undermined Yugoslav confidence in our ability to respond to their needs + in a timely and effective manner. As Eagleburger rightly points out, this is bound to have + important consequences not only for our carefully nurtured attempts to + develop a relationship with the Yugoslav military, but for our broader + political relationship as well. (C)

+

The next meeting of the joint military working group is in mid-October. + This is an important—perhaps the last—chance to show the Yugoslavs that + we are serious about our commitments, and we simply have got to get our + act together. I have talked to George + Vest about this. He feels we should give Jim Siena at ISA a chance to get DOD + into shape (Siena is away and + returns tomorrow). However, time is running out, and DOD is so hopelessly mired down in + bureaucratic red tape and + inter-service rivalry that I despair that the issue can successfully be + resolved in time for the joint military meeting in October without a + push from you or Brown. (C)

+

I suggest that the topic be raised at the VBB luncheon, either this week + or, at the latest, next week. Given the time constraints, this week + would be better but if, after reading Eagleburger’s cable, you feel (as Vest does) that we should give + Siena more time to get + DOD’s act together, Kimmitt and I will postpone + preparations of material until next week. But the + issue does need urgent top-level attention and your active + intervention. Otherwise we risk jeopardizing much of the + careful work we have done to develop the military relationship—and + conceivably a lot more. (C)

+

RECOMMENDATION:

+

That you raise the issue at the VBB luncheon.Gates wrote in the + margin: “Sounds like a suitable agenda item.” (U)

+

APPROVEBrzezinski approved the recommendation and wrote at + the bottom of the memorandum: “Tell me concretely what needs to be done. I need a good-tough + memo, with quotes from Eagleburger, to both V[ance]-B[rown]—and a DR. ZB.” In a + September 19 memorandum, Kimmitt and Larrabee recommended that Brzezinski raise the issue of + military sales to Yugoslavia at the next VBB lunch, and stress that + “both Departments need to give higher-level attention to issues that + arise and decisions that are made.” On the sale of Dragon missiles + to Yugoslavia, Kimmitt and + Larrabee, suggested that + Brzezinski ask Brown “personally to look into the + current status of this case in an effort to rescue it.” (Carter + Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Europe, USSR, and East/West, Larrabee Subject File, Box 68, + Yugoslavia: Military: 1/79–1/80) On September 20, Gates notified Larrabee and Kimmitt that at the VBB “it was + decided that Brown would + expedite resolution of the problem and would report as soon as + possible.” (Ibid.) DISAPPROVE

+

THIS WEEKNEXT WEEK

+
+ +
+ 269. National Intelligence EstimateSource: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, + Brzezinski Material, + Brzezinski Office File, + Country Chron File, Box 86, Yugoslavia: 1–12/79. Secret; [handling restriction not declassified]. + Carter wrote on the cover: “The main unanswered question is: through + what means the Soviets can present such a threat to Yugoslavia. J.” + Attached but not printed is volume II, “The Annexes,” which discuss + specific Yugoslav political, economic, and military aspects. The + text is available in Yugoslavia: From “National + Communism” to National Collapse, p. 579 and + following. + + + NIE 15–79 + + + Washington, September + 25, 1979 + +

PROSPECTS FOR POST-TITO YUGOSLAVIA

+

I. INTRODUCTION

+

1. The early 1980s will probably be a time of troubles in Yugoslavia. The + precipitant will be the incapacitation or death of President Josip Broz Tito, whose role in the + creation and preservation of contemporary Yugoslavia has been so large + that one cannot be confident it will prove dispensable.

+

2. On balance, our confidence on this score is lower now than it was at + the time of our last estimate in 1973. During the past several years, + and especially since the June 1978 Yugoslav Party Congress, a number of + developments which had seemed conducive to a relatively smooth and + orderly post-Tito succession + have lost momentum. Simultaneously, a number of countervailing + developments have ensued. In particular, the institutionalization of an + effective central policymaking process has virtually stopped, while + economic “stagflation” has persisted, and Yugoslav-Soviet relations have + further deteriorated.

+

3. We remain fairly confident that Tito’s passing, in and of itself, will not during the + first six months or so pose a threat to the integrity or independence of + the Yugoslav state. It will, however, reduce the regime’s ability to + manage domestic and foreign challenges, which are likely to be more + severe in the post-Tito period + than they have been in the 1970s. Moreover, the high degree of internal + political solidarity that will probably characterize the immediate + post-Tito succession is + unlikely to persist. In consequence, the country will enter a period, + probably prolonged, of great uncertainty and potential instability.

+

4. The range of plausible contingencies that will shape and reshape the + sequence of events is very large and includes the distinct possibility + that Yugoslavia will not weather the 1980s with its integrity and + independence intact. Of crucial importance is the interplay among a + number of central variables, of which the most critical will be the + nature of Soviet initiatives and reactions, the efficacy of Western + assistance, and, above all, the + cohesion and adaptability of Tito’s successors. While these variables are potentially + too volatile to permit any confident judgment about Yugoslavia’s future + in the 1980s, the odds are at least marginally in favor of Yugoslavia’s + continuing as an integral independent state. Internal instability and + vulnerability to external pressures during a prolonged transition + period, however, could make even an integral Yugoslavia a recurring + source of international tension.

+

II. SUCCESSION CONTEXTS

+

A. Tito’s Historical Achievements

+

5. At the age of 87, President Tito remains the unchallenged leader of a regime that he + founded over 30 years ago. Under his leadership, Yugoslavia has not only + survived severe domestic and foreign challenges but has undergone + remarkable transformations.

+

6. Economically, Yugoslavia has changed from a command to a + market-socialist system, while rapidly industrializing and steadily + upgrading the standard of living of its people. Since 1948, industry’s + share in the gross national product has risen from 16 to 42 percent, + while real per capita annual income has climbed from $650 to slightly + over $2,500, and automobiles, refrigerators, washing machines, and other + consumer durables are no longer scarce luxury items.

+

7. Politically, Yugoslavia has moved from a highly centralized and + repressive Soviet-style dictatorship to a relatively open system with a + considerable amount of authentic individual participation in local + affairs. Although the League of Communists is still the country’s only + political party, other public organizations are no longer subject to + strict party control, and there have been experimental multicandidate + elections for local public offices. Similarly, while public political + dissent is still severely punished, literary publications are no longer + subjected to precensorship, and rank-and-file citizens are free to + travel and live abroad.

+

8. Militarily, the guerrilla partisans of wartime Yugoslavia have been + transformed into conventional armed forces, backed by a territorial + reserve defense force, designed to conduct prolonged unconventional + warfare. The regime has simultaneously fostered development of the Army + as a guarantor of national unity and as an integrative institution in + the country’s domestic political life.

+

9. On the international plane, Yugoslavia has moved from near isolation + to intense multilateral involvement and far-reaching ideological + influence, and has achieved political prestige disproportionate to its + size. Its status has changed from heretical outcast to that of a + recognized variant within the Communist world. In the West, it has + gradually won acceptance not only as a courageous breakaway Soviet + satellite but as an active + interlocutor in East-West and North-South exchanges. And in the Third + World it has established itself not only as a symbolic European ally but + as a leading force within the nonaligned movement.

+

B. Institutional and Procedural + Flaws in Tito’s + Legacy

+

10. These are all transformations for which Tito can claim substantial personal credit. They are + also transformations in which large numbers of Yugoslavs take + understandable pride. In consequence, Tito can be reasonably confident that his successors + will not follow Soviet and Chinese precedents and launch a process of + “de-Titoization.” On the contrary, he can probably rely on his + successors both to profess and to feel a strong loyalty to most of the + basic tenets of Titoism. However, he has recently introduced new + decision-making procedures that will make it extremely difficult for + this loyalty to find expression in effective leadership.

+

11. In particular, the emergence of such leadership will be strongly + impeded by the strictly collegial policymaking procedures that Tito has prescribed both for the + nine-man collective State Presidency and—since 1978—for the much more + important 24-man Presidium of the League of Communists.For a detailed discussion of party institutional + trends and evolving policymaking arrangements and their likely + effect on the succession, see volume II, annex A, “The League of + Communists.” [Footnote is in the original.] So long as + Tito is alive and well, + these procedures do not have decisive significance. Once Tito leaves the scene, however, his + successors will be left to try to make timely and coherent decisions in + large collegiums with short-term rotating chairmen and rules of conduct + that require so much consultation and coordination that they almost + entail a paralyzing liberum veto. Such an + enterprise would be highly problematical under the best of + circumstances—let alone the trying circumstances that will confront + Tito’s successors.

+

C. Economic Strains

+

12. Weakened central leadership will make it more difficult for the + post-Tito regime to manage + what are in any case likely to be increased economic problems. At a + minimum, their lack of charismatic authority will deprive Tito’s successors of an asset that has + helped to prevent economic crisis during the 1970s, when the effects of + high inflation (averaging 17 percent per annum), large deficits in the + balance of payments, growing regional economic disparities, and + fluctuations in growth of consumption, associated with wide swings in + overall growth rates, have threatened to get out of hand. Moreover, the + regional pressures behind inflation and external deficits will be + intensified by a new decentralization program that is giving the regions a greater say in + national economic decisions.

+

13. During the 1980s, Yugoslavia is likely to face persistent foreign + trade deficits as well as continued high domestic inflation and + unemployment. Western demand for Yugoslav exports will probably remain + slack, while competition in Western hard-currency markets will increase. + Domestic energy supplies will tighten, and jumps in world oil prices + (Yugoslavia currently imports 36 percent of its energy and 75 percent of + its oil) will boost external deficits and domestic prices sharply.

+

14. Such strains will increase Yugoslav reliance on Western financing. + Belgrade can probably continue to count on substantial support from + official Western lenders. At present, however, over half of the $10 + billion Yugoslav debt is held by private Western banks. Their loans have + periodically fallen short of Yugoslav needs and could be considerably + affected by heightened political uncertainty in a time without Tito. If private foreign lending + should be curtailed for a lengthy period and the difference is not + covered from official Western sources, post-Tito Yugoslavia could not avoid a significant economic + slowdown. This, in turn, would aggravate the endemic cyclical pattern of + growth and seriously increase the level of unemployment, which currently + amounts to almost 7 percent of the national work force and about 20 + percent of the urban work force in some of the country’s less developed + regions. If the leadership proves incapable of designing and enforcing + an austerity program appropriate to such circumstances, there could be a + prolonged economic crisis with potentially disruptive political + ramifications.For a more detailed + assessment of Yugoslavia’s economic prospects and the economic + issues that will confront Tito’s successors, see volume II, annex B, “The + Economy.” [Footnote is in the original.]

+

D. Regional and Communal + Tensions

+

15. Economic stringencies seem certain to lead to sharper conflicts of + interest among Yugoslavia’s constituent republics and provinces.For an analysis of the role of ethnic + divisions in Yugoslav politics, see volume II, annex C, “Nationalism + and Regionalism.” [Footnote is in the original.] Such + conflicts, in turn, could escalate into militant confrontations among + the already antagonistic ethnonational communities whose “homelands” are + competing for scarce material and financial resources. Such + confrontations have been a recurrent feature of postwar Yugoslav history + and have periodically forced even Tito onto the defensive. In 1968, for example, there + were large riots by the country’s Albanians, who contended that their + “homeland,” the province of Kosovo, was an economic and political colony of the Serbs. And, + from 1968 to 1972, Serbs and Croats engaged in a prolonged + confrontation, during which tens of thousands of citizens joined + outspokenly nationalist organizations and participated in nationalist + demonstrations, and almost the entire Croatian party leadership evinced + “national Communist” proclivities.

+

16. Despite the relative tranquillity that has reigned on nationality + issues since the so-called Croatian crisis, the perceptions and passions + that fueled these nationalist outbursts have not disappeared. Because of + their self-replenishing and mutually reinforcing religious, cultural, + and linguistic roots, these perceptions and passions could easily be + reactivated not only by impending economic stringencies but by a host of + other stimuli. With Tito’s + departure, moreover, the regime will lose most of the protection that it + has enjoyed as a result of his unimpeachable reputation as an ethnic + nonpartisan. None of his likely successors have even a remotely + comparable reputation. And some have such close and exclusive ties with + “their own” particular republics that almost any policy that they + initiate or support is likely to be challenged as ethnocentric.

+

E. Soviet Pressures

+

17. The Kremlin will not necessarily attempt to prevent a smooth and + orderly Yugoslav succession. Under certain circumstances Moscow would + see advantages in a stable, viable Yugoslavia. In any case, the USSR is likely to adopt a restrained + policy in the immediate post-Tito period. Although it probably retains a desire to + reincorporate Yugoslavia into its East European empire, Moscow could + adopt a hands-off or even supportive policy in the immediate + post-Tito period. Such a + policy could persist for some time should Belgrade become more + responsive to Soviet policies and more distant from the West. While not + impossible, however, such a long-term change in Yugoslav policy is + unlikely.

+

18. Even if developments in Yugoslavia prove less favorable to Soviet + interests, Moscow is unlikely to subject Yugoslavia to a direct military + intervention. A Soviet resort to force will remain improbable so long as + it continues to entail serious risks of a sustained Yugoslav resistance + and possible Western political and military support. However, a very + sharp escalation of centrifugal tendencies within Yugoslavia might be + seen by the Soviets as significantly reducing those risks, particularly + if it were perceived as both fragmenting the Yugoslav will to resist and + discouraging Western readiness to respond.

+

19. If the temptations created by such a perception of Yugoslav and + Western weakness were combined with sufficient danger of a radical + growth of Western influence in parts of a disintegrating Yugoslavia, the otherwise strong Soviet + inhibitions against military intervention in Yugoslavia might be + overcome. In such a case, the Soviets would be enticed by the chance to + reestablish their direct presence on the Adriatic and to demonstrate a + dramatic pro-Soviet shift in the regional and international correlation + of forces.

+

20. But even if such a combination of circumstances does not arise, and + Tito’s successors do not + have to contend with a serious threat of Soviet military intervention, + they are likely to be subjected to increased Soviet pressure. As in the + past, the Kremlin will attempt to secure freer Soviet access to Yugoslav + naval facilities and regularized Soviet overflight rights. Along with + these military objectives, it will also press for reduced Yugoslav + support for Romanian and other efforts to establish national autonomy + within the Soviet bloc, less active Yugoslav encouragement of + Eurocommunism, diminished Yugoslav criticism of Soviet foreign policy, + and less vigorous Yugoslav pursuit of a China connection.

+

21. In pursuing these goals, the Soviets may initially place heavier + reliance on incentives than on pressures or sanctions. Furthermore, in + contemplating sanctions, the Kremlin will doubtless take account of the + possibility that “overkill” could prove counterproductive and drive + Yugoslavia toward the West. In the face of prolonged Tito-like resistance, however, the + Kremlin will probably exert stronger pressure on Tito’s successors than it dared to + exert on Tito, with his long + record of defiance and demonstrated ability to rally domestic and + foreign support. Thus, it will be less hesitant to protest strongly and, + if necessary, to follow its protests with measured “retaliation” in the + form of stronger Bulgarian demarches on the Macedonian question, larger + and more frequent Warsaw Pact maneuvers on Yugoslavia’s frontiers, and + more active and supportive contacts with antiregime nationalist and + pro-Soviet “Cominformist” groups both within and outside Yugoslavia.

+

22. Such pressures or sanctions would be even more likely if Tito’s successors were to display what + the Kremlin viewed as excessively Westernizing tendencies—for example, + by obstructing major Soviet diplomatic initiatives, by tolerating the + public expression of anti-Soviet views, or by sanctioning political + pluralism within Yugoslavia. In fact, if it were reasonably confident + that the West was unwilling or unable to compensate, the Kremlin would + probably be prepared to retaliate against such tendencies by withholding + or curtailing scheduled deliveries of arms, petroleum, and other items + of which the Soviet Union is a major Yugoslav supplier.

+

III. SUCCESSION + PROSPECTS

+

23. To cope with the combined effects of increased economic stringencies, + heightened ethnonational tensions, and intensified Soviet pressures, Tito’s successors will have to + overcome the constraints on effective and timely decisionmaking that + inhere in a strictly collegial leadership system. Initially, they will + probably not encounter inordinate difficulties. The great bulk of the + population will react to Tito’s + departure by rallying around the regime, and the ruling elite will + display a high degree of collective solidarity. Before long, however, + these shock effects can be expected to dissipate. Public support for the + regime will then become much more contingent on policy outputs and + outcomes, and Tito’s successors + will find it much harder to submerge their internal differences. + Although the preceding period will not necessarily be free of + significant challenges, this will be the point at which the transition + to the post-Tito era really + begins and Tito’s achievements + undergo their first really strenuous posthumous test of endurance.

+

A. Breakdown + Possibilities

+

24. The chances of passing this test have been diminished by the recent + (February 1979) death of Edvard Kardelj, who was the one Tito aide who enjoyed broad popular + respect and the general trust and deference of his colleagues. Without + such a man to serve as arbiter and peacemaker, Tito’s successors will find it + extremely difficult to compromise their policy differences and rise + above their personal and factional antagonisms and animosities. In + consequence, it is easy to envision a post-Tito recurrence of the political degeneration which took + place during the late 1960s and early 1970s, when Tito allowed his then lieutenants a + fairly free hand in domestic policy.

+

25. By the time Tito belatedly + terminated this experiment in late 1971, virtually the entire domestic + policy process had succumbed to paralysis, and personal and factional + relations within the ruling elite had deteriorated to the point where + Yugoslavia faced incipient violence. To restore political efficacy and + order, moreover, Tito had to + draw on every ounce of his immense personal authority. And, when it + appeared that even this would not suffice, he took the extreme step of + threatening to call in the military.

+

26. In the event of a similar impasse among Tito’s heirs, the military might well intervene on its + own initiative if it were not invited to do so by elements within the + leadership. Tito’s designation + of the armed forces as the ultimate guarantor of Yugoslav unity could be + cited as justification of such an intervention and could mitigate + reluctance in the officer corps to interfere in political matters.

+

27. With their considerable internal discipline and cohesion and close + connection with the country’s security forces, the armed forces could + probably impose a degree of stability in an otherwise shaky situation. + In the process, they would probably tend to favor a greater reliance on + administrative and centralist methods of control and a substantial increase in the discretionary + authority of party professionals.

+

28. However, the Yugoslav military is not politically monolithic, and a + political demarche or coup would almost certainly deepen its internal + divisions. Furthermore, any expansion in the military’s political role + would undoubtedly alienate Croats, Slovenes, Albanians, and other + non-Serbs. Although the regime has made substantial efforts to dilute + the historic Serbian dominance of the officer corps, non-Serbs still + view the military as a predominantly Serbian institution with a + centralist bias that threatens their national interests and + identities.For a discussion of the + Yugoslav military establishment and ethnic attitudes toward its + role, see volume II, annex D, “The Yugoslav Military.” [Footnote is + in the original.]

+

29. Accordingly, while a military intervention might temporarily + stabilize a crisis situation, the longer term prospect would remain one + of potential instability and unrest, with an appreciable chance of + ultimate civil war.

+

B. More Stable + Alternatives

+

30. This readily apparent prospect of such a disastrous outcome provides + the best hope that Tito’s + successors will do everything possible to avert it. This hope is + strengthened by the fact that all of Tito’s present top lieutenants played important + supportive roles in the eventual resolution of the leadership deadlock + of 1968–72. Furthermore, some of the personal and factional antagonisms + that have arisen within the present party Presidium are likely to be + muted by future changes in membership, including a number of changes + that are scheduled for the immediate future and others that could well + occur before Tito’s departure. + In consequence, it is possible that the post-Tito Presidium will adopt less + strictly collegial decisionmaking procedures and that a majority of its + members can be organized into a more or less stable ruling + coalition.

+

31. In broad terms, two such coalitions, with potentially overlapping + memberships, seem feasible in the light of current and emergent Yugoslav + political realities. One, more likely in the event of an early + succession, might be headed by old Titoists such as Vladimir Bakaric, + Milos Minic, and Nikola Ljubicic, and would be + characterized by a strong commitment to the perpetuation of the status + quo ante. It would do everything possible to preserve the present + distribution of authority between the center and the republics, to + maintain a “self-managing” socialist-market economy, to foster the + growth of independent Communist and nonaligned forces in world affairs, + and to guard against too Westward a tilt in Yugoslav domestic and + foreign policy. The other grouping, more likely in the event of a + delayed succession, would include more recently appointed members of the present Presidium (such + as Stane Dolanc) as well as top republic party bureaucrats from whose + ranks replacements for incumbent old Titoists are likely to be + drawn.

+

32. Although Titoist in crucial respects, a coalition of the latter sort + would be far less status quo oriented than its “old Titoist” counterpart + and might be ready to introduce a significant amount of incremental + change. With respect to the division of authority between the center and + the republics, for example, it might be not only willing but eager to + sponsor a return to the more decentralized pattern that obtained during + the late 1960s, especially in matters of day-to-day administration and + management. At the same time, in intrarepublic matters it might be ready + to sacrifice significant features of workers’ self-management and + self-government in the interest of managerial efficiency and political + discipline.

+

33. Along with these changes in domestic policies, a coalition in which + old Titoists played a less dominant role might be prepared to curtail + Yugoslavia’s role in an increasingly fragmented nonaligned movement. In + addition, such a coalition might be less congenitally suspicious of + Soviet intentions than a coalition dominated by men with more vivid + personal memories of the original Tito-Stalin split. Nonetheless, mistrust of the Soviet + Union will remain endemic and a significant Eastward tilt in Yugoslav + policy is unlikely unless Soviet pressures on Belgrade fail to elicit + effective Western support. In fact, such a coalition might eventually be + more willing than its old Titoist counterpart to permit a gradual + Westward tilt in Yugoslav policy in return for economic benefits and + credible security reassurances.

+

34. Even the transformations of one of these potential coalitions into a + more or less stable ruling group would not guarantee the sort of + post-Tito leadership that + might be needed to deal with a severe crisis. However, it would ensure + at least a measure of leadership and would provide some safeguards + against the kinds of erratic or diluted policy choices that could + inadvertently invite foreign encroachments and wholesale withdrawals of + domestic support. And it would make it possible and worthwhile for + interested foreign governments to support Tito’s successors in their efforts to preserve + Yugoslavia’s integrity and independence.

+

IV. IMPLICATIONS FOR THE + WEST

+

35. The amounts and kinds of support that Tito’s successors request from the West will vary with + time and circumstances. Except under great duress, even a + Westward-inclined post-Tito + leadership is unlikely to request explicitly or to welcome conspicuous + “pro-Yugoslav” changes in Western security policy. During the immediate + transition, the chief + international concern of Tito’s + successors will be to deprive Moscow of any plausible excuse to + intervene in Yugoslav affairs. In consequence, they will probably desire + and expect nothing more than a prompt declaration of continued US and + West European interest in the preservation of Yugoslavia’s independence + and integrity, coupled with every possible effort to prevent an + escalation of hostile emigre activities. Although there is little reason + to suppose that emigre activities alone pose a real threat to the + regime, Tito’s successors view + them as such and will certainly exaggerate their potential impact and + treat Western behavior toward them as a test of Western intentions.

+

36. If they are faced with escalating Soviet pressure, Tito’s successors could request and/or + welcome Western representations to Moscow on their behalf. Within + relatively short order, moreover, they are likely to seek active help in + preserving and extending their financial relations with the West, + including not only bilateral relations but relations with the Common + Market. In addition, they could turn to the West for larger supplies of + arms, especially in areas of high technology. And, under extreme Soviet + pressure, they could appeal to the United States and NATO to exert economic and political + pressure on Moscow, to bolster and alert the 6th Fleet and other forces + on NATO’s southern flank, and, if need + be, to provide direct military support.For + a more extensive discussion of Tito’s foreign policy legacy and the ways in which + post-Tito policies + toward East and West may interact, see volume II, annex E, “Foreign + Policy.” [Footnote is in the original.]

+

37. No amount or kind of Western support can stop Tito’s successors from engaging in a + self-destructive succession struggle or prevent Yugoslavia’s constituent + nationalities from embarking on a civil war, if they are determined to + do so. However, skillfully timed and carefully designed and orchestrated + Western support could make a very large difference to the consolidation + and survival of a potentially viable post-Tito leadership and thereby to the preservation of a + stable regional, continental, and global balance of power.

+
+ +
+ 270. Memorandum of ConversationSource: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, + Brzezinski Material, + Subject File, Box 33, Memcons: + Aaron, David: 1–12/79. + Secret. The meeting took place in the West Wing of the White + House. + + + Washington, October 15, 1979, 11–11:15 + a.m. + + + SUBJECT + Summary of David Aaron’s + Meeting with Colonel General Vujatovic + + + PARTICIPANTS + Colonel General Laze Vujatovic, Yugoslav Assistant Federal + Secretary of National Defense for Military Economy + Vladimir Sindjelic, Minister-Counselor Embassy of the Socialist + Federal Republic of Yugoslavia + David Aaron, Deputy + Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs + Steve Larrabee, NSC Staff Member + James Siena, Deputy + Assistant Secretary (European & NATO Affairs) (ISA) + +

After welcoming General Vujatovic, Mr. Aaron noted that the only + thing he had not been dealing with lately was military sales to + Yugoslavia. However, he promised to pay close attention to this in the + future. (C)

+

General Vujatovic stated that he was here to sign + the Memorandum of Understanding to improve cooperation.In an October 3 memorandum, Larrabee recommended to Brzezinski that either he or + Aaron meet Vujatovic for + 15–20 minutes while the latter was in Washington to sign the + Memorandum of Understanding on Bilateral Military Cooperation which + had been negotiated the previous December. Brzezinski approved a meeting with + Aaron. (Carter Library, + National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Brzezinski Office File, Country Chron File, Box 57, + Yugoslavia: 9–12/79) (S)

+

Mr. Aaron + underscored the importance that the Administration attached to the + signing of the Memorandum and to the institutionalized arrangements + created by it.On October 12, Larrabee forwarded to Aaron the Department of State + briefing paper for his meeting with Vujatovic. In his covering + memorandum, Larrabee + recommended that Aaron stress + three basic points with the Yugoslav General: Emphasize the + importance of the MOU; reassure the + GOY of the administration’s + intention to pursue development of closer U.S.-Yugoslav military cooperation; and stress that the + Departments of State and Defense have taken steps to improve + communication with Yugoslav authorities. (Carter Library, National + Security Affairs, Staff Material, Europe, USSR, and East/West, Larrabee Subject File, Box 68, Yugoslavia: Military: + 1/79–1/80) (S)

+

Noting that there had been many attempts to improve cooperation between + Yugoslavia and the United States lately, General + Vujatovic remarked that the Yugoslavs were interested in + strengthening cooperation in the military field in order to maintain + their independence. In regard to military sales however, the two sides + had not been able to achieve + full understanding so far.In telegram 7163 + from Belgrade, September 24, Eagleburger reported that the Yugoslav Government + had decided to purchase 1,000 Dragon anti-tank missiles to be + delivered by the end of 1979. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + D790438–1013) A week later, however, Vujatovic informed the Embassy + that the Yugoslav Government had changed its mind and would not be + purchasing any Dragon missiles either in 1979, or in subsequent + years. (Telegram 7387 from Belgrade, October 2; National Archives, + RG 59, Central Foreign Policy + File, D790451–1096) During their conversation, Vujatovic informed + Eagleburger that the + Yugoslav Government found USG + proposal for the Dragon missile sale was unacceptable, and therefore + had to cancel its order. He added that “it is obvious that the + leaders of the U.S. want an + independent Yugoslavia, but when it comes to practical application, + there is always a tremendous burden of procedural problems.” + (Telegram 7520 from Belgrade, October 5; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + D790460–1288) The Yugoslavs were interested in obtaining + up-to-date equipment because at some point in the future they might have + to face a better equipped adversary. (S)

+

Mr. Aaron + stressed the great importance that the US attached to Yugoslav + independence and integrity. This was the basis of the US interest in + pursuing a military supply relationship with Yugoslavia; it would allow + Yugoslavia to strengthen its independence. While there had been some + difficulties, the US, for its part, was determined to overcome them. We + wanted to put the problems behind us and use the institutional + mechanisms created by the Memorandum of Understanding to lay the basis + for improved cooperation in the military field. (S)

+

General Vujatovic agreed. In his view the US and + Yugoslavia should attempt to put aside past problems and concentrate on + the cooperative aspects of the relationship. (C)

+

Mr. Aaron + said that when he was in Yugoslavia with the Vice President he had not + had enough time to see very much. The next time he visited Yugoslavia he + hoped to see more, particularly defense installations. (C)

+

General Vujatovic replied that Mr. Aaron would be welcome in Yugoslavia + and that he would try to arrange to show him whatever he would like to + see. (S)

+

Mr. Aaron + said that he would particularly like to see units with new American + equipment. (S)

+

General Vujatovic noted that at present Yugoslavia + did not have such units. (U)

+

Mr. Aaron + remarked that he would have to talk to Mr. Siena about that. (U)

+

General Vujatovic said that the Yugoslavs had + included visits to defense installations when General Rogers was in + Yugoslavia. General Rogers had seemed quite pleased with his visit. + Continuing, General Vujatovic + noted that during his talks today he had gained the impression that the + American system was quite complicated. Though it presented problems to + the Yugoslavs they would try to adapt to the system somehow. In return + he hoped that the Americans would show patience and openmindedness with + the Yugoslavs during the initial phase. (C)

+

Mr. Aaron + emphasized that the US wished to pursue its military relationship with + Yugoslavia in a confidential manner. While at times this was difficult + the US was determined to do it. (S)

+

General Vujatovic observed that in the past there + had been some unfortunate experiences with leaks; he hoped this could be + avoided because they had had a negative impact on relations. Turning to + the question of past problems and misunderstandings, he remarked that + sometimes it was difficult to know whether these were a consequence of + the US system or whether they had a deeper political meaning. (S)

+

Mr. Aaron + emphasized that this Administration did not send signals that way. + Noting that the weapons procurement system was a complicated process, he + reiterated that we did not use our military relations to convey + political signals. If the US had a political message to transmit it + would talk directly to the Yugoslav government, but it would not use the + military supply relationship for this purpose. (S)

+

General Vujatovic stated that he was very pleased + to hear this. (U)

+

In closing, Mr. Aaron said he hoped to see General Vujatovic + again either in Yugoslavia or in the States and noted that now that + Yugoslavia and the US had a military relationship, perhaps they would + see more of each other. (C)

+
+ +
+ 271. Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State for Security + Assistance, Science, and Technology (Benson) to Secretary of State VanceSource: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, + Staff Material, Europe, USSR, and + East/West, Larrabee Subject + File, Box 68, Yugoslavia: 8/78–12/79. Confidential. Copies were sent + to Newsom, Aaron, Vest, and Eagleburger. + + + Washington, October + 17, 1979 + + + SUBJECT + Trip to Yugoslavia + +

As you know I spent two and a half days last week in Yugoslavia, + primarily to listen to the Yugoslav’s views of the Westinghouse Nuclear + Power Plant project, a joint project of the Slovenia and Croatia + federations.Benson traveled to Yugoslavia + October 10–12 to attempt to resolve the ongoing dispute between + Westinghouse and the Yugoslav authorities regarding the Krsko + nuclear power plant. In telegram 7797 from Belgrade, October 17, the + Embassy reported that the “visit has calmed the waters—at least for + now.” (National Archives, RG 59, + Central Foreign Policy File, D790481–0525) I also discussed + the Foreign Military Sales program at some length with Ambassador + Eagleburger. Among others, + my colleagues and I met with the Presidents of Croatia and Slovenia, the + Energy Ministers of the two Republics, the Yugoslav Managers of the + Project as well as with Ambassador Eagleburger and members of his staff.Benson met + with Croatian President Flekovic on October 12. (Memorandum of + conversation, October 12; National Archives, RG 59, Office of the Under Secretary for Security + Assistance, Science, and Technology, Chron Files, Speeches, and + Papers of Lucy W. Benson + (1979) and Matthew Nimetz + (1980), Lot 81D321, Box 3, Lucy Wilson + Benson—Chron, October 1979) She met with Slovenian + President Vratusa later that day. (Memorandum of conversation, + October 12; ibid.) My trip to Yugoslavia followed a visit + Under Secretary Hodges and I made to Pittsburgh to listen to + Westinghouse’s side of the story.

+

Several points in the Westinghouse matter are now quite clear:

+

—The contract, signed in 1974 with some push from President Nixon, is now + in serious difficulties. The project is 80% completed, 18–24 months + behind schedule, and Westinghouse is suffering a serious cash flow + squeeze due to high inflation during the life of the contract.

+

—The two parties are heading for a major legal imbroglio which will be of + no long-term benefit to either and which will undoubtedly be a burden on + good Yugoslav-US relations. It could result in lengthy arbitration + during which construction could be halted, resulting in serious + political-economic problems for Westinghouse.

+

—In a continued effort to head off the potential legal confrontation, I + believe the US Government should extend its good offices to both parties. My trip with Luther + Hodges to Pittsburgh and my trip to Yugoslavia were made to see if we + could head off this confrontation by helping both sides find ways to + resolve their problems without resorting to arbitration.

+

These efforts in the first instance should include (a) maintaining + pressure on both sides to work out mutually satisfactory resolutions, + (b) urge Export-Import Bank to offer an acceptable refinancing + arrangement and (c) convince Westinghouse to complete the project in + early 1981. There are other remedies possible such as direct USG involvement in procurement of + essential components, but we should keep these possibilities in abeyance + until we see how well our other efforts will work. I have already talked + with Gordon C. Hurlbert, President of Westinghouse Power Systems Company + since my return. I emphasized to him the importance we attach to the + achievement of an amicable solution not to mention the stake + Westinghouse has in this matter if it has any hopes of obtaining future + contracts in Yugoslavia (and perhaps even in the Third World). While of + course the USG has no legal standing in + this matter, I am convinced, as was Ambassador Eagleburger, that the Yugoslavs + welcomed our trip and our offer of good offices. As for Westinghouse, I + believe that the Corporate Management recognizes the assistance the + Department has extended in all parts of the world (e.g. Korea, + Philippines) in order to channel sizeable contracts to an American + manufacturer.

+

—You need not be burdened with the details of the dispute. Basically, the + Yugoslavs wish to have the project completed as soon as possible + (original contract called for operations in 1979—“on the line in 79”. + Now at best it will be 1981). Westinghouse needs cash since the project + has cost much more ($230 million) than originally expected. Beyond that, + both sides have a myriad of complaints of differing magnitudes against + each other. We think these could be settled amicably if both sides could + achieve their principal objectives.

+

As for the FMS, there can be no question + that Ambassador Eagleburger’s + complaints concerning the Dragon case have validity. As in the + Westinghouse matter, an earlier alert might have prevented the current + situation. The Dragon case is a good illustration of the need for an + Embassy to closely monitor the implementation process of FMS cases. (We all need to watch + implementation of major cases more closely.) There is practically no + chance for that being done effectively in Washington, given the wide + dispersion of responsibilities among agencies. The Ambassador was + reluctant, as are most of our Chiefs of Mission, to add to his staff, + but the importance of having the critical sales “go right” outweigh in + my mind the costs of an additional staff member. I think Ambassador + Eagleburger would agree.

+

Although we obviously have not managed the FMS program satisfactorily, I believe the Ambassador feels + that the Yugoslav military-to-US-military relationships are still improving. I have the same feeling + after talking to Col. General Vujatovic + on TuesdayBenson met with Vujatovic on October 16 to discuss + the Foreign Military Sale relationship with Yugoslavia. (Memorandum + of conversation, October 16; ibid.) and that is, after all, + what is important. But we’d better not have another fiasco.

+

I will keep you posted on further developments.

+
+ +
+ 272. Telegram From the Embassy in Yugoslavia to the Department of + StateSource: Carter + Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Europe, USSR, and East/West, Larrabee Subject File, Box 68, + Yugoslavia: 1/79–1/80. Secret; Immediate Exdis. Also sent Immediate to DOD ASD/ISA and USCINCEUR. Printed from a copy that was received in the + White House Situation Room. + + + + + + Belgrade, November 1, 1979, 1549Z + +

8210. Military handle as Specat + Exclusive. State for Under Secretary Benson frm Ambassador. Subject: Dragon. Refs: A) + Belgrade 7986In telegram 7986 from + Belgrade, October 25, Eagleburger reported that at a Romanian Embassy + reception celebrating the Romanian Armed Forces, General Pekic said “the Dragon system is + right for the Yugoslav armed forces” but that General Ljubicic canceled the purchase + because he believed “the damned Americans are playing politics with + us.” Pekic said that he would + be willing to raise the issue again with Ljubicic “if we could give him a peg on which to + hang his approach.” Eagleburger wrote that he had decided to talk to + Pekic “hat in hand—and + say to him that I want him to understand that it is not ‘politics’ + but bureaucratic bumbling on our part which has put us in this fix.” + (National Archives, RG 59, Central + Foreign Policy File, D790488–1103) B) State 280014.In telegram 280014 to Belgrade, October 27, + Benson informed + Eagleburger that the + 1,000 Dragon missiles were “still available and can be delivered to + aerial port of embarkation within thirty days of receipt of GOY signature on LOA.” Benson agreed that Eagleburger should talk to + Pekic and concluded that + “obviously, given the past history of the problem, we do not want to + press the GOY to buy the Dragon. + What we want to accomplish is to convey to them that in this case as + in other FMS cases we are willing + to do our best to meet Yugoslav needs.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + D790491–0206)

+

1. S-entire text.

+

2. I saw General Pekic on Oct. 31 + to discuss Dragon. I told him that since he had been personally involved + in the Dragon case, I wanted to give him my personal apologies for the + way the case had been handled and to assure him that there had been no + repeat no political motive + behind our escalating cost quotations. I pointed out that the LOA on the + 1,000 Dragon purchase was still valid, and would remain so until the end + of the year. Thus, if the Yugoslavs were to change their minds, the + 1,000 missiles were still available.

+

3. General Pekic replied that he + had always believed that the reason for the change in price quotations + was inflation, and that there was no political motivation behind our + actions. But, he said, there were some (he clearly meant Ljubicic) in the Yugoslav military who + did not agree, and thought we had been playing games with the Yugoslavs. + He added that General Ljubicic + would not repeat not be prepared to reconsider the Yugoslav decision on + Dragon this year, but that the GOY + might “come back to the Dragon or TOW” + next year. He admitted that the Yugoslavs were to some degree at fault + because—given concerns over the need to notify Congress—they had not + reacted fast enough when we first made our offer. It is now time, he + said, to forget our problems over the Dragon, to learn some lessons from + the experience, and to move on to further cooperation.

+

4. With regard to the future, the General made three points:

+

A. He reiterated their desire for modern electronic warfare equipment and + complained about our unwillingness to sell the Yugoslavs sophisticated + GEA. (I understand that the Yugoslavs agreed at the recent Washington + meetings to present us a list of specific electronic warfare needs.)

+

B. On anti-tank weaponry, he indicated that their interest in the Viper + remains high. He acknowledged that even though this system would + probably be denied them for the present, they would be very interested + in an advanced or follow-on Dragon system. (I told him that I had no + knowledge of plans for an improved Dragon.)

+

C. On radars, he said that he could see no reason why the U.S. should withhold up to date equipment + from Yugoslavia, since we know it would never be used against us. Aside + from the air defense radars now under negotiation, he indicated an + urgent need for an anti-aircraft fire control system such as “Skyguard” + for adaptation to weapons in the 30–40 mm class (knowledge nil here on + this system). The General further stated that they would be happy to + give a manufacturer their required technical specifications for a fire + control system to see if anything could be worked out. If none of this + is possible, he would like us to provide a list of radar systems + adaptable to 30–40 mm anti-aircraft guns and allow them to decide for + themselves which most suited their needs.

+

5. Comment: We can forget about Dragon sales to Yugoslavia, at least for + the time being. Pekic’s statement + that Ljubicic would not + reconsider this year was straightforward and unqualified, and would not + have been made unless he knew whereof he spoke. Nor do I see any purpose to be served by now asking + to see Ljubicic. That would only + reveal our anxiety level, lead to another turn down, and expose us to + another series of complaints about our lack of trust as demonstrated by + our refusal to consider sales of our most modern equipment.

+

6. It is interesting, however, that Pekic left the door open for a return to Dragon (or + TOW) sometime next year. It may be + that, in advance of Pekic’s visit + to the US next spring, we can raise the question again so that he can + pursue it while he is in Washington. This is a possibility we should + keep in mind as we prepare for the visit.

+

7. In classic Yugoslav fashion, we are now beginning to see an effort to + use our (or at least my) embarrassment as a lever to get us to agree to + the sale of sophisticated equipment we have disapproved before. While + that is a game we should not play, and while I do not argue that we + should give them the neutron bomb, I do suggest that Washington take a + hard look at whether there are any areas where we could move the limits + forward a bit. Specifically, if there is anything we can do in the three + areas mentioned by Pekic (para 4, above), it could go far to remove + or at least diminish whatever distrust Ljubicic still harbors. We seem to have come through the + Dragon affair with only moderate—and repairable—damage. The objective + now ought to be to demonstrate the accuracy of our claim that what + happened was a consequence of misunderstanding, not deliberate policy. + We can best do that by finding other areas of cooperation and making + them work.

+ + Eagleburger + +
+ +
+ 273. Telegram From the Embassy in Yugoslavia to the Department of + StateSource: National + Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign + Policy File, D790544–0137. Secret; Priority. Vance was scheduled to travel to + Belgrade December 14–15. His trip to Yugoslavia and Romania was + canceled after the U.S. Embassy in + Tehran was seized by protesters on November 4 and U.S. diplomats taken hostage. See Document 219. + + + + + + Belgrade, November 23, 1979, 1552Z + +

8762. Subject: (U) Secretary Vance’s Visit to Yugoslavia—Briefing Materials: + Overview.

+

1. S-entire text

+

2. This message provides for Secretary Vance our overview assessment of the current Yugoslav + scene.The Embassy drafted a list of + possible topics of discussions between Vance and the Yugoslav leadership in telegram 8287 + from Belgrade, November 5. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + D790528–0060) In telegram 8847 from Belgrade, November 28, the + Embassy reported that negotiations for a new consular convention + between the two countries were complete except for the status of + dual nationals. Yugoslavia, which required compulsory military + service of all male citizens over the age of 18, had in the past + arrested U.S. citizens with dual + citizenship visiting the country. The Yugoslav Government informed + the Embassy that a new law on military obligations, which was to be + adopted shortly, exempted dual citizens from military service under + certain conditions. The Embassy recommended an exchange of separate + but binding letters on the issue, which, if agreed to by the + Yugoslav Government, would allow Vance to sign the convention while in Belgrade. + (National Archives, RG 59, Central + Foreign Policy File, D790547–0680)

+

3. You will find Yugoslav leaders deeply troubled by the current world + scene. They see detente in jeopardy, a quickening arms race, a deepening + world economic crisis, a widening North-South gap, and unsettling + instability in key areas such as Iran. They are concerned by Soviet + intentions, the increasing resort to force and military intervention + around the world, and what they see as indecisive leadership in the + West. Finally, they sense, despite brave public words about the Havana + Non-Aligned Summit, that Yugoslav influence in the non-aligned world may + have begun a slow decline. The country is in the throes of severe + economic problems, including high inflation, excessive industrial growth + and a severe trade imbalance, with a substantial rise in imports while + exports stagnate. This has been seriously aggravated by the Montenegrin + earthquake last spring and floods this fall, and a poor wheat crop plus + ever-increasing oil prices. Inflation is running at about 25 per cent, + and correction measures have thus far failed measurably to help. + Shortages in consumer goods—by no means as severe as elsewhere in + Eastern Europe—are causing grumbling, not least, because in this + consumerist society the populace is unaccustomed to austerity. Finally, there is the + ever-present anxiety about the future after Tito, now exacerbated by unease over the approaching + demise of Brezhnev.

+

4. Yet in many respects Yugoslavia continues to be a rather amazing + success story. Robust real economic growth continues at about 7 per cent + annually. The people enjoy access to a wide range of consumer goods and + seem to find little difficulty in paying the skyrocketing prices for + them. Travel to the West—and the input of Western ideas here—is + virtually unhindered. Intellectual and academic exchanges with the West + grow annually; exchanges with the US are especially valued. There are + few barriers to artistic creativity. In sum, the “quality of life” for + the average Yugoslav is good, and he expects it to get better. If it + doesn’t, a post-Tito regime + could find itself facing political consequences. But the converse is + true: so long as the standard of living continues perceptibly to + improve, this will be an important element of stability after Tito.

+

5. Tito and the succession. + NIE 15–79,See Document 269. + just published in Washington, gingerly concludes that Yugoslavia is only + “marginally” more [garble—likely?] to make it through a transition + period without major turmoil. We, too, are guarded in our prognosis—but + continue to believe that the centripetal forces in post-Tito Yugoslavia will prevail over the + centrifugal. The forces acting to hold the country together include an + acutely felt “hang together or hang separately” syndrome; economic + imperatives; an experienced, pragmatic—if undistinguished—collective + leadership accustomed to brokering regional interests: and the vested + interest of the “new class” which has expanded since Djilas’ classic + exposition in 1953 to include an acquisitive, consumerist, thoroughly + Western-oriented middle class.

+

6. The greatest danger is nationalism. Despite Tito’s heroics, intercommunal hatreds + have not been extinguished in the 34 years since WWII. Small but fanatic + and determined emigre extremist groups stand eager—perhaps with KGB + help—to foment and exploit internal turmoil. They are too weak, and + sympathy for terrorism within the country too slight, to create by + themselves a major problem within the country after Tito dies. They could, nevertheless, + exploit a deteriorating situation and, with Soviet help, pose a + potentially serious problem.

+

7. Two factors, difficult to predict, will greatly influence the + situation when Tito dies: the + domestic economic situation, and the international political scene. As + indicated, Yugoslavia is now facing serious economic problems, but it + has survived similar difficulties in the past. The Yugoslav nightmare is + that the Tito and Brezhnev transitions coincide, although + Tito seems in much better + health than Brezhnev. While the outlook for the latter + appears to be dimming rapidly, Tito is still able to function well, but increasingly + focuses ever more narrowly on foreign affairs. There is no + successor-designate. The collective leadership machinery which Tito will leave behind him is designed + to prevent the emergence of any new Caesar. But history indicates that + sooner or later, and probably sooner, some faction will emerge to take + charge, followed by a rise to pre-eminence of a leader from within that + faction. But we cannot at this stage predict who he will be.

+

8. The United States can influence events here. We support the unity, + territorial integrity and independence of Yugoslavia. That support is + visible and welcome. If, in the time remaining to us before Tito dies, as well as at the time of + the event, the United States is seen as a powerful friend and an + effective force for stability in Europe, this will aid the + post-Tito leaders + enormously. Our objective in the pre-succession period is to weave a web + of relationships—political, economic, cultural, and military—which + projects the image of a steadfast friend and gives substance to the + bilateral relationship.

+

9. President Tito, at 87, has had + severe health problems, but continues amazingly vigorous. Over the past + 4–5 years he has progressively shed oversight over day-to-day management + of the government and party and has focused on foreign affairs. His is + still the last word, however, on major personnel assignments and indeed + on any major issue which cannot be resolved at a lower level.

+

10. The ever-pragmatic Tito + continues to tinker with the succession machinery, which now consists of + a 24-man party presidency and a nine-man state presidency. Tito heads both for life, and also + holds the post of Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces. The composition + of both presidencies reflects a delicate national balance between + Yugoslavia’s six constituent republics and two autonomous provinces.

+

11. The two presidencies contain almost all of the most important + personalities. In general, they are a tough, able, but not very + brilliant group. Most important is a small group of “1941 fighters,” + including the Croatian Party Baron Vladimir Bakaric; Serb Minister of + Defense Nikola Ljubicic, Serb + Milos Minic, Principal + Foreign Policy Adviser; Petar Stambolic, Senior Serbian Party figure; + and Admiral Branko Mamula, Croatian Serb who has recently been appointed + Armed Forces Chief of Staff. The most visible younger men are Slovene + Stane Dolanc and Bosnian Croat Branko + Mikulic, contenders for day-to-day Party direction.

+

12. Since Edvard Kardelj’s death last February, no one has been + designated dauphin or has seized that position. Tito has seen to that. Speculation + about friction between Dolanc and Mikulic, and between other members of the leadership, + may have substance, but we have lamentably little hard information on + which to make judgments. For the moment, Dolanc’s career has evidently met a check, and this (at + least temporarily) has favored Mikulic, but neither can be counted out (or, for that + matter, in) over the long run.

+

13. Yugoslav-Soviet relations: Since late 1976 serious strains have + developed in Yugoslav-Soviet relations. They arise out of three broad, + interacting processes: A) Widening policy differences over Africa, the + International Communist Movement, NAM, and other issues; B) Yugoslavia’s + rapidly expanding relations with China; and C) Yugoslavia’s growing + economic and political interest in expanded ties with the West and + particularly the US.

+

14. Over the past year, despite the Brezhnev-Tito + summit in May, policy differences have sharpened. Soviet support for the + Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia, increased tensions with Bulgaria over + Macedonia, and continuing Cuban attempts to maneuver NAM into an + informal alliance with Moscow have reinforced Yugoslav perceptions of a + Soviet challenge to basic Yugoslav interests. Thus, the LCY has + reportedly issued guidance identifying Moscow as “enemy number one”, and + officials have expressed concern about “Soviet expansionist tendencies” + and the possibility of Bulgaria becoming a “Balkan Cuba” or “Balkan + Vietnam”.

+

15. Reinforcing these strains lie deep and growing Yugoslav anxieties + over the post-Brezhnev future, + the impact of the Soviet succession on the Yugoslav succession, and the + possibility that a new, untested, and unsure Soviet leadership could + behave in dangerous and unpredictable ways. Despite these apprehensions, + Yugoslav options appear limited; Yugoslav-Soviet relations are likely to + remain a shifting blend of cooperation and confrontation. Their + essentially adversary relationship will continue to be tempered by heavy + military supply dependence on the Soviet Union (unless we can do + something about this), a burdensome trade deficit with the West, and a + consequent increase in trade with the East, residual ideological + sentiment, and a prudent geographic and political interest in minimizing + tensions where possible.

+

16. US-Yugoslav relations: In this context, Yugoslavia has increasingly + looked to the US to provide balance, diplomatic support, and an + alternative source of trade and military supply.On November 16, the Embassy provided briefing + materials on the status of U.S.-Yugoslav military cooperation. (Telegram 8556 from + Belgrade, November 16; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + D790527–0346) This, as well as the perception of a more + favorable US attitude toward the NAM, parallel interests on broad + international issues (NAM, Cambodia, China, to some degree Africa), and + our own interest in creating a web of relationships which will ease an + inevitably difficult transition period, have led to a rapid expansion of our political, economic, + military, cultural and academic relations over the past two years. Much + yet remains to be accomplished to establish a relationship of mutual + trust with the Yugoslav military; bureaucratic blundering on both sides + and a residue of suspicion complicate our efforts to broaden the + relationship, but progress has been made and our mutual interests + require that more be done.

+

17. Chinese-Yugoslav relations: In the year since Hua’s visit to + Yugoslavia and Romania (August, 1978), the drama and expectations have + diminished. What remains is a record of solid accomplishment in + consolidating and expanding Party and state ties; disappointed (but not + abandoned) hopes for increased trade and economic cooperation based on + mutual advantage; abiding but less strident Soviet concern and + displeasure over Yugoslavia’s role in strengthening China’s diplomatic + presence in the Balkans; and mutual recognition of the importance, + limitations, and usefulness of their relationship.

+

18. For the US, the expansion of Yugoslav-Chinese ties is a positive + development in that it encourages China’s opening to the world, acts as + a marginal restraint on Soviet behavior in the Balkans, and reinforces + US-Yugoslav relations and perceptions of shared policy interest. Further + steady expansion of their relations can be expected, but the pace and + scope will be limited by Yugoslav concern about unduly provoking Moscow, + economic realities, and differences in their systems, outlooks, and + ultimate political objectives.

+

19. NAM Havana Summit: The Yugoslavs, having defined the critical issues + at Havana to be those of “principle,” returned from Havana claiming + victory. The Cubans, on the other hand, played a different game, + ignoring ideological issues and promising flexibility while hammering + away on the substantive issues with telling, radical effect. Only time + will tell who won; whether the condemnation of the Middle East + negotiating process and the issue of Egypt’s suspension from the NAM + will be rendered moot by negotiating progress; whether Cuban behavior at + Havana so irritated the “silent majority” that Castro will not be able + to manipulate the movement over the next three years. What seems clear, + however, is that Yugoslavia emerged from the summit with diminished + influence. Diminished because it chose to fight only on “principle”, + ceding the battlefield to Castro on almost all other issues. Diminished, + because even on those issues where it did fight, it did not win + clear-cut victories, despite the investment of enormous effort and + Tito’s personal prestige. + Diminished because Yugoslavia, a relatively small, relatively developed, + white, European, and northern country has inevitably begun to lose + relevance within the NAM. At some point, Yugoslav leaders may begin to + reevaluate their heavy commitment to the NAM, but certainly not until + after Tito’s passing.

+ +

20. Yugoslav expectations from your visit: The Yugoslavs will wish to + hear your view on European security issues, above all the prospects for + detente. You will have a particularly good opportunity to discuss with + them decisions taken at the NATO + Ministerial, especially the reasons why theater nuclear modernization is + so critical for the maintenance of the European military balance on + which peace depends. The Yugoslavs will be glad to exchange views on the + situation in China and in SE Asia, where our positions are closely + parallel; they may raise Korea, if so, they will tell you the North + Koreans have become really quite reasonable and suggest that we try to + do a deal with them; on the Middle East, they will urge you to begin + dealing directly with the PLO and will be keenly alert for any + indications of evolution of our policy in that direction. If there is + time, South African issues could come up—Yugoslav support for national + liberation movements is virtually unqualified, but they are deeply + concerned about Cuban (and hence Soviet) penetration of the continent + and will welcome a genuine solution in Zimbabwe-Rhodesia if that indeed + appears in prospect.

+

21. On bilateral issues, they may present their case on the Krsko nuclear + power plant project. They will almost certainly urge greater balance in + our trade, press for continuing efforts to suppress anti-Yugoslav + terrorism, ask that we be more forthcoming in our military sales + relationship, and seek a reiteration of our policy of support for + Yugoslavia’s unity, territorial integrity and independence. Above all, + they will welcome your reassurance that US foreign policy toward + Yugoslavia rests on a clear and steady perception of our national + interest, that our support for Yugoslavia’s integrity predates the + present administration and will continue after it precisely because it + corresponds to our most vital national interest—a stable, peaceful, + non-Soviet-dominated Europe.

+ + Scanlan + +
+ +
+ 274. Editorial Note +

On January 12, 1980, Assistant to the President for National Security + Affairs Zbigniew Brzezinski + informed President Jimmy Carter + that the basic contingency plan for Allied support for Yugoslavia + following Yugoslav President Josip Broz + Tito’s death had been completed. (See Document 275.) Tito’s + advanced age and deteriorating health had set the stage for planning for + his death for several years, with a first National Security Council + contingency plan produced and adopted in April 1976. (See Foreign + Relations, 1969–1976, volume E–15, Part 1, Documents on + Eastern Europe, 1973–1976, Document 82.) On December 1, 1978, + an interagency committee met to discuss updating the 1976 plan. A + December 4 Central Intelligence Agency memorandum reported that the + interagency committee decided a rewrite of the 1976 plan was required. + (Central Intelligence Agency, Office of Support Services (DI), Job + 80T00634A, Production Case Files (1978), Box 5, Folder 19, Meeting on + Post-Tito Yugoslavia + [12/4/78]) On April 12, 1979, another meeting of the interagency + committee produced a first draft of an updated contingency plan, which + included a list of possible U.S. actions + in the wake of Tito’s death and + a memorandum for President Carter + concerning the effect of Tito’s + death on Yugoslavia. (Central Intelligence Agency, Office of Support + Services (DI), Job 82T00150R, Production Case Files, Box 6, Folder 143, + Meeting on Post-Tito Yugoslavia + [4/16/79])

+

On November 2, 1979, the Department requested that the Embassy in + Belgrade provide its own recommendation for the public statements + President Carter would make at + the time President Tito died. + (Telegram 286331 to Belgrade, November 2; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + D790501–0739) In a November 2 response, the Embassy wrote that U.S. Ambassador to Yugoslavia Lawrence Eagleburger “is nonetheless + prepared to live with what you have [drafted] with one exception. He + feels that the last paragraph, which reaffirms our support for + independence, territorial integrity and unity is too weak and should be + strengthened. What he suggests (which follows) he suspects will be too + strong for your liking but points out that State ought to be pushing for + as strong a commitment as possible, leaving it to the others, if they + feel they must, to soften it.” (Telegram 8224 from Belgrade, November 2; + National Archives, RG 59, Central + Foreign Policy File, D790503–0859)

+

Tito’s health continued to + deteriorate throughout November and December 1979. By January 1980, the + sclerosis of his veins and arteries and the developing gangrene in his + left leg forced his doctors to amputate it as a last resort measure to + save his life. A January 19, 1980, “Special Analysis” in the CIA’s National + Intelligence Daily concluded that a smooth transfer of power + from Tito to the collegial + system of leadership established since the 1974 constitution would take + place. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan at the end of December 1979 + had heightened the perceived Soviet threat and would “serve to hold the + new Yugoslav leader together during the first few months.” The Agency + believed that in the short term, “the Soviets will not intervene + militarily” and that “other forms of Soviet meddling or pressure during + this period would only reinforce Yugoslav unity.” It acknowledged that + in the long term “we are less sanguine about the prospects of Yugoslav + unity—and Soviet restraint.” (Central Intelligence Agency, Office of + Support Services (DI), Job 82T00466R, Intelligence Publication Files + (1980), Box 1, Folder 1, National Intelligence Daily)

+
+ +
+ 275. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security + Affairs (Brzezinski) to + President CarterSource: Carter Library, National + Security Affairs, Brzezinski + Material, Country File, Box 86, Yugoslavia: 1/80. Secret. Sent for + information. Carter initialed the document indicating he saw + it. + + + Washington, undated + + + SUBJECT + Yugoslavia: Contingency Planning (S) + +

In addition to our own contingency plans to be implemented upon Tito’s death, at the quadripartite + meetings the Political Directors of the FRG, France, Britain and the US, together with the Military + Officers of these countries associated with the quadripartite meetings, + have been engaged in an ongoing study of assistance to Yugoslavia in the + event of Soviet pressure on or intervention in Yugoslavia. (S)

+

A basic contingency document has been worked out. Recent work has + concentrated on two problems:

+

—The resupply situation. Our studies show this to be very + problematic.

+

—The coordination of supplies of new systems to Yugoslavia. It is + clear from our studies that internal bureaucracies in all countries, + including the US, are inhibiting coordination. (S)

 +

The Political Directors have been working hard to overcome the + difficulties. At the next quadripartite meeting, to be held January 31, + a report will be made on progress in cutting through this red tape. The + Military Officers will also report to the Political Directors what aid + could be offered to Yugoslavia in the first weeks of any pressure, and + by whom.In telegram 9542 to Bonn, London, + and Paris, January 12, the Department of State informed the military + officers at the quadripartite meetings of Major General Bowman’s assessment of immediate + and long-term Yugoslav military needs in case of a crisis. Bowman wrote to his counterparts: + “If in the near future a crisis should ensue in Yugoslavia, it might + be necessary to demonstrate to Yugoslav leaders in some concrete way + that the West supports Yugoslav independence. One way to do that + would be to ship some high priority military equipment in the first + week or two.” Bowman went on + to suggest that “if the crisis were bad enough and the Yugoslavs + requested” the United States could provide Stinger, Dragon, and + TOW missiles, as well as “tie + US AWACS radar downlink into the Yugoslav air defense net.” + (National Archives, RG 59, Central + Foreign Policy File, P870104–0252) Their study is focusing on + three questions in particular: (1) what aid could be offered in toto; (2) which countries could offer which + items; (3) how best to divide the pie. (S)

+
+ +
+ 276. Memorandum From Stephen + Larrabee of the National Security Council Staff to the + President’s Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Aaron)Source: National Security Council, Carter + Administration Intelligence Files, Box I–021, SMC 106, Mini SCC 1/18/80, Yugoslavia. Sent for + action. A stamped notation on the first page reads: “DA has + seen.” + + + Washington, January + 17, 1980 + + + SUBJECT + Mini-SCC on Yugoslavia, Friday, + January 18, 11:00 a.m. (C) + +

The main purpose of this mini-SCC on + Yugoslavia should be to ensure that the USG is well-organized and prepared in case Tito should die in the near future. + There are three main papers which should be reviewed:

+

1. State’s revised contingency plan to be + implemented on Tito’s death (Tab + A).Attached at Tab A is a January 16 + memorandum from Tarnoff to + Brzezinski which + included: a preliminary checklist in the eventuality of Tito’s death, suggested members of + the funeral delegation (to be led by the President); draft + condolence messages; a draft memorandum to the Secretaries of State + and Defense, the Attorney General, and the DCI drawing attention to the danger of anti-Yugoslav + terrorism; and a draft letter to Brezhnev cautioning against interference in Yugoslav + internal affairs. In a January 25 memorandum to Brzezinski, Brement and Larrabee argued that the letter to + Brezhnev be dropped from + the Yugoslav contingency plan; Brzezinski agreed. (Carter Library, National + Security Affairs, Staff Material, Europe, USSR, and East/West, Larrabee Subject File, Box 69, [Yugoslavia: + Tito]: 1–2/80) It + contains a checklist of important steps to be taken in the immediate + aftermath of Tito’s death, a + list of the delegation to the funeral, and condolence messages, public + statements, etc. I have checked it over and I think it touches all the + important bases. You need only review the + checklist. (The messages have been cleared with the + speechwriters.)

+

2. A State paper on short-term policy goals (the + first two-three months after Tito’s death) and steps we are taking in terms of + contingency planning (Tab B).Vest submitted the paper the + following day to the Vance. + See Document 277. You should glance + over the parts underlined in red and ask George Vest to briefly summarize the paper and the + steps.

+

In addition to the State paper on short-term policy goals:Aaron wrote + in the margin next to the following three points: “What is + actionable?”

+

—the Department has prepared and updated during the past 10 years a USG Contingency + Study which addresses scenarios for internal disintegration and + Soviet/WP threats and/or invasion. + This study is a useful reference but is too long and unwieldy to be a + useful policy-making tool;

+ +

—EUR has formed an interagency group to + review these plans, bring them fully up-to-date, and prepare necessary + decision documents;

+

—under the aegis of this group PM is + preparing a more detailed analysis of military options for the US and + NATO which will be ready by + January 25. (S)

+

3. The Quad paper on military contingencies in + case of Soviet pressure (Tab C).Tab C is + not attached. Tarnoff + forwarded the final paper, dated March 3, to Brzezinski on March 6. See Document 284. You should ask General + Bowman (DOD/ISA) to briefly + review the status of this paper and DOD + contingency plans for supplying Yugoslavia in the first weeks of any + crisis. (C)

+

As you know, the Political Directors’ meeting will be on January 24–25. + To date the other three Allies have not provided a very useful list of + equipment which they could supply Yugoslavia. Our + objective at the Political Directors’ meeting should be to get + agreement on what each ally would supply in the first week of a + crisis and to push the other three to do more. You should + stress that we want to be in a good position to respond to any Yugoslav + request for aid. However, while we need to be able to respond quickly to + any Yugoslav request for aid, we should also be + mindful of strong Yugoslav sensitivities about NATO discussions of contingency + plans, which they fear will stimulate Warsaw Pact pressures. + (See in particular the cable at Tab D.)Tab + D is not attached. (S)

+

Three final points:

+

—You should task DOD to look into any + changes in legislation that might be + necessary in order to respond to Yugoslavia’s requests quickly and + effectively. Otherwise, we may find that the Yugoslavs turn to us with a + request for a certain type of advanced equipment, i.e., The Dragon, and + we may not be able to supply it in time due to legislative + restrictions.Aaron circled “Dragon,” and wrote + in the margin “what do they want that we can’t supply?”

+

—State should be tasked to look at the signaling + process. The Yugoslavs are very sensitive about external + involvement in their affairs and do not want us to take any action that + might provoke the Soviets. At the same time they want to feel confident + that they can rely on us if they need to. We need to have a better idea + of how we can signal our willingness to help the Yugoslavs without + getting too far out in front.

+

—CIA should be tasked to do a concise analysis of Soviet goals, tactics and + scenarios for intervention. To some extent they have done this + in the latest NIO but we need a + separate policy-related study which focuses solely on the Soviet + angle.Aaron underlined “the Soviet angle” and drew a + question mark under. He also wrote after this point: “Soviet + reaction to P[resident] visit.” (S)

+
+ +
+ 277. Briefing Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for + European Affairs (Vest), the + Director of Policy Planning (Lake), and the Assistant Secretary of State for + Politico-Military Affairs (Bartholomew) to Secretary of State VanceSource: National Archives, RG 59, Office of the Secretariat Staff, Official + Working Papers, S/P Director + Anthony Lake, 1977–Jan + 1981, Lot 82D298, Box 6, TL 1/16–31/80. Secret. Drafted by + McCormack, Barry, and Palmer + on January 17; cleared by Harrison and Kamman. + + + Washington, January + 18, 1980 + + + SUBJECT + Yugoslavia, the Tito + Succession, and the Afghan Crisis + +

The short-term prospects for an orderly transition following Tito’s death are good—but we cannot be + certain. A collective Presidency will take over power, rotating jobs on + an annual basis.

+

With their current preoccupation with Southwest Asia, the Soviets may, + particularly if they pursue an active Euro-detente policy, take a + reasonable, hands-off posture toward Yugoslavia.

+

However, the Soviets will view the post-Tito period as a singular opportunity to influence + Yugoslav policies in their favor. They will pay special attention, + through inducements and threats, to interest groups within the + government, party, and military establishments, and may provide covert + support to divisive elements.

+

The overriding Soviet objective will be to keep the Yugoslav Communist + Party in power, preferably with a leadership group more friendly to + Soviet interests than Tito has + been. They would like to do this without force or any appearance of + Soviet intervention so that any countermeasures by the U.S. and its NATO allies would appear interventionist.

+

Afghanistan has united the Yugoslavs against the Soviet threat as never + before. This mood may relax in time, but, barring unforeseen chaos, the + Yugoslavs themselves will in the foreseeable future pose a formidable + obstacle to Soviet aspirations. Thus the immediate prospect is for the + country to hold together.

+

But we’re not certain how long this relatively stable situation will + prevail, and we’re concerned that none of the potential successors has + much stature. Tito set up a + mechanism supposedly to help with the succession, but he refused to let + a single strong leader emerge. The regime’s efforts to control, monitor, + and eliminate opposition betray its nervousness about separatists and + Cominformists. Moreover, several factors such as emigre activity and national separatism may foster + some uncertainty and instability in the post-Tito period.

+

While the Yugoslavs will want our support, they will not welcome a US or + allied over-reaction. This would have the effect of undermining Yugoslav + confidence in their own ability to cope with the post-Tito period and could provide the + Soviets with pretexts to react in unhelpful ways. They will even suspect + that our expressions of concern are designed to destabilize the country, + perhaps to get the Communist Party out of power. They will be + particularly watchful about our will to control any Yugoslav emigre + activities in the West. Therefore, a primary goal of US policy will be + to ensure a calm US and allied response, reflecting confidence in + Yugoslavia’s stability and political maturity.

+

U.S. Commitments, + Plans, Studies, and Decisions

+

1. Neither we nor any other NATO + members have made any direct commitments to provide either men or + material to Yugoslavia in the event of a crisis or threats from the + Soviets.

+

We have expressed “support” for Yugoslav independence and territorial + integrity during Tito’s 1978 + visit to the U.S. Initially U.S. support would come in the form of + close political and economic ties and stepping up our modest military + supply relationship if the Yugoslavs want this. As the situation + develops, we will want to consult closely with our allies bilaterally, + through the Quadripartite mechanism, and possibly in NATO. However, we should bear in mind + Yugoslav sensitivities about NATO + discussions focused on them, which they see as stimulating compensatory + Warsaw Pact pressures. We should not undertake detailed contingency + planning in NATO, but confine + ourselves to general and confidential exchanges.

+

2. The Department has prepared and updated during the past ten years a + USG Contingency Study for + Yugoslavia, which addresses scenarios for internal disintegration and + Soviet/WP threats and/or invasion. + This study is a useful reference but not a policymakers tool. EUR has formed an interagency group to + review these plans, bring them fully up-to-date, and prepare necessary + decision documents. Under the aegis of this group, PM is preparing a more detailed analysis of + military options for the U.S. and NATO which will be ready by January + 25.

+

3. DOD is working on contingency plans + to meet a situation in which the Yugoslavs might ask us to provide + increased military supplies, logistical support. These plans will be + ready shortly. (In a crisis, the Yugoslavs can muster three million men + in the field and another three million auxiliaries.) They are less + likely to look to the U.S. or the NATO allies for a direct commitment of + military forces, than for the type of assistance mentioned above.

+ +

4. We have sent to the White House statements to be made and actions to + be taken immediately following Tito’s death, including a possible message from the + President to Brezhnev. We are + seeking the urgent views of Embassies Moscow and Belgrade on this latter + issue and will send you a separate memo on the considerations involved + as soon as possible.In telegram 13982 to + Moscow and Belgrade, January 18, the Department requested Embassy + views on whether a letter from Carter to Brezhnev following Tito’s death would be useful. The letter would + stress the importance the U.S. + Government attached to Yugoslav non-alignment, independence, and + territorial integrity, and stress U.S. Government expectations of Soviet actions. The + draft language reads in part: “You should understand that any effort + to exploit President Tito’s + death to weaken Yugoslavia’s internal cohesion or undermine + Yugoslavia’s traditionally independent foreign policy would be + regarded by the United States as an unfriendly act, toward which we + would feel compelled to respond accordingly.” (National Archives, + RG 59, Central Foreign Policy + File, P870123–0524) In telegram 1002 from Moscow, January 19, the + Embassy cautioned against sending a letter before any Soviet threat + to Yugoslavia. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P880025–0685) From + Belgrade, Eagleburger + welcomed the idea of a letter sent immediately following Tito’s death, but suggested + clarification of what constituted troublesome Soviet moves toward + Yugoslavia. (Telegram 429 from Belgrade, January 20; National + Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign + Policy File, P870123–0521) One of our recommendations is for + a Presidential statement, to be issued upon Tito’s death, which reaffirms in clear terms our support + for the independence, sovereignty, and unity of Yugoslavia.

+

5. In the absence of a threat of Soviet intervention, we should quietly + encourage the post-Tito + succession process to produce a new unifying authority, while working + with the Yugoslavs to support their independence. We assume that if any + crisis or Soviet threat develops, the Yugoslavs will take the lead in + telling us what they need and want, and that we should not press U.S. assistance or guarantees beyond what + the Yugoslavs feel is useful.

+

At a mini-SCC meeting today chaired by + Aaron there was strong + interagency endorsement for the general policy line set forth in this + memorandum. A number of specific tasks were assigned to ensure that we + are well prepared. We will keep you closely informed as this work + proceeds.

+
+ +
+ 278. Memorandum From the National Intelligence Officer for the Soviet + Union and Eastern Europe (Horelick) to the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence + (Carlucci)Source: Central Intelligence Agency, + Office of the Director of Central Intelligence, Job 81B00112R, + Subject Files, Box 16, Folder 52, (SCC) Yugoslavia, 1980. Secret; [handling restriction not declassified]. Sent through NFAC + Deputy Director Clarke. + Printed from an uninitialed copy. Copies were sent to the Chairman + of the NIC, D/OSR, and + D/OPA. + + + Washington, January + 21, 1980 + + + SUBJECT + Yugoslav Contingency Planning [classification + not declassified] + +

1. On Friday morning, 18 January, I attended a Mini-SCC on Yugoslavia chaired by David Aaron. Attendees included + Assistant Secretary Vest, + EUR/State, Jim Sienna and Maj. + Gen. Bill Bowman, DoD, Lt. Gen. + John Pustay, JCS, as well as + representatives from Treasury, and various NSC staffers. [classification not + declassified]

+

2. The purpose of the meeting was to lay down guidelines to organize the + government’s preparations for the contingency of President Tito’s death. An Interagency Working + Group (IWG) at the Assistant Secretary level headed by George Vest was established to + coordinate USG policy during the + immediate period following Tito’s death. Defense, CIA, + Justice, Commerce, and Treasury will participate as needed either in the + full group or in special subgroups. I attended the first meeting of that + working group late Friday afternoon. [classification + not declassified]

+

3. A USG Contingency Study for + Yugoslavia has been available since shortly after the 1968 Soviet + invasion of Czechoslovakia and has been periodically updated. This is a + continuing operation. As part of that planning exercise routine + documents (official statements, messages to the new Yugoslav leaders) + have already been prepared. Special anti-terrorism measures are being + studied.See Document 274. [classification + not declassified]

+

4. Because of the extreme sensitivity of any military or logistical + support contingency planning, this aspect of the preparations is being + very closely held to a small subgroup of the Interagency Working Group + on which we are represented. PM has been + charged with preparing an updated military contingency planning document + suitable for serving as a + policymaking tool.On January 22, Bartholomew sent a memorandum to + Vance in preparation for + a January 23 VBB luncheon meeting. At Tab 1 of the memorandum, + covering Yugoslavia, Bartholomew suggested that, while the immediate + crisis brought on by Tito’s + failing health might have subsided, the additional time be used to + “strengthen the West’s ties with Yugoslavia in tangible ways” and + “further prepare for post-Tito scenarios, including covert or overt Soviet + intervention.” The memorandum listed three areas of particular + attention: economic; military cooperation; and Soviet intervention + scenarios. (Department of State, Office of the Secretariat Staff, + Cyrus R. Vance, + Secretary of State—1977–1980, Lot 84D241, Box 2, Vance/Brown/Brzezinski Luncheons 1–3/80) Larrabee sent a similar memorandum + to Brzezinski on January 22. + (Carter Library, Brzezinski + Donated Material, Subject File, Box 34, Meetings—Vance/Brown/Brzezinski: 1/80–2/80) The Yugoslavia discussion in + the VBB was postponed to February 8. An analysis of US and + NATO options should be ready for + review by January 25. Meanwhile DoD is + preparing logistical contingency plans to meet the situation in which + the Yugoslavs might ask us for increased military supplies.See footnote 2, Document + 275. [classification not + declassified]

+

5. We have all been asked to keep a very low profile with respect to any + contingency military planning, the fact of which should not be discussed + publicly. Public discussion of such would be deeply resented by the + Yugoslavs and at this stage would be unnecessarily provocative to the + Soviets. Accordingly, while generally alerting relevant offices and + analysts in NFAC and keeping tabs on intelligence support work that has + already been commissioned in INR and + DIA, I do not recommend at this + point the establishment of any formal mechanism for intelligence support + of military contingency planning. Once intelligence requirements become + clearer later this week, we can see whether ad hoc responses will + suffice or whether some more permanent mechanism needs to be created. + [classification not declassified]

+

6. The closest political monitoring of Yugoslavia is, of course, going + forward. For the time being, the only specific tasks laid on CIA by the IWG were (a) to provide a brief + update on the state of the Yugoslav economy, with special reference to + its credit standing. Work done by OER in support of NIE 15–79See + Document 269. provides a solid + basis for such a paper and I have asked OER to provide a summary and + update of the economic section of that estimate for delivery to the IWG + by COB today; (b) DoD and CIA have been asked by David Aaron to provide him with a + report on the status of US-Yugoslav intelligence exchanges. To the + extent that such exchanges have occurred, they have been handled + primarily by DoD and Ambassador + Eagleburger and I shall + coordinate a reply with State and DoD; (c) I assume also that the DDO + will be represented in some way in anti-terrorist planning which is now + underway and being + coordinated through Bill Odom of + the NSC Staff. [classification not declassified]

+

7. Attached at Tab A is a preliminary checklist of activities which the + SCC has charged the IWG with + conducting in connection with the prospect of succession in + Yugoslavia.Attached but not printed is + a January 18 preliminary checklist of activities following Tito’s death. [classification not declassified]

+ + Arnold L. + Horelick + +
+ + +
+ 279. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security + Affairs (Brzezinski) to + President CarterSource: Carter Library, National + Security Affairs, Brzezinski + Material, Country File, Box 86, Yugoslavia: 2/80. + Secret. + + + Washington, February + 12, 1980 + + + SUBJECT + Tito’s Health + +

It now appears that Tito is + dying.Earlier on February 12, Brzezinski sent a memorandum to + Carter informing him that “CIA + reports this morning that Marshal Tito’s health is rapidly failing. He will not accept + any food and takes very little fluid. The fluid intake and his heart + medicine are both adversely affecting his kidneys. The prognosis is + poor. We will be reviewing our contingency plans for the event of + his death.” Carter initialed the memorandum indicating he saw it. + (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Brzezinski Office File, Country + Chron File, Box 57, Yugoslavia: 1–2/80) You will have to + decide who will attend the funeral. In ordinary circumstances it would + be a good gesture for you to do so rather than send the Vice President. + In the current circumstances, however, the issue is more difficult.

+

If you go, Brezhnev may well be + there. Whether you meet with him or not will be a major issue. If you do + not meet him, you will be severely criticized for refusing to deal with + the Soviets at a dangerous time and you will bear the onus for any + further deterioration in our relationship. If you do meet with him, the + meeting is likely to contribute to a further aggravation of our + relationship because of the positions you will have to take. To have a + different outcome will require that either the Soviets change their position on the + Afghan invasion (which seems highly unlikely, particularly in that + context) or you will have to modify your positions which will raise + charges of zigzagging and undermine our efforts with our allies, the + Islamic countries and the Olympics.

+

These considerations, plus the problem of squaring a trip to Yugoslavia + with your position on not going to New HampshireOn December 4, 1979, Carter announced his candidacy + for reelection. At the same time, he announced that he must postpone + campaign travels due to the ongoing situation in Iran. (Public Papers: Carter, 1979, Book II, p. + 2194) On January 15, 1980, following the Soviet invasion of + Afghanistan and with the Iranian hostage crisis continuing, Carter + told a group of editors and news directors at the White House, that + he continued to limit “the involvement of myself as a clearly + identifiable, partisan campaigner” and that even when he might leave + Washington, D.C., he would not “want to go to a fundraising event + for myself, or to participate in a strictly partisan event, until I + consider the alleviation of these crises to be adequate.” (Public Papers: Carter, 1980, Book I, p. 90) + Carter won the New Hampshire primary on February 26, with 47 percent + of the vote. Senator Edward Kennedy won 37 percent. lead me + to conclude that you should probably plan on sending the Vice + President.

+

We need to begin planning soon so I would appreciate your decision.Neither of the two options were checked. + Carter wrote at the bottom of the page: “My present inclination is + to send Mondale and my + mother.”

+

Agree, the Vice President should go

+

No, I will go

+
+ +
+ 280. Memorandum From Stephen + Larrabee of the National Security Council Staff to the + President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)Source: Carter Library, Brzezinski Donated Material, + Subject File, Box 34, Meetings—Vance/Brown/Brzezinski: 1/80–2/80. Secret; Outside System. Sent + for action. + + + Washington, February + 13, 1980 + + + SUBJECT + VBB: Contingency Planning for Yugoslavia (U) + +

Public Posture: As Ambassador Loncar emphasized to + you the other day,Brzezinski met with Loncar on + February 8 at 12:15 p.m. in his office in the West Wing of the White + House. They discussed Tito’s + health, U.S. support for Yugoslavia, + Afghanistan, and the Non-Aligned Movement. (Carter Library, National + Security Affairs, Staff Material, Office, Presidential Advisory + Board, Box 78, Sensitive X: 2/80) the Yugoslavs are concerned + that Western press speculation may overheat the political atmosphere and + will play into the Soviet’s hands. (See also Yugoslav Defense Minister + Ljubicic’s remarks to General + Graves at Tab A).Not attached. The Embassy + in Belgrade reported the conversation in telegram 1089, February 12. + Ljubicic complained to + Graves that coverage in the Western press of the situation in + Yugoslavia “strengthens the hands of the Soviets, who are looking + for ways to demonstrate that Yugoslavia is moving toward the West.” + (National Archives, RG 59, Central + Foreign Policy File, D800075–0640) In the coming days and + weeks we need to avoid alarmist commentary. Our public + posture should be that we have confidence in the Yugoslav’s ability + to handle the transition successfully. You should emphasize the + need within the USG to hew very closely + to this line. (C)

+

Head of Delegation: + Vance, Shulman, and Vest think that the President should + represent the US at the funeral. Ambassador Eagleburger also strongly believes that the President’s + attendance is in the U.S. interest.In telegram 1137 from Belgrade, February 13, + Eagleburger emphasized + his strong belief that Carter should lead the U.S. delegation to Tito’s funeral. (National + Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign + Policy File, D800077–0396) I concur. As Larry points out, + what the US does immediately and in the weeks ahead will have a major + psychological and substantive impact on Yugoslav + perceptions—particularly in light of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. + The President’s attendance would send an important signal to the + Yugoslavs—and to the Soviets—of our support for Belgrade. Conversely, + his failure to attend the funeral might cause doubts about our support. + I suggest that you recommend the President attend the funeral. (C)

+

Meeting with Brezhnev: If the President does go to the + funeral and Brezhnev also + attends, this raises the question of how to handle any possible meeting + between the two. A meeting would be impossible to avoid. State feels that it should be + low profile and perfunctory.Brzezinski underlined “low profile + and perfunctory” and wrote an illegible comment in the + margin. This is probably impossible. If the President goes, + Marshall, Bob and I feel that + he should emphasize our concerns about Afghanistan and that he should + above all give the impression of firmness and determination. + (Alternatively, Vance could meet + with Gromyko if the Vice + President heads the delegation.) If possible, bilaterals with the allies + should precede any meeting with Brezhnev, but we should avoid a Quad type meeting since + this would offend the Yugoslavs. (C)

+

Coordination with the Allies: Over the next few + days, the allies will be looking to us for indications of what we plan + to do and we need to convey to them our views. If we do not, the allies + may get out in front—Giscard + leading the pack—and attempt to act as mediators between the US and the + Soviets. The Soviets could try to play on this lack of unity within the + allies to further split the US from its allies. The President needs to + convey our thinking to the allies as soon as possible. (C)

+

Military Supply Relationship: General Graves has + been in Yugoslavia where he has had talks with Ljubicic and other Yugoslav officials + (Tab A). The main problem in the military supply relationship remains + the high cost of US weapons and the inability of the Yugoslav’s to pay + for them. Ljubicic made several + proposals on how we might overcome the financial obstacles (military + credits to Yugoslavia and they would then use them to pay for US + hardware, etc.)Ljubicic made two proposals: 1) That the U.S. help Yugoslavia obtain commercial + credits that could be used for the purposes of buying military + hardware if FMS credits remained a + challenge. 2) That the U.S. consider + selling Yugoslavia small quantities of some of the up-to-date + anti-tank and air-defense systems for training purposes. Ljubicic told Graves: “Yugoslavia + recognizes that in exceptional situations—‘and we both understand + what such situations might be’—Yugoslavia may be able to obtain from + the United States the up-to-date weapons systems it needs to defend + itself.” These weapons—which the Embassy identified as the Viper, + Stinger, and Roland missile systems—would be used for training + purposes in preparation for larger scale acquisition in a time of + crisis. (Telegram 1089 from Belgrade, February 12; National + Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign + Policy File, D800075–0640) Ask Harold to explore the + feasibility of Ljubicic’s + proposals and report back as to how we can overcome the financial + obstacles.Brzezinski highlighted this sentence and wrote “Very + important” in the margin. At the bottom of the page he wrote: “We + should immediately call Armstrong, Von + Staden, Wahl[erhime] to see what their people plan to + do, & to set up a system for coordinating our statements and the + line our leaders [wi]ll take in meeting the Soviets, that should + include: * restore Afghanistan as a buffer; * token Soviet + withdrawals and new plans; * Will guarantee neutrality of + non-aligned Afghanistan ([illegible] pro Sunni, Islamic (eg + Iraq)). (S)

+
+ +
+ 281. Memorandum From the Deputy Executive Secretary of the Department + of State (Bremer) to Secretary of State VanceSource: + Department of State, Office of the Secretariat Staff, Cyrus R. Vance, Secretary of + State—1977–1980, Lot 84D241, Box 3, President’s Breakfast—1–3/80. + Secret; Sensitive. + + + Washington, February + 14, 1980 + + + SUBJECT + Your Breakfast with the President Friday, February 15, 1980 + +

1. Yugoslavia.

+

A. Current State of + Play.

+

Tito’s condition remains “very + grave,” according to the latest Yugoslav medical bulletin. While + Tito could die at any + moment, [less than 1 line not declassified] he + could last another day or two.

+

A proposed public statement by the President and condolence messages for + the President and Vice President are at the White House. You also will + issue a brief statement and send a condolence message to the Yugoslav + Foreign Secretary. We will brief key members of Congress, stressing our + confidence in Yugoslavia’s ability to manage its own affairs + successfully during the coming months.

+

Although we have no indication as yet from the Yugoslavs, we expect there + will be a State funeral or memorial service approximately six days after + Tito’s death. Ambassador + Eagleburger has been + informed by the U.K. in Belgrade that a + “firm” decision has already been made that Prince Phillip, Thatcher and Carrington will attend. We + expect heavy, high-level attendance by Third World, Western and at least + some Eastern leaders. Embassy Belgrade’s tentative list of participants + includes Presidents Ceausescu and + Pertini, Schmidt, Genscher and Brandt, and Clark of Canada.

+

A proposed funeral delegation list has been sent to the White House by + Ben Read’s office (Tab 1).Attached but not + printed. Ambassador Eagleburger has asked us to bear in mind, especially + regarding accompanying staff, that there will be a flood of delegations + and that Belgrade is a small city with severely limited hotel space. + Briefing materials are being prepared for use with the Yugoslavs and for + anticipated bilaterals.

+

We can expect the Soviets to field a high-level delegation and will + inevitably have to deal with the question of a possible bilateral. We + would not expect much of substantive value from such a meeting and would probably want to convey + this view publicly. In the interest of allied solidarity, however, we + would not want to be seen as avoiding a bilateral. A meeting would also + give us a chance to express directly to the Soviets our views on SALT, TNF and other issues which will + remain of mutual concern despite Afghanistan. A memo from Marshall on the meeting is at Tab + 2.In the attached February 14 + memorandum to Vance, + Marshall Shulman suggested that the Soviet leadership was likely to: + 1) send a top-level delegation to the funeral in order to gain + influence with the emerging Yugoslav leadership; 2) meet with + Western European leaders to weaken allied support for the U.S. position on Afghanistan; and 3) + lobby non-aligned leaders in attendance. A bilateral meeting between + the United States and the Soviet Union, Shulman suggested, would be + inevitable. While he had little expectation of a breakthrough, such + a meeting would, among other things, help avoid miscalculations on + the Soviet side by stressing U.S. + Government positions with regard to Yugoslavia, Cuba, + etc.

+

B. Outlook for + Post-Tito/Yugoslav + Relations.

+

Bilateral relations have been strengthened significantly during the past + three years in all fields including political, economic and military. + Our problems are minor in comparison to what has been achieved.

+

On Tito’s death, we will want to + demonstrate through actions and public statements, our confidence in + Yugoslavia’s new leadership and in its ability to manage the country’s + economy and its defense.

+

We will need to: continue intensified efforts to prevent anti-Yugoslav + terrorism; encourage U.S. banks and + businessmen to continue business as usual; and see if we can be more + forthcoming regarding Yugoslav arms sales requests.

+

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to Yugoslavia.]

+
+ +
+ 282. Memorandum From Stephen + Larrabee of the National Security Council Staff to the + President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)Source: Carter Library, National + Security Affairs, Brzezinski + Material, Brzezinski Office + File, Country Chron File, Box 57, Yugoslavia: 1–2/80. Confidential. + Sent for information. A stamped notation on the memorandum reads: + “ZB has seen.” + + + Washington, February + 14, 1980 + + + SUBJECT + President’s Attendance at Tito’s Funeral + +

I understand that you feel that the President should not go to Tito’s funeral. While I appreciate the + difficulties his attendance might pose—especially in regard to any + meeting with Brezhnev—in my view + the primary consideration should not be how to + handle a meeting with Brezhnev (who may well not attend the funeral) but + the type of signal the President’s attendance—or failure to + attend—would convey to the Soviets, to the Allies, and above all to + the Yugoslavs. From this perspective, there are strong and + compelling reasons why I believe the President should lead the funeral + delegation:

+

1. The Impact on the Yugoslavs. Despite the + outward calm and all the preparations for Tito’s death, the Yugoslavs still remain nervous about + what the future portends and suspicious of the depth and the sincerity + of U.S. support. As Ambassador Eagleburger has rightly stressed, what + we do in the first few days and weeks after Tito’s death will have a major psychological and + political impact on the Yugoslav leadership and on future Yugoslav + attitudes. Nothing would do more to reassure the new + leadership and underscore our support for Yugoslavia’s independence + and nonaligned position than for the President to go to the + funeral. His attendance would also be a clear signal to others, + who in the wake of Soviet invasion of Afghanistan are concerned about + Soviet intentions, that the U.S. is + firmly committed to supporting Yugoslavia. (C)

+

2. The Danger of Ambiguity. Conversely, if the + President does not go, and other major European leaders do (Thatcher already plans to go, and it is + almost certain that Schmidt and + Giscard will go), it will + appear as if the U.S. is less concerned + about Yugoslavia than are our allies, and the credibility of our past + statements of support will be weakened. Many people will undoubtedly + recall the President’s ambiguous campaign statement on Yugoslavia,See footnote 2, + Document 235, for Carter’s 1976 statement on Yugoslavia + during the Presidential debate with President Ford. and he + will be criticized by some of + his opponents, as well as some journalists, for passing up an important + chance to concretely underscore U.S. + support for Yugoslavia at a critical moment. (C)

+

3. Consultation with the Allies. The trip provides + a valuable opportunity for the President to consult with the allies + (especially Schmidt, Thatcher and Giscard) and to coordinate policy on a + broad range of issues at a moment when allied solidarity is—or at least + is perceived to be—beginning to unravel. A meeting with the major allies + could serve to shore up this solidarity and give it a shot in the arm. + But this will require leadership that only the President can provide. In + lieu of that, as Bob Blackwill + has pointed out, East-West detente will be left in the hands of + Schmidt and Giscard, who may succumb to attempts + by the Soviets to exploit fissures in the Alliance. (C)

+

4. Domestic Political Considerations. The trip + could help the President domestically. He would capture the headlines, + be seen meeting with world leaders and providing international + leadership while the Vice President campaigns in New Hampshire—and he + could be back in the White House in 48 hours. (C)

+

5. The Soviet Angle. Because of Brezhnev’s health, and with Kosygin incapacitated, it is far from + certain that he will attend the funeral. (The Soviets only sent their + Ambassador to Kardelj’s funeral—a point not lost on the Yugoslavs.) If + Brezhnev does not go—and my guess is that he won’t—then there + is no problem. Vance could meet + quietly with Gromyko or you + could meet with Alexandrov.Andrei M. Aleksandrov-Agentov, a + member of the Secretariat of the General Secretary, Central + Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, and Brezhnev’s foreign policy + adviser. If Brezhnev + does go, then the President can hardly avoid meeting with him. While any + such meeting is unlikely to result in any dramatic change in Soviet + policy or a major improvement in bilateral relations, it need not turn + into a shouting match. At the very least it would provide an opportunity + for the President to:

+ + —make clear to the Soviets at the highest level in a firm + nonpolemical manner the nature of our concerns over Afghanistan and + the reasons for our actions; + —reaffirm his belief in the need to dampen military competition + and move forward in areas such as MBFR, SALT and CSCE; + —project an image of firmness and determination to defend vital + U.S. interest; + —keep open the lines of communication and leave the door ajar for + any Soviet initiatives at a later date. (C) + +
+ +
+ 283. Telegram From the Embassy in Yugoslavia to the Department of + StateSource: National + Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign + Policy File, D800082–0524. Secret; Immediate; Limdis. Sent for information to + Zagreb, Moscow, USCINCEUR, + and USNMRSHAPE. + + + + Belgrade, February 15, 1980, 1513Z + +

1248. Dept pls pass to OSD/ASD/ISA. Subj: Yugoslavia After Tito: The Short Term.

+

1. (S-entire text).

+

2. This cable summarizes my views on the short-term prospects + (immediately following the death and for some 6 months thereafter) for a + smooth transition to the post-Tito era. A second cable will consider the longer + term.In telegram 1258 from Belgrade, + February 16, Eagleburger + analyzed the prospects of stability in Yugoslavia over the longer + term. The conventional analysis on Yugoslavia, Eagleburger wrote, ranged “from + mild to extreme pessimism.” Disagreeing with that interpretation, + Eagleburger wrote that, + over the next five years, “Yugoslavia will remain stable, the + collective leadership concept will work,” its foreign policy will + “remain committed to non-alignment,” and that “so long as the Soviet + Union continues its current policies, basic Yugoslav interests will + be in conflict with those of Moscow, with little chance for much + more than a cosmetic accommodation.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + D800084–0050)

+

3. Outwardly the Yugoslavs, and their government, will remain calm. There + will be some military alert measures taken; the police will increase + surveillance of known or suspected internal opponents, and may even take + a few into custody; there will be a host of public statements about + Yugoslavia’s internal stability and its willingness and capability to + defend itself from external threat; the collective presidency will + ostentatiously take decisions; there will be a real effort to show that + business is going on “as usual.”

+

4. To a great degree the perceived picture will be the real one. There + will be no panic; the decision-making process will function smoothly; + the Croats will not rise up against the Serbs, or vice versa. There + will, in fact, be an extraordinary effort to compromise differences (of + which there are many) and to avoid any hint of controversy.

+

5. But the collective presidency will not be—even at this early stage—a + collegium of equals, all of whom have similar weight in the making of + decisions. The evidence during Tito’s earlier illness was clear (even if the identity + of all the players was not) that there will be an inner group (drawn + from the State and Party Presidencies) that will decide most questions. + Bakaric’s role can probably best be described as chairman of the board. + He will oversee the system and his colleagues, coordinate activities between agencies, and + determine agendas. He will not be Generalissimo, but he will be the + ranking General. Milos Minic, + long-term Tito associate and + former Foreign Secretary, will be in charge of foreign policy; General + Ljubicic, Defense Minister, + will run national defense and be involved in broader political + decisions. The central role that these three have played, and will play, + is clear.

+

6. Other participants are less easily discernible. Prime Minister + Djuranovic is probably the key figure on all matters economic and, as + such, inevitably will be a part of—or on the edges of—the inner circle. + Kolisevski, the new but temporary Chief of State, and Doronski, Chairman + of the Party Presidium (also only temporarily), will, because they are + where they are, carry some weight. But both are eminently dull and + forgettable fellows and will probably not survive as significant factors + after their terms expire. Dolanc and Mikulic are important figures now, and may become more + so as time goes on. Dragosavac also bears watching, both from the + Croatian perspective and because he is a leading “conservative” who + could play an important role should things turn sour.

+

7. But beneath the calm exterior there will lie a degree of uncertainty + and disquiet which will not soon or easily be put aside. First and + foremost will be overwhelming fact that the father figure, the man above + the battle who resolved disputes when no one else could, the only true + Yugoslav, is gone. For a while, until they are accustomed to doing + without him, the fact that Tito + is no longer there to turn to will be a massive if subliminal + psychological problem for people and government alike.

+

8. Then, of course, there is the Soviet threat, which is never far from + the mind of any Yugoslav. Relations with Moscow have been bad and + getting worse for the past two years, which adds to the disquiet. And + Afghanistan has hardly been a reassuring event.

+

9. How the Soviets play the first few weeks after Tito’s death can make some difference. + If Brezhnev comes to the funeral + (assuming he is up to it), and if he behaves himself, it will somewhat + relieve concerns. If, on the other hand, the Soviets treat Tito’s death as they did Kardelj’s + (they virtually ignored it), the level of nervousness will skyrocket. + But in any event, I am persuaded that Yugoslav and Soviet interests are + so widely divergent that no real relaxation over the long term is + likely. This is not to say that a less confident Yugoslav leadership + will deal as forcefully with Moscow as Tito did. On the contrary, faced with problems at home + and vulnerable to Soviet economic pressures, the new leaders will + probably—at least in the short term—feel compelled to accommodate Soviet + interests to a greater degree than in the past (e.g., by adopting a + lower profile on issues such as Afghanistan).

+ +

10. And while the Yugoslavs ponder Soviets motives they will also + recognize that with Tito’s death + their leadership role in NAM, already sharply challenged by Castro as a + Soviet surrogate, will be instantly diminished. If they suffered any + illusions before Afghanistan and while Tito was still alive that NAM could be an effective + bulwark against Soviet pressures, they will soon have to conclude that + this is no longer so much the case.

+

11. And finally, Tito’s death + comes at a time of substantial economic disquiet which will not soon + diminish. Terms of trade in 1979 were worse than for many years and will + not improve much this year; an inflation rate of some 30 percent will + not be brought to more acceptable levels for sometime to come; and + devolution to the republics of substantial economic powers means that + the central government probably cannot move rapidly—and perhaps not + effectively—to correct the deterioration. Yet act it must, and soon, or + 1980 will be even worse than 1979 and the eventual cure more painful. + The government knows this; the question is whether it will have the + courage and clout to pursue the corrective actions begun late last year + and early in 1980. In fact, the best early test of the post-Tito collective leadership will be how + effectively it moves to take stiff economic measures at a time of + transition and possible external pressures.

+

12. In sum, there will be no collapse. The transition will be smooth and + with a minimum of turbulence. But there will be substantial if hidden + tension, and a lack of self-confidence that will diminish as and if the + government is able to cope. Those who govern will be sensitive, nervous, + and tough in the extreme—at least at first. They will know, and they + will be right, that how well they do in the first six months after + Tito’s death will have a + substantial impact on the future viability and permanence of the + collective leadership concept.

+

13. In these circumstances the opportunities for the USG are enormous. The Carter + administration has spent some three years preparing for this moment. Our + political relations are at least as good as they have ever been; our + international differences, while still substantial, have been greatly + reduced, both in scope and decibel level; and we have become an + important and valued economic partner. If we act with wisdom, + understanding, and restraint over the course of the critical next six + months the pay-off for both our countries can be substantial. What the + Yugoslavs need now is reassurance that they do not stand alone. They + need to be shown that we, with the West following our lead, stand ready + to help where we can and take risks on their behalf when we must.

+

14. Milovan Djilas believes that post-Tito Yugoslavia will, inevitably, reshape its political + and economic institutions in ways we in the West will find appealing. I + share the hope, but am less confident of the inevitability. Yet the odds favor + liberalization; what we and our Western Allies do, beginning now, will + have a great deal to do with whether that present hope can be turned + into future reality.

+ + Eagleburger + +
+ +
+ 284. Paper Prepared in the Department of StateSource: Carter Library, National + Security Affairs, Staff Material, Europe, USSR, and East/West, Larrabee Subject File, Box 69, Yugoslavia: Military: + 4–9/80. Secret; Sensitive; Nodis. + Sent under a March 6 covering memorandum from Tarnoff to Brzezinski. Tarnoff explained the paper was + “developed by an interagency group chaired by State. A mini-SCC on January 18, 1980, requested + such a study. We recommend that another mini-SCC be held to consider the + post-Tito security + framework and scenarios which the paper sets forth and the adequacy + of present policies in the politico-military field to prepare for + them.” + + + Washington, March 3, + 1980 + +

Yugoslavia: US Politico-Military Strategy + Executive Summary

+

This paper examines four major post-Tito scenarios in Yugoslavia, and Soviet policies for + each. It then sets forth the politico-military steps the US should take + over the near term to prepare for these scenarios, and the policies we + should pursue when one or more of them develops. The issue of direct US + military action in Yugoslavia in response to steps the Soviets might + take is beyond the scope of this paper.

+

The US and NATO have important + interests in a stable, independent, and nonaligned Yugoslavia. Were it + allied or more cooperative with the Warsaw Pact, Yugoslavia could + support expanded Soviet naval and air operations in the Mediterranean. + The occupation of Yugoslavia by Warsaw Pact forces would present a + threat to Greece, Italy, and Austria. In addition, a Soviet takeover of + Yugoslavia would deal a profound psychological blow to NATO.

+

At the same time, Yugoslavia remains a communist state, albeit nonaligned + with extensive but still limited ties to the West. The US and its NATO Allies have no military commitment + to Yugoslavia’s security. The Yugoslavs now expect to rely mainly on + their own resources to blunt any Soviet attack, but they would want some + Western support, e.g., logistic. In the face of an actual attack, they + might change their present + expectation and request more direct Western military engagement.

+

This paper sets forth a number of policy areas for US action. Perhaps the + most important at this time is to strengthen the US military supply + relationship with Yugoslavia. In recent years it has been limited. The + Yugoslavs strongly complain that prices of US equipment are too high, + and they are extremely wary of publicity. Nevertheless, there are + prospects for sales of some systems the Yugoslavs want, such as air + defense radars. Even though the Yugoslavs have not bought much from the + US, they remain seriously interested in developing the arms transfer + relationship.

+

Post-Tito + Scenarios

+

In the initial post-Tito period + Yugoslavia is likely to remain united and the Soviets to exercise a + certain caution. The scenarios set forth below address the situations we + could face over the mid-to-longer term. These scenarios are + illustrative.

+

Scenario 1: Cohesion: Yugoslav leadership + demonstrates unity and basic consensus, achieves broad popular support, + continues nonalignment. The Soviets might attempt to both woo and + pressure the Yugoslav leadership, presenting it with an ambiguous, but + not openly threatening Soviet stance. If the Soviets were willing to + pursue riskier policies, they could seek to weaken the new leadership + and to generate ethnic and regional tensions.

+

Scenario 2: Cohesion with Liberalization and/or + Westward Shift: Internal cohesion as in Scenario 1, but + accompanied by political liberalization or a decided shift westward in + Yugoslav foreign policy. The Soviets would intensify pressures on + Yugoslavia to eschew such trends. Depending on how pronounced were the + trends, the Soviets might even use military pressure. But the greater + the cohesiveness in Yugoslavia, the less likely the Soviets would + intervene with force.

+

Scenario 3: Disunity: Early post-Tito unity and consensus of federal + leadership begins to break down as regional disputes and pressures on + leadership mount. If disunity were limited, the Soviets would urge + decisive recentralization steps. If the situation deteriorated further, + regional constituencies could seek active Soviet backing. There would be + an active prospect of Soviet military intervention. Soviet perceptions + of potential Western responses would be critical.

+

Scenario 4: Soviet Military Intervention: If the + USSR saw disunity in Yugoslavia as + very serious, it might decide to intervene militarily. Were Yugoslavia’s + armed forces cohesive and strong, the USSR might need to assemble 40–50 divisions to launch a + full-scale assault. Alternatively, if Yugoslavia were weakened by + internal conflict, the Soviets might decide to use a smaller force, + perhaps 20–25 divisions. The USSR + would worry about NATO or Chinese counteractions on other + fronts. While at present there is no evidence of Soviet intention to + intervene in Yugoslavia, Soviet actions must be viewed as uncertain and + changeable, and dependent on Yugoslav military and political strength as + well as on opportunities presented and commitments elsewhere.

+

Strategy

+

Over the near term the US can take steps to reassure the Yugoslavs and to + keep the Soviets on the defensive. As post-Tito scenarios emerge, the US can take additional steps, + as necessary and generally after consultations with the Yugoslavs and + our key allies (recognizing Yugoslav sensitivity to NATO actions). The politico-military + measures suggested below would complement economic and other political + instruments of US diplomacy.

+

Decision Point 1: Near Term Objective: indicate a + high level of political interest in Yugoslavia’s independence and unity, + and continue to strengthen Yugoslav political and military ties with the + US and the West, through small and nonprovocative, but cumulatively + important steps. US actions could include:

+ + —at the time of Tito’s + death, US and allied statements of support for Yugoslavia, + —visits by Secretary Vance + and top military officials, + —intensified consultations with key allies, + —implementation of more forthcoming US arms sales policy, and + expanded IMET, + —possibly intelligence cooperation on terrorism. + +

Decision Point 2: Cohesion (Post-Tito Scenario 1) Objective: + continue to demonstrate a high level of political interest. If the + Soviets pursued divisive tactics, the US should take a tougher stance + toward USSR. If the Yugoslavs showed + signs of succumbing to Soviet pressures (e.g., for greater naval or + overflight rights), the US should make countervailing efforts to + reassure and dissuade the Yugoslavs. Specific US policies to counter + divisive Soviet tactics might include:

+ + —warnings to the USSR, and + encouragement of allies and others to do the same, + —provision to Yugoslavs of information on Warsaw Pact military + activities, + —if necessary to signal the USSR, carry out selected US and allied force redeployments, + exercises, or augmentations. + +

Decision Point 3: Cohesion with Liberalization and/or + Westward Shift (Post-Tito + Scenario 2) Objective: measured political support for Yugoslavs + (complementing economic steps, such as strengthening EC ties). Our policies would remain those + at Decision Point 2, intensified as necessary. We could face difficult + choices if events in Yugoslavia moved too fast.

+ +

Decision Point 4: Disunity (Post-Tito Scenario 3) Objective: + support policies that help the new leadership rebuild consensus and + national unity, and resist Soviet intimidation and subversion. + Specifically, the US could provide [less than 1 line + not declassified] specialized equipment needed by the + government. If the Soviets aggressively exploited the situation, the US + and European allies could escalate responses, by:

+ + —making tougher warnings to the USSR, + —expanding force redeployment, augmentation, and exercise measures + (e.g., involving the Sixth fleet, land-based tactical air power, + AWACS, the ACE Mobile Force, the NATO Naval On-Call Force Mediterranean), + —raising the general alert status or increasing the deployability + of US/NATO forces, + —providing US and allied logistics support packages for quick + upgrading of Yugoslav defense capabilities,Following consultations with the Allies in the + Quadripartite Military Group, January 25, 1980, General Bowen + drew up a list of equipment NATO could offer the Yugoslav military in case of + low-, mid-, and high-level crises. (Carter Library, National + Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Brzezinski Office File, + Country Chron File, Box 57, Yugoslavia: 3–4/80) + —taking measures to guarantee and protect the air, sea and land + lines of communication to Yugoslavia, and to ensure enroute + access. + +

These steps should be undertaken in ways that show resolve, yet avoid an + all-out confrontation with the Soviets or the impression that the West + is seeking base rights in Yugoslavia.

+

Decision Point 5: Soviet Military Intervention + (Post-Tito Scenario + 4) Objective: support Yugoslav resistance to Soviet aggression, + in ways consistent with Yugoslav desires, with our larger security + interests in NATO’s Southern Region + and in Europe generally, and with US military posture and requirements + worldwide. The US could:

+ + —augment measures listed at Decision Point 4, + —with allied cooperation, undertake airlift of arms and equipment + to Yugoslav forces in secure areas, + —if necessary, undertake a partial mobilization of US reserve + forces, and other steps to enhance US and allied force + readiness, + —institute stronger measures, if necessary, to protect air and sea + lines of communication to Yugoslavia. + +

[Omitted here is the body of the paper.]

+
+ +
+ 285. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in + YugoslaviaSource: + National Archives, RG 59, Central + Foreign Policy File, D800126–0074. Secret; Priority; Exdis. Drafted by Pfeifle (PM/SAS); + cleared by Barry (EUR), Farber (PM/SAS) and McGiffert (DOD) and in ACDA, T, D/CT, and M; + approved by Nimetz. Sent for + information to the Secretary of Defense. + + + + Washington, March 11, 1980, 2346Z + +

65034. Military addees handle as Specat Exclusive. Subject: Steps the USG Could Take in Support of + Post-Tito Yugoslavia + Military Relations. (S) Ref: Belgrade 1264.In telegram 1264 from Belgrade, February 18, Eagleburger made three + recommendations concerning military cooperation with Yugoslavia + following Tito’s death: 1) + strong consideration of the “sample sales” of advanced weapons + systems to Yugoslavia for training purposes; 2) an expansion of the + IMET program to include + Yugoslavia; and 3) the possibility of selling weapons systems in + Yugoslav dinars rather than U.S. + dollars. (National Archives, RG 59, + Central Foreign Policy File, D800086–0391) The Embassy revised the + IMET proposal in telegram 1274 + from Belgrade, February 18. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + D800086–0715) The proposals stemmed from the discussions between + Graves and Ljubicic, February + 11. See footnote 6, Document + 280. From Nimetz + for Eagleburger.

+

1. Secret (entire text)

+

2. Since the receipt of reftel we + have been engaged in extensive interagency consideration of your thought + provoking ideas. We have a preliminary consensus on a number of your + proposals. You may draw on the following in talking to Gen. Ljubicic and other Yugoslav + officials.

+

A. Weapon system “samples”; we are prepared to provide the GOY LOA’s for small amounts of missiles + (50 each) and a single set of related ground equipment of TOW and Dragon. In addition, we now are + willing to provide LOA’s for 50 Redeye air defense missiles and related + equipment. These are systems we currently can actually draw on to + support Yugoslavia in a crisis. We are also examining other defense + items which might interest the GOY for + this type program. We need more details about Yugoslav ideas on this + approach, e.g., quantities of missiles, when they would wish to begin + etc. In order to explore this further we propose sending an Army team to + Belgrade at an early date to discuss Yugoslav requirements with the aim + of developing effective training packages for these systems, developing + specific components of support packages to be included with missiles, + and determining delivery + times.Siena met with Yugoslav officials on January 10 to + discuss the U.S.-Yugoslav military + supply relationship in preparation for Graves’s visit. In a January + 19 memorandum, he reported that the Yugoslav Government attached + primary importance to receiving information on the availability of + the Viper, Stinger, and Harpoon weapons systems. Siena recommended that the + Department of Defense complete a study on the availability of + weapons systems previously denied the Yugoslavs. (Carter Library, + National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Europe, USSR, and East/West, Larrabee Subject File, Box 68, + Yugoslavia: Military: 1/79–1/80) On March 13, Vujatovic told + Eagleburger that the + Yugoslav Government would welcome an Army team to Yugoslavia to + discuss Yugoslav requirements. (Telegram 2049 from Belgrade, March + 13; National Archives, RG 59, + Central Foreign Policy File, D800129–0341) On March 15, Larrabee reported the Yugoslav + position to Brzezinski. + (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Europe, + USSR, East/West, Larrabee Subject Files, Box 69, + Yugoslavia: Military, 2–3/80) These issues, to include + availability and condition of support equipment need to be addressed + prior to proceeding beyond this conceptual agreement. Items of support + equipment must be identified and screened, resulting in uncertainties at + this time in requirements for calibration and repair, and delivery + dates.

+

B. Since Stinger is only now entering the U.S. inventory and Viper and other systems are not yet in + production, it is premature to consider transfer of these systems. We + will give Yugoslav requests for samples priority attention as soon as it + becomes possible to consider transfer of these systems.

+

C. With regard to Roland, since Yugoslavia is in the Franco-German sales + territory, the GOY should discuss such + purchases with the French and Germans. We have broached the subject of + Roland for Yugoslavia to the French and believe it possible that a sale + of limited numbers would be approved. Obviously, we will support such a + Yugoslav approach.In a March 28 memorandum, + Larrabee informed + Brzezinski and Aaron of Bowman’s discussions within the + Four Powers group with respect to supplying weapons to Yugoslavia. + While some weapons systems were considered too sensitive to provide + to Yugoslavia, the Quad agreed to provide some of the systems + Belgrade requested while more advance systems could be provided at a + later date. Regarding the bilateral U.S.-Yugoslav military cooperation, Larrabee wrote that Defense was + prepared to offer the Yugoslav Government small numbers of more + advanced systems for training purposes. (Carter Library, National + Security Affairs, Brzezinski + Material, Brzezinski Office + File, Country Chron File, Box 57, Yugoslavia: 3–4/80)

+

3. We will find an additional $30,000 in IMET funds and can make room at Leavenworth, Maxwell, + Newport or certain other schools (excluding the US Army War College) if + the Yugoslavs are interested in expanded attendance either in FY 80 or 1981. In previous informal + discussions on this subject the Yugoslavs have cited problems with + making available the right kind of officer and completing his English + language training. If the Yugoslavs desire courses in FY 80, we would have to take reprogramming + action soon including congressional notification.In telegram + 3856 from Belgrade, May 15, the Embassy reported the Yugoslav + request for two IMET slots for the + 1980 Command and General Staff College class at Ft. Leavenworth. + (National Archives, RG 59, Central + Foreign Policy File, D800240–0228) This might attract limited + public attention, but we do not believe it will be at all + controversial.

+

4. Unfortunately we cannot sell military equipment for local currency—we + will explore other ideas to provide useful materiel at lower prices, but + cannot hold out much hope at this point.

+

5. Drawing on the above, please tell Gen. Ljubicic that:

+

—We are intrigued with his idea of training “samples” of weapon systems + and are prepared to send an Army team to Belgrade with the aim of + working out a mutually acceptable program.

+

—We now are prepared to include Redeye air defense missiles in addition + to TOW and Dragon in such a training + program.

+

—We have informally discussed with the French the possibility of the sale + of Roland to Yugoslavia and would support such a sale.

+

—We will provide additional funds for tuition of Yugoslav officers at + selected Service schools if the Yugoslavs are interested.

+

6. Defense concurs.

+ + Vance + +
+ +
+ 286. Telegram From the Embassy in Yugoslavia to the Department of + StateSource: National + Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign + Policy File, D800158–0524. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Sent for information to + USCINCEUR. Larrabee and Kimmitt forwarded the telegram to + Brzezinski under a March + 31 memorandum, and recommended that a mini-SCC be held to discuss the sale of weapons systems to + Yugoslavia. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff + Material, Europe, USSR, and + East/West, Larrabee Subject + File, Box 68, Yugoslavia, 1–11/80) On his copy of the telegram, + Brzezinski approved the + sale of MK–46 and F–5E, and instructed that the sale of the Harpoon + missile not be denied outright. He also noted that Congress would + have to be informed. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, + Staff Material, Europe, USSR, and + East/West, Larrabee Subject + File, Box 69, Yugoslavia: Military: 4–9/80) + + + + Belgrade, March 29, 1980, 0819Z + +

2514. Military addressees handle as Specat Exclusive. For Under Secretary Nimetz. Please pass DOD/ISA McGiffert and CNO. Subject: Military Relationship With Yugoslavia. Refs: + A) Belgrade 2473,Not found. B) + Belgrade 2474,Not found. C) Belgrade + 2471,Not found. D) State + 6062.In telegram 6062 to Belgrade, + January 9, the Department informed the Embassy in Belgrade that, in + light of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the U.S. Government had decided to “adopt a + more forthcoming policy of approving sales to Yugoslavia.” The + telegram instructed Eagleburger to inform Vrhovec that “this means the USG will be prepared to release more + sophisticated weapons systems to Yugoslavia on a case by case basis + should the extent and character of the military requirement + warrant.” (National Archives, RG 59, + Central Foreign Policy File, D800015–0237)

+

1. S-entire text

+

2. We appear to be on the verge of a major breakthrough in our military + cooperation with the Yugoslavs. We need to grab hold of the moment, + because if we let it slip through our fingers this time it is not likely + to come soon again.

+

3. Refs A and B report Yugoslav requests for the sale of MK–46 torpedos + and the Harpoon missile system. Ref C indicates that we may soon receive + a request for the sale of 6 F5E/F aircraft. And, we today signed an LOA + for some 27 million dols worth of AN/TPS–63 radars. In short, we seem to + have overcome the Dragon missile setback; the Yugoslav military has, + clearly at the highest levels, decided to move—and in some highly + visible areas—in our direction.

+

4. It is, I believe, absolutely essential that we react positively (and + hopefully quickly) to the MK–46 and Harpoon requests, and to the F5E/F + request should it be forthcoming. The GOY, and particularly General Ljubicic, will be a lost cause if we now say no on + either the MK–46 or the F5E/F. Honesty compels me to admit, however, + that a no on the Harpoon, while + it will not sit well, will probably not repeat not have the adverse + impact that a rejection in either of the other two cases would entail + particularly in light of ref D. Conversely, an affirmative reply on the + Harpoon would be a major statement of our support at a time when such + signals will have a substantial and lasting impact on the attitudes and + outlook of people of critical importance to us in the years ahead.

+

5. My earlier experience in the Pentagon leads me to believe that the + Navy, for understandable and respectable reasons, will probably question + the wisdom of release of either the MK–46 or Harpoon to the Yugoslavs. + Unless I miss my guess, they will put forth at least two arguments: A) + there can be no guarantee that Yugoslavia will not transfer to the + Soviets, or permit them to examine, the weapons systems in question; B) + Yugoslavia, as a potential opponent, should not be sold weapons systems + that could be used against US forces.

+

6. These are perfectly legitimate concerns for which there is no + completely satisfactory response. As in everything having to do with + foreign policy, the balance of pros and cons must be struck in + individual cases. The arguments in response to the straw horse I may + have created in para 5 are, as I see + them, basically three: they are, admittedly, judgmental in character. + The first, the political advantage to the US—particularly at a time when + Tito is on his deathbed—has + been made by me so many times in so many ways that I will not (you will + be relieved to learn) burden you with a repetition here. Suffice it to + say that on political grounds alone I believe the USG would be well advised to approve + release of both the MK–46 and Harpoon to Yugoslavia.

+

7. As to the question of transfer of the technology, all I can say is + that we have no evidence that such has been the case before, nor is + there any reason to believe that it would happen now, when + Yugoslav-Soviet relations are at a nadir, or in the future. All the + evidence we have indicates that the GOY + is meticulous in refusing to discuss with any third party its military + relationship—much less the intimate details of the weapons involved—with + any arms supplier. We have been held at arms length when we have tried + to talk about Yugoslav purchases from the USSR or others, and understand that others have encountered + a similar attitude. Thus, in my judgment (a judgment fully concurred in + by the DATT), an argument that the Yugoslavs might transfer the + technology is, at best, a worst case judgment supported by no evidence + or experience to date.

+

8. So far as the question of Yugoslavia as a potential enemy is + concerned, I find it hard to envisage a situation in which this would be + a likely event. But, again, using a worst case analysis, it would seem + to me that any war in which the Yugoslavs would be engaged against us + would be one of such magnitude that the Yugoslav contribution would be negligible at best. + What seems far more likely is that the Yugoslavs, who have always + contended that, if attacked by the Soviets, they will do all they can to + drag the West into the struggle, see both the MK–46 and the Harpoon as + means for keeping the Adriatic open as a highway for resupply and + perhaps reenforcement from the West. While we may not much enjoy + contemplating the course of conduct for ourselves that such thinking + would imply, we can hardly take issue with the rationale or point of + view behind it.

+

9. One further word on what may be going on in Yugoslav minds right now + that has led to the rather startling turn in our direction. As + Washington knows, Yugoslav-Soviet relations have been getting steadily + worse, especially since the Afghan invasion. The Yugoslavs have been + surprisingly open in their condemnation of the Soviets, and in their + efforts to lead the Non-Aligned to condemn the Soviet aggression. The + Soviets have reacted, as one might expect. But the reaction has been + surprisingly harsh, and getting more so. While this is not the place to + attempt an analysis of the reasons for the Soviet reaction, it is + difficult to escape the conclusion that it is, at least in part, an + attempt to cow the post-Tito + leadership ab initio, in the belief that over the long haul Moscow will + gain more by applying the baseball bat at a time of uncertainty and fear + in Belgrade than by a display of patience and forebearance. Equally, we + might assume that the GOY, from fear or + a desire to show Moscow it cannot be pushed around (or both), has + decided to strengthen its military cooperation with the US, knowing that + the Soviets will learn of the move. If this is the case, then we have a + great deal to lose—and not just in the military sphere—by actions on our + part that imply to the new Yugoslav leadership that it had better + accommodate while it can because the West is unprepared to offer much + more than tea and sympathy.On his copy, + Brzezinski highlighted + this sentence and wrote in the margin “this is a key + p[oin]t.”

+

10. There is a term (which I have now forgotten) in the science of logic + for the process of setting up false arguments so that by knocking them + down you support your own case. I may have engaged in that practice in + this cable. But the facts are nonetheless clear:

+

—Tito is dying, and Yugoslavia is + already moving into the post-Tito period;

+

—Yugoslav-Soviet relations are in a worse state than at any time since + Tito more-or-less patched up + his quarrel with Moscow in 1955;

+

—The GOY has turned to the US for + military support on a scale not seen since the closing out of our MAP in the 1950’s.

+ +

11. Watersheds are seldom recognized as such at the time. But we may be + in the middle of one so far as US-Yugoslav relations are concerned. It + would behoove us, therefore, to act with a little imagination, since the + payoff could be substantial. And since the Iranians already have both + the MK–46 and Harpoon in their inventory, what do we really have to + lose?

+ + Eagleburger + +
+ +
+ 287. Memorandum From Stephen + Larrabee of the National Security Council Staff to the + President’s Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Aaron)Source: Carter Library, National Security Council, + Institutional Files, Box 121, SCM 106, 1/18/80 Mini SCC, Yugoslavia. Secret; Sent for + action. + + + Washington, April 3, + 1980 + + + SUBJECT + Military Sales to Yugoslavia (C) + +

In preparation for a mini-SCC I met with + Barry and Siena to discuss where we stand on + release of the items in the Kimmitt/Larrabee + memo of March 31, (Tab A).See Document 286 and footnote 1 + thereto. + Siena reiterated what Kimmitt and I had noted in our memo: + that we will need to notify Congress of any sales of the MK–46, HARPOON, + and AN/TPS–63 radars. Current thinking in DOD is to treat each item individually and make a request + for an exception through the National Disclosure Policy Committee (NDPC) + channel—a process that could take several weeks. (S)

+

Siena predicted that there will + be opposition from the Navy on the sale of the MK–46 and HARPOON, though + he thought the opposition to the MK–46 could probably be overcome. + However, because of the danger of leaks he felt it very important that + we go though the NDPC channel and not run roughshod over the Navy. If we + attempted to circumvent the NDPC process, he felt sure there would be a + leak, which would be extremely damaging to our military relationship + with the Yugoslavs. He recommended postponing any mini-SCC until both the MK–46 and HARPOON had + been discussed in the NDPC channel. Bob + Barry concurred. (S)

+ +

At the same time the group agreed that we should try to accelerate the + release of the AN/TPS–63 radars. The problem is that the Yugoslavs have + requested a custom-made radar, and the manufacture of such a radar takes + time. However, Siena is looking + into the possibility of arranging for the leasing of a similar radar on + a stop-gap basis. (S)

+

We are also going back to Larry to get his views on whether a delay of + several weeks will create problems with the Yugoslavs.On April 2, the Department informed the Embassy + that the Department of Defense was not interested in holding an + SCC meeting until the MK–46 and + Harpoon issues had been decided. (Telegram 87420 to Belgrade, April + 2; National Archives, RG 59, Central + Foreign Policy File, D800168–1123) On April 14, the Department + informed Eagleburger that + the two systems were being considered through the National + Disclosure Policy Committee process. (Telegram 98480 to Belgrade, + April 14; National Archives, RG 59, + Central Foreign Policy File, D800187–0739) (C)

+

In light of the fact that moving through the NDPC channel may take couple + of weeks, there are two options:

+ + 1. Hold a mini-SCC only on + State’s political-military paper. + 2. Postpone the mini-SCC until + the request for an exception for the HARPOON and MK–46 has gone + through the NDPC channel and we have a clearer view of the attitude + of the services. (S) + +

Under the circumstances I think it would be better to hold a mini-SCC on State’s Political-Military paper, + and then hold a second mini-SCC on the + bilateral/QUAD issues after the NDPC has had a chance to meet. In the + meantime Kimmitt and I will have + Komer, who has jurisdiction + over the NDPC process, push the process as much as possible, and have + Siena do what he can to + accelerate release of the AN/TPS–63 radars. (S)

+

RECOMMENDATION: That we hold a mini-SCC + on State’s paper only early next week and a + second mini-SCC after the NDPC has met. + Kimmitt and Brement concur.

+

_____ Mini-SCC on State Paper only.

+

_____ Mini-SCC on Bilateral/QUAD issues + and State paper after NDPC process has been concluded.Dodson wrote + on the memorandum: “David—Let’s wait; do them together. Save + yourself a meeting.” Aaron + approved the second option. Dodson noted on the document: “OK to do together but push for fast resolution. Per + DA”

+
+ +
+ 288. Memorandum From Acting Secretary of State Christopher to Vice President + MondaleSource: Carter Library, Donated + Material, Papers of Walter F. + Mondale, Overseas Assignments—Trip Files, 1977–1980, + Box 35, Vice President’s Visit to Yugoslavia for Tito Funeral, 5/5/80–5/8/80: + Delegation Briefing Book. Secret. Christopher was Acting Secretary following the + resignation of Secretary Vance on April 28. + + + Washington, undated + + + SUBJECT + Your Participation in the State Funeral of President Tito + +

I. OBJECTIVES

+

Your presence in Yugoslavia as the head of an impressive U.S. delegation to Tito’s funeralMondale + traveled to Belgrade May 6–8, 1980. is an important symbol + for the Yugoslavs—and for the Soviets. While your visit will be short, + there will be both private and public opportunity to reaffirm our policy + of support for Yugoslav independence, territorial integrity and + unity—simple words, but full of meaning in the context of the present + world situation.

+

In brief meetings with the new Yugoslav leadership, you will want to + emphasize our confidence in their ability to run Yugoslav affairs along + the lines set down by Tito. They + will appreciate concrete expressions of our desire to strengthen the + bilateral relationship by being responsive to their needs, especially in + the economic and military spheres of our cooperation.

+

The Yugoslav leaders will also make clear to you their view of nonaligned + Yugoslavia’s unique international position. They will favor the + continued development of closer relations with the West—including the + U.S.—but they will also caution + against ties which are too close or too visible.

+

The Yugoslavs also want to avoid opening themselves to charges from + opponents within the Nonaligned Movement that they have compromised + their nonaligned credentials by getting too close to the Americans.

+

We expect the question of anti-Yugoslav Government emigre activity to be + high on the Yugoslav agenda of items to bring up with Western + leaders—especially the Americans, Germans, Canadians and + Australians.

+

II. SETTING

+

The Internal Situation

+

The actual succession process has followed the pattern which Tito had cut for it. The former Vice + President, Lazar Kolisevski, a + Macedonian, has become the + President of the collective State Presidency. On May 15, Kolisevski is + to rotate out of office and be replaced by another member of the + Presidency, Cvijetin Mijatovic, a Serb from Bosnia-Hercegovina, for a + one-year term.

+

With Tito’s death, his title of + President of the Presidium of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia + (LCY) will be subsumed within the Presidium as a whole. Thus the current + Chairman of the Presidium, Stevan Doronjski, a Serb from the Vojvodina, + will become the head of the Party until his rotation out of office when + his one year term ends in October, 1980. There is no established + procedure for the rotation process in the LCY Presidium and we do not + know who will replace Doronjski.

+

We anticipate that the succession process will operate smoothly, and that + the collective State and Party governing bodies will function as + planned—at least during the first few months after Tito’s death. Political activity + during Tito’s lengthy illness + indicated that the senior members of the Party, including Vladimir + Bakaric, a Croat, Milos Minic, a + Serb, and a few others, intend to play an active political role in + conjunction with the operation of the collective organs of leadership. + How this will work in practice remains to be seen. We believe that the + military, in the person of Defense Secretary Ljubicic, will represent a stabilizing factor on the + national scene.

+

In the first few months of this year, Yugoslavia passed through a period + of near crisis, occasioned by the most serious illness President + Tito had ever suffered. His + extended illness coincided with severe domestic economic difficulties + and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Any one of these factors would + have posed serious problems for the Yugoslav leadership. Their + unfortunate coincidence compounded the problem and presented the + Yugoslav leaders—this time effectively minus Tito—with a situation without + precedent.

+

Tito’s comrades did very well + indeed.In a May 6 memorandum to the + Vice President, Eagleburger + provided his own analysis of the transition from Tito to the collective leadership. + “By and large the system has functioned smoothly,” Eagleburger wrote, adding that the + new leadership understands that “how well they do in the first six + months will have a substantial impact on the future viability of the + system.” Because of that fact, Eagleburger wrote, “decision-making will proceed in + a fairly orderly fashion” and that “there will, in fact, be an + extraordinary effort to compromise differences and to avoid even a + hint of personal rivalry or controversy.” (National Archives, RG 59, Office of the Secretariat Staff, + Lawrence S. Eagleburger, + Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, Ambassador to + Yugoslavia, Under Secretary of State for Management (1967–1984), Lot + 84D204, Box 10, Chron, May, 1980) To assert that these few + months provided a definitive test of the succession machinery of the + post-Tito leadership would + be an exaggeration. The time was too short for more than a “start-up” run, yet too long for + the development of completely natural relations among Tito’s successors. But this did not + diminish the sense of deserved pride and increased self-confidence which + prevailed in Yugoslavia during this period. This is the principal lesson + to be learned from the events of the past few months: a successful + precedent now exists which will give the post-Tito leaders greater confidence in the + weeks and months ahead.

+

The Economy

+

Tito’s successors have inherited + a seriously overheated economy. The rapid economic growth over the past + three years has pushed the inflation rate over twenty percent, created a + series of huge trade deficits, and driven up hard currency debt to over + $13 billion. The Yugoslavs are now trying to implement a stabilization + policy to tighten credit, slow growth, and cut imports. However, these + measures are politically sensitive and will take time to have a real + impact. To ease the economy over this period, the Yugoslavs have + requested medium term balance of payments assistance from the U.S.On April + 24, Kostic met Secretary of + the Treasury Robert Miller + in Hamburg, West Germany, during the IMF summit and requested financial assistance for + Yugoslavia’s balance of payments deficit. Kostic told Miller that Yugoslavia was + implementing an economic stabilization program but that further + borrowing was required. (Telegram 873 from Hamburg, April 24; + National Archives, RG 59, Central + Foreign Policy File, D800204–0994) and several other + countries, including France, the FRG, + and Kuwait. They also intend to approach the IMF and private Western banks which already hold much of + the country’s external debt.David + Rockefeller, President of Chase Manhattan Bank, traveled to Belgrade + in June to discuss an offer to syndicate a worldwide $500 million + loan for the Yugoslav Government. Belgrade rejected the offer as + insufficient. (Telegram 165468 to the U.S. delegation in Venice, June 23; National Archives, + RG 59, Central Foreign Policy + File, D800303–1182) In a conversation with Eagleburger on June 30, Loncar + said that the Yugoslav Government was opposed to a worldwide loan + syndication and that Belgrade was hoping to get separate loan + agreements from several Western countries. Loncar also stressed that + Belgrade was reticent to accept loans from Arab countries because of + “political strings attached.” (Telegram 5192 from Belgrade, July 1; + National Archives, RG 59, Central + Foreign Policy File, D800316–1265) The Rockefeller plan was finally + accepted by the Yugoslav Government in September. (Telegram 7051 + from Belgrade, September 8; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + D800427–0868) We believe that Yugoslavia’s economic problems + are serious but that a real crisis can still be avoided through prudent + Yugoslav policies and some external financial help. We are now + considering what role the U.S. can + play.Miller traveled to Belgrade as part of the U.S. delegation to Tito’s funeral and discussed with + Kostic the way in which + the U.S. Government could offer + assistance. Miller stressed + that the IMF must be involved in + any stabilization program the Yugoslav Government undertook. + (Telegram 3749 from Belgrade, May 12; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + D800235–0359)

+ +

Foreign Affairs

+

While there is no evidence of any Soviet intention to move against + Yugoslavia at this time, the Yugoslav defense forces have prepared + themselves to defend the country against any threat.

+

In talks in Belgrade in early February with U.S. Defense Security Assistance Agency Chief, General + Graves, Defense Secretary Ljubicic noted the contingency measures which had been + taken “for all eventualities,” but also noted that Yugoslavia was calm + and not excited about the current situation.See Document 280 and footnotes 3 and 7 thereto. (Our military relationship with the + Yugoslavs is modest, but growing.)

+

The Yugoslavs have been typically outspoken in their opposition to + Moscow’s move against Afghanistan and they have played a significant + role in the mobilization of nonaligned sentiment in condemnation of the + Soviet intervention. Previously, they had been almost equally concerned + at what they saw as Moscow’s war by proxy in Kampuchea. A resultant + exchange of open polemics in the Soviet and Yugoslav press has served to + exacerbate further Soviet-Yugoslav relations.In telegram 2095 from Belgrade, March 15, the + Embassy reported the sharp reaction of the Yugoslav press to + publication in the Soviet press of commentaries on an article + published in a Vietnamese newspaper which the Yugoslav Government + considered highly offensive. The Embassy reported that “this is the + sharpest criticism of the Soviet press we can recall for several + years.” (National Archives, RG 59, + Central Foreign Policy File, D800132–1117) In telegram 2180 from + Belgrade, March 18, the Embassy reported that the Yugoslav + Government saw “a concerted Soviet campaign against Yugoslavia” and + felt the Soviet campaign was “not directed toward Yugoslavia’s + internal situation so much as toward Yugoslavia’s public opposition + to Soviet moves in Afghanistan and its influence in the NAM.” + (National Archives, RG 59, Central + Foreign Policy File, D800140–0408) In addition, while Moscow + was probably not surprised at the Yugoslav refusal to attend the April + 28–29 meeting in Paris of European Communist parties, neither was it + pleased by the Yugoslav decision.

+

The U.S. is in a very good position with + the new Yugoslav leaders. We have—particularly during this + Administration—accelerated the pace of our bilateral relations in all + key fields: political, economic, cultural and military. The resultant + “web of relationships,” as Ambassador Eagleburger describes it, has helped to increase our + knowledge of Yugoslav leadership attitudes as well as to increase + Yugoslav confidence in the durability of our friendship and our support. + Tito’s visit to the United + States in March, 1978, contributed to this process and the President’s + frequent correspondence with Tito was of great benefit in keeping up the momentum of + improving relations.

+

Yugoslav Ambassador Loncar expressed his Government’s appreciation for + the President’s May 4 statement in which the President strongly reaffirmed U.S. support for Yugoslavia and stated that + we will do what we must to provide that support.On May 4, in a statement on the death of Tito, Carter noted that “for more + than three decades, under administrations of both parties, it has + been the policy of the United States to support the independence, + territorial integrity, and unity of Yugoslavia.” Noting the + international situation, Carter stated: “America will continue its + longstanding policy of support for Yugoslavia and do what it must to + provide that support.” (Public Papers: Carter, + 1980–81, Book I, p. 827) The Ambassador also + expressed appreciation for a public statement by Deputy Assistant + Secretary Barry on April 22 + pointing out that the U.S. would view + with grave concern any Soviet or Warsaw pact efforts to undermine + Yugoslav territorial integrity, unity and independence.Published in Current + Policy, No. 169, U.S. + Department of State, May 1980. Barry’s statement in front of the Cleveland Council + on World Affairs received no media attention in the United States, + but was immediately attacked by the Soviet press. In telegram 6702 + from Moscow, April 25, the Embassy reported that the Soviet press + described Barry’s statements + as “‘slandering’ Soviet policy” and “barely stopping short of + threatening the USSR.” (National + Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign + Policy File, D800205–0262) The Soviets attacked Barry’s statement as an effort to cast + doubt on Soviet policies.

+

Yugoslav relations with the countries of Western Europe have also + improved during the past few years. In the present situation we have + urged the Western European governments to demonstrate their support for + Yugoslavia at this time by appropriate policy statements, by greater + attention to anti-Yugoslav emigre activity, by economic measures + including successful conclusion of the Yugoslav-EC trade agreement, and by meeting Yugoslav requests for + arms sales.

+

Yugoslavia’s increasing distrust of Soviet motives over the last year + reflected Tito’s personal + disenchantment with Moscow. His successors may well tread a more + cautious line, attempting initially to take a more “balanced” position. + Such a shift would be designed to bolster Yugoslavia’s credentials among + the nonaligned and to reflect Yugoslav concerns about growing East-West + tensions. However, we suspect that a more “evenhanded” approach would be + largely tactical. The Yugoslav people and leaders see a real threat in + the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and Soviet support for the Vietnamese + invasion of Kampuchea.In the briefing + material prepared for Mondale’s trip to Belgrade, the Department noted + that the “Yugoslav leaders perceive Soviet foreign policies—e.g., + support of the Vietnamese invasion of Kampuchea, opposition to an + improvement in Yugoslav-Chinese relations, manipulation of the + Yugoslav-Bulgarian dispute over Macedonia, and attempts to gain + greater influence and control over the international communist and + nonaligned movements—as part of a ‘grand design’ threatening + Yugoslavia’s vital interests.” (Carter Library, National Security + Affairs, Brzezinski + Material, Country File, Box 87, Yugoslavia: Briefing Book for + Tito Funeral, + 5/80)

+

The flagrant nature of Moscow’s intervention in Afghanistan may have + eased the pressures on Yugoslavia within the Nonaligned Movement, + however. The 1979 Havana Nonaligned Summit turned out to be a stand off + between the radicals led by Cubans and the moderates led by the Yugoslavs. But one of the + first casualties in the Afghan war was Cuba. Having survived a record + number of votes in its effort to gain a seat on the United Nations + Security Council, Cuba withdrew from the race immediately after the + Soviet invasion.

+

Nonalignment has been the Yugoslav vehicle for the achievement of + international recognition and status.In + the “Non-Aligned Movement” section of Mondale’s briefing materials, the Department noted + that Tito’s death left no + clear succession in NAM for the leadership of the moderate group of + nations, but that Cuba’s “efforts to exploit the NAM Chairmanship to + radical ends have been rebuffed notably by the strong resistance of + NAM moderates” and that although the United States could not work + with NAM as an organization under Cuba’s chairmanship, it would + continue to “work closely on specific issues of mutual concern with + individual NAM members, especially with moderates like Yugoslavia.” + (Ibid.) While nonalignment will continue to be the pillar of + Yugoslav foreign policy, the Yugoslav role in the Nonaligned Movement + will almost certainly diminish without the charismatic presence of + Tito, one of the founders of + the Movement.

+

III. ISSUES

+

A. + U.S. Policy Toward Yugoslavia

+

1. Suggested Points

+

—Much progress was made in the development of our bilateral relations + during the past three years. President Tito’s tremendous contribution to this mutual + undertaking will be sorely missed. The President will particularly miss + the correspondence which he and Tito exchanged on international issues. We intend to + redouble our efforts to further strengthen our relations, and we are + confident that these efforts will be reciprocated by the Yugoslav + side;

+

—The long-standing U.S. policy of support + for Yugoslavia’s independence, territorial integrity and unity remains + unchanged, as does our understanding and respect for Yugoslavia’s + nonaligned position;

+

—We have been impressed by the calm, confident behavior of the Yugoslav + Government and peoples during the past few months, which saw not only + President Tito’s illness, but + also a rise in international tension caused by the Soviet invasion of + Afghanistan;

+

—For our part, we have tried to dampen unhelpful speculation and rumors + about events relating to Yugoslavia. In this we have worked closely with + the Federal Secretariat for Foreign Affairs in Belgrade and the Yugoslav + Embassy in Washington. Ambassador Loncar’s (LOHN char) experience and + skill have helped us greatly;

+

—We have also been keeping careful watch on anti-Yugoslav terrorist + activity within the United States. The President has made it clear that this Administration will + not tolerate illegal actions directed against Yugoslav establishments + and officials in the United States;The + “Terrorism Against Yugoslavia” briefing paper, prepared by the + Department of State on April 21 and included in Mondale’s briefing book, described + the extent of anti-Yugoslav terrorism in the United States and noted + that “no other foreign government represented in the United States + has been the target of as many actual terrorist incidents as the + Yugoslav Government.” (Ibid.)

+

—We understand the depth of your concern about emigre activities at this + time. We will do what we can to tamp this down and we have expressed our + opinion to the Governments of those countries with large emigre + populations; you must understand, however, that we can do nothing which + would interfere with emigre activities which do not violate any U.S. law;

+

—I am aware of Secretary Kostic’s + (KOS-TICH) discussion with Secretary Miller regarding medium term balance of payments + assistance for Yugoslavia.The Department + prepared two briefing papers on the Yugoslav economy for Mondale’s trip. In “The Yugoslav + Economy in the Post-Tito + Period,” the Department noted that the period of rapid economic + growth Yugoslavia experienced had overheated the economy, pushed + inflation to above 20 percent, and created a large trade deficit. + The paper also noted the “extreme regional + disparity in living standards” between Yugoslav regions. + (Ibid.) In “The Bilateral Economic Relationship,” the Department + noted the U.S. Government had made + “an intensive effort to promote economic relations” and that the + Yugoslavs had “come to view the United States as an economic partner + which can lessen the commercial risks of economic dependence on + Western Europe and the political risks of dependence on the Soviet + Union.” (Ibid.) See also footnotes 4, + 5, and 6 above. We are well aware that Yugoslavia’s + political independence rests to an important degree on the strength of + the economy. We are giving your request for assistance our close + attention; and

+

—There is much that we can do together. We would like to keep up the pace + of high level political visits, and to consult frequently on global and + bilateral issues which concern us. We will do what we can to encourage + the further development of trade and economic relations. In the + important area of military cooperation, we remain ready to respond to + Yugoslav needs and desires.The “Military + Relationship” paper in Mondale’s briefing materials noted that following + the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the United States “adopted a + more forthcoming arms transfer policy.” While the United States + would not release the Harpoon anti-ship missile to the Yugoslav + military, the MK–46 anti-submarine missile sale was being positively + considered, as was the sale of F–5E aircraft. (Carter Library, + National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 87, + Yugoslavia: Briefing Book for Tito Funeral, 5/80)

+

B. + U.S.-Soviet Relations

+

1. Suggested Points

+

—Short to mid-term prospects for improvement in our relations remain + poor. We have seen no indication the Soviets are ready to withdraw from Afghanistan or seriously + to seek a political solution there on terms which we would find + acceptable;

+

—The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan has posed a major threat to peace and + to a geographic region of vital importance. We consider it important + that the international community impose a cost on the Soviets which will + deter them from similar actions in the future and ultimately bring about + their withdrawal from Afghanistan;

+

—The measures we have taken are intended to respond to the seriousness of + the Soviet action. We are determined to maintain our sanctions until the + Soviets withdraw;

+

—But our response has left intact the framework of U.S.-Soviet relations, and we recognize the + need to manage the East-West relationship with dispassion and + consistency. Specifically, we remain firmly committed to further + progress in arms control;

+

—We nonetheless believe it is impossible to divorce detente from + deterrence. A firm response now to Soviet aggression in Afghanistan can + only foster future progress in East-West relations; and

+

—The success of this approach, of course, depends upon the cooperation of + the entire world community.

+

C. Soviet Foreign + Policy

+

1. Suggested Points

+

—The Soviets appear to have underestimated the intensity of the world + response to Afghanistan, and we believe they are unlikely to undertake + any major new initiatives of similar magnitude in the period ahead for + fear of provoking further adverse reaction;

+

—Given the continuing resistance to their troops in Afghanistan and their + interest in allaying European concern, we think any overt moves in + Europe particularly unlikely, but we continue to monitor Soviet military + activities very closely;

+

—The Soviets are aware that we would view any effort on their part to + undermine Yugoslavia’s independence, territorial integrity and unity + with grave concern; and

+

—We have no reason to doubt, however, that the Soviets will continue to + press their interests in the Third World, either directly or through + such proxies as Cuba and Vietnam.

+

D. Afghanistan

+

1. Essential Factors

+

If Tito had lived we would have + expected to see the Yugoslavs play an active role in efforts to launch a + diplomatic initiative on Afghanistan. They may still play a constructive + role but without Tito’s guiding + hand it seems unlikely that + they will be willing to take the lead in international efforts. Yugoslav + interests have coincided with our own since no formulation which would + legitimize continued Soviet military presence in Afghanistan would be + acceptable to Yugoslavia given its concerns about any weakening of + nonaligned opposition to intervention.

+

In his February 25 letter to President Tito, the President stressed U.S. support for a neutral nonaligned Afghan government + acceptable to the Afghan people and said that with Soviet withdrawal, + the U.S. would be willing to join with + the neighbors of Afghanistan in a guarantee of Afghanistan’s true + neutrality and of non-interference in Afghanistan’s internal + affairs.See footnote 6, Document 290.

+

The Soviets show no signs of planning to reduce their presence and in a + variety of ways have indicated their intention to remain in the country. + At the same time, the Babrak regime is experiencing deep internal + divisions. Thus, the Soviets seem far from achieving their twin + objectives of establishing a viable regime in Kabul and pacifying the + countryside.

+

2. Suggested Points

+

—We believe it is of extreme importance that all countries, especially + major nonaligned and Islamic states, cooperate with international + efforts to make the Soviets pay a heavy and continued price for their + aggression;

+

—The United States has taken a series of strong bilateral and + multilateral initiatives to demonstrate to the USSR our resolve. We would welcome any suggestions on how + we might individually or jointly proceed in further pressing for an + early Soviet withdrawal and the establishment of a popularly supported + government in Kabul;

+

—On April 17, the Afghan regime announced a package of proposals + allegedly aimed at promoting a political solution of the Afghan + conflict. The basic elements of this package are proposals for bilateral + Afghan negotiations with Iran and Pakistan to normalize relations to be + followed by a regional conference which would agree on a regional peace + framework. Ultimately these talks would be expanded to include Indian + Ocean and Persian Gulf states with the purpose of making the entire area + a zone of peace;

+

—In our view, this Afghan proposal is fully supported by the USSR and probably was drafted in Moscow. + We do not believe it represents a serious effort to end the Afghan + crisis; and

+ +

—Our foremost problem with the proposal is that it does not require the + withdrawal of Soviet forces, but does require the recognition by other + states of the current Soviet-installed Afghan regime as a precondition + for negotiations. It does not take into account the interest of the + majority of Afghans who are struggling for their right of + self-determination against the Soviets and the Babrak Karmal regime.

+

E. Iran

+

1. Suggested Points

+

—The release of our people remains a paramount interest of our policy + toward Iran. As the President’s recent actions clearly demonstrate, we + will not tolerate continuation of this situation.Reference is to Operation Eagle Claw, which failed + in its attempt to rescue the hostages in Iran on April 24. We + will not relax our effort until the hostages are free;

+

—We appreciate the helpful role which Yugoslavia has played in this + crisis, particularly in talking to the Iranian authorities about the + condition of the hostages and the need for Iran to put this problem + behind it to better focus on the real problems facing the country.In telegram 2569 from Belgrade, April 1, + Eagleburger reported + that “the GOY has publicly and + unequivocally supported the release of our hostages in Tehran. They + have expressed this in statements in Belgrade and by their words and + actions at the UN.” However, + Eagleburger cautioned, + the Yugoslav leadership had limited influence on Iran’s new leaders. + Belgrade, he continued, intends to develop closer ties to Iran in + order to strengthen its own position in the Non-Aligned Movement, + and could not be expected to give much more support or welcome a + tougher U.S. stance on Iran. + (National Archives, RG 59, Central + Foreign Policy File, D800164–0318) Vrhovec recounted his “very frank” conversation with + Iranian Foreign Minister Ghotbzadeh on May 12. Vrhovec told Eagleburger that he had stressed + with the Iranian Foreign Minister the need to free the hostages, + that many prominent non-aligned leaders shared that view, and that, + as long as the hostage situation continued, “it would be difficult + for the non-aligned states fully to support the other ‘legitimate + and progressive’ aims of the Iranian Revolution.” Vrhovec also told Eagleburger that Ghotbzadeh + responded that Iran wants to free the hostages, but, in light of the + recent U.S. rescue attempt, “the + Iranian people ‘would neither understand nor accept’ their being set + free now.” (Telegram 3751 from Belgrade, May 12; National Archives, + RG 59, Central Foreign Policy + File, D800235–0692) We hope the Yugoslavs can continue to + exert their considerable influence on Iran. We believe that Iran’s + problems of internal unrest and economic development are now + overshadowed by the increased Soviet threat to the countries of the + region;

+

—Our rescue attempt was a humanitarian one and was not directed against + Iran or the people of Iran; and

+

—Now, and especially later, when the hostage question is finally + resolved, the Yugoslav Government can do much to keep Iran truly + nonaligned. Such a foreign policy course would be in the best interests + of Iran and other countries.

+ +

F. Nonaligned Movement

+

1. Suggested Points

+

—We understand and appreciate the significance of Yugoslavia’s role in + the Nonaligned Movement. In our frank discussions on issues of concern + to the Nonaligned Movement, we have felt free both to express our + concerns and to offer our advice. We would like to encourage the + continued development of this practice;

+

—We admired the efforts of Yugoslavia to organize nonaligned condemnation + of the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan. This has been a restraining + factor on Soviet behavior at this crucial time.

+
+ +
+ 289. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security + Affairs (Brzezinski) to + President CarterSource: Carter Library, National + Security Affairs, Brzezinski + Material, Country File, Box 87, Yugoslavia: 3–5/80. Drafted by + Larrabee. Brzezinski hand-carried the + memorandum to the President on May 6 at 2:14 p.m. + + + Washington, May 6, + 1980 + + + SUBJECT + Meeting with Yugoslav Ambassador Loncar May 6, 1980 at 3:00 + P.M. + +

You are scheduled to meet briefly with Yugoslav Ambassador Loncar to + express personally your condolences, and those of the American people, + on Tito’s death.Tito’s + condition deteriorated rapidly due to complications from gangrene, + and he slipped into a coma. He died on May 4, three days before his + 88th birthday. Loncar will not bring + the condolence book with him.In a May 5 + memorandum to Carter, Brzezinski recommended that the President visit the + Yugoslav Embassy and sign the condolence book. Brzezinski wrote that “such a + gesture would underscore our support for Yugoslavia at a critical + moment and emphasize your respect and esteem for President Tito.” Carter disapproved the + recommendation telling his appointments secretary, Phil Wise, “no + way!” (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, + Europe, USSR, and East/West, + Larrabee Subject File, + Box 68, Yugoslavia: 1–11/80) (C)

+

Such a meeting will be seen as an important political gesture by the + Yugoslavs and will underscore our support for the new Yugoslav + leadership. Brezhnev signed the + condolence book at the Yugoslav Embassy in Moscow this morning and will + be going to the funeral. We want to make an equally strong impression. + (C)

+ +

I recommend that you:

+

—express your admiration for Tito as a great statesman and leader who contributed + significantly to strengthening world peace. You might mention your + extended correspondence with Tito, which he highly valued.

+

—reiterate our firm support for Yugoslavia’s independence, unity and + territorial integrity and our respect for Yugoslavia’s nonaligned + position.

+

—express confidence in the new Yugoslav leadership’s ability to + handle the transition.

+

—regret that you could not attend the funeral as you had hoped and + note that you have asked the Vice President to represent you. + (C)

 +

The meeting should only take about five minutes. There will be a photo + opportunity. (U)

+

You met Loncar when he presented his credentials in November. (U)

+
+ +
+ 290. Telegram From the Embassy in Yugoslavia to the Department of + StateSource: National + Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign + Policy File, D800227–1187. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Also sent to the White + House. Drafted by Dunlop; cleared by Clift. + + + + Belgrade, May 8, 1980, 0855Z + +

3621. Subj: Tito Funeral: VP + Mondale Bilateral With + Kolisevski.

+

1. S-entire text.

+

2. Summary: SFRY Presidency President Lazar Kolisevski met for a special bilateral with Vice + President Mondale shortly after + the Vice President’s arrival in Belgrade on May 7 at the head of the US + delegation to the funeral of Yugoslav President Tito.Lazar Kolisevski had + been elected on May 15, 1979, as Vice President of the Presidency of + Yugoslavia for a one-year term. Upon Tito’s death on May 4, he assumed the office of the + Presidency. He was replaced by Cvijetin Mijatovic on May 15, 1980. + See Document 288. Accompanying the + Vice President were Secretary of the Treasury Miller; Ambassador Eagleburger; Assistant Secretary + George Vest; New York + Federal Reserve Bank Chairman Anthony Solomon; Deputy Assistant to the + President David Aaron; and + Assistant to the Vice President Denis + Clift. Yugoslavs present in addition to Kolisevski + included Foreign Secretary Josip Vrhovec; FEC Vice + President Dr. Ivo Margan; and (former) Ambassador Dimce Belovski. + Although besieged with the presence of almost 100 high level foreign + delegations in Belgrade for the funeral, President Kolisevski alloted an + hour to the meeting, which was marked by an extremely friendly and open + atmosphere. This memorandum has been cleared by the Vice President’s + staff.

+

3. Subjects covered, on the U.S. side: + Great respect and admiration for President Tito and sorrow at his passing; confidence in + Yugoslavia’s future; U.S. support for + the independence, sovereignty and unity of Yugoslavia, and readiness to + assist Yugoslavia if asked; U.S. concern + over our hostages in Tehran; U.S. + determination to curb anti-Yugoslav terrorism; and our wish to pursue + detente but deep concern over the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.

+

4. Subjects covered by the Yugoslavs: Genuine appreciation for the + expressions of concern from President Carter and the American people during President + Tito’s illness; approval of + the current excellent state of bilateral relations; a desire to + accomplish more in the international struggle against terrorism; an + assertion that the Tehran hostage situation will be raised by Foreign + Secretary Vrhovec during a + planned meeting in Belgrade with Iranian Foreign Minister + Ghotbzadeh;See footnote 18, Document 288. apprehension over the + deteriorating international situation, especially in Soviet-U.S. relations; and the desire somehow to + re-engage the Non-Aligned Movement in putting detente back on the rails. + End summary.

+

5. President Kolisevski opened the meeting by saying that he had just + read a message reporting what the President had said about President + Tito prior to the Vice + President’s departure from Washington.See + footnote 9, Document 288. + This is very much appreciated. The Vice President stated that he had + been asked by President Carter to + convey the deep regret and sorrow of the entire American people at the + passing of President Tito, one + of the great leaders of this generation and true hero. The Vice + President said he had come to Belgrade to represent the President and + the American people, to memorialize a great human being. This may be a + time of sadness, but “the victory of Tito’s life stands as an example for us all.”

+

6. The Vice President observed that his personal sorrow is all the + greater because of having met President Tito, first in 1977 when the Vice President was the + first visitor of this administration to Yugoslavia. Also remembered + vividly is his meeting in 1978 in Washington when President Tito last visited the U.S.

+

7. President Kolisevski wanted the Vice President to know how much the + words of friendship and support by President Carter in the last months had been appreciated by President Tito. He recalled that the day that + President Tito was first to be + operated upon, with Foreign Secretary Vrhovec and LCY Presiding Officer Doronjski he had + visited the President in the hospital in Ljubljana. Together they had + reviewed the world situation. President Tito had decided to send a message to President + Carter.On February 21, Eagleburger was asked by Vrhovec to deliver the text of Tito’s letter to Carter. Vrhovec explained that Tito had approved the text of the + letter prior to falling gravely ill, and, while he could not sign it + at the present time, wished that its contents be delivered to + Carter. Kolisevski signed a cover letter to Carter. Tito’s letter dealt extensively + with the Yugoslav opposition to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan + and Tito’s concern that + détente be preserved by any possible means. (Telegram 1401 from + Belgrade, February 21; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + P870123–0484) When he had recovered somewhat, President + Tito had insisted on + reviewing the draft text of the message to President Carter, because he placed such great + importance on their personal relationship. Then, President Tito had received the message from + President Carter. Its personal + nature had touched him very much, Kolisevski asserted. Tito recalled with particular + appreciation the first sentence in that letter, in which President + Carter had said that he and + his wife Roslyn were praying for his recovery.Carter responded to Tito’s February 20 letter on February 25. The text + of the letter to President Tito, and the covering note to Vice President + Kolisevski were sent to Belgrade and Eagleburger was instructed to deliver them as soon + as possible to Kolisevski. In his letter to Tito, Carter emphasized his desire + to see détente revived, but blamed the Soviet invasion of + Afghanistan for the deterioration of U.S.-Soviet relations. Carter also expressed his thanks + for the Yugoslav position on the release of U.S. hostages from Iran and assured Tito of his administration’s + continued support for Yugoslavia. (Telegram WH80281 to Belgrade, + February 25; Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, President’s + Correspondence with Foreign Leaders File, Box 22, Yugoslavia: + President Josip Broz Tito, + 6/79–2/80)

+

8. Turning to our bilateral relationship, President Kolisevski noted that + the statements of U.S. support for + Yugoslavia from various American leaders since President Tito fell ill “have been positively + assessed.” He hoped the Vice President did not think he was + exaggerating, but Ambassador Eagleburger could confirm that the Yugoslav people have + received President Tito’s death + with dignity, calm, and with resolution. Perhaps it would come as a + surprise to some, but there has not been the slightest disturbance + throughout the country. It is almost as if the Secretary for Internal + Affairs has nothing to do.

+

9. Kolisevski also observed that it is the Yugoslav hope that during + these solemn days, Belgrade would become “an oasis of peace”. The + current leaders of Yugoslavia had worked together with Tito in the revolution and in building + a new political system, and in the struggle for peace. “Therefore, we + consider the accomplishments you see as both his and ours.” The Yugoslav + people, who suffered 1.7 million casualties in World War II have overcome great tribulations to secure + their independence, and will continue to endure further if necessary. + “We know how to defend ourselves. As for our independence and + sovereignty, we will make no concessions to anyone, at any time.” He + added “This is why we approve the public stance you have taken.”

+

10. Vice President Mondale said + that when he first came to Yugoslavia in 1977 he had occasion to express + American support for Yugoslav sovereignty and unity, and also approval + for Yugoslavia’s role as leader in the Non-Aligned Movement. We continue + “to stand ready, as your friend, to be of assistance in ways you might + think proper and appropriate, to achieve your objectives.” He added, “I + come here today, expressly at the direction of the President, to repeat + these assurances of our friendship and our confidence in your + leaders.”

+

11. The Vice President continued that in the past three years our + bilateral relationship has become as good as it had ever been. The + relationship between our two Presidents had gone beyond that which + usually develops between Chiefs of State. President Carter greatly relied on President + Tito’s judgment as a + statesman and on his vast knowledge of the world. We are prepared, the + Vice President continued, further to develop and broaden that + relationship through future high level political meetings or discussions + at a technical level, on economic assistance or in the military area. He + noted that Secretary of the Treasury Miller and Chairman of the Federal Reserve Bank of New + York Solomon were present. President Kolisevski suggested that separate + discussions be held between Messrs. Miller and Solomon with Federal Executive Council Vice + President Ikonic and with Minister of Finance Kostic. As for the military area, + Kolisevski said that he thought both sides are adequately in touch. Vice + President Mondale agreed, + observing that General Graves had recently visited Belgrade.

+

12. Turning to the subject of anti-Yugoslav violence in the U.S., Vice President Mondale noted there are now 17 + criminals in U.S. prisons. The Carter + administration is bitterly opposed to terrorism. He could assure + President Kolisevski that at this particularly sensitive time, U.S. security authorities all over the + country have been alerted to increase protection of Yugoslav + establishments. Mr. Aaron added + that as a member of the National Security Council he had taken part in + several meetings with the Department of Justice and could add his + assurances that our police are as alert as they could be.

+

13. Kolisevski was glad to hear this. Similar assurances had been + received from several countries in Western Europe. This is a very + important subject. Acts of terror can only hinder relationships between + countries. The holding of U.S. hostages + in Tehran is a good example of this. Relations between two countries can + be harmed even if the acts of terror are carried out between agents of + other countries. Interference by intelligence services of third countries can do great harm by + fomenting violence, Kolisevski continued.

+

14. Vice President Mondale + thanked President Kolisevski for his remark about our hostages. This has + been a terrible experience for Americans. Every successful act of + terrorism enhances what the terrorists seek, which is the very + antithesis of civilization. Kolisevski said that the GOY has tried to do what it could in the + hostage situation but it had not been much. He noted that Iranian + Foreign Minister Ghotbzadeh will be meeting Foreign Secretary Vrhovec in Belgrade and will raise the + hostage situation. We will tell them “Keeping the hostages only shows + that the revolution is still unstable, and that this undermines the + stability of the region.”

+

15. Kolisevski asked whether the American side is interested in meeting + with Ghotbzadeh in Belgrade. Vice President Mondale replied that he thought this would be + inappropriate. Mr. Aaron said + that it would be particularly appreciated if the Yugoslavs could learn + anything at all about the physical condition of our hostages, who have + now been moved out of our Embassy compound. The Vice President added + that it is all the more important now that regular visits to the + hostages by the Red Cross or other agencies be allowed.

+

16. The Vice President said that he believes Ghotbzadeh has tried to be + as helpful as any Iranian leader during this situation, as to some + extent has Bani-Sadr. Kolisevski observed that the pressure from the + religious conservatives “on progressive and democratic elements” is + enormous. Foreign Secretary Vrhovec plans to discuss with Ghotzbadeh “the entire + complex of questions” in the area, and would let us know what + transpires. The Vice President said that would be much appreciated.

+

17. Secretary Vhrovec said that he would like to add a few words more + about the general subject of international terrorism. It is perhaps + correct to say that we do not always mean the same thing when we use + this term. Americans, he said, take the word terrorism in a narrow + sense, a particular act or event, and the Yugoslavs take a broader view. + Perhaps it would be good to seek a common definition of terrorism after + which we could address the situation more efficiently. Vrhovec wanted to emphasize however + that cooperation between the two countries in this area has gone very + far indeed. He recalled discussions in Washington in 1978 between + Presidents Carter and Tito, and also what the Vice President + said himself personally on this subject. Former visits to the U.S. by Tito had in some sense been marred by unpleasant + moments, but the last visit to Washington President Tito had cherished. Tito frequently recalled that in + discussing the visit with his colleagues he felt that real progress had + been made on the key issue of violence.

+

18. President Kolisevski observed that Yugoslavia for years has one of + the world’s best records for lack of terrorist activity on its soil. But, he added, Yugoslav + Ambassadors and diplomats have been attacked abroad and killed. Their + Ambassador to Sweden had been brutally murdered in 1971 and “his + murderers have been roaming around free.” In this the U.S. shares a common, sad experience.

+

19. At this point, Kolisevski thought, enough has been said about this + unfortunate topic. He inquired about the prospects for relations between + the U.S. and USSR. He asked if the Vice President thought detente would + survive. In recent discussions with Guinean President Sekou Toure it had + been decided to try to “consolidate” efforts within the non-aligned to + see if something cannot be done to restore momentum toward detente. + However, Kolisevski observed, much more depends on the U.S. and USSR.

+

20. Vice President Mondale + recalled that the Carter administration entered into office profoundly + committed to detente, to concluding negotiations for SALT II, Force Reductions in Europe, and + the Comprehensive Test Ban. We were prepared to expand our political + relationship with the Soviet Union. “I regret to say,” the Vice + President stated, “that no other aspect in our administration has proven + more disappointing.” SALT II, the + centerpiece of our relationship with the Soviet Union, was going to be + ratified. As presiding officer of the Senate he had been working on + this, and was then confident that it would be ratified. Now, the Soviets + had invaded a neighbor. “In my opinion this is one of the worst + international acts since World War II.” This has soured feelings greatly + in America, as Ambassador Belovski knows.

+

21. The Vice President said Americans must now ponder the impact of the + Soviet action. If the Soviet Union can invade Afghanistan today why not + some other country tomorrow? This is profoundly disturbing.

+

22. The Vice President continued, we nonetheless want to find a solution + to world problems, and we have offered that our new Secretary of State, + Ed Muskie, meet with + Gromyko this month in + Vienna. We have not had a response from the Soviets yet.

+

23. The Vice President observed that the U.S. had found it disappointing, as he supposes it was + disappointing to Tito himself, + that in this extremely complex situation the Non-Aligned Movement has + not been able to assert leadership. Can the principles of international + respect and non-intervention be restored? These are fundamental + principles for humanity. If these are not observed what are the + prospects for peace in the long run?

+

24. President Kolisevski noted that, since the Afghan invasion, Foreign + Secretary Vhrovec has visited India, Bangladesh and Iraq. This question + has risen everywhere. The Afghan crisis is not essentially a crisis + within the Non-Aligned Movement but its coordinator is Cuba and this + complicates matters. Yugoslavia has suggested a Non-Aligned Ministerial + meeting to focus on general principles and not on specific events for “we do not wish to see the + movement split.” The NAM must focus on reestablishing respect for the + vital principles of international conduct. This is still being discussed + in Belgrade. It was with Sekou Toure and will be with the Iraqis and + also Kaunda.

+

25. President Kolisevski also recalled that in his last letter to + Brezhnev President Tito called for a withdrawal of Soviet + forces from Afghanistan and appealed to him to let the Afghan people + settle their own affairs according to their own wishes and traditions. + Kolisevski said this also had been stated by the Yugoslavs publicly. + This position is very much appreciated, Vice President Mondale said.

+

26. He then thanked President Kolisevski for the time he had taken during + a day with such a heavy schedule. Their discussion was a most useful + opportunity to review the U.S. + commitment to a strong and friendly relationship, and to say again that + the U.S. is prepared to assist, as and + if the Yugoslavs find appropriate.

+

27. President Kolisevski asked Vice President Mondale to convey on behalf of all the + peoples of Yugoslavia best wishes to President Carter “for his own success and for the + well being of your country.”

+ + Eagleburger + +
+ +
+ 291. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security + Affairs (Brzezinski) to + President CarterSource: Carter Library, National + Security Affairs, Brzezinski + Material, Country File, Box 87, Yugoslavia: 6/80–1/81. Confidential. + Sent for action. A draft of this memorandum was forwarded to + Brzezinski on June 6 by + Kimmitt. Carter initialed + the memorandum, indicating he saw it. + + + Washington, June 6, + 1980 + + + SUBJECT + Presidential Determination to Permit IMET for Yugoslavia (U) + +

Ed Muskie recommends that you + sign a determination permitting Yugoslav officers to study in the United + States under the International Military Education and Training program + (Tab A).Attached but not printed at Tab A + is a May 30 memorandum from Muskie to Carter, with the recommendation that + Carter approve the use of funds for two IMET positions for Yugoslavian officers. + OMB, Defense, and + ACDA concur. (U)

+ +

I also recommend that you sign the determination. Over the past year, the + Yugoslavs have shown a keen interest in enhancing military relations + with the United States. The resumption of attendance of their officers + at U.S. military schools is a + significant step toward reestablishment of a mutually beneficial + military relationship. In addition, as your briefing papers for the + Belgrade visit later this month will show,In a May 14 memorandum to Carter, Brzezinski recommended approval of a one-day stop in + Yugoslavia and one-day stop in Spain following the NATO summit in Venice. Brzezinski suggested that a + Presidential stopover in Belgrade would “underscore our strong and + continued support for Yugoslavia’s independence” as well as “offset + some of the adverse media criticism for your failure to attend + Tito’s funeral.” Carter + approved the recommendation on May 20. (Carter Library, National + Security Affairs, Staff Material, Europe, USSR, and East/West, Larrabee Subject File, Box 69, [Yugoslavia: + President’s Trip]: 5–6/80) the Yugoslavs are again seeking + access to sophisticated U.S. weapons, + including F–5 aircraft, and the resumption of military schooling will + provide a good foundation for addressing this more difficult question. + (C)

+

RECOMMENDATION:

+

That you sign the determination attached to the Muskie memorandum at Tab A.Carter signed Presidential Determination 80–20 on + June 10. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, + Box 87, Yugoslavia, 6/80–1/81) (U)

+
+ +
+ 292. Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the Department of + State (Tarnoff) to the + President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)Source: Carter Library, National + Security Affairs, Brzezinski + Material, Country File, Box 87, Yugoslavia: 6/80–1/81. + + + Washington, June 7, + 1980 + + + SUBJECT + Yugoslav Financial Situation + +

In response to your memo of June 2Not + found. asking for a report on what we are doing to be + responsive to Yugoslav request for economic assistance, we convened a + meeting of the Interagency Group for Europe on June 5 to review steps + under consideration.The Department + forwarded a summary of the meeting, chaired by Barry, in telegram 154463 to + Belgrade, June 12. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + D800286–0983)

+

Treasury will be responding separately concerning Secretary Muskie’s [Miller’s] efforts to arrange + for discussions between Yugoslav National Bank and US bankers about a + major new loan. At the IG meeting we stressed the importance of making + it clear to the Yugoslavs before the President’s trip that the Yugoslav + bankers would be welcome here for discussions as soon as possible. The + President will certainly be able to stress his personal interest in this + matter and Secretary Miller’s + efforts to arrange for meetings. The Yugoslav request for an IMF standby of some $400 million came + before the IMF board on June 6 and was + approved, with the active support of the US Executive Director. The + President will be able to point to our consistent support for Yugoslavia + in the IMF and the importance of close + cooperation with the IMF in resolving + Yugoslavia’s balance of payments problem.

+

The Export-Import Bank representative at the IG meeting pointed out that + the Bank would continue to provide projected financing for Yugoslavia in + 1980 in amounts consistent with past years. The President will be able + to point to Exim’s active role in + US-Yugoslav trade over the years and confirm that the Bank will continue + to be active in Yugoslavia in the time ahead.

+

The Treasury representative reported to the IG that he expected Treasury + approval of payment of monthly federal benefits to Yugoslav + beneficiaries in dollars rather than dinars before the President’s trip. + The sum involved, some $14 million, will not have a major impact on Yugoslav finances but the + action would be an important indication of our readiness to be + helpful.

+

State and AID are discussing the possibility of establishing Yugoslavia’s + eligibility to compete on US-Yugoslav tenders for local service + contracts overseas. Again the impact would be small but it would be a + welcome gesture to the Yugoslavs. On the question of financing military + sales to Yugoslavia, State and Defense agreed that there was no possible + solution outside the US Foreign Military Sales program which the + Yugoslavs are reluctant to use because they believe it would tarnish + their non-aligned image. During the forthcoming US-Yugoslav Joint + Military Committee meeting the week before the President’s arrival,The U.S-Yugoslav Joint Military Commission + meet in Belgrade June 17–18. The Embassy reported on the meeting in + telegram 4906 from Belgrade, June 19. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + P870123–0429) Defense will be prepared to explain the FMS program in more detail and describe + the nature of our programs with other nonaligned countries. If the + question of financing of military sales comes up during the President’s + visit, it was agreed that the best solution would be to recommend that + the Yugoslavs reconsider their position on FMS.

+

The Agriculture representative pointed out that the PL480 Title I program + would not be available for Yugoslavia given policy and budgetary + constraints.

+

There was considerable discussion of the possibility of assisting + Yugoslavia in some way to increase its exports to the US, thus closing + the sizeable trade gap. It was agreed that there was little prospect of + greater Yugoslav use of the Generalized System of Preferences to provide + concessionary access to the US market. However, we have included + language in the draft joint statement to be issued during the + President’s trip pointing to the importance of expanded mutual + trade.

+

Late news received today indicates that there is greater urgency than we + had assumed to help the Yugoslavs with their financial situation, and to + act before the President’s visit. The Yugoslavs today announced a 30 + percent devaluation and Yugoslav Ambassador Loncar told Ambassador + Eagleburger in Belgrade + that, as a result of a June 5 decision by the Yugoslav Government, they + will ask us for an urgent swap arrangement.The Embassy reported Loncar’s meeting with Eagleburger in telegram 4516 from + Belgrade, June 6. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + P870123–0432) This may result from pessimistic reactions the + Yugoslavs have received from US banks on their interest in new balance + of payments borrowings and the “political strings” which certain Arab + countries want to attach to loans they would grant Yugoslavia.

+ +

In response to Ambassador Loncar’s request, Treasury is attempting to + arrange a meeting for him with Secretary Miller early next week.In + telegram 3956 from Belgrade, May 19, Eagleburger provided his analysis of the Yugoslav + economic situation. Stressing that “the GOY is having trouble getting its act together,” + Eagleburger concluded + that, unless the Yugoslav Government corrected the current trends, + the economic situation “can get very much worse.” (National + Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign + Policy File, D800248–0729) Secretary Miller met with Loncar on May 23 and Loncar asked + him to “meet with five or six of the leading U.S. bankers” and persuade them to lend to Yugoslavia. + (Telegram 136134 to Belgrade, May 24; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + D800254–0226) On May 30, Miller told Loncar that, following his discussions + with David Rockefeller, he believed that the best way to proceed was + to have the Yugoslav Government seek a syndication loan organized by + a leading U.S. bank, possibly Chase. + Miller recommended that + the Yugoslav Government be prepared to send representatives from the + Yugoslav National Bank to New York to discuss such a loan with + private lending institutions sometime in early June. (Telegram + 141461 to Belgrade, May 30; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + D800264–0731) Treasury’s initial reaction is that use of the + Emergency Support Fund may be the best way to respond to the new + Yugoslav request.

+ + Peter + TarnoffSeitz signed for Tarnoff above this typed + signature. + + +
+ +
+ 293. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in + YugoslaviaSource: + National Archives, RG 59, Central + Foreign Policy File, D800286–0874. Confidential; Immediate; Exdis. Drafted by Barry; cleared by Clift and Larrabee; approved by Barry. + + + + Washington, June 12, 1980, 0015Z + +

154447. Subject: Vice President’s June 11 Meeting With Yugoslav + Ambassador Loncar.

+

1. (C-entire text).

+

2. Begin summary: The Vice President met with Yugoslav Ambassador Loncar + for half an hour on June 11. Loncar, who had just come from a meeting + with Treasury Secretary Miller + where the Yugoslav balance of + payments problem was discussed (septel),The meeting on June 11 + between Miller and Loncar + was reported in telegram 155726 to Belgrade, June 12. In the + meeting, Loncar informed Miller that the Yugoslav Government found + Rockefeller’s suggestion of a $500 million syndicated loan as + insufficient, and that the Yugoslav Government hoped to keep U.S. and Canadian loans separate from + European loans. Miller told + Loncar that, if the Yugoslav Government presented its case well and + prepared the groundwork, it might be able to get more than + Rockefeller suggested initially, if indeed its case was strong. + (National Archives, RG 59, Central + Foreign Policy File, D800288–0545) asked for the meeting in + order to follow up on the Vice President’s attendance at the Tito funeral.Mondale was + in Belgrade May 5–8. For the Embassy’s report on his conversation + with Yugoslav leaders, see Document + 290. The Vice President stressed how impressed he was + at the way the new leadership is handling Yugoslavia’s problems and + expressed concern about the Yugoslav financial situation and + anti-Yugoslav terrorism. Loncar expressed pleasure with the + unprecedented progress in US-Yugoslav relations and discussed the + President’s visit and dynamics of the Nonaligned Movement. The Vice + President said he would like to meet periodically with Loncar to discuss + Yugoslav developments. End summary.

+

3. The Vice President opened the discussion by saying how impressed he + had been during the Tito funeral + at the sense of confidence of the new leadership and the Yugoslav + people. Paraphrasing Mark Twain, he said that press reports of the + problems of post-Tito Yugoslavia + were grossly exaggerated. Tito + had used the years well in preparing for the transition to a new + leadership. Post-Tito Yugoslavia + certainly faces problems but the prospects for success in dealing with + them are good. The Vice President noted that Loncar had just come from a + meeting with Secretary Miller at + which Yugoslavia’s financial problems were discussed. This was a matter + of concern to all of us and we hope we could be helpful. The Vice + President referred to the bombing of Yugoslav DCM Sindjelic’s house as an outrage and pointed to the + difficulties we had in educating other countries about US law. US law + enforcement authorities are making a major effort to find those + responsible for this crime. The Vice President referred to the “full + court press” the FBI had instituted at the time of the Tito funeral to prevent terrorist + incidents.

+

4. Loncar expressed gratitude for being received by the Vice President + and said that he was glad that he had been in Yugoslavia for the + funeral—not only to pay condolences to Tito but also to see the country during a unique period + in its history where self-confidence and complete unity were reflected. + He said his meeting with Secretary Miller had been useful and that the GOY hoped that the USG and the Secretary of the Treasury + would be able to help with Yugoslavia’s financial problems. Loncar said that Miller had expressed gratification + with Yugoslavia’s stabilization program.

+

5. The Vice President pointed out that he had brought Secretary Miller along on his delegation to the + funeral because of our desire to be helpful.

+

6. Loncar continued that through its efforts to help Yugoslavia over this + financial problem the US had an opportunity to broaden ties with + Yugoslavia in all fields—military, economic and political. On the + terrorism issue he said that the most important fact was that progress + was being made. He had told Attorney General Civiletti what he thought was good and + what needed improvement in US efforts to control terrorism and he did + not want to go over the same ground again but that the arrest of only a + few more terrorists would do much to control the problem.

+

7. Turning to the President’s visit, Loncar referred to the pioneering + role which the Vice President had had in his 1977 visit to Yugoslavia + which came after four bad years in US-Yugoslav relations. This is the + perfect time for President Carter + to come, capping the remarkable progress made in the last three years. + Loncar referred to the great popularity which President Carter enjoys in Yugoslavia + particularly after the statements he made concerning US policy toward + Yugoslavia in February of this year and at the time of Tito’s death. Loncar said that the + visit was taking place at a time of tension in international affairs and + that the Yugoslav leadership would be ready to discuss these problems + forthrightly. The very solid US-Yugoslav relationship is one which has a + wider impact which Yugoslavia can use. However, Loncar cautioned that it + would be important not to sound confrontational notes about US-Soviet + relations during the President’s visit since this would create problems + for Yugoslavia and diminish the importance of the visit. The Vice + President assured Loncar of the President’s understanding on this + point.

+

8. Loncar continued with the description of the dynamics of the + nonaligned movement leading up to the Havana Summit and beyond. + Discussing Yugoslav and Cuban proposals for a NAM Ministerial, Loncar + said there were two issues. One issue was the location of the conference + and here Yugoslavia and others had been insisting that the conference + must be in Sri Lanka, Tanzania or Indonesia or there would be no + conference. More important than the form was the substance and here + Yugoslavia was very active to insure the proper focus. The Vice + President assured Loncar of our appreciation of the constructive role + which Yugoslavia played in the nonaligned movement.

+

9. In closing the Vice President told Loncar he would welcome the + opportunity to continue this kind of exchange in the future.

+ + Muskie + +
+ +
+ 294. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security + Affairs (Brzezinski) to + President CarterSource: Carter Library, National + Security Affairs, Brzezinski + Material, Brzezinski Office + File, Country Chron File, Box 12, Europe: 1980. Secret. Sent for + information. Printed from an uninitialed copy. On June 6, Rentschler sent the memorandum to + Brzezinski along with + memoranda for Carter preparing for the stops in Rome, the Vatican, + Madrid, and Lisbon. (Ibid.) On June 12, Larrabee sent a memorandum to Brzezinski recommending that he + sign the overview memorandum to Carter for inclusion in the briefing + book, which he did on June 13. (Ibid.) Eagleburger provided his own background memorandum + to the President on June 23. (National Archives, RG 59, Office of the Secretariat Staff, + Lawrence S. Eagleburger + Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, Ambassador to + Yugoslavia, Under Secretary of State for Management (1967–1984), Lot + 84D204, Box 10, Chron, June, 1980) + + + Washington, undated + + + SUBJECT + European Trip: Belgrade (U) + +

With Tito’s death, Yugoslavia is + entering the most critical period of its postwar history. For three + decades Tito’s name was + synonymous with Yugoslavia. He was the architect of Yugoslavia’s unique + domestic system with its emphasis on self-management and the driving + force behind its independent foreign policy. And in times of crisis he + was the ultimate guarantor of the country’s unity. (C)

+

His passing leaves a political and psychological void which will be hard + to fill. While we are relatively confident of the ability of the new + leadership to handle the problems posed by the transition—at least in + the short run—many of the centrifugal forces that have plagued + Yugoslavia in the past are likely to reemerge and in the long run they + could pose serious threats to the country’s political stability and + non-aligned position. Moreover, the transition comes at a time of + heightened international tension, prompted in particular by the Soviet + invasion of Afghanistan, which the Yugoslavs see as an indication of the + Soviets increased willingness to use force to solve international + problems. Thus beneath the tranquil facade projected over the last six + weeks the new Yugoslav leadership is uneasy and they will be looking for + indications of our continued willingness to provide support in this + difficult period ahead. (C)

+

Against this background, your trip to Yugoslavia takes on particular + significance. It will be the first visit to Yugoslavia by a head of + state, and I recommend you use it to achieve a number of basic + objectives:

+

—To underscore our support for the new Yugoslav leadership and our + confidence in their ability to handle the transition.

+ +

—To reaffirm the continuity of U.S. + policy toward Yugoslavia.

+

—To establish a personal relationship with some of the key leaders + who will guide Yugoslavia’s destiny in the coming years.

+

—To make clear to the Yugoslav leadership, directly and personally, + the basic outlines of your policy on key international issues, + particularly arms control and relations with the Soviets. + (C)

 +

The memorandum from Ed Muskie at + Tab AIn an undated copy of Muskie’s memorandum to Carter, the + Department noted that the Yugoslav leadership was likely to “urge + that more be done to help them with their most serious problem at + this time—the need for Western financing to cover their balance of + payments and defense needs.” (Carter Library, National Security + Affairs, Staff Material, Office, Presidential Advisory Board, Box + 76, Trip: Box 27) effectively sets out the background, + setting and issues for your meeting with the new Yugoslav leadership. + (C)

+

Your host for your opening substantive discussions on the morning of June + 24 will be Cvijetin Mijatovic, who was elected + President of the State Presidency on May 15. Mijatovic, however, will be + your counterpart in name only. Under the system of rotating collective + leadership set up by Tito, power + is dispersed among a number of institutions and personalities in order + to assure ethnic balance and representation. Mijatovic will be replaced + in less than a year—as will Stefan Doronski the current Chairman of the + Presidium (Politburo)—and he lacks the prestige and authority to provide + the type of strong leadership which Tito provided. (C)

+

The real focal point of power is an “inner leadership” composed of Dr. + Vladimir Bakaric, head of the Croatian party and + one of Tito’s oldest and closest + associates; Milos + Minic, the former Foreign Minister (whom you met + during Tito’s visit to the + United States in March 1978); Nikola Ljubicic, the Defense + Minister; and Stane Dolanc, the former Secretary + of the Presidium. These men formed the real locus of decision-making + during Tito’s illness, and it is + they more than Mijatovic or Doronski who will determine Yugoslavia’s + destiny in the initial transition period. For this reason they have been + brought into the substantive discussions, and your remarks should be + addressed as much, if not more, to them as to Mijatovic and + Doronski.In telegram 4585 from + Belgrade, June 10, Eagleburger recommended that the administration + consider an additional substantive meeting with Yugoslav Presidency + members as well as trying to “pre-cook” the meeting with Mijatovic. + (National Archives, RG 59, Central + Foreign Policy File, D800283–0739) Larrabee reported Eagleburger’s suggestion in a June 12 memorandum to + Brzezinski. Brzezinski disapproved the + recommendation. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, + Brzezinski Material, + Brzezinski Office File, + Country Chron File, Box 12, Europe: 1980) (C)

+

Bilateral Issues

+

I suggest you begin any discussion of bilateral relations by noting the + progress we have made since Tito’s visit and reiterating your high esteem for Tito as a world leader. You might mention in this + connection your extended correspondence with Tito, to which the Yugoslavs attach + great importance.

+

While there are no major bilateral problems between Yugoslavia and the + United States, the Yugoslavs are likely to focus on two issues in + particular:

+

—Terrorism: In the wake of Tito’s death the Yugoslavs are + understandably nervous about an upsurge of terrorism by emigre groups + operating in the U.S. and Western + Europe. Their concern has been heightened, moreover, by the bombing of + the house of the Yugoslav Charge here in Washington, Vladimir Sindjelic, + on June 3. Over the past three years—and particularly recently—we have + taken firm efforts to curb terrorist acts by emigre groups in the U.S., but the Yugoslavs will undoubtedly + press you to do more. In response to their pleas, I suggest you reaffirm + the pledge not to tolerate terrorist acts against Yugoslav personnel and + facilities, which you made in your public statement issued on the + occasion of Tito’s death. You + can also point to the Administration’s good record regarding the arrest + and prosecution of emigre terrorists (some 17 arrests and/or + prosecutions) as proof of your determination to pursue a toughminded + policy against emigre terrorists. (C)

+

—Economic Assistance: The health of the Yugoslav + economy will be a key factor—perhaps the key + factor—in determining how successfully the new leadership will be able + to manage the challenges it will face in the difficult transition period + ahead. At present the economy is beset by major problems, which if not + arrested, could seriously undermine political cohesion and stability. + Inflation is over 20 percent and the Yugoslav foreign debt is nearly $13 + billion. While a stabilization program has been introduced, the + Yugoslavs will have to obtain large-scale economic assistance to avoid a + further downturn in their economy. (C)

+

Economic assistance therefore is likely to be high on the list of topics + that the Yugoslav leaders will want to discuss with you. They have + already approached Bill Miller + about U.S. Government assistance in + obtaining a large loan from U.S. banks, + and they will consider our willingness to be helpful as an important + test of the sincerity of our past pledges of support. I recommend that + you convey a generally sympathetic attitude to the Yugoslavs without + giving the impression that the United States Government can provide + large-scale credits. You might mention that you have already personally + discussed the Yugoslav financial situation with Bill Miller. He, in turn, has talked + to U.S. commercial bankers, particularly + David Rockefeller, about putting together a syndicate for a loan.Eagleburger also detailed the offer made by + Rockefeller to the Yugoslav Government in a June 23 memorandum to + Carter. (National Archives, RG 59, + Office of the Secretariat Staff, Lawrence S. Eagleburger Under Secretary of State for + Political Affairs, Ambassador to Yugoslavia, Under Secretary of + State for Management (1967–1984), Lot 84D204, Box 10, Chron June, + 1980) (C)

+ +

In addition, you might make the following points as an indication of our + desire to be helpful:

+

1. The U.S. Executive Director of + the IMF supported Yugoslavia’s + request to the IMF (on June 6) for + second and third tranche drawings totalling $440 million over an + 18-month period.

+

2. The U.S. Department of Agriculture + made CCC credits available for Yugoslav imports of wheat in 1980 and + is prepared to extend the terms of repayment from the present one + year to three years if Yugoslavia wishes. Further, USDA is prepared + to provide additional CCC credit guarantees in 1981.

+

3. The U.S. Social Security + Administration will change its payments to annuitants residing in + Yugoslavia from dinars to dollars. (C)

 +

International Issues

+

—U.S.-Soviet + Relations/Afghanistan: The Yugoslavs are deeply concerned by + the deterioration in the international situation, particularly the + downturn in U.S.-Soviet relations and + the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, which has direct implications for + their own security. At the same time they worry about the capacity of + the U.S. to provide coherent and + effective leadership in the troubling times ahead. In your discussion of + international topics, therefore, I suggest you devote considerable time + to stressing the strategic threat posed by Soviet actions in Afghanistan + and your determination to make the Soviets pay a high price for their + aggression. You may also wish to encourage the leadership to use their + influence in the Non-aligned Movement to obtain a public condemnation of + the invasion. (S)

+

—Arms Control and Detente: The Yugoslavs maintain + a strong interest in arms control and a relaxation of international + tensions, which they see as enhancing their own security. At the same + time, they are concerned that increased tensions among the superpowers + will lead to greater Soviet pressure on Yugoslavia. It will be useful + therefore to stress your continued commitment to detente—but a detente + based on reciprocity and mutual + restraint—and to make clear that despite the setback in U.S.-Soviet relations, the U.S. intends to continue to pursue those + elements of detente which it considers to be in its own interest, such + as SALT, MBFR, CSCE and TNF arms + control negotiations. (S)

+

While it is unlikely that we can convince the Yugoslavs to publicly + support our TNF decision, it is important that they understand the + rationale behind it and how it bears on their own security. I suggest + you make the following points in particular:

+

—Our December decision was a response to a significant imbalance + of nuclear forces accentuated recently by the Soviet TNF + build-up.

+

—Our objective is the restoration of a stable balance of long range + theater nuclear forces not an acceleration of the arms race.

+ +

—We are committed to TNF arms control negotiations and are ready to + start talking now. But to date the Soviets have adamantly refused to + negotiate unless the Alliance renounces its December decision. We + can not do this because it would legitimate and perpetuate Soviet + superiority.

+

—The continued imbalance of long range theater nuclear forces would + have a negative impact not only on the security of the Alliance but + on Yugoslavia’s security as well. (S)

 +

—Non-Aligned and Third World: The Yugoslavs are + particularly proud of their role in the Non-aligned Movement (NAM) which + Tito helped to found. While + Belgrade’s influence is likely to diminish somewhat in the wake of + Tito’s death, the Yugoslavs + can still be quite useful in countering Soviet and Cuban influence in + the NAM. Thus I recommend you stress the positive role the NAM could + play in world affairs if it is viewed as credible and neutral, and if + Yugoslavia continues to play an important role in it. Cuba will continue + to try to aim the NAM at the U.S. and at + our bilateral problems. You may want to offer a full briefing on U.S.-Cuban relations so that they could be + better prepared to respond to Castro’s charges. (S)

+

—Iran/Iraq: You may also wish to use any + discussion with the Yugoslav leadership on the NAM to explore ways in + which the Yugoslavs can use their influence with Iran to obtain the + release of the hostages, and once they are released, to facilitate a + normalization of U.S.-Iranian relations. + Similarly, the Yugoslavs have good relations with Iraq, and it would be + useful to get them to use their good offices to help us improve our + relations with Baghdad. (C)

+
+ +
+ 295. Memorandum of ConversationSource: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, + Brzezinski Material, + Subject File, Box 38, Memcons: + President: 6/80. Secret. The meeting took place in the Palace of the + Federation. + + + Belgrade, June 24, 1980, 10:45 a.m.–12:45 + p.m. + + + PARTICIPANTS + + + U.S. + The President + Dr. Zbigniew + Brzezinski + Under Secretary David + Newsom + Under Secretary Richard + Cooper + + Ambassador Lawrence + Eagleburger + Steve Larrabee, + NSC Staff Member + Victor Jackovich (Interpreter) + + + + + Yugoslav + President Cvijetin Mijatovic + Lazar + Kolisevski + Veselin Djuranovic + Josip + Vrhovec + Sinan Hasani + Ambassador Budimir Loncar + Mirko Zaric + + + +

President Mijatovic opened the meeting by + welcoming President Carter to + Yugoslavia. He thanked him for his message and expressed his + appreciation for the high-level delegation which the United States had + sent to President Tito’s + funeral. The Yugoslav leadership, he said, particularly appreciated the + condolences that had been expressed through the President’s mother. The + Presidency of Yugoslavia was also grateful for the messages of support + for the non-aligned movement transmitted by the Vice President at the + funeral. (C)

+

President Mijatovic reiterated Yugoslavia’s + constant commitment to non-alignment and stressed that support for this + position in the world was very strong. President Carter’s visit, he said, came at the + right time and underscored the deepening of U.S.-Yugoslav bilateral relations. He then suggested that + President Carter begin the + substantive portion of the conversation, noting that he was eager to + hear the President’s assessment of international trends, particularly in + areas of the world where these trends could be improved. He also looked + forward to hearing the President’s assessment of his discussions in + VenicePresident Carter traveled to Venice to take + part in the G–7 Economic Summit June 21–24. and of U.S.-Soviet relations and U.S.-Chinese relations. In return, the + Yugoslavs would inform the President of issues that concerned them, + particularly detente as well as the situation in the Middle East, Iran + and Afghanistan. The Yugoslav leaders also looked forward to discussing + the situation in the non-aligned movement, especially their own + perspective on the situation. Lastly, they looked forward to a + discussion of bilateral relations, which President Mijatovic noted were + “good.” (C)

+

President Carter began by noting that he had come in the + spirit of peace, friendship and support for the independence and + integrity of Yugoslavia. The welcome at the airport, the outpouring of + enthusiasm along the way to the Palace and the beauty of the Palace + itself were impressive. But even more impressive had been the tomb of + President Tito. This was perhaps + the most appropriate memorial to a great leader he had ever seen—simple, tasteful and solemn, but + not depressing. It well reflected President Tito’s life. (C)

+

In this connection, President Carter remarked that he was + pleased to accept the invitation to come to Yugoslavia even after + Tito’s death and was + gratified by the warm welcome he had received. President Tito’s own life had exemplified his + commitment to freedom and independence, values which were deeply + imbedded in the hearts of all the peoples of Yugoslavia. (C)

+

Turning to his discussions at Venice, President + Carter noted that + the discussions had reflected a common commitment on the part of the + countries represented at the meeting that they stood united in support + of the independence, unity and territorial integrity of Yugoslavia. He + wanted the Yugoslav leadership to know that the United States was + Yugoslavia’s friend and that we stood ready to help in any way that the + leadership might require. In this connection, he underscored the + importance of the non-aligned status of Yugoslavia, noting that + Yugoslavia had maintained a position of genuine non-alignment despite + efforts by Cuba and others to distort the charter of the NAM. The United + States considered the actions of President Tito at Havana to be a triumph for the NAM. (C)

+

Turning again to the discussions at Venice, President + Carter said that one + of the most important topics discussed had been the economic problems + created by the dramatic increase in the price of oil. All nations needed + to face the challenge presented by this increase in the spirit of + cooperation and mutual assistance. Unemployment and inflation had been + created by the rapid increase in the price of oil. The United States was + eager to help Yugoslavia alleviate these problems by pursuing credit + through its private banks. Secretary Miller and Under Secretary Cooper were assisting in this effort. (C)

+

The President noted in this connection that he was + aware that David Rockefeller had recently been in Yugoslavia as a + representative of the private banks. While the banks were independent of + government control, the Administration was eager to work with Yugoslavia + on economic matters, both now and in the future. He noted that the + developed countries presently had a net deficit of $70 billion per year; + the less developed countries had a net deficit of $50 billion per year. + OPEC, on the other hand, had a surplus of $120 billion. This created + problems both for the United States and for Yugoslavia, and underscored + the importance of close consultations. (C)

+

Turning to the question of the non-aligned movement, the President emphasized the need for strengthening the + movement, particularly in the wake of the invasion of Afghanistan. This + had been discussed at Venice. The common position of the countries + represented there was that the Soviet troops had to be totally withdrawn + from Afghanistan. With this + withdrawal, the United States would be willing to cooperate with other + countries to help insure the establishment of a non-aligned Afghanistan + and a government which corresponded to the will of the Afghan people. + (C)

+

Soviet actions in Afghanistan, the President + stressed, posed a serious challenge to detente. The U.S. response had been peaceful and + designed to resolve the problems in Afghanistan without further + bloodshed. The countries that were represented at Venice were united in + demanding that Soviet troops had to be withdrawn from Afghanistan. This + was the message that Secretary Muskie had delivered to Foreign Minister Gromyko,Muskie met Gromyko in Vienna May 15–16 on the + occasion of the Anniversary of the Austrian State Treaty. + which Giscard had delivered to + President Brezhnev, and which + Chancellor Schmidt would take to + Moscow in the next few days. They considered the Soviet action to be of + great strategic importance and a great concern to all of them. The + United States was also deeply concerned about the tone of terrorism, + exemplified most vividly by the capture of 53 United States diplomats, + an act supported by the Iranian Government. The United States was + equally concerned about the terrorist acts against Yugoslav personnel + and facilities in the United States. The President stressed that the + Administration was determined to bring the perpetrators of these + terrorist acts to trial and would do everything possible to prevent such + acts in the future. (C)

+

Turning again to the international situation, President + Carter stressed his + commitment to see detente improved and to continue to seek better + relations with the Soviet Union. He also emphasized his commitment to + the reduction and control of nuclear weapons. The same spirit governed + U.S. attitudes toward Iran. Once the + hostages had been released, the United States would appreciate Yugoslav + assistance in normalizing relations with Iran. The United States had no + quarrel with the Iranian people but only with the terrorists who were + illegally holding 53 U.S. diplomats. + (C)

+

In closing, President Carter asked for President Mijatovic’s comments + on the matters he had raised and expressed his willingness to answer any + questions he might have. (U)

+

President Mijatovic began by noting that the + Yugoslav leadership was deeply interested in President Carter’s views and grateful for his + presentation. He stated that he wanted to discuss international problems + from the Yugoslav point of view. Yugoslavia, he emphasized, was deeply + concerned about the deterioration of the international situation which + had occurred recently in all areas except Zimbabwe. Particularly + worrisome was the deterioration of relations between the U.S. and the Soviet Union and between the Soviet Union and + China. In the Yugoslav view, it was impossible to improve detente + without an improvement in these relationships. Tito had expressed this view and the + new Yugoslav leadership had reiterated it both to Brezhnev and to Hua Guofeng. The + leadership had the impression that both leaders shared their concern but + it was quite apparent that they had different views on how the matters + could be resolved. In the Yugoslav view, dialogue between the major + powers was important, if only to stop the current deterioration of + relations. (C)

+

Turning to the situation in the non-aligned movement, President Mijatovic said that although the situation today was + not entirely comparable with the situation in 1961 when the NAM extended + its appeal to the big powers to hold discussions, there were many + similarities. Today there was a similar danger of great power + confrontation. The situation required frankness. The Yugoslavs had the + feeling that they could talk to the United States frankly and openly, + which was not the case with some of their other partners. In their view, + it was important to stand aside from any attempt to involve other + countries in great power conflicts, and they wished to abstain from any + act that would complicate problems. On the contrary, they believed they + should try to improve the situation. Patience was needed in order to + preserve the spirit of dialogue. This was the essence of Tito’s policy. Tito and all of the new Yugoslav + leadership recognized the changes introduced in international politics + in recent years by President Carter’s Administration and regarded them + positively. They expected the United States to persist in this line, and + their conviction had been reinforced by the President’s arrival + statement and by what he had said in this meeting. They very much + appreciated his views. (C)

+

Turning to the question of blocs, President + Mijatovic said that Yugoslavia’s position was well known but + Yugoslavia was not a priori against blocs. It + evaluated the situation from the standpoint of non-alignment—i.e. to + what extent the policy of a particular country contributed to peace in + the world. Yugoslavia did not build its relations at the expense of + other countries nor on their closeness of views. They insisted on + observance of this point. Yugoslavia did not and would not give up that + principle. The Yugoslav leadership, he stressed, very much appreciated + the fact that the United States accepted Yugoslavia as it was and + because it was as it was. (C)

+

Returning to the question of blocs, President Mijatovic posed a few + questions. What were President Carter’s expectations regarding future U.S.-Soviet relations, SALT II and SALT III? He also wanted to know President Carter’s view about the triangular + relationship between the United States, the Soviet Union and China and + the Soviet contention that China was a dangerous superpower. (C)

+ +

President Carter replied that he had listened with interest + to President Mijatovic’s presentation about the prospects for peace, + which he had characterized as disappointing. He had thought that the + U.S. and Soviet Union had been + making good progress leading up to the meeting with President Brezhnev in Vienna last year. He had + believed, and continued to believe, that SALT II was in the interest of the people of the world. The + American people had accepted the agreement with approval and gratitude, + and the Administration had been making good progress toward the treaty’s + ratification. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee had approved the + treaty without any amendments that posed major problems. The + Administration had cleared the Senate calendar for the first part of the + year so that it could devote top priority to the ratification of the + SALT agreement. The unexpected + Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, however, had greatly upset the American + people and dealt a severe blow to trust in the Soviet Union. With the + invasion of Afghanistan, it had been impossible to ratify the treaty. He + wanted to stress, however, that the United States was continuing to + observe the terms of the treaty and would continue to do so as long as + the Soviets did. (C)

+

Even without prior Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan, the United States + was willing to discuss TNF with the Soviet Union, including SS–20’s and + was willing to discuss also issues such as SALT III. Chancellor Schmidt would repeat the same message to the Soviets + next week when he went to Moscow. But the Soviets so far had been + unwilling to discuss TNF or SALT III. + (C)

+

Continuing, President Carter emphasized that the United States + recognized the clear danger to detente presented by any worsening of + U.S.-Soviet relations. He was + determined that this would not happen. But this did not mean we would + accept the invasion as an accomplished fact. We would do all we could to + obtain the withdrawal of Soviet troops. (C)

+

Turning to China, the President noted that more + than a year ago the United States had normalized its relations with + China. Since then, relations had deepened; indeed they were better than + the United States anticipated they would be at this time. The President + stressed that we did not intend to use our relationship against the + USSR and that we would not sell + weapons to the PRC. The United States + had a long-standing commitment to stability in Southeast Asia, and + believed that its new relationship with China would be a stabilizing + factor in the area. (C)

+

Responding to President Mijatovic’s question about the buildup of China + as a superpower, President Carter stated that the United States did not + see this as happening in the near future. China had no weapons that + could threaten Japan. As far as the United States could determine, its land forces were aimed at + the Soviet Union. China had made an incursion into Vietnam, an action + which the United States had opposed and condemned. The United States + shared the concern of many of the nations regarding Vietnam’s occupation + of Kampuchea. From Ankara,Muskie traveled to Ankara for the + NATO Ministerial meeting June + 25–26. Secretary Muskie would go on to Kuala Lumpur to meet with the + ASEAN leaders to discuss the prospects for stability in Asia.June 27–29. This was in line with the basic + desire of the United States to see stability in Asia and other areas + strengthened. (C)

+

Turning to the Arab-Israeli dispute, the President + said that the Palestinian question and the question of Jerusalem had not + yet been resolved, and he could not predict when success would come. + However, the United States saw no alternative to the Camp David process + which would be acceptable to both parties involved. The United States + would continue to assist Egypt and Israel as long as they believed + progress could be achieved. If, however, this proved unfeasible, the + United States would be willing to join with other countries to look at + other alternatives. (C)

+

President Mijatovic thanked President Carter for his presentation. He said + that he could fairly say that the Yugoslav leadership was satisfied with + the viewpoints that President Carter had outlined and with his constructive efforts in + the international area. Stating that he wished to elaborate on some of + the points which President Carter + had mentioned, he noted that the schedule would have to be expedited + somewhat in order to leave time for a discussion of bilateral relations. + (C)

+

Turning first to the Middle East, he said that according to their + information, neither the efforts of the United States nor the efforts of + others had succeeded in solving the main problem of the Arab-Israeli + dispute: the Palestinian problem. President Tito had reiterated that Yugoslavia supports any action + which leads to progress toward resolving the Middle East crisis. + Yugoslavia feared that the present stagnation reduced any prospect for + resolving the crisis. (C)

+

President Carter interjected that the United States would + appreciate any assistance which Yugoslavia could give in resolving the + present problems in the Middle East. (C)

+

President Mijatovic replied that in May 1948 in + the United Nations Yugoslavia had proposed the formation of a + Palestinian state. If this had been done, it was conceivable that there + would be no Palestinian problem today. Yugoslavia did not say that it + was almighty or that the NAM could solve everything. However, there was + utility in working jointly to try to resolve the problem and to look for + solutions that would bring the + parties more closely together. Yugoslavia feared that if the present + stagnation persisted the policy of the Rejectionist FrontFront of the Palestinian Forces Rejecting Solutions + of Surrender. The group formed in 1974 and rejected the Palestinian + Liberation Organization “Ten Point” Program adopted that year, which + called for the establishment of a Palestinian state over any piece + of Palestinian territory under PLO control. would take a + negative direction and find support on the other side. This could lead + to a very serious problem in a part of the world that was very + vulnerable. In Yugoslavia’s opinion, it would be worthwhile if the + United States showed patience in order to build up confidence and trust + within the Rejectionist Front. He suggested that the U.S. should listen to the suggestions of + the Rejectionist Front, at least as a sort of gesture. At some point, + this might pay off. (C)

+

President Carter replied that there were two key points to + any resolution to the Arab-Israeli conflict:

+ + —Commitment to Israel’s security and + —Resolution of Palestinian rights. + +

He noted that it would be helpful if the PLO would change its avowed + position on the destruction of Israel and accept UN Resolution 242. Their failure to do this was an + important obstacle to any settlement. He again stressed that the United + States would welcome and appreciate any help Yugoslavia could give to + help it improve relations with countries of the Rejectionist Front, + especially Iraq. In this connection, he mentioned Dr. Brzezinski’s visit to Algeria which + had been aimed at improving relations with that country.Brzezinski + traveled to Algeria October 31–November 3 on the occasion of the + 25th Anniversary of the Algerian + Revolution. In conclusion, he noted that U.S. and Yugoslav views coincided but that + the PLO had to accept UN Resolution 242. + (C)

+

Foreign Minister Vrhovec interjected that Yugoslavia had already + discussed these matters with Iraq. In principle, Iraq was ready to + normalize relations but they posed some restrictions. He also noted that + President Qadhafi had recently contacted Yugoslavia and expressed his + interest in meeting with President Carter to resolve U.S.-Libyan problems and had signaled his desire for a + normalization of U.S.-Libyan relations. + (C)

+

President Mijatovic then turned to the question of + Iran. He noted that Yugoslavia didn’t agree with the holding of the + hostages. The leadership was aware that this was a sensitive problem for + the American people and others, and they had made this clear to Iran. He + stressed, however, that actions which made Iran nervous could have the + opposite effect. The forces in Iran were not united and any action which + increased their nervousness + could push Iran in the wrong direction and compel it to lean more + heavily on the other side. (C)

+

President Mijatovic then stated he wished to say a + few words about Afghanistan. There was no need to repeat Yugoslavia’s + basic position on Afghanistan, which was well known. Yugoslavia + understood the views and approach of the United States but felt both + countries should move in the same direction—toward a withdrawal of + Soviet forces from Afghanistan. Yugoslavia, he stressed, could never + accept occupation of Afghanistan. There was no way this could be + justified on any grounds. Yugoslavia had a very firm and principled view + on this. (C)

+

The reestablishment of a genuine non-aligned and independent Afghanistan + was an essential element of Yugoslavia’s approach. This included, + however, withdrawal of Soviet troops. In recent months, Yugoslavia had + held consultations with the NAM on this question. It felt that the NAM + should consider this as well as other crises of instability in the + world. The meeting in New Delhi in January would have to condemn all + invasions, including Afghanistan. The Soviets knew this, and this is why + they were worried. (C)

+

President Carter interjected to ask Yugoslavia’s view on the + Muslim delegation and if they had any relations with the freedom + fighters in Afghanistan, who were struggling for self-determination. + (C)

+

Turning to the second part of the President’s question first, Foreign Minister Vrhovec stated that Yugoslavia did not have + contacts with the freedom fighters. Their knowledge was based on reports + they received through their Ambassador in Kabul. Based on these reports, + their impression was that the Soviets were having, and were likely to + have for some time to come, a difficult time in Afghanistan. (S)

+

Concerning the Committee of Three formed at the last Islamic Conference, + there was some concern about the size of the Committee and whether or + not the Committee should be broadened. It was important that Algeria + gave complete support to the second meeting. In this regard, Foreign + Minister Vrhovec noted that + Yugoslavia had contact with all the Ministers, including Ghotbzadeh, + Foreign Minister of Iran. The Yugoslavs believed that the orientation + and approach of Pakistan was sounder than Iran’s, and Yugoslavia had + suggested that the Pakistanis should persist in their political + initiatives. The Yugoslavs believed that their constructive political + action contributed to pressure for the withdrawal of Soviet troops from + Afghanistan. (S)

+

Turning to Iran, Mr. Kolisevski noted that Foreign + Minister Vrhovec had been in + contact with Ghotbzadeh and that he himself had also talked with + Bani-Sadr in Algiers at the time that Dr. Brzezinski had been there. He had gotten the impression + at that time that the Iranians wanted to solve the hostage issue but + there was a problem of their internal situation. The U.S. had been informed about Foreign + Minister Vrhovec’s discussions with Ghotbzadeh + through its Ambassador. The Yugoslavs had told Iran that they could not + support the holding of the hostages. (C)

+

President Mijatovic said he would like to make a + point about disarmament. It was important to do something to halt the + futile situation regarding disarmament, and he felt it would be + worthwhile to take an initiative at Madrid. He also felt that a well + prepared conference on disarmament in Europe would be useful. He praised + President Carter’s readiness to + observe the SALT II treaty, which he + claimed would be an important contribution to arms control. (C)

+

He then turned to a discussion of international economic relations and + expressed Yugoslavia’s disappointment at the current state of + North-South negotiations. In Yugoslavia’s view, this was one of the + reasons for the current economic situation. If this continued, conflicts + were bound to increase. Yugoslavia advocated the greatest possible + flexibility on the part of the developed and the developing countries, + even though there was a lack of equality. The Yugoslavs believed that a + more flexible attitude on the part of the United States would be of + immense importance. They recognized that it would not be possible to + make a radical change, but some new initiative was needed to demonstrate + forward progress and that the process was not totally dead. In + Yugoslavia’s view, U.S. prestige would + be enhanced in the NAM and the world at large by such an initiative. + Such an initiative would also have a positive influence on Eastern + Europe. The Soviet Union, he stressed, had an unreasonable attitude + toward relations between the developing and the developed world. (C)

+

President Carter replied that North-South relations had been + a matter of considerable discussion in Venice. The heads of state + represented there had directed their Ministers to develop better ways + and means to aid the developing countries. The United States itself had + undertaken a number of measures in this regard, including reducing trade + barriers to imports from the developing world. The Soviet Union, + however, had done very little, except helping Cuba. Similarly, the OPEC + countries had done very little except with other Arab countries. The + President stressed his strong commitment to improve relations between + the developed and the developing world. In addition to what the + countries represented in Venice were already doing, they would make an + intense analysis of the situation in the coming months. (C)

+

President Carter then suggested that the discussions could be + continued at the State dinner that evening and at the breakfast the next + morning, joking that he did not want his first action in Yugoslavia to + make all of the Yugoslav leadership late for lunch. (U)

+

President Mijatovic agreed, saying that they could + reserve bilateral relations for breakfast. (U)

+ +

As the meeting was about to break up, Mr. + Kolisevski asked if it would be possible to get satellite shots + of mineral and water resources in Yugoslavia, especially since the + United States had given such photographs to Bulgaria. (U)

+

President Carter agreed, noting + that he had given a book of photographs to President Tito during his visit in March 1978 + and told him that if he needed more, the United States could supply + them. The President said it would be easy for us to supply such + photographs, and we would be glad to do it. (U)

+
+ +
+ 296. Memorandum of ConversationSource: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, + Brzezinski Material, + Subject File, Box 38, Memcons: + President: 6/80. Secret. The meeting took place in Dedinje + Palace. + + + Belgrade, June 25, 1980, 7:15–8:30 + a.m. + + + SUBJECT + Breakfast Meeting + + + PARTICIPANTS + + + U.S. + The President + Dr. Zbigniew + Brzezinski + Under Secretary David + Newsom + Under Secretary Richard + Cooper + Ambassador Lawrence + Eagleburger + Steve Larrabee, + NSC Staff Member + Victor Jackovich (Interpreter) + + + + + Yugoslavia + President Cvijetin Mijatovic + Lazar + Kolisevski + Dragoslav + Markovic + Veselin Djuranovic + Josip + Vrhovec + Ambassador Budimir Loncar + Steven Doronski + Milos Minic + + + +

Mr. Djuranovic opened the meeting by asking the + President if he had had a good rest. (U)

+ +

The President replied yes. He said he hated to see + his visit come to an end. It would be nice to stay another week, but he + had to get back to work in Washington. (U)

+

The President then invited President Mijatovic to + make a few remarks. (U)

+

President Mijatovic, in turn, suggested that Mr. + Djuranovic discuss the economic situation. (U)

+

Mr. Djuranovic began by noting that Yugoslavia had + had a very dynamic economic development, with an average growth of over + six percent. This had been followed by serious economic problems, + however. The domestic economy had become overheated and Yugoslavia’s + trade deficit had increased, as had its foreign debt. The increase in + oil prices had reinforced these difficulties. Yugoslavia would have to + pay $2.0 billion more this year than last year. All this had caused real + economic problems. The Yugoslavs had introduced a program of economic + stabilization. This was intended to bring down the growth rate, which + would be two percent lower this year. (C)

+

They had also introduced measures to reduce economic investment and + consumption. The Yugoslavs intended to undertake further measures toward + stabilization such as the devaluation of the dinar. The main task was to + reduce the deficit to $2 billion; however, it was necessary to have help + from abroad to carry out this stabilization program. That is why the + Yugoslav government had been talking to Secretary Miller and Mr. Rockefeller. The + Yugoslavs had long experience with Rockefeller, going back some 35 years + and they wanted to continue this favorable cooperation. (C)

+

Turning to the question of Mr. Rockefeller’s recent visit, Mr. Djuranovic said that there had been two + problems. Mr. Rockefeller had wanted a consortium of world banks. + However, this would make a Yugoslav program of stabilization more + difficult. The Yugoslavs wanted credits exclusively from US banks. They + recognized the relationship of the United States government to the + private banks, but felt that the government could still exert a certain + favorable influence on the banks. They had also discussed a second + credit of $500 million next year. This would help to continue the + program of stabilization. In July they looked forward to a meeting with + Secretary Miller in Washington. + (C)

+

The President then invited Under Secretary + Cooper to make comments on + the economic situation. (U)

+

Mr. Cooper + said that he appreciated the problems associated with the Yugoslavian + economy. However, he pointed out that the Yugoslavs had made + considerable economic progress as well. He had discussed with Minister + Kostic his upcoming visit to + Washington. Thus much of this had already been discussed. (C)

+ +

The President said that when he returned to + Washington he would meet with Secretary Miller and ask him to pursue the question of credits + with Rockefeller and other bankers. He understood that one of the + problems had been a lack of dealing with the Central Bank, and that Mr. + Rockefeller would be sending one of his bankers to Belgrade very soon. + The President offered to do anything he could + within the bounds of US laws and customs to give the Yugoslavs + assistance in this matter. He asked if it would be helpful if he talked + to Chancellor Schmidt privately, + and other European banks, or whether the Yugoslavs would prefer to + handle this themselves. (C)

+

Mr. Djuranovic replied that Yugoslavs had already + talked to the Federal Republic, particularly to its finance minister. He + himself would be visiting the FRG soon + and would appreciate US help in this matter. (C)

+

The President then asked whether the Yugoslavs had + any contact with British and French banks. He offered to suggest to them + that they participate in any consortium if the Yugoslavs felt this would + be appropriate. He stressed this would be done on a confidential basis. + In this connection he stated that the United States regarded Yugoslavia + as a sound investment for the banks. Despite current difficulties the US + believed that Yugoslavia’s economic system was basically sound, and that + the banks would respond favorably. (C)

+

Mr. Djuranovic said that he would like to say some + things frankly and openly. He had the feeling that the banks needed more + time in order to gain confidence in Yugoslavia. The President’s visit + had been helpful in this regard. The Yugoslavs intended to continue with + their stabilization program, but the banks still had some reservations. + He noted, in this regard, that the Yugoslavs had already had contacts + with the French and British bankers and the response had been favorable. + (C)

+

The President said it would be helpful to have + Rockefeller’s financial expert come to Belgrade and see the strength of + the Yugoslav economy. This would help to influence a positive response. + (C)

+

Mr. Cooper + added that all countries had problems with the increase of the price of + oil. He stressed that these countries had to break the link between + economic growth and dependence on oil. This was particularly true for + small and medium countries. (C)

+

The President noted that at Venice the countries + represented had discussed the reduction of the import of oil through + conservation measures. The U.S., for + instance, had reduced the import of oil in the first six months by + thirteen and a half percent and it would increase its effort to save + energy in every possible way. He offered to share any U.S. experience and scientific developments + to conserve energy. Some countries, he noted, import as much oil as + their exports. These countries were in much worse condition than the + U.S. or Yugoslavia. The problem was a world-wide problem, + except for the OPEC countries, and it was getting worse. Summing up, he + noted that the exchange had been helpful in enabling the United States + to understand Yugoslavia’s economic problems and he promised to do + everything he could to help out. (C)

+

President Mijatovic said he would like to use the + opportunity on behalf of the presidency and for himself to express his + appreciation for President Carter’s understanding of Yugoslav policies, both bilateral + and international, and to thank him for his assistance on the Krsko + nuclear plant. (C)

+

The President said he understood the plant would + be in business by next year. [(U)?]

+

Ambassador Eagleburger replied that if it wasn’t, he would + be ridden out of town on a rail. (U)

+

The President jokingly said that he would hold + Ambassador Eagleburger + personally responsible. (U)

+

President Mijatovic said he would also like to + thank the President for his help in taking action against the + terrorists, whose activities had been detrimental to the welfare of both + the United States and Yugoslavia. He also wanted to thank him for the + earthquake assistance, which was very important and which had been + greatly appreciated. (C)

+

The President replied that he felt a sense of + brotherhood with the Yugoslavs and that we had much in common. The + United States wanted to see an economically, politically and militarily + strong Yugoslavia and it was in its own interest to help out. Making + reference to Mt. St. Helens,On May 18, + 1980, a 5.1 Richter scale earthquake collapsed the north face of + Mount St. Helens, an active volcano in Washington State. The + subsequent eruption killed 57 people and caused widespread + destruction over 230 square miles. he said that he understood + the tragedy of human event. (C)

+

Continuing, he said that it would be a great pleasure for him to report + that he was the first president to visit Yugoslavia after Tito’s death. He would report what a + strong government existed here and the continuity that he had found; + although, he pointed out, people have little doubt about this. He had + mentioned this in his toast, which had been highly publicized around the + world, but he promised to confirm it with other leaders. (C)

+

President Mijatovic thanked him for these remarks. + (U)

+

The President said that he was grateful that it + was a fact. He added that the United States had greatly benefited from + Yugoslav help in Iran and within the non-aligned movement. In these + trying times Yugoslavia’s allegiance to non-alignment had been a great + benefit to the United States and to countries all over the world. + (C)

+ +

President Mijatovic replied that the Yugoslav side + would inform the countries of the non-aligned movement about their talks + with President Carter. He assured + him that they would report frankly and that the picture of the talks + would be realistic. He also assured him that the Yugoslavs would do + everything to interpret the results as favorable to their friends in the + non-aligned movement, and that this would have a positive impact on the + views of the non-aligned countries. (C)

+

Turning to relations with the Soviet Union, President + Mijatovic noted some interesting new developments had taken + place. There had been a greater Soviet interest in contacts with + Yugoslavia than in the past. Their views and criticisms had not changed, + especially regarding Afghanistan and Kampuchea. In Belgrade, in talks + with Doronski and Kolisevski, the Soviets had emphasized how they + respected the non-aligned principles and non-interference. Yugoslavia + had been very satisfied with this. In this connection, President Mijatovic noted that he had given an interview about + the Belgrade communique which the Soviets had published. This was + interesting and new. In the past the Soviets had not shown much interest + in this. All these were positive signs. In the future he thought the + Soviets would take a deep interest in Yugoslav affairs. (S)

+

The President replied that this was good but he + warned the Yugoslavs to be cautious. (C)

+

Mr. Doronski remarked that the Yugoslavs had had a + lot of bitter experience with the Soviets, and they had had a lot of + good experience. This had tended to make them careful. On the whole, + however, he pointed out, cooperation was developing well. (S)

+

The President stressed that the best deterrent was + a strong and a united people. (C)

+

Mr. Brzezinski added, “and the balance of power”. + (C)

+

President Mijatovic then said he would like to say + something about their experience with the Soviets. He wanted to be frank + and did not want to be misunderstood. The Yugoslavs were aware that the + Soviets had not given up their goal of bringing Yugoslavia into the bloc + and taking away their independence. Some such tendencies existed in the + West, too, he noted, but not in the case of the United States. + Yugoslavia’s policies, domestic and foreign, would remain the same, and + Yugoslavia would continue its non-aligned policy. (S)

+

Mr. Doronski added that Yugoslavia was simply + carrying out Tito’s policy. + (C)

+
+ +
+ 297. Memorandum From Stephen + Larrabee of the National Security Council Staff to the + President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)Source: Carter Library, National + Security Affairs, Brzezinski + Material, Country File, Box 87, Yugoslavia: 6/80–1/81. Top Secret. + Sent for information. Kimmitt + concurred with the recommendations. A copy was sent to Madeleine Albright. + + + Washington, July 25, + 1980 + + + SUBJECT + Military Supply Relationship with Yugoslavia + +

Attached at Tab AAttached at Tab A is a July + 19 memorandum from Brown to + Brzezinski. is + Harold Brown’s response to + your memo of July 7 which noted the dissatisfaction with the military + supply relationship expressed by Defense Minister Ljubicic to the President during his + trip to BelgradeTelegram 5272 from + Belgrade, July 3, reported Eagleburger’s conversation with Vujatovic, and also + referenced the comments made by Ljubicic to Carter at the June 24 State dinner. + (National Archives, RG 59, Central + Foreign Policy File, D800320–0566) and asked Brown for a status report of where we + stand. In the memo Brown argues + that progress in our military relationship over the last year has been + “significant and solid” and suggests that the main problem is the + inability of the Yugoslavs to pay for the equipment they want. He also + notes that DoD is at work on a package + to provide the Yugoslavs with weapons in case of an “emergency” (i.e., + Soviet threat). (S)

+

Brown’s memo gives the impression + all is well and that we basically have little to worry about. This is + not exactly the case. According to Ambassador Eagleburger, who participated in the + discussions at the Joint Committee meeting in June,In telegram 4906 from Belgrade, June 19, Eagleburger summarized the + discussions at the U.S.-Yugoslav + Joint Military Committee meeting in Belgrade June 17–18. (National + Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign + Policy File, P870123–0429) the question of the training + samples has become a political issue for the Yugoslavs, especially for + Ljubicic (hence his remarks + to the President). The main problem has been the question of leasing. DoD had + originally offered to lease the Yugoslavs the training samples for a + period of 90–180 days (because DoD + feared that a longer lease would involve legal and legislative problems) + and then simply to renew the lease. However, the Yugoslavs have been + unhappy with this arrangement. They want assurances of continuity and + they see DoD’s unwillingness to enter into a long-term lease as a + weakening of US support for Yugoslavia. However, the Congress has been + just as adamant in its belief that leasing should not be used to avoid + congressional oversight of controversial sales, and the FY 82 foreign assistance bill contains a provision that + will tighten leasing procedures. DoD is + currently looking into ways to get around this problem and now feels + that it can offer a 2–3 year lease for support equipment plus 5 TOW launchers that the Yugoslavs want. + This would help to alleviate Yugoslav concerns somewhat—although + probably not entirely. (S)

+

A second problem is the question of crisis + support. At the Joint Committee meeting in June there was an + implicit assumption on the part of the Yugoslavs that we would supply + them with the weapons they need in case of emergency. DoD is currently working on a paper which + will outline what we would be willing to offer the Yugoslavs—and in what + quantities—in case of an emergency. This paper will be coordinated with + the NSC and State and will be presented + for discussion and approval at an upcoming MBB. The paper should be ready sometime next week. Once the + paper has been approved, DoD proposes + that General Bowman, our military + representative to the Quad, and Bill Perry go to Belgrade in October to + discuss with the Yugoslavs their requirements. (TS)

+

Personally, I think this strategy makes sense. It would give the + Yugoslavs a sense of increased confidence that we are serious about our + willingness to support them without formally committing us to anything. + However, it would take us another step down the road in our military + supply relationship, and before we agreed to commit ourselves to + supplying the Yugoslavs with major quantities of weapons in an emergency + we would have to consult with Congress.On + July 29, Brzezinski wrote at + the top of the memorandum “Next concrete steps?” Larrabee replied on July 31, + stating that the next concrete step was discussing the paper the + Department of Defense was preparing on weapons systems the United + States would be willing to provide to Yugoslavia in case of an + emergency. Following approval of the paper, a U.S. delegation would be sent to + Belgrade to discuss Yugoslav requirements. Larrabee also stated that the + NSC would “continue to monitor + Defense-State deliberations on the issue of long-term leases of US + military items.” According to a notation on Larrabee’s memorandum, Brzezinski saw it on August 1. + (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, + Box 87, Yugoslavia: 6/80–1/81) (S)

+
+ +
+ 298. Letter From President Carter to Yugoslav President MijatovicSource: Carter Library, National + Security Affairs, Brzezinski + Material, President’s Correspondence with Foreign Leaders File, Box + 22, Yugoslavia: President Cvijetin Mijatovic, 5–9/80. No + classification marking. Brzezinski forwarded the letter, based on a draft + provided by the Department of State, to Carter on August 8. (Ibid.) + According to the log sheet, Carter signed the letter on August 20. + The Department instructed the Embassy in Belgrade to deliver the + text of the letter to the Office of the President as early as + possible. (Telegram 225967 to Belgrade, August 25; National + Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign + Policy File, D800405–1287) Eagleburger delivered the letter to Acting Foreign + Minister Pesic on August 27. + (Telegram 6709 from Belgrade, August 27; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + D800409–0651) + + + Washington, August + 13, 1980 + Dear Mr. President: + +

During my visit to Belgrade in June we agreed that it would be useful to + continue the practice President Tito and I had of writing to one another on subjects of + common concern. I would like to start the exchange with you by raising + two issues of great importance for the further development of East-West + relations: Afghanistan, and the deployment of long-range theater nuclear + forces (LRTNF) in Europe. Both of + these issues affect the interests not only of the countries directly + involved, but of every country in the world.

+

Mr. President, I know of your own deep concern over the Afghan situation, + and I appreciate Yugoslavia’s independent efforts among the nonaligned + nations and hope they will continue. We support the diplomatic efforts + of the Islamic Conference Committee on Afghanistan as the most + productive approach to pursue at the moment, and will be urging our + friends and allies to exert continued pressure on Moscow during this + critical post-Olympic period.

+

I see little ground for optimism about the situation in Afghanistan. The + June 22 announcement of limited Soviet troop withdrawals appears to have + been simply an attempt to mislead. The Soviets redeployed across their + border a relatively small number of troops unsuited to the type of + military operations now being conducted in Afghanistan. The overall + effect of these troop movements has been to increase the effectiveness + of the Soviet combat presence in Afghanistan. The reorganized Soviet + forces are being used ruthlessly to put down the Afghan national + resistance.

+

Meanwhile, the Soviets continue to block any efforts to discuss a + political settlement by insisting on preconditions that would legitimize + the invasion and the present regime in Kabul and that would leave open + the central question of withdrawal. This Soviet recalcitrance is as unacceptable to us as it is + to our allies, to the Islamic Conference and to most genuinely + nonaligned countries. Chancellor Schmidt and President Giscard have told us that the Soviets have been equally + inflexible on Afghanistan in dealing with them.

+

We continue to believe it is possible that the combination of continued + international pressure and strong Afghan resistance may lead the Soviets + to conclude that a peaceful settlement based on complete withdrawal is + in their interest.

+

Yugoslavia has, quite understandably, taken a deep interest in the issue + of the deployment of long-range theater nuclear forces. I do not need to + recount the history of this issue, but I do want to inform you of the + latest developments in our efforts to initiate discussions on long-range + theater nuclear forces with the Soviet Union. Until recently, the + Soviets had refused to engage even in preliminary exchanges and instead + insisted that NATO should first revoke + or suspend its TNF modernization decision taken last December. However, + on July 10, the Soviets indicated to us that they had dropped this + unacceptable precondition, and we are now preparing to engage in serious + preliminary discussions. While it is premature to conclude that the + apparent new Soviet willingness to discuss the issue indicates a genuine + interest in arms control measures involving TNF and based on the + principle of equality, we welcome the opportunity to sit down and + discuss the issue.

+

Mr. President, the United States attaches great significance to the + preservation of the independence, unity and territorial integrity of + Yugoslavia. We want to see a politically stable and economically + prosperous Yugoslavia—one that will continue to play an important role + internationally and within the Nonaligned Movement—and, as I stressed + during our meetings in June, we stand ready to do what we can to help + Yugoslavia achieve this goal. I discussed the Yugoslav balance of + payments situation with Secretary Miller shortly after my return from Europe, and he and + the Vice President subsequently met with Federal Secretary Kostic in Washington.At Mondale’s request, no memorandum of conversation was + prepared for the meeting with Kostic. In telegram 188947 to Belgrade, July 18, the + Department reported that Larrabee described the meeting as mostly symbolic + and that Mondale assured + Kostic of U.S. Government willingness to help + where possible. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800345–0666) + Miller’s July 15 + conversation with Kostic was + reported to the Embassy in Belgrade on July 22. The discussion + focused on the tactics that the Yugoslav Government might employ to + reconcile its desire for a series of bilateral agreements with + Western governments with the suggestion of Chase Manhattan Bank that + they proceed with a worldwide syndication loan. Miller stressed that he did not + have any authority to direct private banks to do anything, and + recommended that the Yugoslav Government proceed with bilateral + agreements in those countries that are willing to do so and accept a + worldwide syndication for the rest. (Telegram 192951 to Belgrade, + July 22; National Archives, RG 59, + Central Foreign Policy File, D800350–1032) See also footnotes 4 and 5, Document 288, and footnote 6, Document 292. We hope + that our efforts with the + U.S. banking community on your + behalf will help you to meet your immediate financial needs.

+

In closing, I would like to express once again my deep satisfaction with + the substance and the atmosphere of my recent visit to Belgrade. I feel + the visit significantly contributed to the strengthening of bilateral + relations, and I look forward to working closely with you in the months + ahead to further deepen cooperation between our two countries.In a meeting with Vest on October 17, Loncar + delivered Mijatovic’s response to Carter’s letter. Mijatovic + discussed Yugoslavia’s economic stabilization program, stressing the + Yugoslav Government’s hope for continued administration support on + the matter. He also addressed the outbreak of the Iran-Iraq War, + CSCE, and the UN Special Session of the General + Assembly on Development. When delivering the letter, Loncar stressed + the Yugoslav desire to continue the letter exchanges between the two + Presidents. (Telegram 280104 to Belgrade, October 20; National + Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign + Policy File, D800501–0534)

+

Sincerely,

+ + Jimmy + Carter + +
+ + +
+ 299. Telegram From Secretary of State Muskie to the Department of StateSource: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + D800458–0419. Confidential; Immediate; Exdis. Also sent to Belgrade. Sent for information + Immediate to Moscow, Warsaw, USUN, + Baghdad, and Havana. Muskie + was in New York to attend the opening of the 35th Session of the + UNGA. + + + + New York, September 25, 1980, 1833Z + +

Secto 8014. Subject: (U) Secretary’s + Bilateral With Yugoslavian Foreign Minister Vrhovec.

+

1. Confidential-entire text

+

2. Summary: Yugoslavian Foreign Minister Vrhovec met for an hour with Secretary Muskie and continued the conversation + for an additional 40 minutes with Under Secretaries Newsom and Nimetz after Secretary Muskie left to attend UNSC meeting. The conversation covered the full range of + current international issues, as well as the Yugoslav economic situation, the Markotic case, and + Assistant Secretary Derian’s + testimony on human rights. End summary.

+

3. The meeting lasted from 4:30 p.m. until 6:10 p.m. on September 23. + U.S. attendees were the Secretary, + Under Secretary Newsom, Under + Secretary Nimetz, and Deputy + Assistant Secretary Barry. + Yugoslav attendees were Foreign Minister Vrhovec, Ambassador to the U.S. Loncar, Ambassador to the UN Komatina, and Vrhovec’s Chef de Cabinet.

+

4. Secretary Muskie opened the + conversation by expressing regret that he had not been able to accompany + the President to Yugoslavia in June. Vrhovec commented that the President’s visit had been + extremely successful, particularly because of the President’s statements + while in Yugoslavia. He noted that Pravda had commented critically on + what the President had said, but that a “very high Eastern European + official” had recently asked Vrhovec for a Yugoslav assessment of the visit. When + Vrhovec responded that the + Yugoslavs considered the visit contributed to detente, the “EE official” said that he had thought so + too but had wanted to hear this directly from the Yugoslavs.

+

5. U.S.-Soviet relations. The Secretary + and Vrhovec discussed the + Gromyko + UNGA speech which Muskie described as defensive. + Vrhovec said that while the + speech had been tough, it was also businesslike and kept doors open. + Muskie commented that + Gromyko had very little to + say on Afghanistan and seemed to be trying to indicate that events there + had nothing to do with U.S. and Western + attitudes toward the USSR. This + clearly does not represent the serious view of the Soviet leadership but + we can not tell whether they consider that they made a mistake in + Afghanistan by underestimating Western reactions. Muskie said that in his discussions + with Gromyko in Vienna and + correspondence since then Gromyko has shown no flexibility but has not been + hostile or abrasive. The Soviets may be looking for an open door, but + they clearly don’t know where it is. Vrhovec opined that the Soviets may actually be ready to + talk about a way to get out of Afghanistan, but it was not reflected in + Gromyko’s speech. It could + be that the Soviet’s are prepared to talk business with the U.S., but at times like that they always + play their cards very close to their chest and display a more rigid + public image than usual.

+

6. Iraq-Iran. In response to the Secretary’s query about a non-aligned + role in Iraq-Iran hostilities,Iraq invaded + Iran on September 22, 1980, marking the start of the Iran-Iraq War, + which ended August 2, 1988. + Vrhovec suggested that neither + side would ask for NAM assistance until it became clear that one side or + the other was prevailing militarily. On the question of motivations, Iraq believed that Iran’s + military weakness provided an opportunity to humiliate Khomeini and + destroy the Iranian Government. Iran similarly is bent on undermining + the Iraqi Government. Thus, both parties to the conflict have + far-reaching goals. Vrhovec said + that Yugoslavia had tried to open sensitive communications with the + parties to see if they could be calmed down, but both were + unpredictable. Secretary Muskie + said that with the threat of blocking the Straits of Hormuz and blocking + shipping in and out, the international community could not afford to + lose time in ending the hostilities.

+

7. UN initiatives on Afghanistan. Under + Secretary Newsom asked what + Yugoslavia knew about possible UN + initiatives on Afghanistan. Vrhovec said he had talked to Agha Shahi yesterday, and + it was hard to see what could be achieved. Shahi was consulting on his + initiative concerning an international conference which would focus on + Soviet withdrawal and efforts to calm the situation. However, the “other + side” had another resolution in its pocket designed to undo the Shahi + proposal. To have two competing resolutions would be a bad thing. In + Yugoslavia’s view it would be good to get a consensus resolution to + resolve the problem but not to see rival ideas put forward.

+

8. Yugoslavia economic situation. As Secretary Muskie was about to leave for a UNSC meeting, he told Vrhovec that he and the President were + deeply interested in Yugoslavia’s efforts to deal with its economic + problems and anxious to be as helpful as possible. Muskie pointed out that the President + has expressed this interest before in Belgrade and maintained it today, + and that public opinion supported U.S. + efforts in this regard. He invited Vrhovec to convey the Yugoslav position on this, on the + situation in Poland, and on other matters of concern to Under Secretary + Newsom, who would report to + him on the remainder of the discussion. Vrhovec, who was clearly not up to date on the current + state of Yugoslavia’s efforts to obtain financing, began by stressing + that a Western bail-out was politically unacceptable to Yugoslavia. + Thus, they sought middle ground between the purely bilateral approach + they favored and the global syndication which had been pressed on them + by Chase. Ambassador Loncar pointed out that this conceptual problem had + been resolved through Yugoslavia’s two-track approach, and that the main + questions now were to be certain that the syndication in which U.S. bankers participated produced enough + money to meet Yugoslavia’s expectations and that the negotiations be + concluded as rapidly as possible.

+

9. Poland. Vrhovec pointed out + that the U.S. approach to the situation + in Poland had been a sensitive one. Events there represented a very + serious development, unfavorable to the USSR. Yugoslavia regarded developments so far as positive, + proving that a way of life imposed from outside was intolerable over + time. Vrhovec noted that so far + the Soviets had been restrained + in their behavior and their propaganda. The fact that events in Poland + had not turned into an East-West confrontation had contributed to a + positive evolution in Poland. Yugoslav PermRep Komatina chimed in to point out that a very + important East European official had recently commented that what had + happened in Poland was incompatible with Marxism/Leninism, but that it + was hoped that these new developments would “melt” as the economic + situation improved.

+

10. Markotic case.Mirko Markotic was a + naturalized U.S. citizen of Yugoslav + (Croatian) descent. He traveled to Yugoslavia in May 1980 and was + arrested immediately after his arrival. The Yugoslav Government + tried and sentenced him to jail time for “anti-government + activities,” and refused to allow U.S. officials visitation rights, arguing that Markotic + was a Yugoslav citizen. On September 1, Eagleburger wrote that Washington “must exact a + price, even though to do so will certainly affect the course of what + has been over the past three years an increasingly warm and + cooperative bilateral relationship.” However, Eagleburger cautioned, the United + States should not allow the Markotic case to affect Washington’s + attitude toward assisting Yugoslavia with its balance of payments + challenges. (Telegram 6817 from Belgrade, September 1; National + Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign + Policy File, D800416–0995) On January 11, 1981, the Presidency of + Yugoslavia granted amnesty to Markotic “in consideration of the + excellent overall state of our bilateral relations.” (Telegram 186 + from Belgrade, January 12, 1981; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + D810015–0788) Under Secretary Newsom brought up the Markotic case in the name of the + Secretary, urging that the Yugoslavs find a solution to this problem + compatible with our good political relations. Vrhovec reacted without emotion and + said he wished devoutly that Markotic had never come to Yugoslavia. He + pointed out that he had been forced to “engage” the Yugoslav leadership + to get information on this case. While the sentence they handed out was + severe, it was understandable. Vrhovec pointed out that while the sentence was within + the framework of Yugoslav law, the authorities had interpreted the law + as harshly as possible. The case had not yet reached its final stage, + and he hoped the higher courts would take a different approach. + Newsom said we did not want + to interfere in Yugoslav law, but that given the number of Americans who + also held Yugoslavian citizenship, he hoped for a resolution which would + not interrupt the movement of people back and forth, and would recognize + American interest in this type of case and consider leniency.

+ +

11. Derian testimony.On September 16, Derian testified before the Subcommittee on + International Organizations of the House Committee on Foreign + Affairs on the status of human rights in the Soviet Union and + Eastern Europe. (Current Policy, No. 204, + U.S. Department of State, + October 1980) Responding to a congressional inquiry, Derian included Yugoslavia in the + presentation, and discussed the Markotic case, eliciting a protest + from the Yugoslav Government. (Telegram 7453 from Belgrade, + September 19; National Archives, RG + 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800447–0459) While in West Berlin, + Eagleburger wrote that + it was unwise to lump together Yugoslavia with the other Warsaw Pact + countries as doing so does not serve U.S. foreign policy. “We are dealing with an uncertain + and therefore neuralgic post-Tito leadership,” he cautioned, and “how we handle + that fact can have a substantial impact on the future of our + bilateral relations.” (Telegram 1996 from West Berlin, September 17; + National Archives, RG 59, Central + Foreign Policy File, D800444–0096) Hoping to resolve the issue prior + to the Muskie-Vrhovec bilateral, the Department + instructed the Embassy to deliver the U.S. response, emphasizing that the administration + “make a very clear and fundamental distinction between nonaligned + Yugoslavia and the countries of the Warsaw Pact” and stress that + there was no change in U.S. policy + toward Yugoslavia. (Telegram 251422 to Belgrade, September 20; + National Archives, RG 59, Central + Foreign Policy File, D800450–0059) The Embassy delivered the U.S. response to the Foreign Ministry + on September 22. Ambassador Loncar raised a point about which + he said he had not had an opportunity to brief Vrhovec in detail. He objected to the + inclusion of Yugoslavia in Assistant Secretary Derian’s testimony on human rights in + Eastern Europe, to some of the specifics in the statement, and to the + fact that the statement was circulated by the U.S. Embassy in Yugoslavia. Mr. Newsom stressed there had been no + change in U.S. policies toward + Yugoslavia and pointed out that our policy had been clearly and + authoritatively enunciated by the President and the Secretary of + State.

+

12. Global negotiations. Vrhovec + asked Newsom if he saw any + possibility of a breakthrough in negotiations at the UN. Newsom pointed out that Ambassador McHenry believed that + a solution could be found once the overheated atmosphere of the Special + Session cooled off. Newsom + pointed out that the U.S. could not + agree to any formulation which detracts from the authority of UN specialized agencies or international + financial institutions, especially in view of the difficulty the U.S. was having in getting congressional + funds for these institutions. Vrhovec said that the Yugoslavs and others had hoped + that a vague formulation would enable the U.S. to agree since this would only result in the beginning + of talks at which all issues would be discussed in detail again. + Newsom pointed out that + Washington agencies were not prepared to accept vagueness of this kind + and required recognition of UN + specialized agencies’ roles and independence. However, he said that no + one was more anxious than Ambassador McHenry to find a solution to the + problem.

+ + Muskie + +
+ +
+ 300. Telegram From the Embassy in Yugoslavia to the Department of + StateSource: National + Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign + Policy File, D800576–1044. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Sent for information + Priority to DOD/OSD/ISA, USNATO, + USDOCOSOUTH Naples, USCINCEUR, USCINUSAFE, and USNMRSHAPE. The telegram was sent at a time when the + domestic situation in Poland was deteriorating fast and a Soviet + invasion of Poland seemed imminent. See Document + 42. + + + + Belgrade, December 3, 1980, 1430Z + +

9712. Department for Under Secretary Newsom and Assistant Secretary Vest. OSD/ISA for Assistant Secretary McGiffert. Subj: Contingency Planning + for Yugoslavia in the Event of Soviet Intervention in Poland.

+

1. (S) Entire text.

+

2. In the event of Soviet military intervention in Poland and the + inevitable European security crisis this would generate, the Yugoslav + leadership—although seeking to avoid “provoking” Moscow—will + nevertheless welcome assurances of Western, specifically US, support. + They may also seek concrete assistance in the economic and/or military + area. This message outlines, in the event of Soviet intervention in + Poland, what our objectives should be in dealing with the Yugoslavs; and + what we may anticipate the GOY may ask + of us. Circumstances will of course govern what they and we say and do, + but these initial thoughts are provided as a basis for Department + planning.

+

3. U.S. objectives: Our actions should + reassure the Yugoslav leaders that we are prepared to support + them—within reason—should they wish it; and provide early warning to the + Soviets, lest in the turmoil and fear generated by intervention in + Poland they be tempted—unlikely as that may be—to regard post-Tito Yugoslavia as equally beyond the + reach of Western assistance.

+

4. Where we could relatively easily predict how Tito would react to a Polish invasion, + we are less certain about the new leadership. They will be + wholeheartedly opposed to the Soviet move, but they will also be scared + and, initially at least, very cautious. A firm indication of support + from the US, early on, could have an immediate steadying effect, and + over the longer run, could influence GOY attitudes toward the US. In any event, how they react + will influence what we do. We may find some actions on our part + advisable before we have a chance to consult with them. But + consultations should take place promptly. If 1968 is any guide, even if + we do not make the first approach the GOY may. In our opinion, making the first move ourselves + would be smart—letting the pace thereafter be partly set by the + Yugoslavs but with us in a + position, if need be, to hold their expectations within limits of the + possible.

+

5. Unilateral steps which we ought to consider include:

+

—A restatement by the Carter administration, at no lower level than the + Secretary of State, of US support for Yugoslavia’s independence, + territorial integrity, and unity;

+

—A statement confirming continuity in this policy from a senior figure in + the incoming Reagan administration, preferably Mr. Bush or the + President-elect himself, but at no lower level than the + Secretary-designate;

+

—A similar statement in the NATO + context, by SYG + Luns, might also be wise, + particularly as a warning to the Soviets. But in Yugoslav eyes it would + probably be regarded as more “provocative” than bilateral statements by + Western powers.

+

6. Our statements should be measured, not too strident. We must not be + seen to be contributing to heightened uncertainty about Yugoslavia’s + future. A simple, straightforward reiteration of US support in the usual + formulation, if made at the right moment and in a broader context, + should accomplish our objective.

+

7. Joint steps: We may well find the Yugoslavs receptive to a visit by a + senior US official (whether the President-elect should be represented in + some way is beyond our ken). Such a visit would be described (properly) + as consultations. The US visitor should neither be seen as a prelude to + a US effort to “envelope” the Yugoslavs, nor should his presence be + construed by the Yugoslavs as presaging a USG blank check. Some initial thoughts follow on what might + be on the agenda during such consultations:

+

—An exchange of views on the situation in Europe, Soviet intentions, + Western reactions, etc.

+

—In this context, we might offer to establish a joint exchange of + intelligence with the GOY on the + situation in Poland and Eastern Europe.

+

—The Yugoslav military may well seek to use the occasion to obtain + further support, i.e., a speed-up of delivery of items already in the + pipeline or under negotiation and/or more forthcoming responses to + requests for state-of-the-art weapons and equipment. (Para 7 below describes what they could be + looking for.)

+

—If a crisis in Poland occurs before the current balance of payments loan + negotiations are completed, the GOY + would wish to lock those resources in as fast as possible and might + again approach us for assistance in this regard.

+

—It is also possible, depending on the circumstances, that the GOY, aware of the Polish request for + substantial direct economic assistance from the US and also aware that this has not been + publicly rejected in Washington, might also make a similar pitch. What + we can do under existing legislation is sharply limited. What the + Yugoslavs might ask of us could exceed those limits, but we should not + be surprised should they approach us. Any Yugoslav request for direct + financial assistance might be tied, directly or indirectly, to their + military needs. For example, GOY + hesitancy about FMS credits for + military purchases might vanish.

+

8. The following is a list of US weapons, equipment and training that + would most likely be found on a Yugoslav wish list. Rank order does not + imply order of priority:

+

A) AN/TPS–63 radars. An FMS contract was + signed earlier this year for the purchase of eight AN/TPS–63 radars. + Delivery is currently scheduled to commence in June 1982. The Yugoslavs + could seek earlier delivery.

+

B) F–5 aircraft. The Yugoslavs have expressed considerable interest in + this aircraft. They would quite possibly ask the USAF to train pilots in + the F–5, even though it is not yet in the YAF inventory. They might also + propose to purchase a number of the planes.

+

C) TOW/Dragon. The US Army is currently preparing FMS cases for small quantities of + TOW/Dragons to use for training purposes. The GOY might ask for accelerated delivery of these anti-tank + weapons and additional urgent training.

+

D) Reconnaissance/EW equipment. Commercial contracts are currently being + prepared for surveillance and countermeasures equipment. The Yugoslavs + might seek accelerated delivery.

+

E) Mark–46 torpedoes. LOA’s for the Mark–46 have been delivered. The + Yugoslavs might seek to accelerate acquisition.

+

F) Another priority would probably be AGM–65 A/B Maverick, 150 of which + the GOY is seeking to buy. + Congressional notification is being prepared. They might well seek to + accelerate the acquisition process.

+

9. The GOY may also push us for some + thing we have so far refused (Harpoon). We would, in the abstract, see + no reason to reverse previous denials.

+

10. Deployment of units of the US Sixth Fleet for operations in the + Adriatic and/or a highly visible ship visit should be considered as an + option to demonstrate US strength and purpose. However, the GOY might find these in the “provocative” + category and we should therefore not undertake such deployment without + careful consideration of the pros and cons. The ship visit would require + consultations; an operational deployment should at least be informally + discussed with the Yugoslavs in advance unless there are overriding + operational reasons not to do so.

+ +

11. The above is not an inclusive list—there may be other steps worth + thinking about. The point is, we ought to have thought through, to the + extent we can, how in the event of catastrophe in Poland we should deal + with the one country in the area most likely to be shaken and most + likely to be looking for reassurance—and one country where what we say + (and are ultimately prepared to do) can make a difference.

+ + Eagleburger + +
+ +
+ 301. Telegram From the Embassy in Yugoslavia to the Department of + StateSource: National + Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign + Policy File, D810030–1032. Confidential; Priority. Sent for + information Priority to Ankara, Athens, East Berlin, Bucharest, + Budapest, Moscow, Prague, Rome, Sofia, Vienna, Warsaw, West Berlin, + USNATO, USUN, USDOCOSOUTH Naples, USCINCEUR, CINCUSAFE, and USNMRSHAPE. + + + + Belgrade, January 21, 1981, 0749Z + +

410. USDOCOSOUTH for INTAF, USCINCEUR for Polad, CINCUSAFE for Polad, USNMR SHAPE pass Stoddart SACEUR/SA. Subj: The Post-Tito Transition: An Appraisal at + Year’s End. Refs: (A) 80 Belgrade 5851In + telegram 5851 from Belgrade, July 28, 1980, the Embassy assessed the + success of the transition in Yugoslavia three months after Tito’s death. The Embassy + concluded that “the leadership has maintained its outward cohesion + and unity,” “the serious economic situation is being addressed,” + “the political-security situation has remained generally stable,” + “Yugoslavia’s diplomacy has been steady and exceptionally active,” + and “the U.S. role in promoting a + smooth transition by making clear our friendship and support for + Yugoslavia remains as important as ever” despite possible challenges + down the line. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + D800362–0856) (B) 80 Zagreb 1190In telegram 1190 from Zagreb, November 25, 1980, the Consulate + assessed the situation in post-Tito Croatia and Slovenia. “The leaders of these two + Republics” the Consulate reported, “are focusing very largely on the + problems of stabilization” and are paying close attention to any + signs of disaffection or “especially in Croatia—for any signs of a + stirring of latent nationalism.” The Consulate concluded: “So far as + we can determine the general mood remains quiet.” (National + Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign + Policy File, D800566–0973) (C) 80 RFE RAD BR 1274.Not + found.

+

1. (C)-entire text.

+

2. This message transmits the summary and conclusions of an airgram + attempting an analysis of the internal situation in Yugoslavia eight + months after the death of Tito.

+ +

3. Last July, three months after Tito’s death, we concluded that the transition was + proceeding as expected, that is, fairly smoothly. The collective + leadership, while hardly brilliant or decisive, was functioning + satisfactorily and maintaining outward unity; the political-security + situation remained generally stable, despite certain pressures to + liberalize and some consequent calls for internal vigilance; + Yugoslavia’s serious economic problems were being addressed, albeit with + inadequate results to date; and Yugoslavia’s traditional foreign policy + priorities remained unaltered—preservation of independence through heavy + commitment to non-alignment, stability and balance in dealing with + Moscow and Washington, and as good relations as possible with its + neighbors.

+

4. Today, more than eight months after Tito’s death, these judgments remain valid. The + situation, however, is anything but static. Indeed, pressures are + building—particularly from the troubled economy—which are forcing the + pace of change and open debate, posing difficult choices for the + collective leadership, and highlighting the issue of where real power + should reside in post-Tito + Yugoslavia. Among these pressures are:

+

—The further deterioration of the international situation. When Tito died, Soviet-backed aggression in + SE Asia, turmoil in Iran, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, and the + near paralysis of the Non-Aligned Movement were already weighing heavily + on the new Yugoslav leadership.In telegram + 301 from Belgrade, January 15, the Embassy reported Minic’s statement to Eagleburger that the international + political situation was most dangerous, and that the relationship + between Washington and Moscow was “absolutely critical.” (National + Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign + Policy File, D810075–0089) Prior to departing from Belgrade, + Eagleburger also met + with Vrhovec and with + Mijatovic to discuss the state of U.S.-Yugoslav relations and the international + situation. (Telegram 406 from Belgrade, January 21; National + Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign + Policy File, D810030–0979; and telegram 408 from Belgrade, January + 21; National Archives, RG 59, + Central Foreign Policy File, D810030–0945) Since then, the + Gulf War, Poland, the threatened collapse of detente, and increased + energy and trade dependence on Moscow have put new pressures on the + leadership—underscoring Yugoslavia’s heavy commitment to the NAM, and + forcing difficult (and no doubt internally contentious) trade-offs + between foreign policy principles, smooth relations with Moscow, and the + self-interest in preserving socialism.

+

—Continuing economic difficulties. The economic chickens of Tito-era economics are now coming home + to roost and the new leadership is having to foot the bill. The economy, + beset by inflation, declining living standards, imbalanced trade, low + productivity, and chronic unemployment, thus remains the make-or-break + issue for the new leadership, a + test of political stability, and a driving force for change throughout + society. No longer able to coast along on the momentum of past policies, + assumptions, successes, or foreign borrowing, the leadership is having + to face the hard and politically controversial economic facts of life. + And that has meant admitting the need for austerity, structural change, + and more open discussion of the roots of and remedies for present + economic ills. This in turn has focused attention on etatist political + and economic interests, the Party’s relevance to solving the country’s + economic problems, and reformist pressures for a shift of economic + decision-making authority upward to the Federal authorities at the + macro-economic level and at the same time, outward from the Republics to + individual enterprises.

+

—The quickening of domestic political life. The need to define new power + relationships following Tito’s + death would in any case have led to an intensification of political life + in Yugoslavia, but the urgency of its economic problems and the lessons + of Poland have pushed this process further and faster than one might + earlier have anticipated. Individual, institutional, and social actors + are scrambling to protect or enlarge their piece of the political and + economic action as well as to define the future. In the process, a new + critical spirit has emerged in all major areas of Yugoslav life. Thus, + since Tito’s death, the + political landscape has been enlivened by open debate on economic + policies, criticism of past leadership errors, calls for more open + decision-making, attacks on corruption and mismanagement, petitions for + greater political and literary freedom, pressures for reform, and + increase assertiveness in the press and cultural field.

+

5. In short, two broad but closely related debates—one economic, the + other political—have emerged between “reformers” who accept the need for + change and “conservatives” who fear it. On the economic side, the issue + is how to respond to economic challenges and to rationalize economic + decision-making without undermining existing authority, self-management + concepts, and the delicate ethnic and Federal-Republican power balance. + Whether and how to avoid excessive trade dependence on the East is a + further issue of growing concern. On the political side, the issue is + where to draw the line between constructive and hostile criticism and + whether the emerging debate can best be controlled through repression or + through participation in it.

+

6. For now, the “reformers,” centered primarily in the State apparatus, + the technical intelligentsia, and academic clearly have the + advantages.In telegram 418 from + Belgrade, January 21, the Embassy reported Eagleburger’s meeting with Federal + Assembly President Dragoslav + Markovic. Markovic told Eagleburger that the Yugoslav Government was + “determined to press ahead with a democratization of society and to + improve economic efficiency.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + D810030–1097) They have pushed through an economic program + based on greater reliance on + market mechanisms and less meddling by local political interests in + investment decisions; left an ambivalent LCY with little alternative + other than to endorse this approach at the December 15th CC LCY plenum + and to accept more open debate and criticism as necessary and healthy; + and argued with apparent success for a policy of differentiation between + a “loyal” and a “disloyal” opposition. With events on their side, the + “reformers” have thus emerged on the offensive and the State apparatus + has proven itself more effective than the Party in developing coherent + and convincing responses to the powerful and broadly based currents for + change.

+

7. The battle is hardly over, though, and the “conservatives”—a mixture + of generally older, more orthodox elements in the Party hierarchy as + well as local and Republican elements motivated more by pragmatic + considerations of power than by ideology—can be expected to fight back + hard. Thus, these conservatives, with LCY Presidency members Dragosavac + and Mikulic in the fore, have + consistently pressed for a tougher line against “dissidents” and have + continued to issue periodic warnings about dangerous “new tendencies,” + attempts to change “fundamentals of the (Titoist) system,” ideological + backsliding, and reliance on “bourgeois” economic methods.

+

8. These same forces no doubt were also instrumental in getting the + December Plenum to take a stand—calling for “uncompromising rejections” + of anti-Socialist and anti-self-management trends—on a process which + seemed bent on moving ahead with or without Party consent. Whether this + attempt to reassert Party control over the debate will have the desired + effect remains to be seen, since the real issue—where to draw the line + between acceptable and unacceptable “reformist” criticism—was not + clarified. In any case, since the Plenum, Party organs have noticeably + stepped up public criticism of opposition elements (Djilas, Mihaljov, + and the backers of “Javnost”—proposed magazine of social criticism); the + Party faithful have been exhorted to struggle harder against + ideologically alien ideas and those who ascribe all present economic + ills to the self-management system; and there have been attempts to + intimidate the signers of the various petitions for greater political + freedom (without, however, noticeable success so far).

+

9. In a way, the emerging atmosphere of criticism and debate is + reminiscent of the political-intellectual ferment of 1970–71 in + Yugoslavia—but without the acute nationalistic content present then—but + also without Tito in the wings + to ensure the debate is kept within bounds. This process has not yet + gone very far and the outcome is not all clear. For now, the debate + remains relatively restrained, responsible, and focused on reform, + “democratization,” and “liberalization” within the Socialist + self-management system. Its main protagonists have been in the political + mainstream rather than the fringe forces which seek to destroy Tito’s “self-management socialism” or to alter it beyond + recognition remain scattered and their programs—where they have + formulated them—have yet to find much resonance in society at large. + This has obviated the need for more heavy-handed repressive + measures.

+

10. From this we draw several conclusions:

+

—The level of turbulence in the post-Tito period has been well within the tolerable, although + the opening up of the political process has proceeded faster than + expected.

+

—The leadership, despite some dissenting voices and a foot-dragging + party, has turned in a credible if somewhat uneven performance, forcing + through necessary inter-Republican compromises and on balance responding + to pressures for change and to economic necessity with cautious + flexibility and even political courage.

+

—The trend toward more open criticism, debate, and decision-making—in one + sense a step toward Karelj’s limited concept of the “pluralism of + self-management interests”—is fully consonant with the generally + liberalizing (and in our view healthy) thrust of Yugoslavia’s post-war + political and economic evolution. It has been animated and legitimized + not by Western-style Democrats or “closet” capitalists but by pragmatic + Communists who are interested more in problem-solving than ideological + abstractions, who believe the Party’s leading role is not historically + ordained but contingent on its ability to provide convincing answers to + current problems, who believe the Socialist system can and should + tolerate a much more open expression of differences, and who see + cautious adjustment to pressures for change less risky in the long run + than sterile resistance.

+

—The forces for change are too broadly based and too deeply rooted to be + checked easily. Other pressures aside, the generation now coming into + its own is a post-war generation less interested in ideology, more + pragmatic, better educated and travelled, less ambivalent about Moscow, + thoroughly imbued with a post-1948 spirit of proud independence and more + realistic about the nature and requirements of Yugoslavia’s Federal + system. Nothing illustrates this new climate more clearly than the + Party’s own assessment that it can only hope to maintain control over + the on-going process by participating in it and endorsing more criticism + and debate.

+

11. That said, there are developments which could alter the pragmatists’s + and reformers’ present advantage. First, a prolonged economic downturn + or collapse could undermine this group’s confidence in its ability to + control the situation while strengthening conservative elements anxious + to preserve power through a more “firm-hand” policy, a quick economic + “fix” (i.e., greater reliance on Eastern trade, markets, and economic + methods), and consequent abandonment in practice if not in name of + genuine non-alignment. So far there is no indication that such a negative process is under + way. The leadership understands the gravity of the economic situation; + has taken politically unpopular steps to turn the situation around; and + has had some initial if far from adequate successes in this regards.

+

12. Second, a shift to a softer Soviet tactical line. Since Tito’s death, the Soviets have waged + something of a “friendship offensive” toward Yugoslavia, generally + holding their tongue in the face of Yugoslav actions (as the December 12 + GOY announcement on Poland) and + press coverage (as of Afghan events) which Moscow must find offensive. + Should Moscow revive the polemics the Yugoslav leaders would immediately + fear this would presage an attempt by Moscow to translate Yugoslavia’s + increased trade and energy vulnerability into political gain. This fear + of the potential consequences of growing trade with the East has become + a pervasive element in the GOY leader’s + thinking. For some, overt Soviet pressure, should it occur, could change + the calculation of the balance of risk and some fence-straddlers might + conclude that more accommodation and tighter internal controls pose + fewer risks than further political and economic experimentation.

+

13. Third, a degeneration of the present more open climate into a + nationalistic free-for-all or into a frontal attack on Party + prerogatives or power. Either development could well trigger a reaction + from the military, as in the 1971–72 “nationalist” crisis when the + military strongly urged (and enabled) Tito to crack down on a situation that seemed to be + getting out of control. Either a nationalist free-for-all or a too-far, + too-fast erosion of Party prerogatives could undercut those arguing that + post-Tito Yugoslavia can + only find the right solutions, and public support for them, through a + process of more open debate, criticism, and decision-making. This is the + least clear area of all: the outcome will hinge on the ability of + contending groups to handle their differences during a period of + economic sacrifice and international tension with political maturity and + good sense. So far the post-Tito + record has been encouraging on this score.

+

14. In short, some eight months after Tito’s death and a year after his taking ill, Yugoslavia + is entering 1981 with a more open political climate, with its leadership + and its commitment to Yugoslav independence and non-alignment intact, + with its course set for continuity and cautious change, and with some + problems on the way to resolution but many more to be worked out. + Economic problems at home, tensions abroad, and liberalizing pressures + continue to weigh upon the leadership, inching it toward a limited kind + of pluralism, stirring conservative counterpressures, and forcing the + pace of change faster than many in the leadership, and particularly in + the Party, would like.

+

15. Thus, while the going will not be easy and the prospect is for more + rather than less political turbulence as power relationships are sorted out, we believe that the + economy will remain the single most critical factor; that the less + doctrinaire elements, who are clearly more in tune with the economic + operatives of change, the popular mood, and the thrust of Yugoslavia’s + post-war evolution, have the best chance of providing the leadership and + answers for Yugoslavia’s economic problems; and that Yugoslavia, despite + possible tightening up against some of the more radical regime critics, + is likely to remain on a course of cautious, pragmatic and generally + liberalizing change in the critical period ahead.

+ + Eagleburger + +
+
+
+ + + + + +
+ Index + + + Aaron, David + Czechoslovakia, 103, 115 + German Democratic Republic, 1 + 34 + Hungary, 171 + Romania, 186, 207, 214, + 216, 223, 224 + Soviet propaganda broadcasting, 66 + U.S. covert publications program, 2, 17 + U.S. differentiated policy structure, 6, 10, 14 + U.S. international broadcasting program, 64, 75, + 79 + Yugoslavia + Intelligence cooperation, 259 + Mondale visit (1977), 236 + Post-Tito contingency planning, 276, 277, 278 + U.S. economic aid, 265 + U.S. economic cooperation with, 248 + U.S. military sales, 257, 266, 268, 270, 285, 287 + U.S. trade with, 271 + + + Abdul-Rauf, Muhammed, 68 + Abshire, David, 47, 48 + Aczel, Gyorgy, 146 + Administration transition period (1980–81), + 80, 175, 176 + Aggrey, O. Rudolph + Romania + Arab-Israeli conflict, 287 + Blumenthal Romania visit, 211 + Carter-Ceausescu correspondence, 186 + Ceausescu visit (1978), + 189, 200, 204 + Credentials presentation, 188 + Foreign policy, 203 + Horodinca defection case, 222 + Iran hostage crisis and, 219 + Mondale-Burtica meetings, 226 + Pacepa defection case, 207 + Polish crisis (1980) and, + 233 + Political situation, 213 + Rauta case, 195, 204 + Ridgway-Andrei meetings, 229 + Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and, 221 + Soviet relations with, 212 + World Bank/IMF loans, 234 + + + Albania, 30, 88 + Albright, Madeleine, 78, 115, 263, 297 + Albright, Raymond, 254 + Aleksandrov-Agentov, Andrei M., 282 + Alekseyeva, Lyudmila, 8 + Allworth, Edward, 68 + Amalrik, Andrey, 3, 8 + American Jewish Committee, 215, 217 + American Jewish community, 214, 215, 216, 217 + Amnesty International, 121, 234 + Anderson, David, 99, 147, 247 + Anderson, Jack, 69 + Andrei, Stefan + Arab-Israeli conflict, 187, 221, 229 + Blumenthal visit, 211 + Brzezinski meetings, 206, 208 + Ceausescu U.S. visit (1978), 194, 200, + 201, 204 + Export controls, 218 + Foreign policy, 203 + Iran hostage crisis, 219, 229 + Most Favored Nation status, 185 + Norfolk port access, 218 + Pacepa defection case, 27, 207, 209 + Polish crisis (1980), 233 + Political situation, 194, 213 + Ridgway meetings, 229 + Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, 221, 229 + U.S. international broadcasting program, 58 + Vance meetings, 201, 202, 209, + 218 + Vance visit proposals (1979), 219 + Warsaw Pact PCC meeting, 211 + World Bank/IMF loans, 234 + + Andrews, Nicholas G. + Bulgaria, 82 + Czechoslovakia, 99 + Hungary, 136, 141, 147, + 150 + + Romania, 189, 190, 192, + 195, 196 + U.S. international broadcasting program, 53 + Yugoslavia, 254 + + Anghel, Petre, 184 + Apro, Antal, 36 + Arab-Israeli conflict (see also Romania and + Arab-Israeli conflict) + U.S.-Yugoslav discussions, 236, + 244, 253, 254, 295 + + Armitage, Jack, 136, 141, 179 + Arms control. See Strategic Arms Limitation + (SALT) talks; UN Special Session on Disarmament. + Atherton, Alfred L. “Roy,” 188 + Atkinson, Richard C., 13 + Austria, 105 + Avram, Ion, 200, 204 + Axen, Hermann, 125 + + + Babalau, Constantin, 213 + Babiuch, Edward, 38 + Bahro, Rudolf, 26, 133 + Bakaric, Vladimir, 269, 273, 288 + Banlaki, Gyorgy, 166 + Barnes, Harry G., Jr., 179, 185 + Barraclough, William, 164 + Barry, Robert + Bulgaria, 94 + Czechoslovakia, 109, 112, 113, + 114 + Hungary, 173 + Iran hostage crisis, 219 + Polish crisis (1980), 41, 44 + Romania, 216, 218, 230, + 231, 232, 233 + Yugoslavia, 277, 285, 287, + 288, 292 + + Bartholomew, Reginald + German Democratic Republic, 128 + Romania, 206, 228, 230 + U.S. international broadcasting program, 57, 61 + U.S. policy toward Eastern Europe, 25 + U.S. refugee assistance, 33 + U.S.-Soviet relations, 21, 22 + Yugoslavia, 277, 278 + + Bass, Kenneth, 70 + Battle Act (Mutual Defense Assistance Control Act), 230 + Bednar, Jiri, 106 + Begin, Menachem, 183, 184 + Beil, Gerhard, 122, 124 + Belovski, Dimce, 236, 238, 244, 251, 254, 258 + Bennigsen, Alexandre, 68 + Benson, Lucy Wilson, 266, 267, 271, 272 + Bergland, Robert, 202, 205 + Bergold, Harry E., Jr., 44, 174, 175, 176 + Bergsten, C. Fred, 6 + Berlin, 1, 124, + 130, 131 + Berlinguer, Enrico, 243 + Bernard, Noel, 58 + Bernardic, Dragan, 244, 254 + Besteliu, Ion, 214, 216 + Biden, Joseph R., Jr., 158, 159 + Biermann, Wolf, 5, 26, 121, 133 + Biester, Edward, 47 + Bilak, Vasil, 108 + Binder, David, 72, 77 + Bingham, Jonathan B., 136, 158 + Blackwill, Robert D., 93, 282 + Blech, Klaus, 55 + Bloomfield, Lincoln, 37 + Blumenthal, W. Michael, 1, 13, 16, 202, 210, 211, 249 + B’nai B’rith International, 214, 215 + Board for International Broadcasting (BIB). See U.S. international broadcasting program. + Bobtodorova, Elena, 93 + Bobu, Emil, 213 + Bogatyrev, Konstantin, 8 + Bogdan, Corneliu, 210, 215, 216, 217, 232, 233, 234 + Bolen, David B., 118, 123, 125, 127, 130, 131 + Bolger, William F., 129 + Boorstin, Daniel, 82 + Borg, C. Arthur, 4 + Bowdler, William G., 17 + Bowie, Robert R., 6, 14, 19, 22 + Bowman, Maj. Gen. Richard C., 258, 261, 275, 278, 285 + Bradtke, Robert, 215, 232, 234 + Brandt, Willy, 120 + Brement, Marshall + Bulgaria, 93 + Dissident movements, 37 + Eastern European political situations, 35 + German Democratic Republic, 132 + Soviet propaganda broadcasting, 66 + U.S. international broadcasting program, 72, 75, + 78 + Yugoslavia, 266, 268 + + Bremer, L. Paul, III, 218, 281 + Brezhnev, Leonid + Carter correspondence, 42 + + Czechoslovakia, 108 + Polish crisis (1980), 42 + Political situation, 35 + Romania, 205, 206 + Soviet policy toward Eastern Europe, 30 + Warsaw Pact PCC meeting, 210 + Yugoslavia, 243, 282 + + Bridges, Peter, 41, 173, 176, 232, 233, 234 + Brody, Clifford, 196, 202 + Brown, Gen. George S., 1, 13, 14, 16, 228, 241 + Brown, Rear Adm. Taylor, 261 + Brown, Harold + Export controls, 13 + Helsinki Accords implementation, 10 + U.S. covert publications program, 2 + U.S. differentiated policy structure, 6, 14, 16 + U.S. policy review, 1 + Yugoslavia, 241, 245, 246, + 255, 259, 260, 297 + + Browne, Monroe, 80 + Brumberg, Abe, 17 + Brzezinski, Zbigniew K. + Bulgaria, 93, 94 + Czechoslovakia, 103, 109, 111, + 115 + Dissident movements, 3, 5, 19, 37 + Eastern European political situations, 9, 35 + Export controls, 12 + + Presidential Review Memoranda, 13 + Romania, 204 + + German Democratic Republic, 128, + 132, 134 + Helsinki Accords implementation, 10 + Hungary + Aaron-Nagy meetings, 171 + Carter oral message, 159 + Crown of St. Stephen, 143, 144, 154 + + Hunter memoranda, 137 + Hyland/Hunter memoranda, 140 + King memoranda, 148, 157 + Oakar communications, 160 + Reactions to return of, 152 + Tarnoff memoranda, 146 + Vance memoranda, 150, 156, 158 + + Grain diversion, 169, + 170 + Huszar meetings, 166 + Most Favored Nation status, 148, 164 + + Jackson-Vanik Amendment waivers extension, 165 + Polish crisis (1980), 42 + Romania + Andrei meetings, 206, + 208 + Blumenthal visit, 210 + Carter-Ceausescu correspondence, 186 + Carter-Macovescu meetings, 187 + Carter-Pungan meetings, 177 + Ceausescu visit (1978), + 181, 197, 199, 200, 201, 202, 203, 204 + Horodinca defection case, 222 + Most Favored Nation status, 180 + Pacepa defection case, 207 + Political situation, 193 + Rauta case, 195, 202 + Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and, 220 + U.S. military sales proposals, 223, 224, 228 + U.S. relief aid, 181 + + Soviet propaganda broadcasting, 65, 66 + U.S. covert publications program + CIA papers, 3 + Henze memoranda, 17, 20, 29, 32, 34, 37 + Special Coordination Committee discussions, 2 + Turner memoranda, 28 + + U.S. international broadcasting program, 45, 46, + 48 + + Administration transition period (1980-81), 80 + Board for International Broadcasting tensions, + 62 + Budget cuts, 57, 59, 60 + Cherne memoranda, 76 + Christopher memoranda, 53 + Gronouski BIB chair appointment, 47 + Holtzman investigation, 69 + Intelligence Information Special Reports, 58 + Muslim audiences, 68, + 70, 71, 72, 73, 74, 75, 77, 78 + Persian-language broadcasting, 61 + Soviet jamming, 79 + Special Coordination Committee discussions, 70 + U.S.-Federal Republic of Germany discussions, 52, 54 + + Voice of America expansion proposals, 63, 64 + + + U.S. policy toward Eastern Europe + King memoranda, 25 + Policy review, 1 + U.S. differentiated policy structure, 4, 6, + 7, 10, 11, 14, 15, 18, 27, 36 + U.S.-Soviet relations and, 21, 22, 39 + + U.S. refugee assistance, 31, 33 + U.S.-Soviet relations, 21, 22, 39, + 238 + Yugoslavia + Belovski meetings, 238 + Carter-Kardelj meetings, 243, 244 + Carter-Tito correspondence, 239 + Carter visit (1980), 294, 295, 296 + Intelligence cooperation, 259 + Military cooperation, 270, 291 + Military transfers to Ethiopia, 237, 238, 242 + Overflight issues, 251 + Post-Tito contingency planning, 251, 274, 275, 276, 278, 280, 284 + Science/technology cooperation, 251 + Tito condolences, 289 + Tito funeral delegation, 279, 280, 282 + Tito U.S. visit (1978), + 251, 252 + U.S. economic aid, 263, + 265, 292 + U.S. economic cooperation with, 248 + U.S. military sales, 242, 243 + + Duncan memoranda, 241 + Eagleburger memoranda, 286 + Hunter memoranda, 257 + Kimmitt/Brement/Larrabee memoranda, 266 + Larrabee memoranda, 268, 285, 297 + Tarnoff memoranda, 240 + + U.S. nuclear exports, 247, 251 + + + Buell, Bill, 62 + Bukovskiy, Vladimir, 3, 8, 37 + Bulgaria + Albanian relations with, 88 + Dissident movements, 5, 86 + Economic situation, 95 + Emigr, assassinations, 86, 87, 88 + Family reunification cases, 83, + 85, 88, 89, 93, 94 + Foreign policy, 30, 95 + Most Favored Nation status + Garthoff memoranda, 94 + State Department papers, 11 + U.S.-Bulgarian discussions, 83, 88, 91, 92, 93 + Vance memoranda, 89 + + Political situation, 81, 95 + Soviet relations with, 88, 90, 94, + 95 + U.S. international broadcasting program, 49, 67 + U.S. relations with + Bonds claims, 11, 92, 94 + Brement/Larrabee-Gotsev meetings, 93 + Cultural agreement, 82, + 83 + Fishing quotas, 91 + Garthoff-Gotsev discussions, 91 + Garthoff memoranda, 94 + Herz memoranda, 85 + Iran hostage crisis and, 36 + Perry memoranda, 95 + Polish crisis (1980) and, + 44 + Presidential Directives, 83 + Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and, 36 + State Department papers, 11 + Tsvetkov U.S. visit (1977), + 88, 89 + U.S. differentiated policy structure and, 16, 83, 91, 94 + Vance-Mladenov meeting proposals, 84, 87 + Vance-Zhivkova meetings, 92 + Zhivkova U.S. visit (1977), + 82 + + Yugoslav relations with, 88, 246 + + Bureau of Intelligence and Research reports + No. 843, “Ceausescu’s Leadership + Position,” 182 + No. 954, “The Prospects for + Domestic Stability in the GDR,” 121 + No. 1238, “East Germany’s New Hard + Line,” 133 + No. 1429, “The Human Rights + Movement in Czechoslovakia,” 110 + + Burg, Steven, 68 + Burtica, Cornel, 211, 222, 226 + Byrne, Malcolm, 42 + Byrne, Thomas R., 96, 99, 100, 101, 102, 105, 106 + + + Caddell, Pat, 153 + + Carlucci, Frank C., 70, 193, 278 + Carrillo, Santiago, 243 + Carter, Hodding, III, 112 + Carter, Jimmy + Brezhnev correspondence, 42 + Bulgaria, 82 + Czechoslovakia, 98, 100 + Dissident movements, 5, 37 + Documents not declassified, 24 + Eastern European political situations, 9 + German Democratic Republic, 52, + 134 + Hungary + Crown of St. Stephen, 141, 142, 143, 144, 152, 153, 157, 158, 161 + Most Favored Nation status, 163, 164 + Oral message, 159 + + Iran hostage crisis + U.S. international broadcasting program and, 68 + U.S.-Romanian relations and, 219, 221, 226, 229 + Yugoslav responses, 279, + 288, 295 + + Polish crisis (1980), 38, 42, + 299 + Romania + Ceausescu correspondence, 177, 186, 221, 226, 229 + Ceausescu visit (1978), + 197, 198, 199, 200, 203, 204 + Horodinca defection case, 222 + Human rights, 195, 199, 202, 203 + Macovescu meetings, 187 + Most Favored Nation status, 180, 203 + Pungan meetings, 177 + Rauta case, 195 + Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and, 220 + + Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, 36, 219, 220, 221, + 295, 298 + Soviet propaganda broadcasting, 65 + U.S. covert publications program, 2 + U.S. differentiated policy structure, 15, 16 + U.S. foreign trade + Export controls, 12, 13, 177, 204 + Jackson-Vanik Amendment waivers extension, 165 + + U.S. human rights policy, 5, 100, 173 + U.S. international broadcasting program + Brzezinski memoranda, 45, + 48, 52 + Holtzman investigation, 69 + Muslim audiences, 68, + 71, 75 + Persian-language broadcasting, 61 + Soviet jamming, 79 + U.S.-German Federal Republic discussions, 52 + + U.S. policy review, 1 + U.S. refugee assistance, 31, 33 + U.S.-Soviet relations, 36, 118, 238, + 239 + Yugoslavia + Kardelj meetings, 243, + 244 + Mijatovic correspondence, 298 + Military cooperation, 291 + Military transfers to Ethiopia, 237, 242 + Mondale-Markovic meetings, 256 + Mondale visit (1977), 235 + Post-Tito contingency planning, 269, 274, 275, 288 + Science/technology cooperation, 251 + Tito condolences, 288, + 289 + Tito correspondence, 236, 239, 243, 251, 290 + Tito funeral delegation, 279, 280 + Tito U.S. visit (1978), + 251, 252, 253, 255 + U.S. economic aid, 294, + 295, 296, 298 + U.S. military sales, 242, 244, 246, 262, 266 + Visit (1980), 229, 291, 294, 295, 296 + + + Carter, Rosalynn, 82 + Carter-Ford debates (1976), 18 + Casey, Mary Ann, 101 + Ceausescu, Elena, 182, 225 + Ceausescu, Nicolae (see also Romania) + Arab-Israeli conflict, 183, 184, 200, + 203, 221, 226 + Begin visit (1977), 183, 184 + Blumenthal visit, 211 + Carter correspondence, 177, 186, 221, + 226, 229 + Dissident movement and, 5, 26 + Dissident repression, 179 + Earthquake (1977), 182 + Foreign policy, 30, 210, 225 + Horodinca defection case, 222 + Mondale meetings, 227 + Most Favored Nation status, 203 + Pacepa defection case, 207 + + Political situation, 178, 182, 194, + 213, 232 + Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, 219, 220, 221, 227, + 229 + U.S. international broadcasting program, 58 + U.S. visit (1978). See under Romania, U.S. relations + with. + + Cemalovic, Col. Gen. Enver, 245 + Cemovic, Momcilo, 249 + Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) (see also + U.S. covert publications program) + Czechoslovakia, 108 + Dissident repression, 126 + Eastern European political situations, 35 + German Democratic Republic, 126 + Memoranda + PA M 79-10210, “East + Germany The Chilly Winds of Spring,” 126 + PA M 80-10166, “Romania A + Situation Report,” 225 + PA M 80-10385C, “Likely + Consequences in Eastern Europe of the Polish + Events,” 40 + RP-78-10293, “Dissidence in + Eastern Europe,” 26 + RP M 78-10144, “Ceausescu’s + Romania a Situation Report,” 194 + + Polish crisis (1980), 40, 42 + Romania, 194, 225 + Soviet propaganda broadcasting, 65 + U.S. covert dissident support programs, 3, 8, 19, 26, 37 + Yugoslavia, 8, 269, 274 + + Charter 77 movement (Czechoslovakia) + Bureau of Intelligence and Research reports, 110 + Byrne memoranda, 96, 105, 106 + Christopher memoranda, 107 + CIA papers, 8, 26 + Intelligence Memoranda, 5 + Prague Spring anniversary and, 105 + State Department papers, 30 + Trials (Oct. 1977), 100, 110 + U.S.-Czech discussions, 99 + Vance memoranda, 100 + Vest memoranda, 101 + + Cherne, Leo, 76, 78, 80 + Chernyayev, Rudilf, 37 + China, People’s Republic of + Romanian relations with, 198, + 203, 205, 206, 208 + Soviet policy toward Eastern Europe and, 30 + Yugoslav relations with, 244, + 251, 252, 256, 273 + + Chnoupek, Bohuslav, 97, 99, 101 + Chramostova, Vlasta, 105, 106 + Christopher, Warren M. + Bulgaria, 82, 83, 88 + Czechoslovakia, 99, 107, 112, + 113 + German Democratic Republic, 120, + 125, 130 + Hungary, 149 + Polish crisis (1980), 41 + Romania + Carter-Ceausescu correspondence, 177 + Ceausescu visit (1978), + 189, 196, 199 + Dissident repression, 179 + Export controls, 218 + Human rights, 179, 196, 199 + Most Favored Nation status, 215, 217 + Norfolk port access, 218, 226 + Pacepa defection case, 205, 207 + Rauta case, 195 + U.S. military sales proposals, 228, 230 + World Bank/IMF loans, 234 + + U.S. differentiated policy structure, 10, 14 + U.S. international broadcasting program, 53 + Yugoslavia, 237, 243, 244, + 251, 265, 288 + + Church, Frank, 237 + Claytor, W. Graham, Jr., 70 + Cleland, Maj. Gen. John R. D., 261 + Clift, A. Denis, 93, 188, 226, 236, 290 + Clough, Susan, 195 + Cocirla, Trandafir, 213 + Colotka, Peter, 108 + Committee for the Defense of the Unjustly Prosecuted (VONS) + (Czechoslovakia), 110 + Committee of the Whole, 201, 252 + Committee of Workers’ Defense (KOR) (Poland), 105, 106, 110 + + Conference on International Economic Cooperation (CIEC), 236 + Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) (see also Helsinki Accords; Helsinki Accords + implementation) + Belgrade conference (1977) + Dissident movements and, 8, 26, 37 + Intelligence Memoranda, 5 + Treverton memoranda, 10 + U.S.-Hungarian discussions, 162 + U.S.-Yugoslav discussions, 243, 244, 252, 256 + + Dissident movements and, 26 + Madrid conference (1980) + Dissident movements and, 26, 110 + Polish crisis (1980) and, + 41 + U.S.-German Democratic Republic discussions, 123 + U.S.-Hungarian discussions, 167, 173, 176 + U.S.-Romanian discussions, 198, 227, 233 + + Romanian role, 198, 199, 221, + 226, 227, 229, 233 + U.S. policy review, 1 + Yugoslav role, 5, 236 + + Congress, U.S. + Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, 10 + Czech gold/claims issue, 96, 97, 98, + 99, 101, 102, 103, 109, + 114, 115 + German Democratic Republic, 123, + 134 + Hungary + Crown of St. Stephen, 136, 140, 142, 152, 155, 156, 158 + Delegation trips, 167 + Most Favored Nation status, 163, 164 + + Romania, 214, 217, 226 + U.S. international broadcasting program, 45, 47, + 48, 80 + Yugoslavia, 297 + + Cook, Paul K., 121 + Cooper, Richard N., 36, 122, 295, 296 + Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls (COCOM), + 39 + Corvalan, Luis, 8 + Council of Jewish Federations and Welfare Fund, 215 + Crane, Philip M., 136 + Critchlow, James, 70 + Cutter, W. Bowman, 6 + Czechoslovakia + Dissident movements, 3, 5, 11, 105, 106 + Dissident repression + Bureau of Intelligence and Research reports, 110 + Byrne memoranda, 96, 106 + Christopher memoranda, 107, 112 + CIA papers, 8, 26 + Intelligence Assessments, 108 + Larrabee memoranda, 111 + State Department papers, 30 + Tarnoff memoranda, 109 + Trials (Oct. 1977), 100, 101, 110 + Trials (Oct. 1979), 111, 112 + U.S.-Czech discussions, 99 + + Economic situation, 108, 116 + Foreign policy, 30, 116 + Most Favored Nation status, 11, + 116 + Political situation, 5, 105, 108, + 116 + Prague Spring (1968), 26, 105, + 108, 182, 260 + Soviet relations with, 108, 116 + U.S. covert publications program, 28 + U.S. international broadcasting program, 49, 116 + U.S. relations with + Bilateral Air Transport Agreement, 96 + Gold/claims issue + Byrne-Long discussions, 102 + Byrne memoranda, 96 + Christopher memoranda, 113 + King memoranda, 103 + Larrabee memoranda, 27, 115 + Morton memoranda, 116 + Nimetz-Johanes discussions, 104 + Nimetz memoranda, 97 + Polish crisis (1980) + and, 44 + Tarnoff memoranda, 109 + U.S.-Czech discussions, 99 + Vance memoranda, 98 + Vest memoranda, 101, 114 + + + Iran hostage crisis and, 36 + Journalist treatment, 11, + 99, 101, 105 + Morton memoranda, 116 + Nimetz-Johanes meetings, 104 + Polish crisis (1980) and, + 44 + Scientific/cultural exchanges, 96, 101, 116 + Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and, 36 + + U.S. differentiated policy structure and, 16 + + + + + + + + Danescu, Alexandru, 58 + Daniel, Yuli, 26 + Davis, Dick, 66 + Deal, Timothy, 169 + Denend, Leslie G., 261 + Derian, Patricia M. + German Democratic Republic, 122, + 123, 127, 131 + Romania, 192, 195, 196, + 233, 234 + Yugoslavia, 299 + + Derwinski, Edward J., 136, 214 + Dinu, Adm. Stefan, 230, 231 + Disarmament. See Strategic Arms Limitation + (SALT) talks; UN Special Session on Disarmament. + Dissident movements (see also Human rights; + specific countries) + CIA papers, 8, 26 + Helsinki Accords and, 5, 26, 30, + 100 + Intelligence Memoranda, 5 + Soviet Union, 26 + U.S. covert support programs, 3, + 8, 19, + 26, 37 + + Djilas, Milovan, 5, 283 + Djuranovic, Veselin, 256, 295, 296 + Documents not declassified, 24 + Dodson, Christine, 75, 128, 287 + Doherty, Ed, 155 + Doicaru, Nicolae, 58 + Dolanc, Stane, 273, 283, 294 + Dole, Robert, 10, 136 + Donovan, Hedley, 39 + Doronski, Stevan, 236, 283, 288, 294, 296 + Draper, Morris, 70, 190 + Dubcek, Alexander, 108 + Duffey, Joseph D., 82 + Duncan, Charles W., Jr., 6, 241 + Dunlop, Harry, 261 + Dyulgerov, Petur, 81 + Dzhemilev, Mustafa, 8 + + + + Eagleburger, Lawrence S. + Yugoslavia + Carter-Kardelj meetings, 244 + Carter visit (1980), 294, 295, 296 + Harriman-Tito meetings, 256 + Intelligence cooperation, 259, 260 + Markotic case, 299 + Military cooperation, 261 + Military transfers to Ethiopia, 237 + Mondale-Kolisevski meetings, 290 + Political situation, 301 + Post-Tito contingency planning, 274, 277, 283, 288 + Tito funeral delegation, 280, 281 + Tito U.S. visit (1978), + 249, 250, 251, 254 + U.S. economic aid, 264, + 265, 292, 294 + U.S. economic cooperation with, 248 + U.S. military sales, 272, 286, 300 + + Aaron-Vujatovic discussions, 270 + Benson visit discussions, 271 + Harold Brown-Ljubicic discussions, 245 + Larrabee memoranda, 268, 285, 297 + Scanlan memoranda, 267 + + + U.S. trade with, 271 + + East Germany. See German Democratic + Republic. + East-West Planning Group, 22 + East-West relations. See U.S.-Soviet + relations. + Eastern European economic situations (see also + specific countries), 11, 30, 35, 40, 43 + Eastern European foreign policies (see also + specific countries), 30, 36 + Eastern European political situations (see also + specific countries), 5, 9, 35 + Edminster, David K., 125, 129 + Egypt, 78 + Eilberg, Joshua, 195 + Elm, Joachim, 127 + Emergency Refugee and Migration Assistance Fund, 31 + Emigration (see also Emigration policy and Family reunification cases under specific countries; Jackson-Vanik + Amendment), 5, 26, + 31, 33 + Enger, Valdik, 37 + English, Glenn, 123 + Environmental Modification Convention (ENMOD), 117 + Ermarth, Fritz, 61, 75, 246 + Esposito, John, 68 + Esztergalyos, Ferenc, 147, 166, 171, 173 + Ethiopia. See Horn of Africa. + + Eurocommunism, 5, 26, 30, 243, 252 + European Community (EC), 36 + Export-Import Bank, 22, 249, 252, 254, 271, 292 + + + + Fair Trade Act, 196 + Fascell, Dante, 47 + Feaver, Douglas, 235 + Fenwick, Millicent, 158 + Ferencz, Benjamin, 127 + Ferguson, Glenn, 57, 59, 62, 69 + Feshbach, Murray, 68 + Findley, Paul, 214 + Fischer, Oskar, 117, 118, 119, 122, 123 + Fish, Lt. Gen. Howard M., 245 + Fojtik, Jan, 106 + Ford, Gerald R., 18, 85, 197 + Foreign Relations Authorization Act (1977), + 45 + France, 38, 132 + Freedom House, 80 + Frelinghuysen, Peter H. B., 48 + Frenzel, William E., 136, 142, 158, 163, 195 + Fried, Edward, 88 + Fromowitz, 192 + Frosch, Robert A., 13 + Funk, Gerald, 61 + + + Gabaj, Col. Vladimir, 261 + Garthoff, Raymond L., 84, 87, 88, 91, 92, 94 + Gates, Robert, 207, 266, 268 + Genscher, Hans-Dietrich, 36, 120 + Georgescu, Emil, 58, 179 + Georgescu, Vlad, 208 + German Democratic Republic (GDR) + Dissident movements, 5, 8, 11, 26, 121, + 126, 131, 133 + Economic situation, 26, 126 + Emigration issues, 5, 30, 125, + 131 + Family reunification cases, 122, + 127 + Foreign policy, 30 + German Federal Republic relations with, 133, 135 + Human rights, 30, 121, 123, + 126, 127, 131, 133 + Narcotics trafficking, 123 + Polish crisis (1980) and, 44, 135 + Political situation, 5, 9, 27, 121, 133, + 135 + U.S. relations with + Christopher-Bolen discussions, 125 + Claims settlement, 11, + 117, 118, 123 + Consular convention + Bolen-Honecker discussions, 118 + Brzezinski memoranda, 134 + Christopher-Bolen discussions, 125 + Christopher memoranda, 120, 130 + Derian-Nier discussions, 123 + Goodby-Nier discussions, 127, 129 + Larrabee memoranda, 132 + Polansky-Fischer discussions, 117 + State Department papers, 11 + Vance-Fischer discussions, 119, 122 + + Derian visit (1978), 123 + GDR Interagency Group discussions, 124 + Human rights and, 123, + 127, 131 + Humanitarian cases, 11, + 117, 118 + Iran hostage crisis and, 36 + Jewish claims, 11, 118, 127 + Journalist treatment, 117, 127, 131, 133 + Larrabee reception attendance, 128 + Polish crisis (1980) and, + 44 + Political consultations, 117 + Scientific/cultural exchanges, 36, 118, 123, 129 + Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and, 36 + State Department papers, 11 + Treverton memoranda, 10 + U.S. differentiated policy structure and, 4, 16 + Vance-Fischer meetings, 118, 119, 122 + + U.S. trade with, 118, 122, 124, + 125, 129 + + Germany, Federal Republic of (FRG) + German Democratic Republic consular convention and, 120 + German Democratic Republic relations with, 133, 135 + U.S. international broadcasting program, 49, 50, + 51, 52, 53, 54, 55, 56, 67 + + Getler, Michael, 96 + Ghibernea, Marcel, 218 + Giddens, Ken, 47, 61 + Gierek, Edward, 5, 9, 26, 38, 106 + + Gilmore, Harry J., 41, 88, 92, 94, 100, 111 + Ginzburg, Aleksandr, 8, 37 + Ginzburg, Vitaly L., 256 + Giscard-d’Estaing, Vale+a7ry, 38 + Glenn, James H., 88, 100, 101, 102, 104, 107, 109 + Gliga, Vasile, 88, 185, 196 + Glitman, Maynard W., 6 + Goldberg, Arthur J., 37, 199 + Goma, Paul, 5, 26, 177, 179, 182, 188, 189 + Gombos, Zoltan, 136 + Gomulka, Wladyslaw, 26 + Goodby, James E., 120, 124, 127, 129, 131 + Goritza, Ion, 218 + Gorman, John, 153 + Gotsev, Lyuben, 85, 87, 88, 91, 93 + Graham, Billy, 26, 146 + Gravel, Mike, 98 + Graves, Lt. Gen. Ernest, 258, 280, 285 + Gray, Victor, 120, 122, 124, 129 + Great Britain. See United Kingdom. + Greece, 258 + Greenwald, Jonathan, 124, 127, 131 + Griffin, Robert P., 158 + Griffith, William, 37, 47, 75, 93 + Grigorov, Konstantin, 88, 89, 92 + Grkovic, Col., 245 + Gronouski, John + U.S. international broadcasting program + BIB chair appointment, 47, 48 + Board for International Broadcasting tensions, + 62 + Budget cuts, 57, 59, 60 + Holtzman investigation, 69 + Holzkirchen modernization proposals, 55 + Muslim audiences, 71, + 77, 78 + Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty office relocation + proposals, 67 + Special Coordination Committee discussions, 70 + + + Group of 77, + 198, 204 + Groza, Maria, 234 + + + Habib, Philip C., 117, 118, 187, 188, 218 + Haferkamp, Wilhelm, 36 + Haig, Gen. Alexander M. Jr., 176 + Hajek, Jiri, 110 + Haman, Josef, 108 + Hamilton, Lee H., 152, 155, 158, 214 + Hanks, Nancy, 82, 83 + Hansell, Herbert J., 141, 149, 204 + Hanson, Rear Adm. Thor, 258 + Harich, Wolfgang, 26 + Harkin Amendment (1977), 196 + Harmon, Sidney, 202 + Harriman, Averell, 256 + Hartman, Arthur A., 6, 136, 137, 138, 139, 141 + Hasani, Sinan, 295 + Hauser, Rita, 48 + Havel, Vaclav, 100, 106, 110, 112 + Havemann, Robert, 26, 121, 126, 127, 133 + Havlicke, Karel, 106 + Hehir, Brian, 155 + Helsinki Accords (see also Helsinki Accords + implementation) + Dissident movements and, 5, 26, 30, + 100 + Soviet VOA jamming and, 79 + + Helsinki Accords implementation (see also + Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe) + Dissident movements and, 110, + 121 + Human rights and, 5, 8, 10, 26, 30, + 101 + Orlov Committee, 3, 8 + State Department papers, 11 + U.S.-Bulgarian discussions, 83, + 85 + U.S.-German Democratic Republic discussions, 127 + U.S.-Hungarian discussions, 145, + 173 + U.S. international broadcasting program and, 4 + + Henze, Paul + Soviet propaganda broadcasting, 65, 77 + U.S. covert publications program, 17, 20, 28, 29, + 32, 34, 37 + U.S. international broadcasting program + Administration transition period (1980–81), 80 + Board for International Broadcasting tensions, + 62 + Budget cuts, 57, 59, 60 + Gronouski BIB chair appointment, 47, 48 + Holtzman investigation, 69 + Holzkirchen modernization proposals, 53 + Muslim audiences, 72, + 75, 77, 78 + Persian-language broadcasting, 61 + + Romania, 58 + Special Coordination Committee discussions, 70 + U.S. covert dissident support programs and, 37 + Voice of America expansion proposals, 63, 64 + + + Herz, Martin F., 85 + Heym, Stefan, 126, 127, 131, 133 + Himmirsky, Krassin, 84, 88, 93 + Hirri, Imam Muhmammed, 68 + Hodges, Luther, Jr., 271 + Hoffmann, Karel, 108 + Holbrooke, Richard, 254 + Hollai, Imre, 147 + Holloway, Adm. James L., III, 235, 240, 242 + Holmes, H. Allen, 226, 232, 234 + Holtzman, Elizabeth, 69 + Honecker, Erich, 5, 9, 30, 118, 121, 131, 133 + Horelick, Arnold, 22, 278 + Hormats, Robert, 149 + Horn, Gyula, 176 + Horn of Africa + U.S.-Romanian discussions, 198, + 199, 211 + U.S.-Yugoslav discussions, 236, + 251, 254, 255 + Yugoslav military transfers, 237, 238, 242, 245 + + Hornblow, Michael, 4 + Horodinca, Nicolae Ion, 222 + Horton, Frank, 136, 142, 152, 158, 160 + Hoskinson, Samuel M., 2, 3 + Hovey, Graham, 75 + Hua Guofeng (Hua Kuo-feng), 205, 206, 208 + Huberman, Benjamin, 12, 13 + Huebner, Nico, 133 + Huffman, 200, 204 + Human rights (see also Dissident repression + under specific countries; U.S. human + rights policy; specific countries) + Brzezinski memoranda, 9 + Dissident movements and, 5, 8, 37 + Helsinki Accords implementation and, 5, 8, 10, 26, 30 + + Human rights movements. See Dissident + movements. + Humphrey, Hubert H., 47, 158 + Hungary + Annual policy/resource assessments, 139 + Dissident movements, 5, 26, 136, + 139 + Emigration policies, 163, 172 + Foreign policy, 30 + Human rights, 136, 173 + Party Congress (1980), 167, 168, + 172 + Romanian relations with, 196, + 213 + Soviet relations with, 5, 169, 170, + 172 + State Department overview papers, 172 + U.S. international broadcasting program, 49, 67 + U.S. relations with + Aaron-Nagy meetings, 171 + Administration transition period (1980–81), 175, 176 + Bergold memoranda, 175 + Brzezinski-Huszar meetings, 166 + Carter oral message, 159 + Crown of St. Stephen + Andrews memoranda, 136 + Brzezinski memoranda, 143, 144, 154 + Hartman memoranda, 141 + Hartman-Nagy discussions, 138 + Hunter memoranda, 137 + Hyland/Hunter memoranda, 140 + Joint communique+a7, 160 + Jordan memoranda, 153 + Kaiser-Kadar discussions, 159 + Kaiser-Losonczi discussions, 145 + Kaiser-Puja discussions, 151 + King memoranda, 148, 157 + Mudd memoranda, 139 + Nimetz memoranda, 155 + NSC papers, + 18 + Oakar communications, 160, 161 + Presidential Directive NSC–21 on, 16 + Property issues, 139 + Reactions to return of, 152 + State Department papers, 11 + Tarnoff memoranda, 146 + Vance memoranda, 142, 150, 156, 158 + Vance-Puja discussions, 147 + + + Iran hostage crisis and, 36, 171, 172 + Polish crisis (1980) and, + 44, 174, 175, 176 + + Ridgway-Esztergalyos meetings, 173 + Scientific/cultural exchanges, 139, 162 + Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and, 36, 167, 169, 170, 171, 172, 175 + State Department papers, 11 + U.S. differentiated policy structure and, 4, 16, + 44, 139, 163, 167, 172, 174, 175 + U.S.-Soviet relations and, 139, 145 + + + U.S. trade with + Bergold memoranda, 175 + Grain diversion, 169, + 170 + Hartman-Nagy discussions, 138 + Kaiser memoranda, 167 + Most Favored Nation status, 164 + + Hartman-Nagy discussions, 138 + Hunter memoranda, 137 + Kaiser-Kadar discussions, 159 + Kaiser-Losonczi discussions, 145 + King memoranda, 148 + Mudd memoranda, 139 + Presidential Directive NSC-21 on, 16 + State Department papers, 11 + Vance memoranda, 149, 163 + Vance-Puja discussions, 162 + + + NSC papers, 18 + State Department papers, 11 + + + + + Hunter, Robert + Hungary, 137, 140, 143, + 144, 161 + U.S. differentiated policy structure, 6, 14 + U.S. international broadcasting program, 53, 75 + Yugoslavia, 239, 248, 257, + 261, 263, 266 + + Huntington, Samuel P., 21, 22, 39 + Hurlbert, Gordon C., 271 + Husak, Gustav, 5, 104, 108 + Huszar, Istvan, 166, 167 + Hyland, William G. + Hungary, 140, 143, 144 + Romania, 180 + U.S. international broadcasting program, 45, 52 + U.S. policy toward Eastern Europe, 1, 6 + + + + Ieurnca, Virgiliu, 58 + Ilic, Col. Bozidar, 261 + Inderfurth, Rick, 9, 57, 61, 144 + Indra, Alois, 108 + Inouye, Daniel K., 31 + Intelligence Assessments + “Hungary on the Eve of the 12th Party Congress,” 168 + PA–79–10354, “The Czechoslovak + Leadership,” 108 + + Intelligence Information Cables, DB–315/04475–78, “Appraisal of Situation Goals and Problems + of Ceausescu’s Romania on the Eve of his Fourth Visit to the United + States,” 193 + Intelligence Information Special Reports, U.S. international + broadcasting program, 58 + Intelligence Memoranda, RP 77-10060, + “Dissident Activity in East Europe An Overview,” 5 + Inter-Balkan Conference (1976), 88 + Interagency Group on Europe, 36 + International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), 247, 249, 251, 252 + International Communications Agency (ICA), 61, 63, 68, 70 + International Monetary Fund (IMF), 36, + 234 + International Nuclear Fuel Cycle Evaluation (INFCE), 247 + Ionel, Vasile, 223 + Ionescu, Nicolae, 217, 222, 226, 233 + Ionita, Gen. Ion, 213 + Iran hostage crisis + State Department papers, 36 + U.S.-Bulgarian relations with and, 36 + U.S.-Hungarian relations and, 36, + 171, 172 + U.S. international broadcasting program and, 37, 67, + 68 + U.S. presidential elections (1980) + and, 279 + U.S.-Romanian relations and, 36, + 219, 221, 226, 229, 273 + Yugoslav responses, 273, 288, 290, + 294, 295 + + Iran-Iraq War, 299 + Iranian Revolution, 61, 70, 71, 72 + Israel (see also Arab-Israeli conflict), + 73, 183 + Italy, 258 + + + Jablonsky, 107, 112, 113 + Jackovich, Victor, 295, 296 + + Jackson, Henry M. (“Scoop”), 99, 163, 195, 226 + Jackson-Vanik Amendment + Bulgarian Most Favored Nation status and, 11 + Czechoslovakian Most Favored Nation status and, 11, 116 + German Democratic Republic Most Favored Nation status and, + 125 + Hungarian Most Favored Nation status and, 11, 16, + 137, 149 + Romanian Most Favored Nation status and, 11, 177, + 180, 197, 215 + Waivers extension, 165 + + Jagielski, Mieczyslaw, 38 + Jakes, Milos, 108 + Jakubec, Jaroslav, 99, 101 + Jaroszewicz, Piotr, 5 + Jaukovic, Col. Djordje, 261 + Javits, Jacob K., 163, 195 + Jenkins, Kempton, 97, 109, 141 + Jewish community. See American Jewish + community. + Joetze, Gunter, 56 + Johanes, Jaromir, 99, 100, 101, 104, 107, 112 + John Paul II, 27, 35, 38 + Johnson, Darryl N., 254 + Johnson Act (1934), 136 + Jojic, Branka, 244 + Jordan, Hamilton, 48, 144, 153 + + + Kadar, Janos + Crown of St. Stephen, 159 + Foreign policy, 30, 142 + Human rights, 5, 136 + Most Favored Nation status, 159 + Political situation, 139, 168, 172, + 175 + + Kadenic, Col. Gen., 258 + Kahout, Pavel, 105 + Kaiser, Herbert, 219 + Kaiser, Philip M. + Hungarian Most Favored Nation status, 145, 149, 159, 162, + 164 + Hungary’s Crown of St. Stephen, 145, 146, 147, 148, + 150, 151, 156, 157, 159 + Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, 167 + + Kalugin, Oleg, 86 + Kania, Stanislaw, 42, 44 + Kant, Hermann, 133 + Kapek, Antonin, 108 + Kaplan, Philip S., 101, 124, 196 + Kaplan, Robert D., 88 + Kardelj, Edvard, 236, 243, 244, 269 + Katz, Julius L., 141 + Kempny, Josef, 108 + Kennedy, Edward M., 195, 263, 264 + Keszthely, Tibor, 147 + Khomeini, Ayatollah Ruhollah, 70 + Khrushchev, Nikita, 26 + Kimmitt, Robert + Romania, 223, 224, 228 + Yugoslavia, 266, 268, 286, + 287, 291, 297 + + King, John, 229 + King, Robert R. + Czechoslovakia, 103 + Hungary, 148, 149, 152, + 154, 156, 157, 160 + Romania, 186, 188, 195, + 199, 200, 202, 204 + U.S. policy toward Eastern Europe, 10, 18, 25 + + Kiralythe, Be+a7la, 152 + Kirilenko, Andrei P., 108 + Kirkland, Lane, 68, 75 + Kissinger, Henry A., 54, 103, 235 + Klutznick, Philip M., 226 + Knezevic, Rajko, 260 + Knoche, E. Henry, 1 + Kohler, Foy D., 47 + Kohout, Pavel, 5, 106 + Kohoutova, Teresa, 106 + Kolakowski, Leszek, 26 + Kolisevski, Lazar, 227, 283, 288, 290, 295, 296 + Korea + U.S.-Romanian discussions, 198, + 203 + U.S.-Yugoslav communications, 238, 239, 243, 244, + 251, 252, 253, 254 + + Kostic, Petar, 288, 298 + Kostov, Vladimir, 86 + Kosygin, Alexei, 108 + Kovalev, Sergey, 8 + Kral, Richard, 106 + Kramer, Frank, 230 + Kreisberg, Paul H., 10, 231 + Kreps, Juanita M., 13, 177 + Kriegel, Frantisek, 8 + Krsko nuclear reactor (Yugoslavia), 249, + 251, 252, + 254, 271, + 273 + Krunic, Capt. Peter, 261 + Kukan, Eduard, 99 + Kuklinski, Col. Ryszard, 42 + Kulikov, Marshal Viktor, 210 + Kuron, Jacek, 26 + + + + Lake, W. Anthony, 30, 101, 195, 196, 234, 277 + Lance, Bert, 1, 13, 16, 46 + Landovsky, Pavel, 105 + Lapidus, Gail, 68 + Larrabee, Stephen + Bulgaria, 93 + Czechoslovakia, 27, 111, 113, + 115 + Dissident movements, 37 + German Democratic Republic, 124, + 128, 132 + Hungary, 166, 171 + Romania + Blumenthal visit, 210, + 211 + Brzezinski-Andrei meetings, 206, 208 + Horodinca defection case, 222 + Mondale-Burtica meetings, 226 + Most Favored Nation status, 214, 215, 216 + U.S. military sales proposals, 223, 224, 228, 230, 231 + + U.S. differentiated policy structure, 27 + U.S. international broadcasting program, 72, 73, + 75, 79 + Yugoslavia + Carter visit (1980), 294, 295, 296 + Military cooperation, 270 + Post-Tito contingency planning, 276, 278, 280 + Tito funeral delegation, 280, 282 + U.S. economic aid, 298 + U.S. military sales, 266, 268, 270, 276, 285, 286, 287, 297 + + + Lazar, Gyorgy, 162 + Lazarevic, Borislav, 244 + Lederer, Jiri, 100 + Lekai, Cardinal Laszlo, 156, 157, 158, 172 + Lenart, Jozef, 108 + Ler, Leopold, 108 + Lipshutz, Robert, 199 + Litynski, Jan, 106 + Ljubicic, Gen. Nikola + Benson visit (1979), 271 + Post-Tito political situation and, 269, 273, 283, 288, + 294 + U.S. military sales, 245, 246, 258, + 280, 285, 297 + U.S.-Yugoslav intelligence cooperation, 259, 260 + + Loncar, Budimir + Carter visit (1980), 295, 296 + Human rights, 299 + Mondale meetings, 293 + Post-Tito transition, 280, 289 + U.S. economic aid to Yugoslavia, 288, 292, 298 + U.S.-Yugoslav intelligence cooperation, 260 + + Long, Clarence, 181 + Long, Russell B., 96, 97, 98, 101, 102, 103, 109, 114 + Losonczi, Pa+a7l, 145 + Lovetinsky, Cestmir, 108 + Lovinescu, Monica, 58, 188, 208 + Lowenstein, James G., 137 + Ludviger, Emil, 244 + Luers, William H. + Czechoslovakia, 99, 100, 101, + 102 + Hungary, 149, 150 + Romania, 184, 188, 192, + 195, 196, 201 + U.S. covert publications program, 17 + U.S. international broadcasting program, 53 + U.S. policy toward Eastern Europe, 22, 94 + Yugoslavia, 244, 254 + + Lukanov, Andrei, 94 + Lukazewicz, Jerzy, 38 + Lyet, Paul, 113 + + + MacGregor, Clark, 47 + Macovescu, George, 179, 185, 187, 188, 189 + Maksic, Malivoj, 251 + Mamula, Adm. Branko, 273 + Manescu, Manea, 210 + Marchais, Georges, 243 + Marcuse, Gisela, 127 + Marev, Spas Iordanov, 83, 85 + Mareva, Ivanka Atanasova, 83, 85 + Marinescu, Teodor, 209, 218 + Mark, David E., 70 + Markoe, Frank, Jr., 48 + Markotic, Mirko, 299 + Markov, Georgi, 86, 87, 88 + Markovic, Dragoslav, 256, 296, 301 + Marshall, Ray, 13 + Matescu, Radu, 229 + Mathews, Jessica Tuchman, 257, 263 + Matic, Vladimir, 244, 254 + Maynes, Charles W., 218 + McAuliffe, Eugene V., 136 + McCormack, 277 + + McGiffert, David E., 245, 258, 267, 285, 286 + McGovern, George, 47, 48, 158, 159 + McIntyre, James T., 59, 60, 63, 71 + McVadon, Cmdr. Eric A., 245, 258, 261 + Mecca hostage incident (Nov. 1979), 70 + Meehan, Francis J., 43, 53, 107, 112, 113, 114 + Merry, Wayne, 135 + Meyer-Landrut, Nikolaus, 55 + Michnik, Adam, 106 + Middle East. See Arab-Israeli + conflict. + Mihajlov, Mihajlo, 5, 8 + Mijatovic, Cvijetin, 288, 290, 294, 295, 296, 298, 301 + Mikulic, Branko, 273, 283 + Miller, G. William, 288, 292, 293, 298 + Al-Min, Imam Khalil, 68 + Mindszenty, Jo+a7zsef, 136, 159 + Minic, Milos + Carter visit (1980), 296 + Mondale visit (1977), 236 + Post-Tito political situation and, 269, 273, 283, 294, + 301 + Post-Tito transition, 288 + Tito U.S. visit (1978), 254 + Yugoslav military transfers to Ethiopia, 237 + + Mitchell, George H., 209 + Mitran, Mircea, 208, 209, 211 + Mladenov, Petur, 84, 85, 87, 91, 92, 94 + Mlynar, Zdenek, 26 + Modzelewski, Karol, 26 + Mondale, Joan, 82, 83, 93, 265 + Mondale, Walter F. + Bulgaria, 82 + Export controls, 13 + Hungary, 152, 157 + Romania, 186, 187, 188, + 226, 227 + U.S. differentiated policy structure, 16 + U.S. international broadcasting program, 74 + U.S. policy review, 1 + Yugoslavia + Carter-Kardelj meetings, 244 + Kolisevski meetings, 290 + Loncar meetings, 293 + Markovic meetings, 256 + Tito funeral delegation, 288, 290 + U.S. economic aid, 298 + U.S. military sales, 236, 240, 242 + Visit (1977), 235, 236 + + + Moore, Frank, 152 + Moore, John L., Jr., 252 + Moore, Patrick, 213 + Morse, David, 94 + Moscow Olympics boycott, 67 + Moses, Alfred, 215 + Mudd, Clayton, 136, 138, 139, 149 + Murphy, John T., 47 + Muskie, Edmund S. + Arab-Israeli conflict, 229 + Hungary, 173 + Polish crisis (1980), 38, 44 + Romania, 228, 231, 233 + U.S. international broadcasting program, 67 + Yugoslavia, 291, 292, 293, + 294, 299 + + Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction (MBFR) talks, 1, 162, 166, 193, 216, 226, 252 + Mutual Defense Assistance Control Act (Battle Act), 230 + + + Nagy, Ferenc + Administration transition period (1980–81), 176 + Brzezinski-Huszar meetings, 166 + Crown of St. Stephen, 136, 138, 146, + 151, 152 + Kadar U.S. visit proposals, 175 + Most Favored Nation status, 138, + 162 + Ridgway meetings, 173 + + Naimsky, Piotr, 106 + National Foreign Intelligence Center Memoranda, R PM 79–10075, “Could Bulgaria Go the Way of + Romania?,” 90 + National Intelligence Estimates, NIE 15–79, + “Prospects for Post-Tito Yugoslavia,” 269, + 273 + National Security Decision Memoranda (NSDM), NSDM 212, “Economic Policies for the Eastern + European Countries,” 94 + National Security Study Memoranda (NSSM), NSSM 245, “President’s Report to Congress Concerning + International Broadcast Facilities,” 45 + New International Economic Order (NIEO), 198, 226 + Newhouse, John, 6 + Newsom, David D. + Czechoslovakia, 114 + Romania, 220, 234 + + U.S. international broadcasting program, 61, 70 + Yugoslavia, 254, 259, 263, + 267, 271, 295, 296, 299 + + Nicolae, Nicolae M. + Arab-Israeli conflict, 188 + Begin visit (1977), 184 + Carter-Macovescu meetings, 187 + Carter-Pungan meetings, 177 + Ceausescu U.S. visit (1978), 200, 204 + Ceausescu visit proposals, 188 + Dissident repression, 179 + Rauta case, 195 + + Nier, Kurt, 123, 127, 128, 129, 130, 131 + Niklas, Manfred, 122 + Nimetz, Matthew + Bulgaria, 84, 88, 92, 94 + Czechoslovakia, 97, 103, 104, + 109 + Hungary + Crown of St. Stephen, 141, 147, 150, 152, 155, 157, 159 + Most Favored Nation status, 149, 162, 164 + + Romania + Dissident repression, 179 + Emigration issues, 217 + Most Favored Nation status, 185, 214, 215 + Norfolk port access, 218 + Pacepa defection case, 207 + Rauta case, 195 + U.S. military sales proposals, 228, 231 + Vance-Andrei meetings, 209 + Vance visit plans (1979), + 219 + + U.S. differentiated policy structure, 10, 14 + Yugoslavia, 254, 285, 286, + 299 + + Nixon, Richard M., 189, 197, 271 + Non-aligned movement (NAM), 236, 243, 251, 252, 255, 256, 273, 288, 294, 296 + Nordhaus, William D., 6 + North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), 10 + North-South relations, 39, 201, 252, 295 + Nosenzo, Louis V., 254 + Novotny, Antonin, 26 + Nowak, Jan, 57, 78 + Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), 247, 251 + Nyerges, Janos, 149 + + + Oakar, Mary Rose, 140, 142, 152, 155, 158, 160, 161 + Oancea, Constantin, 222, 229 + Obst, Harry, 122 + Odom, Brig. Gen. William, 21, 22, 39, 61, 72, 75 + O’Donahue, Daniel, 223, 230, 231 + Office of Management and Budget, U.S., 57, 60, 72, + 74, 75, 78 + Ogaden War. See Horn of Africa. + Okun, Herbert S., 135 + Olszowski, Stefan, 5 + O’Neill, Thomas “Tip,” 156, 158, 167, 237 + Oprea, Gheorghe, 200, 204 + Orleans, Leo, 68 + Orlov, Yuri F., 10 + Orlov Committee, 7 + Orlove, Yuriy, 3 + Ornest, Ota, 100 + Owen, Henry D., 6, 263 + Owens, Carol, 82 + + + Pacepa, Gen. Ion Mihai, 27, 205, 206, 207, 208, 209, 210 + Pacoste, Cornel, 195, 218, 219 + Paczkowski, Andrzej, 42 + Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO). See Arab-Israeli conflict. + Palmer, Stephen, Jr., 277 + Pastore, John, 47 + Patocka, Jan, 5, 110 + Pavlicek, Frantisek, 100 + Pekic, Gen., 272 + Pelikan, Jiri, 3, 100 + Pell, Claiborne, 158, 264 + Percy, Charles H., 47, 48 + Pernick, Irwin, 261 + Perry, Jack R., 44, 92, 95 + Pesic, Branko, 264, 265 + Petkovic, Radivoje, 244 + Petnicki, Zvonimir, 254 + Petran, Janos, 171 + Petrovich, Michael, 254 + Plyushch, Leonid, 3, 8 + Poland (see also Polish crisis (1980)) + Dissident movements, 3, 5, 8, 26, 105, + 106, 110 + Economic situation, 26, 30, 38 + International Monetary Fund membership, 36 + John Paul II visit (1979), 35 + Political situation, 5, 9, 40 + + Soviet policy toward (see also + under Polish crisis (1980), + 5, 9 + U.S. covert publications program, 3 + U.S. economic aid, 43, 44 + U.S. international broadcasting program, 49, 67 + U.S. relations with + Carter visit (1977), 18 + CCC credits, 18, 25, 27, 43, 44 + State Department papers, 11 + U.S. differentiated policy structure and, 4, 16 + + + Polansky, Sol, 117 + Policy Review Committee (PRC), 1, 4, 6 + Polish crisis (1980), 38, 40 + + Christopher memoranda, 41 + German Democratic Republic and, 44, 135 + Soviet policy toward Eastern Europe and, 41, 42, + 43, 44, 135, 233, 300 + Soviet VOA jamming and, 79 + U.S.-Hungarian relations and, 44, + 174, 175, 176 + U.S. international broadcasting program and, 67 + U.S.-Romanian discussions, 232, + 233 + U.S.-Yugoslav discussions, 299, + 300 + + Popa, Dumitru, 213 + Popov, Zdravko, 83 + Popovic, Maj. Gen. Sveta, 258, 261 + Porter, Elsa A., 124 + Potocar, Gen., 245 + Powell, Jody, 37 + Prague Spring (1968), 26, 105, 108, 182, 260 + Presidential Directives + NSC–21, “Policy toward Eastern Europe” (see also U.S. differentiated policy + structure), 16, 18, 25 + PD–13, “Conventional Arms Transfer + Policy,” 240 + PD–30, “Human Rights,” 196 + PD–41, “U.S. Civil Defense Policy,” + 39 + PD–50, “Arms Control Decision + Process,” 39 + PD–53, “National Security + Communication Strategy,” 39 + PD–57, “Mobilization Planning,” + 39 + PD–58, “Continuity of Government,” + 39 + PD–59, “Nuclear Weapons Employment + Policy,” 39 + + Presidential Review Committee, 4, 14 + Presidential Review Memoranda + NSC–9, Comprehensive Review of European Issues, 1, 4, 6, 11, 18, 25 + NSC–31, “Export Control of U.S. Technology,” 13 + PRM/NSC–10, “Comprehensive Net Assessment and Military + Force Posture Review,” 39 + + Press, Frank, 13 + Puerto Rico, 85, 252 + Puja, Frigyes, 147, 149, 151, 157, 158, 162, 173 + Pullai, Arpad, 139 + Pungan, Vasile + Arab-Israeli conflict, 18, 187, 190, + 191 + Carter meetings, 177 + Ceausescu U.S. visit (1978), 200, 204 + Human rights, 192 + Rauta case, 195 + + Pustay, Lt. Gen. John, 70, 278 + Putnam, Robert, 259 + + + + Quandt, William B., 25, 61, 187 + Quinn, Thomas H., 47 + + + Raceanu, Mircea, 229 + Rackmales, Robert, 121, 182 + Radakovic, Gen., 245 + Radio Free Europe. See U.S. international + broadcasting program. + Radio Liberty. See U.S. international + broadcasting program. + Radulescu, Ilie, 213 + Al-Rahman, Fazl, 68 + Raicevic, Col., 261 + Rakosi, Matyas, 26 + Rakowska-Harmstone, Teresa, 68 + Ranghet, Boris, 219, 226, 233 + Rauta, Constantin, 192, 195, 196, 202 + Read, Ben, 281 + Reagan, Ronald (see also Administration + transition period (1980–81)), 78 + Reese, Bill, 75 + Reinhardt, John E. + Bulgaria, 82 + Soviet propaganda broadcasting, 66 + U.S. international broadcasting program, 61, 63, + 68, 70, 71, 79 + + + Rentschler, James M. T., 93, 263, 265, 294 + Resor, Stanley R., 258, 259 + Reston, James (“Scotty”), 251 + Revel, Jean-Francois, 193 + Revesz, Miklos, 176 + Ribicoff, Abraham A., 163, 173, 195 + Ridgway, Rozanne L., 41, 173, 229, 232, 233, 234 + Ringleb, Paul, 122 + Roberts, Walter, 47, 53, 55, 62, 78 + Roche, Col. William, 258, 261 + Roche, John P., 47 + Rockefeller, David, 288, 293, 294, 295, 296 + Rohr, David, 215 + Romania (see also Romania and Arab-Israeli + conflict) + Annual policy/resource assessment, 178 + China, People’s Republic of, relations with, 198, 203, + 205, 206, 208 + Dissident movements, 5, 26, 177, + 179, 188, 193, 194 + Earthquake (1977), 179, 182 + Emigration policy + Aaron-Bogdan discussions, 216 + American Jewish community discussions, 214, 215, 216, 217 + Annual policy/resource assessment, 178 + Brzezinski-Andrei discussions, 208 + Brzezinski memoranda, 197 + Carter-Pungan discussions, 177 + Ceausescu visit (1978) + discussions, 197, 202, 203 + Derian-Pungan discussions, 192 + Goldberg memoranda, 199 + Rauta case, 192, 195, 196, 202 + Ridgway-Bogdan discussions, 233 + Vance-Andrei discussions, 209 + + Family reunification cases, 192, + 195 + Foreign policy, 30, 178, 193, + 210, 211, 225 + Horodinca defection case, 222 + Human rights (see also Emigration + policy above) + Andrews memoranda, 195 + Annual policy/resource assessment, 178 + Ceausescu visit (1978) + discussions, 189, 192, 195, 196, 198, 199 + Christopher memoranda, 179 + CIA papers, 26, 194 + Intelligence Memoranda, 5 + Vance-Macovescu discussions, 188 + World Bank/IMF loans and, 234 + + Hungarian relations with, 196, + 213 + Journalist treatment, 179 + Magyar minority, 193, 194, 196, + 213, 225 + Pacepa defection case, 27, 205, 206, + 207, 208, 209, 210 + Polish crisis (1980) and, 44, 232, + 233 + Political situation, 178, 182, 193, + 194, 213, 225, 232 + Soviet relations with, 178, 193, 205, + 206, 210, 211, 212, 225 + U.S. international broadcasting program, 49, 58, + 67, 188, 193, 208 + U.S. military sales proposals, 223, 224, 228, 230, + 231 + U.S. relations with + Annual policy/resource assessment, 178 + Blumenthal visit, 210, + 211 + Brzezinski-Andrei meetings, 206, 208 + Carter-Ceausescu correspondence, 177, 186, 221, 226, 229 + Carter-Macovescu meetings, 187 + Carter-Pungan meetings, 177 + Ceausescu visit (1978) + Brzezinski memoranda, 181, 197 + Carter-Ceausescu meetings, 200, 203, 204 + Goldberg memoranda, 199 + Inter-Agency Working Group discussions, 189 + Rauta case and, 195, 196 + Vance-Andrei meetings, 201, 202 + Vance/Brzezinski-Ceausescu meetings, 201 + Vance-Macovescu discussions, 188 + Vance memoranda, 198 + Vest/Derian/Lake memoranda, 196 + Vest memoranda, 192 + + Iran hostage crisis and, 36, 219, 221, 226, 229, 273 + Mondale-Burtica meetings, 226 + Mondale-Patan meetings, 186 + Newsom visit, 220, 221 + + NSC papers, 18 + Ridgway-Andrei meetings, 229 + Ridgway-Bogdan meetings, 232, 233 + Scientific/cultural exchanges, 189 + Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and, 36, 219, 220, 221, 226, 227, 229 + Special emissary (1978), + 205 + State Department papers, 11 + U.S. differentiated policy structure and, 4, 16, + 178, 226 + U.S.-Soviet relations and, 178, 189, 200, 216 + Vance-Andrei meetings, 209, 218 + Vance visit plans (1979), + 218, 219, 220 + + U.S. relief aid, 179, 181 + U.S. trade with + Credits, 192, 197, 198, 202 + Export controls + Brzezinski-Andrei discussions, 208 + Carter-Pungan discussions, 177 + Ceausescu visit (1978) discussions, 189, 192, 198, 202, 204 + Vance-Andrei discussions, 209, 218 + + Most Favored Nation status + Aaron-Bogdan discussions, 216 + American Jewish community discussions, 217 + Barnes memoranda, 185 + Blumenthal visit discussions, 211 + Brzezinski memoranda, 180, 197 + Carter-Pungan discussions, 177 + Ceausescu visit (1978) discussions, 189, 197, 203 + Kreps-Pungan discussions, 177 + Larrabee memoranda, 214, 215 + Mondale-Burtica discussions, 226 + Ridgway-Bogdan discussions, 233 + State Department papers, 11 + + Norfolk port access, 36, + 218, 226 + + World Bank/IMF loans, 189, 196, 234 + + Romania and Arab-Israeli conflict + Begin Romania visit (1977), 183, 184 + Brzezinski-Andrei discussions, 208 + Carter-Ceausescu correspondence, 226 + Carter-Macovescu discussions, 187 + Ceausescu visit (1978) discussions, + 200, 203 + Newsom-Ceausescu discussions, 221 + Ridgway-Andrei discussions, 229 + Ridgway-Bogdan discussions, 233 + Vance-Andrei discussions, 209 + Vance-Macovescu discussions, 188 + Vance-Pungan discussions, 190 + Warsaw Pact PCC meeting and, 210 + + Ronai, Rudolf, 136 + Rose, Harald, 122 + Rousselot, John H., 136 + Ruhfus, Jürgen, 51, 54, 55 + Rywkin, Michael, 68 + + + Sakharov, Andrey, 5, 8, 37 + Sandenberg, Ronaldo, 30 + Sanders, Edward, 75 + Sarbanes, Paul S., 195 + Saudi Arabia, 70, 73 + Saunders, Harold H., 17, 190, 221 + Scanlan, John D., 267, 273 + Schaufele, William, 38 + Schecter, Jerrold, 137, 200, 204 + Schlesinger, James R., 13 + Schmidt, Carl W. + Bulgaria, 88, 94 + Czechoslovakia, 101, 102, 107, + 109, 113, 114 + Hungary, 136, 149 + Romania, 209, 215, 218, + 230 + + Schmidt, Helmut, 38, 51, 52, 53, 54, 56, 67 + Schneider, Mark, 234 + Schneider, Rolf, 131 + Schueler, Manfred, 52, 53 + Schultze, Charles L., 1, 13, 16 + Schulze, Richard, 217 + Scott, David, 97, 98 + Seabury, Paul, 78, 80 + Seitz, Raymond, 292 + Shahi, Agha, 229 + Shcharanskiy, Anatoly B., 10, 37, 256 + Sheehy, Ann, 68 + Shenefield, John, 70 + Shorish, Mobin, 68 + Shub, Tony, 62 + Shulman, Marshall D., 22, 280, 281 + Sick, Capt. Gary, 61, 72, 75, 78 + Siddiqui, Muzammil, 68 + Sieber, Rolf, 117, 118, 122 + + Siena, James, 231, 258, 261, 270, 278, 285, 287 + Silins, Ints M., 179, 184, 192, 196 + Sindjelic, Vladimir, 254, 270, 293, 294 + Sinyavskiy, Andrei, 26 + Slocombe, Walter, 14 + Sloss, Leon, 6 + Smith, Lt. Gen. William Y., 6 + Solomon, Anthony M., 109 + Solzhentisyn, Aleksandr, 3, 8 + Somalia. See Horn of Africa. + Sonnenfeldt, Helmut, 18, 21 + Southern Africa, 235, 236, 252 + Soviet invasion of Afghanistan + Henze memoranda, 37 + Post-Tito contingency planning and, 274, 277, 288 + Tito funeral delegation and, 279, 280, 281 + U.S.-German Democratic Republic relations and, 134 + U.S.-Hungarian relations and, 36, + 167, 169, 170, 171, 172, + 175 + U.S. international broadcasting program and, 67, 74, + 78 + U.S. military sales to Yugoslavia and, 286 + U.S. presidential elections (1980) + and, 279 + U.S.-Romanian relations and, 36, + 219, 220, 221, 226, 227, + 229 + U.S.-Soviet relations and, 36, + 39, 219, 288 + Yugoslav responses, 288, 290, 294, + 295, 298, 299 + + Soviet policy toward Eastern Europe + German Democratic Republic and, 124 + Intelligence community papers, 9 + Intelligence Memoranda, 5 + “Perspectives” guidance, 8 + Polish crisis (1980) and, 41, 42, + 43, 44, 135, 233, 300 + Prague Spring (1968), 26, 105, + 108, 182, 260 + State Department papers, 30, 36 + + Soviet Union + Bulgarian relations with, 88, + 90, 94, 95 + Czech relations with, 108, 116 + Dissident movements, 3, 5, 8, 26, 256 + German Democratic Republic relations with, 133 + Hungarian relations with, 5, 169, 170, + 172 + Political situation, 26, 27, 35 + Propaganda broadcasting, 65, 66, 77 + Romanian relations with, 178, + 193, 205, 206, 210, 211, + 212, 225 + U.S. covert publications program, 3, 28 + U.S. international broadcasting program, 49, 70 + Yugoslav relations with (see also + Post-Tito contingency planning under + Yugoslavia), 139, 238, 243, + 244, 252, 273, 296, 301 + + Special Activities Working Group (SAWG), 2, 17 + Special Coordination Committee (SCC), 2, + 23, 70, 169, 276, 277, 278 + Specter, George, 215 + Spiers, Ronald I., 42 + Stambolic, Petar, 273 + Stanishev, Dimitur, 81 + Stanton, Frank, 47, 48 + Starcevic, Svetozar, 244, 254 + Starr, Joyce, 199 + Stefanescu, Serban, 58 + Stetkevych, Jaroslav, 68 + Stevenson, Adlai E., III, 22, 189 + Stivers, Ronald H., 70 + Stoddart, Jonathan D., 110 + Stoessel, Walter J., Jr., 50, 51, 52, 54, 55, 56 + Stojicic, Lt. Col. Gen., 245 + Strategic Arms Limitation (SALT) talks + Odom memoranda, 39 + State Department papers, 10 + U.S.-German Democratic Republic discussions, 118 + U.S.-Hungarian discussions, 162, + 166, 176 + U.S.-Yugoslav discussions, 244, + 245, 246, 252, 295 + + Strauss, Peter, 69 + Strougal, Lubomir, 108, 109 + Suddarth, Roscoe S., 221 + Suslov, Mikhail, 42 + + + Taft, Robert, 47 + Talisman, Mark, 215 + Tarnoff, Peter R. + Bulgaria, 93 + Czechoslovakia, 109 + + German Democratic Republic, 132, + 134 + Hungary, 146, 150, 170, + 171 + Romania, 207, 220 + U.S. international broadcasting program, 52, 53, + 63 + U.S. policy toward Eastern Europe, 11, 36 + Yugoslavia, 239, 240, 247, + 248, 276, 284, 292 + + Thatcher, Margaret, 38 + Thomas, Helen, 195 + Thompson, Frank, 136 + Thornton, Thomas, 61, 75 + Tigrid, Pavel, 100 + Timofei, Ion, 226 + Tito, Josip Broz + Carter correspondence, 236, 239, 243, + 251, 290 + Funeral of, 279, 280, 281, + 282, 288, 290 + Harriman meetings, 256 + Mondale visit (1977), 236 + Political situation, Scanlan memoranda, 273 + Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, 290 + U.S. visit (1978), 153, 249, + 250, 251, 252, 254, 255 + + Toon, Malcolm, 211 + Trade Act (1974) (see + also Jackson-Vanik Amendment), 96, + 98, 101, 102, 109 + Trattner, John H., 125 + Treverton, Gregory F. + Belgrade CSCE meeting (1977), 10 + Hungary, 144 + Romania, 181 + U.S. international broadcasting program, 53, 54 + U.S. policy toward Eastern Europe, 4, 6, 7, 10, 14, 15 + Yugoslavia, 238, 239, 242, + 244 + + Trifa, Valerian, 69 + Tsvetkov, Boris, 84, 85, 88, 89, 94 + Tuch, Hans, 70 + Tumminia, Frank, 226, 229, 231 + Turner, Adm. Stansfield + Export controls, 13 + U.S. covert dissident support programs, 19 + U.S. covert publications program, 20, 28, 29, 32, + 34 + U.S. international broadcasting program, 71 + U.S. policy toward Eastern Europe, 6, 14, 16 + Yugoslavia, 260 + + Turturea, Nicolae, 229 + Tverdokhlebov, Andrey, 3, 8 + + + Ukraine, 3 + Ulbricht, Walter, 121, 133 + UN Special Session on Disarmament (SSOD), 189, 198, 204, 252 + United Kingdom, 109, 113, 281 + U.S. covert dissident support programs, 3, + 8, 19, 26, 37 + U.S. covert publications program + CIA papers, 3 + Henze memoranda, 17, 20, 29, + 32, 34, 37 + Special Activities Working Group discussions, 2, 17 + Special Coordination Committee discussions, 2, 23 + Turner memoranda, 28 + + U.S. differentiated policy structure + Administration transition period (1980–81), 176 + Bulgaria and, 16, 83, 91, + 94 + Hungary and, 4, 16, 44, 139, 163, + 167, 172, 174, 175 + Larrabee memoranda, 27 + NSC–9 on, 1, 4 + NSC papers, 18 + Policy Review Committee discussions, 6, 7, 15 + Polish crisis (1980) and, 41, 43, + 44, 174, 175 + Presidential Directive NSC–21 on, 16, 18, + 25 + Presidential Review Committee discussions, 14 + Romania and, 4, 16, 178, 226 + Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and, 36 + State Department papers, 10, 11, 36 + Treverton memoranda, 10 + + U.S. foreign trade + Export controls (see also under + Romania), 12, 13, 36, 39 + Jackson-Vanik Amendment waivers extension, 165 + State Department papers, 11 + + U.S. human rights policy + Carter nomination acceptance speech (1980), 173 + + Detente and, 139 + Dissident movements and, 5, 26, 96, + 100, 101 + Emigration issues and, 178 + Policy Review Committee papers, 4 + State Department papers, 11 + U.S.-German Democratic Republic discussions, 123, 127 + U.S.-Yugoslav discussions, 256 + World Bank/IMF loans to Romania and, 234 + + U.S. international broadcasting program + Administration transition period (1980–81), 80 + Board for International Broadcasting tensions, 62 + Brzezinski memoranda, 45, 46, 48, + 52, 59, 60 + Budget cuts, 57, 59, 60 + Cherne memoranda, 76 + Christopher memoranda, 53 + CIA papers, 3 + Gronouski BIB chair appointment, 47, 48 + Henze memoranda, 37, 47, 57, + 61, 62, 63, 69 + Holzkirchen modernization proposals, 51, 52, 53, 54, + 55, 56 + Intelligence Information Special Reports, 58 + Morton memoranda, 116 + Muslim audiences, 68, 70, 71, + 72, 73, 74, 75, 77, 78 + Persian-language broadcasting, 61, 64, 70 + Policy Review Committee discussions, 6 + Policy Review Committee papers, 4 + Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty office relocation + proposals, 49, 50, 67 + Romania, 49, 58, 67, 188, 193, + 208 + Soviet jamming, 79 + Soviet propaganda broadcasting and, 65, 66, 77 + Special Coordination Committee discussions, 70 + U.S. covert dissident support programs and, 37 + U.S.-Federal Republic of Germany discussions, 51, 52, + 54 + Voice of America expansion proposals, 63, 64 + + U.S. policy toward Eastern Europe (see also + U.S. differentiated policy structure) + Annual policy/resource assessments, 139, 178 + U.S.-Soviet relations and, 11, + 21, 22, 36, 39 + Vance Budapest statement (1978), + 94 + + U.S. presidential elections (1980), 78, 279 + U.S.-Soviet relations + Carter speech (July 1977), 118, 238 + Detente + Dissident movements and, Intelligence Memoranda, + 5 + State Department papers, 11 + U.S.-Hungarian discussions, 166 + U.S.-Hungarian relations and, 139, 145 + U.S.-Yugoslav discussions, 251, 255, 273, 294 + + Helsinki Accords implementation and, 10 + Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and, 36, 39, 219, 288 + Tito funeral delegation and, 279, 280, 281 + U.S.-Bulgarian discussions, 83 + U.S.-German Democratic Republic discussions, 118 + U.S.-Hungarian relations and, 139, 145 + U.S. policy toward Eastern Europe and, 11, 21, 22, 36, + 39 + U.S.-Romanian relations and, 178, 189, 200, 216 + U.S.-Yugoslav communications, 238, 239, 252, 255, + 256, 290, 295, 299 + + + + Van Well, Gu+a5nther, 56 + Vance, Cyrus + Bulgaria, 84, 87, 89, 92 + Czechoslovakia, 97, 98, 99, + 100, 101, 104 + Export controls, 13 + German Democratic Republic, 118, + 119, 122, 124, 129 + Helsinki Accords implementation, 10 + Hungary + Crown of St. Stephen, 142, 150, 156, 158 + + + Brzezinski memoranda, 154 + Hartman memoranda, 141 + Hyland/Hunter memoranda, 140 + King memoranda, 157 + Nimetz memoranda, 155 + Puja discussions, 147 + Reactions to return of, 152 + + Most Favored Nation status, 149, 162, 163 + + Iran hostage crisis, 219 + Resignation, 228, 288 + Romania + Andrei meetings, 201, + 202, 209, 218 + Arab-Israeli conflict and, 184, 187, 188, 190, 191 + Ceausescu visit (1978), + 198 + + Andrei meetings, 201, 202 + Brzezinski memoranda, 181 + Carter-Ceausescu meetings, 200, 203 + Ceausescu meetings, 201 + Goldberg memoranda, 199 + Macovescu discussions, 188 + Rauta case and, 196 + Vest memoranda, 192 + + Dissident repression, 188 + Export controls, 218 + Horodinca defection case, 222 + Human rights, 196, 198 + Most Favored Nation status, 185, 198 + Norfolk port access, 218 + U.S. relief aid, 181 + Visit plans (1979), 218, 219, 220 + + U.S. covert publications program, 2 + U.S. international broadcasting program, 48, 52, + 61, 63, 71 + U.S. policy toward Eastern Europe + Budapest statement (1978), + 94 + Policy review, 1 + U.S. differentiated policy structure, 6, 7, + 16 + + U.S. refugee assistance, 31 + Yugoslavia + Brzezinski-Belovski meetings, 238 + Djuranovic/Vrhovec meetings, 256 + Intelligence cooperation, 259 + Military transfers to Ethiopia, 237 + Post-Tito contingency planning, 276, 277, 278, 281, 285 + Tito funeral delegation, 280, 281 + Tito U.S. visit (1978), + 251, 252, 254 + U.S. economic aid, 263 + U.S. economic cooperation with, 248 + U.S. military sales, 262, 285 + U.S. trade with, 271 + Visit plans (1979), 273 + + + Vanik, Charles + Czechoslovakia, 99 + Hungary, 136, 137, 139, + 142, 158, 163, 167 + Romania, 194, 195, 203, + 214 + + Velchev, Boris, 81 + Verdet, 213 + Vest, George S. + Bulgaria, 82, 88, 89, 92, 93, + 94 + Czechoslovakia, 97, 101, 104, + 107, 109, 114 + German Democratic Republic, 120, + 122, 130, 131 + Hungary, 147, 150, 158, + 167 + Romania + Bogdan meetings, 233 + Carter visit (1980), 229 + Ceausescu visit (1978), + 192, 200, 204 + Human rights, 196 + Most Favored Nation status, 215 + Norfolk port access, 218 + Pacepa defection case, 205 + Rauta case, 195, 196 + U.S. military sales proposals, 223, 228 + U.S. trade with, 226 + World Bank/IMF loans, 234 + + U.S. differentiated policy structure, 10, 94 + U.S. international broadcasting program, 53, 55, + 67 + Yugoslavia + Djuranovic/Vrhovec meetings, 256 + Mondale visit (1977), 236 + Overflight issues, 251 + Post-Tito contingency planning, 276, 277, 278 + Tito funeral delegation, 280 + Tito U.S. visit (1978), + 254 + U.S. economic aid, 263 + U.S. military sales, 268 + U.S. trade with, 271 + + + Vine, Richard, 14, 53, 89, 129, 130, 261 + Vinocur, John, 75 + Violette, Richard, 261 + + Voh, Col. Vid, 261 + Voice of America (VOA) (see also U.S. + international broadcasting program), 63, + 64, 70, 79 + Von Braunmuehl, 120 + Von Dohnanyi, Klaus, 55 + Von Staden, Berndt, 120 + Vosicky, Pavel, 104 + Vrhovec, Josip, 256, 290, 295, 296, 299, 301 + Vujatovic, Col. Gen. Laze, 270, 271, 285 + Vujatvic, Col. Gen. Dusan, 258, 261 + + + Walesa, Lech, 38 + Walter, Ralph, 57, 59 + Warnke, Paul C., 1, 13, 16 + Warsaw Pact, 210, 211 + Watergate scandal, 47 + Weil, Frank, 6 + Weiser, Benjamin, 42 + Western Europe, 10, 11 + + Eurocommunism, 5, 26, 30, + 243, 252 + + Whalen, Charles W., Jr., 158 + White, John, 70, 72, 75 + Wilson, Charlie, 158 + Wischnewski, Hans Jurgen, 121 + Wise, Philip J., Jr., 289 + Woessner, William M., 53, 120, 122, 123, 124 + Wolf, Ira, 88, 104, 196 + Wolf, Konrad, 133 + Wolff, Lester L., 114, 115 + Workers Defense League (Poland), 5 + World Bank (International Bank for Reconstruction and + Development), 189, 196, 234 + + + Young, Andrew J., 1, 16 + Yugoslavia + Arab-Israeli conflict, 236, 244, 253, + 254, 295 + Bulgarian relations with, 88, + 246 + Chinese People’s Republic relations with, 244, 251, + 252, 256, 273 + Dissident movements, 5, 8 + Earthquake (1979), 263, 264, + 265 + Emigre terrorism, 143, 235, 249, + 251, 252, 254, 288, 290, + 293, 294 + Foreign policy, 30 + Greek relations with, 258 + Human rights, 5, 299 + Italian relations with, 258 + Krsko nuclear reactor, 249, 251, 252, + 254, 271, 273 + Markotic case, 299 + Military transfers to Ethiopia, 237, 238, 242, 245 + Non-aligned movement role, 236, + 243, 251, 252, 255, 256, + 273, 288, 294, 296 + Polish crisis (1980) and, 44, 299, + 300 + Political situation, 5, 226, 227, + 250, 269, 273, 301 + Post-Tito contingency planning, 274 + + Bremer memoranda, 281 + Brzezinski memoranda, 251, 275 + Eagleburger memoranda, 281 + Larrabee memoranda, 276, + 280 + National Intelligence Estimates, 269, 273 + State Department papers, 284 + Vance memoranda, 285 + Vest/Lake/Bartholomew memoranda, 277 + + + Soviet relations with (see also + Post-Tito contingency planning above), 139, 238, 243, + 244, 252, 273, 296, 301 + Tito condolences, 288, 289 + Tito funeral delegation, 279, + 280, 281, 282, 288, 290 + U.S. economic aid + Carter-Mijatovic correspondence, 298 + Carter visit discussions, 294, 295, 296 + Eagleburger memoranda, 264, 265 + Hunter/Rentschler memoranda, 263 + Muskie memoranda, 293 + Muskie-Vrhovec discussions, 299 + State Department papers, 36 + Tarnoff memoranda, 292 + U.S.-Yugoslav discussions, 288 + + U.S. military sales + Aaron-Vujatovic discussions, 270 + Benson visit discussions, 271 + Harold Brown-Ljubicic discussions, 245, 246, 258 + Brzezinski memoranda, 242, 243 + Carter-Kardelj discussions, 244 + Christopher memoranda, 288 + Duncan memoranda, 241 + Eagleburger memoranda, 272, 286, 300 + Hunter memoranda, 257 + + Kimmitt/Brement/Larrabee memoranda, 266 + Larrabee memoranda, 268, + 276, 280, 287, 297 + Mondale-Tito discussions, 236 + Scanlan memoranda, 267 + State Department papers, 36 + Tarnoff memoranda, 240, + 292 + Tito U.S. visit discussions, 249, 250, 252 + U.S. military sales to Romania and, 224 + Vance memoranda, 262, + 285 + + U.S. relations with + Benson visit (1979), 271 + Brzezinski-Belovski meetings, 238 + Carter-Kardelj meetings, 243, 244 + Carter-Mijatovic correspondence, 298 + Carter-Tito correspondence, 236, 239, 243, 251, 290 + Carter visit (1980), 229, 291, 294, 295, 296 + Consular access issue, Tito U.S. visit + discussions, 249 + Cultural convention, 273 + Economic cooperation, 248, 249, 251, 254 + Harriman-Tito meetings, 256 + Intelligence cooperation, 259, 260 + Military cooperation, 249, 258, 261, 270, 291 + Mondale-Kolisevski meetings, 290 + Mondale-Loncar meetings, 293 + Mondale-Markovic meetings, 256 + Mondale visit (1977), 235, 236 + Muskie-Vrhovec meetings, 299 + Overflight issues, 251 + Polish crisis (1980) and, + 44 + Post-Tito, 252 + Science/technology cooperation, 249, 251, 254 + Scientific/cultural exchanges, 249 + Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and, 36 + Tito U.S. visit (1978), + 249, 250, 251, 252, 253, 254, 255 + U.S. differentiated policy structure and, 4 + Vance visit plans (1979), + 273 + + U.S. trade with + Benson visit discussions, 271 + Nuclear exports, 235, + 236, 247, 249, 251, 252, 254 + Scanlan memoranda, 273 + Tarnoff memoranda, 292 + Tito U.S. visit discussions, 249, 250, 252 + + + + + + + + Zablocki, Clement J., 152, 155, 158 + Zaki, Sheikh Ahmad, 68 + Zaric, Mirko, 261, 295 + Zhivkov, Todor, 30, 81, 85, 86, 90, 91, :nl 95 + Zhivkova, Lyudmila, 81, 82, 83, 92 + Zhukov, Yuri, 105 + + + +
+ + + diff --git a/volumes/frus1977-80v26.xml b/volumes/frus1977-80v26.xml index 7fe87d3ed..8718b99ea 100644 --- a/volumes/frus1977-80v26.xml +++ b/volumes/frus1977-80v26.xml @@ -1,119 +1,79842 @@ - - - - - - Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume - XXVI, Arms Control and Nonproliferation - Foreign Relations of the United States - 1977–1980 - Volume XXVI - Arms Control and Nonproliferation - Adam M. Howard - Chris Tudda - - - United States Government Printing Office - Washington - 2015 - frus1977-80v26 - - -

Released in 2015 as print volume and PDF online at history.state.gov

- - - - - - - - - Foreign Relations of the United States - 1977–1980 - Volume XXVI - Arms Control and Nonproliferation - - - Editor: Chris Tudda - - - General Editor: Adam M. Howard - - - United States Government Printing Office - Washington - 2015 - DEPARTMENT OF STATE Office - of - the Historian Bureau - of Public Affairs For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, - U.S. Government Printing Office Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free - (866) 512-1800; DC area (202) 512-1800 Fax: (202) 512-2250 Mail: Stop IDCC, - Washington, DC 20402-0001 - -
- Press Release -

- Office of the HistorianBureau of Public - AffairsUnited States Department of StateNovember 19, 2015 -

-

The Department of State released today Foreign Relations of the - United States, 1977–1980, Volume XXVI, Arms Control and - Nonproliferation. This volume documents the Carter administration’s - multilateral, non-strategic arms control policy from 1977 until 1980. Topics - include anti-satellite (ASAT) talks; chemical and biological warfare - negotiations; conventional arms talks (CAT); nuclear non-proliferation, - safeguards, and the International Fuel Cycle Evaluation program; comprehensive - nuclear test-ban proposals and peaceful nuclear explosions; the United Nations - Special Session on Disarmament; and nuclear non-proliferation in Latin - America.

-

The Carter administration’s priorities in arms control contrasted sharply with - those of the Nixon and Ford administrations. Where his predecessors had - concentrated on bilateral arms control negotiations with the Soviet Union, - Carter aggressively pursued a range of multilateral agreements, with a strong - emphasis on nonproliferation in nuclear and conventional arms. While Moscow - remained the administration’s primary interlocutor, Carter worked closely with - the United Kingdom to try to achieve a comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty. He - also worked with Mexico to convince other Latin American nations to sign and/or - ratify the Treaty of Tlatelolco—which had established Latin America as a - nuclear-free zone in 1968. In conjunction with France, Japan, and other allies, - Carter proposed the establishment of an International Fuel Cycle Evaluation - program that would explore alternative nuclear fuel cycles containing materials - not useable in nuclear weapons. The Carter administration also participated in - multilateral arms control initiatives such as the 1978 UN Special Session on - Disarmament. Meanwhile, Carter tried to reduce the sale of conventional arms to - allies with questionable human rights records.

-

By the winter of 1979–80, however, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and other - Soviet activities jeopardized Carter’s arms control initiatives. Reports of the - use of chemical weapons by the Soviets in Afghanistan and Vietnam in Cambodia - and Laos, the discovery of a 1979 outbreak of anthrax in a biological weapons - factory in Sverdlovsk in the Soviet Union, and renewed Soviet nuclear tests led - to administration protests that the Soviets had violated the 1972 Biological - Weapons Convention and 1976 Threshold Test Ban Treaties respectively. The ASAT - and CAT negotiations principally ended in early 1980, and the volume of U.S. - conventional arms sales remained essentially unchanged during the - administration.

-

This volume was compiled and edited by Chris Tudda. The volume and this press - release are available on the Office of the Historian website at http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1977-80v26. Copies - of the volume will be available for purchase from the U.S. Government Printing - Office online at http://bookstore.gpo.gov GPO S/N 044-000-02673-2; ISBN - 978-0-16-093099-7), or by calling toll-free 1-866-512-1800 (D.C. area - 202-512-1800). For further information, contact history@state.gov.

-
- - - - - - + + + + + + + + Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume + XXVI, Arms Control and Nonproliferation + Foreign Relations of the United States + 1977–1980 + Volume XXVI + Arms Control and Nonproliferation + Chris Tudda + Adam M. Howard + + + United States Government Publishing Office + Washington + 2015 + frus1977-80v26 + + +

Released in 2015 as printed book.

+ + + + + + + + + Foreign Relations of the United States + 1977–1980 + Volume XXVI + Arms Control and Nonproliferation + + Editor: Chris Tudda + General Editor: Adam M. Howard + + United States Government Publishing Office + Washington + 2015 + DEPARTMENT OF STATE Office of the Historian Bureau of Public Affairs For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government + Publishing Office Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512-1800; + DC area (202) 512-1800 Fax: (202) 512-2250 Mail: Stop IDCC, Washington, DC + 20402-0001 + +
+ + About the Series +

The Foreign Relations of the United States series presents + the official documentary historical record of major foreign policy decisions and + significant diplomatic activity of the U.S. Government. The Historian of the + Department of State is charged with the responsibility for the preparation of + the Foreign Relations series. The staff of the Office of + the Historian, Bureau of Public Affairs, under the direction of the General + Editor of the Foreign Relations series, plans, + researches, compiles, and edits the volumes in the series. Secretary of State + Frank B. Kellogg first promulgated official regulations codifying specific + standards for the selection and editing of documents for the series on March 26, + 1925. These regulations, with minor modifications, guided the series through + 1991.

+

Public Law 102–138, the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, established a new + statutory charter for the preparation of the series which was signed by + President George H.W. Bush on October 28, 1991. Section 198 of P.L. 102–138 + added a new Title IV to the Department of State’s Basic Authorities Act of 1956 + (22 U.S.C. 4351, et seq.).

+

The statute requires that the Foreign Relations series be + a thorough, accurate, and reliable record of major U.S. foreign policy decisions + and significant U.S. diplomatic activity. The volumes of the series should + include all records needed to provide comprehensive documentation of major + foreign policy decisions and actions of the U.S. Government. The statute also + confirms the editing principles established by Secretary Kellogg: the Foreign Relations series is guided by the principles of + historical objectivity and accuracy; records should not be altered or deletions + made without indicating in the published text that a deletion has been made; the + published record should omit no facts that were of major importance in reaching + a decision; and nothing should be omitted for the purposes of concealing a + defect in policy. The statute also requires that the Foreign + Relations series be published not more than 30 years after the events + recorded. The editors are convinced that this volume meets all regulatory, + statutory, and scholarly standards of selection and editing.

+

Sources for the Foreign Relations + Series

+

The Foreign Relations statute requires that the published + record in the Foreign Relations series include all + records needed to provide comprehensive documentation of major U.S. foreign + policy decisions and significant U.S. diplomatic activity. It further requires + that government agencies, departments, + and other entities of the U.S. Government engaged in foreign policy formulation, + execution, or support cooperate with the Department of State historians by + providing full and complete access to records pertinent to foreign policy + decisions and actions and by providing copies of selected records. Most of the + sources consulted in the preparation of this volume have been declassified and + are available for review at the National Archives and Records Administration + (Archives II), in College Park, Maryland.

+

The editors of the Foreign Relations series have complete + access to all the retired records and papers of the Department of State: the + central files of the Department; the special decentralized files (“lot files”) + of the Department at the bureau, office, and division levels; the files of the + Department’s Executive Secretariat, which contain the records of international + conferences and high-level official visits, correspondence with foreign leaders + by the President and Secretary of State, and the memoranda of conversations + between the President and the Secretary of State and foreign officials; and the + files of overseas diplomatic posts. All of the Department’s central files for + 1977–1981 are available in electronic or microfilm formats at Archives II, and + may be accessed using the Access to Archival Databases (AAD) tool. Almost all of + the Department’s decentralized office files covering this period, which the + National Archives deems worthy of permanent retention, have been transferred to + or are in the process of being transferred from the Department’s custody to + Archives II.

+ +

Research for Foreign Relations volumes is undertaken + through special access to restricted documents at the Jimmy Carter Presidential Library and other + agencies. While all the material printed in this volume has been declassified, + some of it is extracted from still-classified documents. The staff of the Carter + Library is processing and declassifying many of the documents used in this + volume, but they may not be available in their entirety at the time of + publication. Presidential papers maintained and preserved at the Carter Library + include some of the most significant foreign-affairs related documentation from + White House offices, the Department of State, and other federal agencies + including the National Security Council, the Central Intelligence Agency, the + Department of Defense, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

+

Some of the research for volumes in this subseries was done in Carter Library + record collections scanned for the Remote Archive Capture (RAC) project. This + project, which is administered by the National Archives and Records + Administration’s Office of Presidential Libraries, was designed to coordinate + the declassification of still-classified records held in various Presidential + libraries. As a result of the way in which records were scanned for the RAC, the + editors of the Foreign Relations series were not always able to determine whether attachments + to a given document were in fact attached to the paper copy of the document in + the Carter Library file. In such cases, some editors of the Foreign Relations series have indicated this ambiguity by stating that + the attachments were “Not found attached.”

+

Editorial Methodology

+

The documents are presented chronologically according to time in Washington, DC. + Memoranda of conversation are placed according to the time and date of the + conversation, rather than the date the memorandum was drafted.

+

Editorial treatment of the documents published in the Foreign + Relations series follows Office style guidelines, supplemented by + guidance from the General Editor and the Chief of the Editing and Publishing + Division. The original document is reproduced as exactly as possible, including + marginalia or other notations, which are described in the footnotes. Texts are + transcribed and printed according to accepted conventions for the publication of + historical documents within the limitations of modern typography. A heading has + been supplied by the editors for each document included in the volume. Spelling, + capitalization, and punctuation are retained as found in the original text, + except that obvious typographical errors are silently corrected. Other mistakes + and omissions in the documents are corrected by bracketed insertions: a + correction is set in italic type; an addition in roman type. Words or phrases + underlined in the original document are printed in italics. Abbreviations and + contractions are preserved as found in the original text, and a list of + abbreviations and terms is included in the front matter of each volume. In + telegrams, the telegram number (including special designators such as Secto) is + printed at the start of the text of the telegram.

+

Bracketed insertions are also used to indicate omitted text that deals with an + unrelated subject (in roman type) or that remains classified after + declassification review (in italic type). The amount and, where possible, the + nature of the material not declassified has been noted by indicating the number + of lines or pages of text that were omitted. Entire documents withheld after + declassification review have been accounted for and are listed in their + chronological place with headings, source notes, and the number of pages not + declassified.

+

All brackets that appear in the original document are so identified in the + footnotes. All ellipses are in the original documents.

+

The first footnote to each document indicates the sources of the document and its + original classification, distribution, and drafting information. This note also + provides the background of important documents and policies and indicates whether the President or his major policy + advisers read the document.

+

Editorial notes and additional annotation summarize pertinent material not + printed in the volume, indicate the location of additional documentary sources, + provide references to important related documents printed in other volumes, + describe key events, and provide summaries of and citations to public statements + that supplement and elucidate the printed documents. Information derived from + memoirs and other first-hand accounts has been used when appropriate to + supplement or explicate the official record.

+

The numbers in the index refer to document numbers rather than to page + numbers.

+

Advisory Committee on Historical Diplomatic Documentation

+

The Advisory Committee on Historical Diplomatic Documentation, established under + the Foreign Relations statute, monitors the overall + compilation and editorial process of the series and advises on all aspects of + the preparation of the series and declassification of records. The Advisory + Committee does not necessarily review the contents of individual volumes in the + series, but it makes recommendations on issues that come to its attention and + reviews volumes as it deems necessary to fulfill its advisory and statutory + obligations.

+

Declassification Review

+

The Office of Information Programs and Services, Bureau of Administration, + conducted the declassification review for the Department of State of the + documents published in this volume. The review was conducted in accordance with + the standards set forth in Executive Order 13526 on Classified National Security + Information and applicable laws.

+

The principle guiding declassification review is to release all information, + subject only to the current requirements of national security as embodied in law + and regulation. Declassification decisions entailed concurrence of the + appropriate geographic and functional bureaus in the Department of State, other + concerned agencies of the U.S. Government, and the appropriate foreign + governments regarding specific documents of those governments. The + declassification review of this volume, which began in 2012 and was completed in + 2014, resulted in the decision to withhold 2 documents in full, excise a + paragraph or more in 21 documents, and make minor excisions of less than a + paragraph in 58 documents.

+

The Office of the Historian is confident, on the basis of the research conducted + in preparing this volume and as a result of the declassification review process + described above, that the documentation and editorial notes presented here provide a thorough, accurate, and + reliable record of the Carter + administration’s arms control policies.

+ + + Adam M. Howard, Ph.D. + + + General Editor + + + + Stephen P. Randolph, Ph.D. + + + The Historian + + + Bureau of Public Affairs + + November 2015 + + + +
+ +
+ + Preface +

Structure and Scope of the Foreign + Relations Series

+

This volume is part of a subseries of volumes of the Foreign + Relations series that documents the most important issues in the + foreign policy of the administration of Jimmy + Carter. The subseries presents a documentary record of major + foreign policy decisions and actions of President Carter. This volume documents U.S. arms control policy during + the entire Carter administration, in six + chapters: Anti-Satellite (ASAT) Weapons and + Talks; Chemical and Biological Weapons (CBW) and the Sverdlovsk Incident; + Comprehensive Test Ban (CTB) and Peaceful Nuclear Explosions (PNE); Conventional Arms Talks; Nuclear + Non-Proliferation, Safeguards, and the International Nuclear Fuel Cycle + Evaluation (INFCE); Nuclear Non-Proliferation in Latin America; and the Special + Session on Disarmament (SSOD).

+

Arms control initiatives were at the top of Carter’s foreign policy agenda, just + as they had been in the Nixon and + Ford administrations, and much of + the negotiations took place between the United States and the Soviet Union, + China, and European allies. This volume is therefore best read in conjunction + with other volumes in the Nixon-Ford and Carter + subseries, in order to understand the breadth and scope of U.S. arms control + policy during the Carter administration. + The most important of these volumes include Foreign Relations, 1977–1980, vol. VI, Soviet + Union; Foreign + Relations, 1977–1980, vol. XIII, China; Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, + vol. XXXIII, SALT II, 1972–1980; + Foreign Relations, + 1977–1980, vol. XIV, Korea; Japan; Foreign Relations, 1977–1980, vol. XXVII, Western + Europe; Foreign + Relations, 1969–1976, vol E–11, Part 1, Documents on Mexico; + Central America; and the Caribbean, 1973–1976; Foreign Relations, + 1969–1976, vol. E–11, Part 2, Documents on South America, 1973–1976; + and Foreign Relations + 1977–1980, vol. XXIV, South America; Latin America Regional.

+

Focus of Research and Principles of Selection for Foreign Relations, 1977–1980, Volume XXVI

+

The focus of this volume is on the arms control initiatives other than the + Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) + undertaken by the Carter administration. + Each of the six chapters is presented in chronological order, and each documents + the challenges Jimmy Carter faced in the + latter period of détente. Carter and his + national security team inherited a number of initiatives from the Gerald Ford administration, but in the first + year of his administration, Carter + focused on reorienting U.S. arms control + policy. Carter’s emphasis on the promotion of human rights, which the Nixon and Ford administrations had chosen to downplay, also impacted his + arms control policy. Carter wanted to + reduce conventional arms sales and transfers to U.S. allies who did not place a + high value on human rights. At the same time, Carter’s experience as an engineer + who studied nuclear physics allowed him to take a personal interest in many of + these new initiatives, in particular the Non-Proliferation and INFCE discussions, from 1977 through the early + part of 1979. However, after Carter was + drawn into the Iran Hostage and Afghanistan crises, and as détente faltered, + many of these non-SALT arms control + initiatives waned in importance. His personal involvement notably decreased, and + he began to act in ways similar to the Nixon administration, most noticeably when he began to approve + nearly all conventional arms sales requests.

+

Unlike Nixon and Ford, who met regularly with Soviet General + Secretary Leonid Brezhnev, Carter and Brezhnev only met once, in Vienna in 1979. Thus, they + communicated most frequently by letter, and proposed arms control initiatives + such as ASAT negotiations and the general + issue of non-proliferation in outer space, CBW + discussions, the CTB and PNE talks, and general nuclear non-proliferation + initiatives. The ASAT negotiations were + hampered not only by technical definitions of anti-satellite capabilities, but + also Moscow’s insistence that the U.S. space shuttle program be subject to any + ASAT agreement. The CBW talks, just like in the Nixon and Ford administrations, got set back over the issue of how to + identify incapacitants as well as how a treaty would be verified. The United + States insisted that a treaty could only be verified by on-site inspections + (OSIs), but the Soviets balked at allowing + such visits of their facilities. The CBW talks + were also particularly affected by accusations that the Soviets and their allies + were using chemical weapons in Afghanistan and Southeast Asia, and especially by + the belated discovery in 1980 of a 1979 outbreak of anthrax in a Soviet + biological weapons factory in Sverdlovsk, which violated the Biological + Convention signed by Nixon and Brezhnev at the 1972 Moscow Summit.

+

The CTB/PNE negotiations also involved the United Kingdom, and were affected by + the Labour government’s fall in 1979, the rise of Margaret Thatcher’s + conservative rule, and British opposition to the construction of multiple + National Seismic Stations on its soil. Verification of a potential CTB treaty remained a sore point, as the Soviets + refused to allow OSIs. In the fall of 1980, the + U.S. repeatedly accused the Soviet Union of conducting high-yield nuclear tests + in violation of the 1976 Threshold Test-Ban Treaty (TTBT). Coming on the heels of the Soviet invasion of, and the + charges of their use of chemical weapons in, Afghanistan, and the Sverdlovsk + incident, the alleged TTBT violations further + chilled U.S.-Soviet relations.

+ +

Carter’s nuclear non-proliferation initiatives, including his concern that + nuclear facilities and materials ostensibly meant for “peaceful” purposes could + be diverted into weapons programs, worried U.S. allies, in particularly Japan, + who wanted to decrease their dependence on oil imports by using nuclear energy. + In Latin America, meanwhile, Carter + engaged allies in an attempt to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons. In + the first three months of his administration, Carter’s opposition to the Federal Republic of Germany’s (FRG) 1975 sale of a nuclear reactor and plutonium + technology to Brazil threatened to disrupt U.S.–FRG and U.S.-Brazilian relations. Carter also followed Mexico’s lead and spent much of his + administration trying to convince Brazil, Argentina, and Cuba to sign and/or + ratify the 1968 Treaty of Tlatelolco, which banned nuclear weapons throughout + Latin America. After much pressure from its European allies and developing + nations, the administration also devoted significant attention to the 1978 + UN Special Session on Disarmament

+ +

The majority of communication and policy making was done at the Secretary of + State/Foreign Minister or Ambassadorial levels. Cables and memoranda of + conversation thoroughly document these interactions. Much of the correspondence + was transmitted as cables through embassies, not through the hotline that had + become popular under Nixon. Although + Secretary of State Cyrus Vance met with + Soviet officials both in Washington, D.C. and abroad, National Security Adviser + Zbigniew Brzezinski, a Soviet expert, + clearly carved out a space for himself and sought greater influence through his + meetings with Soviet officials and his communications with Carter as the administration progressed. + Secretary of Defense Harold Brown, + Secretary of Energy James Schlesinger, and Carter’s Special Assistant for Non-Proliferation, Ambassador + Gerard Smith (who had been Nixon’s + Representative during the SALT I talks) also + emerged as significant players in the many inter-agency arms control meetings. + As a result, the hierarchy that was clear during the Nixon administration was more complex during + the Carter years, in part because + Carter sought to be receptive to and + inclusive of a variety of ideas and people.

+

Acknowledgments

+

The editor wishes to acknowledge the assistance of officials at the Jimmy Carter Library, especially Ceri + McCarron, Brittany Parris, and James Yancey. Thanks are also due to Nancy Smith, + then Director of the Presidential Materials Staff at the National Archives and + Records Administration, and to the Central Intelligence Agency for arranging + access to the Carter Library materials scanned for the Remote Archive Capture + project. Special thanks are due to Ernest Emrich, who helped facilitate access + to the Harold Brown and James Schlesinger + Papers at the Library of Congress.

+ +

The editor collected and selected documentation and edited the volume under the + supervision of Kathleen B. Rasmussen, Chief of the Global Issues and General + Division, and Stephen P. Randolph, then the General Editor of the Foreign Relations series. He also coordinated the + declassification review, under the supervision first of Susan C. Weetman, then + Chief of the Declassification and Publishing Division, and later Carl Ashley, + Chief of the Declassification Division. Thomas I. Faith performed the copy and + technical editing. Do Mi Stauber prepared the index.

+ + Chris Tudda + Historian + + +
+ +
+ + Contents + + + About the Series + III + + + Preface + IX + + + Sources + XV + + + Abbreviations and Terms + XIX + + + Persons + XXV + + Arms Control and Nonproliferation + + Anti-Satellite (ASAT) Weapons and Talks + 1 + Chemical and Biological Weapons; The Sverdlovsk + Incident + 143 + Comprehensive Test Ban; Peaceful Nuclear + Explosions + 307 + Conventional Arms Transfers/Talks + 630 + Non-Proliferation, Safeguards, and + International Nuclear Fuel Cycle Evaluation + 782 + Nuclear Non-Proliferation in Latin + America + 1015 + The United Nations Special Session on + Disarmament + 1158 + + Index + 1241 + + + +
+ +
+ + Sources +

Sources for Foreign Relations, 1977–1980, Volume XXVI

+

The files at the Jimmy Carter + Presidential Library in Atlanta, Georgia, are the single most important source + of documentation for those interested in arms control during the Carter administration. Foreign policy research + in the Carter Presidential Library centers around two collections: National + Security Affairs (NSA), Brezezinski Material, and the NSA, Staff Material. The + lot file containing the records of Secretary of State Cyrus Vance is a rich repository of key + memoranda of conversation between Vance + and the leading political figures involved in arms control discussions. The + records of Deputy Secretary of State Warren + Christopher (much of which was already declassified at the time + of research) proved important particularly when he was serving as Acting + Secretary of State. The lot file containing the records of the Arms Control and + Disarmament Agency were particularly helpful. Finally, the papers of Secretary + of Defense Harold Brown at the Library of + Congress document the enormous influence exerted by a relatively unknown cabinet + official during the Carter + administration. The editor also had access to records at the National Security + Council, the Central Intelligence Agency, and the Department of Defense.

+

The editor made considerable use of materials already compiled for other volumes + in the Foreign Relations series, including those of the + Soviet Union; China; Japan, Korea; Mexico, Cuba, and the Caribbean; South + America; SALT II; and Western Europe. Readers + interested in these subjects should consult the relevant volumes for further + information on the specific sources used in research.

+

The following list identifies the particular files and collections used in the + preparation of this volume. The declassification and transfer to the National + Archives of the Department of State records is in process, and some of these + records are already available for public review at the National Archives. In + addition to the paper files cited below, a growing number of documents are + available on the Internet. The Office of the Historian maintains a list of these + Internet resources on its website and encourages readers to consult that site on + a regular basis.

+ +

Unpublished Sources

+ + Department of State + + Lot files. These files have been + transferred or will be transferred to the National Archives and + Record Administration in College Park, Maryland. + Chronological Files of Marshall Shulman, Special Adviser + to the Secretary on Soviet Affairs, 1977–1980, Lot + 81D109 + Executive Secretariat Files, Lot 84D161 + Personal Files of Secretary of State Cyrus Vance, Lot + 80D135 + Chronological and subject files of Cyrus Vance, Secretary + of State, 1977–1980 + Papers of Michael Armacost, Lot 89D265 + + + + National Archives and Record Administration, College + Park, Maryland + + Record Group 59, Records of the Department of State + Central Foreign Policy File + Office of the Under Secretary of State for Security + Assistance, Chronological Files, Speeches, and Records Lucy + W. Benson (1979) and Matthew Nimetz (1980) Files, Lot + 81D321 + Records of Secretary of State Cyrus Vance, 1977–1980, Lot + 84D241 + Records of the Office of the Deputy Secretary Warren + Christopher, Lot 81D113 + + + + Jimmy Carter Presidential Library, Atlanta, Georgia + + National Security Affairs + Brzezinski Material + Brzezinski Office File + Country File + General Odom File + Meetings File + Name File + President’s Correspondence with Foreign Leaders + File + Subject Chron File + Subject File + Trip Files + Unfiled File + VIP Visit File + + + Staff Material + Agency File + Defense/Security Files + Freedom of Information/Legal Files + Global Issues + North/South + Office File + Staff Secretary File + Europe, USSR, and East/West + + + + Donated Historical Material, Zbigniew Brzezinski + File + Plains File + Institutional File + National Security Council Meetings + Presidential Decisions + Presidential Review Memoranda + + + Papers of Walter F. Mondale + + + Central Intelligence Agency, Langley, Virginia + + Office of the Director of Central Intelligence + Job 81B00112R + + + Library of Congress, Manuscript Division + Harold Brown Papers + James Schlesinger Papers + + Records of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency + + Office of the Director, Subject Files Pertaining to Presidential + Review Memoranda and Directives, MEMCONS with Foreign Officials, and + National Security Decision and Study Memoranda, May 1963–October + 1980, Accession #383–98–0053 + + Washington National Records Center, Suitland, + Maryland + + RG 330, Records of the Office of the Secretary of Defense + FRC 330–80–0016 + FRC 330–80–0017 + FRC 330–81–0201 + FRC 330–81–0202 + FRC 330–84–0067 + + + +

Published Sources

+

Brzezinski, Zbigniew. Power and Principle: Memoirs of the + National Security Adviser, 1977–1981. New York: Farrar, Straus, Giroux, + 1983.

+

Carter, Jimmy. Keeping Faith: Memoirs of a President. New + York: Bantam Books, 1982.

+

New York Times.

+

Smith, Gerard. Disarming Diplomat: The Memoirs of Ambassador + Gerard C. Smith, Arms Control Negotiator. Lanham: Madison Books, + 1996.

+

U.S. Department of State. Bulletin, 1977–1980.

+

______ Documents on Disarmament, 1977–1980. Washington: + U.S. Government Printing Office.

+

U.S. National Archives and Records Administration. Public + Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Jimmy Carter, 1977–1980. + Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1978, 1979, 1980, 1981.

+

Vance, Cyrus. Hard Choices: Critical Years in America’s Foreign + Policy. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1983.

+ + +
+ +
+ + Abbreviations and Terms + + ABM, anti-ballistic + missile + acce, + accordance + ACDA, Arms Control + and Disarmament Agency + ACDA/D, Office of + the Director, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency + ACDA/DD, Office of + the Deputy Director, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency + ACDA/IR, Office of + International Relations, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency + ACIS, arms control + impact statement + ADM, air-launched + decoy missile + AEC, Atomic Energy + Commission + ALCM, air-launched + cruise missile + alrey, + already + ARA, Bureau of + Inter-American Affairs, Department of State + ASAT, + anti-satellite + ASD (A), Assistant + Secretary of Defense (Administration) + ASD (I), Assistant + Secretary of Defense (Intelligence) + ASD (SA), Assistant + Secretary of Defense (Systems Analysis) + ATP, augmented test + program + ATR, advanced test + reactor + AWAC, airborne + warning and control + backchannel, a method of communication outside + normal bureaucratic procedure; the White House, for instance, used + “backchannel” messages to pass the Department of State + BW, biological + (bacteriological) warfare + CAP, Carlos André + Peréz + CAT, conventional + arms transfers + CBW, chemical and + biological (bacteriological) warfare + CCD, Conference of + the Committee on Disarmament + CIA, Central + Intelligence Agency + CJCS, Chair, Joint + Chiefs of Staff + CNEA, + Comisión Nacional de Energia Atómica (Argentine + Atomic Energy Commission) + CPSU, Communist + Party of the Soviet Union + CSCE, Conference on + Security and Cooperation in Europe + CTB, comprehensive + test ban + CTBT, Comprehensive + Test Ban Treaty + CV, Cyrus Vance + CW, chemical + weapons + D, Office of the Deputy + Secretary of State + DCI, Director of + Central Intelligence + DCM, Deputy Chief of + Mission + DD/P, Deputy Director + for Plans, Central Intelligence Agency + Del, Delegate or + Delegation + Dept, + Department + Deptel, Department + of State telegram + DG, Director General + of the Foreign Service, Department of State + + DIA, Defense + Intelligence Agency + dissem, + dissemination + DOD, Department of + Defense + DOS, Department of + State + DPRC, Defense + Program Review Committee + EEC, European + Economic Community + EOB, Executive Office + Building + ER, enhanced + radiation + ERDA, Energy + Research and Development Agency + ERW, enhanced + radiation weapon + EST, Eastern Standard + Time + EUR, Bureau of + European Affairs, Department of State + EURATOM, European + Atomic Energy Community + Exdis, exclusive + distribution + FBR, fixed bed + reactor + FMS, foreign military + sales + FonMin, Foreign + Ministry + FonOff, Foreign + Office + FRC, Federal Records + Center + FRG, Federal Republic + of Germany + FSO, Foreign Service + Officer + FSS, full-scope + safeguards + FY, fiscal year + FYI, for your + information + GDR, German + Democratic Republic + GOA, Government of + Argentina + GOA, Government of + Australia + GOB, Government of + Brazil + GOF, Government of + France + GOJ, Government of + Japan + GOP, Government of + Pakistan + HB, Harold + Brown + HEL, high-energy + laser + HEU, highly-enriched + uranium + HMG, Her Majesty’s + Government + HWR, heavy water + reactor + HWT, heavy water + technology + IAEA, International + Atomic Energy Agency + IAWG, Interagency + Working Group + ICBM, + intercontinental ballistic missile + ICC, International + Control Commission + INFCE, + International Nuclear Fuel Cycle Evaluation + INR, Bureau of + Intelligence and Research, Department of State + INR/DDC, Office of + the Deputy Director for Coordination, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, + Department of State + INR/IL, + Intelligence Liaison, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of + State + IO, Bureau of + International Organization Affairs, Department of State + IOC, initial + operating capability + IPMG, + Interdepartmental Political-Military Group + + IRBM, + intermediate-range ballistic missile + IRG, + Interdepartmental Regional Group + ISA, Office of + International Security Affairs, Department of Defense + ISIS, internal + seismic installations + ITAR, International + Traffic in Arms Regulations + JCC, Joint + Consultative Committee + JCS, Joint Chiefs of + Staff + JCSM, Joint Chiefs + of Staff Memorandum + km, kilometers + LANFZ, Latin + American Nuclear Free Zone + LDC, + least/lesser-developed country + LEU, low-enriched + uranium + Limdis, limited + distribution + LMFBR, liquid metal + fast breeder reactor + LRTNF, long-range + theater nuclear forces + LTBT, Limited Test + Ban Treaty + MAD, mutual assured + destruction + MANPADS, + man-portable air-defense systems + MAP, Military + Assistance Program + MBFR, Mutual + Balanced Force Reductions + Mbr, Member + MDW, mass destruction + weapons + ME, Middle East + memcon, memorandum + of conversation + MHV, miniature homing + vehicle, a two-stage anti-satellite missile + MIRV, multiple + independently-targeted reentry vehicle + MLF, multilateral + force + mm, millimeter + MM, minuteman + MOD, Ministry of + Defence (UK) + MR, Memorandum for the + Record + mtg, meeting + mws, megawatts + MX, missile + experimental + NAC, North Atlantic + Council + NASA, National + Aeronautics and Space Administration + NATO, North Atlantic + Treaty Organization + NCA, National Command + Authority + negative security + assurance, pledge not to use nuclear weapons against + Non-Nuclear Weapon States that signed the Non-Proliferation Treaty + NGO, non-governmental + organization + NIE, National + Intelligence Estimate + NNPA, Nuclear + Non-Proliferation Act (1978) + NNWS, Non-Nuclear + Weapon States + Nodis, no + distribution + NPG, Nuclear Planning + Group + NPT, + Non-Proliferation Treaty + NRC, Nuclear + Regulatory Commission + NRP, National + Reconnaissance Program + + NSA, National + Security Agency + NSC, National + Security Council + NSCID, National + Security Council Intelligence Directive + NSDM, National + Security Decision Memorandum + NSF, National Science + Foundation + NSG, Nuclear + Suppliers Group + NTM, national + technical means + NUF, non-use of + Force + NWFZ, nuclear + weapons free zone + NWS, Nuclear Weapon + States + O, Deputy Under + Secretary of State for Administration + O/DDI, Office of the + Deputy Director for Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency + OAS, Organization of + American States + OASD, Office of the + Assistant Secretary of Defense + OASD, ISA, Office + of the Assistant Secretary of Defense, International Security Affairs + OASD, SA, Office + of the Assistant Secretary of Defense, Systems Analysis + OES, Bureau of Oceans + and Scientific and Environmental Affairs, Department of State + OMB, Office of + Management and Budget + ONE, Office of + National Estimates + OPANAL, + Organization for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America + OSD, Office of the + Secretary of Defense + OSI, Office of + Scientific Intelligence + OSI, on-site + inspection + OST, Office of + Science and Technology + P.L., Public + Law + para, + paragraph + PCW, Paul C. + Warnke + PD, Presidential + Directive + PermRep, + Permanent Representative + PM, Bureau of + Politico-Military Affairs, Department of State + PM/ISP, Office of + International Security Policy and Planning, Bureau of Politico-Military + Affairs, Department of State + PMG, + Politico-Military Group + PNE, peaceful nuclear + explosion + Polad, political + adviser + PRC, People’s + Republic of China + PRC, Policy Review + Committee + PrepCom, + Preparatory Committee + Pres, + President + PRM, Presidential + Review Memorandum + PSAC, President’s + Science Advisory Committee + PU, plutonium + R&D, research and + development + RB, reduced + blast + RDT&E, research, + development, test, and evaluation + Ref or Reftel, + reference telegram + Rep, + Representative + Res, + Resolution + RG, Record + Group + rpt, repeat + RPV, remotely piloted + vehicle + + RW, radiological + weapons + RWE, Ralph W. + Earle + S, Office of the + Secretary of State + S/P, Policy Planning + Council or Staff, Department of State + S/PC, Planning and + Coordination Staff, Department of State + S/S, Executive + Secretariat, Department of State + S/S–I, Information + Section, Executive Secretariat, Department of State + SAC, Strategic Air + Command + SAG, South African + Government + SAGSI, Standing + Advisory Group on Safeguards Implementation + SALT, Strategic Arms + Limitation Talks + SAM, surface to air + missile + SC, Security + Council + SCC, Special + Coordination Committee + SCI, Office of + International Scientific and Technological Affairs, Department of + State + SCICOUNS, + Scientific Counselor + SEA, Southeast + Asia + SecDef, Secretary + of Defense + Secto, backchannel + message from Secretary of State + SELA, + Sistema Económico Latinoamericano + Septel, separate + telegram + SFRC, Senate Foreign + Relations Committee + SIG, Senior + Interdepartmental Group + SNIE, Special + National Intelligence Estimate + SNM, special nuclear + materials + SOP, standard + operating procedure + SOV, Office of Soviet + Union Affairs, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State + SS–20, Soviet + intermediate-range ballistic missile + SSM, + surface-to-surface missile + SSOD, Special + Session on Disarmament + SU, Soviet + Union + SYG, Secretary + General + T, Bureau of Security + Assistance, Science, and Technology, Department of State + TASS, + Telegrafnoye Agentsvo Sovetskogo Soiuza (Telegraph + Agency of the Soviet Union) + Telcon, telephone + conversation + TIAS, Treaties and + Other International Acts Series + TNF, Theater Nuclear + Forces + TS, top secret + TTBT, Threshold Test + Ban Treaty + UK, United + Kingdom + UN, United + Nations + UNCTAD, United + Nations Conference on Trade and Development + UNDC, United Nations + Disarmament Commission + UNGA, United Nations + General Assembly + UNSYG, Secretary + General, United Nations + URENCO, Uranium + Enrichment Company (UK) + US, United + States + USAEC, United + States Atomic Energy Commission + USG, United States + Government + USINT, United + States Interest Section in Cuba + USNATO, United + States Mission to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization + + USSR, Union of + Soviet Socialist Republics + USUN, United States + Mission to the United Nations + WDC, World + Disarmament Conference + Z, Zulu time (Greenwich Mean Time) + +
+ +
+ + Persons + + Aaron, David, + Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs from 1977 + until January 1981 + Aden, Alberto, + Argentine Minister of International Organizations from 1974 until + 1979 + Andreotti, + Giulio, Prime Minister of Italy from 1976 until + 1979 + Bahr, Egon, + State Secretary, West German Federal Chancellery; Federal Minister for + Special Affairs until 1974; Federal Republic of Germany Minister for + Economic Cooperation from 1974 until 1976 + Baker, Howard, + Senator (D–Tennessee); Senate Minority Leader from 1977 until 1981 + Barre, + Raymond, Prime Minister of France from 1976 until + 1981 + Bartholomew, + Reginald, Deputy Director, Bureau of + Politico-Military Affairs, Department of State, from 1977 until 1979; + Director, Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs, Department of State, from + 1979 until 1981; Member, National Security Council Staff + Benson, Lucy + Wilson, Under Secretary of State for Security + Assistance, Science, and Technology from 1977 until 1980 + Bessmertnykh, Alexander + A., Counselor, Embassy of the Soviet Union + Bhutto, Zulfikar + Ali, Prime Minister of Pakistan from 1973 until July + 5, 1977 + Botha, Roelof Frederick + (Pik), Foreign Minister of South Africa from 1977 + until 1994 + Bowdler, William + G., U.S. Ambassador to South Africa from 1975 until + April 19, 1978 + Bowie, Robert + R., Deputy Director of Intelligence, Central + Intelligence Agency, 1977 until 1979 + Brewster, + Kingman, U.S. Ambassador to the United Kingdom from 1977 + until 1981 + Brezhnev, Leonid + I., General Secretary of the Communist Party of the + Soviet Union + Brown, George + S., General, USAF; Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff + from July 1, 1974 until June 20, 1978 + Brown, Harold, + Secretary of Defense from January 20, 1977 until January 20, 1981 + Brzezinski, + Zbigniew, Assistant to the President for National + Security Affairs from January 21, 1977 until January 20, 1981 + Buchheim, + Robert, Deputy to the U.S. Team Leader, Bilateral + Working Group on Anti-Satellite Systems from 1978 until 1979; Team Leader + 1979 + Callaghan, + James, Prime Minister of the United Kingdom from April + 1976 until May 4, 1979 + Carter, James Earl + (Jimmy), President of the United States from January + 20, 1977 until January 20, 1981 + Carter, + Rosalyn, First Lady of the United States from January + 20, 1977 until January 20, 1981 + Castro, Fidel, + Prime Minister of Cuba until 1976; President of Cuba from 1976 + Castro, Raul, + U.S. Ambassador to Argentina from 1977 until 1980 + Christopher, + Warren, Deputy Secretary of State from February 1977 + until January 20, 1981 + Clark, Richard + (Dick), Senator (D–Iowa) until January 1979; + Ambassador-at-Large and U.S. Coordinator for Refugee Affairs from May until + November 1979 + Clift, A. + Denis, Member, National Security Council Staff until + 1976; Assistant for National Security Affairs for the Vice President of the + United States from 1977 until 1981 + Crimmins, John + Hugh, U.S. Ambassador to Brazil until 1978 + + Desai, + Morarji, Prime Minister of India from 1977 until + 1979 + Dobrynin, Anatoliy + F., Soviet Ambassador to the United States + Duncan, Charles + W., Deputy Secretary of Defense from 1977 until 1979; + Secretary of Energy from August 24, 1979 until January 20, 1981 + Earle, Ralph, + II, U.S. Ambassador and Director of the Arms Control and + Disarmament Agency from 1980 + Espil, Jorge + Aja, Argentine Ambassador to the United States from 1977 + until 1980 + Farley, Philip + J., Deputy to the Special Presidential Assistant for + Non-Proliferation Matters from 1977 until 1978 + Fisher, + Adrian, Special Adviser, U.S. Delegation to the 32nd + UN General Assembly from 1977 until + 1978; Head, U.S. Delegation on U.S.–USSR Working Groups on Prohibition of + Radiological Weapons, New Types of and Systems of Mass Destruction and + Chemical Weapons from 1977 until 1979; Alternate Representative, Tenth + Special Session of the UN General Assembly, + 1978 + Flowerree, Charles + C., Chief of International Division, Arms Control + and Disarmament Agency from 1977 until 1980 + Ford, Gerald + R., President of the United States from August 9, 1974 + until January 20, 1977 + Fri, Robert + W., Acting Director of the Energy Research and + Development Administration from January until September 1977 + Frosch, Robert + A., Administrator of the National Aeronautics and Space + Administration from June 1977 until January 20, 1981 + Fukuda, Takeo, + Prime Minister of Japan from 1976 until 1978 + García Robles, + Alfonso, Mexican Foreign Secretary from 1975 until + 1976; Permanent Representative to the 1977 Geneva Disarmament Conference; + Chairman of the Mexican Delegation to the UN + Special Session on Disarmament, 1978 + Geisel, + Ernesto, President of Brazil from 1974 until 1979 + Gelb, Leslie + H., Assistant Secretary of State, Bureau of + Politico-Military Affairs, Department of State from 1977 until 1979 + Genscher, Hans + Dietrich, Foreign Minister of the Federal Republic + of Germany from 1974 until 1992 + Gilligan, + John, Director, Agency for International Development + from March 1977 until July 1979 + Giscard d’ Estaing, + Valery, President of France from 1974 until + 1981 + Glenn, John, + Senator (D–Ohio) + Gleysteen, William H, + Jr., Member, National Security Council Staff from + August 1976 until January 1977; Deputy Assistant Secretary for East Asian + and Pacific Affairs from January 1977 until June 1978; U.S. Ambassador to + Korea from July 1978 until June 1981 + González Gálves, + Sergio, Director-in-Chief for International + Organizations, Mexican Secretariat of Foreign Relations from 1977 until + 1979 + Gromyko, Andrei + A., Soviet Foreign Minister from 1957 until 1985 + Gros Espiell, + Hector, Secretary-General, Organization for the + Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America from 1977 until 1980 + Guiringaud, Louis + de, Foreign Minister of France from 1976 until + 1978 + Haig, Alexander M., + Jr., Brigadier General, USA; Commander-in-Chief, + European Command and Supreme Allied Commander Europe from 1974 until + 1979 + Hanson, Thor, + Rear Admiral, USN; Military Assistant to the Secretary of Defense from 1977 + until 1981 + Harriman, + Averell, U.S. Representative, Tenth Special Session of + the UN General Assembly, 1978 + + Hartman, Arthur + A., Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs + from January 8, 1974 until June 8, 1977; U.S. Ambassador to France from 1977 + until 1981 + Hatfield, + Mark, Senator (R–Oregon); ranking member of the Senate + Appropriations Committee + Hermes, Peter, + State Secretary of the Foreign Ministry of the Federal Republic of Germany + until 1977; Federal Republic of Germany Ambassador to the United States from + 1979 until 1984 + Hormats, + Robert, Member, National Security Council Staff until + 1977 + Huang Chen + (Zhen), Chief of the People’s Republic of China Liaison + Office in the United States from March 1973 until November 1977 + Hunter, + Robert, Director of Middle East Affairs and Member, + National Security Council Staff from 1977 until 1981 + Huntington, + Samuel, Member, National Security Council Staff and + White House Coordinator of Security Planning from 1977 until 1978 + Hyland, William + G., Member, National Security Council Staff from + February 1977 until October 1977 + Ikle, Frederick C. + (Fred), Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament + Agency from 1973 until January 1977 + Is(s)raelyan, + Viktor, Soviet Representative to the Committee on + Disarmament and the Chemical Weapons Negotiations + Jackson, Henry M. + (Scoop), Senator (D–Washington) + Jamieson, + Donald, Foreign Minister of Canada from 1976 until May + 4, 1979 + Javits, Jacob, + Senator (R–New York) + Jay, Peter, + U.K. Ambassador to the United States from 1977 until 1979 + Jordan, Hamilton + M., White House Chief of Staff from 1979 until + 1980 + Keeny, + Spurgeon, Deputy Director of the U.S. Arms Control and + Disarmament Agency from 1977 until 1981 + Kennedy, John + F., President of the United States from January 20, 1961 + until November 22, 1963 + Khlestov, + Oleg, Soviet Representative to the International Atomic + Energy Agency from 1978 until 1988; Representative to Bilateral Working + Group on Anti-Satellite Systems + Kissinger, Henry + A., President’s Assistant for National Security + Affairs until November 3, 1975; Secretary of State from September 21, 1973 + until January 20, 1977 + Korniyenko, Georgi + M., Director, USA Department and member of the + Collegium, Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs + Kosygin, Alexei + N., Chairman, Council of Ministers of the Soviet Union + until 1980 + Krimer, + William, interpreter for the Department of State + Lake, W. + Anthony, Director, Policy Planning Staff, Department of + State from 1977 until 1981 + Lambsdorff, Otto + Graf, Minister of Economics for the Federal Republic + of Germany from 1977 until 1982 + Lance, Thomas Bertram + (Bert), Director of the Office of Management and + Budget from January 1977 until September 1977 + Leonard, + James, U.S. Deputy Representative to the United Nations + from 1977 until 1979 + López Portillo, + José, President of Mexico from December 1, 1976 + until November 30, 1982 + Luns, Joseph, + Secretary-General, North Atlantic Treaty Organization from 1971 until + 1984 + + Mansfield, Michael J. + (Mike), Senator (D–Montana); Senate Majority Leader + until 1977; thereafter U.S. Ambassador to Japan + Mathews, Jessica + Tuchman, Member, National Security Council Staff + from 1977 until 1979 + McGiffert, + David, Assistant Secretary of Defense for International + Security Affairs from 1977 until 1981 + McGovern, + George, Senator (D–South Dakota) + McIntyre, + James, Director of the Office of Management and Budget + from September 1977 until January 1981 + McMahon, John, + Deputy Direction of Operations, Central Intelligence Agency, from 1978 until + 1981 + Mendelevich, + Lev, Soviet Ambassador and Head of Delegation to + Conventional Arms Transfers Talks + Molander, + Roger, Member, National Security Council Staff from 1974 + until 1981 + Mondale, Walter + F., Vice President of the United States from January 21, + 1977 until January 20, 1981 + Morokhov, + Igor, First Deputy Chairman of the USSR State Committee + for Peaceful Utilization of Atomic Energy and Delegate to the Comprehensive + Test Ban/Peaceful Nuclear Explosion Talks + Mujezinovic, + Dzevad, Yugoslav Deputy Permanent Representative to the + United Nations + Mulley, + Frederick, U.K. Minister of State for Defence from 1976 + until 1979 + Muskie, Edmund + S., Secretary of State from May 8, 1980 until January + 20, 1981 + Newhouse, + John, Assistant Director, Bureau of International + Security Programs, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency from 1977 until 1979 + Nixon, Richard + M., President of the United States from January 20, 1969 + until August 9, 1974 + Nye, Joseph, + Deputy Under Secretary of State for Security Assistance, Science, and + Technology from 1977 until 1979 + Odom, William + E., Colonel, USA; Military Assistant to the Assistant to + the President for National Security Affairs from 1977 until 1981 + Oplinger, + Gerald, Member, Office of Nuclear Policy and Operations, + Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs, Department of State from 1977 until + 1978; Member, National Security Council Staff from 1979 until 1981 + Owen, David, + Foreign Secretary of the United Kingdom from 1976 until May 1979 + Owen, Henry, + U.S. Ambassador-at-Large for Economic Summit Affairs from 1997 until + 1981 + Palliser, + Michael, U.K. Permanent Under-Secretary of State and + Head of the Diplomatic Service from 1975 until 1982 + Pastor, + Robert, Member, National Security Council Staff and + National Security Advisor for Latin America and the Caribbean from 1977 + until 1981 + Pell, + Claiborne, Senator (D–Rhode Island) + Percy, + Charles, Senator (R–Illinois) + Pérez, Carlos + Andrés, President of Venezuela from 1974 until + 1979 + Petrosyants, + Androkin, Chairman of the Soviet State Committee on + Atomic Energy and Head of the Soviet Delegation to the Comprehensive Test + Ban Talks + Pickering, + Thomas, U.S. Ambassador to Jordan from 1974 until 1978; + Assistant Secretary of State for Oceans and Scientific and Environmental + Affairs from 1978 until 1981 + Pinheiro, Joao + Baptista, Brazilian Ambassador to the United + States + Podgorny, Nikolay + Viktorovich, Chairman of the Presidium of the + Supreme Soviet of the USSR + + Powell, Joseph L. + (Jody), White House Press Secretary from January + 1977 until January 1981 + Press, Frank, + Science Advisor and Director of the Office of Science and Technology Policy + from 1977 until 1980 + Putnam, + Robert, Member, National Security Council Staff from + 1977 until 1981 + Resor, + Stanley, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy and Head + of the Mutual Balanced Force Reductions Delegation from 1977 until + 1981 + Ridgway, + Rozanne, U.S. Ambassador to Finland from 1977 until + 1980 + Roel, + Santiago, Secretary of Foreign Relations, Mexico from + 1976 until 1979 + Rush, Kenneth + W., U.S. Ambassador to France from November 21, 1974 + until March 14, 1977 + Sarbanes, + Paul, Senator (D–Maryland) + Sayre, Robert, + U.S. Ambassador to Brazil from 1979 until 1981 + Schechter, + Jerry, Member, National Security Council Staff + Schlesinger, James + R., Special Assistant to the President from January + until September 1977; Secretary of Energy from October 1977 until July + 1979 + Schmidt, + Helmut, Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany + from 1974 until 1982 + Schroeder, Patricia + (Pat), Member, U.S. House of Representatives + (D–Colorado) + Seignious, George M., + II, General, USA; At-Large Member of Strategic Arms + Limitations Talks Delegation from 1978 until 1979; U.S. Ambassador and + Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency from March 1, 1979 until + 1980 + Shulman, + Marshall, U.S. Ambassador and Special Advisor on Soviet + Affairs to Secretary of State Vance + from 1977 until 1980 + Silveira, Antŏnio Francisco + Azeredo da, Brazilian Minister of Foreign Affairs + from 1974 until 1979 + Simonet, + Henri, Belgian Minister of Foreign Affairs from 1977 + until 1980 + Slocombe, Walter + B., Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for + International Security Affairs from 1977 until 1979; Deputy Undersecretary + of Defense for Policy, 1979 until January 1981 + Sloss, Leon, + Assistant Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency from 1976 + until 1978 + Smith, Gerard C. + (Gerry), Special Presidential Assistant for + Non-Proliferation Matters from 1977 until 1980 + Sparkman, John + J., Senator (D–Alabama); chairman, Senate Foreign + Relations Committee from 1975 until 1979 + Stennis, John + C., Senator (D–Mississippi); chairman, Committee on + Armed Services + Stoessel, Walter J., + Jr., U.S. Ambassador to the Federal Republic of + Germany from 1976 until 1980 + Stone, + Richard, Senator (D–Florida) + Sukhodrev, Viktor + M., First Secretary, Soviet Ministry of Foreign + Affairs and interpreter + Tarnoff, + Peter, Executive Secretary of the Department of State + and Special Assistant to the Secretary of State from 1977 until 1981 + Timerbaev, + Roland, Disarmament Chief of the Soviet Ministry of + Foreign Affairs from 1975 until 1980 + Tindemans, + Leo, Prime Minister of Belgium from 1974 until + 1978 + Todman, + Terence, Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American + Affairs from April 1977 until June 1978 + Toon, Malcom, + U.S. Ambassador to the Soviet Union from January 18, 1977 until 1979 + Trudeau, + Pierre, Prime Minister of Canada until June 4, 1979, and + from March 3, 1980 until June 1984 + + Turner, Stansfield + M., Admiral, USN; Director of Central Intelligence + from January 1977 until January 1981 + Twaddell, + William, Office of the Secretary of State + Utgoff, Dr. + Victor, Member, National Security Council Staff from + 1977 until 1981 + Uyl, Johannes + den, Prime Minister of the Netherlands from May 1973 + until December 1977 + Van den Heuvel, + William, U.S. Ambassador to European Office of the + United Nations in Geneva from 1977 until 1977; Deputy U.S. Ambassador to the + United Nations from 1979 until January 1981 + Van der Stoel, + Max, Foreign Minister of the Netherlands from May 1973 + until December 1977 + Vance, Cyrus + R., Secretary of State from January 1977 until April 28, + 1980 + Vavilov, + Andrei, official, USA Department, Soviet Ministry of + Foreign Affairs + Vest, George + S., Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs + from 1977 until 1981 + Videla, Jorge + Rafael, President of Argentina from 1976 until + 1981 + Von Staden, + Berndt, Federal Republic of Germany Ambassador to the + United States from 1973 until 1979 + Vorontsov, + Yuly, Minister Counselor at the Soviet Embassy in + Washington, DC + Vorster, Johannes + (John), Prime Minister of South Africa from 1966 + until 1978; President from 1978 until 1979 + Waldheim, + Kurt, Secretary General of the United Nations + Warnke, Paul, + Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency from 1977 until February + 1979 + Watson, Thomas J., + Jr., U.S. Ambassador to the Soviet Union from + October 25, 1979 until January 15, 1981 + Weiler, + Lawrence, Special Assistant for Public and Academic + Liaison, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, 1978; U.S. Ambassador and + Coordinator for UN Special Session on + Disarmament from 1977 until 1978 + Wolfowitz, + Paul, Staff Member, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency + from 1972 until 1977; Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Regional + Programs from 1977 until 1980 + Yarmolinsky, + Adam, Counselor, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency + from 1977 until 1980 + York, Herbert, + U.S. Ambassador and Representative to the Trilateral Comprehensive Test Ban + Negotiations from 1979 until 1980 + Young, Andrew, + U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations from 1977 until 1979 + +
+ + + +
+ + Arms Control and Nonproliferation + +
+ Anti-Satellite (ASAT) Weapons and + Talks + +
+ 1. Memorandum From the Acting Director of the Arms Control and + Disarmament Agency (Sloss) to the + President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, + Staff Material, Defense/Security, Utgoff, Box 156, Anti-Satellite Policy: 1–6/77. + Secret. + Washington, February 1, 1977 + + SUBJECT + Anti-Satellite Related Arms Control Initiatives + +

NSDM 345The + Ford administration + issued National Security Decision Memorandum 345, “U.S. + Anti-Satellite Capabilities,” on January 18, 1977. It is printed in + Foreign + Relations, 1969–1976, vol. XXXV, National Security + Policy, 1973–1976, Document 134. essentially + directs that the Director, ACDA, in + coordination with the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, and + the Director of Central Intelligence, identify and assess arms control + initiatives intended to limit the development or deployment of a + capability to attack satellites, to reduce the likelihood that + satellites will be attacked, and to define actions that would constitute + “interference” with satellites.

+

In view of its importance, but mindful of the possibility that the timing + and scope of the arms control study and of related anti-satellite + efforts may be changed, I am beginning the effort directed by the NSDM. I have asked that points of contact + be designated by State, Defense and CIA.

+ + Leon + Sloss + Acting + +
+ +
+ + 2. Editorial Note +

While the administration of President Jimmy + Carter pondered its options for anti-satellite + capabilities, it also tried to establish a “coherent” space policy. The + President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs, Zbigniew Brzezinski, “concluded that + this issue is of a high priority nature warranting a timely, + comprehensive review and statement of national policy.” In an undated + draft Presidential Review Memorandum, he tasked the various departments + involved in national security decision-making to weigh in on the + administration’s strategy. In particular, he asked that the departments + examine “the relative importance of the use of space for the different + yet interrelated goals of our civil, military, and intelligence + programs.” (Memorandum from Brzezinski to the Secretaries of State, Defense, + Interior, Agriculture, Commerce, the Directors of the Arms Control and + Disarmament Agency, Central Intelligence, the Office of Science and + Technology Policy, and the Administrator of the National Aeronautics and + Space Administration, March 5, 1977, and draft Presidential Review + Memorandum; Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Harold Brown Papers, Box 22, 1977 + Missiles and Space Policy)

+

On March 14, 1977, Director of Central Intelligence Stansfield Turner urged Brzezinski to create a Policy Review + Committee devoted to space policy, which would be chaired by Secretary + of Defense Harold Brown, and + argued that “No policy initiative likely to have major effects, e.g. + ASAT negotiations, should be + permitted until those effects have been carefully assessed.” (Memorandum + from Turner to Brzezinski, March 14; Carter Library, + National Security Council, Institutional Files, Box 41, Folder 3, PRM–23 [3])

+

Paul Warnke, the Director of the + Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, concurred with Turner, and noted that “of particular + concern to the arms control effort is that the policy options and + recommendations delineate clearly what the impact of possible US actions might be on maintaining the free + use of space and what effect changes in the operation of US satellite programs for military, + intelligence and civil purposes might have on our + verification capabilities.” (Memorandum from Warnke to Brzezinski; Carter Library, National Security Council, + Institutional Files, Box 41, Folder 3, PRM–23 [3])

+

Carter issued Presidential Review + Memorandum/NSC 23, “A Coherent + National Space Policy” on March 28, which included the determination of + “the appropriate degree of system survivability, defensive, and + offensive capabilities in space, and arms limitations initiatives.” The + memorandum is scheduled for publication in Foreign Relations, 1977–1980, vol. XXV, + Global Issues; United Nations Issues. (Ibid.)

+
+ +
+ + 3. Memorandum of ConversationSource: Department of State, Office of the Secretariat Staff, + Special Adviser to the Secretary (S/MS) on Soviet Affairs Marshall Shulman—Jan 21, 77–Jan 19, + 81, Lot 81D109, Box 8, Vance + to Moscow, March 28–30, 1977. Secret; Nodis. The meeting took place at the Kremlin. Drafted + by Krimer on April 2; + reviewed by Hyland; and + approved by Twaddell on April + 12. The conversation is printed in full in Foreign + Relations, 1977–1980, vol. VI, Soviet Union, Document + 21. + Moscow, March 30, 1977, 11:15 a.m.–2:15 + p.m. + + SUBJECT + Berlin, Cyprus, Arms Control, CSCE, Bilateral Matters + + + PARTICIPANTS + + UNITED STATES + Secretary Cyrus R. + Vance + Ambassador Malcolm + Toon + Mr. Paul + Warnke + Assistant Secretary Arthur + Hartman + Mr. William + Hyland + Deputy Assistant Secretary Slocombe + Mr. William D. + Krimer, Interpreter + + + USSR + Foreign Minister A.A. + Gromyko + Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers L.V. + Smirnov + Deputy Foreign Minister Georgiy Korniyenko + Ambassador A.F. + Dobrynin + Mr. O. Sokolov + Mr. V.M. Sukhrodrev, Interpreter + + +

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to anti-satellite + capabilities.]

+

ANTI-SATELLITE CAPABILITIES

+

The Secretary said that in this connectionGromyko + and Vance had just briefly + discussed a possible international treaty whereby states would + promise not to be the first to use nuclear weapons. he wanted + to raise the issue of placing limits on the anti-satellite capabilities + of both sides. We had noted that such capabilities were in the process + of being developed. We firmly believed that an attempt should be made to + stabilize the strategic situation by discussing such capabilities, and + were prepared to enter into discussions with the Soviet Union concerning + their limitation. In the interim, he would suggest that it would be + useful to exercise restraint in testing anti-satellite systems.

+

Gromyko + said he could not say that no problem existed in this area. He would be + prepared to examine any proposal the United States could submit.

+

The Secretary thought that was good, because he + believed it important that we do this.

+

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to Anti-Satellite + Capabilities.]

+
+ +
+ + 4. Memorandum From the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Brown) + to Secretary of Defense BrownSource: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Harold Brown Papers, Box 22, + Anti-Satellite Program. Top Secret. + Washington, July + 29, 1977 + + SUBJECT + Antisatellites + +

1. (S) In response to your request on 12 April 1977,Not found. the Joint Chiefs of Staff hereby + provide their positions regarding acquisition of a US antisatellite (ASAT) capability and potential negotiations with the USSR concerning an ASAT ban.

+

2. (TS) The Joint Chiefs of Staff believe + that an urgent requirement exists for the United States to attain an + ASAT capability. This capability + is needed to deny the USSR significant + military advantages in the event of conflict and to provide a credible + deterrent against USSR interference + with US space systems during crises.

+

3. (TS) Soviet space systems provide + major military benefits which, together with projected future space + systems, will have an increasingly larger role in strategic and tactical + conflict for real time reconnaissance, command and control, navigation, + and meteorological support. The most immediate threat against US Forces is the use of ELINT and radar + ocean reconnaissance satellite systems capable of locating ships. This + real time enhanced capability seriously challenges the survivability of + the US surface fleet.

+

4. (TS) The USSR is well aware that the United States is increasingly + dependent on space systems for intelligence collection, warning of + missile launch, communications, navigation, and meteorological support. + Current ASAT capabilities favor the + USSR; not only can the USSR eliminate an important element of + the US force structure which supports + US strategy, but it can do so + without suffering similar consequences. Currently, the United States has + no ASAT capability. The Joint Chiefs + of Staff conclude that it would be undesirable for the United States to + remain operationally incapable of responding to or interfering with + military-related USSR space systems, + particularly those which constitute a direct threat to US Forces.

+

5. (TS) The Joint Chiefs of Staff further + believe that the United States should not participate in a ban on + research, development, testing, and deployment of various ASAT systems. Of principal concern is the lack of adequate verification + methods to provide assurance that the USSR does not retain or increase an ASAT capability. Because of the USSR’s present lead in proven engineering + and in operational experience, it could quickly gain superiority in + space should it choose to abrogate a total ASAT ban. Since the United States does not have an ASAT capability, any ban of a lesser + degree which allowed present Soviet ASAT systems to exist but which prohibited development of + new systems would legitimize and perpetuate the present imbalance.

+

6. (TS) The Joint Chiefs of Staff + consider the medium of space to be of utmost importance to the United + States. They request you support their views concerning the acquisition + and deployment of an ASAT capability + as well as their related views on potential negotiations with the USSR concerning an ASAT ban.

+

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

+ + George S. + Brown + Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff + +
+ +
+ + 5. Summary of Significant Discussion and Conclusions of a Policy + Review Committee MeetingSource: + Carter Library, National Security Council, Institutional Files, Box + 41, Folder 3, PRM–23 [3]. Top + Secret; Talent Keyhole; Comint. The meeting took place in the Old + Executive Office Building. + Washington, August 4, 1977, + 3:45–5:45 p.m. + + SUBJECT: + PRM/NSC–23, Coherent Space Policy + + + PARTICIPANTS: + + State: + Warren + Christopher + Michael Michaud + + + Defense: + Harold Brown + Charles + Duncan + Hans Mark + Robert A. Greenberg + Walter + Slocombe + Lt. Gen. William Y. + Smith (JCS) + + + DCI: + John McMahon + [name not declassified] + + + NASA: + Robert + Frosch + Alan Lovelace + + + OSTP: + Frank Press + Arthur Morrisey + + + ACDA: + Spurgeon + Keeny + James Timbie + + + OMB: + W. Bowman Cutter + E. Randy Jayne + + + Interior: + Cecil D. Andrus + + + Commerce: + David Johnson + Richard Frank + + + Agriculture: + Robert Bergland + Harold L. Strickland + + + NSC: + Zbigniew + Brzezinski + William + Hyland + Robert A. Rosenberg + Benjamin Huberman + + +

The PRC, chaired by Secretary Brown, met to review national space + policy issues, identify areas of agreement and disagreement and make + recommendations for decisions to the President.

+

Secretary Brown opened the meeting + with a discussion of United States’ policy on antisatellite (ASAT) activity and arms control (Issue + Five),Presumably Brown is referring to a + briefing memorandum on space policy issues which was not + found. focusing mainly on arms control initiatives. Secretary + Brown proposed a ban only on + peacetime use of antisatellite systems since the Soviets already have a + capability. The U.S. does not. He added that verification of a more + comprehensive ban would be extremely difficult, and that in wartime, + arms control would not provide protection.

+ +

Dr. Brzezinski noted that the + President has committed to discussions with the Soviets,In a March 4 letter to Brezhnev, Carter wrote that he wanted to “reach an early + agreement” on a number of issues, including an “agreement not to arm + satellites nor to develop the ability to destroy or damage + satellites.” The letter is printed in full in Foreign + Relations, 1977–1980, vol. VI, Soviet Union, Document + 13. stating that a comprehensive ban would serve + our security interests, reinforce stability, and support our SALT efforts. He asked that we proceed + rapidly to form a working group to examine the essential aspects of such + negotiations. Dr. Brzezinski + opined that just because the Soviets have something is no adequate + reason for us to acquire an ASAT. He + felt that a comprehensive ban would hold the Soviets at their present + level and add some assurances that they would not proceed in other + areas.

+

Mr. Keeny noted that a peacetime + ban adds little to existing agreements. John + McMahon stated [2 lines not + declassified] General Smith recommended we not proceed with negotiations on + limitations due to verification problems.

+

A formulation by Mr. Hyland would + propose to the Soviets a moratorium on testing and explore with them + what level agreement would be possible before explicitly deciding on an + option. Secretary Brown agreed to + provide a coordinated outline for the President covering the major + approaches, disagreements and problems in this area in two weeks, based + on a special working group effort. The U.S. ASAT question would be treated as well in this paper.

+

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to anti-satellite + capabilities.]

+
+ +
+ + 6. Issues Paper Prepared by the PRM–23 Interagency GroupSource: Carter Library, National Security Council, + Institutional Files, Box 41, Folder 3, PRM–23 [3]. Top Secret. + Washington, August + 9, 1977 +

ARMS CONTROL FOR ANTISATELLITE SYSTEMS ISSUES PAPER

+ + TABLE OF CONTENTS + + + Page + + + I. INTRODUCTION + 1 + + + II. BACKGROUND + 1 + + + A. Prior Statements + 1 + + + B. Summary of the Issues + 1 + + + C. The Baseline: Current Circumstances/Projections + 2 + + + 1. U.S. and Soviet Dependence on Space + 2 + + + 2. Current and Projected ASAT Systems + 4 + + + 3. Current Treaty Limits Upon ASAT Use + 6 + + + III. GENERAL CONCERNS AND ISSUES + 7 + + + A. The Threat of ASAT Arms + Competition + 7 + + + B. Need for a U.S. ASAT + 8 + + + C. Verification + 9 + + + 1. General + 9 + + + 2. Particular U.S. Verification Concerns + 10 + + + 3. Particular Soviet Concerns + 11 + + + 4. Breakout + 12 + + + D. Other Considerations + 12 + + + IV. RELATIONSHIP OF ASATS TO OTHER ISSUES + 12 + + + A. Survivability + 12 + + + B. Free Use of Space + 13 + + + V. APPROACHES TO ASAT ARMS + CONTROL + 14 + +
+

ARMS CONTROL FOR ANTISATELLITE + SYSTEMS

+

I. INTRODUCTION

+

(S) The principal issue for decision is one of basic policy: assuming a + U.S. initiative with the Soviet Union on anti-satellite (ASATThe term + ASAT will here include any + physical or electromagnetic attack on space systems (i.e., physical + destruction, jamming, laser attack, or command capture. [1 line not declassified] [Footnote is in the + original.]) systems, what general approach should be taken in seeking limitations? Clearly + the decision cannot be approached in isolation, but must be integrated + with overall analysis of space policy. It would be premature to draw up + detailed negotiating options at this stage, but it is important to set + broad objectives before proceeding with preparations on an initial + proposal. This paper reviews ASAT + status and background, relates the ASAT issue to other policy issues, and describes four + approaches for ASAT arms control. + Given a decision on approach, it will be possible to develop an initial + proposal to the Soviets, and to pose technical questions for more + intensive study.

+

II. BACKGROUND

+

A. Prior Statements

+

(S) As described publicly, the President has suggested to the Soviets + that each side “forego the opportunity to arm satellite bodies and . . . + to destroy observation satellites.”Not + found. Further, Secretary Vance raised the issue of controlling ASAT systems during the March Moscow + meeting with Minister Gromyko; + Secretary Vance emphasized the + need to maintain strategic stability, suggested the need for discussions + on ASAT’s, and indicated that during + the interim it would be useful if the sides exercised restraint in their + testing of ASAT systems.See Document 3. + Minister Gromyko replied that he + could not say that no problem existed in this area, and stated that the + Soviets would examine any proposal the U.S. submitted on the subject. It + was agreed to establish a bilateral Working Group on antisatellite + limitations. The U.S. has agreed to make a substantive proposal on + ASAT limitations to the Soviets. + Following this, the Working Group would be convened. [2 lines not declassified]

+

B. Summary of the + Issues

+

(S) In overview, the ASAT issue reduces + ultimately to a few key points. On the one hand,

+

—ASAT limitations might preclude a + long-term arms competition characterized by action-reaction cycles, + increased defense costs, peacetime tensions, and crisis instability; + furthermore,

+

—limitations on Soviet capabilities to attack satellites would be + desirable since the U.S. is becoming increasingly dependent on + satellites for basic functions in peacetime, crisis, conventional war, + and strategic war.

+

However, we must take into account:

+ +

—the possible need, independent of Soviet ASAT capabilities, for a U.S. ASAT system to counter threatening Soviet satellites.

+

—the existence of a current Soviet orbital ASAT, noting that the U.S. has none.

+

—the difficult verification problems in a realm where incentives to cheat + may be greater than under previous agreements such as SALT One.

+

(S) Since each side has only a small number of critical operational + satellites (6–15), small numbers of ASAT’s could have a decisive significance. This is in + contrast with SALT and ABM issues where stability is not affected + by small numbers of weapons.

+

C. The Baseline: Current + Circumstances and Projections

+

1. U.S. and Soviet + Dependence on Space

+

(S) There is a tendency to think of space as “peaceful”, in part because + some [less than 1 line not declassified] + compliance with stabilizing treaties which would not otherwise be + possible, warning satellites contribute to our strategic and space + exploration, and international communications. Furthermore, there has + never been a confrontation in space, treaties have given space a special + status, and space has been used as a peaceful area where the U.S. and + USSR can work together + cooperatively.

+

(S) On the other hand, space systems are becoming increasingly important + for battle management on both sides. Table One lists some of the + applications which military [less than 1 line not + declassified] satellites have now or could have within ten + years.

+

Table One (TS)

+

Examples of Military Use of Space Now or + in 1980’s

+

Tactical Operations

+

—real-time surveillance with readout to battlefield commandersOperational now or in the near future—U.S. [Footnote + is in the original.]

+

—all-weather broad ocean surveillance of surface combatant; and convoys + providing real-time targeting data to submarines, surface ships and + aircraftOperational now or in the near + future—U.S. [Footnote is in the original.] [Footnote in the original not declassified.]

+

—[1 line not declassified]

+

—antisubmarine warfare (e.g., relay reports from sonobuoys)

+

—real-time weather dataIbid.

+ +

—responsive world-wide command and control capabilityIbid.

+

—battlefield surveillance

+

Strategic Operations

+

—targeting dataIbid.

+

—early warning of attack by SLBM’s and ICBM’sIbid.

+

—delivery of the Emergency Action Message to nuclear capable forcesOperational now or in the near future—U.S. + [Footnote is in the original.]

+

—precise navigation for strategic weapons delivery systemsIbid.

+

—post-attack damage assessment

+

(S) The entries in Table One are realistic rather than speculative plans. + It follows that satellites may, in the future, have a significant effect + on warfare—they may even determine the outcome of certain wars, + especially wars short of a full nuclear exchange.

+

Relative Dependence and Vulnerability

+

(TS) The U.S. is likely to remain more + dependent on space systems than the Soviets in several important + functional areas. However, the U.S. and USSR have differing needs and are dependent on space in + correspondingly different ways. The U.S. space program tends to have a + small number of expensive, long-lived and sophisticated multipurpose + satellites. As space systems have been integrated into military + operations, the U.S. has changed its operations, plans, and uses of + terrestrial forces. Space is now an integral part of U.S. military, + tactical, and strategic planning. The Soviets tend to have larger + numbers of simpler systems and have launched additional satellites + during crises (e.g., prior to the invasion of Czechoslovakia and during + the 1973 Mid-East war). The Soviets may be emphasizing tactical use of + satellites [less than 1 line not declassified] A + given U.S. satellite will often represent a higher value target than a + given Soviet satellite. However, some Soviet satellites are very + valuable and unique [2½ lines not + declassified]

+

2. Current and Projected + ASAT Systems

+

(S) The U.S. currently has no operational ASAT system, but did have a single-pad system deployed at + Johnston Island from 1964 until 1975. The system employed Thor boosters and a nuclear warhead, + and operated in a direct-ascent mode against low-altitude targets only. + The Johnston Island system was initially a response to Soviet threats + about orbital weapons of mass + destruction (Orbital Bombardment Systems). The system was deactivated + because of fiscal pressures and because a low-altitude nuclear burst + would probably damage U.S. satellites large distances away from the + burst as well as the targeted Soviet satellite.

+

(TS) By contrast with the U.S., the + Soviets have an operational orbital ASAT capability. [1 line not + declassified]

+ + Table Two (TS) [1 line not declassified] + + System + Comments & Description + Capability + + + 1. [1 chart item not + declassified] + + + 2. Galosh Interceptor + —nuclear (with potential for nonnuclear variant) + —[less than 1 line not + declassified] + + + + —direct ascent + —[less than 1 line not + declassified] + + + + —has ASAT capability, [less than 1 line not declassified] + —is operational as an ABM + + + 3. [1 chart item not + declassified] + + + 4. [1 chart item not + declassified] + +
+

U.S. Activities are:

+

(S) The U.S. has not consumated any ASAT deployment plans. The U.S. is developing a miniature + homing vehicle (MHV) which destroys its + target by high-velocity impact. This system is planned to be tested + against low altitude target by 1981. The MHV could be air-launched against satellites below 2000 + km. If the MHV were used on Minuteman or equivalent space launchers, + it could have high-altitude capability.

+

(TS) [1 paragraph (5 + lines) not declassified]

+

Other U.S. [less than 1 line + not declassified] Possibilities are:

+

Ground-Based Lasers—[less than 1 line not + declassified] possible for U.S. by 1981 (there is no dedicated + U.S. laser ASAT program at this + time).

+

Space-Based Lasers—possible for U.S. by mid-1980’s; ARPA is doing + subsystem technology. [3 lines not + declassified]

+

High-Altitude Interceptors—[1 line not + declassified] The U.S. ASAT + interceptor currently under development can grow to a high altitude + capability.

+ +

[less than 1 line not declassified]

+

(TS) [1 paragraph (18 + lines) not declassified][2 footnotes in the original not + declassified]

+

3. Current Treaty Limits + Upon ASAT Use

+

(U) A number of agreements currently limit ASAT activities to some degree during peacetime.

+

(U) The International Telecommunications Convention prohibits harmful + interference with radio services or communications.

+

(U) The 1967 Outer Space TreatyThe Treaty on + Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and + Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and other Celestial Bodies + was signed at Washington, London, and Moscow, January 27, 1967, and + entered into force October 10, 1967. bans placing nuclear + weapons or any other kinds of weapons of mass destruction in orbit and + establishes satellites as under the jurisdiction of states which + register them with the UN. This treaty + further requires international consultations before proceeding with any + activity which would cause potentially harmful interference with the + activities of other parties in the peaceful use of outer space.

+

(U) The Limited Test Ban Treaty prohibits detonating a nuclear weapon in + space.

+

(U) The 1971 “Measures Agreement to Reduce the Outbreak of Nuclear War” + requires the U.S. and USSR to notify + each other in the event of interference with strategic warning systems + or their related communication systems.

+

(U) The 1972 ABM Treaty and the Interim + SALT Agreement ban interference + with National Technical Means (NTM) of + Verification, operated in accordance with international law.

+

III. GENERAL CONCERNS AND ISSUES

+

A. The Threat of an ASAT Arms Competition

+

(TS) A number of recent events have + raised public concerns about a possible arms competition in space, e.g., + [2 lines not declassified] exaggerated + statements in the U.S. press about lasers and charged particle beams, + and misinformed leaks to the press about “laser blinding” of U.S. + satellites.

+

(TS) Concern about Soviet resumption of + orbital ASAT tests [less than 1 line not declassified] led to two NSC directives. Last year, NSDM 333 directed a major review of + satellite vulnerability and survivability. Also, NSDM 345 (signed January 18, 1977) + directed the DoD to build an ASAT system on an expedited basis to + selectively nullify certain militarily important Soviet space systems. Both NSDM 333The Ford Administration issued + National Security Decision Memorandum 333, “Enhanced Survivability + of Critical U.S. Military and Intelligence Space Systems,” on July + 7, 1976. It is printed in Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, vol. XXXV, + National Security Policy, 1973–1976, Document 91. + and 345See footnote 2, + Document 1. are currently in abeyance pending + PRM–23 review.

+

(TS) The U.S. has not yet made a decision + on deploying an ASAT, and the pace of + related R&D has not been + accelerated. There is no deployment program to put a U.S. laser weapon + into space. The U.S. has not begun approved implementation of the + survivability measures recommended in response to NSDM 333. [11 lines not + declassified] The competition could be self-limiting on the + U.S. side because of fiscal constraints. However, an ASAT competition could lead to an + expensive long-term series of action-reaction events in which each side + would attempt to maintain the survivability of his own systems and to + develop ASAT systems with better + capabilities for attack against the adversary’s satellites. In addition + to their value as ASAT systems, lasers + in space could be provocative because of concerns that they were + stepping stones to a space-based laser ABM system. There are major differences between systems for + ASAT’s and those for ABM’s; nonetheless, the situation would be + a source of concern.

+

(S) Improvements and proliferation of ASAT’s could be disadvantageous to the U.S. military since + we may remain more dependent on space than the Soviets, and we may be in + a better position to exploit space because of our superior technological + space capabilities. An active Soviet ASAT program could raise doubts about the survivability of + proposed U.S. satellite systems, and prevent us from reaping the + benefits of our technological advantages.

+

B. Need for a U.S. ASAT

+

(TS) There are important scenarios in + which the absence of U.S. ASAT + capabilities could leave the U.S. at a net disadvantage; for example, + keeping the sea lanes of communication open during U.S./Soviet + conflicts. Further, the U.S. could probably build more effective ASAT’s and more survivable satellites + than could the Soviets, which given the U.S. determination to do so, + they could function to the disadvantage of the Soviets.

+

(TS) [6½ lines not + declassified] These satellites are uniquely valuable over the + broad ocean areas where the Soviets’ terrestrial resources are limited + or subject to attack. In addition, other Soviet space threats may affect + U.S. force operations, e.g., Soviet photo reconnaissance of U.S. massing forces, Soviet + intelligence message transmissions, Soviet weather data over U.S. + deployment routes, and Soviet communications.

+

(TS) In a December 1976 responseSee Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, vol. XXXV, + National Security Policy, 1973–1976, Document 123. + to the ad hoc NSC Panel report that led + to NSDM 345, the Secretary of Defense + stated that it is [3 lines not declassified] He + further suggested that it was not appropriate to initiate an immediate + program to develop and deploy an ASAT + interceptor using the then state-of-the-art techniques rather than use + developing technology. At this time a U.S. direct ascent nonnuclear + interceptor development and test program has been approved. Deployment + planning is underway, but deployment has not been approved.

+

C. Verification

+

Soviet compliance with an ASAT treaty + cannot be assumed, and the net assessment must account for the + possibility of Soviet cheating.

+

1. General

+

(TS) [2 paragraphs (10 + lines) not declassified]

+

—The Soviets have existing ASAT + capabilities [4 lines not declassified] the + ABM/ASAT role of Galosh, [2 lines not + declassified]

+

—A relatively small level of successful cheating, e.g., a handful of + ASAT’s and EW sites, could have a + high payoff.

+

Although the U.S. would abide by the limitations, we could not have + confidence that the Soviets would do likewise if the agreement were not + verifiable.

+

(TS) On the other hand, if ASAT testing were banned [8 lines not declassified]

+

2. Particular U.S. + Verification Concerns

+

(TS) a. [1 paragraph (5 + lines) not declassified]

+

(TS) b. [1 paragraph + (13 lines) not declassified]

+

(TS) [2½ lines not + declassified] Over time the Soviets might lose system + confidence without such testing. The Department of Defense believes that + confidence would not be lost, e.g., the U.S. has retained confidence in + the Titan II ICBM force without + launches over many years. The Soviets could conduct crew training by + launching satellites. For example, the U.S. system at Johnston Island + was maintained operational for eight years after the last ASAT test by allowing the crew to launch + weather satellites from Vandenberg Air Force Base.

+ +

(TS) [5 lines not + declassified] Cooperative measures such as on-site inspection + and other collateral constraints might reduce ambiguities. [3 lines not declassified]

+

(TS) Galosh. + Presumably, the Soviets would be permitted under an ASAT treaty to retain the Galosh + interceptors of their ABM systems. This + ABM has nuclear ASAT capability against low-altitude + satellites and could have a secondary ASAT mission. However, its use as such, if not very + precisely planned, could damage their own satellites as well as the + target satellite.

+

(TS) [1 paragraph (9 + lines) not declassified]

+

3. Particular Soviet + Concerns

+

The Soviets may be concerned that the U.S. could test and deploy + ground-based ASAT systems covertly. + They may not believe that the former U.S. ASAT system cannot now be launched from Vandenberg or + Johnston Island. They may have the same concerns as the U.S. about the + inherent capabilities of both military and civilian ground-, ship-, or + air-based lasers that exist or might be developed for other purposes. + The Soviets may also have parallel concerns to ours about the use of + radar equipment for EW. They have already evidenced concern about the + space shuttle and may believe it could be used for satellite inspection, + capture, and interference.

+

4. Breakout

+

(S) Even if the Soviets complied with terms of an ASAT agreement, we would have to be + concerned about breakout, including breakout simultaneous with ASAT attack. Since the lead time for U.S. + ASAT and satellite programs is + long, U.S. R&D hedges would still + require 2 to 4 more years to achieve compensating operational + capabilities.

+

D. Other Considerations

+

(S) The following are some other considerations which could affect policy + judgments regarding ASAT arms + control.

+

—[1 line not declassified]

+

—[2½ lines not declassified]

+

—[1½ lines not declassified]

+

—[1 line not declassified]

+

—[1 line not declassified]

+

IV. RELATIONSHIP OF ASATS TO OTHER SPACE + POLICY ISSUES

+

A. Survivability

+

(TS) The survivability issue is being + considered separately in the response to PRM–23. Some conclusions are:

+ +

—It would not be prudent to forego implementation of such survivability + measures as were recommended in response to NSDM 333 because of a belief that the satellites will be + protected by treaties. The measures recommended in NSDM 333 would primarily preclude “cheap + shots” based on current and near-term threats and current U.S. + vulnerabilities; most of the threats could still exist covertly under a + ban.

+

—[5 lines not declassified]

+

—[6 lines not declassified]

+

—[4 lines not declassified]

+

—ASAT arms control agreements could + reduce or delay advanced threats.

+

B. Free Use of Space

+

(U) Since incentives to build ASAT’s + are directly related to the nature of satellites they would destroy, the + Soviets may raise the possibility of limiting satellite functions in + response to our ASAT proposal. Some + concessions such as an agreement not to use the space shuttle as a + weapons carrier could overcome open Soviet concerns without major impact + on current U.S. plans. However, in considering any concessions we should + examine the effect it would have on a U.S. policy that promotes freedom + of use of space for peaceful (non-aggressive) purposes. Any limits, for + example, to ban radars in space, navigation systems like the NAVSTAR + Global Positioning System or reconnaissance satellites which appear to + concern the Soviets, would represent a radical departure from U.S. + policy. Such limits could have a major impact on U.S. space programs and + would require major redirections of efforts to compensate for loss of + space capabilities. We must take into account the potentially negative + limitations that would be placed on U.S. satellite reconnaissance + programs if certain restrictive language were included in an ASAT agreement (i.e., declaration of + satellite purpose, prelaunch on-site inspection, etc.). Limitations on + satellite functions, or on the space shuttle, should not be considered + without in-depth analyses.

+

V. APPROACHES TO ASAT ARMS CONTROL

+

(S) While the U.S. and USSR will hold + working group discussions on how we might forego the capability to + destroy satellite observation vehicles, the Soviets have not yet + expressed their views on the subject. The U.S. has not yet analyzed + fully the implications of all of the various possible ASAT limitations, even though the U.S. + has agreed to submit a proposal to the Soviets. Thus, it would be + unrealistic for the U.S. to choose among finely-tuned options at this + time. Instead, the issue for decision now is the choice of a general + approach for initial discussions.

+

(S) Arms control is one component in the overall U.S. policy toward + military and intelligence space activities. Other elements include our + survivability measures, our possible U.S. ASAT capabilities, and the military utility of space to + U.S. strategic and tactical forces. The general policy problem is to + weigh priorities and consider what approaches best serve the national interest. Arms + control is not a substitute for survivability measures, although it + could affect long-term requirements. Even a comprehensive agreement will + not affect ground-station vulnerabilities, nor prohibit passive + deception measures. In addition, it probably would not require the + Soviets to dismantle their ABM systems + with ASAT capability. [2 lines not declassified] With these + considerations in mind, three approaches to ASAT arms control have been defined and compared with the + baseline case of no agreement. A summary comparison of the approaches is + provided in Table Three.

+

(S) The three approaches would include [6 lines not + declassified]

+

A. Approach One: No + Agreement

+

(S) The Soviets may not be willing to agree to any substantive and + equitable ASAT limitations. They may + feel that the U.S. is merely attempting to impede Soviet activities in a + realm where the Soviets currently have advantages. They could respond to + U.S. proposals with counter-proposals which would not be acceptable to + us.

+

(S) In the absence of an ASAT + agreement, it would still be possible for the U.S. to pursue some ASAT arms control initiatives. For + example, we could propose under the “Measures Agreement” that the sides + show restraint in ASAT testing, + especially during crises. [2½ lines not + declassified] we could reaffirm the principal of + noninterference with National Technical Means by emphasizing that SALT obligation publically and privately. + DoD believes that the no agreement + case should not include these measures.

+ + Pros and Cons for the No-Agreement Approach + + Pros + + —U.S. would be free to develop ASATs to counter the + Soviets threat. + —If ASAT + capabilities cannot be controlled in a symmetric [less than 1 line not + declassified] way, it may be preferable to pursue + other objectives [1 line not + declassified] without creating a new + negotiating forum. + —Agreeing to a cosmetic agreement could impede later + attempts to seek substantive controls. + + —Development of U.S. ASAT capabilities may provide a bargaining + chip for future negotiations. + + Cons + + —An ASAT arms + competition could develop, or the U.S. might not develop + its ASAT; then the + asymmetries between the U.S. and USSR could widen. + —[4 lines not + declassified] + —[8 lines not + declassified] + —Would not reinforce the President’s public + position. + —Maintaining satellite survivability against advanced + threats would be more difficult. + —Extensive development of advanced ASATs (e.g., lasers + in space) could threaten the long term viability of the + ABM treaty. + + + +
+

B. Approach Two: [less than 1 line not declassified]

+

(S) Approach Two would not attempt to limit the capabilities of ASAT systems; [1½ + lines not declassified]

+

—[2½ lines not declassified]

+

—[2 lines not declassified]

+

—[5 lines not declassified]

+

(S) We would not designate some satellites as NTMs or as warning systems, since that might decrease the + protection afforded to those satellites not so designated. However, we + could acknowledge that both sides know that certain satellites of the + other side are more relevant to stability than others. In general, we + would try to maintain a high threshold for use of ASATs against any satellites.

+

(S) We could also explore the possibility of developing a wartime + sanctuary for hotline communications.

+

(S) The format of this approach would be more analogous to the Outer + Space Treaty and the Measures Agreement than to the ABM Treaty. There would be no limitations + on Soviet capabilities, and the U.S. would have to develop its + satellite, ASAT, and survivability + policies with due regard for the realities of wartime where treaties + need not apply.

+ + Pros and Cons for Approach Two + + Pros + + —May be negotiable since Soviets have ASATs, the U.S. + does not and the Soviets may refuse to accept + limitations on existing capabilities. + —Could pave the way for future negotiations. + —[3 lines not + declassified] + —Reduces the likelihood of peacetime + misunderstandings. + —[3 lines not + declassified] + + + Cons + —Lacks advantages of Approaches Three and Four. + —[4 lines not + declassified] + —Would permit an arms competition. + —Maintaining satellite survivability against advanced + threats would be more difficult. + + + +
+ +

C. Approach Three: Selected + Limits to Control the Scope of ASAT + Activity

+

(S) This approach would attempt to strike a balance between conflicting + philosophies. It would prohibit types of systems which do not yet exist, + such as high-altitude interceptors, laser weapons in space, and advanced + concepts such as orbital interceptors with multiple warheads. However, + it would not attempt to turn back the clock; low altitude interceptors + and ground-based lasers would be permitted; it would permit explicitly + the existing low-altitude Soviet ASAT + systems and low altitude systems for the U.S.

+

(S) Approach Three would also include “rules of the road” and a [less than 1 line not declassified] Fundamentally, + however, it would be an attempt to limit the scope of ASAT activities. It might include + qualitative or numerical limits on low-altitude ASAT systems as well as the ban on + high-altitude interceptors and exotic weapons in space.

+ + Pros and Cons for Approach Three + + Pros + + —Would place a cap on the competition and preclude + some of the most worrisome possibilities (i.e., high + altitude interceptors, lasers in space). + —Would permit the U.S. to attack low altitude Soviet + satellites [1½ lines not + declassified] + —Would avoid some of the [less than + 1 line not declassified] most risky aspects of + the comprehensive proposals by permitting some + ASATs. + —Would decrease the likelihood of physical attacks on + U.S. satellites most critical to crisis stability (e.g., + warning and communication satellites in high-altitude + orbits). + —May be more negotiable than Approach 4 since it would + not require the + Soviets to give up this existing capability. + —Reduces likelihood of peacetime + misunderstandings. + + Cons + + —Could lower the threshold for use of low altitude + ASATs by not explicitly prohibiting them. + —[4 lines not + declassified] + —It would allow arms competition in low altitude + ASAT + systems. + —Could lead to complacency, failure to institute + survivability means and increased vulnerability. + —May not be negotiable since most high-altitude + satellites are American. + —Creating a partial sanctuary for high altitude + systems may encourage the redesign and/or replacement of + some low altitude systems to become high altitude + systems. + + + +
+

D. Approach Four: + Relatively Comprehensive ASAT Arms + Limitations

+

(S) Approach Four would attempt to preclude a significant arms + competition in ASAT systems. It would + prohibit testing or deployment of any ASAT for physical attack upon satellites, e.g., direct + ascent interceptors and any ASAT laser + weapons. [1 line not declassified] It would + include rules of the road and a ban on [less than 1 + line not declassified] with satellites. Testing of ASATs would + be prohibited.

+

(TS) The Agreement would not include the + Galosh ABM system (although “tests in + ASAT mode” would be prohibited), + and electronic warfare capability such as jamming and interference + (although [less than 1 line not declassified] + would be prohibited). [4½ lines not declassified]

+

(S) This approach would seek strict limits on ASAT capabilities, tight definitions, collateral + constraints, and a mechanism for cooperation such as the Standing + Consultative Commission. We would continue ASAT + R&D, and develop hedges against + Soviet noncompliance or breakout. The treaty would be subject to review + and amendment at five-year intervals.

+

(S) Some believe that a comprehensive approach (Approach Four-A) should + also include a ban on [4 lines not declassified] + Therefore Approach Four-A [less than 1 line not + declassified]

+ + Pros and Cons for Approach Four + + Pros + + —Closes off a potential realm of arms + competition. + —May improve satellite survivability against long-term + threats by making advanced threats less likely. + —Assuming compliance, probably works to U.S. advantage + in the use of space since the U.S. will be more + dependent on space than the Soviets. + + —Reduces likelihood of peacetime misunderstandings and + of attacks on satellites during peacetime. + —[2 lines not declassified] + more difficult under Approach Four than Approach + Three. + —[4 lines not + declassified][footnote in the original not + declassified] + —Enhances the long term viability of the ABM Treaty. + + Cons + + —Precludes a U.S. ASAT interceptor for defense. + —[3½ lines not + declassified] + —The Soviets would retain the advantage of the + nuclear-armed Galosh [1½ lines not + declassified] + —[3 lines not + declassified] + —Satellites would have sanctuary even when they + perform same missions as ground and airborne support + systems (surveillance, reconnaissance, etc.). + —There are verification risks because some forms of + cheating would be relatively easy and incentives to + cheat could be high; assumption that both sides would be + denied ASATs could be naive. + —Could produce complacency, and impede implementation + of survivability measures. + —May be non-negotiable since Soviets have ASATs and we + do not. + + + +
+
+ +
+ + 7. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense Brown to President CarterSource: Carter Library, National Security Council, + Institutional Files, Box 41, Folder 3, PRM–23 [3]. Top Secret; Talent Keyhole; Control System + Only. + Washington, August + 19, 1977 + + SUBJECT + Arms Control for Antisatellite Systems + +

(S) At the August 4, 1977 meeting of the Policy Review Committee on + PRM–23,See Document 5. it was decided that + a separate paper on antisatellite activities and arms control should be + forwarded for your review and decision. That Decision Paper is enclosed + along with an Issues PaperAttached but not + printed. which contains a more detailed discussion of the + issue.

+

(S) Because of the importance of this issue and the widely differing + views on the approach we should take in our proposal to the Soviet + Union, you may wish further discussion of this subject at the NSC level prior to your decision.

+

Harold Brown

+

Attachment

+

Decision PaperTop + Secret; Talent Keyhole; Comint.

+

Washington, undated

+

ASAT + ARMS CONTROLThe term ASAT includes any physical or [less than one line not declassified] on space + systems. [Footnote is in the original.]

+

THE ISSUE

+

What should be the U.S. policy on antisatellite (ASAT) activity and ASAT arms control?

+

BACKGROUND

+

The U.S. has offered to propose ASAT + arms limitations to the Soviet Union. In developing approaches for the + discussions, a fundamental consideration is the need for a U.S. ASAT capability.

+ +

MAJOR FACTORS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM

+

Both the U.S. and the USSR have and are + further developing satellite capabilities in space for a range of + activities spanning peacetime, crisis and wartime. These include treaty + verification, national and military intelligence, weather, navigation, + communications and attack warning. Both sides are increasing the use of + satellites as sources of tactical intelligence to provide near-real-time + photography, electronic ferreting, and radar targeting of military + assets.

+

The Soviet Union currently has an advantage over the U.S. in + antisatellite capabilities. They have an orbital interceptor which has + been judged to be operational [8½ lines not + declassified]

+

The U.S. has no ASAT capability. A + nuclear interceptor system was operational until 1975 at Johnston + Island. Currently, the U.S. is developing a new interceptor which is + planned for testing by 1981. [3½ lines not + declassified]

+

SUMMARY OF THE ISSUES

+

On the one hand:

+

Limitations on Soviet capabilities to attack U.S. satellites would be + desirable since the U.S. is becoming increasingly dependent on its space + assets, and relies on a smaller number of more sophisticated satellites + than the USSR.

+

There has never been a confrontation in space and treaties have tended to + give space a special status as a peaceful arena where both sides can + work cooperatively.

+

ASAT limitations might preclude a + potential arms race in space with its attendant action-reaction cycles, + public concerns, increased defense costs and potential + instabilities.

+

On the other hand:

+

The U.S. must assess the need, independent of Soviet ASAT capabilities, for a U.S. ASAT system to counter threatening Soviet + satellites.

+

There are difficult treaty verification problems in this area.

+

Incentives to cheat may be greater than under previous agreements. + Because each side has a small number (6–15) of critical satellites, + small numbers of ASATs could be decisive. This is in contrast with + current treaties limiting ICBMs and ABMs, where stability is not affected by small numbers of + weapons.

+

APPROACHES

+

Under all of the approaches discussed below, U.S. ASAT research and development activities + will continue, and be modified to conform with any agreements reached during + negotiations. The four approaches are:

+

1. No Agreement: Do not seek an agreement limiting + ASAT systems. This does not + preclude initiatives to further limit the likelihood of peacetime + interference. For example, the U.S. could propose under the existing + Agreement on Measures to Reduce the Risk of Outbreak of Nuclear War, to + show restraint in ASAT testing during + crises.

+

2. Emphasis on Peacetime Problems: Do not attempt + to limit the capabilities of ASAT + system but focus on peacetime problems and on establishment of + thresholds for use. We would propose a peacetime sanctuary for all + satellites.

+

3. Selected Limits: Seek bans on types of systems + which do not yet exist, such as high-altitude interceptors and laser + weapons in space, but permit each side to test and deploy low-altitude + ASAT interceptors, electronic + warfare, and ground-based laser ASAT + systems.

+

4. Relatively Comprehensive Agreement: Seek a + relatively comprehensive agreement which would ban all ASAT capabilities except electronic + warfare. Electronic warfare is excluded because of verification + difficulties. The ban would prohibit testing, deployment or use of any + ASAT for physical attack on + satellites. The current Soviet orbital interceptor would be + dismantled.

+

—A variant (4A) would be a fully comprehensive ban + on all forms of ASAT including + electronic warfare.

+

AGENCY POSITIONS

+

[1 paragraph (4 lines) not declassified]

+

State and ACDA favor a comprehensive + ban on ASAT systems in order to avoid + cycles of action-reaction competition. Such an agreement would enhance + the survivability of U.S. satellites, on which we increasingly depend + for intelligence collection, verification, early warning, and + communications. A ban on testing, deployment, and use of ASAT systems would contribute to + stability by easing concerns about pre-emptive attack on critical + satellites. The present Soviet interceptor is relatively + unsophisticated; future Soviet ASAT + systems would be much more difficult to counter. Measures short of a + comprehensive approach would permit an expansion of Soviet ASAT capabilities, which would make + maintaining the survivability of U.S. satellites more difficult. + Verification would be difficult, but testing and in some cases + construction of an ASAT system would + be subject to observation. State and ACDA favor Approach 4.

+

In the OSD view, antisatellite + negotiations should be directed toward a ban on peacetime interference. + Such a ban would reinforce the principle of noninterference in peacetime + and establish a threshold beyond which specific actions will be + considered hostile. This approach recognizes that we must assume the Soviet Union could retain its + existing capability even in the presence of a comprehensive ban. + Elimination of these capabilities could not be reliably verified and + confidence in the system in the absence of testing could be quickly + regained. This system would be effective against such critical low + altitude systems as the current near-real-time imaging system. In such a + situation it would not be prudent to assume an ASAT agreement would be a suitable substitute for + survivability measures. Furthermore, U.S. counteractions in + survivability and ASAT development + could take several years. Therefore, the OSD feels the U.S. should develop an ASAT capability. Toward these ends, + OSD favors Approach Two.

+

In the JCS view, a ban on ASAT activities would concede existing + Soviet capabilities, since their elimination cannot be verified. + Conversely, such a ban would deny the U.S. the capability to develop a + counter to military-related USSR space + systems, particularly those which may constitute a direct threat to U.S. + forces. Arms Control agreements cannot be used as a substitute for + survivability of U.S. space systems; to do so would be to invite denial + of U.S. use of space systems for a critically long period during a war + given the likelihood of unilateral treaty abrogation at the outset of + conflict. An agreement to prevent testing of an orbital ASAT has two drawbacks. First, Soviet + confidence in their current system would not be appreciably reduced. + Second, the U.S. would be unable to overcome the current Soviet + advantage. Therefore, the JCS believe + the U.S. should develop an ASAT + capability and further that the U.S. should not enter into any agreement + that would ban ASAT research, + development, testing, and deployment.

+
+ +
+ 8. Letter From the Special Advisor to the President for Science and + Technology (Press) to Secretary + of Defense BrownSource: + Washington National Records Center, OSD Files: FRC + 330–80–0017, Box 56, 471.96 (Aug–10 Nov) 1977. Secret. A stamped + notation at the top of the page reads: “SEC DEF HAS SEEN.” In the + upper right-hand corner, Brown wrote “9/10. AF should also get a copy. HB.” + Washington, September 8, 1977 + + Dear Harold: + +

Attached is a report prepared by the Office of Science and Technology + Policy Space Advisory Group on the anti-satellite issue. Their recommendations are that the + US acquire an electronic as well as + a non-nuclear interference capability. In light of current discussions, + you will likely find the report of interest. This group also has + completed its review on space based radars that you requested.Not found. I will forward this report to + you separately.

+

Yours sincerely,

+

Frank + PressPress signed “Frank” above this + typed signature.

+

Director

+

Attachment

+

Memorandum From the Chair of the Advisory Group on + Space Systems (Buchsbaum) to the Special Advisor to the President + for Science and Technology (Press)Secret. The date is + handwritten.

+

Washington, August 26, 1977

+ + SUBJECT + US Anti-Satellite + Capability + +

The growing Soviet use of satellites for military functions has + heightened the need to revise US policy + with respect to a US anti-satellite + capability. The Group believes that the Soviets should not be allowed a + one-sided sanctuary in space for critical space systems that directly + support their military forces. [4 lines not + declassified] These systems would be appropriate targets for + attack under some conditions. The number and types of such space systems + are expected to grow.

+

The Group believes it is undesirable for the US to remain incapable of interfering with Soviet + militarily-related space-systems, particularly those space systems which + would constitute a direct threat to Allied forces during a conflict. + These satellites are limited in number and at low altitudes. [5½ lines not declassified]

+

[2½ lines not declassified] However, we believe + that the most effective way to assure the survival of valuable US space assets in time of crisis is, + first, to reduce through appropriate technical measures the electronic + and even the physical vulnerability of US satellites and, second, to have substantial alternative + mission capabilities for the conduct of war. Approaches for achieving greater survivability were + addressed in NSDM 333.See footnote 15, Document + 6. The Group believes that expeditious + implementation of enhanced survivability measures for critical space + assets should be given high priority.

+

There are two broad alternatives for an anti-satellite capability: (1) + physical destruction or damage, and (2) electronic interference.

+

[4 lines not declassified] However, such a + capability is likely to be perceived as more provocative than electronic + interference for two reasons: (1) its effect is irreversible and + unambiguous and (2) the political consequences of its use are likely to + be more severe. Moreover, such a physical destruction system is likely + to be more expensive than an electronic interference system.

+

Physical damage by radiation such as laser, microwave, or possibly + particle radiation has characteristics somewhat intermediate between + explosive kill and electronic interference. Its effects would not be + reversible, but could be ambiguous and the political consequences less + severe than in the case of explosive kill.

+

The Group recommends that first priority be given to developing an early + capability for electronic interference. Different satellites have + vulnerabilities to different electronic warfare techniques. The generic + techniques which may in principle be employed include noise jamming, + deception, command link capture, uplink jamming, delayed repeater + jamming, and RF burnout of electronic components. Not all of these + techniques can be employed effectively against all satellites. Some of + these techniques would be realized most effectively with co-orbital + jamming satellites, while others could be best achieved from + ground-based jammers. Specifically, some types of radar, ELINT, and + navigation satellites could be negated by another satellite nearby which + emits a noise barrage or rebroadcasts their signals with small random + time delays.

+

Since the operation of many satellite systems is dependent on the + frequent receipt of commands from ground stations, command link capture + or jamming represents a particular vulnerability of satellite systems. + The possibility of interfering with this link depends strongly on the + altitude of the satellite. The command link of a low altitude satellite, + such as a photo-reconnaissance satellite, is normally only turned on to + receive when the satellite is over the Soviet ground station and is out + of view of possible jamming sites. As a result, it is more difficult to + interfere with low altitude satellites than it is to interfere with + satellites in synchronous operational orbit which are always in + view.

+ +

The Group cautions, however, that the operational problems associated + with electronic interference must be carefully controlled. US testing of such a capability can + compromise its effectiveness and would be provocative if exercised + against Soviet systems.

+

[1 paragraph (11 lines) not declassified]

+

In general the nature of the US + development program should be influenced by potential arms control + agreements as well as military requirement. However, in this case it may + not be easy to negotiate a useful and verifiable agreement limiting + anti-satellite activities. It is not clear what kind of agreement would + be in the US interests. Given the nature + of present assets, it would seem that an agreement that would limit both + the US and the Soviet Union to + low-altitude ASAT capability would be + desirable. Such an agreement may be difficult to reach at present. In + contrast to the Soviets, we have no low altitude intercept capability + while their high altitude space assets are more limited than ours. In + addition, because of the limited number of targets, there is no real + distinction between an effectively deployed ASAT system and one that is still in the test stage of + development. Further, the Group does not believe that it is practical to + obtain a verifiable and useful agreement limiting electronic + interference. These various factors must be clearly and fully understood + before entering into negotiations on ASAT limitations.

+

[1 paragraph (5½ lines) not declassified]

+

This target list places enormous technical and operational demands on a + US system. The size and composition + of the targets and the time requirements imply a substantial system + deployment including non-conus basing, in the southern hemisphere. While + the Group is not in a position to present a definitive target list, we + believe a more modest system aimed at the critical military threat is + appropriate. [2½ lines not declassified]

+

The size of this target set and the time requirements must, of course, be + reassessed as the composition of the Soviet satellite fleet evolves.

+

A system aimed only at low-orbit interception is also suggested by the + fact that a demonstration of a high-altitude capability by the US would encourage the early development of + a similar capability by the USSR. This + would negate the current US superiority + of high altitude. In summary, proceeding with development of a low-orbit + intercept system is appropriate. The decision to undertake flight + testing at a suitable time in the development cycle should consider the + status of arms control negotiations or agreements. At present, it would + be premature to develop or demonstrate a high altitude intercept + capability.

+
+ +
+ + 9. Memorandum from the President’s Assistant for National Security + Affairs (Brzezinski) to President + CarterSource: Carter Library, National + Security Council, Institutional Files, Box 41, Folder 3, PRM–23 [3]. Top Secret; Talent + Keyhole; Comint. + Washington, September 19, 1977 + + SUBJECT + PRM/NSC–23 Issue: Arms Control for Anti-Satellite (ASAT) Systems + +

Harold Brown, as Chairman of the + PRM/NSC–23 Policy Review Committee, has forwarded (Tab A)Tab A is Document 7. Tab B is + the attachment to Document 7. Tab C is + Docu-ment 6. for your review and decision the subject issue. + At Tab B is a decision paper which summarizes the issue, discusses the + options and provides agency positions. The more detailed paper done by + the PRM/NSC–23 study group is at Tab C.

+

Arms control is but one aspect of overall U.S. policy toward military, + civil and intelligence space activities. Other elements include our + survivability measures, our ASAT + capabilities and the military utility of space to U.S. strategic and + tactical forces. Arms control is not a substitute for survivability + measures, although it could affect long-term requirements. As we have + discussed before, there is a definite interrelationship between arms + control of ASAT and many other space + related issues. With these considerations in mind, the PRM–23 study developed four approaches to + ASAT arms control as follows:

+

Approach One: No Agreement: This approach is + important because the Soviets may not be willing to agree to any + substantive and equitable ASAT + limitations. They may feel the U.S. is merely attempting to impede + activities in a realm where they have advantages.

+

Approach Two: Emphasis on Peacetime Problems: This + would not limit the capabilities of ASATs, but would focus on peacetime + problems, proposing “rules of the road” and a ban on peacetime + interference to emphasize the importance of satellites to strategic + stability.

+

Approach Three: Selected Limits to Control the Scope of + ASAT Activity: This would + in effect create a partial sanctuary by prohibiting ASAT systems which do not yet exist.

+

Approach Four: Relatively Comprehensive ASAT Arms Limitations: This + would attempt to preclude significant arms competition in ASAT systems.

+

A useful summary comparison of the approaches is provided at Tab C in + Table 4 including possible provisions and problems.

+ +

Conclusions

+

While the JCS supports Approach One, + OSD supports Approach Two. (Their + views are at the red tags at Tab B) On the opposite end of the spectrum, + State, ACDA, OSTP and OMB support Approach Four. I recommend you + support the most comprehensive approach—Approach Four. [5 lines not declassified]

+

There will probably not be a better time to seek an ASAT arms control agreement. The Soviets + probably believe they are temporarily ahead in the ASAT race; however, their present system + is limited. The U.S. has a better system in development, and we will + have a Space Shuttle after 1979. They respect our space technology and + our ability to rapidly deploy advanced weapons systems, and may see the + logic of an arms control agreement now.

+

Approach Four would prevent any further testing or deployment of the + present Soviet ASAT interceptor, and + the testing or deployment of any additional destructive Soviet ASAT system. It would ban the testing or + deployment of any destructive U.S. ASAT system. Obviously, there would be an + asymmetry: the USSR would have an + unsophisticated but tested system for use at lower altitudes, and we + would not. This should encourage Soviet interest in such an agreement. + However, the U.S. will enjoy an asymmetrical advantage in another + potential anti-satellite system—the Space Shuttle—and the Soviets are + well aware of this. [2½ lines not + declassified]

+

In addition to these advantages, Approach Four would have additional arms + control benefits that the other approaches lack. A ban on peacetime use + only (Approach Two) would encourage unrestrained development of more + sophisticated ASAT systems for both + sides. Essentially, it does not add—except cosmetically—to what + presently exists.

+

A ban on advanced systems (Approach Three) would encourage development of + ASAT systems at low altitudes. + Confidence developed in programs at low altitudes could be extended in + the future to a high altitude capability. It would, however, place + limitations on advanced systems such as lasers in space for which the + U.S. has considerable concern and a promising development effort.

+

During any negotiations that might ensue with the Soviets on any of the + approaches adopted to place limits on ASAT systems, we should vigorously and + publicly pursue research and development on all U.S. ASAT systems, carrying to production only + those elements which we cannot get the Soviets to include in a treaty. I + do believe that, short of operational testing, some R&D should be continued as a hedge + against Soviet breakout.

+

Harold has suggested that because of this issue’s importance, and the widely differing views, that an NSC meeting might be held to further discuss the subject. On the other + hand, I believe there has been adequate debate. All the material + necessary for a decision is in this package. Moreover Harold does not + feel strongly that a meeting is necessary.

+

RECOMMENDATION:

+

Approve Approach Four as the desired goal for the purposes of developing + terms of reference for our negotiating team. I will notify the PRC.

+

APPROVE ______Carter checked “Approve.” Underneath he wrote “a) + Continue our own R&D on ASAT pending agreement b) Insist on + strict terms in any agreement re Soviet testing, use, dismantling. + J.C.”

+

DISAPPROVE, schedule NSC meeting first + for further discussion ______

+

OTHER ______

+
+ +
+ 10. Memorandum From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for + International Security Affairs (Slocombe) to the President’s Deputy Assistant for + National Security Affairs (Aaron)Source: + Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Harold Brown Papers, Box 82, ASAT Arms Control. Top Secret. The + salutation is handwritten. + Washington, September 22, 1977 + + SUBJECT + ASAT + +

Dave—

+

Normally, I’d pass this through Bob Rosenberg, but he’s out today:

+

As you know, Secretary Brown would + prefer to have an NSC meeting prior to + final decision on the ASAT issue. I + believe the principal point he would want to have discussed at such a + meeting is the verifiability of comprehensive ASAT prohibitions, taking into account the scale of + violation necessary to have a significant military capability, etc. Our suggestion to include in + the PD a sentence saying in effect that + there would be a review of verification problems before the idea of a + comprehensive ban was broached with the Soviets in any detail was to + provide a mechanism for appropriate high-level consideration of the + issue without pressing for a meeting now. If you feel that such language + can’t be included in the PD, I think I + should advise him and give him a chance to seek an NSC meeting, or talk to you, Zbig or the + President.

+ + Walter + Slocombe + Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense + International Security Affairs + +
+ +
+ 11. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security + Affairs (Brzezinski) to Secretary + of State Vance, Secretary of + Defense Brown, the Director of + the Office of Management and Budget (McIntyre), the Director of the Arms Control and + Disarmament Agency (Warnke), the + Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Brown), the Director of Central + Intelligence (Turner), the + Administrator of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration + (Frosch), and the Special + Advisor to the President for Science and Technology (Press)Source: Carter Library, National Security Council, + Institutional Files, Box 41, Folder 3, PRM–23 [3]. Top Secret. + Washington, September 23, 1977 + + SUBJECT + Arms Control for Antisatellite (ASAT) Systems + +

The President has reviewed the subject decision paper submitted by the + Chairman, PRM/NSC–23 Policy Review Committee,See Document 6. and has approved + Approach Four as the desired goal for our negotiations with the Soviets. + This approach seeks a relatively comprehensive agreement which would ban + all ASAT capabilities except + electronic warfare. The ban would prohibit testing in space or against + objects in space, deployment, or + use of any ASAT for physical attack on + satellites. The current Soviet orbital interceptor would be + dismantled.Reference is to the Soviet + missile that could be targeted against low-altitude targets such as + reconnaissance aircraft and, potentially, satellites. See memorandum + to holders of National Intelligence Estimate 11–3–71, “Soviet + Strategic Defenses,” August 19, 1971. The text of the memorandum is + in the CIA FOIA Electronic Reading + Room (www.foia.cia.gov).

+

Further, the President has directed continuation of our own research and + development (R&D) on ASAT systems pending an agreement. These + programs should be vigorously pursued with a comprehensive R&D program short of operational or + space-based testing, carrying to production only those elements which we + cannot get the Soviets to include in a treaty. Beyond that, some R&D should be continued as a hedge + against Soviet breakout. The policy for public release of information on + U.S. ASAT development will be to + enhance the likelihood of Soviet acceptance of the U.S. proposals.

+

Finally, the President directs that the U.S. Government insist on strict terms in any agreement regarding + discontinuance of testing, use and dismantling of projected or current + Soviet ASAT capabilities. Emphasis is + to be placed on the verifiability of the specific agreement to be + proposed pursuant to this directive, with vigorous pursuit of a program + to insure the capability to verify agreements reached. The first order + of business with the Soviets should be to seek a prompt end to their + ASAT testing.

+

An SCC Working Group including members + from ACDA and DOD should develop detailed terms of reference and + negotiation work packages for Special Coordination Committee review.

+ + Zbigniew + Brzezinski + +
+ +
+ + 12. Memorandum of ConversationSource: Department of State, Office of the Secretariat + Staff, Special Adviser to the Secretary (S/MS) on Soviet Affairs + Marshall Shulman—Jan 21, + 77–Jan 19, 81, Lot 81D109, Box 3, Dobrynin-Vance, 10/17/77. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Shulman; and approved by David Anderson (S/S) on October 31. The meeting took + place at the Department of State. The memorandum is printed in full + in Foreign + Relations, 1977–1980, vol. VI, Soviet Union, Document + 53. + Washington, October 17, + 1977, 4:00–6:15 p.m. + + SUBJECT + Arms Control Issues: SALT, + ASAT, Conventional Arms No. II + of IV + + + PARTICIPANTS + US + The Secretary + Marshall D. Shulman + USSR + Ambassador Anatoliy F. + Dobrynin + +

Dobrynin came in Monday + afternoon, October 17, at the Secretary’s request. The meeting lasted + from 4:00 to approximately 6:15.

+

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to anti-satellite + capabilities.]

+

2. Anti-Satellite Systems—The Secretary said he + wanted to let Dobrynin know that + a proposal would soon be transmitted to the Soviet Union regarding + limitations on ASAT systems. He + underlined the importance of the subject, saying that in his recent + testimony before the CongressVance testified before the Senate + Foreign Relations Committee about SALT and negotiations in the Middle East on October + 13. on SALT, he had been + interrogated at length about the continuing capability of the US to monitor compliance with the SALT agreement by satellite observation. + He had replied that this was very important and this had led to the + question of the effect on satellite monitoring of the development of an + ASAT system. Dobrynin asked whether the American + communication would add further concrete thoughts and suggestions. The + Secretary replied in the affirmative and said that this would have a + significant bearing on the ratification of the SALT agreement.

+

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to anti-satellite + capabilities.]

+
+ +
+ + 13. Memorandum From the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament + Agency (Warnke) to Secretary of + State VanceSource: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + P770184–0491. Secret. + Geneva, October 19, + 1977 + + SUBJECT + Anti-Satellite Limits + +

This will acknowledge your memorandum of October 13Not found. on anti-satellite limits. I am + happy to have your approval on pursuing this subject with the Soviets in + the Standing Consultative Commission.

+

I understand and agree with your desire to strengthen the Moscow channel + for exchanges with the Soviets. I believe, however, that it would be + desirable at the same time to pursue this particular subject in + Washington.

+

The way this issue was left with Dobrynin last summer, the next step is for the US to make a substantive proposal on ASAT limits after which a forum for + further negotiations can be established. Our approach to the Soviets + thus should include a brief exposition of our proposal to ban ASAT systems, our proposal for a prompt + moratorium on testing ASAT systems + while the talks are under way, and our proposal for conducting these + negotiations in the Standing Consultative Commission. We will therefore + be beginning a complex negotiation. The Soviets in all likelihood will + ask questions, seek clarifications, and perhaps make counter-proposals + because of the complexities of this subject. I believe that concurrent + approaches in Washington and Moscow will avoid the difficulties and + potential misunderstanding of handling these sensitive matters entirely + by exchanging cables with Embassy Moscow.

+

This is, of course, a US initiative + proposed by you to Gromyko in + March.See Document + 3. While we don’t know yet what the Soviet attitude + will be, all signs point to an uphill struggle to achieve their consent + to a comprehensive and verifiable agreement. The position adopted by the + President is the one which State and ACDA recommended as a means of dealing with one of the more + important arms control problems. It will help immensely to get these + negotiations off to the best possible start and to convey to the Soviets + the impression that we consider this to be an important issue, that our + approach is fair and balanced as well as comprehensive, and that the best forum for pursuing + these negotiations is the SCC. If + possible, I believe you should take this up personally with Ambassador + Dobrynin at the same time + that Ambassador Toon talks with + appropriate officials in Moscow. If your schedule won’t permit this, + perhaps Marshall Shulman and + Spurgeon Keeny, who follows + this subject closely, might be designated to make the initial Washington + approach.

+ + Paul C. + Warnke + +
+ +
+ 14. Editorial Note +

On November 4, 1977, President Jimmy + Carter wrote Soviet General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev that Soviet + anti-satellite (ASAT) testing in space + had become “of increasing concern to us” and had been “carefully noted + in our country.” Carter warned + that this concern “has emerged in our efforts to build support in the + U.S. Senate for a SALT agreement. This + is a seriously destabilizing development which we have voluntarily + foregone, although we have the technical capability to build systems. A + very early joint agreement not to conduct further tests and to forego + this capability,” the President said, “would be helpful.” (Letter from + Carter to Brezhnev, November 4; Carter Library, + National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Office, Outside the System + File, Box 69, USSR: Brezhnev-Carter Correspondence: 6–12/77. Brezhnev replied that he was “ready to + hold consultations” on ASAT systems, + but said the discussions “would include, of course, all the systems and + means which possess such potential capability including manned space + shuttles.” (Letter from Brezhnev + to Carter, November 15; Carter Library, Plains File, President’s + Personal Foreign Affairs File, Box 4, USSR (Brezhnev + Drafts/Letters) 4/77–9/80)

+
+ +
+ + 15. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security + Affairs (Brzezinski) to President + CarterSource: Carter Library, National + Security Affairs, Brzezinski + Material, Subject Chron File, Box 124, Weapons Systems: 11–12/77. + Secret. + Washington, November 28, 1977 + + SUBJECT + Soviet and US High-Energy Laser + Weapon Programs + +

As you recall, a little over a week ago, [2 lines not + declassified] Harold + Brown has reacted by sending you an assessment of US high-energy laser (HEL) Programs (Tab A).Not attached. An undated memorandum from George + Heilmeier, the Director of the Defense Advanced Research Projects + Agency, to Secretary of Defense Brown, which was attached to a + November 14 memorandum from Under Secretary of Defense William Perry + to Brown, contains + information about High-Energy Laser programs. Heilmeier’s and + Perry’s memoranda are in the Washington National Records Center, + OSD Files: FRC 330–80–0017, Box 56, 471.96 (11 + Nov–Dec) 1977. His main points are: (1) that we are probably + somewhat ahead in technology and would probably be ahead in some + applications if we chose to pursue them; [less than 1 + line not declassified] I have also had my staff examine both + the US high-energy laser program [less than 1 line not declassified] As a result of + that examination, I think that it is appropriate to make the following + points.

+

[less than 1 line not declassified]

+

—[3 lines not declassified]

+

—[4 lines not declassified]

+

—As part of the comparative technology assessment done for PRM–10,Presidential Review Memorandum 10, “Comprehensive Net Assessment + and Military Posture Review,” is scheduled for publication in Foreign + Relations, 1977–1980, vol. IV, National Security + Policy. [4 lines not + declassified]

+

Concerning US + Programs

+

A short description of US + HEL research programs is given at Tab + B.Tab B is attached but not + printed. Overall, those of our programs that are pursuing the + technology needed for tactical applications seem aggressively funded. We + could probably move more rapidly toward a space-based laser ASAT capability if we were willing to + fund a program directed at this purpose. Before making such a decision, + we should examine its impact carefully—particularly in light of our + ASAT arms control interests.

+ +

Concerning Relative Progress and Its + Significance

+

For the various tactical applications of lasers, the military + significance of being the first to deploy an operational system is + probably not very great because such systems would have to be deployed + in large numbers to make a significant overall impact.

+

Ground or space based ABM applications + are potentially very significant. However, a number of ground based + systems would be required, and while laser radars may be practical, + systems with enough power to destroy large numbers of missiles or RV’s + in very short times are a long way off.

+

[1 paragraph (9 lines) not declassified]

+

Nonetheless, the political consequences of a Soviet laser ASAT system in space might be + substantial. Soviet demonstration of a space based laser ASAT system might shatter our sense of + technical superiority as badly as it was when the first Sputnik was + orbited.The Soviet Union successfully + launched the Sputnik satellite in + 1957.

+

Conclusions

+

The issue seems to boil down to one basic question. What should we do to + guard against the possibility of a space-based laser ASAT “gap”?

+

The obvious answer would be to prevent high-energy lasers from being put + in space—or, if there are valuable legitimate uses of HEL’s in space, to develop agreed + procedures with the Soviets to govern all such uses. Accordingly, I have + asked the ASAT arms control working + group to examine the possibilities for verifiable agreements along such + lines.

+

To hedge against the failure of efforts to limit the use of HEL’s in space, we should pursue the + technology required to do this ourselves—as fast as reasonable levels of + efficiency will allow. I therefore intend to ask Harold whether or not + there are any additional technology efforts we should consider if we + want to minimize the delay involved in bridging the gap from tactical to + space ASAT applications.

+
+ +
+ + 16. Information Memorandum From the Principal Deputy Assistant + Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (Slocombe) to Secretary of Defense + BrownSource: Washington + National Records Center, OSD Files: + FRC 330–80–0017, Box 56, 471.96 + (11 Nov–Nov) 1977. Secret. Coordinated by Under Secretary of Defense + for Research and Engineering Ross N. Williams. A stamped notation at + the top of the memorandum reads: “SEC DEF HAS SEEN.” Under the date + stamp, Brown wrote “12/17 Dep Sec should see. HB.” + Washington, December 16, 1977 + + SUBJECT + Anti-Satellite (ASAT) Arms + Control Negotiations—INFORMATION MEMORANDUM + +

During the past several weeks, extensive interagency effort has been + underway on initial studies to form a framework for possible arms + control negotiations with the Soviets on limiting anti-satellite + activity.

+

The current NSC timetable for future + work on this issue proposes a meeting of SCC principals on Thursday, 22 December. Its purpose would + be to (a) review the definition of “interference with space objects,” + which would be banned under an ASAT + regime, (b) set forth our current understanding of the + verification/monitoring issue, (c) consider a proposed public release, + Congressional approach and security policy, (d) discuss the appropriate + negotiating forum, and (e) decide on the manner and timing of an initial + approach to the Soviets.

+

Initially, the ASAT arms control + problem seemed to be one that would lend itself to rapid consideration + within the interagency process, involve a clear definition of choices + and explanation of their effects, and allow early discussions with the + Soviets, with an understood, if not unanimously supported U.S. position + in hand. Our subsequent work on this issue, as well as that of the + intelligence community, continues, however, to turn up unforeseen + complexities. Many of them are in the area of verification/monitoring + while others involve equally significant problems created by the current + asymmetries between the Soviet and U.S. programs, by the inherent + complexity of space technology and its application, and by the + relationship of negotiations planning to our own developing ASAT program. To insure that the + technically complex problems are understood as well as possible and + innovative solution proposals advanced (and understood), the Under + Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering has engaged the + assistance of DARPA and its contractors for technical backup as the + interagency work progresses.

+ +

Broadly, the work so far has shown that, as we all expected, monitoring + is tough—and, in contrast to many areas, there are potentially large + payoffs from small violations. More surprisingly to me as a layman, the + concepts of banning ASAT capabilities + and even interference with satellites has proven very hard to + operationalize. While there may be some in the military and intelligence + space business who resist all ASAT + limits in principle, I remain impressed with the widespread agreement + that ASAT bans would be very useful if + attainable, but very hard to get in technically reliable ways, not to + mention ways that would command political support.

+

From this, I conclude that a reasonable prospect of a responsible and + successful outcome requires that interagency planning proceed at a + deliberate pace, that insures that all associated issues are thoroughly + examined. Until that process is complete, I believe that the pressure + for immediate negotiations with the Soviets would not serve our national + security needs over the long term—nor, indeed, the President’s + commitment to the most comprehensive, effective ASAT agreement we can get. Other agencies + involved, namely NASA, CIA, OJCS, and IC Staff, also believe that + a more orderly and deliberate process is required, particularly as we + would be negotiating with the Soviets from a position of relative + inferiority in this area.

+

Because of these concerns, it may well be that the 22 December SCC meeting will be postponed.The SCC Meeting + scheduled for December 22 was ultimately postponed until February + 15, 1978. See Document 17. In any + event, the interagency effort clearly will not be in a position to + present information and analysis necessary for decisions that soon. The + meeting could serve an educational function and lead to development of a + work plan for the interagency effort in coming to grips with this issue + on an orderly basis. Clearly, doing the job right will take time—but a + hasty proposal would only give us time to repent (and fight off critics + of the process as well as the substance) at leisure.

+ + Walter + Slocombe + +
+ +
+ + 17. Summary of Conclusions of a Special Coordination Committee + MeetingSource: Library of + Congress, Manuscript Division, Harold + Brown Papers, Box 82, Brown Files—General #1, ASAT Arms Control. Top Secret. The + meeting took place in the White House Situation Room. + Washington, February 15, + 1978, 2:30–3:45 p.m. + + SUBJECT + ASAT Treaty + + + PARTICIPANTS + State + Secretary Cyrus + Vance + Jerry Kahan, Deputy Director, Office of Political/Military + Affairs + Defense + Secretary Harold + Brown + Deputy Secretary Charles + Duncan + Walter Slocombe, Principal + Deputy Assistant Secretary for International Security Affairs + JCS + Lt Gen William Y. Smith, + Special Assistant to the Chairman + ACDA + Spurgeon Keeny, Deputy + Director + James Timbie, Head, Strategic Affairs Division + NASA + Robert Frosch, + Administrator + Alan Lovelace, Deputy Administrator + OSTP + Frank Press + Ben Huberman + Arthur Morrissey, Senior Analyst + OMB + Bowman Cutler, Executive Associate Director, Budget + Randy Jayne, Associate Director, National Security and + International Affairs + CIA + Stansfield Turner + Sayre Stevens, Deputy + Director, National Foreign Assessment Center + White House + Zbigniew BrzezinskiIn the right-hand margin, an unknown hand + wrote “(Chairman)” after Brzezinski’s name. + NSC + Victor Utgoff + Robert Rosenberg + Charles Stebbins + +

Treaty Provisions and the Initial Approach to the + Soviets

+

It was agreed that the following general provisions are acceptable as a + framework for future negotiations:

+

—Prohibited (peacetime or + war)

+

—ASAT system testing in space or + against objects in space.

+

—Use of ASAT systems or readying such + systems for operational use.

+ +

—Interference with the operation of any of the other side’s space + systems, including (during peacetime only) electronic warfare (EW) + against satellite systems.

+

—Permitted

+

—Testing of EW ASAT systems in space + and against space objects.In the right-hand + margin, Carter wrote “seems + in conflict” and drew arrows pointing to be the first sentence under + the heading “Prohibited” and the first sentence under + “Permitted.”

+

—R&D and ASAT testing short of space or ground-to-space testing.

+

However, the provisions will not be used in the early stage of + negotiations. Rather, Secretary Vance will contact the Soviets informally, suggesting—as + a first step—that the US and the Soviets + negotiate an agreement that defines an attack on a satellite of the + other side as a hostile act. Secretary Vance will also suggest that, as an indication of good + faith, both sides should immediately forego further ASAT testing in space or against space + objects. Appropriate Congressional leaders are to be briefed on the + US initiative, but the initial + approach to the Soviets will be informal, unpublicized and low-key, + pending indications that these negotiations have reasonable prospects + for success.

+

Relative Impact of a Treaty on Both Sides

+

The Interagency Working Group (IAWG) is + tasked to prepare a study of whether it would be more advantageous to + negotiate a Treaty that would accept the current US/Soviet ASAT asymmetry in favor of the Soviets, + or let the ASAT testing continue on + both sides until capabilities on both sides have become more + symmetrical.

+

Verification

+

Recognizing the difficulties in verifying an ASAT Treaty using current national means, the IAWG is tasked to study whether the + US should devise new systems and + procedures allowing improved verification. Included in the study will be + an examination of various satellite survivability techniques that the + US might employ to improve + verification of any ASAT Treaty + provision that prohibits hostile actions against the other side’s + satellites.

+

Press + Releases/Public Statements

+

The IAWG will clear all press and + public statements concerning ASAT + negotiations, capabilities and other activities.

+ +

Forum for Future Negotiations

+

Dr. Brzezinski, Secretary + Vance and Secretary + Brown will decide later, + among themselves, what forum the US will + propose for conducting ASAT Treaty + negotiations.

+
+ +
+ 18. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security + Affairs (Brzezinski) to President + CarterSource: Carter Library, National + Security Council, Institutional Files, Box 20, PD/NSC–33. Top + Secret. Sent for action. In the upper right-hand corner, Carter wrote “Zbig—on something + like this always get DOD & + State comment. J. p.s. It’s probably o.k.” On February 25, Brzezinski forwarded the memorandum + to Vance and Brzezinski and added “I believe the + timing is such that we should modify the existing PD before the Secretary of State has + his initial talks with the Soviets to assure that they have this + message.” He also requested “your views on this approach by 1 + March.” (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Harold Brown Papers, Box 82, Brown + Files—General #1, ASAT Arms + Control) + Washington, February 24, 1978 + + SUBJECT + U.S. Position Regarding Anti-satellites (ASAT) + +

You will recall as a result of recommendations emanating from PRM/NSC–23, + “A Coherent Space Policy,” that you established several principles + related to Arms Control for ASAT + Systems. These included:

+

—A goal for our negotiations with the Soviets of a relatively + comprehensive agreement which would seek to ban all ASAT capabilities except electronic + warfare.

+

—Discontinuance of testing, use, and dismantling of projected or current + Soviet ASAT capabilities.

+

—Emphasis on verifiability of our proposals and any subsequent + agreement.

+

—Vigorous pursuit of our own comprehensive ASAT + R&D program short of operational or + space based testing, carrying to production those elements not included + in a treaty, and continuing U.S. R&D + after a treaty as a hedge against breakout.

+

It is on this latter point that our additional deliberations have caused + me to recommend a change in tactics. I now have concerns that our own + prohibition in our directive on U.S. space base testing may in fact be + counterproductive. No doubt the contents of the restriction in the PD (TAB A)Tab A is printed as + Document 11. are by now known to + both the Congress and the Soviets providing:

+

—A disincentive to the concerned oversight committee in Congress to fund + an ASAT + R&D program the President has + restricted from what they perceive to be realistic testing—this could + put us even further behind the Soviets unless we make a concerted effort + to properly educate the Armed Services and Defense Appropriations + Committee leadership on the complexities associated with verification, + testing, protection from breakout, etc., an effort we are now + undertaking, but which could fail to be persuasive given the mood on the + Hill.

+

—A disincentive to the Soviets to stop their own testing in space, + knowing that you have precluded U.S. testing in space.

+

A useful solution you should consider as a political move is, for the + record, to remove the restriction against U.S. testing in space (which + means little technically today—as we could not do it in the near term, + with great certainty, anyway) which would be a positive sign that we + intend to seek equivalent capabilities as soon as possible unless the + Soviets are willing to take positive steps to stop testing, dismantle, + and agree to substantive verification + techniques.

+

I believe the timing is such that we should modify the existing PD before Cy + Vance has his initial talks with the Soviets to assure + that they have this message.

+

RECOMMENDATION

+

That you direct removal of the restriction on “operational or space based + testing,” authorizing the Secretary of Defense to pursue, for planning purposes, a U.S. ASAT development program encompassing + that testing in space or against U.S. objects in space deemed essential + to demonstrate a capability.

+

Approve ______

+

Disapprove ______

+

Other ______Carter did not indicate his preference with respect + to the recommendation.

+
+ +
+ + 19. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense Brown to the President’s + Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)Source: Carter Library, National Security Council, Institutional + Files, Box 20, PD/NSC–33. Top Secret. + Washington, February 28, 1978 + + SUBJECT + U.S. Position Regarding ASAT + Policy (U) + +

(S) This memorandum is in reply to your correspondence of February 25, + 1978,Not found. requesting my + views regarding the deletion of space test restrictions from the + existing Presidential Directive on Arms Control for ASAT Systems.

+

(TS) For the reasons which you have + cited, I agree that it would be wise to modify the Presidential + Directive along the lines that you have suggested. Our program, as + currently planned, does not require a change in Presidential guidance + until 1980; however, it is necessary that the Congress support our + budget requests if we are to maintain our option for flight tests in + 1981. Although I think that it is unlikely that the FY 1979 budget requests will not be fully + approved as a consequence of the testing restrictions, the removal of + these restrictions would eliminate any such possibility. Removal of the + testing restrictions also has the advantage of enhancing the likelihood + of Soviet acceptance of U.S. proposals by indicating our firm intent to + achieve a high-performance ASAT + capability as quickly as possible.

+

(S) If we are to achieve an ASAT + interceptor capability of which we are confident, we must test against + targets in space. Therefore, I view space testing as essential to the + test and evaluation process and a necessary phase in the weapon + development cycle. It would be preferable, then, that any authorization + to test not contain a restrictive clause that limits tests to + demonstration purposes, as may have been suggested in your memorandum. + My concern is that development flight tests might be deemed not to be + allowed.

+

(S) If desired, as a means for impressing upon the Soviets our resolve + and ability to develop an ASAT weapon, + we could conduct an ASAT flight test + demonstration (using MINUTEMAN, as I mentioned to you and the President) + within about 12 months for about $50 M. This effort would be quite + different from the program we are now pursuing. The interceptor would be + assembled from available components, would lack the performance, and would be more costly + than the approach we are now taking. While a single-shot demonstration + may provide an incentive to the Soviets to accept our proposals, + however, it may also divert resources away from our present program that + could provide an effective system, if needed. I therefore do not + recommend it.

+ + Harold + Brown + +
+ +
+ 20. Informal Notes on a Meeting Between Secretary of State Vance and Soviet Ambassador DobryninSource: Department of State, Office of the Secretariat + Staff, Special Adviser to the Secretary (S/MS) on Soviet Affairs + Marshall Shulman—Jan 21, + 77–Jan 19, 81, Lot 81D109, Box 3, CV-Dobrynin + 2/28/78. Secret. Drafted by Shulman on March 1. The informal notes are printed + in full in Foreign Relations, 1977–1980, vol. VI, Soviet Union, + Document 85. + February 28, 1978 +

1. Dobrynin came in at his + request for the purpose of delivering a letter from Brezhnev to the President. He + presented the Russian text and an unofficial translation prepared in the + Soviet Embassy. (He commented as he did so that he was doing our work + for us, and that we did not generally prepare a Russian translation of + our letters to Brezhnev.)

+

2. The Brezhnev + letter is a reply to the President’s letter of January,Omission in the original. Carter’s January 25 + letter is printed in Foreign Relations, 1977–1980, vol. VI, + Soviet Union, Document 77. and matches the + President’s letter in its blunt tone, and round-up coverage of a number + of issues. However, it is in line with recent Brezhnev speeches that express concern + about the state of US-Soviet relations + and a desire to seek an improvement. It probably was written before the + Brezhnev speeches of last + week, and lacks the upbeat suggestion of steps to infuse a new dynamism + in the relationship.Reference presumably to + remarks Brezhnev made during + a “high level” meeting in the Kremlin on February 24. He stated that + improved U.S.-Soviet relations were “blocked by all kinds of + obstacles,” including slow progress on talks to limit strategic + arms, the neutron bomb, and trade. (“Brezhnev Claims U.S. is Blocking Improved Ties,” New York Times, February 25, 1978)

+

The letter expresses disappointment at the lack of progress in the SALT negotiations since the Gromyko visit to Washington last + September,On Gromyko’s + September 1977 visit to Washington, where he met Vance and Carter, see Foreign + Relations, 1977–1980, vol. VI, Soviet Union, Document + 50. and protests what he sees as our use of + domestic opposition to SALT to gain + bargaining advantages.

+

On the neutron bomb, the letter also expresses disappointment with the + President’s reply, and repeats the concern that the neutron bomb would + lower the nuclear threshold.

+

He remonstrates US linkage of arms + control negotiations with other issues, particularly the Horn, and + repeats that Soviet objectives in the Horn are limited to helping + Ethiopia resist Somali aggression.

+

On the Middle East, the letter responds by saying that it is the US, not the SU, that has departed from the common approach agreed upon + in the joint statement of October 1,The + joint statement on the Middle East is printed in Foreign + Relations, 1977–1980, vol. VIII, Arab-Israeli Dispute, + January 1977–August 1978, Document 120. The New York Times and Washington Post published the full text of the statement + on Sunday, October 2. and has encouraged separate + negotiations between Egypt and Israel. Other Arab states will not + participate even if these bilateral negotiations succeed, he says, and + therefore only a comprehensive settlement at Geneva can resolve the + situation.

+

3. The Secretary asked if Dobrynin had a report on the Assad + conversations in Moscow. + Dobrynin said he had not yet + received the information, but would hope to be able to convey a report + shortly.

+

4. ASAT. The + Secretary informed Dobrynin that + the US is prepared to begin discussions + on this subject in April at Geneva, and covered the other points set + forth in the agreed talking points.

+

Dobrynin replied that, as + Brezhnev had said in a + previous letter, the ASAT discussions + should cover not only the satellite versus satellite problem, but also + the shuttle system versus satellite situation.

+
+ +
+ + 21. Memorandum From Secretary of State Vance to the President’s Assistant for National Security + Affairs (Brzezinski)Source: Carter Library, National + Security Council, Institutional Files, Box 20, PD/NSC–33. Top + Secret. + Washington, March + 6, 1978 + + SUBJECT + US Position Regarding + Anti-Satellite Arms Control + +

I agree in principle with the idea expressed in your memorandum of + February 25.Not found. I would, + however, be averse to creating the presumption that the US has in fact decided to test ASATs, for + we have not and should not until our development programs have reached + that point at which we need to make such a decision.

+

I therefore propose that the original decision memorandum be changed to + read that the Secretary of Defense should plan on testing when our + programs reach the appropriate stage of development, subject to further + Presidential decision at that time. This would of course carry the + implication that whether or not we test will depend heavily on whether + the Soviets continue to test.

+
+ +
+ 22. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security + Affairs (Brzezinski) to President + CarterSource: Carter Library, National + Security Council, Institutional Files, Box 20, PD/NSC–33. Top + Secret. Sent for action. Carter initialed the memorandum. + Washington, March + 9, 1978 + + SUBJECT + U.S. Position Regarding Anti-Satellites (ASAT) + +

On my previous memo to you regarding removal of the restriction on + “operational or space based testing” you called for DoD and State comment (Tab A).See Document 18.

+ +

Both Harold BrownSee Document 19. and + Cy VanceSee Document 21. + have responded affirmatively to the proposal. Harold stated in his + response that Congressional support for our budget requests are + necessary if we are to maintain our option for flight tests by 1981. + Further, and I believe a most significant point, he states that:

+

“If we are to achieve an ASAT + interceptor capability of which we are confident, we must test against + targets in space. Therefore, I view space testing as essential to the + test and evaluation process and a necessary phase in the weapon + development cycle. It would be preferable, then, that any authorization + to test not contain a restrictive clause that limits tests to + demonstration purposes, as may have been suggested in your memorandum. + My concern is that development flight tests might be deemed not to be + allowed.”

+

Cy, however, feels that our stance should be more cautious. While he + supports the idea in principle, he suggests that the original decision + memo (restriction highlighted at Tab B)Tab B + included a draft PRM and is not + published. be modified to read that the SecDef should plan on testing at the + appropriate stage of development, “subject to further + Presidential decision at that time.”

+

I would suggest that any such limitation would better be treated as an + understanding between you and Harold, rather than lessen the impact of a + very positive statement on testing at this time.Carter + underlined the phrase “understanding between you and Harold” and + wrote “ok. Tell Harold” in the right-hand margin.

+

I share Harold’s belief that removal of the restriction has the advantage + of enhancing the likelihood of Soviet acceptance of U.S. proposals by + indicating our firm intent to achieve a high performance ASAT capability as quickly as + possible.

+

APPROVE Removal of Restriction (as per Brown) ______Carter + checked the “APPROVE Removal of Restriction (as per Brown)” line and + wrote “J” at the end of the memorandum.

+

APPROVE, Subject to Cy’s Qualification ______

+

DISAPPROVE ______

+
+ +
+ + 23. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security + Affairs (Brzezinski) to Secretary + of Defense BrownSource: Carter + Library, National Security Council, Institutional Files, Box 20, + PD/NSC–33. Top Secret. + Washington, March + 10, 1978 + + SUBJECT + U.S. Position Regarding Anti-Satellites (ASAT) + +

The President has signed a Presidential Directive calling for the removal + of the restriction on operational or space based testing. He has + authorized you to pursue, for planning purposes, a U.S. ASAT development program encompassing + that testing in space or against U.S. objects in space deemed essential + to achieve an ASAT capability.

+

All other elements of my Arms Control for Anti-Satellite Systems + memorandum dated September 23, 1977,See Document 11. remain in effect at this + time.

+

The President wishes, however, that prior to the actual conduct of any + such U.S. testing, you obtain his concurrence. He has chosen to treat + this limitation as an understanding between the two of you rather than + lessen the impact of a very positive statement on testing in the more + broadly distributed Presidential Directive.

+ + Zbigniew + Brzezinski + +
+ +
+ + 24. Presidential Directive/NSC–33Source: + Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, + Box 4, Anti-Satellite System (ASAT): 7/77–10/80. Top Secret. + Washington, March + 10, 1978 + + TO + The Secretary of State + The Secretary of Defense + The Director, Office of Management and Budget + The Director, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency + The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff + The Director of Central Intelligence + The Administrator, National Aeronautics and Space + Administration + The Director, Office of Science and Technology Policy + + + SUBJECT + Arms Control for Anti-satellite (ASAT) Systems + +

Reference is made to National Security Advisor memorandum, dated + September 23, 1977, subject as above.See + Document 11.

+

I direct removal of the restriction, cited in the reference memorandum, + on operational or space-based testing. The Secretary of Defense is + authorized to pursue, for planning purposes, a U.S. ASAT development program encompassing + that testing in space or against U.S. objects in space deemed essential + to achieve an ASAT capability.

+

Our future dialogue with the Soviets on Space Arms Control should + indicate that we intend to seek an ASAT capability as soon as possible unless they are willing + to take very positive actions to preclude such a move on our part.

+

All other elements of the referenced memorandum remain in effect at this + time.

+ + Jimmy + Carter + +
+ +
+ + 25. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security + Affairs (Brzezinski) to Secretary + of State VanceSource: Carter Library, National + Security Affairs, Brzezinski + Material, Brzezinski Office + File, Box 123, Subject Chron File, Vance, Miscellaneous Communication With: 3–5/78. Top + Secret. + Washington, March + 14, 1978 + + SUBJECT + U.S. Position Regarding Anti-Satellites (ASAT) + +

The President has signed a Presidential Directive calling for the removal + of the restriction on operational or space based testing. He has + authorized the Secretary of Defense to pursue, for planning purposes, a + U.S. ASAT development program + encompassing that testing in space or against U.S. objects in space + deemed essential to achieve an ASAT + capability.

+

All other elements of my Arms Control for Anti-Satellite Systems + memorandum dated September 23, 1977, remain in effect at this time.

+ + Zbigniew + BrzezinskiPrinted from a + copy that bears this typed signature. + +
+ +
+ 26. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security + Affairs (Brzezinski) to President + CarterSource: Carter Library, National + Security Affairs, Brzezinski + Material, Subject File, Box 4, Anti-Satellite System (ASAT): 7/77–10/80. Top Secret. + Carter initialed the + upper right-hand corner of the memorandum. + Washington, March + 22, 1978 + + SUBJECT + US and Soviet Laser Weapons + Capabilities + +

Harold Brown has responded to your + request for more information on present and potential US and Soviet laser weapons capabilities + with his memo at Tab A.Not + attached.

+ +

The projected dates for achieving some of the capabilities that Harold + refers to are several years later than those you may have heard before. + This is because while most technical reports give dates for initial + operational capabilities—Harold speaks in terms of the date at which + sufficient numbers of any given device could be fielded to achieve a + “meaningful effect.” Given an agreed definition of what a meaningful + effect is for a system, Harold’s date is probably more useful, though + somewhat harder to predict. When Harold speaks of meaningful + capabilities—in Table 1, he means one or two systems; in Table 2, he + means the numbers I have added in the left hand column.

+

Harold’s memo does not mention two other applications of high energy + lasers that may be of interest to you—space based lasers for use + against: 1) ballistic missiles in the powered portions of their + trajectories (where they are most vulnerable), or 2) bombers in the high + altitude mid-course phase of their missions. Accordingly, I asked Harold + for information on these applications and have summarized it below.

+

—[12½ lines not declassified]

+

—[6 lines not declassified]

+

I think the whole area of high energy laser weapons bears careful + watching. As these systems develop, they may pose some significant + challenges to our arms control interests, particularly in the ASAT area.

+
+ +
+ + 27. Presidential Directive/NSC–37Source: Carter Library, National Security Council, + Institutional Files, Box 20, Folder 1, PD/NSC–37. Top + Secret. + Washington, May 11, + 1978 + + TO + The Vice President + The Secretary of State + The Secretary of Defense + The Secretary of Interior + The Secretary of Agriculture + The Secretary of Commerce + The Director, Office of Management and Budget + Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs + Assistant to the President for Domestic Affairs + Director, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency + Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff + Director of Central Intelligence + Administrator, National Aeronautics and Space + Administration + Director, Office of Science and Technology Policy + + + SUBJECT + National Space Policy (U) + +

This directive establishes national policies which shall guide the + conduct of United States activities in and related to the space programs + and activities discussed below. The objectives of these policies are (1) + to advance the interests of the United States through the exploration + and use of space and (2) to cooperate with other nations in maintaining + the freedom of space for all activities which enhance the security and + welfare of mankind. (C)

+

1. The United States space program shall be conducted in accordance with + the following basic principles. (U)

+

a. Commitment to the principles of the exploration and use of outer space + by all nations for peaceful purposes and for the benefit of all mankind. + “Peaceful purposes” allow for military and intelligence-related + activities in pursuit of national security and other goals. (C)

+

b. The exploration and use of outer space in support of the national + well-being and policies of the United States. (U)

+

c. Rejection of any claims to sovereignty over outer space or over + celestial bodies, or any portion thereof, and rejection of any + limitations on the fundamental right to acquire data from space. (U)

+

d. The space systems of any nation are national property and have the + right of passage through and operations in space without interference. Purposeful interference + with operational space systems shall be viewed as an infringement upon + sovereign rights. (U)

+

e. The United States will pursue activities in space in support of its + right of self-defense. (U)

+

f. The United States will maintain a national intelligence space program. + (C)

+

g. The United States will pursue space activities to increase scientific + knowledge, develop useful civil applications of space technology, and + maintain United States leadership in space. (U)

+

h. The United States will conduct international cooperative space-related + activities that are beneficial to the United States scientifically, + politically, economically, and/or militarily. (U)

+

i. The United States will develop and operate on a global basis active + and passive remote sensing operations in support of civil, military, and + national intelligence objectives. Such operations will occur under + conditions which protect classified technology, deny sensitive data, and + promote acceptance and legitimacy of such activities. (C)

+

j. The United States will maintain current responsibility and management + relationships among the sectors focused on civil, defense, and national + intelligence objectives. (C)

+

k. Close coordination, cooperation, and information exchange will be + maintained among the space sectors to avoid unnecessary duplication and + to allow maximum cross-utilization, in compliance with security and + policy guidance, of all capabilities. (U)

+

2. The United States will conduct those activities in space which are + necessary to national defense. The military space program shall support + such functions as command and control, communications, navigation, + environmental monitoring, warning, tactical intelligence, targeting, + ocean and battlefield surveillance, and space defense. In addition, + defense space programs shall contribute to the satisfaction of national + intelligence requirements. The following policies shall govern the + conduct of the military space programs. (C)

+

a. Security. The military space program, including + dissemination of data, shall be conducted in accordance with Executive + Orders and applicable directives for protection of national security + information, and commensurate with both the missions performed and the + security measures necessary to protect related (national intelligence) + space activities. (C)

+

b. [6 lines not declassified]

+

c. Survivability. Survivability of space systems, + including all system elements, will be pursued commensurate with the + planned need in crisis and war, the threat, and the availability of + other assets to perform the mission. Identified deficiencies will be + eliminated and an aggressive, + long-term program will be applied to provide more assured survivability + through evolutionary changes to space systems. For critical missions, a + distributed system architecture shall be considered for reducing single, + critical nodes, including highly survivable emergency systems of limited + capability for use in times of crisis and to back up the first line + systems in case of system failure or attack. Civil systems (e.g., + communications) used for critical military functions shall have a level + of survivability commensurate with their planned use in national + emergencies. (S)

+

d. Anti-Satellite Capability. In accordance with + applicable executive directives, the United States shall seek a + verifiable ban on anti-satellite capabilities, excluding electronic + warfare. DoD shall vigorously pursue + development of an anti-satellite capability, but will not carry to + production those elements which are included in any treaty with the + Soviets. Beyond that, some R&D + should be continued as a hedge against Soviet breakout. The progress of + ASAT arms control negotiations + will be reviewed annually to determine if negotiations with the Soviet + Union continue to be fruitful relative to the threat posed by Soviet + actions in space, and consequently to determine if the U.S. ASAT efforts are still adequate. The + space defense program shall include an integrated attack warning, + notification, verification, and contingency reaction capability which + can effectively detect and react to threats to U.S. space systems. + (TS)

+

3. The United States foreign intelligence program shall include a space + program to acquire information and data required for the formulation and + execution of foreign, military, and economic policies; to support the + planning for and conduct of military operations; to provide warning; to + support crisis management; and to monitor treaties. The following + policies shall govern the conduct of this program. (S)

+

a. Protection of Sensitive Information. The + nature, the attributable collected information, and the operational + details of intelligence space activities will be classified, and as + necessary to protect sensitive aspects, will be controlled in special + compartmented security channels. Collected information that cannot be + attributed to space systems will be classified according to its content. + Security restrictions on intelligence space satellite products will be + selectively relaxed by the DCI to + implement the following changes to permit wider use of space-derived + intelligence information. (S)

+

—The fact that the United States conducts satellite reconnaissance for + intelligence purposes, without disclosing the generic type of activity, + will be classified CONFIDENTIAL (Exempt from the General + Declassification Schedule) and handled outside the special security + control system. (C)

+ +

—The existing special product controls will be used sparingly, and then + only for those products and data that reveal sensitive aspects of the + program as determined by the DCI. + (S)

+

—For SIGINT, the special space-related product control system shall not + be used when the DCI determines that + the intelligence is protected by appropriate classification or the more + general special intelligence control system. (TS)

+

—Operational aspects of intelligence space activities shall be afforded + strict security protection within a special access program system as + determined by the DCI. (S)

+

—Strict control over public statements and background concerning space + reconnaissance will be maintained. (C)

+

—Further changes to the space intelligence security policy can be + authorized only by the President. (C)

+

b. Support of Military Operational Requirements. + Support of military operational requirements is a major space + intelligence mission. National space intelligence assets shall provide + appropriate support to deployed military operational forces in balance + with their primary mission capabilities. In order to ensure a proper + balance between the national and tactical missions of these assets, + there will be military involvement in the requirements, tasking, + exploitation, and dissemination functions and in the development + program. The Secretary of Defense will, together with the Director of + Central Intelligence, ensure that there is no unnecessary overlap + between national foreign intelligence programs and Department of Defense + intelligence programs, and the Secretary of Defense will provide the + Director of Central Intelligence all information necessary for this + purpose. (S)

+

c. Interactions with Civil Community. Selected + space-related prod-ucts and technology shall be made available to civil + agencies within appropriate security constraints. The Intelligence + Community may provide radio frequency (RF) mapping and surveys for the + civil community under appropriate security controls. (TS)

+

d. Survivability. The national intelligence + program shall be configured to operate in a hostile environment. The + guidance set forth in subparagraph 2c. shall be aggressively pursued by + the intelligence community. (S)

+

4. The United States shall conduct civil space programs to increase the + body of scientific knowledge about the earth and the universe; to + develop and operate civil applications of space technology; to maintain + United States leadership in space science, applications, and technology; + and to further United States domestic and foreign policy objectives. The + following policies shall govern the conduct of the civil space program. + (U)

+ +

a. The United States shall encourage domestic commercial exploitation of + space capabilities and systems for economic benefit and to promote the + technological position of the United States, except that all United + States earth-oriented remote sensing satellites will require United + States Government authorization and supervision or regulation. (U)

+

b. Federal civil earth imaging from space, at resolutions at or better + than ten meters, will be permitted under controls and when such needs + are justified and assessed in relation to civil benefits, national + security, and foreign policy. Appropriate controls on other forms of + remote earth sensing will be established. Expanded civil use of + intelligence space data and technology within appropriate security + constraints is encouraged. (C)

+

c. Data and results from the civil space programs will be provided the + widest practical dissemination, except where specific exceptions defined + by legislation, Executive Order, or directive apply. (U)

+

d. United States federal or private space systems identified as critical + to the national defense may be equipped at DoD expense for use in national emergencies or to deny + their use by an enemy in times of national emergency declared by the + President. Implementation will occur as described in subparagraph 2b. + The fact of or the details of such measures may be classified. (C)

+

e. Terrestrially-oriented federal or private radio frequency (RF) surveys + in space are prohibited except through or in coordination with the + Director of Central Intelligence under appropriate security controls. + (TS)

+

f. The United States will develop, manage, and operate the Shuttle-based + Space Transportation System through NASA in cooperation with the DoD to service all authorized space users—domestic and + foreign, commercial and governmental—and will provide launch priority + and necessary security to military and intelligence missions while + recognizing the essentially open character of the civil space program. + Mission control is the responsibility of the mission agency. Military + and intelligence programs may use the Shuttle Orbiters as dedicated + mission vehicles. (C)

+

5. The NSC Policy Review Committee shall + meet when appropriate to provide a forum to all federal agencies for + their policy views; to review and advise on proposed changes to national + space policy; to resolve issues referred to the Committee; and to + provide for orderly and rapid referral of open issues to the President + for decision as necessary. The PRC will + meet at the call of the Chairman for these purposes, and when so + convened, will be chaired by the Director, Office of Science and + Technology Policy. (U)

+ +

Interagency coordinating mechanisms will be employed to review and + coordinate pertinent issues and projects, make evaluations, and + implement policy decisions where appropriate. Special areas of interest + include security and political risks involved with technology transfer + and federal and private space operations involving remote sensing and + communications Unresolved policy issues will be forwarded to the PRC for review and resolution. (C)

+ + Jimmy + Carter + +
+ +
+ 28. Memorandum From the Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of + Defense for International Security Affairs (Slocombe) to Secretary of Defense BrownSource: Washington National Records + Center, OSD Files: FRC 330–81–0202, Box 46, 471.96 + (Apr–June) 1978. Secret. A stamped notation reads: “SEC DEF HAS + SEEN.” Under Slocombe’s + signature, Brown wrote “5/24. Called Dave A. He will include. HB.” + Washington, May 24, + 1978 + + SUBJECT + ASAT—Suspension of Testing + During Negotiations—ACTION MEMORANDUM + +

As you know, there is substantial sentiment in the building to have the + SCC reconsider whether a suspension + of testing during the ASAT talks is in + the United States’ interest. (See Tab A.) The NSC staff refuses, however, to put that issue in the issues + paper being drafted for the meeting in the absence of a request to do so + by a principal. Simply to ask to have the issue discussed does not + prejudge where DOD comes out. + Accordingly, I recommend that you call Dave + Aaron and ask that suspension of testing be included in + the paper as an issue for the SCC.

+

Walter + Slocombe

+

Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of + Defense

+

International Security Affairs

+ +

Tab A

+

Working Paper Prepared in the Department of + DefenseSecret.

+

Washington, undated

+

SCC + Action

+

The direction to seek a “no test” agreement during the negotiations + should be retracted for the following reasons:

+

—The Soviets have an orbital ASAT + system in hand that has:

+

a. An 80% reliability.

+

b. Has been improved—demonstrated intercept on first orbit and may be + employing a passive sensor.

+

c. Launch pad turnaround is estimated to be hours.

+

d. Launch pads available could be 4 and, with the SS–9, approximately + 23.

+

e. Could eliminate 14 US critical low + altitude satellites in 45 hours.

+

f. Can threaten synchronous targets using SL–12.

+

—With a “no test” arrangement during the negotiations, the Soviets will + have less incentive to come to terms that result in a balanced US/USSR + situation and in a quick and orderly fashion.

+

—They know that during this time frame, all US satellites are threatened and vulnerable and theirs are + not.

+

—It is clear to the Soviets that the US + has done little in the way of engineering and technology to get ready + for ASAT development.

+

—Such an agreement could slow US programs + because of DoD budget constraints and + the Soviets would have effectively gained a 3- to 4-year advantage.

+

—Even if the US built an entire ASAT system ready to launch, the Soviets + would have us at a 1- to 2-year disadvantage because it would take that + long to test such a system and solve engineering problems.

+

—US booster options will be disappearing + because of conversion to the Shuttle.One of + the space shuttle’s projected missions was to launch satellites into + space, eliminating the need to launch them by traditional booster + rockets.

+

—In a “no test” situation, the Soviets may insist on a US equivalent response.

+

—We have nothing to offer except to say we won’t test our superior technology.

+

—It is questionable if they will accept such a proposal.

+

—They may insist that we cancel our on-going R&D.

+ +

—Since we have publicly advertised what we are doing (MHV, conventional, non-nuclear ABM), they can point specifically to such + programs.

+

—They have previously contended that the US is the aggressor in this area and they are not. In a + public relations move, such as the neutron bomb, they could probably + make this view stick.

+

—The Soviets may insist on restrictions to the Shuttle during this + period.

+

—This could include no tests of the teleoperator (jeopardy to + skylab).Skylab was a manned space + station built by NASA that had + been damaged upon its initial launch in 1974. During the Carter administration, NASA scientists hoped that the space + shuttle could attach an experimental booster, the teleoperator + retrieval system, to the station, thereby sending Skylab into higher + orbit and extending its life another five years. These plans were + preempted when Skylab reentered the atmosphere and disintegrated in + 1979.

+

—During treaty negotiations, the absence of a no + test agreement could force the Soviets to an acceptable agreement.

+

—A rapid moving US + ASAT program could give them incentive + to come to an agreement before a US test + occurs.

+

—Politically, a “no test” agreement during negotiations could be a + problem.

+

—It would be difficult to negotiate an agreement that did not include + such an article.

+

—We are not ready to come to such a conclusion.

+

—The US would always face an + asymmetry.

+

—A caveat that says the US will test if + we determine the negotiations are not progressing does not help the + situation.

+

—The President would be put in a position of breaking an agreement and of + justifying that the Soviets were not negotiating in good faith.

+

—The implications with respect to détente would prevent us from ever + making such a move.

+

ALTERNATIVES

+

1—Do not request “no testing” during negotiations and make it clear to + the Soviets that we are progressing as rapidly as possible.

+

2—Have a “no test” agreement that expires at the earliest time the US could test the MHV.

+

3—Have a “no test” agreement for all other kill mechanisms except EW and + low altitude non-nuclear kill.

+
+ +
+ + 29. Summary of Conclusions of a Special Coordination Committee + MeetingSource: Carter + Library, National Security Council, Institutional Files, Box 95, + SCC 082, Space Policy, ASAT Hostile Acts and Tests, 6/1/78. + Top Secret; Codeword. The meeting took place in the White House + Situation Room. + Washington, June 1, 1978, + 3:50–6:00 p.m. + + SUBJECT + ASAT Treaty + + + PARTICIPANTS + State + Deputy Secretary Warren + Christopher + Leslie Gelb, Director, + Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs + Defense + Secretary Harold + Brown + Herbert York, + Consultant + Walter Slocombe, Principal + Deputy Assistant Secretary for International Security Affairs + JCS + General David Jones + Lt. Gen. William Y. Smith, + Special Assistant to the Chairman + ACDA + Director Paul Warnke + Spurgeon Keeny, Deputy + Director + Ambassador Robert + Buchheim + NASA + Administrator Robert + Frosch + David Williamson, Special Assistant + OSTP + Director Frank Press + Art Morrissey, Senior Analyst + OMB + Randy Jayne, Associate Director National Security and + International Affairs + CIA + Admiral Stansfield + Turner + Sayre Stevens, Deputy + Director National Foreign Assessment Center + White House + David Aaron + (Chairman) + NSC + Victor Utgoff + BGen Robert Rosenberg + Charles Stebbins (Notetaker) + +

Definition of “Hostile Acts,” and Whether to + Pledge Not to Be the First to Commit Such Acts.

+

There was considerable discussion of these issues which resulted in three + possible approaches to the Soviets:

+

Approach 1: Propose that the US and Soviets regard intercepts of and + physical attacks on satellites of the other side as hostile acts, but + wait to gauge Soviet reactions at HelsinkiThe United States and the Soviet Union were scheduled to begin + ASAT talks in Helsinki, + Finland on June 8. See Document 33. + before deciding whether or not to + seek mutual pledges that neither side will be the first to carry out + such acts. (Favored by Defense and JCS + and acceptable to State and ACDA.)

+

Approach 2: Same as Option 1, except propose that + both sides pledge not to be the first to carry out such acts. (Favored + by ACDA, but opposed by JCS. DOD + wants to examine further whether this should apply to peacetime + only.)

+

Approach 3: Propose that the US and Soviets regard interference (which + includes intercepts, physical attacks [less than 1 + line not declassified] as a hostile act, but make a first-use + pledge only for physical attacks. (Favored by State.)

+

The Interagency Working Group (IAWG) + was tasked on a priority basis to study whether a hostile acts and + no-first-use agreement ought to apply in wartime as well as peacetime + (like the wartime prohibition on the use of poison gas), in particular + to determine what such a prohibition would mean operationally to the two + sides.

+

Type of Agreement

+

With regard to the type of agreement to be reached with the Soviets on + Hostile Acts, there was consensus that we should aim toward constructing + a formal agreement in the long term.

+

However, there was disagreement as to the appropriate form of any interim + agreements we might reach. ACDA + favored parallel statements covering hostile acts and test cessation, + believing this would not require approval by Congress. DOD thought unilateral statements would + offer more flexibility.

+

The Interagency Working Group (IAWG) + was tasked on a priority basis to examine what must be avoided in + constructing interim agreements in order to ensure that the President + can issue a parallel or unilateral statement without having to obtain + the consent of Congress. The IAWG is + to consult the legal counsels of various agencies as appropriate.

+

Nature of a Testing Ban

+

Again, there was no consensus. Two possible approaches to the Soviets + resulted:

+

Approach 1: Informally propose an indefinite + moratorium on ASAT tests but with the + proviso that either side could give the other six months’ notice if it + decided it was necessary to commence testing. (Favored by State, ACDA and OSTP.)

+

Approach 2: Informally propose a high-altitude + testing ban with the proviso that either side give the other a one-year + notice if it is to commence any high-altitude ASAT testing (e.g., above 3000 km). In addition, ask the Soviets to stop their + low-altitude testing while ASAT negotiations are ongoing. State + that the US has no immediate plans to + conduct low-altitude ASAT testing, but + we will give the Soviets six months’ notice if the pressures of the + current asymmetry favoring the Soviets require us to commence such + testing. (Favored by Defense. JCS feels + that neither approach has been thought through enough and that proposing + any testing suspension at this time would be premature.)

+

Treatment of the Space Shuttle

+

There was agreement that the US would + avoid discussing the Shuttle if at all possible, but if such a + discussion can’t be avoided, we will not permit the Soviets to designate + the Shuttle as an ASAT system.

+
+ +
+ 30. Memorandum of ConversationSource: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, + Harold Brown Papers, Box + 82, Brown Files—General #1, ASAT + Arms Control. Secret; Exdis. The + meeting took place at the Soviet Mission. Drafted by York on June 6. + Geneva, June 5, 1978, 8:00–10:00 + p.m. + + SUBJECT + Anti-Satellite Systems + + + PARTICIPANTS + U.S. + Dr. Herbert F. York + Dr. G.W. Johnson + USSR + Academician A.N. Shchukin + +

On Monday, June 5, Shchukin entertained Johnson and me and our wives at + the USSR Mission in Geneva, + Switzerland. The most substantive part of the conversation concerned + ASATs.

+

Shchukin started that part of the conversation by saying he was familiar + with ASATs and invited me to ask any questions I wished about them. I + started by asking him why the Soviet side had undertaken such a program + in the first place. In reply he said that the program simply consisted + of experiments whose purpose was to understand the possibilities and + that in addition one might want to inspect some satellite up close in + order to determine if it was complying with the rules outlawing nuclear + weapons in space. At this point I noted we both have developed manned + and unmanned systems for rendezvous in space, and he agreed with that. + (Neither at this point nor at any other did he once mention the + Shuttle). In this same context he also added that there were often enthusiasts for particular + programs and he cited an entirely different example wherein he had + successfully coped with some Colonel who was pushing a pet but dubious + idea involving balloons.

+

The only technical details about their program that he mentioned were in + negative terms. He said that at very high altitudes, “where the + communications satellites are,” it was too difficult to make an attack. + He also said that attacks must be co-orbital for two reasons, first, + because it is too difficult and takes too much propellant to make a turn + in space, and second because orbits which intersect at large angles mean + that one must control both the time and place of intersection very + exactly, and that in turn is much more difficult than the ICBM accuracy problem where only the + place is important. I noted to myself that these were all accurate + statements about the limitation of their current system, but I did not + mention that fact to him.

+

He then asked me “what about direct attacks from the ground?” I asked + whether he meant ABMs or lasers, and he + replied “yes, lasers.” I commented that we both had a wide variety of + laser development programs now under way and that lasers would be harder + to verify. He said he agreed.

+

He said, and I agreed, that both SALT + and CTB were more urgent, but in reply + to a direct question he stated he personally believed ASATs should be + banned.

+

Also in direct response, he indicated that he was acquainted with + Khlestov but that he did not + know Mayorskiy and (though I am not sure of this) he seemed not even + aware of him.

+
+ +
+ 31. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security + Affairs (Brzezinski) to President + CarterSource: Carter Library, National + Security Council, Institutional Files, Box 95, SCC 082, Space Policy, ASAT Hostile Acts and Tests, 6/1/78. + Top Secret; Codeword. Sent for urgent action. Carter initialed the + memorandum. + Washington, June 6, + 1978 + + SUBJECT + US/Soviet Meeting on Anti-Satellite Matters + +

The SCC met on June 1, 1978, to discuss + final preparations for the US/Soviet preliminary meeting on ASAT matters at Helsinki, June 8–18.See + Document 29. There is agreement + that we should continue to pursue a course of action ultimately leading + to as comprehensive a formal agreement as possible, subject to the + original constraints you established in your original PDSee Document 24.—e.g., dismantling of + Soviet ASAT capabilities, emphasis on + verifiability, and an end to Soviet testing. However, the Summary of + Conclusions at Tab A,See Document 29. as well as Harold’s memo at Tab + C,Not attached. demonstrate that + there is still considerable interagency disagreement over some of the + fundamental issues we intend to initially raise with the Soviets. There + is also some concern among several principals that, despite over nine + months of study, we do not fully understand the implications of what we + intend to propose. The disagreements are summarized below:

+

Hostile Acts. Consistent with the results of an + earlier SCC meeting, Cy Vance has told the Soviets that we + are interested in an agreement that attacks on each other’s satellites + would be considered “hostile acts.” However, there is interagency + disagreement over whether we ought to consider only physical attacks as + hostile acts, or interference—a broader term encompassing both physical + attacks and electronic warfare (EW). ACDA, DOD and JCS favor the former, State the latter. + [1½ lines not declassified]

+

Physical attacks would be easier to verify than interference, [4 lines not declassified] vulnerability of our + fleet. State argues that “interference” is a term already in use in + other US/Soviet bilateral agreements (concerning the operation of + National Technical Means), and negotiations might prove easier if there + is consistency among the various agreements.

+

No First-Use Pledge. ACDA, supported by State, suggested that, to make the talks + more meaningful, we ought to propose at Helsinki that both sides pledge + not to be the first to attack a satellite of the other side. DOD and JCS prefer to await the results of the Helsinki meeting + before deciding whether to propose such a pledge. [3 + lines not declassified] Additionally, Harold Brown, who is inclined to favor + some non-use pledge in peacetime, has asked for more time to consider + whether we want a “no-first-attack” pledge in wartime.

+

In addition, we do not currently have a good capability to monitor some + kinds of ASAT attacks on our + satellites, but we could—and probably ought to—substantially improve our + monitoring capability over the next several years by installing on-board + attack sensors on all our important satellites (long-term costs: + $250–300 M).

+ +

Type of Agreement to be Reached with the Soviets. + There was general agreement that our ultimate goal was to reach a + bilateral (or perhaps multilateral) formal agreement, subject to + Congressional ratification. As we proceed serially from talks of an + exploratory nature to step-by-step agreements, however, no consensus was + reached on the form any interim agreements might take. ACDA favors bilateral parallel statements + regarding hostile acts and no first use, which in their view requires no + Congressional consent.

+

Testing Ban. This is the most contentious + issue—whether and for how long an ASAT + testing ban ought to be proposed. The crux of this issue is the existing + asymmetry in orbital intercept capabilities. Because our ability to + verify the dismantling of the existing Soviet interceptors is poor, a + testing suspension could codify the current asymmetry in real + capabilities. Nevertheless, there was general agreement that it is + important to ban testing now before the Soviets run any high-altitude + ASAT tests, because many of our + most important satellites are out of reach of the current Soviet orbital + interceptor. Several also felt that an immediate ban on low altitude + testing is appropriate because the current Soviet interceptors do not + seem very good, and because it might be difficult to verify that low + altitude testing will not lead to a high altitude capability.

+

As a result of an earlier SCC, Cy Vance told the Soviets we were + interested in a test suspension during the talks. State, OSTP and ACDA favor proposing an indefinite + moratorium on ASAT tests, but with the + proviso that tests could be commenced with six months’ notice. Harold + prefers a high-altitude test ban with a one-year “escape clause,” and a + low-altitude test ban on the Soviets, but with a promise that the US will give them six months’ notice if the + pressures of the existing asymmetry favoring the Soviets require us to + commence such testing. The JCS supports + the high-altitude moratorium but opposes any low-level test ban.

+

RECOMMENDATIONS

+

1. In light of the complexity and sharply divergent opinions about how to + resolve the fundamental issues, and the fact that we do not have even a + hint how the Soviets feel about the ASAT negotiations, I feel the only prudent decision I can + recommend at this juncture is that the Helsinki talks be “exploratory” + in nature. Harold’s memo to you (Tab C) supports this point. Under such + an approach the Soviets would be told that we are prepared to explore + with them the possibility of: (i) treating physical attacks on + satellites [less than 1 line not declassified] as + hostile acts; (ii) pledging not to conduct such attacks; (iii) placing + an indefinite moratorium on high-altitude tests with a one-year right of + withdrawal; (iv) placing a six-month moratorium on low-altitude testing + while we explore the possibilities for an agreement that will guarantee + no significant asymmetries in overall ASAT capabilities.

+ +

We would not seek to finalize any agreement at this first meeting. After + raising the key points, our objective would be to gauge Soviet + reactions—which will give us a better idea of where we go from here.

+

In the unlikely event the Soviets are interested in coming to any sort of + immediate agreement, our Delegation should seek further instructions. We + would not put forth concrete proposals until after a substantive review + in Washington.

+

______ Approve, as outlined above and specified in the PD at Tab B.Carter checked the + “Approve, as outlined above and specified in the PD at Tab B” option, and wrote “J” in + the left-hand margin.

+

______ Disapprove, develop specific proposals.

+

2. Recommend you approve the Summary of Conclusions at Tab A, and sign + the PD at Tab B.

+

______ Approve

+

______ Disapprove

+
+ +
+ 32. Presidential Directive/NSC–39Source: + Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, + Box 4, Anti-Satellite System (ASAT): 7/77–10/80. Top Secret. The Department of State + transmitted the instructions to the ASAT Delegation in telegram 143176 to Helsinki, June 6. + (National Archives, RG 59, Central + Foreign Policy File, P840128–2119) + Washington, June 6, + 1978 + + TO + The Vice President + The Secretary of State + The Secretary of Defense + The Director, Office of Management and Budget + The Director, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency + The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff + The Director of Central Intelligence + The Administrator, National Aeronautics and Space + Administration + The Director, Office of Science and Technology Policy + + + + SUBJECT + Instructions to the US Delegation + to the ASAT Talks with the Soviets + Commencing on June 8 in Helsinki (U) + +

The objective of the upcoming ASAT + talks with the Soviets is to express our interest in reaching a + comprehensive agreement to limit ASAT + capabilities and use (except for electronic countermeasures), to explore + possibilities for some initial steps in the ASAT area (described below), and to gauge Soviet interests + and reactions.

+

After making clear that the US is not + making formal proposals, the Delegation should state to the Soviets that + we are interested in exploring the possibilities for (1) dealing with + physical attacks on satellites possibly by treating them as hostile + acts, (2) pledging not to conduct such attacks, (3) placing an + indefinite moratorium on high-altitude ASAT tests with a one-year right of withdrawal, and (4) + placing a six-month moratorium on low-altitude tests while we explore + the possibilities for an agreement that will guarantee no significant + asymmetries in overall ASAT + capabilities.

+

If the Soviets are interested in coming to an immediate agreement on any + of these ideas, the Delegation should report to Washington for further + instructions.

+

In discussing our interest in a comprehensive proposal and our + unwillingness to accept a significant asymmetry in ASAT capability, the Delegation may + explore with the Soviets the possibility of finding a verifiable means + for effectively eliminating their current orbital interceptor + capability.

+

The Delegation should make clear to the Soviets that we intend to seek an + ASAT capability as soon as + possible unless they are willing to take positive actions to preclude + such a move on our part.

+

Finally, the Delegation should minimize discussions of the space shuttle + and under no circumstances allow it to be characterized as an ASAT system.

+ + Zbigniew + Brzezinski + +
+ +
+ + 33. Telegram From the Embassy in Finland to the Department of + StateSource: National + Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign + Policy File, D780256–0548. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Also sent Immediate to the + National Security Council, the Secretary of Defense, the Joint + Chiefs of Staff, the Central Intelligence Agency, and the National + Aeronautics and Space Administration. + Helsinki, June 20, 1978, 0633Z +

1926. US + ASAT Delegation 0017. Mil addressees + handle as Specat. NASA for Krueger. + Subject: ASAT Discussions—Review of + First Round.

+

1. ASAT first round held in Helsinki + June 8–16, 1978. Instructions to U.S. Delegation transmitted State + 143176.See footnote 1, Document 32.

+

2. The Soviet side came to Helsinki prepared to discuss anti-satellite + topics, and gave every indication that they take this subject seriously. + They responded as follows to U.S. statements that objective of + discussions should be a comprehensive agreement to limit development and + retention of ASAT systems and to + prohibit attacks on satellites and to U.S. comments on an initial + arrangement to prohibit damage or destruction of satellites and to + suspend testing of ASAT systems:

+

—The two sides should use language concerning these talks which would not + imply constraining the scope of an eventual agreement to concerns about + the safety of satellites; we should talk about threats to any object + launched into outer space (including, e.g., objects on interplanetary + trajectories) other than ballistic missiles;

+

—Soviet side argued that the two sides should focus attention initially + on developing and putting into force and independent formal agreement + prohibiting specified hostile actions against space objects, without + conditions as to progress toward or terms of a future comprehensive + agreement.

+

—The Soviet side did not specify unambiguously what (hostile) actions + they would seek to prohibit, but they made clear mention of kinds of + acts of lesser violence than damage and destruction. In particular, they + talked about a prohibition on changing the orbit of a satellite even + though the orbit-changing operation left the satellite undamaged, and + they mentioned prohibition on unspecified forms of interference.

+

—The Soviet side reserved their freedom to advocate formulating such an + agreement in a way which would permit actions against “unlawful” space + objects, although they also said that they were not mentioning their + concern about “unlawful” space objects as a pretext for retaining or + developing and deploying an anti-satellite system;

+ +

—In elaborating their remarks about “unlawful” space objects, the Soviet + side mentioned as an example direct-broadcast television satellites + directing programs into the territory of a state without the permission + of that state. They also mentioned, without explanation, a space object + which intrudes into the air space of a state; and there they argued that + national air space is part of national territory in which a state has a + right to take defensive actions of its own choosing.

+

—The Soviets acknowledged that they have been doing ASAT testing, but provided no information + on their program; and they declined to discuss a test suspension + understanding, saying that it was too early to consider such an + understanding at this stage in the talks.

+

—The Soviet side raised in a tentative way in legalistic language the + idea of including, in an early agreement prohibiting certain (hostile) + acts, a provision against doing things to “enable” carrying out such + acts. They mentioned as an example of an act of “enablement” the + launching into space of an ASAT + device.

+

—The Soviet side said they need time to consider U.S. views on a + comprehensive agreement before they respond, and asked that the U.S. + side bring specific proposals to the next round.

+

3. Soviet side, at first, suggested that an initial “hostile acts + agreement” be formulated in a way which would identify certain specified + acts as hostile acts and prohibit hostile acts. The U.S. side pointed + out that an equivalent alternative approach would be to formulate an + agreement in a way which would prohibit those same specified acts, with + or without identification of them as hostile acts. The Soviet side + listened to this without objection, and, toward the end of the session, + began to refer to the acts alluded to as “acts incompatible with + peaceful relations between states.” This phraseology was used in the + joint press release of June 17, 1978, announcing completion of first + round.The text of the press release is + in telegram 1900 from Helsinki, June 16; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + D780251–1157.

+

4. The U.S. side neither rejected nor accepted the suggestion of the + Soviet side that the two sides first develop an initial agreement + limited in scope to the prohibition of certain (hostile) acts against + objects launched into outer space, but explicitly advocated a two-part + initial understanding with the effect of an undertaking; (a) not to + carry out certain (hostile) acts against such objects, and (b) not to + carry out ASAT tests.

+

5. The Soviet side neither rejected nor accepted the U.S. view that + neither side should acquire new ASAT + systems or retain existing ASAT + systems. They acknowledged that the U.S. side had put forth that view + and they limited their comments to expressions of their view that these + are complex matters, that the + U.S. side has not described clear and specific ways to implement + undertakings to that effect, and that discussion of such undertakings + could be pursued after developing an agreement prohibiting certain + (hostile) actions.

+

6. The U.S. side acknowledged comments of the Soviet side to the effect + that implementation of agreement to liquidate existing ASAT systems would be complex, + particularly in those cases when important component equipments are used + as parts of non-ASAT systems as well + as parts of an ASAT system. The Soviet + side explicitly asked about launch and support facilities and about + radio-technical equipment. The U.S. side suggested that adequate and + verifiable implementation steps would best be negotiated on a + case-by-case basis, starting with a proposal by the side owning the + ASAT system in question, and asked + the Soviet side if they had any views on steps that it would be + appropriate to carry out to eliminate the Soviet ASAT system if an agreement were to + provide for such action. The Soviet side made no substantive reply.

+

7. The Soviet side was silent during plenary meetings on idea of + suspension of testing of ASAT systems, + and reacted to specific repetition of our idea by restating their view + that an understanding to prohibit (hostile) acts against space objects + should be the first order of business. The closest they came to + referring to a test suspension was by way of mention of the U.S. idea of + stopping development of ASAT systems. + In meeting in restricted composition, Khlestov said the Soviet side considered it too early to + talk about an undertaking to suspend tests. He also expressed hope that, + for time being, U.S. would limit discussion of testing suspension to + restricted meetings rather than plenaries. Khlestov was told, in restricted meeting, that, if the + two sides did get into meaningful discussion of test suspension, U.S. + side would propose that high-altitude testing be suspended indefinitely + and low-altitude testing be suspended for six months. He was told that + line between “high” and “low” was related to altitudes of Soviet ASAT tests to date, without quantitative + specification of that line.

+

8. The U.S. side expressed general interest in being sure we understood + what Soviet side had in mind in referring to possible inclusion, in an + initial agreement prohibiting hostile acts, of an element which would + prohibit “enabling” action such as launching any ASAT device into or through outer space. + (If such an agreement element could be realized, clearly prohibiting + launching into or through space of ASAT devices, it would have the effect of stopping testing + of direct-ascent and orbital-interceptor ASAT systems. This general idea might also lend itself to + development into undertakings not to acquire new ASAT devices and/or to liquidate existing + ASAT systems. The possibility of + elaborating the idea of an agreement to prohibit “enablement” was not + pressed further in this round because, when questioned a little more the day after he raised the idea, + Khlestov recoiled into + vagueness and clearly was not going to get drawn willingly into saying + anything more about it in this round. Indeed, his approach at that time + suggested strongly that, if further discussion of the matter were + pursued in this round, he would have to make remarks prejudicial to the + notion of dealing with “enablement.” Preservation and cautious + cultivation of this potential negotiating asset should be a significant + aspect of the U.S. approach to the next round.)

+

9. The Soviet side raised a mixed collection of topics which they will + probably drag along for some time for tactical reasons. One was the + point noted in para 2, above, about + the need to account, somehow, for the contingency of “unlawful” + operations through space objects. In response to questions from the U.S. + side they chose to say that their concerns of this sort were directed + toward possible future capabilities of third countries rather than + future behavior of the U.S. or USSR. A + second was the inconclusive state of international understanding on the + boundary between air space and outer space, and a third was the + legitimacy of direct TV broadcasts from satellites. The U.S. side + expressed the view that these talks are not an appropriate forum for + discussing such matters, and noted that opinions do differ on them. A + fourth was the general assertion that a state has the sovereign right to + take whatever “self defense” actions it deems appropriate against a + space object which intrudes into its air space. (The Soviets might view + this simply as a confortable point to talk about and keep alive in the + discussions for some future use, or it might reflect an extravagant + assessment of potentialities lurking in space shuttle capabilities, or + it might be a retailing of air defense institutional doctrine from + Soviet internal discussions. Legalities of sovereignty over air space + notwithstanding, not only is it unnecessary but it could be dangerous + for the U.S. to agree in general with the Soviet claim that a state has + an unfettered right to defend against a space object entering its air + space because any defense system with significant capabilities against + objects of near-satellite speeds would have substantial ABM potential, and the Soviets ought not + be allowed to erect such a system and claim it to be an “air defense” + system, free of limitations in the ABM + Treaty or any prospective ASAT + agreement.)

+

10. The Soviet side said that in their view it would be a hostile act to + change the orbit of the other side’s satellite even though the satellite + might not be damaged in the process. The U.S. side expressed the view + that changing the orbit of the other side’s satellite, except by + agreement between the two sides, should be prohibited. (The U.S. could + not go beyond a non-use undertaking on this kind of operation without + prejudicing the space shuttle program.)

+

11. In connection with mention of interference, the Soviet side made + vague remarks which might foreshadow their arguing in subsequent rounds for some kind of + prohibition on electronic countermeasures.

+

12. The Soviet side made frequent explicit and implicit references to the + U.S. space shuttle. (They undoubtedly would prefer to exercise the + subject of the shuttle rather than their ASAT system; however, the extent of actual Soviet concern, + if any, about shuttle use remains to be seen.)

+

13. The U.S. side said that the U.S. would pursue its own ASAT program as far and as fast as + necessary to assure national security, but preferred to avoid an arms + race in the ASAT field by appropriate + comprehensive agreement.

+

14. Throughout this round the atmosphere was cordial and discussions were + orderly and relevant to the subject. No agreements were reached in this + exploratory round, but it seems reasonable to judge that the two sides + have similar views of the main characteristics of the subject.

+

15. Time and place of second round to be agreed through diplomatic + channels.

+ + Ridgway + +
+ +
+ + 34. Summary of Conclusions of a Special Coordination Committee + MeetingSource: Carter + Library, National Security Council, Institutional Files, Box 99, Top + Secret; Ruff; Talent Keyhole; [codewords not + declassified]. The meeting took place in the White House + Situation Room. + Washington, November 16, + 1978, 8:30–10:00 a.m. + + SUBJECT + Antisatellite Treaty + + + PARTICIPANTS + State + Warren Christopher Deputy + Secretary + David Gompert Deputy Director, Politico-Military Affairs + Defense + Harold Brown + Secretary + Walter Slocombe Principal + Deputy Assistant Secretary for International Security Affairs + Herbert York Member, ASAT Delegation + ACDA + Spurgeon Keeny Acting + Director + James Timbie Chief, Strategic Affairs Division + Robert Buchheim Head, + ASAT Delegation + JCS + General William Y. + Smith + General David Bradburn Member, ASAT Delegation + White House + David Aaron + (Chairman) + NASA + Robert Frosch + Administrator + David Williamson Assistant for Special Projects + NSC + Victor Utgoff + Robert Rosenberg + Charles Stebbins + OSTP + Frank Press Director + Arthur Morrissey Senior Analyst + CIA + Admiral Stansfield + Turner + Sayre Stevens Deputy + Director National Foreign Assessment Center + +

Dismantling the Soviet Orbital Interceptor. All + agreed that complete dismantling of the current Soviet ASAT interceptor system could probably + not be verified because the interceptors are small and could be easily + concealed. Further, some participants felt that if we were to ask the + Soviets to eliminate the boosters currently used for their ASAT system, and/or the associated launch + facilities, we might have to pay an exorbitant negotiating price, + because:

+

—the SL–11 booster they now use is also used to orbit their ocean + reconnaissance satellites; and

+

—they have some 300 SS–9 boosters which we expect they would want to use + in their space program that would have to be verifiably dismantled. + (SL–11s are slightly modified SS–9s.)

+ +

However, all agreed that we should not yet abandon the dismantling goal; + rather the US should listen to and probe + any Soviet dismantling procedure that is offered in response to the + request we made during the first round of ASAT talks. The US should + make no proposals of its own during this next round, since we have not + yet found a proposal that would satisfy our concerns, and we must be + prepared to live with any proposal we make.

+

The Text of an Initial Agreement. All agreed that + an ASAT Treaty would apply during + peacetime; however, there were questions whether an agreement should + apply during crises or war:

+

—During Crises—OSD and JCS expressed + concern that a hostile acts agreement would prevent useful actions + against Soviet satellites during crises—[1½ lines not + declassified] It was agreed that insofar as treaty language is + concerned, crises would be treated no differently than peacetime.

+

—During War—DOD + is also concerned that if the treaty language called for the agreement + to remain in effect during war, Congress would be more likely to + restrict funding for development of a US + ASAT capability.

+

All agreed that the Interagency Working Group, with legal advice, should + draft specific alternative formulations of the text of an agreement for + discussion at the next SCC + meeting.See Document + 35.

+

Prohibited Acts. All agree that an initial, + hostile acts agreement should prohibit physical attacks on satellites of + the other side, and prohibit the unauthorized displacement from orbit of + satellites of the other side. Since the US space shuttle is the only near-term system of either + side with the ability to displace satellites, and since the Soviets have + already expressed their concern about displacement, the US should make maximum use of the + negotiating leverage implicit in agreeing to prohibit unauthorized + displacement. The US must be careful to + ensure that treaty language allows the US shuttle to perform its normal duties (extraction of + US satellite from orbit, close + inspection, etc.) without such activities being labeled as ASAT testing.

+

[4 paragraphs (24½ lines) not declassified]

+

The Interagency Working Group was directed [1½ lines + not declassified] for consideration in the next SCC meeting.

+

Interim Ban on Testing ASAT Interceptors. There was insufficient time to + fully develop this issue. The agency positions that were expressed + are:

+

—OSD/JCS—Prepared to accept an unlimited duration + high altitude test ban, leaving to the Soviets to propose the boundary + between high and low altitude (per our request during the first round of + talks). However, DOD noted that in order to eliminate the + current asymmetry in low altitude ASAT + capability between the two sides, we should consider the possibility of + allowing the U.S. a limited number of low altitude tests. Additionally, + DOD fears that adoption of a + moratorium on low altitude testing would inhibit funding for the US + ASAT interceptor.

+

—State/ACDA—Prefer a full test ban at all altitudes at least + until the US + ASAT interceptor is ready for testing + in FY 81–82. (ACDA leans toward a three-year test ban; State believes a + ban should last at least one year.) Such a ban would provide the + incentive needed for both sides to work toward a comprehensive + agreement, and wouldn’t hurt us since we aren’t ready to test an + interceptor anyway.

+
+ +
+ 35. Summary of Conclusions of a Special Coordination Committee + MeetingSource: Carter + Library, National Security Council, Institutional Files, Box 21, + PD/NSC–45. Top Secret; Ruff; [codewords not + declassified]. The meeting took place in the White House + Situation Room. + Washington, January 18, + 1979, 10:30 a.m.–12:00 p.m. + + SUBJECT + Antisatellite Treaty + + + PARTICIPANTS + State + Warren Christopher Deputy + Secretary + David Gompert Deputy Director, Politico-Military Affairs + Defense + Harold Brown + Secretary + Herbert York Member, ASAT Delegation + ACDA + Spurgeon Keeny Deputy + Director + James Timbie Chief, Strategic Affairs Division + Robert Buchheim Head, + ASAT Delegation + JCS + General William + Smith + General David Bradburn Member, ASAT Delegation + White House + David Aaron + (Chairman) + NASA + Robert Frosch + Administrator + Philip Culbertson Member, ASAT + Delegation + NSC + Victor Utgoff + Robert Rosenberg + Charles Stebbins + OSTP + Frank Press Director + Arthur Morrissey Senior Analyst + CIA + John Hicks Deputy Director for National Foreign Assessment + Evan Hineman Director, Office of Weapons Intelligence + + +

General

+

All agreed that we should not use the term “hostile act” in an ASAT agreement with the Soviets, because + the term is legally equivalent to an “act of war”, and we would not want + to feel obliged to go to war over a breach of the agreement. Rather, the + treaty language should involve “prohibitions” against certain acts. + (S)

+

All agreed that the ultimate goal of the ASAT talks should continue to be the conclusion of a + comprehensive ASAT agreement with the + Soviets. (TS)

+

All agreed that despite serious reservations about finding a verifiable + scheme for effectively dismantling the Soviet orbital interceptor, the + US should continue to argue in favor + of its dismantling, and listen to and probe any Soviet proposal for + doing so. (We requested such a proposal at ASAT I.) (TS/R [less than 1 line not + declassified])

+

All agreed that our talks with the Soviets should continue to be informal + until it becomes clear that we and the Soviets have a good understanding + of each other’s negotiating aims. (S)

+

[2 paragraphs (12 lines) not declassified]

+

[2 paragraphs (11½ lines) not declassified]

+

Test Suspension

+

During round 1 of the ASAT talks, in an + off the record meeting between the heads of the two delegations, we + suggested an indefinite duration ban on high altitude testing, plus a + six-month ban on low altitude testing. There remains some support + (DOD, OSTP) for staying with this + position until we can gage Soviet reaction to it. However, OSD and JCS would prefer an indefinite duration high altitude test + ban (to protect our DSP and other satellites whose loss could be very + serious), with no ban on low altitude testing (to avoid difficulties in + obtaining funding from the Congress for our ASAT programs). OSD and + JCS are concerned that a low + altitude test moratorium would perpetuate the current asymmetry in + interceptor capabilities favoring the Soviets, and that even if the + Soviets stop testing their current system, they would have a substantial + breakout capability. OSD also feels + that unless we pursue our own ASAT + program, including low altitude testing, we would have no leverage over + the long term to encourage the Soviets to dismantle their orbital + interceptor and get the two sides down to “zero capability” postures. + (TS/R [less than 1 line not declassified])

+

State would prefer a one-year ban on testing at all altitudes to give us + more time to settle our in-house differences, and to avoid our getting + so bogged down with the Soviets in technical details that we might not + be able to reach any kind of an agreement, at least in the near term. + ACDA supports the State position, + but would have the ban last two years. ACDA feels that the Soviets would be the only ones really + affected by such a ban, since + the US will not be ready to test its + interceptor for several years. (TS)

+

There is a difference of opinion whether a test ban should apply only to + interceptors [less than 1 line not declassified] + other ASAT systems. ACDA feels that the test ban should apply + to any system that can carry out the acts that are to be specifically + prohibited in the initial agreement. NASA fears that ACDA’s + test ban formulation would inhibit our using the Space Shuttle to + retrieve our own satellites from orbit, since retrieval would + technically constitute an ASAT test. + OSTP cautions that the ACDA-favored + test ban would have to be worded to permit the Shuttle to perform + certain safety functions. [3½ lines not + declassified] OSD and JCS want a test ban against interceptors + only, because of the Shuttle and verifiability problems. (TS/R [less than 1 line not declassified])

+

The Boundary Between High and Low Altitude + Testing

+

ACDA and State prefer to see no + altitude distinction in a test ban; however, all agreed that if there is + to be such a distinction, the ban should be based on system capability + rather than target altitude. This would, for example, prevent the + Soviets from mating their current interceptor with a larger booster and + testing it at low altitude, since under the system capability + formulation, the larger booster would render the interceptor capable of a high altitude intercept. (TS)

+
+ +
+ 36. Memorandum From the Deputy Director of the Arms Control and + Disarmament Agency (Keeny) to the + President’s Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Aaron)Source: Carter Library, National Security Council, + Institutional Files, Box 100, SCC + 125, ASAT, 1/18/79. + Secret. + Washington, January + 18, 1979 + + SUBJECT + ASAT Instructions + +

Following up on today’s SCC + meeting,See Document + 35. I have a number of comments on the relative + priorities of the issues which may be useful to you in framing these + issues for the President.

+ +

Testing. The Presidential DirectiveSee Document 24. we + are operating under calls for the prompt end of Soviet ASAT testing as the first order of + business. Any proposal, such as the one Defense recommends, which would + not halt Soviet testing is such a departure from the President’s + original objectives that it would call into question what we are trying + to accomplish. Moreover, I believe that making a distinction between + high- and low-altitude testing would introduce serious and unnecessary + problems, which a temporary test suspension for all altitudes would + avoid. You will recall that PRM-23See Document 2. + contained an option to ban only high-altitude ASAT systems, and that was not the one the President + picked.

+

Laser ASAT + systems. The suggestion that we might permit laser ASAT testing to go forward without + restriction also raised fundamental questions as to what we are trying + to accomplish in these talks. In the past, we have been careful to + characterize the ASAT limits we seek + in general terms with no reference to any particular means for attacking + satellites. This policy should be continued. We have a system to monitor + tests [2 lines not declassified] For the future, + we have the technology to build space-based systems to monitor Soviet + laser tests against satellites, but no present plan to do so. I believe + that we should define what additional intelligence collection assets + would be needed to monitor a ban on laser ASAT tests.

+

Interference. While I believe that a ban on + interference with the technical operation of satellites would be + desirable for an ASAT agreement, I do + not believe that this issue is as fundamental as the issues discussed + above which raise questions as to whether or not we are in fact + negotiating in the direction envisaged in the original Presidential + Directive.

+ + Spurgeon M. Keeny, + Jr.Keeny signed “ S.M. Keeny Jr.” above this + typed signature. + +
+ +
+ + 37. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security + Affairs (Brzezinski) to President + CarterSource: Carter Library, National + Security Council, Institutional Files, Box 21, PD/NSC–45. Top + Secret. In the upper right-hand corner, Carter wrote “Zbig. J.” + Washington, January + 22, 1979 + + SUBJECT + Instructions to the Delegation to the 2nd Round of ASAT Talks (U) + +

We are scheduled to begin the second round of ASAT talks with the Soviets on January 23 in Bern. In + preparation for this meeting the SCC + met on January 18.See Document 35. In this meeting the SCC agreed that our strategy should be to + continue to explore potential areas of agreement on an informal basis + until the main elements of a reasonable initial agreement seem fairly + clear to both sides. When this situation has been reached—and it may not + take long—we would make a formal proposal. Staying informal makes + talking with the Soviets somewhat easier: there are several issues the + Soviets owe us a response on, and this approach presents the smallest + risk that we will generate a formal Soviet rejection which would reflect + badly on SALT. (TS)

+

In the first round of talks, the Soviets suggested that we negotiate an + initial agreement banning damage, destruction or unauthorized + displacement of the other side’s satellites—an agreement that would + stand independent of the success or failure of any following + negotiations on other ASAT issues. + Following instructions, the Delegation responded that any initial + agreement should also include a moratorium on ASAT tests. (S)

+

Since the end of round one, the SCC’s + discussions have thus concentrated on the question of what should be + included in an initial agreement and how such an agreement should be + linked to continued negotiations toward dismantling and the + comprehensive limits on ASAT testing, + deployment, and use that you originally set as our goals. (TS)

+

We could negotiate an initial agreement banning just damage, destruction, + and unauthorized displacement but this approach, in addition to allowing + Soviet testing to continue, may not take full advantage of the + bargaining capital inherent in the Soviets’ demonstrated concern that we + might consider displacing some of their satellites with the space shuttle. The SCC thus believes we should continue to + try to achieve more in the initial agreement than the Soviets have + proposed—and has been able to agree that at a minimum, the initial + agreement should include a ban on testing high altitude ASAT interceptors. On several other + issues, however, we have not been able to agree, so you will have to + resolve our differences. (TS)

+

Low Altitude ASAT Interceptor Testing

+

In round one, we attempted to raise the testing suspension idea with the + Soviets and were told that they were not ready to discuss testing. Later + in a private meeting with the head of the Soviet Delegation, Ambassador + Warnke, described our + original idea of an indefinite high altitude test suspension and a + six-month moratorium on testing at low altitudes, but this suggestion is + not yet part of the record. (TS)

+

In this next round we will probe the Soviet reaction to our suggestion. + But we need to decide whether to stay with our earlier suggestion, or + change to some other formulation as suggested in the SCC. (TS)

+

ACDA and State argue that we should + pursue a testing suspension that doesn’t discriminate between high and + low altitudes—ACDA believes the + suspension should last two years; State proposes only one year. Both + argue that a testing suspension that covers all altitudes will be easier + both to negotiate and to verify, and that such a suspension would only + impact on the Soviets since we aren’t scheduled to begin testing our + miniature homing vehicle ASAT until + 1981. (TS)

+

JCS and OSD prefer no low altitude test suspension at all. They + believe that the current asymmetry in ASAT interceptor capabilities is unacceptable, and are + pessimistic about the prospects for identifying and negotiating + verifiable arrangements for eliminating the current Soviet orbital + interceptor—they see the testing of our MHV system as the only way to eliminate the asymmetry. They + further believe that a satisfactory way to draw an altitude distinction + can be identified and negotiated without much difficulty, and that even + a short suspension of low altitude testing will inhibit Congressional + funding for our ASAT development + program. Finally, they believe that there will be significant pressures + to extend such a suspension later, thereby perpetuating the asymmetry. + (TS)

+

I believe that a one-year moratorium is the best position for this round + of talks, primarily because it can be quickly negotiated if the Soviets + are willing to shut off their testing. While it would be nice to be able + to include an indefinite ban on high-altitude testing in an initial + agreement, our studies suggest that drawing a meaningful distinction + between high and low altitudes is a complex proposition. (TS)

+ +

Your Decision:

+

______ No low-altitude suspension; indefinite high (DOD)

+

______ One-year suspension at all altitudes (State, NSC)Carter checked this option and + initialed “J” after the sentence.

+

______ Two-year suspension at all altitudes (ACDA) (S)

+

[5 paragraphs (60 lines) not declassified]

+

Coverage of the Testing Suspension

+

ACDA and State believe that any test + ban or suspension should cover tests of ASAT systems rather than ASAT interceptors. They are particularly interested in + stopping possible tests of high energy laser ASAT systems. (TS)

+

NASA is against such broad coverage + because it could be interpreted as including testing of systems for + displacing satellites, and thus would cause trouble for our plans to use + the Space Shuttle to retrieve our own satellites from orbit. [2 lines not declassified] (TS)

+

DOD and I believe that the test + suspension should only cover ASAT + interceptors because of the verification and shuttle problems. It seems + clear, however, that the pursuit of limits on high energy laser ASAT applications should get high + priority in follow-on negotia-tions. (TS)Carter underlined the phrase “should get high + priority in follow-on negotiations” in this paragraph.

+

Your Decision:

+

______ Cover tests of ASAT interceptors + only (DOD, NSC, NASA)Carter + checked this option, and drew an arrow to the previous paragraph and + wrote “Let this be known to Soviets.”

+

______ Cover tests of all ASAT systems + (ACDA, State)

+

At Tab A is a draft set of instructions to the Delegation reflecting my + recommendations on the above issues. (U)

+

RECOMMENDATION

+

That you approve my issuing instructions of the form given at Tab A, + suitably modified to reflect the above decisions. (U)Carter + approved this option and underlined the words “suitably + modified” in this paragraph.

+
+ +
+ + 38. Presidential Directive/NSC–45Source: + Central Intelligence Agency, Office of the Director of Central + Intelligence, Job 81B00112R, Subject Files, Box 16, Folder 8: + (SCC) ASAT. Top Secret. + Washington, January + 22, 1979 + + TO + The Vice President + The Secretary of State + The Secretary of Defense + The Director, Office of Management and Budget + The Director, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency + The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff + The Director of Central Intelligence + The Administrator, National Aeronautics and Space + Administration + The Director, Office of Science and Technology Policy + + + SUBJECT + Instructions to the US Delegation + to the ASAT Talks with the Soviets + Commencing January 23 in Bern (U) + +

The objectives of the second round of ASAT talks with the Soviets are:

+

—To seek clarification of Soviet views regarding the possibilities for + (1) finding a verifiable means for effectively eliminating their current + orbital interceptor capability, and (2) suspending ASAT interceptor testing. (S)

+

—To continue informal discussions aimed at identifying and clarifying + areas of mutual understanding that might be codified in an initial + ASAT agreement. (U)

+

In discussing the question of dismantling, you may draw on the ideas + contained in the interagency study.See Document 6. However, you must make it + absolutely clear that any suggestions you make in no way constitute a + proposal. (U)

+

In discussing the issue of a testing suspension, you should informally + suggest a one-year suspension of testing at all altitudes. You should + also make it clear to the Soviets that investigating the possibility of + limits on high energy laser ASAT + applications should get high priority in future talks. (S)

+

After discussing these specific issues with the Soviets, you should send + me your assessment of the Soviets’ interest in negotiating a two-part + initial agreement consisting of a ban on damage, destruction, and + unauthorized displacement of each other’s satellites, plus a one-year suspension of ASAT interceptor testing. Except for the + changes implied by the above instructions, the instructions for the + first round remain in force. (TS)

+ + Zbigniew + Brzezinski + +
+ +
+ 39. Telegram From the Embassy in Switzerland to the Department of + StateSource: National + Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign + Policy File, D790037–0612. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Sent for information + Immediate to the National Security Council, the Secretary of + Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Central Intelligence Agency, + and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration. + Bern, January 25, + 1979, 1350Z +

453. US + ASAT Two 004. From Buchheim. Mil addresses handle as + Specat. NASA for Krueger. Subject: (U) + ASAT Two Meetings, January 24, + 1979.

+

1. (U) First plenary meeting of ASAT + Two opened 3:00 pm, January 24, 1979, at U.S. Embassy, Bern.

+

2. (U) Ambassador Khlestov + declined offer to take floor first, deferring to Ambassador Buchheim as host. Buchheim’s statement ASAT Two-003 (Bern 044).Telegram 440 from Bern, January 25, reported + Buchheim’s statement at + the January 24 ASAT II plenary, in + which he emphasized Washington’s desire to work with Moscow to limit + anti-satellite weapons systems and activities and urged that an + agreement be made that devised “practical measures to prevent an + arms competition in outer space and thus to head off the known and + unknown adverse consequences that could flow from such a + competition.” (National Archives, RG + 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790037–0035)

+

3. (S) Khlestov, referring to + prepared text, stated that we have started bilateral negotiations on + subject of anti-satellite systems and activities. This he characterized + as a further positive development from preliminary consultations in June + and as representing a higher and more responsible level of contact + between our two countries. He expressed praise for Paul Warnke as one of initiators of the + negotiations and noted with satisfaction that the leadership of the U.S. + Delegation has now been entrusted to Buchheim.

+

4. (S) Khlestov said he had been + glad to hear in Buchheim’s + statement that U.S. is interested in an elaboration of the measures the + sides are studying, which is the premise from which the Soviet side also + proceeds. He observed that + the extensive consultations in HelsinkiSee + Document 33. had familiarized + the sides with each other’s positions and sketched the general outlines + of the problem. While not all elements had come through clearly in + Helsinki, the Soviet side’s main conclusion was that positions of both + sides coincide on a number of points and that both sides are striving + toward a more complete understanding of each other’s views. Khlestov said he had so summarized in + Moscow the results of the June session and that this report had met with + a positive response.

+

5. (S) Khlestov said that, + although a direction and common approach had emerged as a result of the + Helsinki discussions, providing a basis for joint work, there still + remain points to be clarified. Khlestov recalled that in Helsinki there had been + problems with some elements of the US + view which lacked clarity and others which were incomprehensible. The + Soviet side is proceeding from the premise that the work of the session + in Bern must lead to concrete, practical results and achieve specific + and tangible forward movement. In order to effectively work toward this + goal, Khlestov suggested that the + sides should first work out definitions of terminology, as well as + details and nuances of the issues.

+

6. (S) Khlestov repeated that + Soviet side is most serious and will apply every effort to achieve + concrete results in this session.

+

7. (S) Buchheim expressed interest + in Khlestov’s suggestion that + certain terminology should be clarified and asked whether Khlestov had a list of terms to + suggest. Khlestov replied that he + did not wish to enumerate at this time all the terms which need + elucidation. However, noting again Soviet goal of achieving concrete + results and necessity for defining terms as first step toward this end, + he offered following formulation for defining “space objects”, calling + it “a preliminary set of ideas” for further discussion. The term “space + objects” includes the class of objects placed into orbit around earth or + launched further into outer space, and in relationship to which one side + is the state of registration under the 1975 Registration + Convention.The Convention on + Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space was promulgated by + the 37-member United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer + Space on January 14, 1975; the United States Ambassador to the + UN, John Scali, signed it ten + days later. Scali’s statement is published in the Department of + State Bulletin, February 17, 1975, p. + 232. The term “space objects” includes the component parts of + space objects, their means of delivery and its parts.

+

8. (S) Khlestov explained that + this formulation reflected the Soviet desire to find objective criteria, + based upon the 1975 Conventions to which both sides are parties, which + would cover all space objects. He added that the Soviets had also tried to use the language of the outer + space treaty.The United States, the United + Kingdom, and the Soviet Union signed the Treaty on Principles + Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of + Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, on + January 27, 1967, and it entered into force on October 10, 1967. The + Treaty prohibited the placement of nuclear weapons and other weapons + of mass destruction on the moon and other celestial bodies, in orbit + around the earth, or otherwise stationing them in outer space. + Testing of such weapons on the moon and in outer space was also + prohibited. The text of the Treaty is in Department of State Bulletin, December 26, 1966, pp. + 953–954. As points of reference, he cited Article I, + Paragraph B, of the 1975 Registration Convention and Article I, + Paragraph D, of the Liability Convention.UN Resolution 2777 (XXVI) + creating the Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused + by Space Objects was adopted by the General Assembly on March 29, + 1972. + Khlestov expressed the view that + it would be easier to use a formulation already internationally tested + and based upon language in legal instruments which both sides have + signed.

+

9. (S) After first recalling the Soviet side’s preference for language + characterizing certain acts as incompatible with peaceful relations + between states rather than as hostile acts, Khlestov suggested in a preliminary way the following + definition of which acts would be regarded as “hostile acts”: a hostile + act is an act which the sides regard as a deliberate action upon a space + object by any system or means, either in space or on the ground, which + can lead to the destruction of a space object, its displacement from + orbit, damage to it, or rendering unserviceable its onboard + equipment.

+

10. (S) Khlestov repeated several + times that these two definitions were purely preliminary attempts and + not the final position of the Soviet side, and said that the sides + together can arrive at more precisely formulated definitions. He + suggested that U.S. Delegation formulate its own versions of + definitions, and also requested Buchheim’s preliminary views on those Khlestov had just read. Buchheim stated that he would not + address Khlestov’s preliminary + formulations today but agreed that a productive way to begin these talks + would be to pursue a clearer understanding of these two terms and, in + the process, expose areas of early agreement, as well as areas the sides + will have to argue about a little more. Buchheim and Khlestov agreed that next meeting would include + discussion of those two terms.

+

11. (S) (A) Immediately following the plenary, Buchheim and Khlestov met, with Bradburn, Desimone, + Mayorskiy, and interpreters present. It was agreed that the second + plenary meeting would be on Friday, January 26, 1979, at 3:00 pm, at Soviet Embassy.

+

(B) Referring to the definitions discussed during the plenary meeting, + Buchheim informed Khlestov that the U.S. side has studied + further the desirability of + using the term “hostile acts”, and reminded Khlestov that at Helsinki the U.S. side had mentioned + two possible approaches, i.e., either (a) to simply list acts which the + two sides would undertake not to carry out against a space object + belonging to the other side, or (b) to list acts which should not be + carried out against a space object of the other side, and label them as + “hostile acts” or as “acts incompatible with peaceful relations,” or + identify them with some other label. Following a longish discussion of + the two approaches, both sides agreed to be prepared to address these + alternatives at the next plenary meeting.

+

(C) Khlestov suggested that + terminology formulations should be submitted in writing to make future + work easier. He added that, since Moscow, and presumably Washington as + well, were keeping an eye on the Delegations, such written contributions + should be treated as informal working papers only and not as proposals + or as documents formally tabled.

+

(D) Buchheim then asked, as a + procedural question, whether Khlestov still wished to limit to private meetings + discussion of the question of suspending ASAT interceptor tests, as he had preferred in Helsinki, or + if this subject could now be raised in plenary meetings. Khlestov replied that it could be + raised in either forum. Buchheim + said that he would advise Khlestov in advance before raising the issue in plenary. + Khlestov expressed + appreciation for this courtesy.

+

(E) Khlestov promised working + texts on “hostile acts” and “acts incompatible with peaceful relations + between states” at the next plenary and expressed his hope that the U.S. + Delegation would be similarly prepared.

+

(F) Khlestov asked why U.S. had + proposed Bern as site for this round. Buchheim said USG had + considered several possibilities and had concluded Bern to be most + appropriate for this round.

+

12. (S) Comment. Khlestov’s + approach to definition of “space object” (para 7 above) contains same substance as suggestion by + Soviet side in Helsinki concerning the things against which each party + would undertake not to carry out certain acts, that is, any object + belonging to the other party which is in earth orbit or in a + super-orbital trajectory, e.g., interplanetary probes, but not ballistic + missiles. Our understanding is that the ASAT working group recorded interagency consensus in favor + of such an approach. Unless advised otherwise by Washington, we will, in + further discussions with Soviet side on scope of definition, adopt the + view that an undertaking not to carry out certain acts would be an + undertaking not to carry out such acts against objects in earth orbit + and objects on trajectories more energetic than earth orbits, including + interplanetary trajectories. In this regard, we assume that word + “satellites” in phrase “ban on damage, destruction, and unauthorized displacement of each other’s + satellites” in State 017665Not found. + is intended to be construed in this more comprehensive way as to the + trajectories of objects that are not to be attacked. (End comment).

+ + Warner + +
+ +
+ 40. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of Defense for + International Security Affaris (Slocombe) to Secretary of Defense BrownSource: Library of Congress, + Manuscript Division, Harold + Brown Papers, Box 50, ASAT. Top Secret. The memorandum is stamped “SECDEF Has Seen 8 Feb + 1979.” + Washington, February 1, 1979 + + SUBJECT + PD–45/ASAT Negotiations—ACTION MEMORANDUM + +

Attached is PD–45,See Document 38. + which I assume you’ve seen, setting forth this round’s instructions for + the ASAT negotiations. Substantively, + DoD seems to have won on + interference and lost on testing. More than usual, however, the + instructions are something of a surprise, given the substance of the + meeting, and deserve some comment.

+

1. Testing: The approach of a one-year ban with no + distinction between high and low altitude satellites may make sense if + one is trying to reach quick agreement with the Soviets in order to + bolster SALT ratification prospects + (although it could backfire with Senators concerned about US–USSR + military asymmetries). Herb York + has also argued, perhaps correctly, that a test ban of sufficient + duration would be to the United States’ advantage. A one-year ban, + however, immediately raises the question of renewal. If we do think it + desirable to go ahead with MHV testing + in mid-1981, we will need to make the case soon as to why that is so. + Otherwise, we are likely to find that what is formally a one-year ban + will be continuously extended. Even the prospect of such renewal could present problems, as we + are learning in SALT (with Protocol) + and CTB.

+

The Delegation has been instructed to report back on the Soviet response + to our proposals. An appropriate time to raise the renewal question + would be when we see their response.

+

2. Dismantling: I thought we had closed this issue + out, but it seems to have raised its head again. The first ASAT + SCC for this round decided that the + US should listen to and probe Soviet + proposals for dismantling the orbital ASAT but not make proposals of our own since “we have not + found a proposal that would satisfy our concerns, and we must be + prepared to live with any proposal we made.” However, in order to draw + the Soviets out on dismantling their orbital ASAT, the PD as written + allows the Delegation to “draw on the ideas contained in the interagency + study” and make dismantling “suggestions.” The Delegation also is to + make clear that it is not making any dismantling “proposals.”

+

The PD’s statement on US suggestions (which, I am fairly sure, + reflects an NSC staff decision) + formally adheres to, but in practice may reverse, the SCC conclusion since the interagency study + referred to is in reality an ACDA + paper whose suggestions were the ones that did not satisfy the SCC’s concerns. Buchheim is an able negotiator, + however, so I really don’t expect anything untoward will happen in + Berne. Nonetheless, we should take action in Washington to reestablish + the SCC conclusion (perhaps doing this + also in the context of any discussion about the Soviet response to our + proposals).

+

3. Lasers: The PD—reflecting, we are told, the President’s personal + initiative—says that the Delegation should make it clear to the Soviets + that investigating the possibility of limits on high energy laser ASAT applications should get high + priority in future talks. While, in the abstract, I have no quarrel with + “investigating” this, there is reason to believe that limitations on + laser ASAT applications will be + difficult to construct. For this reason, the interagency ASAT working group had agreed not to + discuss lasers with the Soviets. Given the President’s interest, I think + it would be wise for DoD to move out + smartly on seeing whether something can be done, especially in light of + our and Soviet non-ASAT laser + programs. From DoD’s point of view, + there are substantial arguments for continuing our laser R&D programs as an ASAT hedge and for non-ASAT applications and substantial doubts + about the verifiability of any limits on lasers for ASAT use. Clearly, others disagree, at + least at this point. Accordingly, if you agree, I will arrange with Bill + Perry to (1) survey US and Soviet + current and planned laser programs, (2) provide a menu of choices and + costs (especially impacts on those programs) necessary to get an + effective ASAT laser limitation, and + (3) analyze monitoring/verification issues relevant to possible ASAT laser limitations. We would then have the basis for + analyzing specific proposals in the interagency group.

+

Walter Slocombe

+

Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of + Defense

+

International Security Affairs

+

Agree: ______Brown wrote “HB 2/8” in the “Agree” + option.

+

Other: ______

+
+ +
+ 41. Telegram From the Embassy in Switzerland to the Department of + StateSource: National + Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign + Policy File, D790058–0061. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Sent for information + Immediate to the National Security Council, the Secretary of + Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Central Intelligence Agency, + and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration. + Bern, February 7, 1979, 0803Z +

720. US + ASAT Two 019. From Buchheim. Mil addressees handle as + Specat. NASA for Krueger. Subject: (U) + ASAT Two Plenary Meeting, February + 6, 1979 (Secret—Entire Text).

+

1. Begin summary: During three hour meeting at Soviet Embassy, Khlestov asked, and Buchheim responded to, a number of + questions on U.S. ideas for an initial agreement. Most of the questions + concerned the details of the test-suspension idea. In addition to + questions on the internals of text, Soviets wanted to know when one-year + period would start, and whether agreement would be written so as + automatically to continue or to lapse at end of one year. Buchheim emphasized that we were + discussing concept of an initial agreement, that a prohibition on damage + or destruction covered any means for doing so, and noted need for + discussion in the future of limiting ground-based lasers and other kinds + of anti-satellite systems not covered in initial agreement. End + summary.

+ +

2. Khlestov said preliminary + discussions of U.S. texts at last meeting (see ASAT Two 016, Bern 678)Telegram + 678 from Bern, February 3, reported that the ASAT Delegation presented the Soviet + Delegation with the text of a Non-Paper consisting of two “elements” + for discussion. The first proposed that the two sides pledge “not to + destroy, damage, or change the trajectory of an object which has + been placed in orbit around the earth.” The second proposed that the + two sides issue a moratorium on the launching of “for test or any + other purpose, an interceptor missile for the destroying or damaging + objects which have been placed in orbit around the earth or any + other trajectories into outer space” from the date of the signing of + an ASAT agreement. Khlestov questioned both elements, + including how such objects would be identified and what the U.S. + meant by the phrase “not to destroy, damage . . . any object.” + (National Archives, RG 59, Central + Foreign Policy File, D790053–0273) had helped SovDel to + understand better U.S. ideas, however, they had more questions.

+

3. Khlestov said that in the + Soviet text given to the U.S. (see ASAT Two 005, Bern 528)Telegram + 528 from Bern, January 27, reported that Khlestov had submitted “tentative Soviet views on + defining space objects, and listing of actions which would be + prohibited or inconsistent with peaceful relations between states.” + Buchheim replied that the + United States “was not thinking of formal proposals but was + presenting a possible alternative approach which does not use the + term ‘space object’ and ‘hostile acts’ and which therefore does not + rely on definitions.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + D790055–0375) there were the qualifying words “acts + incompatible with peaceful relations between states.” He recalled that + Buchheim had said some such + qualifying words could be included in a preamble, but U.S. text did not + contain such language. He wanted to know if U.S. side considered it + possible and necessary to have a preamble, if so, what its contents + should be, and whether they could include some qualifying words—either + “acts incompatible with peaceful relations between states” or some + other. Buchheim said the U.S. + side had no objection, in principle, to a preamble and some such words + could be in one.

+

4. Khlestov said that a second + question concerned possible concluding sections of an agreement, such as + listing the official languages of the agreement and the place of + signing. They would also contain the date that the agreement would come + into force. The obligation not to text could extend: (I) 12 months from + date of signing; (II) 12 months from the exchange of instruments of + ratification. The difference between the two commencement dates could be + three, four, five months. He said he would like to know the U.S. point + of view. Buchheim said this was a + question on which he would need instructions and that, if Khlestov felt that the discussion was + at a point where he should ask for such instructions, he would do so. + Khlestov said he wanted to + better understand the essence of the U.S. idea. Buchheim said he would ask for + instructions on that basis.

+ +

5. Khlestov’s next question + referred to Buchheim’s statement + (ASAT Two 015 Bern 665)Telegram 665 from Bern, February 2, reported on a + two-hour plenary session held a day earlier at the Soviet embassy. + The two sides discussed “possible prohibited actions; expressed view + that potential agreement should cover those launch vehicle states + and component parts which go into orbit; and agreed that a potential + agreement should cover objects on surface of moon and other + celestial bodies.” The Soviets also “requested list of specific + actions U.S. would favor prohibiting” and expressed the need for + “provisions” that would “cover inadvertent actions and to take into + account of changes, advances in technology.” Buchheim in return suggested a + “one-year all-altitude test suspension.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + D790050–1268) that the U.S. envisioned the two sides would, + prior to expiration of the 12-month text suspension, meet to discuss + these matters further and take appropriate decisions. He requested + clarification of the U.S. views on this matter with respect to the two + possible interpretations: Does the U.S. believe that an agreement which + would be in effect for a specific period of time would lapse when that + period was over; or does the U.S. have the view that the agreement would + only lapse if the two sides met and agreed not to extend it? Buchheim responded that the U.S. had no + fixed views on the matter. He said the U.S. side was talking about an + initial undertaking on testing lasting for 12 months during which time + the two sides should decide whether to continue, to extend, or to change + the agreement, and that we favored maximum flexibility in consultations + during this 12-month period. He said further that he believed that an + initial agreement should be case in terms that envision further + discussions or agreements by the parties on these matters, and that it + should provide as much flexibility in consultations as seems reasonable. + He noted that Khlestov’s question + envisions the possibility that an article might specify that a text + suspension would continue or lapse depending on what the parties in + consultation agree concerning the text suspension or any other matters + or undertakings. He then asked Khlestov’s views on whether the suspension should + automatically lapse if the parties don’t agree to continue it or would + the suspension continue until the parties do agree to terminate it. The + U.S. has no fixed views on this, he said. Khlestov said that he had drawn two conclusions from + Buchheim’s presentation: + First, that a mechanism for further consideration of this matter had + been more carefully worked out by the U.S. side than by the Soviets, and + second, that the future fate of a test suspension following the 12-month + period must be more precisely formulated. Buchheim said that a perfectly acceptable mechanism to + consider the matter further is these two Delegations. Khlestov asked for Buchheim’s thoughts on paper. Buchheim agreed to do so but said the + thoughts would not be complicated; they would be that the parties + consider the matter during the one-year period under whatever mechanism + the two sides prefer.

+ +

6. Khlestov describing + difficulties SovDel had had in understanding U.S. side’s text on test + suspension, then asked whether the words of that preliminary text, “. . + . interceptor missile for destroying or damaging . . .” were intended to + describe the type of interceptor missiles the sides would agree not to + launch, or to describe the purposes of those launches that were not to + be made. Buchheim said the + purpose of the phrase was to be descriptive of the type of interceptor, + not of the purpose of the launch, and the U.S. would consider the + question of whether the English text should be changed.

+

7. Khlestov then asked what + objects were included in the scope of the words “interceptor missiles.” + Buchheim said an interceptor + missile is a missile, device, rocket, or vehicle—or any other + appropriate word—which has as its purpose to strike or to come close + enough to a target object to damage or destroy that object, by whatever + mechanism of damage is built into it. In discussion it was clarified + that the term referred to devices that approach their targets from + orbit, by direct ascent, or in any other way.

+

8. Khlestov asked about the + meaning of the words “for any other purposes” in the text suspension + text which reads “not to launch, for text or any other purposes, an + interceptor missile . . . .” Buchheim explained that the objective is to suspend + anti-satellite system tests; the implementation of that objective is to + suspend launches for any purposes, such as training, which could provide + test information and that “not to launch” with no reference to testing + would be sufficient, but that the longer phrase used seemed more + appropriate. Khlestov concluded + that the U.S. text’s meaning was that interceptor missiles should not be + launched at all.

+

9. Khlestov then asked whether the + notion of an “interceptor missile” included both the device and its + launch vehicle, that is whether, under the text suspension, only + launches of the launch vehicle with the device on it would be banned, or + whether launches of the launch vehicle without the device would also be + banned. Buchheim explained that + in the U.S. view only launches with the device would be banned.

+

10. Khlestov asked why the U.S. + text concerning prohibited acts, like the Soviet text, called for + obligations “not to destroy, damage or change the trajectory”, while the + U.S. text on test suspension applied only to interceptor missiles + designed to destroy or damage and did not cover means of changing a + trajectory. Why was the scope of the second text narrower than that of + the first? Buchheim said he would + answer the question more fully than it has been asked: there were two + aspects to the differences in scope between the two texts. First element + of U.S. text contains idea of undertaking not to destroy or damage the + kinds of objects described, by any means. The U.S. side did not use the + words “by any means” since it seemed inherent that a pledge not to do + anything meant by any means. + The second element of U.S. text (test suspension) does not include all + possible means for damage or destruction of an object. Buchheim said he did not believe it + revealed any mysteries to either side to note that bringing an + interceptor missile into the vicinity of an object for damage or + destruction is only one means for carrying out such an act. He said that + from publications available to anybody one could suggest in the future + that other devices may be used, including devices on ground designed for + generating intense radiation, lasers or otherwise. Buchheim said the possible undertaking + not to destroy or damage would include all means—by interceptor + missiles, sources of powerful radiation on the ground or any other + means; it is a complete undertaking in that sense. In U.S. judgment of + technology for systems for damaging or destroying objects in space, + interceptor missiles are the practical means in the near term and can + properly be dealt with now. The problem of placing limitations on + systems based on other physical principles, for example powerful lasers + based on the ground, seems to be a problem to be raised in the future + whenever the two sides believe they understand it well enough. Buchheim said the other aspect of + Khlestov’s question concerns + why the second element of the U.S. text did not limit the means for + changing the trajectory of an object in space. The U.S. would + specifically not suggest any such limit, he said, because “changing + trajectories” is another way of saying “provide some means of maneuver.” + Both sides in normal, everyday, peaceful space activity make changes to + the trajectories of their own space objects. It should also be permitted + to do this in cooperative programs, by agreement. The U.S. side sees no + merit in placing impediments in the way of such peaceful activities and + sees no point in prohibiting testing of means for changing + trajectories.

+

11. Khlestov said that the Soviet + side had about one and a half hours more material to discuss and, when + asked its nature, said it dealt with the prohibited acts text. Buchheim indicated willingness to + continue immediately or later in afternoon. Khlestov suggested continuing February 7, at 3:00 pm, at + U.S. Embassy, Buchheim agreed. + Khlestov repeated his request + that the U.S. side bring to the next meeting whatever text it could + clarifying its view of the consultations that would take place before + expiration of the test suspension.

+

12. Delegation requests answers/guidance on following points.

+

A. Is it U.S. view that initial agreement is a package of unlimited + duration which includes, as one element, a provision suspending testing + for one year?

+

B. Is it U.S. view that continuation in force of agreement should be + conditioned in some way on continuation of, or progress in, negotiations + on more comprehensive agreement?

+ +

C. What is U.S. view concerning when 12-month test suspension should + begin? Is it date of signature, date of formal entry into force if that + is different from date of signature, or some other date?

+

D. What is U.S. view concerning handling of test-suspension expiration? + Should it be described as automatically expiring or automatically + continuing absent any further mutual decision by the parties?

+

13. Assessment by Delegation mentioned in State 017665Not found. follows septel.

+ + Crowley + +
+ +
+ 42. Memorandum From Secretary of State Vance to President CarterSource: + Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Harold Brown Papers, Box 50, + International Security Affairs, Negotiations, ASAT. Secret. A note in the + upper-right hand corner by an unknown hand reads “dated APPX. 12 Mar + 79.” + Washington, undated + + SUBJECT + Anti-Satellite (ASAT) + Negotiations + +

We may be able to get an initial ASAT + agreement, or at least agreement in principle, at the Summit with the + Soviets.Carter and Brezhnev were scheduled to meet in Vienna in + June. This would be well worth doing, since the agreement we + seek is strong on its merits and would usefully complement the SALT Treaty by enhancing the security of + our verification means.

+

Getting agreement will require an early positive response by the Soviets + to our proposal for a one-year test ban, as well as a concerted effort + by both sides to settle several secondary issues. We learned from the + recent ASAT round that the Soviets are + especially concerned about two issues which seem to matter far more to + them than us: (1) whose satellites would be protected by the agreement; + and (2) whether “hostile” or “illegal” satellites (e.g. direct broadcast + satellites) would be protected. We have not given the Soviets clear, + firm U.S. positions on either issue. I think we can adopt positions which will protect our interests + and yet meet minimal Soviet concerns:

+

On whose satellites are protected: We should propose that those that are + launched by either side are covered, provided the side continues at + least to share in their subsequent use. This would alleviate Soviet + concerns that we might claim protection for a nominally U.S. satellite + which is really being used by, say, the Chinese. But it would afford + protection for satellites in which we share use with others.

+

On “illegal” satellites: We should propose a general reference in the + agreement to the inherent right of self-defense contained in the UN Charter. This would be neither an + admission that we have illegal satellites nor acceptance of a Soviet + right to use force against any satellites except those which present a + military threat. In fact, we may have our own reasons for such a + provision, since we would not want the agreement to be seen as depriving + us of the right to defend ourselves against the existing Soviet ASAT system.

+

I doubt that there would be any serious substantive objections among + concerned agencies about either of these positions. I propose that we go + back to the Soviets promptly with these ideas, a reaffirmation of our + insistence on a test suspension, and a proposal that the talks resume + immediately for the purpose of reaching an agreement in time for the + Summit.

+
+ +
+ + 43. Summary of Conclusions of a Special Coordination MeetingSource: Carter Library, National + Security Council, Institutional Files, Box 102, SCC 148, ASAT, 3/12/79. Top Secret. The meeting took place in + the White House Situation Room. + Washington, March 12, 1979, + 10:00–11:30 a.m. + + SUBJECT + Anti-satellite Treaty + + + PARTICIPANTS + State + Warren Christopher Deputy + Secretary + Les Gelb Assistant + Secretary for Politico-Military Affairs + Defense + Charles Duncan Deputy + Secretary + Gerald Dinneen Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense + Walter Slocombe Principal + Deputy Assistant Secretary for International Security Affairs + ACDA + Spurgeon Keeny Deputy + Director + James Timbie Chief, Strategic Affairs Division + Robert Buchheim Head, + ASAT Delegation + Joint Chiefs of Staff + LGen William Smith + MGen David Bradburn (Ret.) Member, ASAT Delegation + White House + David Aaron + (Chairman) + NASA + Robert Frosch + Administrator + David Williamson Assistant for Special Projects + NSC + Victor Utgoff + Robert Rosenberg + Reginald Bartholomew + Charles Stebbins + OMB + Al Burman + OSTP + Frank Press Director + Arthur Morrissey Senior Analyst + CIA + John Hicks Deputy Director for National Foreign Assessment + Evan Hineman Director, Office of Weapons Intelligence + +

Satellites Shared with Third Countries. During the + second round of ASAT Talks,See Document 41. the + US took the broad tactical position + that all objects in space, regardless of their ownership or who uses + them, should be protected under an Interim ASAT Agreement. The Soviets, on the other hand, took the + narrow position that other countries should not gain an advantage from a + bilateral agreement—that only space objects launched and used + exclusively by the signatories should be protected. (S)

+

The SCC feels that the Soviet position + is not wholly without merit: for example, it probably makes no sense to + them to protect space objects of the PRC, so long as the PRC is + not a signatory of the 1967 UN + Treaty on Outer SpaceSee footnote 5, Document + 39. and will not be a party to the Interim ASAT Agreement (at least not initially). + But the Soviet position is severely flawed in that it would exclude from + treaty protection those multinational satellites that either the US or Soviet Union share with third + countries. (S)

+

State, OSD, ACDA, NASA and OSTP + agreed that the best and simplest treaty formulation would be one that + protects space objects in which either signatory has + an interest, but the agreement should be worded to leave the + door open for—and, in fact, encourage—multilateral participation later + on. Specifically, the US should insist + that:

+

(1) All space objects launched by the signatories are automatically + protected unless the launching party specifically waives such + protection. (TS)

+

(2) A space object that is launched by a third party is protected if a + signatory claims it has an interest in the object. (TS)

+

(Procedures for accomplishing the above should be drafted by the + Interagency Working Group. Such procedures should place the burden of + challenging the ownership and use of a space object on the signatory + that might want to take action against the object.) (TS)

+

The JCS asked for additional time to + study the two-part formulation; they reported back on March 14, 1979 + that they prefer the earlier US position + that all objects in space, regardless of ownership or use, should be + protected under the Interim Agreement. (TS)

+

“Illegal” Space objects. The Soviets have stated + that they do not want “illegal” space objects that perform so-called + “hostile acts” to be protected by an ASAT agreement (e.g., space objects that broadcast directly + into a state without its permission, modify the environment, violate + airspace, etc.) No such “illegal” objects have been identified by either + side in the past, and the US has refused + to discuss them with the Soviets in the abstract. (It is probably unwise + to open this subject at all, if the real Soviet concern—and their + ultimate target—is our intelligence-gathering satellites.) (TS)

+

The Soviets hinted at some flexibility on this issue during the second + round of ASAT talks. They stated that + the spectre of “illegal” space objects is not a pretext for retention of + specialized ASAT systems, suggesting + that the fundamental Soviet concern is to avoid any impression that + elimination of such systems implies that they are willing to forego the + principle of national sovereignty. Thus, all agreed that while we should + continue to decline to discuss “hostile acts” carried out by “illegal” + space objects, we should reaffirm in the preamble of an ASAT + agreement each signatory’s + right to defend itself as recognized in Article 51 of the UN Charter. (TS)

+

ASAT Test + Suspension. All reaffirmed their commitment to a one-year, + all-altitude, orbital interceptor test suspension as part of an Initial + ASAT Agreement. (S)

+

Relation to SALT + TWO. All agreed that being able to verify compliance with the + SALT TWO agreement is not + dependent on our reaching an ASAT + agreement with the Soviets. However, it was recognized that such an + agreement could provide additional reassurance, and therefore might + complement the SALT ratification + process. The chairman noted that the majority had reached agreement on + the issues, and suggested that we consider finalizing an Initial ASAT Agreement with the Soviets prior to + the US/Soviet SALT summit, provided we + can do so without compromising our basic objectives. (TS)

+
+ +
+ 44. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security + Affairs (Brzezinski) to President + CarterSource: Carter Library, National + Security Council, Institutional Files, Box 102, SCC 148, ASAT, 3/12/79. Top Secret. Sent for + action. + Washington, March + 20, 1979 + + SUBJECT + ASAT (U) + +

As you may recall, in the second round of ASAT talks in BernSee Document 41. the Soviets argued that + our bilateral agreement should not provide protection for (1) satellites + performing “illegal” acts, and (2) satellites of 3rd countries. (S)

+

The SCC has been studying these issues + since the talks adjourned, and met March 12 to discuss possible ways to + resolve them (Summary of Conclusions at Tab A).See Document 43. The + SCC agreed to approach the first + issue by offering to recognize in the Treaty both parties’ inherent + right of self defense as stated in the U.N. Charter. At the same time we + do this we would note the statements made by the Soviets in both rounds + of ASAT talks that their concerns with + “illegal” satellites are not a pretext for retaining ASAT capabilities. This should resolve + the issue if the Soviets’ purpose is to avoid any implication that by banning the use of ASATs, + they are renouncing all rights to defend themselves against a type of + hostile activity. (S)

+

All except JCS agreed to a DOD solution to the second issue—third + country coverage. We would insist that the treaty cover any space object + we launch (unless we specifically waive protection) or claim we have an + interest in. We would also leave the door open for multilateral + participation in the treaty. (S)

+

JCS prefers the position taken by the + Delegation in Bern—that all space objects independent of ownership be + covered in any initial agreement. They are concerned that failure to + cover 3rd party satellites would provide a basis for the Soviets to + retain an ASAT capability. (S)

+

In our view, ultimate Soviet willingness to limit their ASAT capabilities will not be + significantly influenced by whether or not an initial ASAT agreement limiting their use covers + third countries. While it would be nice to have all space objects + covered in the initial agreement as the JCS prefer, the more limited DOD proposal can lead to a useful initial agreement, leaves + us no worse off with respect to our ultimate goal of limiting ASAT capabilities than we are today, and + would provide an incentive for multilateral participation later on—a + positive feature. (S)

+

We need your decision on the above issue; as soon as we have it we would + like to present a démarche to the Soviets indicating how we would + approach the problems discussed above, and suggesting that we get the + Delegations together to work out an initial agreement in time for the + Summit. (TS)

+

Moving along fast enough to achieve this may not be possible, of + course—and the services are unhappy at our efforts to restart the + negotiations so soon. In our view, however, the issues are second order, + straightforward—and our proposed solutions would not compromise our + objectives. (S)

+

RECOMMENDATION

+

That you approve the Summary of Conclusions at Tab A. (U)Carter + checked the “Approve” line.

+

That we adopt the DOD proposal for + resolving the third country coverage issue. (U)Carter + initially checked the “Approve” line, then crossed it out and wrote + “Prefer JCS position” in the + right-hand margin.

+

That we proceed with a démarche to the Soviets outlining our ideas, and + suggesting that the Delegations reconvene to see if we can work out an + initial ASAT agreement in time for the + Summit. (TS)Carter checked the + “Approve” line and wrote “If the SU + continues to develop ASAT in order + to destroy a rudimentary PRC + satellite, what have we gained?” at the end of the + memorandum.

+
+ +
+ + 45. Memorandum From Secretary of State Vance and Secretary of Defense Brown to President + CarterSource: Library of Congress, + Manuscript Division, Harold + Brown Papers, Box 50, ASAT. Top Secret. On April 2, Brzezinski informed the Secretaries + that “the President has decided that the agreement need only cover + satellites the two sides own or share an interest in with third + countries. At the same time, the President notes that his concern + with this approach remains. He stated ‘The Soviets can develop a + very advanced AS (anti-satellite) capability ostensibly just to + destroy PRC satellites. What have + we gained?’” (Carter Library, National Security Council, + Institutional Files, Box 102, SCC + 148, ASAT, 3/12/79) + Washington, undated + + SUBJECT + Anti-Satellite (ASAT) + Negotiations + +

You decided that all space objects, regardless of nationality, should be + protected under the interim ASAT + agreement. However, we ask that you reconsider and decide instead that + the agreement should cover the satellites of the two sides, including those in which either side shares an + interest with third parties. This will fully protect our security and + foreign policy interests.

+

As nearly as we can tell, the Soviets will not agree to an ASAT treaty that protects all (which they + read as “PRC”) satellites. Especially + if we are to get a useful, if limited ASAT agreement in time to help SALT ratification (but probably in any event), there will + have to be some compromise on the ownership question.

+

We know you may be concerned that the Soviets would use this position in + the future as an excuse for retaining ASAT capabilities. However, given the multi-functional + nature of most ASAT components and the + attendant verification problems, the difficulty involved in eliminating + all ASAT capabilities does not derive + solely (or, even, mainly) from the nature of an interim agreement. To + the extent the nature of the interim agreement is a problem, we can deal + with that by making clear that in our view less-than-comprehensive + coverage in an interim agreement is neither a precedent nor a legitimate + excuse for retaining ASAT systems.

+

If you’re concerned about the foreign policy drawbacks of excluding + satellites operated exclusively by third countries, we can show those + countries that an early interim agreement can benefit them as well: (1) + the test suspension will benefit them directly by impeding Soviet ASAT development; (2) We can move from an + interim agreement to negotiations aimed at limiting ASAT systems directly; and (3) We can + invite others to join the process in the future. We should also seek provisions permitting + additional countries to adhere to the agreement, thereby protecting + their satellites (and agreeing not to attack those of other + parties).

+

Your main immediate aims in the ASAT + negotiations have been to take a first step toward a comprehensive + agreement and to stop the Soviet testing program for one year. The + change we suggest combined with the pressure on Soviet leaders at the + upcoming Summit will present us with a unique opportunity to accomplish + these aims, and will help us with SALT + ratification.

+
+ +
+ 46. Memorandum From the President’s Deputy Assistant for National + Security Affairs (Aaron) to Vice + President Mondale, Secretary of + State Vance, Secretary of + Defense Brown, the Director of the Office of Management and Budget + (McIntyre), the Director of + the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (Seignious), the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff + (Brown), the Director of Central Intelligence (Turner), the Administrator of the + National Aeronautics and Space Administration (Froesch), and the + Director of the Office of Science and Technology Policy (Press)Source: Carter Library, National Security Council, + Institutional Files, Box 21, PD/NSC–45. Top Secret. The Americans + and Soviets actually began the third round of talks on April 24. + (Telegram 4064 From Vienna to the Department of State, April 25; + National Archives, RG 59, Central + Foreign Policy File, D790189–0626) + Washington, April + 20, 1979 + + SUBJECT + Instructions to the US Delegation + to the 3rd Round of ASAT Talks + with the Soviets Commencing April 23, 1979, in Vienna (U) + +

The current objective of the ASAT talks + with the Soviets is to negotiate a two-part initial ASAT agreement consisting of an initial + treaty banning damage, destruction, and unauthorized displacement + (change of trajectory) of each other’s space objects plus a one-year + suspension of ASAT interceptor missile + testing.On April 17, the Department of + State instructed the Mission to NATO to inform NATO + members that so far, despite the Soviet Union’s “limited + anti-satellite capability,” the United States had decided to + maintain only a “vigorous research and development program in this + field” rather than deploy an anti-satellite system. However, “if we + do not realize a satisfactory comprehensive agreement that removes + the current asymmetry in ASAT + capabilities,” the Department warned that the United States would + “remove this asymmetry by means of its own ASAT programs.” (Telegram 96873 to USNATO, April 17; National + Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign + Policy File, D790177–0720) The Mission replied that the “only + immediate comment” came from the British Permanent Representative, + who “called the resumption of negotiations ‘good news’. He said he + had been impressed by the destabilizing impact” of the Soviet ASAT system and worried that the + Soviets “might be able to destroy US + capability to detect Soviet launches in the period just prior to + general hostilities.” (Telegram 2971 from USNATO, April 18; National + Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign + Policy File, D790178–0848) Except as modified below, the + instructions for the first two rounds of ASAT talks remain in force. (S)

+ +

1. The US would prefer that all space + objects be covered by the initial ASAT + Treaty. However, the US can accept a + formulation which covers space objects in which either Party has an + interest. Specifically, the US can + accept a limited approach which covers a) all space objects launched by + a Party, except for those in which the Party has no interest and so + designates to the other side, and b) space objects launched by a third + country but in which a Party has an interest and so designates to the + other side. (TS)

+

2. If the US comes to accept limited + coverage in the initial ASAT Treaty, + the Delegation should attempt to get the Soviets to state for the record + that limited coverage is not a pretext for retaining ASAT capabilities and is without + prejudice to future negotiations aimed at limiting or eliminating ASAT capabilities. Delegation should also + ensure that any notification procedures required as a result of limited + coverage require a minimum of information to be provided when interest + in a space object launched by a third country is claimed, and place the + burden of proof on the side challenging the legitimacy of any such + claims. (TS)

+

3. The Delegation should oppose inclusion in the initial ASAT Treaty of an exception for space + objects that are “illegal” or perform “hostile acts.” In addition, the + Delegation should minimize the degree to which the negotiating record + suggests that the US recognizes the + possible existence of such space objects. The Delegation is authorized, + however, to state that in the US view + nothing in the agreement is intended to question a Party’s right of + self-defense as set forth in Article 51 of the UN Charter, and that the US + is prepared to consider language to this effect in the preamble of the + ASAT Treaty. (TS)

+

4. The Delegation should avoid formulations that would complicate a + future option to open the provisions of any final treaty reached by the + two sides to accession by third countries. (C)

+

5. With respect to accidental damage, destruction or displacement of + space objects, the Delegation should insure that the initial agreement + does not require and the negotiating record does not imply a requirement for reporting near misses + in space, either before or after the fact. (S)

+ + David + AaronDeputy Assistant to the President + for National Security Affairs + +
+ +
+ 47. Telegram From the Embassy in Austria to the Department of + StateSource: National + Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign + Policy File, D790200–0634. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Sent for information + Immediate to the National Security Council, the Secretary of + Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Central Intelligence Agency, + the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, and + Moscow. + Vienna, May 2, 1979, 1615Z +

4291. US + ASAT Three 010. From Buchheim. Mil addressees handle as + Specat. NASA for Krueger. Subject: (U) + Comments of SovDel at April 30, 1979 Reception.

+

1. (Secret—Entire text).

+

2. During April 30, 1979 reception at American Ambassador’s residence, + Soviet Delegation members made following comments to members of US Delegation.

+

3. On test suspension and comprehensive agreement:

+

A. Pisarev told Buchheim that + Soviet side would, during this round, state its views on a test + suspension and on a comprehensive agreement.

+

B. Naumov asked Buchheim how + Soviet side should interpret US text on + test suspension,On April 26, the U.S. + Delegation proposed that both sides agree to refrain from testing an + anti-satellite “interceptor missile for destroying or damaging + objects which have been placed in orbit around the earth or on any + other trajectories into outer space” from July 1, 1979, until July + 1, 1980. The text is available in telegram 4131 from Vienna, April + 26; National Archives, RG 59, + Central Foreign Policy File, D790191–0614. in particular what + would be the regime between the date of signature and the date of + exchange of instruments of ratification. Buchheim said that it would be understood that, in + accordance with customary international law, during this period neither + side would do anything inconsistent with the purposes or provisions of + the treaty. Naumov said he understood.

+

C. Terekhov asked Williams also about the interpretation of the April 26 + US text on test suspension. Terekhov + said that there was a split of interpretation in the Soviet Delegation, + but the majority view, which he + shared, was that the test suspension went into effect on the same date + as the treaty as a whole, that is, upon exchange of instruments of + ratification, and expired on a date certain, July 1, 1980. Under this + interpretation, the test suspension might last only one or two months, + he said. Williams confirmed this interpretation of the text standing + alone and asked Terekhov what the minority interpretation of the test + suspension period was. Terekhov was unable to explain + satisfactorily.

+

4. On “hostile acts” exclusion: Mayorskiy told Bradburn that the Soviet + side feels strongly that a “hostile acts” exclusion is needed because + the Soviet side is concerned with the activities carried out by states + against each other by use of space objects, and not just with the + objects as such. He said it is the actions, not the objects, which need + to be considered in an agreement.

+

5. Mayorskiy told Bond that if Article 51 of UN Charter were considered to be exclusive rationale for + action against satellites, then the proposed ASAT agreement was not needed. He said that various + circumstances not involving the right of self defense could be foreseen + where it might be necessary to act against a satellite, such as “when a + satellite was consuming all your oxygen” or when a satellite was flying + “40 KMs above your territory”. Under + those circumstances, resort to peaceful settlement of disputes might + well be too late. If phrase “hostile acts” not acceptable, some other + formulation could do, such as an exception for “gross violation of state + sovereignty”, but that it was absolutely necessary to obtain exception + for those circumstances not involving an armed attack when action + against satellites might be called for. Mayorskiy said that Soviet + position on action against DBS satellites had been misconstrued, the + Soviets had not said that they would destroy unauthorized DBS + satellites. He could not imagine this happening, although it might occur + in some unforeseen scenario. But the Soviet Union did maintain its + freedom to take other actions against DBS satellites, such as blocking + its transmissions or moving it to another position without destroying + it. Mayorskiy rejected analogies between Law of the Sea and Law of Outer + Space, saying that the two were different.

+

6. On scope of coverage: Khlestov + told Bradburn that the Soviets do not agree with the idea of protecting + all space objects regardless of ownership, because the Soviets do not + want the protection to be applicable to Chinese space objects.

+

7. On shuttle: Pisarev spoke with Darbyshire at length about the shuttle, + repeating most of what he had said on subject at SovDel reception in + Bern.Not found. He additionally + stated that he knew of many planned cooperative space activities + involving shuttle but that shuttle nevertheless was a very powerful and a dangerous system. + It could be used to do many things, he said, besides placing a satellite + in orbit or moving a satellite from one orbit to another. The Soviet + side had to take this into account, and the US side in his view, should understand the reasons for the + Soviet side’s concern. He sidestepped a question about what connection + there might be between the Soviet side’s desired “hostile acts” + exceptions and its concerns about shuttle. He stated only that the + Soviet side, in formulating its positions, had given much thought to + shuttle from the beginning and would continue to do so.

+

8. On Soviet expectations for current session: in numerous conversations + (e.g., Mayorskiy/Melanson, Khamanev/Jones, Terekhov/Darbyshire) Soviets + made same set of points on this subject. They said Soviet side had + expected third session would not be held until summer. They had come to + Vienna at this early date at US side’s + suggestion and expected to see some movement in US positions. Instead, the US repeated the positions it had offered in Bern, and so + far only the Soviet side had presented any new ideas in Vienna. Unless + the US side alters its views both on + third-country benefits and on an exclusion from coverage for satellites + committing “hostile acts,” they said, the sides will not be able to + reach an agreement.

+

9. Miscellaneous comments:

+

A. Globenko indicated disbelief when told by Jones that NASA does not build weapons systems.

+

B. Pisarev told Bradburn that Soviet Delegation always brings only one + secretary because Khlestov wants + it that way. The one secretary is always from the Ministry of Foreign + Affairs and is picked by Khlestov. Pisarev, who is from Ministry of Defense, seemed + to be dissatisfied with this arrangement.

+

10. FYI: At Soviet request, because of + May 1–2 Soviet holiday, fourth plenary meeting has been rescheduled for + May 3 at US Embassy, rather than May 2 + as previously reported. (ASAT Three + 009, Vienna 04253).Telegram 4253 from + Vienna, May 1, reported on the third plenary session of the ASAT talks. Buchheim presented a prepared + statement explaining the “US side’s + views on coverage of the prohibited acts element and suggestion that + the right of self-defense could be recognized by reference to the + language of Article 51 of the UN + charter.” Khlestov presented + a revised version of the Soviet view of the definition of space + objects and prohibited acts, which covered “space objects used + jointly by a party and other countries for peaceful purposes. It + also would prohibit interference with operation of equipment, + although intended meaning of interference not yet clear.” (National + Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign + Policy File, D790198–0722)

+ + Wolf + +
+ +
+ + 48. Telegram From the Embassy in Austria to Telegram the Department of + StateSource: National + Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign + Policy File, D790206–0901. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Sent for information + Immediate to the National Security Council, the Secretary of + Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Central Intelligence Agency, + the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, and + Moscow. + Vienna, May 7, 1979, 0942Z +

4406. US + ASAT Three 014. From Buchheim. Mil addressees handle as + Specat. NASA for Krueger. Subject: (U) + Restricted Meeting, May 4, 1979—Part Two.

+

1. (Secret—Entire text.)

+

2. Part one of this report is ASAT + Three 013;ASAT 013 is telegram 4398 from Vienna, May 4, and + reported that Buchheim read a + prepared statement to the Soviet Delegation that focused around the + question that was “impeding general agreement between us.” The two + sides needed to decide whether they were “seeking solely to set + forth undertakings not to carry out certain acts against space + objects, or are we also trying also to deal with missions?” The + United States believed that the answer was the former and that “in + these discussions we are not engaged in the latter task, and that we + should not try to deal with that task.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + D790204–0313) there are only two parts.

+

3. Summary: Restricted meeting was held at Soviet Embassy at 10:30 a.m., + Friday, May 4, 1979. Attendees: U.S. side: Buchheim, Bradburn, Darbyshire and Smith (interpreter); Soviet side: + Khlestov, Mayorskiy, Pisarev, + Terekhov (interpreter). Buchheim + presented prepared statement (see ASAT + Three 013) on view of U.S. side on possible differences of approach + between U.S. and Soviet sides with respect to what we are trying to deal + with in a prohibited-acts element. U.S. side seeks prohibition of + certain acts against space objects; Soviet side appears to be trying to + deal also with acts against missions in which space objects are used. + U.S. side suggested that unknown future contingencies can be dealt with + through provisions for consultation, amendment and withdrawal, and + argued against an exception for cases of “hostile acts”. Soviet side did + not agree. Soviet side asserted need to be permitted by the terms of the + agreement to take immediate steps, including the acts otherwise + prohibited in the agreement, to defend itself in case of a “hostile act” + against it. End summary.

+

4. Following Buchheim’s prepared + statement, Khlestov said he + understood that the U.S. side appeared to be recognizing the viewpoint + of the Soviet side, that a state whose legitimate interest had been + violated retained the right to defend itself. But, he said, he had the + impression that the U.S. was opposed to including an exception for + “hostile acts” in a prohibited-acts element. He said the U.S. had + suggested a right of withdrawal + as a substitute for a “hostile acts” exception. He asked if there was + not a contradiction in the U.S. view, because if the U.S. recognized the + right of a state to take actions against space objects carrying out + pernicious acts, why shouldn’t that right be specified in the + agreement?

+

5. Buchheim said it could be + viewed as a matter of scope. In the U.S. view, there should be a + complete ban on damaging, destroying, or changing the trajectories of + space objects, that is, acts against the objects themselves. There are + many other ways to render ineffective or inefficient or harmless an + attempt to carry out its mission using a space object. In the U.S. view, + Buchheim said, our agreement + should not address any such measures because they are beyond its scope. + As for rights now held by the two countries, nothing would be changed + except that the two sides would have recorded an agreement not to + damage, destroy, or change the trajectory of a space object. The U.S. + side’s specific concern with the Soviet side’s third textSee footnote 4, Document + 47. (on hostile acts) is that it would give, in + advance, on an unspecified basis, legitimacy to damaging, destroying, or + changing the trajectory of a space object as appropriate immediate + remedies if there ever were a space object which carried out pernicious + actions, as construed by the side undertaking the prohibited acts.

+

6. Buchheim said it was the U.S. + side’s view on this matter that there is now, and for the foreseeable + future will be, no reason to believe that violent remedies are necessary + or appropriate and, therefore, they should not be provided for in the + agreement. On the other hand, the U.S. side is completely willing to + include provisions in the agreement which would provide a basis for + dealing thoughtfully with future circumstances. Future circumstances are + unpredictable; the Soviet side has said that perhaps these problems may + never occur. Contingency measures should begin with consultations to + determine whether one side or the other side or both sides wanted to do + something about some new circumstance. A further measure could be to + amend the agreement, if appropriate, taking into account specific + circumstances. These are steps the sides could take together. They are + normal measures provided for in most agreements. To take the case to the + extreme, if one side or the other decided it could no longer abide by + the agreement, it could withdraw from it under conditions of a + conventional nature.

+

7. Khlestov said there was a + difference here in characterizing the actions; the Soviet side had one + term, and the U.S. had another. In the event of such action, a state had + the right to protect itself from such actions of space objects. + Khlestov said he had the + impression that the viewpoints + of the sides coincided here. Buchheim stated that in general this was correct, but he + would state it somewhat differently. He would say that, with regard to + this agreement, the situation should be that after signing the agreement + nothing would have changed regarding the rights now held by both sides + except that they had recorded obligations not to carry out certain + specified acts against space objects. This should be the full scope of + this aspect of the agreement.

+

8. Khlestov said the sides seem to + have a common understanding that even with the agreement under + negotiation the right was recognized for a party to the agreement to + protect itself against space objects used for hostile or pernicious + actions. This was the first point. The U.S. view was that a state could + use any measures for protection against such acts except those listed in + an agreement, namely, damaging, destroying or changing the trajectory of + space objects. Any other measures could be used. Perhaps he was + inexperienced in this, but he wondered if Buchheim could give any examples of other measures + besides those prohibited in the agreement. Buchheim responded that Khlestov could get a better answer to this question from + his own experts. Khlestov said he + was not trying to make Buchheim + say anything. He said that there were other methods and if Buchheim did not wish to talk about + them Khlestov would ask his own + specialists. Buchheim replied + that that would be better. He could answer only in general terms. Since + the Soviet side had thought so much on these matters, and particularly + about what you call “hostile acts”, surely it had thought about measures + that might be taken against such missions. He could not believe that, + with its scientific, technological and military resources, the Soviet + Union could not think of any measures other than blowing up a space + object. Soviet specialists surely knew of other examples. Khlestov said that the U.S. viewpoint + is that a state should undertake other measures for protection against + pernicious acts. The Soviet viewpoint is that—in those instances—a state + must have the right to take actions which are prohibited in the + agreement, that is damaging, destroying or changing the trajectory of a + space object. This is the difference between the sides.

+

9. Khlestov said the Soviet side + wanted to include in the agreement an exhaustive list of actions against + space objects which would be prohibited, because such actions were + effective when used against space objects. He meant not only damaging or + destroying a space object, but all acts should be prohibited which would + affect the space object and would make it inoperative as a result of the + acts. The Soviet side had introduced the act of displacing a space + object from orbit. The two sides had discussed the meaning of “not to + destroy” for a long time. The Soviet side understood that a wide + spectrum of instances were being talked about, not destroying on board + equipment or not interfering with the functioning of that equipment. In other words, the purpose of + our work is to ban any and all actions against space objects which would + impede their normal functioning. If they had left any out, they would + just have to add them. The purpose of the main provision was to give an + exhaustive list of all forms of action which could be taken against a + space object which would impede its normal functioning.

+

10. With such a comprehensive approach, Khlestov said, a state could not protect itself from + pernicious actions carried out using space objects. If it took steps to + interfere with pernicious actions, it would violate the provisions of + the agreement. The U.S. idea to include provisions for making an + addition to the agreement several years in the future was not very + consistent. It would not be good to wait for such an action to occur. It + was better not to have such an action. Including a provision now was an + additional guarantee that cases of a space object being used for + pernicious actions would not happen. Since there would be full clarity + in the text on space objects used for pernicious actions, no one would + want to carry out such actions.

+

11. Khlestov said the Soviet side + proceeded from the premise that there would not be cases when a space + object would be used deliberately for pernicious actions. They referred + to a hypothetical case. Without their “hostile acts” provision, in order + to carry out “prohibited” acts a side would have to quickly withdraw + from the agreement. In situations relating to space objects, the time + factor would be very important. Withdrawal from an agreement would + require certain time-consuming procedures. A question of countering a + space object used to carry out pernicious actions might take minutes or + hours but no more. A question of withdrawing from the agreement would + take weeks or months. Therefore, this is not a solution to the + problem.

+

12. Buchheim said that the Soviet + side’s concern over timing and taking rapid measures raised questions on + the U.S. side. He wondered if the Soviet side brought this up because it + foresaw some activity by the U.S. (or for that matter the USSR) representing real and practical + problems. The U.S. side did not. He thought that an obligation not to + damage, destroy, or change the trajectories of each other’s space + objects included the presumption that both sides would be careful in + what they did with their space objects. As Khlestov had said yesterday, each side knew how to use + space objects properly. He thought that in the spirit of the common + purpose that this agreement could serve, early indications of a move + toward missions which one side would find troublesome should lead to + consultations with the other side, and not to abrupt exercising of a + provision giving a right to begin destroying, damaging or changing the + trajectories of a space object.

+

13. Buchheim said the U.S. side + was only acknowledging a hypothetical possibility, making an agreement + easy to implement if unforeseen + circumstances should arise; but the Soviet viewpoint, involving an + explicit exemption and describing urgency in terms of minutes of time, + leads the U.S. side to wonder if the Soviet side has some specific + problem in mind, as to the present or the near future.

+

14. Khlestov said that both sides + are talking of hypothetical possibilities which might suddenly happen or + might never happen. In the hypothetical situation he was referring to, + the Soviet side proceeded from a consideration of what rights a state + should have if the situation were to happen. He was speaking only of + this, of a hypothetical situation which might occur and the rights a + state must have to deal with it.

+

15. Buchheim replied that this was + encouraging. He had spoken of consultations in the event of signs of the + appearance of a real problem. If the Soviet side sees a real problem, + the time to consult is now. However, if the Soviet side is speaking only + of hypothetical possibilities, this is pleasant to know.

+

16. Bradburn said that the ideas the U.S. side had brought today + represented an attempt by the U.S. Delegation to find common ground + regarding the concerns about hostile acts and provisions for taking into + account these actions. The U.S. side had difficulty with the Soviet + side’s formulations because their acceptance in the agreement seemed to + provide for the exercise of whatever defensive measures a side wished to + take and this seemed to be exactly what a side could do if there were no + agreement. One could say that the sides did not accept any limitations + in entering into this agreement. On the other hand, if the agreement + were made without any exceptions and if the provisions on hostile acts + were taken care of by consultations and maybe even withdrawal from the + agreement, then the sides would be accepting constraints. These + limitations might be seen as an advantage by the sides because the + obligations to consult would insure that if a hostile act occurred, or + if a side believed it had and raised a question, the actions taken would + permit a solution of the problem and this would be seen as preferable by + the sides as compared with the alternative of carrying out prohibited + actions.

+

17. Bradburn said the U.S. side thought it would be a disadvantage in an + agreement which would seem to allow the carrying out of prohibited + actions while the agreement was in force under cirumstances when the + sides perhaps did not understand or did not agree on the seriousness of + the problem. He thought the obligation to consult would serve the + interests of the two sides better than would an exemption which would + permit the carrying out of prohibited acts because this exception would + lead to the possibility of taking violent measures and would increase + the seriousness of the situation. However, the obligation to consult and + even to withdraw before carrying out prohibited acts would lead to a + possibility to defuse this situation.

+ +

18. Khlestov stated that he had + listened with interest to Bradburn’s ideas. He said the mechanism of + consultations between sides participating in a treaty is a normal + process. Even if the sides do not specify in the treaty that they will + consult, it is nevertheless presumed. Khlestov did not know of any case in normal diplomatic + relations in which a side wished to consult about a problem and the + other side said it did not want to talk. Usually they started an + exchange of opinions on the question. What Bradburn had just said about + the consultations sounded logical but it did not resolve the problem at + hand, namely, how to deal with space objects used for pernicious acts. + He thanked Bradburn for his attempt to find a mutually acceptable + solution to the problem, but did not regard this way as an answer.

+

19. Buchheim said he wished to try + to understand the essence of the Soviet side’s viewpoint. The Soviet + side’s main considerations seemed to boil down to two. The first is the + view that there is a hypothetical possibility that space objects could + be used for missions of such character that they must be countered in + order to preserve national interests, and that no other measures that + might be taken against such missions were adequate except for damage, + destruction, or changing the trajectory of the object being used. The + second consideration is that such a hypothetical possibility could + materialize into a reality so suddenly that it would require immediate + action. Therefore, consultations and accommodation between the sides + were not feasible approaches. Is this the essence of the Soviet side’s + point of view?

+

20. Khlestov said that he would + emphasize different things so that Buchheim could understand his viewpoint better. First of + all, an agreement was being concluded and the sides would undertake + obligations not to damage, destroy or change the trajectories of space + objects. In other words, all the most effective means of countering the + space object that had been invented were included in this list. The U.S. + and Soviet sides together had listed all the effective ways of + countering space objects. The Soviet side proceeded from the premise + that always and in every case the sides were committed to carry out + their obligations; that is, not to commit prohibited acts. A state did + not have the right to act otherwise. It was obligated always and in + every case to observe the “prohibited-acts” element of the agreement. He + wished to direct Buchheim’s + attention to the second side of the problem, a hypothetical case which + could arise in which a space object carried out a pernicious act. A + state must have the right to protect itself against these acts. This was + the common approach of both sides. Perhaps in practice this would never + happen, and the Soviet side did not want it to happen. However, the + sides were concluding an agreement of unlimited duration and they did + not know what might happen in practice.

+

21. Khlestov said that, according + to the agreement’s present shape, it was possible that suddenly this + hypothetical situation could occur for reasons the sides could not now see, and, if there + were no exception provisions, neither side would have the right to take + the most effective measures to counter missions of the space object. If + other, permitted, measures were not effective in protecting against the + space object, and if there were no exemption provision in the agreement, + the sides could not do anything that was on the list of prohibited acts. + Therefore, the Soviet side believed that, if a hypothetical situation + were practically realized, in case of necessity a state could carry out + prohibited acts against a space object and this should be so specified + in the agreement. Of course, consultations could take place but, because + of the time factor, consultations were not enough. Logically, this + brought them to the last stage of events. Khlestov said he had in greater detail paraphrased what + Buchheim had said about the + Soviet viewpoint.

+

22. Buchheim stated that the U.S. + side did not deny that it could not predict the future and that + hypothetical situations could not be ruled out. The two sides + acknowledge that they are speaking of hypothetical unknown possibilities + of the future. The idea that such a hypothetical situation might + suddenly turn into a monster which could devour the whole city of + Cleveland with one bite in a few seconds was difficult for him to take + seriously. He thought that if the Soviet Union undertook to build such a + monster, the U.S. would know about it beforehand because this could not + be done in one day. The U.S. would have many ideas to discuss with the + Soviet side in order to head off such a realization. It seems at present + that the views of the Soviet side on the need for quick action as + compared to the more deliberate process of diplomacy was a specific + difference to be considered further. As General Bradburn had stated, the + U.S. side is uneasy with the idea that the agreement might on the one + hand specify that certain acts would not be carried out, but, on the + other hand specify that a side could carry out any of these acts quickly + if something angered it.

+

23. Buchheim said that the U.S. + side, correctly or not, proceeded from the premise that the Soviet side + would never destroy a U.S. space object unless it had serious reasons to + do so. This is certainly true of the U.S. side also. The U.S. side + looked forward to an agreement which would enhance stability of + relations between our two countries. It is the view of the U.S. that the + undertaking should be not to carry out the actions specified—period. If + circumstances change in the future, and such an undertaking seems to be + of doubtful desirability, the sides should take steps to amend the + agreement or conclude a new agreement or agreements to remove the + troublesome circumstances or take other appropriate measures. He thought + the two sides had made important progress today toward bringing their + viewpoints closer together and he hoped that they would continue to do + so.

+ +

24. Buchheim said that he + remembered that the question of “hostile acts” had first arisen in + Helsinki.See Document + 33. As he recalled, at that time the U.S. side + asked the Soviet side if it had brought up this matter out of concern + about what the U.S. might do with space objects, or was it concerned + about third countries, or was this a general concern. The Soviet side + had replied in Helsinki that it was not concerned with U.S. actions but + with what somebody else might do. However, from the discussions in Bern, + including Khlestov’s answer to a + specific question, the U.S. side now understood that the Soviet side’s + third text reflects concern over what the U.S. might do. Is there merit + in our reviewing this question again?

+

25. Khlestov said that, frankly, + the word “concerned” over what the U.S. or a third country might do did + not exactly convey the right meaning intended by the Soviet side. They + had spoken of a hypothetical case. They realize that a hypothetical case + could come from either side or from elsewhere.

+

26. Khlestov said that the Soviet + side would, as promised, provide answers to the questions raised by the + U.S. side at the meeting on 3 May 1979.Telegram 4397 from Vienna, May 4, describes the May 3 plenary. + However, it notes only that Buchheim “read list of questions” but does not + provide the actual questions. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + D790204–0217) Since they had been raised at a plenary meeting + it was logical to answer them at a plenary meeting.

+

27. Next plenary meeting will be held at U.S. Embassy at 3:00 p.m. on May + 8, 1979.

+ + Wolf + +
+ +
+ 49. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Soviet + UnionSource: National + Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign + Policy File, P840142–2594. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Drafted by Gary Matthews + (EUR/SOV); cleared by Joseph Hulings (S/S–O); and approved by Shulman. Sent for information Immediate to the White + House. + Washington, May 18, 1979, 0012Z +

125966. Subject: (S) Démarche to Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin on Anti-Satellite + Negotiations (ASAT).

+ +

1. (S—Entire text)

+

2. During meeting with Ambassador Dobrynin afternoon of May 17, Secretary made following + points regarding ASAT + negotiations.

+

3. Begin text of talking points:

+

—The current round of talks on anti-satellite matters in Vienna is making + progress. If we can achieve agreement by the time of the summit, we will + have advanced the important cause of arms control in this dangerous + area. It would also be a concrete, positive accomplishment in US-Soviet relations.

+

—We are pleased that the two Delegations in Vienna have begun work on a + joint draft text.On May 16, the United + States and Soviet Union exchanged draft texts in their eighth + plenary meeting of the third round of the ASAT talks. (Telegram 4845 from Vienna, May 17; + National Archives, RG 59, Central + Foreign Policy File, D790223–0787) This should help produce + progress in the weeks ahead.

+

—There has been a good exchange between the two sides:

+

We welcome your response to our proposal for a test suspension. We think + you will be encouraged by our Delegations’s reply.

+

There also has been progress on the question about which space objects + would be covered by an agreement. The two sides seem to be getting + closer to an understanding on this.

+

—The most difficult issue remaining may well be what you call “hostile + acts.”

+

As the US understands it, the Soviet side + is suggesting a provision which would permit either party to damage, + destroy, or change the trajectory of space objects without violating the + agreement simply by asserting that it was the target of what you call a + “hostile act.”

+

This would make the agreement hollow. It would imply that either side can + decide whether or not to respect the basic understanding.

+

The US side cannot accept any provision + which casts doubt on the security of space objects in which it has an + interest, or which provides a pretext for taking actions otherwise + prohibited.

+

At the same time, the US is prepared + to:

+

—Reaffirm the inherent right of self-defense as set forth in the UN Charter.

+

—Work out arrangements for prompt consultations, for amendments to deal + with unforeseen circumstances, and for withdrawal if supreme national + interests require it.

+

These measures should give the Soviet side confidence that the agreement + can accommodate unforeseen developments.

+

End text.

+ +

4. Dobrynin responded by asking + what kind of consultations the US had in + mind. The Secretary replied that the Delegations at the present ASAT session in Vienna should set up + procedures. Dobrynin then asked + what the problem was with the Soviet formulation on hostile acts. The + Secretary noted plainly that the formulation would totally undermine the + agreement. Dobrynin, asking + personally and noting that he was expressing no preference, asked + whether the agreement would be a treaty or an executive agreement. The + Secretary replied that this decision could be deferred for the the time + being.

+ + Vance + +
+ +
+ 50. Memorandum From Secretary of State Vance and the Director of the Arms Control and + Disarmament Agency (Seignious) + to President CarterSource: Carter Library, National + Security Affairs, Brzezinski + Material, Subject File, Box 4, Anti-Satellite System (ASAT): 7/77–10/80. + Secret. + Washington, May 18, + 1979 + + SUBJECT + Anti-Satellite Negotiations + +

Considerable progress has been made in the current round of negotiations + on limitations on ASAT systems. An + agreement, however, will require resolution of several differences + between the U.S. and Soviet approaches.

+

The U.S. has proposed an initial agreement consisting of a Treaty + prohibiting damaging, destroying, or changing the trajectories of + satellites, and a one-year suspension of ASAT interceptor testing. We would pursue a more + comprehensive agreement in follow-on negotiations.

+

The Soviets would go beyond our proposal to prohibit additional actions + against satellites, in particular the use of electronic + counter-measures. The U.S. wants to avoid this subject. Another + troublesome issue, whether satellites used by the U.S. together with + third countries are to be protected by the Treaty, is now close to + resolution by the Delegations in Vienna.

+

A potentially serious problem is a Soviet proposal to exclude from + coverage satellites which engage in “hostile” or “illegal” acts. Soviet + examples of “hostile” + satellites have been rather far-fetched (e.g., satellites which harm the + environment, or satellites which swoop down into national airspace). + Such an exemption could legitimize the retention and use of ASAT systems, thus undercutting the basic + objective of the agreement. We are attempting to persuade the Soviets + that provisions for consultation and withdrawal as well as the inherent + right of self-defense provided for in the UN charter are adequate to deal with such a contingency + should it arise. Cy has made these points to Dobrynin.See Document 49. +

+

The Soviets broke their long silence on a test suspension by proposing + last week to suspend until January 1, 1981 testing in space not only of + ASAT interceptors (our proposal), + but of any means of damaging, destroying, or changing the trajectory of + satellites.See Document 48. Restrictions on changing trajectories + could impair the operations of the space shuttle, and have been + rejected. The other principle difference concerns whether or not to + suspend testing of ASAT systems other + than interceptors, primarily ground-based lasers. For verification + reasons, the U.S. proposed to suspend only interceptor tests since + monitoring covert tests of Soviet lasers against satellites would + require U.S. intelligence collection systems not yet in being or + programmed.

+

Since we are aware of no U.S. plans to test a laser against a satellite + before 1981, it is tempting to consider the broader approach the Soviets + have proposed. However, given the importance of verification of Treaty + obligations, we recommend that the U.S. hold to the position to suspend + only ASAT interceptor tests. If the + Soviets insist on the broader approach, we recommend that the U.S. offer + to state that we do not plan any tests of other forms of ASAT systems before 1981, and will notify + the Soviet Union of any change in these plans. The Soviets would have to + make the same statement. This would not be an obligation but a statement + of fact. Such an exchange of statements of plans could encourage the + Soviets to accept the U.S. approach. It could also avoid a situation in + which the Soviets circumvent the interceptor test suspension by testing + a ground-based laser against a satellite, which the Soviets may be in a + position to do by 1981.

+ + Cyrus R. + Vance + + + George M. + Seignious II + +
+ +
+ + 51. Telegram From the Embassy in Austria to the Department of + StateSource: National + Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign + Policy File, D790230–1031. Secret; Exdis; Niact Immediate. Sent for information Niact + Immediate to the National Security Council, the Secretary of + Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Central Intelligence Agency, + the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, and + Moscow. + Vienna, May 21, 1979, 1128Z +

4954. US + ASAT Three 039. From Buchheim. Mil addressees handle as + Specat. NASA for Krueger. Subject: (U) + General Summary of Status.

+

1. (Secret—Entire text.)

+

2. This round has now run for four weeks, and four main questions are + outstanding:

+

(A) Formulation of “prohibited acts” Article (II) and related + definitional Article (I).

+

(B) Test-suspension provisions.

+

(C) Soviet “hostile acts” exemption.

+

(D) Prospects for an eventual comprehensive agreement.

+

3. Question (A) is moving toward resolution, and will be addressed + further in meeting May 22, 1979.

+

4. Delegation received from Washington instructions (State 124103)In telegram 124103 to Vienna, May 16, the + Department of State instructed Buchheim to “advise the Soviets that the present + US view is that the test + suspension should be recorded in a protocol to the treaty.” + (National Archives, RG 59, Central + Foreign Policy File, D790220–0124) concerning new elements in + the May 8, 1979, test-suspension text of the Soviet side,Not found. except the element on scope. + Pending receipt of instructions on the scope element, we will not + express any views to the Soviet side concerning their test suspension + text in order to not show the Soviets where to look for our point of + uncertainty.

+

5. Recommendation: We recommend that Delegation be authorized to accept + scope of test suspension proposed by Soviet side, incorporating in + protocol text language in accordance with para 3 of State 124103The + Department instructed Buchheim to say that “changing the trajectory of + one’s own satellites by both internal and external means is a normal + part of the space programs of both sides, and that testing systems + in such a manner should not be prohibited.” The Department also said + that “the use of the space shuttle to launch, to maintain, and to + retrieve US and other satellites in + which US has an interest must not be + circumscribed in any way by the agreement.” (Telegram 124103 to + Vienna, May 16; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + D790220–0124) adding language to the protocol text calling + for review prior to January 1, 1981, and putting the Soviets on notice + with a formal statement that + experience in implementing the protocol including experience relevant to + verification will be taken into account in that review.

+

6. Further delay in reply to Soviet test-suspension suggestion is bound + to arouse suspicions on Soviet side, and lead them into troublesome + speculations. Further delay could well shatter this entire + enterprise.

+

7. Looking a little farther ahead, we may shortly find ourselves up + against a substantial roadblock in the form of the Soviet side’s + insistence on a “hostile acts” exclusion to the prohibited-acts element. + The Soviet side now says this is a matter of “position” with them, and + they have been unwilling to engage in further meaningful discussion + beyond that assertion. The policy underlying that position may be that + the Soviet side will not accept unqualified constraints on countering + actions unless there are agreed constraints on uses of satellites, + although they have not suggested that they seek such constraints. + Alternatively, their position may rest simply on a policy view that they + must retain complete freedom of action in or over the motherland. + Although it is also possible that the Soviets will abandon this position + when the other questions are resolved, we must keep working on the + problem.

+

8. Main practical significance of Khlestov’s statement of May 18, 1979,In telegram 4927 from Vienna, May 18, the Embassy + reported that Khlestov said + “the very idea of a ‘comprehensive’ agreement has caused us to have + serious doubts from the very beginning, and we have indicated this + to the US Delegation many times.” + (National Archives, RG 59, Central + Foreign Policy File, D790226–0408) on a comprehensive + agreement lies in two points: (a) The Soviet side is well on its way + toward concluding that the U.S. advocacy of a comprehensive agreement is + either false or represents a sincere general view that has not been + thought through as to practical implementation, and (b) it will be + necessary for the U.S. to set forth specific proposals on dismantling if + provisions for dismantling are to be worked on in the future. The Soviet + side has not flatly refused to make reference to future negotiations; + but Khlestov’s statement also + suggests that any commitment to continue negotiations will be couched in + rather general terms. The credibility of U.S. advocacy of progress + toward a comprehensive agreement would probably be further eroded if we + do not join in the scope of a test-suspension suggested by the Soviet + side. Concerning Khlestov’s + comments about third countries retaining freedom of action, there is no + evident reason for the U.S. to refrain from raising, e.g., at the CD, + the idea of a multilateral agreement starting from the position of a + completed bilateral agreement.

+

9. Khlestov, in a side + conversation incidental to a social encounter, told Buchheim that he very much wanted to + plan on departing Vienna not later than June 1, 1979, because (a) Soviet + Embassy is rapidly filling with + people preparing for the summit meeting and (b) hotel in which Soviet + Delegation is lodged is hounding him for a commitment on a departure + date.

+ + Wolf + +
+ +
+ 52. Memorandum From the President’s Deputy Assistant for National + Security Affairs (Aaron) to the + President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, + Brzezinski Material, + Subject File, Box 4, Anti-Satellite System (ASAT): 7/77–10/80. Secret. Aaron did not initial the + memorandum. The memorandum is stamped “ZB HAS SEEN.” + Washington, May 30, + 1979 + + SUBJECT + ASAT Negotiations + +

We are at a critical point. We have the “Hostile Acts” part of our + agreement virtually completed. It is a declaration that we will not + attack, destroy or displace each other’s satellites so long as they are + operated in accordance with international law.The joint draft text containing this declaration is + available in telegram 5107 from Vienna, May 24; National Archives, + RG 59, Central Foreign Policy + File, D790235–1016. On the test suspension, the Soviets + apparently are insisting that we halt some test + programs to be equivalent to their halting their interceptor test + program. In effect, they want us to either halt the shuttle test program + or some aspect of the shuttle test program.

+

I believe you should now take a very strong line with Dobrynin. You should say that this + agreement is being nibbled to death by the hamsters in the Soviet + bureaucracy. The purpose of the agreement is to give a boost to SALT II. They are completely off base if + they think we will somehow stop the shuttle in any of its + aspects—particularly since the shuttle will not be used as an ASAT system in any respect. You can tell + Dobrynin that the President + will be prepared to make such assurances to President Brezhnev.

+

However, we do have an interceptor program and, if it is not possible to + get a test suspension, they can be certain that we will pursue this + program vigorously with a view toward carrying out necessary tests.

+ +

The Soviets have also proposed that we divide the Hostile Acts agreement + from the test suspension and only go ahead with the Hostile Acts + agreement. This would be completely one-sided. In the Hostile Acts + agreement, both sides agree to refrain from damaging or destroying each + other’s satellites—something that would only be done in event of war, in + any case. In addition, we agree not to displace each other’s satellites. + That is a potential capability that only the United States has. You + should argue with Dobrynin that + our open-ended commitment not to displace satellites needs to be matched + by their agreement to a test suspension, and there is no need for + further program limits on the shuttle.

+

In sum,

+

—You should argue that there is a balance of obligations in the Hostile + Acts and test suspension agreements taken together. We will not accept + splitting them up.

+

—We could, if we chose, carry out an interceptor test within the 18-month + period and might be compelled to do so in the absence of an + agreement.

+

—We will never agree to limit the shuttle in an ASAT agreement, but the President is prepared to give + personal assurances that it will not be used in that mode.

+
+ +
+ 53. Memorandum From Secretary of State Vance and the Director of the Arms Control and + Disarmament Agency (Seignious) + to President CarterSource: Library of Congress, + Manuscript Division, Harold + Brown Papers, Box 50, International Security Affairs, + Negotiations, ASAT. Secret. A + stamped notation reads “SECDEF + HAS SEEN.” In the upper-right hand margin, Brown wrote “6/9. WS + [Walter + Slocombe]—Doesn’t the Delegation’s proposal give up some + of our highly classified programs? I suppose it depends on the + language—‘destroy/damage’ might be OK. HB.” + Washington, June 6, + 1979 + + SUBJECT + Antisatellite Negotiations + +

Considerable progress has been made in the ASAT negotiations. We recommend that an effort be made this + week to push these negotiations + toward the conclusion of an initial agreement which could be signed at + the Summit or closely thereafter.

+

The remaining issues have been described in an inter-agency status report + forwarded to you separately.Not + found. The Soviets have agreed to the approach the US suggested—an initial agreement + prohibiting certain actions against satellites and a temporary test + suspension. The remaining problem is how to deal with a number of + additional issues which the Soviets have raised. There is no need to + reconsider our position on many of these issues, such as the scope of + coverage of the prohibited acts agreement, and the Soviet proposals to + ban non-destructive interference with satellites, to limit Shuttle + operations, and to permit attacks on “illegal” satellites. The + Delegation is pursuing solutions which are face-saving for the Soviets + but retain the substance of the US + approach. Cy has discussed the most troublesome of these, the proposed + exemption for “illegal” satellites, with Dobrynin,See Document 49. and plans to take this + issue up again.

+

The one area where we recommend reconsideration of our position is the + scope of the test suspension. Although the US goal is a comprehensive ban on all ASAT systems, we proposed an initial test + suspension only on ASAT interceptors + [2½ lines not declassified] and we should + pursue this.) The Soviets have countered with a proposal to suspend + testing to January 1981, of not only interceptors but any means of + damaging or destroying satellites.Not + found. They point out, correctly, that a suspension of + interceptor testing would appear one-sided and aimed only at their + interceptor program. A broader suspension would appear more evenhanded + (and allay their suspicions that we plan other forms of ASAT tests).

+

Since we plan no tests of any ASAT + system before 1981, and the Soviets may be in a position to test lasers + as well as interceptors during this period, we believe it would be in + our interest to broaden our approach on the suspension. There are two + ways we could do this:

+

We could replace our proposal for a ban on interceptor tests with an + offer to exchange statements that neither side plans to test in space + any means of damaging or destroying satellites before 1981, with + notification to the other side if plans should change. This would not + represent an obligation not to test, so the verification problem would + be reduced. Some SALT issues were + resolved with such exchanges of statements of plans.

+

The Delegation recommends a second approach—to retain a formal test + suspension and broaden it to include all ASAT means. They believe this would be a significant step toward our objective of a + comprehensive ASAT agreement, and it + would prohibit all Soviet ASAT tests + until 1981. They recognize the verification issue but believe it can be + dealt with by citing (1) the fact that the US is giving up nothing because it plans no ASAT test of any kind during this period, + (2) the limited duration, and (3) the breadth of our intelligence + capability.

+

We recommend that we be authorized to explore a broader test suspension + with the Soviets along the lines of the two discussed above. Depending + on your preference we could try either one first (the Soviets would + probably prefer the obligation to a statement of plans). We would make + clear to the Soviets that we are prepared to take this step towards them + provided the other issues in the Treaty can be resolved on the basis of + our position.

+
+ +
+ 54. Telegram From the Embassy in Austria to the Department of + StateSource: National + Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign + Policy File, D790268–0007. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Sent for information + Immediate to the National Security Council, the Secretary of + Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Central Intelligence Agency, + the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, and + Moscow. + Vienna, June 13, 1979, 1537Z +

5963. US + ASAT Three 077. From Buchheim. Mil addressees handle as + Specat. NASA for Krueger. Subject: (U) + Remaining Unresolved ASAT Issues.

+

1. (Secret—Entire text).

+

2. During plenary meetings on June 8 and June 12 the US and Soviet Delegations reviewed the + remaining issues that would have to be resolved before an agreement can + be achieved. A summary of these outstanding ASAT issues follows.

+

A. Test suspension

+

The sides have agreed that the duration of a test suspension would be + until January 1, 1981. The US side + suggested suspending testing only of “interceptors of space objects.” + The Soviet side has also proposed suspending testing of “interceptors of + space objects,” but only if the US side + will also agree (a) to suspend testing of any other means of destroying + or damaging space objects, and (b) to suspend testing of any means for + changing the trajectory of a space object including testing a reusable spacecraft for such a + purpose. The Soviet side has explained that their proposal for + suspending testing of means to change the trajectory of or to displace + from orbit a space object would not require a party to suspend testing + of means internal to a space object for changing that space object’s + orbit, but that it would require suspension of testing of anyternal [external] means, particularly of reusable + spacecraft, for changing the trajectories of space objects. The US side has said a complete suspension of + tests of all external means for changing trajectory, including reusable + spacecraft (i.e., shuttle), is unacceptable. The US side has also said the test suspension should only cover + interceptors of space objects since these are the only means for + damaging and destroying a space object which the sides currently + understand fully and for which practical measures can be taken which + would not adversely affect other programs. The question of format for a + test suspension also remains unresolved: the Soviet side has proposed a + joint statement; the US side has + suggested a protocol to the treaty.

+

B. Article III “hostile acts” exclusion

+

The Soviet side has characterized this as the most important unresolved + issue. Although they have deleted the phrase “hostile acts” from their + proposed language, the Soviet side continues to insist that space + objects which are deliberately used to commit acts against the national + sovereignty of a party, including damage to its territory and national + environment, be explicitly excluded from the coverage of the Article II + provision banning certain acts against space objects. They have stated + that no such hostile acts have been committed to date but that it is + essential to them as a matter of principle to include such a provision + in the text of an agreement. The US side + has explored without success various ways of addressing the concerns + which may lie behind this Soviet position by suggesting language + affirming a party’s right to self-defense as set forth in the UN Charter and language affirming the + existing commitment in the Outer Space Treaty to carry out space + activities in accordance with international law. The US side has made clear that Article III + exclusion proposed by the Soviet side would seem to grant them the + right, which we believe they do not now have, to use anti-satellite + systems at their discretion, and is therefore unacceptable to the US side.

+

C. Article I definition of “interest”

+

Concerning the definition of “space objects in which a party has an + interest,” that is, regarding the class of space objects which would be + covered by the agreement. The sides are in agreement on the criteria of + entry on the national registry and use by a party (subject, on the + US side, to satisfactory resolution + of other outstanding ASAT issues). + However, the Soviet side also insists, as a third criterion, that a + space object must be launched by a party to be covered. The US side has said this is unacceptable since it would exclude space + objects launched by a third country which the US uses.

+

The Soviet side also insists on including the stipulation that a space + object registered, launched, and used by the US but also used on a cooperative basis by a third country + must be used solely “for peaceful purposes” if it is to be included in + coverage. As reflected in the negotiating record of the Outer Space + Treaty, use of this same phrase in the Outer Space Treaty involved + extensive debate between the Soviet Union, which has interpreted this + phrase to mean “for non-military purposes,” and the US, which has interpreted the phrase to + mean “for non-aggressive purposes.” The Soviet side has declined to + explain what this phrase would mean or why they consider its inclusion + necessary in this agreement, and indicated that they prefer that a + satellite used jointly with a third country for military communications + of any sort would not be covered. It appears, for example, that all + NATO satellites could be excluded + from coverage by the Soviet interpretation of this phrase. The US side has said that inclusion of this + phrase in the language of Article I is not acceptable.

+

D. Article I definition of “space object”

+

The sides have agreed that the definition of a space object in paragraph + one of Article I is logically connected with whatever definition of a + “space object in which a party has an interest” the sides may ultimately + adopt in paragraph two. The sides have therefore agreed to set this + issue aside until the “interest” definition is resolved. Nothing + significant is involved in the bracketed language of this + definition.

+

E. Articles II, IV, V and VI

+

The Soviet side has stated that there are no significant differences + between the sides on the contents of the Article II prohibited acts + provision, the Article IV accidental or unforeseen acts provision, the + Article V consultations provision and the Article VI nonsupersession + provision. However, the Soviet side has said they are unwilling to + discuss these articles further until the major issues concerning Article + III, Article I, and a test suspension have been resolved.

+

The US side has agreed that the + differences between the sides on these three articles appear to be minor + and may at this point be only drafting problems. The US side has repeatedly suggested that the + sides continue to work on resolving these issues.

+

F. Title

+

On a title for the treaty, the Soviet side has proposed “Treaty on the + Prohibition of Destruction, Damage, and Changing the Trajectories of + Space Objects.”

+

The US side has suggested “Treaty on the + Limitations Against Space Objects and on Other Measures to Strengthen + such Limitations and to Contribute to the Preservation of Peace in Outer + Space.”

+ +

G. Preamble

+

The language for the preamble has been agreed between the sides, except + that the Soviet side has reserved the option of reintroducing bracketed + language concerning “acts incompatible with peaceful relations between + states.”

+ + Wolf + +
+ +
+ 55. Memorandum of ConversationSource: Department of State, Office of the Secretariat + Staff, Cyrus R. Vance, + Secretary of State—1977–1980, Lot 84D241, Box 9, Vance + Nodis + Memcons, 1979. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Krimer on June 26. The meeting took + place at the Soviet Embassy. Vance was in Vienna from June 15–18, accompanying + Carter at the + U.S.–USSR + Summit. + Vienna, June 15, 1979, 3:15–4:00 + p.m. + + SUBJECT + Vance-Gromyko Discussion of Joint + Communiqué + + + PARTICIPANTS + U.S. + Secretary of State Cyrus R. + Vance + Dr. Marshall Shulman + Mr.Wm. D. Krimer, + Interpreter + U.S.S.R. + Foreign Minister A. A. + Gromyko + First Deputy Foreign Minister G. M. + Korniyenko + Ambassador A. F. + Dobrynin + Mr. V.M. Sukhodrev, + Interpreter + +

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to anti-satellite systems.]

+

ASAT

+

The Secretary turned to the next item—to what would be said in the + Communiqué about the ASAT + negotiations. We could not understand why the language dealing with an + issue of such major importance was still bracketed in the draft of the + Communiqué.

+

Gromyko felt he had to tell the + Secretary that on this question there was a substantial difference + between the positions of the sides. It did not look as if this was + something that could result in agreement here during the summit. Since + this was so, what could they say about it in the Communiqué? The only alternative would be to + say that the sides would continue to seek measures that would resolve + this problem.

+

The Secretary asked what did Gromyko consider to be the substantive difference that + we could not bridge?

+

Gromyko replied that, first, + there was the difference on the question of prohibiting the destruction + of objects in space. Then, of course, it was also a question of the + ownership of such objects. To whom did they belong? Did they belong to + our two states or to everybody? There was also a difference between our + positions here. All this was not mentioned in the draft of the + Communiqué. We did have ongoing negotiations on ASAT and could continue them.

+

The Secretary said that it followed that discussion should be continued, + and that could be reflected in the text of the Communiqué. As for + destruction of objects in space, we had no such plans and the Soviet + Union had no such plans. Why not say so?

+

Gromyko thought that was too bold + a statement to make. The two sides did have a difference in views and he + agreed that they wanted to make progress, but this was not the time or + place to discuss these matters.

+

The Secretary said that was unfortunate. Inclusion of a mention of ASAT in the Communiqué would have added + strength in terms of reassuring the world.The final communiqué for the U.S.–USSR Summit issued on June 18 ultimately included + language on ASATs. Carter + and Brezhnev “agreed to + continue actively searching for mutually acceptable agreement in the + ongoing negotiations on anti-satellite systems.” (“Joint + U.S.–U.S.S.R. Communiqué,” Vienna, June 18, 1979, Department of + State Bulletin, July 1, 1979, pp. + 54–56)

+

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to anti-satellite systems.]

+
+ +
+ + 56. Memorandum of ConversationSource: Department of State, Office of the Secretariat + Staff, Cyrus R. Vance, + Secretary of State—1977–1980, Lot 84D241, Vance + Exdis + Memcons 1979. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Krimer on June 20; and approved by + Aaron. The meeting took + place at the Soviet Embassy. The memorandum of conversation is + printed in full in Foreign Relations, 1977–1980, vol. VI, + Soviet Union, Document 203. + Vienna, June 17, 1979, 11:00 a.m.–1:00 + p.m. + + SUBJECT + Third Plenary Meeting between President Carter and President Brezhnev + Topics: SALT III and other arms + control issues + + + PARTICIPANTS + U.S. + The President + Secretary of State Cyrus R. + Vance + Secretary of Defense Harold + Brown + Dr. Zbigniew + Brzezinski + General David Jones + Mr. Hamilton Jordan + General G. + Seignious + Ambassador Malcolm + Toon + Mr. Joseph Powell + Mr. David Aaron + Mr. Wm. D. Krimer, + Interpreter + U.S.S.R. + President L.I. + Brezhnev + Foreign Minister A.A. + Gromyko + Marshal D.F. Ustinov + Mr. K U. Chernenko + Deputy Foreign Minister G.M. + Korniyenko + Marshal N.V. Ogarkov + Ambassador A.F. + Dobrynin + Mr. A.M. Aleksandrov-Agentov + Mr. L.M. Zamyatin + Mr. V.G. Komplektov + Mr. A.M. Vavilov + Mr. V.M. Sukhodrev, + Interpreter + + +

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to anti-satellite systems.]

+

The President said we were ready to sign a partial agreement with the + Soviet Union on anti-satellite systems, an agreement to bar any damage + or destruction of satellites and announce publicly that neither side has + plans to test anti-satellite missiles or systems.

+

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to anti-satellite systems.]

+

Turning to anti-satellite systems, Gromyko said that Secretary Vance and he had discussed this matter just two days + ago.See Document + 55. He did not believe it necessary to repeat what + he had said to Secretary Vance. + The President was well aware of the Soviet position. The difference + between our respective positions was very great indeed, and he would ask + the President to take a more objective look at this matter. An agreement + could not possibly be one-sided, benefiting the United States alone.

+

When Gromyko turned to + conventional arms transfers, the President interjected a few comments on + the anti-satellite talks. We had not complained about the Soviet-manned + Soyuz/Salyut flights, and had not asserted that they were anti-satellite + systems. Our space shuttle will not be designed as an anti-satellite + system. It was the very center of our space effort in the future. The + President hoped that this would not be allowed to block progress in the + talks because we are going to continue developing this vehicle. This was + not a departure from our overall space effort, and if the Soviets took + the position that the shuttle was being developed as an anti-satellite + system, we would only assure them that it definitely was not.

+

Gromyko said that the Soviet + Union was in favor of continuing these negotiations, but it would be + impossible to reach agreement on the basis of the US position.

+

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to anti-satellite systems.]

+
+ +
+ 57. Editorial Note +

On January 10, 1980, Richard Burt of the New York + Times reported that anonymous U.S. officials said that + “President Carter has instructed + ACDA to stop arms control + negotiations in the wake of the Afghanistan invasion.” However, + Department of State Spokesman Hodding Carter III denied that President + Jimmy Carter had issued a + memorandum containing such instructions. In his press guidance, + Carter conceded that “the + adverse political climate engendered by Soviet actions on Afghanistan + already will have an impact on arms control. But as we have done in the + past we will determine our policies in each arms control negotiations in + accordance with our national interests. Where we see the possibility for progress which will + enhance our security we will move ahead.” Regarding anti-satellite + negotiations, the Spokesman said “no date has been set for resumption of + other negotiations in which we have been involved (The Spokesman was + asked specifically about ASAT, CAT, and Indian Ocean. He repeated that no + dates have been set for them.)” (Telegram 7624 to All NATO Capitals, January 11; National + Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy + File, D800018–0763)

+

George Wilson of the Washington Post, meanwhile, + “quoted Air Force Chief of Staff Lew Allen as predicting that current + chill in U.S.–USSR relations will + accelerate development of weapons to wage war in outer space. Allen, in + making that prediction in an interview yesterday, said ‘there will be + pressure on us to move out more quickly’ on weapons designed to knock + down Soviet satellites used for spying, navigation and communication. + Wilson said Allen ‘sounded regretful as he predicted Air Force will + yield to that pressure.’ Allen said ‘I would still hope for reasonably + strong agreement on continued noninterference’ with satellites U.S. and + USSR have in space to check on + compliance with SALT Treaty. Allen + said ‘expectation of little progress’ in ASAT talks, together with ‘more concern about fragility’ of + noninterference pledges, are sources of ‘pressure to proceed faster’ on + antisatellite weapons.’ Allen said ‘we have capability to do that,’ + adding that Air Force would exercise it in response to changed + relationship with Soviet Union. Wilson said a four star general + indicated extra money would go for anti-satellite weapons already well + along in development rather than more distant possibilities such as + lasers.” (Telegram 8435 to the Mission in Geneva, January 11, 1980; + National Archives, RG 59, Central + Foreign Policy File, D800020–0155)

+
+ +
+ + 58. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Soviet + UnionSource: National + Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign + Policy File, D800174–0742. Confidential; Immediate; Exdis. Sent for information to + USNATO. Drafted by McClean; + cleared by Mark Palmer (PM/DCA), William Shinn (EUR/SOV), and + Suzanne Butcher (S/S–O); and + approved by Vest. + Washington, April 7, 1980, 1917Z +

91540. Subject: Meeting of Assistant Secretary Vest With Soviet Minister Counselor + Vasev, April 4: ASAT, SALT.

+

1. C—Entire text.

+

2. Summary: Soviet Minister Counselor Vasev called briefly on Assistant + Secretary Vest April 4 to + provide notification of the simultaneous launch of two Soviet ICBM’s on April 5. Vest took the occasion to urge the + Soviets not to conduct a test of an anti-satellite interceptor. End + summary.

+

3. Soviet Minister Counselor Vasev asked to see Assistant Secretary + Vest on April 4. He read and + handed over following message:

+

“Guided by good will and in order to avoid any misunderstanding we deemed + it necessary to inform the US side that + a planned simultaneous launch of two strategic ballistic missiles within + the national territory of the USSR + will be conducted on April the 5th in the Soviet Union. The impact area + of reentry vehicles is Kamtchatka Peninsula.”

+

Vest expressed appreciation for + the notification and noted that the US + has provided notifications of ICBM + test launches to the USSR.

+

4. Vest used Vasev’s call to draw + in general terms on talking points in para 5 regarding apparently imminent test of Soviet + anti-satellite interceptor. Vasev replied that in the course of + exploratory ASAT negotiations “all + indications from the US side” were that + the United States is not seriously interested in them. Vasev noted a + “spate of reports” since the start of the negotiations, including + official records of the Congress, showing that the function of the + planned US space shuttle is “60 percent + military”. Vest reiterated our + continuing interest in the negotiations and said that we are seriously + studying the remaining unresolved issues. Vasev said he would report + Vest’s comments to + Moscow.

+

5. ASAT talking points:

+

—Both sides stated at the Vienna summit that we would “continue actively + searching for a mutually acceptable agreement” in the ASAT + negotiations.See Documents 55 and 56. The Secretary reiterated this + commitment to the negotiations in his recent testimony before the SFRC.In a + March 27 statement before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, + Vance said “we will + continue to pursue balanced and verifiable arms control agreements + at other levels—in the mutual and balanced force reduction talks, on + anti-satellite warfare, on banning nuclear weapons tests, on + chemical warfare, and in other areas.” (Department of State Bulletin, May 1980, pp. 16–24)

+

—Since the talks began neither side has engaged in ASAT interceptor testing. This is an + important indication of the seriousness with which both sides have + viewed the pursuit of these negotiations and of our shared interest in + preventing an arms race in space.

+

—However there is evidence that preparations are underway for an ASAT test. Specifically I am informed + that you now have in orbit a target satellite.

+

—Should either side proceed to conduct anti-satellite tests, it would + call into question the seriousness of that side’s interest in achieving + an agreement in this important new area of arms control.

+

—As you know we have tried to insulate our arms control negotiations from + other aspects of our relationship with you. This action would add to the + burdens on the already strained relationship between our two + countries.

+

(—If asked: While we are not prepared now to suggest a time for + scheduling a resumption of ASAT talks, + we are seriously studying the remaining unresolved issues, including the + proposals tabled by both sides at the last round of talks on a + suspension of ASAT tests. We trust you + are doing likewise.)

+ + Vance + +
+ +
+ + 59. Summary of Conclusions of a Mini-Special Coordination Committee + MeetingSource: Carter + Library, National Security Council, Institutional Files, Box 123, + SCC 131, Mini-SCC, ASAT, 6/10/80. Top Secret. The meeting took place in + the White House Situation Room. + Washington, June 10, 1980, + 3:00–4:00 p.m. + + SUBJECT + ASAT (U) + + + State + Reginald Bartholomew, Dir., + Bur. of Polit.-Milit. Aff. + Charles Henkin, Dep. Asst., Polit. Milit. Aff. + Stephen Bond, Asst. Legal Advisor for United Nations + Affairs + JCS + BGen Joseph Skaff, Dep. Dir. for International Negotiations + Col Frank Jenkins, Chief, Strategic Negotiations Div. (J–5) + NASA + Phil Culbertson, Asst. for Special Transportation Systems + Gen. Frank Simokaitis, Dir. of the DOD Affairs Division + WHITE HOUSE + David Aaron + OMB + Al Burman + OSD + Walter Slocombe, Dep. + Under Secretary for Policy Planning + Kent Stansberry, Staff Analyst + Edward Melanson, Dep. Dir. for Intel. Policy (Intl. Negotiations + Foreign Intel. Exchanges) + ACDA + Spurgeon Keeny, Dep. + Dir. + James Timbie, Strategic Affairs Division Chief, Intl. Security + Programs Bureau + Amb. Robert Buchheim, Head, + ASAT Delegation + DCI + Ray McCrory, Chief SALT Support + Staff + [name not declassified], ACIS Staffer + OSTP + Ben Huberman + Art Morrisey + NSC + Jasper Welch + Victor Utgoff + Michael Berta + +

A Mini-SCC was held to discuss what we + might do in another round of ASAT + negotiations with the Soviets that might lead to making some progress. + The first question discussed was: Should we consider making explicit + exceptions in treaty coverage for satellites engaged in activities one + or both sides might find unacceptable? (TS)

+ +

After a short discussion of various ways for defining what would be + covered and our own possible interests in taking defensive actions + against clearly unacceptable satellite activities such as dispensing + noxious gasses into the atmosphere, the chairman asked for agency views + on this issue. (TS)

+

OSD said it found the idea of a general + formula defining exceptions without legal reference attractive. ACDA argued that the agenda optionNot attached. (no coverage for space + objects causing significant physical injury, destruction or damage to a + party to the agreement) protects what we want. The chair questioned the + precise meaning of significant physical injury. OSD, NASA, JCS, and the head of the ASAT Delegation expressed concerns about + the difficulties involved in constructing lists precisely defining what + was covered and what was not. (TS)

+

The chair then summarized the group’s apparent position as follows: (1) + we recognize for ourselves the principle that seems to be bothering the + Soviets, (2) we must know for ourselves what we want to protect and what + we are willing or interested in having protected, (3) whatever specific + formula we choose must be tested against such understanding, and (4) + there is useful work to be done on this issue in another round of + negotiations. There were no objections. (TS)

+

The chair then opened up discussion of the second agenda question: Should + we consider broadening the test suspension from ASAT interceptors only, to all means for + damaging space objects? After a short discussion of various techniques + for broadening the suspension, the chair asked for agency views on this + question. (TS)

+

State favored expanding the suspension to include lasers on the basis + that we aren’t going to be doing any laser testing in the next year to + 18 months, while the Soviets might. State noted that its concerns about + limits in our capability to monitor Soviet laser ASAT testing were largely offset by the + intelligence community’s judgment that the Soviets would not likely be + motivated to cheat during the short suspension period being considered. + JCS expressed concern about our low + confidence in monitoring a laser test suspension, and added that it + hated to rule out tests for an unknown period (the starting date of the + 12–18 month suspension is uncertain). JCS admitted, however, that it would have no laser ASAT program requiring tests for at least + the next several years. OSD noted that + adding a laser test suspension actually toughens our position in + principle—but noted his concerns over the verification issue and said it needs more analysis. + State noted the possibility of adding a collateral constraint to + prohibit launch of ASAT test + satellites. The chair expressed interest in this idea and called for + development of a short paper summarizing the monitoring issue. (TS)

+

The group reaffirmed our current position on the shuttle, and agreed to + the chairman’s suggestion of January 1, 1982 as a more meaningful ending + date for the test suspension. Finally, the JCS noted that the PD-50/ASAT analysisNot found. should be coordinated to reflect + completely the views of all agencies. (TS)

+

In summary, the group agreed that useful work could be done in another + round of negotiations with the Soviets, certainly on the first main + issue, and possibly on the second. (S)

+
+ +
+ 60. Report Prepared in the Central Intelligence AgencySource: Carter Library, National + Security Affairs, Brzezinski + Material, Subject File, Box 4, Anti-Satellite System (ASAT): 7/77–10/80. Secret; [handling restriction not declassified]. A + note at the bottom of the page reads: “This memorandum was prepared + by the Office of Political Analysis and the Office of Scientific and + Weapons Research. It has been coordinated with the Office of + Strategic Research, the National Intelligence Officers for the + USSR and Eastern Europe and + for Strategic Programs, and the Arms Control Intelligence Staff. + [Omitted here is information on where comments and queries may be + addressed.]” + Washington, August + 7, 1980 +

Soviet Interests in ASAT + Talks

+

If US-Soviet talks on + limiting antisatellite (ASAT) + weapons resume, the Soviets would have several specific objectives + beyond reviving the arms control dialogue and putting Afghanistan + farther behind them. They especially wish to extend to their other + satellites legal protection akin to that afforded to satellites + involved in monitoring SALT. In + addition, they want to curtail or slow down US development of ASAT weapons while retaining the right to take action + against satellites whose missions they consider inimical to Soviet + interests. They would probably be willing to alter their positions + somewhat on some of the remaining unresolved issues in order to + obtain an accord. [handling restriction not + declassified]

+ +

Status of the Talks

+

Three sessions of the US–USSR bilateral talks on limiting ASAT weapons have taken place since the + United States proposed such negotiations in March 1977. So far, + tentative agreement has been reached on two substantive elements of a + possible accord:

+

—An article that would prohibit either party from destroying, damaging, + or changing the trajectory or orbit of a space object in which the other + party had an interest.

+

—An article requiring notification by either party in case of accidental + or unforeseen risk to a space object of the other party.

+

The key issues that remain unresolved are:

+

—The definition of what space objects are to be covered by the + agreement.

+

—Whether space objects that engage in hostile or illegal actions are to + be excluded from coverage.

+

—The scope, duration, and format of a test suspension. [handling restriction not declassified]

+

The ASAT arms control negotiations are + not regularly scheduled, and the beginning date and location for each + session are decided by mutual agreement. At the close of the most recent + session in Vienna in June 1979 (at the time of the US-Soviet summit meeting during which the + SALT II treaty was signed) the + Soviets indicated their interest in resuming the negotiations in Vienna + in the fall of 1979, and it was agreed that there should be no + unnecessary delay in setting up the next session. The talks, however, + have not resumed. The atmosphere in US-Soviet relations worsened in the late summer and early fall, + and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December further clouded the + future of ASAT talks by causing + postponement of Senate consideration of SALT II and curtailment of other aspects of the bilateral + relationship. [handling restriction not + declassified]

+

Activity Since the Last Session

+

Soviet Diplomacy. Since the last session there + have been indications of continued Soviet interest in resuming ASAT talks. In September 1979 and again + in February 1980 the second-ranking member of the Soviet ASAT Delegation indicated to a US official that the Soviets had expected + to hear from the United States regarding resumption of the negotiations. + In April a Soviet Embassy official in Washington—after being told that a + test of the Soviet antisatellite interceptor (against a recently + launched target satellite) would be considered by the US to indicate a lack of Soviet seriousness + toward the negotiations—complained that all indications pointed to a + lack of serious US interest in ASAT talks. [classification not declassified]

+ +

Soviet Public Commentary. Shortly after the + diplomatic conversation in February, Soviet press and radio commentaries + seemed to indicate a growing Soviet concern over the expanding US military space effort. They cited in + particular the increased US budget for + space weapons and a potential military role for the US space shuttle. A Red + Star article in March called for international talks as a means + of curbing the US military space + programs. A Warsaw Pact declaration issued in mid-May and an editorial + published in Pravda on 17 June called for the + resumption of all disarmament negotiations that had been suspended or + broken off. [3½ lines not declassified]

+

[2 paragraphs (25 lines) not declassified]

+

Soviet Objectives

+

Protecting Soviet Space Systems. A main Soviet + objective is to extend to other important satellite systems, especially + those that serve national security purposes, legal protection akin to + that afforded satellites involved in monitoring SALT. From the outset of the talks the + Soviets have expressed a willingness to sign a relatively simple treaty + having satellite protection as its principal operative provision. To + this end Moscow has tentatively agreed to a provision that would + mutually prohibit damage, destruction, or changes in the trajectory of + any space object in which the sides have interests. [handling restriction not declassified]

+

Moscow insists that a comprehensive agreement, which would include a + requirement to dismantle existing ASAT + systems, a ban on ASAT development and + deployment, and a test suspension, is unrealistic. Implementation of an + agreement to liquidate existing ASAT + systems would be difficult for the Soviets to accept because equipment + used in their ASAT system is used in + other important space systems as well. [handling + restriction not declassified]

+

The Soviet dependence on space systems for a variety of purposes, + including military, will grow in the future, and the legal regime of + mutual protection sought by Moscow would help assure that its investment + in space will return maximum benefits. A simple treaty would allow the + Soviets to maintain their orbital interceptor as a contingency against + possible abrogation of the treaty, the use by other nations of space + objects for hostile acts, or war. [handling + restriction not declassified]

+

Preserving Soviet Sovereignty. The Soviets remain + distrustful of certain activities the United States could undertake in + space. They want the treaty to limit the definition of “space objects in + which a party has an interest” to those used exclusively by either of + the two sides and those used jointly by either side with other states + “for peaceful purposes”—that is, for non-military purposes. If adopted, + this provision could be used by the USSR to claim that a potentially wide range of satellites is excluded from the + treaty’s jurisdiction. [handling restriction not + declassified]

+

They also insist on reserving the right to take action against activities + they consider inimical to Soviet interests. The Soviets insist that an + ASAT treaty exclude from its + protection provision those satellites that deliberately engage in + “hostile” or “illegal” actions against the other country. Such actions, + according to Moscow, include non-weapons-related activities and are + defined as acts that violate a state’s sovereignty, its air space, or + its territory, or that damage its environment. The Soviets have cited + several examples of activities that would render a satellite legally + unprotected according to their position, including the use of direct + broadcast satellites without prior consent. A similar issue—which has + not been discussed at the ASAT talks + but has been raised repeatedly by the USSR in the UN Outer Space + Committee—is the sharing of information about a country from a civilian + program such as LANDSAT if that country regarded the information as not + serving a peaceful purpose. This Soviet approach, stressing the missions + of satellites, contrasts with the US + approach, which focuses on space objects themselves, and has + implications for US space cooperation + with its allies and other countries, including China. [handling restriction not declassified]

+

Constraining US + Programs. The Soviets are aware that the United States is + developing a “miniature homing vehicle” ASAT weapon system that is designed to be considerably more + capable than their own orbital interceptor. They are also aware of the + superior US technology base that would + enable the United States to outpace them in developing future ASAT weapon systems, including laser + systems (they know about the efforts of the Defense Advanced Research + Projects Agency to develop space-based and land-based laser ASAT systems). [handling restriction not declassified]

+

They are concerned too about the ASAT + potential of the space shuttle, in particular about its capability to + change the trajectories of space objects. Although they have raised in + the ASAT talks their concern about the + shuttle, they probably realize that the United States would never agree + to significant limitations on its testing, and they are in any case + probably more worried for the long term about the specific US + ASAT weapons programs. [handling restriction not declassified]

+

Since they already possess a usable ASAT interceptor weapon that has been successfully tested + and the United States does not, the Soviets have resisted US efforts to limit a test suspension to + interceptors of space objects. Instead, they have argued that the test + suspension should accord with the treaty provision on prohibited acts by + applying to “any means” of damaging, destroying, or changing the + trajectory of a space object, not just interceptors. [handling restriction not declassified]

+ +

Reinforcing the USSR’s “Superpower” Status. As demonstrated in the + recent series of manned Soviet space flights involving nationals from + various “socialist” countries (including most recently a Vietnamese + cosmonaut), the USSR sees its space + program serving important political as well as technical military + purposes. The bilateral nature and highly technical subject of the + ASAT talks underscore the + “superpower” status of the USSR and + its image as an equal of the United States. (In arguing that they cannot + accept a test suspension that would affect only their ASAT interceptor program, the Soviets + have maintained that the provision must “look” good as well as be good.) + These same features of the talks, the Soviets hope, will serve to remind + the United States that it must look to the USSR—not to China or other powers—for resolution of certain + critical security problems. [handling restriction not + declassified]

+

Maintaining the Arms Control Dialogue. The Soviets + almost surely view ASAT negotiations + as a useful part of the overall arms control dialogue with the United + States. Aside from its indirect contributions to the overall economic + and political relationship, the entire arms control process, including + ASAT, contributes a measure of + predictability to the Soviet security environment. In a period when the + centerpiece of the dialogue, SALT, is + in trouble, and when the overall strategic arms competition appears to + be increasing, talks on other questions such as theater nuclear forces + or ASAT are seen by the Soviets as a + means of keeping the dialogue from languishing. [Classification not declassified]

+

Outlook

+

The Soviets would welcome resumption of the talks and probably still + actively desire a bilateral ASAT + accord. They probably feel that their private inquiries in late 1979 and + early 1980, combined with their public call for resumption of + interrupted talks, remain sufficient indications of their interest. [handling restriction not declassified]

+

The Soviets probably realize that alterations in their positions on some + of the unresolved issues will be necessary. The most likely area for + change is the test suspension. The current Soviet position on this + issue, which addresses “any means” of damaging, destroying, or changing + the trajectory of a space object, was probably adopted to counter and + perhaps even to remove what they regarded as a one-sided US position. They seemed taken aback when + told that this position would limit some of their own current systems + used for, or in support of, manned missions (i.e. Salyut, Soyuz, + Progress). A long-term test suspension, combined with an exception for + manned or reusable systems, might come to be viewed in Moscow as suited + to the Soviet aim of constraining the long-term, potential, US + ASAT threat. Even if a long-term + suspension could not be agreed upon, the Soviets might still hope that + such a proposal would cause the United States to drop its insistence on + having a test suspension. + This could enable the sides to agree to the sort of minimal treaty + Moscow has sought from the beginning. [handling + restriction not declassified]

+

Prospects for change are less clear for the sovereignty issues, where the + Soviets have shown little flexibility. Their longstanding record of + applying a very broad definition to what is encompassed in state + sovereignty suggests no likelihood for Soviet compromise in this + area.The ASAT negotiations were not resumed during the last five + months of the Carter + administration. [handling restriction not + declassified]

+
+ +
+ +
+ + Chemical and Biological Weapons; The Sverdlovsk Incident + +
+ 61. Memorandum From the Acting Director of the Arms Control and + Disarmament Agency (Sloss) to the + President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)Source: Carter Library, National Security Council, + Institutional Files, Box 44, PRM–27 + [1]. Confidential. + Washington, February 4, 1977 + + SUBJECT + Chemical Weapons Study + +

The purpose of this memorandum is to recommend that a study be conducted, + on an urgent basis, of US chemical + weapons policy.

+

Current Situation

+

When the Geneva-based Conference of the Committee on Disarmament (CCD) reconvenes on February 15, 1977, it + can be expected to center its attention on chemical weapons limitations + and a comprehensive test ban, the two items of highest priority on its + agenda. There is a general expectation among CCD members that detailed consideration of CW limitations will continue and indeed + intensify during 1977. A short delay in advancing US + CW positions may be understood due to + the change of Administration, but US + participation in the Committee’s CW work + this year is clearly anticipated.

+

It is also very likely that at the outset of the CCD session the Soviets will again approach the US about resuming bilateral consultations + concerning a joint initiative on chemical weapons limitation. (The + US and USSR agreed at the July 1974 Moscow Summit to discuss the + possibility of such an initiative at the CCD.)At the summit, the two + sides “reaffirmed their interest in an effective international + agreement which would exclude from the arsenals of States such + dangerous instruments as chemical weapons.” (“Joint American-Soviet + Communiqué, July 3, 1974, Documents on + Disarmament, 1974, pp. 232–243) At the end of the + first round of consultations, held in Geneva in August 1976, it was + agreed to hold another round at a later date to be determined.Telegram 6837 From Geneva, August 27, 1976, + contains a communiqué that was released on August 30 that announced + that talks would resume at a later date. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + D760327–1079) During last fall’s UNGA, the Soviets inquired at a high level as to US views on resuming the talks; we suggested that the two + countries’ CCD Representatives would + take up the question of scheduling at the spring 1977 session.

+

Present US + Policy

+

The United States is firmly committed to the objectives of complete and + effective prohibition of all chemical weapons. This commitment has been + reiterated on many occasions by past Presidents and other senior + officials. It is consistent with the US + commitment in the 1971 Biological Weapons Convention to continue + negotiations toward that end.

+

Pending Policy Issues

+

The National Security Council has had under study two broad issues in the + area of chemical warfare policy. NSSM 157NSSM 157, July 28, 1972, is printed in Foreign + Relations, 1969–1976, vol. E–2, Documents on Arms + Control and Nonproliferation, Document 263. + addressed possible treaty alternatives for achieving restraints on the + possession of chemical weapons, and NSSM 192NSSM 192, February 7, 1974, is scheduled to be printed in Foreign + Relations, 1969–1976, vol. E–14, Part 2, Documents on + Arms Control, 1973–1976. examined alternatives for + the US chemical warfare posture, mainly + aimed at the question of whether or not to proceed with the acquisition + of binary CW munitions.

+

Two Senior Review Group meetings were held to consider the alternatives + developed in these two NSSM studies, but no consensus emerged on the + closely-linked issues of the military need for modernization of the + US + CW stockpile and acceptable CW treaty restraints where the verification + of compliance is incomplete. Rather than moving these issues to the + President for resolution and decision, it was decided to await the + outcome of an internal DOD reassessment + of its position on binary acquisition and acceptable arms control + approaches. This reassessment has recently been concluded, and the + results are reflected in a memorandum sent to Mr. Scowcroft by Secretary + Rumsfeld on December 23, 1976.Not + found. That memorandum proposed:

+

—A specific arms control approach for international CW restraints, involving a phased total ban + on CW stocks and limited on-site + verification;

+

—deferral for a reasonable time of binary production, pending the outcome + of international negotiations on CW + restraints;There has been no US production of lethal or + incapacitating CW agents since 1968. + [Footnote is in the original.]

+

—FY 1978 funding of a standby binary + production facility.Such requests had been + deleted by the Congress from the FY + 1975 and FY 1976 budgets. No request + was included in the FY 1977 budget. + [Footnote is in the original.]

+ +

After a Senior Review Group meeting was held December 29The Senior Review Group Minutes is scheduled to be + printed in Foreign + Relations, 1969–1976, vol. E–14, Part 2, Documents on + Arms Control, 1973–1976. to discuss the last item, + President Ford decided that this + issue could be handled more appropriately by the new Administration. + Since the arms control issue was considered to be a matter for the new + Administration, it was not addressed.

+

ACDA believes that the chemical weapons + field provides an excellent opportunity for this Administration to + further demonstrate the interest of the United States in arms control by + undertaking an initiative.

+

Recommendation

+

In view of the need to address the issue of chemical weapons limitations + in multilateral and bilateral US-Soviet + discussions in the near future, it is important to attempt to resolve + pending CW arms control policy issues. + ACDA recommends, therefore, that a + study be conducted, on an urgent basis, using as a point of departure + the proposals made by DOD last + December. Attached are suggested terms of reference for such a + study.Attached but not printed is the + list of terms. In parallel with this study I believe it would + be useful to ask the intelligence community for a new assessment of + foreign CW capabilities and + policies.

+ + Leon + SlossSloss signed “Leon” above this + typed + signature.Acting + +
+ +
+ + 62. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassies in the + Soviet Union and the United KingdomSource: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770056–0861. + Confidential. Sent for information to Geneva, USUN, and Paris. Drafted by Robert + Mikulak (ACDA/NTB/WT); cleared by Tuchman, David Anderson (DOD), Homer Phelps (PM/DCA), Jon + Glassman (EUR/SOV), John Shumate (EUR/NE), Floweree, John McNeill + (ACDA/GC), and Peter Sebastian (S/S); and approved by Thomas Davies + (ACDA/NTB). + Washington, February 17, 1977, + 0023Z +

35924. Subject: Geneva Protocol and Biological Weapons Convention. Ref A: + State 034014In telegram 34014 to Kabul and + other posts, February 15, the Department of State reminded the + ambassadors to some three dozen nations that their host countries + had not ratified the Geneva Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use + in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of + Bacteriological Methods of Warfare. The U.S. Government believed + that adherence to the Protocol “would be a significant and + constructive contribution to the broadly-supported effort to prevent + chemical or biological weapons from ever being used” and directed + the ambassadors to “approach host government at appropriate time and + level to encourage adherence to protocol and then report reaction.” + (National Archives, RG 59, Central + Foreign Policy File, D770054–0753) B: State 034003 C: State + 033992.Telegrams 34003 and 33992, both + dated February 15, reminded the ambassadors that their host nations + had either signed but not ratified the Convention on the Prohibition + of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological + (Biological) Weapons and on their Destruction which entered into + force on March 26, 1975 (Telegram 34003 to Buenos Aires and other + posts) or not signed/acceded to the Convention (Telegram 33992 to + Algiers and other posts). The instructions mirrored those of + telegram 34014 to Kabul and other posts, and added that the United + States wanted other nations to adhere to the Convention’s + “requirement for destruction of existing stocks” of biological + weapons. (National Archives, RG 59, + Central Foreign Policy File, D770054–1034 and D770054–0986 + respectively)

+

1. Please inform appropriate Foreign Ministry officials that USG is approaching states which are not + already parties to the Geneva Protocol of 1925 (Ref. A) and the + Biological Weapons Convention (Refs. B and C), to encourage their + adherence. We believe this is particularly opportune time in view of + resolutions at recent UNGA urging + states to become parties to these agreements.Reference is to “General Assembly Resolution 31/65: Chemical and + Bacteriological (Biological) Weapons,” December 10, 1976, Documents on Disarmament, 1976, pp. + 908–910.

+

2. For London: You should note that the US welcomed the reference to the Biological Weapons + Convention by Lord Goronwy-Roberts in his speech at the CCD on 1 July 1976: he stated that “my government feels + they have a special responsibility—and I am sure my Soviet and United + States colleagues agree—to work for greatly increased membership of this + Convention.” You should inquire informally whether the UK has already made approaches to encourage + adherence. If not, you should suggest informally that, in view of key + British role, both in negotiation of the Biological Weapons Convention and as one of the three + depositaries, UK may wish to consider + doing so. You may inform them that we are also approaching the USSR on this question.

+

3. For Moscow: You should suggest informally that, in view of key Soviet + role, both in negotiation of the Biological Weapons Convention and as + one of the three depositaries, USSR + may wish to make similar approaches to encourage adherence to the + Convention. At your discretion, you may also suggest that USSR consider approaching states to + encourage them to become parties to the Geneva Protocol.

+ + Hartman + +
+ +
+ 63. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the North + Atlantic Treaty OrganizationSource: National Archives, RG 59, + Central Foreign Policy File, D770095–0968. Confidential; Priority. + Sent for information to the Mission at Geneva, USUN, Moscow, London, and Paris. + Drafted by Robert Mikulak (ACDA/NTB/WT); cleared by Tuchman, Homer + Phelps (PM/DCA), John Hawes (EUR/RPM), Leo Reddy (S/S), David Ahlberg (DOD), George Humphrey, and Floweree; + and approved by Thomas Davies (ACDA/NTB). + Washington, March 18, 1977, 2333Z +

61090. Subject: Consultations With Allies on Chemical Weapons. Ref: (A) + State 053094;In telegram 53094 to Bonn and + other posts, March 18, the Department of State instructed the + Embassy in Bonn to inform the West German government that the United + States believed that “it would be premature to discuss CW issues in broad NATO forum at this time when US policy study has not yet been + completed.” (National Archives, RG + 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770081–1161) (B) USNATO 1264;In this March 8 telegram, the Mission to NATO advised that the United States consult all the + NATO allies about its chemical + weapons policy while it simultaneously negotiated with the Soviets. + (National Archives, RG 59, Central + Foreign Policy, [no film number]) (C) USNATO 1358.In this March 10 telegram, the Mission to NATO advised the Department of State that many of the + NATO allies had expressed + interest in consultations with the United States on chemical weapons + policy. (National Archives, RG 59, + Central Foreign Policy, [no film number])

+

1. This message transmits text of paper promised Ref A, in response to + recommendations contained Ref B, para + 3 (C) and Ref C.

+

2. Please communicate following US paper + to PolAds: Begin text. In response to + the discussion paper on chemical weapons (CW) limitations + circulated by the Delegation of the Federal Republic of GermanyAn official from the West German Embassy + handed his Government’s proposal for chemical weapons consultations + to Sloss on March 3. The text + of the proposal is in telegram 49286 to Bonn and other posts, March + 5; National Archives, RG 59, Central + Foreign Policy File, D770076–0819. the United States + Delegation wishes to convey its views and to inform other Delegations of + several recent developments in the CW + field.

+

At this time the new US administration is + taking a fresh look at CW policy with a + view to resolving longstanding issues. As part of this review we are + examining CW policy alternatives, + including arms control and military posture options, as well as the + future direction of CW arms control + discussions in both the bilateral (US-Soviet) and multilateral (CCD) arenas.

+

The United States, like the Federal Republic and other allies, believes + that the military and political implications of a CW prohibition make consultations among + NATO member states important prior + to negotiation of a chemical weapons agreement. Because our policy + review is as yet incomplete, we are not at present prepared to take a + definite position on some of the principles presented in the FRG discussion paper, though they are + generally consistent with our own views. We will, of course, welcome + full discussion in NATO once our + policy review is completed.

+

For its part the United States is firmly committed to the objective of + complete and effective prohibition of chemical weapons. To this end the + United States has entered into discussions of the prohibition of + chemical weapons both at the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament + (CCD) and with the Soviet + Union.

+

In the US view, for any approach to + chemical weapons prohibition to be effective, it must be a balanced one. + Satisfactory assurance must be provided to a state that it is not + increasing the risk to its national security in becoming a party and + that opportunities are not created for any state to gain a unilateral + advantages over others. For this reason any CW agreement should provide for independent, international + verification.

+

We also wish to inform our allies that a second round of US-Soviet bilateral consultations on CW limitations, pursuant to the July 1974 + Summit communiqué,See Public Papers: Nixon, + 1974, pp. 567–582. will be held in Geneva during the + period March 28–April 8. At that time specialists from both sides will + be present for informal meetings of the CCD with chemical weapons experts. The US representatives taking part in the + consultations will be instructed to focus on technical issues related to + CW limitations and will not be in a + position to begin negotiating a joint initiative.

+ +

In our view it might be possible to undertake consideration of a joint + US-Soviet initiative during further + consultations, to be held before the summer session of the CCD; however, a final decision on this + matter cannot be taken until our review is completed. We will keep our + NATO allies informed of + developments along this line.

+

For this reason and because CCD + expectations appear to be relatively high regarding prospects for the + start of negotiations on the text of a CW convention during the CCD’s 1977 summer session, we believe that every effort + should be made to complete initial Alliance consultations on CW before the beginning of the summer + session.

+

The United States notes that chemical weapons is one of the principal + topics on the agenda of the disarmament experts’ meetings scheduled for + late April. During these meetings the U.S. representative will provide a + report on the status of our policy review and on the bilateral US-Soviet consultations. End text.

+ + Vance + +
+ +
+ 64. Memorandum of ConversationSource: Department of State, Office of the Secretariat + Staff, Special Adviser to the Secretary (S/MS) on Soviet Affairs + Marshall Shulman—Jan 21, + 77–Jan 19, 81, Lot 81D109, Box 8, Vance to Moscow, March 28–30, 1977. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Krimer on April 12; reviewed in + draft by Hyland; and approved + by Twaddell on April 12. The + meeting took place at the Kremlin. The memorandum is printed in full + in Foreign + Relations, 1977–1980, vol. VI, Soviet Union, Document + 21. Vance visited + Moscow March 28–31. + Moscow, March 30, 1977, 11:15 a.m.–2:15 + p.m. + + SUBJECT + Berlin, Cyprus, Arms Control, CSCE, Bilateral Matters + + + PARTICIPANTS + UNITED STATES + Secretary Cyrus R. + Vance + Ambassador Malcolm + Toon + Mr. Paul Warnke + Assistant Secretary Arthur + Hartman + Mr. William Hyland + Deputy Assistant Secretary Slocombe + Mr. William D. Krimer, + Interpreter + + USSR + Foreign Minister A.A. + Gromyko + Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers L.V. Smirnov + Deputy Foreign Minister Georgiy Korniyenko + Ambassador A.F. + Dobrynin + Mr. O. Sokolov + Mr. V.M. Sukhrodrev, Interpreter + +

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to chemical weapons.]

+

CHEMICAL WEAPONS

+

Gromyko said that he would like + to instruct his representatives in Geneva to suggest that the CCD start drafting the text of an + agreement on chemical weapons, provided the United States agreed of + course. In the process of drafting, some problems might simply + disappear. So far the CCD had indulged + in philosophical discussions. This is all he had to say on the subject. + (He remarked that this was the briefest statement he had ever made on + any issue.)

+

The Secretary agreed that some progress had been made through discussions + between technical people in this area. We were ready and willing to join + with the Soviet Union in this initiative. We would see if working on the + text of an agreement might not change our respective stand on issues on + which we had different views, although our goals were the same.

+

Gromyko said we should instruct + our representatives to get to work.

+

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to chemical weapons.]

+
+ +
+ + 65. Telegram From the Department of State to the United States Mission + to the North Atlantic Treaty OrganizationSource: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770138–0156. + Confidential; Immediate. Sent for information to the Mission at + Geneva, USUN, the Central + Intelligence Agency, the National Security Council, and the + Department of Defense. Drafted by Michael Congdon (ACDA/IR); cleared by Lyall Breckon + (PM/DCA), Flowerree, Thomas + Hirschfeld (S/P), John Hawes + (EUR/RPM), Giles Harlow (DOD/ISA), Jon Glassman (EUR/SOV), and + Margot Mazeau (ACDA/GC); and approved by William Stearman (ACDA/IR). + Washington, April 20, 1977, 2201Z +

89099. Subject: NATO Disarmament + Experts April 21–22: Instructions for USDEL. Ref: USNATO 1134.In telegram 1134 from USNATO, + March 2, the Mission notified the Department of State that NATO’s spring disarmament experts + meeting would meet on April 21 and 22. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, [no + film number])

+

1. Following are instructions for the US + Representative to the NATO Disarmament + Experts, Spring 1977 meeting. Talking points are arranged according to + agenda items as listed Reftel:

+

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to chemical weapons.]

+

IV. Chemical Weapons

+

—The U.S. is currently reviewing CW arms + control issues. We expect this review to be completed in the near future + and, after consultations with our allies, possibly to provide the basis + for a proposal to the U.S.S.R.

+

—A second round of consultations at the expert level on CW was held with the Russians in Geneva + during the period April 1–April 8.Telegram + 2635 from Geneva, April 6, and telegrams 2660 and 2674, from Geneva, + both April 7, relayed the U.S.-Soviet CW discussions. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + D770120–0582, D770122–0124, and D770123–0073 respectively) + These consultations were pursuant to the agreement to consider a joint + initiative reached at the July 1974 summit, but the US + Del was not authorized to begin + negotiations on a treaty. The Soviets are clearly impatient and appear + anxious to begin preparing a joint initiative. The tone of the + consultations was courteous and businesslike.

+

—The consultations focused on technical questions related to CW arms control, particularly in the areas + of scope of prohibition and of verification. In this respect the + consultations represented an extension of the first round, which was + held in August 1976.

+

—Little new ground was broken in the consultations. Because our review + has not been completed, the U.S. was not in a position to present a + proposal. For their part, the Soviets reiterated their well-known views + on verification and + maintained their negative position on technical exchange visits. + Overall, progress was slight.

+

—During the consultations, the U.S. suggested that any joint initiative + take the form of agreed key elements of a CW agreement, rather than a draft treaty text. (If asked: + the preliminary reaction of the Soviet side was that while a full treaty + text was not necessarily required, they preferred to have the key + elements in treaty language.)

+

—It was agreed to continue the discussions, although no date was set. We + have indicated to the Soviets that further discussions could be held + before the CCD summer session, which + begins July 5. This will however depend upon the state of our review and + subsequent consultations with allies.

+

—During Secretary Vance’s recent + visit to Moscow,See Document 64 and footnote 1 + thereto. it was agreed to establish a U.S.-Soviet working + group on CW. No decision has yet been + made on how to proceed with this group, although it is likely that this + group will provide the forum for continuation of the bilateral + consultations already underway.

+

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to chemical weapons.]

+
+ +
+ 66. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security + Affairs (Brzezinski) to President + CarterSource: Library of Congress, + Manuscript Division, Harold + Brown Papers, Box 61, Chemical/Biological Weapons. + Secret. Sent for action. + Washington, May 18, + 1977 + + SUBJECT + A PRM on Chemical Warfare + +

Background

+

The United States is publicly committed to the objective of a complete + prohibition of chemical weapons. The Biological Weapons Convention which + we signed in 1971 contained a specific commitment to continue + negotiations toward that end.

+ +

This year, the two main issues on the agenda of the CCD (The UN Comprehensive Committee on Disarmament) are CW and CTB. The US more or less + promised last year that it would have new proposals in 1977, and + expectations are very high. Both the Japanese and the British have + already presented draft treaties which propose a total prohibition of + CW.The + Japanese proposal is in telegram 2294 from Geneva, March 25; + National Archives, RG 59, Central + Foreign Policy File; and the British proposal is in telegram 2622 + from London, February 14; D770103–0322 and D770052–0596 + respectively. The Soviets approached us at the beginning of + the last CCD session in February, again + seeking to set a date for bilateral talks on this issue. We agreed only + to talks on technical issues, but had to put off their request for talks + on terms of a treaty, since we did not have an agreed interagency + position. A CW group was one of the + eight working groups agreed on during Vance’s Moscow trip,See Document 64 and footnote 1 thereto. lending added urgency to the + need to develop a US position.

+

Current Situation

+

We had originally thought that a coordinated US negotiating position could be worked out at the staff + level without a formal PRM but that + effort has failed. Defense, and especially the Joint Chiefs, are + determined to do a broader review covering questions of force posture + and modernization, and military risks, before they will agree to + discussions on an arms limitation approach. The attached PRM draft is more narrowly focused than + Defense originally wanted, but it satisfies DOD as well as State and ACDA.

+

Timing is now urgent. The next CCD + session begins in early July, but the US + agreed in Moscow to bilateral CW talks + preceding that Conference. Those talks would have to begin in late June, + and we would need about three weeks for consultations with NATO Allies before then. So we will need + to have an option paper ready for your decision by the end of the first + week in June.

+

RECOMMENDATION:

+

That you approve the issuance of the attached PRM.Carter checked the + “Approve” line.

+
+ +
+ + 67. Presidential Review Memorandum/NSC–27Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, + Harold Brown Papers, Box + 61, Chemical/Biological Weapons. Secret. Sent for action. Carter wrote “ok, J” in the upper + right corner of the memorandum. Underneath, Brown wrote “5/20. + ISA—Since our military are so + concerned about the CW threat, we + should look carefully at the possibility reducing the threat by + CW arms limitation. HB.” + Washington, May 19, + 1977 + + TO + The Vice President + The Secretary of State + The Secretary of Defense + + + ALSO + The Director, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency + The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff + The Director of Central Intelligence + + + SUBJECT + Chemical Warfare + +

The President has directed that the Special Coordination Committee + undertake a review of the US chemical + warfare (CW) posture with a view toward + developing CW arms limitation + options.

+

The review shall include:

+

1. An assessment of the nature and trends of the CW threat, to be prepared by the Intelligence + Community.

+

2. A definition of alternative military strategies for deterring CW, and limiting its effect if deterrence + fails. Each strategy description shall include an evaluation of:

+

—supporting force postures and programs, including costs.

+

—associated military risks

+

—US and allied technological + capabilities, and military and social constraints

+

—impact on US allies

+

—effect of use on military operation including incentives for first use + of chemicals

+

3. An evaluation of arms limitation options. Analysis shall include + consideration of:

+

—net effect on US security, including + impact on US Allies

+

—contribution to US-Soviet relations and + to other foreign policy interests

+

—verification and compliance requirements

+

—possibilities for successful negotiation

+ +

The review shall be completed by June 1 and shall not exceed 25 + pages.“Response to PRM/NSC–27: Chemical + Warfare” was submitted to the SCC + on June 1 and is available in Washington National Records Center, + OSD Files: FRC 330–80–0017, 370.64 CBR (June) + 1977.

+ + Zbigniew + Brzezinski + +
+ +
+ 68. Summary of a Policy Review Committee MeetingSource: Carter Library, National + Security Council, Institutional Files, Box 86, SCC 015, Chemical Warfare Limitation + and Programs, 6/8/77. Secret. + Washington, June 8, + 1977 + + PARTICIPANTS + State + Warren Christopher + Reginald Bartholemew + Defense + Charles W. Duncan + Lynn Davis + JCS + Lt. Gen. William + Smith + ACDA + Spurgeon Keeny + Robert Mikulak + NSC + David Aaron + Jessica Tuchman + OMB + Bert Lance + Randy Jayne + +

The meeting opened with a brief review of CW diplomatic history by Keeny, who also reviewed verification issues. Our + information base on CW is very poor: a + result not only of a lack of access to Soviet activities, but also of a + relative lack of effort devoted to CW + intelligence collecting. An acceptable treaty should include more than + national technical means of verification, since these are inherently + inadequate for verifying production and stockpiling programs. A general + discussion followed on the question of verification and whether + accepting a CW treaty with relatively + weak verification provisions might set any precedent for other more + critical negotiations such as CTB and + SALT. Aaron argued that this would not set a precedent, since + what we insist upon is what is necessary for our security in each + individual case. Several participants noted that we had accepted the + Biological Warfare Convention with no + verification provisions, because we believed that the risks of non-compliance were far outweighed + by the benefits of the treaty both from the point of view of superpower + activities, and to prevent spread of biological warfare programs to + other nations.

+

Duncan briefly reviewed the + US-Soviet military imbalance in the + CW area. Compared to the Soviets we + have virtually no CW offensive + capability and our defensive capability is far inferior to theirs. + Bartholomew raised the point + that this was precisely why the Soviet interest in CW is so important. They know that we have + a very inadequate capability, and that congressional and allied opinion + are strongly against additional CW + development, and yet, though the status quo is all in their favor, they are the ones who have been pushing for a + treaty. One would have expected precisely the opposite. No one has the + answer to why they are so interested in a treaty, but it is important to + note. Duncan seconded this + argument and made the additional point that with our small capacity now, + we are at risk already, and that trying for a CW treaty can therefore only improve our position from the + point of view of national security.

+

On the type of treaty desired, there was unanimous agreement in support + of a comprehensive treaty. The proposed key elements of such a treaty + were then reviewed. All agencies approved the + proposed elements as written. Keeny noted however that a ban on defensive activities is not included in these elements. Such a + ban has been studied in the past and thought to be politically + impossible. It was agreed that it might be useful to look at this + question again, but Christopher + stipulated that this should not hold up the negotiations in any way. + Duncan, Keeny and Smith strongly concurred.

+

Duncan opened the discussion of + military options by saying that Defense was badly split. The Joint + Chiefs and DDR&E support Option 1Option + 1 called for the “modernizing” of the chemical retaliatory + stockpile. See “Talking Paper for the Secretary of Defense and the + Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff at the SCC Meeting, June 8, 1977,” undated, + Washington National Records Center, OSD Files: FRC + 330–80–0017, 370.64 CBR (June) 1977. while Secretary + Brown, Duncan and ISA all support Option 3.Option + 3 called for the retention of the current chemical weapons + stockpile. (Ibid.) General Smith said that the Joint Chiefs believe that + construction of a new CW facility would + provide us with additional negotiating leverage. Also, the JCS is concerned over the size of the + Soviet CW capability, and believe that + CW may play an important role in + Soviet military doctrine. In expressing State’s support for Option 3, + Christopher noted that our + allies would be very upset if the US + were to proceed with either of the force improvement options (Options 1 + and 2). ACDA and OMB also support Option 3.

+
+ +
+ + 69. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security + Affairs (Brzezinski) to President + CarterSource: Carter Library, National + Security Council, Institutional Files, Box 86, SCC 015, Chemical Warfare Limitation + and Programs, 6/8/77. Secret. Carter initialed the top of the + memorandum. + Washington, June + 13, 1977 + + SUBJECT + Chemical Warfare + +

The SCC met on June 8 to review the + results of PRM–27 on Chemical Warfare. + A summary of the discussion is at Tab A.See + Document 68. This memo reviews + the issues involved, and presents to you the recommendations reached by + the SCC concerning both a CW arms limitation posture and CW military programs.

+

Principal Issues

+

Discussion in the SCC focused on four + issues:

+

—International Background: There is considerable + support for a comprehensive CW treaty; + the USSR continues to press strongly + for a joint US–USSR initiative. CW and + CTB are the two main issues on the + agenda of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament (CCD) this year. The British, Japanese and + Soviets all have draft treaties for comprehensive CW limitations on the table, and the US indicated last year that we would have + specific proposals ready this year. In 1974 the Soviets passed us a + draft treatyIn July 1974 the Soviets + proposed that the “development, production, and stockpiling of all + lethal CW” be banned. See Foreign + Relations, 1969–1976, vol. XVI, Soviet Union, August + 1974–December 1976, Tab 1, Document 13. for + consideration and the same year we agreed at the Moscow Summit to seek a + joint CW initiative for submission to + the CCD. There have been three meetings + of US-Soviet technical experts on the + issue—the last in MayTelegram 3797 from + Geneva, May 16, reported that during a four-day discussion of mass + destruction weapons between the United States and the Soviet Union, + “there was virtually no discussion of specific issues” regarding + chemical weapons. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + D770173–0565) in response to the commitment for a CW working group made at Vance’s Moscow meeting.See Document 64 and footnote 1 thereto. The Soviets + have hinted at possible flexibility in their longstanding position that + verification be based on national technical means.

+

—Domestic Background: Several times Congress has + defeated budget requests to build a new binary chemical facility. + Congress has passed laws + restricting the transportation, disposal and open air testing of + chemical weapons, and requiring the recipient’s approval before chemical + weapons are deployed overseas. There is also a law requiring the + President to certify that lethal chemical weapons are in the national + interest before funds can be authorized for their production. Finally, + the Environmental Policy Act established additional measures to prevent + environmental damage from chemical munitions. All in all, Congressional + opinion is very hostile to CW.

+

—US and Soviet CW Capabilities: [1 line not declassified] it is they—not we—who + have been pushing for a CW ban. While + there is a consensus that the Soviets are doing much more than we in the + CW area, [4 lines + not declassified] This large Soviet effort and their apparent + eagerness for a treaty may derive from Russia’s huge CW casualties in World War I (Tab B)Not attached.—in addition to the good + politics of taking a leading role on this issue.

+

—Verification: Although some types of CW activities—such as the destruction of + declared stocks—can be verified independently, [2 + lines not declassified] On the other hand, the risk from a + violation is related to the military significance of the weapons system + involved and, in this case, the US has + an insignificant CW capacity. Moreover, + a nation considering whether to violate a CW treaty will realize the consequences if a violation is + detected. Most important, adequate verification does not require + absolute certainty that a violation will be detected but rather really + means enough verification to ensure that a side’s security is not + endangered, and that confidence in the agreement is maintained. Finally, + we would make clear to the Soviets that the verification procedures we + may accept in a CW treaty do not set any + precedent as to what we may consider necessary in a SALT or CTB agreement.

+

Results of the SCC Meeting

+

I. Arms Limitation

+

There was unanimous agreement that the US + should seek a comprehensive treaty banning development, production and + stockpiling of chemical weapons, and requiring the destruction of + existing stocks, rather than any type of more limited agreement. The + agencies also approved unanimously the draft of proposed key elements + for such a treaty (Tab C).Not + attached. If you approve these elements, they will form the + basis for our initial negotiations with the Soviets.Carter + checked the “Approve” line.

+ +

II. Military Programs

+

Only JCS supported a force improvement + option (Option 1 in the PRM) which + would cost anywhere from $500 million to $2 billion, and involve + building the binary facility that Congress has rejected on several + occasions. All other agencies recommend that we + continue the CW force as it now is and + review this decision in mid-1978 on the basis of the progress or lack + thereof in the CW negotiations.

+

RECOMMENDATION:

+

That you approve the status quo military option, with the proviso that + you will review the situation on the basis of progress made in arms + limitation talks.Carter checked the “Approve” + line.

+

Where We Go From Here

+

If you approve the arms limitation posture presented here, the US will immediately undertake consultations + with the British, French, Germans and Japanese. Then, at the opening of + the CCD conference on July 5, we will + begin our long-promised bilateral talks with the Soviet Union with the + goal of developing an outline of the principles of a comprehensive + treaty. This would be presented as a joint initiative to the membership + of the CCD, which would then work from + that base in developing the detailed text of a comprehensive + international CW treaty.Carter + wrote “ok” underneath the last paragraph of the + memorandum.

+
+ +
+ 70. Presidential Directive/NSC–15Source: + Carter Library, National Security Council, Institutional Files, Box + 86, SCC 015, Chemical Warfare + Limitation and Programs, 6/8/77. Confidential. + Washington, June + 16, 1977 + + TO + The Vice President + The Secretary of State + The Secretary of Defense + The Director, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency + The Director of Central Intelligence + + + + SUBJECT + Chemical Warfare + +

The President has directed that a United States Delegation under the + direction of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency should immediately + initiate bilateral consultations with the United Kingdom, France, the + Federal Republic of Germany and Japan, to be followed by negotiations + with the Soviet Union on the subject of a comprehensive treaty to ban + chemical warfare.

+

Talks with the Soviet Union should seek to reach agreement on a joint + US–USSR initiative to be presented to the Conference of the + Committee on Disarmament along the following lines:An unknown hand underlined the phrases “Talks with + the Soviet Union should seek to reach agreement” and “the following + lines.”

+

—Definitions of important terms would be incorporated in the + agreement.

+

—To the extent possible, low-risk, more easily verified actions would be + undertaken at the earliest possible stage.

+

—Production, stockpiling, acquisition or retention of chemical warfare + (CW) agents and munitions would be + prohibited.

+

—Development of CW agents or munitions + would be prohibited, but development of means of protection against + chemical attack would be permitted.

+

—Existing stocks of CW agents and + munitions would be destroyed over a period of at least eight years + according to an agreed schedule. All CW + stocks would be declared at the time a State became a Party. As an + alternative to destruction, dual-purpose agents could be diverted to + peaceful purposes, subject to appropriate controls. Precursors would be + treated in the same manner as agents.

+

—All facilities designed or used for production of single-purpose + chemicals would be declared and immediately closed down. However, under + appropriate controls such a facility could be used for agent/munition + destruction operations. All declared facilities would be destroyed or + dismantled within two years after stockpile destruction had been + completed. Establishment of new production facilities would be + prohibited.

+

—The disposition of declared facilities and the destruction of declared + stocks would require on-site verification under independent, + international auspices.

+

—The agreement would contain agreed procedures for the carrying out of an + investigation by representatives of a Consultative Committee of treaty parties in the event + that suspicious activities were reported.

+

—The following types of chemicals would be subject to the provisions of + the agreement: lethal and other highly toxic chemicals, incapacitating + chemicals, and precursors.

+

—The principal criterion for application of the provisions of the + agreement to specific chemicals would be whether the specific activities + in question are justified for peaceful purposes (“purpose criterion”). + To assist in applying the purpose criterion, two supplementary toxicity + criteria would be adopted.

+

—Transfer of CW agents or munitions to + others would be prohibited, as would any other effort to help others + obtain CW agents or munitions.

+

—Provisions would be included for confidence-building purposes.

+

—Any State Party would have the right to withdraw if it decided that + extraordinary events, related to the subject matter of the agreement, + had jeopardized the supreme interests of its country. Appropriate notice + would be required.

+

—All States would be eligible to become Parties.

+

The President has also directed that US + chemical warfare forces be maintained without force improvement. This + decision will be reviewed, beginning with the start of the FY 1980 budget cycle, on the basis of the + progress made in arms limitation talks.

+ + Zbigniew + Brzezinski + +
+ +
+ 71. Editorial Note +

The United States and the Soviet Union resumed negotiations over chemical + weapons consultations on July 7, 1977, in Geneva. In the first session, + the U.S. representative, Ambassador Adrian + Fisher, proposed that rather than trying to write a draft + treaty, the two sides should instead issue a set of “agreed key + elements” on a chemical weapons convention. This would allow “other + states an opportunity to play a concrete role in development of specific + treaty conventions” in order to “ensure broad acceptance of the + convention.” The Soviet representative, Viktor Likhatchev, said the U.S. + proposal “deserved careful study.” (Telegram 5558 from the Mission at + Geneva, July 8; National Archives, RG + 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770243–0752) In the second session, + the U.S. Delegation proposed a ban on the “development, production, stockpiling, + acquisition or retention of CW agents + and munitions.” The Soviets “asked several questions for clarification, + but made no substantive comments.” (Telegram 5643 from the Mission at + Geneva, July 11; National Archives, RG + 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770246–0173)

+

Fisher turned to the issue of + verification in the third session. “Because of the deficiencies of + non-intrusive methods” of verification, the United States wanted a + system that provided for “on-site” confirmation that stockpiles had been + destroyed and that facilities were not being used for prohibited + activities; for “fact-finding investigation” of suspected treaty + violations; and for the monitoring of the “production and use of + super-toxic chemicals for peaceful purposes.” Again, Likhatchev made no + substantive comments, but said he would pose questions at the next + session. (Telegram 5644 from the Mission at Geneva, July 11; National + Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy + File, D770246–0155)

+

In a brief opening statement at the fourth session, Likhatchev said that + the Soviet Union wanted “the prohibition of incapacitating chemical + warfare agents,” and asked whether the United States “now wanted to + expand” the scope of an agreement “to include incapacitants.” Fisher replied that the United States + “desires a comprehensive treaty, which would not be limited to ‘the most + dangerous, lethal means of chemical warfare’.” (Telegram 5722 from the + Mission at Geneva, July 13; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770249–0022)

+

In their penultimate session, after another discussion about which + chemical incapacitants would be covered under a convention, Likhatchev + turned to the issue of verification. The Soviet Union, he said, favored + a system “based on national control (i.e. ‘self-policing’). This could + be supplemented by: “(A) information exchange among parties on questions + related to compliance, (B) cooperation and consultation among states in + situation where doubt about compliance exists, and examination by the + UN Security Council of complaints of + treaty violation.” He argued that the Soviet Union “believed that the + very fact of a state’s participation in a convention is sufficient + guarantee that the state will ensure compliance,” and “that the system + of control should not violate the sovereign rights of states or lead to + disclosure of military or commercial secrets.” In a “preliminary + response,” Fisher said that + international control would “check national control as both must have + the ability to satisfy ourselves that the agreement is being followed.” + (Telegram 5834 from the Mission at Geneva, July 15; National Archives, + RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + D770252–0767)

+

In their final meeting on July 18, the two sides repeated their positions + on which chemical agents would be covered under an agreement and on + verification. The U.S. Delegation proposed that the talks resume on August 16. The Soviets, + however, said they needed instructions from Moscow before they could + commit to a date. (Telegram 5978 from Geneva, July 19; National + Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy + File, D770256–1078) A July 19 joint communiqué described the talks as a + “first step toward the complete and effective prohibition of chemical + weapons.” The two sides also agreed to meet “in the near future to + continue the consultations.” (Telegram 5967 from the Mission at Geneva, + July 19; National Archives, RG 59, + Central Foreign Policy File, D770268–0382)

+
+ +
+ 72. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense Brown to the Secretaries of + the Military DepartmentsSource: Washington National Records Center, OSD Files: FRC 330–80–0017, Box 45, 370.64 CBR (Aug–Dec) 1977. + Confidential. Also sent to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of + Staff, the Director of Defense Research & Engineering, the + Assistant Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), the Assistant + Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs), the Assistant + Secretary of Defense (Manpower, Reserve Affairs & Logistics), + the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Program Analysis & + Evaluation), the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs), + the General Counsel, OSD, the + Assistant to the Secretary of Defense (Atomic Energy), the Assistant + to the Secretary of Defense (Legislative Affairs), and the Director + of the Defense Intelligence Agency. David McGiffert, the Assistant Secretary of Defense + for International Security Affairs, forwarded this memorandum under + cover of an August 17 memorandum to Brown in which he noted that + “some elements in DOD have + misinterpreted” parts of PD/NSC–15 and were “questioning the current + guidance to continue efforts for upgrading the defensive posture of + U.S. forces against chemical warfare.” (Ibid.) + Washington, August + 22, 1977 + + SUBJECT + Implementation of Presidential Directive/NSC–15, dated 16 June 1977, “Chemical Warfare”See Document + 70. (C) + +

(C) Guidance provided to the Secretary of Defense in PD/NSC–15 states: + “The President has also directed the U.S. chemical warfare forces be + maintained without force improvement. This decision will be reviewed, + beginning with the start of the FY 1980 + budget cycle, on the basis of progress made in arms limitations talks.” + This guidance is to be implemented as follows:

+

1. (C) All efforts related to upgrading the U.S. protective posture against chemical/biological warfare will + continue. This will include RDT&E and procurement of + appropriate equipment and apparatus to insure the survivability of + personnel and equipment in a toxic environment. Training, doctrinal + developments, chemical defense manpower improvements or manpower + additions necessary to provide an effective CW protective posture should also continue.

+

2. (C) Surveillance and maintenance of the present retaliatory stockpile + including any necessary actions required to maintain the retaliatory + readiness posture will continue. This should include maintenance of the + required amounts of ancillary items such as fuzes, bursters, and other + necessary components. Current planning for deployment of chemical + munitions under emergency conditions should continue. Research and + development of improved chemical agents and munitions will continue.

+

3. (C) To insure that this Department can provide a timely response at + the next review period, the start of the FY 1980 budget cycle, the planning requested in the FY 1979–1983 Planning and Programming + Guidance for an integrated binary facility should be completed by the + Secretary of the Army not later than September 1977. Additionally, + appropriate criteria to judge progress in the forthcoming arms + limitations talks should be developed by the Assistant Secretary + (International Security Affairs).

+ + Harold + Brown + +
+ +
+ 73. Telegram From the Mission in Geneva to the Department of + StateSource: National + Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign + Policy File, D770311–0838. Confidential; Immediate. Sent for + information to Moscow. + Geneva, August 29, 1977, 1227Z +

7358. Subj: CCD: US-Soviet Chemical Weapons Consultations: Fifth Round + Wrap-up, Message No. 9.

+

1. Summary: Principal feature of fifth round of US-Soviet negotiations on prohibition of chemical weapons + (Aug 16–26, 1977) was presentation by USSR of detailed position on basic provisions to be + included in possible convention. Soviet presentation, which responded to + US presentation made in fourth round (July 1977),See Document + 71. contained few surprises; however, it represented + most detailed and concrete exposition of Soviet position to date. It + incorporates US proposals in certain + points and suggests a Soviet willingness to enter into a phase of + serious negotiations now that both sides have presented their basic + position. A basis to begin negotiations in the next round now appears to + exist.

+

2. As regards form of joint initiative, USSR appears to have moved towards US concept that joint initiative to CCD should take form of agreed key + elements, through some differences possibly remain. Regarding the + content of the basic provisions, there appears to be substantial degree + of convergence in US and Soviet + positions on scope of convention (types of weapons and activities to be + banned) and disposal of prohibited weapons and facilities, although some + important differences remain and Soviet text is unclear on others.The basic provisions of the Soviet text are in + telegram 7212 from the Mission at Geneva, August 23; National + Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign + Policy File, D770304–0696. On issue of verification, two + sides remain far apart. Despite some minor positive elements in Soviet + presentation, position on the key issue of international verification + involving on-site inspection remains basically unchanged. Regarding + entry into force of the treaty, unclear wording of Soviet basic + provision no. 23 raises the potentially troublesome possibility that + they may insist on ratification by all permanent UN security council members as a precondition. End + summary.

+

3. US and Soviet Delegations held six + meetings in Geneva from Aug 16 through Aug 26, 1977, to continue their + negotiations on elements of a convention prohibiting chemical weapons, + with the purpose of preparing a joint initiative for submission to the + CCD. This was the fifth round of + bilateral negotiations held in accordance with the US-Soviet communiqué of July 1974,See footnote 2, Document + 61. and the third meeting of the joint working + group established as a result of the Moscow discussions between + Secretary Vance and Foreign + Minister Gromyko in March + 1977.See Document + 64. The atmosphere of all meetings was cordial and + workmanlike.

+

4. In the first four meetings which were held on Aug 16, 18, 22 and 23, + Soviet rep (Likhatchev) made a detailed presentation of Soviet positions + on content of possible convention prohibiting chemical weapons which he + characterized as supplementing proposals contained in Soviet 1974 draft + CW convention and as, in effect, a + response to the US proposal presented in + the fourth round in July 1977.See Document 71. At the end of his + presentation, Amb Likhatchev handed over a working paper containing 23 basic provisions as the + basis for a possible joint initiative. At the fifth meeting USRep + (Fisher) presented + preliminary US comments on Soviet + presentation, summarizing apparent points of agreement and differences + between two sides and presenting a number of questions designed to + clarify Soviet position. Soviet Del + answered some of these questions at sixth meeting. US side proposed Sept 26 for resumption of + next round of bilateral talks. Soviet Delegation informally indicated + that this seemed reasonable but did not formally agree to it, pending + instructions.

+

5. Salient points of Soviet basic provisions are summarized and commented + on below.

+

6. Form of the joint initiative. Although Soviet rep emphasized in his + initial presentation that USSR + continues to seek a joint initiative in form of negotiated text of draft + convention or main articles thereof which would be presented to CCD, the “basic provisions” tabled by the + USSR bear a strong resemblance in + form to the “key elements” presented by the US in July and would appear to represent a major step in + the direction of the US approach. It + appears unlikely that Soviets will continue to advocate tabling a + full-fledged jointly agreed treaty text. However, whereas the US approach envisages agreement on + principles or key elements to be subsequently elaborated upon by the + CCD, USSR may continue to favor tabling a set of agreed + provisions in treaty language.

+

7. Scope of the convention. The two sides appear to be in substantial + agreement that development (including testing) production, stockpiling, + acquisition, retention and transfer of the chemical weapons should be + banned by a confidential convention: that ban should include lethal and + other highly toxic chemicals and incapacitants as well as munitions, and + that main criterion for including specific chemicals or activities + should be that of purpose supplemented by toxicity. Soviets accepted + approximate values for toxicity criteria discussed by US in round one. The two sides disagreed, + however, as to whether irritants should be included. (The US position is that they should not). Other + potential points of disagreement concern use of lethal chemical agents + in military field exercises with troops, and the definition of + precursors.

+

8. Disposition of chemical weapons. Soviet presentation indicated a + general acceptance of US concept that + stocks of agents and weapons as well as plans for their destruction and + for the elimination of corresponding facilities according to an agreed + schedule be declared. Following explanations presented by USDEL, Soviets + accepted US explanation as to why a + minimum of eight years would be required for destruction of US stocks of agents and munitions. USSR also agrees that production + facilities could temporarily be used for destruction of agents and + munitions. Major point of difference was that Soviet would permit conversion of production + facilities to peaceful uses whereas US + would require destruction or dismantling of all facilities.

+

9. Verification. Although the Soviet presentation contained some points + of interest, there was no change in the essentials of the Soviet + position which underlined basic Soviet unwillingness to allow on-site + inspection under independent international auspices, whether to verify + destruction of stocks and dismantling of facilities or for clarification + of suspicious activities. Soviet working paper stated as basic principle + that national means of verification should be the main form of + verification. (In bilateral presentation, Soviets made no attempt to + defend the adequacy of the national means described in their CCD working group paper. Also, criticisms + of US verification proposals appeared to + skirt issue of verification of destruction of declared stocks). However + Soviet presentation did go further than previous ones in elaborating + their proposed international procedures. Soviets accepted concept of + consultative committed composed of representatives of States-parties, + although with severely restricted mandate. The committee proposed by + Soviets would in essence be a clearing house for requesting, receiving + and transmitting information, without any authority to make + recommendations or to draw conclusions.

+

10. The most interesting part of Soviet presentation on verification was + their basic provision no. 20 which states that “there should not be + precluded the elaboration of a compromise basis of agreement which would + permit to have a possibility of ascertaining on a voluntary basis, the + real state of affairs on site in case doubts emerge with regard to the + fulfillment of obligations on the prohibition of chemical weapons,” with + the arrangements to be determined by the host country. This provision is + similar to Article II, para 3 of + Soviet draft treaty for a nuclear weapons test ban what precisely the + Soviets are prepared to accept will doubtless not emerge until a later + state in the negotiations.

+

11. At the conclusion of USSR + presentation and in final session, Soviet rep stressed forthcoming + nature of Soviet proposals on verification and called on US to make “equivalent” compromises in + interest of reaching agreement. At best it can be said that within the + narrow limit imposed by the Soviet objection of principle to any form of + independent on-site inspection, Soviets appear to have made a modest + effort to meet some US concerns. What + possibilities for compromise, if any, are inherent in basic provision + no. 20 remain to be seen, but given the past history of the Soviet + position on this issue, it is clear that verification is likely to be + the principal obstacle to agreement.

+

12. Entry into force. One unexpected and potentially troublesome feature + of the Soviet presentation is the stipulation in basic provision no. 23 + that a convention would enter into force “when a sufficiently wide + number of States participate in it, including permanent members of the Security Council”. It is + not clear from the Russian text whether this should be interpreted to + mean some members of the Security Council or all. If the latter, the + Soviets would have interjected a new precondition they have not + previously mentioned. At best, this could represent an effort to create + a bargaining chip which could be traded for US concessions. At worst, it would imply that the Soviets + have no real interest in reaching an agreement since its practical + effect would be to make a convention impossible. Given the generally + responsive character of the Soviet presentation, this seems unlikely. + However, no definitive judgment can be made until the Soviets have + provided the requested clarification. Although the Soviet Del provided answers to some of the + questions asked by the US side in the + fifth meeting, they did not offer an explanation of this point.

+

13. Confidence-building measures. Soviet presentation did not refer + directly to US proposals for + confidence-building measures to be undertaken between signature and + entry into force, except to stipulate that all States-parties should + declare their stocks simultaneously at an agreed date after entry into + force. However, in answer to a question from USDEL, Soviet Rep formally stated in final session that + it was unacceptable to the USSR to + undertake obligations before the entry into force of a convention.

+ + Vanden Heuvel + +
+ +
+ 74. Memorandum From the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament + Agency (Warnke) to the + President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)Source: Carter Library, National Security Council, + Institutional Files, Box 44, PRM–27 + [1]. Confidential. + Washington, September 8, 1977 + + SUBJECT + Report on Bilateral Consultations on a Chemical Weapons (CW) Ban (August 16–26) + +

We have recently concluded a further round of discussions with the + Soviets in Geneva on the question of a treaty prohibiting chemical weapons.See Document 73. The + major feature of the round was the presentation by the Soviet side of an + essentially complete response to a US + proposal that had been tabled during the July session setting forth key + elements of a multilateral treaty.

+

The atmosphere during the three CW rounds + this year has been consistently cordial and businesslike. The Soviets + have adopted our approach of drawing up “key elements” of a joint US–USSR + CW initiative as the basis for + discussion, rather than attempting to work on treaty language. Regarding + substance, the Soviets have moved closer to us on scope (types of + weapons and activities to be banned). They also have accepted the basic + idea of a Consultative Committee composed of all states party to the + agreement, although with a much more restricted mandate than we would + like.

+

A major area of disagreement is verification. The “working paper” the + Soviets passed to our delegation contains no provision for international + verification of the destruction of CW + stockpiles or the cessation of production of agents. We regard some form + of international inspection as vital, especially regarding the + destruction of stocks.

+

Another troublesome aspect of the Soviet position is that they have + included a condition that permanent Security Council members ratify the + treaty as a prerequisite for its entry into force. This is the first + time in seven years that such a provision, obviously aimed at the PRC, has been included in a Soviet + proposal related to CW. It parallels + their current position on entry into force of a Comprehensive Test + Ban.

+

The Soviets have also proposed that declaration of stocks take place at + some agreed time after the treaty enters into force. This proposal is in + contrast to our position that stocks should be declared when states + become parties and that destruction be internationally observed. The + Soviet formula would, if they so chose, permit them to state—at the time + when declaration of CW stocks was + required—that the USSR had no CW stockpile and therefore was in + compliance with that aspect of the treaty, the implication being that + they had disposed of whatever stocks they may have had between the time + of entry into force and the time of their declaration. There would be no + effective means of verifying such a declaration by the Soviets.

+

Somewhat less troublesome elements in the Soviet proposal include the + authorized use of lethal agents in military field exercises (further + complicating verification difficulties), conversion to peaceful uses + (rather than dismantling as we have proposed) of military CW production facilities, and extension of + the scope to cover riot control agents.

+ +

Obviously, verification will be the critical issue to be dealt with when + negotiations resume. Current Soviet formulations make reference to the + possibility, on a voluntary basis, of some form of on-site investigation + (again, analogous to their CTB + posture), but I anticipate that hard and possibly protracted bargaining + will be required to reach a satisfactory outcome on verification. We + expect that the next round of talks, which is scheduled to begin + September 26 in Geneva, will last for several weeks and will give us a + better reading of the extent of Soviet flexibility.

+ + Paul C. + Warnke + +
+ +
+ 75. Letter From Secretary of State Vance to Secretary of Defense BrownSource: Washington National Records + Center, OSD Files: FRC 330–80–0017, Box 45, 370.64 CBR + (Aug–Dec) 1977. Secret. The memorandum is stamped “SEC DEF HAS + SEEN.” In the upper right-hand corner, Brown wrote “10/25. Dave + McG—I believe that to get Congressional support for production we + must first make a real try at a verifiable CW ban. To that end I lean toward the CV view. HB.” + Washington, October + 23, 1977 + + Dear Harold: + +

I recently reviewed Congressional action on the FY 78 Defense budget and noted that funds were again + included for the R&D of binary + chemical munitions. I also understand that plans exist for requesting + funds for a production facility. I am concerned that we do not hinder + our efforts to work out a CW ban with + the Soviets by seeking a binary production capability.

+

The Presidential guidance contained in PD–15 concerning the direction of our CW limitation proposals is quite clear. We are striving for + the prohibition of not only the production and stockpiling of CW munitions, but their development as + well. In addition, the President has directed that our CW forces be maintained without + improvement.

+

I recognize the need to maintain binary munition technology as a hedge + against the possible failure of our efforts to obtain a CW ban. Thus, I currently support a limited + R&D program. At the same time, I + believe that pilot production of binary munitions should not be planned + at this time.

+ +

I believe that if we were to forego plans for production we will have + achieved a significant psychological advantage over the Soviets. This + would force them into the position of having to respond to a US initiative by taking a positive step + toward reducing their own CW program. + Additionally, such restraint would serve to demonstrate our sincere + intent to limit offensive weapons thereby improving the overall climate + for our arms control efforts. By maintaining our R&D program while curtailing production we would retain + a certain amount of leverage at the negotiating table. To forego for now + production of binary munitions seems a small price to pay for the + potential gains that might accrue from such action.

+

While I oppose the production of offensive binary weapons, I support the + enhancement of our CW defensive measures + and the limited R&D necessary for + these programs.

+

Sincerely,Vance signed the memorandum “Cy.”

+
+ +
+ 76. Telegram From the Mission in Geneva to the Department of + StateSource: National + Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign + Policy File, D77039–0960. Confidential. Sent for information to + Athens, Bonn, Brussels, Canberra, Copenhagen, London, Moscow, Oslo, + Ottawa, Rome, The Hague, Tokyo, Wellington, USNATO, and USUN. The United States and the + Soviet Union held ten meetings on chemical weapons between September + 26 and October 21. A record of these meetings is contained in + telegrams 8239, September 27, 8375 and 8400, October 3, 8461, + October 5, 8607, October 11, 8637, October 12, 8823 and 8825, + October 17, 8930, October 19, and 9121, October 24, all from the + Mission at Geneva; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770352–0102, + D770359–1142, D770360–0444, D770363–0202, D770370–0599, + D770371–0707, D770380–1262, D770380–1372, D770384–0415, and + D770391–0110 respectively. + Geneva, October 28, 1977, 1324Z +

9346. Subject: Briefing of Allies on US–USSR Arms Control + Working Groups on Chemical Weapons and Radiological Weapons. Ref: Geneva + 9130This October 25 telegram from the + Mission at Geneva informed USNATO about the state of discussions between the + United States and the Soviet Union on radiological weapons. + (National Archives, RG 59, Central + Foreign Policy File, D770391–0585) (Notal).

+ +

1. Summary: On October 25 and 26 US Reps + briefed allies in Geneva on present rounds of US–USSR negotiations on + chemical weapons and on radiological weapons. End summary.

+

2. On October 26, Ambassador Fisher (head of USDEL) briefed CCD western group (FRG, + Italy, the Netherland, Canada; no reps from UK and Japan were present) on present round of US–USSR + negotiations on chemical weapons (CW) + and on radiological weapons (RW).

+

3. Fisher presented points on + RW along lines of Reftel, stressing + that the Soviet proposal to include reduced blast/enhanced radiation + weapons (the so-called neutron bomb) in the definition of radiological + weapons was unacceptable to the US side. + He said that other than the RB/ER weapon issue, which the Soviets had + introduced late in the game, the two sides were very close to an + agreement on an RW joint initiative. He + noted that no date had been set for the resumption of negotiations on + RW, but if after the UN disarmament debate it appears useful to + continue talks, it would be possible to do so in the margins of the + US–USSR negotiations on CW + when they resume on January 10.

+

4. With respect to the CW negotiations, + Fisher said that both sides + had made a full presentation of positions and that a drafting group had + been established and had started its work on a joint initiative for the + CCD.

+

5. On the scope of prohibition of a possible CW convention, Fisher said that the two sides were not far apart except + for three issues:

+

A. Irritants—the US side does not want to + include irritants used as riot control agents in the prohibition; the + Soviet side does.

+

B. Precursors—the US side would like to + have the convention apply to chemical substances extending back down the + production chain from the actual production of chemical agents; the + Soviet side would like to have the concept of precursors apply to + chemicals used in the final stage of production of chemical agents.

+

C. Carcinogens and teratogens—the Soviet side has proposed specifically + including chemicals causing cancer and birth defects in the treaty; the + US does not think such chemicals + would be suitable for chemical warfare purposes and would be covered by + the general purpose criterion without being specified.

+

6. Fisher said that the key + difference in the US and Soviet + positions is in the area of verification. Perhaps the toughest question + is the verification of the destruction of declared stocks of CW and of the disposition of declared + facilities. The US side is insisting + that there be mandatory on-site inspection; the Soviet side is + suggesting that there be inspection by national committees + (self-inspection).

+

7. Fisher noted that the Soviets + have accepted the concept of a consultative committee, but that they + have a problem with the committee requesting an inspection. The Soviet side has + insisted that any request for an on-site inspection come from a state + party. However, he said that the Soviets may not have any problem with + the consultative committee carrying out an inspection if a state + receiving a challenge invites it to do so.

+

8. Fisher said that the two sides + have not agreed to the final format of the joint initiative. The common + language being developed is not treaty language, but is not too far from + treaty language. With respect to entry into force, he noted that the + Soviets have apparently come off of their earlier position that all + permanent members would be required, by indicating that this issue would + present no problem once everything also is settled.

+

9. Fisher stressed the importance + of taking into account how a future CW + convention might impact on industry. He indicated the importance of + consulting with the chemical industry on the question at an early + date.

+

10. In response to a question about the trilateral (US, UK, + USSR) negotiations on a + comprehensive nuclear test ban (CTB), + Fisher said that he + understood that the issues regarding PNE’s, verification, and treaty versus moratorium still + remain to be resolved. He said that after the current round of CTB negotiations the US and UK + will probably be briefing the allies at NATO rather than in Geneva.

+

11. On October 25, alternate head of USDEL (Turrentine) gave similar + briefing to group of allies who are not members of the CCD (Denmark, Norway, Greece, Belgium, New + Zealand and Australia).

+ + Vanden Heuvel + +
+ +
+ + 77. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the United + NationsSource: National + Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign + Policy File, D770409–0684. Limited Official Use. Drafted by Arch + Turrentine (ACDA/MA/IR); cleared by David Macuk (IO/UNP), David + Carlson (PM/DCA), Edward Melanson (DOD/ISA), and Alan Neidle + (ACDA/MA); and approved by Robert Barry (IO). + Washington, November 5, 1977, 1731Z +

265333. Subject: 32nd UNGA: Resolution + on Chemical Weapons. Ref: USUN + 4183.The Canadian and Polish draft + resolution discussed in telegram 4183 from USUN, October 29, called for the “effective prohibition + of the development, production and stockpiling of all chemical + weapons” and urged all states to accede to the 1925 Geneva Protocol. + (National Archives, RG 59, Central + Foreign Policy File, D770398–0120) In telegram 4373 from USUN, November 5, the Mission + predicted that the resolution would be adopted by the UN General Assembly by November 14. + (National Archives, RG 59, Central + Foreign Policy File, D770407–1101)

+

1. US + Del is authorized to join consensus + adoption or vote for resolution on Chemical Weapons (CW) along the lines of revised + Canadian/Polish draft reported Reftel.

+

2. If explanation of vote is deemed necessary, Del may note the effort that the US and USSR have devoted + to developing a joint initiative on CW + and may indicate US commitment to + continuation of this effort. However, US + Del should avoid suggesting when joint + initiative may be completed.On December 12, + 1977, the United Nations General Assembly passed Resolution 32/77 + largely on the lines of the October 29 Canadian/Polish draft. For + the text of the Resolution, see Documents on + Disarmament, 1977, pp. 825–827.

+ + Christopher + +
+ +
+ + 78. Letter From Secretary of Defense Brown to Secretary VanceSource: Washington National Records Center, OSD Files: FRC 330–80–0017, Box 45, 370.64 CBR (Aug–Dec) 1977. + Secret. In a December 22 memorandum to Brown, Vance replied that he was “pleased + to know that no funds are programmed in the FY 79 defense budget for the production of binary + munitions.” (Ibid.) + Washington, November 22, 1977 + + Dear Cy: + +

I have read your letter of October 23, 1977,See Document 75. regarding chemical + munitions with great interest and share your concerns in the critical + area of chemical warfare (CW). As you + know, I have issued policy guidance to implement PD–15, which supports the current CW negotiations while preserving our potential ability to + produce our own binary chemical weapons if negotiations fail to show + progress.

+

First, let me assure you that there are no funds included in either the + FY 1978 or FY 1979 defense budget for facilities for production or + pre-production of binary chemical weapons. We have included some limited + research and development funding for binary weapons. The only plans that + we are developing for production are contingency plans of the sort we + have for any conceptual weapons system, not firm plans.

+

To place our CW program in perspective, I + want to emphasize that the major effort of our present programs is to + provide improvements in our protective posture, both in research and + development of new items and procurement of standard equipment. These + programs have been fully supported by Congress and I plan to continue + them. We would be pleased to provide you and your staff a complete + briefing on the programs and the DOD + assessment of the CW threat at your + convenience.

+

Even while we are negotiating a treaty to ban chemical warfare, the + threat of the use of chemical warfare against our forces remains great. + Several of our Unified Command commanders have recently communicated to + me personally their concern about the minimal nature of our protective + posture and about the need for improving our CW posture in line with the threat facing US forces and our Allies. Nevertheless, we + have already demonstrated considerable restraint in our own offensive + capability. I hope this will provide a favorable climate for + negotiations. Since 1973, we have unilaterally demilitarized more than + 7,000 tons of chemical agents and a large number of munitions. This + stockpile reduction, coupled with the fact that no chemical weapons have + been produced since 1969, should have already achieved the psychological + advantage you mentioned. Perhaps it will elicit a Soviet response to the + US initiative. However, our combined + intelligence analysis has + continued to show no abatement of the rather significantly expanded + Soviet activity in the chemical warfare field.

+

I do not feel it would be prudent to forego the necessary long-lead + planning required for the research, development, and pilot production of + binary munitions. We do plan to follow the guidance provided in PD–15, supporting to the fullest the + on-going negotiations, and preparing for a review and reassessment at + the beginning of the FY 1980 budget + cycle unless significant progress is made in Geneva prior to that + time.

+

Sincerely,Brown signed the + memorandum “Harold.”

+
+ +
+ 79. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission in + GenevaSource: National + Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign + Policy File, D780011–0663. Confidential; Priority. Drafted by Arch + Turrentine (ACDA/MA/IR); cleared by Les Denend (NSC), Alan Neidle (ACDA/MA), Adrian Fisher (ACDA/D), Alexander Akalovsky + (State), Avis Bohlen (EUR/SOV), Homer Phelps (PM/DCA), Robert + Weekley (OSD/ISA), [name not declassified], + Robert Mikulak (ACDA/MA), and Lawrence Finch (ACDA/MA); and approved + by Thomas Davies (ACDA/MA). Sent for information to USNATO, Moscow, London, Bonn, + Paris, and Tokyo. + Washington, January 7, 1978, 0044Z +

4353. Subject: US–USSR Chemical Weapons Negotiations, Round + Seven: Guidance for US Delegation. Ref: + State 153939.Telegram 153939, July 1, 1977, + contained guidance for round four of the U.S.-Soviet consultations + on chemical weapons limitations. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + D770236–0111)

+

State CW message no. 5

+

1. The seventh round of US–USSR bilateral negotiations of a joint + initiative dealing with a prohibition on chemical weapons (CW) is scheduled to start on January 10, + 1978, in Geneva. The US objective in + these bilateral negotiations is to reach agreement with the Soviet Union + on a common approach to an adequately verifiable prohibition of chemical + weapons, which will enhance the security of the US and its allies. Once all the key elements (along lines + presented during round four) are agreed, a joint initiative on CW would be presented to the CCD for elaboration into the actual + convention. While it would be desirable to complete work on the joint initiative at an early date (if + at all possible prior to the UN Special + Session on Disarmament (SSOD) + scheduled for May/June 1978), we do not wish to set a deadline for + completion of our bilateral negotiations. It is not clear how long it + may take to resolve the differences between the US and Soviet positions on several important issues, in + particular verification. While we are not unmindful of the potential + political benefits which we and the Soviets would share if the joint + initiative were completed by the time of the SSOD, our primary interest is in establishing the basis for + an effective CW convention which will + attract broad support and contribute to international security.

+

2. The Delegation should coordinate with the Soviet side the text of a + press release, along the lines of previous releases, announcing the + opening of the bilateral negotiations. Also, at the end of round seven, + the Delegation should coordinate a joint press communiqué with the + Soviet side on the results of the round.

+

3. Detailed guidance for this round is contained in the cleared position + paper for round four as supplemented and amended in the cleared position + papers for rounds five, six and seven.None + of the position papers were found. In addition, the + Delegation may draw upon other interagency-approved documents, including + those cited Reftel.

+

4. During round seven, the Delegation should continue to work with the + Soviet side in drafting, on an ad referendum basis, language for the + joint initiative in the form of agreed key elements which constitute the + main provisions of a future convention in treaty-like language. + Delegation should explore further the possibility of presenting + supplementary provisions in a separate joint working paper that would be + submitted to the CCD with the joint + initiative.

+

5. Given the interest of the CCD members + in starting multilateral negotiations on a CW convention during the 1978 spring session (beginning + January 31), Delegation should emphasize the diligence with which the + US is pursuing the CW initiative with the USSR. Delegation, therefore, should brief + allies (both CCD members and + non-members in Geneva who follow arms control issues), in general terms, + on the progress being made in the bilateral negotiations, but should + avoid specifying eventual format or exact timing of CCD submission of the joint + initiative.

+

6. It is likely that round seven will continue after the CCD session starts. If the negotiations + reach a point where there seems to be little prospect for further + progress without additional review in capitals or reach a deadlock on + one or more critical issues, the Delegation may propose that designated members, as appropriate, + return to capitals for consultations. Delegation should brief allied + reps in Geneva during course of round seven. In addition, consultations + with the UK, FRG and France should be offered in London, Bonn and/or + Paris as appropriate.U.S. representatives + spoke with the British, French, and West Germans on February 3 in + London. (Telegram 1775 from the Mission at Geneva, February 6; + National Archives, RG 59, Central + Foreign Policy File, D780055–0991)

+ + Christopher + +
+ +
+ 80. Telegram From the Mission in Geneva to the Department of + StateSource: National + Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign + Policy File, D780037–0338. Confidential; Priority. Sent for + information to Moscow. Fisher + had already informed the NATO + allies that “the two sides were no closer to agreement than they had + been at the end of round six and that the Soviet Del had, in fact, ‘regressed’ on some + points.” (Telegram 824 from the Mission in Geneva, January 19; + D780029–0099) + Geneva, January 25, 1978, 1329Z +

1092. CW message no. 13. Subject: US–USSR + Negotiations on Chemical Weapons, Round Seven: Fifth Plenary Meeting, + January 20, 1978. Ref.: Geneva 1081.Telegram + 1081 from the Mission in Geneva, January 25, described the fourth + plenary meeting between the United States and Soviet Union that + occurred on January 17. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + D780037–0196)

+

1. Summary: At fifth plenary, January 20, US + Del made strong statement questioning + regressions in Soviet position in the areas of scope and verification. + US + Del also challenged Soviet side for + using language which US side had + repeatedly said was unclear (e.g., “including governments of states + permanent members of the security council”) without providing sufficient + explanation. Del also stated that + US willingness to study and discuss + new Soviet draft conventionThe new Soviet + draft language is contained in Geneva Telegram 1031, January 24; + National Archives, RG 59, Central + Foreign Policy File, D780035–0723. was no indication of a + change in US position that joint + initiative should be in form of agreed key elements rather than complete + draft convention. Soviet Del deferred + comment on substance of US statement, + but questioned US “reproach” of Soviet + Del for not adequately reflecting, + in Soviet presentations of + January 16 and 17,The Soviets were referring + to the third and fourth plenary meetings. The third meeting held on + January 16 is described in Telegram 681 from the Mission in Geneva, + January 17; National Archives, RG + 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780025–0186. The fourth meeting is + referenced in footnote 2. changes + in US position presented January + 12.The Soviets were referring to the + second plenary meeting, which was held on January 12 and described + in Telegram 581 from the Mission in Geneva, January 16; National + Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign + Policy File, D780035–0723. Brief reports on progress in + drafting group were presented by alternate reps of both Dels. End + summary.

+

2. The fifth plenary meeting of the US–USSR negotiations on + Chemical Weapons (CW) was held afternoon + January 20 at Soviet mission.

+

3. Ambassador V.I. Likhatchev (head of Soviet Del) asked for report from drafting group. A.R. Turrentine + (alt. head of US + Del) reported that the drafting group + had met three times and that discussions had centered on scope, + particularly the issues of irritants and important precursors. Actual + drafting on ad referendum agreed language, he said, had not yet begun + this round, but he thought drafting group might be ready to begin + working on ad referendum language in area of scope once both sides had + completed discussions of remaining questions. B.P. Krassulin (alt. head + of Soviet Del) characterized atmosphere + of drafting group meetings as businesslike and said that extensive + exchange of views on the question of scope proved that differences in + approach still remained. He added that Soviet Del believed that drafting group should conclude + question/answer stage of its work as soon as possible and get down to + the business of “formulating the provisions of the future convention,” + beginning with the section on scope.

+

4. Ambassador A.S. Fisher (head of + US + Del) said that in studying the January + 17 Soviet draft convention, US + Del had noted language which had been + initial Soviet proposal in round six. Pointing out that different + language had been agreed to ad referendum in drafting group, Fisher questioned whether ad referendum + agreed language still stood or had been superseded by language contained + in Soviet draft convention. He said, in US view, US–USSR understanding on ad referendum + agreed language remained in force. He added that US willingness to study and discuss Soviet draft convention + should not be understood to imply any change in US position that joint initiative should be presented to + the CCD in the form of agreed key + elements. Likhatchev stated that “without prejudice to our position as + to the form of the joint initiative,” the previously arranged agreement + for conduct of the drafting group (i.e., drafting ad referendum agreed + language) remained in force.

+ +

5. Fisher presented extensive + statement questioning Soviet Del on + round seven positions which appeared, to US + Del, to be regressions from Soviet end + of round six positions. Salient points of US presentation contained paras 6 thru 8 below. Fisher noted particularly the areas of + scope and verification. Before concluding age had been included again + without clarification. If the Soviet Del was proposing that the convention require adherence of + all permanent members of the security council, he stated, “we can expect + postponement of the fruits of our work for a considerable period of + time—perhaps indefinitely.” Soviet Del + did not offer clarification of this point during meeting. Fisher also reiterated US view that there should be exchanges of + general information on stockpiles, at signature. These would not need to + be provided for in the treaty, but could be arranged on a bilateral + basis. He stressed the fact that such an exchange between the US and USSR would be a prerequisite, in his view, for US to obtain ratification of the + convention.

+

6. Scope—Fisher stated that the + US side had believed that both Dels + had agreed in round six that quantities of otherwise prohibited + chemicals to be produced or diverted for nonhostile purposes should be + limited under the convention and that equipment for troop training in + chemical defense would be such as to preclude any possibility of + offensive chemical warfare training. Now, however, it appeared that the + Soviet Del was advocating complete + freedom for parties to determine unilaterally means of chemical warfare + to be retained. He stated that, in the US view, a convention based on such an approach would not + be viable.

+

7. Verification—Fisher stated that + he believed the US was in basic + agreement with the principles of verification put forward by the Soviet + Del during the fourth plenary (see + para 7, Ref A), but added that the + Soviet draft convention seemed to emphasize the second principle + (non-interference) at the cost of the first (verification must assure + compliance). He pointed out that the US + was prepared to agree that a request for challenge inspection should + come only from a state party and that a challenged party would have the + right to refuse a request for on-site verification, although it would be + obligated to make a reasonable effort to resolve the doubts that led to + the challenge. He stressed that this should be a legal obligation + provided for in the convention, not merely a matter of political + expediency. Fisher also stated + that the US placed great importance on + required verification, under international auspices, of stockpile + destruction and disposition of facilities. He asked how the US-proposed verification scheme + (international inspection, agreed to in advance in the convention, of + stockpile destruction and disposition of facilities, with each state + party declaring where and when they are to be destroyed) could possibly + contravene the second verification principle (para 7, Ref A). Fisher pointed out that the US approach on + this issue was similar to the on-site inspection provisions of the + PNE Treaty.

+

8. Fisher said that the revised + Soviet position on declaration/disposition of facilities compounded the + difficulties of verification in providing that only facilities designed + or used exclusively for prohibited production would be subject to + elimination or dismantling; the US side + viewed this position as creating a loophole and as contrary to the + mutually agreed purpose of the convention. Furthermore, he pointed out, + the Soviet-proposed arrangements where only the chemical warfare + capability of a facility would be disposed of, would require extensive + on-site verification while total elimination of prohibited facilities, + which the US proposed, would not. He + continued his criticism of the Soviet verification proposals by stating + that omission of the super-toxic toxicity threshold from the Soviet + draft convention seemed to be inconsistent with the Soviet “expressed + wish” to avoid “maximizing verification”. He pointed out that this + threshold simplified many verification procedures by coupling the degree + of verification with the relative importance of the activity; and said + that the US, in providing for such a + threshold, had sought to isolate that area requiring particular + attention with respect to verification and, thereby, avoid unnecessary, + extensive verification procedures for areas of lesser importance.

+

9. Likhatchev said that he would defer commenting on substance of US statement until Soviet Del had studied its content. However, he + noted that it seemed to him that most of the questions raised by the + US + Del had already been answered by the + Soviet Del in the course of its earlier + presentations. He took exception to what he characterized as a US “reproach” for not reflecting revised + US positions in Soviet presentations + on January 16 and 17, confirming US + Del view that Soviet statements had + been prepared in Moscow prior to beginning of round seven. Fisher responded that he had not + intended his remarks be taken as a “reproach”, “question? Yes. + Criticism? Perhaps. But, reproach? Never”. Likhatchev concluded his + remarks by calling for prompt conclusion of question/answer sessions and + initiation of actual drafting, specifically in the area of scope.

+

10. The next plenary meeting will be afternoon of January 25. Next + meeting of the drafting group will be held afternoon of January 24.

+ + Vanden Heuvel + +
+ +
+ + 81. Presidential Directive/NSC–28Source: + Carter Library, National Security Council, Institutional Files, Box + 19, PD–28. Secret. Carter wrote at the top “ok + J.C.” + Washington, January + 25, 1978 + + TO + The Vice President + The Secretary of State + The Secretary of Defense + The Director, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency + The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff + The Director of Central Intelligence + The Director, Office of Science and Technology Policy + The Director, Federal Preparedness Agency + + + SUBJECT + United States Policy on Chemical Warfare Program and + Bacteriological/Biological Research Program (C) + +

Following consideration by the National Security Council, the President + has decided that:

+

1. The term Chemical and Biological Warfare (CBW) will no longer be used. The reference should be to the + two categories separately—The Chemical Warfare Program and The + Biological Research Program. (U)

+

2. With respect to Chemical Warfare:

+

a. The primary United States objective will be to negotiate a + comprehensive treaty to ban chemical weapons. U.S. policy on these + negotiations is contained in PD–15.See Document + 70. The objective of the U.S. Chemical Warfare Program + will be to deter the use of chemical weapons by other nations and to + provide a retaliatory capability if deterrence fails. (C)

+

b. The renunciation of the first use of lethal chemical weapons in + accordance with the Geneva Protocol of 1925 is reaffirmed. (U)

+

c. This renunciation is also applied to incapacitating chemical weapons. + (U)

+

d. This renunciation does not apply to the use of riot control agents or + herbicides. Executive Order 11850 provides guidance on authorized + uses.In this April 8, 1975 Executive + Order, President Gerald Ford + renounced “in certain uses in war of chemical herbicides and riot + control agents.” + (http:://www.archives.gov/federal-register/executive-orders/1975.html) + (U)

+

e. Existing overseas stockpiles of chemical weapons can be maintained + without additional consultations. If the matter is raised by the FRG, we will agree to consultations about + the future of stockpiles located in Germany. (S)

+ +

f. The Secretary of Defense shall continue to develop and improve + controls and safety measures in all chemical warfare programs. (C)

+

g. The Director of Central Intelligence shall continue to maintain + surveillance of the chemical warfare capabilities of other states. + (S)

+

h. An Ad Hoc Committee chaired by the NSC shall conduct a periodic review of United States + chemical warfare programs and public information policy, and will make + recommendations to the President. (C)

+

3. With respect to Biological Research:

+

a. The United States renounced the use of all methods of + bacteriological/biological and toxin warfare in accordance with the + terms of the Biological Weapons Convention.The draft text of the Biological Weapons Convention is available in + Department of State Bulletin, November 1, + 1971, pp. 508–511. The United States, the United Kingdom, and the + Soviet Union signed the Convention on April 10, 1972, and it entered + into force on March 26, 1975. (U)

+

b. The United States has destroyed all stockpiles of + bacteriological/biological and toxin materials and associated weapons + systems. (U)

+

c. The United States bacteriological/biological programs will be + consistent with the provisions of the Biological Weapons Convention. + (U)

+

d. The Secretary of Defense shall continue to develop controls and safety + measures in all defensive biological research programs. (C)

+

e. The Director of Central Intelligence shall continue to maintain + surveillance of the bacteriological/biological warfare capabilities of + other states. (S)

+

f. An Ad Hoc Committee chaired by the NSC shall conduct a periodic review of United States + biological research programs and public information on policy, and will + make recommendations to the President. (C)

+

NSDM 35National Security Decision Memorandum 35, “United States Policy on + Chemical Warfare Program and Bacteriological Research Program,” + November 25, 1969, is printed in Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, vol. + E–2, Documents on Arms Control and Non-proliferation, 1969–1972, + Document 165. is hereby rescinded.

+ + Zbigniew + Brzezinski + +
+ +
+ + 82. Telegram From the Mission in Geneva to the Department of + StateSource: National + Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign + Policy File, D780071–0895. Confidential; Priority. Sent for + information to Moscow, USNATO, + London, Paris, and Bonn. + Geneva, February 16, 1978, 1340Z +

2411. CW message no. 31. Subject: US–USSR + Chemical Weapons Negotiations, Seventh Round: Summary of Developments to + Date.

+

1. Summary: As of February 13, the activity level of the seventh round of + the US–USSR Chemical Weapons negotiations was reduced so experts + would return to capitals for consultations. So far the round has been + devoted to detailed exploration of the positions of the two sides. No + further drafting has been undertaken so far. While the Soviets have + moved closer to the U.S. position on some points, they have moved away + in several areas which we previously believed were close to being + resolved. All in all, only modest progress has been made in this round + in resolving major issues. The tone of the meetings, however, continues + to be workmanlike. End summary.

+

2. The seventh round of US–USSR Chemical Weapons negotiations began + 10 January 1978. Eleven plenary and seven drafting group meetings have + been held to date. As of 13 February 1978 the activity level was reduced + so experts could return to capitals for consultations. Meetings of both + the plenary and drafting groups will continue in the interim. (The + period of reduced activity was requested by the Soviets, who indicated + that they had “run out of material.” Judging from the comments of the + Soviet experts, the Soviet Delegation had not expected the round to run + past the end of January.) The seventh round is expected to resume on 29 + March.

+

3. So far the round has been devoted to exploration of the positions of + the two sides. No drafting has yet been undertaken.

+

A. At the beginning of the round the Soviets presented a “supplemented” + draft convention containing twenty-four articles and two annexes. In + effect, this represents an expansion of their previous articles on key + issues into a fully elaborated draft convention.

+

B. At the outset the U.S. Del put forth + detailed proposals for dealing with “important” precursors, “important” + lethal and other highly toxic chemicals, and riot control chemicals. In + addition, it presented the revised U.S. position on challenge inspection + (i.e., to be requested by a state party rather than by the consultative + committee).

+ +

C. The drafting group sessions have been devoted to extensive + question-and-answer exchanges, as each side attempted to clarify the + details of the others position. (In several cases, the Soviets have not + yet been able to respond to questions about their own proposals or the + acceptability of U.S. suggestions.)

+

4. Generally speaking, during this round there has been relatively little + movement toward resolving key issues.

+

A. On the positive side, the Soviets:

+

(1) Have dropped some terms the U.S. had objected to (e.g., + single-purpose, dual-purpose, teratogen, carcinogen), but have retained + others (e.g., chemical agent);

+

(2) Have agreed to put precursors under the general purpose criterion and + have accepted, in principle, the U.S. proposal for a list of “important” + precursors to serve as a focus for verification efforts;

+

(3) May be close to agreeing to accommodate the U.S. interest in + protecting the uses of riot control chemicals specified in Executive + Order 11850;See footnote 3, Document 81.

+

(4) Are apparently willing to specify in the convention the rights and + functions of verification personnel carrying out a challenge on-site + inspection;

+

(5) Have agreed to several other points proposed by the U.S. (e.g., + declarations in connection with destruction activities; inclusion of + toxic chemicals of biological origin; prohibition of new production + facilities; declaration of types and quantities of highly toxic + commercial chemicals produced but they also take the position that each + party will determine the form and content of its own declarations.)

+

B. On the negative side, the Soviets:

+

(1) Have dropped the toxicity threshold separating super-toxic lethal + chemicals from other chemicals. This greatly complicates our effort to + apply more stringent verification arrangements to super-toxic chemicals + (e.g., nerve gas) than to less toxic commercial chemicals (e.g., + hydrogen cyanide, phosgene);

+

(2) Have put forward positions which are not acceptable to the U.S. in + several areas where we previously believed the two sides were fairly + close:

+

—Quantities of otherwise prohibited chemicals to be produced or diverted + for nonhostile military purposes. We had believed that both sides agreed + that a limit should be specified. Now the Soviets would allow each state + party to produce whatever it determines it needs.

+ +

—Retention of chemical munitions. We had believed that both sides agreed + that equipment to be used for protective training should not be suitable + for offensive purposes. The Soviets now would allow the retention, in + quantities to be determined by each state itself, of chemical munitions + for protective training.

+

—Declaration of facilities for production of the means of chemical + warfare. We had believed that both sides shared the view that present + and former facilities would be declared. The Soviets now would declare + only existing “capabilities,” (i.e., ability to produce), and reject + declaration of individual facilities.

+

5. The tone of both the plenary and drafting group meetings has continued + to be friendly and workmanlike.

+ + Vanden Heuvel + +
+ +
+ 83. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission in + GenevaSource: National + Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign + Policy File, D780131–0619. Confidential; Priority. Sent for + information to Moscow, London, Bonn, and Paris. Drafted by Robert + Mikulak (ACDA/MA); cleared by Les Denend (NSC), Robert Weekley (DOD), John Kokolas (CIA), and Margot Mazeau (ACDA); and approved by Thomas Davies + (ACDA/MA). + Washington, March 24, 1978, 2248Z +

77166. Subject: US–USSR Chemical Weapons Negotiations, + Seventh Round: Supplementary Guidance. Ref: (A) State 4353See Document 79. (B) + Geneva 2410.This February 16 telegram from + the Mission in Geneva summarized the major issues the United States + and Soviets would discuss during the seventh round of chemical + weapons negotiations. These included: whether or not to exclude + irritants or riot control agents from an agreement, verification + provisions for “super-toxic” chemicals, which types of chemical + weapons could be retained by the two nations, whether or not either + nation could conduct “challenge inspections” should one believe the + other had not complied with an agreement, a declaration by both + sides of their current stocks of weapons and their production + facilities, and international on-site verification, which the U.S. + considered “the key unresolved issue.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + D780071–0902)

+

State CW message—

+

1. This message provides general guidance for continuance of round seven + discussions following return of experts to Geneva. This guidance supplements that provided + earlier (Ref A). Detailed responses to questions posed Ref A are being + provided separately.

+

2. Del should seek to isolate those + issues which resist resolution at Delegation level and thus may need to + be addressed by senior officials on both sides. To permit such a + judgment to be made, the Delegation should seek to focus bilateral + efforts on resolving issues in the areas listed below, giving particular + attention to verification. Specific issues and detailed U.S. views are + presented in the approved guidance papers.

+

A. Irritants and riot control chemicals;

+

B. Provisions for super-toxic chemicals;

+

C. Type and quantity of chemicals and delivery devices which can be + retained;

+

D. Challenge inspection-related questions:

+

(1) Rights and functions of personnel carrying out challenge on-site + inspection,

+

(2) Obligation to provide a full explanation if a request for challenge + inspection is refused,

+

E. Declaration of stocks and facilities,

+

(1) General declaration of stocks prior to entry-into-force of the + convention,

+

(2) Declaration of facilities,

+

F. Required international on-site verification;

+

G. Extent of use of toxic chemicals in field training exercises.

+

3. In context of discussion of negotiation and implementation of any + multilateral chemical weapons convention, the Delegation should assure + Soviets that U.S. considers it important for the U.S. and USSR to work in close cooperation on a + bilateral basis both before and after the convention comes into force. + The Delegation should indicate that U.S. will present some ideas at a + later stage—but would also welcome Soviets suggestions on the best + mechanism for such bilateral cooperation and consultation.

+

4. Delegation should continue to brief allied reps in Geneva during + course of negotiations. In addition, consultations with the UK, FRG + and France should be offered in London, Bonn and/or Paris as + appropriate.

+

5. We believe that period between round seven and round eight should be + long enough for thorough review in capitals of status of negotiations. + Due to participation of some US + Del members in SSOD, it would not be practical to resume + during SSOD. Del may tentatively agree on late July date for beginning + round eight. Date should be subject to confirmation through diplomatic + channels in mid-June.

+ +

6. Telegram State 71817 should be counted as State CW Message 19 (not repeat not 36).In telegram 71817 to Geneva, March 20, the + Department authorized the Mission in Geneva to agree to reactivate + the chemical warfare talks on March 25. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + D780123–0662)

+ + Vance + +
+ +
+ 84. Telegram From the Mission in Geneva to the Department of + StateSource: National + Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign + Policy File, D780182–0373. Confidential; Priority. Sent for + information to Moscow. + Washington, April 28, 1978, 1443Z +

6458. Subject: US–USSR Chemical Weapons Negotiations, Round + Seven: Summary of Developments Between Feb. 13 and April 26, 1978. Ref: + Geneva 2411See Document + 82. (CW Message No. + 31).

+

CW Message No. 49

+

1. The final meeting of the seventh round of the US–USSR Chemical Weapons + negotiations was held April 26, 1978. For tactical reasons, the official + concluding date will be set to coincide with the end in early May of the + spring session of the conference of the committee on disarmament. The + negotiations, which began January 10, were relatively inactive between + February 13 and March 31 while experts on both sides were in capitals + for consultations. (Developments between January 10 (beginning of round) + and February 13, 1978, are summarized Reftel.) After the experts’ + return, the meetings were devoted to further presentation and + exploration of positions. No drafting was undertaken.

+

2. The US Delegation put forward detailed + views on treatment of irritants, procedures for challenge inspection, + rights and functions of inspectors and the host party in connection with + challenge inspections, quantities of toxic chemicals permitted for + protective purposes, and the preparatory commission.

+

3. The Soviet Delegation responded to US + presentations made during the first half of the round, but did not + engage in extensive question-and-answer exchanges about recent US presentations. Generally speaking, they also did not + commit themselves on details in areas where agreement in principle has + been reached.

+

4. While there was progress on some secondary issues, there was little + progress in resolving the central outstanding issues, i.e., those + relating to on-site verification.The Mission + in Geneva reported on April 19 that Likhatchev said that he had + “always held that a refusal for an on-site inspection would not + affect the effectiveness of the convention if such a refusal were + accompanied by a convincing explanation as to why the request was + deemed unfounded.” The Acting Head of the U.S. Delegation, Alexander + Akalovsky, “noted with regret the absence of any Soviet movement on + the issue of required on-site verification, to which the US attaches great importance.” + (Telegram 5940 from the Mission in Geneva, April 19; National + Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign + Policy File, D780168–0137)

+

A. On the positive side, the Soviets:

+

(1) Have agreed to accommodate the US + interest in protecting the uses of riot control chemicals in defensive + military modes;

+

(2) Have agreed in principle that provisions for supertoxic chemicals + should be different from those for less toxic chemicals;

+

(3) Have agreed in principle to establish a ceiling on the quantities of + super-toxic chemicals allowed for protective purposes;

+

(4) Have accepted the US proposal on + timing of declaration of stocks (i.e., within 30 days after entry into + force);

+

(5) Are willing to accept a provision that a party which refuses a + request must provide a detailed explanation;

+

(6) Indicated they are willing to discuss (at a later stage) the US proposal for a bilateral exchange of + general information on stocks; and

+

(7) Stated they are studying US proposals + on destruction of stocks.

+

B. On the negative side, the Soviets:

+

(1) Have not responded to US requests for + clarification of their position on declaration of “capabilities” or on + retention of munitions;

+

(2) Continue to reject the US proposals + regarding declaration and destruction of CW production and filling facilities, as well as on-site + verification at such facilities, without presenting any suggestions for + a compromise;

+

(3) Continue to reject the US proposal + that super-toxic chemicals be prohibited for hostile military purposes + not related to chemical warfare; and

+

(4) Insist that the important issues be settled in principle before + details are discussed in areas where agreement in principle has already + been reached.

+ +

5. The tone of both the plenary and drafting group meetings continued to + be friendly and workmanlike.

+ + Vanden Heuvel + +
+ +
+ 85. Intelligence Assessment Prepared in the Central Intelligence + AgencySource: Carter + Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 12, Chemical + Weapons, 5/78–11/80. Secret; Noforn. + Washington, May + 1978 + + + SI 78–10044 + + +

Soviet Civil Defense Against Chemical and Biological + Warfare (OUO)

+

Key Judgments

+

The USSR has an extensive biological + and chemical warfare civil defense program. The effectiveness of the + program, however, is limited by the present lack of sufficient resources + such as shelters and protective equipment. Preparations for defense + against biological and chemical warfare are similar in some respects to + those for defense against nuclear weapons and Soviet civil defense + preparations against chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons have been + and continue to be integrated.

+

Most of the Soviet civil defense shelters appear to provide adequate + protection against the effects of biological and chemical weapons. The + standard-type shelters are equipped with ventilation-filtration systems + that include filters specifically designed to remove chemical and + biological contaminants. Currently about 10 to 20 percent of the urban + population can be accommodated in these shelters and accommodations for + 15 to 30 percent are to be built by 1985.

+

Compulsory civil defense training in general is not taken seriously by + the population. Nevertheless, those portions of the program dealing with + chemical and biological weapons will generate at a minimum increased + public awareness of the effects of such weapons and appropriate + defensive measures.

+

Soviet concern with civil defense against biological and chemical weapons + continues even after a biological warfare treaty has been signed and + talks on limiting chemical weapons are under way.

+ +

[Omitted here is the table of contents and the body of the + assessment.]

+
+ +
+ 86. Presidential Review Memorandum/NSC–37Source: + Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, + Box 12, Chemical Weapons, 5/78–11/80. Secret. + Washington, June + 16, 1978 + + TO + The Vice President + The Secretary of State + The Secretary of Defense + + + ALSO + The Director, Office of Management and Budget + The Director, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency + The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff + The Director of Central Intelligence + + + SUBJECT + Chemical Weapons (U) + +

The President has directed that the Special Coordination Committee + undertake a review of the United States chemical weapons (CW) posture incorporating information + acquired over the past year and covering the following:

+

1. An update on the CW threat, U.S. + protective posture and U.S. retaliatory capability.

+

2. An assessment of the current bilateral negotiations with the USSR aimed at the preparation of a joint + CW initiative for presentation to + the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament (CCD) including:

+

—Key elements on which some degree of agreement has been reached with the + USSR.

+

—Key elements on which agreement has not been reached, and possible + approaches for resolution.

+

—Prospects for agreement on a joint initiative consistent with the + current U.S. negotiating instructions.

+

—Consideration of extent of implementation of past decrease regarding + U.S. CW stocks.

+ +

3. In light of the assessment per Paragraph 2, a review of the PD–15 decisionSee Document 70. “that U.S. + chemical warfare forces be maintained without force improvement” + including a discussion of possible steps to modernize or restructure the + U.S. CW posture.

+

The review should be completed by July 14, 1978.

+ + Zbigniew + Brzezinski + +
+ +
+ 87. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United + KingdomSource: National + Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign + Policy File, D780331–1199. Confidential. Sent for information to the + Mission in Geneva, Bonn, Paris, and USNATO. Drafted by Robert Mikulak (ACDA/MA/AT); cleared + by Roger Booth (ACDA/MA/AT), Robert Strand (ACDA/MA/IR), David + Carlson (PM/DCA), Dufour Woolfley (EUR/NE), Susan Klingaman + (EUR/CE), Edgar Beigel (EUR/WE), Sheila Buckley (DOD), [name not + declassified], and [name not + declassified]; and approved by Thomas Davies + (ACDA/MA). + Washington, August 14, 1978, 1515Z +

204929. Subject: Chemical Weapons Consultations With Allies: Guidance. + Ref: (A) London 12331In telegram 12331 from + London, August 3, the Embassy informed the Department of State that + the UK Foreign and Commonwealth + Office had agreed to host a meeting on chemical weapons negotiations + between U.S., UK, French, and West + German experts on August 16. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + D780318–0118) (B) State 198190.In + telegram 198190 to London, August 5, the Department of State + informed the Embassy that “it would be desirable for US and UK experts to consult briefly, prior to the + quadrilateral meeting,” on “questions of particular US–UK + interest.” (National Archives, RG + 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780321–0203)

+

1. This telegram provides guidance for the US Delegation during the bilateral Chemical Weapons + consultations with the UK to be held in + London on August 15 and quadrilateral CW + consultations with the UK, FRG and France to be held in London on + August 16.

+

2. In the August 15 bilateral consultations with the UK, the US + Delegation should:

+

(A) Attempt to clarify the British position on declaration and + disposition of UK Chemical Weapons + production and filling facilities;

+ +

(B) Discuss the desirability and feasibility of further quadrilateral + consultations later this year for the purpose of discussing the + declaration of stocks under the CW + convention and estimates of the Soviet/Warsaw pact Chemical Weapons + stockpile. In our view such consultations would involve political, + military and intelligence representatives. No more than two days would + be necessary. US preferences regarding + exact timing of these quadrilateral consultations cannot be expressed at + this time, but will be made known in near future.

+

3. In the quadrilateral consultations on August 16, the Delegation + should:

+

(A) Explore possible approaches to the question of the cut-off date for + declaration of Chemical Weapons production and filling facilities;

+

(B) Discuss various options for disposition of such facilities, including + the option currently being considered in Washington to permit conversion + of such facilities to peaceful purposes under appropriate + safeguards;

+

(C) Seek views on the US proposal that, + as a confidence-building measure, information be exchanged on activities + related to protection against Chemical Weapons;

+

(D) Ascertain how the FRG plans to + follow up on Chancellor Schmidt’s + proposal at the UN special session on + disarmament that other countries send representatives to Germany to see + that it is possible to verify adequately a ban on production of Chemical + Weapons;

+

(E) Propose that further quadrilateral consultations on stockpile + declaration and estimates be held later in the year, as discussed above + in para 2 (B). (This should only be + raised if the UK has posed no objections + in the earlier bilateral session.)

+ + Vance + +
+ +
+ + 88. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission in + GenevaSource: National + Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign + Policy File, D780332–0685. Confidential; Priority. Sent for + information to Moscow, London, Bonn, Paris, and USNATO. Drafted by Robert Mikulak + (ACDA/MA/AT); cleared by Les Denend (NSC), Gelb + (PM), Sheila Buckley (DOD), Flowerree (ACDA/MA/IR), Roger Booth (ACDA/MA/AT), + Margot Mazeau (ACDA/GC), and [name not + declassified]; and approved by Thomas Davies + (ACDA/MA). + Washington, August 14, 1978, 2201Z +

205530. Subject: US–USSR Chemical Weapons Negotiations, Round + Eight: Guidance. Refs: (A) Geneva 6497;In + telegram 6497 from the Mission in Geneva, April 28, the Mission + recommended that the Department of State consider a number of + questions for discussion during future chemical weapons + negotiations, including how the United States would verify Soviet + compliance with a treaty and how international would inspectors be + chosen. (National Archives, RG 59, + Central Foreign Policy File, D780182–0762) (B) Geneva + 6492;Telegram 6492 from the Mission in + Geneva, April 28, summarized the unresolved issues between the U.S. + and the Soviet Union at the end of round seven of chemical weapons + negotiations. These included: the rights and functions of inspection + personnel and host state during challenge on-site inspection, a + declaration of existing stocks and facilities, the destruction of + facilities, and international on-site inspection of destruction of + stocks and facilities. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780182–0779) + (C) State 197704.Telegram 197704 to + Moscow, August 4, included the text of a Non-Paper that ACDA Assistant Director Thomas Davies + had given to Soviet Embassy Minister-Counselor Bessmertnykh earlier that day in + Washington. The Non-Paper explained that the U.S. considered the + “group of issues related to chemical weapons production and filling + facilities poses one of the most important obstacles to a joint + initiative. Unfortunately the two Delegations have made little + progress on these issues.” The U.S. suggested that both nations + declare all facilities for the production of chemicals “that are + primarily useful for chemical weapons purposes” and “the filling of + chemical weapons” and as soon as a state became party to a chemical + weapons convention, “such facilities should be place in an inactive + (‘mothballed’) status.” These facilities would then be destroyed “by + an agreed deadline” and the “mothballing and destruction” of these + facilities “would be verified by international on-site inspection.” + (National Archives, RG 59, Central + Foreign Policy File, D780320–0046) State CW Message No. 3

+

1. This message provides general guidance for round eight. Detailed + responses to the questions posed Ref A are being provided separately in + the guidance package.Not found. + Highlights are outlined in paras 5–7 below.

+

2. During round eight the Delegation should: a) Actively seek Soviet + views in areas where the Soviets have not yet responded to US questions and proposals, particularly + Ref C, b) Seek to clarify and resolve as many of the remaining issues as + possible and c) Seek to clarify and consolidate areas of agreement + through drafting agreed language for a joint initiative.

+ +

3. In addressing remaining issues the Delegation should devote particular + attention to trying to resolve the issues cited Ref B, which are listed + below:

+

(A) Required international on-site inspection of destruction of stocks + and disposition of facilities.

+

(B) Declaration of stocks and facilities.

+

—General declaration of stocks prior to entry into force of the + convention

+

—Declaration of facilities

+

(C) Destruction of facilities.

+

(D) Rights and functions of inspection personnel and host state personnel + during challenge on-site inspection.

+

4. We believe it is important to resume drafting of agreed language in + order to nail down general points on which the two sides appear to agree + and to specify the more detailed points which are essential to make + agreement on the general points meaningful and effective. For these + purposes we believe that language which is more detailed than that + discussed in round six is necessary. In drafting, the Delegation should + be guided by the format and formulations contained in the set of + “expanded key elements”, which is being provided separately.

+

5. Key points in the guidance package:

+

(A) Detailed guidance has been provided for the first time concerning the + exchange, for confidence-building purposes, of information on activities + related to protection against Chemical Weapons.

+

(B) A background paper is provided on the methods the US would employ for destruction of agent + and weapon stocks. (This is for use by the Delegation in trying to + elicit analogous information from the Soviets.)

+

(C) The US considers it important for the + US and USSR to work in close cooperation on a bilateral basis both + before and after the convention comes into force. It would be best to + continue to use the existing bilateral Chemical Weapons working group as + the forum for bilateral consultations unless it becomes clear that other + arrangements are needed.

+

(D) An alternative approach is outlined for prohibition of super-toxic + chemicals for military purposes not related to chemical warfare.

+

6. The US position on the deadline for + destruction of stocks has been further elaborated. Previously the US proposed that at least eight years be + allowed. We now believe it desirable to be more specific and are + prepared to accept ten years as the deadline. The deadlines for + beginning and completing the destruction of facilities would continue to + be eight years and ten years after entry into force, respectively.

+ +

7. The following points are still under review:

+

(A) Conditions under which the US may be + prepared to permit conversion of facilities (rather than requiring their + complete destruction).

+

(B) Whether to adopt a bilateral approach to mandatory on-site inspection + of facilities.

+

(C) Whether to change proposed cut-off date for declaration of facilities + from January 1, 1940 to January 1, 1947.

+

8. The Delegation should continue to brief allied representatives in + Geneva during the course of the negotiations. In addition, an offer + should be made to hold consultations with the UK, FRG and France at the + end of the round in London, Bonn and/or Paris as appropriate.

+

9. We currently expect round eight to end in late September or early + October and believe that it would be desirable to hold another round + before the end of the year if possible. Most feasible period would be + from late November to late December.

+ + Christopher + +
+ +
+ 89. Telegram From the Mission in Geneva to the Department of + StateSource: National + Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign + Policy File, D780338–0732. Confidential; Priority. Sent for + information to Bonn, London, USNATO, and Paris. + Geneva, August 18, 1978, 1743Z +

12636. Subject: Chemical Weapons Negotiations: Consultations With Allies. + Ref: State 204929.See Document 87.

+

1. Summary: US reps held bilateral + consultations on Chemical Weapons limitations with the UK in London on August 15 and quadrilateral + consultations (US, UK, FRG, + France) on August 16. Allies generally supported US position on exchange of information on chemical + protective measures, on conversion of chemical agent production + facilities, and on value of consultations later in the year on certain + questions related to declaration of Chemical Weapons stockpiles. British + also raised matter of resolution on CW + at coming UNGA. In bilateral session, + they discussed preparations for Biological Weapons Convention Review + Conference including need for UNGA + resolution which they are + drafting for possible sponsorship by depository powers. End summary.

+

2. US and UK representatives held bilateral consultations on Chemical + Weapons limitations in London on Tuesday, August 15, 1978. Salient + points are summarized below:

+

A. In response to questions from UK + Del about outlook for round eight of + the US-Soviet Chemical Weapons + negotiations, US reps reported that + Russians do not expect to have much new material to present. However, + there has been no evidence of a deliberate Soviet slowdown. The US + Del will put emphasis on resolving + outstanding issues and on drafting common language in areas of + agreement.

+

B. British Del head (Burns) inquired + whether US had considered submitting + partial initiative to the CCD which + left verification section blank. He said that pressure from other CCD members might force Russians to make + concessions on verification. US + Del head (Flowerree) responded that US had no plans for such a partial initiative and + considered it important to resolve verification issues before submitting + an initiative to the CCD.

+

C. US reps outlined proposal to be made + to Soviets for confidence-building measure involving exchange of + information on chemical protective activities. They also indicated that + Washington agencies were considering possibility of allowing conversion + of chemical agent production and filling facilities to peaceful + purposes, under appropriate safeguards.

+

D. After Burns raised question of an agreed estimate of Soviet CW stocks, US reps conveyed suggestion for quadrilateral consultations + late in year as instructed Reftel. US + reps said that US envisioned + participation of political, military, and intelligence representatives. + Burns stressed importance of US–UK intelligence conference scheduled to + begin in late October, but agreed that quadrilateral consultations would + also be useful and said he could support US proposal for such consultations.

+

E. Burns said that UK had no plans to + make statement at the CCD during + informal CCD meetings on Chemical + Weapons week of August 21–25. Looking ahead to UNGA, UK had prepared draft + CW resolution along lines of last + year’s resolution (text septel).Not found. He + thought that as in past it might be appropriate to ask Canada and Poland + to act as sponsors of resolution.

+

F. British presented further information on former UK chemical agent production facilities. + There would be no objection to having inspectors walk through former + production buildings owned by Imperial Chemical Industries (ICI). These buildings are now + used only for storage. ICI would also be willing to have inspectors walk + through surrounding chemical complex and look into “from the doorway.” + At the site (Springfields) used by British Nuclear Fuels (BNF), there + are two former production buildings which are not in use. While + destruction would not appear to be a problem at the BNF site or another + site (Valley) used by the Department of the Environment, razing the ICI + buildings would be more difficult but not out of the question. It was + mainly a question of deciding who would pay for the work of dismantling. + (Comment: It appears that British can now accept US position that CW agent + production and filling facilities should be destroyed. End comment)

+

G. Burns also pointed out need for UNGA + to pass a resolution establishing a preparatory committee for the + Biological Weapons Convention Review Conference to be held in 1980. The + UK is preparing a draft resolution + and will provide it to us in the near future. Burns said Dutch believed + that whether convention covers military applications of genetic + engineering would be a controversial issue at the Review Conference. He + asked for US comments on Dutch + suggestion that CCD experts group be + set up to review this issue in an attempt to defuse it. US reps responded that such a group could + be counterproductive since issue, which arose several years ago, now + appeared quiescent. UK reps agreed that + establishing such a group of experts in the CD appeared undesirable.

+

2. Quadrilateral consultations (US, + UK, FRG, France) on chemical weapons limitations were held in + London on Wednesday, August 16, 1978. Salient points are presented + below:

+

A. As at bilateral session, US reps + outlined prospects for round eight, reviewed the US proposal for exchange of information on chemical + protective activities, and discussed a possible change in the US position in order to permit conversion + of chemical agent production facilities to peaceful purposes under + appropriate safeguards. There was general acceptance that the + negotiations will be slow and general support for the US proposals on exchange of protective + information and on conversion of facilities.

+

B. The British expressed a strong preference for using 1940 as the cutoff + date for facilities to be declared. FRG + Del head (Von Arz) said that 1940 was + certainly acceptable to the FRG, + although the 1947 date would be “optically nicer”. French representative + (De Bellescize) said he had no specific instructions, but that the more + comprehensive the agreement, the better. He [said] France would + therefore prefer the 1940 date.

+

C. Von Arz discussed FRG invitation at + the UN special session on disarmament to + government experts to visit the FRG to + see that verification of + non-production of chemical weapons was possible. He said the details of + the visit are being worked out by the German federation of chemical + industry and that an announcement would be made at the coming UNGA session. The visit will be modeled + on a 1977 Pugwash visit to a German chemical plant and will probably + take place in the spring or summer of 1979. Von Arz promised to stay in + close contact with the US Embassy in + Bonn as plans are developed.

+

D. US reps outlined suggestion for + quadrilateral consultations later in the year on stockpile declarations + and estimates with participation of political, military, and + intelligence reps. Burns stated that it would be best to discuss this + matter among the four before raising it in NATO. (Germans had suggested at an earlier meeting that + stockpile estimates be discussed in NATO.) There was no immediate German comment on the US suggestion, but during the luncheon that + followed, German reps eagerly sought further details on proposed + consultations.

+

3. As in previous quadrilateral sessions, French sent Embassy + representative but did not participate actively. French representative + said, however, that in Paris interest in the CW negotiations is increasing. He indicated informally that + the French might send a technical expert to the next session.

+

[Omitted here is the list of participants.]

+
+ +
+ 90. Telegram From the Mission in Geneva to the Department of + StateSource: National + Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign + Policy File, D780375–0858. Confidential; Priority. Sent for + information to Moscow. + Geneva, September 15, 1978, 0849Z +

13849. Subject: US–USSR Chemical Weapons Negotiations. + Preparations for Round Nine.

+

CW Message No. 18

+

We recommend that preparations for round nine focus on the items listed + below:

+

1. How should the U.S. react to the Soviet proposals regarding + non-transfer and declaration of previous transfers?

+

2. How should the U.S. react to the Soviet proposals regarding + non-circumvention?

+ +

3. What super-toxic chemicals should be placed on the “important” + chemicals list.

+

4. How should the U.S. respond to Soviet suggestions concerning the list + of “important” precursors?

+

5. What are U.S. views on whether and how to seek a U.S.-Soviet + understanding on the purposes for which safe riot control chemicals may + be developed, produced and stockpiled?

+

6. What capability does the PRC have to + conduct chemical warfare?

+

7. Are there any steps which might be taken to make it easier for the + Soviets to accept entry into force without the participation of the + PRC?

+

8. Can the U.S. position on declaration and verification related to + facilities be adjusted to improve negotiability while still giving the + U.S. adequate information and access to the facilities?

+

9. Preparation of an informal paper summarizing the US position for exchange with the + Soviets.

+ + Vanden Heuvel + +
+ +
+ 91. Telegram From the Mission in Geneva to the Department of + StateSource: National + Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign + Policy File, D780376–0142. Confidential; Priority. Sent for + information; Priority to Bonn. Sent for information to London, + Moscow, Paris, and USUN. + Geneva, September 15, 1978, 1223Z +

13860. Subject: US–USSR Chemical Weapons Negotiations, Round + Eight: Summary of Developments. CW + Message No. 17. Ref: Geneva 6492.See footnote 3, Document 88.

+

1. Round eight of the US–USSR Chemical Weapons Negotiations, which + began on August 18, 1978, ended on September 14, 1978. During that + period six plenary and five drafting group meetings were held.

+

2. Discussions during the round focused on the scope of prohibition and + on declaration and verification provisions relating to Chemical Weapons + production and filling facilities. There was no progress in resolving + the central outstanding issues, e.g., those relating to declarations and verification. The + major issues remain as discussed Reftel. On secondary issues results + were mixed; some progress was made on a few points, on a number of + issues the U.S. was unable even to obtain a clear statement of Soviet + views.

+

A. On the positive side, the Soviets:

+

(1) Finally responded to U.S. requests for clarification of their + position regarding production “capabilities” (albeit in an + unsatisfactory fashion as noted subpara 2B(2) below).

+

(2) Responded favorably to some aspects of the U.S. proposal to prohibit + transfer of certain super-toxic chemicals to non-parties.

+

(3) Responded favorably to the U.S. proposal that the ceiling on + possession of super-toxic chemicals for protective purposes be one ton + although differing with other aspects of the U.S. proposal.

+

(4) Accepted part of the U.S. list of “important” precursors.

+

B. On the negative side, the Soviets:

+

(1) Have provided only vague confirmation of what in U.S. view are areas + of agreement already reached regarding scope.

+

(2) Continued to reject the U.S. proposals regarding declaration of + CW production and filling + facilities, proposing instead to declare only aggregate production + capacities.

+

(3) Continued to reject any pre-agreed OSI without offering any suggestion for compromise.

+

(4) Have reiterated their initial position that only those precursors + which are used in the final production stage should be covered.

+

(5) Specifically mentioned PRC’s + adherence in context of entry into force implying this may be + requirement for entry into force of convention.

+

(6) Maintained their position that use of chemical munitions should be + allowed for protective training purposes and that super-toxic chemicals + for military purposes not related to chemical warfare should not be + prohibited.

+

(7) Rejected U.S. proposal for centralization of production of super + toxic chemicals for protective purposes.

+

3. While the tone of both the plenary and drafting group meetings + continued to be friendly, the Soviets resisted U.S. efforts to engage + them in give-and-take discussions. In comparison to past rounds the + Soviet representatives were much more restrained in drafting group + sessions. It is not possible to assess to what degree this Soviet + behavior in the negotiations was governed by overall bilateral relations + and to what degree by the issues in the Chemical Weapons negotiations. + As regards such issues, however, it is increasingly apparent that + declarations and pre-agreed verification are the critical issues and + until these matters are + resolved, it will be difficult to make progress on other issues, even if + there is no direct connection.

+

4. We recommend that consideration be given to raising these issues at + senior political level in the near future.

+

5. List of detailed backstopping tasks is being provided septel.Not + found.

+ + Vanden Heuvel + +
+ +
+ 92. Memorandum From the Acting Assistant Secretary of Defense for + International Security Affairs (Slocombe) to the President’s Assistant for National + Security Affairs (Brzezinski)Source: Washington National Records Center, OSD Files: FRC 330–81–0201, Box 39, 370.64 CBR Oct 1978. + Secret. + Washington, November 9, 1978 + + SUBJECT + Chemical Weapons + +

The Department of Defense has reviewed the working group draft of the + response to PRM–37Attached but not printed is an October 20 draft + prepared in response to PRM/NSC–37. and offers the following + comments and recommendations. We are providing separately to your staff + a marked up copy which offers improvement to a number of apparent + editorial problems.

+

The PRM–37 draft response addresses all + of the points in PRM–37 and provides + negotiating alternatives and chemical weapons posture modernization + alternatives which will require timely decisions. However, the document + is too long and some key points are obscured.

+

In the sections which describe the current status of the negotiations + (paras 11.A.3, 4, 5; pages 11–6 to 11–23), the methodology of + presentation and the terminology tend to obscure where we stand on + individual issues with the Soviets and the relative importance of those + issues. For example, the draft + response discusses the status of each of the PD/NSC–15 key elements but + it is not clear on precisely what material the Soviets have apparently + agreed or disagreed, nor is the depth of disagreement clear. For + example, the draft response states that “most of the issues” on scope + have been resolved, that the Soviets have accepted many of the “general + points” within the U.S. key elements, and that various “aspects” of the + U.S. position have been resolved, although most “details” which are + “essential to give meaning to the ‘general point’ remain to be resolved” + (pages 11–6, 7). The relative importance of “issues,” “general points,” + “aspects,” and “details” is obscure. It is misleading to infer that we + are making good progress when most “details” have not been agreed to. In + fact, serious disagreements exist on key elements having to do with + declarations of chemical weapons and facilities, and verification. The + reference on page 11–20 to the U.S. proposal concerning challenge + on-site inspections in the comprehensive test ban negotiations is + misleading because technical data provided by on-site access would be + indispensible to verifying an agreement.

+

The General Assessment of the negotiations (page 11–23) provides an + inadequate wrap-up of the status of negotiations. It should point out, + for example, that no agreement is possible unless one of the parties + changes its basic position on such central issues as declaration, + destruction and verification of stocks and facilities. The Soviets have + given no indication that they are prepared to compromise on key + issues.

+

The section “Rationale For Relying on Non-Chemical Means for Deterring + Chemical Attack” (pages 111–12 to 111–20) presents analysis and + argumentation which does not adequately address the military concerns + expressed elsewhere (pages 111–3 to 111–5) and contains numerous + assertions for which support is not provided.

+

RECOMMENDATIONS:

+

An issues/discussion paper should be prepared for SCC review to resolve the question of + whether to take measures now to improve the U.S. chemical retaliatory + capability and, if so, which alternatives should be pursued. The SCC should also address the three + suggested alternatives in the U.S. negotiating position addressed in the + PRM–37 response.

+

An Executive Summary of the PRM–37 + response should be prepared for common use by each agency. This summary + should contain appropriate excerpts from the annexes such as the views + regarding Soviet intentions (Annex B) and the Soviet assessment of U.S. + capabilities (Annex D).

+

The main body of the PRM response should + contain frequent references to particularly relevant material found in + the annexes.

+ +

Table 1 on page 111–25 should be deleted because there is insufficient + analysis to support the data and the data are unnecessary for this + PRM response.

+

The OJCS concurs.

+ + Walter + SlocombeActing Assistant Secretary of + Defense + International Security Affairs + +
+ +
+ 93. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the + Federal Republic of Germany + Washington, November 9, 1978, 2240Z +

[Source: National Archives, RG 59, + Central Foreign Policy File, D780463–1054. Secret; Immediate. 7 pages + not declassified.]

+
+ +
+ 94. Telegram From the Embassy in the Federal Republic of Germany to + the Department of StateSource: + National Archives, RG 59, Central + Foreign Policy File, D780468–0531. Confidential; Priority. Sent for + information to USUN, London, + Paris, and USNATO. + Bonn, November 14, 1978, 1711Z. +

21058. Subject: Consultations With Allies on Chemical Weapons (CW) Negotiations. Refs: (A) State + 285427,See Document + 93. (B) State 273489.Telegram 273489 to Bonn, October 27, provides the list of U.S. + participants in the quadrilateral discussions and discusses + logistical associated with the discussions. (National Archives, + RG 59, Central Foreign Policy + File, [no film number])

+

1. Summary. Principal topics in quadrilateral (US, UK, FRG, France) consultations on November 13 + were size of Soviet chemical weapons stockpile and plans of FRG and UK + to invite government experts for confidence-building visits to + organophosphorus chemical plants. FRG + and UK agreed with US [3 lines not + declassified] End summary.

+ +

2. Quadrilateral consultations (US, + UK, FRG, France) on chemical weapons negotiations were held + Monday, November 13, 1978 in Bonn. Salient points in discussion are + summarized paras 3–12. Delegation lists given para 13.

+

3. US presentation. US reps began consultations by presenting + views contained Ref. A on estimating Soviet chemical weapons stockpile + and on judging eventual Soviet stockpile declaration. Principal + conclusion was that we may have difficulty in judging the accuracy of + the overall quantity declared by the Soviets, but that it may be + possible to make a rough judgment about whether the quantity appears + “unreasonable” or not.

+

4. Allied reactions. Burns (UK + Del. Head) responded that a rough + judgment was really the objective. [8 lines not + declassified] He pointed out that this should be seen in a + proper perspective. Similar problems would be encountered in trying to + estimate Soviet stocks of other types of munitions. Col. Christen + (FRG) responded that the FRG had come to the same conclusion as the + US and UK. There was no detailed discussion of information + presented by US reps.

+

5. Continuation of intelligence efforts. Burns (UK) suggested that, rather than launch a special NATO study (an idea advocated earlier + this year by the FRG), the four + countries should continue their own separate efforts or divide up the + task (another FRG suggestion) and + periodically exchange views. Christen (FRG) promised that the FRG + would provide any new information to the others and asked that they do + the same.

+

6. Soviet CW program. Burns (UK) asked if the Soviets had shown the same + restraint as the US in pursuing a + chemical weapons program during the bilateral negotiations. [3 lines not declassified]

+

7. Convertibility of commercial chemical facilities. Zeil (FRG) raised question about possibility + that Soviets could use insecticide plants for nerve agent production. + Reid (UK) replied that conversion would + be difficult unless the plant had been specifically designed with that + possibility in mind. He said that in addition to plants producing highly + toxic insecticides, chemical plants employing chemical processes similar + to those used in nerve agent production might also be convertible. + US experts said US was still studying convertibility + question but that prior planning appeared to be necessary.

+

8. China. Burns (UK) asked if Soviet + relations with the PRC might be one + reason for Soviet reticence in the bilateral negotiations. He asked if + Soviets had made Chinese participation a condition for entry into force + of the convention and if the US had had + any discussions with the PRC. Burns + mentioned that before the UK tabled its + draft CW convention in 1976, Chinese + comments had been sought, but none had been forthcoming. Akalovsky + (US) responded that although the + Soviets had not made Chinese + ratification an explicit condition for entry into force, they had + strongly implied it. He said he was not aware of any US–PRC + discussions on CW questions.

+

9. US + CW program. In response to questions + from UK reps, Leonard (US) said principal problem with US stocks was not deterioration, but rather obsolescence of + munitions, which cannot be arrested. He noted that no decision had yet + been taken on the DOD L budget request + for funds to construct a binary Chemical Weapons production + facility.

+

10. Confidence-building visits. Following up on FRG proposal at the UN + special session on disarmament, Von Arz (FRG) provided Dels with draft letterThe draft letter is recorded in telegram 21800 from + Bonn, November 28. The West German Government said in the letter + that it considered “the conclusion of a convention concerning an + effective and comprehensive ban on chemical weapons as an already + existing means of mass destruction a matter of urgent priority.” + (National Archives, RG 59, Central + Foreign Policy File, D780490–0710) to the UN Secretary General inviting UN members to send experts to a workshop on + verification of ban on manufacture of Chemical Weapons. He said workshop + would involve visits to four chemical plants and a round-table + discussion. Tentative workshop dates are March 14–16, 1979. Burns added + that UK was considering possible + invitation in the committee on disarmament for experts to visit the + former UK nerve agent pilot plant at + Nancekuke, Cornwall. (This facility is now being demolished.) He said + trip could include visit to a commercial organophosphorous chemical + plant and a display of military chemical defensive equipment. Burns said + UK visits might follow immediately + after FRG workshop. In response to + FRG and UK requests for US reaction + on timing of visits, Akalovsky said on personal basis that mid-March, + 1979 would not appear to affect the US–USSR negotiations + adversely. He said US would provide + official reaction as soon as possible.

+

11. Committee on Disarmament (CD). Burns (UK) asked what can be done in the CD on Chemical Weapons. + He noted interest of majority of CD members in having a meaningful role + in negotiation of a CW convention. Burns + suggested that CD might first discuss technical methods for destruction + of CW stocks and then take up + possibility of destruction of such stocks at an international facility. + Akalovsky (US) responded that General + US view was that for now it would be + best to avoid introducing controversial points into the CD. Effort in + the CD to work out some part of a CW + convention in isolation from the rest would not be productive. He added + that the concept of an international destruction facility was + interesting and would be given consideration.

+ +

12. French views. French rep (Masset) asked several questions to clarify + US views but did not participate + actively in discussions.

+

[Omitted here is the list of participants.]

+
+ +
+ 95. Memorandum From Jessica Tuchman + Mathews and Leslie G. Denend of the National Security + Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs + (Brzezinski) and the + President’s Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Aaron)Source: Carter Library, National Security Council, + Institutional Files, Box 100, SCC + 170, Chemical Weapons, 12/1/78. Secret. Sent for + action. + Washington, November 30, 1978 + + SUBJECT + SCC Meeting on PRM–37—Chemical Weapons + +

Introduction

+

Since June of last year, the United States has been operating under the + policy guidance established in PD–15See Document 70. calling for: bilateral negotiations + with the Soviets (we have kept our allies informed) based on 15 key + elements which would hopefully lead to the submission of a joint + initiative to the CCD for a + comprehensive CW ban; and maintenance of + the U.S. CW stockpile without + improvement. PRM–37See Document 86. was + made necessary by the PD-15 direction + that the decision on the U.S. stockpile be reviewed during the FY 1980 budget cycle on the basis of + progress in the negotiations.

+

The primary purpose of this meeting is to determine whether or not to + recommend to the President that module I of an integrated binary + production facility ($18 million in FY + 1980) should be included in the FY 1980 + Defense budget. However, the discussion should also address the broader + question of other possible actions to modernize or restructure the U.S. + stockpile. The Agenda which was circulated for the meeting is at Tab + A.Attached but not printed. An + interagency discussion paper is at Tab B.Attached but not printed. The PRM–37 response + with an executive summary is at Tab C.Attached but not printed. However, this memorandum is all + that you need to read.

+

Overview

+

State and ACDA believe that the + negotiations have proceeded about as expected, while the JCS feels that there has been insufficient + progress to warrant a further delay in modernizing and expanding the + U.S. chemical stockpile. The five rounds during the past 15 months + confirm that on-site verification provisions present the most difficult + issues. Progress will be slow at best and a breakthrough in the near + future should not be expected.

+

The U.S. stockpile suffers from two major deficiencies: the number and + type of munitions, and their location. The U.S. has about 30,500 agent + tons of which only 7,200 tons are usable. Over the next seven years, the + 7,200 tons will be reduced gradually to 2,400 tons because of + obsolescence and deterioration. Of the 7,200 tons, roughly 450 tons are + stored at one site in Germany. The deployment of additional chemical + munitions to forward positions in Europe has not been possible because + our Allies remain quite negative on this issue. Importantly, Defense has + not established a requirement for a chemical weapons stockpile of a + specific size. Since there is no overall concept of how chemical weapons + would be employed, it is not possible to estimate consumption rates and, + thus, a requirement. JCS has + established a figure of 30,000 agent tons but it has not been validated + in DOD.

+

The politics within the Pentagon on the CW issue are significant. There are sharp differences + between OSD and JCS. The Army Chemical Corps supported by + the JCS is fighting for its very + existence, and has been fanatic in its push for substantial improvement + in the U.S. stockpile. When this dimension is added to JCS skepticism about the negotiations, the + result is a vocal minority dedicated to binary production. In general, + the services do not grant a high priority to CW. It complicates their planning, increases cost, and is a + form of combat which on emotional grounds is distasteful. An important + aspect of the meeting will be to determine just how strongly Harold Brown feels about the binary + facility. We have heard that he fully expects it to be cut by OMB and only included it to avoid a fight + in his building.

+

Issues

+

1. Proposed Changes to CW Negotiating Instructions: Based on the + experience of the past 15 months, three changes to the key elements + contained in PD–15 have been suggested. + These involve technical points for the most part (e.g., the allowed + period for destruction of facilities) and would normally be resolved within the + delegation. However, the JCS has asked + that they be referred to higher authority. In the interest of time and + the real purpose of the meeting, we recommend you defer discussion of + the proposed changes and instead call for a memorandum. The changes are + straight-forward and can be decided on paper. None are urgent.

+

RECOMMENDATION: That you defer discussion of this + issue and call instead for a memorandum to resolve it.

+

2. Options Affecting the U.S. Chemical Weapons + Stockpile: You should begin the discussion of this issue by + asking ACDA and the JCS to summarize their quite different + concepts of how best to deter chemical warfare. The JCS believes that a capability to + retaliate in kind is essential. ACDA + believes that for a number of reasons (e.g., our inability to forward + deploy chemical munitions), the U.S. may not be able to acquire a + credible capability to retaliate in kind and therefore, argues for + deterrence based on an adequate protective posture plus conventional and + nuclear forces. These views are significant since they determine one’s + position on improvements to the CW + stockpile.

+

There are three principal options:

+

(1) Maintain the Current Chemical Stockpile Without + Quantitative Improvement. Normal maintenance and surveillance + would be performed, but no steps would be taken to increase the + stockpile. Obsolescence and deterioration would gradually erode the + stockpile over the next several years. During FY 1980 the stockpile will contract roughly 750 tons + because the 105mm artillery rounds become obsolete.

+

(2) Improve the U.S. Chemical Weapons Stockpile with + Particular Attention to Upgrading Seriously Deficient Areas + (e.g., weapons designed for delivery by high performance aircraft). This + could involve a range of actions from modest improvements to current + munitions through the filling of present generation munitions from + stockpiled bulk agent to the production and filling of new munitions + with newly produced conventional agent. Because those most closely + associated with CW in the military are + so intent on construction of the binary facility, they have not focused + seriously on the specifics of this option. It is not likely that this + option will be looked at carefully until the binary facility is ruled + out.

+

(3) Proceed with Preparations for Binary Munitions + Production. This would involve establishing a facility to + produce the 155mm binary howitzer projectile, for which all R&D and facility design work has been + completed. Decisions about actual assembly of munitions, production of + component chemicals, or expansion of the facility for production of + other binary munitions would be deferred. This is the first step in a + program which could lead eventually to expenditures totaling $2.0 + billion.

+ +

Politically, this is among the most sensitive issues with the Congress. + The facility has been removed from the budget by the Congress each time + it was proposed by the previous administration. Congressional attitudes + on this issue have not changed significantly. If the facility were + proposed this year, it would take an enormous Administration effort on + the Hill to keep it there and even then the outcome would be uncertain. + State, ACDA, OMB and, we suspect, even OSD oppose construction of a binary facility.

+

RECOMMENDATION: That you firmly oppose the binary + facility. A good outcome for the meeting would be a clear disapproval of + the binary facility coupled with firm directions to Defense to + investigate possible steps to improve the effectiveness of the U.S. + CW stockpile which are relatively + inexpensive and politically feasible. Defense should work with OMB so that the options developed include + the cost.

+
+ +
+ 96. Minutes of a Special Coordination Committee MeetingSource: Carter Library, National + Security Council, Institutional Files, Box 100, SCC 170, Chemical Weapons, 12/1/78. + Secret. The meeting took place in the White House Situation + Room. + Washington, December 1, + 1978, 9:37–10:37 a.m. + + SUBJECT + Chemical Weapons (U) + + + PARTICIPANTS + State + Deputy Secretary Warren + Christopher + Mr. Jerome Kahan, Deputy Director, Bureau of Politico-Military + Affairs + OSD + Deputy Secretary Charles + Duncan + Lt. Colonel Robert K. Weekley, Assistant for Negotiations and + Policy Plans, OSD/ISA + ACDA + Acting Director Spurgeon + Keeny + Dr. Robert Mikulak, Staff Officer + JCS + General David C. Jones, Chairman + Lt. General William Y. + Smith, Assistant to the Chairman + + CIA + Dr. Karl Weber, Director, Office of Scientific Intelligence + OMB + Mr. Edward R. Jayne, Associate Director for National Security and + International Affairs + White House + Mr. David Aaron + (Chairman) + NSC + Mr. Leslie G. Denend + +

MINUTES

+

David Aaron began the meeting at + 9:37 by calling for views on how the chemical weapons stockpile figures + in the deterrence of chemical warfare. Duncan said that the stockpile provides substantial + deterrence if we have a true CW + capability. Jones pointed out that CW + was not used in World War II because each side had a capability. He + agreed with Duncan’s view and + added that the U.S. stockpile is not very good and that only a small + amount of artillery rounds were deployed in Europe. He felt the U.S. + must have a reasonable war-fighting capability along with adequate + protection. Keeny acknowledged + that the existence of the stockpile has a deterrent role; however, he + questioned how effective it was operationally. He felt sure that if the + Soviets used CW they would also have + adequate protection. He asked whether the U.S. in light of Congressional + and NATO political realities could + achieve a credible retaliatory capability. Duncan noted the political problems associated with + deployment but added that a CW + capability was still necessary. Jones added that the likelihood of + CW in Europe could increase as our + tactical nuclear advantage narrowed, and added that the deployment of + binary munitions would be easier than conventional types. Keeny pointed out that CW was a potential super neutron bomb in a + political sense and said that the Europeans do not even want to think + about the prospect of CW in Europe. + Christopher observed that + there was value in a retaliatory capability, but how it was developed + would be affected by three realities: how the allies view it; + Congressional reaction; and the prospects in the CW negotiations. Jayne agreed with Christopher and stressed the importance + of the political dimension of CW. [7 lines not declassified]

+

Aaron outlined the three options developed in the PRM: (1) maintain the stockpile without + improvement; (2) undertake steps short of new production facilities to + modernize the stockpile; or (3) build a binary facility deferring the + production decision. Duncan + favored building the binary facility. Jones strongly supported the + binary facility. He added that roughly two thirds of the cost of the + facility could be recovered in the event of a treaty since it could be + used for the destruction of U.S. stocks. Christopher disagreed and said that option 2 had not been fully developed. He + suggested that modest steps (those at the low end of option 2) might be + undertaken to arrest further erosion of the stockpile. He added that to + go binary would send very negative political signals. Keeny agreed with Christopher, and Jayne did also. + Duncan called into question + the notion that in reality option 2 would be cheaper than option 3 for + similar capabilities. Jones agreed. Aaron questioned whether formulating the question so + that only the binary facility seemed at stake adequately reflected the + true scope of the decision at hand. Duncan added that the U.S. needs a CW capability for deterrence and given + that, binary was the best way to go. Aaron pointed out that it was not a question of whether + or not to maintain a stockpile but rather one of which type the U.S. + would commit to. He framed the issue for the President as on the one + hand replacing and increasing the present stockpile with binary + munitions versus more modest steps to improve the effectiveness of the + current stockpile with no increase in deployments to Europe. Christopher added that option 2 needed + to be fleshed out. Jones stated that without a verifiable treaty, we + need CW capability and in the long run, + binary is the only way to go. Christopher noted that before a decision in favor of + binaries was made more information about Congress and our allies was + needed. (S)

+

Next, Keeny described the proposed + changes to the negotiating instructions. All agreed that the time period + allowed for the destruction of facilities should be clarified and made + independent of the destruction of stocks. On the conversion of + facilities, Keeny said it would + only be offered if the Soviets agreed to the higher on-site verification + requirements. Jones commented that because there was so much necessary + information about Soviet facilities which we did not have that it was + premature to discuss conversion. Smith asked why the decision had to be made now. + Duncan added that the + Soviets are not even prepared to tell us where their facilities are at + this point. Christopher asked if + the negotiators would be willing to agree to explore the topic but agree + to nothing. Mikulak responded that up to this point conversion had been + mentioned in the talks only to say that if conversion were allowed more + intrusive on-site inspection would be required. Aaron felt that the Delegation should + be limited to exploring the conversion issue with the Soviet Delegation. + All agreed. Jones added that the Soviets may even prefer destruction + because of the on-site inspections associated with conversion. On the + issue of bilateral versus multilateral inspection of facilities, + Keeny explained that this + would be an option which might be used only if it proved important in + reaching agreement with the Soviets. Jones emphasized that we were + seeking a true multilateral convention and that bilateral inspections + should not be a part of such an agreement. Duncan felt that it was important to talk to our allies + about this possibility. Aaron + offered a compromise, stating that he sensed there was some receptivity to this idea + but that the first step was to talk to our allies. All agreed. The + meeting ended at 10:37 a.m. (S)

+
+ +
+ 97. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security + Affairs (Brzezinski) to President + CarterSource: Carter Library, National + Security Council, Institutional Files, Box 100, SCC 170, Chemical Weapons, 12/1/78. + Secret. Sent for action. Carter initialed the upper right-hand corner of the + memorandum. + Washington, December 14, 1978 + + SUBJECT + SCC Meeting on Chemical Weapons + (C) + +

The SCC recently reviewed the U.S. + chemical weapons posture. The Summary of Conclusions is at Tab A.Attached but not printed. See Document 96 for the minutes of the + meeting. An issue concerning the future of the U.S. chemical + weapons stockpile requires your decision. (S)

+

Defense argues that an improved U.S. retaliation capability is essential + to the deterrence of chemical warfare and advocates the inclusion of a + binary production facility in the FY + 1980 Defense budget. (Binary implies that munitions are filled with two + relatively harmless chemicals which when mixed after firing form the + toxic agent. The advantage is improved safety in handling and storage.) + Although an actual production decision would not be made for several + years, the intent is to replace and increase the present U.S. stockpile + with modern binary munitions. The cost in FY 1980 is only $18 million; however, the ultimate cost of + the program including production could approach $2.0 billion. (S)

+

On the other hand, State, ACDA and + OMB acknowledge the deterrent role + of the U.S. stockpile but maintain that because of the political + sensitivities associated with chemical warfare, it is not possible to + achieve a much improved retaliatory posture. All agree that in order to + improve the U.S. retaliatory capability additional munitions must be + forward deployed to locations in Europe. Our allies remain very negative + on this issue, based not only on safety which binary munitions resolve + in part, but more importantly on even acknowledging that NATO is considering the prospect of + chemical warfare in Europe. In addition, Congressional attitudes are + quite hostile to the idea of chemical weapons production. Congress removed the binary + facility from the budget each time it was proposed by the previous + Administration. It would require an enormous Administration effort to + defend a binary facility on the Hill, and even then, the outcome is + uncertain. State, ACDA and OMB recommend that, for now, the binary + facility should not be built, although this decision would be reviewed. + As an alternative, they suggest that there might be certain low cost and + politically feasible steps which could be taken to arrest the gradual + deterioration of the current stockpile. On this point, Defense maintains + that there is no way to improve the U.S. stockpile significantly without + chemical weapons production, and if the Administration is considering + new production, a binary facility is the best approach. (S)

+

I concur with State, ACDA and OMB that a binary facility should not be + included in the FY 1980 budget. It would + be a guaranteed no-win situation on the Hill. If attitudes in Congress + and those of our allies change markedly or the negotiations with the + Soviets take an adverse turn, the issue can be reopened. I agree with + the Defense judgment that if the U.S. undertakes the production of new + chemical munitions they should be binary. (S)

+

RECOMMENDATION

+

That you approve the exclusion of a binary facility from the FY 1980 budget. (S)

+

State, ACDA and OMB concur.Carter checked + “Approve” and wrote “J” in the right-hand margin.

+

That you approve the attached Summary of Conclusions.Carter + checked “Approve.”

+
+ +
+ + 98. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission in + GenevaSource: National + Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign + Policy File, D790077–0233. Confidential; Priority. Sent for + information to Moscow, London, Bonn, Paris, and USNATO. Drafted by Robert Mikulak + (ACDA/MA/AT); Robert Strand (ACDA/MA/IR), Roger Booth (ACDA/MA/AT), + (Merle MacDonald (OSD), Harry + Goodall (JCS), [name not declassified] (CIA/OSR), Les Denend (NSC), David Carlson (PM/DCA), Michael + Matheson (L/PM), and [name not declassified] + (CIA); and approved by Lawrence + Finch (ACDA/MA). + Washington, February 18, 1979, + 1028Z +

42041. Subject: US–USSR Chemical Weapons Negotiations, Round + Nine: Guidance. Ref: (A) 78 Geneva 13849See + Document 90. (B) 78 Geneva + 6492See footnote + 3, Document 88. (C) Geneva 2511In telegram 2511, February 14, the Mission in Geneva + informed the Department of State that after “canvassing allied and a + few key non-aligned delegations” to the UN Committee on Disarmament, it had concluded that + chemical weapons “is the most logical—if not the only—one suitable + for active consideration” in the UN + since chemical weapons “affected all countries having a chemical + industry.” (National Archives, RG + 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790070–1085) (D) State + 20148.Telegram 20148 to the Mission in + Geneva, January 25, included general instructions of the UN’s Committee on Disarmament. + Regarding chemical weapons, the Department told the Delegation that + it expected “the US and USSR to be subjected to considerable + pressure and criticism on the chemical weapons issue,” in particular + a proposal by “the nonaligned and some US allies to establish a CW negotiating work group.” The Delegation, the + Department said, “should continue to oppose the creation of such a + group as premature before a US–USSR joint + initiative has been formulated and presented.” The joint initiative, + the Delegation should stress, “will ban a complete spectrum of + weapons which have been used in the past.” (National Archives, + RG 59, Central Foreign Policy + File, D790038–0326)

+

State Message No. 2

+

1. This message provides general guidance for round nine. Detailed + responses to the questions posed Ref A are being provided separately in + the guidance package.Not found. + Highlights are outlined in para 5 + below.

+

2. During round nine the Delegation should: (A) actively seek Soviet + views in areas where the Soviets have not yet responded to US questions and proposals, (B) seek to + clarify and resolve as many of the remaining issues as possible, and (C) + seek to clarify and consolidate areas of agreement through drafting + agreed language for a joint initiative.

+

3. In addressing remaining issues the Delegation should devote particular + attention to trying to resolve the issues cited Ref B, which are listed + below:

+ +

(A) required international on-site inspection of destruction of stocks + and disposition of facilities.

+

(B) Declaration of stocks and facilities.

+

—General declaration of stocks prior to entry into force of the + convention.

+

—Declaration of facilities.

+

(C) Destruction of facilities.

+

(D) Rights and functions of inspection personnel and host state personnel + during challenge on-site inspection.

+

4. We continue to believe it is important to resume drafting of agreed + language in order to nail down general points on which the two sides + appear to agree and to specify the more detailed points which are + essential to make agreement on the general points meaningful and + effective. For these purposes we believe that language which is more + detailed than that discussed in round six is necessary. In drafting, the + Delegation should be guided by the format and formulations contained in + the position summary,Not found. which + is being provided separately, and in the set of “expanded key elements,” + which will be provided when it is completed.

+

5. Key points in the guidance package:

+

(A) A summary of the US position is + provided for transmission to the Soviet Delegation, as agreed at the end + of round eight.

+

(B) With regard to declared facilities, the Delegation is authorized to + explore the concept of conversion under appropriate safeguards. Modified + tactics for presenting the US position + regarding mandatory on-site inspection of facilities are outlined.

+

(C) Guidance is provided for responding to Soviet proposals regarding + non-transfer and declaration of previous transfers, non-circumvention, + the list of “important” precursors, and conditions for entry into + force.

+

6. In our view the convention would completely preclude stockpiling of + Chemical Weapons, regardless of any reservations to the Geneva protocol. + The backstopping committee will study whether or not the US should propose a specific restriction on + use in order to make this point completely clear. Depending on the + conclusions of the study, further guidance may be provided.

+

7. Ref C reports Soviet view that question of a role for CD in CW should be taken up during US–USSR + bilateral negotiations. The Delegation should seek to delay this + discussion until guidance concerning CD Delegation suggestion of + technical working group on toxicity measurement is received. The Delegation should + continue to oppose the creation of CW + negotiating working group as premature before a US–USSR joint initiative + has been formulated and presented (Ref D). Should the Soviets propose a + joint initiative to get the CD involved now in negotiating the text of a + CW convention, the Delegation should + oppose it. (Because a comprehensive CW + prohibition is so complex, and its parts so closely interwoven, it would + be extremely difficult, if not impossible, to negotiate individual key + elements separately. The interrelationship is apparent in the US position summary. We think it would + facilitate consensus on a multilateral convention if a common approach + were developed by the two states with the largest Chemical Weapons + stocks before the CD takes up its work. The US–USSR joint statements + to the CCD (CCD/PV. 788, 9 May 1978, + and CCD/PV. 802, 22 August 1978The first + statement is available as “Joint Statement by the United States and + the Soviet Union to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament: + Negotiations on a Chemical Weapons Ban,” May 9, 1978 and the second + statement is available as “Statement by the U.S. Representative + (Fisher) to the + Conference of the Committee on Disarmament: Chemical Weapons Ban,” + August 25, 1978, in Documents on Disarmament, + 1978, pp. 284–285, 543–544. also refer to the + complexity of CW issues.) The Delegation + should not discuss such a Soviet suggestion in detail, but rather report + and seek further guidance.

+

8. The Delegation should cable verbatim translation of the Soviet + position summary as soon as it is available.

+

9. The Delegation should continue to brief allied representatives in + Geneva during the course of the negotiations. In addition an offer + should be made to hold consultations with the UK, FRG and France at the + end of the round.

+ + Vance + +
+ +
+ + 99. Telegram From the Mission in Geneva to the Department of + StateSource: National + Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign + Policy File, D790180–0536. Confidential; Priority. Also sent to + Bonn, London, Moscow, and USNATO. + Geneva, April 19, 1979, 1525Z +

6663. Subject: (C) US–USSR Chemical Weapons Negotiations, Round + nine: Sixth (Final) Plenary Meeting, April 12, 1979.

+

CW Message No. 19

+

1. (C—Entire text)

+

2. Summary: Sixth and final plenary meeting of round nine was held on + April 12. Both sides presented assessments of round nine. In US view, despite some progress on defining + limitations to be placed on super-toxic chemicals not related to + chemical warfare, little or no progress took place in key areas; at same + time, there seems to have been an unraveling of understanding regarding + toxins and safe irritants. The US + remains convinced that it would be a mistake to make entry into force of + the proposed convention contingent upon adherence of any specific third + state and that Soviet attempts to link such adherence to specific + provisions now under negotiations served only to interfere with the + bilateral negotiations. SovDel, for its part, also concluded that key + questions remained unresolved, citing both “objective” and “subjective” + difficulties. Among the latter the SovDel had not noticed any steps by + the US in round nine to meet their + position. Concerning the question of riot control agents, SovDel + observed that CS had not been specifically discussed and therefore no + agreement could have been reached between the two Delegations. Moreover, + while subdivision of irritants into “safe” and “not safe” categories had + been discussed, agreement had not been achieved. Soviet position on + adherence by all permanent members of UN + security council was restated. Following plenary, an informal meeting + was held to discuss how to deal with CW + issue in the CD (septel)Not found. end summary.

+

3. The sixth and final plenary meeting of round nine was held April 12 at + the Soviet mission. Amb Israelyan opened meeting with the suggestion + that after a short exchange of views, the two sides should hold informal + discussions on how to deal with problem of Chemical Weapons in CD. Amb + Fisher agreed to this + procedure (see septel) and then made + statement presenting US assessment of + round nine. He began with observation that frank exchange of views in + drafting group had clarified respective positions on number of topics + relating to declaration and + destruction of accumulated stocks of Chemical Weapons and that progress + had been made on defining limitations to be placed on super-toxic + chemicals not related to chemical warfare. However, Amb Fisher stated, not much progress has + been made in areas we consider absolutely essential and even on + questions of scope, we appear to have witnessed an unraveling of + understandings in area where we thought there was agreement, i.e. toxins + and safe irritants. Morever, the US + remains concerned by continued Soviet rejection of US proposals to exchange of information on + military activities related to protection against chemical warfare. + Similarly the US continues to attach + great importance to required international on-site inspection of both + the destruction of Chemical Weapons stocks and the disposition of + Chemical Weapon facilities. In this context, we view the declaration of + individual facilities and their locations as absolutely essential to + providing effective verification arrangements. No progress has been made + on these crucial issues during this round. Ambassador Fisher ended his statement with a + reiteration of US views that it would be + a mistake to make entry into force contingent upon adherence by any + specific third countries and that Soviet attempts to establish a linkage + between adherence by specific states and various individual provisions + of a future convention served only to interfere with the bilateral + negotiations.

+

4. Amb Israelyan responded to Fisher’s assessment by asserting that while question of + subdividing irritants into safe and “not safe” categories and relevant + criteria needed to accomplish this had been discussed, agreement had not + yet been reached in this area. Moreover, CS was not specifically + discussed and therefore no agreement on CS could have been reached. + Israelyan then provided his own general assessment of round nine, + beginning with the observation that the key problems have not + disappeared. In explaining the comparatively slow progress he first + referred to “objective” difficulties inherent in negotiations on such a + complex subject as Chemical Weapons which, he added, “is inextricably + linked to other activities of state.” Turning to “substantive” + difficulties, he noted that the USSR + had taken a number of steps to bring the sides closer together, although + we may differ on the significance of the steps. He had not noticed any + similar steps by the US and hoped that + the process of bringing the sides closer together would be a bilateral + one in the next round. Nonetheless, he saw positive results in some + areas such as composition of lists of super-toxic chemicals (on an + illustrative basis). Finally, and most important, both sides confirm + their intention to continue the negotiations and strive for further + progress. Israelyan then departed from his prepared remarks to reiterate + the Soviet position of participation of all permanent members of the + security council, which he maintained is a question vital to the + effectiveness of the convention and which is in the interests of all + concerned, in particular the two negotiating states. He ended his + remarks with the observation + that the position paper presented earlier by the USNot found. contained + new formulations which would be studied carefully.

+ + Sorenson + +
+ +
+ 100. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense Brown to the President’s Assistant for National Security + Affairs (Brzezinski)Source: Library of Congress, + Manuscript Division, Harold + Brown Papers, Box 61, Chemical/Biological Weapons. + Secret. Copy sent to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. In a + June 30 memorandum to Brown, + Brzezinski wrote that the + “views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff” had “been noted and will be + brought to the attention of the President. I suggest we examine this + question in connection with the FY + 1981 Budget review process.” (Ibid.) + Washington, May 24, + 1979 + + SUBJECT + U.S.-Soviet Chemical Weapons Negotiations + +

I enclose for your consideration and for transmittal to the President a + copy of a March 14, 1979 memorandum from the Joint Chiefs of Staff + concerning U.S.-Soviet chemical weapons negotiations.

+

The memorandum underscores the Joint Chiefs of Staff concern that the + U.S. maintain effective means for monitoring compliance with any + agreement which is reached in our negotiations with the Soviets to ban + chemical weapons. The Chiefs also ask for SCC review, prior to this fall, of the decisions to + maintain U.S. chemical warfare forces without force improvement, and not + to seek funds for the binary munitions facility.

+

I support these views of the JCS.

+

Harold + Brown

+ +

Attachment

+

Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary + of Defense BrownSecret. A copy was sent to U.S. Commander in + Chief, Europe.

+

JCSM–57–29

+

Washington, March 14, 1979

+ + SUBJECT + US Chemical Weapons Negotiating + Position (U) + +

1. (S) Review of the US negotiating + position summary developed by the Chemical Weapons Backstopping + Committee indicates that an agreement fully incorporating all elements + in this position would meet the objective of a chemical weapons + prohibition set forth in Presidential Directive/NSC–15.See Document 70. + However, the Joint Chiefs of Staff believe that the current and + projected asymmetries in chemical warfare capability favoring the USSR provide no incentives for the + Soviets to agree to any meaningful prohibitions on chemical weapons.

+

2. (C) The Joint Chiefs of Staff note that the chemical weapons + negotiations, in seeking to eliminate an entire means of warfare, + constitute a disarmament—as opposed to an arms control—undertaking. + Therefore, it is vital to national security that strong, effective + provisions be made for monitoring compliance with any agreement + resulting from such an undertaking.

+

3. (S) There are serious military risks inherent in this disarmament + effort. [5 lines not declassified] These risks + could be offset to some extent if all provisions of the US position summary were fully + implemented.

+

4. (S) While the position summary includes the essential US element requiring onsite international + access for adequate verification, the Soviets have indicated this + approach to chemical weapons verification is unacceptable. In view of + this real and critical difference and of the absence of any compelling + reasons for the Soviets to resolve this difference, it will be important + for the US Delegation to remain resolute + in its negotiating effort. Further, it is essential that the Special + Coordination Committee review again, prior to the fall of 1979, the + decision to maintain US chemical warfare + forces without force improvement and the decision not to seek funds for + the binary munitions facility.

+ +

5. (U) The Joint Chiefs of Staff request that you support their views and + that you also convey these views to the President.

+

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

+ + James E. DaltonMajor General, USAF + Vice Director, Joint Staff + +
+ +
+ 101. Memorandum of ConversationSource: Department of State, Office of the Secretariat + Staff, Cyrus R. Vance, + Secretary of State—1977–1980, Lot 84D241, Vance + Exdis + Memcons 1979. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Krimer on June 20; and approved by + Aaron. The meeting took + place at the Soviet Embassy. The memorandum is printed in full in + Foreign + Relations, 1977–1980, vol. VI, Soviet Union, Document + 203. + Vienna, June 17, 1979, 11:00 a.m.–1:00 + p.m. + + SUBJECT + Third Plenary Meeting between President Carter and President Brezhnev + Topics: SALT III and other arms + control issues + + + PARTICIPANTS + U.S. + The President + Secretary of State Cyrus R. + Vance + Secretary of Defense Harold + Brown + Dr. Zbigniew + Brzezinski + General David Jones + Mr. Hamilton Jordan + General G. + Seignious + Ambassador Malcolm + Toon + Mr. Joseph Powell + Mr. David Aaron + Mr. Wm. D. Krimer, + Interpreter + U.S.S.R. + President L.I. + Brezhnev + Foreign Minister A.A. + Gromyko + Marshal D.F. Ustinov + Mr. K.U. Chernenko + Deputy Foreign Minister G.M. + Korniyenko + Marshal N.V. Ogarkov + Ambassador A.F. + Dobrynin + Mr. A.M. Aleksandrov-Agentov + + Mr. L.M. Zamyatin + Mr. V.G. Komplektov + Mr. A.M. Vavilov + Mr. V.M. Sukhodrev, + Interpreter + +

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to chemical weapons.]

+

Turning to chemical weapons and the possibility of reaching agreement to + prohibit such weapons, Gromyko + noted that the negotiations on this question are proceeding badly and in + an unsatisfactory way. It would evidently be difficult to go into detail + at this meeting, but he wanted to make two points in this connection. + First, we had major differences between our views on questions relating + to verification in this connection and, secondly, for an agreement on + chemical weapons to be effective, it was important that all major + powers, and certainly the permanent members of the U.N. Security + Council, join in such an agreement. What kind of an agreement would that + be without the participation of China? Could one really agree to a + situation in which the Chinese alone would have a free hand to + manufacture chemical weapons? These were the major points to which he + wanted to draw the President’s attention.Carter did not address + the issue of chemical weapons after Gromyko’s comments and in his final two meetings + with the Soviets. However, in the joint communiqué issued after the + Summit, the “two sides reaffirmed the importance of a general, + complete and verifiable prohibition of chemical weapons and agreed + to intensify their efforts to prepare an agreed joint proposal to + the Committee on Disarmament.” (Documents on + Disarmament, 1979, pp. 225–229)

+

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to chemical weapons.]

+
+ +
+ 102. Telegram From the Mission in Geneva to the Department of + StateSource: National + Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign + Policy File, D790401–1186. Confidential; Priority. Sent for + information to Moscow. The tenth round of negotiations began on July + 16. (Telegram 12183 from the Mission in Geneva, July 18; National + Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign + Policy File, D790327–0968) + Geneva, September 3, 1979, 0955Z +

14555. Subject: US–USSR Chemical Weapons (CW) Negotiations, Round Ten: Ninth (Final) + Plenary Meeting, August 31, 1979.

+

CW Message No. 19

+ +

1. (Confidential—Entire text)

+

2. Summary: At ninth (final) plenary meeting, held August 31, both + Delegations gave wrap-up statements. US + Del head Fisher outlined accomplishments of round, drew attention + to issues involved in drafting work and proposed both sides consider + increasing resources devoted to bilaterals. Soviet Delhead reviewed + accomplishments and made plea for common US–USSR approach to the + work of the Committee on Disarmament in the chemical weapons field. + Discussion of verification issues begun at previous meeting was + continued. End Summary.

+

3. Ninth (final) plenary meeting was held Friday, August 31, 1979. + Prepared statements were presented by both sides.

+

4. Statements by US + Del head (Amb. A.J. Fisher) contained overview of the + round.

+

A. Accomplishments: Fisher said + that, overall, the US Delegation + believed that round ten had been successful. He noted that in latter + stages of the round the negotiations had intensified. In Fisher’s view the most important + accomplishments were the initiation of active discussions of + verification issues and initiation of efforts to draft language for a + joint initiative. He noted, on the other hand, that the major unresolved + issues remained the same.

+

B. Drafting group issues. Fisher + pointed out that, in order to permit the drafting group to complete its + work on the first three elements of a joint initiative issues in the + following areas needed to be resolved:

+

—Use of munitions for permitted purposes

+

—Treatment of irritants and herbicides

+

—Coverage of toxins

+

—Transfer of super-toxic chemicals to non-states parties

+

—Scope of the term “precursor”

+

C. Neglected issues. Fisher + expressed disappointment that it had not been possible to give priority + attention to resolving the issues of declaration of stocks and + procedures for challenge inspection. He pointed out that in the latter + case the US had not received a response + to proposals made well over a year ago.

+

D. Committee on Disarmament. With respect to the Committee on Disarmament + (CD), Fisher said US was studying the Soviet August 15 + suggestion that the two sides try to develop a common approach toward + possible CD work on the outline of a CW + convention, (as proposed by the Poles). The US hopes to respond well before the next round begins.

+

E. Delegation staffing. Fisher + pointed out the difficulties experienced in trying to have the same + Delegation members cover both the CD and the CW bilaterals. He proposed that, for next year, both sides + consider assigning a senior + political officer and several advisers solely to chemical + weapons-related work.

+

5. Soviet Del head (Amb. V.L. Israelyan) + also presented a wrap-up statement.

+

A. Overall assessment. Israelyan asserted that there had not been a + single major issue where the Soviet Del + did not present new views and proposals which took US views into account. He said that while + the major issues remained there had been an active and useful exchange + on verification.

+

B. Drafting group. Israelyan noted the promising beginning of efforts to + draft language for a joint initiative. He said that in this connection + the exchange of position summaries during the last round had been most + useful.The U.S. and Soviet position + summaries are in Telegram 12183 from the Mission in Geneva, July 18; + ibid. Enough time and attention should be devoted to drafting + in the next round. The drafting group should also give attention to + clarifying positions and narrowing areas of disagreement.

+

C. Committee on Disarmament (CD) both Delegations received verbal pat on + the back from Israelyan for presenting the detailed joint progress + report to the CD in July. Israelyan expressed concern, however, about + US-Soviet difference on how to deal + with CW related work of the CD. In his + view, first priority should be given to the success of the bilateral + negotiations. For this reason an effort should be made to coordinate + positions concerning possible CD work on the outline of a CW convention.

+

6. As at the previous plenary meeting, verification issues were discussed + extemporaneously.

+

A. Fisher responded to Soviet + question from previous meeting about US + suggestions for using verification procedures taken from the IAEA safeguards system, the Bilateral + Treaty on Peaceful Nuclear Explosions (PNET), and the Comprehensive Test + Ban (CTB) negotiations. He said that + each treaty requires specially tailored verification provisions. + However, all three cases mentioned by Soviets had a common element; + on-site inspections had been agreed on in advance and provided for in + the convention. While the balance between challenge inspection and + systematic inspection for a CW + convention had to be tailored to its special situation, the other three + cases could provide a guide.

+

B. Israelyan agreed that every treaty required verification provisions + suited to the particular nature of the agreement; there can be no + general approach. He said that Soviet side is seeking the most effective + system for verification of chemical weapons prohibition. In the Soviet + view, lack of effectiveness + is just as important an objection to the US approach as the risk the US approach poses to commercial and national security + interests. Israelyan said visits to declared locations, as proposed by + the US, might only create an illusion of + compliance. USSR believes that a + combination of national declarations and challenge inspection would + provide the most effective verification system

+

7. Deputies made brief report on progress in the drafting group. Focus + was on substantive issues which need to be resolved in order to complete + the first three elements (basic prohibition, definitions, + non-transfer/non-assistance). More terms may have to be included in + “definitions” element as work on additional elements is undertaken.

+ + Sorenson + +
+ +
+ 103. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense Brown to the President’s Assistant for National Security + Affairs (Brzezinski)Source: Library of Congress, + Manuscript Division, Harold + Brown Papers, Box 61, Chemical/Biological Weapons. + Secret. + Washington, October + 4, 1979 + + SUBJECT + Binary Chemical Munitions Facility + +

My memorandum of May 24, 1979See Document 100. pointed out the + concern felt by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and myself + regarding the need to maintain effective means of monitoring compliance + with any agreement which is reached with the Soviets to ban chemical + weapons. It also requested review of the 1978 decision to defer funding + for the binary munitions facility. Your response suggested we examine + this decision in connection with the FY + 1981 budget review process.

+

We have been participating in the bilateral negotiations with the Soviets + since 1976 and see little or no movement on their part to resolve + critical differences. In view of the continuing degradation of our + deterrent stockpile and the serious asymmetry of capabilities in this + area, I directed that the binary chemical munitions facility be included + in the Department of the Army basic budget submission in the amount of + $19 million. I believe this + action will provide the Soviets a clear indication of our + dissatisfaction with the negotiations, and will signal the increasing + difficulty of exercising restraint in our own chemical warfare + capabilities while negotiations toward a comprehensive ban continue + without progress.

+

Please inform the other concerned agencies of this action and solicit + their views. If any agency forwards a nonconcurrence, then the SCC should resolve the issue in time to + insure a decision prior to forwarding the FY 1981 budget to the President.

+ + Harold + Brown + +
+ +
+ 104. Summary of Conclusions of a Mini-Special Coordination Committee + MeetingSource: Carter + Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Brzezinski Office File, Box 81, Chemical and + Biological Warfare, 1–6/80. Confidential. The meeting took place in + the White House Situation Room. + Washington, January 24, + 1980, 3:30–5:00 p.m. + + SUBJECT + Committee on Disarmament Involvement in CW Negotiations (C) + + + PARTICIPANTS + + State + Jerome Kahan (Dep. Director—Bureau of Politico-Military + Affairs) + Stephen Steiner (Dep. Director—Office of Disarmament & + Arms Control) + + + OSD + Dr. Lynn Davis (Dept. + Asst. Sec. for Policy Plans & NSC Affairs) + Ms. Shelia Buckley (Director, Negotiating Policy) + + + JCS + General John Pustay (Asst. to the Chairman) + + + DCI + Ray McCrory (Chief, SALT + Staff) + [name not declassified] (Office of + Scientific Intelligence) + + + + ACDA + Spurgeon Keeny + (Acting Director) + Alan Neidle (Dep. Asst. Director for Multi-Lateral + Affairs) + Charles Floweree (Chief, Intelligence Relations + Division) + + + OSTP + John Marcum (Senior Policy Analyst) + + + White House + David Aaron + + + NSC + General Jasper Welch + Jerry + Oplinger + Marshall Brement + Jim Rentschler + + +

The mini-SCC met to review whether the + U.S. should now agree to the formation of a CD Working Group to begin + discussion of CW issues. (C)

+

Keeny reviewed the current + situation. In the bilateral negotiation, progress has been very slow + because of Soviet intransigeance on basic issues, above all verification + questions. Our substantive position is clearly defined and we want a + treaty on our terms, but the prospects are not now encouraging. + Pressures have mounted for multilateral involvement; our allies and + others strongly desire it and the Soviets support it. Our isolation on + this question is politically costly and not helping to achieve our + objective. ACDA believes we should + agree to the formation of a CD Working Group with a one-year mandate to + compile a list of topics to be covered by a treaty.ACDA’s position + is laid out in a memorandum from Davies to Brzezinski, January 22; + Ibid. This will put pressure on the Soviets on substantive + questions. (C)

+

David Aaron asked what other + matters are on the CD agenda this year. Floweree said they will be + considering: 1) RW, 2) CW, 3) negative + security assurances, and 4) comprehensive program for + disarmament. (U)

+

Kahan reviewed the foreign policy considerations involved. The Soviets + are stonewalling in the bilateral negotiation and exploiting our + isolation on the CD question, making it appear that the U.S. is the + intransigeant party. The Soviets are vulnerable on their positions, and + also on their reported use of chemical weapons in Southeast Asia and

+

Afghanistan.Reports that the Soviet Union’s ally Vietnam had + employed chemical weapons against tribes in Laos and Cambodia had + been publicized by the ACDA and + the CIA on December 12, 1979. On + December 20, the U.S. House of Representatives passed a Resolution + condemning such actions. (“Statement by the ACDA Assistant Director for + Multilateral Affairs (Davies) Before a Subcommittee of the House + Committee on Foreign Affairs: Use of Chemical Weapons in Indochina, + December 12, 1979,” “Central Intelligence Agency Paper: Chemical + Warfare in Laos, December 12, 1979,” and “House Resolution 512: Use + of Chemical Agents in Indochina, December 20, 1979,” in Documents on Disarmament, 1979, pp. 810–814, + 820–821) Regarding the use of chemical weapons in Afghanistan by + Soviet forces, telegram 20775 to Conakry and other posts, January + 24, contains the text of Department of State Press Secretary Hodding Carter + III’s statement concerning “unconfirmed” press reports that the + Soviets had used chemical weapons in Afghanistan. He linked these + reports to previous allegations about the use of chemical weapons by + Laos and Vietnam. Carter + said that if the reports were true, “such action would be an + outrageous and inhuman act against defenseless peoples” and made the + conclusion of a chemical weapons convention more “urgent.” (National + Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign + Policy File, D800042–0556) Thus, CD involvement can help to + bring pressure on them in the bilateral. The allies have consistently + indicated their strong desire for CD involvement, both before and since + the Afghanistan invasion.The Soviet Union + invaded Afghanistan on December 24, 1979. Documentation is scheduled + for publication in Foreign Relations, 1977–1980, vol. XII, + Afghanistan. They want serious verification + provisions and will strongly support us. France has just entered the CD + arena; French views and interests on this subject are similar to our + own. By accommodating these allied pressures, we will gain political + credit and improve our position vis-a-vis the Soviets. The nonaligned do + not understand many of the issues, and this provides an opportunity to + educate them and expose the weakness of the Soviet position; the + majority is likely to support us. The PRC will take its seat for the first time this year, and + has expressed an interest in CW; this + provides an opportunity to work with them on an arms control issue. If + we maintain our present position, the PRC will be frustrated and complain of superpower + dominance. (C)

+

General Pustay said that the JCS views + the problem in a military context; the Soviets are well ahead in CW capabilities and we can neither deter or + respond in kind. Only the bilateral forum can provide a negotiated + solution. If we yield now to pressures for multilateral involvement, we + will create expectations for a treaty which may well be translated into + later pressures for relaxation of our substantive position. It is better + to take minimum losses now than larger losses later. The Joint Chiefs + also believe that the U.S. should review our entire position on CW in light of the lack of progress, and + reconsider the question of CW + modernization. (C)

+

Davis said that the Secretary of Defense supports the Joint Chiefs on + modernization and on the need to proceed with a binary facility. But + OSD does not believe that the + tactical question of CD involvement is linked to these issues, and need + not prejudice them. (C)

+ +

Aaron suggested that we take + advantage of the upcoming consultations with allied and other western + countries to build a strong consensus as a basis for US agreement to CD involvement. We would + make clear that we have not yet decided, but are considering a shift in + our past position if satisfactory assurances are + received that we will have strong support to avoid expansion of the CD’s + role or erosion of our position on verification. To reduce the problem + of raising false expectations, we will emphasize that we would take this + step because of the lack of progress in the bilateral, and need to be + sure that it will strengthen, not weaken, prospects for a satisfactory + bilateral outcome. We would then take a final decision before the + opening of the CD session on February 6, in the light of responses to + this approach. (C)

+

There was general consensus with this approach, except for the JCS representative who said that he was + unable to concur. (C)

+
+ +
+ 105. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security + Affairs (Brzezinski) to President + CarterSource: Carter Library, National + Security Affairs, Brzezinski + Material, Brzezinski Office + File, Box 81, Chemical and Warfare, 1–6/80. Secret. Sent for + information. Carter + initialed the top of the memorandum. + Washington, January + 25, 1980 + + SUBJECT + Chemical Weapons (U) + +

A Mini-SCC chaired by David AaronSee Document 104. has discussed + whether the US should change its + negotiating tactics to allow the Committee on Disarmament (CD) to begin + limited multilateral discussion of a CW + treaty. State, ACDA, and OSD favor such a shift on the grounds that + it will end our present and costly isolation on the question and will be + helpful to our position in the US-Soviet + bilateral negotiation. The JCS strongly + opposes the shift; they believe it will increase expectations for a + treaty and eventually create pressures for relaxation of our substantive + positions. It was decided that in upcoming consultations with key allies + and other western nations, we will indicate that we are considering a + shift if we can be assured of strong support to + keep the CD’s mandate narrowly limited, and in protecting our + substantive position. A final decision will be made in light of responses received. The JCS representative noted that he could not + concur in this approach. (S)

+
+ +
+ 106. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in + FranceSource: National + Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign + Policy File, D800044–0544. Confidential; Immediate. Drafted by + Robert Mikulak (ACDA/MA/AT); and approved by Flowerree (ACDA/MA), Oplinger (NSC), Ronald Lorton (NEA/PAB), (Merle MacDonald (OSD), Steven Steiner (PM/DCA), Edmund + McWilliams (EA/VLC), M. Christine Vick (EUR/RPM), and Manuel Sanches + (JCS). Sent for information to + London, Bonn, USUN, USNATO, the Mission in Geneva, + Moscow, and Vientiane. + Washington, January 26, 1980, 0059Z +

21764. Subject: Allied Consultations on Chemical Weapons (CW) Negotiations. Ref: A. State + 002066,Telegram 002066 from the + Department of State, January 4, described the discussion that had + occurred in December in Washington between PM Deputy Director Kahan and the French Ambassador to + the CD, De la Gorce, about the reported use of chemical weapons in + Southeast Asia. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + D800008–0872. B. State 020775.See footnote 3, Document + 104.

+

1. (C—Entire text).

+

2. This message provides guidance for the US Delegation participating in bilateral (US-France) and quadrilateral (US-UK-FRG-France) CW consultations in Paris on January 28 and + consultations with the Japanese CD Delegation in Geneva. Guidance on the + subject of a CD working group on CW will + be provided septel.Not found.

+

3. US-French consultations.

+

A. The purpose of the bilateral consultations is to discuss the reported + use of Chemical Weapons in Laos, and Kampuchea and to consider + possibilities for diplomatic action (see Ref A). We would also at that + time discuss our concerns relating to Afghanistan.

+

B. The Delegation should brief the French on the reported use of Chemical + Weapons in Laos, Kampuchea, and Afghanistan, drawing on intelligence + data provided separately, USG + statements issued on the subject and the background package on Southeast Asia (contained + A–0020)Not found.

+

C. The overall message of the briefing with regard to Southeast Asia + should be that:

+

(1) While we do not have absolute proof, the results of USG investigations support the conclusion + that some chemical agent or combination of agents has been used in Laos + as part of the Lao Government’s effort to bring the H’mong Hill tribes + under its control;

+

(2) There is also limited evidence that it has been used in Kampuchea; + and

+

(3) The US is very concerned by the + reports and believes concerted international diplomatic action could + contribute to a resolution of the problem.

+

D. The Delegation should also seek to draw the French out on relevant + intelligence and other information available to them on use of CW in Southeast Asia.

+

E. Possibilities for further diplomatic action which should be discussed + include:

+

—Démarches by France, UK, FRG, and possibly other interested + countries, similar to those already made by the US to the governments of Laos, Vietnam, and the Soviet + Union regarding use of CW in Southeast + Asia;

+

—Efforts to have an investigation by an impartial international body + (e.g., the International Committee of the Red Cross);

+

—Expressions of concern and any appropriate action in international + political bodies (e.g., the UNGA, + Security Council, Committee on Disarmament); and

+

—In conjunction with requests from concerned states, possible action by + French as 1925 Geneva protocol depositary to convene a meeting of + protocol parties to consider the issue.

+

F. For briefing on Afghanistan, Delegation should draw on Ref B.

+

4. Quadrilateral consultations.

+

The Delegation should consult with the allies on:

+

A. The US–USSR bilateral negotiations on a CW ban (guidance para + 5);

+

B. The role of the Committee on Disarmament (CD) on the CW issue; and

+ +

C. The reported use of Chemical Weapons in Laos, Kampuchea and + Afghanistan, including possibilities for further diplomatic action + (guidance para 7).

+

5. Bilateral Negotiations.

+

A. The Delegation should begin by giving our reasons for having + rescheduled the start of CW round + eleven.Telegram 4614 from the + Department of State, undated, asked for the postponement of the + talks until February 6. (Telegram 14321 to Moscow, January 19, 1980; + National Archives, RG 59, Central + Foreign Policy File, D800032–0105)

+

B. The Delegation should review at an appropriate level of detail the + state-of play in the bilateral negotiations, drawing on the wrap-up + cable from round ten (79 Geneva 14533).Not + found.

+

C. During round eleven the US will:

+

(1) Continue to give priority attention to major unresolved issues, + particularly verification; and

+

(2) Continue drafting in order to nail down points thought to be + agreed.

+

D. In view of past allied interest in these topics, the Delegation should + indicate to the allies that the round eleven guidance authorizes the + Delegation:

+

—To discuss possible mutually agreed procedures for mothballing declared + facilities. Our objective is to facilitate verification by eventually + specifying which actions can and cannot be taken.

+

—To be prepared to agree to a scaled-down version of the Soviet proposal + on declaration of past transfers. We will attempt to trade US agreement on this proposal for Soviet + willingness to accommodate the US + proposal for exchange of information on CW protective activities.

+

—To explore, in the event the current US + effort to keep safe riot control agents and herbicides out of the + convention entirely is rejected, the possibility of adopting legally + binding constraints consistent with our policy on permitted uses in + return for more explicit recognition of those permitted uses.

+

E. The US Delegation will continue to + brief allied representatives in Geneva during the course of the + negotiations. In addition, we would be willing to hold consultations + with the UK, FRG and France at the end of the round.

+

6. The role of the CD on the CW issue. + Guidance on the question of a working group will be provided septel. In connection with the + discussion of the working group proposal, Delegation might also explore + briefly allied views on the Australian proposal to hold small informal + technical seminars on CW to acquaint + working level members of interested Delegation with some of the technical complexities of the issue. + Delegation may tell the allies that, as we understand the proposal, such + seminars would serve as a technical foundation for any future CD efforts + on CW. (One possibility for a US presentation might be a briefing on + destruction of stocks). Del may + indicate US willingness to participate + in such seminars and encourage our allies to do so as well.

+

7. Laos, Kampuchea and Afghanistan.

+

The Delegation should briefly review the situation for the allies and + seek their views on further diplomatic action. In this discussion US reps may draw on the guidance (para 3 above) for the US-French consultations and on the results + of those consultations.

+

8. US-Japanese consultations.

+

In line with past practice, US reps + should seek an early opportunity to meet in Geneva with Japanese CD + Delegation. At the meeting US reps may + draw upon guidance for Paris consultations (paras 3–6 above).

+ + Christopher + +
+ +
+ 107. Telegram From Embassy in France to the Department of StateSource: National Archives, + RG 59, Central Foreign Policy + File, D800051–0597. Confidential; Priority. Sent for information to + Bonn, London, the Mission in Geneva, USNATO, USUN, and + Moscow. + Paris, January 29, 1980, 1645Z +

3210. Subj: (C) Allied Consultations on Chemical Weapons (CW) Issues: US-Soviet Negotiations. Ref: A) State 21764See Document 106. + B) 79 Geneva 14533.Not found.

+

1. C—Entire text.

+

2. Summary: In quadrilateral CW + consultations, US reps briefed allies on + bilateral US-Soviet CW negotiations. Allies raised a number of + detailed questions. Discussion centered around verification of a CW prohibition. End summary.

+

3. Quadrilateral (US-UK-FRG-France) consultations on Chemical Weapons (CW) issues were held in Paris on January + 28, 1980. This telegram + contains report of US reps on discussion + of the US–USSR + CW negotiations. Septels report discussions of a CW working group in the committee on + disarmament (CD) and of the reported use of CW in Laos,Telegram 3199 from + the Embassy in Paris, January 29, reported the discussions on the + use of chemical weapons. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800073–1105) The + telegram discussing a chemical weapons working group in the CD was + not found. Kampuchea and Afghanistan.

+

4. US–USSR Chemical Weapons negotiations.

+

A. Akalovsky (US + Del head) began by stating US desire to continue CW arms control negotiations and explaining + reason for postponement of consultations. He said that in the course of + reviewing the US relationship with the + Soviets and deciding on appropriate actions to take in response to their + invasion of Afghanistan, USG concluded + that CW arms control should continue to + be pursued. This decision was taken both because of the important + international dimension associated with CW and because it is clearly in US security interests to pursue a comprehensive CW prohibition. We were sensitive, + nonetheless, to the impression which could be created by resuming a + security-related bilateral negotiation within days of announcing a + series of retaliatory steps against the Soviets.Reference is to the debates within the Carter administration and NATO about whether or not to + retaliate against the Soviet Union after it invaded Afghanistan. For + more on this subject, see Foreign Relations, 1977–1980, vol. XII, + Afghanistan. Therefore, we proposed to the Soviets + that the start of the next round of the bilaterals be rescheduled to + correspond with the opening of the CD. The Soviets agreed to resume the + talks February 11. US view, in light of + the as yet unconfirmed reports that CW + is being used in Afghanistan and the evidence that it has been used + recently in Southeast Asia, is that it is now all the more urgent and + important to continue to press on CW + arms control and conclude agreement on a comprehensive and verifiable + CW prohibition. In any event, US needed this extra time in order to + prepare better for these consultations as there are other important + CW-related matters which we felt + should be discussed, including Southeast Asia-Afghanistan and the + question of how to handle CW in the + CD.

+

B. Drawing fully on wrap-up telegram from round ten (Ref B) Akalovsky + outlined noteworthy aspects of most recent round of bilateral + negotiations and summarized positive and negative aspects of the round. + As instructed Ref A, he informed allies that in next round US + Del will continue to give priority + attention to major unresolved issues, particularly verification. Del will also seek to continue drafting to + nail down points thought to be agreed. Akalovsky informed allies of key + points in Del’s guidance, as given Ref + A, para 5C.

+ +

C. Kunz (FRG + Del head) recalled strong German + support for mandatory on-site inspection of civil as well as military + chemical industries and asked for clarification of US views. He noted that effort to press + Soviets on this issue could have tactical value but stressed that the + FRG did not want to embarrass the + US by having a stronger position on + this particular question. The FRG would + be prepared to drop its insistence on such inspection if the US wished. Akalovsky responded that while + the US did not favor this form of + inspection in a CW convention, it would + be useful for the FRG to maintain its + position for the time being to put as much pressure as possible on the + Soviet verification position. Reeve, UK + Del head, added that it was difficult + to see how the treaty could operate without mandatory inspection of + civil industry.

+

D. Kunz asked whether US expected + momentum from end of round ten to be maintained in next round. Citing + press reports to this effect, he asked whether the US planned to enhance its CW capabilities in order to put more + negotiating pressure on the Soviets. Akalovsky said that while the end + of round ten was active in comparison with the almost total inaction at + the beginning of the round, this development should not be + overemphasized. He noted that no funds for binary Chemical Weapons have + been included in the new defense budget. The issue will be reviewed late + this year. Progress in the bilateral negotiations will be one of the + factors considered. Akalovsky added that there is growing concern in the + USG that Soviets are stonewalling + on verification in the knowledge that the US offensive CW capability + continues to deteriorate.

+

E. Reeve (UK) asked a series of questions + on relatively technical aspects of the US negotiating position in the bilaterals. In response to + UK inquiry as to whether special + verification provisions were necessary for binary Chemical Weapons, + Akalovsky said that US believed that + binaries were adequately dealt with by generally applicable verification + provisions. He answered UK question on + possibility of a separate verification agreement with limited + participation (as in CTB) saying US did not envision such an + arrangement.

+

F. Responding to UK question about need + to allow ten years for destruction of stocks, Akalovsky said this period + had already been agreed. Sanches (US) + said US analyses showed ten years to be + necessary. When Reeve inquired how many third world countries possessed + CW stocks, Akalovsky responded + saying he did not have this information immediately available, but that + it might be possible to exchange such data through other channels.

+

G. Reeve asked whether US believed CW treaty could be adequately verified by + combination of national technical means and on-site inspection. + Akalovsky noted that no agreement can be foolproof, but that if all elements of the US verification position were accepted, + adequate confidence would exist.

+

H. French also raised a series of detailed questions d’Aboville (French + Del head) asked rhetorically if it + might not be possible to have separate verification agreements for those + parties which possessed CW stocks and + those which did not. He also noted that Soviet position on verification + contains internal contradictions which could be exploited by allies. In + response to question about verification provisions for non-transfer, + Akalovsky (US) said that no specific + provisions had been proposed and that suspected transfers could be + investigated using the challenge inspection provisions.

+

5. Akalovsky (US) said US would continue to brief allies in Geneva + and offered to have quadrilateral consultations at the end of next round + of US-Soviet negotiations, if that were + generally desired.

+

6. Following completion of quadrilateral consultations, Mikulak and + Sanches met with French experts, at their request, to clarify points of + uncertainty identified in French comparison of US and Soviet positions.

+

[Omitted here is the list of participants.]

+
+ +
+ 108. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission in + GenevaSource: National + Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign + Policy File, D800077–0811. Confidential; Immediate. Drafted by + Robert Mikulak (ACDA/MA/AT); cleared by Flowerree (ACDA/MA), David Carlson (PM/DCA), + Oplinger (NSC), Merle MacDonald (OSD), Harry Wilson (JCS), and [name not + declassified]; and approved by Thomas Davies (ACDA/MA). + Sent for information to Moscow, USNATO, London, Bonn, and Paris. + Washington, February 13, 1980, + 1422Z +

39607. Subject: US–USSR Chemical Weapons Negotiations, Round + Eleven: Guidance. Ref: 79 Geneva 14553.Not + found. State CW Message No. + 2.

+

1. (C—Entire text)

+

2. This message provides general guidance for round eleven. Detailed + responses to the questions posed Reftel are being provided separately in + the guidance package.Not found. + Highlights are outlined below.

+ +

3. At the opening of the round the Delegation should say that the US is deeply disturbed by reports that + Chemical Weapons have been used in Laos, Kampuchea, and Afghanistan. + These reports make it all the more important to negotiate a complete, + effective and verifiable prohibition of chemical weapons. The bilateral + negotiations can be instrumental in achievement of that goal. Delegation + should state (A) US expects all states + to observe the principles and objectives of the Geneva protocol and (B) + US hopes that USSR will join with US in reaffirming publicly support for the + protocol.

+

4. During round eleven the Delegation’s strategy should be to:

+

A. Emphasize the US expectation that the + pace undertaken in the latter half of round ten will be continued and + perhaps accelerated;

+

B. Continue to give priority attention to major unresolved issues, + particularly verification-related issues (including declarations); + and

+

C. Continue drafting in order to reaffirm and define precisely points + thought to be agreed. (The Delegation should continue to be guided by + the format and substance contained in the position summary provided to + the Soviets during round nine.)

+

5. Key points in the guidance package:

+

A. Discussion points have been provided on the possibility of attaining + mutually agreed procedures for mothballing declared facilities. Our + objective is to facilitate verification by eventually specifying which + actions can and cannot be taken.

+

B. Guidance is provided for responding to Soviet round ten statements on + verification and on declarations.

+

C. The Delegation is authorized to agree to a scaled-down version of the + Soviet proposal on declaration of past transfers. If possible US agreement on this proposal should be + traded for Soviet willingness to accommodate the US proposal for exchange of information on CW protective activities (round 5 + guidance).

+

D. Further guidance on safe riot control chemicals and herbicides is + included in the package.

+

6. The Delegation should continue to brief allied representatives in + Geneva during the course of the negotiations. In addition an offer + should be made to hold quadrilateral consultations with the US, FRG + and France at the end of the round.

+ + Vance + +
+ +
+ + 109. Memorandum From the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament + Agency (Earle) to the President’s + Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)Source: Carter Library, National Security Council, Institutional + Files, Box 110, SCC 288, USSR + CBW Convention, 3/14/80. + Secret. + Washington, March + 5, 1980 + + SUBJECT + Possible Soviet Biological Weapons Activities + +

There is a growing body of evidence—[less than 1 line + not declassified]—pointing toward the occurrence of a serious + accident in April 1979 at a facility in Sverdlovsk which has long been + suspected of being involved in biological warfare (BW) activities.

+

One interpretation of the accident is that a large amount of dry BW agent was released into the air as a + result of an explosion at the facility. The presence of a large amount + of BW agent would raise a question + regarding Soviet compliance with the BW + Convention’s prohibition on production and stockpiling of BW agent.

+

Given the potential seriousness of this situation, and the fact that the + BW Convention Review Conference is + underway in Geneva,The Biological Weapons + Convention met in Geneva from March 3 to March 21. I believe + we should review this matter on an urgent basis. The first step would be + the preparation as quickly as possible of a thorough all-source + intelligence assessment of the incident. We have asked CIA to expedite publication of such an + assessment, and I understand that a coordinated report should be + available in the next few days.

+

Depending on the intelligence assessment, we should consider whether it + would be appropriate to bring this matter up with the Soviets—and + whether to do so before the Review Conference concludes around March + 21st. In this connection, I note that Article V of the Treaty provides + for direct consultations between Parties, while Article VI provides for + a formal process for complaints being lodged with the UN after a Party “finds” that any other + Party is in violation. We may also have to decide what position to take + on past compliance in the final document of the Review Conference.

+ + Ralph + Earle IIEarle signed the memorandum + “Ralph.” Under his signature, he wrote “I have discussed the + substance of this memo with Cy, who agrees and suggests that we + have an SCC meeting as soon as + possible after receipt of the intelligence assessment. RWE.” + +
+ +
+ + 110. Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the Department of + State (Tarnoff) to the + President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)Source: Carter Library, National Security Council, + Institutional Files, Box 110, SCC + 288, USSR + CBW Convention, 3/14/80. Secret. + Copies were sent to the ACDA, + JCS, OSD, and the CIA. + Washington, March + 7, 1980 + + SUBJECT + Reported Use of Chemical Weapons + +

As you know, we are continuing to receive and analyze reports of the use + of lethal chemical weapons (CW) by the + Soviets and some of their friends in Afghanistan, Laos, and Kampuchea. + Press and Congressional + attention is intensifying.

+

Efforts to Date

+

We have taken a substantial number of steps to assemble pertinent data + and make our concerns known. Our country officers conducted the first + systematic interviews of Hmong refugees and took the initial steps on + the diplomatic front to raise the level of consciousness regarding + reported use of gas in Laos and Kampuchea. Working with Defense, we + organized a very professional investigation by a medical team sent to + refugee camps in Thailand. We have made démarches to the parties + concerned with regard to use in Indochina and have had our Delegations + express concern over the reports in general in the Human Rights + Commission (HRC), the Committee on Disarmament (CD), and the US/Soviet + negotiations on CW.

+

Strategy for the Future

+

We have thought through a broad internationally-oriented strategy that + builds on the actions already taken—a strategy intended to mobilize our + allies and other concerned states behind the effort to resolve the + CW use issue. We particularly need + an investigation into the reports by some impartial third party or + international group. However, for this approach to succeed we must be + careful so that we can avoid being perceived as attempting to engage + others in the growing East/West rivalry.

+

The strategy consists of seven interrelated parts, setting out a number + of actions to involve other states and appropriate international fora + more actively in the issue. Specifically:

+ +

—Intensified collection efforts to further + substantiate the reports, particularly but not exclusively focused on + Afghanistan—[less than 1 line not + declassified] Working with [less than 1 line + not declassified] other countries, we will press for + acquisition of physical data (e.g., gas residue, empty canisters or dud + rounds, blood samples from victims). We are examining the feasibility of + sending a US medical team to Pakistan to + interview Afghan refugees who may have first-hand knowledge of CW use.

+

—Consulting with Allies and other interested + countries, stressing US concern + over the reports; providing briefings; and seeking support for our + strategy.

+

—Stimulating multilateral action, most importantly + an investigation into this matter by a disinterested third party or an + apolitical international organization. In the HRC and appropriate + committees of the UNGA we will request + that an observer team investigate the reports and/or that the SYG appoint an ad + hoc Experts Group to study the issue. As this is unlikely to + work, we are also considering other international bodies and + approaches.

+

—Consulting further with the French on their idea + of convening a meeting of the States Parties to the 1925 Geneva Protocol + to look into the reports.

+

—Making appropriate démarches to the countries + involved whenever the intelligence justifies an approach.

+

—Public expressions of concern, continuing to say + that if the apparently credible reports are true, we would regard such + use as outrageous and inhumane.

+

—Keeping Congress well informed. And thorough + documentation of our actions, as a report on this issue is owed the + House Foreign Affairs Committee in four months.

+

We will continue to pursue this strategy vigorously, working with your + staff and appropriate agencies in its implementation.

+ + Peter + TarnoffExecutive + Secretary + +
+ +
+ + 111. Intelligence AssessmentSource: Carter Library, National Security Council, Institutional + Files, Box 110, SCC 288, USSR + CBW Convention, 3/14/80. Secret. + The Department of State forwarded the assessment to Moscow and the + Mission in Geneva in telegram 68653, March 15. (National Archives, + RG 59, Central Foreign Policy + File, P880025–0592) + Washington, March + 10, 1980 +

Intelligence Community Assessment of Disease Outbreak in + Sverdlovsk (C)

+

The Weapon and Space Systems Intelligence Committee has reviewed all + available intelligence to determine if a reported disease outbreak in + the Soviet Union in April 1979 was associated with a biological warfare + program and has determined the following: (C)

+

An extraordinary outbreak of a disease, probably pulmonary anthrax, + occurred at Sverdlovsk in April 1979. (S)

+

The number of deaths and the virulence of the disease were significant + enough to force the Soviets to impose a quarantine in the area. The + situation was not brought under control until late May 1979. (S)

+

The outbreak in the city was a result of an accident in southwest + Sverdlovsk at the military facility that has long been suspected of + being engaged in research and development on biological warfare agents. + (S)

+

The nature of the accident and the resultant number of disease victims + strongly indicate that the quantity of infectious agent exceeds that + reasonably expected to be required for prophylactic, protection, or + other peaceful purposes. (S)

+

The official silence on this incident is in sharp contrast to usual + public announcements of naturally occurring disease epidemics in the + USSR. (U)

+

[less than 1 line not declassified] has provided + consistent information regarding time, location, and a disease outbreak + associated with a military biological warfare facility and has been + supported by [less than 1 line not declassified] + Specific details provided by these sources are technically accurate and + does provide a plausible explanation for what happened. (S)

+

We have considered explanations of this incident other than the release + of a large quantity of disease-producing agent from a biological warfare + facility. None of these alternatives, including an improperly conducted + vaccine testing or production program, adequately explains what + occurred. Therefore, the Weapon and Space Systems Intelligence + Committee, with the exception of State Department, concludes that there + is a high probability that the Soviets still have an active biological + warfare agent program at this Sverdlovsk facility. (S)

+ +

State Department believes that the April 1979 accident + provides evidence that biological warfare stocks were involved; but + that there is not adequate evidence to conclude that the facility is + involved in current biological warfare production. (S)

+
+ +
+ 112. Summary of Conclusions of a Special Coordination Committee + MeetingSource: Carter + Library, National Security Council, Institutional Files, Box 110, + SCC 288, USSR + CBW Convention, 3/14/80. Secret. + The meeting took place in the White House Situation + Room. + Washington, March 14, 1980, + 9:00–10:00 a.m. + + SUBJECT + Soviet Compliance with Biological Warfare Convention + + + PARTICIPANTS + State + Warren Christopher + Jerome Kahan Dep. Dir., Pol-Mil Affairs + Defense + Harold Brown + Walter Slocombe Dep. Under + Secretary for Policy + ACDA + Ralph Earle + Spurgeon Keeny Deputy + Director + JCS + Gen. David Jones + Lt. Gen. John Pustay + DOE + John Deutsch Under Secretary + White House + David Aaron + NSC + Maj. Gen. Jasper Welch + Marshall Brement + OSTP + Frank Press + Ben Huberman + CIA + Stanfield Turner + [name not declassified] Office of Strategic + Weapons Research + OMB + Randy Jayne Assoc. Dir., NSIA + +

It was agreed that the [less than 1 line not + declassified] data in hand ([less than 1 line + not declassified] Soviet official silence) supports that there + was a major accident in Sverdlovsk in April 1979 in which a cloud of + agent escaped from a military facility long suspected to be a biological + warfare facility and subsequently infected people in the local vicinity + of the facility, causing between [numbers not + declassified] deaths [less than 1 line not + declassified] due to anthrax, a known biological warfare agent. The number and distribution + of victims, the military jurisdiction over the subsequent quarantine, + the inspection of materials leaving the city during the quarantine, and + the visit of a high-level commission from Moscow early in the quarantine + [less than 1 line not declassified] that the + quantity of agent involved exceeds that permissible under the Biological + Warfare ConventionSee footnote 4, Document 81. for public health + purposes. No other hypothesis has been advanced which could reasonably + explain the [less than 1 line not declassified] + reports. (FYI: These reports have been + trickling in since the summer of 1979, but only on 10 March did the + Intelligence Community come to a formal determination of the conclusions + outlined above. End FYI) (S)

+

It was noted that the BW Convention + negotiating record on what quantity is allowed for these purposes is + somewhat ambiguous: the U.S. used the phrase “laboratory quantities,” + whereas the Soviets stuck to “certain quantities.” Therefore, there is + no numerically defined quantity for the permissible amount. (S)

+

Nonetheless, it was agreed that the incident raises serious issues of + compliance by the Soviet Union of the Biological Warfare Convention. + Further, although the evidence contains some ambiguity, it is + sufficiently persuasive that it cannot be ignored and is sufficient to + merit raising with the Soviet Union under Article V of the Biological + Warfare Convention, which provides for direct consultation in such + circumstances. It was further agreed that the evidence in this case is + about as good as we can expect to have for monitoring compliance with + this BW Convention, and testimony at the + time of ratification so indicated. (S)

+

It was agreed that the appropriate channel for approaching the Soviets + was from Ambassador Watson to + the Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister in Moscow. State will prepare an + appropriate cable whose purpose will be to get a serious and + businesslike response, to indicate the seriousness with which the U.S. + Government takes the matter, and to indicate we believe a satisfactory + resolution has bearing on the success of other arms control + negotiations. (S)

+

It was noted that there is currently on-going in Geneva a Review + Conference on the Biological Warfare Convention which is scheduled to + finish on 21 March. Accordingly, the approach to the Soviets should be + made as soon as possible. (S)

+

With regard to instructions to our Delegation at the Review Conference, + it was agreed that: (1) we should inform the Soviet Delegation of our + approach in Moscow; (2) we should seek to avoid any language in the + Review Conference report which might indicate that there had been full + compliance with the Convention; (3) we should brief appropriate allied Delegations on the + reasons for our reservation on compliance; (4) we would not seek to + accuse the Soviets directly or to overly dramatize the situation pending + any Soviet response; and (5) we should not support a recent Swedish + initiative to amend the BW Convention to + provide for a Consultative Commission but consider support for a UK response to the Swedes which suggests + some consultative arrangements within the UN. (FYI: The Convention + now provides for private consultation and cooperation under Article V + and provides for raising unresolved issues in the UN Security Council under Article VI. The + thrust of the Swedish proposal is to provide an international body of + inquiry which would not be subject to major power veto; this non-veto + aspect has made the Swedish proposal attractive to many non-aligned + members of the Convention. End FYI) + (S)

+

It was noted that the extant intelligence information was briefed to the + intelligence communities yesterday. It was agreed that our approach to + the Soviets should be communicated to the Foreign Relations Committees + forthwith. (S)

+

It was noted that the Sverdlovsk incident was alleged in the German press + and brought forth a strong denial by Tass. It was + agreed that there is a high probability that the matter will shortly + come out in the U.S. press. It was also agreed that a working group will + prepare material suitable for briefing the U.S. press on background if that is later decided to be useful. (S)

+

It was agreed that a number of technical and intelligence points should + be followed up with some urgency. (C)

+
+ +
+ 113. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the + Soviet UnionSource: National + Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign + Policy File, P880025–0588. Secret; Niact Immediate; Nodis. Sent immediate to the Mission + in Geneva. Drafted by Mark Palmer (PM/DCA) and Martin Mclean + (EUR/SOV); cleared by Aaron + (NSC), Robert Martin (INR/PMT), + Marshall Brement (NSC), Shulman (S/MS), Earle (ACDA), Peter Wilson (S/P), Slocombe + (DUSD/PP), John Taylor (S/S–O), J.S. + (Pustay), McCrory (CIA), Jerome + Kahan (PM), and Robert Barry (EUR); and approved by Christopher (D). + Washington, March 15, 1980, 0509Z +

68654. Geneva for Ambassador Flowerree only. Subject: Sverdlovsk BW Incident.

+

1. (Secret—Entire text).

+ +

2. Summary and action requested. There is disturbing evidence pointing to + the release of lethal biological agent as the cause of numerous deaths + in Sverdlovsk, USSR, in April–May + 1979. The intelligence community’s present conclusions and report have + been sent to you septel.See footnote 1, Document + 111. Ambassador Watson is instructed to raise this matter with deputy + Foreign Minister Korniyenko as + soon as possible. Ambassador Flowerree should inform Ambassador Israelyan of the + démarche promptly after it is made in Moscow.On March 17, the Mission in Geneva reported that + when informed of the démarche, “Israelyan’s only reaction was to + bemoan the fact that this development would further complicate the + already difficult task of agreeing to a final declaration for the + BW Review Conference. He also + said that he had not been informed by Moscow of the US démarche.” (Telegram 4292 from the + Mission in Geneva, March 17; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + P870149–0757) End summary.

+

3. We are deeply concerned about the the incident in Sverdlovsk in April + 1979 and its implications. We wish to make a serious effort to discuss + this issue bilaterally in accordance with Article V of the Biological + Weapons (BW) Convention. Speed is + essential in view of the end of the BW + Convention Review Conference on March 21, and our desire to give the + Soviets as much time as possible to give USA considered response. It is + in both our interests to have at least a preliminary response before the + end of the Review Conference, since we will have to state at the + conference that we have raised a compliance issue.

+

4. Ambassador Watson should + personally make the following points as soon as possible to Korniyenko or, should he be + unavailable, to another official on the First Deputy Minister or Deputy + Minister level. Points should be provided in the form of a Non-Paper as + well.

+

A.—The United States and the Soviet Union have a continuing interest in + sustaining our mutual efforts to control the arms race.

+

B.—I have been instructed to raise a matter which potentially has + extremely serious implications for the future of arms control + negotiations between our countries and more specific bearing on the + Biological Weapons Convention.

+

C.—Although no public announcement was made by Soviet authorities, for + some time we have been aware of reports of an extraordinary outbreak of + disease which was apparently pulmonary anthrax, which caused numerous + deaths in Sverdlovsk in April 1979, and which resulted in the + establishment of a quarantine.

+

D.—We have now received further information which indicates that this + extraordinary outbreak appears to have been caused by the release of a + quantity of anthrax agent exceeding that justified for prophylactic, protective, or other peaceful + purposes and that it originated at a military facility in + Sverdlovsk.

+

E.—Article V of the Biological Weapons Convention provides that the + parties shall consult and cooperate with one another in solving any + problems which may arise. In accordance with that article, the US government is asking that the Soviet + government consult and cooperate with it and provide information to + explain this outbreak of disease in Sverdlovsk in April 1979.

+

F.—We want to deal with this matter in the same serious way in which we + have consulted on a number of questions involving compliance with arms + control agreements in recent years. Because of the implications + regarding compliance with the Convention itself and for other arms + control negotiations, we are raising this matter directly with you and + asking for prompt and full consultations. A simple denial in response to + this present US approach will not + advance the situation and will not serve our mutual interests.

+

G.—Since we are now in the process of consulting with you on a compliance + related question, we will make a statement before the Review Conference + concludes indicating that we are pursuing consultations in accordance + with Article V. Any response you can make to our request for + consultation and cooperation under Article V before the end of the + Review Conference will be taken into account in determining the + character of the statement we will make.

+

H.—Obviously, under these circumstances we would not be prepared to + approve language in the final document of the Review Conference which + states that no questions have arisen relating to compliance.

+

5. Embassy Moscow should inform Ambassador Flowerree immediately after Ambassador Watson sees Korniyenko. Ambassador Flowerree should then inform + Ambassador Israelyan of the démarche, and repeat points made in para 4 above.

+

6. For Geneva: We will provide additional guidance on Revcon and + consultations with Allies.

+ + Vance + +
+ +
+ + 114. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department + of StateSource: National + Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign + Policy File, P880025–0580. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Later that day, Watson sent an Eyes Only telegram + to Vance and said “I thought + I ought to tell you personally that if we cannot back up the + Sverdlovsk questions with substance, or if the Soviets are able to + prove their denial or shake our position in any way, we will further + reduce our precarious relationship with this country.” (Telegram + 4276 from Moscow, March 17; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + P900077–1675) + Moscow, March 17, 1980, 1031Z +

4225. Department repeat Geneva for Ambassador Flowerree. Subj: Démarche on + Sverdlovsk BW Issue. Refs: (A) Moscow + 4211,In telegram 4211 from Moscow, + March 17, Watson reported + that First Deputy Foreign Minister Georgi Korniyenko “questioned the motives” behind + the raising of the Sverdlovsk incident “at this stage, given the + fact that it did not arise during the several months that our + experts worked together in preparing a draft report for the Review + Conference.” (National Archives, RG + 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P870149–0757) (B) State + 70023,In Telegram 70023 to Moscow, + March 16, the Department of State instructed Watson to delete the final + sentence of paragraph 4 (F) of the Non-Paper Sverdlovsk incident + contained in Telegram 68654 (See Document + 113) and instead convey the sentence orally to Korniyenko. (National Archives, + RG 59, Central Foreign Policy + File, P880025–0585) (C) State 68654.See Document + 113.

+

1. (S—Entire text.)

+

2. I made the démarche on the Sverdlovsk incident this morning to First + Deputy Foreign Minister Korniyenko, reading and leaving with him as a Non-Paper + the talking points from Ref C as amended by Ref B. In supplemental + remarks I made the additional point that a simple denial would not + advance the situation or serve our mutual interests.

+

3. Korniyenko responded to my + presentation by stating that the Soviets would of course study the + statement I had made, but that he would like to make a few immediate + points. First of all, he said, in the case of the Biological Weapons + Convention (BWC) as with all international agreements to which the + Soviet Union is a party, the Soviet Union strictly complies with all + requirements of the agreement. Secondly, in a number of instances US government agencies have been compelled + to admit publicly and officially that charges which have appeared from + time to time in the US press about the + alleged non-observance by the Soviet Union of this or that agreement + were unjustified.

+

4. In the present case, Korniyenko continued, he could not but wonder why we + were raising the matter and what the purpose of our statement was. He + noted that Soviet, US, and British + specialists, as representatives + of the BWC depository, had jointly worked on a report for submission to + the BWC Review Conference and that no such questions had arisen during + the preparation of the report. Now, all of a sudden, the US side was raising expressions of concern, + asking for urgent consultations, and stating that it would inform the + Review Conference that it had done so.

+

5. Korniyenko then characterized + the information I had provided about the incident itself as vague. He + did not know, he said, on what it was based and added that it was not + unheard of for there to be no basis for such allegations. Even assuming, + Korniyenko went on, that + some kind of illness did occur in the Sverdlovsk area, what relationship + did this have to the BWC? He asked me to imagine how we would react if + the Soviets today or tomorrow were to make such a representation to + US, expressing concern about the + “Legionnaires’ Disease,” obliging US to + enter into consultations under the BWC, and trying to bring that matter + into the work of the BWC Review Conference.

+

6. In commenting on Korniyenko’s + remarks, I stated that the US + representation was occasioned by an interagency study of all available + evidence of the unexplained incident in Sverdlovsk, some of it received + fairly recently, and that what we were seeking was an explanation of the + incident. As for his reference to the vagueness of the information, I + told him that I thought it was spelled out rather clearly in the + non-paper I had left with him but that if he could characterize what was + not clear to him I would try to elaborate. Noting that the parties to + the BWC are not permitted to have biological warfare stocks, I told him + that if there was a sensible explanation for what had occurred in + Sverdlovsk I hoped it could be provided to US quickly so it could be taken into consideration in the + report we were required to make [garble].

+

7. Answering his question on how we would react if challenged about the + Legionnaires’ disease, I said I thought I had a pretty good idea of what + our procedure would be. We would in all likelihood invite the Soviets to + send scientists to discuss the matter with our scientists and to visit + the communicable disease center in Atlanta to go over the records of + what our investigation had shown thus far.

+

8. Korniyenko said he had nothing + to add and would merely repeat that the Soviets would study our + statement and provide a response. He stressed that he did not know + whether anything had happened in Sverdlovsk or not and that it would + require looking into and checking. But he was still struck by the fact + that our experts had worked together for several months and that no such + matter had been raised. Our raising of the question at this point could + only give rise to feelings of apprehension on the Soviet side as to our + good faith in doing so—particularly in view of the fact that the Soviets would do nothing + which would violate the Convention.

+ + Watson + +
+ +
+ 115. Memorandum From the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament + Agency (Earle) to Secretary of + State VanceSource: Carter Library, National + Security Affairs, Brzezinski + Material, Country File, Box 83, USSR: 3/20–31/80. No classification marking. Copies + were sent to Brown, Jones, + Turner, and Brzezinski. + Washington, March + 19, 1980 + + SUBJECT + Congressional Consultations on BW + Convention Compliance Question + +

I have now consulted with Senators Church, Javits and Baker + and Congressmen O’Neill, Rhodes, Wright, Zablocki and BloomfieldSenators Frank Church (D-Idaho), Jacob Javits (R-New York), + Howard Baker + (R-Tennessee), and Congressmen and Speaker of the House of + Representatives Thomas P. “Tip” O’Neill (D-Massachusetts), House + Minority Leader John Rhodes (R-Arizona), House Majority Leader James + “Jim” Wright, (D-Texas), Clement Zablocki, Chair of the House + Foreign Affairs Committee (D-Wisconsin), and William Broomfield + (R-Michigan). on the subject of the question we have raised + with the Soviets relative to compliance with the BW Convention. An appointment with Senator ByrdSenate Majority Leader Robert Byrd (D-West + Virginia). could not be arranged.

+

All the Members that I briefed were calm in their reactions and + considered this to be a serious matter that should be pursued with the + Soviets. Chairman Zablocki urged that our Allies get out in front on + this issue, as it is just as much a concern of theirs and in Soviet eyes + these days anything we do of this nature is suspect. Chairman Zablocki + asked if the Review Conference couldn’t be extended until we had an + answer. I undertook to consider these suggestions.

+

Chairman Church expressed concern over what we would do next, if we got a + negative answer from the Soviets. He observed that in view of the U.S. + press reports, the Soviets would probably believe that this was a + deliberate plot by the United States. I replied that at this time we + were awaiting the Soviet reply, considering what we should say in our + plenary statement at the Review Conference and giving general + consideration to any further steps.

+ +

Senator Baker asked if there was + any connection between this issue and the allegations of gas warfare in + Afghanistan. I replied that the two were completely separate questions + and involved different international agreements. Senator Baker asked whether there was anything + he could do to help. I expressed the hope that the Congress would be + restrained in its reaction and permit us time to review and assess the + Soviet response and consider next steps. Senator Javits said that we should insist on a + Soviet response prior to the close of the Review Conference and I said + that we had indicated to them that the nature of their response would + determine the character of our plenary statement at the Conference.

+

Congressman Rhodes said that we had enough difficulties of this type at + this time and it was too bad we had another problem. Speaker O’Neill and + Congressmen Wright and Broomfield listened closely and expressed + appreciation for the briefing.

+
+ +
+ 116. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department + of StateSource: Carter + Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 83, USSR: 3/20–31/80. Secret; Niact + Immediate; Nodis. Printed from a + copy that indicates the original was received in the White House + Situation Room. + Moscow, March 20, 1980, 1054Z +

4496. Department repeat Geneva. Subj: Soviet Reply to Démarche on + Sverdlovsk BW Incident. Refs: (A) Moscow + 4225,See Document + 114. (B) State 68654.See Document 113.

+

1. (S—Entire text.)

+

2. In replying to our démarch on the Sverdlovsk incident, the Foreign + Ministry confirmed that an outbreak of anthrax occurred in Sverdlovsk in + March/April 1979 but said this was due to natural causes, denied that it + had anything to do with the Biological Weapons Convention and charged + that the raising of the issue by the United States creates the + impression that someone is trying to cast a shadow on the efficacy of + the Biological Weapons Convention. The reply was given to the acting + DCM in the form of an oral + statement this morning (March 20) by Viktor Komplektov, Chief of the + Foreign Ministry USA Department, because Komplektov insisted that the + appointment take place before + 12 noon, we imagine the Soviets may be planning shortly to release the + text of the statement to the press.

+

3. Following is the embassy’s informal translation of the oral statement, + a copy of which was given us as a Non-Paper.

+

Begin text:

+

In connection with the representation of the embassy of the USA in Moscow + of 17 March 1980, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the USSR is instructed to state the + following:

+

The Soviet side firmly rejects the efforts of the government of the USA + to place in doubt the conscientious fulfillment by the Soviet Union of + the provisions of the Convention on the Prohibition of Bacteriological + Weapons; with regard to this Convention, just as with other + international agreements in which the Soviet Union participates, the + Soviet side strictly fulfills all provisions of the documents under + which it has accepted the relevant obligations.

+

In accordance with the legislation and practice of the Soviet Union, the + observance of the provisions of the Convention on the Prohibition of the + Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) + and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction, ratified by order of the + Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR on 11 February 1975, is guaranteed by the appropriate + State Institutes of the USSR. In a + statement made by the representative of the USSR in the Committee on Disarmament on 24 June 1975, it + was pointed out that the Soviet Union does not have any of the + bacteriological (biological) agents and toxins, weapons, equipment and + means of delivery indicated in Article 1 of the Convention.Article 1 of the Biological Weapons Convention + outlines the prohibitions detailed in the BWC. While specific + substances are not banned, their purposes can be if they would prove + to be harmful. Biological weapons that are prophylactic, protective + or peaceful are permitted by the BWC. (Draft text of the Biological + Weapons Convention, Department of State Bulletin, November 1, 1971, pp. 508–511)

+

As for the incident referred to by the American side which occurred in + April 1979 in the area of Sverdlovsk, there did in fact occur in this + area in March–April 1979 an ordinary outbreak, arising from natural + causes, of anthrax among animals and cases of illness of people from the + intestinal form of this infection, connected with the use as food of the + meat of cattle which was sold without observance of the rules + established for veterinary supervision. Appropriate warnings in + connection with this were given in the press. No quarantine of any kind + was established.

+

That it occurred, however, has no relationship to the question of + observance by the Soviet Union of the Convention on the Prohibition of + Bacteriological Weapons. And therefore there is absolutely no basis for + putting forward the + question which has been raised by the American side.

+

The impression is automatically created that someone would like under a + clearly invented pretext to cast a shadow on the efficacy of the + Convention on the Prohibition of Bacteriological Weapons—one of the most + important agreements in the arms control area—and to do this at the very + moment when the Review Conference on the operation of this Convention is + taking place in Geneva,The First Review + Conference of the Biological Weapons Convention met March 3–21. See + Document 119. such actions by + the government of the US are clearly not + dictated by concern for the strengthening of valid international + agreements on disarmament. On the contrary, they are only capable of + weakening these agreements, of complicating the situation, of hampering + the efforts of States in the matter of limiting the arms race. The + Soviet side condemns such actions as directly contradicting the + interests of preserving and strengthening peace. End text.

+

4. A/DCM stated that the embassy would transmit the Soviet Union’s + response immediately to Washington. He took note of the fact that the + response contained some information on the incident in Sverdlovsk, but + added that it was not possible to accept the allegations as to the + motives of the US in raising this + matter. Given the growing evidence on the incident, it clearly had to be + raised in order to be dealt with before the BWC Review Conference + meeting in Geneva ended. He emphasized that it was not the intent of the + USA to “cast a shadow” over the BW + Convention or any other disarmament treaty.

+

5. In seeing A/DCM to the door, Komplektov commented that, only 24 hours + after the Ambassador had met with first Deputy Foreign Minister + Korniyenko on March 17,See Document + 114. everything he had said at that meeting had + appeared in the press and that this happens “every time”. That + circumstance, he said, only served to bear out the validity of the views + expressed in the final paragraph of his statement.

+ + Watson + +
+ +
+ + 117. Memorandum of ConversationSource: Department of State, Office of the Secretariat + Staff, Cyrus R. Vance, + Secretary of State—1977–1980, Lot 84D241, Memcons: April, May, June 1980. + Secret. Drafted by Vest; and + approved by Vance. The + memorandum is printed in full in Foreign Relations, 1977–1980, vol. + VI, Soviet Union, Document 272. + Washington, March 21, 1980, 1:30 + p.m. + + SUBJECT + Conversation with Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin + + + PARTICIPANTS + US + The Secretary + Assistant Secretary George + Vest, EUR + Soviet Union + Ambassador Anatoliy F. + Dobrynin + +

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to chemical or biological + weapons.]

+

Dobrynin:—The mood of the country + is reinforced by the pronouncements of the Administration, so much so + that there seemed to be practically nothing left to maintain in our + bilateral relations.

+

Dobrynin illustrated his point + with the report of Soviet gassing of Afghanistan villages, complaining + that our official press briefing accused the Soviets without evidence to + back it up. The Secretary replied that for weeks we have gotten + extensive and numerous reports which give detailed accounts describing + two kinds of gas, smoke and another which causes bleeding and death. We + have report after report from many different sources. Therefore, our + Spokesman was correct when he said that, although we have no + photographs, we have so many reports from refugees that we have to take + account of them. Dobrynin’s + reply was that these are only stories and we have no proof. Do you + believe, he asked, that we have no sense of civilization? It seems that + you will accept any accusation against the Soviets.

+

He then turned to the bacteriological warfare episode. Anthrax, he said, + is a disease which from time to time occurs in the Asian world.See Documents 113, + 114, and 116. The Soviets have experienced it before in Siberia + and warned people to avoid infected meat. In this case it was not a + secret episode, it happened a year ago. Yet when people came to the West + and told stories, we listened to their stories, reacted in public and to + the UN agency without waiting for or + giving credence to what the Soviet Union said. The Secretary pointed out + that the essential fact was that there appeared to be evidence that some + material had not been destroyed which should have been. Dobrynin replied that the Soviet authorities would not + take such chances with their own citizens. The episode took place a year + ago and now was being used as propaganda against the Soviets. The State + Department Spokesman had no answer as to why this subject came up a year + late or why we made accusations without proof. He was forced to conclude + that a US TV commentator was right when + he described it as an instance of the Administration’s “aggressive + psychological warfare.” Certainly that is the atmosphere, an atmosphere + which is altogether negative, a search warrant atmosphere, and as a + result the structure of the past ten years is left standing like a + building exposed to an atomic bomb. The Secretary commented that it was + not our intent to destroy the structure. He had said that before and + stood by it, but he did not minimize the problems. Dobrynin repeated gloomily that the + only thing left was the bare framework of the structure and nothing + else. The Secretary asked if Dobrynin thought the people in Moscow understood the + intensity of the US public reaction to + the invasion in Afghanistan. Dobrynin replied yes, they did understand it and, if + not, the US reminded them of it + daily.

+

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to chemical or biological + weapons.]

+
+ +
+ 118. Telegram From the Mission in Geneva to the Department of + StateSource: National + Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign + Policy File, D800150–0125. Confidential; Priority. Sent for + information to Moscow. + Washington, March 24, 1980, 1828Z +

4735. Subject: US–USSR Chemical Weapons (CW) Negotiations, Round Eleven: Summary of + Developments.

+

CW message number 16

+

1. (Confidential—Entire text).

+

2. Summary. Round eleven represented continuation of pattern established + in second half of round ten. Delegations met frequently. Despite active + discussion of verification, Dels did not narrow differences on key + issues in this area. Some progress was made on secondary issues and in + drafting language for a joint initiative. End summary.

+ +

3. Round eleven of the US–USSR Chemical Weapons negotiations, which + began on February 11, 1980, ended on March 19, 1980. During that period + eight plenary meetings and fourteen drafting group meetings were + held.

+

4. Plenary discussions during the round dealt primarily with issues + relating to on-site inspection, with problems of irritants and + precursors, and with various declarations concerning chemicals used for + permitted purposes. Work in the drafting group was devoted to discussion + of provisions on definition of terms, non-transfer/non-assistance, + permitted activities, declarations to be made within thirty days after a + state becomes a party, and destruction of stocks.

+

5. The most noteworthy features of the round were: continuing active pace + of meetings, better-focussed discussion of verification-related issues, + slow progress in resolving substantive questions, drafting of additional + elements for a joint initiative, and Soviet nervousness about CW discussions in the Committee on + Disarmament (CD).

+

A) Continued active pace. Meetings were held frequently (4 days out of + 5), continuing the pattern begun in the second half of the previous + round. Atmosphere was business-like with no apparent indication that + US-Soviet tensions were spilling + into the bilateral CW negotiations. Both + Delegations experienced considerable difficulty in working around + schedule of other meetings (CD and the Biological Weapons Convention + Review Conference).

+

B) Better-focussed discussion of verification-related issues. Soviets + appeared more willing this round to enter into discussion of + verification-related issues. This reflects pattern first observed toward + end of previous round. Agreement between Dels to respond at the next + plenary meeting, if possible, facilitated exchange of views. + Verification-related discussions dwelt on agreed procedures for + facilitating verification at declared production and filling facilities, + as well as on nature of international participation in on-site + inspections; procedures for challenge inspection were discussed briefly. + As discussed below, while some progress was achieved on secondary + issues, principal issues remain.

+

C) Slow progress in resolving substantive questions. Despite some + progress on secondary issues, U.S. Del + is disappointed that more progress was not achieved given the time and + effort expended. In terms of resolving issues, this round was not much + more productive than previous rounds. (Specific issues resolved are + noted below). Soviets, however, appear not only comfortable with current + pace but have also resisted our attempts at accelerating it.

+

(1) On the positive side, the Soviets:

+

—Agreed that herbicides should be excluded from the Convention;

+ +

11 —Accepted U.S. proposal that production of small quantities of + super-toxic lethal chemicals for protective purposes be limited to a + single small-scale facility, the location of which would be + declared;

+

—Suggested that representatives of the consultative committee be + permitted to participate as observers during on-site inspections;

+

—Suggested a broad interpretation of the term “law-enforcement purposes” + so as to cover those military uses of irritants the U.S. wishes to + protect;

+

—Finally began to respond to April 1978 U.S. proposals on procedures for + challenge inspections.

+

(2) On the negative side, the Soviets:

+

—Continued to oppose pre-agreed (i.e., mandatory) international on-site + inspection;

+

—Continued to insist that coverage of precursors be limited to the final + stage of agent production;

+

—Continued to oppose declaration of facilities at an early stage of the + treaty regime;

+

—Took the position that teams carrying out challenge inspection could not + bring own equipment, and that no data acquired by such teams without + participation of host country personnel could be considered + reliable.

+

(3) Entry into force. Final plenary statement contained the only Soviet + reference during this round to Soviet proposal that ratification by all + permanent members of the UN Security + Council should be a requirement for entry into force. Reference was + indirect; Soviets asked if U.S. had changed its position on + entry-into-force question.

+

D) Drafting of further provisions for a joint initiative. Virtually all + the effort in the drafting group was devoted to discussing and + formulating provisions for a joint initiative. Work begun in previous + round on definitions and non-transfer/non-assistance provision was + continued. Ad referendum agreement was reached on several additional + definitions and on the non-transfer/non-assistance element (texts being + transmitted septels).Not found. As a result first three elements + are virtually complete (element covering the basic prohibition was + agreed in previous round). Work was started on elements dealing with + permitted activities, with declarations to be made thirty days after a + state becomes a party, and with destruction of stocks. Some progress was + made in drafting language on these elements, but a number of substantive + issues remain to be resolved.

+ +

E) Soviet nervousness about CW + discussions in the CD. Soviets, having cynically supported establishment + of a CW working group in the CD, are + obviously nervous about how it will actually function. They raised topic + of CW working group in virtually every + plenary meeting and sought to establish coordinated US-Soviet approach to nature of the group’s + work, scheduling and chairmanship. U.S. Del assured Soviets that U.S. would avoid actions in the CD + which would harm the bilateral negotiations, but avoided more specific + commitments.

+ + Helman + +
+ +
+ 119. Telegram From the Mission in Geneva to the Department of + StateSource: National + Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign + Policy File, D800155–0842. Confidential; Priority. Sent for + information to London, Moscow, USNATO, and USUN. + Washington, March 27, 1980, 1813Z +

4939. Department please repeat to other interested posts. Subject: BWRC: + Biological Weapons Convention Review Conference—Wrap up.

+

1. (Confidential—Entire text).

+

2. Summary. This message provides a summary and analysis of the BW Review Conference held in Geneva, March + 3–21, 1980. Detailed treatment of issues such as verification, complaint + procedures, chemical weapons, and peaceful biological research contained + in paras 9–12. The impact of the revelations regarding the Sverdlovsk + incident on the Revcon is also considered. End summary.

+

3. The Biological Weapons (BW) Convention + Review Conference, which met in Geneva March 3–21, 1980, adopted by + consensus a final declarationSee “Final + Declaration of the Review Conference of the Parties to the + Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and + Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on + Their Destruction,” Documents on Disarmament, + 1980, pp. 152–156. reaffirming the “strong support + (of the 53 states parties in attendance) for the Convention, their + continued dedication to its principles and objectives and their + commitment to implement effectively its provisions.” This successful + conclusion was not achieved without considerable effort by a small group + of delegations, especially the UK with + low-key U.S. support, to bridge gaps between the various positions on + issues such as adequacy of + verification and complaint procedures and the flow of information and + assistance in the area of peaceful research in biological agents and + toxins. These issues as well as treatment of Article IX of the + Convention calling for efforts toward a chemical weapons ban are treated + in more detail below.

+

4. The impact of the Sverdlovsk incident on the outcome of the Revcon + seemed to be relatively slight with most delegations (including some + allies) bemused by the curious timing of our approach to the Soviets and + the subsequent press play. However, these same participants also + recognized the seriousness of the inquiry and the importance of our + obtaining a satisfactory response from the Soviets. In general they + appreciated our low-key handling of the issue within the Revcon. + Sverdlovsk did have the effect of making it more difficult for U.S. + Del to take a direct role in + negotiating the final declaration, which involved finding a median + position between the Soviet line that all was well with the Treaty and + Swedish pressure to amend the Convention to provide for a permanent + consultative committee which the U.S. and most Western delegations + opposed as being unworkable in view of Soviet opposition and as setting + a bad precedent for the NPT.

+

5. Sverdlovsk, coupled with recent events in Southwest Asia, of course + minimized substantially co-depositary cooperation which had + characterized earlier Treaty Review Conferences. Until the Soviet Del was informed of the incident they were + expressing dismay over our conspicuous failure to support them on such + issues as compliance and on the adequacy of verification and complaint + procedures. Our bilateral difficulties with the Soviets provided an + opportunity for the UK + Del, as representatives of the third + depositary power, to play an extremely active role in developing a final + declaration through their proposal, with our encouragement, to establish + an informal “non-group” with representatives from various political and + geographic groups. Their role in negotiating language in Article V was + particularly noteworthy and is detailed in para 9 below.

+

6. Cooperation within the Western group, whose informal meetings were + chaired by the U.S., was generally close and harmonious. A number of our + allies, most notably Canada, Australia, and New Zealand, were vocal in + their early support of the Swedish proposal to amend Article V (see + para 9); however, they soon became + skeptical of chances for its success and began working closely with + UK on compromise formulations. It + should be noted that these delegations were quite supportive of U.S. + positions on issues such as CW and + increasing cooperation to developing countries in the area of peaceful + biological research.

+

7. Oscar Vaerno, the Revcon’s President, put in a solid, if not + spectacular, performance, and was largely responsible for the generally + businesslike pace of the + deliberations. Amb. Voutov of Bulgaria, the chairman of the committee of + the whole, more than once seemed uncomfortable under the watchful eyes + of the Soviets as he attempted to reconcile differing points of view + during the article by article debate. Amb. Maina of Kenya, the drafting + committee chairman, was effective in his role, and clearly appreciative + of the spade work done by the “non-group” in developing draft elements + of a final declaration.

+

8. Detailed discussion of major issues follows.

+

9. Complaint mechanism. Clearly the most controversial and contentious + debate during the conference centered on Sweden’s proposed amendment to + Article V to provide for a permanent consultative mechanism to + investigate complaints of possible violations of the Convention. The + Swedish objective was to ensure that this “fact finding” stage was + clearly distinguished (and thus immune from a possible veto for a + permanent UN security council member) + from the subsequent “Political Decision” phase, i.e., whether to take a + complaint to the security council for appropriate action. Predictably, + the GOS proposal caught on with the Non-Aligned and the objective, if + not the means, attracted some sympathy from Western Dels who shared + Swedish concerns over the adequacy of existing verification measures in + the Convention. However, increasingly strident Eastern opposition and + latent Western skepticism about the wisdom of formally amending a + convention which had been so carefully negotiated and whose amendment + could create two sets of parties each adhering to a different text + enabled the UK + Del to step in as honest broker with a + proposal, based on earlier US–UK discussions, to attempt to meet Swedish + concerns through some other means, such as an interpretative statement + in the final declaration. The UK’s + efforts were aided to a considerable degree by: a) our own low-key but + strong expressions of support; and b) more importantly, by the + realization that many Non-Aligned Dels were more interested in removing + alleged “discriminatory” language in the Convention than with the real + substance of the GOS amendment. It then became a matter of getting the + Soviets, who were obviously aware of their isolated stance, to agree to + some compromise formulation which would be at least minimally acceptable + to the Swedes, but would reflect the view that no amendment was + necessary. The Soviets undoubtedly also feared that, if a consultative + committee were established, interest of others in the Sverdlovsk + incident could create a test case. These “negotiations” to a certain + extent were prolonged needlessly by Swedish (read Amb. Lidgard’s) + insistence that any interpretative language include a commitment to + revise Article V formally at some future date. Swedes finally settled on + a formulation calling for “further consideration” of this issue at “an + appropriate time.”

+

10. While, as noted in U.S. Rep’s + closing statement, the agreed language on the right of any party to call + for the convening of a consultative committee of experts lacks precision in some areas (e.g., it does + not designate the authority who would convene the consultative + committee), we believe the Convention is now an improved instrument. We + must continue to bear in mind, however, that the Swedes and others will + continue to press their case for formal revision of Article V at the + second BW Revcon, whether or not this + agreed interpretation of the current consultative provisions is ever + invoked.

+

11. Chemical Weapons. Suprisingly little controversy was engendered by + the review of Article IX, dealing with negotiations on a chemical + weapons convention, a subject that had been the focus of non-aligned + concerns at the PrepCom last July. + The imminent establishment by the Committee on Disarmament (CD) of a + working group on CW undoubtedly helped + defuse the situation. Therefore, most delegations, particularly the + Non-Aligned, seemed content to make the customary criticism of the + alleged lack of progress in our bilateral talks with the USSR and to call on the CD to begin + immediate multilateral negotiations. However, they stopped short of + seeking any far-ranging discussion on a CW prohibition. A number of delegations did take the + opportunity of citing the indispensability of effective verification + measures to any CW convention—a point we + trust was not lost on our bilateral CW + negotiating partner.

+

12. Peaceful biological research. On the other hand, Article X on + cooperation in peaceful biological research was singled out for + substantial comment by the Non-Aligned, evoking memories of recent + lengthy debates in the UN and elsewhere + on the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Taking their cue from the + background paper on scientific/technological developments in the field + of biology (Bacteriology) as well as the UN + SSOD’s endorsement of the “close + relationship” between disarmament and development, several delegations, + led by Romania, Yugoslavia, and Brazil, pressed for commitments from + developed countries to make info on such scientific/technological + developments available on a more regular and systematic basis to all + parties. They also sought (and obtained) a call in the final declaration + for developed states to provide increased technical assistance, such as + the training of personnel and transfer of equipment and technology in + relevant areas of biological research. The reaction from eastern and + western delegations was extremely cautious, with the USSR citing the extensive amount of + assistance already taking place and the western Europeans expressed + privately their concerns over the potential effect on commercial + proprietary interests of any subsequent efforts to “institutionalize” + transfers of technology in this field.

+

13. The negotiations with the Soviets on compromise language for the + section on the final declaration on Article V ultimately led to + agreement on the question of future Review Conferences. While the BW convention does not provide for subsequent Review + Conferences, it was the clear desire of an overwhelming majority of the + participants that a second Review Conference should be held. Soviet + reluctance to fix a date for this future meeting forced the Swedes to + accept language which made the holding of the conference contingent upon + the request of the majority of the parties, and no earlier than 1985, in + exchange for Soviet acquiescence on the Article V issue. In practice, + however, we believe there will be no difficulty in mustering the + majority required to convene the next Revcon in 1985.

+ + Helman + +
+ +
+ 120. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the + Soviet UnionSource: National + Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign + Policy File, D800156–0291. Confidential; Immediate; Exdis. Sent for information Priority + to the Mission in Geneva. Drafted by Robert Einhorn (ACDA); cleared by Aaron, Jerome Kahan (PM), Keeny, Slocombe (OSD), + Michael Finnarelli (OSTP), James Granger (JCS), Shulman, + Peter Wilson (S/P), Robert Barry + (EUR), McCrory, and Robert + Steven (S/S–O); and approved by + Vance. + Washington, March 28, 1980, 0004Z +

81691. Subject: Sverdlovsk Incident (U). Geneva for Amb. Flowerree. Refs: (A) State 68654;See Document + 113. (B) Moscow 4496.See + Document 116.

+

1. Secret—Entire text.

+

2. Embassy should seek an early opportunity to convey the following + points to Komplektov or another MFA official at a comparable level. + Points should also be provided in the form of a Non-Paper.

+

A. We have studied the response of March 20 by the ministry of foreign + affairs to the United States’ request for information regarding the + outbreak of anthrax in the area of Sverdlovsk in March–April 1979.Ibid.

+

B. We welcome the information you provided regarding the incident. + However, you will appreciate that on matters of such complexity, it is + difficult for us to acquire a sufficiently full and confident + understanding of the situation without a substantially greater exchange + of information. For example, reports available to us indicate a + prolonged outbreak of pulmonary + anthrax in Sverdlovsk, involving large numbers of fatalities. Based on + our experience, we would expect an outbreak of anthrax resulting from + contaminated meat to have been of relatively short duration and to have + resulted in only a small number of fatalities.

+

C. We believe it is essential for our two governments to make prompt and + determined efforts to arrive at a mutual understanding of this matter. + Article V of the Biological Weapons Convention, the importance of which + was recently reaffirmed at the Convention’s Review Conference, requires + consultation and cooperation between parties in order to reduce + uncertainties and allay concerns that might arise. As depositary + governments, the Soviet Union and the United States bear a special + responsibility for ensuring the effective operation of the Convention’s + consultative procedures. As the two leading participants in + international arms control efforts, we have an additional and important + responsibility to demonstrate our readiness to work together + constructively to promote the viability of existing agreements.

+

D. We believe the most effective means of clarifying the situation—and + thereby meeting our mutual obligations under Article V of the BWC—would + be to hold confidential discussions involving Soviet and American + medical, public health and veterinary specialists. We believe the + specialists should meet as soon as possible, preferably within the next + few weeks. We would be prepared to hold the discussions in the Soviet + Union or some other mutually acceptable location.

+

E. In proposing that specialists from both sides meet confidentially to + discuss the Sverdlovsk situation, we are mindful that, in the context of + SALT, U.S. and Soviet experts have + been able to resolve treaty implementation questions of great complexity + and sensitivity in a mutually satisfactory manner. While no formal + consultative mechanism exists for the BW + Convention, we hope that the ad hoc discussions we are proposing would + enable us to deal with the present situation in an equally satisfactory + fashion.

+

F. In reference to the last paragraph of the foreign ministry’s response, + we cannot accept the implication that U.S. efforts are directed toward + complicating the situation and weakening international agreements on + disarmament. Our motivation is precisely the opposite—to resolve the + current situation as quickly as possible and to strengthen those + agreements by restoring confidence in their effective + implementation.

+

3. FYI. Site of initial discussion, + referred to in para 2D above, should + not prejudge possibility of U.S. seeking to visit Sverdlovsk as part of + investigative process if necessary. End FYI.

+ + Vance + +
+ +
+ + 121. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department + of StateSource: Library of + Congress, Manuscript Division, Harold + Brown Papers, Box 82, Brown Files—General #1, Biological Weapons. Secret; + Immediate; Exdis. Sent for + information to the Mission in Geneva and USNATO. + Moscow, April 24, 1980, 1513Z +

6630. Military addressees handle as Specat exclusive for Service Chiefs. + Geneva for Ambassador Flowerree. + Subj: Soviet Response to Démarche on Sverdlovsk Incident. Ref: (A) + Moscow 4974,Telegram 4974 from Moscow, + March 28, reported that officials from the Soviet Ministry of + Foreign Affairs had been unable to locate newspapers that covered + the Sverdlovsk incident because “they were after all local papers + and that the incident occurred a long time ago.” (National Archives, + RG 59, Central Foreign Policy + File, D800156–1044) (B) State 81691.See Document + 120.

+

1. (S—Entire text.)

+

2. The Soviets have rejected our request for consultations under the + Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) in connection with the outbreak of + anthrax in Sverdlovsk, relying on their earlier explanation that the + outbreak was due to natural causes. The reply to our March 28 Démarche + (Ref A) was given to the DCM on April + 24 in the form of an oral statement by Viktor Komplektov, chief of the + MFA USA Department.

+

3. An informal translation of the Soviet statement, which Komplektov also + gave to DCM as a Non-Paper, + follows:

+

Begin text. In connection with the renewed Démarche of the embassy of the + USA in Moscow on March 28, 1980, concerning the cases of anthrax disease + in March–April 1979 in the region of the city of Sverdlovsk, the Soviet + side reaffirms its response to this question which was set forth to the + American side on March 20, 1980.See Document 116.

+

The Soviet side resolutely rejects as fully unsubstantiated the attempts + by the American side to place under doubt the reliability of the + information presented to it to the effect that the mentioned cases of + anthrax disease appeared as a result of epizootics which periodically + break out in these areas. The information given to the American side + clearly indicates that what occurred is in no way connected with a + question concerning the implementation of the Convention on the + Prohibition of Bacteriological Weapons. Accordingly, there are no bases + for raising the question of conducting consultations as foreseen by the + mentioned Convention.

+ +

The fact that, despite the official clarifications given to it, the + American side continues to return to this question only confirms the + earlier conclusion we have drawn concerning the real motives of such + type of actions of the government of the USA which have nothing in + common with the goals of strengthening the Convention on the Prohibition + of Bacteriological Weapons. End text.

+

4. DCM responded that he would of course + report the Soviet statement to Washington. As a preliminary reaction, + however, he said that he must express regret that the Soviets had seen + fit to answer our approach in this manner and to reject the possibility + of consultations, which would have been a constructive way of dealing + with the questions that had arisen. DCM + added that he once again rejected the allegation that the motives of the + US in raising the question were + other than to strengthen the BWC.

+

5. Komplektov responded that he could only say that he regretted DCM’s expression of regret. The Soviets, + he said, had given a very constructive, exhaustive and official response + to the first US Démarche. Repeating that + the Soviet Delegate to the Conference on Disarmament had stated as early + as 1975 that the Soviet Union did not possess any of the bacteriological + agents or instruments prohibited by Article 1 of the BWC, Komplektov + said that this meant that there was no justification for questioning of + Soviet compliance with the BWC. The Soviets had earlier explained, + Komplektov continued, that the 1979 outbreak of anthrax was due to + natural causes despite this, the US was + still endeavoring to cast doubt on the well-grounded official Soviet + position and on the good will which the Soviet side had shown in + answering the US question in a + constructive manner.

+

6. DCM stated that he would not comment + further on Komplektov’s repetition of their position, but would report + the conversation for Washington’s official reaction.

+ + Watson + +
+ +
+ + 122. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the + United KingdomSource: + National Archives, RG 59, Central + Foreign Policy File, D800206–0389. Secret; Priority. Sent Priority + to Paris, Bern, Bonn, Rome, Brussels, The Hague, USNATO, Copenhagen, Stockholm. Sent + for information Priority to the Mission in Geneva, USUN, Islamabad, Vientiane, Moscow, + Bangkok, Ottawa, Canberra, Tokyo, the U.S National Military + Representative to the Supreme Headquarters of the Allied Powers in + Belgium, and Wellington. Drafted by Murray and David Carlson + (PM/CA); cleared by Oplinger + and Brement, Jack Smith and + Manuel Sanches (JCS), Alan + Overmeyer (T), Peter Wilson (S/P), + Robert Peck and Richard Norton (NEA/PAB), Avis Bohlen (EUR/RPM), + Edgar Beigel (EUR/WE), Charles Hoettle (EUR/CE), Cameron Sanders and + William Menold (IO), Mark Palmer + (PM/DCA), [name not declassified] (CIA), George Gasberri (DIA), Merle MacDonald (OSD), Robert Mikulak (ACDA/MA/AT), + Richard Combs (S/MS), Edmund McWilliams and Michael Gelner (EA/VLC), + Martin Mclean (EUR/SOV), Neil Michaud, Richard Thompson, and Dennis + Goodman (EUR/NE), Michael Matheson (L/PM), and Robert Martin and + Gary Crocker (INR/PMA); and approved by Mark Palmer (PM). + Washington, April 26, 1980, 0444Z +

109665. Subject: Consultations on Reported use of Chemical Weapons + (CW).

+

1. (Secret—Entire text)

+

2. Summary: We believe the reports of Chemical Weapons (CW) use in Indochina and Afghanistan + require greater international attention and that they should be + investigated further by an impartial international team. We are planning + to send out an interagency team to selected capitals to discuss the + issue further. This message instructs action addressees to approach host + governments to set up meetings for the team with appropriate host + government officials. The request for administrative assistance in + arranging the team’s trip will follow Septel. End summary.

+

3. The USG continues to be deeply + concerned over continuing reports that Chemical Weapons (CW) are being used in Laos, Kampuchea and + Afghanistan. These reports are sufficiently credible to warrant greater + international attention to discourage such use and help ensure that + Chemical Weapons are not used in any conflict, current or future, in any + region of the world. We believe the most effective means of obtaining + the necessary attention and action would be through an impartial + international investigation.

+

4. Reports of the use of Chemical Weapons are not and should not be a + matter of concern to the United States alone. To stress the seriousness + with which the USG views this issue, to + stimulate support for such an investigation, and to encourage other + actions which could contribute to the resolution of the problem, we plan + to send out a special interagency team of policy officials [less than 1 line not declassified] to selected capitals. Other key + nations will be contacted either in Washington or through our embassies + (we will be sending Septels on this later.)

+

5. Mr. Mark Palmer (Director, State, PM/DCA) will head the team and will + be accompanied by officials from the Department of Defense, the Arms + Control and Disarmament Agency, and the State Department’s Legal + Advisor’s Office. The trip and our separate consultations will have + three specific purposes:

+

—A. To share the evidence we have collected to date, and to encourage + others to join in pooling with us any evidence they may have or + obtain.

+

—B. To describe the diplomatic steps we have taken to date, and to learn + what actions other governments have taken.

+

—C. To present US ideas for further + steps, to consider any ideas others may have, to obtain support in the + evidence collection effort and to seek agreement on a common strategy + which would include having an objective international investigation of + the reports conducted.

+

6. Action addressees are requested to set up meetings for the team with + appropriate host government officials concerned with arms control, + security and foreign policy issues, and the regions involved. In + approaching host governments and initiating these consultations, + embassies may draw on points contained paras 3–5 above.

+

7. For Geneva: We will be in touch with mission by phone to discuss + arrangements for team’s meetings in Geneva.

+

[Omitted here is the travel schedule for the Palmer team.]

+
+ +
+ 123. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense Brown to President CarterSource: + Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, + Box 12, Chemical Weapons, 5/78–11/80. No classification + marking. + Washington, April + 30, 1980 + + SUBJECT + Weteye Bombs + +

On February 25, 1980, the Department of Defense announced that our + inventory of 888 Weteye bombs, containing the nerve agent GB, would be + retained in indefinite storage at Rocky Mountain Arsenal (RMA), Colorado. This decision reversed + an announcement by the Army in May 1978 that the bombs would be moved to + Tooele Army Depot in Utah.See “Brown, in Shift, Will Keep 900 + Nerve Gas Bombs,” New York Times, May 19, + 1978, p. A–12.

+

The decision to retain the bombs at either location was based on the + significant and apparently growing Soviet capabilities in chemical + warfare and the need to retain a credible deterrent to the use of + chemical weapons against U.S. forces or those of our allies. The JCS have recently reaffirmed the military + need for Weteye, the most modern aerial-delivered weapon in our chemical + inventory, and one which is compatible with modern delivery systems. An + additional and important reason for retention is that, in the complete + absence of any NATO offensive chemical + capability, tactical nuclear weapons might be the only available + response to a Soviet/Pact first use of chemical weapons. These are the + reasons not to detoxify (destroy) the bombs in place.

+

The decision to retain the Weteye bombs at Rocky Mountain Arsenal was + based largely on the desire to avoid any hazard that would be associated + with their movement. Although the Army, in coordination with the + Department of Health, Education and Welfare, concluded that the bombs + were safe to move, we decided that such a move was too risky to + undertake, given the high public visibility and concern, because there + would always be the possibility of accident or sabotage. Of course, such + a possibility would be remote, but the consequences of an accident or + sabotage could be extremely serious; if we decided to move them, those + consequences would certainly be highly advertised. With planned + improvements to the present storage site, retention at RMA represented + the least risky alternative that would still allow for retention of the + stockpile. (Other reasons for deciding to keep the bombs at RMA included + RMA’s capability to tap and drain leaking bombs, and the significant + delays caused by litigation and preparation of environmental impact + statements that a move to Utah would entail.)

+

Under Secretary Bill Perry has assumed personal responsibility to see + that the Army takes every reasonable action to insure that the continued + storage at Rocky Mountain Arsenal poses no problems to the health and + safety of the people of Denver. There are no known leaking bombs at + Rocky Mountain Arsenal at this time; all are stored in sealed, air-tight + containers. The Army has already been authorized additional civilian + spaces to increase the security guard force, and is undertaking all + necessary measures to improve fencing, lighting, and other aspects of + security at the facility. In the longer term, the site upgrade will + include the construction of a new underground storage facility that will + provide maximum safety and that would prevent danger to the adjacent vicinity even in the event + of an aircraft crash directly into the storage site. Senator Hart, + Chairman of the Senate Armed Services Subcommittee on Military + Construction, although he personally supports immediate detoxification, + has pledged to work with DoD to provide + the funds necessary to ensure that storage at RMA meets the highest + possible standards of safety and security.

+

Other than urging immediate detoxification, Mrs. Schroeder has made other complaints and + recommendations. She has proposed that the bombs be drained and + subsequently refilled elsewhere. Unfortunately, it does not appear + either timely or cost effective to pursue this suggestion. Approximately + 5 to 7 years and $16 million would be required to implement this + proposal.

+

The storage facility at RMA will be needed until modern binary weapon + systems are available to replace the Weteyes in our deterrent, + retaliatory stockpile. Until a facility is built for the production of + these weapons, I see no prudent option but to retain the Weteyes in the + safest environment possible.

+ + Harold + Brown + +
+ +
+ 124. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense Brown to President CarterSource: + Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, + Box 12, Chemical Weapons, 5/78–11/80. No classification + marking. + Washington, May 16, + 1980 + + SUBJECT + Weteye Nerve Agent Bombs + +

This memorandum updates my 1 May memorandum to youActually dated April 30; see Document 123. and summarizes recent discussions on + the Weteye issue. These discussions have followed our notification to + interested Committees of the Congress of the DoD decision to retain the Weteye nerve agent bombs at the + Rocky Mountain Arsenal (RMA) in Denver, Colorado, rather than to move + them to another location.

+

As you remember, the DoD decision was + based on strong reaffirmation by the Services and the Joint Staff of the + military need for the bombs and + the perceived small, but finite, risk to the public associated with the + movement considering the high media attention that would be given to air + movement and the possibility of a terrorist attack on an airplane as it + was loaded at Stapleton Airport or as it took off. Retention at Rocky + Mountain Arsenal is intended for a period of approximately four to six + years, depending on the construction plan for the new binary facility. + To ensure secure and safe storage of Weteye at RMA, we will invest + approximately $7 million to bring the storage sites up to the level of + protection afforded nuclear weapons.

+

After the Congressional notification of the decision to retain the agent + at RMA, Under Secretary Bill Perry discussed the issue with + Congresswoman Schroeder, Senator + Hart, Governor Matheson and others. With the exception of Congresswoman + Schroeder, there has been to + my knowledge no request for reexamination of alternative actions. + Congresswoman Schroeder asked for + discussion of the following four alternatives, which in one variant or + another we had previously considered:

+

(1) Arrange to fly the Weteye bombs covertly from + Stapleton Airport (to avoid alerting potential terrorists) to Dugway + Army Depot, Utah and then transport them by ground to Tooele Army Depot, + Utah.

+

(2) Transport the Weteye bombs from RMA to Buckley Airfield (an Air + National Guard airfield near Denver) by truck; then in the more + controlled environment associated with a military airfield, take off and + fly to Dugway with ground transport to Tooele.

+

(3) Move Weteye by ground transport from RMA to Pueblo Army Depot, + Colorado for permanent storage.

+

(4) Empty the Weteye bombs at RMA, detoxify the agent, retain bomb cases + and reload and store at Tooele.

+

Let me briefly summarize my position on these four alternatives:

+

Alternative (1). In my opinion, the likelihood of + covert movement of 14 aircraft loads of very + conspicuous cargo from an area as populous as that surrounding RMA is + very slight. Further, trying to convert into a covert action what has + heretofore been an open, widely-debated issue is unlikely to succeed and + more likely to simply exacerbate public opinion.

+

Alternative (2). This requires truck transport + through populous areas, and appears to be even more susceptible to + sabotage than the air transport from RMA.

+

Alternative (3). This requires road transport, + again through populated areas, but over a considerably longer road + distance than alternative (2). This appears to involve greater risk of + sabotage, and when the move is complete, permanent storage will be at a + place less acceptable than Tooele.

+ +

Alternative (4). This requires extensive + investment, both in detoxification equipment not now at RMA, and in + nerve agent loading equipment not now at Tooele. It would take almost as + long to detoxify and rebuild the old bombs as it would to build new + binary bombs to replace them.

+

In summary, let me emphasize that DoD is + sensitive to the difficult military, environmental and political issues + involved in retention of Weteye at RMA. Having spent considerable time + and effort again reviewing the subject, I still believe that the most + responsible position is to retain Weteye at RMA until the binary + facility is in operation or conditions are more favorable for movement. + There is no decision we can take without drawing + significant opposition from some source. Changing our decision will + please some, anger others, and make us susceptible to a charge of + vacillation. Our best course of action is to stick with the decision we + have made, which is most defensible from an objective viewpoint (because + it minimizes the risk) and is no worse than other alternatives from a + political viewpoint.

+ + Harold + Brown + +
+ +
+ 125. Editorial Note +

Per the instructions contained in telegram 109665 to London and other + posts, April 26, 1980 (See Document 122), the + Chemical Weapons Briefing Team briefed their North Atlantic Treaty + Organization allies, as well as the Swiss and the Norwegians, in May + 1980 about the alleged use of chemical weapons in Afghanistan and + Indochina. The team subsequently informed the Department of State that + the Europeans believed that the United States had not provided + sufficient proof that the Soviet Union and/or it allies had used + chemical weapons against civilians. Any investigation, the Europeans + argued, should be undertaken either by the United Nations or by a group + of Non-Aligned nations whose impartiality could be guaranteed. For more + on the Europeans’ misgivings, see telegram 9401 from Bonn, May 19, and + telegram 2368 from Stockholm, May 23; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + D800246–0547 and D800253–0469 respectively.

+
+ +
+ + 126. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission in + GenevaSource: National + Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign + Policy File, D800254–0889. Confidential; Priority. Drafted by Robert + Mikulak (ACDA/MA/AT); and approved by Keeny (ACDA), + Oplinger, Manuel Sanches + (JCS), Merle MacDonald (OSD), David Carlson (PM/CA), and + Thomas Davies (ACDA/MA). Sent for information to Moscow, USNATO, London, Bonn, and + Paris. + Washington, May 24, 1980, 0551Z +

136331. Subject: US–USSR Chemical Weapons Negotiations, Round + Twelve: Guidance. Ref: A) Geneva 4710In + preparation for round twelve of the chemical weapons negotiations, + the Embassy requested guidance from the Department of State + regarding how chemical stocks would be verified and then destroyed. + (Telegram 4710 from Geneva, March 24; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + D800149–0856) B) State 39607.See + Document 108.

+

State CW Message No. 2

+

(C—Entire text)

+

2. This message provides general guidance for round twelve. Detailed + responses to the questions posed Ref A are being provided separately in + the guidance package,Not found. + which will be forwarded in the near future. Highlights are outlined + below.

+

3. During round twelve the Delegation should continue the strategy + contained in the guidance telegram for round eleven (Ref B). This + strategy is to:

+

A. Continue to express US concern over + reports of use of chemical weapons in Laos, Kampuchea and + Afghanistan.

+

B. Emphasize the US hope that the pace of + resolution of issues will be accelerated;

+

C. Continue to give priority attention to major unresolved issues; + particularly verification-related issues (including declarations); + and

+

D. Continue drafting in order to reaffirm and define precisely points + thought to be agreed. (The Delegation should continue to be guided by + the format and substance contained in the position summary provided to + the Soviets during round nine.)

+

4. Key points in the guidance package:

+

A. A US proposal for possible agreed + measures for moth-balling production and filling facilities is + included;

+

B. A US proposal for a possible schedule + for destruction of stocks has been developed;

+

C. Ideas for reaching a mutually agreed definition of the term + “precursor” are provided;

+ +

D. Previous guidance on challenge inspection procedures has been reviewed + and reaffirmed.

+

5. The Delegation should endeavor to develop with the Soviets a progress + report on the bilateral negotiations for presentation to the CD early + this summer. The draft report should be transmitted for Washington + review before presentation to the CD.

+

6. The Delegation should continue to brief allied representatives in + Geneva during the course of the negotiations. In addition an offer + should be made to hold quadrilateral consultations (US, UK, + FRG, France) at a mutually + acceptable time before the beginning of the next round.

+ + Muskie + +
+ +
+ 127. Editorial Note +

In the wake of the Soviet response about the alleged outbreak of + pulmonary anthrax at Sverdlovsk (See Document + 121), both the United States Senate and the House of + Representatives called for further investigation into the incident in + accordance with the 1972 Convention on Biological Weapons. (“Senate + Resolution 405: Sverdlovsk Incident Regarding Biological Weapons, May + 14, 1980, and “Report of a Subcommittee of the House Permanent Select + Committee on Intelligence: Soviet Biological Warfare Activities, June + 1980,” in Documents on Disarmament, 1980, pp. + 220; 239–243)

+

On May 28, 1980, Hodding Carter III, the Press Secretary of the Department of State, said in an + official statement that “information at our disposal has raised serious + questions and concerns regarding the nature of the outbreak of disease + which occurred in Sverdlovsk in 1979. We have pursued this matter + actively and seriously with the Soviet government through private + diplomatic channels. As of this time, our concerns regarding that + incident have not been alleviated, and we will continue to pursue this + matter vigorously in accordance with the consultative procedures + provided for in the Biological Weapons Convention.” The text of Carter’s + remarks, as well as his replies to press questions, are in telegram + 141594 to Moscow, May 30; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800265–0009.

+
+ +
+ + 128. Telegram From the Mission in Geneva to the Department of + StateSource: National + Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign + Policy File, D800277–0164. Confidential; Priority; Exdis. Sent for information to + Moscow. + Washington, June 6, 1980, 1532Z +

8006. Subject: US–USSR Chemical Weapons (CW) Negotiations, Round Twelve: + Conversation With Soviet Amb. Israelyan. Ref: A) Geneva 7667,Telegram 7667 from the Mission in Geneva, May 29, + reported that the Soviets wanted to establish a CTB working group in the Conference on + Disarmament. (National Archives, RG + 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800263–1044) B) Geneva + 7925.In telegram 7925 from Geneva, June + 5, the Mission in Geneva reported that Israelyan referred Flowerree to the May 1980 issue of + the Soviet journal Microbiology, Immunology and + Epidemiology that contained a “straight-forward discussion + of the medical aspects of the outbreak of anthrax in Sverdlovsk.” + (National Archives, RG 59, Central + Foreign Policy File, D800275–0129)

+

CW message no. 8

+

1. (C—Entire text).

+

2. Summary. Soviet CD Rep Israelyan, who + is heading the Soviet Delegation in the CW bilateral negotiations, sees no prospect of a + breakthrough in the talks this year. He attributes the rigid Soviet + stance to the general political atmosphere, exacerbated by the issue of + the Sverdlovsk BW incident. He says the + Soviets will want to study the implications of the results of the U.S. + elections in establishing their future arms control policies. In the + meantime, Israelyan hopes we can keep the CW talks alive by achieving agreement on several secondary + issues where the positions of the two seem to be drawing together. End + summary.

+

3. U.S. CW Delegation head Flowerree spoke privately with Soviet + Del head Israelyan on June 4, + continuing discussion of matters of mutual interest reported Reftel (A). + On this occasion Israelyan’s more interesting comments focused on CW issues and to some extent on BW (see Reftel B).

+

4. Flowerree began by asking + Israelyan how he saw the current round of CW bilaterals developing and whether he saw any value in + scheduling an additional round before the traditional January/February + resumption date. Israelyan responded without hesitation saying there was + “no possibility” of a breakthrough in CW + this year. He said that during his recent discussions in Moscow he had + talked about CW negotiations both in the + Foreign Ministry (including a discussion with Gromyko) and in the Ministry of + Defense. The attitudes he encountered were much harder than they had + been in January (before the eleventh round), particularly in the MOD. As reported Reftel B, he had been + struck by the anger of the military over the U.S. action in making + public its version of the BW incident at + Sverdlovsk. This reaction, Israelyan thought, was a factor in the + hardening of the Soviet position on CW + verification. Flowerree said + this hardening had not escaped the notice of the U.S. Delegation. + Israelyan went on to say that he had not been asked to give his views on + whether the talks should be continued, but said that if he had, he + certainly would have strongly urged that the USSR not move to break them off. He had the strong + impression that Moscow was still firmly committed to the CW negotiations. He noted wryly that in + comparison with MBFR we were making + great progress; nothing had been put on paper in Vienna while there was + ad referendum agreement on a number of draft elements for the CW initiative.

+

5. Israelyan continued by saying that the attitude in Moscow was such + that no one believed there could be a CW + agreement with the U.S. in the present climate, even if the Soviets were + able to accept the U.S. position on verification 100 per cent. In his + view there could be no change whatsoever in the Soviet position before + the U.S. elections, the implications of which the Soviets will want to + assess in establishing their future arms control policies. In these + circumstances he thought the two Delegations should do what they could + to continue movement in the negotiations on secondary issues where there + was a possibility of agreement. Several such issues had already been + raised in the bilaterals and he had been encouraged by the apparent + drawing together of the positions of the two sides on these points. + Israelyan concluded by saying that he hoped Flowerree would not recommend an interruption of the + talks to his authorities in Washington.

+

6. Flowerree replied that he was + going on the assumption that the bilaterals would continue but the + failure to achieve any significant progress toward solving the major + verification issues would inevitably make it more difficult for the U.S. + to maintain unilateral restraint in its overall CW posture.

+

7. Israelyan also alluded to Soviet concern over how the U.S. would + handle CW in the CD context. Flowerree said that the USDEL would + not directly refer to the differences between U.S. and Soviet positions + in the bilaterals, but as the Soviets knew from last year’s experience + with the Dutch questionnaire, the U.S. was prepared to make + straightforward statements about its position on the issues. Israelyan + did not comment on the question of CW + use in Afghanistan and Southeast Asia which had been raised most + recently by the U.S. in the CW plenary + of May 27.

+ + Helman + +
+ +
+ + 129. Summary of Conclusions of a Mini-Special Coordination Committee + MeetingSource: Library of + Congress, Manuscript Division, Harold + Brown Papers, Box 82, Brown Files—General #1, Biological Weapons. Secret. + The meeting took place in the White House Situation + Room. + Washington, July 9, 1980, + 11:00 a.m.–12:00 p.m. + + SUBJECT + Soviet Compliance with Biological Warfare Convention + + + PARTICIPANTS + State + Reginald Bartholomew Dir., + Pol-Mil Affairs Bureau + Jerome Kahan Dep. Dir., Pol-Mil Affairs Bureau + Stephan Ledogar Dir., Regional Pol-Mil Affairs European + Bureau + James Michel Dep. Legal Advisor + Defense + Walter Slocombe Dep. Under + Sec. for Policy + Sheila Buckley Dir. Negotiations Policy Office of Dep. Under Sec. + for Policy + ACDA + Spurgeon Keeny, Jr. Dep. + Director + Admiral Thomas Davies Assistant Director + Robert Mikulak Physical Science Officer Multilateral Affairs + Bureau + White House + David Aaron + NSC + Major General Jasper Welch + Marshall Brement + OSTP + Ben Huberman + Peggy Finarelli + DCI + Ray McCrory Dir. Arms Control Intel. Staff + JCS + Lt. General John Pustay Asst. to the Chairman + +

It was noted that since the SCC meeting + of March 14, 1980,See Document 112. we have made two requests to the + Soviet Union for information that might alleviate our concerns as to + whether the incidents of anthrax in Sverdlovsk in April 1979 pointed to + Soviet non-compliance with the Biological Warfare Convention. The Soviet + replies were brusque,See Documents 121 and 128. asserting that though there were deaths due + to anthrax, they arose through the consumption of diseased meat, and + denied categorically that the Soviet Union was engaged in any activity + which was not in compliance with the Biological Warfare Convention. + (S)

+ +

The Soviet characterization of the event is not consistent with + intelligence information which points to infection by the inhalation of + anthrax spores (a well-known biological warfare agent) and to a quantity + of agent that exceeds that permissible to be held for public health + purposes under the Biological Warfare Convention. Moreover, the + comportment of the Soviet Union has not been in accord with their + responsibilities under Article V of the Biological Warfare Convention + which provides for consultation and cooperation between parties to the + Convention. (S)

+

The United States Government’s disappointment with the substance and form + of the Soviet replies has become public knowledge. Both the Congress, + through resolutions by both houses, and the press have called for a more + vigorous prosecution of our concerns to the Soviets. In recent weeks we + have completed a thorough review of the intelligence data, consulted + with the top experts in biological warfare and medical aspects of + anthrax, and delivered to the Soviets the Congressional + Resolutions.See Document 127. Christopher discussed the Sverdlovsk incident with + Dobrynin on July 10 (see + Document 130) but did not mention the two congressional + resolutions. (C)

+

It was agreed that the task at hand is to convince the Soviet Union that + our concerns are real, that the issue will not go away, that our purpose + is not to take advantage of them through propaganda as they claim, but + to establish a constructive consultation to resolve the matter. (S)

+

The Director of Central Intelligence’s representative pointed out that + the Soviets have reason to suspect our motives: Our original démarche + was almost a year after the incident, during a time of deteriorating + US-Soviet relations over + Afghanistan, and during the Biological Warfare Convention Review + Conference, but within a week after the intelligence community came to a + formal determination based on evidence that dribbled in over the year. + Our démarche was leaked before the Soviet response could be formulated. + (U)

+

There is some evidence from US-Soviet + conversations that they realize it is to their advantage to resolve the + issue. But they are now stuck with their infected meat story which is + also the story they used at the time with their own people. It is + entirely possible that the infected meat story is true but that + something else happened as well. (S)

+

Most of our information is derived [2 lines not + declassified] is reasonably self-consistent, logical, and in + accord with known medical features of anthrax. However, [less than 1 line not declassified] is in all + cases at least second-hand, in some cases clearly fed by a commonly held + body of rumor in Sverdlovsk; [2 lines not + declassified]

+ +

It was agreed that the Soviets have probably not yet told us the whole + truth, but that we will have some difficulty in establishing a violation + of the terms of the Biological Warfare Convention related to holding + those stocks of biological warfare agents for two reasons. First, the + Convention provides a loophole by allowing stocks for public health + purposes. The amounts allowed under this provision were not nailed down + during the Convention negotiations, and the amounts needed to produce + the deaths in Sverdlovsk are uncertain because of our uncertainty as to + number and geographical distribution of the victims, meterological + conditions and the details of the release of anthrax spores. Second, we + will be inhibited in the way in which we can use our intelligence + information, some of which is sensitive. (S)

+

It was agreed that our appropriate next step is to approach the Soviets + at a high level and tell them that their current stance is + unsatisfactory, that the problem will not go away unless they change, + but it is our desire to resolve this in consultation with them, and that + we are obliged to pursue the matter outside bilateral channels unless + they are forthcoming. (S)

+

It was agreed, ad referendum to Secretary Christopher, for Christopher to give Dobrynin the political message tomorrow, July 10, 1980, + with the detailed démarche by Ralph + Earle to Dobrynin + as a follow-up. (S)

+

It was agreed that: (1) we would not commit ourselves at this time to + approach the UN Security Council as + provided by the Biological Warfare Convention as a fall-back to + bilateral consultation; (2) we would focus our démarche on the lack of + consultation and cooperation rather than any accusation of + non-compliance; (3) we would prepare a white paper for possible public + use and circulation to other parties to the Biological Warfare + Convention if the Soviet response is unsatisfactory. (S)

+

It was agreed that our objectives are to demonstrate our support for arms + control and to deter violations of even weakly verifiable arms control + agreements by demonstrating our willingness to raise questions of + non-compliance when we have them. (U)

+

It was noted that our current efforts to publicize our concerns about the + possible use of chemical warfare agents by the Soviet Union in + Afghanistan and by their allies in Southeast Asia will inevitably be + coupled, by timing if nothing else, with our handling of this biological + warfare issue. It was nonetheless agreed that we should pursue the + course outlined above. (C)

+
+ +
+ + 130. Memorandum of ConversationSource: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, + Staff Material, Office Institutional File, Box 42, INT Documents: + #4200s: 7/80. Secret; Nodis. + Drafted by Bartholomew. In + the upper right-hand corner of the memorandum, Brzezinski wrote, “M[arshall] + B[rement], Next step? ZB.” + Washington, July + 10, 1980 + + SUBJECT + BW: The Sverdlovsk Incident + + + PARTICIPANTS + US + The Acting Secretary + PM—Reginald Bartholomew + S/MS—Marshall + Shulman + USSR + Ambassador Anatoliy + Dobrynin + +

Toward the end of a discussion on TNF, + the Acting Secretary mentioned that he had one other matter to raise. + This concerned the outbreak of anthrax in Sverdlovsk last spring.See Document + 114. The Acting Secretary said that we felt that we + hadn’t been able to engage the Soviet Government on this matter to the + extent its seriousness warranted. He noted that Ambassador Earle would meet with Dobrynin to discuss this issue in some + detail.See Document + 131.

+

Dobrynin responded by questioning + what it was the US wanted, since this + was not clear. He noted that the Soviets have already given us an + explanation of this incident.See Document 116.

+

The Acting Secretary again stressed the seriousness we attach to engaging + in bilateral consultations so we could satisfy ourselves on this issue, + and not permit this question to undermine the BW Convention or damage prospects for arms control + generally.

+

Dobrynin reiterated that they + have given us what they have on this matter, and that the Soviets have + not seen anything from us that would contradict their explanation. He + said that our goal should be preserving the Convention and prospects for + arms control. Dobrynin again + stressed that what they have heard was based on hearsay, and that if we + have anything else more to say in terms of evidence or proof would we + please tell them.

+

The Acting Secretary replied by stressing that Ambassador Earle will provide information that + will underline the seriousness of our concerns.

+ +

Due to the press of vacation plans, Dobrynin suggested that Ambassador Earle see Vasev instead and give him a + paper, which Dobrynin would then + make certain is dealt with in Moscow. Dobrynin stressed that he needed to take something back + with him.

+

The Acting Secretary repeated that this was a serious political matter, + that Ambassador Earle had + important things to say about this question, and that Dobrynin should definitely try to see + Earle before returning to + Moscow.

+

Dobrynin said that he understood + the seriousness of this issue, but suggested that it reflected domestic + American election-year politics. But he asked whether we really had + something to say. If so, this would be good. But he did not want to + discuss just anything on this issue in a general fashion. People in + Moscow are critical of the way in which this issue has been the subject + of rumor, hearsay, and press reports.

+

The Acting Secretary said that this issue would be every bit as serious + to the USG if we were now in the first + year of this Administration instead of the fourth year. He suggested the + possibility that the issue might be addressed by distinguished + scientists from each country.

+

Dobrynin repeated again that up + to now there has been no proof, and there have been indirect discussions + in the scientific community which have caused a chain reaction. There + has not been a single additional fact but only hearsay.

+

The Acting Secretary concluded this portion of the conversation by urging + Dobrynin to see Ambassador + Earle on the BW question.

+
+ +
+ 131. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the + Soviet UnionSource: Carter + Library, National Security Council, Institutional Files, Box 110, + SCM 137, Mini-SCC Sverdlovsk, + 7/29/80. Secret; Priority; Nodis. + Sent for information to the Mission in Geneva, USNATO, London, Bonn, Paris, and + the White House. Printed from a copy that indicates the original was + received in the White House Situation Room. + Washington, July 12, 1980, 0037Z +

182944. Geneva for Ambassador Flowerree. Subject: Earle-Dobrynin + Meeting on BW, July 11.

+

1. Secret—Entire text.

+

2. Summary: ACDA Director Earle called in Dobrynin to present him with a paper + expressing our dissatisfaction with Soviet responses to our previous démarches on BW and urging consultations of Soviet and + US experts. He stressed that we were + open to Soviet suggestions as to how serious and meaningful + consultations could be carried out. Dobrynin recalled that the Soviet Government had given a + formal replySee Document 116. to our earlier démarches and + reviewed the previously stated Soviet arguments. However, he promised to + forward our démarche to Moscow and said that either he or the Soviet + Chargé would get back to Ambassador Earle with a reply. End summary.

+

3. In a meeting on July 10See Document 130. Acting Secretary + Christopher emphasized to + Dobrynin the seriousness + with which the US Government approaches + the Sverdlovsk incident and our dissatisfaction with the failure of the + Soviet Government to cooperate. He stressed that failure to resolve the + issue could not only propagandize the Biological Weapons Convention + itself, but also the prospects for making progress in other arms control + areas. The Acting Secretary told Dobrynin that Ambassador Earle would contact him to pursue the matter in more + detail, and he urged Dobrynin to + see Earle despite Dobrynin’s crowded schedule prior to + departure for Moscow.

+

4. Ambassador Earle, referring to + Dobrynin’s meeting the + previous day with Acting Secretary Christopher, said he had a statement to convey to + Dobrynin on the BW question. He stressed that this was an + unwanted problem for us and that our purpose was to clear up ambiguities + in a responsible fashion, not to make propaganda. Ambassador Earle then read the following + statement: Begin text:

+

—On several recent occasions, the United States Government has raised + with the Soviet Government the matter of an extensive outbreak of + anthrax in Sverdlovsk in the spring of 1979 pursuant to Article V of the + Biological Weapons Convention.

+

—The United States Government has studied carefully explanations which + were provided to US earlier by the + Soviet Government. As well as information contained in a May 1980 + article in a Soviet scientific journal.See + footnote 3, Document 128. + The explanation that the reported cases of anthrax were of the + gastrointestinal form and were caused by consumption of meat from + anthrax-infected cattle has left the questions of the United States + Government unanswered and consequently our earlier concerns remain.

+ +

—In this situation, it is clear that our two governments continue to face + a significant unresolved problem having important future ramifications + for both of our countries.

+

—The United States ascribes great importance to this issue and to + achieving a mutually satisfactory resolution of the problem. I wish to + state categorically that the United States seeks a serious and + responsible resolution which will enhance confidence in the Biological + Weapons Convention by ensuring the full realization of its undertakings, + since failure to achieve such a result would both undermine the + Convention and unavoidably result in complications for future US–Soviet cooperation in the vital sphere + of arms control. The United States believes this should be a common + objective for both the Soviet Union and the United States.

+

—To achieve a satisfactory outcome, it is essential that the key parties + concerned, the United States and the Soviet Union undertake cooperative + steps which assist each other in solving this problem. Such consultation + and cooperation must involve serious and meaningful dialogue so that + concerns can be examined carefully. That is clearly what is called for + in the provisions for consultation contained in Article V of the + Biological Weapons Convention. The circumstances surrounding the + outbreak of the disease at Sverdlovsk raise questions within the context + of the Biological Weapons Convention. The United States government is + aware that outbreaks of anthrax occur naturally in the Soviet Union. + However, there is information available to us which causes concern + regarding the outbreak at Sverdlovsk. This information indicates + that:

+

During the first weeks of April 1979, a number of people died in + Sverdlovsk from a disease with symptoms characteristic of inhalation, as + distinct from intestinal or cutaneous, anthrax. The inhalation form of + anthrax is extremely rare and reported incidents involve only a few + cases. (In the past, the anthrax organism has been widely considered a + potential biological warfare agent in part because of its potential for + causing casualties among those who inhale airborne spores.)

+

The number of deaths appears to have been large and far greater than + would be expected for a natural outbreak of any form of anthrax;

+

The initial victims resided or worked in the immediate vicinity and + downwind from a heavily secured military facility in Southwest + Sverdlovsk, known as Cantonment 19;

+

The facility includes animal pens, suggesting it is engaged in activities + involving effects on living organisms;

+

Revetted structures which appear to be suitable for the storage of + explosives are also present within the facility;

+

The section within the Soviet military which is responsible for chemical + and biological programs is associated with a facility in Sverdlovsk;

+ +

At a certain stage in the outbreak, civilian medical personnel were + excluded from the hospital where victims were being treated and the + military assumed exclusive control.

+

—The United States Government believes that the concerns based on this + information make it necessary for the US + and USSR to consult in accordance with + the provisions of Article V of the Biological Weapons Convention.

+

—In an effort to clarify the circumstances surrounding the spring 1979 + anthrax outbreak, and in accordance with Article V of the Biological + Weapons Convention, the United States Government proposed on March 23 + that confidential bilateral discussions be held in which Soviet and + American scientific and medical specialists would participate. This + proposal was based on the proven value of discussions among experts in + resolving questions of great complexity and sensitivity in the SALT Standing Consultative Commission. + The United States Government continues to believe that confidential + consultations on this problem, similar in nature to those conducted in + the Standing Consultative Commission, would provide the best approach + for resolving this matter in a mutually satisfactory manner.

+

—The United States Government envisages that such consultations would + include consideration of the following subjects, together with + appropriate documentation:

+

The nature of the disease involved;

+

The cause of the outbreak;

+

The number of people affected, the geographical extent and the duration + of the outbreak;

+

Background information, particularly with respect to normal incidence of + anthrax in Sverdlovsk.

+

—The United States Government recognizes that arrangements for + consultations must be worked out in a mutually agreeable fashion. For + this reason, we would be open to your suggestions as to how these + serious and meaningful consultations could be carried out.

+

—The United States Government is mindful of the fact that our two + countries were leaders in negotiating the Biological Weapons Convention + and encouraging worldwide adherence. The Convention now has more than 80 + parties who share a stake in the successful realization of its + objectives, including the implementation of its provisions for + cooperation and consultation.

+

—It is therefore now incumbent upon the United States and the Soviet + Union to demonstrate that our two countries are able cooperatively to + resolve a serious problem, as they have undertaken to do in the + Biological Weapons Convention. In view of the importance the United + States Government attaches to this matter, the Soviet Government should understand that the + United States will pursue this issue until a satisfactory resolution can + be achieved, either through bilateral consultations or any other means + which may be necessary to meet our responsibilities, including those to + the other parties to the Convention. The United States Government + prefers to pursue this matter through bilateral consultations and + cooperation. To this end, it has approached the Soviet Government on + this matter a number of times. If the possibility of resolving this + bilaterally is to be preserved, the United States and Soviet Governments + must begin consultations without further delay.

+

—A cooperative resolution of this problem would not only strengthen the + Biological Weapons Convention itself, but would be a positive + development for arms control and disarmament. The United States + Government looks forward to hearing the views of the Soviet Government + on how their two countries may best go about seeking a mutually + satisfactory resolution of this important matter. End text.

+

5. After he had read the statement (a copy of which we handed Dobrynin), Ambassador Earle said he wished to stress several + points: first, this was not an issue which would go away. He noted that + resolutions had been passed in both houses of Congress which, while not + legally binding on the President, constituted a serious expression of + congressional concern. Ambassador Earle noted that the uncertainty regarding what had + really happened in Sverdlovsk would be a festering sore on all arms + control accords and negotiations until this problem was resolved. The + situation was bad enough without having the additional burden of the + suspected BW violation.

+

6. Ambassador Earle stressed that + we were open minded on the form which discussions might take. We + preferred that they be private and on a bilateral basis. In any event, + we were open to Soviet suggestions. He noted the similarity between our + proposal for consultations on BW and the + SCC established in the ABM Treaty and read the text of Article 5 + of the BW Convention as well as the + article on the SCC in the ABM Treaty to prove his point that they + envisaged essentially the same kind of arrangement. He noted that the + work of the SCC had been effective and + helpful. What we wanted was a dialogue along these lines. In effect it + would be an ad hoc consultative group. We were prepared to begin meeting + as early as the first week of August. The longer the present ambiguous + situation continued the greater would be the damage to arms control and + to our relations. Ambassador Earle concluded his presentation by noting that if we + were able to resolve the BW problem, we + could come out of the entire situation with a net plus for arms control + in general. In any case our intention was positive. We certainly had no + desire to undermine arms control.

+

7. Dobrynin replied that the + Soviets had explained their position many times both here and in Moscow. + He thought it was not necessary to quote all the arguments. The Soviets felt that our raising of the + issue was artificial and did not have anything to do with the aim of the + BW Convention. Dobrynin claimed that during the + congressional hearings one of the witnesses called as an expert could + not even explain the symptoms of anthrax.

+

8. Ambassador Earle noted that the + witness in question was not one that we were responsible for and that + nothing in our statement today had as its basis the report of the Aspin + committee.Reference is to the Aspin + Committee Report, otherwise known as “Report of a Subcommittee of + the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence: Soviet + Biological Warfare Activities, June 1980,” in Documents on Disarmament, 1980, pp. 220; + 239–243.

+

9. Continuing, Dobrynin claimed + there was no hard evidence of any violation. All was hearsay. The + Soviets could manufacture such hearsay themselves if they wanted to. He + asked what a commission to investigate the problem could usefully do. + When Ambassador Earle suggested + that, for instance, it could establish how many casualties there had + been, Dobrynin argued that they + had already given these facts to US. + They said there were very few but we claimed there were more, several + hundred in fact. With SALT, + verification could be carried out with satellites. This was not possible + with BW. Agreeing that there were indeed + different kinds of anthrax, Dobrynin nevertheless argued that the head of the + America desk at the Foreign Ministry in Moscow, Viktor Komplektov, who + was a very responsible official, on the presidium of the MFA in fact, + had given US a complete official + explanation. Our persistence was undermining confidence in the adherence + to treaties. Dobrynin challenged + US to document that the Soviets had + violated any treaties in the past. He further argued that the leaks + which followed the raising of the issue by the administration showed our + propaganda purpose.

+

10. When Ambassador Earle + continued to stress the utility of resolving our concerns through + consultation, Dobrynin recalled + that the Soviets had invited American scientists to Moscow to examine + the radiation problem at the US + Embassy.Not found. Our + scientists had gone to Moscow but they had refused to join in a + statement with the Soviets on their common conclusions. Dobrynin asked what could be usefully + discussed in the present case. The Soviets had given their explanation + already.

+

11. Ambassador Earle noted that + this was not the case. The Soviets had given US conclusions, not facts. When Dobrynin pressed him to give an + example, Ambassador Earle + suggested that evidence and documents might be examined to resolve the + disparity over how many people had contracted anthrax. Again stressing + that the problem was a genuine + one which would not go away by itself, Ambassador Earle pressed the argument that the + Treaty itself provided for a cooperative resolution to problems such as + the one we were faced with.

+

12. Dobrynin repeated that the + Soviets had already replied. He claimed we were pressing the issue for + propaganda purposes. Ambassador Earle denied that this was true and said that he was + quite pleased that news accounts of his meeting with Dobrynin had speculated that they were + talking about TNF, not BW. He said he hoped that this meant that + the real purpose of their meeting would remain confidential. He again + emphasized the considerable care we had taken in drawing up the points + in our statement. We had reviewed the Soviet statements but were left + with concerns which we wanted to resolve, if possible, by a low-key, + confidential discussion of the matter among experts.

+

13. Dobrynin, noting for one last + time that the Soviets had already given US their official views on the matter said he would + nevertheless report our statement to Moscow and promised that either he + or, in his absence, Chargé Vasev, would get back to Ambassador Earle with a reply.

+

14. Septel will provide instructions + for briefing allied governments.The + Department of State informed the Allies of the démarche in telegram + 187763 to USNATO, July 16. + (National Archives, RG 59, Central + Foreign Policy File, P880026–1535)

+ + Christopher + +
+ +
+ + 132. Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of Defense + BrownSource: Library of Congress, + Manuscript Division, Harold + Brown Papers, Box 61, Biological/Chemical Warfare. + Secret. In the upper right margin, Brown wrote “7/15—Good argument. Perhaps best + handled by supporting [illegible] add-on, without at this time + changing policy. (since the 3.1M merely puts + US in position more to + construction of binary production facility. [illegible] HB.” + Washington, July + 15, 1980 + + SUBJECT + US Chemical Warfare Policy and + Retaliatory Capability (U) + +

1. (S) The Joint Chiefs of Staff are concerned that the Soviet Union has + not matched the restraint shown by the United States in modernizing + CW capabilities nor the efforts of + the United States to negotiate a meaningful CW treaty. To the contrary, the Soviets not only have + developed an extensive CW capability, + but continuing reports indicate that they also have employed riot + control and incapacitating agents (and possibly lethal agents) in + Afghanistan. Their apparent willingness to employ chemical weapons is in + complete disregard of internationally recognized principles to which the + Soviets publicly subscribe. The Joint Chiefs of Staff view the Soviet + actions in Afghanistan, following the apparent and unchallenged use of + chemical weapons by the Vietnamese in Laos, as part of a developing + pattern by the Soviet Union and its surrogates to employ these weapons + at low levels of conflict.At the end of + this paragraph, Brown wrote + “Our degree of certainty is not very great (about Sov use in Afghanistan—somewhat + greater re SEA).”

+

2. (S) These factors present a serious threat to US security interests, given the marginal capability of the + United States to conduct CW operations + and the reluctance of the Soviets to negotiate an equitable, verifiable + ban on the development, production, and stockpiling of chemical weapons. + The Soviets respect strength and exploit weakness. They know that the + United States and NATO are + comparatively weak in the area of CW. + Gradually improving US chemical defense + posture provides little, if any, deterrence to Soviet use of chemical + weapons. Even a near-perfect defense probably would notIn between “not” and “deter,” Brown wrote “alone.” deter + Soviet use of chemical agents because of the significant military + advantage of placing an opponent in a CW + environment. Until the United States demonstrates that it has an + effective CW retaliatory capability, + combined with a viable defense, the Soviets are not likely to be + restrained from using chemicals in any future conflict. The almost + nonexistent US offensive capability, coupled with a severely limited + defensive capability, is, in fact, seriously destabilizing.

+

3. (S) Considering the asymmetry between the US and Soviet chemical warfare posture, as well as the + current tactical nuclear balance, the Joint Chiefs of Staff believe that + the President should have a credible chemical response option to Soviet + use of offensive chemical weapons—especially if the Soviets selectively + employ chemical weapons against a few critical targets. Nuclear + retaliation, in itself, is a questionable and possibly an undesirable + CW deterrent due to the unknown + level of the Soviet nuclear and chemical response to US use of theater nuclear weapons. For this + reason, it is necessary to pursue a vigorous program that provides + measurable and visible evidence of the US resolve to field a CW + retaliatory capability. The development of a safe—and a politically more + acceptable—binary weapons stockpile should be the first major step in + this direction.

+

4. (S) The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that positive steps be taken + now to develop a credible US + CW retaliatory capability. They further + recommend that a memorandum, substantially like that in the + Appendix,The appendix was not + attached. be forwarded to the President requesting that + US policy be changed to permit + immediate modernization of the US + CW retaliatory capability. Binary + munitions represent the most reasonable option for insuring a credible + retaliatory capability in support of the national policy of deterrence. + In this regard, you may wish to recommend to the President that he + support the action by the House of Representatives of adding $3.1 + million to the FY 1981 budget for + construction of a chemical munitions binary facility.

+

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

+ + David C. JonesGeneral, USAF + Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff + +
+ +
+ + 133. Memorandum From Marshall Brement of the National Security Council + Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs + (Brzezinski)Source: Carter Library, National + Security Council, Institutional Files, Box 110, SCM 137, Mini-SCC Sverdlovsk, 7/29/80. Secret. Sent + for information. + Washington, July + 16, 1980 + + SUBJECT + Sverdlovsk: Next Step (U) + +

Regarding your question (Tab A),Tab A was + not attached. the next step is to await the Soviet response, + which will presumably be negative. The story in today’s New York Times (Tab B)Tab B is not attached. Reference is to “Toll is Put + at 1,000 in Soviet Accident,” New York Times, + July 16, 1980, which described the Sverdlovsk incident. will + confirm their judgment that this is a propaganda ploy and they will + almost certainly continue to stonewall. (U)

+

Meanwhile, ACDA is working on a White + Paper which we would issue if the Soviet response is unsatisfactory. The + problem with this is that the White Paper will not be an entirely + convincing document, at least in a court of law, particularly after + sensitive information has been scrubbed from it by the intelligence + community. In any case, other governments will probably not be convinced + enough by it to take action condemning the USSR. We then will have to decide whether we want to go to + the Security Council with our case or take it to some other multilateral + forum. (C)

+

At that point we will also have to decide whether we can continue to + adhere to a treaty which is being violated flagrantly by the USSR. (Although there remains at least a + modicum of doubt about whether the Soviets are stockpiling BW materials, they clearly have failed to + comply with Article 5 of the BW + Convention, which calls for consultations.) To renounce the Convention + would be a difficult step for us to take, but to adhere to it in the + face of a flagrant violation would not do the cause of arms control any + good either and would be difficult politically as well. Before we make + up our minds as to our ultimate strategy, we should probably first + examine the White Paper, which ACDA + promises will be ready by the end of next week. (S)

+

Oplinger concurs, but believes we + can produce a White Paper which, without needlessly spilling + intelligence sources, can make a compelling case that the Soviets are in + violation of Article 5, perhaps sufficient to get other governments to + condemn them on those grounds. + If we cannot do that much, clearly we cannot sustain a charge of a + substantive violation in the Security Council or elsewhere. (C)

+
+ +
+ 134. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the + Soviet UnionSource: Carter + Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 83, USSR: 7/11–31/80. Secret; Priority; + Nodis. Sent for information + to the Mission in Geneva, USNATO, London, Bonn, Paris, and the White House. Printed + from a copy that indicates the original was received in the White + House Situation Room. + Washington, July 18, 1980, 2021Z +

189291. Geneva for Ambassador Flowerree. Subject: Soviet Response to U.S. Démarche on + Sverdlovsk Incident.

+

1. S—Entire text.

+

2. Summary: Soviet Chargé Vasev came in with a reply to Ambassador + Earle’s démarche of July + 11,See Document + 131 to Dobrynin requesting consultations under the BW Convention on the reported incidence of + anthrax at Sverdlovsk. Vasev said he had been instructed to confirm that + the Soviet side considered the allegations completely unfounded, that + there had been no violation of the BW + Convention and that there was consequently no basis for consultation. + Ambassador Earle regretted that + the Soviet reply had not addressed the factual information we had + conveyed and cautioned that, since the problem would not go away, we + would have to continue pursuing the matter by other means which would + probably include the participation of other parties. End summary.

+

3. Saying that he was speaking on instructions, Vasev delivered the + following “oral reply” on July 17:

+

“In view of repeated requests of the American side the Embassy has been + instructed to confirm once again that the Soviet side considers as + completely unfounded allegations which try to establish some sort of + connection between an outbreak of anthrax in the region of Sverdlovsk in + April 1979 and the compliance by the Soviet Union with the Convention + Prohibiting Bacteriological Weapons.

+

“The Soviet Union, as one of the initiators of and participants in the + Convention, has always attached the utmost importance to the undeviating + fulfillment of all its provisions which represent a major measure in the field of real + disarmament and the effective prevention against making and storing + types of weapons of mass destruction lethal for mankind. We have already + emphasized that the fulfillment by the Soviet side of obligations + established by the Convention is guaranteed by the appropriate state + institutions of the USSR and that the + Soviet Union does not possess bacteriological (biological) agents, + toxins, weapons or equipment and means of delivery as mentioned in + Article I of the Convention.

+

“Besides, in view of the request made by the American side concerning + information on the causes of an outbreak of anthrax in the region of + Sverdlovsk in April of last year the Soviet side has communicated the + fact that the outbreak was a result of periodic livestock epidemics in + those regions and that the cases of human illness were due to the + consumption of cattle meat sold in violation of established veterinary + rules. This communication was based on data from the epidemiological + service furnished in particular by the magazine “Microbiology, + Epidemiology, and Immunology” (May 1980 issue).

+

“The stated facts show that the incident concerning anthrax in the region + of Sverdlovsk is completely within the realm of veterinary and public + health and does not touch upon any matter relating to the aims or + observance of the Convention banning bacteriological weapons as + mentioned in Article V.

+

“It is noted with bewilderment and regret how irresponsibly some American + officials make public statements obviously trying to cast a shadow over + the faithful fulfillment by the Soviet Union of its treaty obligations. + The obviously inspired clamor in the American mass media around this + contrived problem is also noted.

+

“The Soviet side reaffirms that there is no basis for consultations + within the context of Article V of the Convention on the banning of + bacteriological weapons”. End text.

+

4. In the discussion which ensued, Ambassador Earle regretted the Soviet disregard of our démarche + which had furnished detailed information underlying our concern over + compliance. He noted the Soviets had not addressed themselves to the + information in our paper. Referring to his conversation with Ambassador + Dobrynin last Friday, + Ambassador Earle reiterated his + concern that the Soviet unresponsiveness would cast a shadow over both + our bilateral relations and the multilateral arrangement created by the + Convention. Noting that we had not accused the Soviets of a direct + violation, he stated our purpose as seeking to raise in a diplomatic and + noncontentious way a mutual problem which called for consultation under + Article V of the Convention. He added that we were open to Soviet + suggestions on the form such consultations might take. This was our + preferred course. However, Ambassador Earle cautioned, the problem would not go away and if necessary we would be + obliged to deal with it by other means which would include the + involvement of other parties.

+

5. Vasev denied that the substance of the US démarche had been ignored. He said the Soviet side had + studied our paper carefully and reviewed the situation. The Soviets did + not possess any biological agents, weapons, or means of delivery. Their + explanation of what happened in Sverdlovsk had been based on data + furnished by medical experts. Nothing more was required since Article V + did not cover matters of public health and sanitation. Vasev charged + that we were pursuing psychological warfare against the Soviets and + referred to recent newspaper articles based on émigré sources.

+

6. Ambassador Earle pointed out + that we could not let the issue be resolved by a flat Soviet statement. + He referred to the information we had supplied in our paper, noting that + many of the points had not been based upon émigré sources. Vasev + responded that the heart of the matter was simply that the Soviets had + given us a complete explanation.

+

He claimed we were indulging in rumors and psychological warfare. + Ambassador Earle again stressed + the applicability of Article V, quoting from it directly to make his + point. He noted that as a co-depositary of the Convention we had + responsibilities to insure its observance. Vasev again stressed that the + Soviets found no basis for consultation under Article V. After + Ambassador Earle had denied a + final time Vasev’s charge that our purpose was one of propaganda, Vasev + said he had nothing to add and the meeting ended.

+

7. Septel will contain instructions + for briefing allies.The Department of State + informed the Allies of the Soviet response to the démarche in + telegram 189481 to USNATO, July + 19. (National Archives, RG 59, + Central Foreign Policy File)

+ + Christopher + +
+ +
+ + 135. Memorandum for the RecordSource: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, + Harold Brown Papers, Box + 82, Brown Files—General #1, + Biological Weapons. Secret. Copies were sent to Komer, McGiffert, Slocombe, Davis, and Buckley. + Prepared by Weakley; and approved by Slocombe. A hand-written note under the date reads + “Walt—This is a good outcome. Well done—Lynn.” + Washington, July + 31, 1980 + + SUBJECT + Mini-SCC Meeting—Sverdlovsk + (C) + +

A Mini-SCC on the possible BW incident at Sverdlovsk, USSR, was held from 1000–1130 on July 29, + 1980.No minutes or summary of + conclusions of this meeting were found. The purpose was to + discuss possible options open to the U.S. in view of the recent Soviet + rejection of the third U.S. request for information on this matter.

+

D. Aaron (Chairman) opened by + asking for a review of the adequacy of the U.S. case, not from the + perspective of what we believe happened but how well we could defend + ourselves publicly on that case, especially if we decided to react by + taking public steps such as submitting our case to the UN, withdrawing from participation in + treaty, etc. S. Keeny (ACDA) led response, pointing out that we + do have some problems with the case, especially regarding releasability + of information [less than 1 line not + declassified]. A classified white paper is being prepared in ACDA which will primarily consist of + assertions without evidence. Keeny pointed out that soft spots in our case + include

+

[5 lines not declassified]

+

Aaron summed up this phase of the + discussion by noting that we do not have as much assurance as we would + need that there was a BW violation; the + most we can say with assurance is that the Soviets have failed to be + forthcoming on a serious matter. Bartholomew (State) added that we can at least say we + have enough evidence for legitimate concern; there was general agreement + on this. W. Slocombe (OSD) argued that the focus of our case + should be Soviet refusal to cooperate in resolving the problem.

+

The discussion shifted to what actions the U.S. should take. Slocombe argued that we should + continue to press the Soviets along the line we have already, at least + in the short term until the UNGA in + September. The Soviets are resourceful enough to creatively change their + line if we put them on notice that this is a very serious matter to us, + that their stone-walling behavior jeopardizes further arms control + agreements, and that we + take cooperation in verifying arms control agreements very seriously. + Bob Barry (State EUR) said Soviets + would never go beyond their current position. A discussion ensued about + what we could realistically expect if we did cause the Soviet side to be + more forthcoming, how much leverage we can hope to exert, and the + options available for exerting such leverage. Consensus was that we want + to deter Soviet pursuit of BW, avoid + damage to arms control generally—and that a fuller explanation and + corrective action would help on both scores, but that a good deal of + damage had already been done.

+

Aaron summarized and cited tasks + ahead.

+

—First, proceed with preparation of the White Paper (ACDA). We can then estimate its + usefulness and decide what to do with it.

+

—Go to the British; get them to weigh in. (Also use presentation to them + as a test case of the persuasiveness of our evidence to a sympathetic + audience.) (State put together a proposal; will pass staff analysis to + them as soon as possible [less than 1 line not + declassified]).

+

—Pursue another démarche, either in Washington or Moscow, as described + above. Emphasize we want an answer at the senior political level. (State + to circulate proposal).

+

—[2 lines not declassified]

+

—Explore possibility of using the incident as a vehicle for proposing to + amend and clarify the verification and permitted quantity clauses if we + have to go multilateral. (ACDA).

+ + Robert M. Weekley Colonel, USA + Assistant for Negotiations ODUSD (Policy + Planning) + +
+ +
+ 136. Telegram From the Mission in Geneva to the Department of + StateSource: National + Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign + Policy File, D800387–0723. Confidential; Priority. Sent for + information to Bonn, London, Moscow, Paris, and USNATO. + Geneva, August 14, 1980, 1549Z +

11024. Subject: US–USSR Negotiations on Chemical Weapons + (CW): Summary of Developments.

+

CW message no. 17

+

1. (C—Entire text).

+ +

2. Summary. Round twelve of the US–USSR negotiations on Chemical Weapons + (CW) began on May 22 and ended July + 7. In a sense, they also extended beyond the formal closing date almost + until the end of the 1980 session of the Committee on Disarmament (CD) + on August 9, since the two Delegations had a number of private exchanges + in connection with the work of the CD’s working group on CW. The pace of round twelve was fairly + intensive, especially prior to the opening of the CD session June 12. + The substantive results, however, were quite meager. In the crucial area + of verification, the Soviets—while professing willingness to continue + the search for mutually acceptable solutions—made it even clearer that + they were not prepared to move from their present basic position. Some + progress was achieved on a few secondary issues, but it was not + sufficient for a full resolution of those issues. Considerable time and + effort were expended on the preparation of the joint report to the CD. + In general, it was evident that the Soviets did not expect any major + advance in the negotiations during this round. End summary.

+

3. During round twelve of the US–USSR negotiations on CW, eight plenaries and nine drafting group + meetings were held, most of them prior to the opening of the CD session. + Coordination of the joint report to the CD required a number of + additional meetings, outside the regular plenary or drafting group + framework.The joint US–USSR report is in telegram 8409 from the Mission in + Geneva, June 16, 1980. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + D800294–0225) The two Delegations also had several private + discussions after the formal closing of round twelve, in connection with + the work of the CD’s working group on CW.

+

4. Despite the tensions in U.S.-Soviet relations, the atmosphere in the + bilaterals was business-like. Soviet responses to USDel comments + regarding reported use of CW were also + couched in non-polemical terms. Throughout the round, and especially + during the work of the CD’s working group on CW, the Soviets displayed visible concern about preventing + discussions in that group from exposing the weakness of their position, + in particular on verification. Although they were clearly unhappy that + we remained unresponsive to their attempts to engage US in joint efforts to circumscribe those + discussions, this did not affect their working relationship with + U.S.

+

5. The substantive results of round twelve were mixed, with the negative + balancing out the positive.

+

A. The Soviets showed some flexibility on several secondary issues, but + fell short of providing adequate basis for complete agreement on any of + them. Specifically, they:

+

(1) Agreed to specify the maximum aggregate annual capacity (one metric + ton) of a single facility for the production of super-toxic lethal chemicals for non-hostile + military purposes, but expressed a negative attitude towards other U.S. + proposals related to this issue;

+

(2) Agreed that, subject to contrary decision by the first Revcon, the + use of super-toxic lethal chemicals in training should cease at the time + of such a conference—however, they did not accept the U.S. view that the + limitation should also cover other toxic chemicals;

+

(3) Moved from their stand of total opposition to the inclusion of toxins + in the coverage of a CW ban, but + remained unwilling to include all toxic chemicals regardless of origin + (see para B(1) below);

+

(4) Implied that destruction of stocks could be subject to OSI procedures similar to those offered by + them in round nine for destruction of facilities, i.e., notification 90 + days in advance of specific destruction operations and possibility of + requests for OSI;

+

(5) Agreed to exclude from the coverage of a CW ban munitions and devices for dissemination of + irritants—see, however, para B(2) + below;

+

(6) Agreed to include in the general information on stocks to be + exchanged bilaterally the quantitative category of “over 150,000 tons” + and to having such exchange take place 15 days before submission of the + convention to the U.S. Senate for ratification—they made the exchange + contingent, however, on signature of the convention by all five + permanent members of the UN Security + Council;

+

(7) Accepted in principle the concept of joint inspection teams, but with + reservation regarding the type of OSI + it would apply to and the composition and authority of such teams;

+

(8) Agreed to the establishment of a consultative committee within 30 + days after the entry into force of the convention, rather than six + months as they had originally proposed, although they did not agree to + having the committee convene within the same time limit.

+

B. The significance of this limited movement in the Soviet position was + diminished by their negative stand on some issues, especially those in + the crucial area of verification. In particular, the Soviets:

+

(1) Excluded from a prohibition toxic chemicals capable of antigen + activity or of engendering immunity, thus restricting the significance + of their move on the toxin issue (para + 5.A. (3) above);

+

(2) Remained unwilling to accommodate the U.S. position on irritants in a + satisfactory manner, asserting that they could not agree to legalizing + unilateral reservations to the Geneva Protocol;

+

(3) Refused even to discuss provisions regarding the disposition of + facilities on the grounds that obligation to cease production was + already covered by the basic prohibition and, in that connection, + objected to the U.S. proposal to prohibit construction of new CW production facilities because such a provision could entail + requests for OSI also of facilities + constructed for permitted purposes;

+

(4) Continued to reject any provision involving declaration of facilities + early in the implementation of a convention;

+

(5) Rejected the distinction between “implementation” and “compliance” as + based on the U.S. concept of verification, which they did not + accept;

+

(6) Strongly reaffirmed their approach to verification, making it clear + again that no pre-agreed (i.e., mandatory) OSI’s were acceptable and that the concept of “voluntary” + OSI’s should apply to all + obligations regarding destruction, production, and non-retention;

+

(7) While expressing willingness to continue the search for methods of + using NTM for monitoring a CW prohibition, questioned the + U.S.–suggested measures for facilitating verification by NTM, in particular since they would + involve declaration of locations of facilities.

+

6. In view of the fact that none of the issues on which language could be + developed was sufficiently resolved, and also because of the Soviet + refusal to discuss provisions regarding the disposition of facilities, + the drafting group did not actively consider any specific formulations. + A major portion of the group’s time and effort was devoted to the + development of the joint report to the CD.

+

7. In sum, round twelve was not very productive, although at this + juncture probably no different results could have been expected. At the + same time, Soviet behavior in the bilaterals, in the process of the + development of the joint report, and in connection with the CD’s working + group on CW suggests that the Soviets + continue to attach importance to the bilaterals. It was clear that they + feel much more comfortable dealing with the U.S. alone than having to + protect their position against a multitude of differing views, as they + had to do in the CW working group with + regard to issues to be dealt with in negotiations on a convention.

+

8. It is difficult to tell at this point what the eventual objective of + the Soviets may be concerning a CW + agreement, or whether they have even decided themselves. Early in round + twelve Amb Israelyan told Amb Flowerree not to expect much progress and said that the + Soviets would be re-evaluating their positions on arms control issues in + the light of the outcome of the U.S. elections. At least the first part + of this statement was borne out by the results of the round. The Soviets + have talked about the possibility of a new round in January 1981. In the + interim, consideration might be given to approaching them through + diplomatic channels to probe their inventions and to reemphasize to them + the crucial importance of reaching agreement on satisfactory + verification provisions if any real progress is to be made toward a + joint initiative.

+ + Helman + +
+ +
+ + 137. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Kingdom to the Department + of StateSource: National + Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign + Policy File, D800431–0638. Secret; Priority. Sent for information to + Moscow. + London, September 10, 1980, 1356Z +

19227. Subject: (S) U.S./UK Consultations on Sverdlovsk Anthrax Outbreak. + Ref: State 219868.In telegram 219868 to + London, August 18, the Department of State told the Embassy that + ACDA Director Earle had been informed that the + Foreign Office believed that the “bilateral process” between the + United States and the Soviet Union over the Sverdlovsk incident was + “almost exhausted” and that there was “merit in broadening the scope + of diplomatic action” to include UK + involvement. The Foreign Office also warned that the Soviets “might + conclude that there was little risk in taking chances with arms + control agreements, and the prospects for a good CW agreement would be worse.” (National + Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign + Policy File, D800394–0737)

+

Secret—Entire text

+

1. Summary: U.S.–UK consultations on the + 1979 Sverdlovsk anthrax outbreak were held in London on September 10. + U.S. team, headed by Amb. Ralph + Earle, presented U.S. assessment of what happened in + Sverdlovsk, summarized U.S.-Soviet diplomatic exchanges, and suggested + that next step be a UK démarche to the + Soviets. UK team concurred in U.S. + assessment and outlined alternative possibilities for the next step. The + two sides also explored possible strategies for multilateral involvement + at a later stage. In subsequent meeting, Douglas Hurd (FCO No. 3) told + Amb. Earle that he would + recommend to Foreign Secretary Carrington that UK make a bilateral démarche to the Soviets. End + summary.

+

2. U.S. team, headed by Amb. Ralph + Earle, Director, U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament + Agency, met with UK officials from FCO + and MOD for consultations on the 1979 + Sverdlovsk anthrax outbreak. UK team was + headed by Sir Antony Acland, Deputy Undersecretary, FCO. (Delegation + lists contained para 15 below.)

+

3. Earle began by summarizing U.S. + assessment of what had happened in Sverdlovsk and U.S.-Soviet diplomatic + exchanges over the outbreak:

+

A. What happened:

+

—We are confident that there was a serious outbreak of human anthrax in + Sverdlovsk in April 1979. However, we have been unable to determine with + confidence what caused the outbreak. In particular, we have not + concluded that the Soviets have violated the Biological Weapons + Convention.

+ +

—The information available provides a basis for serious concern about the + possibility of an accident at a BW-related facility, the nature of activities at such a + facility, and whether those activities were inconsistent with + obligations under the BW Convention.

+

—These concerns are based on judgments that the outbreak involved the + inhalation form of anthrax, not the intestinal form as asserted by the + Soviets and that the outbreak occurred in the immediate vicinity of a + military facility which has been suspected for some time of BW-related activities.

+

—The possibility that the outbreak resulted from airborne contamination + produced by an accident related to protective or prophylactic work with + biological agents permitted under the convention cannot be ruled out. On + the other hand, there clearly is a basis for concern that activities not + permitted by the Convention may have been conducted at Sverdlovsk and + this is the basis for the U.S. proposal for consultation.

+

B. Diplomatic exchanges:

+

—Since March of this year we have raised the Sverdlovsk case with the + Soviets on a number of occasions.

+

—In these exchanges, we have stressed four major points:

+

1. There is sound reason to question the cause of the outbreak of disease + in Sverdlovsk;

+

2. This issue could be discussed by the U.S. and the Soviet Union in a + setting similar to the one that has been so practical under SALT;

+

3. Resolution of this problem would be a positive development for arms + control, but failure to deal with it in a mutually satisfactory way + could have serious implications for arms control and further complicate + U.S./Soviet relations; and

+

4. This issue will not go away.

+

—So far, the Soviets have been quite unresponsive to our concerns.

+

4. Earle said that the Soviet + explanation that the outbreak was due to meat from anthrax-infected + cattle seemed quite unlikely. It is also disturbing that the Soviets + have denied that our concern in any way obligates them to hold + consultations to clarify the disease in Sverdlovsk is not related to the + Biological Weapons Convention. So, beyond questions relating to + compliance with Article I, Soviet behavior poses a serious question with + respect to their compliance to Article V of the Convention and to their + attitude on the importance of consultative undertakings more + generally.

+

5. Present USG assessment, Earle noted, was that further U.S. + démarches were unlikely to produce a more satisfactory Soviet response. + However, U.S. will continue to press them. In the USG view a UK bilateral approach to the Soviets had some slight chance + of leading to constructive discussions; it thus seemed to be the most + desirable next step.

+

6. Acland responded that a UK + intelligence review, completed in April 1980, had reached conclusions + very similar to those arrived at by the U.S. UK shared U.S. concerns about the cause of the outbreak and + about Soviet + unresponsiveness. Present UK assessment + of diplomatic situation was that Soviets were unlikely to change their + attitude toward U.S. bilateral démarches and that other approaches now + had to be considered.

+

7. In UK view, the objectives of future + steps should be to:

+

—Maintain the credibility of the Convention;

+

—Make clear to the Soviet Union that compliance with the Convention was + being carefully monitored;

+

—Demonstrate domestically and internationally that the Sverdlovsk issue + was being pursued seriously;

+

—Stress the importance of verification provisions in agreements under + negotiation.

+

8. Acland said UK tends to favor a + process of slow escalation of diplomatic steps. Alternatives of simply + dropping the issue or continued U.S. bilateral démarches would not + promote satisfactory resolution. UK will + consider U.S. suggestion that next step be a UK démarche to the Soviets. Other possibilities include + parallel bilateral démarches by the U.S. and others (perhaps by a + neutral country such as Sweden) or a proposal for a meeting of the three + depositaries (U.S., UK and USSR). Earle reiterated U.S. preference for a démarche by the + UK.

+

9. Both sides agreed that once bilateral (or trilateral) approaches had + been exhausted, convening a consultative meeting of states parties was + the logical next step. Palmer (U.S.) outlined preliminary U.S. thinking + about such a meeting. He said that the purpose of a meeting would be to + conduct a thorough and responsible analysis of available information by + qualified experts in order to clarify the cause of the outbreak. Even if + this effort were unsuccessful, the meeting would provide us with an + opportunity to achieve a much wider understanding within the + international community on the nature of the problem. This step would + entail certain risks. Some of the risks are procedural since there is no + established practice for raising this type of compliance issue under the + BW Convention. Other risks relate to + our ability to persuade others that a serious issue is involved. It + would also be desirable to approach such consultations in a way that + might set a valuable precedent for improving the future operation of the + treaty, including the possibility of periodic consultative meetings, and + which would in general strengthen the credibility of the multilateral + arms control process.

+

10. Palmer stressed that before committing ourselves to seeking a + consultative meeting, it would be important to take soundings with key + states to ensure that a proposal would be broadly supported. In view of + the seriousness of the issue, U.S. believes that it would be important + to engage a significant number of concerned BWC parties, particularly + Non-Aligned, in the consultative process. The views of Sweden would be + particularly important because of their past advocacy of a BWC consultative committee and of + their influential role in the neutral/non-aligned group. The U.S. would + prefer to have Sweden take the lead in calling a consultative committee + meeting.

+

11. A discussion of the timing of the next steps ensued. Earle noted that if Lord Carrington + planned to meet with Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko at the beginning of the UNGA session later in September, this + could provide an opportunity for a UK + démarche. He said U.S. believes that next step should not be delayed too + long. It is important that Soviets not get the perception that the issue + is being dropped.

+

12. Acland asked U.S. views on foreshadowing to the Soviets what future + steps were being considered and also on public release of a “white + paper”. Earle responded that U.S. + had already indicated to the Soviets that multilateral involvement was a + possibility, but that being more explicit could lead to Soviet efforts + to block the steps we had in mind. Regarding a “white paper”, the U.S. + believes it important for the near term to maintain as much + confidentiality as possible. We might well provide a classified + background paper to others in the near future, but we see public release + as something for a later stage. (Comment: UK team appeared satisfied with these responses and did not + press either point. End comment).

+

13. Acland concluded by expressing UK + concern about the Sverdlovsk issue and emphasizing usefulness of US–UK + consultations. UK will consider U.S. + suggestions and views and respond as soon as possible.

+

14. In a subsequent meeting, Douglas Hurd (FCO No. 3) told Amb. Earle that he would recommend to + Foreign Secretary Carrington that the UK + make a bilateral démarche to the Soviets to express concern about the + Sverdlovsk incident, as the U.S. team had proposed. Hurd promised a + prompt UK response.

+

[Omitted here is the list of participants.]

+
+ +
+ + 138. Message From Secretary of State Muskie to President CarterSource: + Carter Library, Plains File, Box 5, USSR (General): 9/77–12/80. Secret; Sensitive; Eyes + Only; Nodis. Sent from the White + House Situation Room. The initial “C” written in the upper + right-hand corner of the message indicates that Carter saw it. Carter spent October 4 and 5 in a + fishing cabin in Spruce Creek, Pennsylvania. (Carter Library, + Presidential Materials, President’s Daily Diary) The message is + printed in full in Foreign Relations, 1977–1980, vol. VI, + Soviet Union, Document 304. + Washington, October 5, 1980, 1511Z +

WH07366. Forwarded per request of Secretary Muskie. Please deliver as soon as possible. Subject: + Muskie-Dobrynin Meeting: Follow-up to + Gromyko Bilateral.

+

1. (S—Entire text).

+

2. Begin summary. Secretary Muskie met with Ambassador Dobrynin October 4For the + Muskie-Dobrynin meeting, see Foreign + Relations, 1977–1980, vol. VI, Soviet Union, Document + 303. to take up several issues which time had + prevented his raising with Gromyko in New York:Muskie and Gromyko met on September 25. See + Foreign + Relations, 1977–1980, vol. VI, Soviet Union, Document + 302. Poland, the Sverdlovsk anthrax outbreak, the + September 14 Soviet high-yield test, prospects for Madrid,Delegates of the Organization for Security and + Cooperation in Europe met in Madrid to discuss implementing the + Final Act of the 1975 Helsinki Conference. For more on this, see + Foreign + Relations, 1977–1980, vol. V, European Security, + 1977–1983. including human rights issues, and a + problem affecting continuation of construction of the new Moscow Embassy + complex. He also responded to a question which Gromyko had raised during the New York + bilateral on PD–59.Presidential Directive 59, “Nuclear Weapons + Employment Policy,” was issued on July 25. PD 59 is scheduled for publication in Foreign + Relations, 1977–1980, vol. IV, National Security + Policy. In response, Dobrynin complained that most of what the Secretary had + to say was negative, that there was nothing very positive about it. On + the specific issues raised, Dobrynin said the Poles knew how to handle their + problems without outside interference; there was no utility in + continuing to discuss Sverdlovsk; he had no information as yet on the + September 14 test; our plans for discussing human rights issues at + Madrid would have a very negative effect; and he could understand that + the construction problem was one that might bother us. The Secretary + pointed out that the fact that we continued to set forth our views + frankly, in an effort to lessen the differences between us, should not + be regarded as “negative.” He also stressed the importance of resolving + issues which would facilitate our efforts to achieve ratification of + SALT II. End summary.

+ +

3. The Secretary told Dobrynin he + thought his talk with Gromyko in + New York on September 25 had been very useful and that he had + appreciated Gromyko’s frankness + and relaxed tone. Despite the fact that the meeting had been extended + beyond the agreed time, however, there were several subjects we had not + had time to cover. He thought the best way to treat these was to set out + our position on each of them in a Non-Paper, briefly and without any + polemics, which Dobrynin could + transmit to Gromyko. If there + were additional subjects which Gromyko would like to bring to the Secretary’s attention + in a similar manner he would be glad to consider them.

+

4. The Secretary then summarized each of the issues orally and at the end + of his presentation handed Dobrynin the following Non-Paper:

+

Begin text:

+

Follow-up to September 25 meeting.

+

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to the Sverdlovsk incident.]

+

On arms control matters, we wish to reaffirm the U.S. commitment to + SALT II ratification and to the + achievement of progress in CTB, MBFR, CW, + and ASAT. We would also like to raise + two matters which could have far reaching implications for the future of + arms control negotiations in general and, in the near term, for SALT II ratification. First, the + inability to find a suitable means of resolving the concerns expressed + by the United States regarding the April 1979 outbreak of anthrax in + Sverdlovsk raises serious questions concerning Soviet compliance with + the Biological Weapons Convention. This is a problem that will not + simply go away with the passage of time. We continue to believe that the + best way to resolve our legitimate concerns in this matter would be to + arrange for technical discussions among experts. Although we prefer to + resolve this matter on a bilateral basis, the U.S. Government will also + consider other ways to resolve our concerns in accordance with the terms + of the Biological Weapons Convention—including possible multilateral + action. Soviet cooperation in resolving this matter would be a very + positive step.

+

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to the Sverdlovsk incident.]

+

5. Dobrynin said he would of + course report the Secretary’ remarks to Gromyko. Overall, however, his impression was that they, + quite frankly, were not very encouraging. He then commented briefly on + the individual issues raised as follows:

+

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to the Sverdlovsk incident.]

+

—The U.S. knows the Soviet position on arms control very well: The + Soviets favor a continuation. But we have discussed Sverdlovsk “hundreds + of times” and he doesn’t see anything useful in discussing it further. As for the September + 14 Soviet nuclear test, he has no information as yet.On October 27, Dobrynin presented an oral note from Gromyko to Muskie in response to the + Non-Paper. Muskie’s claim + that the U.S. wanted “normal relations” with the Soviet Union, the + note said, was belied by the Secretary’s October 4 comments. “The + choice of the questions and the way they are posed,” the note + contended, “do not indicate a readiness by the US side to seek mutual understanding. + We have no desire to engage in polemics for the sake of polemics. + But we, understandably, cannot silently pass over statements and + actions of the US side with which we + cannot agree.” Regarding Sverdlovsk, the note said “We reaffirm our + position on the question regarding an outbreak of anthrax in the + area of Sverdlovsk.” (Telegram 287283 to Moscow, October 28; + National Archives, RG 59, Central + Foreign Policy File, P910096–1812)

+

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to the Sverdlovsk incident.]

+
+ +
+ 139. Summary of Conclusions of a Mini-SCC MeetingSource: Carter Library, National Security Council, Institutional + Files, Box 183, SCM 153, Mini-SCC + Chemical Warfare, 11/26/80. Secret. The meeting took place in the + White House Situation Room. + Washington, November 26, 1980 + + SUBJECT + Chemical Warfare (U) + + + PARTICIPANTS + State + Reginald Bartholomew, + Director, Political-Military Affairs + Mark Palmer, Director, Disarm. & Arms Control + Charles Thomas, Dir., Off. of Eur. Aff. & Eur. Security + Robert Pace, Political-Military Officer + OSD + Walter Slocombe, Dep. + Undersec. for Policy Planning + Thomas Dashiell, Staff Specialist for Chemical Technology + OSTP + Ben Huberman, Asso. Dir., Natl. Security, Intl. & Space + Aff. + Margaret Finarelli, Senior Policy Analyst + JCS + Gen John Pustay, Assistant to the Chairman + Col. John A. Tengler, Chemical Staff Planner + DCI + [name not declassified] + [name not declassified] + + OMB + Edward Sanders, Asso. Dir., Natl. Security & Intl. + Affairs + Robert Howard, AF Branch Chief, Natl. Security Division + ACDA + George Ashworth, Asst. Dir., Weapons Eval. & Control + Robert Mikulak, Staff Member + White House + David Aaron + (chaired) + NSC + Victor Utgoff + Gen Jasper Welch + Jerry Oplinger + +

The meeting began with a discussion of the basic objectives of the + proposed binary chemical weapons program, as currently seen. This + discussion included the following points: (1) The case for the $2B + 30,000 agent tons JCS + CW munitions requirement for Central + Europe remains to be made; (2) A more modest stockpile of several + thousand agent tons might cost a total of $300–400M to produce; (3) The + binary CW program would accommodate a + shift to a better mix of CW munitions, + particularly more air-delivered weapons; and (4) Binary munitions offer + the possibility of multipurpose artillery shells that could be normally + configured as smoke or HE rounds, but with a quick change of inserts + converted to CW munitions. (S)

+

The Chair noted that the value of the binary CW program seems to depend significantly on + forward-deploying some of these weapons in Europe and in particular, in + Germany. Defense generally agreed, but stated that the binary program + would probably be worth pursuing even if forward-deployment of binaries + were to prove impossible. The Chair stated that the question still seems + to be: Will we be able to deploy binaries in Europe? (S)

+

State (after noting that the CW issue has + not yet been addressed by the Secretary), argued that the problem of + deploying binaries in Europe is manageable if approached correctly. + State argued that presenting a major new CW program all at one time to our Allies wouldn’t work. On + the other hand, a phased approach beginning with deployment of + air-delivered CW munitions in the UK, and then leading to replacement of + stocks in the FRG, perhaps using the + multipurpose shell idea, could be worked out. (S)

+

The Chair stated that if the value of binaries is strongly dependent on + forward-deployment, we must know Allied—particularly FRG—attitudes. Defense argued that we + should not ask the Allies to participate in this decision. State agreed, + but said that the US should discuss the + management of the CW problem with the + Allies. JCS noted that we might point + out the changed importance of a credible CW deterrent, given changes in the nuclear balance. State + said any suggestion of a changed role for CW weapons would doom any hopes we have for modernizing the + forward-deployed CW stockpile. State + then argued that the program of improvements we are discussing involves + a long series of actions and + consultations that should probably be carried out by the next + administration. (S)

+

The Chair argued that we need to make a decision on the program for the + ’82 DOD budget, and that we are likely + to create a major problem for the next administration if we simply + include funds for the binary plant without consulting with the FRG. Chancellor Schmidt would likely be pressed at home + for his reaction to our decision, and his reaction might very well be to + say binary weapons will never be deployed in Germany. (S)

+

After a short discussion of the specific decisions that must be made, the + mini-SCC agreed to recommend the + following course of action:

+

(1) Do nothing to oppose the Congressional initiatives to fund the binary + plant in 1981.

+

(2) Sign the appropriations bill without comment and place whatever funds + the Congress provides for 1981 on the deferred list, pending decision by + the new administration.

+

(3) Make our final decision on the binary CW plant in the course of the President’s ’82 DOD budget review.

+

(4) If the Congress’ actions lead to a need for significant funding in + 1982, and if the President decides to fund the program, consult with + Chancellor Schmidt to give him + advance warning of our intentions.

+

(5) Let the next administration decide how to complete the required + restructuring of the binary program. (S)

+
+ +
+ +
+ + Comprehensive Test Ban; Peaceful Nuclear Explosions + +
+ 140. Editorial Note +

During the 1976 presidential campaign, the Democratic Party included a + comprehensive test ban in its party platform. (“Widely Differing + Platforms Offer Voters a Clear Choice,” Washington + Post, August 18, 1976) In a September 25 speech in San Diego, + former Georgia Governor Jimmy + Carter, the Democratic Party’s Presidential candidate, + said if elected he “would urge the Soviet Union to join the United + States in agreeing to a ‘total ban’ on all nuclear explosions, including + so-called peaceful devices, for five years.” Carter “further said he would ‘follow + through’ on his belief that a ‘comprehensive’ test ban treaty should be + negotiated, which presumably would include the underground tests now + permitted by [the 1963 Limited Test Ban] Treaty.” (“Carter Vows a Curb on Nuclear Exports + to Bar Arms Spread,” New York Times, September + 26, 1976)

+

The United Nations General Assembly also called for a test ban. A + December 10 Resolution condemned “all nuclear weapons tests, in whatever + environment they may be conducted;” declared “its profound concern that + substantive negotiations towards a comprehensive test ban agreement have + not yet begun and reemphasizes the urgency of concluding a comprehensive + and effective agreement;” called for “all nuclear-weapon States to + suspend the testing of nuclear weapons by agreement, subject to review + after a specified period, as an interim step towards the conclusion of a + formal and comprehensive test ban agreement;” and noted “the particular + responsibility of the nuclear-weapon States which are parties to + international agreements in which they have declared their intention to + achieve at the earliest possible date the cessation of the nuclear arms + race.” (“General Assembly Resolution 31/66: Urgent Need for Cessation of + Nuclear and Thermonuclear Tests and Conclusion of a Treaty to Achieve a + Comprehensive Test Ban,” December 10, 1976, Documents + on Disarmament, 1977, pp. 910–912)

+

On January 23, 1977, during a press interview with selected reporters, + President Jimmy Carter discussed + a number of arms control issues. In response to a question about the + Strategic Arms Limitations Talks (SALT), he said “I would like to proceed quickly and + aggressively with a comprehensive test ban treaty. I am in favor of + eliminating the testing of all nuclear devices, instantly and + completely.” Asked if this included underground tests, Carter replied “Yes. And whether or + not the Soviets will agree to do that, I don’t know yet. They have sent + an encouraging message back, + but the exact caveats might not yet be in view. I can’t answer that + question.” (“Press Interview of + President Carter [Extract],” + January 23, 1977, Documents on Disarmament, 1977, + pp. 20–22)

+

A day later, Secretary of State Cyrus + Vance, according to a Los Angeles + Times story, “tersely and unequivocally denied that there had + been any ‘response from the Soviet Union on this particular issue’.” + Later that day, the Department of State issued a statement that + “clarified” Carter’s remark. “There has not been any official Soviet + message on the subject,” according to the statement. Rather, the + President had actually referred to “a series of public and private + signals since last fall that the Soviet leadership is interested in a + wide variety of arms control initiatives,” particularly Soviet Foreign + Minister Andrei Gromyko’s call + for a comprehensive test ban during a speech at the United Nations in + September 1976. (“Carter + Proposes Halt to All Nuclear Testing,” Los Angeles + Times, January 25, 1977)

+
+ +
+ 141. Presidential Review Memorandum/NSC–16Source: + Carter Library, National Security Council, Institutional Files, Box + 37, PRM/NSC–16 [1]. Secret. The memorandum was attached to a January + 25 cover memorandum from Brzezinski which advised Carter to “immediately” sign the + PRM in order to “show the + seriousness of your purpose” to end all nuclear tests. + (Ibid.) + Washington, January + 25, 1977 + + TO + The Vice President + The Secretary of State + The Secretary of Defense + + + ALSO + The Director of Central Intelligence + The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff + The Director, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency + The Administrator, Energy Research Development + Administration + + + SUBJECT + Nuclear Testing + + +

In order to follow up immediately on my remarks concerning the + elimination of testing of all nuclear devices,See Document 140. + I wish the Special Coordination Committee to undertake a preliminary + review of the major issues involved in the termination of all nuclear + testing.

+

This initial review should be completed for my consideration by February + 9 and should include:

+

1. A preliminary analysis of the major problems of verifying a complete + ban on all testing weapons as well as peaceful nuclear explosions by the + US and the USSR, and other nuclear powers.

+

2. The effect of such a ban on US weapons + testing programs as well as the likely effect on Soviet programs.

+

3. Alternative diplomatic scenarios that might be adopted to move towards + this goal, including the advantages and disadvantages of several + alternatives: a unilateral US + moratorium; a bilateral US/Soviet moratorium; and approaches to other + nuclear powers to join such a moratorium. Consideration should also be + given to a more permanent arrangement; for example, amending the Limited + Test Ban Treaty.The 1963 Limited Test Ban + Treaty among the United States, the United Kingdom, and the Soviet + Union prohibited nuclear weapons tests or any other nuclear + explosion in the atmosphere, outer space, and underwater. + There should also be an examination of the advantages and disadvantages + of moving ahead with or holding the Threshold Test Ban TreatyThe 1974 Threshold Test Ban Treaty between the + United States and the Soviet Union prohibited nuclear weapons tests + underground as well as tests with a nuclear yield exceeding 150 + kilotons. and PNE + AgreementAlong with the Threshold Test + Ban Treaty, the 1976 PNE Agreement + between the United States and the Soviet Union allowed each country + to conduct underground nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes. The + two countries, however, were prohibited from enjoying + “weapons-related benefits” from such explosions. already + before the Congress.

+ + Jimmy + Carter + +
+ +
+ + 142. Memorandum of ConversationSource: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, + Staff Material, Office, Outside the System File, Box 47, Chron: + 2/77. Top Secret. The meeting took place in the Oval Office. The + memorandum is printed in full in Foreign Relations, 1977–1980, vol. VI, + Soviet Union, Document 3. + Washington, February 1, + 1977, 11:30a.m.–12:30p.m. + + PARTICIPANTS + The President + Anatoliy Dobrynin, Soviet + Ambassador to the United States + Secretary of State Cyrus + Vance + Zbigniew Brzezinski, + National Security Affairs Assistant + +

Strategic Issues

+

President Carter began by stating + he would like to move rapidly—aggressively—on arms control issues with + the Soviet Union. He mentioned that he had been encouraged by the + messages he received this summer from Secretary General Brezhnev. He would like to see + Brezhnev’s good wishes + translated into positive results. The President added that his Inaugural + SpeechFor Carter’s Inaugural Address + and his remarks to other nations on U.S. foreign policy, see Public Papers: Carter, 1977, pp. 1–5. and his + recent letterOn January 26, Carter wrote Brezhnev that he wanted to + “improve relations with the Soviet Union on the basis of + reciprocity, mutual respect and benefit.” He mentioned a number of + arms control issues, and said that he hoped “we can promptly + conclude an adequately verified comprehensive ban on all nuclear + tests, and also achieve greater openness about our respective + strategic policies.” Brezhnev answered Carter on February 4 and said that he wanted to + “strictly observe the fundamental principles of equality, mutual + consideration of legitimate interests, mutual benefit and + non-interference in the internal affairs of the other side.” After + raising SALT and other arms + control issues, he said “it is also necessary to put into force + without delay the Soviet-US treaties + on the limitation of underground nuclear weapon tests and on the + explosions for peaceful purposes. At the same time efforts should be + intensified—–and we are ready to cooperate with the United States in + this matter—–for complete and general cessation of nuclear weapon + tests and the prevention of proliferation of such weapons.” The + letters are printed in full in Foreign Relations, 1977–1980, vol. VI, + Soviet Union, Documents 1 and 4. to Secretary + Brezhnev expressed his views + on U.S.-Soviet relations.

+

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to a comprehensive test ban.]

+

Comprehensive Test Ban

+

The President asked about the Comprehensive Test Ban (CTB). Dobrynin raised the issue of French and PRC compliance. The President responded + that a CTB might be initialled for a + limited time, such as 2–4 years. It would be subject to renewal. Both + the United States and the Soviet Union would attempt to get France and + the PRC to comply with the CTB. The President said he envisioned the test ban applying + to peaceful nuclear explosions. Dobrynin mentioned that the Soviets have two peaceful + nuclear explosions scheduled, although the dates have not been fixed. + The President said his preference would be to stop all testing.

+

Dobrynin asked about the two + nuclear treaties pending before Senate. He asked if the President + supported them. The President said he did, but as first steps. Dobrynin said that he was not prepared + to offer a Soviet view on peaceful nuclear devices. The President + indicated that the United States had tested peaceful devices and had not + been encouraged. The President went on to say that he would be willing + to include in the Comprehensive Test Ban an understanding that would + allow the Soviets to conduct their two tests, if observers were + present.An unknown hand circled the + word “tests” in this sentence and wrote “?” in the right-hand + margin. + Dobrynin responded that “this is + fair enough.” The President added, “We’ll try to get France and the + PRC to comply.”

+

Compliance and “Matters of Concern”

+

The President asked for some assurance of compliance. He mentioned that + Gromyko has said + consideration should be given to on-site inspection. The President went + on to say that he would like to be able to write Secretary General + Brezhnev on “matters of + concern,” such as compliance and other sensitive activities which might + be susceptible to misinterpretation. Dobrynin responded that this would be “a good idea.” The + President added that each side would reserve the right not to reply.

+

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to a comprehensive test ban.]

+
+ +
+ + 143. Telegram From the Mission to the North Atlantic Treaty + Organization to the Department of StateSource: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, reel # N/A. + Confidential; Immediate. Sent for information Immediate to Bonn, + London, Paris, Rome, Tokyo, USUN, + and the Mission in Geneva. + Brussels, February 3, 1977, 1550Z +

600. Subject: Comprehensive Test Ban (CTB): The NATO + Perspective. Ref: State 24133.In telegram + 24133 to Bonn, Paris, London, Rome, Tokyo, USUN, USNATO, and + the Mission in Geneva, February 3, the Department solicited + attitudes of a number host countries on the question of a CTB. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + D770058–0808)

+

1. There are three areas on which we think we can usefully comment from + NATO on Allied attitudes toward a + CTB: the need for consultations, + concern about US–Soviet bilateralism, + and the implications for Allied security.

+

2. We can not emphasize strongly enough the need for full and timely + consultations with the Allies at NATO + on any US initiatives or changes in + long-standing US positions regarding a + CTB. While we leave to Washington’s + judgement the manner and timing of consultations, we believe it would be + helpful to the development of support for US initiatives if the Allies could be apprised promptly of + the general lines of US thinking before + final positions are worked out in Washington. Allied support would be + greatly enhanced if we can convince the Allies that their views will be + taken into consideration in the development of the US approach, and that they are not simply + being informed about what the US intends + to do after inter-agency study has been completed in Washington. If + there are options being considered regarding such issues as + verification, PNES, a possible + moratorium, and who should be party to a treaty, we should make every + effort to present these options to the Allies and to consider their + views. The need for timely consultation is particularly evident when we + consider the tacit support the Allies have generally accorded our long + insistence on on-site inspections—even when in recent years not all + Allies were convinced of the technical requirements for such + inspections. The CTB is an issue + political as well as military importance to a number of Allies. Hence, + they must be brought sufficiently abreast of US thinking in order to undertake whatever internal + consultations and adjustments they feel are necessary. In short, let us + tell them as much as we can as early as possible, even if our initial + presentations are brief and tentative.

+ +

3. On modalities, we believe that the more technical aspects of a CTB can be dealt with at the level of + NATO disarmament experts, whose + next meeting is scheduled for April 21–22. However, to deal with the + broader political and military implications of this issue, we propose + instructed permrep discussions; and at an appropriate stage, a visit by + an Assistant Secretary-level official to brief Allies on our views and + to hear their reactions.

+

4. Concerns about US–Soviet bilateralism + can be accommodated through effective consultations and by the way we + proceed with the development of a possible CTB. While the Department will recall the strong cautionary + statement of FRG Ambassador Pauls on + US–Soviet bilateralism during the + Vice President’s meeting with the council,Not found. we would like to point out that this problem + transcends the simple question of whether we touch base with the Allies + before negotiating with the Soviets. While the Allies will appreciate + that bilateral US–Soviet negotiation + must be an important part of the process of achieving a CTB, they will wish to be associated with + the process of negotiations as closely as possible at all stages and, in + some instances, to be seen publicly as participating in this process. + Moreover, the handling of the question of which nuclear states must be + parties, and whether non-nuclear states will be welcome to join, as well + as other issues related to a CTB, will + be judged by the Allies in terms of whether only US and Soviet interests are accommodated or whether the + needs of individual Allies are also considered.

+

5. Allies security concerns, too, can be accommodated through + consultations. The underlying concern, in our view, is likely to be a + vague worry that a CTB might somehow + affect, in technical or psychological terms, the long-range reliability + of the US strategic and theater nuclear + deterrents. The Allies will be interested, in this regard, in measures + the US will undertake to maintain our + major nuclear laboratories and our views on the relevance of the + argument, sometimes heard, that top US + scientists will be less interested in the nuclear program if they cannot + test. Another concern will be the implications of a CTB for the possible development, at some + distant time in the future, of a credible independent European nuclear + deterrent.

+

6. Some Allies may also be concerned about the effect on Allied + solidarity if strongly differing views are evidenced on certain aspects + of a CTB. We will be interested in the + views of other addressees on the attitudes of individual Allies. Our + preliminary assessment is that the non-nuclear Allies will welcome any + progress toward a CTB, although the + Italians may have some minor lingering misgivings. The UK will likely see no security problem. The French, + however, may feel under particular pressure regarding both the + maintenance and development of their nuclear forces and the question of + whether and how they might participate in negotiations. A suggestion of + negotiations among nuclear states might appeal to the French, but it + would have a wrenching effect, we believe, on the FRG and the smaller Allies.

+

6. In sum, a central US objective should + be to proceed in this endeavor in a manner that will enhance, and not + undermine, Allied solidarity.

+ + Strausz-Hupe + +
+ +
+ 144. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department + of StateSource: National + Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign + Policy File, D770041–0791. Confidential. Sent for information to + Bonn, London, Paris, Rome, Tokyo, USNATO, and the Mission in Geneva. + New York, February 4, 1977, 2313Z +

334. Subj: Comprehensive Test Ban: Allied Views in UN Context. Ref: State 24133.See footnote 2, Document + 143.

+

1. Begin summary: At the UN, our allies + have long supported CTB objective and + share the general view that its attainment is the single most important + UNGA disarmament goal. Majority of + them voted for 1976 resolution “condemning” all nuclear tests.See Document + 140. Regardless of their own security concerns, allied + attitudes at the UN also reflect deep + and growing concern that failure to attain CTB will undermine and may finally defeat efforts to + prevent further nuclear proliferation. Major nonaligned States insist + there is direct link between CTB and + progress in non-proliferation, and our allies accept this asserted + linkage—regardless of its objective validity—as important political + reality. Many allies believe US and + USSR should move initially to + limited-participation CTB rather than + seek all-nuclear-weapon state agreement as demanded by Soviets. While + allied views on proper forum for negotiating CTB are somewhat flexible, they generally favor CCD and envisage CTB as multilateral agreement in tradition of Limited Test + Ban Treaty (LTBT) and NPT. End summary.

+ +

2. Allied views on the Comprehensive Test Ban (CTB) issue as expressed at the UNGA largely coincide in broad principle, though there are + significant differences in emphasis on subsidiary questions, such as + verification and PNES. All our allies + support the objective of a CTB, and + most share the prevailing UN view that + the prompt achievement of a CTB is the + highest priority disarmament issue in the UN context. Support for intensified efforts to reach + agreement on a CTB was voiced in the + 1976 UNGA at the Foreign-Minister + level by several of our allies (including Japan, Netherlands, Australia, + and Denmark) and virtually all our allies reiterated their commitment to + the objective in the first committee disarmament debate.

+

3. A significant indication of the strength of this commitment on the + part of several of our allies is their willingness to vote for, and even + cosponsor, the annual CTB resolutions + even though they contain language “condemning” all nuclear weapon + tests—i.e., language generally reserved for such issues as apartheid and + South Africa. The majority of our allies voted for the 1976 resolution, + despite this extreme language; they were Australia, Canada, Denmark, + Iceland, Japan, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, and + Turkey. New Zealand, in fact, played a leading role in drafting the + resolution, on which the US, UK, France, FRG, Italy, Belgium, Luxembourg, and Greece abstained.

+

4. For most of our allies (other than France and to a lesser extent + FRG and Italy), positions taken at + the UNGA on the CTB issue are not primarily based on + specific perceptions of national security interests. Support for the + CTB idea or CTB resolutions does not necessarily + reflect a specific judgment that a CTB + would enhance a country’s own security or a judgment that there are no + military or security risks in a CTB. + Rather, the key to allied CTB attitudes + at the UN is their growing concern that + failure to achieve a CTB and more + broadly to make progress toward nuclear disarmament is seriously + undermining, and may eventually defeat, efforts to prevent the + horizontal spread of nuclear weapons.

+

5. This asserted linkage between progress in nuclear disarmament and + progress in non-proliferation has long been a major tenet of leading + nonaligned and neutral activists, including Mexico, Yugoslavia, Sweden, + and Nigeria. We, and some of our allies have rejected the implication + that non-proliferation efforts should, in effect, be held hostage to + progress in nuclear disarmament, insisting that horizontal proliferation + poses clear and grave threat to all countries, regardless of the state + of negotiations on “vertical proliferation.” But, however valid or + realistic this argument may be objectively, it is politically + unacceptable to most countries. Its unacceptability has been reflected + in the slackening of support, particularly among the nonaligned, for + concrete measures to strengthen + the non-proliferation regime as well as in the growing concern of our + allies over the lack of progress toward a CTB and measures of nuclear disarmament.

+

6. Thus, whether they like the idea of a linkage or not, many of our + allies now openly acknowledge it as a political reality. A Japanese + statement at the 1976 UNGA is + characteristic of many of our allies’ views: “The prevention of + horizontal proliferation presupposes progress in the prevention of + vertical proliferation. If there is no progress in preventing vertical + proliferation, or it becomes clear that none is in prospect, the + justification for seeking the prevention of horizontal proliferation + will be greatly reduced.”

+

7. The consequences of this view are evident in the Swedish + non-proliferation resolution adopted by the 1976 UNGA. The resolution places at the top of + the list of measures needed to strengthen the non-proliferation regime + “determined efforts” by the Nuclear-Weapon States (NWS) to (A) halt the arms race, (B) make + progress toward nuclear disarmament, and (C) solve the difficulties + impeding a CTB. Notably, the resolution + did not call for adherence to the NPT + as a means of strengthening the non-proliferation regime. Against this + background, some of our allies, and many nonaligned, have noted a + growing disparity between US emphasis on + such areas as strengthening safeguards and stiffening export controls + and the predominant UN stress on nuclear + disarmament and security assurances.

+

8. In our view, this is the most important characteristic of the CTB issue in the UN context, the factor uniting most of our allies in + support of CTB resolutions that we do + not accept. (Many of our allies, of course, also support a CTB on its [garble].) The UNGA also provides an opportunity for + annual statements of view on subsidiary issues such as verification and + PNES. Views on these questions + differ in substance as well as emphasis, and cannot be accurately + reflected in a brief summary. We would thus leave it to others to + describe individual allied positions in these questions. However, two + other issues with a specific UN angle + should be mentioned—the issues of participation and negotiating + forum.

+

9. The question of participation has always been latent in CTB debated—i.e., must all NWS participate in a CTB from the outset, or can (or should) a + CTB begin with the US and USSR? The question was brought to the fore in 1975 when the + Soviets submitted their draft CTB + treaty requiring the participation of all NWS, a position they have continued to maintain publicly + since then. Many of our allies have been the most vocal critics of this + position. Australia, Canada, the FRG, + Japan, the Netherlands, Norway, and New Zealand are among those that + have insisted on the possibility of a limited-participation CTB, at least as a first step. Some have asserted more than the + possibility, stressing the special responsibility of the US and USSR to take the lead.

+

10. The issue of the proper forum for CTB negotiations was also raised by the 1975 Soviet + proposal, which envisaged a new negotiating body composed of all NWS and 25–30 NNWS. (The inclusion of the NNWS was at Mexican insistence, evidence of the political + unacceptability at the UN of a + restructured NWS negotiation.) Several + of our allies have strongly defended the role of the CCD in CTB negotiations, pointing out that CTB has been the “highest priority” issue + in the CCD for years. While the forum + question is perhaps of secondary importance, and to some extent a + corollary of the participation issue, the implications of choosing any + forum (whether the CCD, a separate + committee, or bi- or trilateral meeting) will necessarily have to be + weighted. If a CTB is to be, as our + allies and most nonaligned expect, a multilateral instrument in the + pattern of the LTBT and the NPT, or to have broad international + support, it will be important to ensure broadly-based participation + throughout the negotiating process. Participation will be particularly + important in connection with development of solutions to the + verification and PNE problems.

+

11. There has been relatively little specific reaction so far in New York + to President Carter’s + statement,Ibid. which has been + somewhat overshadowed by other recent events, but it is certain to + promote wide interest and raise expectations that the long-standing + stalemate may be broken in the relatively near future. Expectations had + already been raised to some extent last fall, when the Soviets announced + a new position on CTB verification + envisaging a “voluntary framework” for on-site inspection. At the same + time, however, there is certain to be a degree of skepticism on the part + of many unless and until there are specific signs of possible + negotiations, new proposals, or changes of position. Indications that + new developments may be at hand are likely to have a favorable impact on + UN (and CCD) disarmament activities in the coming months, but we + can also expect to be brought to account in the absence of real + movement.

+ + Bennett + +
+ +
+ + 145. Memorandum From the Acting Director of the Arms Control and + Disarmament Agency (Sloss) to the + President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)Source: Washington National Records Center, OSD Files: FRC 330–80–0017, Box 63, A–400.112 Test Ban (Jan–July) + 1977. Secret. Copies were sent to Vance, Harold + Brown, Fri, + and Turner. + Washington, February 11, 1977 + + SUBJECT + Nuclear Test Cessation and PNEs + +

This Agency believes there are serious risks in attempting to accommodate + “peaceful nuclear explosions” under a comprehensive test ban treaty. The + purpose of this early warning is simply to prevent further steps that + could be construed as prejudging the issue before it has been thoroughly + examined and Soviet positions tested in negotiations.

+

Such an accommodation—which may well not prove necessary to achieving + Soviet agreement on a CTB—would + introduce a major shortcoming in the treaty, provide the USSR with an important military asset, + weaken the Limited Test Ban Treaty, and do incalculable harm to our + non-proliferation efforts. Early encouragement of a Soviet impression + that the US may already be persuaded + that a PNE allowance in a CTB is necessary and tolerable could + quickly grow into a serious impediment to negotiation with the USSR of an advantageous agreement.

+

We offer the following points for your consideration:

+

SEPARATION OF PNEs FROM WEAPON TESTS

+

(1) Both the US and the USSR have acknowledged that the + technology of nuclear explosive devices for peaceful purposes is + indistinguishable from that of nuclear explosive devices for weapon + purposes.

+

(2) Point (1) is the central difficulty of the “PNE verification problem.” No techniques have been devised + to verify that a nuclear explosion in a PNE project is not also a weapon test simply because there + are no meaningful criteria on which to base the distinction. This + intrinsic difficulty cannot be eased by international arrangements for + “inspection” or other procedures.

+

(3) Criteria to govern PNEs in ways that + do not substantially compromise the objectives of an agreement limiting + a weapon test can be devised if, and only if: (a) the constraints to be + imposed on weapon activities are less than complete, and (b) the weapon + benefits available under the permissive PNE regime do not extend substantially beyond those + permitted in the weapon test regime.

+ +

(4) Much of the international discussion of CTB benefits has dwelled on interrupting the process of + developing new improved nuclear weapons; and recent Soviet statements at + the UN have also taken this line. This + way of thinking about the matter is deficient on two counts:

+

(a) basic advancement of nuclear weapon technology is not the only + substantial reason for nuclear weapon testing—it may no longer even be + the main reason. Primary reasons for such testing now and in the + foreseeable future are to prove out weapon designs that have been + tailored in detail to best match new delivery systems; to test the + effects of nuclear explosions on other military equipment, and to verify + experimentally the functional soundness of weapons in the stockpile. All + of these can be done through PNE + operations;

+

(b) any meaningful PNE program will, + itself, include development efforts to advance and test nuclear + explosive technology and specific designs. The civil engineering reasons + for such continued development and testing (e.g., to reduce the diameter + of a device, to establish designs that are more economical of + fissionable materials, to establish the ability of the device to deliver + reliably its design yield with acceptable precision) could not be + challenged as unnecessary or inappropriate; however, they generally + parallel corresponding desiderata in the military field. Some of the + kinds of device advancements to be sought for PNE applications are on the frontier of current nuclear + weapon R&D.Carter + wrote Brezhnev on February + 14 and said that he welcomed “your willingness to intensify efforts + to reach agreement on a comprehensive test ban. I recognize that + there are remaining issues with respect to other countries who + continue to have test programs and the possible use of peaceful + nuclear explosions for mining or construction, but I believe there + are satisfactory ways of dealing with these issues. I intend to + ratify the existing agreements which have been negotiated between + our two governments but I consider these only steps toward a common + objective of a complete cessation of nuclear tests. In the meantime + these unratified agreements will be honored by our government.” The + letter is printed in full in Foreign Relations, 1977–1980, vol. VI, + Soviet Union, Document 7.

+

US + PNE PROGRAM

+

(5) The US does not have a significant + PNE program; and, based on current + estimates of economic value in the US + plus environmental and regulatory factors, there is no evident + justification for a significant US + program.

+

WEAPON-TEST ASYMMETRY

+

(6) Because of the inactive current and projected status of the US + PNE program, allowing an active Soviet + program under a complete ban on acknowledged weapon tests would extend + to the USSR a substantial unilateral + military asset (i.e., a clear basis for indirect continuance of weapon + testing).

+ +

NEGOTIATING FACTOR

+

(7) The actual PNE plans of the USSR are not reliably known to the US Government. More importantly, the depth + of political support for PNE plans is + very unclear. We certainly do not know how far the USSR would go in order to retain a PNE allowance against US negotiating opposition. While we surely + should display a complete willingness to consider any proposals of the + Soviet side, it would be very disadvantageous to provide them at an + early stage with any reason to believe that a PNE allowance has been accepted by the US as necessary or tolerable in a CTB.

+

THE LIMITED TEST BAN TREATY OF 1963

+

(8) Discussions in the open literature of Soviet PNE interest include canal building and river diversion + projects (primarily the Kama-Pechora river projectIn a February 8 news conference, Carter said that he had “called + upon the Soviet Union to join us in a comprehensive test ban to stop + all nuclear testing for at least an extended period of time, 2 + years, 3 years, 4 years. The Soviets are interested in using nuclear + explosives to divert the course of a river in Northern Russia. I + don’t think they need to test any more. If they want to put that as + a proviso in the agreement that they would like to go ahead and + divert that river, I think that would be something that we could + negotiate and let us have observers there to learn from them and + vice versa. But I think that the initiation of proposals that might + be mutually acceptable of the kind is very, very important.” (Public Papers: Carter, 1977, pp. 92–100) which, if + undertaken, might be an effort of 5 to 10 years). The kinds of nuclear + explosions necessarily involved in river-diversion or canal building + would, with virtual certainty, violate the LTBT. The USSR has played + fairly loose with LTBT compliance in + their nuclear weapon test program but has always retained the “out” of + claiming accident or technical deficiencies if need be. A planned, + announced and described PNE excavation + project (perhaps with US observers + present) would stand naked of any supportable defense in violating the + LTBT. The Soviets have labored + under this burden for many years, and have not gone forward with any + river-diversion or canal-building project. What they have tried to do is + co-opt the US into sharing this problem + with them—e.g., by advocating international agreement on “acceptable” + levels of radioactivity, which could then be “interpreted” as an + adequate index of compliance with the LTBT. Such a relaxation of the radioactivity prohibition + would both loosen the present inhibitions on underground weapons testing + and weaken the protection which the treaty affords to the environments + of neighboring states and international waters.

+ +

(9) The USSR has not expressed any + interest in seeking an amendment to the LTBT to accommodate excavation-type PNEs. Amendment would + not be possible without the assent of the US and the UK. Moreover, an + amendment that relaxed the radioactivity limitation of PNEs for all + parties would reduce the value of the LTBT as an inhibition on nuclear explosive development by + non-nuclear-weapon states, while an amendment which relaxed that + limitation only for nuclear-weapon states might well fail to be adopted + by the requisite majority of parties to the treaty.

+

(10) The Soviet Union did agree to inclusion in the PNE Treaty of an operative reaffirmation + of the obligation to comply with the LTBT—albeit with a display of real or feigned + reluctance.

+

(11) The draft text of a CTB Treaty + proposed by the USSR in the UNGA would prohibit all nuclear weapon + tests but would allow PNEs to continue under the terms of a separate + agreement.“Soviet Draft Treaty + Introduced in the First Committee of the General Assembly on the + Complete and General Prohibition of Nuclear-Weapon Tests,” November + 22, 1976. (Documents on Disarmament, 1976, + pp. 820–824) The language of their proposed preamble and + operative provisions point rather clearly to a process in which the new + treaty would replace the LTBT and the + LTBT would cease to be operative. + This scheme, if allowed to proceed, would leave PNEs to be governed by + new provisions which would presumably not include the “no radioactive + debris” element that is the substance of LTBT limitation on underground nuclear explosions.

+

NON-PROLIFERATION

+

(12) If any technological criteria—valid or contrived—ever are set forth + to distinguish between weapon and non-weapon explosions or explosives, + then a principle argued by many potential proliferators will have been + explicitly affirmed. There were some discussions of this matter during + the PNET negotiations, and the point was clearly taken as a very serious + one by the Soviet side.

+

(13) A major objective of establishing a CTB would be to help prevent the further spread of nuclear + explosive capabilities. A test ban which made an exception for PNEs + would:

+

(a) legitimize PNEs as distinct from + weapon tests and thus do major damage to our efforts to establish that + PNEs must not be conducted by any non-nuclear-weapon state, since the + technology of a nuclear explosive device for a peaceful application is + indistinguishable from that of a weapon and its development is the + development of nuclear weapons.

+

(b) if limited to nuclear-weapon states, create an excuse for not joining + the CTB on the grounds that the treaty + was “discriminatory” for a number of those non-nuclear-weapon states + that we are most interested in + having join the treaty (e.g., India, Israel, Pakistan, Argentina, + Brazil). Joining in a CTB that banned + PNEs for all parties is probably the most promising way to head off a + second Indian explosion.India conducted its + first nuclear explosion on May 18, 1974.

+

(c) if not limited to nuclear-weapon states, undermine the + non-proliferation benefits of the CTB, + create an intractable problem of devising criteria and verification + schemes and negotiating them with all parties involved, and discriminate + against parties to the NPT (who have + foresworn such explosions) in favor of non-parties.

+ + Leon + SlossActing + +
+ +
+ 146. Paper Prepared by the Special Coordination Committee Working + Group on Nuclear TestingSource: Washington National Records Center, OSD Files: FRC 330–80–0017, Box 63, A–400.112 Test Ban (Jan–July) + 1977. Secret. Attached to a February 16 covering memorandum from + NSC Acting Staff Secretary + Michael Hornblow to Mondale, + Vance, and Brown. (Ibid.) + Washington, undated +

[Omitted here are a cover page and table of contents.]

+

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

+

I. Introduction

+

PRM–16 of January 25 directed that the + Special Coordination Committee undertake a preliminary review of the + major issues involved in the termination of all nuclear testing.See Document + 141. Included were to be an analysis of the problem of + verifying a complete prohibition of weapons tests and peaceful nuclear + explosions (PNEs), an analysis of the effects of such a prohibition on + the US and Soviet nuclear weapons + programs, and a discussion of the various scenarios which might be + utilized in moving toward this goal, including both moratoria and more + permanent types of agreement. A discussion of the pros and cons of + moving ahead with ratification of the Threshold Test Ban (TTBT) and Peaceful Nuclear Explosion + (PNET) Treaties currently before the Senate was also to be included. The + attached report was prepared by an SCC + Working Group in response to PRM–16.

+ +

II. Recent US and Soviet CTB Statements

+

The US has long declared its support of + the goal of an adequately verified prohibition of nuclear testing and + has undertaken commitments in treaties such as the Limited Test Ban + Treaty (LTBT), Non-Proliferation + Treaty (NPT), and Threshold Test Ban + Treaty (TTBT) to work toward that + goal. Since assuming office, the President has on several occasions + strongly expressed his intention to move immediately and aggressively + toward cessation of all nuclear weapons testing.

+

Advocacy of a complete cessation of nuclear weapons testing has long been + a central feature of Soviet declaratory foreign policy. A recent public + declaration of this policy was contained in the September 23 speech of + Foreign Minister Gromyko before + the UNGAGromkyo actually spoke on September 28, 1976. He said that “nuclear + weapons testing should be stopped everywhere and by all. This would + put an end to the qualitative improvement of those weapons.” He also + charged that “the start of negotiations on this question is being + unjustifiably delayed. The problem here is not the absence of + objective conditions—–they have long existed—–but the unwillingness + of some nuclear Powers to begin negotiations.” (Documents on Disarmament, 1976, pp. 643–650) and a + Soviet memorandum on disarmamentOn + September 28, 1976, the Soviet Union introduced a resolution at the + UN General Assembly that claimed + it was “prepared, as it has been in the past, to conduct + negotiations on the most radical disarmament measures, going even so + far as general and complete disarmament.” Among other measures, the + resolution called for “the prohibition of all nuclear-weapon tests. + This problem,” the Soviets contended, “should be tackled without + waiting for the outcome of negotiations on complete nuclear + disarmament.” (“Soviet Memorandum on Questions of Ending the Arms + Race and Disarmament [Extract],” September 28, 1976, Documents on Disarmament, 1976, pp. + 631–641) which was subsequently circulated as a UNGA document. The two statements were + notable in that they conveyed the impression that verification measures + beyond national technical means, including some limited form of on-site + inspection, might be negotiable. This position had been signaled to + US Ambassador Stoessel last Spring by Gromyko and one of his deputies in + conversations which also hinted at some flexibility in the established + Soviet position that all nuclear powers would have to participate in a + CTB.The Gromyko-Stossel + conversation occurred on April 12, 1976 and is reported in telegram + 5682 from Moscow, April 13, 1976; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + D760143–0740. A draft CTB + Treaty tabled by the Soviets at the UNGA in November contains a provision for “voluntary” + acceptance of on-site inspection,The + proposal is available in telegram 279503 to Colombo, November 13, + 1976; National Archives, RG 59, + Central Foreign Policy File, D760425–0034) but does not + extend the scope of prohibition to include PNEs.

+

III. Historical + Background

+

The concept of nuclear test bans as measures independent of more + comprehensive disarmament arrangements dates from the middle 1950s when + first India and later the Soviets proposed test bans that did not contain verification + provisions. In March 1956 the Soviets declared a suspension of testing + and called upon the West to follow their example, but the US and UK + declined to do so because of the verification problem, and in October + the Soviets resumed testing.

+

In the summer of 1958 the US, UK and USSR agreed to commence negotiations for a test ban treaty + that would include an international system of control posts, and the + US and UK proposed a reciprocal suspension of testing for one year + from the commencement of negotiations. The Soviets ceased testing in + November, and this moratorium lasted until 1961. In December 1959, we + announced that we felt free to resume testing but did not do so. In 1959 + and in March of 1961 the Soviets informed us that they considered that + continued testing by France was giving NATO a unilateral advantage. In August 1961 they announced + that they would resume testing and did so with an intensive, + well-planned program. Although the US + responded with a proof test of a stockpiled weapon within a few weeks, + due to the decline of the weapons program during the moratoria it was + well over a year before a developmental test of any significance could + be conducted.

+

The first agreement concerning limitation of nuclear testing to be + achieved was the Limited Test Ban Treaty of 1963 which banned explosions + in the atmosphere, outer space and under water. The Non-Proliferation + Treaty of 1968 recognized the connection between the cessation of + weapons testing and the achievement of non-proliferation objectives, and + obliged its parties to pursue good-faith negotiations toward that end. + The TTBT and PNET, signed in 1974 and + 1976 respectively, will, if ratified, limit the yield of individual + US and Soviet nuclear explosions to + 150 kilotons.

+

Although the US has long been politically + committed to the concept of an adequately verifiable CTB, the issues of verification and + adherence have been among the obstacles to a serious attempt to reach + that goal. We have taken the position that national technical means + alone are not adequate for verification and that some measure of on-site + inspection would be required for adequate assurance of treaty + compliance. The question of the need for adherence by all nuclear + weapons states has also been an obstacle, in that the Soviets have + stated it as a condition precedent to an agreement, and the PRC and France have adamantly refused to + consider a CTB. (For the last few + years, the US has not expressed a + position on the adherence issue.) As discussed in Section II, there are + now some indications of Soviet flexibility on these issues.

+

IV. Key CTB Considerations

+

A. Verification Capability

+

The historical record shows that the Soviets, in complying with + international treaties and agreements, can be expected to exploit fully + the limits specified in these + treaties. This has been our own experience in verifying both the SALT + ONE accords and LTBT and, more recently, the 150 kt limit + of the TTBT. However, a nuclear test + under a CTB would constitute a major + and deliberate violation and despite their tendency to take advantage of + loopholes, we have no evidence of any such gross violation of an arms + control agreement. Nonetheless, it is important in any CTB considerations to recognize the limits + that can be achieved in detecting and identifying nuclear explosions and + to understand fully the impact that testing at or below these limits + would have on US national security. At + the same time, it is important to recognize that the Soviets would be + uncertain as to the specific limits of our detection capability, and the + potential consequences of being caught could be expected to constrain + the political leadership from cheating unless there was an urgent + national security reason for doing so. The US can verify a comprehensive test ban only above certain + yield thresholds which are established by the capabilities and + limitations of US national technical + means, and by the extent of Soviet efforts to evade US surveillance. At current test sites and + under current Soviet test practices, this threshold is very low. + However, assuming they are willing to test underground in seismic or + remote ocean areas and take measures to conceal the nature of their test + operations, [14 lines not declassified]

+

[1 paragraph (12 lines) not declassified]

+

The Soviets undoubtedly have a better capability than the US to marshal resources to accomplish + evasive testing at yields of a few kilotons. If the Soviets were to + carry out nuclear tests in evasion of the provisions of a CTB Treaty, they could continue the + development of some nuclear weapon systems. By conducting tests at or + below our detection threshold, they would be able to improve their + design capabilities in areas such as tactical weapons, certain ABM systems, and weapons effects. The + conduct of such tests would make it easier in the long term for them to + maintain some measure of their scientific, engineering and computer + capabilities relating to the design and stockpile maintenance of nuclear + weapons.

+

There are, however, several factors that would mitigate the incentive to + conduct such low-yield evasive testing. [4 lines not + declassified] the possibility that even a low-yield test might + be detected and identified. The Soviets would also have to take into + account the fact that information on an evasion program might become + available from human sources.

+

B. Impact on US/Soviet Weapons Programs

+

The US has conducted over 480 underground + nuclear weapons tests since 1963, of which about 300 were under 10 kt. + [2 lines not declassified] The US in general has developed a wider + selection of nuclear warheads + which probably are more advanced technologically. [3 + lines not declassified]

+

A mutual cessation of testing would essentially freeze nuclear weapons + technology at current levels for both sides.

+

In the short term, the effect of a CTB + on US strategic systems would be to + inhibit development of optimum, cost-effective upgrades in US strategic deterrent and warfighting + capability. Weapons which could be affected to some degree include B–77 + (the new strategic bomb), M–X, Evader MARV and MK–12A. The impact would + be much more severe on the tactical nuclear systems upgrade currently + planned. An immediate cessation of testing would preclude much of the + theater nuclear forces improvement program which is currently underway. + These improvements are designed to provide tactical weapons with + increased flexibility, reduced collateral damage, improved safety and + security, and faster response time. The major portion of our current + tactical nuclear weapons stockpile was developed prior to 1965 and lacks + these features. As indicated in Table I,Attached but not printed. a prioritized test program of up + to one year’s duration would permit completion of some of this + programmed improvement in the tactical area, but completion of some + strategic programs would require two years. (The MK–12A warhead and B–77 + bomb could probably be completed within one year, however.)

+

Some of these key programs, including the low SNM options for the MX, and + the Cruise Missile, may well experience one or more test failures and + therefore be impossible to complete in the projected time frame. There + are others for which development has been started at DOD request, but for which testing could + not be completed within two years under the most optimistic conditions. + These include Standard Missile 2, PERSHING II and the Minimum Residual + Radiation (MRR) tactical bomb. Under normal conditions, these programs + would be continued for as long as necessary to complete their essential + testing.

+

In the longer range (out to twenty years), US research shows that the US should be able to achieve many new capabilities to meet + anticipated DOD requirements. These + include, as examples: (1) New designs employing current technology to + meet new, more stringent Defense requirements for radiation hardness, + warhead size and weight, and warhead delivery modes; (2) Higher yields + with reduced weight and smaller size to meet the requirements for the + next generation MIRVs, or for new + artillery shells; (3) Whole families of low residual radiation bombs and + warheads which obtain a very small fraction of their yield from fission; + (4) Very small, very clean weapons that provide a few tens of tons yield + in a few tens of pounds; and (5) New bombs and warheads which are safe against misuse, + tampering, HE detonation from impact, and plutonium scattering.

+

A mutual cessation of testing would prevent the Soviets from fully + exploiting their missile throw-weight advantage through optimum MIRVed + warhead development. This probably would not affect current Soviet + strategic systems (e.g., SS–17, 18 and 19) but would constrain their + expected follow-on ICBM, SLBM and + cruise missile systems. [2 lines not + declassified]

+

Design capability on both sides would degrade eventually under a mutual + cessation of tests. The Soviets might have some advantage in slowing + this degrading through provision of domestic political incentives to + their scientists and if necessary conscripting their services, and + through evasive testing (although, as noted earlier, this would involve + a major decision by the Soviet leadership, and slowing this degradation + might not offer enough advantage to justify the risk). On the other + hand, the US leads the USSR in computer hardware and software to + simulate and model new weapons design, but would probably not stockpile + new weapon designs without testing.

+

It is difficult to assess the relative impact of a mutual testing + cessation on stockpile reliability. This is a very contentious issue and + little is known about whether present reliability levels can be + maintained under a CTB or, if not, + about the strategic significance of any degradation. The Soviets might + have an advantage due to [less than 1 line not + declassified] their ICBM + throw-weight advantage, and perhaps a better ability to marshal + laboratory resources in a CTB context. + On the other hand, the US might have an + advantage due to its better quality control, computer simulation and + componentry testing. Because of the relatively rapid introduction of new + systems in the US stockpile, it has not + been generally necessary to conduct confidence testing in order to + assess reliability. [less than 1 line not + declassified] There is general agreement that stockpile + reliability degradation would be slight over the short term (e.g., up to + 5 years) but could become more significant in the longer run (e.g., 10 + to 20 years). The degree to which stockpile reliability degradation + would be significant to national security would depend on our ability to + continue manufacture of old designs and components, and on perceptions + of the relationship of stockpile reliability for deterrence and + war-fighting capability.

+

Many weapons design experts believe that in the long run (20 years), + there would be a nearly complete loss of confidence in the reliability + of our stockpile. Others believe, however, that this judgment overstates + this loss of confidence since a properly drawn CTB agreement would impose substantially similar + constraints on the US and USSR and it may overstate the stockpile + reliability problem in that no comprehensive effort has yet been undertaken by the US to establish designs, facilities and + procedures to cope with this unique situation.

+

It would be appropriate to consider possible safeguards in the context of + a mutual cessation of testing, such as the ones which were adopted + following the LTBT. These safeguards + would include attempting to maintain an R&D and production capability, simulation, and + readiness to resume testing if necessary; and pursuit of an aggressive + program to improve US verification + capabilities.

+

C. Significance of Low-Yield Clandestine Testing. + Although the significance to deterrence and stability of a possible + decline in nuclear weapons design capability and a stockpile reliability + is difficult to assess, it is in this area that concerns about possible + asymmetries are most acute. [5 lines not + declassified]

+

Thus it is important to examine the military importance of testing in + these low-yield ranges. There are defense needs for very low-yield + nuclear weapons such as the HARPOON anti-ship missile, anti-submarine + torpedoes, air defense weapons and precision guided air-to-surface + weapons. These warheads could be developed with testing in the + sub-kiloton range, and it is obvious that such testing would contribute + significantly to maintaining a viable weapons design capability and some + stockpile reliability problems could be solved. [5 + lines not declassified]

+

It is questionable whether such [less than 1 line not + declassified] testing would provide such sufficient military + advantages that the Soviet leadership would be willing to assume the + risk of violating the CTB Treaty with + its attendant costs to their relationship with the US and their international stature. + Nevertheless, it might be possible to significantly reduce such + incentives and asymmetries by defining nuclear tests under a CTB as applying to events of nuclear + origin [1 line not declassified] At least at + these larger yields, however, the treaty should clearly be labeled a + threshold ban rather than a CTB, and + the perception that testing would continue would reduce the + non-proliferation benefits. It could be defended, however, as [7 lines not declassified] Little work has been + done on this definitional issue, and further study would be necessary to + determine whether a definition could be found that would minimize + possible asymmetries in the areas of stockpile reliability and + maintaining design capability without significantly undermining the + non-proliferation impact of a CTB. + Alternatively, it can be argued that the Soviets would not exploit such + opportunities and that, in any event, the national security significance + of these potential asymmetries would be outweighed by the beneficial + impact of a CTB on US-Soviet relations and in limiting nuclear + proliferation.

+

D. Nuclear-Weapons States Participation

+

Even after a bilateral/multilateral CTB + has been achieved, it is likely that China, France, and perhaps other + nations would continue to test. + China has accorded high visibility to weapons testing which it has + indicated that it would continue, and could be expected to severely + criticize a CTB as superpower + collusion. While we could not expect to alter Peking’s opposition to a + CTB, we should consult with them + early in the process to minimize any possible concerns that we would + seek to isolate or embarrass them through a CTB.

+

Similarly, it may be expected that France will be reluctant to adhere to + any test-limiting agreement within the near term. (Embassy Paris reports + that even a leftist government would be expected to continue testing in + the near term.)The report is available in + telegram 3727 from Paris, February 7. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + D770042–1173) They are currently in the midst of major + strategic and tactical weapons modernization efforts. The UK, on the other hand, although concerned + as to whether its Polaris Improvement Program could be completed, could + be expected to respond favorably to a US + CTB initiative and adhere to a CTB agreement.

+

The fact that some nations, particularly China, will continue to develop + nuclear explosives would undoubtedly be viewed with concern by the + Soviet Union. However, since current Chinese weapons technology is + believed significantly inferior to that of the US and USSR, the Soviets + would probably be less concerned about a short-term continuation of + Chinese testing. In the long term, this situation would be viewed as a + serious problem by the Soviets and could even pose a problem for the + US from the national security + standpoint. The result is that an indefinite duration CTBT without periodic reviews is unlikely + to be acceptable to the Soviets. A more realistic test ban goal for both + US and Soviet interests would be a + treaty which had to be reviewed periodically and which provided a + supreme interests escape clause.

+

E. Allied Perceptions

+

Allied confidence in the reliability of our commitment to their security + is based on their perceptions of a number of factors including the + quality and level of US conventional + forces assigned to their defense, the quality and level of US tactical and strategic nuclear forces + relative to those of their potential adversaries, alliance doctrine and + declaratory policy on the use of nuclear weapons and their perceptions + of US political will to defend them. A + mutual cessation of testing by the US + and USSR would probably not, in and of + itself, particularly concern them. Indeed, most have strongly supported + the concept of a CTB in their + declaratory policies. However, if it were to be interpreted by them as a + signal of the beginning of US + disengagement from its commitment, this would create the potential for + serious political and non-proliferation considerations. Thus, while all + our allies except France would publicly support a US + CTB initiative, careful consultations + would be required to reassure them as to the constancy of our + purposes.

+

There is a special problem with NATO + allies who regard our theater nuclear capability as a major deterrent + against Soviet aggression in Europe. We have assured the allies that we + intend not only to maintain but to upgrade and modernize this capability + unless mutual reduction of forces with the Soviet Union are negotiated. + Allied concern has been with war-fighting capability as it affects + deterrence, but we believe they would be willing to forego modernization + in a CTB context. In fact, while the + Allied interest in maintaining a large and viable stockpile remains + high, there has been some concern over technological improvements that + could be viewed as increasing the likelihood of using these weapons on + Allied territory. While theater force modernization is not an issue with + our Allies in the Far East, there is still some concern resulting from + the Vietnam debacle that the US may lose + interest in the region. Thus they would be sensitive to any implication + that the US might be less willing and + less able to carry out its security commitments. Steps would have to be + taken to assure all our allies that we could maintain a credible nuclear + deterrent posture under CTB + conditions.

+

F. Non-Proliferation

+

The objective of preventing the proliferation of nuclear explosive + capabilities has been identified as a major focus of US foreign and national security policy. A + CTB is widely perceived as an + important step towards this objective. A prohibition on nuclear testing + would impose a significant constraint on the development of a nuclear + weapons capability for those states adhering to the measure, even though + the possibility exists for technically advanced states to obtain a + relatively crude nuclear weapons capability without testing. In + addition, a CTB is seen by non-nuclear + weapon states as a key step by the nuclear powers required to balance + the self-denying obligations other countries accepted in the + Non-Proliferation Treaty.

+

It is doubtful that states apparently intent on keeping the nuclear + explosives option open (e.g., Argentina, Brazil, Taiwan, South Korea, + and Pakistan) would, at least at present, be prepared to join a CTB, but the political costs to them of a + decision to go nuclear would be increased. On the other hand, a number + of states that have not adhered to the Non-Proliferation Treaty but have + gone on record as supporting a CTB, + might well decide to join. Examples are South Africa, Spain, Turkey, + Chile, Algeria, Indonesia, and Egypt. Even in the case of India, an + early cessation of US and Soviet testing + might persuade them to defer further testing.

+

The conclusion of a CTB can be expected + to improve international perceptions of the Non-Proliferation Treaty and + raise the barriers to possible + withdrawal from the treaty. The practical implications of this + perception are difficult to predict, especially for those states that + currently pose the most serious proliferation risks. However, for some + countries, a CTB might well tip the + balance of a decision against going nuclear or retaining a nuclear + option.

+

An important factor enabling most of our NATO allies, Japan and South Korea to foreswear the + development of nuclear weapons has been confidence that their security + requirements would be adequately met in the context of their alliance + relationship with the US. If the CTB were perceived as indicative of a + general US intention to withdraw over + time from its military and political commitment, it could have adverse + implications for non-proliferation. CTB + negotiations should therefore be accompanied by extensive consultations + and corollary policies to assure our allies that a CTB will not erode their security.

+

G. Stability Implications

+

It is difficult to assess the impact of possible diminished confidence in + stockpiled nuclear weapons on stability. To the extent that some + degradation were perceived to occur, a nuclear weapons state would have + somewhat less confidence in its ability in the future to develop and + maintain a disarming first-strike capability against the other side’s + strategic missiles and reduced confidence in its second-strike + capability or any other strategic objectives as well. In either case, + possible degradation would be less significant in the shorter run. In + any event, despite possible decreased reliability of their weapons, both + sides would continue to be able to inflict massive damage on soft + targets and population of the other side, due to the large numbers and + capabilities of present strategic weapons. If the numbers of weapons + were reduced to much lower levels, under a future SALT agreement, however, their decreased + reliability could be more important.

+

Some believe that a CTB could enhance + strategic stability in that due to gradual degradation in stockpile + reliability of both sides, there would be reduced confidence in + abilities to successfully carry out a disarming first-strike. Others + believe that a CTB could create + instabilities since if first use of nuclear weapons was considered less + likely, the Soviets might be tempted to take advantage of their + conventional superiority in Europe. Finally, if numbers of weapons were + reduced to very low levels and if the decline in their reliability was + perceived as asymmetric, there could even be incentives to strike first + while there was still high confidence in one’s own weapons, or, + subsequently, to strike first if the other side’s retaliatory forces + were perceived to be ineffective.

+

H. Impact on US-Soviet + Relations

+

Comprehensive test ban negotiations would be but one strand in the + interlocking web of US-Soviet + relationships in which vital arms control negotiations and agreements play a central + role. A ban on nuclear weapons testing is a declaratory goal of Soviet + foreign and arms control policy, and successful conclusion of such an + agreement would have certain beneficial results for the overall US-Soviet relationship.

+

The Soviets view a ban on nuclear weapons testing as a means both to + separate Washington and Peking and to de-emphasize the competitive + military component of US policy toward + the Soviet Union—both primarily political goals which fit in with + Moscow’s other efforts to derive the benefits of a more composed + relationship with the West. Secondarily, the Soviets hope to isolate + France, as well as China, as arms control hold-outs, and to lessen the + likelihood of nuclear proliferation, particularly along the Soviet + periphery.

+

Given the limited sphere of US and Soviet + overlapping interests, movement toward further limits on nuclear testing + would serve as a counterweight to more competitive aspects of the + relationship (for example, potential US-Soviet disagreements on southern Africa, the Middle East, or + Eastern Europe). US movement toward + testing restraints before Chinese accession would compensate, at least + partially, in Moscow’s eyes, for American actions to normalize relations + further with Peking. The divisive potential of a comprehensive test ban + for Sino-American relations, however, may be a central element in + Moscow’s calculations.

+

The political benefits to US-Soviet + relations of further testing limitations would be lessened to some + extent by whatever strains emerged in negotiating mutually acceptable + provisions on verification, peaceful nuclear explosions, and, possibly, + participation. Nonetheless, a negotiated long-term agreement would + greatly reduce the possibility of using renewed testing as a political + tool (as the Soviets did in the 1958–61 Berlin crisis).On November 27, 1958, Soviet Premier Nikita + Khrushchev announced that he would unilaterally recognize Eastern + Germany as a sovereign state, touching off the 1958–1961 Berlin + Crisis, which culminated on August 13, 1961, when East German troops + and workers began building the Berlin Wall.

+

A moratorium on weapons testing as an interim measure before negotiation + of a full test ban agreement would probably have an initially positive + effect on US-Soviet relations, but would + run the risk both of being manipulated for political ends and of + reducing pressure for early conclusion of a negotiated agreement.

+

V. General Conclusions

+

This section sets forth general conclusions on some of the issues raised + in PRM–16; the following sections + present general options for decision.

+ +

A. TTB/PNE Ratification

+

As requested in the PRM, the issue of + ratification of the TTB/PNE Treaties has been analyzed in the context of + alternative approaches to a CTB. + Arguments in favor of ratifying these treaties include:

+

—The Soviet leadership is firmly committed to these treaties as tangible + evidence of the benefits of US-Soviet cooperation, and have repeatedly + stressed the importance of their ratification.

+

—There would appear to be a distinct advantage to the US in codifying the innovative verification + provisions of these treaties both in the CTB context and in other arms control areas.

+

—The treaty provisions would be helpful in verifying the present mutual + restraint in limiting tests to 150 kt, particularly if CTB negotiations are prolonged.

+

—It would also be advantageous to ratify the treaties to preclude Soviet + renouncement of this constraint and resumption of high-yield + testing.

+

On the other hand, critics of the treaties have argued that the 150 kt + threshold is too high and that the PNE + Treaty would legitimize PNEs. However, these treaties represent the + first real progress towards a CTB in + many years and an Administration perceived as urgently working towards a + CTB should have little difficulty + in overcoming any opposition to ratification.

+

As a result, there is consensus in the Working Group that these treaties + should be ratified as a common step in all of the alternative approaches + to a CTB which follow.

+

B. Participation in Negotiations. There is also + interagency agreement that, whether or not preceded by a moratorium, a + CTB should be embodied in a binding + international agreement open to all states; that any CTB initiative should be preceded by + thorough consultations with our allies; and that CTB negotiations should begin with a + bilateral US/Soviet phase (possibly trilateral, including the UK), and should eventually proceed to a + multilateral phase in which the agreement would be concluded. There is + also agreement that such multilateral agreement would probably not take + effect in the foreseeable future if it required adherence by all nuclear + powers before entry into force. Accordingly, if we decided to commence + CTB negotiations at this time, the + most realistic near-term possibility would be an agreement of limited + duration that needed only US and Soviet + adherence to enter into force. The question of possible LTBT amendment as the enabling mechanism + for a CTB was investigated on a + preliminary basis. There would be obvious difficulties in managing a + 103-nation negotiation and some risk that the LTBT might be undermined in the process. It might be + possible to “bind” countries, such as Egypt, Israel or Brazil, who are + parties to the LTBT but have refused + to accede to the NPT. However, these + countries could find a pretext to withdraw from the LTBT if they perceived it in their interest to do so. These issues + are complex and would require extensive further study both from a policy + and legal standpoint prior to a determination whether LTBT amendment could be a desirable + multilateral basis for a CTB.

+

C. Moratorium Concerns. The implications of both + unilateral and bilateral moratoria have been considered as a means to a + cessation of testing. As noted above, our previous experience with the + Soviets concerning a testing moratorium in the late 1950s was an + unfortunate one, and as a result there would be substantial opposition + to a moratorium without active CTB + negotiations at this time. A unilateral moratorium might have + non-proliferation advantages but would suffer from the serious + disadvantage of permitting the Soviets to continue testing and might + allow them to complete priority tests before halting their own program. + Even if the moratorium were bilaterally undertaken, there would be an + obvious disadvantage in that there would be no verification provisions + to assist us in monitoring Soviet compliance. As a result there is + interagency agreement in the Working Group that a moratorium should only + be considered during negotiations toward a formal verifiable agreement + and that, even in this case, the moratorium should have a tight time + limitation to provide leverage in the negotiations and avoid an + indefinite moratorium.

+

VI. The CTB Decision

+

This section discusses the national security advantages and disadvantages + of a CTB. The arguments which favor a + CTB are:

+

—A CTB is a key element in achieving the + US objective of curbing nuclear + weapons proliferation, because:

+

(1) As indigenous nuclear capabilities spread to many countries, + political decisions to refrain from building nuclear weapons will be + increasingly dependent on whether the US + and USSR are perceived to be accepting + restraints on their nuclear arms. A CTB + is widely considered to be a main symbol of such restraint.

+

(2) Some states which have not signed the Non-Proliferation Treaty might + accept the constraints of a CTB.

+

(3) The Non-Proliferation Treaty regime would be strengthened, and + potential withdrawals made less likely, if the nuclear powers fulfilled + their pledge in that treaty to stop nuclear testing.

+

—A CTB would reinforce SALT agreements and have a positive + effect in improving the overall US–USSR relationship.

+

—A CTB would impose significant + restraints on the US–USSR arms race by prohibiting further + refinement of nuclear warheads and by prohibiting nuclear weapon effects + tests.

+

—By reducing Soviet confidence in the long-term reliability of their + missile warheads, a CTB would reduce + the risk of their employing a first-strike strategy.

+ +

—A CTB would be responsive to growing + international and domestic political pressures to end nuclear testing. + It would fulfill US pledges to seek this + goal which have been made in the Limited Test Ban Treaty, the + Non-Proliferation Treaty, UN and CCD speeches, and most recently, by + President Carter.

+

Arguments against a CTB are:

+

—Since World War II the US has depended + on nuclear weapons to deter nuclear and conventional attacks on the + US and its allies. In particular, + nuclear weapons have served to counterbalance the overwhelming + superiority of Soviet conventional forces in Europe. A CTB will inevitably result in some + deterioration of US nuclear + weaponry.

+

—If the Soviets decide to violate or circumvent the CTB Treaty and are successful, at least in + the low-yield range, this could result in further military asymmetries + favoring the Soviet Union.

+

—Future foreign concern over US + capability to oppose Soviet aggression in the event of a perceived + degradation in our nuclear deterrent could result in international + realignments and possibly further proliferation.

+

—Specific strategic and tactical weapons will not be optimized and may + even have to be cancelled because of technical difficulties.

+

—Continued testing by other weapons states, notably China, could + eventually have an adverse effect on US + national security.

+

—An early cessation of nuclear testing would eliminate our current + objectives to improve the safety, security, command/control features, + and reduction of collateral damage from all classes of nuclear + weapons.

+

—The Soviets could have an asymmetric advantage in maintaining stockpile + reliability and nuclear weapons design capability.

+

—[2 lines not declassified] Such testing could be + important for development of some tactical weapons.

+

VII. + CTB Implementing Options

+

A. Negotiations with Continued Testing

+

Under this option we would initiate CTB + negotiations with the Soviets as soon as practicable, but would continue + testing pending conclusion of a CTB + Treaty. (It is considered likely that negotiation of a CTB would take at least a year, + particularly if PNEs were allowed.)

+

Advantages

+

—Together with renewed SALT + negotiations, would demonstrate US + commitment to arms control and enhance prospects for our + non-proliferation objectives.

+ +

—Would be constructive step in US-Soviet + relationship and could improve prospects for accomplishment of other + US bilateral objectives with the + Soviets.

+

—Due to likelihood of protracted negotiations, would permit + accomplishment of some planned US + weapons testing objectives.

+

Disadvantages

+

—Could be criticized for permitting continued testing, particularly if + negotiations were protracted.

+

—Alternatively, if negotiations were completed quickly, could preclude + completion of any remaining US weapons + test objectives.

+

—Similarly, the Soviets might exploit the situation by announcing an + immediate moratorium and calling for the US to halt testing, thus making it difficult for the US to continue testing.

+

B. Negotiations with Cessation of Testing

+

This option is essentially the same as option A, except that we would + seek a time-limited bilateral moratorium on testing during the + negotiations.

+

Advantages

+

—It would restrain the Soviets from improving their nuclear warheads or + correcting possible deficiencies during a possibly protracted period of + negotiations.

+

—It would be widely supported internationally as clearly demonstrating + US and Soviet good-faith commitments + to fulfill their non-proliferation treaty pledge to end nuclear + testing.

+

—It would strengthen US efforts to + dissuade India and other nations from further testing.

+

Disadvantages

+

—It would preclude completion of certain planned strategic and tactical + weapons tests programs.

+

—During the period of the moratorium, we would be limited to national + means of verification only, thereby increasing the risk of clandestine + Soviet testing at low yields.

+

—If prolonged, a moratorium could result in loss of skilled personnel + from the US weapons program, as well as + funding reductions by the Congress. In that case, subsequent failure to + achieve a permanent CTB and resumption + of testing by both sides could leave the US at a disadvantage.

+

C. Phased Approach

+

The primary difference between this option and Option A above is that + this option would defer CTB + negotiations for perhaps two years to provide for a deliberate linking + of the various steps required to reach any CTB with satisfactory progress on a wide variety of other + arms control measures and demonstration of Soviet commitments to a + stable US/USSR national security relationship.

+ +

The following pros and cons are in addition to those in Option A + above.

+

Advantages

+

—Provides time for multinational exploration on verification measures + which could be incorporated in an eventual CTB.

+

—Provides experience in implementing TTB/PNE Treaties and in assessing + Soviet cooperativeness with regard to these treaty provisions.

+

—Provides time for a US assessment of + progress on a broad range of the US/USSR security relationships.

+

Disadvantages

+

—Would be viewed by some as inconsistent with stated US objective of prompt cessation of + testing, and thus could complicate TTB/PNE ratification.

+

—Would probably delay the earliest date of a CTB agreement.

+

—Possible non-proliferation benefits would be deferred until favorable + CTB decision is clearly + demonstrated by initiating CTB + negotiations.

+

—Would defer possible benefits to US-Soviet relationship.

+

D. Lowered Threshold

+

This option could be accomplished as an additional step in either Option + A or C above. It would involve lowering the threshold at an early date + to perhaps 75 kt or so, and could also include further scheduled + reductions towards a very low threshold or CTB. This might provide some of the non-proliferation + advantages of a moratorium with reduced verification risks, and at 75 kt + would permit completion of much of our tactical weapons modernization + effort. It could also assist us in ratification of the TTB/PNE Treaties + by demonstrating the President’s commitment to progress in this area and + would mitigate criticisms that the 150 kt threshold is too high. If the + period of testing at 75 kt were prolonged, however, it would be + desirable to review and possibly amend the TTB/PNE Treaties to ensure + adequate verification. (This could be a complex negotiation in + itself.)

+

VIII. + PNE Accommodation Considerations

+

A. Introduction

+

Since the initiation of US arms control + policy to limit nuclear weapon testing, it has been recognized that + peaceful nuclear explosions (PNEs) + present special and difficult problems for the achievement of an + adequately verified test ban. In seeking a test ban agreement with the + Soviet Union, the US must take account + of the facts that the US currently has + only a very small PNE program while the + Soviets have an active PNE program and + have expressed their desires and plans for continuing that program + during a test ban. Because of economic factors, environmental concerns, and other factors, it is + assumed unlikely that the US would + embark on a large-scale PNE program + after entering into a weapons test ban. However, it is possible that the + US would pursue a limited PNE program, possibly within the confines + of the Nevada Test Site.

+

The Soviet PNE program is very broad in + scope and includes water resource development, oil and gas stimulation, + mining, storage and disposal of wastes, storage of petroleum and other + hydrocarbons, and extinguishing gas well fires. The Soviets claim to + have reduced the last two applications to practice, but most of their + PNEs have been experimental in + nature. The best known Soviet PNE + project is their plan to build a canal to reverse the head waters of the + Pechora River to flow into the Kama, Volga, and then the Caspian Sea. + This is a major project which at one time was described as requiring as + many as 250 nuclear explosives fired in salvos of up to 20 explosives at + a time. The Soviets conducted one PNE + salvo along the canal route in 1971 and have had a second apparently + ready for firing for more than a year. There is some uncertainty as to + whether the Soviets will proceed with this project, and substantial + engineering and feasibility questions probably remain. However, at least + five other PNE tests (for other + applications) are known to be in preparation and the Soviets seem + determined at present to continue their overall program. However, it is + difficult to assess how strongly the Soviets would resist a US proposal to ban PNEs in the context of a + CTB other wise acceptable to them, + particularly if the PNE ban were only + for a limited number of years.

+

B. National Security Implications of PNEs under a + CTB

+

There is international agreement that the technology required for PNEs is + indistinguishable from that required for nuclear weapons tests, and that + any country engaged in PNE device + development or testing inevitably receives weapons-related benefits. + This agreement is reflected in the NPT, + and one of the key objectives of our non-proliferation policy has been + to deter non-nuclear weapon states from indigenous development of PNE technology.

+

Because of the indistinguishability of PNE technology and weapons technology, our lack of interest + in PNE applications, and because of + nuclear weapon proliferation considerations, there is complete agreement + among the participants in this study that a CTB banning all nuclear explosions is more desirable from + the US national security standpoint than + a ban which accommodates PNEs. In the context of a ban of all nuclear explosions, including PNEs, the + capability to verify whether a nuclear explosion has taken place is the + same for both a PNE and a nuclear + weapon detonation.

+

If peaceful nuclear explosions are allowed to continue in some form in + the context of a comprehensive test ban, an opportunity for evasion of test ban constraints is + immediately introduced. Without adequate restrictions, ostensible PNEs + could be exploited to gain practically any nuclear weapon-related + benefits that can be achieved by a declared nuclear weapon test of + equivalent yield.

+

Further, there is concern that an accommodation for PNEs could increase belief in the value of + PNEs, thereby stimulating interest in indigenous PNE programs. This would diminish one of + the principal non-proliferation benefits of a CTB which prohibited PNEs—namely, a closing of this avenue + to potential weapons development (as in the case of India). A contrary + but probably weaker effect would be that some states, which felt that + they had a real economic need for PNEs, would continue to have an + alternative to indigenous PNEs and thereby might accede to such a CTB.

+

Even with a PNE allowance, a CTB would act as an important political + restraint on a decision to develop nuclear weapons overtly, and would + deter overt political use of a weapons capability. Thus, while it is + clear that a CTB banning PNEs would be highly preferable, one which + allowed PNEs (if necessary to + accommodate Soviet interests) would still probably contribute to our + non-proliferation objectives and might have enhanced value in terms of + its impact on the US-Soviet + relationship.

+

C. PNE Accommodation + Options

+

If the Soviets insist on a PNE + accommodation, the fundamental issue is whether a verification + arrangement can be devised that would adequately protect US security interests. To reduce the + weapon-related benefits attendant on accommodating PNEs under a test ban, restrictions would + have to be devised that guard against: substitution of a weapon or + weapon development explosive for the ostensible PNE explosive; detonation of a collateral weapon or weapon + development explosive near the PNE, + simultaneously or nearly simultaneously, with it; or acquisition of + weapon effects data. A number of specific PNE verification procedures have been considered in an + attempt to satisfy these general objectives; however, none would provide + adequate unilateral assurance that the country testing the PNE would not obtain weapons-related + benefits. Consequently, our attention has focused on highly intrusive + cooperative verification arrangements which would seek to ensure that + the US would share at least equally in + any weapons-related data generated in PNE activities.

+

These procedures are extensions of the PNET provisions and as common + elements include: (a) certification of the nature and peaceful purpose + of each PNE project; (b) review of the + proposed project by the verifying party on the basis of data supplied by + host party; (c) observation of the preparation, emplacement, execution, + and post-shot activities; and + (d) on-site seismic monitoring. Opportunities for detection of a + collateral clandestine test or weapons effects experiments would depend + on the details of the on-site observation and monitoring that was + permitted, the relative yields of the PNE and the clandestine weapons test, and national + technical means. Four alternative, supplementary procedures are + considered below:

+

(1) Registration and Measurement of Explosive + Characteristics

+

This procedure consists of (a) registration of the characteristics of a + limited set of explosives; (b) firing of the explosives by observers; + (c) on-site electronic monitoring; and (d) collection of post-shot + radiochemical samples. For this system of constraints, the parties would + have to make available to each other the electronic signatures and + radiochemical samples from the explosives they propose to use.

+

Advantages:

+

—May be easier to negotiate than other options considered; it permits + host to use his own explosives.

+

—Least complicated of options.

+

—May be made multilateral.

+

Disadvantages:

+

—Stockpile reliability testing could be accomplished by preregistering + stockpile weapon signatures.

+

—Radiochemical and electronic signatures may not suffice to identify + adequately the character of the registered explosive.

+

—Radiochemical samples could be difficult and costly to obtain from deep + contained explosions.

+

—Unforeseen circumstances may require new PNE explosive designs which could not be accommodated.

+

(2) Warehousing

+

This procedure involves international warehousing, whereby a stockpile of + PNE devices provided by the US and Soviets adequate for several years + of PNE applications would be + established under international surveillance and used as needed for + PNE applications.

+

Advantages:

+

—Reduces opportunities for checking weapon stockpile reliability.

+

—May be as negotiable as option (1).

+

—May be made multilateral.

+

Disadvantages:

+

—Requires large initial stockpile with attendant security problems and + cost.

+

—Poses problems related to how the explosives in the stockpile could be + maintained and how to replenish the stockpile without permitting the introduction of new weapons + for testing or the disclosure of design information.

+

—Unforeseen circumstances may require new PNE explosive designs which could not be accommodated.

+

—Some stockpile reliability testing could be accomplished by putting + certain weapons in the PNE explosive + stockpile.

+

(3) Explosives Supplied by Observing Party

+

This procedure would include a provision that the observing party would + supply, maintain custody of, and detonate the explosive. The procedure + would presumably have to include a veto right for the supplying State + with respect to safety and treaty obligations.

+

Advantages:

+

—Makes explosive substitution very difficult for PNE projects in host country.

+

—Because of possible large Soviet PNE + program, US may supply many explosives + helping to maintain US nuclear explosive + design capability.

+

—Similar to IAEA + PNE supplier approach, making it more + acceptable internationally.

+

Disadvantages:

+

—Probably not negotiable because of Soviet concern that military + advantages accrue to US, and because of + US veto power.

+

—US may have problems of explosive + supply, logistics and liability.

+

—Melt material left in host country is revealing of explosive design.

+

—Has US/USSR condominium aspects to other nations.

+

—USSR may test new weapon designs by + providing PNE services to friendly + states.

+

(4) US/USSR Cooperative PNE Program

+

This last procedure is based on the establishment of a comprehensive and + effective US/USSR PNE cooperative + program that encompasses all aspects of PNE technology, including mutual disclosure or joint + development of explosive designs. Such a cooperative program must + include verification procedures that assure that the explosive used is + of the same design as that disclosed or developed for the project. Both + sides would share in the weapons-technology benefits of PNEs. This + procedure could also include provisions to maximize non-nuclear + assistance in the proposed projects in an attempt to reduce the numbers + of nuclear explosives required.

+

Advantages:

+

—Allows US to obtain large amount of + information concerning Soviet PNE + program, and some insight into Soviet explosive design.

+

—Cooperative aspects could enhance US/USSR relations (dé-tente), and + might be negotiable for that reason.

+ +

—Cooperative US/USSR program may provide international PNE benefits not otherwise attainable.

+

Disadvantages:

+

—Arrangement might be criticized as a cooperative US/USSR weapon + development program (condominium).

+

—Requires extreme care in the disclosure of design information to avoid + enhancing existing Soviet weapon design capabilities.

+

—May not be negotiable with Soviets because of high degree of + intrusiveness.

+

D. Negotiating Strategy

+

As outlined above, it would appear to be clearly in our interest to exert + maximum pressure to convince the Soviets that PNEs should be banned + under a CTB. If this proves + unacceptable to the Soviets, an alternative would be to include in the + CTB agreement a provision for + consideration of a PNE accommodation at + a later time. This was the final resolution of the Soviet desire for + PNEs above 150 kilotons during the PNET negotiations.

+

If this approach proved unsuccessful, we might attempt to negotiate a + PNE accommodation that would be + restricted to the Pechora-Kama Canal project. This might be negotiable, + would limit the scope of the Soviet PNE + effort, and upon completion could lead to a complete test ban. There + would be important disadvantages, however, in that since only the + Soviets would benefit, other nations could criticize it as + discriminatory.

+

More importantly, the project would involve only excavation explosions + and we have repeatedly stated that major PNE excavation projects would violate the LTBT. This would preclude treating the + LTBT problem as we did in the PNET + by including a provision for strict LTBT compliance and not differentiating between contained + and excavation PNEs. Finally, the project is so large, and would take so + long (perhaps 10 years), that this option would not significantly reduce + weapons-related benefits compared to a general PNE accommodation.

+

Under either the restricted Pechora-Kama or an unrestricted PNE accommodation, their negotiability + would obviously depend on the degree of intrusiveness of the + accommodation arrangement we selected. None of the four such + arrangements outlined above has been examined in detail, and all should + receive further careful review before proceeding with negotiation of any + PNE accommodation.

+
+ +
+ + 147. Letter From the Acting Administrator of the Energy Research and + Development Administration (Fri) + to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, + Harold Brown Papers, Box + 82, Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty 1977. Secret. Copies were sent to + Harold Brown, Vance, George Brown, Sloss, and Turner. + Washington, February 17, 1977 + + Dear Dr. Brzezinski: + +

Subject: Accommodating PNEs Under a Weapon Test Ban

+

This is to confirm ERDA’s position on + identifying the dangers to national security of a comprehensive test ban + which accommodates PNEs. The original request to Heads of Agencies in + PRM–16See Document 141. included a + preliminary review of the major problems of verifying a complete ban on + all testing; weapons, as well as peaceful nuclear explosions. Since that + time, the possibility of accommodating Soviet interest in using PNEs in + the Pechora-Kama River Project has become a factor in the PRM–16 test ban review.

+

It has been established in technical reviews within ERDA and its weapon design laboratories + that there is no known way to prevent the Soviet Union from gaining + military benefits from a comprehensive test ban through low yield + clandestine testing if a PNE + accommodation is permitted. In addition, it will increase significantly + both the opportunities and the yield ranges available for the Soviet + Union to exploit for military advantage. Even under the situation of + maximum use of U.S. nuclear explosives for PNEs in the Soviet Union, it + would still be possible under a CTB for + the Soviets to mask their own weapon tests as collateral explosions + which would not necessarily be detected and identified.

+

As presently described, the Pechora-Kama Project is estimated to require + 5–10 years for completion. In analyses conducted by the Lawrence + Livermore Laboratory prior to the PNET, it was estimated that 250 to 300 + separate explosions with salvo yields up to 3 megatons would be + required. Bilateral treaty constraints on individual explosions to 150 + kt and 1500 kt for salvo yield in accordance with the PNET would + increase the numbers significantly, providing ample opportunity for + Soviet weapon testing and technology acquisition under the guise of + PNE.

+

In the past, the Soviets have made it clear that they are interested in a + comprehensive test ban which accommodates PNEs. They have stated in recent exchanges that they + view the PNET as a basis for establishing a PNE accommodation under a CTB. The PNET threshold is tied directly to the 150 kt + limit of the threshold test ban, with the understanding that the PNET + threshold will be reduced with any reductions in the TTBT limit and that PNEs will not be allowed under a CTB. It is essential that this view of + TTBT and PNET relationships be + maintained.

+

It should be anticipated that the Soviets could continue to endorse a + general PNE accommodation. Under this + condition, which involves both low fission, relatively clean nuclear + devices used for excavation and fission devices for contained + explosions, the Soviets could have access to the full spectrum of weapon + design and effects otherwise banned in a CTB. Under conditions of general accommodation of PNEs, it becomes even more difficult to + deny military benefits.

+

ERDA strongly recommends that any + accommodation of PNEs under a + comprehensive test ban be thoroughly analyzed for its adverse impact on + the treaty, our ability to verify that military benefits are not being + obtained from PNEs, and the relative + impacts on U.S. and Soviet national security.

+

Sincerely,

+ + Robert W. + FriPrinted from a copy + that indicates Fri + signed the original.Acting + Administrator + +
+ +
+ + 148. Memorandum From the Chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff (Brown) to Secretary of Defense + BrownSource: Washington National Records + Center, OSD Files: FRC 330–80–0017, Box 63, A–400.112 + Test Ban (5 Mar 77) 1977. Secret. Copies were sent to the Director + of the Defense Intelligence Agency (Tighe) and the Director of the + Defense Nuclear Agency (Johnson). + Washington, March + 1, 1977 + + SUBJECT + Comprehensive Test Ban Issues (U) + +

1. (C) The purpose of this memorandum is to transmit the views of the + Joint Chiefs of Staff on the Comprehensive Test Ban (CTB) issues and to provide a basis for the + DOD response to PRM/NSC–16.See Document + 141.

+

2. (S) After a careful review of the Interagency Working Group’s response + to the PRM,See Document 146. the Joint Chiefs + of Staff have concluded that, although the facts developed in the + response do not support a CTB at this + time, the presentation of the substantive issues in the Executive + Summary could result in misleading conclusions upon which future US security policy and negotiating strategy + may be based. It is, therefore, essential that these issues be + clarified. The issues of utmost importance concern the impact of a + CTB or moratorium on US military capabilities and the adequacy + of US intelligence capabilities both to + ascertain the status of Soviet weapons programs and to monitor + compliance with a CTB agreement.

+

3. (S) The Joint Chiefs of Staff recognize the longstanding US policy regarding a comprehensive ban on + nuclear testing within the context of an adequately verified agreement, + including the commitments made in the Limited Test Ban Treaty (LTBT), Non-Proliferation Treaty, and + Threshold Test Ban Treaty (TTBT). It + must be pointed out, however, that this policy was developed at a time + when the United States was in a position of clear strategic superiority. + Presumably, a CTB at that time would + have slowed the rate at which the Soviet Union could have improved its + strategic forces and would have delayed the point at which it could have + achieved parity. The strategic situation has changed drastically in the + last few years, and, although there are differing opinions as to the + relative military advantages held by either the United States or the + Soviet Union in specific areas, it is generally agreed that the two + powers are now in a state of overall rough equivalence.

+ +

4. (S) Whether the trend of increasing strength of the Soviet Union + relative to the United States will taper off in the future is a matter + of considerable debate within the Intelligence Community; [3 lines not declassified] It is impossible to + project the threat which may now be developing and which may not be + clearly perceived by the United States until such time as a CTB would make it difficult or impossible + to respond.

+

5. (S) Current US force improvement + initiatives have been taken primarily to respond to threats which have + been postulated with some certainty. A CTB agreement will limit US + ability to develop military systems which are essential to respond to + these postulated threats. It is recognized that a CTB which includes prohibition of peaceful + nuclear explosions (PNEs) will + constrain the Soviet Union’s ability to develop new initiatives. + However, the Joint Chiefs of Staff emphasize that a CTB may render the United States virtually + unable to respond to the future threat which may now be developing and, + thus, is unconstrained by the effects of a CTB.

+

6. (S) National policy calls for development and maintenance of a + deterrent and warfighting capability across the spectrum of warfare, + ranging from strategic nuclear offensive and defensive operations + through tactical nuclear, conventional, and unconventional operations. + To support this policy, the existing strategy provides for forces which + are highly selective, effective, flexible, and responsive to the + requirements of the National Command Authorities. By continuing a strong + technological capability made possible under the constraints of the + LTBT through the maintenance of a + viable underground test program, the United States has continued the + development of nuclear capabilities which will assist in the fulfillment + of national policy objectives. However, without the present underground + testing capability, the US Armed Forces + could not confidently exploit advanced nuclear weapons development + technology or nuclear weapons effects technology to provide these + capabilities nor could they assure the reliability either of new + designs, of older nuclear weapons which have been stockpiled over long + periods of time, or of replications of older tested designs. Therefore, + the Joint Chiefs of Staff believe that, for the foreseeable future, + continued nuclear testing will be necessary.

+

7. [1 paragraph (23 lines) not declassified]

+

8. (S) In the view of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the adequacy of + verifying a CTB agreement is dependent + on the ability unequivocally to assure the national authorities that no + potential adversary is achieving military benefits through nuclear + testing. Although the PRM–16 response + points out that improvements to US + national technical means could reduce the likelihood of undetected + tests, the Executive Summary [10 lines not + declassified]

+ +

9. (S) The Executive Summary overemphasizes the probabilities that the + leadership of the Soviet Union would be unwilling to conduct an evasion + program. In the past, the United States has officially notified the + Soviet Union of 21 violations of the LTBT, but all charges have been denied by the Soviet Union. + There is also some question by experts in the United States about two + Soviet detonations which may have exceeded the 150 kt limit in the + informal understanding regarding the TTBT. It is recognized that these instances may be + considered by some as of a different nature than a violation of a CTB. However, it must still be pointed out + [3 lines not declassified] that even when + clear evidence of a violation exists, any charges against the Soviet + Union may be meaningless.

+

10. (S) In view of the above, the Joint Chiefs of Staff believe that a + CTB is not in the best interests of + the United States at this time because of:

+

a. The potential adverse effect on military capabilities caused by US inability to develop military systems + required to respond to current and future threats, US inability to maintain a nuclear weapons + technology base, and US inability to + insure continued nuclear systems reliability.

+

b. The known limits on US verification + capabilities.

+

c. [2 lines not declassified]

+

d. [2½ lines not declassified]

+

11. (S) If a decision is made to proceed with negotiations for a CTB, the Joint Chiefs of Staff consider + the following points to be pertinent:

+

a. An unverified or unilateral moratorium should be avoided.

+

b. Nuclear testing should continue during CTB negotiations, and the effective date of a CTB should be selected so as to permit the + completion of testing for key systems. Although some systems now under + development might be placed in the stockpile without further planned + testing, it would be at the cost of significantly reduced effectiveness + and reliability. It should be noted that testing [4 + lines not declassified]

+

c. [1½ lines not declassified]

+

d. PNEs should not be permitted in a + CTB environment. Despite a lengthy + exploration in the PRM–16 response to + find ways of accommodating PNEs in a + CTB with minimum risk to national + security, there appears to be no feasible way to prevent military + advantages accruing from the conduct of PNEs.

+

e. All nuclear powers should eventually be signatory to a CTB. In the short term, only the Soviet + Union threatens US security. However, + long-term advances by the PRC or other + countries also could become a factor. Therefore, any cessation of + testing must allow for periodic review and a clear opportunity to renew + testing if all nuclear weapon states do not adhere within a reasonable + period of time.

+

f. The TTBT and Peaceful Nuclear + Explosions Treaty should be ratified as soon as possible.

+ +

12. (U) The Joint Chiefs of Staff request that you consider their views + in concluding your review of PRM/NSC–16.

+

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

+ + George S. + BrownChairman + Joint Chiefs of Staff + + + +
+ +
+ 149. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense Brown to the President’s Assistant for National Security + Affairs (Brzezinski)Source: Carter Library, National + Security Affairs, Brzezinski + Material, Subject File, Box 6, Comprehensive Test Ban (CTB), 3–12/77. Secret. + Washington, March + 5, 1977 + + SUBJECT + Conversation with The President on CTB Considerations + +

At your suggestion, I conveyed my misgivings about the peaceful nuclear + explosions loophole in CTB to the + President in a conversation yesterday.No + record of this conversation has been found. According to the + President’s Daily Diary, Carter and Brown met from 4:45 to 5:20 p.m. on May 4. (Carter + Library, Presidential Materials) Moreover, I described the + JCS position that a ban on nuclear + testing would be contrary to our national security interests. I assured + him that I would be working on the broadest, most balanced view possible + here in the Defense Department.

+

The President agreed that CTB would be a + useful topic for a luncheon discussion by him with the Joint Chiefs, + Charles Duncan, you and + me.

+ + Harold + BrownBrown signed “Harold” at the end of the + memorandum. + +
+ +
+ + 150. Letter From the Director of Military Application of the Energy + Research and Development Administration (Bratton) to the Chairman of the + Military Liaison to the Energy Research and Development Administration + (Cotter)Source: + Washington National Records Center, OSD Files: FRC + 330–80–0017, Box 63, A–400.112 1977. Secret; Restricted + Data. + Washington, March + 15, 1977 + + Dear Mr. Cotter: + +

In anticipation that underground nuclear testing might be further + curtailed or prohibited in the relatively near future, ERDA is taking prudent steps to revise + the underground nuclear test program for FY 1977 and test plans for FY 1978 and FY 1979 in + order best to insure the accomplishment of those tests most urgently + needed to meet presently known, high priority defense requirements for + nuclear weapons at the earliest possible date. Our understanding of + these requirements and of the relative priority of each is summarized in + Enclosure 1.Not attached.

+

We have formulated plans to complete at minimum cost the testing required + for all the weapons listed in Enclosure 1. All advanced development + tests, except those for which preparations are already well advanced, + have been proposed for deferment until late FY 1978. These plans are summarized in Enclosure 2.Not attached.

+

Although the revised number of tests for each fiscal year is not + significantly different than in our previous plans, the nature of the + tests is such that the cost would exceed our budget amounts for testing + by about $6 million in FY 1977 and $13 + million in FY 1978. While it may be + possible to obtain additional funds by reprogramming actions within the + weapons program or from some other ERDA account, it is first essential to verify that each of + these potential weapons should be developed before further restrictions + or a ban on testing.

+

The plan we have formulated is basically a reordering of already planned + tests in order to accomplish the most critical tests as soon as + possible. For each program the point at which these most critical tests + are completed is indicated on Enclosure 2. If testing were stopped after + successful completion of these critical tests but before completion of + all the tests required for the full development of a particular warhead, + it may be possible to stockpile that warhead. However, it may not meet + all required military characteristics, and some of its yield options may + not be fully verified. The impact on each program of completing only the critical tests is given in + Enclosure 3.Not attached. It should + be recognized that the schedule shown in Enclosure 2 is optimistic in + that all tests may not be completed on time and all may not be + successful.

+

If additional resources cannot be obtained from outside the weapons + program, it may be necessary to reprogram funds from the weapons + production budget. This would result in delays in the delivery of + weapons to the DOD. For example, one + option for reprogramming an additional $6 million for testing in FY 1977 would delay the scheduled delivery + of the B61–5 bomb by six to nine months. Reprogramming $13 million in + FY 1978, in addition, would delay + delivery of the B77 bomb by one year if all the funds were applied + against that program. We would not, of course, initiate any + reprogramming action which would impact agreed IOC or delivery commitments without coordinating fully with + the DOD.

+

I would appreciate your concurrence in our proposed revised test program + and its associated priorities. Further, I would welcome comments + regarding programs which you believe should be deleted or slowed in + order to save resources or programs which should be added to provide + further options during a possible test ban. For example, the DOD views on the type of reprogramming + referred to above would be useful.

+

I look forward to hearing from you on this matter, and I shall endeavor + to be as responsive as possible to DOD + suggestions in meeting our mutual nuclear testing goals.

+

Sincerely,

+ + J.K. Bratton + Major General, USA Director of Military + Application + +
+ +
+ + 151. Memorandum of ConversationSource: Department of State, Office of the Secretariat + Staff, Cyrus R. Vance, + Secretary of State—1977–1980, Lot 84D241, Box 10, NODIS Memcons, 1977. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Thayer; and + approved in S on April 5. The memorandum is printed in full Foreign + Relations, 1977–1980, vol. XIII, China, Document + 21. + Washington, March + 23, 1977 + + SUBJECT + SALT, CTB, Indian Ocean, Africa, Middle East, Belgrade + Conference, Vietnam, Fukuda + Visit, Claims/Assets, Exchange Program + + + PARTICIPANTS + People’s Republic of China + Ambassador Huang + Chen + Counselor Tsien Ta-yung + Third Secretary Hsu Shang-wei + United States + The Secretary + Richard Holbrooke, EA + Harry E.T. Thayer, EA/PRCM (Notetaker) + Michel Oksenberg, NSC + +

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to a comprehensive test ban.]

+

CTB

+

The Secretary said that another subject for discussion would be the issue + of a comprehensive test ban. We would discuss the possibility of + negotiating for a ban on all tests of nuclear weapons for a limited + period. As the President had indicated to Huang,On February 8, + Carter told Huang Chen “We have offered the + Soviet Union a comprehensive test ban treaty. This would be a + bilateral agreement with the Soviets. If it can be worked out, then + perhaps others such as China or France can consider joining in some + form, but at the present time this is just an effort with the USSR. At the same time we will + maintain our equivalent strength and will keep the Chinese + Government informed.” (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, + Staff Material, Far East, Box 55, Oksenberg Policy Process, + 10/76–4/77) The conversation is printed in full in Foreign + Relations, 1977–1980, vol. XIII, China, Document + 5. this is an issue between the Soviets and + ourselves; but we would hope that some time in the future other nations + would join such an agreement.

+

The Secretary said he expected that a number of issues would be raised in + this connection, such as peaceful nuclear explosions being permitted + under this test ban. Second, what kind of verification would be required + under such an agreement? Third, whether or not the Soviets are prepared + to enter such an agreement if it is only a bilateral one. The Secretary + said that, at this point, we have no idea as to how the discussions will come out or if the + Soviets have a serious interest in such a discussion.

+

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to a comprehensive test ban.]

+

Ambassador Huang

+

Ambassador Huang, after thanking + the Secretary, said that some of the issues already had been touched on + in his meeting with the President. Nevertheless, he would repeat some + points made then. With respect to the US-Soviet talks and relations, China’s basic view was still the + same. The U.S. had vested interests to protect around the world and the + Soviet aim is expansion. This is unalterable.

+

SALT, CTB

+

As he had said to President Carter, the PRC had + never been interested in the so-called disarmament agreements reached by + the Soviet Union and the U.S. He had already explained the reason to + President Carter. President + Carter had mentioned the + comprehensive test ban, including asking others like France and China to + join following Soviet and U.S. agreement. China’s consistent policy, + Huang told the Secretary, is + to oppose nuclear blackmail proposed by the Soviet Union and the U.S., + and China will not take part in any of these activities. The PRC felt that the Soviet Union and the + United States now had conducted enough tests and don’t want to allow + others to do so. There is no reason for this under Heaven.

+

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to a comprehensive test ban.]

+
+ +
+ + 152. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in + FranceSource: National + Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign + Policy File, D770105–0121. Secret. Also sent to USNATO, Moscow, London, the Mission + in Geneva, USUN, the Liaison + Office in Peking, and the IAEA in + Vienna. Drafted by Mark Ramee (PM/DCA); cleared by James Dobbins + (EUR/CE), Peter Sebastian (S/S), and + Robert Rochline (ACDA); and + approved by Gelb. + Washington, March 25, 1977, 2113Z +

66861. Subject: Comprehensive Test Ban (CTB): Consultations With French.

+

1. Politico-Military Affairs Director Gelb met with French Chargé Boyer March 24 to review + arms control subjects on eve of Secretary Vance’s departure to Moscow. Drawing on President’s + statements and Gelb March 21 + statement to North Atlantic Council,Not + found. + Gelb reviewed SALT, CTB, MBFR, Indian Ocean, + conventional arms transfers, anti-satellite capabilities, and prior + notification of missile launches.

+

2. On test ban, Gelb noted + President’s proposal for US-Soviet bilateral moratorium on nuclear + testing for two, three or four years,See + footnote 3, Document 145. + explaining that if other nations cared to associate with it, this would + be welcomed, but it was not a precondition. US was prepared to hear Soviets out on PNEs, but we did not favor them. Gelb specifically noted that:

+

A) Our test ban initiative was not intended to give problems to our + allies, in particular France;

+

B) US of course would welcome it if + France or others chose to associate with a cessation of testing;

+

C) Such a cessation of testing would not adversely affect NATO strategy or targeting. In our + judgment, a CTB was not to our military + disadvantage;

+

D) Before going forward with specific CTB negotiations, we would consult with our allies, + including France.

+

3. Boyer noted French position was that a certain time was needed for + other military tests. France would not rpt not join any moratorium at present. Boyer did not + rpt not know about the future. + Boyer added that, as Gelb had + noted, there was the hope that a US-Soviet cessation of testing would be + joined by other powers in the future.

+

4. In response to a question, Gelb confirmed position of administration favoring + ratification of Threshold Test Ban Treaty.

+ + Christopher + +
+ +
+ + 153. Memorandum of ConversationSource: Department of State, Office of the Secretariat + Staff, Special Adviser to the Secretary (S/MS) on Soviet Affairs + Marshall Shulman—Jan 21, + 77–Jan 19, 81, Lot 81D109, Box 8, Vance to Moscow, March 28–30, 1977. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Krimer; and approved by Hyland (in draft), and Twadell on + May 9. The meeting took place at the Kremlin. The memorandum is + printed in full in Foreign Relations, 1977–1980, vol. VI, + Soviet Union, Document 20. Vance reported on his conversation with Gromkyo to + Carter and Brzezinski in Secto 3033 from the Secretary’s + Delegation, March 29. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + P840076–0315) + Moscow, March 29, 1977, 4:30–7:30 + p.m. + + SUBJECT + Middle East, Arms Control + + + PARTICIPANTS + UNITED STATES + Secretary Cyrus R. + Vance + Ambassador Malcolm + Toon + Mr. Paul Warnke + Assistant Secretary Arthur + Hartman + Mr. William Hyland + Mr. Leslie Gelb + Mr. William D. Krimer, + Interpreter + USSR + Foreign Minister A.A. + Gromyko + Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers L.V. Smirnov + Deputy Foreign Minister G.M. + Korniyenko + Ambassador A.F. + Dobrynin + Notetaker—Name Unknown + Mr. V.M. Sukhodrev, + Interpreter + +

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to a comprehensive test ban.]

+

CTB

+

Gromyko + said that, as the Secretary would know, the Soviet Union was in favor of + resolving the problem of completely stopping nuclear weapon testing. The + USSR had proposed that all nuclear + powers, without exception, enter into discussions as soon as possible, + with the participation of non-nuclear states, with a view to conclusion + of a treaty on this subject, providing for a complete and universal ban + on testing nuclear weapons. In connection with that proposal, the + question of verification would arise, and the Soviet Union had taken it + into account, although he was convinced that given today’s level of + technology, verification by national technical means should be + sufficient. Still, the Soviet Union was prepared to go further and find + mutually acceptable understandings that would preserve the framework of + voluntary decisions in the context of on-site investigation of certain + phenomena. This should be aimed at providing assurances for all parties + to the treaty that obligations under the treaty were being complied + with. Something of this kind had been suggested by the Swedes. The + Soviets would suggest that our + two countries act promptly, considering the fact that this issue was + currently under discussion in the Disarmament Committee. To translate + these considerations into the text of a mutually acceptable treaty would + be a major step forward.

+

Gromyko + wanted to suggest an idea that the Secretary might not be able to answer + now. Perhaps he could reflect on it, and reply after he returned to + Washington. Such a treaty could initially be signed by our two + countries, and be accompanied by a simultaneous appeal to other nuclear + states, and even to non-industrial countries, to accede to it. When + signing the treaty, the United States and Soviet Union could declare + that for a specified period of time, say one and a half to two years, + they would refrain from testing nuclear weapons; in other words, they + would declare a moratorium on their own testing. If other nuclear powers + did not accede to the treaty within that period of time, the Soviet + Union and the United States would be released from their obligations + under such a moratorium. Gromyko + believed that such a step would impel certain powers to take positive + action and would, in general, favorably influence the whole + international situation. That would be a good thing. It was hard to + imagine who could criticize the new Administration for taking such a + step. In the Soviet Union, and he was quite sure in saying this, such a + step would meet with understanding; people would regard it as positive. + However, one could not consider peaceful nuclear explosions in one and + the same category with the testing of nuclear weapons. Peaceful nuclear + explosions were used in the Soviet Union to accomplish major economic + tasks. Certain plans had been made involving PNEs. He would point out that, taking into account US views, the Soviet Union had agreed to + limit the yield of such explosions under an agreement signed last year. + At the same time, that agreement provided that nuclear explosions for + solely peaceful purposes would be subject to a system of verification + that would be worked out in detail, envisioning in certain cases access + by the representatives of one side to the explosion site of the other. + It would represent a substantial step forward, a radical solution to the + problem of ending nuclear testing, curbing the arms race, and protecting + people against the harmful consequences of such tests, if ratification + of the Threshold and PNE agreements + already signed by our two countries were completed. The Soviets did not + lack readiness to do so. They were waiting to see when the new + Administration in Washington would become more active in this area. Who + could deny the positive significance of the agreements already on the + table in signed form? He thought that each member of the US Senate and House of Representatives + would approve. The US could take this + important step toward strengthening peace and security, strengthening + Soviet-American relations, and thus reinforce some of the positive + statements made in the US. It seemed to + the Soviets that the Carter + Administration could do this if it wished.

+ +

The Soviet Union had tabled a draft treaty banning all nuclear weapon + testing. Surely the Secretary was aware of it, and Gromyko would not repeat its + provisions. It was now before the appropriate international + organizations.

+

The Secretary said with respect to the two + treaties we had already signed, that, as he had indicated yesterday, he + had urged the Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee to take + positive action to ratify these treaties.A + day earlier, Vance had told + Brezhnev that the U.S. + was “moving promptly to secure Congressional ratification of the + Treaty on the Threshold Test Ban and the Treaty on Peaceful Nuclear + Explosions. What we accomplish during our meetings here would help + us in the ratification of those treaties.” This conversation is + printed in full in Foreign Relations, 1977–1980, vol. VI, + Soviet Union, Document 17. The Chairman had + indicated that he would take the necessary steps to move Congress to + act. In addition, the Administration will indicate its support for this + ratification, so as to assist in urging that Congress take prompt action + in the near future. The Secretary said he would be less than frank if he + did not tell Gromyko that there + will be some in Congress who will ask why these treaties should be + signed, in view of the fact that a comprehensive test ban treaty was + being urged by the Administration. The comprehensive test ban could be + strongly supported by the administration and he believed that this would + be an indication of our wish to cooperate with the Soviet Union and + strengthen our bilateral relations.

+

Gromyko + suggested that the Secretary explain to those who do not understand that + these agreements do not run counter or contradict the other one.

+

The Secretary said that we will argue that these + agreements are steps on the way to a comprehensive test ban.

+

Gromyko + said it would be good if progress were achieved. He would also point out + that their own instruments (national means) here in Moscow had so far + registered even weak explosions.

+

The Secretary was sure that our efforts to get + ratification would be aided if both our countries were clearly + cooperating toward achievement of a comprehensive test ban.

+

Gromyko + suggested that we not only cooperate on the technical aspects of + verifying peaceful nuclear explosions, but also make the cooperative + work much more intensive than it was now.

+

The Secretary said he found this idea very + interesting. He would point out, however, that we had grave concerns for + allowing exceptions for peaceful nuclear explosions. The reason for that + was that it was almost impossible to conduct peaceful explosions without + weapons-related benefits. Therefore, we favored elimination of all + nuclear explosions.

+ +

Gromyko + asked what exceptions the Secretary had in mind. After all, there were + provisions for verification. He would suggest that those who shouted the + loudest in the US be sent along as + observers on PNE verification + assignments.

+

The Secretary agreed that verification was one of + the matters that needed to be pursued further. However, experts in the + area said that even with verification it would be possible to develop + information that was contrary to a comprehensive test ban. Therefore, he + would suggest that we have our respective experts get together for + bilateral discussion of this subject in the near future.

+

Gromyko + did not believe there would be any insuperable obstacles in the way of + resolving this problem. One should not forget that all along in the + course of discussing these matters on a bilateral basis the Soviets had + proceeded from the premise that there was a significant difference + between weapons testing and PNE. It was + for this reason that they had signed the two treaties. He would suggest + to the Secretary that we should avoid taking any step that would turn us + backward. One could find skeptics on any question. He supposed one could + even find someone who would maintain that Earth was not turning around + the sun, but that it was the other way around.

+

Smirnov said that this was probably asserted by + those experts who did not want to see that kind of treaty signed. He + pointed out that this was a specific technical problem. “Let your + experts come and see, they could even take the top off the cylinder of + the explosive device to make sure that it was not a weapon.” (The + Secretary asked Gromyko if he + agreed; Gromyko did not + reply.)

+

Gromyko + said that, put in other words, the sooner the US Government obtained ratification of these treaties, the + better. If that were done, there would be nothing but applause for both + sides.

+

The Secretary said he would be happy to respond. + If we could agree upon a satisfactory CTB treaty, we would be very much in favor of signing it + with the Soviet Union, even though others did not sign it initially.

+

Gromyko + said that if the US was ready to accept + the idea in principle, he would suggest that the two sides agree to hold + bilateral discussions at the level of experts. He asked when the US would be prepared to begin.

+

The Secretary consulted with Mr. Warnke, who informed him that we could + do so very rapidly. He would accordingly inform Gromyko and would assure him that it + could be soon.

+

Gromyko + said that Mr. Warnke had given + the Secretary good advice. The Soviet side would await advice as to when + the experts would be ready.

+ +

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to a comprehensive test ban.]

+

BAN ON NEW WEAPONS SYSTEMS

+

Gromyko + said he would briefly touch upon a question the Secretary would be + familiar with—possible conclusion of a treaty or agreement on banning + new types of weapons or weapons systems of mass destruction. The Soviet + Union had raised this question in all seriousness some time ago. It had + hoped that the US would also emphasize + the importance of this question and would join in working on the + problem. From time to time, representatives of past administrations had + sporadically touched on this subject, perhaps sometimes at Soviet + initiative, at other times on their own accord, and had told the Soviet + Union of their views in this regard. An exchange of views had taken + place in the CCD in Geneva and in the + United Nations in New York, but these discussions had been of a very + general nature. At the same time, some serious discussions were held in + Geneva. At first, the US reaction had + consisted in asking the Soviets question after question and in evading + discussion of specifics. Gromyko + noticed that and had been amazed at such an approach. Then, probably + after those who had asked the questions realized that this could not go + on endlessly, another question was asked—what was meant by new types of + weapons systems? Soviet representatives found themselves forced to name + several such types, stating that theirs was by no means an exhaustive + list, and that representatives of all other countries were equally free + to name what they felt could be weapons of mass destruction. What + serious man could deny the existence of this serious problem? Should we + simply permit rocks to roll down the mountain without our doing anything + to stop them?

+

Surely we should attempt to take steps to restrain all countries from + developing new types of weapons of mass destruction; otherwise, + everything that had been accomplished; most notably in the field of + strategic arms limitation, would become worthless. If we were on the one + hand to attempt to limit strategic arms, while others produced new types + of weapons of mass destruction, this would be tantamount to the right + hand not knowing what the left hand was doing. He did not know whether + he had expressed his thoughts clearly, but it should be clear that the + United States and the Soviet Union should combine their efforts. If that + were done, other nations would join in, and that would benefit the + general cause of world peace and the peoples of our countries. Gromyko hoped the Secretary would not + think that the Soviet Union was pursuing some sort of advantage or + political capital in this. He thought that a solution that would benefit + all would be facilitated by developing cooperation between our two + countries, provided, of course, that the United States was interested + and willing. The Soviets would even be prepared to consider the question + of concluding separate + agreements banning the development and manufacture of radiological + weapons, taking into account the interest in this question which was + displayed by the US side. Repeated + contacts on this matter had already taken place. It had also been + discussed in the UN General Assembly. + This was a major question, one that had significance not only for today, + but also for the future.

+

The Secretary said he would respond briefly by + saying that we had found on the basis of experience that for arms + control agreements to be effective, they had to be precisely defined and + capable of verification. Quite frankly, we had problems with the Soviet + proposal because of its broad and general nature. It would be difficult + to deal with. However, we continued to be interested in banning specific + weapons categories, such as the radiological weapons Gromyko had mentioned.

+

Gromyko + said that when the US was ready to + engage in specific discussion of this concrete issue, it should inform + the Soviets accordingly. As for the Soviet draft treaty which appeared + to the Secretary to be general in nature, in the context of exchanges of + views already held at the level of experts, some specific information + was developed. He would suggest that the Secretary take a look at these + materials. Soviet experts had named some very specific weapons + categories. He would ask the Secretary to signal him when the + specialists were ready to exchange views.

+

PEACEFUL NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS

+

The Secretary agreed. He wanted to say before we + got too far away from the issues of non-proliferation and CTB, that agreement on a comprehensive + test ban without an exception for peaceful nuclear explosions would do + much to stop proliferation and discourage others from following India’s + example. He feared that if an exception were permitted for PNE, we would soon find other threshold + countries.

+

Gromyko + said the new treaty would require careful discussion and drafting but, + completely to preclude PNE—could that + really be done?

+

Smirnov said the time would someday come when + Americans, too, would realize the benefits of PNE for national economic purposes.

+

Soviet scientists had suggested using PNE to provide storage space for wastes and for other + purposes. He repeated his suggestion that an expert be assigned to + monitor a peaceful explosion for verification purposes. An expert could + always determine by examining the explosive device whether it was a + weapon or not. He pointed out that the Soviet Union had also made use of + conventional explosives for peaceful purposes. There were no technical + difficulties here, only a desire was needed for verification to be + effective.

+

Gromyko + recalled some films that had shown PNEs. Any expert who could not assure himself that an explosion + was not carried out for weapons + purposes either did not understand the subject or did not wish to see an + agreement of this sort. He recalled that a few years ago a + representative of the United States had talked with him about the + possibility of using PNEs to dig a new + Panama Canal. He asked if the US did not + expect that PNEs might be very + advantageous in the future.

+

The Secretary responded that he was familiar with + the suggestion for construction of a new Panama Canal. The project had + been examined in great detail and we had come to the conclusion that the + results of digging a canal in this manner would be unacceptable—PNEs would produce fallout dangerous to + people in the area. Consequently, the plans had been abandoned. We also + had acquired a great deal of experience in testing PNEs, but had concluded that such + explosions presented environmental dangers. We had also concluded that + the problem of weapons-related information were quite real. One of the + problems that arises with the weapons aspect was the fact that it would + be necessary closely to examine the explosive device itself. This + created many problems.

+

Gromyko + suggested that the Secretary inform him when the US side would be prepared to enter into discussions of all + the questions arising in this connection.

+

The Secretary agreed.

+

Gromyko + suggested that several groups of experts could examine the non-political + questions involved.Vance summarized this conversation + with PRC Ambassador Huang Chen on April 11. The + memorandum of conversation is printed in Foreign + Relations, 1977–1980, vol. XIII, China, Document + 25.

+

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to peaceful nuclear + explosions.]

+
+ +
+ + 154. Memorandum From the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament + Agency (Warnke) to the + President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)Source: Washington National Records Center, OSD Files: FRC 330–80–0017, Box 63, A–400.112 1977. Secret; + Restricted Data. + Washington, April + 29, 1977 + + SUBJECT + Proposed Underground US Nuclear + Weapons Test Program for the Second Half of Fiscal 1977 + +

With regard to the test program proposed by ERDASee Document 150. for the second half of Fiscal 1977, + I recommend:

+

1. a review of the present US policy for + tests near the 150 kiloton limit established by the Treaty on the + Limitation of Underground Nuclear Weapon Tests,Or the Threshold Test Ban Treaty (TTBT), signed by the U.S. and the + Soviet Union on July 3, 1974. For the text of the Treaty see Documents on Disarmament, 1974, pp. + 225–229. and deferral of a decision regarding REBLOCHON and + SCANTLING—the two proposed tests near this limit—pending the completion + of such a review. The current policy of allowing tests at design yields of up to 150 kilotons in face of + the actual yield limit of 150 kilotons specified + by the Treaty is defective because it allows tests with an unacceptably + high risk of violating the Treaty. A more prudent approach should be + adopted. The best approach appears to be limiting tests to devices + having a maximum credible underground yield no greater than 150 + kilotons;

+

2. an interagency study of the military utility and the arms control + implications of developing and deploying nuclear weapons with insertable + nuclear components, and, pending completion and review of this study, + deferral of a decision on the conduct of the KNIGHTHEAD test in support + of such development. I am concerned about the adverse aspects of this + technology with regard to:

+

(a) our non-proliferation and other arms control goals, since it would + lower and blur the nuclear threshold,

+

(b) the security against theft of the small and highly portable removable + nuclear components, and

+

(c) degradation of conventional capabilities if the weapon is to function + in this mode as well as in the nuclear mode;

+

3. deferral of a decision regarding BEAFORT and DANBO pending comments + and decision on the interagency study regarding the SM–2 called for in NSDM 341.The + Ford administration + issued National Security Decision Memorandum 341 on November 24, + 1976. (Ford Library, National Security Adviser, National Security + Decision and Study Memoranda, Box 1, NSDM 341) In light of Secretary Brown’s decision not to request the + ERDA to initiate a phase 3 program + this month,Not found. such a + deferral should not materially affect a future positive decision + regarding a nuclear warhead for SM–2. I am not persuaded by the ERDA representatives’ certification that + DANBO has significant technology implications over and above those + established for the SM–2 as a justification for carrying out this + test.

+ + Paul C. + Warnke + +
+ +
+ 155. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense Brown to the President’s Assistant for National Security + Affairs (Brzezinski)Source: Washington National Records + Center, OSD Files: FRC 330–80–0017, Box 63, A–400.112 + 1977. Secret; Restricted Data. + Washington, May 2, + 1977 + + SUBJECT + Underground Nuclear Weapons Test Program for the Second Half of + FY 1977 (FULCRUM II) (U) + +

(U) I have reviewed and approve the draft Memorandum for the President on + FULCRUM II.Not found. The + “Recommendations” section of the memorandum should reflect that:

+

—The Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff + recommend specific approval of the detailed test program for the second + half of FY 1977 (FULCRUM II) as proposed + by the Administrator of ERDA.Not found.

+

(SRD) If recommendations by the Secretary of State and the Director of + the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency are forthcoming as now reflected + in the draft memorandum, then I desire that the following comments be incorporated in the + Memorandum to the President:

+

—The DoD believes that current TTBT test policy correctly reflects + US obligations under the TTBT. Further, the policy provides an + opportunity for further review, as warranted, of each test near the + 150KT threshold prior to granting final detonation authority. The + proposed FULCRUM II tests are in accord with present test policy. We do + not concur that any tests be deferred on the basis of yet-undetermined + policy revisions. Doing so would be equivalent to unilateral assumption + of a lower threshold than agreed to by us or observed by the USSR.

+

—The proposed tests which ERDA has + designated as possible SM–2 warhead candidates should not be deferred or + deleted from FULCRUM II. As I indicated in my memorandum of April 6, + 1977, which accompanied the NSDM 341 + study, no decisions have yet been made with regard to warhead production + nor to request ERDA to initiate + engineering development of an SM–2 warhead. These issues are currently + being addressed within the DoD. + Deferral of these tests, one of which has significant warhead technology + implications, would unnecessarily foreclose on future DoD warhead options (not just for SM–2) + and will, in effect, prejudge the outcome of the SM–2 study.

+

—The insertable nuclear component (INC) test, KNIGHTHEAD, is designed to + establish the technical feasibility of the INC concept. The test should + not be deferred. While DoD has not + requested engineering development of INC for a specific system, the + concept remains of great interest for possible future warhead options. + The INC concept has the potential to provide enhanced nuclear safety and + warhead security with a reduction in operational costs.

+

(C) The ongoing CTB discussions make it + appropriate to move our testing program along, avoiding delays. Our + program should establish as many warhead options as possible should they + be required for our national security in the future. This does not imply + an accelerated test schedule, and I understand that the draft memorandum + does not propose one.

+ + Harold + Brown + +
+ +
+ + 156. Letter From the Acting Director of the Energy Research and + Development Administration (Fri) + to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)Source: Washington National Records Center, OSD Files: FRC 330–80–0017, Box 63, A–400.112 1977. Secret; + Restricted Data. Copies were sent to Warnke, Vance, Harold + Brown, Lance, + George Brown, and + Turner. A stamped + notation at the top of the first page reads “SEC DEF HAS SEEN.” + Harold Brown initialed + the top right-hand corner of the memorandum and wrote “5/10.” + + Washington, May 9, + 1977 + + Dear Dr. Brzezinski: + +

The Energy Research and Development Administration (ERDA) has reviewed the recommendations of + the Director, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, set forth in a + memorandum to you dated April 29, 1977.See + Document 154.

+

[Omitted here is a brief history of 1974–1976 deliberations on nuclear + testing.]

+

Redefining the yield upon which the threshold is based in the manner + recommended by ACDA would unilaterally + and significantly lower the yield threshold to which the United States + could test and would be asymmetrically unfavorable to the United States. + [2 lines not declassified] ERDA and DoD testing prior to the effective date of the Threshold + Test Ban Treaty was based on the ability to test up to a design yield of + 150 kilotons after this treaty was implemented. When testing at design + yields up to 150 kilotons, the potential excursions above 150 kilotons + are insignificant in comparison [4 lines not + declassified]

+

[4 lines not declassified] If the ACDA proposal of 150 kilotons maximum + credible underground yield were accepted, this development technique + could not be performed for certain weapon systems. [11 + lines not declassified]

+

With regard to ACDA’s comments + concerning insertable nuclear component (INC) warhead technology, the + concept of utilizing insertable components for safety and security + purposes is an old one. [2 lines not + declassified] The recent renewed United States interest in this + concept arises from both the added safety and security that could be + obtained from separable components and from the economic and operational + advantages offered by convertible weapons. A unilateral decision to + arrest the development of such warheads for United States use would in + no way impede Soviet use of this concept. [4½ lines + not declassified]

+ +

[1 paragraph (7 lines) not declassified]

+

Sincerely,

+ + Robert W. + FriPrinted from a copy + that bears Fri’s stamped + signature.Acting + Administrator + +
+ +
+ 157. Memorandum of ConversationSource: Department of State, Office of the Secretariat + Staff, Cyrus R. Vance, + Secretary of State—1977–1980, Lot 84D241, Box 10, NODIS Memcons, 1977. Secret. The meeting + occurred at 10 Downing Street. The memorandum of conversation is + scheduled to be printed in full in Foreign Relations, 1977–1980, vol. XXVII, + Western Europe. + London, May 9, + 1977 + + PARTICIPANTS + UK + Foreign Secretary Owen + Deputy Under Secretary Hibbert + Mr. Ferguson, Principal Private Secretary to the Foreign + Secretary + France + Foreign Minister De + Guiringaud + Political Director DeLaboulaye + Mr. Andreani, Director for European Affairs, Foreign + Ministry + FRG + Foreign Minister Gencher + State Secretary Van Well + Mr. Terfloth, Foreign Ministry Press Spokesman + Mr. Weber, Foreign Ministry Interpreter + US + Secretary of State Vance + Assistant to the President Brzezinski + Assistant Secretary Hartman + Mr. Hunter, NSC Staff + Mr. Dobbins (Notetaker) + +

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to a comprehensive test ban.]

+ +

Comprehensive Test Ban

+

DeGuiringaud said that this was a + subject of extreme sensitivity to France. While he understood the + American reasons for proceeding, among which was an effort to embarrass + the Soviets, he wished to reiterate what he had told VanceNot + found. and his President had told President Carter,Earlier that morning, Carter and Giscard had met at the French Ambassador’s residence + in London. Regarding a CTB, + Carter explained that + “we have called for a joint test ban with the Soviet Union, without + France or China for a period of 2–3 years. During that time, we + would like others to join. We have a few tests we would like to do. + The Russians do, too. We won’t permit a stop to military testing, + and let PNE’s go on, since there + really is no difference from this point of view. We will move as far + as the Soviets in reducing nuclear weapons, ending tests, and + limiting new systems. There has been great Soviet progress on design + and development of new weapons. He hoped we could get them to + reverse this process, and a test ban is part of it.” According to + the record of the conversation, Giscard replied that “some subjects should be saved + for the Four [UK, U.S., French, and + German talks].” (Memorandum of Conversation, May 9; Carter Library, + National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Meetings File, Box 75, + Subject: Box 1 (II)) The Carter-Giscard conversation is scheduled to be printed in + full in Foreign + Relations, 1977–1980, vol. XXVII, Western + Europe. which was that France could not envisage any + adherence to such a ban at this stage.

+

Owen said his government saw the + problems involved but would be willing to see a ban of U.S. and Soviet + tests and would like to be associated with the discussion. At the same + time, he said, his government recognized the French position and that of + China.

+

Vance said that one of the most + difficult issues in negotiating a comprehensive test ban with the + Soviets would be the issue of peaceful nuclear explosions. The U.S. had + indicated to the Soviets that it believed that a fundamental aspect of + such a treaty would be a ban on such explosions. There was not any way + to prevent the use of such explosions to develop military + technology.

+

DeGuiringaud wondered whether the + U.S. believed that nuclear explosions could serve any legitimate + non-military purpose. Vance + replied that the U.S. had given this considerable thought and study. + Extensive experiments had been conducted in the 1960s, under Project + Plowshare,Established in 1957 by + scientists at the Atomic Energy Commission and the University of + California’s Radiation Laboratory, Project Plowshare explored the + technical feasibility of using peaceful nuclear explosions for + industrial purposes. on both the technology and economics of + peaceful nuclear explosions. The results of these studies were quite + negative on both counts. He did not think that the Soviets had looked at + these problems. The U.S. was quite willing to share its data.

+

Owen suggested that perhaps states + such as France and China should be asked to accept a ban on peaceful + nuclear explosions without, initially, at least, necessarily associating + themselves with a comprehensive + test ban. This might help get the Soviets to accept a ban on peaceful + nuclear explosions.

+

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to a comprehensive test ban.]

+
+ +
+ 158. Memorandum From the Acting Director of the Arms Control and + Disarmament Agency (Keeny) to the + President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)Source: Washington National Records Center, OSD Files: FRC 330–80–0017, Box 63, A–400.112 1977. Secret. Copies + sent to Vance, Harold Brown, Lance, George Brown, and Turner. + Washington, May 18, + 1977 + + SUBJECT + The Meaning of “Yield” in the Treaty on the Limitation of + Underground Nuclear Weapon Tests + +

The May 9, 1977See Document 156. letter to you from the Acting + Administrator of ERDA regarding the + review of U.S. testing policy recommended by Mr. Warnke in his memorandum of April 29, + 1977See Document + 154. raises a number of questions which should be + part of the recommended review, and on which ACDA will defer further comment at this time.

+

The ERDA letter also raises a serious + question as to whether there is agreement between the United States and + the Soviet Union on the meaning of “yield” in the Treaty on the + Limitation of Underground Nuclear Weapon Tests. The letter implies that + an understanding exists between the United States and the Soviet Union + on the meaning of “yield” to the effect that the United States would + draw no distinction between “design” and “actual” yield. This Agency is + unaware of any communication by the United States to the Soviet Union or + of any agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union on this + subject.

+

The question of the definition of yield will presumably become public + during the pending Senate ratification hearings on this Treaty. If the + Soviet Union were to challenge the proposed “design” yield definition, + the United States could find itself in an embarrassing position since the ordinary meaning of + the term “yield” in the Treaty context would appear to be “actual” + yield.

+ + Spurgeon M. Keeny, + Jr.Acting + +
+ +
+ 159. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the + United KingdomSource: + National Archives, RG 59, Central + Foreign Policy File, D770212–0710. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Sent for information to + Moscow, USNATO, Bonn, Paris, the + Liaison Office in Peking, the Mission in Geneva, USUN, and Vienna. Drafted by Pierre + Corden (ACDA/MA); cleared by Homer Phelps (PM.DCA), Duff (ERDA), + Robert Squire (OSD), Frank Murphy + (JCS), John Marcum (NSC), and Lewis MacFarlane (S/S); and approved by Thomas Davies + (ACDA/MA). In a June 1 memorandum, Brzezinski informed Carter that British Prime Minister Callaghan had thanked the President + for allowing his government to participate in the CTB negotiations. At the bottom of the + memorandum, Carter wrote “I + see no reason for delaying Britain’s immediate involvement. Get + US & UK together before meeting with Soviets. J.” (Carter + Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 6, + Comprehensive Test Ban (CTB): + 3–12/77) + Washington, June 14, 1977, 2026Z +

137685. Exdis USSALT Two also for + Mission, USIAEA. Subject: US–UK Bilateral Discussions on Comprehensive + Test Ban. Ref: London 9656 (Notal).In + telegram 9656 from London, June 13, the Embassy requested a full + account of the CTB talks between + the United States and the United Kingdom which had been held in + Washington on June 3. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770210–0725) +

+

1. Summary. US and UK

+

On June 3 in preparation for forthcoming US–USSR and US–USSR–UK discussions on a + comprehensive test ban. Initial round will be between US and USSR beginning June 13, 1977. UK desires to be involved at earliest date possible and + will join with US and USSR after initial round. It was agreed + to continue US–UK bilaterals; next set is tentatively scheduled for last + week in June. The channel for all exchanges preparatory to this meeting + was agreed to be Edmonds for the UK side + and Davies for the US side. Press statement for release during or + after conclusion of US–USSR discussions was worked out on ad + referendum basis. UK + Del expressed general agreement with + tentative US position. End summary.

+ +

2. UK Delegation, consisting of John + Edmonds, FCO; Victor Macklen and Michael Harte, MOD; and Anthony Reeve and Drake Seager, UK Embassy, met on June 3, 1977 with a + US Delegation chaired by ACDA Assistant Director Thomas D. Davies. + The meeting covered a number of issues concerning the forthcoming + discussions with the USSR of a + comprehensive test ban.

+

3. Edmonds stated UK objectives for the + meeting as:

+

(A) To implement full support of President Carter’s objective of achieving a comprehensive test + ban;

+

(B) To agree on an appropriate time for the UK to join the US–USSR discussions beginning on June + 13;

+

(C) To get a fuller understanding of the substance and tactics of the + US position for the bilaterals + beginning on June 13;

+

(D) To ensure that the UK views are made + known for those bilaterals; and

+

(E) To seek agreement on a Western approach to negotiating a CTB.

+

4. Edmonds summarized UK + CTB position as follows:

+

(A) The UK has consistently supported an + adequately verified comprehensive cessation of nuclear explosions, + including nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes;

+

(B) The UK wishes to be fully associated + with the negotiation of such a ban, and therefore wishes to be brought + into the discussions at the earliest possible stage;

+

(C) A moratorium on testing is acceptable if it is in binding form and of + fixed duration, and is intended to lead to a CTB treaty;

+

(D) The timing of the beginning of a cessation of explosions is important + for the UK;

+

(E) Any security difficulties for the West need to be minimized; and

+

(F) The UK reserves the right to express + itself on any issue that is discussed bilaterally between the US and the USSR.

+

5. Davies said the US position had not + yet been established, but is likely to include the following points:

+

(A) A comprehensive cessation of nuclear explosions would be embodied in + a multilateral treaty, but would not require adherence of the PRC or France for entry into force;

+

(B) The treaty would prohibit nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes as + well as “weapons” tests;

+

(C) In addition to a “supreme interests” withdrawal clause there would + be, in connection with a Review Conference, a provision enabling parties + to withdraw after about five years;

+

(D) The US is considering verification by + national technical means, including for this purpose the UK seismic assets; by international + exchange of seismic data; by use of secure seismic instrumentation + within the USSR and US; and by some form of on-site inspection; + and

+

(E) After agreement is reached among the US, UK and USSR on key elements of a CTB treaty, these would be referred to the + CCD for elaboration in treaty form. Trilateral + consideration of a number of issues would continue among the US, UK and + USSR at the same time that + multilateral work was proceeding.

+

6. The US side made clear that the US position was still preliminary, in + particular with respect to what elements of verification would be + included in the negotiating position and what would be required in the + final analysis, and with respect to form and timing of a cessation of + testing.

+

7. Edmonds agreed that adherence of the PRC and France for entry into force of a comprehensive ban + was not necessary, and that the UK + envisions a multilateral treaty open to all nuclear and non-nuclear + weapon states. While such a treaty was being negotiated, a halt to + testing could be arranged by the US, + UK and USSR with an open invitation to France and the PRC to join. He thought the PRC was a problem for the USSR to handle, and that although the + UK position on adherence was in fact + the same with respect to the PRC and + France, the UK did not consider the + situation the same; i.e., it intended to establish some channel of + communications with the French on this subject. Davies agreed on + contacts with the French and added that such communications should be + low key, with no pressuring involved.

+

8. The US side asked what the UK had in mind regarding a binding + agreement for test cessation before the entry into force of a treaty + involving the non-nuclear weapon states. Edmonds said the UK envisions an interim treaty. The US side said it has in mind a more informal + arrangement (i.e., parallel announcements of intent), bearing in mind + that a formal agreement of the type described by the UK would, by law, require the approval of + Congress. It was left that these two possibilities could be the subject + of later discussions. The UK side was + asked whether there were any reasons that testing could not be halted + immediately. Macklen responded that, from the MOD point of view, they would like to complete one more + warhead test, which has now been moved up six months to March of 1978. + They are confident that they can meet this test date. However, the + UK side realized that a political + decision could be taken to end testing sooner, and it is prepared to + examine any date for a test cessation at the time the question + arises.

+

9. On nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes, Edmonds said the UK has no flexibility at all, the only + question being the tactical one of how and when this is made clear to + the USSR. The US side said it sees the prospect of a prohibition of + nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes, as well as weapon tests, as a + major opportunity to influence and constrain NPT holdout states. Edmonds agreed.

+

10. It was agreed in principle to have bilateral discussions before each + round of trilateral discussions, and to be flexible with regard to + subject matter (of both a technical and a “technical-political” nature) + for these meetings. Tentative + agreement was reached to have the next US–UK bilateral in + Washington the last week in June, with the agenda open. The channel for + all exchanges preparatory to the meeting was agreed to be Edmonds for + the UK side and Davies for the US side. The UK will join the US–USSR discussions at the beginning of the + second round.

+

11. The two sides agreed that the bilateral and trilateral talks would + proceed on a confidential basis, with no external observers present, and + that the Delegations should be kept small. It was also agreed that there + would be a series of meetings, with breaks in between whose length would + be established on an ad hoc basis. With regard to venue for the + trilaterals, there was discussion of Washington, London or neutral + cities such as Geneva or Vienna (see para 14 below). Chairmanship would be on a rotating basis. + Each party would keep its own records.

+

12. Edmonds said that the Prime Minister would like to announce the entry + of the UK into the discussions when this + takes place. For briefing NATO, + Edmonds said their present thinking is to tell NATO shortly before the Prime Minister makes his public + statement, with Paris and Bonn perhaps receiving earlier notification. + Davies suggested that, in general, NATO be provided joint briefings by the US and the UK as the discussions proceed.

+

13. Edmonds was given a list of the Soviet Delegation coming to + Washington for the US–USSR bilaterals and the UK Embassy has been given a list of the + US Delegation.

+

14. US and UK sides have subsequently agreed ad referendum to + following text of announcement to be issued during or after conclusion + of US–USSR discussions. Final UK + response is expected shortly, and USSR + is being consulted. Begin text: following exploratory consultations, the + US, the UK, and the USSR have + agreed to enter into discussions with a view to the negotiation of a + comprehensive test ban treaty. The first round of these tripartite + discussions will take place in Geneva beginning July 13, 1977. End + text.

+ + Christopher + +
+ +
+ + 160. Letter From the Acting Director of the Energy Research and + Development Administration (Fri) + to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)Source: Washington National Records Center, OSD Files: FRC 330–80–0017, Box 63, A–400.112 TEST BAN (Jan–July) + 1977. Secret. Harold Brown + initialed the top right-hand corner of the memorandum and wrote + “6/28.” + Washington, June + 24, 1977 + + Dear Dr. Brzezinski: + +

Subject: Preparations for Trilateral Comprehensive Test Ban + Negotiations

+

I understand that we have just completed exploratory bilateral + discussions with the Soviet Union on comprehensive test ban treaty + issues and that we are preparing for bilateral talks with the British + before entering into the trilateral negotiations. I wish to reinforce + Paul Warnke’s statement in + his 20 June reportNot found. to the + President on this subject that it is very important that we finalize our + U.S. negotiating position before the bilateral talks with the British. I + realize that you also are much aware of the urgency and are planning to + have an SCC meeting of agency + principals on this subject during the last week of June. It is for that + reason that I would like to register the ERDA position on the key CTB issues which are still being debated in varying degrees + between agencies.

+

PNE

+

You will recall our letter to you of February 17, 1977See Document 147. + on the PNE accommodation issue. This + continues to be a matter of primary concern to ERDA because of our strong convictions that there is no way + to preclude military benefits to any state allowed to conduct nuclear + explosions under a CTB regime. Our + concern in this matter has been reinforced by the efforts of the PNE oriented Soviet Delegation during the + recent exploratory talks. The Soviet exploratory proposals concerning + constraints on PNE device development + and standardization would not preclude large military benefits and would + not in fact prevent device design testing of key components and features + of nuclear explosives. The key test objective of determining yield would + remain uncontrolled and in any case the Soviet proposal would not + prevent the so-called standardized PNE + devices from being used as nuclear weapons against military targets. It + appears we should agree that there is no known way to accommodate PNE under a comprehensive test ban.

+ +

Verification

+

[1 paragraph (12 lines) not declassified]

+

There must be agreed and emplaced, the best possible verification system. + It must be capable of the highest degree of certainty that explosions + can be properly identified and categorized. This will require maximum + upgrading of our current National Technical Means in all possible test + environments. National means must be supplemented with the required + number of tamperproof seismic observatories to form an effective network + internal to the Soviet Union and rights must be provided to perform + mandatory on-site inspections which would act as an effective deterrent + to clandestine explosions. Even a few surreptitious, very low yield, + explosions could permit weapon design improvements and permit the + maintenance of high quality weapon design and design surveillance + teams.

+

Negotiating Tactics and Cessation of Testing

+

I remain concerned over the continuing trend in other agencies to + establish negotiating objectives designed to reach tactical agreement on + only the key elements of a CTBT and + take them into the CCD for development + of treaty text through multilateral negotiation, while, at the same + time, it is indicated that a cessation of testing or a moratorium could + be declared during such a multilateral negotiation.

+

It is our conviction that such an arrangement could lead to a cessation + of testing, under conditions and at a time, when it would not be + possible to verify that clandestine nuclear explosions are taking + place.

+

Certain member states of the CCD have + consistently maintained that national technical means alone will provide + adequate verification. This position was reestablished by the Soviet + Union during the exploratory talks. The Soviets and the Swedes have + already tabled draft treaty texts in the CCD to which the U.S. could not agree.Telegram 1281 from Geneva, February 22, contains + the Soviet draft text of a CTB. The + Soviets proposed that compliance would be verified by each + signatory’s “own national technical means of control, in accordance + with the generally recognized rules of international law.” (National + Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign + Policy File, D770061–0674) Telegram 1148 from Geneva, February 16, + contains the Swedish draft text of a CTB. The Swedes proposed that compliance would be + verified by “inspection on its territory or territory under its + jurisdiction, such inspection to be carried out in the manner + prescribed by the inviting party.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + D770055–0918) There is danger in involving the CCD too early. It is essential that the + U.S., UK, and USSR reach full agreement on the details of verification + prior to involving the CCD in + multilateral negotiation of a treaty text. In fact, if it is intended to + declare a cessation of testing concurrent with multilateral negotiations + in the CCD then it would be preferable + to refer a tripartite treaty text and protocol containing agreed-upon verification details to the + CCD for negotiation. This text + would be used as an interim treaty during any cessation of testing. I + understand that the UK Delegation urged + that we consider reaching a binding agreement before any cessation of + testing and that as indicated in the report to the President, Dr. + Morokhov, the head of the + Soviet Delegation, expressed his personal view that a moratorium during + multilateral negotiations could have the adverse effect of removing the + urgency of completing the treaty and cause other countries to hold back + because they already have a U.S.–USSR + cessation. I consider it essential that the detailed verification system + be installed and operating at the time any bilateral or trilateral + cessation of testing starts.

+

Duration

+

Finally, on duration of the treaty, it should be established that in + addition to the Supreme Interest withdrawal clause there should be a + provision establishing a Review Conference every five years with the + option to withdraw at that time.

+

I will be prepared to discuss these ERDA positions on the CTB + issues in greater detail during the forthcoming SCC meeting.

+

Sincerely,

+ + Robert W. + FriPrinted from a copy + that indicates Fri + signed the original.Acting + Administrator + +
+ +
+ + 161. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security + Affairs (Brzezinski) to President + CarterSource: Carter Library, National + Security Council, Institutional Files, Box 145, Folder 4, JEC IFG + [2] 7702109–7702951. Secret. Sent for action. Carter initialed the top of the + memorandum. + Washington, June + 28, 1977 + + SUBJECT + Underground Nuclear Weapon Test Program for the Second Half of + FY 1977 (FULCRUM II) + +

ERDA has requested approval of its + nuclear weapons test program for the second half of FY 1977 (FULCRUM II).

+

As proposed, FULCRUM II includes tests related to the development of + warheads for new strategic and tactical bombs, the M–X, cruise missile, + and improved eight-inch artillery shell and other tactical systems, + together with several related advanced development tests for R&D purposes. (An ERDA summary of FULCRUM II is at Tab + A.)Not attached. This program + was not designed to implement an accelerated test schedule, and it is + recognized that it might have to be modified or terminated depending on + your decisions regarding cessation of testing and negotiation of a + CTB agreement. All agencies agree + that FULCRUM II should be approved, subject to resolution of three + disputed issues:

+

Proximity of Test Yields to the 150 Kiloton + Threshold. The design yields of two tests in FULCRUM II are at + or near the Threshold Test Ban Treaty (TTBT) limit, and State and ACDA have recommended that you defer approval of these two + tests pending completion of a review of our policy regarding tests near + the 150 kt limit. Harold Brown + objects to deferral of these tests, arguing that our current testing + policy is consistent with our TTBT + obligations. He notes that this policy provides for further interagency + review, as warranted, of each test near the threshold prior to granting + final detonation authority.

+

This matter was exhaustively reviewed on an interagency basis under the + previous administration, and a testing policy was adopted which permits + ERDA to test at design yields up + to 150 kt by establishing stringent review procedures in order to reduce + the probability of actual yields in excess of this limit. (Additional + details are provided at Tab B.)Not + attached. We have reviewed this policy and feel that it + reduces this risk to an acceptably low level while ensuring against + asymmetries with regard to the Soviet testing program. This issue is + peculiar to a partial test ban, + and we see no purpose in reopening it at a time when our agencies should + be concentrating on negotiating a complete prohibition on testing. + Consequently, we recommend that you approve these tests.Carter + checked the “Approve” option and wrote “J” in the right-hand + margin.

+

Standard Missile-2 (SM–2). Two tests, BEAFORT and + DANBO, are related to development of a nuclear warhead for the SM–2, a + naval air defense system included in a counter to possible Soviet cruise + missile threats to our fleet. Originally, however, SM–2 was a tactical + ABM, and for this reason these + tests are opposed by ACDA and State—as + an unfortunate precedent undermining the ABM Treaty.

+

Harold Brown is in a bind. He + feels the SM–2 (designed in the mid 1960’s) is obsolete and has + indicated that he is not convinced that “the military value of the SM–2 + is worth the costs—financial, doctrinal and political.” He feels that + the high altitude cruise missile threat can be met quite well by other + systems. However, because of Navy pressure, he has gone along with + ERDA’s request for the tests to + keep options open should new studies change his mind. OMB objects on programatic grounds and + believes DOD should decide what it + wants before testing warheads.

+

Since the option to proceed with SM–2 will remain even without the tests, + and given the other considerations, we recommend deletion of the BEAFORT + and DANBO tests from FULCRUM II.Carter checked the “Approve” + option and wrote “deletion” next to it. He also wrote “J” in the + right-hand margin.

+

Insertable Nuclear Warheads. The final issue + concerns ACDA’s recommendation for + deferral of a test, KNIGHTHEAD, which is related to development of + insertable nuclear components for naval weapons. Defense opposes + deferral of this test, noting that it is of great interest for possible + future warhead options and could enhance nuclear safety and warhead + security with a reduction in operational costs. This concept would + permit storage of the nuclear components in a single area of a ship and + could effectively increase its conventional firepower since it would + permit conventional use of firing positions and magazine storage + currently reserved for nuclear weapons use. However, this development + would also make many conventional weapons into potentially nuclear ones. + This could have serious arms control implications since it would + complicate verification of any future limitations on nuclear weapons for + naval systems. As a result, ACDA has + recommended that you defer approval of KNIGHTHEAD pending an interagency + study of the military utility and arms control implications of + developing insertable nuclear components. We recommend that you approve the test but require the + study ACDA has requested prior to + eventual decision on production of such components.Carter + checked the “Approve” option and wrote “J” in the right-hand + margin.

+

[5 lines not declassified] They have made it + clear, however, that they strongly support your objectives and are + prepared to do without this test, if necessary. We recommend that you + approve this test subject to the conditions (treaty conformity, safety, + press arrangements, etc.) which have been agreed in our previous tests + of their devices.Carter checked the “Approve” + option and wrote “J” in the right-hand margin.

+

Neutron Weapons. As a final point you should be + aware that FULCRUM II includes proof tests of enhanced radiation + warheads for LANCE and a new eight-inch artillery shell. I recommend + that you permit ERDA to complete these + tests in order to maintain flexibility for your decisions on production + and deployment of these weapons in the context of a review of our + theater nuclear strategy.Carter checked the “Approve” + option and wrote “J” in the right-hand margin.

+

Subject to your decisions, I will prepare an appropriate memorandum to + the agencies concerned.

+
+ +
+ 162. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the + Soviet UnionSource: National + Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign + Policy File, D770237–0319. Secret; Exdis. Sent for information to all NATO capitals; the Secretary of + Defense; the U.S. Commander in Chief, Europe; the U.S. Naval + Military Representative to the Supreme Headquarters of the Allied + Powers, Europe, in Belgium; the Commander-in-Chief, Atlantic + Command, Norfolk; and the U.S. Liaison Office to the Supreme Allied + Commander, Atlantic, Norfolk. Drafted by Eric Newsom (EUR/RPM); + cleared by Homer Phelps (PM/DCA) and James Timbie (ACDA); and approved by James Thyden + (S/S). + Washington, July 2, 1977, 2054Z +

155109. Exdis—military addressees + handle as Specat Exclusive. Following NATO 06260 sent Action SecState June 30, 1977 repeated to + you. Quote. NATO 06260. Subject: + Warnke Briefing on CTB Discussion.

+

Summary: ACDA Director Warnke briefed the NAC June 27 on the June 13–16 US-Soviet + exploratory talks regarding comprehensive test ban, noting in particular + differences on PNEs, verification, and + duration. The text of this report has been approved by Mr. Warnke. Action requested: Suggest Department repeat to AmEmbassy + Moscow, all NATO capitals, and + appropriate military addressees. End summary.

+

1. Briefing on the US-Soviet exploratory discussions regarding a CTB, which took place in Washington June + 13–16, Warnke said the atmosphere + was cordial and positive. The talks were very preliminary, in + anticipation of US–UK–USSR + negotiations but were wide-ranging, covered key issues, and identified + five important problem areas:

+

A) While both sides agreed that a CTB + could make a real contribution to controlling the nuclear arms race and + to non-proliferation, the US referred to + them as “comprehensive nuclear test ban” talks and the Soviets referred + to them as talks on “a general and complete prohibition of nuclear + weapons tests,” the term used in the draft treaty submitted by the + Soviets to the CCD at Geneva.

+

B) While both agreed that the talks should be conducted in a manner that + would elicit maximum support from other countries, the Soviets wished to + work out substantially full text of a possible treaty in trilateral + talks. The US on the other hand wanted + to develop only the key elements in the trilateral talks and then to + elaborate a treaty in multilateral negotiations at the CCD.

+

C) The Soviets maintained that peaceful nuclear explosions (PNEs) are important to the Soviet economy, + that a ban on PNEs would be + inconsistent with Article 5 of the NPT, + and that technical means are available to insure that military benefits + are not derived from PNEs. The US on the other hand believed that a CTB must prohibit PNEs, and that no valid claim could be made that nuclear + parties to the NPT were practicing + discrimination by not providing nuclear technology benefits if they + themselves had concluded PNEs had no + such benefits and would be foregone. Not to prohibit PNEs, in the US view, would encourage proliferation and serve as a + pretext for other countries to emulate the example of India. The US believed that there is no technical way + to prevent either side from deriving military benefits from PNEs.

+

D) Regarding duration, the US and USSR agree that nuclear tests could be + suspended on a trilateral basis for a certain time. However, there are + differences regarding the length of time before withdrawal provisions + could be invoked. The US preferred a + longer period than does the USSR.

+

E) On verification, the Soviets stressed national technical means, + mentioned willingness to exchange seismic data, and also noted the + possibility of a type of voluntary on-site inspection by challenge, + whereby the challenged party could either agree to on-sites or take + action as it sees fit to satisfy the challenge.

+

2. In summing up, Warnke noted + that PNEs seemed to be the biggest + problem, that questions of verification remained to be worked out, and + that differences on duration did not appear to be insurmountable. + Trilateral CTB discussions, including + the UK, would begin on July 13 in + Geneva.

+

3. Pauls (FRG) asked whether the US + considered harmless or at least tolerable small-scale tests that could + not be detected by seismic methods. He also asked about the relevance of + Soviet interest in cratering + PNEs and about Soviet interest in + standardizing and harmonizing the design of devices for PNEs to facilitate verification. Svart + (Denmark) asked about the genuineness of Soviet interest in PNEs for the Soviet economy and possible + differences among USSR officials in + this area.

+

4. Warnke said a great deal of + work still had to be done before the US + could determine what would be satisfactory to verify a CTB. At the same time, verification had to + be considered from the standpoint of both a suspecting country and a + country that might be tempted to cheat. While the US was an open society, the Soviet Union + had the problem of potential defectors and would have to be extremely + cautious not to place itself in a position where there is even a small + chance of its being found undeniably to be cheating on a CTB agreement. He said the US had mentioned the possibility of + tamper-proof unmanned devices to improve seismic detection capabilities, + and would be exploring such possibility further with the Soviets. As to + the use of PNEs for cratering, + Warnke said the US believes that such use would be greatly + constrained by the Limited Test Ban Treaty, and this might gradually + limit Soviet interest in retaining PNEs + for cratering. The Soviets had expressed interest in standardizing + PNEs and foregoing any improvements + in devices used for PNEs, as well as in + facilitating on-site inspection and outside participation in all stages + of PNEs. Warnke acknowledged that there might be differences + among Soviet officials regarding the utility of PNEs, but added that the head of the Soviet Delegation + appeared to have a deep interest in PNEs. End text.

+

Bennett.

+

Unquote.

+ + Christopher + +
+ +
+ + 163. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security + Affairs (Brzezinski) to President + CarterSource: Carter Library, National + Security Council, Institutional Files, Box 20, PRM/NSC–38. Secret. + Sent for action. In the upper right-hand corner an unknown hand + wrote “All actions (Presidential annotations) completed per + D.A.” + Washington, July + 11, 1977 + + SUBJECT + Instructions for Trilateral CTB + Negotiations + +

Following our bilateral CTB discussions + with the British and Soviets, the SCC + has reviewed remaining issues in preparation for trilateral CTB discussions, which begin next + WednesdayJuly 13. in Geneva. + This session is expected to last about two weeks, and there is general + agreement that we should continue the exploratory approach you + authorized for our bilateral talks,Not + found. deferring firm decisions on verification and + moratorium questions pending further exploration of Soviet flexibility + on these issues.

+

This is particularly important in the verification area since we believe + we should determine essential verification objectives and insist on + accomplishing them, rather than using verification as a bargaining chip. + If we establish excessive verification goals which would be relaxed in + subsequent negotiation, we run the risk of generating criticism as to + the adequacy of the agreement in a crucial area.

+

We have prepared a proposed letter from you to Paul Warnke at Tab A which is + consistent with this approach and with your marginal comments on + Warnke’s recent CTB report.Not found. You may wish to give it to him at your meeting on + Monday.July 18.

+

In addition, Harold Brown would + like to add the proviso that we should reach agreement with the Soviets + on verification before we would agree to a moratorium or a suspension of + tests. State, Paul Warnke and I + believe that in this exploratory stage when we do not yet have an + official Soviet reaction on the question of a moratorium, it is + premature to begin imposing conditions. We have not even decided we want + one.

+

We believe you should keep your options open and reach a judgment on this + question in the context of deciding on our overall position. + Accordingly, the letter to Paul + would have him stress the importance of verification but make no linkage one way or another + to a moratorium. If you would like Harold’s condition included in the + letter, we will revise it.

+

_____ leave as isCarter checked the “leave as is” + option and wrote “But emphasize verification.” An unknown hand wrote + “Done” in the right margin.

+

______ revise

+

The other issues covered in Paul’s + instructions enjoy a consensus in the SCC, at least at this stage.

+

Political Aspects. The Soviets can be expected to + take advantage of any opportunities to use the CTB to drive a wedge between us and the Chinese and, to a + lesser degree, the French. This is what lies behind their suggestion of + an agreement that would expire after 18 months if France and China do + not join. In view of the difficulties such a guillotine approach could + generate, particularly as we try to normalize relations with Peking, we + recommend that Paul Warnke be + instructed to probe Soviet views more vigorously on this issue in the + trilateral talks.At the end of this + paragraph, Carter wrote “We + need 3 years.”

+

Moratorium. Soviet Delegation Chairman Morokhov did not have instructions on + this issue when Warnke raised it + with him last month, and Paul is + instructed to pursue it without commitment and subject to your decision + (above) on linking it to verification.

+

Relationship to CCD + and SALT. The Soviets were + not very receptive to our approach of asking the Conference of the + Committee on Disarmament (CCD) to + negotiate the CTB treaty text as soon + as trilateral agreement is reached on so-called “key elements.” However, + since CCD involvement would be helpful + in enhancing widespread adherence to the treaty, we recommend that we + continue exploring this approach, but indicate that we would want full + elaboration of all issues of national security importance prior to + placing the negotiations before the CCD.At the end of this + paragraph, Carter wrote “I’m + not sure about this. Cy should get PRC opinion on worldwide approach—informally from + Huang.” An unknown hand + wrote “Done” in the right-hand margin.

+

We are also concerned about the linkage between CTB and SALT. The + relationship of these two efforts will need to be considered in the + context of possible expiration of the Interim SALT Agreement,The SALT I Interim Agreement, signed in + Moscow on May 26, 1972, was scheduled to expire on October 3. + but we recommend that Warnke keep + the trilateral CTB discussions (and + delegations) separate from the SALT + and CCD discussions at this point.

+

Soviets Statements on PNEs. The Soviet suggestion on PNE verification could substantially + reduce the military risks in permitting PNEs, but a treaty allowing any PNEs would lose much of its + non-proliferation value. Since there is still a possibility that the + Soviets eventually will yield on this issue, we recommend that we + continue to press hard at present for a ban on PNEs while remaining attentive to Soviet ideas on PNE verification.

+

On-Site Inspection (OSI). Although OSI would have little technical verification value, a + provision in the CTB treaty for on-site + inspection is believed to have considerable political value. The Soviets + have offered a voluntary provision, and there is general agreement that + we should attempt to buildCarter corrected the spelling of + the world “built” here by writing a “d” over the “t.” on this + provision with the objective of obtaining the strongest possible + commitment from them in this area. We recommend that Warnke explore alternative formulations + with this objective in mind prior to determination of our negotiating + position.

+

Black Boxes. Our recommendation is that Warnke should continue at present to + explore black boxes with the Soviets but that the SCC should more exhaustively explore their + cost and utility, possible offsetting improvements in our national + means, and the practicality of evasion scenarios, prior to making a + final decision.At the end of this + paragraph, Carter wrote + “Check w/ Press.” An unknown + hand wrote “Done” in the right-hand margin.

+

The Next Stage

+

We anticipate that the principal outcome of this next round of + exploratory talks may be a decision to begin formal trilateral + negotiations. We can handle this in a way that either maximizes or + minimizes the political impact. Paul will seek instructions on this point.

+

RECOMMENDATION:

+

That you sign the instruction letter to Paul + Warnke at Tab A.

+ +

Tab A

+

Letter From President Carter to the Director of the Arms Control and + Disarmament Agency (Warnke)Secret.

+

Washington, + July 11, 1977

+

To Paul Warnke

+

In the trilateral CTB discussions which + begin on July 13, I want you to continue the exploratory approach that I + outlined in my letter of June 13,Not + found. with the following specific objectives:

+

—Explore Soviet views on the political aspects of a CTB, with particular emphasis on avoiding + a participation and review formulation that would be contrary to our + bilateral interests with France and the People’s Republic of China. You + may indicate that a shorter duration of perhaps three or four years + would be acceptable if a satisfactory approach on this issue can be + worked out.

+

—Determine whether the Soviets have an official response to your + exploratory question regarding the desirability of suspending nuclear + explosions at an early stage of the negotiations. I will want to review + their response before making a decision on this issue.

+

—Indicate that in the US view, we should + reach full agreement trilaterally on all issues of national security + significance, before forwarding these key elements to the Conference of + the Committee on Disarmament for negotiation of a complete treaty + text.

+

—Continue to stress the importance the US + attaches to adequate verification. In this context you should:

+

Reaffirm the US position that PNE’s should not be permitted under a + CTB, and comment on Soviet PNE verification proposals.

+

Express the view the installations of internal networks of secure + seismometers in the US and USSR could contribute to increased + confidence in compliance with a CTB and + seek Soviet views on that matter.

+

Explore alternative formulations to the Soviet on-site inspection + proposal, with a view toward trying to get as strong a commitment from + them as possible, and indicate that all rights and functions of the + inspection teams should be agreed explicitly.

+

The SCC will continue its analysis of + our CTB verification capability and + requirements. I will want to review this analysis and the results of + your discussions before making further decisions on these issues.

+

Depending on the course of your exploratory discussions, I would be + prepared to enter into formal trilateral negotiations for the + development of a comprehensive ban on nuclear explosions. You should + consider this issue with + the British and the Soviets and seek instructions on the substance and + timing of any announcement.

+

I am encouraged by the progress you have made and want you to continue to + devote high priority to this effort. In this regard, you should ensure + that our CTB discussions proceed + separately from the ongoing SALT + negotiations and the meetings of the Conference of the Committee on + Disarmament in order to ensure adequate emphasis on this objective.

+

Sincerely,

+ + Jimmy + Carter + +
+ +
+ 164. Memorandum From the President’s Deputy Assistant for National + Security Affairs (Aaron) to Vice + President Mondale, Secretary of + State Vance, and Secretary of + Defense BrownSource: Carter Library, National + Security Affairs, Staff Material, Agency File, Box 1, Arms Control + and Disarmament Agency: 1–7/77. Secret. Copies were sent to + Press, Warnke, George Brown, Turner, and Fri. + Washington, July + 19, 1977 + + SUBJECT + SCC Work Program for + Comprehensive Test Ban (CTB) + Discussions + +

The SCC Working Group should continue + its review of verification issues, taking into account developments in + the ongoing trilateral CTB discussions, + with the following specific tasks:

+

—By August 1, prepare an analysis of the incremental contribution of + unmanned seismic stations to our national technical means, beginning + with an analysis of the cost, location and contribution of one station + or array, and including increasingly larger numbers of stations and + arrays as appropriate.

+

—By August 1, prepare an analysis of the technical feasibility, utility, + risks and costs of CTB evasion + scenarios. This analysis should include an evaluation of the + implications of the improved method for estimating the yield of nuclear + explosions from seismic data.

+

At the request of the President, Frank + Press will establish an ad hoc + scientific group to review and evaluate the responses to the above tasks + prior to their consideration by SCC.

+

In addition, the SCC Working Group + should:

+ +

—By August 15, prepare a safeguards plan concerning measures that could + be taken under a CTB to adequately + maintain our nuclear weapons design capability and the reliability of + our stockpiled weapons, and to ensure readiness to resume nuclear + weapons testing, if necessary. This should include an analysis of the + facility and test site maintenance that would be required, and the types + of experiments that might be conducted under a CTB.

+

—By August 15, review our current and planned national technical means, + including options for further improvements, and develop a proposed + interagency management plan to ensure the effective utilization of all + government resources in monitoring a CTB agreement.

+ + David + Aaron + +
+ +
+ 165. Memorandum From the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament + Agency (Warnke) to President + CarterSource: Carter Library, National + Security Affairs, Staff Material, Agency File, Box 1, Arms Control + and Disarmament Agency: 8/77–2/78. Secret. + Washington, August + 1, 1977 + + SUBJECT + Report on Trilateral Consultations on a Comprehensive Test + Ban + +

We have recently concluded two weeks (July 13–27) of consultations with + the Soviets and British in Geneva on the question of a comprehensive + test ban. This initial round of trilaterals, like the bilateral + discussions held in Washington with the Soviets in June,See Document 159. + was exploratory and somewhat tentative in nature. Nonetheless, the three + delegations proceeded quickly beyond a general discussion of objectives + and negotiating procedures to an intensive and highly purposeful + exchange of views on the major substantive issues.

+

The question of peaceful nuclear explosions (PNEs) was clearly the dominant issue of the round, and the + one which U.S. and Soviet positions diverged most sharply.The Soviet position is discussed in telegram 6401 + from Geneva, July 28; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + D770271–0123. The Soviets devoted most of their energies to + making their case for a PNE exception, + and were reluctant to deal with other matters in comparable detail. All + three Delegations presently regard the PNE issue as, by far, the most serious obstacle to an + agreement. It could also become a critical bottleneck, with the Soviets unwilling to adjust their + positions on less central matters until the PNE issue is resolved.

+

Despite the concentration on PNEs, the + initial round gave us an opportunity to probe Soviet thinking on the + other substantive matters covered in your instruction letter of July + 11,See Tab A, Document 163. including such verification measures + as secure, internal seismic networks and on-site inspections as well as + such political/legal issues as the adherence requirement for entry into + force, duration, and withdrawal provisions. Although the Soviets + consistently stood by the provisions of their draft CTB treaty covering these matters, the + consultations gave us a better impression of where they may eventually + be flexible.

+

The British were a positive factor in the talks, reinforcing our + positions effectively on key matters while taking exception with us + infrequently and only on minor issues. The Soviets see this as a + two-sided negotiation which, with the convergence of U.S.–U.K. positions + and close coordination between the U.S. and U.K. Delegation,The U.S.–UK + discussions held before the trilateral talks are reported in + telegram 172338 to London, July 22; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + D770263–1012. it really is.

+

Both the British and the Soviets expressed reluctance to accept our + suggestion that the first round of formal negotiations be held in London + this Fall. They both expressed a preference for Geneva on the ground + that their facilities in Geneva were more adequate for their + purposes.

+

The three Delegations have agreed to resume the trilaterals in Geneva on + October 3 and to remain in close contact during the interval preceding + the next round.

+

The following is a summary of the major issues covered during the initial + round of trilaterals.

+

Peaceful Nuclear Explosion

+

Discussions on PNEs focused on two + principal questions; whether it is possible to carry out PNEs without + acquiring military benefits and whether non-proliferation objectives + would best be served by a PNE ban or a + PNE accommodation.

+

On the first question, we explained in detail our position that PNEs would inevitably provide military + benefits, no matter how intrusive the arrangements designed to constrain + those benefits. In this connection, we pointed out that a PNE program: would (a) provide the + infrastructure to the state carrying out the program to maintain + personnel and facilities specialized in the design, fabrication, and use + of nuclear explosives at a substantially higher level of competence and + readiness than would be the + case if all nuclear explosions were banned; (b) provide information on + the effects of nuclear explosions that would assist in the design and + protection of weapon systems; and (c) facilitate assessments of the + reliability of a state’s stockpile of nuclear weapons, whose explosive + design features could parallel or be identical to design features of the + explosives used in the PNE program. In + addition, we indicated that we were unaware of any reliable means of + verifying that design improvements were not being introduced while + conducting PNEs, but emphasized that, + even if device standardization could be guaranteed, this would not + eliminate the other military benefits enumerated above.

+

The Soviets, however, took a more narrow view of military benefits, + claiming that such could be precluded by freezing explosive device + design and by prohibiting diagnostic measurements of explosions and by + verifying that each device used in the PNE program conformed to certain specified parameters (in + this connection, mentioning as examples total yield, fission yield, and + the ratios of amount of selected radioactive debris products). Morokhov, head of the Soviet + Delegation, repeatedly sought to draw us into a technical examination of + how device improvement could be effectively precluded. We resisted those + efforts, indicating that we did not consider it promising to get + involved in the technical consideration of proposals which, even if + feasible and practicable, did not even purport to deal with a number of + important military benefits (e.g., maintenance of nuclear explosive + device “infrastructure”) that we had identified. It should be noted that + their proposals as stated would not assure that some device development + was not being carried out.

+

On non-proliferation, the Soviet side contended that a ban on all nuclear + explosions would be resisted by non-nuclear weapon states wishing to + receive the benefits of PNE technology + and would give some of those states the excuse that only indigenous + nuclear explosive development would enable them to realize those + benefits. On the other hand, we maintained that non-nuclear weapon + states have showed little interest in PNEs, and that a number of + critical states that have not joined the Non-Proliferation Treaty would + almost certainly reject a discriminatory agreement which permitted only + existing nuclear powers to carry out nuclear explosions.

+

It is still difficult to predict how firmly the Soviets will maintain + their position on PNEs. Morokhov, who represents the Soviet + agency responsible for PNEs, has + certainly made every effort to demonstrate inflexibility. He has claimed + that all Soviet government agencies are agreed on the need to preserve + PNEs, that the USSR cannot afford to give up a + technology that will make a major contribution to the national economy, + and that there will be no CTB treaty + without PNEs. The question remains, + however, whether the Soviet political leadership will permit the alleged potential benefits + of PNEs to stand in the way of an + objective to which the Soviets have long been committed and which could + have important effects on U.S.-Soviet relations as well as global + non-proliferation efforts. Interestingly, the Soviet military Delegate + volunteered to our military Delegate informally that military benefits + would accrue from PNEs, albeit he + minimized their importance. It is also interesting that the Ministry of + Foreign Affairs representatives on the Soviet Delegation, when asked + this question, do not attempt to defend the Soviet PNE position, but rather say that the + issue will have to be resolved at the highest levels.

+

Our overall impression is that the Soviet government has not made the + political decision to press ahead with PNEs at the cost of abandoning a CTB. However, it is clear to us that it will be futile to + try to resolve the issue of PNEs solely + in the context of the trilateral negotiations. Our case will have to be + presented at a higher political level. Cy + Vance’s meeting with Gromyko in early September would provide a good + opportunity to demonstrate our firmness on the issue and to appeal to + U.S.-Soviet interests that transcend the possible economic value of + PNEs.

+

Verification

+

Our presentations on verification were devoted mainly to outlining, and + seeking Soviet reactions to, our ideas on the installation of secure + seismic stations on U.S. and Soviet territory, and to calling for a + stronger position on on-site inspections than the one contained in the + Soviet draft treaty. On the question of internal seismic stations, the + Soviet side expressed the view that such supplementary verification was + unnecessary in view of the adequacy of national technical means. This + response, however, was tentative and far from a categorical rejection. + They maintained, for example, that the U.S. side had failed so far to + submit sufficiently convincing technical arguments for internal + stations. They did, however, exhibit a good bit of interest in the + technical details we presented. The Delegation has the impression that + the Soviets ultimately will be prepared to accept some number of secure + stations on their territory—although we would not expect them to show + flexibility on this point until the PNE + issue is resolved.

+

With respect to on-site inspections, we pressed the Soviets to go along + with the idea that, once an inspection visit is authorized, the rights + and functions of observers should not be left to ad + hoc determination, but should instead be explicitly agreed upon + in advance in an annex or protocol to the treaty. Although the Soviet + Delegation was not prepared to say so formally, we received informal + indications that such a detailed annex or protocol would ultimately be + acceptable. However, the Soviets continued to emphasize the importance + they place on the “principle of voluntariness,” which, as contained in + the Soviet draft treaty, + provides for on-site inspection only if the party suspected of a + violation agrees on the need for an inspection.

+

Entry into Force and Withdrawal

+

The Soviets continued to support the provisions in their draft treaty + which requires adherence by all nuclear powers before entry into force. + They also reiterated their suggestion that, upon signature of a CTB treaty with such an entry into force + provision, the U.S., U.K., and U.S.S.R. should suspend testing for 18–24 + months. If by the end of that period the requirement for entry into + force of the treaty was not met, the three would be free to resume + testing.

+

We pointed out that the Soviet idea was counter-productive in terms of + the objective of encouraging all nuclear powers to join a CTB, that the scheme would at best result + in a short hiatus in US–UK–USSR + testing, and that it would not as effectively constrain non-nuclear + weapons states not party to NPT from + developing an indigenous nuclear explosive capability. We suggested + instead a treaty that would enter into force without adherence by all + nuclear powers, but would provide for the right to withdraw after about + five years. From several discussions with the Ministry of Foreign + Affairs representatives on the Soviet Delegation, we have the clear + impression that the Soviets will eventually be able to accept something + along the lines of our proposal.

+

Moratorium

+

As instructed in your July 11 letter, I followed up on the exploratory + question I had raised with Morokhov during the June bilateral meetings about the + desirability of suspending nuclear explosions at an early stage of the + negotiations. In a meeting of the heads of the two Delegations, he again + maintained that such a moratorium would serve no useful purpose, but + might instead remove incentives for completing the negotiations and + could thus delay their conclusion. He went on, however, to state + somewhat cryptically that others might decide on a moratorium + “unconnected with the treaty.” I would suggest that we hold off on the + question of a moratorium at the Delegation level until such time as we + have reached trilateral agreement on the key elements of a CTB treaty. At that time, the Soviets are + likely to see the matter in a different perspective.

+ + Paul C. + Warnke + +
+ +
+ + 166. Memorandum From Secretary of State Vance and the Director of the Arms Control and + Disarmament Agency (Warnke) to + President CarterSource: Carter Library, National + Security Affairs, Staff Material, Agency File, Box 1, Arms Control + and Disarmament Agency: 8/77–2/78. Secret; Nodis. The memorandum was attached + to a September 15 covering memorandum from Brzezinski to Harold Brown and Fri which asked for their comments + by September 20. In the upper right-hand corner of Brzezinski’s memorandum, Brown wrote “9/16. MSH—I think it + improper that we are given 2 days to comment on a memo 10 days old. + Perhaps this is [illegible] one I should [illegible] to ZB’s + attention. (perhaps [illegible] a cover [illegible]). HB.” Next to Brzezinski’s signature, Brown also wrote “Walt—I have read + the memo for President, only scanned Tab A. This seems to + [illegible] one of the better efforts. What does Gerry [illegible] think? HB.” + Washington, September 6, 1977 + + SUBJECT + Proposed Strategy for CTB + Negotiations + +

General Approach

+

The strategy suggested in this memorandum has two basic purposes:

+

—Accelerating the shift to concrete negotiation of + practical solutions with the Soviets;

+

—Increasing Soviet receptivity to sound solutions + which will be advantageous over the long haul.

+

We believe we can now foresee the general shape of desirable, and + possibly negotiable, outcomes on the three major issues—peaceful nuclear + explosions, verification, and participation by France and China. + Moreover, we can credibly portray these solutions as genuinely taking + into account the viewpoints of both sides. To give these approaches the + maximum weight possible, and to ensure that they are given serious + high-level consideration in Moscow, we recommend that you approve our + giving the attached draft memorandum (Tab A)Attached but not printed. to Dobrynin, for transmission to senior levels in Moscow, + as an authoritative statement of U.S. views and proposals.

+

Realistically, such a memorandum may not persuade the Soviets to see all + the issues our way because, in fact, we are addressing problems of great + complexity and sensitivity. But the prospects of it bringing the two + sides closer together quickly are great enough, in our judgment, to + warrant the effort. Moreover, such an initiative would, in the broadest + perspective, be consistent with our basic strategy of stimulating + productive negotiations with the Soviets on an important arms control subject—particularly + since more time may be required for meaningful progress on SALT.

+

Where We Stand

+

A report on the last round of consultations is attached (TAB B).Not attached. We would add the + following comments regarding the present situation:

+

—We are now at an important moment of opportunity. + Neither side has locked itself into unbudgeable positions. Even on PNEs, + the Soviets are groping for ideas to make their approach workable.

+

—But much depends on us. The Soviets, in our + judgment, have not thought through the issues as well as we have. + Well-reasoned and fair proposals given to the Soviets soon could make a crucial difference in whether we drift into + stalemate or whether we lead the negotiations towards early concrete + progress.

+

—The senior political levels on the Soviet side should + now be engaged. We have had good exploratory discussions with + the Soviets. But these have been somewhat unusual in being dominated by + a head of Delegation who is primarily a technical official and—as the + head of the Soviet Government’s PNE + program—one who has an understandably strong personal interest in this + particular issue. This could result in undue emphasis on preserving + PNEs, and also, conceivably, failure to convey to us fully Soviet + feelings on such sensitive political issues as the Chinese participation + problem.

+

—The timing for the next round is favorable for U.S. + leadership efforts. If we can get the major lines of our + approach to the Soviets soon, they will have several weeks to think + through the problems. They will naturally already have before them an + account of the arguments we presented during the last round. If we + waited until October to begin suggesting approaches for reconciling our + differences, we might find the Soviets arriving in Geneva with little + flexibility. An early presentation at a high level could have maximum + impact in getting the two sides lined up in the same general direction + on key issues. And this, of course, is a necessary precondition to + meaningful negotiation of precise language on key issues. The deputy + Soviet representative told us at the end of the last round that he hoped + “political decisions” might be made before October.

+

Nature of Proposed Memorandum for Dobrynin

+

In preparing the proposed draft, we have kept several basic + considerations in mind:

+ +

—We have concentrated on the individual merits of each of the three main issues—portraying our approach in each + case in terms of a middle ground or a solution which serves both sides’ + basic purposes. We want to avoid a situation of appearing merely to + request three things from the Soviets so that, if they give us something + on one of the issues, they can claim that we owe them on the others.

+

—We have framed the arguments so that we would be mainly exploring and + advocating key purposes and approaches, rather than presenting detailed + formulae. This will permit flexibility and room for maneuver if the + Soviets should develop variants or alternatives that have some + merit.

+

—Finally, we have framed the positions in the memorandum having in mind + that these should be reasonable and attractive enough to stick with for + some time if the Soviets do not come around sufficiently. We will, of + course, always retain the privilege of reassessing any specific elements + whenever circumstances seem to warrant.

+

Peaceful Nuclear Explosions

+

It seems to us important that we do our best now to get the Soviets away + from insistence on permitting peaceful nuclear explosions. On the + merits, we believe our position of seeking to halt all nuclear + explosions is right, and we should do everything reasonable to see that + our arguments are considered at a high political level. But, as we + indicated, given the personal stake of the Soviet Delegation head in his + country’s PNE program, we cannot be + certain that our arguments have been fairly reported up the line in the + Soviet bureaucracy.

+

The main points we should continue to stress are these:

+

—A PNE program requires an + infrastructure of test-experienced nuclear explosive designers, + manufacturing and testing facilities, and the opportunity for testing + which would support reliability estimates of the weapons stockpile. We + believe there is no way to exclude these significant military benefits + from such a program. Therefore, if PNEs + were permitted now under a CTB, + whatever the effort at inspection, we would almost certainly find + ourselves and the Soviets competing with PNE programs in which both of us, sooner or later, would be + trying to derive as much military benefit as possible. It would simply + be imprudent for either of us not to do so if the other side was + conducting PNEs. Others would recognize what was taking place. Much of + the value of a CTB would be lost.Brown + wrote a check mark to the right of this paragraph.

+

—Permitting PNEs under a CTB would, overall, have a negative impact + on our current non-proliferation efforts. It would perpetuate the rationalization that there is a + valid reason for others to develop their own nuclear explosive devices. + Incidentally, an encouraging report has recently come in from Joe + Nye’s consultations in + India:In telegram 1848 from Bombay, + August 2, the Consul reported that Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi + “needed strong justification for giving up his freedom of action” on + the issue of PNEs “and said that an + agreement between the US and the + USSR to give up PNEs under the CTB would help.” (National Archives, + RG 59, Central Foreign Policy + File, D770276–0753) senior Indian officials indicated their + opinion that it would be helpful to the Prime Minister if the U.S. and + the USSR agreed to forego PNEs in a CTB.Brown wrote a check mark to the + right of this paragraph.

+

To make our presentation as effective as possible, we are suggesting that + we include in the memorandum a significant new element which can + credibly be portrayed as responding to Soviet concerns. This is the + suggestion that the treaty, instead of banning PNEs outright and forever, could reflect that the parties + would keep under continuing review whether the military benefits of + PNEs can be eliminated. However, + PNEs would not be allowed unless + and until mutually acceptable agreement were worked out. This approach + could be a significant face-saving device for the Soviets, particularly + if the preamble reflected that the treaty did not preclude forever such + possible economic benefits from PNEs as + might be realized. This formulation would avoid making the past Soviet + investment in its PNE program look like + a complete waste. As a possible further inducement to the Soviets, we + could offer to discuss with them our experience in developing + large-scale conventional engineering techniques which have made PNE possibilities look even less + attractive than earlier.Brown wrote a check mark to the + right of this paragraph.

+

By suggesting deferral as a way out, we would also be meeting one Soviet + point which may have some validity; it is probably true, as the Soviets + argue, that a fair number of non-nuclear countries would take some + comfort in the idea that we were keeping open a possibility of using + PNE technology for everyone’s + benefit, even if that were a distant and uncertain prospect.

+

One final point—if we are looking for an acceleration of productive + negotiations, it would not be promising to pursue the Soviet position of + permitting PNEs with inspection. Wholly + aside from the fact that such inspection would not eliminate military + benefits, it would precipitate an extremely difficult and time-consuming + negotiation. The inspection procedures would undoubtedly be highly + contentious, requiring agreement on technical definitions and detailed + provisions regarding such factors as access, sampling, device design and + emplacement. This task, involving negotiation of inspection procedures + to try to minimize military benefits, would be far more demanding than + was the negotiation of + inspection provisions for the PNE + Treaty of 1976 which involved only procedures to confirm that individual + explosions did not exceed the 150-kiloton threshold. Even so, + negotiation of the inspection provisions for the PNE Treaty required most of two years.

+

For all these reasons, we believe we can best serve our interest in + moving rapidly toward negotiations and the prospect of sound results by + pressing the Soviets at the highest level to forego a PNE exception in the CTB treaty, while offering them a + significant face-saving element—deferral rather + than permanent prohibition of PNEs. One possible straw in the wind: a + Soviet military official commented to one of our Delegation officers in + Geneva that the PNE issue might be like + the XVIII Amendment to the U.S. Constitution—drinking was banned but + later permitted by further amendment.Brown lined through the + sentence “One possible straw in the wind: a Soviet military official + commented to one of our Delegation officers in Geneva that the + PNE issue might be like the + XVIII Amendment to the U.S. Constitution—drinking was banned but + later permitted by further amendment.” In the right margin he wrote + an arrow and said “I agree fully with the position proposed by + US, but not with the Sov officer’s analogy.” In the left + margin he wrote “take out.”

+

Verification

+

The elements of a reasonable verification package might also now be + pressed on the Soviets. We could pick up their willingness to have + on-site inspections whenever there is mutual agreement to permit one. + But we could reasonably insist that there also be agreement on the + rights that inspectors would need to perform their mission effectively. + Similar agreement was elicited from the Soviets in the PNE Treaty.

+

In addition, we could ask for agreement on a relatively small number of + automatic and secure seismic stations in each of our countries. The + Soviets may not ultimately accept this; but they have not yet been + firmly negative, and it seems worth a try. If we did succeed, it would + be a breakthrough, valuable in and of itself, and also helpful + domestically.Brown wrote “I agree” to the right + of this sentence. You will have before you shortly an + interagency study on the value of different numbers of automatic seismic + stations, and this should permit you to decide more precisely on what we + should ask for. We would not, however, have to specify the exact number + in the memorandum for Dobrynin. + That could be decided later.

+

With the Soviets, we could make the pitch that we are meeting them + halfway in not insisting on mandatory on-site inspections—an historic + shift for us. Actually, from our standpoint, it is arguable that the + difference between “mandatory” and cooperatively-arranged inspections is + largely illusory.Brown wrote a check mark to the + right of this sentence. A provision for + cooperatively-arranged on-sites + is likely to accomplish about all that any on-site inspection provision + is capable of. In fact, no on-site inspections, mandatory or otherwise, + will accomplish a whole lot if there is not cooperation of the host + government. For example, in remote mountainous terrains of the Soviet + Union, it is hard to imagine how any foreign team could operate + effectively over a large area and for a sustained period if the Soviets + were bent on throwing up harrassing obstacles.

+

Moreover, we are really not likely to ever request an on-site inspection, + “mandatory” or voluntary, just for a fishing expedition—the risk of + coming up with an embarrassing absence of evidence would be too + great—but only when we are confident there has been a violation and that + we could find the evidence if we arrived at precisely the right place. + But, if such a situation were to occur, the Soviets would not be likely + to let us get there, whatever the wording of the treaty. So, in the end, + the right to ask for an inspection would mainly be useful as a further + inhibition against violations because it would strengthen our hand in + demonstrating—by their refusal to permit an inspection—that the Soviets + had something to hide. (This, of course, is very different from + consulting with the Soviets through private diplomatic channels to try + to resolve an ambiguous situation.)

+

Entry Into Force

+

The present Soviet position is that the treaty would come into force only + when all nuclear powers have ratified. The Soviets suggest, however, + that there might be a US–UK–USSR + moratorium for 18–24 months once the negotiations have been + completed—with the freedom to resume testing thereafter if all nuclear + powers have not accepted the treaty. A high-level presentation would + stress to the Soviets that their position would inevitably boomerang. + The Chinese (and the French) would reject such crude pressure. There + would, therefore, only be a brief and temporary halt in our own testing; + and there would be no opportunity for important non-nuclear-weapon + states to accept formal treaty constraints.

+

We can present our alternative as one which meets the objectives we both + share. If the treaty entered into force for a specified period, parties + could decide at the end of that period whether it was necessary for them + to withdraw. (Although we are prepared to agree to a period as short as + about three years, it would be advantageous at this stage to speak in + terms of roughly five years.)Brown wrote a check mark to the + right of the sentence in parentheses. After the treaty was in + force, and with the accession of a number of other states, there would + almost certainly be increasing though subtle pressure, over time, on + France and China. As a result, + even if they did not adhere in this period, their rate of testing might + sag even below its already quite slow pace.

+

Despite the obvious logic of our position, this issue is still worth a + high-level presentation because it is one of extreme sensitivity for the + Soviets and, unless we succeed in bringing the Soviets around, we may + have little to show for our efforts. We could not, of course, join with + the Soviets in their solution involving, as it does, only a testing + pause and creation of a propaganda stick which the Soviets would use + against the Chinese.

+

Conclusions and Recommendations

+

In conclusion, we recommend that you authorize us to provide the attached + draft memorandum to Dobrynin for + transmission to Moscow because we believe this could significantly + increase the chances of moving more rapidly toward concrete + negotiations, and toward a better agreement. We are, of course, quite + conscious of the desirability of not painting ourselves into a corner. + We do not believe arguments along the lines of those in the attached + draft would do so.Brown wrote a check mark to the + right of this sentence. And it is possible that our + high-level presentation could open some important doors for us.

+
+ +
+ + 167. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense Brown to the President’s Assistant for National Security + Affairs (Brzezinski)Source: Washington National Records + Center, OSD Files: FRC 330–80–0017, Box 63, A–400.112 + TEST BAN (Aug–Dec) 1977. Secret; Noforn. + Washington, September 21, 1977 + + SUBJECT + Proposed Strategy for CTB + Negotiations (U) + +

(U) The Department of Defense has reviewed the proposed strategy paper + concerning the U.S. position in the Comprehensive Test Ban (CTB) negotiations.See Document 166. + We support the general thrust of the paper but believe that some + clarification and modification are required to minimize the potential + impact on U.S. national security.

+

—(S) Peaceful Nuclear Explosions (PNE). We must recognize that a + treaty which does not ban all nuclear explosions by all nuclear powers + is, by definition, not comprehensive. We do not view PNE to be acceptable in the long or short + run; they must be discontinued to preclude military benefits from the + testing of any nuclear explosive devices. We would expect the Soviets to + continue their research, development, and engineering of nuclear + explosive devices, and remain poised to resume testing at an opportune + time. From this, they would be able to acquire military benefits the + U.S. may deny itself. Because of this asymmetry, we feel that the PNE deferral proposal should contain some + form of review after a specified period such as five years. Insistence + on a formal review would better demonstrate that this issue will remain + a major concern of the U.S.

+

(S) The tone of the memorandum to the President is more optimistic than + is warranted. In that respect, I do not agree with the relevance or + accuracy of the analogy attributed to a Soviet military official (page + 5, second paragraph).See footnote 8, Document 166.

+

—(S) Verification. A related issue is the need, in + our CTB strategy, to address what + concessions the Soviets may expect from us if they agree to terminating + PNE. Some aspect of our + verification proposal would be the likely target, since the Soviets + would have little concern about the U.S. resuming a PNE program. The proposed strategy should + specifically state that a technically adequate number of automatic and + secure seismic stations inside the U.S.S.R. are a sine-qua-non of the U.S. position. The Dobrynin memorandum (on page 3 line 10)See footnote 2, Document + 166. should also state “... a necessary number of + secure automatic seismic observato-ries... ,” + not “unmanned, unobtrusive seismic observatories.” The words “unmanned” + and “unobtrusive” could complicate the negotiations. The proposed + strategy should further state that on-site inspections, whether + “mandatory” or “cooperatively arranged” remain an integral part of the + U.S. position.

+

(S) While I fully appreciate the sense of urgency to take advantage of + perceived opportunities in timing, I want to emphasize that an + acceptable long-term resolution has the higher priority. On-going + technical study and development of verification measures are essential + but still incomplete; e.g., what nuclear experiments will be allowed, + how should PNE be defined, what is the + value of seismic monitoring, and what is the value of sub-kiloton + testing? I also have reservations about presenting this package now from + the tactical point of view. For example, by tabling this paper, we will + be in a position of indicating some “give”—no matter how limited—on the + crucial PNE issue. We would be + compromising the on-site issue without assurance of Soviet acceptance of + the requisite number of seismic stations. An alternative tactic might be + to seek resolution with the Soviets of the verification, duration and + participation issues, positioning the talks so that only Soviet + insistence on PNE blocked agreement. At + that point, we might have a better prospect of inducing Soviet + acceptance by proposing the face-saving PNE deferral proposal. In any case, this is the kind of + question which ought to be discussed at an SCC or an NSC meeting + prior to presentation to the Soviets and not handled strictly on paper, + since there are both substantive technical and tactical issues that + should be addressed.

+

(S) Finally, I presume that action will be taken to consult with our + British colleagues on this matter.

+

(U) My views on the above are shared by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.In a September 21 memorandum to George Brown outlining their views + on the CTB negotiations. Slocombe and Joint Staff Director + Vice Admiral Patrick Hannifin discussed the proposed strategy for + the CTB negotiations. A typed + notation on the memorandum indicates that Smith initialed the Chairman of the + Joint Chiefs of Staff’s approval on September 21. (Washington + National Records Center, OSD Files: + FRC 330–80–0017, Box 63, + A–400.112 TEST BAN (Aug–Dec) 1977)

+ + Harold + Brown + +
+ +
+ + 168. Memorandum of ConversationSource: Department of State, Office of the Secretariat + Staff, Special Adviser to the Secretary (S/MS) on Soviet Affairs + Marshall Shulman—Jan 21, + 77–Jan 19, 81, Lot 81D109, Box 8, Gromyko to US, Sept. + 1977. Secret. The meeting took place in the Secretary’s Conference + Room. Drafted by Krimer; and + approved by Twaddell. + Vance describes the + meeting with Gromyko in Hard Choices, pp. 60–61. + Washington, September 23, + 1977, 6:40–8:00 p.m. + + SUBJECT + SALT Procedures; MBFR; Rhodesia; Mutual Criticism; + CTB + + + PARTICIPANTS + US + Secretary of State + Ambassador Paul C. + Warnke + Ambassador Malcolm + Toon + Dr. Marshall Shulman + Mr. Leslie H. Gelb + Mr. William G. + Hyland + Mr. Walter Slocombe, + Dept. of Defense + LTG. Edward L. Rowny, Joint Chiefs of Staff + Mr. Mark Garrison, EUR/SOV + Mr. William D. Krimer, + Interpreter + USSR + Foreign Minister A.A. + Gromyko + Deputy Foreign Minister G.M. + Korniyenko + Ambassador A.F. + Dobrynin + Mr. V.G. Komplektov + Mr. N.N. Detinov + Mr. A.A. + Bessmertnykh + Mr. Sytenko + Mr. Chernyshev + Mr. V.M. Sukhodrev, + Interpreter + +

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to a comprehensive test ban.]

+

CTB

+

The Secretary wanted to touch briefly on one area of our various joint + working groups, i.e., the one that concerned the comprehensive test ban. + As the President had indicated this morning,Earlier that day, Carter + told Gromkyo that “an area where we should demonstrate to the world + at large that we were capable of cooperating was the complete cessation of nuclear testing.” + (Memorandum of Conversation, September 23, 10:30 a.m.–1:30 p.m.; + ibid.) this was an area in which he was very much interested + and was desirous of early progress. The situation as the Secretary + understood it now was that there were three main points of difference + between us which had to be overcome: (1) The date on which the proposed treaty would come into + force, (2) Various verification problems, and (3) Peaceful nuclear + explosions. Regarding the date of entry into force of the treaty, the + United States had suggested a treaty of limited duration, which would + become effective upon signature. The reason was that once the treaty + became effective, even though it had only three signatories—the Soviet + Union, the United States and Great Britain—this would put more pressure + on the French and hopefully on the Chinese to join and become + signatories to the treaty. The Secretary thought that if we waited until + other countries signed the treaty, we would be putting off a necessary + and desirable action for too long. On the question of verification, the + Secretary had received an indication from Mr. Warnke that this was an issue that + could be resolved in the working group. He believed progress should be + made at the next meeting of the working group. And finally, on the + question of peaceful explosions, as the President had indicated, we were + prepared to provide to the Soviet Union information which we had + gathered in the course of our own investigations of peaceful explosions, + should that be considered desirable. Insofar as methods of dealing with + peaceful explosions were concerned, it was our view that the best and + the proper way to handle them was to include a provision in the treaty + banning peaceful explosions, and provide for reconsideration of that + issue after a certain date at the request of either party.

+

Mr. Warnke wanted to say a few + words to supplement what the Secretary had said. What we had in mind was + to find some way to prevent the dispute over peaceful explosions from + holding up conclusion of a treaty that would be of great benefit to both + countries. The debate on how to devise measures to prevent a side’s + gaining military advantages from peaceful explosions involved some very + difficult technical matters. Therefore, we would suggest that the + parties agree to complete cessation of all nuclear explosions, that a + provision to that effect be included in the treaty, in addition to a + provision in the treaty stipulating that we would continue to work + together to find ways of distinguishing between peaceful nuclear + explosions and weapons-related explosions. This would leave open the + possibility of peaceful nuclear explosions for the future, except that + we would prevent delaying resolution of the much more important matter + in a general comprehensive treaty.

+

Gromyko said that the Soviet + Union certainly attached great importance to such a treaty, and will + continue negotiations and do all in its power to bring them to a + successful conclusion. The Soviet Union did indeed attach signal + importance to the question of peaceful nuclear explosions. In the + conditions of the Soviet Union they had tested this method to an + adequate extent, and had come to certain conclusions about its + usefulness. Of course, if they received the information about US experience that had been promised by the + President, they would study it + carefully. The Soviet Delegation at the negotiations which resume in + Geneva on October 3 will have the necessary and proper instructions. He + agreed that conclusion of a treaty would be of great political + importance worldwide, but at this time he would not associate himself + with what the Secretary had said about a treaty without an exception for + peaceful explosions. In any case, he would suggest that we continue + negotiating and seek agreement in this field.

+

Gromyko thanked the Secretary for + the discussions they had held during this current meeting, and also for + the talk with President Carter. + He was not saying good-bye because he and the Secretary had agreed to + meet in New York City at least once next week, perhaps even twice, but + in any case on September 30 at 9:30 a.m.

+

The Secretary wanted to reciprocate to the Foreign Minister on behalf of + himself and his colleagues. It had been a great pleasure to have Mr. + Gromyko here in + Washington.

+
+ +
+ 169. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense Brown to the President’s Assistant for National Security + Affairs (Brzezinski)Source: Carter Library, National + Security Affairs, Brzezinski + Material, Subject File, Box 6, Comprehensive Test Ban (CTB), 3–12/77. Secret; Personal Close + Hold. + Washington, October + 1, 1977 + + SUBJECT + CTB Negotiations + +

It was reported in paragraph 31 of reporting cable SECTO 10014, dated September 30,Telegram Secto 10014 from the Secretary’s Delegation in New + York, September 30, reported that Vance told UN + Secretary General Kurt + Waldheim that the United States was “not totally + inflexible” about the Soviet Union’s “demand” that PNEs be excluded + from a CTB. (National Archives, + RG 59, Central Foreign Policy + File, D770357–0177) that Cy + Vance discussed the CTB + with Secretary General Waldheim. + My understanding is that Cy indicated US + willingness to entertain an exception for Soviet PNEs to the CTB. The criteria had to do with a limited + number/purpose of projects, and a limited number of explosions.

+

I want to express my grave concerns about such an approach. Such + explosions, even in limited numbers, and particularly if protracted over + a period of years, would + allow stockpile confidence testing of a sort which I consider important + and which the US would lack. Moreover, I + believe they could allow a small number of development tests of + substantial yield. Such an exception would therefore make it very + difficult to justify a CTB, which I + consider otherwise supportable from a Defense point of view. Also, I + believe that the arms control community will see this as a gaping + loophole, not only for the Soviets but for countries which are lukewarm + or hostile toward inhibitions on their own nuclear weapons programs.

+

The formulation of a PNE arrangement + that allows the subject to be reopened after five years, but only + through the amendment route, which gives the US full control over whether PNEs are ever allowed, has + seemed to me to be an acceptable fallback from a complete PNE ban. It appeals to me as a face saving + arrangement for the Soviet PNE project + head who chairs the Soviet CTB + Delegation. However, the existence of this suggestion to Waldheim (which, since he was + accompanied by a number of UN officials, + will surely be known to the Soviets) appears to me to make the PNE part of the CTB negotiations very difficult from the US point of view. I would expect support + for the fallback position of amendment at the end of five years to be + harder to obtain now from the JCS, who + are likely to see the Vance + suggestion to Waldheim as the + likely end-point of such a fallback process.Brzezinski later wrote + to Harold Brown that + “Cy Vance is aware of + the problem and has undertaken remedial action, including a phone + call to Waldheim correcting + his original statement and reaffirming our position that PNEs should be banned under a CTB. The Soviets may still learn of + Vance’s original + comment, but would have to weigh it against the President’s strong + representation that PNEs must be + banned, in his meeting with Gromyko and in his UN address.” (Memorandum From Brzezinski to Harold Brown, October 6; Washington + National Records Center, OSD Files: + FRC 330–80–0017, Box 63, + A–400.112 TEST BAN (Aug–Dec) 1977)

+ + Harold + Brown + +
+ +
+ + 170. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission in + GenevaSource: National + Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign + Policy File, P840083–0496. Drafted by Keeny (ACDA/D); + cleared by Eric Fleischer (S/S–O); + and approved by Keeny. + Secret; Niact Immediate; Nodis. + Sent Immediate to the White House. + Washington, October 5, 1977, 1637Z +

239666. White House for Brzezinski + and Schlesinger. Subject: + Instructions for CTB Delegation.

+

1. The following Presidential instructions for the trilateral CTB negotiations have been received from + the White House.

+

2. Begin quote. “In the trilateral CTB + negotiations that begin on October 3, I want you to continue presenting + and seeking Soviet acceptance of our positions on the key substantive + issues, and to maintain the momentum towards a resolution of remaining + differences among the three participants. In doing so, you should be + guided by the following considerations.

+

3. You should hold firm on our basic position that PNEs should not be permitted, and while + hearing the Soviets out on any new ideas they may have, be prepared to + explain why the accommodation schemes they have presented are not + adequate for eliminating military benefits.

+

4. As you are aware, in my discussions with Gromyko,See Document 168. I offered to give the + Soviets the results of our testing experience which demonstrates the + limited technical and economic utility of PNEs. The SCC will + promptly develop an appropriate presentation and forward it for your use + in the negotiations.

+

5. If the Soviets propose a formula for including in a PNE ban a provision for continuing review + to determine whether PNEs might be + permitted in the future, you may indicate that we are prepared to give + this serious consideration.

+

6. You should continue to explore the possible contribution that a + network of automated seismic installations in US and Soviet territory could make to CTB verification capabilities, describing + relevant technical factors, such as types of instrumentation, site + selection, installation and maintenance. However, you may, as + appropriate, indicate that we do not insist on a large number of such + installations.

+

7. You should continue to press the Soviets to agree, in advance, to + detailed procedures for carrying out on-site inspections, including full + delineation of rights and functions of observers, and should outline our + bilateral and multilateral approach to on-site inspection arrangements. + You are also authorized to + indicate to the Soviets that we are prepared to consider ways in which + differences might be narrowed between mandatory and voluntary on-site + inspection provisions.

+

8. We should maintain the position that the treaty should provide for + entry-into-force without the adherence of all nuclear powers, and that + parties should have the right subject to suitable notice provisions, to + withdraw if, after five years, all nuclear powers have not joined. You + may indicate to the Soviets that we are prepared to reduce the duration + provision to three years if in your judgment this will elicit + commensurate Soviet moves on other outstanding differences.” End + quote.

+ + Christopher + +
+ +
+ 171. Telegram From the Mission in Geneva to the Department of + StateSource: National + Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign + Policy File, D770367–0343. Secret; Limdis; Immediate. Sent for information to London and + Moscow. + Geneva, October 7, 1977, 1920Z +

8586. Limdis USCTB. Subject: CTB Negotiations—Assessment of First Week + (Oct 3–7). CTB No: 13.

+

NSC For Dr. Brzezinski.

+

Summary: Principal development of opening week—during which there were no + apparent changes in substantive positions of the three participants—was + distinct shift in Soviet perception of US position on PNEs. In + the wake of recent high-level meetings with Gromyko,See Document 168. President’s UNGA statement,On October 4, Carter told the UN + General Assembly that negotiations for a CTB “are now being conducted by the United States, the + United Kingdom and the Soviet Union. As in other areas where vital + national security interests are engaged, agreements must be + verifiable and fair. They must be seen by all parties as serving a + longer-term interest that justifies the restraint of the moment. The + longer-term interest in this interest is to close one more avenue of + nuclear competition and thereby demonstrate to all the world that + the major nuclear weapon Powers take seriously our obligations to + reduce the threat of nuclear catastrophe. My country believes that + the time has come to end all explosions of nuclear devices, no + matter what their claimed justification—–peaceful or military—–and + we appreciate the efforts of other nations to reach this same goal.” + (Public Papers: Carter, 1977, pp. 1715–1723) and + hard line taken by US + CTB + Del this week, Soviet Delegation now clearly seems to + appreciate that our position on PNEs is + firm. Although not necessarily related to this development, Morokhov’s remarks on PNEs and other issues have been subdued + and defensive. US Delegation plans next + week to keep up the pressure on the Soviet PNE position, while outlining our views on verification. + End summary.

+

1. In terms of the positions taken by the three Delegations in the + plenary meetings and restricted sessions, first week of talks was + relatively uneventful. There were no apparent departures in substantive + positions, and little evidence of Soviet flexibility on any of three + major issues. US and UK Delegations devoted week to elaboration + of views on peaceful nuclear explosions (PNEs), while Soviets delivered low-key statements on + “political” aspects of PNE questions + and verification.

+

2. Despite routine character of week’s meetings, there seems, at least + for the moment, to have been a shift in the character and tone of + discussions on PNE question. During + July round, Morokhov took an + aggressive posture from the start, predicting confidently that “new” + Soviet proposals for eliminating military benefits would solve PNE issue. There were several indications + that Soviets did not believe that negative position taken by US + Del in July reflected a firm consensus + in Washington. Now, however, Soviets seem clearly to recognize that + US position is firm.

+

3. Chief contributing factor has, of course, been strong line on PNEs taken by the President both in his + meeting with Gromyko and his + UNGA speech. (Both were cited to + us by Soviet Deloff as evidence of firm US position). When US + Deloff showed text of President’s statement [to] Soviet Deputy Chairman + Timberbaev, latter remarked, “I see that President Carter has changed his position.” When + asked what he meant, Timberbaev said that President’s early press + conference remarks indicated that PNEs + could be accommodated. Half-jokingly, he said ACDA must have gotten to him. Deloff replied that there is + no disagreement within USG on PNE questions, and that clear position + stated by the President at UNGA + reflects strong and unanimous recommendation of all US agencies interested in problem.

+

4. Aside from President’s position, Soviets seem to have been impressed + by hard line taken by Amb Warnke + in plenary statements and private conversations.Warnke’s + statement at the opening plenary is in telegram 8405 from Geneva, + October 3; National Archives, RG 59, + Central Foreign Policy File, D770360–0447. + Warnke has emphasized in plenary + that, in view of inevitability of acquisition of military benefits and + serious setback to non-proliferation efforts that would result from + PNE exception, PNE ban is indispensable component of + effective CTB. Warnke has also expressed the view that + it is hard to see how us could possibly be party to a CTB that + allowed PNE. Strong UK statements have effectively reinforced + US views. By end of week, Soviet + Deloff Malev (Septel)Malev’s comments are in telegram 8587 from Geneva, + October 7. (National Archives, RG + 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770367–0320) said Soviets + were struck by firmness of US position + on PNEs.

+

5. In what may or may not be significant, Marokhov’s tone in discussing + PNEs during first week was markedly + less assertive than during previous round. During July talks, Soviet + Chairman often used strong formulations in describing Soviet position on + PNEs (e.g., Soviet government does + not conceive of a solution that does not allow PNEs). At least during this week, he has been noticeably + subdued (e.g., Soviet government sees no reason that PNEs should be banned under a CTB).

+

6. It is impossible at this stage to tell whether Morokhov’s behavior can be attributed + in any way to PNE positions taken by + US in recent weeks, or whether it + reflects any shift in Soviet attitudes. It is conceivable, given high + level US-Soviet meetings on eve of present round and possibility that + Soviet leadership has taken time to consider results of those meetings, + that Soviet DTB Delegation has simply not yet received instructions. + Moreover, Marokhov has indicated that he plans to make further + statements on PNE question on Oct 11 + and 12 plenaries, and he may well return to his earlier, assertive + posture. Nonetheless, contrast seems noteworthy, and has particularly + intrigued British Delegation.

+

7. While Delegation will begin next week to outline our thinking on + verification (starting on TuesdayOctober + 11. plenary with on-site inspections), we plan, on the PNE question, to continue, in coordination + with the British, to bear down on the Soviet position and to impress on + them the firmness and soundness of our view that a PNE ban is an essential requirement of an + effective CTB. We will continue to + watch for any evidence (such as possible indication contained in + conversation reported Septel) that + Soviets may be interested in exploring solutions that would involve + banning PNEs from outset while keeping open possibility of permitting + them sometime in future. Unless otherwise instructed, we would not, + however, advance any such ideas ourselves.

+ + Warnke + +
+ +
+ + 172. Memorandum From the Acting Director of the Arms Control and + Disarmament Agency (Keeny) to the + President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)Source: Washington National Records Center, OSD Files: FRC 330–80–0017, Box 63, A–400.112 1977. Secret. Copies + were sent to Vance, + Harold Brown, Lance, George Brown, and Turner. + Washington, October + 11, 1977 + + SUBJECT + ACDA Comments on FY 1978 Underground Test Program + +

In response to the NSC memorandum of + September 29,Not found. we have + reviewed the proposed FY 1978 + underground test program (CRESSET) forwarded by ERDA’s September 16 letter to the + President.Not found.

+

The ERDA letter and attachments + adequately describe the proposed tests and their relationship to + particular weapon systems or other objectives. There is a need, however, + to clarify the number of tests that the President is being asked to + authorize. The proposed program would involve 32 tests (33 devices), but + the funding for FY 1978 will provide for + executing only about 25 tests.

+

ACDA can concur in an FY 1978 program of 25 tests, which is + roughly the number conducted in FY 1976 + and FY 1977. In view of the TTBT obligation to limit the number of + underground tests “to a minimum”, ACDA + would not favor an expansion beyond 25 tests unless there were + compelling reasons to do so. I recommend, therefore, that the + President’s authorization of CRESSET state explicitly that separate + approval would be required if it is proposed that more than 25 tests + actually be conducted during FY + 1978.

+

In considering which of the 33 devices should be given priority, ACDA believes that in CRESSET emphasis + should be given to completing development of warheads which are at an + advanced stage of development and which fill a priority requirement. + Lower priority should be given to embarking at this time on new lines of + development which would require two or three years of testing to + complete development. In a few months we should be in a much better + position to judge the prospects of concluding a CTBT during FY 1978, and the new lines of development could be examined + at that time. This point, incidentally, illustrates the value of continuing to review the test program + at six-month intervals as ACDA has + recommended.

+ + Spurgeon M. Keeny + , Jr.Acting + +
+ +
+ 173. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security + Affairs (Brzezinski) to Secretary + of Defense Brown and Secretary of + Energy SchlesingerSource: Washington National Records + Center, OSD Files: FRC 330–80–0017, Box 63, A–400.112 + 1977. Secret. Copies sent to Vance, Harold + Brown, Lance, + George Brown, and + Turner. Harold Brown wrote in the upper + right-hand corner of the memorandum, “10/22 HB.” + Washington, October + 20, 1977 + + SUBJECT + FY 1978 Underground Nuclear Test + Program (CRESSET) + +

The President has approved the underground nuclear test program for the + first half of FY 1978 (CRESSET I), + consistent with the FY 1978 DOD and DOE budget levels, and subject to + the following limitations:

+

—Approval of the BACKSTAY and KNIGHTHEAD tests is held in abeyance + pending DOD submission and interagency + review of a study of the military utility and arms control implications + of insertable nuclear components.

+

—Implementation must be in accordance with existing policy regarding + testing near the 150 kt limit of the TTBT.

+

The above approval is conditional upon the outcome of the CTB negotiations; the United States must + be prepared to cease testing if agreement on a CTB Treaty is reached.

+

Specific approval of the test program for the second half of FY 1978 (CRESSET II) should be requested by + March 1978. The total number of tests to be conducted during FY 1978 is not to exceed 25.

+ + Zbigniew + Brzezinski + +
+ +
+ + 174. Telegram From the Mission in Geneva to the Department of + StateSource: National + Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign + Policy File, D770395–0558. Secret; Exdis; Immediate. Sent for information to London and + Moscow. + Geneva, October 27, 1977, 2048Z +

9319. Exdis USCTB. Pass to DOE. + Subject: CTB Negotiations: Recommended + Strategy.

+

CTB Message No. 46.

+

For the President and Secretary of State from Paul Warnke.

+

1. Summary: I believe strongly that most effective and expeditious way of + promoting concrete CTB negotiations on + terms favorable to US is to (a) recess + current round late next week (Nov. 3 or 4); (b) approach Soviets at high + political level as soon as possible after recess to present package + proposal designed to maximize pressure for Soviet acceptance of PNE ban; (c) begin a relatively brief + round (about two weeks) at end of November or beginning of December to + table US package formally and provide + further explanation of it; and (d) resume more detailed negotiations in + latter half of January. This message outlines reasons for this + recommended approach. End summary.

+

2. After merely repeating previous positions in first weeks of present + round, Soviets have recently made substantial effort to create + impression that they are willing to compromise on some key CTB issues, particularly on questions of + procedures for carrying out on-site inspections and of seismic stations + on US and Soviet territory designed and + operated to provide authenticated seismic data. They have also said they + expect to present new position on question of nuclear weapon state + adherence requirement for treaty entry into force. On central issue of + Peaceful Nuclear Explosions (PNE), + however, they have continued to insist that exception be made for such + explosions. On an informal basis, they have mentioned various schemes + which they assert should meet our concerns about the military benefits + of PNE, such as (a) US access to Soviet PNE designs and devices; (b) joint US-Soviet program for device development + and production; and (c) US supply of + devices for projects on Soviet territory. (It is not clear whether this + last idea includes Soviet supply of devices for US and third countries.) Morokhov, head of Soviet Delegation, recently returned + from consultations in

+

Moscow to say he hoped to get + positive new instructions on several questions by November 1 or 2 (see + Septel).Telegram 9321 from Geneva, October 27, reported + that Morokhov had told the + Delegation that “he had just returned from Moscow and that he + expected to receive new instructions about November 1 ‘give or take + a day.’ Morokhov said he was + certain that his instructions would be of great interest and value + to US and UK Delegations and that they would enable him to make + important statements on PNE as well + as entry into force.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + D770395–0613)

+

3. In my view, recent Soviet flexibility on such questions as + verification and entry into force can be attributed, at least in part, + to tactical judgment that their reasonableness on those matters may help + persuade US to accommodate them on + PNEs. They may reason that, by + prolonging round and making progress on verification and entry into + force, they can isolate question of PNEs and maximize pressure on our position. The three ideas + they have floated informally for accommodating PNEs (para two, above) + seem designed to entice US into a + detailed technical exploration of means to exempt PNEs. While superficially attractive in + terms of the level of intrusiveness involved, all are seriously + deficient on non-proliferation grounds, all are of questionable + practicability, and, as far as military benefits are concerned, they are + at best capable of dividing those benefits between the USSR and US (ideas two and three) and at worst unable to eliminate + unilateral Soviet benefits (first idea).

+

4. In my judgment, our immediate objective should be to get the Soviet + leadership to come to grips with the reality that we are not prepared to + pursue PNE accommodation schemes, that + reaching agreement with us on a CTB + will require a basic change of Soviet thinking on PNEs, and that, once the central issue of + PNEs is resolved, it will be + possible to find mutually acceptable solutions to remaining problems. In + order to promote that objective, I believe we should (a) recess present + round at end of next week, (b) soon thereafter (i.e. 7–10 days), make a + high level approach to the Soviets, preferably at the Presidential + level, to present US proposals on key + CTB issues; (c) resume Geneva talks + for about two weeks to give us an opportunity to table our substantive + package formally and explain it; and (d) resume more detailed + negotiations in latter half of January.

+

5. Substantive elements of an integrated package would be as follows: (a) + provided the treaty bans all nuclear explosions, we could accept an + obligation to keep under consideration whether PNEs should be carried out in future. The treaty would + specify that PNEs could only be carried + out pursuant to a treaty amendment, which would require approval by some + percentage of treaty parties, including all nuclear weapon state + parties. (b) We would call for an agreed number of automated seismic + installations, or their functional equivalent, on US and Soviet territory, but without specifying a number + at this stage. (c) We could then accept concept of “challenge” on-site + inspections under which decision to carry out inspections would be made + by mutual consent of requesting party and host party, provided + procedures for carrying out such inspections are agreed in advance in + legally binding form. (d) We would reiterate our position that the + treaty should provide for entry into force without adherence by all + nuclear powers. (e) We would also reiterate our position that, after + five years have elapsed since entry into force and if all nuclear powers + have not joined the treaty, parties would be able to withdraw without + invoking the Supreme National Interests withdrawal clause.

+

6. Following are the principal reasons why I recommend the tactical and + substantive approach outlined in paras four and five.

+

(a) The recommended date for recess will give US five full weeks of negotiations. We have been able to + present our case fully, and continuing until the end of next week will + enable US to receive and clarify any new + positions the Soviets may take as a result of Morokhov’s recent consultations in + Moscow. Prolonging the round to permit further detailed work on + questions such as verification would, in my view, only put off the date + when the Soviets will have to face the central PNE issue squarely. Moreover, announcing that parties plan + to resume in about a month will ensure that no momentum will be lost and + that the public perception of an impasse will not develop.

+

(b) We believe strongly that the best means of having an impact on the + Soviet bureaucracy is to present our proposals in a formal, written way + and to do so at a high secret political level. While the Soviets have + already tabled a draft treaty, we have not given them any document that + can serve as a focus for decision-making. Morokhov has formally requested that we provide such a + document. Timerbaev (Soviet + Deputy) has stressed to US privately + that the best way of getting Soviet leadership to review its position is + for US to make a formal proposal, and I + believe he is right. As far as making our initial presentation at a high + political level, this not only has the obvious advantage of underlining + the seriousness of the proposal, but it also guards against any message + presented in Geneva being distorted on its way to the Soviet + leadership.

+

(c) We believe the modifications of our position on PNEs and on-site inspection will not + damage our negotiating posture, but will in fact strengthen it in + certain respects. On PNEs, there is now + a degree of vulnerability in our present posture which could be + misinterpreted as overly rigid and arbitrary—banning forever a + conceivable application of science for peaceful purposes, a technology + which the US viewed favorably a decade + ago. A US proposal to include, together + with an immediate ban, some reference to the possibility of future + reconsideration, would + therefore seem entirely reasonable and prudent and, given the treaty + amendment procedure, the possibility for reconsidering the PNE question would exist whether or not + explicitly recognized in the treaty. Moreover, the treaty amendment + procedure would give US an effective + veto over any future proposal for exempting PNEs. In reality, acceptance of our modified proposal would + amount to acceptance of a PNE ban. Far + from being a US concession, it would + reaffirm and formalize our position and put US on the strongest ground, in case we have to stand and + fight on that ground for a sustained period. However, the sooner we can + set forth this position, and present it in a formal and concrete way, + the easier it should be for Soviet officials to pursue a serious + reconsideration of the issue. Although we would not be making a + concession from our standpoint, our new proposal could still be + portrayed to the Soviets as a good-faith effort to meet their + longer-range concerns.

+

(d) On the question of on-site inspections, it was concluded at the + SCC meeting in SeptemberThe SCC meeting, + held on September 27, is available in Carter Library, National + Security Council, Institutional Files, Box 89, SCC 032, CTB, Negotiating Issues and Options. that + “mandatory” inspections have little utility as a verification measure + and, in any event, would create some serious practical difficulties if + applied on US territory. Therefore, + accepting the concept of “challenge” inspection is something we would + wish to do on our own sooner or later. By playing that card now, we + would undercut the argument by the Soviet Delegation (to US and to the Soviet leaders) that they + have been reasonable on all other issues and now the US must be reasonable on PNEs. It would also show the Soviet + leadership that, if they accept our PNE + proposal, we are prepared to show flexibility in areas where they have + in the past staked out strong positions of principle.

+

(e) By resuming detailed negotiations in mid-January, it would give + US time to develop some of the + detailed aspects of our verification position. At present, Delegation’s + guidance on verification is mostly of a general character and would have + to be fleshed out considerably in preparation for detailed + negotiations.

+

7. We have discussed this approach with the British Delegation, and they + strongly support both the tactical and substantive aspects, as well as + the timing. British feel particularly strongly about recessing by end of + next week and plan to make formal proposal to that effect on Oct 28. + They anticipate no significant change in the Soviet PNE position and believe that prolonging + the talks now would convey a signal of weakness in our PNE stand and would play Morokhov’s game by his rules.

+ +

8. As indicated above, Morokhov + will probably unveil modified Soviet positions on a number of issues + next week. We would, of course, want to take his statement into account + as we formulate and implement our approach. Nevertheless, I feel the + basic course of action outlined here would be valid for dealing with + most eventualities short of the announcement of a Soviet decision to + accept a PNE ban. Such an unexpected + development could permit prompt initiation of detailed negotiations. The + exact nature of the less desirable but more likely new Soviet positions + could, however, also affect timing. If, for example, the proposals + amounted to substantial movement toward US positions, including that on PNEs, we might wish to demonstrate our interest by resuming + soon after Thanksgiving (Nov 28) with only a little more than three + weeks break, and begin detailed negotiations as soon as we have a + detailed position to present. However, if their ideas are less + significant, we could hold off until about December 5 and then meet for + only one or two weeks for the limited purpose of tabling our + proposal.

+

9. In order to facilitate the development of a package proposal, should + this recommended strategy be approved, the US + CTB Delegation will send to Washington + separately a draft paper for possible formal presentation in + December.

+

10. At present time, it appears that, subject to unexpected developments, + we will recess at end of next week (Nov 3 or 4) and agree to resume in + about one month. Decision on whether to agree to early (week of Nov 28) + or later (week of December 5) resumption date, or whether to leave + indefinite (“in about one month”) would be taken after Morokhov statement next week.

+

11. All US + CTB Delegation members concur in this + message.

+ + Warnke + +
+ +
+ + 175. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security + Affairs (Brzezinski) to President + CarterSource: Carter Library, National + Security Affairs, Brzezinski + Material, Subject File, Box 6, Comprehensive Test Ban (CTB), 3–12/77. Secret; Sensitive. + Carter initialed the + memorandum. + Washington, November 1, 1977 + + SUBJECT + Soviet Move on CTB + +

As you know, Dobrynin called + Cy Vance todayNo record of this telephone conversation was + found. to tell him that Brezhnev will tomorrow announce that the Soviets are + prepared to accept a testing moratorium that would include PNEs in the context of a CTB treaty. The question is what public + stance we should take on the Soviet move. Depending on when Brezhnev makes his statement, Cy might + address the question at his 11:00 A.M. press conference tomorrow.

+

It is clear that Brezhnev will be + talking about a moratorium on PNEs, + which is in itself significant. It is less clear from the little + Dobrynin had to say to Cy + how this fits with the Soviet position now on the table. The Soviets + could still insist that the treaty permit PNEs and say that the inclusion of PNEs in the 18–24 month moratorium (during which all + nuclear powers must accede to the treaty for it to go into effect) would + be simply to allow further consideration of agreed modalities for PNEs. Or they could say that the question + of PNEs would be left open in the + treaty with the 18–24 month moratorium used to decide their ultimate + disposition. The second of these possibilities obviously goes further + toward our own position than the first.

+

Your last CTB instruction to PaulSee + Document 170. already includes + the possibility of a treaty which would ban all explosions including + PNEs, but provide for continuing + review of PNEs with the notion that if + (someday, somehow) all the problems could be settled, they might then be + permitted. You instructed Paul to + see if he could elicit a Soviet proposal along those lines. The Soviets + were aware of the idea. Brezhnev’s statement tomorrow looks like their response.

+

In any event, as I said earlier, Soviet acceptance of extending a test + moratorium to include PNEs, however it + might relate to their proposed treaty, would be a significant move on + their part. In our public response, we would not want to hail it as a + “breakthrough” or greet it with a shout of joy: we have to have time to + see how they will play it and + what strings might be attached; and steadiness in any event is the best + stance both in dealing with the Soviets and in terms of domestic + reactions. But—this said—we should certainly greet it as a significant + step and avoid any suggestion that we are downplaying it. Thus, I think + the best line might be to say:

+

—We regard it as a positive step toward a fully comprehensive test + ban;

+

—It is a helpful evolution in the Soviet position on a key issue in the + CTB negotiations;

+

—We will want to give the Soviet statement full consideration in the + context of the proposals and positions that both sides have advanced in + the Geneva negotiations.

+
+ +
+ 176. Memorandum From the Acting Director of the Arms Control and + Disarmament Agency (Keeny) and + the Director of the Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs (Gelb) to Secretary of State VanceSource: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P770197–1650. + Secret. Drafted by Alan Niedle (ACDA/MA); and cleared by Edward Ifft + (PM/DCA), Cowey, Avis Bohlen (EUR/SOV), Wreathem Gathright (S/P), Shulman, and Louis Kahan (PM). A stamped notation on the bottom of the first page + of the memorandum reads “CV.” + Washington, November 3, 1977 +

CTB + Developments

+

Summary

+

Following up on Brezhnev’s 60th + Anniversary speech,On November 2, Brezhnev announced that he wanted + a treaty that banned “nuclear weapons tests, so that no such tests + will be conducted underground, as well as in the atmosphere, in + outer space and under water,” including a “moratorium on nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes, along + with a ban on all tests of nuclear weapons for a definite + period.” (“Address by President Brezhnev Before the Central + Committee of the CPSU: Halting the + Production and Testing of Nuclear Weapons [Extract],” November 2, + 1977, Documents on Disarmament, 1977, pp. + 679–680. Emphasis in the original.) the Soviet CTB Delegation has presented to our + Delegation important proposals which could provide a way out of the + CTB impasse. The essence is that + the Soviets are now willing to accept a three-year halt in conducting + PNEs and are willing to have a + three-year treaty banning weapon tests which would enter into force + without Chinese and French accession. There are still a number of + critical points for us which are unclear or not satisfactory but our initial impression is that we + might be able to use Brezhnev’s + proposed framework—a treaty and a protocol on PNEs—as the basis for future negotiations.

+

The Soviet Proposal

+

The Soviet CTB Delegation said in Geneva + that the Soviets could accept a three-year treaty banning nuclear weapon + tests which would enter into force without France and China. A PNE moratorium in the form of a treaty + protocol would take effect simultaneously and for the same length of + time. The treaty (but presumably not the moratorium) would become of + unlimited duration if France and China acceded within three years. There + could be provision for review before expiration or every five years if + the treaty became of unlimited duration. The Soviet proposal stipulated + that, after entry into force of the treaty, negotiations would continue + for the purpose of reaching a mutually acceptable solution on PNEs and procedures for their conduct.

+

On verification, the Soviets rejected US + proposals for automated seismic installations but agreed to consider + increasing the number of national stations to be included in a global + seismic network and expressed willingness to consider measures to + guarantee the authenticity of the data from such a network. They + repeated their proposal for on-site inspections on a voluntary basis, + but added that rights and functions of inspecting personnel could be + agreed in advance.

+

Significance of the Soviet Move

+

The Soviet move is a major step towards our position. Seen in the context + of other recent steps, such as the substantial progress on SALT during Gromyko’s visitSee Foreign + Relations, 1969–1976, vol. XXXIII, SALT II, 1972–1980, Documents + 182, 183, and 184. and certain other + gestures outside the arms control field, it suggests that the Soviets + may want to achieve trilateral agreement on a CTB in time for a Summit.

+

—In agreeing to give up PNEs for three + years, the Soviets are in effect conceding that PNEs are not all that vital to them for that period. + (Perhaps this means that they have no major PNE projects slated for the next three or four years.) This + provides an opening for seeking a satisfactory long-term solution of the + problem.

+

—Dropping the requirement for French and Chinese adherence was an + essential step in order to bring any treaty into sight.

+

—While Soviet verification ideas are not surprising, the willingness to + work out agreed inspection procedures in advance is a step in the right + direction. We will give urgent study to the Soviet suggestion that authenticated data from + national seismic stations be used in lieu of automated seismic + installations.

+

Initial Reactions

+

It seems to us that we should be able to accept the basic framework of + the Soviet proposal, that is, a treaty and a protocol. But we would want + to press for certain important elements which either now look unclear or + unsatisfactory in the initial Soviet presentation.

+

—Treaty duration and withdrawal now seem the central problems separating + us. The treaty should not automatically collapse if France and China do + not accede in three years since no one can realistically expect them to + do so. Nor should the moratorium on PNEs automatically terminate if the problem of preventing + military benefits from PNEs is not + solved since it probably won’t be. We will therefore want to try to find + some way, consistent with our present position, to have both the treaty + and the protocol continue past the initial period unless a party takes + some special step of withdrawal. Unfortunately, on this point, the + Soviet Delegation seemed to envision just a straight termination of the + treaty and the protocol if the various conditions haven’t been met. The + Delegation did not have the impression that the Soviets had fully + thought through all the ramifications.

+

—Tying the treaty and the protocol together. Obviously it would not be + acceptable for countries to be able to sign the treaty banning weapon + tests but not accept the protocol banning explosions for alleged + peaceful purposes. The protocol would therefore have to be regarded as + an essential and integral part of the treaty. This would also mean that + the protocol banning PNEs should be + amendable only in the same way the treaty could be amended—with the + consent of all the participating nuclear powers. The Delegation + immediately raised these questions informally with the Soviets and the + initial response indicated possible flexibility.

+

Future Work

+

There will be a break in the talks beginning this Friday,November 4. and a resumption on December 5. + This should give us ample time to figure out the best strategy and to + prepare ourselves for detailed negotiations in December. The Delegation + will shortly be sending its analysis and recommendations.

+

One thing seems fairly certain. It will be very much in our interest to + have concrete proposals and texts to provide the Soviets for the next + round. If we can accept Brezhnev’s proposed framework of a treaty and protocol on + PNEs, we should be in a strong + position to press the Soviets to modify some aspects of their approach—especially on duration of the + treaty and the PNE moratorium—to bring + them more closely into line with our objectives.

+
+ +
+ 177. Memorandum From the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament + Agency (Warnke) to President + CarterSource: Carter Library, National + Security Affairs, Staff Material, Agency File, Box 1, Arms Control + and Disarmament Agency: 1–7/77. Secret. In the upper right-hand + corner, Carter wrote “Good. + J.” On November 9, Ambassador Toon informed Vance of a meeting that he had had that day with + Brezhnev, who “wanted to + call special attention to his Nov. 2 statement of readiness to reach + agreement on CTB including a + moratorium on PNE’s. Speaking + directly, Brezhnev said “it + was not easy for us to take such a decision, as it directly affects + our national economic plan, and we expect that the U.S. and the U.K. + as participants in the talks which are underway will in the end + respond with appropriate reciprocity’ so as to achieve agreement on + this major issue.” (Telegram 16276 from Moscow, November 9; National + Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign + Policy File, P840076–0378, N770007–0385) + Washington, November 8, 1977 +

On Friday, November 4th, we held our last trilateral meeting on the + Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty until December 5.Warnke’s + detailed analysis of this session is contained in telegram 9792 from + the Mission in Geneva, November 4; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + D770407–0198. Before leaving Geneva that day, I also had an + opportunity to meet with Minister Semenov to discuss the status of our + SALT talks.

+

In both negotiations, the Soviet Delegations have made significant moves + to accommodate our views. Most dramatic, of course, was the presentation + of a substantially revised Soviet position on the banning of nuclear + tests. But on SALT, also, new + provisions tabled by the Soviet Delegation come closer to our ideas on + the definition of heavy bombers, including those which could be equipped + with long-range cruise missiles, and on the testing of cruise + missiles.

+

The breakthrough in the Comprehensive Test Ban talks began with the + announcement by Dr. Morokhov, + head of the Soviet Delegation, that he was returning to Moscow over the + week-end of October 21 to 24. He had previously suggested some movement + on the issue of entry into force of the treaty without adherence of + France and China. On his return, on October 26, he said he had new + positions to present on all subjects, including that of peaceful nuclear + explosions. He explained, however, that this would have to await a + speech by Mr. Brezhnev.

+

On the morning of the Brezhnev speech, November 2, the + Soviets presented a statement at our plenary meeting in which they + offered a PNE moratorium as a Protocol + to the treaty.The November 2 offer from the + Soviets is in telegram 9612 from Geneva, November 2; National + Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign + Policy File, D770403–0404. The Soviet statement also agreed + to entry of the treaty into force prior to the adherence of the other + nuclear weapons states. On verification, though continuing to oppose the + automated seismic installations and any mandatory on-site inspections, + they agreed in principle to pre-arranged procedures for on-site + inspections and to some additional national seismic installations with + provisions which would assure the validity of the data.

+

The major remaining problem on CTB is + the Soviet insistence that the parties to the treaty “should be relieved + of their obligations” if all nuclear weapons states have not agreed to + the treaty by the end of three years. This is unsatisfactory both from + the standpoint of the stability of a test ban and because of the likely + reactions of the French and Chinese to what they would regard as undue + pressure.

+

I hope that we can put together an American package responsive to the + Soviet proposals, but remedying the defects, to be tabled when our + meetings resume on December 5.

+

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to a comprehensive test ban.]

+
+ +
+ + 178. Memorandum from the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff + (Brown) to Secretary of + Defense BrownSource: Library of Congress, + Manuscript Division, Harold + Brown Papers, Box 50, TS C.T.B. Secret; Restricted Data. A stamped notation + in the upper right-hand corner reads “30 NOV 1977 SEC DEF HAS SEEN.” + Underneath the stamp, Harold + Brown wrote “11/30 David McG Walt S,—we should take + appropriate action to the extent possible during the next few days. + I agree with the overall ideas, differ on the details. HB.” The annexes are not + attached. + Washington, November 30, 1977 + + SUBJECT + Comprehensive Test Ban (U) + +

1. (S/RD) In view of the importance of comprehensive test ban (CTB) issues to all aspects of the nation’s + nuclear weapons posture, the Joint Chiefs of Staff believe that greater + attention should be given to key CTB + issues within the Department of Defense. Development of a sound US + CTB position will depend to a large + extent upon the DOD’s presenting, in + the intragovernmental arena, well-conceived positions on national + security and related technical issues. A number of important questions + remain to be resolved before a coherent DOD position can be presented. Some of these are:

+

a. What is the national intent with regard to maintenance of the nuclear + weapons stockpile under a CTB?

+

b. What low-yield experiments are advisable under a CTB in order to assure confidence in the + stockpile and maintain design expertise in the laboratories?

+

c. How should this “permitted experiment” issue be addressed at + intragovernmental and international levels?

+

d. How is long-term stockpile reliability achieved under a CTB? (For example, should a small number + of standardized warhead designs be settled upon? Should these designs be + modernized? What rebuilding rate is necessary? What are the cost and + technological penalties of standardizing materials and processes so as + to avoid future change?)

+

e. Would an extended transition period (several years) at a reduced + underground test threshold be valuable for redesigning the US stockpile for maintenance under a CTB?

+

f. To what degree can new delivery systems and conceptual weapon systems + be adapted to existing nuclear warhead designs without weapons + testing?

+

g. What measures constitute adequate verification?

+

h. What are the required CTB safeguards, + and what added costs should be budgeted for them and programmed now?

+ +

i. What urgent efforts are necessary (while testing is still permitted) + for an effective transition into a CTB?

+

2. (S) The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that three specific actions be + taken now to accelerate development of a comprehensive DOD position on these and other important + CTB issues, to achieve better + DOD-Department of Energy (DOE) + cooperation, and to promote discussion of these matters at + intragovernmental levels:

+

a. First, and most urgently, the Joint Chiefs of Staff believe the issue + of “permitted experiments under a CTB” + must be raised at the national level prior to the departure of the + US Negotiating Team for the 5 + December plenary session in Geneva. Their concern here is to assure that + US negotiators understand—prior to + presenting papers or discussing the issues with the Soviets—that a + CTB should provide for some + low-yield nuclear experiments which, among other factors, can assist in + assuring confidence in the stockpile. This is likely to be a + controversial issue within the US + Government, but it is believed that it is critical to national security. + Full addressal is already late, but the United States should not + compound the problem by opening new and more detailed discussions with + the Soviets until a generalized national position on this matter has + been given [to] the negotiators. Annex A contains a proposed memorandum + to the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs raising + this issue.

+

b. Second, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that you establish a + temporary CTB Task Force within the + DOD. In their judgment, the issues + are of such breadth and complexity that they cannot be handled + adequately without a dedicated organizational structure. Since the + issues are largely technical and the work focuses on R&D and acquisition—not just of nuclear + weapons, but of delivery systems as well—they suggest that a + representative of the Under Secretary of Defense for Research and + Engineering chair this effort. Other key members of the Task Force + should be from OASD(ISA), OATSD(AE), OJCS, DIA, DNA, and the Military Departments. + Since the DOE is directly involved in many of the issues, the Joint + Chiefs of Staff recommend that DOE be invited to participate in Task + Force work. Annex B contains a proposed memorandum establishing this + CTB Task Force.

+

c. Third, a fully effective working relationship with DOE should be + achieved for continuing, in-depth communication on the issues summarized + in paragraph 1 above. DOE has principal responsibility for many of these + issues, and close DOD–DOE cooperation + is essential to effective solution of CTB problems already identified and likely to arise in the + future. The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that you take the initiative + by sending the proposed memorandum in Annex C to the Secretary of Energy + raising the issue. The memorandum also invites his participation in the + DOD + CTB Task Force.

+

3. (U) In summary, the Joint Chiefs of Staff believe that the national + security and technical aspects of a CTB + are of such importance as to require significantly increased attention + within the DOD and closer DOD–DOE cooperation. Moreover, they should + be addressed as an urgent + matter in the Special Coordination Committee prior to resumption of + substantive negotiations.

+

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

+ + George S. + BrownChairman Joint Chiefs of + Staff + +
+ +
+ 179. Memorandum From Secretary of State Vance to President CarterSource: + Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, + Box 6, Comprehensive Test Ban (CTB), 3–12/77. Secret. In the upper-right hand corner of + the memorandum, Carter wrote + “Cy—I agree. J.” To the right of the subject line, Brzezinski wrote “resolved Dec. + 5th. ZB.” + Washington, December 3, 1977 + + SUBJECT + CTB On-Site Inspection + +

I have read Paul Warnke’s + memorandumNot found. concerning + on-site inspection which he cabled in from abroad today in response to + the conclusions reached at the SCC + meeting on Friday.An undated memorandum + attached to the List of Participants for the December 2 SCC Meeting on CTB reads “No summary of conclusions + were made for this meeting. But new instructions were sent to + P. Warnke for the conduct + of the negotiations.” (Carter Library, National Security Council, + Institutional Files, Box 90, SCC + 043, CTB Negotiating Options and + Issues, 12/2/77) No minutes for the meeting have been found. The new + instructions for Warnke are + in Document 181. After further + reflection I have come to the conclusion that Paul’s position is correct. As I + understand the technical aspects of the problem as explained by the + experts, on-site verification is essentially cosmetic and, as Paul says, “without significant + practical value”. Further, his point that if we introduce a mandatory + on-site inspection proposal and subsequently fall off that proposal it + would be characterized as a major retreat on our part is well taken. In + addition, the British are taking the same position as that recommended + by Paul, and our taking a + mandatory on-site verification position would require us to split with + our British colleagues. In light of what I have said above I believe we + should stick with our British colleagues.

+ +

Attachment:

+

Memorandum from Paul Warnke.Not attached.

+
+ +
+ 180. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security + Affairs (Brzezinski) to President + CarterSource: Carter Library, National + Security Affairs, Brzezinski + Material, Subject File, Box 6, Comprehensive Test Ban (CTB), 3–12/77. Secret. Sent for + action. In the upper-right hand corner, Carter wrote “Zbig I agree with Paul/Cy—Keep black boxes & + ‘right to challenge’ strong. J.” + Washington, December 4, 1977 + + SUBJECT + Instructions for CTB + Negotiations + +

The CTB negotiations will resume on + Monday, December 5, in Geneva for about two weeks, followed by a holiday + recess until mid-January. The SCC has + completed an analysis of Brezhnev’s recent proposal along with a Working + PaperTelegram 290032 to the Mission in + Geneva, December 5, contains the elements of the Working Paper. + (National Archives, RG 383, Records + of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Office of the Director, + Standing Consultative Commission and Comprehensive Test Ban Files, + Accession #383–98–0146, Box 1, CTB + Working Papers on Permitted Experiments Under Test Ban, December + 1977) on the key elements of a CTB Treaty which we would plan to hand to the Soviets + during the December session.

+

The SCC metSee footnote 2, Document 179. + on FridayDecember 2. to discuss the + key issues in these negotiations. Agreement was reached on a recommended + position on duration, PNEs, and + internal seismic stations, but ACDA + reserved its position on on-site inspection (OSI). To attempt to bridge the gap between our mandatory + and the Soviet voluntary OSI positions, + the Working Group had recommended that we propose a “challenge” OSI formulation that would require some + justification for any decision to refuse an OSI request. I pointed out that in my view there would be + little value in such a provision (it is really not a “challenge + inspection” but just a right to receive an explanation) and suggested + that we insist that in addition to justification for any refusal of OSI requests each party would be entitled to a small annual + quota of mandatory inspections if it found such justification + unsatisfactory.

+

ACDA (Spurgeon Keeny) opposed this approach, arguing that the + Soviets would reject it and consider it a very negative step in the + negotiations; however Harold + Brown, Cy Vance, + Frank Press, Jim Schlesinger, Stan Turner, and the JCS (Dave Jones) all endorsed this + approach as a useful means of enhancing confidence in the treaty. + Subsequently, Paul Warnke has + sent you a strongly worded dissent by cable from Geneva, which Cy Vance has endorsed (Tab B).Not attached. + Paul argues that a mandatory + quota of OSIs would be of little + practical value; that the Soviets would strongly oppose it and harden + their position on other negotiating issues, and that it could be a + “political booby trap” in that it could increase the domestic costs of + eventually moving to challenge inspection in order to achieve a CTB agreement with the Soviets.

+

While I do not rule out challenge inspection as an eventual acceptable + outcome, I do not agree with Paul’s arguments. If a mandatory inspection quota really + made no sense, then what would be the sense of “the right to challenge” + or “producing a carefully constructed on-site inspection provision” . . + . but one which the Soviets can completely refuse us the right to + conduct? On the contrary, I believe there would be considerable value in + a small annual quota of mandatory inspections; certainly fewer than + might be needed, but enough to build confidence in the treaty and + reassure likely Senate critics. Coupled to an obligation to provide + adequate explanation, such a quota would help resolve uncertainties and + give us higher verifiability.

+

As Paul notes, the Soviet + negotiators will probably strongly resist a mandatory quota; however, + its negotiability may be enhanced by our two track approach—e.g., the + bilateral agreement would have the mandatory quota but the multilateral + treaty would only require challenge OSI. Further, President Kennedy got Krushchev at one point to agree to a quota + of two or three mandatory OSIs (and + black boxes) per year,Kennedy and Khrushchev discussed + the issue of inspections at the 1961 Vienna Summit. See Foreign + Relations, 1961–1963, vol. VII, Arms Control and + Disarmament, Document 31. and it is by no means + certain that you could not achieve a similar outcome. With regard to + Paul’s argument that this + could increase the domestic cost of eventually settling for challenge + inspection, the Senate is well aware that we have insisted on mandatory + OSI as a prerequisite for a CTB for over two decades and to abandon it + at this stage without having made a determined effort at the political + level could have even greater costs.

+ +

As a final point, Cy Vance has + noted that the UK might insist on going + with challenge inspection; however, in our consultations with them, the + British have indicated that they do not have a firm position on + verification and will follow our lead on these issues. Consequently, I + recommend that you authorize us to propose a small annual quota of + mandatory inspections in addition to the obligation for explanation of + any refusals. I have in mind that the quota might be perhaps two or + three per year, but we will have the Working Group take a quick look at + this to ensure that it is consistent with our needs.

+

As you know, Defense was anxious that tabling the Working Paper might + prejudice our position on the sorts of experiments that could be + conducted under a CTB, or the detailed + nature of verification provisions we would need on on-site inspection + and internal seismic stations. These issues are currently undergoing + intensive interagency study and we will not be ready to discuss them in + detail until January. However, the Working Paper was carefully drafted + to avoid prejudicing these issues, and in the SCC discussion we agreed to some modifications which will + further protect us on these issues, including an explicit caveat to this + effect in your instructions to Paul + Warnke. Harold would still prefer on balance to withhold + the portions of the paper dealing with prohibitions on weapons tests or + PNEs, pending further SCC review, but can accept tabling of the + entire document subject to the agreed modifications and caveat in your + instructions.

+

Following is a brief discussion of the other key issues, together with + the SCC agreed recommendations:

+

PNEs. The Soviets + have proposed that their three-year moratorium on PNEs be incorporated + in a Protocol to the CTB treaty which + would call for continuing negotiations on how to permit PNEs in the future. We would agree to + having a Protocol on PNEs, providing + that it is integrally linked to the treaty and would remain in force + concurrently with the treaty. Rather than agree to continue negotiations + on how to permit PNEs, we would simply + offer to keep them under consideration and would insist that any + subsequent agreement on PNEs would + require an amendment of the treaty with our agreement.

+

Duration. Consistent with previous instructions, + Paul Warnke would be + authorized to indicate, while maintaining our position that the treaty + should continue in force indefinitely without French or Chinese + adherence, that each party should have the right to withdraw from the + treaty with one year’s advance notice if it determined that continued + testing by a non-party affected its security.

+

Internal Seismic Stations. The Soviets continue to + object to our concept of “black boxes,” but have indicated that they + would be willing to consider joint design of “national stations” in + order to assure adequate authentication of seismic data. From a + verification standpoint, it is unimportant to us whether these stations are automated, manned by Soviet + nationals, or jointly manned, provided that our requirement for timely + transmission of authenticated seismic data can be met. Consequently, we + would indicate flexibility of labeling of the stations, which could + result in Soviet willingness to agree to use of our equipment and + consideration of a larger number of stations for this purpose than would + otherwise be the case.

+

We have prepared a cable to Paul + (Tab A)Not attached. for your + approval which is consistent with the above recommendations and would + instruct the Delegation to table the modified Working Paper at Tab + C.Not attached. In my view, the + tabling of this document with our movement towards the Soviet position + on the PNE protocol, seismic stations + and duration, even with the tough OSI + position, constitutes a forthcoming response to the Soviet proposal, + which maintains our essential requirements on duration and verification, + and should facilitate the process of beginning negotiation of treaty + language in January.

+

RECOMMENDATION

+

That you approve the position taken by NSC, OSTP, Defense, Energy and CIA by authorizing the cable to Paul Warnke at Tab A. _______

+

No, revise in the light of the State/ACDA position. ______Carter did not indicate a + preference with respect to the recommendation.

+
+ +
+ 181. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission in + GenevaSource: National + Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign + Policy File, P940083–0507. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Sent for information + Immediate to Bern. Drafted by Keeny; cleared by Sydney Goldsmith (S/S–O); and approved by Keeny. + Washington, December 5, 1977, 2340Z +

290031. Del by OOB 12/6 Bern pass to + Amb. Warnke. Subject: + Instructions for CTB Negotiation.

+

1. The following White House CTB + instructions have been received from Dr. Brzezinski for Amb. Warnke.

+ +

2. Begin quote. “When the trilateral CTB + negotiations resume on December 5, the President wants you to respond to + the recent Soviet initiative in a way that is responsive to the positive + aspects of the Soviet proposals while maintaining the essential elements + of our position on key issues. In doing so, you should be guided by the + following considerations.

+

3. You should maintain our existing position in favor of a stable and + durable treaty that could continue indefinitely without French and + Chinese adherence. You should propose that each party should have the + right, however, after a period of three years, to withdraw from the + treaty, giving one year’s advance notice, if it determined that + continued testing by a nonparty affected its security.

+

4. You are authorized to accept the Soviet suggestion of a protocol + banning PNEs provided that the protocol + would be an integral part of the treaty and would therefore remain in + force for all parties concurrently with the treaty banning nuclear + weapon test explosions. You may also indicate that we could accept a + commitment in the protocol to keep under consideration whether + arrangements should be made in the future for carrying out PNEs, provided that an amendment to the + treaty with our consent would be required for establishing such + arrangements.

+

5. In continuing discussion of on-site inspections, you should maintain + the previous position. You are also authorized to indicate to the + Soviets that we are prepared to consider ways in which differences might + be narrowed between mandatory and voluntary on-site inspection + provisions, while maintaining on the table our present position. You + might encourage the Soviets to propose as a compromise the small annual + quota idea by referring at some point to Khrushchev’s 1962–1963 + proposal.See footnote 6, Document 180.

+

6. You should outline our approach to obtaining authenticated seismic + data from internal seismic stations with agreed characteristics and + indicate that we would be prepared to accept various modes of + operation—manned or unmanned, joint or national—provided that our + technical requirements are met for obtaining timely, useful, and + authenticated seismic data.

+

7. Consistent with these considerations, you should table the modified + working paper which will be sent to you by separate cable to present + US views on the key substantive + elements of a CTB treaty and + protocol.See footnote 2, Document 180. In discussion of the + working paper, you should indicate that the terminology used to describe + the substantive elements dealing with prohibition of nuclear weapons tests and nuclear + explosions intended for peaceful purposes may require mutually + acceptable understanding regarding distinctions between prohibited + explosions and permitted nuclear experiments.” End quote.

+ + Vance + +
+ +
+ 182. Memorandum From the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament + Agency (Warnke) to President + CarterSource: Carter Library, National + Security Affairs, Staff Material, Agency File, Box 1, Arms Control + and Disarmament Agency: 8/77–2/78. Secret. In the upper-right hand + corner of the memorandum, Carter wrote “good report. J.” + Washington, December 29, 1977 + + SUBJECT + December Round of Trilateral Comprehensive Test Ban (CTB) Negotiations + +

During the recent round of trilateral talks, held in Geneva from December + 5 to 20, the principal development was our formal tabling of a U.S. + Working PaperSee footnote 2, Document 180. outlining our views on + the key substantive elements of a multilateral treaty banning nuclear + weapons tests and of an integrally related protocol dealing with + peaceful nuclear explosions. Much of the session was devoted to + answering detailed Soviet questions regarding our Working Paper and, in + the process, we got a fairly good picture of Soviet thinking on the main + issues. Highlights are summarized below.

+

On-Site Inspections (OSI). As instructed,See Document 181. our Delegation + did not put forth a specific proposal on OSI. Instead, we continued to express our interest in + narrowing the differences between the traditional positions of the + participants and extensively explored Soviet receptivity to the idea, + discussed during the 1958–1962 CTB + negotiations, of an annual quota of mandatory inspections.

+

The Soviets stated categorically and repeatedly that they were not + prepared to consider any form of mandatory OSI, including a quota. They said that a U.S. proposal for + mandatory OSI would be rejected and + would be regarded as an attempt to complicate the negotiations at a time + when the USSR had made several + important concessions in order + to make agreement possible. They maintained that the Soviet side had + already demonstrated its willingness to find compromises that bridged + traditional positions on OSI, citing + their acceptance of the Swedish-developed concept of “challenge” + inspections and their recent willingness to work out in advance the + detailed rights and functions of inspection teams, rather than leave + them to ad hoc decisions by the host party.

+

However, while rejecting the concept of mandatory OSI, the Soviets agreed with the principle + that requests for OSIs should not be + dealt with in an arbitrary manner and they unquestionably understood our + emphatic assertion that the treaty would be placed in jeopardy if this + principle were not observed. The Soviets have indicated that, if we do + not find their prior proposals adequate, it is up to us to give them a + specific alternative when the negotiations resume in January.

+

Duration. We stressed our opposition to the Soviet + proposal for a treaty that would terminate automatically if China and + France have not joined within three years, and proposed instead the + right of any party to withdraw on one year’s notice if, after three + years, continued testing by a non-party affected its security.

+

The Soviets admitted to us informally that they recognize that their idea + of a “guillotine clause” will have to be abandoned, and they indicated + they would be considering alternatives enabling the treaty to be + extended even without participation by all nuclear powers. However, they + expressed serious concern with our “right of withdrawal” formula. They + argued that, of the three nuclear powers that would join from the start, + the USSR would feel the greatest + pressure to withdraw because of Chinese and French testing, but that, if + they actually decided to invoke their right to do so, they would be + subject to heavy criticism for contributing to the breakdown of the + treaty regime. Because of this concern, they favored the concept that + all the nuclear powers should be released from their obligations + simultaneously. I believe it will eventually be possible to work out an + acceptable compromise that promotes our basic objectives (e.g., a + formulation providing that, after a specified period, treaty parties + would determine, perhaps at a Review Conference, whether the treaty + would continue for another specified period).

+

Peaceful Nuclear Explosions. While accepting the + Soviet idea of a protocol on PNEs and + agreeing that the possibility of carrying out PNEs in the future should be kept “under consideration”, we + took a strong position that the ban on PNEs must remain in force as long as the weapons test ban + remains in force, unless of course the PNE ban is replaced earlier by arrangements for conducting + PNEs that the U.S. can support.

+

The Soviets asserted that they continue to have a strong interest in + carrying out PNEs in the future and + that means can be found for eliminating any military benefits. They maintained that our proposal on + duration of the PNE ban is + unsatisfactory, since it would provide no incentive to reach agreement + on arrangements for conducting PNEs. + Instead, they called for a definite time limit (three years) for + negotiating such arrangements, after which the moratorium on PNEs would expire—presumably whether or + not those arrangements had been concluded and whether or not the treaty + on weapon tests continued.

+

We, of course, emphasized that it would be unthinkable for us to leave + PNEs unconstrained while the + weapons test ban continued. Soviet Delegation members appreciate why + their proposal would not be acceptable to us, but have not hinted at any + means of solving this problem and have instead pointed out that the + PNE issue continues to involve + substantial bureaucratic stakes in Moscow, thus making it difficult for + them to alter their position very soon.

+

Internal Seismic Stations. Although our detailed + proposals will not be ready until January, we outlined our general + thinking on the design of the stations and indicated that, as long as + agreement can be reached on the technical requirements for ensuring the + receipt of timely and authenticated seismic data, we would not object to + Soviet manning of stations in the USSR.

+

The Soviet response was somewhat ambiguous. The technical members of + their Delegation seemed receptive to our concept and particularly + interested in receiving sophisticated U.S. equipment for the stations. + At the higher, political level, however, a more cautious position was + taken. They seemed particularly sensitive to any appearance of the + internal stations making inroads on Soviet sovereignty, and expressed + concern about whether the U.S. concept permits sufficient Soviet + national responsibility and control over the stations on their + territory.

+

We cannot expect a definitive Soviet reaction until we have presented our + ideas in detail next round. However, in light of the important political + and ideological implications of “authenticated” internal stations for + the Soviet leadership, I would be very surprised if achieving Soviet + acceptance of an effective arrangement did not require a prolonged and + difficult negotiation.

+

General Comments. Although the Soviet negotiators + repeatedly expressed appreciation of our Working Paper and the detailed + explanations given them, there was no new movement on their part on the + issues of PNEs, treaty duration, and + internal seismic stations. Indeed, some slight hardening of position + could be discerned. It should be remembered that, in putting forth on + November 2 the revised Soviet positions on a PNE moratorium and entry into force, Morokhov stressed that the Soviet + leadership expected some reciprocal movement on our part to accommodate their position on + verification. This expectation was emphasized often during the recently + completed round.

+

I believe, therefore, that the Soviet Delegation was disappointed and a + bit put off by our failure to propose a specific provision bridging the + gap between our past insistence on mandatory on-site inspections and + their concept of voluntary on-site inspections. I think we can expect + little further progress on the other issues until we deal constructively + with this issue.

+

Consequently, if we are to maintain the current momentum toward + agreement, the most urgent requirement in our preparations for the round + scheduled to begin on January 18 is to adopt a position on how on-site + inspections will be initiated. I will shortly be sending you a + memorandum recommending an approach to the OSI issue. In addition, I believe it is important that we + be prepared when the talks resume to present detailed proposals on the + contents of the separate verification agreement we would conclude with + the Soviets to supplement the multilateral CTB treaty.

+ + Paul C. + Warnke + +
+ +
+ 183. Memorandum From the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament + Agency (Warnke) to the + President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, + Staff Material, Agency File, Box 1, Arms Control and Disarmament + Agency: 8/77–2/78. Confidential. + Washington, January + 13, 1978 + + SUBJECT + Report for the Soviets on U.S. PNE Experience + +

As you know, when Gromyko came + here in September, the President told him that we would provide the + Soviet Government with an account of U.S. experience regarding the + economic utility of peaceful nuclear explosions (PNEs).See + Document 168.

+

Immediately thereafter, we began in Washington to prepare such a report. + In Geneva, Gerry Johnson, who ran our PNE program for several years and is now my deputy on the CTB Delegation, gave Morokhov an oral rundown of our PNE experience.

+

With the Brezhnev initiative of + November 2,See footnote 2, Document 176. we decided to hold off + on delivery of our paper while waiting for a clearer picture of the + implications of the new Soviet PNE + moratorium proposal. Subsequently, Morokhov has taken the view that the Soviet Government + continues to see great importance in PNEs. I therefore believe we should now send a copy of our + report to Gromyko. In addition + to getting our views on the very limited economic value of PNEs to the Soviet leadership, it would + demonstrate our willingness to engage them in a continuing and serious + dialogue on the PNE issue.

+

With your concurrence, I will give Dobrynin a copy of the attached package, which contains + our PNE report and a cover note from + Cy Vance to Gromyko.The cover note from Vance + is not attached. DOE, DOD, + JCS, and State concur in forwarding + the report. The cover note has been worked out with State.

+

Paul C. + Warnke

+

Attachment

+

Paper Prepared in the Arms Control and Disarmament + AgencyNo classification + marking.

+

Washington, undated

+

Summary: US Perspectives on + Peaceful Nuclear Explosions

+

The US opposition to permitting PNEs under a CTB reflects our conclusion that the potential economic + benefits of PNEs are not sufficient to + override serious verification and non-proliferation problems that would + be associated with their use. Our PNE + verification and non-proliferation concerns have been made clear in the + CTB negotiations; this paper + presents a review of the economic utility of PNEs based on experience gained in the US + PNE program.

+

PNE applications were studied by the + US over a period of twenty years, + and in selected areas field tests were conducted using nuclear + explosives. US industry was directly + involved, and was relied upon to identify promising applications of + PNEs. The ultimate determination of + the economic value of PNEs was made + largely by industry. PNEs were investigated for use in + excavation, natural gas stimulation, shale oil recovery, copper mining, + and underground storage cavities. Field testing using nuclear explosives + was conducted for the excavation and natural gas stimulation + applications.

+

Each of these potential areas of application involved its own difficult + technical problems as well as the general problems associated with any + PNEs (such as safety, environmental impact, treaty obligations, and + public acceptance). One of the most publicized PNE applications, earth excavation, was found to present + the most serious difficulties. A sea-level canal to supplement the + Panama Canal was long regarded as a promising application for PNEs, but a massive study of alternative + approaches concluded for technical, economic, and political reasons that + a route using conventional explosives was preferable. In addition, + PNE excavation would be difficult + or impossible to carry out in compliance with the LTBT.

+

Even for deep underground applications where radioactivity can in general + be contained, technical and societal problems remain. Moreover, the + anticipated costs would largely eliminate any economic advantage of + PNEs. Continuing development of alternative methods generally do not + involve the great uncertainties or potential legal problems of PNEs.

+

The scale of the efforts in some projected PNE applications would have presented unique security + problems. Natural gas stimulation, for example, could have involved an + effort of perhaps 1,000 PNEs annually + to achieve a 5 per cent increase in US + natural gas production. Significant problems could arise in handling and + security of PNE devices in such numbers + in the US. These problems would be + compounded—and there would be cause for serious concern about terrorist + actions—if other countries sought PNE + services on even a fraction of this scale.

+

The US + PNE program was undertaken to assess + technical feasibility and economic utility of eventual commercial use of + nuclear explosives by US industry. As + costs and problems associated with the experimental program increased, + industry reassessed the total costs involved in projected commercial + applications. Ultimately, it became evident that even if PNE technology promised some possible + economic advantages over competing technologies, these advantages could + well be lost when the costs of other factors were taken into account. In + these circumstances, there was little incentive for participating + contractors to continue to pursue PNE + technology, and their decision to withdraw from the PNE program was, ultimately, an economic + decision—in the broad sense of the term.

+
+ +
+ + 184. Memorandum From the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament + Agency (Warnke) to President + CarterSource: National Archives, RG 383, Records of the Arms Control and + Disarmament Agency, Office of the Director, Paul C. Warnke Files, December + 1974–July 1979, Accession #383–98–0154, Box 1, Memoranda to the + President Regarding SALT, Cruise + Missiles, CTB, NPT, and Indian Ocean Arms Control, + January–October 1978. Secret. A copy was sent to Keeny. Drafted by Robert Einhorn + (ACDA/MA). + Washington, January + 13, 1978 + + SUBJECT + On-Site Inspections (OSIs) Under + a Comprehensive Test Ban + +

I believe that our exploration of the OSI issue with the Soviets has already gone as far as it + productively can and that, if we are to avoid an impasse in the CTB negotiations, we must make a formal + proposal on OSIs when the talks resume + later this month. Specifically, I recommend that we now propose a + compromise approach that is responsive to the Soviet principle of + “voluntariness” and, at the same time, meets basic U.S. requirements for + an effective inspection provision. The principal reasons for this + recommendation are that:

+

—a U.S. proposal for mandatory OSIs + would almost certainly deadlock the negotiations, raise doubts in the + minds of the Soviets and others about the sincerity of our commitment to + conclude a CTB in the near future, and + jeopardize our efforts to obtain further Soviet concessions on other + CTB issues of greater importance to + us;

+

—the actual technical contribution to our CTB verification capability of any form of on-site + inspection, whether mandatory or voluntary, is quite limited;

+

—difficult practical and legal problems would arise for the U.S. under a + mandatory OSI system because of the + need to deny access to sensitive U.S. national security facilities and + to respect constitutional rights regarding private property;

+

—we would encounter serious domestic problems if we formally proposed + mandatory OSIs and then, as must be expected, had to fall back in order + to reach an agreement; and

+

—the overall verification package that now seems achievable should put us + in a good position to explain to the Congress and to the American people + that effective and reasonable measures have been worked out for + verifying the treaty. This package is likely to include improved + national technical means, authenticated data from seismic stations in + the USSR, and a new challenge OSI approach (described below) that eliminates the key defects + of the Soviet proposal while preserving the basic deterrent quality of + the mandatory approach.

+

These reasons, as well as my suggestions for a specific solution, are + discussed below.

+

Discussion of OSI + during the December Round. Although we tabled a U.S. Working + Paper in December outlining the key elements of a CTB treaty and protocol, the paper did not + contain a proposal on OSIs.See footnote 2, Document + 180. Instead, as instructed, the U.S. Delegation + expressed a desire to narrow the differences between traditional U.S. + and Soviet positions and explored at considerable length Soviet + receptivity to an annual quota of mandatory inspections.

+

Soviet reactions to our probes on mandatory OSIs, which were made on a number of occasions and at + several levels, were uniformly and categorically negative. Morokhov, head of the Soviet + Delegation, said that we should have no illusions: his government would + reject any U.S. proposal for mandatory OSIs and would regard it as a backward step intended to + complicate the task of negotiating a treaty at a time when the USSR had made several important + concessions in order to make agreement possible. He maintained that the + 1962 Khrushchev offer of 2–3 annual inspections had been discredited and + formally withdrawn by the Soviet Government and that all segments of + their bureaucracy were opposed to it.See + footnote 6, Document + 180.

+

In response to our calls for narrowing the differences between our + traditional positions, the Soviets asserted that they had already + demonstrated their willingness to compromise. Morokhov pointed out that, despite the + USSR’s long-standing opposition to + any form of OSI, they had accepted the + Swedish-developed concept of voluntary, or “challenge”, inspections. He + also cited Soviet readiness, announced during the recent October round, + to work out in advance the detailed rights and functions of inspection + teams.

+

Limited Technical Value of OSIs. The Interagency Working Group’s study of + September 1977The Working Group study of + OSIs is available in Washington + National Records Center, OSD Files: + FRC 330–80–0017, Box 63, + A–400.112 TEST BAN (27 SEP 77) 1977. demonstrated that the + actual verification value of on-site inspection must be considered quite + limited, given the small probability of discovering evidence of a + nuclear explosion with current OSI + techniques if the evader has taken certain precautions (e.g., sufficient + depth of burial, careful stemming and emplacement hole construction). + Because of uncertainties in fixing the precise location of suspicious + events, OSI visits would, in most + cases, be like looking for a needle in a haystack. As the study points + out, success would not be assured even if the location of a covert test were known within ten + meters.

+

For these reasons, the interagency study concluded that the value of an + OSI provision in a CTB was largely political. Any state + rejecting a demonstrably reasonable OSI + request would create the impression internationally that it had + something to hide and would give another state grounds for withdrawal. + This would be the case whether the rejection was prohibited under the + terms of the treaty (i.e., mandatory approach) or legally permitted + (i.e., voluntary approach).

+

Practical/Legal Problems of Mandatory OSIs. Even under a nominally + “mandatory” system, neither we nor the Soviets could tolerate OSIs at + sensitive locations, such as missile sites. The attempt to work out + criteria for exempted locations would be very difficult, and any + criteria that the Soviets could support—given their broad definition of + sensitive facilities—might well be so general as to raise domestic + concerns about OSI “sanctuaries” in the + USSR. In addition to the question + of national security exemptions, serious legal problems would arise in + seeking to grant the USSR mandatory + inspection rights on privately-held territory in the U.S. Given + constitutional and statutory protections of U.S. citizens and their + property, the U.S. Government’s ability to accede to a Soviet OSI request could well depend, in a number + of circumstances, on judicial determinations.

+

Both of these legal dilemmas would be minimized under a voluntary OSI system. In the case of a sensitive + area, an OSI request could either be + turned down for valid national security reasons or the area to be + inspected could be altered through negotiations to exclude the sensitive + facility. In the case of a privately-held area, the U.S. Government + either could turn down the request on the basis of the landowner’s and + judge’s objections or could negotiate with the Soviets and the landowner + to restrict the scope of the OSI visit + to a mutually acceptable level.

+

Domestic Considerations. If we were to propose + mandatory OSIs, it is only realistic to assume we would have to fall + back at a later stage in order to reach an agreement. When our + “concession” became public, as it certainly would, it would be + characterized by critics as a major U.S. retreat and could even affect + prospects for ratification. It seems far preferable, in my view, to make + a determination now, based on the limited technical utility of OSIs, + that a mandatory OSI provision would + contribute little, if anything, to adequate verification of a CTB and that therefore there is no good + reason to seek such a provision.

+

Critics of a CTB will no doubt try to + make an issue of verifiability. However, I believe that the verification + measures that are likely to be achievable—including authenticated data + from seismic stations in the Soviet Union, challenge OSIs, as well as + enhanced national technical means—will strike the American people and Congress as an impressive + package. Moreover, such a package would represent a considerable advance + beyond where we were just a few years ago, when the Soviets were + insisting on national technical means alone.

+

Negotiating Considerations. There is little doubt + that a U.S. proposal for mandatory OSIs would be unacceptable to the + Soviets and would lead to a stalemate in the CTB negotiations. But the cost of making such a proposal is + not just that resolution of the OSI + issue would be delayed until we decided to abandon the idea of mandatory + inspections. U.S. insistence on mandatory OSI has long been regarded worldwide as a reflection of + U.S. unwillingness to stop nuclear testing, and a formal U.S. proposal + would be seen by the Soviet leadership—and by the rest of the world when + it became generally known—as a throwback to earlier U.S. attitudes + toward a CTB.

+

In addition to stalemating the OSI issue + and casting doubt on our desire to conclude a CTB in the near future, a proposal for mandatory OSIs would + work against our efforts to obtain further Soviet concessions in areas + of much greater actual importance to us, especially internal seismic + stations and PNE-related issues, and + would thus be getting our priorities wrong. The Soviet representatives + have stressed that they expected reciprocal movement by us for their + November 2 initiative on PNEs and entry into force, which they regard as + having made agreement possible, and that they were disturbed by our + failure in December to take any tangible steps toward them on the OSI issue. Indeed, by the end of the + December round, we could discern some stiffening of Soviet positions, + particularly on internal stations. I believe we have to face up to the + prospect that, until we meet the Soviets half way on OSIs, they will not + be inclined to meet our concerns on other issues.

+

The British have recently informed us via diplomatic note (attached)Attached but not printed is a December 29, + 1977, paper from the British Embassy entitled “Comprehensive Test + Ban.” that they do not believe further progress can be made + toward a CTB without Western + willingness to abandon mandatory OSIs and that they hope we will be + prepared to do so when the negotiations resume later this month.

+

Seeking an Acceptable Compromise. The present + Soviet OSI proposal contains a number + of serious deficiencies. Specifically, OSI requests are to be based on seismic evidence that meets + certain technical criteria, thus making it impossible even to request an + inspection if the available evidence is either non-seismic (e.g., + overhead photography) or is seismic but does not meet the criteria. + Then, once a request is made, the party on whose territory the + questionable event has taken place can simply reject it out of hand, + without even providing an explanation.

+ +

I recommend that we make a counterproposal designed to shift the burden + of proof from the requesting party (where it is placed under the Soviet + proposal) to the suspected party as well as to raise the political costs + that the suspected party would incur if it refused a reasonable OSI request without giving justifiable + grounds for doing so. The formulation I recommend, which would be + incorporated in the separate verification agreement that will be + concluded with the Soviets to supplement the multilateral CTB treaty, would contain the following + elements:

+

—Each party would have the right to request an OSI at any time (i.e., there would not be a ceiling on the + number of requests that could be made).

+

—Any type of evidence, seismic or otherwise, could justify an OSI request. There would be no technical + criteria for screening out events as not eligible to invoke an OSI request.

+

—As in the Soviet proposal, the party on whose territory the event took + place would have the right to turn down the request. However, if it + decided to do so, it would be obligated to provide a detailed + justification for its decision, including any seismic, photographic, or + other evidence that it believed demonstrated that no violation had been + committed.

+

—If the requesting side were not satisfied by the explanation, it could + call for further information. If it remained unsatisfied by such + additional information, it would be entitled to bring the matter to the + U.N. Security Council.

+

—The parties would issue an agreed interpretative statement to the effect + that arbitrary refusals to grant OSI + requests could undermine confidence in the treaty and could create a + situation in which a party whose requests had been arbitrarily denied + might consider that its supreme national interests were being + jeopardized. The clear implication would be that a party could + legitimately withdraw from the treaty if it felt that its requests for + OSI were being turned down on + insufficient grounds.

+

The principal distinction between a mandatory OSI system and a purely voluntary one is that a refusal to + grant an inspection under the former type would constitute a treaty + violation and would thus justify withdrawal from the treaty by a party + whose interests are threatened. The agreed interpretative statement + described above would provide the functional equivalent of that + advantage, and would serve as a significant disincentive against + arbitrary rejections of OSI requests. + The recommended approach, by requiring suitable justification for any + OSI refusal and by eliminating + Soviet-proposed barriers to making an OSI request, would tend to create the presumption that the + state which is asked to accept an inspection visit will either grant + that request or provide a convincing explanation why the visit is + unnecessary.

+ +

By providing explicitly for bringing the matter to the Security Council, + the Soviet Union would be put on notice that it can turn down a + reasonable U.S. OSI request only at + considerable political cost. Given the Soviet Union’s veto, we would + not, of course, ask the Security Council to take corrective action. + However, the threat that its arbitrary behavior could be exposed + publicly in a forum that commands wide international attention would + strengthen the overall value of the provision as a deterrent against + arbitrary rejection of an OSI + request.

+

Recommendation. Although I believe that OSIs, in + general, have very limited utility as a CTB verification measure, I am confident that the approach + outlined above for initiating OSIs, together with prearranged rights and + functions of inspection teams that would be triggered when an OSI request is accepted, would give us as + much value as could be derived from any OSI provision, including the idea of a mandatory quota. I + therefore recommend that you authorize us to propose that approach when + the CTB negotiations resume.

+

I have already sent copies of this memorandum to State, Defense, JCS, Energy and CIA, and they all agree with the basic approach regarding + challenge OSIs that I have outlined. OSD, JCS, and Energy have + commented to me that we should use our move on OSI in a manner that enables us to obtain Soviet + concessions on matters of importance to us, especially on duration of + the PNE ban and internal seismic + stations. JCS suggests the approach be + explored, but not tabled at this time. If you approve my recommendation, + I will present our new position in the way I believe will best maximize + our pressure on the Soviets to move our way on the critical remaining + issues. I would make clear that our willingness to accept the challenge + OSI approach is contingent on + reaching a satisfactory solution on the entire treaty.

+ + Paul C. + WarnkePrinted from a + copy that indicates Warnke signed the memorandum. + +
+ +
+ + 185. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission at + GenevaSource: Carter + Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 6, + Comprehensive Test Ban (CTB), + 3–12/77. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Sent for information Immediate to the White House. + Printed from a copy that indicates the original was received in the + White House Situation Room. + Washington, January 26, 1978, 0236Z +

21039. Del by—opening of bus. 1/281 + White House for Brzezinski. + Subject: Instructions for CTB + Negotiations.

+

1. Following CTB instructions for Amb. + Warnke received today from + Dr. Brzezinski.

+

2. Begin quote. “When the trilateral CTB + negotiations resume on January 20, the President wants you to move ahead + with the negotiation of the key elements of a multilateral CTB treaty and protocol, and to explain + and seek Soviet acceptance of our positions on the contents of a + supplementary U.S.-Soviet agreement on verification. In doing so, you + should be guided by the following considerations.

+

3. You should propose the concept of challenge on-site inspections, which + would include the following elements: (a) there would not be a limit on + the number of OSI requests, nor + conditions as to the type or technical adequacy of evidence that must be + presented before a questionable event would be eligible for an OSI request; (b) a party not accepting an + OSI request would be obligated to + provide a detailed justification; (c) a requesting party not satisfied + with the explanation would be entitled to bring the matter to the U.N. + security council; and (d) there would be an agreed understanding that + arbitrary refusals to grant OSI + requests could undermine confidence in the treaty and could create a + situation in which a party whose requests had been arbitrarily denied + would consider that its supreme national interests were jeopardized + (thus providing a basis for withdrawal from the treaty).

+

4. You should present our new position in a manner that encourages + maximum Soviet movement toward us on issues of importance. You should + stress that our new position on inspection is part of an integrally + related and essential verification package—which includes our position + on internal seismic stations and OSI + procedures. Furthermore, you should state that the offer of this + verification package represents movement on our side on an important and + sensitive issue, and is contingent on Soviet movement to satisfactory + solutions on the duration and PNE + protocol issues along the lines we have proposed.

+

5. You should draw on the working group guidance paper in continuing to + promote our approach to obtaining timely, useful, and authenticated data from internal seismic + stations. If it appears helpful in advancing our objectives, you may + indicate to the Soviets that, while we are not prepared to propose a + specific number of stations, we are examining networks ranging up to + around twenty installations. You may indicate that the precise number + will depend on such factors as noise levels, locations, and the extent + to which arrays of seismometers may be included.

+

6. You should draw from the working group guidance papers in presenting + our views on the rights and functions of on-site inspection teams that + would be explicitly provided for in the separate, U.S.-Soviet + verification agreement and on procedures for international seismic data + exchange.

+

7. If the issue of permitted nuclear experiments is raised, you should + repeat our position that the terminology used to describe the basic + CTB prohibitions may require + mutually acceptable understandings regarding distinctions between + prohibited explosions and permitted nuclear experiments. The Delegation + should indicate, however, that we are not prepared to pursue this issue + further at this time.

+

8. You should continue discussion of issues concerning the treaty + duration and PNE protocol on the basis + of my December 4th instructions.” End quote.

+ + Vance + +
+ +
+ 186. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security + Affairs (Brzezinski) to President + CarterSource: Carter Library, National + Security Affairs, Staff Material, Agency File, Box 1, Arms Control + and Disarmament Agency: 8/77–2/78. Confidential. Sent for action. + Carter initialed the + memorandum. + Washington, January + 30, 1978 + + SUBJECT + Report for the Soviets on US + PNE Experience + +

In your Fall meeting with Foreign Minister Gromyko,See Document 168. you offered to provide + the Soviet Government with an account of our PNE experience. Shortly thereafter, we briefed the Soviet + CTB Delegation in Geneva on our experience and the SCC Working Group prepared a detailed + PNE paper for transmittal to + Gromyko. As a result of + Brezhnev’s offer of a PNE moratorium on November 2,See footnote 2, Document + 176. we deferred transmittal of our PNE paper to Gromyko pending Soviet elaboration of their new PNE position in the December round of the + CTB negotiations.

+

Although the main PNE issue is settled, + it is clear from those discussions that considerable work remains on the + issue of duration of the PNE Protocol + and its linkage to the CTB treaty. The + Soviets have informally indicated in Geneva that, due to the size of + their PNE program, any provision for + extension of the PNE moratorium poses + difficult bureaucratic problems for them. As a result, it would be + useful to forward our PNE report at + this time to demonstrate good faith in continuing PNE discussions and keep the Gromyko channel open in the event it + is needed for resolution of the remaining PNE issues.

+

In an earlier comment on a Weekly Report item,Not found. you indicated that you wanted to + read the PNE paper, and a brief summary + is attached for your review at Tab A.Attached but not printed is a paper entitled “U.S. Perspectives on + Peaceful Nuclear Explosions.”

+

RECOMMENDATION

+

_______ That you authorize transmittal of the PNE report to Gromyko.Carter wrote a check mark + authorizing the transmittal of the PNE report to Gromyko. Underneath this sentence, Carter wrote “use ‘private + industry’ vs ‘industry’,” referring to page one of the PNE report that noted that + “Experimental programs (including nuclear experiments) have been + conducted jointly with U.S. industry on the most interesting ideas + and there have been careful evaluations of both technical + feasibility and cost effectiveness.” Despite twenty years of such + programs, “no application has been identified by the United States + where PNEs offer important, clearcut advantages over alternative + approaches, and the United States no longer funds any PNE activities.” Vance sent the PNE Report under cover of a February + 14 letter to Gromyko. + (National Archives, RG 383, Records + of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Accession #383–98–0120, + Box 1, US Perspectives on Peaceful + Nuclear Explosions, February 1978.

+
+ +
+ + 187. Telegram From the Mission in Geneva to the Department of + StateSource: National + Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign + Policy File, D780061–0359. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Sent for information Priority + to London and Moscow. + Geneva, February 9, 1978, 1844Z +

1993. Exdis USCTB. Pass to DOE. + Subject: CTB Negotiations: US–UK + Bilateral Meeting, February 8.

+

CTB Message No. 123.

+

1. Summary. US and UK Delegations met on February 8 to discuss + issue of UK role in US–USSR + separate agreement on verification. US + Alt Rep (Neidle) reviewed principal + reasons why, in US view, verification + agreement should be bilateral in nature with UK association. He outlined US proposals for specific features of UK role as per instructions. UK Delegation was generally receptive to + US approach which acting UK + Rep (Edmonds) said was consistent with + formulation used in UK December 16 + plenary statement (agreement between US + and USSR with UK association)The UK statement is in telegram 12360 from + the Mission in Geneva, December 17, 1977; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + D770471–0209. and with general guidance issued by UK ministers. On specific features of + UK role, UK Deloff (Fakley) said that, from standpoint of technical + requirements for giving UK confidence + that Western security interests are protected, US proposals corresponded to what UK Delegation had in mind. End summary.

+

2. US + Rep outlined reasons why, in US view, agreement should be bilateral in + nature, particularly because straightforward, bilateral arrangement that + did not appear to be subjecting Soviets to unequal verification burden + would serve overriding Western interest of getting the USSR to accept detailed and effective + verification provisions. At the same time, he said US welcomed association of UK in such a way as to permit benefits of + UK expertise and participation, and + to give UK a higher level of assurance + regarding Soviet compliance than would be available to the non-nuclear + parties to the treaty (see full text of talking notes, para 8). Drawing on Del’s instructions,Not found. he outlined proposed nature of + UK association, as envisaged by + US, i.e., inclusion of UK personnel on US on-site inspection teams operating in the USSR; possibilities for US–UK + consultations in event of UK concerns + about Soviet behavior; UK right to + receive all data from internal stations in USSR; UK participation in + US seismic station installation + teams on Soviet territory. On legal form, he said US had in mind an exchange of notes between + US and UK which would specify US + intentions with regard to inclusion of UK personnel in carrying + out certain functions. He said US + envisaged frequent bilateral consultations with UK, as well as possibility of ad hoc trilateral + consultation when this seemed appropriate and noted that UK would have option of requesting OSI on Soviet territory independently of + US under multilateral treaty.

+

3. UK + Rep noted that HMG had made political decision that UK should be associated with bilateral + US-Soviet verification agreement, consistent with formulation in UK plenary statement of December 16, but + had not thought out details of association. He indicated UK Delegation’s views on best form of + association would influence London’s thinking. He said US approach seemed consistent with UK December 16 formulation and acknowledged + the importance of proposing an arrangement that was capable of achieving + Soviet support for effective verification provisions.

+

4. UK Deloff, in supplementary comments, + stressed UK requirements that a separate + agreement provide assurance of treaty compliance and ensure US–UK + cooperation. He said, from technical point of view, US proposals were what his Delegation had + in mind. Stating that there was no justification for independent British + OSI capability, he said UK would favor integration of UK personnel in US + OSI inspection teams. On ISIs, access to regional seismic data + from stations in USSR satisfied UK requirement. On installation of ISIs, he said UK envisaged involvement in three phases: (1) site + selection; (2) installation and station checkout; and (3) maintenance. + He said this was extent of UK technical + involvement envisaged.

+

5. US + Rep responded that US concept of site installation did not + exclude site selection. We had not suggested UK involvement in site maintenance, since this might be + conducted infrequently with very limited number of personnel, and would + probably be more of a chore than anything. But he said we would be + prepared to discuss this. Fakley said basis for UK desire to be included in maintenance phase was that it + would be only available basis for continuing UK involvement after initial installation of stations. + US + Rep noted that explicit references to + UK association in body of bilateral + agreement would establish basis for working out extent and details of + UK role. UK + Rep expressed agreement with this + concept and stressed that UK wanted + UK participation to be a positive, + not a complicating factor.

+

6. UK + Rep raised issue of procedure for + consultations. US + Rep noted, as practical matter, that in + many cases, US and UK would presumably want to consult + promptly in the event of a suspected Soviet violation. Tripartite + consultations might on occasion be deemed desirable as well, but in view + of wide range of possible scenarios, it would not seem appropriate to + make them obligatory.

+ +

7. UK + Rep said he would report discussions + back to London and would receive instructions in the near future.

+

8. Text of US + Rep’s talking notes follows: Begin + text:

+

—The overall Western objective for the separate agreement should be to + ensure effective verification of the USSR without undercutting our goal of obtaining broad + non-nuclear weapon state adherence to the treaty.

+

—We thus have an interest in making effective verification procedures as + palatable and negotiable as possible to the Soviets. Our judgment is + that we are more likely to achieve Soviet acceptance of such procedures + if we make the arrangements as simple as possible and do not in any way + appear to be subjecting them to double jeopardy.

+

—We also have an interest in avoiding the perception of discriminatory + verification arrangements. In our view, the separate agreement will be + more palatable to the non-nuclear states if it is perceived to be based + on such factors as special mutual security concerns (such as those + between the two super-powers) and geographical considerations (large + land masses with locations suitable for evasive testing).

+

—We both also have certain domestic considerations to take into account. + We understand that the form of British association could be of some + importance to you, and that there will be other questions, including, + for example, the costs that may be involved. For us, it is important + that the separate agreement be seen as capable of operating in a + streamlined and prompt manner.

+

—For these reasons, we believe that emphasis should be given to the + bilateral, as opposed to the trilateral (or nuclear weapon state), + aspects of the agreement.

+

—At the same time, we recognize and welcome the UK’s interest in being associated. We believe it is + important for the measures contained in the agreement to benefit from + UK expertise and participation. And + as a leading nuclear weapon power, and the only other nuclear power to + join the treaty from the start, the UK + should be able, through a practical form of association, to obtain a + higher level of assurance regarding Soviet compliance than would be + available to the non-nuclear parties.

+

—Taking these factors into consideration, we have devised an approach to + UK association that we believe would + meet overall Western objectives. The agreement we have in mind would be + bilateral, with the US and USSR as its parties. At the same time, + the agreement would be developed on a trilateral basis, with the UK playing an active role in the + negotiations.

+

—The agreement, under our suggested approach, would apply to activities + on US and Soviet territory. As far as + OSIs are concerned, it would + cover US requests for OSIs on Soviet + territory and Soviet requests for OSIs on US territory. In the event that a US request was accepted, the agreement should permit US to include UK personnel on US + inspection teams. Moreover, if the UK + had concerns about Soviet behavior, the two of us could discuss the + matter and, on the basis of those discussions, the US might make an OSI request under the agreement. On the other hand, the + UK might wish to raise the matter + with the Soviets independently and to make a UK + OSI request, as it would be entitled to + do under the multilateral treaty. Either option would be available.

+

—As far as the possibility of Soviet inspections on UK territory is concerned, we believe this + could be handled under the multilateral treaty. We doubt that the + Soviets would insist on dealing with this contingency under the separate + agreement, and we see no reason to anticipate their concerns.

+

—As far as internal stations are concerned, we also doubt that the USSR would desire such stations on UK territory and therefore see no reason + why this possibility should be offered to them.

+

—With respect to internal stations, we believe the UK should have the right to receive all of + the data from internal stations in the USSR. In addition, the UK + might want the right to participate in US installation teams on Soviet territory. These rights + could be provided for explicitly in the bilateral agreement.

+

—With respect to consultations, we would naturally plan to consult + bilaterally with you frequently and on all aspects of the separate + agreement. There may also be circumstances when ad hoc trilateral + consultations would be desirable.

+

—As far as the legal form of UK + association is concerned, we have in mind an exchange of notes between + the US and the UK. The US note would + express how we intended to exercise our rights under the agreement to + include the UK in carrying out certain + functions and our intention to share all internal seismic data. The + UK note would express your readiness + to cooperate and participate in implementing the agreement. The signing + of the notes could take place simultaneously with the signing of the + bilateral agreement. End text.

+ + Warnke + +
+ +
+ + 188. Memorandum from Secretary of Defense Brown to the President’s Assistant for National Security + Affairs (Brzezinski)Source: Washington National Records + Center, OSD Files: FRC 330–81–0202, Box 53, A–400.112 + TEST BAN (1 Jan–15 Mar) 1978. Secret; Restricted Data. + Washington, March + 3, 1978 + + SUBJECT + Nuclear Weapons Stockpile Reliability Under a CTB (U) + +

(S) Almost two months ago, I raised the issue of what nuclear experiments + would be permitted under a CTB. Since + then we have analyzed this issue in some detail.

+

(S) The purpose of this paper is to discuss the issue of maintaining + confidence in the nuclear stockpile under a CTB. Specifically, this paper will address: the ways we + have ensured stockpile reliability in the past; the potential problems + we will face under a CTB; the + alternatives available to maintain high confidence in stockpile + reliability in the future; and the implications of these alternatives in + terms of verification, our non-proliferation objectives, U.S.–U.S.S.R. + asymmetries, and achieving Congressional ratification of the treaty.

+

(S) I begin with the assumption that without question it will be U.S. + national policy under a CTB to maintain + high confidence in our nuclear deterrent forces. An essential element of + this will be confidence in the reliability of our nuclear weapons + stockpile.

+

(S/RD/N) Maintenance of Stockpile Reliability in the + Past. In the past, we have ensured reliability of the nuclear + weapons in our stockpile by a comprehensive program in which nuclear + testing played a key role at several points.The U.S. stockpile consists primarily of high-technology warheads, + each uniquely optimized for its intended delivery system and its + military mission. Each type warhead is custom-designed according to + the required yield, output, weight, size, and shape. Usually, old + designs are not rebuilt for new applications. Maximum emphasis is + placed on reduced size and weight, economical use of special nuclear + materials (oralloy, plutonium, and tritium), maximum yield-to-weight + ratio, inherent one-point safety, security, and survivability. + [Footnote is in the original.] First, during development, + each device was extensively tested in a program that typically started + at low yields for development of the primary, and progressed up to full + yield detonations and nuclear effects tests of the weaponized version. + Second, during the stockpile life of the weapon, reliability problems + uncovered in the stockpile surveillance program were resolved by expert + design teams who were familiar with the results of all past testing of + the weapon and whose competence was maintained by participation in a + continuing nuclear test program. When necessary, individual reliability problems were + investigated and resolved by specific nuclear tests. The adequacy of + fixes or design modifications occasionally had to be verified by nuclear + testing. Finally, the weapon was replaced in the inventory well before + the end of its nominal service life by a new design which was perfected + through its own development test series.

+

(S/RD/N) The yield levels of the above test programs varied, of course, + from a few pounds to full weapon yield. [5 lines not + declassified]

+

(S/FRD) Potential Problems Under a CTB. Under a CTB—whatever its terms—we will not be able + to continue maintaining the stockpile as before. The outlook for + stockpile reliability depends upon the type of CTB we aim for and achieve.

+

(S/FRD) If a CTB allowed no weapons + testing having any nuclear yield, our confidence in the reliability of + the stockpile would remain high initially, and would then decline at an + accelerating rate, possibly reaching quite low values. Methods to + quantify this degradation are not now known. The reasons for its + occurrence are complex. In the worst cases, a specific problem could + require retirement of entire major systems. As warheads reach the end of + their service life—and some in the stockpile will reach that point + relatively soon—we are not certain that we can replace them with exact + copies in which we have high confidence. There are a number of reasons + for this, including our inability to reproduce materials or duplicate + manufacturing processes exactly; some of these may be prohibited because + of present day environmental and safety regulations. Finally, as + delivery systems are necessarily changed with advancing technology or + new missions and threats, we are not certain we can adapt existing + warheads with high confidence. The possibility of such situations + arising under a CTB prompts + consideration of alternative CTB + concepts.

+

(S) The central question to be asked with regard to all alternatives to + an ideal “zero-yield” treaty is: Which alternatives would maintain the + highest stockpile reliability over the long term without jeopardizing + the potential benefits, particularly the non-proliferation benefits, of + a CTB?

+

(S/FRD) Alternative Approaches. Three alternative + approaches appear worthy of consideration, either singly or in + combination. We would argue that each could be made compatible with the + concept of a CTB because of the special + requirements of nuclear weapon states (NWS) to ensure the reliability of their stockpiles. In + brief form, these alternatives are:

+

—(S/FRD) Permitted Experiments. Allow low-yield + (kiloton or sub-kiloton) experiments below some designated threshold + with the purpose of contributing to stockpile maintenance.

+ +

—(S/FRD) Quota. Permit some low number of nuclear + tests (e.g., 2–5) annually for the purpose of stockpile maintenance.

+

—(S/FRD) Phase-out. Provide a transition period + (e.g., 10 years) during which testing, within some limits to be + determined, would be allowed for the purpose of adapting existing + stockpiles to lower-yield test conditions.

+

(S/RD/N) Permitted + Experiments (U).

+

(S/FRD) Provisions for “permitted experiments” would allow the use of + explosive release of nuclear energy for maintaining our confidence in + stockpile reliability. This alternative would make a clear-cut + distinction between “nuclear testing” which would be prohibited and + “nuclear experiments” which would be permitted. Energy-related work, + such as inertial confinement fusion, would continue.

+

(S/FRD) The value of low-yield nuclear experiments for maintenance of + confidence in the nuclear weapons stockpile would vary with the yield + allowed. Such experiments may range from the minimum “observable” + nuclear yield, about [numbers not declassified] + kiloton, to an upper limit of a few kilotons. They are different in a + most essential way from zero-yield hydrodynamic testing in which no + fissile material is involved. [4 lines not + declassified]

+

[6 paragraphs (44 lines) not declassified]

+

(S/RD/N) [3 lines not declassified] However, + testing above 1 KT, except perhaps in connection with a quota or + phase-out provision, may not be considered compatible with the concept + of a CTB.

+

(U) Another way to summarize the requirements for maintenance of + stockpile reliability and to show the yield dependencies of other + related aspects of a CTB is shown in + Table 1.[Table 1 not + declassified]

+

(S) There are at least two ways that “permitted experiments” could be + incorporated in a CTB. One approach + would be to ban “nuclear explosions” in the treaty, and then define the + term in such a way as to exclude the tests we wish to allow. A possible + formulation might be: “For the purposes of this treaty, a nuclear + explosion is defined as an event producing more thancalories yield from + a super-critical assembly in less than a few microseconds.” A second + approach would be to ban nuclear explosions (undefined) and then + explicitly identify an exclusion. There are a number of ways this + exclusion could be worded; for example: “The prohibition of Articledoes + not apply to fully contained nuclear experiments conducted in reusable + laboratory facilities.” This second approach, however, would be + applicable, because of technical limits on containment, only to nuclear experiments whose + yield limits would be about 100 tons.

+

(S) Quota and Phase-out Alternatives. Both the + quota and phase-out alternatives are variants on the permitted + experiments theme. However, as presently conceptualized, both approaches + would permit testing at a much higher kiloton threshold than envisaged + under the permitted experiments option.

+

(S) The quota approach would apply a stringent + limit on the number of tests allowed each year (e.g., 2–5). The purpose + of the testing would be stockpile maintenance, i.e., tests only for + conversion to “woodenized” warheads, recertifying rebuilt warheads, or + fixing problems. If no lower limit were imposed, the 150 KT threshold of + the TTBT could govern, but this + approach could be coupled with a reduction of the 150 KT threshold.

+

(S) The phase-out approach would be constructed + explicitly to attempt transition to “wooden” warheads which might be + designed to be replaceable with only limited design guidance or testing. + As in the alternative above, the TTBT + could govern yield unless otherwise specified. The duration could be + specified by the number of years or tests or both (e.g., 10 years or 25 + tests, whichever comes first).

+

(S/RD) Combination of Alternatives. Possibly more + attractive than any of the individual alternatives—both for achieving + the “tightest” possible CTB for + non-proliferation purposes and for achieving high stockpile + reliability—would be a combination. For example, a quota (5 tests per + year) at a reduced yield threshold (15 KT) for a phase-out period (5 + years), followed by permitted experiments (sub-kiloton), and with the + purpose of all tests being rigorously limited by description to + stockpile maintenance. During the phase-out period, a periodic review + would be conducted to assess the progress in achieving the desired goal. + If success was not likely, it might not follow that the transition would + be made to the “permitted experiments” phase. If it made negotiating + strategy easier, this could be approached on a “Phase I, Phase II” + basis. In all alternatives nuclear effects testing could be + “piggy-backed” on weapons tests. (Note that this combination will not + allow high-yield testing to resolve problems that may occur with + secondaries.)

+

(S/FRD) Implications of the + Alternatives (U)

+

[1 paragraph (10 lines) not declassified]

+

(S) Non-Proliferation. The implications of the + various alternatives to maintain stockpile reliability under a CTB for our non-proliferation objectives + are difficult to determine. By agreeing to a CTB, the U.S., U.S.S.R., and U.K. will have taken a major + step toward achieving the over-all objectives of the Non-Proliferation + Treaty. We will be severely constrained in the development of new + weapons even if nuclear experiments, a quota on testing, or a phase-out of testing are permitted + (for nuclear weapons states only). At issue here in relation to our + NPT objectives is how a CTB which allowed (or did not allow) one + or more of the various alternatives would affect the nuclear development + decisions of those states who have not signed the NPT.

+

(S) Any exceptions for nuclear weapons states will be characterized by + some of the non-nuclear states as discriminatory. States which want a + rationale for continued non-participation in the NPT are likely to exploit any exception + from an ideal zero-yield treaty. On the other hand, I see no reason to + believe that a zero-level treaty (as opposed to one allowing + experiments, a quota, or a phase-out) will provide sufficient reason for + those same states to participate in the NPT. The motivations behind the decisions for nuclear + weapons are far more complex, and virtually impossible to characterize + in advance. We should distinguish in our own thinking between those real + motivations, on the one hand, and excuses on the other.

+

(S/RD) U.S.–U.S.S.R. Asymmetries and Congressional + Ratification. A third consideration is how any of the various + alternatives for maintaining stockpile reliability under a CTB would affect asymmetries in the + reliability of U.S. and U.S.S.R. stockpiles. Although much is unknown in + this area, several factors appear to give the Soviets an advantage in + reliability of their stockpile. First and most important, they can + retain their weapon design lab personnel for many years simply by + control of personnel assignments. Second, their missiles have a larger + throw-weight by a significant amount, giving them more flexibility in + correcting problems without nuclear testing (i.e., by falling back to + simpler, heavier warhead designs).

+

[1 paragraph (6 lines) not declassified]

+

[8 lines not declassified] Higher yield primaries, + while almost surely weighing more, would be less subject to deleterious + effects of small changes in production processes, materials, etc., and + thus could have better long-term reliability.

+

(S) It would appear, therefore, that the Soviets would begin a CTB with a “built-in” asymmetry in their + favor. The quota and phase-out alternatives are the ones that would + contribute more directly to minimizing the effects of this + asymmetry.

+

(S) With respect to the permitted experiments alternative, the question + of potential asymmetries becomes intertwined with the verification + capabilities of both sides. [5 lines not + declassified] A unilateral U.S. failure to carry out + experiments at that level could produce significant technical + asymmetries. It would almost certainly have a considerable political + impact if it were believed that we were not, but the Soviets were, doing + such experiments.

+ +

(S) Another consideration is that we should expect close Congressional + scrutiny of the stockpile reliability and verification problems + associated with a CTB. A treaty which + constrains experiments to the kiloton and sub-kiloton range—let alone a + still lower level—is likely to be attacked by some as a “give away” that + concedes a permanent reliability advantage to Soviet nuclear forces. On + the other hand, a CTB treaty that has a + higher yield quota or phase-out provision will probably be attacked by + others as a significant departure from the ideal of a “comprehensive” + test ban.

+

(S/FRD) Options (U)

+

(S) At issue is whether some form of limited nuclear testing—limited in + yield, numbers of tests, or duration—should be allowed under a CTB in order to maintain, over the long + term, high confidence in the reliability of our nuclear weapons + stockpile.

+

(S) At this time, there is no known method of ensuring high stockpile + reliability that does not include some nuclear testing. Yet any proposal + for modifying a “zero-yield” CTB would + conflict with the basic purposes of an ideal CTB, the degree dependent upon the type of modification + desired. Weighing together these two policy requirements is the tough + problem.

+

(S) The options which appear to offer the best approach toward + satisfactorily gaining both objectives of stockpile reliability and + non-proliferation are listed below:

+

1. (S/FRD) Phase-out, i.e., some form of quota + testing, restricted solely to nuclear weapon states, at a limit of 15 KT + or less, over a specified period of time. [2 lines not + declassified] As to the length of the transitional period, it + is again noted that methods to quantify confidence levels in the + reliability of our stockpile, in a condition of non-testing, are not + known. Sufficient time to determine the feasibility of a “woodenized” + stockpile and to permit an orderly transition to a posture that would + provide adequate assurance of high confidence in stockpile reliability + under a CTB would be essential + criteria. For a short transition period, e.g., 5 years or less, a review + provision following it would be desirable.

+

2. (S/FRD) Small quota of tests per year. A quota + of perhaps two tests per year at some fixed yield limit, perhaps as low + as 5 KT or even as high as the 150 KT TTBT limit, might provide sufficient opportunity for + assuring stockpile confidence. This rate would be so much lower than the + current testing rates of both the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. that it should + allay most concerns about the development of new weapons. However, this + approach would be a major deviation from a pure CTB. To minimize its impact on our non-proliferation goals, + it would require full clarification to the non-nuclear weapon states of + the need of nuclear weapons + states to maintain a reliable nuclear weapon stockpile. The advantage of + this approach is that throughout the yield range it continues testing in + the mode where our past experience lies, and also [less than 1 line not declassified]

+

(S/FRD) Under both Options 1 and 2, sub-kiloton nuclear experiments, + e.g., 100 tons, would be allowed indefinitely. They would assist in + maintaining high levels of scientific expertise at the laboratories. + This would also allow energy-related work to go on, and would accept the + fact that military benefits, e.g., nuclear weapons effects testing, + cannot be excluded from such work.

+

3. (S/RD) Permitted Experiments [less than 1 line not declassified]. Stockpile confidence would + be lower than under options 1 and 2 above. While testing at levels less + than about [less than 1 line not declassified] + would not contribute directly to stockpile reliability, the positive + benefit of such testing would be in encouraging the retention of + laboratory expertise which would help indirectly to assure stockpile + confidence. Full support by the government in retaining the high + scientific quality of the laboratories would be essential. [2 lines not declassified]

+

(S) There are other variations which could also contribute to stockpile + reliability but would probably contribute less toward non-proliferation + objectives than the above options.

+

1. (S/FRD) [2 lines not declassified] Such tests + would contribute directly to stockpile reliability but may not solve all + stockpile maintenance questions requiring testing. [1 + line not declassified]

+

2. (S) Formal Review. Under this variant, there + would be no provision for nuclear tests for stockpile reliability during + the period of the agreement; however nuclear experiments under 1 kiloton + would be permitted. The agreement would include a provision for a formal + review at the end of the 3 to 5 year initial duration period. At that + time, each party would have the right to conduct those nuclear tests at + a specified yield which are certified by each government to be required + to maintain stockpile reliability.

+

(S/FRD) Recommendation. The issues identified in + this paper concerning some form of limited testing under a CTB for maintaining high confidence in the + reliability of our nuclear stockpile are of sufficient national + importance to warrant an SCC meeting to + obtain a conclusive decision.

+ + Harold + Brown + +
+ +
+ + 189. Telegram From the Mission in Geneva to the Department of + StateSource: National + Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign + Policy File, D780125–1235. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Sent for information Priority + to London and Moscow. + Geneva, March 22, 1978, 0910Z +

4351. USCTB. Pass to DOE. Subject: CTB + Negotiations: Assessment of Session Held January 23 to March 22, + 1978.

+

CTB Message No. 187

+

1. Summary: With trilateral negotiations entering brief recess, most + significant development in recent weeks has been emergence of + verification, rather than peaceful nuclear explosions (PNEs), as chief Soviet preoccupation and + as the key issue on which prospects for early achievement of a CTB treaty depend. It has become clear + that our proposals on internal seismic installations (ISIs) and on-site inspections (OSIs) have + struck sensitive nerves in the Soviet government and have encountered + strong resistance within certain quarters on the basis of traditional + Russian concerns about sovereignty and security. While the Soviets + continue to state agreement in principle to the idea of authenticated + ISIs and preagreed OSI rights and functions, and have + accepted a number of specific elements of our approach, their overall + response to our proposals—as reflected in the draft separate agreement + they tabled on March 15The draft agreement + is in telegram 4069 from the Mission in Geneva, March 16; National + Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign + Policy File, D780117–0507.—has been minimal and inadequate. + They have, in particular, proposed leaving decisions on key verification + requirements to a joint consultative commission after the treaty enters + into force.

+

2. However, the Soviets have stressed informally that, if verification + difficulties can be resolved, duration and PNE linkage would no longer be problems. Soviet Rep (Morokhov) has privately told both us and the British + that he would recommend Soviet government acceptance of idea that + weapons test ban treaty should be permitted to extend without French and + Chinese adherence and that, in the absence of mutually acceptable means + of carrying out PNEs, the PNE moratorium should continue as long as + the treaty. And, despite objections concerning U.S. verification + proposals, leaders of Soviet Delegation have given every indication that + Soviet government wants to conclude a CTB treaty at an early date. End summary.

+

3. Much of the work of the round beginning on January 23 consisted of + detailed U.S. presentations on verification. Including the introduction + of illustrative language for the separate verification agreement, the + presentation of technical justifications for our proposals, and responses to Soviet questions. + The Soviet reaction to our verification package evolved gradually. At + first, our proposals evoked considerable interest and even a few + positive signals. As the round progressed, however, reactions became + more negative, culminating in the Soviet plenary statements of March 3 + and 10,The Soviet plenary statements are in + telegram 3421 from the Mission in Geneva, March 4; National + Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign + Policy File, D780099–0598 and telegram 3854 from the Mission in + Geneva, March 11; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + D780109–0775. where Morokhov labeled U.S. proposals on ISIs and OSIs unacceptable.

+

4. The basis for this hardening Soviet attitude on verification is what + appears to be an acute concern, at least within certain parts of the + Soviet Delegation, that our verification proposals would involve + unwarranted intrusion on Soviet sovereignty and would jeopardize Soviet + security by making available intelligence information unrelated to the + CTB treaty. The more they have + studied the details of our proposals, the more they have expressed + opposition. They have claimed, for example, that the high quality + seismometers we propose would detect missile launches and tank movements + within the USSR, that U.S. ISI site + selection, installation, and maintenance teams would have unwarranted + opportunities to roam around vast areas and engage in unauthorized + activities, and that U.S. procedures for exempting certain sites from + on-site inspection areas would enable us to conduct an intelligence + mapping operation of the Soviet Union.

+

5. It is apparent that verification has become a controversial and + divisive issue within the Soviet Delegation, presumably reflecting sharp + bureaucratic differences in Moscow. At more than one plenary meeting, + Morokhov has staked out + extreme positions on matters of Soviet sovereignty and security, only to + contradict himself a few minutes later at the restricted heads of + Delegation meeting. He has acknowledged that he is under certain + constraints when his whole Delegation is present, and has encouraged us + to take him more seriously when he speaks in the private sessions. At + working group meetings, we have seen representatives of different Soviet + agencies openly contradict one another.

+

6. Of course, Soviet concerns about the effects of our verification + proposals on Soviet sovereignty and security are either highly + exaggerated or without any technical foundation. But these issues are + probably being considered by the Soviet government only partially on + their merits. Our proposals clearly cut against the doctrinal grain, and + we would expect that they have stimulated the attention and the + hostility of the Soviet security apparatus, if not other influential + segments of the Soviet bureaucracy as well. With such high stakes, we + can anticipate great difficulty + in getting the Soviets to go along with our proposals on + verification.

+

7. Internal seismic installations. Among the verification issues, the + most sensitive to the Soviets, and the most important to us, is ISIs. The Soviets have, at least in + principle, accepted important elements of our approach, especially the + need for agreed technical characteristics of the equipment, agreed + authentication measures, agreed procedures to ensure the integrity of + the authentication device, agreed station locations, and agreed + communications channels. But critical problems remain. The most + generalized defect of the Soviet approach to ISIs, as presented in their March 15 draft, is that + practically all agreed requirements for the seismic installations would + be determined by the joint consultative commission after entry into + force of the treaty, rather than provided for in the separate agreement. + Privately, Morokhov has argued + that it would be easier to work out characteristics satisfactory to us + in the JCC than in the separate + agreement itself, since these issues will have greater political + visibility and sensitivity during the treaty negotiations. We have taken + the position that controversial issues can best be resolved in these + negotiations. A possible basic difference of principle may also exist on + the nature and volume of the data to be exchanged. The Soviets have + discussed, but not yet formally proposed, an approach under which data + from the ISIs would be provided only + upon request for the purpose of clarifying the character of events that + had been detected by national technical means. In addition, pointing out + that the equipment proposed by us will probably not be ready for + deployment when the treaty enters into force, the Soviets have called + for the use of existing equipment and have not been clear on whether + they envisage upgrading later.

+

8. The present Soviet position on ISIs + is clearly inadequate, and we have told them so. We have stressed that + we could not enter into a CTB without + first having nailed down our essential verification requirements in the + separate agreement, including the requirement for receiving all data + recorded at the ISIs, not just + specially requested data. It is currently difficult to predict how much + detail, in terms of ISI characteristics, the Soviets will be prepared to + accept in the separate agreement. While claiming that he has already + gone beyond his instructions in the March 15 draft, Morokhov has hinted that the Soviets + would be prepared to consider more detailed formulations. He talked of + finding the “golden mean” between the Soviet draft and the “excessive + detail” of the U.S. proposal. However, Morokhov has also said that he is not in a position to + put forward modifications of the Soviet draft and has urged us to + propose additions and modifications of our own.

+

9. On-site inspections. Relative to ISIs, remaining difficulties on OSIs seem less acute and + more easily resolvable. On the question of procedures for initiating OSIs, the stated Soviet + objective has been to ensure that OSIs would not be used for harassment + or for purposes unrelated to CTB + compliance. They have accordingly tried to delineate clearly the limited + type of event that could trigger an OSI + request and also to limit the type of evidence that could be used in + making such a request. Throughout the round, Soviet Delegation members + have given us confusing and most often troublesome signals on this + question. However, from recent remarks by Morokhov and his deputy, Timerbaev, it seems that there may now be a reasonably + good possibility of finding language that meets the Soviet need for + specificity in describing the type of event that could trigger an OSI, without establishing criteria (e.g., + requirement for seismic evidence) that could serve as a barrier to U.S. + OSI requests. In addition, we have + continued to stress that our proposed agreed understanding on the + consequences of arbitrary behavior in rejecting OSIs is an essential + element of our voluntary approach to OSI. While the Soviets have not formally responded to our + proposal, Timerbaev has indicated + that they may be prepared to work with us on such an understanding.

+

10. On OSI rights and functions, the + Soviets have continued to agree in principle that these should be agreed + in advance and specified in the separate agreement. In practice, + however, their draft deals only with rights, in general terms, contains + nothing on functions and defers certain key elements (e.g., types of + equipment, number of personnel, duration of OSI) to ad hoc determination by the joint consultative + commission. U.S. Delegation believes that Soviets will eventually agree + to a more complete and explicit treatment of the rights and functions in + the separate agreement, along the lines we have proposed. However, this + may well prove difficult and time-consuming, and we would still have the + job of getting the Soviets to accept the details of our proposal.

+

11. International seismic data exchange (ISDE). The verification issue on + which the most progress was made in terms of working out agreement + language was ISDE. In the course of several sub-group sessions, a + bracketed composite text was developed of the treaty annex containing + the guidelines for the ISDE. The present text includes only a few + bracketed formulations, reflecting disagreements on relatively minor + issues. The only factor preventing elimination of virtually all of the + brackets (with the exception of those containing alternate formulations + on the nature of the implementation body) was the inability of the + Soviet Delegation, even on this relatively simple and uncontroversial + issue, to coordinate its position effectively. Soviet sub-group + representatives came to several meetings without instructions, and were + simply unprepared to negotiate.

+

12. Duration and peaceful nuclear explosions. Throughout the round, the + U.S. and UK Delegations kept the + pressure on the Soviets to abandon their existing positions on duration of the weapons test ban + treaty and linkage between the duration of the treaty and that of the + PNE moratorium. While Soviet + Delegation members indicated informally, almost from the start of the + round, that they were prepared to consider alternatives to their present + position on treaty duration, they were unwilling, and remain unwilling, + to make a formal proposal until there is a greater measure of agreement + on verification. Until recently, we had speculated that the Soviet + tactic might be to wait until verification is resolved, and then offer + to permit the weapons test ban to continue without French and Chinese + adherence in exchange for our acceptance of a deadline for the PNE moratorium. However, Morokhov on March 9 told us that he was + convinced that the duration and PNE + issues would pose no difficulty once verification was solved. He said + that he would recommend Soviet acceptance of the idea that the treaty + should be permitted to continue and that, in the absence of trilateral + agreement on procedures for carrying out PNEs, the PNE moratorium + should remain in force as long as the weapons test ban.

+

13. U.S. Delegation considers it unlikely, in light of the importance of + the issues involved, that Morokhov would talk that way if the Soviet Delegation + did not already have authority to move along those lines or if Morokhov was not confident that he + could get that authority. If this is correct, the Soviets are prepared + to move much more decisively and much more quickly from their Nov 2 + position (i.e., fixed deadline for PNE + moratorium)See footnote 2, Document 176. than we had expected. + Indeed, such a move would constitute total acceptance of our position on + PNE linkage.

+

14. Of course, even if Morokhov’s + remarks can be depended upon fully, we would not expect it to be easy to + find mutually acceptable formulations on duration and PNE questions. The Soviets may well back + away from their November 2 positions gradually, in small and initially + inadequate steps. In any event, it is very doubtful that they would + accept our December 7 proposal concerning a special right of + withdrawal,Telegram 11707 from the + Mission in Geneva, December 7, 1977, contains the text of the + December proposal, which specified that “after three years have + elapsed since the entry force of the treaty, any party could give + one year notice and, at the end of that year, withdraw from the + treaty if it determined that conditions arising from the conduct of + nuclear explosions by any non-party required its withdrawal for + reasons of national security.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + D770454–1524) since that formulation, in their view, places + too heavy a responsibility on the individual state deciding to exercise + its right. Instead, they will probably insist on some formula that + incorporates the principle of “unity of action” among the three nuclear + powers which, to the Soviets, probably means trilateral consultations + prior to a decision on extending the treaty and either simultaneous + release from their CTB + obligations or a joint + determination to extend the treaty. The duration formula recently + proposed by the UK includes that + principle, while meeting our key objective of permitting the treaty + regime to continue without French and Chinese adherence. Moreover, as + the UK Delegation suggested, it could + provide an opportunity to terminate CTB + obligations and resume testing if serious stockpile reliability problems + developed. U.S. Delegation believes that UK proposal could well be desirable option to pursue and + feels that it should be given careful consideration during the + recess.

+

15. Conclusion. Despite their cautious and inadequate position on + verification, we have no reason to think that the Soviets are interested + in relaxing the pace of the negotiations. In fact, by providing us a + preview of their position on duration and PNE linkage and by giving us their draft separate agreement + immediately before the recess, Morokhov has conveyed the impression that at least the + leadership of the Soviet Delegation is determined to move ahead and even + accelerate the pace.

+

16. Morokhov has told us privately + several times that, if verification can be solved, the other issues will + fall into place easily and quickly. We question how easily and quickly + that might be. But at the present time, we can agree with his assessment + that verification, especially the question of internal seismic + installations, holds the key to prospects for achieving a treaty at an + early date.

+

17. A caveat is necessary, however, on the permitted nuclear experiments + issue. In accordance with instructions, we have not raised the issue + with the Soviets. Early in the round, the Soviet deputy mentioned to + U.S. Alt Rep that the issue could cause + difficulties for our two countries. In the course of an informal + conversation March 9 on the detection capabilities of ISIs, Morokhov said that the USSR “would not do nuclear experiments” under what he + believed to be the current detection threshold using NTM (one-half of a kiloton). Recently, + Timerbaev asked UK Dep Rep + Edmonds when we would get to the issue raised in the first paragraph of + the U.S. December 7 working paper (i.e., definitions). He said that the + three Delegations should be able to handle that matter the way we did at + the NPT Review Conference (when a + certain type of laser fusion research was interpreted as not falling + within the scope of the NPT).No further information was found.

+

18. It is quite possible that the Soviets have simply not figured that + the permitted experiments might not be confined to activities like laser + fusion research. In fact, we have no idea of how the Soviets would react + to the range of options that we have considered in the course of the + review. Therefore, when we + say that verification is the principal remaining stumbling block, this + necessarily leaves out of account the permitted experiments question. We + currently have no way to predict whether this question, depending on the + option chosen, will become a serious complicating and delaying factor in + the negotiations.

+ + Warnke + +
+ +
+ 190. Summary of Conclusions of a Special Coordination Committee and + Presidential Review Committee MeetingSource: Carter Library, National Security Council, + Institutional Files, Box 92, SCC + 066, CTB, Stockpile Reliability + Experiment: 3/23/78. Secret. The meeting took place in the White + House Situation Room. + Washington, March + 23, 1978 + + SUBJECT + CTB: Stockpile Reliability and + Permitted Experiments + + + PARTICIPANTS + State + Cyrus Vance + Leslie Gelb Director, + Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs + Defense + Harold Brown + David McGiffert Asst Sec + for International Security Affairs + Gerald Johnson + Energy + Secretary James + Schlesinger + Donald Kerr Acting Asst Sec for Defense Programs + JCS + Admiral James Holloway Acting Chairman, JCS + Maj Gen Edward Giller JCS + Rep + CTB + CIA + Sayer Stevens Dep Dir, National Foreign Assessment Center + [name not declassified] Chief, Nuclear + Energy Division, OSI + White House + Zbigniew Brzezinski + NSC + Reginald Bartholomew + Benjamin Huberman + OSTP + Frank Press + John Marcum + +

The purpose of the meeting was to discuss the issue of stockpile + reliability and whether some continued testing should be permitted under + a CTB. At the opening of the meeting + Dr. Brzezinski explained that due to activities + connected with the meeting between President Carter and Prime Minister Begin,Begin and Carter met in Washington on March 21 and 22. See + Foreign + Relations, 1977–1980, vol. VIII, Arab-Israeli Dispute, + January 1977–August 1978, Documents 232 and 234. this meeting + needed to be terminated at about 6:15 p.m. Consequently, he stated that + this meeting would be used to vent the issues and get some sense of the + position of the participants, without trying to resolve the issue.

+

At Dr. Brzezinski’s request, + Frank Press reviewed the + findings of a distinguished panel of outside experts he had convened to + consider this issue. He explained that although they had concurred in + the Panel’s report,Not found. along + with the other members, the directors of our nuclear weapons design + laboratories had subsequently written him to reinforce their concerns + that some testing would be needed eventually to maintain confidence in + the reliability of our nuclear weapons stockpile.

+

On verification, he explained that the Panel felt that verification + capabilities using internal seismic stations may be considerably better + than originally expected, but he cautioned that these results seem + almost “too good to be true” and proposed that they be thoroughly + reviewed by an appropriate OSTP panel before being adopted.

+

Secretary Brown commented that in + any event, it was just a matter of time before our capability is that + good. Dr. Press agreed, and noted + that seismic arrays would be particularly helpful in improving our + capability.

+

Dr. Press then discussed the + problem of stockpile reliability. He noted that all Panel members agreed + that we could maintain the present level of confidence for five years + without testing and that there would be some decline in reliability in + the long term, with divergent views as to how rapid the decline would + be. He reviewed the Panel’s comments on the three options under + consideration by the SCC Working + GroupMarcum, Huberman, and Bartholomew summarized the three + options in a March 21 memorandum to Brzezinski. Option one “would ban all testing and + rely on self-regulation to determine whether some testing at very + low levels such as one point safety tests might be permitted.” + Option two “would augment this approach with a review conference at + the end of a specified period to consider stockpile reliability + along with other problems such as testing by France and China, and + provide for withdrawal if necessary at a lower cost than invoking + the supreme national interest clause.” The third option “would + explicitly permit testing under one of a number of sub-options such + as delay of entry into force, annual quotas, or a yield ceiling + ranging from a few tons to a few kilotons.” (Carter Library, + National Security Council, Institutional Files, Box 92, SCC 066, CTB, Stockpile Reliability Experiment: 3/23/78) + and noted that it saw considerable value in a more than routine review + conference at the end of five years which could consider stockpile + reliability along with other problems such as PNEs + and testing by other states + which affect the future of a CTB. + Secretary Vance wondered whether + we would know how much degradation had occurred after five years. + Secretary Brown responded that + this was a new challenge since in the past there had never been a time + when new weapons were not under constant development; he felt that the + issue was one of confidence and not real decline. Dr. Brzezinski observed that we would not + know how rapid the decline would be; Dr. Press agreed, noting there would be some decline but + that the rate would be uncertain.

+

Dr. Press discussed the Panel’s + finding that to maintain the present level of confidence in stockpile + reliability in the long term, testing at 3 KT would be needed. It was + recognized that this would be viewed as a threshold ban rather than a + CTB and could undermine our + political objectives. The Panel did not think the marginal reduction in + political price in reducing the testing threshold from 3 KT to 300 tons + would be worth the loss in technical utility of the threshold.

+

Secretary Brown stated that he + differed somewhat from this conclusion noting that we might in time + learn how to more effectively utilize testing at a level as low as 100 + tons. Secretary Vance inquired + whether a 3 KT threshold would permit development of new weapons. Dr. + Press responded that a 3 KT + threshold would eliminate development of strategic warheads, that some + tactical warheads might be developed although this would be of uncertain + importance, and that 3 KT might permit development of weapons by current + non-nuclear weapons states. In response to a question from Secretary + Schlesinger, Dr. Press discussed the difference between + our seismic detection and identification thresholds, noting that they + occasionally differ by up to a factor of two.

+

Secretary Brown commented that + stockpile reliability would obviously be a key issue in Senate + ratification and that possible disparities would also receive a lot of + play since there was clearly a verification threshold of the order of a + [less than 1 line not declassified] He argued + that we should think further about the non-proliferation impact of a + less than comprehensive treaty and be prepared in the context of + ratification to address how much various kinds of treaties would help + our non-proliferation efforts.

+

Secretary Brown then commented on + the three options noting that option A (CTB with self-regulation) would be most helpful for + non-proliferation and probably is negotiable, but it could be said that + the disparity is greatest in this option. In thinking about option B + (review conference), he wondered whether the Soviets had originally + expected they could use PNEs to solve + the stockpile reliability problem. He noted that PNEs would be a possible way out for us as + well, but that the Indians might be able to take advantage of this + option. He agreed that there + were a number of issues which favored the five year/review conference + approach but he was concerned that the political threshold against + resuming testing would be high. With regard to option C (provision for + continued testing) Secretary Brown noted that it included a possible phase out + approach. He again mentioned that testing at 100 tons might be + interesting and also suggested also that we might consider contained + experiments in laboratory facilities, but expressed concern that this + could lead to a containment race. Dr. Press commented that the Panel was very skeptical of the + utility of a threshold as low as 100 tons and Secretary Brown agreed that there was + considerable uncertainty as to its effectiveness.

+

Dr. Brzezinski, noting that time + was short, asked Paul Warnke for + his views. Warnke declined to + comment on the technical issues but noted there were strong + international as well as Soviet expectations that we were seeking a + genuine CTB. He agreed that if we could + not afford the risks, we should move to option B. He argued that option + C would be perceived internationally as a threshold ban rather than a + CTB and would have very little + value. Consequently, he believed that we should abandon the negotiations + rather than adopt option C. Dr. Brzezinski observed that the President’s commitment to a + CTB was very clear and that an + absolutely compelling national security argument would be required for + him to adopt option C.

+

Secretary Schlesinger noted that + while we were on record as supporting verifiable arms control + agreements, the Panel had stated we would be able [less than 1 line not declassified] He was concerned that the + lack of verification below this level might be unacceptable to Congress. + Secretary Brown and others noted + that we had never insisted on absolute verification but have always been + careful to speak in terms of its adequacy and of the significance of any + possible evasion.

+

Secretary Schlesinger’s second + concern was whether the weapons laboratories would be able to continue + certification of performance of our stockpiled weapons; he noted that + without testing [less than 1 line not + declassified] they might not be able to do so. He commented + that this might not be in our security interest and that the reaction + could be very severe if we tell Congress that we cannot verify and + certify. He argued that the non-proliferation issue could cut both + ways—some countries might develop nuclear weapons if they lost + confidence in our deterrent.

+

Dr. Brzezinski noted that + stockpile degradation would be troublesome if the Soviets could maintain + their confidence by cheating while ours declined; however, if the + decline in stockpile reliability was about the same on both sides, there + would not be any political problem. Therefore he thought that enhanced + verification could be important in this regard and wondered whether we + should review possible enhancement measures. After some discussion, + Secretary Brown noted that while some improvements were under + consideration, it was unlikely that we could push the verification + threshold [less than 1 line not declassified]

+

Secretary Vance then commented + briefly on the options, noting that he could support the review + conference approach but that he agreed with Paul Warnke that we should get out of the negotiations + rather than adopt any provision for continued testing. After some + discussion on the degree of redundancy in warheads for our current + strategic systems, the meeting adjourned at about 6:20 p.m.

+ +
+ +
+ 191. Memorandum of ConversationSource: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, + Brzezinski Material, + Subject File, Box 36, Memcons: + President: 4/78. Secret; Sensitive. Carter spoke with Callaghan by phone from the Oval Office. The + memorandum is scheduled to be printed in full in Foreign + Relations, 1977–1980, vol. XXVII, Western + Europe. + Washington, April 17, 1978, + 2:27–2:47 p.m. + + SUBJECT + Summary of Telephone Conversation between the President and Prime + Minister Callaghan + +

The following is a paraphrase of the conversation:

+

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to a comprehensive test ban.]

+

Callaghan: + May I raise the Comprehensive Test Ban for just a moment. Your experts + and ours as well, I understand, are now saying that we will need a few + controlled explosions once the treaty has gone into effect, in order to + verify existing stockpiles. I hope you will look into that. I would need + a lot of convincing that it made sense.

+

The President: There had been discussion here that + perhaps after two, three, or four years, after the expiration of the + treaty, then there might be a need for some explosions. But to have them + during the treaty would short-circuit the basic thrust of the + treaty.

+

Callaghan: + Yes, I feel that way very strongly. But the experts are convinced that + some explosions are necessary. What will be necessary is a political + decision, and we will have to assess the risks.

+

The President: This question has not been brought + to me. I know that Jim + Schlesinger, who heads the Energy Department and is + responsible for these + matters, has been concerned, from his time as Secretary of Defense. But + Harold Brown has been willing + to forego explosive tests during the time of the agreement. We have + discussed the possibility of mutual monitoring after the agreement for a + few tests.

+

Callaghan: + That would be after the treaty expired.

+

The President: Yes. If I find something more on + the technical issues, I’ll tell you.

+

Callaghan: + Thank you. I mentioned the issue to Harold + Brown. If we did have to include some explosions in an + agreement, no one would think we were very serious about a test ban.

+

The President: I’ll follow the issue. It’s always + good to hear from you, Jim. Please give my best to Audrey.

+

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to a comprehensive test ban.]

+
+ +
+ 192. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security + Affairs (Brzezinski) to President + CarterSource: Carter Library, National + Security Affairs, Brzezinski + Material, Subject File, Box 6, Comprehensive Test Ban (CTB), 1–2/78. Secret. Carter initialed the memorandum. + Above Carter’s initial, an unknown hand wrote “Cy sent to Marcum + 4/19.” + Washington, April + 18, 1978 + + SUBJECT + Additional Information Items + +

CTB and + Stockpile Reliability

+

As I alerted you last week,Not found. + there is growing opposition within Defense and Energy to a CTB and for the first time Harold Brown, whose active support + would be essential in ratification efforts, is seriously waivering in + his support for this objective.

+

As you will recall, the Chiefs pointed out in previous discussions with + youNot found. their concern that + we may be unable to maintain confidence in our nuclear weapons stockpile + under a CTB and that the Soviets could + maintain confidence in their weapons through clandestine testing. Harold also sent me a signed + memorandumSee Document 188. which concludes that without + testing, stockpile reliability can be maintained adequately for awhile, + but there would eventually be accelerating erosion possibly down to a + very low level. Harold’s study presented several options to mitigate + this problem ranging from threshold treaties to gradual phaseouts of + testing; all would involve continued testing at least at one KT or + higher for several years.

+

In addition to a special study by Frank + PressNot found. of + this issue which included the directors of our weapons labs, and a + special meeting of the SCC,See Document 190. + Cy and I met with Harold privately.No + minutes for this discussion were found. We urged him to + tentatively accept the idea of guarding against long-term stockpile + problems by having a review conference after five years to determine + whether the treaty should continue. This would probably be negotiable + since Soviet concerns about PNEs and + testing by France and China could be met in the same manner. The British + raised this same thought with me during the Callaghan visit, and we have now received a formal paper + from their government proposing this approach.The UK Government + delivered a paper to the Department of State on April 11 that + formally proposed “a treaty of limited duration, preferably of 5 + years, without accepting any commitment about the future of the test + ban thereafter.” The text of the paper is in telegram 93541 to + London, April 12. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840163–0161) At + the bottom of the page, Carter wrote “Callaghan & I discussed this. Will resist moves + to test during agreement period.” See Document + 191.

+

However, Harold is concerned that at the time of the review conference + there would be a high political threshold against resuming testing, and + he would not agree to have the Working Group examine the modalities of + this approach unless it also considered his options for continued + testing. As a result, we agreed that Harold would think further about + the issue and that we would continue the discussion after his trip. Cy + and I will follow-up on this as soon as we all are in town, but Harold + may not yield.

+

Thus, at some point it may be necessary for you to meet privately with + Harold to remind him that he supported a CTB as being in our national interest in discussions with + you prior to your inauguration, and last Spring, during the PRM–16 review. Harold’s position is + clearly central—with his support we can use the SCC process to get Jim + Schlesinger and the Chiefs to reluctantly go along.

+ +

I have prepared a background paper on the technical aspects of this issue + which I will provide separately if you want it.Under this paragraph, Carter wrote “hold for later.”

+
+ +
+ 193. Memorandum From the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Jones) + to Secretary of Defense BrownSource: + Washington National Records Center, OSD Files: FRC + 330–81–0202, Box 53, A–400.112 TEST BAN (1 Jan–15 Mar) 1978. Secret. + Brown forwarded this + memorandum to Carter under + cover of an April 22 memorandum. (Ibid.) To the right of the date, + Brown wrote “4/20 Walt + Slocombe—I think a + formal transmission of these views and explicit drawing of attention + to expectation JCS will not support + options A or B version of CTB in + ratification is needed. HB.” + + + JCSM–119–78 + + + Washington, April + 18, 1978 + + SUBJECT + Comprehensive Test Ban (U) + +

1. (S) On 1 March 1977, the Joint Chiefs of Staff providedReference: JCSM–52–77, 1 March 1977, “Comprehensive Test Ban Issues + (U).” [Footnote is in the original.] their views regarding a + Comprehensive Test Ban (CTB) and + possible negotiations with the Soviet Union.See Document 148. These views have + not changed. In light of the initiation of formal trilateral + negotiations last October and the ongoing interagency studies, the Joint + Chiefs of Staff believe it appropriate to address a matter of principal + concern—maintenance of, and confidence in, the US nuclear deterrent posture under a CTB.

+

2. (S) The Joint Chiefs of Staff continue to believe that a complete ban + on all nuclear testing is not in the best interest of the United States. + They believe any test ban must specifically provide for adequate nuclear + testing in order to:

+

a. Maintain high confidence in the reliability of US nuclear weapons and hence confidence in the US nuclear deterrent.

+

b. Avoid undesirable asymmetries which are otherwise likely to result due + to the inability of the United States to verify compliance with the test + ban.

+ +

3. (S) To assure high confidence in the nuclear deterrent, certain + minimum nuclear testing requirements must be fulfilled. These + requirements include:

+

a. Identifying and correcting reliability and potential safety problems + in existing nuclear weapons.

+

b. Replacing nuclear weapons reaching the end of their stockpile + life.

+

c. Adapting existing warhead designs to new delivery systems with high + confidence.

+

d. Incorporating into existing warheads systems to enhance safety, + security, and command and control.

+

e. [2½ lines not declassified]

+

These minimum requirements should be able to be fulfilled at the level of + testing necessary to assure confidence in nuclear stockpile + reliability.

+

4. (S) At the Special Coordination Committee meeting of 22 March 1978, + three options were discussed which might be applied under a CTB regime.See footnote 4, Document + 190.

+

a. Option A—Self-Regulation. This option would ban + testing without defining what activities were permitted or + precluded.

+

b. Option B—Periodic Treaty Review. This option + would also ban testing but would include explicit provision for periodic + review with the understanding that serious problems with the US stockpile could prompt action to seek + treaty amendments to allow limited testing.

+

c. Option C—Provision for Continued Testing. This + option would allow some nuclear tests limited by yield, number of tests, + agreed phaseout period, or date of entry into force.

+

The Self-Regulation and Periodic Treaty Review options, which would + preclude necessary weapons testing, would contribute to long-term + strategic instability because the United States would be unable to meet + the criteria stated in paragraph 2 above. Further, the Periodic Treaty + Review option, by deferring the question of testing, might place the + United States in an unacceptable position should the need arise to seek + treaty amendment. The political consequences of seeking treaty + amendment, or failing that, unilateral abrogation of the treaty, are + such that the United States might find itself in the position of having + to accept a high military risk. The Appendix provides additional + discussion of the Periodic Treaty Review option.

+

5. (S) The Joint Chiefs of Staff conclude that continued testing is + essential to maintain the US nuclear + deterrent posture. Therefore, they cannot support a test ban which:

+ +

a. Does not specifically provide for the degree of testing necessary to + maintain confidence in stockpile reliability.

+

b. Could lead to asymmetries because of the inability of the United + States to verify compliance.

+

The Joint Chiefs of Staff reserve judgment on the numbers of tests and + yields required pending further technical review and consideration of a + Department of Energy position on these questions.

+

6. (U) The Joint Chiefs of Staff request that you support their views and + that you also convey these views to the President prior to his decision + on the negotiating position for the next round. In this connection, a + decision should be reached as a matter of urgency since the level of + testing could impact significantly on the US approach to verification and peaceful nuclear explosion + issues.

+

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

+ + David C. JonesActing Chairman Joint Chiefs of + Staff + +
+ +
+ 194. Memorandum From Robert + Hunter of the National Security Council Staff to the + President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, + Staff Material, Brzezinski + Office File, Country Chron File, Box 15, Great Britain: 4–8/78. + Secret; Sensitive. + Washington, May 3, + 1978 + + SUBJECT + Your meeting with British Ambassador Jay, April 21, 12:10 to 12:35. + +

The following is a summary of the conversation:

+

CTB

+

Jay wanted to know how we are + going to handle the problem of maintaining the reliability of nuclear + stockpiles under a CTB. You indicated + that there is not much to say right now, and that we are looking at + three options: a 5-year review procedure, an exemption (i.e. a TTB), and + one other. We are still on the same course as before, even though it is + true that State and ACDA are for a + CTB with a 5-year review. We will + be looking at this matter intensively, and the President has been informed of the issues. You also + indicated that with some of the options, there in effect is no + treaty—i.e. a CTB; and that we first + have to know how severe the stockpile degrading problem is before + determining whether to go to an option that is less politically + significant. In response to Jay’s + question about the value of a CTB on + vertical and horizontal proliferation, you indicated that there is a + subjective judgment; but that you see the importance of a CTB as being more in terms of U.S.-Soviet + relations than proliferation. Jay + indicated the Prime Minister’s concern about a CTB in terms of the Indian nuclear problem. You said that + we are not approaching this issue as an excuse to back out of a CTB—although there are some people in the + government who would use the issue in this way—but rather because there + is a serious problem for review. We will move quickly, and within two + weeks will be giving it close attention. Because of the May 4 resumption + of the CTB talks, we should have a + meeting here next week on the issue. There is a large number of + unknowns—including on our own needs. Jay said that we understand the UK position on this.

+

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to a comprehensive test ban.]

+
+ +
+ 195. Memorandum From the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament + Agency (Warnke) to President + CarterSource: National Archives, RG 383, Records of the Arms Control and + Disarmament Agency, Office of the Director, Paul C. Warnke Files, December + 1974–July 1979, Accession #383–98–0154, Box 1, Memoranda to the + President Regarding SALT, Cruise + Missiles, CTB, NPT, and Indian Ocean Arms Control, + January–October 1978. Secret. In the upper right-hand corner of the + memorandum, Carter wrote “I + would like to expedite—Let Soviets know this. J.” + Washington, April + 28, 1978 + + SUBJECT + Likely Timing on the Comprehensive Test Ban + +

The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty negotiations with the U.S.S.R. and the + U.K. will resume on May 4. Although progress was made at the last + round—nine weeks ending on March 21—it is probable that the trilateral + negotiations will continue through the summer. Because it is expected + that the product of these negotiations will then be sent to the + Conference of the Committee on Disarmament in Geneva for its consideration, it is unlikely that a + treaty could be completed before the end of this year.In the right margin, Carter bracketed the portion of this sentence that + reads “Because it is expected that the product of these negotiations + will then be sent to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament + in Geneva for its consideration” and wrote “why?”

+

This prognosis is based largely on the fact that, although accepting the + principle of internal seismic installations to be located on Soviet and + U.S. territory, the Soviet side is moving very slowly in negotiating the + specifications of the seismic equipment, the procedures to ensure + authentication of the data and the nature of involvement of non-Soviet + personnel in the installation and repair of the equipment.

+

Also drawing out the negotiations is the Soviet resistance to agree in + advance on the rights and functions of U.S. personnel who would conduct + on-site inspections in the Soviet Union.

+

These verification matters will be included in a separate agreement + between the United States and the Soviet Union with which the United + Kingdom would associate itself. Satisfactory provisions in this regard + are, in my opinion, essential to the verifiability of a Comprehensive + Test Ban Treaty.

+

Somewhat unexpectedly, the other major problems—precluding peaceful + nuclear explosions unless the U.S. agrees to their conduct and making + treaty duration not depend on Chinese and French participation—seem + susceptible of resolution without undue difficulty. While voicing + general agreement in principle with our positions on these questions, + however, the Soviet side is reluctant to address duration and the PNE moratorium conclusively until the + verification issues have been settled.

+

The Soviet Delegation appears to have strong military and intelligence + components and there is considerable suspicion expressed about the + purpose and functioning of our proposed equipment and procedures for the + internal seismic installations. As I see it, therefore, the negotiations + on these verification problems will be technical, detailed, and + protracted.

+ + Paul C. + WarnkeWarnke signed the memorandum + “Paul.” + +
+ +
+ + 196. Memorandum From Secretary of Energy Schlesinger to the President’s Assistant for National + Security Affairs (Brzezinski)Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, James Schlesinger Papers, Subject + File, Box 2, Energy Department, Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban, + General, 1978 May. Secret. + Washington, May 2, + 1978 + + SUBJECT + COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN CONCERNS + +

As we have discussed previously, I believe agreement must be reached + within the Executive Branch on a U.S. negotiating position for a + Comprehensive Test Ban that permits us to protect vital national + security interests and that offers a realistic prospect of winning + Senate ratification.

+

Such a negotiating position must meet four central concerns:

+

1. Ensuring our ability to certify and maintain the U.S. nuclear + stockpile;

+

2. Ensuring verification provisions that give the U.S. high confidence + assurance of compliance by the Soviets;

+

3. Maintaining a linkage between permitted experiments, verification, and + Peaceful Nuclear Explosives; and

+

4. Ensuring that compliance provisions of the agreement on the previous + three issues improve, rather than complicate, U.S.-Soviet relations on + arms control issues.

+

I am concerned that we have been unable to reach a consensus on these + issues, and that if we do not, the ability of the Administration to win + Senate ratification may be significantly lessened. In the present + climate—with controversy growing regarding SALT, and in the wake of the neutron warhead deferral and + the B–1 cancellation—the Administration must ensure that stockpile risks + are minimized, and that verification and compliance prospects are + improved as a result of any such treaty if we are to hope for + ratification. Each of these major issues is discussed further below.

+

1. The nuclear weapons designers within the laboratories and the + Department of Energy believe that the DOE requires some level of testing + in order to identify stockpile problems and certify the adequacy of + fixes. Some level of testing would be required as well to implement + necessary changes in safety, security, and command/control, and to adapt + older designs to new delivery systems entering the inventory. While we know little in detail + of the Soviet weapons program, what we do know suggests that the Soviet + nuclear stockpile would not suffer to the same degree nor degrade as + rapidly as ours.

+

We maintain this view strongly and are disappointed that the interagency + process thus far has seemed unwilling to accommodate this position.

+

2. The adequacy of seismic verification is one of the most difficult + subjects we must face in the CTB + area—and one of the most important for both acceptance of the Treaty and + preventing the development of major asymmetries.

+

DOE believes that even with the optimal level of Internal Seismic + Installations (ISIs), we will remain + unable to both detect and identify events below + the few kiloton level in low coupling media. Without the optimal level + of ISIs, even this capability would be + significantly degraded. DOE representatives have discussed my concerns + with Dr. Press about the OSTP/CTB + Review Panel Report, and he has agreed to look into this matter.No record of these discussions were + found.

+

3. In addition, I believe it is essential to our deliberations, as well + as being a sound negotiating strategy, that we maintain the linkage + between permitted experiments, verification, and Peaceful Nuclear + Explosives. It would be unwise to attempt to resolve the verification + issues relating to the number and type of ISIs and On-Site Inspections (OSIs) without first + addressing the issue of permitted experiments—since these two categories + of problems are related intimately to the level that can be adequately + verified. Further, to resolve these problems by decoupling them from + PNEs would seem to give away any + leverage we might have with the Soviets for our desired outcome on + prohibiting PNEs. I am aware, of + course, that the Soviets have told us privately that if these other + issues are resolved, we can settle the PNE questions without difficulty; but we must assume that + this is a Soviet negotiating tactic that may not well serve our + interests.

+

Unfortunately, this essential linkage is not considered in the 17 April + ACDA paper requested by the + National Security Council on the ISI strategy for the 4 May resumption + of negotiations. This paper treats ISIs independently of other key treaty issues, and + recommends the negotiation of a questionable phased approach based upon + resolving the details of our verification capabilities in a Joint + Consultative Commission after completion of the basic agreement and its + entry into force.

+

4. A CTB agreement must not only meet + objective tests of adequate verifiability but, perhaps most importantly, + must lower rather than raise + the level of tensions inherent in public perceptions of the U.S./Soviet + competition.

+

In this regard, our experience in dealing with contentious compliance + issues arising from the ABM Treaty and + with the Interim Agreement must be kept in mind as we proceed with the + CTB negotiations. This experience + should caution us against what seem to be easy ways of resolving sticky + negotiating problems at the expense of future serious compliance + problems. For example, as we attempt to drive down the detection + threshold, we will inevitably increase the number of detected but + unidentified, and therefore ambiguous, events that must be resolved with + the Soviets. If our experience in SALT + is any guide, the sheer number of such ambiguous incidents could + complicate both the compliance process and the U.S. public perception of + Soviet attitudes toward serious arms control agreements.

+

Finally, in attempting to reach consensus on the substance of major + issues, I am concerned that the interagency process must be rationalized + and strengthened to ensure objective consideration of sometimes + differing views. These difficult issues must be faced squarely now, and + an integrated U.S. position and strategy based on balanced inputs must + be developed. This may require more diligence on everyone’s part to + ensure that balance is reflected. I stand ready to cooperate in that + process, and would be pleased to discuss the issues raised in this memo + with you more fully.

+
+ +
+ + 197. Summary of Conclusions of a Special Coordination Committee and + Presidential Review Committee MeetingSource: Carter Library, National Security Council, + Institutional Files, Box 93, SCC + 071, CTB, Permitted + Experiments/Reliability: 5/2/78. Secret. The meeting took place in + the White House Situation Room. + Washington, May 2, 1978, + 2:30–3:50 p.m. + + SUBJECT + CTB—Stockpile Reliability and + Permitted Experiments + + + PARTICIPANTS + State + Cyrus Vance + Jerome Kahan Dep Dir, Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs + Defense + Harold Brown + David McGiffert Asst Sec + for International Security Affairs + Energy + Donald Kerr Acting Asst Sec for Defense Programs + JCS + General David Jones Acting Chairman, JCS + Maj Gen Edward Giller JCS + Rep + CTB + White House + Zbigniew Brzezinski + NSC + Reginald Bartholomew + Benjamin Huberman + OSTP + Frank Press + John Marcum + CIA + Stan Turner + Sayer Stevens Dep Dir, National Foreign Assessment Center + +

The purpose of the meeting was to continue discussion of the issue of + stockpile reliability and permitted experiments under a CTB. The discussions focused on a treaty + of fixed duration as proposed by the British, and whether this would + strike a better balance between military risks and foreign policy + objectives than a treaty of indefinite duration.

+

In discussion of the fixed duration approach, there was general agreement + that it should include a strong safeguards program, a requirement for + Senate ratification of any extension, and a review conference in the + fifth year to consider the future of the treaty. There was disagreement, + however, on whether the term of the treaty should be three rather than + five years, whether we should declare our intention to resume testing + after five years or just preserve the option to do so if necessary, and + the level of permitted experiments.

+

Defense and Energy generally argued in favor of a plan rather than option + to resume testing. Secretary Brown noted that this would reduce problems in retaining + laboratory personnel and would be more acceptable on the Hill. In effect it would shift the + burden of proof to those favoring extension of the treaty rather than + those favoring resumption of testing. Defense and Energy also preferred + the shorter term, but in response to Dr. Brzezinski’s query agreed that they could “live with” a + five year term under a plan to resume. State and ACDA were concerned, however, that a + declaration that we planned to resume testing could seriously undermine + the non-proliferation benefits of the treaty although they acknowledged + that this might be mitigated through careful wording of the statement. + They were also concerned that a duration of three rather than five years + would be viewed as an insufficient commitment and that the Soviets might + refuse to let us install internal seismic stations during this + period.

+

The permitted experiments issue was discussed at some length and JCS and Energy reasserted their views that + experiments at three to five kilotons would be adequate for solving + reliability problems. There was agreement, however, that permitted + experiments even at very low levels (a few pounds or tons) would be + useful for maintaining the laboratories and help resolve stockpile + problems.

+

In the course of the meeting all, except JCS, agreed that they could support a fixed duration treaty + with some concerns as noted above on the term of the treaty and the + wording of the assurance regarding resumption of testing. General Jones + indicated that in the JCS view a CTB was not in the US interest at this time due to concern about the adequacy + of verification and the opinion of the weapons laboratory directors that + they could not maintain adequate confidence in the reliability of our + stockpile without testing.

+

General Jones acknowledged that the laboratory director’s comment was + based on an indefinite duration treaty and it was agreed that the NSC would ask for their views on a fixed + duration treaty with assurances and variations as noted above. Dr. + Brzezinski concluded the + meeting with the statement that we would summarize the issues for the + President either asking for a meeting or his preliminary guidance on the + issues (with a reclama session, if needed).

+
+ +
+ + 198. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security + Affairs (Brzezinski) to President + CarterSource: Carter Library, National + Security Council, Institutional Files, Box 93, SCC 071, CTB, Permitted Experiments/Reliability: 5/2/78. Secret. + Sent for action. Carter + initialed the memorandum. + Washington, May 10, + 1978 + + SUBJECT + CTB + +

In an SCC meeting last week all of your + advisers, except for the JCS, agreed to + support a fixed, five-year duration treaty as proposed to you by + Jim Callaghan,See Document 191. + subject to your support for a strong safeguards plan, Senate + ratification of any extension of the treaty, and your assurance that any + necessary testing would be carried out after five years. (Summary of + Conclusions is attached.)See Document 197. This memorandum + includes a brief discussion of the JCS + views and of the substantive issues which you may want to decide + following your luncheon discussion with the Chiefs today.

+

In explaining the Chiefs’ opposition, Dave Jones stated that in addition + to concerns about verification, the Chiefs relied heavily on technical + judgment of the laboratories that they could not adequately maintain the + reliability of our weapons without testing at 3 to 5 KT. He acknowledged + that the laboratory directors had commented only on an indefinite + duration treaty, and it was agreed that we would ask for their views on + a fixed duration treaty before proceeding further.

+

We subsequently obtained their comments—Harold Agnew’s is polemical in + nature and negative towards your CTB + objective; Roger Batzel’s is more responsive and acknowledges that a + fixed duration approach would help in meeting his concerns, but + maintains that testing at 3 to 5 KT would be needed eventually. Taken + together, these comments do not provide much flexibility for the Chiefs, + and they are likely to continue to oppose the fixed duration approach + during your luncheon discussion tomorrow.

+

As a result, we will need your guidance on several issues in the near + future. The most important issue is whether we should seek a 3 to 5 KT + threshold treaty, as the Chiefs prefer, or a fixed duration CTB. If you prefer the latter,Carter + underlined the words “a fixed duration CTB.” you will also need to decide whether the + duration should be 3 or 5 years, the level of experiments that would be + permitted, and whether your + assurance regarding resumption of testing should constitute a plan to resume testing after five years, or just + the option to do so. You may want to make these + decisions following your luncheon with the Chiefs. However, if you + decide to overrule them, I recommend that you defer decision until after + an NSC meeting, to ensure for the + record that they have had an opportunity to formally present their + views.

+

______ Schedule NSC Meeting.

+

______ Make decision after luncheon.Carter checked the + “Make decision after luncheon” option.

+

Fixed Duration vs. 3 to 5 KT Threshold

+

A 3 to 5 KT threshold would be more consistent with verification + capabilities and stockpile reliability needs, but eliminating risks in + these areas would seriously erode potential benefits of a CTB to non-proliferation and our relations + with the Soviets, and would be viewed as a significant departure from + your public commitment to halting testing. The threshold treaty would + have smoother sailing during ratification hearings, and the Chiefs’ + views would carry a lot of weight, but with Harold’s and Jim Schlesinger’s support, a fixed + duration treaty would probably be ratified after a difficult struggle. I + believe that the fixed duration approach is adequately protective of our + security interests and more consistent with your political objectives, + and recommend that you authorize us to propose it in the + negotiations.Carter checked the “Approve” + option.

+

3 vs. 5 Year Duration

+

Harold and Kerr (speaking for DOE) have specifically agreed that they + could live with a five-year duration, but both would prefer three years, + arguing that this would make it easier to keep the laboratories + together. They recognize, however, that the shorter duration might be + criticized by non-nuclear weapons states as an insufficient commitment, + and could jeopardize prospects for installing an effective network of + internal seismic stations. In addition, the preponderant technical + judgment is that we can maintain reliability without testing for at + least five years. We may have to consider a 3-year duration eventually + since the Soviets may see this as a means of exerting more pressure on + China; however, I recommend that you authorize the five-year duration as + our initial position.Carter underlined the words + “five-year duration” and checked the “Approve” option.

+ +

Permitted Experiments/Safeguards

+

An important issue in developing a safeguards plan under the fixed + duration approach is whether low-level experiments should be permitted + in addition to related work in laser fusion and other areas. From a + technical standpoint, tests at a few pounds or tons of yield are + unlikely to help much with reliability problems, but can be useful for + safety and weapons effect purposes, and would definitely assist in + maintaining the laboratory infrastructure. [4 lines + not declassified] However, low-level testing (a few pounds to a + few tons) can be defended on safety and safeguards grounds, and I + recommend that you authorize us to include such experiments in the + safeguards plan which we are developing for your review.Carter + checked the “Approve” option, wrote “minimal,” and wrote “?” in the + right-hand margin.

+

Plan or Option to Resume Testing

+

Harold and Jim would prefer that you announce that you plan to resume + testing after five years for reliability purposes. This would make the + opportunity to resume more credible on the Hill and shift the burden of + proof to those favoring extension of the test ban from those favoring + resumption of testing. Cy and Paul prefer a weaker assurance that you would carry out + any test that might be necessary, but agree that with careful wording + the stronger form might be acceptable. For example, you could state your + intention to resume testing unless a vigorous safeguards program and + studies in the interim indicated that this was not necessary. I + recognize that this could undercut potential non-proliferation benefits, + particularly in India, but a strong assurance from you would reassure + the Chiefs and make it considerably easier for Harold and Jim to defend + the treaty. Therefore, I recommend that you authorize us to use the + strong form of the assurance as worded above.Carter + checked the “Approve” option.

+
+ +
+ + 199. Telegram From the Mission in Geneva to the Department of + StateSource: National + Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign + Policy File, D780208–0615. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Sent for information Priority + to London and Moscow. + Geneva, May 17, 1978, 1923Z +

7606. Exdis USCTB. Pass to DOE. + Subject: CTB Negotiations: Warnke-Petrosyants Meeting, May 16.

+

CTB Message No. 211

+

1. Summary. On May 16 Warnke met + for first time with Petrosyants, + new head of Soviet CTB Delegation. + Warnke relayed to Petrosyants President Carter’s personal view of importance + of CTB and his desire to expedite + negotiations. Tone of discussion was encouraging. Without seeking to + diminish the difficulty of resolving remaining issues, Petrosyants conveyed very positive + outlook on prospects for the negotiations. He laid the groundwork for + one important step forward by indicating willingness to begin detailed + discussion of agreed understanding on OSIs. End summary.

+

2. Warnke, accompanied by Johnson, + Neidle and Finch, met at Soviet mission on May 16 with Petrosyants, accompanied by Timerbaev and Tarasov. Petrosyants opened substantive + discussion with brief review of session to date, observing that US has submitted “quite a few interesting + proposals.” The Soviets are studying these and asking questions about + them. They have received replies to some questions but not others, but + this is “only natural” in view of the amount of material involved and + its seriousness. Petrosyants + observed that, in the process of negotiation, each side thinks it is the + other which must change its positions.

+

3. Warnke began by reporting that + President Carter had asked him + to state to Petrosyants + personally that the President wants to expedite the negotiations in + whatever way he can, that he sees this as a most important matter, and + is concerned that we can implement our nonproliferation policy only if + we can show the world that the US and + USSR can stop nuclear weapons + testing.

+

4. Warnke then reviewed the + highlights of the negotiations from their beginning, characterizing the + Soviet move last year on PNEs as very constructive. He thought the + Soviets would agree that US had made + some very constructive steps also, in accepting the Soviet position that + seismic stations on the territory of a country should be controlled by + that country, and in connection with initiation of on-site inspections. + On latter point, Warnke recalled + that longstanding US + position had been to require + mandatory on-site inspections. However, as result of negotiations during + 1977, US had decided that it could + accept Soviet approach of voluntariness subject to certain conditions, + including agreement that OSI requests + would not be refused on arbitrary basis.

+

5. Petrosyants suggested that our + problem was to find mutually acceptable formulations. In this regard, + the Soviet side felt that the formulation “arbitrary refusals” of + on-site inspections—which the US had + proposed for the agreed understanding—was not appropriate for documents + such as this. The Soviet side might prefer a formulation such as + “insufficiently substantiated refusals.” Warnke indicated that we were prepared to consider + alternative formulations and suggested that the political working group + examine the draft language for the agreed understanding. Petrosyants agreed that this could be + done—the first time the Soviets have been willing to consider the text + of the agreed understanding.

+

6. Warnke commented that much + progress had been made in the negotiations, although difficult issues + remained. In particular, the task now with regard to national seismic + stations is to work out specifics regarding equipment and procedures for + their operation. Petrosyants + inquired regarding the state of development of US equipment for national seismic stations. The Soviets did + not want to buy a “pig-in-a-poke”; they needed to see detailed designs. + Johnson indicated that equipment is in an advanced stage of development. + We would make available design drawings but these would not be precise + designs of the production model since further changes could be expected. + Perhaps through their involvement before the designs were finalized, + Soviet experts could offer useful suggestions. Petrosyants said that US proposal to use seismic equipment which + it was currently developing, but which was not yet in production stage, + was a cause of concern to the Soviets. He thought therefore we could + develop some specific stages in establishing national seismic stations. + The first stage would be based on the use of existing, operating seismic + stations. The second stage would consist of improving these stations. + The third would involve creation of seismic stations with outstanding + characteristics as the US has proposed. + This last stage would require establishing a new communications system + and other details. It would involve a complex set of problems and would + need considerable work which the joint consultative commissionReference to the SALT Standing Consultative Commission created by the + United States and the Soviet Union to consider issues of + verification of arms limitation agreements. See Foreign + Relations, 1969–1976, vol. XXXII, SALT I, 1969–1972. + would carry out.

+ +

7. Warnke responded by noting + that, between our Delegations, we have assembled in Geneva an impressive + collection of technical experts. We should use this expertise to solve + as many problems now as we can rather than simply putting the hard + problems off to the joint consultative commission. Petrosyants said, “this proposal is + absolutely right. Let them solve the problems here as soon as they can, + so they can go home and get back to their regular work.”

+ + Warnke + +
+ +
+ 200. Presidential Directive/NSC–38Source: Washington National Records Center, OSD Files: FRC 330–81–0202, Box 53, A–400.112 TEST BAN (Apr–5 + June) 1978. Secret. The Department of State forwarded the memorandum + to the Mission in Geneva in telegram 134357, May 26; National + Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign + Policy File, P840128–2355. + Washington, May 20, + 1978 + + TO + The Vice President + The Secretary of State + The Secretary of Defense + + + ALSO + The Secretary of Energy + The Director, Arms Control & Disarmament Agency + The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff + The Director of Central Intelligence + The Director, Office of Science and Technology Policy + + + SUBJECT + Comprehensive Test Ban (C) + +

The President has reviewed the recent deliberations of the SCC on the Comprehensive Test Ban (CTB) issues, and has reached the following + conclusions.

+

a. In view of the importance of maintaining confidence in safety and + reliability of our stockpiled nuclear weapons, the US should propose in the CTB negotiations that the treaty have a + fixed, five year duration. The treaty would automatically terminate at + the end of five years. During the fifth year there would be a review + conference to determine whether to negotiate a replacement treaty.

+ +

b. In forwarding the treaty to the Senate for ratification the President + has decided to state his intention to resume testing at the end of the + five years limited only to weapons safety and reliability purposes + unless a vigorous safeguards program and studies in the interim indicate + that this is not necessary. He has also decided that any further + agreement on testing limitations after the five year treaty would be + presented to the Senate for ratification.

+

c. The President has decided that nuclear weapons experiments at minimal + yield levels (a few pounds or somewhat higher) should be permitted under + the CTB in addition to experiments in + laser fusion and other related areas for civil energy purposes. He has + also directed that the precise nature and yields of such experiments be + detailed in a CTB Safeguards Plan by + the SCC and forwarded for his review by + June 30, 1978.

+

In connection with these decisions, the President has asked that the + Soviets be informed of his desire to expedite the CTB negotiations. In this regard, the + US Delegation should state that the + fixed duration treaty proposal, coupled with our earlier historic shift + on on-site inspection, represents major movement on the part of the + US on issues of Soviet concern and + that in return we expect Soviet movement in the direction of our + positions on the remaining CTB + verification issues.

+ + Zbigniew + Brzezinski + +
+ +
+ + 201. Memorandum of ConversationSource: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, + Staff Material, Office, Outside the System File, Box 50, Chron: + 5/78. Secret; Nodis. The meeting + took place in the Cabinet Room at the White House. Drafted by + Krimer. Printed from a + draft that bears numerous handwritten edits. Bartholomew noted on the first + page: “ZB: Krimer + memcon with RB fixes. Reg.” The memorandum is + printed in full in Foreign Relations, 1977–1980, vol. VI, + Soviet Union, Document 115. + Washington, May 27, 1978, + 8:00 a.m.–12:20 p.m. + + SUBJECTS + + SALT, CTB, Africa, Human + Rights + + + + U.S. PARTICIPANTS + President Jimmy + Carter + Secretary of State Cyrus R. + Vance + Secretary of Defense Harold + Brown + Dr. Zbigniew + Brzezinski + Ambassador Paul C. + Warnke + Ambassador Malcolm + Toon + Mr. David + Aaron + Mr. Reginald + Bartholomew + Mr. Hamilton + Jordan + Mr. Jody + Powell + Mr. Wm. D. Krimer, + Interpreter + + + USSR + PARTICIPANTS + Foreign Minister A.A. + GromykoBartholomew underlined + “Gromyko.” + Ambassador A.F. + Dobrynin + Deputy Foreign Minister G.M. + Korniyenko + Ambassador V. Makarov + Minister Counselor A.A. + Bessmertnykh + Mr. V.G. Komplektov + Mr. N.N. Detinov + Mr. V.M. + Sukhodrev, Interpreter + [Omitted here is a discussion about SALT.] + + + CTB + + +

As for CTB, the President did not see + any need for detailed discussion here of verification and other matters. + He believed that one primary issue he and Gromyko might discuss was the duration of the agreement + being negotiated. We would like to see it have a five-year term, and + then renegotiate the agreement if both sides considered it advisable to + enter into a new agreement. To be perfectly frank, we had concerns with + our own nuclear arsenal which requiredBartholomew put brackets + around “which required” and wrote “and” in the margin above + it. occasional testing in order to assure us that its capabilities were intact. We + believed that five years was the maximum period of time we could go + without some testing. He hoped that this would be satisfactory to the + Soviet Union. As for the detailsBartholomew added “on compliance,” + after “details.” they could be left up to the negotiating + teams.

+

Gromyko said that in the course + of the negotiations encouraging progress had been achieved on this + issue. There were still some unagreed questions—not many—including the + question the President had just mentioned, i.e., the duration of a + possible accord. He would ask the President to take into consideration + some of the other outstanding matters involved in the CTB negotiations. Immediately prior to his + departure from Moscow Gromyko + had looked into the status of those negotiations and could say now that + if the other issues can be resolved—and on some of them U.S. + representatives had taken a very hard position—he believed that a + positive solution could be found to the question of duration of the + agreement.

+

The President asked Ambassador Warnke to touch on the other issues involved.

+

Ambassador Warnke said there + appeared to be agreement in principle on the concepts of authenticated + national seismic installations and on on-site inspections. Considerable + differences still existed on the extent to which specific equipment to + be used would be agreed upon at the present stage of the negotiations. + There were also differences on the question of how on-site inspection + would be carried out and what equipment would be permitted for that + purpose.

+

The President said there was no need this morning to discuss the + technical questions involved. He believed that one political question + could be resolved, i. e., the length of the agreement. He thought that + as termination of the agreement approached, negotiations could be held + regarding extension of the agreement.Bartholomew added “or a + new agreement” after “extension of the agreement.” His + position was that five years was a reasonable term. As termination + approached, negotiations could be resumed.

+

Gromyko repeated that if the + other questions could be resolved in a positive manner, if the + President’s negotiators would manifest greater flexibility, he did not + think a five-year term would present any difficulties.

+

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to a comprehensive test ban.]

+
+ +
+ + 202. Memorandum From Secretary of Energy Schlesinger to President CarterSource: + Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, + Box 6, Comprehensive Test Ban (CTB), 1–12/78. Secret; Restricted Data. In the upper + right-hand corner of the memorandum, Carter wrote “Zbig—You & Jim set up a briefing + with a lab director & me. a) I don’t know how device works & + b) what Soviet position is on this issue. J.” + Washington, May 30, + 1978 + + SUBJECT + CONTINUED DISCUSSION OF A ZERO-YIELD CTB + +

Let me continue our discussion, started on the trip from Knoxville,No record of this conversation has been + found. According to the President’s Daily Diary, Carter was in Tennessee on May 22 + to speak to the Tennessee Valley Authority and to address a group of + scientists at the Oak Ridge National Laboratory. (Carter Library, + Presidential Materials) regarding permitted experiments under + the CTB by pursuing the points + developed below.

+

1. Over many years the underlying thrust in weapons design has been to + compensate for volumetric constraints and throw-weight limitations in + the U.S. strategic program by developing highly compact, highly + sophisticated weapons. Such high sophistication, as in other cases, + results in some degree of technical risk. [7 lines not + declassified]

+

2. Why would previously tested and certified weapons + need to be retested? In the continued non-nuclear testing of + weapons components, it turns out with some regularity that individual + components fail or degrade. Even acceptable components may become + unavailable as manufacturers shift product lines or go out of business. + Materials are altered slightly or may (as with beryllium) be subject to + more stringent regulation. The consequence is that new components or different materials + have to be integrated into previously deployed weapons designs. + Developing weapons remains to a considerable extent an art rather than a + science. Weapons designs which seem appropriate, based on computer + models, fail to work as predicted when actually tested.

+

[1 paragraph (16 lines) not declassified]

+

3. Readiness of material and men is of paramount concern to the military + services. For this reason everything from radars to engines to missiles + are regularly exercised to demonstrate that they will remain + operationally ready. For there to be doubt about nuclear weapons + reliability is vastly distressing to the Services. The notion that + nuclear weapons might degrade over the years, and have attached to them + lower confidence in + reliability is disturbing both in military and political terms.

+

4. Even though we can detect nuclear detonations in hard rock down [less than 1 line not declassified] as a practical + matter today [1 line not declassified] This is + true if the Soviets make no effort to muffle or decouple weapons tests. + The reasons are, first, that the Soviets can test in lower coupling + media than hard rock. Second, for true verification we must be able, not + only to detect seismic disturbances, but to identify such disturbances as nuclear + detonations.

+

With an improved verification capability (a network of seismic arrays or + stations located within the Soviet Union), [1 line not + declassified] Even improved verification capability, however, + creates problems. As our ability to detect + improves, the number of ambiguous events will increase. Indeed, there + will be several hundred such ambiguous events each year causing both + (possibly undue) military alarm, but certainly political problems.

+

5. Aside from the technical and security aspect of a zero-yield test ban, + the interactions between the non-verifiability of + the prospective treaty and the potential non-certifiability of the + stockpile will inevitably stir deep Congressional concern—in an + atmosphere already stirred by other matters. The Administration has + steadily pledged to sign no arms control agreement that cannot be + adequately verified, though it has not in the case of the CTB yet stated what threshold is required + for adequate verification. Recently, the Senate requested Mr. Warnke to address these concerns in + assessing the verifiability of a CTB.Not found. Given + basic suspicion and the strained relations with the Soviet Union, it + will be difficult to persuade the Senate to trust the Soviets to comply + with the Treaty in [1 line not declassified]

+

One cannot, of course, decouple the verification issue from the permitted + experiments issue. Thus, the prospect that over time the DoE would be + unable to certify stockpile reliability will vastly reinforce that + concern. [2½ lines not declassified] We, by + contrast, would most assuredly not test, and thereby be forced to absorb + whatever degradation in reliability occurs because of the unknowns. It + will be pointed out that there is an undoubted asymmetry between ourselves and the Soviets + in that they suffer less from throw-weight limitations, volumetric + constraints, and the inherent sophistication that applies to our + weapons.

+

When the partial test ban agreement was signed and approved in 1963, it + could be stated that the burden of the agreement fell equally on both + sides and the U.S. security position was improved. Given the problems of + verification and certification—and the presumed asymmetry between + ourselves and the Soviets—that conclusion cannot be readily drawn in the + case of the zero-yield test ban. As a result Congressional resistance + will be formidable and the arguments sharp. The Chiefs are already on + record as opposing such a ban. The laboratories and DoE personnel will + be obliged to elucidate the consequences for certification under such a + ban. Leaving aside the military questions, the political consequences + could hardly be worse.

+

6. Since (a) some testing will be required to maintain confidence in both + weapons reliability and safety, and (b) very low or zero thresholds [less than 1 line not declassified] even under + optimistic assumptions about Soviet agreement to on-site seismic + detection, I urge you to consider the following course of action.

+

This alternative approach serves the national security interests of the + United States and its allies, takes a reasonable step toward legitimate + arms control (no new weapons development), and + avoids a protracted and uncertain Congressional debate. The alternative + is to indicate American willingness to accept drastic reduction in the + presently proposed threshold test ban from 150 KT [less than 1 line not declassified] Such a level is consistent + with our existing verification capabilities. Moreover, we should also + indicate that, if the Soviets are prepared to allow a network of internal seismic stations or arrays, we could + reduce that threshold [less than 1 line not + declassified]

+

Such an approach would be consistent with both certification requirements + and our present verification capabilities—and would also put pressure on + the Soviets to allow improvements in those verification capabilities. A + prudent approach of this sort on arms control would better serve the + interests of the nation and would also have a higher chance of + success.

+
+ +
+ 203. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense Brown to President CarterSource: + Washington National Records Center, OSD Files: FRC + 330–81–0202, Box 53, A–400.112 TEST BAN (Apr–5 June) 1978. Secret. A + handwritten “J” in the upper right-hand corner of the memorandum + indicates Carter saw the + document. + Washington, June 1, + 1978 +

I attach a copy of a memorandum from the Joint Chiefs of Staff on + (PD)/NSC–38, announcing your decisions as to the U.S. negotiating position on CTB. They have asked that I forward it to + you, as an expression of their strongly held views. I believe that the + JCS memorandum accurately + identifies the technical and military factors involved. I agree with + some, but not every one, of their evaluations.

+

A CTB involves some level of military + risk. However, I believe that the probability that a CTB would adversely affect the reliability + of the warheads for our important strategic systems is low enough during + a three-year (or, less clearly, even a five-year) period so that for + such a period the military risk in itself is acceptable. Of some weight + also is the fact that we would become aware by continued stockpile + inspection if a question of such reliability arises and, in principle, + could invoke the supreme-national-interest withdrawal clause.

+

I emphasize that there would be a serious question of continued stockpile + reliability on the U.S. side if there were an indefinite CTB.In the + right margin, Carter drew an + arrow pointing to this and wrote “I agree.” The greatest + risk, therefore, follows from the tendency of a limited-term agreement + to be extended. The statement of intention to resume tests at the end of + a limited-term in order to assure stockpile reliability can somewhat + ameliorate that problem. But the pressure at the time of expiration to + renew (and also pressure not to do so) will probably be very great + despite anything we say now. Such a concern about extension is likely to + be expressed by opponents during the ratification process. This aspect, + in my judgment, makes the prospects for approval of a CTB substantially less favorable than + those for SALT, and also less + favorable the earlier a CTB is + concluded.

+

[1 paragraph (3 lines) not declassified]

+

I believe that the JCS paper understates + the potential advantages from a CTB for + non-proliferation (which many of us see as its main benefit). However, + those advantages have yet to be articulated sufficiently. In my view it + would be useful for the State Department and ACDA to set forth the criteria by which they believe we + would be able to judge after a five-year period whether proliferation + had indeed been inhibited by the CTB, + and therefore whether there would be reasons supporting renewal to + counter the military and technical needs for reliability tests.In the left margin, Carter bracketed the portion of + this paragraph that begins with “and ACDA set forth” and ends with “reliability + tests.”

+

A great concern of mine is the possible irretrievable dissipation of our + nuclear scientific and technological talent if a CTB is perceived by them as being of long + or indefinite duration. To be able to test for stockpile reliability + after a previously set time period of some years, and to correct + deficiencies, the capabilities of the nuclear design laboratories have to be maintained. From + this point of view there are two matters that particularly trouble me. + (1) The decision to limit experiments to a few poundsCarter + underlined the phrase “a few pounds.” of high explosive + equivalent—rather than, for example, a few hundred tonsCarter + underlined the phrase “a few hundred tons.”—limits sharply + the degree of interest of such experiments to the scientists and + technologists on whose continued skills and continued professional + dedication to nuclear weapons design we would depend when tests are + resumed. (2) Second, the five-year period of the treaty instead of a + three-year period that had alternatively been proposed also reduces the + chances of keeping viable nuclear laboratories together. The laboratory + directors have told the JCS that, given + a commitment to resume testing, they can maintain relevant laboratory + effectiveness for three years, but probably not for five. I therefore + urge that these two issues be reexamined as part of the development of + the safeguards program you requested by June 30.Carter + highlighted both point (1) and point (2) and wrote in the left + margin “(1) I don’t feel strongly about this,” drawing an arrow + pointing at the sentence for point (1), and “might help with this + (2),” drawing an arrow pointing at the sentence for point + (2).

+

Harold + Brown

+

Attachment

+

Memorandum From the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of + Staff (Jones) to Secretary of Defense BrownSecret. Brown + wrote “5/30 HB” to the right of the + memorandum number.

+

JCSM–188–78

+

Washington, June 1, 1978

+ + SUBJECT + Presidential Decision on Comprehensive Test Ban (U) + +

1. (S) Presidential Decision (PD)/NSC + 38See Document + 200. announced that in view of the importance of + maintaining confidence in safety and reliability of US stockpiled nuclear weapons, the + President has decided that the United States should propose a + fixed-duration Comprehensive Test Ban (CTB) treaty of 5 years, with provision for nuclear weapon + experiments of a few pounds yield. In forwarding the treaty to the + Senate for ratification, the President would state that the United + States intends to resume testing at the expiration of the treaty, for + safety and reliability purposes only, unless testing is shown not to be + necessary. Any further agreement on testing limitations after the 5-year treaty would be + presented to the Senate for ratification.

+

2. (S) The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that the test ban, as outlined, + would involve significant military risks. In a memorandumReference: JCSM–119–78, 18 April 1978, “Comprehensive Test Ban (U).” + [Footnote is in the original.] which you forwarded to the + President on 22 April 1978,See Document 193. the Joint Chiefs of + Staff stated they believe that a test ban must allow continued testing + at a level sufficient to:

+

a. Maintain high confidence in the reliability of US nuclear weapons and hence confidence in the US nuclear deterrent.

+

b. Avoid undesirable asymmetries which are otherwise likely to result due + to the inability of the United States to verify compliance with the test + ban.

+

3. (S) Recent discussions which the Joint Chiefs of Staff have held with + Department of Energy officials and their laboratory directors, upon whom + the United States must rely for technical judgments concerning the + reliability of US nuclear weapons, have + further underscored the requirement for continued testing to maintain + stockpile reliability. These experts have stated that, under a CTB with zero testing over an extended + period, stockpile reliability will be degraded. They have taken the + position that the most current nuclear warheads and bombs in the US stockpile cannot be maintained without + nuclear testing. Their current best estimate is that the required + nuclear yield for that purpose is at [less than 1 line + not declassified] With nuclear testing permitted at [less than 1 line not declassified] it is likely + that the current nuclear weapon stockpile could be maintained in a safe + and reliable condition. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have found these + assessments persuasive.

+

4. (S) Based on available information, Soviet reliability problems may + not be as severe, since the Soviets’ typically heavier weapons and + larger payloads have allowed them to use coarser design criteria which + are not as susceptible to problems as the high-technology US designs. This is likely to cause an + asymmetric degradation of the stockpiles. Assuming that the Soviets + recognize this, they may eventually perceive a strategic advantage, and + the asymmetry therefore would become destabilizing.

+

5. (S) The announced intention to restrict resumption of testing to that + necessary for weapons safety and reliability appears to preempt + decisions concerning weapons development which are better made in the + context of other arms control agreements. The United States may be unilaterally restricting + development of new strategic weapons, without any similar restraint upon + the Soviets if a SAL agreement or other agreements reached do not + restrict new strategic weapons development. Moreover, such an + unfavorable asymmetry may also be imposed on the development of new + theater/tactical nuclear weapons, at least until an arms control + agreement with reciprocal restraints might be achieved.

+

6. (S) [10 lines not declassified] Thus, the + United States will face a situation wherein the Soviets could test + without detection and the United States will not test—a situation that + could lead to asymmetries detrimental to the credibility of the US deterrent.

+

7. (S) Experience with the nuclear stockpile has demonstrated that + serious problems can arise during a 5-year ban on nuclear testing. The + decision in PD/NSC 38 does not provide for testing to address stockpile + reliability problems which may arise during the period of the treaty. In + the event that a serious problem arises, the United States would either + have to exercise the “supreme national interest” withdrawal clause or + depend on a less reliable deterrent force. The Joint Chiefs of Staff + believe that, rather than accept the prospect of placing the United + States in this undesirable situation, the United States should initially + seek to negotiate a treaty which lowers the testing threshold to the + level of verification capability. Such a lowered threshold could provide + an opportunity to learn how to deal more confidently with stockpile + reliability problems in an environment of restricted testing, while at + the same time observing Soviet performance under the treaty and + upgrading US monitoring + capabilities.

+

8. (S) JCS discussions with the nuclear + laboratory directors also have confirmed the belief of the Joint Chiefs + of Staff that retention of skilled scientists and engineers at the + US nuclear weapons laboratories is + essential to maintain the stockpile and retain a nuclear weapons design + capability. The Joint Chiefs of Staff concur with the judgment of the + laboratory directors that it is unlikely that the necessary number of + skilled scientists and engineers can be retained throughout a 5-year + test suspension, even under the incentives of a strong safeguards + program.

+

9. (S) In addition to the military and technical considerations expressed + above, there are also politico-military implications which should be + given consideration. The Joint Chiefs of Staff recognize that it is in + the US national interest to stop nuclear + proliferation. However, they are not at all certain the balance of + considerations with respect to a test ban, as outlined, would contribute + substantially to nonproliferation. Further, if US allies were to lose confidence in the ability of the + United States to maintain a credible and reliable stockpile and, hence, + in the deterrent quality of US nuclear + guarantees, they could be disposed to develop or increase nuclear + stocks.

+ +

10. (S) The Joint Chiefs of Staff judge the military risks to national + security to be serious. The issue is considered to be the adequacy of + the US nuclear deterrent forces—both + perceived and actual—and the equivalence of those forces to those of the + Soviet Union. The magnitude of the risks and the potential consequences + compel the Joint Chiefs of Staff to conclude that the negotiating + position could result in a treaty which would adversely affect the + national security interests of the United States.

+

11. (S) The Joint Chiefs of Staff request that you forward this + memorandum to the President.

+

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

+ + David C. JonesGeneral, USAF Acting + Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff + + +
+ +
+ 204. Memorandum From the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament + Agency (Warnke) to President + CarterSource: Carter Library, National + Security Affairs, Brzezinski + Material, Subject File, Box 6, Comprehensive Test Ban (CTB), 1–12/78. Secret. + Washington, June 5, + 1978 + + SUBJECT + Role of the CCD in a + Comprehensive Test Ban + +

In the margin of my April 28 memorandumSee + Document 195. to you regarding + the likely timing of a comprehensive test ban treaty, you asked why the + product of the trilateral negotiations would be sent to the 30-nation + Geneva Conference of the Committee on Disarmament (CCD) for its consideration.

+

One of the most important benefits of a CTB, in terms of our non-proliferation objectives, is the + opportunity it provides to get non-nuclear weapon states, especially + those that have not joined the NPT, to + undertake a commitment not to carry out nuclear tests. While some states + are unlikely to sign the CTB at this + time no matter how it is negotiated, we believe that in a number of + important cases prospects for + adherence would be significantly improved if the non-nuclear states have + some sense of participation in the process of achieving an + agreement.

+

In India, for example, where Desai + could face strong internal pressures not to join and where + considerations of pride and prestige are often controlling, the + government could be disinclined to adhere to a CTB that it had no role at all in negotiating. The same + could be said for several other borderline cases. The willingness of a + number of key non-nuclear states to join the treaty could strengthen + prospects for ratification, since it would demonstrate the treaty’s + value as a non-proliferation measure and the importance of bringing it + into force.

+

With these non-nuclear weapon state sentiments in mind, we have provided + public assurances that we support a role for the CCD in achieving a CTB. In your message to the CCD in July 1977, you stated that the + CCD “has set its priorities for + future action and is now ready to prepare the way for negotiations on a + comprehensive test ban and a chemical weapons prohibition. The U.S. + shares these priorities and fully recognizes the essential role to be + played by the CCD.”Carter’s entire statement was not found. Telegram + 5448 from Geneva, July 5, 1977, noted that Fisher read the statement to the + CCD. Carter’s statement + concluded “with the following words: ‘I have pledged my + administration’s dedicated efforts to halting the nuclear arms race + and achieving practical limitations on the world’s conventional + armaments. I assure that the United States will work tirelessly to + contribute to the success of the CCD’.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + D770238–0736)

+

Sending the treaty to the CCD would of + course involve some increase in the length of the negotiating process. + And, since the text would become public when it went to the CCD, it would be available for public and + Congressional scrutiny for a period of time while the negotiations were + nominally still going on. However, the CCD countries are anxious to have a CTB in force, and would probably be + receptive to expediting their multilateral consideration of it (perhaps + 6–8 weeks or less). And although the text sent to the CCD will be a public document, this public + exposure is not apt to evoke any greater Congressional interest in + affecting the negotiations than is now the case. In addition, while some + CCD members may suggest changes in + the trilaterally negotiated text, they must recognize that the basic + substantive elements worked out by the U.S. and U.S.S.R. will not be + subject to alteration.

+

It should be emphasized that what we would be submitting to the CCD is the multilateral treaty text only, + not the separate verification agreement. The latter, which would contain + the detailed verification provisions that we would rely on and which we + expect would be the primary focus of public and Congressional attention, + would be completed by the U.S., U.K., and U.S.S.R., and would not be + negotiated at the CCD at all.

+ +

An alternative to sending the treaty to the CCD would be to complete and sign the treaty trilaterally, + and then call on other countries to join. This was the procedure + followed for the 1963 Limited Test Ban Treaty (but not for the NPT and the four other multilateral arms + control treaties negotiated since then).In + the left-hand margin next to this paragraph, Carter wrote “This seems better to + me—No final decision.” It would permit completion of the + process a little earlier and would avoid the possibility of having the + CCD discussions engender public and + Congressional reactions that might influence the multilateral + negotiations. However, as indicated above, the CCD phase would probably be quite brief and, in any event, + the only item left for CCD + consideration—the multilateral treaty—is not expected to stimulate as + much domestic interest as the separate verification agreement, which + would have been completed.

+

Of more importance is the likelihood that the alternate approach would + provoke considerable resentment among the non-nuclear states at their + having been excluded from the process altogether. This could have a + decisive impact on adherence decisions in a number of critical + cases.

+

I therefore recommend that we maintain our existing position in support + of sending the results of the trilateral talks to the CCD for final action on the text of the + multilateral treaty. If trilateral agreement were to be reached at the + time of a possible U.S.-Soviet summit meeting, announcement of the + completion of the trilateral phase of the negotiations would be + considered a major accomplishment of such a meeting.

+
+ +
+ + 205. Summary of Conclusions of a Special Coordination Committee + MeetingSource: Carter + Library, National Security Council, Institutional Files, Box 95, + SCC 084, CTB Verification, Seismic Station + Network: 6/12/78. Secret. The meeting took place in the White House + Situation Room. + Washington, June 12, 1978, + 10:30–11:30 a.m. + + SUBJECT + Comprehensive Test Ban (CTB) + + + PARTICIPANTS + State + Secretary Cyrus + Vance + Les Gelb Director, Bureau + of Politico-Military Affairs + Defense + Secretary Harold + Brown + David McGiffert Asst + Secretary for International Security Affairs + Energy + Secretary James + Schlesinger + Dr. Donald Kerr Acting Asst Secretary for Defense Programs + JCS + General David Jones + Lt General William Y. Smith + JCS + CTB Representative + White House + David Aaron + NSC + Reginald Bartholomew + Benjamin Huberman + OSTP + Frank Press + John Marcum + CIA + Admiral Stansfield + Turner + [name not declassified] Chief, Nuclear + Energy Division + +

The purpose of the meeting was to continue discussion of the issue of low + level testing under a CTB, to consider + the characteristics of the network of national seismic stations (NSS) + which we should propose in the Geneva negotiations, and to consider + whether entry into force of the treaty should be delayed until after + installation of the NSS network is completed.

+

In beginning the discussion of low level testing, David Aaron pointed out that the + President had ruled out kiloton level testing in PD/NSC–38See Document 200. + and that we should focus our attention on the range from a few pounds to + a few hundred tons. After extensive discussion, it was agreed that the + Safeguards PlanNot found. should + include several discrete options detailing the utility of testing in + this range.

+ +

Jim Schlesinger argued that if + kiloton-level testing was not permitted the real cutting edge in + retaining capabilities would be in whether the duration was three or + five years. David Aaron said this + could be put to the President to see if he wanted to reopen the + issue.

+

In discussing the seismic network options there was agreement that due to + their high cost, time required for installation, and remaining + uncertainty, large numbers of arrays were not desirable. A consensus was + reached in favor of proposing 12–15 single stations with the right to + convert perhaps one or two of these to arrays subsequently (the + conclusion was a little imprecise as to how many would be + converted).

+

Since the basic network could be installed within two years, there + appeared to be agreement after some discussion that we should not + attempt to delay entry into force pending completion of the + installation. At the conclusion of the meeting, Schlesinger commented that considering + the remaining negotiating problems, CCD + involvement and Senate ratification, it would probably be 18–24 months + before the treaty entered into force.

+
+ +
+ 206. Memorandum of ConversationSource: Carter Library, National Security Council, + Institutional Files, Box 95, SCC + 084, CTB Verification, Seismic + Station Network: 6/12/78. Secret. The meeting took place in the + White House Cabinet Room. + Washington, June 13, 1978, + 2:05–3:30 p.m. + + SUBJECT + Summary of Meeting with the President on CTB Issues + + + PARTICIPANTS + President Jimmy + Carter + Harold Brown, Secretary of + Defense + James Schlesinger, + Secretary of Energy + David Aaron, Deputy + Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs + Stuart Eisenstat, Assistant to the President for Domestic Affairs + (first 10 minutes) + Dr. Frank Press, Director + of the Office of Science and Technology Policy + John Marcum, Senior Adviser, Office of Science and Technology + Policy + Harold Agnew, Director, Los Alamos Nuclear Laboratory + Roger Batzel, Director, Livermore Nuclear Laboratory + +

Harold Agnew began by saying that he understood + that it might be good if he or Roger Batzel ran through a brief + explanation of how nuclear + weapons actually worked. The President agreed + saying he had read some simple text books but wanted a more complete + understanding.

+

Harold Agnew presented a chartAttached but not printed. of a simple + two-stage device to the President and explained its design features. He + noted that we had made tremendous progress in nuclear weapons technology + and illustrated this by pointing out that the current Trident warhead + had a yield [less than 1 line not declassified] + with a weight [less than 1 line not declassified] + compared to a yield [less than 1 line not + declassified] of the Hiroshima device with a weight of [less than 1 line not declassified] He said this + represented a factor of more [less than 1 line not + declassified] in yield to weight ratio. He observed that this + tremendous gain was made through very sophisticated technology. One + major step was that instead of using a solid glob of plutonium, we now + use a [less than 1 line not declassified] With + this design we can get [less than 1 line not + declassified] in the primary or first stage, but an even more + significant step was in using tritium gas for “boosting” the primary. + This boosting process produces [less than 1 line not + declassified] than the [less than 1 line not + declassified] and increases the primary yield [less than 1 line not declassified] causes the + secondary stage of the weapon to ignite.

+

Harold Agnew noted that over the years nuclear + weapon designers had been under considerable pressure to develop designs + that would use less fissionable material, which could be in short supply + for civil purposes, and that would be smaller, lighter and safer. In + explaining what the two-stage primary act really does, he said that the + Trident primary has a yield [less than 1 line not + declassified] the secondary [less than 1 line + not declassified]. The important consideration is that the + primary must produce [less than 1 line not + declassified] there would be no ignition from the + secondary.

+

He then showed a picture of the Sprint ABM warheadNot + attached. noting that this was the first neutron bomb that + had been developed. He described its features as [2½ + lines not declassified] This device was tested and achieved + [less than 1 line not declassified] He then + explained that at a later point because of fratricide concerns—e.g., + concern that the warhead might be disabled [less than + 1 line not declassified] another Sprint warhead that had been + detonated earlier, it had been decided to add a hardened layer [3 lines not declassified] He noted that this + wasn’t a complete fizzle but was less [less than 1 + line not declassified] necessary to ignite the secondary stage. + He asserted that if we had stockpiled the modified device without + testing we wouldn’t have known about the problem; stockpile surveillance + was essential but could not determine the yield of the device.

+ +

The President asked what kind of stockpile + surveillance method was used. Agnew responded + that all kinds of statistical sampling techniques were employed, weapons + were disassembled occasionally, and the components were examined. He + noted that the weapons were designed to last 20 years, but that any time + the materials used in manufacturing components are changed one can get + problems. He pointed out that the devices we had developed were very + delicate and that in his view it would not be prudent to consider + maintaining the stockpile indefinitely without testing.

+

The President asked what Agnew meant by + indefinitely. Agnew responded that in an example + which Roger Batzel would describe, a problem had been experienced within + four years. Roger Batzel explained that [3½ lines not declassified]

+

The President asked whether the problem had + occurred after development of the warhead. Batzel + replied that it had actually been after deployment of the warhead and + had been discovered through surveillance of warheads deployed in the + fleet. The problem had been a mechanical safety device which was + intended to insure that the weapon would not produce a significant + nuclear yield if the high explosive (HE) was detonated accidentally.

+

The President said that he understood that the + problem was not identified in an explosion but in an inspection of the + safety device. Batzel agreed and stated that we + had subsequently replaced the primary on that device. He pointed out + that we have a similar problem now with the primary of the Poseidon + warhead. He pointed out that the Poseidon produced a nuclear yield [less than 1 line not declassified] packaged in a + re-entry vehicle weighing [less than 1 line not + declassified] He explained that although primaries used to have + hundreds of detonators distributed over the surface of the HE in order + to generate a spherical implosion wave, [1 line not + declassified] In the Poseidon primary a new HE material had + been used which exuded a liquid which corroded [less + than 1 line not declassified] that with time, no yield would + have resulted. Fortunately, during the process of development, an + alternative design using different HE material had been fully tested and + we were able to simply substitute this primary for the defective one. + Otherwise further nuclear testing would have been required.

+

Roger Batzel also argued that US designers in responding to military + requirements had made remarkable achievements in minimizing weight and + maximizing yield of warheads. [3 lines not + declassified] Agnew interjected that + without the one-point safety requirement we would not be so close to the + edge. Batzel agreed, adding that a factor of two + increase in weight would also avoid some problems. He also remarked that + while these were remarkable accomplishments we might have pushed the technology too hard and + created problems for ourselves in the current context.

+

Harold Agnew said that people could say that we + haven’t been testing stockpiled weapons for reliability for years, why + now? He said that they didn’t realize the benefits to stockpile + maintenance that are achieved from testing new weapons and continuing to + produce nuclear weapon materials and components. He observed that many + devices which are being tested in new warhead development programs use + the same primaries which are in the old stockpiled weapons.

+

The President asked whether the Soviets had more + reliable warheads than the US. Harold + Brown answered that in general their warheads were + believed to be heavier, somewhat more roughly constructed and less + sensitive to deterioration. Roger Batzel agreed + and pointed out that they had not had the same constraints on weight and + size, and appeared to have developed less sensitive warheads.

+

The President asked how long we have had small + primaries. Roger Batzel responded nearly 20 years + and after thinking about Polaris and Poseidon, said it was really about + 10 years. Harold Agnew pointed out that + development of smaller primaries had really been a result of the + pressure of MIRVing of ICBMs and SLBMs.

+

The President asked what had been our experience + with regard to correcting problems in inventory. Roger + Batzel replied that in the early 1960s a vulnerability test of + one of our ICBM RVs had been carried + out. The President asked if this was for + fratricide purposes. Batzel said yes but added + that it was primarily to check for vulnerability to Soviet ABMs. [3 lines not declassified] Harold Brown + pointed out that [2 lines not declassified]

+

Harold Agnew stated that another example was with + our B–25 air-to-air warhead which consisted of [less + than 1 line not declassified] The plutonium at that time was + manufactured in Hanford and Rocky Flats—one making [less than 1 line not declassified]. After the weapons were + stockpiled, people began to notice [less than 1 line + not declassified] After disassembling them it was discovered + [less than 1 line not declassified] This was + due to very slight differences in the manufacturing processes at Hanford + and Rocky Flats so that the plutonium [less than 1 + line not declassified] might shrink slightly while that [less than 1 line not declassified] expanded.

+

Agnew said that another example where the warhead + did not perform as expected was the Talos/Terrier as mentioned earlier, + [less than 1 line not declassified] As a + result of these problems he felt that we wouldn’t be able to certify + warheads if the materials were changed in any way without testing.

+

Frank Press + commented out that he had brought a panel of experts together to look + into this issue. His panel had included the current laboratory directors, former laboratory + directors, such as Herbert York, + and other nuclear weapons experts. He pointed out that the laboratory + directors concerns were as they had been stated today but the other + members had a different view and felt that reliability could be + maintained for at least five years without testing, and that this had + been our basis in recommending the five year duration approach to the + President.

+

The President commented to the laboratory + directors that one concern he had is whether they were able to maintain + their objectivity on this issue in view of their desire for preservation + of the laboratories. He said he was trying to put a lid on production + and development of all new nuclear weapons and that an important element + of this is to put a cap on testing. He stated that we must maintain + reliability of our nuclear weapons but that he would need as much + flexibility from the laboratory directors as possible to accomplish his + overall objectives. He pointed out that without their support a test ban + would experience serious difficulties with Congress. He noted that his + own advice on the issue was conflicting in that he had decided to ban + testing for five years while preserving the right to resume testing. He + continued that in his view a threshold test ban would circumvent the + basic purpose of the treaty. He wanted to make clear he was not + referring to a few pounds but to hundreds of pounds or a kiloton. He + pointed out that had discussed this issue earlier in the day with Prime + Minister Desai of India,According to the President’s Daily Diary, + Carter met with + Desai in the Oval Office + from 11:01 to 11:26 a.m. (Carter Library, Presidential Materials) A + record of their meeting is scheduled for publication in Foreign + Relations, 1977–1980, vol. XIX, South + Asia. and Desai + had said that a 5KT level would open the flood gates to proliferation. + He said he was eager to learn from the laboratory directors but expected + them to support his objectives as much as possible.

+

Roger Batzel said that they were trying to be + responsive but the problem was that they didn’t know what problems would + arise in 2, 3, 4, or 5 years.

+

The President then asked what the yield range was + for our present primaries. Harold Agnew replied + that they ranged [less than 1 line not + declassified] the Titan down to [less than 1 + line not declassified] some of our other nuclear systems. Harold + Brown pointed out that the Soviets are believed to + have larger primaries involving heavier, more rugged designs which are + probably less sensitive to deterioration. Roger + Batzel said that although some of our primaries had higher + yields, testing [less than 1 line not + declassified] enable us to recertify these primaries when + problems arose. He said the laboratories have tried to be responsive to + the President’s objectives by holding the yield as low as possible, [less than 1 line not declassified] + reproducibility is a real problem that there was serious doubt that testing [less than 1 line not declassified] be useful. The + difficulty was that it is necessary to get significant boosting in order + to insure the primary worked properly. He said that to date we haven’t + resolved that testing [less than 1 line not + declassified] was useful.

+

Harold Agnew elaborated on this point, explaining + that we have tested [less than 1 line not + declassified] adding small amounts of boosting gas but the + yield varied widely and was unpredictable as the boosting gas was added. + There is no consistency in the results until the yield gets [less than 1 line not declassified]

+

The President asked whether there was any + statistical evidence on the difference in warheads between 3, 4, and 5 + years, noting that he gathered there was a difference in view here. Harold Agnew responded that we expected all our + weapons to last 20 years but as noted earlier in some cases, such as + Polaris, problems had been discovered in just four years. The President pointed out they had not discovered + it through testing. Harold Agnew agreed and said + they had discovered it by surveillance.

+

The President asked whether they had ever + discovered in a stockpile warhead any physical deterioration by nuclear + testing. Agnew replied that the [less than 1 line not declassified] when taken + from the stockpile and tested had produced an [less + than 1 line not declassified] However, it had never been tested + before since it had been developed and stockpiled while the moratorium + was in effect. Harold + Brown pointed out that was a result of not + testing the warhead rather than of deterioration after the warhead had + been properly tested and stockpiled.

+

Frank + Press, asking that the laboratory directors correct him + if he were wrong, pointed out that it was his understanding that most of + our warheads had worked properly the first time they were tested. Harold Agnew responded [3 lines + not declassified] Frank Press agreed that such problems had + occurred but stressed that most of the time the devices had performed + well the first time they were tested. Harold + Agnew acknowledged that this was true and said that was an + argument frequently used by some of Frank + Press’ colleagues. In fact, 80% or so did work the first + time but the problem was that this might not include Minuteman or + Trident or some other important warheads.

+

David Aaron + asked whether there hadn’t been enough testing of enough designs over + the years to get a good basis to predict how the weapons would perform. + The President asked whether he was referring + to new designs. Harold + Brown said that that was not the issue. The + question was whether there would be deterioration in the stockpiled + weapons within five years. If so, then in his view, Frank Press’ point was right—we could + redesign and rebuild the weapon and have confidence that it would + probably work.

+ +

David Aaron + asked Frank Press whether his + panel had looked into the previous record on the problems that had + arisen in the stockpile. Frank Press responded that his group had + reviewed the record and it was essentially just as the laboratory + directors had said today. In his view, the important point was that if + the weapons were rebuilt the same way as originally, they would have + high confidence in their performance.

+

The President asked whether stockpiled warheads + were routinely tested. Roger Batzel replied they + were not and Harold Agnew noted that we do have + proof tests of each type of warhead before it is stockpiled which + certifies performance of all warheads of a type before they are put into + a stockpile. The President said this was good, + otherwise we would have to test every weapon. Harold + Agnew returning to the question, said that the primaries of old + warheads were sometimes tested in development of new weapons and + sometimes the entire stockpiled warhead would be tested for other + reasons, such as vulnerability, but not routinely.

+

Harold + Brown offered to more clearly explain the issue, he + said that once the final proof test is completed, the weapons would be + stockpiled and subjected to surveillance procedures, but would probably + not be tested again unless for some other purpose such as Harold Agnew + had mentioned. Roger Batzel pointed out that some + very peculiar problems had arisen over the years even in the nuclear + components themselves. [2½ lines not + declassified]

+

The President asked Jim Schlesinger whether he had any thing he wanted to + mention in this discussion. Schlesinger responded that + there were two points he wanted to raise. The first was that this was + not a typical statistical problem and that we are trying to determine + the probability of a unique unpredictable event and we don’t have any + idea when or whether it will occur. In discussing his second point he + presented a chart showing the utility of testing at various yield + levels—from a few pounds to ten tons would be useful for one point + safety and hydronuclear testing, from ten tons to 10 KT for reliability + testing, and from 10 KT to 150 KT for development of new weapons.

+

Schlesinger explained that the main point was that + [less than 1 line not declassified] we could + meet our needs but that lower yield levels did not give us the + confidence that the primary will drive the secondary. He said that left + to their own devices the laboratories would prefer to go on designing + new nuclear weapons. In accomodating the President’s desires they had + given up on that but they still had the responsibility of certifying + stockpiled warheads. As he pointed out this would require testing [less than 1 line not declassified]

+

The President noted they didn’t routinely test + stockpile weapons. He then asked for the typical reliability of the + launchers for these warheads. + John Marcum replied they were about 80%, Harold + Brown said yes, 75–80% but pointed out the real + difference was that for the launchers they didn’t have to worry, there + was a 25% chance that none of them would work.

+

The President said it was his understanding that + there would be a provision that if he or Brezhnev had a pressing national need they would be able + to withdraw from the treaty. Harold Brown agreed, saying + there would be a “supreme national interest” withdrawal clause, but it + would be very difficult politically to exercise that clause since it + would abrogate the treaty. Further, there would be undoubtedly fierce + interagency fights over whether the particular problem was serious + enough to justify withdrawal.

+

David Aaron + pointed out that it might be possible to define a flexible “supreme + interest” clause that would let either side resume testing for national + security reasons without collapse of the treaty. The + President agreed that this might be possible.

+

Jim + Schlesinger interjected that an alternative would be + to have a small quota of tests below 5 KT and that this would minimize + the difficulty associated with the threshold. The + President noted that from what Harold Brown said we would be able to test if really + necessary and asked how long it would take us to do so if a problem + arose.

+

Roger Batzel replied that this would take from 6 + to 9 months depending on the level of readiness provided for in the + Safeguards Plan. The President asked how long the + moratorium had lasted. Harold Brown said it lasted about 2½ years from + the summer of 1958 to early 1961. Harold Agnew + said that a lot of people thought he was paranoid but that he had never + gotten over this. He presented a chartAttached but not printed. showing that the Soviets have + resumed testing immediately with a massive and well prepared program, + whereas it had taken us an extended period to carry out the first test. + Frank + Press told Harold Agnew that we really needed his + and Roger Batzel’s help in designing a Safeguard Plan which would + provide the right level of readiness and help keep our weapons group + together.

+

Harold Agnew said that he understood there could + be concern as the President mentioned with regard to whether the + laboratories have a vested interest in testing. He assured the President + that their only concern was to maintain our nuclear deterrent. He said + that the laboratories constitute a valuable resource and they happen to + think they are smarter than anyone else and could do a better job in + solving most new problems. He commented that their staff spent 40% of + their time on weapons and 60% + on energy activities and they would supply the technical effort wherever + the President wanted it.

+

The President asked what else they would do in + maintaining the stockpile. Harold Agnew said they + had been examining this question and, in his view, their present + surveillance procedures were adequate, although they could, of course, + increase this program if it made anyone feel better. He pointed out they + used to test one out of fifty weapons each year, but now did much less + of this sort of testing.

+

Frank Press + asked the lab directors whether they saw any real hope for reliability + testing at the 100 KT level. Both replied they didn’t think this was + likely. Harold Agnew pointed out that [2½ lines not declassified] Harold Brown asked + [2½ lines not declassified] Harold Agnew concluded that [1 line not + declassified]

+

The President, noting the particular names of some + of the tests, asked Agnew for the origin of those names. Harold Agnew responded that many of them were + place names from New Mexico. James Schlesinger pointed out + that there was a great deal of empiricism in nuclear weapons, that in + theory, it always appeared they would work well.

+

The President said his only remaining concern + after this discussion was the need to consider the relative effect of no + testing on the Soviets. As he understood there was no real effect, + except for the massive weight of their warheads. Harold Agnew said there was another point in that Soviet + missiles have much greater throw weight, which meant that if a problem + arose they could simply put another warhead on, which might be less + optimal in terms of weight or size, more easily than we could. Harold + Brown pointed out that since the size of their + warheads were larger, they might have to test at a higher yield than 3–5 + KT. On the other hand, since their warheads were less sensitive, they + might not have to test at all.

+

James + Schlesinger [3 lines not + declassified] Harold Brown [2 lines not + declassified] John Marcum [1 line not declassified]

+

Roger Batzel [5 lines not + declassified]

+

The President asked Batzel [1½ + lines not declassified] Batzel [1½ lines not declassified] Harold Brown [1½ lines not declassified]

+

The President said he had a question for Frank Press, that he had just heard we + didn’t have sensing devices monitoring the treaty. Frank Press assured + him that we did have these devices for use in internal seismic stations + and they had been installed in bore holes in New Mexico for testing. + Although we had not completed packaging of these sensors, we should be + ready to begin installation in the Soviet Union as soon as the treaty + entered into force. He estimated it might take two years to install a + complete network of single stations and perhaps three years for + arrays.

+ +

The President asked how many seismic stations we + were talking about proposing in the negotiations. Frank Press replied + that our analysis indicated that a network of about 17 single stations + would be roughly comparable to about five arrays. James Schlesinger + responded we were thinking of proposing 12–15 single stations and this + would get us down to a threshold of about [less than 1 + line not declassified]

+

Harold + Brown and Frank Press objected noting + that the real threshold would be lower when other national means were + taken into account. Frank + Press said we should be precise on this issue, + that with that kind of network we would detect down to 2/10 of a KT in + many cases. He noted that in seismic regions detection would be + equivalent to identification of the event and that in seismic regions, + we were looking at very remote locations so that any suspicious activity + from satellite photos would help identify the event. Other national + means could also help identify problems, and in general the + identification threshold should not be more than two times the detection + threshold, or about 4/10 of a KT in rock. He said this should be + increased by a factor of five in looser material and conceivably by a + factor of 10, which would get to the level James Schlesinger had mentioned, with dry alluvium. [7 lines not declassified] Harold Agnew inserted that the Soviets were doing this right + now. Frank + Press noted that we had also conducted tests in + cavities.

+

The President [1 line not + declassified] Harold Agnew [1 line not declassified] John + Marcum [4½ lines not declassified]

+

James + Schlesinger showed the President another + chartAttached but not printed. + illustrating the problem of unidentified events and said that even with + the seismic network we had in mind there could be 38 or so unidentified + events annually. He said we would be pretty comfortable in verifying at + the 5 KT level. He noted that seismic arrays were very expensive and + that it was probably not worth driving this down to 4 KT, although it + might give us more support on the Hill. He asserted that it was the + combination of our inability to verify or certify that would give rise + to serious domestic political problems.

+

Harold + Brown said these were unrelated problems and that as + noted earlier the Soviets might not need to test at all. He felt the + verification problem was a consequence of our previous statements that + any agreement we negotiated must be highly verifiable. He felt the + Soviets were unlikely to cheat under the five year approach, but said + that James Schlesinger was right + in that verification would be a political problem. There was no doubt + that a 5 KT threshold or a small quota would be better in terms of a + Senate ratification effort.

+ +

The President asked if we had a real low threshold + for a short period, he emphasized that he meant very short, of perhaps + six months, what would the lab directors want to test? Harold Agnew responded that if other needs had been met they + would want to use their quota to test stockpiled warheads for + reliability purposes. The President asked how + they would view three years, maybe with a small quota. Roger Batzel replied that a duration of three years would be + much easier than five years in maintaining laboratory capabilities. Harold + Brown noted we had gotten through 2½ years during + the moratorium. Roger Batzel agreed but said it + was starting to hurt and that more than three years would be + particularly tough.

+

Frank Press + commented that offering opportunities to work in laser fusion and other + related areas could be helpful in retaining scientists. Harold Agnew agreed but argued that the best + people would switch into other areas on a permanent basis. In time we + would lose our good people and have little confidence in our stockpile, + but he guessed that presumably this was consistent with our long range + objective.

+

David Aaron + said in his view it wouldn’t help to have a short period of testing + unless a problem had been identified which needed to be corrected. Harold Agnew agreed and pointed out that what was + really needed was a 3–5 KT threshold to cover any problems that would + arise and that this would be a major step forward in restraining + testing.

+

The President asked what the effect of a CTB would be on SALT. Harold + Brown responded that SALT constraints were not applicable to warheads. Roger Batzel commented there was a relationship + in that the CTB would constrain our + ability to provide warheads for new missile systems.

+

Harold + Brown said that if we don’t test for three years and + that, in that time, deterioration had not occurred, then the same + problems would be experienced after three years as now. The President said we could build all new + warheads at that time for critical systems. He asked if SALT II permitted new missiles what would + be the effect of a CTB? Harold + Brown said there would be little effect, since if we + were going to resume testing after 3–5 years we would just design new + warheads and test them at that time.

+

John Marcum pointed out that it was his + understanding that prior to the threshold test ban we had fully tested + new warheads which were intended to meet the future needs of the M–X, + TRIDENT II and cruise missile systems. Harold + Agnew agreed that this was the case and said we had a family of + tested warheads for use and planned to use these in developing new + systems, since we would be unable to develop new strategic warheads even + at 3–5 KT. The President commented then the 5 KT + threshold would not really help in this regard. Harold Brown said + probably not although new tactical warheads might be developed. Roger Batzel commented that in testing these new warhead designs + the laboratories had tried to anticipate future strategic needs.

+

The President asked what the yield was on the + largest device we had tested. Harold Brown replied [less than 1 line not declassified] Harold Agnew said it was more [less than 1 line not declassified] and for a very dirty device + (lots of fissionable material) the yield could have been as high [less than 1 line not declassified]

+

David Aaron + asked whether from the laboratory perspective it would be better to have + a small quota for reliability testing each year or to have unlimited + testing after five years. After having the question repeated, Roger Batzel responded that they would probably + prefer a small number of tests each year.

+

The President told David Aaron that with either a quota or threshold he + thought we would lose our non-proliferation impact and the other + political benefits we were seeking. In his view, a 5 KT level would be + high enough to permit further proliferation in other coun-tries and + might be just fine for India. Harold Brown said he agreed + completely.

+

Harold Agnew asked whether 2 KT would matter. The President said he thought so, that the + essence of our position is that for a period of time we would not test + at all and then could resume testing.

+

The President said he wanted to make clear that he + did not share all the laboratory director’s concerns. He said he wasn’t + sure at all that he shared their concerns about problems arising within + five years, but said he might not be qualified to judge. Harold + Brown said this was a judgmental issue and the + President’s opinion was as good as anyone’s.

+

The President asked whether there was any way to + make the warheads less sensitive, possibly by adding more tritium. Harold + Brown responded that we might make them less + sensitive by relaxing the one-point safety criteria, explaining that + this requirement meant that an accidental detonation of the HE at one + point should not result in a significant nuclear yield and that this + requirement had required us to minimize the plutonium in the + warhead.

+

Roger Batzel said they had examined all these + ideas, that to redesign the stockpile would take a lot of time and could + have some disadvantages, and wouldn’t really help much. He said that at + the expense of more weight we could double the HE. Harold Agnew noted we could also add plutonium to make the + primary hotter so it would be more likely to achieve an effective + tritium burn.

+

The President said he had to leave for another + appointment and that the meeting was very useful. The meeting adjourned + at 3:30 p.m.

+
+ +
+ + 207. Summary of Conclusions of a Special Coordination Committee + MeetingSource: Carter + Library, National Security Council, Institutional Files, Box 95, + SCC 084, CTB Verification, Seismic Station + Network: 6/12/78. Secret. The meeting occurred in the White House + Situation Room. The memorandum was originally dated June 26, and an + unknown hand wrote “7” over the 6. + Washington, June + 27, 1978 + + SUBJECT + Comprehensive Test Ban (CTB) + + + PARTICIPANTS + State + Secretary Cyrus + Vance + Les Gelb Director, Bureau + of Politico-Military Affairs + Defense + Secretary Harold + Brown + David McGiffert Asst + Secretary for International Security Affairs + Energy + Secretary James + Schlesinger + Donald Kerr Acting Asst Secretary for Defense Programs + JCS + General David Jones + Lt General William Y. + Smith + ACDA + Paul Warnke + Spurgeon Keeny, Deputy + Director + Thomas Davies, Asst Director for Multilateral Affairs + White House + Zbigniew Brzezinski + David Aaron + NSC + Reginald Bartholomew + Benjamin Huberman + OSTP + Frank Press + John Marcum + CIA + Admiral Stansfield + Turner + [name not declassified] Chief, Nuclear + Energy Division + +

The purpose of the meeting was to review our CTB policy on duration, permitted experiments and + verification in light of recent meetings and deliberations by the + President and to briefly discuss the CTB Safeguards Plan which the Working Group is + preparing.

+

In beginning the meeting, Dr. Brzezinski observed that these were highly interrelated + issues and suggested that we begin with duration and permitted + experiments. He pointed out that after meeting with the laboratory + directors, the President continued to rule out kiloton-level testing, + but had more flexibility in considering a shorter duration with very low + level permitted experiments.

+ +

The discussion then focused on the implications of shortening the + duration to three years with permitted experiments restricted to a few + pounds or somewhat higher as in PD/NSC–38. There was general agreement + that this would be a useful step in further limiting military risks and + maintaining laboratory capabilities, and that the treaty would still be + worthwhile from the non-proliferation and political standpoint. Dave + Jones agreed that the shorter duration would be helpful, but stated he + would have to meet with the Chiefs to determine whether they could + support this approach.

+

With regard to ratification, Harold + Brown stressed that the support of both the Chiefs and + the laboratory directors would be essential and argued that in this + context it would be important to retain the PD/NSC–38See Document 200. + language on intention to resume testing at the end of the treaty + duration. Dave Jones agreed with this view and suggested that it would + be useful if the testing resumption were not limited to safety and + reliability purposes. All agreed with this recommendation.

+

The permitted experiments level was then discussed in detail and it was + agreed that this level should be raised slightly from the “few pounds or + somewhat higher” of PD/NSC–38 to “less than one hundred pounds” in order + to permit some benefit in maintaining design skills and checking + calculations while minimizing adverse non-proliferation impacts.

+

The impact of the shorter duration on internal seismic stations was also + discussed. Frank Press pointed + out that military risks would be limited by the three year duration and + we would probably not be able to completely install our proposed 12 to + 15 station network in just three years. He suggested a two-step approach + of proposing seven stations during the three year treaty (the Soviets + have informally indicated they might accept this many) with the larger + network deferred for consideration in the context of a replacement + treaty. A consensus was reached in favor of authorizing the Delegation + to propose this approach following the Soviet response to our 12 to 15 + station proposal.

+

Dr. Brzezinski adjourned the + meeting by reviewing the changes that would be in PD/NSC–38 under this + approach—e.g., duration of three instead of five years, deletion from + the intention to resume testing clause of the restriction to reliability + and safety purposes, and raising the level of permitted experiments to + less than one hundred pounds instead of a “few pounds or somewhat + higher.” He asked that the views of the Chiefs and the lab directors on + this approach be submitted by ThursdayJune + 29. evening so that a decision memorandum could be submitted to the President on + Friday. At Jim Schlesinger’s + request it was agreed that the decision memorandum would include each + agency’s preferred position as well as their view on the acceptability + of this approach.

+
+ +
+ 208. Draft Presidential Directive/NSCSource: + Carter Library, National Security Council, Institutional Files, Box + 20, PRM/NSC–38. Secret. In the upper right-hand corner, Carter wrote “ok. J” The + memorandum was attached to an undated memorandum from Brzezinski to Mondale, Vance, Harold Brown, Schlesinger, Warnke, Jones, Turner, and Press that stated that the Presidential Directive + contained “CTB instructions which + replace those of PD/NSC–38.” (Ibid.) + Washington, undated + + TO + The Vice President + The Secretary of State + The Secretary of Defense + + + ALSO + The Secretary of Energy + The Director, Arms Control & Disarmament Agency + The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff + The Director of Central Intelligence + The Director, Office of Science and Technology Policy + + + SUBJECT + Comprehensive Test Ban + +

The President has reviewed the recent deliberations of the SCC on the Comprehensive Test Ban (CTB) issues,See Document 207. and has reached + the following conclusions.

+

a. In view of the importance of maintaining confidence in safety and + reliability of our stockpiled nuclear weapons, the US should propose in the CTB negotiations that the treaty have a + fixed, three year duration. The treaty would automatically terminate at + the end of three years. During the third year there would be a review + conference to determine whether to negotiate a replacement treaty.

+

b. In forwarding the treaty to the Senate for ratification the President + has decided to state his intention to resume testing at the end of the three years unless a + vigorous safeguards program and studies in the interim indicate that + this is not necessary. He has also decided that any further agreement on + testing limitations after the three year treaty would be presented to + the Senate for ratification.

+

c. The President has decided that routine scientific experiments at + minimal yield levels (less than one hundred pounds) should be permitted + under the CTB in addition to + experiments in laser fusion and other related areas for civil energy + purposes. He has also directed that the precise nature and yields of + such experiments be detailed in a CTB + Safeguards Plan by the SCC and + forwarded for his review by July 31, 1978.Not found.

+

d. Following the Soviet response to our current proposal for fifteen + single national seismic stations with the right to upgrade at least two + to arrays, the US should indicate in the + CTB negotiations that in the + context of a three year duration treaty, we should be willing to accept + a network of ten simple stations and defer the larger network for + consideration in the context of any replacement treaty.

+ + Zbigniew + Brzezinski + +
+ +
+ 209. Memorandum From Secretary of Energy Schlesinger to the President’s Assistant for National + Security Affairs (Brzezinski)Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, James Schlesinger Papers, Subject + File, Box 1, Chronological File, 1978 July. Secret; Restricted Data. + Two tabs are attached but not printed. + Washington, July 1, + 1978 +

Attached are memoranda from the directors of the DOE nuclear weapons + design laboratories responding to the request for comments on the new + position on CTB discussed at the SCC meeting of 27 June 1978.See Document + 207.

+ +

You may also recall that both Dr. Agnew and Dr. Batzel provided responses + to questions from the NSC staff for you + on 5 May 1978.Not found. You will be + interested in reviewing those earlier memoranda which more fully express + their views on the fundamental issues and on the impact of a CTB.

+

As stated in the earlier memoranda and in the enclosed responses, a + treaty limited to three years is clearly preferable from the point of + view of delaying the loss of weapons design capability. In either case, + however, it will be difficult to motivate good people to stay. There + will also be a penalty from the safety and reliability point of view, + but the expectation is that this penalty would be limited.

+

It is going to be difficult to maintain morale and motivation of key + designers and scientific staffs under a near zero yield test ban even + for the three-year period. In order to minimize losses, it will be + necessary to provide both tangible assurances which demonstrate the + national resolve to resume testing and also the resources necessary to + assure successful start-up of a meaningful test program.

+

The verification problem will be intensified by both the shorter term + treaty and the more limited network of stations. During the ratification + process it will come to be recognized that we will only be able to + verify [1 line not declassified] As we have + already seen, the Soviets will take the position that the verification + issue should be reconsidered and that no other means of verification + beyond national technical means will be required.

+

In summary: the shorter period for the CTB alleviates some of the national security concerns. + Nonetheless, a noticeable risk remains if testing of the performance of + boosted primaries is foreclosed, since there is some (low) probability + that some deficiency may occur in critical weapons in the stockpile. It + would seem essential, therefore, that the Administration be able to + articulate the compensating benefits of a three-year moratorium.

+
+ +
+ + 210. Minutes of a Special Coordination Committee MeetingSource: Carter Library, National + Security Council, Institutional Files, Box 96, SCC 093, CTB, Test Ban Options and Issues: 7/6/78. Secret. The + meeting took place in the White House Situation Room. Brzezinski summarized the meeting + in a memorandum to Carter, July 7; Ibid. + Washington, July 6, + 1978 + + SUBJECT + Comprehensive Test Ban (CTB) + + + PARTICIPANTS + State + Secretary Cyrus + Vance + Jerome Kahan Dep Director, Bureau of Politico-Military + Affairs + Defense + Secretary Harold + Brown + Dep Secretary Charles + Duncan + David McGiffert Asst + Secretary for International Security Affairs + Energy + Donald Kerr Acting Asst Secretary for Defense Programs + JCS + General David Jones + Lt General William Y. + Smith + ACDA + Paul Warnke + Spurgeon Keeny, Deputy + Director + Admiral Thomas Davies Asst Director for Multilateral + Affairs + White House + Zbigniew Brzezinski + Hamilton Jordan + NSC + Reginald Bartholomew + OSTP + John Marcum + CIA + Sayre Stevens Dep Director, + National Foreign Assessment Center + [name not declassified] Chief, Nuclear + Energy Division + +

MINUTES OF MEETING

+

The purpose of the meeting was to continue discussion of the three year + approach on CTB, in light of comments + received from the ChiefsThe JCS remained opposed to a CTB. See Memorandum From the Joint + Chiefs of Staff to Brown, June 29, 1978; Library of Congress, + Manuscript Division, Harold + Brown Papers, Box 82, Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty + #2. and Laboratory Directors.See + footnote 4, Document + 204.

+ +

In beginning the meeting, Dr. Brzezinski stated that we want to pull together + differing agency positions on this issue and noted that the JCS position was less forthcoming than he + had understood. He had expected that the three year approach would + provide the basis for JCS support from + the national security perspective and the other agencies had agreed on + the three vs. five year approach on that basis. In his view, if the + three year approach did not generate more support we might as well have + the same fight over the five year proposal. Harold Brown pointed out, however, that we wouldn’t get + the same letter from the Chiefs on the five year proposal.

+

Paul Warnke stated that if the + Chiefs still felt that serious risks remained he would recommend staying + with the five year duration since it is better from a non-proliferation + standpoint. In his view, the very limited support from the Chiefs and + the Laboratory Directors was not a good enough basis to change this + position. Cy Vance agreed noting + that we are weakening the treaty from a non-proliferation standpoint by + agreeing to the three year approach and should go back to five + years.

+

Dr. Brzezinski noted that Roger + Batzel’s comments were fairly supportive, and that Harold Agnew’s, while + linking CTB to SALT, also had some support. Harold Brown stated that his attitude + differed from the Chiefs and he has transmitted these views to the + President.Brown sent a memorandum to Carter on June 30 which + transmitted the views of the JCS on + a CTB. He noted that his “views on + this subject differ from theirs, as I have previously indicated to + you.” (Memorandum from Brown + to Carter, June 30, Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, + Harold Brown Papers, Box + 82, Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty #2) He agreed that three + years would not be as good for non-proliferation but noted the + non-proliferation arguments had not been fully analyzed and he did not + place as high an emphasis on them. On balance, however, he felt the + three year approach was better and more acceptable to most policy + officials than five.

+

Donald Kerr, speaking for Jim + Schlesinger, stated that three years was a better way to + reduce risks. In his view, while they could only certify continuing + reliability with testing at 3–5 KT, three years represented a good + compromise for national security and retention of laboratory personnel. + He noted with regard to verification that a shorter duration would + weaken our bargaining position and that what we could install would be + less than what we hoped for.

+

(Hamilton Jordan entered at this + point.)

+

Don Kerr continued that we could accomplish planned improvements in our + Atomic Energy Detection System earlier and could also propose that the + US and Soviets do some calibration + testing taking advantage of the precedents of the Peaceful Nuclear + Explosive Treaty. Spurgeon Keeny commented that this + wouldn’t help much since calibration shots would be at test sites and + would tell us very little about evasion concerns.

+

Dr. Brzezinski summarized the + three year approach saying that we are trying to balance five + elements—duration, level of testing, Safeguards Plan, verification, and + commitment to resume testing, in striving for a package which meets our + national security needs and permits us to go ahead with our foreign + policy objectives. He then read a draft Presidential Directive.See Document + 208. In reviewing the verification portion of the + directive, Dr. Brzezinski + suggested that maybe we should go to 10 internal seismic stations, + rather than 7. Harold Brown and + Paul Warnke supported this + suggestion and after a brief discussion, it was agreed that the + directive should be modified to include seeking 10 simple stations + instead of 7.

+

David Jones indicated that there was no subject on which the Chiefs had + been more consistent. He acknowledged that three years with resumption + of testing was far better than five, but to conclude that the problems + would go away would be erroneous. He said that the JCS memorandum had been based on a + thorough review of each element of the package and left the final + judgement to the individual Chiefs. In response to Dr. Brzezinski’s question, he agreed that + the elements of the draft Presidential Directive were responsive to the + Chiefs’ concerns but stated that their basic feeling was that there is + no way to maintain reliability without testing at 3–5 KT—an indefinite + duration would be catastrophic, five years would be very very serious, + three years would be less serious but would still be a problem.

+

Harold Brown commented that + instead of leaving the final judgment to the individual Chiefs, he felt + the memo expressed judgment at the end that a 3–5 KT threshold would be + better. Bill Smith interjected + that in the best of worlds, we would have both the non-proliferation + benefits and continue to test at the 3–5 KT level. Dr. Brzezinski noted that with a longer + duration there could be a higher test level, and with the shorter + duration a lower test level. Bill + Smith stated that a more accurate non-proliferation + assessment was needed to clarify the benefits of the treaty since the + military risks were quite real to the Chiefs.

+

Paul Warnke offered to provide as + much detail as needed, noting that this factor had been taken into + account fully in the President’s February 1976 decision.Not found. + Cy Vance stated that it was + pretty clear that India and possibly Brazil would go along with the + CTB. Paul Warnke agreed and said that the CTB might lead India to accept full scope + safeguards as well. David Jones + acknowledged that military risks had to be balanced against these + possible gains for non-proliferation but noted that the Chiefs would be + more negative on the prospect of such gains.

+

Dr. Brzezinski stated that he + wanted to go through the draft Presidential Directive paragraph by + paragraph and have each participant register dissent or consent. On + duration, Cy Vance said he + preferred five years but would go to three if the other provisions were + satisfactory. David Jones said it was clear to him that three was very + much preferable than five, but that he had to represent all the Chiefs’ + views and would have to fall back on the judgment in paragraph 8 of the + memorandum on the entirety of the package rather than item by item. + Jones said that as Roger Batzel had noted, testing at 3–5 KT was a + fundamental requirement in the long term. Harold Brown observed that this referred to concern + about a continuation of the treaty after three years, and Dr. Brzezinski noted that the burden of + proof would be on those who wanted to continue the treaty. David Jones + disagreed asserting that the burden of proof would fall programatically + on the tester. Dr. Brzezinski + pointed out that the treaty would terminate after three years and David + Jones said that he thought the burden of proof would fall equally on + those parties.

+

Harold Brown said that the real + question would be verification and not reliability with regard to the + burden of proof. David Jones agreed stating that the Chiefs are + convinced that without much difficulty the Soviets can test at 3, 5, 10 + KT at low risk and this drives the conclusion that we would have to stop + and they would continue by cheating. In his view, we couldn’t do that + but the Soviets could in their closed society.

+

At Harold Brown’s suggestion, Dr. + Brzezinski then asked for and + received confirmation that all agencies including Energy would support + this approach except the Chiefs. Donald Kerr stated that three years was + definitely better than five years. Harold + Brown said that in his view this approach was consistent + with national security and that Jim + Schlesinger should clarify his position on that issue. + Dr. Brzezinski read the final + paragraph from Jim Schlesinger’s + transmittal of the Laboratory Directors’ viewsSee Document 209. + and said he took that as an endorsement of the three year approach. + Harold Brown agreed that this + meant he (Jim Schlesinger) was + on board. Donald Kerr also agreed.

+

David Jones, supported by Harold + Brown, indicated that if the Chiefs were pressed again on + this approach it would probably be counter-productive and we would get + more no’s than yes’s. He indicated that in time as the provisions of the + treaty become clearer and with + a better understanding of the non-proliferation benefits of a CTB they might be more supportive of this + approach. There was agreement that State and ACDA would prepare a non-proliferation assessment for this + purpose. David Jones asserted however, that if the paper were sent now + the Chiefs would still say that it (the three year approach) doesn’t + meet their concerns.

+

Bill Smith observed that the + “unless” clause in the commitment to resume testing had not been + included in the Chiefs’ assumptions, in other words their view was based + on unconditional commitment to resume testing after three years. + Harold Brown said that if + this was true the paper was internally inconsistent. He recognized the + problem that having a group of people with different concerns reduced + the consistency of conclusions. In his view the Chiefs may have assumed + that testing would resume but didn’t really believe it. David Jones, + said that paragraph 8 of the JCS + memorandum was based on the most favorable assumptions.

+

Dr. Brzezinski suggested that we + should go back to the President and tell him that all agencies were + prepared to sign on for the three year approach, and that JCS was standing by its concern but were + also more satisfied with the three year than five year proposal. Donald + Kerr indicated that in his view the Safeguards Plan should not be + mentioned in the intent to resume testing clause, since there was + nothing in the plan that would be relevant to the decision of whether to + seek a replacement treaty. Harold + Brown said there was some relationship but suggested that + the Safeguards Plan could be included in a separate sentence. John + Marcum disagreed with Kerr pointing out that the Safeguards Plan would + provide the essential data base for deciding whether to negotiate a + replacement treaty.

+

Paul Warnke stated that in his + view, the non-proliferation benefits were marginal as is and that he + felt we should stick to the five year position unless a general + consensus developed in favor of the three year approach.

+

Harold Brown disagreed stating + that the three year approach would be an improvement in the ratification + context in demonstrating that risks had been limited.

+

Paul Warnke asked how we would + deal with permitted experiments. He thought that since testing would be + limited to less than 100 pounds we would not need to seek an + understanding with the Russians, but in any case we could proceed to + table language for Article I of the treaty and reserve our position on + whether an understanding would be needed.

+

Dr. Brzezinski asked the working + group to examine this issue and adjourned the meeting stating that we + would report to the President and that State and ACDA would send a + non-proliferation assessment to the JCS.

+
+ +
+ 211. Memorandum From Secretary of State Vance and the Director of the Arms Control and + Disarmament Agency (Warnke) to + the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Jones)Source: Library of Congress, + Manuscript Division, Harold + Brown Papers, Box 82, Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty + #2. Secret. Copies sent to Brown, Schlesinger, and Brzezinski. A stamped notation at the top of the + memorandum reads “SECDEF HAS + SEEN, JUL 1978.” Underneath the date, Brown wrote “7/11 Dave McG—this should be of some + help with JCS. HB.” + Washington, July + 10, 1978 + + SUBJECT + Non-Proliferation Value of a Comprehensive Test Ban (CTB) + +

One of the most serious potential threats to our national security is the + further spread of nuclear weapons. We believe that a major national + security advantage of a CTB—in addition + to the constraint it would impose on Soviet strategic force + modernization—would be CTB’s + contribution to the achievement of non-proliferation objectives.

+

By demonstrating the willingness of the nuclear powers to accept + restraints on their own nuclear capabilities, CTB would put the U.S. in a stronger position to carry out + our non-proliferation strategy. We could better press key non-nuclear + states to accept restrictions on their activities.

+

The President has publicly repeated his commitment to a test ban; and the + intense interest of the non-aligned nations, as well as our allies, in a + test ban was expressed in the recent U.N. Special Session on + Disarmament.The UN Special Session on Disarmament was held in New York + from May 23 to June 30. Continued failure to reach a CTB would seriously impede our + non-proliferation efforts and could result in considerable erosion of + what we have achieved.

+

We believe that the longer the duration of the CTB, the greater the benefits. But even a three-year ban, + if non-discriminatory, would have significant non-proliferation value. + Following are some specific benefits.

+ +

1. Prevent Testing by + Threshold States.

+

A CTB would commit non-nuclear weapon + parties to accept constraints upon nuclear weapon development. These + nations would be unable to obtain either the political benefit or the + initial proof of weapons afforded by tests. This would be important + politically for nations which have not joined the NPT—notably India, Pakistan, Egypt, + Israel, Argentina, Brazil, Spain, South Africa, and Saudi Arabia. Six of + these nations are parties to the Limited Test Ban Treaty. A widely + supported CTB—one that, unlike the + NPT, could not be attacked as + discriminatory—would be politically very costly for such states to + reject. There are reasonable prospects that a substantial number of them + will join. Even for those that choose not to adhere, the existence of a + CTB could well be a factor + inhibiting any decision to test.In the + right margin next to this paragraph, Brown wrote “This is less useful an exposition than + it would be if it [illegible] of these countries specifically” and + underlined the words “could well be.”

+

2. Strengthen the NPT

+

Most of the non-nuclear parties to the NPT have stressed the importance they attach to fulfillment + of the reciprocal undertakings of nuclear weapons states to curb + vertical proliferation. One of the steps most persistently urged is a + comprehensive test ban treaty, which is considered a litmus test of + nuclear power intentions. A CTB could + make it easier to persuadeBrown highlighted the portion of + this paragraph that begins “Most of the non-nuclear parties” and + ends with “easier to persuade” and wrote in the right-hand margin + “same on this.” additional states to join the NPT, and reduce charges of discrimination + and of failure to fulfill our obligations under Article VI of that + Treaty.Article VI of the + Non-Proliferation Treaty declared that signatories must pursue + “negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to + cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear + disarmament” and make progress towards a treaty “on general and + complete disarmament under strict and effective international + control.” (“Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons,” July + 1, 1968, Documents on Disarmament, 1968, pp. + 461–465) It would also minimize the chances of withdrawal by + countries, such as Yugoslavia and Nigeria, that have hinted at that + possibility. If a CTB is in effect by + 1980, it will improve the negotiating position of the United States in + the NPT Review Conference.

+

3. Reinforcement of the + Treaty of Tlatelolco

+

Argentina and Brazil, two states of primary proliferation concern who + have not joined the NPT, have + interpreted the Treaty of Tlatelolco as not foreclosing “peaceful” + nuclear explosives. Since Tlatelolco could well enter into force at + about the same time as a CTB, the + latter would close out this possibility.

+ +

4. India.

+

While Prime Minister Desai has + declared that he will not authorize any further explosions,On June 9, Desai told the UN + Special Session on Disarmament that India had “abjured nuclear + explosions even for peaceful purposes.” (“Address by Indian Prime + Minister Desai before the + Special Session of the General Assembly Devoted to Disarmament: + Indian Nuclear Policy [Extract],” June 9, Documents on Disarmament, 1978, pp. 382–383) it is + important to translate this into a treaty obligation binding India. + Desai states that India will + “support all non-discriminatory measures toward nuclear disarmament,” + and indicated that a CTB would “remove + a sensitive element of discrimination and bring the chances of + acceptance of a non-proliferation treaty both internationally and + nationally much nearer.” Last month Foreign Minister Vajpayee told U.S. + Congressmen that India would join a non-discriminatory CTB. Given India’s standing in the + non-aligned movement as well as the importance of Indian actions in this + area in the wake of its 1974 test, Indian adherence to the CTB would have a beneficial effect on + other countries, particularly Pakistan.Above and to the right of this paragraph, Brown wrote “useful.”

+

Our other major non-proliferation objective in India—full scope + safeguards—would be promoted by a CTB. + At his January 5 press conference, Desai said “India will agree to full scope safeguards + only if the nuclear powers, at least the big + two, the United States and the Soviet Union, signed a comprehensive + treaty to avoid all types of tests” and took certain other steps. In his + recent meetings with Prime Minister Desai, the President placed great emphasis on the CTB as a major part of the solution to the + safeguards problem.See footnote 4, Document 206. Since + the Non-Proliferation Act of 1977 requires termination of U.S. nuclear + aid to India if full scope safeguards are not in place in 18 months, a + CTB may avert a serious division + between the United States and India.

+

5. South Africa.

+

A CTB which South AfricaBrown + circled and drew a line from the words “South Africa” and wrote + “would it?” above and to the right of this paragraph. joined + would convert into a treaty obligation the assurance Prime Minister + Vorster gave the President + that South Africa would not explode a nuclear device.Telegram 247704 to London, Paris, and Bonn, + October 15, 1977 reported that on September 13, South African + Foreign Minister “Pik” Botha + had handed Ambassador Bowdler a letter from Vorster to Carter that “led off with reiteration of SAG’s previous assurances that South + Africa does not have or intend to develop nuclear explosives for any + purpose, that Kalahari is not a nuclear test site, and that there + will not be any nuclear testing in South Africa.” (National + Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign + Policy File, P840081–2508) This would help reduce regional + apprehensions about South African intentions as well as the risk of consequential decisions by + others to go nuclear. In the near term, a CTB could advance the progress begun during Ambassador + Smith’s recent visit in + achieving South African adherence to the NPT and full scope safeguards.Gerard + Smith, the President’s Special Assistant for + Non-Proliferation Matters, visited South Africa from June 26–28 to + discuss nuclear issues.

+

In summary, we believe that a CTB is a + central element of our efforts to prevent the further proliferation of + nuclear weapons.

+ + Cyrus + Vance + + + Paul C. + Warnke + +
+ +
+ 212. Memorandum of ConversationSource: Department of State, Office of the Secretariat + Staff, Special Adviser to the Secretary (S/MS) on Soviet Affairs + Marshall Shulman—Jan 21, + 77–Jan 19, 81, Lot 81D109, Box 8, Vance-Gromyko July 1978. Secret. The meeting took place at + the Soviet Mission. Drafted by Krimer on July 15. + Geneva, July 13, 1978, 10:40 a.m.–1:30 + p.m. + + SUBJECT + Vance-Gromyko Meeting, SALT, CTB + + + PARTICIPANTS + U.S. + Secretary of State Cyrus R. + Vance + Ambassador Paul C. + Warnke + Ambassador Malcolm + ToonThese participants + joined the discussion at 11:50 a.m. for discussion of CTB matters. [Footnote is in the + original.] + Mr. William D. Krimer, + Interpreter + USSR + Foreign Minister A.A. + Gromyko + First Dep. Foreign Minister G.M. + Korniyenko + Dep. Foreign Minister V.S. Semenov + Mr. A.M. PetrosyantsIbid. + Ambassador A.F. + DobryninIbid. + Mr. V.M. Sukhodrev, + Interpreter + + +

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to a comprehensive test ban.]

+

CTB

+

Noting that in the person of Ambassador Warnke Secretary Vance had a specialist on all questions, Gromyko said that for the purpose of + discussing CTB matters he would have to + call in his experts.

+

Ambassador Toon, Chairman + Petrosyants, Minister Semenov + and Ambassador Dobrynin joined + the group for discussion of CTB + matters.

+

Ambassador Warnke expressed his + belief that Chairman Petrosyants + would agree with him in saying that good progress had been achieved + toward a CTB Treaty. The Delegations + were now working diligently to develop a separate verification agreement + that would contain appropriate provisions. Warnke could really not see any issue of principle + remaining. Initially there had been three major issues before the + sides:

+

(1) Peaceful nuclear explosions;

+

(2) Verification; and

+

(3) Duration of the Treaty

+

Warnke would take them up in + inverse order, because due to the fact that on September 2 President + Brezhnev had agreed to a + moratorium on peaceful nuclear explosions for the same duration as the + Treaty, we could now agree to a limited duration and thus a limited + moratorium.

+

We had agreed in principle that the duration of the Treaty would be + either three years or five years. The two sides had also agreed that + during the moratorium they would continue to consider together if there + was some way to permit resumption of peaceful nuclear explosions without + involving military aspects or endangering our common objective of + non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. Thus, we now had substantive + agreement on two of the three issues. As for verification, we did have + agreement in principle. We had given up our traditional insistence on + mandatory on-site inspection and had moved toward the Soviet position + that such inspection be on a voluntary basis. We still had to work out + the circumstances under which on-site inspection would be carried out, + and the two sides were working on the conditions for such inspection. + For our part, we were working on the assumption that a well + substantiated demand for on-site inspection could not very well be + rejected without affecting the viability of the Treaty. There were + proposals on the table concerning specific numbers of locations for + national seismic stations on the territory of the Soviet Union and the + United States, and the experts of the two sides were currently engaged + in intensive work on this question. Finally, there was no difference of + views between the two sides regarding the fact that we were working toward a general and + comprehensive test ban, and not merely toward a threshold test ban.

+

Warnke thought that both sides + recognized that there were areas of routine scientific experiments + producing very low yield that would have to be provided for. He knew + that last year it had been pointed out in the course of discussions that + one such area was that of laser fusion as a means of generating + electricity. Experiments in that area would produce low nuclear yields, + to be measured in terms of pounds. He was sure that there was no + intention on either side to interfere with these scientific + developments. Chairman Petrosyants would be an expert in this area, and would + be familiar with the nature of these experiments.

+

Thus, Warnke would say, he was + satisfied with the progress that had been achieved, and believed the + prospects were good. He knew that they should consider together the + question of the timing and entry into force of the Agreement, + particularly in light of the recent UN + Special Session on Disarmament and the proposal to reconstitute the + Conference of the Committee on Disarmament.See Document 501. There were + matters of procedure and timing, and how best to enlist international + support, that could be worked out between the sides. He hoped that + Chairman Petrosyants would in + general agree with his review of where we stood at the present time.

+

Chairman Petrosyants said that, in + general, the situation as set out by Ambassador Warnke was correct. Their negotiations + were indeed being carried on successfully. The Delegations were engaged + in intensive and important work on certain issues. However, he would + have to report that they had not yet resolved and, he would even say, + not even approached resolution of one major question. Some time ago the + Soviet Union had suggested and tabled a proposed text for so-called + Article I, the purpose of which it was to define the objectives of the + Treaty. The language proposed by the Soviet side very clearly indicated + the purposes of the Treaty and the ultimate objective of complete + cessation of nuclear weapon tests in all environments. The U.S. + Delegation, on the other hand, had merely set out its considerations in + the so-called Working Document, but had not put forward a draft for + Article I, i.e., for the Article which was to spell out the main purpose + of the Treaty. He would ask that a draft of this Article be presented as + soon as possible. That would make it easier to continue the work of the + Delegations.

+

Petrosyants said that the greatest + difficulty in the negotiations involved the question of verification. + The Soviet Union was in favor of verification, and in this sense stood + on common ground with the United States. The first element of verification was on-site + inspection in the event of ambiguous physical phenomena which raised + questions about compliance with the Treaty. On-site inspection would be + implemented on a voluntary basis. In general, he would say, the work of + specifying the functions of the personnel to be involved in on-site + inspection was proceeding rather successfully. There were still some + differences between the sides on this subject, but Petrosyants did not believe them to be + so important as to warrant airing at so important a meeting as the + current one. He was sure that he would be able to resolve them with + Warnke.

+

As for the second element of the verification question—automatic national + seismic stations—there were still quite a few unresolved questions and + quite a few divergent views. The Soviet side believed it would be best + to carry out verification by national technical means, including + national seismic stations, which were in the possession of all the + states involved. The U.S. Delegation had proposed installation of + so-called automatically operated seismic stations on each other’s + territory. He and Warnke had + discussed the various characteristics of such stations, their range of + operation, etc. At their invitation the principal inventor had come to + Geneva, bringing with him documentation and figures. As a result of + discussions with specialists, it had been established that to date these + stations exist only on the drawing board, and that one could not expect + even one such station to be assembled in the United States any earlier + than October of this year. From a technical standpoint that station was + very complex, and when the Soviet side had asked how much time would be + required for testing it, the inventor had specified a period of no less + than three months. In the Soviet view it would be impossible to + guarantee that a station produced in just one sample and tested for only + three months would operate reliably. He believed that it would be quite + wrong to jeopardize the Treaty by installing this kind of equipment, + since it would be very likely to mislead people. He did not believe it + possible to put one’s faith into the operation of such a station without + having any assurance of the reliability of its operation. One most + important element of that station, the so-called authenticity block, did + not even exist on the drawing board so far, and would not be completed + even by October. For all these reasons he thought the sides should limit + themselves to inspection by personnel and by using the technical + facilities, including seismic stations, which the sides have at their + disposal at present. Finally, the Soviet side believed that it should be + possible to divide the verification question into two stages. At the + first stage verification would be carried out without the use of + national seismic stations on the territory of the other side, and at the + second stage they could proceed to the use of improved seismic + stations.

+ +

Gromyko asked if the two sides + had agreed on the possibility of using national seismic stations.

+

Petrosyants replied in the + negative.

+

Secretary Vance asked what the + quality of verification would be during the initial period without + improved and installed seismic stations.

+

Petrosyants replied that first and + foremost he would point out that neither side had any intention of + violating the Treaty and conducting nuclear explosions.

+

Gromyko remarked that this should + be viewed as the moral policy of all the countries involved.

+

Petrosyants pointed out something + that he thought might be even more important. The United States had in + its own country a well-developed network of seismic stations, as well as + stations located along the perimeter of Soviet borders, particularly + south and east of these borders. Thus, everything was subject to + observation and identification. Moreover, there were systems for an + international exchange of seismic data from seismic stations. All this, + taken together, would in his view assure a good level of verification. + This is why the Soviet side had not advanced any proposal to locate + seismic stations on the territory of the United States. They simply were + not needed.

+

Gromyko noted that there were + evidently three issues that were not as yet finally agreed. The first + concerned the purposes of the Treaty. It was obviously necessary to + reach agreement on Article I, specifying that the Treaty was aimed at + ensuring a complete ban on the testing of nuclear weapons. It should not + be a difficult task to draft such an article. The fact that the United + States had not provided a draft so far gave rise to certain doubts on + his side. Secondly—duration of the Treaty. He had the impression that + the United States was losing its taste for the five-year duration it had + previously proposed. When he had been in Washington last and had + indicated that a five-year term might be acceptable, he had thought that + he had made a concession that would be readily grasped by the United + States. He thought if a three-year duration were now to be established, + people would become suspicious that the participants to the Treaty were + developing new facilities and would engage in a new round of testing + after the three-year period. Third, as to verification. Some progress + had been achieved in view of the understanding on the participation of + personnel on a voluntary basis. As for automatic equipment, he thought + it would be best of all if agreement were reached to use the technical + facilities as the disposal of each of the parties on a national basis. + If any third country were to ask the United States to install so and so + many stations on its territory, no one would object. But, in the absence + of such requests, national technical means should be sufficient. After + all, the initial participants in this Treaty were countries that had adequate technical + means at their disposal. Moreover, the automatic “machine” the U.S. side + had mentioned was still on the drawing board. From the standpoint of the + tasks it was to perform it was a very crude piece of equipment. It could + not distinguish between nuclear explosions and other explosions carried + out for economic purposes, such as mining, for example. Would it then be + necessary to call out the fire brigades each time that such a crude + machine gave a signal? He would surely not characterize that kind of + equipment as a miracle of technology. In fact, the use of a machine that + could not distinguish between nuclear explosions and other explosions, + carried out for economic purposes, could be likened to the use of an + automatic lawn mower one controlled from one’s living room, which in + addition to cutting the grass also destroyed one’s flower beds. It + seemed to him that this whole question should be viewed in proper + perspective and that agreement not be made contingent on some “miracle + machine” of doubtful merit. He thought the two sides should agree to use + the national technical means at their disposal for purposes of + verification.

+

Fourth and last point: what should the agreement to be concluded be like? + The United States somehow wanted it to provide for some kind of an + exception. The Soviet side wanted to ensure that all nuclear weapon + tests were ruled out under the Treaty, because in dealing with nuclear + weapons it would make little difference whether the yield was expressed + in terms of kilotons or pounds. We did have a threshold test ban + agreement between us, although it had not yet been ratified and had not + entered into force. Why, then, should our two countries sign a second + threshold agreement? No, what was needed was a treaty completely banning + all nuclear weapon tests. A new threshold agreement would only create + doubts and make an unfavorable impression on world public opinion. As + for scientific research, that would be a different matter, but it must + not permit testing of nuclear weapons. If the U.S. side was aiming at + another threshold agreement, the Soviet Union could not agree to such a + concept. He would want to see the United States display greater + flexibility in this respect. Of course, the distance between the two + sides had been reduced to some extent, and that was good. But a certain + distance nevertheless still remained.

+

The Secretary wanted to comment briefly on the four points Gromyko had made, and would then ask + Mr. Warnke to state his views. + First concerning the purposes to be spelled out in Article I of the + Treaty. There was no difference between the two sides on the question + that what we were seeking was a complete test ban. As for the time when + we would be in a position to table our own version of Article I, he + would ask Mr. Warnke to comment + after he had finished. As for duration—we have been considering whether + a three-year term or a five-year term would be most appropriate for the + Treaty. When our consideration + of this matter was completed, we would be in touch. On the question of + verification—the form of the instrument to be used in connection with + verification was important from the standpoint of ratification in the + United States, and it was a matter that would receive major attention + during Congressional discussions in the process of ratification. + Finally, on the fourth point—what we were talking about was laboratory + research. There was no real difference between us in this respect.

+

Warnke said he did not have much + to add to the Secretary’s comments. On the first point—we had submitted + a Working Paper, and were developing an Article I which we hoped to + submit in the near future. Secondly, regarding duration of the Treaty. + Of course, one of the things to be considered in this connection was the + impact of the Treaty on other countries, and the need to further the + non-proliferation objectives we had in common. The Soviet Union had + proposed a three-year duration. Warnke had listened to the arguments of the Soviet + Delegation and had found them to be quite persuasive. Third, on + verification. He did not believe it necessary to comment any further on + on-site inspection. As for national seismic stations, he had thought + that we had reached the point where the issue was not whether or not + such stations were to be used, but rather when, how many and where. If + the Soviet Union was now changing its position in this respect, + Warnke could only view this + as a serious setback to the negotiations. He believed it was necessary + to recognize that neither side anticipated that we would not have an + agreement that would replace the current one after three years. After + all, it would hardly be worthwhile to negotiate on a three-year + agreement unless we expected it to be replaced at the expiration of that + period. He believed that one of the key factors for determining whether + or not there would be another treaty banning nuclear testing would be + the question of whether or not there was sufficient confidence in the + verification procedures in the treaty now being negotiated. As Secretary + Vance had pointed out, + acceptability of the Treaty to the U.S. Senate would depend in large + part upon Senate satisfaction with the verification procedures. He + believed that the national seismic stations would prove to be an + important element in such procedures. He further believed that from the + standpoint of furtherance of our common non-proliferation objective, and + from the standpoint of the impact on other countries, it was necessary + to be sure that there were verification procedures and facilities that + would give them confidence that the nuclear powers had stopped nuclear + testing. Therefore, he would agree with what he understood Chairman + Petrosyants had + suggested—that there was the possibility of dividing verification into + two stages, recognizing that time would be required before equipment + could be installed in connection with these national seismic stations. + However, he would not feel confident unless there was acceptance of the + principle that after a certain + period of time national seismic stations would in fact be installed. + Thus, he felt that we ought to continue discussing the question of how + many such stations would be installed, where and when. However, he + believed that if there was a difference in principle on the entire + question, he would say quite frankly that his optimism would be + seriously set back. Concerning the technology involved, he did not think + we needed to fear that the equipment in question would operate like the + lawn mower to which Gromyko had + referred. He believed that installing the equipment would be a + substantial step forward in terms of verification and rather than raise + questions, would settle them and promote confidence.

+

Gromyko noted that Warnke had avoided the question + Gromyko had asked. He would + therefore repeat it: will that equipment be capable of distinguishing + between nuclear explosions and ordinary non-nuclear explosions carried + out for economic purposes?

+

Warnke said the answer to that + question was no.

+

Gromyko said that in his country, + with its vast territory, hundreds and perhaps thousands of economic + explosions were carried out annually, especially in the eastern part of + the country. He would ask, then, will there be fire brigades constantly + travelling throughout his country pursuant to signals received from that + machine? He thought this would hardly promote confidence on either side. + Such were his views concerning the equipment in question. As for + national means, on its own territory each country could install as many + machines as it felt were needed.

+

Warnke thought that Gromyko’s comments were not relevant + to the issue. Obviously there will be chemical explosions, whether or + not one had seismic stations. Chemical explosions could be appropriately + dealt with through pre-notification procedures. But, he would point out, + this was not a problem that would be created by the stations; the + problem existed in any case. Otherwise one might also say that national + technical means should not be very good, because if they were, they will + raise questions. For purposes of verification we had proposed the use of + national technical means, voluntary on-site inspection and these + additional seismic stations. Without all three elements there would not + be adequate confidence in compliance with a complete test ban. A limited + threshold treaty would be futile in terms of furthering our + non-proliferation objectives.

+

Gromyko said he could see that + Warnke was quite hypnotized + by his machine, a machine that could not distinguish between nuclear and + chemical explosions. Well, that was his business. In a country as large + as the Soviet Union there would be many chemical explosions for many + different economic purposes. Could that machine distinguish chemical + explosions from nuclear explosions? No, it could not. In the case of + nuclear explosions, could + it distinguish between weapons related explosions and economic + explosions? No, it could not. It does not even exist as yet, has not + been tested, and already the U.S. side was trying to impose such + equipment on other countries. The Soviet Union was not in favor of that. + The Soviets would like to see a more reliable system of verification. As + far as the present parties to the negotiations were concerned, i.e., the + United States, the Soviet Union and Great Britain, they were quite + capable of assuring reliable verification through the use of their own + national technical facilities. As for the number of stations, of course + the Delegations could discuss that matter; he would not reject that. + But, things should be simplified and a certain flexibility + displayed.

+

Further, Gromyko wanted to be + sure that Secretary Vance and + Mr. Warnke were not talking about + nuclear explosions as such, but of laboratory experiments and research + for scientific purposes. He would like to get some clarification of the + nature of such laboratory explosions. If they were what he thought they + were, perhaps there was a way out. What would be the scientific purposes + of such laboratory experiments?

+

Warnke had two comments to make. + First, he would return to his hypnotic machine. He would point out again + that the chemical explosion problem would not be created by that + machine. Practically, the solution to that problem would be to provide + more information regarding the location of such explosions.

+

Gromyko interrupted to say that + Warnke was just confirming + what Gromyko had said.

+

Warnke would not pretend that the + equipment would be perfect. However, it would be better than anything we + had now. To object to the equipment because, while it could detect + chemical explosions, it could not distinguish them from nuclear + explosions, would be tantamount to saying that we must reduce the crime + rate by reducing the number of police reports. Finally, regarding the + question of scientific experiments. What we had in mind were routine + scientific laboratory experiments, producing low yields. We were not + proposing that either of us be enabled thereby to test nuclear + weapons.

+

Gromyko felt it necessary to ask + an additional question. When Warnke spoke of laboratory experiments did he really + have in mind experiments conducted in an enclosed building, such as the + buildings in which laboratories were usually located? Or did he have in + mind experiments conducted in open spaces, somewhere in Nevada, or + Nebraska, or some desert area?

+

Warnke replied that what he had in + mind were experiments conducted in a reusable laboratory.

+

Gromyko said he could see that he + had not received an answer.

+

Mr. Korniyenko added that the + type of laboratory to be used required definition.

+ +

Secretary Vance said it was his + understanding that what we were talking about were experiments in an + enclosed space.

+

Gromyko said it would be + necessary to obtain additional information and confirmation regarding + the purposes of the experiments, if the U.S. side could provide them, + because the Treaty does place a great responsibility on the three + countries involved.

+

The Secretary expressed his hope that the Soviet side would give some + further thought to what appeared to be a radical change in the position + of the Soviet side with respect to the machine Warnke had talked about. He could tell + Gromyko that without doubt + these three elements, this tri-partite verification process, would be + very important in terms of Congressional consideration.

+

Gromyko said that the U.S. + Government would best know how to deal with the U.S. Congress; he could + not provide any advice in this respect. At the present time he could add + nothing to the Soviet position. It seemed to him that the Soviet side + had displayed a great deal of flexibility in the negotiation of the + CTB Treaty. Thus, when the main + question had appeared to be the question of duration, the Soviet Union + had accepted the U.S. position, but now seismic stations were regarded + as a matter of new importance.

+

Warnke said he could not accept + the statement that this was a new matter. It had been an essential part + of our position from the very beginning.

+

Gromyko recalled that in May + President Carter had + characterized the question of duration as being the most important + question. He would refer the Secretary to the record of that + conversation to confirm this fact.See Document 201.

+

The Secretary said that what the President had in mind was based on his + impression that duration was one matter on which there was disagreement. + In the CTB negotiations, duration and + verification were of coequal importance.

+

Gromyko reminded the Secretary + that in May he had told President Carter that the Soviet Union would be prepared to accept + a five-year term for the Treaty in the event that all other matters were + agreed, including verification. The President quite definitely stressed + duration as the most important question.

+

He could see that there was still some distance between the respective + positions on the test ban treaty. This was not a simple matter; he would + suggest that the Delegations continue their work. In general, the + attitude of the Soviet Union, based on principle, toward the + advisability of concluding a treaty on the complete banning of nuclear + weapon tests had not + changed in the least. He continued to believe that this would be an + important international step. He would only ask the Secretary not to + assume that the Soviet Union was interested in conclusion of such a + treaty to any greater degree than the United States. In his view all + three countries negotiating the treaty were equally interested in its + conclusion.

+

The Secretary wanted to assure Gromyko that we assumed that all were equally interested + in achieving this extremely important goal.

+

Gromyko said it was good to know + that we shared the same objective.

+
+ +
+ 213. Memorandum From the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament + Agency (Warnke) to President + CarterSource: National Archives, RG 383, Records of the Arms Control and + Disarmament Agency, Office of the Director, Paul C. Warnke Files, December + 1974–July 1979, Accession #383–98–0154, Box 1, Memoranda to the + President Regarding SALT, Cruise + Missiles, CTB, NPT, and Indian Ocean Arms Control, + January–October 1978. Secret. + Washington, July + 28, 1978 + + SUBJECT + Duration of a Comprehensive Test Ban (CTB) + +

Our trilateral talks with the USSR and + UK on a Comprehensive Test Ban + Treaty are continuing to proceed well.The + trilateral CTB negotiations resumed + on May 4 in Geneva and continued into August. A good number + of the formal treaty provisions have been agreed and the Soviet + Delegation is talking seriously on the issues of the way in which + on-site inspections would be conducted and the characteristics of the + national seismic stations that would be established in the Soviet Union + and the U.S.

+

The question of the initial duration of the treaty is, however, impeding + the final development of on-site inspection procedures and, even more + seriously, Soviet consideration of the number, timing and specific + characteristics of the national seismic stations. Accordingly, + substantial further progress will require that we state soon our final + position on treaty duration.

+ +

It is, however, also clear that a final decision that moves from a five + year treaty to a three year treaty will interfere seriously with our + ability to negotiate any extensive and effective network in the USSR. This could make our ratification + problems more severe. There are also indications that moving to a three + year term could adversely affect prospects for gaining adherence by + key-nuclear states, and thus reduce a CTB’s non-proliferation value.

+

Verification. Our discussions with the Soviet + CTB Delegation suggest strongly + that, for a five-year treaty, the Soviets would be prepared to come + quite close to meeting our proposals on national seismic stations, + including our proposal that they accept a substantial number of + stations. After press accounts alerted them to a possible U.S. move to + three years, however, they have taken a much more reserved position. The + head of the Soviet Delegation has made it clear that his government + would accept substantially less in terms of verification, particularly + seismic stations, for a three-year treaty than for a five-year one. He + maintains that, for a three-year duration, it is virtually impossible to + justify a seismic network that would take over two years to install, + would require considerable effort and expense, and would involve + advanced equipment that has not yet even been fully developed or + tested.

+

In addition, we are told by members of the Soviet Delegation that our + far-reaching seismic station proposals have encountered strong + resistance in the Soviet bureaucracy because of their unprecedented + intrusiveness. While the Soviet government appears reluctantly prepared + to accept most of our proposals in the context of a relatively durable + CTB, it can be expected to have + much greater difficulty swallowing what they probably regard as a + serious compromise of Soviet doctrine for the sake of a treaty that + could lapse after only three years.

+

We believe, therefore, that a U.S. shift to three years would result in a + significant weakening of the verification package we could hope to + negotiate. It is unlikely, for example, that we could obtain more than a + few stations on Soviet territory, and even then the Soviets would be + very reluctant to agree in advance or in any detail to the sophisticated + technical features we are proposing.

+

The implications of having to settle for less could be quite serious. + Clearly, verification will be a key factor in the ratification debate, + and the type of seismic network that seems attainable for a five-year + treaty could be a major asset. It would have substantial appeal both in + the Senate and with the American public as a breakthrough in terms of + Soviet acceptance of intrusive verification measures and as an important + precedent for future arms control measures, such as SALT. Our shift to three years could + undercut this opportunity.

+

Effect on India and other key states. Foreign + Secretary Mehta recently told our Ambassador that the Indian Government + was troubled by a New York Times storyTelegram 178021 to Geneva, July 14, reported that the Indian + Government was “troubled” by a July 1 story in the New York Times that said “US military and nuclear experts have forced a change in + our position so that certain kinds of testing will be permitted and + the duration of the CTB will be + reduced to 3 years.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + D780289–0851) indicating that we had decided to permit + certain kinds of nuclear testing under a CTB and to shift to a three-year treaty. Ambassador Goheen + reported that Mehta seemed to be saying that India would not become + party to so limited a CTB.

+

The Indians are probably more concerned by the prospect of movement away + from a comprehensive ban than they are by a possible shift to three + years—and they may well be prepared to go along with the shorter + duration provided that the treaty is comprehensive. Nonetheless, they + would almost certainly find the five-year approach easier to + support.

+

We would expect other key non-nuclear states also to favor a longer + treaty, and in some cases this preference could be a decisive factor in + whether they choose to adhere. A number of these states may interpret + the three-year approach as lack of a true commitment on our part to a + CTB and as a clear indication of + our intention to resume testing, and they may decide that, rather than + join from the start, they should wait and see whether the nuclear powers + are serious enough about a test ban to continue it after the three-year + moratorium.

+

Negotiating Leverage. Because the Soviets earlier + proposed a form of three-year treaty, we had assumed that, by moving to + three years, we could seek to obtain corresponding Soviet movement on + other issues. However, not only have the Soviets signaled clearly that + they could accept a five-year treaty, but the Soviet Delegation leader + has told us that he prefers five to three. If anything, our move to + three would give the Soviets additional leverage on us. The Deputy + Chairman of the Soviet Delegation recently expressed to the UK Deputy his disappointment that with the + three year duration we would end up with only “a brief self-imposed + moratorium.” He complained about the influence of the U.S. Joint Chiefs + of Staff and said that he regretted now that the Soviet side had failed + to accept the idea of unlimited duration.

+

United Kingdom Position. The British have + repeatedly emphasized to us their strong view that five years is the + minimum term which should be negotiated. Their Delegation head informed + me that Prime Minister Callaghan + planned to mention this to you in Bonn.Not + found. Although the UK would + probably go along with a three year term if we urge it, they will do so + reluctantly.

+ +

Stockpile Reliability Implications. No technical + basis has been adduced for questioning our ability, without nuclear + testing, to maintain high confidence in the reliability of our stockpile + for a substantial period of time, and certainly for five years. Any + expressions of preference for a three year period seem to derive more + from an eagerness to resume testing than from any serious contention + that the problems of maintaining stockpile reliability for five years + are significantly greater than those for a three year period.

+

Indeed, a three year treaty might be insufficient time to provide + experience in maintaining the stockpile without testing to enable us to + make a sound judgment on whether a test ban can be continued.

+

These various circumstances tend strongly to support a five year treaty + duration. The longer term would permit negotiation of more effective and + more domestically attractive verification measures and would elicit + greater support among key non-nuclear countries. The three year period + would, as a practical matter, foreclose the installation of a + significant seismic network in the Soviet Union and could be regarded by + other countries as, in the words of the Soviet Deputy, just “a brief + self-imposed moratorium”. Indeed, if other considerations lead you to + modify your earlier decision in favor of a five year treaty, I would + suggest that a four year treaty would much more adequately advance our + CTB objectives than one of three + years.

+

In short, the costs to our negotiating position and to our + non-proliferation objectives resulting from the reduction of the CTB term would be heavier than I believed + when we first discussed this possibility. I wonder whether the gains in + quieting CTB opponents would be + sufficient to offset these costs.

+
+ +
+ + 214. Memorandum From Secretary of State Vance and the Director of the Arms Control and + Disarmament Agency (Warnke) to + President CarterSource: Washington National Records + Center, OSD Files: FRC 330–81–0202, Box 2, unlabeled + Folder. Secret. + Washington, September 2, 1978 + + SUBJECT + Comprehensive Test Ban Negotiations + +

With the CTB negotiations now in recess, + it is appropriate that we review our approach and take decisions which + will allow us to move ahead when the negotiations reconvene. We believe + that our review should be guided by these three objectives:

+

—We should seek to preserve the momentum of the negotiations and to + capitalize on the Soviet leadership’s current readiness to work out an + agreement along the basic lines we have proposed.

+

—We should strengthen the chances of wide adherence by non-nuclear states + by providing for their involvement in the negotiating process, but we + should choose a form of involvement that does not run the risk of + unraveling the results of the trilateral negotiations.

+

—We should avoid submitting a CTB treaty + to the Congress at a time when that might complicate ratification of + either SALT or CTB.

+

We have devised a strategy which we believe satisfactorily reconciles + these objectives.

+

—First, we would proceed expeditiously in the trilateral talks to resolve + the remaining substantive issues. The Soviets have seemed eager to + complete the talks and have continued to move toward our positions on + all major issues, including our approaches on national seismic stations, + on-site inspection procedures, and peaceful nuclear explosions. + Prospects are good for settling outstanding issues during the next + round. But rather than terminate the trilaterals at that time, we would + plan to hold a final round at a later time, aiming + perhaps for late spring or early summer 1979.

+

—Second, before this final round, we would undertake an extensive series + of consultations with other states. We would begin with key Allies + (France, FRG, Japan) and then proceed + to other Allies and pivotal non-aligned countries (for example, India, + Yugoslavia, Brazil, Sweden, Mexico, Nigeria). The purpose would be to + explain and build support for the trilaterally negotiated text. We would + expect to receive a number of suggestions for changes, and we, the + Soviets, and British would decide whether any of these were acceptable + when we got back together for the final round.

+

—A final decision on whether the treaty would go to the Geneva + Disarmament Committee would be taken during the last trilateral round. From the preceding + consultative phase, we would gain a better understanding of how strongly + others felt about taking the treaty to this multilateral body and how + much difficulty we might have in protecting our interests there. We + would make our decision based on gaining maximum international support, + consistent with our own requirement for a realistic CTB.

+

The principal advantage of this approach is that it would enable us to + nail down agreement with the Soviets soon without having either to + proceed directly with ratification or to delay the process artificially. + We would have the flexibility to decide how best to maximize other + nations’ support, and to adjust CTB + timing to the SALT schedule.

+
+ +
+ 215. Message From the White House Situation Room to the President’s + Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Presidential + Correspondence with Foreign Leaders, Box 20, United Kingdom: Prime + Minister James Callaghan, + 6–9/78. Secret. + Washington, September 14, 1978, + 1203Z +

FM The White House Situation Room. Sitto 124. To Dr. Brzezinski for the President. WH81232. + Message to President Carter from + Prime Minister Callaghan.

+

Dear Jimmy,

+

I believe you will be making important decisions about the Comprehensive + Test Ban before the tripartite negotiations resume in Geneva on 28 + September.

+

I know that your people have been giving a great deal of thought over the + past weeks to some of the outstanding issues in the negotiations. I + recognise that these raise difficult military and technical problems. + But I am sure that, like me, you continue to believe that we must do all + we can to bring the negotiations to a positive and satisfactory + conclusion. The political benefits of a successful treaty could be + enormous. The Wests’ relations with the Soviet Union are not in good + shape at present and a CTB treaty in + the near future would do much to improve them. It would also be seen by + the world at large as a major step forward in arms control. I am + particularly anxious that it should be a treaty that will win the + support of leaders of non-nuclear states like Prime Minister Desai and so help to prevent the proliferation of + nuclear weapons.

+

If we are to achieve these political benefits, then the longer the treaty + lasts the better. The longer it is, the more serious our commitment to a + test ban will be seen to be and the more time we shall have to persuade + other countries to sign it. Earlier this year we agreed on a treaty + lasting five years. I know that for very good reasons you are now + considering whether that period should be shorter. If you decide that + you can no longer go for five years, then I very much hope that you will + conclude that you need not go below four.

+

When we met in Bonn in July I said I was afraid that non-nuclear powers + would be deterred from supporting a treaty if you found it necessary to + make a statement that the United States would be likely to resume + testing after the expiry of the treaty. I remain of that view. But I + accept entirely the need to safeguard the future: none of us can foresee + what the world will be like in four or five years time. Nonetheless, if + you decide that it is essential to make a statement, I wonder whether it + might be made in such a way as to limit its effect on the non-nuclear + world. We have some ideas on how this might be done, and my people will + be ready to discuss them with yours in the talks due to start + tomorrow.

+

I believe that you will also be considering the question of permitted + experiments. I think that the yield limit of 100 pounds which was + mentioned to GromykoSee Document 212. + is low enough for us to be able to claim that the test ban really is + comprehensive. But a higher limit would make the treaty appear to be a + threshold treaty, which you and I have decided against, and this, I + know, would be badly received by countries like India.

+

We might also be able to make the treaty more attractive to the + non-nuclear powers if they saw the prospect of participating in a review + conference which would give them a say on what, if any, further + arrangements should follow the treaty when it ends. For this reason I + believe that we should seek to give the conference the role of + considering all possible options and that we should not appear to rule + out at this stage any option, including an extension of the treaty. An + approach of this kind would also be likely to help overcome our present + differences with the Russians on the role of the review conference.

+

I look forward to hearing your views on these issues to which, I know, we + both attach great importance.

+

With warm regards,

+ + Jim + Callaghan + +
+ +
+ + 216. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense Brown to the President’s Assistant for National Security + Affairs (Brzezinski)Source: Washington National Records + Center, OSD Files: FRC 330–81–0202, Box 53, A–400.112 + TEST BAN (6 June–Dec) 1978. Secret; Sensitive; Eyes + Only. + Washington, September 19, 1978 +

I have the memorandum to the President from Secretary Vance and Paul Warnke on the CTB + negotiations, dated September 2nd.See Document 214. It raises serious + concerns in my mind about the potential negative impact on SALT ratification which the proposed + strategy may have.

+

As a procedure to consult with other nations to involve them in + non-proliferation efforts, and as a way to control the timing of a + presentation of a CTB treaty to + Congress, the proposed strategy makes sense. However, I do not believe + the strategy would work to prevent an early confrontation with Congress. + As soon as a policy is enunciated on 3 vs 5 years, permitted + experiments, and particularly on our intention on resumption of testing + after the 3 or 5 years, there would be a response from the JCS and from at least the working levels + of DOE. Opponents in Congress will then hold hearings, claiming that + they have as much of a right to be consulted and to influence the text + of the agreement as do the non-nuclear states. There will be testimony + from the JCS and the laboratory + directors that in their judgment such a treaty is not in the best + interest of national security. Though others of us will be able to point + out the stockpile reliability will not be degraded unacceptably in 3 or + even in 5 years, the whole process will in my view make severe trouble + not only for CTB but also for SALT ratification.

+

My own judgment is therefore that we should hold off on these decisions, + instead pressing the Soviets further at the resumed CTB negotiations on the issue of + verification and its relation to a duration clause. Moreover, I believe + that we should further explore the idea of combining a comprehensive + test ban of limited-duration with an unlimited-duration threshold test + ban treaty at a substantially reduced yield.

+

If the President nevertheless decides to proceed as Cy and Paul recommend, I suggest that he make + a decision only to go to a 3 (or 4) year duration, reserving until after + SALT ratification any decisions on + permitted experiments and on any softening of a resumption + commitment.

+ + Harold + Brown + +
+ +
+ + 217. Memorandum From the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament + Agency (Warnke) to President + CarterSource: Carter Library, National + Security Affairs, Brzezinski + Material, Subject File, Box 6, Comprehensive Test Ban (CTB), 1–12/78. Secret; Nodis. + Washington, September 19, 1978 + + SUBJECT + Future of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Negotiations + +

Our trilateral talks with the USSR and + UK will resume a week from Thursday, + September 28. Progress in these talks requires the release of your + decision setting a three year fixed term as our objective.Not found.

+

Harold Brown and Zbigniew Brzezinski, and probably + Jim Schlesinger, believe + that release of this decision will cause a domestic debate which could + prejudice SALT’s chances. But the + controversy is about your intent that the treaty be a genuine + comprehensive test ban and not merely a lower threshold test ban. It + won’t be heightened by a cut-back from five to three years.

+

We have repeatedly affirmed to the Soviets and to the British that our + objective is a comprehensive test ban. The resumed talks would be + directed toward this end. But we cannot settle the verification issues, + particularly the number and types of seismic stations, without a firm + decision on duration.

+

Accordingly Cy Vance and I + believe your decision on the three year term should be released and + trilateral negotiations continued, following the strategy for securing + multilateral support set forth in our attached memorandum.See Document + 214.

+

In our view, the only alternative would be now to approach the Soviets + and the British and to tell them we have decided to suspend the CTB talks until after SALT ratification. We believe that to do + so would cause far more controversy and difficulty than going ahead as + we recommend.

+

The Soviets are already charging us privately with welching on a CTB. If we suspend the talks, there is no + question of the fact that they will saddle us with the blame. The + non-aligned countries, probably led by India, will complain that they + have been misled and our non-proliferation efforts will suffer a severe + setback. Domestically, there is both a Congressional and private + constituency that puts a comprehensive test ban high on its priority + list. These constituencies will be disappointed and vocal. The picture that will be painted + is that the Administration has steadily retreated from a genuine test + ban of indefinite duration to a ban of a fixed and limited period and + now to the indefinite suspension of the talks.

+

From the standpoint of SALT, we feel + that, if there is to be a confrontation about your reaffirmation that we + are seeking a comprehensive test ban, it would be better to have that + confrontation now, rather than having it smoldering during the critical + stages of SALT.

+
+ +
+ 218. Message From President Carter to Prime Minister CallaghanSource: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Presidential + Correspondence with Foreign Leaders, Box 20, United Kingdom: Prime + Minister James Callaghan, + 6–9/78. Secret. Transmitted via the Cabinet Line on September 25. + Brzezinski forwarded a + draft message to the President for his approval under a September 25 + covering memorandum. (Ibid.) Carter initialed Brzezinski’s cover memorandum and wrote “Zbig—ok as + amended.” + Washington, undated + + Dear Jim: + +

I appreciated receiving your message of September 14th on the CTBSee Document 215. and have carefully + considered your views on the question of duration. I have not yet + completed my review of all the CTB + issues, but I would prefer that when the negotiations resume we should + negotiate on the assumption that the duration of the agreement will be + three years. I agree with you on the lower threshold. Further, assuming + that the duration is three years, we should propose a network of ten + simple seismic stations with a larger network deferred for consideration + in the context of any negotiation of a follow-on agreement. I will keep + in mind your suggestions regarding the CTB review conference provision and your views on the + assurances I plan to give the Senate on resumption of testing.

+

I share fully your view on the importance of a CTB, and I am committed to achieving a CTB. But I want to be frank with you on + the timescale for completion of the negotiations. In my view, it is + important, while we continue to make progress on CTB, that the trilateral agreement should + not be concluded before a SALT II + agreement. I know this will likely result in a somewhat slower pace than + both of us had hoped. But I am + now convinced that this is the soundest approach to assure favorable + Congressional action on both the CTB + and SALT agreements.

+

Sincerely,

+ + Jimmy + +
+ +
+ 219. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security + Affairs (Brzezinski) to Vice + President Mondale, Secretary of + State Vance, Secretary of + Defense Brown, Secretary of + Energy Schlesinger, the Director + of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (Warnke), the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff + (Jones), the Director of Central Intelligence (Turner), and the Director of the + Office of Science and Technology Policy (Press)Source: + Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, James Schlesinger Papers, Subject + File, Box 2, Energy Department, Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban, + General, 1978, Sept.–Oct. Top Secret; Sensitive. + Washington, September 25, 1978 + + SUBJECT + Comprehensive Test Ban Instructions (C) + +

The United States Delegation to the Test Ban Negotiations should focus + its negotiating efforts on achieving our objectives in the field of + verification. For negotiating purposes, it should be assumed without + commitment that the Comprehensive Test Ban agreement would have a fixed + duration of three years and that in the final year of any agreement, + there would be a review conference to determine whether to negotiate a + replacement agreement.

+

In addressing the issue of verification, the United States Delegation can + indicate that, assuming a three-year duration agreement, we would be + willing to accept a network of 10 simple stations deferring a larger + network with arrays for consideration in the context of any replacement + agreement.

+

As these negotiations proceed, any changes in the Delegation’s position + on any remaining issues should be referred to the SCC for consideration and approval.

+

There should be no multilateral + CTB consultations without the + approval of the President.

+

The Delegation should bear in mind that the President has decided to + resume testing at the end of the agreement unless a vigorous safeguards + program and studies indicate that this is not necessary.

+ + Zbigniew + Brzezinski + +
+ +
+ 220. Memorandum From the Acting Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff + (Rogers) to Secretary of State VanceSource: + Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Harold Brown Papers, Box 82, + Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty #2. Secret. Copies were sent to + Brown, Schlesinger, Brzezinski, and Warnke. + Washington, September 26, 1978 + + SUBJECT + Nonproliferation Value of a Comprehensive Test + +

1. (S) The Joint Chiefs of Staff have carefully studied your memorandum + of 10 July 1978,See Document 211. subject as above. While they agree + that proliferation of nuclear weapons is a serious national security + issue, they remain unpersuaded by the evidence you have presented on the + potential nonproliferation benefits of a Comprehensive Test Ban (CTB) of the type currently under + discussion.

+

2. (S) The Joint Chiefs of Staff have been unable to establish to their + satisfaction any causative relationship between a ban on nuclear testing + and the cessation of the development of nuclear weapons by states + without such weapon. They feel at this point that a nation’s decision to + develop nuclear weapons is dependent upon perceptions of vital + self-interest, not upon the existence of a CTB. Further, they believe the benefits stated in your + memorandum would be uncertain and debatable in the case of a CTB of unlimited duration, and that + significant nonproliferation benefits would not be derived from the type + of CTB now being considered by the + United States—one of 3- to 5-year duration with an announced option to + resume testing.

+

3. (S) Clearly, there are divergent views concerning the nonproliferation + benefits of a 3- to 5-year CTB followed + by resumption of testing. The Joint Chiefs of Staff believe that an + interagency paper weighing the + nonproliferation impacts and the national security risks of a CTB should be developed for consideration + by the National Security Council. The Secretary of Defense has been so + advised.

+

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

+ + Bernard W. Rogers + General, USA Acting Chairman Joint Chiefs of + Staff + +
+ +
+ 221. Memorandum of ConversationSource: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, + Staff Material, Office, Presidential Advisory Board, Box 81, + Sensitive XX: 9/20–25/78. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Krimer. The meeting took place in the Cabinet Room + at the White House. The conversation is printed in full in Foreign + Relations, 1977–1980, vol. VI, Soviet Union, Document + 150. + Washington, September 30, + 1978, 9:45 a.m.–1:00 p.m. + + SUBJECT + Carter-Gromyko Plenary + Meeting + + + PARTICIPANTS + U.S. + The President + Secretary Cyrus R. + Vance + Secretary Harold + Brown + Dr. Zbigniew + Brzezinski + Ambassador Warnke + Ambassador Toon + Mr. David Aaron + Mr. Reginald + Bartholomew + Mr. William D. Krimer, + Interpreter + U.S.S.R. + Foreign Minister A.A. + Gromyko + First Deputy Foreign Minister G.M. + Korniyenko + Ambassador A.F. + Dobrynin + Mr. V.G. Makarov + Mr. V.G. Komplektov + Mr. A.A. + Bessmertnykh + Mr. N.N. Detinov + Mr. V.M. Sukhodrev, + Interpreter + +

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to a comprehensive test ban.]

+ +

CTB

+

The President said he would like to see us move rapidly to conclusion of + a complete test ban treaty.

+

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to a comprehensive test ban.]

+

CTB

+

Gromyko noted that the CTB negotiations were indeed moving + forward, but rather slowly. The main thing he would want to point out + was that whenever the situation at these negotiations appeared to + improve, US representatives would + introduce new proposals that threw cold water on the whole process. + There was a time when the United States had argued in favor of a + five-year term for a CTB treaty. At + that time the Soviet Union was more in favor of a three-year term, + although it did not oppose five-years. It simply thought that it was + easier to work out a three-year treaty. Then, quite suddenly, in the + United States various officials began to assert that five years was too + long, that such duration would interfere with certain national plans for + testing nuclear weapons, while a three-year term would not. That + position was hardly convincing. The Soviet Union had finally expressed + agreement to the five-year term, but then the United States changed to + three. All these zigzags were most perplexing and difficult to + understand. The Soviet Union would take this into account in the future. + For their part, the Soviets could also talk about national plans, but + they stand on a different position. Things would be very difficult + indeed were they to reply in kind. Nevertheless, since the United States + had changed its position, obviously the Soviets would have to take this + into account, because there were two other parties to the negotiations. + Basically, they would like to see this agreement completed. It would be + a limited agreement, of course, because apart from the three particular + powers, other nuclear powers would not be signatories to the agreement. + Nevertheless, it would have a positive impact on the international + situation.

+

In conclusion, Gromyko said that + these were the specific considerations he had wanted to convey to the + President, and in general wanted to tell the President on behalf of the + Soviet leadership and L.I. + Brezhnev personally that the Soviet Union’s policy was + aimed at good relations with the United States and remained as set out + and formulated in Brezhnev’s + message to the President.Just before this + meeting, Gromyko handed + Carter a message from + Brezhnev. Carter “said that he found this + letter to be interesting and constructive,” and asked if he could + “respond to it more directly in writing.” (Memorandum of + Conversation, September 30, 9:30–9:45 a.m.; Carter Library, National + Security Affairs, Staff Material, Office, Presidential Advisory + Board, Box 81, Sensitive XX: 9–20–25/78) The text of the message is + ibid. The Soviet Union would do all in its power to maintain and develop good relations + with the United States.

+

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to a comprehensive test ban.]

+

CTB

+

In this connection the President said that a three-year term for the + treaty would suit us better. He hoped we were in harmony on this and + would proceed to conclude the treaty without delay. He did not, however, + want to conclude it before concluding a SALT Agreement. It would be better if he submitted a CTB Treaty to Congress together with a + SALT Treaty. We believed that + there should be no testing other than laboratory testing, and that there + should be adequate verification.

+
+ +
+ 222. Memorandum From the Director of Central Intelligence (Turner) to the President’s Assistant + for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, + Box 6, Comprehensive Test Ban (CTB), 1–12/78. Secret; [handling + restriction not declassified]. Copies were sent to + Vance and Warnke. + Washington, October + 6, 1978 + + SUBJECT + Comprehensive Test Ban Instructions + +

1. I have reviewed your memorandum of 25 SeptemberSee Document 219. + concerning the change in our negotiating position for the current round + of CTB talks in Geneva. I am very + concerned about the decisions to reduce our requirement for internal + seismic stations [less than 1 line not + declassified] Since monitoring of Soviet compliance with a + CTB will be the responsibility of + the DCI, I am further concerned that I + was not consulted on this decision prior to its implementation.

+

2. I recognize that the implementation of a full [less + than 1 line not declassified] network [less + than 1 line not declassified] might not be possible during the + term of a three year treaty. I believe it to be unwise to immediately + and unilaterally reduce our requirements until we have at least explored + Soviet reaction to our three year treaty proposal. Moreover, establishing the right to have + [number not declassified] stations [less than 1 line not declassified] is important + in itself. If, for instance, the treaty were extended for a second three + years, we would be without grounds for establishing any [number not declassified] over the six year + period. [2 lines not declassified] I believe that + it would impair the prospects for ratification if we had abandoned what + might turn out to be a very useful element of verification.

+ + Stansfield + Turner + +
+ +
+ 223. Telegram From the Mission in Geneva to the Department of + StateSource: National + Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign + Policy File, D780419–0887. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Sent for information Priority + to London and Moscow. + Geneva, October 13, 1978, 1858Z +

15493. Exdis USCTB. Pass to DOE. + Subject: CTB Negotiations: Status of + Verification Issues.

+

CTB message no. 332

+

1. Summary. During the initial weeks of the current negotiating round, + the US Delegation has devoted most of + its efforts to pressing the Soviets to make early and favorable + responses to US proposals on the + remaining verification issues. In our three plenary statements and in + many informal exchanges at various levels, we have emphasized the top + priority we assign to verification, urged the Soviets to join us in + concrete negotiations particularly on arrangements for national seismic + stations (NSS), and stressed our view that verification measures must be + effective regardless of the length of the treaty. While we have not yet + gotten into detailed negotiations, there have been some promising signs + that the Soviets may be preparing to get down to serious business in the + near future. End summary.

+

2. Beginning with our opening statement on September 28,The U.S. statement is available in telegram 14623 + from Geneva, September 28. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + D780397–0007) we have tried to use every available + opportunity, either in formal plenary sessions or in informal + conversations, to emphasize the importance of getting down to detailed + work on outstanding verification issues, especially NSS and OSI, and to call on the Soviets to respond + favorably to the proposals we + have already put on the table. One obstacle to pursuing verification + matters in the opening days of the round was the Soviet Delegation’s + initial reluctance to agree to proceed with the negotiations on the + assumption of a three-year duration. This problem was compounded by the + timing of Gromyko’s discussions + in New YorkGromkyo and Vance met in New York on September 27 and 28 during + the UN General Assembly meeting. See + Foreign + Relations, 1977–1980, vol. VI, Soviet Union, Document + 148. and Washington,See Document 221. + which the Soviet Delegation said made it difficult for them to give us a + considered response to our proposed approach on duration. The Soviet + Delegation has now confirmed that it is prepared to proceed on a + three-year basis.

+

3. On-site inspection. All Delegations have recognized that, of the + principal verification issues left, the question of OSI rights and functions is the one where + we are closest to reaching agreement. However, the Soviets at first + resisted specific discussions in the OSI working group, claiming that it was up to the US to adjust its OSI proposals to the shorter duration of three years. + Heckrotte (US) vigorously rejected this + idea on the grounds that the technical requirements for effective + inspections were independent of treaty duration. In subsequent informal + conversations, Neidle, Giller and other US Delegation members reinforced the position that it was + illogical, and unacceptable, to cut back on OSI procedures because of a three-year duration. At the + second meeting of the OSI working + group, held after a delay of several days, the Soviets did not return to + the theme that OSI procedures should be + streamlined. Instead, they made a concrete and serious proposal on one + of the significant technical OSI issues + remaining, the question of position-fixing. Another encouraging + development was Soviet Chairman Petrosyants’ remarks to US Reps Johnson and Neidle on October 12 that the question + of OSI rights and functions should move + rapidly to agreement. Sov Dep Rep + Timerbaev also confirmed to + Neidle on October 12 that OSI rights + and functions would not be affected by whether there was a three, as + opposed to a five, year duration.

+

4. National Seismic Stations (NSS). We have told the Soviets that we + consider NSS to be the most important issue left in the negotiations. We + have made clear that they owe us responses to our proposals on the + technical characteristics of the stations and on procedures for site + selection, installation, and maintenance. On October 11,The proposed locations for National Seismic + Stations are in telegram 15307 from Geneva, October 11. (National + Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign + Policy File, D780416–0174) we tabled the locations for our + revised 10-station network, emphasizing that the question of NSS numbers + was the only verification issue that required revision in light of the move to a three-year + duration. Subsequent informal conversations, including US rep Johnson’s conversation with + Timerbaev October 12,The October 12 Johnson-Timerbaev discussion is recorded in + telegram 15493 from Geneva, October 13. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + D780419–0887) have stressed that we view agreement on + high-quality NSS arrangements as a prerequisite to the successful + conclusion of a CTB treaty. In separate + conversations, Neidle strongly encouraged Chairman Petrosyants and Timerbaev to reply soon to our proposal + for 10 stations, and urged that the Soviet Delegation make as positive a + response as it is authorized to make, rather than simply come back to us + with a counterproposal reduced for negotiating purposes. Neidle stressed + that agreement on a good NSS network was of the greatest importance and + that the highest levels of the US + government were watching to see the Soviet response. Finch, Givan and + other US Deloffs have conveyed similar + messages to Soviet counterparts.

+

5. On October 12 Sov Deloff Slipchenko, + after being pressed by Einhorn on when Sov + Del would get down to business on NSS, + indicated that his Delegation was giving active consideration to a + response on numbers, and thought they might be in a position to make a + counterproposal as early as next week. Tarasov separately confirmed to + Finch that Sov + Del planned to present its NSS position + next week, although not as early as at the NSS working group meeting on + Oct. 16.

+

6. In a number of recent conversations, the Soviets have begun stressing + the notion that it is hard to justify the burdens of NSS for a + three-year treaty that might not extend. We have tried to discourage + them from thinking that there is mileage in that argument. Finch argued + with Tarasov that an effective NSS program could be even more important + with a three-year duration, since we would be facing decisions in the + third year regarding future CTB + limitations. If the NSS program had gone well, it would not only make a + direct contribution to verification of the initial treaty but—as + evidence of our countries’ ability to succeed in a cooperative + verification effort—it could contribute to a positive climate and + increase the prospects of decisions to have CTB beyond three years. For these reasons, Finch thought + the US position was sound, that there + should be no compromise in qualitative aspects of NSS, and he urged a + positive Soviet response soon.

+

7. When Timerbaev told Neidle that + there was resistance on the Soviet side to accepting a large NSS network + for a treaty which might end after three years, Neidle responded that he + saw no prospect of getting off the ground with any treaty without a good + NSS network; nor did he see prospect for continuing with a CTB after the initial duration if such a + network had not been established.

+ +

8. Chemical explosions. On October 9, we presented our proposal regarding + prenotification of large chemical explosions.The October 9 proposal on chemical explosions is in + telegram 15236 from Geneva, October 13. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + D780414–0530) The Soviets have indicated to us informally + that they will not be able to respond right away since they do not have + people with the necessary expertise on their Delegation. They say that + Soviet officials will have to do research regarding such factors as the + frequency and purpose of chemical explosions in the USSR that would be covered by the + prenotification provision.

+ + Johnson + +
+ +
+ 224. Letter From Ambassador-at-Large and U.S. Special Representative + for Non-Proliferation Matters Smith to President CarterSource: + Washington National Records Center, OSD Files: FRC + 330–81–0202, Box 53, A–400.112 TEST BAN (6 June–Dec) 1978. + Confidential. Copies were sent to Vance, Christopher, and Brown. + Washington, December 21, 1978 + + Dear Mr. President: + +

You have charged me with coordinating your Administration’s efforts in + the nonproliferation field. One of the heaviest burdens that + nonproliferation policy carries is the continued absence of progress on + a comprehensive test ban. I think we must face up to the prospect of + defections from the Nonproliferation Treaty if a CTB is not reached before the Treaty comes + under review at a conference in the spring of 1980. I can think of no + greater threat to the security of our country than such an unravelling + of the ties that keep a number of nations from going for nuclear + weapons.

+

Among the direct benefits of such a treaty could be binding legal + commitments by nations such as India, Pakistan, South Africa, Israel, + and Egypt not to conduct nuclear test explosions. In the case of India, + this would codify the policy position taken by the present Prime + Minister against any repetition of the 1974 explosion; in the case of + South Africa, it would reinforce the assurances given by the Prime + Minister in 1977 that his + government would not carry out nuclear weapon tests; and in the case of + Israel, Egypt, and Pakistan it would not only constrain weapons + development, but inhibit demonstration of a nuclear weapons + capability.

+

To the extent that other states, such as Argentina and Brazil, assert + that their present treaty obligations do not preclude “peaceful” nuclear + explosions, a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty would provide a + nondiscriminatory vehicle for removing any ambiguity on this point.

+

While these benefits would, of course, depend on gaining the adherence of + these states to a CTB, all but two of + them (Argentina and Pakistan) joined the Limited Test Ban Treaty, and + Prime Minister Desai has + indicated willingness to join a nondiscriminatory CTB.

+

More generally, achievement of a CTB + would be of material help in meeting demands for balancing the restraint + we are asking of non-nuclear weapon states by placing long promised + constraints on vertical proliferation. This step appears indispensable + to an Indian decision to accept full-scope safeguards, and it clearly is + crucial to the success of the conference to be held in mid-1980 to + review the operation of the NPT, as + well as to our ability to avoid the deterioration of that pillar of our + nonproliferation policy.

+

I urge you to include among the nation’s New Year’s resolutions a + determination to get a significant comprehensive nuclear test ban in + 1979. The prospects for success of your nonproliferation policy would + then be substantially improved.

+

Respectfully,

+ + Gerard + SmithSmith signed the letter + “Gerry.” + +
+ +
+ + 225. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security + Affairs (Brzezinski) to President + CarterSource: Carter Library, National + Security Affairs, Staff Material, Global Issues, Oplinger/Bloomfield Subject File, + Box 42, Proliferation: Comprehensive Test Ban, 1/79–10/80. + Confidential. Sent for action. Aaron initialed the memorandum for Brzezinski. Carter initialed the top + right-hand corner of the memorandum indicating that he saw it. + + Washington, January + 9, 1979 + + SUBJECT + Non-Proliferation and the CTB + (C) + +

In the attached letter,See Document 224. + Gerry Smith states his view of + the linkage between US non-proliferation + goals and a CTB. He concludes that the + Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) will be + seriously endangered if a CTB agreement + is not reached before the international NPT Review Conference scheduled for June 1980. (C)

+

It is already clear that there will be two contentious issues at the + NPT Conference: the failure of the + nuclear suppliers to live up to their obligations under Article IV and + Article VI of the Treaty. Article IV involves the “right” of all parties + to the “fullest possible exchange” of materials and technology for the + peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The efforts of the London Suppliers + Group and of unilateral US policy make + this a particularly sensitive issue. Article VI pledges the parties to + pursue measures to end the nuclear arms race. Debate will focus on the + success or failure of the major powers in reaching SALT and CTB agreements, and on the adequacy of the provisions of + these agreements. Some countries will argue that enough time has now + elapsed to prove that by failing to control the nuclear arms race, the + weapons states do not intend to live up to their half of the NPT bargain, and that the Treaty should + therefore be abandoned. (C)

+

Certainly a CTB agreement will make the + Review Conference much easier for us. Beyond this, it is difficult to + judge whether Gerry is accurate + in predicting the consequences if we fail to reach a CTB agreement by then. (C)

+

RECOMMENDATION:

+

That you read Gerry Smith’s + letter. (U)

+
+ +
+ + 226. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the + United KingdomSource: + National Archives, RG 59, Central + Foreign Policy File, D790026–1078. Secret; Priority; Exdis. Sent for information to the + Mission in Geneva and Moscow. Drafted by Barbara Schrage (ACDA/MA); + cleared by Joseph Hulings (S/S); and + approved by Thomas Davies (ACDA/MA). + Washington, January 19, 1979, 0045Z +

14457. Subject: CTB Negotiations: UK Statement at US/UK Bilateral Meeting, + January 17, 1979.

+

Following is the text of the opening statement presented by Ambassador + John Edmonds, CTB Delegation leader, + during the US/UK bilaterals held in Washington on January 17–18, 1979. + Begin text:

+

1. On 14 September,Telegram 234612 to + London, September 15, reported the UK Government’s position on the CTB negotiations. Edmonds said his + government had four objectives: to “curb the development of new + types of nuclear warheads by the nuclear weapon states without + adversely affecting Western security;” to “contribute to the + improvement of East/West relations;” to “show the world that 3 + nuclear weapon states are capable of giving practical effect to + their long-standing commitment to genuine measures of arms control;” + and to “make a worthwhile contribution to our non-proliferation + objectives by attracting the support and adherence of important + non-nuclear weapon states, especially those who are not parties to + the NPT.” (National Archives, + RG 59, Central Foreign Policy + File, D780376–0747) during our last bilateral consultations + in Washington, I set out what we saw as the important outstanding issues + facing the United States and British Governments in the Comprehensive + Test Ban Negotiations. They were:

+

A. The duration of the treaty;

+

B. The question of what happens after the initial duration;

+

C. Permitted experiments;

+

D. The verification arrangements, including the National Seismic Stations + required for a treaty of relatively short duration.

+

2. For various reasons, the last round of negotiations, from 29 September + to 14 December, was not very productive. There was definite progress + only on the first of these four issues. The US proposal that negotiations should proceed on the basis + of a three-year treaty was accepted by the Russians—and by the UK, although we stressed that our final + position on duration would depend on the entire treaty package. The + other three issues are still before us, and we look forward to a full + discussion of them today and tomorrow.

+

NSS in the UK and dependent + territories.

+

3. NSS is the subject on which there has been the greatest change since + September. I think it fair to say that the Soviet proposal of 27 NovemberThe Soviet proposal is in telegram 18185 from + Geneva, November 27, 1978. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + D780488–0912) for ten NSS in the UK and dependent territories took all concerned, British + and American, by surprise. Maybe we should have realized that the + Russians might interpret their principle of “equal obligations” in + literal mathematical terms, without serious regard to the usefulness of + NSS for monitoring British compliance with the treaty. Anyway, that is + what the Russians have done, apparently after considering the whole NSS + issue at a very high level.

+

4. I said in Geneva that we do not intend to create unnecessary + difficulties over the Soviet proposals for NSS in the UK and dependent territories. I also + stressed that the proposals are different in kind from those for NSS in + the USA and USSR. The proposals have + since been very thoroughly examined in London. Although we have looked + at them positively, they present a complex series of + problems—constitutional, technical, financial and logistic. I have + copies for you of a working paperNot + found. reviewing theoretically possible locations for NSS in + the UK and in all our dependent + territories, including those not on the Soviet list. We hope you will + have time to look at this and let us have some comments before we leave + Washington.

+

5. The position so far is that British Ministers are willing in principle + to accept at least one NSS in the UK and + probably one or two in dependent territories. A final British commitment + to these or any other specific number or locations will be subject to + clarification of the technical and financial implications.

+

6. However, it is the Soviet proposal for as many as nine NSS in UK dependent territories which raises the + serious problems:

+

A. Some of the territories suggested by the Russians are politically + unsuitable; two of them are independent and two others soon will be, and + other objections are noted in the paper I am giving you.

+

B. The Soviet view of “equal obligations”—that the UK, like the US and Soviet Union, should accept ten NSS—is questionable, + since the UK is not seeking independent + verification rights in the Soviet Union. An equally good case could, for + instance, be made for equality of obligations between east and west: + i.e., ten NSS in the USSR and ten in + the west divided between the US and + UK. One might even turn the equality + concept against the Russians by proposing that each SVA party could have + the right to five NSS in the territory of each of the other two.

+

C. The most important difficulty is the absence of any verification case + for NSS in UK dependent territories. NSS + are needed to supplement + national technical means for monitoring the large land areas of the + Soviet Union and the United States. But the total area of UK dependent territories is very small. + Soviet satellites can observe these territories and seismic monitoring + can be deployed close to them, so that even if testing were likely, it + could readily be detected without NSS. Indeed, the Russians have + admitted that they want NSS in UK and + dependent territories for political, not technical, reasons.

+

D. We have nevertheless considered all our dependent territories as + possible sites for NSS. Most of the territories are seismically entirely + unsuitable: in many cases NSS would only be of use in relation to events + within a few tens of kilometers. The costs of NSS could not be justified + on verification grounds. And there are dangers in accepting technically + useless NSS: for example degrading the criteria for selection of NSS + sites in the Soviet Union and thus discrediting the value of the whole + NSS system.

+

E. Finally, many dependent territories are remote and lack facilities. I + shall return to this aspect in a moment.

+

7. We have identified several possible British responses to the Soviet + proposals. Some would be suitable for use when the negotiations resume, + one objective being to probe how serious the Russians really are in + proposing so many NSS in UK dependent + territories and to discover their minimum position. Some other options + may be more appropriate as fall back positions for a later stage.

+

Each option has advantages and disadvantages, some of which I shall + mention. We have not yet decided which options are best. On the basis of + our discussions here, Ministers will be consulted as soon as we return + to London. The options are:

+

A. To challenge the Soviet interpretation of “equality”, on lines I have + already indicated.

+

B. To say that we have no objection in principle to NSS in UK and dependent territories, but that we + have only identified about three locations which, as well as being + constitutionally appropriate, have any verification value. Subject to + Soviet reactions, we could later say that we are willing to discuss + without commitment other constitutionally appropriate locations where we + so far have seen no verification value.

+

C. The same as option B, but with the UK + undertaking a purely nominal “obligation” to accept up to ten NSS, + although not all would actually be installed.

+

D. To offer a number of NSS including some in independent commonwealth + countries, subject to their agreement. Two possibilities for + consideration might be Australia (where the UK has conducted nuclear tests) and Canada; these countries + offer much better seismic sites than could be found in UK dependent territories. Under this + arrangement it would be + particularly appropriate for data to be made available to the + International Seismic Data Exchange, thereby enhancing its role and + reducing criticism of the exclusiveness of the SVA.

+

E. To offer less than ten NSS but including some stations with arrays of + seismometers, and therefore superior performance to simple NSS, as + compensation for the reduced number.

+

F. To offer NSS at sites of our choosing in UK and dependent territories. The paper I am giving you + about all the possible locations suggests that we could offer ten + without unacceptable political or security consequences. The big + disadvantage of this option is that there is no verification case for + the very considerable effort and cost.

+

8. We are concerned about costs. Since many of the possible locations in + UK dependent territories are + isolated and lack the most basic facilities, NSS would be particularly + expensive to install and operate. Costs might be divided in various ways + under the SVA. The possibilities include:

+

A. Each party pays all the costs of those NSS which it requires on the + territory of others. We should prefer this solution but the Russians + could be expected to resist it strongly, since they are seeking 20 NSS + in the west against ten in the Soviet Union.

+

B. Each side pays all the costs for NSS on its own territory. If the + UK agreed to accept an equal number + of NSS, this course would be unfavorable to the UK because of the higher cost of installing NSS in remote + places with bad communications and other facilities.

+

C. Each side pays one third of the total cost of all NSS. But all parties + might be unwilling to share in costs they could not control.

+

D. Some split arrangement, for instance—each party pays the real estate + cost of NSS on its territory plus maintenance and manning, and the other + two parties share the costs of the seismic equipment, its installation + and data retrieval.

+

9. It would be helpful to have your estimate of the capital costs of the + equipment itself and its installation at a typical site in the United + States. This would help us to estimate how much more expenditure would + be required because of the remoteness and lack of facilities of some of + the sites in UK dependent + territories.

+

10. We look forward to discussing the negotiating options and the general + principles underlying NSS in the UK and + dependent territories with you before our experts examine the technical + issues involved. One of the points on which we would welcome your views + is how we should keep up the pressure on the Russians to reveal more of + their position on the technical characteristics and timetable for + installation of NSS, while discussion continues on numbers and locations + in all three countries.

+ +

What happens after three years?

+

11. I described here on 14 September the British Government’s continued + belief that we should leave all our options open. Since then we have + regularly advocated early tabling of fresh language for the review + conference, and the Russians have repeatedly asked for it. We very much + hope that you can very soon propose to us a formula which leaves all the + options open and is likely to be negotiable with the Russians.

+

12. I should also like to recall the British Government’s close interest + in any statement about US intentions to + resume testing at the end of a three-year comprehensive test ban. We + still believe that such a statement could undermine the effectiveness of + the treaty and deter a number of non-nuclear weapon states from + adhering. We hope that, if the US + Government feels it necessary to make a statement about resumption of + testing, this will be sufficiently qualified to minimize the + disadvantages.

+

Permitted experiments.

+

13. I turn now to permitted experiments. We have been considering further + the position you reached last May that experiments at minimum yield + levels should be permitted under a CTB. + We have since been told that the yield limit will be 100 pounds. I can + confirm that the UK supports your + general position. British Ministers have not yet taken a decision + regarding any British program of experiments. We should now like to + discuss various aspects of the subject, including its relevance to the + adherence of non-nuclear weapon states to the treaty.

+

14. In particular, we should be interested to hear whether your studies + on this subject cover both civil and military experiments; and whether + you have reached any views on the conditions and locations for + conducting permitted experiments.

+

15. In the negotiations, the Russians have been pressing for + clarification of the statement about permitted experiments in your + working paper of 7 December 1977. We cannot therefore avoid returning to + the subject in Geneva. In our view, permitted experiments should not be + mentioned in the treaty. Moreover we think the Russians have no interest + even in an informal understanding. If they expressly dissented from a + US statement that small experiments + would continue to be permitted, this might weaken the legal case for + conducting the experiments. It might therefore be best to go for a + low-key unilateral statement in the negotiations, which would be + designed to pass without contradiction by the Soviet Union.

+

16. We take it that the US program of + permitted experiments is certain to become public knowledge as an + element in your package of safeguards. The intention that such + experiments should continue under a CTB + is certain to be criticized by some non-nuclear weapon states. Some may use it to justify a + refusal to adhere to a short term treaty. We will need, with both the + NNWS and the public, to insist + that permitted experiments under 100 pounds yield are not nuclear tests + in the accepted sense of the term and anyway cannot be monitored. We + should explain that the CTB is not + intended to restrain research except where that involves nuclear weapon + test explosions or peaceful nuclear explosions. We should seek to + convince any critics that permitted experiments will not serve the + development of new designs for nuclear warheads. But these arguments may + be challenged by the well-informed; we should be interested in how you + propose to deal with this.

+

Conclusion.

+

17. We are ready to discuss with you other current issues in the + negotiations as well. These include technical aspects of on-site + inspection; the question of an agreed understanding about on-site + inspection requests; chemical explosions; and the multilateral handling + of the CTB treaty after the tripartite + negotiations.

+

18. When we return to Geneva we should aim quickly to get to grips with + the Russians on the difficult problems of NSS and the role of the review + conference. We want to try to negotiate on more than one problem at a + time in the next round, in order to move forward as quickly as we can. + We shall need to re-emphasize to the Russians our determination to + achieve a comprehensive test ban without undue delay. As long as they + have any reason to doubt our resolve, there is less incentive for them + to be flexible especially on verification.

+

19. I should like to sum up as far as possible in terms of action.

+

A. We are here to seek your views on our response to the Soviet proposals + for NSS in the UK and dependent + territories. We shall then prepare a position for putting to the + Russians early in the coming round of negotiations.

+

B. We believe that the UK and US should persuade the Russians to + negotiate on all other NSS issues, concurrently with the consideration + of NSS in the UK and dependent + territories.

+

C. We believe that the US and UK should propose revised language for the + review conference early in the next round. We look forward to your + proposals for this.

+

D. We believe that it will be desirable to say something to the Russians + about permitted experiments in the course of this next round. Again, we + look forward to your views on this.

+

E. Finally, we should also like to hear your latest thinking on the + desirable timetable for the CTB + negotiations. End text.

+ + Vance + +
+ +
+ + 227. Options Paper Prepared by the Special Coordination Committee + Working GroupSource: Carter + Library, National Security Council, Institutional Files, Box 101, + SCC 128, CTB, 2/1/79. Secret. The paper was + attached to a January 24 cover memorandum from the NSC Staff Secretary, Christine Dodson, + to Vance, Brown, Schlesinger, Warnke, Jones, and Turner. + Washington, January + 23, 1979 +

COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN NEGOTIATIONS: THE REVIEW + CONFERENCE

+

This paper considers options with regard to legal formulas that the + US might propose for the CTB treaty’s review conference + provision.

+

Background

+

In May 1978, the President decided that the CTB should have a fixed duration, that there should be a + review conference in the final year of the treaty to determine whether + to negotiate a replacement treaty, and that any further agreement should + be submitted to the US Senate (PD–38).See + Document 200. To implement this + decision, the US and UK Delegations in JuneThe U.S.–UK + illustrative treaty text is in telegram 9710 from Geneva, June 26, + 1978. (National Archives, RG 59, + Central Foreign Policy File, D780265–0119) proposed the + following three sections of illustrative treaty text:

+

(1) This Treaty shall remain in force for . . . years.It was subsequently decided that the negotiations + would proceed on the assumption of a three year duration. [Footnote + is in the original.]

+

(2) During the . . . yearIt was subsequently + decided that the negotiations would proceed on the assumption of a + three year duration. [Footnote is in the original.] after the + entry into force of this Treaty, the [Depositary/Depositary Governments] + shall convene a conference of the Parties to review the operation of the + Treaty and to consider the question of whether there should be a + replacement Treaty.

+

(3) Any decision on this question shall be made by a majority of the + Parties to the Treaty, which majority shall include all Parties that are + Permanent Members of the Security Council of the United Nations.

+

The Soviets have accepted the first and third sections, but in the August + 10 plenary and subsequently, they have rejected the “replacement treaty” + formulation. The Soviets say they recognize that the US is not willing or able to commit itself + beyond the three year period, and that it must therefore keep all + options open for that period. But they insist that language be used which recognizes the + possibility of extending the comprehensive treaty, under certain + conditions.

+

Under the formulation that the Soviets proposed in July, 1978,The Soviet proposal is in telegram 11490 from + Geneva, July 26, 1978. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + D780306–0771) the review conference would be convened to + “review the operation of the Treaty and to consider the question of + extending it, depending on whether any states not Party to the Treaty + will conduct nuclear explosions”. Aside from the question of + “extension”, the Soviet formulation is deficient in that it + heavy-handedly points a finger at France and China, which we are + unwilling to do on broad policy grounds, and it highlights one possible + reason for discontinuing the treaty to the exclusion of reasons that + might be more relevant, to U.S. security interests.

+

The Soviets have said that, just as the question of seismic stations is + the most important remaining issue for the United States, the most + important issue for them is finding a mutually acceptable formula for + this clause (informal trilateral meeting, November 28). Soviet + Delegation chairman Petrosyants + stressed in the final plenary meeting in December that this issue is + “also of great importance in terms of finding mutually acceptable + solutions to verification issues, and in particular to the issue of + national seismic stations”. Proposing a solution to the “replacement + treaty problem” and the construction of a new review conference + formulation at the beginning of the next round could, therefore, put us + in a stronger position to insist that the Soviet Delegation respond to + our proposals on the technical characteristics of national seismic + stations.

+

In addition, the British have frequently criticized the “replacement + treaty” formulation (they agreed only reluctantly to table it last + June), and have urged the US to put + forth a new formulation. The British Delegation that visited the US on September 14 requested that the + US alter its proposal, and suggested + a formulation referring to treaty arrangements following the period of + three years. We said then that we would keep the British suggestion + under review. In December, the British restated their belief that it + would be necessary to propose a new formulation on this issue in order + to induce the Soviets to be more forthcoming on verification. They said + that a number of possible formulations could meet our needs, including + one that authorized the review conference “. . . to consider the + question of any future treaty arrangements”.

+

Objectives

+

Our objectives are as follows:

+

—to promote US national + security by protecting all options for the period beyond three + years. The President has decided to state his intention to + resume testing after the + expiration of the treaty unless a vigorous safeguards program and + studies indicate that resumption is not necessary. The review conference + formulation therefore should not create a barrier either to having no + treaty obligations beyond three years, to having different treaty + provisions, or to having the same treaty provisions.

+

—to permit the US to + carry out the President’s commitment that any further agreement on + testing limitations after the three year period would be submitted + to the Senate for approval. We would insist on seeking Senate + advice and consent on any subsequent treaty obligation regardless of + whether other treaty parties would be required to obtain legislative + approval in their countries.

+

—to find a formula, consistent with these objectives, + that is more likely to be negotiable with the Soviets and + British. The Soviets have stressed that the language must at + least provide for the possibility of extending + the same comprehensive treaty.

+

—to increase the prospects for adherence to the treaty + by non-nuclear weapon states. Non-nuclear states may be less + likely to join the treaty if the review conference formulation + unnecessarily provokes questions about whether certain nuclear weapon + states are already tilted against having a treaty after three years.

+

—to avoid singling out the question of French and + Chinese testing in relation to the function of the review + conference. We might want to refer to factors affecting the + concerns of individual nations, but if we did so, we would want to + broaden the phrase to reflect other relevant factors.

+

In examining alternative review conference formulations, it is important + to bear in mind the extent to which our interests are protected by + provisions that have already been agreed in the negotiations. For + example, by virtue of language to which the Soviets have already agreed, + the treaty will have a three year duration. Therefore, US agreement would be required for any + treaty obligation regarding prohibitions after that period, and we would + only accept such obligations with Senate approval. In connection with + the tabling of any new review conference language, we would reaffirm + formally that such prohibitions would be submitted for a new approval by + the US Senate.

+

In addition, it is already agreed that the review conference cannot take + any decision on the period beyond three years without the approval of + all parties that are Permanent Members of the U.N. Security Council. + Thus, it is clear that the treaty will simply expire at the end of three + years and no new arrangement will follow unless the U.S. agrees to it. + Before the review conference, we would conduct private consultations + with the UK and USSR to coordinate a nuclear weapon state + position. Regardless of the outcome of these consultations, we will have + a veto over actions by the review conference.

+ +

Options

+

Our present review conference language (“to consider the question of + whether there should be a replacement treaty”) is directly based on + language used in PD–38. One approach is + to stick with this formulation in the negotiations. Another is to hold + to the present formulation but, at an appropriate time, to pursue an + agreed understanding with the British and the Soviets to clarify that + the intent of the treaty language is to assure that all options are open + regarding the future of the treaty. Alternatively, we could decide to + propose a new formulation, inserting one of the phrases listed below + after the words “review the operation of the treaty and”.

+

Option “A”

+

“consider the question of extending its provisions”

+

Option “B”

+

“consider the question of subsequent treaty prohibitions”

+

Option “C”

+

“consider the question of whether there should be future treaty + arrangements”

+

While there are many more possible variants, the above options represent + a range of formulations which would demonstrate some movement if we + decide to change our review conference proposal. Option “C” closely + parallels the latest British suggestion (p. 4) and would involve the + least change in the PD–38 language. On + the other hand, Option “A” uses the word “extending” and represents + greater contrast with the language used in PD–38 than do the other two options. Option “B” drops the + conditional “whether” and uses the term “prohibitions” rather than the + broader word “arrangements”.

+

The dependent clause

+

Regardless of which option is selected, there is agreement that it would + be advantageous to propose a final clause to the review conference + provision, as follows:

+

“, taking into account all relevant factors.”

+

The Soviets have proposed a final clause that refers specifically to the + question of continued testing by non-parties. The clause set forth above + is broad enough to reflect our stockpile reliability concerns and may + simultaneously meet a Soviet need for some reference to testing by + non-parties.

+
+ +
+ + 228. Summary of Conclusions of a Special Coordination Committee + MeetingSource: Carter + Library, National Security Council, Institutional Files, Box 101, + SCC 128, CTB, 2/1/79. Secret. The meeting took + place in the White House Situation Room. + Washington, February 1, + 1979, 10:30–11:15 a.m. + + SUBJECT + Comprehensive Test Ban + + + PARTICIPANTS + State + Secretary Cyrus + Vance + Jerry Kahan Dep Director, Bureau of Politico/Military + Affairs + Defense + David McGiffert Asst + Secretary for International Security Affairs + Energy + Secretary James + Schlesinger + Duane Sewell Asst Secretary for Defense Programs + JCS + General David Jones + General Edward Giller + ACDA + General George + Seignious + Spurgeon Keeny, Deputy + Director + Herbert York (CTB Delegation Chairman) + White House + David Aaron + NSC + Reg Bartholomew + Ben Huberman + OSTP + Frank Press + John Marcum + DCI + Dr. Robert Bowie + [name not declassified] Chief, Nuclear + Energy Division + +

The purpose of the meeting was to review the status of the negotiations + and develop guidance for the resumption of the talks on February 5. The + main issue for decision was whether we should change our position on the + CTB review conference + provision.

+

In beginning the meeting, David + Aaron welcomed Herb + York as the new CTB + Delegation chairman and asked George + Seignious for an update on the negotiations. Seignious briefly summarized the + results of the Fall session, noting that although the Soviets had agreed + to a three year duration and a 10 station NSS network, little progress + had been made on the detailed verification issues. In his view the main + task now was to nail down effective NSS provisions and a new review + conference provision could be helpful in this regard.

+ +

Aaron stated without objection + that there was agreement on how to proceed on the other issues. This + would involve continuing to defer discussion of permitted experiments in + the negotiations, maintaining our positions on the OSI and NSS verification issues, and + responding positively to the Soviet proposed NSS network in the US.

+

There was also general agreement with Cy + Vance’s observation that a long period of negotiations + lay ahead and that it was clearly undesirable to go to the Hill on + CTB before SALT is ratified. He noted that major + differences remained on NSS issues such as the location of stations, + equipment design and who would manufacture it, as well as data + transmission. Similarly difficult OSI + issues remained and in the best of all worlds, he could not see winding + up trilateral agreement until sometime approaching early Fall.

+

Aaron noted that the review + conference issue should be considered in the context of the burden of + proof or presumption regarding extension of the treaty, and the + relationship of the review conference provision to other nuclear weapon + states, particularly the Soviet effort to use the provision for leverage + in France and China. He then asked for views on the three options + developed by the Working Group. There was agreement that the formulation + selected should end with the phrase “taking into account all relevant + factors” to attempt to get the Soviets to drop their linkage of + extension to whether France and China continue testing.

+

Seignious favored an option which + referred explicitly to “extension” of the treaty. However, Frank Press noted that in his view a + more neutral formulation, “to consider the question of whether there + should be future treaty arrangements” was more consistent with the + President’s objective of providing a credible opportunity to resume + testing. Bob Bowie stressed that + in the long term [less than 1 line not + declassified] was somewhat concerned about any reference to + extension.

+

Dave Jones, noting the Chief’s concerns about both verification and + reliability, preferred to stick with our current position, but could + support the “arrangements” approach if a shift was needed for policy + reasons. Dave McGiffert and + Jim Schlesinger also favored + the “arrangements” approach.

+

Cy Vance supported Seignious’ position but offered a + compromise formulation using the term “renewal” instead of “extension.” + Aaron suggested that + “modification” also be included and a near-consensus was reached on “to + consider the question of renewing its provisions and any modifications.” + Schlesinger and McGiffert were willing to accept this + as a backup to the “arrangements” approach, but Dave Jones was concerned + that the compromise changed the tone of “whether there should be + arrangements.” He reserved his position and asked for more time to study the language. (Jones + subsequently informed the NSC that the + JCS recommend against this + compromise.)

+

Aaron concluded the meeting by + confirming that the “arrangements” approach was acceptable to all though + some preferred going beyond this and others preferred our current + position. He stated that this would be reported to the President along + with the compromise formulation, noting that some preferred this + approach while others could either support it as a backup or had + reserved their position. At their request, he also agreed to note that + Vance and Seignious preferred the “extension” + formulation.

+
+ +
+ 229. Editorial Note +

The United States, the Soviet Union, and the United Kingdom (UK) continued to meet in Geneva over the + next 2 months to discuss a Comprehensive Test Ban (CTB), but they made little progress, in + particular on the issue of on-site inspection of testing sites. + Secretary of State Cyrus Vance + sent UK Foreign Secretary David Owen a letter noting that a + “deadlock” had developed because the UK + government had approved the construction of only one National Seismic + Station (NSS) on British soil. Vance acknowledged that the United States sympathized + “with the problems that your government faces on the NSS question. But + it seems quite clear now that this stalemate could go on indefinitely” + since the Soviets had agreed to allow ten stations on their soil, which + Vance described as “the most + intrusive verification arrangement in any arms control agreement to + date.” Vance also instructed the + U.S. Ambassador to the UK, Kingman Brewster, to tell the UK government that “we believe it would + probably require a British proposal to move more than halfway toward the + Soviet position if we are to have any hope of getting the Soviets to be + more flexible on this issue.” (Telegram 100316 to London, April 21; + National Archives, RG 59, Central + Foreign Policy File, D790182–1031)

+

CTB discussions also took a back seat in + overall arms control negotiations as Washington and Moscow spent much of + the spring finalizing the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks II treaty. For + more on these discussions, see Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, vol. XXXIII, + SALT II, 1972–1980, Documents + 235–238.

+

Meanwhile, the political position of the ruling Labour Government in the + United Kingdom had become precarious after Prime Minister James Callaghan lost a vote of no + confidence on March 28, 1979, which forced him to call a general election for early May. On April + 23, Brewster said that if Labour + won the election, the administration could expect the UK “to move ahead on the CTB.” If the Conservatives won, however, + Brewster predicted “we cannot + expect an early UK move on NSS, and + should not, in my view, expend too much of our influence trying to + elicit one. Important as progress toward a CTB is, there will be other more immediately pressing + issues on which we will want to bring the new British government along, + such as Southern Africa and SALT. I + believe that we have a chance to secure Conservative government + cooperation on these issues, and on CTB.”

+

Brewster warned, however, that the + Conservatives “will want to take a fundamental look at the CTB. Their first and preeminent concern + will be that such a ban not inhibit Britain’s future as a nuclear power, + nor foreclose any of the options which a Conservative government will be + examining in its early months for the maintenance of such a British role + through the end of the century.” The last thing the United States should + do, Brewster stressed, was “have + them learn that the US had sought, only + a few days before a change in government, to modify the UK position, apparently siding with the + Soviet Union” on the issue of NSS. He recommended that he delay delivery + of the message contained in telegram 100316 to London until after the + election. (Telegram 7959 from London, April 23; National Archives, + RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + D790186–0104) Vance agreed with + Brewster, and on April 26 + instructed the Ambassador to deliver a note on NSS to “the Senior Career + Level of the FCO” rather than the Foreign Secretary. (Telegram 104658 to + London, April 26; National Archives, RG + 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790190–0244)

+

On May 4, the Conservative Party under the leadership of Margaret + Thatcher won the general election and assumed power. A week later, + President Jimmy Carter wrote a + congratulatory letter to the new Prime Minister and, while he did not + directly raise the CTB issue, he + promised to “work closely with all the NATO allies” on SALT, + other arms control issues, and “future nuclear cooperation.” (Carter + Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Materials, Brzezinski Office File, Box 15, Great Britain: + 9/78–5/79)

+
+ +
+ + 230. Memorandum From Secretary of Energy Schlesinger to the President’s Assistant for National + Security Affairs (Brzezinski)Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, + Box 13, Comprehensive Test Ban (CTB), 1/79–9/80. Secret; Restricted Data. Copies were sent + to Brown, Jones, and + Press. + Washington, May 4, + 1979 + + SUBJECT + CTB-RELATED ENHANCED TEST + PROGRAM + +

Following up our telephone conversation of yesterday afternoon,Not found. this memorandum highlights + two major problem areas regarding the study of an enhanced nuclear + weapons test program that DOE and DOD + have been preparing.

+

The study defines a two-year enhanced test program which includes an + additional 16 tests through FY 80 and 13 + in the first half of FY 81. This program + would be expensive—on the order of an additional $123 M through the end + of FY 80 and a total of $284 M in FY 81; this would require $31 M in FY 79 and $92 M in FY 80 over the current Administration program. In view of + the extremely tight budget constraints facing the DOE, the existing + FY 79 and FY 80 test program levels were judged to represent the best + balance of DOE resources within the defense programs’ area. These + incremental costs could not be accommodated from within DOE’s resources + without significantly affecting our ability to meet Presidential + guidance on the production of weapons required for DOD systems.

+

Due to the large incremental costs involved, I believe it would be most + useful to obtain an initial Administration estimate on the amount of + money to be made available for this enhanced effort and then size the + test program to this sum. I believe that the potential political + repercussions of any other potential courses of action could be + substantial. If the recommended program were to be reduced for financial + reasons, questions would undoubtedly arise concerning the + Administration’s commitment to do all that is necessary to prepare for a + CTB. This would be far worse, + having recognized a significant enhancement to be advisable, than not + proceeding on the recommended path.

+

It should be borne in mind that DOE, in FY 79, has already sent to the Congress a $12.8 M + supplemental for the two additional confidence tests; we have two + additional supplementals pending with OMB totalling $81 M—$40 M for Pershing II warhead and $41 M + for NOVA (the latter one + already has been earmarked within the President’s Contingency Fund); and + a sizeable supplemental would be required if the advanced dates for + readiness of National Seismic Stations are to be met.

+

Given the large amount of FY 79 + supplemental funding being requested for DOE Defense Program activities, + it would seem wise to determine in advance that the Administration would + lend its full weight in support of an additional request.

+

The second problem bears on the structure and scope of any outside review + of the DOE/DOD recommendations. Given the highly technical nature of an + integrated nuclear weapons test program, the individuals comprising the + review group must be currently and intimately familiar with the detailed + technical purposes of each test element that will make up this program. + I remain skeptical that such expertise is to be found outside DOE and + DOD, though there are many vocal + critics of the test program. Consequently, I believe that Harold and I + should pass on the membership of the review group to assure competency + and balance. This is especially important in light of the earlier OSTP + review of seismic verification and stockpile reliability in which the + lack of technical competence of the group’s review was manifest.In a May 10 memorandum to Brzezinksi, + Press called Schlesinger’s criticism about the + OSTP’s review “surprising” and characterized the OSTP panel’s + technical competence as “indisputable.” (Carter Library, National + Security Affairs, Brzezinski + Material, Subject File, Box 13, Comprehensive Test Ban (CTB), 1/79–9/80)

+
+ +
+ + 231. Memorandum From the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament + Agency (Seignious) to Secretary + of State Vance, Secretary of + Defense Brown, Secretary of + Energy Schlesinger, the Chairman + of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Jones), and the Director of Central + Intelligence (Turner)Source: Carter Library, National + Security Council, Institutional Files, Box 153, Folder 4, JEC IF and + IFG 7901686–7903516. Secret. Copies were sent to Brzezinski and Ambassador Herbert York. + Washington, May 8, + 1979 + + SUBJECT + Comprehensive Test Ban: The Review Conference Issue + +

Last round we proposed that the multilateral review conference “consider + the question of whether there should be future treaty arrangements, + taking into account all relevant factors.” However, the Soviets + continued to argue for a formula that referred to the possibility of + extension and that cited testing by non-parties (i.e., China and France) + as a factor affecting extension.

+

We must, of course, fully protect our option to resume testing after + three years if required for national security. In my view this option is + already well protected: the treaty will end automatically after three + years; we will have a veto over any review conference decision on future + restraints; the Senate will have to approve any follow-on treaty; and we + will make it clear to the Congress and American people that we will + resume testing if required for our security.

+

The problem, I believe, is that we have tried to use the review + conference provision as still another means of protecting our options. + We have chosen general terms like “future treaty arrangements” that were + designed to reflect the broad range of options we will want to choose + from in determining, within our own government, what should follow after + three years. However, I believe we have lost sight of the fact that the + review conference provision deals not with internal USG options but with the role of a multilateral conference. I feel that role should + be very limited.

+

Clearly, it is not in our interest for the conference (and therefore a + large number of non-nuclear and non-aligned countries) to get involved + in decisions that vitally affect U.S. security—such as whether the + CTB will be followed by a threshold + ban. Presumably, we would not even want a multilateral threshold treaty, which would tend to legitimize + low-yield testing by all parties. The most practical way of pursuing a new threshold measure + would be to withhold our consent for a follow-on CTB at the review conference, thus + allowing the CTB to terminate. We could + then negotiate a new threshold treaty on a bilateral or trilateral + basis.

+

As to verification, we are negotiating a separate trilateral agreement + for the measures we consider essential, especially national seismic + stations. If there is to be a CTB after + three years, the verification changes we would want, such as more + seismic stations in the USSR, would + involve upgrading this separate agreement, not the verification + provisions of the multilateral treaty—and this should be done + trilaterally, with no interference from the multilateral conference.

+

For these reasons, the review conference language should not imply (as + does “future treaty arrangements”) that the multilateral conference + would have a broad mandate to shape the future of the treaty. Nor should + it indicate (for example, by using the term “modifications”) that we + expect the conference to deal with changes in the multilateral + treaty—the normal amendments procedure would handle those.

+

Instead, the multilateral conference should serve essentially to affirm + what we have decided prior to the conference. If we decide on no treaty + or a new threshold ban, we would insist on treaty expiration at the + conference, and our veto would guarantee that result. However, if we, + the Soviets, and the British were all prepared to accept a comprehensive + ban after three years, we would seek what would be certain endorsement + by the conference. The review conference language should therefore + authorize a very limited choice: letting the treaty lapse or having a + CTB after three years.

+

On the basis of these considerations, I recommend the following package proposal:

+

—Instead of the Soviet term “extension” which implies continuous + obligations, we would propose revised US + language authorizing the conference to “consider the question of + renewing” the treaty.

+

—We would insist that the Soviets drop their reference to testing by + non-parties and accept a general formula like ours.

+

—We would propose a new provision specifying that a review conference + decision to renew the treaty would enter into force when 20 states, + including the US, the UK, and the USSR, have given notification of their acceptance of that + decision. Under this provision, we could control when the renewed + obligations became effective, and we would not permit entry into force + until the Senate had approved.

+

—We would seek a provision in the trilateral verification agreement to + the effect that, prior to the multilateral conference, the three parties + would consider modifications of the agreement that would take effect if + the multilateral treaty is renewed. This would give us a clear basis for making upgraded + verification a condition for renewing the treaty.

+

I am attaching a text of what these review conference provisions would + look like.

+

I feel that the approach I am suggesting promotes U.S. interests better + than our current position, and I therefore recommend that we take the + initiative in putting it on the table when the talks resume.

+

Text of Proposed Multilateral Review + Conference Provision

+

ARTICLE VII

+

1. This Treaty shall remain in force for three years.

+

2. During the third year after the entry into force of this Treaty, the + Depository shall convene a conference of the Parties to review the + operation of the Treaty and to consider the question of renewing it, + taking into account all relevant factors. Any decision on this question + shall be made by a majority of the Parties to the Treaty, including all + Parties that are Permanent Members of the Security Council of the United + Nations.

+

3. A renewal of this Treaty shall take effect, for those Parties + accepting it, when the governments of 20 Parties, including the + governments of all Permanent Members of the Security Council of the + United Nations, have notified the Depositary of their acceptance.

+

Text of Proposed Provision for the + Trilateral Verification Agreement

+

1. To promote the objectives and implementation of the provisions of the + Treaty and of this Agreement, the Parties to this Agreement shall + establish promptly a Joint Consultative Commission within the framework + of which they will:

+

. . . Consult prior to the conference of the Parties to the Treaty + provided for in Paragraph 2 of Article VII of the Treaty, review the + operation of this Agreement and consider any modifications to this + Agreement that may be desirable in the event of renewal of the + Treaty.

+
+ +
+ + 232. Memorandum of ConversationSource: Department of State, Office of the Secretariat + Staff, Cyrus R. Vance, + Secretary of State—1977–1980, Lot 84D241, Box 9, Vance + Nodis + Memcons 1979. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Peter Sommer + (EUR). The meeting took place + at the Ministry of Defence. The conversation is scheduled to be + printed in full in Foreign Relations, 1977–1980, vol. XXVII, Western + Europe. + London, May 22, + 1979 + + PARTICIPANTS + + US + The Secretary + Assistant Secretary Vest + Ambassador Brewster + Minister Streator + Peter Sommer (Embassy Notetaker) + + + UK + Francis Pym, Secretary of State for Defense + Sir Frank Cooper, Permanent Under Secretary, MOD + Michael Quinlan, Deputy Under Secretary, Policy and + Programs, MOD + Roger Facer, Private Secretary to the Secretary + + + + SUBJECTS + Conservative Commitment to Defense, NATO Issues, TNF, + US Strategic Systems, SALT, ABM, MBFR, UK’s Nuclear Deterrent, SALT III, CTB, Anti-Satellite Negotiations, Arms Sales to + China + +

Conservative Commitment to Defense

+

Pym said he was privileged the Secretary could visit the MOD and he personally wanted to emphasize + the Conservative Party’s anxieties over the growing Soviet threat and + Britain’s weakened defense posture. The Conservatives are determined to + do something positive. As a first step, the Conservatives had increased + military pay, which in some ways was only a minor achievement, but it + did underline the Conservatives’ commitment to defense. He added that + the Conservatives, however, would be hard-pressed to improve + substantially current defense programs because the UK economy is at zero growth. The Secretary + replied that he was pleased to be able to come to the MOD and the US is pleased with the Conservatives’ strong commitment to + defense.

+

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to a comprehensive test ban.]

+

Comprehensive Test Ban

+

The Secretary said he and Lord Carrington had gotten hung up the question + of how many national seismic stations should be located in the British Isles.Vance’s May + 21 discussions with Carrington are reported in telegram Secto 4006 from the Secretary’s + Delegation, May 22. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + P840171–0170) Carrington had explained the British + problem—the monetary implications—and the Secretary agreed that clearly + ten stations on a country the size of the British Isles was + unreasonable. The Secretary felt, however, the Soviets would not settle + for anything less than five UK stations. + He added perhaps a worthy idea was to have some of the Commonwealth + states, like Australia and New Zealand, accept a station. The Secretary + noted that yesterday Michael + Palliser had suggested a formula allocating seismic + stations in relation to each country’s land mass. The Secretary joked + that under such a formula, Britain would probably end up with only half + a station. Pym said a change in the rules at this stage would make it + difficult to achieve agreement. The Secretary underlined that we will be + under pressure to make progress in the next CTB round, which begins on June 4, because if we do not it + is unlikely negotiations will be completed on time for the NPT Review Conference. The Secretary said + the US will press the Soviets at the + SummitReference is to the upcoming + U.S.–USSR summit in Vienna + scheduled for June 15–18. to stop linking the number of + seismic stations and the other remaining technical problems related to + verification, but he was not sanguine that the Soviets would budge. Pym + promised to discuss these issues with Lord Carrington. Cooper asked if + there would eventually be a threshold under the CTB treaty. The Secretary said the US would insist on limiting it to laboratory tests for a + treaty of three years duration. That is as far as we can honestly go in + keeping the Joint Chiefs aboard and considering the reliability of our + nuclear stockpile.

+

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to a comprehensive test ban.]

+
+ +
+ + 233. Telegram From the Secretary’s Delegation in London to the + Department of StateSource: + National Archives, RG 59, Central + Foreign Policy File, P840171–0149. Secret; Cherokee; Immediate; + Nodis. Also sent Immediate to + the White House. The conversation is scheduled to be printed in full + in Foreign + Relations, 1977–1980, vol. XXVII, Western + Europe. + London, May 24, 1979, 0129Z +

Secto 4025. Department for Christopher only. White House to Dr. + Brzezinski for the President. + Subject: Meeting With PM Thatcher.

+

1. Secretary Vance met for an + hour with PM at No. 10; also present + were Foreign Secretary Carrington; Lord Privy Seal and House of Commons + Foreign Affairs Spokesman Sir Ian Gilmour; Brian Cartledge, P.M.’s + Private Secretary for International Affairs, and U.S. Ambassador + Brewster.

+

2. Topics covered were SALT; Begin and + Middle East; C.T.B.; Turkey; Rhodesia and Southern Africa.

+

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to a comprehensive test ban.]

+

13. Discussion then turned to C.T.B. Mrs. T. indicated that she had + private scientific advice, unknown perhaps to Carrington and Gilmour, + that Soviet salt mines made it possible to defy detection; especially if + timed to coincide with predicted earthquakes. Secretary said simply that + our scientific advisors did not agree with hers and suggested that we + send our most knowledgeable to talk with hers.

+

14. Mrs. T. then harked back to Eisenhower moratoriumOn October 31, 1958, President Dwight D. Eisenhower + and UK Prime Minister Harold + MacMillan announced a one-year moratorium on nuclear testing, to + which the Soviets agreed a few days later. (American Foreign Policy, Current Documents, 1958, pp. + 1356–1357) and the advantage this gave to Soviets who used + moratorium to prepare for tests while we did not. Result, she said, + would be spate of Soviet tests which left US behind. Secretary said this is why we would have + safeguards program which would put US in + position to respond quickly if Soviets took actions putting US at a disadvantage. He said we were + satisfied we could plan tests and keep test scientists and engineers in + alert status for that length of treaty and that the stockpile would not + be denigrated during the three year period of the treaty. On the way out + the PM asked Secretary who we could send + over and he suggested Frank Press + as an outstanding expert in this area. She was extremely pleased.

+

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to a comprehensive test ban.]

+
+ +
+ + 234. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Kingdom to the Department + of StateSource: National + Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign + Policy File, D790243–0755. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Sent for information to + Geneva. + London, May 29, 1979, 1533Z +

10489. Geneva for CTB Delegation. + Subject: CTB: UK Ministerial Decision on NSS.

+

1. (S—Entire text). Ambassador Edmonds, head of UK + CTB Delegation, called on DCM to convey UK ministerial decision on National Seismic Station issue. + Text of Amb Edmonds talking points follows:

+

Begin text:

+

As you know, both the Prime Minister and Lord Carrington discussed the + comprehensive test ban with Mr. Vance during his visit to London.See footnote 2, Document + 232. Both voiced their misgivings about the + requirement that the United Kingdom should accept 10 National Seismic + Stations (NSS).

+

Ministers have now reflected further on the question of NSS. In doing so, + they had very much in mind the need to hold the Russians to their + acceptance of 10 NSS on Soviet territory. They are also aware of the + importance of bringing the CTB + negotiations to a successful conclusion.

+

On the other hand, they were also much concerned about the difficulty of + defending a decision to spend large sums of money on a project for which + their is simply no technical justification. The Russians know that the + United Kingdom has no independent nuclear testing facility and could not + possibly establish one, either in the United Kingdom or the dependent + territories, without detection. Our technical people are satisfied that + NSS would not provide any effective addition to means already available + to the Soviet Union for monitoring United Kingdom compliance with the + treaty.

+

Ministers have considered the NSS issue against the background of their + commitment to severe retrenchment in public expenditure. This will make + it even more difficult to justify capital costs of 20–30 mission pounds + on a project which is bound to appear nonsensical to parliament and the + public.

+

The government attaches high priority to increasing the resources made + available to defence, thereby improving our contribution to NATO. The money needed for 10 NSS could + be much better spent on re-equipping our forces in Europe.

+ +

Ministers are therefore unwilling that the United Kingdom should pay for + more than the one NSS which we have already agreed to accept, at + Eskdalemuir. If your government concludes that we must accept more than + one in order to secure Soviet agreement, we hope that you will be able + to find some way of providing the necessary funds. In that case, + Ministers would be prepared to accept up to four NSS on British + territory. We should be glad to discuss the implication of this with + you. End text.

+

2. Comment: Embassy’s earlier démarcheSee + Document 229. and Secretary’s + discussion here last weekSee Document 233 and footnote 2, Document 232. prompted, we understand, + ministerial discussion chaired by P.M. last week at which foregoing + decision was reached. We consider it, however, a bargaining position + from which UK can be further moved. In + view of fact that Secretary Vance has already emphasized the importance USG places on progress in CTB, embassy believes that a presidential + message to P.M. Thatcher may be needed now to move British to reconsider + their position. Such a message could emphasize importance US attaches to early progress in CTB, argue benefits resulting from + agreement, highlight need for adequate verification, and urge + reconsideration of UK position.

+ + Brewster + +
+ +
+ + 235. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security + Affairs (Brzezinski) to Secretary + of Energy SchlesingerSource: Carter Library, National + Security Affairs, Brzezinski + Material, Subject File, Box 13, Comprehensive Test Ban (CTB), 1/79–9/80. Secret. Copies sent + to Vance, Brown, Jones, Seignious, and Press. + Washington, June + 14, 1979 + + SUBJECT + CTB Enhanced Test Program + (U) + +

This is in response to your memorandum of May 4See Document 230. + concerning the CTB Enhanced Test + Program. I recommended development of this program to the PresidentNot found. to redress the growing + asymmetry in US and Soviet testing + rates, and to investigate some of the uncertainties involved in + maintaining reliability without testing. The President directed me to + proceed on this basis but was concerned that the additional tests should + support a CTB—e.g., the program should + investigate reliability problems rather than generate “new” warhead + development needs. Subsequently, the President reaffirmed his support + for this effort in the context of his review of the Quicksilver II + testing plan.Not found. (S)

+

In light of this support, the preliminary incremental amounts you + mentioned do not appear unreasonable and I am optimistic that the + Administration will support such a request. I understand that the FY 81 figure is in fact consistent with the + preliminary request DOE has already submitted to OMB.Not + found. We need to move quickly, however, since the Committee + mark-up of the FY 80 budget is in + progress and we are losing valuable time for carrying out additional + tests prior to the advent of a CTB. + Consequently, it is requested that you facilitate participation by your + staff and the lab directors in the ad hoc NSC Working Group to ensure prompt completion of the + Enhanced Test Program for review by the President. (S)

+

In this regard, Assistant Secretary Sewell of your staff has previously + submitted a list of prospective membersNot + found. and Frank plans to draw from this list in establishing + the panel. Frank also tells me he would welcome an opportunity to + discuss with you any further suggestions you might have regarding the composition or activities of the + review group.

+ + Zbigniew + BrzezinskiAaron signed the memorandum for + Brzezinski. + +
+ +
+ 236. Memorandum of ConversationSource: Department of State, Office of the Secretariat + Staff, Cyrus R. Vance, + Secretary of State—1977–1980, Lot 84D241, Box 9, Vance + Exdis + Memcons 1979. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Krimer on June 20; and approved by + Aaron. The meeting was + held at the Soviet Embassy. The memorandum of conversation is + printed in full in Foreign Relations, 1977–1980, vol. VI, + Soviet Union, Document 203. + Vienna, June 17, 1979, 11:00 a.m.–1:00 + p.m. + + SUBJECT + Third Plenary Meeting between President Carter and President Brezhnev + Topics: SALT III and other arms + control issues + + + PARTICIPANTS + + U.S. + The President + Secretary of State Cyrus R. + Vance + Secretary of Defense Harold + Brown + Dr. Zbigniew + Brzezinski + General David Jones + Mr. Hamilton + Jordan + General G. + Seignious + Ambassador Malcolm + Toon + Mr. Joseph + Powell + Mr. David + Aaron + Mr. Wm. D. Krimer, + Interpreter + + + U.S.S.R. + President L.I. + Brezhnev + Foreign Minister A.A. + Gromyko + Marshal D.F. Ustinov + Mr. K.U. Chernenko + Deputy Foreign Minister G.M. + Korniyenko + Marshal N.V. Ogarkov + Ambassador A.F. + Dobrynin + Mr. A.M. Aleksandrov-Agentov + Mr. L.M. Zamyatin + + Mr. V.G. Komplektov + Mr. A.M. + Vavilov + Mr. V.M. + Sukhodrev, Interpreter + + +

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to a comprehensive test ban.]

+

Further, the President said we would like to proceed with a comprehensive + nuclear test ban agreement, either with or without the participation of + Great Britain. We will do everything possible to induce other nations, + France, Great Britain and China, to join in substantial reductions in + nuclear weapons development and deployment. Obviously he could not speak + for them and would think that the Chinese would be difficult to + persuade. But it is obvious that for several years now the United States + and the Soviet Union had such massive nuclear inventories that their + predominance over the other nuclear powers is adequate. Moreover, the + Soviet SS–20 missiles and other + medium-range systems constituted a formidable means for dealing with + these nations. But the absence of nuclear cooperation from other + countries should not be allowed to interfere with progress on a + bilateral basis toward the SALT III + agreement.

+

Turning to another subject, Brezhnev said it would be very important promptly to + complete and sign a treaty on the general and complete prohibition of + nuclear weapon testing. The Soviet Union had done a great deal in that + direction, having met Western positions on a number of important + matters. Speaking frankly, he would have to say that the CTB negotiations were being slowed and + delayed, and by no means through any fault of the Soviet Union. + Brezhnev expressed the hope + that the United States and England will change their inflexible + approach, in particular, to questions of verification. If that were + done, all three partners could jointly and without further delay + finalize their agreement on this important and necessary measure.

+

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to a comprehensive test ban.]

+

The President wanted to make one more comment. He had outlined to + Brezhnev several very + specific and important thoughts and suggestions regarding future arms + negotiations leading to SALT III. + Brezhnev had not responded, + but the President saw an area of agreement in Soviet willingness to halt + the production of nuclear weapons and to reduce stockpiles, taking into + account current stockpiles and the security interests of the sides. + Secondly, he believed it very important that we agree and publicly say + that we will not deliver nuclear fuel to any nation that is not under + the NPT or under IAEA control. We needed to move forward + on the comprehensive test ban. Personally, the President thought that a + requirement for ten stations in a small nation such as Great Britain was + excessive. Great Britain shared this view. If the talks failed for that reason, we were + prepared to discuss with Prime Minister Thatcher the withdrawal of Great + Britain from the talks so we can proceed to reach agreement on a + bilateral basis.Shortly before he and + Brezhnev signed the + SALT II Treaty, Carter handed Brezhnev a brief handwritten + letter listing his proposals for the next round of arms control + talks that would comprise SALT + III. Among other issues, Carter said the two nations must conclude a + “comprehensive test ban treaty with or without Britain. (hopefully + with them.)” The letter is printed in full in Foreign + Relations, 1977–1980, vol. VI, Soviet Union, Document + 202. Third, the President thought that good + progress could be made today on mutual and balanced force reduction if + the discussions were continued between Secretary Brown and Marshal Ustinov. We needed to + follow up further on President Brezhnev’s suggestion concerning notification of tests + and exercises. The President hoped that before he left Vienna these + proposals could be pinned down so that our discussions could be fruitful + and not wasted.

+
+ +
+ 237. Telegram From the Mission in Geneva to the Department of + StateSource: National + Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign + Policy File, D790329–0620. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Sent for information Priority + to London and Moscow. + Geneva, July 19, 1979, 1712Z +

12262. Exdis USCTB. Pass to DOE. + Subject: CTB Negotiations: Assessment + of June 4–July 20 Round CTB message no. + 478.

+

1. (Secret—Entire text). Summary: This message contains my assessment of + the June 4–July 20 round of CTB + negotiations. It incorporates numerous suggestions from members of the + Delegation but has not been cleared by all of them. In sum, there has + been very little serious negotiation, and therefore very little progress + toward a CTB, during this round. At the + beginning of the round the UK Delegation + announced that the new UK government was + studying the question of National Seismic Stations (NSS) on UK territory and would state its position + later. The fact that it failed to do so during this round was the + ostensible reason for the Soviets to continue to refuse to move on NSS. + However, their refusal to move may also reflect a more fundamental + problem, namely a growing doubt about the ultimate success of these + negotiations—a doubt related both to their uncertainty over the SALT + debate and to the possible + impact on the CTB negotiations of the + approaching US presidential campaign. + The fact that the US Delegation has been + unable even to state a position on several political issues, such as the + preamble to the multilateral treaty and permitted experiments, probably + reinforces Soviet fears that the US is + no longer fully committed to completing the project. If there is to be + progress during the next round it will obviously be necessary to settle + the UK NSS issue. In addition, we should + be properly instructed so that we can get on with negotiating the + remaining political issues of the treaty, as well as deal with Soviet + requests for US NSS components and two + complete NSS. End summary.

+

2. General situation and atmosphere. The negotiations remain stalled, a + situation that was already apparent during the last round. Only two + plenary meetings were held. At the first, on June 5,A report on the June 5 Plenary is in telegram 9583 + from Geneva, June 6. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + D790257–0304) the UK + Delegation stated that the new UK + government had not yet completed its study of the NSS question and was + therefore not ready to respond to the Soviets (as it still is not). The + Second Plenary was held July 11A report on + the July 11 Plenary is in telegram 11747 from Geneva, July 12. + (National Archives, RG 59, Central + Foreign Policy File, D790351–0209) at our request so that I + could restate and clarify the US + position on NSS equipment, including the requirement that NSS equipment + installed in the Soviet Union must be US-manufactured. Although the Soviets had let it be known that + they planned to make a statement on July 11, they did not do so and did + not explain why they had changed their mind. Nor did they show much + interest in holding private substantive discussions. Symptomatic of + their lack of interest in substantive exchanges, the Soviets took the + initiative in arranging a trilateral lunch, instead of the usual + plenary, to end the round.

+

3. Although the Soviets continued to press the UK to respond on UK NSS, + they conveyed less sense of urgency that we should get on with the + negotiations and they were less active in seeking US intervention with the UK on the NSS question. The apparent + relaxation displayed by the Soviets gave US the impression that they were somewhat less concerned + than before with moving the negotiations forward.

+

4. Relationships among the Delegations continued to be cordial, providing + a good basis for further constructive work when and if the negotiations + are unblocked. We are impressed in particular by the apparent desire of + the Soviets to keep up a show of cooperative activity, and they excelled + themselves in arranging social activities, presumably to show goodwill. + The visit to Moscow by me, Dr. Johnson, and John Marcum,York, Johnson, and Marcum visited + Moscow from June 25–30. The trip included a tour of the seismic + observatory at Obninsk which the Soviets planned to use as a + National Seismic Station under a CTB treaty. York’s report of the visit is in telegram 11274 from + Geneva, July 5; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + D790306–0938) as well as the completion of plans for the + visit of Soviet and UK experts to US NSS facilities, contributed to good + relationships among the Delegations.

+

5. Accomplishments during this round. A few modest accomplishments can be + recorded. The political working group agreed on language for a paragraph + in Article III of the separate verification agreement dealing with the + privileges and immunities of On-Site Inspection (OSI) designated personnel. In addition, at + the end of the round, the US tabled + draft language for another paragraph of the same article, dealing with + expenses incurred during an OSI. The + OSI working group reviewed the + texts of Article III that had already been negotiated, and agreed on a + joint composite text (with some brackets denoting issues not yet agreed) + of the entire article. Apart from this accomplishment, the OSI working group devoted many hours to + debating the acceptability of portable seismometers as OSI basic equipment. The Soviets + introduced this issue at the beginning of the round by challenging the + US and UK Delegations to provide data showing that portable + seismometers would be useful in determining the nature of ambiguous + events and would not result in false alarms. Throughout the debate the + Soviets refused to deal in specifics but rejected all US/UK arguments as + unconvincing. It is still not clear whether the Soviets have serious + objections to the use of portable seismometers or were merely looking + for a convenient issue that would keep the OSI group busy.

+

6. Our major effort during the round was to restate, clarify, and expand + upon the US position regarding the use + of US equipment for NSS in the USSR. In that context I also outlined the + main elements of a cooperative NSS program. In informal meetings, we + concluded arrangements for the visit by Soviet and British experts to + our NSS development facilities. In addition, the trip to Moscow + mentioned above (June 25–30) provided an opportunity to establish + contact with Sadovsky, Director of the Soviet Institute of Geophysics, + who was identified to US as the man + responsible for the Soviet NSS Program.

+

7. The UK role in the negotiations. In + private discussions with US, members of + the UK Delegation have betrayed some + embarrassment and concern over the prolonged delay in London in deciding + on a position concerning NSS on UK + territory. It is our impression that the UK Delegation recommended that the UK answer the Soviets during this round by proposing a few + (perhaps as many as four) NSS on overseas territories (paid for by + Britain, not the US). I have little + doubt that the Delegation + strongly opposed “Zero NSS”, which would imply UK withdrawal from the SVA, arguing that this would be + unacceptable to the Soviet Union and damaging to British prestige. From + contacts with the British here and in London, I have the impression that + the new UK Government has some basic + reservations regarding the value of a CTB treaty. For example, Minister of State Douglas Hurd + referred in a conversation with me to a low-threshold treaty as a + hypothetical possible substitute for a CTB. He also asked why Britain should play the Soviet + “Numbers Game” and whether it would not be in the UK interest, though not necessarily in + US interest, for the UK to withdraw from the negotiations + altogether. These reservations about the value of the CTB may help explain why the UK Government has been so slow in reaching + a decision on NSS.

+

8. The Soviet role and attitude. Throughout the round the Soviets + continued to wait for a UK response to + their proposal for ten NSS on UK + territory. They repeatedly made it clear that they had no interest in + NSS within the British Isles, and that the withdrawal of the UK from the NSS arrangements would be + unacceptable. Finally, they continued to refuse to discuss any other NSS + issues before the question of the number and location of UK NSS was settled. At the opening of the + round, the Soviets hinted at some flexibility regarding the number of + UK NSS they could accept, conveying + the impression that they might settle for fewer NSS in UK territory than the ten proposed for the + USSR. By the end of the round, + however, the Soviets were again saying that, whatever number of NSS + there were in UK dependent territories, + the USSR would accept the same number + in the Soviet Union. The Soviets may have hoped that their apparent show + of flexibility would elicit an early UK + answer, to which they could reply by reaffirming their requirement of + equal numbers. The Soviets may in fact have in mind using whatever + number the UK comes up with as a basis + for driving the US toward a lower number + of NSS in the USSR, at least during + the first three years. On several occasions Petrosyants and Timerbaev informally raised the possibility of adjusting + the phasing of the installation of the NSS, in effect of agreeing to + install a small number of NSS (or none) during the first duration of the + treaty with a commitment to install more if the treaty is renewed.

+

9. During this round, in contrast with the last, the Soviets in informal + discussions avoided any suggestion that they will be ready to begin + serious negotiations on other NSS issues as soon as the UK issue is settled. This may be because, + as I have just indicated, the Soviets have in mind using the number + proposed by the UK as a basis for + proposing a reduction in the number of NSS in the USSR, possibly linking this to an + adjustment in the phasing of installation. They may expect a prolonged + debate over these issues and for this reason no longer expect to move promptly to NSS technical + issues. Or they may envision a prolonged and difficult debate over whose + equipment will be used in the Soviet Union. Either way we should not + assume that settling the UK issue will + necessarily open the door for a speedy settlement of NSS technical + issues.

+

10. The question of US equipment in + Soviet NSS. We have now left no room for doubt that we will require the + use of US-manufactured equipment in the + NSS installed in the Soviet Union. I and other members of the Delegation + discussed this matter informally with the Soviets several times. We also + went over the US position with Korniyenko during the Moscow visit, + and I of course stated our position in detail in my plenary statement of + July 11, placing the requirement for using US equipment in the context of reciprocity and of a + cooperative NSS program.

+

11. The Soviets have not categorically rejected the use of US equipment in the Soviet Union. In his + comments at the plenary Petrosyants even avoided restating the Soviet position + (which has been generally negative but not a categorical rejection), on + the grounds that the position was well known and did not need to be + repeated. In private discussions, he and other members of the Soviet + Delegation described the US position as + very hard. Their emphasis, however, was less on the substance of the + US position (which they refuse to + discuss before the UK NSS question is + settled) but on their contention that the US statement represented an essentially new position and + came as an unpleasant surprise. We pointed out that US spokesmen had said as early as May 1978 + that it would be necessary to use the US + downhole unit.A method of seismic + testing. Nevertheless, I tend to believe that the Soviet + reaction of surprise contains truthful elements if not the whole truth, + in the sense that our previous statements about using US equipment were never given much emphasis + and therefore may not have been taken seriously. In rereading the + record, I think it is at least possible that the Soviets were convinced + that we could be persuaded to compromise on this issue. They may dig in + on this point, holding to the argument that their acceptance of NSS is + on condition that Soviet equipment will be installed in Soviet + territory. Or they may try to drive us toward some sort of compromise + involving few or no NSS in the first three years with a commitment to + settle the question of whose equipment will be used in a full scale + system when or if the treaty is renewed.

+

12. CTB negotiations, SALT, and the US political scene. It is evident that the SALT debate in the US has slowed these negotiations. The + Soviets have asked US if the SALT debate will interfere with US decisions on CTB. They have also referred to the fact that President + Carter told Gromyko that we would not finish the CTB negotiations before SALT was concluded.See Document 221. + We must assume that the Soviets will not wish to commit themselves + further to the CTB, and especially not + to make any significant concessions, before they are confident that the + SALT treaty will be ratified and + that the US seriously intends to go + ahead with the CTB. The Soviets have + also frequently referred to the 1980 presidential campaign as something + that might make it impossible for the US + to proceed with the CTB, and therefore + a matter of concern to their negotiators. From the Soviet perspective, + the obvious question is whether any concessions can be expected from the + US in the present situation, and + whether any Soviet concessions would be worthwhile. It is relevant, in + this connection, that the Soviets no longer talk of the need to complete + the CTB by any particular time. Early + in this round we occasionally referred to the NPT conference in May 1980 as a target date, but got no + response from the Soviets. Clearly they no longer regard May 1980 as a + realistic target date. Members of the Soviet Delegation have even + speculated that the negotiations would require two more years.

+

13. Conclusions. The fact that the US + Delegation entered this round with no new instructions, and that it + remains uninstructed on several political aspects of the treaty—notably + the preamble and the question of permitted experiments—has contributed + to the present impasse. The fact that we are still unable to state a + US position on these issues tends to + undermine Soviet confidence in our commitment to the CTB objective. If we are to make any + progress during the next round, and if we are to avoid the possibility + that these negotiations might unravel altogether, I believe we must + return next round in a position to negotiate most open issues, including + not only the outstanding political issues but also the Soviet request to + buy US seismic components and two + complete NSS. Our ability to make constructive proposals on these issues + would contribute substantially to improving the negotiating + atmosphere.

+

14. Further, the delay of the UK in + responding on the NSS question probably strikes the Soviets as further + evidence that both the UK and the US are losing interest in the CTB objective. During the recess, I hope + that the UK will reach a decision + regarding the number of NSS in UK + dependent territories and that the US + will come to a firm conclusion concerning our reaction to this new + decision. Without new instructions for both the US and the UK Delegations, + we are unlikely to make any progress next round. If we continue to + appear in Geneva lacking instructions, the Soviets (and the UK too) may interpret this as proof that we + are no longer seriously committed to achieving a CTB treaty.

+ + York + +
+ +
+ + 238. Memorandum From Secretary of Energy Schlesinger to the President’s Assistant for National + Security Affairs (Brzezinski)Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Agency File, + Box 8, Energy Department: 8–10/79. Secret. + Washington, August + 22, 1979 + + SUBJECT + Soviet Nuclear Test + +

[8½ lines not declassified]

+

I strongly urge that this Government seek an explanation of this event + from the Soviet government. [2½ lines not + declassified] The United States has adhered scrupulously to + this bilateral moratorium. It appears that the Soviets have been less + scrupulous.

+

The US response to this type of event + could have a major impact on Senate deliberations on the SALT II Treaty. Some Senators could see + US actions in this area as being + indicative of future US actions with + respect to compliance ambiguities in SALT. Consequently, I urge your serious consideration of + this issue.

+
+ +
+ 239. Memorandum From John Marcum and Marshall Brement of the National + Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National + Security Affairs (Brzezinski)Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Agency File, + Box 8, Energy Department: 8–10/79. Secret. Outside the + System. + Washington, August + 24, 1979 + + SUBJECT + Soviet Nuclear Test (S) + +

Jim Schlesinger has written you + (Tab B)Document 238. to point out + that the most recent Soviet nuclear test has a high probability of + having exceeded the 150 KT threshold and to urge that we seek an + explanation of this event from + the Soviets. This is technically correct, but the situation is actually + less certain since other seismic data, which we do not understand fully, + indicate that the yield may have been considerably smaller. + Nevertheless, Schlesinger’s + concerns are well founded and, per David’s instructions, the State + Department delivered a démarche we had already initiated to the Soviets + this afternoon (Tab C).Attached but not + printed. That afternoon, Acting Assistant Secretary of State for + European Affairs Goodby handed Soviet Chargé Vasev a démarche based + on the draft at Tab C that noted the administration’s “concern” over + the test. The text of the démarche is contained in telegram 227369 + to Moscow, August 29. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + D790394–1013) (S)

+

At David’s suggestion, we also called in Bessmertnykh to reinforce State’s protest. We asked him + whether or not, in light of the three large explosions this summer, the + Soviets intended to adhere to the 150 kt limit and made clear that we + were free to respond appropriately. Bessmertnykh reaffirmed strongly that the Soviets + considered themselves bound by this limit and fished for an indication + that we were more concerned about the domestic consequences than the + actual yield of the explosion. We responded that it was the large size + of this explosion and the earlier ones this summer that prompted our + concern. (S)

+

We have prepared a brief response to Schlesinger at Tab A,Tab A + is an August 24 memorandum from Brzezinski to Schlesinger which noted that the United States had + “requested that they [the Soviets] provide technical data relating” + to the test to which Schlesinger had alerted Brzezinski on August 22 [Document 238] as well as + “the explosions of June 23 and August 3 which we had raised with + them previously.” (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, + Brzezinski Material, + Agency File, Box 8, Energy Department: 8–10/79) Telegrams 166361 and + 205927 to Moscow, June 28 and August 8 respectively, discuss the + U.S. démarches to the Soviet Union concerning the June 23 and August + 4 Soviet nuclear tests. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790292–0271 and + D790358–1164 respectively) informing him that you share his + concerns and that the text has been protested to the Soviets. (S)

+

Recommendation

+

That you sign the memorandum at Tab A.

+
+ +
+ + 240. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the + United KingdomSource: + National Archives, RG 59, Central + Foreign Policy File, D790427–0917. Secret; Exdis; Immediate. Sent for + information Priority to the Mission in Geneva and Moscow. Drafted by + Steven Steiner (PM/DCA); Neil Michaud (EUR/NE), Arnold Raphel, Avis + Bohlen (EUR/SOV), and Robert Steven (S/S); and approved by Bartholomew (PM). + Washington, September 18, 1979, + 2327Z +

245697. CTB Delegation for Okun. + Subject: CTB: Approach to UK on NSS Question.

+

1. On behalf of the Secretary PM Director + Bartholomew called in UK Embassy Counselor Weston (in absence of + DCM Robinson) September 17 to make + démarche along following lines:

+

—The US government continues to place + great importance on the progress of the CTB negotiations.

+

—The negotiations are stalled on the NSS issue because of the Soviet + rejection of the present UK + position.On September 27, Carrington + told Vance that his + government had “perhaps embarrassed the US with their position on a verification presence.” + Vance replied that the + United States did “not believe that one seismic station is an + adequate answer.” (Telegram 254134 to the Mission in Geneva, + September 27; National Archives, RG + 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790441–1007) The Soviets + consider the ball to be in the Western court on this question. They may + believe they have the UK and US on the defensive and that they can make + it appear that the two Western parties are responsible for the stalemate + and have lost interest in the talks.

+

—We therefore need a combined US/UK strategy which will: (A) solidify our + joint approach on this issue; (B) put some pressure on the Soviets and + test their willingness to negotiate seriously; and (C) move the + negotiations off dead center and ensure that the talks do not unravel + over this issue.

+

—We recommend, therefore, that your government consider the following + strategy for this round:

+

—Both the US and UK would work together to counter Soviet claims that the + UK would have the same number of + stations as the US and USSR.

+

—We would propose instead that the UK + make a credible step in the direction of the Soviet position, a step + which would include the acceptance of NSS in dependent territories. We + note that this was discussed by the President and the Prime Minister at + their Tokyo meetingAccording to the + President’s Daily Diary, Carter met with Thatcher in Tokyo on June 27 from + 6:15 to 7:30 p.m. (Carter Library, Presidential Materials) No other + record of this meeting has been found. and that the Prime + Minister said HMG would be taking this + matter under serious consideration.

+ +

—The US would give its strong support to + a meaningful new UK position. We would + make it clear to the Soviets that we do not believe the UK could go any further. We would push them + hard to accept this offer and press them on this both in Geneva and at a + senior level in Washington and Moscow. We would suggest that the UK also take such action.

+

—At the same time, we would urge the Soviets—while this issue is being + considered in Moscow—to move on to serious negotiation of other issues + of concern to the UK and US.

+

—To make the maximum impact upon the Soviets, such a move should + optimally be made by US (UK and US) + at the start of this coming round, and, in any event, as early in the + round as possible. We would appreciate it, however, if London would + allow time to consult with US, as it is + indispensible that we fully coordinate the approach that we will each + take in presenting our new position.

+

2. Bartholomew noted that full + substance of démarche had been approved by the Secretary and by senior + levels of other concerned agencies. Weston asked if we could elaborate + upon the meaning of a “credible” step. Bartholomew said that this has not been defined by + USG. Speaking on strictly personal + basis, he pointed out that even if the UK does not judge that such a move would have a good chance + of Soviet acceptance, such a move is still worthy of consideration. It + will place UK and US in better position on NSS issue and will + put the Soviets to the test.

+

3. Weston asked if we had any time frame in mind. Bartholomew replied that the key factor + on timing now is that its very much in mutual UK and US interest to have + made substantial progress in CTB by the + time of the NPT review conference. + Further, we continue to have an intrinsic interest in moving CTB ahead on its own merits. Its in our + mutual interest to overcome the impression of a stalled negotiation and + the potential for unraveling.

+

4. Weston said US views would be taken + into account and that UK decision could + be expected September 19.Telegram 15850 + from the Mission in Geneva, September 26, reported that in his + opening statement, British Ambassador John Edmonds said that after + “a much more thorough review,” the new UK Government could “confirm” that it “wishes to work + for the early achievement” of “a good comprehensive test ban + treaty.” However, Edmonds said that despite the Soviet proposal that + each of the three nations should build 10 national seismic stations + to verify a CTB, after “careful and + intensive consideration,” the UK + Government had concluded that “there is no justification for + locating national seismic stations in United Kingdom dependent + territories. They have therefore decided that one national seismic + station in the United Kingdom, at Eskdalemuir in Scotland, is the + appropriate British contribution to an effective and realistic + system of verification by these stations.” (National Archives, + RG 59, Central Foreign Policy + File, D790441–1086) In his opening plenary statement, York said that the U.S. Government + “strongly supports both the British desire for a test ban and the + offer to accept one national seismic station in the United Kingdom,” + which it believed was “appropriate.” York’s plenary statement is in telegram 15848 from + Geneva, September 27. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + D790441–1051) + US approach was therefore timely. Weston said he could not + speculate on the outcome of UK + Ministers’ meeting which would make decision.

+

5. Weston also noted that US approach did + not mention the possibility of UK + staying out of the SVA, and he asked for explanation. Bartholomew, speaking personally, + acknowledged that this was not included in US approach, and pointed out that even if UK does decide that this would be the best + course of action, it still might be better for tactical reasons at least + to try first the strategy recommended in this US approach. He noted that a British decision to withdraw + from the SVA would not solve the issue automatically, as US and UK + would have to press Soviets to accept this solution. He pointed out that + we would, of course, be happy to hear out the British if they have other + views on this question.

+ + Vance + +
+ +
+ + 241. Telegram From the Mission in Geneva to the Department of + StateSource: National + Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign + Policy File, D790563–0302. Secret; Exdis; Immediate. Sent for information Priority to + London and Moscow. + Geneva, December 6, + 1979, 1712Z +

19619. USCTB. Subject: CTB Negotiations: + Final Assessment of Round Nine. Ref: A. CTB No. 491, 17 Oct 79CTB message No. 491, or telegram 16934 + from Geneva, October 17, reported that the Soviets had “taken two + modest but potentially useful steps long urged by the U.S.: 1) they + have indicated some flexibility regarding their previous position on + the number of NSS to be located in the UK and dependent territories; and 2) they have formally + agreed to begin ‘ad-hoc’ discussion of technical characteristics of + NSS even before the numbers issue is resolved. Soviet negotiating + strategy evidently is to try to trade movement on these two matters + for U.S. and UK flexibility on the + UK NSS numbers issue.” The + ad-hoc meeting, the Mission reported, would meet for the first time + on October 17. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + D790475–1023) B. CTB No. + 510, 14 Nov 79CTB message No. 510, or telegram 18246 from Geneva, + November 14, reported on the activity of the ad-hoc working group on + NSS technical characteristics, which “provided the busiest and most + productive period of the past year. The report of the working group + represented limited, but useful, progress, which was unexpected at + the start of this round, or at the start of the working group’s + operation.” (National Archives, RG + 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790524–0789) C. CTB No. 515, 29 Nov 79CTB message No. + 515, or telegram 19217 from Geneva, November 29, reported that the + Soviets had agreed to drop a provision in the Separate Verification + Agreement of the proposed CTB + treaty “which would have provided that the rights and functions of + OSI designated personnel, and + the equipment used by them, would be specified in detail in the + consultations on the conduct of each individual OSI. The U.S. Delegation had opposed + such a provision, maintaining that the fundamental OSI rights and functions should be + arranged during these negotiations and spelled out in the SVA, not + deferred for agreement on a case-by-case basis. Soviet agreement to + drop this paragraph,” the Mission contended, “thus represents a + useful move in our direction.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + D790549–0640) D. CTB No. + 518, 5 Dec 79.CTB message No. 518, or telegram 19583, from Geneva, + December 5, reported that UK + Ambassador Edmonds had called 1979 “a disappointing year for the + negotiations, with little progress achieved.” York called 1979 “less than + satisfactory. The foremost problem has been the Soviet unwillingness + to proceed on other NSS issues until the UK numbers question is resolved. This Soviet position + was not a useful one, and should not delay us further.” (National + Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign + Policy File, D790561–0796)

+

CTB message no. 522

+

(S—Entire text)

+

Summary: Since previous assessments this round, agreement has been + reached on complete ad Ref text for Article III of separate verification + agreement. This, together with earlier report on agreed technical + characteristics of NSS, constitutes modest progress this round. However, + Soviets continue to refuse to negotiate NSS text before number of UK NSS is settled. End summary.

+ +

1. As reported previously the Soviets agreed to limited technical + discussions on NSS before the question of the number of UK NSS was settled (Ref A). These + discussions resulted in a report agreeing on technical characteristics + of the seismic portion of most of the NSS downhole package in which U.S. + specifications and explanatory text were accepted by the Soviet side + (Ref B). Three issues, the specification of linearity and noise level, + and the recovery of the data “with fidelity” were not settled in the + report, and remain to be resolved.

+

2. Additional progress was agreement in Article III of the separate + verification agreement on the definition of designated personnel for + conducting On-Site Inspections (OSI) + and on the burden of costs of OSI. The + Soviets also agreed to drop a bracketed paragraph in this article, + making Article III complete, unbracketed ad referendum text (Ref C).

+

3. On the issue of UK NSS, the Soviets + indicated early in the round that they could be flexible on their + proposed number (ten), but have insisted the UK first move off its position of one NSS—a number the + Soviets say is totally unacceptable. The UK has remained firm in maintaining that one NSS is the + correct number for monitoring UK + compliance with a CTB. The U.S. has + firmly supported the UK position + throughout the round.

+

4. The U.S. proposed in the final plenary a cooperative NSS development + program to install and evaluate U.S. NSS in the USSR and in Alaska. The initial Soviet + response was cool. They said that the proposal seemed to contain a + number of preconditions, and would have to be studied carefully (Ref + D).

+ + York + +
+ +
+ + 242. Memorandum of ConversationSource: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, + Brzezinski Material, + Subject File, Box 37, Memcons: + President: 10–12/79. Secret. The meeting took place in the Cabinet + Room at the White House. The conversation is scheduled to be printed + in full in Foreign + Relations, 1977–1980, vol. XXVII, Western + Europe. + Washington, December 17, + 1979, 10:30 a.m.–12:30 p.m. + + SUBJECT + The President’s Meeting with Prime Minister Margaret + Thatcher + + + PARTICIPANTS + The President + The Vice President + Secretary of State Cyrus + Vance + Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski, + Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs + David Aaron, Deputy + Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs + Ambassador Kingman + Brewster + Ambassador at Large Henry + Owen + George Vest, Assistant + Secretary of State + Robert D. Blackwill, NSC Staff + Member + Prime Minister of the United Kingdom Margaret Thatcher + Lord Carrington, UK Secretary of + State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs + Sir Nicholas Henderson, Ambassador to the U.S. + Sir Robert Armstrong, Secretary to the Cabinet + Sir Michael Palliser, + Permanent Under Secretary of State, Foreign and Commonwealth + Office + Sir Frank Cooper, Ministry of Defense + Michael Alexander, Private Secretary to the PM + George Walden, Principal Secretary to the Secretary of + State + +

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to a comprehensive test ban.]

+

As the meeting neared its end, Lord Carrington said that he and Secretary + Vance would talk about + Belize in their meeting in the afternoon. The President said he would + discuss China and perhaps Namibia at dinner with the Prime Minister. The + CTB should also be addressed. Mrs. + Thatcher quickly replied that the UK + could only afford one seis-mic station and had offered to withdraw if + that would help the negotiations.Brewster had briefed Vance about Thatcher’s misgivings + about a CTB and particularly the + construction of more than one NSS in the United Kingdom. Given her + “ingrained” suspicions about the Soviet Union and her predisposition + “to give greater weight to defence preparedness and less to arms + control,” Brewster contended + that “it would be useful for the President to review with Mrs. + Thatcher the range of complexity the U.S. and its allies face on the + world scene by a frank statement of the U.S. approach to East-West + relations,” especially on the CTB + issue. The recent “slight signs that the Soviets are beginning to + show greater flexibility” on the NSS, Brewster said, validated her government’s “firmness” + on the issue. (Telegram 23716 from London, November 29; National + Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign + Policy File, D790550–0566) The President said he had + discussed this issue with Brezhnev at Vienna who had objected to UK + withdrawal.See Document 236. If the British could not accept ten + seismic stations, perhaps four would be an appropriate number. The Prime + Minister, her voice breaking, said four was a ridiculous number. The + UK only needed one and had much + better ways to spend its money. The President wryly noted that Britain + might consider these stations as a kind of status symbol and asked the + Prime Minister to again consider accepting four of them. Mrs. Thatcher + replied that although Britain had no wish to withdraw, these stations + were very expensive. (S)

+

The President, Secretary Vance + and Dr. Brzezinski and the Prime + Minister, Lord Carrington and Sir Robert Armstrong then moved into the + Oval Office for further discussion. (C)

+
+ +
+ 243. Telegram from the Department of State to the Embassy in the + Soviet UnionSource: National + Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign + Policy File, No reel number available. Secret; Immediate. Sent + immediate to London and the Mission in Geneva. + Washington, December 19, 1979, + 0530Z +

321521. Geneva for CTB Delegation. + Subject: TTBT Data Exchange. Ref: + State 315631 (Notal).

+

1. S—Entire text.

+

2. In his meeting with Ambassador Dobrynin on December 6,Not + found. the Secretary handed over the following Non-Paper + relating to TTBT data exchange noting + that this was not just a technical question but a matter of political + significance.

+

Begin text:

+

Both our governments have recently reaffirmed their intention not to take + any actions incompatible with the 150 kiloton limit on underground + nuclear explosions called for by the Threshold Test Ban Treaty of + 1974See footnote + 4, Document 141. and the Peaceful Nuclear + Explosions Treaty of 1976.See footnote 5, Document 141. It is + in our mutual interest to take + steps to minimize any misperceptions regarding adherence to these + statements of intent.

+

The achievement of a CTB retains its + very high priority in the view of the USG. It is our desire to move ahead with it expeditiously + and to build the popular support needed for its ratification. However, + it should be clear that unless we can resolve the current uncertainties + regarding nuclear testing, we will be unable to generate and maintain + this necessary public support.

+

[12 lines not declassified]

+

The Soviet démarche of September 17,Bessmertnykh delivered + the Soviet démarche, which was a reply to the August 24 U.S. + démarche, on September 17. The text is in telegram 244481 to Moscow, + September 18, (National Archives, RG + 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790425–0762) which raised + the question of whether our September 6 event had exceeded 150 kt + demonstrates that we indeed have a common problem. We have confirmed + that the yield of that US test did not, + in fact, exceed 150 kt. However, our own teleseismic measurements + suggest that the signals generated, unless analyzed in conjunction with + accurate geological and geophysical knowledge of the testing area, could + lead to an erroneously high estimate of the yield.

+

To reduce our uncertainties regarding seismic signals from the Soviet + tests I mentioned, we would like to receive from you pertinent + geophysical data on the area where these tests were conducted. We would, + for our part, be happy to provide to you similar data to reduce the + uncertainties you expressed over our test of September 6.

+

We note that in response to an earlier request which we made for such + data, the Soviet side suggested that such uncertainties would not arise + if the US had ratified the TTBT. We do not consider this a feasible + course of action at this time, as pressing for ratification of the + TTBT would complicate our efforts + to conclude a CTB—which remains our + priority objective in this area. But, as I said, this climate of + uncertainty regarding current testing activities undermines the basic + political support which a CTB will + require.

+

To make this data exchange as constructive as possible, to reduce the + uncertainties which I have described, and to enhance the mutual sense of + confidence which is so important in this area, we propose the + establishment of an ad hoc joint technical panel or working group.

+

We would ask this ad hoc panel or group to develop procedures for the + exchange of geological and geophysical data for those regions of active + test sites where unusual geology and other factors have apparently + contributed to incorrect yield estimates that resulted in expressions of + concern by both our governments. The concerns we both hold could perhaps be dealt with by precise + data on quite limited areas, building on the hypothetical sample profile + of a testing area already exchanged in connection with the TTBT. The panel could also develop + procedures for participation of US and + Soviet experts in an exchange of calibration data from past explosions + at these sites. And there are undoubtedly other measures that the panel + could consider as well to eliminate unnecessary uncertainties.

+

End text.

+ + Christopher + +
+ +
+ 244. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Kingdom to the Department + of StateSource: National + Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign + Policy File, D800019–0932. Secret; Priority. Sent for information to + the Mission in Geneva and Moscow. + London, January 11, 1980, 2047Z +

803. Subject: (S) US/UK CTB + Consultations.

+

Secret—Entire text

+

1. Following the meeting on issues related to high yield testing, the + UK asked for a meeting at FCO to + cover broader CTB issues. UK side, led by Assistant Under Secretary + Patrick Moberly and Ambassador Edmonds, included Dennis Fakley (MOD), Tony Reeve (FCO), Michael Warner + (MOD) and Ivor Callen (FCO). US side led by John Marcum (OSTP), included + Larry Finch (ACDA), Steve Steiner + (PM/DCA), Jack Griffin (DOE), Col. Dick Thornton (JCS) and Embassy Pol-Mil officer.

+

2. Moberly stated that UK wished to cover + four areas: The status of CTB in the + light of Afghanistan,The Soviet Union + invaded Afghanistan on December 25, 1979. the UK–NSS issue, other CTB issues in 1980, and plans for future + US/UK bilaterals.

+

3. Marcum said that in the course of deciding on actions US would take in response to Soviet + invasion of Afghanistan, USG had looked + at whether CTB negotiations should + continue. Decision was taken that negotiations should continue at a slow + pace. Talks should continue because they are in the US and Western interest, and because they + have an important international dimension, particularly with the NPT REVCON approaching in August. The + US would, therefore, continue with + its previous positions and current initiatives in CTB, and will not try to turn back the clock. In particular, US wants to continue bilateral discussions + with the UK on the NSS question, + pursuant to the Carter-ThatcherSee Document 242. and Vance-CarringtonNot found. talks in Washington, at which + US undertook to look into + possibility of providing equipment for 3 stations in UK dependent territories, while UK looked into possibilities for locating + them. US and UK should work expeditiously to develop a common position + on this issue, and then consult closely on the tactics of how and when + to use this move with the Soviets in Geneva.

+

4. Moberly said UK ministers would regard + this statement of USG policy as + important. He said that although UK + ministers had not specifically reviewed future of CTB post Afghanistan there was no + intention to halt negotiation or to disengage from the talks as a result + of the crisis in Afghanistan. He inquired regarding the meaning of the + phrase, “proceed at a slow pace.” Marcum responded that US plans to continue with CTB, but expected that the agreement would + not be completed prior to SALT II + ratification. This meant that the work remaining would be stretched out + over a longer period. Marcum stated that the US did not intend to halt progress in the talks, or to + delay the talks. At present we believe the talks should resume on Feb 4 + as scheduled. Also, in preparation for the NPT REVCON, negotiations should show some limited progress + over the next few months, even though US + forsees actual CTB completion in a much + longer time frame. The essential thing now, he suggested, was for US and UK + to make progress bilaterally as soon as possible, so the Soviets cannot + exploit differences between us.

+

5. Moberly said Soviets may try to raise CTB in the CD and asked how we should respond. Both US and UK + participants agreed that one should try to insure that CD has other + issues to work on in order to keep pressure off CTB. UK side asked whether + US could permit multilateral + negotiation in the CD of the CTB + preamble or review conference language. Marcum replied that while the + preamble might be a possibility eventually, the review conference + language is much more sensitive. UK side + pointed out that even if we succeeded in holding off CD pressures, + US and UK face a multilateral problem with the coming NPTRC. + US side acknowledged this, and + pointed out that it is therefore important for US and UK to be on the high + ground in the talks.

+

6. UK/NSS issues: UK presented US with preliminary working paper on NSS + issues.Not found. Moberly said + NSS is not necessarily the key issue to get the talks moving and could + possibly be saved for later. US side + responded in general terms that US sees + broad range of verification issues as crucial, and did not want + separation of multilateral treaty from SVA issues. UK + side then agreed that NSS is one of several important issues. Marcum + pointed out that since this issue is the key question publicly known to + be at stalemate, US and UK should concentrate on agreeing + bilaterally on this issue on the basis of discussions during the + Thatcher visit. US and UK should also consider the tactical aspect + of the issue. For example, one might want to see what the Soviets put on + the table prior to deciding how to play a new UK NSS position in Geneva.

+

7. UK side asked status of internal + US deliberation on NSS financing + issue and stressed that this would be important to decision by UK ministers. Marcum said work is in + progress on whether US would be able to + fund equipment for additional UK NSS + stations, but USG will need more time + to reach final position. It would be helpful to US in meantime to know how UK views the issue at this stage. Moberly replied that the + UK paper demonstrates that the + UK is looking seriously at possible + sites in the Southern Hemisphere. He urged that US get its views to UK as + soon as possible. US side agreed that it + would do its best to get back to UK as + soon as possible.

+

8. Marcum pointed out that NPT + monitoring value—and prospects for US + funding of equipment for additional UK + NSS sites in Southern Hemisphere—could be enhanced if additional + monitoring equipment such as acoustic and ionospheric sensors, ocean + bottom seismometers, radiation detectors, etc., could be installed at + these locations. He noted utility such sites would have had in context + of problem of evaluating September 22 possible nuclear explosion in + South Atlantic.

+

9. Prototype: Marcum said US also wished + UK to look at possibility of + participating in the NSS prototype program, and possibility of placing a + prototype station in Southern Hemisphere UK site. Fakley (UK + MOD) agreed that there would be a case + for doing this in Southern Hemisphere, as it could provide helpful + experience on stations on small island locations. While technically + interesting, much will depend on whether UK ministers agree to the principle of NSS in dependent + territories. Moberly asked whether the prototype question could be + considered regardless of whether the UK + were willing to accept 3 additional stations. The US side responded that the issue might be + viewed independently, although it would be preferable to resolve UK NSS numbers issue at same time. Moberly + said this was an interesting idea which UK would consider.

+

10. Next steps: Edmonds said it seemed unlikely that one would have both + a firm US offer and a UK Ministers’ decision by Feb 4. Marcum + agreed but said US would hope for + further discussions before then or shortly thereafter. There would also + need to be consultations between the two Delegations before the + negotiations resume. Reeve said UK had + explored NSS issue with FCO Minister of State Hurd in a preliminary way. + It was clear that before UK could review + its position the shape of the + US offer must be clear. UK side undertook, however, to see how much + further issue of sites might be reviewed at senior official level on + basis of information now available. Marcum repeated that USG would also get back to UK with its views as soon as possible.

+

11. Other issues: Edmonds asked that US + reconsider its refusal to discuss the preamble, as he felt current + US position could not be defended at + NPT REVCON. He expressed concern + that this issue could be placed in a multilateral forum against US wishes if US was not ready to discuss it. Marcum took note of this + and said US would review all open CTB issues, both on substance and tactics. + On review conference, Edmonds acknowledged that ball is in Soviet court + in formal sense and that this is more delicate issue than preamble. + Marcum noted the US saw no need to + reconsider its position on this issue and UK agreed. UK also asked + that US look at presentation of CTB issues at NPTRC (and publicly if + Soviets break ranks). UK agreed with + US view that coordination on these + matters would best be done in Geneva, with support from London and + Washington.

+

12. On question of next bilateral, UK + side suggested that US Delegation + members and possibly some Washington officials come to London for + consultations on Jan 30 or 31, prior to resumption in Geneva.

+ + Brewster + +
+ +
+ + 245. Paper Prepared by an Interagency Review GroupSource: Carter Library, National + Security Council, Institutional Files, Box 11, SCC 297, CTB, 4/3/80. Secret. + Washington, January + 30, 1980 +

NEW NSS ISSUES IN THE CTB + NEGOTIATIONS

+

A basic issue relating to National Seismic Stations (NSS) which has been + under consideration on an interagency basis over the past several weeks + is:

+

—whether our willingness to provide US + NSS equipment to the USSR should be + reconsidered, and in particular whether our offer to lend an NSS unit to + the USSR for joint testing should be + changed, in light of post-Afghanistan guidelines on scientific exchanges and technology transfer + to the Soviet Union.On January 4, Carter announced that he had + “directed that no high technology or other strategic items will be + licensed for sale to the Soviet Union until further notice.” (Public Papers: Carter, + 1980–81, pp. 21–24)

+

If it is determined that we want to maintain our general approach to NSS + in the negotiations, and that we are still prepared to lend the Soviets + an NSS unit, then two NSS issues in relation to the UK are:

+

—whether we should offer to fund the equipment for three additional + UK NSS in the Southern Hemisphere, + in the context of the UK shifting from a + one-site to a four-site NSS position, and

+

—whether the US should offer to lend the + UK an NSS unit for joint US–UK–USSR testing at a + UK site in the Southern + Hemisphere.

+

This paper provides a brief review of the background on these issues for + decision, together with the principal factors bearing on each of them. + Negotiating tactics and timing are also discussed.

+

As background for considering the NSS issues outlined above, following is + the projected timetable for production of prototype NSS units. The first + unit will be installed in Alaska in February 1980. An older unit which + has been tested in Tennessee will be upgraded to current standards; this + unit could then be available for loan to the USSR or the UK (although it + will differ in some respects from the other NSS units). Another unit + should be ready in March 1981, with additional units expected in May and + July 1981; these units are being produced for use in a 5-station + research network in the US, but they + could be made available for other uses if deemed appropriate.

+

I. Technology Transfer + Issue

+

The immediate case at issue is whether our offer to lend an NSS unit to + the USSR for joint testing should be + withdrawn in light of post-

+

Afghanistan guidelines on scientific exchanges and technology transfer to + the Soviet Union.

+

A. Background

+

This issue must be considered in light of earlier analyses of the + technology transfer question, the US + proposal to lend the Soviets an NSS unit, and new circumstances in the + post-Afghanistan period.

+

Technology Transfer Analyses. The question of + technology transfer associated with providing US NSS equipment for use at stations in the USSR was examined on an interagency basis + in 1977,Not found. in 1978,The 1978 Interagency Study of NSS technology + transfer to the Soviet Union is available in Library of Congress, + Manuscript Division, Harold + Brown Papers, Box 82, Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, + 1978. and again in 1979Not + found. (in preparation for the visit of Soviet experts to the + US). In each instance, the + responsible agencies determined that the NSS equipment could be + transferred to the Soviet Union for use in monitoring + a CTB treaty. In its review of + this matter in 1978,Not found. the + DOD cited the following grounds for + concurring in the transfer:

+

—It is not practical to “reverse engineer” the critical components and + produce them in quantity.

+

—The number of NSS is small enough so that diversion to other + applications would be no threat.

+

—Since the equipment would be provided in connection with an + international treaty, it would not set a precedent for approval of + export of system components alone.

+

Two conditions were imposed by the DOD:

+

—The Soviets should not be given manuals or data on how to build critical + elements of the NSS (or any embargoed items).

+

—DOD should be consulted in connection + with any Soviet request to be present when the NSS equipment is being + manufactured.

+

On June 30, 1978, the Department of Commerce authorized the transfer of + NSS technical data and hardware to the USSR.Not found. + Consistent with the DOD recommendations + cited above, Commerce specifically excluded from its authorization any + technical data relating to production of NSS components. The 1979 + review, completed just before Soviet experts visited the US, approved transfer of the equipment on + the same basis as the 1978 authorization (outlined above).

+

US Prototype + Proposal. It was decided that the US would offer to transfer one NSS to the USSR. The US + CTB Delegation was instructed in early December 1979—at the end + of the last round—to offer the USSR, + on a loan basis, a prototype NSS unit for joint testing by US, UK and + USSR experts at a site in the + USSR.The US NSS joint cooperative + development proposal is in telegram 19581 from Geneva, December 5, + 1979. (National Archives, RG 59, + Central Foreign Policy File, D790561–0762) The Soviets were + also invited to participate in NSS test activities at a site in Alaska. + The US proposal for joint testing of NSS + equipment was portrayed to the Soviets as our response to earlier Soviet + requests for two complete sets of US NSS + equipment and five specific components. The Soviets have not yet + responded to the December proposal.

+

Post-Afghanistan Restrictions. It was decided on + January 2, in response to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, that the + US would tighten controls on US exports to the USSR on a case-by-case basis. Specific technology transfer + cases are currently being reviewed. Factors being considered in these + reviews include whether the equipment is “space qualified” (as some + parts of the NSS equipment are).

+

B. Discussion

+

There is agreement that this is primarily a political issue. It requires + weighing one set of US objectives + against another: On the one hand, there are the US objectives in relation to the CTB negotiations and the NSC Action Plan that led us to make the proposal in the + first place. On the other hand, there is the need to take into account + the present policy of restrictiveness towards exports to the USSR.

+

A question has been raised as to whether the earlier determinations that + the NSS equipment could be transferred to the USSR for use in monitoring a CTB treaty are also valid for the proposed joint prototype + test and evaluation effort in light of post-Afghanistan guidance.

+

—One factor to be considered is whether the interaction between US and Soviet technicians in such a joint + effort could result in the sharing of information on manufacturing + processes that we would not want transferred.

+

—If so, then we should work out modalities for the proposed joint effort + to try to ensure that the type and level of interaction would not permit + the exchange of more information than we considered appropriate.

+

At present, before the Soviets have responded to our proposed joint + prototype testing effort, the Delegation does not require further + guidance on the specific features of the US-proposed joint program; if necessary, the Delegation can + take questions and report them to Washington. The nature of the Soviet + response will provide the terms of reference for additional decisions + that may have to be taken at a later date.

+ +

Some possible Soviet reactions to our proposal are as follows:

+

—They may not respond at all for some time, or they may respond + negatively.

+

—They may renew their proposal for two sets of NSS equipment and the five + components.

+

—They may react positively in principle but have specific ideas regarding + the features of the joint effort.

+

In any event, if the Soviets are receptive to the idea of a joint + program, it will take considerable time to work out its main features, + and we will have time to develop our specific approach in response to + Soviet reactions to our loan offer. If further study of the technology + transfer issue is deemed appropriate, this should provide time for such + a study to be undertaken and to be factored in as we plan our specific + approach. It would be desirable for internal US planning purposes, however, to proceed to work out the + details of our proposal for a joint NSS test effort as we see it.

+

C. Issue for Decision

+

For now, the issue for decision is whether to withdraw our prototype NSS + loan offer or to let it stand; and if we let it stand, how the + Delegation should deal with it in the February round. There are three + basic options:

+

Option 1. Withdraw the NSS prototype loan + offer.

+

—Would reinforce general post-Afghanistan technology transfer policy.

+

—Would send a clear signal to the Soviets regarding the negative + consequences for a CTB (and arms + control generally) of their invasion of Afghanistan.

+

—Would constitute a setback to CTB + negotiations, probably precluding further progress on verification + issues for some time. Could lead to collapse of the negotiations.

+

—Could precipitate public charges by the Soviets that the US had undermined the CTB negotiations.

+

—Could jeopardize long-term US objective + of having our equipment used at NSS in the USSR, since Soviets could claim that US refusal to transfer US equipment left them no alternative but + to use their own equipment.

+

—Could deny us information from prototype testing that might be useful in + relation to estimating yields of Soviet high yield tests.

+

Option 2. Let prototype loan offer stand but do + not press for Soviet response.

+

—Would neither promote progress in the negotiations nor constitute a + setback.

+

—Would facilitate Soviets resisting progress on joint program pending + resolution of other issues such as UK + NSS question.

+ +

Option 3. Let prototype loan offer stand and + press Soviets for response.

+

—Would signal US interest in making + progress on NSS issues.

+

—Would keep pressure on Soviets to move forward with NSS technical + issues.

+

—Would forego opportunity to use withdrawal of NSS loan offer to + reinforce post-Afghanistan technology transfer policy.

+

II. + UK Funding Issue

+

Should the US offer to fund equipment for + three UK NSS in the Southern Hemisphere, + in the context of the UK shifting its + negotiating position from one NSS to four?

+

A. Background

+

For well over a year, negotiation of NSS issues in Geneva has been + deadlocked over the question of the number of UK NSS sites.See Documents 240, 241, 242, 243, 244, and 245. The Soviets have taken the + position that the UK should have ten NSS + (one in the UK proper and nine in + dependent territories around the world) if the US and USSR are to have + ten. The UK has offered one NSS in + Scotland and has strenuously resisted moving to a larger number, citing + technical and budgetary considerations. We have supported the UK on this in Geneva, particularly in the + last round, although advising them privately that we thought they would + eventually have to move to a larger number in order to resolve the + impasse.

+

During Prime Minister Thatcher’s December 1979 visit to Washington,See Document + 242. the President suggested that the UK consider offering three additional NSS + sites, for a total of four, and it was agreed between Foreign Secretary + Carrington and Secretary VanceIbid. that + the UK would consider the possibility of + three additional locations for installing NSS while the US would look into the possibility of + funding the equipment for those stations. During discussions on January + 10 with a US team visiting London,Not found. + UK spokesmen presented a staff-level + technical review of NSS siting issues, but said the UK did not intend to initiate a + policy-level review of this matter until they have received a specific + US funding proposal.

+

What is needed, therefore, is a decision on the next step with regard to + making a specific funding proposal to the UK; if the UK then decided + to shift from one NSS to four, we could consider with them questions of + timing and tactics for presenting the new UK position to the Soviets in Geneva. A new UK NSS position need not be presented to + the Soviets early in the February round, and perhaps not until we have + heard from the Soviets again on this issue.

+ +

B. Discussion

+

Although we are insisting on the use of US equipment at NSS in the USSR, we do not yet know whether the Soviets will ask that + their equipment be used at sites in the US and UK. Thus, to relieve + the UK of the financial burden of + acquiring equipment for three additional NSS sites, a US funding offer must apply regardless of + whether the UK ultimately uses US or Soviet equipment. The cost of US equipment and related assistance to the + UK for three NSS is estimated at + $6–8 million; there is no reason why the cost should be higher for + Soviet equipment. What would be involved at present is a commitment in + principle to seek this funding at an appropriate time in the future; no + specific budgetary actions need be undertaken at present.

+

Following are factors bearing on this issue:

+

—US offer to fund equipment for three + additional UK NSS could lead to UK to shift to four-site NSS position.

+

—UK will be concerned that any movement + beyond one station could result in pressures in the future for them + accept a number larger than four.

+

—We should assure the UK that if they + shift to four stations we will stand firmly with them in trying to + resolve the UK NSS issue on this + basis.

+

—Nevertheless, the UK probably will seek + assurances that our offer to fund equipment would apply for additional + NSS if they eventually moved beyond four stations.

+

—We would make clear to the UK that the + Executive Branch can only make a commitment to request funds for UK NSS from the Congress at an appropriate + time. The UK would have to take into + account the possibility that the Congress might not approve these + funds.

+

—There are differing views regarding the relationship of US assistance to the UK and overall US–USSR funding + arrangements:

+

—Some are concerned that an offer of US + funding of equipment for UK stations + would complicate working out funding arrangements with the USSR in the future, and they argue that + the basic ground rules for financing NSS in all three countries should + be negotiated before the US makes any + commitments to the UK.

+

—Others feel that these overall arrangements cannot be negotiated until + the Soviets agree to use US equipment, + and that we will never reach that stage of the negotiating process until + the impasse over UK NSS is broken.

+

—Contribution of three additional UK NSS + to monitoring UK compliance with CTBT would be marginal.

+

—Three additional UK NSS in Southern + Hemisphere could make some limited contribution to NPT monitoring (as discussed in attached + CIA paper):Not attached.

+

—These NSS probably would not improve detection capabilities, due to high + noise environment of island locations.

+ +

—They could be helpful, however, in identifying as earthquakes or + explosions nearby seismic events detected by other seismic stations.

+

—In terms of NPT and LTBT monitoring, the US and UK + could both benefit by installing (on a bilateral basis) other sensors at + nearby sites to help monitor atmospheric and underground explosions in + the Southern Hemisphere.

+

—Co-locating these sensors with NSS sites would permit use of UK diplomatic leverage in areas where + direct US access may be limited. Could + also take advantage of presence of UK + personnel and secure communications facilities.

+

—Additional costs would be involved, and detailed analysis of the costs + and benefits of such additional sensors could be investigated—taking + into account planned AEDS improvements and other alternatives—after + specific locations are identified by the UK.

+

III. + UK Prototype Issue

+

Finally, there is the issue of whether we should offer to lend the UK an NSS unit for joint testing at a + UK site in the Southern + Hemisphere.

+

This would involve the loan of an NSS unit to the UK on the same basis as the offer already made to the + USSR. Offering an NSS to the + UK for joint testing would not be + appropriate unless we are continuing with our overall NSS approach in + relation to the USSR. If this is the + case, some factors bearing on the decision are as follows. Setting up a + prototype test facility in the Southern Hemisphere:

+

—would broaden UK participation and + reinforce the US prototype test proposal + made to the USSR;

+

—could make some limited contribution to NPT monitoring, depending on location;

+

—could enable us, in NPT Review + Conference, to point to cooperative efforts at UK site as evidence of ongoing activities;

+

—would offer opportunity to further demonstrate utility of satellite + communication for NSS data transmission from remote sites;

+

—could involve trade-offs between providing USSR or UK an NSS unit, due + to limited number of NSS units available prior to March 1981.

+

Considerations will also vary somewhat depending on our decision + regarding funding equipment for three additional UK NSS.

+

—If we decide not to fund equipment for three + additional UK NSS sites, offering the + prototype could still keep a little pressure on UK to move off its one-station position in the future.

+

—If we decide to defer the UK equipment funding decision, but offer to lend the UK a prototype unit, this would give them + an opportunity to signal some flexibility if they wanted to do so.

+

—If we decide to fund the equipment, and this + leads the UK to shift to a four-station + position, they might be interested in the prototype loan as a way to + gain wider participation in the NSS program at an earlier date.

+ +

The UK, however, may see in the offer of + a prototype NSS unit an opportunity to defer changing its NSS position, + since by accepting the prototype and thus signalling the possibility of a future change of position, they + could hope to ease the pressures somewhat.

+
+ +
+ 246. Editorial Note +

The issues of funding of National Seismic Stations (NSS) for the United + Kingdom and the potential transfer of NSS equipment to the USSR continued during the spring of 1980. + The Special Coordination Committee (SCC) scheduled a meeting for March 12, 1980, to discuss these + issues.

+

Regarding the funding issue, an agenda for the SCC meeting prepared by the National Security Council + (NSC) identified three options: The + United States could (1) “inform the UK + that we are willing to make a commitment to seek appropriate funding + from Congress if they are willing to locate three NSS in their dependent + territories in the Southern Hemisphere;” (2) “Defer decision and inform + UK that this possibility remains + under serious review;” (3) “Inform UK + that we have decided not to fund NSS equipment for UK stations.” Secretary of State Cyrus Vance endorsed Option 1. No + record of Vance’s recommendation + has been found.

+

As for the technology transfer, an ad hoc group of the NSS SCC Working Group had begun to review + “prototype equipment in order to identify elements of that equipment + that could raise technology transfer questions. The group will then + assess options for replacing those elements with others involving less + advanced technology, taking into account any degradation of NSS + performance, delays in the NSS program schedule, and implications for + the CTB negotiating process.” Once this + assessment had been completed, the SCC + would decide “whether we should reconsider our willingness to transfer + US NSS technology to the Soviet + Union to gain information for CTB + monitoring, and in particular, whether we should withdraw our offer to + loan them an NSS prototype for joint testing and operation.” (Agenda: + SCC Meeting on BW and CTB, March 12; Carter Library, National Security Council, + Institutional Files, Box 11, SCC 297, + CTB, 4/3/80)

+

On March 13, NSC staff members John + Marcum, Ben Huberman, and Jasper Welch informed the President’s + Assistant for National Security Affairs, Zbigniew Brzezinski, that “we think funding of the + UK equipment would be an acceptable + outcome once we are prepared to move the talks ahead. It would help us achieve our NSS verification + objectives and the Southern Hemisphere sites, although not contributing + to CTB monitoring per se, would augment + our NPT monitoring capability. + Nevertheless, moving ahead with Cy’s proposal now + might be viewed on the Hill as inconsistent with our general + post-Afghanistan policy and belt-tightening on government expenditures.” + Marcum, Haberman, and Welch recommended that the United States “defer + Cy’s proposal at present.” They also contended that given “Thatcher’s + personal opposition to CTB and our + shared post-Afghanistan concerns, they would probably be amazed if we + tried to close the deal at this time.” (Memorandum from Marcum, + Huberman, and Welch, March 13; ibid.)

+

A March 13, 1980, memorandum from the Nuclear Test Monitoring Working + Group to Stansfield Turner, the + Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, restated the issues that + would be discussed at the SCC meeting, + which had been rescheduled for March 14. An unknown hand, however, twice + changed the date for the SCC meeting, + first to March 26, and then to April 1. No summary of conclusions or + minutes of the SCC meeting, which + likely occurred on April 3, has been found. (Ibid.)

+
+ +
+ 247. Telegram From the Mission in Geneva to the Department of + StateSource: National + Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign + Policy File, D800166–0089. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Sent for information Priority + to London and Moscow. + Geneva, April 2, 1980, 1428Z +

5176. USCTB. Subject: CTB Negotiations: + Assessment of Round Ten. Ref: Interim Assessment, CTB 548.Telegram 3746 from Geneva, March 7, provides an interim assessment + of the tenth round of the CTB + negotiations. (National Archives, RG + 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800118–0359)

+

CTB message no. 575

+

(S—Entire text)

+

Summary. Although tempo increased somewhat in recent weeks, negotiations + this round proceeded at a very slow pace and little progress was made on + substantive matters. The ad hoc working group provided the principal + negotiating forum, reaching agreement regarding the three technical characteristics of + borehole seismic equipment deferred from last round.Equipment that drills hole into the earth where + seismometers are installed to measure seismic activity. + OSI working group also met frequently. + The outlook for the next round is for further lack of progress, unless + the general political climate improves so as to allow a concerted effort + to reinvigorate negotiations. End summary.

+

1. This message contains Del’s final + assessment of Feb. 4–April 5, 1980 round of CTB negotiations.

+

2. Since the Interim Assessment of March 7 (CTB 548), the negotiations moved forward somewhat. + Nonetheless, negotiations during the round as a whole proceeded at a + very slow pace and little progress was made on substantive matters.

+

3. Ad hoc working group: The major negotiating activity was conducted in + the reconstituted ad hoc working group on NSS technical characteristics, + which met between March 19 and March 26. The U.S. and UK Dels had repeatedly urged that the + Delegations address the three technical characteristics deferred in the + group’s report to the heads of Del last + round (CTB 499).CTB Message No. + 499, or telegram 17760 from Geneva, November 2, 1979, is in the + National Archives, RG 59, Central + Foreign Policy File, D790509–0695. During this round, the + group essentially completed consideration of all the technical + characteristics proposed by U.S. Del + concerning the seismic component of NSS borehole equipment. U.S. Del has also urged that reports of this + group be promptly converted into composite ad referendum text of Article + I of the technical annex to the separate verification agreement, and + that the Dels begin negotiation of other outstanding NSS technical + matters. Del notes that the group + became somewhat less “ad hoc” in nature this round. This round, + participants of all three Dels were led by spokesmen who have been on + Dels for some time, instead of by special experts brought in from + capitals. This trend is in U.S. interests. Soviet Del has, however, been unwilling to go so + far as to call this group the NSS working group, in line with its policy + that it will not institute NSS working group discussions until UK NSS issue is resolved.

+

4. OSI working group: The OSI working group continued to meet, + addressing two topics. Bulk of time was devoted to consideration of text + regarding technical characteristics of basic equipment to be used on an + OSI. At Soviet suggestion, group + also took up questions of local orientation of designated personnel + within inspection area, particularly those concerning scale and + stereoscopic nature of aerial photographs; these topics will be + addressed further next round. Soviets continue to profess to want + progress in OSI area, but have not put + forward new negotiating + positions. No substantive progress was recorded in the OSI working group this round.

+

5. Report to CD: U.S. and UK Dels + prepared draft of trilateral report to be delivered sometime during next + round to committee on disarmament. Report, with certain additions, was + cleared by U.S. and UK CD and CTB Dels, and with London (CTB 551CTB Message No. 551, or telegram 3886 + from Geneva, March 11, contains the US/UK draft text of a trilateral + report on the CTB negotiations to + be delivered to the Committee on Disarmament in June. (National + Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign + Policy File, D800125–0431) and 560).CTB Message No. + 560, or telegram 4481 from Geneva, March 19, contains the revised + US/UK draft of the trilateral CTB + report after the UK government + suggested changes. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + D800140–0735) However, per guidance from Washington,Not found. we informed Soviet Del that a draft would be provided to them + via diplomatic channels during the recess. It is expected that the + process of obtaining trilateral agreement on this report will be a major + activity in the next round.

+

6. Other CD activities: Throughout round Del consulted with U.S. CD Del in order to monitor CTB-related activities in CD. Proposals for CTB working group in CD and for other + potentially harmful CTB-related + activities have thus far been quashed. The CTB + Del strongly supports U.S. CD Del’s efforts in this regard.

+

7. Negotiating issues: Question of numbers and locations of UK NSS was discussed infrequently, although + Soviets insist it remains largest immediate hurdle in negotiations. At + final plenary, Soviets repeated that solutions to other NSS technical + matters would depend on progress on the UK NSS question and that the U.S. and UK desire to achieve a treaty would be + judged by movement on this issue. No Del indicated any change in its position on this issue + (CTB 533,CTB Message No. + 533, or telegram 2665 from Geneva, February 19, reported that + Earle and Helman had met + with Petrosyants on March 13 + to discuss the UK NSS issue. + (National Archives, RG 59, Central + Foreign Policy File, D800087–0940) 535,CTB Message No. + 535, or telegram 2738 from Geneva, February 20, reported that after + Edmonds “called for work on NSS technical matters,” Petrosyants said “the U.S. and + UK Dels should reciprocate for + past Soviet flexibility and abandon their unrealistic position on + UK NSS. This would create the + conditions necessary for progress on a broad front.” (National + Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign + Policy File, D800089–1013) 543,CTB Message No. 543, or + telegram 3022 from Geneva, February 25, contains the text of two + USSR plenary statements by + Petrosyants. The first, + made at the opening of the plenary, said that “the Soviet Delegation + is prepared to continue in a constructive manner to seek + possibilities for moving ahead along all the basic lines of the + negotiations.” In the second, delivered after the U.S. statement, + Petrosyants said “we + expected much more from the U.S. and UK Delegations regarding the substance of the specific + questions facing us,” in particular the issue of UK NSS. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + D800024–0168) + 571).CTB Message No. + 571, or telegram 5133 from Geneva, April 1, reported that at the + closing plenary, the “heads of Del + formally accepted second report of ad hoc working group on NSS + technical characteristics, calling it a useful contribution.” + Nevertheless, “all three Dels expressed dissatisfaction with lack of + progress this round, with U.S. and UK Dels criticizing Soviet position regarding technical + characteristics of OSI basic + equipment. Soviets described NSS question as all-important to + conduct of negotiations, stating that U.S. and UK movement on this issue would + demonstrate our desire to achieve a treaty.” (National Archives, + RG 59, Central Foreign Policy + File, D800164–0551) Question of U.S. December 5, 1979 + proposals for NSS joint cooperative development programSee footnote 8, Document + 245. was carefully avoided by both sides in formal + statements and informal discussion by Heads of Del, although it was raised several times informally by one + member of Soviet Del. (Evidently, + Moscow instructions to Soviet Del to + avoid raising this topic are as firm and as explicit as ours. Del believes we cannot expect Soviets to + address this issue until we explicitly raise the subject again.) We + stated that all our proposals remain on the table and that the + Delegations should proceed on that basis (CTB 525,CTB Message No. 525, or telegram 1986 + from Geneva, February 7, reported that all three Delegations “made + brief statements concerning the need for progress in our + negotiations.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + D800066–0753) 531,CTB Message No. 531, or telegram 2142 + from Geneva, February 11, includes “an expansion of the report” + concerning the December 15, 1979, US + proposal for an NSS joint cooperative program. (National Archives, + RG 59, Central Foreign Policy + File, D800073–0784) 541,CTB Message No. 541, or + telegram 3031 from Geneva, February 25, reported that Petrosyants “said that further + progress on NSS questions would be impossible until the U.S. and + UK move ahead on the question of + NSS numbers and locations.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + D800098–0232) 556).CTB Message No. 556, or telegram 4389 + from Geneva, March 18, reported that the heads of all three + Delegations “welcomed the reconvening of the ad hoc working group to + deal with the three technical characteristics of the NSS downhole + seismic equipment that had been deferred in report completed last + round.” (National Archives, RG 59, + Central Foreign Policy File, D800138–0985)

+

8. Soviet positions and attitudes: Soviets were cautious and low-key + throughout the round. They negotiated in a businesslike fashion, but did + not put forward any new positions. They appeared to expect the U.S. and + UK Dels to follow a similar course. + They apparently believe that the negotiations will proceed at about the + present pace until the overall political situation is altered. Soviets + observe that negotiations are blocked in political and NSS working + groups, and have increasingly urged progress in OSI working group, but have shown no sign of + flexibility.

+

9. UK positions and attitudes: The UK + Del gave no indication of any change in + its position regarding UK NSS. They + conveyed strong disappointment over inability to deliver draft of CD + report to Soviet Del this round.

+ +

10. Prospects: We believe the Soviets are not likely to initiate any + significant new proposals on the major outstanding negotiating issues, + especially those concerning verification, until they judge the overall + political climate has improved and the chances are good that the U.S. + and UK would reciprocate.

+ + York + +
+ +
+ 248. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security + Affairs (Brzezinski) to President + CarterSource: Carter Library, National + Security Council, Institutional Files, Box 11, SCC 297, CTB, 4/3/80. Secret. Sent for action. Carter initialed the top of the + memorandum. + Washington, April + 11, 1980 + + SUBJECT + SCC Meeting on CTB (U) + +

The SCC met on April 3 to review the + UK national seismic stations (NSS) + issue in the CTB negotiations.No record of this meeting has been + found. As a follow-up to his discussions with Lord Carrington + during the Thatcher visit in December,See + Document 242. Cy wants + authorization to commit us to provide, at no cost to the UK, equipment for three additional NSS + stations in exchange for the British finding suitable sites in the + Southern Hemisphere and agreeing to offer four sites, vice one, on + UK territory.Telegram 25369 from London, December 21, noted that + Vance and Carrington had + agreed that “USG would consider + problem of financing additional UK + NSS while UK would consider + additional locations, FCO was beginning to look again at various + sites.” (National Archives, RG 59, + Central Foreign Policy File, [no film number]) No other record of + this meeting has been found. You will recall that the Soviets + have said they refuse to pursue further negotiations on NSS until the + UK falls off its position. OSD and ACDA strongly supported this approach, but JCS and DOE opposed the proposal. (S)

+

DOE’s concern was that although the total cost of the added UK stations (about $8 million) is small, it + would be difficult to defend on the Hill since they would contribute + little to CTB monitoring. However, as + Frank Press pointed out, + these Southern Hemisphere stations would augment our NPT monitoring capability for events such + as the September 22 possible + nuclear explosion in the South Atlantic,See + footnote 6, Document 244. particularly if other nonseismic + detection equipment could also be installed at these sites. (S)

+

Dave Jones expressed more fundamental concerns. He stated that CTB is the most difficult arms control + issue for the Chiefs, since they do not believe it is in our national + security interest. As a result of recent verification concerns, such as + possible Soviet testing above 150 KT and the suspect biological weapons + incident at Sverdlovsk,See Documents 109, 110, 111, 112, 113, 114, 115, 116, 117, 118, 119, 120, 121, and 122. he recommended a comprehensive + review of CTB and other arms control + issues before proceeding further. (S)

+

A comprehensive arms control review is clearly not a good idea in this + election year. The UK NSS issue has + stalemated the CTB negotiations for + nearly a year and we need to show at least some progress before the + NPT Review Conference. I believe + Cy’s approach is the best bet for getting the British to agree to the + four NSS that you have twice urged Thatcher to accept. This is unlikely + to over-accelerate the negotiations but would enable us, if appropriate, + to move to a more defensible position when the negotiations resume in + mid-June. (S)

+

OMB noted correctly that the British + were hiding behind the financial issue and warned that even this small + expenditure could be viewed on the Hill as inconsistent with your + budgetary constraints. To minimize these political disadvantages, I + suggested that we explore funding offsets in other areas where we help + the British, such as testing their warheads and providing fuel for their + nuclear submarines. Chris thought this might be possible but wanted to + close the deal with the UK on going to + four NSS before engaging them in an offset discussion. (S)

+

On balance, I believe we should tell the British that we will need a pro + forma UK payment for the three NSS, but + that we will offset these costs in future US billings to the UK on + other projects by the amount of the NSS cost. This approach will avoid a + line item in the DOE budget, but will meet Cy’s desire to give the three + additional sets of NSS equipment to the UK cost-free. If you agree, I will explore this possibility + with UK Deputy Cabinet Secretary Robert + Wade-Gery. If a satisfactory agreement is reached on this offset + approach, we can then coordinate a message for Cy to send to Carrington. + (S)

+

RECOMMENDATION:

+

That you authorize us to proceed on this basis. (U)

+

APPROVE _______ OTHER _______Carter checked the “other” option + and wrote “I see no justification for a monetary grant of $8 million + to U.K. However, I think they should accept the 4 stations. + J.”

+
+ +
+ + 249. Report Prepared in the Office of Science and TechnologySource: Carter Library, + National Security Council, Institutional Files, Box 20, PRM/NSC–38. + Secret. The report was attached to a May 16 covering memorandum from + Brzezinski to Brown and Duncan. + Washington, April + 25, 1980 +

[Omitted here is Section I: an introductory paragraph about the Augmented + Nuclear Test Program.]

+

II. General Impact and Scope of ATP

+

The Panel agrees that the ATP as + proposed would make an important contribution to increased confidence in + the reliability of the U.S. nuclear weapon stockpile under a CTB. The ATP cannot, however, eliminate all concerns about stockpile + reliability especially under a protracted CTB. The most important contribution of the program with + respect to improving CTB readiness is + to make available redundant warheads for the important strategic + systems.

+

Also of importance is the renewed effort to better understand weapon + design questions. Such effort will provide the laboratories with a + better data base with which to analyze and deal with future weapon + problems. Even in the absence of a CTB, + the ATP, particularly its increased + support for weapons physics would be of value. The nuclear weapons + program has suffered in the immediate past because of dwindling budgets + and accelerated Phase III testing to meet current needs and a potential + CTB deadline.

+

Of concern is the decrease in the number of experienced, innovative + designers. The Panel is worried that the scope of the proposed program + is so ambitious that it might overwhelm the laboratories. In particular, + acceleration of testing as proposed in the ATP would require a sharp increase at the outset in the + number of specialists in the program. It would surely require inducing + some experienced personnel who have left the program in the recent past + to return to it.

+

We note that the proposed ATP covers a + five-year span, although only the first two years are explicitly + discussed. That part of the program that contributes to the availability + of tested warheads for U.S. strategic systems is planned to be finished + by the end of fiscal year 1980. Thus, a CTB could be undertaken after 1980 without impacting on the + availability of tested warheads for U.S. strategic systems. While the + remaining portion of the program seems clearly very useful, it is harder + to quantify its direct contribution to stockpile reliability and + longevity or to other factors that bear on readiness for a CTB. The weapon physics tests could + continue profitably for a very long time, indeed. However, since each such test provides some + additional understanding of design physics even partial completion of + the program will be useful.

+

[Omitted here are the specifics of the Augmented Nuclear Test + Program.]

+
+ +
+ 250. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the + United KingdomSource: + National Archives, RG 59, Central + Foreign Policy File, D800224–1231. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Sent for information + Immediate to Moscow, the Mission in Geneva, and USNATO. Drafted by Steven Steiner + (PM/DCA); cleared by Robert Einhorn (ACDA), John Marcum (NSC), Neil Michaud (EUR/NE), and Jane Becker (S/S–O); and approved by Mark Palmer + (PM/DCA). + Washington, May 6, 1980, 1638Z +

119590. Exdis, USNATO for PM Director Bartholomew. Subject: CTB: Approach to UK on NSS + Numbers.

+

1. Secret—Entire text

+

2. As prelude to visit of Lord Carrington, PM Director Bartholomew called in British DCM Fretwell May 2 to inform the UK officially of the President’s decision on UK NSS issue.

+

—Fretwell was accompanied by UK Embassy + POL/MIL Counselor Weston. Bartholomew delivered points in paragraph 3.

+

3. Begin text:

+

A. The President believes that as we move together to meet the challenge + posed by the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan,The Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan on December 25, 1979. + we should continue to pursue Western security interests through balanced + and verifiable arms control agreements, including CTB.

+

—It is clear that the trilateral CTB + negotiations have been bogged down for well over a year.

+

—We have received some indications that the Soviets might make the case + to other States, in connection with the upcoming NPT review conference, that the US and UK + are responsible for the continuing stalemate in the talks.

+

—While we do not accept the Soviet contention, we must naturally try to + ensure that the two Western partners are seen in the most advantageous + possible light at the review conference in order to protect our mutual + non-proliferation objectives.

+ +

B. You will recall that both in Washington in DecemberSee Document 242. + and earlier in Tokyo,See footnote 3, Document 240. the + President asked the Prime Minister—as a means of doing our part on the + Western side to facilitate progress in CTB—to consider accepting four NSS in the UK and its dependent territories.

+

—We have looked at various ways together as to how this might be done. + One possibility, for example, was reflected in the idea which Secretary + Vance and Lord Carrington + discussed on a contingency basis in DecemberNo record of this meeting has been found. that if you would + look into the possibility of locating three stations in Southern + Hemisphere territories, we would examine whether it might be possible to + fund the equipment for those three stations.

+

—The President has concluded after examining this idea that it would not + be appropriate for US to finance those + stations. We remain prepared, however, to explore other possibilities of + mutual cooperation with you.

+

C. We continue to believe that our key objective should be to nail down + Soviet acceptance of 10 NSS on their territory. And we should avoid + giving the Soviets any basis for charging that we are obstructing the + CTB.

+

—The President therefore hopes you will be able to accept three stations + in the Southern Hemisphere. In our view, such stations would serve our + mutual interests in both CTB and + non-proliferation monitoring, and give us a much firmer basis for + continuing to oppose the unjustified Soviet demand that the UK accept ten NSS.

+

—On this basis, and after consulting with you on tactics and timing, we + would make it clear to the Soviets that the Western side had now done + all it can to resolve this question, and we therefore fully expect them + to accept the new position. While it’s highly unlikely that the Soviets + would promptly accept the offer, it would put US in a good position to demand that the Soviets drop their + linkages and negotiate seriously on the many difficult and + time-consuming verification and other issues which would still remain + unresolved.

+

—If the UK agrees in principle to accept + four NSS, we would consult closely with you on how and when to play this + in Geneva in order to put the strongest possible pressure on the + Soviets. Needless to say, we would stand solidly with you in advancing + such a position to the Soviets.

+

D. Let me stress, finally, that we value the close and cooperative US/UK + relationship on CTB policy. We + naturally want to continue this, and look forward to working closely + with you in coming months on all CTB-related issues, including the question of how to handle + CTB both in the CD and at the + NPT review conference in August. + End text.

+ +

4. Fretwell responded by noting that UK + experts felt there would be little monitoring value in locating seismic + stations in the Southern Hemisphere. Bartholomew replied that our own experts did see at + least some such value in Southern Hemisphere sites, especially if other + types of sensors were also located there, and noted that this would be + of benefit to our mutual non-proliferation interests as well as to + CTB.

+

5. Fretwell then asked how we view near-term prospects in CTB. Bartholomew replied that we’re realistic in this regard, + but we nonetheless face international pressures on CTB and at least need to be politically + positioned to deal with such pressures. We believe NSS question is of + particular importance due to the long lead time required to negotiate + verification issues in way that meets western interests. Thus, we + believe it’s worth looking now at the question of UK NSS numbers. Fretwell commented that + UK did have this in mind, but were + hoping that US would pay for additional + stations.

+

6. Weston asked US view of other pending + CTB issues and said “it would help + in London” on NSS issue if US were to + show movement on its December NSS prototype proposalSee footnote 8, Document + 245. and on preamble language. Bartholomew replied that our emphasis + now is on verification because this will be by far the most + time-consuming area to negotiate, and added that we do not consider + other questions to be of the political or substantive magnitude of the + NSS issue.

+

7. Pursuing this, Fretwell asked how US + would react “if UK thought it would make + sense” to link question of a move on NSS with US movement on other issues. Bartholomew replied that it might not be tactically wise + for the Western parties to move on several issues at once, and that we + should therefore place emphasis on verification areas, as these have the + greatest impact on Western interests. He pointed out that the technology + transfer issue is already under active review in the USG, and that the preamble question is + also likely to be reviewed.

+

8. Weston asked at the end of the meeting whether US would be prepared to have a bilateral before beginning + of next round. Bartholomew + replied that we would be happy to do so if UK wished.

+ + Christopher + +
+ +
+ + 251. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the + United KingdomSource: + National Archives, RG 59, Central + Foreign Policy File, D800263–0732. Secret; Priority; Exdis. Sent for information to the + Mission in Geneva and Moscow. Drafted by Steven Steiner (PM/DCA); + cleared by Robert Einhorn (ACDA), + John Marcum (NSC), Neil Michaud + (EUR/NE), and William Butcher (S/S–O); and approved by Palmer. + Washington, May 28, + 1980, 2510Z +

140484. Subject: CTB—UK Response to US Approach on NSS Numbers. Reference: State 119590.See Document + 250.

+

1. Secret—Entire text.

+

2. In response to May 2 approach by PM + Director Bartholomew on UK NSS numbers, UK Embassy provided following “speaking notes” to + Department on May 23.

+

3. Begin text.

+

Ministers have noted the President’s decision that it would not be + appropriate for the US to fund equipment + for additional UK NSS and have given + careful consideration to his hope that we would nonetheless be able to + agree to three stations in the Southern Hemisphere.

+

We agree that we should continue to pursue a CTB: That the joint UK/US negotiating position should be as + defensible as possible: and that a key objective should be to clinch + Soviet acceptance of 10 NSS on their territory. However we are mindful + of the President’s earlier decision that the CTB negotiations should continue ‘at a slow pace’,Not found. reflecting the view, with + which we agree, that there is now no prospect of bringing the CTB to fruition this year. This leads us + to a different conclusion about the desirability of our agreeing to + accept three additional NSS at this juncture:

+

(A) Our overall conclusion in the technical study we handed to the US team in London on 10 JanuaryNot found. was that the gains in + verification capability of NSS in dependent territory sites in the + Southern Hemisphere would be marginal, whether for monitoring NWS or NNWS.

+

(B) In addition to the technical objections there are political, security + and logistical difficulties in finding suitable sites. The Falkland + Islands, which appears to be technically the best site, would present + US with a serious political problem + with Argentina. There would be no site in the Indian Ocean if Diego + Garcia is ruled out on security grounds. This would leave only Pitcairn + in the Pacific and islands in the South Eastern Atlantic.

+ +

(C) It is increasingly widely recognized, especially by our allies, that + the stalemate in the negotiations derives principally from wider + difficulties in East/West relations, including particularly the + postponement of SALT + ratification.On January 3, Carter requested that the Senate + delay consideration of the SALT II + treaty after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. (Public Papers: Carter, + 1980–81, p. 12) Pending a change in the current + political atmosphere, real progress on key issues seems unlikely. We + have accepted that some of the most difficult, requiring US decisions, may have to wait until after + the presidential election. An isolated concession on UK NSS will not lead to progress on a broad + front.

+

(D) We are not convinced that an increased UK offer would improve our chances of inducing the Russians + to drop their linkages and negotiate seriously on other unresolved + issues. Their refusal to do so is already one of the most indefensible + aspects of their position. Recognizing, as we do, that the negotiations + cannot be concluded this year, they may well pocket any concession over + NSS and press for a further increase in 1981. However strongly the + Americans supported us, there would be no guarantee that a further + concession would not be required in order to achieve agreement.

+

In short we consider that any such difficult decision, involving our + departure from the only strongly defensible technical position, should + be contemplated only when it is likely to achieve a positive result in + the form of a complete treaty. Meanwhile our tactic should be to + continue to press the Russians to leave numbers of UK NSS aside.

+

We are however concerned to find suitable subjects to occupy the + negotiations. Without additional negotiating substance the coming round + will be even more strained than the last. At the same time, with the + approach of the NPT review conference, + outside critical attention will concentrate increasingly on the + unresolved issues. The combination of these two factors might lead the + Russians to assume that we have totally lost interest in a CTB and tempt them into breaking + ranks.

+

We believe therefore that we should concentrate on areas of work which do + not involve major controversial decisions on the part of the US and the UK but which will maintain some forward momentum. In our + view, negotiation of the preamble would fill this role admirably. This + issue, as Mr. Bartholomew + acknowledged, is not of the same political or substantive magnitude as + the question of NSS. Precisely for that reason, we think it offers an + attractive basis for keeping the negotiations going. The Soviet Union + table a draft on 26 July 1978The Soviet + draft preamble is in telegram 11528 from Geneva, July 26, 1978. + (National Archives, RG 59, Central + Foreign Policy File, D780306–1137) which they reintroduced on 12 June 1979.The Soviets re-submitted the draft preamble + on June 12, 1979. Discussion of the draft is in telegram 10021 from + Geneva, June 13, 1979. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + D790268–0209) We gave you a UK draft on 9 October 1978Not + found. which conformed to the well established pattern for + arms control and disarmament agreements. In view of the many precedents, + we do not regard discussion of the preamble as in any way prejudicial to + Western interests.

+

The approaching NPT review conference + makes it highly desirable that we should be closely in step. Quite apart + from the points more particularly bearing upon strategy for the next + negotiating round of CTB, we think it + would be useful if we could compare notes on the wider context of how to + approach the NPT review conference, in + particular Article VI of the treatySee footnote 5, Document 211. and how + the CD should be involved. If you thought it worthwhile, Patrick + Moberly’s presence in Washington on other business during the week + beginning 9 June might provide an appropriate opportunity, for example + Thursday 12 June.

+

British Embassy, Washington, 23 May 1980.

+

End text.

+ + Muskie + +
+ +
+ + 252. Summary of Conclusions of a Special Coordination Committee + MeetingSource: Carter + Library, National Security Council, Institutional Files, Box 114, + SCC 325, CTB, 7/2/80. Secret. The meeting took + place in the White House Situation Room. Brzezinski forwarded the Summary to Carter under cover of a July 3 + memorandum. (Ibid.) The Department of Defense’s version of the + meeting is in Memorandum For the Record, July 3; Library of + Congress, Manuscript Division, Harold + Brown Papers, Box 82, CTB: Negotiation Issues 1979. + Washington, July 2, 1980, + 10:00–11:30 a.m. + + SUBJECT + SCC Meeting on CTB + + + PARTICIPANTS + + State + Deputy Secretary Warren + Christopher + Reginald + Bartholomew, Director Bureau of + Politico-Military Affairs + + + Defense + Walter Slocombe, + Deputy Under Secretary for Policy Planning + + + JCS + General David Jones + Lt. General John Pustay + + + DCI + [name not declassified] Deputy + Director for Scientific Weapons Research + + + ACDA + Director Ralph + Earle + Spurgeon Keeny, + Deputy Director + + + Energy + Under Secretary Worth Bateman + Julio Torres, Special Assistant + + + OSTP + Director Frank + Press + John Marcum, Senior Policy Analyst + + + White House + Zbigniew + Brzezinski + David Aaron + + + NSC + General Jasper Welch + Benjamin Huberman + + +

At the SCC Meeting on CTB today, a consensus was reached on four + issues which do not involve significant changes in your current + instructions but taken together will move us into a more defensible + position for the upcoming CD and NPT + Review Conferences. They will also enable us to seek some limited + progress on verification consistent with your post-Afghanistan decision + that CTB should continue at a slow + pace. (C)

+

The first issue involved a long-standing dispute with JCS over whether the US should table a draft preamble text as + have the UK and Soviets referring to the + objective of halting testing “for all time” as well as other objectives + from preambles of treaties to which we are party. The Chiefs were + concerned that this could be inconsistent with the limited-duration + treaty we are pursuing. We pointed out that our policy is protected fully by the operative duration + and review conference provisions we are negotiating, and in the end, + they agreed to tabling a slightly modified text referring to this as a + long-term goal.In the right-hand margin, + Carter wrote + “ok.” (S)

+

There was also agreement on three related national seismic station (NSS) + issues. Based on an interagency review of NSS technology transfer,See Document + 246. it was agreed that a high-capacity tape recorder + and a bubble memory should be replaced with less sensitive components. + This will reinforce our tightened post-Afghanistan export controls and + will involve only minimal impact on NSS availability and capability. + Pending completion of this review, we had deferred any followup to the + proposal we made last December to lend the Soviets an NSS prototype for + joint testing and evaluation.See footnote 8, Document 245. Since + this issue is now resolved, there was agreement that we should reaffirm + this proposal as a means of keeping the pressure on the Russians for + some progress on verification.In the + right-hand margin, Carter + wrote “ok.” (S)

+

The final point concerned continued UK + intransigence in refusing your urging that they accept four NSSs (with + three in the Southern Hemisphere), vice the one in Scotland they have + agreed to. In an effort to make some progress on this issue, there was + agreement that we should broaden the prototype offer to include loan of + an NSS to the UK on the same basis as + the USSR. As part of this offer, we + should suggest that the UK install the + NSS prototype in the Southern Hemisphere, thereby enabling them to show + some flexibility in Geneva. We should continue to maintain as our + eventual objective that they should accept four NSSs.In the right-hand margin, Carter wrote “ok.” (S)

+
+ +
+ + 253. Summary of Conclusions of a Special Coordination Committee + MeetingSource: Carter + Library, National Security Council, Institutional Files, Box 116, + SCC 339A, USSR High-Yield Nuclear + Test/Afghanistan: 9/15/80. Secret. The meeting took place in the + White House Situation Room. Carter initialed the upper right-hand corner of the + memorandum. + Washington, September 15, 1980 + + SUBJECT + Soviet High-Yield Nuclear Test + + + PARTICIPANTS + + State + Secretary Edmund + Muskie + Under Secretary David Newsom + George Vest, + Assistant Secretary for European Affairs + + + Defense + Deputy Secretary W. Graham Claytor, Jr. + David McGiffert, + Assistant Secretary, International Security Affairs + + + JCS + Lt. General John Pustay, Assistant to the Chairman + + + DCI + Director Stansfield + Turner + [name not declassified] Deputy + Director, Office of Scientific Weapons Research + + + ACDA + Director Ralph + Earle + + + OSTP + John Marcum, Senior Adviser for Technology & Arms + Control + + + White House + Zbigniew + Brzezinski + David Aaron + + + NSC + Marshall Brement + + +

At the end of the PRC meeting on + Afghanistan today, an SCC was convened + to discuss briefly the high-yield nuclear test which the Soviets + conducted on Saturday.September 13. + [11½ lines not declassified]

+

Following a brief discussion, it was agreed that David Newsom would raise + the issue immediately in a meeting he had scheduled on other business + with Dobrynin this afternoon. + After some revisions, a State-proposed démarcheUnder Secretary of State David Newsom handed + Dobrynin the démarche on + September 15. The text is in telegram 246325 to Moscow, September + 16. (National Archives, RG 59, + Central Foreign Policy File, D800441–0802) was approved which + would note that the test appeared to have [less than 1 + line not declassified] reaffirm the importance of strict + observance of [less than 1 line not + declassified], and call for technical consultations on the basis of the proposal we made last + December following several earlier Soviet high-yield tests.See Document 243. + (At that time, they rejected the proposal arguing that we should first + ratify the TTBT). It was also agreed + that the SCC would meet next week to + review available evidence and consider next steps. [3 + lines not declassified] We deferred this contingency step last + fallNot found. out of concern + that it could be overly provocative to the Soviets.In the left-hand margin, Carter wrote “clear with me + first.”

+
+ +
+ 254. Summary of Conclusions of a Special Coordination Committee + MeetingSource: Carter + Library, National Security Council, Institutional Files, Box 116, + SCC 343, 9/24/80, USSR Nuclear Test. Secret. The + meeting occurred in the White House Situation Room. In the upper + right-hand corner, Carter + wrote “Zbig. J.” + Washington, September 24, + 1980, 2:00–3:00 p.m. + + SUBJECT: + Soviet High-Yield Nuclear Testing + + + PARTICIPANTS: + + State + Deputy Secretary Warren + Christopher + Jerome Kahan, Deputy Director Bureau of Politico Military + Affairs + + + Defense + Deputy Secretary W. Graham Claytor, Jr. + Deputy Under Secretary Walter + Slocombe + + + JCS + Lt. General John Pustay, Assistant to the Chairman + + + DCI + Ray McCrory, Chief, Arms Control Intelligence Staff + + + [name not declassified] Chief, + Nuclear & Test Monitoring Branch + + + Energy + Duane Sewell, Assistant Secretary for Defense + Programs + + + ACDA + Director Ralph + Earle + Spurgeon Keeny, + Deputy Director + + + OSTP + John Marcum, Senior Adviser for Technology & Arms + Control + + + White House + David Aaron + + + NSC + Marshall Brement + + + +

The SCC met today to continue its review + of the September 14 Soviet high-yield nuclear test.Memorandum SW–M–80–10077, September 22, provided an + assessment of the September 14 nuclear test. (Ibid.) [12 lines not declassified] After some discussion, + there was agreement that to reduce these uncertainties we should have + another round of technical consultations with the British, and that OSTP + should reconvene its outside panel to review the yield assessment + problem. (S)

+

The SCC also reviewed a State draft of + what Ed Muskie should say on + this issue in his meeting with Gromyko tomorrow.The + undated proposed talking points for Muskie are ibid. Muskie and Gromyko met for three hours on September 25; the + subject of the Soviet test did not come up. (Telegram Secto 8020 from the Secretary’s + Delegation, September 26; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + D800459–0264) In view of the uncertainties in our assessment + and earlier Soviet rejection of our requests for consultations,See footnote 3, + Document 253. there was general agreement with + David Aaron’s suggestion that + we should be assertive, but careful, and ensure that the Soviets + understand the implications of this issue for SALT. Consequently, agreement was reached on a modified + approach which would reinforce our earlier démarche, express your + personal concern, press for a positive response to our proposal for + technical consultations, and note that failure to resolve the issue + could constitute a severe blow to our SALT ratification efforts. (S)

+

The question of whether DOE should be authorized to drill a deep test + hole was then discussed. State, Defense and ACDA opposed this step in view of its arms control + implications and our uncertainties. Defense noted we should first decide + whether we actually needed to test above 150 KT and which warhead should + be tested. DOE favored the drilling step and noted it should be + authorized soon to provide the option for a test by late October. JCS also supported the step but urged that + a new hole be funded and drilled, to avoid delaying planned nuclear + tests. A consensus was reached that the Working Group should prepare a + study of US requirements and costs for + testing above 150 KT which with the Soviet response and our continuing + technical review would provide a better basis for decision on the + drilling issue.In the right-hand margin, + Carter wrote “Do not do + anything re >150 KT test unless I am convinced a) That we really + need one and b) We’re ready to abandon Limited Test Ban agreement. + J.” (S)

+

As a final point, David Aaron + noted increasing concern over DOE’s delay in modifying the NSS as you + directed this Summer,Not found. and + their general unresponsiveness in managing the NSS development program. + DOE responded that the problem was partly money and partly difficulty in locating modified + components with adequate capabilities. It was then agreed that ACDA with DOE and OMB would draft an analytical paper + discussing the reasons for delay and providing options for faster + development including their costs and the possibility of accepting some + loss in capacity. (S)

+
+ +
+ 255. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security + Affairs (Brzezinski) to Vice + President MondaleSource: Carter Library, National + Security Council, Institutional Files, Box 116, SCC 343, 9/24/80, USSR Nuclear Test. Secret. Also sent + to Muskie, Brown, Duncan, Earle, Press, + Jones, and Turner. + Washington, October + 2, 1980 + + SUBJECT + Soviet High-Yield Nuclear Testing (U) + +

The President has reviewed the conclusions from the September 24 SCC Meeting on Soviet High-Yield Nuclear + TestingSee Document + 254. and has directed that the following tasks be + undertaken:

+

—OSTP should reconstitute its outside panel of experts to review the + yield assessment problem. (C)

+

—There should be a second round of bilateral consultations with the + UK on this issue. (S)

+

—ACDA with DOE should prepare a study + by October 20 of the NSS development program, identifying reasons for + delay and providing options for faster development, including their + costs and the possibility of accepting some loss in system capability. + The paper should be reviewed on an interagency basis by the Working + Group, including OMB, prior to SCC consideration. (S)

+ + Zbigniew + BrzezinskiAaron signed the memorandum on + Brzezinski’s + behalf. + +
+ +
+ + 256. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security + Affairs (Brzezinski) and the + Director of the Office of Science and Technology Policy (Press) to President CarterSource: Carter Library, National Security Council, + Institutional Files, Box 20, PRM/NSC–38. Secret. In the upper + right-hand corner of the memorandum, Carter wrote “C.” + Washington, October + 31, 1980 + + SUBJECT + Augmented Nuclear Test Program (U) + +

Earlier this year, you authorized us to develop an Augmented Nuclear Test + Program (ATP)Not found. aimed at improving the basic + research content of our test program and enhancing our readiness for + CTB. The initial submission by the + weapons laboratoriesNot found. was + insufficiently responsive to these objectives and we convened an OSTP + panel to review the draft ATP. The + Panel produced a useful and interesting report (Tab C)Document 249. and most of its + recommendations were incorporated in the final ATP (Tab D),Not + attached. which is supported strongly by Harold Brown and Charles Duncan (Tab E).Not attached. (S)

+

The ATP consists of a detailed two year + test plan under which our testing rate would be increased from the + present 10–12 to about 20 per year (the current Soviet rate is about + 25–30 per year). Also, although not requested, the ATP includes an out-year program for an + additional three year effort in which testing would be increased to + about 25 per year. Consistent with the OSTP Panel recommendations, the + program: (1) emphasizes R&D tests + aimed at reducing weapons physics uncertainties such as boosting which + are important to stockpile reliability; (2) includes so-called stockpile + confidence tests of production-line warheads and alternate warheads for + key weapons systems (these were not done in the past); and (3) provides + for more thorough documentation of warhead design and components and + other measures to improve our ability to maintain the stockpile without + testing. Brief summary chart on the status of the warhead development + effort and R&D objectives of the + ATP are included at Tab B.Not attached. (S)

+

On the whole, we are well-satisfied with the final draft of the ATP and believe that it merits your + endorsement. We feel that your concern that an increased test program + not subvert effort toward a CTB has been met by keying the ATP priorities to CTB readiness and by explicitly requiring the laboratories + to be prepared to halt testing in the event of a CTB. (S)

+

We have, in addition, been sensitive to your earlier concern with the + level of laboratory manpower in addressing the buildup of the testing + level. (S)

+

A buildup to about 20 tests in FY 1982 is + appropriate since there are a number of important stockpile confidence + tests which can be carried out without elaborate preparations. However, + we do not need to decide on whether to increase the level further to 25 + until the specific tests involved in shifting the program emphasis + towards basic research are identified and reviewed. Consequently, we + recommend that the testing rate be limited for now to about 20 per year. + (S)

+

To accomplish this reduced goal, some increase in manpower is necessary + (but less than the buildup from the current 7400 to 8100 by the end of + FY 84, envisioned by the proposed + ATP). Accordingly, with OMB, we will stress efficiencies to + minimize the infrastructure buildup associated with the added testing. + OMB concurs in this approach and + believes that an FY 81 supplemental of + less than 50 million dollars is enough to begin the effort (this could + raise the FY 81 test level to as many as + 14 and allow for preparations for about 20 tests in FY 82); and an FY 82 increment of about 100 million dollars would be + sufficient to accomplish this goal. We will ask DOE/DOD to address + subsequent long-term testing needs following your review of the detailed + FY 1981 test program, GUARDIAN, + which will be forwarded to you shortly. (S)

+

RECOMMENDATION:

+

We believe that the revised ATP would + restore some needed research to the test program, would enhance our + readiness for CTB, and would be + responsive to Congressional concerns about the current asymmetry in + US and Soviet test rates. + Consequently, we recommend that you authorize Zbig to sign the directive + at Tab A which would (1) approve the ATP in principle; (2) set the test rate at about 20 per + year; (3) stress the priority of initiatives related to enhancing CTB readiness, with adjustments to systems + priorities to reflect recent DOD + decisions; and (4) direct that the FY 81 + Supplemental and FY 82 incremental + funding needs for the ATP be determined + in the context of the FY 82 DOE budget + review. (S)

+

Approve _______Carter checked the “Approve” option and wrote “J” at + the bottom of the page. Brzezinski signed the directive at Tab A, a November + 12 memorandum to Brown and + Duncan. + Disapprove ______ Other ______

+

Jim McIntyre concurs.

+
+ +
+ + 257. Editorial Note +

The final negotiating session among the United States, the United + Kingdom, and the Soviet Union on a comprehensive test ban during the + administration of President Jimmy + Carter lasted from October 6 to November 14, 1980. + Department of State negotiators noted the “progress” that had been made + over the previous 42 months, but acknowledged that issues such as the + duration of a CTB treaty, the issue of + National Seismic Stations, and on-site inspections still needed to be + resolved. (Telegram 14496 from the Mission in Geneva, November 13; + National Archives, RG 59, Central + Foreign Policy File, D800544–0447)

+

The Department of Defense’s Representative to the negotiations, Dr. + Warren Heckrotte, however, argued that the discussions had resulted in + “very little substantive negotiations,” and found “very little reason + why” the talks should continue as presently constituted. The Soviets, he + contended, had taken an increasingly “harsh” tone, not only in the + Geneva talks, which he believed reflected the fact that “a more + conservative element” of military personnel had begun to outnumber + diplomats in the Soviet Delegation, but also in the Soviet press and + other official organs. Carter’s loss in the 1980 presidential election, + the U.S. Senate’s failure to ratify the Strategic Arms Limitations Talks + II Treaty, and Moscow’s inherent mistrust of an on-site inspection + regime, he warned, had contributed to the current atmosphere. (Telegram + 319 from Heckrotte to Brown, + McGiffert, and Slocombe, November 12; Library of + Congress, Manuscript Division, Harold + Brown Papers, Box 82, CTB: Negotiation Issues 1979)

+
+ +
+ +
+ + Conventional Arms Transfers/Talks + +
+ 258. Editorial Note +

In his memoirs, Zbigniew + Brzezinski, President Jimmy + Carter’s Assistant for National Security Affairs, + recalled that upon taking office, he and his staff quickly set a number + of foreign policy goals that the Carter administration should pursue. One was the + restriction of “the level of global armaments, unilaterally and through + international agreements. We were determined to reduce by 15 percent, + with the exclusion of transfers to NATO, Australia, New Zealand, and Japan, the dollar value + of transfers from the 1976 totals.” (Power and + Principle, p. 55) In his first National Security Council + meeting, President Carter + “directed that all requests for arms sales come to him” for approval. + (Summary of Conclusions, January 22, 1977; Carter Library, National + Security Affairs, Staff Material, Office, Meetings File, Box 1, NSC Meeting #1: Held 1/22/77, 1/77)

+

In a January 23, 1977, interview, Carter said that while he did not want to institute a + “moratorium” on arms sales “because that is an abrupt and total + termination of all ownership,” he noted that his advisers, “in I think + unanimity,” supported “the necessity for reducing arms sales or having + very tight restraints on future commitments to minimize the efforts by + arms manufacturers to initiate sales early in the process. The Secretary + of State will be much more hesitant in the future to recommend to the + Defense Department the culmination of arms sales agreements. I have + asked that all approvals of arms sales, for a change, be submitted to me + directly before the recommendations go to Congress. We also have asked + Vice President [Walter] Mondale + in his early trip among our own allies and friends, some of whom are + heavy arms exporters, to join with us on a multilateral basis. We will + also be talking to some of the primary arms purchasers, particularly the + Middle East when Secretary Vance + goes there very shortly, to hold down their purchases of arms from us + and other countries. This will be a continuing effort on my part.” (Documents on Disarmament, 1977, p. 20)

+
+ +
+ + 259. Presidential Review Memorandum/NSC–12Source: + Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Global + Issues, Mathews Subject + File, Box 3, Arms Sales: Presidential Review Memorandum/NSC–12: 5/75–6/77. + Secret. + Washington, January + 26, 1977 + + TO + The Vice President + The Secretary of State + The Secretary of Defense + + + ALSO + The Secretary of the Treasury + The Director, Office of Management and Budget + The Chairman, Council of Economic Advisers + The Director, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency + The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff + The Director of Central Intelligence + + + SUBJECT + Arms Transfer Policy Review + +

The President has directed that the Policy Review Committee, under the + chairmanship of the Department of State, review our policy with regard + to the international transfer of conventional arms.

+

The review should be completed by March 15, 1977, and should:

+

1. Examine the role of arms transfers in the conduct of U.S. foreign + policy, identifying the benefits and disadvantages of arms transfers as + a policy tool, and their dominant or subordinate position relative to + U.S. political, economic, and military interests. This examination + should include:

+

(a) the feasibility and desirability of various unilateral and + multilateral initiatives to restrict arms transfers on a national, + regional, and global basis;

+

(b) consideration of such factors as: the type of weapon, equipment, or + service being transferred; the role and activities abroad of commercial + arms suppliers; third country transfers; transfer of high technology and + sensitive items; co-production; employment of U.S. citizens on defense + contracts abroad; and international standards of human rights; and

+

(c) the feasibility and desirability of restricting all U.S. arms + transfers to government-to-government transactions.

+

2. Identify and analyze basic policy options, on the basis of the + foregoing examination. Consider the impact of each option on the U.S. + economy, on defense + readiness and procurement, and on U.S. relationships with both recipient + and supplier states.

+

3. Review the current organizational structure for departmental and + interagency consideration of arms transfer requests, and develop options + for mechanisms and procedures to provide systematic policy guidance in + the future.

+

4. Assess the current relationship between the executive and legislative + branches in this area, and propose guidelines and changes necessary for + an optimum relationship.

+ + Zbigniew + Brzezinski + +
+ +
+ 260. Memorandum From Secretary of State Vance to President CarterSource: + Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Global + Issues, Mathews Subject + File, Box 4, Arms Transfers: Policy (General): 2–5/77. + Confidential. + Washington, February 8, 1977 + + SUBJECT + Conventional Arms Transfers + +

You have directed a PRM on arms + transfers due March 15.See Document 259. Even as this is being + done and without prejudice to the decisions you will make at that time, + the State Department will have to deal with immediate problems. These + include presentation on the FY–78 + budget, the backlog of pending decisions, and questions from Congress + and press. This memorandum describes:

+

—Steps we have initiated in the State Department to deal with arms + transfer issues that are currently on our agenda, and

+

—Planning in progress to bring greater coherence and increased control to + the world arms trade in the longer run.

+

BACKGROUND

+

The term arms transfers is a rubric for three forms of military exports: + (1) those paid for by the US as grant + aid under the Military Assistance Program (MAP); (2) those paid for by the recipient under the Foreign + Military Sales Program (FMS) using + US Government credits or loan guarantees and/or the US military logistics system; and (3) those + conducted as straight commercial sales. Each type of arms transfer + requires a different form of government involvement.

+

(1) + MAP

+

The Military Assistance Program is included each year in the annual + budget as a foreign assistance item. The questions to + whom and how much are decided by a + State-Defense-ACDA-OMB review process, which is coordinated + through the Security Assistance Program Review Committee, chaired by the + Under Secretary of State for Security Assistance. Congress makes the + final determination when the budget is submitted.

+

(2) + FMS

+

Foreign Military Sales are the largest portion of total US arms exports. FMS requiring US Government + direct loans or credit guarantees are included in the annual budget by + country and dollar amount. FMS cash + sales, however, do not appear in the budget and Congress has no formal + opportunity to make its views known until it is notified of individual + proposed sales. The attachment is a description of how the + decision-making process operates in a typical FMS case.

+

The International Security Assistance and Arms Export Control Act of 1976 + requires that the Executive Branch must give the Congress thirty days + prior notification of any FMS + transaction in excess of $25 million and any FMS sale of major defense equipment in excess of $7 + million. Within this thirty days Congress may vote to veto the + transaction. The thirty calendar day formula was reached on the basis of + assurances from the Executive Branch that the concerned committees would + receive twenty days’ informal prenotification of the formal + notification. In effect, therefore, Congress has fifty calendar days in + which to consider a pending Letter of Offer for a proposed significant + FMS transaction.

+

(3) Commercial Sales

+

All commercial sales of military services and equipment must be licensed + by the US Government. This function is + performed by the Munitions Control Office of the State Department. + Legislation requires that licenses for commercial military deliveries be + notified to Congress according to the formula used for FMS cases.

+

Additional facts that help clarify discussions about the complicated + subject of arms transfers are:

+

—Most dollar figures cited for government-to-government (FMS) sales represent orders taken in a given year, not deliveries. Some years, total orders have topped $10 billion, + but annual deliveries have never reached $5 billion.

+ +

—On the average, about 40% of US + Government orders or deliveries are weapons systems. The balance is + vehicles, transport aircraft, construction, training and miscellaneous + services.

+

STEPS NOW BEING TAKEN

+

1. The Pipeline. Over $32 billion in defense goods + and services, ordered by foreign governments (mainly in the Middle + East), are under contract and scheduled for delivery over the next eight + years. We are putting together a list and timetable of what is to be + delivered to whom. We will assess the immediate impact and use this + information in evaluating future requests for sales.

+

2. Pending Sales. We are now reviewing 17 proposed + Foreign Military Sales (FMS) cases + worth $2.3 billion which we inherited from the last Administration. We + are screening these very carefully and will send to you separately a + list of those items which we believe should be considered by you prior + to being sent forward for Congressional review. At that time, we will + also propose procedures for obtaining your views on future cases. Among + the most pressing issues are a number of large proposed sales to the + Persian Gulf area. Those requiring notification to the Congress cannot + be processed until we have satisfied the SFRC’s resolution requiring an Executive Branch statement + of Persian Gulf policy.On September 24, + 1976, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee passed a resolution + “opposing further arms sales to Persian Gulf states pending + completion of an overall National Security Council study.” (“Arms + Sales to Saudis Set Back,” Washington Post, + September 25, 1976, p. A1)

+

3. Fiscal 1978 Security Assistance Programs. + Together with OMB and DOD we have reviewed the past + Administration’s proposed request to Congress for FY 1978 funds for grant aid, FMS financing and military training. These + are for the most part reasonable and defensible, although we would have + formulated it somewhat differently. Given the short time available, we + have been able to make only limited changes, and these have centered + principally on our human rights concerns. To show + that we intend to follow a different policy on this issue, we have + proposed to OMB that the grant aid + program in Ethiopia be eliminated, that the FMS financing program in Uruguay be eliminated and that the + FMS financial program in Argentina + be cut.

+

4. Congress. Members of my staff and I have begun + an active campaign to build confidence with members and key staff on the + Hill. We will institute a new procedure with respect to Congressional + notifications of proposed arms transfers—namely, including a policy + justification with each new FMS case. + Current practice on these notifications is to report formally only the + name of the buyer, the content and price of the proposed sale and the military department + handling the contract. Policy explanations are not among the items + required by the law and usually are given only selectively and + informally.

+

5. Controlling Promotion of Arms Sales. We are + planning to publish shortly in the Federal + Register a notice of a proposed regulation which would require + State Department approval before an arms manufacturer may undertake + efforts to promote the sale of major military hardware overseas. Such a + regulation should inhibit efforts by private firms to create appetites + for arms in foreign governments.

+

PLANNING IN PROGRESS

+

In the context of the PRM which you have + ordered we are examining ways of bringing tighter control over US arms exports and encouraging + multilateral restraints on the arms trade. Here are some of the ideas + under consideration in both areas:

+

A. Control Over US Arms + Exports

+

(1) We need to increase the flow of early information about proposed + sales to all interested agencies and to regularize the criteria for + evaluating all major FMS cases. We want + to assure that arms control and human rights considerations receive + proper early attention on each proposed transaction.

+

(2) We need to develop better control at the critical points leading to + formal arms transfer decisions. Too often decisions are “created” by the + activities of arms salesmen, the excesses of some zealous military + advisory personnel, and the appetites of foreign leaders, combined with + inertia on the part of the Executive in bringing policy considerations + to bear at an early stage.

+

(3) Sales of high technology, sensitive weapons, co-production projects + and equipment requiring large numbers of supporting American technicians + should receive a more rigorous screening than has been the case in the + past.

+

(4) It is essential to develop good working relations with Congress on + these issues, over the longer term, to avoid arbitrary efforts at + control, such as moratoria and dollar ceilings. Such approaches tend to + appear punitive and could severely harm other US foreign policy interests in some countries or + regions.In the left-hand margin next to + this paragraph, Carter wrote + “We might meet w/ key Congress leaders before final + decision.”

+

(5) We need to take action promptly to establish an interagency mechanism + to coordinate security assistance and arms export control activities and + to bring the expertise of all concerned agencies to bear on the basic + policy decisions.

+ +

B. Efforts to Encourage Multilateral Restraint

+

(1) Unilateral Restraints. We believe our + objective must be to reduce the international traffic in arms, not + simply to reduce the US role in that + traffic. As we gain credibility through improved policy and procedural + control over our own arms exports, we can begin to elicit the + cooperation of other nations. This could be a long-term process, because + arms exports have great commercial and political importance to our + friends.

+

(2) Informal Multilateral Restraint. When we + disapprove a proposed sale because we wish to avoid introducing a new + capability or level of technology into a particular region, we can let + other suppliers know the reason for our decision and encourage + comparable restraint on their part (e.g., intermediate range missiles in + the Middle East). In addition, we can use available international fora + (CCD, NATO, UN, OAS, etc.) to urge restraint by other + suppliers and by recipients. We can also try to identify particular + regions where opportunities exist for mutual restraint among arms + importing countries and seek to encourage such restraint through + diplomatic efforts with those countries. NATO standardization and offsetting procurements by the + US from our European allies may be + useful incentives in discouraging sales efforts in other regions.

+

(3) A Conference of Arms Suppliers. With the + benefit of experience gained from the Nuclear Suppliers’ + Conference,The Nuclear Supplier Group, + founded in 1974 after India’s successful nuclear test, included the + United States, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, Canada, the + Federal Republic of Germany, France, and Japan. It met several times + from 1974–1977 to set guidelines for the export of nuclear material + to states which did not possess nuclear weapons. we may be + able to initiate a similar dialogue among suppliers of conventional + arms. Although arms suppliers are a more diverse group with more widely + divergent interests, we should make an effort to see what can be + achieved by a suppliers’ conference. As first steps, we are identifying + the sales practices of various suppliers and considering what issues + could usefully be discussed by those participants whose attendance would + be required. We shall also have to take into account the predictable + resistance from recipients and consider means of involving them in the + process.

+

(4) A Dialogue with the USSR. Requests by foreign countries for sales from + the US are often a response to military + supply relations between the requesting country’s neighbor and the + Soviet Union. The Soviets have experienced difficulties in their arms + sales activities which are similar to some of our own problems and it + would seem that bilateral discussions could produce worthwhile results + on a number of issues (e.g., sales to African countries which might fuel + an arms race or produce + instability not desired by either side). Yet, we have not previously + engaged the Soviets in a dialogue on this subject. We are beginning to + plan how bilateral talks could be proposed, the subjects we would like + to discuss, and how a US/USSR dialogue could relate to an arms + suppliers’ conference. Moving towards discussions with the Soviets will, + of course, require careful preparation not only in Washington, but in + the capitals of our friends.In the + left-hand margin next to this paragraph, Carter wrote “Explore in Cy’s visit to Moscow. Earlier w/ Dobrynin.” In an earlier + interview, Vance said that + “I do believe that the area of disarmament or arms reduction in the + conventional arms area is of critical importance. It is the area + where the largest amount of money is spent, and is a very serious + and substantial problem. I would expect the discussion of reduction + of conventional arms to be on the agenda of items that we might + discuss when I go to Moscow at the end of March.” (Documents on Disarmament, 1977, pp. 27–29)

+

Attachment

+

Paper Prepared in the Department of State

+

Washington, undated

+

CASE STUDY OF A FOREIGN MILITARY SALENo classification marking. At the bottom of the + first page, Carter wrote “Be + sure that I’m consulted early in this process.”

+

This paper describes the procedures involved in a hypothetical foreign + military sales (FMS) case from its + inception to its being reported to Congress. There is no typical FMS case; actual cases arise in a variety + of ways. For purposes of illustration, therefore, we will follow a + hypothetical sale to Iran of the Maverick missile under FMS cash procedures.

+

Iran possesses a Maverick capable aircraft and is interested in Maverick. + This interest is derived from its perceptions of the threat. Interest, + however, is stimulated by a representative of a commercial firm and a + description of the system in one of the aerospace publications. Initial + discussions are carried out with the MAAG and a DOD survey group is sent with State concurrence to review + the threat and to determine the feasibility of introducing the new + system in the country. During this period the defense manufacturer will + seek to maintain interest in the system.

+

The request for Maverick planning data is received in Washington + simultaneously by Defense and State. The US Air Force takes the survey team results, reviews the + military justification, and determines whether the sale will impact on + US military requirements. Air Force + will then consult with the US supplier + to determine when the items can be scheduled for production and the cost. It will also review related + costs of training and support of the system.

+

In State, the Maverick request is reviewed by the Politico-Military + Affairs and the Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs Bureaus (PM and NEA) to determine whether sale is + consistent with our foreign policy, particularly in the country and + region. PM will also obtain the views of + the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) regarding the arms control implications of the sale. + If existing guidance is inadequate, policy level approval is sought. If + there are no policy objections, Iran would receive the information + requested.

+

Assuming Iran is satisfied with the information received, the next step + is to request a Letter of Offer, which is a contract outlining the + precise terms and conditions of sale including prices and delivery + times. It normally takes Defense 60–90 days to prepare an LOA. As soon + as reasonable estimates are available, Defense requests State approval + to issue an advance notification to Congress. This request is reviewed + in State by PM, NEA, ACDA and the Congressional Relations + Bureau as well as by the NSC staff. If + approved, Defense sends a classified letter to the staff of the House + International Relations Committee and Senate Foreign Relations + Committee, which has 20 days to review the case. The purpose of this + step is to give Congress sufficient time to review major + transactions.

+

If there are no objections to the proposed Maverick sale, State will + authorize Defense to proceed with the formal 30 day notification + pursuant to Section 36(b) of the Arms Export Control Act and to give an + unsigned copy of the LOA to Iran. The LOA cannot be issued by the USG if Congress within 30 days adopts a + concurrent resolution stating that it objects to the proposed sale, + unless the President states in his certification that an emergency + exists which requires such a sale in the national security interests of + the US. Congress has never adopted such + a resolution. An objection to the Maverick sale would most likely be the + subject of negotiations between the Executive and Legislative branches + and a compromise reached (as in the case of the actual sale of Mavericks + to Saudi Arabia).

+

After the 30 day review period, the LOA is signed by representatives of + Iran and the USG. The case is + implemented by the Air Force.

+

The foregoing process is described in schematic form in the attached + chart.Attached but not + printed.

+
+ +
+ + 261. Memorandum From the Deputy Secretary of State Designate + (Christopher) to President + CarterSource: Carter Library, National + Security Affairs, Staff Material, Global Issues, Mathews Subject File, Box 3, Arms + Sales: Procedures: 6/76–3/77. No classification marking. Brzezinski informed Christopher in a February 24 + memorandum that he had forwarded the memorandum and the proposed + regulation to Carter and + said “I agree that publishing the proposed regulation at this time + would be beneficial.” (Ibid.) + Washington, February 19, 1977 + + SUBJECT + Proposed Regulation to Control Arms Sales Promotion by U.S. + Firms + +

This memorandum describes a regulation under consideration within the + Department of State to require U.S. firms promoting international arms + sales to obtain our approval before making significant sales proposals. + Your approval is requested for the publication of a notice inviting + public comment on the proposed regulation.

+

Present Controls

+

U.S. arms transfers take place through two main + channels—government-to-government sales and direct commercial sales by + United States firms. Government-to-government foreign military sales + (FMS) are made in response to + requests received from a foreign government. The FMS program is administered by the + Department of Defense under the direction and supervision of the + Department of State. A license from the Department of State is required + for the export of military equipment or technology which is sold + commercially.

+

U.S. firms engaged in the manufacture and sale of military equipment are + involved in widespread marketing efforts to sell their products abroad. + These marketing efforts are subject to U.S. Government control only to + the extent they include the export of demonstration models or of + military technology for which an export license is required. Companies + frequently consult with the Departments of State and Defense to ensure + against conflict with United States policy and to avoid the expense of + promoting sales which will ultimately be disapproved. However, we have + no assured involvement in an arms sale until the foreign government + makes a request under the government-to-government FMS program or we receive a license + application for the export of items for which a commercial sales + contract has been signed. At that point, where the foreign purchaser has + already been persuaded that it needs the items in question, it is often + more difficult to achieve restraint. Refusal to sell under FMS or denial of an export license to carry out a commercial sale can + give offense to a friendly foreign government and may result in a sale + of comparable items by some alternative supplier.

+

Under the present regulations, a U.S. firm has the option of seeking our + advice before it begins an effort to market its product in a given + country or of proceeding without consultation in the hope that the + expressed desires of the purchasing country will help to secure the + required U.S. approval.

+

Proposed Controls

+

The new regulation we are considering would require the Department of + State’s approval before a proposal, recommendation or presentation is + made which is designed to induce a decision to purchase significant + combat equipment valued at $7 million or more. The regulation would + describe the kinds of activity that would require such approval. (The + items which constitute significant combat equipment are identified in + the present regulations.) A similar prior approval requirement would be + established for proposed agreements to produce, assemble or maintain + significant combat equipment in a foreign country. This would formalize + and make mandatory the informal consultation that now precedes many, but + by no means all, major arms sales promotion initiatives.

+

Procedures

+

A preliminary draft of the proposed regulation was circulated to the + directly affected companies and to industry associations in December. + The text has been substantially revised to take into account the initial + industry reactions. The next step in the rulemaking procedure would be + to publish the revised draft in the Federal Register with an invitation + for public comment. The published notice would also announce a public + meeting, following a thirty-day period for written comments, at which + members of the public could express their views orally to the + responsible officials of the Departments of State and Defense.

+

In light of the comments received from the public, we could adopt the + regulation, with or without change; we could begin again with a new text + if it appeared substantial revision was required; or we could abandon + the proposal.

+

A notice of proposed rulemaking has been prepared for publication in the + Federal Register. A copy is attached.Attached but not printed. I favor proceeding with this + proposal because it could provide a valuable tool for the enforcement of + policies developed to restrain the further proliferation of conventional arms. The Department of + Defense and the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency also support the + adoption of a regulation along these lines. The staffs of the concerned + Congressional committees have told us they believe the regulation would + be well received in Congress.

+

Other Pending Actions

+

Two other regulatory amendments are pending. One, designed to change the + definition of significant combat equipment with respect to military + electronics, has been published as a proposed rule. Written comments + have been received and a public meeting was held on February 4. The + other, which would institute a system of civil penalties and + administrative remedies for export control violations, is ready for + informal distribution to industry in advance of publication. Both of + these amendments implement legislation enacted last year and are + relatively uncontroversial.

+

Recommendation

+

That you authorize publication of the attached notice in the Federal + Register.

+
+ +
+ 262. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security + Affairs (Brzezinski) to President + CarterSource: Carter Library, National + Security Affairs, Staff Material, Global Issues, Mathews Subject File, Box 3, Arms + Sales: Procedures: 6/76–3/77. Confidential. Sent for action. In the + upper right-hand corner of the first page of the memorandum, + Carter wrote “Let me + have orig draft of regulation before it was modified by munitions + manufacturers. JC.” + Washington, February 23, 1977 + + SUBJECT + Conventional Arms Transfers + +

At Tab A is a memorandum from Secretary VanceSee Document 260. on the subject of + conventional arms transfers.

+

I must point out that many of the issues addressed in the Secretary’s + memorandum, particularly those mentioned on pages 5 through 7, are + currently under consideration in the context of the PRM/NSC–12 review of conventional arms + transfers. The comments in the attached memorandum, therefore, represent + only the views of the Dept. of State; + the positions of other agencies will be contained in the PRM response due March 15.

+

On pages 3 and 4 of his memorandum, Secretary Vance mentions 17 pending Foreign + Military Sales cases currently under review. I strongly believe that we + should not transmit any cases to Congress prior to evaluation of and + decision on the PRM–12 response. A + one-month delay would not seriously affect either contract prices or + delivery dates, although there may be short-term dissatisfaction and a + degree of uncertainty in some recipient states. This rather minimal + negative aspect is greatly outweighed by the fact that delaying the + transmittals would permit evaluation of the cases, under new policy + guidelines, by an interagency group specifically designed to conduct + such an evaluation. I will discuss this issue with Secretary Vance and will advise you of the + result of our conversation.

+

On page 4, Secretary Vance also + mentions a proposed regulation which is designed to moderate the + overseas sales efforts of U.S. arms manufacturers by providing for State + Department approval earlier in the sales process. The proposed + regulation and an explanatory memorandum are at Tab B.The explanatory memorandum is Document 261; the proposed regulation is attached but not + printed. If you approve, the proposed regulation will be + published in the Federal Register, followed by a + 30-day period for public comment and a public meeting. Initiating this + action now will permit integration of its findings into the PRM review, and I therefore recommend that + you approve publication of the proposed regulation.

+

RECOMMENDATION

+

That you approve publication in the Federal + Register of the proposed regulation at Tab B.Carter did + not indicate his preference with respect to this recommendation. The + proposed new regulation was not codified pending further review of + the issue of arms transfers.

+
+ +
+ + 263. Memorandum From Secretary of State Vance to President CarterSource: + Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Global + Issues, Mathews Subject + File, Box 4, Arms Transfers: Policy (General): 2–5/77. + Confidential. + Washington, March + 6, 1977 + + + SUBJECT + Congressional Notification of Pending Conventional Arms Transfer + Cases + +

In my memorandum of February 8,See Document 260. I reported that we had + several billion dollars worth of pending Foreign Military Sales cases + which we inherited from the previous Administration, as well as requests + pending for Munitions Control export licenses to fulfill signed + commercial contracts. Both require notification to Congress pursuant to + Section 36 of the Arms Export Control Act of 1976. Zbig has suggested to + youSee Document + 262. that we not send any of these cases to + Congress prior to your decisions on the PRM–12 response on arms transfer policy. I do not agree + that we should delay on all of these cases, and am recommending an + alternative method of proceeding.

+

Discussion

+

We transfer defense articles and services through several channels. The + largest volume is through government-to-government agreements under + Foreign Military Sales (FMS) + procedures. Straight commercial transactions must be licensed by the + State Department’s Office of Munitions Control at the time the goods or + services are ready for export. The process through which major FMS and commercial cases are reported to + Congress is described at Attachment 2.Attached but not printed.

+

We are now holding for Congressional notification 49 FMS and commercial cases totalling + approximately $5 billion in defense goods and services. Ideally, the + decision to send these cases to Congress should await the completion of + our arms transfer policy review under PRM/NSC–12, as suggested by + Zbig Brzezinski in his + memorandum to you of February 23 but deferral of all cases raises some serious problems.

+

—Almost all of these cases are non-controversial and raise no serious + policy problems for us.

+

—Our contacts with Congressmen strongly indicate that Congress is ready + to accept most of the cases without debate. The main problem

+

for many legislators is the + Persian Gulf. Here, we will hold some cases for your review and for + completion of the policy review.

+

—It will be almost six weeks before you make decisions on a new overall + policy. By that time the backlog of cases could total $7 billion. If we + wait to send these cases to Congress until your overall policy is set, + the very magnitude of the submissions is likely to overshadow the new + approach you will be enunciating.

+

—Such a moratorium would, in general, create expectations about our + future arms policy that cannot be met. We are not intending to forsake + arms transfers as a part of our foreign policy. Whatever controls you do + institute will not produce overnight results and will require + cooperative efforts if they are to be effectively implemented. A + moratorium of even a month will cause panic among those it affects and + will tend to galvanize opposition before policy decisions have been + made.

+

—Bilateral political problems will result. Seven of these cases involve + NATO countries. It is inconsistent + for us to press NATO countries to do + more on defense, while at the same time denying them items they have + ordered. Both the Dutch and the British have made this point to us. With + respect to other friendly countries, 33 of the 49 cases involve + logistics support (without which equipment will be inoperable), annual + ammunition procurement, and ancillary equipment for or small additions + to stocks of weapons we have already agreed to provide.

+

—Delay will mean price increases and production problems. The majority of + current cases (23 of the 36 FMS cases) + are not new and many have been pending since last November. Specific + practical problems have already developed, or will soon develop, + including:

+

Delivery delays and price increases (for Israel and Greece)

+

Logistic problems (for Iran, Taiwan, and Korea)

+

Disruption of signed commercial contracts (10 of the 13 pending export + license cases)

+

Possible breaks in production lines.

+

Pending Cases

+

The growing list of pending cases (see Attachment 1)Attached but not printed. fall into several + categories described below. I am recommending that you submit to + Congress approximately $3.7 billion of the $5.0 billion total.

+ + + + Cases + Value (Mil) + + + Category I: Construction and follow-on support for systems + already in country + 12 + $1,185 + + + Category II: Follow-on Ammunition supplies + 4 + 140 + + + + Category III: Systems to Supplement existing in country + inventories or to complement weapons received or on order + 17 + 771 + + + Category IV: Major new Equipment transfer and force + expansion + + + + + A. Approval Recommended + 10 + 1,568 + + + B. Deferral Recommended + 6 + 1,368 + + + TOTALS + 49 + $5,032 + +
+

Of the cases in Categories I–III, there is only one which raises policy + questions: ammunition for Ethiopia. The Ethiopian case relates to our + policy in this part of Africa. It should be deferred until we have + completed our African policy review, which is now underway. The + consequence of deferral is likely to be that the Ethiopians will + interpret deferral as denial. The ammunition was requested sometime ago + and additional delay in a decision will further strain our bilateral + relations. Ethiopia may well turn to other suppliers. Nevertheless, + deferral is warranted.In the right-hand + margin next to this paragraph, Carter wrote “defer OK.”

+

There are several cases in Category IV that I would recommend for + deferral:

+

Jordan—9 AH–1 + Cobra Helicopters

+

($19 million)

+

The sale of helicopter gunships to Jordan was approved in principle some time ago, but was + not completed because of Jordan’s financial problems. Notification of this case to + Congress is likely to attract Israel’s attention. Because further delay + on this case does not pose foreseeable consequences, it should be + deferred until the policy review has been completed.In the right-hand margin next to this paragraph, + Carter wrote “defer + OK.”

+

Iran—7 E–3 Aircraft (AWACs)

+

($1.2 billion)

+

Iran has received two proposals for an early warning and control system, + of which the AWACs (airborne warning + and control system) is one. Iran has commissioned a comparative study to + determine which of these systems will be chosen. Under these + circumstances, further delay will not cause inconvenience. The size and + sophistication of this system, on the other hand, would undoubtedly draw + Congressional criticism, particularly in view of the general concern + about US sales to the Persian Gulf.In the right-hand margin next to this + paragraph, Carter wrote + “defer OK.”

+

Pakistan—155mm Self-Propelled Howitzers

+

($35 million)

+ +

Pakistan is very anxious to receive this equipment, but we have been + withholding approval pending satisfactory agreement on the nuclear + reprocessing issue.For more on the issue of + nuclear processing and Pakistan, see Foreign Relations, 1977–1980, vol. + XIX, South Asia. We should therefore continue to + defer action on this case.In the + right-hand margin next to this paragraph, Carter wrote “defer + OK.”

+

Peru—140 Armored Personnel Carriers

+

($16 million)

+

The buildup in Peruvian military forces has created great uneasiness in + the region. For the US to contribute to + this buildup at this time would only add to this uneasiness. This is + clearly a case that should be deferred for reassessment in light of new + policy.In the right-hand margin next + to this paragraph, Carter + wrote “defer OK.”

+

Sudan—6 C–130 Transport Aircraft

+

($74 million)

+

The previous administration committed the USG to supply these transport aircraft to Sudan, as a + significant step to improve relations with this strategically-placed + country. We have already supplied C–130’s to other countries in the area + (Israel, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia). This would be the first US military sale to the Sudan in a long + time. Deferral of this case would interrupt the trend of improvement in + our relations with the Sudanese and strengthen the hand of those in the + Sudanese Government who question the value of reliance on the US, which President Nimeiri has espoused. + Deferral is nevertheless warranted because of the broader implications + of establishing a new military supply relationship without first + establishing a policy for the area. Sudan has already requested the + purchase of F–5E aircraft and other major items.In the right-hand margin next to this paragraph, + Carter wrote “Might be + OK to deliver.”

+

Iran—73 ALQ–119 ECM Pods

+

($24 million)

+

The proposed sale of this electronic countermeasures system (ECM) raises + a technology question and should await the outcome of the arms transfer + review. Although it is not our most advanced ECM system, it will add to + the electronic countermeasures capability of the Iranian Air Force. We + have been told by Westinghouse that the consequence of delaying this + case would be plant layoffs, beginning in January 1977. Nevertheless + deferral is warranted.In the right-hand + margin next to this paragraph, Carter wrote “defer OK.”

+ +

The rest of the cases in Category IV either involve NATO countries or raise significant + problems if they are deferred. In addition to the British and Dutch + cases, we have:

+

Saudi Arabia—Improved HAWK Program

+

($1.1 billion)

+

This case is a commercial contract for the expansion of the Saudi I–HAWK + air defense system and represents the largest segment of a package. Most + of this package consists of commercial contracts, licensed by State + Department’s Munitions Control, and requiring Congressional notification + because of dollar value. There is a small portion of the package that is + an FMS case. Because of its size ($8 + million), Congressional notification is not required. However, we intend + to report this portion to Congress, as supplementary information to the + Munitions Control notification. The contract for this deal was signed + last June and the equipment is now ready to ship.In the right-hand margin next to this paragraph, + Carter wrote “?” + It will attract Congressional criticism. The case has already been + discussed informally with some Congressmen and staff. Although they + understand that it was initiated during the last administration and that + our ability to make adjustments is limited, they look to the + administration to review the matter. Delay will subject the contractor + to late delivery penalties.

+

Iran—TOW Missiles Launcher Kits

+

($40 million)

+

The previous Administration approved a proposal to permit Iran to + assemble TOW anti-tank missile launchers. A $40 million contract was + signed by the US company in January 1976 + and a license was issued to ship $9 million in equipment the first year. + The current export license request involves the second shipment of the + contract and is valued at approximately $12 million. The purpose of this + system is to improve Iran’s defense capability against the large force + of Soviet-supplied tanks concentrated in Iraq. Deferral would involved + disruption of an on-going assembly line.In the last sentence of this paragraph, Carter lined through the “d” in + “involved.” His written comment in the right-hand margin is + illegible.

+

Singapore—Armored Personnel Carriers

+

($40 million)

+

The previous Administration approved the sale to Singapore of 246 armored + personnel carriers (APC) and related vehicles. The contract was signed + in March 1976 and deliveries are scheduled to begin in April. These + vehicles will be used to modernize Singapore’s Army by replacing the + existing fleet of Cadillac Gage Commando vehicles. We previously + provided Singapore with 220 APC’s and related vehicles. Deferral would be very disruptive because + shipment is about to begin.

+

Israel—126 M–60 tanks

+

($85 million)

+

94 155 mm + Self-Propelled Howitzers

+

($52 million)

+

These are two of the Israeli requests approved by President Ford in October 1976. The tanks will + be used to create a new mechanized brigade. The howitzers will be used + to expand divisional artillery support.In + the right-hand margin next to the second and third sentences in this + paragraph, Carter wrote + “OK.” Approval of these cases is important as an indication + of US support for Israeli security, + particularly after the negative decision on the concussion bombs + (CBU–72).On February 17, White House + Press Secretary Jody Powell announced that + Carter had reversed + Ford’s October 8, 1976 + decision approving the sale of concussion bombs to Israel and banned + their sale to other nations. Carter’s “decision to cancel the sale + was ‘related to a general desire to limit and reduce the sales of + sophisticated and highly destructive weapons worldwide,’ Powell said.” (“Concussion Bomb + Sale Off; Panel on Appeals Judges Set,” Washington + Post, February 18, 1977, p. A2) Your decision to + approve these items was announced by the White House Press Spokesman on February 18.

+

Jordan—16 8″ + Self-Propelled Howitzers

+

($12 million)

+

These are part of a multi-year force modernization program for the + mechanization of brigade artillery. The US has already furnished Jordan 32 of these howitzers and 103 self-propelled 155 + mm howitzers.

+

Iran—Airborne Segment of IBEX Intelligence + Collection System

+

($30 million)

+

The IBEX system is a multi-million dollar program to provide Iran with a + sophisticated intelligence collection capability. The original Rockwell + contract was signed in March 1975. The current license involves only the + airborne segment of the program.

+

Greece—TOW Anti-Tank Missiles

+

($15 million)

+

CH–47 Cargo Helicopters

+

($60 million)

+

These cases represent the sale of items not now in the Greek inventory. + The purpose of providing the TOWs and helicopters is to improve Greece’s + capabilities to meet its NATO + obligations.Carter’s written comment + in the right-hand margin next to this paragraph is + illegible.

+

Congressional Consultation

+

When we receive your decision, I intend that we provide the responsible + Congressional committees with brief statements of justification for all cases which are submitted. + We are already talking with interested members and staffers about our + arms transfer dilemmas. They appreciate that the backlog results from + commitments inherited from the previous administration.

+

We expect the greatest number of questions about sales to the Persian + Gulf. Senator Humphrey, however, believes that the problem will be + manageable in view of the intent of the new administration to change + policy and provided we do not propose at this time the sale of lethal, + offensive weapons. None of the pending cases for Persian Gulf countries + fall into this latter category. Humphrey added, however, that we should + proceed on sales of defensive systems to this region only after + extensive congressional consultations.

+

Recommendations:

+

That you authorize me to initiate Congressional notifications on the + commercial export licenses and FMS + cases now pending, except those I have recommended for deferral.Carter did not indicate his preference with respect + to this recommendation.

+

Future Procedures:

+

In your January 23 interview with AP and UPI, you said that you have + asked that all approvals of arms sales be submitted to you directly + before recommendations go to Congress. The attachment to this memorandum + illustrates the range of goods and services on order, and demonstrates + how relatively few are major controversial orders for sophisticated + lethal weapons.

+

As you pointed out in the same interview, I will be much more hesitant in + the future to recommend new arms sales agreements. Many sizeable FMS and commercial cases, however, involve + noncontroversial items ($18 million radar for Tunisia) or sales to our + NATO allies (e.g. $119 million + sale of Sidewinder air-to-air missiles to the UK). Such routine cases do not seem to require your + personal attention. If you agree, I will submit recommendations to you + only on those cases which I believe may be politically sensitive or + controversial. We will continue to consult the National Security Council + Staff on all FMS and commercial cases + requiring Congressional notification and work out procedures to insure + that Dr. Brzezinski is + appropriately informed prior to any notification to the Congress.

+

Recommendation:

+

That I submit to you for your personal review only those FMS sales and commercial export licenses + of major weapons systems requiring Congressional notification which I believe are + likely to be politically sensitive or controversial.Carter did + not indicate his preference with respect to this + recommendation.

+

Alternatively, that I submit to you my + recommendations on all FMS and + commercial arms sales cases requiring Congressional notification, + pending completion of PRM–12.Carter checked the “Approve” option and underneath + wrote “J.C.”

+

Attachments:

+

1. List of Pending CasesAttached but not + printed.

+

2. Congressional Notification Process

+
+ +
+ 264. Memorandum From Secretary of State Vance to President CarterSource: + Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Global + Issues, Mathews Subject + File, Box 4, Arms Transfers: Congress: 3–9/77. + Confidential. + Washington, March + 17, 1977 + + SUBJECT + Legislation on Conventional Arms Transfer + +

This memorandum proposes an Administration initiative to seek deferral of + significant changes in the legislation presently governing United States + arms transfers. In essence, we would undertake, in exchange for + Congressional restraint at this time, to involve Congress directly in a + joint deliberative process, following your decisions on the response to + PRM/NSC–12,See Document 259. designed to formulate legislation + that takes into account the objectives and concerns of both + Branches.

+

Background

+

Work is progressing on the study of conventional arms transfers which you + have directed by PRM/NSC–12, and we should be ready to present options + and recommendations to you in the latter part of March. This study will + also provide the basis for the studies and reports to Congress mandated + by last year’s Arms Export Control Act.

+ +

There is a substantial risk that Congress will not await the formulation + of the Administration’s specific arms transfer policies, or the studies + and reports it has requested, but will instead seek to attach a variety + of amendments to the FY 1978 security + assistance authorization bill. A number of amendments to the legislation + presently governing arms transfers have already been introduced. These + amendments would impose new restrictions on your authority and would + further complicate the Congressional review procedures for Executive + Branch decisions.

+

Present Situation

+

We have begun a broad-ranging consultation to inform members of Congress + of the restraint-oriented objectives you have already stated, to explain + to them our current efforts to achieve better control and greater + restraint with respect to arms transfers, and to elicit their ideas. In + the course of these consultations, we are urging members to refrain from + pressing for substantial changes in existing law until the + Administration has had an opportunity to develop and begin to implement + its policies. Most members are sympathetic but cannot assure us that + Congress will not try to preempt your decisions.

+

The FY 1978 security assistance + authorization bill must be considered within a very brief time span. The + Administration’s request will have to be submitted early in March and + the bill must be reported out of committee by May 15. This schedule will + not permit a considered examination of existing law and a thoughtful + statutory revision that will complement your policies. Either the + Congress will confine itself to authorizing necessary appropriations and + enacting only needed statutory authority or it will attach to the bill a + number of hastily considered piecemeal modifications of existing + authorities and procedures.

+

A Plan for Avoiding Harmful Legislation

+

The content of the FY 1978 authorization + bill will be determined to a considerable extent by how Congress + perceives the Administration’s commitment to reducing the proliferation + of conventional arms, and how it perceives the Administration’s + willingness to involve Congress in the process.

+

Our ongoing consultations are a step in the right direction, but are not + likely to be sufficient, in themselves, in gaining the time we need for + constructive legislative revision. We may, however, be able to achieve + the cooperation of Congress by offering it a significant participatory + role in framing the legislation that will be needed after you have + decided on the options that will be presented to you in response to + PRM/NSC–12.

+

Specifically, I suggest that you authorize me to explore with + Congressional leaders the possibility of convening a joint + Executive/Legislative + Branch working group which would meet after enactment of the FY 1978 security assistance authorization + bill. This working group would consider changes in the basic authorizing + legislation desired by either Branch, and would prepare a draft bill + reflecting agreements reached in their deliberations that would be + formally considered in the FY 1979 + authorization cycle. The draft bill, apart from substantive revisions, + could reorganize the legislation into a more simple and intelligible + format that would facilitate its implementation.

+

The Executive Branch participants in the working group would be drawn + from the several agencies concerned, and would work under the + supervision of the Under Secretary of State for Security Assistance. + Their principal source of guidance would be your decisions resulting + from the PRM–12 study. The results of + their deliberations with Congressional participants (concentrating on, + but not limited to, the foreign affairs committees) would be presented + to you for approval.

+

Disagreements that could not be resolved by the working group would be + referred for resolution by senior Administration officials and the + Congressional leadership. Even if complete agreement could not be + reached, the experience would be mutually instructive and conducive to a + more harmonious working relationship between the two Branches. Better + legislation would probably emerge from such a collaborative effort than + from the more traditional process of recent years in which both Branches + have independently proposed legislation to which they were publicly + committed.

+

If you approve the concept described above, and if key members of + Congress are receptive, you could then publicly urge Congress to defer + legislative revision at this time, and propose a collaborative effort + later this year within a comprehensive policy framework. Such a proposal + could be made in a meeting with Congressional leaders or in your message + to Congress next week transmitting the FY 1978 security assistance authorization bill.

+

Recommendation

+

That you authorize me to discuss with Congressional leaders the proposal + described above, and to indicate that it has your support.Carter did + not indicate whether he authorized Vance to discuss the proposal with Congressional + leaders.

+
+ +
+ + 265. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security + Affairs (Brzezinski) to President + CarterSource: Carter Library, National + Security Affairs, Staff Material, Global Issues, Mathews Subject File, Box 4, Arms + Transfers: Policy (General): 2–5/77. Secret. Sent for action. In the + upper right-hand corner of the first page of the memorandum, + Carter wrote “Zbig—see + me. J.C.” At the bottom of the first page, an unknown hand wrote + “Closed 4–1–77 KM.” + Washington, March + 17, 1977 + + SUBJECT + Congressional Notification of Pending Conventional Arms Transfer + Cases + +

Secretary Vance recommends that + selected arms sales be transmitted to Congress prior to completion of + the PRM/NSC–12 review on this subject (Tab A).See Document 263. + In addition, he recommends that he determine which cases you should + review in the future.

+

I agree with Secretary Vance that + there are sound reasons to transmit selected cases at this time. In my + view, however, the only clearly uncontroversial cases are those in the + Secretary’s categories I and II (construction and follow-on support, and + follow-on ammunition supplies), and recommended NATO, Israel and Jordan cases in categories III and IV + (supplements to existing inventories, and major new equipment). Their + transmittal would have the least adverse effect on the PRM review and should generate little or + no opposition in Congress. The other category III and IV sales, however, + are precisely those which must come under closer scrutiny if we are to + restrain the sale of arms. For this reason, I recommend deferral of all + the other category III and IV transmittals until the PRM review is completed in the first week + in April.

+

Concerning which cases you should review, you have stated publicly that + all arms sales are to come to you directly before submission to Congress. In + addition, I believe it would be premature to decide what future cases + you will or will not see before you have reviewed the results of PRM–12. If, after reviewing the PRM–12 response, you decide to delegate to + the Secretary of State the authority to determine which cases will be + forwarded to you, no agency could maintain that such a decision was made + without consideration of its views on the subject.

+

RECOMMENDATION

+

That you approve transmittal to Congress at this time of all category I + and II arms sales cases, and the recommended NATO, Israel and Jordan cases only in categories III and IV.Carter did + not indicate his preference with respect to this recommendation.

+

That you defer a decision on which future cases should be forwarded to + you for review.Carter did not indicate his preference with respect + to this recommendation.

+
+ +
+ 266. Minutes of a Policy Review Committee MeetingSource: Carter Library, National Security Council, + Institutional Files, Box 60, PRC + 008, Latin America 3/23/77. Secret. The meeting took place in the + White House Situation Room. The minutes are scheduled to be printed + in full in Foreign + Relations, 1977–1980, vol. XXIV, South America; Latin + America Regional. + Washington, March 24, 1977, + 3:30–5:00 p.m. + + SUBJECT + Latin America + + + PARTICIPANTS + + State + Warren + Christopher + Terence + Todman + William Luers + + + Defense + Charles + Duncan + Major Gen. Richard E. Cavazos + + + Joint Chiefs of Staff + General George S. + Brown + Lt. General William + Smith + + + CIA + Deputy Director Enno Knoche + Robert Hopkins + + + Treasury + Anthony Solomon + Edward Bittner + + + Arms Control and Disarmament Agency + Leon Sloss + + + Commerce + Frank Weil + + + NSC + Dr. Zbigniew + Brzezinski + David Aaron + Thomas Thornton + Robert A. + Pastor + + +

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to conventional arms + transfers.]

+ +

Arms Transfers

+

Christopher asked whether the + United States, as a declining source of arms to Latin America, is + justified in adopting a special policy on arms transfers to Latin + America.In undated talking points for a + March 15 PRC meeting sent under + cover of a March 12 briefing memorandum for Vance, the Assistant Secretary for + Inter-American Affairs, Terence + Todman, and the Director of Policy Planning, + Anthony Lake, suggested + that Vance note that U.S. + options in terms of regional arms control were limited given its + declining role in providing arms to Latin America. (National + Archives, RG 59, Records of + Anthony Lake, Policy + Planning Staff, Office of the Director, Entry P–9, Regular Subject + Papers, Box 2, Folder TL 3/1–15/77)

+

General Brown reminded everyone + that in the early Kennedy years + we tried to get Latin American governments to shift defense expenditures + to nation-building, but as sovereign states, they just turned to other + sources to buy arms. As long as they are going to buy, he preferred that + they buy from us rather than the Russians.

+

Sloss from ACDA said that we must approach this + problem globally at both ends. Discuss it with the Soviets and with + other suppliers, and at the same time urge restraint by purchasers. If + this does not work, he is inclined to agree with George Brown.

+

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to conventional arms + transfers.]

+
+ +
+ + 267. Memorandum of ConversationSource: Department of State, Office of the Secretariat + Staff, Special Adviser to the Secretary (S/MS) on Soviet Affairs + Marshall Shulman—Jan 21, + 77–Jan 19, 81, Lot 81D109, Box 8, Vance to Moscow, March 28–30, 1977. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Krimer; approved in draft by + Hyland; and approved by + Twadell on May 9. The meeting took place at the Kremlin. The + memorandum is printed in full in Foreign Relations, 1977–1980, vol. + VI, Soviet Union, Document 20. + Moscow, March 29, 1977, 4:30–7:30 + p.m. + + SUBJECT + Middle East, Arms Control + + + PARTICIPANTS + + UNITED STATES + Secretary Cyrus R. + Vance + Ambassador Malcolm + Toon + Mr. Paul + Warnke + Assistant Secretary Arthur + Hartman + Mr. William + Hyland + Mr. Leslie + Gelb + Mr. William D. + Krimer, Interpreter + + + USSR + Foreign Minister A.A. + Gromyko + Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers L.V. + Smirnov + Deputy Foreign Minister G.M. + Korniyenko + Ambassador A.F. + Dobrynin + Notetaker—Name Unknown + Mr. V.M. + Sukhodrev, Interpreter + + +

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to conventional arms + transfers.]

+

ARMS TRANSFERS

+

The Secretary suggested they now take up the + question of arms transfers to third world countries. He said that we + were concerned that arms transfers by the US and USSR to other + countries, into the third world, could in the long run only lead to + misunderstandings and difficulties. In our judgement, we had to find a + way to exercise restraint in transferring arms to third world countries. + Our restraint would depend on restraint by the Soviet Union, and it + seemed to us that we should also enlist the cooperation of other sellers + of weapons. As President Carter had said, we + would be prepared to take unilateral steps in this direction. But in the + long run, unilateral action could not succeed without the cooperation of + other countries supplying arms. He proposed to use a specific example. + In our judgement, providing arms to countries in southern Africa would + fuel the flames and possibly lead to a broad conflict. We believed that + this was not in the interest of either our two countries nor in the + interest of people in the area. We believed that such actions could only + strain relations between our two countries, which was not in our mutual + interest. Therefore, we wanted to get the situation under control, either on a multilateral + or bilateral basis. The United States would like to begin a serious + dialogue on the question of arms transfers. He would appreciate learning + Gromyko’s thoughts on how we + could exchange views on this subject. We would emphasize our interest in + how one might reach a multilateral agreement among arms suppliers, and + how one might best proceed to organize such an accord. We had already + raised our concerns with the Federal Republic of Germany, Great Britain + and France.

+

Gromyko + acknowledged that the problem did exist. No one could deny that. Much + weaponry was supplied to many countries. The biggest arms supplier, as + President Carter has said on + various occasions, was the United States, and had been for some time. In + this connection, he would ask a specific question by way of example. Who + was it that forced the United States to supply billions of dollars worth + of armaments to Iran—was it any action on the part of the Soviet Union + or some other country? Was this really indicative of any desire to + exercise restraint? The Soviet leadership had been surprised and + concerned when it learned of these massive arms sales. In effect, these + sales had aggravated the problem. That was his first remark. Secondly, + it was obvious that this question should be posed within the context of + the military clashes that were taking place in the world. There were + some countries that, whether we wanted it or not, were involved in + military conflicts, and this fact was greatly related to the question of + arms transfers. Only on paper could these two questions be separated. In + any case, very frequently this linkage was obvious. Thirdly, the Soviet + Union would be prepared to consider any concrete proposal the US Government wanted to table with a view + to resolving this problem. Whenever the United States was ready, the + USSR would be happy to take a look + at it. The more specific, the better. Before involving others, it would + perhaps be better to talk between our two countries; otherwise, third + parties might ask for our own joint views, which might not exist.

+

The Secretary said that one of the problems one + faces in the area of arms transfers was that it was often said that + should we not sell arms to some country or another, the Soviet Union, or + France, or Germany, would certainly jump in and do so. As a result, arms + sales continued. One simply had to find a way to cut the Gordian + Knot.

+

Gromyko + said he realized the problem did exist and it was necessary to take a + look at it.

+

The Secretary asked if it might be looked at in + the context of the Middle East, perhaps.

+

Gromyko + said that if it were done in the context of a peaceful settlement in + that area, the Soviet Union would be in favor of it.

+

The Secretary asked: “Why not before?”

+ +

Gromyko + said that it could not be done before, simply because it would be wrong + from a political, factual, or any other aspect now. For example, on + February 18, 1977, Reuters reported a statement by Prime Minister Rabin + of Israel that Israel had received 1½ billion dollars worth of weapons + since the 1973 war, as against 300 million before that. Gromyko thought the Secretary would + agree that arms transfers and conflicts were interrelated.

+

The Secretary pointed out that this was certainly + not a one-sided issue. The Minister would know that the Soviet Union had + supplied massive arms to Middle East countries.

+

Gromyko + said he would not deny that, and suggested our two countries find ways + to do something about it.

+

The Secretary asked: “What about Africa?”

+

Gromyko + said the same thing applied there, except that in that whole area there + were 100 times more American weapons than Soviet.

+

The Secretary suggested that was something that we + must jointly examine in the future.

+
+ +
+ 268. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security + Affairs (Brzezinski) to President + CarterSource: Carter Library, Brzezinski Donated Material, + Subject File, Box 24, Meetings—PRC + 11: 4/12/77. Secret. Although the memorandum is undated, a list of + attendees attached to the Summary of Minutes at Tab C, but not + printed, indicates that the PRC + meeting occurred on April 12. (Ibid.) + Washington, undated + + SUBJECT + PRC Meeting on PRM–12—Conventional Arms + Control + +

Yesterday the PRC met on the subject of + conventional arms control. Attached you will find the following:

+

—At Tab A: decision memorandum covering the five major issues on which + there was disagreement. In each case the options + chosen and arguments for and against are presented on the facing + page.

+

—At Tab B: For your information—to be initialed if approved—a summary of + the PRM’s conclusions on which there + was consensus. These are presented as modified by the PRC discussion.

+

—At Tab C: For your information only (Tab A contains the relevant + portions needed for decision), a summary of the + minutes of the meeting, and a list of attendees.

+

The major issue remains whether or not to impose a dollar volume ceiling. + In my view, the implicit message of those who argued against imposing a + ceiling was the feeling—or the fear—that we would not stay under it. + This goes right to the heart of the question of whether you are + determined to achieve real reductions in the volume of arms transferred + overseas. If you are, then nearly everyone would agree that the only way + to do so is to set a specific ceiling.

+

The fear that we might not meet a ceiling is quite justified. The FY 1976 FMS total, excluding NATO, Japan, Australia, and New Zealand, was $7.02 billion. The comparable estimate for FY 1977 (including the decisions you made + earlier this week) is $8.25 billion. Possible + additional major cases of which State is already aware are:

+ + + + Possible Major Cases + Low + High + + + Iran + 250 F–18L + 2.5 + 3.0 + + + Iran + 140 F–16 + 2.2 + 2.2 + + + Saudi Arabia + 50 F–15 + 3.0 + 4.0 + + + Israel + 250 F–16 + 3.0 + 4.0 + + + Spain + 72 F–16 + 1.2 + 1.5 + + + Pakistan + 110 A–7 + .6 + .6 + + + Korea + 60 F–16 + 1.0 + 1.0 + + + Israel + Miscellaneous + .3 + .3 + + + Egypt + 200 F–5s + .7 + .7 + + + + + 14.5 + 17.3 + +
+

Thus we are already more than a billion dollars over last fiscal year. A + lot more is pending, and we have 5 months left to + go of FY 1977.

+

On the other hand, if we look at the calendar year—for which this + Administration is responsible—the picture is much brighter, in fact a + significant cut appears possible. My point is simply that a strict + discipline is going to be needed to just avoid surpassing last year—let + alone cutting back.

+

At this time, your choice is among: a specific ceiling; an unspecified + reduction; or, relying on other types of controls to achieve restraint. + The decision of exactly what a ceiling should cover, exactly what level + should be adopted, and which year it should be applied to, can be + addressed in a follow-on paper if you decide on the ceiling option.

+

In my opinion there are three compelling reasons for a ceiling:

+ +

—Political necessity. Neither Congress nor the + press will let you get away with saying “we will sell less” as was + suggested yesterday. Conventional arms control was a major focus of your + campaign.

+

—International necessity. The U.S., as the world’s + leading supplier, will have to make clear its intent to exercise + restraint if we are to create any international momentum toward joint + supplier restraint. Tougher management guidelines will not be + sufficient.

+

—Management realities. A ceiling is probably the + only way to force the hard choices necessary to actually cut the volume + of arms transfers.

+

Tab A

+

Major Issues of DisagreementSecret.

+

Washington, undated

+

DOLLAR VOLUME CEILINGS

+

Vance + recommends Control 3(b). He believes there is a need for a ceiling in + the early years of the new arms sales policy, because it would help us + discipline ourselves and manage the program more effectively than would + a general statement on reduction. Also, it would force us to consider + more explicitly the trade-offs between and among arms sales.

+

Brown + recommends Control 2. He believes that establishing a ceiling would: 1) + reduce our flexibility; 2) encourage purchasers to cluster their orders + early in the fiscal year; 3) result in the ceiling being used as a + floor; 4) lead to enormous accounting problems; 5) spur Congress to put + ceilings or subceilings into law. He notes, however, that a ceiling is + politically attractive and the only sure way to meet our goal of + restraint in the conventional arms area.

+

Warnke + recommends Control 2, agreeing that the ceiling cuts into our + flexibility and may become a target. He would recommend, however, using + the term “significant reduction.”

+

Smith + (JCS) recommends Control 1.

+

Benson + (Under Secretary of State for Security Assistance) recommends Control 2, + believing that reductions in arms sales can be achieved without an + inflexible ceiling.

+

Lance + recommends Control 2, but would also use the term “significant + reduction.”

+ +

Aaron + recommends Control 3(b). He believes that, given your statements on this + subject, defense of a new policy of restraint would be a political + impossibility without a quantified percentage reduction or ceiling. He + stated that this would be the first question asked of Jody Powell and our witnesses on the + Hill.

+

Brzezinski + recommends Control 3(b), believing that only a ceiling will allow you to + fulfill your pledge to reduce the transfer of arms. Establishment of a + ceiling would tell the U.S. public and the world that we intend to scale + down our arms transfers, thus indicating our sincerity to the French, + British, and other suppliers.

+

DOLLAR VOLUME CEILINGS

+

Issue: Should there be a fixed ceiling on the + dollar volume of U.S. arms transfers?

+

Controls:

+

1. Utilize ceilings for planning purposes only, relying on other specific + controls to achieve greater restraint in arms transfers.

+

2. State that the dollar volume of arms transfers in FY 1977 will be reduced from the FY 76 total, and that the volume of FY 1978 transfers will likewise be reduced + from the FY 1977 total.Carter bracketed the phrase that begins with “the + dollar volume” and ends with “transfers will likewise”, drew a line + through “likewise”, and wrote a comment in the right-hand margin + that is illegible.

+

3. For FY 1977, impose a ceiling on total + U.S. arms transfers at a level equal to the FY 1976 total. For FY 1978, + reduce the ceiling by 10 percentCarter underlined “10 percent” and + wrote a comment in the right-hand margin that is illegible. + from the FY 1976 total. The ceiling + could be applied:

+

a. Across the board to all types of transfers: weapons, ammunitions, + supporting equipment, spare parts, training, and construction.

+

b. Only to weapons and weapons-related items, exempting those sales which + clearly can be classified as services.

+

Decision:

+

Control 1. _______

+

2. ______Carter drew lines to 2 and 3a here and wrote + “Combine. J” and “Specific to reductions or # limits [that] will be + set by me with Cy + Harold—J” in the right-hand margin.

+

3a. ______

+

3b. ______

+ +

LIMITS ON TRANSFERS OF NEW + SYSTEMS

+

Vance + recommends Controls 1, 2, and 4. He believes that this issue is at the + heart of the arms sale problem, and strict controls need to be + established.

+

Brown + recommends Control 1, and if dollar volume ceilings are not imposed, he recommends Control 4 also. He + does not recommend Control 2, because of our Latin American experience + which has demonstrated that unilateral restraint on our part does not + reduce the flow of weapons to a region.

+

Warnke + recommends Controls 1, 2, and 4. He also believes this issue is central + to the arms sale problem, and that strict control is thus a necessity. + He notes that Controls 2 and 4 are inextricably bound, that applying + Control 4 without Control 2 would be of little use.

+

Smith + recommends Control 4.

+

Lance + recommends Controls 1, 2, and 3.

+

Brzezinski + recommends Control 1, assuming dollar volume + ceilings are established. He notes that while Control 2 appears + reasonable in the abstract, it might unduly limit our flexibility in + future situations, where transfer of limited amounts of high-technology + equipment may advance our interests.

+

LIMITS ON TRANSFER OF SIGNIFICANT NEW + SYSTEMS

+

Issue: The issue is the extent to which we should + limit the transfer, or production abroad, of significant, + newly-developed weapons systems. The transfer of advanced systems raises + concern about destabilizing effects in the region involved, the + financial burdens involved for recipients, and the compromise of new + technology.

+

Controls:

+

1. Establish more extensive guidelines for assessing requests for + equipment sales, including requirements 1) that supplying the system + would uniquely strengthen the requestor’s ability to perform military + functions which serve U.S. security interests, and 2) that less-advanced + existing systems with roughly comparable capabilities are unavailable + from the United States.Carter wrote “ok” in the + right-hand margin beside this paragraph, and a comment beneath it + that is illegible.

+

2. Enunciate the principle that the United States will not be the first + supplier to introduce into a region an advanced weapon that creates a + new or significantly higher combat capability.Carter + wrote “ok” in the right-hand margin beside this + paragraph.

+ +

3. Compile a list of all major advanced systems which we will not release + overseas for sale, cooperative R&D, + or coproduction.

+

4. Prohibit the commitment for sale, cooperative R&D, or coproduction of newly-developed, major weapons + systems at least until the systems are operationally deployed with U.S. + forces.Carter wrote “ok” in the right-hand margin beside + this paragraph.

+

Decision:

+

Control 1. ______Carter checked options 1, 2, and + 4.

+

2. ______

+

3. ______

+

4. ______

+

LIMITS ON NEW TECHNOLOGY EXPLICITLY + DEVELOPED FOR EXPORT

+

Vance + recommends Control 3.

+

Brown + recommends Control 2. He is against U.S. manufacturers becoming so + involved in a foreign market as to have a vested interest.

+

Warnke + recommends Control 2, but would support Control 3.

+

Benson + recommends Control 3, but would support Control 2.

+

Brzezinski + recommends Control 1.

+

LIMITS ON NEW TECHNOLOGY EXPLICITLY + DEVELOPED FOR EXPORT

+

Issue: Should the United States permit the sale + abroad of systems which represent advanced U.S. weapons technology, but + which are developed or modified especially for the foreign market?

+

Controls:

+

1. Establish more extensive guidelines for assessing requests for + equipment sales, including requirements 1) that supplying the system + would uniquely strengthen the requestor’s ability to perform military + functions which serve U.S. security interests; 2) that after a specified + period, the requestor must have the ability to maintain the system with + minimal U.S. assistance; and 3) that less-advanced, existing systems + with roughly comparable capabilities are unavailable from the United + States or friendly suppliers.

+

2. Permit the export of unique systems or major modifications of U.S. + systems on a case-by-case basis if the recipient validates a requirement + for a specific weapon system to fulfill a specific mission, but normally prohibit sales if roughly + comparable capabilities could be provided by existing or planned + systems.Carter wrote “ok” in the right-hand margin beside + this paragraph.

+

3. Permit export of unique advanced weapons systems or major + modifications onlyCarter underlined “only”, drew a + line to the word “modifications”, and wrote “unless special + circumstances [illegible] by president—” in the space above this + paragraph. to key treaty allies (NATO, Japan, Australia, and New Zealand). Prohibit in all + other cases.

+

Decision:

+

Control 1. ______

+

2. ______

+

3. ______Carter checked option 3, and wrote “Does this change + present policy toward Israel? J” in the margin.

+

LIMITS ON COPRODUCTION

+

Vance + recommends Control 1.

+

Brown + recommends Control 1, but would not object to imposition of Control + 2.

+

Warnke + recommends Control 1, but would not object to imposition of Control + 2.

+

Smith + recommends Control 1.

+

Lance + recommends Control 2.

+

Brzezinski + recommends Control 2, noting that it would be inconsistent to approve + significant numbers of coproduction agreements while restricting U.S. + exports of high-technology items.

+

LIMITS ON COPRODUCTION

+

Issue: The development of indigenous military + industries is a priority objective of an increasing number of countries. + Responding to requests for assistance in establishing production + capabilities is a growing policy issue for the United States. There are + two interrelated concerns: (1) Should the United States limit the number + of significant coproduction agreements; and (2) How might we restrict + the proliferation of arms we do approve for coproduction.

+

Controls:

+

1. Subject all requests to review under guidelines applied globally. In + reviewing requests, analyze closely whether or not the proposed + coproduction project would over time provide equipment in excess of local needs. Stipulate in each + approved agreement the terms under which exports will be permitted, if + at all, emphasizing the principle that coproduction is intended for the + co-producers’ requirements and not for export.

+

2. Prohibit all new coproduction agreements of significant weapons, + equipment, or major components, beyond assembly of subcomponents and the + fabrication of high-turnover spare parts, except with key allies and + where the President determines that such agreement is justified by + extraordinary circumstances. Subject requests for any other items (e.g., + major overhaul facilities) to review under guidelines applied globally. + Apply to all agreements the export restrictions specified in Control + 1.

+

Decision:

+

Control 1. ______

+

2. ______Carter checked option 2 and wrote “Explain + consequences to me” in the right-hand margin.

+

SENSITIVE WEAPONS

+

Vance + recommends Control 3.

+

Brown + recommends Control 3.

+

Warnke + recommends Control 1, believing that a list is unnecessary if we + establish a policy presumption against sales. If a list were approved, + he has no opinion on whether it should be public or private.

+

Smith + recommends Control 3.

+

Benson + recommends either Control 2 or Control 3.

+

Lance + recommends Control 1, with the President approving exceptions.

+

Brzezinski + recommends Control 3.

+

SENSITIVE WEAPONS

+

Issue: Certain weapons are considered sensitive + from a political or a security point of view, because they are + particularly deadly, or are particularly susceptible to use by + terrorists. Should there be a public listing of sensitive weapons which + the United States will not transfer to foreign countries?

+

Controls:

+

1. Continue the current system of informal, unpublished guidelines.

+

2. Establish a public list of sensitive items which the United States + will not transfer abroad.

+ +

3. Establish a list of sensitive items which the United States will not + transfer abroad, but do not make it public.Carter + wrote “ok” in the right-hand margin beside this + paragraph.

+

Decision:

+

Control 1. ______

+

2. ______

+

3. ______Carter checked option 3 and wrote “J” in the + right-hand margin.

+

Tab B

+

Areas of ConsensusSecret.

+

Washington, undated

+

1. Management

+

RECOMMENDATION:

+

1. Maintain essentially the present system, but improve procedures by + means of more explicit guidelines drawn from the policy controls + chosen.

+

2. Additionally, approve in principle the + establishment of an interagency Arms Export Control Board, advisory to + the Secretary of State and chaired by the Under Secretary for Security + Assistance, with the Director of State’s Bureau of Politico-Military + Affairs as Vice Chairman. Terms of reference for the Board would be + determined later.Carter wrote a comment beneath + this paragraph that is illegible.

+

2. Multilateral + Restraint

+

RECOMMENDATION: On the basis of the President’s + decisions that define U.S. policy, State and ACDA will develop a plan to promote international + cooperation in restraint of arms transfers.

+

3. Control of U.S. + Government Financing: MAP

+

RECOMMENDATION: Continue to use grant MAP as an element of base agreement quid + pro quo, and in special cases on a temporary basis for specific + political and military purposes (e.g., Jordan).

+

4. Control of U.S. + Financing: FMS Credits

+

RECOMMENDATION: Continue to provide FMS financing at levels determined + essentially by U.S. political and military objectives.

+ +

5. Employment of U.S. + Citizens on Overseas Defense Contracts

+

RECOMMENDATION: The question of the extensive use + of U.S. citizens to support overseas military projects will be a factor + in arms transfer decisions.

+

6. Third Party + Transfers

+

RECOMMENDATION: That a policy recommendation be + made to terminate assistance in cases of substantial violations;

+

Additionally, as a condition of sale for certain + categories of equipment and certain countries, require agreement between + the United States and the recipient that the equipment will not be transferred.

+

Additionally, in cases where there is a serious + risk of future unauthorized third party transfer or the quantity of + items appears to exceed military needs, deny the original sales request + or reduce the quantity requested.

+

7. Arms Transfers to + Low-Income Countries

+

RECOMMENDATION: Obtain an interagency assessment + of the economic impact of proposed transfers of major defense equipment + to those LDCs receiving United States + economic assistance. Consider denying arms requests when the economic + impact is substantial.

+

8. Restricting Arms + Transfers to Government-to-Government Transactions

+

RECOMMENDATION: Maintain a mix of + government-to-government and commercial sales. Review present categories + of commercial transfers to identify those items which might be shifted + to government channels. Remove civilian-type items from the Munitions + List.

+

9. Commercial and + Government Incentives to Stimulate Arms Transfers

+

RECOMMENDATION: Policy level approval by the + Department of State is required before authorizing:

+

(a) licenses for sales promotion or technical data transmission by + private firms;

+

(b) U.S. military or civilian briefings, site surveys, transmission of + technical information, or any similar activity which might promote the + sale of defense articles or services.

+

Additionally, U.S. embassies and military elements + will not promote nor assist in the promotion of arms sales without + specific authorization.

+

Additionally, the Defense Department will continue + its review of Government procedures which may promote sale of arms, + reporting the results of this review to the President within 60 + days.

+ +

Tab C

+

Summary Minutes of a Policy Review + Committee MeetingSecret.

+

Washington, undated

+

SUMMARY MINUTES

+

POLICY REVIEW COMMITTEE MEETING ON ARMS + TRANSFERS (List of Attendees Attached)Attached but not printed.

+

Dollar Volume Ceilings

+

Brown + argued against dollar volume ceilings, citing the following reasons: 1) + reduces our flexibility; 2) encourages purchasers to cluster orders + early in the fiscal year; 3) encourages use of the ceiling as a floor; + 4) would lead to enormous accounting problems; 5) might spur Con-gress + to put ceilings or even subceilings into law. Brown said the + arguments for dollar volume ceilings include: 1) the political + attractiveness of ceilings; and 2) the fact that it is the only sure way + of doing what we said we would do in the conventional arms area. Brown, + Warnke, and Benson + recommended that instead of imposing a ceiling, we should state that we + will agree to sell less each year, something that has occurred over the + past two years anyway, and something which would indicate our commitment + to restraint. Warnke and Lance recommended further + that the President announce that we will have “significant reductions” + in arms sales. Smith stated his opposition to a ceiling, + maintaining that we will have trouble with our allies if we set an + arbitrary ceiling at the outset of a fiscal year.

+

Brzezinski + said that he thought ceilings would allow the President to fulfill his + pledge to reduce the transfer of arms, and that ceilings would tell the + U.S. public and the world, especially other suppliers, that the + President intends to scale down the transfer of arms. Brzezinski stated, however, that he + would recommend focusing on weaponry since that is what contributes most + significantly to the arms race. Vance stated that he believed + there was a need for a ceiling in the early years of the new arms sales + policy, because it would help us discipline ourselves and manage the + program more effectively than would a general statement on reduction. + Aaron + stated that, given the President’s strong statements on this subject, + defense of the new policy would be a political impossibility without a + number indicating some percentage reduction or ceiling. Vance + agreed, and Brzezinski stated that, excluding allies and focusing on weaponry alone, + a 10 percent cut would be an appropriate number.

+

Significant New Systems

+

Vance and + Warnke recommended: + adoption of restrictive guidelines; enunciation of a principle that we + would not be the first to introduce significant systems into a region; + and, prohibition of transfer at least until the system was deployed with + U.S. forces. Brown and Smith supported the prohibition of transfer at + least until U.S. operational deployment. Brzezinski and Brown were hesitant about + establishing the principle prohibiting our first introduction of a + significant system, because it might be beneficial in selected instances + to introduce limited quantities of new significant items to preclude + proliferation of less-significant, but still dangerous, weaponry. If + dollar volume ceilings are established, Brzezinski recommended only + adopting restrictive guidelines.

+

New Technology Developed Solely for + Export

+

Brown, Warnke, and Lance recommended that + systems developed or modified solely for export normally be approved + only if a special need exists and comparable capabilities cannot be + provided by an existing U.S. system. Brown stated that he is + against U.S. suppliers becoming so involved in foreign markets that they + develop a vested interest. Vance recommended an even + more restrictive control, allowing transfers of this type only to key + allies. Brzezinski recommended establishment of + extensive guidelines, rather than the other two controls.

+

Coproduction

+

Brzezinski and + Lance recommended + prohibition of coproduction agreements except in very limited + circumstances. Brzezinski noted that it would be inconsistent + to approve coproduction agreements while restricting U.S. exports of + military equipment. All other participants recommended adoption of + restrictive, but not prohibitive, guidelines, although Brown, Warnke, and Benson stated they could + accept the guideline calling for prohibition.

+

Sensitive Weapons

+

Most of the participants agreed that a list of sensitive weapons needs to + be established. Vance, Brown, + Smith, and Brzezinski recommended keeping + the list private, Brown asserting that a public list could be an + attractive nuisance. Lance recommended maintaining the current + system of informal, unpublished guidelines, while Warnke said that a + list would be unnecessary if we established a presumption against + sales.

+ +

Arms Export Control Board

+

There was agreement in principle to establish an interagency Arms Export + Control Board, advisory to the Secretary of State, and chaired by the + Under Secretary of State for Security Assistance. Terms of reference + will be established in a follow-on memorandum, with special emphasis + given to ensuring the President is kept apprised of significant + developments.

+

Multilateral Initiatives

+

Vance + reiterated our commitment to seek multilateral cooperation after + establishing our own policy. He stated that it would be ACDA and State’s responsibility to + develop a proposed program for submission to the President.

+
+ +
+ 269. Memorandum of ConversationSource: Department of State, Office of the Secretariat + Staff, Cyrus R. Vance, + Secretary of State—1977–1980, Lot 84D241, Box 10, EXDIS + Memcons, 1977. Confidential; + Exdis. Drafted by Jenkins; + cleared by Benson in + substance and Kimmitt in draft; and approved by Twaddell on May 4. The meeting took + place at the Capitol. Vance + held a similar meeting with members of the House of Representatives + on April 26. (Ibid.) + Washington, April + 28, 1977 + + SUBJECT + Arms Transfer Policy + + + PRESENT + The Secretary + Mrs. Lucy Benson, Under + Secretary, Security Assistance + Mr. Robert Kimmitt, NSC + Staff + Mr. Kempton Jenkins, Deputy Assistant Secretary, Congressional + Relations + Senator Sparkman + Senator Baker + Senator Stennis + Senator Percy + Senator Pell + Senator McGovern + Senator Clark + Senator Stone + Senator Sarbanes + Senator Thurmond + Senator Javits + + Senator Glenn + Senator InouyeDucked in for a few + minutes only. [Footnote is in the original.] + +

Before the session got underway, Baker raised some questions about how genuine the + consultation was to be. He noted the Gwertzman story in the New York Times last MondayThe New York Times published + Bernard Gwertzman’s article “Carter is Studying Arms Sale Controls” on April + 25. and wondered whether, in fact, the President had already + made his decisions. The Secretary informed him that the decisions had + not been made and regretted the leak. He pointed out that the Gwertzman + story concerned an options paperReference + is to a paper prepared by the Ad Hoc Interagency Group on Arms + Transfer, “Response to PRM/NSC–12: Arms Transfer Policy Review,” + undated, attached to an April 7 memorandum from the Acting Staff + Secretary of the National Security Council, Michael Hornblow. + (National Archives, RG 383, Records + of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Office of the Director, + Subject Files Pertaining to Presidential Review Memorandum and + Directives, MEMCONS with Foreign + Officials, and National Security Decision and Study Memoranda, May + 1963–October 1980, Accession #383–98–0053, Box 1, Presidential + Review Memorandum/NSC–12—Arms + Transfer Policy Review, January–May 1977) and what he was + discussing today was a Presidential draft drawn up after considering the + options paper.

+

The Secretary then distributed copies of the draftSee Attachment to Document 270. to each + Member and led the Members through a point-by-point consideration of + it.

+

Introduction

+

Sparkman and Percy queried how we would be able to + factor in the human rights element. Sparkman expressed some worry that commitment to human + rights can be perceived as intervention; the difference is a fine line. + The Secretary recognized the problem and assured the Senators that it + was the President’s intention to deal with this problem with great + precision and care.

+

Paragraph 1

+

Senator Stone opened the longest + discussion of the meeting by questioning the specific exemptions for + NATO, Australia, New Zealand and + Japan, criticizing the absence of Israel from the excepted list. He + pointed out that the problem was exactly the same on points 3 and 4 in + the paper.

+

McGovern contested Stone, pointing out that, should we + make a specific exception for Israel, we would then be cast in the role + once again of one-sided support for Israel at the expense of the Arab + states. He emphasized that pursuit of a peaceful settlement in the + Middle East is the most important contribution we can make to Israeli + security. Stone disagreed, + insisting that the draft in its present form “discriminates” against Israel. He insisted the + document must include a reference to our special relationship with + Israel. Stone and McGovern then had a brief but intense + exchange without result. Pell + interjected that the way to solve this problem might be to drop the + specification of any countries. Stone accepted that; Sarbanes pressed for deleting the exceptions in all + three paragraphs.

+

Paragraph 2B

+

Javits expressed concern that the + “prohibited” terminology was too sweeping. He said, furthermore, how + could a system be operationally deployed with U.S. forces before + research and development are already completed? He suggested that 2B be + recast in the language of 2A, i.e., “except in extraordinary + circumstances approved by the President”. While no one else at the + meeting spoke on that subject, several Members nodded their agreement + with Javits’ suggestion.

+

Paragraph 3

+

Sparkman suggested deleting the + exceptions would solve the only problem in this paragraph. Sarbanes and others concurred.

+

Paragraph 4

+

Several of the Members commented again on the “exception” for NATO countries, et al. Once again it was + clear that deletion of these exceptions would solve the + no-reference-to-Israel problem. Stone insisted that the absence of any reference to + Israel in this document which does reference other exceptions would + clearly be a signal to Israel and the Arab states of a downgrading of + the U.S. special relationship with Israel.

+

Paragraph 5

+

McGovern noted that this is simply + a restatement of the existing law under the Foreign Assistance Act, + which the Secretary confirmed.

+

Paragraph 6

+

Glenn and Javits expressed concern that this + paragraph is perhaps more sweeping than we realize. Glenn even suggested that we might be + exceeding our constitutional authority and said, “You will be telling + American businessmen that they cannot go out and sell unless the + Department of State authorizes it.” The Secretary and Mrs. Benson pointed out that there have + been preliminary discussions with a number of defense corporations and + that they seemed ready, generally, to acquiesce in this practice. In + point of fact, Mrs. Benson said, + much of this preliminary discussion with the State Department is already + a well-established tradition, although nothing is as complete and + binding as that in the draft. Other members of the Committee agreed with + Glenn’s assessment that this + is a significant policy change, but, in contrast to Glenn, they clearly support it—Clark, McGovern, Pell + and Sarbanes particularly.

+

Javits suggested that we subsume + paragraph 6 under paragraph 2 and limit its application to + “sophisticated weaponry”.

+

There was then a good deal of back and forth with Glenn, Javits and others as to what is covered and what is not. + It seemed from the discussion that a brief insert after the language, + “defense articles and services” to explain that we mean items of major + defense equipment on the ITAR list + would answer these questions.

+

Arms Control and Iran

+

McGovern then asked the Secretary + about how this new policy would impact upon our arms sales to Iran and + the Committee’s deep concern about arms transfers to the Persian Gulf + area. The Secretary said, in his judgment, this policy would have a + profound effect on arms sales to Iran, particularly in terms of the more + sophisticated weaponry which the Iranians have sought. He pointed out + that in Iran, for example, a number of cases had developed where arms + salesmen had dealt directly with the Iranians and had created interest + in advanced weapons systems, some still on the drawing board, which then + posed a diplomatic challenge for us if we chose to limit such sales.

+

Earlier Notification to Congress

+

Clark said he hailed the + President’s draft and wondered if we might not wish to crank in a + specific means of providing earlier notification to the Congress. He + said whereas Congress now has 20 days informal notice and 30 days formal + notice, this was still after an arms sale project was fairly well + developed and Congressional disapproval became difficult and + diplomatically expensive. He referred to the possibility of + Congressional involvement at the price-and-availability stage. Clark said perhaps the new board for + arms sales controls would be the best vehicle for early Congressional + input. Mrs. Benson and the + Secretary concurred.

+

Hussein’s Visit

+

Javits then raised the question of + Hussein’s visit.King Hussein of Jordan visited the United States + on April 25–26. For more on these meetings, see Foreign + Relations, vol. VIII, Arab-Israeli Dispute, January + 1977–August 1978, Documents 30 and 31. He said the + situation, in his judgment, is now ripe for a review of Rabat.King Hussein and Yasser Arafat, the head of + the Palestine Liberation Organization, met in Rabat, Morocco in + March to discuss a proposed Palestinian state on the West Bank and + whether the PLO should be an independent representative or part of + the Jordanian delegation to an upcoming peace conference on the + Middle East. He wondered whether this had come up during + Hussein’s visit.

+ +

The Secretary replied that he had indeed discussed it with Hussein. He + said Hussein will not be the first one to raise the question with his + colleagues, and other leaders are not sufficiently in agreement to + revise it. It would seem, however, that this could be done some time in + the future.

+

Javits replied that few things + would provide more reassurance as to peaceful settlement in the Middle + East. Hussein has a well-deserved reputation as a moderate. The Rabat + agreement, however, gave the ball to the radical militants among Arab + leaders and he, Javits, felt it + was a matter of great urgency to get the ball back into the hands of the + moderates.

+

Consultation

+

The meeting concluded with a number of Senators, including Percy and Sparkman particularly, praising this genuine + consultation. It was obvious that all the Members present recognized the + serious intent on the part of the President to consult in advance. They + expressed the hope that this is the harbinger of a new era in + consultation.

+
+ +
+ 270. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security + Affairs (Brzezinski) to President + CarterSource: Carter Library, National + Security Affairs, Staff Material, Global Issues, Mathews Subject File, Box 3, Arms + Sales, Presidential Review Memorandum/NSC–12: 5/75–6/77. Secret; Sensitive. In the upper + right-hand corner of the memorandum, Carter wrote “ok—Will issue after + Summit—JC.” + Washington, May 3, + 1977 +

Attached is a revised version of the proposed Presidential Directive on + arms transfers. It has been revised by Cy + Vance and myself, in the light of Cy’s consultations on + the Hill.See Document + 269.

+

To facilitate your reading and approval, the new passages are underlined; + previously approved language to be removed is bracketed and crossed out + in pencil.

+

More specifically, please note that the first underlined passage merely + states the exemption which previously had been repeated several times + throughout the PD, thereby flagging it + excessively. Since the US has 42 defense treaties, we concluded + that we had no choice but at least to mention these special treaty + obligations specifically once.

+

The addition to paragraph 2 c. was in our submission to you, and I think + it is consistent with what you favor. If it is not we will take it + out.

+

The proposed alternative language for paragraph 5 is designed to be more + consistent with existing laws.

+

Since this issue is likely to be discussed at least in your bilateral + with Giscard, we suggest that + you take a copy of this memorandum with you and that its final issuance + be delayed until your return.Underneath + this sentence, Carter wrote + “Let’s do so. J” and drew an arrow to the word “until.”

+

Attachment

+

Annotated Presidential DirectiveSecret; Sensitive. All brackets are in the + original.

+

Washington, undated

+

ANNOTATED PDSuggested new + language is underlined. Existing language to be removed is + bracketed. [Footnote is in the original.]

+

After reviewing results of the Policy Review Committee meeting held on + April 12, 1977, to discuss US + conventional arms transfer policy, I have concluded that we must + restrain the transfer of conventional arms by recognizing that arms + transfers are an exceptional foreign policy implement, to be used only + in instances where it can be clearly demonstrated that the transfers + contribute to our national security interests.

+

In establishing this policy of restraint, the United States will continue + to utilize arms transfers to promote our security and the security of + our allies and close friends.

+

Recognizing that unilateral restraint can have only limited effectiveness + without multilateral cooperation, the United States will continue its + efforts to urge other suppliers to join us in pursuing policies of + restraint. In addition, we believe that regional agreements among + purchasers of arms can contribute significantly to curbing the + proliferation of conventional weaponry, and we will assist in whatever + way possible in the conclusion of such agreements.

+

The United States will give continued emphasis to formulating and + conducting our security assistance programs in a manner which will promote and advance + respect for human rights in recipient countries.

+

Further, an assessment will henceforth be made of the economic impact of + proposed transfers of major defense equipment to those less developed + countries which receive US economic + assistance.

+

In recognition of our special treaty obligations with NATO countries, Japan, Australia, and New + Zealand, these countries will be exempted as appropriate from the dollar + volume restraints and other controls established below:

+

In furtherance of this policy of restraint, and except in extra-ordinary + circumstances personally approved by me, I direct that:

+

1. The dollar volume (in constant 1976 dollars) of [Transfers of] new + commitments under the Foreign Military Sales and Military Assistance + Programs for weapons and weapons-related items in FY 1978 will be reduced from the FY 1977 total [(exempting transfers to + NATO countries, Australia, New + Zealand, and Japan in both cases)]. It will be our goal to continue to + reduce total dollar volume [s approved] in each subsequent year.

+

2. With regard to newly-developed advanced weapons systems:

+

a. [Except in extraordinary circumstances personally approved by the + President,] The United States will not be the first supplier to + introduce into a region an advanced weapons system which creates a new + or significantly higher combat capability.In the left-hand margin next to this paragraph, Carter wrote “Too tight a + restriction—why delete?” and then crossed the phrase out.

+

b. Commitment for sale [, cooperative research and development,] or + coproduction of newly-developed advanced weapons systems is prohibited + until the systems are operationally deployed with US forces.

+

c. The Secretary of State will establish more extensive guidelines for + assessing requests for newly-developed advanced weapons systems, + including requirements 1) that supplying the system would uniquely + strengthen the requestor’s ability to perform military functions which + serve US security interests, [and] 2) + that less-advanced, existing systems with roughly comparable + capabilities are unavailable from the United States, and 3) that + providing these systems will not require the presence in country of + large numbers of Americans for long periods of time.:ueIn the left-hand margin next to this paragraph, + Carter wrote “ok.”

+

3. [Unless an exception is personally approved by the President,] Unique + advanced weapons systems developed or significantly modified solely for + export will be transferred only within the treaty relationships referred + to above [only to NATO countries, + Australia, New Zealand, and Japan].In the + left-hand margin next to this paragraph, Carter wrote “ok.”

+ +

4. Agreements for coproduction of significant weapons, equipment, or + major components, beyond assembly of subcomponents and the fabrication + of high-turnover spare parts are prohibited, [except with NATO countries, Australia, New Zealand, + and Japan, or where the President determines that such agreement is + justified by extraordinary circumstances.] Requests for any other items + (e.g., major overhaul facilities) will be subject to guidelines applied + globally, analyzing closely whether the proposed coproduction project + would over time provide equipment in excess of local needs. In each + approved agreement, terms under which third-country exports will be + permitted, if at all, will be stipulated, emphasizing that coproduction + is intended for the coproducer’s requirements and not for export.

+

5. [Unless otherwise specified, no significant weapons, equipment, or + major components acquired from the United States will be transferred to + third countries without US permission.] + In addition to the requirements of law and existing policies concerning + re-transfer assurances, the US, as a + condition of sale for certain weapons, equipment, or major components, + may stipulate that the US will not + entertain any requests for re-transfers.:ueIn the left-hand margin next to this paragraph, Carter wrote “ok.”

+

6. Policy level approval by the Department of State will be required + before authorizing 1) licensing for sales promotion or technical data + transmission by private firms, and 2) US + military or civilian briefings, site surveys, transmission of technical + information, or any similar activity which might promote the sale of + items of major defense equipment [defense articles and services]. + Further, US embassies and military + elements will not promote or assist in the promotion of arms sales + without specific authorization. Finally, the Secretary of Defense will + continue the review of government procedures which may promote the sale + of arms, reporting the results of this review within 60 days.

+
+ +
+ + 271. Presidential Directive/NSC–13Source: + Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Global + Issues, Mathews Subject + File, Box 4, Arms Transfers: Presidential Directive/NSC–13: 5–11/77. Secret; Sensitive. + Carter signed the top of + the first page and initialed the bottom of pages 2 and 3. Carter announced the new policy on + May 19. (Public Papers: Carter, 1978, pp. + 931–932) The Department of State informed all diplomatic posts that + PD–13 had been publicly + announced and provided guidance for an explanation of the new policy + to be held “at highest appropriate Foreign Ministry level” with each + host government. (Telegram Tosec 40353/115244 to all diplomatic + posts, May 19; National Archives, RG + 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770179–0462) + Washington, May 13, + 1977 + + TO + The Vice President + The Secretary of State + The Secretary of Defense + + + ALSO + The Secretary of the Treasury + The Director, Office of Management and Budget + The Chairman, Council of Economic Advisers + The Director, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency + The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff + The Director of Central Intelligence + + + SUBJECT + Conventional Arms Transfer Policy + +

After reviewing results of the Policy Review Committee meeting held on + April 12, 1977,See Tab C, Document + 268. to discuss US + conventional arms transfer policy, I have concluded that we must + restrain the transfer of conventional arms by recognizing that arms + transfers are an exceptional foreign policy implement, to be used only + in instances where it can be clearly demonstrated that the transfers + contribute to our national security interests.

+

In establishing this policy of restraint, the United States will continue + to utilize arms transfers to promote our security and the security of + our allies and close friends. Recognizing that unilateral restraint can + have only limited effectiveness without multilateral cooperation, the + United States will continue its efforts to urge other suppliers to join + us in pursuing policies of restraint. In addition, we believe that + regional agreements among purchasers of arms can contribute + significantly to curbing the proliferation of conventional weaponry, and + we will assist in whatever way possible in the conclusion of such + agreements.

+ +

The United States will give continued emphasis to formulating and + conducting our security assistance programs in a manner which will + promote and advance respect for human rights in recipient countries.

+

Further, an assessment will henceforth be made of the economic impact of + proposed transfers of major defense equipment to those less developed + countries which receive US economic + assistance.

+

In recognition of our special treaty obligations with NATO countries, Japan, Australia, and New + Zealand, these countries will be exempted as appropriate from the dollar + volume restraints and other controls established below. The United + States will remain faithful to its treaty obligations, and will also + honor its historic responsibilities regarding Israel’s security.At a May 16 Cabinet meeting, Brzezinski noted that the PRM had been “revised in accordance + with the President’s directive. It now recognizes the special status + of Israel.” White House Counsel Robert “Lipshutz and others have + reported that the policy is being favorably received in the Jewish + community.” (Minutes of the Cabinet meeting, May 16; Carter Library, + Cabinet Meeting Minutes, Box 7, 1/24/77–5/23/77)

+

In furtherance of this policy of restraint, and except in extraordinary + circumstances personally approved by me or where I determine that + countries friendly to the United States must depend on advanced weaponry + to offset quantitative and other disadvantages in order to maintain a + regional balance, I direct that:

+

1. The dollar volume (in constant 1976 dollars) of new commitments under + the Foreign Military Sales and Military Assistance Programs for weapons + and weapons-related items in FY 1978 + will be reduced from the FY 1977 total. + It will be our goal to continue to reduce total dollar volume in each + subsequent year.

+

2. With regard to newly-developed advanced weapons systems:

+

a. The United States will not be the first supplier to introduce into a + region an advanced weapons system which creates a new or significantly + higher combat capability.

+

b. Commitment for sale or coproduction of newly-developed advanced + weapons systems is prohibited until the systems are operationally + deployed with US forces.

+

c. The Secretary of State will establish more extensive guidelines for + assessing requests for newly-developed advanced weapons sys-tems, + including requirements 1) that supplying the system would uniquely + strengthen the requestor’s ability to perform military functions which + serve US security interests, 2) that + less-advanced, existing systems with roughly comparable capabilities are + unavailable from the United States, and 3) that providing these systems + will not require the presence in country of large numbers of Americans + for long periods of time.

+ +

3. Unique advanced weapons systems developed or significantly modified + solely for export will be transferred only within the treaty + relationships referred to above.

+

4. Agreements for coproduction of significant weapons, equipment, or + major components, beyond assembly of subcomponents and the fabrication + of high-turnover spare parts are prohibited. Requests for any other + items (e.g., major overhaul facilities) will be subject to guidelines + applied globally, analyzing closely whether the proposed coproduction + project would over time provide equipment in excess of local needs. In + each approved agreement, terms under which third-country exports will be + permitted, if at all, will be stipulated, emphasizing that coproduction + is intended for the coproducer’s requirements and not for export.

+

5. In addition to the requirements of law and existing policies + concerning re-transfer assurances, the US, as a condition of sale for certain weapons, equipment, + or major components, may stipulate that the US will not entertain any requests for re-transfers.

+

6. Policy level approval by the Department of State will be required + before authorizing 1) licensing for sales promotion or technical data + transmission by private firms, and 2) US + military or civilian briefings, site surveys, transmissions of technical + information, or any similar activity which might promote the sale of + items of major defense equipment. Further, US embassies and military elements will not promote or + assist in the promotion of arms sales without specific authorization. + Finally, the Secretary of Defense will continue the review of government + procedures which may promote the sale of arms, reporting the results of + this review within 60 days.

+ + J.C. + +
+ +
+ + 272. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security + Affairs (Brzezinski) to Secretary + of State Vance and Secretary of + Defense BrownSource: Carter Library, National + Security Affairs, Staff Material, Global Issues, Mathews Subject File, Box 2, Arms + Sales: Dollar Volume/Ceiling: 4/77–8/78. Secret. + Washington, May 27, + 1977 + + SUBJECT + Fiscal Year 1977 Foreign Military Sales + +

Because of the President’s interest in monitoring the level of foreign + military sales, the Department of State, in coordination with the + Department of Defense, should provide the following Foreign Military + Sales dollar amounts for the periods October 1, 1976, to January 19, + 1977, and January 20, 1977 to September 30, 1977, respectively (in + current dollars):

+

1. Foreign Military Sales agreements signed;

+

2. Letters of Offer and Acceptance extended, but not signed;

+

3. Letters of Offer and Acceptance pending (sales finally approved, but + LOA not extended);

+

4. Letters of Offer and Acceptance projected, but not currently + pending.

+

Also, on the basis of these figures, please provide a total dollar + estimate of Foreign Military Sales agreements which will be signed in + Fiscal Year 1977; i.e., the figure which will be reported in next year’s + Congressional Presentation Document.

+

A reply is requested by June 10, 1977.

+ + Zbigniew + Brzezinski + +
+ +
+ + 273. Memorandum From Secretary of State Vance to President CarterSource: + Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Global + Issues, Mathews Subject + File, Box 4, Arms Transfers: Policy (General): 6/77–4/79. No + classification markings. In the upper right-hand corner of the first + page of the memorandum, Carter wrote “To Cy. J.” + Washington, June + 21, 1977 + + SUBJECT + Lockheed’s Request for Amendment to the International Traffic in + Arms Regulations Concerning C–130 Aircraft + +

This memorandum requests your decision on a request by Lockheed that the + C–130 military transport aircraft manufactured by that firm be removed + from the category of “significant combat equipment” on the United States + Munitions List. This administrative designation causes the C–130 to be + within the definition of “major defense equipment” contained in the Arms + Export Control Act. That Act prohibits commercial sales to non-NATO countries of major defense equipment + under contracts of $25 million or more, thus requiring that foreign + sales of three or more C–130s be handled under the Foreign Military + Sales (FMS) program. Lockheed complains + that the FMS procedures are unduly + protracted and that without commercial sales the production line may + have to close before the company receives sufficient FMS orders to continue its operation. Also + relevant, although not mentioned by Lockheed, is the Defense + Department’s estimate that Lockheed receives approximately $500,000 more + for a commercially sold C–130 than for one sold under FMS procedures.

+

Background:

+

Since January 1969, most major items on the Munitions List, including all + listed military aircraft, have been designated as “significant combat + equipment.” The original consequence of designation as “significant + combat equipment” was that an export license would not be given for + commercial sale of a designated item unless the foreign purchaser had + given the Department of State direct assurances against retransfer.

+

Last year, the significant combat equipment designation was given + additional legal significance by being made a part of the definition of + “major defense equipment” in the Arms Export Control Act. Munitions List + articles which, like the C–130, fall within the definition of major + defense equipment are subject to additional controls under the Arms + Export Control Act, + including the limitation that export licenses may not be issued for + commercial sales of $25 million or more to non-NATO countries.

+

Significant combat equipment designation has also been proposed as a + criterion for determining which arms sales proposals by U.S. firms will + require prior State Department approval.

+

Evaluation of Lockheed’s Request:

+

Our view, shared by the Department of Defense, is that Lockheed’s problem + is a temporary one and is not as grave as the company describes it. + There is little effective competition for the C–130 and foreign demand + for this versatile, reliable aircraft remains high. The Secretary of + Defense met with the President of Lockheed-Georgia, Mr. Robert Ormsby, + on June 16,A record of this conversation + has not been found. to discuss ways in which FMS procedures could be expedited and + possibly inequitable features concerning cost reimbursements to the + manufacturer could be improved. We understand that steps are being taken + by the Department of Defense to offset some of the present slack and + thus enable Lockheed to continue C–130 production, even though major + foreign sales will have to be through FMS rather than commercial channels. Accordingly, a change + in the International Traffic in Arms Regulations does not seem + necessary.

+

If the regulations were changed as requested by Lockheed, we would + doubtless receive many requests for equal treatment from other affected + companies. Lockheed’s argument that the C–130 is “nonlethal” would apply + equally to many other items of significant combat equipment. With + respect to military aircraft alone, we could expect requests for similar + relief from the manufacturers of tanker aircraft, helicopters, trainers + and military aircraft designed for surveillance, reconnaissance, + mapping, etc.

+

While we have received a number of expressions of Congressional interest + on Lockheed’s behalf, we have not heard from those members of Congress + who have no direct constituent interest in this matter, but who are + advocates of arms transfer restraint and whose cooperation will be + necessary for the successful implementation of your policy. Some of + these members would probably be concerned with a decision that + encouraged the use of the less stringently controlled commercial + channels for sales of military aircraft.

+

In sum, we believe special relief for Lockheed is not warranted and would + risk creating doubts in industry and Congress regarding the + Administration’s resolve to control and restrain arms transfers.

+ +

Options:

+

You could direct amendment of the International Traffic in Arms + Regulations, either by deleting the C–130 from the Munitions List or by + deleting it from the definition of significant combat equipment. For the + reasons set out above, I believe that neither action should be taken at + this time and that we should, instead, seek to remove any legitimate + complaints by Lockheed through improvements in FMS procedures.

+

Recommendations:

+

That you authorize the Department of State to inform Lockheed that the + C–130 will continue to be designated as “significant combat equipment” + and that we will seek to improve FMS + procedures concerning its sale.Carter checked the “Approve” + option, and wrote underneath “Cy—Let me know what specifically is + done re FMS procedures. It seems to + me that a non-weapon configuration would make it possible to sell + C–130’s with minimum delay. It’s a good safety valve to retain + friendly relations & not violate offensive weapons constraints. + J.C.”

+
+ +
+ 274. Memorandum From the Director of Central Intelligence (Turner) to Secretary of Defense + BrownSource: Library of Congress, + Manuscript Division, Harold + Brown Papers, Box 78, Arms Transfer/FMS Policy, 1977. + Secret. A stamped notation at the top reads “SEC DEF HAS SEEN, 1 JUL + 1977.” In the upper right-hand corner, Brown wrote “7/1 ASD (ISA)—all agencies are providing self-serving + disclaimer, and many of them may well be correct. Are we in DOD the only [illegible]? I doubt it. + (State for example is worse). HB.” + Washington, June + 30, 1977 + + SUBJECT + Control of Incentives that Stimulate Arms Transfers + +

1. As requested in your memorandum of 9 June 1977,Not found. I have undertaken the + Presidentially-directed review of policies and procedures that may + promote the sale of arms, insofar as these may relate to Central + Intelligence Agency responsibilities and operations.

+

2. As a result of this review, I am satisfied that present Agency + policies and procedures do not serve, directly or indirectly, to + stimulate foreign requests for arms transfers. As you know, under + present rules, before the + Agency could become involved in any paramilitary or intelligence support + programs, such programs would have to be submitted to the NSC/SCC for + review and to the President for decision. To the extent such programs + might encompass transfers of military or military-related equipment, the + Agency’s procedures would not, in any event, involve sales promotional + activities, incentives to defense contractors to promote sales, or other + practices that might stimulate foreign requests for arms transfers.

+

3. I understand that a joint State-Defense cable is being drafted to + provide new policy guidelines on this subject to US foreign service posts in the field. I propose to send a + similar cable through Agency channels to assure that our field personnel + are fully aware of the new policy thrust.

+ + Stansfield + Turner + +
+ +
+ 275. Memorandum From Secretary of State Vance to President CarterSource: + Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Global + Issues, Mathews Subject + File, Box 4, Arms Transfers: Policy (General): 6–12/77. + Confidential. + Washington, July + 21, 1977 + + SUBJECT + Foreign Military Sales Procedures Regarding C–130 Aircraft + +

When you approved my recommendation of June 21See Document 273. + to continue designation of the Lockheed C–130 military transport + aircraft as “significant combat equipment”, you also asked me to inform + you what had been done to improve Foreign Military Sales (FMS) procedures as they relate to the sale + of these aircraft. You also inquired whether a non-weapon configuration + would make it possible to sell these aircraft with minimum delay.

+

The C–130 is basically a military transport aircraft. It is not normally + equipped with weapons, and has been sold to many countries. Thus far you + have approved the sale of C–130s without armament configuration to + Sudan, the Philippines, Korea, Bolivia and Zaire. The C–130 may be sold + commercially if the total value of the sale is less than $25 million. + Since three C–130s and related equipment cost more than this, commercial sales are effectively + restricted to no more than two aircraft. Lockheed also makes a civilian + model of the C–130 (the L–100 series) which does not meet some of the + military specifications. In any event, most governments appear to prefer + to purchase the military model on a government-to-government basis under + FMS procedures.

+

The time required to process the government-to-government sale of a C–130 + is divided as follows: 1) USG approval + process (i.e., from receipt of a country request to purchase through + completion of the statutory Congressional notification) and 2) the + subsequent contracting process (time required for negotiation and + signature of a contract with Lockheed) after the Congressional review + period is completed.

+

Some delay in the USG approval process + is attributable to the present requirement that, with the exception of + NATO countries, Australia, New + Zealand and Japan, we are required to send all proposed C–130 sales + which require Congressional notification to you for approval. In order + to save processing time, I recommend that you authorize me to approve + sales of non-weapon configured C–130 aircraft worldwide, and refer to + you only those proposed sales which clearly involve sensitive political + aspects—e.g., for countries like Egypt.

+

With regard to the time involved in the contracting process, the + Department of Defense informs me that in the past protracted + negotiations between the U.S. Air Force and Lockheed appear to have been + caused by Lockheed attempting to obtain the most favorable price in the + knowledge that a government-to-government agreement had already been + reached for a sale. The Department of Defense claims to have largely + resolved with Lockheed the matter of delays in contract pricing by + taking actions to enable Lockheed to continue its C–130 production line + without interruption. Specifically, once a sale has received the + required Executive and Congressional approvals, DOD now enters into letter contracts which permit Lockheed + to proceed with production pending negotiation of a definitized + contract. The Department of Defense informs me that it is also working + more closely with Lockheed to avoid a production gap in the C–130 line + due to crew training problems or delays in providing support equipment + from US Government sources. We hope + these actions will result in the contracting for sale of C–130 aircraft + in a time span consistent with both the US and the contractor’s interests.

+

Recommendation:

+

That you authorize me to approve the sale worldwide of non-weapon + configured C–130 aircraft, including notifications to Congress.Carter checked the “Disapprove” option and + underneath wrote “Send to me for immediate approval—minimize + delays—Indicate time required for each transaction. J.C.”

+
+ +
+ + 276. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security + Affairs (Brzezinski) to President + CarterSource: Carter Library, National + Security Affairs, Staff Material, Global Issues, Mathews Subject File, Box 4, Arms + Transfers: Policy (General): 6–12/77. Confidential. Sent for + action. + Washington, July + 30, 1977 + + SUBJECT + Foreign Military Sales Procedures Regarding C–130 Aircraft + +

The memorandum from Secretary Vance (Tab A)See Document 275. recommends that you + authorize the Secretary of State to approve world-wide sales of + nonweapon configured C–130 aircraft in order to reduce the time required + to process government-to-government sales. As indicated below, I believe + delays can be reduced without delegating approval authority.

+

On June 28, you delegated approval authority for conventional arms + transfers requiring Congressional notification only to NATO, Australia, New + Zealand and Japan.Carter’s decision is recorded in a + memorandum from Brzezinski to + Vance, June 28; Carter + Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Global Issues, + Mathews Subject File, + Box 4, Arms Transfers: Policy (General): 6–12/77. The + delegation of authority was limited to the countries exempted from most + of the PD/NSC–13 controls,See Document 271. including the FY ’78 dollar volume control, so that the + bureaucracy would face the tough trade-offs which have to be made + knowing that their recommendations will be personally reviewed by the + President. It would be an unfortunate bureaucratic signal to change that + decision so soon.

+

The argument that delegating the approval authority would save time is + not persuasive. The vast majority of the time is consumed in + coordination within the Departments of State and Defense. Therefore, I recommend that you continue to approve cases which + go to Congress, but that requests to purchase C–130s (and other + major systems) be forwarded to you for a decision as soon as the + required staffing and coordination are completed. The current + practice is to hold requests until a sufficient number have accumulated + to assemble a decision package.

+

RECOMMENDATION

+

That you continue to approve sales of C–130 aircraft which go to Congress + except to NATO, Australia, New Zealand + and Japan as previously + delegated. Cases will be forwarded to you as soon as they are ready for + a decision.

+

APPROVE ______Carter checked the “Approve” option and underneath + wrote “JC.” DISAPPROVE ______ OTHER ______

+
+ +
+ 277. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security + Affairs (Brzezinski) to Secretary + of State Vance and Secretary of + Defense BrownSource: Carter Library, National + Security Affairs, Staff Material, Global Issues, Mathews Subject File, Box 2, Arms + Sales: Dollar Volume/Ceiling: 4/77–8/78. Confidential. + Washington, September 8, 1977 + + SUBJECT + Arms Sales Totals + +

In response to a May 27See Document 272. request from the + President, you reported on June 13,Not + found. a best estimate of the total dollar volume of FMS agreements for fiscal year 1977 of + $9.9 billion. This estimate included $1.2 billion for the AWACS sale to + Iran. I now understand that current staff estimates of the total for + this year are $9.9 billion not including AWACS. + Thus the estimate appears to have changed by more than one billion + dollars in the past three months. In order to allow the President to + consider the proper disposition of the AWACS sale, please provide by COB + tomorrow, Friday, September 9, your best current estimate of the dollar + total for FY ’77.

+

In making decisions on the timing and content of arms sales packages + under the ceiling imposed by PD–13, it + is essential for the President to have accurate and timely estimates of + the dollars volumes that have been and are likely to be committed in any + given year. Therefore on September 30, and monthly thereafter, you + should provide a report containing the following:

+ +

—The cumulative total of FMS agreements + signed since the beginning of the current fiscal year, including a + country-by-country listing of the totals for each of the ten largest + recipients in that year.

+

—A detailed listing and dollar total of letters of offer and acceptance + extended, but not signed.

+

—The same for sales that have been approved by the President (or the + Secretary of State) but not yet approved by Congress.

+

—The same for requests for letters of offer and acceptance in the + clearance process within the bureaucracy including date of receipt.

+

—The same for serious indications of interest from foreign governments + for which we have not yet received a formal request.

+

In each category, totals should be broken down for exempted and + non-exempted countries.

+ + Zbigniew + Brzezinski + +
+ +
+ 278. Memorandum of ConversationSource: RG 59, + Department of State, Office of the Secretariat Staff, Cyrus R. Vance, Secretary of + State—1977–1980, Lot 84D241, Nodis + Memcons 1977. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Shulman; and approved by David + Anderson (S/S) on October 31. The + meeting took place in the Department of State. The conversation is + published in full as Document 53 in Foreign + Relations, 1977–1980, vol. VI, Soviet Union. + Vance informed the + Embassy in Moscow about Dobrynin’s visit in Telegram 251209 to Moscow, + October 19; National Archives, RG + 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840076–0427. + Washington, October 17, + 1977, 4:00–6:15 p.m. + + SUBJECT + Arms Control Issues: SALT, + ASAT, Conventional Arms No. II + of IV + + + PARTICIPANTS + US + The Secretary + Marshall D. Shulman + USSR + Ambassador Anatoliy F. + Dobrynin + +

Dobrynin came in Monday + afternoon, October 17, at the Secretary’s request. The meeting lasted + from 4:00 to approximately 6:15.

+

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to conventional arms + transfers.]

+ +

3. Conventional Arms Transfers and Sales—The + Secretary noted that Gelb had + raised this point with BessmertnykhNot + found. and that Bessmertnykh had said that it might be a long time + before a reply was received from Moscow. The Secretary said the + President attaches considerable importance to this subject and urged + Dobrynin to do everything + possible to speed up a reply.In a September + 23 meeting with Gromyko, + Carter “expressed his + concern over continuing arms sales around the world, and noted that + in this respect we were guilty of excess to some extent, as was the + Soviet Union. We were eager to cooperate with the Soviet Union on + this subject and prepared to do so in the UNGA session.” Gromkyo replied that “both sides had + sinned in this respect.” (Memorandum of Conversation, September 23; + Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Materials, Subject File, + Box 35, Memcons: President, + 9/19–9/30/77) + Dobrynin replied that he would + do so, but he went on to say, in what he described as an unofficial + reaction, that the US was selling more + and more arms around the world, including to some of the neighbors of + the Soviet Union. In this connection, he cited sales to Iran. He noted + the Administration’s declared intent to reduce arms sales and asked why + the US had been speeding up the process. + The Secretary said that many items had been in the pipeline, but an + effort was being made to hold sales and transfers down. This was + reflected in the fact that the total would come to about $9.8 billion + this year, instead of the $11 billion originally projected. This + includes some very expensive items, such as AWACS. There would be + further reductions next year, he said. Dobrynin asked why not show some restraint as a good + will gesture. The Secretary replied that restraint was being shown and + that AWACS, for example, had a purely defensive function.

+
+ +
+ + 279. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security + Affairs (Brzezinski) to Secretary + of State Vance and Secretary of + Defense BrownSource: Department of State, RG 59, Office of the Deputy Secretary: + Records of Warren + Christopher, 1977–1980, Lot 81D113, Withdrawn Items, Box + 7, Arms Transfers. Confidential. + Washington, November 8, 1977 + + SUBJECT + Managing the Arms Transfer Program in FY 1978 + +

Because of the President’s commitment to curtail U.S. arms transfers in + FY 1978 by reducing new agreements + from the total in FY 1977, and in order + to make those transfers which are in the national interest expeditiously + and efficiently, the Secretary of State should coordinate the + development of options for consideration by the PRC before January 31, 1978 on the management of the FY 1978 Arms Transfer Program. In + preparation, the Secretary of State in close coordination with the + Secretary of Defense should undertake the following steps on an urgent + basis:

+

1. To assist in identifying existing commitments, prepare a summary of + outstanding arms sales commitments from previous years including: + Letters of Offer and Acceptance extended but not signed; proposed sales + which have completed Congressional review; and proposed sales which are + in advanced stages of processing within the Executive Branch.

+

2. To assist in forecasting FY 1978 + support sales, prepare summary data relating to follow-on support sales + made annually since FY 1973, including + ammunition, logistics, and technical assistance.

+

3. To provide the information required to control future sales, develop a + new management information system for arms transfers including at a + minimum the following characteristics:

+

As near as possible to real-time recording of the + dollar values of signed Letters of Offer; but in no case should the + delay be longer than five days.

+

Priority tracking, manual if necessary, of large sales (in excess of $100 million).

+

The use of parametric statistical techniques to + forecast aggregate totals of smaller sales establishing explicit confidence intervals.

+

The necessary precision to respond to monthly + reporting requirements during the second half of each fiscal year with + accuracies better than plus or minus five percent.

+ +

The inclusion of scope changes to Letters of Offer + as an explicit element of Executive Branch reporting on arms transfers. + Henceforth, scope changes should be counted in the fiscal year in which + they occur and be included in all estimates of arms transfer totals.

+

4. To allow a preliminary allocation of the dollars available under the + ceiling, prepare options taking into account: Letters of Offer already + extended; follow-on support sales; sales to which the United States has + a political commitment; and, sales of high priority to recipient + nations.

+ + Zbigniew + Brzezinski + +
+ +
+ 280. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security + Affairs (Brzezinski) to Secretary + of State Vance, Secretary of + Defense Brown, the Director of + the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (Warnke), the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff + (Jones), and the Director of Central Intelligence (Turner)Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, + Staff Material, Global Issues, Mathews Subject File, Box 4, Arms Transfers: Policy + (General): 6/77–4/79. Confidential. + Washington, November 10, 1977 + + SUBJECT + U.S. Arms Transfer Policy Implementation + +

In the interest of relating the goals and guidelines of PD–13See Document 271. to our relationships + with key countries and within key regions, the Secretary of State should + coordinate the preparation of interagency arms transfers studies on + Africa, Latin America, Iran, Saudi Arabia, and the smaller states of the + Persian Gulf. These studies should consider the purposes and the + possible consequences of transferring arms and other military equipment + of varying categories and levels of sophistication to these particular + countries and regions.

+

The studies should pose options for PRC + consideration and subsequent Presidential decision regarding both our + general arms transfer posture toward these countries and regions and, to + the degree possible, our disposition concerning major outstanding or + anticipated requests.

+

Comparable interagency studies regarding other regions or major countries + should also be undertaken as determined by the Secretary of State.

+ +

PRC consideration of each of the five + studies mentioned above should take place before January 1, 1978.

+ + Zbigniew + Brzezinski + +
+ +
+ 281. Summary of Conclusions of a Special Coordination Committee + MeetingSource: Carter + Library, National Security Council, Institutional Files, Box 90, + SCC 044, Arms Transfer Policy: + US/USSR: 12/9/77. Secret. The meeting took place in the White House + Situation Room. + Washington, December 9, + 1977, 9:30–11:00 a.m. + + SUBJECT + US–USSR Conventional Arms Transfer Talks + + + PARTICIPANTS + + State + Dep Sec Warren + Christopher + Mr. Leslie Gelb + (Director, Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs) + Mr. William Luers (Dep Asst Sec for European + Affairs) + + + Defense + Mr. Walter + Slocombe (Prin Dep Asst Sec for International + Security Affairs) + + + JCS + Adm Patrick Hannifin (Director, JCS) + + + CIA + Adm Stansfield + Turner + Mr. George Allen (National Intelligence Officer for + Special Studies) + + + ACDA + Mr. Spurgeon Keeny + (Acting Director) + Mr. George Allen (Asst Director) + + + White House + Mr. David Aaron + (Dep Asst to the President for National Security + Affairs) + + + NSC + Reginald + Bartholomew + Jessica + Tuchman + Leslie Denend + + +

The SCC met to review the proposed + strategy for talks with the Soviets scheduled to begin on December 14. + Issues and conclusions that were reached follow:

+ +

1. The Context: Our Overall + Restraint Strategy

+

The US is pursuing talks in three + interdependent forums: US-European; + US–USSR; and, US-recipient. We + have met with the European suppliers. They were cautious and skeptical. + Their economic health depends to some extent on their arms industries, + and particularly, on arms exports. They consider Soviet cooperation + essential. In our first meeting with the Soviets, we intend to stress + the mutual interest we share in arms transfer restraint including: + better bilateral relations, a reduction in the likelihood of US–USSR + confrontations, and a lessening of international tensions. At the UN Special Session on Disarmament next + spring, we will sound-out recipient country concerns regarding arms + transfer restraint and present the US + case.

+

2. + US Leverage and Soviet Reactions

+

Because Soviet continued participation is critical to our multilateral + efforts, we must succeed in these talks in getting agreement for a + second meeting. We will emphasize the difficulty of sustaining our + unilateral restraint for very long if multilateral progress cannot be + demonstrated. There is also the implicit threat of publicly casting the + Soviets in an unfavorable light on an important disarmament issue should + they refuse to continue the talks. We can expect the Soviets to remain + cautious and, as they stated, respond to specific US proposals. We are moderately hopeful + that they will at least agree to a second round of talks.

+

3. Substance of the US Strategy for These Talks

+

There was agreement that this first round should be exploratory and + conducted for the most part on an illustrative basis. In reviewing our + restraint policy as well as the guidelines discussed with the Europeans, + we would present these as approaches for a discussion of possible ways + to achieve multilateral cooperation. It is important during this early + stage of talks which we believe will be lengthy and complex, not to + raise fears among recipients of a US–USSR condominium.

+

Regarding the possibility of proposing specific regions of the world for + supplier restraint, we will raise the issue of regions to define the + problem of arms competition, and suggest that different cooperative + agreements might well be required in different regions; however, we will + not identify specific regions as candidates + for supplier restraint.

+

Regarding the suggestion of specific weapons systems such as + surface-to-surface missiles (SSMs) and + man-portable air defense systems (MANPADS), we will take the view that outside of NATO and the major states involved in the + East–West confrontation, there are areas where these types of weapons, + because of their destructive power or susceptibility to terrorist + diversion, should not be transferred. We will emphasize our mutual interest in restraining + these kinds of arms transfers. While not amounting to a formal US proposal, these issues will be raised + explicitly enough to give the Soviets something to think about and to + respond to.

+

4. [1 paragraph (11 lines) not declassified]

+
+ +
+ 282. Telegram From the Department of State to the Liaison Office in + PekingSource: National + Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign + Policy File, P850056–1764. Secret; Priority; Nodis. Sent for information Priority + to the White House. Drafted by William + Gleysteen (EA); cleared by Harry Thayer (EA/PRCM), + Alan Romberg (S/P), Priscilla Clapp + (PM), Shulman (S/MS), William Luers + (EUR), and Lowell Fleischer + (S/S–O); and approved by Richard + Holbrooke (EA). + Washington, December 9, 1977, 2330Z +

294655. Subject: Briefing the PRC on + U.S.-Soviet Talks on Conventional Arms Transfers.

+

1. U.S. and Soviet officials will meet in Washington on December 14 to + discuss prospects for cooperation in limiting conventional arms + transfers. The U.S. side will be represented by PM Director, Leslie + Gelb, and the Soviet side by Ambassador Khlestov, Chief of MFA’s Treaty and + Legal Department. Talks will be taking place at U.S. initiative and are + motivated by our concern that U.S. efforts to limit arms transfers + abroad will be undercut unless the USSR and other major international suppliers also agree to + restrain their transfers. The Soviets appear to appreciate that this + question has a bearing on U.S.–Soviet relations, but they are + approaching the subject with great caution and we cannot predict whether + they can be drawn into a constructive dialogue.

+

2. Given the PRC’s suspicions that the + U.S. is all too prone to deal with the USSR, at the expense of others, we think it important to + give the Chinese advance notice of the talks and their purpose. In + particular, we wish to stress that the talks are an obvious corollary to + our own arms transfer policy and, if successful, would limit the + potential for Soviet opportunism. In addition, we want to make clear + that the talks with the Soviets, and possibly with other powers, will + not be used to pressure the PRC to join + an international arms control regime. Obviously, we would welcome + Chinese cooperation, but we do not expect it at this stage.

+ +

3. Accordingly, USLO should approach the Foreign Ministry at an + appropriate level to make the following points, stressing that we do not + intend any publicity or widespread briefings of other countries:

+

(A) U.S. and USSR will shortly begin + talks in Washington at the assistant secretary-level to determine + whether there is any prospect of complementing U.S. arms transfer + guidelines by similar restraints on the part of other international arms + suppliers.

+

(B) The talks are taking place at U.S. initiative, and the U.S. does not + know whether there is any prospect for Soviet cooperation. The U.S. will + stress, however, that there are limits on our willingness to take + unilateral measures.

+

(C) If successful, such talks could enhance our prospects for + international restraints on arms transfers, thereby reducing the + potential for Soviet opportunism.

+

(D) Obviously, we would welcome Chinese cooperation in this field, but + our talks are not conditioned on this. If the Soviets seek to tie any + agreement to Chinese cooperation, we will reject such an effort as + inappropriate.

+

(E) We will keep the PRC informed of any + significant progress in the talks.

+ + Christopher + +
+ +
+ 283. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department + of StateSource: National + Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign + Policy File, D770463–0539. Confidential; Immediate. + Moscow, December 13, 1977, 1030Z +

17935. Subject: Soviet Attitudes on Conventional Arms Transfer Controls. + Ref: State 293007.On December 8, the + Department of State had asked for the Embassy’s “assessment as to + likely tactics Soviet Delegation” to the CAT talks. (Telegram 293007 to Moscow, December 8; + National Archives, RG 59, Central + Foreign Policy File, D770456–1169)

+

Summary and Introduction

+

The Embassy’s assessment of Soviet attitudes towards the Conventional + Arms Transfers (CAT) talks is that the + Russians will initially play a conservative, waiting game. We base this + assessment on our evaluation of a variety of factors which we believe + contribute to (A) an inhibition on the part of the Soviets to change + their current policies in this area and (B) a desire to explore and + assess parameters of U.S. intentions on CAT. As they + have told us on several occasions, their line is that arms transfers + result from the political situation in a given area and that political + solutions to existing differences must first be devised before realistic + programs designed to control arms transfers can be implemented. In one + sense this “policy” amounts to avoiding a CAT control policy. Nevertheless, it does not represent a + totally negative attitude toward all aspects of arms transfers controls + and thus permits the Soviets to take positive, if selective, stands + towards such controls should they choose to do so. We feel that the + Soviets will speak favorably, but not very concretely, about the + possibilities for CAT controls in this + first round of what they undoubtedly believe will be a long series of + negotiations. End summary and introduction.

+

1. Factors inhibiting change: for the Soviets there are several factors + which will incline them toward great caution in the CAT talks. Among these are:

+

—Oft repeated Soviet “principled” commitment to promote the cause of + revolutionary liberation movements and “progressive” states in the third + world. In these areas, the Soviets rely proportionately more than the + U.S. on arms transfers to establish influence. Unlike the West, the + Soviets generally lack the capability to significantly project their + influence through financial, commercial and cultural means, particularly + in comparison with the U.S. The Soviets may therefore feel they have + proportionately more to lose in terms of influence if there is a mutual + reduction in arms transfers.

+

—Soviets would be concerned about the Chinese (A) filling the vacuum + produced by Soviet reduction in arms transfers to national liberation + movements or “progressive” states; (B) denouncing the Soviets for + working with U.S. to seek “super power hegemony.”

+

—The transfer of Soviet weaponry, even though individual items are + sometimes discounted (e.g., to Peru) or even free (e.g., to Cuba), is a + reliable means of acquiring substantial foreign exchange. To the extent + that Soviet oil exports may decline, the sale of weaponry would assume a + larger importance in this regard.

+

—Moscow may suspect that the U.S. will be primarily interested in + attempting to concentrate arms transfer limitations on those very hot + spots that the Soviets find the most tempting, i.e., the Middle East and + the Horn of Africa.

+

2. Factors arguing for controls: we would list the following:

+

—The failure of past enormous cumulative outlays of military assistance + to third world countries (e.g., Indonesia, Egypt, Somalia) to provide + important and lasting political returns cannot but have had an impact on + the Soviet leadership. This factor alone must have contributed to the + Soviet decision to participate in exploratory talks with the U.S. Soviet + concerns influencing caution or reluctance listed para 2 will, however, need to be + satisfied somewhat if talks are to reach tangible levels of + progress.

+ +

—Soviet concern that unchecked arms transfers will in the long run + contribute to the modernization of the armed forces of a potentially + dangerous (and eventually menacing) adversary: China.

+

3. Prospects for the current talks: We believe the Soviets will approach + the current talks with the utmost caution, much in the manner in which + they have examined other arms control proposals which impact on central + political-military policies and activities, e.g., CTB and SALT. These talks will, therefore, be more difficult for + the Soviets than those which have only a peripheral impact on foreign + policy, e.g. chemical weapons, Indian Ocean, ENMOD. This caution will be + further reinforced by the fact that the Soviets, to the best of our + knowledge, have not yet developed a cohesive public policy with respect + to arms transfers. Our attempts to draw MFA officials and USA institute + staffers into detailed discussions of possible arms transfers controls + have been unsuccessful. Over the past eight months (since the March + proposal for a working group on this subject),During a March 29 press conference in Moscow, + Vance said that he and + Gromyko had agreed to + set up bilateral working groups to discuss numerous issues, + including conventional arms transfers. The text of the press + conference is in telegram 3034 from the Secretary’s Delegation in + Moscow, March 29; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + D770108–0039. we have elicited nothing more from our Soviet + interlocutors than a restatement of the Soviet policy as outlined in the + first paragraph above and the comment that, since these talks are at + U.S. initiative, it is up to the U.S. to take the first step. Moreover, + recent indirect contacts with relevant Soviet officials have failed to + produce any signs of a new policy consensus. Although Soviets will be + primarily interested in exploring U.S. intentions in the talks, they + will not want to be put in a tactical disadvantage of simply discussing + U.S. proposals. Instead, they will probably attempt to move the + discussions along lines more favorable to them without clearly + indicating their objectives in the CAT + area. They may repeat the few consistent Soviet reactions which we have + heard on this subject:

+

—A critical review of the volume and character of U.S. arms sales and + transfers;

+

—A charge that U.S. practices set the tone and provide the momentum for + world-wide conventional arms transfers;

+

—a criticism of the role played by U.S. allies in supplementing U.S. + transfers. (We should of course be aware of the arms transfer role of + such Soviet surrogates as the GDR and + Czechoslovakia.)

+

5. It is possible that the Soviets may attempt to move the conversations + towards discussions focusing on initial measures which would impact much + more severely on the U.S. and its allies. An example of this might be + some type of recommendation that would limit transfers of arms to Latin + America (less Cuba) or to China. Or Soviets could suggest that limitations apply only to + highly sophisticated weapons which they tend not to supply in any case. + The Soviets may be willing to take the plunge and suggest a discussion + of arms limitations in the Persian Gulf region. They have often, + privately and publicly, expressed their serious concern over U.S. arms + sales to Iran and Saudia Arabia (while ignoring, of course, their own + sales to Iran, Iraq—and now Kuwait). The Gulf is intimately linked to + the M.E., a region which the Soviets would be most wary of discussing. + But they may feel that, on balance, any process which could lead to + controls on U.S. sales to Iran and Saudi Arabia would be manageable in + terms of their own relationship to Iraq.

+

6. The Middle East is, clearly, a special case. Soviet M.E. policy has + been built around the goal of limiting the U.S. military presence and + influence in this region, which lies on the Southern borders of the + Soviet Union, of developing a buffer zone of countries well disposed + toward the Soviet Union, and—at least in the short run—of increasing + Soviet political and military influence in the region. Due to the + importance of Moscow’s arms supply to the Arabs in implementing Soviet + policy in this region, we believe it is unlikely that Moscow would be + interested in any serious limitation on their own arms transfers to the + M.E., tempting as the prospect of U.S. limitations might be.

+

7. There might, however, be a possibility of making formal the de facto + qualitative self-limitation which the two super powers already practice + in the region. Contributing to this possibility is the fact that + formerly greedy customers such as Egypt, Sudan, Somalia and, probably + Jordan, no longer will feed + at the Soviet trough. Also, arms shipped to Libya and other radicals may + now constitute a surfeit and therefore the Soviets may be less reluctant + to see some limitations. In this connection we recall the comment made + by Brezhnev in his March 21, + 1977 TUC speech, to wit:

+

“We already said that in connection with a peace settlement in the Middle + East the relevant states could study the question of facilitating an + ending of the arms race in that area. In general, the problem of + international arms trade seems to merit an exchange of views.”

+

Brezhnev’s choice of words seemed + to leave open the possibility of engaging in M.E. arms limitation talks + prior to the actual achievements of a comprehensive M.E. peace + settlement. Even if our hypothesis is valid, however, Moscow would + almost certainly link such talks to simultaneous, serious negotiations + on M.E. peace in the Geneva context. Since the Soviet interpretation of + the Cairo meetingReference is to a meeting + originally scheduled for December 3 in Cairo that had been postponed + at the Carter + administration’s request. For more on this subject, see Foreign + Relations, 1977–1980, vol. VIII, Arab-Israeli Dispute, + January 1977–August 1978, Document 161. is that the + prospects for Geneva have + been seriously set back, we doubt that Brezhnev’s words will be given + this favorable interpretation by the Soviet CAT Delegation now.

+

8. The fact that Ambassador Khlestov will be leading the Soviet team does not seem + to us to indicate either rapid or dramatic movement by the Soviets + towards presenting a detailed, specific draft declaration or other + substantive proposal. Khlestov, + while affable, able, patient (witness his years in MBFR), is a mechanic, not a policy + innovator. He and his advisors will, we believe, be more interested in + determining the U.S. position and in establishing a positive Soviet + posture towards arms transfers controls without specifically commiting + themselves to practical actions. Since, as we pointed out above, we + believe the Soviets will look upon these talks as almost as important to + their current policies as CTB and + SALT, we think that they will + prefer to wait for subsequent rounds before making any major moves.

+ + Toon + +
+ +
+ 284. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the North + Atlantic Treaty Organization and the Embassies in Belgium, Canada, + Denmark, Greece, Iceland, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, + Turkey, and ItalySource: + National Archives, RG 59, Central + Foreign Policy File, D780001–0958. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Robert Mantel + (PM/SS); cleared by Thomas Gorman (DOD/ISA), Barry Blechman (ACDA), Jerome Kahan (PM), and Lowell Fleischer (S/S–O); and approved by William Luers + (EUR). Sent for information to + Paris, London, Bonn, and Moscow. A day later, the Embassy in Moscow + relayed its “deep concern and dismay over receipt of belated and + relatively uninformative report” on the CAT talks. (Telegram 18660 from Moscow, December 29; + National Archives, RG 59, Central + Foreign Policy File, D780001–0599) + Washington, December 28, 1977, + 2328Z +

308915. Subject: U.S.-Soviet Talks on Conventional Arms Transfer Issues. + Ref: State.

+

1. The U.S. and the USSR held + discussions in Washington, December 14–19 on conventional arms transfer + issues.

+

2. FYI: FRG, UK and French + Ambassadors were debriefed in Department by PM Director Gelb.

+

3. For NATO: For use as + appropriate.

+ +

4. For capitals: You should seek appointment at appropriate level to + provide a general debrief on the talks. You should take any detailed + questions and forward them to Department. Talking points follow:

+

—The U.S. and the USSR held preliminary + discussions in Washington from December 14–19 on the limitation of + conventional arms transfers; the Soviets preferred to refer to these + discussions as “preliminary” rather than the first meeting of a + U.S.-Soviet working group on this subject. We had no objection to + this.

+

—The talks were part of our efforts to move forward toward the + President’s objective of reducing the volume and sophistication of + conventional arms transfers. This requires the cooperation of other + suppliers and recipients.

+

—Because the U.S. and the USSR are the + two largest suppliers of arms to the third world, it is important that + the two countries begin to discuss this issue.

+

—The discussions were exploratory and general in nature. We did not seek + to reach any agreements.

+

—The U.S. explained its arms transfer policy at length and identified + what we believe to be common concerns of the two countries. We pointed + out potential dangers that could result from unrestrained transfers.

+

—In explaining our policy, we discussed the guidelines that the U.S. is + following, including the following which could form the basis for a + mutual approach:

+

—No first introduction of advanced equipment that would significantly + increase the combat capability in a region;

+

—Restraints on transfers of certain weapons which are particularly + susceptible to misuse by terrorists;

+

—Restraints on co-production agreements of advanced systems; and

+

—Controls on third party transfers.

+

—The U.S. acknowledged that this is a complex and difficult subject, and + that meaningful progress will take time.

+

—The U.S. noted that neither we nor the Soviets should be expected to + disadvantage our respective friends and allies or to jeopardize our + national security interests. “Legitimate” security needs of buyers + should be met.

+

—The Soviets asked many questions about U.S. policy and our approach to + the issues of restraint.

+

—The U.S. indicated that we thought the most useful approach was to + discuss possible harmonization of national guidelines (the + London-Nuclear Suppliers Group Approach) rather than to seek + quantitative limitations, even though we, for our own purposes, had + adopted a ceiling.

+

—The Soviets approached the talks with some skepticism; nevertheless, + they agreed to assess the results of the Washington talks and to consult + with U.S. as to the next meeting.

+

—We are optimistic that we can develop an ongoing dialogue that may + enable us, over time, to convince them that cooperative approaches + toward restraint objectives are in their interest as well as our + own.

+ +

—The U.S. clearly noted that our ability to sustain our own policy of + restraint was dependent, in part, on achieving the cooperation of other + suppliers and recipients.

+

5. In view of sensitivity of these talks, please request that + confidentiality be protected.

+ + Vance + +
+ +
+ 285. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the + Soviet UnionSource: National + Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign + Policy File, P840081–2373. Secret; Nodis. Sent for information to the White House. Drafted + by Robert Mantel (PM/SSP); cleared by Gary Matthews (EUR/SOV) and + John Thyden (S/S); and approved by + Gelb. + Washington, December 30, 1977, + 2128Z +

310500. For Ambassador from Gelb; + White House for Brzezinski. Subj: + “Non-Paper” on US-Soviet Conventional Arms Transfer Talks.

+

1. Ambassador should seek appointment with Khlestov and transmit to him personally, on behalf of + Gelb, text of “Non-Paper” + that summarizes US presentation to + Soviets during talks.

+

2. Purpose of “Non-Paper” is to provide on an unofficial but written + basis central thrust of US + presentation.

+

3. Begin text:

+

US-SOVIET CONSULTATIONS ON LIMITATION OF THE + INTERNATIONAL ARMS TRADE

+

The United States believes that the preliminary meeting on this subject, + held in Washington on December 14 through 19, 1977, was an important and + useful step toward improving our mutual understanding of this complex + topic.

+

MUTUAL INTERESTS

+

The US and USSR have many parallel if not common interests in + restraining conventional arms transfers. The US has taken the first steps toward this objective by + adopting a policy of restraint in its own arms sales. This effort has + the active support of President Carter. Measures taken to implement this new policy of + restraint were described by the US + representatives at the December meeting.

+ +

As a practical matter, however, the US + ability to sustain its restraint policy depends, in part, on the + demonstration of progress toward restraint by other suppliers, including + the USSR. Without international + cooperation, the prospects for continuing US restraint are uncertain.

+

The United States believes that US-Soviet + cooperation in restraining arms transfers is as important as the most + important other items on our arms control agenda; further, that talks on + controlling the arms trade fall within the spirit and context of the + mutual obligations we assumed when our two countries signed, at the + highest level, the “Basic Principles of Relations between the US and the USSR,” on May 29, 1972.For the + complete text of the Joint Declaration see Department of State Bulletin, pp. 899–902.

+

Our common interest in restraining arms transfers has been demonstrated + in the past when situations developed in which our respective supply of + arms to opposing sides in local conflicts led to tensions in our own + relations, and adversely influenced the political climate for progress + in other arms control negotiations. Other important common stakes in + arms transfer restraint include:

+

—Prevention and/or limitation of regional conflicts: unrestricted arms + transfers could help spark dangerous and destabilizing local conflicts, + perhaps drawing US inadvertently into + unwanted and dangerous confrontations.

+

—Assisting efforts to stem nuclear proliferation: unrestrained transfers + of conventional military technology might gradually undermine our + cooperative efforts to stem nuclear proliferation, through states opting + for nuclear weapons to offset changes in local balances of conventional + military forces resulting from arms transfers.

+

—Avoiding manipulation by recipients: the US and USSR should aim to + avoid situations in which recipients of our arms might be tempted to + play us off against one another.

+

—Reducing supplier uncertainties: future policies of our arms recipients + are not predictable, arms supply relationships often prove to be of only + limited political value.

+

—Reducing costly and unnecessary weapon acquisitions: the US and USSR should encourage the use of scarce financial resources + in the third world for more constructive purposes than arms + acquisitions.

+

—Encouraging other suppliers to restrain arms exports: any US-Soviet understandings on restraint + cannot be fully effective without parallel action by other suppliers. + Yet, as the two largest suppliers, our cooperation is necessary as an + example to others.

+

MUTUAL APPROACHES TO + RESTRAINT

+

The United States believes that common acceptance of the following + criteria would constitute a first step toward cooperation:

+ +

—There should be no advantage for any supplier;

+

—The fulfillment of recipients’ legitimate security requirements must not + be jeopardized;

+

—Any steps toward cooperation must be flexible, and reflect both our + common concerns and respective national security requirements.

+

The London Nuclear Suppliers’ Group may be a relevant precedent. There, + the emergence of harmonized national guidelines was the most useful + result. We could strive for similar harmonization in arms transfer + restraint.

+

Possible forms which such restraint guidelines might take include:

+

—Advanced systems restraint: introduction of advanced weapon systems into + a region where they have not previously been deployed could endanger + peace and stability by creating a significantly higher combat capability + in the area. Guidelines could be discussed concerning the definition of + “advanced systems” in specific regions of the world.

+

—Limitations on selected weapons: certain categories of weapons, for a + variety of reasons, are almost always inherently destabilizing, and + susceptible to misuse by criminals and terrorists. Discussions of + guidelines which would limit the spread of such weapons appears to be in + our mutual interest. Man-portable air defense systems are illustrative + of the type of weapons system that might be limited.

+

—Co-production restrictions: both the US + and USSR have entered into agreements + with third countries for the co-production or licensed production of + some important weapon systems. Problems which arise in connection with + co-production include the transfer of important technology to the + co-producer and the possible export by the co-producer of surplus + production. Consideration might be given to guidelines which would call + for foregoing co-production arrangements with developing countries for + significant weapons or components of major weapons.

+

—Retransfer controls: as with nuclear proliferation, failure to adopt + tight retransfer controls could lead to circumvention of arms restraint, + thereby undermining Soviet–American interest in avoiding the dangers and + destabilizing consequences of particular arms transfers. It may be in + both our interest to assure that weapons either of us might supply not + be retransferred without our approval.

+

CEILINGS

+

Although the US would not totally rule + out any approach at this point, it is not our intention to seek + agreement on the total amount of arms each country should sell. The + different requirements of friends and allies of each supplier would make + negotiation of overall ceilings extremely difficult. In our view, the + development of common restraint guidelines for certain kinds of weapons + and regions would have a more direct impact in reducing the risk of + regional conflict and the danger of US-Soviet confrontation.

+

SPECIAL SESSION ON DISARMAMENT + (SSOD)

+

Our governments have a common interest in the conventional arms transfer + issue at the SSOD because of our + responsibilities as major suppliers and our need to respond credibly to critics about our + intention to restrain arms transfers. Although the problem can not be + solved by any single state or group of states, it might be useful for + the US and USSR to consider consultations with regard to this issue + prior to the SSOD.

+

NEED FOR ONGOING + CONSULTATIONS

+

The great number of mutual interests and problems involved in the arms + transfer restraint issue strongly suggest the need for ongoing + Soviet-American consultations.

+

Further talks would present an opportunity for both sides to discuss + possible policy guidelines and specific restraint measures in greater + detail. We also anticipate the Soviet Union may wish to discuss further + its policies and practices during future sessions. Finally, a + continuation of this dialogue will provide US with the opportunity to talk about transfers + contemplated by either side which might be subject to misinterpretation + by the other side.

+

The problem of how to accommodate the legitimate defense needs of + recipients while involving them in the restraint process is also one + which we have not fully addressed. One way to involve recipients might + be through regional approaches to restraint. Additional consultations on + this issue would be particularly useful in preparation for the SSOD.

+

In summary, the United States believes that future talks on these + questions are very important and would help to make clear our mutual + stakes in cooperation to prevent further escalation of the conventional + arms trade.

+ + Christopher + +
+ +
+ + 286. Summary of Conclusions of a Policy Review Committee MeetingSource: Carter Library, + Brzezinski Donated + Material, Box 24, Meetings: Policy Review Committee Meetings (PRC), PRC 51: 1/26/78. Secret. The meeting took place in the + White House Situation Room. + Washington, January + 26, 1978 + + SUBJECT + Management of Arms Transfers + + + PARTICIPANTS + + State + Secretary Cyrus + Vance + Lucy Benson, Under + Secretary for Security Assistance + Leslie Gelb, + Director, Office of Politico-Military Affairs + + + Defense + David E. McGiffert, + Assistant Secretary for International Security + Affairs + Lynn Davis, Deputy Assistant Secretary, Policy Plans and + NSC Affairs + + + JCS + General George + Brown + Lt. General William + Smith + + + CIA + Sayre Stevens, + Deputy Director, National Foreign Assessment Center + Dickson Davis, NIO S/S + + + OMB + James + McIntyre + Edward Sanders, Deputy Associate Director International + Affairs Division + + + ACDA + Spurgeon + Keeny + Barry Blechman, Assistant Director, Weapons Evaluation and + Control + + + White House + Zbigniew + Brzezinski + Jessica Tuchman, + NSC + Leslie G. Denend, NSC + + +

The PRC met to review the FY 1978 conventional arms sales program. + The following issues and conclusions were raised.

+

1. AWACS

+

There was agreement that the remaining two letters of offer totaling less + than $300 million will be signed up during FY 1978.

+

2. Planned Reduction

+

It was agreed that options would be presented to the President on the + appropriate size of the planned reduction in sales during FY 1978. There are three options:

+ +

Option 1. A five percent reduction during this + year recognizing the importance of achieving and even exceeding the + target for the year.

+

Option 2. An eight percent reduction this year to + ensure the credibility of our policy of restraint.

+

Option 3. At least a five percent reduction this + year with the additional commitment to at least a ten percent reduction + by the end of two years to establish a downward trend over a longer + period and facilitate planning.

+

3. Ceiling Management

+

There was agreement on the procedures to be used in managing the ceiling. + The sale of aircraft to the Middle East is likely to account for a large + portion of the ceiling dollars available for new sales commitments this + year. The attached listingNot + attached. presents other major requests—excluding the Middle + East package—and will be forwarded to the President for his approval as + the FY 1978 plan, as part of a flexible + predictive approach to managing the ceiling. There will be a monthly + review of the plan to measure progress against the ceiling, incorporate + new information and recommend additional cases. The normal clearance + process during which arms control, human rights, and economic impacts + are assessed before forwarding the request for the President’s approval + will be preserved. For large cases or when there is disagreement on a + particular case, it may be necessary to convene the PRC before the case goes to the + President.

+

4. Congressional and + Press Strategy

+

There was broad agreement that a substantial education program must be + carried out with the Congress and the press. State will prepare a plan + by next TuesdayJanuary 31. which + will identify the members of Congress whom we must contact and develop a + strategy for the Press. State + will also contact the Chairmen of the HIRC and the SFRC in an effort to head off requests + for Administration working papers which might contain lists of possible + sales, citing the problems of the list becoming public and of falsely + generating expectations.

+
+ +
+ + 287. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security + Affairs (Brzezinski) to President + CarterSource: Carter Library, Brzezinski Donated Material, Box + 24, Meetings: Policy Review Committee Meetings (PRC), PRC 51: 1/26/78. Secret. Sent for action. Brzezinski hand-wrote the date in + the upper right-hand corner of the first page of the memorandum. + Above the date, Carter wrote + “C.” + Washington, January + 30, 1978 + + SUBJECT + PRC Review of FY 1978 Arms Sales + +

The PRC has met twiceThe first PRC + meeting on FY 1978 arms sales was + scheduled for January 10. No record of this meeting was found. The + second meeting is Document 286. to + consider the FY 1978 arms sales program + including the ceiling management system, specific requests which make up + the FY 1978 plan, and the reduction in + sales to be achieved in FY 1978. This + memorandum requests your approval of the management system and the plan, + and presents options on the reduction. (S)

+

I. Ceiling Management

+

The ceiling has been broken down as indicated in the table on the + following page. The allocations for follow-on support, MAP, and small cases are based on Defense + and State estimates of requirements for FY 1978.

+

The PRC recommends a flexible predictive + approach to managing the ceiling, with a particular focus on management + of the ceiling dollars available for sales of new systems. At the + beginning of each year known and anticipated possible sales for that + year and beyond will be compiled. The PRC will make an initial assessment of those sales which + should be made during the year and will list them for your consideration + in order of priority. The list will subsequently be reviewed and updated + on a monthly basis providing the flexibility to incorporate new + information, and to respond to changing circumstances. This process does + not replace the normal clearance process during which arms control, + human rights and economic impacts are assessed for each individual sale + before it comes to you for final approval. However the existence of the + list, approved by you, will force the bureaucracy to think in terms of + trade-offs when new cases arise, thereby allowing us to meet our + restraint goals. (S)

+ +

Recommendation

+

I recommend that you approve the predictive approach as described above + for managing the arms transfer ceiling. (S)Carter did not indicate + his preference with respect to this recommendation.

+

FY 1978 CEILING (in + billions of 1978 dollars)

+ + + FY 1978 + Ceiling Baseline + + $ 9.3 + + + (Based on sales of weapons and weapons-related items to other + than NATO, Japan, Australia + and New Zealand in FY + 1977.) + + + + + Less Commitments + + + + + Signed Sales Agreements and Letters of + + + + Officer and Acceptance outstanding. + 2.4 + + + + (Includes the AWACS sale to Iran and other agreements signed + so far this year as well as LOAs offered but not yet signed by + the foreign government.) + + + + + Reserve for follow-on support. + 1.2In the right-hand margin, + Carter drew an + arrow pointing to the number “1.2” and wrote “This is, I + presume, based on past sales—Give firm orders to DOD + not to exceed.” + + + + (Includes ammunition, spare parts, maintenance and technical + support for systems already sold.) + + + + + Reserve for MAP. + .1 + + + + (Includes weapons and weapons-related portion of direct + military assistance approved in the budget by Congress.) + + + + + + 5.3 + + + Discretionary Balance + + $ 4.0 + + + Less the Planned Reduction + + (.47–.74Carter circled + “.74.”) + + + (Five to eight percent depending on which option you + select.) + + + + + Available for Sales of New + Systems + + (3.26Carter circled “3.26.”–3.53) + +
+ +

II. The FY 1978 Plan

+

A major part of new sales commitments in FY 1978 will be a package of aircraft sales to the Middle + East. The value of LOAs signed this year for that package could range + from $1.3 to $3.5 billion, but will most probably be in the range of + $1.5 to $2.0 billion. The listing at Tab ATab A was not attached. represents priority groupings of + other major requests—sales within groups are listed + alphabetically—excluding the Middle East aircraft package. Based on the + allocations in the table on the previous page, we should be able to + conclude agreements on the requests contained in the first two groups in + the listing at Tab A. However, the plan is not static; it will be + updated monthly to reflect new requests and those which have been + withdrawn. The importance of the plan is that it offers a comprehensive + listing and facilitates the necessary trade-offs. It does not replace + your review of individual cases before they are notified to Congress. + (S)

+

Recommendation

+

I recommend that you establish the listing at Tab A as the FY 1978 Sales Plan.Carter + checked the “Approve” option.

+

III. Planned Reductions

+

During the past week there has been considerable negative reaction in the + press to the $13.2 billion forecast for total overall sales in FY 1978. Sales are expected to increase + because of an increase in NATO sales + and construction activities in Saudi Arabia, both of which are not + included in the ceiling. The press stories argue that the Administration + has either abandoned restraint or is practicing “slight of hand” with + the numbers. In this context, there was disagreement on the appropriate + size of the reduction in sales under the ceiling to be achieved in + FY 1978. Opinion was divided among + three possible options, all in constant (1977) dollars:

+

1. A five percent reduction this year. Although it + may be viewed by some as insufficient to show restraint, this is + attractive in that we can meet and probably exceed this target (i.e., + promise five percent and deliver six–eight percent). Moreover, we can + probably maintain that goal in the future as well. I support this option + along with the JCS.

+

2. An eight percent reduction this year. Those who + support this option believe that in light of the current political + climate and the forecast for the high overall sales total, eight percent + is the minimum politically credible figure. Because inflation is + expected to run at approximately seven percent, a reduction of eight + percent will show an absolute decrease from last year without appealing to an adjustment for + inflation. However, your credibility would be at stake if this goal was + not met, or if we feel compelled to reduce it in subsequent years. State + and ACDA support this option.

+

3. At least a five percent reduction this year with the + additional commitment to at least a ten percent reduction by the end + of two years. This option would sustain a five percent annual + reduction for two years, thereby removing uncertainty in the policy. + However, it could reduce your flexibility in an area where there are + substantial uncertainties. Those who support this option believe that + the longer period will facilitate our arms sales planning and allow more + time for other suppliers to emulate our restraint. Defense and OMB support this option; it is NSC’s second choice. (S)

+

Your Decision

+

Option 1: ______

+

Option 2: ______Carter checked “Option 2” and underneath wrote + “JC.”

+

Option 3: ______

+
+ +
+ + 288. Memorandum of ConversationSource: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, + Brzezinski Material, + Office File, Country Chron File, Box 56, Venezuela, 1–4/78. + Confidential. The meeting occurred at the Miraflores Palace. + Carter was in Caracas on + March 28 and 29. In a follow-up meeting with Perez on April 28, + Assistant Secretary of State for Latin American Affairs Viron Vaky + said the United States supported Perez’s call for “regional + restraint, tying this to the larger US effort to encourage multilateral restraint.” + (Telegram 4012 from Caracas, April 29; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + D780187–0874) + Caracas, March 28, 1978, 3:30–4:40 + p.m. + + SUBJECT + International Political Issues: Panama Canal Treaties, + Non-Proliferation, Middle East, Africa, Belize, Nicaragua, and + Conventional Arms Restraint + + + PARTICIPANTS + President Jimmy Carter + Secretary of State Cyrus R. + Vance + Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski, + Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs + Terence A. Todman, + Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs + W. Anthony Lake, Director, + Policy Planning Staff + Robert A. Pastor, NSC Staff Member + Ambassador Viron P. Vaky + Guy F. Erb, NSC Staff + Member + Venezuela + Carlos Andres Perez, + President + Simon Bottaro Consalvi, Minister of Foreign Affairs + Manuel Perez Guerrero, Minister of State for International + Economic Affairs + Valentin Acosta Hernandez, Minister of Energy and Mines + Carmelo Lesseur Lauria, Minister, Secretariat of the + Presidency + Hector Hurtado, Minister of State, President of the Investment + Fund + Ambassador Ignacio Iribarren + Dr. Reinaldo Figuerido, Director of Foreign Trade Institute + +

After exchanging cordialities, President Perez asked about President + Carter’s preference with + regard to an agenda. President Carter said that he would like to discuss international + political issues today and economic issues tomorrow.

+

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to conventional arms + transfers.]

+

Conventional Arms Restraint

+

Perez raised the issue of the arms race in the + Andes. He said that Venezuela had called a meeting based on the Ayacucho + Declaration,Declaration signed by + Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Panama, Peru, and + Venezuela on December 9, 1974 urging “the creation of a permanent + order of international peace and cooperation and to create + conditions that permit the effective limitation of armaments and put + an end to their acquisition for offensive warlike ends, in order to + dedicate all possible resources to the economic and social + development of each of the countries of Latin America.” (Documents on Disarmament, 1974, pp. + 819–822)

+

which is dormant. The problem is + that if the U.S. doesn’t sell arms to the region, the Europeans (and the + Soviets, President Carter added) + do. Perez said that “we cannot remain with our arms folded”. In answer + to a question by President Carter on how Ayacucho could be reactivated, Perez said + that they could propose a meeting, but the situation is complicated by + the breaking of relations between Bolivia and Chile.Bolivian President Hugo Banzer broke relations with + Chile on March 21.

+

President Carter said that in the last five years, Latin + America has purchased $7 billion worth of weapons. The U.S. has become a + smaller supplier because of its arms restraint policy, selling less than + Britain, France, or the Soviets. We would like to reduce our arms sales + even more, though there is a limit on how far we can go because of + private interests. We would welcome Perez’ ideas on reviving + Ayacucho.

+

Perez said he would support the President’s + policies on arms restraint and try to get them adopted by other + countries, but he needed more information.

+

The President said he would send the U.S. arms + sales policy statement,See footnote 1, Document 271. and + that perhaps it could be used as a model or a voluntary formula. + Recently, the U.S. asked Mexico to reassess its defense needs and + President Jose Lopez Portillo + withdrew his request. It would be beneficial to pursue this as a prelude + to the U.N. Special Session on Disarmament.

+

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to conventional arms + transfers.]

+
+ +
+ + 289. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department + of StateSource: National + Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign + Policy File, D780153–1117. Confidential; Priority; Exdis. + Moscow, April 10, 1978, 1226Z +

7232. Subject: U.S.-Soviet Talks on Conventional Arms Transfers. Ref: (A) + State 80818,In telegram 80818 to Moscow, + March 29, the Department of State asked for an “Embassy assessment + of what we might expect from the Soviet side” when the conventional + arms transfers talks resumed in Helsinki in May. (National Archives, + RG 59, Central Foreign Policy + File, D780136–1095) (B) Moscow 6771.In response to telegram 80818 to Moscow, March 29, + the Embassy reported in telegram 6771, April 5, that Soviet + Ambassador-at-Large L.I. + Mendelevich “avoided specific comments” about the + conventional arms transfers talks and stuck to “general observations + of U.S. December presentation and Soviet presentation in May in + Helsinki. He recognized that it is Soviet turn to give their views, + and claimed his remarks in Helsinki will be more ‘political/legal’ + and less ‘technical’ than U.S. December presentation.” (National + Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign + Policy File, D780148–0001)

+

1. The Embassy has the following comments and views on the coming CAT talks set for Helsinki May 4. Our + observations of last December on the Soviet approach in the first + roundSee Document + 283. seem in general to remain valid for Helsinki. + We continue to think that the cautious and conservative approach of the + Soviets will remain unchanged.

+

2. The evidence seems to indicate that the Soviets consider the current + stage of the talks to be only exploratory. To underline this they have + pointedly suggested that the talks be referred to as consultations and + not “working group” discussions. (Mendelevich on April 4 also questioned the use of the + term “working group” for the CAT + talks.) Furthermore, the thrust of Mendelevich’s remarks on April 4 showed that the Soviets + still have doubts that U.S.-Soviet cooperation on CAT can be fruitful. He claimed that a + final decision to continue with the talks cannot be made until after the + conclusion of the next round. We would estimate, therefore, that + although the Soviets will, as Mendelevich indicated, take the lead in Helsinki, they + will not go so far as to elaborate a series of specific proposals.

+

3. Khlestov’s few substantive + comments in December and Mendelevich’s remarks indicate that they will instead + press hard on the question of those political principles which ought, in + their view, to govern the transfer of arms. In this respect we see the + “legal” approach of Khlestov as + continuing with Mendelevich. He + will likely argue that the “principles” are paramount and that they must + be treated before deciding whether and how to control transfers. While + this is very thin gruel for the + coming session, Mendelevich is + capable of spreading it over the four days of talks with questions and + comments on the U.S. approach completing his contribution to the + session. Clearly the Soviets are not in a great hurry to make progress, + although they will make every effort to avoid appearing to be the brake + on the talks.

+

4. Although the change to Mendelevich from Khlestov will certainly result in some minor changes in + style and substance, we do not think that the basic approach will be + greatly affected in this coming round. Mendelevich’s designation is probably the result of a + combination of factors. First, the LOS session has just begun in Geneva + and could be crucial to the success of a LOS agreement. Khlestov has been a senior Soviet + participant in the LOS process since its inception. He headed previous + Soviet LOS Delegations and as an MFA department chief he has chief + responsibility for back-stopping the current round. Thus, substantively + and bureaucratically his participation in the CAT talks at this time may be difficult.

+

5. Mendelevich, on the other hand, + has no line responsibilities within MFA and his only other + responsibility, the Indian Ocean talks, are not so pressing as to occupy + him full time. Finally, MFA USA Department First Secretary Kuznetsov + told us that the Soviet side does not consider that the CAT talks have reached the point where the + treaty and legal expertise which Khlestov has can be fully utilized. This is another way + of saying that the talks are too preliminary to warrant his taking time + from his other duties to devote attention to CAT. Whether Khlestov will return to CAT at a later stage is a question, although Mendelevich would have US believe he will not, since on April 4 he + characterized his duties in CAT as + “permanent.”

+

6. Mendelevich has virtually + assured US that he will continue to + press the “legal” argumentation which Khlestov began last December. From the Soviet point of + view such an approach is most advantageous because it focuses attention + on the question of “who” has a “legitimate” need for arms and not “what” + arms should or should not be supplied. Khlestov’s reference to “principles” in December clearly + indicated that the “racist” and “aggressor” states should not be “legal” + recipients and that states exercising “legitimate self-defense” and + National Liberation Movements should be. Before moving on to the + question of “what” should be supplied to these latter (i.e., the + “technical” issue in the words of Mendelevich), the Soviets will wish to call into + question the legitimacy of transfers to the former.

+

7. It is in this area that the Soviets will likely have their sharpest + criticism (polemics are not Mendelevich’s style) of the U.S. for what Mendelevich referred to on April 4 as + “undesirable transfers.” Israel (“aggressor”), South Africa (“racist”), + Iran and Saudi Arabia (“arms in excess of self-defense needs”) are some + of the “bad” examples of U.S. arms transfers which are likely to be singled out. (The use of U.S. + supplied arms in Lebanon by Israel recently will be particularly + attractive to them as a case in point.)

+

8. However, Khlestov seemed to + indicate in December that a regional approach to arms transfers was not + a proper topic for the discussions. Instead he thought the “main topic” + was the question of a “general limitation of the international arms + trade.” Since the logic of the Soviet position argues that the regional + problems are only the reflection of the global “principles,” we think + that they will try to stay away from a discussion of regional arms + transfer restraint in favor of a more general discussion of universally + applicable “principles.”

+

9. On what Mendelevich described + as the “technical” level, it appears from what he said that the Soviets + will not make a point of differences with the suggested approaches which + the U.S. side outlined in the December round. Rather, Mendelevich said he would have + “questions” about these approaches. The Soviet tactic might be to claim + that since these are “technical” details, they deserve additional + exposition, not debate, at this stage of the discussions. Such a + posture, combined with a Soviet statement that they agree in principle + that these U.S. suggestions are acceptable—although not all + inclusive—would assist the Soviets in focusing the discussion on the + “political, legal” issues as they see them.

+

10. In sum, we foresee a rather desultory round of talks, not dissimilar + to the December session with the difference that in this one the Soviet + side will be a more active participant.

+ + Toon + +
+ +
+ + 290. Summary of Conclusions of a Policy Review Committee MeetingSource: Carter Library, + Brzezinski Donated + Material, Subject File, Box 29, Meetings—PRC 60: 4/26/78. Secret. The meeting took place in the + White House Situation Room. + Washington, April + 26, 1978 + + SUBJECT + Talks with the Soviets on Arms Transfer Restraint + + + PARTICIPANTS + + State + Leslie Gelb, + Director, Office of Politico-Military Affairs + + + Defense + David E. McGiffert, + Assistant Secretary for International Security + Affairs + + + JCS + Lt. General William + Smith + + + CIA + George Allen + + + ACDA + Spurgeon + Keeny + Barry Blechman, Assistant Director, Weapons Evaluation and + Control + + + White House + David Aaron + Jessica Tuchman, + NSC + Reginald + Bartholomew, NSC + + +

The PRC met to discuss plans for the + next round of talks with the Soviets on supplier restraint in the + transfer of conventional arms. The following issues were raised and + positions taken.

+

The discussion focused on two issues: What our goals should be for this + round of talks; and, what approach to use in pursuing those goals. On + the first question there were two views. NSC and ACDA argued that + as the Soviets have not yet had their interest engaged in this process, + the purpose of this round must simply be to hook them into it, and to + get their agreement to continuing series of full-fledged working group + meetings. If this proves successful subsequent rounds could address + specific tough issues. State argued that this round is the time to begin + discussion of the difficult issues because otherwise we would be + offering the Soviets the opportunity to string us along, which they + would be happy to do indefinitely. In so doing, we would lose our slim + remaining chance of engaging British and French cooperation in this + effort. Neither Defense nor JCS took a + clear position on this issue.

+

Regarding the approach to be taken, two approaches—overlapping, but + differing significantly in emphasis—were presented.Tarnoff sent + Brzezinski an undated + Issues Paper, “Strategy at the Helsinki CAT Talks,” that discussed the two approaches. (Carter + Library, National Security Council, Institutional Files, Box 68, + PRC 060, Arms Transfer Talks, + Helsinki, 4/26/78) The regional emphasis approach + would highlight the need for restraint in specific regions, and would + present these as the focus for future discussions. State, which argued + for this approach, proposed that three types of regions be presented: + trouble spots (e.g., the Horn); potential trouble spots (e.g., Southern + Africa); and, relatively quiescent regions (e.g., Latin America).

+

ACDA favored a functional emphasis which would seek to involve the other + suppliers in a multilateral effort to harmonize their respective + national policies along the lines of the guidelines the United States + has adopted unilaterally (e.g., agreement not to be the first to + introduce new, more potent systems into a region; severe limitations on + coproduction; ban on transfer of particularly sensitive weapons such as + MANPADS, etc.). ACDA argued that in many cases the + guidelines are designed to be applied regionally, and could therefore be + used as a vehicle for concrete, tough negotiations.

+

During the discussion the following positions emerged. State favored the + regional approach, citing such controversial regions as the Horn and + Southern Africa. NSC and ACDA argued that there was nothing in + that presentation to attract the Soviets and that it would seriously + diminish our chance of getting them to agree to future meetings on that + basis. Acknowledging this argument, Defense and JCS concluded that we should use the regional approach but + cite as examples only non-controversial regions such as Western Africa, + Latin America and South Asia. State argued that such an approach would + destroy the credibility of the entire supplier restraint effort. NSC noted that if any type of regional + approach were used, the list of examples should include regions, such as + the Middle East, which would be uncomfortable for us to address, as well + as those which would be uncomfortable for the Soviets.

+

Finally, NSC and ACDA agreed that in order to maximize our + chances for a continuing process, and since we have not developed any + specific regional proposals to lay on the table, we should adopt the + functional approach in this round, but should make clear to the Soviets + that we would intend at an early stage to address specific regional + problems in that context.

+
+ +
+ + 291. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security + Affairs (Brzezinski) to President + CarterSource: Carter Library, Brzezinski Donated Material, + Subject File, Box 29, Meetings–PRC + 60: 4/26/78. Secret. Sent for action. Carter wrote “C” in the upper + right-hand corner of the memorandum. + Washington, April + 28, 1978 + + SUBJECT + Talks with the Soviets on Conventional Arms Transfer + Restraint + +

A PRC meeting was held yesterday + concerning the approach to be adopted in next week’s talks with the + Soviets on supplier restraint in arms transfers. The discussion revealed + a sharp difference of opinion as to how we should approach this round of + talks. The debate centered on whether we should raise specific + contentious issues in this round, or whether we should aim only to + secure Soviet agreement to participate in a serious, continuing process. + Tab ATab A is printed as Document + 290. is the Summary of Conclusions of the meeting which + outlines the arguments made.

+

Subject to your approval, I intend to resolve the issue with the + directive at Tab B. Also, in order to demonstrate to the Soviets that + this effort has high level support, I believe it would be helpful for + the delegation to have with it a statement from you expressing your + personal commitment to arms transfer restraint and your concern for the + success of these talks. A draft statement is at Tab C for your + approval.

+

RECOMMENDATION

+

That you approve the directive and statement at Tab B and C + respectively.

+

Approve Presidential Directive

+

______Carter changed “Approve” to + “Disapprove” on this line, underlined it twice, and checked this + option. In the right-hand margin he wrote “We should move quickly + & forcefully to spell out “functional” & “regional” + restraint proposals. Give Soviets copy of our unilateral arms sales + policy, & see early if they are serious.”

+

As amended

+

______

+

Approve Presidential Statement

+

______

+

As amended

+

______Carter checked the “As amended” + option.

+ +

Tab B

+

Draft Presidential DirectiveSecret.

+

Washington, undated

+ + TO + The Secretary of State + The Secretary of Defense + + + ALSO + The Director, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency + The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff + The Director of Central Intelligence + + + SUBJECT + US–USSR Talks on Conventional Arms Restraint + +

The President has approved the following directive.

+

The United States Delegation to the US–USSR talks on + conventional arms transfer in Helsinki May 4–8 should view its primary + objectives in this round to secure Soviet agreement to participate in a + continuing and regular series of working group meetings on multilateral + supplier restraint.Carter bracketed this paragraph in + the right-hand margin and underlined the phrase “to secure Soviet + agreement to participate in a continuing and regular series of + working group meetings.” In the left-hand margin he wrote “not + enough—Let’s get to the point.”

+

To this end, the Delegation should continue the functional guidelines + approach in its presentation to the Soviets. The Delegation should also + make clear that we believe that meaningful arms restraint talks must + address specific regional situations in troublesome, potentially + troublesome, and currently calm areas, and that we intend to make + specific proposals in this regard in the next round and thereafter. If + the Soviet delegation cites specific regions where our arms transfer + policies concern them, the U.S. Delegation should cite the Horn and + Southern Africa as regional situations where Soviet arms transfer + policies concern us. If the Soviets show inclination to engage at this + meeting in discussion of arms transfer restraint in specific regional + situations, the Delegation is authorized to do so coordinating with + Washington as required.

+

The Chairman of the Delegation is authorized to make use of the attached + Presidential statement as he deems appropriate, in order to demonstrate the commitment and support + of the highest levels of the United States Government to this + effort.

+

Zbigniew + Brzezinski

+

Tab CNo + classification marking.

+

President Carter has asked me to + make this statement on his behalf:

+

This is an opportunity to convey my personal concern, and that of the + United States Government, over the growing world trade in conventional + arms, and the urgency I attach to international cooperation to reduce + that trade. The unrestrained transfer of conventional weapons represents + a serious and continuing threat to peace, and a diversion of resources + badly needed for economic and social development.

+

As great powers, and as the world’s leading arms suppliers, the United + States and the Soviet Union have a special responsibility to restrain + this traffic in armaments. We have distinct but common interests in + doing so. Moreover, without US-Soviet restraint, others will not alter + their arms transfer practices and opportunities for meaningful + multilateral restraint will be lost. And without multilateral restraint, + no single supplier could be expected to sustain a policy of restraint + for very long.Carter crossed out the word “restrain” and + substituted “curb” in the first sentence and added “such” before the + words “a policy” and crossed out the words “of restraint” in the + last sentence

+

Restraint does not mean an end to arms sales. Obviously, the legitimate + defense needs of friends and allies must be fulfilled. Neither of us + would have it otherwise. Restraint does mean that we take steps in + common—in cooperation with suppliers as well as with recipients—to + prevent sales from increasing the risk of war or inflaming regional and + global tensions. Regional conflicts cannot be solved by arms transfer + restraint alone. But restraint can contribute to the resolution of such + problems and help avoid future conflicts.

+

To my way of thinking, our common responsibilities in this area flow + naturally from the basic tenets of our relations—from the principles + agreed to at the highest levels of our governments on May 29, 1972.Carter crossed out “To my way of thinking,” + capitalized the letter “O” in “our,” crossed out the phrase “agreed + to at the highest levels,” and substituted “accepted by the leaders” + in the first sentence. For the final text of the “Basic Principles + of Relations Between the United States of America and the Union of + Soviet Socialist Republics, issued on May 29, 1972, see Public Papers: Nixon, 1972, pp. 633–635. These + principles affirm the importance of preventing the development of situations which can lead to + confrontations or aggravate problems in our relations. They also affirm + our readiness to exchange views at the highest level when necessary on + various problems in our relations.

+

I regard progress in this field as one indication of the importance we + each ascribe to these principles. In particular, our governments must + take clear, visible steps now, in Helsinki, to record our mutual + determination to restrain arms sales, and to create machinery + appropriate to this purpose.

+

By enlarging our arms control agenda to include restraint in transfers of + conventional arms, we take one more important step away from conflict + and confrontation, and toward more cooperative relations.

+
+ +
+ 292. Presidential Directive/NSC–36Source: Carter Library, National Security Council, + Institutional Files, Box 68, PRC + 060, Arms Transfer Talks, Helsinki, 4/26/78. Secret. + Washington, April + 28, 1978 + + TO + The Secretary of State + The Secretary of Defense + + + ALSO + The Director, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency + The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff + The Director of Central Intelligence + + + SUBJECT + US–USSR Talks on Conventional Arms Restraint (U) + +

The President directs that the U.S. Delegation to the US–USSR + talks on conventional arms transfer in Helsinki, May 4–8, should move + quickly and forcefully to engage the Soviets in discussions of specific + functional and regional restraint proposals, looking to further + development of these proposals in subsequent rounds. While the + Delegation should seek to secure Soviet agreement to participate in + further meetings, the primary objective is to determine whether they are + serious about this effort.

+ +

In this context, the Delegation should reiterate the elements of our arms + restraint policy.

+

The Chairman of the Delegation is authorized to make use of the attached + Presidential statement as he deems appropriate, in order to demonstrate + the commitment and support of the highest levels of the United States + Government in this effort.

+

Zbigniew + Brzezinski

+

Attachment

+

Presidential StatementConfidential.

+

Washington, undated

+

President Carter has asked me to + make this statement on his behalf:

+

This is an opportunity to convey my personal concern, and that of the + United States Government, over the growing world trade in conventional + arms, and the urgency I attach to international cooperation to reduce + that trade. The unrestrained transfer of conventional weapons represents + a serious and continuing threat to peace, and a diversion of resources + badly needed for economic and social development.

+

As great powers, and as the world’s leading arms suppliers, the United + States and the Soviet Union have a special responsibility to curb this + traffic in armaments. We have distinct but common interests in doing so. + Moreover, without US-Soviet restraint, others will not alter their arms + transfer practices and opportunities for meaningful multilateral + restraint will be lost. And without multilateral restraint, no single + supplier could be expected to sustain such a policy for very long.

+

Restraint does not mean an end to arms sales. Obviously, the legitimate + defense needs of friends and allies must be fulfilled. Neither of us + would have it otherwise. Restraint does mean that we take steps in + common—in cooperation with suppliers as well as with recipients—to + prevent sales from increasing the risk of war or inflaming regional and + global tensions. Regional conflicts cannot be solved by arms transfer + restraint alone. But restraint can contribute to the resolution of such + problems and help avoid future conflicts.

+

Our common responsibilities in this area flow naturally from the basic + tenets of our relations—from the principles accepted by the leaders of our governments on May 29, + 1972.See footnote 9, Document 291. These principles affirm + the importance of preventing the development of situations which can + lead to confrontations or aggravate problems in our relations. They also + affirm our readiness to exchange views at the highest level when + necessary on various problems in our relations.

+

I regard progress in this field as one indication of the importance we + each ascribe to these principles. In particular, our governments must + take clear, visible steps now, in Helsinki, to record our mutual + determination to restrain arms sales, and to create machinery + appropriate to this purpose.

+

By enlarging our arms control agenda to include restraint in transfers of + conventional arms, we take one more important step away from conflict + and confrontation, and toward more cooperative relations.See footnote 2, Document + 285.

+
+ +
+ 293. Report Prepared by the Delegation to the US-Soviet Talks on + Conventional Arms Transfers Second RoundSource: Carter Library, National Security Council, + Institutional Files, Box 94, PRC + 079, Arms Transfer Policy: U.S. Next Proposals, 5/29/78. Secret. The + report was attached to a May 10 memorandum from Tarnoff to Brzezinski. (Ibid.) + Washington, undated +

US-Soviet Talks on Conventional Arms Transfers Second + Round, May 4–8, 1978

+

Delegation Report

+

Significant progress, more than we expected, was made in the US-Soviet + talks on Conventional Arms Transfers, which took place in Helsinki from + May 4 to 8.

+

Our net assessment is this: We cannot draw positive conclusions from this + round about Soviet willingness to make restraint agreements with us or + to actually cut back on their arms transfers. The fundamental Soviet + stance remains wary and skeptical.

+ +

In the judgment of the Delegation, however, the Soviets were serious and, + for the most part, practical in their approach to this round. Most + importantly, they are now committed to the process of discussing + restraint. When our joint communiqué stating this is released on + Thursday,May 11. In a joint communiqué, + the two sides “agreed that the problem of limiting international + transfers of conventional arms is urgent” and called for “solution + on a constructive basis so as to promote international peace and + security and strengthen détente.” Both sides also “stated their + belief that effective solution of the problem requires full + consideration of the legitimate defense needs of the recipients in + accordance with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the + United Nations.” (“Joint Communiqué by the United States and the + Soviet Union: Consultation on Limiting International Transfers of + Conventional Weapons,” May 11, 1978, Documents on + Disarmament, 1978, p. 286) we will have some basis + to ask for more cooperation from other suppliers and recipients.

+

It is our strategy to use this process itself as a means of generating + pressures on suppliers to slow down the pace of transfers and to think + twice about how much and what kinds of weapon systems are to be + transferred.

+

1. Objectives

+

The US side was charged with (a) + assessing the “seriousness” of Soviet interest in the talks, and (b) + securing Soviet agreement to future rounds of meetings. The latter + proved to be of only minor consequence as the Soviet side clearly was + prepared to agree to continue the discussions, even before the sessions + began. With regard to Soviet “seriousness”:

+

They certainly were serious at this round. They came prepared to present + their own approach to conventional arms restraint—one based on + “political and legal principles.” They asked fairly sophisticated + questions about the US functional + guidelines which revealed serious study of the details of US policy.

+

The tone throughout was constructive. The Soviets avoided polemics as a + rule. Nor did they shrink from discussions of topics on which they are + vulnerable—such as arms transfers to the Horn of Africa.

+

The joint communiqué issued at the conclusion of the round + (attached)The joint communiqué was not + attached. contains significant evidence of “seriousness.” In + it, the Soviets agreed: (a) that the subject was “urgent”; (b) that + transfers could affect US-Soviet relations adversely, as well as + international peace; (c) that the talks are in accord with the 1972 + Declaration of Basic Principles of US-Soviet + Relations;See footnote 9, Document 291. (d) that the talks would + continue on a “regularly scheduled” basis; and (e) most importantly, + that future rounds would consider “concrete measures” to implement arms + restraint. Public acceptance of each of these points is a first for the + Soviets, and was attained only after persistent US efforts. A communiqué of this length and substance is + rare, and should be counted as evidence of their positive mood.

+

We also discovered other points of agreement including, most importantly, + the need to involve other suppliers as well as recipients in the + restraint process.

+

A more definitive assessment of Soviet seriousness must await their + response to the US proposed agenda for + the next round (see below), and their presentation at that round. Two + factors suggest a cautious attitude: (a) the Soviets, despite + considerable US pressure, refused to + characterize the next round as “negotiations”—a word, which to them + indicates that formal agreements are to be considered; and (b) the + proposal the Soviets tabled at the Helsinki round (i.e., that we each + agree not to sell “excessive” arms to one another’s neighbors) obviously + was not a serious one.On May 17, the + Department of State instructed the Embassy in Moscow to “personally” + inform Mendelevich that the + United States rejected this proposal because it was “one-sided and + not cast in the spirit of our discussions as focusing on specific + regional situations where arms transfers can harm our bilateral + relations, as well as threaten international security and stability, + and on broad political and military criteria.” (Telegram 125832 to + Moscow, May 17; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P850004-1540) + With regard to the latter point, however, they did state that + this proposal was “separate” from the rest of the discussion. In any + case, Gelb informed the Soviet + chairman, Mendelevich, privately, + that the USG would formally reject the + proposal.

+

2. Respective Positions

+

The Soviet side presented in some detail, and argued forcefully, for + discussion of “universal political and legal principles.” If, they + argued, the two sides and other suppliers could agree on such abstract + principles, arms transfer restraint would become an actuality. + Essentially, the Soviet “principles” specify that countries which engage + in certain types of conduct in contravention of international norms + could under no circumstances receive arms from other countries, while + other recipients—which engage in conduct considered desirable under + these norms—could receive arms without limitation. The international + norms of conduct would be drawn primarily from Soviet interpretations of such ambiguous + documents as the UN General Assembly’s + Definition of AggressionUN General Assembly Resolution 3314 + (XXIX), December 14, 1974, defined aggression as “the use of armed + force by a State against the sovereignty, territorial integrity or + political independence of another State, or in any other manner + inconsistent with the Charter of the United Nations.” + (http:://www.un-documents.net/a29r3314.htm) and Declaration + of Friendly Relations.UN General Assembly Resolution 2625 + (XXV), October 24, 1970, proclaimed that states “shall refrain in + their international relations from the threat or use of force + against the territorial integrity of any State;” “shall settle their + international disputes by peaceful means;” had “a duty not to + intervene in matters within the domestic jurisdiction of any State;” + had “a duty to cooperate with one another in accordance with the + Charter;” respected the “principle of equal rights and + self-determination of peoples;” and uphold the “principle of + sovereign equality of States.” + (http:://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NRO/348/90/IMG/NRO34890.pdf)

+

The US side argued that while appropriate + political and legal principles might be developed, it also is necessary + to develop functional guidelines such as those which make up US unilateral arms transfer policy (The + Soviets characterized these as “military/technical guidelines”). These + rules would provide specific practical guidance for sales decisions + based on the nature of the weapons involved and the local military + situation, and would also deal with specific problems such as + co-production arrangements and re-exports.

+

By the end of the round, both sides referred to “criteria for arms sales” + which, it was understood, would include both political/legal and + military/technical factors. The US side + insisted, however, that drawing up such a list of criteria—no matter how + inclusive—was not sufficient. To be effective in restraining arms, we + argued, these criteria had to be applied to the situations in specific + regions. Consequently, the agenda proposed by the US side for the next round included the + establishment of working groups on political/legal criteria, + military/technical criteria, and regional situations—specifically, Latin + America and Africa south of the Sahara. The Soviets cautioned us not to + expect their agreement to this complete agenda the next round. They + would at best agree to discuss one region, they said, and only under the + rubric of a general discussion of the “regional approach.”

+

This will be the next test of Soviet “seriousness.” While we should not + expect them to accept our proposed agenda in toto, there should be + appropriate progress toward regional discussions in the next round.

+

3. Next Steps

+

The next round would probably be held in early July, and hence we need to + move quickly to prepare. We also will have to move considerably beyond + our previous work into the preparation of specific proposals, rather + than general considerations, that can be laid on the table.

+

Specifically, we suggest: (a) + that the President authorize our participation in a third round of + talks; (b) that an SCC meeting be held + soon to review progress to date and to formulate, for your approval, + draft general guidance for preparation of the US positions for next round; and (c) that a second SCC meeting be held in about six weeks to + formulate, for your approval, draft specific guidance and instructions + for the US side in the third round.

+ + Leslie + Gelb, ChairmanDirector, + Political/Military Affairs Department of + State + + + Barry Blechman, Deputy + Assistant Director + US Arms Control and Disarmament + Agency + + + + Jessica + Mathews + National Security Council Staff + + + + Brigadier General Robert Sennewald + Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff + + + + James Michel + Legal Advisor Department of State + + + + John Rowe Office of the Secretary of + Defense + +
+ +
+ + 294. Summary of Conclusions of a Special Coordination Committee + MeetingSource: Carter + Library, National Security Council, Institutional Files, Box 94, + PRC 079, Arms Transfer Policy: + U.S. Next Proposals, 5/29/78. Secret. The meeting took place in the + White House Situation Room. + Washington, May 24, 1978, + 3:00–4:00 p.m. + + SUBJECT + US-USSR Conventional Arms Transfer + + + PARTICIPANTS + + State + Warren + Christopher + Leslie Gelb, + Director, Office of Politico-Military Affairs + + + Defense + David McGiffert, + Assistant Secretary for International Security + Affairs + + + JCS + Lt. General William Y. + Smith + + + CIA + Dr. Robert Bowie, + Director, National Foreign Intelligence Assessment + Center + + George Allen, NIO for Special Studies + + ACDA + Spurgeon + Keeny + Barry Blechman, Assistant Director, Weapons Evaluation and + Control + + + White House + David Aaron + Reginald + Bartholomew, NSC + Jessica Mathews, + NSC + + +

The general statement of objectives for multilateral talks on + conventional arms restraint (CAT)Not found. was agreed to. Concerning + the possible risks inherent in this enterprise, DOD pointed out that what we are trying to negotiate is a + means to an end and not an end in itself. This lead to a discussion of + the necessity for highly specific regional proposals, each to be judged + on its own merits for consistency with US national security interests. State suggested and it was + agreed to, that in presenting each regional proposal the working group + should include an analysis of the US + national security interest, analogous to that prepared for a proposed + arms sale. It was further agreed that we should not undertake any + démarche at this time directed at engaging the European suppliers, but + rather wait for them to react to the progress made in the US-Soviet forum. It was agreed that any + approaches to arms recipients at this time would be premature, at least + until specific regional proposals had been agreed to and approved.

+ +

The proposed work program was approved with the following changes: (1) + each regional proposal should include a justification in terms of US national security interest; (2) the + working group should isolate and analyze “the surrogate problem”—i.e., + Cubans and others, including those supported by Western nations; and, + (3) the group should look at ways and means to improve our data base on + arms transfers. The meeting closed with a strong plea by the Chairman + for the best efforts of all agencies participating in the work program + in the interest of giving this admittedly difficult undertaking a fair + try, and of avoiding serious mistakes. All agencies pledged to + cooperate.

+
+ +
+ 295. Summary of Conclusions of a Special Coordination Committee + MeetingSource: Carter + Library, Brzezinski Donated + Material, Subject File, Box 12, Meetings–SCC 94: 7/78. Secret. The meeting took place in the + White House Situation Room. Brzezinski informed Carter of the results of the meeting in a July 11 + memorandum. (Ibid.) + Washington, July 10, 1978, + 2:04–3:30 p.m. + + SUBJECT + Conventional Arms Transfer Talks with the USSR and Security Assistance for + Kenya + + + PARTICIPANTS + + State + Deputy Secretary of State Warren Christopher + William Harrop, Deputy Assistant Secretary for + Africa + Leslie Gelb, + Director, Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs + + + Defense + David McGiffert, + Assistant Secretary for International Security + Affairs + + + JCS + Lt. General William Y. + Smith, Assistant to the Chairman + + + CIA + Dr. Sayre Stevens, + Deputy Director, National Foreign Assessment Center + George Allen, National Intelligence Officer for Special + Studies + + + ACDA + Deputy Director Spurgeon M. + Keeny + Dr. Barry Blechman, Assistant Director, Weapons Evaluation + and Control Bureau + + + OMB + Edward G. Sanders, Deputy Associate Director, + International Affairs Division + + + + White House + David Aaron + + + NSC + Reginald + Bartholomew + Jessica Tuchman + Mathews + Leslie G. Denend + + +

The SCC affirmed the continuing + objective of these talks to move the Soviets toward concrete measures of + conventional arms transfer restraint. Soviet refusal to establish a + regional working group, one of three agreed upon at the last round, + before arriving in Helsinki for the start of this round, has complicated + the preparation of a U.S. strategy for the talks.

+

It was agreed that a decision on how to respond if the Soviet Delegation + proves reluctant to establish the regional group or places unacceptable + preconditions on its agenda, could not be made in advance since it + should be based on the tone and substance of the Soviet posture in + Helsinki. It was decided that the delegation should report to + Washington, proposing either to return to Washington, to delay the start + of the talks until agreement is reached, to include regional proposals + in the plenary sessions, or some other possibility. Washington would + then issue instructions. It was further agreed that while each + delegation is always free to discuss whatever it wishes, the U.S. + delegation should not take any action to lend status to the Soviet + ‘neighbors’ proposal, including agreeing to place it on the agenda of a + regional working group.

+

If the question of the regional group can be resolved satisfactorily and + the talks proceed, it was agreed that the discussion of legal/political + criteria which have been proposed by the Soviets will move in parallel + with the discussion of U.S.-sponsored military/technical guidelines. The + delegation will not agree to political/legal criteria without Soviet + agreement on military/technical guidelines.

+

It was agreed that in discussing with the Soviets how restraint might be + implemented, the U.S. position will be that suppliers should seek + recipient acceptance of the agreed-upon restraint norms before + implementation, but that recipients would not hold a veto over supplier + restraint. In certain circumstances or for particular weapons systems + the U.S. would be prepared to implement strictly supplier restraint.

+

On whether or not to inform key African leaders of the talks before they + begin, ACDA expressed the view that + given the uncertainties surrounding the talks and the future of the + Regional Working Group in particular, prior consultations could only + serve to raise African fears unnecessarily. State and Defense maintained + that prior consultations are desirable to allay potential African + concerns that outsiders are meeting to decide what is best for Africa. + The SCC did not approve consultations with the Africans before the + talks begin but directed State to prepare the substance of what we would + say to the Africans and circulate it for interagency review.

+

There was disagreement on which African states should be included in the + U.S. regional proposal for Africa. ACDA felt strongly that we should stick with sub-Saharan + Africa. DOD agreed but noted that they + did not feel strongly on this. State feels that by confining our + proposal to sub-Saharan Africa, we are running a high risk of having our + restraint proposal perceived as discriminating between black versus + white African states. All agreed that the introduction of the entire + Middle East issue which would accompany the inclusion of Egypt and Libya + must be avoided. State’s final position was that the delegation attempt + to have the Soviets agree to the discussion of all of Africa except + Egypt and Libya. David Aaron + suggested that the delegation propose two regions to the + Soviets—sub-Saharan and North West Africa. The issue was not + decided.

+

It was agreed that Cuba should not be allowed to stand as an obstacle to + achieving Soviet agreement to a proposal for restraint in Latin America. + The U.S. delegation will make clear at the beginning of the talks that + our discussion of restraint in Latin America includes all of the states + of Latin America and the Caribbean, but we will not make the inclusion + of Cuba a precondition for U.S. agreement on a Latin American regional + restraint initiative.

+

The SCC also discussed possibilities for + reprogramming FY 1978 and FY 1979 FMS credit to Kenya to finance an initial U.S. response to + Kenya’s request for assistance in modernizing its military forces. The + discussion pointed out the political difficulties of cutting FMS credits from any potential donors. The + SCC did not reach a decision. + Defense and State were directed to reach agreement on common data for + the potential credit donors and develop formal agency positions. The + survey team was directed to identify a less costly initial package which + we might be prepared to offer the Kenyans.

+
+ +
+ + 296. Telegram From the Department of State to All American Republic + Diplomatic PostsSource: + National Archives, RG 59, Central + Foreign Policy File, D780347–0862. Secret; Immediate. Sent for + information Immediate to Caracas, Mexico City, the Interests Section + in Havana, and the Consulate in Belize. Not sent to Paramaribo. + Drafted by Priscilla Clapp (PM); and + approved by Jerome Kahan (PM), Luigi + Einaudi (ARA), Alan Platt (ACDA), Lorna Watson (ACDA), and Andrew Thomas + (PM/SSP). + Washington, August 25, 1978, 0038Z +

216300. Subject: Conventional Arms Transfer Restraint: Debrief on US-Soviet Talks.

+

1. Department is briefing selected governments on third round of US-Soviet Conventional Arms Transfer + (CAT) talks, held in Helsinki July + 18–28. Action addressees should seek meeting at Senior ForMin level to + brief confidentially on Helsinki talks, drawing on talking points in + paragraph 3 below. If any posts recommend that department conduct + supplementary debrief of embassies in Washington, please inform us + immediately.

+

2. Purpose of debriefing is to keep other governments informed of + progress we are making with suppliers on conventional arms restraint. + Host governments would not be wrong to draw conclusions from briefing + that we are seriously pursuing a major foreign policy goal and hence + that recipient initiatives to help define restraint measures are timely + and likely to influence supplier actions. But we do not want to convey + impression of US, much less joint US-Soviet, desire to impose external + limitations on Latin America. Further, although we support current Latin + American initiatives toward self-restraint,Telegram 220400 to all American Republic diplomatic posts, August + 30, transmitted a summary of the conference on the “limitation + and/or prohibition of certain types of conventional weapons” held in + Mexico City August 21–24. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + D780354–0696) and have been in touch with both Venezuela and + Mexico with regard to their initiatives (para 4 below), we do not believe we should either assume + too strong a public stance or too eager a private one. Please report + reactions of host government to US-Soviet CAT talks, including + any comments volunteered on current Latin American restraint initiatives + or their relationships to supplier restraint as envisaged in US-Soviet talks.

+

3. Talking points for CAT III + debrief.

+

A. Background.

+

—The US and Soviet sides have met three + times to discuss conventional arms restraint. At the conclusion of + second round of talks last May, the two sides issued a joint communiqué + in which they agreed:The text of the + communiqué is printed in Documents on Disarmament, + 1978, p. 286.

+

(1) that the problem of limiting + global arms transfers was urgent, and (2) to hold regularly scheduled + meetings to explore concrete measures to promote Conventional Arms + Transfer restraint.

+

—Events since then have underscored the existence of international + concern for such measures. In June, the UN Special Session on Disarmament adopted a program of + actionThe text of the program is + printed in “Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the + General Assembly,” June 30, 1978, Documents on + Disarmament, 1978, pp. 411–439. calling for + consultations among suppliers and recipients on limiting arms transfers. + US-Soviet bilateral meetings are + thus consistent with this program and represent an effort to implement + it. (Note: Brasilia may wish to eliminate or modify this point, since + GOB formally disassociated itself + from this part of the program of action.)

+

—In Latin America the June 22, 1978 declaration by the eight signatories + of the 1974 Declaration of Ayacucho calling for regional agreement + limiting Conventional Arms Transfers,Documents on Disarmament, 1978, p. + 391. and the diplomatic efforts of Mexico toward the same end + at the OASGA and since, have given new impetus to recipient efforts to + restrain arms transfers on a regional basis.

+

B. The July Meeting: Agreement on Framework.

+

—In most recent (third) round of talks, the US and Soviet Union agreed on a three-part framework for + future talks, consisting of political-legal criteria, military technical + criteria, and regional application.

+

—(1) The political-legal criteria (or guidelines) are based on the UN charter, UN resolutions, and other internationally agreed documents; + and will identify (a) legal constraints on arms transfers; and (b) + relevant political factors to be taken into account in making arms + transfer decisions. Good basis has been established for the elaboration + of mutually acceptable language during the next round.

+

—(2) The military-technical criteria (or guidelines) will determine how + to regulate both types and quantities of weapons transferred. Both sides + agreed that a comprehensive and effective approach to arms transfer + restraint will require both types of criteria.

+

—Both sides have agreed to discuss the application of these criteria in + specific regional situations. This will give reality to the criteria, + which would otherwise be general and abstract statements of interest, + and will reduce the chances of future misunderstanding.

+

—Both sides agreed that any region or sub-region of the world could be + discussed, provided regional groupings were not artifically + contrived.

+ +

C. Interim Restraint.

+

—Both sides agreed that, in advance of final agreement on criteria, it + would be possible to reach interim restraint agreements for specific + regions. What form such agreements might take is not yet determined and + will depend in large part on attitudes of recipient countries.

+

D. Role of Other Suppliers and Recipients.

+

—Both sides recognize that successful effort to develop arms restraint + regimes will require the active participation of not only other + suppliers, but also recipients. They are hopeful that suppliers and + recipients will find it in their interests to support arms transfer + restraint.

+

—We have made clear to the Soviets that we believe legitimate defense + requirements of recipients must continue to be met.

+

E. Assessment and Future Prospects.

+

—There was considerable movement toward reaching a common understanding + of the general criteria (or guidelines) for US-Soviet restraint in arms transfers.

+

—The Soviets appear to take these talks seriously.

+

—The next round—tentatively planned for December to enable both sides to + undertake thorough preparations—will provide the test of prospects for + near-term success.

+

4. FYI: Venezuela is currently exploring + how and when to convene foreign ministers meeting referred to in June + 22, 1978 restatement of Ayacucho Declaration. Mexico invited all Latin + American governments, except Chile, to a meeting August 21–24 in Mexico + City. Mexican objectives in convening meeting were apparently + three-fold:

+

—To gain support for Mexican position on prohibition of certain types of + weapons in UN Geneva Conference on Laws + of War;

+

—To reach agreement on establishment of Latin American commission to make + recommendations on guidelines for regional restraint to a 1979 foreign + ministers meeting;

+

—To make joint appeal to suppliers to abide by regional desire for + restraint.

+

US position is to support both + initiatives on the basis that they have a common goal, that the process + of reaching that goal will be long-term, and that developing momentum + and sustaining that process will require the active commitment of many. + We know that attitudes among host governments are wide-ranging and hope + your debriefing on Helsinki talks will serve indirectly to elicit + comments.

+

End FYI.

+ + Christopher + +
+ +
+ + 297. Intelligence Assessment Prepared in the Central Intelligence + AgencySource: Carter + Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Freedom of + Information/Legal, Kimmitt, Arms Transfer File, Box 25: Latin + America, 2–12/78. Secret; Noforn. + + + ER 78–10476 + + + Washington, August + 1978 +

Latin American Arms Market: Changing Patterns of Supply

+

Key Judgments

+

Latin American countries, closely tied to the United States after World + War II for military security assistance, began shifting arms procurement + to Western Europe in the late 1960s to refurbish their outdated arsenals + and to adjust to a more restrictive US + sales policy.

+

Latin America, one of the last of the Third World regions to acquire + modern weaponry, procured $4 billion worth of arms in 1974–77. West + European suppliers garnered $2.3 billion of this total, or about three + times the US figure. While the United + States remained the single largest supplier, its sales slumped badly + toward the end of the period. The USSR + signed major contracts with one client—Peru.

+

In the past four years, Argentina, Ecuador, and Peru together placed + nearly two-thirds of the equipment orders and Venezuela, Brazil, and + Chile another 30 percent.

+

We expect a substantial drop in sales in 1978–79, as Latin American + countries absorb deliveries of their recent large purchases and ponder + the requirements of their upcoming new equipment cycles.

+

Latin America: Arms SuppliersFor more detailed tables, see the appendix. [Footnote is in the + original.]

+

Million US $

+ + + + United States + Western Europe + Other Non-Communist + USSR + Total + + + 1974 + 240 + 265 + 55 + 5 + 565 + + + 1975 + 205 + 700 + 145 + 55 + 1,105 + + + 1976 + 145 + 315 + 35 + 340 + 835 + + + 1977 + 130 + 1,035 + 140 + 110 + 1,415 + + + 1st half, 1978 + NA + 55 + 30 + 0 + NA + +
+

Military sales to Latin America in 1980–83 could reach $3 billion to $4 + billion (in 1976 prices), with West European suppliers increasing their share of the market even + further. We expect market developments in this four-year period to + follow this general pattern:

+

US sales will be largely made up of spare + parts and electronics equipment.

+

France will have excellent prospects for sales of jet aircraft and air + defense systems.

+

West Germany should be able to market missiles, ground force equipment, + and submarines.

+

Italy should be building new surface combatants for several Latin + American states.

+

British sales will tend to lag behind the sales of other West European + producers.

+

Israel can be expected to replace the United States in a growing number + of technical assistance programs in the region, including the training + of local personnel and sales of certain types of advanced military + equipment.

+

Brazil and Argentina, which are the first arms producers of any + consequence to emerge in the region, should more than double their + combined $105 million sales of 1974–77.

+

The USSR will continue to play a + restricted role in the market.

+

[Omitted here is the body of the assessment.]

+
+ +
+ 298. Memorandum From Acting Secretary of State Christopher to President CarterSource: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, + Staff Material, Global Issues, Mathews Subject File, Box 5, Arms Transfers: + 8–10/78. Secret; Nodis. + Washington, September 28, 1978 + + SUBJECT + Multilateral Restraint in Conventional Arms Transfers + +

Over the past year, we have made progress with the Soviets and with + recipients in seeking cooperation on restraint in conventional arms + transfers. However, with the Europeans, we have achieved none of our + objectives, mainly because of the French. It will be difficult to + produce further results without support from the Europeans, because both + the Soviets and recipients will take their cue from European attitudes + before committing themselves to real restraint measures. Therefore, we + must now make a concerted effort to bring the Europeans along.

+ +

French participation is the key: with it, the British and Germans are + likely to be forthcoming. Over the past year, the French have put two + major conditions on their willingness to participate in discussions on + restraint: demonstration of Soviet willingness to cooperate, and the + development of indigenous regional restraint efforts. Giscard himself has elaborated these + conditions publicly and has indicated the possibility of a positive + French attitude toward restraint should these conditions be met. We + believe there has been progress toward meeting both these conditions. + (Of course, French objections may go deeper—to basic questions of + economic competition—and the French may therefore be unwilling to take + part in arms restraint at this time.)

+

Having tried to persuade the French at lower levels, we now believe that + any appeal to be effective needs to go to Giscard himself in order to increase the limited chances + of getting a positive response. This approach may fail. However, the + alternative of doing nothing would definitely be a serious weakening of + the whole arms restraint effort. I therefore recommend that you sign the + attached letters, urging another quadrilateral meeting on conventional + arms transfersTalks between the United + States, the United Kingdom, the Federal Republic of Germany, and + France on conventional arms transfers had been scheduled for June + 22–23, 1977. No memoranda of the talks have been found. (Telegram + 10061 from Bonn, June 15, 1977; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + D770213–1206) and, particularly in the case of the French, + holding out the option of bilateral talks as well.

+
+ +
+ + 299. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in + FranceSource: National + Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign + Policy File, P840139–2046. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. The text was received from + the White House. Drafted by Priscilla Clapp (PM); cleared by Tarnoff, Feurth (EUR/RPM), Gary Matthews (EUR/SOV), + Thomas Hirschfeld (ACDA/WEC), William Marsh (T), John Rowe + (DOD/ISA), and John Merrill (JCS); + and approved by Jerome Kahan (PM). + Carter sent a similar + letter to British Prime Minister James + Callaghan in telegram 265150 to London, October 19. + (National Archives, RG 59, Central + Foreign Policy File, P840139–2042) + Washington, October 19, 1978, 1952Z +

265150. Subject: Conventional Arms Transfer Restraint.

+

Embassy should deliver, as appropriate, following Presidential message to + President Valery Giscard + D’Estaing. (FYI:—There + will be no signed original transmitted. End FYI.)

+

Dear Valery:

+

On several occasions during the past year, you and I have exchanged views + on the international arms trade. I believe we are in agreement that + unrestrained arms transfers—especially to particular regions—can have + serious consequences for regional stability and for diversion of scarce + resources needed for civilian economic needs. We also agree, I believe, + that controlling the arms trade cannot come solely from efforts by + supplier states to impose restraints on recipients, or by ignoring the + legitimate defense needs of individual nations. Instead, there must be a + cooperative approach, including both suppliers and recipients.

+

Last year, representatives of our governments met, with their West German + and British counterparts, to compare views concerning the basic issues + involved, and to discuss possible steps to gain some control over the + arms trade. You indicated that France would be ready to take part in + seeking restraint, provided that initiatives came from particular + regions, and provided that the Soviet Union were prepared to + cooperate.

+

At the UN Special Session on Disarmament, + you expanded on the regional approach, proposing that restraint should + develop through consultations within regions, and indicating that France + would be prepared to support such regional agreements. You also + suggested that the most realistic way to achieve restraint would be + through joint supplier-recipient limitations.

+

I am pleased to note that this approach has begun to materialize. During + the Special Session on Disarmament, eight Latin American countries + signed a declaration reaffirming their intentions to seek a limitation on arms purchases. In + August, Mexico hosted a meeting of all but three Latin American + countries to extend this commitment on restraint to the entire region + and to begin to develop concrete ways to carry it out.

+

As you know, we have also been actively pursuing this issue with the + Soviet Union. In our last round of bilateral talks with the Soviets in + July, we made considerable progress in defining a framework for + restraint in conventional arms transfers, which provides, among other + things, for the development of general criteria that could guide the + activities of both suppliers and recipients in their arms transfer + activities. The Soviets also indicated that interim restraint + arrangements are possible where regional conditions are favorable. It is + my judgment that this framework, if agreed upon among a number of + suppliers and recipient nations, can provide the basis for working + toward genuine restraint, thus slowing the pace of East-West competition + in the arms trade.

+

Neither we nor the Soviets, however, contemplate a purely bilateral + solution to the problem of arms transfers. Proceeding on the basis of + the UN + SSOD program of action, we are + exploring ideas for practical discussions on restraint arrangements + between suppliers and recipients. In this regard, the Soviets have also + asked US to come to the next meeting in + December prepared to discuss ways of involving other major suppliers who + seek solutions to this problem, as well as means to achieve practical + discussions between suppliers and recipients.

+

I believe, therefore, that the time is right to try building further upon + the approach which you outlined at the UN Special Session. Thus, I would like to propose that + representatives of our two governments undertake further discussions, + designed to explore the possibilities of supplier and recipient + cooperation in support of efforts for restraint. These talks could most + usefully take place in concert with the British and Germans, and I am + writing in this vein to Jim + Callaghan and Helmut + Schmidt. Of course, I would also welcome separate + discussions with your government, either before or after a four-power + meeting.

+

I am particularly mindful of the practical problems which arms restraint + would pose for individual supplier nations. The arms trade does not + exist in a vacuum, but is also related to weapons production for + national defense and our common security; to national balances of + payments; to arms trade among nations in the Western Alliance; to + fostering national technological bases that will help sustain civilian + economies; and to our common security concerns in the developing world. + At some point, these issues will also need to be considered, if we are + to ensure that no supplier nation is to bear a disproportionate + burden.

+

In view of the complex factors involved, including the differing national + interests and perceptions of suppliers and recipients, it will not be + easy to achieve an international regime for arms restraint, even for a + single region. But I + believe that we need to begin the patient work that is essential to + progress toward the goal you and I both share.

+

I would very much welcome your views on this critical issue. And I hope + it will be possible for representatives of our two governments—along + with the British and Germans—to resume discussions in the very near + future.

+

With warmest regards,

+

Sincerely,

+

Jimmy Carter

+ + Newsom + +
+ +
+ 300. Intelligence Assessment Prepared in the Central Intelligence + AgencySource: Department + of State, RG 59, Office of the + Deputy Secretary: Records of Warren + Christopher, 1977–1980, Lot 81D113, Withdrawn Items, + Box 5, Chronological Files, Memoranda to the Secretary, 1977. + Secret; Noforn. + + + ER 78–10591 + + + Washington, October 1978 +

Arms Sales to the Third World, 1977

+

Key Judgments

+

Arms sales to the Third WorldFor the purpose + of this report, the Third World refers to the following: (1) all + countries of Africa except South Africa; (2) all countries of East + Asia except Hong Kong and Japan, and Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam, + which became Communist in 1975; (3) Greece and Turkey in Europe; (4) + all countries in the Middle East and South Asia; and (5) all + countries in Latin America except Cuba. [Footnote is in the + original.] reached an estimated $22.4 billion in 1977 as + sizable orders by Iran and other Middle East clients reversed a two-year + slump. In terms of constant US dollars + (with Soviet sales being valued on a comparable basis), 1977 sales, + although still 10 percent less than 1974 sales, were about 10 percent + above the 1975–76 level.

+ + + + Billion US $ + Billion 1976 US $ Constant + Prices + + + 1974 + 21.3 + 25.6 + + + 1975 + 19.5 + 21.1 + + + 1976 + 19.5 + 20.9 + + + 1977 + 22.4 + 22.9 + +
+ +

On the buyers’ side, Iran and Saudi Arabia continued to dominate the + market in 1977, purchasing about 45 percent of the arms sold to Third + World countries. Algeria, Iraq, Ethiopia, India, and Argentina accounted + for another 20 percent.

+

As for suppliers, the USSR, France, and + West Germany substantially increased their Third World arms sales in + 1977, in both absolute and percentage terms. The United States, while + retaining its lead as the single largest supplier, saw its market share + decline by 8 percentage points. US sales + are characterized by proportionately larger support and associated + services provided clients. In the support category, US sales in constant prices surpassed those + of the USSR (the second-largest arms + supplier) by 75 percent; in services, the ratio was 8 to 1. As for + weapon systems, the spread between US + and Soviet sales was narrower, with US + sales only 12 percent higher.

+

Deliveries of military items to the Third World continued their rise of + recent years, in both current prices and constant prices (with Soviet + deliveries valued comparably):

+ + + + Billion US $ + Billion 1976 US $ + + + 1974 + 7.9 + 9.8 + + + 1975 + 8.9 + 10.3 + + + 1976 + 11.7 + 12.7 + + + 1977 + 13.8 + 14.1 + +
+

Once again the USSR responded more + quickly than other suppliers in following up sales with deliveries. At + the end of 1977 the backlog of Soviet orders stood at about $5 billion, + while the backlog of other suppliers had mounted to $45 billion, + including $30 billion for the United States (fiscal year data). The five + top Third World recipients of foreign arms in 1977 were Iran ($2.7 + billion), Saudi Arabia ($2.0 billion), Israel ($1.1 billion), Iraq ($1.0 + billion), and Libya ($0.8 billion).

+

Looking ahead for the next several years, we expect the Third World arms + market to level off and drift downward: (a) the leading clients have + huge backlogs of orders and, in some instances, find it hard to digest + the existing flow of arms; and (b) a number of Third World countries + face increasing financial problems—for example, in managing their debts + and marketing their raw materials at good prices. We note that the + USSR and West European suppliers + are taking vigorous steps to maintain sales in what may well prove to be + a stagnating market.

+

[Omitted here is the body of the assessment.]

+
+ +
+ + 301. Memorandum From Secretary of State Vance to President CarterSource: + Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Global + Issues, Mathews Subject + File, Box 5, Arms Transfers: 8–10/78. Confidential. + Washington, November 6, 1978 + + SUBJECT + The FY 1979 Arms Transfer + Ceiling + +

We have reached interagency consensus on the FY 1979 arms transfer ceiling management plan (Tab 1),Not attached. but one issue requires + your decision: the reduction to be made in the ceiling.

+

I believe that our national security interests and arms restraint + objectives in FY 1979 can be achieved + with a further $734 million or 8 percent reduction from the FY 1979 baseline of $9.2 billion. After + adjusting for inflation of 7.2 percent, the FY 1979 ceiling would be $8,430 million compared to actual + FY 1978 ceiling sales in FY 1978 dollars of $8,539 million. This + FY 1979 ceiling level would be + equivalent to $7.4 billion in transfers in FY 1977 dollars, or a reduction of $1.4 billion (16 + percent) in two years.

+

The ceiling plan is sufficiently flexible so that it can accommodate + potential transfers to the Middle East, should further requests + materialize and we decide to respond favorably. All major ceiling cases + will be sent to you for decision prior to Congressional notification in + accordance with the procedures you established.

+

The Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) and the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency agree with + me that this FY 1979 ceiling level would + permit us to make those sales important to our national interests while + demonstrating our continuing commitment to arms transfer restraint.The OSD and + ACDA reports were not + found.

+

The Joint Chiefs agree that our security interests can be met within the + proposed cut, but believe an 8 percent reduction is inappropriate in + view of the lack of progress of our multilateral restraint + initiatives.Not found. They + point out that both the Soviets and the major NATO suppliers have failed to follow our example by + adopting even modest restraints, or by agreeing to concrete measures + during a year and a half of Conventional Arms Transfer (CAT) talks. The OJCS believes that a more + modest reduction of 2 to 5 percent ($200–$500 million) would preserve + the credibility of our + policy and send a more appropriate signal to other arms suppliers, + particularly in view of your statement last February that “the extent of + next year’s reduction will depend upon the world political situation and + upon the degree of cooperation and understanding of other nations.”See “Statement by President Carter: Arms Transfer Policy,” + February 1, 1978, Documents on Disarmament, + 1978, pp. 44–45. The Joint Chiefs believe that a + larger reduction would suggest that our restraint policies are + insensitive to the actions of others, and would prompt continued + intransigence in negotiations.

+

I do not agree with this assessment. My concern, which is shared by + OSD and ACDA, is that other suppliers and domestic critics are more + likely to interpret such a modest reduction as lack of Administration + commitment to restraint, particularly since the CAT talks have not yet had time to produce results. + Soundings we have taken with Congress at the staff level support this + conclusion. At the same time, I believe that progress at CAT is necessary before we make future + commitments to reduction, and that other suppliers should not count on + our continuing to make reductions. Therefore, I recommend that you state + in your public announcement that decisions on future arms transfer + levels will depend on the cooperation on restraint we receive in the + coming year from other nations. A proposed draft Presidential statement + is at Tab 2.Not attached.

+

Recommendations:

+

That you approve an 8 percent reduction for FY 1979 and that you announce that decisions on future + levels will depend on the cooperation of others.Carter + checked the “Approve” option and wrote “J. Be very careful. Don’t + come too close to our limit.”

+

ALTERNATIVELY, that you approve a more modest + reduction of 2 to 5 percent for FY 1979 + and that you announce that future levels will depend on the cooperation + of others, expressing disappointment at the pace of multilateral + cooperation thus far.

+

Approve 5% reduction ______

+

Approve 2% reduction ______

+
+ +
+ + 302. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security + Affairs (Brzezinski) to President + CarterSource: Carter Library, National + Security Affairs, Staff Material, Global Issues, Mathews Subject File, Box 5, Arms + Transfers: 8–10/78. Confidential. Sent for action. + Washington, November 13, 1978 + + SUBJECT + The FY 1979 Arms Transfer + Ceiling + +

The State memorandum at Tab ASee Document 301. presents the FY 1979 Conventional Arms Transfer Ceiling + Management Plan and recommends that the eight percent reduction achieved + in FY 1978 be repeated in FY 1979.

+

The ceiling for FY 1979 has been + calculated based on the FY 1978 ceiling + after adjusting for inflation.

+ + + FY 1978 ceiling + $8.551 billion + + + Inflation (FY 1978 to FY 1979–7.2%) + +.616 + + + FY 1979 ceiling + baseline + 9.167 + + + 8% reduction + −.733 + + + FY 1979 ceiling + $8.434 billion + +
+

State and Defense have identified a worldwide total of $10.5 billion in + potential sales which might be concluded in FY 1979. However, for a number of reasons (normal + attrition; uncertainties surrounding sales to Iran; no sale of F–16s to + Korea this year; formal requests have not yet been received for some + sales) roughly $2.5 billion of that total is unlikely to be signed in + FY 1979. Therefore, we are faced + with a realistic demand of roughly $8.0 billion which can easily be + accommodated within a ceiling of $8.4 billion.

+

The announcement of the FY 1979 ceiling + will be an important factor in our efforts to secure multilateral + cooperation in restraining arms transfers. Virtually all agencies + believe that FY 1979 will be the true + test of that effort, that our prospects are sufficiently encouraging to + pursue the CAT talks over the next 12 + months with real vigor, and that continuing an eight percent reduction + sends the appropriate signal to the other suppliers and to + recipients.

+

The Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (OJCS) points out that in the + year since we began talking about multilateral restraint no suppliers or + recipient nations have adopted concrete measures of restraint comparable + our unilateral ceiling. The OJCS would prefer a smaller reduction—say two to five percent—in FY 1979 to signal our concern and put the + others on notice that we are not prepared to sustain unilateral + restraint indefinitely.

+

While I take the OJCS point that U.S. unilateral restraint may not be + possible to sustain indefinitely, I feel strongly that for an + undertaking of this complexity one year is simply too short a period to + expect measurable results. My recommendation is to repeat the eight + percent reduction of last year: first, because it provides continuity + for the CAT talks, and second because + it can be done in FY 1979 without + seriously affecting any of our security assistance plans.

+

A draft statement at Tab B has been prepared for the public announcement + of the FY 1979 program.Not attached. Carter issued a statement on November 29 saying that + “Conventional arms restraint is an important objective of this + administration and the Congress. To ensure U.S. leadership and to + supplement existing legislation, I established for the first time a + set of quantitative and qualitative standards by which arms transfer + requests considered by this Government would be judged. The + principle consideration in the application of these standards is + whether the transfer in question promotes our security and the + security of our close friends.” (Documents on + Disarmament, 1978, pp. 691–692)

+

RECOMMENDATION

+

That you approve an eight percent reduction in FY 1979 and the proposed public statement (Tab B).After “(Tab B),” Brzezinski wrote “making further reductions also + dependent on the cooperation + restraint of other suppliers.” + Carter checked the + “Approve” option and beneath the approval line wrote: “This is not + much of a restraint. J”.

+
+ +
+ + 303. Minutes of a Special Coordination Committee MeetingSource: Carter Library, National + Security Council, Institutional Files, Box 118, SCC 118, Arms Control/Conventional + Arms Transfers, 11/21/78. Secret. The meeting took place in the + White House Situation Room. + Washington, November 21, + 1978, 9:32–11:10 a.m. + + SUBJECT + Conventional Arms Transfers—Round IV + + + PARTICIPANTS + + State + Deputy Secretary Warren + Christopher + Mr. Leslie Gelb, + Director, Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs + + + Defense + Secretary Harold + Brown + Mr. David + McGiffert, Assistant Secretary for International + Security Affairs + + + JCS + General David C. Jones, Chairman + Rear Admiral James A. Lyons, Jr., Assistant Deputy + Director for Politico-Military Affairs, Plans and Policy + Directorate + + + CIA + Dr. Sayre Stevens, + Deputy Director, National Foreign Assessment Center + Mr. Neil Linsenmayer, NIO for Special Studies + + + ACDA + Deputy Director Spurgeon M. + Keeny + Dr. Barry Blechman, Assistant Director, Weapons Evaluation + and Control Bureau + + + White House + Dr. Zbigniew + Brzezinski + Mr. David + Aaron + + + NSC + Mr. Reginald + Bartholomew + Dr. Jessica T. + Mathews + Dr. Leslie G. Denend + + +

Dr. Brzezinski opened the meeting + by questioning a basic element in the approach to the CAT talks presented in the interagency + paper.Attached but not printed. + He stated that sensitive issues pertaining to our alliance + relationships, which should not be a matter for discussion with the + Soviets, were being proposed for discussion. Focusing on China and the + Koreas, he asked whether the risk of damage by even listening to a + presentation on this area was not too great since listening is also part + of negotiations.

+

In response, Christopher replied + that his question goes to the fundamental feeling one holds about these + negotiations. If that feeling is positive—as State’s is—then he believes we should be prepared to + listen to what the Soviets want to talk about so that we can talk to + them about what we want. He therefore recommends + that we hear what the Soviets have to say on Korea, ask whatever + questions are necessary to clarify the proposal, and indicate that we + will comment at the next round. He added that Ambassador Gleysteen had been asked his views on + this. Gleysteen felt that the + government of South Korea should be consulted in advance, and if they + did not strongly object, we should proceed as the State Department + proposed.In telegram 9189 from Seoul, + October 14, Gleysteen said + “I would like to emphasize one other obvious point about the + conventional arms talks. If we are ever going to talk to the Soviets + about any kind of mutual restraint agreements in Korea, I assume we + will have the courtesy and good sense to review what we have in mind + with the Koreans before we start talking to Soviets. If we don’t, we + will be in deep trouble.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + D780420–0344) He repeated this in telegram 10395 from Seoul, + November 20. (National Archives, RG + 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780523–0064) + Christopher quoted Gleysteen’s conclusion that: “We—and + to a lesser extent the Soviets—play a crucial role in moderating the + North-South Korean arms race, and we should not close our minds entirely + to a rather passive exploration of the issue.”

+

Secretary Brown remarked that his view was more + negative and he interpreted Gleysteen’s cable as more negative also. Since the + US is the major arms supplier to + South Korea, and the Chinese to North Korea, mutual US-Soviet restraint would greatly upset the + ROKG. He didn’t know how negative we should be: whether we should walk + out, or listen in silence, or try to agree to an agenda in advance. His + inclination was that we should try to agree with the Soviets on + restraint in just one area—Africa—and if we couldn’t agree there, he + asked, how can we agree anywhere else? He noted that he recognized that + the US has the most to gain from mutual + restraint in Africa.

+

Brzezinski asked what views of the + group were on Brown’s suggestion + of singling out a single non-aligned region for initial agreement. He + stated that he believed that the Soviets found these negotiations very + attractive because they hold the promise of establishing a global US–USSR + relationship above established allied or emerging political + relationships—at no cost to the Soviets. We have no interest in + promoting that, and on the other hand, have a great deal to lose. He + sees no conceivable interest to the US + in listening to Soviet presentations on China, Korea and Iran. It would + make more sense to isolate a single region where there is the least + amount of conflictual interest. He also wanted to know how far we can + move towards agreement with the Soviets without the extensive + involvement of the British and French.

+ +

Christopher replied that we cannot + reach any form of agreement, even ad referendum with the Soviets. That + would be getting too far out ahead of our allies. However, he does not + think that we can construct an agenda containing only the things we want + to talk about. He also feels that if we did this the African countries + would feel singled out.

+

Blechman argued that we cannot ignore the history of these negotiations. + We had insisted on the regional focus, and + we had proposed Latin America and Africa. We + had told the Soviets that any regional area which possessed geographical + coherence and reflected politico-military realities could be presented + as a valid candidate for regional restraint, though that did not mean we + would agree to discuss it. Therefore, how could we refuse to even hear + the Soviet proposals?

+

Brzezinski replied that listening + is a form of negotiating and that we have to be sensitive to overriding + political realities. The very fact that these negotiations are taking + place is sensitive. Keeny + remarked that he does not know of a single case in an arms control + negotiation where we have refused to let another side talk about + something relevant to the substance of the talks. Aaron replied that these are not arms + control negotiations—they go to the heart of our relations with other + nations.

+

Brzezinski then proposed that we + let the Soviets make their case on these regions in the context of + arguing over the agenda for the meeting, while + not agreeing to their inclusion on the agreed agenda itself. At least + then we would not just be sitting and listening. Keeny argued that there might be some + real possibilities for restraint in Korea, therefore let’s listen. + Sayre Stevens remarked that + advanced weapons for North Korea can only come from the USSR, not from China, and that the + current relationship might change and the Soviets might resume arms + shipments to North Korea. Brown + said that it was not clear whether Brzezinski’s clever suggestion would work but it was + worth a try.

+

Brzezinski asked why the + delegation had not proposed discussing arms transfers to Vietnam. + Failure to do so appeared to signal an attitude that was not + sufficiently sensitive to wider political concerns. Gelb replied that Vietnam had been + considered. He personally had nothing against raising it—in fact it + might be a good idea. However, we could not talk about transfers to a + single country without reference to its neighbors—that is the essence of + the regional approach we are following as directed by the President. In + this case the regional experts in State and the other agencies had + strongly opposed having the US raise the + Southeast Asian region. He wanted to make clear that the CAT delegation was not trying to prejudice + US interests, but was carrying out + an exercise based on Presidential directives.

+

Gelb stated that if you put the + agenda to the test Brzezinski was + suggesting the talks are doomed to failure. He asked whether the CAT + negotiations are worth the risk + that the Soviets would not agree to such an agenda. Christopher added that the real + question was whether we were prepared to hear what they had to say and + then to reject those areas we don’t want to talk about. Gelb noted that this was just what the + delegation was proposing should be done, but that the Soviets would not + agree to only address areas that are in the US interest.

+

Brzezinski then had to leave and + wanted to summarize his position. He felt that we should first discuss + the agenda, letting the Soviets make their case on Korea, if necessary, + in that context. We should then make our pitch on Soviet transfers to + Vietnam and then we should proceed to discuss Latin America and Africa + as roughly symmetrical regional topics. If the Soviets won’t agree to + proceed on this basis, then we will know that the reason they are + interested in CAT is to use CAT to affect our relationships with our + allies.

+

Gelb remarked that from the very + beginning, the prospect of the US and + the USSR working together for + restraint has been inherent in this enterprise. There is a risk to our relationships with our friends and allies, + but the question is whether we can accept that risk. Our allies like + Korea are big boys. Why can’t we go to them and tell them that the + Soviets are likely to raise their region and that we will listen in + response. He disagreed with Brown’s earlier remark that the Gleysteen cable was negative. Our plan was to consult + with the Koreans before the round and if they strongly objected, we + would tell the Soviets that Korea was not an appropriate topic. + Brown asked whether we also + planned to consult beforehand with Iran. Gelb replied that he had personally briefed the Shah on + CAT about ten months ago.Gelb + met with the Shah on February 5. No record of their meeting was + found. The Shah was quite relaxed about it. Brown replied that that was a different + era and the Shah would not feel the same now, whereas the Koreans may be + more relaxed now than previously. He felt that we had a wider spectrum + of alternatives in dealing with Korea than with the Shah, but that + active discussion was not an option in either case.

+

Christopher asked what the + negotiators felt about having a discussion at the beginning of the talks + on what should be discussed. Gelb replied that such a discussion would be fruitless, + and would only lead to a stalemate. In essence to do this would amount + to a decision to end the talks. Blechman agreed, saying that we had + thought that Mexico CityThe next round of + Comprehensive Arms Talks were scheduled for December 5–15 in Mexico + City. would be a test of the Russians and now we are finding + that it is a test of ourselves. Keeny said that getting other suppliers to cooperate in + arms restraint is the President’s policy. If we don’t want to pursue it, + we should put the issue to him and let him decide. McGiffert noted that our unilateral restraint policy was + prefaced by the need to protect US + national security interests.

+

Brown stated that walking out + might be the appropriate response on Iran. Gelb asked Brown + what his objective was in that strategy. Brown replied that progress in this round of CAT was too high a price to pay if Iran + were to be further destabilized, or if we had to go through another + round of reassuring the Koreans, such as he had just been through in the + past year. Gelb asked why he + thought that explaining to the government of Iran what might happen + would lead to such destabilization. Brown replied that it was simply the fact that the talks + were going on. Keeny argued that + this issue is not related to the current situation in Iran. Brown agreed but argued that these + discussions would make the situation very much worse. Keeny replied that if that were true + then we should break off the talks, but he was challenging the basic + thesis that the fact of something being brought up would have such + cosmic implications. Aaron asked + whether listening to the Soviets on Iran was more important than making + progress on Latin America and Africa. Blechman answered that in order to + make progress we must be prepared to listen. Secretary Brown then had to leave.

+

Aaron then said that he would try + to frame the issues. First, do we try to negotiate an agenda at the + beginning of the talks. Our position on Korea and on China is that we + would simply not discuss it. On the region including Iran there are + options. We could be prepared to discuss it. We could listen and then + exclude it. Or we could treat it like China as not being an appropriate + matter for discussion. Christopher said that this position was that Iran + belonged in the same category as China. Blechman said that we should + listen to the Soviet proposal and then deflect the discussion to a + sub-region, namely the Yemens. McGiffert said that Iran should be treated like + China.

+

Christopher asked what our + experience has been. Will the Soviets persist in pursuing this region, + or will they heed our warning? Gelb replied that they will persist. Keeny asked what we would do if they do + persist. McGiffert said the + US should walk out. Gelb disagreed with the State + Department’s position on how to treat Iran. He disagreed also with + Brown’s assessment of what + will happen in Iran if we consult with them. These kinds of problems in + our bilateral relations can be easily managed at the stage where we now + are with the Soviets which is essentially ground zero. If we stonewall + on this region, in his opinion we put the talks at serious risk. If we + want to do that there should be explicit guidance from the President. + Aaron said that we would need + an official State Department position on whether or not we should + consult in advance of the round with the government of Iran. He noted + that the Shah may consider this the last straw and would surely wonder + what our intentions are. We should keep a sense of perspective. We had + developed areas of mutual + interest (Latin America and Africa). Now, when the Soviets were + proposing to discuss our vital interests, we are preparing to talk about + them. Gelb and Blechman strongly + disagreed with this analysis.

+

Aaron said that there were several + other areas that needed discussion. If all these issues are resolved, + how far can we go in CAT without our + key allies? We have gotten a positive response to the President’s + message from the British, but nothing from the French. Christopher replied that he did not + rule out the possibility of another meeting with the Soviets if progress + is made at Round IV. However, he did not feel we should reach any + agreements, even ad referendum. But the delegation should be authorized + to agree in principle to another CAT + meeting, if the date was set far enough in advance so that there would + be time for consultations with our allies. Gelb added that there was also the possibility of + scheduling meetings of the Working Groups in between the formal rounds. + General Jones said that there should be no more meetings until we + demonstrate progress with the allies. Working Group meetings on Africa + might be all right if we uncover areas of real interest. McGiffert said that any decision on + further meetings should be made in Washington, not by the delegation. + Aaron added that today’s + meeting had revealed the great sensitivity that existed over these + talks, so that coming back to Washington for a decision certainly seems + warranted. Blechman asked whether that also applied to working group + meetings on the criteria and on Latin America and Africa: areas where + the US wants to press ahead? McGiffert said there was a serious + problem with Latin America because of the MIG–23s in Cuba. Aaron emphasized that CAT was not the forum in which to discuss + MIGs in Cuba, though Cuba is included in our proposals for regional + restraint in Latin America. Christopher repeated that the Department of State + supported the guidance as drafted in the interagency paper, giving the + delegation authority to schedule additional rounds and meetings based on + its view of progress made in this round. On Africa, State favored a + US proposal covering only + sub-Saharan Africa, not the whole continent. Later the region could be + broadened to include all of Africa. He would like a question to be posed + to the President on the fundamental issue of whether to go forward with + CAT. He favored doing so. He then + had to leave the meeting.

+

Blechman asked whether the decision paper for the President would be + cleared among the agencies. Aaron + replied that we would try to faithfully reflect the discussion. If any + agency feels it necessary, it is free to contribute its own paper.

+

Aaron then raised the issue posed + in the interagency paper of whether we should table a proposal on Latin + America at this round, or simply explore possible options. McGiffert asked what State felt about + Mexico’s views on this. + Jones added that we must be particularly sensitive about Mexico’s views + since the meeting will be in Mexico City. We have to be careful that the + suppliers do not get out in front of the recipients. Gelb answered that the Mexicans have + no objection to our tabling a proposal. What they would object to is any + form of agreement on a proposal. State favored tabling a proposal. + Keeny said that ACDA agreed. McGiffert favored exploring options but making no + proposal. Gelb noted that there + are many things about the Mexican proposal with which we disagree. + Aaron asked whether we have + consulted with Brazil on our proposal. Gelb said that we have talked to them about our general + approach but not about the specifics. We have not told any other + government about the specifics, but we have briefed Brazil and many of + the other Latin American countries in some detail on our general + approach. McGiffert noted that + although we had weapons lists for Latin America it was not clear exactly + what proposal the delegation would be tabling. Aaron directed the Interagency Group to + prepare a specific proposal for approval prior to the talks.

+

Turning to Africa, Aaron felt that + there is a political asymmetry between Latin America and Africa, and + that if the Soviets did not appear serious about discussing concrete + proposals on Africa, that perhaps we should not make a concrete proposal + on Latin America. Since Latin America is in our backyard it would not + make sense to talk in detail about Latin America, but not about Africa. + Gelb responded that any + proposal that the delegation was authorized to make would presumably be + approved because it was in our interest. He did not therefore see the + linkage between the two regions that Aaron was suggesting. Aaron replied that the linkage was there, and was + important. On the scope of the Africa proposal, Gelb explained that Secretary + Vance was afraid that a + proposal on all of Africa might affect the current Middle East talks + because of Libya, and so for this round we should stay with sub-Saharan + Africa. In the long run we would hold out the possibility for expanding + the region to all of Africa minus Egypt. All agreed. Gelb added that since everybody else + was doing so, he would also like to make a statement for the record. The + delegation is not proposing things because the Soviets will like it or + not like it. The issue is not how to make the Soviets happy, but how to + frame a proposal which is both negotiable and in the US interest. Aaron said that the question is what is in our + interest?

+

Gelb said that on Africa State + would like authorization for both Options 1 and 2. He would not oppose + sending this issue back to Washington during the round, but there is a + problem because of the short duration of the round—only seven working + days. Stevens asked whether the first option didn’t mean that the US couldn’t change the existing arms + balance in Africa. Blechman responded that the idea was to make as far reaching a proposal as + possible since restraint is clearly in our interest in Africa because + the Soviet Union is transferring so much more than we. McGiffert favored instructing the + delegation to have a general discussion with the Soviets on Africa. If + they show interest, the delegation should report back to Washington + which will then decide whether a proposal should be tabled and what it + would be. Gelb said that + approach would not work, and that after all this time we ought to be + able to approve or disapprove the options as drafted. Keeny favored approval of both options, + with a preference for Option 1. Aaron agreed with McGiffert’s view that the delegation should check back + with Washington for approval during the round. Gelb said that objections to the + weapons lists (which had already been cleared by all agencies involved) + should be raised here and worked out before the round. Blechman and + Keeny added that the + delegation was not asking for authority to make changes in the options, + but rather for authority to table a pre-authorized option. McGiffert said that the delegation + should explore the possibilities for limitations of less sophisticated + weapons systems. If there is interest, report back to Washington. + General Jones agreed. Aaron said + that the Interagency Group should prepare precise formulations of the + two options which would then be considered for approval. Gelb emphasized that State’s position + was that the delegation have the power to proceed once the proposal was + approved.

+

On the question of how to approach the control of the transfer of + technology and coproduction in CAT, + McGiffert argued that it be + treated only as a means of assuring noncircumvention of agreed restraint + regimes, and not as a separate criterion. Keeny argued that since control of coproduction and + technology is an important part of our unilateral restraint policy, it + makes sense to seek to apply the same limitations to the Soviets. It + should therefore be treated as a separate criterion. Jones and Gelb both favored treating + coproduction as a non-circumvention issue. Gelb noted however that he understood ACDA’s argument and felt that the issue + should be posed in that manner for the President.

+
+ +
+ + 304. Paper Prepared in the National Security CouncilSource: Carter Library, National + Security Affairs, Brzezinski + Office File, Subject Chron File, Box 123, Vance, Miscellaneous Conversations + With: 10–12/78. Secret. Sent as an attachment to a November 29 + memorandum from Brzezinski to + Christopher. (Ibid.) All + brackets are in the original. + Washington, undated +

CAT IV: + GUIDANCE FOR THE US + DELEGATION

+

I. OVERALL GUIDANCE

+

A. Objectives

+

We continue to seek concrete steps toward international restraint in arms + transfers. Toward this goal, we must move forward with the Soviets, with + other suppliers, and with recipients simultaneously, but seek to avoid a + lack of movement in one or two of these areas from precluding progress + in the third. We want to avoid consideration of the sensitive areas of + East Asia and West Asia and focus on regions where our strategic + interests in terms of arms transfers are not directly engaged, such as + Africa and Latin America.

+

B. Summary of Our Approach in Mexico City

+

We will press on two tracks: substantive and procedural. Each track + should be compatible with the other, but capable of independent + results.

+

1. Substantively, the Delegation should seek detailed exploration in + CAT IV of interim arms transfer + restraint measures (IRMs) for Latin America and Africa. Any interim + agreement arrangement would limit new commitments, be of finite and + relatively short duration, and could be subject to modification as + others joined the dialogue. (Detailed guidance contained in regional + sections.) [Because limitation on new commitments would permit delivery + of pipeline items, the Delegation should insist that the Soviets advise + us of their existing commitments to these regions.]

+

We expect Soviet regional proposals to focus initially on East Asia + (PRC, ROK/DPRK) and West Asia + (Persian Gulf). [Before the round begins, the US Head of Delegation should inform the Soviet Head of + Delegation that concrete progress toward restraint in Africa and Latin + America is in our mutual interest. He should also inform him that we are + not prepared to discuss either East Asia or West Asia. He should state + that if the Soviets press us on these two regions, the Head of the + US Delegation will have to seek + instructions from Washington before proceeding with this round.] (Detailed guidance on + dealing with anticipated Soviet regional proposals is contained in + regional sections.)

+

We are prepared to put forward a proposal on Africa and Latin America. We + are willing to put forward the former alone but not the latter.

+

We also seek continued progress toward agreement on the criteria to + govern arms transfers, which would form the basis of the overall + framework for restraint. We need to ensure in this round that work + proceeds on the military/technical criteria and on political/legal + criteria consistent with our own policies. Also in this round, we should + elicit a Soviet commitment to the establishment of, and detailed + discussions of the nature of, the consultative mechanism through which + restraint would be implemented.

+

2. Procedurally, we seek, over the long term, a series of + supplier/recipient consultations, each organized for a different region. + These consultations would discuss both the overall framework for + restraint and interim restraint measures. Any US/Soviet IRM which + previously had been agreed upon could be confirmed or modified as a + result of such meetings. These consultations could precede more formal + joint supplier-recipient conferences, and may themselves have to be + preceded by discussions among recipients alone, and among suppliers + alone. The latter could take the form of a series of US-other suppliers bilaterals. We will have + to probe Soviet views on this question in Mexico City.

+

C. Other Suppliers

+

[It is neither desirable nor necessary to anticipate or plan our specific + approaches to other suppliers until we have a clearer idea as to the + nature and scope of possible US-Soviet + agreements. In the discussions, the Delegation should not take issue + with the principle that long-term comprehensive restraint measures + require participation by all major suppliers. But it should maintain + that certain interim US-Soviet + restraints affecting particular weapons transfers to specific regions or + sub-regions can make sense as bilateral measures and can provide a basis + for broader and more durable arrangements involving other suppliers and + recipients. The Delegation should stress that more substantial US-Soviet progress in moving toward + concrete restraint arrangements is needed to help bring other suppliers + along. If the Soviets press the argument that certain bilateral + restraints could be circumvented by other suppliers, the Delegation + could note that, in such cases, at the very least, we would seek their + agreement to avoid actions that would upset such interim measures. The + Delegation, however, should make clear to the Soviets in CAT IV that the US will not and cannot speak for our Allies on questions of + arms transfers. If a specific bilateral agreement is in sight, the Delegation should report to + Washington so that appropriate consultations can be held with the Allies + and so that the Delegation can receive instructions on how to relate + such an agreement to the positions of the other suppliers.]

+

The Delegation should deal with the anticipated Soviet suggestion of + holding a multilateral suppliers meeting by arguing that serious and + systematic bilaterals between the US and + the USSR and between each of us and + our major allies would be the best way to proceed in the near term. + These consultations would help ensure that suppliers would bring a + reasonably consistent position into joint supplier-recipient + conferences, build suppliers’ support for interim restraint measures, + and develop a comprehensive framework for restraint based upon criteria + and consultative mechanisms. (The Delegation should not rule out the + possibility of a multilateral suppliers’ meeting following intensive + bilaterals as a prelude to supplier-recipient consultations and a + supplier-recipient conference.)

+

D. Further Negotiations

+

[Over the near term, we wish to sustain the momentum of US-Soviet negotiations during the coming + year, so long as CAT is not exploited + by the Soviets to disadvantage our sensitive relationships in East and + West Asia. The Delegation should seek prior Washington approval before + agreeing on a schedule for further negotiations, either at the + Delegation or working level. In determining a future schedule, we should + be mindful of the unique and difficult character of the initiative and + should not establish unreasonable expectations for progress in the + CAT IV round.]

+

II. REGIONAL GUIDANCE

+

A. Latin America

+

1. Objectives. As a general strategy, the + Delegation should discuss with the Soviet Union the emerging regional + initiative, including: (1) Mexico’s key role since the merger of the two + initiativesReference is to the June 17 + pledge by Carter and + Presidents Lopéz Michelsen of Colombia, Quirós of Costa Rica, and + Pérez of Venezuela, the + Chief of Government Omar Torrijos of Panama, and Prime Minister of + Jamaica Manley to combine their support for the Treaty of Tlatelolco + with their support for the Ayacucho Declaration to limit the supply + and purchase of conventional arms. (“Joint Statement by the United + States and Latin America: Treaty of Tlatelolco, the Organization of + the American states, and Arms Transfers [Extract],” Documents on Disarmament, 1978, p. + 391) and the apparent development in Latin America of a + consensus on the need for wide regional participation, (2) elements of + restraint concepts developed at + August Mexico City meetingA report on the + Latin American and Caribbean Conventional Weapons meeting held in + Mexico City is in telegram 14169 from Mexico City, August 28. + (National Archives, RG 59, Central + Foreign Policy File, D780351–1056) (including both transfer + restraints and other restraint-related measures), (3) importance of + suppliers supporting this initiative and helping to keep momentum, (4) + sensitivity of recipients to appearance of supplier-imposed restraints, + (5) significance of our showing support for the prospective + supplier-recipient conference as a means of establishing an effective + restraint regime. The Delegation should be alert to avoid any + discussions which could be understood as narrowing or undermining the + 1962 US/USSR Understandings on offensive weapons in Cuba.The 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis ended when the Soviet + Union agreed to withdraw all offensive nuclear weapons from Cuba. + The United States in turn agreed not to invade Cuba and withdrew + offensive nuclear weapons from Turkey.

+

2. Interim Restraint Measures

+

(a) Political/Diplomatic Measures

+

(1) Regarding the second Mexican note,Not + found. Telegram 17638 from Mexico, October 24, reported that a + second major note to major arms suppliers “would be made available + to the U.S. Thursday October 26.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + D780438–0614) The first note, also not found, was sent in August. + (Telegram 260203 to Mexico, October 14; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + D780420–0885) the Delegation should propose that:

+

—the thrust of this reply should be to support in principle appropriate + regional arrangements to restrain transfers of conventional weapons, while reserving the right to consider specific + regional proposals which the Latin Americans may develop.

+

—replies should emphasize the need for progress on regional arrangements + such that Latin American recipients will be ready for consultations in + 1979 with suppliers as part of the preparatory work for a formal + supplier-recipient conference.

+

—replies should mention the recent UN + SSOD endorsement of supplier-recipient + coordination of arms transfer restraintSee + Document 299. and indicate the + importance of restraint to be considered in other appropriate regions as + part of a global concept.

+

—replies should be through the vehicle of a private diplomatic note + delivered before March 1979. The Delegation should indicate that we are + prepared to go ahead with our note even if the USSR is unwilling to do so.

+

(FYI: Replies should not include + endorsement of restraints on use of conventional weapons. Although a + general reference could be given to the Geneva Conference on Special Weapons, that should not be the + first nor the primary forum for issuing statements of support for Latin + American restraint initiatives.)

+

(2) Regarding public support for Latin American restraint, the Delegation + should propose language for a joint communique that:

+

—endorses the Latin American restraint initiative in the context of the + UN + SSOD Program of Action, noting the + former’s origins in the Declaration of Ayacucho.

+

—expresses willingness in principle to honor regional restraint + arrangements, in Latin America and in other regions.

+

(b) Interim Weapons Restraint Proposals

+

Regarding specific weapons restraint proposals, the Delegation should + explore region-wide restraint possibilities. [After the exploratory + discussions, the Delegation is authorized to table an ad referendum proposal, subject to consultations with other + major suppliers. The Delegation should seek further guidance as to the + content of a specific proposal. In addressing specific proposals, we + should take into account the Mexican initiative for regional + restraint.]

+

(c) Supplier Consultations

+

Regarding further suppliers’ consultations on Latin America, the + Delegation should stress the need for sustained US-Soviet bilaterals and suggest that we each hold such + bilaterals with our respective allies as a means of developing a + consistent approach toward restraint in Latin America for discussions at + a supplier-recipient conference or informal supplier-recipient + consultations which could precede such a conference. The sensitivity of + the region to multilateral suppliers’ meetings should be emphasized, but + not so as to rule out the possibility of a suppliers’ conference.

+

B. Africa

+

1. Objectives

+

Our long-term goal is to see African disputes settled through negotiation + and not by force of arms; we believe that the available resources of + Africa and of its friends should be used for economic and social + progress on the continent.

+

The current and projected levels of arms transfers to Africa work against + these goals, and thus our objective is a meaningful agreement on arms + transfer restraint. Specifically, we want to see a reduction in the flow + of Soviet arms to Africa.

+

2. Overall Tactics

+

The Soviets see Africa as a place we want to + discuss because the trend of events is running against us. During Round + IV, they will try to condition + further discussion of restraint in Africa on our agreement to discuss + other areas of interest to them. Indeed, even if the Soviets come to + agree upon meaningful restraint in Africa, they will probably look for + trade-offs from us outside Africa, for the simple reason that our arms + transfers to Africa are minimal.

+

[Thus, our key tactic at Mexico City must be to make the Soviets see that + a restraint agreement in Africa is in our mutual interest—whether or not + we agree to discuss the areas of primary interest to the Soviets.]

+

3. Courses of Action and Proposals

+

In addition to the general tactics outlined above and assuming that we + are able to bring the Soviets to further discussion of Africa, the + Delegation will propose the following courses of action.

+

(a) The Region Defined: Sub-Saharan Africa

+

Consistent with guidance for round III, an African proposal should cover + sub-Saharan Africa. The Delegation should, as necessary, indicate that + we would also be willing to discuss northwest Africa, but under no + circumstances Egypt.

+

(b) Region-wide Interim Weapons Restraint + Proposals

+

[The Delegation is authorized to explore interim restraint possibilities + and to make a proposal for Africa. The Delegation should seek further + guidance on what specific proposal to table. The Delegation should make + clear that the US is prepared to + implement such interim restraint measures bilaterally.]

+

(c) High Tension Areas

+

Along with Africa-wide interim restraint, the Delegation should press for + discussion and eventual agreement on additional arms transfer restraint + in certain areas of particularly high tension. The region-wide IRM may + be viewed as the preliminary evidence of our mutual intention to + restrain arms flows. The discussions on the high tension areas will give + more substance to our region-wide undertakings and allow all parties to + demonstrate that they are striving for meaningful agreements.

+

If region-wide restraint is deemed insufficient, our aim will be further + and more specific arms restraint in certain areas, with the ultimate aim + of reducing tensions and avoiding possible confrontations. The priority + areas for such discussions are Angola/Zaire and Ethiopia/Somalia and at + some point North Africa and Southern Africa. In each of the priority + areas we would point to our own restraint and suggest the Soviets take + reciprocal measures. If the Soviets choose to raise other countries, we + would be prepared to consider them as long as they fit with our overall + objectives.

+ +

(d) Political/Diplomatic Initiatives

+

The US should not make demarches to + African states until we see the Soviet reaction at Mexico City. However, + the Delegation could agree to the issuance of a joint public statement + at the end of the session that would encourage regional initiatives.

+

C. Asia

+

1. East Asia

+

The Soviets have made it clear they intend to raise the question of China + within the context of their East Asia proposal. [Prior to the official + start of the round, the head of Delegation should reiterate what we have + told the Soviets informally—namely:

+

—That as far as we are concerned, East Asia is not an appropriate topic + for the talks, and we will have no comment to make;

+

—state that to address East Asia in the CAT context would be too much of a burden for CAT and would doom the talks to failure; + and

+

—firmly refuse to discuss the subject, ask no questions, make no + proposals, and not agree to inclusion of this area on the agenda. Tell + them that if they persist, the US + Delegation will have to seek instructions from Washington prior to + proceeding with the formal discussion.]

+

The same applies to both China and Korea.

+

2. Southeast Asia

+

The Soviets have indicated that they will not raise the Southeast Asian + sub-region. However, if they reverse their position and do so, the + Delegation should:

+

—listen to what the Soviets have to say and ask questions to clarify the + proposal; and

+

—not offer any US counter-proposals.

+

3. West Asia

+

Particularly because of the current delicate internal situation in Iran, + but also due to other factors, it is not in the US interest to raise the West Asian area at this time. + However, we can expect that the Soviet side will raise the area for + discussion.

+

[Prior to the round, the head of Delegation should inform the Soviets + that it is not appropriate to discuss this region at this time, and take + the same position as on East Asia.]

+

4. South Asia

+

The Soviets have indicated they will not raise the South Asian + sub-region. However, if they reverse their position and do so, the + Delegation should:

+

—listen to what the Soviets have to say, ask questions to clarify the + proposal, but not offer any US + counter-proposals.

+ +

III. FUNCTIONAL + GUIDANCE

+

A. Military/Technical Criteria

+

The Soviets have stated that they will table their own military/technical + criteria at Round IV. We should be prepared to discuss these criteria in + conjunction with the eight military/technical criteria which the US side tabled in Round III, with the aim + of reaching agreement. We should also be prepared to discuss such + supporting measures as controls on retransfers, arms sales promotional + activities and physical security, as appropriate. Controls on the + transfer of weapons manufacturing technologyDefined as co-production, licensed production, or co-assembly. + [Footnote is in the original.] should be sought as necessary + to prevent circumvention of other agreed restraints on transfers of + weapons themselves. Thus, co-production controls should be sought only + for weapons whose transfer is restrained pursuant to military/technical + criteria.

+

B. Political/Legal Criteria

+

With respect to political/legal criteria, the Delegation should continue + the discussions which began at the third round on the parallel US and Soviet drafts. To the extent + consistent with the position paper on political/legal criteria prepared + for the third round,Not found. the + Delegation should work with the Soviet side to develop mutually + acceptable criteria. However, these efforts should be coordinated with + the pace and tenor of the discussions on the other CAT issues, particularly the + military/technical criteria, so that agreement on political/legal + criteria does not take place prematurely.

+

C. Consultative Mechanism

+

The Delegation is authorized to build upon the presentation in Round III + to seek agreement on the establishment of, and the functions of, a + consultative mechanism to refine and implement the understandings + arrived at by the two sides in the CAT + rounds. The Delegation is also authorized to present, for purposes of + discussion, illustrative examples of how such a mechanism might be + structured and to seek Soviet responses in order to refine our own + approach to the question. In particular, the Delegation should seek + Soviet thoughts as to the best way to structure multilateral + consultations. Any consultative mechanism should be designed to + implement agreed restraint measures.

+
+ +
+ + 305. Telegram From the Department of State to All American Republic + Diplomatic PostsSource: + National Archives, RG 59, Central + Foreign Policy File, D790024–0450. Secret; Immediate. Sent for + information to USUN, the Mission + in Geneva, and Moscow. Drafted by George Jones (ARA/RPP) and + Priscilla Clapp (PM); Ralph Johnson + (ARA/RPP), John Bushnell (ARA), + Lorna Watson (ACDA), and Michael + Eshes (AF/I); and approved by Gelb (PM). + Washington, January 17, 1979, 2156Z +

12960. Subject: Conventional Arms Transfers: Debrief on US-Soviet Talks. Refs: (A) State + 216300,See Document + 296. (B) State 319188,Telegram 319188 to XX, December 19, 1978, contained the text of a + joint U.S.–USSR communiqué about + the December 5–15 Conventional Arms Limitation talks in Mexico City. + (National Archives, RG 59, Central + Foreign Policy File, D780524–1038) (C) State 307629Telegram 307629 to all diplomatic posts, + December 6, 1978, informed all diplomatic posts of the December 5–15 + Conventional Arms Limitation talks in Mexico City. (National + Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign + Policy File, D780502–1073) (D) State 322255.In Telegram 322255 to Mexico, December 22, 1978, + the United States Government told the Government of Mexico that it + “views with favor the proposal to convene, at an appropriate time, a + conference to discuss the regulation of international transfers of + arms into the Latin American region” and “would welcome the + opportunity to participate.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + D780530–0906)

+

1. (U) Posts may at discretion draw on following to brief host + governments on fourth round of US-Soviet + CAT talks, held in Mexico City + December 5–15. Joint communiqué was transmitted in Ref B.

+

2. (S) During the third round with the Soviets in July we reached a + general understanding that we would proceed in these talks to discuss + political-legal criteria, military-technical criteria and the regional + application of these criteria. When we met for the fourth round in + Mexico City, we were not able to reach agreement on terms of reference + for the regional part of the discussions, and therefore decided to drop + that part of the discussion for this round.

+

3. (S) Accordingly, the work of this round focused on general criteria. + The political-legal working group continued its discussion of criteria + and made considerable progress in developing a common text, although + significant differences remain.

+

4. (S) Regarding military-technical criteria, the Soviet side for the + first time came forward with its ideas. In a number of areas the Soviet + criteria bear similarities to the ideas we had put forward, in other + areas we are still quite far apart. No date has been set for the next + round, but it will be held in Helsinki.

+ +

5. (S) In sum, we did not make progress on regional issues, but we did + make limited progress on the general criteria. We continue to believe + that discussions about the regional application of criteria are + essential if arms transfer restraint is to be meaningful, and we hope + that these discussions about specific regions can be resumed in the next + round.

+

6. (S) However, regardless of how US-Soviet talks develop, there is no reason why recipient + countries cannot move ahead in developing their own consensus on + conventional arms restraint. They have a clear mandate to do so from + UNSSOD, and supplier countries have a mandate to cooperate. FYI. Government of Mexico sought, as did + US, a clear statement of support for + the Latin American initiative in the CAT IV communique. The final language was as far as the + USSR was prepared to go, and it + would not have gone that far were it not for threat by GOM to denounce + both powers publicly for their failure to respond to Mexican expression + of interest. End FYI.

+

7. (C) Accordingly, US has responded + positively (Ref D) to Mexican diplomatic requests for endorsement of its + initiative and for an indication of willingness to respect restraint + agreements Latin American States may reach. As secretary pro-tem of + 20-nation group,The Latin America and + Caribbean Conventional Arms Restraint Group. Mexico hopes to + obtain agreement to a meeting for March 1979 in Quito to set up a + permanent consultative mechanism on arms restraint and begin the + identification of types of restraints that might be broadly acceptable. + Venezuela has told US that the Ayacucho + initiative has been folded into the larger effort and that it fully + supports the 20-nation group. (However, it would prefer a date other + than March because of the change of government that month in + Venezuela.)

+

8. (C) Because the restraint initiative is a Latin American effort, and + must remain so if it is to succeed, the degree to which the US can become involved, even behind the + scenes, is limited. However, we continue to be interested in following + developments closely and would appreciate your reports of public or + private comments by host governments on either the US-Soviet talks or the Latin American + initiative.

+ + Vance + +
+ +
+ + 306. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense Brown to the President’s Assistant for National Security + Affairs (Brzezinski)Source: Library of Congress, + Manuscript Division, Harold + Brown Papers, Box 78, 1977 Arms Transfer/FMS Policy. + Secret. + Washington, April + 28, 1979 + + SUBJECT + Conventional Arms Transfer (CAT) + Talks (U) + +

(S) On March 6, 1979 a mini-SCC meeting + was heldNo minutes or summary of + conclusions for this meeting have been found. to determine an + appropriate response to the Soviet proposal that the Conventional Arms + Transfer (CAT) Talks be + reconvened.McGiffert informed Brown that the Soviets had proposed that the CAT talks be resumed on March 20 + however the “United States put them off temporarily, but the Soviets + are expected to raise the issue at the summit [in Vienna scheduled + for June].” (Memorandum from McGiffert to Brown, April 13; Ibid.) At that meeting it + was decided to explore alternative approaches for establishing an agreed + agenda for the next round of negotiations. The following considerations + reflect the views of the Department of Defense on that subject.

+

(S) The Department of Defense has been supportive of conventional arms + transfer (CAT) restraint to the extent + that it promotes collective security by seeking to limit unrestrained + and potentially destabilizing transfers. In this regard, Defense has + consistently held that concrete regional application is essential for + any meaningful CAT restraint regime. + Moreover, it is the DOD position that + an appropriate means be found to test the willingness of the Soviets to + commit themselves to concrete restraint without establishing the + legitimacy of Soviet-proposed regions.

+

(S) Defense believes the approach offering the best prospect for success + is one that would allow the talks to proceed with the understanding that + each side would be allowed to nominate regions for restraint but that + actual restraint proposals could not be presented until both sides + agreed on the appropriateness of a candidate region. Given the + exemptions and exclusions previously identified by each side, these + ground rules would most likely lead to a discussion of Africa, if + discussion of any region is in fact possible.

+

(S) Defense views sub-Saharan Africa as the best prospective regional + candidate, as US and Soviet interests + are not as directly engaged there as they are elsewhere. There are + practical advantages in seeking restraint in Africa, given both existing + legal and political constraints on US arms transfers + to the area and demonstrated willingness by the Soviets to devote + massive military assistance resources in an effort to expand their + influence in the region.

+

(S) The United States should not, however, entertain discussion of + Soviet-proposed regions merely as a quid pro quo for Soviet agreement to + discuss Africa. Guidance for the Mexico City round was necessary + tactically to establish this point with the Soviets firmly. Having + established that position, the United States must not allow the Soviets + to exploit the current impasse by focusing the talks on general + principles which they consider essential while ignoring the regional + discussions which we consider essential. Such exploitation would be + effectively blunted by making agreement on candidate regions a + pre-condition of actual restraint proposals.

+

(U) The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, concurs in this memorandum.

+ + Harold + Brown + +
+ +
+ 307. Memorandum From the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament + Agency (Seignious) to Secretary + of State VanceSource: Carter Library, National + Security Affairs, Staff Material, Global Issues, + Bloomfield/Oplinger, Box + 31, Chron: 5/79. Secret. + Washington, May 3, + 1979 + + SUBJECT + Conventional Arms Transfer Talks + +

The Conventional Arms Transfer talks with the Soviets are now at an + important juncture, given the continued impasse over regions and + inability to schedule a new round of talks. I believe it is critical, + both for other US arms control + objectives and for overall US-Soviet + relations, particularly in view of the upcoming summit,Reference is to the Summit held between Carter and Brezhnev in Vienna, June 15–18, + 1979. See Document 309. that we be + in a position to move these talks forward in a constructive manner.

+

I find quite promising the April 28th proposal of Secretary Brown,See + Document 306. under which both + sides would be free to make their case for inclusion of particular regions in a restraint + regime, but actual restraint proposals would be limited to those regions + which both sides had accepted. We are prepared to support this + constructive proposal, with two caveats.

+

First, I believe that the US should be + prepared to listen to Soviet regional presentations at Round V on their + merits, and make no comment. I favor presenting our substantive + responses, whether rejection or counterproposal, at Round VI. Second, + the negotiations should proceed on other important agenda items while + regional issues were being resolved. Particularly important are the + continued drafting of common criteria and the development of a + consultative mechanism; such agreement would be a necessary prerequisite + for effective regional restraint and also would offer an opportunity to + apply restraints on transfers of certain weapons on a global basis.

+

I recommend that you convene a PRC at an + early date to consider Secretary Brown’s initiative.

+ + George M. + Seignious IISeignious signed the + memorandum “George.” + +
+ +
+ 308. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Kingdom to the Department + of StateSource: National + Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign + Policy File, D790258–0646. Confidential; Priority; Exdis. Sent for information to Paris + and Bonn. + London, June 7, 1979, 1526Z +

11183. For EUR, PM, ACDA, and NSC only. Subject: Conventional Arms + Transfer Restraint.

+

1. (C—Entire text). Summary: Embassy recommends that USG consider renewed effort to secure some + greater measure of accord among the major Western suppliers on arms + transfer issues before moving to any agreement on the subject with the + USSR. While acknowledging the + difficulties of achieving greater western accord, we believe recent + developments and evolving attitudes make another effort worthwhile. In + the absence of greater Western accord, any super power agreement may + further divide us from our allies on these issues. End summary.

+ +

2. The prospect of a renewal of US + discussions with the Soviets on conventional arms transfer restraint + raises once again the problem of involving the other major suppliers—our + principal allies—Britain, France and Germany. Each of these governments + has, to a varying degree, questioned the wisdom of the US approach to its own arms sales, and has + expressed skepticism regarding the prospects for securing meaningful + Soviet cooperation along the lines envisaged by the USG. None of our allies has been willing + to accept the kinds of constraints which the US has imposed on itself, although the FRG has restrictions of its own which are + in some respects even more far reaching.

+

3. Clearly no US/Soviet effort at mutual restraint can be long maintained + without cooperation from the other major suppliers. Western cooperation + is, in and of itself, an important objective, in some instances more + important than achieving Soviet restraint. The major arms sales + competition in the third world is not, after all, East-West, but + intra-Western; recipient countries switching much more easily among + Western suppliers than between East and West.

+

4. Our allies have maintained that they could not be expected to accept + cooperative restraints unless the Soviets could be brought in as well. + One should not conclude from these statements that a US/Soviet agreement + would in fact lead our allies to cooperate. On the contrary, it may + stimulate their suspicions and reinforce their determination not to + accept any external constraints. In the UK, the new government, not having been party to our + earlier consultations on this issue, could react negatively to any + US/Soviet accord it experienced as impacting on the UK’s freedom of action. It is also + instructive to note that as the prospect for US agreement with the Soviets seemed to come closer, in + 1977–78, the French became progressively less cooperative, eventually + veto-ing further quadripartite consultations,The Embassy reported in telegram 35883 from Paris, + October 31, 1978, that “France is not ready to participate, at this + time, in four-power talks or talks with the Soviet Union on CAT. The GOF would rather keep the matter as a subject for + bilateral discussion.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + D780450–0450) and refusing to do more than listen to US briefings.

+

5. These considerations lead us to conclude that unless some greater + measure of accord among the Western suppliers is achieved prior to any + US/Soviet agreement, such a super power agreement may divide US from our allies even further on this + issue. We recognize the difficulty of achieving today an agreement among + Western suppliers which eluded US two + years ago. Nevertheless, there are several new factors which make + another effort worthwhile. First, events in Iran have illustrated the + political—and even commercial—folly of unrestrained competition among + arms suppliers (all of whom, incidentally, were Western). Second, the prospect for involving + the Soviets in a dialogue on arms transfer seems more practical today + than it did two years ago. Third, US + efforts to restrain its arms transfers and to focus international + attention on the issue have gradually had an impact on official + attitudes, at least in the UK. Finally, + the threat of greater competition resulting from the US lifting some of its self-imposed + constraints, in the absence of agreed restraints, is more credible today + than two years ago.

+

6. In seeking to involve our allies in a more constructive dialogue we + recommend setting ourselves fairly modest initial objectives. In 1977 + the US notified the Europeans of the + basic elements of its new arms transfer policySee footnote 1, Document + 271. before it had discussed these issues with them + in any depth. From their standpoint the subsequent four power + discussions were an effort to change their policies, without offering + them the slightest prospect that they might change ours. In renewing our + effort to achieve greater Western accord, we would suggest a more open + ended approach, one in which we explained to our allies that the USG was reviewing its own policies, as + well as its approach to involving the Soviets and other suppliers, and + would like our allies’ views before making any decisions.

+

7. The new British governmentOn May 4, the + Conservative Party under the leadership of Margaret Thatcher won a + general election and replaced the Labour party. may, in our + view, be open to renewed Western discussions on the problems posed by + Conventional Arms Transfers, leading toward more regular exchanges on + such issues and perhaps toward agreement on certain limited, generally + acceptable principles of restraint. The creation of such a forum, and + even modest agreement on elements of restraint would in our view be a + major step forward. We would welcome comment from Embassies Paris and + Bonn regarding the receptivity of their host government to any such + renewal consultations, bilateral or quadripartite, among the Western + suppliers.

+ + Brewster + +
+ +
+ + 309. Memorandum of ConversationSource: Department of State, Office of the Secretariat + Staff, Cyrus R. Vance, + Secretary of State—1977–1980, Lot 84D241, Vance + Exdis + Memcons 1979. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Krimer on June 20; and approved by + Aaron. The meeting took + place at the Soviet Embassy. The memorandum is printed in full in + Foreign + Relations, 1977–1980, vol. VI, Soviet Union, Document + 203. + Vienna, June 17, 1979, 11:00 a.m.–1:00 + p.m. + + SUBJECT + Third Plenary Meeting between President Carter and President Brezhnev + Topics: SALT III and other arms + control issues + + + PARTICIPANTS + + U.S. + The President + Secretary of State Cyrus R. + Vance + Secretary of Defense Harold + Brown + Dr. Zbigniew + Brzezinski + General David Jones + Mr. Hamilton + Jordan + General G. + Seignious + Ambassador Malcolm + Toon + Mr. Joseph + Powell + Mr. David + Aaron + Mr. Wm. D. Krimer, + Interpreter + + + U.S.S.R. + President L.I. + Brezhnev + Foreign Minister A.A. + Gromyko + Marshal D.F. Ustinov + Mr. K.U. Chernenko + Deputy Foreign Minister G.M. + Korniyenko + Marshal N.V. Ogarkov + Ambassador A.F. + Dobrynin + Mr. A.M. Aleksandrov-Agentov + Mr. L.M. Zamyatin + Mr. V.G. Komplektov + Mr. A.M. + Vavilov + Mr. V.M. + Sukhodrev, Interpreter + + +

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to conventional arms + transfers.]

+

When Gromyko turned to conventional arms transfers, the + President interjected a few comments on the + anti-satellite talks.

+

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to conventional arms + transfers.]

+ +

Returning to conventional arms transfers, Gromyko noted that the + negotiations had begun some time ago and seemed to move right along, but + then the representatives of the United States had proposed to discuss + conventional arms transfers on a regional basis. In brief, the regions + mentioned were those in which the United States was interested. When + Soviet representatives mentioned other areas and countries of concern to + both sides, US representatives had + simply refused to discuss them. Such a unilateral approach could not + possibly be acceptable to the Soviet side, so US representatives had simply walked out of the talks and + had returned home. Thus, the conventional arms transfers talks were now + in a state of suspense.

+

The President said with respect to conventional + arms transfers that our position has been that we should not begin with + areas where each country was deeply involved. We provide military + assistance to South Korea and Japan, for example. The Soviet Union + provided military assistance to Vietnam and Ethiopia. We would want to + concentrate in the beginning on areas where there was not that much + controversy, where our two countries were not involved by commitments of + long standing.

+

Gromyko + said the Soviet Union would be prepared to resume the conventional arms + transfer negotiations.In a June 18 joint + communiqué, the two nations agreed “that their respective + representatives will meet promptly to discuss questions relating to + the next round of negotiations on limiting conventional arms + transfers.” (Public Papers: Carter, 1979, pp. + 1081–1087)

+

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to conventional arms + transfers.]

+
+ +
+ + 310. Memorandum of ConversationSource: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, + Staff Material, Brzezinski + Office File, Subject Chron File, Box 123, Vance, Miscellaneous + Communications With: 5–8/79. Top Secret. The meeting took place at + the White House. + Washington, July 5, 1979, + 12:33–2:00 p.m. + + PARTICIPANTS + Amb. Anatoliy + Dobrynin + Zbigniew Brzezinski + +

1. Dobrynin first conveyed warm + greetings from Brezhnev to the + President. He reported that Brezhnev in his report to the Politburo spoke in + personally warm terms of the President as a person with whom one can + have a serious discussion over difficult issues, without acrimony, and + as a person who is genuinely interested in arms control. Dobrynin also added that Brezhnev said to the Politburo that + “even Brzezinski seems to be a + decent fellow.”

+

2. I conveyed through Dobrynin to + Brezhnev the President’s + regards as well as the two pens that the President forwarded. Dobrynin interpreted one of the pens + as a gift for himself and, given the absence of precise instructions, I + did not object. In any case the President’s noteNot found. and the pens will go to Brezhnev with Dobrynin, who leaves for Mos-cow + tomorrow.

+

3. Dobrynin raised the question + of CAT and Indian Ocean talks. With + respect to CAT, I told him flatly that + there was no point in having a meeting unless we resolve in advance the + agenda; otherwise, the meeting will degenerate into a hassle over the + agenda. I pointed out to him that this is in our mutual interest. If + CAT is to be serious, we must not + use it for political purposes and try to undercut the politically + sensitive relationships of either of the participants in CAT. After some sparring, Dobrynin agreed, and I said that in + that case Bartholomew will be + available to discuss with the Soviet Chairman the timing as well as the + agenda of the next round.

+

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to conventional arms talks.]

+
+ +
+ + 311. Memorandum From Charles Stebbins of the National Security Council + Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs + (Brzezinski)Source: Carter Library, National + Security Council, Institutional Files, Box 120, SCM 075, Mini-SCC, CAT—Conventional Arms Transfers, 7/12/79. Secret. Sent + for information. A stamped notation at the top of the memorandum + reads “ZB HAS SEEN.” Brzezinski also initialed the + memorandum. + Washington, July + 12, 1979 + + SUBJECT + Conventional Arms Transfer (CAT) + (U) + +

The Mini-SCCNo other record of this meeting has been found. agreed on + the following gameplan at this morning’s meeting:

+

—Reg Bartholomew will try to meet + one-on-one with Mendelevich in + Washington next week to fulfill the Vienna Communiqué obligation to meet + promptly on CAT.See footnote 2, Document + 309. (C)

+

—He will remind Mendelevich that + the US has been exercising unilateral + arms transfer restraint for two years, but will hint that the lack of + similar restraint by other suppliers will have to be factored into our + future transfer decisions—for example, in deciding how or whether to + fill the transfer “gap” resulting from the loss of the Iranian + market.In the wake of the January + Revolution in Iran, the United States suspended arms sales to Iran. + See Foreign + Relations, 1977–1980, vol. X, Iran: Revolution, January + 1977–November 1979.(S)

+

—He will reiterate the previous US + position that multilateral restraint can only result from bilateral + progress, that progress means forward movement on the regions issue, and + that we are prepared only to discuss the Sub-Saharan Africa and Latin + American regions. (S)

+

—Reg will listen to Mendelevich’s + position on regions while trying to get him to agree that the only + practical way to proceed on this key issue is to tackle relatively + non-turbulent regions where neither side has vital interests at stake. + Reg will reject Soviet regions that do not meet this criterion. (S)

+

—Whatever the outcome of the meeting, Reg will suggest that the two stay + in contact through diplomatic channels, and—anticipating no real + progress on regions next week—that they meet again possibly in Europe in + the Fall. (C)

+
+ +
+ + 312. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense Brown and Secretary of State Vance to President CarterSource: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, + Harold Brown Papers, Box + 78, 1977 Arms Transfer/FMS Policy. Secret. Carter initialed the top of the + memorandum. + Washington, August + 14, 1979 + + SUBJECT + Assessment of U.S. Arms Transfer Policy + +

We have recently assessed our experience of the past two years with the + arms transfer restraint policy established by PD–13.See Document 271. On the whole, we believe the policy + has supported U.S. interests in restraint without denying us the + capability to meet our foreign policy requirements and the defense needs + of our allies and friends.

+

There has been considerable criticism of the policy from several + quarters. Some allies and friends perceive the policy as being + artificially restrictive to the point of denying legitimate access to + U.S. military equipment. U.S. industries complain that it disadvantages + them in international markets vis-a-vis other exporters. Most + significantly, however, members of Congress continue to be skeptical of + the policy. Some believe its only achievement has been creative + bookkeeping; others feel that arms transfers are no longer being used as + an effective instrument of foreign policy. We believe that all these + criticisms have been overstated, but we nevertheless expect them to + emerge once more as Congressional studies currently under way are + completed and the Senate Foreign Relations Committee moves to hearings + at the end of the year.

+

Our own principal conclusions are:

+

—The policy has required the creation of a planning system that allows us + to look at the flow of U.S. arms transfers over a multi-year period and + to establish priorities.

+

—The machinery created to implement the policy ensures that the Executive + Branch takes a wide range of factors—political, security, arms control, + economic, and human rights—into account in all major arms transfer + cases.

+

—The policy has imposed measurable restraint on U.S. arms transfers.

+

—Even though we have sold less than we could have, there has not been a + subsequent reduction in the total volume of the world’s arms trade.

+

(U) In the course of this policy reassessment, we have identified the + following issues that will require attention in the near future.

+ +

Qualitative Controls

+

(C) The qualitative controls of PD–13 + have been generally effective. Nevertheless, there are a couple of + questions that may require decisions over the coming months.

+

(S) 1. We are currently considering whether to authorize the development + of an intermediate fighter aircraft solely for export. (The F–5E + currently fills this role.) If we decide that this is a good idea for + policy reasons, we shall then have to decide whether it requires an + exception to PD–13.

+

(S) 2. Several countries are expressing interest in the F–18L, a + land-based version of the Navy aircraft modified solely for export. In + 1977 an Iranian request for the F–18L was denied because the aircraft + was not operationally deployed with U.S. forces. It is necessary that we + review our position on this at an early date because of renewed interest + in the aircraft.

+

(S) Another area of concern is co-production. We have chosen to make + exceptions to this guideline in a number of instances. This is a basic + dilemma for U.S. policy. As our non-NATO friends and allies continue to expand their own + production capabilities, the long-term task of arms control becomes more + difficult; on the other hand, co-production provides us a measure of + control that would be lost if other suppliers sold the concerned + equipment. An interagency study, chaired by ACDA, is currently under way to examine the trends in + Third-World arms production capability.

+

(C) A related problem has been the reluctance on the part of some NATO countries to enter into RSI + co-production arrangements because of our control over third-party sales + outside of NATO. These controls have + their foundation in our statutes as well as in the arms policy. We are + trying to work out these problems on a case-by-case basis.

+

Quantitative Control (The Ceiling)

+

(C) The ceiling on sales to non-exempt countries has been the most + controversial aspect of PD–13. Its + positive features include its visibility as a symbol of the US commitment to arms transfer restraint + and the managerial reforms associated with it. While it has not led to + the rejection of any specific arms transfer requests, it did achieve its + purpose of reducing sales in FY 78 + compared to FY 77. In FY 79, because of cancellations by Iran, + total sales could drop significantly and come in well under the ceiling. + This could lead to pressure to lower the base for calculating the FY 80 ceiling. Such pressure should be + resisted because in FY 80 important + sales to Israel, Egypt and Saudi Arabia could largely fill the gap left + by Iran in FY 79.

+

(C) In any case, we believe that no further reductions in the ceiling + should be made unless there is evidence of progress in our multilateral + restraint effort. After four rounds of negotiations with the Soviets we + have no tangible evidence + of Soviet restraint, and our European allies have made future restraint + on their part (they have not shown any in the past) contingent on our + ability to get restraint from the Soviets. We will be submitting our + formal recommendation to you later this summer in the context of our + FY 80 plan.

+

Multilateral Cooperation

+

(C) PD–13 recognized that achievement of + the objective of a worldwide reduction in arms transfers required the + cooperation of other suppliers and recipients. We have not yet made + concrete progress toward such cooperation although our efforts will + continue. Nevertheless, we believe that the qualitative controls in + PD–13 support U.S. national + interests regardless of such cooperation. The substantive and procedural + benefits of the qualitative controls, as distinct from the FY 80 ceiling level noted above, are not + vitiated by the lack of multilateral progress. We shall be assessing the + results of the multilateral restraint effort and commenting on its + implications in a report due to the Congress by December 31, 1979.

+

Conclusions

+

(C) We believe that PD–13 continues to + support our national objectives in arms restraint and that the policy + should be maintained with no further reductions under the ceiling. As + noted above, our experience suggests that certain aspects of the policy + will raise questions of interpretation as circumstances change. We will + continue to review PD–13 to ensure that + it remains in consonance with our basic foreign policy needs and arms + control objectives. We will also continue to tailor carefully rhetoric + about the policy and specific policy decisions in order that it reflect + realistically the objectives and achievements of PD–13.

+

(U) The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Director, Arms Control + and Disarmament Agency concur in this memorandum.

+ + Harold + Brown + + + Cyrus + Vance + +
+ +
+ + 313. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security + Affairs (Brzezinski) to President + CarterSource: Carter Library, National + Security Affairs, Staff Material, Defense/Security, Box 2, + Conventional Arms Transfers. Secret. Sent for information. In the + upper right-hand corner, Carter wrote “Zbig—I won’t be eager to change the + policy. J.” + Washington, September 10, 1979 + + SUBJECT + Assessment of US Arms Transfer + Policy (C) + +

Cy and Harold have forwarded an assessment of the arms transfer policy + established in PD–13 (Tab A).See Document 312. On + September 11, Brzezinski sent + a letter to Brown and + Vance informing them + that Carter had read their + memorandum. He wrote “You should be aware that he [Carter] added a note to me, ‘I + won’t be eager to change the policy’.” (Library of Congress, + Manuscript Division, Harold + Brown Papers, Box 78, 1977 Arms Transfer/FMS + Policy) They conclude that the policy should be retained, + since it supports our national objectives in arms restraint and has + resulted in a coordination process that ensures a wide range of factors + are taken into account in all major arms transfer cases. (C)

+

However, the Secretaries do note that, despite measurable restraint on + the part of the US, the total volume of + worldwide transfers has not diminished. As a + result, they intend to recommend in the near future that no further + unilateral reductions be made in the current arms transfer ceiling + unless there is progress in our multilateral restraint efforts. They + also caution that a number of decisions may be required shortly + involving exceptions to PD–13. (S)

+

I agree with the Secretaries’ assessment. Given the high political stakes + involved, now is not the time to step away from the policy, or to + conduct a fundamental policy review. However, you could suffer domestic + and international political damage if you + continue to be perceived as consistently withholding US arms from markets that the Soviets and + other suppliers are quick to fill. The fact of higher sales worldwide + since the issuance of PD–13 makes it + appear that the end result of US + unilateral restraint is the encouragement of increased sales by other + countries. (C)

+

Therefore, without abandoning PD–13, we + need to take steps that will signal to the Soviets and others that we + are reaching the limit of our patience with their total lack of + cooperation in global arms transfer restraint. You will receive a series + of follow-on memoranda suggesting specific steps that might be taken, + beginning with the Secretaries’ forthcoming memorandum on the FY 80 ceiling. (C)

+
+ +
+ + 314. Memorandum From Charles Stebbins of the National Security Council + Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs + (Brzezinski)Source: Carter Library, National + Security Council, Institutional Files, Box 120, SCM 083, Mini-SCC, CAT-Conventional Arms Transfers, 9/19/79. Secret. Sent + for action. Copies were sent to Kimmitt and Brement. + Washington, September 19, 1979 + + SUBJECT + Conventional Arms Transfers (CAT) + Talks (U) + +

The Mini-SCCNo other record of this meeting has been found. agreed on + the following gameplan at this morn-ing’s meeting:

+

—Reggie Bartholomew will meet with + Mendelevich in Europe on + September 25 to discuss a possible CAT + V agenda—barring a deci-sion later this week to delay the meeting as a + result of the situation in Cuba.Reference + is to the discovery of a Soviet combat brigade in Cuba. For more on + this, see Foreign Relations, 1977–1980, vol. VI, Soviet Union, + Documents 216, 217, 219, 220, 221, 222, 223, 224, 225, 226, 227, and 228, and Foreign + Relations, 1977–1980, vol. XXIII, Mexico, Cuba, and the + Caribbean. (S)

+

—Reggie will press hard to get the Soviets to accept the earlier US position that discussions of restraint + measures for Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) or Latin America (LA) should be + placed on the CAT V plenary agenda. He + will again argue that: (1) CAT V must + produce significant forward movement on the regions issue; (2) the only + practical way to proceed on the issue is to tackle relatively + non-controversial regions where there is mutual interest in restraining + transfers; and (3) in the US view, the + only regions that meet these criteria are SSA and LA. (S)

+

—If the Soviets cannot be persuaded to place SSA or SSA and LA on the + CAT V agenda, Reggie will be + authorized to agree to convene CAT V + without any Soviet commitment on regions; but he will caution them that, + against the discouraging backdrop of the current situation in Cuba, the + US will not be able to sustain its + CAT initiative without significant + progress on regions at CAT V. (This + approach, coupled with our earlier agreement to permit discussions of + any regions in heads of delegation meetings + only, will tell us whether the Soviet problem with regional discussions + is substantive or procedural.) (S)

+

—Reggie will then propose that CAT V be + convened in Helsinki in mid-January, claiming that the US needs several months to prepare for the + round. If Mendelevich suggests + convening earlier, Reggie will indicate that the US + doesn’t want CAT to complicate SALT, but if the Soviet desire for an + earlier convening can be taken as an earnest of their good intentions on + the regions issue, we might be willing to reconsider our position on + timing. (S)

+

The CAT Working Group was tasked to take + a new look at how Cuba should be dealt with in any CAT V restraint proposal for Latin + America. Additionally, Marshall Brement is to prepare talking points for + Reggie to use in chiding Mendelevich about the current situation in Cuba. (S)

+

RECOMMENDATION:

+

That you approve the above gameplan.Brzezinski did not + indicate his preference with respect to this + recommendation.

+
+ +
+ 315. Paper Prepared by the Soviet GovernmentSource: Carter Library, National + Security Affairs, Staff Material, General Odom File, Box 36, PD–50 [Arms Control Negotiations], + Follow-Up Working File: 9–10/79. No classification markings. A typed + notation at the top of the paper reads “Non-Paper 10/12/79 [US translation].” A handwritten + notation above this reads “NODIS.” + October 12, 1979 +

As was agreed during the meeting between A.A. Gromyko and Secretary Vance in New York September 27Telegram 256735 to Moscow, September 29, reports + Gromyko’s and Vance’s discussion of arms control + in New York. (National Archives, RG + 59, Central Foreign Policy File, Reel Number N/A) concerning + a bilateral exchange of views in Washington on the status of arms + control and disarmament negotiations, we would like to receive the views + of the American side on how to move forward on the following + problems.

+

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated conventional arms transfers.]

+

5. Limiting the Sale and Transfer of Conventional + Weapons.

+

The sides have agreed on the basic directions of the negotiations, and on + some questions one can even detect a convergence of approaches. However, + during the last round the USA sharply changed

+

course in these talks. Without + explanation, the US declined to hold the + previously agreed meeting of heads of delegation on September 25.According to telegram 247872 to Moscow, + September 21, the Department of State postponed the Bartholomew-Mendelevich meeting because it + believed “that it would be inappropriate to have CAT HOD [Head of Delegation] meeting + while Cuban question is unresolved.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + P840142–2418) Reference is to the discovery of the Soviet combat + brigade in Cuba.

+

We would appreciate clarification by the American side of its motives for + its recent conduct with respect to the negotiations, which were begun at + the initiative of the US, as well as its + views regarding further prospects for these negotiations.

+

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated conventional arms transfers.]

+
+ +
+ 316. Editorial Note +

On December 28, 1979, Secretary of State Cyrus Vance submitted a report to the United States + Congress on the progress of comprehensive arms restraints discussions. + “The principal objective” of the talks, he explained, had been “to bring + about reductions in worldwide arms transfers, particularly those that + could worsen regional instabilities or stimulate regional arms races, + introduce new levels of weapons technology into a given region, or prove + susceptible to misuse by terrorists.” The United States and the Soviet + Union, he reported, had held four rounds of talks, and had begun to + draft “common texts” on the need for conventional arms restraint. + However, “the sides were unable to move forward on the important third + part of the framework, regional application of criteria, because they + were unable to agree on candidate regions for restraint.”

+

Vance, nevertheless, said that + the two sides had made “progress” by agreeing that “arms transfers are + an urgent international problem,” had “developed a framework for + addressing arms transfer issues,” and had “begun to develop a common + text of criteria that define the legal principles and the kinds of + transfers that are of critical concern.” While he conceded that “[m]uch + remains to be done in the bilateral talks,” Vance contended that a policy of comprehensive arms + transfer restraint “has and will continue to serve U.S. interests.” + (“Report by Secretary of State Vance to the Congress: Multilateral Discussions on + Conventional Arms Transfer Restraints,” December 28, 1979, Documents on Disarmament, 1979, pp. 828–834)

+ +

In January 1980, the New York Times reported that + anonymous U.S. officials said that “President Carter has instructed ACDA to stop arms control negotiations in + the wake of the Afghanistan invasion.” (Telegram 7624 to all NATO capitals, January 11; National + Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy + File, D800018–0763) However, Department of State Spokesman Hodding + Carter III denied that President Carter had issued a memorandum containing such + instructions. Hodding Carter III also told the Associated Press that + “no dates have been set for resumption of long-stalled talks on limiting + conventional arms transfers, anti-satellite warfare and armaments in + Indian Ocean region.” (Telegram 8435 to the Mission in Geneva, January + 11, 1980; National Archives, RG 59, + Central Foreign Policy File, D800020–0155) Vance, however, told the New York + Times that the Carter + administration should “continue to pursue limits on conventional arms + transfers with understanding that when our friends are placed in + jeopardy by actions or threats that are directed against them, we will + help them and provide them with military assistance. We will continue + that policy.” (Telegram 18290 to Brasilia, January 22; National + Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy + File, D80038–0064)

+

In March 1980, Vance told the + Senate Foreign Relations Committee that while the administration + “remained convinced” that agreements to reduce conventional arms + transfers “can contribute to a safer world, we do not at this time + foresee progress. In the absence of agreed international restraint, we + do not plan to reduce further the ceiling on our own arms transfers.” + (Documents on Disarmament, 1980, pp. 176–179) + Later that evening, the Department of State told the Mission in Geneva + that “mutual disagreements over regional applications prevented the + negotiations from moving forward. There are no plans at present for + another CAT round. Recent events + affecting the stability of key regions and involving US-Soviet interests, including Afghanistan, + have obviously complicated the climate. We intend to monitor the + bilateral atmosphere and regional situations closely, and we hope that + it will eventually be possible to reconvene the CAT talks.” (Telegram 81683 to the Mission in Geneva, March + 27; National Archives, RG 59, Central + Foreign Policy File, D800156–0303)

+
+ +
+ +
+ + Non-Proliferation, Safeguards, and International Nuclear Fuel Cycle + Evaluation + +
+ 317. Presidential Review Memorandum/NSC–15Source: National Archives, RG 383, Records of the Arms Control and Disarmament + Agency, Office of the Director, Subject Files Pertaining to + Presidential Review Memoranda and Directives, MEMCONS with Foreign Officials, and + National Security Decision and Study Memoranda, May 1963–October + 1980, Accession #383–98–0053, Box 1, Presidential Review + Memorandum/NSC–15—Nuclear Non-Proliferation Policy, January–March + 1977. Secret; Exdis. + Washington, January + 21, 1977 + + TO + The Vice President + The Secretary of State + The Secretary of Defense + + + ALSO + The Director, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency + The Administrator, Energy Research and Development + Administration + The Chairman, Nuclear Regulatory Commission + The Director of Central Intelligence + The Assistant to the President for Energy Policy + + + SUBJECT + Nuclear Proliferation + +

The President has directed that the Policy Review Committee, under the + chairmanship of the Department of State, undertake a thorough review of + U.S. policy concerning nuclear proliferation. The review should develop + policy options for the United States—both near and long term—for + achieving its non-proliferation goals. The review should:

+

1. Assess the current status of U.S. nuclear fuel assurance policies, + reprocessing policy including alternatives to reprocessing, and + possibilities for the handling and disposal of nuclear wastes.

+ +

2. Review the decisions announced by President Ford in the statement of October + 28,Ford stated on October 28 that in order to reduce + the proliferation of nuclear materials, the “reprocessing and + recycling of plutonium should not proceed, unless there is a sound + reason to conclude that the world community can effectively overcome + the associated risks of proliferation.” He promised that the United + States would “greatly accelerate its diplomatic initiatives, in + conjunction with nuclear supplier and consumer nations, to control + the spread of plutonium and technologies for separating plutonium” + and align its domestic and international positions by working + “closely with other nations.” He concluded by calling for “all + nations to recognize that their individual and collective interests + are best served by internationally assured and safeguarded nuclear + fuel supply, services, and storage” and to end their pursuit of + “nuclear capabilities which are of doubtful economic value and have + ominous implications for nuclear proliferation and instability in + the world.” (Public Papers: Ford, 1976–77, pp. + 2763–2778) and identify the policy options required to + implement those decisions.

+

3. Provide a review of the current status of major ongoing negotiations + with and among foreign nations concerning proliferation.

+

4. Assess options for formal and informal international coordination of + incentives, controls and sanctions throughout the nuclear fuel cycle in + order to limit nuclear proliferation.

+

5. Analyze the strengths and liabilities of bilateral negotiations, the + London Suppliers Group,The London Suppliers + Group, or the Nuclear Supplier Group, founded in 1974 after India’s + successful nuclear test, included the United States, the Soviet + Union, the United Kingdom, Canada, the Federal Republic of Germany, + France, and Japan. It met several times from 1974 to 1977 to set + guidelines for the export of nuclear material to states that did not + possess nuclear weapons. and the IAEA, as institutions for implementing U.S. + non-proliferation goals.

+

6. Identify current U.S. nuclear export requirements, and examine what + new requirements might be applied to current and future export + agreements, and what measures must be taken to insure U.S. credibility + as a nuclear supplier state.

+

7. Review current estimates of energy demand outside the United States, + and assess the potential of non-nuclear alternatives to meet those + needs.

+

8. Review congressional initiatives and suggest strategies for + coordination of executive and legislative branch policies concerning + nuclear export and non-proliferation.

+

The review should be completed by February 28, 1977.

+ + Zbigniew + Brzezinski + +
+ +
+ + 318. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in + BelgiumSource: National + Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign + Policy File, P840084-0745. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Also sent immediate to Bonn. + Drafted by Jerome Kahan (S/P); + cleared by Louis Nosenzo (PM), + Edward McGaffigan (T), Charles Van Doren (ACDA), and Peter Sebastian (S/S); and approved by Bartholomew (S/P). + Washington, January 24, 1977, 1530Z +

15111. Tovip 3. Subject: Sensitive Nuclear Exports and NPT.

+

Vice Presidential party, eyes only for Aaron

+

1. Per request transmitted by Hyland,Not found. + following is State Department evaluation of impact of NPT on sensitive nuclear exports. Text of + treaty is being made available to party. As party aware, FRG Under Secretary Hermes in discussions with Secretary + VanceNo record of a meeting between Vance and Hermes was found. According to the + German documentary record, Hermes visited Washington and delivered a Non-Paper + on non-proliferation to Mondale on January 16. See Akten + zur Auswärtigen Politk der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, + 1977, Part One, p. 16. The Non-Paper was not found. + cited alleged inconsistencies between US + statements during NPT negotiations and + US position now on sensitive + transfers. As overall observation, Department would note the potential + pitfalls of allowing FRG officials to + engage party in narrow, legalistic debate over interpretation of NPTThe Treaty + on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons or Non-Proliferation + Treaty (NPT) was signed on July 1, + 1968 by 56 nations, including the United States, the United Kingdom, + and the Soviet Union. The U.S. Senate ratified the Treaty on March + 13, 1969, and it entered into force on March 5, 1970. See Document 250 in Foreign + Relations, 1964–1968, vol. XI, Arms Control and + Disarmament. in context of discussion of US policy on sensitive nuclear + transfers.

+

2. The basic objective of NPT is to + prevent the further spread of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive + devices without impeding the development, production and use of nuclear + energy for peaceful purposes. Consistent with this objective, the treaty + requires all parties, when acting as suppliers, to ensure that transfers + of nuclear material and equipment are subject to IAEA safeguards. Article I obligates + nuclear-weapon states party to the treaty “not in any way to assist, + encourage, or induce any non-nuclear-weapons state to manufacture or + otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other explosive devices.” Article + II obligates non-nuclear weapons states party to the treaty not to + acquire nuclear weapons or explosives from any source.

+

3. At the same time, Article IV states that nothing in the treaty “shall + be interpreted as affecting the inalienable right of all parties to the + treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for + peaceful purposes without discrimination and in conformity with Articles I and II of this + treaty.” Article IV also calls for all parties to facilitate and + participate in the “fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials, + and scientific and technological information for the peaceful uses of + nuclear energy.” Special attention was to be given to the needs of + developing countries.

+

4. Starting in 1972 the US adopted a + national policy of imposing special restraints and review procedures + over requests for so-called sensitive nuclear exports, i.e., equipment + and technology related to uranium enrichment, plutonium reprocessing, + and heavy water production. In practice, this policy resulted in an + embargo on such exports from the US. + When the London Suppliers Group convened in 1975, the US sought to persuade other major suppliers + to adopt a parallel policy on these exports. However, in the agreed + guidelines, we were only able to obtain multilateral consensus for + restraint in, but not an embargo on, sensitive transfers. If such + transfers are to be made, the guidelines call for improved safeguards + over such transfers going beyond NPT + requirements (e.g., safeguards triggered by technology in addition to + equipment and material). We have subsequently called for a three-year + moratorium on such exports.

+

5. While the US approach to sensitive + transfers has been supported by most if not all key suppliers, some + suppliers and recipients have criticized this policy as incompatible + with Article IV of the NPT. These + nations argue that the NPT places an + explicit responsibility on supplier states party to the treaty to make + any and all types of peaceful nuclear assistance available to recipients + party to the treaty, as long as the materials and facilities are under + safeguards. To strengthen this position, these nations cite US assurances and statements to this effect + issued during the treaty negotiations. For example, citations from some + of these US statements appear in the + FRG “Non-Paper” transmitted by + Hermes to Secretary Vance at their recent meeting (we + understand that Assistant Secretary Hartman is carrying this paper).

+

6. The US position in response to these + criticisms rests on the following points:

+

A. We do not believe that safeguards necessarily provide an adequate + basis for transfering all nuclear items, while supporting the overriding + non-proliferation objective of the NPT. + Transfers of sensitive equipment and technologies can lead to the direct + availability of strategic quantities of weapons-usable material (notably + plutonium but also highly-enriched uranium) in non-nuclear weapons + states. It is presently uncertain whether safeguards could be devised + and implemented to provide timely detection of diversion of these + materials. Moreover, if safeguards were to be terminated or abrogated, + the recipient could then rapidly utilize the materials and facilities in + order to acquire nuclear explosives capacity.

+ +

B. Regarding the meaning of Article IV of the NPT, we would note that the rights under this article apply + only to NPT parties, and not to + non-parties, (such as Brazil and Pakistan). Moreover, this provision was + not intended to create any new “inalienable right” for NPT parties. It simply states that nothing + in the treaty should be interpreted to affect the rights that would have + existed in the absence of the treaty, and goes on to point out that any + exercise of such rights must be “in conformity with Article I and II of + this treaty.” Furthermore, the Article IV language calling for the + “fullest possible exchange” of nuclear assistance among parties must + also be viewed in the light of the basic NPT objectives as reflected in Articles I and II. In any + case, our policies on sensitive nuclear exports are not predicated on + any interpretation of the NPT; they are + supplemental measures based on our interest in taking all appropriate + steps to avert the further proliferation of nuclear explosives + capability as technological developments increase the risks of such + proliferation.

+

C. We currently see little or no economic justification for acquisition + of enrichment and reprocessing facilities by non-nuclear weapons states + outside the OECD area. In our view, the overall intent of Article IV is + to ensure that parties in a position to do so will help other parties to + enjoy the benefits of nuclear power for peaceful purposes. This does + not, however, oblige them to make transfers that are not economically + justified in the recipient country, especially where such transfers + might also incur increased risks of proliferation. Rather, the US believes that the spirit and letter of + Article IV can and should be met by the provision of non-sensitive fuel + supplies and fuel cycle services from supplier states, since this can be + more economic than small-scale fuel cycle plants and would significantly + reduce proliferation risks. We are, of course, interested in exploring + other alternatives, when justified, such as regional, multinational fuel + cycle centers.

+

D. As a nuclear-weapons state, the US + sees an overriding obligation in Article I of the NPT not to “in any way” assist non-nuclear + weapons states to manufacture or acquire nuclear explosives. We believe + that sensitive transfers, without economic justification and before we + have had an opportunity to explore alternatives, could contravene these + obligations. We further believe that non-nuclear weapons states party to + the treaty, when supplying nuclear assistance, should feel bound to act + in accordance with the intent of Article I, since it reflects the + essential non-proliferation thrust of the NPT.

+

7. FYI. While FRG concerns are focused primarily on their agreement with + Brazil,The Carter administration criticized the Federal + Republic of Germany’s 1975 sale of a nuclear reactor and plutonium + technology to Brazil. For more on this see Documents 397, 398, 399, 400, 401, 402, 403, 404, 405, and 406. they also are very concerned with the + implications of US non-proliferation + policy for their own development of sensitive technology. Discussions of + such implications are best avoided at this point. If pressed, we + recommend line that USG is currently + developing a program to evaluate risks and alternatives associated with + back-end fuel cycle activities, has reached no RPT no conclusions + regarding same, and we expect + early and full discussions with FRG as + US evaluation activities progress. + Similar considerations apply in the case of Japan.

+

8. If issue of amending NPT arises in + connection with discussions of US export + policy, Department suggests that US + position strongly opposing this approach as impracticable, undesirable, + and unnecessary be reaffirmed. Such an approach would be impracticable, + since it would involve reconsideration of NPT by almost 100 legislatures. It would also seriously + endanger future viability of treaty by raising devisive questions and + risking weakening of the NPT. This is + why we and others strongly resisted all moves at NPT review conference to amend treaty. + Further, we believe that policies US + have proposed in context of nuclear suppliers discussions are + supplementary to, and not in conflict with, the NPT. End FYI.

+ + Vance + +
+ +
+ 319. Backchannel Message From Vice President Mondale to the President’s Assistant + for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, + Box 7, Backchannel Messages: Europe: 1–6/77. Secret; Eyes Only; + Sensitive. + Bonn, January 25, 1977, 1139Z +

590. Subject: My First Day of Meetings in Europe

+

As I mentioned on the phone,A record of this + conversation was not found. my first day of meetings went + well and received an enthusiastic response. In the morning, I spoke to + Prime Minister Tindemans of + Belgium, the NATO Council, NATO Secretary General Luns and General Haig. In the afternoon I had indepth + discussions with European Commission President Roy Jenkins and the other + Commissioners, as well as Dutch Foreign Minister Van der Stoel. On your authority I + released my NATO statement, and I also + held a press conference.Documents on + Mondale’s meetings with + the NATO leaders and his statement + are scheduled to be printed in Foreign Relations, 1977–1980, vol. XXVII, + Western Europe.

+

The highlights of my conversations are as follows:

+

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to non-proliferation.]

+ +

—Non-proliferation: The Dutch Foreign Minister came to Brussels primarily + to discuss non-proliferation. The Netherlands is a partner in a + consortium with the United Kingdom and West Germany to produce enriched + uranium through their own ultracentrifuge process. The Germans want to + sell some of this uranium to the Brazilians for use in the reactors + provided under the West German-Brazilian nuclear deal.See Documents 397, 398, 399, 400, 401, 402, 403, 404, 405, and + 406. The Dutch are considering + vetoing this fuel sale, because they want no part of the West + German-Brazilian deal to transfer sensitive reprocessing and enrichment + technology, however, they are concerned over West German threats to pull + out of the consortium if the Dutch veto the sale and are disturbed at + the profound political confrontation that might ensue. They therefore + were probing for U.S. support. In this connection, they urged the U.S. + to adopt the Canadian position on international safeguards (no sale of + nuclear fuel unless the purchasing company has all of its nuclear + facilities under safeguards).

+

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to non-proliferation.]

+
+ +
+ + 320. Memorandum of ConversationSource: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, + Brzezinski Material, VIP + Visit File, Box 8, Japan: Prime Minister Fukuda, 3/21–22/77, Briefing Book [II], Folder 6. + Secret. Drafted by Sherman. The meeting took place in the Prime + Minister’s Office. The memoranda of conversation is scheduled to be + printed in full in Foreign Relations, 1977–1980, vol. XIV, Korea; + Japan. + Tokyo, February 1, + 1977 + + SUBJECT + Vice President Mondale—Prime Minister Fukuda Conversation II + + + PARTICIPANTS + Japan + Takeo Fukuda, Prime + Minister + Iichiro Hatoyama, Foreign Minister + Sunao Sunoda, Chief Cabinet Secretary + Fumihiko Togo, Japanese Ambassador + Bunroku Yoshino, Deputy Vice Minister + Toshio Yamazaki, Director General, American Bureau + Hisashi Owada, Private Secretary to the Prime Minister + Ryuchiro Yamazaki, Interpreter + United States + The Vice President + Richard Holbrooke, Assistant Secretary, Bureau of East Asian and + Pacific Affairs + C. Fred Bergsten, Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for + International Affairs + Thomas P. Shoesmith, Minister + Michael Armacost, NSC Senior + Staff + William C. Sherman, Director for Japanese Affairs + James Wickel, Interpreter + +

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to non-proliferation.]

+

The Vice President said that there were several points he wished to make: + First, with respect to nuclear proliferation, he + said the US had pressed both Germany and + France to exercise great circumspection with respect to their sales of + sensitive materials and technologies to such countries as Pakistan and + Brazil. Reprocessing facilities which could produce weapons grade + material are simply bomb factories. The question is one in which the + President has a great personal concern. We understand Japan’s concern + for assured supplies of fuel for nuclear power plants. We are also + grateful for Japanese ratification of the NPT. The US hopes to + continue discussions with the GOJ about + the aspects of the problem which may be of concern to Japan. We want to + cooperate to keep the problem under control.

+

The Vice President continued, saying that he understood the GOJ was interested in sending a team to + discuss Japanese views with US experts in Washington. He said we + would be happy to welcome such a visit and to begin talking in a + confidential way about this very complex problem.

+

The Prime Minister said that he hoped the Vice President understood the + sensitivity of Japanese feelings about nuclear matters. The Japanese + cities had been destroyed by nuclear weapons, and Japan was fully in + accord with US concerns over + proliferation dangers. The question of peaceful use was quite different. + Japan was by tradition and by basic governmental and Diet policy firmly + opposed to any military use, production or possession of nuclear + weapons. However, its total lack of energy resources made it essential + to consider the development of nuclear power for peaceful purposes. He + said the Japanese would welcome the opportunity to send a group to + discuss the subject in Washington.

+

The Vice President said that we would be happy to work out arrangements + on his return to Washington.

+

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to non-proliferation.]

+
+ +
+ 321. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in + FranceSource: National + Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign + Policy File, P850056–1667. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Drafted by John Kalicki + (S/P); cleared by James + Lowenstein (EUR), Terence Todman (ARA), Alfred Atherton (NEA), Gelb (PM), Denis Lamb (D), Tarnoff (S), Lake (S/P), Donald + Tice (P), Leo Reddy (S/S), and + Edward McGaffigan (T); and approved by Christopher (D). + Washington, February 3, 1977, 0147Z +

24240. Subject: Letter to Foreign Minister. Ref: Paris 3187.Telegram 3187 from Paris, February 11, reported + that Pakistani Chargé Iqbal Riza had said that regarding nuclear + proliferation, “the principal problem arose because it was + difficult, because of nationalistic sensitivities, for Bhutto to indicate any change in + the GOP position on the contract + for the French nuclear processing plant before the elections.” + (National Archives, RG 59, Central + Foreign Policy File, D770036–0102) The Pakistani elections were + scheduled for March 7.

+

1. Please deliver the following letter from Secretary Vance to de Guiringaud.

+

2. Begin text: Dear Mr. Foreign Minister: I am sure you are aware of the + high importance we attach to the avoidance of nuclear proliferation. I + wish to confirm personally to you that I share my predecessor’s sense of the importance of our + increasing cooperation in the non-proliferation field, as conveyed in + his last letter to you before leaving office.Kissinger’s + January 17, 1977 letter to de + Guiringaud is printed in Foreign + Relations, 1969–1976, vol. E–15, Part 2, Documents on + Western Europe, 1973–1976, Document 343. We look + forward to continuing our nuclear policy consultations later this month, + as we indicated to your ambassador, so as to further align our nuclear + policies. Presently we are in the process of reviewing US policy and, in this regard, I would + expect to confirm the continuity of the basic policy directions + announced in the October 28th Presidential statement.See footnote 2, Document + 317.

+

In the meantime, we have decided to move into official channels in the + contacts regarding sensitive nuclear projects in Brazil, about which we + have kept you informed. I anticipate high-level consultations with both + parties beginning next week, following up FRG State Secretary Hermes’ visit to Washington and Vice President Mondale’s trip, and we would look + forward to discussing with you any progress as soon as possible + thereafter. This would afford us an opportunity to exchange further + views on the approach most likely to forestall enrichment and + reprocessing in Brazil, taking into account the important principles of + assured nuclear fuel supply and no commercial disadvantage raised with + you by Mr. Kissinger and pursued + by US with the FRG.

+

As you know, President Carter + attaches the highest importance to removing nuclear proliferation risks + in both Brazil and Pakistan, as well as worldwide. I am encouraged by + the progress we have made with Prime Minister Bhutto and reported to you.See Foreign Relations, 1977–1980, vol. XIX, South + Asia. I also believe that the formula of a joint + decision by France and Pakistan to indefinitely defer Pakistan’s + reprocessing plant, and substitution of French reactors, fuel and + perhaps a fuel fabrication plant, will facilitate a successful solution + of this problem.

+

In view of the forthcoming Pakistani elections I am indicating to Prime + Minister Bhutto that we might + resume negotiations in March, unless he prefers to open these earlier. + In the interim, however, we are making clear to him the seriousness and + depth of our desire that he forego his reprocessing plans, and this + period will also give you and me time to exchange views on the most + desirable negotiating package from our respective standpoints. I would + therefore welcome any further thoughts you can convey to me as to how + best to proceed.

+

I greatly look forward to working with you in my new capacity, and to + contributing to a deepening of the important relationship between our + two countries. Sincerely: Cyrus R. + Vance: End text.

+ +

3. In delivering letter, please confirm that we would anticipate specific + exchange on sensitive nuclear issues with France prior to more general + consultations later this month, although latter would not exclude + further informal discussion of sensitive issues, if desired. You should + also seek GOF confirmation that it does + not plan to transfer any reprocessing technology or equipment to + Pakistan pending further consultations with US, in conformity with understanding previously reached + between former Secretary Kissinger and de + Guiringaud at their December 10 meeting in Brussels.See Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, vol. E–15, + Part 2, Documents on Western Europe, 1973–1976, Document + 342.

+ + Vance + +
+ +
+ 322. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security + Affairs (Brzezinski) to President + CarterSource: Carter Library, National + Security Affairs, Staff Material, Global Issues, Oplinger/Bloomfield File, Box 42, + Proliferation: Clinch River Breeder Reactor, 2/77–9/79. + Confidential. Sent for information. At the top of the memorandum, an + unknown hand wrote “NOTE: Delivered to the Pres. Via Rich Hutcheson [illegible.]” + Washington, February 16, 1977 + + SUBJECT + Funding for the Clinch River Reactor + +

I understand that you have spoken with Jim + Schlesinger and are considering approving the ERDA request for Clinch River funding. + I feel that you should know that such a course + could have extremely serious effects on the success of your + non-proliferation efforts in the critical next six months.

+

We are asking other nations to make profound changes in their own energy + plans because of our concern with the proliferation risks of the global + trend toward a plutonium economy. The only way in which we can + demonstrate our willingness to share in the sacrifices we are asking of + others is by clearly slowing down our breeder program and that we no + longer look upon it as the centerpiece of our energy strategy. This is + entirely consistent with your campaign statements to “minimize our + efforts in the breeder field.”

+ +

It is for these reasons that I—as well as the Department of State, ACDA, + the CEQ and the Domestic + Council—strongly recommend that you either zero out the Clinch + River budget item or make a much more meaningful cut in the program than + ERDA contemplates. The funding + level they have recommended in no way slows the heart of the Clinch + River program and in fact entails a $41 million increase in spending over FY + ’77. I submit that this will not be seen as a serious + action on our part by the Germans, the French, the Brazilians, the + Pakistanis or the Japanese.

+

At the same time, the course of action I am advocating does not require + any concrete sacrifice in our domestic energy situation. If either + PRM–15See Document 317. or the breeder + program reviewSee Document 337. indicate that the Clinch River + Reactor is not inimical to our efforts in the proliferation field or is + essential to our domestic energy needs (both extremely unlikely), then a + budget supplemental can be sent to Congress in + plenty of time for action before the beginning of the new fiscal + year, with no interruption in the program.

+

At your request I will be forwarding to you first thing tomorrow, a paper + on what we can do in regard to international restraints with the hope of + getting other nations to join in our efforts. By far + the most potent option available to us is exactly this one: to + clearly tell the rest of the world that we consider the dangers of + proliferation seriously enough to halt for the time being our own + progress toward commercialization of the breeder by stopping or + dramatically slowing the first big step—further work on the Clinch + River Reactor.In his memoirs, + Carter wrote “My first + veto” of a congressional bill was a “$6 billion authorization bill + for energy research,” including “$80 million for commencing + construction of a nuclear breeder reactor on the Clinch River near + Oak Ridge, Tennessee. Because it was enormously expensive and + unnecessary, and would open up a new and dangerous plutonium + industry in our country, I was determined to prevent construction of + this prototype plant.” (Carter, Keeping Faith, pp. + 101–102)

+
+ +
+ + 323. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security + Affairs (Brzezinski) to President + CarterSource: Carter Library, National + Security Council, Institutional Files, Box 60, PRC 007, 3/16/77, Nuclear + Proliferation. Confidential. Sent for information. Carter initialed the upper + right-hand corner of the memorandum and the margin beside each + paragraph after “Preliminary options” with a “C”. + Washington, February 17, 1977 + + SUBJECT + Nuclear Proliferation + +

This is a quick response to your request of February 16 regarding + possible U.S. initiatives designed to develop “international restraints” + in order to slow nuclear proliferation.Not + found. As you know, we have a PRM in process to develop “options for formal and informal + international coordination of incentives, controls and sanctions + throughout the nuclear fuel cycle in order to limit nuclear + proliferation.” The PRM response will + be submitted by February 28th.

+

The following list of possible U.S. actions does not therefore attempt to + provide a thorough analysis of each, but rather sets forth some of the + major options being considered in the PRM. Many of these options entail considerable sacrifices + on the part of other nations which originally adopted the + once-conventional U.S. wisdom regarding long-range energy plans. We will + now be asking them to reconsider these plans at considerable cost in + dollars or national pride or both. Accordingly, there are certain + domestic actions which may have to be taken to make any or all of the + above steps credible or saleable to other nations.

+

First, we should try to demonstrate that we no longer view the breeder + reactor (at least in its current design) as the centerpiece of our + energy strategy by sending an unequivocal signal that we are not + proceeding with its commercialization—specifically with the Clinch River + demonstration project. Secondly, we might even have to consider + suspending completion of the Barnwell reprocessing plantA private-sector company began construction of a + commercial nuclear reprocessing plant in Barnwell, SC in 1970. until we have + completed our own thorough investigation of all possible alternatives to + reprocessing.In the right-hand margin + next to this paragraph, Carter wrote “ok but not cancel + outright.”

+ +

Preliminary options:

+

1. A call by the U.S. or jointly by the Suppliers + Group, for a three-year moratorium on sensitive transfers while + we search for other ways to meet legitimate nuclear energy fuel cycle + needs. The term “sensitive transfers” refers to enrichment facilities, + reprocessing facilities, and highly enriched, weapons grade uranium + (HEU).

+

2. Further investigate the possibility of a few + multinational fuel cycle centers which would provide regional + enrichment and reprocessing capacity. This option would only be + attractive if a study reveals that there exist suitable sites for such + an operation, and that multilateral management and control arrangements + could be worked out that would guarantee adequate safeguarding.

+

3. Fuel assurances provided either unilaterally or, + much more attractively, multilaterally. In either case, this + policy would demand that we expand current U.S. enrichment capacity so + that we can guarantee the supply of low-enriched fuel. Longer term + possibilities might include some form of international “bank” managed by + the IAEA which would ensure + non-discriminatory access by all nations to an international pool of + SWU’s (the measure of enrichment capacity).

+

4. As an alternative to reprocessing, the creation of a + multinational spent fuel-plutonium storage regime. Under such a + policy, reprocessing would be either ruled out or indefinitely deferred + in favor of a “once through” fuel cycle in which used fuel rods are not + reprocessed but rather stored for an indefinite period of time.

+

5. Renegotiation of existing agreements for + cooperation. Under this policy, the United States would attempt + to renegotiate its existing agreements for cooperation to include + stricter safeguard criteria. One possibility would require recipient + nations to agree to full scope safeguards under which all of their + nuclear facilities—regardless of where they came from—would be subject + to IAEA safeguards. Not only are there + severe legal barriers to renegotiating existing agreements, but this + effort would meet very stiff political resistance from key nations such + as Yugoslavia, Israel, and many others. Canada is encountering serious + difficulties in its effort along these lines (PDB, February 17).

+

6. A legislative or regulatory finding that + reprocessing plants are inherently unsafeguardable (there are + several such Bills on the Hill). This would mean that in + exporting nuclear fuel the U.S. would have to require that it not be + reprocessed, or be returned to a nuclear weapons state for reprocessing. + This would raise immediate problems with the Japanese (among others) who + have a reprocessing plant in the final testing stages and need our + permission to begin reprocessing U.S.-supplied fuel.

+

7. Expansion of U.S. cooperation in developing + non-nuclear energy resources. The United States’ abundant + (relatively speaking) domestic supply of energy makes many other nations highly suspicious of our + efforts to limit proliferation. Thus, a long-term effort in this area + will probably have to include a substantial commitment by the United + States to help other nations develop alternative—perhaps in some cases + non-electrified—energy programs. This would be costly.

+

8. U.S. or joint efforts to research and develop + alternative reactor designs. There is a likelihood that “second + generation” nuclear fuel cycles can be developed that are inherently + much more proliferation resistant than the uranium-plutonium fuel cycle. + One possibility that has attracted increasing attention is a thorium + cycle which uses denatured Uranium-233 as fuel.Underneath this paragraph, Carter drew an arrow and wrote + “Thorium breeder to go critical at Shippingport [Pa] this + fall—J.”

+

9. A substantially strengthened IAEA endowed with the power to impose + stiff sanctions for any violations of safeguard agreements. + This would require a major political effort to obtain the needed + consensus, especially among the nuclear club members.Underneath this paragraph, Carter wrote “I look forward to + the 2/28 recommendations.”

+
+ +
+ + 324. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in + FranceSource: National + Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign + Policy File, P850056–2027. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Sent for information + Immediate to Bonn, Brasilia, and Islamabad. Drafted by John Adsens + (EUR/RPE) and Oplinger + (PM/NPO); cleared by Nye, + John Kalicki (S/P), Denis Lamb (D), + Louis Nosenzo (OES/NET), Charles Van Doren (ACDA), Edgar Beigel (EUR/WE), and + Peter Bridges (S/S); and approved by + James Lowenstein (EUR). + Washington, February 25, 1977, + 0023Z +

42053. Subject: U.S.-French Nuclear Policy Review. Ref: Paris 4591,Telegram 4591 from Paris, February 25, + reported that France “is committed to nuclear electrical power and + needs to export” and “breeder reactors are considered essential and + their export will be strongly pursued.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + D770053–0997) Paris 4693.Telegram 4693 from Paris, February 16, reported that the French + Government seemed to believe that “some form of international + agreement is necessary for providing necessary fuel cycle services + to nuclear reactor customers to eliminate any quasi-economically + justified transfer technology.” Furthermore, the French believed + that “breeder reactors are a necessary thing of the future and their + success will depend in part on a successful international + arrangement for coping with nonproliferation.” (National Archives, + RG 59, Central Foreign Policy + File, D770055–0515)

+

1. U.S.-French talks on nuclear non-proliferation policy on February + 19–20 included thorough and informal exchange of views on major + non-proliferation issues and opportunity consult on sensitive nuclear + projects in Brazil and Pakistan. Atmosphere of talks was very open and + constructive.

+

2. A. Policy toward sensitive nuclear transfers—both sides agreed that it + essential to avoid states backing into nuclear weapons capability due to + spread of sensitive technology and materials. U.S. suggested that next + step is to gain time to permit evaluation of further controls and + possible bilateral and multilateral incentives which could include + assured fuel supply, spent-fuel storage, exploration of alternative + nuclear technologies. French suggested that offer of fuel cycle services + on economic basis could help to compensate for denial of technology, + were receptive to concept of multilateralizing such services, and + offered to consider how to effect this. They stressed that it is + important that suppliers of fuel services not be seen as a bloc opposed + to technological cooperation, and that if a country chooses to develop + indigenously an independent nuclear fuel cycle capability, it is not + French policy to prohibit them from doing so.

+

B. Fuel assurances—U.S. stressed that we do not propose new regime + resulting in commercial disadvantage for any supplier. Fuel assurances + would maximize economic disincentive for go-it-alone programs: such assurances could include + earmarked stocks, equity investment in supplier facilities, and possible + fuel fund under international control. While not absolute guarantee, + three-tiered program of bilateral, multilateral and international fund + assurances could minimize political interference with fuel supply and as + noted provide economic incentive to forego sensitive transfers. French + expressed some reservations about fuel bank concept but agreed fuel + assurances necessary part of supplier package.

+

C. Full scope safeguards—U.S. indicated that we have not yet reached + decision on requiring safeguards on all nuclear facilities as a + condition of any nuclear cooperation; concept has advantages in that it + would appear to accomplish NPT + objective to get binding legal commitment not to acquire nuclear + explosives: such a policy would also minimize nuclear transfers in + absence of safeguards and would remove present anomaly of non-parties to + NPT subject to less stringent + safeguards than NPT parties. French + continue to have problem with this approach, believe it inappropriate to + use French supply leverage to prohibit indigenous nuclear programs + (following French route to independent capacity) that it would be seen + as being imposed on others by suppliers and thus increase mistrust and + increase risks of independent national efforts. However, French + expressed interest in U.S. suggestion of possible compromise formula + that would require the recipient country to accept safeguards on all + existing facilities and subsequent materials produced in these + facilities. Country would make no commitment not to acquire + unsafeguarded facilities but it understood that to do so would result in + termination of supply. It would also agree to notify supplier in advance + of such a move. While states not to be required to put existing + unsafeguarded materials under safeguards, it understood that any test of + nuclear device would also result in supply termination. Both French and + U.S. sides agreed to look further at question of how far safeguards + issue can profitably be pursued at next suppliers meeting.

+

D. Suppliers group expansion—utility of group at present fourteen members + not yet evaluated; further expansion to be approached with caution, but + not ruled out. We more than French see value in continuing meetings as + forum for harmonization of nuclear policies, and as framework for + continued close consultations among key members.

+

E. Guidelines publication—some merit in publication of guidelines which + widely known to exist; however, publication crystalizes a situation + which still essentially fluid. Publication also forces developing + countries to accept publicly criteria for cooperation which could lessen + flexibility in some cases.

+

F. Reprocessing policy—U.S. indicated we exploring number of + alternatives: one possibility would be general international consensus + to observe halt on further + spread of national facilities during which there would be multinational + evaluation of safeguard techniques, alternative means of exploiting + spent fuel, and alternative reactor technologies. During this pause, it + might be recognized that some reprocessing desirable to meet genuine + needs on storage and environmental grounds to dispose of spent fuel; + this could be met by use of existing reprocessing facilities, provided + that recovered plutonium not returned to NNWS. French emphasized strong domestic commitment to + reprocessing and breeder programs and proposed to perform reprocessing + services for U.S. customers without return of plutonium. It was agreed + we would explore those possibilities further in subsequent + exchanges.

+

G. Sanctions—U.S. discussed number of possibilities for + publicly-expressed sanctions policies by suppliers. French indicated + reluctance to go beyond present policy that violation of agreements with + France would automatically imply (unspecified) sanctions. In other + cases, French indicated readiness to discuss in London means for + strengthening IAEA mechanism for + application of sanctions as appeared under Article XII of statute.

+

3. We learned in course of discussions of sensitive issues on margins of + talks that:

+

—GOF has told FRG it will not seek commercial advantage in Brazil if + enrichment and reprocessing are deferred; GOF will respect reactor commitment at least for next 10–15 + years and prepared to back up FRG fuel + supply.

+

—French told us we could inform Brazilians in course of talks next week + that GOF will not seek commercial + advantage and is prepared back up fuel supply as in return for deferral + of sensitive transfers.

+

—French will defer sensitive transfer now pending to Pakistan for at + least three more weeks to give us time to persuade GOP to accept joint agreement on + indefinite deferral.

+ + Vance + +
+ +
+ + 325. Study Prepared by the Ad Hoc Interagency Group on Nuclear + ProliferationSource: + National Archives, RG 383, Records + of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Office of the Director, + Subject Files Pertaining to Presidential Review Memoranda and + Directives, MEMCONS with Foreign + Officials, and National Security Decision and Study Memoranda, May + 1963–October 1980, Accession #383–98–0053, Box 1, Presidential + Review Memorandum/NSC–15—Nuclear + Non-Proliferation Policy, January–March 1977. + Confidential. + Washington, March + 9, 1977 +

This report has been prepared in response to PRM–15See Document 317. in which the President has requested + recommendations on how the United States should proceed in its efforts + to deter the spread of nuclear weapons. The material which follows + includes an introductory section setting out the background, broad + policy considerations, and principal issues that the current study is + designed to address. This is followed by a series of sections outlining + optional and recommended courses of action in the primary areas of + current concern.Detailed analyses of these + issues and options were prepared as a basis for this report and are + available. [Footnote is in the original.]

+

[Omitted here is the table of contents.]

+

I. INTRODUCTION

+

A. BACKGROUND

+

For over twenty years the United States has been firmly committed to + preventing the spread of nuclear weapons. The President has pledged that + this Administration would, as a matter of priority, intensify US efforts. The proliferation of nuclear + explosive capabilities to an increasing number of countries threatens to + reduce our ability to control international events and manage crises, + expose our nation to new risks, have a dissolvent effect on our + alliances, and enhance the prospect of terrorist nuclear attacks. Our + objective is to prevent this proliferation.

+

A successful non-proliferation policy requires attention both to the + political and security motivations that lead states to acquire explosive + devices and to the technical capabilities that make it possible for a + state to develop nuclear explosives with little timely warning. Avoiding + proliferation ultimately will depend to a large extent on how successful + we are in reducing motivations to acquire nuclear weapons capability. + These motivations are complex and are not amenable to short-term + solutions. They reflect political evaluations of national security + interests, of the strength and + durability of alliances, the reliability of security guarantees, and + perceptions that nuclear weapons status or near-status is prestigious + and carries significant political rewards.

+

To successfully meet these concerns over the long-term, steps must be + taken to enhance the credibility of existing security guarantees. We + also need to make progress in achieving meaningful and verifiable arms + control agreements that reduce nuclear weapon force levels and limit or + prohibit nuclear testing; in establishing nuclear-free zones; in + strengthening alliances; and in devaluing the prestige identified with + nuclear weapon capability. This report, while sensitive to the + importance over the long-term of reducing political and security + motivations to acquire nuclear weapons, focuses on the more immediate + problem of containing technical capabilities.

+

The problems addressed in this report arise from the nature of nuclear + technology itself. The nuclear fuel cycle begins with mining of natural + uranium. The amount of fissile material in natural uranium—the isotope + U–235—must be increased to produce fuel for US-type nuclear power reactors (enrichment). Fuel + assemblies are fabricated from the enriched uranium and burned in a + reactor. The resultant spent fuel is stored temporarily at the reactor + site.

+

After burning in a reactor, nuclear fuel contains a mixture of plutonium, + slightly enriched uranium, and radioactive waste products. This spent fuel must be cooled for several months at + the reactor site.

+

After cooling, spent fuel can be transported to more permanent storage. + However, it has been assumed that spent fuel would be reprocessed to recover the plutonium and uranium, which would + be recycled into new fuel (mixed-oxide or breeder + fuel), thus reducing the amount of fresh enriched uranium required. The + radioactive wastes separated during reprocessing would be prepared for + permanent disposal.

+

The current problem is that many states are developing or have plans to + develop full fuel cycle capabilities, that is, not only power reactors, + but also reprocessing facilities and, in some cases, enrichment + facilities that produce or are capable of producing weapons-usable + material.

+

We are particularly concerned that the spread of enrichment and + reprocessing facilities will bring these states close to the nuclear + weapon threshold, making it easier to decide to acquire weapons in the + future and reducing the time that diplomacy has available to counter + moves toward proliferation. Motivations respond rapidly to changing + political and security perceptions. If motivations coincide with a + capability to produce nuclear explosive devices, further proliferation + will almost certainly result. However, the technical capabilities which + states have to acquire or produce weapons are amenable to more immediate + controls than are motivations. Our efforts in the first instance must, + therefore, focus on averting the further spread under national + control of facilities and materials capable of use for weapons + purposes and on strengthening safeguards and other controls over all + peaceful nuclear activities.

+

Our non-proliferation policy must also take account of the legitimate + role nuclear power can play in contributing to world energy needs and, + specifically, in reducing reliance on costly and uncertain sources of + oil. Non-proliferation and energy cooperation objectives need not + conflict: even if national access to weapons-usable material is limited, + supplies of non-sensitive fuels and reactors can continue; conversely + failure to contain proliferation risks will not only seriously reduce + world security but will also result ultimately in serious setbacks to, + if not curtailment of, the continued application of peaceful nuclear + power.

+

The US has had a long-term interest in + assuring that nuclear power should be available, but only under the most + rigorous safeguards, and that the growth and direction of the industry + should not outpace progress in forging the necessary protective + constraints and institutions. To this end, important protective + arrangements were developed over the past two decades including + bilateral constraints and controls, IAEA safeguards, and the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).

+

Since the Indian test of 1974,See Foreign + Relations, 1969–1976, vol. E–8, Documents on South + Asia, 1973–1976, Documents 161, 162, 163, 164, 167, 168, 169, and 161. which + demonstrated that a developing country could produce nuclear explosives + by misusing peaceful nuclear cooperation, the United States has taken a + number of initiatives seeking broad supplier state acceptance of common + export policies. These include not only safeguards and control over + nuclear exports and strengthening of the international safeguards + system, but also efforts to forestall the acquisition of sensitive + facilities by countries not already possessing them and minimizing + access to and improving control over weapons-usable materials.

+

These and other related actions were stated in President Ford’s October 28 nuclear policy + message.See footnote 2, Document 317. The key decision was + that reprocessing would no longer be regarded as inevitable and should + not proceed unless there is sound reason to conclude that the world + community can effectively overcome the associated risks of + proliferation. Avoidance of proliferation must take precedence over + economic interests. In addition, the Ford statement called for a three-year moratorium on + transfers of sensitive technology while alternative ways of meeting fuel + cycle needs were explored, coupled with a domestic pause on commercial + reprocessing pending evaluation of its proliferation risks. This latter + decision was taken in the context of reprocessing for recycle in present reactors and did not + address the US breeder reactor + development program.

+

B. OVERALL STRATEGY

+

The October 28 statement—and the Carter San Diego speechOn + September 25, 1976, in San Diego, Carter pledged that “if elected President, he would + halt further arms sales of nuclear power technology and nuclear + reactor fuel to any nation that refused to forgo nuclear weapons + development or insisted on building its own national plant for + reprocessing reactor fuel.” (Charles Mohr, “Carter Vows a Curb on Nuclear + Exports to Bar Arms Spread,” New York Times, + September 26, 1976, p. 1)—offer a similar political and + technical basic framework for the conduct of non-proliferation + policy.

+

A common element in these policy statements is reinforcement of controls to ensure that civil nuclear supply + is only used for peaceful purposes. They call for action to strengthen + technical controls through more universal application of IAEA safeguards and improvement of + safeguards and physical protection measures to deter unauthorized use of + nuclear materials and facilities.

+

A second key element is denial of access to sensitive + technologies (e.g., enrichment and reprocessing) so as to delay + the spread of stockpiles of weapons-usable material and the facilities + that produce them, while the international community develops ways to + shape the future of nuclear energy so as to reduce proliferation + risks.

+

Both policy statements also recognize that an effective non-proliferation + policy cannot rely solely on denials and controls. A policy based solely on denial of + sensitive technology transfers would lack legitimacy in the eyes of + other nations, and over the long term would not present indigenous + development of sensitive technologies and facilities. Similarly, a + policy which permits the spread of sensitive national facilities, albeit + under strengthened political commitments, in-ternational safeguards and + physical security measures, would not in itself meet the problem of + states acquiring capabilities which could quickly be turned to weapons + purposes after abrogation of safeguards agreements.

+

We believe that a meaningful long-term non-proliferation policy requires + the addition of a third approach based on the + principle of bilateral and multilateral incentives. Such + incentives must be responsive to other countries’ energy requirements. + In particular, in encouraging acceptance of our non-proliferation policy + and objectives we must be able to provide assured supplies of + non-sensitive nuclear fuels (e.g., low-enriched uranium) on a timely, + adequate, reliable and economically acceptable basis and be responsive + to concerns over the management of spent fuel and nuclear waste.

+ +

We also believe that a key element in developing + international support for our non-proliferation policy is establishment + of an International Fuel Cycle Evaluation Program that objectively and + thoroughly examines the economic, environmental and non-proliferation + advantages and risks of the current fuel cycle and major alternatives. + The domestic component must relate our future energy needs with our + non-proliferation and environmental objectives. The international + component must seek to involve countries with major nuclear energy + programs (both existing and projected) and address their legitimate + concerns, to ensure that the evaluation will be internationally + accepted.

+

This international component is particularly important because many other + countries, including most key suppliers, strongly disagree with the + US assessment that reprocessing is + not necessary in the near term. Rather they consider this technology + essential for resource conservation, for meeting waste handling and + environmental requirements and for breeder development and fuel + purposes.

+

C. MAJOR ISSUES

+

While the approaches identified above—controls, + denials, incentives, together with an International Fuel Cycle Evaluation Program—are key policy + elements in our proposed overall non-proliferation strategy, a number of + major policy implementation choices need to be made.

+

1. How should the US + deal with reprocessing and the export and disposition of + weapons-usable materials?

+

There is interagency consensusConsensus, as used here and subsequently in the + report refers to the working level only, and not necessarily to + official Agency views. [Footnote is in the original.] on + the need for an international moratorium on the export of + enrichment and reprocessing plants and technology, the most difficult + cases being the existing French and German agreements to export such + facilities to Pakistan and Brazil, and our efforts to ensure the absence + of reprocessing in Taiwan.

+

There is an interagency consensus on the need for + assessment of reprocessing and examination of alternatives for + recovering energy value from irradiated fuel and that this evaluation should be international and broad + based.

+

There is also an interagency consensus that domestic, + regional, and international spent-fuel storage arrangements are + needed in supporting our approach to reprocessing.

+

Differences among Agencies exist, however, on the following issues:

+ +

—how an international fuel cycle evaluation program + should allocate resources and effort domestically and + internationally between reprocessing and alternative technologies.

+

Some argue that virtually all domestic technical evaluation efforts + should be addressed to non-reprocessing technologies, in order to + provide a clear signal to others that the US is not going forward with reprocessing. Existing + reprocessing plants abroad could be used for evaluation of reprocessing, + both technically and organizationally.

+

Others favor an approach in which the US + technical evaluation includes not only alternative technologies but also + reprocessing itself in order to establish more effective safeguards and + controls in the event that decisions (in the US or elsewhere) are made to proceed with reprocessing.

+

Options and recommendations on this issue are on pages 15 & 16.

+

—how the US should deal + with reprocessing activities abroad.

+

We are being pressed by Japan, Spain, Switzerland and Sweden to permit + them to ship US-supplied fuel to the + UK or France for reprocessing, on + the grounds that lack of available spent fuel storage capacity could + force them to shut down their reactors. This raises a number of issues + requiring immediate decision: Should we permit reprocessing in existing + facilities in these nuclear weapon states (NWS), subject to US + approval over disposition of separated plutonium? Should we seek a + moratorium on all new reprocessing plants? How + should we handle existing reprocessing plants in non-nuclear weapon + states (NNWS)In this report and in the NPT, only the US, + UK, France, USSR and China are considered NWS. All others, including India, are + NNWS. [Footnote is in the + original.] such as the plants in Japan, in Germany and + Belgium? Do we integrate some, all or none of these into an + International Fuel Cycle Evaluation Program?

+

A major issue in our on-going negotiations is the US right of approval over reprocessing. This has also + raised problems in our attempts to obtain such rights in negotiating + with Iran, Spain, Yugoslavia and others. While there is a consensus on + the need to tighten and extend our veto rights over reprocessing, we + need to spell out the conditions under which we allow reprocessing + and/or alternative disposition of spent fuel.

+

Finally, there are the related questions of how to meet near-term + domestic and foreign spent fuel storage concerns and how best to assure + that adequate fuel supplies will be available during the evaluation + period. In addition, we must determine whether or under what conditions + to continue exporting weapons-usable material or reactors requiring + their use. Proposed licenses to export highly-enriched uranium to the + FRG and South Africa under existing + contracts are pending and are being challenged in licensing + proceedings.

+

2. How can the US help + to create a reliable nuclear fuel assurance system?

+

There is interagency consensus:

+ +

—that the US must move + rapidly and decisively to reestablish its reliability as a nuclear + fuel supplier, and that to achieve this end we must not only + take steps to provide new enrichment capacity but + also to restore certainty that contractual commitments + will be honored on a timely basis for all cooperating states + adhering to their non-proliferation obligations;

+

—that a policy of constraint on reprocessing must + be accompanied by strong incentives, focusing on assured supply of low-enriched uranium and of natural uranium + fuel;

+

—that the establishment of parallel policies among the nuclear supplier + states which would at least entail cooperative planning of new + enrichment facilities and close consultations on the relation between + fuel assurances and “back-end” constraints is essential;

+

—that multilateral as well as international arrangements to assure access + to fuel supplies are needed in order to avoid placing reactor exporting + nations at a competitive disadvantage or recipients at an economic + disadvantage provided they abide by generally accepted non-proliferation + guidelines.

+

Differences exist over what specific steps need to be + taken now with respect to multilateral collaboration in the area of + enrichment.

+

Discussion of this issue and recommendations on fuel assurances are on + pages 22–28.

+

3. How should we tighten our agreements for civil + nuclear cooperation and our nuclear export policy?

+

Nuclear exports take place under agreements for cooperation between the + US and individual recipient + countries.

+

There is interagency consensus that stricter terms + should be required in new agreements including, if all suppliers + concur, full-scope safeguards (i.e., safeguards on all nuclear + activities in NNWS); and that we should seek to upgrade existing agreement to include at + least some additional conditions.

+

This study examines:

+

—what new requirements we will impose for future + agreements for cooperation. Of primary concern are:

+

Whether we make full-scope safeguards (i.e., + safeguards on all nuclear activities in a NNWS) a condition of US + nuclear cooperation or instead insist on alternative measures aimed at + widening safeguards application.

+

Whether and to what extent the US should + impose new requirements in the absence of agreement by + other key suppliers to impose them.

+

(A decision to impose increased safeguards and other conditions for new + agreements would affect, among others, the proposed agreements with + Israel, Egypt, and Brazil.)

+

—how we should upgrade cooperation under existing + agreements, in particular:

+ +

What interim export standards should we apply + pending renegotiation of existing agreements and consultations with + other suppliers.

+

Should we favor, as part of our comprehensive legislative proposal, the application of new stricter export standards + either automatically or subject to a Presidential + determination, after a specified period of time.

+

If these new stricter standards (e.g., full-scope safeguards + requirements) are applied to exports under existing agreements, this + would require modification of all agreements. Depending on the nature of + the increased safeguards conditions, these could be particularly + difficult in the case of some key non-NPT parties such as India, South Africa and Spain. US reprocessing controls are also likely to + raise bilateral tensions with both NPT + and non-parties. While US leverage alone + may suffice in many cases, whether other suppliers adopt similar + policies will have an important bearing on the success of such a US policy.

+

It should be noted that current bills in Congress which have strong + bipartisan support, go much further in tightening the criteria for both agreements and licensing, particularly in + seeking to foreclose foreign reprocessing.

+

Options and recommendations on nuclear export policy are on pages + 31–41.

+

4. How far-reaching a policy should we pursue alone and + with others to strengthen sanctions against violations on + non-proliferation obligations?

+

There is a consensus supporting the October 28 statement to at least cut + off nuclear cooperation with states who may in the future violate a + US safeguards agreement. The issues + now are:

+

—whether to extend this policy to include a clearly stated intention to + cut off supplies in the event any international safeguards agreement is + violated or if a US customer hereafter + explodes a nuclear device (useful, perhaps, + in the case of India);

+

—whether and how to strengthen the operation of the sanctions provision + of the IAEA Statute;

+

—whether to expand sanctions into non-nuclear areas, such as automatic + suspension of eligibility to receive discretionary US economic, military, or financial + assistance;

+

—how much emphasis to place on obtaining agreement on common sanctions + policies from other suppliers before determining a US position on the above measures?

+

Discussions and recommendations on these issues are addressed on pages + 29–30.

+

D. CONSIDERATIONS AFFECTING POLICY FORMULATION

+

In addressing and deciding on specific issues associated with the above + areas, four policy considerations must be factored in:

+ +

—urgency associated with the decision in question. + For example, a number of bills have been introduced in Congress, that, + if enacted, could adversely affect our ability to further + non-proliferation objectives. The Executive Branch needs to put forward + a comprehensive legislative package urgently to focus Congressional + efforts in a supportive direction.

+

—the relative emphasis given to denials, controls, + sanctions and incentives in implementing our non-proliferation + policy. A decision on how to handle reprocessing of US-origin fuels, for example, must be + evaluated in terms of whether our objectives are best achieved by strict + controls over reprocessing, and recovered plutonium, denying outright + authorization to reprocess, offering alternative guaranteed fuel sources + in lieu of reprocessing, assistance in spent fuel storage or a + combination of these approaches;

+

—the degree to which the United States should stress a + unilateral or multilateral approach in defining and + implementing our non-proliferation policy. For example, we must + recognize that fundamental differences may exist + between the US and other supplier + and recipient states on the best way to control proliferation; + and that unilateral US policies may lead + to unproductive or possibly counterproductive non-proliferation + results.

+

—the need to assess the longer-term costs as well as + benefits of short-term non-proliferation policy measures. Total + denial of safeguarded nuclear assistance to a given country could, for + example, lead that country to undertake development of indigenous and + uncontrolled nuclear weap-ons capability.

+

Against this background of policy considerations and major is-sues, the + following section presents the detailed options and recommendations to + allow policy decisions consistent with the overall strategy outlined + above.

+

[Omitted here is Part II: Policy Options and Recommendations.]

+
+ +
+ + 326. Memorandum of ConversationSource: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, + Brzezinski Material, + Country File, Box 76, United Kingdom: 1–3/77. Secret; Sensitive. The + meeting took place in the Old Executive Office + Building. + Washington, March + 11, 1977 + + PARTICIPANTS + + FRANCE + Francois de Laboulaye Political Director + + + UNITED KINGDOM + Sir Michael + Palliser Permanent Under Secretary + Sir John Hunt Cabinet Secretary + Reginald Hibbert Deputy Under Secretary + + + FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY + Gunter van Well Political Director + + + UNITED STATES + Ambassador Henry + Owen President’s Representative + Arthur A. Hartman + Assistant Secretary + David Aaron, Deputy + Assistant to the President + Robert Hunter, + Senior Member National Security Council + Roger Waldman, Assistant to Ambassador Owen + James F. Dobbins, Jr. EUR/WE (Notetaker) + + +

Owen opened the meeting by noting that its purpose + was to review the handling of non-economic issues which President + Carter wished to raise at + the summit.Reference is to the G–7 Summit + scheduled for May in London. President Carter wished to raise these issues + for two reasons: first, because he thought they were important and + deserved discussion; and second, because he was of the general view that + Japan should be involved more extensively in consultations with the + United States and Europe on non-economic issues.

+

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to non-proliferation.]

+

Turning to proliferation, Owen said that there had + been bilateral contacts between the US + and all the participants in the summit of the seven (Italy was to be + contacted in the near future) on the US + proposal for a fuel cycle evaluation program. In his own discussion with + Japanese officials, Owen said, he + had found them extremely interested. The subject of proliferation was on + everyone’s minds and would certainly be discussed at the summit. + Certainly President Carter would + do so. Owen suggested that there + were two aspects of non-proliferation—restraints and how to meet + legitimate needs. The question of restraints was being dealt with in the + London suppliers group. It did not appear that there was much the summit could add. The more + interesting question was the second—that of meeting legitimate atomic + energy needs. In this area it seemed to him that there were three + principles which might be discussed and perhaps agreed upon at the + summit. These were:

+

—that these needs were real and should be met;

+

—that it was in the general interest that these needs be met with the + minimum risk of providing countries the means to convert civilian to + military nuclear programs;

+

—in some cases a multilateral or international role in meeting these + needs might be desirable.

+

If summit discussion could focus on these principles, continued Owens, and if agreement could be + reached to launch a study to give effect to them, this would represent + an important outcome.

+

Owen noted that the issue of + energy was already on the summit agenda and suggested that as nuclear + energy and thus non-proliferation were inextricably connected to this + topic, perhaps they should be discussed under the energy item.

+

De Laboulaye acknowledged that it might be + impossible to avoid a discussion of nuclear energy under the energy + item. It was probably better, however, not to go into detail, given the + limited time available at the summit. He suggested, therefore, that + discussion be limited to the first two of the three principles + Ambassador Owen had outlined. He + felt that there was insufficient preparation for discussion to proceed + to the third point—that of international intervention. In the absence of + agreement, discussion at the summit on this point could be + counterproductive.

+

Owen + wondered whether there might not be agreement on the first of these two + points, and on the initiation of a study. De + Laboulaye replied that this was perhaps possible, but would + seem to him to be the maximum his government could accept.

+

Van Well agreed that proliferation should be + discussed under energy. He felt, however, that the third of Owen’s proposed principles should be + discussed among the four before participation was enlarged.

+

At this point there was some discussion about whether the four-power + summit should come before or after the seven power meeting.Reference is to the meeting among the United + States, the United Kingdom, France, and the Federal Republic of + Germany scheduled for May in London. It was agreed that the + desirability of discussion of non-proliferation among the four should + not override other considerations which tended to favor scheduling the + four-power meeting following the seven nation summit.

+ +

Palliser + said that everyone was agreed on the importance of non-proliferation + efforts. Discussion at the summit should not leave the impression that + there was disagreement on this fundamental point. He agreed that the + subject should be discussed under the energy item. He felt that the + principles which Ambassador Owen + had outlined were at a pretty high level of generality. The question was + whether summit agreement to initiate a study would be viewed by press + and the public simply as a way of postponing discussion.

+

Ambassador Owen noted that a great deal would depend on the + outcome of bilateral consultations which the United States was + undertaking with each of the summit participants. If there was + agreement, the summit could reflect it. If there were not, one would + have a different situation. In this case, perhaps, the summit should + confine itself to endorsing the principles he had outlined—either two or + all three of them. These principles might be rather general but that + was, after all, in the best tradition of summitry.

+

Hibbert noted that it was important that + non-participating states not feel that those at the summit were ganging + up on them. Owen replied that his first principle was + included for that purpose. Reflecting on the problem of + non-proliferation in general, Owen recalled that Europe had confronted a somewhat + similar difficulty thirty years ago and had resolved it by creating the + European Coal and Steel Community. Perhaps on non-proliferation a + similar international approach is needed to overcome national suspicion + and rivalries.

+

Owen noted that bilateral + consultations on the proposal for a fuel cycle evaluation program would + have progressed by the next summit preparatory meeting. He felt there + was agreement that proliferation should be discussed at the summit under + energy, and that at least the first two of his three principles were + generally acceptable. Whether the third principle could be agreed upon + and a study initiated at the summit was still open for discussion. This + was generally agreed to be a fair summation of where matters stood.

+

Van Well reiterated that there should also be + discussion of proliferation among the four. This would offer a better + form to review certain political ramifications of the issue. Owen + inquired what questions the four would address. Van + Well envisaged discussion in the four focusing on the political + constraints which each of the participants felt in this area. Hartman + agreed that a frank discussion of this sort among the four leaders would + be very useful. No one felt that such a discussion would require + detailed preparation. Owen noted that President Carter might well treat the political + aspects of non-proliferation among the seven. Van + Vell said that this was perfectly acceptable but that other + leaders might prefer to reply in the four.

+

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to non-proliferation.]

+
+ +
+ + 327. Intelligence ReportSource: Carter Library, National Security Council, Institutional + Files, Box 64, PRC 028, 7/27/77, + North/South Issues [2]. Confidential. + + + RP 77–10055 + + + Washington, March 1977 +

Political Perspectives on Key Global + Issues

+

[Omitted here are a table of contents and Parts I–V of the report.]

+

VI. NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION

+

Despite the efforts of the US and other + nuclear supplier countries, a small number of states will probably + fabricate nuclear explosives within the next decade or so. It is + therefore necessary to plan for an era in which proliferation is + occurring, as well as to continue efforts to prevent or retard its + occurrence. The principal objectives of the discussion that follows are + to identify and measure the strength of those trends that contribute to + the proliferation process, to assess the implications of further + proliferation for US interests, and to + indicate some of the complexities of dealing with the dual problem of + slowing the rate of proliferation and managing the consequences when it + cannot be prevented.

+

A. Motives, Capabilities, and Opportunities

+

The decision to build nuclear weapons flows from a convergence of + pressing national motivations and adequate capabilities.A nuclear weapon here refers to any explosive + generated by fissionable materials. The distinction between an + explosive and a weapon, although analytically valid, does not + possess immediate policy relevance. In the contemporary political + context, the possession of even a “crude” weapon has a psychological + and political impact transcending its actual military utility. In + the future, however, if and when more states attain greater levels + of sophistication in weaponry and delivery systems, the size and + quality of nuclear arsenals will take on important military and + political significance. [Footnote is in the original.] While + an appropriate technical base is a necessary precondition for the + development of atomic arms, it is clearly not sufficient in itself to + cause a country to cross the nuclear threshold. Several West European + states, for example, have for some time been capable of building nuclear + weapons. But because US security + guarantees, the existence of NATO, and + the general relaxation of East-West tensions have dampened anxieties + about external threats, they have lacked the political incentives to do + so.

+

For most states, considerations of national security have been and will + continue to be the principal determinants governing their attitudes + toward the acquisition of nuclear weapons. However, as the threshold + costs of acquiring a nuclear capability are lowered, less demanding + security interests, and + even prestige and domestic political motives may be enough to cause some + states to reconsider the nuclear option.

+

While it should be emphasized that years of restraint have not + necessarily immunized the nonweapon industrial democracies from + pressures for proliferation, it is among the LDCs that the interaction of motivations and capabilities + is of most concern today. In these countries feelings of political and + military insecurity are widespread, aspirations to greater global or + regional status abound, and the demands on domestic stability are + difficult to satisfy. All of these political pressures are occurring at + a time when the economic and technical costs of building nuclear weapons + are declining.

+

Political Motivations

+

Security: Intense and longstanding regional + conflicts account for much of the anxiety motivating the LDCs to acquire nuclear weapons. The + likelihood that these basic feelings of insecurity will launch concrete + actions designed to bring the nuclear option within reach has been + significantly enhanced by several international developments, for + example:

+

—Real or perceived inabilities to compete effectively in local + conventional arms races because of deficiencies in access to foreign + supply, in financial means, or in other resources (e.g., Pakistan and + South Africa).

+

—The acquisition of a nuclear capability by a declared or potential rival + (e.g., Pakistan and Iran).

+

—Loss of faith in the credibility or utility of great power security + commitments (e.g., Pakistan, Taiwan, South Korea).

+

Other developments that have increased the security concerns of some + nuclear threshold states (Taiwan and South Korea in particular) include + the US defeat in Indochina, the + continuing debate over withdrawal of American troops from abroad, and + mounting evidence of wide popular support for reducing the level of + US commitments generally. In short, + the impression that national security will increasingly become the + exclusive responsibility of individual states has buttressed arguments + in favor of developing nuclear weapons for deterrence and defense.

+

Prestige: The demands of LDCs for more control over international arrangements + affecting their fortunes and futures and their dissatisfaction with the + existing international political and economic system have led many + states to give priority attention to enhancement of their global or + regional stature. And for some countries, most notably India and Brazil, + but probably Argentina and Iran as well, the prestige associated with + actual or potential nuclear status has furnished a particularly strong + incentive for developing a nuclear weapons capability.

+ +

Domestic Political Concerns: Internal factors have + also contributed to proliferation pressures in a growing number of + countries. Substantial domestic benefits can accrue to regimes that can + demonstrate the competence necessary to build a nuclear device, + especially among the LDCs. The prestige + of the Indian Government, for example, experienced such a boost when it + set off its nuclear explosion, although its effects were largely + temporary. Conversely, failure to undertake or complete a nuclear + weapons program in the face of clear regional challenges or great power + pressure could severely undermine a regime’s existing base of support. + This consideration may currently loom large in Pakistani Prime Minister + Bhutto’s calculations.

+

Facilitating Factors

+

A number of economic and technological trends have combined to facilitate + the acquisition of the capability to fashion nuclear explosives. The + enormous expense and vulnerabilities related to dependence on foreign + sources of petroleum have, for example, heightened the appeal of nuclear + power as a potential source of cheap, independent, and reliable energy. + Also, the prestige that accompanies the acquisition and operation of + highly sophisticated facilities, especially if it creates a potential + base for increasing future military power, has made nuclear energy a + particularly attractive investment for many states.Virtually any state with a nuclear power program + can build a nuclear explosive within a decade or less of the + decision to do so. It needs to separate out the plutonium produced + as a byproduct of running power reactors (and design and develop a + device). These are not trivial tasks, but not of insurmountable + technical difficulty for many states. The political + obstacles—ranging from consequence of the violation of treaty + obligations to great power retribution—are more formidable. + [Footnote is in the original.]

+

Competition between suppliers of nuclear technology, arising in part from + balance-of-payments problems created or aggravated by the enormous + increase in the cost of imported oil, has also served to increase the + capabilities of threshold states. Of the leading suppliers, the French + and the Germans have offered to sell equipment that would greatly + facilitate the fabrication of nuclear explosives. They have used a + uranium enrichment plant and spent fuel reprocessing facilities as + sweeteners to clinch sales of power reactors to Brazil and Pakistan.

+

Partly in this manner, nuclear technology originally acquired at great + effort and expense by the leading nuclear states is now becoming widely + disseminated. Not only have many of its initial mysteries become matters + of public knowledge, but there has been an international effort, led to + a great degree by the US, to assist + LDCs to gain access to the benefits + of the atom by providing research facilities and aiding in the + construction of an international nuclear power industry.

+ +

B. Antiproliferation Efforts

+

With a few exceptions, the policies adopted by the great powers to slow + the spread of nuclear weapons have focused primarily on limiting the + opportunities and capabilities of threshold states. Hence, apart from a + few international declarations of intent to resist nuclear aggression, + such as Security Council Resolution 255,UN Resolution 255, “Question + Relating to Measures to Safeguard Non-Nuclear Weapons States Parties + to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,” June 19, + 1968, proclaimed that Non-Nuclear Weapons States threatened by + “aggression with nuclear weapons or the threat of such aggression” + would receive aid from UN members, + in particular “nuclear-weapon State permanent members.” + (http:://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/255(1968)) + most nonproliferation efforts have concentrated on creating + institutional and legal arrangements to embargo, monitor, or control + international nuclear commerce.

+

The reluctance of the major nuclear powers to address the problem of + motivations directly is understandable. The costs in terms of the + necessary massive readjustment of foreign policy priorities, the risks + and the demands on limited resources that would flow from more active + engagement in local and regional affairs in various parts of the world, + and the loss of freedom of maneuver in areas ranging from superpower + competition and alliance politics to North-South disagreements over the + distribution of international wealth and power would be enormous. + Furthermore, the high degree of concern and cooperation among the + nuclear powers required for success in such an endeavor would be + difficult to sustain.

+

The Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) of + 1968 constitutes the central legal instrument of the anti-proliferation + effort. Some 100 nations have adhered to the treaty since it was opened + for signature. But a number of nuclear weapon and key threshold states, + including France, India, Israel, Egypt, Pakistan, Brazil, and Argentina, + have so far proved unwilling to endorse the Treaty.

+

While it does require nonweapons adherents to forgo the acquisition of + atomic arms, the NPT makes only a + passing reference to the major concerns which fuel the proliferation + process. Addressing relatively minor motivating factors, it obligates + the five nuclear weapons states to end their nuclear arms race and to + supply peaceful nuclear explosives to nonweapons states at reasonable + cost and on a nondiscriminatory basis. So far, however, neither of these + pledges has been fulfilled.

+

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), under UN aegis, has + become the central organizational instrument of the nonproliferation + regime. It administers the international “safeguards” agreements + governing proper use of peaceful nuclear materials and facilities. Lacking enforcement powers, it + acts chiefly as a certifying accountant. In performance of this + function, it is obligated to notify all members of the IAEA, the Security Council, and the + UN General Assembly of any + “violations” that it uncovers. So far, the IAEA has reported no irregularities that it deemed + warranted such action.

+

Within the IAEA an exporters’ committee + of NPT signatories, known as the + Zangger Committee, has been established. It maintains a “trigger list” + of nuclear items that must be placed under IAEA safeguards before they can be transferred abroad. + However, because some nuclear exporters are not NPT adherents or are uncomfortable with the public scrutiny + arising from IAEA procedures, another + organization has been formed to regulate nuclear commerce—the Nuclear + Suppliers Group, also known as the London Suppliers Conference—and it + has maintained the confidentiality of its discussions. It, too, has a + “trigger list.”

+

Individual supplier states have also attempted to control the nuclear + potential of nonweapons states by means of unilateral embargoes on + nuclear technology and materials as well as through bilateral efforts to + restrain other exporters and importers. The US, for example, has consistently refused to export nuclear + fuel separation technology and has actively sought to block the proposed + sale of such technology to Brazil, Pakistan, and South Korea by other + suppliers. Similarly, Canada has threatened to suspend exports of + nuclear materials to potential weapons states, while the Soviet Union + has generally demonstrated great caution in managing the nature and + extent of its nuclear exports.

+

There are a number of weaknesses in the NPT–IAEA system, + including a provision that allows a nation to renounce its treaty + obligations on 3 months’ notice. Another lies in the fact that, although + the IAEA has so far escaped the + politicization that has hampered other UN agencies, it is limited in effectiveness by shortages of + funds and manpower. In addition, the nuclear safeguard regime is beset + with the technical obstacles and uncertainties associated with almost + any system of international inspection and verification. Indeed, the + “normal” margin of error in the accounting practices at some nuclear + facilities is large enough, theoretically, to permit the undetected + diversion of enough nuclear material to build several weapons a year. + Finally, with a few exceptions, only items of international nuclear + commerce are covered by safeguards at all. Indigenous nuclear facilities + can be developed that fall outside the inspection system, as in the + Indian, Israeli, and South African cases.

+

Efforts to curb the spread of nuclear technology through unilateral + embargoes and direct intervention have incurred substantial costs. In + addition to the loss of export opportunities, the US, for example, has found that its tough + antiproliferation posture has strained its political relations with a number of LDCs, for example, Brazil and Pakistan. + Moreover, US efforts to block sales of + uranium enrichment plants or spent fuel reprocessing facilities by other + suppliers have led to tensions with West European countries, + particularly France and Germany, as well as with Japan.

+

Only one country, India, has publicly crossed the nuclear threshold since + the NPT came into existence. Measured + in these terms, the antiproliferation effort has been relatively + successful. But the number and determination of the countries that are + currently seeking to place themselves in a position to develop nuclear + weapons underscore the inadequacy of a basically unidimensional approach + and raise troublesome questions about the decade that lies ahead.

+

C. The Outlook

+

In part because of the persistence and interplay of the global problems + discussed in earlier chapters, none of the principal political motives + for acquiring nuclear weapons shows signs of losing its force in the + decade ahead. On the contrary, the odds are that some factors, such as + aspirations to regional dominance arising from new-found economic power, + will loom larger than before. It is also safe to assume that the + international environment will continue to be characterized by + considerable tension and conflict, the international political and + economic systems will remain under challenge, and a substantial number + of governments will have to cope with domestic strife and + instability.

+

At the same time, technological advance and the continued spread of + nuclear expertise are almost certain to continue to erode the economic + and technical obstacles to developing nuclear weapons. Thus, pressures + for proliferation will mount while the difficulty of crossing the + nuclear threshold will decline.

+

Recognition of this state of affairs is likely to sustain the trend + toward greater consensus and cooperation among nuclear suppliers that + has emerged during the past few months. Although the currently contested + sales of sensitive technology to Pakistan and Brazil may yet go through, + tighter export controls recently adopted by France, Canada, and perhaps + Germany, indicate that nonproliferation is gaining in salience as an + international issue.

+

Nevertheless, although some of the major weapons powers may desire to + undertake more energetic efforts than in the past to dampen the basic + motives that underlie the proliferation process, they will find it + exceedingly difficult to do so within the framework of a comprehensive + and coordinated campaign because of other, conflicting national and + international policy objectives. And since the record suggests that + measures aimed primarily at curbing the ability of LDCs to develop a nuclear device can do no + more than slow the proliferation process, the prospects are strong that over the next years or so + additional states will either fabricate nuclear devices or develop the + capacity to do so on very short notice.

+

D. Implications

+

While certain to add new risks and complexities to international + politics, the emergence of a few new nuclear powers need not necessarily + provoke regional holocausts, dangerous superpower confrontations, or an + all-out nuclear arms race. On the contrary, there is some prospect that + the introduction of nuclear weapons into some current areas of tension + and conflict (e.g., the Middle East and the Korean Peninsula) could, + over time, contribute to regional stability and reduce interstate + violence by creating local “balances of terror.”The conviction—publicly professed by a number of + Arab spokesmen—that Israel has a nuclear arsenal may have been one + of the factors contributing to the recent moderation of Arab + positions on the settlement of the Middle East conflict. [Footnote + is in the original.] Elsewhere, the acquisition of atomic + arms by states not feared for their irredentist or hegemonial ambitions + might diminish the chances—or at least constrain the scope—of wars among + regional rivals through what one observer has described as a “porcupine + effect.” And in any case, if the superpowers can muster the necessary + determination, they will have it within their powers to reduce + significantly the risks of direct nuclear confrontation arising from + third-party disputes.

+

Nonetheless, the proliferation process will require careful and constant + management during the critical period of adjustment that will + characterize the decade ahead, if some of the more disastrous + consequences are to be avoided. The actual impact of proliferation will + depend in large part on the pace at which the process proceeds, the + motives and behavior of the states that acquire nuclear weapons, and the + actions taken by the major nuclear powers to anticipate and contain the + tensions and problems that arise.

+

One of the most important determinants of the consequences of + proliferation is the nature of the states that eventually do develop + nuclear weapons. The character of the regime and the motivation for + achieving nuclear status are the two most critical factors. + Unfortunately, a great number of the potential LDC nuclear powers have political systems prone to chronic + or latent instability, which makes their nuclear conduct difficult to + predict. Although a valid argument can be made that any additional + proliferation heightens regional and global tensions generally, some + states clearly represent more risk than others. For example, the + Brazilian-Argentinian rivalry, which centers more on a competition for + prestige than deep-seated antagonisms, would likely provoke a much less dangerous nuclear + arms race than the Pakistani-Indian case.

+

Until now, the relatively long time lag between each new entry into the + nuclear club has eased the task of containing the resulting + reverberations. The expanding list of states with large and growing + stockpiles of plutonium-bearing spent reactor fuel creates the potential + for a more destabilizing spread of nuclear explosive capabilities. While + it is true that the decision to traverse the nuclear threshold will be + made by autonomous political units, a chain reaction may be established + as each successive proliferating state anticipates the security + implications of the nuclear program of other states. Not only are + “proliferation chains” possible in specific regions (the Middle East, + Latin America, Far East), but nonsecurity motivations may also set them + off across regions—e.g., Brazil following Pakistan, Iran following + Brazil—as aspiring regional powers compete for international prestige + and status.

+

The attitudes and policies of the major nuclear powers will perhaps be + the single most important determinants of the ultimate consequences of + the proliferation process. They have an obvious common interest in + preventing the nuclearization of regional conflicts that could involve + the superpowers in a serious confrontation. However, crosscutting + interests impair their ability to employ cooperatively the military, + political, and economic measures necessary to lessen the regional + insecurities driving the resort to nuclear diplomacy. Paradoxically, + Taiwan, West Germany, Japan, and South Korea—to cite a few—are cases + where great power competition has led to a nuclear umbrella for weaker + allies that now serves to restrain further nuclear proliferation.

+

The challenge to US policy arising from + the proliferation process will therefore be twofold: to continue to slow + the spread of nuclear weapons and to cope with such additional + proliferation as occurs. Judgments advanced earlier in this discussion + suggest that the first of these tasks is likely to become increasingly + difficult. And both tasks are certain to conflict to some degree with + other important objectives, such as controlling the pace of conventional + arms transfers, disengagement from regional conflicts, and advancement + of human rights. Hence difficult policy choices will be required.

+

The transfer of increasing quantities of sophisticated conventional + weaponry to LDCs may be necessary to + deflect them from developing nuclear weapons or, if that fails, from + brandishing or using them once they have been fabricated. US military capabilities may need to be + increased or reoriented to deal with new and more powerful potential + adversaries. Some longstanding tacit or explicit alliances may need to + be reevaluated in terms of the costs of association with or intervention + on the behalf of new nuclear states or their rivals. The adoption of any + or all of these courses of action may well interfere with other policy + objectives—and it is + unlikely that any single approach will be able to address + comprehensively the proliferation consequences presented by every nation + in every region.

+

Whatever the specific trade-offs made, the costs of managing the + proliferation process over the next decade—and particularly of those + steps that will be needed to dissuade new nuclear states from + brandishing or using their weapons—will be high. In a sense, they will + likely be comparable to those that would have been involved in + addressing the general admixture of motives driving the proliferation + process at an earlier stage. One possible advantage may be that they can + be paid piecemeal and with better appreciation for the risks and + trade-offs involved, and for their likely damage-limiting effects.

+

In any event, greater cooperation among the major + nuclear powers will be essential. Specifically, such concert + will have to be directed toward decoupling possible regional conflicts + from their own global competition, assuaging regional tensions, and + controlling the behavior of new nuclear states through a combination of + pressures and incentives. Since the interests of the USSR and the PRC will be even more directly threatened than those of the + US should most of the present + threshold states attain nuclear status, the Communist powers might prove + quite willing to explore ways of sharing those burdens.The emphasis placed on nonproliferation by the + great powers may create opportunities for linkage by threshold and + nonthreshold states alike. Other issues—conventional arms transfer + policies, North-South economic relations, law of the sea + negotiations, energy cooperation, or behavior in international + organizations—might become entangled with great power + antiproliferation efforts. [Footnote is in the original.]

+

In sum, proliferation presents a twofold problem of delay and management. + Slowing proliferation when it cannot + ultimately be stopped could prove of substantial + value in reducing the long-term costs of the process. The dangers for + regional and global peace can probably best be muted if the process is + spread out as much as possible in both time and space. Thus, special + attention should be paid to the requirements and costs of dampening the + effect that the entry of each new member into the nuclear club is likely + to have on pressures for proliferation elsewhere—including those felt in + the industrialized states that have so far eschewed the acquisition of + nuclear weapons.

+

Finally, since the degree and quality of great power cooperation will + greatly affect the level of risk to the US and to the world generally of the proliferation process, + special attention will have to be paid to the prospects for and the + reverberations of acquisition of nuclear arms by those states (e.g., + Taiwan, Japan, and West Germany) most likely to have the sharpest + adverse impact on relations among the powers. Here, as in most aspects + of the proliferation issue, the Communist powers will probably have strong incentives to cooperate + with the US. But even then, the + resources and attention necessary to minimize the dangers presented by + the spread of nuclear weapons are likely to be substantial and + continuing.

+
+ +
+ 328. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security + Affairs (Brzezinski) to President + CarterSource: Carter Library, National + Security Council, Institutional Files, Box 60, PRC 007, 3/16/77, Nuclear + Proliferation. Secret; Sensitive. Brzezinski did not initial the + memorandum. + Washington, undated + + SUBJECT + Summary of PRC Meeting on Nuclear + Proliferation (PRM–15) + +

The meetingNo minutes or summary of + conclusions of the March 16 meeting were found. began with a + summary by Nye, of the two + principal conclusions of the review:See + Document 325. that the U.S. + should seek a pause in international nuclear + developments which make weapons useable material more available; and + that the pause would be used for an international + nuclear fuel cycle evaluation program (hereinafter FCEP) in + which suppliers and recipients jointly participate.

+

FCEP and Reprocessing: The Key Question

+

Discussion opened on the principal issue: What should the FCEP evaluate? + Should the evaluation concern itself with improvements (safety and + safeguards) in reprocessing? Or, should it + concern alternatives to reprocessing and to other + sensitive technologies which make plutonium or HEU directly available? Views were presented on what should + be done about domestic reprocessing, but without reaching any + conclusion. The discussion quickly turned to the question of what the + FCEP should evaluate and how it should be presented to the international + community. ERDA felt that in order to + be “credible” the evaluation would have to include reprocessing, (Option + a, Recommendation 3, p. 16). State felt that + while FCEP should concentrate on alternatives, that we could not present + the international program as one in which reprocessing is a closed + question to which we already know the answer. Therefore, the evaluation + would have to include reprocessing abroad, although we would cancel it domestically so as to + provide a strong “educational” signal.

+

Brown argued that this position + raised the question of “who would co-opt whom”. He felt that State’s + position amounted to saying “we won’t reprocess, but you can” whereas we + could be saying “we won’t, and we don’t believe you should because it’s + dangerous and perhaps suicidal”. Brown doubts that State’s position is a correct tactic: + “If we are unable to head off the French, the Germans, and the Japanese + then we are simply indulging in a self-denial”. He stated that even + Option b as presented in the PRM isn’t strong enough: “the tone of the + paper doesn’t satisfy me” and that the only tactic which holds some + chance of success would be to take a very tough position against + reprocessing. He acknowledged that this is a risky approach and we have + no way of knowing whether it will work.

+

Schlesinger agreed that we will + have to spend “considerable diplomatic capital” and added “the only way + to head off the French is to deal with the breeder, just playing around + with safeguards isn’t going to do it”. However, he is even less + optimistic than Brown that our + efforts will be successful. On being asked to sum up his position, + Brown said that the FCEP + should focus “exclusively on alternative fuel cycles not requiring + separation of plutonium”. When asked by others how he would prevent + other nations from going ahead with reprocessing he replied: “we will + let them go ahead to the extent we can’t help it”. Warnke agreed with Brown. Schlesinger did not disagree but was highly skeptical of + its chances of success. Nye + continued to argue that some reprocessing was required “as the bait on + the hook” and to answer “technical and institutional” questions.

+

International Plutonium Storage

+

The group reached quick agreement that we not + continue to pursue the concept of an IAEA plutonium storage regime as proposed in the October + 28th statementSee footnote 2, Document 317. (Recommendation 5, p. + 18, Option b).

+

Full Scope Safeguards

+

All agencies firmly agreed that we should adopt full scope safeguards as + a “goal”, the discussion concerned whether we should adopt them + unilaterally. ACDA took the lead in + strongly arguing that we do (Option a, + Recommendation 13, p. 34) while State argued for a modified version + (Option b) under which a nation would not have to + place existing sensitive material under safeguard + and could acquire an unsafeguarded sensitive facility by simply terminating—but not technically breaking—its agreement with us. State + believes that this option would be more acceptable to non-NPT parties, particularly, Israel.

+

Aaron argued that the Israelis + would never agree to this, and that therefore we might as well adopt + full scope safeguards because of its symbolic significance. ERDA disliked both Options a and b and favored Option + d—continuation of present policy. Schlesinger moved from a position of + uncertainty to one of outright disapproval of full scope safeguards, + warning that it was “not a risk but a certainty” that we would lose some + of the market share we now have if we adopt full scope. Brzezinski commented that we have to be + much more explicit in the assumptions we make as to the probable + reactions of other nations to our policies. We have to be more precise + about the political price we may have to pay. The discussion ended with + no consensus, but with some leaning toward full scope safeguards.

+

Application of New Criteria

+

The group then considered how new export criteria would be imposed on + existing agreements for cooperation (Recommendation 19, p. 41). State + favored the position that the law should require the President to + determine after a specified time whether supply to a given nation could + continue if all the criteria are not met (Option b). ERDA on the other hand + favored Option c which would simply make the new + criteria “negotiating goals” which would be applied to existing + agreements only when there is complete supplier acceptance. ERDA feels that “we no longer have much + market control, its timely to use what we’ve got”.

+

EURODIF Purchase

+

The question of whether the United States should purchase shares in + EURODIF (multinationally-owned enrichment enterprise in France) was + discussed. State was alone in urging that the Administration seek + legislative authority to do so. Others argued that this proposal needs + more study, particularly Schlesinger who argued that this plan would amount to + saying that “we don’t trust ourselves” and that it would be a direct + attempt to “circumvent U.S. law and U.S. policy”. All then agreed on the + need for further study, with State urging that it be treated as a + “matter of urgency”.

+

Legislative Approach

+

There was a swift and complete consensus that the Administration produce + its own comprehensive legislative package, rather than attempting to + work through bills already introduced.

+

Open Season

+

On the question of whether ERDA should + hold an open season (Recommendation 7, p. 24) when customers would be + allowed to cancel or defer + enrichment commitments made on the basis of unrealistic demand + expectations, there was complete agreement, except from Schlesinger who felt that we had + worked hard to get long term contracts, and now we should stick to + them.

+

Follow-On Needs

+

Nye summarized the issues which + urgently need further work, including establishing the international + diplomatic framework for the pause and the FCEP, and the budgetary and + program decisions necessary to implement whatever policy is agreed upon. + He felt that the former task should be carried out by a task force + chaired by State, and the latter by one chaired by ERDA. Both task forces would be + subcommittees of the follow-on interagency group.

+

OMB

+

OMB, was not represented at the meeting, + but did submit written commentsNot + found. which focus on “the lack of necessary analysis” in + several areas, but particularly as regards the fuel assurances and spent + fuel storage incentive programs. OMB + feels that questions of scope, costs, criteria, effectiveness and + domestic impacts have not been adequately defined and that therefore the + studies proposed in Recommendations 4, 8 and 10 be clearly recognized as + studies and not as plans for implementation. OMB also favors continued funding for some reprocessing + activities (Option a, Recommendation 3).

+

Attachment

+

Areas of AgreementSecret.

+

Washington, undated

+

There is consensus (or very nearly so) on these PRM recommendations.

+ + + Number + Subject + Comments + + + 1 (p. 13) + Pause + ERDA notes its belief that + if Japan participates in the evaluation program the Tokai plant + should be allowed to operate. + + + + + + 2 (p. 14) + International Evaluation Program + - - - - - - + + + 4 (p. 17) + Spent Fuel Storage + OMB feels that much more must + be learned about the parameters, costs and consequences of such + a program, but does not disagree so long as the study is clearly + a study and not a plan of implementation. + + + 5 (p. 18) + International Plutonium Storage + Consensus at PRC on option + b—de-emphasize efforts to establish + international plutonium storage. (This reverses a recommendation + made by Ford in the + October 28th statement.) + + + 7 (p. 24) + Fuel Assurance—Further Study and Open SeasonDebated at PRC. [Footnote is in the + original.] + All agencies agree on open season (allowing both cancellation + and deferral) but at PRC + meeting Schlesinger + disapproved, feeling that this would be “administrative + self-abuse” and “would not help to establish our credibility as + a supplier”. + + + 8 (p. 24) + Fuel Assurance—Revised Terms for Enrichment Contracts + - - - - - - + + + 9 (p. 25) + Fuel Assurance—Presidential Override of NRC Decisions + - - - - - - + + + 10 (p. 26) + Fuel Assurance Study + OMB feels that on this as on + 7 and 8 above, that the PRM + goes too far toward implementation and does not adequately + reflect the current lack of programatic development and + budgetary analysis. OMB has no + problem with a thorough study however. + + + + 11 (p. 27) + Investment in EURODIF/COREDIFDebated at PRC. [Footnote + is in the original.] + Consensus was reached after PRC discussion that this proposal will not be + adopted at this time but will be studied as one of many possible + international fuel assurances to be analyzed in 10 above—the + study to be conducted as a matter of urgency. + + + 12 (p. 29) + Sanctions + There is strong agreement on this package with the exception + that ERDA “questions the + wisdom” of the proposed legislation since it might “unduly limit + Presidential flexibility”. + + + 13 (p. 34) + Safeguard Policy if agreed by other Suppliers + - - - - - - + + + 15 (p. 35) + Provisions re PNEsDebated at PRC. [Footnote is in the + original.] + This issue is closely tied to, and should be considered in + connection with the question of required safeguards + (Recommendation 14). + + + 16 (p. 36) + Other Provisions in New Agreements + - - - - - - + + + 17 (p. 37) + Criteria Applied to Existing Agreements + ERDA has problems with the + reprocessing criterion which it feels “could immediately result + in delays in export”. + + + 18 (p. 39) + Upgrading Existing Agreements + OMB approves if it is + understood that the use of fuel assurances as “primary + incentive” in any negotiation be contingent upon Presidential + approval of recommendations made in the study required by 10 + above. + + + + + + 20 (p. 43) + Legislative PackageDebated at + PRC. [Footnote is in + the original.] + Vigorous unanimity at PRC + that Administration should develop its own comprehensive + bill. + + + 21 (p. 49) + Non-Nuclear Alternatives + All agencies approve this recommendation, but it is + substantially weaker than position taken during campaign. + Stronger alterna-tive (World Energy Conference, or some other) + is proposed. + +
+
+ +
+ 329. Memorandum of ConversationSource: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, + Brzezinski Material, VIP + Visit File, Box 8, Japan: Prime Minister Fukuda, 3/18–24/77, Folder 8. Secret; Noforn. The + meeting occurred in the Cabinet Room. The memorandum is scheduled to + be printed in full in Foreign Relations, 1977–1980, vol. XIV, Korea; + Japan. + Washington, March 22, 1977, 10:35 + a.m. + + PARTICIPANTS + President Jimmy + Carter + Takeo Fukuda, Prime + Minister of Japan + Vice President Walter + Mondale + Cyrus Vance, Secretary of + State + Iichiro Hatoyama, Minister of Foreign Affairs + Zbigniew Brzezinski, + National Security Advisor + Sunao Sonoda, Minister of State and Chief Cabinet Secretary + Thomas Shoesmith, Charge’ d’Affaires, American Embassy, + Japan + Fumihiko Togo, Japanese Ambassador + Keisuke Arita, Deputy Vice Foreign Minister + Richard Holbrooke, Assistant Secretary of State for East + Asia + Toshio Yamazaki, Director General + Hisashi Owada, Private Secretary to the Prime Minister + Koji Watanabe, Division Chief, First Section North American + Affairs Bureau, Foreign Ministry + Henry Owen + Michael Armacost, Senior Staff Member, NSC (Notetaker) + Robert Hormats, Senior + Staff Member, NSC + + Ryuichiro Yamazaki (Interpreter) + James Wickel (Interpreter) + William Sherman, Japan Country Director, Department of + State + +

The President began by outlining to the large meeting the points + discussed in his preceding private talk with Prime Minister Fukuda.Not + found. He underscored the importance the U.S. attaches to + nonproliferation and the reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel, and noted + that we are currently in the process of developing a national policy + concerning energy which would be made public in mid-April. He expressed + his belief that reprocessing spent fuel elements of light water reactors + is not necessary anywhere in the world. He noted that despite the + billion dollar investment we have made in the Barnwell reprocessing + facility in South Carolina, if we adopt the policy on reprocessing + toward which he is currently inclined, that facility will not be used. + He acknowledged that Japan has a large stake in nuclear energy and has + developed its own pilot reprocessing plant at Tokai.The implications of the Japanese reprocessing plant + at Tokai are analyzed in an NSC + Paper, undated, attached to a memorandum from Brzezinski to Carter, April 5; ibid. He + added that this issue—which will be on the agenda at the Summit meeting + in London—will require international agreement, and he hoped that we + could get all nations to forego the use of reprocessing capabilities. In + this connection the President said he had given the Prime Minister the + just-published report of American scientists on the problems and + potential of nuclear energy use (Nuclear Power Issues + and Choices). The President emphasized the need for very close + consultations among governments to develop guidelines for restraint in + this area which we would apply first to ourselves and to all nations of + the world, not just Japan.

+

The President recognized that there are many nations involved in this + problem. He stated that we have complete confidence in Japan’s sincere + desire to avoid proliferation, but, he said, we need a worldwide + agreement to control the proliferation of nuclear weapons capabilities. + In this connection he referred to difficult negotiations we have already + undertaken with Germany, Brazil, Pakistan, and France. In addition he + said that we are trying to control the development of a nuclear weapons + capability in Taiwan, the ROK, South Africa, and India. He noted that + Canada and Australia, both major producers of uranium, are eager to + control proliferation. He expressed again his belief that close + consultations between the U.S. and Japan were desirable, whatever his + final decision. He affirmed that we intend to avoid making our decisions + in a way which would be embarrassing to Japan, but he reiterated his + desire to promote a wide agreement concerning reprocessing capabilities + that would help avoid the spread of nuclear weapons.

+ +

The Prime Minister then emphasized the special position of Japan + concerning nonproliferation. Japan, he said, is the only nation which + suffered a nuclear attack; the Government of Japan firmly maintains the + three non-nuclear principles, i.e. no manufacture, no use, no + introduction of nuclear weapons into Japan. His concerns about + nonproliferation, Prime Minister Fukuda said, may even exceed those of President + Carter. At the same time, + Japan’s energy situation compels it to explore all possible alternatives + to fossil fuels. When Japan ratified the Nonproliferation Treaty, the + GOJ promised the Diet and the + Japanese public that this would remove impediments to Japan’s + acquisition of a complete nuclear cycle, including reprocessing + capabilities.In an undated memorandum, + Vance told Carter that since Japan was “90 + percent dependent on outside energy sources,” it saw nuclear power + “as its only realistic means of reducing this dependence” in spite + of its “historic sensitivity to the dangers of proliferation.” + (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, VIP Visit + File, Box 8, Japan: Prime Minister Fukuda, 3/18–24/77, Briefing Book [II]) Carter initialed Vance’s memorandum. In his + memoirs, Brzezinski recalled + that he had alerted Carter + “to the extreme sensitivity of the Japanese to any changes in our + nuclear policy and the impact these changes would have on U.S.-Japan + relations.” (Brzezinski, Power and Principle, pp. 130–131) + Japan now has a pilot reprocessing plant which is ready to begin “hot” + tests this summer. Inability to initiate these tests, Fukuda said, as a result of U.S. + decisions would constitute his “biggest political headache”.On February 25, the Embassy in Japan warned the + Department of State that “the Japanese believe that controls on fuel + reprocessing which the U.S. may adopt could set back their effort to + make themselves less dependent on OPEC oil. It would be difficult to + overstate the strategic importance of this issue. In all + probability, few developments could contribute more to confirming + Japan’s long-term orientation toward the U.S. than our assured + cooperation in its nuclear energy program.” (Telegram 2626 from + Tokyo, February 25; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + D770065–0493) The Prime Minister then posed the question: + “Are other countries possessing reprocessing capabilities going to stop + their activities in this field? What about the communist countries?” If + the others continue, and Japan is prevented from doing so, he said this + would constitute an example of “unforgivable inequality”. Prime Minister + Fukuda promised to pass the + report which the President had given him on to his experts, but he added + that urgent consultations at a governmental level between the U.S. and + Japan would be required. He asked, “Who is the highest and most + authoritative U.S. representative on this subject with whom we should + consult?”

+

The President indicated that the U.S. would try to obtain the agreement + of the UK, France, West Germany, and the + USSR—as well as Japan—to join us + in stopping reprocessing. We think reprocessing is wasteful and + unnecessary. We have no authority over other nations, he said, but we + are thinking in terms of voluntarily complying with constraints on the + use of reprocessing capabilities ourselves even in the absence of an international agreement. + The President emphasized that we intend to assure reliable supplies of + enriched uranium for light water power reactors, and the United States + is moving in the direction of improving its ability to provide fuel to + other nations. As for the USSR, he + indicated that he did not know what position they would take, but + Secretary Vance would be able to + give a quick report after his visit to Moscow.Vance met + with Soviet leaders in Moscow, March 28–30. See Document 332. Dr. James Schlesinger, he said, would represent him in + further discussions with Japan on this subject.

+

The Prime Minister asked whether U.S. policy decisions in this area would + be announced on April 20.

+

The President indicated they would.

+

The Prime Minister then asked whether the U.S. expected to be in touch + with the British, French, Germans, and Japanese on this matter before + that time.

+

The President again responded affirmatively.

+

The Prime Minister indicated his intent to designate someone from the + Japanese side to represent his government in urgent consultations with + Schlesinger.

+

The President said “fine”.

+

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to non-proliferation.]

+
+ +
+ 330. Presidential Directive/NSC–8Source: + Washington National Records Center, OSD Files: FRC + 330–80–0017, Box 62, A–388.3 NON–PRO 1977. Secret. + Washington, March + 24, 1977 + + TO + The Vice President + The Secretary of State + The Secretary of Defense + The Director, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency + The Administrator, Energy Research and Development + Administration + + + + ALSO + The Director of Central Intelligence + The Chairman, Nuclear Regulatory Commission + The Assistant to the President for Energy Policy + + + SUBJECT + Nuclear Non-Proliferation Policy (C) + +

It shall be a principal U.S. security objective to prevent the spread of + nuclear explosive—or near explosive—capabilities to countries which do + not now possess them. To this end U.S. non-proliferation policy shall be + directed at preventing the development and use of sensitive nuclear + power technologies which involve direct access to plutonium, highly + enriched uranium, or other weapons useable material in non-nuclear + weapons states, and at minimizing the global + accumulation of these materials.

+

1. Specifically, the U.S. will seek a pause among all nations in + sensitive nuclear developments in order to initiate and actively + participate in, an intensive international nuclear fuel cycle + re-evaluation program (IFCEP) whose technical aspects shall concern the + development and promotion of alternative, non-sensitive, nuclear fuel + cycles. This program will include both nuclear supplier and recipient + nations.

+

2. For its part the United States Government will:

+

—Indefinitely defer the commercial reprocessing and recycle of plutonium + in the U.S.

+

—Restructure the U.S. breeder reactor program so as to emphasize + alternative designs to the plutonium breeder, and to meet a later date + for possible commercialization. As a first step the need for the current + prototype reactor, the Clinch River project, will be reassessed.

+

—Redirect the funding of U.S. nuclear research and development programs + so as to concentrate on the development of alternative nuclear fuel + cycles which do not involve access to weapons useable materials.

+

—Provide incentives, in the area of nuclear fuel assurances and spent + fuel storage, to encourage the participation of other nations in the + International Fuel Cycle Evaluation Program. Detailed studies of these + programs shall be carried out by the NSC Ad Hoc Group established herein, and submitted to me as + directed in the accompanying memorandum.

+

—Initiate a program of assistance to other nations in the development of + non-nuclear means of meeting energy needs.

+

—Increase production capacity for nuclear fuels.

+

3. It shall also be U.S. policy to strengthen the existing + non-proliferation regime: by encouraging the widest possible adherence + to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, and to comprehensive international + safeguards; by strengthening and improving the IAEA; and by providing stronger sanctions against the + violation of nuclear agreements. Therefore the U.S. will announce its intention to + terminate nuclear cooperation with any non-nuclear weapons state that + hereafter

+

—detonates or demonstrably acquires a nuclear explosive device; or

+

—terminates or materially violates international safeguards or any + guarantees it has given to the United States.

+

4. In order to implement these policies to perform the necessary studies, + and to coordinate departmental activities in the non-proliferation + field, I hereby establish an NSC Ad Hoc + Group, to be chaired by the Department of State, and to include the + Presidential Assistant for Energy. This group shall establish task + forces, chaired by the appropriate agencies, to perform, among others, + the tasks detailed in the accompanying memorandum.

+

Jimmy + Carter

+

Attachment

+

Tasks for the NSC Ad + Hoc GroupSecret.

+

Washington, undated

+

The NSC Ad Hoc Group, established in + PD–8, is directed to:

+

—prepare and submit by March 31 a comprehensive list of all activities, + facilities and technologies related to nuclear power, which involve + direct access to weapons useable materials;

+

—prepare and submit by April 1, a review of the Fiscal 1978 budget with + appropriate recommendations to implement the policies set forth in the + accompanying Presidential Directive;

+

—prepare and submit by April 5, proposed nuclear export policies, + including: a summary of current applications for export of Highly + Enriched Uranium and plutonium; criteria which should be applied to + nuclear exports at the licensing stage; a list of criteria and + conditions which should be required for new and amended agreements for + cooperation, and necessary revisions in existing agreements; explicit + options covering U.S. policies on consent to retransfer, reprocess, + reexport and reuse U.S.-supplied fuels, Highly Enriched Uranium, + plutonium, and materials irradiated in U.S.-supplied facilities; and + legislative proposals to implement these recommendations;

+

—prepare and submit by May 1, a detailed study of measures the U.S. might + take so as to be able to offer nuclear fuel assurances to nations participating in the + International Fuel Cycle Evaluation Program, including: rigorous revised + estimates of future nuclear energy demand; measures to expand U.S. + enrichment capacity; analysis and justification of U.S. stockpile + programs; recommendations for appropriate terms and conditions for + future toll enrichment contracts; assessments of the benefits of + declaring an open season on enrichment contracts; exploration of + international undertakings and agreements; and other short and long-term + options for providing nuclear fuel assurances and collaborating with + other suppliers;

+

—prepare and submit by May 1, a thorough study of measures the U.S. might + take concerning nuclear fuel storage including: measures to expand U.S. + spent fuel storage and transportation capacity; proposals for meeting + the storage needs of those participating in the International Fuel Cycle + Evaluation Program; analysis of the advantages and disadvantages of + international spent fuel storage (but not plutonium storage which the + U.S. shall discourage and measures to accelerate the development, + demonstration and licensing of long-term spent fuel storage, both + retrievable and terminal.

+

—prepare and submit by May 1, a program for promoting the development of + non-nuclear energy alternatives and for assisting other nations with + non-nuclear means to meet their energy needs.

+ + Jimmy + Carter + +
+ +
+ 331. Telegram From the Department of State to the White HouseSource: Carter Library, Papers + of Walter F. Mondale, Box + 84, National Security Issues—Nuclear Policy, 2/1977–4/1979. Secret; + Immediate; Nodis. Printed from a + copy that indicates the original was received in the White House + Situation Room. + Washington, March 27, 1977, 0451Z +

67973. For Dr Z Brzezinski only. + Following tel sent Action Bonn, Brasilia, Brussels, Berlin, The Hague, + Islamabad, London, Moscow, New Delhi, Ottawa, Paris, Prague, Rome, + Stockholm, Tehran, Tokyo, Warsaw, Info NATO, EC Brussels, IAEA + Vienna, USUN New York, USDel Secretary + from State March 27:

+

Quote Secret State 67973 Tosec 30017. Eyes only for the Ambassador; + Moscow for Secretary Vance. + Subject: Presidential Nuclear Policy Statement.

+ +

1. In the very near future, the President intends to announce certain + policy decisions concerning nuclear non-proliferation.

+

2. You should approach host government at high level—Foreign Minister, + Prime Minister, or equivalent—and advise host government in strictest + confidence of forthcoming Presidential statement, indicating that U.S. + is consulting only small number of important states in advance. You + should explain that we envisage announcement will present U.S. domestic + policy decisions, within context of strong U.S. desire to develop + effective international arrangements to meet global energy needs, while + minimizing risk of spread of nuclear explosive capabilities.

+

3. For your use in briefing host government, you should use the following + talking points, which may be left behind as a Non-Paper.

+

Begin text:

+

(A) The United States is mindful of global energy needs, and the desire + of individual countries to gain a secure source of energy supply. At the + same time, the U.S. is deeply concerned about the consequences for all + nations of a further spread of nuclear explosive capability. It believes + that these risks would be vastly increased by the further spread of + sensitive nuclear technologies. The United States views sensitive + technologies and facilities as those which involve direct access to + plutonium, highly enriched uranium, or other weapons useable + material.

+

(B) The United States has made a thorough review of nuclear fuel cycles, + bearing in mind all relevant factors. It has concluded that the + overriding dangers of proliferation and direct implications for peace + and security—as well as strong scientific and economic evidence—militate + for a major change in U.S. domestic nuclear energy policies and + programs.

+

(C) Accordingly, the United States has reached the following domestic + decisions which will be announced in the very near future. The United + States will:

+

(I) Indefinitely defer the commercial reprocessing and recycling of + plutonium in the U.S.;

+

(II) Restructure the U.S. breeder reactor program to emphasize designs + other than the plutonium breeder, and to defer date for possible + commercialization;

+

(III) Redirect funding of U.S. nuclear research and development programs, + to concentrate on development of alternative nuclear fuel cycles which + do not involve access to weapons useable materials; and

+

(IV) Increase U.S. production capacity for nuclear fuels.

+

(D) These U.S. domestic decisions have implications for other nations. + Accordingly, the United States wishes to consult closely with a limited + number of interested nations on the international implications of its + domestic decisions, and on the best way for it to proceed in concert with these other nations + to promote the objective of developing effective international + arrangements to meet global energy needs and minimize the risk of + proliferation.

+

(E) The United States would like to discuss a wide range of international + approaches and frameworks, that will permit all nations to achieve their + energy objectives while reducing the likelihood of a further spread of + nuclear weapons. Among other things, it wishes to explore the + possibilities of an international nuclear fuel-cycle evaluation program, + aimed at exploring (I) alternative, non-sensitive fuel cycles; (II) a + variety of international and U.S. measures to assure access by all + nations to nuclear fuel supplies and spent fuel storage.

+

(F) The United States is committed to strengthening the non-proliferation + regime: by encouraging the widest possible adherence to the NPT and to comprehensive international + safeguards; by strengthening and improving the IAEA; and by enforcing sanctions against the violation of + nuclear agreements with the U.S.

+

(G) The United States seeks comments and suggestions on this approach, as + part of developing a multilateral framework to resolve issues raised + above. Initial comments and questions would be welcome in advance of + announcement of U.S. domestic nuclear policies and programs. These + comments and questions may be given to the U.S. Ambassador for referral + to Washington, or directly to the State Department through embassies in + Washington. We would welcome receiving initial comments and questions by + April 1.

+

(H) Following announcement of U.S. domestic programs, the United States + will continue the closest possible consultations with other governments, + seeking ways to meet in an international framework the various problems + and issues involved. End text.

+

4. For Brasilia and Islamabad. On an urgent basis the Department would + value advice you may have to offer in connection with briefing host + government. Christopher. + Unquote.

+ + Christopher + +
+ +
+ + 332. Memorandum of ConversationSource: Department of State, Office of the Secretariat + Staff, Special Adviser to the Secretary (S/MS) on Soviet Affairs + Marshall Shulman—Jan 21, + 77–Jan 19, 81, Lot 81D109, Box 8, Vance to Moscow, March 28–30, 1977. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Krimer; and approved in draft by + Hyland. The meeting took + place at the Kremlin. The memorandum of conversation is printed in + full in Foreign + Relations, 1977–1980, vol. VI, Soviet Union, Document + 20. + Moscow, March 29, 1977, 4:30–7:30 + p.m. + + SUBJECT + Middle East, Arms Control + + + PARTICIPANTS + + UNITED STATES + Secretary Cyrus R. + Vance + Ambassador Malcolm + Toon + Mr. Paul + Warnke + Assistant Secretary Arthur + Hartman + Mr. William + Hyland + Mr. Leslie + Gelb + Mr. William D. + Krimer, Interpreter + + + USSR + Foreign Minister A.A. + Gromyko + Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers L.V. + Smirnov + Deputy Foreign Minister G.M. + Korniyenko + Ambassador A.F. + Dobrynin + Notetaker—Name Unknown + Mr. V.M. + Sukhodrev, Interpreter + + +

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to non-proliferation.]

+

NON-PROLIFERATION

+

Gromyko + suggested that the subject of non-proliferation required some + discussion.

+

The Secretary said he would be happy to start. As + he had indicated the other day, the question of non-proliferation was a + matter of major concern for our government, for the Carter Administration.On March 28, Vance told Brezhnev and Gromyko that Carter “felt that we must be bold and vigorous in + achieving control over nuclear weapons,” that “in the very near + future we would announce certain policy decisions concerning nuclear + non-proliferation,” and that the United States “shared Soviet + concern about the dangers of proliferation of nuclear weapons, and + we believed that the actions which we are about to take would + constitute a major step forward toward this end.” The memorandum of + conversation is printed in full in Foreign Relations, 1977–1980, vol. + VI, Soviet Union, Document 17. As a consequence of + the priority we attached to this issue, we had begun a study immediately + upon taking office. That study was about to be completed. We would be + prepared to discuss such things as international fuel assurance + arrangements, international spent fuel storage and strengthening IAEA safeguard arrangements. As a result + of the study, we had come to the following conclusions, which would be + announced very shortly: First, we would indefinitely defer commercial + fuel reprocessing; Secondly, we + intended to restructure our breeder reactor program in such a way as to + stress designs other than plutonium-related; Third, we would redirect + the funding of nuclear research and development programs in such a way + as to concentrate on alternative nuclear fuel cycles that would not + involve materials that could be used for weapons purposes; Fourth, we + planned to increase US production of + nuclear fuels. We believed that these steps will be constructive and + that they should be discussed in international fora, to see whether + international action could be taken to strengthen control on sensitive + technology with the objective of stopping further proliferation. That in + brief was where we stood today. We would, of course, continue to urge + those who had not signed the NPT to + sign and ratify the treaty in view of its great importance. We would + continue to encourage widest possible use and adherence to the treaty + and urge strengthening and improving safeguards for enforcing sanctions + against violators of such a treaty.

+

Gromyko + said that he had listened to the Secretary’s communication on this issue + with interest, and so had his colleagues. Soviet views on this issue + were as follows: the task of preventing nuclear war demanded most + insistently that insuperable obstacles be placed in the path of the + spread of nuclear weapons. Above all, this was the task of making the + NPT, already in effect, truly + all-embracing and universal. It was well-known fact that countries such + as the Peoples Republic of China and France were outside the treaty; so + were a significant number of other countries. The Secretary knew this + well and also surely knew that there were some countries that were very + close to starting the building of their own nuclear weapons. The Soviet + Union was prepared, together with the United States, to continue efforts + aimed at insuring that these and all other states so far outside the + treaty become parties to the treaty. Why could not our two countries + think of some new forms of influencing them, perhaps even on a + trilateral basis (i.e., the US, the + USSR, and UK) or on a bilateral basis only, with the Soviet and + US governments approaching the + governments of non-participating countries to speed up adherence to the + treaty. Speaking quite frankly, Gromyko would say that the Soviet side had not yet + observed any energetic measures on the part of the United States to + exert its influence in the right direction. It was quite true that + occasionally some statements were made urging adherence, but this was + only a small part of what could be done. He would not say that the + United States had acted wholeheartedly in this matter so far. The danger + remained that non-nuclear countries which received nuclear materials + from other countries would utilize such materials for purposes of + weapons development. The Soviet Union was resolved to make sure that + international cooperation in this field and in the field of peaceful + nuclear explosions not become another channel for nuclear weapons + proliferation. He was convinced + that this was not a commercial question, but a major question of + policy.

+

By way of example, Gromyko + thought it would be appropriate to mention the current nuclear + deliveries by the FRG to Brazil and by + France to Pakistan, deliveries that could not but give rise to concern. + In the Soviet view, what was needed was effective nuclear control over + any receiving country. The Soviet Union had advocated and now advocates + all-embracing improvement of the system of control in this field, and + was prepared to cooperate with the United States and others.

+

The Secretary interrupted to say he appreciated + hearing this from Gromyko. As + Gromyko would know, we had + worked with Brazil, Germany, France and Pakistan to see to it that + sensitive materials and information transfers through creating + processing plants not be brought to fruition, and that other measures be + taken to guarantee fuel supply so as to eliminate the danger in this + area.

+

Gromyko + said it would be hard for the Soviets to believe that the United States + was not able to bring greater pressure to bear on Brazil in these + matters. Had the Brazilian leaders really come to the conclusion that + they could not live without nuclear weapons? He thought the Brazilians + must be fully aware of the fact that their action might set off a chain + of events, thereby worsening the situation. Of course, he knew that some + positive statements were being made in the US from time to time, say every six months or so, but it + seemed to him that the United States was not fully using its options to + bring pressure to bear. Perhaps the new Administration would need some + time before it could do more in this respect.

+

The Secretary said he disagreed with the Minister. + His deputy had gone to Brazil to discuss this issue.See Document 404. + We had asked Brazilian leaders to stop their arrangement with Germany + and find an alternate solution. We had told them we would guarantee fuel + supply. As a result of this maximum pressure, Brazilian-US relations had become quite strained. It + was difficult to see how we could have done more.

+

Gromyko + said that, of course, the Secretary was a better judge of what could be + done. He would suggest that in addition to the contacts we had on this + subject within the framework of international organizations, it would be + useful to hold Soviet-American consultations on the whole complex of the + problem of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. It was true that we had + not had too much contact in this respect. Some meetings were held a long + time ago and at infrequent intervals. In the course of such + consultations, the Soviet Union and the United States could agree on + joint action in the direction of improving the already operating London understanding between + the exporting countries, in which the Soviet Union, the United States + and others were active. In the course of such consultations we could + also review the effectiveness of IAEA + functions, and discuss the question of sanctions. We had a great deal to + do.

+

The Secretary said that he would welcome that.

+

Gromyko + said that was very good. He would ask that both sides specifically + reflect on when they could consult on setting a specific schedule.

+

The Secretary agreed to do that.

+

Gromyko + said he wanted the US Government and + President Carter to know that + the Soviet Union attached signal importance to the entire issue of + non-proliferation. The Soviet leadership liked it when the President, or + the Secretary, or others, stressed the importance of this issue in the + view of the United States.

+

The Secretary said that was very good. The + President will be very pleased to hear of this Soviet position.

+

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to non-proliferation.]

+
+ +
+ 333. Telegram From the Embassy in the Federal Republic of Germany to + the Department of StateSource: National Archives, RG 59, + Central Foreign Policy File, P840084–2207. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. + Bonn, March 29, 1977, 1851Z +

5585. Department please pass Moscow for Secretary Vance. Subject: Presidential Nuclear + Policy Statement. Ref: (A) State 67973;See + Document 331. (B) Bonn + 5498.In telegram 5498 from Bonn, March + 29, Stoessel said “In the + interest of our own credibility,” the United States should “expedite + the issuance” of enriched uranium licenses to the FRG “in all cases where such action + would not run directly contrary to our broader non-proliferation + policy.” (National Archives, RG 59, + Central Foreign Policy File, D770107–0555)

+

Begin summary: After carefully reviewing talking points outlining + substance of forthcoming presidential statement on nuclear policy and + making several comments and inquiries regarding specific points, + Chancellor Schmidt said outline + would be studied immediately and comments would be given as soon as possible, in first instance orally + to Secretary Vance when he + visits Bonn March 31During their March 31 + meeting, Schmidt handed + Vance a Non-Paper + detailing his government’s comments. (Tosec 30162/71504; Carter + Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Global Issues, + Oplinger/Bloomfield File, + Box 43, Proliferation: Foreign Consultation, 3–4/77) however, + Schmidt underlined in serious + tone that he felt time limit of April 1 for comments on subject of such + major significance to his country and to world as a whole was quite + inadequate. Somewhat bitterly, he questioned whether this procedure + reflected the nature of genuine consultations which should take place + between allies. End summary.

+

1. Chancellor Schmidt received me + March 29 for what developed into one and one-half conversation. Subject + matters concerned forthcoming presidential statement on nuclear policy, + FRG-Brazil nuclear deal, financial + aid to Portugal and SOFO. (Latter three subjects will be reported + Septels).Telegram 5766 from Bonn, March + 31, contains information on the Vance-Schmidt + discussions of the FRG-Brazil + nuclear deal, aid to Portugal, and the U.S. Army’s Special + Operations Field Office (SOFO) in Berlin. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + P850050–2334) Chancellor was accompanied by Chancellery + Deputy Assistant Secretary Loeck; I was alone.

+

2. After listening to my presentation regarding presidential statement on + nuclear policy and carefully reading Non-Paper which I left with him + containing talking points, Chancellor commented that, at first glance, + he felt US position as outlined was “not + free from in-built intellectual conflict.” In this connection, he noted + point (F) in talking points where it is said that US is committed to encouraging widest + possible adherence to the NPT. He had + no quarrel with this thought and indeed supported it strongly; however, + Chancellor felt it would be more accurate if reference had been made to + an “amended NPT,” since it seemed clear + that US was not satisfied with NPT as it presently exists. Indeed, if + NPT were to be re-negotiated, one + could think of a number of changes which should be made in it based on + experience of last ten years. Chancellor recalled his conversation in + Bonn with Vice President Mondale + in which he had stressed that FRG will + adhere to NPT and to any other treaty + to which it is a party;See footnote 2, Document 398. + moreover, FRG will be ready to + negotiate additional agreements in field of non-proliferation which + would contribute to increased controls.

+

3. In present circumstances, however, Chancellor saw a discrepancy + between US calling for wider adherence + to NPT and our stand with regard to + provision of nuclear technology to other states, as reflected in our + attitude toward FRG-Brazil agreement. + Here, he referred to Article IV of NPT + providing for non-discrimination. I remarked that we did not believe that Article IV + constituted an obligation for a state to transfer sensitive nuclear + technology to a state not possessing it. Chancellor rejoined that this + could be our interpretation and could be valid for US, but he did not see that, on other hand, + Article IV constituted an obligation on the FRG to refrain from transferring such technology.

+

4. Chancellor inquired as to meaning of phrase “indefinitely defer” + (para B.1 of talking points) in + reference to commercial reprocessing of plutonium. He wondered if this + meant that a firm decision had been taken to cancel all plans for + commercial reprocessing; I said I did not believe this was the case and + that the phrase should be taken as it stands, i.e., that further work on + commercial reprocessing installations would be deferred for the + indefinite future. Chancellor inquired if US had military reprocessing plants in operation and I + responded affirmatively.

+

5. Chancellor noted wording in para F + of talking points regarding sanctions against the violation of nuclear + agreements with the US and inquired + whether at the present time the US + considered that any states with nuclear agreements with the US are in violation of those agreements. I + replied that I did not believe that this was the case and that the + wording was intended to apply to possible future events.

+

6. In this connection, the Chancellor referred to “reluctance” of US to deliver highly enriched uranium to + EURATOMTelegram 43 to Brussels, January 2, refers to a + petition by the Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC) to the + Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) + requesting that exports of Highly Enriched Uranium for use in FRG nuclear reactors be denied. The + NRDC claimed that since the FRG had + refused to commit to “not export these technologies and ‘because the + FRG has shown a willingness to + export sensitive nuclear technologies,’ (apparently a reference to + FRG-Brazilian cooperation), + development of these reactor types by the FRG will inevitably lead to their spread to other + countries.” The NRDC also cited “over a dozen alleged inadequacies + in EURATOM safeguards system, + including absence of various types of U.S. back-up safeguard rights, + lack of physical security requirements, and inadequate U.S. + knowledge of operation and inability to obtain information from + EURATOM system.” Despite + the petition, the Department of State reported that it expected that + the export application, currently “under review within executive + branch,” would “shortly be forwarded to the NRC with recommendation for issuance.” (National + Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign + Policy File, D770001–1281) and inquired whether this should + be taken as a deliberate signal and a foreshadowing of the type of + sanctions which the US would take + against other states which might not agree with US views on nuclear policy. I said this was not the case + and that the delay in approval of shipments of highly enriched uranium + has been caused by bureaucratic requirements. (In this connection, see + Reftel (B).)

+

7. Chancellor focussed on date of April 1 (para G of talking points) by which US would wish to receive comments and noted that this was + extremely short timeframe in which to comment meaningfully on matter of + such importance to FRG and to world as + a whole. He said that, + obviously, FRG would wish to give most + serious consideration to statement of such “global strategic + significance” but that it was clearly impossible to provide considered + views by April 1. At this point, Chancellor queried whether Prime + Minister Fukuda of Japan had been + informed of forthcoming Presidential statement on a matter of such + importance to Japan during his recent visit to the United States. I said + I did not know but that Japanese Government, together with small number + of other governments, was being informed at present time of proposed + statement.

+

8. Chancellor noted Secretary Vance would be visiting Bonn March 31 and that + preliminary FRG views could be conveyed + to him orally at that time. However, and here Chancellor spoke in + emphatic and serious tones, he wished to emphasize his personal view + that, if indeed President’s statement is to be issued as soon as April 3 + or 4, he would find it difficult to understand, since he did not feel + that provision of such a limited time for consideration of a question of + this magnitude was really compatible with the type of consultative + procedures which should obtain between close allies.

+

9. Deputy Assistant Secretary Loeck, who escorted me out of chancellery + after conversation with Schmidt, + noted implications of Presidential statement for FRG’s program to develop reprocessing + capability. He said FRG feels latter is + essential to accomplishment of FRG’s + nuclear energy program; in light of this, Loeck said, he anticipated + that President’s proposed statement would be seen as having extremely + serious impact on FRG’s situation.

+ + Stoessel + +
+ +
+ + 334. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security + Affairs (Brzezinski) to President + CarterSource: Carter Library, National + Security Council, Institutional Files, Box 4, PD–08 [1]. Secret. Carter initialed the upper + right-hand corner of the memorandum. + Washington, April + 1, 1977 + + SUBJECT + Comments on Jim + Schlesinger’s Memorandum of March 31 Regarding PD No. 8 + +

I have no fundamental problems with Jim + Schlesinger’s thoughtful comments (Tab A). More + specifically:

+

1. Regarding constraints on non-nuclear weapons states, it seems to me + that the distinction between nuclear weapons states and non-nuclear + weapons states is an important fact; in some circumstances this fact should be treated differently when it + involves in one case an ally and in another case a non-ally, and our + diplomacy should reflect this additional distinction.

+

2. With respect to the phrase “demonstrably acquires a nuclear explosive + device,” [2 lines not declassified] Thus I + believe you retain the needed flexibility, though otherwise Jim’s point + is well taken.

+

3. Unless I am profoundly mistaken, I think that the first interpretation + given by Jim to the phrase “emphasize alternative designs to the + plutonium breeder” is correct.

+

4. I share Jim’s concern that we do not overdo our efforts given our + interest in good trilateral relations. I believe your present efforts at + consultations take that consideration into account. The question which + is really at issue here is one on which the government is deeply + divided: should the fuel cycle evaluation program include reprocessing, + or just alternatives to it? The first section of the attached summary of + the PRC meeting on proliferation (Tab + B)See Document + 328. will give you some feeling for the different + positions.

+ +

Tab A

+

Memorandum From the President’s Assistant (Schlesinger) to President + CarterSecret. In the upper right-hand corner of the + memorandum, Carter wrote + “Zbig—Comment. J.”

+

Washington, March 31, 1977

+ + SUBJECT + Problems Raised by P.D. No. 8 + +

In accordance with your suggestion,Not + found. I outline below the four problems that I see created + by the precise wording of P.D. No. 8.

+

1. The all-inclusive constraint on non-nuclear weapons + states. The P.D. imposes a definitive barrier between the + nuclear weapons and non-nuclear weapons states in terms of the handling + of nuclear power technologies. Some non-nuclear weapons states, notably + Germany and Japan, will regard this barrier as highly discriminatory. + Both at the time they were urged to ratify the NPT and in bilateral negotiations both countries were + assured that they would not be subjected to discrimination by remaining + in the status of non-nuclear weapons states. (It has been the continuing + desire of the United States Government to avoid creating any incentive + to become a nuclear weapons state.) Reprocessing facilities in Germany, + Japan, and also Belgium and Italy were established under these + understandings. These nations must be persuaded to join with the United + States in the effort directed toward the control of weapons-useable + material. But they will not accept being treated as in the same category + as Pakistan, Iran, or Brazil. To avoid unproductive controversy and to + provide the proper incentives for collaboration, the line of distinction + will have to be drawn someplace other than the non-nuclear weapons + states.In the right-hand margin next to + this paragraph, Carter wrote + “I agree.”

+

2. Termination of nuclear cooperation. The + difficulty in the phrase “demonstrably acquires a nuclear explosive + device” [2½ lines not declassified] The political + difficulties are obvious. Consequently, you may desire to put more + flexibility in your policy position before going public.Carter + underlined the words “before going public” and wrote “not going + public with this” in the right-hand margin next to this + paragraph.

+

3. The U.S. breeder program. If the phrase “emphasize alternative designs to the plutonium + breeder” implies that new money and the high growth rates will go to + alternative designs, that is readily accomplished. If, however, it were to imply that + aggregate spending on and program size of the alternatives will be + larger than for the LMFBR program, it + would imply either the dismantling of the LMFBR program or waste in the other programs or both. We + will need, I believe, to maintain an adequate base program for the + LMFBR. We should avoid plowing + ahead with commercialization. But we must continue our R&D on the LMFBR because in the 21st Century it may be an essential + fallback—if none of the other energy alternatives materialize. We cannot + afford, as the Ford Foundation + study emphasizes,Not found. simply + to back away from R&D on the LMFBR. We can defer commercialization, + but it will remain an essential fallback option.In the right-hand margin next to this paragraph, + Carter wrote “I + agree.”

+

4. The larger diplomatic problem embodied in the P.D. No. 8 is one + requiring your careful analysis, to assure that substantive benefits + exceed diplomatic costs. Briefly other nations will be reluctant to + follow us on reprocessing and even more reluctant to follow our lead on + defering the breeder. The starker (and purer) our diplomatic position on + these matters, the less likely is it that we shall gain the necessary + acquiescence of the Germans and Japanese, let alone the French. But + ultimately we must have the collaboration of the other supplier + countries. Thus, the question for your determination is the amount of + diplomatic capital that you wish to expend in staking out a position + which has the virtue of logical clarity but has the deficiency of + forfeiting the necessary foreign support.In + the right-hand margin next to this paragraph, Carter wrote “I agree.”

+
+ +
+ + 335. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security + Affairs (Brzezinski) to the + Deputy Secretary of State (Christopher)Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, + Box 32, London Suppliers Group: 3–6/77. Secret. At the top of the + memorandum, an unknown hand wrote “[illegible] Sent 4/1/77 + [illegible].” + Washington, undated + + SUBJECT + The Future of the London Suppliers Group + +

I am very concerned at the evolution of the proposal to expand the London + Suppliers Group to include “threshold” states, from the status of a + suggestion we were willing to study in order to make progress in the + German-Brazilian talks, to a proposal whose implementation we are now + apparently studying.Not found.

+

In my view, there are several compelling reasons for not expanding the + London Group, to wit:

+

—The London Suppliers Group has been a powerful and effective instrument + for achieving concerted supplier policies. It is the only such + instrument available.

+

—Brazil may have two reasons for wanting entrance: status and the ability + to disrupt the suppliers club through an expanding membership of + recipients (if Brazil is admitted, many other nations will demand equal + treatment). Thus their motive might be not only to become one of the big + guys, but perhaps to destroy the only really effective + anti-proliferation forum in the process.

+

—We clearly have to deal with the growing antagonism among the + non-supplier LDCs toward the ability of + the suppliers to set policy both in the London Group and in the IAEA. However my understanding was that + this was precisely the function we were envisaging for the Fuel Cycle + Evaluation Program which would be open to any nation which wished to + join.

+

—However, if both the London Group and the Fuel Cycle Evaluation are open to + recipients, we are left with no forum in which the suppliers can agree + on tough anti-proliferation policies.

+

—Expanding the Suppliers Group would be an enormous price to pay for . . + . what? We have no indication so far that Brazilians would give up the + sensitive parts of the FRG deal as the + quid pro quo for admittance. Even if they were to accept this condition, + however, this plan

+

seems like short sighted policy. + What are we going to offer to the next nation—Pakistan and the others + which will follow—which will already be members because of the + expansion.

+

—In an expanded group the Soviet Union would gain direct access to + Western supplier relations with Western consumers. It could be expected + to take a hard line—and then sit back and watch us try to pick up the + pieces with Brazil and others.

+

I believe that this is a very important decision, and one which has not + been seriously enough studied. I note that it has been discussed with + several parties, including the Russians. My feeling is that we should + make clear to the Germans and to others who may ask, that the U.S. + position is that the expansion is a proposal—one among several—that we + are willing to consider and to study, but no more. Anything beyond this + I believe would require the President’s direct approval. I would welcome + your thoughts on this matter.

+ + Zbigniew + BrzezinskiBrzezinski signed the + memorandum “Zbig.” + +
+ +
+ 336. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security + Affairs (Brzezinski) to President + CarterSource: Carter Library, National + Security Council, Institutional Files, Box 4, PD–08 [1]. Confidential. Sent for + action. In the upper right-hand corner, Carter wrote “Zbig—What do we have in reprocessing + capacity now. For military or other purpose? J.” + Washington, April + 2, 1977 + + SUBJECT + Proliferation—Follow-on to PD–8 + +

As a result of the Presidential Decision you signed last week, several + tasks were immediately assigned to the follow-on group. The first paper + is attached. A second decision paper addressing the Japanese problem is + also ready at this time.Reference is to a + discussion paper on Japan’s reprocessing plant at Tokai. The paper + can be found in the Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, + James Schlesinger + Papers, Energy Department, Japan, 1977–1979. Negotiations + with the Japanese begin next Tuesday. Three more short papers, dealing + with different aspects of U.S. nuclear export policies, will be ready + within a few days.

+ +

In PD–8, you build U.S. policy around the + central concept that the U.S. will attempt to discourage the further + development and use of “sensitive nuclear power technologies which + involve direct access to weapons useable materials.” The first task is + therefore to define exactly what we will classify + as “sensitive,” and in so doing, to achieve government-wide agreement on + this central issue. Since these definitions will form the conceptual + bedrock of our policy, they do require your approval. One + issue—concerning technologies which appear to lie on the boarderline—is + flagged for your special attention (Part II).

+

Part III of the paper deals with important political questions, and with + the crucial issue on which the bureaucracy is still deeply divided, of + whether our evaluation program will include reprocessing, or just + alternatives to it, and more specifically, what the U.S. attitude should + be toward existing reprocessing plants.

+

The attached paper (much of which I do not understand) was approved by an + interagency group, including Jim + Schlesinger.

+

Attachment

+

Paper Prepared by the Interagency Group on + ProliferationConfidential.

+

Washington, undated

+

ACTIVITIES, FACILITIES AND TECHNOLOGIES + INVOLVING DIRECT ACCESS TO WEAPONS USEABLE MATERIAL

+

I. Definition of + Weapons-Useable Materials

+

Weapons useable materials are:

+

—uranium which is enriched in the isotope 235 to 20% or greater (HEU), or uranium-233 (produced by + irradiation of thorium).

+

—plutonium.

+

These materials must be in either metal or oxide forms in order to be directly useable in + weapons: we will call these forms Category A.

+

Uranium 235 and 233 and plutonium may be present in various chemical and + physical forms short of pure oxide or metal: conversion of these forms + to pure oxide or metal presents differing difficulties in terms of + complexity of chemical operations, time required, and amount of material + required. They can be categorized as follows:

+ +

Category B: Material requiring relatively simple + chemical operation

+

—HEU in UF6 form (i.e. the output of + enrichment plants).

+

—HEU oxide or metal in unirradiated fuel + elements.

+

—HEU and/or Pu in nitrate form (i.e. the + output of reprocessing plants).

+

Category C:There is some + controversy over whether Categories B and C are really + different. The answer is not yet known. You should note that + they may turn out to be essentially one category. However the + gap between C and D is very large. [Footnote is in the + original.] Material requiring more complex chemical + operation

+

—unseparated U-Pu nitrates (e.g. from “coprocessed” LWR fuel).

+

—mixed oxide (U-Pu) fuel for LWRs (Pu less than 20%).

+

Category D: Material involving complex chemical + operation, in presence of high radioactivity levels, or involving + isotopic separation (decreasing order of difficulty)

+

—low enriched or natural uranium.

+

—all irradiated fuel.

+

—partially coprocessed fuel (i.e. some fission products removed).

+

II. + Technologies/Facilities

+

The major nuclear fuel cycles are presented in Table I, and identified by + their utilization or production of the various categories of material. + The Table reveals much useful information concerning proliferation. For + example, it indicates that only one strictly non-sensitive fuel cycle + now exists: the heavy water natural uranium cycle (HWR) without reprocessing. It should be + noted however, that the HWR has + significant non-proliferation problems. Its core uses many more, smaller + individual (and therefore harder to keep track of) fuel rods than an + LWR, and it is reloaded continuously, without shutting down the reactor. + On the other hand, an LWR must be shut down to be reloaded, and this is + only done twice a year, after which it is sealed. The HWR is also capable of producing high + quality weapons grade plutonium without interfering with its power + production. It was a research version of this reactor which produced the + material for the Indian explosion.

+

The other attractive fuel cycle from the proliferation viewpoint is the + LWR without recycle. A large majority of nuclear power programs are + based on this reactor (though not on this fuel cycle). The principle + drawback of the LWR cycle, is of course that it requires—somewhere—an + enrichment capability. All known enrichment processes produce a Category + B product, except laser isotope separation which produces Category + A.

+

The decisions which arise from these technical analyses relate to which + technologies will be included in our international program, and which we regard as too + sensitive, and therefore beyond the pale. The major problem on which + agencies now disagree, is whether coprocessing should be encouraged, for + example at Tokai. NRC feels that + coprocessing is no better in the long run than reprocessing, ACDA disagrees. Other agencies are + unsure. To a lesser degree, this same confusion holds for partial + coprocessing. This issue is addressed in the accompanying paper on + Tokai. It does not require a Presidential decision at this time, but any + guidance you might care to offer would be valuable.

+

COMMENTS: + _____________________________________________________________________ + _____________________________________________________________________ + _____________________________________________________________________

+

III. Political Aspects

+

To be effective, the evaluation program needs to develop and + demonstrate:

+

1. technical alternatives which will maximize physical barriers to the + direct accessibility of weapons-useable materials, e.g., LWRs with + long-term spent fuel storage instead of reprocessing, or cycles using + fuel “spiked” with highly radioactive material from partial + coprocessing.

+

2. technical/political alternatives which will isolate sensitive + technologies, facilities and materials under effective institutional + arrangements, e.g., multinational centers, or supplier monopolies on + sensitive facilities.

+

3. institutional arrangements by which positive results of the program + could be implemented as widely as possible.

+

The success of the evaluation program will depend, in large part, on a) + its acceptability to the other industrialized countries and b) the + degree to which it can be reconciled with existing programs relating to + breeder development and associated reprocessing. In this regard, it + should be noted that the British are in the process of scaling up their + Windscale reprocessing facility, the French have a commercial + reprocessing plant in operation with specific plans to increase + capacity, the Japanese have built their Tokai pilot reprocessing plant + and are ready to begin testing it, and the FRG has a pilot reprocessing plant in operation and appears + firmly committed to another much larger facility.

+

Table II lists existing or planned foreign reprocessing facilities. All + of these nations also have avowed interests in proceeding with the + breeder. In some cases, the U.S. does not have substantial leverage over + their activities. Our objective is to try to induce them to actively + participate in the evaluation program and to reorient their current + programs.

+

Given this situation, we could seek the cooperation of France, the UK, and the FRG through an evaluation framework which would include + optimizing safeguards and related controls that might be applied to reprocessing and related + plutonium handling facilities. Results of such work would prove valuable + should we not be successful in moving the world away from a plutonium + economy.

+

Alternatively we could adopt an approach which would leave existing + facilities outside the evaluation framework. At the same time, in either + case, the U.S. could attempt to wean away British and French + reprocessing clients through aggressive aid with spent fuel storage, and + through selective use of the U.S. veto over reprocessing of U.S.-origin + fuel.

+

If we adopt a more confrontational position, such as + seeking to actively discourage operation of all foreign facilities, + there is significant risk that key allies will go forward in spite + of our efforts, that we will undercut our attempts to move others + away from a plutonium economy, and that we will be isolated in the + process from both industrialized and developing countries.

+

ISSUE: General U.S. stance toward existing + reprocessing facilities:

+

Include in the evaluation program—work to improve safeguards _______.

+

Neutral stance—existing plants outside the evaluation program + _______.

+

Actively discourage reprocessing wherever it exists _______.

+

Other _______.

+

COMMENTS: __________________________________________________________

+
+ +
+ + 337. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant (Schlesinger) to President CarterSource: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, + James Schlesinger + Papers, Box 1, Chronological File, 1977 Apr. No classification + marking. The Committee’s Report is available on the National + Resources Defense Council’s website. + (http:://docs.nrdc.org/nuclear/files/nuc_77060801a_23.pdf) + Washington, April + 7, 1977 + + SUBJECT + BREEDER REVIEW REPORT + +

In late February, I directed the Acting Administrator of the Energy + Research and Development Administration (ERDA)Not found. to + establish a Steering Committee to review the Liquid Metal Fast Breeder + Reactor (LMFBR) program with + particular emphasis on the role of the Clinch River Breeder Reactor + Project (CRBR) in the program. The Steering Committee was made up of + knowledgeable opponents and proponents of the breeder reactor program. + The work of the Committee has been completed and the Acting + Administrator has provided me with his judgements, conclusions and + recommended courses of action.

+

The Committee reached a consensus conclusionAfter the word “conclusion,” Schlesinger wrote “*” and at the bottom of the page + wrote “* a delightful surprise since Committee included such + [illegible] as Thomas Cochran and Russell Train.” that the + U.S. should:

+

—Preserve the fission option for the long term;

+

—Research reactor technologies consistent with our nonproliferation + objectives;

+

—Recognize there is no totally proliferation-proof fission option.

+

I regard these conclusions as sound foundations of our policy on advanced + nuclear technologies and they reinforce the role of nuclear power in + providing portions of our future energy needs.

+

The Committee’s disagreements centered around the balancing of energy + risks and proliferation benefits of pursuing alternative systems. The + balancing of these risks and benefits is at the heart of national policy + on the breeder program, and the Committee’s disagreements illuminated + the central issues. The role of the CRBR is primarily a function of the + larger risk-benefit issue of the breeder.

+ +

However, the risks of pursuing alternative systems depend almost entirely + on assumptions, of which there are many varying views, regarding:

+

—the size of the U.S. uranium resource;

+

—the installed nuclear capacity in 2000;

+

—the rate of electricity demand growth after 2000.

+

With an estimate of 400,000 megawatts of installed nuclear capacity by + about the year 2000, which is consistent with our national energy + policy, it can be concluded that:

+

—if uranium resources are only 1.8 million tons, then the existing LMFBR program is needed to sustain the + fission option; or

+

—if uranium resources are 3.7 million tons, and if electricity demand + grows at 3.3 percent after 2000, breeder commercialization will occur + shortly after the turn of the century; or

+

—if uranium resources are 3.7 million tons, and if electricity demand + grows at 1.5 percent after 2000, there are adequate resources to delay + breeder introduction until about 2010.

+

Consistent with our nonproliferation objectives, we should actively + pursue research and development on advanced reactor concepts, fuels and + systems, and to the extent possible, with other nations. The potential + benefits could lead to:

+

—significant reduction in inventories of plutonium;

+

—extension of the uranium resource base (as shown in the + attachment);Attached but not + printed.

+

—limiting the accessibility of weapons materials through the use of + denatured fuel cycles (which require isotopic separation of the material + rather than the easier chemical separation).

+

During the next 1–2 years while these R&D programs are underway, the construction of the CRBR + should be deferred but the design and licensing processes should + continue. This approach:

+

—is consistent with our new nonproliferation policies and provides a + responsible and balanced signal to other nations;

+

—is consistent with the acceptable minimum delay in breeder introduction + (LMFBR or alternative) of 5–10 + years beyond the current date of 1993;

+

—mitigates dissolution of the Government/Industrial infrastructure + somewhat;

+

—extracts the benefit (a complete design) in which most of the CRBR + program costs have been invested to date.

+ +

Based upon my consideration of the conclusions reached by ERDA and the Steering Committee, I + recommend an advanced nuclear technology policy that reflects the + following elements:

+

—The LMFBR base program to be held at + somewhat less than its current level, and directed toward evaluation of + alternate breeders, fuels, and advanced converter reactors with emphases + on nonproliferation and safety concerns.

+

—Construction of the Clinch River Breeder Project indefinitely deferred + but the design completed and reviewed with the licensing + authorities.

+

—Within two years,

+

—One or more alternate concepts (breeder, advanced converter, and/or + fuel) be selected and an aggressive R&D program be mounted to pursue the selected + concepts.

+

—A demonstration plant for the alternate concept be part of the R&D program.

+

—A final decision be made to abandon CRBR construction entirely, or to + reorient it to the new concept.

+
+ +
+ 338. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security + Affairs (Brzezinski) to President + CarterSource: Carter Library, National + Security Council, Institutional Files, Box 60, PRC 007, 3/16/77, Nuclear + Proliferation. Secret. Sent for action. Carter initialed the upper right-hand corner of the + memorandum. + Washington, April + 15, 1977 + + SUBJECT + U.S. Attitude Toward Reprocessing Abroad + +

From the very beginning of the PRM + deliberations, the key central decision on which views have continued to + differ is the question of how the United States should relate to the + reality of existing reprocessing abroad. The first section of the + attached minutes of the PRC meeting + summarizes the arguments that were made on this subject at that time + (Tab A).See Document + 328.

+

The State Department feels very strongly that we have + to be able to give a specific answer to the question: “Will the + international fuel cycle evaluation program include + reprocessing?”

+ +

After your announcement,On April 7, + Carter stated that + despite his belief that the “benefits of nuclear power” were “very + real and practical,” he worried that “components of the nuclear + power process will be turned to providing nuclear weapons.” + Therefore, he announced that the U.S. would “defer indefinitely the + commercial reprocessing and recycling of plutonium produced in the + U.S. nuclear power programs” and called for the “establishment of an + international fuel cycle evaluation program aimed at developing + alternative fuel cycles and a variety of international and U.S. + measures to assure access to nuclear fuel supplies and spent fuel + storage for nations sharing common non-proliferation objectives.” + His administration would also begin to “redirect funding of U.S. + nuclear research and development programs to accelerate our research + into alternative nuclear fuel cycles which do not involve direct + access to materials usable in nuclear weapons.” He closed by + promising that the U.S. would “develop wider international + cooperation in regard to this vital issue through systematic and + thorough international consultations.” (Public + Papers: Carter, + 1977, pp. 587–588) Joe Nye and Nelson Sievering (of ERDA) held a consultation in Paris.The Nye/Sievering consultations with the French are reported + in telegram 9761 from Paris, April 4; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + D770116–0483. The French took a very tough line, stating that + they would not participate in the international evaluation program if + reprocessing were not included in it. The State Department interprets + this as a flat final position on the part of the French. I have no way + of knowing whether that is the case or whether their position was + dictated by negotiating tactics. However, as you know, it cannot be + doubted that there is substantial international resistance to our + proliferation proposals, particularly from the French.

+

The international evaluation program has been conceived as including + major physical demonstrations and actual operating plants on the various + new technologies. No one doubts that the United States will be providing + the bulk of the financial support for these operations. There is + therefore a real likelihood that if reprocessing + is included in the program, we would be supporting it abroad while + banning it here (which may mean a $250 million loss to the Barnwell + consortium).

+

This decision is a tough, close, political call. To rule out reprocessing + might fatally jeopardize the program, while to include it might merely + result in marginally improving the safety and safeguardability of + reprocessing plants, or even “proving” (perhaps by being outvoted in + some program forum) that reprocessing is acceptable—exactly the opposite + of what we set out to do.

+

A possible middle position might be to offer to do paper studies on + reprocessing within the context of the evaluation program and to leave + Windscale and LaHague (the British and French reprocessing plants) + operating outside the program. I do not believe that there is any a + priori reason that every nuclear facility in the participating countries + has to be a part of this program. Further, there are a great many + issues—in fact the key issues—which can be debated and decided on paper. + These include economic questions as to the value of reprocessing in a + non-breeder fuel cycle, the + availability of uranium resources, future nuclear energy demand, etc. + Other key issues that determine the value of reprocessing will be + directly addressed in the operational sense, including accelerated + R&D and development of spent + fuel storage technologies. I do not know whether this position would be + acceptable to others but it may be worth exploring.

+

Issue:

+

—A tough U.S. stance against reprocessing everywhere where we can + influence it. ______

+

or

+

—Including reprocessing in the international fuel cycle evaluation + program. ______

+

or

+

—A compromise position including paper studies, but not operational + demonstration. ______Carter checked this option and + wrote “We won’t pay reprocessing costs for others.”

+

Requests for approval for retransfer for + reprocessing.

+

The United States now has the right to approve or veto any retransfer of + U.S.-supplied fuel to another country (now the UK or France) for reprocessing. U.S. policies on approving + such requests is intimately related to our overall policy toward + reprocessing, since we can in effect, halt or very substantially slow + British and French reprocessing by preventing their clients from coming + to them.

+

The interagency group recommends that approvals be granted only when:

+

—Both the fuel owner and reprocessor are generally cooperative in + non-proliferation and evaluation efforts;

+

—The U.S. is provided a veto on retransfer of the produced plutonium;

+

—A need exists, for example in terms of requirement for fuel movement due + to fuel storage capacity limitations; and

+

—No commitment is implied for long term continuation of approvals.

+

The Nuclear Regulatory Commission which has the responsibility for + implementing these decisions, points out in its formal agency + commentsNot found. that: “The + paper could usefully include as an option a tougher stance on requests + for approval for retransfer of reprocessing. Under this option, reprocessing in the UK and France + would be viewed only as a last resort, to be avoided if at all + possible. A clear showing of need would be a strict + prerequisite to granting of approvals.”

+

Issue:

+

Interagency recommendation

+

or

+

Tougher stance (which still allows flexibility) Carter + checked this option and underlined the phrase “still allows + flexibility.”

+
+ +
+ 339. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security + Affairs (Brzezinski) to President + CarterSource: Carter Library, National + Security Council, Institutional Files, Box 60, PRC 007, 3/16/77, Nuclear + Proliferation. Confidential. Sent for action. + Washington, April + 15, 1977 + + SUBJECT + Proliferation Issues + +

There are two major issues on which there is interagency disagreement + whose resolution is required before the Administration legislation + package can be completed this weekend.

+

I. Additional Conditions to + be Required in New Agreements for Nuclear Cooperation.

+

The following are proposed to supplement existing requirements in the + negotiation of new agreements. We would also seek to incorporate these + conditions in existing agreements, through renegotiation and the use of + incentives.

+

A) Reprocessing:Consent for US-supplied fuel is + already required. [Footnote is in the original.] U.S. consent + required for reprocessing and further disposition of foreign fuel irradiated in all + U.S.-supplied (including previously supplied) reactors.

+ +

B) Retransfer:Consent + for US-supplied fuel is already + required. [Footnote is in the original.] U.S. consent + required for retransfer of foreign fuel + irradiated in all U.S.-supplied (including + previously supplied) reactors.

+

C) Full-Scope Safeguards: That the recipient be + required to place all its nuclear facilities and + materials under IAEA safeguards.

+

We can anticipate significant difficulty in negotiating U.S. rights of + approval over reprocessing and disposition of U.S.-supplied nuclear fuel + or foreign fuel irradiated in U.S. reactors. Many countries view U.S. + control of their fuel as infringement on their sovereignty and their + rights to recover the residual fuel value in the spent fuel. In + addition, with countries not party to the NPT, our greatest difficulty will be in attempting to + negotiate a full-scope safeguards provision requiring that such + recipients place all their nuclear facilities and + materials under safeguards of the International Atomic Energy. This + includes such countries as Spain, Brazil, Egypt, Israel, Turkey, South + Africa, India and a number of Arab countries.

+

Issue C: Full-Scope Safeguards

+

Traditionally, safeguards have been required by a supplier only on + nuclear material and equipment it supplies, although the 99 non-nuclear + weapon states party to the NPT have + agreed to accept safeguards on all their peaceful + nuclear activities. Only Canada and Sweden have gone beyond this in + adopting the policy of insisting on full-scope safeguards in new nuclear + agreements. While the UK, USSR, and others urge this as a common + supplier policy, they have heretofore been unwilling to adopt it unless + all suppliers agree. In the past, the French have specifically resisted + agreeing to such a safeguards requirement, arguing that it would put + them in the position of requiring of non-nuclear weapon states defacto + NPT adherence, a position they + continue to reject as a matter of principle.

+

All Agencies agree that we should favor a “full-scope + safeguards” policy. Agencies differ, on both the form of the full-scope safeguard commitment that + should be required and whether deviations should be tolerated in + exceptional circumstances.

+

In your San Diego speech of September 25,See + footnote 6, Document 325. + you said that the U.S. should make no new commitments for the sale of + nuclear technology or fuel to countries which refuse to forego nuclear + explosives and to place their nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards. There is a range of + formulations consistent with your San Diego statement. For example, at + British initiative, and with non-NPT + parties in mind, the IAEA has drafted + a model NPT-type agreement under which + a recipient would undertake, for a period of 25 years, to place all + nuclear facilities and materials that it might acquire under IAEA safeguards which would survive any termination of the + agreement.

+

Some favor this formulation as a fallback to our obvious first preference + for NPT adherence. They believe that + the NPT-type international commitment + covering existing and future facilities inherent in the British formula + is necessary to preclude the possibility that a + country would use outside assistance while developing indigenous + capabilities with intent to forego safeguards once they achieve + independence. Those who support this formulation also believe + that U.S. adoption of such a policy would significantly improve chances + of supplier agreement at the April meeting of supplier countries to + require full-scope safeguards as a condition of new supply commitments, + or, failing that, of getting the French and Germans to agree not to + undercut the application of such a policy by other suppliers.

+

Others favor (again as a fallback to our first preference for NPT adherence) a bilateral formulation. Under this formulation, the U.S. would + simply require as a provision in new bilateral agreements for + cooperation that the recipient have all its facilities and materials under safeguards as a continuing condition of + U.S. nuclear supply. As an example, Brazil, because it presently has all + its nuclear facilities and materials under safeguards, would qualify for + U.S. supply under this formula. However Brazil or any other nation would not be required to make an international + commitment to full-scope safeguards but would understand that + U.S. nuclear supply would be terminated if it acquired any unsafeguarded + nuclear facilities or materials.

+

Those who favor this formulation believe it achieves full-scope + safeguards but avoids forcing key recipients of concern, such as Brazil + and Spain, to make a highly-visable and long-term NPT type commitment which they have + publicly rejected in the past. They believe that while its negotiability + is uncertain, it may be more acceptable to certain countries of concern. + They also believe that this approach may prove more acceptable to the + French and therefore a greater chance of full supplier agreement.

+

Issue:

+

That you authorize the U.S. to require in new agreements for nuclear + cooperation the proposed controls A) and B) over foreign fuel irradiated + in U.S.-supplied reactors and:

+

i) Either NPT adherence or, failing + this, a full-scope safeguards formulation along the lines of the British formula involving an international + commitment to full-scope safeguards.

+

APPROVE ______ (ACDA)

+ +

OR

+

ii) Either NPT adherence or, failing + that, a full-scope safeguards formulation involving a bilateral formulation between supplier and recipient.

+

APPROVE ______ (State and Defense)Carter did not check either + option.

+

(ERDA favors neither)

+

II. Presidential + Flexibility.

+

Another issue concerns the degree of flexibility we will permit in + approving or disapproving new agreements, or in renegotiating existing + agreements, if we fail to obtain recipient acceptance of one or more of + required new conditions. Congress has taken a strong position that all + nuclear cooperation should be cut off if a particular agreement does + meet every single required condition. On the other hand, Executive + branch agencies believe that flexibility is essential in seeking to + renegotiate existing agreements where U.S. termination of supply on the + grounds that new conditions are not met, could be + legal grounds for a recipient to contend that in return it can legally + view its safeguards commitments as lapsed.

+

Agencies differ on the issue of whether flexibility—in the form of + exceptions to be determined by the President when he believes it would + serve the national interest—should be allowed just for existing + agreements or for new agreements as well.

+

Issue:

+

That you authorize us to seek in any proposed legislation of export + criteria, provision for exception by Presidential determination or + equivalent flexibility:

+

for existing as well as new agreements ______ (State, Defense)Carter + checked this option and underneath wrote “JC.”

+

OR

+

for existing agreements only ______ (ACDA)

+
+ +
+ + 340. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security + Affairs (Brzezinski) to the + Deputy Secretary of State (Christopher)Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, + Global Issues, Oplinger/Bloomfield File, Box 52, Proliferation: + Reprocessing, 4/77–8/80. Secret. + Washington, April + 22, 1977 + + SUBJECT + Presidential Decision on Proliferation + +

The President has decided that the international fuel cycle evaluation + program should include paper studies but not operational demonstrations + of reprocessing. He feels that there is no reason why every nuclear + facility in a participating country must be a part of the program. He + does not want any American funding—direct or indirect—of reprocessing + activities, other than paper studies. He believes that many of the key + questions concerning reprocessing—the economic value of reprocessing in + a non-breeder fuel cycle, the availability of uranium resources, future + nuclear energy demand, etc.—can be debated and decided on paper. Other + key concerns, particularly the development of spent fuel storage + capabilities, will be operationally studied. He views this option as a + compromise position between a rigid American posture against + reprocessing on the one hand, and encouraging the further development of + reprocessing by including it in the evaluation program, on the + other.

+

He has further decided that a clear showing of need should be a strict + prerequisite to granting of U.S. approvals of requests to retransfer for + reprocessing. This is basically the interagency recommendation—retaining + flexibility—but with a stronger presumption against approval of these + requests. Under this option, reprocessing in the UK and France would be viewed as a last resort, to be + avoided if at all possible.

+

He has approved the bilateral formulation favored by State and Defense + for full scope safeguards, with the explicit provision that this be + regarded as an interim measure, and the understanding that we will + continue to press for supplier acceptance of a requirement for formal + recipient commitment to full scope safeguards, preferably through + adherence to the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

+

On the question of Presidential flexibility, he has approved the option + which provides for exception by Presidential determination for both new + and existing agreements.

+ + Zbigniew + Brzezinski + +
+ +
+ + 341. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the + International Atomic Energy AgencySource: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770157–0816. + Secret; Exdis; Priority. Drafted + by Jane Coon (OES/NET/RD); cleared by Arthur Shankle (S/S); and approved by Louis Nosenzo + (OES/NET). + Washington, May 5, 1977, 0321Z +

102157. Following repeat London 7093 Action SecState Info Lon-don Apr + 30.

+

Quote. Subject: Bilateral Nuclear Suppliers Consultations With Japan, + April 27, 1977.

+

1. Japanese Del headed by Kobayashi + opened meeting with statement he was instructed to make emphasizing + necessity for Japan to develop nuclear power for peaceful purposes to + sustain economic growth. He indicated this necessity will be raised in + bilaterals at the economic summit, pointing out that a Japanese full + fuel cycle is an indispensable part of their nuclear program for + peaceful purposes which in turn is essential to their being able to play + expected role in world economic order. Kobayashi indicated they were + encouraged by presidential statement at April 7 press conferenceSee footnote 3, + Document 338. which recognized necessity for + certain countries to reprocess. But he expressed deep disappointment + over subsequent explanation that this did not mean that U.S. would + consent to reprocessing of U.S.-supplied fuel in Japan.

+

2. Japanese Del asked whether U.S. would + treat Japan as a major ally and partner in global economic and political + affairs, or like Pakistan, Brazil, Argentina, Kenya and even Uganda? He + implored us to be consistent. If Japan were not allowed to proceed with + reprocessing he said there would be bitter resentment among Japanese + people, grave difficulties in Diet efforts to get IAEA safeguards agreement approved, + questions regarding value of NPT + adherence and continuing credibility of NPT, and a serious problem of de facto discrimination + against Japan in favor of European countries, which could do harm to our + traditionally cooperative relationship and to far east stability.

+

3. Nye replied that he would + report GOJ views faithfully and + elaborated on the April 7 presidential statement. He repeated U.S. + position supporting current generation nuclear reactors, but stressing + importance of examining alternative technologies before proceeding with + plutonium economy.

+

4. Japanese Del was informed current + bilateral difficulties regarding Tokai were occasioned by Article 8(c) + of agreement of cooperation,Reference is to the 1968 + Japan-U.S. Nuclear Cooperation Agreement which required Japan to + obtain advance approval from the U.S. Government for any + international transfer of nuclear material of U.S. origin. + which required us either to give or refuse consent to an activity that + we were not permitting in the U.S. In spite of this provision, + presidential statement showed U.S. cognizance of Japanese energy needs. + The small quantities of uranium recycled through Tokai would be + insignificant relative to total Japanese energy requirements.

+

5. Nye reassured Japanese Del that U.S. viewed Japan as a major + economic power and had no desire to restrict their energy needs. He + explained Japanese role in INFCEP would be without prejudice to solution + on Tokai issue.

+

6. Thorne (ERDA) explained budget steps + being taken to implement U.S. non-proliferation objectives. A + comprehensive program involving 750 million dollars with Fall 1978 + target date identifies nuclear power options and alternatives with lower + proliferation risks. Studies would include assessment of uranium and + thorium reserves availability.

+

7. Japanese showed concern that INFCEP would a priori exclude + reprocessing and prejudge conclusion of studies. A study over 3 or 4 + years that did not produce an acceptable solution would place Japan in a + difficult position. Nye + acknowledged U.S. intent to include evaluation of reprocessing and that + U.S. does not prejudge study outcomes. Japanese replied that economic + and environmental aspects of reprocessing were domestic problems and + that they were fairly certain that reprocessing could be + safeguarded.

+

8. When asked, Kobayashi replied that Japan could go along with U.S. on + Article 14 (sanctions). They were reluctant to make Article 9 (re + consent to reprocessing) mandatory but would not block consensus on + this. On Article 4 (full scope safeguards), they stated that requirement + to meet safeguards duration requirements of GOV 1621Reference is to IAEA document GOV/1621. caused some problems + when exporting small parts for countries already possessing + reactors.

+

9. Nye provided explanation of + presidential decision to issue MB–10sThe + Presidential Decision was not found. MB–10 refers to applications + that nations must submit in order to obtain shipment-by-shipment + approvals from the U.S. Government prior to transporting spent + nuclear fuel to overseas reprocessors. on a case-by-case + basis based on demonstrated need, for example congested storage at + reactor sites. Yamamoto subsequently called U.S. Del’s attention to the requirement for + Japanese utilities to make a five percent deposit by the end of August + in order to confirm contract to be negotiated by end of May for + reprocessing in UK and French facilities beginning in 1982/3. + He suggested that we agree to discuss the extent of need for MB–10 + covering fuel envisioned under contract well before mid-August deadline + for GOJ decision on commercial + reprocessing contract, preferably in the course of follow-on Tokai + consultations beginning in May.

+

Spiers.

+

Unquote.

+ + Vance + +
+ +
+ 342. Memorandum of ConversationCarter + Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Trip File, Box + 3, President, Europe, 5/5–10/77: [Memcons]. Secret. According to the President’s Daily + Diary, the meeting lasted from 3:30 to 6:16 p.m. and took place at + 10 Downing Street. No list of participants for this meeting has been + found. Carter visited London + May 7–11 for the G–7 and NATO + Summits. (Carter Library, Presidential Materials) + London, May 7, + 1977 +

SUMMIT—May 7, Afternoon Session

+

NON-PROLIFERATION

+

Callaghan: + We have agreed to begin this afternoon with a discussion of nuclear + energy and I would like President Carter to open up on this issue.

+

President Carter: I think we are all aware of the public + displeasure at the rapid turn to nuclear power. In the United States, 22 + states had referenda to prohibit the construction of nuclear power + plants. I feel that governments should depend more on nuclear power in + the future for electricity. We have a major industry in the mining and + enrichment of uranium. We export enriched uranium at no profit, and + sometimes at great headache. But it is hard to convince the opposition + to our exports that we should maintain an export policy when they think + this is going to be used for explosives.

+

The question is how do you maintain nuclear production in the US, and supply others, without the fear + that we will enhance the capacity of other countries to produce + explosives?

+

This must be addressed on an international basis. We endanger relations + with consumer countries if we act unilaterally. When I became President I inherited a + moratorium on the export of nuclear fuel which was imposed by my + predecessor.See footnote 2, Document 317. I know this concerned + all of you.

+

I want to work with you to find ways of stopping proliferation and the + possible use of nuclear fuel for explosives in order to export fuels + which will be used for nuclear power. There are a number of different + degrees of status among nations on this issue. Some NPT signatories produce weapons, other do + not. Other have vowed never to produce weapons. We must cooperatively + address this question. I know of the national sensitivities which are + involved. I want you to know that I plan to expand US enrichment production capabilities. I + want to insure that if we can find means of improving accountability, + treatment of waste products and proper safe guards we will insure fuels + for nations who want to produce electricity and are willing to comply + with these safeguards. We believe it is necessary to assess the future + of the plutonium economy and especially the fast breeder reactor, + although we believe this technology won’t be needed for 20–25 years.

+

We built two reprocessing plants in the US before I became President. They have been shut down + because they did not work. They did not help on waste disposal, but + instead generated by-products. We have also decided to cancel + construction of our next reprocessing plant and we won’t build the + breeder, although we will not prevent others from building it if they + wish. As I said, we don’t think a breeder will be needed for 25 years. + Some of you have different opinions. And I can understand your + reluctance to rely totally on us for uranium.

+

But it is difficult for me to get our people to support shipments of + uranium supplies unless there is some assurance that the uranium will + not be used for weapons. I suggest therefore that we set up a group of + technicians to examine this issue and report back to us. This can + provide an analysis of the problem so that we can understand what the + needs are. I cannot control people’s views on the export of raw + materials unless I can give them answers on the issue of explosives. I + would rather take action along with you than action which might be ill + advised. We should be concerned with the complete fuel cycle including + the availability of uranium reserves around the world and the intentions + of suppliers to increase enrichment facilities. We should define the + possible constraints to be placed on consumers before they receive + supplies. This should be done on a multilateral basis. We should also + look at the breeder from a common vantage point and look at how to + resolve the issue of nuclear waste disposal. I know that I have already + aggravated leaders here because of my hesitation to change my + predecessor’s decisions on fuel exports.

+ +

Callaghan: + Is your proposal for a preliminary study different from your proposal + for an international nuclear fuel cycle evaluation program? If the final + preliminary study is completed in two months, it could in other words + decide on how to establish an international fuel cycle evaluation.

+

President Carter: Yes, it would be preliminary to the + longer study.

+

Trudeau: + President Carter’s case is based + on the unstated major premise that there is a danger of proliferation + which we can and should do something about. I am not convinced that all + here share that premise. All agree the danger exists, but some may not + think we can do anything about it.

+

President Carter: The CIA has done a sobering study on the prospects of the + technology capabilities of nations who might want to built nuclear + devices.Not found. Twelve to + fifteen countries are capable of building nuclear devices. One premise + at the end of the study might be that any country in the future which + explodes a device gets no more fuel. Such countries include Brazil and + South Korea. They see nuclear power as a status symbol. Perhaps we did + not deplore the Indian explosion enough. If it were pre-ordained that if + a country exploded a nuclear device they would get no more fuel maybe + they would not try it.

+

Schmidt: I, + as a person and as Head of Government, agree that there is a danger + which you, Prime Minister Trudeau, describe, and that we should do something about + it.

+

But what are the consequences of this? The effort does not embrace the + number of states and the categories of states which must be brought in. + There are four categories of states: NPT members who are nuclear, NPT non-members who are non-nuclear; non-NPT members who are nuclear; and + non-NPT members who are + non-nuclear. If arrangements additional to the NPT are agreed upon and do not include these different + groups of states with different interests there could be + difficulties.

+

If there were an additional arrangement, plus the NPT, it might not include all the + important groups. These countries not invited would need careful + watching.

+

After Germany came into being in October 1954 we signed the Brussels + Treaty which renounced nuclear, biological and chemical weapons. We also + signed the NPT. It was not easy to + ratify in Parliament. I pushed ratification hard but we had to change + governments in order to do it.

+

There is no doubt that the peaceful use of nuclear energy by my country + is a vital means of safeguarding our energy supplies as well as our social, economic and + technological progress. Not all present at this Conference have signed + the NPT. The NPT should run parallel with any new arrangement on + safeguards involving the provision of nuclear supplies. We should have + no discrimination against non-weapon states. The NPT is the legal basis for + non-proliferation. Our efforts must run parallel to efforts to develop + the peaceful use of nuclear energy and safeguard world energy supplies. + We will support and participate in the energy consultations sketched out + by President Carter. But we + should include countries who by 1985 or 1990, if left out, will use + plutonium and uranium to produce nuclear weapons. We must also recognize + that the stronger our supplier rules are the more the incentive for + countries to develop their own uranium. Such countries should be + included in this group.

+

Trudeau: I + agree. It is better to have the other countries agree than to disagree. + But how would they get the uranium?

+

Schmidt: + All countries can get uranium. You can make an A-bomb in your back yard. + Other technology will spread. I see them spreading already.

+

Trudeau: + Isn’t that like saying there is nothing we can do?

+

Schmidt: + No, no, no. That is not what I meant. If you exclude them they will from + the beginning be of no help. They will be difficult.

+

I will be willing to participate in this study but it should not + prejudice existing relations among countries, no more moratorium and no + constraint on existing bilateral or third country arrangements. It + should not prejudice the work of the Nuclear Supplier Club. And we must + give the “have nots” and the “must nots” the feeling that we are not + discriminating against them. That would decrease chances for successful + cooperation.

+

Jamieson: + If we say we want to help you develop peaceful technology do we also say + we do not want you to use it for an explosive device? What does the + distinction mean?

+

Schmidt: + Yugoslavia rather than Brazil, is a good example. If we do not take + their interests into account it could produce an attitude you cannot + control.

+

Jamieson: + It is a question of national pride with Yugoslavia.

+

Trudeau: It + is not a matter of pride that countries should have biological weapons. + It should not be a matter of pride but Yugoslavia and India develop + nuclear weapons.

+

Schmidt: + National pride is an important factor of life. If you want to get + countries cooperation you cannot tell them what you know is in their + best interest. There will be additional uranium found in the years ahead + just like oil in the North Sea and Alaska.

+ +

Vance: + Would you include just the threshold countries or just those with + reactors?

+

Andreotti: + Two comments. First, I am convinced of the need for non-proliferation. I + saw this as urgent when we signed the NPT. We signed it with conviction. Article IV of the NPT gives the assurance that we will use + nuclear technology for peaceful purposes.Article IV of the Non-Proliferation Treaty stipulates that “Nothing + in this Treaty shall be interpreted as affecting the inalienable + right of all the Parties of the Treaty to develop research, + production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without + discrimination.” (Documents on Disarmament, + 1968, pp. 461–465) I agree that we should have two + months to consider the issue. But what is in Article IV should remain + valid in its entirety. The Conference should restate the importance of + Article IV. It should restate that enriched uranium should be used for + reactors and for industrial development and scientific research. Second, + in the last few days we have read that French scientists have developed + a process without the risks of use of uranium for military purposes. I + would like President Giscard to + comment.

+

Giscard: + For my part France is aware of the dangers of nuclear proliferation. We + believe in the need to share responsibility and address this problem. I + agree with President Carter and + Prime Minister Trudeau on this. + We have not signed the NPT for a + variety of reasons.

+

Where we depart from the US is that we + consider nuclear energy unavoidable. There will be reduced energy + causing slower industrialization unless we have nuclear sources, + particularly in view of the coming oil shortage. It is a valid source of + energy for countries without military technology. We were entitled to + provide ourselves with nuclear energy.

+

Certain factors are essential in operating plants. Enrichment is now done + primarily by the US and 20% by Britain, + Germany, France and Italy. At present, enrichment is a probable factor + in proliferation. But the construction of international plants is + difficult and expensive and small countries cannot do it. Reprocessing + involves creation of plutonium from nuclear fuel elements after their + use. We feel that it is not realistic to think of medium-size countries + storing non-processed nuclear waste. Therefore, the waste should be + destroyed. But this is difficult in that plutonium is a byproduct of + reprocessing. It is impossible for medium-size countries to have nuclear + industry without reprocessing.

+

With respect to the breeder, it is possible that between 1985 and 1990 + there will be a shortage of natural uranium. The producers will be the + US, Canada, Australia and France. + France will be knocking on the door of the uranium producers monopoly. + But we will have to ensure that maximum benefits are derived from + uranium. The breeder gives you 50 times more electricity from the same + amount of uranium. It is like a + multiplication of the amount of oil we have by 50. We cannot rule out + the breeder without an analysis of the large number of issues involved. + We and the Germans have launched an experimental effort on the + environmental and safety issues involved. A breeder does not appear more + dangerous than other reactors. It is as dangerous as a light-water + plant. The danger is the amount of plutonium which comes out of the + process. It can be subverted to military use. But to manufacture the + bomb from stolen plutonium, you would need 2000 people working 18 + months. This would be difficult to hide. All countries need to recognize + the risks of the danger of proliferation by terrorists. But the breeder + is indispensable if we are to make the best out of our uranium.

+

I am not sure we should accept Helmut’s view that each country should do what it wants, + that is make its own decisions about when to provide nuclear technology + to other countries. Why did we suspend the sale of nuclear technology to + South Korea? This was not because of US + pressure. It was because information we received was that despite public + statements they were going to manufacture a nuclear bomb.

+

Let me then spell out our thinking on this. First, very few countries + will require reprocessing—Germany, Japan and EURODIF countries. They + will need a large program to deal with their nuclear waste. Others will + not need a reprocessing facility. Second, only those producers who are + embarking on a breeder—France, Germany and the USSR, as well as the UK, + need plutonium. We are, therefore, justified in finding measures to meet + our needs while not transferring technology to countries which do not + need it. Third, on enrichment, there are a number of non-proliferation + technologies. French scientists are developing a new technique to enrich + fuel to a level insufficient for military purposes. If countries attempt + to take it further, to too high a level of enrichment, the process would + break down. If a critical level were reached, a chemical process would + take over like a sort of slow explosion which would take a long + time.

+

Fourth, on reprocessing, we can imagine a formula to reduce the military + risks. We can imagine a form of service contract where reprocessing + countries reprocess the waste of others and retain the plutonium under + some international agreement whereby an international organization would + supervise it. The rest of the reprocessed fuel could then be sent back + to the consumer. The technique needs further investigation as does the + form of contract which might be used. This would be a way to reduce the + military risks, and I believe it is achievable.

+

We can subscribe to the view of the US + and can provide technology for the peaceful use of energy and see that + it remains peaceful.

+

Schmidt: I + believe President Giscard + misunderstood me. I do not feel that a country should be left to do what + it wants to do about sales. But + we should not discriminate against countries on the peaceful uses of + energy.

+

Fukuda: I + appreciate and agree with the importance of President Carter’s comments. Japan was the first + nation baptized by nuclear holocaust. We had agreed not to manufacture, + not to allow in, and not to own nuclear weapons. President Carter is concerned about the issue of + nuclear energy because of the danger of weapons. We cannot and will not + do this.

+

In the morning we discussed the economic recession and its structural + causes. One factor of this depression is tighter energy supplies. The + US + CIA study indicated that in 10 years + energy, particularly, oil, would be in short supply. In the 21st + century, there will be fusion. In the meantime, we must ride out the + gap. We must ask how we bridge the gap and give people confidence in the + future. This is our perception. This is why we in the last few years, + with American advice, have spent roughly $1 billion on a reprocessing + plant. Our experimental reprocessing plant will be open by autumn.

+

Japan is in a unique position. For us, Article IV of the NPT is an important issue which we cannot + ignore. People have confidence in the sanctity of this Article. It has + an impact on the minds of people everywhere. With respect to the new + study, it is hard to expect that all of the countries now producing + explosives could be included. We cannot predict the attitude in China, + India and the USSR. It is difficult to + expect most poorer countries in the world to agree with President + Carter’s plan. Nations’ + rights must be safeguarded. Why not have professional experts undertake + global surveillance in a central mechanism of those countries concerned? + We can get countries together to study the means of surveillance. + Reprocessing is needed to give economies strength and to give energy to + our economies.

+

Some countries may wish to get out of the NPT if we do not act wisely.

+

President Carter: President Giscard misunderstood me on the importance of nuclear + energy. I think nuclear energy for electricity is a crucial part of the + use of energy for the future. I believe in the increased use of nuclear + power in the civilized world. This is demonstrated by our willingness to + export nuclear fuel, a decision I recently made. This is not profitable + for us. We use one-third of the enriched uranium we produce; we export + one-third; and we store one-third for future domestic use and exports. + The action we have taken in initiating this discussion is a crucial + prerequisite for the unrestrained export of nuclear fuel. Unless there + is international surveillance of the use of nuclear fuel, it will be + difficult for us to manufacture and ship it. The sale of reprocessing + plants to NPT countries is most + worrying.

+ +

Reprocessing is no panacea for waste-product storage. I cannot agree with + President Giscard that there is + a lack of space available to store waste. It does not take a large + country to store nuclear fuel. One square mile is adequate. It is no + easier to store fuel in the US than it + is in Japan or other countries. Reprocessing is no answer to disposal. + In all countries people fear the proximity of nuclear fuel. The size of + the nation is a minor fact.

+

We are eager to find a solution. We want to provide fuel to others. If + there is international supervision over how to control nuclear + facilities, then we can export.

+

I also do not agree with President Giscard’s view that uranium will run out soon. I think + we have 25–30 years of uranium available. By that time there will + perhaps be production of the breeder. In September, we will go critical + on our new thorium reactor.

+

We will be cooperative in trying to remove restrictions on the export and + use of nuclear fuel. But unless we take action to ensure the facilities, + and think they are safe, we cannot export. We must find assurances to + satisfy the people of my country. Hundreds of demonstrators have just + been arrested in New Hampshire protesting against a light-water + reactor.On May 1, hundreds of + demonstrators opposed to the construction of a nuclear power plant + in Seabrook, NH were arrested. (John Kifner, “Hundreds Arrested in + New Hampshire Atom Protest,” New York Times, + May 2, 1977, p. 69) The example I have suggested can improve + our understanding.

+

Trudeau: I + believe that President Carter + and President Giscard are both + reaching the same conclusion. President Giscard is saying, I believe, that there should be + safeguards for the full fuel cycle and the plutonium should be brought + back to the suppliers. Did I understand you right, President Giscard, that you want full fuel cycle + safeguards when you suggested that plutonium be recycled?

+

Giscard: + We think reprocessing is a technical necessity. Work must be carried + forward for technical reasons and to encourage the breeder because + European uranium supplies will be less guaranteed than the supplies of + oil. From 1980 onward, we will import all of our natural uranium. The + uncertainty of supply compels Europe to derive maximum benefits from + minimum amounts of uranium. We can be self-sufficient with the breeder. + If not, we will have to be 50 times more dependent on Canada, the US, and Niger. Thus, reprocessing is + necessary from a technical point of view.

+

On technology transfer and safeguards, we must seek all possible legal + and fiscal guarantees on safeguards beyond the NPT. There should be no technology transfer without sound + economic arrangements.

+ +

Trudeau: On + the fuel cycle, as far as the ultimate idea is concerned, we need to + define a safeguard system to ensure that production does not lead to + explosive devices. I feel the question of reprocessing is secondary to + that.

+

Giscard: + The US at one time stopped the export of + uranium on the grounds that there would be reprocessing and because of + the fear of explosives. We will study, as suggested, aspects of + non-proliferation. But we cannot subscribe to the dictum that there + should be no reprocessing of uranium.

+

Trudeau: + Are you saying in your plan that there should be no reprocessing + elsewhere?

+

Giscard: + No. They send back the waste. Then we keep the plutonium which comes out + of the reprocessing. I am not saying that Japan and Germany could + reprocess without safeguards. I would want to insist that the plutonium + be returned.

+

Schmidt: + President Carter, you say that + it is difficult to get the consent of the people in the area for even + one square mile of storage of nuclear waste. Are you saying that you + will not store other nations’ waste?

+

President Carter: It is almost impossible to get people + to agree to store the waste from a foreign country. We are faced with + states saying they will allow no power plants in their borders; and they + object to the transfer of nuclear waste across the borders. Vermont + allows no power plants. People will not accept the waste of others.

+

Schmidt: + Some people in Germany say that we will let you build a power plant if + the US will take the waste. Now it is + clear that you won’t?

+

President Carter: This is not an unfriendly statement, + but it is an accurate statement.

+

Schmidt: + No, no; I understand. It is a necessary clarification and a reflection + of the interest of the US.

+

I agree with Valery on the need + for safeguards.

+

No one has mentioned Brazil so far. But we are under criticism for our + bilateral, or trilateral, deal on Brazil. The Vienna agency is the third + party. When we signed this deal, we not only followed the NPT, we went beyond it. In the meantime, + there were new views, and new dangers were seen. But at that time we + went far beyond the existing legal obligations and in fact added + international controls beyond what we were legally bound to do, or to + ask of the Brazilians. We have lived up to our obligations. But we do + not want to take additional obligations if others don’t.

+

Jamieson: + We have said publicly that your agreement with Brazil involves + obligations above the legal maximum.

+ +

Owen: All + of us will have to tighten up on safeguards. There is a need for a wider + group. Some countries want nuclear energy. The danger is in delay. We + support the fuel cycle evaluation program and also agree on the + preliminary study. But this could take a year. We should make progress + in the London Suppliers Group and perhaps widen the membership. We who + are deeply involved should lead the way. If we did nothing in the + Suppliers Group, it would be dangerous.

+

Our scientists question whether you can store waste from such reactors + very well. The UK Magnox is a case in + point. There we have got to reprocess. But there is a great deal to be + said about the exchange of information.

+

President Carter: The crux of the question is whether we + are going to insist that reprocessing be under strict safeguards to + allow countries access to fuel in a prudent and acceptable way. If the + safeguards are not adequate, it will be difficult to provide nuclear + fuel. This is true for Canada and Australia as well, although I cannot + speak for them. I have no objections if nations wish to reprocess or + have the breeder. But there is no reason for us to permit countries who + are not signatories to the NPT to + develop nuclear weapons capabilities. I am not trying to stop the + breeder. Our reprocessing plants did not work, but I hope that you who + are building a breeder will be more successful. The crux of the + situation is to devise some way to develop adequate safeguards so that + we can provide fuel to those who need it.

+

Callaghan: + The difficulty you have is to persuade other countries that your + position is based on the reality of the problem of proliferation rather + than to serve your advantage as an energy rich country. You cannot give + people the impression that you are trying to shut other countries out. I + accept that your view is based on concerns about proliferation and the + need for proper safeguards but it is important that you not give the + impression of depriving countries of the benefits of nuclear fuel.

+

I believe President Carter’s + suggestions offer an opportunity of moving forward. If you in the US go forward in the absence of a study, it + presents difficulties for all of us. The issue that we must study is + that we have got to see that safeguards can be erected so that what you + want can be achieved. What is said here has indicated that without + agreement on this matter countries without coal, oil or natural gas will + have problems. We need a technical study so that we can really work out + the issues that can be solved in this manner.

+

MacDonald: Canada’s policy is to refuse the supply + of raw uranium. We will control supply in the first instance. We would + have to reach an understanding on what the safeguards are going to be. + The arguments in the US situation are + the same as in Canada. If we were forced to take unilateral action we + would be hit from both sides by not supplying raw uranium and not providing + reprocessing. Canada therefore supports the study group idea and + believes that somehow there should be a linkage with the London Supplier + Group.

+

Vance: + There is no inconsistency; the London Supplier Group could go along + without interfering in the study.

+

Giscard: + Are we going beyond the NPT or was the + proposal for physical guarantees governing the sale or non-sale of + various plants. I believe that in President Carter’s thinking one can go beyond legal guarantees and + consider that certain sales would not take place in certain + circumstances. I believe that restrictions over and beyond legal + guarantees should be considered.

+

The reprocessing countries are represented here in this room. It is not a + question of what conditions we impose on our own procedures. Germany and + Japan have industrial potential. It is foolish to consider imposing + conditions on them. What we are talking about is conditions on the sale + of reprocessing facilities to others—physical conditions involved. There + will be no more sales by France because of proliferation. Pilot plants + present a serious danger of proliferation and these need to be + considered as well as other proliferation techniques. Do we agree that + there should be physical limits? And I should like to ask where and when + will President Carter’s study + group meet and what would it discuss?

+

Callaghan: + As I see it the preliminary study would be done among ourselves. I + suggest that we establish a group of experts to work out the terms of + reference for the evaluation program—detailed terms of references for + the Carter program. I wonder, however, when we need to involve the + Soviet Union. Perhaps not now, but in the second stage.

+

President Carter: Our contacts suggest that the Soviets + do not want to come in at this stage but perhaps later.

+

Callaghan: + As long as the Soviet Union does not feel excluded. We should ask our + experts to meet quickly and report by the end of June or July. I am + worried about one impact that will come out of this meeting. The experts + group should be represented as part of the normal process of + consultation. On location, I understand that Paris is pleasant in the + spring. Our aides should agree on the terms of reference.

+

President Carter: Yes, two months is just about what is + needed.

+

Trudeau: + President Carter’s study would + focus on whether reprocessing is good or necessary. But Giscard was asking a different + question. He also asks what kind of safeguards are we talking + about—legal or physical (sale or non-sale) of reprocessing plants. I am + also worried about President Giscard’s point that safeguards should only be applied + to other countries and not to the seven represented here. This is + discrimination. If we go for safeguards they must apply to all of us. + Also how do you apply legal + safeguards to the US and France who have + the bomb and Germany and Canada who do not but might want to produce + some day.

+

Callaghan: + Our people have to consider whether safeguards can be contained in a + legal framework. There are a lot of technical questions. We should try + to get the agreed facts. The group should consider whether safeguards + should be confined to existing legal frameworks, with possible physical + safeguards in addition.

+

President Carter: We are willing to let Japan have + nuclear fuel, but we would want to tell Congress about the safeguards if + that fuel is reprocessed. There are a number of questions raised about + reprocessing. I would like to tell people that if the fuel is + reprocessed there will be conditions. And we will have to have + inspections on ourselves. Even though this will be a difficulty for + those building bombs.

+

Trudeau: + Will we apply these safeguards to ourselves? Unless we answer this + question we cannot expect nuclear fuel.

+

Callaghan: + UK has adopted international inspection + procedures.

+

Trudeau: + But the UK is not building the bomb.

+

Schmidt: I + would not like to see this type of discussion in the press. Someone said + that there might be the possibility of others keeping their own nuclear + options open. Especially, then, I would not like to see any suggestion + that some countries might not keep their international nuclear + commitments. This would cause an up-roar in Germany.

+

But what do we say to our public? I did not know that it was agreed that + the Ministers would see the press, but perhaps it cannot be avoided. We + must be very careful not to provoke public opinion in other countries. + We should be very careful in reporting to our press. Simply say we had a + very valuable, necessary, discussion that we are not as far apart as has + previously appeared in the press. We should not tell things to the press + about what was said.

+

Schmidt: It + is possible after the discussion to describe it with three sentences + which represent the highest common denominator. The first sentence + should say that we have set up a task force. We should limit ourselves + to another long sentence on the terms of reference on the task force. + You and your people could formulate this over dessert. We should agree + on the terms of references and insure that there is not a great row in + the press.

+

On the confidence issue good words can add confidence. It is also + important that we represent orally and on TV only what we want to + present. We made progress in understanding each other, and the way that + we present this is important.

+

Giscard: + Let me raise quickly a number of points. We must clarify our + differences. One key issue is our supplies to third countries such as + Iran and Brazil. One + concrete problem is how we supply countries with plants without opening + up charges of proliferation.

+

Second, if the system of safeguards applies to ourselves, we would cause + difficulties as a number of agreements already exist such as among the + UK, France and Germany, and France + and Japan. We should not apply the same discipline to the US as to Brazil or India. With respect to + the three party and two party agreement, should we cancel them? We + should have mutual trust. We should not leave the impression that we are + bringing our agreements among ourselves into question.

+

How can we meet our energy needs and achieve non-proliferation, or as + little proliferation as possible? If we open up agreements among + ourselves, we will not make much progress. I like the first few + sentences of the US draft paper.Not found.

+

Trudeau: + President Giscard says we should + discriminate in favor of ourselves. Chancellor Schmidt says we should treat everyone + equal. This is a difference that is still not resolved. Although we will + all be there tomorrow at the conclusion in Banquet Hall, we should have + one spokesman so that our differences will not emerge. I think that it + should be our Chairman.

+

Callaghan: + The public point is important and cannot but have international + repercussions. I agree with Helmet on the press briefing. We should keep + this type of discussion out of the press. We can try a form of + words.

+

Trudeau: We + should not discuss the discrimination issue but simply talk about how we + can meet energy requirements.

+

President Carter: Perhaps we can use the first three + sentences of the US draft.

+

Schmidt: We + can use those sentences and add that the group here has established a + study of how this can be brought about.

+

Andreotti: + I agree with that type of statement. I wish to stress that there are + countries who having signed the NPT, + particularly Article IV, do not wish to see this contested once again. + We should say that we are not discussing Article IV, or policy which has + been established.

+

Callaghan: + Does anyone want to discuss Article IV?

+

Schmidt: + This is not being put under question. We should say that it stands + up.

+

Callaghan: + Do we agree not to bring this into question?

+

Trudeau: + With India, they say their energy is also for peaceful use. Should we + send more nuclear material to India?

+ +

Callaghan: + I know you would like guidelines which would relieve you of certain + arbitrary decisions.

+

Trudeau: My + electorate will say, “Is this what they agreed in London?” It will not + impress my electorate.

+

Callaghan: + You are saying this will not be enough to help you restore shipments of + nuclear fuel to India.

+

President Carter: We are in different positions. The + study will not help to resolve some of these difficulties but the + results may help.

+

Trudeau: We + are now imposing unilateral safeguards on everyone. If we go no further + than we have this afternoon this will continue. We have suspended sales + since December.

+

Callaghan: + We should not be able to say we recognize the difficulties of the + situation. We can have confidence. For the time being we should get the + study going. We should say that the seven recognize the need to + establish a system of international assurances but meanwhile have + sufficient confidence in each other to decide when new shipments should + be approved. But it is not possible on the basis of a 1-½ hour + discussion to refer to physical safeguards of the type mentioned by + Giscard.

+

Schmidt: I + want the US to develop its nuclear + technology. I want them to do it. The study should move ahead. Once the + 8–10 week study is concluded it will take months and years to bring it + into effect. We cannot now reach a just position which alleviates the + burden of decision of the US and Canada. + This is why other states also wish to explore these problems. Others + have stakes in this field but are not represented. We should not exclude + them or we will provoke them to do what we do not want them to do. We + should ultimately find some way of including the threshold countries—not + South Africa or Israel. Not inviting the threshold countries will not + encourage confidence abroad.

+

The utmost that can be achieved is the three sentences of the US paper which will give the task force + terms and say how this can be brought about. Then the matter can be + discussed again and decisions made on the involvement of other + countries.

+

Fukuda: I + agree in principle with the experts committee. But I share some of the + concerns already stated. Can the Soviet Union and China be persuaded to + come in? I think that will take a long time. President Carter said the study should be + completed in two months, but I am not sure that is quite workable.

+

The committee or task force would be of such a nature as to merely + represent the views of the seven. The target of the group should be the + end of June or something like that. With respect to press we should say + that we discussed a broad range of issues, including future energy + question, including other sources, and not just say we were discussing + the reprocessing of spent + fuels. We should say that we exchanged views on a broad range of issues + on supply and demand for energy sources.

+

Callaghan: + The US has stated the position that + there should be a nuclear fuel cycle evaluation program. We are here + trying to develop an understanding of the terms of references of the + study and to try to meet the points the President has raised. It would + work in parallel with the London Supplier Group. It would determine what + is to be included and what is not to be included. The expert group would + see whether terms of reference could be agreed for this program. The + emphasis should be on meeting energy needs with as little proliferation + as possible.

+

But we should recognize that this is only one aspect of energy in the + communique as Prime Minister Fukuda pointed out. In addition the EC has some + competence. We should come back tomorrow with some acceptable wording on + this.

+

Genscher: + We should make certain that the task force sees its goals as achievement + of a system of safeguards against proliferation. We should say we are + studying these conclusions but that before final decisions are made we + will discuss them with the London Supplier Group. This will avoid any + misunderstandings.

+

Giscard: + The public will misunderstand if we say we are studying methods of + non-proliferation. We should say that because of difficulties in the + energy area we find it indispensable to develop nuclear energy. It + should be on the basis of our energy requirements that we base our + study.

+

Callaghan: + We should try to meet our energy requirements with as little + proliferation as possible. That is what I believe we agree we are trying + to achieve.At the conclusion of the G–7 + Summit, the members nations issued a declaration covering a range of + issues. Regarding energy and nonproliferation, the nations pledged + to “further conserve energy and increase and diversify energy + production, so that we reduce our dependence on oil. We agree on the + need to increase nuclear energy to help meet the world’s energy + requirements. We commit ourselves to do this while reducing the + risks of nuclear proliferation. We are launching an urgent study to + determine how best to fulfill these purposes.” (Public Papers: Carter, + 1977, pp. 819–824)

+

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to non-proliferation.]

+
+ +
+ + 343. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security + Affairs (Brzezinski) to President + CarterSource: Carter Library, National + Security Council, Institutional Files, Box 4, PD–08 [1]. No classification marking. + In the upper right-hand corner of the first page of the memorandum, + Carter wrote “Zbig. Get + me a brief memo—perhaps with photos or sketches & maps showing + me what we’re doing now with wastes. JC.” + Washington, May 12, + 1977 + + SUBJECT + Storage of Foreign Spent Nuclear Fuel + +

While we were in London, the NSC + Interagency Group on Proliferation was completing the last three major + studies assigned by you in PD–8. One of + these concerns spent fuel storage. The report is the result of an + intensive six-week effort, and contains recommendations which are + unanimously supported by State, ACDA + and ERDA—an unusual situation on this + issue. The conclusion is that the US + will have to accept foreign spent fuel as a key incentive if other + countries are to agree to forego reprocessing.

+

Quoting from the summary paper (Tab B):Attached but not printed.

+

“Indefinite deferral of reprocessing within the US and our policy initiatives for other countries to join + in this deferral will require a significant increase in spent fuel + storage capacity . . .

+

“The overall concept we envisage is to provide short-term storage for + existing reactors (i.e. for approximately ten years) through more + efficient use of existing reactor basin storage and through existing or + planned away-from-reactor storage facilities. Long-term storage (i.e. + after about ten years of out-of-reactor storage) would be provided in + regional, international storage facilities; one for the EC area, one for + Japan and Pacific Basin, and one for US + utilities and US foreign customers, as + needed. To bring this about, the US + Government will have to (1) take the lead in working with foreign + customers to expand capacity of existing reactor storage basins; (2) + make provisions for US and foreign + near-term storage shortfalls in the US; + (3) develop long-term storage facilities in the US that will handle fuel from foreign as well as US utilities; and, (4) initiate concrete + steps to establish other international storage areas.”

+

While you may not choose to approve all of the options + the Group has recommended, it does seem clear that until you have + had an opportunity to study their proposals, we should not lock + ourselves into a public position which would rule out any storage of + foreign spent fuel in the US. + Therefore, I have drafted for your approval (Tab A),Attached but not printed. a proposed + response should this issue + arise at your press conference today. It leaves you flexibility for + whatever policy you may subsequently adopt.

+

One final note, concerning the political acceptability of receiving + foreign spent fuel. You may be interested in the memorandum of + conversation at Tab C.Not attached. + It summarizes the results of a meeting between members of the Executive + Branch, and environmentalist and anti-nuclear leaders. This is the group + which would lead any opposition on this issue. As you can see, they + generally support the idea of such a policy as a favorable tradeoff + against reprocessing.

+

RECOMMENDATION

+

That you approve the formulation at Tab A for public treatment of this + issue for the immediate future.

+
+ +
+ 344. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security + Affairs (Brzezinski) to President + CarterSource: Carter Library, National + Security Council, Institutional Files, Box 4, PD–08 [1]. Confidential. Sent for + action. + Washington, May 31, + 1977 + + SUBJECT + Japanese Nuclear Talks—Negotiating Guidance + +

A Japanese delegation arrives for talks on June 2, 3 on the Tokai + reprocessing issue. The memorandum at Tab A—prepared by the NSC Interagency Group on + Proliferation—seeks your instructions for these talks.

+

This meeting is being held at Japanese insistence. The U.S. tried + unsuccessfully to postpone it, feeling that very little has changed + since the last round.The most recent round + of discussions lasted from April 5–15. Also, the timing of + these talks is bad for us since, as you know, Vance has been discussing with + Ambassador Gerard Smith the + possibility of his assuming overall responsibility for proliferation + negotiations. Smith’s presence + would provide us with the negotiating experience that has been so noticeably lacking in + previous proliferation talks.

+

This memorandum raises some issues not treated in the interagency paper, + summarizes the views of the five lead agencies—State, Defense, ERDA, ACDA, and Schlesinger—and sets forth the options available to + you.

+

OPTIONS AND ARGUMENTS

+

Option 1: Permit reprocessing at + Tokai on a provisional, experimental, multinational basis involving + IAEA participation to test + safeguards.

+

As you know, Tokai cannot operate commercially without a prior finding of + safeguardability by the U.S. We wish to avoid such a finding since our + policy is based on the premise that reprocessing by its very nature + cannot be adequately safeguarded. This option assumes that Tokai could + be allowed to operate experimentally without the + finding of safeguardability. However there is some question as to + whether that could in fact be done without opening the USG to legal challenge. State and ERDA both believe that Option 1 should be authorized as a fallback option available to the + U.S. delegation should Option 3 and 2 prove non-negotiable. ACDA and Defense disagree. Schlesinger believes that it + could be seen as inconsistent with domestic policies.

+

We expect that the Japanese will table some version of this option.

+

Option 2: Explore through expert + consultation the feasibility of alter-ing Tokai so that it could + operate to test both reprocessing and partial coprocessing.

+

As you know, partial coprocessing produces a mixed product of uranium and + plutonium “spiked” with highly radioactive waste products which make the + mixture dangerous and expensive to handle.

+

State believes that this should be the second + allowed position. ERDA agrees. ACDA on the other hand feels + that in some respects Option 2 is the least + preferable option, in that—unlike Option 3—it establishes a precedent + for reprocessing. Nor does it have the advantage of Option 1 of avoiding + discrimination of treatment between the Japanese and FRG (which also has an experimental + reprocessing plant).With the appointment of + Spurgeon Keeny, who was + the director of the Ford/Mitre study, [on nuclear power and issues] ACDA now has a strong expertise on + this issue. ACDA’s comments, which + raise several important points, are attached at Tab B for your + information. [Footnote is in the original.] Tab B is not + attached.

+

Option 3: Explore the + possibility of operating Tokai only with a modified process that + does not produce pure separated plutonium (i.e., some form of + partial coprocessing).

+

All agencies agree that some version of this option is most preferable + but they differ in their expectations of its acceptability to the + Japanese. Defense and ACDA believe that only this + option should be authorized for + negotiations, while State and ERDA believe that + fallback options will be necessary.

+

Also, both Defense and ACDA believe that the U.S. + should not offer to provide plutonium for the + Japanese breeder, as proposed in the interagency paper. ACDA has calculated that reprocessing of + the British-supplied fuel from the Magnox reactor at Tokai can provide + sufficient plutonium to meet Japanese needs.

+

Schlesinger supports, but did not choose between, + some version of Options 2 or 3.

+

Option 4: Seek Japanese + agreement to defer running the Tokai plant for a fixed period of + time, offering an incentives package in exchange.

+

All agencies agree that this option is likely to be non-negotiable.

+

SUGGESTED U.S. STRATEGY

+

All agencies are agreed that we should seek agreement on Option 3. They + differ over whether we should offer to provide plutonium, and as to how + far we should fallback in this meeting. Our strategy clearly should be + to avoid the political damage that would result if the Japanese prove + adamant against Option 3 and the talks reach a deadlock. At the same + time, we want to avoid damaging U.S. non-proliferation objectives + through showing so much flexibility (i.e., interest in Option 1) that + the Japanese return home encouraged to maintain a rigid position.

+

Therefore, I recommend that the delegation be + instructed to negotiate with a view to reaching agreement on Option 3, + as modified to bar an offer of U.S.-supplied plutonium. In addition, if no progress can be made, and the Japanese propose some version of Option 1, the + delegation should be instructed to respond by + drawing them out on the details of their proposal. Our delegation should + make it explicit however that the Japanese should not read into our + response any expectation of eventual U.S. approval of such an + option.

+

YOUR DECISION

+

1. Our Basic Position

+

Option 3 (State, ERDA) ______

+

OR

+

Option 3—no plutonium (DoD, ACDA, NSC) ______Carter did not indicate which + option he preferred.

+ +

2. Fallback—in order of increasing flexibility.

+

None (DoD, ACDA) ______

+

Respond to Option 1, but do not offer it (NSC) ______

+

Option 2 (State) ______

+

Option 2 and 1 (ERDA) ______Carter did + not indicate which option he preferred.

+

Attachment

+

Memorandum Prepared by the NSC Interagency Group on ProliferationConfidential.

+

Washington, undated

+

NON-PROLIFERATION AND REPROCESSING IN JAPAN

+

Based on the President’s instructions to listen to Japanese views on how + to deal with the pilot reprocessing plant at Tokai, U.S. representatives + from State, ACDA and ERDA met with a visiting Japanese + delegation between April 5 and 15. At the closing session it was agreed + that another meeting would take place in which the U.S. and Japan would + offer new proposals. This memorandum seeks your guidance and + instructions for discussions scheduled on June 2 and 3 in + Washington.

+

Japanese spokesmen consistently have stressed that because members of the + European Community including West Germany can reprocess U.S.-origin fuel + under the U.S.–EURATOM agreement + with-out prior U.S. approval, while Japan cannot, Japan is effectively + being discriminated against with regard to plutonium technology + development and breeder-related research. In this context they have + argued that under the U.S.-Japan agreement our rights are limited to + allowing us to make a determination as to whether safeguards can + effectively be applied to the facility and that it is inappropriate for + the U.S. to employ them to force alterations in the Japanese + program.

+

The Tokai issue has become one of the major campaign issues in the + forthcoming Upper House elections. Prime Minister Fukuda is deeply concerned about the + political consequences of this issue. In support of their case for + proceeding to operate Tokai as initially intended,

+

Japanese officials have referred + to the President’s April 7On April 7, + Carter told reporters + that he recognized that it “would be impossible, counterproductive, + and ill-advised for us to try to prevent other countries that need + it from having the capability to produce electricity from atomic + power” and that the “one difference that has been very sensitive as + it relates to, say, Germany, Japan, and others, is that they fear + that our unilateral action in renouncing the reprocessing of spent + fuels to produce plutonium might imply that we prohibit them or + criticize them severely because of their own need for reprocessing. + This is not the case. They have a perfect right to go ahead and + continue with their own reprocessing efforts. But we hope they’ll + join with us in eliminating in the future additional countries that + might have had this capability evolve.” (Public + Papers: Carter, + 1977, pp. 581–586) and May 2On May 2, Carter told European journalists that he favored + “the supply of adequate nuclear fuel to nations for power + production” but was “heavily committed to the prevention of the + capability of non-nuclear nations from developing explosives, atomic + weapons.” (Public Papers: Carter, 1977, pp. + 760–767) press conference remarks citing Japan as one of the + countries which have “a perfect right to go ahead and continue their own + reprocessing.” They aver that the President reaffirmed that position in + private discussions at London with Prime Minister Fukuda.No + record of this conversation has been found.

+

Japanese spokesmen have proposed that resolution of the Tokai issue be + placed in the context of a broad political understanding in which Japan + would publicly support our nuclear fuel cycle evaluation program and our + position on the security risks inherent in plutonium production. They + also appear ready to support our conclusion that recycling plutonium for + light water reactors is neither necessary nor economically justified. In + return the United States would affirm that it does not intend to + discriminate against Japan and, until such time as a viable alternative + to a plutonium fuel cycle may be established, that it will grant + approvals of transfers of spent fuel for reprocessing elsewhere, and + avoid invoking provisions in the U.S.-Japanese bilateral agreement in + such a way as to jeopardize Japan’s long-term nuclear strategy. + Additionally the United States would seek to facilitate Japanese access + to assured supplies of low enriched uranium and Japanese interest in + becoming a supplier of enriched uranium.

+

United States non-proliferation policies have been articulated in the + President’s public statements, PDM–8 decisions and proposed legislation. + Any decision on Tokai must bear in mind not only the high political + importance of that issue to the Japanese, but our own interests as well. + A Tokai decision would be the first, by this Administration, on a + foreign reprocessing facility. Although the facility, and its context, + are somewhat unique, a U.S. decision could set precedents. The manner in + which the U.S. exercises its rights could affect European Community + willingness to renegotiate reprocessing rights they now have under the + U.S.–EURATOM agreement for + cooperation.

+ +

There are four general options available under the existing + circumstances:

+

Option 1: Permit reprocessing at Tokai on a + provisional, experimental, multinational basis involving IAEA participation to test + safeguards. Operating on the assumption that one of the + outcomes of the fuel cycle evaluation program might be the continued use + of plutonium in some nuclear programs, this Option would permit + exploration of various safeguards, surveillance, containment and + accounting procedures—and multilateral plant concepts—with a view to + ensuring that any eventual reprocessing would be carried out only under + the most stringent and acceptable conditions. The operations would not involve a determination that reprocessing + plants can be safeguarded. They would be of limited duration, entail a + limited number of reprocessing campaigns and would be cast explicitly in + the context of test activities to cover the contingency that a + restricted number of reprocessing facilities might emerge in the longer + term. The derived plutonium would be employed in the Japanese advanced + reactor programs.

+

This alternative would in all likelihood be acceptable to Japan, although + it would beg the question of whether and when Tokai could operate + commercially. However, it could establish a presumption that + reprocessing is “safeguardable” and signal to other nations that + national reprocessing is acceptable. Those risks could be reduced by + explicitly linking the Tokai safeguards test activities to the + possibility of the eventual emergence of a limited number of carefully + sited multinational reprocessing facilities. Furthermore, the notion + that improved surveillance, containment and accountability resolve the + problem of plutonium stockpiling and abrogation of safeguards agreements + would be explicitly rejected. This Option could be seen as inconsistent + with the U.S. policy of indefinite deferral of commercial reprocessing. + On the other hand, a major advantage of this option is that it reduces + the pressure we will otherwise face to supply plutonium for Japan’s + experimental breeder program.

+

Option 2: Explore through expert consultation the + feasibility of altering Tokai so that it could operate to test both + reprocessing and partial coprocessing. This option would + involve reorienting the Tokai facility to test alternative methods of + extracting value from spent fuel without separating plutonium such as + partial coprocessing. In addition it would permit a limited amount of + conventional reprocessing in order to derive information regarding + safeguards accounting and surveillance techniques. Criteria would be + established to assess the non-proliferation value of the selected + technology. While this solution would permit some traditional + experimental reprocessing, it would be compatible with our international + nuclear fuel cycle evaluation program, give tangible international + content to our evaluation program with leadership assumed by a major nuclear-user + state, and enable the Japanese to start up the Tokai facility in a + manner reasonably consistent with our non-proliferation objectives. + Furthermore, a safeguardability determination would not be required.

+

Although there could be some political sensitivity in Japan, this is + fairly close to what they already have proposed informally and should + defuse the immediate issue between us. On the other hand, it must be + recognized that this option would entail significant modification of + Tokai without assuring the continuing operation of the plant or an + outcome consistent with long-term nuclear planning and could be regarded + by the Japanese as a threat to their fast breeder reactor program. To + alleviate this concern, we believe this option would have to be + accompanied by U.S. offers to make available to Japan, directly or + indirectly, the plutonium necessary to the continuation of their breeder + research program.

+

Option 3: Explore the possibility of operating Tokai + only with a modified process that does not produce pure separated + plutonium based on a program worked out through expert consultations + with the United States. This alternative is similar to Option 2 + but excludes the possibility of running Tokai in + a manner that would produce pure plutonium. While partial coprocessing + might be the selected alternative technology, final selection of an + operating process would depend on the conclusions of an expert committee + of Japanese and U.S. nuclear experts. As in Option 2 the + non-proliferation value of the selected technology would be assessed + according to specified criteria. In order to facilitate continuation of + the Japanese advanced reactor research program, the U.S. would undertake + to provide the required plutonium directly or indirectly and would + facilitate Japanese access to ensured supplies of low enriched uranium + and uranium feed.

+

The Japanese might regard this proposal as discriminatory in view of the + fact that European countries are engaged in conventional reprocessing. + The U.S. would have to facilitate Japanese access to plutonium for their + experimental breeder program along the lines noted in Option 2. + Depending on the quantities involved, our nuclear agreement might have + to be modified for this purpose.

+

The U.S. also might be faced with Japanese requests to contribute + substantially to the cost of the Tokai modification. The time needed to + implement this Option (possibly as much as three years) and other + related uncertainties is not likely to make it very appealing to the + Japanese. However, this alternative could satisfy the letter and spirit + of U.S. policy on deferring conventional reprocessing while offering the + Japanese a technical solution for running the Tokai plant.

+

Option 4: Seek Japanese agreement to defer running the + Tokai plant for a fixed period of time, offering an incentives + package in exchange. Under this Option the U.S. would seek Japanese agreement to + defer start-up of the Tokai plant during the evaluation period. In + exchange, the U.S. would offer to provide the plutonium necessary for + continuation of the Japanese advanced reactor programs, facilitate + Japanese access to assured supplies of uranium ore, take measures to + provide forward deliveries of low enriched uranium for the Japanese LWR + reactors permitting the creation of a three-year advance LEU stockpile on Japanese territory. The + Japanese asked for these assurances during the first round of + discussions. If the circumstances so dictated, the U.S. would seek to + facilitate Japanese participation through equity sharing or involvement + in U.S. multinational enrichment facilities, or in enrichment activities + elsewhere.

+

This Option would prevent the start-up of a new reprocessing facility + but, as in Option 3, would require us to either deliver substantial + quantities of plutonium or to approve sustained transfers of irradiated + fuel from Japan to France or the United Kingdom for reprocessing and to + authorize the return to Japan of separated plutonium. The latter course + could lead to establishing undesirable precedents. This Option also + might entail facilitating the sharing of technology for enrichment + purposes. The Option would undoubtedly be received very negatively in + Japan because of the political implications of Japan acceding to U.S. + demands on Tokai as well as its obvious discriminatory features + vis-a-vis West Germany and the European Community.

+
+ +
+ 345. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in + JapanSource: National + Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign + Policy File, D770202–0809. Secret; Immediate. Drafted by William + Sherman (EA/J); cleared by Louis Scheinman (T), James Bonight + (OES), Harold Benglesdorf + (ERDA), Marvin Moss (ACDA), Michael Armacost (NSC), and Sydney Goldsmith (S/S); and approved by William Gleysteen + (EA). + Washington, June 7, 1977, 1506Z +

130632. Subject: U.S.-Japan Nuclear Talks.

+

1. During series of talks just concluded major attention was devoted to + drafting agreed principles in the context of which operation of the Tokai facility using U.S. + origin fuel might be worked out. Full text follows Septel.The + full text of the agreed principles is in telegram 132388 to Tokyo, + June 8. (National Archives, RG 59, + Central Foreign Policy File, D770204–1089) Essence of these + principles was:

+

A. U.S. recognized importance of nuclear energy development to Japan, + supported continued development of peaceful uses of nuclear energy and + committed itself not to jeopardize Japan’s long-term energy strategy, + including its breeder research and development program, promised to work + with Japan and other countries to establish assured supplies of uranium + ore and lightly enriched uranium, and reaffirmed that it had no + intention of discriminating against Japan in area of peaceful uses of + nuclear energy.

+

B. Japan stated its support and intention to cooperate in INFOP, and said + it shared concern regarding proliferation dangers stemming from + utilizing plutonium. It stated its view that plutonium recycling in + LWR’s could be a useful technological option if it could be made + sufficiently proliferation-resistant; however, it took due note of U.S. + conclusion that such recycling is neither economically justified nor + necessary. Japan also is of view that plutonium recycling in LWR’s is + not yet ready for commercialization.

+

C. It was agreed that operation of Tokai facility would be worked out on + basis of these principles. U.S. and Japanese experts agreed consult to + develop solution whereby the Tokai facility is operated initially in a + manner that would provide new information of significant + non-proliferation value.

+

2. With respect to U.S. team of experts, GOJ negotiators stipulated that team should prepare joint + report with Japanese colleagues, that report be submitted to both + governments as quickly as possible, and that, if practicable, it be + submitted while team was still in Japan.

+

3. At this stage, GOJ negotiators did + not rpt not wish to allude to fact that + principles had been agreed upon and wished avoid any reference to + existence of document in discussing negotiations with press. U.S. side + agreed. At same time, negotiators agreed ask their governments to + consider making text of agreed principles public at later date.

+

4. Negotiators also agreed on terms of reference for joint technical team + visit to Tokai-Mura. In brief, mandate of team is to:

+

A. Examine degree of proliferation resistance of various methods of + operating facility, explore methods of reducing proliferation danger, + including improving safeguards effectiveness.

+ +

B. Explore alternative methods of operation (e.g., some sort of + coprocessing) and assess the impact of such alternatives on cost, + storage tank availability and lead time, schedule delays, etc.

+

C. Recommend preferred modes of operation, both interim and long + term.

+

5. Dept believes this round of + negotiations was successful in outlining a general framework for a + mutually acceptable outcome and in providing a suitable basis for + further discussion. We still do not, however, have resolution on a mode + of operation of Tokai-Mura that would be acceptable to both sides and we + would expect the U.S. team to probe with the Japanese the extent to + which they are prepared to operate on a basis not involving production + of weapons-usable material. While difficult negotiations still lie + ahead, some genuine agreement has been achieved on general principles + and the issue has been somewhat defused.

+ + Vance + +
+ +
+ 346. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in + RomaniaSource: National + Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign + Policy File, D770206–1164. Confidential. Sent for information to + Paris and Vienna. Drafted by Samuel Fromowitz (EUR/EE); cleared by + James Devine (OES/NET), Edward McGaffigan (T), and Louis Nosenzo + (OES/NET); and approved by John Armitage (EUR). + Washington, June 9, 1977, 2107Z +

133712. Paris for Nye and + Nosenzo, Vienna for IAEA. Subject: + International Nuclear Fuel Cycle Evaluation.

+

1. Following is paper outlining the International Nuclear Fuel Cycle + Evaluation Program.

+

2. Begin text. The International Nuclear Fuel Cycle Evaluation (a + possible approach).

+

A. The objectives of the International Nuclear Fuel Cycle Evaluation are + to:

+

—Enhance international cooperation in dealing with common concerns + related to the use of nuclear power for civil purposes and provide a + forum for exchange of views and voluntary harmonization of policy; + and

+ +

—Provide information to guide the development of alternative nuclear + power systems that minimize potential proliferation while assuring + reliable economic and environmentally acceptable energy supplies for + each nation. The Program will identify and assess the feasibility of + alternate systems to meet energy needs on a timely basis.

+

B. Each participating country and international organization would + contribute to the objectives set forth in paragraph 1 above by applying + scientific, technical and financial resources, alone or in cooperation + with others as it deems appropriate, to programs and projects commonly + identified as useful in the Evaluation.

+

C. The participants could designate national agencies or other public or + private organizations as the vehicle for their contribution to the + Evaluation.

+

D. The Evaluation Program will consist of a number of coordinated + research and study programs related to existing fuel cycles and future + cycle alternatives. Countries and international organizations interested + in participating in research and evaluation in a particular area will + work together. One or more of the participants, as agreed among + themselves, would be designated as the lead participants, i.e. + responsible for arranging meetings and coordinating work in the + particular area. The overall evaluation will be coordinated through + participation in a steering committee which would meet to launch the + Program and periodically to assess progress. The steering committee can + consist of representatives of lead participants and other participating + countries as well as representatives of international organizations with + a major interest in the Evaluation.

+

E. Discussion of an overall INFCE plan + and schedule should take place in the next few months. We would hope + that identification of lead participants and joint examination of a work + plan for each major area could proceed in parallel, with work + implementation in some areas beginning in early fall. At this juncture, + the U.S. believes there would be merit in launching the Program through + a steering committee meeting that would direct various technical working + groups to define and develop areas of mutual interest. These groups + would report back to the steering committee. We would expect the general + review of results and discussion of further work in about two years. + Including a possible prioritizing of items for further development.

+

F. The work of the Evaluation would be coordinated with and make use of + the capabilities of the IAEA. The + IAEA could be represented on the + steering committee. The results of working groups would be fed into the + IAEA program through symposia and + publications. IAEA experts could + participate in working groups and might function as lead participants in + some areas. Periodic overall reviews could take place under IAEA auspices. The capabilities of other + organizations could be applied as appropriate.

+ +

G. Participating nations would, in accordance with their own interests + and programs, undertake and coordinate research and evaluation in the + following specific areas, and others as identified by the + participants.

+

(1) An international assessment of uranium availability and demand taking + into account the work already being performed by the IEA and NEA. This + would include consideration of coordinated exploration, joint resource + development, and measures to facilitate export/import arrangements + consistent with prudent non-proliferation conditions. Differing market + regimes and interaction with commercial issues would be taken into + account. A parallel study on thorium could also be undertaken.

+

(2) Investigation of sound mining techniques for recovery of lower grade + ores.

+

(3) An evaluation among interested states of uranium enrichment + requirements and projected capacity. This would include consideration of + joint planning to ensure adequate capacity and of collaborative + investment opportunities.

+

(4) An examination of possible institutional arrangements designed to + assure long-term fuel supply. This will include analyses of such + arrangements as bilateral supplier-consumer guarantees, multinational + arrangements that would permit consumer investment in enrichment + services, and fuel pooling, all aimed at insuring access on a + non-discriminatory basis to reactor fuel to countries meeting mutually + agreed non-proliferation constraints.

+

(5) An examination of demand and assured supply arrangements for heavy + water.

+

(6) Coordinated research, information exchange and technical aid in + fostering near-term options for increasing spent fuel storage including + technologies for more efficient utilization of existing spent fuel + capacity (e.g. neutron absorbing racks) and technologies for rapidly + installing additional capacity. Studies designed to facilitate the safe + and economical transportation of spent fuel and radioactive wastes.

+

(7) Possible establishment of international spent fuel repositories, + including studies on a regional basis to assess sites for such + repositories and develop legal, financial and institutional frameworks + for bringing such repositories into existence.

+

(8) Studies on long-term retrievable storage. This would include + consideration of various research concepts and comparison of + experimental results on ongoing research on retrievable storage + technologies.

+

(9) Work on the technology for permanent storage of spent fuel or high + level waste, including disposal canister design and testing. Joint + consideration of international repositories would also be + undertaken.

+ +

(10) A systematic assessment of the comparative advantages of various + reactor and fuel cycle concepts, taking into account relevant criteria + pertaining to non-proliferation benefits, technical feasibility, + economic implications, and prospective usefulness in meeting energy + needs.

+

(11) Research on various technical methods to increase once-through + uranium utilization in LWRS and HWRS, such as optimized fuel and loading + designs and spectral shift modifications that would significantly + increase fuel utilization and reactor efficiency.

+

(12) Research programs on advanced reactors, breeder alternatives and + thorium use, including:

+

—HTR once-through applications using low-enriched uranium;

+

—HTR thorium/uranium denatured fuel cycle applications;

+

—Various breeder concepts, including light water, thorium, sodium, and + gas-cooled breeders, particularly those concepts which, while requiring + sensitive fuels and fuel cycle elements, would also support existing or + future non-sensitive reactor cycles;

+

—Other advanced reactor concepts, including research on reactor + possibilities that are in the conceptual rather than experimental stage, + such as particle accelerator/reactor concepts, homogeneous reactors, + plasma reactors and hybrid fission/fusion reactor concepts.

+

(13) Efforts in the area of reprocessing and related technical + alternatives including:

+

—Analytical studies of the economic and environmental aspects of + reprocessing and recycle, including the results of extensive recent U.S. + work on the economic and environmental affects of reprocessing and + recycle;

+

—Technical alternatives to reprocessing techniques which produce + plutonium in a pure form, to include international evaluation of the + non-proliferation, safeguards, physical protection and economic + implications of techniques such as uranium separation only; Various + coprocessing modes, pyro-chemical processing, and THOREX reprocessing + evaluation; (The non-proliferation and other implications of the use of + conventional reprocessing and plutonium-handling techniques would be + employed as a frame of reference in assessing the value of + alternatives.)

+

—With regard to reprocessing or other processes involving production and + use of weapons-usable material, an examination of the problems + associated with attempting to safeguard or better protect them and + evaluation of possible future international arrangements to reduce + proliferation risks associated with abrogation or termination of + safeguards. End text.

+ + Vance + +
+ +
+ + 347. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security + Affairs (Brzezinski) to President + CarterCarter Library, National Security Affairs, + Brzezinski Material, + Brzezinski Office File, + Box 12, France: 1977. Confidential. Sent for action. Carter initialed the top of the + memorandum. + Washington, June + 22, 1977 + + SUBJECT + Reply to Giscard + +

President Giscard has sent you + (at Tab B)The Giscard letter was not attached but is available in + telegram 147101 to Paris, June 23. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + P850056-2578) a letter on proliferation. (It is not really a + personal letter but rather one prepared by the bureaucracy.) In the + letter, he asserts that a misunderstanding occurred regarding the + objectives of the nuclear experts meeting in Paris on June 8–9.Not found. He says he thought it was + supposed to study the feasibility of the fuel cycle study; we and + everyone else thought that issue was settled and used the Experts’ + Meeting to draft terms of reference for the study.

+

Giscard’s letter suggests that + the French now are going back on what appeared at the Summit to be a + commitment to participate in our proposed international fuel cycle + evaluation. He expresses his belief that the experts should meet again + to undertake the preliminary study commissioned in London.

+

Attached at Tab ATab A was not attached. + Carter’s response is + available in telegram 147101 to Paris. (Ibid.) is a proposed + response to President Giscard + that urges the French to get back on board with respect to the + evaluation, while making some accommodation for the apparent + “misunderstanding.” It also takes advantage of Giscard’s opening to you to raise our + two key issues with the French:

+

—Adoption of full scope safeguards: We have made + startling progress in the past two months on full scope safeguards: the + Canadians already practice them unilaterally; the British, Germans and + Soviets have stated clear support for them as joint supplier policy. The only remaining barrier to their + formal adoption at the fall London Suppliers meeting is France.

+

—The Pakistani deal: We want to take this + opportunity again to bring up the Pakistan issue with Giscard. A + complimentary reference to Giscard’s efforts to delay deliveries to Pakistan and + mention of the potentially positive effect on Pakistan of the attitude + of the new Indian Government + should encourage Giscard to feel + more like a partner in these efforts and would tie the Pakistan issue + into the overall picture in a low-key way.

+

The French concerns, mentioned in paragraph 2 of your reply, refer to: + French demands that for the duration of the fuel cycle study (1) the + U.S. allow all reprocessing of U.S.-supplied fuel + from third countries, and (2) the U.S. agree not to renegotiate the + U.S.–EURATOM Agreement for + Cooperation.On June 23, 1958, the + Eisenhower administration asked Congress for the “early approval” of + an agreement between the United States government and the six EURATOM countries—Belgium, France, + the FRG, Italy, Luxembourg, and the + Netherlands—to cooperate to produce and use nuclear energy in + Western Europe. (See “President Asks for Congressional Approval of + Agreement with European Atomic Energy Community,” June 23, 1958, in + Department of State Bulletin, pp. + 70–80) While both of these positions are in conflict with + your expressed policy, there is modest room for maneuver. Specifically, + State and ERDA propose the following + steps referred to in the response.

+

1. That we agree to begin renegotiation of those elements of the + U.S.–EURATOM Agreement that are + not controversial, and that we agree not to + take up, for the period of the first two-year phase of the fuel cycle + evaluation, the controversial elements relating to disposition of spent + fuel within the European Economic Community, including both reprocessing + and retransfer.

+

2. That we indicate that we are prepared to consider favorably U.S. + approval for reprocessing sufficient amounts of spent fuel during the + period of the evaluation to ensure that the capacities of existing French facilities are met, but not agree + to any long-term contract for reprocessing of spent fuel (particularly + from Japan) that would be used to finance the construction of new French reprocessing facilities.

+

Finally, I believe we can use the response to Giscard to good effect by noting that + Gerry Smith will soon be + available to meet with appropriate officials of the French Government to + explain your views in greater detail. This reference to Gerry’s role should help open a useful + channel of communications at a level between the technical experts and + direct contact between you and Giscard. The French have been exploiting this gap up + until now.

+

RECOMMENDATION:

+

That you approve the draft response.Carter checked the + “Approve” option and wrote “as amended” in the right-hand + margin.

+

That you approve the negotiating positions outlined here, to be proposed + to the French by Smith as soon as + possible.Carter checked the “Approve” option and wrote “Be + firm—C” in the right-hand margin.

+
+ +
+ + 348. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the + Soviet UnionSource: National + Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign + Policy File, D770240–0291. Confidential. Sent for Information to + Paris, London, Bonn, Brasilia, Brussels, and Vienna. Drafted by Rust + (ACDA/NP/NX); cleared by Nye, Louis Nosenzo (OES), Oplinger, + Nelson Sievering (ERDA), William + Salisbury (EUR/RPE), Jon Glassman (EUR/SOV), and Giles Harlow + (DOD); and approved by Charles + Van Doren (ACDA/NP). + Washington, July 6, 1977, 1613Z +

156342. USEEC, USIAEA. Subject: US–USSR Non-proliferation Discussions—June + 17.

+

1. Summary. Morokhov made lengthy + statement including many points contained in statement at last London + meeting.The last meeting of the London + Suppliers Group occurred on April 28–29. Morokhov’s statement is in telegram 106802 to + London, May 11. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + D770166–0383) Major new point was proposal for joint top + level US–USSR declaration outlined below. Nye deferred answer on top level + declaration question but suggested London guidelines could be common + suppliers declaration when guidelines finalized and publicized.Reference is to the Zangger Committee of the + London Suppliers Group’s Guidelines for which nuclear supplies could + not be exported to Non-Nuclear Weapons States by members of the + Group. These guidelines came from Article III of the + Non-Proliferation Treaty, which said that “source or special + fissionable material and equipment or material especially designed + or prepared for the processing, use or production of special + fissionable material, to any non-nuclear weapon State for special + purposes, unless the source or fissionable material shall be + subjected to the safeguards required by this Article.” (Documents on Disarmament, 1968, pp. + 461–465) + US raised protocol II of treaty of + Tlatelolco, pointing out relevance of Soviet action to possible movement + by Brazil.Protocol II calls upon + nuclear-weapon states to agree to respect the obligations set forth + in the Treaty and to promise not to use or threaten to use nuclear + weapons against Contracting Parties to the Treaty. See Foreign + Relations, 1964–1968, vol. XI, Arms Control and + Disarmament, Document 226. Full scope safeguards + were discussed and Nye urged + USSR to announce a unilateral + policy similar to US. Nye suggested Soviet proposals on + stockpile limits and regional centers be considered in INFCE. Highlights follow. Full report + will be pouched.Not found. End + summary.

+

2. US team headed by ACDA Director Warnke and Deputy Under Secretary Nye met for 4½ hours June 17 with + Soviet Delegation headed by Morokhov. Warnke + opened meeting by referring to March agreement in Moscow to hold regular + nonproliferation discussions,See Document 332. briefly reviewed + several agenda items, reemphasized relevance of a CTB with no PNE loophole to non-proliferation, and asked Nye to handle detailed discussions. Following Nye’s introductory remarks Morokhov delivered a lengthy statement + (para 3 and 4).

+

3. Morokhov mentioned Brezhnev’s May 29See “Address by General Secretary Brezhnev on French Television + [Extract],” May 29, 1977, in Documents on + Disarmament, 1977, pp. 357–358. call for maximum + non-proliferation effort and identified the following areas for joint + US–USSR consideration:

+

—Enhancement of NPT; suggested joint + action to encourage adherence by several conspicuous non-parties;

+

—Promotion of full scope safeguards as condition of supply, including + efforts to secure such a condition on part of potential exporters of + source material; (there was discussion of how to deal with French on + this question);

+

—Moratorium on sensitive transfers—Morokhov said USSR + supports and stressed that fuel services should be offered; USSR can expand enrichment capacity;

+

—Agreement among exporters on sanctions; suppliers should consult if + recipient defaults on IAEA obligation + including exploding nuclear device; exports should be halted and issue + raised at IAEA and UN; USSR + also ready to consider other sanctions;

+

—Limits on stockpiles of weapons usable material by requiring spent fuel + return to supplier or to regional center; could be additional provision + in London guidelines;

+

—Multinational centers for spent fuel storage and reprocessing;

+

—Regular bilateral and multilateral supplier consultations especially in + cases of large transfers or when major new assistance is undertaken; + also suppliers could exchange trigger list information;

+

—Strengthening IAEA safeguards; + mentioned carrying out experts’ recommendation of safeguards evaluation + unit, and urged stronger US support; + said USSR puzzled by US “passivity” on ensuring effective + agreements with EURATOM and Japan; + suggested encouraging NPT parties to + conclude agreements, and discussed SAGSI;

+

—Promotion of physical security convention; USSR studying US + draft;Not found.

+

—Suggestion of US–USSR declaration to be signed at top + levels calling for universal nonproliferation regime, supporting + peaceful international nuclear cooperation not contributing to explosive + spread, full scope safeguards and additional NPT adherence and other supplier group type issues on + sensitive transfers, sanctions, physical security; support for IAEA safeguards. Morokhov stressed that list of topics + was suggestive only; essential element is joint character of declaration + at highest levels.

+

4. Morokhov concluded statement by + saying INFCE proposal will contribute + to nonproliferation and USSR has no + objection to pro-gram. They will consider participation of Soviet + experts in technical discussions.

+ +

5. Initial Nye comment on Soviet + proposal for joint declaration was to defer any response re issuance at + top level. Since list of topics parallels suppliers guidelines, he + suggested that this purpose could be served by the joint suppliers + declaration when guidelines finalized and published. Morokhov indicated proposed declaration + would precede further and complement existing suppliers efforts and be + wider in scope.

+

6. NPT and Treaty of Tlatelolco: + Nye noted President + Carter support for universal + NPT adherence, but mentioned full + scope safeguards and Tlatelolco as partial steps which are useful in + specific situations (i.e. in India and Latin America). Nye reported some indications Indians + may be willing to consider full scope safeguards and US impression Brazil might waive + entry-into-force provisions of Tlatelolco if USSR signed Protocol II. Nye repeated US request + for USSR to reconsider their Protocol + II position. Soviets responded by reiterating their support for full + scope safeguards and NPT. Timerbaev (USSR) said Protocol II position is being studied but + remains unchanged for now. He suggested Tlatelolco approach too + complicated to obtain full scope safeguards. Nye reported some preliminary + indications Argentina might move towards acceptance of full scope + safeguards.

+

7. Morokhov reiterated the + suggestion for joint messages—perhaps along with UK—encouraging NPT + adherence. NYE said US fully accepts + spirit of this suggestion but sometimes best diplomacy lies not in such + joint approaches, but in exchanges of information—such as the present + one—regarding measures to strengthen nonproliferation regime.

+

8. EURATOM and NPT Safeguards Agreement: Morokhov said situation was + dangerous,In telegram 124488 to + Brussels, May 28, the Department of State said that “there continue + to be reports of major obstacles to the implementation by the IAEA of effective safeguards in EC + NNWS [European Community + Non-Nuclear-Weapon States]. In particular, there appears to be a + continued unwillingness on the part of EURATOM to fully allow the independent verification + activities by the IAEA which are + called for in the IAEA/EURATOM safeguards agreement and which are + essential for effective IAEA + safeguards.” (National Archives, RG + 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770191–1100) represented + clear cut NPT violation, and asked if + US would consider joint action at + September board to urge EURATOM to + conclude this matter speedily. Nye said US also + concerned, that we have indicated our concern to EURATOM, and are prepared to do so + again, but did not indicate willingness to act in IAEA board.

+

9. Full Scope Safeguards: To Soviet question on French position Nye said may have to consider + fall-back in September if their position is clearly negative. Nye encouraged USSR to make public statement similar to + US and others as way of moving + French in this direction. Morokhov said such a unilateral approach is no problem but they doubt it + would be effective. He said perhaps French could approach this like + NPT, i.e. not a party officially + but act as if they were. He indicated FRG waiting for French. Also said any hope of retroactive + application unrealistic and should be abandoned.

+

10. Moratorium on Sensitive Transfers: Nye said US position to + get statements country-by-country has some chance of success. Morokhov said while practicing such a + policy they prefer to press for formal adoption in suppliers guidelines. + He indicated French statement was not specific enough.Not found. + Nye questioned whether full + suppliers group was appropriate for this purpose since only a few + members were suppliers of sensitive items.

+

11. Nuclear Materials Stockpiles and Regional Centers: Nye said these questions ought to be + considered in INFCE rather than in + London group. He elaborated on INFCE + rationale and asked Morokhov for + specific suggestions or reactions to US + evaluation proposal, e.g. how should it relate to IAEA and should any of technical features + be changed? Morokhov suggested + this be deferred to next round of consultations.

+

12. Libya: Morokhov assured US Delegation that the fuel was enriched to + only 20 and that all spent fuel would have to be returned.

+

13. Timerbaev announced that he + and Warnke had come to agreement + on opening of CTB talks in Geneva on + July 13, and that there should be further nonproliferation bilaterals + before September suppliers’ meeting. Soviets appear to have had + impression that such talks might be in Geneva following CTB, but Warnke did not make this commitment.

+ + Vance + +
+ +
+ + 349. Memorandum From Secretary of State Vance to President CarterSource: + Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, + Box 22, France: 1–12/77. Secret. In the upper right-hand corner of + the first page of the memorandum, Carter wrote “Cy, J.” + Washington, July 8, + 1977 +

[Omitted here is material unrelated to non-proliferation.]

+

4. Gerard + Smith’s Meetings in Paris: + Gerard Smith has just completed + an initial day of consultations in Paris with Foreign Minister de Guiringaud and other key officials + on non-proliferation and nuclear policy questions.The Embassy transmitted a report of the meeting in + telegram 19861 from Paris, July 8. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files, + D770243–0334) The French reiterated strongly the importance + they attach to their present nuclear power program.In the left-hand margin, Carter wrote “We’ll form a policy, + along with others, either with or without the French.”

+

The discussion produced understandings on spent fuel retransfers, and on + renegotiation of the US/EURATOM agreement. The understandings remove + these issues as impediments to French participation in the International + Nuclear Fuel Cycle Evaluation (INFCE). However, the French indicated great distress over + Canada’s insistence that it have a veto over reprocessing of any fuel + Canada supplies. It is not yet clear whether the French participation in + INFCE will be conditioned on + solution of this problem. The French government will make its decision + after the next experts meeting, now scheduled for the end of July.

+

Ambassador Smith also reiterated + our concern over the reprocessing plant sale to Pakistan and our + interest in full-scope safeguards. There is no new French position on + these issues yet.

+

[Omitted here is material unrelated to non-proliferation.]

+
+ +
+ + 350. Telegram From the Embassy in France to the Department of + StateSource: National + Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign + Policy File, P840083–0297. Secret; Immediate; Cherokee; Nodis. The message was forwarded to + Brzezinski in telegram + 186754 to the White House, August 8. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + N770004–0680) + Paris, August 9, 1977, 1720Z +

22983. For the Acting Secretary from the Ambassador. Subject: French + Reprocessing Plant for Pakistan.

+

1. On August 8 de Guiringaud told + me in strict confidence how the French government intends to proceed on + the Pakistani reprocessing issue in hopes of (A) buying a substantial + amount of additional time and (B) putting the Pakistanis in a position + in which they will have to accept a plant not capable of producing + plutonium. De Guiringaud + explained that he was giving US this + highly sensitive information in advance because we would have a crucial + role to play after rpt after the French + make their move. Meanwhile, he would like to know our reaction. + Obviously, any leak of the French intention would almost certainly blow + up the whole operation, causing a crisis in French-Pakistani relations + and putting us in considerable difficulty with the French. I therefore + request that this be held on the strictest need to know basis.

+

2. After summarizing the history of this subject, going back to 1972, and + implying that neither he nor Giscard would have moved in this direction, De Guiringaud explained that France + has thus far turned aside repeated overtures by Agha Shahi to come to + Paris to seek reconfirmation of French willingness to proceed with the + contract. de Guiringaud, + however, decided to delay seeing Agha Shahi until after the Seven Power + meeting in Paris and French acceptance of INFCE had generated the necessary momentum and created a + new situation. This, according to de + Guiringaud, has given the new basis for international + efforts on non-proliferation and, indeed, changed the atmosphere for + international discussions.

+

3. Accordingly, de Guiringaud is + sending word to the Pakistani government that he is prepared to see Agha + Shahi sometime between about Sept 5 and Sept 15.

+

4. De Guiringaud’s plan is to + make a presentation along the following lines:

+

—France has signed a contract and it intends to honor its commitment.

+ +

—However, since French-Pakistani talks first began on the matter in 1972 + (contract signed in 1974) the relevant techniques have substantially + changed.

+

—France, therefore, proposes to revise the plans for the reprocessing + plant so that it will furnish a product which, perhaps with some + supplemental treatment, can be used [garble] only as reactor fuel.

+

—French and Pakistani experts should review the entire matter and reach + agreement on revision of plans for the plant. Meanwhile, however, the + French would send no more equipment based on old plans.

+

5. Irrespective of how the Pakistanis might really feel about that—and + whatever the internal pressures might be from the military or other + elements of the power structure in Pakistan—the Pakistanis would have to + limit their outward protest: otherwise they would be, in effect, + admitting to the world that they want the reprocessing plant in order to + obtain plutonium. In such an eventuality, de Guiringaud is confident that he can persuade + Giscard to cancel the + contract.

+

6. de Guiringaud believes it more + likely that the Pakistanis will protest on grounds of increased cost + rather than a change in the character of the product to be produced by + the reprocessing plant. The French say there would indeed be an increase + in cost, perhaps on the order of some $10–12 million. (Comment: It was + clear in context of the conversation that this was a very rough estimate + and we should not take it as a firm figure.)

+

7. After he has made his pitch to Agha Shahi, de Guiringaud would like us to follow + up with the Pakistanis to reassure them that Paris is offering an + honorable way out: that acceptance of the French offer would put them + clear of the Symington Amendment;The 1976 + Symington Amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 banned + U.S. economic, military assistance, and export credits to countries + that deliver or receive, acquire or transfer nuclear enrichment + technology when they do not comply with IAEA regulations and inspections. and that the + US would be willing to help with the + supplementary costs. With regard to cost, de Guiringaud emphasized that neither the French + government nor private company (St. Gobain) would be in a position to + pay. Moreover, he interprets his previous understandings with Secretary + Kissinger on this subject to + be still in force; [garble] that we would be prepared to help with the + supplementary financial costs if a way out could be found to meet our + desiderata on non-proliferation.

+

8. Whatever the ultimate outcome, de + Guiringaud does not seem to anticipate an immediate, flat + Pakistani rejection. He considers it more likely that the Pakistanis + would go along with some bilateral experts’ review which ought at the + very least to take about six months. By then, Pakistan would be heavily + engaged in INFCE which should put + them under additional pressure not to go too far.

+ +

9. I asked whether the French are truly confident that different + technology would get around the danger of producing weapons grade + material. De Guiringaud repeated + that he believes French technology can give the Pakistanis a plant + producing an enriched material which, with some supplementary treatment + and shaping into fuel rods, could be used only as reactor fuel. For the + Pakistanis to take the product of this plant and turn it into plutonium + would be technically possible but would require an entire additional + plant whose construction would be easily detectable.

+

10. Prior to this exchange, I had briefly outlined our suspicions about + Pakistani intentions. Locke will now follow up in more detail with de + Laboulaye. I sensed that French welcome this information because some of + them at any rate have had their own suspicions. Thus the emphasis in the + new proposal on testing Pakistani intent.

+

11. Once again let me emphasize sensitivity of these discussions. In + addition to reaction we might have, it is clear to me that at some point + prior [to] French talk with Pakistanis we would wish to agree on exact + nature of our intervention and perhaps also have very discreet talk + about technical details of French plan.

+

12. Other parts of my conversation are being transmitted separately.Telegram 23286 from Paris, August 10, + reported that de Guiringaud + “reiterated standard but strong French concerns on arms control and + strategic issues, particularly CTB + and MBFR.” (National Archives, + RG 59, Central Foreign Policy + File, D770288–0193) +

+ + Hartman + +
+ +
+ + 351. Telegram From the Department of State to Secretary of State + VanceSource: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + D770306–0438. Secret; Niact Immediate; Exdis. Drafted by Stephen Ecton (EA/J) (text as + received by the White House); cleared by Eric Fleischer (S/SO); and + approved by Robert Oakley (EA). Vance was in the People’s Republic of China August + 20–26. + Washington, August 24, 1977, 2116Z +

Tosec 90128. 202154. Subject: Tokai Mura Decision.

+

1. Following is text of memorandum for the Secretary from Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski. Begin quote. The + President has considered U.S. policy options with respect to the Tokai + reprocessing plant issue, and instructs the U.S. negotiator to seek + early resolution of the Tokai issue with Japanese authorities along the + line of State’s proposed model agreement (attached).Not found. In particular, the agreement + should include these essential elements:

+

2. (1) Japanese government acceptance of these undertakings:

+

—Public agreement that recycling in light water reactors is + premature.

+

—Active support for INFCE and other + U.S. non-proliferation objectives.

+

—Limitation of any operation of Tokai involving plutonium separation to + meet actual plutonium needs for advanced reactor development.

+

—Postponement of any major moves toward a follow-on 1500 ton reprocessing + plant during INFCE.

+

—Consultations with U.S. regarding the results of INFCE and the appropriateness of + multinational alternatives to a national reprocessing facility as well + as spent fuel storage possibilities.

+

—Affording the IAEA maximum + opportunity, including continuous inspection, to apply safeguards during + experimental operations on Tokai.

+

3. (2) Approval for the start-up of the Tokai facility for reprocessing + in the scheduled mode, but with a limited amount of irradiated fuel, + coupled with Japanese agreement to undertake a mutually acceptable major + coprocessing experiment subsequently.

+

4. (3) The negotiator is further authorized to seek, but not insist upon, + the addition of advanced safeguards testing and the requirement for a + blended product. End quote.

+ + Christopher + +
+ +
+ + 352. Memorandum of ConversationSource: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, + Brzezinski Material, + Subject File, Box 35, Memcons: + President, 8/77. Secret. The meeting took place in the Oval + Office. + Washington, August 25, 1977, 9:45–9:55 + a.m. + + PARTICIPANTS + The President + Gerard Smith, + Ambassador-at-Large for U.S. Nuclear Proliferation Matters + Michael Armacost, NSC Staff + Member + +

Ambassador Smith indicated that he + wished to talk briefly about what he might face in the negotiations with + Japan over the Tokai issue. He noted that one should not expect them to + return from this round of talks with an agreement signed and sealed—with + which the President readily agreed. The Japanese, Smith said, are likely to raise a + number of specific questions which will require a U.S. response; above + all, whether we will be prepared to assist them in obtaining plutonium + to meet their advanced reactor requirements by shipping plutonium + directly or approving shipments from the UK or France. In addition, the Japanese will face + difficulties in determining what type of conversion plant to build since + different facilities would be required to handle the product of + conventional reprocessing on the one hand and a coprocessed product on + the other.

+

The President emphasized that Congress at present feels very strongly + about limiting U.S. exports of plutonium. Therefore, Smith should indicate to Fukuda and other Japanese + representatives that we cannot guarantee Congressional approval for any + arrangements which would provide for U.S. exports of plutonium. The + President replied that he would be prepared to join Smith in discussing this matter with + Congressional leaders to insure that the legislation makes provisions to + handle Japan’s unique problem. He indicated that Smith could tell Fukuda that he would undertake such + efforts with the leadership on the Hill.

+

Smith then noted that we are + asking the Japanese to undertake a very large-scale safeguard + experiment, the cost of which may run as high as $15 million. He asked + the President whether as the negotiator, he had any leeway to accept + some sharing of these costs. The President indicated that this would be + very hard to sell with Congress and the public in view of the fact that + we have been doing major experimentation in this field for years without + requesting others to share the financial burden. Smith suggested that one step short of + direct cost-sharing would involve transfer by the U.S. of some advanced + instrumentation to the IAEA which in turn could make it + available for us by the Japanese at Tokai. The President indicated that + he would have no difficulty with this sort of arrangement.

+
+ +
+ 353. Memorandum from Acting Secretary of State Christopher to President CarterSource: National Archives, RG 59, Papers of Michael Armacost: Lot 89D265, Box 4. + Secret; Nodis. + Washington, August + 30, 1977 + + SUBJECT + Current Tokai Negotiations + +

Gerard Smith is now in Tokyo + negotiating the conditions under which the Japanese prototype + reprocessing facility at Tokai may reprocess US-origin fuel. His negotiating instructions are set forth + in Attachment 1.See Document 354. +

+

Gerry Smith has obtained Japanese + agreement to all the undertakings we requested with one exception: the + Japanese have said they now can give us only an assurance of their intention to go to coprocessing after two years, + because they cannot agree to a commitment which + would require Diet ratification. Gerry has cabled us asking for authority to reach an ad + referendum agreement on this revised basis this week (Attachment + 2).Telegram 206967 to the White House, + August 30; National Archives, RG 59, + Central Foreign Policy File, N770005–0443.

+

With your approval, we would propose to cable Gerry tomorrow to modify his instructions along the + lines he and Ambassador Mansfield have recommended, for the following + reasons:

+

1. Japanese acceptance of our position on deferral of recycling of + plutonium in light water reactors is an important support for our + non-proliferation policy, and is particularly useful coming on the eve + of the launching of the INFCEP program.

+

2. We believe that the commitments that the Japanese have made are more + important than the question of when a technically marginal procedure + such as coprocessing would commence at Tokai. We still retain the option + to insist on coprocessing after two years.

+ +

3. It is important to maintain a close working relationship with Japan in + the nuclear area, and Ambassador Mansfield has warned that further delay may not work in + our favor. Political developments could complicate our relationship and + threaten gains already made.

+

You should be aware that Smith’s + recommended solution may be criticized by some in Congress. However, the + pending non-proliferation legislation would cause difficulties for any + of our proposed solutions, and the problem may be exacerbated by further + delay. In any case, consultations with Congress will be crucial. + Ambassador Mansfield should be + able to help.

+

ACDA agrees with this + recommendation.

+

Attachments:

+

1. Memorandum from Dr. Brzezinski.

+

2. Telegram from Ambassador Smith.

+
+ +
+ 354. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security + Affairs (Brzezinski) to President + CarterSource: National Archives, RG 59, The Papers of Michael Armacost: + Lot 89D265, Box 4. Secret. A handwritten “C” in the upper right + corner indicates that Carter + saw the memorandum. + Washington, August + 31, 1977 + + SUBJECT + Tokai Decision + +

Ambassador Smith is standing by for your decision regarding the + proposal summarized below. Given the extraordinary importance and public + visibility of this issue in Japan, it will be preferable to have a + resolution of this issue prior to Smith’s departure from Tokyo in roughly 12 hours from + now.

+

The memorandum from Warren + ChristopherSee Document 353. contains a + recommendation, supported by ACDA, + that the changes proposed by Smith be accepted. The brief cable from Smith, marked by me,See footnote 3, Document + 353. summarizes the key elements of the proposed + deal, while his longer cable explains the significance of the Japanese offer to delay + construction of the plutonium conversion plant.Smith’s + longer cable is telegram 13359 from Tokyo, August 31. (National + Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign + Policy File, P850106–2030)

+

In essence, the Japanese (1) want to defer decision on coprocessing for + two years, subject to successful R&D + and INFCEP; (2) recognize that U.S. originated fuel will not be + available beyond the two-year period unless they then accept + coprocessing; and (3) are willing to impose a voluntary deferment on the + construction of their proposed plutonium conversion plant, despite their + existing financial commitments to proceed.

+

I have asked for comments, as you instructed, from Jessica Tuchman and Kitty Schirmer. + Their reactions are as follows:

+

Schirmer: “I concur with the Christopher memo and Brzezinski’s recommendation to accept; in our public + announcement we should stress the major commitments the Japanese have + made at our behest.”

+

Tuchman feels that we should insist on a commitment from the Japanese to + go into coprocessing unless it is agreed by both sides that it is + technically infeasible or ineffective; in effect, our original position. + Her view is that the implied commitment by them, implicit in the + two-year deferral, will be viewed by Congress and elsewhere as an + excessive concession.

+

On balance, having had extensive consultations with Gerry Smith, Joe Nye, Christopher, and others, I feel that we should authorize + Smith to proceed as urged by + him.Underneath the last sentence, + Carter wrote “ok. J.C.” + On September 12, the United States and Japan announced that they + would “cooperate in evaluating the nuclear fuel cycle and the future + role of plutonium” and would “defer decisions relating to the + commercial use of plutonium in light water reactors at least during” + the INFCE program over the next + two years. (Documents on Disarmament, 1977, + pp. 560–562)

+ + J.C. + +
+ +
+ + 355. Memorandum of ConversationCarter + Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Brzezinski Office File, Box 12, France: 1977. + Secret; Sensitive. The meeting took place in the Cabinet + Room. + Washington, September 15, + 1977, 11:06 a.m.–12:50 p.m. + + SUBJECT + Summary of the President’s Meeting with French Prime Minister + Raymond Barre + + + PARTICIPANTS + President Jimmy + Carter + Vice President Walter F. + Mondale + Secretary of State Cyrus + Vance + Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski, + Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs + Warren Christopher, Deputy + Secretary of State + Arthur A. Hartman, U.S. + Ambassador to France + George Vest, Assistant + Secretary of State for European Affairs + Robert Hunter, NSC Staff Member (Notetaker) + Alec Toumayan, Department of State Interpreter + Raymond Barre, Prime + Minister of the French Republic + Louis de Guiringaud, + Minister of Foreign Affairs + Jacques Kosciusko-Morizet, Ambassador of France to the United + States + Francois de Laboulaye, Under Secretary for Political + Affairs + Jean-Claude Paye, Advisor to the Prime Minister on International + Affairs + +

The President and the Prime Minister met alone in the Oval Office from + 11:06 a.m. until 11:33 a.m., and together with the others in the Cabinet + Room until 12:50 p.m., as follows.

+

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to non-proliferation.]

+

The President said that this is a legitimate + reason. He appreciates France’s taking part in the fuel cycle + evaluation. There had been some problems, and he hopes that we have + accommodated to France’s concerns. When the U.S., Canada, and Australia + decide on a policy, he wants to understand France’s needs. We never try + not to let others get the breeder reactor. We are working on one, too. + We should share experiences on questions like the origin of uranium ore, + and how to minimize the “refining” of it for explosives. It would + strengthen our hand in the proliferation field, and our decision will + not affect France adversely. The fuel cycle meeting will be on October + 21.

+

The Prime Minister said that the French position + was decided in their nuclear council by Giscard last October, and in December we knew about it; + Giscard talked about it + clearly. France appreciated the discussions to prepare the evaluation + program. But they have some conditions. First, there should be useful + discussions with the Soviet Union. Second, the study should be more at the level of experts than + an “integral” conference. That is, not governments—they have already + talked about it.

+

Third is this: there is a need to keep up freedom of supply, to all + countries, for specific purposes. Therefore, renewing the EURATOM-Canadian agreement would be + useful.Canada and EURATOM signed an agreement + similar to that of the U.S.–EURATOM agreement on October 6, 1959.

+

There are long-term problems. France is against the military uses of + atomic energy. It will take all measures to avoid proliferation. If it + works on breeders, it is because energy progress is essential: they have + no coal, oil, or gas. They are the fourth largest importer (of oil?) in + the world. They cannot maintain the correct working of their economy + without energy progress: including new forms of energy, breeders, and + reactors for electricity. They will take all measures to avoid diversion + to military uses.

+

The Foreign Minister said that when the fuel cycle + program next meets in Washington, it will be a governmental meeting, to + evaluate progress. After that experts should meet, in different groups, + with different ideas—such as waste products, breeders, etc. They would + like one group in Paris: reprocessing. (Both the + President and Secretary Vance said “uh huh.”)

+

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to non-proliferation.]

+
+ +
+ 356. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security + Affairs (Brzezinski) to President + CarterSource: Carter Library, National + Security Affairs, Brzezinski + Material, Brzezinski Office + File, Box 12, France: 1977. Secret. Hunter initialed the memorandum for Brzezinski. Carter initialed the upper + right-hand corner of the memorandum. + Washington, undated + + SUBJECT + French Proliferation Policy + +

Ambassador Hartman, Farley, Nye, and NSC staff met + this morn-ing to discuss the important issues raised yesterday by the + French on nuclear matters: (1) + concerning their new conditions for participation in INFCE; and (2) the news, conveyed by + cable, that they are trying to use INFCE as a means to disband the London Suppliers Group + arguing that INFCE makes the London + Group redundent. This is particularly disturbing because we believe that + we are close to finally achieving a consensus in London on full-scope safeguards—one of our top + proliferation goals. The consensus of all those at this meeting was that + if time permits today, it would be very important if you could raise the + following points with Barre:

+

—I’d like to just take a minute to return to the questions you raised + yesterday on the subject of nuclear proliferation.

+

—We are pleased that we can reiterate the three + assurances you raised on the subject of French participation in INFCE.

+

We understand the Soviets will participate.

+

We are agreed that the purpose of INFCE is to work out at the expert + level a new consensus on the nuclear fuel cycle.

+

Thirdly, as Ambassador Smith said + in Paris, we can agree with you that INFCE should not be used to prejudge + other nuclear issues including those of nuclear + supply.

+

—In this regard, let me also say that we believe that INFCE is not a reason to curtail our + fruitful cooperation in the London Suppliers + Group where there is still useful work to be done. In + particular, I hope your government will look again at some formula by + which we can reach agreement on comprehensive + safeguards.In their final meeting + on September 16, Carter told + Barre that the United + States “will not prejudge issues. We also do not consider the study + to be a substitute for the London Suppliers’ Group.” (Memorandum of + Conversation, September 16; ibid.)

+
+ +
+ + 357. Memorandum of ConversationSource: Department of State, Office of the Secretariat + Staff, Cyrus R. Vance, + Secretary of State—1977–1980, Lot 84D241, Box 10, NODIS Memcons, 1977. Secret; Nodis. Approved by David Anderson + (S/S) on October 11. The meeting + took place in Vance’s + office. + Washington, September 16, 1977 + + PARTICIPANTS + US + The Secretary + Under Secretary Philip Habib + Ambassador Arthur A. + Hartman + Assistant Secretary George S. + Vest + James F. Dobbins, EUR/WE (Notetaker) + FRANCE + Louis de Guiringaud + Foreign Minister + Francois de Laboulaye Political Director + +

Pakistan and Non-Proliferation

+

de Guiringaud related that, in a + meeting on September 8 with Pakistani Foreign Minister Aga Shahi, he had + told Aga Shahi that France had a contract to furnish Pakistan with a + plant which was capable of reprocessing used nuclear fuel in a manner + that would enable it to be used again to fuel reactors. He had then + proposed to have plans for this plant restructured, along the lines + de Guiringaud had earlier + discussed with Ambassador Hartman. De + Guiringaud told Aga Shahi that the French government + would, in due course, open conversations with Pakistan to rewrite + certain parts of the agreement.

+

Aga Shahi had been very surprised, de + Guiringaud said. De + Guiringaud had been forced to endure an hour-long series + of complaints about discrimination against Pakistan, vis-a-vis India, in + the nuclear field. Aga Shahi had talked about the Canadian and US assistance to India in the nuclear + field, including assistance on breeder technology. He claimed that India + had been able to become a nuclear power as a result of such assistance. + He had insisted that Pakistan must receive treatment comparable to that + given India. Something must be done for Pakistan or assistance to India + must be cut back.

+

De Guiringaud said that he had, + as a result of this conversation, initiated a study of France’s nuclear + relationship with India. The Secretary said that he would have a paper + prepared for de Guiringaud + outlining the current state of the US + nuclear relationship with India. He said that the United States had + agreed to provide a certain amount of fuel for the Tarapur reactor. The + United States had also talked to India about the need to accept + full-scope safeguards. The Indians had agreed to consider this + seriously. Habib added that there had been some general discussion on this issue with + Desai who had indicated that + the Indians would not conduct further nuclear tests. The Secretary said + that Desai personally had been + clear on this, and that he rejected testing. De Guiringaud noted, however, that not + all of Desai’s subordinates were + in agreement with his position, nor was Desai necessarily capable of controlling these + people.

+

De Guiringaud said that Aga Shahi + had asked, during the period before the Pakistani elections, that the + French government not do anything to give the impression that the + contract was not going forward without change. De Guiringaud had agreed to this + request. He agreed that if it became known that pressure was being + applied on Pakistan this would become an election issue which Bhutto might well make use of. + (De Guiringaud also said + that Aga Shahi had conveyed a clear impression that he felt that some of + the charges against Bhutto, + including one of murder, were not without substance.)

+

De Guiringaud asked that the + contents of this conversation with Aga Shahi be kept absolutely + confidential. The Secretary promised to do so.

+

De Guiringaud recalled that + Ambassador Hartman had asked + whether there had been any transfers from France of equipment for the + Pakistani reprocessing plant after August 4. He said that the French + government had last authorized transfers of such equipment on July 16. + Such authorizations were valid for six months, and there was no way of + determining within that period when items authorized were shipped.

+

The Secretary expressed the hope that the French government would + continue to consider agreeing to full-scope safeguards at the London + Suppliers Meeting. De Guiringaud + replied that this issue had come before France’s Foreign Nuclear Policy + Council, but no decision had been made to date. There would, he said, be + another meeting of the Council at the end of September. He assured the + Secretary that the French government was aware of US concerns in this matter.

+

De Guiringaud inquired about the + status of the Brazil/German reprocessing contract. The Secretary replied + that the US position had not changed. + The US had indicated to Brazil that it + wished to continue to discuss this matter. President Carter would be sending a letter to + Brazilian President Geisel in the + near future. In his letter he would suggest follow-up discussions. The + Secretary said he would be going to Brazil the end of October to meet + the Foreign Minister.

+ +

De Guiringaud asked whether the + US was also working with Argentina. + Vance said it was. He had + spoken to the Argentine Foreign Minister and would be visiting there + when he visited Brazil. The Argentines had explained their need for + nuclear power but seemed quite cooperative.

+

de Guiringaud asked whether the + US was aware that Germany had + concluded an agreement to supply Brazil with conventional arms. The + Secretary said he was not, but would check. De Guiringaud also raised the activities of the German + company which was constructing a missile test site in southeastern + Zaire. He asked whether the US had any + information on the range of these missiles. The Secretary said that he + would check and provide the French government with what information was + available. De Laboulaye noted the coincidence between the location of + the German test site and the area of the recent problems in Shaba.

+

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to non-proliferation.]

+
+ +
+ 358. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security + Affairs (Brzezinski) to President + CarterSource: Carter Library, National + Security Council, Institutional Files, Box 4, PD–08 [4]. Confidential. Sent for + action. In the upper right-hand corner of the memorandum, Brzezinski wrote “RI [Rick + Inderfurth] JT [Jessica + Tuchman]. Implement. ZB.” + Washington, October + 7, 1977 + + SUBJECT + Nuclear Fuel Assurances + +

Your April 7 statement on nuclear proliferation policySee footnote 3, Document + 338. identified

+

assured access to nuclear fuel supplies

+

assistance with spent fuel storage

+

as the key areas in which the US would + develop programs to encourage other nations to adhere to our new, + rigorous, non-proliferation policies. Such incentives will be + particularly important in the many cases where we will be asking other + nations to renegotiate existing Agreements for + Cooperation to meet our new standards.

+

You have already approved a program for spent fuel storage.Not found. This memorandum asks for your + approval of several measures to provide assured access to fuel supplies. + These measures have been developed during a lengthy interagency study + (Tab B)Attached but not printed. by + the NSC Ad Hoc Group on Proliferation + (hereinafter, “the Group”). This paper substitutes for a longer decision memorandum (Tab A)Attached but not printed. submitted by the Group which you + need not read. In general, the recommendations + have the support of all members of the Group + (State, ERDA, DOD, ACDA, NRC, CIA, + CEQ, FEA, EPA, OSTP, Schlesinger, Eizenstat, OMB + and NSC) except where important + differences are noted.

+

Assured access to nuclear fuel has two distinct components:

+

—access to uranium ore

+

—access to enrichment services

+

To be fully satisfactory to recipients, a program must provide access to + both of these on a timely basis, in adequate quantity, and + in a fully reliable manner. Your decisions on the + following measures will be provided as guidance to the agencies:

+

1. Parity pricing and non-discriminatory terms in + US fuel supply contracts for + nations meeting non-proliferation standards. The Group + recommends that you approve a policy under which nations that meet our + higher standards—as embodied in new or amended Agreements for + Cooperation—would receive nuclear fuel at the same price and under the + same conditions as domestic customers. Such parity pricing and + non-discriminatory terms will assure foreign customers of the importance + we attach both to non-proliferation and to ensuring that legitimate + energy needs are met. The Group believes that a standard of pricing that + differentiates between domestic and foreign customers would undermine + our efforts to achieve parallel policies among all fuel supplier + nations.Carter checked the “Approve” option and in the + right-hand margin wrote “Prices should equal costs. Do they? + J”

+

2. Contribution to International Uranium Resource + Exploration. Perhaps the most critical issue in the + plutonium/breeder debate is whether there is enough uranium to supply + the world’s needs through the fission age without the necessity of + recourse to the breeder. The US has + recently stepped up its own uranium resource evaluation program, and has + encouraged the international community to do likewise. The International + Energy Agency (IEA) is currently doing paper studies preparatory to + actual field exploration of international uranium reserves. The Group + recommends that you authorize it to prepare options to provide increased + US technical and financial + assistance in support of the IEA’s activities.Carter + checked the “Approve” option and in the right-hand margin wrote + “J.”

+

3. Explore the Possibilities of Foreign Investment in + US Enrichment Plants. Even + under the most attractive terms, foreign countries hesitate to place + their reliance in a fuel supply contract, since the supplier has full control over its + implementation, and could, under unforeseen circumstances cut off their + fuel supply. One way to alleviate these fears would be to offer foreign + nations part ownership in new US + enrichment plants under terms which would guarantee their access to some + of the plant’s output. For our part, we would insist on terms that would + assure our control of plant operations, and fully protect classified + data and technology. Such an investment plan could reduce foreign + incentives to construct their own enrichment facilities, and could + establish a basis for truely multinational fuel cycle cooperation. The + Group requests your authorization to undertake ad referendum discussions + with other nations to explore the prospects for such investment + arrangements. Any resultant proposals would be submitted for + approval.Carter checked the “Approve” option and in the + right-hand margin wrote “explore idea only. J.”

+

4. Discussions of Possible Multilateral Programs with + Other Uranium and Enrichment Suppliers. Eventually, multilateral programs of assured fuel supply, + would be preferable to bilateral ones, since they would ensure that + proliferation goals were not undercut by commercial competition among + suppliers, and because the US cannot + expect to meet all foreign needs on its own. Accordingly, the Group + requests your authorization of discussions and preliminary negotiations + with other uranium producers, and enrichment service suppliers to + explore: (1) the establishment of a secure uranium + supply base, through various measures including possible + guarantees by uranium producers; (2) a variety of + possible investment arrangements between the US and others, including unilateral, + cross-investment and barter plans; and (3) the + establishment of multilateral pooling or collective guarantee + arrangements involving joint planning, fuel sharing and back-up + arrangements among suppliers. All of these arrangements would only be + offered to nations which are supportive of our non-proliferation goals. + In all cases, these discussions will be exploratoryCarter + underlined the word “exploratory” in this paragraph.—no + commitments will be made without your prior approval.Carter + checked the “Approve” option and in the right-hand margin wrote + “J.”

+

5. Internationally Owned Fuel Supply—The Fuel + Bank. Over the long term, the ultimate in fuel dependability + would be provided by an arrangement in which nuclear fuel supply is + owned and sold by an international entity—as + opposed to nationally owned resources subject to + multilateral guarantees or management. One possibility is an + international fuel bank. Such a bank would own supplies of both uranium and enrichment capacity (as measured + in SWUs, Separative Work Units) and any nation which adhered to certain + non-proliferation standards would be eligible to participate. The purpose of such an arrangement + would be that the bank acts as an insurance policy, protecting customers + from arbitrary political actions by suppliers. There is a great deal of + Congressional interest in this idea, and our preliminary investigation + concludes that it has significant merit.

+

All agencies except + OMB and the NRC recommend that you authorize consultations with other + countries and international agencies on the desirability and feasibility + of such a fuel bank, including an indication of our willingness to make + a contribution of enriched fuel from the US stockpile (subject to a determination that DOD’s stockpile requirements will not be + adversely affected). We would indicate that, if satisfactory + arrangements were made, the US would be + prepared to make an initial contribution sufficient for ten large + reactors for five years (or 5 million SWU), and that we would work with + other uranium producers to provide uranium supplies for the bank.In the left-hand margin next to this + paragraph, Carter wrote + “100,000/reactor.” + OMB and NRC on the other hand, believe + that more analysis is needed before any specific indication is made of + the size of the potential US + contribution.OMB explanation of their position is at Tab C. + [Footnote is in the original. Tab C is attached but not + printed.]

+

There is virtue in both positions. Further analysis of the idea is clearly needed, but I believe that we would + learn a great deal from consultations with others that would contribute + to such an analysis. I see no harm in proceeding with consultations in + which we would indicate that we are prepared to make a “substantial” + contribution—without mentioning any number which could be taken as an + implied commitment. I therefore recommend that you authorize talks along + these lines, and a subsequent analysis to be submitted for your + decision.Carter checked the “Approve” option and in the + right-hand margin wrote “J.”

+

Alternatively that 5 million SWUs be mentioned as the possible + contribution.

+

Alternatively that no mention be made of the size of a possible US contribution.

+
+ +
+ + 359. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department + of StateSource: National + Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign + Policy File, D770431–0609. Confidential. Sent for information to the + Mission in Geneva and Vienna. + Washington, November 7, 1977, 2129Z +

4402. USIAEA. Subject: 32nd UNGA: + Non-proliferation—Visit of Deputy Under Secretary Nye to USUN. Ref: USUN + 4350.Telegram 4350 from USUN, November 4, reported that + Non-Aligned countries planned to introduce two resolutions in the + UN General Assembly. The first + would amend a Malaysian, West German, and Czechoslovakian draft + resolution “inviting IAEA to + increase the representation of developing countries on its board of + governors.” The second would “table Yugoslav/Pakistani draft + resolution (with additional co-sponsors) ‘on the peaceful use of + nuclear energy for economic and social development.’ After + statements by 10–12 countries, consideration of both resolutions + will be deferred pending further consultations and negotiations.” + (National Archives, RG 59, Central + Foreign Policy File, D770406–0432)

+

1. Summary: In Nov 3 visit to USUN, + Deputy Under Secretary Nye met + with 19 representatives, mainly from developing countries to describe + our non-proliferation objectives and review purpose and goals of the + INFCE conference. In addition, he + discussed the draft res on “Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy for Economic + and Social Development” in bilaterals with Yugoslavs and Pakistanis + (Reftel, paras 4–7). Mission and Disarmament Del believed Nye + visit was timely and valuable, enabling us to explain our policy in + greater depth to UN Dels and also + providing opportunity for them to express their concerns and aspirations + directly to Nye. Comment by + participating Delegations has been uniformly favorable. End summary.

+

2. In afternoon session at US Mission, + Nye presented a summary of + US non-proliferation policy to 19 + UN Delegations including a question + and answer period. The following states attended: Algeria, Australia, + Argentina, Bahamas, Brazil, Ethiopia, Indonesia, Iran, Malaysia, Mexico, + Nepal, Nigeria, Pakistan, Peru, Philippines, Sri Lanka, Singapore, + Sweden, Venezuela and Yugoslavia.

+

3. Nye briefly outlined the + origins and general philosophy of our non-proliferation policy, + emphasizing our concerns to maintain an appropriate balance between the + objectives of non-proliferation and access to nuclear materials and + technology for peaceful purposes in developing countries, and the + complexities created by the emergence of new nuclear technologies since + the 1950’s. The Carter + administration, he said, was committed to stopping both vertical and + horizontal proliferation. He outlined the purpose and goals of the + INFCE conference: Indicated our + interest in opening up the London Suppliers Club to other + participants.

+ +

4. Nye also stressed the + importance of balanced UNGA + resolutions on peaceful uses of nuclear energy, noting that the Congress + and US public opinion could be expected + to react adversely to virtually unqualified UN endorsement of transfer of nuclear technology to + developing countries. A major US + objective at INFCE was to develop new + safeguardable technologies which would be both proliferation-resistant + and economical. UN actions and decisions + should be closely coordinated, he said, with the INFCE and IAEA work in this field.

+

5. The questions, asked mainly by the reps from Argentina, Brazil, + Pakistan, and Yugoslavia, reflected many of the concerns raised in the + first committee by the developing countries. They included the + following: (A) Why has the London Club not been opened to recipients and + what will happen to it during the INFCE? (B) Are the developing countries expected to + postpone their nuclear programs based on old technologies pending the + outcome of the INFCE? (C) How long + will it take to develop and prove the new technologies? (D) What will be + the implication of these new technologies for our commitment to nuclear + disarmament? (E) Is the US prepared to + consider stopping its R&D for + weapons development, or is it only asking NNWS to accept more stringent safeguards while going ahead + with its own program? (F) If a CTB is + attained, will nuclear safeguards apply to nuclear weapons states as + well as to nonnuclear weapon states? (G) Will comprehensive safeguards + in the US be retrospective or applied + only to new facilities?

+

6. At the end of the one and one-half-hour program, Argentina Perm-Rep Ortiz de Rozas expressed on behalf of + the group appreciation to Nye + and his hope that the Carter + administration would indeed move ahead in positive spirit to finding + viable answers acceptable to both developing and developed countries in + reconciling the objectives of non-proliferation and energy for + development.

+

7. In the late afternoon Nye met + separately with Yugoslav and Pakistani UN Dels to discuss the non-aligned draft resolution on “The + Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy for Economic and Social Development”. + While indicating US readiness to seek to + work out an acceptable text he highlighted our difficulties with the + latest version. He emphasized our concern that only safeguardable + nuclear technologies should be transferred to developing countries as + well as our doubts about a UN conference + (Reftel).

+

8. We believe Nye visit provided + timely and useful opportunity for US to + restate and clarify our non-proliferation objectives to a number of + important UN Delegations. Moreover, we + believe that Nye was able to + convey our concerns to Yugoslavia and Pakistan in constructive spirit + while highlighting the implications for their own interests in an + unbalanced UNGA resolution. The + Mission and Disarmament Del expressed + their appreciation to Nye for + his efforts.

+
+ +
+ + 360. Telegram From the Mission in Geneva to the Department of + StateSource: National + Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign + Policy File, D770471–1027. Confidential; Priority. Sent for + information Priority to Moscow, Vienna, and Brussels. On December + 15, the Department of State had instructed the Mission in Geneva to + sound out Morokhov about the + Soviet position on safeguards on nuclear power reactors. (Telegram + 298736 to the Mission in Geneva; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + D770466–0182) + Geneva, December 19, 1977, 1016Z +

12375. USEEC USIAEA. Subject: Consultations With the Soviets on + EURATOM/IAEA Agreement and Other Matters. Ref: Geneva 12348 + (Notal).See Document 428.

+

1. In view of Morokhov’s + responsibilities in non-proliferation area, Amb Warnke took opportunity of Morokhov’s presence in Geneva for + CTB negotiations to raise question + of Soviet adherence to Protocol II of Treaty of Tlatelolco at a + bilateral meeting Dec 15 (reported Reftel). After concluding discussion + of Tlatelolco, Morokhov delivered + a lengthy complaint about EURATOM + resistance to IAEA safeguards,Telegram 8369 from the Mission in Vienna, + September 15, reported that the Soviets had criticized EURATOM’s “failure to bring into + force safeguards agreement with IAEA.” The Soviets also worried that “safeguards + evaluation section be given resources and authority sufficient to + carry out its task.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + D770335–0485) about the light water reactor safeguards + situation,Telegram 10069 from Vienna, + November 18, reported that the Soviets “have put strong pressure on + Agency to be less flexible regarding acceptance of validity of + cassettes” of the surveillance equipment on each light-water reactor + “brought out by EURATOM + inspectors alone.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + D770429–0808) about lack of coordination between US and USSR Missions in Vienna, and about management of the IAEA safeguards department, particularly + role of IAEA Deputy Director Rometsch. + Text of Morokhov comments (which + were handed over as a Non-Paper)Not + found. being hand-carried to department by Boright.

+

2. In a separate evening session with Belov and Kalinkin, Boright (US) described in detail US reasoning on the LWR compromise and on + importance of other safeguards issues, and noted complexity of + safeguards issues and need for some flexibility. Soviets were apparently + receptive to these arguments, and appreciative of reassurances as to + US desire for continued + consultations.

+

3. At subsequent bilateral meeting with Soviets Dec 16, Morokhov expressed satisfaction with + discussions of previous day, calling them useful and timely. He + appreciated that US and USSR both attach exceptionally great importance to nuclear + non-proliferation and are aware that further joint actions, both in + IAEA and elsewhere, are + essential.

+

4. On EURATOM, Morokhov said that, during Dec 15 + discussions, two sides had reached the understanding that it is + necessary to work out stringent verification provisions in complete + accordance with model IAEA safeguards + agreement. Both sides also concluded that it is necessary for IAEA–EURATOM agreement to be implemented in very near future + because large number of materials and facilities, including sensitive + ones, are involved.

+

5. He said Soviets were willing to hold consultations with US Mission on number of technical questions + related to application of safeguards to light water reactors and to + chemical reprocessing plants. Appropriate instructions would be given to + Soviet IAEA Mission, and he expected + US Mission to receive instructions + as well. Soviet side was prepared to discuss jointly the measures which + must be taken by board of governors, but this must be done very soon, so + that board can adopt appropriate recommendations in February.

+

6. Warnke said that we agreed + entirely with the Soviet side on the importance of IAEA safeguards. We further agreed on the + central importance of independent verification by the IAEA, and we believed this should apply + in EURATOM as elsewhere. Warnke continued that we were generally + in agreement with Soviet view that the IAEA inspectorate staff should be increased, and evaluation + functions strengthened. We were aware that management of the safeguards + department had not always been optimal, but this was due to many + factors, and not to a single individual. He agreed on importance of post + of Deputy Director General, and said we should think carefully and well + in advance about a proper replacement when Mr. Rometsch leaves the + agency.

+

7. With regard to light water reactor safeguards, Warnke maintained that the compromise + proposal under consideration would allow the IAEA to do its basic independent verification with an + acceptable three month timeliness of verification. We hoped that the + Soviet side would not take a rigid position on this point, since that + could delay agreement unnecessarily and endanger more important + safeguards issues.

+

8. Warnke added that we regarded + safeguards principles for sensitive facilities to be very important. On + this matter, EURATOM had accepted + the agency’s proposal for continuous inspection. We should consider how + the board might provide some guidance on timeliness of detection for + such facilities.

+

9. Warnke concluded that, in view + of shared objectives on non-proliferation matters, US and USSR should work closely together in that field, and he + agreed that our IAEA missions should + consult on safeguards and other matters.

+ + Warnke + +
+ +
+ + 361. Memorandum of ConversationSource: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, + Brzezinski Material, + Subject File, Box 35, Presidential MemCons, 1/78. Secret; Sensitive. The meeting took + place entrained between Bayeux and Paris. The memorandum is + scheduled to be printed in full in Foreign Relations, 1977–1980, vol. XXVII, + Western Europe. + January 5, 1978, 2:00–4:30 + p.m. + + SUBJECT + Summary of the President’s Meeting with French President Valery Giscard d’Estaing + + + PARTICIPANTS + President Jimmy + Carter + Secretary of State Cyrus + Vance + Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski, + Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs + Ambassador Arthur A. + Hartman, U.S. Ambassador to France (Notetaker) + President Valery Giscard + d’Estaing + Foreign Minister Louis de + Guiringaud + Secretary General Jean Francois-Poncet + Ambassador Francois de Laboulaye, French Ambassador to the United + States + +

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to non-proliferation.]

+

Non-Proliferation

+

President Giscard said that he was making progress in the + development of his views on this subject and he hoped that we could + exchange views from time to time on the problem. He welcomed the INFCE study and hoped that there would + be no modification of supply policies by the United States and Canada + during the period of the study.

+

The President commented that, in his discussions + with the Indians, Desai had said + that he could not accept full scope safeguards.See Foreign Relations, 1977–1980, vol. XIX, South + Asia. The President explained to him that Congress + might soon pass a law which would prevent us from shipping any nuclear + material to any country which does not accept such safeguards. The + President said he asked Desai + that, if we and the Soviets should sign a CTB agreement, could India then accept the same kind of + safeguards as non-nuclear powers such as Germany, Canada and Japan have + accepted? Desai thought that this + would be reasonable. The President went on to say that, while he + understood there were some technical problems, he was anxious for France + to accede to the Protocol to the Treaty of Tlatelolco which provides for + a nuclear free zone in Latin America. He said that Argentina now agrees + to accede. He said that we understand that France has a problem because + certain of the French Departments are in the area and we had in effect to face the same + problem with Puerto Rico. He said that transitting nuclear material was + still permitted according to our interpretation but de Guiringaud said + that under certain circumstances he understood that that interpretation + could be changed and this would present a problem for France.

+

President Giscard said that he would not authorize the + shipment of sensitive material to Pakistan but that this matter + presented great difficulties for him internally. The Pakistanis are + pressing for deliveries under the contract and he wished to avoid any + explanation of this problem at the present time. He recalled that an + offer had been made to the Pakistanis to build a different kind of plant + which would involve only coprocessing and that these discussions were in + effect continuing. He said that if he was asked if this problem had been + discussed with us he would say no.

+

The President said that it appeared Desai had been informed of this French + position and President Giscard confirmed that this was the case.

+

The President also reported that Brazil was now + having second thoughts about its reprocessing plant which they now saw + as too expensive and perhaps not very effective. He said that this was a + real turning point and we should take advantage of it.

+

The meeting ended at 4:30 p.m.

+
+ +
+ 362. Letter From Ambassador-at-Large and Special Representative for + Non-Proliferation Matters Smith + to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)Source: Carter Library, National Security Council, + Institutional Files, Box 4, PD–08 + [4]. Confidential. + Washington, January + 13, 1978 + + Dear Zbig: + +

I believe it is essential that the President approve these shipments of + highly-enriched uranium to Europe quickly. All of these cases represent + US commitments to existing projects. + They are not new commitments which our policy seeks to avoid. As you + know, the Europeans are extremely sensitive to any signs that the US is using its nuclear fuel as pressure to + achieve US objectives in INFCE or to force them to renegotiate + the US–EURATOM Agreement. While I have tried to assure the French and others that this is + not the case, the Europeans read the already long delay associated with + HEU approvals (none since last May) + as US pressure tactics. Our + non-proliferation efforts, as well as our overall political + relationships with alliance countries, would be best served by prompt + approval.

+

The Romanian case is also significant in view of our efforts to improve + relations with Eastern Europe. In my view the proliferation risk here is + negligible. Also, this case involves a firm US commitment.

+

Sincerely,

+ + Gerard + SmithSmith signed the memorandum + “Gerry + Smith.” + +
+ +
+ 363. Telegram From the Mission in Geneva to the Department of + StateSource: National + Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign + Policy File, D780052–0795. Secret; Priority. Sent for information + Priority to Vienna and Moscow. Sent for information to Brussels and + Bonn. + Geneva, February 3, 1978, 1853Z +

1680. Pass to DOE. Brussels for EC. Subject: Soviet Non-Paper on IAEA Matters February 3.

+

1. At Soviet request, Ambassador Warnke met with Soviet CTB + Rep + Morokhov on Feb 3 for a follow-up + discussion of the IAEA and + non-proliferation issues which had been raised during similar Morokhov-Warnke conversations in December.See Document 360. + Non-Paper read by Morokhov on + instructions urged following actions:

+

A. Appropriate steps by U.S. to ensure a favorable decision by Feb 7 EC–9 + Council of Ministers on issue of inspections of light-water power + reactors in EURATOM countries, in + light of efforts by certain EURATOM + countries, particularly the FRG, to + revise present compromise proposal.

+

B. Coordinated action by U.S. and Soviet missions in Vienna to ensure + implementation of effective IAEA + safeguards, in particular continuous inspection, of reprocessing and + enrichment facilities in EURATOM countries, and to bring about + a radical increase in the effectiveness of IAEA safeguards.

+

C. U.S. support for candidacy of Jeniken (Canada) to replace retiring + Deputy Director General for safeguards Romech. (Text of Non-Paper is + given para 4 below.)

+

2. Turning to separate issue, Morokhov urged that U.S. and USSR exchange views and act jointly to ensure the adoption + as a guideline by the next meeting of nuclear exporters of the principle + of full-scope safeguards in recipient States. (Text of Morokhov’s remarks on full-scope + safeguards to be supplied).

+

3. Action requested: Instructions regarding reply, if any, that should be + given to Soviets here.

+

4. Following is text of Soviet Non-Paper given Feb 3:

+

Begin text: We should like, first of all, to note with satisfaction that + the meeting we held last December at which we discussed a wide range of + questions related to the prevention of the proliferation of nuclear + weapons and to the activities of the International Atomic Energy Agency + in the implementation of non-proliferation safeguards was most useful. + That meeting showed that our countries act essentially in an agreed + manner on questions of non-proliferation of nuclear weap-ons, including + issues pertaining to practical implementation of IAEA safeguards. The time elapsed since + that meeting has shown that our Missions in Vienna have begun to + cooperate more, and they have been able to influence the leadership of + the Secretariat of IAEA in the proper + direction. As a result of joint efforts, it has become possible to + ensure that the leadership of the IAEA + at present is taking what is, on the whole, a correct position.

+

At the same time, despite the work which has been done, we have not + succeeded in solving one of the principal issues of IAEA safeguard activities, namely, the + issue of application of IAEA + safeguards to the nuclear activities of the Non-Nuclear Member States of + EURATOM. As you recall, one of + the questions that we discussed was the question of application of + IAEA safeguards to light water + power reactors in the EURATOM + countries. At that time we agreed on joint measures to properly + influence resolution of this question. The Soviet Union in particular + supported the US compromise proposal for + carrying out inspections of this type of facility four times a year. The + Delegation of EURATOM which + recently held talks with the IAEA + secretariat on this subject has, in principle, accepted this compromise + proposal. However, according to the information available to the IAEA secretariat, some EURATOM countries, above all the + FRG, are attempting to revise that + agreement. It is expected that the council of ministers of the European + Community will make a final decision on this question at its meeting + February 7. Under these circumstances it is urgently necessary, in our + view, to exert appropriate + influence in order to ensure the adoption of the needed decision by the + Council of Ministers of the European Community. We hope that the U.S. + side will take the necessary steps in this matter.

+

We believe it necessary to call to the attention of the U.S. side the + fact that, along with resolution of matters pertaining to ensuring + adequate safeguards for light water reactors in the EURATOM countries, it is necessary to + seek the earliest resolution of the question of implementation of + effective IAEA safeguards for other + nuclear facilities, above all for nuclear fuel processing plants. At + present, the main principle concerning implementation of safeguards on + these facilities, that is, the principle of continuous inspection, has + been preliminarily agreed. Representatives of EURATOM, while formally supporting + this principle, are in effect working toward undermining it in + developing the practical provisions. Resolution of this question calls + for adoption of effective agreed measures. In this connection we would + deem it advisable for our Missions in Vienna to give highest priority to + the solution of this matter.

+

As before, the question of a radical increase in the effectiveness of + IAEA safeguards remains + unresolved. The measures taken by the Secretariat upon the + recommendations of the USSR and U.S. + have not brought the necessary results.See + footnote 3, Document 360. Telegram + 10676 from Vienna, December 14, also reported that “responding to + U.S. initiatives, IAEA Secretariat + is trying to implement more stringent non-proliferation safeguards + measures” but noted that the Secretariat “anticipates considerable + difficulty in achieving this upgrading in view of opposition by + EURATOM and certain + important governments and need for Board of Governors to provide + necessary manpower and other resource approvals.” (National + Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign + Policy File, D770465–1102) As yet, work on evaluating the + effectiveness of safeguards has not been properly organized. This task + also requires agreed action by our Missions in Vienna.

+

In this connection we should again like to call the attention of the U.S. + side to the need to replace Deputy Director General for Safeguards + Romech. As a result of our consultations, a decision was made to the + effect that Romech would leave his post in May of this year. The + question of choosing a candidate for this post now arises. As you know, + we supported the nomination of Jenikens, a Canadian, who, as we + understand it, is also supported by the U.S. our Missions in Vienna + would now be well advised to work without delay in support of this + candidate. End text.

+ + Warnke + +
+ +
+ + 364. Memorandum From Secretary of State Vance to President CarterSource: + Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, + Box 123, Vance, + Miscellaneous Communications With: 3–5/78. Secret. In the upper + right-hand corner of the memorandum, Carter wrote “Good report. J.” + Washington, February 26, 1978 + + SUBJECT + Non-Proliferation Policy Progress Report + +

The following non-proliferation progress report covers the period since + your speech last October before the organizing conference of the + International Nuclear Fuel Cycle Evaluation (INFCE).On October 19, 1977, + Carter told the INFCE Conference that the United + States was “eager to cooperate as a nation which is a consumer and + also as a supplier. We want to ensure that where there is a + legitimate need and where there’s mutually agreed upon + nonproliferation restraint, that there be an adequate supply of + nuclear fuel.” (Public Papers: Carter, 1977, pp. + 1812–1814)

+

Where Are We After the First Year?

+

Your non-proliferation policy has challenged the conventional wisdom + surrounding the nuclear fuel cycle and progress has been made towards + key objectives. International attention to the proliferation risk of + sensitive nuclear technologies has increased. A more cooperative + assessment of the problems is underway. Opposition remains and tensions + with some nations persist, but our intentions and actions are better + understood, received with less suspicion and have greater + credibility.

+

The London Nuclear Suppliers Group Guidelines were published in early + January, publicly establishing minimum conditions for nuclear technology + exports to which all Suppliers have agreed.The updated Guidelines applied to nuclear transfers for peaceful + purposes to help ensure that such transfers would not be diverted to + unsafeguarded nuclear fuel cycle or nuclear explosive activities. + (Documents on Disarmament, 1978, pp. + 7–25) By submitting them to the IAEA and publishing them we reduced institutional tensions + between the Suppliers Group and the IAEA.

+

Following your opening of the INFCE, + its constituent working groups have begun substantive work. The polemics + we feared could hamper the Evaluation’s progress have been minor and a + number of nations see real value in such a comprehensive examination of + the nuclear fuel cycle. It will take time but our purpose is to develop + a consensus, not to solve immediate problems.

+ +

The French decision to seek to amend the reprocessing plant contract with + Pakistan moves France somewhat closer to your policy, but we are still + uncertain about the firmness of the decision and the type of + modifications the French are proposing. The FRG agreement to export to Brazil a complete fuel cycle + remains essentially intact, but the size of the enrichment facility + reportedly will be reduced, and there appears to be some dissension in + the Brazilian nuclear community concerning the technological and + economic value of the deal.

+

Your visit to India,Carter visited India January + 1–3. while it did not lead to Indian acceptance of full-scope + safeguards, reinforced the dialogue and underscored for Prime Minister + Desai the importance you + attach to non-proliferation measures. In Iran, your talks with the + ShahCarter visited Iran December 31, 1977–January 1, + 1978. resulted in agreement in principle on the terms for a + new Agreement for Cooperation, but differences of interpretation of the + agreement in principle still exist.

+

The new Non-Proliferation legislationThe + Carter administration + submitted the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act to Congress in January. + Carter signed it into + law on March 10, 1978. tightens criteria for nuclear + cooperation but does not call for moratoria on exports. Likewise, the + Administration’s conditions for new highly enriched uranium (HEU) exportsThe Carter administration + established the Reduced Enrichment for Research and Test Reactors + (RERTR) Program in 1977 to develop the technical means to use + Low-Enriched Uranium (LEU) instead + of HEU in research reactors, while + ensuring no significant loss of performance. are stringent, + but exports under existing agreements are not embargoed.

+

It is increasingly evident abroad that the United States has a long-term + commitment to a stronger international nuclear community based upon a + viable non-proliferation regime. We must recognize, however, that while + we have sensitized the international community to the dangers of + proliferation, we remain essentially isolated (with Canada and + Australia) among the major industrialized states in questioning the + inevitability of moving toward reprocessing and early commercialization + of breeder technology. The prevailing attitude remains that + non-proliferation goals can be pursued without conflict with perceived + nuclear energy needs if reliance is placed on political and safeguards + arrangements rather than limits on technology. The success of our policy + will depend to a great extent on our ability to reconcile these + differences. Cooperation towards this end is increasing. Our objectives + will not be reached quickly but the strategy is sound.

+

Specific progress in key areas of the policy is outlined in the + attachment.

+ +

Attachment

+

Paper Prepared in the Department of StateSecret.

+

Washington, undated

+

Non-Proliferation Progress

+

1. Safeguards

+

The Nuclear Suppliers Group Guidelines set important minimum standards + requiring safeguards on all transferred and by-product nuclear exports. + The new legislation retains the provision you called for last AprilSee footnote 3, + Document 338. which would require full-scope + safeguards in all new and existing agreements, allowing an 18-month + negotiation period for existing agreements.

+

Only six non-nuclear weapons states are known to have unsafeguarded + nuclear facilities—Spain, Egypt, Israel, Argentina, South Africa and + India. We expect to begin renegotiation shortly of our agreement for + cooperation with Spain. Egypt has indicated its willingness to accept + full-scope safeguards if Israel is held to the same standard. We are + exploring ways of providing such assurances. Argentina has indicated + some willingness to accept full-scope safeguards in return for fuller + nuclear cooperation. A technical team is traveling to Pretoria this + month to begin talks on how the Valindaba enrichment plant could be + brought under safeguards. The political sensitivity of our overall + nuclear relationship with South Africa is aggravated by continuing + uncertainties [1 line not declassified] We will + also have problems convincing South Africa that safeguards on Valindaba + will not expose proprietary commercial information.

+

Your visit to India extended the rapport with the Indians, and PM + Desai declared India’s + willingness to accept full-scope safeguards if a Comprehensive Test Ban + (CTB) were concluded and if the + nuclear weapons states were to dedicate themselves to stopping + “vertical” proliferation by halting the production of nuclear weapons + and reducing their nuclear stockpiles. We are exploring ways to ensure + that the Indians do not define these conditions in ways that would be + impossible for us to meet.

+

We have begun a program to renegotiate old agreements and negotiate new + ones that incorporate the newly legislated criteria. In renegotiating + the EURATOM agreement we face + serious political and legal problems on issues other than safeguards, + and these could affect our other negotiations. Sensitive political problems remain to be solved + in South Africa and Argentina, but we will continue a dialogue aimed at + getting safeguards on all of their facilities.

+

2. Restraints on Sensitive + Transfers

+

The informal assurances we received from the Germans and the French of a + de facto moratorium on new agreements to + transfer reprocessing facilities bolster the Guidelines, which call for + restraint in export of sensitive technology. Efforts to extend + restraints retroactively to the FRG/Brazil deal have failed so far but the Brazilian projects + themselves are shaky. [2 lines not declassified] + Elements of the Brazilian scientific community are pushing for + modifications of the agreement. We have repeatedly spelled out our views + against reprocessing. Now that the French are seeking to modify their + contract to transfer a reprocessing facility to Pakistan, and are + pressing the Germans to follow suit, the Germans are more isolated. + Until after the French electionsThe + French legislative elections were scheduled for March 12 and March + 19. we are reluctant to press the French on what + “modifications” they will actually agree to with Pakistan. Should simple + coprocessing be involved we see little non-proliferation benefit.

+

We will urge the French to continue their efforts to convince the Germans + of the regional security implications of Brazil’s having a reprocessing + capability. Mutual deferral of reprocessing in Argentina and Brazil will + be sought: in Brazil, we plan to focus our efforts on President + Geisel’s successor, who will + not be as personally committed to the deal; Argentina has indicated + privately that it would consider deferring its own reprocessing plant + only if Brazil were to do so. We have said that we would consider + providing heavy water production technology that Argentina wants only if + it deferred reprocessing, as well as adopted full-scope safeguards.

+

Planning on how to control the diffusion of sensitive centrifuge and + other enrichment technology is now underway, and we will consider + various institutional frameworks to ensure control of the front end of + the fuel cycle.

+

3. Incentives

+

We are working to implement foreign aspects of the spent fuel storage + policy Secretary Schlesinger + announced last October.The proposal, + which was actually first announced by Schlesinger’s aide John Ahearne during an October + 18, 1977 press conference, would allow the U.S. Government to + “acquire and store the spent nuclear fuel that’s piling up at the + nation’s utilities.” (“President Proposes U.S. Acquire and Store + Spent Nuclear Fuel,” Wall Street Journal, + October 18, 1977, p. 19) Several countries (Sweden, India, Austria, Switzerland, + Denmark) have indicated interest.

+

The $5 million non-nuclear energy alternatives programNot found. is starting with initial data + collection and resource assessment in four less developed countries. We + have designed the use of this limited budget so as to affect directly + countries that are on the threshold of moving towards nuclear power + programs.

+

Planning for a three-level system of fuel assurances is proceeding. Very + recently the DOE published its proposed new terms and conditions for + enrichment service contracting with the United States Government. In + addition, the potential for cross-investment among supplier countries in + enrichment facilities and other possible multilateral fuel assurance + measures involving suppliers and consumers are also being examined. + Finally, we are exploring the possibility of an International Nuclear + Fuel Bank and will use INFCE to + obtain the views of others.

+

4. Building Consensus on + the Structure of the Fuel Cycle

+

On October 19, you opened the organizing conference of the INFCE by calling on nations to cooperate + in the search for solutions to the proliferation problem. Nearly fifty + countries and four international organizations are now participating + actively in the various INFCE working + groups, all of which have begun substantive work. Despite the sometimes + stiff bilateral opposition to our non-proliferation policy, the INFCE participants have focused their + attention within a multilateral context on the technical aspects of the + nuclear fuel cycle and its proliferation risks. Maintaining a + constructive atmosphere in the INFCE + and directing its work towards a consensus on the particularly sensitive + parts of the fuel cycle (reprocessing and enrichment) remain key tasks. + We will need to develop plans on how to utilize the INFCE results in defining and + implementing future elements of our policy.

+

5. Domestic Policy and + Legislation

+

Legislation consistent with your proposals of last April has passed both + houses of Congress by overwhelming majorities. Our program to + renegotiate existing agreements for cooperation and negotiate new ones + will proceed according to the newly legislated criteria.

+

In addition to your decision to veto the ERDA authorization bill containing funds for the Clinch + River Breeder Reactor, we have restructured the FY–1978 work program at Barnwell reprocessing plant so as + to remove the possibility of any reprocessing there. However, we + fore-see continuing Congressional pressures to use the Barnwell plant in + FY–1979 in a way that would be perceived by other nations + as inconsistent with policies we are urging on them.

+

We are working closely with DOE in examining and assessing various + alternative nuclear technologies and their proliferation resistance. The + results of DOE’s Non-Proliferation Alternative System Assessment + ProgramNot found. will be + prepared for foreign dissemination in INFCE and elsewhere. As these efforts develop, they will + support our calls for other nations to study more + proliferation-resistant fuel cycles.

+

6. Measures to Affect + Motivations to Develop Explosives

+

Portugal recently ratified the NPT, + bringing to 103 the number of parties. Indonesia appears prepared to + ratify. We will continue to press for South Africa’s accession. India, + Brazil, France, and China still oppose the Treaty as discriminatory.

+

During Secretary Vance’s trip to + Latin America,Vance visited Latin America from + November 20–23, 1977. See Foreign Relations, 1977–1980, vol. XXIV, + South America; Latin America Regional. Argentina + declared its intent to ratify the Treaty of Tlatelolco. Recent + reporting, however, suggests that Argentina’s intentions regarding + ratification are still uncertain. Assuming Argentina does ratify the + Treaty, only Cuban, French, Russian and US (on Protocol I)Protocol I + of the Treaty of Tlatelolco bound overseas nations with territories + in Latin America—the United States, the United Kingdom, France, and + the Netherlands—to the terms of the treaty, which prohibited the + manufacture, testing, storage, and use of nuclear weapons in Latin + America. actions would then remain to bring the Treaty into + effect for Brazil and Argentina. We have urged all of them to act and + our ratification of Protocol I is ready for submission to the + Senate.

+

A Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty may be concluded this year. A CTB will be a concrete expression of our + intent to curb the nuclear arms race. If the CTB contains no exceptions for weapons states and excludes + all nuclear explosions, it will be an important tool in our efforts to + formalize PM + Desai’s pledge to forswear any + further peaceful nuclear explosions (PNEs) and to move India towards full-scope safeguards.

+

Your decision to strengthen NATO by the + addition of more troops will serve to reinforce our security guarantees + in this area. On the other hand, we must work carefully to minimize the + regional political-military implications of our withdrawal from East + Asia. We are particularly concerned about the intentions of Taiwan and + South Korea.

+

We are also studying the relation between our arms transfer policies and + non-proliferation.

+
+ +
+ + 365. Letter From Ambassador-at-Large and Special Representative for + Non-Proliferation Matters Smith + to President CarterSource: Carter Library, National + Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Pastor Country File, Box 1, + Argentina: 1–9/78. Confidential. At the top of the page, Brzezinski wrote “Mr. President, A + concise and informative report from Gerry Smith. Given your interest in the issue, it + might be useful to have him call on you. Zbig.” Carter underlined the words “call + on you,” drew an arrow pointing to them, and wrote “not now. + C.” + Washington, February 27, 1978 + + Dear Mr. President: + +

In Europe for the IAEA Board of + Governors meeting, I also talked with Chancellor Kreisky and Foreign + Ministers David Owen (UK), de + Guiringaud (France) and Simonet (Belgium), several EC Commissioners and PermReps, and a number of atomic + energy officials. I was the first American allowed to inspect the French + military gaseous diffusion plant (Pierrelatte) and the huge civil + enrichment plant under construction (Tricastin).

+

I got the following impressions:

+

1. There is respect for INFCE which is + a “going concern”, but INFCE is being + used as a rationale to try to defer hard decisions—like EURATOM’s agreeing to renegotiate its + supply arrangements with the U.S. (Under the nonproliferation + legislation, EURATOM must so agree + in order to avoid a U.S. embargo on nuclear exports.) I think EURATOM will agree. But there are + feelings of resentment at what is seen as U.S. duress and a breach of + international obligations by domestic legislation.

+

2. Europeans are used to depending on the U.S. for nuclear deterrence but + they seem determined to keep to a minimum their peaceful nuclear energy + dependence on the U.S. The British and French emphasized their + disagreement with our policy to defer reprocessing and fast breeder + commercialization. Europeans don’t want to give us a veto over + reprocessing of U.S.-origin spent fuel because that would place + decisions as to their energy programs in our hands. Expect long, tough + negotiations over this issue, since energy dependence is a lively fear + in Europe (and Japan).

+

3. The non-weapons states are especially sensitive to signs of American + discrimination in its nonproliferation policy in favor of the UK and France.

+

4. Kreisky is hurting politically because his government cannot find a + way to assure Austrians that reactor spent fuel can be securely stored. + I explained your foreign spent fuel storage policy and stressed its numerous conditions + precedent.Not found. He asked me + to tell you of his full support for your nonproliferation policy.

+

5. Conversation with the Argentine Governor at IAEA indicates that they are not about to fulfill the + agreement reached last November with Secretary Vance to ratify Tlatelolco.

+

Respectfully,

+ + Gerard + SmithSmith signed the memorandum + “Gerry + Smith.” + +
+ +
+ 366. Editorial Note +

On March 10, 1978, President Jimmy + Carter signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978 + (NNPA) during a White House + ceremony. In his remarks, Carter + said that “This legislation takes a major step forward in clarifying our + Nation’s policy. I think it would be a much more predictable factor in + the decisions made by foreign nations. It will give guidance to me, to + the Congress, to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, and to the + Department of Energy and other agencies in our Federal Government who + deal with this sensitive subject.” He also noted that “with the + assistance of our European allies,” an International Nuclear Fuel Cycle + Evaluation study had been created “to inventory existing nuclear fuels + in the form of ore, both uranium, thorium, and others, to assess the + quality and capability of enrichment facilities and to deal with the + proper distribution of nuclear fuels to those who don’t have supplies in + their own country—-with international safeguards and constraints being + adequate; and at the same time, to deal with the unsolved question of + the disposition of spent nuclear fuels. This is one of the most + complicated questions that presents itself to the international + community. I think it is accurate to say that some of our friends abroad + will have to readjust their policy.” (Public Papers: + Carter, 1978, pp. + 498–500)

+

In his memoirs, the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs, + Zbigniew Brzezinski, recalled + that Congress had grown increasingly concerned with the proliferation of + nuclear materials after India’s 1974 explosion of a nuclear weapon. The + Carter administration, + however, worried that various draft bills “were excessively tough. To + head them off and to prevent further legislative initiatives, we + introduced our own bill, the + Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act, which was passed in March 1978 with + overwhelming majorities in both houses. The Act set the criteria for + licensing the export of nuclear material, and prohibited U.S. export to + any country not accepting international safeguards on all of its plans.” + (Brzezinski, Power and Principle, pp. 132–133)

+

In his memoirs, the Ambassador-at-Large and Special Representative for + Non-Proliferation Matters, Gerard + Smith, recalled that while the Act “gave the United + States veto rights over reprocessing of spent fuel it provided to + foreign countries, called for renegotiation of existing contracts and + agreements, tightened export license criteria, and prohibited U.S. + export of fuel to any nation not accepting so-called ‘full-scope’ + safeguards,” the Act could not prevent other nations from finding “other + sources of supply for their fuel.” He recalled “When the President + signed the bill into law and photos were taken in the White House, I + stood to one side despite Brzezinski’s protest that I should be in the middle of + the picture. I was determined not to be associated with this + legislation, although as Carter’s Special Assistant, I was bound to uphold it.” + Ultimately, Smith said “as things + developed, I took it as my principal mission to roam the globe trying to + cut down on the bitterness about our new policies and to mend fences + with both allies and ‘threshold,’ or potential nuclear, states.” + (Smith, Disarming Diplomat, pp. 192–193)

+
+ +
+ 367. Memorandum of ConversationSource: Department of State, Chronological Files, + Speeches, and Papers of Lucy W. + Benson, Lot 81D321, Box 8, EURATOM 1978. Confidential. + Drafted by William Salisbury (EUR/RPE). The meeting took place at + the Department of State. + Washington, March + 15, 1978 + + SUBJECT + EURATOM–IAEA Safeguards + + + PARTICIPANTS + US + Philip J. Farley, + S/AS + William R. Salisbury, EUR/RPE (notetaker) + USSR + Alexander Bessmertnykh, + Counselor of Soviet Embassy in Washington + + +

SUMMARY: Farley handed Bessmertnykh + US reply (attached)Attached but not printed. to the March 3 + Soviet textThe note relayed Moscow’s + concern about “the especially active opposition of the FRG to the control by the IAEA of its nuclear activities. We + would like to know what steps the US + Government has in mind to take to help the IAEA in solving that problem.” The complete text of the + note is in telegram 57425 to Brussels, March 7. (National Archives, + RG 59, Central Foreign Policy + File, D780101–0744) on this subject. Farley stressed US belief that EURATOM members are working in good faith toward an + acceptable implementation arrangement. Bessmertnykh said that this is not primarily a technical + issue but a political one, and that EURATOM members should set a better example for others. End + summary.

+

Mr. Farley handed Counselor + Bessmertnykh the attached + text and went over its points orally. Bessmertnykh thanked him for the presentation, agreed + that the US and USSR are largely in accord on + non-proliferation issues, but noted that we seem to disagree on the + analysis of the EURATOM–IAEA situation. All the information + available to the Soviets indicates that the FRG in particular is doing its utmost not to have strict + IAEA safeguards made effective + within EURATOM. Bessmertnykh said he agrees with our + assertion that EURATOM acknowledges + as a general matter the necessity of IAEA safeguards, but that the point is how those safeguards + are applied in practice. The Soviets had not been sure where the US stands on this, since when Morokhov raised it in Geneva with + Warnke as a bilateral matter + there was no substantive response, only a promise to forward it to + Washington, and the US was silent at the + February IAEA Board meeting on this + issue and on the necessity of an April Board meeting to resolve it.

+

Bessmertnykh said he was pleased + that our March 15 text concluded with an assurance that we would + continue to urge completion of the EURATOM–IAEA + arrangements. The Soviets do not see this as basically a technical issue + but a political one which raises particularly serious concerns in the + context of such events as FRG-Brazil + nuclear cooperation. For this reason, the Soviets see a need for more + effort on the part of like-thinking nations in the non-proliferation + field.

+

Farley agreed that there were + currently difficult situations regarding non-proliferation, and that + developments in Latin America were one. But we do not see the same kind + of problem in Western Europe, and see no indication that the FRG or others in EURATOM are trying to evade IAEA standards. We think the EC is moving + in good faith toward a satisfactory solution, and that the problems have + been essentially technical in nature.

+

On the procedural question of US channels + for discussion, Farley noted + that Warnke is not directly + involved in these safeguards issues but that Ambassador Smith—who, of course, is the US Representative to the IAEA—is the primary source. Either he or Farley will go to the April meeting of + the Board, and would be happy to talk with the Soviets if they wish. We + do hope to see this issue resolved in April.

+

Bessmertnykh said that, while + Farley may be right in + saying that the situation in Western Europe on non-proliferation is + different than that elsewhere, EURATOM should not be setting a bad example for others, but + on the contrary should be out front in accepting a maximal IAEA role. Farley noted the high degree of nuclear energy + development in the EC, the preexistence of EURATOM safeguards and the technical complexities involved, + and expressed doubt that others could credibly point to the EURATOM–IAEA situation as a precedent for national situations + elsewhere.

+

The two agreed to stay in touch on non-proliferation issues, particularly + where IAEA-related.

+

After the meeting, Bessmertnykh + told Salisbury he agreed that EURATOM–IAEA arrangements + were nearing a satisfactory conclusion, but repeated that he is + concerned at the precedential effect, and at the prospect that general + US-Soviet agreement on + non-proliferation goals will diverge in specific cases because of “other + factors” present in such cases.

+
+ +
+ 368. Paper Prepared in the Central Intelligence AgencySource: Carter Library, National + Security Affairs, Brzezinski + Material, Unfiled File, Box 144, Nuclear Non-Proliferation: + 9/78–1/81. Confidential. + + + RP 78–10315 + + + Washington, 78 +

The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty: Looking Toward the + 1980 Review Conference

+

Key Judgments

+

The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), an important bulwark against the spread of nuclear + weapons, will receive its second five-year review at a conference to be + held in 1980. Forces operating outside the treaty—especially the + security concerns and regional rivalries of nonnuclear weapons + states—will continue to be the main determinants of the scope and rate + of the proliferation process. But the NPT, if it remains + at its present level of effectiveness, will provide significant + political, legal, and moral constraints on the behavior of adherents + (over 100 countries) and nonadherents alike.

+

The Second NPT Review Conference is + likely to reveal a number of concerns and misgivings about the operation + of the treaty. It may also give an opportunity to some states to + criticize US nonproliferation policy, + which has relied heavily on the NPT and + its International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards system. The following critical questions + will probably dominate the review conference agenda:

+

Have the nuclear supplier states allowed “the fullest possible” flow of + nuclear technology and goods for peaceful uses to NPT adherents, as promised?

+

Have the nuclear weapons states delivered on their pledge to seek “in + good faith” nuclear and general disarmament?

+

Are IAEA safeguards adequate to protect + against violations of the letter and spirit of the treaty?

+

The conference may also debate such sensitive political issues as whether + or not adherents should continue nuclear cooperation with “pariah” + states, such as Chile, Israel, South Africa, and Taiwan.

+

The ability of the NPT to attract + additional adherents and keep those it has—and even its long-term + viability—will hinge, in part, on how successfully these questions are + addressed, not only at the review conference, but also in other + international forums, as well as on the general course of the + proliferation process.

+

[Omitted here is the body of the paper.]

+
+ +
+ 369. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassies in the + United Kingdom, the Federal Republic of Germany, the Netherlands, Japan, + France, Canada, the Soviet Union, and AustraliaSource: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + D780417–0367. Confidential. Drafted by Allen Locke (PM/NPP); cleared + by Marilyn Meyers (EA/J), Rust Deming (OES/NET), Carol Stocker + (EUR/RPE), Frank Bennett (EA/ANZ), Charles Van Doren (ACDA), Ronald Bettauer (L/N), Robert + Kelley (S/AS), and Marvin Humphreys (PM/NPP); and approved by + Nye. + Washington, October 11, 1978, 2340Z +

258208. Subject: Nuclear Suppliers Group: Policy on Transfers of + Enrichment Technology.

+ +

1. Embassies should present to appropriate host government officials the + Non-Paper in para 2, drawing orally on + background information in para 3. We + are seeking preliminary reactions of key Nuclear Supplier Governments to + our approach to and proposed language for clarification of the restraint + in export of uranium enrichment technology called for in the Nuclear + Supplier Group guidelines. Host authorities should be clear that we are + not seeking to establish any forms of restraint beyond those already + provided for in the guidelines. At the same time, you should stress that + the US, for its part, has never + transferred enrichment technology under its agreements for cooperation + in the peaceful uses of atomic energy, and does not foresee any + circumstances likely to arise in the near future which would occasion a + change in this policy.

+

2. Text of Non-Paper follows: Begin text: transfers of enrichment + technology. In recent months, the US has + held informal consultations with several Nuclear Supplier Group members + on the question of adopting further restraints in the area of enrichment + technology exports. We have found the view to be generally held that the + relevant suppliers might usefully adopt additional restraint in this + area. At the same time, we have concluded that a formal meeting of the + Nuclear Suppliers Group and formal amendment of the Nuclear Supplier + Group guidelines would not be feasible at this time. Accordingly, we are + considering adopting the following principle as US policy.

+

“In applying Article 7 of the guidelines, the Government of the US recognizes the need for special + restraint in the transfer of enrichment technology and for early + consultations before making any commitments in this field. As stated in + Article 7, the US believes that any such + transfer should be under arrangements that include supplier involvement + and/or multinational participation, and believe it desirable to continue + supplier consultations regarding the characteristics of such + arrangements which will reinforce international safeguards.

+

“We would appreciate governments’ comments on this approach and + indications of whether governments would be prepared to adopt similar + policies for future commitments.” End text.

+

3. Following background information may also be drawn upon in discussing + above presentation with host authorities. NSG guidelines call for “restraint” in export of sensitive + fuel reprocessing and uranium enrichment technologies, but do not + incorporate any understandings as to the circumstances under which such + exports might be appropriate. With respect to reprocessing, several key + relevant suppliers have additionally undertaken, unilaterally, further + voluntary restraint on exports. FRG and + France, for example, have publicly indicated their intention not to + enter into new arrangements for transfer of reprocessing technology. The + US is strongly of the view that + similar policies are also necessary with respect to enrichment technologies. We have over the + past months informally consulted with the governments of the UK, France, the FRG, and the USSR + concerning the approach incorporated in the above note. On the substance + of our approach to special restraint in enrichment exports, it should + also be noted that: (a) restraint should cover all present enrichment + technologies, and not only those mentioned in the NSG guidelines: (b) at the same time, we + recognize that additional, more stringent, controls may prove necessary + in the future regarding advanced isotopic separation technologies such + as laser isotope separation: (c) supplier consultations would not be + intended or used for commercial advantage. We would not intend to make + any public announcement of this policy.

+

4. For Paris. We have made a particular effort to shape the above text to + take into account the exchange Nye had with Bujon (CEA) and Louet (MFA) in late + May.Not found. If the French + question whether the proposed principle would apply to their chemical + process, you should say that processes that are demonstrated to be + particularly attractive with respect to difficulty of producing HEU and ease of material accountancy could + be treated in a less stringent manner.

+

5. For Bonn. We have also sought to shape our approach according to the + views expressed by Dittman, et al, when they met with Nye in Bonn in late May.Not found. If the Germans raise the question + of transfer of enrichment technology under the FRG-Brazil deal, you should say that text does not envision + any retroactive application of the proposed principle. Our + previously-stated concern on the transfer of sensitive technologies + under the FRG-Brazil deal remains + unchanged.

+

6. For London. Proposed language of suppliers undertaking is that agreed + upon by Nye and Moberly.Not found. British are thoroughly + familiar with the proposed approach. You should share this instruction + with FCO, to keep them informed of steps we are taking.

+

7. For Moscow. Our basic approach on this issue was discussed most + recently with the Soviets in Vienna on September 19, when Ambassador + Gerard Smith briefed + Morokhov (Vienna 8485)Telegram 8485 from Vienna, September 20, + reported that the head of the Soviet Delegation to the IAEA General Conference, Morokhov, “welcomed briefing by + Gerard Smith on status of + London Suppliers Conference, saying Soviet and US interests were ‘identical’ in + non-proliferation.” Smith + called this comment “significant.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + D780384–0286) subject was also discussed in May, when + Nye met in Geneva with + Timerbaev.Not found. Soviets seemed generally + sympathetic to the need for further restraints on enrichment exports, and Timerbaev was particularly concerned + that the NSG continue to show signs of + life, preferably through a meeting of the 15. In the absence of an + opportunity to convene such a meeting of the NSG, we see an advantage to early and positive action on + the present proposal as an alternative means of demonstrating continued + vigor of the NSG effort.

+

8. For Canberra. You should provide the informal note and background info + for the GOA’s background only, noting + our desire to keep the Australians fully and currently informed of + supplier issues that impinge directly on their interests. With reference + to recent US-Australian exchanges + involving Nye on the subject of + multinational enrichment ventures, you should ensure that GOA understands that our approach is + consistent with the possibility of establishing a multinational + enrichment plant in Australia and in no way seeks to undercut any + Australian aspirations in this regard. Neither is this initiative + intended to press GOA in any way for a + public statement on multinational control of enrichment facilities + (State 244023).In telegram 244023 to + Canberra, September 26, the Department of State said it concurred + with the Embassy’s judgment “not to push for a public GOA statement” favoring multinational + control of enrichment and processing facilities “at this time.” + (National Archives, RG 59, Central + Foreign Policy File, D780392–0928)

+

9. Department would appreciate early initial reactions to this + approach.

+ + Vance + +
+ +
+ + 370. Memorandum Prepared in the Central Intelligence AgencySource: Department of State, + Chronological Files, Speeches, and Papers of Lucy W. Benson, Lot 81D321, Box 8, + INFCE 1978. Secret; [handling restriction not declassified]. At + the top of the memorandum, an unknown hand wrote “FYI—slow + read.” + + + RP–M–78–10433 + + + Washington, November 16, 1978 +

THE POLITICS OF INFCEThis + memorandum was prepared by the International Issues Division of + the Office of Regional and Political Analysis and was + coordinated with the relevant Divisions of the Office of + Regional and Political Analysis, the Office of Economic + Research, and the Office of Scientific Intelligence. Comments + and Questions should be addressed to [less than 1 line not declassified]. [Footnote is in the + original.]

+

The International Nuclear Fuel Cycle Evaluation (INFCE) represents one of the most + ambitious and complex ventures undertaken in the field of + international diplomacy. This two-year program, launched by a US initiative, seeks to construct a + consensus among industrial and developing nations on the future role + of nuclear energy. In this effort, the Evaluation takes into account + not only national economic requirements but also the global + political objective of reducing, to the maximum extent possible, the + dangers of nuclear weapons proliferation.

+

The Evaluation has stimulated a higher degree of + awareness concerning the dangers inherent in the spread of advanced + nuclear technology and of US policy + objectives in this sensitive area. It has also identified the major + obstacles to a new consensus on the future role of nuclear energy. + As it enters its second and final year, INFCE is beset by a fundamental dispute among the + participating countries—indeed, it has been hampered from the start + by the difficulty of reconciling US + non-proliferation policy with the priority resource-poor nations + attach to energy-security. Many of the advanced industrial nations + believe that a plutonium-based fuel cycle will reduce their + dependence on external energy resources. Their desire to proceed + with the “plutonium economy” despite its associated proliferation + hazards has been amply demonstrated in the INFCE working groups. These nations, + along with the LDCs, justify their + resistance to US non-proliferation + policy on the basis of:

+

—Conservative estimates of the size of world uranium + reserves, coupled with high projections of the need for nuclear + power;

+

—Claims that the reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel and + its recycle in power reactors offers an effective program for + dealing with anticipated energy vulnerabilities; and

+

—Assertions that the fast breeder reactor will + eventually lead to a self-contained fuel cycle that will help + eliminate the problems associated with energy dependence.

+ +

Efforts by the United States and other major uranium + suppliers to formulate an effective alternative to the plutonium + economy lack credibility in the eyes of energy-dependent nations. + INFCE is unlikely to resolve + this conflict because there are

+

—Serious doubts about the United States as a reliable + uranium supplier, reinforced by the 1978 Nuclear Non-Proliferation + Act that requires the review and possible revision of supply + contracts, and

+

—Few, if any, political guarantees or technical fixes + that will satisfy those nations with the greatest need for assured + access to nuclear fuel.

+

Underlying reservations about US non-proliferation policies have prompted the + advanced industrial nations to conduct a damage limitation exercise + in INFCE. Even in its most + positive sense, the Evaluation for these nations represents + primarily an opportunity to reaffirm the long-term benefits of the + plutonium economy in the face of US + criticism. The less developed nations, for their part, see INFCE as a chance to voice once + again their demands for the unrestricted transfer of nuclear + technology rather than as an opportunity to join the search for a + more proliferation resistant nuclear regime.

+

Representatives of the nearly 60 governments and + international organizations participating in the Evaluation are + scheduled to hold a plenary session in Vienna from 27 November to 1 + December to review progress to date. Thus far, the working groups + have assembled technical data that will serve as the basis for their + formal reports, which are to be completed within the next six + months.

+

The success of INFCE + cannot, however, be measured only in terms of these technical + studies or the final report that will probably be drafted from them. + Indeed, INFCE has no formal + binding authority on its participants. As a US initiative, it is only one part of Washington’s + broad policy to slow the pace of nuclear proliferation. + Consequently, developments relating to nuclear energy and technology + outside the Evaluation will have an impact on its outcome. For + example, bilateral consultations between the United States and + INFCE participants concerning + the implementation of the 1978 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act could + have a decisive influence on the degree of cooperation exhibited + during the concluding year of the Evaluation.

+

One factor that might overshadow the Evaluation is the + second NPT Review Conference. The + Conference is scheduled to begin only three months after the + Evaluation ends in February 1980. At a minimum, preparation for the + Review Conference preparation will divert the attention of nuclear + policy makers and experts from many developing countries which + consider it a more effective political forum to criticize supplier + states attempting to curb the transfer of nuclear + technology.

+

Shifting the focus of the debate to a new arena may + make it easier to draft an INFCE + report. Nonetheless, the extent to which a final re-port represents + a resolution rather than an effort to paper over the disagreement + between those who place the highest priority on non-proliferation + and those who are preoccupied with energy security would appear at this juncture to depend + more on perceptions by the energy-poor nations of greater + flexibility in US policy than on any + substantial compromises on what they see as essential national + interests.

+

[Omitted here is the body of the memorandum.]

+
+ +
+ 371. Letter From Ambassador-at-Large and Special Representative for + Non-Proliferation Matters Smith + to President CarterSource: Carter Library, National + Security Affairs, Staff Material, Global Issues, Oplinger/Bloomfield File, Box 52, + Proliferation: Smith (Gerard) + Initiative: 5/78–9/79. Secret. Copies were sent to Brzezinski and Vance. Stamped notations at the + top of the letter read “JTM has seen” and “LD has + seen.” + Washington, January + 17, 1979 + + Dear Mr. President: + +

I understand that Schmidt referred + to your non-proliferation pol-icy at GuadalupeSee Foreign Relations, 1977–1980, vol. XXVII, Western + Europe. and according to the report I had from + State Secretary Hermes in Bonn + last week Schmidt expressed + concern about a possible U.S.-Canadian-Australian uranium cartel.Smith, + Hermes, and other U.S. + and FRG officials met in Bonn on + January 10. A report on this meeting is in telegram 1254 from Paris, + January 12. (National Archives, RG + 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790016–1079) On this score + during these Bonn discussions the Germans, while saying there was much + agreement between the U.S. and German positions on nonproliferation, + also said our legislation was discriminatory and they felt that the + United States was now a less reliable supplier than before the + legislation.

+

In subsequent talks at Paris with my opposite number, Andre Jacomet, he + reported that the Germans had said they were tempted to support the + position of the Group of 77 who apparently believe that the United + States is not living up to its NPT + commitment to assure a full flow of nuclear technology and material to + the non-weapon states.A report of the + Smith-Jacomet discussion + is in telegram 1423 from Paris, January 15. (National Archives, + RG 59, Central Foreign Policy + File, P840130–1770) I think this reported attitude is more a + matter of “letting off steam” than a real German position but it + suggests that nonproliferation can be a highly divisive issue in + relations with the Federal Republic.

+

The French also reported that the Italians were bitter about having + joined the Non-Proliferation Treaty and apparently are sympathetic to + the developing countries’ + position that renunciation of weapons plus acceptance of safeguards is + adequate assurance against the spread of nuclear weapons.Ibid.

+

Jacomet also said that Hermes + (FRG) reported that the U.S. was + now in agreement with the FRG on the + Brazilian deal.Smith reported this comment in telegram 1289 from + Paris, January 12. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + D790017–0013) We are asking Ambassador Stoessel to correct this + impression.

+

As evidence of how ticklish the domestic nuclear situation is in + Germany—we were advised that if the recent vote on going ahead with the + Kalkar breeder had not passed the Bundestag “owing to 6 abstentions”, + the breeder issue could have “toppled the government”.

+

Respectfully,

+ + Gerard + SmithSmith signed the letter + “Gerry.” + +
+ +
+ 372. Paper Prepared in the Department of StateSource: Carter Library, National + Security Affairs, Staff Material, Global Issues, Oplinger/Bloomfield File, Box 31, + Chron: 7/79. Confidential. Sent under cover of a July 20 memorandum + from Vance to Carter. + Washington, undated +

STATUS REPORT FOR THE PRESIDENT ON NON-PROLIFERATION + POLICY/NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE INITIATIVES

+

Events of the past several months—particularly the INFCE plenary last November and the + bilateral talks with our major nuclear cooperation partners in November + and January, as well as our talks with India and Pakistan on nuclear + issues—allow us to take a broad look at the progress and prospects of + our non-proliferation policy, especially our initiatives on managing the + nuclear fuel cycle.

+

In the two years since your April 1977 non-proliferation policy + announcements,See footnote 3, Document 338. we have + clearly achieved a heightened sensitivity abroad to the dangers that nuclear proliferation + would pose and to the importance of deterring proliferation. We have + also made progress in renegotiating some of our nuclear cooperation + agreements, gained new adherents to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation + Treaty, and won limited support from other nuclear suppliers for + restraints on sensitive nuclear exports, particularly in the case of + exports to Pakistan.

+

At the same time, and especially because of the insecurity of global + energy supply that was accentuated by events in Iran,In the wake of the Shah’s decision to leave Iran, + the nation’s new government suspended oil exports, which affected + the world’s energy supply. See Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, vol. + XXXVII, Energy Crisis, 1974–1980, Documents 181, 182, 187, 188, 189, 192, 193, 194, and 200. our efforts to + restrain the use and transfer of sensitive nuclear technologies and + materials are still viewed by many governments as an unacceptable + infringement on their nuclear energy development plans. These + governments defend their nuclear energy plans primarily on political + grounds, specifically on their right to increase their energy + independence and to undertake related technological development.

+

As a result, although our INFCE + consultations show a growing consensus between ourselves and several of + our industrialized partners on most issues concerning the nuclear fuel + cycle and sensitive technology transfers, we have not been able to win + many other governments’ support for our fundamental position: that + non-proliferation concerns, as well as technical and economic factors, + indicate that the transfer and use of sensitive technologies should be + significantly restrained and delayed.

+

In talks with us even the Canadians, whom we view as close allies in our + non-proliferation effort, have voiced doubts about the effectiveness of + an attempt to deny sensitive technologies to the developing states even + if they accept safeguards and give other non-proliferation assurances. + Canadians argue that such a discriminatory approach could weaken the + NPT. They also stress their + interest in maintaining an option for Canadian enrichment and + reprocessing facilities.

+

If the problems of access to peaceful nuclear technology and nuclear arms + control cause a serious confrontation at the June 1980 NPT Review Conference, the NPT regime, which has served us so well + over the last decade, could be significantly undercut. The situation + would be even more acrimonious if the outcome of INFCE appears discriminatory or if + SALT II and a Comprehensive Test + Ban Treaty are not concluded before the conference. We are currently + consulting with the other NPT + depositary states (UK and USSR) and other key countries to promote + a more productive atmosphere at the conference.

+ +

As an outcome of INFCE, we look + forward to a reasonably balanced technical analysis of fuel cycle issues + in the final INFCE report in February + 1980. But we do not expect to achieve a formal new international regime + under which governments are committed to a set of norms and rules + corresponding to our policy preferences. Rather, alongside the INFCE process, we hope to achieve a + growing informal consensus among the major industrial countries on a set + of general principles for nuclear commerce and fuel cycle management + that can serve as a guide for national policies. To reach even an + informal understanding, we will have to make some compromises. We also + believe that such a consensus among suppliers may evoke a strong + negative reaction on the part of many developing countries, although we + are trying to bring them into the consensus as well.

+

We have begun to develop certain illustrative elements of the consensus + we hope to achieve. These include strictly limiting and + multinationalizing new enrichment and reprocessing plants; using + plutonium only for research, development, and deployment in breeders and + advanced thermal reactors; no recycling of plutonium in current + generation thermal reactors; and pacing construction of any new + reprocessing plants to meet only breeder and advanced reactor + requirements and to avoid stockpiling of plutonium. We have also + encouraged multinational safeguarded interim spent fuel + repositories.

+

We hope that restraints of these kinds can be made acceptable on the + basis of an evolutionary principle: that is, that various nuclear + technologies and facilities may be transferred to developing countries + but only when their energy needs and electric grids would support such + transfers. However, we expect that a number of developing countries will + resist this approach because they want complete access now to all + nuclear technologies and will resent in principle a formula that + discriminates between states on the basis of level of development.

+

In the near term, we will have to compromise on some of our illustrative + elements in relation to the advanced countries. In particular, West + Germany, Japan and Canada want to pursue, or to retain the option for, + national enrichment and reprocessing programs. Winning their agreement + to place such sensitive facilities under multinational auspices will + require efforts that continue beyond the conclusion of INFCE. Also, West Germany and Belgium + (and possibly Japan) are not likely to be dissuaded from their programs + for research and development for thermal recycle of plutonium, although + they may agree not to enlarge such programs for at least a decade.

+

To reach a consensus on fuel cycle issues, we believe that we will have + to move beyond our present case-by-case consideration of approvals of + retransfers of US-supplied fuel for + reprocessing because this confronts our nuclear partners with + uncertainties they believe they cannot manage. We believe it may be possible to deal with such + approvals on a generic basis within the framework of the restriction on + reprocessing that we are now considering proposing.

+

Our approval right on reprocessing is the main issue in the renegotiation + of our nuclear cooperation agreements. We have signed a new agreement + with Australia and initialed one with Norway.The United States signed an agreement concerning + the peaceful use of nuclear energy with Australia on July 5 and + initialed an agreement with Norway on nuclear cooperation on May + 11. Our negotiations are well under way with Finland and + several other countries. Reaching agreed conditions on reprocessing + would allow us to move forward with our renegotiation program in + particular with EURATOM and + Japan.

+

Beyond the fuel cycle consensus we are seeking, we also face certain + critical cases posing a high risk of proliferation. Pakistan’s sensitive + nuclear programs aim at achieving an explosives capability, directly + challenging efforts to restrain proliferation. We are working with other + suppliers to restrain sensitive exports to Pakistan, while exploring + internally and with other governments various approaches to the + problem.

+

At the same time, we do not believe that India will agree to place all + its peaceful nuclear activities under IAEA safeguards by March 1980 as the law requires for + continued US cooperation, and the + collapse of the Desai Government + raises new uncertainties about India’s future nuclear course.Indian Prime Minister Moraji Desai resigned, July 15, after Deputy Prime + Minister Charan Singh and Minister of Health Raj Narain withdrew + from his ruling Janata Party. We have not been successful in + gaining South Africa’s agreement to adhere to the NPT or to accept IAEA safeguards on its enrichment activities. Meanwhile, we + believe South Africa is already producing weapons-grade enriched + uranium. Finally, the FRG contract with + Brazil for the transfer of sensitive nuclear technology, while + encountering some delays and difficulties, remains intact with sensitive + facilities planned to come online in Brazil in the mid-to-late 1980’s. + This situation is complicated by Argentina’s plans for the indigenous + development of a reprocessing facility.

+

All these critical cases pose difficult challenges for us this year and + beyond. On other non-proliferation issues, we also foresee a difficult + 1980 scenario that we believe we should signal to you. The following + sequence is likely:

+

—A final INFCE conference in February + whose formal results are extremely modest in comparison to the hopes we + originally entertained, but which may still discomfit many of our + nuclear partners, especially the developing countries.

+ +

—A March 10 US embargo on nuclear supply + to non-nuclear weapon states that have not placed all their peaceful + nuclear facilities under IAEA + safeguards (this is likely to affect India in particular).

+

—In the case of EURATOM, a need for + you to extend for one year the March 10 deadline for obtaining their + agreement to grant the US the right to + veto reprocessing of spent US-supplied + fuel.

+

—A June Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference marked by challenges + on the part of countries which believe the nuclear-weapon states have + not fulfilled their NPT obligations to + transfer nuclear technology for peaceful uses and to reduce their own + nuclear weapons forces.

+

—An industrialized-nation summit in which we, as well as our partners, + may be called upon to make certain explicit concessions (for example + with regard to the agreed conditions under which reprocessing of spent + US-supplied fuel will normally be + approved).

+

On these and other issues, our leverage is limited and declining. We are + not the only supplier of essential nuclear materials, equipment, or + services, and some countries will be willing to forego our nuclear + supplies despite the value they place on good overall relations with + us.

+

Also, it is not likely that the principles we hope to establish will + receive early formal approval internationally or be reflected in new + institutions in the near term. However, we believe that the potential + problems can be moderated if we use a more informal and flexible + approach to our non-proliferation goals, especially because other + governments will accept significant restraints on their nuclear + activities far more readily in practice than in principle.

+

We also believe that achieving an effective global consensus on + non-proliferation policy, and especially on managing the nuclear fuel + cycle, will require a continuing effort through the 1980s and beyond. + Even if the process we foresee moves forward reasonably successfully, we + must expect that some “problem states” will elect to remain outside the + consensus that begins to develop and that we will, on occasion, be + confronted with difficult dilemmas in restraining potential + proliferators.

+
+ +
+ + 373. Memorandum From Ambassador-at-Large and Special Representative + for Non-Proliferation Matters Smith to President CarterSource: + Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Global + Issues, Oplinger/Bloomfield + File, Box 31, Chron: 7/79. Secret. + Washington, July + 27, 1979 + + SUBJECT + Nonproliferation + +

I.

+

The Secretary of State’s July 20 Nonproliferation Status ReportSee Document + 372. to you indicates the following:

+

—The International Nuclear Fuel Cycle Evaluation (INFCE) will end in February 1980 with + only modest results.

+

—We face critical decisions by mid-1980: waiver of the deadline for + renegotiation of our agreement with the European Community as the + Europeans will continue to refuse us a reprocessing veto; possible + cut-offs of nuclear exports to India and South Africa; and a major issue + with Japan if we insist on continuance of case-by-case review of + proposals for reprocessing of US-origin + spent fuel and continued deferral of the Japanese planned reprocessing + program.

+

—We will in addition face criticism at the NPT Review Conference in June 1980.

+

Further, our task of working out acceptable new international + arrangements is complicated by the legislative requirement for changes + in existing supply commitments and the shift of the nuclear export + licensing function to the NRC.

+

II.

+

We are now beginning a thorough and systematic exploration of + international nuclear policy in the post-INFCE period. An interagency group will be getting under + way. Other countries are looking for a degree of harmonization of + nuclear policies in the aftermath of INFCE. International explorations on a more specific basis + than in the past are called for. Unless otherwise directed, I propose to + go forward with the efforts outlined in this memorandum on the basis of + the following observations.

+

1. Although there is enhanced concern in various industrial countries and + to some extent in developing countries about the nuclear proliferation + threat (largely owing to your initiative, but reinforced by developments in Pakistan),On June 25, Smith informed IAEA Director General Eklund about “the seriousness + with which the United States viewed” the “evidence” that Pakistan + “was pursuing a nuclear explosive program, mentioning activity in + reprocessing, gas centrifuge enrichment and nuclear explosive + design.” (Telegram 178818 to Vienna, July 11; National Archives, + RG 59, Central Foreign Policy + File, P840167–2015) many nuclear nations view U.S. policy as + an effort to deny them autonomy (however unrealistic that possibility + may be in some cases). There is a widespread belief, and it is notable + that even Canada may be moving in this direction, that restrictions on + sensitive facilities are likely to become less effective or even + counterproductive where countries in which they are located or planned + agree to IAEA safeguards on all their + civil nuclear facilities (full-scope safeguards).

+

2. There is fairly wide acceptance, largely as a result of efforts in + INFCE and elsewhere, of the views + that (a) the economic advantage of recycling of plutonium in thermal + reactors is marginal, at best; and (b) reprocessing is not a necessary + precondition for waste disposal.

+

3. There is substantial acceptance in Japan, France, the UK, the FRG, other European nations, and the USSR, of the need to prevent widespread + construction of national enrichment and reprocessing plants and the + spread of plutonium and high enriched uranium. But none of these + countries is prepared to imitate the U.S. by foreswearing reprocessing + (although the FRG has been forced by + domestic pressures to accept deferral of their proposed major commercial + facility). While the first four agree that multinational approaches to + sensitive facilities and materials are of interest for nonproliferation + reasons, they, like the U.S., resist acceptance of dependence on + multinational plants.

+

4. INFCE will not come up with either + fuel cycle or hardware “fixes” which will significantly reduce the + potential for diversions to weapons programs.

+

5. With demands for nuclear power much reduced and sources of nuclear + equipment and enrichment services increasing, U.S. ability to influence + the conditions of international nuclear trade has greatly diminished. It + is likely to diminish further.

+

III.

+

In light of these observations and in order not to be further isolated + from influencing nuclear developments abroad, we need to develop new + approaches (reflecting the incentives and institutions foreshadowed in + your 1977 speech and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act (NNPA)) designed to achieve our basic + nonproliferation objectives. Our best hope lies in developing a + consensus among the Summit 7, certain other important industrialized + countries and some key LDC’s.

+

I propose, in both internal efforts and in exploratory talks with other + governments, to explore a range of possibilities building on NPT and IAEA safeguards, while maintaining to the extent possible + supplier restraints. These possibilities would be based on the + following:

+ +

1. An understanding with the major industrial states + that we would not exercise a veto on nuclear trade among them or on + their development of sensitive facilities involving materials of + U.S. origin; provided (i) they accept full-scope and improved + safeguards on all civil nuclear facilities and an appropriate + institutional framework for their operation and the management of + the materials they produce, and (ii) they have a reasonable economic + case for building sensitive plants. We would interpret + reprocessing in order to obtain plutonium for certain research, for + breeders and for other advanced reactors as “reasonable” for countries + with large programs, but not in the near to medium term for the recycle + in conventional thermal reactors or as a precursor to waste disposal. + (Eventual U.S. agreement to this point could require legislative + changes; our exploratory talks would note this fact.)

+

2. The development of international and multinational + institutions as a further means of reducing the likelihood that + critical materials will be diverted to making weapons. This + would include (as foreshadowed in the NNPA) willingness to consider foreign participation in U.S. + enrichment capacity.

+

3. As a part of such institutional development, early + establishment of an effective international plutonium + storage/management system. Since accumulation of substantial + stocks of plutonium by some countries is inevitable, nuclear cooperation + with them and other nations which might acquire or produce plutonium + should be conditioned on their willingness to place excess civil + plutonium stocks under international control. This should include U.S. + willingness (as proposed by the Ford Administration) to place U.S. excess civil + plutonium in an effective control system.

+

4. Short- and long-term measures to provide + greater assurance of fuel supply, especially to countries stopping short + of full fuel cycles.

+

5. Technical cooperation and assistance regarding + (i) three major problems of nuclear power (safety, spent fuel + disposition and waste disposal) and where appropriate (ii) research and + development on breeders and other advanced nuclear technologies.

+

6. Improved safeguards for enrichment, + reprocessing and MOX fabrication plants, and undertakings to limit new + enrichment capacity to low enrichment.

+

In sum, we plan to begin exploration of what post-INFCE regimes might look like. + Hopefully, we will as a result be able to provide you with a realistic + assessment of the best possible alternatives which could be negotiable + with other countries. You would then be in a better position to + establish post-INFCE U.S. policy.

+

I am taking the liberty of sending a copy of this memorandum to the + Secretaries of State and Energy, and the Director of ACDA.

+ + Gerard + SmithSmith signed the memorandum + “Gerry.” + +
+ +
+ + 374. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security + Affairs (Brzezinski) to + Ambassador-at-Large and Special Representative for Non-Proliferation + Matters SmithSource: Carter Library, National + Security Affairs, Staff Material, Global Issues, Oplinger/Bloomfield File, Box 31, + Chron: 8/1–12/79. Secret. + Washington, August + 10, 1979 + + SUBJECT + Post-INFCE Negotiations + (U) + +

I do not believe that the President should be asked to address the + question of exploring the post-INFCE + proposals outlined in your memorandum of July 27 until they have been + developed in considerably more detail and specificity.See Document 373. + Some of them would appear to require significant changes in the policy + decisions made in 1977,See Document 330, and footnote 3, Document 338. and several might + require new or amended legislation. Without a detailed analysis of what + we would be proposing in each area, and an assessment of the impact of + the whole package on our objectives, it would be difficult for the + President to make a judgment on the acceptability of this approach. I + suggest that the post-INFCE planning + group which you have recently established prepare a paper on each of the + six possibilities, including specific proposals which might be explored + with other governments, required changes in existing legislation and + policy guidelines, and an overall assessment of how the package might + affect the pace of reprocessing and breeder deployment in countries + participating in the arrangement and our ability to restrain sensitive + activities in other nations. These papers should be reviewed by the + PRC before the President is asked + to authorize explorations with other governments. (S)

+ + Zbigniew + Brzezinski + +
+ +
+ + 375. Memorandum of ConversationsSource: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, + Staff Material, Global Issues, Oplinger/Bloomfield File, Box 52, Proliferation: + Smith (Gerard) + Initiative: 5/78–9/79. Secret. Drafted by Francis Hodsoll (S/AS) on + August 30. The conversations took place in Smith’s office at the Department of + State. + Washington, August + 21 and 30, 1979 + + PARTICIPANTS + Ambassador Gerard Smith, + S/AS + Ambassador Henry Owen, + White House + Mr. Robert Bowie + Mr. Abraham Chayes + Dr. Albert Carnesale + Mr. Phillip Farley + Dr. George Rathjens, S/AS + Mr. F.S.M. Hodsoll, S/AS + + + SUBJECT + Post-INFCE Nonproliferation + Regime and 1980 Summit + +

The following ideas were expressed:

+

1. Smith should explore this Fall + with key industrialized countries (Japan, UK, France, FRG, + Netherlands, Belgium, Sweden, Italy, Canada, and possibly Australia) + views on the framework for a Post-INFCE Nonproliferation Regime (including multinational + arrangements).

+

2. It is understood that there will be organized this Fall a + nongovernmental meeting on post-INFCE + institions; this would include key developing, as well as developed, + countries. Ian Smart (UK) could be a + principal organizer of this effort.

+

3. The purpose of these efforts would be to provide a basis for (i) + developing recommendations for the President on post-INFCE U.S. policy, and (ii) talks next + year leading hopefully to a consensus among the Summit 7 plus Belgium, + the Netherlands and Sweden on the basic elements of post-INFCE civil nuclear arrangements. We + would attempt to achieve this consensus in time so that appropriate + initiatives could be undertaken in June 1980 at the Venice Summit; + Summit discussions and actions should avoid a developing country + perception of the “Big Boys” ganging up on them.

+

4. In parallel with the talks referred to in 3 above, we should arrange + to begin a dialogue with key developing countries who have participated + actively in the INFCE TCC (Egypt, + India, Philippines, Argentina, Korea, Romania, Brazil, Mexico, and + Yugoslavia). The purpose would be to develop a degree of understanding, + if not consensus, prior to the + 1980 NPT Review Conference. A number of + these countries should be worked in as a part of the Smith exploratory trip (perhaps India, + Korea, Argentina, and Romania, which are active members of the TCC).

+

5. As agreed with Dr. Brzezinski, + to provide USG authority for the Fall + explorations, Smith should meet + with Secretaries Vance, + Brown and Duncan and Dr. Brzezinski shortly after Labor Day. For + this purpose, a memorandum would be prepared outlining (i) the nature of + the non-proliferation policy problem and (ii) the general thrust of + ideas which we believe should be explored with other countries. The + memorandum would indicate that it is too soon to consider actual policy + changes, but that the explorations would provide a basis for formulating + realistic proposals for the President’s consideration. It would also + suggest a communication signaling the Smith explorations and the President’s interest in + reaching resolution of outstanding civil nuclear issues.

+

6. Prior to the Fall explorations, the interagency group requested by the + NSC should develop back-up + analytical papers on key elements of the post-INFCE regime (e.g., plutonium management, research, etc.). + On the basis of these papers, country specific papers will be prepared + (including analysis of carrots and sticks to achieve our objective).

+

7. Also prior to the Fall explorations, Smith should consult with key Congressional leaders + (Church, Jackson, Glenn, Percy, and McClure on the Senate side; and Zablocki, + Bingham and Findley on the House side).

+

8. The USSR and PRC probably will not be major factors in + a post-INFCE regime including + multinational arrangements. Nonetheless, their participation should be + sought.

+

9. Consideration should be given to raising the Pakistan issue at the + 1980 Summit.

+
+ +
+ + 376. Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the Department of + State (Tarnoff) to Denis Clift of the National Security + Council StaffSource: Carter + Library, Papers of Walter F. + Mondale, Box 2, Talking Points for Foreign Policy + Breakfasts: 7/79–12/79. Secret; Nodis; Eyes Only. + Washington, October + 12, 1979 + + SUBJECT + Status Report on Current Non-Proliferation Issues + +

In response to your request,Not + found. we have prepared the following brief summary of + current non-proliferation issues. Please let me know if you wish further + elaboration on any of these issues.

+

Pakistan (Secret/Nodis)

+

Pakistan continues to pursue a nuclear explosive capability, including + development of enrichment and reprocessing facilities to acquire weapons + useable material and development of the non-nuclear elements of a + nuclear explosive device. We believe that Pakistan will not be able to + accumulate enough fissile material from its enrichment and reprocessing + activities for a nuclear explosive for at least two to three years, but + there are recurring reports that Pakistan might test a device within the + next six months, perhaps with material acquired from abroad. We cannot + exclude this possibility.

+

We have terminated foreign assistance to Pakistan in accordance with the + Symington amendmentThe Symington amendment + introduced by Senator Stuart Symington (D-Missouri) required the + President, when furnishing development assistance under the Foreign + Assistance Act of 1961 and making sales under the Agricultural Trade + Development and Assistance Act of 1954, to take into account (1) + “the percentage of the recipient or purchasing country’s budget + which is devoted to military purposes, and (2) the degree to which + the recipient or purchasing country is using its foreign exchange + resources to acquire military equipment.” (The Foreign Assistance + Act of 1967, P.L. 90–137, approved + on November 14, 1967; 81 Stat. 459) (PL–480 continues), and + we have repeatedly told high levels of the Pakistan government that we + will not be able to respond to its legitimate security and economic + development needs as long as it continues its present nuclear + activities. Some of our allies, the PRC + and the Soviet Union have also expressed their concerns to the GOP.

+

Foreign Affairs advisor Agha Shahi will be in Washington next week for + consultation on security questions, including the nuclear issue. We are + also consulting with our allies with a view to developing a common + approach to the Pakistan problem.

+ +

[Pages 2 and 3 of this document are missing] conclusively what has taken + place. We have informed key Allies of these indications and are now + attempting to verify the indications by independent means. This + information is being very closely held.

+

This development complicates an already difficult situation in regard to + South Africa’s nuclear activities. South Africa has not moved forward + with a package settlement we proposed last year by which it would place + its enrichment facility (which is capable of producing weapons-useable + material) under safeguards and adhere to the NPT in return for resumed US supply of fuel for its research reactor and fulfillment + of our commitment to supply fuel for the two power reactors it is + acquiring from France.

+

We have prodded South Africa toward resolutions of the nuclear issue and + have also discussed the problem with France, the only other state with + leverage in the nuclear area with South Africa. France has informed + South Africa that it will not undercut the position we have taken. We + are now considering internally additional steps that might be taken.

+

Harmonization of Policies with Key States on the + Nuclear Fuel Cycle (Confidential)

+

The International Fuel Cycle Evaluation (INFCE) will formally end next February but most of its + reports have been written. INFCE has + played a useful role in developing a basis for fuel cycle decisions, but + it is a technical study, not a negotiation, and as such will not, in + itself, resolve differences on fuel cycle issues. It has, however, + provided for a pause and a number of useful conclusions from a + non-proliferation point of view.

+

We have begun informal consultations with key countries (primarily + France, UK, FRG and Japan) on developing common approaches to + outstanding nuclear issues. The key issues involve ground rules and + institutions for sensitive nuclear facilities and material, particularly + reprocessing plants and plutonium. Most of the other major countries are + also now looking for ways to resolve remaining issues, and we need to + accelerate our discussions if we are to have maximum impact.

+

We are seeking a consensus including (1) plutonium use is appropriate in + breeder and advanced reactor development in states with large electrical + grids; (2) recycle of plutonium in light water reactors should be + avoided because it is only marginally economic and poses a serious + proliferation risk (it could result in early separation and use of + plutonium in any state with a reactor); (3) development of new + reprocessing capacity should thus be limited to the requirements for + plutonium for breeder and advanced reactor R&D and development of both enrichment and reprocessing facilities should be + related to international capacity rather than strictly national needs; + and (4) sensitive facilities be subject to appropriate institutional + arrangements and incorporate feasible technical barriers to misuse and + improved safeguards.

+

We are making progress, but key issues remain to be resolved. Ambassador + Gerard Smith is planning + shortly to begin consultations with key countries on a post-INFCE framework. We hope to reach + agreement on elements of such a framework before the seven-nation Summit + next summer in Venice.

+ + Peter + TarnoffTarnoff signed the memorandum + “Peter.” + Executive Secretary + + +
+ +
+ 377. Memorandum From Ambassador-at-Large and Special Representative + for Non-Proliferation Matters Smith to Secretary of State VanceSource: + Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Global + Issues, Oplinger/Bloomfield + File, Box 41, Proliferation: 11/79–5/80. Confidential. Copies were + sent to Christopher, + Benson, Pickering, Duncan, and Owen. + Washington, November 20, 1979 +

Recent Consultations in Europe on + Nonproliferation

+

After visiting FRG, France, UK, Belgium and The Netherlands (and + consulting the Japanese in Washington),Reports on these discussions are in telegram 19652 from Bonn, + November 2 (National Archives, RG + 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790507–0778); telegram 35420 from + Paris, November 9 (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790521–0650); + telegram 21817 from London, November 5 (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + D790508–1128); telegram 6677 from The Hague, November 6 (National + Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign + Policy File, D790518–0230); telegram 6678 from The Hague, November + 6; (National Archives, RG 59, + Central Foreign Policy File, D790518–0175); and telegram 296435 to + Tokyo, November 15. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + D790525–0776) our impressions about realistic post-INFCE possibilities are:

+ +

I

+

Although these countries are more sensitive to the risks of proliferation + than two years ago, they seem more set than we on giving their own + energy needs first priority. They are concerned about spread of + reprocessing and enrichment plants and weapons-grade materials. But, + they believe we place too much emphasis on risks of diversion from + nuclear power programs as compared with dedicated production programs, + and that we are over-emphasizing the risks of plutonium separation and + use as compared with risks from spread of enrichment facilities and + accumulation of spent fuel.

+

Our allies are very much concerned about the lack of predictability of + supplier states’ actions, especially the United States, primarily with + respect to approving the reprocessing of spent fuel and use of + plutonium. There is still general disapproval of and resentment against + the Nuclear Nonproliferation Act of 1978 because of its requirements on + these points. The prevailing view is that these requirements are more + likely to be a stimulus, than an impediment, to the spread of sensitive + facilities and materials.

+

II

+

On breeders, thermal recycle of plutonium and the need for reprocessing + for waste disposal, there is some convergence of American and other + advanced countries’ views.

+

All believe it necessary for advanced states to continue R&D on breeders as a high priority. + With fewer energy options, the others feel this more strongly than we + do. But none—not even the French—are prepared now to make a flat + commitment to breeder commercialization, although they and the Japanese + expect to do so within the next decade.

+

They all accept that the economic advantage of thermal recycle is at + present marginal, at best, and that decisions about recycle will be made + on other grounds—assurance of supply and the perceived advantage by some + of reprocessing for waste disposal and the need in this case to burn up + the resulting plutonium.

+

The Germans are committed in principle to + reprocessing as a precondition to waste disposal and feel that reopening + the question would jeopardize their already politically fragile nuclear + power program. However, there is increasing acknowledgment that + reprocessing is not required to dispose of waste safely. In fact, in the + Free World, except for France and UK, + there is likely to be little commercial reprocessing of spent fuel for + years.

+

III

+

With the end of INFCE approaching and + the NPT Review Conference in August + 1980, our major problem will be to deal with pressures for a general agreement on conditions + for nuclear supply. There is a risk that others will favor conditions + which would be so permissive as to seriously undercut our + nonproliferation efforts. If, on the other hand, the conditions appear + discriminatory, it will be a formidable problem to gain their acceptance + by states other than those favored. Acceptance will have to be based on + common approaches, at least among key suppliers and consumers, since our + leverage as a supplier has diminished. If we can make some + accommodations, a consensus may develop among the advanced countries + that will be acceptable to most developing states and assist us and + other suppliers in dealing with the countries of greatest concern from a + nonproliferation point of view. We envisage an evolutionary, or + building-block, process—not a grand design.

+

IV

+

The two most promising prospects appear to be full-scope safeguards + (FSS) and an effective + international plutonium storage (IPS) system.

+

The French have so far blocked FSS as a + norm for nuclear trade. It may soon be possible to get them, and other + major supplier nations, to agree to condition exports on IAEA safeguards on all peaceful nuclear + activities, though the French may wish to withhold this step pending + resolution of our differences with respect to U.S. consent rights over + U.S. origin spent fuel reprocessed in EURATOM countries and over plutonium derived therefrom.

+

An IAEA study is underway on an IPS and + some Europeans are committed to its early realization—with or without + the U.S. There are unresolved issues with respect to the extent of + coverage (i.e., whether IPS should follow plutonium from the time of + separation until it is back in a reactor), and on the question of + authority for release of plutonium. We can probably influence + developments in ways consistent with our nonproliferation objectives if + we weigh in heavily and can hold out the prospect that exercise of U.S. + consent rights with respect to plutonium release could be affected if the IPS has authority to prevent release in + the absence of a clear and reasonable need and satisfaction of other + agreed conditions.

+

As noted, our allies and others are very concerned about the lack of + predictability in our nuclear supply actions and the exercise of our + consent rights for reprocessing. Their attitude toward IPS can be + influenced by its relation to the exercise of these consent rights. To + influence the development of a post-INFCE consensus, we will need to work out guidelines + concerning the exercise of our consent rights.

+

V

+

Aside from IPS, there is little interest in the advanced countries in + early multinationalization of fuel cycle facilities, although the UK, France and Belgium have indicated willingness to consider some + additive anti-proliferation measures beyond safeguards in order to set a + desirable precedent.

+

VI

+

In order to meet possible criticism at the NPT Review Conference, the UK and France indicated interest in exploring possible + initiatives prior to the Conference to provide further assistance to + developing countries in assessing their energy needs and dealing with + the problems of nuclear power (e.g., reactor safety).

+

VII

+

We will continue to consult these and other states, including developing + countries. It seems unlikely that any new arrangements will be ready for + agreement next year.

+
+ +
+ 378. Letter From Secretary of State Vance to French Foreign Minister François-PoncetSource: Carter Library, + National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Global Issues, Oplinger/Bloomfield File, Box 47, + Proliferation: INFCE (Post): + 9/79–1/80. Confidential. + Washington, December 1, 1979 + + Dear Jean: + +

Ambassador Gerard Smith has + reported to me on the useful discussions he recently held in Paris on + finding common approaches to a post-INFCE regime for international nuclear commerce.See Document 377. + He advised me that you are planning to consider this subject at an + inter-Ministerial meeting to be held on December 10. In that connection, + I urge you to give special consideration to the goal of achieving + comprehensive, full-scope international safeguards coverage in + non-nuclear-weapon states. We believe the urgency of achieving this goal + has greatly increased, and hope that France may now find it possible to + adopt, in parallel with other major supplier states, a policy of making + new commitments for cooperation with non-nuclear-weapon states in the + civil uses of nuclear energy only with those that accept a binding + obligation to place all present and future nuclear facilities under + international safeguards.

+ +

In looking at the countries of special proliferation concern—including + India, Pakistan, Israel and South Africa—we find it striking that each + of them has endeavored to produce weapons-usable material in unsafeguarded nuclear facilities. Thus they can + proceed down the path of nuclear explosive development, pointing out + that they are violating no international undertakings, while at the same + time enjoying the benefits of international cooperation with their + nuclear power program. We believe it is time to try to plug this + loophole by facing them with a choice.

+

We do not believe this would involve any serious sacrifice of market + opportunities, since the number of potential customers who have not + already agreed to accept full-scope safeguards has become very small, + and some of these are now moving toward such acceptance. Moreover, a + common policy requiring full-scope safeguards would avoid the + unfortunate type of situation we have been witnessing in the competition + for Argentine sales,See Document 420. where perceived differences in + safeguards requirements appear to have influenced the award of the + contracts.

+

If you are prepared to move with us in this direction, we see more + advantage to having the supplier states who are members of the NPT announce at the NPT Review Conference their adoption of + full-scope safeguards as a condition of future supply commitments. I + believe this would significantly strengthen support for the Treaty by + defusing the arguments of the developing world that NPT Parties derive no real benefits and + are, in fact, penalized with regard to conditions of nuclear supply + compared to non-NPT Parties. While we + realize France is, of course, not a party to the NPT, your support for this new policy + would be extremely important in bringing the NPT supplier states along, and we hope you could take + whatever parallel action seemed suitable to make clear your approach at + that time.

+

We understand the possible reluctance of a supplier state to require its + customers to have safeguards on materials that are not traceable to its + own exports. But we are convinced that this requirement is necessary not + only to prevent additional states from nuclear explosive development but + also to achieve effective safeguards on one’s own + exports. Examples of why we believe this is so are set forth in the + enclosure.Attached but not + printed.

+

As you know, President Carter + attaches considerable importance to this goal, and I would appreciate + your calling this letter to the attention of President Giscard d’Estaing prior to the inter-Ministerial + meeting.

+

Sincerely,

+ + CyVance signed the letter “Cy.” + +
+ +
+ 379. Memorandum From Ambassador-at-Large and Special Representative + for Non-Proliferation Matters Smith to President CarterSource: + Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Harold Brown Papers, Box 6, + Non-Proliferation. Secret. Sent under cover of a February 19 + memorandum from Vance to + Carter. Vance advised + Carter to approve “the + general strategy he [Smith] + is suggesting” and noted that as the INFCE “draws to a close, it is important that we remove + unnecessary causes of division with our Allies which do not help + nonproliferation, and that we begin to build a better international + nonproliferation regime. An indispensable element is that the U.S. + be considered a reliable and predictable supplier.” + Washington, February 16, 1980 + + SUBJECT + Nonproliferation Strategy for 1980 and Beyond + +

The purpose of this memorandum is to seek approval of a general strategy + to improve our nonproliferation policy in 1980. We will ask for + authority to make specific moves as required. The strategy in large part + makes elements of our current policy more detailed and specific. The + most critical issues involve (i) European and Japanese reprocessing of + U.S. origin material and use of the resulting plutonium and (ii) + improvements to the nonproliferation regime. Nothing proposed for 1980 + would require any change in the law.

+

I

+

At the start of your administration, it was important promptly to + increase awareness of the need to slow the spread of sensitive + facilities which were making control of nuclear proliferation more + difficult. Since 1977, the + International Nuclear Fuel Cycle Evaluation (INFCE), which you initiated, and bilateral discussions have + provided us and others with better perceptions of both the problems and + possible solutions.

+

Several things have become clear:

+

1. We are seen to be an unreliable supplier and ambivalent about nuclear + power.Vance underlined the phrase “an unreliable supplier + and ambivalent about nuclear power” and wrote in the left-hand + margin next to this paragraph: “You need to tell us whether we are + unreliable because of Exec. branch policy, because of Cong. + legislation or both—Being unreliable may not be as bad as giving + materials which lead countries to have capabilities without + safeguards.” Alternate suppliers are emerging and our + influence over nuclear trade and programs is becoming increasingly + limited. Our influence over reprocessing and plutonium use is + particularly limited in that we lack consent rights regarding EURATOM countries and cannot + politically treat Japan less favorably than Europe.

+

2. While for domestic reasons many nuclear programs have been slowed in + recent years and the proliferation dangers inherent in plutonium based + fuel cycles are now better perceived (in large part as a result of U.S. + efforts), breeder and advanced reactor options are still perceived to be + of great importance by major countries in Europe and Japan. These + programs will continue even if we do not agree; their importance is + affirmed by INFCE. To the extent U.S. + policy attempts to interfere with these programs, it is seen to threaten + these countries’ energy security.Vance underlined the words “their + importance is affirmed by INFCE” + and “interfere” in this paragraph. In the left-hand margin next to + this paragraph, Vance wrote + “in preparation for this meeting you need a brief summary of INFCE conclusion and a comment as to + why we were not successful in convincing people of our views on the + dangers. This summary could either be a TAB, or if short enough in + the talker. Do we now accept the INFCE conclusion? Do we accept that interference + threatens their energy security?” An unknown hand wrote “in + part.”

+

3. The NPT regime is the foundation of + nonproliferation policy but is increasingly attacked by countries who + see nuclear suppliers as not keeping their part of the bargain—“fullest + possible exchange . . . for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.” U.S. + policy is singled out as particularly damaging.

+

4. We need to develop a joint strategy with the major suppliers (our + allies with the most advanced nuclear programs—UK, France, FRG, Japan) to + (a) improve the nonproliferation regime and (b) agree on criteria for + plutonium uses and related reprocessing.

+

5. We need also to make NPT or + equivalent (Tlatelolco) obligations more attractive, provide greater + supply assurances to countries accepting these obligations, and isolate to a greater extent the problem + countries.Vance underlined the phrase “greater supply + assurances to countries accepting these obligations, and isolate” + and wrote in the left-hand margin “what is the example of countries + where we have not given supply assurances when they have accepted + safeguards.” An unknown hand wrote: “NPA enjoins us to do better but + we don’t;” “none;” “case-by-case basis only and general policy;” “5 + yr licensing recently. But most want link licensing to life of + reactor;” and “For breeder reactors (INFCE agrees only with lgr countries) can have + [illegible] for govts using spent fuel for reprocessing now have + [illegible] consent (transfer or reprocess), Regularize. In return, + defer thermal recycle. Breeders and adv reactors are + most.”

+

II

+

We face major decisions in 1980 that were deferred for the period of + INFCE. These involve requests for + consent to reprocessing of U.S. origin fuel in France, the UK and Japan; the conditions of our consent + to the use of the resulting plutonium; and the EURATOM renegotiation aimed at giving + us such consent rights where we will have to specify how we would + exercise them. We also face decisions on implementation of the statutory + requirement that countries with which we cooperate have safeguards on + all their nuclear activities (full-scope safeguards). And, we face an + NPT Review Conference in August, + where restraints on international nuclear cooperation will be a major + issue.

+

Following INFCE’s concluding Plenary + February 25–27, we should demonstrate that its analysis is being taken + into account in U.S. policy and that we are willing to become a more + reliable supplier. This is essential if we are to limit the spread of + sensitive facilities and stop the current move towards multilateral + negotiations of criteria for nuclear trade which could result in U.S. + isolation, North-South confrontation and setbacks for our + nonproliferation policy.In the left-hand + margin next to this paragraph an unknown hand bracketed the first + sentence, drew a line toward the word “stop” and wrote + “?”

+

Beyond 1980, we should consider amendment of the NNPA to (i) eliminate its retroactive + provisions, and (ii) if not already accomplished by reorganization plan, + relieve the NRC of its role in export + control (except possibly with respect to safety). These issues need not, + however, now be resolved, and nothing proposed in this memorandum limits + your freedom of action here.

+

III

+

Any strategy to reduce proliferation risks associated with the fuel cycle + must begin with the other major suppliers. Without their support, U.S. + nonproliferation policy can have only limited effect.An unknown hand bracketed this paragraph in the + left-hand margin.

+ +

These countries are allies, have accepted NPT or equivalent obligations, and have large electric + grids and advanced nuclear programs. Their investigation or pursuit of + breeders and other advanced fuel cycle option is understandable.

+

The proposed strategy involves private negotiations with these countries + aimed at achieving a bargain that helps meet their wish for more + predictable use of U.S. origin spent fuel, our wish to avoid precedents + which could lead to premature spread of plutonium, and our mutual + interest in an improved nonproliferation regime.An unknown hand bracketed the first three lines of + this paragraph in the left-hand margin. In addition, the + strategy seeks to reduce apparent discrimination by providing (i) for + new benefits to those accepting NPT or + equivalent obligations and (ii) for the possibility of additional + countries joining the preferred group when their programs and + nonproliferation assurances warrant.Vance underlined the + words “new benefits to” and wrote in the left-hand margin next to + this paragraph “we move from sticks to carrots and back and forth, + depending on what has not worked recently.”

+

The highlights of the strategy are:See Tab A + for details. [Footnote is in the original.]

+

1. To seek supplier and other support for (a) making NPT or equivalent full-scope safeguards + (FSS) a condition of new supply + commitments; (b) relating reprocessing and plutonium use to well + defined, reasonably safe and limited, programs (breeders and advanced + reactors) and deferring commitments to commercial thermal recycle; (c) + an effective international plutonium storage (IPS) regime; and (d) + enhanced cooperation in dealing with countries posing significant + proliferation risks.In the left-hand + margin next to this paragraph an unknown hand wrote “Do tab on + breeder thermal—Adv Reac.”

+

2. To provide U.S. agreement for a period of years for the advanced + countries (in EURATOM and Japan) to + reprocess U.S. origin spent fuel and use the resulting plutonium in well + defined breeder and advanced reactor programs.

+

3. To provide new benefits, including longer term and possibly up to + “life-of-reactor” fuel assurance (LEU), + to countries which accept NPT or + equivalent FSS and do not otherwise + demonstrably pose a significant proliferation risk.Vance + bracketed the phrase “to countries which accept NPT or equivalent FSS and do not otherwise demonstrably + pose a significant risk” and wrote in the left-hand margin “Who are + these countries—I doubt they are the ones we should pay much + attention to.” An unknown hand wrote “Korea, Yugoslavia, Rumania + (politically important in NPT + context).”

+ +

IV

+

Much of this proposed 1980 strategy is consistent with present policy; + none of it requires changes in law. The principal differences involve + (i) longer term and possibly up to “life-of-reactor” fuel assurance, + (ii) agreement for a period of years for the advanced countries to + reprocess U.S. origin spent fuel and use the resulting plutonium for + breeder and advanced reactor RD&D, and (iii) support for an + effective IPS. (These differences and their rationale are discussed in + Tabs C, G and H.)Vance bracketed the phrase + “countries to reprocess U.S. origin spent fuel and use the resulting + plutonium for breeder and advanced reactor RD&D, and (iii) + support for an effective IPS” and wrote in the left-hand margin + “with limits on transfer?” An unknown hand wrote “Yes. + Negotiated.”

+

V

+

I propose we:

+

1. Conduct negotiations along these lines in 1980.

+

2. Seek the support of other suppliers for increased fuel supply + assurance and appropriate technical assistance and cooperation for + NPT or equivalent countries, + particularly developing countries.Carter did not indicate + a preference with respect to the recommendation.

+

Attachments:

+

Tab A - Summary of Strategy

+

Tab B - Country Distinction Analysis

+

Tab C - Major Differences Between Proposed Strategy and Current + Policy

+

Tab D - Foreign Reactions to U.S. Policy and Law

+

Tab E - Summary of INFCE Results

+

Tab F - Views on Major Problems and Opportunities for the Post-INFCE Period

+

Tab G - Issues Paper on Approval of Reprocessing and Plutonium Use

+

Tab H - Issues Paper on International Plutonium StorageTabs A–H are attached but not printed.

+
+ +
+ + 380. Paper Prepared in the Department of StateSource: Carter Library, National + Security Affairs, Staff Material, Global Issues, Oplinger/Bloomfield File, Box 53, + Proliferation: Smith (Gerard) + Initiative: 11/79–4/80. Confidential. Sent under cover of a March 5 + memorandum from Smith to + Owen. + Washington, undated +

Summary of INFCE

+

The President emphasized at INFCE’s + 1977 opening session the need for greater mutual understanding of + nuclear fuel cycle problems and opportunities with a view to finding + “common ground” regarding the role of nuclear energy and prevention of + proliferation. It was agreed by the participating countries to proceed + with INFCE as a technical study which + would not jeopardize their respective fuel cycle policies and not be + binding on them.

+

INFCE is now completed with the + following results:

+

1. Although it began with tension and suspicion of US motives, the INFCE dialogue has eased tensions, eliminated + misunderstandings regarding US policy, + and provided a basis for common approaches. INFCE reflects both varying views and “common ground”. The + President has indicated we would take INFCE results into account; this is consistent with the law + which states that its provisions shall not prejudice objective + consideration of these results.

+

2. There is now broad international acceptance of the proposition that, + while proliferation is basically a political problem, fuel cycle weapons + usable material (plutonium and high enriched uranium), and technology + from which it can be obtained, pose proliferation risks.

+

3. Different national situations (e.g., lack of energy resources or + indigenous uranium) can lead to different fuel cycle choices. Although + views differ on timing, and INFCE is + overly optimistic, regarding commercialization, exploration of breeder + and advanced reactor options (using plutonium) is attractive to + countries with large electric grids and advanced nuclear programs. But + recycle of plutonium in current generation reactors (thermal recycle) is + economically marginal, although some wish to preserve the option for + energy security. These factors could justify distinctions between + breeder programs in advanced countries and widespread use of plutonium + wherever there are reactors.

+

4. INFCE did not endorse any fuel + cycle as being more proliferation resistant than another; nor did it + identify any technical fix for proliferation risks. It did single out + the importance of improved IAEA + safeguards; international plutonium storage; limits on, or multinational + approaches to, sensitive facilities (enrichment and reprocessing); and + reduced enrichment levels + for research fuel. INFCE also + concluded that reprocessing was not a necessary precondition for waste + disposal.

+

5. Based as they are on 1977 data, INFCE’s nuclear power projections are greatly exaggerated + (the US component (50% of the total) is + now 30% lower for 1995); the low estimate looks more like a realistic + high. Under this low case, there will be more than enough uranium to + supply reactors well into the next century without breeders, and present + and planned enrichment capacity is sufficient to the end of the century. + This availability of uranium and enrichment services reduces the urgency + of breeders and thermal recycle.

+

6. While recognizing that nuclear supply assurance and nonproliferation + assurance are complementary, INFCE + expresses concern over unpredictability in nuclear export policies and + in the exercise of rights regarding reprocessing and plutonium use + (i.e., US and Canadian policies). INFCE notes that international nuclear + markets have worked reasonably well in the past, but asserts that + continuing uncertainty in supply policies could cause future damage to + power programs. It urges common approaches satisfactory to both + suppliers and consumers.

+

7. INFCE is moderate on developing + country needs and asserts that nuclear power is not a panacea.

+
+ +
+ 381. Minutes of a Special Policy Review Committee MeetingSource: Carter Library, National + Security Council, Institutional Files, Box 79, PRC 137, Non-Proliferation, Tarapur: + 4/9/80. Secret. The meeting took place in the White House Situation + Room. The minutes devoted to Tarapur are scheduled to be printed in + Foreign + Relations, 1977–1980, vol. XIX, South + Asia. + Washington, April 9, 1980, + 4:00–5:30 p.m. + + SUBJECT + Non-Proliferation Matters and Tarapur Fuel Licenses + + + PARTICIPANTS + + White House + Mr. David + Aaron + Ambassador Henry + Owen + + + State + Secretary Cyrus + Vance + Deputy Secretary Warren + Christopher + + Ambassador Gerard + Smith (Ambassador-at-Large and Special + Representative of the President for + Non-Proliferation) + Mr. Frank Hodsoll (Deputy Special US Representative for Non-Proliferation + Matters) + Ms. Jane Coon (Deputy Assistant Secretary) (Tarapur + only) + + + OSD + Deputy Secretary W. Graham Claytor, Jr. + Mr. Walter + Slocombe (Deputy Under Secretary for Policy + Planning) + + + Energy + Mr. Worth Bateman (Acting Under Secretary) + Deputy Secretary John Sawhill + Dr. George Cunningham (Assistant Secretary for Nuclear + Energy) + + + JCS + General David Jones + + + DCI + Admiral Stansfield + Turner + [name not declassified] (Special + Assistant for Nuclear Proliferation Intelligence) + + + ACDA + Mr. Spurgeon Keeny + (Deputy Director) + Mr. Charles Van Doren (Assistant Director, + Non-Proliferation Bureau) + + + OSTP + Dr. Frank + Press + Mr. Benjamin Huberman + + + OMB + Dr. John White + Mr. Dan Taft (Deputy Associate Director Special Studies + Division) + + + CEQ + Mr. Gus Speth + + + Domestic Policy + Mr. Stuart Eizenstat + Ms. Kitty Schirmer + + + NSC + Dr. Lincoln Bloomfield + Mr. Jerry + Oplinger + Mr. Thomas Thornton + + +

Vance + opened the meeting by stating that the objectives of the President’s + 1977 non-proliferation policies remain valid. But do our assumptions + about how to achieve those objectives? Our policies have not been as + effective as we hoped, and have caused resentment with our Allies. We + have to respond to their energy needs, and this could lead to a better + non-proliferation regime. Smith’s + proposalsSee Document 379. have been approved by DoE and ACDA, and we should try to agree to send + the paper forward to the President as soon as possible. (S)

+ +

Smith said + that in preparing his paper, he did not want to demean the President’s + 1977 policies. Those policies have greatly increased international + awareness that the fuel cycle is a “dangerous beast.” Our successes + include persuading the FRG and France + not to export sensitive technologies, turning off dangerous developments + in Korea and Taiwan, and cancellation of the reprocessing contract in + Pakistan. INFCE came out better than + expected. On MB–10 issues, while there has been a fair amount of static, + we did not turn any down. Our failures include the FRG/Brazil deal, Argentina and our efforts + to use organized sanctions in Pakistan. We have not made a dent on + India, and have not made much progress with South Africa, although we + probably did manage to abort a test. (S)

+

We now face the problem of the post-INFCE period and the NPT + Review Conference. The law requires us to get consent rights over + reprocessing in the US–EURATOM agreement. Europeans have + hinted that they might be willing to give us the juridical right if + there were an implied understanding on how we would exercise it. The + Japanese plan to build a large reprocessing plant; they want + predictability in meeting their plutonium requirements. (S)

+

Smith said + that we have essentially three options: to continue on our present + course, which would not get us to our 1977 objectives; to follow the + course advocated by the UK (a universal + code of nuclear trade)Not found. + which is dangerous, or to become more flexible and try to build a better + regime. The proposals put forward would not require a change in the law, + but he personally hoped that we would change it later. (S)

+

Smith + defined the regime he seeks as including:

+

—full-scope safeguards as a common supplier requirement for new export + commitments;

+

—deferral of thermal recycle;

+

—IPS;

+

—reaffirmation and perhaps extension of FRG and French policies not to export enrichment and + reprocessing technology;

+

—enhanced cooperation in dealing with mavericks; and

+

—multinational auspices for sensitive facilities. (S)

+

Smith said + that what he seeks now is approval of planning + assumptions; i.e. authority to take soundings in some depth on + the Hill and abroad, particularly on the central question of relaxing + our MB–10 policy to permit generic approval of reprocessing and + plutonium use in advanced countries. (S)

+

There was some discussion of which countries might qualify for this + treatment. Would Korea, for example, qualify? Smith said that the scheme was intended to have an + evolutionary character, if Korea and Taiwan want in, it would be hard to + say no. (S)

+

Smith said + that he also wanted to offer long-term fuel licenses; for NPT parties he would issue licenses for + the life of the reactor. (S)

+

Smith said + that if we fail to do something along these lines, our policy would + begin to fall apart. Other countries are turning to the Soviets; Europe + is currently doing more enrichment for Europe than the US. They are also building their own + enrichment plants. He did not think that the changes would have any + affect on domestic nuclear programs such as Barnwell and Clinch River. + He had talked to Congressman Bingham and other staffers; we would run + into some static, but there are other Congressmen who will believe the + changes don’t go far enough. (S)

+

Owen asked + exactly what the President is being asked to decide; would it be + authority to open negotiations. Smith said it would be authority to go ahead with + Congress and Japan and Europe, with the President’s approval to be + sought before we get locked in. It is hard to define when he would come + back to the President; perhaps before we give them specific proposals. + But the President would be free to change the timing or substance as we + go along. (S)

+

Smith said + that no concessions would be agreed until everything in the package was + agreed; the “deal” is a whole package. (S)

+

As for the risks of public perception of a major change, Smith said + that is why he regards his proposals as planning assumptions. At the end + of the negotiation, he felt that the public would accept the result. + (S)

+

Asked about the acceptability of relaxing our MB–10 policy only for some + countries, and not for advanced LDC’s + like Brazil, Argentina and Taiwan, Smith said Argentina won’t be + producing plutonium in quantities until the next decade. He could not + predict the future, but full-scope would help to prevent new deals + without adequate safeguards. (S)

+

Aaron said + that what the US would give up is clear; + it is not clear what we would require in return. There would be + increased flow on plutonium, but the regime the flow goes into is not + very clear. The goal of better cooperation for problem countries may + become a constantly moving target; others will pocket our concessions + but it is not clear we will get the desired return. (S)

+

Smith said + that if we only succeed in getting an effective IPS, we would be better + off than now. (S)

+

Eisenstat said he had real concerns on the signal + this change would send with regard to our position on Clinch River and + domestic reprocessing; he wanted to consider this further and take + Congressional soundings. We + have a great deal of water to carry on the Hill already with energy + matters and the NRC reorganization + plan. He did not want to set off a wave of indignation among those who + have supported the President. He reserved his position. (S)

+

Keeny + agreed that Smith’s proposals + would be helpful to non-proliferation. We should be clear about the + package of quids. Generic approval of MB–10’s should not constrain us in + arguing against premature plutonium commitments, and IPS should not be + taken as a green light for reprocessing. We should retain our bilateral + approval rights in establishing an IPS. (S)

+

Speth said that the effect of the proposals would + be to put the US stamp of approval on + reprocessing and plutonium use. In the long run, the policy would be + based on an explicitly discriminatory regime. He felt that the paper + presented one point of view; the President needs to hear the contrary + case. He felt this might be presented by the NSC. He was not optimistic that the line that we were not + radically changing the policy would wash, and felt that Bingham, + Zablocki and others would be very skeptical. (S)

+

Aaron said + he had reservations about Congressional explorations. That could trigger + newspaper stories about a major change in policy. He felt we need a + systematic study of all options. Smith’s proposals may be better than other ideas, but + the questions of quids, other options, and the effect on + near-proliferators needed to be closely analyzed. He also felt it was + important to look at the question of timing. (S)

+

Claytor said he thought Smith was absolutely right and it was + time to move. (S)

+

Jones also supported Smith. (S)

+

Vance said + a working group would be established to produce a full options paper in + two weeks. (S)

+

[Omitted here is material related to Tarapur fuel licenses]

+
+ +
+ + 382. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security + Affairs (Brzezinski) to Secretary + of State VanceSource: Carter Library, National + Security Council, Institutional Files, Box 79, PRC 137, Non-Proliferation, Tarapur: + 4/9/80. Secret. Also sent to Brown, Duncan, McIntyre, Eizenstat, Christopher, Earle, Speth, Jones, Turner, and Press. + Washington, April + 18, 1980 + + SUBJECT + April 9 PRC on Non-Proliferation + Issues (C) + +

The President has approved the PRC + decision at the April 9 meeting that an interagency working group should + prepare a paper providing a systematic analysis of a full range of + options for our post-INFCE + non-proliferation strategy. (S)

+

The analysis should include consideration of the following specifics:

+

1. MB–10 PolicySee footnote 5, Document 341.

+

—the criteria which would be used to distinguish FBR and ATR research, + development and demonstration programs from “commercialization” in + approving requests for plutonium return and/or use;

+

—a quantitative analysis, through the year 2000, of projected + accumulations of separated plutonium, and of the requirements of breeder + and ATR programs in EURATOM and Japan, under each of the + MB–10 options considered;

+

—how each MB–10 option would be applied to countries, other than Japan + and EURATOM, and the political and + non-proliferation implications of distinguishing between categories of + countries. (S)

+

2. Quid Pro Quos

+

The analysis should consider a full range of non-proliferation + commitments which might be sought from EURATOM and Japan in return for modifications of US MB–10 policy, including continued US prior consent rights over the + disposition of US supplied or derived + materials used in EURATOM and + Japanese breeder and ATR programs. + (S)

+

3. International Plutonium Storage

+

The paper should specify in some detail the characteristics of an IPS + regime which we would regard as effective, including the definition of + “excess” plutonium, release conditions, and verification mechanisms. In + particular, it should discuss whether a negotiable IPS would restrict + plutonium release to certain countries (e.g. those meeting agreed + economic criteria) or end-uses, whether the US and other suppliers would apply such restrictions to + plutonium entering the IPS, and

+

how such restrictions, however + applied, would affect the prospects for acceptance of IPS by countries + of proliferation concern. (S)

+ + Zbigniew + Brzezinski + +
+ +
+ 383. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security + Affairs (Brzezinski) to President + CarterSource: Carter Library, National + Security Affairs, Staff Material, Global Issues, Oplinger/Bloomfield File, Box 52, + Proliferation: Smith, Gerard, + 3–6/80. Secret. + Washington, June + 17, 1980 + + SUBJECT + Post-INFCE Explorations by + Gerry Smith + +

At Tab A is Warren Christopher’s + paper on the timing of Gerry + Smith’s post-INFCE + explorations with the Europeans and Japanese on his proposals for + modifications in US non-proliferation + policy. The paper is simply a listing of reasons for and against + authorizing Smith to proceed; + Christopher does not offer a + recommendation.

+

In my view, your decision should be based on the following consideration. + The decision on TarapurOn April 28, + Carter approved the + issuance of two pending licenses so that India could import enriched + uranium from the United States for its nuclear power plant at + Tarapur. For more on this decision, see Foreign Relations, 1977–1980, vol. + XIX, South Asia. will encounter determined + resistance on the Hill. Many there who applauded the policy you + announced in 1977, see the Tarapur decision as a significant move away + from that policy. Moreover, we face a growing coalition of opposition + made up of those who oppose Tarapur on substance, and Reagan supporters + who simply want to embarrass you.

+

No matter how tightly Smith’s + instructions are worded, his explorations will be seen as another + deviation from your policy, generating further opposition on the Hill + and among liberal supporters. The question is whether or not you want to + address both of these issues simultaneously. I think not, and there is + no need to do so since you can control the timing of the Smith initiative, waiting until after + it has been fully reviewed in the normal NSC process.

+

RECOMMENDATION

+

That you not authorize Smith to conduct post-INFCE explorations at this time.Carter + checked the “Disapprove” option and wrote “J” underneath.

+ +

Tab A

+

Memorandum From Acting Secretary of State Christopher to President Carter

+ Secret. +

Washington, undated

+ + SUBJECT + Post-INFCE Explorations + +

At the Friday foreign policy breakfast,June + 13. I promised to send you an analysis of advantages and + risks to Gerry Smith’s proceeding + with post-INFCE explorations now, as + opposed to after Tarapur is resolved by the Congress.

+

Reasons for Not Going Ahead Now

+

—Movement on this approach now could create public perceptions that “the + Carter Administration is + proposing to weaken its non-proliferation policy” or “the Carter Administration is changing + signals on breeder reactor programs.”

+

—The Tarapur decision complicates our moving forward now with post-INFCE in two ways. First, both decisions + will be characterized by some as U.S. non-proliferation retreats—Tarapur + as a fall off of our commitment to full-scope safeguards, and + post-INFCE as a retreat from our + opposition to premature reprocessing and plutonium use. Second, it could + be argued that our Tarapur decision is inconsistent with our post-INFCE explorations. That is, the Tarapur + decision is based on the rationale of preserving controls over + U.S.-origin material to prevent its reprocessing in India, whereas our + post-INFCE explorations are + designed to relax such controls where we have them in Europe and Japan + outside of EURATOM.

+

—The approach could be characterized as helping European and Japanese + nuclear programs (in particular breeder, advanced reactor and + reprocessing programs) that might otherwise fail. And, our approach may + not in fact achieve greater allied cooperation in improving the + non-proliferation regime.

+

—The precedent of this approach could undercut our effort to prevent the + spread of sensitive technology and material to countries outside Europe + and Japan, or result in charges of discrimination by countries which we + assert do not meet the necessary criteria.

+ +

Reasons for Going Ahead Now

+

—Other countries expect us to take INFCE results into account, and key Allies have already + approached us on harmonizing policies. If we do not move soon, the + Australians (who are actively negotiating with EURATOM and Japan) could make + agreements which would undercut our ability to limit reprocessing and + plutonium use. We also need greater fuel supply assurances to meet + anticipated criticism at the NPT Review + Conference.

+

—Our supply leverage is diminishing and our reliability is in question. + Failure to commence explorations now would risk our Allies’ going their + own way in their nuclear programs and making the issue an even greater + irritant in our relations. We could also lose their cooperation in + improving the non-proliferation regime, in particular deterring + commercial thermal recycle.

+

—Going ahead with Tarapur and the post-INFCE explorations is entirely consistent. Both actions are + designed to support the non-proliferation regime—in the case of Tarapur, + to preserve safeguards and controls over U.S.-origin material in India; + in the case of post-INFCE, to obtain + limits and controls on U.S.-origin material in EURATOM (which we currently do not + have) and greater non-proliferation cooperation generally including + full-scope safeguards as a condition of future + supply. Both decisions also serve broader foreign policy objectives.

+

—Post-INFCE explorations will be less + sensitive politically than Tarapur, especially since they will be + low-key, non-committal and confidential and would be only with Allies + who are either NPT parties with + full-scope safeguards or, in the case of France, a nuclear weapons + state. USG consideration of post-INFCE options has already had some press + play (particularly in the trade press). We have had extensive + consultations with those most concerned in Congress, and no one has + objected to further explorations.

+

Options

+

______ Let Gerry Smith go ahead + with explorations now.Carter checked the “Let Gerry Smith go ahead with + explorations now” and wrote “J” underneath.

+

______ Postpone Gerry Smith’s + explorations until after Congress acts on Tarapur.

+

(A copy of proposed instructions for Gerry + Smith is attached for your convenience.)

+ +

Attachment

+

Draft TelegramSecret; + Nodis. In the upper + right-hand corner, Carter + wrote “Let’s let Gerry do this exploration of + the idea on his own and report back to me. I may not wish to go + forward with it. I’ll discuss some in Venice [the Summit of + Industrialized Nations, the G–7, to be held on June 22 and + 23]—J.C.”

+

Washington, undated

+

USIAEA for Ambassador Smith from + Secretary. Subject: Post-INFCE + Explorations.

+

1. SECRET (ENTIRE TEXT)

+

2. The President authorizes you on an absolutely non-committal basis (and + in a low key and confidential manner) to explore with the major European + governments and Japan arrangements by which they would agree to + cooperate in strengthening the non-proliferation regime and limit the + reprocessing of spent fuel and use of plutonium. Your purpose is to + clarify what we might expect from our allies in return for greater + predictability in the exercise of consent rights over the use of US-origin spent fuel. Based on these + explorations, we would be better able to develop positions for the + statutorily mandated renegotiation of our agreements with EURATOM, Japan, and certain other + countries.

+

3. In your explorations, you should be guided by the following + elements:

+

A. What we would seek:

+

—Deferral by the involved countries of commitments to commercial thermal + recycle for a specified period.

+

—Limiting new reprocessing capacity to that required for breeder and + advanced reactors and restraint in the separation of plutonium to avoid + unnecessary stockpiling and pressures for thermal recycle.

+

—Support for development of an effective IPS and avoidance of excess + national stockpiles of plutonium.

+

—Agreement by EURATOM and Japan to + US consent rights called for in the + NNPA.

+

—Continuing limits over US-origin + material after use in breeder and advanced reactor RD&D + programs.

+

—Increased commitments to spent fuel storage as our alternative to + reprocessing.

+ +

—Improved cooperation in dealing with countries of proliferation concern, + including concrete steps to strengthen restraints on exports of + sensitive technology and material to such countries.

+

—Commitments to condition significant new nuclear supply commitments on + NPT-type safeguards on future, as + well as existing, facilities.

+

—Cooperation to make reprocessing associated with breeder reactors more + proliferation resistant.

+

—Cooperation on improving the “once-through” cycle.

+

—Dedication of future enrichment capacity to produce low-enriched uranium + only.

+

—Greater commitments of financial and technical resources and political + support for development and implementation of improved IAEA safeguards.

+

B. What we would consider + offering:

+

—The United States would adopt predictable ground rules for the exercise + of US consent rights and control over + reprocessing and use of plutonium in certain RD&D programs for + breeder and advanced thermal reactors. Specifically, you may explore + advance agreement to reprocessing of US-origin material in mutually agreed facilities for use of the + resulting separated plutonium in certain agreed breeder and advanced + reactor RD&D programs in advanced NPT or equivalent countries that meet certain criteria.

+

—You may indicate willingness to consider generic agreement to + reprocessing in the United Kingdom and France for other countries that + have good non-proliferation credentials, or no spent fuel storage + alternatives, or where it is in our non-proliferation interest to remove + spent fuel.

+

—You should also indicate the US is + reviewing in the context of preparations for the NPT Review Conference, licensing of export + of low-enriched fuel for a longer term than now, as well as backup + assurances and increased technical assistance, to NPT parties with good non-proliferation + credentials.

+

4. You should make clear that in return for flexibility on reprocessing + and plutonium use we would expect agreement to improvements in the + present non-proliferation regime, particularly a more helpful active + role in dealing with problem countries. You should stress that no final + policy decisions have as yet been made.

+
+ +
+ + 384. Memorandum of ConversationSource: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, + Staff Material, Global Issues, Oplinger/Bloomfield File, Box 52, Proliferation: + Smith, Gerard, 7/80. + Confidential; Nodis. + Washington, July + 23, 1980 + + SUBJECT + Post-INFCE Explorations + + + PARTICIPANTS + U.S. + Ambassador Gerard + Smith + Frank Hodsoll + FRG + Ambassador Peter + Hermes + Mr. Stephan Von Welck + +

SUMMARY

+

Ambassador Smith opened the + Post-INFCE discussion making + clear he was continuing his personal and confidential explorations and + that no US policy decisions had been + made. Smith said that he had been + authorized to explore (without commitment) ideas such as programmatic + approvals of reprocessing and plutonium use, as a basis for the + US/EURATOM renegotiation. Smith + reviewed needed improvements in the non-proliferation regime (with + particular emphasis on full-scope safeguards (FSS), better cooperation regarding problem countries, + improved safeguards and avoiding premature or excessive plutonium + separation). He stressed that progress on these elements would be needed + if we were to move toward greater predictability in supply and + retransfer relationships.

+

Ambassador Hermes stated he had + conveyed our views on rescheduling the visit to Bonn to Lautenschlager + and Haunschild. While he had not received final word he believed a + Smith visit in September + rather than August would probably be alright. We suggested September 12 + as a possible date.

+

Hermes listened to our points + which he said he would convey to Bonn. His questions focused on:

+

—How could we resolve the inconsistency of seeking NNPA conditions which were more onerous + than those already set out in our international agreements?

+

—Who would have to agree to FSS and on + what basis?

+

—How would the US distinguish the Indian + case?

+ +

—What would be the “designated areas” where advance consents to + reprocessing of US-origin material and + use of the resulting plutonium would be permitted?

+

—What problems did we see with our approach?

+

END SUMMARY

+

1. The meeting opened with a brief discussion of the current situation in + Pakistan. Smith said he did not + understand how Germany could doubt the proliferation risk in that + country; Hermes responded that + some of the information they had had not been accurate; they were aware + only of relatively small scale basement operations. Smith responded that the Paks were + proceeding with both reprocessing and enrichment; he suggested a lot had + happened since our last technical briefing of the Germans and that + perhaps a further technical discussion should take place. Hermes said he would take this up with + Bonn.

+

2. Hermes then said he had + conveyed to Bonn Smith’s preferences on timing of his post-INFCE Bonn trip. Our suggestion of + September was probably OK; but, since Lautenschlager and Haunschild were + on leave, Hermes would have to + confirm later. Smith said that, + if for any reason the FRG wanted him in + Bonn in August, he would be prepared to go.

+

3. Smith then made the following + points on his post-INFCE + explorations:

+

—The President had authorized him to explore certain ideas.

+

—If key countries were willing to join together to modernize the + non-proliferation regime, the U.S. might be able to make its rules on + reprocessing of US-origin spent fuel, + and plutonium use more flexible. We should be able to move to a + programmatic, instead of case-by-case, approach. Would EURATOM give prior consent rights if + we gave advance approvals for reprocessing and plutonium use in breeder + and advanced reactor RD&D programs?

+

—If the President decides to move in this direction on reprocessing and + plutonium use, it would only be in the context of broader movement + toward non-proliferation improvements including:

+

—FSS.

+

—Better cooperation with problem countries (e.g., Pakistan).

+

—Substantially larger commitments to improving safeguards.

+

—New reprocessing capacity would be established only where needed for + breeders.

+

—New enrichment capacity would be designed only for production of LEU.

+

—An effective IPS would be established.

+

4. Hodsoll then noted that we were in addition seeking expanded + commitments to restrain the export of sensitive technologies, more + proliferation resistant reprocessing, cooperation on “once through” fuel + cycle and deferral of commercial thermal recycle.

+ +

5. Hermes asked what was the + situation with regard to prior consent before the NNPA. Smith said we do not have consent rights now, and that + in order to get such rights we might provide an “automatic OK” for + specified programs. Hermes asked + whether the FRG would “designate areas + and the US would say yes or no”. + Smith said the FRG would initially designate the areas + for programmatic consent.

+

6. Hermes noted that the US and FRG + were now in a transitional period through March 1981.Telegram 25455 to Paris, January 29, discussed + Smith’s January 14 and 16 + bilateral discussions with the French on non-proliferation. + Smith told the French + Delegation “that a recommendation for a one-year extension of the + EURATOM deadline” set to + expire in March 1981 “to agree to US + prior consent on reprocessing and plutonium use had been forwarded + to the White House.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + D800052–0771) + Smith said that, if US–EURATOM negotiations were underway, the US could extend the deadline. Smith noted that we would have to cease + exports to EURATOM unless the + deadline were extended.

+

7. Hermes then asked if the new + procedure being suggested by Smith would be tougher than the procedure that currently + existed in EURATOM: i.e., US-origin material could be used for + peaceful, safeguarded uses. Smith + said the new procedure was required to comply with the NNPA. Hermes noted that the NNPA contravened the existing agreement with EURATOM countries. He asked what the + impact of our law was on international agreements which he thought were + “the supreme law of the land”. Smith noted that he believed that under U.S. law + legislation subsequent in time to a treaty superseded the treaty for + US domestic purposes.

+

8. Hermes said the FRG wanted development of an effective + IPS. He said the suggestions outlined by Smith constituted in effect “a grand design”. Smith said we had to aim high to + achieve improvements.

+

9. Smith then reported on our + bilaterals with the UKTelegram 14956 from London, July 15, reported that + during the July 14 U.S.–UK bilateral + meeting on post-INFCE + explorations, the UK government said + “principle of US-origin material and + use of the derived plutonium not necessarily a problem, but + predictability in exercise of such consent rights would be needed to + prevent it becoming so.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P80029–1100) + and France.No record of the U.S.-France + bilateral talks has been found. Telegram 134778 to Bonn, May 22, + reported that during the May 13 U.S.–FRG bilateral meeting on post-INFCE explorations, the FRG Delegation said “the FRG and France are united in their + opposition to U.S. prior consent rights.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + D800252–0605) The French told us it would be difficult to + predict future needs, but did not rule out in principle prior consent + plus advance agreement on how it would be exercised. The UK similarly did not rule this out in + principle, but were uncertain regarding their breeder program. Smith noted he would be meeting with the Japanese next week and + with the British and French again in September.

+

10. Smith stressed there would not + be quick action in the US given our + pending elections. He said he was trying to lay the groundwork for + EURATOM negotiations + thereafter.

+

11. Smith then noted a number of + other matters in which he thought the Germans would be interested:

+

—We were considering longer-term licensing of LEU. Hermes thought + this would be an important improvement.

+

—Our voluntary offer had been ratified by Senate.The U.S. voluntarily offered to accept IAEA safeguards for the transfer or + export of nuclear materials. + Hermes said the FRG was pleased.

+

—The US was working on improved + procedures for licensing exports of HEU.

+

—Carnesale would be a good NRC + chairman.

+

12. Hermes then posed four sets of + questions:

+

a. FSS. Would we + get all suppliers to agree on an FSS + approach that included enriched uranium and natural uranium, as well as + equipment and technology? Specifically, would the USSR agree? Smith said the Soviets had indicated that if all other + suppliers agreed they could agree to an FSS approach. There was no problem in Europe as all + non-nuclear weapon states in Western Europe were NPT parties, and the UK and France had indicated willingness to + place their civil facilities under safeguards. Hermes queried whether Italy, + Switzerland and South Africa would agree to FSS. He noted that we needed today more countries to make + FSS effective than when the + Supplier Guidelines were agreed. He asked whether agreement would have + to be multilateral and whether we planned to reconvene the NSG. Smith responded that we did not envisage reconvening the + NSG, but assumed a series of + bilateral agreements reflecting the FSS + approach.

+

Hermes thought asking consumers to + accept FSS as a condition of trade was + a big undertaking. He wondered what the legal basis for it might be. + Smith noted that the majority + of countries had accepted FSS through + NPT. Hermes said the problem was “the threshold countries”. + These were not NPT parties. He asked: + would our approach cause difficulty in the Argentine and Brazilian + cases? Hodsoll stressed we were only talking about new commitments.

+

Hermes said the FRG “quite agreed on the principle of + FSS for all countries.” The + difficulty was not the principle, but the imposition of FSS on other countries. He reiterated the + German view that it was better to “control, than deny, the + have-nots”.

+

b. Distinguishing Tarapur. How does the US distinguish our FSS approach from our recent decision to support shipments + of fuel to Tarapur? Smith + responded that the NNPA permitted such + shipments where license applications and shipments would have been made + in time prior to March 1980 but for USG + blockage. He also noted that the Indian shipments were pursuant to prior contracts which provided for + shipments to the 1990s; our FSS + approach would only apply to “new commitments”. In response to Hermes’ question, Smith stated that we expected the + Tarapur review period provided in the NNPA to expire in early October. He gave Hermes our current reading on + Congressional prospects: the House would vote against the President; + while it was close, we hoped the Senate would sustain the President.

+

c. Programmatic Consent. What “designated area” + would be eligible for programmatic approvals? Smith said that we envisaged providing + such approvals for breeder and advanced reactor RD&D (including + reprocessing for breeder needs, but not for commercial thermal recycle). + Smith said the question of + thermal recycle RD&D was not clear in our minds. Smith noted thermal recycle was + particularly troublesome because it could justify plutonium flows + wherever there are reactors. He said this had been a particular concern + in India; if we did not agree to the pending Tarapur licenses, there was + a substantial risk that India would reprocess and recycle US-origin spent fuel and thus establish a + precedent for recycle linked to small scale reprocessing plants.

+

Hermes said the Germans still + planned some thermal recycle programs and implied that the US approach could cause Germany a problem. + Hodsoll noted that our approach to thermal recycle was only for a + limited (10–15 year) period during which we doubted there were likely to + be moves in any country towards commercial thermal recycle. He noted + that our approach would not preclude case-by-case consideration of + specific needs for thermal recycle R&D.

+

d. Problems with US + Approach. What did we envisage the problems would be with our + approach? Smith responded that he + understood that our approach to thermal recycle might pose a problem for + the FRG, Belgium and Japan; and that + the FSS export condition might be + difficult for the FRG, but he assumed + (if the French went along with FSS) the + FRG would not want to be isolated. + Program designations might also offer difficulties.

+
+ +
+ + 385. Intelligence Assessment Prepared in the Central Intelligence + AgencySource: Carter + Library, National Security Council, Institutional Files, Box 116, + SCC 137, 9/4/80, TNF and NPT. Secret; Noforn; NoContract; Orcon. + + + PA 80–10355 + + + Washington, August + 1980 +

The NPT Review Conference: + A Preview (U)

+

Key Judgments

+

The second nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) review conference will open on 11 August in Geneva. + The prospects for formal reaffirmation of the value of the treaty are + clouded by a number of recent international developments:

+

The interruption in progress toward major arms control agreements because + of the sharp increase in East-West tensions.

+

The aggravation of the controversy over assured access to nuclear + material and technology for peaceful purposes, which has resulted from + the efforts of the United States and other major nuclear suppliers to + establish more rigorous export criteria.

+

The success of some nonnuclear weapons states (such as Pakistan and South + Africa) in acquiring or developing militarily sensitive nuclear + technology free of international controls. (U)

+

These and other related developments, such as renewed concern about + India’s nuclear intentions, will be cited by many NPT signatories at Geneva as evidence that + the delicate balance that the treaty seeks to establish between the + rights and obligations of nuclear and nonnuclear weapons states is + deteriorating. Most criticism of the nuclear weapons states will focus + on their failure to live up to their obligations under Article VISee footnote 5, + Document 211. to halt and reverse the nuclear arms + race, and under Article IVSee Document 318. to facilitate, + together with other major nuclear suppliers, the fullest possible + exchange of nuclear materials and technology for peaceful purposes. + (U)

+

All the nuclear weapons states party to the treaty—the United States, the + USSR, and Great Britain—are + vulnerable to criticism on the first count. The Soviets, however, have + sought to maneuver themselves into a position of comparative advantage + with respect to each of the major security issues that are likely to be + raised: SALT II, the Comprehensive + Test Ban Treaty, and the question of negative security assurances (guarantees that the nuclear + powers will not use or threaten to use their nuclear arsenals against + nonnuclear weapons states). (C NF)

+

In part because of the controversial Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of + 1978, the United States is uniquely vulnerable to criticism on issues + relating to the Third World’s demand for ready access to nuclear fuel + and technology under the provisions of Article IV. Of all other + suppliers, only Canada has been nearly as active in attempting to slow + the spread of advanced nuclear technology. The Soviets, as members of + the London Suppliers Group, have been quietly supportive of these + efforts. But because their role as a nuclear supplier outside the Warsaw + Pact area has so far been limited, they are in a far less exposed + position than the United States. (C NF)

+

Moscow will be tempted to exploit these differences to its political + advantage. Because it still has a strong stake in the survival and + effectiveness of the global NPT regime, + however, its actual efforts to this end will probably be relatively + restrained. The fact that the Soviets can count on the United States + bearing the brunt of Third World criticism in any event makes such + restraint all the more likely. (C NF)

+

The importance attached to the review conference and the issues that will + be aired there has been demonstrated by the attention that has been + given to preparing for the meeting by both the developing and + industrialized nations in recent months. It has also been reflected in + the failure of most NPT signatories to + agree on who should preside over the meeting. The choice could be + critical to the outcome of the conference, for it was only through the + strong personal intervention of the president of the first NPT review conference, Inga Thorsson of + Sweden, that that meeting managed to produce a final declaration five + years ago. (U)

+

Not surprisingly, most industrialized nations favor reappointment of + Thorsson, but her candidacy has been challenged in recent weeks by a + number of developing countries who support selection of an Iraqi + diplomat for the post. The issue seems unlikely to be resolved before + the conference opens. (U)

+

Although the portents are even less auspicious than they were in 1975, + the serious approach to the meeting evinced by most likely participants + is reassuring. So too is the fact that none of the countries most likely + to participate has demonstrated a specific intent to disrupt the + meeting. In view of what appears to be a continued broad consensus on + the basic value of the NPT (whatever + specific flaws may be perceived), there is about an even chance that the + conference participants will be able to produce some sort of final + declaration. But there also is a good chance that the developing nations + will insist that the text of the document contain language more + explicitly critical of the performance of the nuclear weapons states—particularly with respect to + Article VI—than was the case in 1975. (C NF)

+

If agreement cannot be reached on a final declaration, most nations + involved will consider the conference a failure. The possibility of + actual or threatened defections—perhaps tied, in the latter case, to + deadlines for the conclusion of major arms control agreements—would + increase, and the prospects of attracting new adherents to the NPT would decline. Even under such + circumstances, the major nuclear suppliers could probably preserve the + basic features of the existing global nonproliferation regime for some + time to come if they acted in concert. Nonetheless, the moral force + behind this regime would have been largely dissipated. (C NF)

+

[Omitted here is the body of the assessment.]

+
+ +
+ 386. Memorandum From the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament + Agency (Earle) to Special + Coordination Committee PrincipalsSource: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, + Harold Brown Papers, Box + 45, NPT: Revcon. + Confidential. + Washington, September 3, 1980 + + SUBJECT + NPT Review Conference + +

As its end-of-the-week adjournment nears, the Non-Proliferation Treaty + (NPT) Review Conference in Geneva + is in serious disarray. There is a real possibility of a divisive + outcome that would be portrayed by many as demonstrating that the NPT has not served the interests of its + non-nuclear weapon state (NNWS) + parties. The non-aligned participants led by a few militants and + supported to some degree by neutrals such as Sweden are pressing very + hard for acceptance of contentious wording on several important issues + for inclusion in a final conference declaration. Because of + repercussions that a highly-publicized “failure” of this major + conference could have, I believe it warrants our urgent attention.

+

The goal of the conference has been a consensus document that would + review all aspects of the NPT’s + implementation. Negotiation of this text, especially the portion + concerning nuclear arms control negotiations (Article VI), has proved extremely + difficult. Some of the principal points on which agreement is still + being sought relate to criticism of South Africa and Israel for + allegedly developing a nuclear capability and blocking agreement on + nuclear free zones in their regions, a call for the parties to SALT II to act in the interim period + prior to its ratification as though the treaty were in force, a call for + a moratorium on nuclear testing, and establishment early next year by + the Committee on Disarmament (CD) of a working group to discuss a + comprehensive test ban (CTB). These and + other issues are still under negotiation, and it is hoped that ways will + be found to deal satisfactorily with most of them in a final + document.

+

In the absence of a consensus the probable alternative would be a + communiqué stating simply that the conference had taken place and noting + several other facts about the meeting and indicating that another review + conference would be held in five years. We would anticipate, however, + that the non-aligned would independently issue and seek maximum + publicity for its version of what the final document should have stated + and be highly critical of those, mainly the U.S., that it would hold + responsible for failure to reach agreement. We and others would, of + course, also make our views known.

+

A third alternative, which we have not, however, explored as a + possibility with the delegation in Geneva and which may be + non-negotiable, could be a short declaration in support of the NPT as a sound treaty, on the functioning + of which, however, there are differing views. The latter might be + attached or issued separately by the concerned delegations. This would + have the advantage of putting all parties on record in support of the + NPT regime, but we cannot now + assess whether such an outcome would be negotiable.

+

While it is still too early to be sure, the leaders of our delegation in + Geneva believe that U.S. acceptance of a CD working group on a CTB may be pivotal in achieving a + consensus on a final document. In light of this possibility, I believe + we should discuss whether it is desirable to give Ambassadors Van Doren + and Flowerree contingent + authority to agree, if it appears this would lead to a consensus, to + language calling for the CD to set up a CTB working group with an appropriate mandate. The timing + and precise tactics with which this authority would be used would have + to be left to the delegation, as it would have to act in an extremely + fast-moving negotiating situation. It would be understood that the + authority would not be employed unless the delegation was satisfied that + it was necessary to achieve a consensus and that a consensus would + result.

+

Attached are a number of arguments for and against U.S. acceptance of a + CD working group on CTB under the above + circumstances.

+ +

Attachment

+

Paper Prepared in the United States Arms Control and + Disarmament AgencyConfidential.

+

Washington, undated

+

Factors to Consider in Determining U.S. + Position on CD Working Group on a Comprehensive Test Ban (CTB)

+

—If a consensus cannot be achieved at the NPT Review Conference because of U.S. unwillingness to + accept a CD working group on CTB, many + nations, especially from the third world but also including some western + countries, would blame the U.S. for “wrecking” the review conference by + its inflexibility, and undermining one of the Administration’s own major + arms control objectives—a strengthened non-proliferation regime. This + criticism would be echoed in future multilateral fora, including the + UN General Assembly this fall.

+

—We would risk a serious blow to the NPT + regime, and lose the positive effects that a final conference document + would have, including encouragement of further adherence to the treaty + and increased technical cooperation, advancement of full-scope + safeguards and increased support for IAEA safeguards, and discouragement of action by + non-nuclear weapon states (NNWS) to + assist other NNWS to acquire nuclear + weapons or explosive devices.

+

—We would face a generally more hostile attitude in multilateral arms + control efforts across the board, on which we need the cooperation and + support of others to achieve our objectives. Resentment could spill over + into other security-related issues.

+

—Actual establishment of a working group would be subject to consensus + agreement in the CD in February, where its precise terms of reference + would have to be negotiated, a process that would take many weeks or + even months and in which we could exercise considerable influence. We + could expect substantial differences of view on the working group’s + mandate. Given the time required for negotiation of the mandate, the + working group would be unlikely to be able to start substantive + discussions before the end of the CD’s first 1981 session (May) or + sometime during its second (June–August) session.

+

—In addition to influencing the working group’s mandate, we would also + have some opportunity in the working group itself to restrict the scope + of its activity. We could seek to have the group at least initially, for example, carry forward + the discussions already held by CD experts on exchange of international + seismic data to monitor a test ban.

+

—A working group would provide an opportunity for the Soviets, if they + were so inclined, to exploit third world pressures on issues such as + verification, where our position is considered by many to be + unnecessarily demanding. Progress in the trilateral talks might actually + be hindered by a working group if the result were increased Soviet + resistance to acceptance of our position on key issues or, + alternatively, might result in a weakened verification regime and would + jeopardize Senate ratification of a CTB + Treaty.

+

—Some of the U.S. positions in the trilateral talks (e.g., on duration of + the treaty), could be exposed in the working group discussions and be + subject to severe criticism. We would come under pressure to modify + them, probably from domestic, as well as foreign critics.

+
+ +
+ 387. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission in Geneva + and the Embassy in the United KingdomSource: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800420–0217. + Confidential; Immediate. Sent for information Immediate to Moscow. + Drafted by Napper (EUR/SOV) and Steiner (PM/DCA); cleared by Palmer + (PM/DCA), Combs, Jr. (EUR/SOV), Bohlen (EUR/RPM), McGaffigan (S/MS), + and Jones (ACDA/MA); and approved by Bartholomew (PM). + Washington, September 3, 1980, 2316Z + +

234386. Subject: Bartholomew/Bessmertnykh Meeting on NPT Issues. Refs: A, Geneva 11751;Telegram 11751 from Geneva, September 3, reported + on the September 2 Trilateral NPT + Review Conference talks. The U.S., UK, and Soviet Delegations “decided the conference + President should be pressured to break the impasse on the language + of the final declaration. The Soviets indicated that they would be + willing to take public positions on key Article VI issues which they + will attempt to present as concessions and indications of + flexibility. These positions would include acceptance of: “a + deadline for conclusion of trilateral negotiations on a CTBT (1982), a CD working group on + CTB (but only if all five + NWS participate), and a nuclear + testing moratorium (again, only if all NWS participate). (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + D800419–0331) B, Geneva 11698.Telegram 11698 from Geneva, September 2, reported that “prospects + can hardly be considered good for consensus outcome” of the NPT Review Conference, “and there is a + real possibility for a divisive conference result that would be + portrayed by many as demonstrating that the NPT has not served the interests of its non-nuclear + weapon state (NNWS) parties and + that non-proliferation efforts are losing ground.” The Mission also + warned that “over the last week or so, the more militant Non-Aligned + Delegations, primarily Yugoslavia, Sri Lanka, and Mexico, have + strengthened their grip on the Group of 77, and have taken assertive + and uncompromising positions on key conference issues, especially in + the area of arms control.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + D800417–0402)

+ +

1. Confidential—Entire text.

+

2. PM Director Bartholomew called in Soviet Embassy + Political Counselor Bessmertnykh + on September 3 to discuss developments at NPT Review Conference. After referring to past record of + US/Soviet cooperation on NPT issues in + general and particularly on key arms control issues which come within + purview of Article VI, Bartholomew conveyed substance of following points:

+

—We have been following very closely the state of play at the NPT Review Conference and want to share + our views with you.

+

—Nuclear disarmament issues in Article VI,See footnote 5, Document 211. + and particularly CTB, are major + questions which go to the very heart of our respective national security + interests.

+

—Considerable progress in trilateral negotiations, has been made in + CTB, and the basis has been created + for building upon this to bring the negotiations to a successful + conclusion.

+

—Unlike other CD issues, such as CW and + RW, CTB matters should in the first instance be resolved by the + three interested NWS, and not + negotiated prematurely by states not possessing nuclear weapons. Such a + situation would encourage states whose interests are not directly + concerned to make extreme demands of the trilateral negotiating + partners.

+

—We therefore continue to believe that it would be inadvisable to have + multilateral negotiations on CTB prior + to completion of the trilaterals. We are concerned that such a + development could set back prospects for the very progress which our + countries and so many others desire in the talks.

+

—On other CTB-related issues we do not + feel that there should be either a deadline for completing trilateral + negotiations or a testing moratorium pending completion of an + agreement—even if such a moratorium is conditioned on participation by + all NWS.

+

—We hope you will look carefully at this situation and gauge the + potential damage to our mutual interests in permitting multilateral + negotiation of a CTB. We believe that, + working together along with our respective allies, we can find ways to + meet multilateral concerns on this and other major issues at the NPTRC, + ways which protect the essential interests of all concerned.

+

3. In reply, Bessmertnykh said + that he was unaware of developments reported Reftels since Soviet + Embassy here is not regularly informed of events in Geneva. Bessmertnykh said that he personally + agreed with Bartholomew’s points + and agreed to transmit substance of démarche to Moscow immediately.

+ +

4. For Geneva: NPT Delegation should + inform SovDel of Bartholomew/Bessmertnykh meeting without characterizing Bessmertnykh’s response; and reiterate + points contained in para 2 above.

+

5. For London: You should inform FCO of meeting and convey substance of + démarche.

+ + Muskie + +
+ +
+ 388. Memorandum for the RecordSource: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of the + Director of Central Intelligence, Job 81B00112R, Subject Files, Box + 15, Folder 19: (PRC) + Non-Proliferation, 1980. Secret. No minutes or summary of + conclusions for this meeting has been found. + Washington, September 4, 1980 + + SUBJECT + September 3 Mini SCC Meeting on + the NPT Review Conference + +

1. The meeting, chaired by David + Aaron, was called at the request of ACDA to review the state of play at the + NPT Review Conference in Geneva + which is scheduled to end Friday.September + 12. The Conference at this time is in serious disarray and + there is a good chance that they will not be able to agree on a final + consensus document. The major area of disagreement is on that portion + dealing with Article VI of the treaty which concerns nuclear arms + control negotiations.See footnote 5, Document 211. The + group of 77 (G–77), the Non-aligned Nations, wants to put into the final + document three items that the US finds + unacceptable:

+

—a call for establishment of a CTB + Working Group in the Committee on Disarmament (CD)

+

—a call for a moratorium on nuclear testing

+

—criticism of South Africa and Israel for allegedly developing a nuclear + capability.

+

2. ACDA proposed at the meeting that we + might want to accept the creation of a CTB Working Group in the CD in exchange for elimination of + the other objectionable items from the final document and thereby be + able to produce a consensus document. It was acknowledged that we did + not know if such an exchange would be acceptable to the G–77. The US has always opposed a multilateral forum such as the CD + for the CTB because of the risks of + manipulation by the Soviets on verification issues. The discussion at + the mini SCC revolved around the degree + of damage that would be done to the NPT + regime by failure to achieve a final consensus document, balanced + against the risks to progress in the CTB negotiations by putting any part of them in a + multi-lateral form. The general feeling at the meeting was leaning + toward the ACDA suggestion except for + JCS who flatly opposed creation of + a CTB Working Group in the CD. No + decision was made at the meeting and it was decided to add the issue as + an agenda item to the SCC meeting on + theater nuclear forces on Thursday.September 11.

+

3. My assessment is that while there would certainly be some short term + negative impact on our non-proliferation efforts from failure to achieve + a final consensus document at the Review, the long term prospects for + the NPT regime will depend primarily on + the future performance and behavior of the nuclear weapons states + (NWS) in the arms control and + nuclear supply arenas. At this stage the NNWS still believe that a viable NPT is in their interests, primarily as a tool in keeping + pressure on the NWS for arms control + progress and nuclear supply assurances.

+

4. Attached is a short paper prepared by ACDA on the issues that were discussed at the meeting.Not attached.

+ + [name not declassified] + +
+ +
+ 389. Telegram From the Mission in Geneva to the Department of + StateSource: Carter + Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 6, + Comprehensive Test Ban (CTB): + 1/79–9/80. Secret; Flash; Nodis. + Geneva, September 4, 1980, 1129Z +

11804. For the Secretary, Deputy Secretary, and ACDA Director. Subject: NPT Review Conference (60): Urgent Request for Contingency + Guidance.

+ +

1. (Secret—Entire text)

+

2. With respect to issue on NPT RevCon + which we understand will be subject of discussion by principals this + morning, following is input from US + NPT RevCon Del.

+

3. We believe the NPT RevCon is in + serious danger of ending in well-publicized disarray. The more militant + G–77 Delegations, especially Mexico, Sweden, and Yugoslavia, are + continuing to take an uncompromising line.In telegram 11709 from Geneva, September 2, the Mission noted “the + G–77 has sought to broaden the issue” of the NPT to include prohibiting “even + seemingly legitimate civil nuclear cooperation with South Africa and + Israel” because “it ‘indirectly’ contributes to their nuclear + weapons capabilities.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + D800417–0703)

+

4. It is our shared judgment that only hope for a satisfactory + substantive outcome lies in a compromise final document retaining a + number of constructive formulations on safeguards and peaceful uses, + avoiding unacceptable language on Israel but reflecting various strongly + held views on major arms control issues and going some way toward + meeting main non-aligned objectives. In the latter category we believe + we can within present guidance handle all but the:

+

(A) Moratorium on nuclear testing;

+

(B) Working groups in Committee on Disarmament on CTB and nuclear disarmament; and

+

(C) Interim compliance with SALT + II.

+

Moratorium is clearly not acceptable and many non-aligned, even militants + like Ambassador Fonseka (Sri Lanka), understand this. Nuclear + disarmament working group is not of the highest priority according to + Fonseka and might not be pressed if other desiderata are achieved. + Although we obviously could not accept a formal interim commitment on + SALT II compliance in final + Conference document, this is an issue on which our position is strong + because of our stated policy and because of adamant Soviet opposition to + any commitment prior to ratification of SALT II. This leaves a CTB + working group as the only conceivable area of US flexibility.

+

5. What we are requesting is contingency authority to accept—if necessary + and sufficient to achieve an acceptable Conference outcome—language + calling on the CD at its next session to establish an ad hoc working + group, with an appropriate mandate, on the question of a CTB. Such language would make clear that + the precise mandate or terms of reference for such a working group would + have to be worked out by consensus in the CD, and would specify that the + CD’s work should not interfere with the trilateral negotiations. + Moreover, any such formulation would only be accepted if agreed to by + the other trilateral + negotiating partners. In this connection British floated last night with + US and Soviets a contingency formula + which Soviets accepted with slight modification, reflected below:

+

“The Conference therefore believes that at its next session, the CD + should draw up terms of reference for a working group on a nuclear test + ban treaty. It considers that efforts in the CD on this subject and the + separate trilateral negotiations by the NWS parties to the treaty are not mutually exclusive.” + (FYI: Establishing “Terms of + Reference” is tantamount to establishing the working group.)

+

This language was prepared as a draft of part of a possible compromise + final document reflecting divergencies of views on many issues which + might be used as a last minute Chairman’s draft. We have not indicated + any ability on our part to accept this formulation. It has not yet been + shown to anyone except a few members of Depositary Delegations.

+

6. We would not propose to use the authority we are seeking unless and + until it becomes clearer than it now is that its use is necessary and + sufficient to achieve an otherwise acceptable Conference outcome. We are + not yet at the stage where this judgment can be made, but time is + becoming so short that we need guidance on whether this bargaining tool + would be available in the crunch of the final hours of the Conference. + We will keep you advised of the situation and of our advice as to + whether such contingency guidance need be drawn upon.

+ + Helman + +
+ +
+ 390. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security + Affairs (Brzezinski) to President + CarterSource: Carter Library, National + Security Affairs, Brzezinski + Material, Subject File, Box 6, Comprehensive Test Ban (CTB): 1/79–9/80. Secret. Sent for + action. Carter initialed the + upper right-hand corner of the memorandum. + Washington, September 4, 1980 + + SUBJECT + NPT Review Conference + +

The SCC this morningNo record of this meeting was found. reached + consensus that we should authorize our delegation to the NPT Review Conference to agree to the + formation of a working + group on CTB under the auspices of the + Conference on Disarmament. The JCS did + not agree because they fear that such a working group will become a + source of independent pressure on the trilateral CTB forum that will make it more difficult + for us to achieve such goals as good verification provisions. All others + agreed that this was a serious possibility but felt that we should make + this attempt if we could avoid a total collapse of the NPT Review Conference (the inability to + reach agreement on a consensus document).

+

The SCC consensus was subject to the + proviso that we will agree to the formation of the working group if it + is clear that our agreement would produce an acceptable conference + outcome, though all understood that the idea would have to be floated + during discussions in Geneva tomorrow. We know this is clearly a long + shot with all the disorder at the conference but we feel we should give + our people something to work with and, as Ed Muskie put it, we would be better off failing having + made the effort, than having failed to make the effort. The UK and Canada support this approach.

+

RECOMMENDATION

+

That you approve the SCC consensus.Carter checked the “Approve” option and wrote “J” in + the right-hand margin.

+
+ +
+ 391. Memorandum From the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament + Agency (Earle) to President + CarterSource: Carter Library, National + Security Affairs, Staff Material, Global Issues, Oplinger/Bloomfield File, Box 50, + Proliferation: Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference, 9–11/80. + Confidential. Copy sent to Muskie. Carter initialed the upper right-hand corner of the + memorandum. + Washington, September 12, 1980 + + SUBJECT + Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) + Review Conference + +

The NPT Review Conference completed + SundaySeptember 7. was a + difficult, contentious process, and it was not possible to reach + agreement on a substantive declaration satisfactory to all + participants.

+ +

There was no controversy over the NPT + itself—which was supported by all speakers (with no suggestions for + amendments or protocols and no withdrawals from the Treaty). There was, + however, widespread resentment on the part of many of the non-nuclear + weapon parties at the disparity between their self-denial and the dearth + of concrete achievement by the nuclear weapon states in limiting their + nuclear armaments.Carter bracketed this paragraph + and wrote “I agree” in the left-hand margin.

+

Most participants made clear that they considered greater progress by the + nuclear weapon states on nuclear arms control—as contempated by Article + VISee footnote + 5, Document 211. of the Treaty and consistently + advocated by you—to be basic to the NPT + bargain. This led to strong pleas from all quarters for prompt + ratification of SALT II and early + initiation of SALT III. But it also + led to bitter denunciations of the failure to have achieved a + comprehensive test ban—which was the step most clearly desired—not only + by the neutrals and non-aligned but also by a number of our allies.

+

Your approval of a contingent offer by the U.S. to establish a CTB working group in the CD—even though it + was not successful in achieving a consensus document—helped to head off + an acrimonious ending of this particular Conference. But the underlying + discontent and resentment still remain. Unless we succeed in achieving + significant limitations on nuclear testing in + the next few years it is clear from this Conference that the NPT, and the non-proliferation regime of + which it is the principal pillar, will be in serious jeopardy.

+ + Ralph + Earle II + +
+ +
+ + 392. Memorandum for the RecordSource: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of the + Director of Central Intelligence, Job 81B00112R, Subject Files, Box + 15, Folder 27: (PRC) Special + Nuclear Materials, 1980. Secret. Original paragraph classification + and handling restrictions not declassified. No minutes or summary of + conclusions for this meeting has been found. + Washington, September 26, 1980 + + SUBJECT + PRC Meeting of 25 September 1980: + Options for Augmenting Supply of Nuclear Materials + +

1. The subject meeting was chaired by Secretary Brown who reviewed the results of the + July 24 meeting on the same subject.No + minutes or summary of conclusions of the July 24 meeting has been + found. At that meeting it had been agreed to upgrade the + three operating reactors at Savannah River and to restart the L-reactor + at Savannah River. There had been disagreement on whether to convert the + N-reactor at Hanford to weapons grade plutonium production and restart + the Purex facility. It was also agreed at the 24 July meeting that no + actual implementation of these decisions would be made until after the + completion of the NPT Review + Conference.

+

2. Discussion at this meeting centered around the conversion of the + N-reactor at Hanford, the restart of the Purex facility and the negative + impact that these actions might have on US nonproliferation policy and goals. The previous + agreements reached at the 24 July meeting were reaffirmed. It was + decided to send two options forward to the President, one recommending + immediate action on conversion of the N-reactor and restart of the Purex + facility, the other recommending postponing this decision until + December. NSC and JCS supported the first option while + State, ACDA, DoD and OMB supported the + second. The budgetary impact of a three month delay in the decision was + minimal.

+

3. Intelligence input to the meeting was minimal consisting only of a + reaffirmation of our previous estimate of Soviet plutonium production + and a statement of our confidence in the accuracy of this estimate. No + follow-on action will be required from this meeting.

+ + [name not declassified] + +
+ +
+ + 393. Memorandum From Secretary of State Muskie to President CarterSource: + Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Global + Issues, Oplinger/Bloomfield + File, Box 50, Proliferation: Non-Proliferation Treaty Review + Conference, 9–11/80. Secret. In the upper right-hand corner of the + first page of the memorandum, Carter wrote “Ed. A reasonable approach. + C.” + Washington, October + 16, 1980 + + SUBJECT + After the Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference + +

I know you are aware of the inconclusive results of the recent NPT Review Conference in Geneva, despite + our best efforts to achieve a last minute compromise. I would like to + give you my views on its broader significance and the prospects for + non-proliferation.

+

The Meaning of the Review Conference

+

Because the Review Conference ended on a discordant note, we will face + tougher sledding on arms control issues and in pressing our + non-proliferation objectives. In addition to continual criticism by the + non-aligned, it will be harder to hold the support of many of our + Allies, to whom progress in arms control is important both in terms of + NPT obligations and for perceptions + of their own security. Furthermore, the Soviets will be highly critical + of our own arms control efforts (Gromyko’s recent UNGA + speech is a good example of this).In a + September 22 address to the UN + General Assembly, Gromkyo “blamed the United States and its allies” + for “escalating international tensions and charged that Washington + is working out plans for a nuclear war in an atmosphere of + ‘militarist frenzy’. ” (Don Oberdorfer, “Gromyko Blames U.S. Policies for + Rising Global Tensions,” Washington Post, + September 24, 1980, p. A20)

+

However, I do not believe there is a real danger of withdrawal or + abrogation by Treaty parties in the near term. There was strong support + for the Treaty itself at the Conference. Many non-aligned leaders (such + as Yugoslavia and Mexico) have been instrumental in endorsing the NPT through the years and have substantial + self interest in seeing the Treaty preserved.

+

While generally based on a real concern over the lack of forward movement + on arms control, non-aligned demands for accelerated progress and a + significantly greater multilateral role in negotiations also reflect a + desire by some Third World leaders to prove their credentials by + engaging in public confrontation with key Western countries.

+

The Preservation of Non-Proliferation

+

The NPT is essential for the + preservation of non-proliferation and it is vital to prevent its + unravelling. However, the Treaty itself is not sufficient to deal with the truly dangerous problem + posed by the nuclear threshold states.

+

Some present or potential threshold countries (e.g., Iraq) are NPT parties and would think twice before + withdrawing from the Treaty. Moreover, progress on a CTB or other arms control measures might + strengthen the international consensus on non-proliferation that could + help restrain non-party states as well.

+

Nonetheless, certain threshold countries are already well on the way + toward fuel cycle autonomy or are obtaining technical options to develop + nuclear explosives. These states will make their decision on whether to + produce a nuclear device on the basis of their perception of immediate + security interests and vulnerabilities, with internal politics also + coming into play. If one or more of these countries decides to obtain a + nuclear explosive capability, there would be an increased chance for + regional conflict and serious consequences for the continued Treaty + adherence of neighboring NPT + parties.

+

In any case, it appears likely that we may be faced with cruel dilemmas + involving our national security, if such threshold states as Pakistan or + South Africa continue their progress in developing nuclear devices.

+

Implications for Arms Control and Peaceful + Cooperation

+

After the NPT Review Conference, we plan + to adopt the following stance on major arms + control issues in the near-term:

+

—The concession on a CTB Working Group + which you approved was worth making under the circumstances, but was + only valid in terms of achieving a consensus final document at the + NPTRC. We believe the non-aligned will seek to “pocket” our contingent + concession, and that Australia, Canada, and other allies may join them + in increasing the pressure for a Committee on Disarmament Working Group. + We will resist accepting their position since multilateral involvement + in CTB talks would seriously complicate + tripartite negotiations, especially the important verification + issue.

+

—We should not agree to a CD Working Group on nuclear disarmament, since + nuclear arms control can be approached effectively only through + step-by-step negotiations by the partners directly concerned.

+

—We will continue to reject proposals for cut-off of production of + Special Nuclear Materials (SNM),Telegram 268280 to London, October 7, noted + that “We share HMG’s view that + efforts should be made to discourage arms control proposals that are + presently unrealistic and unworkable—such as cut off.” The Carter administration believed + that “consideration of cut-off would be premature and inadvisable in + light of the current international situation and the importance of + not detracting from priority issues on the arms control agenda, such + as SALT, and CTB. As appropriate, we would also + stress the various difficulties associated with a possible cut-off + (definitions, modalities, and verification) and the need to ensure + that our security interests would be properly protected.” (National + Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign + Policy File, D800479–0470) which some of our Allies may + support, as premature. We + could receive increased criticism because of our decision to upgrade our + SNM production capacity. We still + regard cut-off as a desirable long-term arms control objective.

+

To demonstrate our support for the IAEA + and legitimate nuclear power programs in developing countries, we will + be generally supportive of implementing Review Conference understandings + on peaceful uses. (Gerry Smith will be sending you a more comprehensive + memorandum covering this area.)See Document 395.

+

—As a follow-on to INFCE and the + NPTRC, we will continue to pursue through the IAEA forum the concepts of international spent fuel + storage, and an effective international plutonium storage regime.

+

—We will also pursue, through a newly established IAEA Committee, mechanisms such as a fuel + bank for improved assurances of non-sensitive nuclear supply.

+

Finally, we must focus on the need for restraint in nuclear exports to potential threshold + countries. This would include:

+

—Pressing for acceptance of full-scope safeguards as a condition of new + supply commitments to non-nuclear weapons states not party to the + Treaty.

+

—Continuing to press nuclear exporters to restrict the transfer of + reprocessing and enrichment technology and sensitive nuclear + materials.

+
+ +
+ + 394. Intelligence Assessment Prepared in the Central Intelligence + AgencySource: Carter + Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Global Issues, + Oplinger/Bloomfield File, + Box 50, Proliferation: Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference, + 9–11/80. Secret; [handling restriction not + declassified]. Original paragraph classification and + handling restrictions not declassified. + + + PA 80–10482 + + + Washington, November 1980 +

Deadlock at the NPT Review + Conference: Causes and Consequences

+

Key Judgments

+

The recent conference in Geneva to review the nuclear Non-Proliferation + Treaty (NPT) failed to produce a + declaration assessing how effectively the treaty has been implemented + over the past five years. None of the 75 participants questioned the + need for or basic purpose of the NPT, + but they were unwilling to make the compromises necessary to reach a + final declaration reaffirming the value of the treaty. Widespread + concern now exists that the failure to reach a consensus will undermine + confidence in the global nonproliferation regime.

+

Causes of Failure

+

A longstanding conflict over the intent of the treaty between the nuclear + weapons states and nonnuclear weapons states, primarily those in the + developing world, was the root of the problem. Ever since the + negotiation of the NPT in the late + 1960s, the two groups have disagreed over the delicate balance of rights + and obligations in the treaty. The developing nations have consistently + argued, and did so forcefully at the conference, that the problem of + nonproliferation is a matter of controlling the nuclear arms race + between the nuclear powers as well as containing the spread of nuclear + weapons to other states. The three nuclear weapons states that are party + to the treaty—the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union, and the United + States—prefer to emphasize the containment purposes of the NPT, arguing that a global + nonproliferation regime is valuable in its own right and its + implementation should not be made dependent on progress in the arms + control area.

+

The developing nations at the conference, acting as spokesmen for the + Group of 77 (G–77), alleged that there had been no meaningful progress + toward disarmament since the 1975 Review Conference and insisted that + their viewpoint be expressed in a final declaration. They also sought + commitments from the nuclear weapons states to increase the role of + nonnuclear weapons states in arms control negotiations.

+ +

The G–77 entered the conference with a wide range of arms control + demands. These were eventually narrowed to three items that they + insisted be included in the final declaration:

+

The establishment of a multilateral working group on a comprehensive test + ban treaty (CTB) in the Committee on + Disarmament.

+

A pledge by the Soviet Union and the United States to observe the terms + of the SALT II agreement pending + ratification.

+

Language that would single out Israel and South Africa for criticism and + prohibit nuclear cooperation with these two nonsignatories unless they + accepted international safeguards over their entire nuclear + programs.

+

Significant concessions by the industrial nations giving assurances about + the supply of nuclear fuel and technical assistance to nuclear programs + of Third World signatories of the NPT + were not sufficient to lead to compromise in the arms control area. + Indeed, G–77 leaders like Yugoslavia and Mexico apparently persuaded the + more moderate nations within the Group to dig in their heels because the + nuclear weapons states showed no signs of agreeing to any of the arms + control demands until well into the last week of the conference. The + United States eventually indicated a willingness to accept a CTB working group under certain + conditions, but by that time most of the developing nations had decided + that an inconclusive conference outcome would provide a dramatic warning + to the superpowers.

+

Consequences of Failure

+

The failure of the review conference to reaffirm the NPT in a final declaration is likely to + have a number of far-reaching consequences:

+

It will weaken the global nonproliferation regime. The inconclusive + outcome does not alter the treaty obligations of signatories, but the + failure to agree on whether the treaty has been effectively implemented + raises serious questions about its long-term viability.

+

No signatory is likely to withdraw from the treaty in the next few years + because of the conference outcome, but the prospects for persuading + nonsignatories to adhere to the treaty have been greatly reduced. Some + nonsignatories may conclude that the costs of nonadherence and the + potential penalties for crossing the nuclear threshold have been + reduced.

+

The issue of nuclear weapons programs in the Third World is likely to be + further politicized. The G–77 nations at the conference, for example, + were unwilling to discuss the question of how to deal with potential + proliferators within their own ranks.

+

The developing nations’ insistence on discussing nuclear arms control + between the superpowers probably will complicate future discussions of + nuclear proliferation. This linkage may make any strengthening of the global nonproliferation + regime conditional upon progress in arms control, thus providing an + additional excuse for some developing nations to resist specific US proposals for tighter control of + international nuclear commerce.

+

The ability of the developing nations to mold and pursue a unified + negotiating position at the review conference is likely to reinvigorate + their efforts to negotiate as a bloc on other international issues that + can be cast in North-South terms. G–77 unity has been under considerable + strain recently, particularly on economic issues such as the cost of + oil. Stimulated by their success on nuclear matters, the G–77 members + are likely to redouble attempts to find issues of common concern around + which they can achieve consensus.

+

The increased cooperation among developing nations does not necessarily + imply, however, that the dialogue with industrial nations will become + more acrimonious. Nations normally considered moderates within the G–77 + and the related nonaligned movement assumed leadership roles at the + NPT review conference. This may + presage a trend against Cuba and other radical nations that have + attempted to steer these organizations in a distinctly anti-Western + direction.

+

The results of the review conference may even stimulate a leadership role + for Third World moderates, particularly in the nuclear proliferation + field. Many developing nations wish to preserve, in upcoming meetings of + the new International Atomic Energy Agency Committee on the Assurance of + Supply and in other forums, important concessions on nuclear trade + issues already won from the industrial nations.

+

Finally, the outcome of the NPT review + conference is likely to affect future arms control negotiations and + deliberations. At minimum, it will reinforce the G–77’s allegations that + the nuclear weapons states are dragging their feet on arms control + negotiations, and this attitude may serve as a basis to oppose as + ineffective and discriminatory almost any multilateral arms control + initiative sponsored by the superpowers. In any event, the nonaligned + nations probably will lobby in the UN + General Assembly for a broader mandate for the Committee on Disarmament, + including the creation of a working group on CTB.

+

If the CTB issue is not resolved in the + UN, nonaligned nations are certain + to insist on such a working group in the 1981 sessions of the Committee + on Disarmament, knowing that Washington has accepted the idea, at least + in principle. Even if the procedural issue is resolved in the Committee + on Disarmament, there is little reason to expect the developing nations + to be in a cooperative mood at the Third NPT review conference in 1985 unless the nuclear weapons + states have by then concluded a comprehensive test ban treaty and other + arms control agreements.

+

[Omitted here is the body of the assessment.]

+
+ +
+ + 395. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security + Affairs (Brzezinski) to President + CarterSource: Carter Library, National + Security Affairs, Staff Material, Global Issues, Oplinger/Bloomfield File, Box 52, + Proliferation: Smith, Gerard, + 8–11/80. Secret. Sent for information. In the upper right-hand + corner of the first page of the memorandum, Carter wrote “Zbig. How best to + present alternatives to next administration? J.” + Washington, November 24, 1980 + + SUBJECT + Non-Proliferation Policy—Report of Gerry Smith (U) + +

Attached are three papers from Gerry + Smith which together comprise his final report to you on + non-proliferation policy:

+

—A report (Tab A) on his explorations with Europe and Japan of a possible + bargain in which the US would relax its + constraints on their reprocessing and plutonium programs in return for + greater cooperation in dealing with problem countries. He concludes that + such a deal cannot be struck “within the strict framework of the April + 1977 policy.”See Document 330 and footnote 3, + Document 338. (C)

+

—A longer paper (Tab B) giving his overall assessment and recommendations + on how our policy should be changed. (C)

+

—A brief memorandum (Tab C) urging that priority attention be given to + the Israeli weapons program and the negotiation of a CTB. (S)

+

These papers cover a lot of territory, but two issues are central: (a) + how to deal more effectively with problem countries, like Pakistan and + Argentina, where proliferation risks are immediate or around the corner, + and (b) the relevance of global constraints on reprocessing and + plutonium, which affect important Allied programs, to such risks. + (C)

+

Smith believes that we have put + too much emphasis on denying access to sensitive material and + technology, and should focus more on proliferation motives through the resolution of disputes and by enhancing + security arrangements. The alternative view, elaborated in PRM–15,See + Document 317. is that where + motives and technological capability coincide, proliferation will almost + certainly result; motives are the most volatile and least controllable + factor, and access to materials and technology the most amenable to + short-term control. (C)

+

While he acknowledges that economic developments since 1977 have strongly + confirmed US arguments that reprocessing + and plutonium fuels should be deferred, Smith believes that the European and Japanese programs present no + significant proliferation threat, and that we must relax our controls + there in order to gain their cooperation in withholding sensitive + materials and technology from problem countries. The alternative view is + that a more permissive plutonium policy toward Europe and Japan would + inevitably increase both proliferation risks, and political resentment, + in the rest of the world. (C)

+

These and many other questions addressed in Smith’s analysis were debated extensively in 1977. It is + entirely appropriate that they should be examined again in the light of + our experience over the past four years. Smith’s present conclusions would be contested by many, + but this is an important and well-argued brief for one point of view. + (C)

+

Tab A

+

Memorandum From Ambassador-at-Large and Special + Representative for Non-Proliferation Matters Smith to President CarterConfidential.

+

Washington, October 30, 1980

+ + SUBJECT + Non-Proliferation Policy after INFCE + +

I

+

In June, you authorized me to explore with major European allies and + Japan on a personal and non-committal basis arrangements by which they + might agree to greater cooperation in strengthening the + non-proliferation regime and limiting reprocessing of spent fuel and use + of plutonium.See Document 383. The purpose was to clarify what we + might expect from our allies in return for greater predictability in + exercise of consent rights over the use of US-origin fuel. On the basis of such clarification, we + would be better able to develop positions for renegotiation of + agreements for cooperation with EURATOM, Japan, and other countries, as required by the + NNPA. As you requested, here are + the results of the explorations.

+

II

+

In a series of discussions with senior nuclear and foreign policy + officials of the UK, France, the FRG, and Japan, I put forward for their + consideration a regime + for the next 10–15 years in which those countries would:

+

—defer commitments to thermal recycle;

+

—limit new reprocessing capacity to that required for breeders, and limit + separation of plutonium to avoid unnecessary stockpiling and pressure + for thermal recycle;

+

—support development of an effective International Plutonium Storage + regime, and avoid excess national stockpiles of plutonium;

+

—agree to US consent rights, as called + for in the NNPA, including their + continuation over material after use in breeder RD&D programs;

+

—increase commitments to spent fuel storage as an alternative to + reprocessing;

+

—require full-scope safeguards as a condition of new supply commitments + and improve cooperation in dealing with problem countries;

+

—cooperate to make reprocessing more proliferation-resistant, to improve + the “once-through” fuel cycle, to limit future enrichment capacity to + production of low enriched uranium only, and to improve IAEA safeguards through financial, + technical and political support.

+

III

+

I suggested that in such a regime the US + might:

+

—adopt predictable ground rules for exercise of consent rights over + reprocessing and plutonium use in specified breeder and other advanced + reactor RD&D programs;

+

—grant generic authorizations to reprocessing in the UK and France for other countries that have + good non-proliferation credentials, no spent fuel storage alternative, + or where it is in our non-proliferation interest to remove spent + fuel.

+

The regime defined above, which you approved as a basis for exploration + but without decision as to its ultimate acceptability, was drawn up + after extended review within the Executive Branch. Our effort had been + to identify a position for reprocessing and plutonium use in Europe and + Japan that would meet the near-term requirements of those countries, + avoid damaging precedents for other countries, and evoke greater support + from Allies in dealing with countries of near-term proliferation + concern.

+

IV

+

The Allies recognize the need to increase efforts with problem countries. + They believe the more promising approach is political (dealing with + motivations of problem countries) rather than technical (trying to stop + or slow access to sensitive technologies and materials). They may be + willing to adopt NPT-type full-scope + safeguards as a requirement for new supply commitments, in return for + our easing interference in their programs.

+

The Allies agree that national stockpiles of excess plutonium should be + avoided. They support establishment of an international plutonium storage regime, with some + skepticism that a truly effective IPS would be acceptable to the + countries we worry about most. This skepticism may be well-placed, but I + believe we should work actively to try to develop the best possible + IPS.

+

V

+

The EURATOM countries (where we now + have no consent rights) are very loath to give us such controls. They + resist proposals that they set a “good example” to the rest of the world + by limiting their domestic programs for reprocessing and plutonium use. + They see a right of consent as an infringement of their national + sovereignties, as giving us a “supervisory” role over their programs, + and as introducing an arbitrary and unpredictable element in their + nuclear power planning. They foresee our generic approach as requiring + impossible precision in forecasting the plutonium needs of their breeder + programs.

+

In the end we may be able to get the Europeans to grant formal consent + rights provided it is clear that they would be exercised in a very + general way. The UK, France, and the + FRG, unlike the US, are committed to reprocessing and to + developing options for breeders and thermal recycle. They believe these + programs are indispensable for their energy security, and that their + decisions on and pursuit of these programs are national issues not + subject to compromise with the US. They + believe we overemphasize the dangers of the civil nuclear fuel cycle and + that decisions they take with respect to their own programs are not + relevant to dealing with the problem countries.

+

VI

+

Japan will not much longer tolerate asymmetry between US–EURATOM and US-Japan + nuclear relations. Our case-by-case exercise of consent rights in Japan + is a constant source of friction. We are unlikely to get control over + use of US supplies in Europe comparable + to that which we have in Japan. If unable to get consent rights in + Europe, or able to get them only under an agreement providing for + liberal application, we will have to agree to the same with Japan. We + probably will have to accept Japan’s having a commercial scale + reprocessing plant, and agree to some generic approvals for reprocessing + of Japanese fuel in Europe and use in Japan of some of the separated + plutonium.

+

VII

+

I believe we cannot accomplish the foregoing within the strict framework + of the April 1977 policy. For this and other reasons, the direction of + our non-proliferation effort should be reviewed. I think the NNPA should be amended to restore a + positive attitude toward international cooperation on the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. I expand + on these ideas in the attached paper.

+

Gerard + SmithSmith signed the memorandum + “Gerry.”.

+

Tab B

+

Paper Prepared by Ambassador-at-Large and Special + Representative for Non-Proliferation Matters Smith

+ Confidential. +

Washington, October 30, 1980

+

U.S. NON-PROLIFERATION POLICY AND PROGRAMS: AN + ASSESSMENT

+

Executive Summary

+

I

+

In light of concerns that growth of civil nuclear power and the advent of + wide-spread trade in weapons-usable materials would lead to an increased + proliferation of nuclear explosives, initiatives were taken by the + Administration and Congress to foreclose the electric power route to + nuclear explosives. They included i) the President’s April 1977 Policy + Statement,See footnote 3, Document 338. deferring indefinitely + commercial reprocessing and commercial-scale breeders in the United + States and continuing a moratorium on exports of enrichment and + reprocessing technology, and ii) enactment of the Nuclear + Non-Proliferation Act of 1978 (NNPA), + which established detailed criteria and procedures to govern United + States nuclear export and international cooperative activities. Studies + were started (the International Fuel Cycle Evaluation (INFCE) and the Non-Proliferation + Alternatives System Assessment Program) to seek ways of minimizing the + proliferation risks inherent in nuclear electric power generation.

+

There resulted an increased awareness of proliferation risks and a + willingness of major nuclear suppliers to defer new reprocessing export + commitments and, generally, to cooperate in restricting exports where + proliferation risks could be demonstrated (e.g., Pakistan). However, + serious concern persists about Pakistan. Acquisition of sensitive + facilities by Iraq, Argentina and Brazil also creates proliferation + risks. We have been unable to + persuade these countries and India, South Africa and Israel to accept + fullscope safeguards.

+

Nations with the most advanced nuclear power programs (in Europe and + Japan), which are not of proliferation concern, resent our efforts to + impose stringent requirements on them which have resulted in uncertain + nuclear supply. They now see us as insensitive to their critical energy + needs. They have not agreed to condition exports, or even new export + commitments, on the recipient’s accepting full-scope safeguards or + foreswearing national enrichment or reprocessing facilities. While the + reduction in the growth of nuclear electric power supports U.S. + arguments that reprocessing, thermal recycle and breeder + commercialization can be prudently deferred, it has put governments + committed to nuclear power and their nuclear industries on the defensive + and as a result spirited defenses of these options have been + mounted.

+

II

+

Our approach to non-proliferation has been too single-minded. Inadequate + consideration has been given to linkages between proliferation and other + foreign policy and security interests. In particular, where other + interests have appeared to conflict with non-proliferation + constraints—in the Tarapur and Pakistan cases, for example—the former + have appeared to prevail (although our actions in these cases were + supportive of or consistent with our non-proliferation interests).

+

U.S. non-proliferation consideration led to legislative and policy + constraints of general application, including a highly restrictive + export policy, disregarding the fact that proliferation risks vary + greatly from one country to another, and that the energy security + requirements of other major industrial nations differ from America’s. We + should adopt a more balanced approach which recognizes the motivations + which lead nations to acquire nuclear explosives. No system of export + constraints can substitute for elimination of these motivations, by + resolution of international disputes, security guarantees and reduction + of the prestige value of nuclear weapons.

+

III

+

There are only five states of near-term proliferation concern—India, + Iraq, [less than 1 line not declassified], + Pakistan and South Africa—with perhaps a half dozen others of concern in + the longer term. While as a matter of general policy accepted + international practice calls for equal treatment for all states, + distinctions where risks are gravest are the only way to achieve the + support of major Allies and other nuclear suppliers in coping with + proliferation risks effectively.

+

We need more flexibility in dealing with close Allies on export, + reprocessing and retransfer requests, and in nuclear cooperation + negotiations. We need + policies which are more sensitive to Allies’ energy needs, are + consistently and predictably implemented, and are neither unilaterally + derived nor based on threats of denial.

+

There is virtually no support for a “throw away” fuel cycle, abandoning + the energy value of the plutonium and uranium in spent fuel. We should + recognize that regrettably R&D and + pilot scale reprocessing plants are a prudent near-term step to nations + with medium or long-term interest in reprocessing for energy purposes, + and that technical fixes we once thought to have promise do not now + appear viable.

+

It is illusory to believe we have much leverage to force our views on + foreign nations when other supply sources are available and it is we, + not the recipients, who are seeking to alter existing terms of nuclear + trade.

+

IV

+

What leverage we do have has been undercut by i) the ambiguity of + American government policy on nuclear power as an energy option, ii) the + divisions in the country on this issue, and iii) our speaking on + non-proliferation with different voices—those of the Administration, the + NRC and the Congress. In + particular, with the export licensing function residing in the NRC, other nations lack confidence that + undertakings of the Executive Branch will be fulfilled in a timely and + predictable manner. Our unilaterally established policy and legislative + requirements have generated concerns about security of supply and have + driven foreign nations to increased fuel cycle independence, further + reducing any residual leverage for our supply position. A policy of + export restraint can succeed only if suppliers act in concert. It is not + likely that all supplies will accept our policies. Measures to enhance + security of supply are likely to be more effective in inducing nations + to forego reprocessing and enrichment technology and breeders than + threats of denial or highly restrictive conditions.

+

V

+

I recommend that we:

+

1. Consider proliferation problems primarily as international security + issues;

+

2. Center non-proliferation efforts on problem countries—those where + early explosive acquisition seems probable;

+

3. Increase flexibility in dealing with major Allies (EURATOM and Japan);

+

4. Recognize that reprocessing will occur and

+

—support an international plutonium storage system,

+

—rely on economic factors rather than U.S. pressures to dissuade nations + from adopting thermal recycle,

+

—urge other suppliers to condition new nuclear supply commitments on + full-scope safeguards, and

+ +

—give increased support to IAEA + safeguards;

+

5. Enhance U.S. nuclear supply reliability by

+

—transferring the export licensing function from NRC to the Executive Branch,

+

—eliminating duplicative reviews of export activities to allow some + predictability concerning U.S. actions in authorizing requests, and

+

—eliminating certain sanctions provisions in the NNPA and the Foreign Assistance Act.

+

Gerard + SmithSmith signed the paper + “Gerry.”

+

Tab C

+

Letter From Ambassador-at-Large and Special + Representative for Non-Proliferation Matters Smith to President CarterSecret. Brzezinski initialed the upper right-hand corner of + the memorandum.

+

Washington, October 31, 1980

+

Dear Mr. President:

+

I am sending along separately my final report. But I would like to stress + two matters which I believe to be central to success for your + non-proliferation policy—[less than 1 line not + declassified] and a Comprehensive Test + Ban.

+

While we have urged our allies to set a good example by limiting their + power programs’ [less than 1 line not + declassified] we have set a bad example by acquiescing in [less than 1 line not declassified] While we, by + law, cut off aid to PakistanThe United + States cut off aid to Pakistan on April 5, 1979. See Foreign + Relations, 1977–1980, vol. XIX, South Asia. + [1 line not declassified] a large percentage + of American [less than 1 line not declassified] + The international community is well aware of this inconsistency and + discrimination. I trust [less than 1 line not + declassified] can be introduced into the Middle East + negotiations.

+

CTB—For ten years we have had an + obligation under NPT to get on with + arms control and disarmament. That was the quid pro quo for the + non-weapons states to forego weapons. As clearly demonstrated during + last August’s NPT Review Conference, a + large number of states believe we have failed to keep our end of the + bargain. That belief bodes badly for the credibility of your program and + the life expectancy of the NPT regime. + That argues strongly for ending the subordination of our proliferation + interest to possibly marginal weapons refinement.

+ +

As I leave government, I urge you to give priority to these two often + overlooked aspects of your great non-proliferation effort.

+

Again, may I say how much I appreciate having had the privilege, + opportunity and experience of serving under your fine leadership.

+

Respectfully,

+ + Gerard + SmithSmith signed the letter + “Gerry.” + +
+ +
+ 396. Memorandum From Jerry + Oplinger of the National Security Council Staff to the + President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)Source: Carter Library, Brzezinski Donated Material, Subject File, Box 15, + NSC Accomplishments—Nuclear + Non-Proliferation: 12/80. No classification marking. Sent for + information. + Washington, December 23, 1980 + + SUBJECT + Non-Proliferation + +

Attached is the history of non-proliferation policy which you asked + for.Attached but not printed. I + have tried to hold it to the 15 pages you requested, and the result is a + highly compressed and selective account. It is very difficult to write + on this subject without some personal bias showing through, but I have + tried to keep it reasonably straightforward and non-polemical.

+

Some more personal and subjective comment seems appropriate however, so I + will make it here:

+

On balance, and judged by its stated objectives, the Carter non-proliferation policy has to + be considered a failure.An unknown hand + underlined the words “be considered a failure.” A half-dozen + countries have moved perceptibly closer to a nuclear explosive + capability, and in at least one case (Pakistan) that movement now + appears irreversible. Almost all of this slippage involved assistance + from Europe, and could have been prevented. Reprocessing plant capacity + has more than tripled; world + plutonium stockpiles (most of it of US + origin) have grown substantially and appear likely to increase at least + tenfold in the next decade. Our own nuclear R&D budget, which we said in 1977 was to be + restructured to defer the breeder and develop safer alternatives, + continues to fund the breeder at excessive levels and to ignore + alternative technologies. While our 1977 objective was to prevent the + development of plutonium fuel cycles, we have continued to cooperate + with other countries, permitting Japan, the UK, and France to reprocess large quantities of US-supplied spent fuel to support such fuel + cycles.

+

The fault was not with the Carter + policies. They rested on three basic principles which seem at least as + self-evident today as in 1977: that certain nuclear materials (HEU and plutonium) are explosives and if + available in nuclear power programs will make possible rapid conversion + to weapons; that misuse of these materials cannot be prevented or + adequately controlled by international inspection (safeguards) or any + political institution yet devised, and that the technologies which + introduce these materials into common use could be deferred for at least + many decades without economic penalty. While the dangers of plutonium + are obvious, what is not generally understood is that a single fuel charge for a breeder reactor would + contain enough high-grade plutonium for hundreds + of nuclear weapons; that is comparable to the total stockpile of the + US or the USSR in the early 1950’s and is a major strategic threat. + Safeguards, whose purpose is only to detect diversion of materials to + unauthorized use, are meaningless when dealing with materials which can + be made into bombs within a week. Plutonium-fueled reactors are economic + only at uranium prices exceeding $100 per pound based on 1977 breeder + capital costs; the current cost of uranium is $30 and falling, breeder + costs are soaring and these trends now seem likely to push the economic + utility of breeders well past 2050.

+

The failure of US policy in the face of + all this has been a failure of will and of implementation at the working + level of US government. The policy was + entrusted to a bureaucracy which cared less for these facts and their + clear implications than for diplomatic harmony. Intimidated by the + reactions of foreign nuclear bureaucracies, our diplomats recommended, + in a series of critical decisions, actions which quickly eroded both the + substance and credibility of our policy. The British and French, poised + on the brink of heavy investments in reprocessing plants economically + dependent upon US MB–10 approvals, + watched us agree to Japanese reprocessing of our fuel, insisted upon + commitments to similar approvals as the price of their participation in + a misguided international debate (INFCE) which we did not have the votes to win, watched our + performance, and decided to ignore us. In response, we approved every + single reprocessing request ever presented to us, and adopted a set of + guidelines which guaranteed that these projects would succeed and eventually produce an + amount of separated plutonium sufficient not only for their breeder + programs, but to create vast economic pressures for recycle in today’s + reactors.

+

Meanwhile, in Pakistan, Argentina, Brazil and Iraq, the European + suppliers continued to transfer materials and equipment which was either + dangerous in itself or subject to controls so weak they permitted these + countries to continue other dangerous nuclear activities with impunity. + Our allies had learned that we were more concerned with rhetoric than + results, that our bottom line was infinitely elastic, that State could + be depended upon to argue their interests, and + that the practical test of US policy on + any important issue would be—not its capability actually to curb + proliferation—but its ability to please.

+

Whether the policies would have led to greater success had they been + implemented with the conviction, toughness and tenacity that they + obviously required must now be left to the historians. Without those + qualities in the people who were responsible for the daily conduct of + the policy, the President, and you, never had a fair chance. It is still + possible that the logic of events, including the spread of plutonium, + and one or more nuclear tests in the Middle East, will make nuclear + proliferation a central concern, and what this Administration originally + tried to say and do will have an ultimate impact. But the effectiveness + of a serious non-proliferation policy is likely to be lower, and the + costs considerably higher, next time around.

+
+ +
+ +
+ + Nuclear Non-Proliferation in Latin America + +
+ 397. Editorial Note +

During the 1976 presidential campaign, candidate Jimmy Carter called for “new + international action to make the spread of peaceful nuclear power less + dangerous.” In an address at the United Nations on May 13, Carter warned that despite the fact + that “several administrations” had refused “to authorize the sale of + either enrichment or reprocessing plants, even with safeguards,” to + nations that did not possess nuclear technology, “other principal + suppliers of nuclear equipment” had recently “begun to make such sales.” + Carter ultimately called for + a worldwide “voluntary moratorium on the national purchase or sale of + enrichment or reprocessing plants.” News reports contended that + Carter was referring to the + Federal Republic of Germany’s 1975 sale of a nuclear reactor and + plutonium technology to Brazil. (“Excerpts From Carter Speech on Nuclear Policy,” and + Kathleen Teltsch, “Carter + Proposes a Nuclear Limit,” New York Times, May + 14, 1976, pages 12 and 47, respectively) The Gerald Ford administration had also opposed + the sale between the Federal Republic of Germany and Brazil but failed + to convince either nation to abrogate the purchase. For more on this + subject, see Foreign + Relations, 1969–1976, vol. E–11, Part 2, Documents on South + America, 1973–1976, and Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, vol. E–15, + Part 2, Documents on Western Europe, 1973–1976, Documents 289, + 297, and 303.

+

Only hours before Carter’s + inauguration on January 20, 1977, the Ambassador to Brazil, John Crimmins, reported that the + FRG Ambassador to Brazil had said + that his government would “brook no third-country interference in the + Brazilian-German agreement, although this attitude does not prevent + ‘clarifications’.” The FRG Ambassador + had assured a group of European journalists that Brazil, although not a + signatory to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, “had made clear several times + ‘in various international forums’ Brazil’s intention not to fabricate + nuclear devices” and “reportedly cited as one example Brazil’s signature + of the Tlatelolco Treaty,” the 1967 pact that outlawed nuclear weapons + in Latin America and the Caribbean. (Telegram 539 from Brasilia, January + 20; National Archives, RG 59, Central + Foreign Policy File, D770022–0258)

+

In his first National Security Council meeting on January 22, Carter instructed Vice President + Walter Mondale, during + Mondale’s upcoming European + visit, to “confirm to Chancellor [Helmut] Schmidt that provision of nuclear fuel reprocessing + technology to Brazil will create a major crisis in US-German relations.” The NSC then agreed “to review the U.S. commercial aspect of + the reprocessing issue so as to meet expected charges that the U.S. + opposition to Germany’s supply technology to Brazil is self-serving.” + (Summary of Conclusions of National Security Council Meeting, January + 22, 1977; Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, + Office, Meetings File, Box 1, NSC + Meeting #1: Held 1/22/77, 1/77)

+

On January 26, Crimmins reported + that Brazil’s Foreign Minister, Antônio + Francisco Azeredo da Silveira, had said, “in an obvious + allusion to the nuclear question,” that Brazil would “not permit its + destiny to be ‘defrauded or disparaged by misunderstandings or foreign + influences’ and that “the quality of life depends on a nation’s + self-respect, self-fulfillment, and autonomy.” One Brazilian newspaper + called Silveira’s comments + “extremely aggressive” and a Foreign Ministry press backgrounder made it + clear that his “remarks were aimed at President-elect Carter and other leaders of the great + powers.” Crimmins concluded that + while Brazil remained determined to maintain its “energy autonomy” and + would refuse to abrogate the purchase of the nuclear reactor from the + Federal Republic of Germany, this “beginning position of apparent + intransigence” could be modified through bilateral negotiations with the + United States. (Telegram 693 from Brasilia, January 26; National + Archives, RG 59, Department of State, + Central Foreign Policy File, D770028–0387) In a later telegram, however, + Crimmins warned that the + dispute over non-proliferation in Latin America could produce “serious + and irreversible damage to the U.S.-Brazilian relationship.” (Telegram + 741 from Brasilia, January 26; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + D770028–1090)

+
+ +
+ 398. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in + BrazilSource: Carter + Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, + Pastor Country File, Box + 2, Brazil, 1–2/77. Confidential; Immediate; Nodis. Sent for information + Immediate to Bonn and Rome. Drafted by Charles W. Bray III (ARA), Regina Eltz (ARA/ECA), and John + Kalicki (ARA/ECA); cleared by W.H. Luers (ARA); and approved by Vance. The telegram number “Tovip 22” is + handwritten. + Washington, January 27, 1977, 0120Z +

Tovip 22. 18228. For the Ambassador from the Secretary. Subject: Message + From the Secretary to Foreign Minister Silveira. Rome for Aaron with Vice President’s Party.

+ +

1. Unless you perceive objection, please deliver the following message, + and make the following points, to Foreign Minister Silveira:

+

Begin quote: Dear Mr. Minister:

+

I have asked Ambassador Crimmins + to make himself available to you and want to convey to you, by means of + this letter and his presence, the importance we attach to our + relationship with Brazil.

+

We wish to affirm our desire to continue the consultative processes which + have served both countries so well over the years. My colleagues in this + administration would welcome your views on the various issues—bilateral, + regional and global—with which our two governments will be confronted in + coming months. For my own part, I am looking forward to the early + opportunity of meeting you.

+

Please accept my best wishes.

+

Sincerely,

+

Cyrus Vance. End quote.

+

2. You can make any or all of the following points orally to Silveira:

+

—I am deeply concerned that events and newspaper stories of the past + weekThe Washington + Post reported on January 26, 1977, that Vice President + Mondale, during his + meeting in Bonn with West German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt, requested the + FRG curb its sale of nuclear + technology to Brazil. The Los Angeles Times + also reported the same week that Carter objected to a German agreement to construct a + plant in Brazil for reprocessing spent nuclear reactor fuel “because + it would give Brazil plutonium, which can be used only for making + nuclear weapons.” (David Broder and Michale Getler, “U.S.-Bonn Agree + to Early Talks on Nuclear Curb,” Washington + Post, January 26, 1977, p. A1; “Mondale Wins German Promise on + Nuclear Sales,” Los Angeles Times, January + 25, 1977, p. A2) not affect US-Brazilian relations;

+

—We would like to move ahead promptly to consult on the full range of + issues outstanding between us, including the nuclear. I recognize that + the differences on some issues are deep, but I am committed to + attempting to reduce them, where that may be possible, by frank + consultation;

+

—I believe we owe the GOB an early and + authoritative presentation of the perspectives President Carter’s administration brings to the + nuclear issue. We would be prepared to send a representative to Brasilia + for that purpose at Silveira’s + convenience.

+

—While we have not worked out detailed nuclear policies—and do not intend + to consult on important issues through the press—I would like the + Foreign Minister to know that in his discussions with Chancellor + Schmidt, Vice President + Mondale conveyed President + Carter’s interest in moving + toward official discussions with both the FRG and Brazil on nuclear exports and non-proliferation + issues.Mondale met with Schmidt on January 25 in Bonn. He reported on his + meeting in telegram Bonn 590 from Mondale to Brzezinski, September 25. (Carter Library, National + Security Affairs, Brzezinski + Material, Country File, Box 24, German Federal Republic, 1–3/77) In + his memoirs, Brzezinski wrote + that after Mondale expressed + “our strong opposition to the deal,” Schmidt “stood firm” and gave only his “assurance” + that the FRG “would observe + existing international safeguards” against the proliferation of + weapons-making materials. (Brzezinski, Power and + Principle, p. 131) (FYI:

+

We do not yet have an account + of the Vice President’s discussions with Schmidt.)

+

We wish to discuss with you a range of possibilities for meeting Brazil’s + legitimate energy needs, without incurring proliferation risks. One + possibility we would be prepared to consider is a guarantee, within the + context of FRG supply of nuclear + reactors, of the nuclear fuel needed for Brazil’s full economic + development, if this would help defer indefinitely the enrichment and + reprocessing elements of the contract.

+

—This approach would not require abrogation of your contract with the + FRG, but would be based on joint + agreement between the parties concerned.

+

—This is not a concern focused on Brazil; it is a global issue. We + recognize that we both share a strong non-proliferation interest and we + support Brazil in its desire to expand and diversify its energy sources. + Our concern is rather with the global implications of any + precedent-setting transfer of sensitive nuclear technology. As you will + recognize, the approach we suggest would meet both your economic and our + mutual non-proliferation interests.

+

—As you know, this administration is approaching the proliferation + question in all its aspects including the need for greater efforts on + the part of nuclear weapons states. This balanced view is the context in + which we are seeking indefinite deferral of the enrichment and + reprocessing projects.

+

(If asked: We will pursue our concerns about the Pakistani reprocessing + project with both France and Pakistan.In + April 1974, France agreed to supply a nuclear fuel reprocessing + plant in Pakistan. The Administration views all such + transfers in the same light, and attaches the highest importance to + finding acceptable alternatives.)

+

—On the broader question of our relationships, we would welcome the + GOB’s views on how and when we + might move ahead on consultations covering the full range of issues of + mutual interest. I am inclined to believe that it might be useful to + begin promptly with at least some of the existing sub-groups, but I do + hope to meet with you when our respective calendars can be + clarified.

+

—I would have no objection if the GOB + wished to convey the flavor of my written message above to the press. I + would prefer that any public references to the nuclear issue be confined + to our willingness to consult at an authoritative level in an effort to + acquaint the GOB with our perspectives + and to seek better understanding of the Brazilian position.

+ +

3. If, in your judgment, there are better ways to proceed in the present + circumstances, please let me have your views immediately.

+

4. Unless I hear from you promptly, I will also convey the foregoing to + Ambassador Pinheiro as soon as + an appointment can be arranged.That + afternoon, Crimmins met with + Silveira and conveyed + Vance’s talking points. + (Telegram 777 from Brasilia, January 20; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + P840086–0900)

+ + Vance + +
+ +
+ 399. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security + Affairs (Brzezinski) to President + CarterSource: Carter Library, National + Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Pastor Country File, Box 2, Brazil, + 1–2/77. Secret. Sent for information. Carter initialed the upper right-hand of the + memorandum. + Washington, January + 28, 1977 + + SUBJECT + Brazil Nuclear Agreement + +

The Brazilian Foreign Minister made an extremely strong statementSee Document + 397. about foreign interference with Brazil’s sovereign + right to make international agreements, like the one with the Federal + Republic of Germany on nuclear reprocessing facilities. The U.S. Embassy + thinks Brazil is very sensitive to your remarks on nuclear energy + exports, but that the “extreme aggressiveness” of the Foreign Minister’s + statement is a tactical effort to ensure that after U.S.-German + discussions, the German-Brazilian agreement will be as close to the + original as possible. Since President Geisel has made remarks stressing the “safeguard” + provisions of the agreement, there is reason to believe that the + Brazilian Government is not wholly united on the issue, and that they + may just be trying to adapt to your position. In fact, recent and very + private probes by people in the State Department indicate some + willingness by the Brazilians to negotiate directly with us.Ibid.

+
+ +
+ + 400. Memorandum of ConversationSource: Department of State, Office of the Secretariat + Staff, Cyrus R. Vance, + Secretary of State—1977–1980, Lot 84D241, Box 10, EXDIS + Memcons, 1977. Confidential; + Exdis. Drafted by Robert + Zimmerman (ARA/ECA); cleared by Bray and Terence A. Todman, (ARA); and approved by William Twaddell on February 4. The meeting took + place in the Secretary’s Office. + Washington, January 28, 1977, 11:30 + a.m. + + SUBJECT + U.S.-Brazilian Consultations + + + PARTICIPANTS + Brazil + Joao Baptista Pinheiro, + Brazilian Ambassador + United States + The Secretary + Warren M. Christopher, + Deputy Secretary + Terence A. Todman, + Assistant Secretary, ARA + Robert W. Zimmermann, ARA/ECA (Notetaker) + +

Following initial amenities, the Secretary said that yesterday Ambassador + Crimmins delivered a + messageSee Document + 398. from him to the Brazilian Foreign Minister and + he wanted to take this early opportunity to cover the ground with + Ambassador Pinheiro.

+

It was his strong conviction, the Secretary said, that great emphasis + must be placed on strengthening bilateral relations between the United + States and Brazil. Deputy Secretary Christopher will do so as well and, with Assistant + Secretary Todman, we will be very + well assisted in dealing with issues that arise. The Secretary stated + his firm belief that the two nations must consult across the whole range + of common problems. He then told Pinheiro that he had suggested to Silveira that we might start the + consultative process with some of the subgroups already in being. He + noted that Silveira had been + told that the U.S. is prepared to send a representative to Brazil to + exchange perspectives on the nuclear issue and that the Deputy Secretary + would be following this matter himself.

+

In his conversations with Schmidt + in Bonn, the Secretary continued, Vice President Mondale had conveyed President + Carter’s deep concern with + the problem of proliferation.See footnote 3, Document 398. In this + connection the U.S. will be prepared to discuss with Brazil the whole + range of possibilities for meeting Brazilian energy needs including a + guarantee of fuel for Brazil’s nuclear plants so that there would be no need for + reprocessing and enrichment facilities. Finally, the Secretary + emphasized that the concern with nuclear proliferation was global and in + no way directed at Brazil. The control of proliferation is very + important to future peace and order and a matter of general concern to + the United States Government.

+

Ambassador Pinheiro said he + wished to express his government’s appreciation for this early + initiative to resume the bilateral dialogue and said that he was aware + of the content of the Crimmins-Silveira conversation. He welcomed the Secretary’s + statement of the importance that the United States attaches to relations + between the two countries. Brazil, he said, totally reciprocates the + importance accorded to relations between the two countries; Brazil takes + pride in being a faithful friend and ally of the United States. There + are differences on some issues but this is not true in the case of + proliferation. Brazil has demonstrated its similar preoccupation with + this problem by signing the guarantees which cover its agreement with + Germany—guarantees which go beyond the NPT in renouncing peaceful nuclear explosions. In addition, + Brazil has signed the Treaty of Tlatelolco. Brazil, he emphasized, is + equally concerned about proliferation but the problem must be addressed + in relation to all aspects of the matter and must include those + countries which already have the pertinent technology. When Brazil did + not sign the NPT it was in protest + against vertical proliferation.Vertical + proliferation is an increase in the capabilities of the existing + nuclear powers while non-nuclear weapons states were prohibited from + developing nuclear capabilities. It is to be hoped that those + who have the technology will be equally circumscribed because the danger + is the same.

+

Ambassador Pinheiro said he did + not intend by these preliminary remarks to get into the kinds of details + that would arise in the fruitful discussions he hoped would take place. + Nevertheless, Brazil has certain limitations on the actions it can take. + Brazil cannot subordinate its sources of essential energy to the control + of even friendly countries such as the United States because attitudes + depend upon the political winds. For example, he said, in spite of the + belief that certain institutions should consider projects on their + merits, the United States conditions loans on other issues such as human + rights performance. Brazil cannot be dependent on one source outside + Brazil’s control. This became evident with relation to the oil exporting + countries. Brazil will be only too happy however to explore all areas of + mutual interest and consultations will strengthen the mutual purpose of + the two countries. He pointed out that in view of its growing specific + weight, Brazil is interested in a broad range of issues including + North-South relations and disarmament. It is only by close consultation that peace and order can + be achieved.

+

The Secretary said he would look forward to mutual cooperation to this + end. Pinheiro said he would + transmit to his government the views expressed by the Secretary and he + would only respectfully request the United States to try to look at the + nuclear problem from Brazil’s point of view as well. Brazil needs the + energy but is equally interested in the nonproliferation question.

+

Pinheiro then remarked that the + press was already aware that he was seeing the Secretary today. The + Secretary said that he had instructed the Department’s press people to + respond to questions by saying he had asked the Ambassador to come in to + talk about the broad range of common interests between the two countries + and how we might approach these mutual interests in a constructive way. + If the press inquired whether nuclear matters were discussed the answer + would be affirmative—that it was one of the subjects raised.In a second meeting with Vance on February 2, Pinheiro said that Silveira wished to emphasize that + his government wanted to hold meetings with the United States to + discuss the nuclear issue and that Brazil and the Federal Republic + of Germany remained committed to nuclear non-proliferation. However, + he stressed that the “Brazilian Government believes that an effort + to prevent the transfer of technology would be unjust and even + impossible to achieve” and he called the agreement between the + Federal Republic of Germany and Brazil “a valid, legally binding + instrument entered into by two states and supplemented by an + agreement on safeguards.” Vance thanked Pinheiro for passing on Silveira’s message and said that a Delegation led by + Deputy Secretary of State Warren + Christopher would visit Brazil on February 10 to + discuss the issue. While he “understood that Brazil considers the + agreement as legally binding,” Vance asked that it delay “implementation of the + agreement until after” Christopher’s visit. Pinheiro replied that he would “convey this point + immediately.” (Memorandum of Conversation, February 2; Department of + State, Office of the Secretariat Staff, Cyrus R. Vance, Secretary of State—1977–1980, Lot + 84D241, Box 10, EXDIS + Memcons, 1977) On February 3, + the Department of State instructed Walter Stoessel, the Ambassador to the + Federal Republic of Germany, to inform Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher about + Christopher’s trip and + that the United States considered the issue “of the highest + importance to USG and we intend to + approach these discussions from standpoint of reaching overall + solution, involving acceptable alternatives to transfer of + enrichment and processing plants to Brazil.” (Telegram 24890 to + Bonn, February 3; Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff + Material, North/South, Pastor + Country File, Box 2, Brazil, 1–2/77)

+
+ +
+ + 401. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security + Affairs (Brzezinski) to President + CarterSource: Carter Library, National + Security Affairs, Brzezinski + Material, Country File, Box 24, German Federal Republic, 1–3/77. + Secret. Carter initialed the + upper right-hand corner of the memorandum. + Washington, undated + + SUBJECT + The German-Brazilian Deal: The New Approach in More Detail + +

While all the details have not yet been worked out (these would be + submitted to you at a later date), the following general strategy has been approved by State, + ACDA, and Gerry Smith for a new approach + to the German-Brazilian deal:

+

—Acceptance of full scope safeguards by both Brazil and Argentina through + implementation of the Treaty of Tlatelolco.

+

—Mutual deferral of reprocessing by both countries in the interest of + each nation’s security vis-a-vis the other.

+

—Assistance to both nations at the front end of + the fuel cycle (since enrichment is less of a proliferation risk than + reprocessing), specifically:

+

transfer of German enrichment technology to Brazil,

+

heavy-water assistance (jointly by the US + and Canada) to Argentina.

+

Our hope for the success of this approach rests on the belief that: (a) + both Brazil and Argentina have a very strong interest in avoiding a + bilateral race toward acquiring a weapons capability; and, (b) neither + nation has fully thought through the implications of the path each is + now embarked on, in these terms. If both can be brought (with the help + of other affected regional powers such as Venezuela, Colombia and + Mexico) to see the advantage each gains in mutual + deferral of the weapons option, the plan may stand a reasonable + chance of success.

+

One tactical consideration poses a major problem. During the last round of + negotiations, the Brazilians made abundantly clear that they

+

deeply resented the fact that + we had first approached the Germans.The + Carter administration + scheduled a meeting between Christopher and a FRG Delegation headed by Ambassador Peter Hermes to discuss the nuclear + issue on February 10 and 11. Christopher arranged to “personally brief” + Ambassador Pinheiro about + the meeting. (Memorandum from Tuchman to Brzezinski and Aaron, February 10; Carter Library, National + Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Pastor Country File, Box 2, Brazil, + 1–2/77) During his meetings with Hermes, Christopher said that the Carter administration believed + that “it is urgent that we halt the transfer of sensitive + technologies leading to acquisition of weapons usable material.” + Hermes replied that + “proliferation is best met by development of adequate safeguards, + not by refusal to supply sensitive technologies, control of which in + any event is uncertain given relatively wide knowledge of basic + elements of sensitive technologies in question (particularly + reprocessing).” The Federal Republic of Germany, Hermes stressed, was “obligated by + its agreement with Brazil” to supply such materials. (Telegram 32301 + to Bonn and Paris, February 12; Carter Library, National Security + Affairs, Brzezinski Material, + Country File, Box 24, German Federal Republic, 1–3/77) Vance briefed Carter on Christopher’s discussion with + Hermes on February 11. + (Memorandum from Vance to + Carter, February 11; + ibid.) + They feel that if any deal is to be made it must be + struck with them and not imposed upon them by the Northern powers. + They feel that by going to the Germans first, we relegate them to + second class status.The CIA reported that “Brazil sees US efforts to halt the spread of + nuclear weapons technology as a deliberate attempt to impede the + country’s economic and technological development” while its military + leaders “firmly believe that a sine qua non of great power status is + the ability to explode a nuclear device.” Predicting a coming + decline in U.S. influence in Brazil, the CIA suggested that Brazil was now “willing to take + economic risks in its relations with the US on the nuclear issue.” (Intelligence Memorandum + RP–M–77–10022, February 11; Carter Library, National Security + Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Pastor Country File, Box 2, Brazil, 1–2/77) + On the other hand, we owe the Germans the consideration due a close + ally—particularly where major economic interests may be at stake.

+

I therefore recommend (with the concurrence of Smith and State), that you simply make + clear to Schmidt that we are + still working on devising some mutually acceptable solution to this + problem, that we have some new ideas, and that Smith will be coming to Bonn to discuss + them.

+

If you approve this strategy, your points to Schmidt would simply be:

+

—We are deeply concerned about recent events in Argentina, which point + strongly to a regional race towards acquiring nuclear weapons + capability.Carter drew a check mark in the right-hand margin + next to this paragraph.

+

—We (Germany and the US) share a heavy + responsibility to do everything possible to avoid such a + development.

+

—This is too important an issue for the US to ignore, but at the same time, we are determined that + it not sour our relations with the FRG.

+

—We are developing some new ideas—which protect Germany’s economic + interests. When they are fully developed, Gerry Smith will be coming to Bonn to discuss them with + you.

+ +

Decision:

+

______ General strategy:Carter checked the “Approve” + option.

+

______ Tactics with Schmidt:Carter checked the “Approve” option.

+
+ +
+ 402. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in + MexicoSource: National + Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign + Policy File, D770051–0353. Confidential; Immediate. Sent Immediate + for information to USUN and the + Mission in Geneva. Sent for information to all American Republic + diplomatic posts. Drafted by Robert Einhorn (ACDA/NTB); cleared by + Oplinger, Tuchman, + Michael Congdon (ACDA/IR), John + King (ARA/RPP), George Falk (ARA/MEX), Giles Harlow (DOD), David Macuk (IO/UNP) and Edward + McGaffigan (T); and approved by Charles Van Doren + (ACDA/NTB). + Washington, February 12, 1977, + 1555Z +

32669. Subject: US Position on Protocol + IProtocol I of the Treaty of Tlatelolco + bound overseas nations with territories in Latin America—the United + States, the United Kingdom, France, and the Netherlands—to the terms + of the treaty, which prohibited the manufacture, testing, storage, + and use of nuclear weapons in Latin America. of Treaty of + Tlatelolco. Ref: Mexico 1413.In telegram + 1413 from Mexico City, February 5, Ambassador Jova told the + Department of State that Mexican President Jose Lopez Portillo might raise + the subject of non-proliferation during his forthcoming meeting with + President Carter. (National + Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign + Policy File, D770041–0835) Pass to Ilene Heaphy, + SaturdayFebruary 12. a.m.

+

1. Department is aware that General Conference of Organization for the + Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (OPANAL), at its April 1975 session, + adopted resolution calling on US, France + and USSR to adhere to protocols to + Treaty of Tlatelolco (Protocol I in case of US and France, II in case of USSR) and declaring that if such adherence is not achieved + by February 14, 1977, OPANAL would + “submit the situation created” to the UN + Security Council. Presumably, one of the reasons for upcoming + extraordinary session of General Conference, scheduled on February 14 + deadline (which is tenth anniversary of opening for signature of Treaty + of Tlatelolco), is to draw attention to non-compliance of nuclear powers with above + resolution and to consider further action on issue, perhaps decision to + bring matter to Security Council.

+

2. As Embassy knows, we have taken the position toward Protocol I that + neither the Virgin Islands nor Puerto Rico could be included in the + nuclear-free zone because the Virgin Islands were part of US Territory and Puerto Rico has a special + relationship with the US. However, we + have held that Guantanamo could be included if Cuba joined the Treaty + and that the Treaty would apply to the Canal Zone when jurisdiction over + the Zone returned to Panama under the Treaty currently being + negotiated.

+

3. The new administration is presently conducting a thorough, interagency + examination of US non-proliferation + policy, and we would expect, in this connection, to review US attitude toward Protocol I, which has + not been reviewed since the mid-1960s. Therefore, while no decision has + been taken to alter our Protocol I position as described above, we would + hope that it would be possible, in connection with the upcoming General + Conference, to avoid taking a posture that could convey to OPANAL members the impression that we + were overly rigid and unresponsive to their appeals that we reconsider + the matter. Such an impression could encourage the members to proceed + with any plans they may have to bring the protocols adherence issue to + the UN Security Council. We strongly + want to avoid such an action, not only because it might appear to raise + questions about our commitment to non-proliferation, but because it + could bring the sensitive issues of the Canal Zone negotiations and + US-Cuban relations to a highly + visible and politicized forum.

+

4. Embassy is therefore requested to convey the following points to + OPANAL officials in manner + deemed most appropriate (we would not object to circulation by OPANAL of any written communication to + OPANAL members):

+

A. The US Government wishes to express + its continuing support for the Treaty of Tlatelolco, as evidenced by its + adherence to additional Protocol II of the Treaty,Protocol II calls upon nuclear-weapon states to + agree to respect the obligations set forth in the Treaty and to + promise not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against + Contracting Parties to the Treaty. See Foreign + Relations, 1964–1968, vol. XI, Arms Control and + Disarmament, 1964–1968, Document 226. and its hope + for the widest possible adherence to the Treaty and its additional + protocols, by Latin American states and states located outside the + region.

+

B. With respect to the appeal contained in Resolution 74 (IV), adopted + April 17, 1975 by the General Conference of OPANAL, the US Government + wishes to state that it is presently conducting a thorough examination of its nuclear + non-proliferation policy, which will include a review of the question of + US adherence to additional Protocol + I of the Treaty of Tlatelolco.

+

C. The US Government intends to maintain + close contact with OPANAL on this + question.

+

5. Embassy should not speculate on the outcome or timing of US review. It is likely that question of + possible US adherence to Protocol I will + be handled in more extended time frame than general non-proliferation + review.

+

6. Embassy is requested to report as soon as possible on any developments + regarding possible move to bring Protocol I question to Security + Council.Ambassador Thompson reported + that his presentation to OPANAL, + including the administration’s decision to review the question of + Protocol I, “was well-received and the most noteworthy event of the + session.” (Telegram 1826 from Mexico City, February 15; National + Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign + Policy File, D770053–1212)

+ + Vance + +
+ +
+ 403. Editorial Note +

On February 16, 1977, President Jimmy + Carter told Department of Agriculture employees that he + was “moving aggressively” to “eliminate the possibility of additional + nations being able to build atomic weapons,” and specifically cited his + attempts “to induce the Germans not to sell nuclear processing + capability to the Brazilians.” (“President Carter Discusses Foreign Affairs Priorities,” Department + of State Bulletin, March 21, 1977, pp. 265–266) + The Department of State transmitted Carter’s remarks to the Embassy in Brazil on February 18 + in telegram 37480. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770057–0845) The + Brazilian government, however, continued to resist Carter’s entreaties. Nogueira Batista, + the President of NUCLEBRAS, Brazil’s state-supported nuclear energy + company, said that Carter had + caused “serious problems” between the United States and Brazil by trying + to “pressure” Brazil and West Germany to either suspend or abrogate + their nuclear deal. Batista also said that the “Americans acted like + amateurs in foreign policy.” (Telegram 1352 from Brasilia, February 18; + National Archives, RG 59, Central + Foreign Policy File, D770058–0849) Foreign Minister Silveira said that Brazil “had nothing + to fear from President + Carter’s statement,” + reiterated Brazil’s and the Federal Republic of Germany’s determination + to go forward with the deal, and gave Batista “a vote of confidence.” + Pressure from Washington, he said, “will get nowhere.” (Telegram 1414 + from Brasilia, February 18; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770059–0315)

+
+ +
+ 404. Telegram From the Embassy in Brazil to the Department of + StateSource: National + Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign + Policy File, D770071–0248. Secret; Niact Immediate; Exdis. In a March 6 memorandum to + Mondale, Christopher said that Silveira “took a hard stand” + during their meeting and “reacted with disinterest” to Christopher’s attempts to explore + “bilateral and multilateral alternatives to Brazil’s plan to acquire + national enrichment and reprocessing facilities.” (National + Archives, RG 59, Papers of Warren Christopher, Withdrawn + Items, Box 5, Chronological Files, Memoranda to the Secretary, 1977) + In his memoirs, Brzezinski + recalled that Silveira + received Christopher “very + coldly,” and “his public reception was even worse. Popular + anti-American sentiment was running high, and the trip only served + to strengthen President Ernest Geisel’s position on this issue.” The Christopher Mission, Brzezinski wrote, “did not succeed, + and it weakened American credibility.” (Brzezinski, Power and + Principle, p. 131) + Brasilia, March 2, + 1977, 0345Z +

1616. Subject: Discussions on Nuclear Cooperation.

+

1. In full day of discussions with Foreign Minister Silveira and GOB officials, Deputy Secretary Christopher:

+

—Impressed upon Brazilians, in context of President Carter’s letter to Geisel,Not + found. strength of US + opposition to spread of nuclear explo-sive capabilities and + directly-related enrichment and reprocessing technologies.

+

—Presented for joint discussion and consideration alternatives to + national enrichment and reprocessing designed to meet energy needs while + reducing proliferation dangers.

+

—Stressed that US seeks neither + commercial advantage nor abrogation of FRG-Brazil deal by either party, but made clear that + sensitive transfers should be deferred pending full examination of + alternatives.

+

2. In response, Silveira + emphatically and repeatedly refused to suspend in any way, either + privately or publicly, any element of agreement with FRG. Most he would accept—after being + pressed hard by Deputy + Secretary—was to continue conversations on this matter and to consider + alternatives proposed by US. He said + that his mandate, from Geisel did + not give him any further latitude.

+

3. Silveira reiterated GOB support of nuclear power to meet + energy needs, opposition to nuclear weapons (but not specifying + explosives) proliferation reliance on international safeguards as + fundamental policy tenet, unwillingness to accept discrimination in + technology access, and determination to reduce dependency on outside + energy sources. Beyond this, new elements of GOB position were:

+

—An intimation of willingness to forego PNE’s, even beyond scope of trilateral agreement with + FRG and IAEA;

+

—Acknowledgment that GOB considers + itself bound to take no action inconsistent with the provisions of + Treaty of Tlatelolco as long as other signatories do not violate them; + and

+

—Readiness to consider further unspecified international + non-proliferation undertakings, particularly as regards safeguards, as + long as there is no abrogation of existing agreements.

+

4. US side welcomed GOB statements supporting limited + non-proliferation objective, but emphasized concern with spread of + nuclear weapons, usable material and sensitive technology, and view that + safeguards were necessary but not sufficient to prevent nuclear + spread.

+

5. In elaboration of possible alternatives to national enrichment and + reprocessing, US side discussed + bilateral, multilateral and international arrangements for assuring + supplies of reactor fuel and described possibilities for international + evaluation of fuel cycle, including reactor technologies, spent fuel + storage, and reprocessing and its alternatives. To provide for GOB participation in latter, US side outlined international mechanism + based on bilateral consultations among interested countries with current + and planned major nuclear energy programs—with multilateral meetings as + appropriate. In his only “observation”, Silveira welcomed our clarification that bilaterals + would not be exclusively with the US.) + US side also reported willingness of + France to back up fuel supply to Brazil and French agreement not to + place FRG or Brazil at commercial + disadvantage. US outlined possibilities + for non-nuclear energy cooperation, which Silveira expressed strong interest in pursuing.

+

6. At conclusion of talks, Deputy Secretary made clear—and Silveira appeared to register—that + GOB now faces key choice for energy + security: it can consider multilateral alternatives to meet its energy + needs, or it can accept risks to its nuclear program by proceeding on + its present course. Deputy Secretary summed up message he wanted + Silveira to take away with + him as follows: (A) President Carter is deeply committed to halting nuclear spread; + (B) We have suggested alternatives to Brazil, which we will summarize in + writing after return; (C) We expect GOB to seriously consider + these proposals, which we believe will benefit Brazil and the + international community, and will forestall proliferation; (D) We ask + Brazil to take no irretrievable steps prejudicing availability of + alternatives; and (E) US will continue + consultations regarding proposals with other interested States, + understands that GOB will be back in + touch as it considers these proposals, and is prepared to meet again + with GOB any time and any place.

+

7. Brazilians proved highly suspicious of and resistant to US suggestion that joint press statement be + issued, arguing that any statement would imply GOB readiness to suspend FRG agreement. When faced with prospect of independent + US statement, however, GOB side finally agreed to issue following + jointly agreed text: Quote the two parties exchanged views on nuclear + matters and energy needs. Each side will consider the positions + expressed by the other. There will be further talks on these matters. + End quote.

+

8. Comment: For the most part, Silveira projected some of this reaction we judge to be + posturing, which at times bordered on the offensive. He pointedly + indicated that he was prepared to do no more than to listen to what + US had to say, just as Brazil would + listen to “any other” friendly country. As we engaged Brazilians on + issues raised by FRG agreement, others + on the GOB side clearly insisted that + Silveira voice even more + forceful opposition to reopening the agreement in any way. At several + points, Silveira sought to leave + impression that GOB was prepared to + accept attenuation of bilateral relationship if that were price of going + ahead with nuclear accord. In the end, however, Silveira very grudgingly agreed to + consider US suggested alternatives—a + word he refused to accept, preferring “proposals”—and to hold further + talks.

+ + Crimmins + +
+ +
+ 405. Editorial Note +

On March 7, 1977, Deputy Secretary of State Warren Christopher urged President Jimmy Carter to take advantage of West + German Chancellor Helmut + Schmidt’s recent “flexibility,” displayed in a February 23 + letter to Carter, in order to + “forestall sensitive transfers to Brazil” without damaging the U.S.-West + German relationship. (Memorandum From Christopher to Carter, March 7; National Archives, RG 59, Papers of Warren Christopher, Withdrawn Items, + Box 5, Chronological Files, Memoranda to the Secretary, 1977)

+ +

On March 8, Carter wrote Schmidt + that he remained “profoundly concerned with the spread of sensitive + enrichment and reprocessing facilities which are capable of producing + materials which can be rapidly used in nuclear weapons.” In particular, + Carter worried that despite + safeguards, such materials could either be diverted to weapons + production or agreements could be abrogated by “governments tempted by + ready access” to nuclear materials. Transfers of nuclear material, the + President argued, would “establish a very adverse global precedent at + the very time when we should be moving to lessen the risk of nuclear + explosions.” Carter instead + urged Schmidt to defer “the + enrichment and reprocessing elements of your nuclear agreement with + Brazil pending joint examination of the alternatives,” and noted that + Christopher would travel to + West Germany at the end of the week to discuss non-proliferation. + Carter, however, stressed + that he sought neither “the abrogation of your agreement nor commercial + disadvantage for Germany or Brazil.” (Carter Library, National Security + Affairs, Brzezinski Material, + Country File, German Federal Republic: 1–3/77)

+

Brazilian President Ernesto + Geisel, meanwhile, announced what Ambassador John Crimmins called Brazil’s + “steadfast views on nuclear policy.” In particular, Geisel reiterated his government’s + determination to develop a peaceful yet independent nuclear program. + Crimmins warned that + Geisel’s statement indicated + that the “FRG–GOB agreement is all or nothing, and a lack of equitable + international nuclear cooperation could frustrate arms nonproliferation + objectives by stimulating the development of unsafeguarded nuclear + technology.” (Telegram 1898 from Brasilia, March 10; National Archives, + RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + D770083–0431)

+

Carter raised the proliferation + issue in a meeting with West German Foreign Minister Hans Dietrich Genscher on March 14, in + which he repeated his call for “multilateral solutions” to the problem + of nuclear non-proliferation and pledged that the United States was + “prepared to do more than we have in the past.” Genscher replied that the Federal + Republic of Germany had historically been committed to + non-proliferation, and said that it would fulfill its agreement with + Brazil. He also argued that “the more certain Brazil is” that Bonn would + fulfill its nuclear agreement, “the greater will be Brazil’s willingness + to abide by multilateral restraints.” The Federal Republic of Germany, + he stressed, could be “more flexible if it is not perceived to be under + United States pressure.” Carter + promised that he would make “special efforts to indicate that we trust + Brazil and regard non-proliferation as a world-wide problem. We do not + distrust any nation, but we do not want to add another country to the + list of those that can explode bombs.” (Memorandum of Conversation, + March 14; Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box + 24, German Federal Republic, 1–3/77)

+
+ +
+ + 406. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security + Affairs (Brzezinski) to Secretary + of State Vance, Secretary of + Defense Brown, and the Director + of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (Warnke)Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, + North/South, Pastor Subject, + Treaty of Tlatelolco, Box 66, Brazil, 3–12/77. Secret. + Washington, April + 7, 1977 + + SUBJECT + Protocol I of the Treaty of Tlatelolco + +

Attached is a decision memorandum on whether the United States should + adhere to Protocol I of the Treaty of Tlatelolco on creating a Nuclear + Free Zone in Latin America.

+

Please state your Department’s preferences on the options presented by + COB Monday, Apr 11, 1977, so that the President will have time to + consider whether or not he would like to include an announcement on + adherence in his Pan American Day speech on April 14.

+

Zbigniew + Brzezinski

+

Attachment

+

Decision MemorandumSecret.

+

Washington, April 6, 1977

+ + SUBJECT + U.S. Adherence to Protocol I of the Treaty of Tlatelolco + +

The Issue

+

Whether we should adhere to Protocol I to the Treaty for the Prohibition + of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco), which would + obligate us to prohibit and prevent the testing, use, manufacture, + storage, installation, deployment, or possession of nuclear weapons in + territories located in Latin America for which we are internationally + responsible—principally Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands, Guantanamo + Naval Base, and the Canal Zone.

+ +

Background

+

The U.S. supported the negotiation of the Treaty of Tlatelolco, which was + concluded in 1967, and in 1971 adhered to its Protocol II, under which + nuclear weapon states undertake to respect the nuclear-free zone and to + refrain from using nuclear weapons against its parties. (The UK, France, and China have also joined + Protocol II, while the USSR has not.) + However, citing primarily the integral relationship to the U.S. of + Puerto Rico as well as its importance to hemispheric defense, we have + stated that we were not prepared to adhere to Protocol I. (Of the three + other states eligible to adhere, the UK + and the Netherlands have joined, while France has not.)

+

U.S. adherence to Protocol I would eliminate one of the few remaining + requirements specified in the Treaty of Tlatelolco for the full entry + into force of the nuclear-free zone regime, which would involve + commitments by all Latin American states to forswear acquisition of + nuclear weapons and to accept IAEA + safeguards on all their nuclear facilities. (The remaining requirements + would be Soviet adherence to Protocol II, French adherence to Protocol + I, and Cuban and Argentine ratification of the Treaty of Tlatelolco. + Brazil has already ratified, but unlike most other Latin American states + that have done so, has exercised its right under the Treaty not to be + bound until all the specified conditions are met.)

+

When the question of U.S. adherence to Protocol I was last reviewed + internally, a Strategic Air Command squadron equipped with nuclear + weapons was deployed at Ramsey Air Force Base in Puerto Rico and nuclear + anti-submarine warfare devices were stored at Roosevelt Roads Naval + Station in Puerto Rico. At present, however, we do not deploy or store + nuclear weapons in any Protocol I territory. Moreover, while we continue + to have operational requirements for nuclear-armed naval vessels to call + at ports in the zone and to pass through the Panama Canal as well as to + patrol and conduct training exercises in the Caribbean area, U.S. + adherence would not abridge transit rights or freedom of navigation on + the high seas, and therefore those requirements would not be + affected.

+

U.S. adherence would, however, rule out existing contingency plans, which + could be activated at a time of advanced readiness, for transferring + nuclear depth charges to Roosevelt Roads for use by the squadron of P–3 + ASW aircraft stationed there. Alternatives would be available for + performing the ASW mission envisaged in those plans [2 + lines not declassified] although these alternatives could + involve some loss of [3 lines not + declassified]

+

A potentially controversial legal matter involves a provision of the + Treaty of Tlatelolco specifying that, upon fulfillment of all + requirements for full entry into force, the Treaty’s zone of application + would expand to a large area + extending at some points up to 1500 miles from the Latin American coast. + While the authors of the Treaty presumably intended this provision to + have some constraining effect, our legal analysis indicates that the + activation of this “extended zone of application” would not have any + practical effect on U.S. obligations under Protocol I and II, and would + therefore not in any way restrict U.S. freedom of navigation on the high + seas surrounding Latin America. However, to insure against future + controversy, we would want to place our interpretation of this provision + on record at the time we signed the Protocol and deposited our + instrument of ratification (presumably after consulting with key treaty + parties and determining that they would not object to our + interpretation).

+

Advantages of U.S. Adherence

+

—Would have a favorable effect on U.S. relations with Latin America, + particularly with Mexico, the principal sponsor of the Treaty, and + Panama.

+

—Would generate pressures for Soviet adherence to Protocol II, which + would obligate the Soviets not to store or deploy nuclear weapons in any + Latin American territory.

+

—Would enhance prospects for adherence to the Treaty of Tlatelolco by + Brazil, Argentina and Cuba although the latter two would still have the + legal power to block the Treaty’s full entry into force if they + considered it in their interest to do so. (In the absence of such + adherence, there is a serious risk that Argentina and Brazil will follow + the Indian route to a nuclear explosive capability.)

+

—Would not affect any current U.S. operational requirements or + deployments.

+

Disadvantages of U.S. Adherence

+

—Would rule out existing contingency plans for storing nuclear ASW + devices in Puerto Rico, although alternative (perhaps less optimal) + means for implementing those plans would be available.

+

—Would limit U.S. flexibility to deal with possible future threats in the + Caribbean and South America by deploying or storing nuclear weapons in + our Protocol I territories.

+

—If we adhered without requiring adherence by other holdouts (e.g., Cuba, + USSR), could be perceived as + giving up military options in the Caribbean area without requiring + reciprocal restraints and as reducing the leverage we might otherwise + have for inducing those holdouts to take corresponding actions.

+

Options

+

(1) Continue existing policy.

+ +

(2) Adhere to Protocol I without conditions. If + this option were chosen, it could be announced in the April 14 Pan + American Day speech, although it would be important to contact the + Puerto Rican government before any announcement in order to confirm that + they would not have objections.

+

(3) Adhere to Protocol I when Cuba joins the Treaty and + the USSR joins Protocol II. + If this option were chosen, it is assumed that, in view of the + sensitivity of current discussions with Cuba, we would proceed through + diplomatic channels rather than through an announcement in the April 14 + speech, which might be resented by the Cubans as placing public pressure + on them. While this option would reduce possible criticism on the + grounds that we had not required reciprocal restraints by others, it + could entangle Protocol I in other U.S.-Cuban and U.S.-Soviet matters, + and thereby delay U.S. adherence and any benefits resulting + therefrom.

+

(4) Adhere to Protocol I when all other requirements + for full entry into force of the Treaty of Tlatelolco are + fulfilled. Since the focus on Cuba would be diluted, this could + be announced on April 14 or pressed through diplomatic channels. + Although this option would ensure full reciprocity, it could delay U.S. + adherence indefinitely and might be criticized by Latin Americans as + imposing unreasonable conditions on U.S. adherence.

+
+ +
+ 407. Memorandum From the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament + Agency (Warnke) to the + President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, + Staff Material, North/South, Pastor Subject, Treaty of Tlatelolco, Box 66, + Brazil, 3–12/77. Secret. Copies were sent to Vance and Brown. + Washington, April + 11, 1977 + + SUBJECT + Protocol I of the Treaty of Tlatelolco + +

ACDA believes that the military costs + of US adherence to Protocol I—primarily + the constraint on contingency plans for storing nuclear anti-submarine + warfare devices in Puerto Rico—are modest compared to the benefits of + improving our relations with Latin America and strengthening international support for our global + non-proliferation efforts. In addition, such adherence could increase + the likelihood of a Soviet pledge not to deploy or store nuclear weapons + anywhere in Latin America and a commitment by Argentina, Brazil and Cuba + not to acquire nuclear weapons or permit them to be deployed on their + territories.

+

We favor option two of the options listed in the + decision memorandum.See attachment to Document 406. Announcement of our + decision to adhere in a major Presidential address on April 14 would + maximize the favorable impact of that decision on US relations with Latin America. Equally + important, in our view, such an announcement would be a valuable means + of strengthening international support for the Administration’s + non-proliferation policies. Nonaligned recipients of nuclear technology, + whether or not located in Latin America, would welcome US adherence to Protocol I as demonstrating + our willingness to bear our fair share of responsibility for curbing + proliferation and as balancing an approach to non-proliferation that has + been criticized by some as requiring recipients to make the greatest + sacrifices, especially in terms of foregoing access to nuclear + technologies.

+

We also regard option two as a more promising means of achieving + corresponding restraints by the USSR, + Cuba and Argentina than if we made US + adherence conditional on acceptance of restraints by those states. + Making our adherence conditional on actions by others would, in effect, + place us in a bilateral negotiation with each of them, with the risk + that the Tlatelolco issue would get entangled with unrelated matters of + bilateral concern and the strong likelihood that, forced to view the + situation essentially as a bargain with the US, the other states would be reluctant to accept a bargain + that clearly requires greater concessions by them than by the US. The result might well be continued + impasse.

+

On the other hand, US adherence without + conditions can be expected to stimulate Latin American proponents of the + Treaty of Tlatelolco, who would be encouraged by enhanced prospects for + early completion of the Treaty regime, to apply pressure on the + remaining holdouts to accept their respective obligations. While there + is of course no guarantee that such pressure will succeed, we feel that + it will be more effective than the modest, and perhaps + counterproductive, leverage we could bring to bear on the holdouts + directly.

+

If the President decides to announce a new Protocol I position on April + 14, we believe it would be important to brief key Congressmen in advance + and to consult with the Governor of Puerto Rico. In addition, in implementing such a + decision, it would be necessary to develop a statement of understandings + to accompany our signature and ratification of Protocol I that would + place on record our interpretation that the Tlatelolco regime does not + affect transit rights or freedom of navigation on the high seas.

+ + Paul C. + Warnke + +
+ +
+ 408. Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the Department of + State (Tarnoff) to the + President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P77065–0426. + Secret. + Washington, April + 12, 1977 + + SUBJECT + Protocol I of the Treaty of Tlatelolco + +

The Department of State prefers option 2 of the four options set forth in + the decision memorandum attached to your memorandum of April 7 on the + above subject.See attachment to Document 406. State believes that + careful attention should be given to the political effects on our + relations with Puerto Rico of an immediate signing of the Protocol. The + people of Puerto Rico have a strong interest in the nuclear status of + their territory. We, therefore, concur in the importance of ascertaining + in advance of any announcement that Puerto Rico would not object to our + adherence.

+

The Department of State also believes that our adherence (both signature + and ratification) should be made subject to understandings which restate + the U.S. position that:

+

(1) rights of transit and transport, and of innocent passage, through + parties’ territories are not affected; and

+

(2) all explosive nuclear applications are + prohibited by the Treaty and Protocol.

+

In announcing our intent to sign Protocol I, we should underscore our + interest in adherence by all states of the region, and in ratification + of the Protocols by all eligible countries. We could also add that + expeditious ratification by the U.S. would be aided by progress toward + full entry into force of the + Treaty. Such a statement should stop short of making U.S. ratification + explicitly conditional on other ratifications.

+ + Peter + Tarnoff + Executive Secretary + + +
+ +
+ 409. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense Brown to the President’s Assistant for National Security + Affairs (Brzezinski)Source: Washington National Records + Center, OSD Records, FRC 330–84–0067, Latin America MWFZ, + April 1977. Secret. + Washington, April + 12, 1977 + + SUBJECT + Protocol I of the Treaty of Tlatelolco (U) + +

(S) The Department of Defense has reviewed the draft decision + memorandumSee the attachment to Document 406. on U.S. Adherence to + Protocol I of the Treaty of Tlatelolco and prefers Option One with + further study to determine the legal and operational implications, + particularly for U.S. transit rights in the geographic area of the + Treaty.

+

(S) The DOD does not support the premise + that U.S. adherence to Protocol I would not affect the right of U.S. + warships and aircraft to conduct transits, port visits, training + exercises, and patrols within the Caribbean area. Freedom of navigation + which is fundamental to our national security could be jeopardized by + adherence to this protocol. The precedent of accepting limitations on + U.S. sovereignty over U.S. territory, plus constraints on operational + use, deployments, and contingency options in the Caribbean is + inadvisable at this time.

+

(S) To encourage Soviet adherence to Protocol II, the Secretary General + of the Latin America Nuclear Weapons Free Zone organization (OPANAL) recently made a new proposal. + The new OPANAL formulationTelegram 80379 to Mexico City, April 9, explained that “While we + support OPANAL efforts to + encourage Soviet adherence to Protocol II, we are concerned by + formula reportedly proposed to Soviets by OPANAL Secretary General Gros Espiell as possible basis for + such adherence (i.e., interpretative statement that Article I of + Treaty of Tlatelolco prohibits transit of nuclear weapons through + the territory encompassed by the Treaty). Proposed interpretation,” + the Department of State contended, “would be inconsistent with + position on transit issue taken by states which participated in + negotiation of Treaty of Tlatelolco as well as by us.” (National + Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign + Policy File, D770124–1121) would interpret the treaty as + “prohibiting” transit of nuclear weapons through the treaty territory. + This interpretation, if accepted, would prohibit transit of U.S. nuclear + weapons in the treaty area under Protocol II (Tab D).Tab D is not attached.

+

(U) When other requirements for full entry into force of the Treaty of + Tlatelolco are fulfilled, the U.S. should re-examine its policy + regarding U.S. adherence. Presently there appears to be no compelling + reason to accept constraints on U.S. freedom in the Caribbean.

+

(U) The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff concurs in this matter.

+ + Harold + Brown + +
+ +
+ 410. Editorial Note +

On April 7, 1977, President Jimmy + Carter announced that after “an extremely thorough review + of all the issues that bear on the use of nuclear power,” including his + concern that nuclear materials ostensibly designated for peaceful + purposes could be diverted into weapons, he had concluded that the + United States must work with other nations to explore “a wide range of + international approaches and frameworks that will permit all nations to + achieve their energy objectives while reducing the spread of nuclear + explosive capability.” (Public Papers: Carter, 1977, pp. + 587–588)

+

A week later, Carter addressed + the Permanent Council of the Organization of American States and + promised to sign Protocol I of the Treaty of Tlatelolco. However, he + said that “banning the spread of nuclear explosives does not require + giving up the benefits of peaceful technology.” The United States, he + assured his audience, would “work closely with all of you on new + technologies to use the atom for peaceful purposes.” (Public Papers: Carter, + 1977, pp. 611–616) The Department of State forwarded Carter’s remarks to all American + Republic diplomatic posts in + telegram 85145, April 15. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770132–0029)

+

Alfonso García Robles, the + Mexican diplomat who was “one of the principal architects” of the Treaty + of Tlatelolco, “expressed great pleasure at” the announcement. (Telegram + 2849 from the Mission in Geneva, April 19; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + D770135–0628) OPANAL Secretary + General Hector Gros Espiell + echoed those sentiments on April 20. (Telegram 3979 from Caracas, April + 21; National Archives, RG 59, Central + Foreign Policy File, D770140–0286)

+

The Department of State also instructed the Ambassador to Brazil, + John Crimmins, to tell the + Brazilian government that Carter’s decision to sign Protocol I would hopefully lead to + “full participation in the treaty by other states, including (although + not singling out) Brazil.” Nevertheless, the Carter administration wanted to + reassure Brazil that it did not “wish to reinforce any GOB suspicions that we are adhering to + Protocol I specifically as a lever on Brazil.” The United States was + “not only ‘preaching’ to others about nuclear risks,” but would “place + some restraints on our own actions in furtherance of nonproliferation + goals.” (Telegram 92303 to Brasilia, April 23; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + P840086–0918)

+
+ +
+ + 411. Telegram From the Embassy in Venezuela to the Department of + StateSource: National + Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign + Policy File, D770139–0423. Confidential. Sent for information to + Brasilia, Buenos Aires, Mexico City, Moscow, Paris, and the Mission + to the International Atomic Energy Agency. The U.S. Representative + to OPANAL, Viron Vaky, + reiterated Carter’s decision + to sign Protocol I to OPANAL on + April 20. His statement is in telegram 93329 to all American + Republic diplomatic posts, April 26. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + D770144–1038) After Vaky’s statement, the Brazilian representative + “pledged to do nothing which would frustrate the objectives of the + treaty and reiterated Brazil’s support for the cause of + non-proliferation of nuclear weapons in Latin America.” OPANAL subsequently adopted a + resolution “urging” Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Cuba to “become + parties to the treaty and to waive the preconditions to bring the + treaty into effect.” (Telegram 93330 to all American Republic + diplomatic posts, April 26. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + D770144–1027) + Caracas, April 21, 1977, 1920Z +

3975. Subject: Latin American Non-Proliferation Consultations.

+

1. Amembassy utilized occasion of OPANAL meeting in Caracas to discuss OPANAL matters and other + non-proliferation related questions with several delegations and with + OPANAL and Venezuelan officials. + In an initial conversation between OPANAL Secretary General Gros + Espiell, Ambassador took the occasion to reiterate to + Gros + USG concern over the position he had + taken with the Soviets on transit (see Mexico 5368).Telegram 5368 from Mexico City, April 18, reported + that Gros Espiell “was + delighted and encouraged” by Carter’s announcement that he would sign Protocol I. + (National Archives, RG 59, Central + Foreign Policy File, D770134–0706) Ambassador emphasized the + fact that the position Gros had + taken with the Soviets (that Article I of the treaty prohibited transit + of nuclear weapons and therefore the Soviets could become party to + Protocol II) was wholly inconsistent with the understanding that had + permitted the U.S. to become part of the Protocol II and now to take the + step of becoming party to Protocol I. Gros stated he did not wish to take any action which + would undercut the position of the U.S. or complicate prospects for + ratification of Protocol I. Accordingly, Gros said he intended to drop the entire matter.

+

2. We also took the occasion to ask Gros his assessment of the prospects for the other steps + being taken to bring the treaty into effect. Gros stated that the action by the + U.S. greatly improves chances for the additional steps to be taken, + though he cautioned that each of them could take some time. We asked in + particular about Argentina. Gros + said he had received some tentative indications that the Argentines + might prefer the Treaty of Tlatelolco to either the NPT or the British full scope safeguards model as a means of + becoming a full field cycle safeguard state, but they had not pursued + the question with him recently.The Embassy + in Argentina reported that the Argentine Government considered the + ratification of the Treaty “a difficult matter which was presently + being studied.” (Telegram 2917 from Buenos Aires, April 20; National + Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign + Policy File, D770138–0202)

+

3. During a cocktail reception after the opening session given by the + Foreign Minister, Ambassador had the opportunity to have a short private + discussion with the Foreign Minister. During these discussions U.S. + Representatives emphasized their appreciation for the Foreign Minister’s + kind remarks concerning President Carter’s decision to sign Protocol I and stressed the + importance the U.S. attached to having countries, such as Venezuela, + continuing to speak out in favor of non-proliferation. Otherwise, there + was a risk that non-proliferation would be viewed as a matter of sole + interest to the super powers. The Foreign Minister assured U.S. Reps + that was not the case and that Venezuela would continue to support U.S. + non-proliferation initiatives. We also pointed out that it would now be + easier for the U.S. to take other quiet steps to assist the actions of + Mexico, Venezuela and others to bring the treaty into force. U.S. Reps + pointed out that it would have been difficult for the U.S. to raise this + matter with other countries, such as the Soviets, so long as we + ourselves had not decided to ratify both protocols. U.S. Reps suggested + in turn that Argentina and others in Latin America were not good + candidates for American persuasion and that it would be more useful if + the Latin American countries themselves kept up the momentum. The + Foreign Minister agreed and said he would raise the question with the + Argentines when they are in Caracas for a state visit on May 11–16. He + stated “we do have some influence on the Argentines”. Finally, U.S. Reps + pointed out that more ambitious efforts would be needed in the future to + deal with the potential problems of reconciling peaceful uses of the + atom with the dangers of proliferation and that the U.S. would be + spending substantial sums to investigate alternative, inherently safer + nuclear technologies. Moreover, it may be necessary to create new + international institutions or enhance the role of existing international + institutions to reduce the dangers inherent in nuclear power. The + Foreign Minister agreed and stated that it might be possible for OPANAL to play such a role, either in + carrying out such tasks or in planning and coordinating work which might + be carried out by the nations themselves, or by new regional + institutions. He thought these matters required further consideration + and study, and stated that President Perez will probably wish to discuss + these questions directly with President Carter when he makes his state visit.Venezuelan President Carlos Andres Pérez was scheduled to make a state + visit to Washington in late June.

+ +

4. In a conversation on April 20, the head of the Mexican Delegation, + Gonzalez Galves of the + Mexican Foreign Ministry reiterated strongly the point made in Mexico + City 5505Telegram 5505 does not refer to + Carter’s decision. + Reference is likely to telegram 5431 from Mexico City, April 16, + which contained the text of Mexican President José López Portillo’s + congratulations to Carter + for his decision to sign Protocol I. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + D770133–0526) that the government of Mexico was particularly + pleased with the step taken by Pres. + Carter. Gonzalez Galves stressed that the + American action will make it much easier to put real pressure on the + Soviet in particular, and also on the Argentines to ratify Protocol II + and the basic treaty respectively. He thought Cuba might be a somewhat + more difficult case in the near term though he was optimistic about the + eventual outcome. As for the French, he thought they would be last, but + that it was just a matter of time before they too became party to + Protocol I.

+

5. Comment: OPANAL officials and + others with whom U.S. Reps spoke had ample reasons of their own to wish + to stress publicly their pleasure at the step taken by the U.S. since + our action tends to increase the pressure on the Soviets to become party + to Protocol II. However, these officials were, if anything, more + effusive in their praise of the President’s position in private + conversation. The Mexican pleasure derives primarily from the leading + role they have always played in this treaty. The Venezuelans, however, + are genuinely worried about proliferation, particularly in Brazil, and + enthusiastically support U.S. non-proliferation policies. At the same + time, Venezuelans should be expected to occasionally engage in third + world rhetoric about “discriminatory supplier policies.” Nevertheless, + in the final analysis, if at some juncture multi-national solutions + become important to a resolution of non-proliferation problems in Brazil + or Argentina, we can count on Venezuela taking an active, positive and + leading role to assist us.

+

6. Finally, at the request of the Foreign Ministry, U.S. Rep Williamson met with an official of the + Foreign Ministry’s international policy division and went over same + points made earlier (see para 3) to + Foreign Minister. Venezuelans said they were interested in studying + these matters in relation to President Perez’ upcoming State visit to + Washington.

+ + Vaky + +
+ +
+ + 412. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassies in the + Federal Republic of Germany and BrazilSource: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840086–0628. + Secret; Nodis. Sent for + information Immediate to London. Drafted by Denis Lamb (D); cleared + by Steven Steiner (S/S); and + approved by Christopher. + Washington, April 23, 1977, 2134Z +

92297. For Ambs from the Deputy Secretary; London for Nye. Subject: FRG/GOB Nuclear + Agreement—Next Steps.

+

1. We are considering how best to take advantage of the meeting between + President Carter and Chancellor + Schmidt at the London + summitThe London Economic Summit, a + meeting of the Western industrialized nations, took place on May + 7–8. See Foreign + Relations, 1977–1980, vol. III, Foreign Economic + Policy, Documents 27 and 28. to meet our concerns over aspects of the + FRG-Brazil nuclear agreement.

+

2. The purpose of this cable is to give you our tentative thinking on the + elements of a comprehensive settlement and to seek your views on the + package as well as possible tactics by which to secure its + acceptance.

+

3. It may be possible to proceed as follows.

+

—Just prior to the President’s meeting with Schmidt, Ambassador Crimmins would deliver a letter from the President for + Geisel. The letter would + contain appropriate preambular language referring to our mutual energy + problems and prospects, the departure from previous US policy represented by our SALT proposals, comprehensive test ban + policy, adherence to Protocol I of Tlatelolco, and deferral of domestic + reprocessing. The letter would then propose the elements contained in + paragraph four below, suitably phrased.

+

—The letter would be an attempt to wrench this subject out of diplomatic + channels and raise it to the level of high statecraft. It might, or + might not, make a specific proposal with respect to further discussions. + The letter could be delivered through Silveria, possibly with backup duplicate through SRF/SNI + channels.

+

—In his meetings with Schmidt the + President would express disappointment that the Germans had issued + initial licenses. He would inform Schmidt orally (and via a “Non Paper”) of the proposals + he had just made to Geisel. The + President would ask Schmidt + whether he considered the proposals to be reasonable. If, as we hope, + Schmidt responds in the + affirmative, then the President would ask Schmidt to convey that view personally and explicitly to + Geisel.

+

4. Elements of possible compromise settlement:

+ +

A. Treaty of Tlatelolco

+

—Request Brazil to confirm publicly, consistent with the position taken + by Foreign Minister Silveira, + that it will act as if bound by the Treaty of Tlatelolco, and thus all + of its nuclear facilities will be under IAEA safeguards.

+

—Over the longer term, offer to work with Brazil to bring the Treaty of + Tlatelolco into full effect, with the result that all peaceful nuclear + explosives would be precluded. (Brazil is committed not to use its + present nuclear supply from the US and + Germany for explosives.)

+

B. Expanded Nuclear Cooperation

+

—Offer to cooperate with Brazil in developing technology associated with + high temperature reactors and the thorium fuel cycle, as part of the + US-proposed fuel cycle evaluation + program. Point out that we believe that these technologies could greatly + aid Brazil in achieving energy independence; without reliance on the + plutonium economy.

+

C. Enrichment

+

—Tell Brazil that we accept the contemplated initial steps toward the + establishment of a multi-national enrichment facility in Brazil. + (Licenses for a laboratory-scale facility utilizing the unproven Becker + nozzle process are to be issued in 1979; subsequently a demonstration + plant will be licensed.)

+

D. Reprocessing

+

—Ask Brazil to acquiesce in deferral of any further transfers of + reprocessing technology pending evaluation of present and alternative + nuclear fuel cycles in the fuel cycle evaluation program.On April 27, Crimmins reported in telegram 3330 from Brasilia + that “the time has come to make the move” proposed by the Department + of State. “The critical factor,” he cautioned, remained “our + readiness and ability to exert persuasive influence and pressure on + the FRG.” He also urged the + administration to make sure that the Brazilians “understand what we + are driving at; ambiguity on this point can only lay up serious + trouble for the future.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + P840086–3330)

+ + Vance + +
+ +
+ + 413. Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the Department of + State (Tarnoff) to the + President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, + Harold Brown Papers, Box + 74, General Files, Tlatelolco, Treaty of. Limited Official + Use. + Washington, May 25, + 1977 + + SUBJECT + U.S. Adherence to Additional Protocol I to the Treaty of + Tlatelolco + +

In response to Mr. Hornblow’s memorandum of May 13Not found. the Departments of State and + DefenseA more detailed description of + the Defense Department’s position is contained in a letter from + Secretary Brown to Secretary + Vance attached to this + memorandum. [Footnote is in the original. Brown’s letter is attached but not + printed.] have agreed that when the President submits + Protocol I to the Senate for advice and consent, he should recommend + that United States ratification be made subject to the following + statements:

+

“That the understandings and declarations attached to its ratification of + Additional Protocol II apply also to its ratification of Additional + Protocol I;

+

“That the provisions of the Treaty made applicable by this Additional + Protocol do not affect the exclusive power and legal competence under + international law of a state adhering to this Protocol to grant or deny + transit and transport privileges to its own or any other vessels or + aircraft;

+

“That the provisions of the Treaty made applicable by this Additional + Protocol do not affect rights under international law of a state + adhering to this Protocol regarding the exercise of the freedoms of the + seas, or regarding passage through or over waters subject to the + sovereignty of a state.”

+

The first of these statements has the effect of repeating our earlier + declarations and understandings, notably those stating that Treaty + parties retain unimpaired power to grant transit and transport rights to + other countries; that the United States recognizes national claims of + sovereignty over territorial waters only insofar as such claims are + consistent with international law; and that the United States considers + that the Treaty covers nuclear explosive devices which are ostensibly + for peaceful purposes as well as devices acknowledged to be nuclear + weapons. The second statement is designed to express our understanding + that we retain our rights to transit our territories’ waters and airspace with vessels + containing nuclear weapons, and to call at ports there; such transitory + presence of nuclear weapons would not infringe our undertaking to keep + the territories free of nuclear weapons. The purpose of the third + statement is to make known our understanding that our obligations under + the Protocol do not affect our operations on the high seas, or our + rights of innocent passage through territorial waters (or of passage of + straits, or of archipelagic passage, if either of these is adopted as + international law).

+

I will forward to you shortly a set of formal submittal and transmittal + documents incorporating these interpretive statements.

+

The Department of State has also consulted with the Puerto Rican + Secretary of State on the question of attaching a statement to our + ratification that would allow reconsideration of our adherence as to + Puerto Rico if Puerto Rico became a state. The effect of ratifying + without such a reservation would be that Puerto Rico could not legally + be removed from coverage of the Protocol if it became a state; and + Puerto Rico would be the only state in which by international obligation + we could not place nuclear weapons. The Puerto Rican authorities + understood this consequence when they stated during our consultations + with them that they had no objection to our ratifying without such a + reservation.

+

The Departments of State and Defense have agreed to recommend that such a + provision should not be included in the statements recommended for + attachment to our ratification. To do so would dilute the effect of our + ratification. Moreover, we believe that application of the Protocol to + Puerto Rico as a state would not create an objectionable distinction + among states of the Union. In this connection, we note that a number of + other treaties have had a similarly limited geographic effect within the + United States (e.g., Rush-Bagot + Agreement limiting naval forces on the Great Lakes). However, we have + noted the matter because the absence of such a reservation could have + domestic political consequences in the event of Congressional + consideration of statehood for Puerto Rico.

+

Finally, we believe no mention of the recommended interpretive statements + need be made when the President signs the Protocol, since all the + proposed statements are technical in character and none reserves + obligations of the United States under the Protocol. However, we intend + to give a copy of the statements privately to Mexican officials in + connection with the signing, indicating to them that we anticipate that + these statements will be submitted to the Senate for its + consideration.

+ + Peter + Tarnoff + Executive Secretary + + +
+ +
+ + 414. Memorandum of ConversationSource: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files, P770115–2365. + Confidential. Drafted by H.B. Thompson (ARA/MEX); cleared by H.B. + Lane (ARA/MEX); and approved by William + Twaddell (S) on June 23. The meeting was held in the + James Madison Room at the Department of State. + Washington, May 26, 1977, 1:30 p.m. + + SUBJECT + CIEC, LOS negotiations, Middle East, Treaty of Tlatelolco + + + PARTICIPANTS + Mexico + Santiago Roel, Secretary of + Foreign Relations + Fernando Solana, Secretary of Commerce + Carlos Tello, Secretary for Programming and Budget + United States + The Secretary + Warren Christopher, Deputy + Secretary of State + Terence A. Todman, + Assistant Secretary (ARA) + Herbert B. Thompson, Charge de’Affaires, (notetaker) + +

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to the Treaty of Tlatelolco.]

+

Treaty of Tlatelolco

+

Now that the United States has signed the Protocol I of the Treaty of + Tlatelolco, Mr. Todman asked what + can be done to get others to sign the treaty. Secretary Roel said that Mexico must try to + persuade others but cannot pressure them. He said Mexico has spoken to + the Cubans and the Argentines. He thought the United States example + would be very helpful in encouraging others to sign.Carter + signed Protocol I earlier that day. For the text of his statement + see Public Papers: Carter, 1977, p. 1027.

+

Secretary Vance suggested that + the U.S. signing would put some pressure on the Soviets, who have shown + considerable sensitivity at our seizing the initiative in disarmament + efforts. He suggested that if the Soviets were to sign Cuba might very + well follow. Secretary Roel + agreed.

+

Secretary Roel said that he had + found this a very useful day and thought it a very important one, given + the significant events which it had included. He noted that the events + of the day revealed a marked improvement in U.S.—Mexican relations. He + asked rhetorically why this should be so. Referring to his accompanying + colleagues, he asserted that it is largely because Mexico now has a + younger generation which is mature enough to speak plainly with its + United States counterparts + and to operate on the basis of a psychological sense of equality. In any + case, he said, he wanted to express his sincere appreciation for the + day. He said he had telephoned President Lopez Portillo, who had expressed himself as very + pleased with the visit and had sent his best regards.

+

Secretary Vance agreed that this + had been a very important day. He said that the United States signing of + the Treaty of Tlatelolco is of great significance. He said we are + particularly grateful to the Foreign Secretary for his extraordinary + kindness in going to the lengths of bringing the Treaty to Washington + for us to sign. He reminded Secretary Roel that President Carter had already told him of his grati-tude.According to the President’s Daily Diary, + Carter met with + Secretary Roel from 1:00 to + 1:03 p.m. on May 26. (Carter Library, Presidential Materials, + President’s Daily Diary). The luncheon concluded with mutual + expressions of esteem and friendship.

+
+ +
+ 415. Editorial Note +

On June 8, 1977, First Lady Rosalyn + Carter met with Brazilian Foreign Secretary Antônio Francisco Azeredo da Silveira + in Brasilia to discuss President Jimmy + Carter’s desire to maintain “close cooperation and + consultation with Brazil” on a number of subjects, including the + non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. She also asked him to waive the + conditions Brazil had articulated regarding ratification of the Treaty + of Tlatelolco. Silveira replied + that while Brazil believed in safeguarding nuclear materials, “it will + never accept restrictions on the transfer of technology.” He also said + that while Brazil had not ratified the Treaty, it “considers itself + committed” to upholding its principles, and had adopted such conditions + “as a means of pressuring the Soviets to adhere” to the Treaty. + (Telegram 4682 from Brasilia, June 8; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + D770205–0025)

+

The Ambassador to Brazil, John + Crimmins, later informed Washington about the status of a + variety of nuclear issues with Brazil, including the Treaty of + Tlatelolco, and advised the Department to follow up on Mrs. Carter’s presentation to Silveira, perhaps via a personal + letter from Carter to Brazilian + President Ernesto Geisel. A + private comment by Geisel to the + First Lady that “he would consider this matter,” Crimmins suggested, might indicate his + openness to such a personal entreaty by Carter. The Brazilians, Crimmins stressed, remained “suspicious” not only of the Soviet Union but also + Argentina’s and Chile’s nuclear ambitions, as well as France’s reticence + about signing the Treaty. (Telegram 5033 from Brasilia, June 18; + National Archives, RG 59, Central + Foreign Policy File, D770219–0055)

+

The Department of State also tried to enlist other Latin American + nations, particularly Mexico, in its diplomatic effort to convince + Brazil, Argentina, and Cuba to bring the Treaty of Tlatelolco “into full + force within two years.” The Assistant Secretary of State for + International Organization Affairs, C. William Maynes, told the Mexican + Ambassador to the United States, Sergio + Gonzalez Galvez, that the United States “would prefer to + work with both Argentina and Brazil so that adherence” to the Treaty was + “not achieved under compulsion.” The United States, he said, would take + the same tack with the Soviet Union “and continue to do so cautiously.” + Maynes also urged the Ambassador to convince Cuba to sign the Treaty. + (Memorandum of Conversation, June 27; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + P770116–1900)

+
+ +
+ 416. Memorandum of ConversationSource: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, + Brzezinski Material, + Country File, Box 85, Venezuela, 1/77/–12/78. Confidential. The + meeting took place in the Cabinet Room. The memorandum of + conversation is scheduled to be printed in full in Foreign + Relations, 1977–1980, vol. XXIV, South America; Latin + America Regional. + Washington, June 28, 1977, + 11:16 a.m.–12:15 p.m. + + SUBJECT + President Carter’s First + Meeting with the President of Venezuela During His State + Visit + + + PARTICIPANTS + President Jimmy + Carter + Vice President Walter + Mondale + Secretary of State Cyrus + Vance + Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs Dr. + Zbigniew + Brzezinski + Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs Terence A. Todman + NSC Staff Member Robert A. Pastor (Notetaker) + President Carlos Andres + Perez of Venezuela + Minister of Foreign Affairs Ramon Escovar Salom + Minister of State for International Economic Affairs Manuel Perez + Guerrero + Minister of Mines and Hydrocarbons Valentin Hernandez + Acosta + + Minister of Finance Hector Hurtado Navarro + Minister of Information and Tourism Diego Arria + Permanent Representative to the United Nations Simon Alberto + Consalvi Bottaro + Ambassador to the United States Ignacio Iribarren Borges + Ambassador to the OAS Jose Maria + Machin + +

President Carter opened the + conversation by saying that since the United States and Venezuela shared + so many goals and values, he was looking forward to seeking President + Perez’s advice on the many bilateral and multilateral issues of concern + to the two governments.

+

President Carlos Andres Perez thanked President Carter for his generosity and said + that “what you attribute to me is precisely what you are.” He said that + because he identified fully with many of President Carter’s policies, he felt that + coordination of policies would be easy. President Perez said that he + would not only try to relate the Venezuelan view of issues, but also the + views of Latin America and the entire developing world.

+

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to nuclear non-proliferation.]

+

On the issue of nuclear energy, President Perez said that he thought that + a Latin American organization like OLADE (a + Latin American Energy Organization set up by a Venezuelan initiative) or + OPANAL (responsible for + implementing the Tlatelolco Treaty) would be one way + of approaching the problem of developing nuclear energy, and he + suggested SELAThe Sistema Económico Latinoamericano y del Caribe + or Economic System of Latin America and the Caribbean, a regional + organization dedicated to promoting economic cooperation and social + development. as a possible channel or perhaps as an + organization that could manage a reprocessing plant. On reprocessing, he + said that Brazil was basically using the need for a reprocessing plant + as an excuse to obtain a nuclear weapons’ capability, which it wanted + for reasons of status.

+

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to nuclear non-proliferation.]

+

President Carter reiterated his + strong opposition to the creation of nuclear + explosives capabilities in the Hemisphere, and said that Mrs. + Carter had made this point + with many leaders, but particularly with Brazilian President Geisel.See + Document 415. In addition, we + continue to put maximum pressure on Germany and Brazil to try to get + their agreement modified. Our general policy will remain that we will + continue to provide nuclear fuel for these countries + which do not have reprocessing capabilities.

+

The President said that Geisel had + claimed his intentions were peaceful, but Mrs. Carter had warned that his successors + may not be so peaceful. Speculating on Brazil’s motives, the President + thought that the capability + to produce nuclear weapons probably held a certain status for Brazil and + represented greater equality in power.

+

Nonetheless, Mrs. Carter + encouraged Geisel to bring the + Treaty of Tlatelolco into effect. The US has also asked the Soviets, and if + Argentina could ratify it, that would remove Brazil’s excuse. The + President said that Argentina’s apparent desire to build a + reprocessing plant caused him some concern. He had signed + Protocol I as an indication of his commitment. He asked whether Venezuela would use its influence to encourage + Argentina’s ratification of the Tlatelolco Treaty.

+

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to nuclear non-proliferation.]

+

President Perez then told of his recent and very frank conversation with + a representative from French President Giscard. President Perez told + him that France was setting a bad example in Latin America in its + reluctance to sign the Tlatelolco Treaty and its + non-proliferation policies,Giscard had told Carter on May 9 that “France sees + that it is impossible and unjust to prevent many countries from + getting the benefits of atomic energy.” In particular, he noted that + Brazil wanted the “full system, particularly for dignity and + independence.” Nevertheless, he agreed that “[w]e must avoid + transfer of technology that is not needed for peaceful purposes.” + (Memorandum of Conversation, May 9; Carter Library, National + Security Affairs, Staff Material, Meetings File, Box 75: Subject: + Box 1 (II)) and that Venezuela supported + President Carter’s + initiatives in this area. President Perez said that President + Videla of Argentina made + a commitment to try to have Argentina subscribe to the Tlatelolco + Treaty, but Videla couldn’t + give Perez complete assurances until he examined the issue with the + rest of his government.

+

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to nuclear non-proliferation.]

+
+ +
+ + 417. Memorandum of ConversationSource: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, + Brzezinski Material, + Country File, Box 24, German Federal Republic, 4/77–3/78. Secret; + Sensitive. The meeting took place in the Cabinet Room. The + conversation is scheduled to be printed in full in Foreign + Relations, 1977–1980, vol. XXVII, Western Europe. + In an undated memorandum to Carter, Vance advised him to try to convince Schmidt to at least defer the + transfer of nuclear materials to Brazil while simultaneously + convincing Brazil and Argentina to implement the Treaty of + Tlatelolco. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, + Box 24, German Federal Republic, 4/77–3/78) In a July 12 memorandum + to Carter, Brzezinski called Schmidt’s visit “unusually + important” not only because Schmidt’s political future was considered “extremely + clouded” both domestically and within the Atlantic alliance, but + because of U.S. pressure to abrogate the Brazilian nuclear deal. + Brzezinski said that + Schmidt considered + fulfilling “his contractual obligations” a “matter of ‘honor,’ + especially so with all the Third World watching. Nor can Germany + afford to repudiate an agreement that encounters American + disapproval. What is frustrating for the Germans + is that they basically share your non-proliferation goals, but + for the foregoing reasons, feel that the Brazilian deal allows + for little compromise.” (emphasis in the original) + (Ibid.) + Washington, July 13, 1977, + 11:00 a.m.–12:25 p.m. + + PARTICIPANTS + The President + The Vice President + Secretary of State Cyrus + Vance + Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs Dr. + Zbigniew + Brzezinski + Ambassador Walter + Stoessel + Ambassador Gerard + Smith + Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs George Vest + Gregory F. Treverton, NSC Staff + Member, Notetaker + Chancellor Helmut + Schmidt + Foreign Minister Hans Dietrich + Genscher + Ambassador Berndt von + Staden + State Secretary Manfred Schueler + State Secretary Klaus Boelling + Assistant Secretary for Political Affairs Juergen Ruhfus + Assistant Secretary Dieter Hiss + Interpreter for Minister Genscher, Mrs. Gisela Niederste-Ostholt + +

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to nuclear non-proliferation.]

+

Non-Proliferation

+

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to nuclear non-proliferation in + Latin America.]

+

The President said that if we can identify the + problems, we can address them. Brazilian President Geisel had told Mrs. Carter that Argentina was building a + reprocessing plant and he implied that Brazil would not if Argentina did + not. Neither country has signed the Tlatelolco Treaty. The President + felt that if we can assure autonomous fuel supply arrangements, then progress can be made. + The U.S. was unsuccessful in getting Argentina to sign the Tlatelolco + Treaty. Brazil is not a party to the NPT. Brazil has signed the Tlatelolco Treaty, but it is not + yet in force. The U.S. signed; it will not introduce nuclear weapons in + Puerto Rico or the Canal Zone. We are pressing the Soviets and the + French to sign.

+

The Chancellor said that the FRG’s view was that cooperation must be + based upon equal status. He felt an amendment to the NPT would be difficult to achieve. It was + better to work within the IAEA (which + he labelled, jokingly, “a modern American four-letter word”).

+

The President said that the concern with + non-proliferation had predated his Administration.

+

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to nuclear nonproliferation.]

+
+ +
+ 418. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department + of StateSource: National + Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign + Policy File, D770295–0784. Confidential. Sent for information to + Vienna. + Moscow, August 16, 1977, 1555Z +

11862. USIAEA. Subject: Cuban Influence on Soviet Signing of Tlatelolco + Treaty Protocol.

+

1. Subject of Treaty of Tlatelolco and Protocols arose in conversation + between Emboff and MFA Disarmament Chief, Roland Timerbayev, August 10. + Emboff asked if there had been any movement on the Soviet consideration + of Protocol One and Timerbayev replied that it was still under study. + Some weeks ago Timerbayev had expressed doubt to Emboff that U.S. + ratification of Protocol Two would be without reservation and hinted + that possible U.S. reservations on Protocol Two could affect Soviet + action on Protocol One. Asked about reasons for delay in Soviet action, + he mentioned Cuba and when pressed said that “it is logical to assume” + that Soviet-Cuban relations were an important factor in Soviet decision + on ratification. He refused to be drawn out further. He also claimed + that the Soviet Union was trying to get the Cubans to sign the NPT, and that Moscow expected to assume + the major share of the burden among the nuclear powers in getting Cuba + to sign. In the same way, the USSR + looked to the U.S. and other + Western nuclear powers to play the major role in getting the South + Africans to adhere to the NPT.

+

2. Comment: To best of our knowledge, this is first comment by Soviet + official on Cuban influence on Soviet signing of Protocol One of Treaty + although Editor-in-Chief of Latin America magazine, Sergo Mikoyan, made + general linkage to Emboffs during recent conversation (June 2 Memcon pouched to Dept).Mikoyan’s comments were reported in telegram 7783 from Moscow, June + 2. (National Archives, RG 59, + Central Foreign Policy File, D770197–0560)

+ + Toon + +
+ +
+ 419. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security + Affairs (Brzezinski) to President + CarterSource: Carter Library, National + Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Pastor Subject, Treaty of + Tlatelolco, Box 66, Brazil, 3–12/77. Secret. Sent for + action. + Washington, August + 31, 1977 + + SUBJECT + Nonproliferation and Nuclear Assistance + +

State does not believe that there are any important decisions pending in + this area. On nuclear proliferation, we are awaiting a more propitious + time—probably after INFCEP discussions in October—for our consultations + with Brazil and Germany. State and NSC + recommend that you continue to pursue Tlatelolco with Argentina, Chile, + and Brazil (either directly or by the Vice President).

+

Representative Paul Findley (Rep. Ill.) + had an article in the Washington Post on + Thursday, September 1,See Paul Findley, + “Chances for a Latin American Agreement,” Washington Post, September 1, 1977. urging + Argentina and Brazil (and indirectly, you) to agree to bilateral, + on-site, nuclear verification agreements as a way to check the advance + of both countries toward a full fuel cycle. The problem with his + proposal is that Argentina and Brazil could conceivably collude to + cheat, and thus it is probably better to stay with the original + strategy.

+ +

Attachment

+

Paper Prepared by the Department of State and the + National Security CouncilConfidential.

+

Washington, undated

+

NON-PROLIFERATION

+

ISSUE FOR DECISION

+

No policy decisions on Latin American non-proliferation questions appear + to be required at the present time.

+

ESSENTIAL FACTORS

+

1. Nuclear Cooperation

+

We have indicated on several occasions—in the President’s April 14 OAS speech,See Document 410. at the April + meeting of OPANALSee Document 411. + (the Treaty of Tlatelolco implementation organization), and at the July + meeting of the Inter-American Nuclear Energy Commission (IANEC)Not found.—that we are in favor of + expanding our nuclear cooperation with Latin American states, not only + on a bilateral basis and through the IAEA, but also through Latin American regional + institutions.

+

Few Latin American states have significant nuclear energy programs. While + we have supplied power reactors to Brazil and Mexico, our bilateral + cooperation to date has largely involved the transfer of research + reactors and fuel to a limited number of recipients, including + Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Mexico, and Venezuela, and no requests for + the transfer of power reactors are pending. We would be prepared in the + future to conclude agreements for cooperation with additional Latin + American states, provided they can accept the non-proliferation + constraints that will be required by pending legislation. Future + cooperation with Argentina and Brazil will be influenced by the outcome + of current disagreements with both countries over their desire to + acquire sensitive fuel cycle technologies and their failure to adhere + either to the NPT or the Treaty of + Tlatelolco.Brzezinski discussed the issue of trying to get + Argentina and Brazil to sign the Treaty of Tlatelolco or the NPT in an August 3 memorandum to + Vance. (Carter Library, + National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Brzezinski Office File, Country Chron, Box 5, + Brazil, 9–12/77) (Our strategy for dealing with Argentine and Brazilian problems, + which the President has approved, is outlined in Ambassador Smith’s July 22 memorandum to Secretary + Vance, a copy of which was + sent to you.)Smith’s memorandum is Ibid.

+

We have not expressed any preference regarding which institution or + institutions should be used for promoting regional nuclear cooperation, + and have indicated that we would be prepared to go along with any clear + preference that may develop among the states of the region. Some states, + particularly Venezuela and Argentina, have favored the revitalization of + IANEC, an OAS subsidiary organ, while + others, notably Mexico, support giving OPANAL a role in the peaceful nuclear energy field. We have + been neutral on this question (supporting both a study of OPANAL’s future role in nuclear + cooperation and a two-year, $400,000 plan of action for IANEC), and for + the time being plan to remain so in the absence of a clearer Latin + American consensus than exists at present.

+

2. Treaty of Tlatelolco

+

Aside from US ratification of Protocol I, + remaining requirements for full entry into force of the Treaty of + Tlatelolco are Cuban and Argentine ratification of the Treaty, French + adherence to Protocol I, and Soviet adherence to Protocol II. Although + Brazil and Chile have already ratified, they have so far chosen not to + waive the conditions for bringing the Treaty into force for + themselves.An unknown hand underlined + “Cuban,” “Argentine ratification,” “French adherence to Protocol I, + “Brazil,” “Chile,” and “waive the conditions” in this paragraph and + wrote “specific conditions” in the right-hand margin next to this + paragraph.

+

We have begun to implement a strategy for bringing the Treaty into full + force, and will actively continue our efforts during the next several + weeks. We have not approached Cuba directly, but have encouraged key + Latin American supporters of the Treaty (e.g., Venezuela, Colombia, + Mexico, Peru) to urge adherence by the holdout states. We have also + asked the USSR to encourage Cuba to + join the Treaty. In the case of Argentina, we have raised the issue + directly with the Argentine leadership, and have also relied on efforts + by other Latin American states. The visit of Latin American leaders to + Washington next week will provide an opportunity to continue these + efforts. Moreover, the proposals we plan to make to Argentina and Brazil + in the hope of resolving the current disagreements include acceptance by + those states of fullscope IAEA + safeguards, which could be accomplished through Tlatelolco + adherence.

+

With respect to non-hemispheric holdouts, we have already raised the + question of Protocol II with the Soviets at several levels and they have told us they would + reconsider their position. In addition, we plan to raise Protocol I when + French Prime Minister Barre + visits Washington on September 15. We do not believe there are realistic + prospects for securing Soviet and French adherence by the time of the + Panama signing ceremony.

+
+ +
+ 420. Draft Memorandum of ConversationSource: National Archives, RG 59, Papers of Warren + Christopher, P–13, Box 13, Human Rights—-Argentina I. + Confidential. The meeting took place at the White House. A stamped + notation at the top of the memorandum reads “Has not been revised by + the NSC.” No other record of this + meeting was found. + Washington, September 9, 1977, 9:00 + a.m. + + SUBJECT + President Carter/President + Videla Bilateral + + + PARTICIPANTS + ARGENTINA + Lt. General Jorge Rafael + Videla President of Argentina + Oscar A. Montes, Minister of Foreign Affairs and Worship + Jorge A. Aja Espil, + Ambassador to the United States + Julio Cesar Carasales, Ambassador to OAS + Enrique Quintana, Chief of Protocol + Cdr. Eduardo Alberto Traid, Aide-de-camp + US + President Carter + Vice President Mondale + Secretary Vance + Dr. Zbigniew + Brzezinski + Assistant Secretary Todman + Robert Pastor, NSC + Charge Maxwell Chaplin + +

President Carter opened the + conversation by expressing his pleasure at the attendance of the + Argentine President and emphasizing its significance as a demonstration + of hope for the Panama Canal Treaty. He was also pleased that it + provided an opportunity for the hemispheric leaders to have + conversations about issues of common concern.

+

President Videla expressed his + satisfaction over the opportunity to witness an event of such major + importance as the Canal Treaty Signing, as well as the opportunity to + have a face-to-face discussion with the President. He observed that the + signature of the treaty not only denotes the end of one era but opens a + new one in which the United States has demonstrated its sincerity and goodwill toward + Latin America. He added that the Argentine presence was his government’s + effort to establish its goodwill in response. He observed that while + US-Argentine relations have had + their ups and downs throughout history, the temporary circumstances + which impeded close relations have always been overcome by the basic + identity of interests of the two nations.

+

As a parenthetical comment, President Carter observed to Videla that his Spanish was the clearest and easiest to + understand he had ever heard—the President either chose simple words or + had an unusually clear manner of expressing himself. He found this + typical of the Argentina which he and his wife had visited some years + previously. President Carter + also added his thanks for the hospitality that President Videla had shown to Assistant + Secretary Todman during the + latter’s recent visit to Argentina.

+

President Carter said he hoped to + have a frank discussion of two major issues with the objective of + optimizing relations between the two nations.

+

Non-Proliferation

+

President Carter considered the + threat of nuclear explosives the greatest problem facing the hemisphere. + Because Argentina leads the Latin American nations in nuclear + technology—which is a great credit to Argentina—he hoped that Argentina + could also lead in the establishment of a nuclear free zone in the area + and the prevention of introduction to nuclear explosives. He observed + that all hemispheric countries but Cuba and Argentina had signed and + ratified the Treaty of Tlatelolco and that Chile and Brazil had + conditioned their approval of that treaty upon Argentina’s ratification + and acceptance of it. He expressed the hope that Argentina would ratify + this treaty which would provide unrestricted use of nuclear energy for + power but no introduction of nuclear explosives.

+

President Carter said that the + United States, the European community, Canada and Australia were now + evolving a study of fuel cycle from ore to reactor wastes and + safeguards. On October 19 there will be a three-day meeting on this + subject, and it would be helpful if the GOA could be represented at this meeting. He envisaged + establishing common policies with regard to the export of nuclear + technology, heavy water and enriched uranium. He said this policy + envisages restriction of sale of these items to countries which do not + cooperate in the non-proliferation effort. President Carter said he understood that + Argentina was cooperating with Canada with respect to limited safeguards + but stressed the importance the United States places on the NFZ and the + NPT.

+

President Videla responded by + observing that the two countries’ coincidence of interest was mirrored + by the fact that the two Presidents’ agendas were the same. He did not perceive these + issues as problems but as opportunities for progress. He reviewed + Argentina’s 25 years’ work in developing the peaceful use of nuclear + energy, noting that one power reactor is currently in use, a second + under construction and a third in the planning phase. He understood + President Carter’s concern over + the misuse of nuclear energy and said Argentina had offered to establish + safeguards beyond those which were really needed. However, he understood + that even this may not be sufficient reassurance for Latin America and + the world.

+

President Videla said the GOA had considered ratifying the Treaty of + Tlatelolco but stressed that President Carter must be aware of the great need for proper + political timing of such an action. Argentina was only 18 months away + from its gravest national crisis, so the government must be particularly + careful not to disturb the progress toward normalcy. He stated that as + soon as political conditions permit—perhaps before the end of the + year—he would give proof of the GOA + goodwill with regard to non-proliferation by ratifying the Treaty of + Tlatelolco. He asked if this reassured President Carter.

+

President Carter said it did, and + stated that if the GOA decided to send + a delegation to the fuel cycle conference, it would be particularly + exciting if it would be possible to announce intended ratification of + the treaty at that time, but he would defer to President Videla on the best political timing. + With Argentine ratification, the treaty would be in effect for all + countries but Cuba, and the United States would be raising this issue + with the Cubans. The President added that Argentine ratification would + also remove our concerns about technology and heavy water supply to + Argentina from the United States and other suppliers. The President had + discussed this very issue the previous day with Prime Minister Trudeau in the interest of establishing + a common export policy.

+

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to non-proliferation.]

+
+ +
+ + 421. Telegram From the Interests Section in Cuba to the Department of + StateSource: National + Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign + Policy File, D770345–1044. Confidential. Sent for information to + Mexico City, Moscow, Panama, and London. + Havana, September 22, 1977, 1800Z +

170. Subj: Cubans and NPT.

+

1. USINT Chief and First Secretary + (Glassman) made courtesy call on Soviet Chargé Narlen Manasov and + Political Counselor Aleksander S. Seletsky, September 20. In course of + tour d’horizon, USINT officers + inquired whether Soviets had urged Cuba to sign Non-Proliferation Treaty + (NPT). Manasov, a veteran of six + years here, said that Soviet Embassy here had never rpt never made approach to Cubans on + NPT; he did not comment on + approaches elsewhere.

+

2. Manasov recalled that Cuban UN Perm + Rep Alarcon had some time ago set + forth position that Cuba would not sign NPT until Guantanamo base removed, Panama Canal problem + settled, and U.S. embargo on Cuba lifted. (FYI on Panama Canal treaties, Manasov remarked that, in his + personal opinion, treaties were best that could be negotiated at present + time. He said that Cubans definitely support treaties.) With regard to + Treaty of Tlatelolco and its Protocols, asserted that lack of Soviet and + Cuban adhesion stemmed in part from fact that U.S. maintained right for + its warships carrying nuclear weapons to transit Panama Canal, implying + that this would be special privilege.

+

3. British Ambassador told USINT + Chief, during recent call, that during visit early this month of British + MP Eldon Griffiths, latter pressed Cuban Vice-President Carlos Rafael + Rodriguez for GOC to sign NPT. + Rodriguez reportedly stated that Cubans would not sign NPT as matter of principle while it had + powerful nuclear neighbor with which it has serious differences. + Implication, consistent with Alarcon’s reported position, was that + change in this position in long term is possible when major problems + with U.S. have been resolved.

+

4. Action requested: Department and ACDA requested to forward available information on bases of + Soviet and Cuban objections to Treaty of Tlatelolco and its Protocols. + Also request background on any conditions, other than those cited above, + which Cubans have posed for signing NPT.

+ + Lane + +
+ +
+ + 422. Telegram From the Embassy in Argentina to the Department of + StateSource: National + Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign + Policy File, D770382–0746. Secret; Immediate. Sent for information + to Brasilia. + Buenos Aires, October 18, 1977, 1417Z +

7732. Subject: Tlatelolco Treaty. Ref: (A) State 242904In telegram 242904 to Buenos Aires, October 9, the + Department of State asked the Embassy to estimate whether or not + Argentina would ratify the Treaty of Tlatelolco in the near future + and to assess which groups within Argentina favored or opposed + ratification. (National Archives, RG + 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770369–0339) (B) Buenos + Aires 7577Telegram 7577 from Buenos Aires, + October 11, relayed the comments of Rear Admiral Carlos Castro + Madero, the President of the Comisión Nacional de Energía Atómica + (Argentina’s Atomic Energy Commission), who said that “Argentina + adheres totally to the principle of nuclear non-proliferation for + war purposes but cannot accept restrictions to the development of + Argentina’s nuclear plan for the sake of non-proliferation.” + (National Archives, RG 59, Central + Foreign Policy File, D770371–0176) (Both Notal).

+

1. Summary: Ratification of Tlatelolco has acquired serious political + dimensions and its fate remains doubtful. President Videla and ranking officials of the + Argentine Commission on Atomic Energy (CNEA) have indicated privately that they are not opposed to + ratification but that it + cannot be done without heavy political cost to the government. + Nationalistic groups both within and without the government are against + ratification, which is variously seen as: a further encroachment on + national sovereignty; a weakening of Argentina’s position as a + developing nuclear power vis a vis Brazil; unacceptable bending to U.S. + and foreign pressure; and a bargaining chip which should be used to + extract better treatment from the U.S. CNEA officials say ratification is being studied and a + decision will be made in time to discuss with Secretary Vance on his visit to Argentina in + November. End summary.

+

2. Argentina’s intentions concerning Tlatelolco are clouded by serious + political implications. President Videla, during his meeting with President Carter in Washington last monthCarter and Videla met on September 7. Videla said that “as soon as + political conditions permit—perhaps before the end of the year, + Argentina would ratify the Treaty of Tlatelolco.” Carter replied that the + administration would “talk to the Cubans about signing” the Treaty + and also asked if “Argentina would send representatives to the + International Fuel Cycle Evaluation Conference” (INFCE) scheduled to run from October + 19–21, 1977. Videla did not + respond to Carter’s + question. (Checklist and Follow-up Items, Meeting between President + Carter and President + Videla, September 9; + Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, + Box 45, Latin America, 9–11/77) For more on the INFCE conference, see Document 359. said he was not + opposed to ratification but that it would require careful political + timing. CNEA officials have also + privately indicated that they have no objection to ratification but that + it would be at significant political cost to the Videla Government. The issue is + currently being studied by the Argentine Government and a decision will + be made in time to discuss with Secretary Vance during his visit in November, according to CNEA Secretary General Jorge Coll + (protect).

+

3. Chief opposition to ratification comes mainly from nationalistic + elements—both right and left wing—from both within and outside the + government. While it is likely that the treaty is poorly understood by + many of its opponents, it has nevertheless come to be seen as another + issue in the sensitive area of Argentine national sovereignty.On October 18, Castro Madero displayed + “surprise that the USG attached + such importance to Tlatelolco” during a meeting with a U.S. + Delegation headed by Ambassador-at-Large Gerard Smith. He also “made clear that ‘political’ + motivation” for Argentina’s need to continue reprocessing nuclear + materials was influenced by Brazil’s determination to establish its + own independent reprocessing program. (Telegram 255565 to Buenos + Aires, October 26; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + D770392–1097) + CNEA officials have said that + opponents to the treaty are principally nationalist elements who would + take advantage of its ratification to accuse the current leadership of + selling out the country’s basic interests. CNEA President Admiral Castro Madero heightened such + nationalistic sentiments recently by declaring that Argentina cannot + accept restrictions to development of its nuclear plan for the sake of + non-proliferation. (BA 7577). The belief that advanced nuclear powers + are pressuring and discriminating against smaller countries to impede + their development of nuclear power has helped to harden sentiment + against ratification.

+

4. Castro Madero himself has privately told Emboff that he personally + cannot see why the USG is so interested + in Tlatelolco since the treaty permits nuclear explosions for peaceful + purposes, a type of nuclear capability which could easily be diverted to + non-peaceful purposes. As Argentina has expressed willingness to accept + full-scope safeguards, Castro Madero claims that the treaty will not + bind Argentina any more than it will already be under other safeguard + agreements.

+

5. Other opponents, seriously concerned with Brazilian intentions and + efforts in the nuclear energy field, claim ratification will further + weaken Argentina’s position as the most advanced nuclear power in South + America. Minister Diaz Bessone, for example, privately claimed to Datt + that Argentina cannot afford to do anything that will restrict its + chances or enhance Brazil in the competition to develop nuclear power + capability.

+

6. The perception among the military that nuclear non-proliferation, and, + more immediately, Argentina’s ratification of Tlatelolco are major U.S. + foreign policy goals, has led some military to believe ratification can and should be + used as a “bargaining chip” to extract better treatment from the U.S., + particularly over human rights questions. They see the U.S. making + concessions and soft-pedalling on Brazilian human rights violations in + order to influence that country’s nuclear power program, and would like + to use Tlatelolco in the same way. Others admire the Brazilian + government’s blunt negative reaction to U.S. human rights pressure and + advocate a similar aggressively non-cooperative attitude for Argentina + on matters of U.S. bilateral concern.

+

7. Other objections to ratification were registered by the CNEA advisory committee on safe guards + which reported that adherence to the treaty would bring a number of + disadvantages. These include: the financial cost of staffing and + maintaining the large complex administrative mechanism foreseen in the + treaty; excessive layering of inspection requirements beyond those + levied in other international and bilateral nuclear agreements; and the + political inacceptibility of having Great Britain be a party to + additional Protocol I by signing for the Falkland Islands as required by + the treaty (Paragraph 1.B of Article 28). Argentina does not recognize + British sovereignty over the islands. [less than 1 + line not declassified]

+

8. While the Tlatelolco treaty—as most nuclear questions—is of interest + to only a small sector of the public, strong opposition from vocal + military and civilian interest groups and the growing awareness of + nuclear capability as an important foreign policy tool will make + ratification a costly business for the Videla Government. Should the Videla Government opt in favor of + ratification quickly and without any apparent concession on the part of + the U.S., the navy can be expected to find fault with the decision and + use it to paint itself as the major defender of the country’s + sovereignty. It should also be pointed out that even should Videla agree to ratification, the + actual process would require approval from the legislative advisory + commission (CAL) and a junta decree. CAL has rejected + government-introduced proposals before and other government and military + officials, most particularly Admiral Massera, could, despite the most + careful preparations on the part of the Videla Government, use public doubts on the issue for + self-promoting propaganda.

+

9. This cable is classified secret—not releasable to foreign + nationals—[1 line not declassified]

+ + Chaplin + +
+ +
+ + 423. Telegram From the Department of State to the United States + Interests Section in CubaSource: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, + North/South, Pastor Subject, + Treaty of Tlatelolco, Box 66, Brazil, 3–12/77. Confidential; + Priority. Sent for information Priority to Mexico City, Moscow, + Panama City, and London. Drafted by Robert Einhorn (ACDA/NP) and + Lorna Watson (ACDA/NP); + cleared by Oplinger, Lawrence + Scheinman (T), Philip Farley + (S/AS), Mark Garrison (EUR/SOV), Emery Smith (ARA), and Luigi Einaudi (ARA/PCC); and + approved by Charles Van Doren (ACDA). + Washington, October 19, 1977, 2046Z +

251232. Subject: Cuba and the Treaty of Tlatelolco. Ref: Havana 170.See Document + 421.

+

1. Principal reasons given by Cuba for not attending Treaty of Tlatelolco + negotiations and, subsequently, for not adhering were: (A) “aggressive + policies” of the US toward Cuba; (B) + need to denuclearize US military bases + in Puerto Rico, Virgin Islands, and Canal Zone; and (C) “illegal + detention” of Guantanamo. Officials of Mexican Government and + Organization for Proscription of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America + (OPANAL), the Treaty of + Tlatelolco implementation organization, have from time to time consulted + Cuba on adherence to treaty. Ambassador Gros Espiel, Secretary-General of OPANAL, recently told Amd. Lucey that + he considered present Cuban attitude toward treaty to be very + negative,Gros Espiel’s remarks are reported in telegram 15579 + from Mexico City, September 16. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + D770337–0740) and that he planned to postpone further efforts + to persuade Cuba to join until US had + completed Protocol I ratification. Mexican CCD + Rep and principal author of Tlatelolco + Treaty, Garcia Robles, has + expressed opinion that Cuba is likely to join only in context of + continuing improvement in US-Cuban + relations.

+

2. Cuban adherence to Treaty of Tlatelolco is one of few remaining + requirements for bringing treaty regime fully into force throughout + region, which would involve acceptance of full-scope IAEA safeguards by all Latin American + states and would be a major step forward in global non-proliferation + efforts. Remaining requirements under Treaty’s entry into force + provision are Argentine ratification (they have already signed), Cuban + signature and ratification, Soviet adherence to Protocol II and French + and US adherence to Protocol I + (President Carter signed + Protocol I on behalf of US on May 26, + 1977, and Protocol will soon be sent to Senate for ratification). Brazil + and Chile have already ratified but (unlike the 22 other Latin American + states that have done so) have exercised their right under Treaty’s + entry into force provision not to waive conditions for bringing treaty + into force for themselves. When above requirements fulfilled, these two would become + automatically bound.

+

3. Soviet Union has maintained that it has not adhered to Protocol II + because Treaty of Tlatelolco (A) does not unambiguously ban indigenous + development of nuclear explosive devices ostensibly for peaceful + purposes, (B) does not ban transit with nuclear weapons through the + territorial sea, overflight, and port visits, and (C) does envisage + expansion of zone of application to large areas of high seas.

+

4. In recent months, we have approached Soviets on several occasions at + high levels to urge them to adhere to Protocol II (and to urge them to + encourage Cuban adherence to treaty). We have sought to allay Soviet + concerns on legal grounds by (A) explaining our interpretation, which + was formally stated in association with our ratification of Protocol II + and which is shared by all present parties to the treaty, that the + treaty bans indigenous development of any nuclear explosive device; (B) + explaining our interpretation, which will be presented formally when we + ratify Protocol I, that treaty zone of application does not affect + freedom of navigation on high seas; and (C) pointing out that the US view on transit privileges (i.e., that + the treaty does not affect the right of parties under International Law + to grant or deny transit privileges, including port visits, to states + outside the region) is based on an agreed interpretation by the Latin + American states and does not give the US + special privilege. We have recently heard from Soviet officials that + chief problem is political in nature—their relationship with Cuba.

+

5. On NPT, Soviet MFA disarmament Chief + Timberbaev told US on August 10 that + USSR was trying to get Cuba to + sign treaty.See Document 418.

+

6. US interest in obtaining Cuban + adherence to Treaty of Tlatelolco has so far mainly been served by + urging Latin American proponents of treaty to encourage remaining Latin + American holdout states to join. There may, however, be value in direct + US-Cuban contacts on this question. + Therefore, if USINT Havana considers + it advisable you are authorized, in whatever manner you consider most + promising, to raise question of Tlatelolco adherence with Cubans. In + doing so, you may wish to draw on following points:

+

—By signing Protocol I this year and earlier by adhering to Protocol II, + the US is formally committing itself not + to deploy nuclear weapons anywhere in the Latin American region. In + addition, Protocol II contains an assurance against the use of nuclear + weapons against parties to the treaty. We hope that these actions will + contribute to bringing the Treaty of Tlatelolco regime fully into force + throughout Latin America. In particular, we hope that our actions will + encourage others who are in a + position to take steps toward achieving that objective to reconsider + their attitudes towards the treaty.

+

—We believe that completion of this important Latin American endeavor + will make a major contribution to the security of the entire Western + Hemisphere and would serve as an important example to other regions of + the world.

+

—At the Protocol I signing ceremony, President Carter expressed his support for the + initiative taken by the people of Latin America to rid their region + forever of the threat of nuclear war. “As I said in my own inaugural + address, our ultimate hope is that we can eliminate completely from the + earth any dependence upon atomic weapons, and I think it is significant + and typical of our Latin American neighbors and those countries in the + Caribbean that tens years before that time they had already made this + worthy commitment which sets an example for the world.”

+ + Vance + +
+ +
+ 424. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security + Affairs (Brzezinski) to President + CarterSource: Carter Library, National + Security Affairs, Brzezinski + Material, Country File, Box 6, Brazil, 1–12/77. Secret. Sent for + action. In the upper-right hand margin, Carter wrote “Zbig—ok—but: Draft a frank ltr to + Giesel, pointing out obstacles after I make the recommendation to + NRC. J.C.” + Washington, November 2, 1977 + + SUBJECT + Nuclear Fuel for Brazil + +

At Tab A is a recommendation from Gerry Smith,Attached but not printed. supported by State + and DOE, that you recommend to the NRC + that they approve shipment of the initial loading of low-enriched fuel + for Brazil’s Angra I reactor. ACDA + does not oppose the recommendation, but has some reservations which are + also at Tab A.Attached but not + printed.

+

Our agreement with the + BraziliansOn July 17, 1972, the United + States and Brazil signed an agreement whereby the United States + would provide low-enriched nuclear fuel to Brazil for its Angra I + reactor. envisaged shipment of the fuel by December 1977 in + order to meet the planned start-up date of the reactor in July 1978. + [less than 1 line not declassified] the date + is likely to slip by as much as one year because of construction + problems and bad site selection. Nevertheless, there is no question that + the Brazilians feel that we are legally and morally bound to approve + shipment by December.

+

As you will recall, this issue arose when you sent the letter to + Geisel last week.Carter + wrote Giesel on October 25 that he was prepared to send Smith to Brazil “to discuss with + you our new ideas, or to adopt any other mode you prefer,” on the + nuclear question in advance of Carter’s expected visit to Brazil later in November. + (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Brzezinski Office File, Country + Chron, Box 5, Brazil, 9–12/77) Geisel replied on October 31 and said he welcomed + Smith’s visit. (Carter + Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 6, Brazil, + 1–12/77) Our initial strategy was to have made our new + proposal to the Brazilians and Germans simultaneously, in order to avoid + a recurrence of last February’s incident when the Brazilians accused us + to trying to go behind their backs in talks with the Germans. We now + fear that there is a high probability that the Germans will tell the + Brazilians of our proposal (possibly in a highly distorted form) and + that, out of pique, the Brazilians will refuse to invite Gerry Smith or to give the proposal + serious consideration. State and Smith feel extremely strongly that the + only chance for a fair hearing is for you to remove the Sword + of Damocles—the Angra fuel—by confidentially notifying them that you + have recommended approval to the NRC.

+

You should be aware of the risks of this decision. In three areas Brazil + does not precisely meet the criteria of the new non-proliferation + bill,Reference is to Carter’s proposal for a Nuclear + Non-Proliferation Act which he submitted to Congress on April + 27. and it is therefore quite possible that the NRC will refuse the license, and/or that + the license would be the subject of legal proceedings by anti-nuclear + groups. The three areas are: Brazil’s refusal to give us an explicit + no-PNE assurance; Brazil’s refusal + to accept full scope safeguards; and, the lack of explicit and airtight + provisions in the US-Brazil Agreement + for Cooperation giving the US a right of + veto over the reprocessing of both US-origin and foreign fuel from Brazilian reactors. These are + all legal questions that can be interpreted one way or the other. What is clear is that there is a basis here for + controversy in Congress, in the courts, and at the NRC over whether approval of this + license is consistent with your non-proliferation policy.To the left of this paragraph, Carter wrote “I presume they meet + present criteria. J.”

+

Finally, there is the question + of whether the Brazilians are more likely to be responsive to our + proposal if we withhold the fuel or if we grant it. This is a personal + judgment. I can only add that those who have been directly dealing with + the Brazilians are united in believing that we should approve the + shipment immediately, and that your decision should be conveyed + privately and confidentially to the Brazilians by Ambassador Crimmins.

+

RECOMMENDATION:

+

That you recommend to the NRC that they + approve shipment of this initial loading of low-enriched fuel for + Brazil’s Angra I reactor.Carter did not initial either the + “Approve” or “Disapprove” option.

+
+ +
+ 425. Memorandum From Secretary of State Vance to President CarterSource: + National Archives, RG 59, Records of + the Secretary of State, Cyrus + Vance, 1977–1980, Lot 80D135, Box 1, Latin America, + November 1977. Secret. Copies were sent to the Office of the Deputy + Secretary, the Bureau of Political Affairs, the Bureau of Economic, + Business, and Agricultural Affairs, the Bureau of Security + Assistance, Science, and Technology, the Bureau of Inter-American + Affairs, the Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs, the Bureau of + Oceans and Scientific and Environmental Affairs, the Arms Control + and Disarmament Agency, and the Executive Secretariat. + Washington, November 17, 1977 + + SUBJECT + Nuclear Discussion with Argentina and Brazil + +

During my visit to Latin America on November 21–23, I expect to discuss + nuclear and non-proliferation matters with President Videla of Argentina and President + Geisel of Brazil. I have + asked Gerry Smith to accompany me + on the trip to participate in the nuclear talks.

+

In Argentina, we will seek a public Argentine declaration of its decision + to ratify the Treaty of Tlatelolco. Argentina may not be prepared to go + that far, and we may have to settle for a declaration of Argentine + intent to ratify, rather than a firm decision. We will emphasize to + Argentine officials the need to apply full safeguards to its nuclear + program as a requirement + for continued nuclear cooperation with the US.An unknown hand underlined + this sentence. It became clear during recent talks with + Argentine nuclear officials in WashingtonNot found. that any success in achieving deferral of + Argentina’s reprocessing program will depend heavily on what we can + accomplish with the Brazilians.

+

Nonetheless, the postponement of your visit to Brasilia, and a number of + other recent developments, lead me to believe that we should take a + somewhat more attenuated and indirect approach in pursuing our + non-proliferation strategy with Brazil than originally planned.

+

Schmidt’s unwillingness to support + our ideas for resolving the Argentine/Brazil problem will stiffen + Brazilian resistance, and Geisel + is likely to reject out of hand any package of proposals we present at + this time. France’s recent decision not to complete the Pakistani + reprocessing plant and to press the FRG + for a similar policy in Brazil, coupled with increasing disenchantment + within the Brazilian scientific community with the FRG/Brazil agreement, suggest that the + climate for a satisfactory solution may improve if these factors are + given more time to work.

+

I believe that the best approach at this time is to avoid specific + discussion of the FRG/Brazil agreement, + to set out our ideas in the context of seeking Brazil’s views on how to + deal with a hemispheric security problem, and to leave specific + solutions for a later stage.An unknown hand + underlined the sentence “set out our ideas in the context of seeking + Brazil’s views on how to deal with a hemispheric security problem, + and to leave specific solutions for a later stage” in this + paragraph. The main elements of our thinking could thus be + presented and left for Geisel to + consider, without being prematurely offered as an American solution.

+

I attach a more detailed outline of this approachAttached but not printed. which I would + propose to use as the basis for the Brazil talks if you approve.

+
+ +
+ + 426. Memorandum From Secretary of State Vance to President CarterSource: + Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, + Box 6, Brazil, 1–12/77. Secret; Nodis. Carter + initialed the upper right-hand corner of the memorandum. Vance also discussed the nuclear + issue with Venezuelan President Carlos + Andres Pérez on November 23. (Telegram 11456 from + Caracas, November 25; Department of State, Office of the Secretariat + Staff, Cyrus R. Vance, + Secretary of State—1977–1980, Lot 84D241, Box 10, NODIS Memcons, 1977) + Washington, November 28, 1977 + + SUBJECT + Latin American Nuclear Strategy: Post-Visit Assessment + +

The nuclear discussions during my November 21–23 trip produced mixed + results. The Argentine talks produced more progress than we had + anticipated;A record of Vance’s discussions with Argentine + President Jorgé Rafael + Videla is in telegram Secto 11012 from the Secretary’s Delegation in Buenos + Aires, November 22. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + P840076–0545) Brazil continues unyielding, as we + expected.A memorandum of Vance’s November 22 conversation + with Brazilian President Geisel is in the National Archives, RG 383, Records of the Arms Control and + Disarmament Agency, Office of the Director, Lot 81D155, Box 10, + Brazil Bilaterals, November 22, 1977. But the Argentine + results should tend to isolate Brazil in Latin America at the same time + that France’s decision not to complete its reprocessing sale to Pakistan + increases the isolation of the FRG in + Europe. In sum, I believe that we made some progress in our strategy, + but it is clear that it will take a sustained effort, as well as some + luck, to move Brazil.

+

Argentina

+

We achieved three things:

+

—a public commitment to ratify the Treaty of Tlatelolco, (albeit without + a waiver of the entry into force requirements), balanced by public + affirmation of US willingness to expand + nuclear cooperation in a manner consistent with our non-proliferation + policy and to recognize Argentina’s potential as a nuclear exporter. But + Argentina is not willing to bring the Treaty into force by waiving the + requirement that other states (the USSR, France, and Cuba) ratify.

+

—a private understanding that Argentina will move to full-scope + safeguards as a condition for additional US assistance (that would not include at this stage the + transfer of heavy water technology). If such an exchange is made, we + will have achieved the main substantive effect of the Treaty in + Argentina.

+

—a private expression of Argentine willingness to consider deferring + reprocessing if Brazil also defers (a concept of + regional equilibrium) and if it receives heavy + water technology from the US and Canada. This is the basic + exchange foreseen in the strategy you approved last July,Not found. and the Argentines have signalled + its acceptability.

+

Brazil

+

The Brazilians were aware of our October approach to Schmidt and the FRG’s rebuff.On October 25, Smith gave a + “presentation, copy of which was an informal talking point paper, + was left with the Chancellor,” which notified Schmidt that “the US has been concerned that sensitive + nuclear projects being carried out in Brazil might cause other + countries,” in particular Argentina, “to move ahead with similar + projects in order to preserve their competitive position at both the + technological and military levels.” Carter, he said, wanted to press Brazil, the Federal + Republic of Germany, and Argentina for “a deferral for a period to + be agreed upon of reprocessing” which “would permit the US to drop objections to the enrichment + program.” (Telegram 257624 to Brasilia, October 27; National + Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign + Policy File, D770395–0555) They expected a renewed attack on + the FRG agreement and were prepared to + reject it. They were not aware of the results of our Argentine visit, + and there was too little time for them to absorb its implications. In + these circumstances I felt it best to make the Argentine idea of + “regional equilibrium” the centerpiece of a brief presentation, and to + bring in the remaining elements of our package only indirectly. Their + response in the formal sessions was to quietly reaffirm their standard + position, but they listened carefully and the factors we presented may + have greater impact as internal Brazilian criticism of the FRG deal develops. We were careful to + avoid any implication of pressure that would stimulate nationalistic + rejection or stop internal fermentation.

+

Next Steps

+

I think it is important that we avoid explicit pressure on Brazil that + would tend to close their minds while we are trying to get them to + consider the implications of a shifting situation which may in time + require them to adjust. By the time of your visit in the Spring, you may + wish us to resume a more direct approach. We will pursue technical talks + on thorium and the problems of reprocessing in the context of INFCE, and bilaterally if they show + interest. We will also work closely with France in the effort to soften + the FRG position, and consider ways to + further isolate the FRG and Brazil + through Latin American support for the “regional equilibrium” + reprocessing moratorium concept. In Caracas we touched lightly on this + concept. President Perez may prove a strong supporter, and could help us + with the Argentines and perhaps the Brazilians. We will also want to + protect our present position by moving ahead with the US/Argentine + cooperation mapped out in Buenos Aires while at the same time assuring + that they take no irreversible steps to develop a reprocessing + capability.

+
+ +
+ + 427. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security + Affairs (Brzezinski) to President + CarterSource: Carter Library, National + Security Affairs, Brzezinski + Material, Country File, Box 6, Brazil, 1–12/77. Secret. Carter initialed the upper + right-hand corner of the memorandum. + Washington, December 3, 1977 + + SUBJECT + Secretary Vance’s Trip: + Nuclear Results and Follow-up + +

Cy has prepared a short report (Tab A)See + Document 426. analyzing the + results of his discussions on nuclear matters on his trip to Latin + America. It is a short and good report so I will not summarize it here. + Let me just add a couple of points.

+

In Brazil, Cy and several members of his party had good discussions with + the Minister of Commerce and Industry Calmon de Sa and the Minister of + Mines Ueki on cooperative approaches to develop non-nuclear sources of + energy, including alcohol (from sugar), bioconversion, hydrogen, coal + mining technology, and solar energy. The Brazilians seemed quite + enthusiastic about the idea, but they have a problem which has been + holding them back, which is quite similar to our own: different + Ministers have responsibilities for different subjects, and there is no + overall way to coordinate such a cooperative effort.

+

An attempt at developing a cooperative approach to energy research and + development might be the best way to demonstrate to the Brazilians our + genuine interest in their energy problem, our interest in cooperating in + scientific endeavors with them, and the sincerity of our position on + nuclear energy. If you approve, I will ask Cy—who had conversations on + this subject in Brazil—to designate a person in State to work with DOE + in negotiating an overall agreement on cooperation between the US and Brazil in researching and developing + non-nuclear energy sources.Carter checked + the “Approve” option.

+

A second point I wanted to bring to your attention is that our proposal + on the German-Brazilian deal, which Gerry + Smith conveyed to the Germans,Not found. was not conveyed to the + Brazilians in its entirety. Gerry felt that they would reject it + immediately if he put it on the table and so he described the proposal + only in very general terms. Since the Brazilians have left the door open + for other discussions, we will have the opportunity to put the entire proposal forward at + a more propitious time.

+

I am also attaching a brief summary of Cy’s conversation with GeiselSee + footnote 3, Document 426. + and Gerry Smith’s remarks at the + Brazilian Foreign Ministry (Tab B).See + Ambassador Smith’s “Remarks + on Nuclear Matters at Working Session at Foreign Ministry in + Brasilia,” November 22, 1977. (National Archives, RG 383, Records of the Arms Control and + Disarmament Agency, Office of the Director, Lot 81D155, Box 10, + Brazil Bilaterals, November 22, 1977)

+
+ +
+ 428. Telegram From the Mission in Geneva to the Department of + StateSource: National + Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign + Policy File, D770471–0113. Confidential. Sent for information to + Buenos Aires, Brasilia, Mexico City, Moscow, and the Interests + Section in Havana. + Geneva, December 17, 1977, 1110Z +

12348. Subject: Approach to Soviets on Protocol II of Treaty of + Tlatelolco.

+

1. Since Soviet CTB negotiator Morokhov also has major responsibility + in Soviet Government for non-proliferation matters, Ambassador Warnke took opportunity of Morokhov’s presence in Geneva for + trilateral CTB negotiations to convey + information to Soviets regarding Argentine intention to ratify Treaty of + Tlatelolco and to encourage Soviet adherence to Protocol II. Warnke’s presentation, made at + bilateral meeting on December 15, drew on points set forth in para 2 below. After listening attentively + to Warnke’s presentation, + Morokhov expressed gratitude + for report on Argentine developments. He said that he was not now in a + position to provide Soviet reactions because issue of Protocol II + adherence was currently being reviewed in Moscow. His government was + also presently in process of carrying out consultations with other + countries on this issue. He nonetheless regarded Warnke’s presentation as “useful and + important.”

+

2. Warnke’s presentation + follows:

+ +

(A) During Secretary Vance’s + recent trip to Argentina,See Documents 426 and 427. the Argentine government announced its + intention to ratify the treaty of Tlatelolco.

+

(B) We understand that Argentine ratification, unlike its signature of + the treaty several years ago, will not be accompanied by an + interpretative statement that the treaty permits its parties to develop + nuclear explosive devices for peaceful purposes. We also understand that + Argentina would negotiate a full-scope safeguards agreement with the + IAEA providing for safeguards + against any military or nuclear explosive use.

+

(C) However, Argentina is not prepared, at this time, to waive the + preconditions specified in the treaty for entry into force. Thus, + Argentina will put itself in the same legal position as Brazil and + Chile, which have both ratified but not waived the entry into force + conditions. Twenty-two Latin American states have ratified, waived the + conditions, and are therefore already bound by the treaty.

+

(D) When the remaining conditions are met, Argentina, Brazil, and Chile + would automatically be bound by the treaty, and would be obligated to + conclude a full-scope safeguards agreement with the IAEA.

+

(E) At present, the only remaining conditions are U.S. ratification of + Protocol I (we signed in May 1977),See footnote 2, Document 414. French + signature and ratification of Protocol I, Cuban signature and + ratification of the treaty, and Soviet signature and ratification of + Protocol II.

+

(F) Therefore, our two governments are both in a position—through our own + actions and through encouragement of steps by others—to help bring the + Treaty of Tlatelolco fully into force.

+

(G) Let me underscore the great significance of what could lie ahead. + Argentine and Brazilian adherence to the treaty would be one of the + greatest boosts for non-proliferation in a long time. Those two + countries clearly pose a serious threat in the non-proliferation area. + Given their unyielding attitude toward the NPT, the Treaty of Tlatelolco is our best, and perhaps our + only, opportunity to get them to accept formal restraints against the + development of nuclear explosives.

+

(H) For our part, now that the president has signed Protocol I, we hope + to have it ratified within the coming year. We have also urged the + French to reconsider their position toward Protocol I, and we have + indications that they are doing so.

+

(I) In addition, through our newly opened Interests Section in Havana, we + have directly raised the issue of the treaty of Tlatelolco with the + Cubans at various government levels. We have received inquiries from the Cubans about various + aspects of the treaty and its zone of application.

+

(J) We hope that the Soviet government will seriously consider adhering + to Protocol II in the near future and will join us in encouraging other + states (Cuba, France) to take corresponding steps.the Cubans about + various aspects

+

(K) We recognize that you have had certain reservations about the Treaty + of Tlatelolco on legal grounds, especially regarding the questions of + PNES and freedom of the high seas. We shared those concerns, but have + studied those issues intensively and have concluded that they are not a + problem. When we ratify Protocol I, we will make an interpretative + statement regarding these issues, and would be happy to discuss them + with you further.

+ + Warnke + +
+ +
+ 429. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in + ArgentinaSource: National + Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign + Policy File, D780062–0871. Secret. Drafted by Fernando Rondon + (ARA/ECA); cleared by Nye + and Smith in draft; and by + Oplinger, Louis Nosenzo + (OES), Ronald Bettauer (L), + Jeffrey Siegel (INR), Charles Van + Doren (ACDA), Phyllis Oakley + (ARA)/RPP), and Malcolm Barneby + (ARA/AND) for information; and approved by Robert Zimmermann + (ARA/ECA). + Washington, February 10, 1978, + 0103Z +

35248. Subject: U.S.-Argentine Nuclear Relations.

+

1. Summary. On February 6, Argentine Ambassador Aja Espil met with Ambassador Gerard Smith and Dr. Joseph Nye to review U.S.-Argentine + nuclear issues. Aja Espil + expressed his confidence that Argentina will ratify the Treaty of + Tlatelolco, as promised in the November 21 communiqué issued after the + Secretary’s visit to Buenos Aires.The + communiqué is printed in telegram 8813 from Buenos Aires, November + 22, 1977. (National Archives, RG 59, + Central Foreign Policy File, D770432–0403) End summary.

+

2. Ambassador Smith asked + Argentine Ambassador Aja Espil to + call on him in order to clarify Argentina’s stance on ratification of + the Treaty of Tlatelolco in light of confusing reports emanating from + officials of the Argentine Atomic Energy Commission (CNEA). Dr. Joseph Nye was also present.

+ +

3. Ambassador Smith noted that + both Argentine President Videla + and Foreign Minister Montes had informed the President and the Secretary + of Argentina’s intention to ratify the Treaty of Tlatelolco.See Document 420. + The November 21 bilateral communiqué noted this intention as well as the + United States intention to ratify Protocol I of the treaty. During the + Secretary’s visit,See Documents 426 and 427. + the U.S. had also agreed to assist Argentina in its research reactor + exports to Peru by facilitating fuel transfers, and we had agreed to + supply heavy water. Argentina was to move concurrently on full-scope + safeguards. The U.S. had also explained the difficulties involved in the + transfer of heavy water technology, which would entail a deferral of + reprocessing. Argentina too had explained the difficulties it would face + in deferring reprocessing, noting that it would be possible only in the + context of regional equilibrium.

+

4. Ambassador Smith continued that + we were surprised when the Argentine Atomic Energy Commission’s (CNEA) legal adviser, Martinez, told + Congressman Moorehead, in the presence of Foreign Ministry Official + Matas, that Argentina will not ratify Tlatelolco until the U.S. commits + itself to the transfer of heavy water technology. Martinez’ statements + were contrary to what Argentine officials told our President, the + Secretary and Deputy Secretary, and contrary to the heart of the + November 21 communiqué.

+

5. Ambassador Aja Espil explained + that there are different opinions within the Argentine Government and + that the Nationalists oppose all compromise, including Tlatelolco. + Aja Espil reiterated the + intention of both President Videla and the other members of the Junta to ratify the + treaty. As of December, the Ambassador indicated, the Foreign Ministry + was preparing a document on the steps required for Argentina to complete + ratification. Aja Espil again + played down Martinez’ views, and said that he (Aja Espil) knew Videla’s views. The Ambassador + suggested that we discuss this subject again with Admiral Castro Madero, + who should be visiting Washington on February 17, on his way back from + Canada and enroute to the IAEA Board + of Governor’s meeting in Vienna. Dr. Nye expressed the hope to see Castro here while + Ambassador Smith looked forward + to a meeting in Vienna.

+

6. Dr. Nye again outlined the + three stages of our nuclear cooperation. In stage one, both the U.S. and + Argentina will work to ratify Protocol I and the treaty, respectively. + Stage two involves the supply of heavy water and fuel for a second + research reactor to be sold to Peru. The latter will require an + amendment of our bilateral agreement for cooperation. Full-scope + safeguards will be necessary. Under stage 3, the transfer of heavy water + production technology might be envisioned under a major change in U.S. policy, and Argentina + also would have to change its policy and defer reprocessing. “Regional + equilibrium” would be necessary for any reprocessing deferral, the + Argentine representatives had said. Nye stated that at no time did we link stage 3 to stage + 1, as Martinez had.

+

7. Aja Espil stated that Martinez + does not make policy.

+

8. Ambassador Smith raised the + Argentine/Peruvian agreement and our earlier understanding that the + second research reactor to be provided to Peru (10 megawatts) would use + low enriched uranium (LEU). Smith observed that in December, CNEA officials had stated that highly + enriched uranium was required. The Peruvians, on the other hand, + informed us that the 10 mw reactor would be fueled with LEU.

+

9. Aja Espil was not briefed on + the question of the 10 mw reactor for Peru. He promised to investigate. + He inquired about the progress of the quadrilateral agreement (U.S., + Argentina, Peru and IAEA) required for + the transfer of the zero power reactor fuel to Argentina. Aja Espil was assured that we were + close to an accord on the quadrilateral agreement.

+ + Vance + +
+ +
+ 430. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in + VenezuelaSource: National + Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign + Policy File, D780048–0877. Confidential; Priority. Drafted by Lorna + Watson (ACDA/NP/NX) and + McFadden (DOE); cleared by Anne Jillson (IO/SCT), Robert Kelley + (S/AS), Louis Cecchini (OES), + Robert Sloane (L/OES), and William Sergeant (ARA); and approved by Charles Van + Doren (ACDA). + Washington, February 12, 1978, + 2024Z +

26891. Subject: Venezuelan Concern Over IAEA Nuclear Material. Ref: Caracas 209.Telegram 209 from Caracas, January 10, reported + that the United States, per a December request by the Venezuelan + government for special nuclear materials, was “prepared to provide a + gift of uranium” to Venezuela. Still, Ambassador Vaky relayed + “US concern that Venezuela has + not yet fulfilled its obligations under the NPT to conclude a safeguards agreement” to Venezuelan + Foreign Minister Simon Alberto Consalvi. The United States, Vaky + stressed, “urged early completion of these negotiations, and noted + that the status of the agreement would be taken into account when + the Nuclear Regulatory Commission reviews the required export + license” for the gift of uranium. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + D780015–0479)

+ +

1. In response to Reftel, Embassy is requested to raise the following + points with TabordaAdmiral Jesus Taborda of + the Venezuelan National Nuclear Council. and appropriate + members of the government to clarify US + position.

+

A. The president is very appreciative of President Perez’ personal + support on non-proliferation.

+

B. The US does not repeat not want to + indicate any falling off of our support for the gift of uranium to + Venezuela.

+

C. It is especially because Venezuela is seen as a leading nation on + non-proliferation issues that its failure to conclude safeguards + agreement pursuant to the NPT and the + Treaty of Tlatelolco can be perceived as a problem. In particular, other + countries within the region may be less inclined to take the final steps + necessary to bring Tlatelolco into effect.

+

D. While we understand that safeguards are applied under the existing + trilateral (US/IAEA/Venezuela) agreement concrete movement on the + safeguards agreement pursuant to the NPT and Tlatelolco would further enhance Venezuela’s + traditional non-proliferation stand.

+

2. The US reminder about need for NRC approval, was in no way intended as + threat to withhold material but seemed a necessary caution to prevent + assumption by gov that US executive + branch decision to allocate gift to Venezuela would per se assure + export. Should more specific questions be raised again by Taborda or any + other gov official, or if Embassy feels response is necessary on Taborda + remarks reported Reftel, Embassy should draw on following information. + Draft agreement on transfer of fuel will be cabled in near future.

+

3. NRC is an independent regulatory + agency, not repeat not part of executive branch. In reviewing export + license applications, NRC obtains + executive branch recommendations, but is not obliged to follow them + (although normally has done so). Several factors are taken into account + by executive branch agencies in developing executive branch + recommendations and by NRC + independently in reaching its decisions on license issuance. Among these + factors is recipient nation’s position on nuclear non-proliferation; in + this connection, Venezuela’s support of US non-proliferation policies would naturally be a strong + positive influence. Other factors considered include, inter alia, + whether an NPT party has fulfilled its + NPT commitment to conclude NPT safeguards agreement; the fact that + Venezuela has not yet done so would inevitably be a negative factor. We + cannot predict what weight the NRC + would give various factors in any particular case, but gov conclusion of + NPT safeguards agreement by time + export license application is submitted is certainly highly desirable. + However, if this proves impossible, we believe that likelihood of favorable NRC action will be strengthened if gov + meanwhile makes significant progress in negotiating the required + agreement. We have no reason to believe that NRC would give factors different relative weights depending + on whether or not any proposed export was material to be provided as + gift through IAEA.

+

4. With respect to executive branch recommendation to NRC to license another shipment of + slightly enriched uranium (under 3 percent U-235) for India’s Tarapur + nuclear power plant, as Embassy recognized this is not a gift. + Furthermore, it is worth noting that the 1963 agreement for cooperation + under which the Tarapur reactors were supplied is unique in that it + provides for use of only US-supplied + fuel for the life of the reactors, and India contracted in 1966 with the + US atomic energy commission for + long-term supply of enrichment services. India has provided US with written assurance that all nuclear + material supplied for or produced in Tarapur will be used only to meet + the needs of the Tarapur plant (thus precluding any use of such material + for any nuclear explosive device). In view of this, plus various + controls contained in agreement for cooperation on Tarapur, India + currently meets immediate export criteria contained in pending + non-proliferation legislation. President Carter has strongly urged India to accept full-scope + IAEA safeguards on all its nuclear + activities especially in light of pending legislation. France, of + course, is a nuclear-weapon-state, thus not all non-proliferation + controls applicable to US exports to + non-nuclear-weapon-states are relevant to exports to France. However, + exports to France are subject to US–EURATOM agreement + which contains guarantee of use for peaceful purposes only and + requirement for multinational EURATOM safeguards; and France is currently negotiating + safeguards agreement with IAEA which + would provide for IAEA safeguards with + respect to certain French civil nuclear activities.

+ + Vance + +
+ +
+ + 431. 431. Intelligence Report Prepared in the Central Intelligence + AgencySource: Carter + Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 4, Argentina, + 1/77–12/78. Secret; [handling restriction not + declassified]. According to a March 10 note from CIA Executive Secretary B.C. Evans to + Dodson, the report “was prepared under the auspices of the National + Intelligence Officer for Nuclear Proliferation and the Acting + Intelligence Officer for Latin America.” (Ibid.) + Washington, March + 10, 1978 +

SIGNIFICANCE OF RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN ARGENTINE NUCLEAR + POLICY

+

Summary

+

1. The ultimate intentions of the Argentine leadership in the nuclear + field are not yet clear. Recent events have reconfirmed Argentine + leaders’ determination to develop an independent plutonium and heavy + water production capability. There is no evidence of a decision by the + government to carry the nuclear program through to a weapons capability, + but such an option is clearly left open.

+

2. While there are no indicators that Argentina has engaged in or planned + for any research dedicated to designing the implosion mechanism for a + nuclear explosive device, the management of its reprocessing program has + been led since 1976 by military officers who seem strongly motivated to + acquire sufficient fissile material for a nuclear weapons capability. + Brazil’s nuclear potential probably has become a factor in Argentine + deliberations over their future nuclear development programs. + (Argentina’s nuclear policymakers have begun to allude confidentially to + Brazil’s reprocessing plans as a justification for their own + reprocessing programs.)

+

3. The managers of Argentina’s reprocessing program have not regarded the + presence or prospect of international safeguards as serious obstacles to + the acquisition of plutonium for experimental or military purposes; + moreover, most influential Argentines have regarded international + safeguards as an infringement on their national sovereignty and + encumbrances imposed by great powers. Yet we have no evidence that + Argentina’s nuclear activities have ever been conducted in violation of + international safeguards.

+

4. Argentina’s top leadership seems to have been preparing to sign the + Treaty of Tlatelolco only on the condition that it not impede the + further development of its independent nuclear capabilities and does + not

+

restrict future Argentine + options to develop the ingredients for nuclear weapons.

+

[Omitted here is the body of the report.]

+
+ +
+ 432. Memorandum of ConversationSource: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, + Staff Material, Office, Outside the System File, Box 56, Country + Chron, Venezuela: 1–4/78. Confidential. The meeting took place at + Miraflores Palace. + Caracas, March 28, 1978, 3:30–4:40 + p.m. + + SUBJECT + International Political Issues: Panama Canal Treaties, + Non-Proliferation, Middle East, Africa, Belize, Nicaragua, and + Conventional Arms Restraint + + + PARTICIPANTS + President Jimmy + Carter + Secretary of State Cyrus R. + Vance + Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski, + Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs + Terence A. Todman, + Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs + W. Anthony Lake, Director, + Policy Planning Staff + Robert A. Pastor, NSC Staff Member + Ambassador Viron P. Vaky + Guy F. Erb, NSC Staff + Member + Venezuela + Carlos Andres Perez, + President + Simon Bottaro Consalvi, Minister of Foreign Affairs + Manuel Perez Guerrero, Minister of State for International + Economic Affairs + Valentin Acosta Hernandez, Minister of Energy and Mines + Carmelo Lesseur Lauria, Minister, Secretariat of the + Presidency + Hector Hurtado, Minister of State, President of the Investment + Fund + Ambassador Ignacio Iribarren + Dr. Reinaldo Figuerido, Director of Foreign Trade Institute + +

After exchanging cordialities, President Perez asked about President + Carter’s preference with + regard to an agenda. President Carter said that he would like to discuss international + political issues today and economic issues tomorrow.On March 29, Carter and Perez discussed North-South Issues, + Energy, the Caribbean, and the Law of the Sea. (Memorandum of + Conversation, March 29, 1978; Carter Library, National Security + Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Pastor Subject File, Box 63, President’s Trip to + Brazil and Venezuela (3/78))

+

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to non-proliferation.]

+ +

President Carter said that + Argentina had promised to ratify the Tlatelolco Treaty soon. Although + they have said this before, they had sent a message this month + indicating they are getting ready to do so.Ambassador Aja Espil + informed Nye on March 22 + that Argentina “has every intention of ratifying the Treaty of + Tlatelolco, as President Videla committed his country to do in conversations + with President Carter and + Secretary Vance. The + Ambassador said this welcome development would take place soon, + noting that the United States should have no doubt about Argentina’s + intentions.” (Telegram 76482 to Buenos Aires, March 24; National + Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign + Policy File, D780130–0734)

+

The U.S. Congress had passed a law on nuclear energy, which clearly + spells out the U.S. position in providing nuclear fuel with certain + safeguards.Carter signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act on + March 10. See Document 366. + President Carter said his visit + to Brazil would be used to explain our position fully; he was afraid + that Brazil may not have completely understood it. We believed it was + relatively easy to cooperate in ways which will provide nuclear power + and at the same time eliminate the danger of weapon production.

+

Perez said that during his conversations with Geisel (November 1977) he expressed solidarity with U.S. + policy. Geisel was upset, and + took the position that one could not keep Brazil from doing the things + that the U.S. has already done. Perez told him that whatever the U.S. + has already done, the world cannot afford unrestrained proliferation. It + was because of aspirations in this area, Perez said, that he had + proposed a multinational Latin American reprocessing center, under the + auspices of OLADE or SELA, as a way of + overcoming jealousies and satisfying needs. Brazil, of course, was also + worried about Argentina. Geisel + said that first he wanted to talk to President Carter, then he would talk to the GOV + about the multinational center proposal.

+

President Carter said that we + have tried the reprocessing route and have found it unsatisfactory. The + International Nuclear Fuel Cycle Study which will be completed soon will + probably recommend regional centers under international safeguards, + precisely to overcome national sensitivities. He said he expected that + the study would find that reprocessing is simply not a necessary part of + a nuclear energy system. He expressed the view that both Germany and + France realize the problems and would probably not offer the same kind + of arrangements now that they did then.

+

President Carter said that common + expressions of concern would be useful in drawing the distinction + between legitimate desires for peaceful use of nuclear energy and arms + production. He also noted that Brazil has thorium, and this is a + promising source of fuel which would avoid the plutonium problem. + Geisel is discussing the use + of thorium, and this may be an avenue out of the present problem. + Perhaps, the President said, + the U.S. pushed too far too fast with Brazil, but we will discuss these + matters.

+

Perez asked whether the U.S. would be helpful to Argentina in the area of + thorium technology if they expressed interest, and the President + answered affirmatively.

+

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to non-proliferation.]

+
+ +
+ 433. Telegram From the Embassy in Brazil to the Department of + StateSource: National + Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign + Policy File, P850104–2220. Secret; Immediate; Cherokee; Nodis. + Brasilia, April 4, 1978, 2020Z +

2704. Subject: Draft Memorandum of Conversation of Second Bilateral + Meeting Between Presidents Carter and Geisel, March 30, 1978, 11:15 a.m.No final version of this conversation was found. + Carter and Geisel discussed Africa, the Middle + East, and the overall U.S.-Brazilian relationship in their first + meeting on March 29. (Telegram 6924 from Brasilia, April 4; Carter + Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, + Pastor Subject File, Box + 63, President’s Trip to Brazil and Venezuela (3/78): + 1–5/78)

+

1. The following is a draft Memorandum of Conversation for the second + bilateral meeting between Presidents Carter and Geisel + on March 30 at 11:15 a.m. For most of the meeting, participants on the + US side in addition to President + Carter were: Secretary + Vance, Dr. Brzezinski and Chargé Richard E. + Johnson; the Brazilian side was represented by President Geisel, Foreign Minister Silveira and Counselor Ronaldo Mota + Sardenberg, the Minister’s Special Adviser for Bilateral Political and + Economic Affairs. After a discussion of approximately forty-five + minutes, the group was expanded with the addition of Assistant Secretary + Todman, Director Lake, Mr. Pastor and Embassy Economic Counselor Ruser on the + US side and Finance Minister + Simonsen, Planning Minister Velloso, Industry and Commerce Minister + Calmon De Sa and Counsel Nogueira, a Foreign Ministry Advisor for + Political Affairs, on the Brazilian side.

+

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to non-proliferation.]

+ +

17. Changing the subject, President Carter stated that he had enjoyed his press conference + earlier that morning.The text of Carter’s March 30 press conference + is printed in Public Papers: Carter, 1978, pp. + 627–634. Questions arose on both nuclear matters and human + rights. These were answered truthfully and honestly with an + acknowledgement that there were certain difficulties in these areas and + that they had been discussed with the Brazilian government. He pointed + out to the press that we are interested in discussing these matters with + the Brazilian government, adding that the differences are minor in + comparison with areas of bilateral agreement.

+

18. President Geisel said that + these two subjects could not have been avoided. Had he been a + journalist, they would have figured in his line of attack as well. + Obviously President Carter has + an obligation to reply truthfully with an explanation of his views. It + would be absurd were he to feel embarrassed in responding. Our + differences are natural and are not as great as is often stated.

+

19. President Carter said he had + two questions to raise concerning the nuclear question. Brazil, he said, + has signed and ratified the Treaty of Tlatelolco but will not recognize + its applicability until all nations sign the Treaty. This would include + nations which will never sign, like France and the Soviet Union, perhaps + also Cuba (under Soviet pressure). Giscard + D’Estaing has said he has no particular objections to + Tlatelolco, but he has doubts as to the desirability of France taking + part in these Western Hemisphere arrangements. President Carter aked whether, if Argentina + signs and the list of Central and South American signatories is thereby + completed, Brazil would agree to implement the accord?

+

20. President Geisel replied that + this question would require further study. Argentina does not cause + major concern for Brazil, he said. However, Brazil feels that countries + like France and the USSR, which have + nuclear weapons, should make a commitment pertaining to the non-use of + these weapons in the Western Hemisphere. They should undertake to fight + their wars elsewhere, not in South America, and to refrain from + stockpiling their nuclear weapons here. Brazil wishes that the Russians, + French and Chinese would also sign Tlatelolco. President Geisel said that the Ambassador of the + Soviet Union, a country with which Brazil has fair relations, especially + in the trade sphere, came to him with a note critical of Brazil’s accord + with the Federal Republic of Germany. President Geisel said that he had to be a bit + rude in his reply. He told the Soviet Ambassador that he had no right to + bring this matter up in his dealings with Brazil, in the absence of + Soviet acceptance of Tlatelolco obligations.

+ +

21. Foreign Minister Silveira + said there were three phases in the implementation of the Treaty of + Tlatelolco—the signing, the ratification and finally the acceptance of + the treaty by the nuclear powers. Brazil believes that with the signing + of Tlatelolco it has committed itself not to manufacture nuclear + weapons. Under the Geneva Convention on Treaties, if a country has + signed an agreement, it is binding even though it may not have been + fully ratified, and that country must comply with the agreement’s terms + pending ratification. Brazil feels that it must continue to work for a + ban on nuclear attacks on this continent and on the storage of nuclear + weapons here; Brazil does not wish to abandon the pressure on this + point. This firm Brazilian policy of seeking guarantees from the Soviet + Union and other countries was adopted after the Cuban missile crisis, + when President Kennedy + successfully pushed for the evacuation of missiles from Cuba. Brazil + came out firmly in favor of assurances against the establishment in the + Western Hemisphere of bases for the storage of arms. President Kennedy’s successful handling of the + Cuban missile crisis marked the beginning of a decrease in the pressure + which Cuba exerted over Latin American nations. Brazil is totally + committed at present not to manufacture nuclear weapons. The agreement + with the Federal Republic of Germany provides that no nuclear devices + will be manufactured even for peaceful uses. The manufacture of nuclear + explosives even for peaceful uses is for Brazil in the realm of fantasy, + and Brazil is not interested in fantasy.

+

22. President Carter noted that + Brazil has accepted IAEA safeguards on + installations purchased from the Federal Republic of Germany. He asked + whether this applies to other installations.

+

23. President Geisel said that + there are no unsafeguarded facilities in Brazil. This includes the + facilities at universities where research is underway. Such facilities + are under international controls. The scientific community in Brazil had + hoped that Brazil’s failure to ratify might mean that their research + would not be under international control, but was disappointed to learn + that this was not to be the case. President Geisel reiterated that Brazil’s research centers are + under Vienna safeguards, as well as anything constructed under the + agreement with the FRG. Brazil feels + that the IAEA should be strengthened + and possibly reorganized to permit it to conduct its activities in + Brazil and throughout the world. As a UN + agency, it should be in a position to use any necessary resources to + fulfill its purposes.

+

24. President Carter said that + when his administration began there was no systematic formulation for + considering requests for the supply of nuclear fuel abroad. US policy in this respect was variable. + There is now in existence within the USG an entity responsible for such allocations. President + Carter noted that he cannot + control these allocations although he can exercise a veto power. We have recently passed a law + which clarifies the circumstances under which the US will ship nuclear fuel in the future. It + is important that Ambassador Smith return to Brazil and meet with the Brazilian + authorities in order that there can be a clear understanding by both + sides of the terms of this legislation, and so that Brazil’s future + needs for nuclear fuel can be met, consistent with US law. This law makes US terms clearer and will help avoid future + interruptions in supply.

+

25. President Geisel said that he + had not as yet examined the complete text of the law, but had read about + certain of its provisions. He is aware that it calls for the + renegotiation of existing accords with re-gard to the supply of nuclear + fuel. Brazil has a 1972 agreement with the United States in this sphere. + The Angra I nuclear power facility is under construction, with + Westinghouse contributing. The US has + agreed to furnish enriched fuel for the startup as well as for + re-loading for a thirty-year period. President Geisel said that he had heard that the + US has recently reaffirmed its + commitment to furnish the startup fuel; he had expected nothing less of + US, but was nevertheless pleased + with this reaffirmation. Brazil is, however, concerned about subsequent + shipments for re-loading over the thirty-year period, and would be happy + to receive Ambassador Smith to + discuss this question and examine the implications of the new + legislation. President Geisel + expressed confidence that no problems would emerge.

+

26. Foreign Minister Silveira + said that there were no activities in Brazil not subject to safeguards. + This is a concrete fact; this situation will continue to prevail unless + there is a change in the status quo.

+

27. President Carter noted that + Brazil has recently signed an agreement with the FRG to exchange technical information + concerning the thorium fuel cycle. The United States welcomes this + action. Our offer also remains open. The US has thorium and has had extensive experience in this + area. Our only breeder reactor is based on thorium. If the German + agreement turns out to be inadequate or if Brazil feels the need for + more consultations on the thorium fuel cycle, we will be glad to + cooperate. The US believes that the + INFCE studies represent a good + means of learning from one another. There are certain unpredictabilities + in the nuclear sphere which need to be resolved. The INFCE studies do not have as their + objective persuading countries to take action which is against their own + interests, but rather are designed to help interested nations work + together.

+

28. President Geisel responded + that Brazil is very active in INFCE + and is pleased to be involved in this kind of cooperative effort. + Thorium cooperation with the FRG is not + a new development, but rather has been underway for some time (Foreign + Minister Silveira interjected at + this point that it began + in 1979).An error in transcription; + Silveira meant + 1978. President Geisel + observed that the United States is working along the same lines and that + Brazil wanted to cooperate in an endeavor in which all have an + interest.

+

29. President Carter agreed, + stating that this is one more approach to a solution of the energy + problem, an excruiatingly difficult matter for all of us.

+

30. President Geisel said he is + happy about the US initiative on the + bilateral examination of problems in areas involving other kinds of + fuel. Brazil is seeking to develop alcohol as a source of energy, a + natural direction for Brazilian efforts since the country has large land + reserves. Brazil has found new and higher grades of coal deposits in the + south, and the US offer to cooperate in + coal research and development is most welcome. President Geisel said he was extremely happy over + the prospect of joint efforts to cooperate in resolving the energy + problem and to improve the outlook, in the face of the inevitable + eventual exhaustion of oil reserves.

+

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to non-proliferation.]

+
+ +
+ 434. Telegram From the Embassy in Mexico to the Department of + StateSource: National + Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign + Policy File, D780180–0823. Limited Official Use; Priority. Sent for + information to Brasilia, Buenos Aires, Caracas, the Mission in + Geneva, Georgetown, the Interests Section in Havana, Moscow, USUN, Panama City, Paris, Santiago, + and Vienna. + Mexico, April 22, 1978, 0016Z +

6639. USIAEA. Subject: Treaty of Tlatelolco—Ratification Prospects.

+

1. OPANAL General Secretary Gros Espiel gave visitors from + National Defense University and Emboffs a good rundown of present state + of play on pending ratifications of Tlatelolco Treaty in meeting at + OPANAL HQ on April 21.

+

2. Argentina. Gros indicated + paramount importance of Argentine ratification inasmuch as it was most + nuclearly advanced country in region, and he believed some of Argentine + military wanted to retain right to make nuclear weapons. Gros cited Vance-Montes joint communiqué statement that Argentina + would soon ratify, as U.S. would Protocol I. Gros thinks Argentina is waiting for + U.S. Protocol I ratification, but would then ratify (without waiver) in + next 2–3 months. He believes Argentine internal politics now such that + it will wish to improve U.S. attitudes toward it and will want to uphold + its commitment to Vance, once + U.S. has done its part.

+

3. Brazil. Gros noted that he had + tried in vain for several years to point out that Brazil, as signer and + ratifier, must respect Treaty. In last year, Brazilians have stated + three times that they would, under Vienna Convention,Reference to the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law + of Treaties. not do anything contrary to Treaty. This was + stated (1) in a letter from Silveira, (B) by a Brazilian Rep at the 1977 OPANAL + meeting in Caracas, (C) in the Geisel-Lopez Portillo Joint Communiqué. Gros has “off the record” info that + Brazil would become a full party if the USSR would sign and ratify Protocol II.

+

4. Chile. Gros says he has a + recent telegram from the Chilean Foreign Minister that indicates that + Chile would waive the entry into force requirements if the USSR would ratify Protocol II.

+

5. Cuba. Gros cited Guantanamo as + the most fundamental problem preventing Cuba from signing and ratifying. + He thinks that negotiations with Cuba will become much easier once the + U.S. ratifies Protocol I, although this will not solve the problem + completely. Cuban adherence, he says, is also connected with the USSR attitude toward Protocol II. Once + this and U.S. Protocol I ratification are accomplished, he believes + fruitful negotiations with Cuba can be accomplished.

+

6. Guyana. Gros says Guyana wants + to sign, but has been prevented from doing so by Venezuelan opposition + under Article 25.Article 25 of the Treaty + of Tlatelolco states that “Unless the Parties concerned agree on + another mode of peaceful settlement, any question or dispute + concerning the interpretation or application of this Treaty which is + not settled shall be referred to the International Court of Justice + with the prior consent of the Parties to the controversy.” + (http:://www.opanal.org/opanal/tlatelolco/tlatelolco-i.htm) + He says intense negotiations have been underway with Venezuela, and he + thinks a “formula” has been found which will be acceptable to both + countries. He therefore expects Guyana to become a party “in the coming + months.”

+

7. United States. Gros thinks + that the wait in seeking Senate consent to Protocol I was justified as + the ratification of the Panama Canal treaties paves the way for Protocol + I.Reference to the fact that Article IV + of the Panama Canal Treaty states that “since Panama is a signatory + to the Treaty of Tlatelolco, the United States shall not install any + type of nuclear armament on the territory of Panama.” The Carter administration therefore + needed to gain Senate ratification of the Panama Canal treaties + before submitting the Treaty of Tlatelolco to the Senate. The Senate + ratified the first Panama Canal Treaty on March 16 and the second on + April 18. He views the Canal zone as now denuclearized by the new Canal Treaty + (except for transit rights) and notes that, through this treaty, Panama + has accepted transit rights.

+

8. France. Gros says he has + “unofficial information” that the French may announce their intent to + sign Protocol I during the SSOD.

+

9. USSR. Gros believes there are “indications” of a change of + position on the part of the Soviets toward Protocol II. When Lopez Portillo visits Moscow in + mid-May, he will raise the question with the USSR on behalf of all of Latin America. The timing will + also nearly coincide with the SSOD in + New York. Thus, while there is no assurance, Gros thinks a favorable Soviet + announcement is “very possible.” He added that the Soviet Ambassador + told him April 20 that there were “possible signs” of a change of Soviet + attitude.

+ + Thompson + +
+ +
+ 435. Memorandum From Robert + Pastor of the National Security Council Staff to the + President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, + Brzezinski Material, + Country File, Box 45, Latin America, 12/77–7/78. No classification + marking. Sent for information. Copies were sent to Hunter and Tuchman. + Washington, April + 28, 1978 + + SUBJECT + Your Question About the Treaty of Tlatelolco + +

I have obtained the relevant portion of Brezhnev’s statementSee + “Address by President Brezhnev [Extract],” April 25, 1978, in Documents on Disarmament, 1978, pp. + 256–258. on signing Tlatelolco, and it does not appear that + he intends to sign it with any reservations—at least he did not refer to + any reservations in that statement. The statement follows:

+

In accordance with its principled line of reducing the threat of nuclear + war, the Soviet Union has also adopted a decision to become a party in a relevant form to the International Treaty on + Banning Nuclear Weapons in Latin America. Thus we, like the other states + possessing nuclear weapons, will take upon ourselves the obligation not + to help in the acquisition of nuclear arms by Latin American states, and + also not to use such weapons against the states that are parties to the + treaty.

+

Where Brezhnev says that the USSR will become a party “in a relevant + form” ACDA and I interpret that as + meaning he will be signing the Protocol II. With regard to the + President’s note on Vance’s + night reading on Tlatelolco,Not + found. I have spoken to Bob + Hunter and to officials in ACDA to make sure that they touch base with the French + before the SSOD to make clear our + desire that the French adhere to Tlatelolco. Furthermore, I have been in + touch with ARA requesting that they + cable relevant posts about the Soviet announcement and ask those + countries which have not yet signed, ratified, or permitted the Treaties + to come into force, to do that. We have just received a cable from our + Interests Section in HavanaTelegram 1097 + from Havana, April 27; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + D780181–0611. which speculates on whether the Cubans will + follow the Soviet example, and concludes that they may not.On May 4, Vance told Mexican President José López Portillo that Mexico + could be “very helpful” in persuading Cuba to sign the Treaty of + Tlatelolco. If Cuba refused, however, he warned that the Treaty + could not be implemented. (Memorandum of Conversation; Carter + Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, + Pastor Country File, Box + 28, Mexico, 3–7/78) The cable also makes the point that + acceptance of Tlatelolco by the Soviets is a public confirmation of + their private 1962 and 1970 assurance to US not to deploy nuclear weapons in Cuba.On Soviet private assurance of 1962, see footnote + 4, Document 404. On October 6, 1970, in response to accusations that + the Soviets were constructing a nuclear naval port at Cienfuegos, + Dobrynin informed + National Security Advisor Henry + Kissinger that the Soviet Government “would like to + reaffirm once more that the Soviet side strictly adheres to its part + of the [1962] understanding on the Cuban question and will continue + to adhere to it in the future on the assumption that the American + side as President Nixon has + reaffirmed, will also strictly observe its part of the + understanding.” (Memorandum of Conversation, October 6, 1970; Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, vol. + XII, Soviet Union, January 1969–October 1970, Document + 224).

+
+ +
+ + 436. Telegram From the Embassy in Chile to the Department of + StateSource: National + Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign + Policy File, D780203–1070. Confidential; Priority. Sent for + information to Buenos Aires. + Santiago, May 12, 1978, 2211Z +

3612. For NRC. Subject: Chile Will Sign + NPT and Accept Total Safeguards on + All Nuclear Installations in Chile in Exchange for U.S. Assistance in + Nuclear Field.

+

1. Summary: Reports reaching Embassy indicate Chile might be willing to + sign the NPT, accept total safeguards + on all Chilean nuclear facilities, and waive requirements for entry into + force of Tlatelolco Treaty in exchange for an assured nuclear fuel + supply and technical assistance from the USG. Ambassador will shortly be invited by CCEN for + discussion on the subject. Chile’s strategy will be to first attempt to + obtain nuclear fuel and technical assistance from U.S. without making + concessions; second, attempt to obtain nuclear fuel and technical + assistance from U.S. by placing La Reina reactor and facilities under + total safeguards but only the fuel supply at Lo Aguirre under + safeguards; and finally, agree to sign NPT, accept total safeguards, and waive requirements for + entry into force of Tlatelolco Treaty in exchange for an assured nuclear + fuel supply and technical assistance from the U.S. in event previous + alternatives fail. End summary.

+

2. Embassy Science Officer was told by a member (protect) of the Chilean + Nuclear Energy Commission (CCEN) on 11 May that Chile would be willing + to sign the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), accept total safeguards on all Chilean nuclear + facilities, and waive requirements for entry into force of the Treaty of + Tlatelolco in exchange for a agreement with the United States government + to provide Chile with a dependable supply of nuclear fuel and other + undefined nuclear technology assistance. This decision was reached, + along with a preliminary negotiating strategy, during a 10 May meeting + of the CCEN Advisory Board.

+

3. During the meeting on the CCEN Advisory Board, CCEN President General + (R) Jaime Estrada L. told board members that he had received inquiries + from both the Chilean Foreign Minister Hernan Cubillos Sallato and + Defense Minister General Raul Benavides as to why Chile should not sign + the NPT. Estrada stated that he had + been opposed to Chile signing the NPT + and accepting total safeguards over all CCEN installations. He was, + however, beginning to realize that Chile would not be able to continue + operating its two experimental nuclear reactors. Moreover, the GOC would be forced to + cancel plans for building a 600 mw nuclear electric power plant slated + to go on-line in 1987, all due to inability to obtain nuclear fuel to + operate the facilities. Estrada said that CCEN had dispatched Dr. Max + Von Brandt to France in February of this year to attempt to obtain 90 + percent enriched uranium for CCEN’s experimental reactors. However, the + French informed Von Brandt that due to heavy pressure from the USG, they would no longer be able to + supply Chile with highly enriched uranium. Chile was now without a + nuclear fuel supply, said Estrada, and would have to find some means of + changing this situation. After consideration of all available facts, the + Advisory Board recommended that Estrada invite the U.S. Ambassador to + CCEN headquarters for a discussion of the problem and offer to sign the + NPT, accept total safeguards and + waive requirements for entry into force of the Tlatelolco Treaty in + exchange for nuclear assistance from the U.S. Estrada reluctantly agreed + to the recommendation but insisted on the following graduated + negotiating strategy:

+

A) CCEN would first attempt to arrange for a U.S. nuclear fuel supply and + technical assistance without making concessions toward NPT.

+

B) CCEN would secondly attempt to arrange for a U.S. nuclear fuel supply + and technical assistance in return for placing the La Reina reactor and + facilities under total safeguards but limiting only the fuel supply to a + safeguards agreement at the Lo Aguirre reactor; and

+

C) Failing the above alternatives, CCEN would finally agree to sign the + NPT, accept total safeguards on all + nuclear facilities, and waive requirements allowing the Treaty of + Tlatelolco to enter into force in exchange for a firm U.S. commitment to + provide CCEN with an assured supply of reactor fuel and other undefined + nuclear technical assistance.

+

4. Comment: The above represents a possible breakthrough in our attempts + to encourage Chile to sign the NPT. + Department guidance on a proper response to CCEN, if and when Ambassador + is summoned, would be helpful as well as an indication of U.S. + willingness to negotiate a nuclear assistance pact with CCEN in exchange + for Chile signing the NPT and accepting + total safeguards.In telegram 141207 to + Santiago, June 3, the Department of State called the news of Chile’s + impending decision “very positive events for overall US non-proliferation efforts if we can + secure them.” The Department remained concerned, however, that its + hope for “a rapid restoration of democratic institutions in Chile” + might conflict with the goal of non-proliferation. (National + Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign + Policy File, D780233–0061) The Embassy replied on June 9 that “the + conflicts between USG human rights + and nuclear objectives are more apparent than real.” (Telegram 4371 + from Santiago; National Archives, RG + 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780244–1349)

+ + Landau + +
+ +
+ + 437. Editorial Note +

On May 18, 1978, after numerous statements to U.S. officials over the + previous months, (see, for example, telegram 9419 from Moscow, April 29; + National Archives, RG 59, Central + Foreign Policy File, D780184–1211) Soviet General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev signed Protocol II of + the Treaty of Tlatelolco. For the text of the statement announcing the + decision, see Telegram 11259 from Moscow, May 20, 1978. (National + Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy + File, D780213–0008)

+

Four days later, Argentine President Jorge + Rafael Videla wrote President Jimmy Carter that “following necessary + studies and consideration, my Government has decided that the Argentine + Republic will accede to the Treaty of Tlatelolco. The appropriate + official announcement will be made during the United Nations Conference + on Disarmament.” Videla also + said that this “singularly important act merely serves to confirm our + constant policy in matters of nuclear energy, the basic lines of which I + explained to you during our meeting. (See Document + 420) The same act now becomes all the more relevant in that it + is linked to United States’ disarmament policy and affords, without any + doubt, clear evidence of the common concern of our two countries in + behalf of a more just and stable world order.” (Letter from Videla to Carter; Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff + Material, North/South, Pastor + Country File, Box 1, Argentina, 1–8/78)

+

On May 24, President Carter + submitted Protocol I of the Treaty to the U.S. Senate for ratification. + Carter said that he was “convinced that it is in the best interest of + the United States to ratify Protocol I. Such a step will strengthen our + relations with our Latin American neighbors, further our global + non-proliferation and arms control objectives and contribute to the full + realization of Latin American Nuclear Free Zone.” He also hoped that his + decision would influence other nations to adhere to the Treaty so it + could “enter into full force and effect for the entire zone of + application.” (Public Papers: Carter, 1978, pp. + 961–962)

+

On June 12, Carter wrote + Videla and said he “was very + pleased to receive your letter informing me that Argentina would ratify + the Treaty of Tlatelolco. The coming into force of the Treaty will + represent a very significant step toward the establishment of a more + secure world order. I very much hope that Argentina will be able to + formally to ratify the Treaty and bring it into effect soon. This will + give important impetus to our common efforts to reduce the dangers of + further proliferation of nuclear weapons and to secure a nuclear free + zone in Latin America.” (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, + Staff Material, North/South, Pastor Country File, Box 1, Argentina, 1–8/78)

+
+ +
+ + 438. Telegram From the Embassy in France to the Department of + StateSource: National + Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign + Policy File, D780226–0459. Confidential. Sent for information to + Mexico City and USUN. + Paris, May + 30, 1978, 2005Z +

17098. Subject: French Action on the Treaty of Tlatelolco. Ref: State + 133115In telegram 133115 to Paris, May + 25, the Department of State instructed the Embassy to notify the + French Government that the Soviet Union and Argentina intended to + ratify Protocol II during the UN’s + Special Session on Disarmament. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + D780221–0015) (Notal).

+

1. Summary: French will discuss with OPANAL possible conditions under which GOF might adhere to Protocol I of the + Treaty of Tlatelolco. These discussions will probably be held after the + June 28 conclusion of the SSOD. End + summary.

+

2. As instructed Reftel Emboff raised Protocol I issue with Jacques + Boullet, Acting Chief of PACTSND Disarmament at Foreign Ministry, in + absence of more knowledgeable officials who are in New York for SSOD.

+

3. Boullet noted that in his SSOD + speech May 25 President Giscard + said that “France hopes . . . to be able to sign Protocol I. With that + intention it will open contacts with authorities established by the + treaty with a view of examining the conditions under which the signature + could come about.” Thus the GOF + statement is conditional.

+

4. Boullet said that as far as he knows no contact has yet been made with + OPANAL. He expected that the + contacts will not occur until after the conclusion of the SSOD. However GOF officials now in New York may have a better idea on + timing.

+

5. We will continue to discuss this issue. For that purpose we would + appreciate receiving a copy of the analysis of the treaty and Protocol I + which has been given to French Embassy in Washington.Not found.

+ + Hartman + +
+ +
+ + 439. Telegram From the Embassy in Argentina to the Department of + StateSource: National + Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign + Policy File, D780253–0160. Confidential. Sent for information to + Brasilia, Mexico City, and Vienna. + Buenos Aires, June 16, 1978, 2032Z +

4680. USIAEA. Subject US/Argentine Nuclear Cooperation. Ref: A Buenos + Aires 4284,Telegram 4284 from Buenos Aires, + June 5, reported that “With the ratification of the Treaty of + Tlatelolco, Argentina feels it has lived up to the US recommendation made during the visit + of Secretary Vance last + November concerning the first stage for nuclear cooperation; the + GOA is expecting an active + US response.” (National + Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign + Policy File, D780234–1016) B State 140112,Telegram 140112 to Buenos Aires, June 2, informed + the Embassy that “Argentine Foreign Minister Montes confirmed + publicly that Argentina will ratify the Treaty of Tlatelolco. There + was no indication, however, as to when this long awaited step might + take place or whether Argentina will waive the condition necessary + for the treaty to enter into force.” The Department also requested + “the Embassy’s thoughts on when actual ratification might be + expected and what, if any, additional steps we might take to + encourage prompt Argentine action.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + D780232–0070) C State 78782,Telegram 78782 to Buenos Aires, March 28, contained a note + concerning U.S. understanding of the Joint Communiqué on nuclear + cooperation issued during Vance’s November 1977 visit to Argentina. (National + Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign + Policy File, D780133–0917) + D State 73111.Telegram 73111 to Buenos Aires, March 27, informed + the Embassy that Castro Madero had asked Smith to “provide him a written statement of the + conditions under which we would supply heavy water to Argentina.” + Accordingly, the Department instructed the Embassy to deliver a note + to the Argentine Government which explained that the United States + would supply heavy water to Argentina contingent upon Argentina’s + adoption of full-scope safeguards with the IAEA and ratification of the Treaty of Tlatelolco. + (National Archives, RG 59, Central + Foreign Policy File, D780133–0917)

+

1. Summary: The GOA having announced + ratification of the Treaty of TlatelolcoAt + the May 27 UN Special Session on + Disarmament meeting, the Argentine Minister of Foreign Affairs, Vice + Admiral Oscar Montes, announced that his country would ratify the + Treaty. (Telegram 4184 from Buenos Aires, May 31; National Archives, + RG 59, Central Foreign Policy + File, D780229–0156) is taking steps toward discussion with + IAEA for international safeguards. + They expect the US to recognize this + with some positive moves toward expanded cooperation such as discussions + on transfers of heavy water productions technology. They still contend + this was the agreement reached in the Joint Communiqué of last + NovemberSee footnote 2, Document 426. and claim that + reprocessing discussions were out of the context of the Joint + Communiqué, and in any event, according to GOA they are not reprocessing. The GOA does not feel Tlatelolco is important from a non + proliferation standpoint but will follow this requirement to satisfy + US requests. They again specify that + the NPT is discriminatory and they will not sign. The GOA is highly interested in expanded + nuclear cooperation with the US and is + looking forward to talks in this direction. End summary.

+

2. The following is an unofficial and free translation of a Diplomatic + Note received by the Embassy in answer to our Diplomatic Note No 75 + dated 3/28/78 (Reftel C), concerning US + understanding of the Joint Communiqué issued during the visit of + Secretary Vance to Argentina in + November, 1977, and delineating the three stages of cooperation + discussed.

+

3. “—The Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Worship of the Argentine + Republic presents its compliments to the Embassy of the United States of + America and has the honor to refer to the Embassy Verbal Note No 75, + dated March 28, 1978.

+

—The Government of the US expresses in + Note 75 its position with respect to some of the questions discussed + during the conversations held by officers of both countries on bilateral + nuclear cooperation, on occasion of the visit to Buenos Aires of Mr + Cyrus Vance, Nov 18–22, + 1977. It also establishes its interpretation of the text of the Joint + Communiqué in connection with those questions.

+

—In referring to the activities to be undertaken by both governments, the + Note states in the three stages indicated that: ‘these actions would + occur separately; they would not be linked, nor would subsequent stages + of expanded cooperation be specifically linked to these actions.’ These + are high principles but to our understanding, do not include the idea of + mutual relations, ie “do ut des” (give and take). It seems natural to + interpret that, in general, a cooperation plan contemplates in some way + an approximate equivalence in the actions that both countries + undertake.

+

—Hence, it is our interpretation that the conversations held at that time + led to the expressed intention on the side of the US to transfer heavy water technology to + our country, and to our country’s intention to ratify the Treaty of + Tlatelolco and enter into a regime of full-scope safeguards like those + of the IAEA.

+

—We understand that this technology transfer—even though it may not + really contribute to nuclear proliferation—may be of a sensitive nature + and dissemination would be considered as an exception to the US policy. Argentina in turn expected the + US to understand that the + ratification of Tlatelolco contained difficulties, since it implicated + overcoming internal opposition from different sectors. Also, it is to be + noted that such ratification corresponds in a larger measure—if not + exclusively to the interpretation of the US, and not that of Argentina, with respect to the effects + of non-proliferation of Tlatelolco and that it would satisfy a point of + US policy.

+ +

—Argentina takes note, then, of what the Government of the US expresses in the Note which is now being + answered, but would like at least to point out that its own + understanding of the questions mentioned in the Note pertaining to the + meaning of the Joint Communiqué, differs in some aspects with those of + the Government of the US.

+

—It may be remembered also that some opinions stated during the + conversation (in November), which my government feels are of great + importance, were expressed by the GOA + in opposition to the unilateral and anticipated postponement of possible + chemical reprocessing activities, which in any event, are not being + carried out in Argentina.

+

—Notwithstanding the above mentioned, the Argentine Government is + convinced that both countries are greatly interested in pursuing the + high objective of nuclear non proliferation, and also that the US Government has a sincere interest in + promoting and extending nuclear cooperation for peaceful ends with + Argentina. Under such circumstances, the Argentine Government is certain + that the different opinions on the interpretation of the Joint + Communiqué and other questions mentioned in Note 75 can be reconciled by + means of the contacts which may be established, and which the Argentine + Government looks forward to with its best disposition.

+

—The Ministry of Foreign Relations and Worship renews to the Embassy of + the United States of America the expressions of its highest + consideration.” Signed: Alberto + Aden, Minister, International Organizations Dept.

+

4. Comments: On June 13, SciCouns + met with Minister Aden, MFA, who + prepared the Note, (Aden handles + UN and international organizations + and has responsibility for nuclear affairs in that division) to discuss + the contents of the Note and other issues related to the Treaty of + Tlatelolco and full scope safeguards. Minister Aden indicated that Argentina has + announced the ratification of Tlatelolco and will enter into discussion + in the near future with IAEA to + develop and agreement for full scope safeguards. He said the treaty is + now with the CAL and the Presidency for final approvals.

+

5. However, Aden stated + emphatically that the GOA had overcome + tremendous internal pressure against the ratification of Tlatelolco and + feels now the ball is in the US court, + so to speak, to live up to their part of the “bargain” as agreed in the + Joint Communiqué. Aden mentioned + also that Argentina would not sign the NPT because of its discriminatory aspects as outlined by + Foreign Minister Montes at the SSOD. + He feels the US should understand how + deeply the signing of the Tlatelolco Treaty had separated internal + GOA politics, and how much pressure + was on the President not to ratify the Treaty. The President, however, + in order to live up to his US + commitment, made the decision to ratify. Aden stated that Argentina never attached much importance to the Tlatelolco + Treaty as a device to prevent non-proliferation since they (Argentina) + never had the intentions to proliferate. However, primarily because the + US felt this was an important move + followed by international safeguards as discussed during the Vance visit last November, the GOA decided to ratify the Treaty + accompanied by international safeguards and was under the impression the + US would follow up with discussions + on the transfer of heavy water technology. This exchange, according to + Aden, was the crux of the + whole matter and apparently where both countries are now of different + opinions relative to the outcome of the November discussions. The SciCouns reviewed again the US understanding of the discussions as + stated in our note, and indicated that it is our clear understanding + that paragraph 7 of the Communiqué referred to expanded US/Argentine + nuclear cooperation under the first two stages and that the phrase + “relevant technology” did not include transfer of heavy water production + technology except under conditions described in the third stage. The + third stage included the requirement for a deferral of reprocessing + activities and the negotiation of a full scope safeguard agreement if + this was not accomplished under stages one or two. These would be the + conditions for further discussions on the transfer of heavy water + technology. As stated in the Note, this US position had been expressed on several occasions to + Castro Madero and other GOA officials + by Amb Smith, Prof Nye, and Embassy officers.

+

6. Aden indicated deferral of + reprocessing was not a part of the Joint Communiqué but of separate + discussions during the visit. He claimed this was not connected to + receiving heavy water technology from the US; and in any event, Argentina was not involved in + chemical reprocessing and does not have the need nor the technology. + However, Aden said this would + remain a technical question that could be discussed further with the + US.

+

7. Finally, Aden stated Argentina + was highly interested in moving ahead with important discussions with + the US on future nuclear cooperation and + objectives of non-proliferation. He feels if both governments work + together on a sincere basis for peaceful purposes of atomic energy, + these differences related to the Joint Communiqué and stages of + cooperation can be resolved.

+

8. The reporting officer indicated he was actively working with CNEA officials and lawyers on the review + of the US Non-Proliferation Act and that + they had requested discussions with the US side on the renegotiation of a nuclear cooperation + agreement (Reftel A) which would be necessary before some of the + expanded cooperation referred to in the Note could take place.

+

9. In a final question on the PNE + Section of Tlatelolco, Aden + mentioned this would be decided by Cal and the presidency but he felt + this was not of great importance to Argentina.

+ +

10. As stated in previous messages and inclusive in the above Note and + conversation, the GOA has indicated + their decisions to include full scope safeguards with the ratification + of Tlatelolco. However, they (GOA) + fully expect that the US should + understand how difficult this decision was because of internal pressure + against it and feel they have lived up to their commitment in the Joint + Communiqué of last November. The GOA + now expects the US to enter into + expanded talks on nuclear cooperation, including the provision of heavy + water production technology. Regarding the provision requesting the + deferral of reprocessing, they claim it was not a part of the Joint + Communiqué and, in any event, would not be an issue since (CNEA) is not reprocessing.

+

11. It seems we have now come to the point where further joint talks are + necessary. If Argentina takes the action to fulfill stage two by moving + toward a safeguards agreements with IAEA, we should move ahead with discussions on the + renegotiation of our nuclear cooperation in the fields indicated. The + issue of reprocessing and heavy water technology can be covered in these + discussions. The Embassy could begin by discussing the model nuclear + cooperation agreement with the GOA + which we have not yet received authority to do.On June 30, the Ambassador to Argentina, Raul Castro, reported that the + Argentine Government believed that “the Brazilians are dictating + nuclear policy to the US,” because + not only had its nuclear deal with the Federal Republic of Germany + gone forward, but it had not been forced to adhere to the Treaty of + Tlatelolco, establish full-scope safeguards, or sign the NPT. Meanwhile, Argentina believed + that it was “being diplomatically isolated and discriminated against + from the standpoint of transfer of nuclear technology for not + signing the NPT.” (Telegram 5034 + from Buenos Aires, June 30; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + D780271–1134)

+ + Castro + +
+ +
+ + 440. Memorandum from the President’s Assistant for National Security + Affairs (Brzezinski) to Secretary + of Defense BrownSource: Library of Congress, + Manuscript Division, Harold + Brown Papers, Box 74, General Files, Tlatelolco, + Treaty of. Confidential. The memorandum was leaked to columnists + Rowland Evans and Robert Novak, who quoted from it in a Washington Post column. (Evans and Novak, + “Retreat from an ‘Open Administration’,” Washington Post, August 28, 1978) The column elicited an + official letter from the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, + General David Jones, to the Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations + Committee, John Sparkman + (D-Alabama), which explained that the Joint Chiefs had endorsed the + signing of Protocol I in December 1977. (Congressional Record, September 27, 1978) + Washington, August + 7, 1978 + + SUBJECT + Senate Ratification of the Treaty of Tlatelolco + +

I understand that the Senate Foreign Relations Committee is currently + planning to hold hearings on Protocol I of the Treaty of Tlatelolco in + mid-August. I know that you are aware of the importance which the + President attaches to ratification of Protocol I, and that you will + ensure that the representatives from your Department and from the Joint + Chiefs of Staff who will testify before the Committee will indicate + their complete and unequivocal support for the Treaty.

+

You may recall that the President said that he would sign Protocol I in + his Pan-American Day speech, April 1, 1977,Carter actually made + the announcement on April 14, 1977. See Document + 410. and signed it on May 26.See footnote 2, Document + 414. At least partly because of the President’s + decision, the Argentines and the Soviets have both taken steps to ratify + the Treaty. It would be ironic and perhaps a little embarrassing if we + were one of the last holdouts, preventing the Treaty from coming into + force sooner. There is little chance that the Senate would be able to + ratify the Treaty this year if DOD or + the JCS expressed any reservations to + ratification. Indeed, unless DOD and + JCS are aggressively supportive of + ratification, the Senate may decide to put off consideration until next + year. I don’t have to tell you that it would be a significant + accomplishment of the President’s non-proliferation and Latin American + policy if Protocol I could be ratified this year. Could you please have + your staff inform mine who will be the representatives from DOD and JCS testifying at the hearings?

+ + Zbigniew + Brzezinski + +
+ +
+ + 441. Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the Department of + State (Tarnoff) to the + President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, + Staff Material, North/South, Pastor Subject, Treaty of Tlatelolco/Nuclear, Box + 66: 1/78–4/80. Confidential. + Washington, August + 11, 1978 + + SUBJECT + Colombian Representations with Cuba re Tlatelolco + +

During the meeting in Panama June 16–17, Colombian President Alfonso + Lopez Michelsen promised President Carter to press Fidel + Castro to sign the Tlatelolco Treaty.Not found. President Lopez has now provided + us with the following summary of the results of his representations.

+

Lopez instructed his Foreign Minister who attended the Cuban national + ceremonies July 26 to speak personally to Castro on this subject. Castro told the Colombia Foreign Minister that he would + not sign the Treaty; that the USSR had been pressing him hard to do the + same thing and he has said no to the Soviets; that this was in fact one + of the main current points of differences he had with the Russians. + Castro explained that he was + not about to give up his freedom of manuever or limit his future freedom + (even though he had no intention of storing or acquiring nuclear arms) + just because the big powers ask him to do so, i.e. “free of charge.” + Lopez concluded that Castro is + firm against signing.

+

President Lopez said he wanted President Carter to know that he had complied with his promise and + asked that the above information be passed to him.

+ + Peter + Tarnoff + Executive Secretary + + +
+ +
+ + 442. Telegram From the Embassy in France to the Department of + StateSource: National + Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign + Policy File, D780327–0403. Confidential. Sent for information to + Mexico. + Paris, August 9, 1978, 1751Z +

25032. Subject: French Position on the Treaty of Tlatelolco. Ref: State + 198484.In telegram 198484 to Paris, + August 7, the Department of State asked the Embassy for an update on + the French position on the Treaty and information on a possible + August trip by Giscard to + Mexico. (National Archives, RG 59, + Central Foreign Policy File, D780322–1011)

+

1. According to Francis Beauchataud (Acting Chief of MFA Pacts and + Disarmament Office), the French have had preliminary discussions with + Treaty organization in order to clarify some uncertain aspects of + Protocol I and will continue these talks in September. One major + juridical sticking point is French insistence that overseas departments + in South America and Caribbean (Martinique, Guadeloupe and French + Guiana) be explicitly recognized as “de jure” a part of France and not + allowed to float along under the vague Protocol rubric of “de facto or + de jure” territories. In more general terms, Beauchataud characterized + Protocol I as an “assortment of compromises” for which France, as a + non-participant in the negotiating process, would need fuller + explanation before signing.

+

2. Comment: Beauchataud made no reference to a Giscard visit to Mexico. (The French + President is scheduled to visit Brazil.) He placed no urgency on French + adherence to Protocol I, referring instead to a rather open-ended + negotiating process beginning in the fall. These talks would serve to + clarify the numerous ambiguities in the Protocol which the French now + perceive.

+ + Hartman + +
+ +
+ 443. Editorial Note +

Vice President Walter Mondale, + scheduled for an early September 1978 visit to Rome to meet with the + Italian Government and Pope John Paul I, agreed to meet with Argentine + President Jorgé Rafael Videla on + September 4 “to discuss the deterioration in U.S.-Argentine relations.” + In addition to human + rights, the Department of State briefed Mondale about Argentina and nuclear non-proliferation. + The Department admitted that “the ultimate intentions of the Argentine + leadership in the nuclear field are not clear,” but noted that + Argentina’s “decision to ratify the Treaty of Tlatelolco represents a + limited but welcome step to accept greater restrictions on its freedom + of action.” Still, Argentina had refused to forego the construction of + its own reprocessing plant “unless parallel action is taken by Brazil.” + Such a plant could “give Argentina an ample source of safeguard-free + plutonium to support a weapons program as early as 1981.” (Briefing + Memorandum attached to Memorandum from Assistant Secretary of State for + Latin American Affairs Viron Vaky to Secretary Vance, September 1; Carter Library, + National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 4, Argentina, + 1/77–12/78) However, neither Mondale nor Videla raised the nuclear issue during the meeting. The + details of their discussion are reported in telegram 226556 to Buenos + Aires, September 7. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780365–0126)

+

Over the next three months, the United States continued to press + representatives of the Argentine Government to set a date for its + official ratification of the Treaty of Tlatelolco. An Argentine diplomat + said that the “tie-up” over ratification lay in the Ministry of Economy, + which had “requested more background information on the Treaty.” + (Telegram 7156 from Buenos Aires, September 12; National Archives, + RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + D780374–0734) In early October, another Argentine diplomat blamed the + delay on “questions” that had been raised “about the safeguard agreement + that would be negotiated with IAEA, + which the Foreign Ministry was unable to answer because such agreement + has not rpt not yet been negotiated.” + (Telegram 8903 from Vienna, October 3; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + D780404–0116)

+

The Central Intelligence Agency also reported that both Argentina and + Brazil resented U.S. intrusion into their nuclear programs. Argentina + “steadfastly refuses to sign the nuclear nonproliferation treaty, + contending that it discriminates against countries without nuclear + weapons,” and believed that the Jimmy + Carter administration “will have to relent in its current + policy. Meanwhile Argentina wants to have the technology so it can + independently decide whether or not to reprocess” nuclear materials. + Brazil, the Agency reported, had “great power aspirations” and its + “resentment of US human rights and + proliferation policies has heightened Brazilian sensitivities.” Like + Argentina, “the Brazilians view US + nuclear nonproliferation concerns in similar context, often saying that + US opposition to the Brazil-West + German nuclear accord is merely a veiled attempt to constrain Brazilian + growth.” Argentina’s decision to “develop reprocessing technology will + almost certainly prompt + Brazil to follow suit.” (Intelligence Report RPM–78–10410, November 6; + Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, + Pastor Country File, Box 1, + Argentina: 9–12/78)

+

On November 24, the Embassy in Vienna informed the Department of State + that the International Atomic Energy Agency was “urgently seeking views + of USG, Canada, FRG, and UK re an approach to resolve the no rpt no explosive device issue which + Argentina is steadfastly resisting in connection with its negotiation of + a full-scope safeguards agreement” pursuant to its ratification of the + Treaty of Tlatelolco. Vienna said that while it had become “increasingly + concerned about the intensity with which GOA apparently is pursuing the PNE issue and the motivations behind this push,” the IAEA’s position represented a “retreat” + from its previous position that “the no rpt no explosive device commitment would henceforth be made + explicit in all future safeguards agreements.” The Embassy recommended + that the Carter administration + coordinate a “negative response to the Agency” because the “suggested + approach is contrary to US policy.” + (Telegram 10694 from Vienna, November 24; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + D780484–1054)

+

The Embassy in Buenos Aires subsequently informed the Department that + Argentine officials, in particular “hard-liners” in the military and + Foreign Ministry, had “consistently indicated that Argentina must keep + her nuclear options open and maintain the right of PNE’s as the GOA interprets the Tlatelolco Treaty.” These officials + “felt strongly that this option must be left open because of the + regional stability question and the fact that there is very little trust + in the direction future Brazilian governments will move on a nuclear + weapons program, whether under safeguards or not. The GOA has maintained this same policy on the + reprocessing issue.” (Telegram 9362 From Buenos Aires, November 28; + National Archives, RG 59, Central + Foreign Policy File, D780492–0826)

+
+ +
+ + 444. Telegram From the Embassy in Mexico to the Department of + StateSource: National + Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign + Policy Files, D780446–0175. Confidential; Immediate; Exdis. + Mexico, October 30, 1978, 0239Z +

18001. Dept please pass NSC for Aaron and Pastor. + Subject: Deputy Assistant to President for National Security David Aaron’s Conversation with + Ambassador Sergio Gonzalez + Galvez, Director in Chief for International + Organizations, Secretariat of Foreign Relations (SRE).

+

1. Following is a memorandum of the conversation which took place between + Mr. Aaron and Amb. Gonzalez Galvez at the Mexican + Secretariat of Foreign Relations (SRE) on October 26, 1978. The + conversation covered a wide range of subjects including conventional + arms control, Tlatelolco, Nicaragua, UN, + OAS, nonaligned movement, Belize, + and Mexican participation in peace keeping operations. Other + participants are listed at end of telegram.

+

2. Mr. Aaron opened the meeting by + speaking of President Carter’s + interest in revitalizing the spirit of cooperation which had + characterized the beginning of the Lopez + Portillo-Carter + Administrations. He said he would be reporting the results of his visit + directly to the President and that he would welcome Gonzalez Galvez views on a wide range + of international issues. He spoke of President Carter’s great interest in + Mexican-U.S. relations and expressed the belief that the time was now + ripe for increased emphasis on U.S.-Mexican cooperation.

+

3. Gonzalez Galvez began by + recounting the history of Mexico’s recent efforts for international arms + control.

+

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to the Treaty of Tlatelolco.]

+

5. Tlatelolco

+

Gonzalez Galvez (GG) expressed + thanks for the effective support the U.S. has given the Tlatelolco + Treaty, support he knew had been especially effective with the Soviet + Union and Argentina. He then said that in response to the U.S. request, + Foreign Secretary Roel had spoken + to Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko asking that the Soviets not reiterate the + statement they made upon signing the Treaty when they deposit their + instrument of ratification. Gromyko had been noncommittal, saying only that the + Soviets would seriously consider the Mexican request. Gonzalez Galvez said the Soviets gave + no indication of when they would ratify. Mr. Aaron emphasized that reiteration of the Soviet + statement would give the U.S. serious problems both because it would cast doubt on the validity of + the Treaty and lead to other reservations, and because it would + seriously jeopardize U.S. ratification of Protocol I of the Treaty. He + urged that the Mexicans continue to press the Soviets not to reiterate + their statement. Mr. Pastor added + that if the Soviet statement were repeated, a statement from Mexico + supporting the U.S. position on nuclear transit might be necessary to + ensure U.S. Senate ratification of Protocol I of the Treaty.

+

6. Gonzalez Galvez said Mexico + strongly preferred not to have to make a statement re nuclear transit. + He noted that his government has already declared that it would not + permit nuclear transit on its territory and said that Panama had taken a + similar position in a declaration made in 1968. We pointed out that + notwithstanding any earlier Panamanian statement, the New Panama Canal + treaties quite clearly do not prohibit nuclear transit, and that the new + treaties superceded the 1968 Panama statement. GG accepted that point. + He added that he had spoken to the Cubans on Tlatelolco.

+

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to the Treaty of Tlatelolco.]

+
+ +
+ 445. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the + Federal Republic of GermanySource: National Archives, RG 59, + Central Foreign Policy Files, D780480–1105. Secret; Exdis. Sent for information to + Brasilia, Buenos Aires, and Ottawa. Drafted by John Bligh (EUR/CE); + cleared by Susan Klingaman (EUR/CE), Richard Barkley (EUR/CE), James + Thyden (S/S–O), and Vest; + and approved by William Woesner (EUR/CE). + Washington, November 22, 1978, + 0252Z +

295257. Subject: Supply of Heavy Water to Argentina. Ref: (A) Bonn + 21089,Telegram 21089 from Bonn, + November 15, reported that the West German Foreign Ministry said + that its government “has difficulties with supplying heavy water + technology to Argentina and has told the Argentines so. Basic FRG policy is to refuse to provide + sensitive technology to a nation which is attempting or intending to + acquire sensitive nuclear technologies for the full fuel cycle.” + (National Archives, RG 59, Central + Foreign Policy Files, D780471–0410) (B) State 285333.Telegram 285333 to Bonn, November 9, informed + the Embassy that in recent discussions with Argentina on nuclear + cooperation, the United States “reiterated that (1) it expected + Argentina to complete its ratification of the Treaty of Tlatelolco; + (2) agreement to NPT-type + full-scope safeguards would greatly facilitate expanded cooperation + with the US (e.g., assistance with + Argentine export of research reactors); and, (3) heavy water + technology supply would be contingent upon indefinite deferral of + its reprocessing plans. In this context, Dr. Jorge Coll, + Secretary-General of CNEA, stated + that deferral of reprocessing was linked to Brazil’s program because + of Argentina’s concern about regional stability, and that US policy on the non-supply of heavy + water production technology was driving Argentina toward doing + business with the FRG.” (National + Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign + Policy Files, D780464–0048)

+ +

1. Assistant Secretary Vest took + advantage of November 20 visit (on unrelated subject) by Ambassador + Von Staden to present latter + with following aide mémoire expressing U.S. concerns over + non-proliferation aspects of subject transaction:

+

Begin text: The Department of State wishes to bring to the attention of + the Embassy of the Federal Republic of Germany an issue involving + Argentina which is of grave concern to the United States.

+

The United States is deeply concerned over the prospect of nuclear + weapons proliferation in the Western Hemisphere and has indicated to + Argentina its expectation that that country will complete ratification + of the Treaty of Tlatelolco and accept an international safeguards + obligation covering all of its nuclear activities and precluding any + nuclear explosive use.

+

In addition, both Brazil and Argentina have been urged to defer their + plans for the development of nuclear reprocessing facilities. The United + States believes that the Argentine reprocessing program is spurred + primarily by a desire to maintain its lead over Brazil and that this + competition could lead to a reprocessing race in Latin America which + would threaten hemispheric stability.

+

In discussions with Argentina over the last year, the United States has + taken the firm position that it would be prepared to supply heavy water + production technology, which Argentina is seeking, only if Argentina + deferred its reprocessing plans in addition to the steps indicated + above.

+

The United States is concerned, however, that Argentina will attempt to + obtain this sensitive technology from other suppliers without deferring + reprocessing.

+

Representatives of the United States have called the attention of + officials of the Government of the Federal Republic and other potential + suppliers of heavy water production technology to this matter and to the + belief that this technology should not be supplied to Argentina unless + it agreed to defer its reprocessing plans. The Embassy of the United + States in Bonn has been informed that the Government of the Federal + Republic shares these concerns and intends to take a similar position, + if the Federal Republic is approached concerning the supply of heavy + water production technology.

+ +

The Department of State appreciates this attitude and wishes to ensure + that senior members of the Government of the Federal Republic are aware + of the strong interest of the United States in this issue.

+

The Department of State believes that it is important that the + Governments of the United States and the Federal Republic consult + closely on this issue and, in particular, before any binding commitments + are entered into for the supply of this technology to Argentina.

+

The Department of State appreciates the Embassy’s consideration in + advising the Government of the Federal Republic of United States’ + concern in this matter and looks forward to continued cooperation on the + non-proliferation issue. End text.

+

2. Von Staden promised that + expression of U.S. concerns would reach highest levels of his government + adding that he was sure that Rouget (Ref A) had already seen to it.

+ + Christopher + +
+ +
+ 446. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassies in the + United Kingdom and FranceSource: National Archives, RG 59, + Central Foreign Policy Files, D780496–1184. Confidential; Immediate. + Sent for information Priority to Moscow, Mexico City, USUN, Vienna, and Panama City. + Drafted by Margot Mazeau (ACDA/GA) and Michael Matheson (L/PM); + cleared by Louis Nosenzo (OES/NET), Lorna Watson (ACDA/NP), Charles + Steiner (PM/NPP), George Jones (ARA), Kent Brown (EUR/SOV), Pastor (NSC), Susan + Flood (OSD/ISA), Mark Lissfelt, and Peter Reams (EUR/NE); and + approved by James Michel (L). + Washington, December 1, 1978, 2125Z +

304639. USMission IAEA. Subject: U.S. + Response to Soviet Statement on Protocol II to the Treaty of + Tlatelolco.

+

1. On May 18, 1978, the Soviet Union signed Protocol II to the Treaty for + the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America, also known as the + Treaty of Tlatelolco.See Document 437. Protocol II is open + for adherence to nuclear weapon states only and requires them to respect + the nuclear weapon-free zone established by the Treaty and to refrain + from using or threatening to use nuclear weapons against the parties to + the Treaty. The U.S., UK, France and + People’s Republic of China have previously signed and ratified Protocol + II.

+

2. We welcome Soviet signature of Protocol II. However, their signature + was accompanied by a declaration which, inter alia, stated that:

+

“The final act of the preparatory commission for the denuclearization of + Latin America interprets the Treaty in the sense that the granting of + transit authorization for nuclear weapons requested by States that are + not party to the Treaty shall lie within the jurisdiction of each State + party to the Treaty. In this regard, the Soviet Union reaffirms its position that transit + authorization for nuclear weapons in any form would be contrary to the + purposes of the Treaty, according to which, as specifically stated in + the Preamble, Latin America must be completely free from nuclear + weapons, and would be incompatible with the non-nuclear status of the + States party to the Treaty and with their obligations laid down in + Article 1 of the Treaty.”

+

“Any actions carried out by a State or States Party to the Tlatelolco + Treaty that are incompatible with their non-nuclear status . . . shall + be considered by the Soviet Union to be incompatible with the + obligations of those countries under the Treaty. In such cases the + Soviet Union reserves the right to review its obligations under + additional Protocol II.”

+

“The Soviet Union also reserves the right to review its attitude toward + additional Protocol II in the event of actions by other States + possessing nuclear weapons which are incompatible with their obligations + under the aforementioned Protocol.”

+

3. It is not clear to U.S. whether this declaration was intended as a + statement of Soviet view as to the legal obligations of the parties, or + only a statement as to how they might react to certain actions by others + which they would regard as politically objectionable even though legally + permissible; and we would not want to characterize the statement one way + or the other. Nonetheless, the above parts of the Soviet statement take + exception to the negotiating history of the Treaty and are in conflict + with the formal understanding placed on record by the United States at + time of its ratification, and we would not wish to leave them + unchallenged. The USG instrument of + ratification of Protocol II included the following understanding: “that + the United States government takes note of the preparatory commission’s + interpretation of the Treaty, as set forth in the final act, that + governed by the principles and rules of international law, each of the + contracting parties retains exclusive power and legal competence, + unaffected by the terms of the Treaty, to grant or deny non-contracting + parties transit and transport privileges.” (In fact, the idea of + including in the Treaty a prohibition on granting such transit and + transport privileges was explicitly rejected during the negotiation of + the Treaty.) Thus, it is clear that the Treaty permits the contracting + parties to grant transit rights through their territories to airplanes + or vessels carrying nuclear weapons, and the USG placed explicit reliance on that interpretation in + ratifying Protocol II.

+

4. We have requested that the Soviets reconsider their declaration and + have strongly urged them not to repeat it upon ratification. However, + they have not given any indication that they are willing to refrain from + repeating it. Soviet declaration will be a negative factor when Senate + considers U.S. ratification of separate Protocol to Treaty (Protocol I), + applicable to non-Latin American States who administer territory in + Treaty’s zone of application.

+ +

5. USG intends to reply formally to the + Soviet declaration through the depositary (the Government of Mexico) and + to request the depositary to circulate reply to all signatories and + parties to the Treaty and its protocols. USG reply could be made either at time of Soviet + ratification or at this time. If statement were made now and if the + Soviet Union were to repeat its declaration on ratification on Protocol + II, we would then reiterate our own position in an appropriate manner. + FYI: We want to have our statement + on record when Senate considers U.S. ratification of Protocol I next + year. End FYI.

+

6. Proposed U.S. reply follows:

+

Begin text. The Department of State refers to the note from the Embassy + of Mexico, dated June 7, 1978,Not + found. transmitting a copy of the Spanish translation of a + declaration made by the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist + Republics on the occasion of its signing of Protocol II to the Treaty + for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America.

+

The Government of the United States welcomes the signature of the + Protocol by the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. + However, the Government of the United States does not agree with the + view expressed by the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist + Republics in the second sentence of paragraph 5 of its statement on + signature:

+

“That transit authorization for nuclear weapons in any form would be + contrary to the purposes of the Treaty . . . and would be incompatible + with the non-nuclear status of the States party to the Treaty and with + their obligations laid down in Article 1 of the Treaty.”

+

The Government of the United States wishes to reaffirm its position, as + expressed in the statement accompanying its ratification of Protocol II, + that, as set forth in the preparatory commission’s final act, each of + the contracting parties retains exclusive power and legal competence, + unaffected by the terms of the Treaty, to grant or deny non-contracting + parties transit and transport privileges.

+

It is therefore the position of the Government of the United States that + the statement made by the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist + Republics in no way affects the legal rights and obligations of any + party to the Treaty or its protocols.

+

The Department requests the Embassy to take the necessary steps to have + the Government of Mexico inform the other parties to the Treaty and its protocols of the view + expressed by the Government of the United States with respect to this + matter. End text.

+

7. Since both UK and France are parties + to Protocol II, we request that you advise appropriate British and + French officials of the foregoing, encourage them to make similar + replies to the Soviet declaration, and elicit their views as to the + timing of such replies (i.e., whether they prefer to await Soviet + ratification). We will provide copies of above to Embassies in + Washington.

+ + VanceOn December 12, + the Soviet Presidium officially ratified Protocol II. Its + statement made no mention of the transit issue. (Documents on Disarmament, 1978, pp. + 709–710) + +
+ +
+ 447. Memorandum From Ambassador-at-Large and Special Representative + for Non-Proliferation Matters Smith to the President’s Assistant for National Security + Affairs (Brzezinski)Source: Carter Library, National + Security Affairs, Brzezinski + Material, Country File, Box 4, Argentina, 1/79–1/80. Confidential. A + copy was sent to Matthews. + Washington, March + 1, 1979 + + SUBJECT + Your Meeting with Otto Lambsdorff and the Question of FRG Heavy Water Technology Sale to + Argentina + +

Lambsdorff yesterday said it was + especially important for the FRG to + sell heavy water technology to Argentina as an accompaniment to its + selling reactors which use heavy water.No + further record of this meeting has been found. German + industry needed to include this technology in its offer in order to + compete with the Canadians for reactor sales. Recently we have had + indications that the Canadians may also offer this technology to gain + Argentine reactor sales. Lambsdorff stressed that the FRG would condition the sale on Argentina’s acceptance of + safeguards on all Argentine nuclear facilities (“full-scope”).Telegram 1254 from Paris, January 12, reported that Smith told Hermes that the United States “was + pleased by assurances given by FRG + that it would not sell heavy water technology without receiving + assurances parallel to those requested by US (Tlatelolco plus full scope safeguards plus delay of + reprocessing).” The Germans said that the final decision “had not + been made,” but “asked why full scope safeguards alone were not + enough.” Smith and Pickering argued “that with + sensitive facility like reprocessing plant, possibility of + abrogation of safeguards was real and that we did not believe it was + good idea to introduce reprocessing anywhere at a premature stage.” + The U.S. Delegation believed “it is clear that Germans are being + pushed by their industry to sell heavy water technology to Argentina + and do not want to make deferral of Argentine reprocessing a + condition.” Indeed, “Smith + categorically restated US opposition + to such sale.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + D790016–1079) The Canadians have said they would also insist + on full-scope safeguards.

+

Our position has been conveyed to the GermansSeveral months ago George + Vest conveyed our position to Ambassador Von Staden [see Document 445]; I reviewed our position with + Hermes in Bonn last month + [see footnote 3 above] and last week in Vienna I was told by the + FRG Governor on the IAEA Board that Schmidt was aware of our position. + [Footnote is in the original.] and Canadians.Not found. Heavy water production technology + should be offered only if Argentina defers its reprocessing plans, as + well as accepts full-scope safeguards and ratifies the Treaty of + Tlatelolco. The basis for our position is not that heavy water + technology will enable Argentina to build a bomb, but that this + technology will make Argentina independent of sup-plier pressure, + thereby removing any lever to get Argentina to defer reprocessing.

+

I urged Lambsdorff that the + Federal Republic not face the U.S. with a fait accompli but to raise the + matter at a higher level, and in the meantime we would review the + matter. I suggest you ask that we be given an opportunity to review the + matter before any final decision is reached by the FRG.

+

Attached is my request to Tom + Pickering for a State-ACDA review.Not + attached. (Dr. Mathews is participating.)

+ + Gerard + SmithSmith signed the memorandum + “Gerry.” + +
+ +
+ + 448. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the + Soviet UnionSource: National + Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign + Policy Files, D790131–0131. Confidential; Immediate. Sent for + information Priority to Buenos Aires, Bonn, Vienna, and Ottawa. + Drafted by Anne Stefanas (OES/NET/NEP) and Michael Matheson (L/PM); + cleared by Charles Salmon (T), Robert Kelley (S/AS), George Suchan + (PM/NPP), Robert Sloan (L/N), Richard Williamson (ACDA), Benglesdorf (DOE), Carol Kay + Stocker (EUR), Kent Brown (EUR), Charles Brayshaw (ARA), and George Jones (ARA); and approved by Michael Guhin + (OES/NET/NEP). + Washington, March 21, 1979, 1614Z +

69906. USIAEA. Subject: Supply of Heavy Water Production Technology to + Argentina (C). Refs: A) Vienna 1944;Telegram 1944 from Vienna, February 28, reported that the Soviets + “had had reports to effect that Argentina was insisting in its + negotiations for purchase of heavy water from FRG that this sale should be + accompanied by a sale of heavy water technology” from the United + States. (National Archives, RG 59, + Central Foreign Policy Files, D790096–0500) B) Moscow + 6645;Telegram 6645 from Moscow, March + 17, reported that the Soviets again asked whether or not the United + States would supply heavy water technology to Argentina. (National + Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign + Policy Files, D790123–0235) C) Buenos Aires 1787.Telegram 1787 from Buenos Aires, March 6, reported + that “Canada and Germany are expected to present final proposals on + Atucha II reactor and related nuclear components to the GOA by March 15. Both proposals will + include commercial heavy waters plants and related technology. It is + possible that Germany will also propose fast breeder reactor + technology in exchange for Argentine uranium.” Most notably, the + Embassy noted that “neither Canada nor Germany are expected to + include any provisions in their proposals excluding reprocessing.” + (National Archives, RG 59, Central + Foreign Policy Files, D790104–0017)

+

1. (C) Entire text.

+

2. In response to Morokhov’s + questions posed Reftel A concerning sale of heavy water production + technology and heavy water to Argentina, Embassy should convey the + following comments to Morokhov + (if he has returned to Moscow) and other appropriate Soviet officials. + (These can also be used to answer Komplektov, per Reftel B.)

+

3. As Assistant Secretary Pickering informed Morokhov in February,See + footnote 2 above. Argentina is currently shopping for heavy + water production technology and has discussed sale of this technology + with several suppliers, but principally with Canada and the FRG.

+

4. Both Canada and the FRG are fully + aware of our position (which we believe is shared by the USSR) that such sensitive technology + should not be transferred as a general rule; and, failing this, our view + that any transfer to Argentina of heavy water technology should be + conditioned on Argentine ratification of the Treaty of Tlatelolco, conclusion of an NPT-type full-scope safeguards agreement + with the IAEA, and indefinite deferral + of its reprocessing plans.

+

5. Morokhov asked about the other + suppliers’ conditions for the sale of heavy water to Argentina for use + in its Atucha II reactor. In the spirit of the suppliers’ guidelines, + the US is attempting to remove + non-proliferation considerations from the area of commercial competition + by offering to supply heavy water to Argentina for Atucha II in + connection with the FRG reactor sale on + the condition that, should the FRG win + the bid for the Atucha II reactor, the FRG will require NPT-type + full-scope safeguards as a condition of supply. We understand that + Canada will require NPT-type full-scope + safeguards as a condition of supply of heavy water for Atucha II. We + hope the USSR would also adopt the + same conditions for supply of heavy water to Argentina for Atucha + II.

+

6. We intend to continue to emphasize our concerns in this matter. We + believe close consultation between suppliers is very important, + particularly in light of the number of suppliers with whom the GOA is discussing transfer of nuclear + technology and material. We appreciate consultations with the Soviets on + these matters.

+

7. FYI. Neither the Canadians nor the + FRG has yet decided whether to + proceed with the sale of heavy water production technology to Argentina. + In addition, there are indications that Argentina may not insist that + the nuclear sales package include heavy water technology at this time, + although it would still plan to acquire the technology at some future + time. End FYI.

+ + Vance + +
+ +
+ 449. Telegram From the Embassy in Ecuador to the Department of + StateSource: National + Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign + Policy File, D790189–0869. Confidential; Immediate. Sent for + information to Mexico City. + Quito, April 25, + 1979, 2120Z +

2714. Subject: (U) Opening Session of OPANAL.

+

1. Entire text confidential.

+ +

2. At OPANAL opening session + statements were made by several observer nations and organizations + including China, US,On April 24, Ambassador to Ecuador Raymond Gonzalez + spoke to OPANAL. He said that + the Treaty of Tlatelolco “represents a unique pledge by Latin + American nations to forego the acquisition of nuclear weapons, and + sets an example for all nations to follow in the pursuit of world + peace.” President Carter, he + noted, considered the Treaty “a particularly important component of + world-wide efforts to inhibit nuclear proliferation, as well as a + central measure to the maintenance of the security of the entire + hemisphere.” (Telegram 2735 from Quito, April 26; National Archives, + RG 59, Central Foreign Policy + File, D790194–0426) France,During a state visit to Mexico, French President Valery Giscard + d’ Estaing signed Protocol I of the + Treaty of Tlatelolco. (Telegram 3926 from Mexico City, March 9; + National Archives, RG 59, Central + Foreign Policy File, D790107–0379) Great Britain, the Soviet + Union, Finland, Poland, the OAS, and + messages from the General Secretary of the UN, and the Director General of IAEA. While most of the statements were general comments + reaffirming support for the principles and objectives of the Treaty of + Tlatelolco, the statements of China and the Soviet Union deserve + particular attention. Note that report of Chinese and Soviet statements + is based on informal translation.

+

3. China was supportive of the idea of denuclearized zones and emphasized + the need for the superpowers to recognize the serious menace represented + by the arms race. China also stated that it favored the total + prohibition, destruction and non-use of nuclear weapons. In specific + reference to the Treaty of Tlatelolco, the Chinese called for two + particular developments:

+

—Dismantling of all foreign military bases in Latin America and no future + establishment of new bases in this region and

+

—Prohibition of all types of nuclear weapons carriers from both sea and + air space of Latin America.

+

4. The Soviet Union reiterated its reservations as stated in its initial + signature of Protocol II in May 1978. They reaffirmed their statements + that transit of the zone would be incompatible with the Treaty and that + the Soviet Union reserved the right to review its adherence under any of + these circumstances. However, the Soviet Union also called for action by + Argentina, Brazil and Chile to complete their adherence to Tlatelolco + and emphasized the contribution of the NPT to the peaceful use of nuclear energy through + international cooperation. They also stated policy similar to that of + the US on preference for Tlatelolco + parties. In discussions following the session, Soviet Delegate Shelepin + reiterated the importance of adherence to the Treaty by Argentina, Chile + and Brazil and of the possibility of our two countries working together + not only to achieve this, but also to encourage NPT adherence and in the area of the Tlatelolco preference + policy.

+ +

5. In discussions with the Mexican Delegation, by far the largest and + most influential, Mexican Delegates inquired about the status of the + instrumented fuel rods, and whether the US was still waiting for a formal note from the Foreign + Ministry. Would appreciate current status on these issues. ASAP.

+ + Gonzalez + +
+ +
+ 450. Telegram From the Embassy in Mexico to the Department of + StateSource: National + Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign + Policy File, D790352–0811. Confidential. Sent for information to + Brasilia, Buenos Aires, Caracas, the U.S. Interests Section in + Havana, Moscow, Vienna, and all U.S. Consulates in + Mexico. + Mexico City, August 1, 1979, 2002Z +

12955. Vienna for IAEA. Subject: Treaty + of Tlatelolco/NPT Review Conference. + Ref: (A) Mexico 8058 (Notal),Telegram 8058 + from Mexico City, May 16, reported that Smith discussed INFCE, the “desirability of Mexican contribution to + work on post-INFCE institutional + arrangements, Pakistan, and U.S.-Mexican nuclear cooperation” with + Roel and Gonzalez Galvez on May 14 and 15. + (National Archives, RG 59, Central + Foreign Policy File, D790225–0571) (B) Mexico 5103 + (Notal).Telegram 5103 from Mexico City, + March 28, reported that Gros + Espiell expressed “surprise” that Castro Madero said + that Argentina would not ratify the Treaty of Tlatelolco given that + during his recent trip he “had been assured that ratification + presented no problem for Argentina.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + D790146–0723)

+

1. (C—Entire text.)

+

2. Summary: OPANAL SecGen foresees + Brazilian final accession to Treaty of Tlatelolco, but believes that + Cuba remains negative and Argentina’s ratification continues in doubt. + Latin American preparations for NPT + Review Conference are at very preliminary stage. End summary.

+

3. Emboffs met July 31 with OPANAL + SecGen Hector Gros Espiell for + tour d’horizon. Regarding Treaty of Tlatelolco, Gros said that Brazilians are waiting + for U.S. and France to complete ratification of Protocol I before + depositing their own Treaty ratification. On Argentina, Gros said that ratification prospects + remain discouraging despite past assurances that Argentina would move + ahead. Gros asserted that + Mexican FonSec Castaneda had recently urged ratification on Argentine + Ambassador here—but + efforts of GOM and OPANAL thus far + have not been successful.

+

4. Gros opined that any renewed + efforts to encourage Cuba to adhere to Treaty will probably have to + await both completion of Latin American ratifications and “political + changes” in Washington (that is, improved U.S.-Cuban relations). + Gros confirmed earlier + reports that Mexican President Lopez + Portillo had raised Tlatelolco with Fidel Castro during latter’s May visit + to Mexico. According to Gros, + Castro was not receptive and + Tlatelolco was omitted from Joint Communiqué at his insistence.

+

5. Regarding NPT Review Conference, + Gros said that no reactions + have yet been received to OPANAL’s + solicitation of Latin American (LA) views. Gros said that LA representatives will probably meet in + January or February to elaborate common position for Review Conference, + including concrete suggestions for better implementation of NPT Article IV (peaceful nuclear + cooperation) by nuclear-weapon states. Gros remarked that Soviet Ambassador is meeting with him + this week because of Moscow’s concern that LA states might seek to + denounce or undermine NPT at Review + Conference—a concern Gros + apparently does not share.

+

6. Turning to LA nuclear organizations, Gros said that he is considering seeking to work out an + agreement between IANEC (the OAS + Inter-American Nuclear Energy Commission) and OPANAL—whereby function of former would + be limited to technical/scientific questions, while latter would have + monopoly in political field. (Comment: Key GOM arms control figure + Ambassador Sergio Gonzalez + Galvez remarked to Gerard + Smith in May that IANEC is excessively oriented toward + Brazil, Argentina and Chile (see Ref A). Gros’ effort to work out agreement presumably parallels + GOM’s effort to maintain primacy of OPANAL in LA nuclear affairs.)

+

7. On conventional arms control, Gros expressed pessimism over prospects for Mexican + initiative—given unsettled LA political situation following + Nicaragua.Reference is to the July 16 + resignation of Nicaraguan President Anastasio Somoza Debayle and the + assumption of power by the Sandinistas on July 19. (Drafted + by Jon Glassman.)

+ + Lucey + +
+ +
+ + 451. Intelligence Cable + + + IN 2896699A + + + Washington, August + 7, 1979 +

[Source: National Archives, RG 383, + Records of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Office of the + Director, Lot 81D155, Box 9, Treaty of Tlateloloco—1979–1980. Secret. 5 + pages not declassified.]

+
+ +
+ 452. Memorandum from the President’s Assistant for National Security + Affairs (Brzezinski) to Secretary + of State VanceSource: Carter Library, National + Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Pastor Country File, Box 1, + Argentina: 8–12/79. Confidential. Copies were sent to Schlesinger and Seignious. + Washington, August + 7, 1979 + + SUBJECT + Canadian Heavy Water Technology to Argentina (C) + +

Canada’s recent decision to transfer heavy water technology to Argentina + without a requirement that the Argentine reprocessing program be + deferred represents a serious defeat for the position we have + consistently taken on this question.Telegram 5842 from Buenos Aires, July 19, reported that press + reports from the Toronto Star indicated that + the Government of Canada had renewed its pledge to sell a nuclear + reactor to Argentina as well as a heavy water plant “without + additional clauses or safeguards.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + D790329–0999) The impact upon our more general position with + respect to national reprocessing plants is likely to be magnified + because Canada has been such a close partner with us in + non-proliferation matters. (C)

+

It would be extremely difficult for the Canadian Government to reverse + this decision, but there is a fall-back position they could adopt which + would still maintain substantial control over reprocessing activities in + Argentina. If Canada were to require an understanding that any heavy + water produced in Argentina following the transfer would be presumed to + be based upon Canadian technology, and that any special nuclear material + irradiated through the use of such heavy water required prior Canadian + consent before reprocessing, substantial control would be maintained + while permitting Argentina the option of building its proposed facility. + The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act would require us to obtain such a provision if we + were to make such a transfer, and we would not be asking Canada to do + more than we would be required to do under our own legislation. The + precedent involved would not affect future Canadian transfers of heavy + water, only production technology. (C)

+

Unless you perceive substantial objections to such an approach, I suggest + that you carry out a demarcheBrzezinski wrote “*” after the word + “demarche” and wrote “With the Canadians wanting a visit from the + President (who is concerned about this matter) it is a propitious” + [the remainder of Brzezinski’s comment is missing in the original]. + of this kind within the next week. The prospects for success may not be + bright, but I believe we have an obligation to try. (C)

+ + Zbigniew + Brzezinski + +
+ +
+ 453. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassies in + Ecuador, Argentina, and NicaraguaSource: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files, D790369–1171. + Confidential; Immediate; Exdis. + Sent for information to all American Republic diplomatic posts. + Drafted by Michael Adams (ARA/ERA); cleared by Pastor (NSC), L. Paul Bremer (S/S), and Robert Steven (S/S–O); and approved by Vaky + (ARA). + Washington, August 14, 1979, 2220Z +

212082. Subject: The Secretary’s Meeting With Foreign Minister Pastor.

+

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to the Treaty of Tlatelolco.]

+

Treaty of Tlatelolco

+

The Secretary said that he had understood from the Foreign Minister’s + predecessor that Argentina would move on Tlatelolco, and he asked about + the status of it.

+

The Foreign Minister said he wanted to be frank. Argentina had various + sources of energy, among them nuclear plants solely intended for + peaceful ends, for the development of the country, and to complement the + country’s hydroelectric capacity. Argentina had now reached the stage of + being able fully to implement its energy plan. An obstacle to this is + the strong pressure being applied with respect to safeguards. He + believed the GOA’s point of view is a + just one. If Argentina can complete its energy objectives it has no objection to full and + complete safeguards. Argentina is fully determined to sign Tlatelolco + but wants to be in a position to take a few steps to fulfill its energy + plan. It hopes to finish negotiations for a heavy water plant in the + next two months. Once these measures are achieved, Argentina plans + adherence to the ban on biological warfare and to the Treaty of + Tlatelolco.

+

The Secretary said he had not understood there were conditions in the + previous Joint Communiqué.

+

The Foreign Minister noted that at the time the circumstances he referred + to had not existed.

+

The Secretary again asked when Argentina could sign.

+

The Foreign Minister repeated this could be in a couple of months after + Argentina has arranged purchase of the heavy water plant. The Secretary + observed that he had not understood that Argentina was pressed on the + matter such that it could not abide by the communiqué. He assumed + Argentina’s stated intention would be carried out as indicated in the + communiqué. The Foreign Minister’s response was the first indication of + a different view prevailing in Argentina. President Videla had told President Carter that Argentina would ratify + Tlatelolco and this was reflected in the communiqué.See Document + 437.

+

The Foreign Minister insisted the “central concept” had not changed; what + was different were new circumstances which Argentina had to take into + account before signing.

+ + Vance + +
+ +
+ + 454. Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the Department of + State (Tarnoff) to the + President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, + Brzezinski Material, + Country File, Box 4, Argentina, 1/79–1/80. + Confidential. + Washington, August + 22, 1979 + + SUBJECT + Heavy Water Production Technology to Argentina + +

With reference to your August 7 memorandum to the SecretarySee Document 452. + on Canada’s recent decision not to go along with our request that it + require Argentine deferral of reprocessing for the supply of heavy water + production technology, we agree it is important to move ahead quickly to + seek the strongest assurances the traffic will bear against possible + misuse of the technology. We also agree that the Canadians would not + likely reverse their decision and, therefore, that our approaches now + should focus on other key elements on which we wish to see a common + supplier position for supply of this technology.

+

We have already informed the Canadians, Germans, and Swiss that we attach + considerable importance to continuing supplier discussions to ensure + common supplier positions on measures in addition to requiring Argentine + acceptance of NPT-type safeguards. We + have also asked the Canadians whether they would require the + reprocessing controls noted in your memorandum. We expect to discuss + these matters in detail with the Canadians, Germans and Swiss later this + week.

+

In our strategy for these follow-on discussions and demarches, we + consider it important to emphasize those additional elements which are + most realistically achievable recognizing that we have already spent + considerable leverage and that our leverage among the three suppliers + varies substantially. Their willingness to support stronger measures + also varies substantially. As will be noted, we are particularly + concerned that pressing the Canadians hard on reprocessing controls now + could further drive the sale to the Swiss and Germans under less + stringent controls and, thus, adversely affect US-Canadian relations without any non-proliferation gain. + At the same time, we are concerned that pressing the Swiss and Germans + hard on the matter would not only have very little chance of success but + also diminish our chances of getting their agreement to key supplier + controls.

+ +

In this light, a prime goal of our approaches will be to ensure common + interpretation of how the Nuclear Supplier Group (NSG) Guidelines are to be applied to + protect against Argentina later building unsafeguarded facilities with + the technology and without violating any agreement. As you know, the + Guidelines entail bilateral requirements for safeguards as well as + controls over retransfer of the technology or produced heavy water and + controls on facilities produced through the technology. Although not + explicit in the Guidelines, we will wish to ensure that the suppliers + include a presumption that any facility built within at least 20 years + and using the same type of technology will be considered as built with + the transferred technology and subject to the same conditions.

+

There may well be differences among the three suppliers and ourselves + over how the NSG Guidelines are to be + carried out. However, we hope to be in a strong position in this regard + since we will be working from the Guidelines to which we can expect + suppliers to adhere. We consider common interpretation on these + bilateral requirements very important. Such requirements provide a + safety net against Argentine construction of an unsafeguarded reactor in + the event Argentina were later to withdraw from a full-scope safeguards + agreement. (Such agreements normally contain withdrawal clauses.)

+

We plan to focus our approaches as well on the importance of requiring a + provision that safeguards be applied on Argentine heavy water plants and + heavy water to protect against the scenario of possible diversion to + clandestine reactors. The IAEA is + still developing aspects of such safeguards, and we will need to + continue to work with the IAEA and + other concerned countries to develop the most promising safeguards + approach.

+

In addition, we intend to continue to urge supplier agreement to seek + Argentine adherence to the Treaty of Tlatelolco in connection with their + negotiations for heavy water production technology. Argentina has + declared its intention to ratify the treaty and its ratification would, + of course, add further political and legal inhibitions to possible + misuse later of this or other technology in the nuclear area. Also, + Argentine adherence is a necessary step to the treaty’s entering into + force for Brazil and Chile.

+

This is not part of the NSG Guidelines, + and other suppliers may well question whether this should be required in + addition to Argentine acceptance of NPT-type safeguards. Also, the Argentines have made clear to us + that they are not going to ratify Tlatelolco before they have concluded + arrangements for the supply of heavy water production technology. We + recognize that all the suppliers are not likely to require, and + Argentina is thus unlikely to accept, Tlatelolco adherence as an + absolute precondition for agreeing on heavy water production supply. However, we believe we should + continue to underline the importance of Tlatelolco adherence to the + suppliers. Their pressing the point at all with Argentina could help + assure favorable action by Argentina later on the treaty.

+

With respect to the reprocessing controls noted in your memorandum, as + noted, we have already questioned the Canadians on this point and hope + to get a readout from them later this week. If the Canadians were to + include such a requirement in their proposal, we would be in a position + to pursue it with the other suppliers. However, while we agree that this + kind of control would be highly desirable, we do not believe that it is + achievable. It would in effect grant the supplier of heavy water + technology control over the reprocessing of essentially all nuclear fuel + in Argentina, including fuel from the German reactor as well as + indigenously supplied fuel in indigenously built reactors.

+

In the unlikely event that the Canadians were to agree to seek such a + control, the Germans could and probably would argue that their + commitment not to undercut the Canadians applied only to NPT-type safeguards and possible linkage + to deferral of reprocessing, but not to this kind of extended + “contamination.” It appears even more certain that the Swiss would not + agree. Thus, the main result could well be to make the sale of heavy + water production technology by the Germans and Swiss appear more + attractive to the Argentines, thereby making us take the blame if the + Canadians lose the sale (which appears probable). Such a result would + seriously damage our relations with Canada without any non-proliferation + benefit being achieved.

+

Finally, all three potential suppliers may view such a suggestion as + going beyond the approaches we have been seeking thus far because of the + extended contamination noted above. They are unlikely to be impressed + with arguments based on our law which is, at any rate, ambiguous on this + point. To make such controls a centerpiece of our next approaches, + therefore, could well be at the cost of achieving some of the other + highly important conditions outlined in this memorandum.

+

With these factors in mind, we believe our next steps should concentrate + on those elements which have a realistic chance of being achieved not + only with the Canadians but also with the Germans and Swiss. In view of + the competition for supply of this technology, supplier agreement + remains the key to securing additional assurances against its + misuse.

+ + Peter + Tarnoff + Executive SecretaryBremer + signed the memorandum for Tarnoff. + + +
+ +
+ + 455. Telegram From the Embassy in Brazil to the Department of + StateSource: National + Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign + Policy Files, D790422–0125. Confidential. Sent for information to + Buenos Aires and Moscow. + Brasilia, September 12, 1979, 1615Z +

8069. Subject: Treaty of Tlatelolco. Ref State 225187.In telegram 225187 to Brasilia, August 27, the + Department of State said that given “recent movement on the Treaty + by other countries” including the Soviet Union, the United States, + and France, “Dept believes this + may be a useful occasion to raise this issue in very low-key fashion + with appropriate GOB officials to + ascertain GOB position on this + matter. At its discretion, Embassy is also authorized to encourage + positive action by Brazil to waive conditions to have the Treaty + enter into effect.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files, + D790392–0974)

+

1. (C—Entire text)

+

2. In conversation with Brazilian Foreign Minister on September 11, I + inquired whether statement by Foreign Ministry spokesmanNot found. on ratification by non-Latin + American countries of protocols to Treaty implied that Brazil might be + willing to waive Treaty into effect once that had happened. His reply + was negative. He said that all requirements must be met before Brazil + would consider Treaty in force with respect to Brazil. He ticked these + requirements off and they included Cuban adherence. He smiled and said + that once Soviet Union and other non-Latin countries adhere, Soviet + Union might just tell Cuba to ratify also. He said that he was aware + Cuba was using Guantanamo as bargaining chip. He offered no basis for + his comment except the interest of the USSR in control of proliferation and strong influence of + USSR on Cuba.

+ + Sayre + +
+ +
+ + 456. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security + Affairs (Brzezinski) to Secretary + of State VanceSource: Carter Library, National + Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Pastor Country File, Box 1, + Argentina: 8–12/79. Confidential. + Washington, October + 18, 1979 + + SUBJECT + Non-Proliferation—Argentina (U) + +

The President has asked that our concern about safeguard + arrangementsNot found. in + connection with the German and Swiss contracts to supply a reactor and a + heavy water plant to Argentina be made public. In particular, he wants + the public to be informed of the differences be-tween those arrangements + and the safeguard conditions sought by Canada. (C)

+

I would appreciate it if you would arrange for an early statement on this + matter by the Department’s spokesman, taking into account further + diplomatic efforts we may contemplate to influence the safeguard + conditions to be applied by Switzerland and the FRG. The text of the statement should be coordinated with + Jerry Oplinger of the NSC staff. (C)

+ + Zbigniew + Brzezinski + +
+ +
+ + 457. Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the Department of + State (Tarnoff) to the + President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, + Staff Material, North/South, Pastor Country File, Box 1, Argentina: 8–12/79. + Confidential. + Washington, October + 30, 1979 + + SUBJECT + Non-Proliferation: Proposed Public Statements on Swiss and FRG Contracts with Argentina + + + REF: + Your Memorandum to Secretary Vance of October 18, 1979See Document + 456. + +

We have carefully considered the action proposed in your memorandum of + October 18 in the context of further diplomatic efforts we are + contemplating to influence the safeguard conditions to be applied by + Switzerland and the FRG to nuclear + sales to Argentina. Our judgment is that we should hold off public + statements until it is clear that our diplomatic efforts have been + unsuccessful. We plan to undertake the following next steps:

+

—We will consult as called for by the London Suppliers Guidelines with + Canada, the FRG, the Swiss and possibly + the UK on the safeguard requirements. + The FRG has already agreed in principle + to such consultations. Gerard + Smith, when he is in Bonn this week for post-INFCE discussions, will say to Genscher that we wish to consult with + the above states on Argentina. We expect Genscher will assent to this. We will then contact the + Swiss and other participants to arrange the consultations.

+

—In these consultations we will emphasize that Argentina is an + exceptional case in order to avoid a debate about the merits of + requiring full-scope safeguards on a generic basis: sensitive heavy + water technology as well as reactor sales are involved; Argentina has + split its order among a number of suppliers in part to avoid the + full-scope safeguard requirement; and suppliers have a shared + responsibility to prevent this “divide and conquer” strategy from + succeeding.

+

—We are considering letters from the Secretary to Genscher and Swiss Foreign Minister + Aubert to reinforce our concerns on this matter.

+

We believe our diplomatic efforts have some chance for success and would + be endangered by going public now with our concerns. Upon Gerry Smith’s return about November 8 + we will assess whether diplomatic efforts are still worth pursuing and how and when to make + this matter public.On November 5, Brzezinski replied “The President + desires a public statement on this matter in the near future, + focusing on the sensitivity of the Swiss heavy water technology + transfer to Argentina and the differences between the safeguard + requirements attached to that transfer and those sought by Canada. I + would appreciate it if the State Department would release a factual + and analytical public statement, cleared by the NSC staff, by November 9.” (Memorandum + from Brzezinski to Vance, November 5; Carter Library, + National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Pastor Country File, Box 1, + Argentina: 8–12/79)

+ + Peter + Tarnoff + Executive Secretary + + +
+ +
+ 458. Memorandum From Jerry + Oplinger of the National Security Council Staff to the + President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, + Staff Material, North/South, Pastor Country File, Box 1, Argentina: 8–12/79. + Secret. Sent for information. + Washington, November 20, 1979 + + SUBJECT + Argentine Safeguards: Hoist on our own Petard? (C) + +

Behind our last minute efforts to persuade the Swiss and Germans to + impose full-scope safeguards on Argentina may lurk a nasty dilemma for + the U.S. (S)

+

Unlike Canada, we do not normally require “NPT-type full-scope safeguards; we require “de facto + full-scope.” The difference is simply that Canada requires an indefinite + commitment to keep everything safeguarded in the future; we only require that everything in country now be under safeguards. The theory behind our + looser requirement is that the recipient’s need for continued enriched + fuel supply will normally deter subsequent acquisition on unsafeguarded + facilities. (C)

+

But this theory breaks down in the Argentine case; their program is based + on heavy water reactors which use unenriched fuel. They have their own + uranium, and lack only the capability to produce heavy water in large + quantities to reach potential independence from outside supply. The Swiss are now filling that + gap. Unless they agree to the Canadian safeguards formula, the + Argentines could build a complete fuel cycle in the future free of + safeguards, and thumb their nose at outside suppliers. That is why in + this particular case we have strongly backed the Canadian safeguards + formula, and are pressing it on the Swiss and Germans. (S)

+

But we will probably fail. We will then face the safeguards question + ourselves. We are negotiating to supply research reactor fuel to + Argentina, and a U.S. firm has been awarded over $55 million in key + components for the German reactor sale itself. Will we insist on NPT-type safeguards, as we are telling the + Swiss and Germans they should do (and lose the business), or will we + ignore our own advice and revert to our normal de + facto standard? (S)

+

There will be strong arguments for business as usual; we do not have the + leverage to insist since the Argentines can go elsewhere. But we will be + accused of applying a double standard, and the Canadians will be + severely bent out of shape. In this case, I think we simply must + practice what we have been preaching. (S)

+
+ +
+ + 459. Telegram From the Embassy in Argentina to the Department of + StateSource: National + Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign + Policy Files, D790546–0913. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Sent for information to Bern, + Bonn, Brasilia, New Delhi, and Ottawa. + Buenos Aires, November 27, 1979, + 2045Z +

9680. New Delhi for Ambassador Smith. Subject: (S) US/Argentine Nuclear Consultations. + Ref: (A) State 300937In telegram 300937 to + Bern, November 20, the Department of State informed the Embassy that + “It has been decided that we will not issue a public statement at + this time concerning Swiss safeguard requirements for the sale of + heavy water production technology to Argentina. Instead, we will + continue our diplomatic efforts.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files, + D790533–0780) (B) State 300663In + telegram 300663 to Buenos Aires, November 19, the Department + instructed the Embassy to remind Argentine officials that “(A) + Argentina is, of course, aware of US + views regarding full-scope safeguards and ratification of Tlatelolco + and nuclear cooperation with Argentina; (B) Argentina is also aware + US has consulted with other + potential suppliers about nuclear cooperation with Argentina and + Argentine nuclear programs; and allegation that US has falsified or distorted any + information on Argentine program is completely unfounded, and we + have not distributed any fake photographs” of alleged Argentine + nuclear reprocessing plants. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files, + P840163–1510) (C) Buenos Aires 9557Telegram 9557 from Buenos Aires, November 21, + reported that while the Embassy had reiterated the points made in + telegram 300633, Argentine officials worried “that the US has, in their opinion, imposed + US national policies on Germany + and Switzerland by pressuring them to demand an NPT-type FSS agreement before supplying nuclear technology or + equipment, which goes beyond NSG + guidelines. There seems to be a general feeling in Argentina that + the US has a campaign against + Argentina to deny nuclear technology, which has created a mutual + distrust between the two countries and seems to be the core of the + problem.” (National Archives, RG 59, + Central Foreign Policy Files, D790536–0785) (D) Buenos Aires + 9590.Telegram 9590 from Buenos Aires, + November 23, reported that “Embassy was pleased Department has + decided not to issue a public statement at this time concerning + Swiss safeguard requirements for HWT. This would have completely ruptured US/Argentine + nuclear relations and would probably have a strong negative + political impact as well.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files, + D790540–0565)

+

1. (S—Entire text).

+

2. The Embassy strongly feels that a continuing nuclear relationship with + Argentina is essential toward attaining US long-range goals for non-proliferation. By continuing + active cooperation with Argentina, we will remain on the inside of + nuclear policy-making and maintain direct knowledge of and some degree + of influence over Argentine nuclear policy and programs. Without this + continuing direct contact and cooperation, the US will be forced to depend on other countries in the + future to assure Argentina’s adherence to safeguards and other + non-proliferation issues. We do not feel the US can depend fully, for example, on Germany and/or Switzerland as agents + through whom to carry out US nuclear + policy, the US message for + non-proliferation must be conveyed by the US itself where possible.

+

3. As mentioned in Reftel (C), we do not feel that Argentina should be + written off from the standpoint of a US + nuclear relationship or a continued US + influence. The USA has many friends within top CNEA management and other GOA circles concerned with nuclear policy that respect + US overall non-proliferation + policies and US technologies. However, + they are discouraged by what they feel is a US campaign to deny technology necessary to Argentina to + develop its nuclear industry on an independent basis and become a + nuclear supplier in South America.

+

4. As suggested in Reftel (A), embassy officers reiterated to GOA nuclear officials, including Jorge + Coll and Abel Gonzalez, just last week that US nuclear policy has remained the same and our continuing + consultations with other suppliers is based on our belief that worldwide + application of international safeguards over all peaceful nuclear + programs is a legitimate concern of the US as well as of all other countries. In addition, as + mentioned in Reftel (C), we have reiterated the importance the US attaches to Argentina fulfilling its + commitment to ratify Tlatelolco and to continue its negotiation with the + IAEA for a FSS agreement and furthermore have + emphasized that these actions would certainly enhance possibilities of + expanded US/Argentine cooperation.

+

5. SciCouns is scheduled to meet + again this week with CNEA safeguards + committee to review US/Argentine relationship and discussions on latest + Argentine policy on the ratification of Tlatelolco. In fact, we feel, as + stated previously, the most effective and long-lasting way of obtaining + a FSS agreement for Argentina is + through ratification of Tlatelolco and an arrangement with Brazil to + wave it into effect and follow up with a FSS agreement based on the Treaty.

+

6. A high-level visit to Argentina would give the impression of US interest and desire for continued + cooperation and could be approached on a step-by-step basis beginning + with an official note outlining US + conditions for release of (1) three kilograms of depleted uranium for + uranium plate fuel testing, and (2) ten kilograms of 20 percent enriched + uranium for fuel plate fabrication, and (3) for provision of 20 percent + enriched uranium for the RP–0 in Peru and RA–6 in Bariloche. The HEU for the RA–3 request could be handled + separately since we understand now this fuel may not be needed until the + end of 1980. The next step could be a high level visit to Argentina by + Asst. Secy. Pickering and/or Amb. + Smith. The specific + objectives and benefits of such a visit are the following:

+

—Maintenance of an ongoing dialogue at a high level.

+ +

—Open and candid discussion of US/Argentine nuclear relationships and + non-proliferation policy.

+

—Discussion of US/Argentine cooperation in lieu fuels for Argentine + reactors.

+

—Discussion of expanded US cooperation + and sales that could be facilitated by Argentine ratification of + Tlatelolco and followed by a FSS + agreement with the IAEA based on the + Treaty. This arrangement could be discussed in context of + Argentine/Brazilian cooperation and possibilities of waving Tlatelolco + into force.

+

—Expanded cooperation could center around US assistance in development of Argentine research reactor + program and certain fuel cycle technology and helping Argentina become a + reliable nuclear supplier in Latin America. This assistance would + include a US commitment for continued + supply of 20 percent enriched uranium and cooperation with Argentina in + nuclear assistance to third countries.

+

—Discussions on possibilities for an amended cooperation agreement that + could include the above items and others such as (1) organized exchange + of experts, (2) exchange of radiation safety information on a regular + basis, and (3) credits for sales of US + equipment and supplies.

+

7. We would not expect any miracles to emerge out of a visit of this + sort; but CNEA leaders, particularly + Castro Madero, Jorge Coll, Martinez Fabini, and Antonio Carrea would be + highly receptive to talks on these subjects. As we have mentioned in the + past, the Argentines at this point are primarily interested in a + sympathetic US view of their nuclear + programs and policies and would appreciate frank discussions on the + whole range of issues. In the final analysis, the benefits would be + continued cooperation, the opportunity for US direct influence in the Argentine nuclear policy, and + perhaps persuasion toward a permanent international safeguard + regime.

+ + Castro + +
+ +
+ + 460. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in + AustraliaSource: National + Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign + Policy Files, D790550–0428. Confidential; Exdis for Assistant Secretary Pickering. Drafted by Stephen V. + Noble (OES); and approved by Lynn + Turk (S/S–O). + Washington, November 29, 1979, + 1059Z +

307827. For Asst Secy Pickering. + Following Repeat Bern 6724 Action State info Bonn Buenos Aires 27 Nov + 79.

+

Qte. Bern 6724. Subj: US-Swiss Nuclear + Supply Consultations. Ref: (A) Bern 6634Telegram 6634 from Bern, November 21, informed the Department that + “the decision not to issue public statement concerning Swiss + safeguard requirements on supply of heavy water production plant to + Argentina eliminates an almost certain drag on possible Swiss + cooperation.” (National Archives, RG + 59, Central Foreign Policy Files, D790536–0418) (B) State + 300937.See footnote 2, Document 459.

+

1. C—Entire text.

+

2. Summary: Amb Gerard Smith and + party accompanied by Amb Vine met with Sec of State Weitnauer, legal + advisor Bindschedler, and other Swiss officials morning of Nov 26. End + summary.

+

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to Argentina.]

+

7. Smith then turned to the + problem of Argentina which, he said, could become another Pakistan + unless it accepted a commitment to safeguard future facilities. There + were hemispheric implications to which the US was keenly sensitive. Two years ago Argentina had + assured the US they would ratify the + Treaty of Tlatelolco, [less than 1 line not + declassified] they may not intend to do this but rather intend + to keep their weapon option open. Smith said that the President had a personal interest in + this problem and had asked Smith + to speak to the Swiss.Carter’s request was not + found. Given the propensity of the press in the US to discover and report on situations of + this sort, Smith could not + guarantee that the Argentina situation and US concern would not be dealt with in the American press. + If so, the White House might have to take a position reflecting US-Swiss differences in approach.

+

8. Swiss side explained in detail the safeguards arrangements they had + worked out, and emphasized that Switzerland had abided by all its NPT and NSG commitments in establishing safeguard and other + controls on its supply of heavy water production technology. Switzerland + believes one cannot ask for more than is required by Swiss obligations + under international law. The Swiss could not accept as a given that + Argentina would not meet + its commitments, and believed that their controls (which Bindschedler + spelled out) excluded Argentina’s capitalizing on Swiss technology to + produce unsafeguarded special nuclear material. Swiss were strongly of + the view that Argentina could build a heavy water plant itself, and thus + escape all controls, if Switzerland went too far with its conditions. + Weitnauer noted that if there is press discussion in the US on this point, Switzerland can regard + itself on safe ground. He noted that the Swiss have done their + “utmost.”

+

9. Smith emphasized that the + US was not suggesting an embargo on + the sale of Swiss heavy water technology to Argentina. He urged that, as + we work on development of a more comprehensive post-INFCE regime we not prejudice future + negotiations by permitting Argentina to develop an unsafeguarded + capability. He noted that Argentina is prepared to pay a half billion + dollars more to buy reactors from the FRG in order to avoid the ful-scope safeguard required by + Canada for the same transaction. (Von Arx noted Argentines had + experienced huge overrun in earlier Canadian reactor sale, and that this + had been reason they gave little credence to low Canadian bid.)

+

10. Swiss pointed out that Pakistan is clearly a special case where there + is near term danger. They do not see Argentina as in the same category. + Von Arx indicated that Switzerland had urged Argentina to ratify the + Treaty of Tlatelolco but does not believe it will do so until Cuba does + and the US ratifies Protocol I. He noted + that Argentina has expressed concern that supplementary inspection + rights held by OPANAL could threaten + commercial secrets. Van Doren later returned to this subject and urged + that Swiss make clear that they are proceeding on the understanding that + Argentines will fulfill their public and private commitments to ratify + Tlatelolco and promptly complete the safeguards agreement called for on + that Treaty.

+

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to Argentina.]

+

12. Comment:

+

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to Argentina.] As to renegotiating + their exchange of letters with Argentina, Swiss appeared immovable. They + do not share US assessment regarding + Argentina’s intentions and feel they have taken every step required of + them to prevent misuse of technology they supply. But they did say they + would continue to urge Tlatelolco ratification and would consult with + FRG and compare notes on these + respective safeguards approaches. They are, moreover, prepared to work + with the US and others to develop a + comprehensive system in which full-scope safeguards will be the future + norm. Vine. unqte.

+ + Vance + +
+ +
+ + 461. Telegram From the Embassy in Brazil to the Department of + StateSource: National + Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign + Policy Files, D790595–0619. Secret. Sent for information to the U.S. + Interests Section in Baghdad, Bonn, Buenos Aires, Madrid, Mexico + City, and Vienna. + Brasilia, December 10, 1979, 1600Z +

10578. USIAEA. Subject: Status Report on Non-Proliferation: 1979, The + Transition From Geisel to + Figueiredo. Ref: (A) Brasilia 7869;Telegram + 7869 from Brasilia, September 5, reported that Hervasio de Carvalho, + the Brazilian representative to the IAEA, said “that Brazil would not waive the + entry-into-force requirements” of the Treaty of Tlateloloco. He also + said “that the Treaty was designed as a whole and it would not make + sense unless all Latin American countries adhered and unless the + major powers accepted the protocols.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files, + D790412–0684) (B) Brasilia 8069;See Document 455. (C) Brasilia + 6944;Telegram 6944 from Brasilia, + August 6, reported that during a July 25–28 visit to Caracas by + Brazilian Foreign Minister Guerreiro, the Brazilian and Venezuelan + governments “concluded a general agreement for cooperation in + peaceful applications of nuclear energy. According to the GOB Foreign Ministry, cooperation is + planned to be limited to personnel training in Brazil and uranium + prospecting techniques and will not include technology transferred + from the US or FRG.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files, + D790357–1212) (D) Brasilia 9285;Telegram 9285 from Brasilia, October 22, informed the Department + that “a Delegation of Brazilian nuclear specialists, headed by + NUCLEBRAS President Paulo Nogueira Batista, visited Iraq in early + October for further discussion of a possible nuclear agreement + between the two countries.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files, + D790488–0082) (E) Brasilia 4687;Telegram 4687 from Brasilia, May 25, relayed Brazilian press + reports that “during the visit of the Iraqi Vice President a secret + agreement was reached between Iraq and Brazil under which Iraq could + obtain plutonium from Brazil.” A spokesman from the Brazilian + Foreign Minister “denied ‘categorically’ that Brazil had entered + into a secret agreement and said that the report ‘is entirely out of + the question.’ He stressed that Brazil does not have functioning + nuclear reactors capable of producing plutonium, thus indicating + that the transaction could not possibly be implemented.” (National + Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign + Policy Files, D790258–0783) +

+

(F) State 290745;Telegram 290745 to Brasilia, November 7, informed + the Embassy that Carvalho told Pickering on October 24 that “there was pressure + from those in the nuclear energy field in Brazil to terminate + nuclear relations with the US + altogether and give the business to URENCO or Brazil’s own enrichment plant when it came on + stream, rather than renegotiate the US-Brazil agreement. Carvalho said that he wanted to + continue cooperation with the US and + wanted to find out what the US was + willing to do to avoid a renegotiation and fulfill its supply + commitment for Angra I.” Pickering said “we were not demanding renegotiation + of the agreement but needed confirmation that all of Brazil’s + nuclear activities were under safeguards.” (National Archives, + RG 59, Central Foreign Policy + Files, D790515–1126) (G) Brasilia 9251;Telegram 9251 from Brasilia, October 20, reported + that a Foreign Ministry Energy official “denied a press report of + Oct 13 that the GOB is planning to + renounce its agreement with the US + for cooperation in peaceful uses of atomic energy. He commented that + the possibility had not even been raised.” (National Archives, + RG 59, Central Foreign Policy + Files, D790481–0646) (H) Brasilia 8791;Telegram 8791 from Brasilia, October 5, reported + that the Brazilian Minister of Mines had “publicly stated October 1 + that the Brazilian nuclear program with West Germany had slowed down + and that the eight 1300–MWS originally envisaged under the accord + would not be built until 1995 (when the accord expires). Even this + estimate appears optimistic according to informed sources which + indicate that present plans call for only four power plants to be + built by 1995.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files, + D790460–0882) (I) Brasilia 10313;Telegram 10313 from Brasilia, November 28, + reported numerous delays, rising cost estimates, and “an apparently + unrealistic schedule calling for completion of the fuel cycle + technology transfer by 1986 and for all nine reactors of the + Brazilian nuclear program to be in operation by 1995 continues to be + defended in public by the Minister of Mines and Energy, but + statements and plans by other government officials and agencies do + not support this.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files, D790553–1042) + (J) Brasilia 9281;Telegram 9281 + from Brasilia, October 22, reported that according to press + accounts, General Dirceu Coutinho, the former head of Nucleim, the + uranium enrichment subsidiary of NUCLEBRAS, “urged that the + Brazilian reactor construction program be suspended after three + units presently contractor for, until nuclear power became + economically competitive in Brazil and Brazil could develop a viable + enrichment system.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files, + D790487–0329) (K) Brasilia 9814.Telegram 9814 from Brasilia, November 8, reported + a member of the Argentine Embassy “confirmed press reports” that + “Argentina and Brazil are negotiating agreement for peaceful nuclear + cooperation.” Such cooperation would “cover uranium mining, + training, long term research and industrial exchange,” including + “one sensitive area: laser production of heavy water.” + Representatives from both Argentina and Brazil “ruled out any + military or PNE application.” The + Embassy said “such bilateral cooperation would serve to improve + capabilities and hence independence of both nations in nuclear + technology. However cooperation could also serve to open each + nation’s nuclear programs and to create trust between two potential + nuclear rivals. Hence we support Embassy Buenos Aires’ assessment + that nuclear cooperation between Brazil and Argentina is on balance + in US interests.” (National + Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign + Policy Files, D790519–0839)

+

1. (S—Entire text).

+

2. Begin summary: The transition in 1979 from Geisel to the Figueiredo administration bought few major + changes to Brazilian non-proliferation policies. The GOB continues to refuse to consider the + NPT + or to waive Tlatelolco into + force. It also continues to foreswear any action contravening + Tlatelolco’s objectives and any intentions of developing a nuclear + explosive device. The major new developments of non-proliferation + concern in 1979 were: (a) a more active nuclear diplomacy, with GOB negotiating nuclear arrangements for + cooperation in peaceful applications of nuclear energy with Argentina, + Venezuela, and, of most concern, Iraq; and (b) a marked slow-down in the + nuclear program undertaken with the West Germans. Of the factors causing + the GOB to defer decisions to undertake + costly new projects envisaged under FRG–GOB nuclear accord, + the troubled economy stands out as the most important and the least + susceptible to change. If the nuclear power development continues to + drag, there will be correspondingly less incentive to expand future + enrichment and reprocessing capabilities beyond the experimental stage. + The U.S. continues to have little influence on GOB nuclear policies. Our early full adherence to the + Tlatelolco protocols would be well received here. A clear message to the + GOB restating U.S. requirements for + continued cooperation—perhaps tied to Tlatelolco protocal + adherence—might prepare the way for a resumption of a more active + nuclear relationship. End summary.

+

[Omitted here is the body of the telegram.]

+
+ +
+ 462. Telegram From the Embassy in the Federal Republic of Germany to + the Department of StateSource: National Archives, RG 59, + Central Foreign Policy Files, P840133–2108. Secret; Nodis. + Bonn, December 19, 1979, 1819Z +

22524. For Deputy Secretary Christopher. Subject: FRG Sale of Nuclear Reactor to Argentina—Safeguards Issue. + Ref: New Delhi 22430.Telegram 22430 from + New Delhi, December 7, reported that the Federal Republic of Germany + was “very disturbed” that the “US + was not [nit] picking and trying to dictate + tactics and FRG resented this. If + we kept it up it would not help cooperation.” (National Archives, + RG 59, Central Foreign Policy + Files, D790569–0354)

+

1. (Secret—Entire text).

+

2. Action requested: See paragraph 13.

+

3. Summary: We are concerned that the safeguards negotiations for the + sale of a nuclear reactor by the FRG to + Argentina may result in something less than full-scope safeguards or + their equivalent on Argentine + facilities. This matter has the potential for developing into a problem + in U.S.–FRG relations. I suggest you + call in Ambassador Hermes for + discussions on the Argentine deal. End summary.

+

4. As you know, the U.S. has been pushing very hard to get the FRG to require full-scope NPT-type safeguards (over all Argentine + nuclear facilities) in its sale of a nuclear power plant (Atucha II) to + Argentina.

+

5. This effort has been underway for some time. In addition to the + demarchés by the Embassy, there have been several visits by Ambassador + Gerard Smith and Assistant + Secretary Tom Pickering and many + by other representatives of the Department and of ACDA during which this subject has been + discussed and the U.S. position reiterated.

+

6. The U.S. originally asked Canada, the FRG and Switzerland, who were bidders on the reactor and + heavy water manufacturing plant, not only to require full-scope + safeguards on the sale of both of these facilities but also to require + Argentina to postpone indefinitely the reprocessing of nuclear fuel.

+

7. While the bidders were unwilling to tie reprocessing to these sales, + the U.S. was given to understand that Canada and the FRG would require full-scope safeguards. + Further, the FRG repeated many times + that it would “not undercut” the Canadians by offering softer safeguards + to Argentina.

+

8. Late last July, we heard a new theme from the FRG,Not found. namely + that it would require full-scope NPT-type safeguards if it sold both the reactor and the heavy + water plant to Argentina, but if the order were split and the FRG sold only the reactor (which turned + out to be the case), then Germany would consult with its partners (U.S., + Canada and Switzerland) before defining the safeguards package to be + offered to Argentina.

+

9. With this change in tone and the deviation from what we and the + Canadians had been led to believe, namely that the FRG would adhere to the same position as + Canada and require full-scope NPT-type + safeguards in connection with even a reactor-only sale, both the U.S. + and Canada initiated another series of demarchés.

+

10. We and Canadians were then told that the FRG would again approach Argentina and request full-scope + NPT-type safeguards but if these + were not accepted by Argentina, the FRG + had developed a “pragmatic solution” to the problem which would avoid + the objectionable (to Argentina) full-scope NPT-type safeguards terminology but would be a de facto + equivalent. The FRG expressed + confidence to Ambassador Smith and the Embassy that + it could obtain Argentine agreement to the “pragmatic solution.”

+

11. Now, in the cable received by the Embassy from Gerry Smith in New Delhi, reporting his + conversation with State Secretary Haunschild (Reftel), it appears that + the initial negotiating position of the FRG will not be to request full-scope safeguards, but + rather will be the “pragmatic solution.” Further, it appears, [1 line not declassified] that the opening + negotiating position of Argentina will be much less than full-scope + safeguards, or the pragmatic solution. In fact, it will be less than the + nuclear suppliers’ group guidelines. (We also have seen [1 line not declassified] despite assurances we + have had to the contrary, Argentina has no intention of signing the + Tlatelolco Treaty after completion of the deal with the FRG and Switzerland.)

+

12. If one assumes that in the course of negotiations some compromise is + reached between the opening positions of the FRG and Argentina, the result clearly will be less than the + full-scope safeguards we desire, and may well leave the door open for + Argentina to pursue a nuclear option outside of international safeguards + leading to nuclear weapons capability.

+

13. Action requested: In light of this very serious and possibly + deteriorating safeguards position, I recommend that you call in + Ambassador Hermes and inform him + of the serious concern of the U.S. that the FRG may be heading for a compromise on safeguards which not + only leaves the world vulnerable to the development of a nuclear weapons + capability in Argentina but also can establish a very undesirable + precedent at a time when we all are seeking stronger safeguards against + proliferation.

+

14. I am concerned that this whole matter has the potential of developing + into a problem of considerable import in U.S.–FRG relations. For this reason, in addition to + proliferation considerations, I believe it would be desirable to discuss + the situation frankly with Hermes + (who was closely involved in the negotiations with Argentina in his + previous position) to make sure that the FRG understands at a high level the risks of the course + they apparently are contemplating.

+ + Stoessel + +
+ +
+ + 463. Memorandum from the President’s Assistant for National Security + Affairs (Brzezinski) to President + CarterSource: Carter Library, National + Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Pastor Country File, Box 1, + Argentina: 1–4/80. Confidential. Sent for action. Carter initialed the upper + right-hand corner of the memorandum. + Washington, January + 4, 1980 + + SUBJECT + Approval of Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) Exports (U) + +

The attached packageNot attached. + from the NSC Ad Hoc Group on + Non-Proliferation (which includes State, DoD, DoE, and ACDA) + requests your approval of 7 export licenses for the shipment of HEU to Argentina, Belgium, West Germany, + The Netherlands, Japan, France and Sweden. Of the 7 cases, 6 are + non-controversial. (U)

+

The Argentine case, however, raises some significant policy problems. + Argentina has requested 12 kgs of HEU + to refuel the US-supplied RA–3 research + reactor. Argentina has agreed in principle to a three-year cooperative + program to convert the RA–3 for the use of 20% enriched fuel. Approval + of the current request would keep the reactor operating during that + period, and is therefore important to our objective of achieving + conversion to safer fuels. (C)

+

This request must be considered, however, in the light of the transfer of + heavy water production technology from Switzerland to Argentina. This + transfer will close the last major gap in Argentina’s fuel cycle, and + give Argentina the potential ability to operate an unsafeguarded + reprocessing plant in the future. Because of this, we have strongly and + repeatedly urged the Swiss and Germans to use this opportunity to + require Argentina to accept the more stringent Canadian safeguards + standard, which goes beyond the normal requirement of other suppliers + (including the US) by requiring + full-scope safeguards on all future nuclear + activities. Both Switzerland and the FRG have rejected this approach; the Germans have said they + will try to achieve its “practical equivalent,” but the prospects for + success are poor. (C)

+

The Ad Hoc Group feels that despite the safeguards question, we should + meet the Argentine request in order to preserve the opportunity to + convert the reactor to lower-enriched fuel. While there is no + contractual commitment to provide the HEU fuel, and no alternative supplier at this time, the Ad + Hoc Group believes that this supply can be distinguished from the + German/Swiss contracts as the continuation of an existing supply + relationship rather than a major new commitment. (C)

+ +

I believe that you should withhold approval of the Argentine request + until the outcome of the current FRG/Argentine safeguards negotiations is known, for two + reasons: (C)

+

—Approval now on lesser safeguards conditions than we have urged on the + FRG could signal a softening of our + position and affect the negotiations; (C)

+

—A final decision on continuing to supply HEU should take into account the specifics of the + safeguards arrangements the FRG is able + to negotiate. (C)

+

RECOMMENDATIONS:

+

1. That you approve Executive Branch recommendations to the NRC for the issuance of licenses for + export of highly enriched uranium as described in the attachments, + except for the Argentine request. (C)Carter checked the + “Approve” option and wrote “J” in the right-hand margin.

+

2. That you defer a decision on the Argentine request and ask that it be + resubmitted with a new analysis and recommendations when the outcome of + the FRG/Argentine safeguards + negotiations is known. (C)

+

DEFER DECISION _______

+

APPROVE REQUEST _______ Carter checked the “Approve + Request” option and wrote “J” in the right-hand margin. Underneath + the options line Carter + wrote “ace to p. 2 of Ad Hoc memo J.”

+
+ +
+ 464. Telegram From the Embassy in Mexico to the Department of + StateSource: National + Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign + Policy Files, D800069–0006. Confidential; Priority. Sent for + information to Paris, the U.S. Interests Section in Havana, and the + Consulates in Guadalajara, Hermosillo, Monterrey, Tijuana, Ciudad + Juarez (pouch), Matamoros (pouch), Mazatlan (pouch), Merida (pouch), + and Neuvo Laredo (pouch). + Mexico City, February 8, 1980, 2255Z +

2240. Subject: Call for U.S. Ratification of Protocol One of Treaty of + Tlatelolco.

+

1. (Confidential—Entire text.)

+

2. OPANAL Secretary-General + Ambassador Hector Gros Espiell + presented memorandum to us, February 7, calling for prompt U.S. + ratification of Protocol One of Treaty of Tlatelolco. (Protocol One + applies Treaty’s + denuclearization provisions to territories for which signatories are de + jure or de facto “internationally responsible” within the geographical + zone of application of the Treaty. The United States signed Protocol One + on May 26, 1977.)

+

3. Gros Espiell explained that + the memorandum is worded somewhat peremptorily in hope that this will + help U.S. process of ratification. He added that he will present a + similar memorandum to the French next week urging Protocol One + ratification to coincide with Mexican President Lopez Portillo’s planned visit to + Paris in May. In reviewing memorandum with Gros, we noted that USG + fully supports Protocol One and that U.S. ratification is question of + legislative tactics, not of executive intent. Informal translation of + OPANAL memorandum follows.

+

4. Begin text. President Carter + signed Additional Protocol One of the Treaty of Tlatelolco for the + United States on May 26, 1977. This protocol was sent to the Senate for + approval prior to ratification in May 1978. The Foreign Relations + Committee began its analysis in public hearings that received wide + journalistic coverage. After this preliminary analysis, as far as we + know, it has not returned to be an object of consideration of the + committee.

+

5. The General Conference of OPANAL + in its sixth regular period of sessions approved Resolution 121(VI) + adopted April 26, 1979, which says in this regard, “2. Calls on the + Governments of the United States and France to proceed as soon as + possible to the ratification of Additional Protocol One.” The United + Nations general assembly in its Resolution 33/58 adopted December 14, + 1978 invited the United States of America, “. . . to make every effort + to ratify as soon as possible Additional Protocol One of the Treaty for + the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of + Tlatelolco.)”

+

6. The absence of ratification of Additional Protocol One by the United + States of America, almost three years after its signature, deeply + preoccupies the Latin American State-parties to the Treaty of + Tlatelolco. This absence of ratification would appear to demonstrate + little interest in the question of military denuclearization of Latin + America. Such an attitude on the part of the United States of America—in + certain form incompatible with the repeated declarations of President + Carter and Secretary of + State Vance of full and total + support for the Treaty of Tlatelolco—prejudices Latin American efforts + to denuclearize the continent militarily and affects all policy + regarding peaceful use of nuclear energy in Latin America, reducing the + force of United States’ efforts in this area and affecting negatively + negotiations to obtain the signatures, ratifications, and waivers still + lacking for the Treaty of Tlatelolco (Cuba, Guyana, Argentina, Brazil, + and Chile.)

+ +

7. At a time in which the ratification of the SALT II Treaty has been indefinitely postponed,On January 3, Carter requested that the Senate delay consideration + of the SALT II treaty after the + Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. (Public Papers: + Carter, + 1980–81, p. 12) it is extremely important that the + United States not reduce its support, so often proclaimed and invoked, + of the Treaty of Tlatelolco. And, today, the only formally effective way + of undoubted transcendence of realistically manifesting this support is + in the ratification of Additional Protocol One. All the credibility of + United States policy on non-proliferation of nuclear weapons in Latin + America is compromised, at the present time, if it does not proceed with + urgency to ratify Additional Protocol One. End text.

+

8. Comment: While we believe the OPANAL memorandum is more a product of Ambassador Gros’ own making than a reflection of + a ground swell of opinion among Latin American States, the Ambassador’s + message provides food for thought. Gros indicated, incidentally, that he will be discussing + with Mexican Foreign Secretary Castaneda next week (in addition to a + possible reply to the U.S. statement on transit rights in connection + with Soviet adherence to Tlatelolco Protocol Two)Not found. the possibility of a multilateral + approach to Cuba on Tlatelolco signature. The possibilities for such an + approach, he said, appear heightened in the wake of Nicaraguan and + Jamaican endorsement of Tlatelolco signature by all states of the region + in joint communiqués with the GOM, January 24 and February 6 + respectively. Gros added, + however, that U.S. ratification of Protocol One would appear to be a + political, albeit not a juridical, necessity in order to undertake such + an approach to the Cubans.

+

9. Action requested: please inform us of the current status of Protocol + One ratification and provide us with text of reply, if Department + desires to make one, to OPANAL’s + memorandum. (Drafted: Jon D. Glassman)

+ + FerchOn February 19, the Department + of State replied that “it would prefer not to respond to OPANAL memorandum in writing. + Please inform Gros + Espiell that Department has received memorandum + and will take appropriate opportunity to pass its substance + informally to Senate Foreign Relations Committee, which as + Gros Espiell is + aware is considering ratification of Protocol.” While the United + States remained committed to Protocol I, it could not guarantee + quick ratification given the “number of other treaties which + would be ahead of Protocol I on the Senate Calendar.” (Telegram + 44793 to Mexico City, February 19; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy + Files, D800088–0296) + +
+ +
+ + 465. Telegram From the Embassy in Mexico to the Department of + StateSource: National + Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign + Policy Files, D800132–0007. Confidential; Priority. Sent for + information to the U.S. Interests Section in Havana, Moscow, the + Mission in Geneva, Vienna, and all Consulates in + Mexico. + Mexico City, March 15, 1980, 0047Z +

4484. Department pass to American Republic Collective Vienna for USIAEA. + Subject: Cuba Formally Declines to Adhere to Treaty of Tlatelolco.

+

1. (C) Summary: The Government of Cuba has formally requested that OPANAL—the executive organ of the + Treaty of Tlatelolco—inform Latin American signatories of the Treaty + that Cuba does not now find it possible to adhere to the Treaty (which + requires formal renunciation of the nuclear weapons option.) The Cubans + spell out conditions which would permit them to consider Treaty + adherence. These conditions incorporate earlier Cuban stances, albeit + stated in extremely broad and far-reaching terms: dissolution of + bilateral and multilateral military and security treaties between the + United States and the Latin American States, the “return of territory + occupied by U.S. military bases” in Latin America and the dismantling of + these bases, the termination of “militarist and aggressive” policies in + Latin America made possible by the U.S. “colonial presence,” and the + ending of threatening U.S. military maneuvers and efforts to create + intervention forces in the hemisphere. End summary.

+

2. (C) The Cuban note, inexplicably dated December 29, 1979, was + delivered to OPANAL by the Cuban + Embassy in Mexico City in the second week of March. (OPANAL Secretary-General Ambassador + Hector Gros Espiell believes + that delivery of the note may have been held up as a result of the furor + over the Soviet Afghan invasion.)The Soviet + Union invaded Afghanistan on December 25, 1979. The Cubans + request that the text of the note be circulated to all Treaty of + Tlatelolco signatories. (Distribution will be made the week of March + 17.)

+

3. (C) The Cuban note responds to the call by the OPANAL General Conference in Quito, + April 14–17, 1979, for Cuban adherence to the Treaty of Tlatelolco. + Ambassador Gros Espiell stated + that, to his knowledge, the Cuban note constitutes the first instance in + which Havana has formally communicated its conditions for adhering to + the Tlatelolco Treaty. Given the far-reaching nature of Havana’s stated + conditions, which go beyond anything that could reasonably be achieved + even in the unlikely event of a U.S.-Cuban bilateral rapprochement, + Ambassador Gros opined that Cuba wished to send a + clear message of intransigence to the other Latin American States. + (Gros remarked on the + interesting contrast between the tone of the Cuban note and Moscow’s + praise of the Treaty of Tlatelolco at the February Vienna INFCE review.)

+

[Omitted here is the body of the telegram.]

+

8. Comment: The Cuban note will certainly disappoint the GOM which is + pressing for French notification of Tlatelolco Protocol One during + President Lopez Portillo’s visit + to Paris in May and a Brazilian waiver to allow entry into force for + that country during Lopez + Portillo’s scheduled July visit. The Soviet reaction is + also of some interest since the Cuban note could be read as an implicit + rebuke of Soviet signature and ratification of Tlatelolco Protocol II. + In light of the Cuban note, we would expect that the GOM and other + States of the region would become increasingly interested in the state + of safeguard negotiations on the Soviet-supplied nuclear power plant + being constructed near Cienfuegos, Cuba. (Drafted: Jon D. Glassman)

+ + Ferch + +
+ +
+ 466. Memorandum of ConversationSource: National Archives, RG 383, Records of the Arms Control and Disarmament + Agency, Office of the Director, Lot 81D155, Box 14, Argentina, + Jan–March 1980. Drafted by Clifton Metzner. The meeting took place + at the Comisión Nacional de Energía Atómic (CNEA). Copies were sent to the + Ambassador, the Deputy Chief of Mission, the Science Counselor, the + Defense Attaché, the Bureau of Security Assistance, Science, and + Technology, the Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, the Bureau of + Oceans and Scientific and Environmental Affairs, and the + Secretary. + Buenos Aires, March 24, 1980, 3:30 + p.m. + + SUBJECT + Nuclear Consultations + + + PARTICIPANTS + Argentina— + Vice Admiral Carlos Castro Madero, President, CNEA + Dr. Antonio Carrea, Advisor to CNEA President + Dr. Hugo Erramuspe, Director of Research and Development, CNEA + Dr. Carlos A. Kroll, Coordinator of General Secretariat, CNEA + Dr. Jorge Martinez Fabini, Manager of Law Division, CNEA + Ing. Alejandro Placer, Advisor to CNEA President + + U.S.— + Ambassador at Large Gerard C. + Smith + Ambassador Raúl H. + Castro + Maxwell Chaplin, DCM, AmEmbassy + Buenos Aires + Claus W. Ruser, ECA Director + Allen W. Locke, Deputy Special Representative for + Non-Proliferation Matters + Clifton G. Metzner, Jr., Science Counselor, AmEmbassy Buenos + Aires + +

Admiral Castro Madero opened by welcoming Amb. Smith and his group and wished them a + fruitful stay, adding that the Commission would do its best to make it + so. Amb. Smith remarked that he + was happy to be back in Argentina after his last trip in November, 1977, + with Secretary of State Vance.See Document 426. He said he was sorry + that he could not attend the asado (barbecue) that was to be offered in + his honor by Admiral Castro Madero on Thursday, March 27, but because of + pressure of business he had to return to Washington on Wednesday, March + 26.

+

Amb. Smith said he hoped + safeguards would not become an issue for discussion since each party’s + position is already well known. He categorically denied that the U.S. + had pressured or tried to block other countries’ efforts to transfer + technology or equipment to Argentina. He said that the U.S. positions on + full-scope safeguards had been given to supplier countries. Far from + blocking any exports to Argentina, the U.S. had sought to be of help by + offering to make heavy water available.

+

Admiral Castro Madero mentioned there had been a number of comments in + newspapers and other sources that the U.S. had pressured Switzerland and + Germany to demand fullscope safeguards for the sales of equipment,See Charles A. Krause, “U.S. General Asks + Argentine Aid on Embargo,” Washington Post, + January 25, 1980, p. A16. and several U.S. senators had tried + to block these sales to Argentina. He added that this information was + mostly gathered from the press, in the U.S. and Argentina. However, + Castro Madero said he was pleased with Amb. Smith’s remarks that the U.S. had not tried to block + these sales.

+

Amb. Smith then discussed + non-proliferation in broad terms and indicated political solutions would + have to be reached on a worldwide as well as a regional basis. He cited + the dangers of the India and Pakistan nuclear arms race. He asked if + Argentina had any ideas to prevent this prospective proliferation. India + had exploded a device in 1974 for “peaceful purposes”. The Pakistanis + now are reacting to that development. Pakistan is constructing a + reprocessing plant (originally with French assistance) which has no + commercial significance, which they claim is for peaceful purposes. + Pakistan is also constructing a production size plant to enrich uranium. + India has recently hinted that it may have a need for nuclear weapons. What are the + possible political solutions in South Asia? We (the U.S.) would welcome + help in finding solutions.

+

Smith then called attention to the + serious problems concerning Iran and terrorism and the possibility that + plutonium in the future could get into the hands of terrorists when more + countries are in a position to obtain plutonium.

+

Amb. Smith asked how Argentina, + when it became a responsible world nuclear supplier, would condition its + exports. Castro Madero remarked that the South Asian situation was + certainly not equivalent to the South American position. He added that + so far no country had developed nuclear weapons through a nuclear power + program. This, he said, would not be the way to reach a weapons program. + He added that Brazil and Argentina were in the process of reaching a + nuclear agreement for cooperation which should alleviate fears of an + arms race in South America. This, he said, naturally, is not a complete + answer to the problem but global approaches are difficult to implement. + He said the best guarantee for non-proliferation is through strong + country alliances and cooperation. According to Castro Madero, denial of + technologies to developing countries has been counter productive and has + not been successful in preventing nuclear proliferation. Smith said that a denial policy alone + could not hope to succeed. It must be accompanied by political + initiatives.

+

Amb. Smith turned again to the + Pakistan situation and indicated that Pakistan had centrifuges for + enrichment of uranium and asked if in order to be a more reliable + supplier (in the Argentine sense) the U.S. should sell Pakistan better + centrifuges, thus enabling it to enrich more uranium for a nuclear bomb. + These are the difficult issues driving U.S. export policies and + non-proliferation. He questioned if Argentina were a major supplier in + the world, would it sell reprocessing technology, for example, to any + country that asked for it? What type of safeguards would they + require.

+

Smith expressed a hope that U.S. + export licensing procedures could be made more flexible. He said that + regional and worldwide political solutions must be found for + proliferation problems. The U.S. was certainly not pointing out + Argentina as a special case.

+

Amb. Smith then moved to + post-INFCE discussions and + indicated he hopes the U.S. would take action to become a more reliable + nuclear supplier, and to modernize present nuclear licensing procedures. + He allowed that the INFCE studies + will have to be analyzed, and it will have to be decided what should be + done with the findings. Smith + asked Castro Madero how the GOA felt in + this regard. Castro Madero indicated that Argentina was in favor of the + formation of a committee composed of interested countries to review the + INFCE studies and establish the terms of reference for + approaches to the problems involved. The international plutonium study + and spent fuel management were two important ones from the Argentine + point of view. The Committee, he felt, should come directly under the + IAEA Director General to give it + more flexibility. Amb. Smith + agreed that the working parties should report to the Director + General.

+

Amb. Smith then asked Castro + Madero what the results were of the Brazilian visit to Argentina. Castro + Madero indicated this was a follow-up to his visit to Brazil in January + and was to establish the guidelines for an overall agreement and define + the areas of mutual interest for cooperation. Both countries, he said, + were willing to sign this agreement. He said that Argentina had been + interested in looking ahead in the distant future for a broader Latin + American nuclear alliance, but this was not in the cards for the near + future since most Latin American countries want to keep their freedom of + action. He hoped that the Argentine/Brazilian accord could be a catalyst + for the beginning of a political solution in this area.

+

Amb. Smith then referred to + information he had received that Cuba would not be interested in signing + or ratifying the Treaty of Tlatelolco. He said that the primary reason + given by the Cubans was the U.S. must first dissolve its bilateral and + multilateral arms agreements in South America and, particularly, remove + the Guantánamo base from Cuba. Castro Madero said he did not have any + information on this subject.

+

The discussion then turned to bilateral affairs, and Amb. Smith mentioned the supply agreement + between Peru, the U.S., Argentina, and the IAEA for the provision of enriched uranium for the Peruvian + reactor. He also referred to a 10 MW research reactor Argentina was + constructing for the Peruvian program and asked with what other + countries Argentina may be developing supply cooperation. Castro Madero + said that Bolivia and Uruguay both are interested in research reactors + and that the enriched uranium would have to come from the U.S. He + pointed out the U.S. was restricting the export of enriched uranium to + Argentina for the Peruvian reactor and other requests, which would + curtail their program to develop their own low enriched fuel fabrication + plans. He said Argentina had furnished an official commitment to the + U.S. last September that all facilities were under safeguards. + Nonetheless, this apparently was not acceptable, and the U.S. has now + asked for additional requirements for safeguards over all nuclear + activities which go beyond the original agreements. At that point, Dr. + Antonio Carrea indicated it would be very difficult to furnish the U.S. + with a confirmation that all facilities and materials are under + safeguards every one, two, or three months during the time each export + order would be pending before the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. The Argentines said in any + event they could not act on the latest U.S. suggestion since it had not + been formally communicated to them. Mr. Locke explained that the reason + the U.S. requested the 90-day notification was to cover the period the + NRC and other U.S. agencies were + making their reviews. In any event, it was agreed that some solution + could be found. This problem could be discussed further to determine + what arrangement could be worked out agreeable to both parties. Amb. + Smith said we understand what + the problem was, and hoped a solution can be found. At this point the + meeting was ended.

+

After the meeting, Mr. Placer, CNEA + Safeguards Chief, mentioned to the Science Counselor that the problem of + exchange of notes and 90-day notification on pending uranium exports was + really not the major problem, but that the deletion of the wording in + the note referring to deuterium not supplied by the U.S. is more + important and would have to be resolved before an agreement could be + reached.Telegram 2604 from Buenos + Aires, March 26, reported Smith’s impression of his visit. “Conditions for our + visit,” the Ambassador said, “were not auspicious” given that Castro + Madero was in Moscow “at the Soviets’ invitation” while a + “high-level German Delegation” was in Buenos Aires “to complete + negotiations for the Atucha II reactor.” Smith noted that in his talks with Videla and other Argentine + officials, “we stressed the seriousness with which we view the + international situation, that there will be no ‘lurch towards + détente,’ and our aim to strengthen relations with Argentina.” + Nevertheless, Smith said + “There was no encouragement during my talks that Argentina will + ratify Tlatelolco any time soon; on full-scope safeguards we agreed + to disagree. Argentina’s nuclear program is well advanced and will + move ahead under able leadership. Our central objective must be to + prevent the emergence of a nuclear arms race in the hemisphere.” + (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, + North/South, Pastor Country + File, Box 1, Argentina: 1–4/80)

+
+ +
+ + 467. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the + Federal Republic of GermanySource: National Archives, RG 59, + Central Foreign Policy File, D800153–0662. Confidential; Immediate. + Sent for information Priority to Bern, Buenos Aires, and Ottawa. + Drafted by Anne Stefanas (OES/NET/NEP) and Erwin Von Den Steinen + (EUR/CE); cleared by Pickering (OES), + Allen Locke (S/AS), William Salmon (T), George Suchan (PM/NPP), + Charles Van Doren (ACDA/NP), L. Paul Bremer (S/S), Ronald Bettauer (L), George Jones (ARA), Robert Galluci (S/P), John Whitman (ARA/ECA), and Ward + Barmon (EUR/RPE); and approved by Vance. Stoessel delivered the letter on March 28. (Telegram + 6079 from Bonn, March 28; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + D800157–0130) + Washington, March 26, 1980, 1459Z +

79756. Subject: Vance/Genscher Letter on Argentine + Supply.

+

1. Entire text confidential.

+

2. We continue to believe that it is extremely important that the FRG not relax its safeguards conditions + for nuclear supply to Argentina. The failure, thus far, of the FRG and Argentina to reach agreement on + safeguards has increased pressure within the FRG for such relaxation, and we understand a decision was + made at a meeting of the Nuclear Cabinet to go ahead with the reactor + sale to Argentina, trying to obtain the best safeguards conditions + possible. Accordingly, the Ambassador is requested to call on Genscher as soon as possible and + deliver the following letter from the Secretary:

+

3. Quote: Dear Hans-Dietrich: I + am writing you about our common goal of limiting the risk of nuclear + weapons proliferation which remains an objective of transcendent + importance. Since we last discussed this issue it has been the subject + of continuing contact between our two governments, and I wish to + underline my support for the strong position which I understand your + negotiators have been taking in their discussions with the government of + Argentina.

+

However, I must tell you quite frankly that I am concerned over the + information which Ambassador Hermes gave Ambassador Smith March 19The + information Hermes provided + Smith is in telegram + 75515 to Bonn, March 21. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + D800145–0474) regarding the decision by the Nuclear Cabinet + to weaken your position. Let me stress my conviction that your posture + on safeguards conditions should remain firm. We believe that a policy of + patient firmness is correct, realistic and in our common + non-proliferation interest.

+

I am asking Ambassador Stoessel + to deliver this letter personally and to stress our desire to cooperate + with you in this effort. We will also keep you informed about our discussions on nuclear + matters with the government of Argentina. Sincerely. Cyrus Vance. Unquote.

+

4. In delivering this letter, Ambassador is requested to make following + points:

+

—I know you are aware of our concern about FRG requirements for nuclear supply to Argentina. We have + not raised this concern recently at a high level while your negotiators + have been discussing the matter with GOA officials. Naturally, we are anxious to learn as soon + as possible of any Argentine response to your proposal, which we were + gratified to learn, included the issue of Argentine adherence to the + Treaty of Tlatelolco.

+

—The Secretary also has written to Federal Councillor Aubert on this + subject.Vance’s letter to Aubert is in telegram 45004 to + Bern, February 20. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + D800088–0863) Although we have had no formal reply to the + letter, we understand that Sulzer signed a contract with the Argentines + on March 14.

+

—In light of the Swiss decision, it is all the more important that the + FRG holds to the strongest possible + safeguard conditions.

+

—I understand that the FRG Nuclear + Cabinet met last week and decided to continue nuclear negotiations with + Argentina, during which it would seek the best possible safeguards + conditions. (FYI: FRG Ambassador Hermes called Ambassador Smith March 19 to report this. In subsequent + conversation with Department officer, FRG Embassy Science Counselor refused to go beyond + Hermes’ report, other than to + say that no deviation from position expressed by Lambsdorf to Smith February 15 was intended.Not found. Department assumes FRG position to be that expressed by + Lambsdorff, i.e., that + FRG has resolved to complete + reactor sale and will settle for best safeguards conditions obtainable. + End FYI.)

+

—In addition, Ambassador Gerard + Smith will be visiting Buenos Aires March 24–25. He will + be discussing a range of subjects, following up on General Goodpaster’s + earlier visit. He does not intend to discuss the subject of Argentina’s + negotiations with other nuclear suppliers. We wish to assure your + government the US will insist that + Argentina confirm that all of its facilities are safeguarded as a + condition of any nuclear supply from the United States. As mentioned in + Secretary Vance’s letter, we + will continue to provide you additional details concerning our position + through your Embassy in Washington.

+ + Vance + +
+ +
+ + 468. Minutes of a Policy Review Committee MeetingSource: Carter Library, National + Security Affairs, Brzezinski + Material, Brzezinski Office + File, Country Chron, Box 3, Argentina 1979–1980. Secret. Sent for + information. The meeting took place in the White House Situation + Room. + Washington, May 14, 1980, + 10:30–11:15 a.m. + + SUBJECT + Minutes—PRC Meeting on Argentina + (C) + + + PARTICIPANTS + State + Warren Christopher, Dep. + Secretary + John Bushnell, Dep. Ass’t. Secretary + Defense + W. Graham Claytor, Jr., Dep. Secretary + Frank Kramer, Principal Dep. Ass’t. Secretary + Agriculture + James Starkey, Dep. Under Secretary + Commerce + Luther Hodges, Dep. Secretary + Abraham Katz, Ass’t. Secretary for Internat. Economic Policy and + Research + Energy + Woody Cunningham, Ass’t. Secretary for Nuclear Energy + Arms Control and Disarmament + Spurgeon Keeny, Dep. + Director + Richard Williamson, Nuclear Exports Div. Chief, Bureau of + Nonproliferation + Joint Chiefs of Staff + Lt. General John Pustay + Central Intelligence + Jack Davis, NIO for Latin America + White House + David Aaron + Henry Owen + National Security Council + Thomas P. Thornton + Robert Pastor + +

Bushnell began the meeting by discussing + Argentinian relations with the Soviet Union. He pointed out that the + current government is unlikely to get close to the Soviets and this + provides a certain implicit limitation on the process of + Soviet/Argentinian ties. The Argentine Government is playing a + short-term game in the grain, trade and perhaps nuclear area.

+

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to non-proliferation.]

+

Keeny, + discussing nuclear matters, said it is not clear what the options are. + The Soviets are interested in some nuclear cooperation with

+ +

the Argentinians but there has been minimal activity to date.On April 17, INR + reported that “US countermeasures in + the wake of Afghanistan have stimulated further Soviet efforts to + exploit Argentine policy differences with the US, particularly in the commercial + area.” INR further noted that + Castro Madero had “announced that excellent results had been + achieved at Argentine-USSR nuclear + talks held in Moscow in late March to explore the possibilities of + nuclear cooperation. The Soviets, according to one CNEA official, said that if US-Argentine negotiations for enriched + uranium were not successful, the USSR would meet Argentina’s enriched uranium + requirements. Possible Soviet supply of heavy water and heavy water + technology may have been discussed, although Soviet officials have + privately reiterated to us Moscow’s opposition to such transfers.” + (Bureau of Intelligence and Research—Analysis: April 17; + Ibid.) Thus there does not seem much to preempt there. Our + own relations with Argentina are another question. We do not want to + (indeed legally we cannot) expand these relations unless they accept + full-scope safeguards and ratify the Tlatelolco Treaty. We do have some + flexibility though on whether we should continue to cooperate in + marginal ways within the law. The question is whether we are willing to + supply things that at some future date might be related to a nuclear + weapons program.

+

Bushnell said there is no problem because what we + are supplying is for their research program. The issue is whether we + want to break a nuclear dialogue with them completely and perhaps turn + them to the Soviets. He hopes that we might be able to make greater + progress next year when there will be a new administration and + leadership on nuclear matters. Thus he asked, should we break the + dialogue now or continue to do “minor” things.

+

Keeny said + it depended on which items were involved.

+

Claytor said that the nuclear non-proliferation + policy is bankrupt in general and that we should do absolutely + everything we can under the law to cooperate with Argentina.

+

Keeny + inquired whether that would include the provision of tritium. Perhaps + the only thing the Argentinians want are things that cause no problem + for us. We should look at the specifics.

+

Christopher + pointed out that the President has certainly not abandoned the nuclear + non-proliferation policy.

+

Claytor countered that the policy had been + ineffective and that the Soviets are always ready to jump in where we + are unable to extend cooperation.

+

Bushnell observed that there were very few license + requests pending from the Argentinians and there probably would be no + problem over the next six months or so.

+

Christopher, returning to the general topic, said he + believed that the group should support the middle option. We should give + due weight to positive trends in the human rights area but should not + try to repeal the + Humphrey-Kennedy + AmendmentThe Humphrey-Kennedy Amendment to the 1976 + Foreign Assistance Act prohibited the supply of U.S. military + equipment to Argentina and Chile after October 1, 1978. at + this time since that would be impossible with the present Congress and + politically unwise. This Option B needs fine tuning from the + Interdepartmental Group; what we should do in the coming months is to + warm up our relationship with Argentina. Perhaps in 1981 we will be able + to have an initiative on the military side, including training at + least.

+

Hodges said he was encouraged by Christopher’s summation, for the trends + in human rights are important. The Commerce Department also supports + Option B.

+

Aaron said + that we needed a specific program to improve our relations. The options + as stated in the paper are too static. Our goals should be first, to + maintain a nuclear relationship that will result in Argentine accession + to the Tlatelolco Treaty; secondly, a commercial policy that makes clear + that we want the hydroelectric contract and will pursue it; third, there + is no possibility of changing the military legislation now; fourth, + there is a major OAS vote coming up and + how we react will be a signal to them. We should relate that to the + policy issues. Overall, we should have a tone that rests somewhere + between Options B and C, leaving out for the time being any change in + our military supply policy. The Inter-departmental Group should set up + an 18-month program with benchmarks for our progress and for Argentine + performance.

+

At the same time Aaron noted that there is no reason to improve + relations dramatically with Argentina now directly after they have stuck + their finger in our eye on the grain issue. We should make clear our + irritation with them at this time and then pick up the pieces with a new + administration when it comes into office. We will not be able to get + very far with Videla. We should + take the opportunity of the new administration, however, for turning a + new page. If we move to improve our relations with them now we will + simply not have the respect of the Argentinians.

+

Claytor said that he saw Option C as the desirable + goal, less the repeal of the Humphrey-Kennedy Amendment which would be impossible. We should + do all that we can with the Argentine military to restore relations + between our two armed services. At the moment we are driving them to the + Soviets. The Soviets are our greatest global problem and we are simply + letting small things interfere with our dealing with this problem.

+

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to non-proliferation.]

+
+ +
+ + 469. Telegram From the Embassy in Argentina to the Department of + StateSource: National + Archives, RG 383, Records of the + Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Office of the Director, Lot + 81D155, Box 9, Treaty of Tlateloloco—1979–1980. Secret; Immediate; + Nodis. + Buenos Aires, August 18, 1980, 1732Z +

6609. Subject: (S) Possible Argentine Ratification of Tlatelolco.

+

1. S—Entire text.

+

2. During an informal conversation with a member of President Videla’s staff, I asked about recent + Argentine press reports that the GOA is + studying the ratification of Tlatelolco. The official said that the + study was in fact completed and was now in the Presidency. We discussed + at some length the specifics of the bureaucratic process the study had + run through. With some apparent hesitation at his indiscretion, the + official ventured the assessment that Videla would decide to proceed with the ratification. + Ratification could not, of course, take place if perceived by the + Argentine public as occurring in response to US pressure. For this reason, the step had not been + seriously considered while Argentina was still negotiating the + reactor/heavy water plant purchases with the FRG and GOS. One of the suggestions as to what a possible + high-level Argentine emissary to Washington might do had been to let him + carry the news of an affirmative decision.

+

3. Comment: The source was not clear about the timing of the decision and + its announcement. Presumably, if taken at all, President Videla would wish to do this before + leaving office. (It is also interesting to note that the study is ready + for decision just before President Videla’s visit to Brazil.) The discussion also left + unclear what pressures opponents of an affirmative decision might still + bring to bear in these final stages of the review process, which falls + into the period in which the three armed forces must make a final + determination of the next President. A number of variables evidently + will go into this final decision, among them (to an unknown degree) the + evolution of US-Argentine relations over + the next six months, both tone and substance. As to the existance of the + study, I have no doubt. This is the second time the study has been + mentioned in confidence by a high Argentine official, several months + apart and under different circumstances. I see no reason to question + their veracity at this juncture.

+ + Ruser + +
+ +
+ + 470. Memorandum from the President’s Assistant for National Security + Affairs (Brzezinski) to President + CarterSource: Carter Library, National + Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Pastor Country File, Box 1, + Argentina, 6–11/80. Confidential. Sent for action. Carter initialed the upper right + corner of the memorandum. + Washington, September 10, 1980 + + SUBJECT + Nuclear Export to Argentina (C) + +

The attached memorandum (Tab A)Attached but + not printed is an undated memorandum from the NSC Ad Hoc Group on Non-Proliferation + to Carter outlining the + options, which was attached to a September 4 cover memorandum from + Tarnoff to Brzezinski. requests your + decision on the conditions under which the Executive Branch should + recommend that the NRC approve an + export license for a major component for the Atucha II reactor in + Argentina. The US company may lose the + contract by default unless we inform Argentina that we are prepared to + make a favorable recommendation within the next week or so. (C)

+

The decision is being put to you because agencies are divided on the + conditions under which we should recommend NRC approval of this export. State, DoE, Commerce and + DoD believe that we should settle + for the minimum requirements of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act for + components of this kind: i.e., (1) IAEA safeguards on the export itself, (2) a no-explosive + use pledge, and (3) a US veto on any + retransfer. ACDA believes that we + should in this case go beyond the minimum legal requirements and insist + upon Argentine progress toward ratification of the Treaty of Tlatelolco + and/or toward NPT-type full-scope + safeguards. (C)

+

The ACDA recommendation would be + consistent with our past position on exports to Argentina. Atucha II was + part of the Swiss/German deal last year whose safeguard conditions were + of great concern to us. In that case, we made strenuous but unsuccessful + efforts to maintain a common supplier front insisting upon NPT-type safeguards, which are not + required by US law. All agencies are + agreed that we should insist upon this level of safeguards, even though + not required by law, for a complete reactor or a component such as a + pressure vessel. Thus ACDA argues that + our general policy goes beyond the minimum legal requirements, that this + is entirely appropriate for Argentina, and that we should stick with it. + (C)

+

The majority opinion is based on the view that this component does not + constitute sufficient leverage to move the Argentines on safeguards, and that the net + impact of refusal on our non-proliferation objectives would be negative. + (C)

+

On balance, I support the majority position favoring approval of the + sale. It is a very close call, however, and should the NRC refuse to go along, you would have to + send the case to Congress. You do not need another Tarapur. State is + fairly optimistic on the NRC, and our + own checks suggest that the Commissioners will not object provided that the three legal requirements are + met squarely and unambiguously. But there are serious reservations in + NRC about adequacy of formulations + on these points negotiated with Argentina in the past and State has + suggested that “indirect” assurances may be all the Argentine traffic + will bear. If you approve the sale, I would suggest that your approval + be subject to the negotiation of clear and unambiguous Argentine + assurances, and that the bureaucracy be admonished that similar future + exports should be subject to political review at the Departmental level. + (C)

+

RECOMMENDATION:

+

Option 1 That we recommend NRC approval + of the export, subject to the assurances required by Section 109(b) and + other applicable provisions of the Atomic Energy Act. (Recommended by + State, Commerce, Energy and Defense.) (C)Carter checked the + “Approve” option.

+

NSC concurs but believes that approval + should be conditioned upon the receipt of direct + and unambiguous Argentine assurances. (C)Carter checked the “Approve” option and wrote “J” in + the right-hand margin.

+

Option 2: That we defer action on this and similar exports pending some + Argentine progress on ratification of the Treaty of Tlatelolco and/or + progress toward acceptance of NPT-type + full-scope safeguards as outlined above. (Recommended by ACDA.) (C)

+
+ +
+ +
+ + The United Nations Special Session on Disarmament + +
+ 471. Telegram From the Department of State to All North Atlantic + Treaty Organization CapitalsSource: National Archives, RG 59, + Central Foreign Policy File, D770042–0647. Confidential. Sent also + to USUN, USNATO, Canberra, Vienna, Madrid, + Stockholm, Tehran, Tokyo, Kuala Lumpur, Manila, Cairo, Monrovia, + Rabat, Kinshasa, Buenos Aires, Nassau, Brasilia, Bogota, Caracas, + New Delhi, Colombo, and Belgrade. Sent for information to Dacca, the + Interests Section in Baghdad, Kathmandu, Algiers, Cotonou, + Bujumbura, Tripoli, Port Louis, Lagos, Khartoum, Tunis, Lusaka, + Sofia, Berlin, Budapest, Warsaw, Bucharest, Moscow, Prague, + Georgetown, Mexico, Panama, Lima, the Mission to the IAEA, Islamabad, and Addis Ababa, and + the Mission in Geneva. Drafted by David Macuk (IO/UNP); cleared by + Gerald Helman (IO/UNP), William Stearman (ACDA), Bartholomew, Thomas Hirschfeld (S/P), Martin Goldstein (DOD/ISA), Allen + Holmes (EUR/RPM), Wesley Kriebel (IO/ML), Jon Glassman (EUR/SOV), + Stephanie Perry (NEA/RA), Louise McNutt (EA/RA), John Whiting + (AF/RA), John King (ARA/RRP), Jack, Seymour (EUR/EE), and Robert + Homme (EUR/RPE); and approved by Donald Toussaint (IO). + Washington, February 5, 1977, 2312Z +

26795. Subject: UN Special Session on + Disarmament.

+

1. Begin summary: The 31st United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) adopted a resolution calling for a + Special Session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament (SSOD) to be held in 1978;“General Assembly 31/189: General and Complete + Disarmament,” December 21, 1976, in Documents on + Disarmament, 1976, pp. 945–952. + SSOD Preparatory Conferences + (PrepCons) are scheduled for March, May and September, 1977. We have + concluded that US interests would best + be served tactically by adopting a positive posture towards the SSOD and plan to participate + constructively in the SSOD + PrepCons.

+

2. This message (A) provides background information on the SSOD and (B) solicits reporting from + addressees in order to identify those issues which we might want to + examine more closely prior to and during the upcoming SSOD Preparatory Conferences.

+

3. We believe that action addressees (except India, Sri Lanka, and + Yugoslavia, see para 11 B and C), + which include the NATO allies, are + likely to share many of our interests. We would anticipate a greater + divergence of views on disarmament issues between US and most info addressees. At the + discretion of each Embassy, action addressees may take soundings of host + governments on their views regarding the SSOD PrepCons and the SSOD itself. While no approach to host governments should + be made at this time by info addressees, the Department would appreciate post’s analysis + of host country outlook on SSOD and + possible means of dealing with it. End summary.

+

4. Background: Dissatisfaction with the slow progress on multilateral + disarmament issues among many of the states not aligned with the US or the Soviets has resulted in pressures + for giving greater momentum to disarmament through a meeting in which + all states could participate. In August, 1976, the Conference of Heads + of States of Governments of Non-Aligned Countries, held in Colombo, + discussed the issue in its political declaration and adopted a + resolution calling on the UN to convene + a Special Session of the GA to review the problem of disarmament and to + promote a program of priorities and measures in the disarmament + field.“Resolution of the Fifth + Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries: + Disarmament, August 19, 1976,” is ibid., pp. 566–567.

+

5. On December 14, 1976,The date in the + telegram is in error; the Resolution is actually dated December + 21. the 31st UNGA adopted + by consensus a resolution calling for a Special Session of the General + Assembly devoted to disarmament to be held in New York in May–June, + 1978. The resolution established a Preparatory Committee (PrepCom) with the mandate of examining + all relevant questions relating to the Special Session. The PrepCom is scheduled to meet at UN Headquarters, New York, March 7–11, May + 9–20, and September 6–9, 1977. March conference will be organizational + in nature and deal with procedural issues; May conference will develop + the SSOD agenda; the September + preparatory conference will prepare the draft of SSOD resolution for presentation to the + 32nd General Assembly.

+

6. Member states have been asked to submit country views on the SSOD to SYG + Waldheim by April 15, 1977.

+

7. Members of the PrepCom are:

+

—Western European and others: US, UK, France, Australia, Austria, Belgium, + Canada, FRG, Italy, Norway, Spain, + Sweden, Turkey;

+

—Asian: Bangladesh, Cyprus, India, Iran, Iraq, Japan, Malaysia, Nepal, + Pakistan, Philippines, Sri Lanka;

+

—African: Algeria, Benin, Burundi, Egypt, Ethiopia, Liberia, Libya, + Mauritius, Morocco, Nigeria, Sudan, Tunisia, Zaire, Zambia;

+

—East European: (proposed) Bulgaria, GDR, Hungary, Poland, Romania, USSR, Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia;

+

—Latin: Argentina, Bahamas, Brazil, Colombia, Cuba, Guyana, Mexico, + Panama, Peru, Venezuela.

+

8. US attitude: In the past we have + opposed proposals for an SSOD. We were + skeptical that an SSOD could have any + meaningful results, arguing that it would invite rhetorical posturing + and unrealistic disarmament proposals, intrude on the activities of the + CCD, and inject extraneous complications into negotiations + such as MBFR and SALT. While these potential disadvantages + have not disappeared, the situation changed tactically with the decision + of the Non-Aligned Heads of State at Colombo to bring about an SSOD. The large bloc of votes which the + Non-Aligned commands at the UN made an + SSOD unstoppable. Faced with this + situation, we concluded that US + interests would best be served tactically by adopting a positive posture + towards the SSOD. At a minimum this + would allow us, in cooperation with allies and others who may share our + views on specific issues, more effectively to employ tactics—in the + Preparatory Committee and subsequently in the SSOD, designed to avoid confrontation and allow us to + influence the course of procedural and substantive preparations to our + advantage. Moreover, a positive approach would allow us, together with + our allies, to pursue and shape specific initiatives which might develop + that appeared likely to further our arms control or other + objectives.

+

9. Our Delegation to the 31st UNGA was + therefore instructed to join in the consensus approval of a resolution + calling for the convening of an SSOD + and to explain that the US plans to + participate constructively in the careful preparation which will be + needed to bring about a successful SSOD.Telegram 292475 to USUN, December 1, 1976, included the + authorization to join the consensus adoption on a vote for a SSOD resolution. The Department of + State also instructed the UN + Delegation to make a statement that noted that “unrealistic public + expectations can be stimulated by the promises often associated with + large conferences and are just as frequently disappointed. Public + understanding and public support of arms control measures are too + important to risk this.” The U.S. therefore “approaches the proposal + for a Special Session on Disarmament with both caution and hope. We + are cautious because of the size of the conference and the fact that + its objectives remain vague and unspecified. We are hopeful, + however, because of the strong interest on the part of many UN members for such a conference and + the seriousness of purpose which accompany the sentiments expressed + regarding the necessity of its success.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + D760444–0885)

+

10. General instructions: A. Action addressees should plan on making + informal soundings based on the guidance provided in para 12 sufficiently before Feb. 14 to + allow reporting to the Department by that date. We are interested in + your assessment of how the host government views on those issues likely + to arise during the PrepCons. Our most immediate concern involves the + March 7–11 PrepCon which will deal with organizational matters. + Reporting should include the names of heads of Delegations likely to be + attending PrepCon. Except where deemed necessary by posts, or when + instructed otherwise, precedence of reporting need not exceed priority + level. Where report is of considerable length, post may want to pouch + document to Department with summary of report sent by cable.

+ +

B. Info addressees should at this time make no approach to host + governments on the SSOD. We would + appreciate, however, posts’ analysis of host country attitude toward + SSOD (see A above) and possible + means of dealing with it.

+

11. Special instructions:

+

A. For US Mission NATO: We seek full and close + consultations on SSOD activities with + our NATO allies and selected countries + which have been extensively engaged in our arms control efforts in the + past. Such consultations should help in avoiding unnecessary + confrontation and should permit the US, + our allies, and their friends to influence the course of procedural and + substantive preparations to our mutual advantage. While such + consultations could take place on a bilateral ad hoc basis, we believe + that a multilateral meeting of NATO + representatives would also be useful in coming to a basic understanding + of national positions and the development of a common strategy and + tactics. Toward this end, US mission + NATO should address question of + SSOD at the next PolAds meeting, + drawing as appropriate on information in paras 4 through 9 and on + guidance in para 12, noting that we + will also be discussing SSOD + bilaterally with PrepCon members, but that we believe subject is of + importance to allies, and urging that discussions be developed in future + PolAds meetings to consider the + upcoming SSOD PrepCons and the April + 15 country views submission. Mission should note that the most immediate + question concerns the March 7–11 SSOD + PrepCon, which will deal with organizational matters such as + chairmanship, voting, rules of procedure, financial questions, formation + of subcommittees, and the role of observers. Mission should seek + agreement on early date for PolAds + discussions on SSOD. We would also + appreciate US + NATO views on holding a special + meeting of disarmament experts very early in April to exchange views on + the national submissions to the UN + SYG on the SSOD which are due on April 15. We would not envision such + a meeting as replacing the regular meeting of disarmament experts + scheduled for April 21–22.

+

B. For Belgrade: Begin FYI: We believe + GOY has played and will continue to play an important role in + development of SSOD. We have an + interest in working closely with the Yugoslavs in view of both this fact + and in view of its leading role among Non-Aligned. Since GOY may not + share US interests to same degree as + other action addressees, however, we wish to avoid committing USG to special consultative relationship + with GOY on SSOD. End FYI. With this in mind, Embassy should + approach Krivokapic, referring, to his own request for early US-Yugoslav bilateral talks preparatory to + SSOD (see Belgrade 405),Telegram 405 from Belgrade, January 21 is in + National Archives, RG 59, Central + Foreign Policy File, D770024–0230. expressing our interest in working constructively + and positively in the SSOD process. + You may draw on guidance in para 12, + adding that we wish to work step-by-step so that each phase can be + successful. You may note in this regard that we welcomed Yugoslav + efforts at the last UNGA to produce a + balanced SSOD resolution which we were + able to support.

+

C. For New Delhi, Colombo: In addition to Yugoslavia, we consider that + the helpful efforts of other key Non-Aligned countries are necessary to + allow the SSOD process to develop in a + manner which will best serve US + interests. Embassy should therefore approach host government to state + US recognizes and appreciates + efforts made by Non-Aligned at 31st UNGA to introduce moderate SSOD resolution which could receive support of the US. Drawing on guidance para 12, you should express US interest in continuing to work + constructively and positively in SSOD + process, adding that we wish to work step-by-step so that each phase can + be successful. FYI. However, since host + government may not share US interests to + same degree as other action addressees, Embassy should avoid committing + US to special consultative + relationship with host government. End FYI.

+

12. General guidance for action addressees: During informal consultations + with host governments on SSOD, posts + may draw on the following points as appropriate, modifying them to suit + the specific circumstances:

+

—We supported a consensus resolution last fall calling for a Special + Session of the General Assembly to discuss disarmament in the hope that, + with adequate preparation, it could make a realistic and constructive + contribution to the broader objectives of arms control and + disarmament.

+

—First conference of the recently constituted Preparatory Committee takes + place March 7–11. That meeting will consider organizational and + procedural questions germane to that committee and the Special + Session.

+

—Preparatory conferences will meet on at least two other occasions this + year, May 9–20 and September 6–9, during which time the Committee will + develop the SSOD agenda and draft a + resolution for presentation to the 32nd General Assembly.

+

—It is also expected that the Committee will determine the types of + action to be taken by the SSOD i.e., + general declarations, specific agreements, planned studies, expert + commissions, etc.

+

—(Particularly because your government is a member of the Preparatory + Committee.) The US, at this time, would + welcome your views on questions of an organizational, or procedural + nature, and any other issues regarding an SSOD that are of concern to your government.

+

—We look forward to working with the government of ( ) (during the + various meetings of the Preparatory Committee and) prior to and during + the Special Session to achieve the most positive result possible.

+ + Vance + +
+ +
+ + 472. Memorandum from the Deputy Secretary of State (Christopher) to President CarterSource: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, + Brzezinski Material, VIP + Visit File, Box 14, United Nations, Secretary General Waldheim, 2/25–26/77: Cables and + Memos. Confidential. + Washington, February 21, 1977 + + SUBJECT + Official Visit by United Nations Secretary General Kurt Waldheim + +

I. OVERVIEW

+

A. Issues Waldheim May Raise

+

1. Overall Relations

+

Waldheim will seek an expression + of your support of his efforts generally. He will expect you to + characterize the policy of your Administration towards the United + Nations.

+

[Omitted here is information unrelated to the Special Session on + Disarmament.]

+

7. Special Session on + Disarmament (SSOD)

+

The General Assembly last November decided to hold a Special Session in + 1978 on disarmament to give new political impetus to negotiations + generally, to assert the interest of the UN in the field and to develop a program for future + multilateral efforts. Three preparatory conferences are to be held + during 1977 beginning in late March.

+

We have adopted an open-minded attitude toward the proposal, indicating + our willingness to participate actively and with constructive ideas. We + recognize that the Special Session, as a prominent and highly political + forum, presents some risks of confrontation, polemics, and + recommendations that we might not be able to accept. At the same time, + however, we see some potential for useful action at the session in such + areas as nonproliferation and conventional arms limitation and perhaps + on a comprehensive test ban.

+

The Secretary General’s role in the preparation is largely formal and + administrative, although the Secretariat is expected to be charged with + preparing background reports and the Secretary General is certain to + submit his own views in a special report to the session when it + convenes.

+ +

Talking Points (If Raised)

+

—The United States is taking an open-minded attitude toward the Special + Session on Disarmament and will participate actively in the process.

+

—We see a potential for a constructive outcome from the session if all + approach it in a spirit of cooperation and with a commitment to work + toward realistic and generally acceptable results.Carter and + Waldheim met on February + 27 but the Secretary General did not raise the SSOD issue. The memoranda of + conversation is scheduled to be printed in Foreign + Relations, 1977–1980, vol. XXV, United Nations; Global + Issues.

+

[Omitted here is information unrelated to the Special Session on + Disarmament.]

+
+ +
+ 473. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the North + Atlantic Treaty OrganizationSource: National Archives, RG 59, + Central Foreign Policy File, D770105–0133. Confidential; Immediate. + Sent for information Immediate to the Mission in Geneva. Sent for + information to London, Paris, Bonn, and USUN. Drafted by Michael Congdon (ACDA/IR); cleared by William + Stearman (ACDA/IR), Thomas + Hirschfeld (S/P), Gerald Helman + (IO/UNP), and Bartholomew; + and approved by John Hawes (EUR/RPM). + Washington, March 26, 1977, 1925Z +

67750. Hold for opening of business. Subject: PolAds’ Discussion of + UN Special Session on Disarmament + (SSOD). Ref: A) USNATO 1359;Telegram 1359 from USNATO, March 10, reported that neither the UK disarmament expert nor the French + disarmament expert would be able to attend the March 28 Political + Advisors meeting on SSOD. The + Mission therefore recommended that the “most effective way to elicit + and exchange of allied views on response to UN + SYG on SSOD would be to circulate to PolAds a paper setting forth US views on this issue.” (National + Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign + Policy File, [no film number]) B) London 4760.Telegram 4760 from London, March 22, reported that + a member of the UK Foreign and + Commonwealth Office told the United States that it was “likely that + May [SSOD] PrepCom will be less substantive + than heretofore anticipated in view of the fact that many nations + will not have prepared their reports.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + D770098–0966)

+

1. Final draft of US report on its views + to UNSYG on SSOD has not yet been completed. Mission should therefore + draw on this message in its discussions at March 28 PolAds’ meeting.

+ +

2. USG has adopted positive approach to + SSOD. Most recently, President + Carter’s UN speechThe + text of Carter’s Address to + the United Nations General Assembly, March 17, is in Public Papers: Carter, 1977, pp. 133–135. indicated + that we would make a strong and positive contribution to the SSOD. In such a forum it may be possible + to reach agreement on certain broad principles of arms control and + disarmament negotiations agreements, and to identify priorities by + drawing attention to areas ripe for early attention; Session should also + have responsibility to assess capacity of current institutions to handle + tasks on the international arms control and disarmament agenda. This is + not to say, however, that it should have mandate to prescribe new, or + abolish old, institutions without agreement of principal participants in + arms control process.

+

3. US + Rep should also indicate USG willingness to consider substantive + discussions on specific arms control issues by SSOD or its committees. This does not repeat not mean + USG foresees negotiating role for + Special Session or its committees in concluding specific arms control + measures. It does mean USG is open to + possibility that Session might encourage broad agreement on specific + measures in light of atmosphere which develops during preparatory phases + and during Session itself. US + Rep should state that we are not in a + position to identify what those issues may be at this point in the + process.

+

4. US Reps should indicate that we + recognize the whole gamut of traditional arms control topics will + probably be raised at the Session. We shall want to emphasize that the + first requirement for meaningful arms control agreements involving the + major powers is the active support of those powers. We wish to avoid the + danger that sensitive negotiations could be adversely affected by + contentious political debate in the SSOD, or that alliance interests could be damaged in larger + forum.

+

5. US + Rep should also indicate we would like + to see final acts or documents receive widest possible agreement. USG therefore sees some value in working + with responsible members of Non-Aligned Movement, e.g. Yugoslavia, + during preparatory phases and at Session to bring about such agreement. + Yugoslav approach may, however, be somewhat too specific and we believe + greater level of generality may prompt wider adherence.

+

6. Final documents may include:

+

A) Overview of where we stand in disarmament process (what Yugoslavs have + called “taking note of results achieved so far, drawing up balance + sheet,) including review of progress and problems over past decade. + Yugoslavia’s original position was that, “this appraisal should be + devoid of extreme demands and superfluous verbal criticism of leading military powers for + past failures.” One criterion of the value of such final document, we + believe, should be its adherence to this caveat.

+

B) Priorities, drawing attention to areas ripe for early attention. We do + not repeat not envisage here a comprehensive negotiating program, + complete with timetable, of the sort more radical members of the + NonAligned might favor. Rather, we believe it may be possible to reach + agreement on identifying the most outstanding issues.

+

C) General principles to govern arms control negotiations and agreements. + Depending on climate of meeting, statement of principles could be so + highly general as to be meaningless, or so specific and directed at + certain countries as to be damaging. We would prefer a middle ground + which concentrated on principles of existing and possible future + agreements and on gaining wide adherence. We would judge specific + formulations on their individual merits.

+

D) The capacity of current institutions to promote progress on arms + control and disarmament as a means of bringing about greater national + and international security and peace. We believe question of possible + revision of CCD and UN structure on disarmament questions will + certainly come up at Special Session, and we wish to contribute + responsibly to the debate. We believe the CCD to be a good multilateral forum for pursuing our + interests. Any proposed changes to the CCD would be viewed from this perspective, and thorough + justifications for change would be needed to gain our agreement.

+

7. In general we believe Special Session should avoid problems of UN First CommitteeThe UN First + Committee, or the Disarmament and International Security Committee, + deals with disarmament and other security-related questions. + by adopting broad framework for consideration of specific proposals and + avoiding consideration of national shopping lists of pet projects. It + will also be important to avoid being bound by traditional patterns of + First Committee work, such as adoption of mass of discrete and often + unrealistic resolutions. In our view success of Session will depend in + large measure on determination of all partici-pants to forgo the kinds + of polemical exchanges and confrontations which have so often + characterized disarmament debates in the UN First Committee.

+

8. If it does so, Special Session can provide significant opportunity for + fundamental reexamination of disarmament problem in its full scope. + Session can focus on basic questions such as extent to which arms + control and disarmament measures can help make the international system + safer for all nations, large and small; role of UN in promoting greater understanding of all aspects of + disarmament problem; and, finally, what positive action each nation, as + well as UN as an organization of nations, can take to begin + difficult movement toward national and international security at lower + levels of armaments.

+

9. We will have further thoughts on the SSOD agenda which we will convey to NATO as they are developed. For working + purposes, agenda items could parallel one or more of the possible final + documents described para 6 above. We + plan to distribute US response to SYG to NATO prior to submission.

+

10. Finally, you should emphasize to PolAds importance we attach to continued detailed + consultations on SSOD as national + planning evolves. Issues at stake in SSOD are so closely related to fundamental concerns of + NATO that they must be dealt with + on the basis of the highest standards of NATO consultation.

+ + Christopher + +
+ +
+ 474. Telegram From the Mission to the North Atlantic Treaty + Organization to the Department of State and the Mission to the United + NationsSource: National + Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign + Policy File, [no film number]. Confidential. Sent for information to + all NATO capitals, Belgrade, the + Mission in Geneva, and Moscow. + Brussels, April 22, 1977, 1843Z +

2348. Subject: NATO Disarmament Experts + Discussion of UNSSOD.

+

1. Summary: At the April 20–21 meeting of the NATO disarmament experts, discussion of the UN Special Session on Disarmament focused + on the need for intensified allied consultations in preparation for the + 1978 meeting; replies to the UNSYG; + the probable role of the Soviets at the meeting; the need for dialogue + with the Non-Aligned; and the upcoming meeting of the Preparatory + Committee. Consensus of the experts favored a special PolAd meeting to be held in late May to + discuss further the Non-Aligned position paperNot found. and a Canadian suggestion that a + PrepCon subcommittee be established to begin drafting the final + conference document. End summary.

+ +

2. Of the eleven nations represented, seven (Norway, UK, US,Earlier in the day, the + Carter administration + said that the “Special Session offers an opportunity to come to + grips, in a concentrated manner, with some of the fundamental + problems in the disarmament field.” Nonetheless, the session “will + need to do more than seek agreement on abstract priorities + determined without reference to their achievability, on general + principles for disarmament that may or may not contribute to the + solution of specific problems, or on a rigid programme and schedule + of action seeking to determine a long-range process inevitably + dependent on a multitude of factors subject to unforeseeable change. + Such efforts, if not kept in perspective, could result in obscuring + the Session’s paramount purposes and divert its attention from more + urgent problems.” The United States also cautioned that the Session + “must be regarded as one step in a very long and arduous process. + That process is nothing less than improving the security of all + nations and their peoples and building a world order in which human + energies and talents are devoted more fully to meeting the basic + needs of all humanity.” (Telegram 90685 to USNATO, April 22; National + Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign + Policy File, D770139–0860) Canada, France, the Netherlands + and Italy) stated that they have drafted but not yet submitted their + replies to the UNSYG. Both Denmark + and Turkey have already done so. In light of their plans to circulate + their draft replies to the other Delegations, experts did not give + detailed summaries of their positions.

+

3. The FRG (Ruth) emphasized the + necessity for Western consultations with the Non-Aligned states leading + up to the SSOD. He cited recent + discussion in Bonn with the Yugoslav Representatives to the NACC and the + seriousness with which the Non-Aligned are approaching disarmament + issues. According to the FRG, these + states view the 1978 meeting as the first in a series to be held under + UN auspices. The German position was + widely supported: Belgium and the UK + stressed the need for such consultations with Non-Aligned leaders, + notably Yugoslavia. Denmark (Schoen) viewed the SSOD as an opportunity for the West to + improve its image in the developing world and urged that it adopt an + active stance at the conference.

+

4. Belgium (Onkelinx) and Denmark expressed similar expectations + regarding the Soviet role at the SSOD + noting that the USSR appeared to have + lost interest in the conference. Several Delegations noted that lack of + support for a World Conference on Disarmament (WDC) accounted for Soviet aloofness. Canada suggested that + willingness to consider follow-on SSOD’s could further deflate Soviet WDC efforts. However, the UK (Edmonds) questioned Soviet motives, citing Soviet + demarchés to Italy and the FRG as well + as the UK for bilateral consultations + with the USSR on SSOD issues. France (Mistral) warned + against complaency regarding Soviet inactivity, and foresaw a renewed + campaign to link SSOD with WDC.

+

5. Turkey (Ulucevik) noted that the most recent version of the + Non-Aligned paper was identical to the earlier draftNot found. with the addition of references + to a WDC. France (Mistral) categorized + the text as an exhaustive + catalogue of disarmament procedures and warned that if the SSOD were to base its work on this + document, the conference would be unable to reach conclusions. The + US (Sloss) shared this opinion, but saw some encouraging + signs of pragmatism, resulting probably from Yugoslav influence. The + Netherlands (Bruyns) cited a covering memoNot found. which indicated that the draft was intended to + assist the Non-Aligned in preparing their replies to the UNSYG and not to limit their scope. The + FRG (Ruth), referring to its recent + consultations with the Yugoslavs, viewed the Non-Aligned as open to + consultation with the West, but Belgium (Onkelinx) warned that the + Non-Aligned might be more receptive to Soviet initiatives than Western + ones and that an alliance between the East and the Non-Aligned might + easily arise at the SSOD.

+

6. The UK (Edmonds) said first PrepCon + had gone as well as could be expected and noted that handling of + disarmament issues at Fall UNGA would + have considerable impact on the SSOD, + perhaps distracting interest from PrepComs.

+

7. Canada (Hammond) said his government believed SSOD’s success or failure would depend + heavily on content of final document of the session, and degree of + consensus it had gained. For this reason Canada was proposing in its + reply to SYG the establishment of a + drafting subcommittee at the May meeting to begin work immediately on + the final document. France (Mistral) questioned whether the PrepCon’s + mandate included such activities and other Delegations (US, UK) + pointed out disadvantages of drafting too early, as this might lead to + debate over language rather than content and interfere with national + re-examinations of arms control issues in preparation for the SSOD. A UK proposal that allies begin work on a Western preliminary + draft for use at an appropriate future time, perhaps the 3rd PrepCon, + found wide support. Delegations also agreed that the scope of the final + document, which all recognized as inevitable, be neither too general nor + too specific and that Western collaborative effort would be necessary to + ensure the production of a suitable text.

+

8. The FRG (Ruth) stressed the need for + the intensification of allied consultations in preparation for the + SSOD. A UK suggestion for further discussion of the Non-Aligned + paper (para 5) and of Canadian + proposal for a drafting subcommittee (para 6) was widely supported. The Netherlands indicated + that such discussion might appropriately be held first in the PolAds. The chair (Pabsch) stated that + he would pass on in his report to the NAC the consensus of the meeting calling for a special + meeting of the PolAds in the second + half of May devoted to these issues.

+ + Perez + +
+ +
+ + 475. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the + United NationsSource: + National Archives, RG 59, Central + Foreign Policy File, D770160–0899. Limited Official Use; Immediate. + Sent for information to USNATO + and the Mission in Geneva. Drafted by David Thompson (ACDA/MA/IR) + and David Macuk (IO/UNP); cleared by Flowerree, Lyall Breckon (PM/DCA), Gerald Helman + (IO/UNP), Martin Goldstein (DOD/ISA), and Thomas Hirschfeld (S/P); and approved by Charles Maynes + (IO). + Washington, May 7, 1977, 0101Z +

104340. Subject: Second Meeting of PrepCom of UN Special + Session on Disarmament: Guidance for US + Delegation.

+

1. Begin summary: This message provides guidance on key issues expected + to arise at the second meeting of the Preparatory Committee for the + Special UNGA on Disarmament. It + supplements the position paper prepared for the first meetingNot found. as well as the general statement + of US views contained in our response to + the SYG’s request for views (State + 90685).See footnote 3, Document 474. Specific guidance is set + out below on (A) the agenda of the Special Session, (B) role of the + Secretariat, (C) non-governmental organizations, and (D) scheduling of + further PrepCom work and + intersessional working arrangements (May through August). Additional + guidance will be provided as needed. End summary.

+

2. Guidance for second meeting of PrepCom of UN Special + Session on Disarmament:

+

I. Introduction:

+

The first meeting of the PrepCom was + concerned largely with the election of a Chairman and Bureau, + participation, rules of procedure, and the role of the Secretariat and + other questions regarding support. We expect the second PrepCom meeting to devote its + attention to:

+

A. Development of the agenda of the Special Session,

+

B. Role of the Secretariat,

+

C. Role of non-governmental organizations (NGOS),

+

D. Scheduling of further PrepCom + work and intersessional working arrangements (May through August), + and

+

E. Creation of subcommittees or working groups.

+

This paper provides general guidance for the US Delegation on these issues. Additional guidance will be + provided as needed, taking into account the Delegation’s reporting and + recommendations.

+

II. A General Approach and Objectives:

+

Our general appoach to the Special Session on Disarmament is that + contained in the US letter of April 22, + 1977, to the Secretary General, and the Delegation should draw on it in its + private and public comments. Our immediate objective at the second + PrepCom meeting is to work for + an agenda which will reflect a realistic set of objectives for the + Session. It should be general in its phrasing, neither anticipating the + negotiation of specific arms control measures nor prejudging the results + of the Special Session.

+

As at the first PrepCom meeting, we + will want to strengthen the cooperative atmosphere that has existed so + far by making it clear that Non-Aligned moderation facilitates our + ability to be forthcoming.

+

III. Consultations and Coordination:

+

We will wish to continue to pursue actively consultations with all major + actors and to strengthen our interest in on-going processes of open + dialogue.

+

The Delegation should maintain especially close relations with our allies + on the PrepCom, as well as with the + Western group in general. Consultative group meetings consisting of + NATO members, Japan, Austria, as + well as the special WEOG working group established during the first + PrepCom should be + continued.

+

Consultations with the Soviets will also be important in view of our + common interests in such areas as SALT + and the CCD; the Delegation should make + clear to the Soviets that we share important interests which could be + adversely affected by the Session and we hope to work together + throughout the preparatory processes to protect such interests. We do + not expect, however, to develop a fully coordinated approach with the + Soviets in light of our different approaches to certain elements of the + Session; e.g., the World Disarmament Conference issue.

+

In consultations with key Non-Aligned, neutral and developing countries, + the Delegation should seek to encourage openness, moderation, + cooperation, and avoidance of block positions and atmosphere of + confrontation. We will seek to give concrete evidence of our willingness + to be flexible and to carefully consider reasonable Non-Aligned + concerns. As at the first Preparatory Committee meeting, the Delegation + should keep in close touch with leading Non-Aligned and neutral + Delegations, including those of Yugoslavia, Sweden, Argentina, Brazil, + Iran, and Egypt, as well as others that may emerge as major players.

+

IV. Issues:

+

(1.) Agenda of the Special Session: We have indicated in our submission + to the SYG that the US will adopt a flexible attitude toward + the agenda. Although we would prefer an agenda that simply sets out an + organizational framework (e.g., general debate, adoption of final + documents), we are prepared to go along with the general trend in favor + of a more thematic agenda along the lines proposed in the Non-Aligned + information paper (USUN 1069Telegram 1069 from USUN, April 8, + reported that the 10-member Non-Aligned steering group had given the + Mission a paper containing a potential agenda for the SSOD or a World Disarmament + Conference. The agenda included four elements: “(A) review and + appraisal of the present international situation in light of the + stagnation in the field of disarmament, the continuing of the arms + race and close interrelationship between disarmament, international + peace and security and economic development; (B) adoption of a + declaration of principles on disarmament; (C) adoption of a program + of action on disarmament; (D) review of the role of the UN in disarmament, of disarmament + mechanisms, including the question of convening a WDC.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + D770124–0635) and 1290).Telegram + 1290 from USUN, April 28, reported + that “recent conversation with other Dels indicate general + expectation that second meeting of Special Session PrepCom will not go much beyond + development of skeletal agenda for the Session along lines proposed + in Non-Aligned ‘information paper’.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + D770150–0251) In seeking to work out a generally acceptable + formulation, the Delegation should attempt to:

+

A. Keep the number of items to a minimum and as broad as possible; each + item (other than general debate) should constitute a framework for a + final document or section of document (if there is only one).

+

B. Avoid inclusion of specific arms control topics as agenda items.

+

C. Avoid tendentious, prejudicial, or judgmental language (such as the + reference in the Non-Aligned paper to “stagnation” in disarmament or + possible Soviet efforts to have an item on the “need” for convening a + WDC).

+

D. Avoid language that might create false expectations by appearing to + promise more than is possible; specifically, we believe it would be + inadvisable at this point to commit the Session to adoption of a + “declaration of principles of disarmament.” While it may be possible to + develop some generally acceptable “principles” (or more modest + “guidelines”) we believe this prospect should be kept open for the + present by referring to the basic “declaration” as a declaration on + disarmament or a political declaration.

+

All of these considerations have a bearing on the handling of the + particular and probably contentious question of a World Disarmament + Conference (WDC). The Delegation should + make clear to others that our position on WDC has not changed. We continue to consider the Special + Session a separate and self-contained proposition unrelated to a WDC and we do not believe its status and + significance should be undermined by efforts to make it subordinate to + or a step toward a WDC. The Delegation + should seek to discourage inclusion of a WDC on the agenda. If such inclusion appears inevitable, we + are prepared as a tactical measure to accept mention of the WDC question on the agenda as one of the + institutional and organizational issues to be discussed at the Session, + on a par with the UN First Committee, + the CCD, the UNDC, and the UN + Secretariat. We would not, however, favor isolating WDC as a special topic for + consideration.

+ +

Accordingly, the Delegation should seek to maintain the phrasing used in + the Non-Aligned paper as a suitable compromise—i.e., review of the role + of the UN and of disarmament mechanisms, + including the question of convening a WDC. The Delegation should seek further guidance if + agreement on a formula of this kind cannot be reached.

+

(2) Role of the Secretariat:

+

Mission’s report (USUN 1290) suggests + that there may not be significant pressure for substantive studies by + Secretariat at this stage. We are prepared to consider any proposals + that might be made, but would not favor any studies requiring additional + expenditures.

+

We see no advantage in opposing a request that the Secretariat prepare a + report organizing the views contained in responses to the SYG into general categories or “themes,” + although, in view of the vastly different approaches taken by various + governments, we doubt that any precise categorization will be possible + or that the results will be of great value. A committee request for such + a report should be as specific as possible, making clear that the + document should not attempt to interpret views, assess trends, or draw + conclusions.

+

We have no objection to the preparation of the following support + documents by the Secretariat:

+

—Presentation of disarmament resolutions adopted by the General + Assembly.

+

—A paper on existing principles and proposals for the conduct of + disarmament negotiations.

+

—A description of existing structures and machinery for disarmament + negotiations.

+

—A compilation of presentation in thematic form of responses to the + secretary general’s request for country views on the SSOD . . . provided the costs of such + services fall within currently budgeted Secretariat funds ($90,000).

+

(3) Non-Governmental Organizations: Assuming the statement on NGOs to be prepared by the Chairman and + rapporteur accurately reflects the agreement reached at the March 31 + Bureau Meeting (USUN 1027)Telegram 1027 from USUN, April 6, reported that the members of the SSOD + PrepCom agreed that NGOs should be “welcomed but that they + have no right to ‘participate’.” This reflected the “deep and + general fear” of “NGO ‘agitation’ + or ‘interference’ in Special Session,” as the Soviet bloc was + “adamantly opposed to NGO + involvement” while “many Western Delegations fear domestic + reverberations if ‘their’ NGOs, often affiliated with opposition + political parties, are allowed any status; and many Non-Aligned seem + to have vague fears that NGOs will inject extraneous (or even + relevant) issues embarrassing to them.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + D770119–0388) the Delegation may support it as indicated + (State 82519).In telegram 82519 to USUN, April 13, the Department of + State informed the UN that it found + “no objection to NGO participation + formula” proposed in telegram 1027. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + D770128–0116)

+ +

(4) Scheduling of further PrepCom + work and intersessional working arrangements: we believe it will be + important to maintain a pattern of informal consultations and + discussions during the summer so that Delegations can gain a clearer + understanding of the positions of different governments and identify + areas of likely agreement and possible disagreement to facilitate + greater understanding of the expectations of different governments and + identification of likely areas of accord and disagreement. Since there + appears to be a growing expectation that discussions at the 32nd UNGA will significantly shape the course + of preparations during 1978 as well as the Special Session itself, it is + essential that a groundwork of common understanding be laid before + then.

+

We do not believe that elaborate arrangements need be made for a series + of informal meetings during the summer having a specific mandate (e.g., + to report to the PrepCom in + September). But we would strongly favor action at the May meeting to + make possible periodic informal meetings for exchanges of views on the + proposed agenda items and other issues. The Delegation should work with + others to develop support for such meetings and to take the necessary + administrative steps to make them possible.

+

Should it become obvious that the second Preparatory Committee meeting + will not go beyond the development of a skeletal agenda for the Session + (e.g., along the lines proposed in the Non-Aligned “information” paper), + we would be prepared to consider a 4th, and as yet unscheduled + Preparatory Committee meeting to take place during the spring of 1978 to + allow further consideration of a detailed agenda by the Preparatory + Committee.

+

(5) Creation of subcommittees or working groups: the Delegation should + not object to a decision in principle on the creation of subcommittees + or working groups of the whole corresponding to the major elements of + the agenda and to the anticipated components of the final document. Care + should be taken to avoid creation of a WDC sub-committee or a sub-committee focused on the + so-called disarmament-development link. Further guidance on these issues + will be provided as needed in the light of developments at the PrepCom meeting and the Delegation’s + recommendations. Our major procedural concern with respect to the + establishment of sub-committees or working groups would be to avoid an + excessive amount of simultaneous meetings. We would prefer that + subcommittee meetings be held at different times during the preparatory + phase. If there is a proposal to establish any sub-committee or working + group with a mandate to continue its work on an intersessional basis, + the Delegation should report the details and further guidance will be + provided.

+ + Christopher + +
+ +
+ + 476. Memorandum of ConversationSource: Department of State, Office of the Secretariat + Staff, Cyrus R. Vance, + Secretary of State—1977–1980, Lot 84D241, Box 10, NODIS Memcons, 1977. Secret; Sensitive. + The meeting took place at 10 Downing Street. The memorandum is + scheduled to be printed in full in Foreign Relations, 1977–1980, vol. XXVII, + Western Europe. + London, May 9, + 1977 + + PARTICIPANTS + UK—Foreign Secretary Owen + Deputy Under Secretary Hibbert + Mr. Ferguson, Principal Private Secretary to the Foreign + Secretary + France—Foreign Minister DeGuiringaud + Political Director DeLaboulaye + Mr. Andreani, Director for European Affairs, Foreign + Ministry + FRG—Foreign Minister Genscher + State Secretary Van Well + Mr. Terfloth, Foreign Ministry Press Spokesman + Mr. Weber, Foreign Ministry Interpreter + US—Secretary of State Vance + Assistant to the President Brzezinski + Assistant Secretary Hartman + Mr. Hunter, NSC Staff + Mr. Dobbins (Notetaker) + +

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to the Special Session on + Disarmament.]

+

The UN Special + Session on Disarmament

+

Gencher felt that they should take very seriously and begin to prepare as + soon as possible for the UN Special + Session of Disarmament. There were elements of this meeting which the + West could turn to its advantage. For instance, the West might wish to + call attention to the fact that its ability to contribute to Third World + economic development was limited by the arms burden imposed on it by the + East.

+

Owen suggested that the + preparations for CSCE, which went + forward concurrently in NATO, EEC, and the Council of Europe, offered a + model for preparation for the UN + session. Gencher noted that there were a larger number of countries + involved in the special session than in the CSCE. One must seek to avoid a polarized UNCTAD type situation. This was why + this was an urgent question. Once opinion on these issues became + formulated, it would be very difficult to exert any influence. Close + cooperation with the U.S. was essential, which was why he raised the + matter with the four power forum.

+ +

Owen suggested that the four + Political Directors might look into this matter and report to the + Ministers. Vance thought this a + good suggestion. If, he said, there were issues included which didn’t + seem to fit in other forums, then they should consider dealing with them + among the Four.

+

DeGuiringaud said that he was + quite willing to have the Political Directors discuss the issue, + although he was not sure that they would be able to agree on a common + position. They might have common goals but different approaches. + Owen said that for the + moment, their task would be to look at the procedural questions of how + they might eventually reach substantive agreement. It was agreed that + the Political Directors would do a paper on preparations for the Special + Session on Disarmament for Ministers’ consideration at their next + meeting.

+

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to the Special Session on + Disarmament.]

+
+ +
+ 477. Memorandum of ConversationSource: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P770145–0605. + Confidential. Drafted by Michael Congdon (ACDA/MA/IR). The meeting + took place in the Indonesian Lounge of the United Nations General + Assembly Building. + New York, September + 9, 1977 + + SUBJECT + Preparation of Final Documents for the UN Special Session on Disarmament + + + PARTICIPANTS + United States: + Mr. Lawrence Weiler, ACDA, Coordinator for the UN Special Session on + Disarmament + Mr. John Hirsch, US Mission to the + UN + Mr. Michael Congdon, ACDA/MA/IR + Yugoslavia: + Mr. Dzevad Mujezinovic, + Deputy Permanent Representative of Yugoslavia to the UN + Mr. M. Mihajlovic, Yugoslavia Foreign Ministry + Mr. Miljenko Vukovic, Counselor, Mission of Yugoslavia to UN + + + COPIES TO + See attached sheetAttached but not + printed. + + +

Weiler stated at the outset of the + discussion that the United States wished to be as helpful as it could + over the next several months to ensure that the Special Session is a + success. He observed that the easy part of the preparatory process and + procedural matters is now over and that we now face the much more + difficult problem of preparing the final outcome. He said he believed + all countries needed to do a lot of think-ing, not only about the + prospective documents, but also what we all want to see the SSOD produce in terms of new ideas and + initiatives. Weiler said he + assumed that our two countries were in agreement in wanting the SSOD to be productive, to cause things to + be different, to create an improved climate for arms control and + disarmament discussions, and to give an impetus to disarmament efforts. + Further, he believed one goal should be to ensure that no one group of + countries stands aside in the process. It was his personal opinion that + the session ought to stimulate public support for disarmament efforts + and progress. This, he admitted, would have more effect on some + governments than others; it was certainly true in the case of the United + States. If the result of the conference were to be contentiousness, it + would produce an adverse reaction in the US, while improving public support would be a major + accomplishment toward our arms control and disarmament objectives.

+

He said that he wished to highlight a few points in the non-aligned draft + Declaration on Disarmament;Not + found. not exhaustively, but as indicative of the careful + language necessary in drafting a document of this type in order to + achieve the greatest possible support:

+

—The final documents, in order to gain wide support, should refer to some + progress in disarmament efforts, albeit not enough, for, indeed, some + progress had been made.

+

—They should also acknowledge the fact that there is not just one arms + race, but many, all over the world.

+

—The program of action should avoid rigid time schedules which give an + air of artificiality to what is produced.

+

—The documents should reflect an emphasis on the nuclear side of the + disarmament question, but not to the exclusion of conventional weapons + (not necessarily limited to conventional arms transfers) and the need + for reducing conventional weapons and force levels. For understandable + reasons, attention to problems of conventional arms has almost fallen + away and been forgotten, while force levels produce concerns that, + whether perceived or real, affect other political perceptions.

+

—The problem of non-proliferation should be reflected in these documents. + If the SSOD does not contribute to + efforts to strengthen nonproliferation, and if it, instead, weakens these efforts, thoughts + about general disarmament become academic. Whatever opinion one has of + the NPT, he said, one central objective + of the treaty was to buy time to get on with other arms control + activities. For, whenever there is proliferation, it makes it more + difficult to move forward on arms control and disarmament. This is in + addition to the dangers to international security produced by + proliferation. Thus, the documents must reflect that there cannot be + increased prospects for arms control if there is further nuclear + proliferation.

+

—The documents should make another point about the importance of merely + halting or freezing arms competition, for this is the prerequisite to + reversing arms build-ups and to disarming, which may in many cases be + easier than reaching agreement on where to stop. He said there is a + certain tendency to depreciate any step that does not involve + reductions, which is not reflective of realities.

+

—It is also necessary that the documents avoid code words such as + “dissolution of military blocs.”

+

—We should also seek precision of language in these papers if they are to + gain widespread support, noting that the nonaligned paper, if taken + literally, called for immediate nuclear disarmament.

+

—Halting “nuclear weapons testing,” was a phrasing that, of course, was + not acceptable to the US.

+

—It is hard to tie savings from disarmament automatically and + mechanically to development assistance. The documents should point out + that the savers too will benefit from the redirected resources which + would emerge from disarmament programs since this is a major incentive + for disarmament efforts.

+

—The SSOD, and therefore also the + documents, should stimulate public involvement—more openness, more + information. There is much concern world wide about the unknown in + national security postures, and we are concerned that this is a stimulus + to arms racing.

+

—It is important that new ideas be reflected in the SSOD and, if possible, also in the + documents. While it is too early to promise any specific new ideas out + of the US, we believe the menu must be + enriched by all participants.

+

—Decisions on machinery for disarmament should follow decisions on the + Program of Action. We believe it is essential not to turn a negotiating + body into a voting body (such as the UNGA). This would change the nature of the forum and it + would no longer be a real negotiating body.

+

Weiler reiterated that he was only + speaking personally, and that he was not trying to give an exhaustive + summary of comments on the Nonaligned paper, but only trying to + highlight for the Yugoslav delegation the trend in our thinking and the general nature of our + assessment of the document, and only in a very preliminary way.

+

The Yugoslav delegation thanked Mr. Weiler for his comments and said they were extremely + valuable as an indication of US interest + and of US thinking on the SSOD. Mujezinovic said he would not take the time to answer + the individual points made by Mr. Weiler at this time, but rather, he said, would address + the question of how we might proceed in the drafting exercise. The + Yugoslav Government, he noted, had sought and continued to seek more + governmental points of view as to the eventual shape of the final + documents. Ideally they would like to see the US views set forth, but still, based in part on the + existence of several drafts of the declaration, they felt in a rather + good position from which to proceed. The Soviet/Eastern European papers + (USUN 2711Telegram 2711 from USUN, August 24, is in National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + D770306–0503. and UN + Documents A/AC.187/81 and 82), the Romanian papers (UN Documents A/AC.187/77, 78, and 79), the + paper submitted informally by several Western delegations (USUN 2942),Not found. Australian and Norwegian drafts, and Japanese and + UK comments on earlier papers all + reflected various governmental positions. He said his delegation would + continue to seek grounds for a final document, but cautioned that they, + as was the case with most of the nonaligned, did not have the great + expertise in disarmament matters possessed by the larger powers. He said + the nonaligned would now have to produce a new draft, of the type + produced by others, and try also to arrange the text according to what + would appear to be an acceptable format.

+

Turning to some comments in general on the thrust of Mr. Weiler’s presentation, Mujezinovic said his government wished + the special session to “dramatize” the lack of progress in disarmament + over the past three decades, and to generate both a common policy toward + stimulating negotiations, and also political will to enter serious + negotiations. They sincerely hoped to produce an outcome which would be + acceptable by consensus, but he was doubtful whether this would be + possible, particularly on some contentious issues such as the need for + continuing alliance systems and the question of the peaceful uses of + nuclear energy. He recalled Mr. Weiler’s emphasis on non-proliferation and said that, in + the view of his government, what was needed was a “new system” to + prevent nuclear proliferation, and he saw the SSOD as a necessary first step in this field. His + government felt it was ironic that the very states which were committed + to nonproliferation were accused in fact and by implication of + endangering the nonproliferation regime. Most nonaligned agreed that + nuclear weapons and proliferation were dangerous. What they did not understand was why + the nuclear armed states should accuse them of endangering the regime. + His own country was a member of the NPT. “We are the sole countries obeying nuclear + non-proliferation (sic.),” he said, “and perhaps to our economic + detriment.” He said there was a great resentment at what he called the + “slap in the face” received by the non-aligned at the NPT review conference,The NPT Review + Conference took place May 5–30, 1975. where the nuclear + powers, the real proliferators, in response to calls for further action + on their Article VI obligations,Article VI + of the Non-Proliferation Treaty declared that signatories must + pursue “negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to + cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear + disarmament” and make progress towards a treaty “on general and + complete disarmament under strict and effective international + control.” (Documents on Disarmament, 1968, + pp. 461–465) treated the non-nuclear weapon states as if they + were seeking to undermine the treaty.

+

Changes in emphasis and an understanding of the legitimate rights of the + non-nuclear states to pursue economic development, he said, are + necessary on the part of the nuclear weapons states, and nuclear + nonproliferation cannot be pursued through suppliers’ cartels such as + the London Group.

+

In more general terms he referred to the need for more responsive + disarmament mechanisms, mechanisms flexible enough to embrace the + opinion of the large number of non-militarily powerful states who have a + vital interest in bringing about a safer world. There should be a change + in perception of the interests of these states in disarmament. In this + regard, he said, Mr. Weiler’s + emphasis on conventional arms put the cart before the horse. We must + begin to eliminate the most dangerous weapons first, he said, and in the + context of progress on this front, it might then be possible to move to + progress on conventional arms. Conventional arms restraint and reduction + haven’t gotten off the ground because the most responsible states have + not yet started the process. Once they do other states will join in.

+

In conclusion, each side expressed appreciation for the views of the + other, and they agreed to remain in close touch, particularly at the + time of the UN General Assembly debate + on disarmament and during the subsequent preparatory committee + meetings.

+
+ +
+ + 478. Memorandum From the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament + Agency (Warnke) to Secretary of + State VanceSource: National Archives, RG 383, Records of the Arms Control and + Disarmament Agency, FRC + #383–98–0143, Bureau of Multilateral Affairs, Chemical Weapons, + Disarmament, and CTB Files, + 1970–85, Box 3, UN Special Session + on Disarmament, Working Paper on International Mechanisms for + Disarmament, August 1976–July 1978. Confidential. + Washington, January + 20, 1978 + + SUBJECT + Specific US Initiatives for the + SSOD + +

This memorandum describes five possible specific initiatives that the + United States might propose at the SSOD. These initiatives are intended to take advantage of + the opportunities for significant progress in arms control that the + SSOD offers, and to respond + positively to the concerns of SSOD + participants.

+

Unhappily, possibilities for US + initiatives that could be acceptable within the United States government + do not correspond precisely to the priorities of the developing + countries and the nonaligned, or to favorite themes of the NGOs. Still it seems best to pursue + initiatives that have real rather than apparent content, even if they + are less responsive to the expressed demands of other participants in + the Special Session.

+

We think the problem is not one of overloading the system, but rather + identifying at most two or three specific initiatives that the United + States can present.

+

The memorandum also outlines the course we propose to pursue in + developing positions on other issues that are not likely to be the + subject of specific US initiatives.

+

If, in the course of our work over the next few weeks, we are able to + identify additional promising initiatives, we will send you further + reports on any major possibilities.

+

Possible Specific Initiatives

+

1. Nuclear Non-Use Assurances. We might want to + take an initiative in the area of nuclear non-use assurances to support + our non-proliferation objectives, while maintaining alliance deterrence + capabilities. Specifically, we could revive a formulation that we + proposed to the Soviets in 1968 in the NPT negotiations and that became the basis for our + adherence in 1971 to Protocol IISee footnote 5, Document 402. of the + Treaty of Tlatelolco—non-use against non-nuclear weapon states party to + the NPT (or other binding international + non-proliferation commitments) except those engaged in aggression in association with a nuclear + weapon state. The pledge thus would not apply to Eastern Europe in the + event of a Warsaw Pact attack. Nor would it apply to a North Korean + attack on South Korea inspired or supported by China or the Soviet + Union. It would apply to those states most deserving from the + non-proliferation perspective, i.e., those formally renouncing nuclear + weapons that do not have nuclear power protectors. The initiative would + therefore help create a more balanced non-proliferation regime. The + pledge would take the form of a unilateral US policy statement, and we might also call on other + nuclear powers to undertake corresponding restraints. Our initiative + would, of course, have to be preceded by consultations with NATO and Asian allies. We propose to + develop a specific proposal for inter-agency coordination.

+

2. Cutoff-Transfer. Since 1956, Administrations of + both parties have proposed a cutoff by nuclear weapon states in the + production of fissionable materials for weapons use. Associated with a + cutoff, the US still has on the table a + proposal to transfer agreed amounts of such materials to peaceful + purposes (e.g. 60,000 kgs. of U–235 by the US, provided the Soviet Union transfers 40,000).

+

A US failure to follow up on this + proposal would be hard to explain. This Administration may be able to + seize the opportunity to propose something even more meaningful at the + SSOD. We could, for example, serve + non-proliferation and disarmament objectives, and the interests of the + developing countries, by proposing that a quantity of weapons grade + U–235 be diluted to reactor fuel and transferred to an international + nuclear fuel authority, bank, or other appropriate depository. Such an + initiative could be proposed as part of a cutoff agreement, or + undertaken separately by the US to show + our desire for progress. In the latter instance we might call on the + Soviets for a similar undertaking.

+

I recommend that we take up the matter directly with the President after + State and ACDA have worked out a + specific proposal. If the President thought the proposal had merit, the + next step on the transfer could be a direct request from him to + Harold Brown, George Brown and Jim Schlesinger for a quick appraisal + from their perspectives. They could confirm that an adequate supply is + available for this purpose. Because the cutoff is still technically + US policy, it might not require a + formal interagency review. We probably should inform the Soviets before + formal presentation at the SSOD.

+

3. Prohibition of ASAT Systems. In March, you proposed to the Soviet + leaders that we begin a bilateral negotiation to ban ASAT systems.See Document 3. + The President has approved + (September 23, 1977) the concept of a general ban on ASAT systems as the goal of the proposed + negotiation with the Soviet Union on this subject.See Document 11. + SCC agreement on the details of our + position has not yet been reached, however, so that the negotiation has + not yet been scheduled. We should press for development of a US position so that we can get this + negotiation started. We could then cite this on-going negotiation in the + SSOD as one of the many + initiatives on arms control undertaken by this Administration and could + use the SSOD to build up support.

+

If, however, we have not been able to initiate this negotiation, the + SSOD provides an appropriate forum + to achieve this established objective as a national initiative rather + than as a formal agreement. The President could announce at the SSOD that it was the intention of the + US not to test or deploy + anti-satellite systems designed for physical attack on satellites, as + long as other countries followed the same policy.

+

This simple formulation would not affect our plans to develop electronic + warfare capabilities in this field. Although obviously directed at the + Soviet Union, the formulation basing our intention to ban ASAT on the actions of all countries in this field would somewhat obscure the + bilateral nature of the issue and put additional pressure on the Soviets + to curtail their activities in this area. Since the issue is essentially + one of tactics and politics, we would propose to prepare a joint + State-ACDA memorandum for the + President on this initiative.

+

If we are unable to agree on a position that would permit the start of + bilateral negotiations, and are not prepared to launch this national + initiative at the SSOD, we could + propose that the SSOD consider a + possible international convention on non-interference with satellites. + It could not yield as prompt or as effective control over the threat to + our satellite capability, but it would be, at least, a useful minimum + step. This proposal could be examined on an interagency basis.

+

4. Preference Assistance for Non-Proliferators. + The SSOD will provide an appropriate + forum to present and explain our non-proliferation program. Some + third-world countries have criticized recent US non-proliferation policies and the London Suppliers’ + Group as efforts to deny nuclear technology to developing countries, and + as a “violation” of our obligation under Article IVSee footnote 4, Document + 342. of the NPT to + assist in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Although there is some + non-aligned support for our non-proliferation objectives, this + polarization along North-South lines on nuclear issues is damaging to + US non-proliferation interests. In + order to gain more support from developing countries, and to give developing countries further + incentives to become or remain parties to the NPT, we would propose an announcement, at the SSOD, of substantially enhanced + cooperation for developing countries party to the NPT or to other binding international + non-proliferation commitments. Among the forms of preference we are + examining are:

+

—Some preference in the terms and conditions of Ex-Im Bank financing. We + pledged to undertake such measures during the NPT Review Conference, but have not yet carried out that + pledge;

+

—The transfer of a substantial quantity of material enriched to a maximum + of only 20% for use in research applications. The material, which could + be used instead of weapons grade HEU, + could be obtained from HEU currently + contained in and excess to the needs of our weapons stockpile. This + transfer, which would amount to no more than 1,000 kgs., could be done + in conjunction with the transfer initiative described above, or + independently. In either event it should be coordinated with the + international fuel bank concept being developed in INFCE.

+

—Establishment of a special fund for the fabrication, supply, and + ultimate return of research reactor fuel.

+

These latter two measures, in addition to the other advantages, would + also serve to give countries an incentive to move away from + weapons-usable highly-enriched uranium to low-enriched fuel in their + research reactors.

+

We would plan to prepare a specific proposal for inter-agency + coordination.

+

5. Confidence Building Measures. Regional + stability is central to peace and security throughout the world. + Confidence building and stabilizing arms control measures can dampen the + sense of insecurity that preoccupies countries in many regions, by + reducing the chances of setting off or escalating conflict between + nations.

+

Following the example of the CSCE + confidence building measures (CBMs),Included in Basket One of the Helsinki Final Act is a document on + Confidence-Building Measures and Certain Aspects of Security and + Disarmament. The confidence-building measures were designed to + reduce the “dangers of armed conflict and of misunderstanding or + miscalculation of military activities which could give rise to + apprehension.” The Final Act of the Conference on Security and + Cooperation in Europe, signed on August 1, 1975, at Helsinki, is in + the Department of State Bulletin, September + 1, 1975, pp. 323–350. to which the United States has + subscribed, we could propose in the SSOD that ways to apply CBMs and other stabilizing measures + be explored for areas of regional tension. For example, regional + agreements on pre-notification of military maneuvers, and + preannouncement of movements of major military forces could go a long + way to foster mutual confidence and security about military behavior + that otherwise might be + perceived to be potentially hostile. Moreover, they could provide a + foundation for regional arms control cooperation that could eventually + lead to more significant agreements to limit and reduce forces and to + ease the burden of defense expenditures on national budgets.

+

Neither the UN nor existing regional + organizations now have the technical expertise for a serious effort to + promote stabilizing measures between interested nations. The United + States could propose to strengthen the international machinery for this + purpose, making our own experience available in the process. We would + propose to prepare a coordinated proposal, working initially with PM.

+

In addition to these possible specific initiatives, we are continuing to + work in four other areas in preparation for the SSOD.

+

1. Disarmament-Development Link. It will be hard + to escape addressing Third World interests in assuring that any savings + from “disarmament” will be ascribed to economic and social development + in the Third World. This Administration’s self-restraint initiatives + (B–1)Carter canceled funding for the B–1 bomber, a + supersonic, low-level penetration aircraft, on June 30, 1977. For + more on this decision, see Foreign Relations, 1977–1980, vol. IV, + National Security Policy. and arms control + achievements (SALTThe Carter + administration continued the Nixon and Ford administration’s commitment to the SALT II negotiations with the Soviet + Union, which aimed to replace the SALT I Interim Agreement with a long-term agreement to + limit strategic offensive weapons systems. See Foreign + Relations, 1969–1976, vol. XXXIII, SALT II, 1972–1980. + and CTB prospects) will go some + distance to show seriousness about arms control. Nevertheless, this will + not be adequate for many developing countries, which draw distinctions + between disarmament (which presumably generates significant savings) and + arms control (which, aside from the ABM + Treaty, has not). Aside from continuing support for the Norweigian + initiative (longer term study for the disarmament/development + link),The Norwegian initiative was + actually written by the Nordic countries including Sweden, Finland, + and Norway. Telegram 4486 from USUN, November 10, contains the text of the proposed + resolution, which called for the “curtailment of expenditures on + armaments” which would “facilitate the availability of greater + resources for economic and social development, particularly to the + developing countries.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + D770426–0762) and the need to avoid any automatic linkages, + we have two approaches in mind:

+

1) an attempt to achieve acceptance of the principles of common + obligations (for both developing and developed countries) to preserve + scarce resources otherwise devoted to armaments, and

+

2) to point out that any transfer of savings which might be possible + would be facilitated by some internationally acceptable accounting instrument. For the latter + purpose, UNSYG’s current military + expenditure reporting initiative seems the most hopeful.

+

Possible US approaches range from SSOD endorsement of mutual obligations, + as principles, through increased openness and standardization of + military expenditure reporting, to proposals establishing special + development and security funds. These will be reviewed on an interagency + basis (at NSC staff suggestion), under + ACDA chairmanship, to identify + those that have enough merit for SSOD + consideration.

+

Whatever proposals we can come up with in linking disarmament and + development are likely to be too watery a gruel even for the + undernourished world. I believe, therefore, that we should plan on + making our presentation as a response to LDC initiatives, rather than as a US initiative, although our initial general presentation in + the SSOD should stress our sympathetic + concern about the problem.

+

2. Comprehensive Test Ban and CW Treaty. You are familiar with the issues + involved in presentation of a CTB to + the Special Session. This possibility should be borne in mind, but + cannot presumably be resolved until late winter or early spring, + depending on the progress of the negotiations and the reactions of the + CCD after it convenes at the end of + the month.

+

If a CW Treaty emerges from the CCD in time, the question of how it should + be brought before the Special Session will need to be addressed—but not + yet.

+

3. Conventional Arms Transfers. Restraint is a + major Administration initiative, which we will have to pursue in the + SSOD, both to maintain our + credibility and to sustain our multilateral restraint efforts outside + the UN. Many LDC’s object to restraint as a discriminatory echo of the + NPT and a way of limiting Third + World arms acquisitions while developed countries remain free to produce + arms for their own needs. Our options for meeting this LDC objection without inhibiting our own + defense are very limited. We will acknowledge the Third World concern + that their legitimate defense needs must be met, and we will argue that + restraint serves LDC interests, such as + lowering tensions and promoting development. A realistic SSOD objective would be to seek some + recognition in the conference documents (i.e., Declaration of Principles + and Program of Action) that restraint is desirable.

+

We are working with PM on an intensive + series of bilateral consultations to take place before and during the + SSOD to develop greater interest + in and support for the Administration’s policies. The success of this + effort will presumably be reflected in the SSOD’s final documents, as well as in continuing + negotiations.

+

4. Further Encouragement for Nuclear Weapons Free + Zones. The United States has already approached the French and + the Soviets to encourage adherence to Protocols I and II of the Treaty of Tlatelolco.See Documents 438 + and 446. We would plan to raise + this question with them again before the Special Session begins, urging + them to make an announcement at the Session.

+

We would anticipate that the topic of additional nuclear weapons free + zones will receive considerable attention during the SSOD. We would plan to review the + tactical situation during the PrepComs to determine whether to press for + a more open attitude towards NWFZs, + particularly in Africa.

+

5. Future Arms Control Forums. We are preparing an + options paper on possible changes in the present co-chairmanship + arrangements that will still be consistent with the special position of + the US and the USSR in the forum. We will also be working with State and + within the two upcoming PrepCom + sessions on other proposals for new forums or changes in existing + forums.

+

I look forward to your reactions to these specific initiatives outlined + above, as well as any comments you may have on other activities + described, so we can proceed expeditiously with our program of work.

+
+ +
+ 479. Memorandum From the President’s Deputy Assistant for National + Security Affairs (Aaron) to Vice + President Mondale, Secretary of + State Vance, Secretary of + Defense Brown, and the Director + of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (Warnke)Source: National Archives, RG 383, + Records of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, FRC #383–98–0143, Bureau of + Multilateral Affairs, Chemical Weapons, Disarmament, and CTB Files, 1970–85, Box 3, UN Special Session on Disarmament, + Working Paper on International Mechanisms for Disarmament, August + 1976–July 1978. Confidential. Copies were sent to Gilligan, George Brown, and Turner. + Washington, February 6, 1978 + + SUBJECT + Backstopping Committee for the UN + Special Session on Disarmament (SSOD) + +

As you are aware, the United Nations General Assembly will be meeting in + a Special Session on Disarmament from May 23 to June 28, 1978. Three + meetings of the Preparatory Committee for the SSOD + (PrepCom) have already been held and a fourth is now going + on, through the end of this month. A final PrepCom is scheduled to begin April 10, lasting about two + weeks.

+

The United States has taken a positive approach to the SSOD both in private discussions and in + public. In addressing the United Nations Permanent Representatives on + March 17, 1977,See footnote 4, Document 473. President Carter said, “Working with other + nations represented here, we hope to advance the cause of peace. We will + make a strong and positive contribution at the upcoming Special Session + on Disarmament (of the UN General + Assembly), which I understand will commence next year.”

+

As the Special Session itself approaches, there is a need for the U.S. + Government to develop positions on substantive issues now being debated + in the PrepComs, and to formulate plans for U.S. participation in the + SSOD, including initiatives that + the United States may wish to put forward unilaterally. Therefore, there + should be established under the NSC + Special Coordination Committee an interagency committee to coordinate + the U.S. Government’s activities with respect to the SSOD. You should designate a + representative to this committee with a rank equivalent to and not lower + than that of Deputy Assistant Secretary. The Arms Control and + Disarmament Agency will be the lead agency for SSOD matters, and will chair the Backstopping Committee + which will refer policy issues to the SCC for guidance.

+

I would appreciate your communicating to the Director of the Arms Control + and Disarmament Agency the name of your representative on the SSOD Backstopping Committee at your + earliest convenience. The NSC staff + representative will be Samuel P. + Huntington.

+ + David + Aaron + Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security + Affairs + + +
+ +
+ + 480. Note From President Carter to Secretary of State Vance and the President’s Assistant + for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat Files, Lot + 84D161, Box 1, Miscellaneous. No classification marking. Carter hand-wrote the note. + Brzezinski forwarded the + note under cover of a February 27 memorandum. (Ibid.) + Washington, February 27, 1978 + + Cy & Zbig + +

We need to evolve soon US position re + UN Disarmament Conference. We’re in + danger of being clobbered by all nations for arms sales & by Soviets + on ER weapons.

+ + J.C. + +
+ +
+ 481. Memorandum From Secretary of State Vance and the President’s Assistant for National + Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to + President CarterSource: Carter Library, National + Security Affairs, Staff Material, Brzezinski Office File, Subject Chron File, Box 118, + Special Session on Disarmament: 2–5/78. Secret. + Washington, March + 2, 1978 + + SUBJECT + Special Session on Disarmament + +

In your note of February 27See Document 480. you expressed concern + about (1) our overall position at the UNGA’s Special Session on Disarmament (SSOD) next May/June; and (2) our + vulnerability in the SSOD context on + arms sales and ER weapons issues.

+

We have committed ourselves to a positive and forthcoming approach to the + Special Session. We intend to be receptive to the views of others and to + put forward new ideas of our own at New York.

+

To carry out this approach we are working on a three point program:

+

I. Working from the base of our current arms control policies we are + developing guidance for our SSOD + delegation which will encourage support for these policies and which will exploit positive + achievements. We will emphasize our SALT and CTB efforts, our + non-proliferation programs, and our CW + and RW negotiations.

+

II. Recognizing that our current efforts in the disarmament field cannot + produce sufficient demonstration of momentum by the time of the SSOD, we are examining what possible + specific arms control initiatives the US + might be able to put forward which would have merit in themselves and + which would strengthen our overall position. Proposals being considered + include: (1) Cut-off by nuclear weapons states in the production of + fissionable materials for weapons use; (2) Some forms of preferential + assistance for peaceful use of nuclear energy by countries that have + adhered to the NPT; (3) An + international agreement for reporting on nuclear accidents; and (4) A + proposal to meet Third World demands that the developed countries + recognize a relationship between savings from disarmament and economic + and social development.

+

These possible initiatives are being analyzed carefully to determine + their feasibility and effectiveness. We will also have to weigh how we + will surface any one or more of them that we finally approve. The + disarmament-development initiative represents at once an area of great + interest among the LDC’s and the area + in which it will be difficult for us to advance a sufficiently specific + proposal.

+

III. We will be instructing our delegation for the final session of the + SSOD Preparatory Committee (PrepCom) session in April so they can + play an active role in developing draft language for a Declaration on + Disarmament and a Program of Action, key elements of a final SSOD document. We are also consulting + with Allies and a number of nonaligned states on the question of + possible modifications in the multilateral disarmament machinery (the + UN and the CCD).

+

Our soundings thus far and our experience at the meetings of the PrepCom, the most recent of which + ended on February 24, have convinced us that Third World expectations + are extremely high. What the non-aligned—led by India and + Yugoslavia—really want is for the US and + Soviets to come to some sort of agreement that will constitute a + “breakthrough” in the direction of nuclear disarmament. This expectation + goes beyond SALT and CTB agreements, which they assume will be + achieved by that time and, thus, the Soviet proposal for a ban on ER weapons would likely find a receptive + audience. If SALT and CTB are still pending, we can expect an + even greater sense of disillusionment among the non-aligned and greater + difficulty in promoting our other arms control objectives in the SSOD.

+

On their part, the non-nuclear weapon states want to receive assurances + that nuclear weapons will not be used against them. Two Allied countries—Canada and the + UK—are planning to propose formulas + providing such assurances at the Special Session.

+

Most UN member states want to have a + greater voice in disarmament decisions. While we want to be responsive + to this desire, we intend to protect the negotiating effectiveness of + bodies such as the CCD.

+

We are fully conscious of these considerations as we move forward in our + planning.

+

Obviously, a six-week conference of 140 nations is not an effective + context within which specific arms control agreements can be negotiated, + and thus major breakthroughs cannot be expected. At best, we can hope to + start a process which may lead to significant progress in subsequent + negotiations. While offering constructive initiatives ourselves, + therefore, we will also seek to moderate or reduce unrealistically high + expectations on the part of the LDC’s + and non-governmental organizations.

+

All of our work is now being carried out in the Interagency Backstopping + Committee, chaired by ACDA, which the + NSC recently established. We + recognize that if we are to achieve our goals, we must accelerate our + preparations. We will have to be able to respond to others’ initiatives + as well as to field our own. It’s clear that key SSOD policy issues will have to be + addressed very soon by all interested agencies at high levels.

+

On the two specific issues which you raised in your memorandum we have + the following observations:

+

Arms Sales. At the several PrepCom meetings that have been held + and in ongoing bilateral and multilateral consultations, we have sought + support for universal adherence to conventional arms transfer restraint. + There is substantial resistance among the LDC’s to endorsing arms transfer restraints. We (and the + other arms suppliers) must expect to take some flak at New York on this + issue, unless we can succeed in making the case that all nations would + profit from restraints that reduce risks and costs while permitting + legitimate defense needs to be met.

+

ER Weapons. We + have proposed to our Allies that we link ER weapons and arms control in a way that would offset + anticipated Soviet propaganda at the SSOD.Not found. Our + proposal would focus attention on the modernization of the Soviet + theater nuclear system and would involve a ER Weapon/SS–20 tradeoff. While there was general agreement + at the last NAC (February 24) that an + arms control strategy for ER + weapons is needed,Not found. additional consultations will be + required before we can come up with a NATO position. Most of our Allies, including Bonn, agree + with us on the need to put the ER + decision behind us before the SSOD and + the NATO summit.

+
+ +
+ 482. Memorandum From Secretary of State Vance and the Director of the Arms Control and + Disarmament Agency (Warnke) to + President CarterSource: Library of Congress, + Manuscript Division, James + Schlesinger Papers, Box 1, Chronological File, 1978 + Apr. 1–22. Secret; Restricted Data. Vance did not initial the memorandum. + Washington, March + 27, 1978 + + SUBJECT + The US Position on Cut-off in + Production and Transfer of Fissionable Materials for Use in Nuclear + Weapons + +

We believe that an interagency study should be completed as soon as + possible on the desirability of proposing at the UN Special Session on Disarmament (SSOD), negotiations on a cut-off in the + production of fissionable materials for nuclear weapons. We should also + study the desirability of transferring agreed amounts of enriched + uranium from US and Soviet weapon + stockpiles to peaceful purposes. Even without a transfer, a cut-off + agreement would represent a major step in our efforts to halt and + reverse the nuclear arms race.

+

[4½ lines not declassified]

+

While a preliminary assessment by ACDA + concludes that such an agreement could advance US security interests,Not + found. we believe a comprehensive examination of the issues + involved in cut-off and transfer should be undertaken immediately by all + appropriate Executive Branch departments and agencies. The impact on + US nuclear force planning options + should be analyzed under a variety of possibilities, ranging from + projections of likely force levels to various higher options. We should + assess the impact on Soviet capabilities, and the extent to which such constraints on the + Soviets would reduce our own requirements. A cut-off and transfer + proposal would involve important national security issues, but we + believe this Administration’s commitment to nuclear arms control + requires that we give the most serious consideration to reaffirming our + previous proposals in this area.

+

A cut-off proposal has been advanced in various forms by four previous + US Administrations, beginning with + that of President Eisenhower. We will have to face this issue in any + event at the Special Session, for it is part of the Program of Action of + the non-aligned, and may be advanced as a suggestion by some of our + allies as well.

+

A cut-off and transfer would be complementary to SALT TWO and a Comprehensive Test Ban, + and could be presented as a logical follow-on to those treaties. + Together with these ongoing efforts, it is regarded by non-nuclear + weapon states as one of the primary requirements to maintain and + strengthen the NPT and the overall + non-proliferation regime. Proposing such negotiations would demonstrate + our intention to deal ultimately with a central issue of nuclear + disarmament—halting the continued production and stockpiling of nuclear + weapons. As such, it directly addresses the concerns expressed by Prime + Minister Desai and hence would + improve the prospects for obtaining Indian acceptance of full scope + safeguards—one of our priority non-proliferation objectives.

+

It is not clear that reaffirming a cut-off and transfer proposal would + lead to productive negotiations with the Soviets. They have in the past + rejected the cut-off, and Brezhnev’s November 2 proposal for a halt in the + production of nuclear weapons,The “Address + by President Brezhnev Before + the Central Committee of the CPSU: + Halting the Production and Testing of Nuclear Weapons [Extract],” + November 2, 1977, is in Documents on Disarmament, + 1977, pp. 679–680. beginning with a ban on “neutron + weapons,” carries obvious difficulties for the US. The likely Soviet rejoinder would be a call for + negotiation of a production ban on nuclear weapons as well as on + fissionable materials. They have informally indicated to us in New York + during the Special Session Preparatory Committee meetings that a cut-off + could be a corollary to a weapons production ban. We could counter that + such a ban applicable to all nuclear weapons states appears unattainable + now, but as evidence of our desire for progress, the US stands ready to initiate discussions now + on materials cut-off.

+

We could also consider transferring an agreed quantity of highly enriched + uranium from our special nuclear weapons material stockpile, diluted to + lower enrichments, to applications supporting US non-proliferation objectives (e.g. research on more + proliferation-resistant fuel cycles). This offer could be conditioned on + Soviet willingness to do the + same. Such a materials transfer would serve disarmament and + non-proliferation objectives, and it is something specific that could be + accomplished sooner than a cut-off agreement.

+

Despite the uncertain prospects for early completion of negotiations on a + cut-off, it would be productive to make such a proposal at the SSOD, and would give substance to our + expressed desire to move in the direction of nuclear disarmament. It + would also help to fulfill the pledge you made to the General Assembly + last March that the US would make a + strong and positive contribution to the SSOD.See footnote 4, Document 473.

+

As has been the case when the US has + advanced the proposal in the past, the United Kingdom has expressed some + concern about the idea of a cut-off proposal because of the effect such + an agreement could have on its nuclear weapons program. This concern + might be eased by extensive advance consultations and by initially + proposing only US-Soviet exploratory + discussions. Should such discussions take place and provide the basis + for beginning serious negotiations, we would again consult with the + UK to see whether their concerns + could be met adequately.

+

It should be noted that while any inspection of + Soviet territory would be difficult to negotiate, one of the advantages + of our present cut-off proposal is that on-site inspection requirements + would be handled by an international body (IAEA). Furthermore, such inspection would + be limited to safeguards to preclude the diversion of nuclear materials + to weapons purposes. Previous US + proposals (in the 1960’s) had included IAEA inspection of shutdown military facilities, as well as + civil facilities, and US adversary + inspection rights for suspected clandestine activity—both of which were + strongly opposed by the Soviets. [7 lines not + declassified] This is a critical issue that should also be + addressed in the interagency study.

+

We recommend that you sign the memorandum at Tab 1Not attached. directing the preparation of + an interagency study of the issues involved in reaffirming at the SSOD + US proposals to negotiate an adequately + verified cut-off and transfer agreement.

+
+ +
+ + 483. Memorandum from Secretary of Defense Brown to the President’s Assistant for National Security + Affairs (Brzezinski)Source: Carter Library, National + Security Affairs, Staff Material, Brzezinski Office File, Subject Chron File, Box 118, + Special Session on Disarmament: 2–5/78. Secret; Restricted + Data. + Washington, March + 31, 1978 + + SUBJECT + U.S. Position on Cut-Off in Production and Transfer of Fissionable + Materials for Use in Nuclear Weapons + +

Yesterday, I was informed that a memorandum for the President had been + sent to the National Security Council staff asking that an interagency + study be conducted on the desirability of proposing at the UN Special Session on Disarmament (SSOD) negotiations on a cut-off of + fissionable materials for nuclear weapons and the transfer of enriched + uranium from stockpiled weapons to non-aligned nations for peaceful + purposes.See Document 482. I agree that a thorough analysis of + these important issues may be useful. However, I do not believe that it + would be in our best interest at this time to initiate a chain of events + that is implicitly assumed to lead to a reaffirmation of a cut-off or + transfer proposal of the sort we first made in 1963, at the upcoming + SSOD. Rather, we should await the + outcomes of the current CTB and SALT negotiations before we consider + proposals to further constrain our freedom of action in the nuclear + weapons area. Only when these negotiations are completed will we have a + firm understanding of our future weapons needs and be in a position to + address a cut-off of production of fissionable materials.

+

The strategic situation has changed since the United States first + advanced a cut-off proposal in 1963.See + Foreign + Relations, 1961–1963, vol. VII, Arms Control and + Disarmament, Document 313. At this time, we enjoyed + a significant advantage over the Soviet Union in terms of nuclear + weapons materials. [6½ lines not declassified] + The potential political advantages of reaffirmation of the cut-off and + transfer proposal must be weighed against current and projected U.S. + need. The projections of requirements may have to be modified based on + SALT outcomes. We must avoid being + constrained on future weapons decisions because of a lack of + availability of weapons grade materials.

+

To meet the fissionable material requirements of the FY 78–80 Nuclear Weapons Stockpile Plan + approved by the President in PD/NSC–26Presidential + Directive/National Security Council-26, “FY1978–1980 Nuclear Weapons + Stockpile,” December 27, 1977, is scheduled to be printed in Foreign + Relations, 1977–1980, vol. IV, National Security + Policy. and the FY + 81–85 projections as noted by the President will require all the + material currently available, plus the output of the Department of + Energy’s three operating production reactors through 1985. Should a + SALT agreement not be reached, + options to increase rapidly our strategic forces capability by beginning + new or accelerating planned systems (e.g., SLCMs, GLCMs, CMC) are likely + to require all the above material and the restart of some reactors + currently maintained in standby status. In addition, some strategic + options such as the MXThe proposed MX + (Missile Experimental) Missile was a Multiple Independently Targeted + Re-entry Vehicle (MIRV) nuclear + weapon that the Carter + administration considered deploying on railroad tracks as a mobile + system. For more on the MX, see Foreign + Relations, 1977–1980, vol. IV, National Security + Policy, and Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, vol. + XXXIII, SALT II, 1972–1980, + Documents 80, 81, + 130, 188, 191, 197, 205, 236, 239, and 244. would require + more highly enriched uranium than is currently available for the weapons + program. Thus, a cut-off or mandated transfer out of stockpiles could + pre-empt our ability to deploy systems currently under development. + Additionally, continued production of tritium is mandatory to maintain + operational warheads now stockpiled.

+

[1½ lines not declassified] The Soviets have + consistently opposed IAEA safeguards + for any of their facilities. It is therefore unlikely that they would + agree to any intrusive verification provisions that allowed for on-site + inspection. [7 lines not declassified]

+

In addition to the technical difficulties associated with a cut-off + initiative, the diplomatic utility of such an effort is also open to + serious question. The U.S. has offered similar proposals on at least + four other occasions, and the Soviets have rejected each one. It is no + more likely that the U.S.S.R. will accept this initiative than it has + the others. Given that this initiative would be only a reintroduction of + a very old idea that has never produced any tangible results, and given + that the Soviets are likely to respond negatively, the effort could be + attacked by some non-nuclear weapon states as a calculated and empty + gesture on the part of the United States.

+

Some of our closest allies appear to be opposed to the idea of a cut-off + or transfer. For example, the British, in reaction to a similar Canadian + proposal, argued in FebruaryThe British + objection to the Canadian proposal is in telegram 2787 from London, + February 17. (National Archives, RG + 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780074–0713) The Canadian proposal + was not found. that a cut-off would be “injurious to the + development and refurbishment of UK + nuclear weapons,” and thus harmful to the UK as well as the NATO + nuclear deterrent. They noted that a cut-off would be [less than 1 line not declassified] and went so far as to enlist U.S. support in + helping dissuade the Canadians from pursuing this proposal.

+

There are clearly major differences of view among the various agencies, + about the national security effects, political feasibility, relative + effect on U.S. and Soviet stockpiles, and verifiability of such an + initiative. It is unfortunate that lack of prior consultation with the + Department of Defense in the formulation of the memorandum has prevented + any attempt to compose them before it was forwarded to the President for + his decision.

+

The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff shares these views.

+ + Harold + Brown + +
+ +
+ 484. Memorandum from Secretary of Energy Schlesinger to the President’s Assistant for National + Security Affairs (Brzezinski)Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, James Schlesinger Papers, Box 1, + Chronological File, 1978 Apr. 1–22. Secret. + Washington, April + 1, 1978 + + SUBJECT + The Vance-Warnke Proposal Regarding a Cut-off + of Production and Transfer of Fissionable MaterialsSee Document + 482. + +

I have now had a chance to peruse the subject memorandum on fissionable + materials production cut-off and transfer. My comments are as + follows:

+

1. Given a production cut-off, there is no way, repeat no way, to fulfill the stockpile objectives embodied in the + Presidentially-approved nuclear-weapon stockpile paper.

+

2. The alternatives facing the President under such conditions would be + simple. We could fail to produce the weapons for the strategic + forces—the Trident, Minuteman III upgrade, and the Cruise + Missile—prospectively entering into inventory. Alternatively we could + achieve constraint by a substantial drawdown of tactical weapons. This + would imply a significant withdrawal from the [number + not declassified] weapons now deployed in Europe with all that + that would entail for Alliance relationships and the MBFR + negotiations. Additionally, we might attempt to straddle the issue by + some drawdown from the tactical weapons stockpile while reducing + strategic force objectives.

+

3. One of the Savannah River reactors now is devoted to the production of + tritium. A cut-off of tritium production, since it has a half life of + 12.5 years, and has to be replaced every 4 to 8 years, would essentially + eliminate stockpile effectiveness in a few years.

+

4. Substantial production of highly enriched uranium (HEU) is indispensable for fueling the + nuclear navy. While the proposal is obscure on this point (since it + would presumably cover all such materials that could be used in + weapons), it seems difficult to imagine that we would accept conditions + in which we were unable to provide sufficient fuel for Polaris, Poseidon + and other nuclear powered vessels.

+

5. [5½ lines not declassified] To suggest that the + IAEA, with minimal clout, a spotty + track record, and modest resources, could enforce such an agreement + strikes me as quixotic.

+

6. Given the requirement for some reactor products (i.e., one or two + operating reactors to produce tritium to maintain operable weapons) and + given the requirement for highly enriched uranium production to provide + fuel for naval reactors, any agreement acceptable to us would imply the + type of qualifications and ambiguities which the Soviets could + continuously exploit in raising questions regarding our compliance.

+

7. Weapons production by the Department of Energy is responsive to DOD requirements as established by the + President. Our force structure is designed in response to national + security objectives, which are themselves constrained by ratified arms + control agreements such as SALT I and + prospectively SALT II. It would seem + to me that the appropriate initial determination is that of the force + structure. Requirements for weapons and, derivatively, for fissionable + materials should flow from that initial determination—without the + imposition of an arbitrary limitation on materials. We can be assured + that the Soviets will not fail to derive their fissionable material + requirements in this manner. We should take care to avoid haphazardly + constraining our own force structure through such a Procustean + device.

+

8. While I have no inherent difficulty with a study of the issue, since + it is likely (for the reasons developed above) to put to rest this type + of long speculated-on initiative, I do have serious concern with the + proposed crash-effort study. The Special Session on Disarmament has long + been scheduled. Why could not this issue have been developed in an + orderly manner, rather than accept the risks attendant in attempting to + cram such a study into three weeks time?

+
+ +
+ + 485. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security + Affairs (Brzezinski) to Secretary + of State Vance, Secretary of + Defense Brown, Secretary of + Energy Schlesinger, the Director + of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (Warnke), the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff + (Jones), the Director of Central Intelligence (Turner), and the Director of the + Office of Science and Technology Policy (Press)Source: + Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Brzezinski Office File, Subject + Chron File, Box 118, Special Session on Disarmament: 2–5/78. + Secret. + Washington, April + 4, 1978 + + SUBJECT + Study of Initiatives at the SSOD + on Cut-Off and Transfer of Fissionable Materials for Use in Nuclear + Weapons + +

In March of last year, the President pledged a strong and positive US contribution to the UN Special Session on Disarmament.See footnote 4, + Document 473. In view of this commitment and the + fact that several participants are likely to raise the issue of an + agreement halting the production of fissionable materials which can be + used for nuclear weapons (cut-off) and transferring highly enriched + uranium from the weapon stockpile to peaceful purposes (transfer), it is + important that we fully analyze the possible impacts and implications of + such proposals on US national security + interests, including our interest in nuclear arms control, and the + desirability of possible US cut-off or + transfer initiatives. Therefore, a study should be undertaken to include + a discussion of the following:

+

—Review of past US cut-off/transfer + proposals and the circumstances surrounding them;

+

—Assessment of US and Soviet special + nuclear materials stockpiles and trends;

+

—The impact on future US nuclear forces + (from projections of likely force levels to various high options);

+

—The impact on future Soviet nuclear forces;

+

—The impact on the overall US–USSR military balance;

+

—Relationship to other arms control activities;

+

—An assessment of possible verification systems and their adequacy;

+

—Possibilities for recovery of nuclear material from the current + stockpile and the pipeline;

+

—Special problems (e.g., tritium production, naval reactors);

+

—Allied views and interests;

+

—Soviet attitudes; and

+ +

—Views and actions of non-aligned and non-nuclear-weapon states + (particularly in the SSOD context and + from the perspective of US + non-proliferation policy).

+

The study should be prepared by an ad hoc working group of the Special + Coordinating Committee and should be submitted no later than April 28, + 1978.

+ + Zbigniew + Brzezinski + +
+ +
+ 486. Summary of Conclusions of a Mini-Special Coordination Committee + MeetingSource: Carter + Library, National Security Council, Institutional Files, Box 117, + SCM 013, Mini-SCC, SSOD: 4/20/78. Confidential. The + meeting took place in the White House Situation Room. Draft minutes + of the meeting are ibid. + Washington, April 20, 1978, + 10:30–11:45 a.m. + + SUBJECT + UN Special Session on + Disarmament + + + PARTICIPANTS + State + Gerald Helman + Jerome Kahan + David Gompert + Defense + Lynn Davis + Susan Flood + ACDA + Adam Yarmolinsky + Lawrence Weiler + Charles Flowerree + JCS + Lt. Gen. Arnold Braswell + CIA + Sayre Stevens + George Allen + AID + Alexander Shakow + Mary Jane Heyl + Energy + Donald Kerr + Ray E. Chapman + White House + David Aaron + NSC + Samuel Huntington + Robert Putnam + +

The question of whether or not the President should speak at SSOD depends heavily on the content of + the US presentation. If he is to speak, + it is highly desirable that the presentation not be limited to the sorts of initiatives + currently under study. A Presidential address should offer an ambitious + 10-Year Disarmament Program, outlining long range goals and objectives + for enhancing global security in such areas as strategic arms control + and regional stability. ACDA will pull + together agency suggestions for a 10-Year Disarmament Program into a + draft for NSC review within the next + week. No final decision was taken on the date for the US presentation.

+

A proposal for extending negative security + assurances beyond the President’s statement of October, + 1977,On October 4, 1977, Carter told the UN General Assembly that “In order to + reduce the reliance of nations on nuclear weapons, I hereby solemnly + declare on behalf of the United States that we will not use nuclear + weapons except in self-defense; that is, in circumstances of an + actual nuclear or conventional attack on the United States, our + territories, or Armed Forces, or such an attack on our allies.” (Public Papers: Carter, 1977, pp. 1715–1723) is now + being put into final form. Regional bureaus and JCS are particularly concerned about the impact of such an + initiative on relations with our allies. More complete information is + needed about the probable reactions of key allies. Some of this + information may be obtained from the May 2 meeting of NATO disarmament experts, at which the + UK proposal for negative security assurances may be + discussed. When more information on allied attitudes is available and + when the options paper has been completed, the issue will be raised for + consideration at the SCC.

+

The “eyes and ears of peace” proposal for US technical assistance for regional peace-keeping will be + considered in the Backstopping Committee next week.Reference is to a NSC proposal that the United States provide equipment + to monitor compliance with disarmament agreements to nations or + regions who requested such assistance. Agencies were urged to + make any technical objections to the proposal as precise as + possible.

+

Further consideration of our treatment of ERW at SSOD will be + postponed until additional policy guidance is available.

+

Within the next week, interagency agreement within the Backstopping + Committee is anticipated on initiatives on regional confidence-building + measures, nuclear accident reporting, and preferences for NPT parties. (The offer of fuel cycle + services has been deleted from the latter proposal.) Views of State/EA + will be solicited on the nuclear accidents initiative. A split paper is + anticipated on the Disarmament/Development proposal for a UN Special Development and Security Fund. + All these proposals, as well as the report of the group studying the + cutoff proposal, will then be submitted to the SCC for decision or endorsement.

+
+ +
+ + 487. Memorandum of ConversationSource: Department of State, Office of the Secretariat + Staff, Special Adviser to the Secretary (S/MS) on Soviet Affairs + Marshall Shulman—Jan 21, + 77–Jan 19, 81, Lot 81D109, Box 8, Vance to Moscow, April 1978. Secret; Sensitive; + Nodis. The meeting took place + at the Kremlin. Drafted by William + Krimer. The memorandum of conversation is printed in + full in Foreign + Relations, 1977–1980, vol. VI, Soviet Union, Document + 102. + Moscow, April 21, + 1978, 6:30–8:00 p.m. + + SUBJECT + Vance-Gromyko Meeting + + + PARTICIPANTS + U.S. + Secretary of State Vance + Ambassador Malcolm + Toon + Ambassador Paul C. + Warnke + Ambassador Ralph Earle, + II + Mr. Leslie H. Gelb + Ambassador Marshall D. Shulman + Mr. Reginald + Bartholomew + Lt. Gen. Edward L. Rowny + DAS of Def. Walter B. + Slocomb + Mr. Mark Garrison + Mr. William D. Krimer + (Interpreter) + U.S.S.R. + Foreign Minister Gromyko + First Deputy Foreign Minister Korniyenko + Dep. Foreign Minister Semenov + Ambassador A.F. + Dobrynin + Marshal N.V. Ogarkov + Col.-Gen. M.M. Kozlov + Mr. V.G. Makarov + Mr. N. Detinov + Mr. V.M. Sukhodrev, + Interpreter + Mr. A.A. Obukhov, Note Take + Mr. V.F. Isakov, Note Taker + +

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to the Special Session on + Disarmament.]

+

SSOD

+

Gromyko + noted that the U.N. Special Session on Disarmament would be convened + shortly. He did not know how the Secretary viewed it, and what he + thought the prospects were for a successful outcome. If the Secretary + had any ideas on this score, he would be pleased to hear them. The + Soviet side regarded the SSOD as a + broad worldwide forum, and would, of course, set forth its views on + disarmament in that forum. It would be very good if the countries of the + West as well as the East approached the SSOD in a serious and businesslike manner and adopted + positive decisions on the questions involved. The important thing, of + course, was not just to adopt decisions but also to implement them. The + U.N. adopts quite a few good decisions, but subsequently, when the + Secretary General circulates them to member governments, all too often + they pile up on desks in various government offices and nothing much + happens. He was not trying to reproach anyone in this regard, but simply + would not like to see this happen in the case of the SSOD. As he had said, the Soviet side + attached great importance to the SSOD and + believed that it should in no way be used to belittle a subsequent World + Disarmament Conference.

+

The Secretary said that he felt very strongly that + the SSOD was of great importance. We + very much hoped that somehow positive and concrete decisions can come + out of the SSOD and that it not simply + end up in general statements that had no flesh and bone. Some other + unnamed countries have submitted proposals that could not be understood. + However, he believed it possible to make real progress at that + conference. Ambassador Leonard + would be coming to Moscow on the 27th of this month in order to talk to + Gromyko’s people about the + SSOD. At the United Nations he is + working on our preparations for the Special Session.

+

Gromyko + said that Soviet representatives would be prepared to discuss the + various issues with Ambassador Leonard.

+

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to the Special Session on + Disarmament.]

+
+ +
+ 488. Summary of Conclusions of a Special Coordination Committee + MeetingSource: Carter + Library, National Security Council, Institutional Files, Box 93, + SCC 072, SSOD—U.S. Initiatives, Goals, and + Strategies: 5/5/78. Secret. The meeting took place in the White + House Situation Room. + Washington, May 5, 1978, + 10:00–11:30 a.m. + + SUBJECT + United Nations Special Session on Disarmament + + + PARTICIPANTS + State + Mr. David Newsome Under Secretary for Political Affairs + Mr. Jerome Kahan Deputy Director, Bureau of Politico-Military + Affairs + Mr. Gerald Helman Deputy Assistant Secretary for Political and + Multilateral Affairs + USUN + Ambassador James F. Leonard + U.S. Deputy Representative to the United Nations + ACDA + Mr. Spurgeon Keeny Deputy + Director of ACDA + Mr. Adam Yarmolinsky + Counselor for ACDA + Ambassador Lawrence Weiler + U.S. Coordinator for SSOD + + Defense + Deputy Secretary Charles + Duncan + Mr. David McGiffert + Assistant Secretary for International Security Affairs + JCS + Lt. General William + Smith + CIA + Admiral Stansfield + Turner + [name not declassified] Acting Assistant + NIO for Special Studies + Energy + Dr. Donald Kerr Acting Assistant Secretary for Defense + Programs + AID + Governor John + Gilligan + Mr. Alexander Shakow Assistant Administrator for Program and + Policy Coordination + White House + Dr. Zbigniew + Brzezinski + NSC + Mr. Reginald + Bartholomew + Dr. Samuel + Huntington + Mr. Robert Putnam + +

It would be desirable to develop for a possible Presidential address at + SSOD a generalized statement of + ten-year disarmament goals, particularly stressing a gradual scaling + down of Soviet and American strategic forces, with provision for + participation by other nuclear powers in the later phases of this + process. However, it is not appropriate at this point to include + specific numerical targets, because there is not time to complete the + necessary staffing and consultations before SSOD. The SALT + Interagency Working Group is asked to develop over the next several + months a series of specific targets as a framework for considering + future steps in strategic arms control.

+

This Administration has compiled a strong record in the field of arms + control, and some participants thought it possible that a Presidential + address could be crafted that would recount this record and add some new + elements or initiatives, without outlining a full-fledged Ten-Year + Program. It was agreed that any US + address at SSOD should refer to NATO and to the complementarity between + arms control and defense policy, both contributing to national + security.

+

The meeting considered six specific possible US initiatives at SSOD.The six initiatives are + summarized in a May 4 memorandum from Huntington and Putnam to Brzezinski. (Carter Library, National Security + Affairs, Staff Material, Brzezinski Office File, Subject Chron File, Box 118, + Special Session on Disarmament: 2–5/78) The proposal on + stabilizing measures was approved. The proposal on ACIS was disapproved. The proposal on + peaceful nuclear cooperation was approved, subject to consultations with + OMB and Congress. (It will be + necessary to resolve a few details involving the funding of fuel cycle + services and the working of Ex-Im preference for NPT parties.)

+ +

Concern was expressed about the probable adverse Chinese reaction to the + proposal on nuclear accident reporting, particularly since it might + appear directed at the PRC. It was + agreed to ask the UKUN to broach with the PRC the relevant proposal in the UK draft Program of Action. If the PRC’s reaction is not adverse, USUN would then approach the PRC directly on the proposal. The proposal would be + included in the US + SSOD presentation only if the PRC did not object.

+

Concern was expressed about the psychological impact of the proposed + negative security assurances in + NATO, in Korea, and perhaps + elsewhere. It was agreed that the US + would consult with South Korea, with Japan, and with the FRG on this subject, using as the basis of + the consultation the current UK + proposal, the language of which is similar to the language of the + proposed US declaration. A later SCC meeting would, in the light of these + consultations, decide whether or not to go forward with the initiative. + If the decision was affirmative, we would first privately inform Israel + and Iran and reassure them that the declaration would not impair our + existing commitments to their security. The question of the exact + language of the proposed US + declaration—whether or not to include “or threaten to use”—was + deferred.

+

There was general agreement with the objective of establishing a link + between development aid and disarmament efforts, but it would be + premature to commit ourselves to the proposed fund for this purpose. + Instead, the US should express general + support for a multilateral effort to define criteria which would permit + the preferential use of development aid to reward states that make + significant arms control and disarmament efforts.

+

The NSC staff will coordinate a revision + of the existing PM draft speechNot found. to encompass the decisions + reached at this meeting, including a generalized statement of a ten-year + disarmament program and reference to the approved initiatives, with the + pending initiatives bracketed. A meeting of the SCC will be held next week to consider, first of all, the + substance of the redrafted speech, its impact on related Administration + policies (e.g., defense, NATO), and + whether or not it would justify a Presidential appearance at SSOD. In addition, the agenda for the + SCC will include the + cutoff/transfer proposal now being studied by the Marcum committee, the + “eyes and ears of peace” proposal, and possible follow-up action on + negative security assurances and + nuclear accident reporting. The SCC may + also consider US responses to potential + adverse initiatives from other powers at SSOD.

+
+ +
+ + 489. Summary of Conclusions of a Special Coordination Committee + MeetingSource: Carter + Library, National Security Council, Institutional Files, Box 93, + SCC 074, SSOD—U.S. Presentation and + Initiative: 5/5/78. Secret. The meeting took place in the White + House Situation Room. + Washington, May 12, 1978, + 9:00–10:00 a.m. + + SUBJECT + United Nations Special Session on Disarmament + + + PARTICIPANTS + + State + Mr. David Newsome Under Secretary for Political + Affairs + Mr. Jerome Kahan Deputy Director, Bureau of + Politico-Military Affairs + Mr. Gerald Helman Deputy Assistant Secretary for Political + and Multilateral Affairs + + + Defense + Deputy Secretary Charles + Duncan + Mr. David McGiffert + Assistant Secretary for International Security + Affairs + + + JCS + Lt. General William + Smith + + + CIA + Dr. Sayre Stevens + Deputy Director, National Foreign Intelligence Assessment + Center + + + OSTP + Dr. Frank + Press + Mr. John Marcum Senior Staff Analyst + + + ACDA + Mr. Spurgeon + Keeny + Mr. Adam + Yarmolinsky Counselor for ACDA + Ambassador Lawrence + Weiler U.S. Coordinator for SSOD + + + USUN + Ambassador James F. Leonard U.S. Deputy Representative to the + United Nations + + + AID + Mr. Robert H. Nooter Deputy Administrator—Acting + Administrator + + + OMB + Mr. James + McIntyre + + + White House + Dr. Zbigniew + Brzezinski + Mr. David + Aaron + + + NSC + Dr. Samuel + Huntington + Mr. Robert + Putnam + + +

On the basis of the SCC + ad hoc Working Group report,Not found. the meeting addressed the issue + of whether or not the US should offer at + SSOD a proposal for a cutoff of + the production of fissionable materials for use in nuclear weapons. + ACDA, supported by USUN, favored such an initiative. All + other agencies opposed such an initiative, several of them (including + DOD) expressing strong opposition. + If other countries offer cutoff proposals, several agencies (including State) would recommend + that the US agree to noncommittal + consultations on the subject. Another meeting will be held next week to + further consider possible US responses + to cutoff proposals from other countries.

+

The meeting reviewed a draft speech for SSOD,Not found. + agreeing on a number of textual changes that will be reflected in the + next draft. The section on defense and NATO should be strengthened, particularly if the President + delivers the speech. Generalized wording on a scale-down in strategic + arms was accepted. The meeting confirmed that the initiative on nuclear + accidents reporting will be offered if and only if the PRC does not express opposition in our + bilateral consultations. Details of the peaceful nuclear cooperation + initiative will be omitted from the speech. Agencies will suggest + alternative wording for the section on disarmament/development.

+

After receiving a report that key allies had not objected to the idea of + US + negative security assurances that would + go beyond the President’s October 1977 statement,See footnote 2, Document + 486. the meeting discussed alternative formulations + for the proposed assurances. The tentatively agreed formulation is:

+

The United States will not use nuclear weapons against any non-nuclear + weapon state party to the NPT or any + comparable internationally binding commitment not to acquire nuclear + explosive devices, except in the case of an attack on the United States, + its territories or armed forces, or its allies by such a state allied to + a nuclear weapons state, or associated with a nuclear weapon state in + sustaining or carrying out the attack.

+

If the President approves this proposed declaration, we will inform + Israel, Iran, and our allies of the proposed declaration. (JCS opposed any change in the statement of + October 1977.)

+

The proposal for US technical assistance + for regional confidence-building and peace-keeping (“eyes and ears”) was + approved, provided that (1) the assistance be offered under UN or regional peace-keeping auspices; (2) + references to U–2s be deleted; (3) non-military capabilities be used to + the extent possible; and (4) there be a further review of budgetary + implications.

+

Some strong support was expressed for a Presidential appearance at SSOD, as evidence of his continued + commitment to arms control and disarmament. However, some concern was + expressed about the implications of the proximity of an SSOD appearance and the NATO Summit.The NATO Summit was scheduled to + be held in Washington May 30–31. Both international and + domestic considerations will be laid out as the basis of a Presidential + decision on the question.

+
+ +
+ + 490. Memorandum from Secretary of Defense Brown to President CarterSource: + Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Brzezinski Office File, Subject + Chron File, Box 118, Special Session on Disarmament: 2–5/78. + Secret. + Washington, May 15, + 1978 + + SUBJECT + Fissionable Material Cutoff + +

I believe that to make a US initiative at + the SSOD urging fissionable material + cutoff would be a mistake. It would introduce additional uncertainties + into our own planning, particularly those for air-launched (and other) + cruise missiles, Trident II, and M–X. In order to cope with our military + needs, as well as with the (correct) perceptions that the Soviets are + and will remain ahead in throw weight and in capabilities of their + peripheral attack systems, we need to preserve our advantage in + strategic warheads. This will not be easy in any event. But particularly + because we can have more warheads while the Soviets have more throw + weight only if our warheads are smaller than theirs, we will have to use + more fissionable material per warhead.

+

The absence of a reasonable assurance of verification without intrusive + control measures would make a successful negotiation difficult, at the + least. Moreover, proposals that rely on dubious verification measures + undermine the whole concept of arms control.

+

Though the United States position has favored a fissionable material + cutoff in principle for a long time, the situation, including the + balance between the US and the Soviet + Union, has changed very substantially since twenty or even ten years + ago. What might then have been an arrangement freezing us into + superiority is by no means any longer the case; indeed, we may, + particularly in the light of verification problems, be freezing + ourselves into a position of inferiority in availability of necessary + fissionable material.

+

My own judgment would be that we should be prepared to listen + sympathetically to proposals that others may make at the SSOD on this subject in principle, but we + should not make any such proposal an important part of our position. + Moreover, we should oppose proposals that negotiations on this subject + should be initiated at this time on the grounds that there is already a + full plate of arms control negotiations in train. If we did propose a + cutoff, I think we will be subjecting ourselves to a great deal of + internal conflict that would probably spill over into other, more + important and more urgent, arms control issues.

+ +

I attach a memo stating the position of the JCS, which is similar to but goes beyond my own.Not attached.

+ + Harold + Brown + +
+ +
+ 491. Memorandum From the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament + Agency (Warnke) to President + CarterSource: National Archives, RG 383, Records of the Arms Control and + Disarmament Agency, Office of the Director, Paul C. Warnke Files, December + 1974–July 1979, Accession #383–98–0154, Box 1, Memoranda to the + President Regarding SALT, Cruise + Missiles, CTB, NPT, and Indian Ocean Arms Control, + January–October 1978. Secret. Copies were sent to Vance and Christopher. Warnke hand-wrote an undated cover + letter to the memorandum that reads “Dear Mr. President, I have + discussed this with Cy Vance + who agrees we should reaffirm—not disavow—our long-standing cut-off + proposal. PCW.” (Ibid.) Warnke also forwarded the + memorandum and the hand-written note to Vance on May 15. (Ibid.) + Washington, May 15, + 1978 + + SUBJECT + SSOD Speech and the Cut-off + Proposal + +

With regard to the proposed speech to the UN Special Session on Disarmament (SSOD), I strongly endorse Cy Vance’s recommendation that you + deliver the speech yourself. Failure to do so would be widely + interpreted as a downgrading of your commitment to arms control, + especially since the session will be addressed by numerous heads of + state including Callaghan, + Giscard, Schmidt, Trudeau, and Desai.

+

One item that I believe should be included in the speech is a renewal of + the U.S. proposal for an adequately verified worldwide cut-off of + fissionable material production for nuclear weapons. This proposal has + been an essential element of U.S. disarmament policy for more than + thirty years, and has been advanced in one form or another by five + Presidents. In this context, I am particularly concerned by the + suggestion that we not only refrain from advancing this proposal but + actively oppose it when it comes up for discussion at the SSOD. There is no question but that this + will be a major proposal (supported by the non-aligned and major allies + such as Canada and Japan) in the program of action of the SSOD. I believe it would be far better for you to present + this proposal on our own terms, rather than for the U.S. to appear to + have abandoned it—and eventually to have to respond to other nations’ + proposals less acceptable to us.

+

I am confident that such a proposal, particularly in a SALT/CTB regime, + would be fully consistent with our national security interests and that + such an agreement can be adequately verified. The proposal would be + formulated to protect continued tritium production and fuel for nuclear + propulsion.

+

Our offer to negotiate on the cut-off would contribute significantly to + our non proliferation policy by rectifying the widely resented + discriminatory situation where the nuclear powers continue to expand + their nuclear arsenals and are not themselves subject to the inspection + procedures we are pressing on non-nuclear weapon states. Conversely, a + repudiation (explicit or implicit) of the long standing policy on + cut-off would contribute to an international environment clearly + counter-productive to our overall non-proliferation strategy. As you + know, this point has been clearly articulated by Desai and other leaders of the + non-nuclear weapons states. More fundamentally, failure to reaffirm this + policy at some point during the SSOD + would undercut the credibility of your call for worldwide reduction in + nuclear forces. Finally, if we stand silent on this issue, we leave the + initiative to the Soviets. They are expected to advance major proposals, + foreshadowed by Brezhnev’s + proposed ban on the production of nuclear weapons,See footnote 3, Document + 482. which, although attractive internationally, + would not be acceptable to the U.S.

+

While I recognize there are differences in the government on the impact + of such a proposal on U.S. and Soviet forces, there is no question that + it would presently constrain the USSR + more than the U.S. and I believe on balance would clearly be in our + national security interest, particularly in the context of SALT and CTB agreements. At present, we are producing no highly + enriched uranium and relatively little plutonium for weapons, [8½ lines not declassified] For the U.S. to expand + its stockpiles would require shifting capacity from low enriched + production for power to high enriched material for weapons production + (of which there has been none since 1964) and to reactivate, at + substantial cost and high visibility, plutonium production reactors now + mothballed. These actions, which would have to be launched almost + immediately in view of long lead times, would be politically difficult, + destabilizing, and would undercut your disarmament objectives in a + dramatic fashion.

+ +

The principal weakness of this proposal is that it almost certainly will + not lead to early negotiations in view of long standing Soviet + sensitivities about the relatively intrusive verification required. + Moreover, if the proposal should lead to negotiations, they will clearly + be protracted in view of the complex verification problems requiring, in + addition to national technical means, at least IAEA-type safeguards on all permitted nuclear activities. + In these circumstances, I find it difficult to understand arguments + against a forthcoming position on this subject which has a substantial + symbolic and tactical significance in the upcoming special session.

+

I recommend therefore that you include in your speech an appropriately + qualified statement in support of a cut-off in the context of progress + on SALT and CTB, along the lines of TAB A.Tab A is attached but not printed. The detailed nature and + timing of our negotiating position on this subject could then be + developed on the basis of further interagency review.

+ + Paul C. + Warnke + +
+ +
+ 492. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security + Affairs (Brzezinski) to President + CarterSource: Carter Library, National + Security Affairs, Staff Material, Brzezinski Office File, Subject Chron File, Box 118, + Special Session on Disarmament: 2–5/78. Secret. In the upper + right-hand corner of the memorandum, Brzezinski hand-wrote “May 16 ’78.” + Washington, May 16, + 1978 + + SUBJECT + UN Special Session on + Disarmament + +

The second SCC meeting on SSOD took place Friday, May 12. A summary + of conclusions is attached at Tab A.See + Document 489. The meeting + surfaced three issues which require your decision.

+

1. Negative Security + Assurances

+

Many non-aligned countries and several of our allies, including the + UK and Japan, support assurances by + nuclear weapons states (NWSs) + that they will not use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapons + states (NNWSs) except in very + specialized circumstances. Such negative + security assurances might marginally assist our + non-proliferation policy. In addition, in his speech on April 25th + BrezhnevReference is to Brezhnev’s declaration that Moscow would become a + party to the Treaty of Tlatelolco, which banned nuclear weapons in + Latin America, and his comment that “we, like other states + possessing nuclear weapons, will take upon ourselves the obligation + not to help the acquisition of nuclear arms by Latin American + states, and also not to use such weapons against the states that are + parties to the treaty.” (“Address by President Brezhnev [Extract], April 25, + 1978, Documents on Disarmament, 1978, pp. + 256–258) seemed to take the position that the USSR would use nuclear weapons only in + response to aggression by a NWS. We + have developed our own version of a more limited negative security assurance which reads as + follows:

+

The United States undertakes not to use nuclear weapons against any + non-nuclear weapon state party to the NPT or any comparable internationally binding commitment + not to acquire nuclear explosive devices, except in the case of an + attack on the United States, its territories or armed forces, or its + Allies by a state allied with a nuclear weapon state, or associated with + a nuclear weapon state in sustaining or carrying out the attack.

+

In your October speech to the UNSee footnote 2, + Document 486. you said that the US would not use nuclear weapons except in + response to an “attack on the United States, our territories, or armed + forces, or such an attack on our allies.” The new formulation is more + restrictive in that it would not permit us to use nuclear weapons in + response to an attack on the US, its + territories, armed forces, or allies, if the attacking state (1) had + signed the NPT or comparable agreement, + and (2) was not allied to a NWS, and (3) was + not associated with a NWS in sustaining + or carrying out the attack. For example, under your October statement we + could use nuclear weapons in response to an attack by Cambodia on + Thailand, but under the new language we could not, unless Cambodia were + assisted in the attack by the PRC.

+

We have consulted the Japanese, Koreans, and Germans on this language and + they have no problems with it. All the relevant USG agencies also support the language except for the + JCS, which prefers that we stick + with your October language at the UN. + The issue thus is:

+

Should the US undertake + the negative security assurance + stated above?

+

_______ Yes _______ NoCarter checked the “No” option and + wrote “Stand on my previous statement” in the right-hand + margin.

+ +

2. Cut-Off of Fissionable + Material Production

+

ACDA has proposed that the US continue its traditional position of + favoring a cut-off by proposing to “seek to achieve the worldwide + cessation of the production of fissionable materials for weapons + purposes.” Among other things, they argue that:

+

(a) [2 lines not declassified]

+

(b) [2 lines not declassified]

+

(c) [3 lines not declassified]

+

(d) [5 lines not declassified]

+

(e) we have no plans to resume production of fissionable material; no + agency is asking for such authority.

+

Attached at Tab B is a memorandum from ACDA setting forth their case at greater length.See Document 491. + USUN supports the ACDA proposal. All the other relevant + agencies—State, DOD, DOE, JCS, OSTP, NSC—firmly oppose the ACDA initiative (DOD and + JCS with particular vehemence), + although some think we should be “positively noncommittal” if a similar + proposal is advanced by other states (as, indeed, several non-aligned + states will do). The opposition to the cut-off argues that:

+

a. [4 lines not declassified]

+

b. [4 lines not declassified]

+

c. It is very dubious whether the Soviets would ever agree to IAEA inspection and other safeguards + necessary to police a cut-off.

+

d. In the longer term, new HEU + production facilities utilizing advanced technologies (i.e., gas + centrifuge and laser isotope separation) [1½ lines not + declassified]

+

e. Even with a cut-off, production of HEU for marine propulsion reactors and of tritium would + have to continue, and it will be very difficult to develop verification + techniques which would not compromise sensitive data.

+

f. The UK and probably France oppose a + cut-off.

+

As you know, this issue is very sensitive politically; a decision to go + ahead with the cut-off proposal could have significant repercussions on + our efforts to get SALT and CTB agreements. A repudiation of our + traditional support for the cut-off could have adverse impact on our + overall non proliferation efforts.Underneath this paragraph, Brzezinski wrote “(I also attach a strong negative + from Harold),” a reference to Document + 490.

+

The issue thus is:

+

Should the US propose + negotiations designed to lead to the worldwide cessation of the + production of fissionable materials for weapons purposes?

+

______ Yes ______ NoCarter checked the “No” + option.

+ +

If you decide in the negative, should we be “positive but non-committal” + on such proposals from other states?

+

______ Yes ______ No; opposeCarter did not check either option + and wrote “Check with me later—Do not disavow our past statements” + in the right-hand margin.

+

3. Your Appearance at the + SSOD

+

The opening ceremonies for the SSOD + occur on May 23. The US inscribed to + speak second on May 24th, immediately following Yugoslavia (whose + representative chairs the General Assembly). The spectrum of opinion + among your principal advisors as to whether you should deliver the + US address runs from mildly + skeptical to enthusiastically positive. State, ACDA, and USUN all + strongly believe you should speak. Defense does not object provided you + emphasize the need for strong defenses in the absence of arms control + agreements and the importance of NATO, + and provided your remarks do not detract from our commitment to the + NATO Long-Term Defense Program + which will be endorsed at the NATO + Summit a week later. If you do not speak, either the Vice President or + Secretary Vance will make the + major US presentation. A preliminary + draft text for a speech, developed by an interagency committee and + discussed at the SCC, is at Tab C.Not attached.

+

In general, the arguments in favor of your speaking are:

+

a. You have made a strong point of your commitment to disarmament, and + your record in the field is quite positive. Failure to address the + SSOD would be seen as a serious + weakening of that commitment and would mean foregoing an opportunity to + underline your favorable record.

+

b. Ten NATO heads-of-government + (including Schmidt, Giscard, Callaghan, Trudeau) plus several others including Desai and Perez will speak, and this + would make your absence all the more noticeable.

+

c. By speaking you would indicate your appreciation of the efforts by + Yugoslavia, India, Venezuela and other non-aligned countries who took + the initiative in organizing the SSOD, + and who are of key importance to our non-proliferation efforts.

+

d. By setting forth at the beginning of the SSOD a set of important, long-term and yet realistic + disarmament goals, you can contribute to a successful conclusion of the + Special Session.

+

The principal arguments against your speaking are:

+

a. The new proposals which the US has to + offer, because they are realistic, are also rather limited; later + speakers, including the USSR, will + undoubtedly “outbid” us with much more sweeping initiatives.

+ +

b. There is not a logical problem, but there is a political problem in + reconciling what you say at the UN on + May 24th with what you will be endorsing at the NATO Summit on May 30–31. Critics may + again have the opportunity to talk about the “inconsistency” of your + policies. (Many think this problem might be handled by carefully chosen + words on the role of self-defense and collective security in your UN speech.)

+

c. The mood at the UN when you speak on + the second day will probably be benign and hopeful. By the end of the + session, however, there will probably be many sharp clashes and few + concrete accomplishments. This could lead people to see the SSOD as another project of your + Administration which has gone sour.

+

Apart from these considerations, there is also the domestic political + impact. Domestically, you have been seeking to emphasize your defense + orientation so as to be on the strongest ground to fight for a SALT agreement. This appearance could go + in the opposite direction or be neutral—and the latter case would + obviously do little to advance international disarmament prospects.

+

The issue thus is:

+

Do you wish to deliver the US presentation to the SSOD on May 24th?

+

______ Yes ______ NoCarter checked the “No” + option.

+
+ +
+ + 493. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security + Affairs (Brzezinski) to Secretary + of State Vance, Secretary of + Defense Brown, Secretary of + Energy Schlesinger, the Director + of the Office of Management and Budget (McIntyre), the Representative to the United Nations + (Young), the Director of the + Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (Warnke), the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff + (Jones), the Director of Central Intelligence (Turner), and the Director of the + Office of Science and Technology Policy (Press)Source: + Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Brzezinski Office File, Subject + Chron File, Box 118, Special Session on Disarmament: 2–5/78. + Secret. + Washington, May 17, + 1978 + + SUBJECT + UN Special Session on + Disarmament + +

Having reviewed the Summary of Conclusions for the May 12 SCC meeting on the UN Special Session on Disarmament,See Document 489. + the President has decided:

+

1. The U.S. should not undertake the negative security assurance. (The + President noted that we should stand on his previous statement.)

+

2. The U.S. should not propose negotiations + designed to lead to the worldwide cessation of the production of + fissionable materials for nuclear weapons. (The President noted that we + should not disavow our past statements.)

+

3. The President will not deliver the U.S. + presentation to the SSOD on May + 24.

+ + Zbigniew + Brzezinski + +
+ +
+ + 494. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the + United NationsSource: + National Archives, RG 59, Central + Foreign Policy File, D780219–0805. Confidential; Immediate. Sent for + information to Belgrade, Bonn, London, Rome, The Hague, Ottawa, + Tokyo, Paris, Moscow, Stockholm, New Delhi, Mexico, USNATO, USUN, the Department of Defense, the Central + Intelligence Agency, and the National Security Council. Drafted by + Arch Turrentine (ACDA/MA/IR); cleared by Lyall Breckon (EUR/RPM), + Williams (DOE), Thomas Miller (P), Adam + Yarmolinsky (ACDA), + Robert Putnam (NSC), Allen (CIA), John Marcum (NSC), Roger Fritzel (JCS), + Steven Steiner (PM/DCA), Susan Flood (DOD/ISA), Alexander Shakow + (AID), Robert Reis (EB), John Joyce (S/MS), David Macuk (IO/UNP), + and Cameron Hume (S/P); and approved + by Gerald Helman (IO). + Washington, May 24, 1978, 1813Z +

132087. Subject: Guidance for US + Delegation to the UN Special Session + Devoted to Disarmament, May–June 1978.

+

1. Summary. This message outlines the US + objectives with respect to the UN + Special Session devoted to disarmament (SSOD) and provides the US + Delegation with general guidance. In addition, more detailed guidance is + provided on major disarmament issues and on the final document which the + SSOD is expected to produce + (including sections on declaration on disarmament, program of action, + and disarmament machinery). End summary.

+

2. US Objectives.

+

This administration is actively pursuing a number of specific arms + control and disarmament negotiations with a view to enhancing US security interests and promoting + international stability. The arms control and disarmament efforts of + this administration are both a high-priority and a high-visibility + element of its foreign and national security policy. During the course + of the SSOD, the US will have an opportunity to present its + position on all major disarmament issues currently under consideration + and to outline what we see as appropriate tasks for the future. In + general, what we are seeking as the main outcome of the SSOD is to sustain or accelerate the + momentum of current disarmament negotiations and to lay the basis for + realistic new programs in years ahead. With the foregoing in mind, the + US objectives for the SSOD include the following:

+

—Enhance understanding of and support for our overall arms control + objectives by other countries, and extend and improve our dialogue with + important Non-Aligned and other countries which have not shared these + objectives;

+

—Create a receptive environment and broaden support for the arms control + agreements currently under negotiation with the USSR on high priority arms control issues + (e.g. SALT, CTB, and CW);

+ +

—Make the North-South dialogue on disarmament more constructive, winning + greater Third World support and understanding for our goals—particularly + in the areas of conventional arms transfer restraints and + non-proliferation, endeavoring, in turn, to be responsive to Third World + concerns about self-restraint by the nuclear powers and access to + peaceful nuclear technology;

+

—Preserve the integrity of existing multilateral negotiating forums such + as the CCD while maintaining + flexibility with regard to proposals for procedural changes which may be + proposed to meet Non-Aligned desires for a more substantive role;

+

—Establish, through the program of action to be adopted by the SSOD, a positive but realistic arms + control and disarmament agenda for the next few years;

+

—Maintain a common position to the extent possible with our allies on + arms control matters and if the opportunity arises, encourage a more + forthcoming French and Chinese attitude to arms control initiatives of + particular importance to US;

+

—To the extent possible, utilize the SSOD to give new impetus to arms control negotiations;

+

—Gain greater public support—in the US + and abroad—for arms control and disarmament and better explain our + various efforts and relate them to one another.

+

—To resist the initiatives of others that might be inimical to basic + US security interests or to + effective, practical, and verifiable arms control agreements.

+

—Counter Soviet efforts to use SSOD as + a propaganda vehicle.

+

—Discourage and when necessary oppose impractical or misguided arms + control initiatives which would not be in the interest of the United + States, our allies or the international community.

+

3. General Guidance.

+

The US + Del should promote the objectives set + forth in para. 2 above seeking + appropriate opportunities to do so in major policy statements, in + negotiations on SSOD final document, + and in informal meetings among Delegations. Del should continue to consult closely with the key + players, and in particular with our allies. While the principal allied + consultative mechanism will continue to be the Barton Group,The Barton Group was a group of Western nations who + met to consider arms control and disarmament policy in anticipation + of the SSOD. the Western + Group of CCD members (US, UK, + FRG, Italy, Netherlands, Canada, + Japan) will meet as required but has agreed to limit its agenda to + machinery issues related to the CCD. + The US should not object to discussing + other issues in the Western Group if there is agreement to do so. In + addition, Del should maintain close + bilateral contact with UK, FRG and French. Consultations with the + Soviets will also be important, particularly with respect to nuclear + issues and other issues currently under negotiation bilaterally. While + we should stay in close touch with the Soviets on issues related to + CCD organization in general and the + co-chairmanship in + particular, we should not take positions which are less flexible than we + otherwise might be prepared to take just to maintain a common front with + the Soviets. With respect to consideration of the SSOD final document, the US + Del should make every effort consistent + with basic US policy on arms control + issues to ensure that consensus procedures are used and that voting is + avoided.

+

4. Declaration on Disarmament.

+

The declaration is essentially a political statement by governments which + outlines the problem of the growth of armaments and serves as a “call + for action.” The US can support the + concept of such a statement. At the same time, the US + Del should seek to moderate any + language which may be advanced which does not recognize that + achievements have occurred in past negotiations, which questions our + will for progress, which carries overtones of criticism of our alliances + and overseas deployments or which is contrary to US policy in such areas as non-proliferation. US + Del should work for a balanced + declaration which can be adopted, preferably as a part of the final + document, or separately, by consensus. Del may agree to language in the draft declaration on an ad + referendum basis but should submit language to Washington for USG approval of substance. Del is authorized to accept minor + editorial changes in final text which in Del’s judgement do not involve questions of substance and + should report such changes for information purposes.

+

5. Program of Action.

+

Previous work on the draft program of action indicated a considerable + divergence of views. The US + Del should work for a realistic program + which is applicable to the years ahead. We wish to avoid raising + expectations on issues which are clearly not ready for active + negotiations. The CCD has been given + the task of preparing a longer-range comprehensive program of + disarmament. The USG believes that the + CCD is the most appropriate body to + carry out this talk and is prepared to participate actively in such + work. US + Del should resist efforts to set fixed + timetables in a program of action for future negotiations. US + Del may accept giving primacy to + nuclear issues and setting as our ultimate goal the complete elimination + of nuclear weapons from the arsenals of states. However, it should also + be recognized that this process must be carried out in a way that + increases stability and makes the likelihood of conflict less. US + Del should seek to ensure that it is + recognized that the reduction of nuclear arms by nuclear weapon states + is not an isolated process but there must also be conventional arms + reductions by both nuclear weapon states and non-nuclear weapon states. + However, Del should not concede the + necessity of a specific link between nuclear and conventional arms + reductions. Del should encourage + support for recognition of conventional arms restraints, especially with + respect to arms transfers, in the program of action. The general US objective with respect to the program of action is to + reach consensus agreement on a document that will be realistic, + supportive of our arms control policies, and at a minimum, will not + disrupt a reasonable negotiating agenda for the next three to five + years. US + Del may agree to inclusion in program’s + various sections, in addition to more immediate tasks, reference to + longer term goals as long as they are consistent with US policy. US + Del may agree to language in the draft + program of action on an ad referendum basis but should submit all + language to Washington for USG + approval.

+

6. Disarmament Machinery.

+

One section of the final document to be adopted by the Special Session + will be recommendations for changes to the international machinery + dealing with arms control issues. At present, this machinery consists of + the following elements:

+

—The Conference of the Committee on Disarmament (CCD),

+

—The UNGA First Committee,

+

—The UN Center for Disarmament, and

+

—The UN Disarmament Commission (dormant + since 1965).

+

At the PrepCom meetings, several + proposals have been made for modifying disarmament machinery:

+

A. Restructure the CCD to accomplish the + following objectives:

+

(1) Abolish the US–USSR co-chairmanship, removing the + primary symbol of super-power condominium in the CCD, and replace with another system to be + agreed;

+

(2) Enlarge the membership;

+

(3) Provide for increased participation in the CCD by non-member states;

+

(4) Strengthen the relationship of the CCD to the UN.

+

B. Consider only disarmament and security issues in the UNGA First Committee, and pass other + First Committee items (e.g., outer space) to the Special Political + Committee.

+

C. Reconvene the UN Disarmament + Commission to follow-up on SSOD and + UNGA decisions and + recommendations.

+

There have also been other, primarily cosmetic, proposals for changes in + the disarmament machinery, including enhancing the role of the UNSYG and the UN Center for Disarmament; establishment of an + international institute for research on disarmament; and creation of an + international verification agency. Separate guidance will follow on + French and Dutch proposals for the creation of an international + satellite observation/verification agency.

+

In addition to these specific proposals, some fundamental changes have + been suggested by the French, including the dissolution of the CCD and its replacement by a new body + directly subordinated to the UNGA, which would have a + slightly larger membership and a Chairman appointed by the UN Secretary-General. However, most members + of the CCD are of the view that the + French will not actively participate in any multilateral negotiating + body, regardless of its structure of procedures, until after work on a + comprehensive test ban treaty has been completed.

+

The most significant and contentious proposals are those dealing with the + CCD. The impetus for the proposed + changes comes from several states, including both the Non-Aligned and + our allies, who are interested in providing for wider participation in + the work of the CCD and increasing the + role of individual members in the negotiating process vis-a-vis the + co-chairmen. Also, there is a general desire to facilitate participation + by France and the PRC in the future + work of the Committee. (France is a member of the CCD, but has never participated in the + work of the Committee.) There is widespread support for the abolition of + the co-chairmanship which most countries regard as anachronism. The + co-chairmanship is one of the stated obstacles to French participation. + The US position is that we should be + flexible but should preserve the CCD’s + ability to function as an effective negotiating body. We attach + importance to gaining French participation in the CCD and facilitating the PRC’s joining at some future time. We + could accept recommendations for a limited enlargement of the + Committee’s membership and constructive recommendations for changes in + CCD procedures, so long as the + Committee retains control over its work and continues to operate by + consensus. We would also be willing to consider ways in which non-member + states might participate, in a limited way, in the work of the + Committee. We would oppose any attempt to alter CCD procedures to conform with UNGA rules of procedure. We would not be opposed to + proposals designed to acknowledge the relationship between the UN and the CCD such as giving the SYG’s representative a more active role. In the context of + achieving a satisfactory package of recommendations regarding changes to + the CCD, we would be prepared to give + up the co-chairmanship, if a generally acceptable alternative can be + found.

+

The Soviets are more attached to the co-chairmanship than we and are + likely to hold out until late in the Session before giving way on this + point. Both the US and the USSR will use it as bargaining leverage + to insure that any recommended reforms to the CCD emerging from the SSOD are satisfactory.

+

On the aspects of the machinery question not directly related to the + CCD, we have fewer problems. We + have no objection to having the First Committee deal solely with + disarmament and related international security issues, nor do we object + to some strengthening in the staff of the UN Disarmament Center so it might carry out technical studies and research on + disarmament issues. While we are not enthusiastic about proposals to + revitalize the UN Disarmament + Commission, should momentum build behind such proposals we would not + oppose it provided its mandate were clear and limited.

+

The Soviets will continue to press for a world disarmament conference as + a follow-up to the SSOD. The US continues to believe that the conditions + which exist now or in the foreseeable future do not justify setting a + date for a world disarmament conference. However, the US will announce support for a second + SSOD to be held in several + years.

+

US + Del may agree to draft language on + disarmament machinery ad referendum and should report such language to + Washington for approval in substance. Del may accept minor editorial changes on final text, but + should inform Washington of all changes.

+

7. Possible Soviet initiatives.

+

We anticipate that USSR will offer a + number of initiatives when Foreign Minister Gromyko addresses the SSOD. Such Soviet initiatives are likely to include the + following:

+

A. Negotiations on an agreement to halt production of nuclear + weapons;

+

B. A treaty banning all new types of mass destruction weapons (MDW);

+

C. Assurance of non-use of nuclear weapons except in case of aggression + against USSR or its allies by another + nuclear power;

+

D. Negotiations on renunciation of “nuclear neutron weapons”;

+

E. A halt to development and production of new and highly destructive + conventional arms;

+

F. A freeze by permanent members of the Security Council and their allies + on their armed forces and conventional arms.

+

US + Del should report all Soviet + initiatives in detail and may indicate that the USG is giving them appropriately careful study. Guidance + will be provided subsequently on how US + Del should respond to each Soviet + initiative.

+

8. Specific Issues.

+

A. SALT. US + Del should seek to work out language + with the Soviets on SALT to propose + for the final document; along lines of the language discussed at last + PrepCom. While others, in + particular the Mexicans, may wish to leave their mark on such language, + it is particularly important that we not permit others to force a split + between the US and USSR on this issue. Language on SALT issue should be consistent with + language of UNGA + Res 32/87.UN General Assembly 32/87 G, + December 12, 1977, called for the United States and the Soviet Union + to limit and then reduce the number of nuclear weapons in their + respective stockpiles. + US + Del may agree ad referendum to language on SALT issue but should report all such + language to Washington for approval.

+

B. CTB. Since negotiations on a CTBT initiative are at a sensitive stage, + US + Del should carefully coordinate any + language on this issue with USSR and + UK Dels. Del may accept language which stresses importance of + completing negotiations as a matter of urgency, but should not accept + setting any specific deadlines or target dates. If joint language proves + possible, US + Del should seek to retain language + along lines discussed at last PrepCom, otherwise we would prefer language explicitly + stating US view that CTB should ban all tests of nuclear + explosive devices whether for peaceful or military purposes. US + Del should discourage any proposals for + a moratorium on nuclear testing.

+

C. Cut-Off. US + Del should report any proposals + regarding a cut-off of the production of fissionable materials for + nuclear weapons use. Guidance on US + response to such proposals will be provided subsequently.

+

D. Non-Proliferation. As background to nonproliferation discussions + US + Del should acknowledge responsibility + of nuclear weapons states to reduce their own arsenals—pointing to + SALT, CTB, and President Carter’s pledges to work towards nuclear disarmament. + The US should emphasize those aspects of + our non-proliferation policy that have generated considerable + international support (e.g., NPT, + INFCE, Treaty of Tlatelolco, + IAEA, NUF) and should seek to avoid being drawn into contentious + issues like the nuclear suppliers group. Del should use suitable opportunities to welcome or + encourage action by particular states on the NPT or Treaty of Tlatelolco. Relevant sections in the + non-proliferation background paperNot + found. identify appropriate countries.

+

Regarding the dispute over access to nuclear technology our objective + should be to develop among the Non-Aligned a better understand-ing of + the US position and to work for language + consistent with US nuclear export + policy. It is US policy to continue a + substantial program of international nuclear cooperation and the + initiative to be announced at the SSOD + will give further evidence of that commitment. US should not be defensive about its past record in this + area—both bilaterally and through the IAEA. Any language worked out should strike a balance + between our willingness to provide the benefits of nuclear technology to + the developing world and our responsibility to ensure that any such + exports are not misused. Such goals should not be viewed as + contradictory. Specifically, the US can + support language that argues for “the right of access” as long as + appropriate non-proliferation concerns are also recognized. “Unhindered access” to technology + is unacceptable because it is US policy + not to export certain sensitive technologies (e.g., reprocessing). Any + implication that IAEA safeguards alone + is a sufficient control measure should be avoided because US must legally require other assurances + (e.g., physical security, vetos on retransfer/reprocessing) and because + the US has raised serious questions + about the safeguardability of reprocessing plants. Our negotiating + strategy should focus on developing supplier state consensus and working + principally with Yugoslavia and other NPT parties (e.g., Iran, Mexico, Nigeria) to encourage + Non-Aligned compromise—emphasizing that only through close + supplier-recipient cooperation (e.g., INFCE) can such issues be resolved.

+

E. Disarmament/Development Link. The US + cannot accept an automatic link that would commit savings which may + accrue from disarmament to increases in development assistance. However, + the US is prepared to acknowledge that + development assistance is a high priority objective which deserves + serious consideration in the reprogramming of savings which may accrue + from disarmament. The US + Del should express general support for + a multilateral effort to define criteria which would permit the + preferential use of development aid to favor states that make + significant arms control and disarmament efforts. Such use would, of + course, have to be weighed against the other US criteria for the allocation of development aid.

+

F. Military Expenditure Reporting and Limitations. The US supports Swedish proposal for a field + test by small but representative group of states of Military Expenditure + Reporting (MER) matrix. We believe that development and general use of + such a standardized reporting instrument is a prerequisite of Military + Expenditure Limitations (MEL) agreements. Along with several other + Western States, we have announced that we will submit US military expenditures data for field + test in the interest of greater openness of information about military + spending. However, we have largely deferred to Swedish (and to a degree + Mexican, leadership in carrying case for Non-Aligned support and + participation in test. In view of failure to date of any announced + LDC participation, Del should approach Swedish Del early in the session to suggest + coordinated efforts to persuade group of fence-sitting states (possibly + India, Venezuela, Colombia, Peru, Ghana, Nigeria, and Liberia) if + possible simultaneously, to announce their participation.

+

G. Reduced Blast/Enhanced Radiation Weapons. The Soviets are likely to + continue their propaganda campaign against RB/ER weapons. In responding, + US + Del should rely on points contained in + State 110723.Not found.

+ +

9. Issues Papers supplementing these instructions have been prepared on + the following topics:

+

A) Conventional Arms Transfers

+

B) Stabilizing and Confidence-Building Measures

+

C) Eyes and Ears of Peace

+

D) Nuclear Weapons Free Zone

+

E) Peaceful Nuclear Cooperation

+

F) Non-Proliferation

+

G) Cut-Off.None of the Issues Papers were + found.

+ + Christopher + +
+ +
+ 495. Editorial Note +

On May 25, 1978, Vice President Walter F. + Mondale addressed the Special Session on Disarmament. The + United States, he said, wanted to achieve eight “bold” objectives over + the next years. It wanted to 1) “substantially cut” strategic arms + stockpiles and “place increasingly stringent qualitative limitations on + their further development;” 2) end the practice of nuclear explosions by + achieving a Comprehensive Test Ban treaty; 3) prevent the proliferation + of nuclear weapons; 4) ban “other weapons of mass destruction” such as + chemical and radiological weapons; 5) “slow down and then reverse the + sharp growth in conventional arms” transfers; 6) strengthen regional + arms control agreements; and 7) “fully develop the institutions and + expertise required for arms control; all of which would allow nations to + 8) “release additional resources for economic and social development.” + Arms control, he concluded, “must be the moral agenda of our time.” + (“Excerpts From Vice President Mondale’s Address to the U.N. Disarmament Session,” New York Times, May 25, 1978, p. A16)

+
+ +
+ + 496. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security + Affairs (Brzezinski) to President + CarterSource: Carter Library, National + Security Affairs, Staff Material, Brzezinski Office File, Subject Chron File, Box 118, + Special Session on Disarmament: 5–6/78. Secret. Aaron initialed the memorandum on + Brzezinski’s + behalf. + Washington, June 6, + 1978 + + SUBJECT + Cut-Off of Fissionable Materials and the SSOD + +

You have decided that we should not propose negotiations on a cut-off of + production of fissionable materials for nuclear weapons while not + disavowing our past statements on this issue. This leaves open the + question of whether we are prepared to enter negotiations on a cut-off + if proposed by other states at the SSOD. You asked that we consult you on any such + clarification of policy.

+

Harold Brown, joined by Warren Christopher for Cy Vance, believes that we should not + agree at this time to enter negotiations on a cut-off should such + negotiations be proposed by other states at the SSOD.Brown offered his views + in a May 25 memorandum to Brzezinski. (Ibid.) However, ACDA wishes to leave open the option of + launching negotiations in response to other initiatives. In any event, + we will want to join, if possible, the final document of the SSOD which is likely to include a general + call for cut-off negotiations.

+

Do you agree with the following clarification of our policy?

+

The U.S. Government is not prepared, at this time, to agree to enter into + specific negotiations on a cut-off, should such negotiations be proposed + by other states. However, we should be prepared to go along with a final + document of the SSOD which includes a + general call for negotiations on a cut-off.

+

Yes ______Carter checked the “Yes” option and wrote “J” in the + right-hand margin.No _______

+
+ +
+ + 497. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security + Affairs (Brzezinski) to Secretary + of State Vance, Secretary of + Defense Brown, the Director of + the Office of Management and Budget (McIntyre), the Director of the Arms Control and + Disarmament Agency (Warnke), and + the Director of the International Communication Agency (Reinhardt)Source: Carter Library, + National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Brzezinski Office File, Subject + Chron File, Box 118, Special Session on Disarmament: 6–7/78. No + classification marking. + Washington, June 8, + 1978 + + SUBJECT + Interagency Committee on Public Diplomacy and Disarmament + +

Whatever the specific accomplishments of the UN Special Session on Disarmament (SSOD), it has focused the attention of + important publics throughout the world on disarmament issues. As we move + beyond SSOD, it is desirable to foster + a more informed and rational climate of opinion in other countries + within which future official deliberations can take place. I am, + therefore, establishing under the Special Coordination Committee an + interagency committee to develop a year-long program in public diplomacy + addressing the several issues of arms control and disarmament.

+

Our goals are:

+

—to stimulate serious and constructive international discussion of + important arms control and disarmament issues;

+

—to involve a wider spectrum of thoughtful and interested foreign + individuals and institutions in a discussion involving clear statements + of the U.S. positions and policies;

+

—to help develop a broader based consensus in other countries in support + of U.S. positions; but at a minimum, to bring more serious and realistic + public deliberations to bear on the several issues;

+

—to diminish the ability of the Soviet Union and others to command public + attention in foreign countries on the basis of emotional rhetoric.

+

Among other means for achieving these goals, the committee should + consider:

+

—regional seminars and conferences bringing together leading + intellectuals for realistic discussions of arms control and disarmament + issues;

+

—visits to the U.S. by foreign journalists and scholars to discuss arms + control and disarmament issues with American counterparts;

+ +

—programs aimed at diffusing the results of these discussions to wider + audiences abroad;

+

—intensified research designed to provide U.S. policy-makers with a + clearer understanding of the views of important foreign publics.

+

You should designate an appropriate member of this interagency committee + with a rank equivalent to and not lower than that of Deputy Assistant + Secretary. The committee will be chaired by the International + Communication Agency. Final recommendations of the committee should be + completed as soon as practicable and in any event no later than August + 1, 1978.Not found. I would + appreciate your communicating to the Director of the ICA the name of + your representative to the interagency committee at your earliest + convenience. The NSC staff + representative will be Dr. Robert + Putnam.

+ + Zbigniew + Brzezinski + +
+ +
+ 498. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security + Affairs (Brzezinski) to President + CarterSource: Carter Library, National + Security Affairs, Staff Material, Brzezinski Office File, Subject Chron File, Box 118, + Special Session on Disarmament: 6–7/78. Secret. Carter wrote a “C” in the upper + right-hand corner of the first page of the memorandum indicating + that he saw the document. + Washington, June + 10, 1978 + + SUBJECT + SSOD and Negative Security + Assurances + +

On behalf of the US delegation to the + UN Special Session on Disarmament, + Averell Harriman and Andy + Young have expressed serious concern to Cy + Vance that the guidance under which they are now + operating is in several respects not sufficiently forthcoming to ensure + a positive outcome of the Special Session.In telegram 2311 from USUN, June + 7, Harriman and Young reported that “the + Non-Aligned countries view our lack of positive response at the + Special Session to their request for (A) firm negative security assurances and (B) a + commitment in principle to explore more steps toward nuclear + disarmament as being a failure of the US to take an affirmative position as required by our + obligations under the NPT.” This + failure, they argued, “precludes us from advancing important + objectives in non-proliferation, and seriously risks our being + isolated from almost all our friends.” (Ibid.) Their concerns + focus on: (1) negative security assurances; and (2) the + cutoff of the production of fissionable materials for weapons purposes. + Andy and three other members of the delegation will meet with you on + this subject on MondayJune 12. at + 1:00–1:30.

+

Attached at Tab I is a memorandum from Cy + Vance, recommending that, in light of the delegation’s + comments, you reconsider your earlier decision on negative security assurances. Harold Brown and I join in this + recommendation.

+

Although the language of the proposed negative + security assurance that we worked out last month would have + been cumbersome for a major public address, its practical significance + will be understood and welcomed now by other states at SSOD. The Vice President told the Special + Session that “we are here to listen to the voices of other nations, as + well as to raise our own on behalf of arms control and disarmament.” + US flexibility on this issue could + be offered gracefully as the fruit of thoughtful listening and could + enhance our leverage on other issues, especially non-proliferation.

+

The proposed language of the assurance has been approved by all the + concerned US Government agencies, except + for the JCS. The Chiefs’ principal + concern is that this is a “slippery slope” and that there will be + further erosion in this position. The last eight words of the proposed + negative security assurance could + give rise to varying interpretations.

+

The proposed assurance is consonant with the independent initiatives on + this subject by the UK, Japan, and other + countries, and has been cleared with both the Koreans and the Germans. + The language reads as follows:

+

“The United States will not use nuclear weapons against any non-nuclear + weapon state party to the NPT or any + comparable internationally binding commitment not to acquire nuclear + explosive devices, except in the case of an attack on the United States, + its territories or armed forces, or its allies by such a state allied to + a nuclear weapon state, or associated with a nuclear weapon state in + carrying out or sustaining the attack.”

+

In light of these considerations, do you wish to authorize our delegation + to state agreement with the language of the proposed negative security assurances?

+

Yes ______Carter checked the “Yes” option and wrote “J” in the + right-hand margin. No ______

+

Depending on your decision, we will supply appropriate talking points for + your meeting with the delegation on Monday.

+ +

When Harriman and Young drafted their cable to Vance on behalf of the delegation, + they were not aware of your recent action clarifying your earlier + decision on cutoff. As Secretary Vance points out, that clarification should be + sufficient to reassure the delegation that they will have sufficient + flexibility on this issue at the Special Session.

+

Tab 1

+

Memorandum From Secretary of State Vance to President CarterSecret.

+

Washington, June 10, 1978

+ + SUBJECT + Special Session on Disarmament + +

Ambassadors Young and Harriman have reported to me that the + success of our efforts to ensure a positive UN Special Session on Disarmament, as well as to protect + our non-proliferation interests, may hinge on our response to the desire + of non-nuclear weapons states for firm negative + security assurances and a commitment in principle to explore + more steps to achieve nuclear disarmament. Both of these demands reflect + general commitments we made under the Non-Proliferation Treaty in return + for the promise of other states not to acquire or develop nuclear + weapons. I support the suggestion of Ambassadors Young and Harriman that you review our position on these two + issues.

+

All of the other nuclear weapon states have stated their readiness to + offer additional assurances to non-nuclear weapon states or have already + done so, and the non-nuclear weapon states have strongly urged that we + do so. We risk being isolated on this issue, even from some close + allies. Prime Minister Callaghan + told the Session that the UK wants to + agree with other nuclear weapon states to give such assurances. I urge + you to reconsider your decision on this matter.

+

Ambassadors Young and Harriman and I suggest that the United + States be prepared to state agreement with the language of our proposed + negative security assurance that + had received general interagency (JCS + however remained hesitant) and Allied approval last month. It would + clearly strengthen the delegation’s hand on a major SSOD issue. How it is implemented will be + important, particularly with the Federal Republic of Germany and + Republic of Korea. I believe it would be best that the United Kingdom continue to + take the lead in suggesting this specific language.

+

The negative security formulation we had been considering is:

+

“The United States will not use nuclear weapons against any non-nuclear + weapon state party to the NPT or any + comparable internationally binding commitment not to acquire nuclear + explosive devices, except in the case of an attack on the United States, + its territories or armed forces, or its allies by such a state allied to + a nuclear weapon state, or associated with a nuclear weapon state in + carrying out or sustaining the attack.”

+

Second, Ambassadors Young and + Harriman have provided + suggested language for a US statement of + policy concerning the conditions under which we might eventually explore + the possibility of a cutoff of the production of fissionable material. + They did this before your recent decision providing guidance on how to + handle cutoff at the SSOD. Their + language goes too far in implying that we could move automatically after + SALT II and CTB “to explore the possibilities for + negotiations” of additional measures, including a cutoff. But I believe + your guidance solves the problem.

+
+ +
+ 499. Memorandum of ConversationSource: Department of State, Office of the Secretariat + Staff, Cyrus R. Vance, + Secretary of State—1977–1980, Lot 84D241, Box 10, EXDIS + Memcons, 1978. Secret; Exdis. The meeting took place in the + Cabinet Room. + Washington, June 12, 1978, + 1:05–1:35 p.m. + + SUBJECT + Summary of the President’s Meeting with Representatives of the + U.S. Delegation to the United Nations Special Session on + Disarmament + + + PARTICIPANTS + President Jimmy + Carter + Vice President Walter + Mondale + Cyrus Vance, the Secretary + of State + Ambassador Andrew Young, + U.S. Representative to the UN + Ambassador James Leonard, + Jr., U.S. Deputy Representative to the UN + David Aaron, Deputy + Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs + Marjorie Benton, U.S. Delegation to the UN Special Session on Disarmament + Paul Newman, U.S. Delegation to the UN Special Session on Disarmament + Robert D. Putnam, National + Security Council Staff Member + + +

The President opened the meeting by thanking the + delegation for their service at the Special Session. He pointed out that + a number of new U.S. arms control policies had been undertaken in the + last sixteen months, in such areas as non-proliferation, SALT, CTB, ASAT, Indian Ocean, + and conventional arms transfers. In this latter field, we have + unilaterally imposed a series of annual reductions, while honoring + previous commitments in a minimal way. We are in close consultation with + our key allies and other powers on this topic. At the Special Session + the delegation can stand on this solid record. The President recalled + his discussions with Callaghan, + Schmidt, and Giscard about their proposals to the + Special Session. We are in the midst of reinvigorating the MBFR talks and have recently had a fairly + favorable response in those talks. In short, progress is being made on a + number of fronts. How can we now help constructively to make a success + of SSOD and to lay the ground work for + future arms control efforts?

+

Ambassador Young reported that the Vice President’s + speechSee Document + 495. had set a realistic tone for a serious + discussion of complex issues at the Special Session. Other countries + recognized that the U.S. is taking the Special Session seriously. To the + extent that there was any disappointment, it was because there had been + high hopes for U.S. moral leadership, embodied perhaps in one or two + creative initiatives. The Vice President had said that we were there to + listen, however, leaving open the possibility that our policies would + evolve. The U.S. Delegation wanted to report to the President mid-way + through the Special Session on possible U.S. contributions to building a + consensus document.

+

The President asked what we could do now to be + more constructive.

+

Ambassador Young reported that he and Governor Harriman had worked out some language + that might be helpful. Under the non-proliferation treaty, all nuclear + powers are committed to moving to eliminate our nuclear arsenals and to + offering security assurances to non-nuclear weapons states. On the + latter, the President came close in his speech at the United + Nations,See footnote 4, Document 473. and the language that + Cy Vance has recommended + would go the rest of the way. The delegation’s original instructions to + oppose cutoff proposals were insufficiently forthcoming. The new + language that the President has approved would give the delegation + latitude on cutoff. We are far ahead of the Soviets on this issue.

+

The President interjected that on negative security assurances he is + prepared to let Cy Vance issue a + statement along the lines of the language that had been worked out + previously.

+ +

Ambassador Leonard said that this assurance should be + offered in a most solemn way. He proposed that Secretary Vance issue the statement in the name + of the President, possibly at New York next week.

+

The President said it should be done without + delay. Otherwise, the decision would ooze out and be subject to + misinterpretation. Are there things at SSOD, beyond these two, that are important?

+

Ambassador Young replied that as the Vice President had + announced, the United States favors a follow-up conference. We are + pushing for greater openness about military budgets. We are in a good + position at the Special Session. He said he had underestimated the + significance of SSOD.

+

The President asked if there was more substance to + it than Ambassador Young had + expected.

+

Ambassador Young replied that SSOD will start a process. Other nations are looking to us + for leadership. As in the case of the Seventh Special Session on + North/South economic relations,The UN’s Seventh Special Session devoted to + improving the economic prospects of the developing countries took + place in September 1975. See Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, vol. E–14, + Part 1, Documents on the United Nations, 1973–1976, Documents + 27, 28, and 29. this Special + Session is the beginning of a longer process, and between now and 1981, + SSOD will continue to have + echoes.

+

The President noted that it is important that the + U.S. Delegation emphasize at SSOD what + we have already done, including our efforts to get full adherence to the + Treaty of Tlatelolco, and to control conventional weapons in Latin + America. He noted that we could make still more progress if others would + adopt the policies that the United States had unilaterally imposed upon + itself on conventional arms transfers. Third, the delegation can + emphasize the important steps that we have taken in the area of + non-proliferation and should make every effort to get other countries to + join in these initiatives.

+

The Secretary of State remarked that there is only + one country which has not joined us on Tlatelolco,France. and that country is beginning to + feel the pressure.

+

Ambassador Leonard noted that it is important that the + U.S. is continuing to make progress on SALT and on CTB, but even + so, other nations fear that there are no ceilings yet on the arms + race.

+

The President interjected that they’re right.

+

Ambassador Leonard continued that a cutoff is needed in + order to impose a ceiling on the arms race. The new guidance will give + the delegation a good posture for achieving a consensus document at the + Special Session, although + we will be pressed to commit ourselves to specific negotiations. He + hoped that the President would continue to follow up on the cutoff + study.See Documents + 484 and 485. He and + others believe that cutoff would be in our national security interest. + However, he recognized that the study has not progressed to a point + which would allow us to make that case and, therefore, the guidance does + not extend that far.

+

Mr. Newman noted that these decisions will help + immensely the morale of the U.S. Delegation in New York and it will help + significantly in achieving consensus at the Special Session. It will + help, for example, in heading off the Iraqi resolution condemning the + United States and Israel for armaments in the Middle East.

+

The President asked that Secretary Vance, Ambassador Young, and Mr. Aaron work on the announcement of the + negative security assurance.

+

Ambassador Young noted that over the last five years opinion + polls have shown, without much variation, 75% approval of both SALT and détente. The only exception was + the period in 1976 when President Ford rejected the word “détente,” but thereafter, the + proportion went back up from 50% to 75%. He hoped that we could use + SSOD to rally American public + opinion in support of SALT.

+

Ms. Benton suggested to the President in this + context that he do a fireside chat on SALT and détente, to clarify Administration policy.

+

The President termed this an excellent idea that + we would work on. We are evolving a public relations campaign to sell + SALT to the American people and to + the Senate. In the absence of an agreed treaty, it would be premature to + work in that direction. We have agreed with the Soviets not to reveal + details of the negotiations at this time. But at this point we are in + good shape in terms of U.S. public opinion, with a ratio of 78 to 12 in + favor of SALT, almost the reverse of + the split on the Panama Canal at the outset.Public opinion polls taken in 1977 as the Carter administration resumed the + final negotiations of the Panama Canal treaty revealed that over 70% + of the American public opposed the treaty, which would have given + control over the canal zone to Panama. The Republicans have + decided to campaign against SALT, + although that will be a serious mistake on their part. Some Republicans, + like Matthias, Kissinger, and + Ford may support SALT, but most will campaign against it. + In this case, however, we will have public opinion on our side. He + repeated his thanks to the delegation for their contribution to the work + of the Special Session. He noted his appreciation for Harold Willens’ + article in the New York Times on the importance + of press coverage of SSOD.Harold Willens, “Where Are the Media?,” New York Times, June 11, 1978, p. + E21.

+
+ +
+ + 500. Memorandum From the President’s Deputy Assistant for National + Security Affairs (Aaron) to + Secretary of State Vance, + Secretary of Defense Brown, + Secretary of Energy Schlesinger, + the Director of the Office of Management and Budget (McIntyre), the Representative to the + United Nations (Young), the + Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (Warnke), the Chairman of the Joint + Chiefs of Staff (Jones), the Director of Central Intelligence (Turner), and the Director of the + Office of Science and Technology Policy (Press)Source: + Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Brzezinski Office File, Subject + Chron File, Box 118, Special Session on Disarmament: 6–7/78. + Secret. + Washington, June + 14, 1978 + + SUBJECT + Cutoff of Fissionable Materials and the SSOD + +

The President has clarified, as follows, our position at the UN Special Session on Disarmament on the + issue of the cutoff of production of fissionable materials for nuclear + weapons:

+

The U.S. Government is not prepared, at this time, to agree to enter into + specific negotiations on a cut-off, should such negotiations be proposed + by other states. However, we should be prepared to go along with a final + document of the SSOD which includes a + general call for negotiations on a cut-off.

+ + David + Aaron + +
+ +
+ 501. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department + of StateSource: National + Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign + Policy File, D780274–0227. Confidential; Immediate. Sent to all + diplomatic posts as telegram 168947, July 4, (National Archives, + RG 59, Central Foreign Policy + File, D780275–0390. + New York, July 3, 1978, 1536Z +

2774. Dept. Please pass to all + diplomatic posts. Subject: Special Session on Disarmament—Wrap-up.

+ +

1. Summary: The plenary of the Special Session on Disarmament concluded + in early hours July 1 with the adoption by consensus of the draft final + document as transmitted in USUN + 2726,Telegram 2726 from USUN, June 29, contains the ad referendum text of the SSOD’s final declaration on + disarmament. (National Archives, RG + 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780268–0853) 2727,Telegram 2727 from USUN, June 29, reported that the Eastern European bloc + countries objected to the reference in the ad + referendum text of the SSOD’s final declaration on disarmament “to ‘principle’ + of ‘creating new forums’ relating to disarmament and one section + which is an Italian proposal supported by no other Delegations. It + is expected that Italian language and EE block brackets will dropped + during debate in ad hoc committee on June 29.” (National Archives, + RG 59, Central Foreign Policy + File, D780268–0950) and 2751Telegram 2751 from USUN, June 30, + contains the text of the final document of the SSOD. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, + D780270–0419) (NOTAL). Forty-five countries expressed views + and/or reservations at the closing meeting. This message provides our + assessment of the significance of the Session. End summary.

+

2. As the first global conference on disarmament since 1932, the Special + Session inevitably raised high expectations. Many hoped for major + breakthroughs or fresh departures in the field of arms control and + disarmament. Given the sharply differing views on the approach to and + objectives of the Special Session among the major groups and key + players, and the importance of these issues to security interests of all + nations, the prospects for consensus seemed remote. The consensus + outcome can be attributed to the determination of a number of key + Delegations and individuals, and readiness finally to compromise on a + number of difficult issues. Recognition of the importance of ongoing + efforts in disarmament negotiations was also an important factor.

+

3. The result is a final document which constitutes an agreement by the + international community, including the nuclear weapons states and our + Western allies, to a broad agenda of goals and priorities for + disarmament negotiations in the years ahead. The text, while not fully + meeting the desires of any single country or group of nations, has + generally been well received by Delegations. Our allies have told us + that they are satisfied with the result and believe it will get a good + reception in their countries.

+

4. Our acceptance of the final document except for a few reservations is + seen by the Non-Aligned and others as evidence that we are attaching + more importance to multilateral disarmament efforts. At the same time, + we believe that our political and security interests have been fully + preserved. Our reservations on some nuclear questions have clarified to + others our specific concerns without undercutting the basic consensus + which has been attained.

+

5. The outcome of the Special Session is seen here as the beginning of a + new phase in which the UN and its + associated bodies will henceforth play a larger role in disarmament issues. Among the significant + achievements we would highlight the participation of France in the + restructured Disarmament Committee and the higher profile China has + shown in the arms control arena. The decisions to enlarge the + Disarmament Committee (DC) and to revive the UN Disarmament Commission reflect the greater interest by + more states in participation in international disarmament deliberations. + An immediate follow-up problem will be the selection of the 5 to 8 new + members of the DC. An intensive lobbying campaign by interested states + has already begun.

+

6. Another significant result is the recognition by the international + community of the importance of conventional arms issues, particularly + international transfers. The Japanese deserve considerable credit for + perservering on this issue. We were also able to avoid reference to the + controversial issue of production.

+

7. In the final text, the urgency of undertaking negotiations in the area + of nuclear disarmament is acknowledged but in such a manner as to make + clear that these negotiations must proceed in a measured and ordered + fashion. Our commitment to the earliest possible completion of SALT II and CTB as well as our new policy statement on security + assurances helped our position at the SSOD. In the end the Indians did not press for a vote on + their draft resolution for a nuclear test moratorium.

+

8. The Indians also sought to include a call for a binding international + commitment on the non-use of nuclear weapons. The final text on non-use + was a delicate compromise on this highly sensitive problem. Indian + PermRep Jaipal expressed his + appreciation of our readiness to be forthcoming on this issue in his + statement to the ad-hoc committee on June 30.

+

9. The non-proliferation section, while clearly not all we wanted, give + clear expression to the importance of international action to prevent + further proliferation of nuclear weapons. The underlying differences of + view between US and key non-nuclear + states (Brazil, Pakistan, India) inevitably remain.

+

10. By working out the final consensus we headed off a number of + unacceptable proposals including: the Indian characterization of nuclear + weapons use as a crime against humanity, the Non-Aligned demand for + withdrawal of foreign bases, and the Soviet texts on the neutron bomb + and the non-stationing of nuclear weapons on territories of states where + they are not now present. The two Indian resolutions and the + Iraqi-inspired resolution against Israel were withdrawn, enabling US to avoid confrontations on several + highly contentious issues. There was also a plethora of other issues and + proposals on which consensus was not possible and which were handled by + a decision to refer them to the appropriate deliberative body + (Disarmament Commission or the 33rd UNGA).

+ +

11. Assessment of performance. Ironically France emerges as perhaps the + least satisfied Delegation. While on the one hand they did work out the + terms of an agreement enabling them to join the reconstituted + Disarmament Committee, all of their initiatives were blocked by Soviet + objections. Thus, their proposals for an international satellite + verification agency, an international disarmament fund for development + and an International Research Institute have simply been included in a + follow-up section for possible consideration by the 33rd UNGA, where they are likely to receive + approval in a voting situation.

+

12. Of the other allies, the British were by far the most active, + particularly on nuclear and machinery questions. Although at times they + were in our view a bit over-zealous, they provided help on crucial + issues, especially in the nuclear field, with deft drafting that broke + several stalemates. The British also acted as spokesmen for the EC–9, + most of the rest of whose members were comparatively passive except on + issues of particular concern to their narrow national interests (e.g. + membership in the new negotiating body). The Netherlands, Canada, + Australia and New Zealand, who have been firm supporters of + non-proliferation efforts, vigorously participated in the extremely + difficult negotiations on this issue. Canada initially lobbied hard for + the proposals put forward by Prime Minister Trudeau in his plenary speech on nuclear disarmament, + including the cessation of flight testing, but retreated when they got a + cold shoulder from most allies and no support from the Non-Aligned who + wanted to maintain their own proposals intact. The Danes and Norwegians + who talk a good game on general disarmament issues, contributed little + except to warn us off from a corridor effort to find satisfactorily weak + language in which to take note of the Soviet proposal on non-stationing + of nuclear weapons in areas where they are not now present. Australia + and New Zealand, in a somewhat quixotic and poorly coordinated move, + associated themselves the the Indian draft resolution calling for a + moratorium on nuclear testing at a time when we and the Indians were + working behind the scenes to reach the compromise on language in the + program of action which eventually killed the resolution.

+

13. The Western European neutrals played no significant role. The Swedes + were surprisingly ineffective. Their leader, Mrs. Thorsson, a lion in + past disarmament debates, remained in the background expressing her + general displeasure in private but taking no active part in the drafting + of the final document. This posture probably reflects her loss of + standing with the Non-Aligned as a result of her tough tactics at the + NPT review conference. Swedish + CCD Ambassador Hamilton was + coordinator of the drafting group that produced the non-nuclear portions + of the program of action but did not provide strong leadership. The + Finns were completely out of the action except for a weak effort in + private to try to draft a + bland compromise final document. This document never surfaced in + committee. The Austrians were moderately active in an attempt to give + credibility to their bid for membership in the new CD.

+

14. The Soviets seem to have come prepared to obtain as great an + advantage as they could but finally agreed to join a reasonable + consensus. In our judgement they obtained very little i.e. some + reflection of the Brezhnev + proposal on a halt in the production of nuclear weapons and a very + lukewarm endorsement of an eventual world disarmament conference but no + mention of the neutron bomb to which they had attached considerable + importance. On machinery they negotiated hard to keep changes to a + minimum but showed sufficient flexibility to enable a deal to be struck + on the negotiating body.

+

15. The Non-Aligned by no means achieved all they wanted but did not go + away angry. They now have a greater stake and a larger role in + international disarmament efforts. Despite the early establishment of a + coordinating group, they had no cohesive leadership and in the end they + fragmented. On some issues such as non-proliferation they were divided + among themselves. Our impression is that there was a behind-the-scenes + struggle between the radicals and the more moderate states. An example + of the radical pressures was the Cuban effort to retain language on the + dismantling of foreign military bases which was supported by the more + moderate Non-Aligned until it become clear that the West would not + yield. We also found ourselves in protracted bilateral discussions with + the Ghanaian and Egyptian delegations on issues which preoccupied them, + (“racist regimes” and Middle East NWFZ), a further reflection of lack of focus and coordination + in the Non-Aligned group. Pakistan stood alone on many issues and + created enormous difficulties up until the closing moments.

+

16. The real leadership in the session came from Committee Chairman Ortiz + De Rozas of Argentina with the strong Assistance of Ambassador Garcia Robles of Mexico who was named + “super-coordinator” in the closing days, and Nigeria’s CCD Ambassador Adeniji who was the + coordinator for the nuclear section of the program of action. Their + combination of firmness and sensitivity to the real concerns of the key + countries in the various groups made consensus possible.

+ + Leonard + +
+ + +
+ +
+ + + +
+ + Index +

References are to document numbers

+ + + + Aaron, David L. + ASAT talks + At Vienna Summit, 56 + Hostile acts agreement, 52 + Priorities in, 36 + Protection of satellites, 43 + Special Coordination Committee meetings on, 29, 34, 35, 43, 59 + Third round, 46 + + + Carter-Gromyko talks, 201, 221 + Chemical weapons + CD Working Group, 104, + 105 + Funding for binary weapons, 139 + Policy Review Committee meetings on policy for, + 68 + Special Coordination Committee meetings on, 95, 96, 104, 139 + Vienna Summit discussion of, 101 + + + Comprehensive test ban + Carter-Gromyko discussions of, 201, 221 + Carter meeting with nuclear laboratory officials + on, 206 + Carter-Thatcher talks on, 242 + SCC discussion of, 205, + 207, 228, 252 + SCC work program for discussions of, 164 + + + Conventional arms transfers + Dollar volume ceilings, 268 + Policy Review Committee meetings on, 266, 290 + U.S.-Soviet talks on, 281, 294, 295, 303 + Vienna Summit discussion of, 309 + + + Non-proliferation Treaty, 318, + 388 + Nuclear proliferation, 317, 326, 381, + 398, 401, 444 + Nuclear testing, 235, 253, 254 + Policy Review Committee meetings, 68, 317, 381 + Special Coordination Committee meetings + ASAT, 29, 34, 35, 43, 59 + Chemical weapons, 95, + 96, 104, 139 + Comprehensive test ban, 205, 207, 228, 252 + Conventional arms transfers, 281, 294, 295, 303 + Nuclear testing, 253, + 254 + Special Session on Disarmament, 489 + Sverdlovsk incident, 112, 129, 135 + + Special Session on Disarmament, 479, 486, 489, 496, + 499, 500 + Sverdlovsk incident, 112, 113, 120, + 129, 135 + U.S.-Argentine relations, 468 + Vienna Summit (June 1979), 56, 101, + 309 + + ABM Treaty (1972), 6, 131, 161 + Acland, Sir Antony, 137 + Acosta Hernandez, Valentin, 288, 432 + Ad Hoc Interagency Group on Arms Transfer, 269 + Ad Hoc Interagency Group on Nuclear Proliferation, 325, 358, 375, 463, 470 + Adams, Michael, 453 + Aden, Alberto, 439 + Adeniji, Oluyemi, 501 + Adsens, John, 324 + Afghanistan (see also Soviet invasion of + Afghanistan) + Non-ratification of Geneva Protocol by, 62 + Policy Review Committee meeting on, 253 + Refugees in Pakistan from, 110 + Use of chemical weapons in + International investigation into, 122 + Quadrilateral discussions of, 106, 107, 126 + Reports of, 104, 132 + U.S. statements at CW talks, 108, 126, 128 + U.S. strategy for, 110 + Vance-Dobrynin talks on, 117 + + + Africa (see also Conventional arms + transfers to Africa; Ethiopia; Nigeria; South Africa, Republic of) + High-tension areas in, 304 + + Nuclear free zone in, 386 + + Agnew, Harold, 198, 206, 209, 210 + Agreements, international (see also + Biological Weapons Convention (1972); + Comprehensive test ban (CTB); Limited Test Ban Treaty (1963); Tlatelolco Treaty) + Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty (1972), 6, 131, 161 + Argentine-Brazilian agreement on nuclear cooperation, 461, 466 + Ayacucho Declaration, 288, 296, 304 + Ban on new weapons systems (proposed), 153 + Basic Principles of Relations between the U.S. and the + U.S.S.R (1972), 285, 293 + Brussels Treaty (1948), 342 + Canada-EURATOM Agreement for Cooperation (1959), 355 + Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by + Space Objects (1972), 39 + Convention on Registration of Objects Launched into Outer + Space (1975), 39 + Geneva Protocol (1925), 62, 77, + 81, 106, 110 + International Telecommunications Convention, 6 + Japan-U.S. Nuclear Cooperation Agreement (1968), 341 + “Measures Agreement to Reduce the Outbreak of Nuclear + War,” 6 + Nuclear Test Moratorium (1958), + 206, 232, 286 + Outer Space Treaty (1967), 6, 39, 43 + Panama Canal Treaty, 434, 499 + Peaceful Nuclear Explosions (PNE) Treaty, 102, 141, + 146, 153, 210, 243 + Rush-Bagot Amendment, 413 + Threshold Test Ban Treaty (1974), + 141, 146, 153, 158, 173, + 243 + Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (1969), 433, + 434 + + Ahearne, John, 364 + Ahlberg, David, 63 + Air defense systems, 263 + Airborne warning and control system (AWACS), 263, 277, 278, 286, 287 + Aircraft + AH–1 Cobra helicopter, 263 + B–1 bomber, 196, 478 + C–130, 263, 273, 275, 276 + CH–47 cargo helicopters, 263 + E–3, 263 + F–5E, 263, 312 + F–18L, 312 + Heavy bombers, definition of, 177 + MIG–23, 303 + P–3, 406 + U–2, 489 + + Akalovsky, Alexander, 79, 84, 94 + Alarcón de Quesada, Ricardo, 422 + Alaska, 241, 245 + Alcohol as energy source, 427, 433 + Aleksandrov-Argentov, Andrei M., 56, 101, 236, 309 + Alexander, Michael, 242 + Algeria, 146, 300, 359, 471 + Allen, George, 281, 290, 294, 295, 486, 494 + Allen, Lew, Jr., 57 + Alternative energy, 427 + Ammunition, 263, 265 + Anderson, David, 12, 28, 62, 278, 357 + Andreani, Jacques, 157, 476 + Andriotti, Giulio, 342 + Andrus, Cecil D., 2, 5, 27 + Angola, 304 + Angra I reactor (Brazil), 424, 461 + Anthrax + Intestinal, 116, 117, 121, + 129, 131, 137 + Pulmonary, 111, 113, 120, + 126, 129, 131, 137 + + Anti-ballistic Missile Treaty (1972), 6, 131, 161 + Anti-Satellite (ASAT) weapons + Arms competition in, 6 + Ban on, 5, 7, 11, 12, 13, + 478 + Comprehensive agreement on, 51 + Congressional funding for, 35 + Control of, 6, 7, 9, 10, 13, 18 + Démarche to Dobrynin on, 49, 50 + DOD position, 7, 9 + High-energy laser weapons’ role as, 15, 26, 40 + No-first-use pledge for, 31 + Office of Science and Technology Policy’s Space Advisory + Group report on, 8 + Soviet systems, 4, 9, 28, 34, 35, + 40 + + Space shuttle seen as, 6, 20, 29, + 47, 52, 56, 60 + Special Coordination Committee meetings on + Dismantling of Soviet systems, 34, 40 + Option for talks on, 11, + 17, 29, 31, 43, 59 + Testing ban, 34, 35, 68 + Text of agreement at, 34 + Treaty on, 16, 17 + U.S.-Soviet talks, 281 + + + Survivability of, 6, 8 + Talks on + First round review, 33 + Second round, 37, 38, 39, 41, 42, 43, 44 + Third round, 46, 47, 48, 50, 51, 53, 54 + Agenda for possible future rounds, 59 + Approval of goals for, 11, 18 + Brezhnev-Carter message exchanges on, 5, 14, + 20 + Carter’s desire for, 5, + 6 + Definitions as discussed in, 54 + Hostile acts agreement, 52 + Illegal satellites, 42, + 43, 44, 46, 53 + Initiation of process for, 1 + Interagency Working Group on, 17, 29, 34, 43 + Issue paper for, 6, 9, 11 + JCS position, 4 + Joint communiqué on, 55 + Options for, 31 + Presidential Directives for, 32, 38, 40 + Priorities in, 36 + Satellite protection, 42, + 43, 44 + Satellites shared with third countries, 42, 43, 44 + Scheduling of, 29, 31 + Soviet interest and objectives in, 60 + Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, effect on, 57, 60 + Special Coordination Committee discussion of + options for, 11, 17, 29, 31, 43, 59 + Stalling of, 316 + Status of, 60 + Suspension of testing during talks on, 28, 33, 34, 35, 37, 40 + U.S. framework for, 16 + U.S. initiatives for, 12, + 13 + U.S. support for, 138 + Vance-Dobrynin discussions, 12, 13, 49, 50 + Vance-Gromyko discussions, 3, 6, 13, 55, 56 + Vienna Summit discussion of, 42, 55, 56 + + + Testing of + Altitude distinctions in, 35, 40 + Ban on + Agency disagreements on, 29, 31, 34, 35 + As protocol to treaty, 51 + Broadening of, 53 + Comprehensive test ban as affected by, 40 + JCS position, 34, + 35 + Soviet questions around, 41, 47 + Special Coordination Committee meetings on, + 34, 35, 68 + U.S. proposals for, 37 + + + By Soviets, 33, 58 + Flight test demonstrations, 19 + For improvement of, 18, + 19, 21, 22 + Laser systems, 36, 37, 50, 59 + + + Treaty on + Agreement in Vienna, possible, 42 + Consultations as part of, 49 + Relative impact of, 17 + SALT agreement ratification as supported by, 5, 12, + 40, 43 + Soviet position, 60 + Special Coordination Committee meetings on, 16, 17 + Testing ban as protocol to, 51 + + + U.S. capabilities + Alternative possibilities for development of, 6, 8 + Flight test demonstrations, 19 + JCS position, 4 + Office of Science and Technology Policy report on, + 8 + Operational testing for improvement of + Presidential Directives on, 23, 24, 25, 36 + Removal of restrictions on, 18, 19, 21, 22 + + + Policy review on, 2 + + Research and development program for, 46 + + + Verification of capabilities for, 4, 6, 13, 30, 31, 59 + York-Shchukin discussion of, 30 + + Anti-submarine warfare, 6, 406 + Apartheid, 144 + Arafat, Yasser, 269 + Argentina (see also Argentine Tlatelolco + Treaty accession) + Ayacucho Declaration, 288 + Biological Weapons Convention adherence by, 453 + Brazilian agreement for nuclear cooperation, 461, 466 + Brazilian nuclear competition with, 401, 417, 422, 443, + 445 + Brazilian-U.S. relations, 439 + Comprehensive test ban, 145, + 146, 211, 224 + Conventional arms transfers, 260, 297, 300 + FRG nuclear sales to, 462, 466, 467 + Full-scope safeguards for + Argentine discussion with IAEA on, 439, 443 + Argentine position, 364, + 395, 422 + FRG position, 462 + OPANAL views on, 411 + U.S.-Argentine agreement on, 426 + U.S. dilemma with, 458 + U.S-Soviet discussion of, 348 + U.S. strategy for, 419, + 459 + + INFCE conference, 420, 422 + Non-proliferation Treaty, 327, + 439, 443 + Non-ratification of Biological Weapons Convention by, 62 + Nuclear materials and equipment + Atucha II reactor, 448, + 466, 470 + European nuclear fuel transfers, 396 + Heavy water exports to, 420, 429, 439, 445, 448 + Heavy water production technology assistance + By Canada, 447, + 448, 452, 454 + By FRG, 447, 448, 454, 456, 462 + By Switzerland, 454, 456, 457, 459, 460 + By the Soviet Union, 448, 468 + By the United States, 364, 401, 426, 429 + U.S. dilemma from, 458 + + Plutonium production by, 381, 443 + Research reactor exports to Peru, 429, 466 + U.S. highly enriched uranium exports, 463 + U.S. reactor part exports, 470 + + Nuclear proliferation + In the post-INFCE era, 375, 466, 467 + Motives for, 327 + U.S.-Argentine talks on, 357, 381, 420, 466, 467 + U.S. meeting with UN Delegates on, 359 + U.S. position, 395 + + Nuclear reprocessing, 417, 426, 439, + 443 + Nuclear weapons development by, 415, 431 + Peaceful nuclear explosions, 211, 224, 439, 443 + RA–3 reactor, 459, 463 + RA–6 reactor, 459 + Regional equilibrium as need for, 426, 429 + Regional nuclear cooperation, 419 + Seismic stations in the Falklands, 251 + Soviet Union, relations with, 468 + Special Session on Disarmament, 471, 475 + U.S. nuclear cooperation with, 419, 459, 468 + U.S. relations with, 439, 442, 443, + 466, 468 + + Argentine Commission on Atomic Energy (CNEA), 422, 429, 459 + Argentine Tlatelolco Treaty accession + ACDA position, 407 + Agreement to, 437 + Announcement of ratification, 439 + Argentine backpedaling on, 365, + 453, 460, 462 + Argentine commitment for ratification, 426, 439 + + Argentine conditions for, 431 + As requirement for entry into force of treaty, 406, 419 + Carter-Videla talks on, 420, + 422, 432 + Delaying in signing, 422, 453 + Possibility of, 469 + Soviet position, 449 + U.S.-Argentine discussions of, 425, 429, 434 + U.S.-French discussion of, 361 + U.S.-Mexican discussion of, 411 + U.S. nuclear cooperation and, 419, 459 + U.S.-Soviet discussions of, 428 + U.S. support for, 419 + U.S.-Venezuelan discussion of, 416 + Warnke’s presentation on, 428 + + Arita, Keisuke, 239 + Armacost, Michael, 320, 329, 345, 352 + Armitage, John, 346 + Armored personnel carriers (APCs), 263 + Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) + Anti-Satellite (ASAT) weapons, 7, + 9, 13 + + Talks on, 1, 43, 44, 46, 59 + Testing ban, 34, 35, 478 + + + Chemical weapons + CD working group on, 104, 105 + Funding for binary weapons production, 95, 97 + PRM/NSC 27, 66 + Retention of current U.S. stockpile of, 68 + U.S. policy toward, 61 + Use in Asia of, 110, + 122 + + Clinch River reactor funding, 322 + Comprehensive test ban + CD working group on, 386 + Criteria for renewal of, 203 + Five-year review, 194 + Fixed duration treaty, 197 + Non-proliferation value of, 210, 211 + On-site inspections, 180, 196 + Peaceful nuclear explosions as accommodated under, + 145 + + Conventional arms transfers, 261, 287, 290, 295, + 301, 307, 316 + Cutoff and transfer agreements, 489, 491, 492 + FRG nuclear sales to Brazil, 401 + Hostile acts in space, 29, 31 + NPT Review Conference, 388 + Nuclear fuel, 358, 392, 424, + 489, 491, 492 + Nuclear proliferation, 210, 211, 343, + 348 + Nuclear reprocessing, 344, 354 + Nuclear testing, 158, 161, 172, + 248, 254, 255 + Seismic stations, 248, 255 + Special Session on Disarmament, 479, 481, 489, 491, + 492, 496 + Sverdlovsk incident, 133, 135 + Tlatelolco Treaty, 407, 425 + U.S. reactor part exports to Argentina, 470 + + Arms Export Control Board, 268 + Armstrong, Robert, 242 + Army Chemical Corps, 95 + Arria, Diego, 416 + Ashworth, George, 139 + Aspin Committee, 131 + Assad, Hafez al-, 20 + Atherton, Alfred, 321 + Atomic Energy Detection System, 210 + Atucha II reactor (Argentina), 448, 466, 470 + Aubert, Pierre, 457, 467 + Australia + Biological Weapons Convention Review Conference, 119 + Chemical weapons, 76, 106 + Comprehensive test ban, 144 + Conventional arms transfers, 268, 269, 270, 271, + 275, 276 + Fuel cycle evaluation program, 355 + Nuclear cooperation with the United States, 372 + Nuclear fuel exports by, 383 + Nuclear proliferation, 329, 359, 364, + 369, 375 + Nuclear reprocessing by, 369 + Seismic stations in, possible, 226, 232 + Special Session on Disarmament, 471, 477, 501 + + Austria, 364, 365, 471, 475, 501 + Ayacucho Declaration, 288, 296, 304 + + + + + B–77 bombs, 146 + BACKSTAY nuclear test, 173 + Bacteriology, 119 + Bahamas, 359, 471 + Baker, Howard, 115, 269 + + Balances of terror, 327 + Bangladesh, 471 + Banzer, Hugo, 288 + Barkley, Richard, 445 + Barmon, Ward, 467 + Barneby, Malcolm, 429 + Barnwell reprocessing plant, 323, 329, 338, 364 + Barre, Raymond, 355, 419 + Barry, Robert, 77, 113, 120, 135 + Bartholomew, Reginald + ASAT talks, 43, 59 + Bessmertnykh talks with, 387 + Carter-Gromyko talks, 201, 221 + Chemical weapons, 68, 139 + Comprehensive test ban + Carter-Gromyko discussions of, 201, 221 + SCC discussions of, 205, + 207, 210, 228, 252 + Three year approach, 210 + + Conventional arms transfers + Mendelevich discussions, 311, 314, 315 + Policy Review Committee meetings on, 290 + U.S.-Soviet talks on, 281, 294, 295, 303, 310 + + Non-proliferation Treaty, 318 + Nuclear weapons stockpile reliability, 190, 197 + Policy Review Committee meetings, 68 + Seismic stations, 240, 250, 251 + Special Coordination Committee meetings + ASAT talks, 43, 59 + Binary weapons, 139 + Comprehensive test ban, 205, 207, 210, 228, 252 + Conventional arms transfers, 281, 294, 295, 303 + Sverdlovsk incident, 129, 135 + + Special Session on Disarmament, 471, 473, 487, 488 + Sverdlovsk incident, 129, 130, 135 + + Barton Group, 494 + Basic Principles of Relations between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R + (1972), 285, + 293 + Bateman, Worth, 252, 381 + Battlefield surveillance, 6 + Batzel, Roger, 198, 206, 209, 210 + BEAFORT nuclear test, 154, 161 + Beauchataud, Francis, 442 + Becker, Jane, 250 + Begin, Menachim, 191, 233 + Beigel, Edgar, 87, 122, 324 + Belgium + Chemical weapons, 76 + Comprehensive test ban, 144 + Nuclear proliferation, 375, 377 + Nuclear reprocessing, 325, 334, 372, + 384 + Special Session on Disarmament, 471, 474 + U.S.–EURATOM Agreement for Cooperation (1958), 347 + U.S. highly enriched uranium exports to, 463 + + Belize, 242, 288 + Benavides, Raul, 436 + Benglesdorf, Harold, 345, 448 + Benin, 471 + Bennett, Frank, 369 + Benson, Lucy W., 268, 269, 286, 377 + Benton, Marjorie, 499 + Bergland, Robert, 2, 5, 27 + Bergsten, C. Fred, 320 + Berlin crisis (1958–1961), 146 + Berta, Michael, 59 + Bessmertnykh, Alexander A. + Bartholomew talks with, 387 + Carter-Gromyko talks, 201, 221 + Chemical weapons, 88 + Comprehensive test ban, 168, + 201, 221 + Conventional arms transfers, 278 + EURATOM and IAEA safeguards, 367 + Soviet nuclear testing, 239 + + Bettauer, Ronald, 369, 429, 467 + Bhutto, Zulfikar Ali, 321, 327, 357 + Bindschedler, Rudolf, 460 + Bingham, Jonathan B., 375, 381 + Bioconversion, 427 + Biological weapons (BW) (see also + Biological Weapons Convention; Sverdlovsk incident), 61, 62, 81, 85, 111 + Biological Weapons Convention (1972) (see also Biological weapons) + Amounts of biological agents allowed under, 111 + Argentine adherence to, 453 + Article I, 116, 121, 134, + 137 + Article V + Provision for consultation in, 109, 112, 113, 120 + + Soviet failure to comply with, 129, 131, 133, 134 + Swedish amendment to, 119 + + Article VI, 109 + Article IX, 119 + Article X, 119 + Encouragement of adherence to, 62 + Lack of verification provisions in, 68 + Peaceful biological research, 119 + Review Conference (Geneva, 1980), + 89, 109, 112, 113, 115, + 119, 129 + Soviet non-compliance with, 121, + 129 + Soviet position, 114 + Swedish initiative for amendment of, 112, 119 + U.S. commitment to, 61, 81 + + Bittner, Edward, 266 + Black boxes, 163, 180 + Blackwill, Robert D., 242 + Blechman, Barry + Conventional arms transfers, 284, 286, 290, 293, + 294, 295, 303 + SCC meetings, 294, 295, 303 + + Bligh, John, 445 + Bloomfield, Lincoln, 381 + Bloomfield, William, 115 + Blumenthal, W. Michael, 259, 271 + Boelling, Klaus, 417 + Bohlen, Avis, 79, 122, 175, 240, 387 + Bolivia, 275, 288, 466 + Bombs (see also Enhanced radiation (ER) + weapons; Nuclear weapons) + B–77, 146 + CBU–72 concussion, 263 + Minimum Residual Radiation (MRR), 146 + Neutron, 20, 28, 161, 196, 206 + + Bond, Stephen, 47, 59 + Bonight, James, 345 + Boosting, 256 + Booth, Roger, 87, 88, 98 + Boright, John P., 360 + Botha, P.K., 211 + Bottaro Consalvi, Simon, 288 + Bouillet, Jacques, 438 + Bowdler, William G., 211 + Bowie, Robert R., 228, 294, 375 + Bradburn, David, 34, 35, 39, 43, 47, 48 + Braswell, Arnold, 486 + Bratton, Joseph K., 150 + Bray, Charles W., III, 398, 400 + Brayshaw, Charles, 448 + Brazil (see also Brazilian Tlatelolco + Treaty accession; Germany, Federal Republic of, nuclear sales to + Brazil) + Acceptance of full-scope safeguards by, 395, 399, + 412, 419, 433 + Angra I reactor, 424, 461 + Argentine agreement for nuclear cooperation, 461, 466 + Argentine nuclear competition with, 401, 417, 422, 443, + 445 + Comprehensive test ban, 145, + 146, 210, 211, 214, 224 + Conventional arms transfers, 296, 297 + European nuclear fuel transfers to, 396, 424 + London Suppliers Group membership for, 335 + Non-proliferation Treaty, 318, + 319, 320, 327, 364 + Nuclear agreements with, 325, + 461 + Nuclear proliferation + Comprehensive test ban’s value against, 211, 224 + In the post-INFCE era, 375 + Nuclear power seen as status symbol, 342 + U.S.-Brazilian talks on, 329 + U.S. meeting with UN Delegates on, 359 + U.S. position, 321, 357, 369, 397 + + Nuclear reprocessing by, 324, + 361, 364, 412 + Peaceful biological research, 119 + Peaceful nuclear explosions, 211, 224, 404 + Regional nuclear cooperation, 419 + Special Session on Disarmament, 471, 475, 501 + U.S. nuclear aid to, 419 + U.S. relations with, 397, 400, 403, + 404, 439, 443 + Venezuelan nuclear agreement with, 461 + + Brazilian Tlatelolco Treaty accession + Brazilian position, 400, 415, 433, + 434, 450 + FRG position, 397 + Reservations made in, 406, 455 + Soviet position, 449 + U.S. position, 348, 410, 415, + 416 + + Breakout, 6, 9, + 11, 18, 27, 35 + + Breckon, Lyall, 65, 475, 494 + Breeder reactors + Clinch River (CRBR), 322, 323, 330, + 337, 364 + Economy of, 396 + French export of, 324 + French position, 342 + Funding for, 322 + Gas-cooled, 346 + Kalkar (FRG), 371 + Liquid metal fast (LMFBRs), 334, + 337 + Proposal for research on, 346 + Sodium, 346 + Steering committee report on, 337 + Thermal, 373, 377, 384 + U.S. push for agreement on use of, 376 + + Brement, Marshall + Chemical weapons, 104, 122 + Conventional arms transfers, 314 + Nuclear testing, Soviet, 239, + 253, 254 + Special Coordination Committee meetings, Nuclear testing, + 253, 254 + Sverdlovsk incident, 112, 113, 129, + 133 + + Bremer, L. Paul, 453, 454, 467 + Brewster, Kingman, 229, 232, 233, 242, 308 + Brezhnev, Leonid I. + ASAT, 5, 14, 20, 55, 56 + Chemical weapons, 101 + Comprehensive test ban + British withdrawal from negotiations, 242 + Soviet acceptance of moratorium on peaceful + nuclear explosions, 175, + 176, 183 + Soviet interest in, 142 + Vance-Brezhnev discussions of, 153 + Vienna Summit discussion of, 236 + Withdrawal provisions in, 206 + + Conventional arms transfers, 283, 309, 310 + Meetings with Carter, 42, 55, 56, + 236, 309, 310 + Message exchanges with Carter, 5, + 14, 20, 142, 145, 221 + Negative security assurances, 492, 493, 498 + Neutron bomb, 20 + Nuclear proliferation, 332 + Nuclear weapons production halt, 482 + Special Session on Disarmament, 491 + Speeches + 60th Anniversary, 176, 177 + CPSU Central Committee (Nov. 1977), 482 + TUC (Mar. 1977), 283 + + Threshold Test Ban Treaty (1974), + 153 + Tlatelolco Treaty, 435, 437, 492 + Toon meetings with, 177 + Vance’s discussions with, 153, + 332 + Vienna Summit (June 1979), 55, 56, + 101, 236 + + Bridges, Peter, 324 + British Nuclear Fuels (BNF), 89 + Brown, George S. + ASAT capabilities, 4, 24 + ASAT talks, 11, 40, 46, + 53 + Comprehensive test ban, 147, + 148, 178, 198 + Conventional arms transfers, 266, 286, 292 + Nuclear fuel supply, 392 + Nuclear testing, 156, 158, 172, + 173 + Operation FULCRUM II, 155 + PD/NSC–15, 72, 78 + PD/NSC–28, 81 + PD/NSC–36, 292 + PD/NSC–38, 203, 208 + PD/NSC–39, 32 + PRM/NSC 12, 259 + PRM/NSC 16, 141 + PRM/NSC 27, 67 + PRM/NSC 37, 86 + Special Session on Disarmament, 478, 479, 483 + + Brown, Harold: + ASAT: + Arms control approaches to, 9 + Arms control decision paper, 7 + Capabilities, 2, 4, 19, + 22, 23, 24 + Report from Office of Science and Technology + Policy, 8 + Vienna Summit discussion of, 56 + + ASAT talks: + Approval of goals for, 11 + Lasers, 26, 40 + Options for, 31 + PD–45, instructions for, + 40 + Special Coordination Committee meetings on, 17, 29, 34, 35 + Suspension of testing during, 28, 40 + Third round, 46 + U.S. framework for, 16 + + + Carter-Gromyko talks, 201, 221 + Chemical weapons: + Binary weapons funding requests, 95, 103 + Congressional budgeting for facilities for + stockpiling of, 75 + JCS views on negotiations on, 100 + U.S. policy and retaliatory capability, 132 + Vienna Summit discussion of, 101 + Weteye bombs, 123, 124 + + Comprehensive test ban: + Carter discussions with DOD officials, proposed, + 149 + Carter-Gromyko discussions of, 201, 221 + Carter meeting with nuclear laboratory officials + on, 206 + Consultations with Allied and Non-Aligned states, + 216 + JCS position, 148, 178, 220 + Non-proliferation value of, 211, 224 + Nuclear testing during, 191 + On-site inspection quotas, 180 + Peaceful nuclear explosions as accommodated in, + 145, 147 + Review conference proposals, 227, 231 + SCC discussion of, 205, + 207, 210 + SCC work program for discussions of, 164 + Three year approach, 210, 217 + Trilateral negotiations, 160, 163, 166, 167, 216, 219, 257 + Vienna Summit discussion of, 236 + + Conventional arms transfers: + Coproduction limits, 268, 312 + Dollar volume ceilings, 268 + In FY 1977, 272, 277 + Management of restraints on, 279, 280 + New technology developed for export, 268 + Of sensitive weapons, 268 + PD/NSC–36, 292 + Review of policies for promotion of, 274 + SCC meetings on, 303 + U.S. policy assessment on, 312, 313 + U.S.-Soviet talks on, 303, 306, 307 + Vienna Summit discussion of, 309 + + High-energy lasers (HELs), 26 + Interagency Committee on Public Diplomacy and Disarmament, + 497 + Mutual and balanced force reductions, 236 + Negative security assurances, 498 + Nuclear proliferation, 317, 375, 382 + Nuclear testing: + Augmented program for, 230, 249, 256 + ERDA review of ACDA recommendations on, 156 + For FY 1977’s second half, + 154 + For FY 1978, 172, 173 + Meaning of “yield” in TTBT, 158 + Soviet high-yield, 255 + Testing for SM–2, missile + warheads, 161 + + Nuclear weapons stockpile reliability, 188, 190, 192, 193, + 197 + Operation FULCRUM II, 155 + PD/NSC–8, 330 + PD/NSC–13, 271 + PD/NSC–15, 70, 72 + PD/NSC–28, 81 + PD/NSC–38, 200, 208 + PD/NSC–39, 32 + PD/NSC–45, 38 + Peaceful nuclear explosions, 166, 169 + PRM/NSC 12, 259 + PRM/NSC 15, 317 + PRM/NSC 16, 141, 146, 192 + PRM/NSC 23, 5 + PRM/NSC 27, 67 + PRM/NSC 37, 86 + Special Coordination Committee meetings: + ASAT talks, 17, 29, 34, 35 + Comprehensive test ban, 205, 207, 210 + Conventional arms transfers, 303 + + Special Session on Disarmament, 478, 479 + + Carter’s decisions for, 493 + Cutoff and transfer agreements, 483, 485, 490, 492, 496, 500 + + Sverdlovsk incident, 112 + Tlatelolco Treaty, 406, 407, 409, + 413, 440 + Vienna Summit (June 1979), 56, 101, + 236, 309 + + Brown, Kent, 446, 448 + + Brussels Treaty (1948), 342 + Brzezinski, Zbigniew: + ASAT: + Arms control approaches, 9 + Arms control policy discussions, 10 + Capabilities, 2, 18, 19, 21, 23, 25 + PRC meetings on, 2, 5 + Vienna Summit discussion of, 56 + + + ASAT talks: + Approval of goals for, 11, 18 + Hostile acts agreement, 52 + Initiation of process for, 1 + Instructions for second round of, 37, 38 + Special Coordination Committee meetings on, 17, 31 + + Barnwell reprocessing plant, 323 + Carter-Geisel talks, 433 + Carter-Gromyko talks, 201, 221 + Carter-Pérez talks, 432 + CBW study proposal, 61 + Chemical weapons: + Approval of U.S. posture for limitation of, 69 + Binary weapons funding requests, 103 + CD Working Group on, 105 + JCS views on negotiations on, 100 + Negotiations on, 70, 74 + PRM–37, 86, 92 + Special Coordination Committee meetings on, 95, 97 + Use in Asia of, 110 + Vienna Summit discussion of, 101 + + Clinch River reactor funding, 322, 323 + Comprehensive test ban: + Callaghan message to Carter on, 215 + Carter discussions with DOD officials, proposed, + 149 + Carter-Dobrynin discussions of, 142 + Carter-Gromyko discussions of, 201, 221 + Carter-Thatcher talks on, 242 + CD working group on, 390 + Consultations with Allied and Non-Aligned states, + 216, 219 + DOE position, 196 + Fixed duration treaty, 197, 198 + JCS position, 220 + Non-proliferation value of, 211, 224 + On-site inspections, 179 + Peaceful nuclear explosions as accommodated by, + 145, 147 + Permitted experiments under, 202 + Quadripartite discussions of, 157 + SALT agreement ratification before CTB, 218 + SCC discussions of, 207, + 210, 248, 252 + Three year approach, 210, 217 + Trilateral negotiations: + Instructions for, 163, 170, 180, 181, 185, 219 + Proposed strategy for, 166, 167 + Review of U.S. strategy for, 216 + Soviet acceptance of moratorium on peaceful + nuclear explosions, 175, + 183 + U.S. preparation for, 160 + + U.S.-British discussions of, 159 + Vance-Gromyko discussions of, 153 + Vienna Summit discussion of, 236 + + + Conventional arms transfers: + Amounts of, In FY 1977, + 272, 277 + Congressional notification of, 263, 265 + Controls over promotion of, Regulations for, 261, 262 + Coproduction limits, 268 + Dobrynin-Brzezinski discussions of, 310 + Dollar volume ceilings, 268 + For new systems, 268 + FY 1978 program, 286 + FY 1979 ceiling, 302 + Management of restraints on, 279, 280 + New technology developed for export, 268 + Of sensitive weapons, 268 + PD/NSC–13, 270 + Policy Review Committee meetings on, 266, 268, 286, 287, 290 + Sales of C–130s, 276 + U.S. policy assessment on, 313 + U.S.-Soviet talks on: + Bartholomew-Mendelovich discussions, 311, 314 + Dobrynin-Brzezinski discussions, 310 + Guidance for, 304 + PD/NSC–36, 291, 292 + + Policy Review Committee meetings on, 286, 287, 290 + Reports on, 293 + SCC meetings on, 295, 303, 306 + U.S. Non-Paper on, 285 + + U.S.-Venezuelan talks on, 288 + Vienna Summit discussion of, 309, 310 + + Dobrynin’s discussions with, 310 + Fuel cycle evaluation program, 347, 355, 374 + Heavy water production technology exports to Argentina, + 452, 454, 456, 457, 458 + High-energy lasers (HELs), 15, + 26 + Interagency Committee on Public Diplomacy and Disarmament, + 497 + Latin American regional nuclear cooperation, 419 + Meeting with Jay, 194 + Negative security assurances, 492, 493 + Nuclear fuel exports, 358, 362, 424, + 463 + Nuclear proliferation + Additional conditions for new nuclear cooperation + agreements, 339 + Carter-Fukuda talks on, 329 + Carter-Giscard talks on, 361 + Carter’s policy statement on, 331 + Congressional concern over, 366 + European-U.S. differences on, 365 + French nuclear sales to Pakistan, 350 + French policy on, 356 + FRG nuclear sales to Brazil, 399, 401, 404, 427 + In the post-INFCE era, 375, 382, 383 + International restraints for slowing of, 323 + London Suppliers Group expansion, 335 + PD/NSC–8, 334, 336, 343 + Policy Review Committee meetings on, 317, 328 + Presidential decision on controls over + reprocessing, 340 + Smith’s final report on U.S. policy on, 395 + Storage for foreign spent nuclear fuel, 343 + U.S. policy toward, 371, + 396 + U.S.-Venezuelan talks on, 416 + Vance’s trip to Brazil, 427 + + Nuclear reprocessing, 338, 340, 344, + 351, 353, 354 + Nuclear testing + Augmented program for, 230, 235, 249, 256 + ERDA review of ACDA recommendations on, 156 + For FY 1977’s second half, + 154, 161 + For FY 1978, 172, 173 + Meaning of “yield” in TTBT, 158 + Soviet, 238, 239, 253, 254, 255 + + Nuclear weapons stockpile reliability, 188, 190, 192, 197 + Operation FULCRUM II, 155, 161 + PD/NSC–8, 334, 336, 343 + PD/NSC–13, 270 + PD/NSC–28, 81 + PD/NSC–37, 27 + PD/NSC–38, 200, 208 + PD/NSC–39, 32 + Peaceful nuclear explosions, 145, 147, 169, 183, + 186 + Policy Review Committee + ASAT, 2, 5 + Conventional arms transfers, 259, 266, 268, 286, 287, 290 + Nuclear proliferation, 317, 328 + Nuclear reprocessing, 338 + + PRM/NSC 12, 259 + PRM/NSC 15, 317 + PRM/NSC 16, 141 + PRM/NSC 23, 5 + PRM/NSC 27, 66, 69 + PRM/NSC 37, 86, 92 + Protected vs. illegal satellites, 44 + Seismic stations, 222, 246 + Special Coordination Committee meetings + ASAT talks, 17, 31 + Chemical weapons, 95, + 97 + Comprehensive test ban, 207, 210, 248, 252 + Conventional arms transfers, 295, 303, 306 + + Special Session on Disarmament, 488, 489 + + + Special Session on Disarmament + Carter’s decisions for, 492, 493 + Conventional arms transfers, 480 + Cutoff and transfer agreements, 483, 484, 485, 496 + Four-power discussion of, 476 + Special Coordination Committee meetings on, 488, 489 + + Sverdlovsk incident, 109, 130, 133 + Tlatelolco Treaty + Carter-Schmidt discussions of, 417 + Cuban refusal for signing of, 441 + DOD position, 440 + JCS position, 440 + Reservations made upon ratification of, 413 + Soviet signing of, 435 + U.S. adherence to, 406, + 407, 408, 409 + + U.S.-Japanese agreement for Tokai, proposed, 351 + U.S. nuclear reactor part exports to Argentina, 470 + Vienna Summit (June 1979), 56, 101, + 236, 309, 310 + + Buchheim, Robert + ASAT talks + Agenda for possible future rounds, 59 + Dismantling of Soviet systems, 40 + Second round, 39, 41 + Special Coordination Committee meetings on, 17, 29, 34, 35, 43, 59 + Third round, 47, 48, 51 + + + Buchsbaum, Solomon J., 8 + Buckley, Sheila, 87, 88, 104, 129, 135 + Buckley Airfield, 124 + Bujon de L’Estaing, François, 369 + Bulgaria, 471 + Bundestag, 371 + Burman, Allan V., 43, 59 + Burns, David Allan, 89, 94 + Burt, Richard, 57 + Burundi, 471 + Bushnell, John, 305, 468 + Butcher, Suzanne, 58 + Butcher, William, 251 + Byrd, Robert, 115 + + + + + Callaghan, Audrey, 191 + Callaghan, James + Carter meetings with, 191, 192, 198, + 499 + Comprehensive test ban + Message exchange with Carter on, 215, 218 + SALT agreement ratification before CTB, 218 + Talks with Carter on, 191, 192, 198 + U.S.-British discussions of, 159 + + Conventional arms transfers, 299 + Election loss to Conservatives, 229 + Message exchange with Carter, 215, 218, 299 + Negative security assurances, 498 + Nuclear proliferation, 342 + Nuclear weapons stockpile reliability, 191, 192 + Special Session on Disarmament, 491, 492, 499 + + Callen, Ivor, 244 + Cambodia, use of chemical weapons in, 104, 106, 107, 108, 122, 126, 128 + Canada + As London Suppliers Group member, 260, 317 + Biological Weapons Convention Review Conference, 119 + Chemical weapons, 76, 77, 89 + Cutoff and transfer agreements, 491 + Fuel cycle evaluation program, 355 + Full-scope safeguards, 447, 457, 458, + 462 + Heavy water + Exports by, 426, 447 + Full-scope safeguards on, 457 + Production technology assistance to Argentina, + 447, 448, 452, 454 + + Non-proliferation Treaty, 372 + Nuclear assistance to India by, 357 + Nuclear processing plants, 372 + Nuclear proliferation + Argentine-IAEA negotiations, 443 + Desire for control of, 329, 364, 385 + Full-scope safeguards for prevention of, 339, 347 + In the post-INFCE era, 375 + Nuclear fuel sales, 319, + 327, 329, 364, 385 + + Nuclear reprocessing by France, 349 + Seismic stations in, possible, 226 + Special Session on Disarmament, 471, 474, 483, 491, + 494, 501 + + + Canada-EURATOM Agreement for Cooperation (1959), 355 + Canal Zone, 402, 406, 423 + Carasales, Julio Cesar, 420 + Carcinogens, 76 + Carlson, David, 77, 87, 98, 108, 122, 126 + Carnesale, Albert, 375, 384 + Carrea, Antonio, 459, 466 + Carrington, Lord Peter + Belize, 242 + Comprehensive test ban, 242 + Seismic stations, 232, 234, 240, + 248 + Sverdlovsk incident, 137 + Vance discussions with, 242, + 244, 245, 248 + Vance-Thatcher meetings, 233 + Visit to Washington (May 1980), + 250 + + Carter, Hodding, III, 57, 104, 127, 316 + Carter, James Earl + ASAT + Arms control decision paper, 7 + Arms control policy discussions, 10 + Operational testing for improvement of + capabilities, 18, 22, 23, 24, 25 + Vienna Summit discussion of, 55, 56 + + + ASAT talks + Approval of goals for, 11, 18 + Desire for, 5, 6 + Instructions for second round of, 37, 38 + Priorities in, 36 + Protected vs. illegal satellites, 42, 44 + Space shuttle, 56 + Third round, 50, 53 + + Barnwell reprocessing plant, 323, 364 + Chemical weapons + Approval of U.S. posture for limitation of, 69 + CD Working Group on, 105 + Funding of binary weapons production, 95, 100 + Negotiations on, 70 + Special Coordination Committee meetings on, 95, 97, 100 + Vienna Summit discussion of, 101 + Weteye bombs, 123, 124 + + Chinese People’s Republic, 242 + Clinch River reactor funding, 322, 323, 364 + Comprehensive test ban + As campaign promise of, 140 + Callaghan-Carter talks on, 191, 192, 198 + Carter-Dobrynin discussions of, 142 + CD working group on, 390, 391 + Consultations with Allied and Non-Aligned states, + 214, 219 + Discussion, proposed, with DOD officials on, 149 + Fixed duration treaty + Approval of, 199, + 200 + Carter-Gromyko discussions of, 201, 221 + Three vs. five year options, 197, 198, 213 + Three year approach, 218 + + + Gromyko’s discussions of, 153, 168, 201, 212, 221 + Meeting with nuclear laboratories officials on, + 206, 209 + Non-proliferation value of, 224 + On-site inspections, 179, 182, 184 + Permitted experiments under, 198, 202 + Press statements on, 140, 144 + SALT agreement ratification before CTB, 218, 221, 237 + SCC work program for discussions of, 164 + Thatcher’s discussions of, 242, 244, 245 + Trilateral negotiations + British withdrawal from negotiations, 242 + Changing approaches to issues in, 252 + Instructions for, 163, 170, 180, 185 + On-site inspections, 184 + Proposed strategy for, 166 + Review of U.S. strategy for, 214 + Sessions of, 165, + 195, 257 + Soviet acceptance of moratorium on peaceful + nuclear explosions, 175 + Speeding up of, 199 + + U.S.-British discussions of, 159 + Vance-Gromyko discussions of, 153, 168, 201, 212, 221 + Vienna Summit discussion of, 236 + + + Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, 204 + Conventional arms transfers + Ceiling management in, 287 + Concussion bomb sale ban, 263 + Congressional notification of, 263, 265 + Controls over promotion of, Regulations for, 261, 262 + France as obstacle to limits on, 298, 299 + FY 1979 ceiling, 301, 302 + Gromyko’s discussions of, 278 + Legislation on, 264 + Policy Review Committee meetings on, 259, 268, 287 + Presidential directive on, 270, 271, 277, 312 + Sales of C–130s, 273, 275, 276 + SCC meetings on, 295 + Submission for approval through, 258 + U.S. policy assessment on, 312, 313 + U.S.-Soviet talks on, 285, 291, 292, 295 + U.S.-Venezuelan talks on, 288 + Vienna Summit discussion of, 309, 310 + + Dobrynin’s talks with, CTB, 142 + FRG nuclear sales to Brazil, 397, 399, 401, 403, + 405, 412, 417, 426, 427 + Fuel cycle evaluation program, 347, 355, 366, 372, + 373, 374 + Heavy water production technology exports to Argentina, + 457 + High-energy lasers (HELs), 15, + 26 + Latin American regional nuclear cooperation, 419 + Meetings + With Barre, 355 + With Begin, 191 + With Brezhnev, 42, 55, 56, 236, 309, 310 + With Callaghan, 191, + 192, 198, 499 + With Desai, 361 + With Fukuda, 329 + With Geisel, 433 + With Genscher, 405 + With Giscard, 157, 361, 416, 499 + With Gromyko + On comprehensive test ban, 153, 168, 201, 212, 221 + On conventional arms transfers, 278 + On peaceful nuclear explosions, 170, 171 + + With Huang Chen, 151 + With Lopez Portillo, 402 + With nuclear laboratories officials, 206, 209 + With Pérez, 288, 411, 432 + With Roel García, 414 + With Schmidt, 412, 417, 499 + With SSOD Delegates, 499 + With Thatcher, 242, 244, 245 + With Videla, 420, 422, 432 + + + Messages + Brezhnev exchange of, 5, + 14, 20, 142, 145, 221 + Callaghan exchange of, 215, 218, 299 + From López Portillo, 411 + From Gerard Smith, 224, + 225, 365 + From Vorster, 211 + Schmidt exchange of, 299, 405 + To Geisel, 412, 415, 424 + To Giscard, 299, 347 + To Thatcher, 229 + Videla exchange of, 437 + + Namibia, 242 + Negative security assurances, 492, 493, 498 + Neutron bomb, 20 + NPT Review Conference, 390, 391, 393 + Nuclear fuel exports, 358, 424, 463 + Nuclear Non-proliferation Act signed by, 366 + Nuclear proliferation + Additional conditions for new nuclear cooperation + agreements, 339 + Carter-Fukuda talks on, 329 + French policy on, 356 + Full-scope safeguards, 430 + G–7, summit discussion of, + 342, 344 + In the post-INFCE era, 375, 378, 382, 383 + International restraints for slowing of, 323 + London Suppliers Group expansion, 359 + PD/NSC–8, 330, 334, 336 + + Policy review for, 317 + Presidential decision on controls over + reprocessing, 340 + Quadripartite discussions of, 326 + Smith’s final report on U.S. policy on, 395 + Statement of fuel cycle evaluation program policy, + 331, 333, 338 + Storage for foreign spent nuclear fuel, 343 + U.S.-French talks on, 349, 355, 361 + U.S. policy toward, 364 + U.S. strategy for, 379 + U.S.-Venezuelan talks on, 416 + Vance’s trip to Brazil, 426, 427 + + + Nuclear reprocessing + By France, 349 + U.S.-Japanese talks on, 344, 352, 353, 354 + U.S. policy on, 338, + 340 + + Nuclear testing, 161, 172, 235, + 254, 255, 256 + Nuclear weapons stockpile reliability, 191, 192, 193 + Operation FULCRUM II, 161 + PD/NSC–8, 330, 334, 336 + PD/NSC–13, 270, 271 + PD/NSC–15, 70 + PD/NSC–28, 81 + PD/NSC–37, 27 + PD/NSC–38, 200, 203 + PD/NSC–39, 32 + Peaceful nuclear explosions, 170, 171, 183, 186 + Press conferences of, 145, 344 + PRM/NSC 12, 259, 260 + PRM/NSC 15, 317 + PRM/NSC 16, 141 + PRM/NSC 27, 66, 69 + PRM/NSC 37, 86 + Seismic station numbers, 208 + Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, 57, 245 + Special Coordination Committee meetings, 31, 95, + 97, 100, 295, 390 + Special Session on Disarmament + Carter’s decisions for, 492, 493, 496, 500 + Carter’s speech at, possible, 486, 488, 489, 491, 492, 493 + Conventional arms transfers, 480, 481 + Cutoff and transfer agreements + ACDA position, 491, 492 + Decisions on, 492, + 493, 496, 500 + DOD position, 490, + 492 + Interagency study on, 482, 483 + + Meeting with Delegates to, 499 + Waldheim discussions of, 472 + + + Speeches + At SSOD (proposed), 486, + 488, 489, 491, 492, 493 + During campaign (San Diego, Sept. 1976), 325, 339 + During campaign (United Nations, May 1976), 397 + Inaugural (Jan. 1977), 142 + INFCE organizing conference (Oct. 1977), 364, 373 + OAS Permanent Council (Apr. 1977), 410, 419 + Pan American Day (Apr. 1977), 406, 440 + To USDA employees (Feb. 1977), 403 + UNGA (Mar. 1977), 473, 479, 482, 485, 499 + UNGA (Oct. 1977), 171, 486, 492 + + Tlatelolco Treaty, 414, 417, 420, + 422, 426, 432, 464 + U.S.-Mexican relations, 444 + U.S. nuclear reactor part exports to Argentina, 470 + U.S.-Soviet relations, 245 + Vienna Summit (June 1979), 55, 56, + 101, 236, 309, 310 + Visits + Brasilia (Nov. 1977), 424 + Brasilia (Apr. 1978), 433 + Caracas (Mar. 1978), 288, 432 + France (Jan. 1978), 361 + India (Jan. 1978), 364 + Iran (Dec. 1977–Jan. 1978), 364 + London (May 1977), 342, 344, 412 + Panama (June 1978), 441 + Tokyo (1979), 240, 250 + Vienna (June 1979), 55, 56, 101, 236, 309, 310 + + + Carter, Rosalyn, 415, 416 + Cartledge, Brian, 233 + Carvalho, Hervesio de, 461 + Casteñeda y Álvarez de la Rosa, Jorge, 450, 464 + + Castro, Fidel, 441 + Castro, Raul H., 439, 466 + Castro Madera, Carlos, 422, 429, 439, 450, 459, 468 + CAT. See Conventional arms + transfers. + Cavazos, Richard E., 266 + CBU–72, concussion bombs, 263 + Cecchini, Louis, 430 + Central Europe, 139 + Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) + “Arms Sales to the Third World, 1977” (Intelligence Assessment), 300 + ASAT talks + Second round, 39, 41 + Soviet interest and objectives in, 60 + Third round, 47, 48, 51, 54 + U.S. framework for, 16 + + “Chemical Warfare in Laos” (CIA paper), 104 + Comprehensive test ban, 180, + 184, 222 + Conventional arms transfers, 274, 297, 300 + “Deadlock at the NPT Review Conference: Causes and + Consequences” (Intelligence Assessment), 394 + FRG nuclear sales to Brazil, 401 + “Latin American Arms Market: Changing Patterns of Supply” + (Intelligence Assessment), 297 + Negative security assurances, 385 + Non-Proliferation Treaty, 368, + 370, 385 + “The NPT Review Conference: A Preview” (Intelligence + Assessment), 385 + Nuclear fuel access, 358 + “The Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty: Looking Toward the + 1980 Review” (CIA Paper), 368 + Nuclear proliferation, 342 + “The Politics of INFCE” (CIA Paper), 370 + Seismic station numbers, 222 + “Significance of Recent Developments in Argentine Nuclear + Policy” (Intelligence Report), 431 + “Soviet Civil Defense Against Chemical and Biological + Warfare” (Intelligence Assessment), 85 + Sverdlovsk incident, 109 + U.S.-Argentine relations, 443 + U.S.-Brazilian relations, 443 + + + Challenge inspections, 82, 182, 184 + Chaplin, Maxwell, 420, 466 + Chapman, Ray E., 486 + Chayes, Abraham, 375 + Chemical and biological warfare, 81 + Chemical explosions, 223 + Chemical warfare, 95, 132 + Chemical weapons (CW) + Approval of U.S. posture for limitation of, 69 + British draft UNGA resolution, 89 + Canadian/Polish draft UNGA resolution on, 77 + CCD focus on limitations on, 61 + CCD role in discussion of, 63, + 66, 89, 94, 98, 102 + Challenge inspections of, 82 + Chinese People’s Republic’s capabilities for use of, 90 + Chinese People’s Republic’s ratification of treaty on, + 74, 94, 101 + Congressional attitude toward, 96, 97 + Consultation with Allies on, 87, + 89, 94, 106, 107, 126 + Disposition of, 73 + DOD position, 78 + Facilities for, 80, 88, 89, + 94, 99 + FRG draft treaty on, 69 + Funding for binary weapons + Congressional action on, 95, 100, 103, 132 + DOD request for, 100, + 103, 132 + For replacement of old devices, 124 + Lack of, 78, 94, 95 + SCC meetings on, 95, 96, 97, 100, 103, 139 + + + Herbicides, 81, 118 + House Resolution against use in Indochina of, 104 + Incapacitants, 71, 81 + Irritants, 76, 99, 118 + Legislation on, 69 + NATO attitude toward, 96 + NATO capabilities for, 123, 132 + NATO disarmament experts discussion of, 65 + NATO study on, proposed, 94 + Negotiations on (see also + Verifications below): + Agreed key elements proposal, 71, 73 + + Briefing of allies on, 76 + CD working group, 98, + 104, 105, 118, 136 + Confidence-building measures for, 70, 73, 94 + Convention on, 79, 86 + Destruction of stocks, 94, 136 + Development of joint initiative through, 77 + Drafting group issues, 102 + During SSOD, 79, 83 + Focus for, 90 + Guidance for U.S. Delegation, 79, 83, 88, 98, 108, 126 + JCS position, 100 + Joint U.S.-Soviet statements, 98 + Presentation of Soviet draft convention during, + 73 + Progress report on, 126 + Rounds: + Fourth, 71, 79 + Fifth, 73, 74, 79 + Sixth, 74, 79, 98 + Seventh, 79, 80, 82, 83, 84, 88 + Eighth, 83, 88, 89, 90 + Ninth, 88, 90, 98, 99 + Tenth, 102, 106, 107 + Eleventh, 106, + 107, 108, 118 + Twelfth, 126, 128, 136 + + + Soviet foreign policy as affected by, 283 + Soviet position, 82 + Soviet slowdown in, 128, + 136 + Staffing of Delegations for, 102 + Stalemate in, 80 + U.S. objectives in, 63, + 69 + U.S.-Soviet working group, 65, 76, 118 + U.S. support for, 138 + U.S. topics for discussion in, 69, 83 + Use of CW in Asia as topic in, 108, 126, 128 + + + Nerve gas, 82 + No-first-use policy on, 81 + Non-circumvention of agreements on, 90, 98 + Non-transfer of, 90, 98 + PD/NSC–15, 70, 72, 78, 81, + 86, 95 + PD/NSC–28, 81 + Precursors, 76, 82, 90, + 98, 118 + PRM/NSC 27, 66, 67, 69 + PRM/NSC 37, 86, 92, 95 + Quadrilateral consultations on, 87, 89, 94, 106, + 107, 126 + Research and development of, 75 + Riot-control agents, 74, 76, 81, + 82, 84, 99 + Soviet Civil Defense against, 85 + Soviet draft treaty on, 69, 73 + Soviet stockpiles of, 94 + Soviet superiority in, 68, 69 + Special Coordination Committee meetings on + Formation of CD Working Group, 104 + Funding for binary weapons, 95, 96, 97, 100, 103, 139 + Reviews of U.S. policy, 67, 86, 92 + U.S. military options, 68 + + Study proposal on, 61 + Teratogens, 76 + Toxicity criteria for, 73, 80, 82, + 84, 88, 118, 136 + Treaty ratification by UNSC permanent members, 74, 76, + 101, 118 + UN Committee on Disarmament’s instructions on, 98 + U.S.-British consultations on, 70, 79, 83, 87, 89 + U.S.-Federal Republic of Germany consultations on, 63, 70, + 79, 83 + U.S.-French consultations on, 70, + 79, 83, 106, 107, 110 + U.S. military options for, 68 + U.S. overseas stocks of, 139 + U.S. policy toward, 61, 81, 132 + U.S. retaliatory capability, 132 + U.S. stockpiles of + Congressional budgeting for, 75 + Deadline for destruction of, 88, 96 + Deficiencies in, 95 + In Federal Republic of Germany, 81 + Options for, 95 + Reduction of, 78 + Retention of, 68, 72 + + + Use in Asia of + Call for international investigation of, 122 + Quadrilateral discussions of, 106, 107, 126 + Reports of, 104, 132 + U.S. briefing of allies on, 125 + + U.S. statements in CW talks, 108, 126, 128 + U.S. strategy for, 110 + Vance-Dobrynin talks on, 117 + Weapon and Space Systems Intelligence Committee + report on, 111 + + + Use in Cambodia, 104, 106, 107, + 108, 122, 126, 128 + Vance-Gromyko discussions of, 64, + 65, 66, 69, 73 + Verification + Differences over, 73, + 74, 136 + FRG position, 89, 94 + On-site inspections, 84, + 107, 118 + Possibilities of, 87 + U.S.-British discussion of, 89 + U.S. position, 68, 69, 80, 126 + U.S.-Soviet discussion of, 71, 102, 118 + + + Vienna Summit discussion of, 101 + Weteye bombs, 123, 124 + World War I casualties from, 69 + + + Chemical Weapons Backstopping Committee, 100 + Chernenko, Konstantin U., 56, 101, 236, 309 + Chile + Ayacucho Declaration, 288 + Comprehensive test ban, 146 + Conventional arms transfers, 296, 297 + Non-proliferation Treaty, 436 + Nuclear weapons development by, 415 + Tlatelolco Treaty, 419, 434, 435, + 436, 449 + + + Chilean Nuclear Energy Commission (CCEN), 436 + China, People’s Republic of + As NPT non-signer, 364 + Carter-Thatcher discussions of, 242 + CD role of, 104 + Chemical weapons capabilities of, 90 + Chemical weapons treaty ratification by, 74, 94, + 101 + Comprehensive test ban + Adherence to + British position, 159 + International pressure for, 166, 168 + Refusal to negotiate, 146, 157 + Soviet position, 176, 177, 192 + U.S. position, 142, 159, 236 + + + Review conference, 227, + 228, 231 + U.S. discussions with, 151 + + + Conventional arms transfers, 282, 283, 303, 304 + Nuclear accident reporting, 488 + Nuclear proliferation, 375 + Nuclear testing by, 146 + OPANAL, 449 + Pakistani nuclear weapons development, 376 + Satellites of, 42, 43, 45, + 47 + Soviet Union, relations with, 94 + Special Session on Disarmament, 494, 501 + Tlatelolco Treaty, 406 + U.S. relations with, 146, 163 + U.S. space cooperation with, 60 + Vance visit (1977), 351 + + + Christopher, Warren M. + Argentine-U.S. relations, 468 + ASAT talks, 29, 43 + ASAT testing, 34, 35 + Chemical weapons, 68, 77, 79, + 88, 96 + Comprehensive test ban, 224, + 252 + Conventional arms transfers + Controls over promotion of, 261 + France as obstacle to limits on, 298 + Policy Review Committee meetings on, 266 + U.S.-Soviet talks on, 281, 294, 295, 303, 304 + + + Dobrynin’s discussions with, 131 + FRG nuclear sales to Argentina, 462 + FRG nuclear sales to Brazil, 389, 400, 401, 404, + 405, 412 + Fuel cycle evaluation program, 355 + NPT Review Conference, 389 + Nuclear proliferation, 321, 335, 340, + 377, 381, 382, 383 + Nuclear reprocessing, 351, 353, 354 + Policy Review Committee meetings, 68, 381 + PRM/NSC 23, 5 + Soviet high-yield nuclear testing, 254 + Special Coordination Committee meetings + ASAT, 29, 34, 35, 43 + Chemical weapons, 96 + Comprehensive test ban, 252 + + Conventional arms transfers, 281, 294, 295, 303 + Nuclear testing, 254 + + + Special Session on Disarmament, 473, 491, 496 + Sverdlovsk incident, 112, 113, 129, + 130 + Tlatelolco Treaty, 414 + + + Church, Frank F., 115, 375 + Civil Defense, 85 + Clapp, Priscilla, 282, 295, 299, 305 + Clark, Richard C., 269 + Classification of information, 27 + Classified documents, 93, 451 + Claytor, W. Graham, Jr., 253, 254, 381, 468 + Clift, Denis, 376 + Clinch River breeder reactor (CRBR) project, 322, 323, 330, 337, 364 + CNEA (Argentine Commission on Atomic Energy), 422, 429, 459 + Co-orbital jamming, 8 + Coal mining, 427 + Cochran, Thomas, 337 + Coll, Jorge, 422, 445, 459 + Colombia, 401, 419, 441, 471, 494 + Combs, Richard, 122, 387 + Command-and-control capability, 6 + Commerce, U.S. Department of, 245, 468, 470 + Commercial arms sales, 260, 261 + Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), 476 + Committee on Disarmament (CD) (see also + Conference of the Committee on Disarmament) + Chemical weapons + Australian proposal for technical seminars, 106 + CD instructions on, 98 + Destruction of stocks of, 94 + Negotiating working group on, 98, 104, 105, 118, 136 + Progress report on negotiations, 126 + Quadrilateral discussions of, 107 + U.S. discussion on, 98, + 104, 105, 118, 136 + Use in Asia of, 106, + 110 + Work on CW convention in, Soviet position, 102 + + + Chinese People’s Republic’s role in, 104 + Comprehensive test ban treaty + Discussion in, 153 + Trilateral working groups, 247 + Working group, 128, 386, 388, 389, 391, 394 + + + + + Comprehensive test ban (CTB) (see also + On-site inspections; Peaceful nuclear explosions; SCC meetings on + comprehensive test ban; Seismic stations; Verification) + Algerian position, 146 + Allied views in UN context on, 144 + Articles of proposed treaty, 212, 231 + As Carter’s campaign promise, 140 + ASAT test ban’s affect on, 40 + Australian position, 144 + Black boxes, 163, 180 + Brazilian participation in, 145, + 146, 210 + British position, 143, 171, 179, + 215 + British role in, 159, 187 + Carter discussion with DOD officials, proposed, 149 + Carter-Dobrynin discussions of, 142 + Carter-Gromyko discussions of, 153, 168, 201, 212, + 221 + Carter’s press statements on, 140, 144 + CCD role in, 204 + CCD talks on, 153, 164, 214 + CD working group on + As discussed in NPT Review Conference, 386, 387, 388, 389, 391, 393 + Committee on Disarmament consideration of, 394 + JCS position, 390 + Soviet proposal for, 126 + Special Coordination Committee discussion of, 386, 388, 390 + Trilateral negotiations as affected by, 390, 393 + + + Challenge inspections, 182, 184 + Chemical explosions as verification obstacle, 223 + Chilean position, 146 + Chinese People’s Republic’s adherence to + British position, 159 + Refusal to negotiate, 146, 157 + + Soviet position, 176, + 177, 192 + U.S. position, 142, 159, 236 + + + Consultations with Allied and Non-Aligned states, 214, 216, + 219 + Coordination of language in Special Session on Disarmament + on, 494 + Criteria for renewal of, 203 + Cutoff and transfer agreements, 491 + Danish position, 144 + DOD position, 148, 178, 192 + DOE position, 196 + Dutch position, 144 + Egyptian position, 146 + Entry into force of treaty on, 165, 166, 205 + Fixed duration treaty + British position, 197, + 213, 215 + Carter-Gromyko discussions of, 201, 221 + Carter’s approval of, 198, 200 + JCS position, 197, 198, 220, 232 + Resumption of testing after, 198, 200 + Review conference proposals, 194, 215, 227, 228, 231 + SCC meetings on, 197, + 198, 200, 207, 210 + Seismic stations for three-year treaty, 197, 198, 207, 209, 213 + Soviet position, 221 + Three vs. five year options, 197, 198, 210, 213 + Three year treaty approach, 208, 209, 210, 217 + Verification and treaty length, 213 + + + French adherence to + British position, 159 + International pressure for, 166, 168 + Refusal to negotiate, 146, 157 + Soviet position, 176, + 177, 192 + U.S.-French discussions of, 152 + U.S. position, 142, 143, 159 + + + Icelandic position, 144 + Implementing options for, 146 + Indian participation in + Agreement for, possible, 210 + British position, 194 + Indian position, 204, + 211, 213, 364 + U.S. desire for, 145 + U.S. resumption of testing, effect on, 198 + + + Indonesian position, 146 + Italian position, 143, 144 + Japanese position, 144 + JCS position + Fixed duration treaty, 197, 198, 220, 232 + JCS memorandum on, 203 + Non-proliferation value of, 211, 220 + PRM/NSC 16, 148, 149 + Questions for developing of, 178 + Three-year approach, 210 + + Mexican position, 144 + NATO perspectives on, 143 + New Zealand position, 144 + Nigerian position, 144 + Non-proliferation value of, 146, + 210, 211, 220, 224, 225, + 348 + Norwegian position, 144 + Nuclear testing during, 191, + 202 + Nuclear weapons design laboratories directors’ positions, + 198, 206, 209, 210 + Nuclear weapons stockpile reliability under, 146, 178, + 188, 192, 213 + Peaceful nuclear explosions (PNEs) under + As accommodated under, 145, 147 + As problem for verification, 146, 195 + DOD position, 167, 169 + ERDA opposition to, 160 + Soviet acceptance of moratorium on, 175, 176, 183, 189, 199, 212 + Soviet protocol for, 182 + Vance-Gromyko discussions of, 153, 168 + + Periodic treaty review, 193 + Permitted experiments + British position, 215, + 226 + Carter’s approval of, 198, 202 + DOD position, 178, 188 + DOE position, 202 + Low yield, 146, 147, 200, 212 + SCC discussion of, 190, + 197, 207 + + Setting of levels for, 207, 210 + Zero yield, 202 + + Portuguese position, 144 + Preamble to treaty, 252 + Presidential Directive on (proposed), 210 + Quadrilateral discussions of, 157 + Ratification provisions for extension of, 198, 200, + 208, 227 + Replacement treaty problem, 227 + Safeguards in, 102, 359 + Safeguards Plan, 200, 205, 207, + 210 + SALT linkage with + As reinforcement, 146 + SALT II ratification before CTB, 214, 216, 217, 218, 221, 237 + U.S. disapproval of, 163 + + Self-regulation of, 193 + Senate ratification of, prospects for, 212 + Senate ratification provision for treaty extensions, 198, 200, + 208, 227 + South African position, 146, + 211, 224 + Soviet draft treaties, 160, 165, 251 + Soviet expression of interest in, 140, 142, 146 + Soviet invasion of Afghanistan as affecting, 244, 250 + Spanish position, 146, 211 + Sverdlovsk incident’s effect on, 248 + Swedish position, 144, 160, 184 + Talks seen as unproductive, 241, + 250 + Treaty renewal, 203, 228, 231 + Trilateral negotiations + British position, 171 + British withdrawal from, 236, 237, 240, 242 + CD working group, effect on, 390, 393 + Changing approaches to issues in, 252 + Continuation during NPT Review Conference of, 244 + Duration of treaty, proposals for, 180, 182 + ERDA assessment of, 189 + Failure to complete before NPT Review Conference, + 232, 237 + Guidance for, 228 + Lack of progress in, 237, 257 + New Soviet instructions on, 174, 177 + Peaceful nuclear explosions issue as obstacle to + agreement in, 165 + Progress in before NPT Review Conference, 240, 248 + Proposed strategy for, 166, 167, 174 + Review of U.S. strategy for, 214, 216 + Scheduling of initial talks, 162 + Sessions + July 1977, 163, 165 + Oct.–Nov. 1977, 165, 170, 171, 177 + Dec. 1977, 174, 178, 180, 181, 182, 184 + Jan.–Mar. 1978, 182, 185, 189 + May–Aug. 1978, 195, 213 + Sept.–Dec. 1978, 217, 219, 228 + Feb.–Mar. 1979, 229 + June–July 1979, 232, 237 + Oct.–Dec. 1979, 241 + Feb.–Apr. 1980, 247 + Oct.–Nov. 1980, 257 + + Soviet acceptance of moratorium on peaceful + nuclear explosions, 175, + 176, 183, 189, 199, 212 + Speeding up of, 199 + Status of verification issues at, 223 + Timing for, likely, 195 + U.S.-British discussions of, 159 + U.S. instructions for, 163, 170, 180, 181, 185, 219 + U.S. preparations for, 160 + U.S. proposed memorandum for Dobrynin on, 166 + Weakening of Soviet position on peaceful nuclear + explosions, 171, 189 + Working groups, 247 + + Turkish position, 144, 146 + + U.S. advocacy for multilateral adoption of, 151 + U.S.-British discussions of + June 1977, 159 + July 1977, 160, 165 + Feb. 1978, 187 + Sept. 1978, 226 + Jan. 1979, 226 + May 1979, 232 + Jan. 1980, 244 + May 1980, 250 + + U.S.-Chinese People’s Republic discussions of, 151 + U.S. negotiating position finalization, 160 + U.S. Non-Paper on, 243 + U.S.-Soviet exploratory discussions (June 1977), 162 + U.S.-Soviet relations as affected by, 146 + U.S. statements on, 146 + Vance-Brezhnev discussions of, 153 + Vance-Dobrynin discussions of, 243 + Vance-Gromyko discussions of, 153, 165, 168, 212, + 223 + Verification + As obstacle to agreement on PNEs, 146, 195 + As primary Soviet concern in negotiations, 189 + British role in, 187 + By national technical means, 156, 160, 209, 212 + Capability for, 146, + 163 + DOE position, 196 + Group of 77, position on, + 390, 391 + International seismic data exchange, 189 + OSTP review, 230 + Peaceful nuclear explosions as problem for, 146 + Prenotification of chemical explosions, 223 + Role in Senate ratification of, 212 + Status of verification issues at trilateral + negotiations, 223 + Swedish proposals, 153, + 160, 184 + Treaty length and, 213 + U.S.-British discussions of, 244 + U.S.-Soviet discussions of, 153, 165, 182 + + Warnke-Petrosyants discussion of, 199 + Withdrawal from treaty on, 176, + 177, 184, 189, 190, 206 + Yugoslav position, 144 + Zero-yield testing, 202 + + Conference of Non-Aligned Nations (Colombo, 1976), 471 + Conference of the Committee on Disarmament (CCD) (see also Committee on Disarmament) + Allied views on, 144 + Ban on new weapons systems (proposed), 153 + Chemical weapons + British draft resolution on, 89 + Convention on, 79, 86 + Limitation as focus of, 61 + Role in discussion of, 63, 66, 89, 94, 98, 102 + + Comprehensive test ban, 160, + 163, 164, 195, 204, 214, + 247 + Conclusion of, 84 + French role in, 494 + Genetic engineering, 89 + Reconstitution of, 212 + Special Session on Disarmament, 475, 494 + Structural revisions of, possible, 473 + Tlatelolco Treaty, 437 + + Confidence-building, 70, 73, 94, 478 + Congdon, Michael, 65, 402, 473, 477 + Congress, Acts of (see also Nuclear + Non-Proliferation Act) + Environmental Policy Act, 69 + Foreign Assistance Act, 269 + Humphrey-Kennedy Amendment, 468 + International Security Assistance and Arms Export Control + Act (1976), 260, 263, 264 + P.L. 480, 376 + Security Assistance Authorization for FY 1978 (1977), 264 + Symington Amendment, 376 + + U.S.-Venezuelan discussion of, 432 + + + Congress, U.S. (see also Congress, Acts of) + ASAT program funding by, 35 + Chemical weapons + Attitudes toward, 96, + 97 + Budgeting for R&D on, 75 + Funding for binary weapons production facility, + 95, 100, 103, 132 + Legislation on, 69 + Use in Asia of, 110 + Weteye bombs, 123, 124 + + + Conventional arms transfers + Notification of Ford administration-era sales, + 260, 262, 263, 265 + Restraint as objective in, 302 + State Department strategy for limits on, 286 + To Israel, 265 + Vance’s report on, 316 + + Full-scope safeguards, 361 + Nuclear Non-proliferation Act as guidance for, 366 + Nuclear proliferation, 366, 383 + Nuclear reprocessing, 364, 381 + Nuclear weapons stockpile reliability, 188, 190 + Plutonium exports, 352, 353 + Special Session on Disarmament, 488 + Sverdlovsk incident, 115, 127, 129 + + Consalvi Bottaro, Simon Alberto, 416, + 430, 432 + Constitution, U.S., 166 + Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space + Objects (1972), 39 + Convention on Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space + (1975), 39 + Conventional arms transfers (CAT) (see also + Conventional arms transfers to Africa; Conventional arms transfers + to Iran; Conventional arms transfers to Latin America) + Allied discussion of (proposed), 298 + Ammunition re-supply, 263, 265 + Assessment of policy on, 312, + 313 + Carter-Brezhnev discussions of, 309 + Ceiling management in, 286, 287, 312 + Channels for, 261 + Congressional notification of Ford administration-era + sales, 260, 262, 263, 265 + Controls over promotion of, 260, + 261, 262, 270, 271, 274 + Coproduction limits, 268, 270, 271, + 285, 303, 304, 312 + Deferral of requests for, 263 + Dollar volume ceilings on, 258, + 268, 270, 271, 277 + Employment of U.S. citizens for overseas projects, 268 + Exemption from controls on, 268, + 269, 270, 271 + For new systems, 268 + France as obstacle to limits on, 299 + From Israel, 297 + From the Soviet Union, 283, 288, 297, + 300 + FY 1977 amounts, 268, 272, + 277, 300 + FY 1978 program, 286, 287, + 302 + FY 1979 ceiling, 301, 302 + FY 1980 sales, 312 + Incentives for stimulation of, 268 + Interim restraint measures (IRMs), 304 + International Traffic in Arms regulations, 273 + Legislation on, 264 + London Suppliers Group guidelines as precedent for + agreement on, 284, 285 + Management of restraints on, 279, 280 + Multilateral restraints on + British position, 267, + 308 + Efforts for encouragement of, 260 + French position, 267, + 298, 299, 308 + FRG position, 267, 308 + JCS position, 301 + Lack of progress in, 312, 313 + LDC position, 481 + Mondale’s talks with allies on, 258 + Presidential directive on, 270, 271, 277, 312 + Soviet attitudes toward, 283 + Vance-Gromyko discussions of, 267 + + New technology developed for export, 268 + + OAS discussion of, 296 + Pipeline and pending sales, 260, + 262 + Policy Review Committee meetings on, 266, 268, 286, 287, + 290, 291 + Qualitative and quantitative controls, 312 + Reduction in amount of, 258, + 260, 261, 296, 302, 303 + Regional Working Groups, 295 + Significant combat equipment, 261, 270, 271, 273, + 275 + Soviet paper on, 315 + Special Coordination Committee meetings on, 281, 294, + 295, 303, 306 + Special Session on Disarmament + LDC resistance to restraints, 481 + Program of Action on, 296, 299, 304 + U.S. initiatives, 478, + 481, 492 + U.S. restraint on sales, 281 + U.S. vulnerabilities in, 480, 481 + + + State Department strategy for limits on, 286 + Study on consequences of, 280 + Submission for approval to Carter, 258 + Supplier/recipient consultations, 304 + Third party transfers, 268, 285, 312 + To Australia, 268, 269, 270, + 271 + To Egypt, 263, 268, 283 + To Iraq, 283, 300 + To Israel, 263, 265, 267, + 268, 269, 271, 289 + To Japan, 268, 269, 270, + 271 + To Korean Republic, In FY 1977, + 268 + To low-income countries, 268 + To Middle East, 283 + To NATO members in FY 1977, 268 + To New Zealand, 268, 269, 270, + 271 + To Pakistan, 268 + To Persian Gulf states, 260, + 263, 280, 304 + To Peru, 263, 283, 297 + To Saudi Arabia, 268, 300 + To Spain, 268 + To the Third World (CIA paper), 300 + Types of, 260 + U.S. policy on + Assessment of, 312, 313 + Carter administration’s review of, 258, 259 + CIA review of, 274 + Disagreements on, 268 + Latin American transfers, 266 + PD/NSC–13, 270, 271, 277, 312 + + + U.S.-Soviet talks on + ACDA position, 290, 295, 307 + Bartholomew-Mendelevich discussions, 311, 314, 315 + Briefing of Chinese People’s Republic on, 282 + Carter-Gromyko discussions, 278 + Dobrynin-Brzezinski discussions, 310 + DOD position, 290, 294, 295, 306 + Guidance for, 304 + Israeli sales, 297 + Latin America, 290, 293, 296, 303, 304, 305, 314 + Mexico City, Dec. 1978, + 303, 304, 305 + PD/NSC–36, 291, 292 + Policy Review Committee meetings on, 286, 287, 290, 291 + Regional vs. functional emphasis in, 289, 290 + Reports on, 284, 293, 296, 305 + SCC meetings on, 281, + 294, 295, 303, 306 + Soviet areas of focus in, 304 + Soviet attitudes and approaches to, 283, 289 + Soviet invasion of Afghanistan as affecting, 57, 316 + Stalling of, 316 + Three-part framework for, 296 + U.S. embassy Moscow perspectives on, 283, 289 + U.S. Non-Paper on, 285 + U.S.–ROK discussions of, 303 + U.S. strategy on, 260, + 281 + Vance-Dobrynin discussions, 260, 267, 278 + + Vance-Gromyko discussions, 267, 315 + Western European views on, 308 + + U.S.-Venezuelan talks on, 288 + Vance meeting with Senators on, 269 + Vance’s report to Congress on, 316 + + Conventional arms transfers to Africa + Horn of Africa, 283, 290, 293 + Study of consequences of, 280 + Sub-Saharan, 295, 303, 304, + 306, 314 + U.S.-Soviet talks on, 293, 295, 306 + U.S.-Venezuelan talks on, 288 + Vance-Gromyko discussions of, 267 + + Conventional arms transfers to Iran + AWACS aircraft purchase request, 263, 277, 278, 287 + Electronic countermeasures systems, 263 + In FY 1977, 268, 278, 300 + Limitation of, 269 + Soviet position, 267, 283, 289 + Studies of, 260, 280 + TOW missile launcher kits, 263 + U.S.-Soviet talks on, 303 + + Conventional arms transfers to Latin America + British, 288, 297 + By Federal Republic of Germany, 297 + Changing patterns of supply, 297 + French, 288, 297 + Israeli, 297 + Latin American and Caribbean conventional weapons + meetings, 296, 299, 304, 305 + Limitation of, 283 + Policy Review Committee meetings on, 266, 290 + Self-restraint in, 296 + Soviet, 283, 288, 297 + Study on consequences of, 280 + U.S. policy, 499 + U.S.-Soviet talks on, 290, 293, 296, + 303, 304, 305, 314 + Western European, 297 + + Coon, Jane, 341, 381 + Cooper, Frank, 232, 242 + Coprocessing, 344, 353 + Coproduction limits, 268, 270, 271, 285, 303, 304, 312 + Corden, Pierre, 159 + COREDIF, 328 + Cotter, Donald H., 150 + Council of Europe, 476 + Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ), 322, 358 + Coutinho, Dirciu, 461 + Crimmins, John + FRG nuclear sales to Brazil, 397, 398, 399, 400, + 405 + Tlatelolco Treaty, 410, 415 + + Crocker, Gary, 122 + Cuba (see also Cuban Tlatelolco Treaty + accession) + As SSOD PrepCom member, 471 + Conventional arms transfers, 283, 295 + Missile crisis (1962), 304 + Non-proliferation Treaty, 421 + Soviet combat brigade in, 314, + 315 + Soviet Union, relations with, 418 + + Cuban Tlatelolco Treaty accession + ACDA memorandum on, 407 + As requirement for entry into force of treaty, 406, 435 + Colombian representations over, 441 + Cuban conditions for, 421, 423, 434 + Cuban refusal of, 441, 450, 465 + Guantanamo’s inclusion and, 402, + 434 + Nuclearization of Puerto Rico and, 423 + OPANAL position, 423, 450 + Soviet encouragement of, 415, + 423 + Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and, 465 + Soviet signing and, 418, 435 + U.S. support of Latin American encouragement of, 415 + + Cubillos Sallato, Hernan, 436 + Culbertson, Philip, 35, 59 + Cunningham, George, 381 + Cunningham, Woody, 468 + Cutter, W. Bowman, 5, 17 + Cyprus, 471 + Czechoslovakia, 6, 283, 359, 471 + + + + + Dalton, James E., 100 + DANBO nuclear test, 154, 161 + DARPA (Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency), 6, 16 + Dashiell, Thomas, 139 + Davies, Thomas D. + Chemical weapons, 63, 79, 83, + 87, 88, 108, 126 + + Comprehensive test ban, 159, + 207, 210 + House testimony of, 104 + Special Coordination Committee meetings, 207, 210 + Sverdlovsk incident, 129 + + Davis, Dickson, 286 + Davis, Jack, 468 + Davis, Lynn, 68, 104, 135, 286, 486 + Declaration on Disarmament, 477 + Defense, British Ministry of (MOD), 159 + Defense, Soviet Ministry of, 128 + Defense, U.S. Department of (DOD) (see also + Office of the Secretary of Defense) + ASAT talks, 28, 34, 35, + 37, 44 + Chemical weapons + Binary weapons funding, 100, 103, 132 + Intra-departmental differences over, 68, 69 + PD/NSC–15, 78 + PRM/NSC 27, 66 + U.S. policy toward, 61 + Use in Asia of, 110, + 122 + Weteye bombs, 123, 124 + + + Comprehensive test ban + Carter discussion, proposed, 149 + Fixed duration treaty, 197 + On-site inspections, 184 + Permitted experiments, 178, 188 + Position on, 148, 178, 192 + Proposed strategy for trilateral negotiations, + 167 + + + Conventional arms transfers + CIA review of policies for promotion of, 274 + FY 1977 amounts, 272 + FY 1978 program, 287 + Lockheed sales of C–130 + aircraft, 273 + Regulations for controls over promotion of, 261 + U.S.-Soviet talks, 290, + 294, 295, 306 + + Cutoff and transfer agreements, 489, 490, 492 + DOE cooperation with, 178, 484 + Hostile acts in space, 29, 31 + Japanese reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel, 344 + Nuclear fuel, 358, 392 + Nuclear testing, 161, 254, 256 + Nuclear weapons stockpile reliability, 188, 192, 202 + Operation FULCRUM II, 155 + Peaceful nuclear explosions, 167, 169, 183 + PRM/NSC 16, 146, 148, 192 + Special Session on Disarmament, 489, 490, 492 + Technology transfers to the Soviet Union, 245 + Tlatelolco Treaty, 409, 440 + + Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA), 6, 16 + Deming, Rust, 369 + Democratic Party, 140 + Denend, Leslie G. + Chemical weapons, 79, 83, 88, + 95, 96, 98 + Conventional arms transfers, 281, 286, 295, 303 + SCC meetings, 281, 295, 303 + + Denmark, 76, 144, 364, 474, 501 + Desai, Morarji + Carter meetings with, 361 + Comprehensive test ban, 204, + 206, 211, 224 + Full-scope safeguards, 482 + Nuclear proliferation, 357, 361, 364 + Resignation as Prime Minister of, 372 + Special Session on Disarmament, 491, 492 + + Détente, 499 + Detinov, Nikolay N., 168, 201, 221, 487 + Deutsch, John, 112 + Development and disarmament + Backstopping Committee report on, 486 + SSOD’s endorsement of, 119 + U.S. approaches to, 478, 494 + U.S. guidance for discussion of, 475 + U.S. initiatives for, 481 + Yugoslav position, 477 + + Devine, James, 346 + Diaz Bessone, Ramón G., 422 + Diego Garcia, 251 + Diet, Japanese, 353 + Dinneen, Gerald, 43 + Disarmament (see also Special Session on + Disarmament) + CIA Intelligence Assessment, 394 + Declaration on, 494 + Development and, 119, 475, 477, + 478, 481, 486, 494 + + Experts meetings, 65, 143, 471, + 474 + Indian position, 471 + Machinery for, 494 + Nuclear proliferation’s affect on, 477 + Sri Lankan position, 471 + Ten Year Program for, 486, 488 + U.S. eight objectives in, 495 + Yugoslav position, 471, 477 + + Dobbins, James F., Jr., 152, 157, 326, 357, 476 + Dobrynin, Anatoly F. + ASAT, Vienna Summit discussion of, 55, 56 + ASAT talks + Démarche on, 49, 50 + Hostile acts agreement, 52 + Illegal satellites, 53 + U.S. démarche on, 49, + 50 + Vance-Dobrynin discussions of, 12, 13, 49, 50 + Vance-Gromyko discussions of, 3, 55 + + Brzezinski’s discussions with, 310 + Carter-Gromyko talks, 201, 221 + Chemical weapons, 64, 101, 117 + Christopher’s discussions with, 131 + Comprehensive test ban + Carter-Dobrynin discussions of, 142 + Carter-Gromyko discussions of, 201, 221 + Trilateral negotiations, 166, 175 + Vance-Dobrynin discussions of, 243 + Vance-Gromyko discussions of, 153, 168, 212 + Vienna Summit discussion of, 236 + + Conventional arms transfers, 260, 267, 278, 309, + 310 + Earle’s discussions with, 131, + 134 + Muskie’s discussions with, 138 + Nuclear proliferation, 332 + Peaceful nuclear explosions, 183 + Seismic stations, 166 + Soviet high-yield nuclear testing, 253 + Special Session on Disarmament, 487 + Sverdlovsk incident, 117, 129, 130, + 131, 134 + Vance’s discussions with, 117, + 243, 260, 267, 278 + Vienna Summit (June 1979), 55, 56, + 101, 236, 309, 310 + + Documents not declassified, 93, 451 + Dodson, Christine, 227, 431 + Domestic Council, 322 + Downhole units, 237, 241, 247 + Duff, Robert, 159 + Dugway Army Depot, 124 + Duncan, Charles W. + ASAT Treaty, 17, 43 + Chemical weapons, 68, 96 + Comprehensive test ban, 149, + 210 + Conventional arms transfers, 266 + Nuclear proliferation in the post-INFCE era, 375, 377, + 381 + Nuclear testing, 235, 249, 255, + 256 + Policy Review Committee meetings, 68, 266 + PRM/NSC 23, 5 + Special Coordination Committee meetings, 17, 43, + 96, 210 + Special Session on Disarmament, 488, 489 + + + + + + + Earle, Ralph W., II + Comprehensive test ban, 252 + Dobrynin’s discussions with, 131, 134 + NPT Review Conference, 386, 389, 391 + Seismic stations, 247 + Soviet high-yield nuclear testing, 253, 254, 255 + Special Session on Disarmament, 487 + Sverdlovsk incident + Congressional consultation on, 115 + Initial reports on, 109 + SCC meetings on, 112 + U.S.-British consultations on, 137 + U.S. démarches on, 113, + 129, 131, 134 + + + + East Asia, 304 + Eastern Europe, 501 + Economic System of Latin America and the Caribbean (SELA), 416, 432 + Ecton, Stephen, 351 + Ecuador, 288, 297, 449 + Edmonds, John + Comprehensive test ban, 159, + 187, 189, 226, 241 + Seismic stations, 240 + Special Session on Disarmament, 474 + + Egypt + As NPT non-signer, 327 + Comprehensive test ban, 146, + 211, 224 + Conventional arms transfers, 263, 268, 283 + Full-scope safeguards for, 364 + + Israeli negotiations with, 20 + Nuclear agreements with, 325 + Nuclear proliferation, 364, 375 + Special Session on Disarmament, 471, 475, 501 + + Eighteenth Amendment to U.S. Constitution, 166 + Einaudi, Luigi, 296, 423 + Einhorn, Robert, 120, 184, 223, 250, 251, 402, 423 + Eisenhower, Dwight D., 233, 482 + Eizenstat, Stuart E., 27, 206, 358, 381, 382 + Eklund, Sigvard A., 373, 449 + Elections + British (1979), 229 + French (1978), 364 + Japanese (1977), 344 + Pakistani (1977), 321, 357 + U.S. (1976), 140 + U.S. (1980), 128, 136, 257 + + Electronic countermeasures systems, 263 + Electronic intelligence (ELINT), 4 + Electronic warfare (EW), 6, 8 + Eltz, Regina, 398 + Emergency Action Message, 6 + Energy, U.S. Department of (DOE) + Alternative nuclear technologies, 364 + Comprehensive test ban, 184, + 197, 198, 202, 206, 209, + 210 + Cutoff and transfer, 484 + Defense programs of, 230 + DOD cooperation with, 178, 484 + Nuclear Non-proliferation Act as guidance for, 366 + Nuclear testing, 235, 254, 256 + Peaceful nuclear explosions, 183 + Seismic stations, 196, 248, 254, + 255 + Special Session on Disarmament, 488, 492 + U.S. reactor part exports to Argentina, 470 + + + Energy conservation, 342 + Energy Research and Development Administration (ERDA) + Clinch River reactor funding, 322 + Comprehensive test ban, 147, + 160, 180, 189, 196 + Japanese reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel, 344 + Nuclear fuel access, 358 + Nuclear proliferation, 317, 343 + Nuclear testing, 150, 154, 155, + 156, 158, 172 + Operation CRESSET, 172 + Operation FULCRUM II, 161 + Peaceful nuclear explosions, 147, 160 + Seismic stations, 160 + Tokai nuclear plant, 238 + + Enhanced radiation (ER) weapons (see also + Bombs; Neutron bomb; Nuclear weapons), 480, 481, 482, 494 + Environmental impact statements (EISs), 123 + Environmental modification (ENMOD), 283 + Environmental Policy Act, 69 + Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), 358 + Erb, Guy F., 288, 432 + Erramuspe, Hugo, 466 + Escovar Salom, Ramón, 411, 416 + Eshes, Michael, 305 + Eskdalemuir, 234, 240 + Espil, Jorge A. Aja, 420, 429, 432 + Estrada, Jaime, 436 + Ethiopia + As SSOD PrepCom member, 471 + Conventional arms transfers, 260, 263, 300, 304, + 309 + Nuclear proliferation, 359 + U.S.-Soviet discussion of, 20 + + EURATOM (see also U.S.–EURATOM Agreement + for Cooperation (1958)) + Canadian cooperation agreement with, 355 + Lack of IAEA safeguards, 333, + 348, 360, 363, 367 + U.S. right of veto over reprocessing by, 372, 379, + 381, 382, 384, 395 + U.S. Senate acceptance of IAEA safeguards for, 384 + + EURODIF, 328, 342 + Europe + Adoption of full-scope safeguards by, 395 + Conventional arms transfers, 281 + Independent nuclear deterrent in, possible, 143 + Nuclear fuel exports to, 362 + Nuclear fuel transfers from, 396, 424 + Nuclear proliferation differences with the United States, + 365 + + + European Coal and Steel Community, 326 + European Community (EC), 344, 348, 363, 373, 420 + European Economic Community (EEC), 347, + 476 + European Gaseous Diffusion Uranium Enrichment Consortium + (EURODIF), 328, 342 + Evader MARV re-entry vehicle, 146 + Evans, Benjamin C., 431 + Evans, Rowland, 440 + Executive Order No. 11850, 81, 82 + Export controls, 261 + Export-Import Bank, 478, 488 + “Eyes and ears of peace” proposal, 488, + 489 + + + + + Facer, Roger, 232 + Fakley, Dennis, 187, 244 + Falk, George, 402 + Falkland Islands, 251, 422 + Far East, 146 + Farley, Philip J., 356, 367, 375, 423 + Federal Energy Administration (FEA), 358 + Federal Register, 261, 262 + Ferguson, Ewen A. J., 157, 476 + Figueirido, Reinaldo, 288, 432, 461 + Finarelli, Michael, 120 + Finarelli, Peggy, 129, 139 + Finch, Lawrence, 79, 98, 199, 223, 244 + Findley, Paul, 375, 419 + Finland, 449, 478, 501 + Fisher, Adrian + Chemical weapons negotiations, 71, 73, 76, 79, 80, 99, + 102 + Comprehensive test ban, 204 + + Fleischer, Eric, 170, 351 + Fleischer, Lowell, 282, 284 + Fletcher, James C., 2 + Flood, Susan, 446, 486, 494 + Floweree, Charles C. + Chemical weapons + CD working group on, 104 + Consultation with allies on, 63, 106 + Guidance for negotiations on, 88, 108 + NATO disarmament experts discussion of, 65 + Report on negotiations on, 128 + Soviet slowdown in negotiations on, 136 + + Encouragement of adherence to Geneva Protocol and + Biological Weapons Convention, 62 + Non-proliferation Treaty Review Conference, 386 + Special Session on Disarmament, 475, 486 + Sverdlovsk incident, 113, 114, 120, + 131 + + Fonseka, Ignatius Benedict, 389 + Ford, Gerald R. + Chemical weapons policy, 61, 81 + Conventional arms transfers to Israel, 263 + Détente, 499 + Nuclear proliferation, 317, 325, 397 + SALT II Treaty, 499 + + Ford Foundation, 334 + Ford/Mitre study, 344 + Foreign Affairs, Soviet Ministry of (MFA), 283 + Foreign Assistance Act, 269 + Foreign Military Sales Program (FMS) + As type of arms transfer, 260 + C–130 aircraft as significant + combat equipment, 275, 276 + Case study of, 260 + Decision-making process for, 260, 261 + For Kenya, 295 + FY 1977 amounts, 272 + Letters of Acceptance for, 272, + 279 + Letters of Offer for, 260, 272, 279 + U.S. financing for, 268 + + Foreign Nuclear Policy Council (France), 357 + Four-Power Summit (London, May 1977), 326 + France (see also French nuclear sales to + Pakistan) + As NPT non-signer, 327, 364 + Chemical weapons + Quadrilateral consultations on, 87, 89, 94, 106, 107, 126 + U.S. consultations on, 70, 79, 83, 106, 107, 110 + + Comprehensive test ban + Adherence to + British position, 159 + International pressure for, 166, 168 + Refusal to negotiate, 146, 157 + Soviet position, 176, 177, 192 + U.S.-French discussions of, 152 + + U.S. position, 142, 143, 159 + + + Quadrilateral discussions of, 157 + Review conference, 227, + 228, 231 + UN resolutions on, 144 + U.S. advocacy of, 151 + U.S. consultations on, 152, 214 + + Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, 494 + Conventional arms transfers + Allied talks on (proposed), 298 + France as obstacle to limits on, 299 + In FY 1977, 300 + Multilateral restraints on, 267, 298, 299, 308 + To Latin America, 288, + 297 + + Cutoff and transfer agreements, 486 + Elections (1978), 364 + Fuel cycle evaluation program, 347, 348, 349, 355, + 356 + India, relations with, 357 + London Suppliers Group, 260, + 317, 324, 356 + Nuclear power, 349 + Nuclear proliferation + French policy on, 356, + 377 + Fuel cycle evaluation program role for avoidance + of, 336, 338, 355 + Full-scope safeguards for prevention of, 347, 348, 357, 377, 388 + In the post-INFCE era, 375, 376, 377, 378, 379 + Quadripartite discussions of, 326 + U.S. controls for, 430 + U.S.-French discussions of, 324, 347, 348, 395 + U.S.-French talks on, 324, 347, 349, 355, 357, 361 + + + Nuclear reprocessing + French position, 342, + 365 + Of Japanese spent fuel, 341 + U.S.-French talks on, 324, 349, 377, 384 + U.S. policy differences over, 328 + + Nuclear testing by, 146 + OPANAL, 438, 449, 464 + Pakistani relations with, 350 + South African nuclear weapons development, 376 + Special Session on Disarmament, 471, 474, 476, 494, + 501 + Tlatelolco Treaty + Argentine accession to, 361 + French adherence to + As requirement for entry into force of + treaty, 419 + Brazilian position, 415 + French position, 433, 442 + OPANAL-French talks on, 438 + OPANAL position, 402, 449, 464 + Signing of treaty, 406, 449 + U.S.-French discussion of, 361 + U.S. position, 435, 478, 499 + + Transit rights, 361, + 446, 449 + + U.S.–EURATOM Agreement for Cooperation (1958), 347, 349, 430 + U.S. highly enriched uranium exports to, 463 + U.S. relations with, Soviet attempts at manipulation of, + 163 + + François-Poncet, Jean, 361, 378 + Frank, Richard, 5 + French Guiana, 442 + French nuclear sales to Pakistan + Canceling of, 381, 425 + French-Pakistani talks on, 356, + 357 + French position, 364, 416 + French reconsideration of, 350, + 357, 360, 361, 364, 426 + U.S position, 321, 347, 349, + 395 + U.S.-Soviet discussion of, 332 + + Fretwell, John, 250 + Fri, Robert W. + Comprehensive test ban, 145, + 147, 160, 164 + Nuclear testing, 156 + Operation FULCRUM II, 155 + PD/NSC–8, 330 + PRM/NSC 15, 317 + PRM/NSC 16, 141 + + Fritzel, Roger, 494 + Fromowitz, Samuel, 346 + Frosch, Robert + ASAT weapons and talks, 11, 17, 24, + 29, 34, 35, 43, 46 + PD/NSC–37, 27 + PD/NSC–39, 32 + PD/NSC–45, 38 + PRM/NSC 23, 5 + Special Coordination Committee meetings, 17, 29, + 34, 35, 43 + + + Fuel bank, 358, 364 + Fuel cycle evaluation program (FCEP) (see + also International Nuclear Fuel Cycle Evaluation (INFCE) + Conferences) + Allied contacts on, 326, 331, 333 + British position, 342 + Carter’s decision on reprocessing, 340 + Carter’s policy statement on, 331, 333, 338 + Establishment of ad hoc NSC group on, 330 + For avoidance of nuclear proliferation, 336, 338, + 355 + French position, 347, 348, 349, + 356 + IAEA’s coordination with, 346 + Japanese position, 341, 344 + London Suppliers Group and, 342 + Multinational centers for regional processing capacity, + 323, 348 + Need for, 325 + Outline of proposal for, 346 + PD/NSC–8, 330 + Politics of (CIA paper), 370 + Purpose and functions of, 328 + Reprocessing as question for inclusion within, 338 + Soviet position, 348 + Status reports on, 372, 373 + Study for, 361, 366, 432 + Types of fuel cycles, 336 + U.S.-French talks on, 355 + U.S. policy on, 330 + + Fukuda, Takeo + Japanese reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel, 344 + Nuclear proliferation, 320, 329, 342, + 344, 352 + Washington visit (Mar. 1977), 151, 329, + 333 + + + Full-scope safeguards (see also Nuclear + proliferation), 364 + + British model, 411 + Canadian position, 447, 457, 458, + 462 + European adoption of, possible, 384, 395 + For Argentina + Argentine discussions with IAEA on, 439, 443 + Argentine position, 364, + 395, 422 + FRG position, 462 + OPANAL views on, 411 + U.S.-Argentine agreement on, 426 + U.S. dilemma with, 458 + U.S.-Soviet discussions of, 348 + U.S. strategy for, 419, + 459 + + + For Brazil, 395, 399, 412, + 419, 433 + For Egypt, 364 + For heavy water, 454, 457, 460 + For India, 361, 364, 430, + 482 + For Iraq, 395 + For Israel, 364, 395 + For Japan, 352 + For prevention of nuclear proliferation, 327, 339, + 347, 348 + For South Africa, 364, 395 + For Spain, 364 + For Venezuela, 430 + French position, 347, 348, 357, + 377, 388 + FRG position, 384, 447 + Lack in EURATOM of, 333, 348, 360, + 363, 367 + London Suppliers Group and, 347 + Progress in establishment of, 364 + Soviet position, 363 + U.S.–FRG discussion of, 384 + U.S. legislation for support of, 361 + U.S. position, 373 + + + + + + G–7 Summit (May 1977), 326, 342 + Galluci, Robert, 467 + Gandhi, Rajiv, 166 + García Robles, Alfonso, 410, 423, 501 + Garrison, Mark, 168, 423, 487 + Gasberri, George, 122 + Gathwright, Wreathem, 176, 417 + Geisel, Ernesto B. + Argentine-Brazilian nuclear competition, 417 + Rosalyn Carter meeting with, 415, 416 + Carter meetings with, 433 + Carter’s messages to, 412, 415, 424 + FRG nuclear sales to Brazil + Brazil’s questioning of value of, 364 + Brazilian policy on, 405 + Christopher’s discussions in Brazil on, 404 + Compromise settlement, possible, 412 + Safeguards emphasized in, 399, 433 + U.S. position, 357 + + + Nuclear fuel imports from the United States, 424 + Pérez’ meeting with, 432 + + Transition from Presidency of, 461 + Vance meetings with, 425, 426, 427 + + Gelb, Leslie H. + ASAT talks, 29, 43 + Chemical weapons, 88 + Comprehensive test ban, 152, + 153, 168, 176, 205, 207 + Conventional arms transfers, 278, 281 + + FY 1978, program, 286 + U.S.-Soviet discussions of, 284, 285, 290, 293, 294, 295, 303, 305 + + + Meeting with the Shah, 303 + Nuclear proliferation, 321, 332 + Nuclear weapons stockpile reliability, 190 + Special Session on Disarmament, 487 + + Gelner, Michael, 122 + General Conference for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin + America (OPANAL) + Full-scope safeguards for Argentina, 411 + Nuclear energy development, 416 + Resolution 121(VI), 464 + Sessions + Apr. 1975, 402, 411 + Apr. 1977, 419 + Apr. 1978, 434 + Apr. 1979, 449, 464, 465 + Feb. 1977, 402 + + + Tlatelolco Treaty, 402, 409, 411, + 423, 438, 449, 450, 464 + + Genetic engineering, 89 + Geneva Conference on Middle East (proposal), 20 + Geneva Conference on Special Weapons, 304 + Geneva Protocol (1925), 62, 77, 81, 106, 110 + Genscher, Hans-Dietrich + Carter meetings with, 405 + Comprehensive test ban, 157 + FRG nuclear sales to Argentina, 467 + FRG nuclear sales to Brazil, 400, 405 + Full-scope safeguard for heavy water, 457 + Nuclear proliferation, 342 + Special Session on Disarmament, 476 + Tlatelolco Treaty, 417 + Vance’s message to, 467 + + Germany, Democratic Republic of, 146, + 283, 471 + Germany, Federal Republic of (FRG) (see + also Germany, Federal Republic of, nuclear sales to Brazil) + As London Suppliers Group member, 260, 317 + Chemical weapons + Briefing of U.S. allies on negotiations on, 76 + Draft treaty on, 69 + Quadrilateral consultations on, 87, 89, 94, 106, 107, 126 + U.S. consultations on, 63, 70, 79, 83 + U.S. stockpiles in, 81 + U.S. stocks in, 139 + Verification issues, 89, + 94 + + Comprehensive test ban, 144, + 157, 214 + Conventional arms transfers, 267, 297, 298, 300, + 308 + EURATOM and IAEA safeguards, 367 + Full-scope safeguards, 384, 447, 457, + 462 + Heavy water + Exports by, 445, 447, 454 + Full-scope safeguards on, 457 + Production technology assistance to Argentina, + 447, 448, 454, 456, 462 + + International Atomic Energy Agency board, 359 + Negative security assurances, 488, 492, 498 + Non-proliferation Treaty, 318, + 319, 333 + Nuclear proliferation + Argentine-IAEA negotiations, 443 + FRG nuclear sales to Argentina, 462, 466, 467 + FRG reprocessing plants, 325, 328, 334, 342, 372, 377 + Fuel cycle evaluation program role for, 336 + Full-scope safeguards for prevention of, 384, 447, 462 + In the post-INFCE era, 375, 376, 377, 379, 384 + Quadripartite discussions of, 326 + U.S. as supplier of uranium to, 325, 371 + U.S.–FRG discussions of, 395 + + Pakistani nuclear weapons development, 384 + + Special Session on Disarmament, 471, 474, 476, 494 + Tlatelolco Treaty, 397 + U.S.–EURATOM Agreement for Cooperation (1958), 347, 363, 384 + U.S. highly enriched uranium exports to, 333, 463 + U.S. relations with, 401 + + Germany, Federal Republic of, nuclear sales to Brazil + Brazil’s questioning of value of, 361, 364 + Carter-Schmidt discussion of, 412, 417 + French position, 364, 416 + FRG position, 333, 342, 398, + 417 + London Suppliers Group expansion and, 335 + New U.S. approach to, 401, 427 + Slowing of program for, 461 + Soviet position, 367, 433 + U.S.-Brazilian consultations, 400, 404 + U.S.-Brazilian relations as affected by, 397, 399, + 403, 404, 443 + U.S. position, 357, 369, 397 + U.S.-Soviet discussion of, 332 + + Ghana, 494, 501 + Giller, Edward, 190, 197, 223, 228 + Gilligan, John, 479, 488 + Gilmour, Ian, 233 + Giscard d’Estaing, Valery + Carter meetings with, 157, 361, 416, + 499 + Carter’s letters to, 299, 347 + Conventional arms transfers, 297, 298 + Fuel cycle evaluation program, 347, 355 + Nuclear proliferation, 342, 347, 361, + 378, 416 + Pakistani-French relations, 350 + Special Session on Disarmament, 491, 499 + Tlatelolco Treaty, 433, 438, 449 + Visit to Latin America (Aug. 1978), + 442 + + Givan, William D., 223 + Glassman, Jon D. + Chemical weapons, 65 + Geneva Protocol and Biological Weapons Convention, 62 + Non-proliferation Treaty, 421, + 450 + Nuclear proliferation, 348 + Special Session on Disarmament, 471 + Tlatelolco Treaty, 450, 464, 465 + + Glenn, John H., 269, 375 + Gleysteen, William, 281, 303, 345 + Goheen, Robert F., 213 + Goldsmith, Sydney, 181, 345 + Goldstein, Martin, 471, 475 + Gompert, David C., 34, 35, 486 + Gonzalez, Raymond E., 449 + Gonzalez Galves, Sergio, 411, 415, 444, 450 + Goodall, Harry, 98 + Goodby, James E., 239 + Goodman, Dennis, 122 + Goodpaster, Andrew, 467 + Gorman, Thomas, 284 + Goronwy-Roberts, Baron, 62 + Granger, James, 120 + Great Britain. See United Kingdom. + Greece, 76, 144, 263 + Greenberg, Robert A., 5 + Griffin, Jack, 244 + Griffiths, Eldon, 421 + Gromyko, Andrei A. + ASAT talks, 3, 6, 13, 55, 56 + Carter meetings with + On comprehensive test ban, 153, 168, 201, 212, 221 + On conventional arms transfers, 278 + On peaceful nuclear explosions, 170, 171 + + + Chemical weapons + Hardening of attitude toward negotiations, 128 + Prohibition of, Vance-Gromyko discussions of, 64, 65, 66, 69, 73 + Vienna Summit discussion of, 101 + + + Comprehensive test ban + Carter’s discussions of, 153, 168, 201, 212, 221 + Fixed duration treaty, 197, 201, 221 + Permitted experiments, 215 + SALT agreement ratification before CTB, 221, 237 + Soviet expression of interest in, 140, 146 + Vance-Gromyko discussions of, 153, 165, 168, 212, 223 + Vienna Summit discussion of, 236 + + + + Conventional arms transfers, 267, 278, 309, 315 + Muskie’s discussions with, 138, + 254 + No-first-use of nuclear weapons, discussion of, 3 + Nuclear proliferation, 332 + Peaceful nuclear explosions, 168, 183, 186 + Special Session on Disarmament, 487, 494 + Speeches at UNGA, 140, 146, 393 + Sverdlovsk incident, 137 + Tlatelolco Treaty, 444 + Vance’s discussions with + ASAT, 3, 6, 13, 55, 56 + Chemical weapons, 64, + 65, 66, 69, 73 + Comprehensive test ban, 153, 165, 168, 212, 223 + Conventional arms transfers, 267, 315 + Nuclear proliferation, 332 + + Vienna Summit (June 1979), 56, 101, + 236, 309 + Visit to Washington (Sept. 1977), + 165 + + Gros Espiell, Héctor + Cuban adherence to Tlatelolco Treaty, 423, 465 + Non-proliferation Treaty, 450 + Nuclear technology cooperation, 410 + Pending ratifications of Tlatelolco Treaty, 434, 450 + Transit rights for nuclear weapons, 409, 411 + U.S. meetings with, 411, 434, 450 + U.S. ratification of Protocol I, 464 + + Group of 77, 371, + 387, 389, + 390, 391, + 394 + Guadeloupe, 442 + Guantanamo, 402, 406, 423, 434, 455, 466 + Guerreiro, Ramiro Elisio Saraiva, 455 + Guhin, Michael, 448 + Guiringaud, Louis de + Comprehensive test ban, 157 + Fuel cycle evaluation program, 355 + Nuclear proliferation, 321, 349, 350, + 357, 361 + Nuclear reprocessing, 349 + Special Session on Disarmament, 476 + + + Guyana, 434, 464, 471 + Gwertzman, Bernard, 269 + + + + + Habib, Philip, 357 + Haig, Alexander M., Jr., 100, 319 + Hanford project, 392 + Hannifin, Patrick, 167, 281 + Harlow, Giles, 65, 348, 402 + Harriman, Averell, 498, 499 + Harrop, William, 295 + Hart, Gary, 123, 124 + Harte, Michael, 159 + Hartman, Arthur A. + ASAT talks, 3 + Chemical weapons, 64 + Comprehensive test ban, 153, + 157 + Conventional arms transfers, 267 + Fuel cycle evaluation program, 355 + Non-proliferation Treaty, 318 + Nuclear proliferation, 326, 332, 350, + 356, 357, 361 + Special Session on Disarmament, 476 + + + Hatoyama, Iichiro, 320, 329 + Hawes, John, 63, 65, 473 + Health, Education and Welfare, U.S. Department of, 123 + Heaphy, Ilene, 402 + Heavy water + Argentine-Brazilian agreement for production of, 461 + Canadian exports of, 426, 447 + Export to Argentina of, 420, + 429, 439, 445, 448 + FRG export of, 445, 447, 454 + Full-scope safeguards for, 454, + 457, 460 + Natural uranium fuel cycle (HWR), 336, 346 + Production of, 318 + Production technology assistance to Argentina + By Canada, 447, 448, 452, 454 + By FRG, 447, 448, 454, 456, 462 + By Switzerland, 454, + 456, 457, 459, 460 + By the Soviet Union, 448, 468 + By the United States, 364, 401, 426, 429 + U.S. dilemma from, 458 + + + Swiss exports of, 458 + + Heckrotte, Warren, 223, 257 + Heilmeier, George, 15 + Helicopters, 263 + Helman, Gerald + Comprehensive test ban, 247 + Special Session on Disarmament, 471, 473, 475, 486, + 488, 489, 494 + + Helsinki Conference (1975), 138 + + Henderson, Nicholas, 242 + Henkin, Charles, 59 + Herbicides, 81, 118 + Hermes, Peter, 318, 321, 384, 401, 462, 467 + Hernandez Acosta, Valentin, 416 + Heyl, Mary Jane, 486 + Hibbert, Reginald, 157, 326 + Hicks, John, 35, 43 + High-altitude interceptors, 6 + High-energy lasers (HELs), 15 + Hineman, Evan, 35, 43 + Hirsch, John, 477 + Hirschfeld, Thomas, 65, 299, 471, 473, 475 + Hiss, Dieter, 417 + Hmong people (see also Laos), 106, 110 + Hodges, Luther, 468 + Hodsoll, Francis S.M., 375, 381, 384 + Hoettle, Charles, 122 + Holbrooke, Richard C.A., 151, 282, 320, 329 + Holloway, James L., III, 190 + Holmes, Allen, 471 + Homme, Robert, 471 + Hopkins, Robert, 266 + Hormats, Robert, 329 + Horn of Africa, 20, 283, 290, 293 + Hornblow, Michael, 146, 269, 413 + Hostile acts. See under satellites. + House of Representatives, U.S. + Foreign Affairs Committee, 110, + 112 + Funding for binary weapons facility, 132 + “House Resolution 512:: Use of + Chemical Agents in Indochina,” 104 + International Relations Committee, 286 + Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, 131 + Sverdlovsk incident, 112, 127, 129, + 131 + + Howard, Robert, 139 + Howitzers, 263 + Hsu Shang-wei, 151 + Huang Chen, 151, 153, 163 + Huberman, Benjamin + ASAT talks, 59 + ASAT Treaty, 17 + Comprehensive test ban, 205, + 207, 228, 252 + Funding for binary weapons, 139 + Nuclear proliferation, 381 + Nuclear weapons stockpile reliability, 190, 197 + PRM/NSC 23, 5 + Seismic stations, 246 + Special Coordination Committee meetings, 17, 139, + 205, 207, 228, 252 + Sverdlovsk incident, 112, 129 + + Hulings, Joseph, 49, 226 + Human rights, 138, 269, 436, 468 + Hume, Cameron, 494 + Humphrey, George, 63 + Humphrey, Hubert H., 263 + Humphrey-Kennedy Amendment, 468 + Humphreys, Marvin, 369 + Hungary, 471 + Hunt, John, 326 + Hunter, Robert, 157, 194, 326, 355, 356, 435, 476 + Huntington, Samuel P., 479, 486, 488, 489 + Hurd, Douglas, 137, 237, 244 + Hurtado Navarro, Hector, 288, 416, 432 + Hussein, King (Jordan), 269 + Hutcheson, Rich, 322 + Hydrogen as energy source, 427 + Hydrogen cyanide, 82 + Hyland, William G., 3, 5, 64, 153, 168, 267, 318, 332 + + + + + IBEX intelligence collection system, 263 + Iceland, 144 + Ifft, Edward, 176 + Imperial Chemical Industries (ICI), 89 + Incapacitants, 71, 81 + Inderfurth, Rick, 358 + India + As NPT non-signer, 327, 364 + Canadian nuclear assistance, 357 + Comprehensive test ban + Non-proliferation value of, 211, 224 + Participation in + Agreement on, 210 + British position, 194 + Indian position, 204, 211, 213, 364 + U.S. desire for, 145 + U.S. resumption of testing, effect on, 198 + + + Permitted experiments, 215 + U.S. consultations on, 214 + + Conventional arms transfers, 300 + French relations with, 357 + + Non-acceptance of full-scope safeguards by, 395 + Nuclear proliferation + Comprehensive test ban’s value against, 211, 224, 364 + Full-scope safeguards, acceptance of, 361, 364, 430, 482 + In the post-INFCE era, 375, 378 + Motives for, 327 + Pakistan arms race with, 347, 466 + Spent nuclear fuel storage, 364 + Suspension of nuclear fuel shipments, 342 + U.S.-Indian talks on, 329, 372, 381 + + Nuclear testing, 145, 153, 317, + 325, 366 + Nuclear weapons development by, 378 + Pakistani relations with, 347 + Peaceful nuclear explosions, 166, 190 + Special Session on Disarmament, 471, 481, 492, 494, + 501 + Tarapur reactor, 357, 383, 384, + 395, 430 + Test ban proposals of, 146 + + Indian Ocean talks, 57, 283, 289, 310, 316 + Indochina, 104 + Indonesia, 146, 283, 359, 364 + Inouye, Daniel K., 269 + Insecticides, 94 + Insertable Nuclear Components (INC) concept, 155, 156, 161, 173 + Intelligence collection systems, 263 + Intelligence Support Activity (ISA), 68 + Inter-American Nuclear Energy Commission (IANEC), 419, 450 + Interagency Committee on Public Diplomacy and Disarmament, 497 + Interagency Group on Nuclear Proliferation, 330, 336, 343 + Interagency Review Groups, 245 + Interagency Working Group (IAWG) on ASAT talks, 17, 29, 34, 43 + Interim restraint measures (IRMs), 304 + Internal seismic installations (ISIs). See + Seismic stations. + International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) + As central organization instrument for non-proliferation, + 327 + As institution for implementing U.S. non-proliferation + goals, 317 + Board of Governors meeting (Feb. 1978), 429 + Developing countries’ representation on board of, 359 + Fuel cycle evaluation program’s coordination with, 346 + General Conference of, 369 + Model agreement on nuclear technology, 339 + Nuclear fuel, 236 + Plutonium storage study by, 377 + Safeguards system + Argentine-IAEA discussions of, 439, 443 + At Tokai, 351 + Brazil as agreeing to, 399, 412, 433 + EURATOM’s approach to verification, 333, 348, 360, 367 + For heavy water, 454 + For sensitive nuclear exports, 318 + Senate acceptance for EURATOM of, 384 + Soviet position, 363 + + + Strengthening of, 323 + Verification of international agreements by, 102, 482, + 483, 484 + + + International Committee of the Red Cross, 106 + International Energy Agency (IEA), 358 + International Fuel Cycle Evaluation Program, 325 + International Nuclear Fuel Cycle Evaluation (INFCE) Conferences + Argentine representation at, 420, 422 + Carter’s speech to, 364, 373 + CIA paper on, 370 + Negotiations after the conclusion of, 374, 376, 377, 378 + Non-proliferation in the era following + Policy Review Committee meeting on, 381, 382 + Smith’s exploration with industrialized countries, + 375, 377, 378, 383 + Smith’s paper on, 381, + 383 + State Department status report on, 376 + U.S.-Argentine discussions of, 466 + U.S.–FRG discussions of, 384 + U.S. strategy for, 379 + + Vance’s message to François-Poncet on, 378 + + + Plenary session for review of progress, 370 + Results of, 372, 373, 381 + Summary of, 380 + U.S. meeting with UN representatives on, 359 + U.S.-Mexican discussions of, 450 + + + International plutonium storage (IPS), 377, 382, 384, 395 + International Research Institute proposal, 501 + International Security Assistance and Arms Export Control Act (1976), 260, 263, 264 + International Seismic Data Exchange (ISDE), 189, 226 + International Telecommunications Convention, 6 + International Traffic in Arms regulations, 273 + Iran (see also Conventional arms transfers + to Iran) + Negative security assurances, 488, 489 + Nuclear proliferation, 327, 359, 494 + Revolution (1979), 308, 311, + 372 + Special Session on Disarmament, 471, 475 + + Iraq + As NPT signatory, 393 + As SSOD PrepCom member, 471 + Conventional arms transfers to, 283, 300 + European nuclear fuel transfers to, 396 + Full-scope safeguards for, 395 + UN resolution on Middle East armaments, 499, 501 + + Iribarren Borges, Ignacio, 288, 416, 432 + Irritants, 76, 99, 118 + Isakov, V. F., 487 + Israel + As NPT non-signer, 327 + Comprehensive test ban, 145, + 211, 224 + Conventional arms transfers by, 297 + Conventional arms transfers to, 263, 265, 267, 268, + 269, 271, 289 + Egyptian negotiations with, 20 + Full-scope safeguards for, 364, + 395 + Iraqi UN resolution on Middle East armaments, 499, 501 + Negative security assurances, 488, 489 + Nuclear agreements with, 325 + Nuclear proliferation, 211, 224, 323, + 328 + Nuclear weapons development by, 378, 386, 389, 394 + + Issraelyan, Victor L., 99, 102, 113, 128, 136 + Italy + Chemical weapons, 76 + Comprehensive test ban, 143, + 144 + Conventional arms transfers, 297 + Non-proliferation Treaty, 371 + Nuclear proliferation, 375 + Nuclear reprocessing, 334, 342 + Special Session on Disarmament, 471, 474, 494, 501 + U.S.–EURATOM Agreement for Cooperation (1958), 347 + + + + + + Jackson, Henry “Scoop,” 375 + Jacomet, Andre, 371 + Jaipal, Rikhi, 501 + Jamaica, 464 + Jamming, 8 + Japan (see also Tokai nuclear plant) + As London Suppliers Group member, 260, 317 + Chemical weapons, 66, 69, 70, + 106 + Comprehensive test ban, 144, + 214 + Conventional arms transfers + C–130 transport aircraft, + 275, 276 + U.S. exemption from controls on, 268, 269, 270, 271 + Vienna Summit discussion of, 309 + + + Cutoff and transfer agreements, 491 + Elections (1977), 344 + Fuel cycle evaluation program, 341, 344 + Full-scope safeguards, 352 + Negative security assurances, 488, 492, 498 + NPT ratification by, 320 + Nuclear proliferation + In the post-INFCE era, 375, 376, 377, 379 + U.S.-Japan discussions of, 344, 345, 352, 353, 354, 395 + + U.S.-Japanese bilateral nuclear suppliers + consultations, 341 + + + Nuclear reprocessing + Thermal recycling, 384 + U.S. agreements on, 395 + U.S.-Japanese talks on + Guidance for, 344, + 351, 353, 354 + Reports on, 341, + 345, 395 + U.S. planning for, 352 + + U.S. possibilities for regulation of, 323, 325, 328, 334 + + Special Session on Disarmament, 471, 475, 477, 491, + 494 + U.S. defense of, 146 + U.S.–EURATOM Agreement for Cooperation (1958), 344 + U.S. highly enriched uranium exports to, 463 + U.S. relations with, 329 + + + Japan-U.S. Nuclear Cooperation Agreement (1968), 341 + Javits, Jacob, 115, 269 + Jay, Peter, 194, 284 + Jayne, E. Randy, 5, 17, 29, 68, 96, 112 + Jenkins, Frank, 59 + Jenkins, Kempton, 269 + Jenkins, Roy, 319 + Jillson, Anne, 430 + John Paul I, Pope, 443 + Johnson, David, PRM/NSC 23, 5 + Johnson, Gerald W., 30, 183, 190, 199, 223, 237 + Johnson, Ralph, 305 + Johnson, Richard E., 433 + Johnson, Warren D., 148 + Johnson Island, 6, 7 + Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) + ASAT arms control as seen by, 7, + 9 + ASAT talks, 4 + + Agenda for possible future rounds, 59 + Satellites shared with third countries, 44 + Second round, 39, 41 + Third round, 47, 48, 51, 54 + U.S. framework for, 16 + + ASAT testing ban, 34, 35 + Chemical weapons + CD working group on, 104, 105 + Difference within DOD over CW policy, 68, 69 + Funding for binary weapons production, 95, 132 + Negotiations as seen by, 100 + PRM/NSC 27, 66 + U.S. policy and retaliatory capability, 132 + Use in Asia of, 110, + 132 + Weteye bombs, 123, 124 + + + Comprehensive test ban + Carter discussions with DOD officials, proposed, + 149 + CD working group on, 390 + Fixed duration treaty, 197, 198, 220, 232 + JCS memorandum on, 203 + Non-proliferation value of, 211, 220 + On-site inspections, 180, 184 + PRM/NSC 16, 148, 149 + Questions for developing of position on, 178 + Three year approach, 210 + Treaty renewal, 228 + Trilateral negotiations, 167, 184 + + Conventional arms transfers, 287, 290, 301, 302 + Hostile acts in space, 29, 31 + JCSM–57–29, 100 + JCSM–119–78, 193 + JCSM–188–78, 203 + Negative security assurances, 492, 498 + NPT Review Conference, 388 + Nuclear fuel supply, 392 + Nuclear testing, 148, 254 + Nuclear weapons stockpile reliability, 178, 192, 193, 197, + 198, 203 + Operation FULCRUM II, 155 + PD/NSC–38, 203 + Peaceful nuclear explosions, 169, 183 + Seismic stations, 248 + Special Session on Disarmament, 486, 490, 492 + Tlatelolco Treaty, 440 + + Jones, David C. + ASAT, 29, 56 + Chemical weapons, 96, 101, 103, + 132 + Comprehensive test ban + Non-proliferation value of, 211 + On-site inspection quotas, 180 + Review conference proposals, 227, 231 + + SCC discussions of, 205, + 207, 210, 228, 252 + Three year approach, 210 + Trilateral negotiations, 219 + Vienna Summit discussion of, 236 + + + Conventional arms transfers, 280, 303, 306, 309, + 312 + Nuclear proliferation, 211, 381, 382 + Nuclear testing, 230, 235, 255 + Nuclear weapons stockpile reliability, 193, 197, 198, 203 + PD/NSC–13, 271 + PD/NSC–37, 27 + PD/NSC–38, 200, 208 + PD/NSC–45, 38 + Special Coordination Committee meetings + ASAT, 29 + Chemical weapons, 96 + Comprehensive test ban, 205, 207, 210, 228, 252 + Conventional arms transfers, 303 + + Special Session on Disarmament, 485, 493, 500 + Sverdlovsk incident, 112 + Tlatelolco Treaty, 440 + Vienna Summit (June 1979), 56, 101, + 236, 309 + + Jones, George, 305, 446, 448, 467 + Jordan, 263, 265, 283 + Jordan, Hamilton + ASAT, 56 + Carter-Gromyko talks, 201 + Chemical weapons, 101 + Comprehensive test ban, 201, + 210, 236 + Conventional arms transfers, 309 + Special Coordination Committee meetings, 210 + Vienna Summit (June 1979), 56, 101, + 236, 309 + + Jova, Joseph J., 402 + Joyce, John, 494 + + + + + Kahan, Jerome + ASAT Treaty, 17 + Chemical weapons, 96, 104, 106 + Comprehensive test ban, 210 + Conventional arms transfers, 284, 295, 299 + Non-proliferation Treaty, 318 + Nuclear weapons stockpile reliability, 197 + Soviet high-yield nuclear testing, 254 + Special Coordination Committee meetings, 210, 228 + Special Session on Disarmament, 486, 488, 489 + Sverdlovsk incident, 112, 113, 120, + 129 + + Kahan, Louis, 176 + Kalicki, John, 321, 324, 398 + Kalkar breeder reactor (FRG), 371 + Kama-Pechora river project, 145 + Katz, Abraham, 468 + Keeny, Spurgeon M., Jr. + ASAT talks + Priorities in, 36 + Special Coordination Committee discussion of, 17, 29, 34, 35, 43, 59 + + Chemical weapons, 68, 96, 104, + 126 + Comprehensive test ban + SCC discussions of, 207, + 210, 228, 252 + Trilateral negotiations, 170, 176, 181, 184 + + Conventional arms transfers, 281, 286, 290, 294, + 295, 303 + Japanese reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel, 344 + Nuclear proliferation, 381 + Nuclear testing, 158, 172, 254 + Policy Review Committee meetings, 68, 381 + PRM/NSC 23, 5 + Special Coordination Committee meetings + ASAT talks, 17, 29, 34, 35, 43, 59 + Comprehensive test ban, 207, 210, 228, 252 + Conventional arms transfers, 281, 294, 295, 303 + Sverdlovsk incident, 112, 129, 135 + + Special Session on Disarmament, 488, 489 + Sverdlovsk incident, 112, 120, 129, + 135 + U.S.-Argentine relations, 468 + + Kelley, Robert, 369, 430, 448 + Kennedy, John F., 180, 266 + Kenya, 295 + Kerr, Donald + Comprehensive test ban, 205, + 207, 210 + Nuclear weapons stockpile reliability, 190, 197, 198 + + Special Session on Disarmament, 486, 488 + + Khlestov, Oleg + ASAT talks, 39, 41, 47, + 48, 51 + ASAT testing, 33 + Conventional arms transfers, 283, 285, 289 + Laser development verification, 30 + + Khrushchev, Nikita S., 146, 180, 181, 184 + Kimmit, Robert, 269, 314 + King, John, 402, 471 + Kissinger, Henry A., 499 + Klingaman, Susan, 87, 445 + KNIGHTHEAD nuclear test, 154, 155, 161, 173 + Knoche, Enno Henry, 266 + Kokolas, John, 83 + Komplektov, Viktor G. + ASAT, 56 + Carter-Gromyko talks, 201, 221 + Comprehensive test ban, 168, + 201, 221, 236 + Conventional arms transfers, 309 + Heavy water technology exports to Argentina, 448 + Sverdlovsk incident, 116, 120, 121, + 131 + Vienna Summit (June 1979), 56, 236, + 309 + + Korea, Democratic People’s Republic of, 303, 304 + Korea, Republic of + Comprehensive test ban, 146 + Conventional arms transfers, 268, 275, 303, 304, + 309 + Negative security assurances, 488, 492, 498 + Nuclear proliferation, 327, 329, 342, + 375, 379, 381 + + Korniyenko, Georgiy M. + ASAT, 3, 55, 56 + Carter-Gromyko talks, 201, 221 + Chemical weapons, 64, 101 + Comprehensive test ban, 153, + 168, 201, 212, 221, 236 + Conventional arms transfers, 267 + Nuclear proliferation, 332 + Seismic stations, 237 + Special Session on Disarmament, 487 + Sverdlovsk incident, 112, 113, 114, + 116 + Vienna Summit (June 1979), 55, 56, + 101, 236 + + Kosciusko-Morizet, Jacques, 355 + Kozlov, M.M., 487 + Kramer, Frank, 468 + Krassulin, B.P., 80 + Kreisky, Bruno, 365 + Kreps, Juanita M., 2, 27 + Kriebel, Wesley, 471 + Krimer, William D. + ASAT, 3, 55, 56 + Carter-Gromyko talks, 201, 221 + Chemical weapons, 64, 101 + Comprehensive test ban, 153, + 168, 201, 212, 221, 236 + Conventional arms transfers, 267, 309 + Nuclear proliferation, 332 + Special Session on Disarmament, 487 + Vienna Summit (June 1979), 56, 101, + 236, 309 + + Kroll, Carlos A., 466 + Krueger (NASA), 33, 39, 41, 47, 51, 54 + Kuwait, 283 + + + + + La Reina reactor (Chile), 436 + Laboulaye, Francois Lefebvre de, 157, + 284, 326, + 355, 357, + 361, 476 + LaHague, 336, 338 + Lake, Anthony, 266, 288, 321, 432, 433 + Lamb, Denis, 321, 324, 412 + Lambsdorff, Otto, 447, 467 + Lance, Bert + Chemical weapons, 68 + Conventional arms transfers, 268 + Nuclear testing, 156, 158, 172, + 173 + PD/NSC–13, 271 + Policy Review Committee meetings, 68 + PRM/NSC 12, 259 + + + LANDSAT, 60 + Lane, H.B., 414 + Laos (see also Hmong people) + Use of chemical weapons in, 104, + 106, 107, 108, 122, 126, + 128, 132 + + + Laser isotope separation, 336 + Lasers + Fusion research, 189, 206 + Ground-based, 6 + High-energy (HEL) weapons, 15, + 26, 40 + Space-based, 6 + Testing of, 36, 37, 50, + 59 + + Verification of ASAT laser development, 30, 59 + + + Latin America (see also Conventional arms + transfers to Latin America; General Conference for the Prohibition + of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America; Nuclear materials and + equipment; Nuclear proliferation) + NPT Review Conference preparations in, 450 + Nuclear free zone in, 361, 386, 406, + 420, 437, 449 + Nuclear power, 416 + Regional equilibrium in, 426, + 429 + + + Latin America and Caribbean Conventional Arms Restraint Group, + 296, 299, + 304, 305 + Latin American Energy Organization (OLADE), 416, 432 + Law of the Sea, 289 + Lawrence Livermore Laboratory, 147 + Ledogar, Stephan, 129 + Legionnaire’s Disease, 114 + Leonard, James F., 94, 487, 488, 489, 499 + Less-developed countries (LDCs), 327, + 335, 359, + 481 + Lesseur Lauria, Carmelo, 288, 432 + Letters of Acceptance, 272, 279 + Letters of Offer, 260, 272, 279 + Liberia, 471, 494 + Libya, 283, 300, 471 + Liévano Aguirre, Indalecio, 441 + Light water reactors (LWRS), 342, 345, 346, 353, 360 + Likhatchev, Viktor, 71, 73, 80, 84 + Limited Test Ban Treaty (1963) + Agreement on, 146 + Amending of, 141 + Member states of, 211 + Peaceful nuclear explosions as violation of, 145, 183 + Prohibition of space detonations, 6 + Soviet violations of, 148 + Trilateral signing of, 204 + Underground testing as permitted by, 140 + + + Linsenmayer, Neil, 303 + Lipshutz, Robert, 271 + Liquid metal fast breeder reactors (LMFBRs), 334, 337 + Lissfelt, Mark, 446 + Lo Aguirre reactor (Chile), 436 + Locke, Allen W., 350, 466, 467 + Lockheed Corporation, 273, 275 + London Economic Summit (London, May 1977), + 412 + London Suppliers Group + As institution for implementing U.S. non-proliferation + goals, 317 + French role in, 260, 317, 324, + 356 + Fuel cycle evaluation program and, 342 + Full-scope safeguards, 347 + Guidelines of, 284, 285, 364, + 454, 457 + Meetings of, 348 + Membership of, 260, 317, 335, + 359 + NPT’s Article IV and, 225 + Sensitive nuclear exports, 318, + 323 + Trigger list of, 327 + U.S. policy on enrichment technology transfers, 369 + + Lopez Michelson, Alfonso, 304, 441 + López Portillo, Jose + Carter communications, 402, 411 + Conventional arms transfers, 288 + Tlatelolco Treaty, 411, 414, 434, + 435, 450 + Visit to Brazil (July 1980), 465 + Visit to Moscow (May 1978), 434 + Visit to Paris (May 1980), 464, 465 + + Lorton, Robert, 106 + Louet, Phillipe, 369 + Love, John, 317 + Lovelace, Alan, 5, 17 + Low-income countries, 268 + Lowenstein, James, 321, 324 + Lucey, Patrick J., 423 + Luers, William H., 266, 281, 282, 284, 398 + Luns, Joseph M.A.H., 319 + Luxembourg, 144, 347 + Lyons, James A., Jr., 303 + + + + + McClure, James A., 375 + McCrory, Ray, 59, 104, 113, 120, 129, 254 + MacDonald, Merle, 98, 106, 108, 122, 126 + MacFarlane, Lewis, 159 + McGaffigan, Edward, 318, 321, 346, 387, 402 + McGiffert, David E. + Comprehensive test ban, 205, + 207, 210, 211, 228, 257 + Conventional arms transfers, 286, 290, 294, 295, + 303, 306 + + Nuclear proliferation, 72, 75 + Nuclear testing, 178, 253 + Nuclear weapons stockpile reliability, 190, 197 + Special Session on Disarmament, 488, 489 + Sverdlovsk incident, 135 + + + McGovern, George S., 269 + Machin, José Maria, 416 + McIntyre, James T. + ASAT, 11, 24, 46 + Conventional arms transfers, 286 + Cutoff and transfer agreements, 500 + Interagency Committee on Public Diplomacy and Disarmament, + 497 + Nuclear proliferation, 382 + Nuclear testing, 256 + PD/NSC–37, 27 + PD/NSC–39, 32 + PD/NSC–45, 38 + PRM/NSC 37, 86 + Special Session on Disarmament, 489, 493 + + + Macklen, Victor, 159 + Mclean, Martin, 113, 122 + McMahon, John, 5 + MacMillan, Harold, 233 + McNeill, John, 62 + McNutt, Louise, 471 + Macuk, David, 77, 402, 471, 475, 494 + McWilliams, Edmund, 106, 122 + Makarov, V.G., 201, 221, 487 + Malaysia, 359, 471 + Malev, Leonid P., 171 + Man-portable air-defense systems, 281, + 290 + Manasov, Narlen, 421 + Manley, Michael, 304 + Mansfield, Mike, 353 + Mantel, Robert, 284, 285 + Marcum, John + Chemical weapons, 104 + Comprehensive test ban + Carter meeting with nuclear laboratory officials + on, 206 + SCC discussion of, 205, + 207, 210, 228, 252 + Three year approach, 210 + U.S.-British discussions of, 159, 244 + + + Nuclear testing by the Soviet Union, 239, 253 + Nuclear weapons stockpile reliability, 192, 197 + Seismic stations, 246, 250, 251 + Special Coordination Committee meetings, 205, 207, + 210, 228, 252 + Special Session on Disarmament, 489, 494 + Visit to Moscow (June 1979), 237 + + Mark, Hans, 5 + Marsh, William, 299 + Martin, Robert, 113, 122 + Martinez Fabini, Jorge, 429, 459, 466 + Martinique, 442 + Massera, Emilio Eduardo, 422 + Matheson, Michael, 98, 122, 446, 448 + Matheson, Scott M., 124 + Mathews, Jessica Tuchman. See Tuchman, + Jessica. + Matthews, Gary, 49, 285, 299 + Matthias, Charles, 499 + Mauritius, 471 + Maynes, Charles William, 415, 475 + Mayorskiy, Boris, 30, 39, 47, 48 + Mazeau, Margot, 65, 83, 88, 446 + MB–10s, 341, 381, 382, 396 + “Measures Agreement to Reduce the Outbreak of Nuclear War,” + 6 + Mehta, J.S., 213 + Melanson, Edward, 47, 59, 77 + Mendelevich, Lev I., 289, 293, 311, 314, 315 + Menold, William, 122 + Merrill, John, 299 + Metzner, Clifton G., Jr., 466 + Mexico + Comprehensive test ban, 144, + 214 + Conventional arms transfers, 296, 299, 303, 304, + 305 + + Withdrawal of arms request, 288 + + + International Nuclear Fuel Cycle Evaluation Conferences, + 450 + NPT Review Conference, 387, 389, 393, + 394 + Nuclear fuel imports, 449 + Nuclear proliferation, 359, 375, 401, + 444, 494 + Regional nuclear cooperation, 419 + Special Session on Disarmament, 471, 494 + Tlatelolco Treaty + Aaron-Gonzalez Galvez discussions of, 444 + Brazilian accession to, 415 + + Encouragement of holdout states for entry into, + 419, 435, 444, 450 + U.S. adherence to Protocol I, 406, 411 + U.S.-Mexican discussions of, 414, 444 + + + U.S. nuclear aid to, 419 + + Meyers, Marilyn, 369 + Michaud, Michael, 5 + Michaud, Neil, 122, 240, 250, 251 + Michel, James, 129, 293, 446 + Mid-East War (1973), 6 + Middle East (see also Israel) + Conventional arms transfers, 258, 267, 283, 286, + 290 + Geneva Conference proposal for, 20 + Nuclear free zones in, 386, 501 + U.S.-Venezuelan talks on, 288 + Vance-Thatcher discussions of, 233 + + Mikoyan, Sergo, 418 + Mikulak, Robert + Biological Weapons Convention, 129 + Chemical weapons + Consultation with allies on, 63, 87, 106, 107 + Funding for binary weapons, 139 + Negotiations on, 79, 83, 88, 90, 108, 126 + Policy Review Committee meetings on, 68 + SCC meetings on, 96, 129, 139 + Use in Asia of, 122 + + Geneva Protocol and Biological Weapons Convention, 62 + Policy Review Committee meetings, 68 + Special Coordination Committee meetings, 96, 129, + 139 + Sverdlovsk incident, 129 + + Military Assistance Program (MAP), 260, + 268 + Military Expenditure Limitations (MEL), 494 + Military Expenditure Reporting (MER), 494 + Miller, Thomas, 494 + Miniature homing vehicles (MHVs), 6, 28, 40 + Minimum Residual Radiation (MRR) bombs, 146 + Missiles + Cruise, 161, 177, 206, 484 + Galosh, 6 + HARPOON, 146 + HAWK, 263 + Interceptors, 6, 41, 47, + 54, 58, 60 + LANCE, 161 + M–X, 146, 161, 206, 483, 490 + Maverick, 260 + Minuteman, 6, 19 + Minuteman III, 484 + Pershing, 146 + Sidewinder, 263 + SL–11, 34 + SL–12, (Proton), 28 + SL–17, 146 + SL–18, 146 + SL–19, 146 + Soviet ICBM test notifications, 58 + SS–9, 28, + 34 + SS–20, 236, 481 + Standard 2, (SM–2), 146, 154, 155, + 161 + Test site in Zaire for, 357 + Thor, 6 + Titan II, 6 + TOW, 263 + Trident, 206, 484, 490 + + + MK–12A re-entry vehicle, 146 + Moberly, Patrick, 244, 251, 369 + Mohr, Charles, 325 + Mondale, Walter F. + Argentine-U.S. relations, 442 + ASAT talks, 46 + Comprehensive test ban, 164, + 219, 242 + Conventional arms transfers, 258, 271 + FRG nuclear sales to Brazil, 397, 398, 400, 404 + Fuel cycle evaluation program, U.S.-French talks on, 355 + Meetings + Carter-Fukuda, 329 + Carter-Thatcher, 242 + With Allies, 258 + With Fukuda, 320 + With Haig, 319 + With Schmidt, 397, 398, 400 + With Videla, 443 + + NAC statement (Jan. 1977), 319 + Non-proliferation Treaty, 320 + Nuclear proliferation, 320, 329, 416 + PD/NSC–8, 330 + PD/NSC–13, 271 + PD/NSC–15, 70 + PD/NSC–28, 81 + PD/NSC–37, 27 + + PD/NSC–38, 200, 208 + PD/NSC–39, 32 + PD/NSC–45, 38 + PRM/NSC 12, 259 + PRM/NSC 15, 317 + PRM/NSC 16, 141, 146 + PRM/NSC 27, 67 + PRM/NSC 37, 86 + Soviet high-yield nuclear testing, 255 + Special Session on Disarmament, 495, 498, 499 + Tlatelolco Treaty, 417, 443 + Visits + Bonn (1977), 333, 398, 400 + Rome (Sept. 1978), 443 + Tokyo (Feb. 1977), 320 + + + Montes, Oscar Antonio, 357, 420, 429, 434, 439 + Morocco, 471 + Morokhov, Igor + Comprehensive test ban, 182, + 184 + EURATOM and IAEA safeguards, 367 + Nuclear proliferation, 348, 360, 363, + 369 + Nuclear testing, 160, 163 + Peaceful nuclear explosions, 165, 171, 174, 177, + 183, 189 + Tlatelolco Treaty, 428 + + Morrisey, Arthur + ASAT talks, 17, 29, 34, + 35, 43, 59 + PRM/NSC 23, 5 + Special Coordination Committee meetings, 17, 29, + 34, 35, 43, 59 + + Moscow Summit (July 1974), 61, 63 + Moss, Marvin, 345 + Mujezinovic, M., 477 + Munitions Control Office, 260, 263 + Munitions List, 273 + Murphy, Frank, 159 + Muskie, Edmund, 138, 253, 254, 255, 391, 393 + Mutual and Balance Force Reductions (MBFR), 138, 236, 484 + + + + + Namibia, 242 + Napper, Larry C., 387 + Narain, Raj, 372 + National Aeronautic and Space Agency (NASA) + ASAT talks + Agenda for possible future rounds, 59 + Satellite protection, 43 + Second round, 39, 41 + Third round, 47, 48, 51, 54 + U.S. framework for, 16 + + + ASAT testing ban, 35 + Space Transportation System, 27 + + + National Intelligence Estimate:: NIE 11–3–71, 11 + National liberation movements, 289 + National Security Council (NSC) + Ad hoc Group on fuel cycle evaluation program, 330 + Ad Hoc Group on Nuclear Proliferation, 325, 358, 375, 463, + 470 + ASAT arms control policy discussions by, 7, 9, 10 + ASAT talks, 39, 41, 47, + 48, 51, 54 + Biological weapons policy, 81 + Chemical warfare policy studies, 61, 81 + Comprehensive test ban, 180 + Conventional arms transfers, 260, 287, 290, 304 + FRG nuclear sales to Brazil, 397 + Interagency Group on Nuclear Proliferation, 330, 336, + 343, 344 + Meetings, 397 + Nuclear fuel, 358, 392 + Nuclear proliferation, 327, 356 + Special Session on Disarmament, 479, 481, 483, 492 + Tlatelolco Treaty, 419 + + + National Security Decision Memoranda + NSDM–35, “United States Policy on + Chemical Warfare Program and Bacteriological/Biological + Research Program,” 81 + NSDM–333, “Enhanced Survivablility + of Critical US Military and Intelligence Space Systems,” 6, + 8 + NSDM–341, “FY 1977–79, Nuclear Weapons Stockpile,” 154 + NSDM–345, “U.S. Anti-Satellite + Capabilities,” 1, 6 + + + National Security Study Memoranda, NSSM 157, “Review of United States Position on Chemical Weapons + Prohibitions,” 61 + National Seismic Stations (NSS). See + Seismic stations. + + National Technical Means (NTM) of verification, 13, 31, 153, 160, 209, 212 + Natural gas stimulation, 183 + Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC), 333 + NAVSTAR Global Positioning System, 6 + Navy, U.S. Department of, 161 + Negative security assurances + CIA paper discussion of, 385 + Special Coordination Committee discussion of, 486, 488, + 489 + SSOD discussions of, 486, 488, 492, + 493, 498 + + + Neidle, Alan F., 77, 79, 104, 176, 187, 199, 223 + Nepal, 359, 471 + Nerve gas, 82 + Netherlands + CCD, 494 + Chemical weapons, 76 + Comprehensive test ban, 144 + Genetic engineering, 89 + Nuclear proliferation, 319, 375, 377 + Special Session on Disarmament, 474, 501 + Tlatelolco Treaty, 364, 402, 406 + U.S.–EURATOM Agreement for Cooperation (1958), 347 + U.S. highly enriched uranium exports to, 463 + + + Neutron bomb (see also Enhanced radiation + (ER) weapons), 20, 28, 161, 196, 206 + New weapons systems ban (proposed), 153, + 161 + New York Times, 133, 213, 269, 316 + New Zealand + Biological Weapons Convention Review Conference, 119 + Chemical weapons, 76 + Comprehensive test ban, 144 + Conventional arms transfers, 268, 269, 270, 271, + 275, 276 + Seismic stations in, 232 + Special Session on Disarmament, 501 + + + Newman, Paul, 499 + Newsom, Eric, 162 + Newsome, David, 253, 488, 489 + Nicaragua, 288, 450, 464 + Niederste-Ostholt, Gisela, 417 + Niger, 342 + Nigeria + Comprehensive test ban, 144, + 214 + NPT withdrawal by, 211 + Nuclear proliferation, 359, 494 + Special Session on Disarmament, 471, 494 + + + Nimeiri, Gaafar, 263 + Noble, Steven V., 460 + Nogueira Batista, Paulo, 403, 433 + Non-governmental organizations (NGOs), 475 + Non-proliferation Alternatives Assessment Program, 395 + Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) (1968), (see also NPT Review Conference (Venice, 1980)) + Argentine position, 327, 439, 443 + Article I, 318 + Article II, 318 + Article III, 348 + Article IV + Criticism of nuclear-weapons states for failure to + follow, 225, 385, 450, 478 + Text of, 318, 342 + U.S.–FRG disagreements on interpretation of, 333 + + + Article VI, 211, 225, 251, + 385, 386 + + As contentious in NPT Review Conference, 388 + Soviet position, 387 + Text of, 477 + + As central legal argument against proliferation, 327 + As creating space for negotiating disarmament, 477 + Chile as signatory to, 436 + CIA paper on, 368 + Comprehensive test ban seen as strengthening, 211, 224, + 225 + Cuban position, 421 + FRG position, 318, 319, 333 + Impact on sensitive nuclear exports of, 318, 319, + 320, 323, 372 + Increase in number of adherents to, 372 + Italian position, 371 + Japanese ratification of, 320 + Non-signers of, 327, 364 + Nuclear fuel, 236 + Permanent consultative committee for overseeing of, 119 + Portuguese ratification of, 364 + + Principal foci of, 146 + Prioritization for signers of, 488 + Review Conference (Geneva, 1975), + 394, 477, 478 + Review Conference (Geneva, 1985), + 394 + South African accession to, 364 + U.S. commitments under, 498 + U.S.-Soviet discussion of, 348 + Withdrawal from, 211 + + + Nooter, Robert H., 489 + North Africa, 304 + North Atlantic Council (NAC), 162, 319, 342, 481, 489, 492 + North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) + Chemical weapons, 63, 65, 94, + 96, 123, 125, 132 + Comprehensive test ban, 143 + Conventional arms transfers, 265, 275, 276 + CSCE preparations in, 476 + Disarmament Experts meetings, 65, + 143, 471, 474 + Negative security assurances, 486, 488 + Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, 107 + Special Session on Disarmament, 473, 474, 488 + U.S. ASAT capabilities, 46 + U.S. conventional arms transfers to members of, 268, 269, + 270, 271 + U.S. nuclear umbrella, 146 + + + Norton, Richard, 122 + Norway + Chemical weapons, 76 + Chemical weapons use in Asia, 125 + Comprehensive test ban, 144 + Nuclear cooperation with the United States, 372 + Special Session on Disarmament, 471, 474, 477, 478, + 501 + + Nosenzo, Louis, 318, 324, 341, 346, 348, 429, 446 + Novak, Robert, 440 + NPT Review Conference (Venice, 1980) + Article VI as contentious in, 388 + CIA papers on, 368, 370, 385, + 394 + Contingency guidance requested for, 389 + Continuation of CTB talks and, 244 + CTB working group in CD as discussed in, 386, 387, + 388, 389, 391, 393 + Disagreement with U.S. positions expected at, 373, 377, + 379 + Failure to complete CTB before, 232, 237 + Israeli nuclear weapons development as issue in, 386 + Latin American preparations for, 450 + Need for CTB before, 211, 224, 225 + NPT as supported at, 391, 393 + Nuclear power, 393 + Nuclear testing moratorium, 386 + Pakistan as issue in, 375, 385 + Progress in CTB before, 240, + 248 + Reports on, 386 + Results of, 391, 393 + SALT Treaty ratification as advocated in, 391 + SCC meetings on, 386, 388, 389 + South African nuclear weapons development as issue in, + 385, 386 + Trilateral talks at, 387 + U.S. diplomatic actions in advance of, 375 + + + Nuclear accident reporting, 481, 486, 488 + Nuclear experts meeting (Paris, June 1977), + 347 + Nuclear Free Zones (see also Tlatelolco + Treaty) + As SSOD initiative, 478 + In Africa, 386 + In Latin America, 361, 386, 406, + 420, 437, 449 + In Middle East, 386, 501 + + + Nuclear fuel (see also Nuclear + reprocessing) + As restricted to IAEA-approved countries, 236 + Assurance of access to, 358, + 394 + Australian exports of, 383 + Brazilian imports from the United States of, 424 + Cutoff and transfer agreements + ACDA position, 489, 491, 492 + As other states’ initiatives, 496 + As U.S. initiative, 478, + 481, 492 + British position, 482, + 483, 486 + Carter’s decision on, 492, 493, 496, 500 + + DOD position, 489, 490, 492 + DOE position, 484 + Guidance for, 494, 498, 499 + Interagency study on, 482, 483, 485 + Special Coordination Committee discussion of, 488 + Verification for, 491 + + + European transfers of, 396, 424 + Exports to Europe of, 362 + For nuclear-powered Naval vessels, 484, 492 + Fuel bank for, 358, 364 + Mexican imports of, 449 + NRDC request for denial of sales to FRG of, 333 + Options for augmenting supply of, 392 + Parity pricing for, 358 + Retransfers of, 339 + Sales of, 319, 371 + Sensitive transfers of, 318, + 319, 348, 364 + Storage of foreign spent fuel, 343, 364, 365 + Suspension of shipment to India of, 342 + Transfer of weapons-grade material into, 478, 482, + 483, 484, 485 + U.S. as supplier of, 325, 379, 458 + + + Nuclear materials and equipment. See + Germany, Federal Republic of, nuclear sales to Brazil; Latin + America. + Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act (NNPA) (1977), 211, 364, 366, 373, 377, 385 + + Canadian heavy water production technology exports to + Argentina, 452 + FRG–U.S. discussions of, 384 + India as affected by, 211 + Passage and signing of, 364, + 366 + Requirements of, 395 + U.S. non-proliferation objectives as affected by, 373 + + + Nuclear power + As status symbol, 342 + Divisions in U.S. attitudes toward, 395 + French program for, 349 + Latin America, 416 + NPT Review Conference understandings on, 393 + Reprocessing as unnecessary for, 432 + Shifting U.S. policies on, 325, + 379 + Unpopularity of, 342 + U.S. technical cooperation on problems of, 373, 394, + 410, 481, 488, 494 + Yugoslav/Pakistani UN resolution for peaceful uses of, + 359 + + + Nuclear Power Issues and Choices (report), + 329 + Nuclear proliferation (see also French + nuclear sales to Pakistan; Full-scope safeguards; Latin America; + Nuclear reprocessing) + Additional conditions for new nuclear cooperation + agreements, 339 + Argentine-IAEA negotiations, 439, 443 + Belgian position, 377 + Brazilian policy under Figueiredo administration, 461 + British position, 377 + Carter’s policy statement on, 331, 333, 338 + Comprehensive test ban as value against, 144, 146, + 210, 211, 220, 348 + Disarmament as affected by, 477 + Efforts against, 327 + Facilitating factors for, 327 + French policy on, 356, 377 + FRG nuclear sales to Argentina, 462, 466, 467 + Full-scope safeguards for prevention of, 327, 328, + 339, 347, 348 + G–7 summit discussion of, 342, 344 + Guidance for U.S. statements in Special Session on + Disarmament on, 494 + HEU as dangerous for, 330, 396 + In the post-INFCE era + Policy Review Committee meeting on, 381, 382 + Smith’s exploration with industrialized countries, + 375, 377, 378, 383 + Smith’s paper on, 381, + 383 + State Department status report on, 376 + U.S.-Argentine discussions of, 466 + + U.S.–FRG discussions of, 384 + U.S. strategy for, 379 + Vance’s message to François-Poncet on, 378 + + Interagency Group on, 330, 336, 343, + 344 + International restraints for slowing of, 323 + MB–10 policy, 341, 381, 382, 396 + Mondale-Fukuda talks on, 320 + Motives for acquiring nuclear weapons, 327 + NSC Intelligence Report on, 327 + Nuclear experts meeting (Paris, June 1977), 347 + Nuclear fuel sales, 319, 327, 329, + 364, 385 + Nuclear testing for stockpile reliability, effect on, 188 + Outlook for, 327 + Pakistani-U.S. talks on, 372 + PD/NSC–8, 330, 334, 336, 343 + Peaceful nuclear explosions and, 145 + Policy Review Committee meetings on, 317, 328, 334, 381, + 382 + PRM/NSC 15, 317, 325, 328 + Proliferation chains, 327 + Quadripartite discussions of, 326 + Regional equilibrium for prevention of, 426, 429 + Renegotiation of agreements on, 323, 349, 362, 365, + 395 + Restraints on, 326 + Gerard Smith as negotiator on + French position, 364 + FRG position, 333, 342 + London Suppliers Group expansion and, 335 + Soviet position, 367 + U.S. position, 344, 357, 369, 371 + U.S.-Soviet discussions of, 332 + + + Soviet position, 363 + Storage for foreign spent fuel, 343, 364, 365 + Suspension of fuel shipments to India, 342 + U.S.-Argentine discussions of, 357, 381, 420, 466, + 467 + U.S.-British discussions of, 395 + U.S. controls for, 430 + U.S.-European differences on, 365 + U.S.-French talks on, 324, 347, 355, + 357, 361 + U.S.–FRG discussions of, 395 + U.S.-Indian talks on, 329, 372, 381 + U.S.-Japanese discussions of, 344, 345, 352, 353, + 354, 395 + U.S. policy toward + FRG position, 371 + History of, 396 + Policy Review Committee review of, 317 + Shifting of, 381 + Smith’s final report on, 395 + Status reports on, 364, + 372, 373 + + U.S.-Soviet discussions of, 348, + 360 + U.S.-Venezuelan talks on, 288, + 411, 416, 432 + Vance-Brezhnev discussions of, 332 + Vance-Gromyko discussions of, 332 + Vance’s message to Azeredo da Silveira, 398 + Vance’s message to de Guiringaud on, 321 + Vertical, 400 + + + Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), 333, 338 + + Nuclear fuel access, 358 + Nuclear Non-proliferation Act as guidance for, 366 + Reviewing for export license by, 430 + U.S. nuclear fuel exports to Brazil, 424 + U.S. reactor part exports to Argentina, 470 + + Nuclear reprocessing (see also Nuclear + fuel; Nuclear proliferation) + Alternative types of, 346, 364 + As unnecessary for nuclear power, 432 + By Argentina, 417, 426, 439, + 443 + By Australia, 369 + By Belgium, 325, 334, 372, + 384 + By Brazil, 321, 361, 364, + 412 + By France + French position, 342, + 365 + Of Japanese spent fuel, 341 + + U.S.-French discussion of, 324, 349, 377, 384 + U.S. policy differences over, 328 + + + By FRG, 325, 328, 334, 342, 372, + 377 + By fuel cycle evaluation program, 328, 338 + By Italy, 334, 342 + By Japan + Thermal recycling, 384 + U.S. agreements on, 395 + U.S.-Japanese talks on + Guidance for, 344, + 351, 353, 354 + Reports on, 341, + 345, 395 + U.S. planning for, 352 + + + U.S. possibilities for regulation of, 323, 325, 328, 334 + + By Pakistan, 263, 320, 324, + 349, 357, 361 + By South Africa, 325 + By Soviet Union, 342 + By the United Kingdom, 341, 342, 377, + 384 + Carter’s decision on, 340 + For energy production, 395, 396 + MB–10s, 341, 381, 382, 396 + Policy Review Committee meeting on, 338, 381 + Presidential flexibility over controls on, 339, 340 + Progress on restraints on transfers of facilities for, + 364 + Regional equilibrium in, 426, + 429 + Safeguards for, 325, 328 + U.S. budget increases for, 396 + U.S. deferring of, 331, 332, 333 + U.S. policy for, 317, 338, 339, + 340 + U.S. right of veto over EURATOM for, 372, 379, 381, 382, + 384, 395 + + Nuclear Suppliers Group. See London + Suppliers Group. + Nuclear Test Monitoring Working Group, 246 + Nuclear Test Moratorium (1958), 206, 233, 386 + Nuclear testing (see also Comprehensive + test ban; Nuclear tests; Nuclear weapons) + ACDA position, 172 + Asymmetry in, 145, 203 + Augmented Nuclear Test Program (ATP), 230, 235, 249, 256 + British position, 146, 226, 233 + Budgeting for, 150, 230, 235 + By France, 146 + By India, 145, 153, 317, + 325, 366 + By South Africa, 211 + By Soviet Union, 238, 239, 248, + 253, 254, 255 + Calibration shots, 210 + Carter-Callaghan discussions of, 191, 192 + Detection thresholds, 189, 202 + Digging of deep hole for, 254 + During comprehensive test ban, 191, 202 + Enhanced program for, 230, 235, 249, + 256 + For FY 1977’s second half, 154, 161 + For FY 1978, 172, 173 + For stockpile reliability, 146, + 178, 188 + Geological and geophysical data needed for accurate yield + estimates, 243 + High-yield, 253, 254, 255 + Hundred-pound limit on, 208, + 210 + In accordance with TTBT, 173 + JCS position, 148 + Kiloton level testing, 198, 205, 206, + 207 + Low-level, 205 + Low-yield, 146, 147, 200, + 212 + Moratoria on + British position, 146, + 233 + British-U.S. discussions of, 233 + NPT Review Conference call for, 386 + Soviet acceptance for peaceful nuclear explosions, + 175, 176, 183, 189, 199, 212 + Soviet instructions on, 163 + Soviet position, 146, + 160 + U.S. proposal for, 152, + 206 + U.S.-Soviet discussions of, 165 + + Of neutron bomb functions, 161 + Of SM–2, warheads, 155, 161 + Operation CRESSET, 172, 173 + Operation FULCRUM II, 155, 161 + Operation GUARDIAN, 256 + Operation QUICKSILVER II, 235 + + Permitted by Limited Test Ban Treaty, 140 + Quotas for, 188 + Resumption after treaty expiration of, 226 + SCC meetings on, 253, 254 + Soviet démarche on, 243 + Underground, 140 + U.S. démarche on, 243 + Yield assessment issues, 254, + 255 + + Nuclear tests + BACKSTAY, 173 + BEAFORT, 154, 161 + DANBO, 154, 161 + KNIGHTHEAD, 154, 155, 161, + 173 + REBLOCHON, 154 + SCANTLING, 154 + Soviet, 238, 239, 248, 253, 254, + 255 + + + Nuclear weapons (see also Bombs; Enhanced + radiation (ER) weapons; Nuclear testing) + Argentine development of, 415, + 431 + As status symbol, 401, 416 + Banning in space of, 39 + Brazilian development of, 443 + Chilean development of, 415 + Definition of, 327 + Detonation in space of, 6, 39 + Independent European deterrent, possibility of, 143 + Indian development of, 378 + Israeli development of, 378, + 386, 389, 394 + Neutron bomb, 20, 28, 161, + 196, 206 + No-first-use discussions, 3 + Non-use against non-nuclear states, 478 + Pakistani development of + As NPT review conference issue, 375, 385 + Motives for, 327 + Status report on, 376 + U.S.–FRG talks on, 384 + U.S. national security as impacted by, 393 + U.S.-Pakistani talks on, 372 + U.S. position, 373, 378 + + Physics of, 249, 256 + Politicization of third-world programs for, 394 + Production halt, 482 + Research and development of, 146, 359 + Stockpile plan, 483 + Stockpile reliability of + After five years, 213 + Augmented Test Program’s contribution to, 249, 256 + British position, 192 + Carter-Callaghan discussions of, 191, 192 + DOD concerns with, 188, + 192, 202 + JCS position, 178, 192, 193, 197, 198, 203 + OSTP review of, 230 + SCC meetings, 197 + SCC reports on, 146, + 190 + Surveillance for, 206 + Testing for, 146, 178, 188 + Under comprehensive test ban, 146, 178, 188, 192, 213 + + + NUCLEBRAS, 403 + Nye, Joseph S. + Nuclear proliferation, 317, 324, 341, + 348, 356, 359, 369 + Nuclear reprocessing, 338, 354, 439 + Peaceful nuclear explosions, 166 + Tlatelolco Treaty, 429 + + + + + + + Oakley, Phyllis, 429 + Oakley, Robert, 351 + Oberdorfer, Don, 393 + Obninsk, 237 + Obukhov, A.A., 487 + Oduber Quíros, Daniel, 304 + Office of Management and Budget (OMB) + ASAT arms control as seen by, 9 + Chemical weapons, 68, 95, 97 + Conventional arms transfers, 287 + Ethiopian grant military aid program, elimination of, 260 + Nuclear fuel access, 358 + Nuclear fuel supply, 392 + Nuclear proliferation, 317 + Nuclear testing, 161, 235, 256 + Seismic stations, 248, 254, 255 + Special Session on Disarmament, 488 + + + Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP) + ASAT arms control as seen by, 9 + ASAT talks, 43 + + Augmented Nuclear Test Program, 249, 256 + Comprehensive test ban, 180, + 230 + Nuclear fuel access, 358 + Nuclear testing, 254 + Seismic devices, 190, 230 + Space Advisory Group report on ASAT, 8 + Special Session on Disarmament, 492 + Stockpile reliability, 230 + + Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) + ASAT arms control as seen by, 7, + 9 + ASAT talks + Agenda for possible future rounds, 59 + Satellite protection, 43 + Second round, 39, 41 + Third round, 47, 48, 51, 54 + + Chemical weapons, 95, 104, 105, + 110 + Conventional arms transfers, 301 + Seismic stations, 248 + + Ogarkov, Nikolai V. + Chemical weapons, 101 + Comprehensive test ban, 236 + Conventional arms transfers, 309 + Special Session on Disarmament, 487 + Vienna Summit (June 1979), 56, 101, + 236, 309 + + Oil, 372 + Oksenberg, Michael, 151 + OLADE (Latin American Energy Organization), 416, 432 + On-site inspections (OSI) (see also + Comprehensive test ban) + ACDA position, 180, 196 + Aerial photography, 247 + As major Soviet issue in CTB negotiations, 189 + British position, 184 + Expenses incurred during, 237 + For chemical weapons agreements, 84, 107, 118 + Immunity for inspectors, 237 + Lessening of U.S.-Soviet disagreement on, 223 + Limited technical value of, 184 + Mandatory vs. voluntary, 166, + 175, 179 + Political value of, 163 + Position-fixing, 223 + Quotas for, 180, 181, 182 + SCC discussions of, 180 + Technical characteristics of equipment for, 247 + U.S. proposal for, 184 + Withdrawal from CTB Treaty for refusal of, 184 + + O’Neill, Thomas P. “Tip,” 115 + Onkelinx, André J. B., 474 + Operation CRESSET, 172, 173 + Operation FULCRUM II, 155, 161 + Operation GUARDIAN, 256 + Operation QUICKSILVER II, 235 + Oplinger, Jerry + Chemical weapons, 104, 106, 108, + 122, 126, 139 + Heavy water production technology exports, 456 + Nuclear proliferation, 323, 348, 381, + 396 + Tlatelolco Treaty, 402, 423, 429 + + Oralloy, 188 + Orbital Bombardment Systems, 6 + Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), 138 + Organization of American States (OAS), 296, 419, 449, 468 + Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), 329 + Ormsby, Robert, 273 + Ortiz de Rozas, Carlos, 359, 501 + Outer Space Treaty (1967), 6, 39, 43 + Overmeyer, Alan, 122 + Owada, Hisashi, 320, 329 + Owen, David, 157, 342, 365, 476 + Owen, Henry D. + Argentine-U.S. relations, 468 + Comprehensive test ban, 242 + Fuel cycle evaluation program, 380 + Nuclear proliferation, 326, 329, 375, + 377, 381 + + + + + + P.L. 480, 376 + Pace, Robert, 138 + Pahlavi, Shah Reza, 303, 364, 372 + Pakistan (see also French nuclear sales to + Pakistan) + Comprehensive test ban, 145, + 146, 211, 224 + Conventional arms transfers, 268 + Elections (1977), 321, 357 + + European nuclear fuel transfers to, 396 + French relations with, 350 + Indian relations with, 347 + Non-acceptance of full-scope safeguards by, 395 + Non-proliferation Treaty, 318, + 320, 327 + Nuclear power, 359 + Nuclear proliferation + French-Pakistani talks on, 356, 357 + Indian arms race with, 347, 466 + U.S. meeting with UN Delegates on, 359 + + Nuclear reprocessing by, 263, + 320, 324, 349, 350, 357, + 361 + Nuclear weapons development by + As NPT Review Conference issue, 375, 385 + Motives for, 327 + Status report on, 376 + U.S.–FRG talks on, 384 + U.S. national security as impacted by, 393 + U.S.-Pakistani talks on, 372 + U.S. position, 373, 378 + + Refugees in Afghanistan from, 110 + Special Session on Disarmament, 471, 501 + U.S. military and economic aid to, 263, 395 + + Palestine, 269 + Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), 269 + Palliser, Michael, 232, 242, 326 + Palmer, Mark + ASAT, 58 + Chemical weapons, 122, 139 + NPT Review Conference, 387 + Seismic stations, 250, 251 + Sverdlovsk incident, 113, 137 + + Panama, 288, 406, 421, 434, 444, 471 + Panama Canal + Nuclear transit through, 421, + 434, 444 + PNEs used in constructing replacement of, 153, 183 + Ratification of treaties on, 434 + Soviet position, 421 + U.S. public opinion on treaty for, 499 + U.S.-Venezuelan talks on, 288 + + Parity pricing for nuclear fuel, 358 + Pastor, Carlos W., 453 + Pastor, Robert A. + Argentine-U.S. relations, 468 + Conventional arms transfers, 266, 288 + Nuclear proliferation, 416, 420, 432, + 433 + Tlatelolco Treaty, 435, 444, 446, + 453 + + Pauls, Rolf F., 143, 162 + Paye, Jean-Claude, 355 + Peaceful biological research, 119 + Peaceful nuclear explosions (PNEs) (see + also Comprehensive test ban; Peaceful Nuclear Explosions + (PNE) Treaty (1976)) + Argentine position, 211, 224, 439, + 443 + As violation of Limited Test Ban Treaty, 145, 183 + Brazilian position, 211, 224, 404 + Carter-Gromyko discussions of, 170, 171 + Freezing of device design, 165 + Indian uses of, 166, 190 + Panama Canal’s replacement using, 153, 183 + Problems with, 157 + Registration and measurement of explosive characteristics, + 146 + Tlatelolco Treaty’s language on, 423 + Under comprehensive test ban + Accommodation of, 145, + 147 + As problem for verification, 146, 195 + DOD position, 167, 169 + ERDA opposition to, 160 + Soviet protocol in, 182 + Trilateral negotiations + British position, 171 + PNEs as obstacle to agreement in, 165 + Soviet acceptance of moratorium in, 175, 176, 183, 189, 199, 212 + U.S. negotiating instructions, 170 + U.S. proposed strategy for, 166, 174 + Verification as obstacle to agreement on + PNEs, 146, 195 + Weakening of Soviet position on, 171, 189 + + Vance-Gromyko discussions of, 153, 168 + + U.S. program for, 145 + U.S. report for Soviets on experience with, 183, 186 + + U.S.-Soviet cooperative program for, 146 + U.S.-Soviet exploratory talks on, 162 + Verification, 102, 146, 163, + 167, 195, 210 + Warehousing of devices for, 146 + + + Peaceful Nuclear Explosions (PNE) Treaty (1976), 102, 141, 146, 153, 210, 243 + Peck, Robert, 122 + Pell, Claiborne dB., 269 + Percy, Charles H., 269, 375 + Pérez Guerrero, Manuel, 288, 411, 432 + Pérez Rodriguez, Carlos Andres + Carter meetings with, 288, 411, 432 + Conventional arms transfers, 304 + Full-scope safeguards, 430, 432 + Geisel meetings with, 432 + Nuclear proliferation, 416, 426, 432 + Special Session on Disarmament, 492 + + + Perry, Stephanie, 471 + Perry, William, 15, 40, 123, 124 + Persian Gulf, 260, 263, 280, 304 + Peru + Argentine research reactor exports to, 429, 466 + Ayacucho Declaration, 288 + Bolivia, relations with, 288 + Conventional arms transfers, 263, 283, 297 + Nuclear proliferation, 359 + RP–0 reactor, 459, 466 + Special Session on Disarmament, 471, 494 + Tlatelolco Treaty, 419 + + + Petrosyants, Andronik M., 199, 212, 223, 227, 237, 247 + Phelps, Homer, 62, 63, 79, 159, 162 + Philippines, 275, 359, 375, 471 + Phosgene, 82 + Pickering, Thomas, 377, 447, 448, 459, 460, 461, 467 + Pierrelatte gaseous diffusion plant, 365 + Pinheiro, João Batista, 398, 400, 401 + Pisarev, I., 47, 48 + Pitcairn Island, 251 + Placer, Alejandro, 466 + Platt, Alan, 296 + Plutonium + Applications for export of, 330 + Argentine production of, 381, + 443 + As weapons-usable material, 336, + 396 + Coprocessing, 344, 353 + Economical use of, 188 + Exports of, 352, 353 + IAEA study on storage of, 377 + In spent fuel, 325, 327 + International control of, 373 + International storage of, 377, + 382, 384 + Multinational spent-fuel storage, 323, 328 + National stockpiles of, 395 + Nitrate, 336 + Nuclear laboratories officials’ meeting with Carter, 206 + Pakistani reprocessing plant as non-producer of, 350 + Reprocessing + By Belgium, 325, 334, 372, 384 + By Japan, 344, 345, 352, 353, 354 + By the United States, 322 + Policy Review Committee meeting on, 338 + PRM on, 317, 328 + + Soviet production of, estimated, 392 + U.S. exports of, 354 + U.S. push for agreement on controls on, 376 + + Poland, 77, 89, + 138, 449, + 471 + Polaris Improvement Program (UK), 146 + Policy Review Committee + Afghanistan, 253 + Approaches to ASAT arms control, 9 + Call for creation of, 2 + Chemical weapons, 68 + Conventional arms transfers, 259, 266, 268, 286, + 287, 290, 291 + Criteria for meetings of, 27 + Decision paper by, 6, 9, 11 + Meetings + Mar. 16, 1977, 328, 338 + Mar. 24, 1977, 266 + Apr. 12, 1977, 268, 270 + June 8, 1977, 68 + Aug. 4, 1977, 7 + Jan. 10, 1978, 287 + Jan. 26, 1978, 286, 287 + Apr. 26, 1978, 290, 291 + Apr. 9, 1980, 381, 382 + May 14, 1980, 468 + Sept. 25, 1980, 392 + + + + Nuclear proliferation, 317, 328, 334, + 381, 382 + Nuclear reprocessing, 338 + PRM/NSC 12, 268 + PRM/NSC 15, 317, 328 + PRM/NSC 23, 5 + + Political parties + Conservative (UK), 229, 232, 308 + Democratic (U.S.), 140 + Labour (UK), 229, 308 + Nationalists (Argentina), 429 + Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), 269 + Republican (U.S.), 499 + Sandinistas (Nicaragua), 450 + + Porcupine effect, 327 + Portugal, 144, 333, 364 + Powell, Jody, 201 + Powell, Joseph, 101, 236, 309 + Power and Principle (Brzezinski), 329 + Precursor chemicals, 76, 82, 90, 98, 118 + Presidential Directives + On ASAT operational testing, 23, + 24, 25, 36 + On comprehensive test ban (proposed), 210 + On conventional arms transfers, 270, 271, 277, 312 + PD/NSC–8, 330, 334, 336, 343 + PD/NSC–13, 270, 271, 277, 312 + PD/NSC–15, 70, 72, 78, 81, + 86, 95 + PD/NSC–26, 483 + PD/NSC–28, 81 + PD/NSC–33, 24, 36 + PD/NSC–36, 291, 292 + PD/NSC–37, 27 + PD/NSC–38, 200, 203, 207, 208, + 227 + PD/NSC–39, 32 + PD/NSC–45, 38, 40 + PD/NSC–59, 138 + + + Presidential Review Committee, 190, 197 + Presidential Review Memoranda + International restraints on nuclear proliferation (in + process), 323 + PRM/NSC 10, 15 + PRM/NSC 12 + + Ad Hoc Interagency Group options paper, 269 + Awaiting the review of, 260, 262, 263, 264, 265 + Policy Review Committee meeting on, 268 + Text of, 259 + + PRM/NSC 15, 317, 325, 328, 395 + PRM/NSC 16, 141, 146, 148, 149, + 192 + PRM/NSC 23 + + Approaches to ASAT arms control, 9 + ASAT arms control decisions based on, 18 + ASAT test ban, 36 + Issuance of, 2 + Issues paper prepared by interagency group on, + 6, 9, 11 + Policy Review Committee discussion of, 5 + + PRM/NSC 27, 66, 67, 69 + PRM/NSC 37, 86, 92, 95 + + Press, Frank + ASAT capabilities, 2, 24 + ASAT report from Office of Science and Technology Policy, + 8 + ASAT talks, 11, 17, 29, + 43, 46 + ASAT weapons test ban, 34, 35 + Comprehensive test ban + Carter meeting with nuclear laboratory officials + on, 206 + On-site inspection quotas, 180 + SCC discussion of, 205, + 207, 228, 252 + SCC work program for discussions of, 164 + Trilateral negotiations, U.S. instructions for, + 219 + + Nuclear proliferation, 381, 382 + Nuclear testing, 230, 235, 255, + 256 + Nuclear weapons stockpile reliability, 190, 197 + PD/NSC–28, 81 + PD/NSC–37, 27 + PD/NSC–38, 200, 208 + PD/NSC–39, 32 + PD/NSC–45, 38 + PRM/NSC 23, 5 + Seismic stations, 196, 248 + Special Coordination Committee meetings + ASAT weapons and talks, 17, 29, 34, 35, 43 + Comprehensive test ban, 205, 207, 228, 252 + Seismic stations, 248 + + + Special Session on Disarmament, 485, 489, 493, 500 + Sverdlovsk incident, 112 + + Project Plowshare, 157 + Public opinion, 117, 499 + Pueblo Army Depot, 124 + Puerto Rico, 361, 402, 406, 407, 408, 413, 423 + Pulmonary anthrax, 111, 113, 120, 126, 129, 131, 137 + Purex, 392 + Pustay, John + Chemical weapons, 104, 139 + Comprehensive test ban, 252 + Nuclear testing, 253, 254 + Sverdlovsk incident, 112, 129 + U.S.-Argentine relations, 468 + + Putnam, Robert, 486, 488, 489, 494, 497, 499 + Pym, Francis, 232 + + + + + Quinlan, Michael, 232 + Quintana, Enrique, 420 + + + + + RA–3 reactor (Argentina), 459, 463 + RA–6 reactor (Argentina), 459 + Rabin, Yitzhak, 267 + Radar, 263 + Radar ocean reconnaissance, 4 + Radioactivity levels, 145 + Ramee, Mark, 152 + Ramey Air Force Base, 406 + Raphel, Arnold, 240 + Rathjens, George, 375 + Re-entry vehicles, 146 + Reactors (see also Breeder reactors; Tokai + nuclear plant) + Angra I (Brazil), 424, 461 + Atucha II (Argentina), 448, 466, 470 + Becker nozzle process for, 412 + Cienfuegos (Cuba), 465 + Hanford, 392 + Heavy water (HWRs), 336, 346 + High-temperature, 412 + La Reina (Chile), 436 + Light water (LWRS), 342, 345, 346, + 353, 360 + Lo Aguirre (Chile), 436 + Purex, 392 + RA–3 (Argentina), 459, 463 + RA–6 (Argentina), 459 + Research (Bolivian), 466 + Research (Uruguay), 466 + RP–0 (Peru), 459, 466 + Savannah River, 392, 484 + Tarapur (India), 357, 383, 384, + 395, 430 + Thorium, 323, 342, 346, + 412 + Valindaba (South Africa), 364 + Windscale, 336, 338 + + + Reams, Peter, 446 + REBLOCHON nuclear test, 154 + Red Cross, International Committee of the, 106 + Reddy, Leo, 63, 321 + Reduced Enrichment for Research and Test Reactors (RERTR) program, + 364 + Reeve, Anthony, 107, 159, 244 + Refugees, 110 + Regional equilibrium, 426, 429 + Reinhardt, John E., 497 + Reis, Robert, 494 + Rentschler, Jim, 104 + Research and development (R&D) + As augmented nuclear testing program emphasis, 256 + For ASAT weapons, 46 + On alternate energy, 427 + On chemical weapons, 75 + On co-processing, 354 + On LMFBRs, 334, 337 + On nuclear weapons, 146, 359 + On reprocessing for energy production, 395, 396 + + + Rhodes, John, 115 + Rhodesia, 233 + Ridgway, Rozanne L., 33 + Riot-control agents, 74, 76, 81, 82, 84, 99 + Rochline, Robert, 152 + Rockwell International, 263 + Rocky Mountain Arsenal (RMA), 123, 124 + Rodriguez, Carlos Rafael, 421 + Roel García, Santiago, 414, 444, 450 + Rogers, Bernard W., 220 + Romania, 119, 362, 375, 379, 471, 477 + Romberg, Alan, 282 + Rometsch, Rudolf, 360, 363 + Rondon, Fernando, 429 + Roosevelt Roads Naval Station, 406 + Rosenberg, Robert A., 5, 10, 17, 29, 34, 35, 43 + Rowden, Marcus A., 330 + Rowe, John, 293, 299 + + Rowny, Edward L., 168, 487 + RP–0 reactor (Peru), 459, 466 + Ruhfus, Juergen, 417 + Rumsfeld, Donald, 6, 61 + Ruser, Claus W., 433, 466 + Rush-Bagot Amendment, 413 + Rust, Dean, 348 + + + + + Sa, Calmon da, 427, 433 + Sadovsky, Mikhail A., 237 + Salisbury, William R., 348, 367 + Salmon, Charles, 448 + Salmon, William, 467 + Sanches, Manuel, 106, 107, 122, 126 + Sanders, Cameron, 122 + Sanders, Edward, 139, 286, 295 + Sarbanes, Paul S., 269 + Sardenberg, Ronaldo Mota, 433 + Satellites (see also Anti-Satellite (ASAT) + weapons) + Attacks by, 48 + Co-orbital jamming, 8 + Hostile acts on + Agreement on, 52, 56 + Soviet position, 51, 54 + Special Coordination Committee meetings on, 17, 29, 31, 43 + U.S.-Soviet discussion of, 31, 39, 47, 48, 56 + + + Illegal, 42, 43, 44, 46, 53 + Interference with + Proposals on, 50 + Soviet position, 37, 47, 48 + U.S. position, 1, 7, 16, + 31, 36, 478 + + International verification agency for (proposal), 501 + Launching systems for, 28 + Monitoring of attacks on, 31 + NAVSTAR, 6 + Of the Chinese People’s Republic, 42, 43, 45, 47 + Protection of, 42, 43, 44 + Reconnaissance, 6 + Shared with third countries, 42, + 43, 44 + Skylab, 28 + Space shuttle + As ASAT system, 6, 20, 29, 47, 52, 56, 60 + As military vehicle, 58 + As satellite launcher, 28, 51 + + + Sputnik I, 15 + Tactical use of, 6 + Trajectory changing of, 51 + Unlawful, 33 + U.S. dependence on, 6 + + Saudi Arabia + Comprehensive test ban, 211 + Conventional arms transfers, 263, 268, 280, 283, + 289, 300 + + Savannah River reactors, 392, 484 + Sawhill, John, 381 + Sayre, Robert M., 455 + SCANTLING nuclear test, 154 + SCC meetings on comprehensive test ban + CD working group, 386, 388, 390 + Changing approaches to issues in negotiations, 252 + Entry into force of CTB, 205 + Fixed duration treaty, 197, 198, 200, + 207, 210 + Guidance for talks on, 228 + Low-level testing, 205 + Mandatory vs. voluntary inspections, 174, 179 + On-site inspections, 180 + Permitted experiments, 190, 197, 207 + Preliminary review of issues in, 141, 146 + PRM/NSC 16, 141 + Review conference proposals, 227 + Seismic stations, 190, 205, 210, + 246, 248 + U.S. negotiating position on, 160 + Verification capabilities, 163 + Work program for discussion of, 164 + + Scheinman, Lawrence, 423 + Scheinman, Louis, 345 + Schirmer, Kitty, 354, 381 + Schlesinger, James A. + Clinch River reactor funding, 322 + Comprehensive test ban + Carter meeting with nuclear laboratory officials + on, 206 + DOE position, 197 + Fixed duration treaty, 198 + JCS position, 220 + Non-proliferation value of, 211 + Nuclear testing during, 191 + On-site inspection quotas, 180 + Permitted experiments under, 202 + Review conference proposals, 227, 231 + SCC discussion of, 205, + 207 + Three year approach, 217 + + Trilateral negotiations, Instructions for, 170, 219 + + Heavy water production technology exports, 452 + Japanese processing of spent nuclear fuel, 344 + Nuclear fuel access, 358 + Nuclear proliferation, 317, 329, 334, + 336 + Nuclear testing + Augmented program for, 230, 235 + Detection thresholds, 202 + During comprehensive test ban, 191 + For FY 1978, 173 + Soviet, 238, 239 + + Nuclear weapons stockpile reliability, 190, 196 + PD/NSC–8, 334, 336 + PD/NSC–38, 200, 208 + PRM/NSC 15, 317 + Special Coordination Committee meetings, 205, 207, + 228 + Special Session on Disarmament, 478, 484, 485, 493, + 500 + Storage for spent nuclear fuel, 364 + + Schmidt, Helmut + Carter meetings with, 412, 417, 499 + Chemical weapons, 87, 139 + Conventional arms transfers, 299 + FRG nuclear sales to Brazil + Carter-Schmidt discussions of, 412, 417 + Message exchanges with Carter on, 405 + Mondale-Schmidt discussions of, 397, 398, 400 + Smith’s discussions of, 401, 426, 427 + + Heavy water technology exports to Argentina, 447 + Mondale meetings with, 397, 398, 400 + Nuclear proliferation, 333, 342, 371 + Special Session on Disarmament, 491, 492, 499 + Tlatelolco Treaty, 417, 425 + + Schrage, Barbara, 226 + Schroeder, Patricia, 123, 124 + Schueler, Manfred, 417 + Schultze, Charles L., 259, 271 + Scowcroft, Brent, 61 + Seabrook, 342 + Seager, Drake, 159 + Sebastian, Peter, 62, 152, 318 + Security Assistance Authorization for FY 1978 (1977), 264 + Seignious, George M., II + ASAT, 46, 53, 56 + Chemical weapons, 101 + Comprehensive test ban, 231, + 236 + Conventional arms transfers, 307, 309, 312 + Heavy water production technology exports, 452 + Nuclear proliferation, In the post-INFCE era, 382 + Nuclear testing, Augmented program for, 235 + Special Coordination Committee meetings, 228 + Vienna Summit (June 1979), 56, 236, + 307, 309 + + Seismic stations (see also Comprehensive + test ban) + Ad hoc working group on, 247, + 255 + Analysis of contribution of, 164 + And Senate ratification of comprehensive test ban, 212 + Components of, 252 + Development of, 199 + DOE position, 196, 248, 254, + 255 + For three-year treaty, 197, 198, 207, + 209, 213 + Funding for, 230 + In Alaska, 241, 245 + In Australia, 226, 232 + In Canada, 226 + In New Zealand, 232 + In the Falkland Islands, 251 + In United Kingdom and dependent territories + British position, 229, + 234, 237, 242, 244, 251 + Financing of, 244 + Non-CTB benefits arising from Southern Hemisphere + stations, possible, 245, + 248 + SCC discussions of, 248 + Soviet position, 226, + 237 + U.S. démarche on, 240 + U.S. funding for, 245, + 246, 248 + U.S. position, 159, 187, 236, 250 + + Joint cooperative development proposal on, 245, 247 + Limitations of, 202 + + Loan to Soviets of, 245 + Numbers of + CIA position, 222 + ERDA position, 160 + Interagency study on selection of, 166 + Presidential decision on, 208 + SCC discussion of, 205, + 210 + U.S. position, 167, 250 + U.S.-Soviet discussion of, 185, 212, 223 + + Ownership of, 180 + Readiness for installation of, 206 + SCC discussions of, 190, 205, 210, + 246, 248 + Soviet position, 176, 189, 212, + 241 + Tamper-proof, 162 + U.S. negotiating position on, 170 + U.S. prototypes, 245, 252 + U.S.-Soviet discussions of, 165, + 182 + + Seismic Verification Agreement (proposed), 226, 237, 240 + SELA (Economic System of Latin America and the Caribbean), 416, 432 + Seletsky, Aleksander S., 421 + Semenov, Vladimir S., 177, 212, 487 + Senate, U.S. + Comprehensive test ban + DOE position, 196 + On-site inspection quotas, 180 + Ratification provision for extension of, 198, 200, 208, 227 + Seismic stations and ratification of, 212 + + Conventional arms transfer, 269 + Foreign Relations Committee + Conventional arms transfers, 260, 286, 316 + Sverdlovsk incident, 112 + Tlatelolco Treaty ratification hearings, 440, 464 + Vance testimony before, 12, 58, 316 + + IAEA safeguards, 384 + Ratification hearings on Threshold Test Ban Treaty, 158 + Resolution 405, 127 + SALT ratification + Before CBT, 214, 216, 217, 218, 221, 237 + Failure of, 257 + NPT Review Conference call for, 391 + Prospects for, 40, 43, 251 + Soviet nuclear testing’s effect on, 238, 254 + U.S.-Soviet observation of pending ratification, + 394 + U.S. support for, 138 + + Soviet nuclear testing, 238 + Sverdlovsk incident, 112, 127, 129, + 131 + Tlatelolco Treaty, 364, 434, 437, + 440, 464 + Warnke testimony before, 202 + + Senior Review Group (SRG), 61 + Sennewald, Robert, 293 + Sensitive weapons, 268 + Sergeant, William, 430 + Sewell, Duane, 228, 235, 254 + Seymour, Jack, 471 + Shaba, 357 + Shahi, Agha, 350, 357, 376 + Shakow, Alexander, 486, 488, 494 + Shankle, Arthur, 341 + Shchukin, A.N., 30 + Shelepin, Alexander N., 449 + Sherman, William C., 320, 329, 345 + Shinn, William, 58 + Shoesmith, Thomas P., 320, 329 + Shulman, Marshall D. + ASAT talks, 12, 20, 49, + 55 + Comprehensive test ban, 168, + 176 + Conventional arms transfers, 278, 282 + Special Session on Disarmament, 487 + Sverdlovsk incident, 113, 120, 130 + + Shumate, John, 62 + Siberia, 117 + Siegel, Jeffrey, 429 + Sievering, Nelson F., 338 + Sievering, Nicholas, 348 + Significant combat equipment, 261, 270, 271, 273, 275 + Silveira, Antônio Francisco Azeredo da + Carter-Geisel meetings, 433 + FRG nuclear sales to Brazil, 397, 398, 399, 400, + 404, 412 + Rosalyn Carter meeting with, 415 + Tlatelolco Treaty, 434 + + Simokaitis, Frank, 59 + Simonsen, Mario H., 433 + Singapore, 263, 359 + Singh, Charan, 372 + + Skaff, Joseph, 59 + Skylab, 28 + Slipchenko, Victor R., 223 + Sloane, Robert, 430, 448 + Slocombe, Walter B. + ASAT arms control policy discussions, 10 + ASAT talks + Dismantling of Soviet systems, 40 + Lasers, 40 + PD–45 instructions for, + 40 + Special Coordination Committee meetings on, 17, 29, 34, 43, 59 + Suspension of testing during, 28, 40 + Third round, 53 + U.S. framework for, 16 + Vance-Gromyko discussions of, 3 + + Chemical weapons, 64, 92, 139 + Comprehensive test ban + JCS position, 178 + Lack of progress in negotiations for, 257 + Proposed strategy for trilateral negotiations, + 167 + SCC discussion of, 252 + Vance-Gromyko discussions of, 168 + + Conventional arms transfers, 281 + Nuclear proliferation, 381 + Nuclear weapons stockpile reliability, 193 + PRM/NSC 23, 5 + Soviet high-yield nuclear testing, 254 + Special Coordination Committee meetings + ASAT talks, 17, 29, 34, 43, 59 + Comprehensive test ban, 228, 252 + Conventional arms transfers, 281 + Funding for binary weapons, 139 + Nuclear testing, 254 + Sverdlovsk incident, 112, 129, 135 + + Special Session on Disarmament, 487 + Sverdlovsk incident, 112, 113, 120, + 129, 135 + + Sloss, Leon, 1, 61, 63, 145, 147, 266, 474 + Smirnov, Leonid V., 3, 64, 153, 267, 332 + Smith, Emery, 423 + Smith, Gerard C. “Gerry” + EURATOM and IAEA safeguards, 367 + Fuel cycle evaluation program, 356, 373, 374, 380, + 450 + Heavy water technology exports, 447, 457, 459, 460, + 467 + Messages to Carter, 224, 225, 365 + Nuclear fuel exports, 362, 424, 439 + Nuclear Non-proliferation Act’s signing, 366 + Nuclear power, 393 + Nuclear proliferation + Final report on U.S. policy on, 395 + FRG nuclear sales to Brazil, 401, 426, 427 + In the post-INFCE era, 375, 377, 378, 381, 383 + Smith as negotiator on + French position, 364 + FRG position, 333, + 342 + London Suppliers Group expansion and, 335 + Soviet position, 367 + U.S. position, 344, 357, 369, 371 + U.S.-Soviet discussions of, 332 + + U.S.-Argentine discussions of, 466, 467 + U.S.-French discussions of, 347, 349 + U.S.-South African discussions of, 211 + U.S. strategy for, 379 + + Nuclear reprocessing, 352, 353, 354, + 439 + Tlatelolco Treaty, 417, 419, 422, + 425, 429 + + Argentine accession to, 419, 422, 429 + Brazilian accession to, 419 + Carter-Schmidt discussions of, 417 + + Vance visit to Brazil and Argentina, 425 + + + + Smith, Jack, 122 + Smith, William Y. + ASAT talks, 17, 29, 34, + 35, 43 + Chemical weapons, 68, 96 + Comprehensive test ban, 167, + 205, 207, 210 + Conventional arms transfers + Coproduction limits, 268 + Dollar volume ceilings, 268 + For new systems, 268 + FY 1978 program, 286 + Of sensitive weapons, 268 + Policy Review Committee meetings on, 266, 290 + U.S.-Soviet talks on, 294, 295 + + Policy Review Committee meetings, 5, 68, 266, 290 + + PRM/NSC 23, 5 + Special Coordination Committee meetings + ASAT talks, 17, 29, 34, 35, 43 + Chemical weapons, 96 + Comprehensive test ban, 205, 207, 210 + Conventional arms transfers, 294, 295 + + + Special Session on Disarmament, 488, 489 + + + Sokolov, O., 3, 64 + Solana Morales, Fernando, 414 + Solar energy, 427 + Solomon, Anthony M., 266 + Somalia, 20, 283, 304 + Sommer, Peter, 232 + Somoza Debayle, Anastasio, 450 + South Africa, Republic of + Apartheid, 144 + Comprehensive test ban, 146, + 211, 224 + Conventional arms transfers, Soviet position, 289 + Full-scope safeguards for, 364, + 395 + NPT accession by, 364 + Nuclear proliferation, 211, 224, 325, + 327, 329 + Nuclear weapons development by + As NPT Review Conference issue, 385, 386 + French position, 376 + Group of 77 position, 389, 394 + Testing, 211 + U.S. national security as impacted by, 393 + U.S. position, 376, 378, 381 + + Uranium exports to, 325 + + South Asia, 290, 304 + South Yemen, 303 + Southeast Asia. See Cambodia; Laos. + Southern Africa (see also South Africa, + Republic of), 233, 267, 304 + Soviet invasion of Afghanistan + Arms control negotiations as affected by, 57, 60, + 216, 244, 250, 316 + Cuban rejection of Tlatelolco Treaty and, 465 + NATO discussion of, 107 + SALT II Treaty ratification as affected by, 251 + Soviet response to U.S. measures against, 468 + U.S. public opinion on, 117 + U.S. technology transfers to Soviets restricted because + of, 245, 246 + + Soviet Union (see also Conventional arms + transfers (CAT), U.S.-Soviet talks on; Sverdlovsk incident) + Argentina, relations with, 468 + As London Suppliers Group member, 260, 317 + As superpower, 60 + ASAT systems, 4, 9, 28, 34, 35, + 40 + ASAT talks + First round, 33 + Interest and objectives in, 60 + Interference with satellites, 37, 47, 48 + Protection of satellites, 42, 43, 44 + Questions around test bans, 41, 47 + Soviet comments at, 47 + + + ASAT Treaty, 60 + ASAT weapons testing, 33, 58 + Biological weapons, 85, 111 + Biological Weapons Convention (1971), 62, 81, 114, 121, 129 + Chemical weapons, 82 + + Bilateral consultations on limitation of, 61 + Draft treaty on, 69, 73 + Foreign policy as affected by, 283 + Joint initiative on, 77 + Joint U.S.-Soviet statements, 98 + Prohibition of, 63 + Slowdown, 128, 136 + Soviet Civil Defense against, 85 + Soviet foreign policy as affected by negotiations + on, 283 + Soviet position, 82 + Soviet superiority in, 68, 69 + Stockpiles of, 94 + U.S.-Soviet working group, 65, 76, 118 + Use in Asia of, 104, + 132 + Verification, 71, 102, 118 + Work on CW convention in CD, 102 + + Chinese People’s Republic, relations with, 94 + Civil Defense, 85 + Comprehensive test ban + CD working group on, 126 + Chinese People’s republic adherence to, 176, 177, 192 + Fixed duration treaty, 221 + + French adherence to, 176, 177, 192 + Peaceful nuclear explosions under + Soviet acceptance of moratorium, 175, 176, 183, 189, 199, 212 + Soviet protocol, 182 + Weakening of position on, 171, 189 + + Soviet draft treaties, 160, 165, 251 + Soviet expression of interest in, 140, 142, 146 + Trilateral negotiations, 174, 177 + U.S.-Soviet exploratory discussions (June 1977), 162 + Verification, 165, 182, 189 + + + Conventional arms transfers (see + also Conventional arms transfers (CAT), U.S.-Soviet + talks on) + In FY 1977, 300 + Multilateral restraints on, 283 + Soviet paper on, 315 + To Africa, 283 + To Latin America, 283, + 288, 297 + To Middle East, 283 + U.S. sales to Iran, 267, + 283, 289 + U.S. talks on, 303 + + Cuba, relations with, 418 + Czechoslovakia invasion (1968), + 6 + Enhanced radiation (ER) weapons, 494 + Fuel cycle evaluation program, 348 + Full-scope safeguards, 339, 347, 363 + GDR recognition by, 146 + Heavy water technology exports to Argentina, 448, 468 + ICBM test notifications by, 58 + Israeli-Egyptian negotiations, 20 + Limited Test Ban Treaty violations by, 148 + Non-proliferation Treaty, 348, + 387 + NPT Review Conference, 386, 387, 389 + Nuclear proliferation, 339, 347, 367, + 375, 433 + Nuclear reprocessing plants, 342 + Nuclear testing, 238, 239, 248, + 253, 254, 255 + + Moratoria on, 146, 160, 163, 165 + + Acceptance for peaceful nuclear explosions, + 175, 176, 183, 189, 199, 212 + + + Soviet and U.S. démarches on, 243 + + Nuclear weapons transit rights, 446, 449 + OPANAL, 402, 449 + Pakistani nuclear weapons development, 376 + Panama Canal, 421 + Peaceful nuclear explosions + Cooperative program with United States on, 146 + Soviet acceptance of moratorium, 175, 176, 183, 189, 199, 212 + Soviet protocol, 182 + Verification of, 163 + + + Seismic stations, 176, 189, 212, + 241, 245 + Special Session on Disarmament, 471, 474, 475, 494, + 501 + Tlatelolco Treaty Protocol II, 428 + Tlatelolco Treaty Protocol II adherence + As requirement for entry into force of treaty, + 419 + Brezhnev’s message on, 435, 492 + Cuban influence on, 418 + OPANAL position, 402 + Possibility of, 434 + Reservations on, 446, + 449 + Signing of, 418, 435, 437, 446 + U.S. position, 478 + U.S.-Soviet discussion of, 348, 360 + + U.S.–EURATOM Agreement for Cooperation, 363 + U.S. relations with + Carter-Brezhnev message exchanged on, 142, 221 + Construction of U.S. embassy Moscow, 138 + CTB Treaty as benefit for, 146 + Irradiation of U.S. embassy Moscow, 131 + + + Space, 6, 27, + 33, 39, 57 + Space-based testing, 23, 24, 25 + Space hostilities, 29, 31 + Space objects, 39, 41, 48, 54 + Space systems, 6 + Space Transportation System, 27 + Spain, 146, 211, 268, 325, 364, 471 + + Sparkman, John J., 153, 269, 440 + Special Coordination Committee (SCC) (see + also SCC meetings on comprehensive test ban) + ASAT talks + Dismantling of Soviet systems, 34, 40 + Options as discussed for, 11, 17, 29, 31, 43, 59 + Protection of satellites, 44 + Test ban, 34, 35, 68 + Text of agreement at, 34 + Treaty on, 16, 17 + U.S.-Soviet talks on, 281 + + + Chemical weapons + Formation of CD Working Group on, 104 + Funding for binary weapons facility, 95, 96, 97, 100, 103, 139 + Reviews of U.S. policy on, 67, 86, 92 + U.S. military options for, 68 + + Conventional arms transfers, 281, 294, 295, 303, + 306 + Cutoff and transfer agreements, 485, 488 + Interagency Committee on Public Diplomacy and Disarmament, + 497 + Meetings + 1977 + + June 8, 68, 69 + Last week of June, 160 + Dec. 2, 179, 180 + Dec. 9, 281 + Dec. 22, (postponed), + 16 + + 1978 + + Feb. 15, 16, 17 + Mar. 22, 193 + Mar. 23, 190 + Apr. 20, 486 + May 2, 197, 198 + May 5, 488 + May 12, 489 + May 24, 294 + June 1, 29, 31 + June 12, 205 + June 27, 207, 209 + July 6, 210 + July 10, 295 + Nov. 16, 34, 35 + Nov. 21, 303 + Dec. 1, 95, 96, 97 + + + 1979 + + Jan. 18, 35, 37 + Feb. 1, 228 + Mar. 6, 306 + Mar. 12, 43 + July 12, 311 + + + 1980 + + Jan. 24, 104, 105 + Mar. 12, 246 + Mar. 14, 129 + Apr. 3, 246 + June 10, 59 + July 2, 252 + July 9, 129 + July 29, 135 + Sept. 4, 388, 390 + Sept. 15, 253 + Sept. 24, 254, 255 + Nov. 26, 139 + + + Negative security assurances, 486, 488, 489 + NPT Review Conference, 386, 388, 390 + Nuclear testing, 253, 254 + Nuclear weapons stockpile reliability, 146, 190, 197 + Peaceful nuclear explosions, 170, 186 + Seismic stations, 190, 205, 210, + 246, 248 + Special Session on Disarmament, 485, 486, 488, 489 + Sverdlovsk incident, 109, 112, 129, + 135 + Working group on national seismic stations, 246 + + Special nuclear materials (SNM), 393 + Special Operations Field Office (SOFO), 333 + Special Session on Disarmament (SSOD) (see + also United Nations General Assembly) + Agenda for, 475 + Argentine role in, 475 + ASAT weapons ban, 478 + Australian role in, 471, 477, 501 + Austrian role in, 471, 475, 501 + Brazilian role in, 471, 475, 501 + British role in, 476, 477, 488, + 494, 501 + + Canadian role in, 471, 483, 491, + 494, 501 + Carter meeting with delegates to, 499 + Carter-Waldheim discussions of, 472 + Carter’s speech at (possible), 486, 488, 489, 491, + 492, 493 + CCD as affected by, 475, 494 + Chemical weapons negotiations during, 79, 83 + Chinese People’s Republic’s role in, 494, 501 + Comprehensive test ban, 211, + 212 + Conventional arms transfers + LDC resistance to restraints on, 481 + Program of Action on, 296, 299, 304 + U.S. initiatives, 478, + 481, 492 + U.S. restraint on sales, 281 + U.S. vulnerabilities on, 480, 481 + + Coordination of language on comprehensive test ban in, + 494 + Cutoff and transfer agreements + ACDA position, 489, 491, 492 + As other states’ initiatives, 496 + As U.S. initiative, 478, + 481, 492 + British position, 482, + 483, 486 + Carter’s decisions on, 492, 493, 496, 500 + DOD position, 489, 490, 492 + DOE position, 484 + Guidance for, 494, 498, 499 + Interagency study on, 482, 483, 485 + Special Coordination Committee discussion of, 485, 488 + Verification for, 491 + + Danish role in, 501 + Declaration on disarmament, 494 + Development and disarmament + Backstopping Committee report on, 486 + SSOD’s endorsement of, 119 + U.S. approaches to, 478, + 494 + U.S. guidance for discussion of, 475 + U.S. initiatives for, 481 + Yugoslav position, 477 + + Disarmament experts meeting, 471, 474 + Dutch role in, 501 + Egyptian role in, 471, 475, 501 + Enhanced radiation (ER) weapons, 480, 481 + Final documents for, 477, 501 + Finnish role in, 478, 501 + Four-power discussion of, 476 + French role in, 476, 494, 501 + FRG role in, 476, 494 + Ghanaian role in, 494, 501 + Guidance for delegates to, 471, + 475, 494, 498, 499 + Indian role in, 471, 481, 492, + 494, 501 + Iranian role in, 475 + Italian role in, 471, 494, 501 + Japanese role in, 471, 475, 477, + 491, 494 + Mexican role in, 471, 494 + Mondale’s address to, 495, 498, 499 + NATO discussion of, 473, 474 + Negative security assurances, 486, 488, 492, 493, + 498 + New Zealand role in, 501 + NGO’s role minimized in, 475 + Norwegian role in, 477, 478, 501 + Nuclear accident reporting, 481, + 486, 488 + Nuclear free zones as initiatives at, 478 + Nuclear proliferation, 494 + Pakistani role in, 471, 501 + Preparatory committees (PrepComs), 471, 475, 479, 481 + Preparatory conferences (PrepCons), 471, 474 + Program of Action for, 296, 299, 304, + 477, 494 + Reports on, 492, 501 + Resolution calling for, 471 + Romanian role in, 471, 477 + SALT II as affected by, 475, + 494 + SCC meetings on, 485, 486, 488, + 489 + Soviet role in, 471, 474, 475, + 494, 501 + Soviet-U.S. discussions of, 475, + 494 + Sri Lankan role in, 471 + Swedish role in, 475, 478, 494, + 501 + Tlatelolco Treaty ratifications during, 438, 439 + U.S. Backstopping Committee for, 479, 481, 486 + U.S. change of tactics toward holding of, 471, 473 + U.S. consultation and coordination with major actors, 475, 494 + U.S. initiatives for, 478, 488, 494 + U.S. position, 480 + + Vance-Gromyko discussions of, 487 + Venezuelan role in, 471, 492, 494 + Verification of chemical weapons ban, 87 + Yugoslavian role in, 471, 474, 475, + 477, 481, 492 + + Spent fuel + French reprocessing of, 341 + Japanese reprocessing of, 341, + 344, 345, 395 + Plutonium in, 325, 327 + Storage for, 323, 328, 343, + 364, 365 + + Speth, Gus, 381, 382 + Squire, Robert, 159 + Sri Lanka, 359, 387, 471 + Staden, Berndt von, 284, 417, 445, 447 + Standing Consultative Commission (SCC), 13, 131, 199 + Stansberry, Kent, 59 + Stapleton Airport, 124 + Starkey, James, 468 + State sovereignty, 60 + Stearman, William, 65, 471, 473 + Stebbins, Charles + ASAT Treaty, 17, 29, 34, + 35, 43 + Conventional arms transfers, 311, 314 + Special Coordination Committee meetings, 17, 29, + 34, 35, 43 + + Stefanas, Anne, 448, 467 + Steiner, Charles, 446 + Steiner, Steven E. + Chemical weapons, 104, 106 + Comprehensive test ban, 240, + 244 + FRG nuclear sales to Brazil, 412 + NPT Review Conference, 387 + Seismic stations, 250, 251 + Special Session on Disarmament, 494 + + Stennis, John, 269 + Steven, Robert, 120, 240, 453 + Stevens, Sayre + ASAT Treaty, 17, 29, 34 + Comprehensive test ban, 210 + Conventional arms transfers, 286, 295, 303 + Nuclear weapons stockpile reliability, 190, 197 + Special Coordination Committee meetings, 17, 29, + 34, 210, 295, 303 + Special Session on Disarmament, 486, 489 + + Stocker, Carol Kay, 369, 448 + Stoessel, Walter J., Jr., 146, 333, 371, 400, 417, 462, 467 + Stone, Richard B., 269 + Strand, Robert, 87, 98 + Strategic Air Command (SAC), 406 + Strategic Arms Control Treaty (SALT I), 163, 251 + Strategic Arms Control Treaty (SALT II) + ASAT ban as support for, 5, 12, 40, + 43 + Comprehensive test ban linkage with + As reinforcement, 146 + SALT ratification before CTB, 214, 216, 217, 218, 221, 237 + U.S. disapproval of, 163 + + Continuing commitment to, 478 + Cruise missile testing, 177 + Cutoff and transfer agreements, 492 + Definition of heavy bombers, 177 + Finalization of treaty, 229 + Interagency Working Group on, 488 + Lack of progress in negotiations for, 20 + Senatorial ratification of + Before CBT, 214, 216, 217, 218, 221, 237 + Failure of, 257 + NPT Review Conference call for, 391 + Prospects for, 40, 43, 251 + Soviet nuclear testing, effect on, 238, 254 + U.S.-Soviet observation of pending ratification, + 394 + U.S. support for, 138 + + Signing of, 60, 236 + Soviet nuclear testing as affecting ratification of, 238 + Special Session on Disarmament, 475, 494 + U.S. public opinion on, 499 + Vance-Thatcher discussions of, 233 + + Strategic Arms Control Treaty (SALT III), 236, 391 + Streator, Edward, 232 + Strickland, Harold L., 5 + Stuart, Ian, 375 + Suchan, George, 448, 467 + Sudan, 263, 275, 283, 471 + Sugar, 427 + Sukhodrev, Viktor M. + ASAT, 3, 55, 56 + Carter-Gromyko talks, 201, 221 + Chemical weapons, 64, 101 + + Comprehensive test ban, 101, + 153, 168, 201, 212, 221 + Conventional arms transfers, 267, 309 + Nuclear proliferation, 332 + Special Session on Disarmament, 487 + Vienna Summit (June 1979), 55, 56, + 101, 236, 309 + + Sunoda, Sunao, 320, 329 + “Supreme national interest,” 206 + Survivability, 27 + Svart, Ankar, 162 + Sverdlovsk incident + ACDA White Paper on, 133, 135 + Comprehensive test ban as affected by, 248 + Congressional interest in, 115, + 127, 129 + Hodding Carter’s statement on, 127 + Initial reports on, 109 + Muskie-Dobrynin discussion of, 138 + SCC meetings on, 109, 112, 129, + 135 + Soviet non-compliance with Biological Weapons Convention, + 121, 129 + U.S.-British consultations, 137 + U.S. consultation with allies on, 134 + U.S. démarches on + British position, 137 + Mar. 17, 1980, 112, 113, 114, 116, 129 + + Soviet responses to, 120, 121, 127, 128 + + July 10, 1980, 129, 130, 131, 134 + + U.S. proposals for investigation of, 120 + Vance-Dobrynin discussions of, 117 + + Sweden + Biological Weapons Convention Review Conference, 112, 119 + Comprehensive test ban, 144, + 160, 184 + + U.S. consultations on, 214 + Verification proposals by, 153, 160, 184 + + NPT Review Conference, 389 + Nuclear proliferation + Fuel reprocessing, 325 + Full-scope safeguards for prevention of, 339 + In the post-INFCE era, 375 + Spent nuclear fuel storage, 364 + U.S. meeting with UN Delegates on, 359 + + + Special Session on Disarmament, 471, 475, 478, 494, + 501 + Sverdlovsk incident, 112, 137 + U.S. highly enriched uranium exports to, 463 + + Switzerland + Argentine import of heavy water technology from, 454, 456, + 457, 459, 460 + Chemical weapons use in Asia, 125 + Fuel reprocessing, 325 + Full-scope safeguards on heavy water, 457, 460 + Heavy water exports from, 458 + Spent nuclear fuel storage, 364 + + Symington Amendment, 350, 376 + + + + + Taborda, Jesus, 430 + Taft, Dan, 381 + Taiwan, 146, 327, 329, 381 + Tanks, 263 + Tarapur reactor (India), 357, 383, 384, 395, 430 + Tarasov, Boris, 199, 223 + Tarnoff, Peter + Chemical weapons use in Asia, 110 + Conventional arms transfers, 290, 293, 299 + Full-scope safeguards for heavy water, 457 + Heavy water production technology exports to Argentina, + 454, 457 + Nuclear proliferation, 321, 376 + Pakistani development of nuclear weapons, 376 + Tlatelolco Treaty, 408, 413, 441 + U.S. nuclear reactor part exports to Argentina, 470 + + Taylor, John, 113 + Technology transfers, 119, 245, 246 + Television broadcasts, 33 + Tello Macías, Carlos, 414 + Teltsch, Kathleen, 397 + Tengler, John A., 139 + Teratogens, 76 + Terekhov, Andrei, 47, 48 + Terfloth, Klaus, 157, 476 + Terrorism, 124, 183, 285 + Thailand, 110 + Thatcher, Margaret + Carter meetings with, 242, 244, 245 + Chinese People’s Republic, 242 + + Comprehensive test ban, 233, + 234, 236, 242, 244, 245, + 246 + Election victory, 229, 308 + Namibia, 242 + Seismic stations, 234, 242 + Vance’s discussions with, 233, + 234 + Visit to Tokyo (1979), 240, 250 + Visit to Washington (Dec. 1979), + 242, 244, 245, 248 + + Thayer, Harry E.T., 151, 282 + Theater force modernization, 146 + Third World, 300, 312, 394, 417 + Thomas, Andrew, 296 + Thomas, Charles, 138 + Thompson, David, 475 + Thompson, Herbert B., 402, 414 + Thompson, Richard, 122 + Thorium + Available reserves of, 341 + Brazilian-FRG cooperation on, 433 + Brazilian supplies of, 432 + Production of U–233, from + irradiation of, 336 + Reactors, 323, 342, 346, + 412 + Technical talks on, 426 + + Thorne, Robert D., 341 + Thornton, Dick, 244 + Thornton, Thomas P., 266, 381, 468 + Thorsson, Inga, 385, 501 + Threshold Test Ban Treaty (1974), 141, 146, 153, 158, 173, 243 + Thurmond, Strom, 269 + Thyden, James, 162, 445 + Thyden, John, 285 + Tice, Donald, 321 + Tighe, Eugene F., 148 + Timbie, James + ASAT weapons and talks, 17, 34, 35, + 43, 59 + Comprehensive test ban, 162 + Policy Review Committee discussion of PRM/NSC 23, 5 + Special Coordination Committee meetings, ASAT weapons and + talks, 17, 34, 35, 43, 59 + + Timerbaev, Roland M. + Comprehensive test ban, 171, + 174, 189, 199, 223 + Nuclear proliferation, 348, 369 + Seismic stations, 237 + Tlatelolco Treaty, 418, 423 + + Tindemans, Leo C., 319 + Tlatelolco Treaty (see also Argentine + Tlatelolco Treaty accession; Brazilian Tlatelolco Treaty accession; + Cuban Tlatelolco Treaty accession; Nuclear Free Zones) + Article 25, 434 + Article 30, 413 + Carter-Schmidt discussions of, 417 + Chilean accession to, 419, 434, 435, + 436, 449 + CTB as reinforcement for, 211 + Guyana’s accession to, 434, 464 + Jamaican accession to, 464 + Merger of Ayacucho Declaration with, 304 + Mexican encouragement of holdout states for entry into, + 419, 435, 444, 450 + Nicaraguan accession to, 464 + Peaceful nuclear explosions as covered by, 423 + Prospects for ratification of, 434 + Protocol I + As interpreted in OPANAL, 409, 411 + British adherence to, 364, 406 + Dutch adherence to, 364, + 402, 406 + French adherence to + As requirement for entry into force of + treaty, 419 + Brazilian position, 415 + French position, 433, 442 + OPANAL-French talks on, 438 + OPANAL position, 402, 449, 464 + Signing of, 406, + 449 + U.S.-French discussion of, 361 + U.S. position, 435, 478, 499 + + + U.S. adherence to + ACDA memorandum on, 407 + Basis for, 478 + Decision memorandum on, 406 + DOD position, 409, + 440 + Exclusions for Puerto Rico and Virgin + Islands, 402 + JCS position, 440 + OPANAL position, 464 + Reservations included in ratification, 413 + Senatorial ratification of, 364, 434, 437, 440, 464 + Signing of, 414, + 423, 464 + State Department memorandum on, 408 + + + + Protocol II + British adherence to, 406, 422 + Chinese People’s Republic’s adherence to, 406 + French adherence to, 406 + Soviet adherence to + As requirement for entry into force of + treaty, 419 + Brezhnev’s message on, 435, 492 + Cuban influence on, 418 + OPANAL position, 402 + Possibility of, 434 + Reservations on, 446, 449 + Signing of, 418, + 435, 437, 446 + U.S. position, 478 + U.S.-Soviet discussion of, 348, 360 + + U.S.-Brazilian discussion of, 410 + U.S.-Soviet discussions of, 428 + + Ratification during SSOD of, 438, 439 + Tenth anniversary of opening for signature of, 402 + Transit rights + British position, 446 + French position, 361, + 446, 449 + OPANAL position, 411 + Soviet position, 446, + 449 + Through Panama Canal, 421, 434, 444 + U.S. position, 406, 407, 408 + + U.S.-Mexican discussion of, 414, + 444 + U.S. support for, 464, 499 + + + Todman, Terence A. + Carter-Geisel meetings, 433 + Carter-Perez meetings, 432 + Conventional arms transfers, 266, 288 + Nuclear proliferation, 321, 400, 416, + 420, 432, 433 + Tlatelolco Treaty, 414 + + Togo, Fumihiko, 320, 329 + Tokai nuclear plant (Japan) + ERDA position, 238 + Readiness for testing at, 336 + U.S.-Japanese discussions of, 329, 341, 344, 345, + 351, 352, 353 + U.S. policy toward, 325 + + Tooele Army Depot, 123, 124 + Toon, Malcolm + ASAT talks, 3, 56 + Brezhnev meetings with, 177 + Carter-Gromyko talks, 201, 221 + Chemical weapons, 64, 101 + Comprehensive test ban, 153, + 168, 201, 212, 221, 236 + Conventional arms transfers, 267, 283, 285, 289, + 309 + Nuclear proliferation, 332 + Special Session on Disarmament, 487 + Vienna Summit (June 1979), 56, 101, + 236, 309 + + Toronto Star, 452 + Torres, Julio, 252 + Torrijos Herrera, Omar E., 304 + Toumanyan, Alec, 355 + Toussaint, Donald, 471 + Toxicity, 73, 80, 82, 84, + 88, 118, 136 + Traid, Eduardo Alberto, 420 + Train, Russell, 337 + Treaty of Tlatelolco. See Tlatelolco + Treaty. + Treverton, Gregory F., 417 + Tricastin nuclear enrichment plant (France), 365 + Tritium, 188, 206, 468, 484 + Trudeau, Pierre Elliott, 342, 420, 491, 492, 501 + Tsien Ta-yung, 151 + Tuchman, Jessica + Chemical weapons, 63, 68, 95 + Conventional arms transfers, 281, 286, 290, 293, + 294, 295, 303 + Encouragement of adherence to Geneva Protocol and + Biological Weapons Convention, 62 + FRG nuclear sales to Brazil, 401 + Heavy water exports, 447 + Nuclear fuel assurances, 358 + Nuclear reprocessing, 354 + Policy Review Committee meetings, 68 + SCC meetings, 95, 294, 295, + 303 + Tlatelolco Treaty, 402, 435 + + Tunisia, 263, 471 + Turk, Lynn, 460 + Turkey, 144, 146, 233, 304, 471, 474 + Turner, Stansfield M. + ASAT, 2, 11, 17, 24, 29, + 34, 46 + Comprehensive test ban + On-site inspection quotas, 180 + + Peaceful nuclear explosions as accommodated in, + 145, 147 + Review conference proposals, 227, 231 + SCC discussion of, 164, + 205, 207 + U.S. instructions for trilateral negotiations, + 219 + + Conventional arms transfers, 274, 280, 281, 292 + Nuclear proliferation, 381, 382 + Nuclear testing, 156, 158, 172, + 173, 253, 255 + Nuclear weapons stockpile reliability, 197 + PD/NSC–8, 330 + PD/NSC–13, 271 + PD/NSC–15, 70 + PD/NSC–28, 81 + PD/NSC–37, 27 + PD/NSC–38, 200, 208 + PD/NSC–39, 32 + PD/NSC–45, 38 + Policy Review Committee, 2, 381 + PRM/NSC 12, 259 + PRM/NSC 15, 317 + PRM/NSC 16, 141 + PRM/NSC 27, 67 + PRM/NSC 37, 86 + Seismic stations, 222, 246 + Special Session on Disarmament, 479, 485, 488, 493, + 500 + Sverdlovsk incident, 112 + + + Turrentine, Arch, 76, 77, 79, 80, 494 + Twaddell, William, 3, 168, 400, 414 + + + + + Ueki, Shigeaki, 427 + United Kingdom (UK) + As London Suppliers Group member, 260, 317 + Biological Weapons Convention (1971), 81, 119 + Chemical weapons + British draft UN resolution on, 89 + Draft treaty on, 69 + Quadrilateral consultations on, 87, 89, 94, 106, 107, 126 + U.S. consultations on, 70, 79, 83, 87, 89 + U.S. stocks of, 139 + Verification issues, 89 + + Comprehensive test ban + British position, 143, + 171, 179, 215 + British role in negotiations for, 159, 187 + British withdrawal from trilateral negotiations, + 236, 237, 240, 242 + Chinese People’s Republic adherence to, 159 + Fixed duration treaty, 197, 213, 215 + Indian participation in, 194 + Permitted experiments, 215, 226 + Quadrilateral discussions of, 157 + UN resolutions on, 144 + U.S.-British discussions of, 159, 160, 165, 187, 226, 232, 244, 250 + Verification, 187, 244 + + Conventional arms transfers, 263, 267, 288, 297, + 298, 308 + Cutoff and transfer agreements, 482, 483, 486 + Elections (1979), 229 + Full-scope safeguards, 311 + Intelligence conference with the United States (1978), 89 + Negative security assurances, 486, 492, 498 + NPT Review Conference, 389 + Nuclear proliferation + Argentine-IAEA negotiations, 443 + Fuel cycle evaluation program role for, 336 + Full-scope safeguards for prevention of, 339, 347 + In the post-INFCE era, 375, 376, 377, 379 + Quadripartite discussions of, 326 + U.S.-British discussions of, 395 + + Nuclear reprocessing, 341, 342, 377, + 384 + Nuclear testing moratorium, 146, + 233 + Nuclear tests, 226 + Nuclear weapons stockpile reliability, 192 + On-site inspections, 184 + OPANAL, 449 + Polaris Improvement Program, 146 + Seismic stations + British position, 229, + 234, 237, 242, 244, 251 + Financing of, 244 + Non-CTB benefits arising from Southern Hemisphere + stations, possible, 245, + 248 + SCC discussions of, 248 + + Soviet position, 226, + 237 + U.S. démarche on, 240 + U.S. funding for, 245, + 246, 248 + U.S. position, 159, 187, 236, 250 + + + Special Session on Disarmament + British role at, 476, + 477, 488, 494, 501 + Cutoff for production of fissionable materials for + nuclear weapons, 482, 483 + NATO discussion of, 473, + 474 + Nuclear accident reporting, 488 + PrepCom membership, 471 + + Sverdlovsk incident, 137 + Tlatelolco Treaty, 364, 406, 446 + + United Nations (UN), 153, 472 + United Nations Charter, 43, 44, 47, 54, 293 + United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), 476 + United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) (see + also Special Session on Disarmament) + Aggression as defined by, 293 + Chemical weapons, 61, 77, 89, + 110 + Comprehensive test ban, 140, + 144, 145, 146 + Conventional arms transfers, 278 + Declaration of Friendly Relations, 293 + Disarmament Committee, 98, 475, 494 + First Committee, 473, 475, 494 + Iraqi resolution on Middle East armaments, 499, 501 + Outer Space Committee, 60 + Resolutions + 31/65, 62 + 31/66, 140 + 31/189, 471 + 32/77, 77 + 32/87, 494 + 33/58, 464 + 2625/XXV, 293 + 3314/XXIX, 293 + On establishing preparatory committee for BW + conference, 89 + + Seventh Special Session, 499 + Special Political Committee, 494 + 31st Session, 471 + 32nd Session, 475 + + United Nations Human Rights Commission (HRC), 110 + United Nations Secretariat, 475 + United Nations Security Council (UNSC) + Chemical weapons treaty ratification by permanent members + of, 74, 76, 101, 118 + On-site inspection, 184 + Sverdlovsk incident, 133 + + Uranium + As a product of coprocessing, 344 + As weapons-usable material, 336 + Available resources of, 337, + 341, 342, 370 + Depleted, 459 + Ease of access to, 342 + Exports to South Africa of, 325 + Fear of cartel in sale of, 371 + For Venezuela, 430 + Hexafluoride, 336 + Highly-enriched (HEU) + As fuel for nuclear powered Naval vessels, 484, 492 + As weapons-usable material, 330 + Danger for nuclear proliferation of, 330, 396 + Difficulty in production of, 369 + Exports for FRG reactors, 333, 463 + Forms of, 336 + U.S. approvals for export of, 362, 364, 384, 463 + + Low-enriched (LEU), 364, 384, 429 + Nitrate, 336 + Origins of ore for, 355 + Oxide, 336 + Resource exploration for, 358 + U–233, 323, 336 + U–235, 325, 336, 478 + U.S. exports of, 325, 333, 371, + 383, 463 + + Uruguay, 260, 466 + U.S.–EURATOM Agreement for Cooperation (1958) + Application to France of, 347, + 349, 430 + Canadian cooperation agreement’s similarity to, 355 + Japanese views on, 344 + Renegotiation of, 349, 362, 365, + 395 + Soviet position, 363 + + Ustinov, Dmitriy F., 56, 101, 236, 309 + Utgoff, Victor, 17, 29, 34, 35, 43, 59, 139 + + + + + Vaerno, Oscar, 119 + Vajpayee, Atal B., 211 + + Vaky, Viron P., 288, 411, 430, 432, 443, 453 + Valindaba enrichment plant, 364 + Van der Stoel, Max, 319 + Van Doren, Charles + FRG nuclear sales to Argentina, 467 + Heavy water technology exports, 460 + Non-proliferation Treaty, 318, + 386 + Nuclear proliferation, 324, 348, 369, + 381, 430 + Tlatelolco Treaty, 402, 423, 429 + + Vance, Cyrus R. + ASAT + Soviet testing, 58 + U.S. capabilities, 2, 21, 22, 24, 25 + Vienna Summit discussion of, 55, 56 + + ASAT talks + Approval of goals for, 11, 18 + Démarche to Dobrynin, 49, + 50 + Lasers, 50 + Protected vs. illegal satellites, 42, 53 + Special Coordination Committee meetings on, 17 + Testing ban, 31 + Third round, 46, 50, 53 + U.S. proposals for, 13 + Vance-Dobrynin talks on, 12, 13, 49, 50 + Vance-Gromyko discussions of, 3, 6, 13, 55, 56 + + Belize, 242 + Brezhnev’s discussions with, 153, 332 + Carrington’s discussions with, 242, 244, 245, 248 + Carter-Geisel talks, 433 + Carter-Gromyko talks, 201, 221 + Carter-Perez talks, 432 + Chemical weapons + Congressional budgeting for facilities for + stockpiling of, 75 + DOD position, 78 + Prohibition of, 64, 65, 66, 69, 73 + Soviet discussions over, 64, 65, 66, 69, 73 + U.S. guidance for talks on, 83 + Use in Asia of, 117 + Vance-Gromyko talks on, 64, 65, 66, 69, 73 + Vienna Summit discussion of, 101 + + Comprehensive test ban + British-U.S. discussions of, 232 + Carter-Dobrynin discussions of, 142 + Carter-Gromyko discussions of, 201, 221 + Carter-Thatcher discussions of, 242 + Consultations with Allied and Non-Aligned states, + 214, 216 + Non-proliferation value of, 211, 220, 224 + On-site inspections, 179, 180 + Peaceful nuclear explosions as accommodated in, + 145, 147, 153, 168 + Quadripartite discussions of, 157 + Resumption of testing after fixed-duration treaty, + 198 + Review conference proposals, 227, 231 + SCC discussion of, 164, + 205, 207, 210, 228 + Thatcher-Vance discussions of, 233, 234 + Three year approach, 210 + Trilateral negotiations, 166, 176, 214, 216, 219 + Vance-Brezhnev discussions of, 153 + Vance-Dobrynin discussions of, 243 + Vance-Gromyko discussions of, 153, 165, 168, 212, 223 + Vienna Summit discussion of, 236 + + Conventional arms transfers + Amounts of, In FY 1977, + 272, 277 + Congressional notification of, 263, 265 + Coproduction limits, 268, 312 + Dollar volume ceilings, 268 + For new systems, 268 + FY 1978 program, 286 + FY 1979 ceiling, 301 + Legislation on, 264 + Management of restraints on, 279, 280 + Meeting with Senators on, 269 + Middle East nations reduction in purchases, U.S. + request for, 258 + Multilateral restraints on, 267 + New technology developed for export, 268 + Of sensitive weapons, 268 + Sales of C–130s, 273, 275, 276 + To Latin America, 266 + U.S. policy assessment on, 312, 313 + U.S.-Soviet talks on, 260, 267, 278, 307, 315 + + U.S.-Venezuelan talks on, 288 + Vienna Summit discussion of, 307, 309 + + Dobrynin’s discussions with, 117, 243, 260, 267, + 278 + Fuel cycle evaluation program, 355, 372 + Gromyko’s discussions with + ASAT, 3, 6, 13, 55, 56 + Chemical weapons, 64, + 65, 66, 69, 73 + Comprehensive test ban, 153, 165, 168, 212, 223 + Conventional arms transfers, 267, 315 + Nuclear proliferation, 332 + + Heavy water production technology exports, 452, 456 + Interagency Committee on Public Diplomacy and Disarmament, + 497 + Meetings + Carter-Fukuda, 329 + Carter-Giscard, 361 + With Carlos Pastor, 453 + With Geisel, 425, 426, 427 + With Hermes, 318 + With Huang, 151, 153 + With Pérez, 426 + With Videla, 425, 426, 432 + + Messages + To Aubert, 467 + To Azereda da Silveira, 398 + To de Guiringaud, 321 + To François-Poncet, 378 + To Genscher, 467 + + Middle East, 233 + Negative security assurances, 493 + No-first-use of nuclear weapons discussion, 3 + Non-proliferation Treaty, 318 + NPT Review Conference, 389 + Nuclear proliferation + Argentine-U.S. discussions of, 466 + Carter-Fukuda talks on, 329 + Carter-Giscard talks on, 361 + Carter’s policy statement on, 331, 333 + G–7 summit discussion of, + 342 + In the post-INFCE era, 375, 377, 378, 381, 382 + Message to Azeredo da Silveira, 398 + Message to de Guiringaud on, 321 + Gerard Smith as negotiator on, 344 + U.S.-Brazilian consultations, 400 + U.S.-French discussions of, 357 + U.S.-Japanese bilateral nuclear suppliers + consultations, 341 + U.S. policy toward, 364, + 371 + U.S. strategy for, 379 + U.S.-Venezuelan talks on, 416 + Vance-Brezhnev discussions of, 332 + Vance-Gromyko discussions of, 332 + + Nuclear reprocessing, 349, 351, 443 + Nuclear testing, 156, 158, 172, + 173, 235 + Nuclear weapons stockpile reliability, 190, 192, 197 + Operation FULCRUM II, 155 + PD/NSC–8, 330 + PD/NSC–13, 270, 271 + PD/NSC–15, 70, 78 + PD/NSC–28, 81 + PD/NSC–37, 27 + PD/NSC–38, 200, 208 + PD/NSC–39, 32 + PD/NSC–45, 38 + Peaceful nuclear explosions + As accommodated in a comprehensive test ban, 145, 147, 153, 168 + DOD position, 169 + Soviet acceptance of moratorium on, 176 + U.S. report for Soviets on experience with, 183, 186 + Vance-Brezhnev discussions of, 153 + Vance-Gromyko discussions of, 153 + + Policy Review Committee meetings, 381 + PRM/NSC 12, 259, 260 + PRM/NSC 15, 317 + PRM/NSC 16, 141, 146 + PRM/NSC 27, 67 + PRM/NSC 37, 86 + Report to Congress on, 316 + Seismic stations, 222, 229, 240, + 246, 248 + Senate Foreign Relations Committee testimony of, 12, 58, + 316 + Special Coordination Committee meetings + ASAT talks, 17 + + Comprehensive test ban, 164, 205, 207, 210, 228 + Sverdlovsk incident, 109 + + Special Session on Disarmament + Carter meeting with delegates to, 499 + Carter speech proposal for, 491 + Carter’s decisions for, 493 + Cutoff and transfer agreements, 482, 484, 485, 491, 496, 500 + Four-power discussion of, 476 + U.S. Backstopping Committee for, 479, 481 + U.S. initiatives for, 478 + U.S. position, 480 + Vance-Gromyko discussions of, 487 + + Sverdlovsk incident + Congressisional consultation on, 115 + SCC meetings on, 109 + U.S. démarches on, 114 + U.S. proposals for investigation of, 120 + Vance-Dobrynin talks on, 117 + + Thatcher’s discussions with, 233, 234 + Threshold Test Ban Treaty (1974), + 153 + Tlatelolco Treaty + Argentina accession to, 419, 434, 453 + Brazilian accession to, 419 + Carter-Schmidt discussions of, 417 + Cuban accession to, 435 + U.S. adherence to, 406, + 407, 413 + U.S.-Mexican discussion of, 414 + U.S. support for, 464 + + Vienna Summit (June 1979), 55, 56, + 101, 236, 309 + Visits + Argentina (Nov. 1977), 364, 422, 425, 426, 427, 439 + Bonn (Mar. 1977), 333 + Brazil, 425, 426, 427 + Caracas (Mar. 1978), 288 + Caracas (Nov. 1977), 426 + China (1977), 351 + Moscow (Mar. 1977) + Chemical warfare discussions, 64, 65, 66, 69, 73 + Comprehensive test ban discussions, 153 + Conventional arms transfers, 260, 267 + Nuclear proliferation, 332 + + Vienna (June 1979), 55, 56, 101, 236, 309 + + + + + + Vandenberg Air Force Base, 6 + Vasev, Vladillen M., 58, 130, 131, 134, 239 + Vavilov, A. M., 56, 101, 236, 309 + Velloso, João Paulo dos Reis, 433 + Venezuela + Ayacucho Declaration, 288 + Brazilian nuclear agreement with, 461 + Conventional arms transfers, 288, 296, 297, 305 + Full-scope safeguards for, 430 + Nuclear proliferation + Brazilian-Argentine nuclear arms race, 401 + U.S. meeting with UN Delegates on, 359 + U.S.-Venezuelan talks on, 288, 411, 416, 426, 432 + + Regional nuclear cooperation, 419 + Special Session on Disarmament, 471, 492, 494 + Tlatelolco Treaty, 419 + Uranium imports by, 430 + U.S. nuclear aid to, 419 + U.S.-Venezuelan talks, 288, 411, 416, + 426, 432 + + Verification (see also + Under chemical weapons; Under comprehensive test ban) + By IAEA, 482, 483, 484 + By national technical means, 13, + 31, 153, 160, 209, 212 + For cutoff and transfer agreements, 491 + International agency for satellites (proposal), 501 + Lack of provision in Biological Weapons Convention for, + 68 + Of ASAT capabilities, 4, 6 + Of ASAT laser development, 30, + 59 + Of EURATOM by IAEA, 348 + Peaceful nuclear explosions, 102, 146, 163, 167, + 195, 210 + + Vertical proliferation, 400 + Vest, George S. + ASAT talks, 58 + + Chemical weapons use in Asia, 117 + Comprehensive test ban, 232, + 242 + Fuel cycle evaluation program, 355 + Heavy water exports to Argentina, 445, 447 + Nuclear proliferation, 357 + Nuclear testing, 253 + Tlatelolco Treaty, 417 + + Vick, M. Christine, 106 + Videla, Jorge Rafael + Carter meeting with, 420, 422, 432 + Carter’s message exchange with, 437 + Mondale meeting with, 443 + Tlatelolco Treaty + Argentine accession to, 416, 429, 437, 453, 469 + Carter-Videla discussions of, 420, 422, 432 + U.S.-Argentine discussion of, 466 + + Vance meetings with, 425, 426, 432 + + Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (1969), 433, 434 + Vienna Summit (1961), 180 + Vienna Summit (June 1979) + ASAT, 42, 55, 56 + Chemical weapons, 101 + Comprehensive test ban, 232, + 236, 242 + Conventional arms transfers, 307, 309, 310 + + Vietnam, Democratic Republic of, 104, + 106, 107, + 132, 303, + 309 + Vine, Richard D., 460 + Virgin Islands, 402, 406, 423 + Von Brandt, Max, 436 + Von Den Steinem, Erwin, 467 + Von Welck, Stephan, 384 + Vorster, Balthazar J., 211, 224 + Voutov, Peter, 119 + Vukovic, Miljenko, 477 + + + + + Wade-Gery, Robert, 248 + Walden, George, 242 + Waldheim, Kurt, 94, 169, 449, 472 + Waldman, Roger, 326 + Warheads + B–25, 206 + Minuteman, 206 + NOVA, 230 + Pershing II, 230 + Polaris, 206 + Poseidon, 206 + SM–2, 155, 161 + Sprint, 206 + Talos/Terrier, 206 + Trident, 206 + + Warner, Michael, 244 + Warnke, Paul C. + ASAT capabilities, 2, 24 + ASAT talks, 3, 11, 13, 29 + ASAT testing ban, 37 + Carter-Gromyko talks, 201, 221 + Chemical weapons, 64, 74 + Comprehensive test ban + Carter-Gromyko discussions of, 201, 221 + Consultations with Allied and Non-Aligned states, + 214, 216 + Fixed duration treaty, 198, 210, 213 + JCS position, 220 + NAC briefing on, 162 + Non-proliferation value of, 211 + On-site inspections, 179, 180, 182, 184 + Review conference proposals, 227 + SCC discussions of, 164, + 207, 210 + Senate testimony on, 202 + Trilateral negotiations + Finalizing of U.S. negotiating position, + 160 + Proposed strategy for, 166, 174 + Review of U.S. strategy for, 214, 216 + Sessions of, 165, + 171, 174, 177, 195 + Soviet acceptance of moratorium on peaceful + nuclear explosions, 175, + 183 + U.S. instructions for, 163, 181, 219 + + Vance-Gromyko discussions of, 153, 168, 212 + Warnke-Petrosyants discussion of, 199 + + Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, 204 + Conventional arms transfers, 267, 268, 280, 292 + EURATOM and IAEA safeguards, 367 + Interagency Committee on Public Di-$(LB$):mbplomacy :mxand + Disarmament, 497 + Negative security assurances, 493 + Nuclear proliferation, 328, 332, 348, + 360, 363 + Nuclear testing, 154, 156 + Operation FULCRUM II, 155 + + PD/NSC–8, 330 + PD/NSC–13, 271 + PD/NSC–15, 70 + PD/NSC–28, 81 + PD/NSC–37, 27 + PD/NSC–38, 200, 208 + PD/NSC–39, 32 + PD/NSC–45, 38 + Peaceful nuclear explosions, 168, 183 + PRM/NSC 12, 259 + PRM/NSC 15, 317 + PRM/NSC 16, 141 + PRM/NSC 27, 67 + PRM/NSC 37, 86 + Seismic stations, 222 + Special Coordination Committee meetings, 164, 207, + 210, 290 + Special Session on Disarmament, 478, 479 + + Carter speech proposal for, 491 + Carter’s decisions for, 493 + Cutoff and transfer agreements, 482, 484, 485, 491, 500 + Vance-Gromyko discussions of, 487 + + Tlatelolco Treaty, 406, 407, 428 + + Warsaw Pact, 60 + Washington Post, 419 + Watanabe, Koji, 329 + Watson, Lorna, 296, 305, 423, 430, 446 + Watson, Thomas J., Jr., 112, 113, 114, 116 + Weapons and Space Systems Intelligence Committee, 111 + Weapons-usable materials, 336 + Weber, Heinz, 157, 476 + Weber, Karl, 96 + Weekley, Robert K., 79, 83, 96, 135 + Weil, Frank, 266 + Weiler, Lawrence, 477, 486, 488, 489 + Weitnauer, Albert, 460 + Welch, Jasper, 59, 104, 112, 129, 139, 246, 252 + Well, Günter von, 157, 326, 476 + West Asia, 303, 304 + Western Africa, 290 + Western Europe, 297, 308 + Westinghouse, 263 + Weston, John, 240, 250 + Weteye bombs, 123, 124 + White, John, 381 + Whiting, John, 471 + Whitman, John, 467 + Wickel, James, 320, 329 + Willens, Harold, 499 + Williams, Ross N., 16 + Williamson, David, 29, 34, 43 + Williamson, Richard, 411, 448, 468 + Wilson, George, 57 + Wilson, Harry, 108 + Wilson, Peter, 113, 120, 122 + Windscale, 336, 338 + Woesner, William, 445 + Woolfley, Dufour, 87 + World Disarmament Conference (WDC), 475, + 494 + World Energy Conference, 328 + World War I chemical weapons casualties, 69 + World War II, 96 + Wright, James C., Jr., 115 + + + + + Yamazaki, Ryuchiro, 320 + Yamazaki, Toshio, 320, 329 + Yarmolinsky, Adam, 486, 488, 489, 494 + Yemen, 303 + York, Herbert F. + ASAT talks, 29, 30, 34, + 35, 40 + Comprehensive test ban, 228, + 237, 241, 247 + Nuclear weapons stockpile reliability, 206 + Seismic stations, 240 + Special Coordination Committee meetings, 29, 34, + 35, 228 + Visit to Moscow (June 1979), 237 + + Yoshino, Bunroku, 320 + Young, Andrew, 493, 498, 499, 500 + Yugoslavia + Comprehensive test ban, 144, + 214 + Development’s link to disarmament, 477 + NPT Review Conference, 387, 389, 393, + 394 + NPT withdrawal by, 211 + Nuclear power, 359 + Nuclear proliferation, 323, 342, 359, + 375, 379, 494 + Peaceful biological research, 119 + Special Session on Disarmament, 471, 474, 475, 477, + 481, 492 + + + + + + Zablocki, Clement, 115, 375, 381 + Zaire, 275, 304, 357, 471 + Zambia, 471 + Zamyatin, Leonid M., 56, 101, 236, 309 + Zangger Committee, 327, 348 + Zimmermann, Robert W., 400, 429 + + + +
+ + + diff --git a/volumes/frus1981-88v13.xml b/volumes/frus1981-88v13.xml new file mode 100644 index 000000000..8b955f63f --- /dev/null +++ b/volumes/frus1981-88v13.xml @@ -0,0 +1,56915 @@ + + + + + + + + Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume + XIII, Conflict in the South Atlantic, 1981–1984 + Foreign Relations of the United States + 1981–1988 + Volume XIII + Conflict in the South Atlantic, 1981–1984 + Alexander R. Wieland + Adam M. Howard + + + + United States Government Publishing Office + Washington + 2015 + frus1981-88v13 + + + +

Released in 2015 as printed book.

+ + + + + + + + + + Foreign Relations of the United States + 1981–1988 + Volume XIII + Conflict in the South Atlantic, + 1981–1984 + + Editor: Alexander R. Wieland + General Editor: Adam M. Howard + + United States Government Publishing Office + Washington + 2015 + DEPARTMENT OF STATE Office of the Historian Bureau of Public Affairs For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, + U.S. Government Publishing Office Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free + (866) 512-1800; DC area (202) 512-1800 Fax: (202) 512-2250 Mail: Stop IDCC, + Washington, DC 20402-0001 + + +
+ + About the Series +

The Foreign Relations of the United States series presents + the official documentary historical record of major foreign policy decisions and + significant diplomatic activity of the U.S. Government. The Historian of the + Department of State is charged with the responsibility for the preparation of + the Foreign Relations series. The staff of the Office of + the Historian, Bureau of Public Affairs, under the direction of the General + Editor of the Foreign Relations series, plans, + researches, compiles, and edits the volumes in the series. Secretary of State + Frank B. Kellogg first promulgated official regulations codifying specific + standards for the selection and editing of documents for the series on March 26, + 1925. These regulations, with minor modifications, guided the series through + 1991.

+

Public Law 102–138, the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, established a new + statutory charter for the preparation of the series which was signed by + President George H.W. Bush on October + 28, 1991. Section 198 of P.L. 102–138 added a new Title IV to the Department of + State’s Basic Authorities Act of 1956 (22 U.S.C. 4351, et seq.).

+

The statute requires that the Foreign Relations series be + a thorough, accurate, and reliable record of major U.S. foreign policy decisions + and significant U.S. diplomatic activity. The volumes of the series should + include all records needed to provide comprehensive documentation of major + foreign policy decisions and actions of the U.S. Government. The statute also + confirms the editing principles established by Secretary Kellogg: the Foreign Relations series is guided by the principles of + historical objectivity and accuracy; records should not be altered or deletions + made without indicating in the published text that a deletion has been made; the + published record should omit no facts that were of major importance in reaching + a decision; and nothing should be omitted for the purposes of concealing a + defect in policy. The statute also requires that the Foreign + Relations series be published not more than 30 years after the events + recorded. The editors are convinced that this volume meets all regulatory, + statutory, and scholarly standards of selection and editing.

+

Sources for the Foreign Relations + Series

+

The Foreign Relations statute requires that the published + record in the Foreign Relations series include all + records needed to provide comprehensive documentation of major U.S. foreign + policy decisions and significant U.S. diplomatic activity. It further requires + that government agencies, departments, and other entities of the U.S. Government + engaged in foreign policy + formulation, execution, or support cooperate with the Department of State + historians by providing full and complete access to records pertinent to foreign + policy decisions and actions and by providing copies of selected records. Most + of the sources consulted in the preparation of this volume have been + declassified and are available for review at the National Archives and Records + Administration (Archives II) in College Park, Maryland.

+

The editors of the Foreign Relations series have complete + access to all the retired records and papers of the Department of State: the + central files of the Department; the special decentralized files (“lot files”) + of the Department at the bureau, office, and division levels; the files of the + Department’s Executive Secretariat, which contain the records of international + conferences and high-level official visits, correspondence with foreign leaders + by the President and Secretary of State, and the memoranda of conversations + between the President and the Secretary of State and foreign officials; and the + files of overseas diplomatic posts. The records that constitute the Department’s + central files for 1981–1989, which were stored in electronic and microfilm + formats, will eventually be transferred to the National Archives. Once these + files are declassified and processed, they will be accessible. All of the + Department’s decentralized office files from this period that the National + Archives deems worthy of permanent preservation will also eventually be + transferred to the National Archives where they will be available for use after + declassification and processing.

+

Research for Foreign Relations volumes is undertaken + through special access to restricted documents at the Ronald Reagan Presidential Library and other + agencies. While all the material printed in this volume has been declassified, + some of it is extracted from still-classified documents. The staff of the Reagan + Library is processing and declassifying many of the documents used in this + volume, but they may not be available in their entirety at the time of + publication. Presidential papers maintained and preserved at the Reagan Library + include some of the most significant foreign affairs related documentation from + White House offices, the Department of State, and other federal agencies + including the National Security Council, the Central Intelligence Agency, the + Department of Defense, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

+

Some of the research for volumes in this subseries was done in Reagan Library + record collections scanned for the Remote Archive Capture (RAC) project. This + project, which is administered by the National Archives and Records + Administration’s Office of Presidential Libraries, was designed to coordinate + the declassification of still-classified records held in various Presidential + libraries. As a result of the way in which records were scanned for the RAC, the + editors of the Foreign Relations series were not always + able to determine whether attachments to a + given document were in fact attached to the paper copy of the document in the + Reagan Library file. In such cases, some editors of the + Foreign Relations series have indicated this ambiguity by stating that + the attachments were “Not found attached.”

+

Editorial Methodology

+

The documents are presented chronologically according to time in Washington, DC. + Memoranda of conversation are placed according to the time and date of the + conversation, rather than the date the memorandum was drafted.

+

Editorial treatment of the documents published in the Foreign + Relations series follows Office style guidelines, supplemented by + guidance from the General Editor and the Chief of the Declassification and + Publishing Division. The original document is reproduced as exactly as possible, + including marginalia or other notations, which are described in the footnotes. + Texts are transcribed and printed according to accepted conventions for the + publication of historical documents within the limitations of modern typography. + A heading has been supplied by the editors for each document included in the + volume. Spelling, capitalization, and punctuation are retained as found in the + original text, except that obvious typographical errors are silently corrected. + Other mistakes and omissions in the documents are corrected by bracketed + insertions: a correction is set in italic type; an addition in roman type. Words + or phrases underlined in the original document are printed in italics. + Abbreviations and contractions are preserved as found in the original text, and + a list of abbreviations and terms is included in the front matter of each + volume. In telegrams, the telegram number (including special designators such as + Secto) is printed at the start of the + text of the telegram.

+

Bracketed insertions are also used to indicate omitted text that deals with an + unrelated subject (in roman type) or that remains classified after + declassification review (in italic type).

+

The amount and, where possible, the nature of the material not declassified has + been noted by indicating the number of lines or pages of text that were omitted. + Entire documents withheld after declassification review have been accounted for + and are listed in their chronological place with headings, source notes, and the + number of pages not declassified.

+

All brackets that appear in the original document are so identified in the + footnotes. All ellipses are in the original documents.

+

The first footnote to each document indicates the sources of the document and its + original classification, distribution, and drafting information. This note also + provides the background of important documents and policies and indicates whether the President or his major policy + advisers read the document.

+

Editorial notes and additional annotation summarize pertinent material not + printed in the volume, indicate the location of additional documentary sources, + provide references to important related documents printed in other volumes, + describe key events, and provide summaries of and citations to public statements + that supplement and elucidate the printed documents. Information derived from + memoirs and other first-hand accounts has been used when appropriate to + supplement or explicate the official record.

+

The numbers in the index refer to document numbers rather than to page + numbers.

+

Advisory Committee on Historical Diplomatic + Documentation

+

The Advisory Committee on Historical Diplomatic Documentation, established under + the Foreign Relations statute, monitors the overall + compilation and editorial process of the series and advises on all aspects of + the preparation of the series and declassification of records. The Advisory + Committee does not necessarily review the contents of individual volumes in the + series, but it makes recommendations on issues that come to its attention and + reviews volumes as it deems necessary to fulfill its advisory and statutory + obligations.

+

Declassification Review

+

The Office of Information Programs and Services, Bureau of Administration, + conducted the declassification review for the Department of State of the + documents published in this volume. The review was conducted in accordance with + the standards set forth in Executive Order 13526 on Classified National Security + Information and applicable laws.

+

The principle guiding declassification review is to release all information, + subject only to the current requirements of national security as embodied in law + and regulation. Declassification decisions entailed concurrence of the + appropriate geographic and functional bureaus in the Department of State, other + concerned agencies of the U.S. Government, and the appropriate foreign + governments regarding specific documents of those governments. The + declassification review of this volume, which began in 2013 and was completed in + 2015, resulted in the decision to withhold 5 documents in full, excise a + paragraph or more in 9 documents, and make minor excisions of less than a + paragraph in 42 documents.

+

The Office of the Historian is confident, on the basis of the research conducted + in preparing this volume and as a result of the declassification review process + described above, that the documentation and editorial notes presented here provide a thorough, accurate, and + reliable record of the Reagan + administration’s policy toward the conflict in the South Atlantic.

+ + Adam M. Howard, Ph.D. + General Editor + + Stephen P. Randolph, Ph.D. + The Historian + Bureau of Public Affairs + December 2015 + + + +
+ +
+ + Preface +

Structure and Scope of the Foreign + Relations Series

+

This volume is part of a subseries of volumes of the Foreign + Relations series that documents the most important issues in the + foreign policy of the administration of Ronald + Reagan. This volume addresses the administration’s response to + the crisis and 1982 war between Argentina and the United Kingdom over the South + Atlantic island territories of the Falkland Islands/Islas Malvinas,Please note that the naming convention in editorial + matter for this geographic area reflects Department of State policy at the + time of compilation in 2011; it does not reflect the naming convention in + 2015, Falkland (Malvinas) Islands. South Georgia, and the South + Sandwich Islands. It charts the development of the Anglo-Argentine sovereignty + dispute which, from the U.S. perspective, was transformed by the Argentine + landings on the Falklands/Malvinas and South Georgia in March–April 1982 from a + persistent, though peripheral, boundary issue to a formidable diplomatic + challenge, with geopolitical implications that threatened to transcend the + narrow geography of the South Atlantic. This violent clash between a powerful, + if problematic, regional partner and one of the United States’s closest allies, + prompted a further clash within the U.S. foreign policymaking establishment as + administration officials balanced the costs of the conflict for U.S. interests + in the Western Hemisphere against the risks of undermining the Western Alliance. + The volume documents the intense diplomatic efforts, undertaken largely by + Secretary of State Alexander M. Haig, + Jr., to broker a peaceful resolution to the conflict before it + escalated further and, when these proved unsuccessful, to manage the outcome of + the war and limit its damage to U.S. political and economic interests.

+

The first part of the volume covers the slowly increasing involvement of the + United States in the months leading up to the war. Following a brief series of + documents that illustrate both the background of the Anglo-Argentine sovereignty + dispute, as well as U.S. attitudes toward the issue on the eve of the Reagan years, Chapter 1 opens with the + beginning of a fresh round of talks between Argentina and the United Kingdom + regarding the future of the Falklands/Malvinas in February 1981. The + inconclusive course of negotiations over the next 14 months forms the backdrop + for the rapid emergence and escalation of tensions in the weeks prior to the + war, marked by the mounting crisis over the Argentine presence in South Georgia, + ominous signs of wider Argentine military + action, and the Reagan administration’s + unsuccessful efforts to prevent hostilities.

+

The volume then turns to the April–June 1982 war itself. Chapter 2 covers the + first month of the conflict, which centers around Haig’s “shuttle diplomacy” mission between London and Buenos + Aires, in which the Secretary of State attempted to broker a negotiated + settlement to the dispute, and culminates in the administration’s public “tilt” + toward the British position on April 30 when a settlement proved elusive. + Chapter 3 deals with the final 6 weeks of the war and documents not only the + political and military support given by the United States to the British and the + implementation of U.S. sanctions against Argentina which followed the April 30 + announcement, but also the United States’s continued diplomatic efforts to limit + the scope of the fighting and its political consequences. Lastly, Chapter 4 + looks at the war’s aftermath and the U.S. perception of its impact, U.S. postwar + relations with the belligerents, and the conflict’s damaging effect on + U.S.-Latin American relations. This portion of the volume examines the + significant influence exerted by the lingering Falklands/Malvinas sovereignty + dispute, and the perceived need to accommodate British sensitivities in + particular, upon the Reagan + administration’s attempts to normalize political, economic, and military + relations with Argentina between the end of the war and the re-establishment of + civilian government in December 1983.

+

Readers interested in the way in which the Reagan administration’s approach to the Anglo-Argentine conflict + in the South Atlantic fit into the broader continuum of its bilateral + relationship with Argentina, particularly its prewar rapprochement with the + ruling Junta, and its wider policy in South America should read Foreign Relations, 1981–1988, + Volume XVI, South America; Latin America Region, alongside this + compilation. For the administration’s policies in Central America and the + Caribbean during the first term, researchers should consult Foreign Relations, 1981–1988, + Volume XIV, Central America, 1981–1984; Foreign Relations, 1981–1988, Volume XVII, Part + 1, Mexico; Western Caribbean, and Foreign Relations, 1981–1988, Volume XVII, Part 2, + Eastern Caribbean. Similarly, those seeking the broader context of + Anglo-American relations and U.S. strategic relations with the Western Alliance + during Reagan’s first term should + consult Foreign Relations, + 1981–1988, Volume VII, Western Europe, 1981–1984 and Foreign Relations, 1977–1980, + Volume V, European Security, 1977–1983, respectively.

+

Focus of Research and Principles of Selection for Foreign Relations, 1977–1980, + Volume XIII +

+

As a crisis volume, this compilation is tightly focused on the events surrounding + the April–June 1982 Anglo-Argentine war in the South Atlantic and the political, economic, diplomatic, and military + responses of the U.S. Government to that conflict. For the administration of + Ronald Reagan (and, indeed, for the + administrations that preceded his), the longstanding sovereignty dispute between + Argentina and the United Kingdom in the South Atlantic was, prior to the spring + of 1982, a matter of peripheral interest, an issue toward which the United + States had traditionally maintained a neutral stance. However, with the rapid + increase of tensions between the two countries beginning in March 1982, followed + by the landing of Argentine forces and the expulsion of British authorities from + the Falklands/Malvinas, the South Atlantic took hold of the attention of U.S. + policymakers at the highest level. The ways in which the Reagan foreign + policymaking establishment attempted to meet this challenge, and was often + divided by it, are at the heart of this volume. If allowed to escalate, + administration officials reasoned, the South Atlantic conflict threatened U.S. + relationships with the belligerents, relationships that the United States judged + important to geopolitical interests not only in the Western Hemisphere but also + in Europe. The conflict also carried explicit Cold War dimensions, providing an + opportunity for the Soviet Union or Cuba to exploit the situation and broaden + its influence.

+

In the documentary record, the development of U.S. policy throughout the crisis + bears the heaviest, most visible influence of Secretary of State Alexander M. Haig, Jr., and Secretary of + Defense Caspar W. Weinberger. Following + the April 7 decision of the National Security Planning Group to send Haig to London and Buenos Aires, he was given + primary responsibility for achieving a negotiated settlement between the two + sides. In the weeks that followed, Haig + shuttled between the two capitals almost constantly, cabling regularly with the + White House on the progress of negotiations. Memoranda of conversation of + Haig’s meetings with British and + Argentine officials, including those with British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher and Argentine President + General Leopoldo Galtieri, were kept by + the Secretary’s party but do not appear to have been given wide distribution. + These documents illustrate vividly the extent to which Haig sought to press the two sides to come to + terms. Haig’s central role in shaping + U.S. policy is also clearly displayed in the numerous action memoranda presented + for his decision, documents which he frequently annotated extensively with his + own observations. In addition, the reader will note the large number of + documents printed from the Office of the Secretary of Defense files. From the + beginning of the crisis, Secretary Weinberger was a prominent, forceful advocate for the British + position. Following the U.S. Government’s April 30 announced “tilt” toward the + United Kingdom, Weinberger assumed a + central role in personally approving a wide range of British requests for + military assistance, reflected in the series of decision memoranda printed in + this volume.

+ +

As compared with the Departments of State and Defense, the role of the National + Security Council in the decisionmaking process during the South Atlantic crisis + was less pronounced. In contrast with previous administrations, the NSC occupied a less central place in foreign + policymaking at the start of the Reagan + years, reflective, in part, of the administration’s early enthusiasm for a + decentralized policymaking process. Moreover, assessment of the impact of the + NSC on the development of U.S. policy + during the South Atlantic conflict is hampered by the apparent idiosyncrasies of + the institution’s recordkeeping at the time. William P. Clark, Reagan’s Assistant for National Security Affairs in the spring of + 1982, was a close confidante of the President, but few of his personal + interactions with Reagan during this + period, such as Clark’s daily national + security briefings, made their way into the documentary record. Similarly, + NSC Staff members Dennis Blair, Roger Fontaine, and James + Rentschler regularly forwarded numerous memoranda to Clark for the latter’s action throughout the + South Atlantic war; few copies in NSC files, + however, bear indication of decisions + Clark may have rendered based upon + these documents.

+

Documenting the role of Reagan himself is + inhibited by similar constraints. While briefed by his Cabinet officials on + their activities, few of Reagan’s own + views on the situation appear in the documentary record. Unlike some of his + predecessors, Reagan rarely wrote on the + documents he was given. The President’s thoughts or actions regarding the issues + presented were usually recorded (if they were recorded at all) in notes written + later by someone on the White House staff. Indeed, Reagan’s “voice” in U.S. policymaking is displayed most directly + in the records of meetings with advisers (where an official record was kept) and + in his communications, including both written correspondence and telephone + conversations, with Galtieri and + Thatcher. Reagan maintained a regular written + correspondence with Thatcher throughout + the crisis; moreover, he personally intervened with both leaders at several + junctures with the intent of convincing them to moderate their actions, + beginning with his unsuccessful April 1, 1982, attempt (undertaken at British + request) to convince Galtieri to halt + Argentine offensive operations on the Falklands/Malvinas before they began. In + most cases, these interactions were documented in official memoranda of + conversation; in all cases, Reagan was + provided with a detailed set of talking points by his advisers beforehand, + guidance the President appears to have followed closely.

+

Acknowledgments

+

The editor wishes to thank officials at the Ronald Reagan Presidential Library, + especially Mike Dugan, Sherrie Fletcher, Lisa Jones, and Cate Sewell. Thanks are + also due to the Central Intelligence Agency for arranging access to the Reagan + Library materials scanned for the Remote Archives Capture declassification project. The History Staff of the + Center for the Study of Intelligence of the Central Intelligence Agency was + accommodating in arranging full access to the files of the Central Intelligence + Agency, and Sandy Meagher was helpful in providing access to the Department of + Defense materials. The editor also thanks the staff at the National Archives and + Records Administration facility in College Park, Maryland, for their valuable + assistance. Lastly, the editor wishes to extend special thanks to the families + and executors of the Estates of former Secretary of State Alexander M. Haig, Jr., and former Secretary + of Defense Caspar W. Weinberger for + granting Department of State historians access to the personal papers of + Secretaries Haig and Weinberger deposited at the Library of + Congress. Additional thanks are due to officials of the Library of Congress + Manuscript Division for facilitating that access.

+

Alexander R. Wieland collected, selected, and edited the documentation for this + volume under the supervision of Adam M. Howard, the General Editor of the Foreign Relations series. The volume was reviewed by + Kristin Ahlberg, Assistant to the General Editor of the Foreign Relations series, and Stephen Randolph, Historian of the + Department of State. Chris Tudda coordinated the final declassification review + under Carl Ashley, Chief of the Declassification Division. Mandy A. Chalou, + Stephanie Eckroth, Heather McDaniel, and Rita + Baker performed the copy and technical editing. Do Mi Stauber, + Inc., prepared the index.

+ + Alexander R. Wieland + Historian + + + +
+ +
+ + Contents + + + About the Series + III + + + Preface + IX + + + Sources + XVII + + + Abbreviations and Terms + XXV + + + Persons + XXXV + + + Conflict in the South Atlantic, 1981–1984 + + + Prelude to the Conflict, May 1979–April 1, + 1982 + 1 + + + Seeking a Negotiated Settlement, April 2–April + 30, 1982 + 75 + + + Managing the Conflict, May 1–June 15, 1982 + 431 + + + Postwar, June 15, 1982–November 6, 1984 + 704 + + Index + 925 + + + + + +
+ +
+ + Sources +

Sources for Foreign Relations, + 1981–1988, Volume XIII, Conflict in the South Atlantic, 1981–1984

+

This volume documents the development of U.S. policy toward the Anglo-Argentine + sovereignty dispute in the Southern Atlantic Ocean, centered upon the island + territories and adjacent waters of the Falkland Islands/Islas Malvinas, South + Georgia, and the South Sandwich Islands, during the first administration of + President Ronald Reagan. While the + volume’s main narrative tracks the Reagan administration’s handling of the crisis sparked by the + outbreak of war in the South Atlantic between Argentina and the United Kingdom + in April–June 1982, the volume also seeks to contextualize these actions by + documenting U.S. officials’ prewar attitudes toward the dispute and the abortive + negotiations between the Argentine and British Governments that predated + hostilities, as well as the U.S. assessment of the postwar balance between the + belligerents, the conflict’s impact on wider U.S. interests in the Western + Hemisphere and Europe, and attempts to encourage a lasting diplomatic settlement + after June 1982. Moreover, the final chapter of the compilation illustrates the + significant influence exerted by the lingering sovereignty dispute, and the + perceived need to accommodate British sensitivities in particular, upon the + Reagan administration’s attempts to + normalize political, economic, and military relations with Argentina between the + end of the 1982 war and the re-establishment of civilian government in December + 1983. The purpose of this access guide is twofold: to inform the reader where to + locate the most relevant source material related to these issues and to assess + the role played by these collections in the construction of this + compilation.

+

As with any subject relating to U.S. foreign policy during the Reagan years, researchers seeking to document + the administration’s attempts to respond to the crisis and war between Argentina + and the United Kingdom the South Atlantic, its prelude and its aftermath, along + with the often-thorny interdepartmental debates within the policymaking + establishment that accompanied U.S. decisionmaking, would be well-served to + begin their work at the Ronald Reagan Presidential Library in Simi Valley, + California. Although the National Security Council did not hold the same + dominant position in U.S. foreign policymaking at the start of Reagan’s first term that it had held during + the 1970s, reflective of the administration’s initial enthusiasm for + decentralized bureaucracy, the files of the NSC’s Executive Secretariat serve as an important central repository for many of the key policy documents + relating to the South Atlantic conflict. Within the Executive Secretariat files, + two collections, the Country File and Cable File, were integral for this + compilation. Organized geographically by region, the Country File offers + substantial documentation not only relating to bilateral relations with + Argentina and the United Kingdom, including memoranda, telephone conversations, + and reporting cables, but also several folders of material devoted specifically + to the course of the war itself. Similarly, the Cable File contains a separate + “Falkland File,” a voluminous series of telegrams produced during the 1982 + Anglo-Argentine war by the Department of State, the Department of Defense, and + other U.S. Government agencies, and collected by the White House Situation Room.

+

Beginning in 1983, the NSC Executive Secretariat + was replaced and the NSC Staff was reorganized + into geographic directorates. Therefore, researchers interested in documentation + relating to the postwar situation in the region; the impact of the British + victory on Anglo-American relations, U.S.-Latin American relations, and the + transition to civilian rule in Argentina; and the continuation of the + sovereignty dispute in the United Nations and Organization of American States, + should consult the files of the Latin American Affairs Directorate (which also + contains significant additional documentation from the 1982 war) and the + European and Soviet Affairs Directorate. Lastly, any documentary record of the + Reagan administration’s policy + toward the South Atlantic conflict, and the role of the National Security + Council in shaping it, would be incomplete without research in the office files + of several key individuals, most notably the President’s Assistant for National + Security Affairs, William P. Clark, and + NSC Staff members Dennis Blair, Roger Fontaine, and James + Rentschler.

+

While the Reagan Library holdings provide a solid foundation for reconstructing + the documentary record of the Reagan + administration’s policy toward the Anglo-Argentine dispute, it would be + impossible to construct a complete picture of U.S. diplomacy, especially during + the April–June 1982 war, without the files of the Department of State and + Department of Defense. Both sets of records include vital documentation, + including action memoranda and memoranda of conversation with Argentine and + British officials, not found elsewhere. As the source notes in this compilation + indicate, the Department of State’s Central Foreign Policy File and + institutional Lot Files are enormously rich resources for illustrating the + central role of the Department in general, and of Secretary of State Alexander M. Haig, Jr., in particular, in + shaping and executing the administration’s attempt to achieve a negotiated + settlement to the conflict following the Argentine landing on the + Falklands/Malvinas on April 2, 1982. For documenting Secretary Haig’s + diplomatic “shuttle” between Washington, London, and Buenos Aires, three Lot + Files—82D370, 83D210, and 89D213—are indispensable. These lots contain not only + multiple draft versions of the settlement agreement Haig unsuccessfully sought to broker between the two sides in + multiple rounds of intense bilateral discussions, but also verbatim memoranda of + conversation of Haig’s exchanges with + British Prime Minister Margaret + Thatcher, Argentine President General Leopoldo Galtieri, and other officials of the British and + Argentine Governments, documents which do not appear in any other collection. + Moreover, these lots provide valuable documentation on diplomatic initiatives + undertaken after the administration’s public “tilt” toward the British side in + late April, most notably records of discussions concerning the Peruvian peace + initiative and reports of Ambassador-at-Large Vernon Walters’s meetings with the Argentine Junta in May 1982, + copies of which are also not readily available elsewhere.

+

Like Haig, Secretary of Defense Caspar W. Weinberger exerted considerable + influence on the administration’s diplomatic course. An early and consistent + supporter of the British position, Secretary Weinberger advocated for the full weight of U.S. political and + military resources to be placed behind the Thatcher government. To capture the dimensions of Weinberger’s viewpoint, its scope and depth, + Department of Defense records are essential. As with Department of State lot + files, the official records of the Office of the Secretary of Defense contain + many types of documentation, including memoranda of conversation and reports on + the military situation produced by U.S. defense attachés, not generally found in + other agencies’ files. Also unique to Defense files are many of the documents + dealing with U.S. military aid to the British, including most of the relevant + signed action memoranda presented to Weinberger.

+

Numerous other collections also yielded important documentation for this volume. + The files of the Central Intelligence Agency provided critical meeting minutes, + assessments, and analyses of the political and military situation in the South + Atlantic. The files of Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman General David Jones were also useful in rounding out + the U.S. military’s view of the Anglo-Argentine war.

+

This documentation has been made available for use in the Foreign Relations series thanks to the consent of the agencies + mentioned, the assistance of their staffs, and, especially, the cooperation of + the NatioGeneral David Jonesnal Archives + and Records Administration. In addition, with the kind permission of the + respective Estates of Secretaries Haig + and Weinberger and with the assistance + of the staff of the Manuscript Division of the Library of Congress, special + access was granted Department of State historians to the Secretaries’ personal + papers, which remain closed to the public. These papers contain a wealth of + unique documentation which does not + appear in official files, including handwritten notes, meeting minutes, and + annotated documents, which contribute significantly to our understanding of the + central roles played by Secretaries Haig + and Weinberger in shaping the Reagan administration’s approach to the South + Atlantic conflict. Without these, this volume would have been incomplete.

+

In addition to the paper files cited below, a growing number of documents are + available on the Internet. The Office of the Historian maintains a list of these + Internet resources on its website and encourages readers to consult that site on + a regular basis.

+

Unpublished Sources

+ + Department of State + Central Foreign Policy File + + Lot Files + Lot 89D489: Bureau of European Affairs, United Kingdom + Political Files + Lot 90D400: Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, + Falklands/Malvinas Files of Luigi Einaudi + Lot 86D157: Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs, Falklands + Crisis Historical Files + Lot 83D210: Under Secretary of State for Political + Affairs, Miscellaneous Files, March 1981–February 1983 + Executive Secretariat + Lot 82D370: Executive Secretariat, Files of + Alexander M. Haig, Jr., 1981–1982 + Lot 83D288: Executive Secretariat, Very Sensitive + Correspondence Files of Alexander M. Haig, Jr., + 1981–1982 + Lot 84D204: Executive Secretariat, Files of + Lawrence S. Eagleburger, 1967–1984 + Lot 87D327: Executive Secretariat, Secretary + Shultz Memoranda of Conversation + Lot 89D213: Executive Secretariat, Files of + Ambassador-at-Large Vernon A. Walters, + 1981–1985 + Lot 96D262: Executive Secretariat, S/S Special Handling + Restrictions Memos, 1979–1983 + Lot 12D215: Executive Secretariat, Top Secret + Hardcopy Telegrams + + + + + + + National Archives and Records Administration, College Park, Maryland + RG 218, Files of the Joint Chiefs of Staff + + FRC 218–92–0030: Official Files of Chairman of the Joint + Chiefs of Staff General David Jones, June 1978–June + 1982 + + + + Ronald Reagan Presidential Library, Simi Valley, California + White House Staff and Office Files + Files of the Executive Secretariat, National + Security Council + Agency File + Cable File + Falkland File + + + Country File + Europe and Soviet Union + Latin America/Central + + + Head of State File + Meeting File + National Security Decision Directives (NSDD) + File + National Security Planning Group (NSPG) File + National Security Study Directives (NSSD) + File + Subject File + VIP Visits File + + + Files of the European and Soviet Affairs + Directorate, National Security Council + Files of the Latin American Affairs Directorate, + National Security Council + Files of the Political Affairs Directorate, + National Security Council + Files of the Situation Room, White House + Dennis C. Blair Files + William P. Clark Files + Roger W. Fontaine Files + David Gergen Files + Oliver North Files + + + Papers of George P. Shultz + President’s Daily Diary + + + Central Intelligence Agency + National Intelligence Council + Job 83B01027R: Policy Files (1978–1982) + Job 83T00966R: Chronological Files (1982) + + + Office of the Deputy Director for Intelligence + Job 83T00966R: Chronological Files (1982) + Office of the Director of Central + Intelligence + Job 83M00914R: EXDIR and Executive Registry Files + (1982) + Job 84B00049R: Subject Files (1981–1982) + Job 88B00443R: Policy Files (1980–1986) + Job 89B00224R: Committees, Task Forces, Boards, + and Councils Files + + + Office of Russian and European Analysis, Directorate of + Intelligence + Job 01T02211R: Intelligence Publication + File—Record Copy of Finished Intelligence + Pubs + + Office of Support Services, Directorate of + Intelligence + Job 83B00225R: Production Case Files (1982) + Job 83B00228R: Production Case Files (1982) + Job 84T01067R: Production Case Files + (’81–’82) + + + Office of Security + Job 87T00623R: Policy Files (1973–1986) + Job 95B00915R: Leak Data Base Files (1976–1991) + + + History Staff Files + + + Washington National Records Center, Suitland, Maryland + RG 330, Records of the Department of + Defense + + FRC 330–84–0003: 1982 Official Files of the Office of the + Secretary of Defense and Deputy Secretary of Defense + FRC 330–84–0004: 1982 Official Files of the Office of the + Secretary of Defense and Deputy Secretary of Defense + FRC 330–86–0042: 1982 Official Files of the Office of the + Secretary of Defense and Deputy Secretary of Defense + FRC 330–87–0067: Official Files of the Under Secretary of + Defense for Policy + + + National Security Council + National Security Council Institutional Files + + + Library of Congress + Manuscript Division + Papers of Alexander M. Haig, Jr. Department of + State Files + Papers of Caspar W. Weinberger Department of + Defense Files + + + + + + + +

Published Sources

+ Congress and the Nation, Volume IV, 1981–1984. Washington: Congressional Quarterly, 1985. + Freedman, Sir Lawrence. The Official History of the Falklands + Campaign, Volume I: The Origins of the Falklands + War. London: Routledge, 2005. + ______. The Official History of the Falklands Campaign, + Volume II: War and Diplomacy. London: Routledge, + 2005. + Haig, Alexander M., Jr. Caveat: Realism, Reagan, and Foreign + Policy. New York: Macmillan, 1984. + Henderson, Nicholas. Mandarin: The Diaries of Nicholas + Henderson. London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1994. + New York Times + Reagan, Ronald W. Diaries: Volume I, January 1981–October 1985. Unabridged edition. New York: Harper, + 2009. + Rentschler, James M. A Reason to Get Up in the Morning: A Cold + Warrior Remembers. Estate of James M. Rentschler, 2008. (Self-published + memoir) + + ______. “Falklands Diary: 1 April–25 June 1982,” Margaret Thatcher + Foundation. + Shultz, George P. Turmoil and Triumph: My Years as Secretary of + State. New York: Scribner’s, 1993. + Thatcher, Margaret. The Downing Street Years. New York: + HarperCollins, 1993. + United Nations. Yearbook of the United Nations, 1982, 1983, + 1984. + United States. Department of State. American Foreign Policy: + Current Documents, 1981, 1982, 1983, 1984. Washington: U.S. Government + Printing Office, 1984–1986. + ______. Department of State. Bulletin, 1981–1984. + ______. National Archives and Records Administration. Public + Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Ronald Reagan, 1981, 1982, + 1983, 1984. Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1982–1986. + Washington Post + Weinberger, Caspar. Fighting for Peace: Seven Critical Years at the Pentagon. New York: + Warner Books, 1990. + + +
+ +
+ + Abbreviations and Terms + + + + A–3, U.S. + carrier-capable strategic bomber (Skywarrior) + A–4, U.S. + carrier-capable attack aircraft (Skyhawk) + AAF, + Argentine Air Force + AAW, + anti-aircraft warfare + ABC, American + Broadcasting Company + ACDA, Arms + Control and Disarmament Agency + Adm, + Admiral + AEW, airborne + early warning + AF, + airfield + AF #1, Air + Force One + AFB, Air + Force Base + AFCP, Air + Force Command Post + AFLC, Air + Force Logistics Command + AGI, + auxiliary general intelligence (reconnaissance ship) + AIM 9–L, AIM 9–M, U.S. air-to-air + missile variants (Sidewinder) + ALCON, all + concerned + AmCit(s), + American citizen(s) + AMH, + Alexander M. Haig, Jr. + ARA, Bureau + of Inter-American Affairs, Department of State + ARA/BR, + Office of Brazilian Affairs, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, + Department of State + ARA/CAR, + Office of Caribbean Affairs, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, + Department of State + ARA/CEN, + Office of Central American Affairs, Bureau of Inter-American + Affairs, Department of State + ARA/ECP, + Office of Regional Economic Policy, Bureau of Inter-American + Affairs, Department of State + ARA/PPC, + Office of Policy Planning Coordination, Bureau of Inter-American + Affairs, Department of State + ARA/RPP, + Office of Regional Political Programs, Bureau of Inter-American + Affairs, Department of State + ARA/SC, + Office of Southern Cone Affairs, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, + Department of State + ARA/USOAS, U.S. Mission to the Organization of + American States + ARGNAV, + Argentine Navy + ARMA, Army + Attaché + Arg., + Argentine; Argentina + ASAP, as + soon as possible + ASD, + Assistant Secretary of Defense + ASSTSECSTATE, Assistant Secretary of + State + ASW, + anti-submarine warfare + avail, + available + AWACS, + Airborne Warning and Control System + AWG–10, + U.S. radar system + + + B–52, U.S. + long-range strategic bomber + BA, Buenos + Aires + + Backfire, Soviet long-range strategic bomber + BAF, + Brazilian Air Force + BAOR, + British Army of the Rhine + Bear, Soviet + long-range strategic bomber + BGEN, + Brigadier General + bldg, + building + + + C3, command, control, + communications + C–130, U.S. + military transport aircraft + CBI, + Caribbean Basin Initiative + CGT, + Confederación Generale del Trabajo (General + Confederation of Labor, Argentine trade union federation) + CIA, Central + Intelligence Agency + CINC, + Commander in Chief + CINCARGNAV, Commander in Chief, Argentine + Navy + CINCLANT, Commander in Chief, Atlantic Command + CINCMAC, + Commander in Chief, Military Airlift Command + CINCPAC, + Commander in Chief, Pacific Command + CINCSAC, + Commander in Chief, Strategic Air Command + CINCUSAFE, Commander in Chief, United States Air + Force, Europe + CINCUSNAVEUR, Commander in Chief, United States + Navy, Europe + CM, (Nicanor) + Costa Méndez + CMC, + Commandant of the Marine Corps + cmts, + comments + CNO, Chief of + Naval Operations + CNS, Chief of + Naval Staff (UK) + COB, close of + business + COCOM, + Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls + COIC, Combat + Operations Intelligence Center (USAFE) + COIN, + counterinsurgency + COMDR, + COM, Commander + comm, + communications + COMNAVINTCOM, Commander, Naval Intelligence + Command + COMNAVSUPSYSCOM, Commander, Naval Supply + Systems Command + COMSAT, + communications satellite + COMSC, + Commander, Military Sealift Command + CONUS, + continental United States + CPPG, Crisis + Pre-Planning Group + ctry, + country + CV, carrier + variant (able to operate from aircraft carriers) (USN) + CVBG, + carrier battle group (USN) + CVS, + anti-submarine aircraft carrier (USN) + CW, CWW, + Caspar W. Weinberger + + + DAO, Defense + Attaché’s Office + DAP, Defense + Attaché Program + DASD, Deputy + Assistant Secretary of Defense + DASD/IA, + Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, Inter-American Affairs + DCA, Defense + Communications Agency + DD/FF, + destroyer/fast frigate (USN) + DDO + (NMCC), Deputy Director of Operations (National + Military Command Center) + DefMin, + Defense Minister + DepSec, + Deputy Secretary + Dept, + Department + + DIA, Defense + Intelligence Agency + DIRLAUTH, Direct Liaison Authorized + dist, + distribution + DMA, Defense + Mapping Agency + DOD, + Department of Defense + DOD/DSAA, + Defense Security Assistance Agency, Department of Defense + DOD/ISA/IA, + Inter-American Affairs, International Security Affairs, Department + of Defense + DOI, date of + information + DOS, + Department of State + DRB, Defense + Resources Board + DSAA, + Defense Security Assistance Agency + DSCS, + Defense Satellite Communication System + DTG, + date-time-group + + + E–2B, U.S. + carrier-capable tactical airborne early warning aircraft + E&E, + emergency and evacuation + EB, Bureau of + Economic and Business Affairs, Department of State + EB/IFD/ODF, Office of Development Finance, Bureau + of Economic and Business Affairs, Department of State + EB/OMA, + Office of Monetary Affairs, Bureau of Economic and Business Affairs, + Department of State + EC, European + Community + ECM, + electronic countermeasures + EDT, Eastern + Daylight Time + ELINT, + electronic intelligence + EmbOff, + Embassy Officer + ES, Executive + Secretariat + EST, Eastern + Standard Time + EUR, Bureau + of European Affairs, Department of State + EUR/NE, + Office of Northern European Affairs, Bureau of European Affairs, + Department of State + EUR/NE/UKB, United Kingdom Affairs, Office of + Northern European Affairs, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of + State + EW, early + warning; electronic warfate + Exdis, + exclusive distribution + Eximbank, + Exim, Export-Import Bank of the United + States + Exocet, + French anti-ship missile + + + F–4, U.S. + interceptor aircraft/fighter bomber + F–15, U.S. + tactical fighter aircraft + FA, Falklands + Islands + FAA, Federal + Aviation Administration + FAB, Fuerza + Aerea Brasileira (Brazilian Air Force) + FBIS, + Foreign Broadcast Information Service + FCO, Foreign + and Commonwealth Office (UK) + v, + Field Intelligence Center—Europe and Atlantic (USN) + FLTCINC, + Fleet Commander in Chief + FM, Foreign + Ministry; Foreign Minister + FMS, foreign + military sales + fo., + folio + FonMin, + FoMin), Foreign Minister; Foreign Ministry + ForSec, + Foreign Secretary + FRG, Federal + Republic of Germany + + FWG, + Falklands Working Group, Department of State + FY, fiscal + year + FYDP, Future + Years Defense Program + + + G–77, Group + of 77, a coalition of developing countries established at the + conclusion of the first United Nations Conference on Trade and + Development in 1964 + GA, (United + Nations) General Assembly + Gannet, + U.K. fighter aircraft + GDS, + (Argentine Ambassador Lucio) Garcia del Solar + GMT, + Greenwich Mean Time + GOA, + Government of Argentina + GOB, + Government of Brazil + GOC, + Government of Chile + GOP, + Government of Portugal + GPS, GS, + George P. Shultz + GSP, + Generalized System of Preferences + + + H, Alexander M. Haig, Jr.; also, Office of + the Assistant Secretary of State for Congressional Relations + HA, Bureau of + Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs, Department of State + HARM, + High-Speed Anti-Radiation Missile + Harpoon, + U.S. anti-ship missile + Harrier, + British fighter aircraft + Hawk, U.S. + medium-range surface-to-air missile; U.K. jet trainer + aircraft + hdqtrs, + headquarters + helos, + helicopters + HF, high + frequency + H-K, + Humphrey-Kennedy Amendment + HM, Her + Majesty(’s) + HMG, Her + Majesty’s Government (UK) + HMS, Her + Majesty’s Ship (UK) + + + ICRC, + International Committee of the Red Cross + IDB, + Inter-American Development Bank + IEEPA, + International Emergency Economic Powers Act + I-Hawk, + Improved Hawk missile + IMET, + International Military Education and Training + INF, + Intermediate-Range Nuclear Force + INR, Bureau + of Intelligence and Research, Department of State + INR/IAA, + Office of Analysis of Inter-American Republics, Bureau of + Inter-American Affairs, Department of State + INR/IC/CD, Coordination Division, Office of + Intelligence Coordination, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, + Department of State + I.O., Indian + Ocean + IO, Bureau of + International Organization Affairs, Department of State + IOC, initial + operational capability + IO/UNP, + Office of United Nations Political and Multilateral Affairs, Bureau + of International Organization Affairs, Department of State + ISP, Office + of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security + Policy + + + JB, James + Buckley + JSOC, Joint + Special Operations Command + + + KC–10, U.S. + aerial refueling tanker + + KHz, + kilohertz + klm, + kilometer + KSG, K. Scott + Gudgeon + kts, + knots + + + L, Office of the Legal Adviser, Department + of State; also, Lima time (military time zone equivalent to GMT + 11 + hours); local time + LADE, + Lineas Aéreas del Estado, state-owned airline + operated by the Argentine Air Force + LANDSAT, + Land Remote-Sensing Satellite + L/ARA, + Inter-American Affairs, Office of the Legal Adviser, Department of + State + LDC, + less-developed country + LDP, p. + 81 + LDX, + long-distance xerography + Limdis, + limited distribution + L/OES, + Oceans, International Environmental and Scientific Affairs, Office + of the Legal Adviser, Department of State + LOU, Limited + Official Use + LPD, Land + Platform Dock + L/PM, + Politico-Military Affairs, Office of the Legal Adviser, Department + of State + LSE, Lawrence + S. Eagleburger + LSL, Landing + Ship Logistic + LST, Landing + Ship Tank + LTG, + Lieutenant General + + + M, Nicanor Costa Méndez + MAC, Military + Airlift Command + MANPADS, + Man-Portable Air-Defense System + Martel, + U.K.-French anti-radiation missile + MC, Office of + Munitions Control Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs, Department of + State + MCM, mine + countermeasures + MDE, major + defense equipment + MEGO, my + eyes glaze over + Memcon, + memorandum of conversation + MEZ, Maritime + Exclusion Zone + MFA, Ministry + of Foreign Affairs + MFM, Meeting + of Foreign Ministers + MFO, + Multinational Force and Observers in the Sinai + MGen, Major + General + MILGP, + Military Group + MLSF, mobile + logistics support force + MOA, + memorandum of agreement + MOD, + MODUK, Ministry of Defense; Minister of Defense + (UK) + MOU, + memorandum of understanding + MP, Member of + Parliament + MPA, maritime + patrol aircraft + MRA&L, + manpower, reserve affairs, and logistics + MSC, Military + Sealift Command + msg, + message + + + NAM, + Non-Aligned Movement + NASA, + National Aeronautics and Space Administration + NATO, North + Atlantic Treaty Organization + NAVATT, + Naval Attaché + NAVMTO, + Naval Matériel Transportation Office + + NAVWPNSTA, Naval Weapons Station + NBC, National + Broadcasting Company + NCA, National + Command Authority + NDP, National + Disclosure Policy + Nestor, + voice encryption device + NF, + Noforn + NFI, not + further identified + NFOIO, + Naval Field Operational Intelligence Office + Niact, + night action + NID, National + Intelligence Daily + Nimrod, + U.K. maritime patrol aircraft + NLT, no later + than + NM, nautical + mile + NMCC, + National Military Command Center, Joint Staff, Department of + Defense + NOAA, + National Oceanographic and Atmospheric Administration + Nocontract, No contractor dissemination + Nodis, no + distribution + Noforn, no + foreign dissemination + NOREUR, + Northern Europe(an) + Notal, not + received by all addressees + NPIC, + National Photographic Interpretation Center + NSC, National + Security Council + NSPG, + National Security Planning Group + + + OAS, + Organization of American States + OASD/ISP, + office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International + Security Policy + OASGA, + Organization of American States General Assembly + OBE, + overtaken by events + OES/OPA, + Office of Oceans and Polar Affairs, Bureau of Oceans and + International Environmental and Scientific Affairs, Department of + State + OJCS, Office + of the Joint Chiefs of Staff + OMB, Office + of Management and Budget + OPCON, + operational control + ops, + operations + Orcon, + originator controlled + orig., + originator + OSD, Office + of the Secretary of Defense + OSD(C), + Comptroller, Office of the Secretary of Defense + OT and E, + operational training and evaluation + OVP, Office + of the Vice President + + + P, Office of the Under Secretary of State + for Political Affairs + P–3, U.S. + anti-submarine and aerial reconnaissance aircraft + PA/OAP, + Office of Plans and Opinion Analysis, Bureau of Public Affairs, + Department of State + para, + paratroops + PARPRO, + Peacetime Aerial Reconnaissance Program + PDC, Pérez de + Cuéllar + PEN, Poder + Ejecutivo Nacional (National Executive Power) + PermRep, + Permanent Representative + PGM, + precision guided munitions + Phalanx, + U.S. anti-aircraft/anti-missile gun + PM, Bureau of + Politico-Military Affairs, Department of State; Prime + Minister + + PM/MC, + Office of Munitions Control, Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs, + Department of State + PM/P, Office + of Policy Analysis, Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs, Department + of State + PM/RSA, + Office of Regional Security Affairs, Bureau of Politico-Military + Affairs, Department of State + PM/SAS, + Office of Security Assistance and Sales, Bureau of Politico-Military + Affairs, Department of State + POL, + petroleum, oil, lubricants; Political Section of an Embassy + POLAD, + Political Advisor + Pres., + President + + + RADM, Rear + Admiral + RAF, Royal + Air Force (UK) + RB, Richard + Burt + ref, + reference + reftel, + reference telegram + RM, Royal + Marines (UK) + RN, Royal Navy + (UK) + RNAS, Royal + Navy Air Station (UK) + RNLMC, + Royal Netherlands Marine Corps + RO, reporting + officer + Roland, + French-German surface-to-air missile + RR, Ronald + Reagan + + + S, Office of the Secretary of State + S, secret + SACEUR, + Supreme Allied Commander, Europe + SACLANT, + Supreme Allied Command, Atlantic + SAM, + surface-to-air missile + SATCOM, + satellite communications + SC, (United + Nations) Security Council + SCR, (United + Nations) Security Council Resolution + Sea King, + U.K. naval helicopter + SecDef, + Secretary of Defense + Secto, + series indicator for telegrams from the Secretary of State + septel, + separate telegram + SHAPE, + Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers, Europe + SHF, super + high frequency + Shrike, + U.S. anti-radiation missile + Sidewinder, U.S. short-range air-to-air missile + (AIM–9) + SIG, Senior + Interagency Group + Sitrep, + situation report + Skyhawk, + U.S. carrier-capable attack aircraft (A–4) + SLOC, sea + line of communication + SOA, speed of + advance + SOSUS, + sound surveillance system + SOUTHCOM, United States Southern Command + Specat, + special category + SR–71, U.S. + long-range reconnaissance aircraft + S/S, Executive + Secretariat, Department of State + SSG, Special + Situation Group + SSIXS, + Secure Submarine Information Exchange System + SSN, + nuclear-powered submarine + S/S-O, + Operations Center, Executive Secretariat, Department of State + + SSOD, + (United Nations) Special Session on Disarmament + SSP, SACEUR + Scheduled Program + Stadis, + (Department of) State Distribution + Stinger, + U.S. surface-to-air missile + STR, Special + Trade Representative + STRIKFLTLANT, Striking Fleet Atlantic + SYG, + Secretary-General + + + T, Office of the Under Secretary of State + for Security Assistance, Science, and Technology + tacair, + tactical aircraft + TASS, Soviet + official news agency + telecon, + telcon, telephone conversation + TEZ, Total + Exclusion Zone + TIAR, + Tratado Interamericano de Asistencia + Recíproca (Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance; + also known as the Rio Treaty) + Todep, + series indicator for telegrams to the Deputy Secretary of + State + Tosec, + series indicator for telegrams to the Secretary of State + Trident, + U.S. submarine-launched ballistic missile + TU–95, + Soviet long-range strategic bomber (Bear) + + + U, Unclassified + UHF, ultra + high frequency + UK, United + Kingdom + UKUN, United + Kingdom Mission to the United Nations + UN, United + Nations + UNGA, United + Nations General Assembly + UNITAS, + United International Antisubmarine Warfare (naval exercise) + UNSC, United + Nations Security Council + UNSSOD, + United Nations Special Session on Disarmament + UNSYG, + United Nations Secretary General + UPI, United + Press International + US, United + States + USA, United + States Army + USAF, United + States Air Force + USAFE, + United States Air Forces in Europe + USCINCEUR, United States Commander in Chief, + European Command + USCINCLANT, United States Commander in Chief, + Atlantic Command + USCINCSO, Commander in Chief, United States + Southern Command + USDAO, + United States Defense Attaché’s Office + USDEL, + United States Delegation + USDOCOSOUTH, Documents Officer, Allied Forces, + Southeastern Europe + USEC, United + States Mission to the European Community + USG, United + States Government + USICA, + United States International Communication Agency + USINT, + United States Interests Section + USMC, United + States Marine Corps + USN, United + States Navy + USNATO, + United States Mission to the North Atlantic Treaty + Organization + USNMR + SHAPE, United States National Military + Representative, Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers, Europe + USOAS, + United States Mission to the Organization of American States + USSOUTHCOM, United States Southern Command + USSR, Union + of Soviet Socialist Republics + USTR, United + States Trade Representative + + USUN, United + States Mission to the United Nations + + + VADM, Vice + Admiral + VP, Vice + President + VSTOL, + V/STOL, vertical and/or short take-off and landing + (aircraft) + VTOL, + vertical take-off and landing + VTXTS, U.S. + Navy training system + Vulcan, + U.K. strategic bomber + + + WH, White + House + w/in, + within + w/o, + without + WPAFB, + Wright-Patterson Air Force Base + WPC, William + P. Clark + + + YPF, + Yacimientos Petrolíferos Fiscales (Argentine + petroleum company) + + + Z, Zulu Time (Greenwich Mean Time) + + + + +
+ +
+ + Persons + + + Abrams, + Elliott, Assistant Secretary of State for + Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs from December 12, 1981 + Acland, Sir + Antony, British Permanent Under Secretary of + State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs and Head of the + Diplomatic Service from 1982 + Adams, Alvin P., + Jr., Deputy Executive Secretary of the + Department of State until December 1982 + Adelman, Kenneth + L., Deputy Permanent Representative to the + United Nations from 1981 until 1983 + Aguirre, + Francisco, Co-owner, Diario de las Americas + Aguirre Lanari, Juan + Ramón, Argentine Minister of Foreign Affairs + and Worship from July 2, 1982, until December 10, 1983 + Alberti, Francesco + J., Deputy Director, Office of Southern Cone + Affairs, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, Department of + State + Alemann, + Roberto, Argentine Minister of Economy from + January 1982 until June 1982 + Alfonsín, + Raúl, President of Argentina from December + 10, 1983 + Allen, Lew, + Jr., General, USAF Chief of Staff, USAF + until June 30, 1982 + Allen, Richard + V., Assistant to the President for National + Security Affairs from January 21, 1981, until January 4, 1982 + Allin, Lyndon K., + “Mort,” Staff Member, Office of the Press + Secretary, White House + Anaya, Jorge + I., Admiral, Commander in Chief, Argentine + Navy; Member of the Ruling Junta until June 1982 + Anderson, + Robert, Ambassador to the Dominican Republic + from May 24, 1982 + Andreotti, + Giulio, Italian Prime Minister, 1972–1973, + 1976–1979, and 1989–1992; Italian Foreign Minister, 1983–1989 + Aragones, + Emilio, Cuban Ambassador to Argentina + Arias Stella, + Javier, Peruvian Foreign Minister until + December 1982 + Armstrong, + John, Washington Bureau, American + Broadcasting Company + Atkeson, Edward + B., Major General, USA; National + Intelligence Officer for General Purpose Forces, National + Intelligence Council, Central Intelligence Agency + + + Bailey, Norman + A., Member of the National Security Council + Staff, from April 1981 until October 1983 + Baker, James A., + III, White House Chief of Staff + Baldrige, H. Malcolm, + Jr., Secretary of Commerce + Barnes, Michael + D., member, U.S. House of Representatives + (D-MD) + Barrow, Robert + H., General, USMC, Commandant of the Marine + Corps until June 30, 1983 + Begin, + Menachim, Prime Minister of Israel + Belaúnde Terry, + Fernando, President of Peru + Benn, + Tony, British Member of Parliament (Labour + Party) until June 1983 and from March 1984 + Bennett, W. Tapley, + Jr., Permanent Representative on the Council + of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization until March 31, + 1983 + Bernstein, + Carl, television correspondent, Nightline program, American Broadcasting + Company + Bignone, + Reynaldo, President of Argentina from July + 1, 1982, until December 10, 1983 + + Binns, Jack + R., Director, Office of Northern European + Affairs, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State from August + 1982 + Blackwill, Robert + D., Deputy Director, Bureau of + Politico-Military Affairs, Department of State from January 1981 + until May 1982; Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European + Affairs from May 1982 until June 1983 + Blair, Dennis + C., Member of the National Security Council + Staff from 1981 until 1983 + Blakemore, David + L., Director, Office of Security Assistance + and Sales, Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs, Department of State + from July 1983 + Block, John + R., Secretary of Agriculture + Boam, Thomas + Anthony, Major General, British Army, Head + of the British Defense Staff in Washington from 1981 + Bolten, + Joshua, Inter-American Affairs, Office of + the Legal Adviser, Department of State + Bosworth, Stephen + W., Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for + Inter-American Affairs from July 1981 until January 1983; Director + of the Policy Planning Staff, Department of State from January 3, + 1983, until April 7, 1984 + Bouchey, + Lynn, Council for Inter-American + Security + Bowdler, William + G., Assistant Secretary of State for + Inter-American Affairs from January 4, 1980, until January 16, + 1981 + Braithwaite, Rodric + Q., British Embassy in Washington + Bremer, L. Paul, + III, Executive Secretary of the Department + of State from February 2, 1981, until March 27, 1983 + Briggs, Everett + E., Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for + Inter-American Affairs until September 1982; U.S. Ambassador to + Panama from September 30, 1982 + Brock, William E., + III, United States Trade + Representative + Brown, James + L., Major General, USAF, Assistant Director + for JCS Support, Defense Intelligence Agency + Brown, Leslie + H., Deputy Director, Bureau of + Politico-Military Affairs, Department of State [[dates?]] + Buckley, James + L., Under Secretary of State for Security + Assistance, Science, and Technology from February 28, 1981, until + August 20, 1982; Counselor of the Department of State from September + 9, 1982, until September 26, 1982 + Bullard, + Julian, Deputy to the Permanent Under + Secretary, British Foreign and Commonwealth Office until 1984 + Bunge, + Wenceslao, Argentine envoy + Burkhalter, E.A., + Jr., Rear Admiral, USN; Deputy Director, + Defense Intelligence Agency + Burt, Richard + R., Director, Bureau of Politico-Military + Affairs, Department of State from January 23, 1981, until April, + 1982; Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs-designate + from May 10, 1982, until February 17, 1983; thereafter, Assistant + Secretary of State for European Affairs + Bush, George + H.W., Vice President of the United + States + + + Camilion, + Oscar, Argentine Minister of Foreign Affairs + and Worship from March 29, 1981, until December 11, 1981 + Campbell, + John, Office of Northern European Affairs, + Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State + Canosa, + Eduardo, Vice Comodoro, Argentine Air Force, + Argentine representative in Falklands/Malvinas + Caputo, + Dante, Argentine Minister of Foreign + Relations and Worship from December 10, 1983 + Carlucci, Frank C., + III, Deputy Director of Central Intelligence + until February 4, 1981; Deputy Secretary of Defense from February 4, + 1981, until December 31, 1982 + Carrington, 6th + Baron of (Peter Alexander Rupert), British + Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs until April + 5, 1982 + Casey, William + J., Director of Central Intelligence from + January 28, 1981 + + Castaneda, + Jorge, Mexican Secretary of Foreign Affairs + until November 30, 1982 + Cavandoli, Carlos + R., Comodoro, Under Secretary of State, + Argentine Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Worship + Chaplin, + Maxwell, Deputy Chief of Mission, U.S. + Embassy in Buenos Aires from 1976 until 1980 + Childress, Richard + T., member, National Security Council Staff + from October 1981 + Clarey, + S.S., Captain, USN; Executive Assistant to + the Chief of Naval Operations + Clark, William P., + Jr., Deputy Secretary of State from February + 25, 1981, until February 9, 1982; Assistant to the President for + National Security Affairs from January 4, 1982, until October 17, + 1983; Secretary of the Interior from November 18, 1983 + Clarke, Richard + A., Deputy Director, Office of Policy + Analysis, Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs, Department of State + until September 1983; thereafter, Director, Office of Policy + Analysis + Cochran, Harry + C., Special Assistant for Warning, National + Intelligence Council, Central Intelligence Agency + Cohen, Herman + J., Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau of + Intelligence and Research, Department of State until April + 1984 + Coles, A. + John, Private Secretary to the British Prime + Minister + Colombo, + Emilio, Italian Minister of Foreign Affairs + until August 4, 1983 + Constable, Elinor + G., Deputy Assistant Secretary, + International Finance and Development, Bureau of Economic and + Business Affairs, Department of State + Cormack, James + P., Captain, USN; Military Assistant to the + Secretary of Defense + Costa Méndez, + Nicanor, Argentine Minister of Foreign + Affairs and Worship from December 22, 1981, until June 30, + 1982 + Crabbie, + Christopher, First Secretary, British + Embassy in Washington until 1983 + + + Dagnino Pastore, + José Maria, Argentine Minister of Economy + from June 1982 until September 1982 + Dalton, James + E., Lieutenant General, USAF; Director of + the Joint Staff from July 1, 1981, until June 30, 1983 + Dam, Kenneth + W., Deputy Secretary of State from September + 23, 1982 + Darman, Richard + G., Deputy Assistant to the President until + September 1981; Assistant to the President from September + 1981 + Davidoff, Constantino + S., Argentine businessman + Davila, Michael + A., Director of Mission Operations, Mission + to the Organization of American States from March 1981 until August + 1982 + Deare, + Ron, West Indian and Atlantic Department, + British Foreign and Commonwealth Office + Deaver, Michael + K., White House Deputy Chief of Staff + DeLauer, Richard + D., Under Secretary of Defense for Research + and Engineering from May 7, 1981, until November 4, 1984 + Dick, + Ronald, Air Commodore, Royal Air Force, Air + Attaché, British Embassy in Washington + Dobbins, James F., + Jr., Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for + European Affairs from October 1982 + Dobrynin, Anatoly + F., Soviet Ambassador to the United + States + Draper, William H., + III, Chairman, Export-Import Bank of the + United States + Duarte, José + Napoleón, President of El Salvador + + + Eagleburger, Lawrence + S., Assistant Secretary of State for + European Affairs from May 14, 1981, until January 26, 1982; Under + Secretary of State for Political Affairs from February 12, 1982, + until May 1, 1984 + Edwards, James + B., Secretary of Energy from January 23, + 1981, until November 5, 1982 + + Einaudi, Luigi + R., Staff Director, NSC Interdepartmental + Groups, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, Department of State; + Director, Office of Policy Planning Coordination, Bureau of + Inter-American Affairs, Department of State + Enders, Thomas + O., Assistant Secretary of State for + Inter-American Affairs from June 23, 1981, until June 27, + 1983 + Evans, + Rowland, syndicated newspaper + columnist + + + Fall, + Brian, Principal Private Secretary to the + British Foreign Secretary from 1981 until 1984 + Fearn, + Robin, South America Department, British + Foreign and Commonwealth Office + Fenn, + Nicholas, News Department, British Foreign + and Commonwealth Office + Figueiredo, João + Baptista de Oliveira, President of + Brazil + Figueroa, + Gustavo, Chief of Cabinet, Argentine + Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Worship + Finegold, Edmund + S., Chief, Arms Transfer Division, Bureau of + Nuclear Weapons and Control, Arms Control and Disarmament + Agency + Fischer, Dean + E., Assistant Secretary of State for Public + Affairs from August 7, 1981, until August 19, 1982; Department of + State Spokesman from March 28, 1981, until August 19, 1982 + Fontaine, Roger + W., member, National Security Council Staff + from February 1981 until November 1983 + Forrester, + Ricardo, Office of Antarctic and Malvinas + Affairs, Argentine Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Worship + Forster, + J.R., Captain, USN, Assistant to the + Director of Naval Intelligence for Foreign Liaison + Franco, Ruben + O., Vice Admiral, Argentine Navy, Naval + Attaché, Argentine Embassy in Washington until June 1982; Member of + the Ruling Junta from June 1982 until December 1983 + Fraser, + Malcolm, Australian Prime Minister until + March 11, 1983 + Fretwell, M. John + E., Minister, British Embassy in Washington + until December 1981 + Funseth, Robert + L., Director, Office of Northern European + Affairs, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State until + November 1982; thereafter, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for + European Affairs + + + Galtieri, Leopoldo + Fortunato, Lieutenant General, Commander in + Chief, Argentine Army, until December 22, 1981; President of + Argentina and Member of the Ruling Junta from December 22, 1981, + until June 18, 1982 + Garcia del Solar, + Lucio, Argentine Ambassador to the United + States + Gast, Philip + C., Lieutenant General, USAF; Director of + Operations, Joint Staff, Joint Chiefs of Staff + Gates, Robert + M., Deputy Director for Intelligence, + Central Intelligence Agency from 1982 + Gergen, David + R., Assistant to the President and Staff + Director, White House until June 1981; Assistant to the President + for Communications from June 1981 + Giffard, + John, Deputy Under Secretary of State for + Foreign Affairs, British Foreign and Commonwealth Office + Gillespie, Charles + A., Executive Assistant to the Assistant + Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs + Gilly, Pedro + M., Lieutenant General, Secretary to the + Venezuelan National Security and Defense Council + Gilmore, + David, Under Secretary of State for Defense + Affairs, British Foreign and Commonwealth Office + Goldberg, Sherwood + “Woody,” Executive Assistant to the + Secretary of State until July 1982 + + Gompert, David + C., Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for + European Affairs from 1981 to 1982; Deputy to the Under Secretary of + State for Political Affairs from 1982 until 1983 + Gorman, Paul + F., Lieutenant General, USA; Assistant to + the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff + Gosney, + Richard, British Embassy in Buenos + Aires + Graham, Sir + John, British Permanent Representative on + the Council of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization from + 1982 + Gregg, + Donald, Assistant to the Vice President for + National Security Affairs + Gudgeon, K. + Scott, Assistant Legal Adviser for + Inter-American Affairs, Office of the Legal Adviser, Department of + State + + + Haass, Richard + N., Director, Office of Regional Security + Affairs, Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs, Department of State + until 1982; thereafter, Deputy for Policy Planning, Bureau of + European Affairs, Department of State + Haig, Alexander M., + Jr., General, USA (ret.); Secretary of State + from January 22, 1981, until July 5, 1982 + Hallman, William + H., Political Counselor, U.S. Embassy in + Buenos Aires from 1977 until 1980 + Hastie-Smith, + Richard, Deputy Under Secretary (Policy and + Programs), British Ministry of Defense from July 1981 + Hayward, Thomas + B., Admiral, USN; Chief of Naval Operations + until June 30, 1982 + Hekman, P.M., + Jr., Rear Admiral, USN; Deputy Director for + Operations, National Military Command Center, Joint Staff, Joint + Chiefs of Staff + Helms, + Jesse, Senator (R-North Carolina); Chairman + of the Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere Affairs of the Senate + Foreign Relations Committee + Henderson, Sir + Nicholas, “Nicko,” British Ambassador to the + United States until July 31, 1982 + Herrera Campins, + Luis, President of Venezuela until February + 2, 1984 + Hervey, John + B., Rear Admiral, Royal Navy, Naval Attaché, + British Embassy in Washington + Heseltine, + Michael, British Secretary of State for + Defence + Hidalgo, + Edward, Secretary of the Navy from October + 1979 until January 1981 + Hill, M. + Charles, Executive Secretary of the + Department of State from March 28, 1983 + Holmes, H. + Allen, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State + for European Affairs until September 1982 + Hormats, Robert + D., Assistant Secretary of State for + Economic and Business Affairs from May 21, 1981, until August 25, + 1982 + Howe, Sir + Geoffrey, British Secretary of State for + Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs from June 11, 1983 + Howe, Jonathan + T., Rear Admiral, USN; Senior Military + Assistant to the Deputy Secretary of Defense from 1981 until 1982; + Director, Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs, Department of State + from May 10, 1982, until July 1, 1984 + Howells, W. + Dean, Deputy Director, Office of + Politico-Military Analysis, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, + Department of State from September 1982 + Hunt, Rex + Masterman, British Governor of the Falkland + Islands; taken prisoner on April 2, 1982 + Hutchinson, H.F., + Jr., Vice Chairman, National Intelligence + Council, Central Intelligence Agency + + + Iglesias, Hector + Norberto, Brigadier General, Argentine Army, + Secretary General of the Presidency + Iklé, Fred + C., Under Secretary of Defense for Policy + from April 2, 1981 + + Inman, Bobby + Ray, Admiral, USN; Deputy Director of + Central Intelligence from February 12, 1981, until June 10, + 1982 + + + Johnson, Philip + K., Political Officer, Mission to the + Organization of American States + Johnston, Ernest + B., Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for + Economic and Business Affairs + Jones, David + C., General, USAF; Chairman of the Joint + Chiefs of Staff until June 18, 1982 + Jones, George + F., Director, Office of Regional Political + Programs, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, Department of State + until August 1982 + + + Kanter, + Arnold, Director, Office of Policy Analysis, + Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs, Department of State + Keane, John + F., Political Officer, U.S. Embassy in + Buenos Aires until September 1984 + Kelly, John + H., Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for + European Affairs from June 1983 + Kennedy, Richard + T., Under Secretary of State for Management + from February 28, 1981, until December 15, 1982 + Kilday, Lowell + C., Director, Office of Brazilian Affairs, + Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, Department of State until August + 1983 + Kimmitt, Robert + M., member, National Security Council + Staff + King, John + F., Political Counselor, U.S. Embassy in + Buenos Aires until April 1984 + Kirkpatrick, Jeane + J., Permanent Representative to the United + Nations + Koch, Noel + C., Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of + Defense for International Security Affairs + Kozak, Michael + T., Office of the Legal Adviser, Department + of State + + + Lami Dozo, + Basilio, Brigadier, Commander in Chief, + Argentine Air Force, 1981–1982; Member of the Ruling Junta until + June 1982 + Lasater, John + R., Brigadier General, USAF; Acting Deputy + Assistant Secretary of Defense for Europe/NATO Policy + Laxalt, + Paul, Republican Senator from Nevada + Leach, Sir + Henry, Admiral, Royal Navy, First Sea Lord + and Chief of the Naval Staff until 1982 + Legere, Laurence + J., Defense Adviser to the Mission to the + North Atlantic Treaty Organization + Lewin, Sir + Terence, Admiral, Royal Navy, Chief of the + Defense Staff until September 30, 1982 + Lilac, Robert + H., member, National Security Council + Staff + Ling, + Qing, Chinese Permanent Representative to the + United Nations; President of the Security Council, 1982 + Listre, + Arnoldo, Acting Argentine Permanent + Representative to the United Nations, July 1982; Director General of + Foreign Policy, Argentine Ministry of Foreign Relations and Worship + from August 1982 + López Portillo, + José, President of Mexico + Louis, John J., + Jr., Ambassador to the United Kingdom from + May 7, 1981, until November 7, 1983 + Luce, + Richard, British Minister of State for + Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs from September 1981 until April + 1982 + Luers, William + H., Ambassador to Venezuela until June 28, + 1982 + Luns, Joseph + M.A.H., Secretary General of the North + Atlantic Treaty Organization + + + Mallea Gil, + Miguel, General, Argentine Army, Military + Attaché, Argentine Embassy in Washington + Marsh, John O., + Jr., Secretary of the Army from February + 1981 + + McFarlane, Robert C., + “Bud,” Counselor of the Department of State + from February 28, 1981, until April 4, 1982; Deputy Assistant to the + President for National Security Affairs from January 1982 until + October 1983; Assistant to the President for National Security + Affairs from October 17, 1983 + McMahon, John + N., Executive Director, Central Intelligence + Agency, until June 1982; Deputy Director of Central Intelligence + from June 1982 + McManaway, Clayton + E., Jr., Deputy Executive Secretary of the + Department of State from September 1981 until June 1983 + McMullen, R. + Bruce, Deputy Director, Office of + Development Finance, Bureau of Economic and Business Affairs, + Department of State until August 1983 + McNamar, Robert + T., Deputy Secretary of the Treasury + McNutt, + Louise, United Nations Adviser, Regional + Affairs, Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Department of + State + McPherson, Melville + P., Administrator, Agency for International + Development from February 27, 1981 + Meese, Edwin, + III, Counselor to the President + Menendez, Mario + B., Brigadier General, Argentine Army, + Governor of the Malvinas and Commander of the Argentine garrison + from April 3, 1982, until June 15, 1982 + Menges, Constantine + C., National Intelligence Officer for Latin + America, National Intelligence Council, Central Intelligence + Agency + Mercandetti, + Susan, + Nightline program, American Broadcasting + Company + Meyer, Edward C., + “Shy,” General, USA; Chief of Staff of the + United States Army until June 1983 + Michel, James + H., Deputy Legal Adviser of the Department + of State until April 1983; thereafter, Principal Deputy Assistant + Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs + Middendorf, J. + William, II, Permanent Representative to the + Organization of American States from June 12, 1981 + Miles, Richard + M., Deputy Director, Office of Regional + Security Affairs, Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs, Department of + State from August 1981 until September 1983 + Miret, + Jose, Major Brigadier General, Argentine Air + Force, representative of the Ruling Junta + Mitterrand, + François, President of France from May 26, + 1981 + Monge, Luis + Alberto, President of Costa Rica from May 8, + 1982 + Monroe, Frederick + F., Special Assistant for Science and + Technology and for Development, Human Rights and Refugee Affairs, + Global Issues Staff, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department + of State until September 1984 + Montgomery, + Hugh, Director, Bureau of Intelligence and + Research, Department of State from October 19, 1981 + Montgomery, + William, Executive Assistant to the Under + Secretary of State for Political Affairs from July 1982 until July + 1984 + Moore, + Jeremy, Major General, Royal Marines, + Commander of British Land Forces in Falklands Campaign + Morley, Robert + B., Deputy Director, Office of Policy + Planning Coordination, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, Department + of State until August 1982; Office of Mexican Affairs, Bureau of + Inter-American Affairs, Department of State from August 1982 until + August 1983; thereafter, Director, Office of Southern Cone Affairs, + Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, Department of State + Motley, Langhorne + A., Ambassador to Brazil from September 19, + 1981, until July 6, 1983; Assistant Secretary of State for + Inter-American Affairs from July 12, 1983 + Muldoon, + Robert, New Zealand Prime Minister until + July 26, 1984 + Muñiz, + Carlos, Argentine Permanent Representative + to the United Nations from August 1982 + + + + Nagler, Gordon + R., Vice Admiral, USN; Director, Command and + Control, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations + Newell, Gregory + J., Assistant Secretary of State for + International Organization Affairs from June 4, 1982 + Nicolaides, + Cristino, General, Argentine Army, Chief of + Staff of the Argentine Army; Member of the Ruling Junta from June + 1982 until December 1983 + North, Oliver + L., member, National Security Council Staff + from 1982 + Nott, + John, British Defense Secretary until January 6, + 1983 + Nutting, Wallace + H., General, USA; Commander in Chief, U.S. + Southern Command until 1983 + + + O’Connell, + S.K., Office of Southern Cone Affairs, + Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, Department of State + Ogden, Richard + M., Director, Office of Security Assistance + and Sales, Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs, Department of State + from June 1981 until July 1983 + O’Leary, + Jeremiah, Press Secretary to the President’s + Assistant for National Security Affairs + Onslow, + Cranley, British Minister of State for + Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs from 1982 until 1983 + Ortiz, Francis + V., Ambassador to Peru from October 1, 1981, + until October 27, 1983; Ambassador to Argentina from November 18, + 1983 + Ortiz de Rozas, + Carlos, Argentine Ambassador to the United + Kingdom + + + Pakenham, Michael + A., First Secretary, British Embassy in + Washington until 1983 + Palliser, Sir + Michael, British Permanent Under Secretary + of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs and Head of the + Diplomatic Service until 1982; Special Adviser to the Prime + Minister, Cabinet Office, from April to July 1982 + Parsons, Sir + Anthony, British Permanent Representative to + the United Nations until 1982 + Peña, + Ricardo, Brigadier General, Argentine Air + Force, Air Attaché, Argentine Embassy in Washington + Pendleton, Miles S., + Jr., Deputy Director, Office of Northern + European Affairs, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State + until December 1982; Member, Falkland Islands Working Group, + Department of State from April 1982 until June 1982 + Penfold, John + H., Deputy Director, Office of Regional + Economic Policy, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, Department of + State from August 1981 until July 1983 + Pérez de Cuéllar, + Javier, Secretary General of the United + Nations from January 1, 1982 + Perle, Richard + N., Assistant Secretary of Defense for + International Security Policy from August 5, 1981 + Perón, + Juan, President of Argentina, 1946–1955 and + 1973–1974 + Perry, + Robert, Special Assistant to the Under + Secretary of State for Political Affairs from April 1982 until July + 1984 + Piedra, + Alberto, Senior Policy Adviser, Mission to + the Organization of American States from April 1982 until July + 1984 + Pinochet, + Augusto, President of Chile + Platt, + Nicholas, Deputy Assistant Secretary of + State for International Organization Affairs from July 1981 until + July 1982 + Poindexter, John + M., Rear Admiral, USN; Military Assistant to + the President from 1981 until 1983; thereafter, Deputy Assistant to + the President for National Security Affairs + Price, Charles + H., Ambassador to the United Kingdom from + November 11, 1983 + Price, George + C., Belizean Prime Minister from September + 21, 1981 + Proper, Datus + C., Director, Office of Regional Political + Programs, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, Department of State from + September 1982 + Pym, + Francis, British Secretary of State for + Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs from April 6, 1982, until June 11, + 1983 + + + + Quijano, + Raúl, Argentine Permanent Representative to + the Organization of American States + + + Rabb, Maxwell + M., Ambassador to Italy from June 20, + 1981 + Raphel, + Arnold, Deputy Director, Bureau of + Politico-Military Affairs, Department of State from June 1982 until + April 1984 + Rashish, + Myer, Under Secretary of State for Economic + Affairs from June 29, 1981, until January 20, 1982 + Reagan, Ronald + W., President of the United States + Regan, Donald + T., Secretary of the Treasury from January + 22, 1981 + Rentschler, James + M.T., member, National Security Council + Staff from 1982 + Ridley, + Nicholas, British Minister of State for + Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs until September 1981; Financial + Secretary to the Treasury from September 14, 1981, until June 11, + 1983; thereafter, Transport Secretary + Richards, + Francis, Assistant Private Secretary to the + British Foreign Secretary + Robinson, Davis + R., Legal Adviser of the Department of State + from July 30, 1981 + Robinson, William + B., Director, Office of Munitions Control, + Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs, Department of State from + December 1981 + Roca, + Eduardo, Argentine Permanent Representative + to the United Nations from January 1982 until June 1982 + Ros, + Enrique, Argentine Under Secretary of State + for Foreign Affairs and Worship + Roshco, + Bernard, Director, Office of Plans and + Policy Analysis, Bureau of Public Affairs, Department of + State + Rostow, Eugene + V., Director, Arms Control and Disarmament + Agency from June 30, 1981, until January 12, 1983 + Roussel, + Peter, Staff Member, Office of the Press + Secretary, White House + Rowen, + Harry, Chairman, National Intelligence + Council, Central Intelligence Agency + Royo, + Aristides, President of Panama until July + 31, 1982 + Ryan, Robert J., + Jr., Director, Office of Regional Economic + Policy, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, Department of State from + August 1981 until March 1984 + + + Saint-Jean, Alfredo + Oscar, President of Argentina from June 18, + 1982, until July 1, 1982 + Sapia-Bosch, Alfonso + F., member, National Security Council Staff + until June 1983 + Scanlan, John + D., Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for + European Affairs from June 1981 until October 1982 + Schmidt, + Helmut, West German Chancellor until October + 1, 1982 + Schneider, William, + Jr., Associate Director for National + Security and International Affairs, Office of Management and Budget, + until September 9, 1982; thereafter, Under Secretary of State for + Security Assistance, Science, and Technology + Seitz, Raymond + G.H., Deputy Assistant Secretary of State + for Public Affairs from October 1981 until July 1982; Executive + Assistant to the Secretary of State from July 1982 until July + 1984 + Service, Robert + E., Director, Office of Southern Cone + Affairs, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, Department of State until + August 1982; Member, Falkland Islands Working Group, Department of + State from April 1982 until June 1982 + Sherman, William + C., Deputy Permanent Representative to the + United Nations in the Security Council from July 1981 until January + 1984 + Shlaudeman, Harry + W., Ambassador to Argentina until August 26, + 1983; Ambassador at Large and Special Envoy for Central America from + March 26, 1984 + Shoemaker, + Christopher C., Member of the National + Security Council Staff until June 1982 + Shultz, George + P., Secretary of State from July 16, + 1982 + Sienkiewicz, + Stan, Special Assistant to the Under + Secretary of State for Security Assistance, Science, and Technology + from July 1981 + + Simons, Thomas W., + Jr., Director, Office of Soviet Union + Affairs, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State from + September 1981 + Sinclair, + Ian, Legal Adviser, British Foreign and + Commonwealth Office + Small, William + N., Admiral, USN; Vice Chief of Naval + Operations from 1981 until 1983 + Smith, Carl + R., Major General, USAF; Military Assistant + to the Secretary of Defense from May 1982 + Smith, Keith + C., Office of Northern European Affairs, + Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State until July + 1983 + Smith, N. + Shaw, Director, Office of Southern Cone + Affairs, Bureau of Inter-American Relations, Department of State + from June 1982 until August 1983 + Smith, William + D., Rear Admiral, USN; Director of Naval + Communications, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations + Smith, William + F., Attorney General from January 23, + 1981 + Sorzano, Jose + S., Representative to the United Nations + Economic and Social Council from 1981 until 1983; Deputy Permanent + Representative to the United Nations from 1983 + Sotera, + Alfredo, General, Argentine Army + Intelligence + Stanford, John + H., Colonel, USA; Department of Defense + representative on Interagency Group + Stockman, David + A., Director, Office of Management and + Budget from January 21, 1981 + Stoessel, Walter J., + Jr., Under Secretary of State for Political + Affairs until January 26, 1982; Deputy Secretary of State from + February 11, 1982, until September 22, 1982 + Streator, Edward J., + Jr., Deputy Chief of Mission, U.S. Embassy + in London until August 1984 + + + Taft, William Howard, + IV, General Counsel of the Department of + Defense from April 2, 1981, until May 2, 1984 + Takacs, Esteban + Arpad, Argentine Ambassador to the United + States from August 1981 + Thatcher, Margaret + H., British Prime Minister + Thomas, Charles + H., Director, Office of Security and + Political Affairs, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of + State + Thomas, + David, Assistant Under Secretary for the + Americas, British Foreign and Commonwealth Office + Thomas, Derek + M.D., Minister, British Embassy in + Washington until 1984 + Thompson, Herbert + B., Deputy Permanent Representative to the + Organization of American States + Tobin, Thomas + G., Brigadier General, USAF; Deputy Director + for Operations, National Military Command Center + Train, Harry D., + II, Admiral, USN; Commander in Chief, + Atlantic Command until September 30, 1982 + + + Ulloa Elias, + Manuel, Peruvian Prime Minister until + January 3, 1983 + Ure, + John, British Assistant Under Secretary of State + for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs + + + Vessey, John W., + Jr., General, USA; Chairman of the Joint + Chiefs of Staff from June 18, 1982 + Videla, Jorge + Rafael, General, President of Argentina + until March 29, 1981 + Viola, Roberto + Eduardo, General, President of Argentina + from March 29, 1981, until December 10, 1981 + + + Waldheim, + Kurt, Secretary-General of the United + Nations until December 31, 1981 + Wall, J. + Stephen, First Secretary, British Embassy in + Washington until 1983 + Walters, Vernon A., + “Dick,” Ambassador at Large from July 22, + 1981 + + Watson, Thomas + C., Rear Admiral, USN; Deputy Director for + Planning and Resources, Office of the Director J–4 (Logistics), + Joint Staff, Joint Chiefs of Staff + Weinberger, Caspar + W., “Cap,” Secretary of Defense + Wenick, Martin + A., Director, Office of Northern European + Affairs, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State from + November 1983 + West, Francis J., + Jr., Assistant Secretary of Defense for + International Security Affairs from April 4, 1981, to April 1, + 1983 + Wheeler, Michael + O., Colonel, Member of the National Security + Council Staff from January 1982 until March 1983 + Wheelock, + Jaime, Nicaraguan Minister of Agricultural, + Cattle Development and Agrarian Reform + Whitelaw, + William, British Member of Parliament, + Deputy Leader of the Conservative Party + Whitney, + Ray, British Foreign and Commonwealth + Office + Whittemore, + Clive, Private Secretary to the British + Prime Minister + Wick, Charles + Z., Director, International Communication + Agency from June 9, 1981 + Williams, + Anthony, British Ambassador to Argentina + until April 1982 + Williams, James + A., Lieutenant General, USA; Director, + Defense Intelligence Agency from September 1981 + Wright, Sir J. + Oliver, British Ambassador to the United + States from September 1982 + + + Young, Janet, + Baroness, Leader of the British House of + Lords + + + Zakheim, + Dov, Special Assistant to the Assistant + Secretary of Defense for International Security Policy + Zambrano Velasco, + Jose Alberto, Venezuelan Foreign + Minister + Zellnick, + Bob, Deputy Washington Bureau Chief, + American Broadcasting Company + Zinn, + Ricardo, Argentine businessman + + + + + +
+ + + +
+ + Conflict in the South Atlantic, 1981–1984 + +
+ Prelude to the Conflict, May 1979–April 1, 1982 + +
+ 1. Airgram From the Embassy in Argentina to the Department of + StateSource: Department of + State, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, Falkland Files of Luigi Einaudi, Lot 90D400, + Falklands Crisis History. Confidential. Drafted by Yvonne Thayer + (POL); cleared by Chaplin; approved by Hallman. Sent for information to + London, Montevideo, Santiago, and USCINCSO. + + + A–36 + + + Buenos Aires, May 16, + 1979 + + + SUBJECT + The Malvinas (Falkland) Islands: A Political and Social + Review + +

(U) SUMMARY: This airgram provides a detailed study of the Malvinas + (Falkland) Islands: its history; the foreign policy problem it + represents for Argentina and the United Kingdom; travel and logistics; + economic, administrative and social factors; American residents and + interests on the Malvinas; and aspects of life on the Islands today. It + was prepared following the drafting officer’s week-long visit to the + Islands January 24–31, 1979.

+

(U) During that trip, American businessmen, American historians and + marine architects, American conservationists, American journalists and + tourists, and resident American settlers met in Stanley expressed an + interest in having on record at the State Department basic information + on the Islands, including travel, communications, documentation, and + visitors’ facilities. Although changes in plane schedules and + accommodations will undoubtedly occur, the enclosed information should + provide basic orientation for the prospective traveler.

+

(C) The paper concludes that Argentina will eventually regain political + sovereignty over the disputed Malvinas Islands, as a result of + gradualist bilateral negotiations with Great Britain. Deterioration of + the current talks could + postpone but probably not avoid the eventual end of Britain’s admittedly + anachronistic colonial rule. It is less clear whether the Argentines + will be successful in populating and rejuvenating the Islands’ economy + over the long term. As long as the Malvinas do not fall into unfriendly + hands or are not exploited for harmful strategic and military ends, + US interests are unlikely to be + adversely affected by future disposition of the Islands. END + SUMMARY.

+

THE MALVINAS ISLANDS

+

I. Introduction

+

(U) The Malvinas (Falkland) Islands constitute one of Argentina’s oldest + foreign policy problems. The question of sovereignty over the Islands, + claimed by Argentina but administered by Great Britain since English + marines threw out Argentine settlers in 1833, has become an Argentine + staple at the UN and among the + Non-Aligned, absorbing for many years a disproportionate amount of + Argentine international political capital and energy in world fora.

+

(U) Argentina wants to re-establish uncontested sovereignty over the + Malvinas and far-flung dependencies to the southeast—the South Georgias, + Sandwich and Shetland Islands—for a number of reasons: to right its + historic grievance against British usurpation; to obtain the strategic + and military benefits of a land base and enormous territorial sea claim + in the southern Atlantic; to establish possession over the petroleum, + fishing, krill, and other maritime resources; and to control access as + well as fortify its claim to a corresponding sector of Antarctica.

+

(C) Argentine claims in Antarctica overlap with those of Great + Britain—and, in part, Chile—largely based on overlapping claims to the + Malvinas Islands and dependencies. Argentine fear that Chilean rights in + the Beagle Channel could spread to future Chilean claims eastward toward + the Malvinas and southward in Antarctica helped to feed the southern + border controversy with Chile which nearly erupted into war in late + 1978.Documentation relating to the Carter + administration’s handling of the Beagle Channel dispute between + Argentina and Chile is scheduled to be printed in Foreign + Relations, 1977–1980, vol. XXIV, South America; Latin + America Region.

+

II. The Argentine Claim

+

(U) Argentina bases her claim to the Malvinas on the Islands’ possession + and occupation by Spain in the late 1790s. Though the actual discoverer + of the Islands remains in dispute, the first documented settlement was + established by the French in 1764. The French named the Islands “Iles + Malouines”, after the French port St. Malo. (The name was later + translated by the Spanish to Malvinas.) Two years later the French sold the islands to the Spanish + Crown for 25,000 British pounds. In the meantime the British, in 1765, + laid claim to the islands, initiating a sovereignty dispute first with + France, then with Spain which was only abandoned when Britain’s + attention was turned to the Revolutionary War launched by the American + colonies to the north.

+

(U) The Spanish remained in actual possession of the Islands for the next + 40 years until Argentina, newly independent from Spain, claimed them for + itself. A small Argentine delegation established a new capital at the + protected harbor of Stanley, only to be dislodged by three boatloads of + British seamen in 1833. The British, through the royally chartered + Falkland Islands Company, populated the Islands with colonists and + sheep, and have administered it ever since.

+

(U) For many years the Argentines maintained their claim with little more + than routine official protests to the British government. Since the + mid-1960s however, Argentina has increasingly pressed its claim and + persistently raised the issue in world fora. In 1964 the UN, in response to an Argentine appeal, + classified the Islands as a non-self-governing territory administered by + the UK and called on both parties to + initiate talks towards peaceful resolution of their conflicting + sovereignty claims.

+

(U) Confidential bilateral talks began in 1966, showing little progress + until 1971. By that time, the Falkland Islands Company, popularly called + the FIC, had announced its intention to withdraw its monthly + Stanley-Montevideo cargo boat run, thus ending the Islands’ only regular + link to the mainland. The resultant communications crisis led to the + 1971 Joint Statement which established regular Argentine air service to + the Islands; norms for telephone, telegraph and postal services; and + agreement on travel documents. Subsequent agreements established a Joint + Commission to consult on matters of mutual concern regarding the + Islands, placed an Argentine official representative to the Joint + Commission resident in Stanley, and authorized the Argentine petroleum + company YPF and gas company, Gas de + Estado, to distribute fuel on the Islands. Today more than a dozen + Argentines live in Stanley—the official Joint Commission representative, + Argentine Air Force Vice-Commodore Canosa, employees of YPF and Gas de Estado and two Spanish language teachers + financed by the Argentine Education Ministry.

+

(U) In the meantime, bilateral relations with Britain took a sudden turn + for the worse when in late 1975 the British government unilaterally + dispatched a high-ranking mission to investigate the worrisome economic + stagnation of the Islands. Although the Shackleton mission eventually + concluded the economic improvement irrevocably required greater ties to + the Argentine mainland, the Argentine government strongly opposed the + visit and, in an incident overplayed at home allegedly to distract the Argentine public from more + pressing internal problems, recalled its ambassador from London in early + 1976. London reciprocated by bringing its ambassador home from Buenos + Aires and the two countries have maintained relations at the chargé + level since then.

+

(U) In 1977 the two countries resumed bilateral negotiations over the + fate of the Islands and by early 1979 Argentina officially suggested + diplomatic representation be upgraded to the level of ambassador. + Reportedly the two countries will exchange ambassadors before the end of + the year.On November 15, 1979, Argentina and + the United Kingdom announced their decision to renew full diplomatic + relations at the ambassadorial level. Anthony Williams was named the British Ambassador to + Argentina and Carlos Ortiz de + Rozas was posted to London as Argentine Ambassador to + the United Kingdom. (Telegram 9375 from Buenos Aires, November 15, + 1979; Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, + D790531–0622)

+

(C) The current talks promise to be a drawn-out affair. Great Britain has + tried to focus the talks on economic cooperation, which Argentina + insists on tying to progress on the sovereignty question. Britain has, + both publicly and privately, signalled its willingness to withdraw as an + anachronistic colonial power from the Islands; but it has also, in + response to significant UK parliamentary + pressure, promised to take no step without the consent of the + Islanders.

+

(C) The Islanders are opposed to further Argentine presence on the + Islands and adamantly opposed to the Islands’ transfer. The Islanders + maintain a powerful Falkland Islands lobby in Britain and have enlisted + conservative MPs in opposing any change + in the Islands’ colonial status. The Islanders are deeply suspicious of + the renewed bilateral talks, grudgingly admitting economic benefits but + rejecting any change in political status.

+

(C) The Islanders are loathe to admit any Argentine foothold in the + archipelago. When after the December, 1978 round of talks, the sides + announced tentative agreement toward potential cooperation in scientific + research in the outer island dependencies, the Islanders emphatically + rejected the proposal.The talks between + Argentina and the United Kingdom took place in Geneva, December + 18–20. In telegram 10044 from Buenos Aires, December 26, 1978, the + Embassy transmitted a summary and assessment of the meetings. + (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, + D780534–0248) (Argentina already has a small scientific research station on the south + Georgian island of Thule,Reference is to the + 1976 Argentine establishment of a weather research station, staffed + by 40 scientists, on Southern Thule, an island in the South Sandwich + Islands. The United Kingdom formally protested the Argentine + presence at the end of 1976 and again in October 1977. In May 1978, + the Argentine Foreign Ministry rejected the British protest with a + communiqué that “strongly reaffirmed Argentina’s sovereignty over + the Southern Sandwich Islands.” To this, former Prime Minister Lord + Home (Sir Alec Douglas-Home) “urged Britain to give Argentina a + deadline to withdraw the 40 scientists before Argentina ‘try + something more ambitious and even more dangerous’ in the disputed + area,” a suggestion a British Foreign Office spokesman reportedly + rejected. In telegram 3648 from Buenos Aires, May 11, 1978, the + Embassy reported that an official of the British Embassy in Buenos + Aires stated “the UK has no real + problem with the Argentine base per se and has already taken the + legal steps to reaffirm its claims on the Islands,” adding “neither + country wants trouble over the Thule base and both hope the issue + will simply fade away.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy + File, D780201–0845) to the periodic consternation of the + Islanders and their British Parliament supporters. The December proposal + would have, in effect, legitimized the Argentine presence on Thule.) The + communique released after the last round of talks in New York in March, + 1979 conspicuously omitted any mention of joint scientific cooperation + and announced only that the talks were held and another session would be + scheduled later in the year.

+

(C) Argentina is clearly annoyed at British foot dragging on the + question. It also feared a Conservative victory in the upcoming British + elections.In the British General Election + held May 3, 1979, the Conservative Party, led by Margaret Thatcher, defeated the + incumbent Labour Party government of Prime Minister James + Callaghan. The Conservative Party has traditionally shown far + less willingness than the Laborites to discuss the future political + disposition of the Islands.

+

(C) In the meantime, however, Argentina is following a patient, + multifront policy designed to build international pressure to force + Britain into speeding negotiations on the sovereignty question while, at + the same time, steadily seeking to win the Islanders’ confidence if not + their loyalty. On the international front, Argentina consistently raises + the issue in the Non-Aligned, the OAS + and the UN and has long conditioned its + vote on third world issues to ensure maximum LDC support for its Malvinas position. For the Islands, + Argentina provides at great financial sacrifice the twice weekly Air + Force LADE flights, subsidized + petroleum products and bottled gas, a vastly overbuilt fuel storage + complex, two language teachers giving free Spanish lessons, full + scholarships to any Islander youth interested in studying in Argentina, + and maintenance support for the Stanley airstrip. Air Force Vice + Comodoro Canosa told the + reporting officer he also intended to offer the Islanders an additional + weekly cargo flight to bring in fresh food and other desirable supplies from the Argentine + mainland. GOA, he said, is also + considering offering to build a vocational school on the Islands, which + it would construct wholly from Argentine building materials and staff + with Argentine teachers. (To date all building materials are shipped in + from England at great cost.) With these attractive offers, Argentina + hopes to accustom and soften the Islanders to accepting eventual + Argentine sovereignty.

+

(C) Argentine Foreign Ministry officials have made it clear that the + Islanders will be free to retain their British citizenship and enjoy + advantageous immunities, not to mention considerable economic + assistance, under Argentine rule.

+

(C) COMMENT: The Embassy predicts, based on contacts and information + available here, that eventually Argentina will regain political + sovereignty over the Malvinas, most likely with solid guarantees + conserving the Islanders’ patrimony and life style and bilateral + agreements for joint economic and scientific exploitation of the area. + The opposition of the new Conservative government in Britain could delay + that outcome, but it is clear that the continued decline and + depopulation of the Islands will require some accommodation if the + Islands are to remain viable at all.

+

(C) Another outburst of Argentine impatience and revanchism could, + however, upset and maybe destroy the delicate gradualist approach + underway today. Such an event would probably stiffen British backs and + public opinion from letting go of the Islands and bring about further + deterioration in bilateral UK-Argentine + relations.

+

(C) It appears unlikely at this writing that Argentina would attempt an + armed occupation of the Islands, which would only bring international + sympathy to the stalwart Islanders as an endangered species. The + Argentine Foreign Ministry officials currently responsible for the + Malvinas negotiations have expressed to an Embassy officer their support + for the present gradualist process and their confidence that the Islands + will revert to Argentina sooner or later. The recent unnerving near-war + with Chile over conflicting Beagle Channel claims may have also helped + to temper Argentine officials’ impatience in pursuing a Malvinas + solution. At the same time, Argentine diplomats will be compelled to + demonstrate to the home audience real progress in the ongoing talks, + balancing that off against potential British backlash at any sign of a + “selling-out” of the Islanders. END COMMENT.

+

III. Economic, + Administrative and Social Factors

+

(U) The Islands themselves are of little economic importance. The single + enterprise on the islands is sheep raising and the entire organization + of the Islands is geared to the production of wool. The Malvinas produce + about two and one half million kilos of wool each year at a value of about US $5 million. (By way of comparison, Argentina produces + 155 million kilos of wool per year and exports 90 million kilos.) Other + economic endeavors—meat and kelp processing, canning, mink + ranching—quickly met with failure, due in good part to the inertia and + opposition of the Islanders, who fight any change in their quaint and + isolated existence.

+

(C) The presence of maritime resources and possibly oil in the + surrounding sea has sparked renewed interest in the Islands; however, + major economic projects have to date been largely kept in abeyance until + the political sovereignty question is resolved. A major British food + processing firm is tentatively investigating the possibility of + commercializing krill which exists in abundance off the South Georgia + Islands. Seismic studies prepared by international geophysical research + companies suggest oil may be present in the nearby sea, a factor of + little interest to the Islanders and one typically downplayed by both + the British and Argentine claimants in their discussions over + sovereignty of the Islands. Physical and climatic conditions would at + any rate make oil exploitation a tremendously costly proposition and + near-term exploitation of possible oil reserves does not appear + likely.

+

(U) The limited economic activity and opportunity on the Islands has lead + to their steady depopulation. Spurred by farm mechanization, economic + stagnation, residents’ personal dissatisfaction and nagging doubts over + the political future of the Islands, the resident population has dropped + from 2,400 to about 1,600 in the last ten years. The dismantling several + years ago of international satellite tracking and communications + installations caused an abrupt fall in the population and outside + influence in Stanley. The lack of women, outnumbered by men by almost + two to one overall and by an even greater proportion in “the Camp,” has + also inhibited family growth and permanent settlement on the + Islands.

+

(U) About half of the population of the Islands lives in Stanley, the + rest in camp settlements. Camp dwellers, scattered randomly on the two + main islands of West and East Falklands and on some of the nearby 200 + outer islands of the archipelago, entertain a traditional disdain and + dislike for the “city folk” of Stanley and the two societies live + effectively cut off from one another.

+

(U) Responsible both for the economic existence and the increasing + stagnation of the Islands is the Falkland Islands Company. The FIC, as + it is called, exercises a virtual monopoly over the Islands, owning + about half the land, half of the 600,000 sheep and producing nearly half + the revenue, at a profit of some US $1.2 + million a year. The company, set up by British royal charter in the + mid-1800’s, operates the Islands’ only inter-island cargo vessel, the + main Stanley jetty, the main warehouse and repair service and the + largest general store. Its domain embraces nearly every aspect of the Islanders’ daily life. Workers + live in the company houses, eat in company kitchens or receive company + supplied food, shop at the company store and save at the company + “bank.”

+

(C) At the same time, the company encourages no competition and has made + no effort to develop the islands beyond wool production. While resident + company officials, mostly non-“natives,” are among the loudest to + condemn Argentine intentions, most are assigned to the Islands only + temporarily and evidence little loyalty beyond that to their + stockholders.

+

(U) The Islands are administered by a governor appointed by the British + Crown, assisted by an executive council which includes the colonial + secretary and the treasurer (also appointed from England) and six island + counselors and a legislative council which includes again the colonial + secretary and treasurer and five locally elected representatives, + apportioned from Stanley and the Camp. Government, for the most part, + means carrying out instructions received from London, administering + public services, keeping the inter-islands Beaver aircraft flying, and + serving as liaison between island interests and the UK. Forty-two Royal British marines + comprise the Falklands’ token defense force.

+

(U) The British government is, along with the FIC, the main employer on + the Islands. Local revenues come from fairly hefty local taxes, with the + British government kicking in mainly salary differentials for British + government-hired doctors, teachers, pilots and other necessary skilled + personnel. The UK also finances major + projects, such as the new airstrip, boarding facilities for the Stanley + school, and the first road to be built outside of Stanley, currently + under construction.

+

(U) Given the declining and largely unskilled native population on the + Islands, contract workers make up as much as a quarter of the + population. These are hired by the British government as well as by the + wool companies. Most come to the Islands on two-year renewable contracts + with a one-way (to the Islands) trip paid. Contract workers are paid the + Islands salaries of some two to four thousand pounds a year (US $4,000–$8,000), with the difference from + normal British salaries paid directly to their accounts in the UK.

+

(C) The presence of contract workers and the posted British officials is + viewed as a necessary evil, occasioning among many Islanders + considerable resentment as well. Native Islanders, for example, are not + paid the salary differential automatically granted to British contract + workers for the same work. From what the reporting officer saw and heard + while visiting the Islands, the “natives” do not mix easily with + officials or contract workers, partly due to personality differences and + native prejudice against “outsiders.” Many of the Islanders (quite + correctly) also distrust the UK’s + commitment to retaining the Falklands as a colony and are deeply suspicious of the current + bilateral talks with Argentina. The Islanders also spoke of the social + segregation and “snobbish” behavior of the temporarily-posted officials + and contract-workers.

+

(C) Among the complaints of the Islanders were the failure of Britain to + provide more generous and active economic support and to “face down” the + Argentines on the question of political sovereignty. Knowledgeable + Islanders suspect the winds are changing against continued political + attachment to England. Some are coming to grips with that possibility + and speak of their determination to remain on the Islands under any + flag; others prefer to fight the Argentine presence. One British-born + long-time resident married to an Islander asked if the United States + might be interested in “taking over” the Islands if the British bowed + out. Another hinted ominously that the inhabitants may “offer” the + Islands to the Russians, who heavily fish the surrounding waters.

+

(C) Despite its threats, the formerly vociferous Falkland Islands + Committee which fights for keeping the Islands British, has lost a lot + of its thunder of late. Finances for the small, albeit effective, + Committee delegation in the UK is + growing tight, and Islander membership is falling off. A spate of + vandalism against Argentine targets or symbols on the Islands in 1975 + and 1976 has also ceased and a sense of resignation, with pockets of + vocal protest, permeates Stanley.

+

(C) It can be expected that if the Islands return to Argentine + possession, a significant number of British residents will depart the + Islands. It is less clear whether Argentina will have any more luck + populating the Malvinas with Argentine pioneers than it has had + populating its own vast, empty Patagonia.

+

IV. Americans and US Interests in the Islands

+

(U) There are some ten US citizens living + in the Malvinas, five in Stanley and another five or six in the Camp. + All but one at the time of the reporting officer’s January 1979 visit + were Bahai, a universalist religious sect which increases exposure to + the faith by encouraging members to “pioneer” in various parts of the + world. Pioneers pay their own travel expenses and find their own jobs. + They live scattered throughout the community and apparently seek + adherents not through active proselytizing, but through attracting + others to their simple and serene life style. Members abstain from + political activity and alcohol, but are not rigidly organized or + segregated. The reporting officer did not detect any aberration or + coercion in connection with their presence or activities in Stanley.

+

Those Bahais visited in Stanley appeared to be fairly well integrated + into the community. The senior Bahai was John Leonard, a gracious fatherly person who has worked + for the FIC in Stanley for 22 years. Other US citizens on the Islands are John and Jeanne Sheridan + (she works as the secretary to the British colonial secretary, he is a + cabinet maker and artist); Kathryn Watson (a nurse married to a + British-contract dentist); Don and Debbie Youngquist (who live in Port + Stephans settlement, where he works as an electrician); Greg and Polly + Malby (who live on Fox Bay East settlement where he works as a carpenter + and electrician and she as a nurse); and Martin Dibble and Robin Grey + who work as laborers at the Port Howard settlement. American citizen + Margaret Smith, who is not a Bahai, was working on a settlement during + the reporting officer’s January 1979 visit. The Bahais in Stanley + expressed considerable satisfaction at the visit of an American + government official and requested assistance with US tax, passport, residency and other + documents and information. (It was later arranged with the UK Embassy in Buenos Aires that US citizens on the Islands could transmit + their passports for renewal to the US + Embassy in Buenos Aires through the British Embassy’s Stanley-Buenos + Aires weekly air pouch.)

+

(U) The US at present has no economic or + political interests in the Islands. An American shrimp-shelling + equipment manufacturer has been approached by a British firm to consider + participating in a commercial krill processing project, with no concrete + results to date. Potential oil reserves are unknown and high extraction + costs preclude near term petroleum exploitation in the Malvinas area. + American marine archeologists and conservationists are increasingly + visiting the Islands, attracted by the many historical shipwrecks and + interesting and unique flora and fauna.

+

(U) Strategically the Malvinas are important for their geographical + location straddling the southern Atlantic. Although a Soviet presence or + base on the Malvinas might properly be viewed with alarm by the US for strategic and defense reasons, that + possibility appears remote. The US + position on the Argentine-British dispute has been strictly neutral and + the USG has always abstained on the + issue in world fora.

+

[Omitted here are sections on “Travel and Logistics” and “Life on the + Malvinas.”]

+

VII. Conclusion

+

(C) The steady depopulation and economic stagnation of the Islands + coupled with Britain’s confidentially acknowledged intention to ease out + of its anachronistic colonial rule make it fairly apparent that + Argentina will eventually triumph in its long pressed claim to the + Malvinas. What of the present British heritage will remain and whether + the Argentines will be more successful in populating and making + economically viable the archipelago is worthy of doubt. Argentine + interest in the Malvinas is primarily strategic and historic and only + secondarily economic. The vast + barrenness and distance of the Malvinas, coupled with its present + minimal economic output, would require a major costly and sustained + effort on the part of succeeding Argentine governments to boost the + islands out of their present stagnation. Argentine Vice-Commodore + Canosa, who presently + represents his government on the Islands, speaks expansively of future + Argentine plans to bring roads and houses, businesses and factories, + tourists and Argentine pioneers to the Malvinas. In the end, it may well + be the sheep and penguins that win out.

+ + ChaplinChaplin initialed “MC” next to this typewritten + signature. + +
+ +
+ 2. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in + ArgentinaSource: Department + of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D800225–0913. Secret; + Priority; Exdis. Sent for + information Priority to London. Drafted by J.D. Blacken (ARA/CEN); cleared in S/S–O and in draft by Deputy Assistant + Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs John A. Bushnell, W.R. + Warne (ARA/CAR), and M. Michaud + (EUR/NE); and approved by + Bowdler. + + + Washington, May 7, 1980, 0200Z + +

120050. Subject: US/UK Consultations: UK Talks on Falkland Islands.

+

1. Secret–Entire text.

+

2. During the discussion on the Caribbean and Guatemala-Belize (septels)The + portion of the conversation dealing with the Caribbean was + summarized and transmitted by the Department in telegram 117143 to + London, Ottawa, Paris, Bonn, USNATO, USINT + Havana, Kingston, Paramaribo, and Brussels, May 3. (Department of + State, Central Foreign Policy File, D800220–0586) A summary of the + portion of the conversation that addressed the Guatemala-Belize + border dispute was transmitted in telegram 121020 to Belize, May 8. + (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, + D800227–0153) on April 30 between UK + FCO Minister Ridley and FCO Latin America Director Harding, and Asst. Secretary + Bowdler and DAS Bushnell, Ridley described his recent talks with the Argentines + concerning the Falkland Islands.The talks + took place April 28–29 in New York. The British and Argentine + delegations were headed by Ridley and Cavandoli, respectively. A formal summary of the + talks was presented in the form of two separate but identical + letters from the delegations to Waldheim, dated May 5. The U.S. Mission to the + United Nations reported on May 13 that the letters were circulated + as General Assembly documents on May 12. The English language text + of these letters was transmitted to the Department in telegram 1871 + from USUN, May 13. (Department of + State, Central Foreign Policy File, D800242–0884)

+

3. Ridley said that his recent + meeting with the Argentines should be called “talks” rather than + negotiations. He met with the Argentine Foreign Minister Cavandoli to test the Argentine + position and report back to his government. An anodyne communique had + been issued at the conclusion of the talks. The Argentine position is + that they want to have a solution which enables them to say that the + Islands have been returned to them.

+

4. For the 1850 British residents on the Islands, the problem is one of + their interest which is not to be Argentinian. This is also an emotional + political issue in the UK all out of + proportion to the number of people involved. However, if nothing is + done, the Argentines might harass the British on the Island. Ridley said that both sides would have + to be flexible. He commented that perhaps one solution might be for the + UK to recognize Argentine + sovereignty, then lease the Islands, since no Argentines live on them; + however, this raises questions of oil rights, etc.

+

5. Argentine military leaders told Ridley that Argentina had just two major foreign policy + problems left—the Beagle Channel,See footnote 2, Document 1. and + Falkland Island disputes—and once they were solved the slate would be + wiped clean. Then, the military could turn the country over to a + civilian government.

+

6. Ridley remarked that the + Argentines appeared to be “increasingly thick” with the Russians and, to + a lesser extent perhaps, with the Cubans. Bowdler noted that they appeared interested in + developing cooperation with the Soviets on nuclear energy. The U.S., + however, did not believe that they were developing a close relationship + with the Cubans. Bushnell pointed out that Cuban support of Argentine + terrorists will continue to be an impediment to close relations beyond + trade between the Argentine military regime and the Cubans.

+ + Christopher + +
+ +
+ + 3. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United + KingdomSource: Department + of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D810100–0377. Secret; + Immediate; Exdis. Sent for + information Immediate to Buenos Aires. Drafted by Funseth; cleared by Eagleburger and Bremer; and approved by Goldberg. + + + Washington, March 3, 1981, 2021Z + +

53712. Subject: Secretary’s Meeting With British Foreign Secretary + Carrington, February 27, + 1981: Falkland Islands.

+

1. (S–Entire text).

+

2. At their meeting on the above date and subject, Carrington briefly outlined what he + regards as the principal elements of the UK dispute with Argentina over the Falkland Islands.No memorandum of conversation of this meeting + has been found. Argentina will not agree to put its claims + before the International Court because they are not valid. Problem for + Britain is similar to what they frequently encounter when they try to + cast off a colony: The people who live on the Falkland Islands do not + want to become Argentines.On January 20, as + part of an overall assessment of British policy toward Latin America + and the Caribbean, the Embassy in London wrote of the state of the + Falklands/Malvinas negotiations: “The end-of-year push to achieve + some movement toward a settlement with Argentina on the Falklands + dispute came to naught. Ridley’s efforts to employ a forcing strategy in + negotiations with the Islanders were thwarted by a small but + highly-effective Falklands lobby in London, concentrated in the + House of Lords and the Conservative media. As a result, Ridley was forced to back off and + give public assurances that nothing would be done to change the + status of the Islanders without their express approval. The Foreign + Office, though discouraged, will probably have another go at moving + things off dead center before the current Parliament is dismissed. + Ridley may have decided + it is simply not worth the trouble.” (Telegram 1165 from London, + January 20; Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, + D810029–0299) The British tactic is to keep the ball in the + air as long as possible in order to avoid a showdown with Argentina. One + idea the British are considering is to cede sovereignty of the Falkland + Islands to Argentina on the understanding that Argentina would lease + back the Islands to Britain for 99 years. The Falkland Islanders don’t + like this idea.

+

3. Participants in addition to principals: US—Stoessel, + Rashish, Eagleburger, Streator and Funseth; UK—Henderson, + Palliser, Bullard, Fretwell, Walden, Fenn and Pakenham.

+ + Haig + +
+ +
+ + 4. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Kingdom to the Department + of StateSource: Department of + State, Central Foreign Policy File, D810117–1025. Confidential. Sent + for information to Buenos Aires. + + + London, March 12, 1981, 1235Z + +

4663. Subject: Britain Searches for Solution to Falkland Island Dispute. + Ref: State 53712.See Document 3.

+

1. (C–Entire text) Summary: Although last month’s talks in New YorkBritish and Argentine representatives, led by + Ridley and Cavandoli respectively, convened + in New York February 23–24 for a new round of discussions on the + status of the Falklands/Malvinas. During these talks, the first + between the two sides since April 1980, the two sides agreed to + pursue the “question” of the Islands “in further negotiations at an + early date.” On March 23, the two sides confirmed the outcome of the + talks in separate but identical letters to Waldheim from Beltramno and Whyte, + which were circulated as General Assembly documents on April 1. The + text of these letters was transmitted to the Department in telegram + 1050 from USUN on April 3. + (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D810160–0579) + During a meeting with a USUN + official, April 3, a UKUN officer + described the February session as “more an opportunity to give + Argentines and Falkland Islanders exposure to each other” than “a + substantive meeting.” (Ibid.) produced no progress toward a + settlement of Britain’s dispute with Argentina over the Falkland + Islands, they may have served a useful purpose. Island negotiators may + finally realize that the current arrangement cannot be maintained + indefinitely. The Islanders are considering new proposals as a basis for + further discussions with the Argentines. Another round of talks, + however, is unlikely before the end of the year. While the search for a + settlement continues, the status quo serves as a useful reminder to + Britain of its continuing responsibilities in the Western Hemisphere. + End summary.

+

2. Stalemate in New York: On March 10, Ron + Deare, Head of the Foreign Office’s West Indian and + Atlantic Department, reviewed the status of discussions with Argentina + on the future of the Falkland Islands. The ministerial level talks in + New York at the end of February produced a stalemate. Argentina still + insisted on its sovereignty, and the Islanders were determined to remain + British. Minister of State Nicholas + Ridley had carried a mandate from London to support the + Islanders.

+

3. Reviewing the options: During the runup to the New York talks, + Ridley, in an effort to get + things off dead center, had proposed several options to the Islanders + including a lease-back arrangement which would have conceded Argentina + sovereignty over the Islands on the understanding that they would + immediately be leased back to the British for a specified period. The Islanders wanted to make no + concessions. They proposed a freezing of the status quo for as long as + fifty years, in the hopes that the problem would somehow disappear in + the interim. The ensuing discussions predictably made little + progress.

+

4. A poor start: The Argentines were in a belligerent mood even before + the talks began. They were incensed by a proposal being considered by + the Islanders to encourage the immigration of laborers from the British + dependency of St. Helena. The Falklands have a labor shortage and St. + Helena has a labor surplus. What the Islanders viewed as a mutually + beneficial economic arrangement sent the Argentines straight up the + wall. They regarded it either as a scheme to ensure long-term British + domination or as an insidious plot “to dilute Argentina’s racial stock.” + Not the best way to start negotiations, Deare observed.

+

5. The bright side: There was, however, a positive aspect. The inclusion + of two Islanders on the British side of the table was a useful + educational device. They were “shocked” to learn first hand of the depth + of the Argentine feeling on the sovereignty issue. They went home in a + sober mood. Through them, Deare + opined, the Islanders may finally realize that the status quo cannot be + maintained indefinitely.

+

6. Next steps: The Falklanders are now reassessing their position and in + due course will come back to the British with new proposals as a basis + for further discussions with the Argentines. Fortunately the upcoming + elections are likely to occupy center stage in Buenos Aires over the + summer. Nothing therefore is likely to occur much before the end of the + year when another effort will be made.

+

7. The U.S. perspective: Against this background, the best the British + are likely to achieve in the near-term is to neutralize the issue in the + hopes that, with time, the realities of interdependence will eventually + compel the parties themselves to come to terms. From the U.S. + standpoint, a settlement would remove another contentious Latin American + perennial. But while the search for a settlement continues, the status + quo serves as a useful reminder to Britain of its continuing + responsibilities in the Western Hemisphere.

+ + Streator + +
+ +
+ + 5. Telegram From the Embassy in Argentina to the Department of + StateSource: Department of + State, Central Foreign Policy File, D810152–0335. Confidential. Sent + for information to London. + + + Buenos Aires, March 30, 1981, + 1830Z + +

2289. Subject: (U) Falkland Islands Negotiations: The View From Buenos + Aires. Ref: London 4663.See Document 4.

+

1. (C) Summary: Argentine Government hopes that recent New York + talksSee footnote 3, + Document 4. have convinced Falkland Islanders and + HMG that freeze in the status quo + is unacceptable. The GOA would be + willing to consider a lease-back arrangement. End summary.

+

2. (U) On March 6 the Argentine Foreign Ministry issued a communique in + which it referred to recent rumors about the status of negotiations on + the Falkland/Malvinas question and declared GOA continues to reject any proposal that does not + recognize Argentine sovereignty over the Islands as a first principle. + GOA statement also noted that the + negotiations have been stepped up since April of 1980.See footnote 3, Document + 2.

+

3. (C) EmbOff called on Ricardo Forrester of the Foreign + Ministry’s Office of Antarctic and Malvinas Affairs. Although Argentines + firmly maintain that the negotiations are bilateral between the UK and Argentina, Forrester did not indicate that GOA is miffed at the participation in the + UK Delegation of the two Islanders, + known as “Kelpers” (for the seaweed that grows along the Islands’ + shorelines). Noting that the Kelper lobby is strong in London, he + implicitly acknowledged that Islander attitudes are an important factor + in finding a solution. He said he hopes that a more realistic debate + will now take place on the Islands. An Argentine Army Colonel who works + on Malvinas matters told EmbOff that + he was cautiously optimistic that negotiations would not get off dead + center, although, he added, previous talks have gone through cycles of + hope and disillusion in the past. Argentines, therefore, seem to + approach a new phase in the discussion with circumspection.

+

4. (C) The Islanders will be holding elections in the second half of this + year. According to UK Embassy Malvinas + Officer Richard Gosney, the + incumbent popularly-elected leaders, called Counsellors, are reluctant + to make commitments that would limit their successors’ options. + Nevertheless, the community of 1,800 is closely knit despite being + scattered and isolated, and, according to Gosney, there is reason to hope that discussion among + the Islanders will proceed so that the new authorities will be ready to present views to HMG soon after taking office in the latter + part of 1981.

+

5. (C) The Argentines are prepared to wait a while, but their patience is + limited, according to Forrester. + He acknowledged that Argentina would be willing to consider a lease-back + arrangement, depending on the formulation. Economic decline of the + Islands is of concern to all parties, although he noted that in addition + to promising geological structures indicating that the area has + petroleum potential, there are substantial fishing resources. These at + present are exploited mostly by the Poles and Soviets. Argentina and the + UK, according to Forrester, share the hope that the + sovereignty issue can finally be resolved so that progress can be made + on economic problems.

+ + Shlaudeman + +
+ +
+ 6. Telegram From the Embassy in Argentina to the Department of + StateSource: Department of + State, Central Foreign Policy File, D810356–0871. Confidential. Sent + for information to London, Montevideo, Rome, Santiago, and + Warsaw. + + + Buenos Aires, July 30, 1981, + 1225Z + +

5542. Rome for Vatican. Subject: Argentina Urges Acceleration of + Negotiations. Ref: (A) Buenos Aires 5472 (Notal),Telegram 5472 from Buenos + Aires, July 27, addressed Argentine press coverage of the question + of Argentina’s participation in the Multinational Force and + Observers mission (MFO), an entity + which was to serve in a peacekeeping capacity following Israeli + withdrawal from Egypt’s Sinai Peninsula. (Department of State, + Central Foreign Policy File, D810351–0120) (B) memcon of July + 8, 1981 with British EmbOff in + Buenos Aires (Notal).Not found.

+

1. (C) Summary. On July 22, Foreign Ministry announced that it was urging + HMG to accelerate the pace of + negotiations over the Falkland Islands (Malvinas). The announcement + revealed some details of a strong and detailed reiteration of the GOA’s position contained in a note handed + to the British Ambassador here. The timing and vigorous tone of the + statement took the British here somewhat by surprise, but the substance + was not new, according to a source at UK + Embassy. FonMin Camilion said + that the GOA acted now because the + Falklanders will hold municipal elections in September and he plans to + meet with Lord Carrington in New York at the + UN General Assembly.See Document 7. We + suspect that Camilion’s timing + may also be related to the Junta’s consideration of participation in the + Sinai MFO. He may want to divert media + attention from that subject or, on the contrary, make a point: Arab + support on the Malvinas issue would be jeopardized by Argentine + participation in MFO. End summary.

+

2. (U) Key points of the GOA note + are:

+

(A) No significant progress has occurred since the recommencement of + Falkland negotiations in 1977.

+

(B) Better communications between the Islands and South America have not + produced the intended results of “improving mutual understanding” and + “contributing to a successful negotiation.”

+

(C) The question of Island sovereignty is a subject for bilateral + negotiation between GOA and HMG exclusively; Islander attitudes are + not a factor.

+

(D) There are only two alternatives: effective Argentine sovereignty over + the Falklands, South Georgia and South Sandwich Islands or a + continuation of the status quo, and the latter is not only intolerable + to GOA and world community but also + means a constant deterioration in the economy of the Islands.

+

3. (U) The note goes on to state the longstanding GOA position on sovereignty and + willingness to respect the interests of the Falklanders. It adds that + Argentina will continue to provide services to the Islanders (among + other things, air transport, fuel and some foodstuffs) as long as there + is “an evident British political will to advance constructively” in the + negotiations. The GOA states that it is + prepared to have the United Nations guarantee that the interests of the + Islanders will be protected. (References to the role of the UN interlace the statement.) Finally, the + communique indicates that “Argentina will consider practical + arrangements that take into account the interests of those who could + benefit from the development of the Islands’ resources.”

+

4. (U) In a separate but related development, on July 24 the Argentine + Navy stopped six Polish vessels for fishing “within Argentine + jurisdictional waters south of the Malvinas” (precise location not + cited), escorted them to an area beyond the claimed jurisdictional + waters and lodged a protest with the Polish fleet commander.

+

5. (C) A British Embassy official who handles Falkland affairs here told + EmbOff that GOA statement appears at first reading to + contain nothing new. However, he noted that the timing is somewhat + odd—the Island elections and meeting in New York with FonSec Carrington + are six weeks off—and its tone is + more vigorous than in the past. The implied threat to cut back further + on services to the Islands (flights were reduced from twice weekly to + once weekly some time ago) was cited as an example, but he acknowledged + that GOA entities—the state airline and + the state oil company—are losing money on these operations, so HMG is not surprised at GOA frustration. British Embassy official + was unwilling to speculate on reasons for new, tougher line on the + Malvinas. With respect to the six Polish trawlers, he said they had not + been able to learn coordinates of vessels’ location when they were + stopped, and HMG will consider what + action to take, if any, once this information is obtained.

+

6. (C) Comment: FonMin Camilion + has wrapped himself tightly in the flag over the Malvinas before (Ref + B), no doubt in part to dispel doubts about him among the Argentine + military. But the unlikely timing and unusual force of this announcement + makes us suspect he has ulterior motives. Camilion is in a difficult spot on the Sinai MFO issue, which is receiving heavy press + play, including a strong “La Prensa” editorial on July 28 in support of + Argentine participation; Camilion + may be trying to divert attention to another issue. On the other hand, + he may be trying to remind his readers that Arab support of the + Argentine position on the Malvinas should be factored into the Sinai + participation equation. In the same vein, we note that last week the + Under Secretary for International Economic Relations in the Foreign + Ministry, Ambassador Figuerero Antequeda, announced out of the blue that + Argentina and a large number of unspecified Arab countries will soon be + signing a major commercial agreement, but no other details were offered. + Argentina has never had significant trade with the Arab world.

+ + Shlaudeman + +
+ +
+ + 7. Telegram From the Embassy in Argentina to the Department of + StateSource: Department of + State, Central Foreign Policy File, D810469–0965. Confidential. Sent + for information to London and USCINCSO. + + + Buenos Aires, October 5, 1981, + 1900Z + +

7196. CINCSO also for POLAD. Subject: + Malvinas/Falklands Dispute.

+

1. (U) Foreign Minister Oscar + Camilion was questioned sharply on this subject at his + airport press conference on arrival from the U.S. October 4. Camilion said he and Lord Carrington had agreed in New + York that once certain events have taken place over the coming weeks + (meaning the current round of elections in the Islands), a date would be + set for resuming the negotiations, perhaps before the end of the year. + Asked if it were true, as press accounts from New York suggested, that + he and Lord Carrington had also + agreed that the Islands could not continue as a “colony”, the Minister + asserted his belief in a general “understanding” that “the status quo of + the Mavinas can no longer be maintained and now we must negotiate.”

+

2. (U) The Minister replied to a question on the attitude of the + inhabitants of the Islands with the statement that Argentina is + committed to respect their interests but will not consult them. In his + view, the Islanders have no right to veto in a negotiation that is + between the UK and Argentina. According + to the press, the Minister became irritated and refused to answer when + questioned as to what specific steps the GOA might take to resolve the issue.

+

3. (C) Comment. HMG’s Ambassador here, + Anthony Williams, told me + that Lord Carrington made clear + to Camilion in New York that the + question is not one of respecting the “interests” of the Islanders, but + rather of respecting their “desires.” Williams says that the current elections in the Islands + seem to be producing an even harder line there. The general sentiment in + his understanding is against any more talks whatsoever with the + Argentines. Williams nevertheless + expects a new negotiating session, if not before the end of the year, in + the early months of 1982. But he looks for nothing positive by way of + results. In his view HMG has about + exhausted its ingenuity, particularly with the idea of ceding + sovereignty and then leasing back the Islands. The Argentines, on the + other hand, seem unwilling or unable to go beyond saying “the Malvinas + are ours.”

+

He also notes continuing muttering in the GOA about cutting off Argentine air service and supply to + the Islands.

+ + Shlaudeman + +
+ +
+ + 8. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Kingdom to the Department + of StateSource: Department of + State, Central Foreign Policy File, D810588–0688. Confidential. Sent + for information to Buenos Aires, Brasilia, and Bern. + + + London, December 10, 1981, 1704Z + +

24464. Subj: Talks Resume on Falkland Islands. Ref: London 4663.See Document + 4.

+

1. C–Entire text.

+

2. Summary: Anglo-Argentine talks on the future of the Falkland Islands + will be held in Geneva on Dec. 18–19. With no solution in sight, the + British objective is simply to keep the process of dialogue going. While + the search for a settlement continues, the status quo serves as a useful + reminder to Britain of its continuing responsibilities in the Western + Hemisphere. End summary.

+

3. Robin Fearn, Head of the + Foreign Office’s South America Department, confirmed to EmbOff on December 8 that talks on the + future of the Falkland Islands will be held in Geneva on December 18–19. + Two representatives of the Falkland Islands will also attend the + talks.

+

4. Fearn noted that circumstances + had gotten in the way of an earlier resumption of the talks adjourned in + New York at the end of February.

+

—In March, the government in Buenos Aires changed.On March 29, Lieutenant General Roberto Viola replaced Lieutenant + General Jorge Rafael Videla + as head of the Argentine Junta and de facto President.

+

—In July, Argentina, after informal talks with HMG, had circulated a statement at the UN about reconvening talks.

+

—In October, Legislative Council elections were held in the Falklands, + with HMG pledged to consult with the + winners.

+

5. HMG views Argentina as the proposer + and HMG as the responder in the + upcoming talks. The sovereignty issue remains central, and the Islanders + seem more determined than ever to remain British. HMG’s position is straightforward: It + seeks a resolution of the issue, but will not agree to a settlement + “over the heads of the Islanders.”

+

6. HMG is pessimistic about + possibilities for any dramatic breakthroughs. The Islanders have + rejected the lease back arrangement, and few options seem available. It + might help, Fearn speculated, if + there were another government in Argentina. It is easy to understand, he + said, why those currently in charge in Buenos Aires are not well loved. + The Falklanders argue with considerable effect in London that they do + not wish to become “1800 more disappeared persons.” From the U.S. standpoint, while the search for + a settlement continues, the status quo serves as a useful reminder to + Britain of its continuing responsibilities in the Western + Hemisphere.On December 14, the scheduled + talks were postponed following a request from the Argentine Deputy + Foreign Minister, which cited his need to remain in Buenos Aires + during the transition of government following President Viola’s ouster by fellow members + of the ruling military Junta on December 10. In telegram 24760 from + London, December 15, the Embassy reported that “no new date was set + for the talks, but the British assume the delay may carry over until + the spring as the new Argentine government reassesses its position + on the Falklands.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy + File, D810596–1184) After a brief interval, Viola was succeeded as de facto + President of Argentina by Lieutenant General Leopoldo Galtieri on December + 22.

+ + Louis + +
+ +
+ 9. Memorandum of ConversationSource: Department of State, Bureau of European Affairs, United + Kingdom Political Files, Lot 89D489, POL–15(h) Country Political 82—Latin America. + Confidential. Drafted by Keane on January 28; cleared by King. + + + Buenos Aires, January + 27, 1982 + + + SUBJECT + Status of Falklands Dispute; Beagle Negotiations; Argentine Ties + to Nonaligned Movement + + + PARTICIPANTS + Mr. Richard Forrester, + Malvinas Desk, Ministry of Foreign Affairs + John F. Keane, Political + Officer, American Embassy + +

Falklands Dispute

+

Forrester does not expect any + significant new Argentine initiative regarding the Malvinas dispute in + the near future. Activity has been at a standstill in his office since + the government crisis here led to postponement of talks scheduled for + late last year.See footnote 4, Document 8. Rescheduling them may be + put off until Ambassador Ortiz de + Rozas is replaced in London.

+ +

I asked Forrester for his views on + a recent article in Buenos Aires daily La Prensa + by gadfly Iglesias Rouco, who alleged that the Galtieri administration may be + considering sending an “ultimatum” to Her Majesty’s Government demanding + recognition of Argentine sovereignty over the Malvinas and significant + movement toward resolution of the drawn-out dispute. Forrester brushed aside the article as + Rouco’s fantasy. He acknowledged that there are officials in the Armed + Forces and the Foreign Ministry who would like to threaten or use force, + but these people are not involved in the issue. He noted, for example, + that in the Foreign Ministry the only officials involved are Under + Secretary Ros, the Malvinas + directorate, the legal division in a supporting role and, of course, + Foreign Minister Costa Mendez. + He said that he did not know the attitude of Costa Mendez or the President, but it + appeared to him that the administration is fully engaged in other issues + (e.g. the economy and, in foreign affairs, the Beagle dispute). The + Malvinas problem is on the back burner.

+

[Omitted here are portions of the discussion relating to Argentina’s + dispute with Chile over the Beagle Channel, Argentine participation in + the Non-Aligned Movement, and decisionmaking in the Argentine Foreign + Ministry.]

+
+ +
+ 10. Editorial Note +

On February 24, 1982, the Deputy Chief of Mission of the U.S. Embassy in + London, Edward J. Streator, met + with British Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs + Richard Luce for a tour + d’horizon of Latin American topics in anticipation of the latter’s + meeting with Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs + Thomas O. Enders, scheduled + to take place in Washington on March 1. During the meeting, which also + touched upon El Salvador, Belize, and Cuba, Luce commented on the upcoming negotiations on the + Falklands/Malvinas, set to begin in New York on February 26. In telegram + 4235 from London, February 25, the Embassy transmitted a synopsis of the + meeting and on these negotiations: “Luce noted that he would be in New York over the weekend + for further discussions with Argentine officials on the future of the + Falkland Islands. The Argentines, he said, were if anything more prickly + than ever. The new regime in Buenos Aires was sounding more hawkish. It + came through in a more aggressive attitude toward Chile over the Beagle + Channel, and the Falklands negotiations could easily go the same route, + to the disadvantage of all concerned. Luce wondered if we + might quietly pass the word to the Argentines to ‘cool it’ a bit.” + (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D820101–1058)

+

No memorandum of conversation or summary of Luce’s March 1 meeting with Enders has been found, although British Foreign + Secretary Lord Carrington + stated in his March 8 message to Secretary of State Alexander M. Haig, Jr. that the + Falklands/Malvinas were among the topics discussed by the two officials + (see Document 12). The Department transmitted a + summary of the portion of the meeting in which British commitments to + Belize were discussed in telegram 55897 to Belize, London, and + Guatemala, March 3, repeated for information to USSOUTHCOM, March 13. (Department + of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D820114–0181)

+
+ +
+ + 11. Telegram From the Embassy in Argentina to the Department of + StateSource: Department of + State, Central Foreign Policy File, D820117–0752. Confidential. Sent + for information to London, Montevideo, Rome, and + Santiago. + + + Buenos Aires, March 4, 1982, + 1855Z + +

1250. Subject: (U) Malvinas Dispute. Refs: (A) Buenos Aires 1197,Telegram 1197 from Buenos Aires, March 2, + conveyed an informal translation of the text of a “tough” statement + on the outcome of the February 26–27 talks, which Figueroa issued the evening of + March 1. After discussing the Argentine proposal for monthly + Anglo-Argentine meetings on the Falklands/Malvinas, the objective of + which “will be to genuinely accelerate negotiations underway toward + obtaining recognition of Argentine sovereignty over the Malvinas, + South Georgia, and South Sandwich Islands,” the statement continued: + “Argentina has for fifteen years negotiated patiently, loyally and + in good faith with Great Britain for a solution of the dispute over + sovereignty on those islands within the framework of the U.N. + resolutions. The new system is a positive step toward an early + solution to the issue. In the event this (early solution) does not + occur, Argentina retains the right to put an end to that mechanism + and to choose freely the procedure which best suits her interests.” + (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, + D820112–0040) (B) Buenos Aires 1112.In telegram 1112 from Buenos Aires, February 26, the + Embassy conveyed its comments on Ros’s remarks to the press after the February talks + and the views of a British Embassy official on U.K. impressions of + Argentina’s approach to the bilateral talks. In response to + Luce’s February 24 + request (see Document 10) for the United + States to “quietly urge restraint on the Argentines,” the Embassy + advised that the United States should “avoid involvement” in the + dispute. “As Department recalls, the Argentine Navy has tried to + draw us into the dispute on Argentina’s side. In any case, the cost + to us here of being perceived as leaning toward the British in this + dispute, which arouses Argentine passions, could be high and the + Argentines would find ways of indicating their displeasure.” In a + final comment, the Embassy noted: “Some of our contacts in the + GOA have sought to convey a + sense of urgency about the current round of negotiations” and “we + have also heard references to an Argentine desire to accelerate the + pace of the negotiations but it is hard for us to tell what + precisely the Argentines hope to accomplish.” (Department of State, + Central Foreign Policy File, D820105–0567)

+

1. (C) Summary: The focus of the Feb. 26–27 UK–GOA talks on the + Falkland Islands was on the pace of the negotiations rather than the + substantive issues. The Argentine delegation proposed monthly meetings + which it hopes will accelerate resolution of the dispute or at least + give the appearance of movement to the domestic audience. A combination + of carrots and sticks which the GOA + revealed on its drawing boards is not new and the GOA breach of confidentiality of the talks + was an irritant to HMG. The ball is now + in HMG’s court, but UK official here is not optimistic, since + HMG rejects GOA premise that negotiations are + predicated on HMG acceptance of + Argentine sovereignty over the Islands. End summary.

+

2. (U) The unilateral GOA FonMin + statement of March 1 (reftel A) + marks a renewed effort by the Argentines to force the pace of the Falkland Islands negotiations. + GOA statement reveals part of what + transpired at the New York talks, in violation of an understanding with + HMG to treat the substance of the + negotiations confidential. Furthermore, in a press backgrounder, a + FonMin source, probably Costa + Mendez himself, “revealed” how the GOA is prepared to take Islanders’ + interests into account, but also how GOA would bring pressure to bear if no solution develops + soon.

+

3. (U) The GOA is preparing several + proposals to be tabled at the next meeting, according to the FonMin + source. These include “statutes” that Argentina would implement + guaranteeing respect for the economic interests, religious freedom, + political structures and a system for compensating those inhabitants of + the Islands who might choose to leave once Argentine sovereignty comes + into force. On the other hand, according to the source, if the + negotiations remain stalemated, the GOA + is prepared to carry out a “well-defined plan” of increasing pressure on + HMG, including UN denunciations, “international juridical + measures” (presumably the World Court), economic pressure on the + Islanders, and a step-by-step cooling of bilateral relations, all the + way to a complete break. Some of the measures the GOA would consider against the Islanders, + according to the press, include suspension of the Islands’ only airplane + connections and air postal service to the outside world, and suspension + of Argentine fuel shipments. However, the source noted that, contrary to + some jingoistic press speculation, the GOA is not contemplating the use of force to seize the + Islands.

+

4. (C) A British Embassy official who handles Falkland affairs told + EmbOff on March 3 that Argentine + FonMin statement took HMG by surprise + and is likely to annoy HMG because of + the breach of confidentiality. We note BA dailies March 4 carry wire service reports that HMG negotiator Richard Luce said the GOA statement is “not positive and it concerns us.” He + confirmed that in the New York talks Argentina proposed high-level + monthly meetings with pre-determined agendas, but it is by no means + certain that HMG will accept, in view + of the complexity of the issues to be discussed and impracticality of + such frequent meetings. Moreover, the premise implied in the Argentine + statement that the objective of the monthly talks would be to determine + when the UK will recognize Argentine + sovereignty is totally unacceptable to HMG.

+

5. (C) As to the “concessions” Argentina is prepared to make to win “the + hearts and minds of the Islanders” and the threat of sanctions in the + event of an impasse, as UK + EmbOff put it, there is nothing new + in the Argentine proposal. Former Foreign Minister Camilion made the same offers and + threats last year, he pointed out (81 Buenos Aires 5542).See Document 6. He + was not willing to speculate on whether the GOA means it this + time, although he said that there have been too many rumors recently of + a hardening GOA position to dismiss + them entirely.

+

6. (C) Comment: The unilateral Argentine communique was released before + the GOA negotiator returned to Buenos + Aires, indicating that the GOA planned + to issue it regardless of the outcome of the talks, which the British + entered with instructions to listen only. In any event, the Foreign + Ministry has limited influence on GOA + decisions regarding the Malvinas, which, like the Beagle, is managed at + the Junta level. The unexpected, threatening GOA communique suggests a hardening attitude, which was + also reflected in a bellicose speech on March 3, attended by + tough-minded Navy CINC + Anaya, on the anniversary of the + death of Argentina’s most famous naval hero. The GOA may also have wanted to assume a + popular posture at a time when any distraction from the nation’s + economic woes is welcome.

+ + Shlaudeman + +
+ +
+ 12. Editorial Note +

From March 4 through 11, 1982, Assistant Secretary of State for + Inter-American Affairs Thomas O. + Enders traveled to Venezuela, Chile, and Argentina. He + visited Argentina March 8 through 10. Summaries of his discussions with + Argentine officials on Argentina’s human rights record and the situation + in Central America are in telegrams 1401 and 1409 from Buenos Aires, + March 11 and 12, respectively. (Department of State, Central Foreign + Policy File, D820131–0466 and D820133–0169) During a meeting on March 8 + between Enders and Argentine + Minister of Foreign Affairs and Worship Nicanor Costa + Mendez devoted to a range of bilateral and + regional issues, which had followed a private meeting between the two + men earlier the same day, the status of the Falklands/Malvinas + negotiations was discussed. Telegram 1446 from Buenos Aires, March 12, + transmitted a summary of the meeting, including the portion on the + Islands: “This portion of the talk was almost exclusively devoted to a + briefing by [Argentine] Under Secretary [Enrique] Ros on the history of the issue since 1964. + Ros presented a picture of + British intransigence. The GOA has long + been willing to accord the Islanders every kind of special status to + safeguard their way of life, he said. However, the GOA insists that the British recognize + Argentine sovereignty in the Malvinas and their dependencies. When + Enders observed that HMG’s position does not seem to be based + on economic or strategic concerns but on its belief that the wishes of + the Islanders must be respected, + Ros said that UN decision on the Island clearly set aside + the concept of self-determination for the Islanders. Ros said with emphasis that ‘the United + Nations did not give the Islanders the right of veto.’ Ros stated that at the recent bilateral + talks with the British, the GOA had + proposed the establishment of a permanent high-level commission in + London and Buenos Aires to seek out a solution. The GOA is now waiting for the British answer. + Ros stated that his + government is under increasing pressure from various sources to solve + the Malvinas problem. Now the government is trying to see if the British + are really interested in resolving the issue or instead are just looking + for ways to procrastinate. Argentina is willing to do its upmost to find + a negotiated solution but a solution cannot be delayed indefinitely, + Ros stated.” (Department of + State, Central Foreign Policy File, D820137–0228)

+

The same day, March 8, British Foreign Secretary Lord Carrington sent a message to + Secretary of State Alexander M. + Haig about Enders’s discussions with the Argentines, which was + delivered by the British Embassy to the Department of State under a + covering letter from the U.K. Ambassador to the United States, Sir Nicholas Henderson. In the + message, which mentioned the “very helpful” meeting between Enders and Richard Luce on March 1 (see Document + 10), Carrington + stated the United Kingdom’s increasing concern about “the Argentine + Government’s attitude, in particular about the threats which recur in + the Argentine press (apparently with some measure of government + inspiration) to use force if the negotiations do not soon reach a + conclusion on Argentine terms.” “You will realize,” Carrington continued, in a passage + that Haig highlighted in the + margin of his copy, “that it is politically impossible for us to + negotiate against such a background, so anything that Tom Enders can do while in Buenos + Aires to bring the Argentines to a more reasonable and pacific frame of + mind will be much appreciated by us.” At the top of his copy of + Carrington’s message, + Haig wrote: “Was Tom + apprised?” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, + P820044–1953) No evidence of a transmission of Carrington’s message to Enders in Buenos Aires has been found. + On March 12, following his return to Washington, Enders sent a draft response to + Carrington’s message, under + an action memorandum, to Haig + for the latter’s approval. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy + File, P820044–1948 and 1949) For Haig’s response, as transmitted to London, March 13, see + Document 13.

+
+ +
+ + 13. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United + KingdomSource: Department + of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D820135–0667. Confidential; + Immediate. Sent for information Immediate to Buenos Aires. Drafted + by O’Connell; cleared by + Enders, Service, and K. Smith; and approved by + Haig. + + + Washington, March 13, 1982, 1437Z + +

67606. Subject: Message to Foreign Minister.

+

1. Please deliver the following message from the Secretary to Lord Carrington:

+

Begin text:

+

Dear Mr. Minister:

+

During his visit to Buenos Aires,See Document 12. + Tom Enders raised the Falkland + Islands both in private and in public. He said that there are human and + strategic aspects to the dispute and that both must be satisfied. Tom + urged the Argentines to continue negotiations. They were noncommittal + but not negative.

+

As opportunities present themselves, we will continue to urge a + constructive approach with due regard for all interests at stake. End + text.

+

2. FYI: On March 8, British Embassy delivered message from the Foreign + Minister requesting that Assistant Secretary Enders, during his talks in Buenos + Aires, urge the GOA to be more + reasonable regarding the Falkland Islands.Summarized in Document 12. Text + being pouched.

+ + Haig + +
+ +
+ + 14. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Kingdom to the Department + of StateSource: Department of + State, Central Foreign Policy File, D820146–0021. Confidential. Sent + for information to Buenos Aires, Montevideo, Santiago, and USUN. + + + London, March 18, 1982, 1719Z + +

6107. Subject: Falklands Dispute: The view From London. Ref: (A) Buenos + Aires 1197,See footnote 2, Document 11. (B) Buenos Aires + 1250.See Document + 11.

+

1. C–Entire Text.

+

2. Summary: HMG fears that the Falkland + Islands talks may break down if Argentina continues to insist on + discussing only the question of sovereignty. Nonetheless, the British + believe that at this point the Argentines have little choice but to + continue negotiations. End summary.

+

3. FCO South America Department Head + Robin Fearn has told us that + the negotiations over the Falkland Islands are in real danger of + breaking down. At the recent meeting in New York, he said, the Argentine + delegation was “clearly uninterested” in discussing anything other than + the early transfer of sovereignty. Every British effort to widen the + discussion failed, ending with the unilateral Argentine communique (Ref + A).

+

4. HMG is anxious to keep the + negotiations going, fearing that Argentina might otherwise feel impelled + to attempt a military solution. The British remain convinced of the + legality of their position and the issue is an emotional one in + Parliament, particularly in the House of Lords. Fearn fears that talks may be broken + off if the Argentines refuse to take a more flexible approach.

+

5. Should negotiations break down, HMG + is considering the feasibility of bringing the question before the + United Nations. The British believe they would stand a good chance of + winning there, given the Argentine record on human rights, the UK’s recent successes in decolonization + (Zimbabwe and Belize),Following the signing + of the Lancaster House Agreement in December 1979, Zimbabwe achieved + de jure independence from the United Kingdom on April 18, 1980. + Belize became independent of British rule on September 21, + 1981. and the contrast between British democracy and the + Argentine Junta. HMG would prefer, + however, to avoid such a course if at all possible.

+

6. Comment: Argentine diplomats here keep in close touch with the + evolving situation in Gibraltar, a case with some parallels. With Anglo-Spanish negotiations + scheduled to begin after April 20, the Argentines will be examining + closely any concessions HMG is willing + to make to Spain. Any give on Gibraltar will almost certainly harden the + Argentine position even farther, despite the many differences between + the two situations. For the moment, however, FCO believes that negotiations will continue, if only for + lack of a better option on either side.

+ + Streator + +
+ +
+ 15. Telegram From the Embassy in Argentina to the Department of + StateSource: Department of + State, Central Foreign Policy File, D820154–0489. Confidential; + Priority. Sent for information to London and USUN. + + + Buenos Aires, March 23, 1982, + 1916Z + +

1638. Subject: Weekend Episodes in the South Georgia and + Falkland/Malvinas Islands.

+

1. (U) All Buenos Aires morning dailies March 23 bannered the weekend + flag-raising incident involving Argentine seamen in the South Georgia + Islands on March 19, denounced yesterday in London. British Ambassador + Anthony Williams was summoned + this morning to the Foreign Ministry for a discussion of the issue, + which now appears complicated by the retaliation by British Falkland + Islanders. On March 22, learning of the Argentine activity, the Falkland + “Kelpers” reportedly attacked the offices of Argentina’s state airline + in Port Stanley. They lowered the Argentine flag over the building and + hoisted the Union Jack, vowing “an eye for an eye”, according to local + press reports.

+

2. (U) The GOA initial reaction Monday + eveningMarch 22. to the British + complaint about the crew of an Argentine Government vessel landing in + Leith Harbor in the South Georgia Islands, about 900 miles east of the + Falklands, seemed bland. A spokesman explained that an Argentine Navy + cargo transport, the “Bahia Buen Suceso”, had been routinely chartered + to a private firm to work in the Islands, as it had to other private + operators in South Atlantic ports. The March 23 press reported that in + this instance, the ship was being used to salvage scrap from an + abandoned whale processing facility owned by the Christian Salvendsen firm. The spokesman said when + this work was completed March 21, the vessel and its privately-chartered + crew left the area.

+

3. (U) Asked about the Falklanders’ attack on the LADE office, the FonMin spokesman said + the situation could become “grave”. LADE is Lineas Aereas del Estado, a small Argentine Air + Force feeder airline which is the Falklands’ main connection to the + mainland. Its offices in Port Stanley reportedly had its locks forced by + irate British Islanders, who then took down the Argentine flag on the + building and hung a British flag on a tree in front of it. There were no + other reports of damages.

+

4. (C) During a meeting March 23, the Foreign Minister and Under + Secretary Ros at their initiative + briefed the Ambassador on the Argentine version of this affair. They + said a local entrepreneur had entered into a contract in London to take + the scrap from the whale “factory.” He then hired a crew of workmen + (four they thought) and bought passage for them on the “Bahia Buen + Suceso” which deposited them in Leith. Ros emphasized that the ship regularly plies those + waters, is unarmed and crewed entirely by civilians.

+

5. (C) HMG protested because permission + was not sought to land the workmen. As indicated in the press, the ship + has departed; but, contrary to the impression left by the press + accounts, the workmen are still there, according to Ros. He was unable to say how long they + might remain, that presumably depending on the time required to finish + the scrap job and on when the ship might come around again. It would + seem, at least, that the incident may not be closed.

+ + Shlaudeman + +
+ +
+ 16. Telegram From the Embassy in Argentina to the Department of + StateSource: Department of + State, Central Foreign Policy File, D820157–0409. Confidential; + Priority; Exdis. Sent for + information to London, USUN, + Montevideo, and Santiago. + + + Buenos Aires, March 24, 1982, + 1949Z + +

1671. Subject: Falklands/Malvinas Dispute: Argentine Concerns. Ref: (A) + London 6107;See Document + 14. (B) Buenos Aires 1638.See Document 15.

+ +

1. (C–Entire Text).

+

2. Summary. The GOA, having failed so + far to elicit a response from HMG to + the proposal for a permanent negotiating commission, seems increasingly + inclined to write off the current round of negotiations on the + Falklands/Malvinas. The next Argentine move will probably be to take the + issue again to the UN’s Committee of + 24.The United Nations General Assembly + established the Committee of 24, known more formally as the Special + Committee on Decolonization, in 1961 in order to monitor the + implementation of UNGA Resolution + 1514, the “Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial + Countries and Peoples,” which affirmed the right of all peoples to + self-determination and called for the end of colonialism. It was the + Special Committee that in 1964 confirmed that the provisions of the + Declaration applied to the Falklands/Malvinas. The GOA might apply pressure by cutting off + services now provided to the Islands, but we doubt that an attempt at a + “military solution” will be made any time soon. Foreign Minister + Costa Mendez and others in + the GOA are looking for ways to enlist + U.S. support for the Argentine cause. This issue is likely to complicate + Argentine-U.S. relations, particularly as matters of importance to + US arise in the UN and the NAM where Argentina will continue to seek support for its + claim on the Islands. End summary.

+

3. As reported in Ref B, Foreign Minister Costa Mendez and Under Secretary Enrique Ros on March 23 gave me their + version of the weekend incident in the South Georgia Islands. They also + took the occasion to assert their concern over the direction in which + the underlying dispute seems to be headed.

+

4. Ros said the GOA proposed in the February talks with + HMG that the two sides establish a + permanent negotiating commission. The British delegation purportedly + agreed to recommend the proposal to HMG, but the Argentines have subsequently heard nothing. + Ros thought that must mean a + rejection of the proposal. Ros + added that the GOA would then be + obliged again to take the dispute to the UN, to the Committee of 24.

+

5. Costa Mendez observed that the + weekend affair, particularly the insult to the Argentine flag, has + aroused nationalist feelings here. The Foreign Ministry tries to calm + these emotions, but that is getting increasingly more difficult to do. + The Minister next reverted to a theme we have heard from him before: + “You (the USG) will sometime have to + take an interest in this.” When the Malvinas problem comes up President + Galtieri allegedly often + asks “what do the Americans say?” According to Costa Mendez, he has continued to + explain to the President that we are only kept informed, not consulted. + But, given our security + interests, the tradition of the Monroe DoctrineFirst + articulated by President James Monroe in his State of the Union + address of December 2, 1823, the Monroe Doctrine refers to the policy that regarded + any attempts by a European country to expand its colonial holdings + in the Western Hemisphere or to interfere in the affairs of any + sovereign state in the Americas as an act of aggression to which the + United States would respond. At the same time, the Doctrine pledged + that the United States would refrain from interfering in the affairs + of existing European colonies in the Americas or in the internal + affairs of the European countries themselves. and the like, + we will have to become concerned, in the Minister’s opinion.

+

6. I replied that we would most certainly not wish to see the + negotiations break down. We do have a strong interest in seeing this + dispute between two friends resolved. The way to do that is through + negotiations between the two parties. As for the Monroe Doctrine, I recalled reading + that Daniel WebsterSecretary of State from + 1841 until 1843 and again from 1850 until 1852. had made + clear to the Argentines in 1841 that it did not apply retroactively, and + thus did not apply to the Malvinas problem.

+

7. Comment. The cynical view here, especially among the politicians, is + that the GOA has brought this ancient + quarrel up to center stage as a means of diverting the attention of the + Argentine people away from their economic woes. I am not so sure. The + talks with the British seem to have evolved quite naturally into a + stalemate, given the time elapsed and the inability of the British to + negotiate on sovereignty. In any event, the GOA has now gotten itself into a domestic political + position where it will have to do something if the proposal for a + permanent commission is not accepted.

+

8. We are not inclined to take very seriously the rumbling here about a + “military solution.” It seems more likely that the “other measures” the + GOA threatens will at least + initially take the form of a renewed plea in the UN and perhaps a reduction in the level of diplomatic + relations with HMG. The Argentines also + have open the possibility of making life more difficult for the + Islanders, particularly by cutting off air service. With respect to the + UN, HMG’s estimate of its chances there (Ref A) is clearly not + shared by the GOA which continues to + count on NAM and G–77 support. (We assume that Robin Fearn’s remark about Argentina’s + military government did not indicate an expectation that the problem + would be easier to deal with if Argentina had an elected government. The + politicians, particularly the Peronists and the left-wing radicals, are + even more bellicose than the military when it comes to the + Malvinas).

+

9. We do think that at least some elements in the GOA are quite serious about trying to + enlist U.S. support for their Malvinas case in the context of our closer + and more cooperative bilateral relationship. We have managed to stay + pretty well clear of this dispute since Webster’s time and there is no reason to change course + now. But we should recognize that the Malvinas (and the Beagle too) are + likely to be a complicating factor in our relationship. Complications + may particularly arise in relation to issues in the UN and the NAM where Argentina will continue to look for support from + those who frequently do not share our views.

+ + Shlaudeman + +
+ +
+ 17. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Kingdom to the Department + of StateSource: Department of + State, Central Foreign Policy File, D820159–0368. Secret; Immediate. + Sent for information to Buenos Aires, Santiago, and + Montevideo. + + + London, March 25, 1982, 1748Z + +

6687. Subject: HMG Requests U.S. Help in + South Georgia Dispute. Ref: London 06653.In + telegram 6653 from London, March 25, the Embassy reported on the + British political atmosphere following the Argentine landing on + South Georgia. Streator + informed the Department that while the landing was “a pretty small + affair, even within the context of the Falklands/Malvinas” dispute, + “feeling runs deep in some quarters,” as illustrated by comments + made by both political parties critical of the Thatcher government’s decision to + withdraw the Royal Navy ship HMS + Endurance from the South Atlantic. The FCO, he continued, “is trying to tread + as carefully as possible and believes that the Government of + Argentina will do so, too.” Noted Streator: “They [the British] fear that too + precipitate action might be perceived as an insult to Argentine + national honor and provoke an exaggerated response. This in turn + could lead to a confrontation that neither side wants, but from + which neither could withdraw.” He concluded: “Despite the + comic-opera quality of the incident itself, FCO officials believe that the pressure for quick + action will be ‘enormous.’” (Department of State, Central Foreign + Policy File, D820159–0310)

+

1. C–Entire text.

+

2. Summary: U.K. wants U.S. support soonest with Argentina to achieve + Argentine withdrawal from South Georgia of party of Argentines who + landed on the Island ostensibly to collect scrap metal and hoisted + Argentine flag. End summary.

+

3. Deputy Under-Secretary John + Giffard called in Charge March 25 to inform him that + Carrington is sending a + message to the SecretarySee Document 22. requesting that the U.S. + use its influence with Argentina in the current impasse over the + Argentines encamped on South Georgia Island. Argentina has conveyed its + displeasure over the dispatching of the British ice patrol vessel Endurance to South Georgia.The Endurance, normally stationed at Port + Stanley, had been on patrol when the Argentine party landed on South + Georgia on March 19. + HMG also has had reports that the + Argentine Navy may be planning to intercept the Endurance if it removes Argentine party and provoke a naval + confrontation, possibly with a view to bringing the entire Falklands + dispute to a head. Should that happen, the British would have to + respond, and a situation will have arisen that neither Foreign Ministry + wants. HMG consequently plans to hold + off taking any action, but considers it essential that the intruders be + removed. The Endurance is presently waiting about + ten miles away from the Argentine party.

+

4. British also said an Argentine vessel is lying off South Georgia that + could be used to evacuate landing party. No landing strip is available + on the Island for aircraft.

+

5. Comment: British concern over this affair has clearly intensified + since the earlier briefing reported reftel.

+ + Streator + +
+ +
+ 18. Telegram From the Embassy in Argentina to the Department of + StateSource: Department of + State, Central Foreign Policy File, D820160–0043. Secret; Niact Immediate; Exdis. Sent for information + Immediate to London. + + + Buenos Aires, March 25, 1982, + 2211Z + +

1718. Subject: HMG Request for U.S. Help + in South Georgia Dispute. Ref: London 6687.See Document 17.

+

1. (S–Entire text).

+

2. There are clearly some ugly possibilities in this situation. As I + understand it, Foreign Minister Costa + Mendez asked HMG to hold + off when he learned on TuesdayMarch + 23. that the Endurance had been sent + to South Georgia to take off the Argentine working party. Anthony Williams, the British + Ambassador here, in turn asked that the GOA find a way ASAP to have the group depart. + The FCO in London is pressing for + Argentine action. But, according to Williams, Costa + Mendez now says that the presence of the Endurance in the area has become widely known and + the GOA would appear to be succumbing + to British pressure if it agreed to evacuate the men. It appears likely + that the Argentine Navy will in fact act if the Endurance attempts to remove the working party.

+

3. Williams has explored the + perceptible alternatives, including various possibilities for legalizing + the entry of the Argentines into South Georgia, but so far he has had no + success. He believes a way must be found to freeze the situation until a + solution can be found. He has suggested informally to me that the USG call on both sides to stand down. The + Endurance would then presumably proceed to + Stanley for re-fueling, tensions would ease and perhaps a way out could + be negotiated without undue damage to either party’s claim to + sovereignty.

+

4. I agree with Williams (and + please protect him) that any USG + intervention must be directed at both sides. An attempt on our part + simply to get the Argentines to withdraw the working party, as HMG requests, has little prospect for + success. What would be needed in my judgment would be parallel messages + from the Secretary to Carrington and Costa + Mendez calling for the two countries to take no further + action and perhaps offering our good offices. The problem with this is + that it gets us into the middle of a dispute with no resolution in + sight. I am far from certain, for example, that at this point the + Argentines on South Georgia would agree—or that the GOA would let them agree—to a legalization + of their entry even if HMG could find a + way. Presumably the working party would depart after finishing the scrap + job, but that will require four to five months I am told.

+

5. Under Secretary Ros has asked + me to come in tomorrow morning specifically to inform me on the current + state of GOA relations with HMG. I shall urge restraint.See Document 20. But + on balance, barring suddenly fortuitous developments, I think we also + need a high-level message to both sides which at a minimum does the same + thing.

+ + Shlaudeman + +
+ +
+ + 19. Article In the National Intelligence Daily Prepared by the Central + Intelligence AgencySource: + Central Intelligence Agency, Job 84B00049R, Subject Files + (1981–1982) Box 7, NSPG Meeting + re: [text not declassified]/Falklands Islands + Dispute 5 Apr 82. Top Secret; Codeword. The National Intelligence Daily was a serial publication by + the CIA. This article was attached + to an April 5 covering note from [name not + declassified] to Inman [text not + declassified]. + + + Washington, March 26, + 1982 + +

ARGENTINA-UK: + Possible Conflict in South Atlantic

+

An incident last weekend in the South Georgia Islands—administered by the + UK but claimed by Argentina—could + develop into a more serious problem between the two countries. A group + of Argentine civilians was transported last weekend to South Georgia, + where they raised the Argentine flag, and the British ordered a lightly + armed patrol boat to evict the group. While diplomats in London and + Buenos Aires tried to smooth over the incident, the Argentine Navy + issued orders to several warships to prevent any British interference. + The UK has agreed to delay action if the + Argentines remove the civilians, but Buenos Aires intends to keep them + on the island. [handling restriction not + declassified]

+

Comment: The two countries have been negotiating + their conflicting claims for 15 years, but Buenos Aires recently has + become impatient for some progress and is threatening to break off the + talks. The Argentine Navy is the most aggressive and nationalistic of + the services, and some potential exists for precipitate action not fully + authorized by the high command. [handling restriction + not declassified]

+
+ +
+ + 20. Telegram From the Embassy in Argentina to the Department of + StateSource: Department of + State, Central Foreign Policy File, D820162–0574. Secret; Immediate; + Exdis. Sent for information + Immediate to London. + + + Buenos Aires, March 26, 1982, + 2225Z + +

1752. Subject: Argentine-British Dispute in South Georgia. Ref: Buenos + Aires 1718.See Document + 18.

+

1. (S–Entire text).

+

2. Ambassador Williams told me by + telephone late this afternoon (March 26) that he had been discussing + with Foreign Minister Costa + Mendez throughout the day a possible solution to the + impasse at South Georgia and that the proposal was not up for + consideration in London and here by the Junta. Williams gave me no details, but I + assume the deal would involve withdrawal of the Endurance from the scene and an Argentine commitment to take + off the working party.

+

3. In a meeting with me this afternoon (postponed from this morning) + Under Secretary Ros argued that + the basic problem was British “gunboat diplomacy”. He said HMG’s demand that the working party + withdraw or be removed by force was unacceptable to the GOA. He also said that if the Endurance were to retire, a solution “might be + possible.”

+

4. Ros gave me the following + version of the Argentine case: DavidovConstantino S. + Davidoff. (the scrap merchant) went out to Stanley + last year and explained to the authorities what he intended to do. He + then provided the British Embassy with the names of the 40 members of + the working party (Ros insists + that the correct number of men on the Island is 40) and documented them + in accordance with the 1971 British-Argentine treaty governing + navigation and air transport in the Falklands.See Document 1. The + party admittedly did not check in at Grytviken, but that is only a + scientific station in any case. Now the British assert that the 1971 + treaty does not extend to South Georgia, although it had always been + understood that the dependencies of the Falklands were included. (I can + confirm that this was also Ambassador Williams’s understanding until yesterday.)

+

5. Comment. The British fear, perhaps with reason, that the Argentines + intend to establish a permanent presence on South Georgia as they did in + 1976 on South Thule in the South Sandwich Islands.See footnote 5, Document + 1. + Ros’s remark to me that it might take year or more to + finish the South Georgia scrap job was not reassuring on that score. In + any event, it would appear from here that the Endurance is the key to the problem of the moment. If the ship + moves in to take off the workmen, there will surely be trouble. If it + stays where it is, the impasse and the tensions accompanying it will + continue. An agreement on reciprocal withdrawals may be possible but it + will not be easy to reach.

+ + Shlaudeman + +
+ +
+ 21. Telegram From the Embassy in Argentina to the Department of + StateSource: Department of + State, Central Foreign Policy File, D820163–0916. Limited Official + Use; Niact Immediate. Sent for + information Immediate to USUN and + London and for information to Santiago and Montevideo. + + + Buenos Aires, March 27, 1982, + 1515Z + +

1753. Subj: Confrontation in South Georgia Islands.

+

1. The crisis atmosphere heightened sharply overnight Mar 26–27 as the + armed Argentine Navy transport “Bahia Paraiso” carrying a unit of + marines, reportedly turned up at Leith Harbor. Its mission there, where + it is said to be in sight of the British icebreaker “Endurance”, is to + protect the Argentine work party landed on San Pedro Island Mar 18 that + triggered the present UK-GOA face-off. Unconfirmed press accounts + attributed to Argentine naval sources also reported the dispatch of two + missile corvettes, “Drummond” and “Granville”, to the South Georgias in + support of the ArgNav transport.

+

2. The arrival at Leith of “Bahia Paraiso” was announced last night by + FonMin Costa Mendez, who called + the situation in the disputed archipelago “serious” and “grave”. He + spoke to the press after an emergency meeting of the three service + commanders of the ruling Junta, making clear that the GOA is not presently disposed to back off. + “The Republic is ready to provide the workers (at Leith) all diplomatic + and security protection that may be necessary,” he said. The GOA, he added, has adopted a posture to + insure that “measures are not taken against them (una medida que no + corresponde) and that they are permitted to continue their work.” + Costa Mendez added that a + British proposal for overcoming the crisis is under study. He has met + six times in the last three days + with British Ambassador Williams + and reportedly is meeting Williams again this morning.

+

3. President Galtieri, returning + to the National Palace after midnight following the Junta meeting, told + waiting reporters that Costa + Mendez has briefed the military high command on several + international questions, not just the situation in the South Georgias. + Among these he said was the current debate in UNSC on Nicaragua’s intervention accusations against the + US and Argentina and the status of + the Papal mediation on the Beagle channel dispute with Chile. He was + otherwise uncommunicative, calling the situation at Leith a diplomatic + matter.

+

4. Press reports attributed to GOA + military sources said “Bahia Paraiso” has a crew of 200 plus a + contingent of marine infantry and two helicopters aboard. Military + sources had taken note of reports from London that “Endurance” has + orders to extract the workers at Leith by force if necessary. The crisis + atmosphere was ratcheted up several notches by additional reports of + intense activity at the nation’s principal naval base at Puerto Belgrano + and the marine station at Mar del Plata. “Clarin” quoted high navy + sources as saying the temperature is rising to “extremely critical” + levels.

+

5. Also overnight, the GOA’s case for + the presence of the Argentine work party at Leith—numbered anywhere from + six to more than 40—appeared to get an important boost. “Georgias del + Sur”, the Argentine company which bought the abandoned whaling + facilities at Leith Harbor from its Scottish owner in 1979, made public + a letter it had sent to the UK Embassy + here on March 9 setting out its work plans for San Pedro Island. The + firm is headed by an Argentine-Levantine named Constantin Davidoff. The letter was addressed to + Ambassador Williams. The company + also asserted last night that its plans to send a work party to the + Island were discussed previously in greater detail with the Embassy + Political Counselor who it claimed was also provided a list of the + workers being sent to Leith.

+

6. Comment: The point of the dispute in the UK view, as we understand it, is that the work crew was not + properly processed under British immigration procedures. While everyone + in Buenos Aires had assumed that the South Georgias were part of the + administrative regime governing the Falkland Islands, it appears now + that the other South Atlantic archipelagoes come under a separate set of + rules for immigration purposes.

+ + Shlaudeman + +
+ +
+ + 22. Message From British Foreign Secretary Carrington to Secretary of State + HaigSource: Department of State, Central + Foreign Policy File, P820054–0571. Confidential. Printed from an + unsigned copy. Sent to Haig + under a March 28 cover letter from Henderson. According to Haig’s memoirs, Henderson personally delivered the message the same + day. (Haig, Caveat, p. 261) The Department transmitted + the text of the message to the Embassy in Buenos Aires in telegram + 83326, March 29. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, + D820165–1097) + + + March 28, 1982 + +

Your Charge d’Affaires in London will have reported to youSee Document 17. the + serious situation which has developed between ourselves and the + Argentine Government following the illegal landing at Leith Harbour on + the British island of South Georgia last week of a party of Argentines. + The Argentines have a long-standing claim to the Falkland Islands and + their dependencies and, despite all our efforts to resolve the dispute + by peaceful negotiation, the Argentines have recently been making it + clear that they are prepared to use other means to achieve their aim of + a full transfer of sovereignty. The whole question of the Falklands is a + very sensitive one for us, our public opinion and our Parliament.

+

As soon as we discovered the presence of the party, we sought to persuade + the Argentine Government through diplomatic channels to remove them. But + they have refused to do this. Instead they appear to have consolidated + the party’s position by landing further equipment and have issued a + statement that the men on South Georgia will be given all necessary + protection. I have moreover, just received an uncompromising and + negative message from the Argentine Foreign Minister about the problem. + It offers no constructive suggestions and seems likely only to aggravate + the problem.

+

The Royal Navy Ice Patrol Ship, HMS + Endurance, is anchored nearby in Grytveken + Harbour. A number of Argentine Navy vessels are heading for the area and + we cannot exclude the possibility that, if we attempt to remove the men + ourselves, they may retaliate.

+

It is our firm wish to resolve this problem peacefully. To that end, we + have done everything we can to persuade the Argentines to find a way + out: we are prepared to examine every avenue with them. But the + continued presence of these men is an infringement of British + sovereignty and you will understand that we cannot acquiesce in + that.

+

I appreciate that this dispute will seem to others a bilateral matter + from the British and Argentine Governments. But despite all my + Government’s efforts to find an acceptable solution, we have now reached + a stage where the situation + will soon become very difficult. I do not, however, believe that it is + in anyone’s interests to allow this incident to be the cause of what may + become armed conflict in the South Atlantic, and I wish to explore every + possible avenue which might help us to avoid this.

+

I should accordingly be grateful if you would consider taking the matter + up with the Argentines, stressing the need to defuse the situation and + find a solution we can all accept. If the Argentines maintain that they + will not remove the men themselves and that they will resist any attempt + by us to do so, the use of a third country ship might be a compromise + they could accept. The problem could also be resolved by the Argentines + agreeing that their men should seek the necessary permission from the + British authorities at Grytveken in order to regularise their + presence.

+

I should be very grateful for any help you can give us on this. If we do + not find a solution soon, I fear the gravest consequences.

+
+ +
+ 23. Telegram From the Embassy in Argentina to the Department of + StateSource: Department of + State, Central Foreign Policy File, D820165–0179. Secret; Immediate; + Exdis. Sent for information + Immediate to London and for information to Montevideo, Santiago, and + USUN. + + + Buenos Aires, March 29, 1982, + 1457Z + +

1768. Subject: Dispute in South Georgia. Ref: Buenos Aires 1753,See Document + 21. 1754.In telegram 1754 + from Buenos Aires, March 28, the Embassy provided a report on the + situation in the South Atlantic as of noon Buenos Aires time. + (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, + D820164–0279)

+

1. (S–Entire text).

+

2. British Ambassador Williams + called on me this morning (March 29) with the following information:

+

—Last FridayMarch 26. See Document 20. Foreign Minister Costa Mendez proposed informally as a + way out of the impasse that the Argentine ship Bahia + Paraiso take the Argentine working party on South Georgia + around to Grytviken where their + entry could be legalized. London accepted this idea over the protests of + the Islanders, who I gather are self-governing. The military Junta here + rejected the Foreign Minister’s proposal. The Foreign Minister then + handed yesterday to Williams a + noteWilliams provided a copy of Costa Mendez’s note to the Embassy + on March 29. In telegram 1790 from Buenos Aires, March 30, the + Embassy transmitted an informal translation of the note. (Department + of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D820167–0259) which + insists on Argentine rights and offers no apparent way out of the + impasse.

+

—Williams is now persuaded that + the Argentine military have stage-managed this entire incident as a + means of pressing the British for accelerated negotiations on the + Falklands/Malvinas without revealing their full intentions to the + Foreign Ministry. One particular piece of evidence in this regard is the + fact that the Bahia Paraiso has been unloading + equipment at Leith Harbor. Costa + Mendez told Williams initially that the ship had been sent there + suddenly to watch over the working party and perhaps to evacuate + them.

+

—Lord Carrington has sent a + message to the SecretarySee Document 22. asking us to take the + problem up with the Argentines, “stressing the need to defuse the + situation and find a solution we can all accept.” (Williams gave me the text of the + message.)

+

3. I informed Williams that the + CNO will be visiting Argentina, + arriving Wednesday eveningMarch 31. + and departing Saturday afternoon.April + 3. I emphasized that this trip had been planned long in + advance.

+

4. Comment: As I feared, the Argentines refuse to have the presence of + the working party regularized. The British, for their part, continue to + insist that the men must be removed. If that is not done, their point + being that the exercise of immigration controls is an essential element + of sovereignty. The GOA may be + attempting to force HMG to accept the + Argentine proposal for a permanent negotiating commission on the + Falklands/Malvinas. If that is the purpose, it is difficult to imagine + how the Argentines could have been more mistaken in the method they + chose.

+

5. I am not optimistic about the results of an intervention on our part + at this juncture. A general appeal from the Secretary to the two sides + to calm down might help momentarily, but to ask both to withdraw their + ships (which is what is needed) without some agreement on the working + party would presumably not go over very well in London. I should note + Williams’ comment that the + British Navy currently has units + on maneuvers in the Caribbean that could be deployed fairly rapidly to + the South Atlantic.

+ + Shlaudeman + +
+ +
+ 24. Briefing Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for + Inter-American Affairs (Enders) + and the Acting Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs + (Scanlan) to the Deputy + Secretary of State (Stoessel)Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, + P820057–0766. Confidential. Tom Niles (EUR) initialed the memorandum on behalf of Scanlan. A stamped notation in the + upper right-hand corner of the first page states that Stoessel saw the memorandum on + March 30. Attached but not printed are a copy of telegram 1768 from + Buenos Aires (see Document 23), + biographical information about Henderson and Takacs, and agendas for the March 29 meetings with + the two Ambassadors. For a record of the two meetings, see Document 25. + + + Washington, March 29, + 1982 + + + SUBJECT + Your Demarches to British Ambassador Henderson and Argentine Ambassador Takacs + +

I. YOUR OBJECTIVE

+

Express our concern over potential confrontation + between British and Argentine naval vessels in South + Atlantic; urge restraint and concerted + effort to defuse situation; offer our good + offices in resolving this immediate problem, if so requested by both + parties. Talking points attached.

+

II. SETTING

+

The British and Argentines have been disputing the + sovereignty of the Falkland Islands (250 miles east of + Argentina) since the 1830s. The two countries also dispute sovereignty + over the South Georgia, Sandwich and Shetland + Islands, long administered by the UK. There are 1800 British residents in the Falklands and + British installations on some of the other islands. In 1964 the UN classified the + islands as a non-self-governing territory + administered by the UK and there have + been sporadic + UK-Argentine talks since then. There is an agreement on travel documents + and the GOA provides regular airline + and communications services and fuel supplies. The talks, last held in February,See + Document 11. have stalemated over Argentine insistence that its + sovereignty be discussed first, and the + UK’s unwillingness to agree to + anything without the consent of the islanders who + are vehemently attached to the UK. The + Argentines have recently escalated the public + rhetoric on the dispute and the UK asked us to counsel them to be more + reasonable. The GOA has + traditionally sought our support. We have maintained a + neutral stance, asserting the issue should be resolved through + negotiations. Either side may take the dispute back to the + UN.

+

III. CURRENT PROBLEM

+

On March 19, a civilian-chartered Argentine naval transport landed a party of salvage workers on a South + Georgia Island and departed, pursuant to a contract with a British firm + for removal of an old whaling station. HMG protested that the party did + not seek permission and requested their removal. + The Argentine company says it requested and received + approval to land the men. Following reports that the Argentines + raised their flag on one of the South Georgia Islands, Falkland Islanders March 22 allegedly retaliated against the Argentine airline office in Port + Stanley. Details of the situation are in dispute. A British icebreaker, the Endurance, is in the area; the Argentine navy is shadowing it and probably will interfere if the Endurance attempts + to remove the work party.At 1604Z, March 29, + the Embassy in Buenos Aires reported that Argentine press reports, + citing “unidentified high level Argentine navy sources,” had stated + that “five Argentine warships, including two missile-carrying + corvettes, two destroyers and a submarine, will join the ‘Bahia Paraiso’ at the South Georgia Islands, + but this has not been officially confirmed.” (Telegram 1770 from + Buenos Aires, March 29; Department of State, Central Foreign Policy + File, D820165–0327) The dispute has become a major nationalistic issue in both countries. The + British want us to use our + influence to have the GOA + withdraw the workers, and Lord Carrington has sent a personal + message to the Secretary (attached).See Document 22.

+

The GOA would resent such a one-sided + approach, and a U.S. tilt could endanger our improving + relations with Argentina and their support on hemispheric issues. The + best course is to advise both sides to avoid + precipitous action in order to allow passions to cool so that a + compromise can be found without loss of face to either side. While we + do not intend to become directly involved in the + substance of this bilateral dispute, we could + offer our good offices to assist with a solution to the immediate problem, if both + sides agree and so request. However, it is not clear at this point how any such “good office” role could + usefully extend beyond talking to the two sides. We doubt strongly that the GOA would agree to let a U.S. ship take the men off the + island, as suggested by Carrington in his letter to the Secretary.

+ +

• CONCERNED ABOUT POTENTIAL NAVAL CONFRONTATION.

+

• APPRECIATE THE PUBLIC CONCERNS OF BOTH SIDES.

+

• UK AND ARGENTINA BOTH OUR FRIENDS.

+

• WISH TO SEE AMICABLE RESOLUTION.

+

• URGE RESTRAINT ON BOTH SIDES.

+

• UNDERLYING ISSUES CAN ONLY BE RESOLVED BY YOUR TWO GOVERNMENTS. DO NOT + SEE A USEFUL USG ROLE.

+

• IF BOTH PARTIES AGREE ON A USEFUL ROLE FOR USG IN HELPING RESOLVE IMMEDIATEAn unknown hand underlined this word. PROBLEM, WE ARE + PREPARED TO LISTEN AND DO WHAT WE CAN.

+
+ +
+ 25. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassies in + Argentina and the United KingdomSource: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy + File, D820166–0400. Confidential; Immediate; Exdis. Sent for information + Immediate to Montevideo, Santiago, and USUN. Drafted by O’Connell; cleared by Service, Smith, Bosworth, Bremer, and Stern; and approved by Stoessel. + + + Washington, March 30, 1982, 0149Z + +

83963. Subject: Deputy Secretary’s Meeting With Argentine and UK Ambassadors. References: (A) London + 6930,In telegram 6930 from London, March + 29, the Embassy reported: “According to FCO, the British believe that there has been + ‘absolutely no movement’ on the impasse over South Georgia. The + British are maintaining their position that the Argentines must be + removed from the Island, and Argentina, complaining about gunboat + diplomacy, insists that it is prepared to defend them. Talks are + continuing mainly through the British Embassy in Buenos Aires, as + the Argentine Ambassador is not in London. FCO officials fear that the two countries may be on a + confrontation course, and deny that any likely form of compromise is + currently under discussion. Indeed, the Carrington-Haig letter was sent only after + the Argentines had made clear the intractability of their position.” + (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, + D820165–0386) (B) Buenos Aires 1770,See footnote 3, Document + 24. and previous.

+

1. Confidential–Entire text.

+ +

2. The Deputy Secretary called in separately March 29 the Ambassadors of + Argentina and the UK and made the + following points regarding the situation at South Georgia Island:No memoranda of conversation of Stoessel’s meetings with Takacs or Henderson have been + found.

+

—We are concerned about the situation in the South Georgia Island and the + possibility of confrontation.

+

—We appreciate the public concern over this issue in Argentina and in the + UK.

+

—We would hope for an amicable resolution; both parties are good friends + of ours.

+

—We urge restraint on both sides.

+

—We realize that the underlying issues need to be solved between the two + parties and do not see a useful role we could play with respect to + them.

+

—However, we are concerned about the immediate situation in South Georgia + Island and if both sides felt we could play a useful role, we are ready + to listen and offer our good offices.

+

—The situation is of personal interest to the Secretary.

+

2. Ambassador Takacs said that he + had no instructions on the issue but would convey the Deputy Secretary’s + comments to Buenos Aires immediately. Takacs asked if he could tell his Foreign Minister that + the same message was being conveyed to the British. The Deputy Secretary + replied that he would be telling the exact same thing to Ambassador + Henderson and reiterated + that we would like to be helpful if both sides believe we can be.

+

3. Ambassador Henderson said that + the workmen were on the Island illegally, having gone there ostensibly + under the scrap removal contract. They had no immigration permission for + the Island, not even a white card which is valid for entry into the + Falkland Islands proper. The line the Argentines are taking does not + suggest they are prepared to do anything. The British do not want them + to stay there but they are prepared to make an important concession: if + the Argentine ship, the Bahia Paraiso, would take + the work party around to Grytviken Harbour, they could give them + permission to stay. Henderson + did not see how the USG could condone + the illegal occupation of the Island and did not see why it would be + taking sides to ask if the GOA was + willing to accept this reasonable compromise. Henderson did not seem to be aware + (Buenos Aires 1768)See Document 23. that the GOA had vetoed this possibility.

+ +

4. Henderson then noted that + CNO, Admiral Hayward would be arriving in Argentina + in a few days and asked if he might be able to play a helpful role with + the Argentines. The Deputy Secretary said that the CNO would be fully briefed.

+

5. We asked whether it might be possible for HMG to send an official around to Leith Harbor to + regularize the status of the workmen. Henderson said that if we gave assurances that the + GOA would agree, he would suggest + it to London.

+

Going back to the points the Deputy Secretary had made earlier, Henderson took mild issue with our + counseling them on restraint; the British were “not hotting it up at + all.” The Deputy Secretary said we would inform our Embassy in Buenos + Aires to see if there were any unexplored possibilities that could be + raised with the GOA in an effort to + regularize the status of the Argentine workmen.

+

6. You should report these demarches to Foreign Ministries. Embassy + Buenos Aires, unless it perceives reasons to contrary, should ask the + GOA if it would be agreeable to + having someone travel from Grytviken to Leith Harbor to document + workmen, while making clear that there is no HMG agreement at this time.On + the morning of March 30, Shlaudeman met with Costa Mendez to discuss the Stoessel-Takacs meeting and to convey the + Department’s request. Summarizing the meeting, Shlaudeman reported: “The GOA is not at the moment willing to + entertain any face-saving device by which the status of the workmen + on South Georgia could be regularized. The Argentine position is + that this problem can only be dealt with in the framework of + negotiations on the question of sovereignty over the + Falklands/Malvinas. The GOA is not + interested in USG good offices + unless these were to be extended to treatment of the underlying + issues.” (Telegram 1814 from Buenos Aires, March 30; Department of + State, Central Foreign Policy File, D820168–0344)

+ + Haig + +
+ +
+ + 26. Telegram From the Central Intelligence Agency to Multiple + RecipientsSource: + Department of State, Bureau of European Affairs, United Kingdom + Political Files, Lot 89D489, POL–15(h) Country Political 82—Latin America. Secret; + Noforn; Nocontract; Wnintel. Sent to + the National Security Agency, Department of State, Defense + Intelligence Agency, Department of the Treasury, White House + Situation Room, National Security Council Staff, CIA Office of Current Operations, and + USCINCSO. + + + Washington, March 30, 1982, 1612Z + +

184543. TDFIRDB–315/06529–82. Dist: 30 Mar 82. Country: Argentina/United + Kingdom. Subject: Argentine Army and Navy Assessment of the Current + Status and Prospects of the Dispute With the United Kingdom Over Islands + in the South Atlantic (DOI: About 28 + March 1982). Source: [3 lines not + declassified].

+

1. On or shortly before 28 March 1982, the Argentine Army and Navy + prepared a joint assessment for President Leopoldo ((Galtieri)) on the current dispute with + the United Kingdom over the South Georgia Islands in the South Atlantic. + The assessment included the following points:

+

A. Argentine public opinion strongly approves of the Argentine Government + taking a strong stand against UK + “threats” to Argentina.

+

B. The UK Embassy in Buenos Aires was + aware of plans to place Argentine workers on the Island and has + therefore urged London to keep this in mind and be moderate in its + response.

+

C. The UK appears unwilling to take any + action to remove the workers.

+

D. Successful handling of this incident could help to fortify the + Galtieri government and give + it an image of being strong, decisive, and highly nationalistic. This + will deflect leftist charges against the government. The “crisis” is + already serving to deflect public attention from economic problems and + from the planned labor demonstration in Buenos Aires on 30 March.

+

E. If Argentina gives the appearance of having “lost” in this + confrontation with the UK, it will serve + to strengthen enormously Chile’s position in the dispute with Argentina + over the Beagle Channel.

+

2. (Source comment: On 28 March, working-level officers within the + Argentine Naval Intelligence Service, who are not necessarily privy to actual + operational planning, discounted the possibility of Argentine + intervention should the British choose to forcibly remove the Argentine + workers from the Island; these naval intelligence officers believed that + the Argentine Navy is not ready or able to support any type of armed conflict in the South Georgias + area because of existing limitations on equipment. These naval + intelligence officers expected that, if the British should remove the + workers, the Argentine Government would certainly speak strongly but + would try to cast itself as a peacemaker by avoiding a direct conflict + with the UK.)

+

3. (Field comments:

+

A. The views attributed to the British Government may not reflect its + true position, but these perceptions by the Argentine Army and Navy will + help determine the policies it recommends to the President and may help + determine the policies he actually adopts.

+

B. The views of naval intelligence personnel in paragraph 2 should not be + read as a definitive statement of Argentine Naval operational + plans.)

+

4. (Ambassador’s comment: Former Foreign Minister Oscar ((Camilion)) told me that the Argentine + Government has deliberately built up the incident in South Georgia to + buy “political space” for Galtieri. This report would suggest that he may be + right.)

+

[Omitted here is dissemination information.]

+
+ +
+ 27. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United + KingdomSource: Reagan + Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC + Cable File, Falkland File 03/31/1982–04/01/1982. Secret; Sensitive; + Immediate; Exdis. Sent for + information Immediate to Buenos Aires. + + + Washington, March 31, 1982, 1802Z + +

85529. Subject: Letter From the Secretary to Lord Carrington.

+

1. Secret–Entire text.

+

2. Please convey immediately the following message from the Secretary to + Lord Carrington.

+

3. Begin text:

+

Dear Peter,

+

I know that the Falkland Islands was one of the first issues you raised + with us as Foreign Secretary.See Document 3. The situation which has + developed in the last few days on South Georgia Island is indeed + serious, and I want you to know that we will do everything we can to + assist in its resolution. I am + instructing our Ambassador in Buenos Aires to convey my concern to the + Argentine Foreign MinisterSee footnote 4, Document 29. and to + urge that his government take no steps which would aggravate the present + crisis. Furthermore, I am urging the Argentine Government to abide by + existing arrangements and understandings concerning regularizing the + status of foreign residents on South Georgia Island.

+

We will, of course, have a greater chance of influencing Argentine + behavior if we appear to them not to favor one side or the other. We + will continue quietly to try and move the Argentines away from taking + further steps which would make a peaceful resolution more difficult to + achieve. I believe that you know Tom + Hayward, our Chief of Naval Operations. He arrives in + Buenos Aires on March 31 on a long-standing invitation, and will do what + he can to be helpful.

+

Let me know, Peter, if you have any suggestions on how we might help + defuse the immediate crisis through the use of our good offices.

+

I admire your patience in this situation.

+

Sincerely,

+

Al.

+

End text.

+

4. Instruction to Ambassador Schlaudeman in Buenos Aires sent septel.

+ + Haig + +
+ +
+ + 28. Message From British Prime Minister Thatcher to President ReaganSource: + Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Cable File, Falkland File 03/31/1982–04/01/1982. + Top Secret; Sensitive. Sent personal from Thatcher via Cabinet Office + channels. Telegram 7232 from London, April 1, reported that FCO Assistant Undersecretary for the + Americas Ure informed the + Embassy that Thatcher, + during a late evening meeting on March 31, had decided to send the + message to Reagan. (Reagan + Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC + Country File, Europe and Soviet Union, United Kingdom + (04/01/1982–07/31/1982) (4)) In telegram 86943 to London, April 1, + the Department re-transmitted the text of Thatcher’s message. + (Ibid.) + + + London, March 31, 1982, 2025Z + Dear Ron, + +

You will know about the disturbing intelligence reports both from your + sources and from ours that the Argentine Navy could be preparing to + invade the Falkland Islands within the next 48 hours. There are less + than 2,000 inhabitants there. We maintain only a small garrison of about + 75 Marines at Port Stanley—the capital of the Falklands—and the only + Royal Navy vessel which we have in the area at the moment is an ice + patrol ship. An Argentine assault would undoubtedly result in loss of + life. We could not acquiesce in any Argentine occupation: The Falkland + Islanders have always made it clear they wish and intend to remain + British.

+

Will you talk urgently with the Argentine President and ask him to give + you an immediate assurance that he will not authorise any landing, let + alone any hostilities. You can tell him that we will not escalate the + dispute or start fighting. Meanwhile, we are pursuing urgent diplomatic + initiatives with the Argentine to reach a settlement and I would ask for + your support in this effort too.

+

Warm personal regards,

+ + Margaret + +
+ +
+ + 29. Telegram From the Embassy in Argentina to the Department of + StateSource: Reagan + Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC + Country File, Latin America/Central, Argentina + (01/01/1982–04/02/1982). Secret; Niact Immediate; Exdis. Printed from a copy that was received in the + White House Situation Room. + + + Washington, March 31, 1982, 2208Z + +

1871. Subject: South Georgia Dispute: Junta’s Response to Our Demarche. + Refs: (A) Buenos Aires 1814,See footnote 6, Document 25. (B) State + 85529,See Document + 27. (C) State 85654.In + telegram 85654 to Buenos Aires, March 31, the Department instructed + Shlaudeman to deliver a + message from Haig to + Costa Mendez expressing + the former’s “hope that both governments will be able to move + forward toward satisfactory resolution” of the “longstanding issues” + between Argentina and the United Kingdom. Haig continued; “Because these + issues are not new, it would appear that arrangements and + understandings have been agreed upon in the past for how to deal + with problems such as that now posed at Leith Harbour. I urge your + government do everything possible to adhere to such arrangements, + and to avoid any actions that would make solution even more + difficult. I have made the same requests to the British. I am + convinced that it is in the interest of both governments to resolve + the current impasse as quickly as possible. If our good offices can + be of assistance, please let me know.” (Reagan Library, Executive + Secretariat, NSC Country File, + Latin America/Central, Argentina (01/01/1982–04/02/1982))

+

1. Secret–Entire text.

+

2. Foreign Minister Costa Mendez + called me in late this afternoon (March 31). (The instructions referred + to in Ref B had not arrived.) The Minister said he had conveyed my + demarche of yesterday (Ref A) to the governing Junta. After expressions + of high regard for the USG and myself, + he gave me the following response from the three commanders: the GOA is prepared to accept the proffered + good offices of the USG, but only on + the basis that HMG first recognize the + sovereignty of Argentina over the Malvinas and agree to deliver those + Islands and their dependencies to Argentina within a reasonable period + of time. The good offices of the USG + would then be employed to help arrange such details as the future status + of the Islanders under Argentine rule and the establishment of a + permanent British fueling station to support operations in the + Antarctic.

+

3. I asked two questions in response. Had prior recognition of Argentine + sovereignty been a precondition in the GOA’s February proposal for a permanent negotiating + commission? Did this reply from the Junta affect in any way the + Minister’s assurances to me yesterday with respect to the possibility of + a confrontation? Costa Mendez + said that recognition of sovereignty was not a prior condition in the + February proposal, but that the + objective of the proposed negotiations was clearly stated as being + affirmation of Argentine sovereignty. On the second question, he + reiterated that there would be no confrontation unless the British tried + to take the working party off South Georgia. I said we would regard any + confrontation as most serious.

+

4. With respect to the Junta’s message, I said again that we did not see + how we could be useful in resolving the sovereignty issue. I did promise + to convey the Junta’s message to the Secretary. Costa Mendez closed the meeting by + delivering himself of some harsh observations on the British, asserting + that the GOA had had enough, that + HMG had tried to dupe and string + along Argentina for years and that the GOA was prepared “to break relations” without any + qualms.

+

5. Comment: The Junta’s response is, of course, absurd. It sounds like + Galtieri playing Patton. In + any event, the GOA is clearly bent on + pressing to the utmost the advantage it thinks it has. Always assuming + the British are not going to make any rash move with the Endurance and its marines, my inclination would + be to let things sit for awhile in the hope that the Argentines will + begin to come down out of the clouds. They are likely to have increasing + difficulties in maintaining a significant naval presence within + reasonably quick reach of South Georgia. For one thing, the Argentine + Navy’s only oiler is reportedly laid up in Ushuaia. If the press reports + of British Navy ship movements toward the South Atlantic are true, the + Argentines may simmer down a bit. Our impression from contacts in the + Argentine Navy is that no armed action is expected in that quarter for + the time being at least.

+

6. Ref C arrived as I was drafting this cable. In view of the Junta’s + reply, I recommend against delivery of the Secretary’s message. It would + only prompt the GOA to put its extreme + position into writing, where we surely don’t want it. I would prefer not + to deliver any high-level message until after the CNO has had a chance to talk to the navy + here and to give us his insights.

+

7. I will leave to the Department the question of whether or not to share + any of this with HMG. I have told my + British colleague that the GOA has not + so far accepted our good offices and did not find acceptable the + proposal to send someone to document the workmen at South Georgia. + (London had fully informed him on the Stoessel-Henderson conversation.)See + Document 25. I do not propose to + brief him on the Junta’s extraordinary response.

+ + Shlaudeman + +
+ +
+ + 30. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United + KingdomSource: Reagan + Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC + Cable File, Falkland File 03/31/1982–04/01/1982. Secret; Sensitive; + Immediate; Nodis. Sent for + information Immediate to Buenos Aires. + + + Washington, April 1, 1982, 0429Z + +

086367. Subject: British Demarche on Argentine Threat.

+

1. S–Entire text.

+

2. Summary. UK Ambassador Henderson called on the Secretary to + report HMG’s fear that the Argentine + Government is planning to carry out a military invasion of the Falkland + Islands within forty eight hours. He asked for immediate US intervention with the Argentines at the + Presidential level. The Secretary assured the British that the US would be in touch urgently with the + Argentines at the highest level. End summary.

+

3. British Ambassador Sir Nicholas + Henderson, under instructions from London, called on the + Secretary evening of March 31 to inform him that HMG believed it had solid evidence that + the Argentine Government was moving a large Naval task force toward the + Falkland Islands. The information, which the British believe the US also has, indicates that the task force + is due to reach Port Stanley at 0006 hours April 2 and will join a + submarine which has orders to observe a beach as a possible landing + site. The Ambassador stated that Argentine aircraft overflew the + Falklands March 30. More serious, according to the British, is other + intelligence which they believe shows that the Argentine Junta is + contemplating military action on April 2 no matter what kind of + assurances they are giving us.

+

4. Henderson reported that the + UK is still trying to defuse the + situation and that Lord + Carrington had offered to send a high level figure to + Buenos Aires to try and deal with the problem of the workers at Leith + Harbor.In telegram 1888 from Buenos + Aires, April 1, Shlaudeman + reported that Williams had + received from Costa Mendez a + verbal answer that morning regarding the proposed visit of a + high-level British official to discuss the workers at Leith Harbor. + Costa Mendez said the + Government of Argentina was “not interested” and that “from the + Argentine point of view the Leith Harbor affair is closed.” + Conveying this reply to Shlaudeman, Williams added that Costa Mendez did indicate that “the GOA would be prepared for immediate + discussions on the sovereignty issue.” (Reagan Library, Executive + Secretariat, NSC Country File, + Latin America/Central, Argentina (01/01/1982–04/02/1982)) Later that + day, Williams provided + Shlaudeman with the text + of Costa Mendez’s written + follow-up to his verbal response, an informal translation of which + Shlaudeman transmitted + to the Department in telegram 1908 from Buenos Aires, April 1. + (Ibid.) The British believe, however, that the GOA is not interested in negotiating over + the status of the workers, but only on the question of sovereignty over the Islands. HMG is convinced that the Argentines will + only hold off if the US immediately + raises the issue with the Argentine President. Henderson said that the situation is + serious and that Mrs. Thatcher + is very worried.

+

5. The Secretary answered that he had been concerned that Carrington thought we had not been + supportive enough at the outset of the dispute. The USG had not wanted to take sides as long + as the dispute appeared to be only over workers status. Now that that + there is plainly a military dimension, we will urgently contact the + Argentine Government at the highest level. The Secretary said he + recognized that the British have done much for us and in turn Carrington should be told that we + will do what we can to assist in this matter.

+

6. Henderson said Carrington would certainly be + reassured to hear that.

+

7. In addition to the Secretary and the Ambassador, present were Asst. + Sec. Enders, DAS Holmes, Robert Service of ARA/SC and Keith + Smith of EUR/NE.

+ + Haig + +
+ +
+ 31. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in + ArgentinaSource: Reagan + Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC + Cable File, Falkland File 03/31/1982–04/01/1982. Secret; Sensitive; + Niact Immediate; Nodis. Sent for information + Immediate to London. + + + Washington, April 1, 1982, 0918Z + +

86790. For Shlaudeman from + Enders. Subject: Possible + Military Action Off Falklands.

+

1. S–Entire text.

+

2. British Ambassador Henderson + has just been in to see the SecretarySee + Document 30. to follow up on + personal message from PriMin Thatcher to President ReaganSee Document 28. referring to “the disturbing + intelligence reports from both your sources and ours that the Argentine + Navy could be preparing to invade the Falkland Islands within the next + forty-eight hours.” Henderson left us a summary of + their intelligence analysisNot found. + which we are sending you separately. Although our analysts have not + developed such a full picture, there is enough information to support + their fear of possible military action. We would welcome your comments + on the British analysis. But clearly it is difficult in this situation + to rely only on our own assessment of intentions. The British are most + concerned that the Argentines not know about the extent of their + intelligence on Argentine military moves. You should therefore take care + not to disclose the source or extent of this intelligence.

+

3. Thatcher’s message says that + the Brits “would not acquiesce in any Argentine occupation.” That, of + course, is a statement of political fact.

+

4. Request you contact Galtieri + immediately. Tell him we have disturbing reports. Tell him that we don’t + want to overreact, but would like very much to be reassured. Tell him + that from the US point of view we + believe that we are embarked on one of the most fruitful periods in the + history of our relationship, in which we can become not only the + partners in the struggle against Communism in the Hemisphere, but + together we can again achieve that standing in international life which + we both can rightfully claim. Tell him that should any military action + occur, for whatever reason, it is a simple fact that overriding internal + and external pressure would be brought to bear on us to abandon the new + and promising relationship we are building. We would deeply regret that, + because we regard it as one of the more promising factors of the current + international picture.

+

5. Tell him that the British tell us they will not escalate the dispute + or start fighting. It would be useful if we could assure the British + that the Argentines have no intention to make a military landing on + disputed Islands or to initiate hostilities.

+

6. The British have also told us that they are preparing an “urgent, + diplomatic initiative,” which we understand to be the sending of a high + level emissary to Buenos Aires to discuss the South Georgia dispute. We + do not want to volunteer, of course, but obviously you should send back + to us any reaction for the British that they have to that concept.See Document 30 and + footnote 2 thereto.

+ +

7. You should say that the Secretary, acting at the request of the + President, has asked you to make this demarche.Following a telephone conversation with Service, Shlaudeman conveyed this message + for Galtieri to Costa Mendez. In telegram 1892 + from Buenos Aires, sent at 1802Z on April 1, Shlaudeman reported that he + “stressed” to Costa Mendez + “the importance we attach to the developing relationship between our + two countries and the heavy damage any military action would do to + that relationship.” Costa + Mendez “made no direct response to my request for + assurances re Argentine intentions,” but “did say he realized the + seriousness of the message, asked for a non-paper covering it (which + I have provided) and said he would get it to the President before my + appointment with Galtieri + this afternoon.” (Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Cable File, Falkland File + 03/31/1982–04/01/1982) For a report of Shlaudeman’s meeting with Galtieri, see Document 37.

+

8. This message supersedes earlier guidance on message from Secretary to + Costa Mendez.See footnote 4, Document + 29.

+ + Haig + +
+ +
+ 32. Article In the National Intelligence Daily Prepared by the Central + Intelligence AgencySource: + Central Intelligence Agency, Office of Support Services (DI), Job + 84T00301R: Intelligence Pub Files (1982), Box 2, Folder 1: National + Intelligence Daily. Top Secret; [handling + restriction not declassified]. + + + Washington, April 1, + 1982 + +

ARGENTINA-UK: + Possible Clash

+

Argentina evidently plans an invasion as early as + tomorrow of the disputed Falkland Islands, if its increasingly tough + diplomatic posture does not yield results. [handling restriction not declassified]

+

Buenos Aires has formed an amphibious task force with landing craft, air + cover, and communications security. It joins a task force in the area + having the country’s only aircraft carrier, as well as several + destroyers, escorts, and a submarine. [handling + restriction not declassified]

+

Argentina’s Foreign Minister has stated that it will require British + recognition of Argentine sovereignty over the Falkland Island and South + Georgia groups and expeditious transfer of them to Buenos Aires. He said, however, there would be + no confrontation unless the British try to remove the Argentine + nationals from South Georgia. [2 lines not + declassified] [handling restriction not + declassified]

+

The UK reportedly has formed a task force + in Britain and has alerted naval units in the Caribbean and near + Gibraltar, but they will not arrive for 10 days to two weeks. Last + Thursday,March 30. + however, one or two British nuclear-powered attack submarines evidently + deployed toward the South Atlantic and could be in the Falklands this + weekend. [handling restriction not + declassified]

+

Comment: The Argentine force could be in + position—probably just south of the Falkland Islands—at dawn. The + Foreign Minister’s suggestion that Argentina will only respond + militarily to direct British action is belied by the amphibious force’s + invasion configuration. [handling restriction not + declassified]

+

Britain is aware of a possible invasion and could send reinforcements to + the Falklands—a runway capable of handling large transports is + available, but refueling would be required. [handling + restriction not declassified]

+

A negotiated settlement is possible, but the Argentines may still be + gambling that a third power such as the US will intercede and force some concessions from the + UK. London, however, will resist + Buenos Aires’s effort to link resolution of the issue of the nationals + in South Georgia to discussions of sovereignty. If Argentina does + invade, the Thatcher government + would have little choice but to respond militarily, or risk a crisis it + might not survive. [handling restriction not + declassified]

+
+ +
+ + 33. Intelligence Information Cable From the Central Intelligence + Agency to Multiple RecipientsSource: Reagan Library, Roger W. + Fontaine Files, Falkland Islands + [04/01/1982–04/02/1982]. Secret; Wnintel; Noforn; Nocontract. Sent to the + Department of State (INR), the + Joint Chiefs of Staff (DIA), the + NMCC at CIA, the National Security Agency, the + Departments of the Treasury and Justice, the FBI, and the National + Security Council Staff. + + + TDFIR DB–315/06791–82 + + + Washington, April 1, + 1982 + + + SUBJECT + Argentine Government Determination To Take Military Action, If + Necessary, in the Current Conflict With the UK Over Islands in the South Atlantic (DOI: 31 March, 1 April 1982) + + + SOURCE + [4 lines not declassified] + +

1. On the evening of 31 March 1982, Argentine President Leopoldo + ((Galtieri)) and the other + two members of the ruling military Junta were determined that Argentina + will take military action, if necessary, to resolve the current conflict + with the United Kingdom over conflicting claims of sovereignty over the + South Georgia Islands in the South Atlantic. In meetings late on 31 + March, Galtieri and the two + other members of the Junta were in firm agreement that Argentina will + not back down on this matter.

+

2. This position was supported by Argentine Foreign Minister Nicanor ((Costa Mendez)). Late on 31 + March, Costa Mendez told members + of the Junta that the current impasse with the UK is a military problem, not a diplomatic problem; + Galtieri forcefully echoed + this statement.

+

3. On the morning of 1 April, there was no change in this position. The + Argentine Army and Air Force were ready to provide whatever assistance + might be required by the Navy if a decision were made to take military + action.

+

4. On 1 April, the Argentine Navy had information that two Soviet + submarines were in the general area of the Malvinas (Falkland) + Islands/South Georgia Islands in the South Atlantic.

+

5. (Field comment: The source did not state or imply that a decision has + been made to take military action in the current dispute. He did not + provide any time at which such a decision might be made or such action + might be taken.)

+

[Omitted here is dissemination information.]

+
+ +
+ + 34. Memorandum From Dennis C. + Blair of the National Security Council Staff to the + President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Clark)Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Latin + America/General, Argentina (01/01/1982–04/02/1982). Top Secret. The + date is handwritten. Poindexter initialed the top right-hand corner of + the memorandum. + + + Washington, April 1, + 1982 + + + SUBJECT + U.K.-Argentine Dispute in Falkland Islands + +

In briefing the President this morning,Most + likely a reference to the President’s daily national security + briefing. On April 1, Reagan + met with Bush, Clark, Gregg, and Meese for the briefing in the Oval Office from 9:30 + to 10:10 a.m. (Reagan Library, President’s Daily Diary) No other + record of the briefing has been found. the following points + are most important:

+

—Last night Mrs. Thatcher asked + you to call General Galtieri to + ask him for an assurance that he will not authorize an invasion of the + Falkland Islands;See Document 28.

+

—An amphibious force, probably carrying 500 troops, is on the way to the + Falkland Islands, and is estimated to arrive at 6:00 a.m. on + Friday;April 2.

+

—Secretary Haig has instructed + our ambassador to tell General Galtieri that any military action would wreck the + promising U.S.-Argentina relationship;See + Document 31.

+

The question to decide this morning is whether the President should + personally call Galtieri to urge + restraint.

+

Pros

+

—Mrs. Thatcher has asked the + President to do so;

+

—The call might cause Galtieri to + think twice about the invasion and call it off or delay it;

+

Cons

+

—The President runs the risk of becoming a mediator in an intractable + dispute which has gone on for years;

+

—We do not yet have the results of the ambassador’s call on Galtieri,See Document 37. so it may not be + necessary for the President to intervene personally

+ +

The question for the longer term is the attitude the United States should + take if the Argentinians invade tomorrow, and war breaks out between the + two countries.

+

—We clearly should call for an end to hostilities, and support peace + conferences, cease-fires, etc.

+

—The United Kingdom is both in the right, and a more important and closer + ally. In the final analysis, we must support the U.K.

+

—We should consider initiatives like a personal envoy from the President + (a la Habib)Reference is to Ambassador + Philip C. Habib. Following his retirement from the Foreign Service, Habib served as a special + envoy on behalf of the Carter and Reagan administrations, most notably in + Lebanon.

+
+ +
+ 35. Information Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for + Inter-American Affairs (Enders) + and the Acting Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs + (Holmes) to Secretary of + State HaigSource: Department of State, Central + Foreign Policy File, P850056–1407. Secret. Drafted by Service; cleared by Smith, B. Willcox (P), and + Bosworth. Bosworth initialed the memorandum + on behalf of Enders. + Service initialed for + Smith and + Wilcox. + + + Washington, April 1, + 1982 + + + SUBJECT + Falkland Islands/South Georgia Dispute Between Argentina and the + UK + +

ISSUE

+

Argentina appears to be planning military action against the Falkland + Islands. The British have asked for our urgent assistance to prevent any + such action; their intelligence (and ours) indicates + invasion plans for 0400 EST April + 2. Ambassador Shlaudeman has instructions to obtain peaceful + assurances from President Galtieri today.See Document 31. + If Galtieri + will not give adequate assurances, what do we do next?In the right-hand margin of this paragraph, a + notation in an unknown hand reads: “British holding cabinet meeting + at 5:30 (our time) WH stressing + about possible call by Pres.”

+ +

ESSENTIAL BACKGROUND

+

Argentina and the UK dispute sovereignty + over the islands. We do not take a position on that issue but recognize + UK administration and control. + UK/Argentine negotiations over the years have made very little progress + on the basic sovereignty issue. The Galtieri Government wants to force the pace and appears + to be using the incident on South Georgia Island as the handle.

+

Argentine naval forces have been deployed and are + capable of taking the Falkland Islands. We doubt they could hold + them against a British effort to retake. We cannot be sure that + the GOA intends to follow through with + its invasion plans. However, they only stopped a similar invasion order + against Chilean-held islands at the very last minute in December 1978. + In that case the Pope stepped in as mediator. Foreign Minister Costa Mendez has twice assured our + Ambassador that there would be no confrontation unless the British tried + to remove the Argentine working party from South Georgia, but it is not + clear whether this also rules out an invasion of the Falklands.

+

The British seek a diplomatic resolution to the current + crisis, and we do not expect them to escalate it by forcibly + removing the Argentine workers from Leith Harbour. Nevertheless, if Argentina takes military action against British + possessions, there will be a British military response. As long + as the majority of the inhabitants of the Falkland Islands prefer + British citizenship, the British will not cede sovereignty to + Argentina.

+

The GOA has serious internal problems + and might see bold action on the Falklands as the best way to rally + popular support. On the other hand, the Galtieri government has eagerly sought good relations + with the U.S. as the best way of overcoming legitimization problems + stemming from the excesses of the 1976–78 period. The GOA may see their support for our policy + in Central America as reducing USG + opposition to a forceful posture on the disputed islands.

+

WHAT NEXT?

+

Scenario A—Galtieri provides assurances that the GOA will not initiate military action.

+

This will resolve the immediate problem. While the Argentine ships might + remain on station for a face-saving period, the action would return to + the diplomatic plane.

+

We should:

+

—Urge the UK not to increase its own + military and naval presence and at the same time ask Argentina to remove + its own.

+

—Encourage UK to proceed with its plans + to send a special emissary to Buenos Aires and urge the GOA to accept him.

+

—Maintain our offer of good offices with respect to the immediate problem + at the South Georgias.

+ +

Scenario B—Galtieri does not give Ambassador Shlaudeman the necessary assurances + that Argentina will not use force.

+

Given the shortness of our time horizon we should + immediately:

+

—Ask President to place a direct call to Galtieri.

+

—Call in the Argentine Ambassador to see you.

+

In addition to pointing out the grave damage that would be done to + US/Argentine relations by Argentine seizure of the disputed islands, we + should tell them that in the event of Argentine military action in the + Falklands, the U.S. would support politically the UK.

+

We could also consider the following:

+

1. US support for a UK appeal to the UN Security Council.

+

However, a UK initiative in the Security + Council would probably not get very far. Argentina enjoys the support of + most of the Third World for its sovereignty claims, could count on the + Soviet Bloc, and probably also China.

+

2. Tell the GOA that we will reassess + our current position of neutrality on its somewhat similar Beagle + Channel dispute with Chile.

+

While the GOA can reasonably hope to + gain sovereignty over the Falklands and southern dependencies through + patience (the islands are increasingly dependent on the Argentine + economy and assistance; many British realize that UK control is an anachronism, even though + they are strongly opposed to abandoning British subjects), the same does + not apply to areas disputed with Chile. The GOA needs international community support for a negotiated + settlement.

+

WHAT IF THE ARGENTINES INVADE THE FALKLANDS?

+

We may have no good options at that point. Once in possession of the + Falklands it is very unlikely the Argentines will leave voluntarily, + regardless of what we do or threaten. They may assume that the UK will not attempt to retake the islands, + and that international attention will soon shift elsewhere.

+

Nevertheless, we will have to:

+

—Voice our strongest opposition to this action and state that the United + States cannot recognize a solution that has not been agreed upon by the + two parties.

+

—Urge immediate withdrawal of Argentine forces.

+

—Hold up indefinitely on the certification that would permit renewed U.S. + arms sales and assistance to Argentina.

+

—Support fully UK initiatives at the + UN or elsewhere.

+

It is more likely at this point, given the pressures on + the Thatcher Government, + that the UK will order the marine + garrison to resist an invasion and will attempt to retake the + islands. It could bring in sufficient naval power in 3–4 weeks to effectively neutralize + Argentina’s proximity advantage. There could well be armed conflict, + both at sea and on land. U.S. efforts at that point should be directed + toward a cease fire and withdrawal of the Argentines. In that context we could consider sending our own special + emissary.

+
+ +
+ 36. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United + KingdomSource: Reagan + Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC + Cable File, Falkland File 03/31/1982–04/01/1982. Secret; Sensitive; + Immediate; Nodis. Sent for + information Immediate to Buenos Aires and the White + House. + + + Washington, April 1, 1982, 1600Z + +

86916. Subject: Presidential Message to Mrs. Thatcher on Falkland Island Dispute.

+

1. Secret–Entire text.

+

2. Embassy should deliver immediately the following message from the + President to Prime Minister Thatcher: Quote: Dear Margaret, I have your urgent + message of March 31 over Argentina’s apparent moves against the Falkland + Islands.See Document + 28. We share your concern over the disturbing + military steps which the Argentines are taking and regret that + negotiations have not succeeded in defusing the problem.

+

Accordingly, we are contacting the Argentine Government at the highest + levelsSee Documents + 37 and 41. to urge them + not to take military measures which would make a just solution more + difficult to achieve. As you requested, we are also asking for + assurances from them that they will show restraint and not initiate + hostilities.

+

I want you to know how we have valued your cooperation on the challenges + we both face in many different parts of the world. We will do what we + can to assist you here.

+

Sincerely, Ron. Unquote.In telegram 7307 from + London, April 1, the Embassy reported that Reagan’s message was delivered to + the Prime Minister’s office during the evening of April 1. + (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, + D820174–0106)

+ + Haig + +
+ +
+ + 37. Telegram From the Embassy in Argentina to the Department of + StateSource: Reagan + Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC + Country File, Latin America/Central, Argentina + (01/01/1982–04/02/1982). Secret; Flash; Nodis. Sent Niact + Immediate to London. Printed from a copy that was received in the + White House Situation Room. + + + Buenos Aires, April 1, 1982, + 2345Z + +

1912. Subject: Possible Military Action in Falklands. Ref: State + 86790.See Document + 31.

+

1. Secret–Entire text.

+

2. I met this evening with President Galtieri to review the points in reftel. Also present were the Foreign + Minister, the President’s principal military aide, and our ARMA. Galtieri had been informed of our demarche and had with + him a talking paper prepared for his response. I emphasized to him, as I + had to the Foreign Minister, that any armed confrontation would do + serious damage to the excellent relations we have been developing + between our two countries. I asked for the assurances on the use of + force as set forth in para five of the + reftel. Galtieri did not address that question + in his talking paper, but when later I pressed it said bluntly that he + was not going to tell us whether or not he intended to use force.

+

3. The President and the Foreign Minister both made it clear that they + believed our demarche was the result of a request from HMG. (Comment: This should be borne in + mind in assessing Galtieri’s + response. He was undoubtedly speaking as much to the British as to us + and his intention was clearly to keep from tipping his hand.) With + respect to US/Argentine relations, the President insisted that Argentina + has the support on this issue of the great majority of nations and that + the failure of the U.S. to understand its position would do us damage in + the Southern Cone and elsewhere. He referred several times to Argentine + support for our position in Central America—support which I + acknowledged—and seemed to suggest there should be a quid-pro-quo in + this case.

+

4. The talking paper, which the President handed to me at the end of the + meeting, reviews the Argentine complaints about HMG’s lack of response to the Argentine proposals of + January and February. It describes the current situation as “intolerable + and impossible to maintain” in terms of “our national honor.” The paper + contains the following sentence: “We have not considered for a moment + that at a time when the freedom of the American people is seen to be + seriously threatened your + government (USG) would be inclined to + defend a colonial system represented by fewer than 2,000 persons + thousands of kilometers from the metropol. We believe firmly that such + situations belong to the history of past centuries and that it is not + rationally possible to ask us to be the last example of a colonial + aggression.”

+

5. The last point in the paper responds in a way to our request for + assurances. The Foreign Minister commented that this point was the key. + It states: “We can offer all the tranquility and security required if + public and express recognition of our sovereignty is made real, along + with the stipulation, also public, that in a period not to exceed the + end of the year 1982 the consequences of said recognition will be made + concrete.” I told the President that we were not talking about US support or lack of support for the + British position, that we were not taking sides, and that we were only + speaking of the possibility of military action, a possibility which + concerns us greatly. I said that such action could bring unforeseen and + very grave consequences. The President said that Argentina was prepared + to face such consequences.

+

6. Comment: Galtieri was + emotional and, I believe, quite nervous. I’m still not certain that he + means to take action tomorrow. It would be in his nature to run a bluff + to the very end. On the other hand, his ego shows signs of serious + inflation and I’m afraid that he is capable of doing something + stupid.

+ + Shlaudeman + +
+ +
+ 38. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the United + NationsSource: Department + of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D820173–1064. Confidential; + Niact Immediate. Sent for + information Immediate to all UN + Security Council capitals and Buenos Aires. Drafted by P.C. Wilcox + (IO); cleared by Pendleton, Service, Platt, Holmes, Bosworth, and in S/S–O; and approved by Stoessel. + + + Washington, April 2, 1982, 0019Z + +

87649. Subject: Falkland Islands Dispute in the Security Council.

+

1. (C–Entire Text)

+

2. US should vote for the resolution + which the British have informed us they will introduce in the Security + Council calling on all parties to refrain from the use of force in the + Falkland Islands dispute and to seek settlement of the matter through peaceful negotiations.In telegram 808 from USUN, sent at 0104Z, April 2, the Mission informed the + Department that a special emergency session of the Security Council + would be held the evening of April 1 “at urgent request of the + UK.” At the session, the Mission + continued, “UK seeks a statement by + the President of the Security Council which is non-judgmental, + balanced and emphasizes restraint by both parties, non-use of force + and settlement by peaceful means. UK + statement to the Council will point to the imminent danger of armed + invasion of the Falklands and the deterrent effect which prompt + Council action might have on GOA.” + (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, + D820173–1097) + US representatives should make a brief + statement during the debate in the Council in support of the principles + in the UK resolution, emphasizing the + need for peaceful, negotiated settlement. The US statement should not comment in any way on the question + of sovereignty over the Falkland Islands. The Secretary has been in + touch with Lord Carrington to + assure him of our strong support for the UK position. If UK proposes + approval by the Council of a statement by the President of the Council + instead of a resolution, US should + likewise support.

+ + Haig + +
+ +
+ 39. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassies in + Argentina and the United KingdomSource: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Latin + America/Central, Argentina (01/01/1982–04/02/1982). Secret; Niact Immediate; Nodis. Sent for information + Immediate to USUN. Printed from a + copy that was received in the White House Situation + Room. + + + Washington, April 2, 1982, 0304Z + +

87865. Subject: UK-Argentine + Confrontation: Secretary Calls In Argentine Ambassador.

+

1. (S–Entire text).

+

2. The Secretary called in Argentine Ambassador Takacs at 7:45 p.m., April 1. They met + for 15 minutes, with ARA DAS Bosworth also present. The Secretary + told Takacs that the President + and he are deeply concerned about the situation in the South Atlantic. + Our assessment suggests that the use of force is contemplated on the + Falkland Islands and in South Georgia as well. We know that the UK will take a counter action if this happens. The situation + would become a tragedy. Nothing would be more self defeating for + Argentina’s interest in good relations with the United States. The + Secretary described our present relations as those of unprecedented + cordiality after many years of languishing. GOA use of force would reverse our cooperation in Central + America and the hemisphere. The reaction of the American people will be + overwhelming, we will have to side with the British, and US-Argentine relations will be back to the + worst days.

+

3. The Secretary said he had been in touch with Lord Carrington and received the + clear impression the British will react. He said he had urged the + President to call Galtieri. He + was shocked to learn that the Argentine President would not take the + call.In his memoirs, Haig wrote that Reagan had attempted to telephone + Galtieri at 6:30 p.m., + but had been informed by Galtieri’s aide that he was “unavailable” to take + Reagan’s call. + (Haig, Caveat, p. 264) Subsequently, an Argentine official + (Gustavo Figueroa) had called + to say that Galtieri would be + available for a call shortly. The Secretary told Takacs that he had called him in + before this subsequent information.

+

4. The Secretary concluded his opening presentation by saying it would be + a supreme irony when we are confronting the threat from Castro for our + friends to come to blows. To avoid that, the President is prepared to + send Vice President Bush to + Buenos Aires immediately if that would be helpful.

+

5. Takacs asked if our Ambassador + in Buenos Aires had told Galtieri this afternoon that the British were prepared + to use force. The Secretary did not know but he affirmed that it was his + clear judgment after talking to Carrington. He added he knows enough about British + politics to be pretty sure how Prime Minister Thatcher will react. Time has about + run out. If the information we have is correct, it will be a casus + belli.

+

6. The Secretary repeated that we are willing to do all we can, adding, + however, that we cannot get into the dispute itself.

+

7. Takacs wanted the Secretary to + know some of the history of this problem from the Argentine side. He + said that Galtieri is in much + the same situation as Thatcher, + that next year will be the 150th anniversary of the start of the + dispute, and no (Argentine) Government can exist with the situation + remaining as it is. The incident in South Georgia has added fuel to the + fire. Takacs added, however, + that we must hope we can keep the situation manageable.

+

8. Takacs said he would inform + his government immediately of the conversation.

+ + Haig + +
+ +
+ + 40. Talking Points Prepared for President ReaganSource: + Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Subject File, Memorandums of Conversation—President + Reagan (April 1982). No + classification marking. No drafting information appears on the + talking points. The talking points are attached to an April 2 + handwritten note by Poindexter, which reads: “President used this with + minor mods [modifications] in telephone call last night.” In + addition, an attached NSC + correspondence routing slip indicates that the talking points were + sent to McFarlane for + action. Both Poindexter and + McFarlane initialed the + routing slip. No memorandum of conversation of the Reagan-Galtieri telephone call has been + found. For the substance of the conversation, see Document 41. + + + Washington, undated + +

SUGGESTED TALKING POINTS FOR TELEPHONE CALL TO PRESIDENT + LEOPOLDO FORTUNATO GALTIERI

+

—I am calling you on an extremely serious matter that threatens the peace + of this hemisphere.

+

—I want you to know of my personal concern about your dispute with the + United Kingdom regarding the Malvinas and South Georgia Islands.

+

—I have very disturbing intelligence that Argentina is prepared to invade + the Malvinas Islands by early tomorrow morning—0600 to be exact.See Document + 34.

+

—Another concern of mine is this. I know Prime Minister Thatcher very well. Maggie is a very + determined woman. When she knows she’s right as in the case of Gibraltar + and Northern Ireland, she will not give in. The use of force by anyone + will be met by force on her part. I am convinced of that. There should + be no illusions about it.

+

—I know this is a matter of longstanding and great sensitivity to all + Argentines.

+

—As you know, both you and the British are close friends of this country. + And you know that with our traditional friendship with Great Britain, I + am determined as I laid out in my February 24 OAS speechReference is to + Reagan’s remarks on the + Caribbean Basin Initiative to the Organization of American States + made on February 24. See Public Papers: Reagan, 1982, Book I, pp. + 210–215. to help build a lasting positive relationship with + all the nations of this hemisphere.

+

—Long before I became President I advocated renewed good relations with + the countries of this Hemisphere, especially the major ones—Mexico, + Brazil, and Argentina. I was and am determined to reverse the course set + by my predecessor.

+ +

—And as you know better than I there have been a number of bad moments in + our relations. I want to end that forever and build a lasting + partnership.

+

—Together we can do so much. Argentines and Americans are working + together now more closely than at any time in our history.

+

—But a conflict in this hemisphere would be a heavy blow to these + hopes.

+

—Furthermore, I must tell you in all candor that if Argentina initiates + the use of force against the Malvinas Islands, it will wreck our + relationship. The American people and the Congress will see it as an act + of Argentine aggression. And as President, so will I.

+

—I am therefore asking you not to invade the Malvinas Islands or start + any conflict with the United Kingdom.

+

—I am further prepared to act on our longstanding position of seeking + peaceful bilateral negotiations in this matter which I understand is of + great importance to you and all Argentines.

+

—IThis point and the following point are on + an attached page which appears to have been added from another draft + of the talking points. Both sections are classified Secret. + usually do not talk this way, but I must have, now, your absolute + assurance that there will be no landing on the Falkland IslandsAn unknown hand crossed out the word + “Falkland” which had been typed before this word. tomorrow + morning.An unknown hand added “IF:” in + large capital letters above the subject heading.

+

IF THE ARGENTINE PRESIDENT REFUSES TO AGREE

+

—I am prepared to dispatch Vice President Bush/Amb. Kirkpatrick immediately and insist that you withhold + action until you have met with him/her.An + unknown hand highlighted this point with vertical lines in both the + left- and right-hand margins.

+
+ +
+ + 41. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassies in + Argentina and the United KingdomSource: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Cable File, Falkland File + 04/02/1982. Secret; Sensitive; Niact Immediate; Nodis. Sent for information Immediate to the White + House. + + + Washington, April 2, 1982, 0437Z + +

87911. Subject: President’s Conversation With Argentine President + Galtieri.

+

1. (S–Entire text).

+

2. The President telephoned Argentine President Galtieri at 2030 EST to discuss threat of Argentine + military action against Falkland Islands.According to the President’s Daily Diary, Reagan spoke with Galtieri over a conference line + from 8:34 to 9:14 p.m., April 1. (Reagan Library, President’s Daily + Diary) No memorandum of conversation of this telephone call has been + found. In his personal diary entry for April 2, Reagan recorded his account of the + conversation: “Last night I called the Pres. of Argentina—talked for 40 min. trying to + persuade him not to invade the Falkland Islands (property of U.K. + since 1540 or so). Argentina has been trying to claim them for 149 + years. I got nowhere.” (Reagan, Diaries, vol. I, p. + 121) For Haig’s account of + the conversation, see Caveat, pp. + 264–265. The President stated that USG had solid information that Argentina was planning to + take military action to take control of the Islands, and warned that + doing so would be a tragedy, and would gravely compromise US-Argentine relations. The President made + a personal appeal to Galtieri + not to take any military step against the Falkland Island chain and + offered the USG’s good offices, + including his willingness to send Vice President Bush to Buenos Aires.

+

3. Galtieri replied that he + appreciated the President’s concern, but the UK had refused to relinquish sovereignty for 149 years and + time had run out. He went on to refuse President’s offer of good offices + and said the US appeal had been simply + overtaken by events.

+

4. When President pressed Galtieri whether GOA + intended to use force, Galtieri + replied that Argentina feels free to use whatever resources are at its + disposal, unless HMG that very night + recognized full Argentine sovereignty over all of the Islands and agreed + to provisions for turning over control within next few months. When + pressed whether Argentine military would take action in the morning, + Galtieri stated that GOA had full freedom to use force at the + moment it judges opportune.

+

5. Following the conversation, the President sent a personal message to + Prime Minister Thatcher.See Document + 42.

+ + Haig + +
+ +
+ + 42. Message From President Reagan to British Prime Minister ThatcherSource: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Cable File, Falkland File + 04/02/1982. Secret; Sensitive. Sent in telegram WH01641 via Cabinet + Office channels. The Department transmitted the text of the message + to Buenos Aires and London in telegram 88190, April 2. (Department + of State, Executive Secretariat, Files of Alexander M. Haig, Jr., 1981–1982, + Lot 82D370, No folder) + + + Washington, April 2, 1982, 0245Z + + + Dear Margaret, + +

I have just talked at length with General Galtieri about the situation in the Falklands.See Document + 41. I conveyed to him my personal concern about the + possibility of an Argentine invasion. I told him that initiating + military operations against the Falkland Islands would seriously + compromise relations between the United States and Argentina and I urged + him to refrain from offensive action. I offered our good offices and my + readiness to send a personal representative to assist in resolving the + issues between Argentina and the United Kingdom.

+

The General heard my message, but gave me no commitment that he would + comply with it. Indeed, he spoke in terms of ultimatums and left me with + the clear impression that he has embarked on a course of armed conflict. + We will continue to cooperate with your government in the effort to + resolve this dispute, both in attempting to avert hostilities and to + stop them if they should break out. While we have a policy of neutrality + on the sovereignty issue, we will not be neutral on the issue of + Argentine use of military force.

+

Warmest wishes,

+ + Ron + +
+
+ + +
+ Seeking a Negotiated Settlement, April 2–April 30, 1982 + +
+ 43. Situation Report Prepared by the Department of State Falkland + Islands Working GroupSource: + Washington National Records Center, OSD Files, FRC 330–84–0003, Argentina (Jan–15 May) + 1982. Confidential. + + + Washington, April 2, + 1982 + + +

Situation Report No. 1

+

Situation in Falkland Islands as of 0600 + EST

+

1. Argentine press reports invasion of Falkland Islands began at 0400 + EST April 2.At 9:40 a.m. Buenos Aires time, the Argentine Junta + released an official statement announcing the commencement of the + operation. According to an Embassy translation of the statement, the + “combined operation” was launched “with the objective of recovering + for the national patrimony the territories of the Malvinas Islands, + South Georgia Islands and South Sandwich Islands.” (Telegram 1917 + from Buenos Aires, April 2; Department of State, Central Foreign + Policy File, D820175–0906) There is no official confirmation, + but UK + FCO reports it has lost communications + contact with Port Stanley.Ure informed the Embassy in London + at 11:30 local time (GMT + 1 hour) + that the U.K. Government had “lost communications contact with Port + Stanley because of technical and weather problems, was trying to + patch in a link through HMS + Endurance, and was not sure at that moment + whether the Argentines had landed.” Ure added that he planned to telephone Henderson and instruct him to ask + Haig to issue a “prompt, + public condemnation of Argentine military action if it were + confirmed, and to request U.S. help in getting other countries to + condemn the aggression and to call for a withdrawal of troops and a + cessation of hostilities.” (Telegram 7330 from London, April 2; + Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Europe and Soviet Union, United + Kingdom (04/01/1982–07/31/1982 (3)) For an account of Henderson’s April 2 morning + meeting with Haig, see Document 46. However, HMG thus far is saying “that no invasion + has taken place.”

+

2. At the urgent request of the British, the Security Council met evening + of April 1. UK permrep said that an + Argentine force was heading for the Falklands and an invasion could + occur as early as the next morning. Both sides presented their versions + of the long-disputed sovereignty of the Falkland Islands and the + dependencies of South Shetlands and South Georgia Islands. The President + of the Council read a statement previously accepted or acquiesced in by + all members which expressed concern and called on the two governments to + exercise the utmost restraint and to refrain from use or threat of force + in the region. The US rep supported the + President’s statement as did the UK + rep.For a summary of the + Security Council meeting of April 1, including the text of the + UNSC President’s statement, + see Yearbook of the United Nations, 1982, p. + 1320.

+ +

3. The British have notified us they are contemplating using Wideawake + Air Force Base on British-owned Ascension Island to debark limited + number of personnel for transfer to navy ship. We believe this is a + courtesy notification, but are checking.

+

4. We are telling the press the US + strongly supports the UN Security + Council’s call for the exercise of the utmost restraint and avoidance of + the use of or threat of force.The White House issued a statement at the daily news briefing, + which began at 12:40 p.m. See Public Papers: + Reagan, 1982, + Book I, p. 411.

+ + Robert E. + Service + Falkland Islands Working + Group + + Richard W. Erdman + Senior Watch + Officer + + +
+ +
+ 44. Telegram From the Chief of Naval Operations (Hayward) to the Joint Chiefs of + StaffSource: Reagan + Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC + Cable File, Falkland File, 04/02/1982. Secret; Sensitive; Flash; + Noforn. Sent for information + Immediate to the Department of State, Department of Defense, DIA, and CNO Admin. + + + Buenos Aires, April 2, 1982, + 1330Z + +

921345/Bravo 005. Subj: Argentina Situation. Adm + Hayward sends.

+

1. (S/NF) Adm + Hayward was received by Adm + Anaya, CINCARGNAV and naval member ruling + Junta, at 0825L this am in ARGNAV + Hdqtrs Bldg here in Buenos Aires.

+

2. (S/NF) Adm + Anaya explained situation as + follows:

+

A. At 10 pm local last evening (1 Apr) 70 Argentine Marines (referred to + as commandos) landed south of Port Stanley, Malvinas Islands + (Falklands).

+

B. At 4 am this morning the govt radio station on the Island was + secured.

+ +

C. At 6 am a battalion of Marines landed by amphibious means near Port + Stanley (a batt normally is about 350). NavAtt estimates with LST + Cabo San Antonio and available LVTP–7 amphibious + vehicles Arg Marine force ashore could total max of 300.

+

3. (S/NF) No additional info was provided on action in Malvinas by Adm + Anaya. Adm expressed apologies that this action came during my + visit. He attempted to link Arg action with their role in countering the + perceived threat of “Soviets” in the region, refering to their count of + an estimated 60 Soviet fishing trawlers in the vicinity of these + Islands.

+

4. (S/NF) I informed Adm + Anaya that remainder of my visit + was cancelled and that plans were initiated to leave for Rio de Janeiro + this afternoon.In telegram 1950 from Buenos + Aires, April 3, the Embassy reported that [text + not declassified] had met with Anaya’s personal aide, Captain Ricardo Nolte, on + April 2. Nolte indicated that Anaya was “surprised” by Hayward’s “brusque” reaction to + the Malvinas operation when Anaya and Hayward met that morning, which “did not accord at + all” with the Argentine Navy’s expectation of how the United States + would receive the news of the operation. According to Nolte, “the + navy believed that while we would disapprove, our reaction would be + more softly stated owing to growing GOA–US coincidence of + interests and US pragmatism.” + (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, + D820177–0027)

+
+ +
+ 45. Telegram From the Department of State to All Diplomatic and + Consular PostsSource: + Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D820176–0038. + Secret; Immediate. Drafted by Campbell; cleared by Service; approved in S/S–O. + + + Washington, April 2, 1982, 1704Z + +

88344. Inform Consuls. Subject: Falklands Situation Report No. 2.

+

1. (S–Entire text).

+

2. Situation in Falkland Islands as of 1000 EST.

+

3. The Argentine Junta announced at 0815 EST that their military occupation of the Falklands is a + complete success. The UK Embassy in + Washington has confirmed only that Argentina has launched military + operations against the Falklands.

+ +

4. The Secretary has approved revised press guidance which reflects the + confirmation of hostilities, deplores Argentina’s resorting to force, + and calls on Argentina to immediately withdraw its forces.

+

5. There are Argentine press reports that the UK ice patrol vessel Endurance has + been sunk. The UK Embassy here denies + this.

+

6. The UK Embassy has told us that the + Royal Marines on the Falklands are under orders to resist. The + Argentines claim the Marines made no resistance. We have no reports as + yet of either any fighting or casualties.

+

7. At Brussels there was a special meeting of the NAC to consider the + crisis.A summary of the special meeting + of the NAC was sent to the Department in telegram 2272 from the + Mission to NATO, April 2. + (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, + D820175–0930) The UK asked + that the Allies weigh in with the Argentines and supported a statement + to be issued by SYG + Luns urging resistance and + non-use of force. In London, Prime Minister Thatcher held an emergency Cabinet meeting this + morning.

+

8. Embassy Buenos Aires reports that there are ten to twenty American + citizens on the Falklands.

+

9. The British Ambassador in Buenos Aires reports that his government is + breaking diplomatic relations with Argentina and asking the Swiss to + take over its interests.

+

10. Sitrep 1See Document 43. not + disseminated telegraphically.

+ + Haig + +
+ +
+ + 46. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United + KingdomSource: Reagan + Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC + Country File, Europe and Soviet Union, United Kingdom + (04/01/1982–07/31/1982 (4)). Secret; Niact Immediate; Exdis. Sent for information Immediate to Buenos Aires, + USUN, and the Mission to + NATO. Printed from a copy that + was received in the White House Situation Room. + + + Washington, April 2, 1982, 1916Z + +

88416. Subject: Secretary Discusses Falkland Island Invasion With + Ambassador.

+

1. (S–Entire text).

+

2. The Secretary met with UK Ambassador + Henderson morning of April 2 + to discuss Argentine occupation of the Falkland Islands. The Secretary + began by describing the latest information from Buenos Aires on the + extent of Argentine military activities in the South Atlantic and said + that it was the U.S. judgment that the reports of occupation were + accurate. Henderson answered + that HMG had reached the same + conclusion.

+

3. Henderson said that his + government would like the U.S. to take three important steps: recall the + U.S. Ambassador to Argentina; raise the issue of Argentine military + action in the Organization of American States (OAS); and embargo U.S. defense sales to Argentina. He also + said that his government was raising the issue today in the UN Security Council and would like our + support.

+

4. The Secretary replied that the U.S. would carefully consider the three + measures and get back to the British promptly. He assured Henderson that the U.S. wanted to be + as helpful as possible in the Security Council and that we would + instruct the U.S. delegation to get in touch right away with UK Ambassador Parsons.At 1958Z, April 2, + the Department advised USUN of the + Haig-Henderson meeting and instructed + the Mission to vote for a British resolution calling for “a + cessation of hostilities by Argentina, withdrawal of Argentine + forces, and a return to negotiations for a peaceful settlement of + the dispute,” which British representatives planned to introduce in + the Security Council that day. In addition, the Department + instructed USUN to make a + supporting statement containing the following points: “The US deplores Argentina’s use of force; + We call on Argentina to cease hostilities and withdraw its military + force immediately; We also urge the parties to resume negotiations + in order to settle this dispute peacefully.” (Telegram 88491 to + USUN, April 2; Department of + State, Central Foreign Policy File, D820176–0398) In telegram 89843 + to USUN, April 3, the Department + transmitted the final, cleared text of the U.S. statement. + (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D820177–0647) The + statement as read by the Alternate Representative to the UN Security Council on April 3 is + printed in American Foreign Policy: Current + Documents, 1982, p. 1298. + Henderson inquired as to what + the Secretary thought the reaction would be in the OAS if the U.S. raised the issue. The + Secretary answered that it could be viewed as another anti-colonial, Third World issue, but we would + look carefully at it.

+

5. DAS Holmes asked whether + HMG considered getting the Vatican + involved in trying to resolve the dispute. The Ambassador said that in + his opinion the GOA won’t listen to the + Vatican, if it won’t listen to the President of the U.S. The Secretary + concluded by stating that it was clear that the GOA was using the Falklands issue at home as a political + diversionary move, and the military operation would prove to be a major + problem for what we are trying to do in this Hemisphere.

+ + Haig + +
+ +
+ 47. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security + Affairs (Clark) to President + ReaganSource: Reagan Library, Executive + Secretariat, NSC Country File, + Latin America/Central, Argentina (01/01/1982–04/02/1982). + Confidential. + + + Washington, undated + + + SUBJECT + Issues LuncheonAccording to the + President’s Daily Diary, Reagan held a luncheon meeting with Senator + Laxalt at the White + House swimming pool from 12:18 to 1:18 p.m., April 2. (Reagan + Library, President’s Daily Diary) No record of the conversation + has been found. + +

Falkland Islands

+

The Argentine occupation of the Falkland Islands is a genuine crisis. The + conflict involves two powers friendly to the U.S.—one of them a key + NATO partner who remembers an + American betrayal under very vaguely similar circumstances—Suez, 1956. + The problem for the U.S. is to maintain its commitment to the U.K. + special relationship; not alienate the Argentines; and find a peaceful + way for all concerned out of this mess. Only the U.S. possesses the + energy, wit, resources, and motivation to do so.

+
+ +
+ + 48. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Kingdom to the Department + of State and the Embassy in ArgentinaSource: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy + File, D820175–0710. Confidential; Immediate; Exdis. This telegram repeats + portions of a telegram sent from [text not + declassified] April 2, which was then repeated for + information by the DIA to the White + House at 1759Z. (Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Cable File, Falkland File, + 04/02/1982) + + + London, April 2, 1982, 1725Z + +

7406. Subject: Information on U.K. Military Activities Related to + Falkland Dispute.

+

1. Confidential–Entire text.

+

2. The following repeats for your information [less + than 1 line not declassified].

+

Begin text:

+

8. (C/Noforn) Summary: Ministry of + Defense radio contact with Port Stanley was lost at 0945 London (GMT plus 1) on 820402 and efforts to + reestablish communications are being made through HMS + Endurance, the Royal Navy ice ship, now on patrol + nearby in the South Atlantic. Assuming an Argentine invasion from the + amphibious force in the area, the MOD is planning to send a task force + of at least 7 ships and probably 2 commandos of Royal Marines (1800 + approx strength). Early this date, instructions were given to RN and RM + units to reassign all foreign personnel to shore establishments. The MOD + Command Center has been on a fully manned basis since early morning + (820330) and the Chief of the Defence Staff is holding a 1500 session + (820402) to discuss contingency operations.

+

9A. (C/Noforn) Details: The following + info was all that could be obtained from various sources as MOD offices, + both civilian and military, are extremely reluctant to talk.

+

—(1) (C/Noforn) The Argentine naval + force estimated at 5 ships plus 2 brigades of Marines is believed to + have landed near/at Port Stanley around 0930 London time 820402. As of + 1300 radio contact had not been reestablished and attempts to + reestablish communications through HMS + Endurance had not been successful.

+

—(2) (C/Noforn) The UK response is to organize a task force of + at least seven (7) ships which may include the HMS + Invincible, Hermes, Superb (a nuclear powered submarine), an LDP, and two Royal fleet auxiliaries. From + RM and RN sources an SOA of 16 + knots was considered maximum obtainable from the force and it would take + at least eighteen (18) days to reach the Falklands from the UK.

+ +

—(3) (C/Noforn) UK forces in the Falklands area include the + HMS + Endurance with two (2) Lynx helicopters armed + with (NFI) anti-tank missiles and 97 + Royal Marines (RM’s), armed with rifles, + general purpose machine guns and (NFI) + anti-tank weapons. There are 22 RM’s on + South Georgia and 75 in or near Port Stanley.

+

—(4) (C/Noforn) Two Sea Harrier Squadrons (5 aircraft each) at + RNAS Yeovilton have been alerted, + 800 Squadron is leaving this date to go aboard HMS + Hermes for a possible departure 820403, and 801 + Squadron is preparing to go aboard HMS + Invincible with an estimated departure + 820406.

+

—(5) (C/Noforn) The 3rd Commando + Brigade with headquarters at Plymouth is on full alert and 45 Commando + in Arbroath Scotland is packing its gear with an order to be prepared to + depart in 72 hours. All Easter leaves have been cancelled in 45 + Commando.

+

—(6) (C/Noforn) Royal Air Force + involvement at this point seems to be limited to a small number of + C–130 sorties to Ascension Island. + They will fly POL and comm gear to the island for transfer to a + ship for bulk transport to the Falklands. Although the airport at Port + Stanley can handle a C–130 (4100 feet + long), RAF staffers feel that the + distance of the Falklands from the UK + and the lack of a staging point in South America will preclude airlift + support to the area.

+

9B. (C/Noforn) ORG cmts: Two subsequent attempts since 1300 + 820402 to obtain further details of UK + deployment plans for force dispositions have been unsuccessful. Normally + open discussions with close RM contacts + have been noticeably guarded and although willing to discuss contingency + plans they were not allowed to do so by the Defence Secretariat. It was + obvious to RO that staff officers have + been on alert for at least 48 to 60 hours and a schedule for full-time + operations over the weekend was observed. The above information was + passed separately to DIA and the DIA rep in NMCC.

+

End text.

+

3. We also note newspaper report in daily “Standard” March 2Presumably April 2. to the + effect that 24-ship U.K. task force which had taken part in NATO exercise “Springtrain” had put to + sea again without shore leave. Task force includes two country class + guided missile destroyers, 3 other destroyers, thirteen frigates and two + submarines including the nuclear submarine Superb. Report cites source at Gibraltar as saying only that task + force is “no longer in our operational area.”

+ + Streator + +
+ +
+ + 49. Telegram From the Central Intelligence Agency to Multiple + RecipientsSource: Reagan + Library, Roger W. Fontaine + Files, Cable File, Falkland Islands [04/01/1982–04/02/1982]. Secret; + Noforn; Wnintel. Sent to the + National Photographic Interpretation Center, the National Security + Agency, the Department of State, the Defense Intelligence Agency, + the Department of the Treasury, the Secret Service, the Federal Bureau of + Investigation, the Department of Justice, the White House Situation + Room, the National Security Council Staff, the CIA Office of Current Operations, the + Joint Special Operations Command, USCINCSO, and CINCLANT. + + + Washington, April 2, 1982, 1913Z + +

198782. TDFIR–314/00539–82. Dist: 2 April 1982. Country: Argentina/United + Kingdom. Subject: Partial Chronology of the Argentine Military Action + Against the Malvinas (Falkland) Islands (DOI: 1, 2 April 82). Source: [3 lines not + declassified].

+

1. On 2 April 1982, a senior Argentine naval officer returned to Buenos + Aires from Southern Argentina after having participated in the + preparations for and the launching of the Argentine military action + against the Malvinas (Falkland) Islands. The naval officer said that the + time and date of the operation had been set at least seven days in + advance; it was launched at 2200 hours local time on 1 April in very + high seas. The first unit employed was an eight-man underwater + demolition team, followed shortly by a full marine infantry battalion in + an amphibious assault; this battalion was augmented by 20 tanks, and two + helicopters went in with a total of about 25 army commandos. The purpose + of the first part of the operation was to secure the airfield at Port + Stanley; this was achieved at 0200 hours local time on 2 April.

+

2. As soon as the airfield was secured, two C–130 aircraft with air assault troops landed to reinforce + the marine battalion. The C–130 + aircraft were scheduled to return to Rio Gallegos, in Argentina’s + southernmost province of Santa Cruz, to ferry members of the 11th + Infantry Brigade to Port Stanley.

+

3. Members of the 9th Infantry Brigade at Comodoro Rivadavia were on + alert on the morning of 2 April.

+

4. Argentine naval personnel involved in the operation believe it went + like clockwork.

+
+ +
+ + 50. Action Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for + Inter-American Affairs (Enders) + and the Acting Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs + (Holmes) to Secretary of + State HaigSource: Department of State, Executive + Secretariat, Files of Alexander M. Haig + Jr. 1981–1982, Lot 82D370, Falklands Crisis—1982. + Secret. Drafted by Smith; + cleared by Service, + Pendleton, Gudgeon, and Johnson. Service initialed for Enders and Holmes. A stamped notation at the + top of the memorandum indicates that Haig saw it. + + + Washington, April 2, + 1982 + + + SUBJECT + How We Should Respond to HMG’s + Request for Measures Against Argentina + +

SUMMARY

+

The Argentine military invasion of the Falkland Islands was successfully + completed in the AM of April 2. This morning, British Ambassador + Henderson formally presented + three requests from his Government: to withdraw the U.S. Ambassador to + Buenos Aires; to take the issue to the OAS; to embargo arms sales to Argentina.See Document 46.

+

ANALYSIS OF ISSUE

+

The Argentines apparently calculated that the risk of UK military retaliation and damage to its + relations with the U.S. was worth the price, and probably calculated + that the US and UK would acquiesce in a fait + accompli. The Argentines may have calculated that their recent + assistance to the U.S. in Central America would ensure our acceptance of + the invasion. In analyzing U.S. options, we must take into account + Argentine support for U.S. policy in Central America and our longer term + relationship with Argentina. At the same time, the British as our oldest + and most reliable ally strongly believe that they should be able to + count on U.S. support on the Falklands issue. We have already assured + the UK that we will give them very + strong support on the issue of Argentine use of military force, while + remaining neutral on the issue of sovereignty over the Falklands. We are + giving them strong support in the UN + Security Council debate which began today.The UN Security Council considered + the Falklands/Malvinas issue in both morning and evening sessions, + April 2. (Telegram 832 from USUN, + April 3; Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, + D820177–0349) On the morning of April 3, the British Embassy + requested U.S. assistance to persuade Zaire and Japan to vote for a + British resolution introduced the previous day; the Department + informed the British that “the US + will do everything possible to help obtain passage of the UK resolution.” (Telegram 89842 to + USUN, April 3; Department of + State, Central Foreign Policy File, D820177–0646) Later on April 3, + the Department instructed USUN to + vote against a second draft resolution introduced by Panama should + it be brought to a vote. (Telegram 89871 to USUN, April 3; Department of State, + Central Foreign Policy File, D820177–0692) The British resolution, + which demanded the “immediate cessation of hostilities” and the + “immediate withdrawal of all Argentine forces” from the Islands and + called upon the Argentine and British Governments to “seek a + diplomatic solution to their differences,” was adopted by the + Security Council as Resolution 502, April 3. The Security Council + also agreed not to vote on the Panamanian draft resolution. The text + of UNSC Resolution 502 (1982) is + printed in American Foreign Policy Current + Documents, 1982, pp. 1298–1299.

+ +

EVALUATION OF OPTIONS

+

1. That you recall the U.S. Ambassador to Argentina.

+

PRO: EUR believes that Ambassador + Shlaudeman should be called + back to the United States for at least one week in order to comply with + a request by our closest ally, and to demonstrate to Argentina that it + seriously misjudged U.S. opposition to its military invasion. The + British are going to bat for us in many areas of the world. We in effect + owe it to them. Having an Ambassador in Buenos Aires over the past week + in direct contact with the highest Argentine authorities was not enough + to convince them of our serious opposition to the invasion. Recalling + the Ambassador might get their attention.

+

CON: ARA believes that during this + period of serious crisis in Buenos Aires and the major strain in + U.S./Argentine relations, it would be a serious mistake to withdraw our + Ambassador. Recall of our Ambassador would not bring a withdrawal from + the Falklands and would result in a further loss of U.S. influence over + the Junta. There are actions (e.g., UN) + we are taking to help the British. Recall of the Ambassador, even + briefly, could seriously jeopardize our common interests with Argentina + elsewhere in the hemisphere.

+

2. Raise this issue in the OAS.

+

Mechanisms exist to call expeditiously for a Permanent Council session to + deal with a situation which endangers the peace of the region. + Alternatively, the Permanent Council could consider a resolution calling + on the parties to resolve their dispute by peaceful means. The Permanent + Council also could consider convoking a meeting of Foreign Ministers + under either the OAS Charter or the Rio + Treaty.The Inter-American Treaty of + Reciprocal Assistance, or Rio Treaty, was signed at the + Inter-American Conference for the Maintenance of Continental Peace + and Security held in Rio de Janeiro in 1947. Article 3 of the Treaty + stipulates that an armed attack against one signatory of the treaty + would be considered an attack on all signatories.

+ +

We consider the British OAS idea + inadvisable and, potentially, seriously prejudicial to their position. + In our view:

+

—The British have no status at the OAS; + they are not permanent observers; they would not be permitted to + speak.

+

—The Argentines, if they wish, could seek to turn invocation of OAS mechanisms against the British.

+

—The Inter-American Juridical Committee in a 1976 statement upheld the + Argentine claim to sovereignty. Some OAS members, certainly Argentina, will cite this as a + precedent.

+

—While the OAS is not necessarily a + biased forum, Argentina would seem to hold more cards when it comes to + votes within that organization; the outcome could be seriously + disadvantageous to the British.

+

—If outright condemnation of the UK could + be avoided in the OAS, it could only be + on the basis of a peace-making action under OAS auspices which would require significant concessions by + the UK.

+

—The matter is in the UN right now and we + strongly support British efforts there.

+

—Should any attack on Argentine military units occur, the GOA would use this as an additional ground + for seeking OAS or Rio Treaty measures + against Britain and few OAS members + would want to make the British case even if the UK acted in legitimate self-defense consistent with the + UN Charter.

+

Raising the issue on behalf of the British in the OAS would be very costly to U.S. interests + in this region. Besides the impact on our bilateral relationship, the + OAS itself could be severely + damaged. OAS consideration would + intensify the latent Latin-Caribbean split within that organization. (We + assume a number of the English-speaking Caribbean states, though not + enough to change the outcome, would support the British against a united + Latin front.)

+

3. Embargo of Arms Sales.

+

HMG probably does not realize that U.S. + arms sales are still prevented under the Humphrey-Kennedy Amendment.Reference is to the June 1977 amendment to the + FY 1978 foreign assistance + appropriations bill, named for its sponsors Senators Hubert H. + Humphrey (D-Minnesota) and Edward M. + Kennedy (D-Massachusetts), which imposed an embargo + on new arms transfers to Argentina in response to its human rights + record. The amendment took effect on October 1, 1978. + Congress has repealed the restriction but we have not yet gone to the + Congress with the required certification. ARA and EUR believe that + we should put an indefinite hold on lifting the suspension in light of + the Argentine move. But we should not publicly or explicitly link + certification with the Falkland + affair, since this could tend to tie our own hands for the indefinite + future. You should be aware that Argentine use of USG-furnished defense articles in its + invasion may violate the terms of our bilateral agreement under which + they were provided, and that a prompt report to Congress under the Arms + Export Control Act may be required.A + notation in an unknown hand reads: “We are looking into this + now.”

+

RECOMMENDATION

+

1. Recall of our Ambassador in Buenos Aires for at least one week. + (EUR favors, ARA opposes.)A + notation in an unknown hand indicates that this recommendation was + disapproved on April 3.

+

2. Raise the Falkland issue at the OAS. + (ARA and EUR recommend against).A + notation in an unknown hand indicates the decision not to raise the + issue at the OAS was taken on April + 3.

+

3. That we put an indefinite hold on lifting the arms sales restriction + on Argentina. (ARA and EUR support).A + notation in an unknown hand indicates that the recommendation was + approved on April 3. Following up on this approval, Blackwill sent an April 7 + information memorandum to Haig which pointed out that the April 2 memorandum + “did not mention that there is $3.9 million in the pipeline to + Argentina under agreements concluded prior to October 1, 1978, the + effective date of the Kennedy-Humphrey amendment. These items consist + primarily of aircraft and ship spare parts, and were not affected by + your decision.” Blackwill + continued: “The British are particularly concerned about the + Argentines acquiring spare parts in this pipeline for C–130’s and A–4’s, an acquisition which in most cases would not + require a Munitions Control license and thus will routinely occur + unless you direct otherwise.” Attached to this April 7 information + memorandum was an April 7 action memorandum from Enders and Holmes to Haig, which spelled out Haig’s options regarding action on + the Argentine arms pipeline. On the first page of the information + memorandum, Haig wrote: + “Hold until my return.” In the upper right-hand corner of the + information memorandum, an unknown hand wrote: “Returned to PM 5/19 per APA as OBE.” (Department of State, Executive + Secretariat, S/S Special Handling + Restrictions Memos 1979–1983, Lot 96D262, ES Sensitive April 1–9, 1982)

+
+ +
+ + 51. Action Memorandum From the Acting Assistant Secretary of State for + European Affairs (Holmes) and + the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Enders) to Secretary of State + HaigSource: Department of State, Central + Foreign Policy File, P880104–0638. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Pendleton; cleared by Service, Michel, and Blackwill. Pendleton initialed for Enders, Service, and Michel. + + + Washington, April 2, + 1982 + + + SUBJECT + U.S. Support for the UK at + Ascension + +

We need your urgent guidance on a British request for support for the + movement of up to twelve RAF + C–130’s through Ascension April 3–7. + The request includes a fuel uplift of 630,000 pounds—the fuel to be + bought from U.S. stocks on the island.

+

This request was foreshadowed in a message received early this morning + from Carrington.The text of the message from Carrington has not been found. In + telegram 7329 from London, April 2, the Embassy reported that the + message, which was passed by the British Embassy in Washington, “was + intended solely as notification, in keeping with past practice of + notifying U.S. authorities when U.K. forces plan to use facilities + at Ascension.” (Department of State, Executive Secretariat, Files of + Alexander M. Haig Jr., + 1981–1982, Lot 82D370, Falklands Crisis—1982 (1)) The British + plan to ferry troops to Ascension for embarcation aboard ships there en + route to the Falkland Islands area.

+

The issue is whether we support this UK + move, particularly by providing our fuel.

+

We believe we should. L believes we are under an obligation to permit the + UK to use these facilities in the + event the UK considers additional + logistic, administrative or operating facilities necessary at the + airfield.In an April 5 press conference, + Fischer outlined U.S. + policy on the British use of U.S. military facilities, including + Wideawake Airfield on Ascension Island: “Our view on this is that + Ascension Island is a British possession. The United Kingdom has the + legal right to land military aircraft there after notifying the U.S. + Air Force Commander at the airfield. The U.S. Government is + obligated under a 1962 agreement governing its use of the airfield, + to cooperate in the United Kingdom use of logistic, administrative, + or operating facilities; and therefore, such use of the airfield + does not, in any way constitute U.S. involvement in the United + Kingdom-Argentine dispute.” (American Foreign + Policy: Current Documents, 1982, p. 1299) The agreement + referenced by Fischer is the + Agreement Relating to the Use of the Airfield at Wideawake on + Ascension Island by Aircraft of the Royal Air Force, effected by + notes exchanged in Washington on August 29, 1962. Wideawake + Airfield, which has hosted a continuous USAF presence since 1957, is known officially as RAF Ascension. + DOD has prepared a message authorizing + UK access to our fuel.Not found. We have held it pending your + decision.

+ +

PROS: The British will expect this form of + tangible support. This is their “en route access,” and to deny it would + have enormous consequences for UK + cooperation on our own en route access plans.

+

CONS: Our help to the UK would have an obvious impact on those in the hemisphere + who support Argentina in its dispute with the UK. It would further alienate us from many Latin American + nations once it becomes known, particularly if the UK employs its forces against + Argentina.

+

We believe it would be best to inform the British and our Commander on + Ascension orally.

+

RECOMMENDATION:

+

That you approve UK access to U.S. fuel + on Ascension and that decision be transmitted orally.An unknown hand initialed approval of this + recommendation on behalf of Haig, April 2.

+

ARA sees no alternative but to approve + this proposal. However, Tom + Enders believes we should instruct Ambassador Shlaudeman to inform the Argentines at + an appropriate level and at an appropriate timeAn unknown hand circled “appropriate time” and drew + a line from it to a notation below, which reads: “to be discussed by + Enders with the + Secretary Sat. [April 3] AM.” that we are providing this + service to the British under the terms of our agreement.An unknown hand initialed approval of this + recommendation on behalf of Haig, April 2. In telegram 89865 to Buenos Aires, + April 3, the Department transmitted the message to Shlaudeman. (Reagan Library, + Executive Secretariat, NSC Country + File, Latin America/Central, Argentina (04/03/1982–04/06/1982)) + Shlaudeman informed the + Argentine Government of the U.S. decision the same day. (Telegram + 1960 from Buenos Aires, April 3; ibid.)

+
+ +
+ + 52. Paper Prepared in the Central Intelligence AgencySource: Reagan Library, Executive + Secretariat, NSC Country File, + Latin America/Central, Argentina (01/01/1982–04/02/1982). Secret; + [handling restriction not declassified]. + Casey sent [text not declassified] an undated paper + entitled “The Falklands Dispute: An Historical Perspective” to + Clark under an April 2 + covering note. Casey also + sent the papers and a memorandum to both Haig and Carlucci, under identical covering + notes. The copy sent to Haig + is in the Department of State, Executive Secretariat, Files of + Alexander M. Haig Jr., + 1981–1982, Lot 82D370, No folder; the copy sent to Carlucci is in the Washington + National Records Center, OSD Files, + FRC 330–84–0003, Argentina (Jan–15 May) 1982. + + + Washington, April 2, + 1982 + +

Quick Intelligence Assessment on Falkland + Affairs (April 2, 1982)

+

I. Brief History of the Dispute

+

The controversy dates to 1833 when the British occupied the island + claimed by the Argentines as part of their colonial heritage. The + dispute was only a minor irritant in otherwise good bilateral relations + until Buenos Aires, anxious to recover the islands, took the dispute to + the UN in 1965. The General Assembly + declared sovereignty in dispute and established what turned out to be an + ineffective mechanism for negotiations. Growing economic potential in + Falkland territorial waters heightened tensions during the mid and late + 1970s. The latest round of talks, which began in February, failed in + mid-March when the British refused to bow to Argentine public demands + that negotiations be speeded up. The South Georgia incident began on + March 19, escalating into confrontation and the Argentine invasion + Friday.

+

Did Argentina plan the Escalation?

+

Although there is no direct evidence that the Argentines manufactured the + original incident at South Georgia on 19 March, they were looking for a + chance to put pressure on the British and, at the least, quickly seized + upon a tactical opportunity to confront the British militarily. The + civilian group that went to South Georgia had complied with all + immigration procedures known to Argentine and British authorities in + Buenos Aires and whether Argentine officials encouraged the flag raising + itself is unknown. Nonetheless, President Galtieri has pursued a generally aggressive foreign + policy, and Navy Chief Anaya has + been pushing for some action in the absence of diplomatic progress on + the Falklands. The Argentines relatively quickly came to see the issue + as a military rather than diplomatic problem and the decision to + implement long held contingency plans for the invasion was probably made + last weekend.

+ +

II. Events to Date

+

The Argentines successfully invaded the Falkland Islands this morning; + some 200–350 Argentine Marines with armored vehicles evidently went + ashore near Port Stanley and airborne units reportedly secured the local + airfield. There is also information that three Argentine ships are in + the harbor at nearby Port Williams. The Argentines may be debarking as + many as 500–1000 well-armed troops from the task force, and the 10–14 + naval ships in the area include the country’s only aircraft carrier as + well as several guided missile destroyers, frigates, corvettes, + transport and amphibious craft, and at least one submarine. There + evidently was sporadic resistance by the small force of Royal Marines + and irregulars on the main Falkland Islands, and the ice patrol ship Endurance was able to depart South Georgia Island + and is now somewhere between South Georgia and the main islands. The + Argentines appear to be securing the islands and plan to name the + general officer in charge of Army operations as military governor.

+

III. UK + Options

+

A. Diplomatic

+

The British have broken diplomatic relations with Argentina, but they + could continue to make use of the UN + Security Council as a means of keeping open a channel of communications + and as a forum to put Argentina in the dock as an “aggressor.” They + probably do not expect the UN debate to + resolve the crisis, but they hope it will at least show that Britain had + attempted to find a diplomatic solution before resorting to military + countermeasures. The British could also ask their European partners to + join in a demarche to the Argentines demanding they withdraw their + troops and seek a peaceful settlement or even to condemn Argentina + openly. London is likely to ask the US + to continue to exert pressure on Argentina to “see reason,” and to + mobilize other Latin American states to intervene with the Argentines. + While the British hope that the US will + maintain contact with Buenos Aires and perhaps continue to serve as a + conduit, they probably prefer public US + support for the British position to jolt the Argentines and convince + them that the US will not push London to + accept a fait accompli. London undoubtedly + expects US support at the UN as well. London could in principle offer + at the UN or in another forum to discuss + the ultimate sovereignty of the Falklands, but only after a cooling off + period, and only after Argentine withdrawal from the islands.

+

B. Economic

+

British economic options are limited. Trade between Argentina and the + UK is not significant for either + country. In 1980, the UK exported goods + totaling $402 million to Argentina while imports reached $265 + million—representing 0.4 percent and 0.2 percent of total UK exports and imports, respectively. Manufactured goods of all + kinds accounted for nearly 90 percent of British sales; purchases from + Argentina consist mainly of meat and other foodstuffs. UK banks hold about 10 percent of + Argentina’s total commercial bank debt of $23 billion, but this provides + no practical leverage. London’s best hope would be for general US and EC + economic restrictions on Argentina—something that would be hard to + enforce. The British have never shown much faith in economic sanctions, + however, and in any case, the length of time it would take to have any + effect would make them politically unacceptable.

+

C. Military

+

There have been press reports that one or two nuclear-powered attack + submarines were sent to the Falkland Islands last week. The units + identified as being detailed to the Falklands were said to be the two + taking part in a naval exercise near Gibralter. Those two submarines, + however, were still in place as of 1 April. It is not yet clear whether + the press was in error only about the identity of the submarines or, + equally likely, it could be that no submarines were deployed ahead of + the rest of the forces.

+

A large British naval group has been participating in an exercise near + Gibralter with US and Portuguese forces. + Included in this group of 24–28 ships were four guided missile + destroyers, 12 frigates, five naval oilers, two nuclear-powered attack + submarines, and other support ships. A substantial portion of this + group, if not all, reportedly is underway towards the South Atlantic but + probably can not arrive before two weeks. As it is presently configured + this force apparently should be capable of attacking the Argentine naval + group on arrival. Even if the British were able to force the Argentine + fleet away, they do not have the capability to invade the Falklands in + light of the substantial forces Argentina evidently is deploying to the + islands. The British force could blockade the islands while awaiting the + arrival of a second British naval group.

+

The second British task force of seven ships including two carriers—the + Hermes and the Invincible—is forming in Britain. This force probably can + not leave before 8 April and would not arrive in the Falklands for about + 18 days after that. The two carriers each have five VSTOL aircraft on + board; the Hermes carrier has 5 helicopters, the Invincible 8 + helicopters as well. Two commando units, a brigade headquarters, a + Rapier battery and 1800 to 1900 troops probably would be on board. This + force could be used to invade the islands.

+

There are a few other British warships in the Caribbean and near Belize. + They also could be detailed to join the task force en route.

+

The British evidently have little option to employ air units. The + distance between the British airfield in Ascension Islands to the + Falklands is so great that aircraft can not fly from the base and + return. There apparently are no + alternate airfields the British could use to land their aircraft.

+

IV. Argentine Responses—Military, Diplomatic, + Implications for Beagle Dispute

+

The Argentines probably soon will begin reprovisioning and reinforcing + their forces on the islands before any British units arrive. Air Force + units in southern Argentina reportedly were being strengthened + yesterday; the airbase at Rio Gallegos in the far south would be a + particularly good candidate for receiving fighters and has had Mirage + aircraft there in the past. It is also possible that combat aircraft + could be sent to the airfield at Port Stanley. The field is capable of + handling jets and has a fuel storage capacity of 50,000 liters. The + Argentines, however, probably will try to increase the fuel storage + capacity at the field, to establish command and control communications, + and to provide maintenance and logistic support, as well as protection, + for aircraft and crews.

+

While we have no evidence, we believe that Argentine ground force units, + particularly those in the south, probably are on a heightened alert + status. Reinforcements for the islands likely will come at first from + the 9th Infantry Brigade which, with a strength of about 4500, is the + largest ground unit in the south. Other units could be alerted and + readied for transport to the south, but this probably would take several + days to accomplish. Transports and other naval craft could be sent to + ports along the South Atlantic to ferry troops and equipment to the + islands.

+

Virtually the entire Argentine fleet is involved in the Falkland + operations. Given the age of many of the units—some are almost 40 years + old—and their sustained operations at sea, it appears sensible for the + Argentines to begin withdrawing some of their more vulnerable naval + craft once the reinforcement and reprovisioning of the islands has been + accomplished. We also do not believe that the Argentines would fare well + in a full-scale naval engagement with the British, particularly in view + of the nature of the forces the British are preparing to send to the + Falklands. If Argentine ships are attacked, however, they will respond + in kind.

+

The invasion has probably strengthened Galtieri’s standing within the military, especially the + Navy and among predominantly nationalist political opponents who have + long advocated invading the Falklands. We expect this support to + continue, even among hardline Peronist labor union leaders who, despite + repression of their recent demonstration, will have little choice but to + back Galtieri. Like Thatcher, Galtieri probably calculates that he will have to avoid + appearing to waver or risk serious domestic and international political + costs. The Argentines see a + direct correlation between a tough—and successful—effort on the + Falklands and success in their Beagle dispute with Chile. Similarly, + they believe a defeat on the Falklands would be an enormous setback in + the Chile dispute, thus doubling their stake in the current + confrontation.

+

Diplomatically, Argentina will probably utilize its ties to the + Non-Aligned Movement and to developing nations in the United Nations to + try to block British efforts in international fora to condemn the + invasion. Buenos Aires may anticipate US + opposition in the OAS but had + calculated earlier that they could defeat the British in a showdown in + the UN over the issue.

+

V. Potential for Soviet and/or Cuban + exploitation

+

Cuba, which traditionally has supported Argentina’s claim to the Falkland + Islands, will probably be initially cautious in providing political + backing for the Argentine move—Havana will want to be sure to avoid + embarrassment in the event Buenos Aires’ military adventure fails. + Nevertheless, the incident gives Havana the opportunity to renew its + criticism of the Thatcher + government, which it views with obvious distaste.

+

The Soviets will seek to exploit the crisis by giving political support + to Argentina; but will not become directly involved militarily. The + Soviets have been trying to establish close relations with Argentina, in + large part because it provides more than 10 percent of Soviet grain + imports and helped offset the US grain + embargo in 1980–81. In contrast, relations with the UK are already poor. Now that Argentina has + already occupied the islands, Moscow could call for a ceasefire and + subsequent talks. Moscow will work to avoid UN Security Council condemnation of Argentina, threatening + to veto it. It is likely to use the situation to intensify longstanding, + but so far unproductive efforts to sell Argentina military equipment. To + ingratiate themselves with the Argentines, the Soviets may provide + Buenos Aires with surveillance information of British military + moves.

+
+ +
+ + 53. Memorandum From James M. + Rentschler, Dennis C. + Blair, and Roger + Fontaine of the National Security Council Staff to the + President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Clark)Source: Reagan Library, NSC Latin American Affairs Directorate Files, + Falklands/Malvinas: NSC & State + Memos, 1982. Secret. Sent for action. Blair initialed for Fontaine. Rentschler wrote “Jim” next to his + name. + + + Washington, April 2, + 1982 + + + SUBJECT + Falklands: What Next? + +

We believe that it is essential to convene, on an expeditious basis, an + SSG whose main objective would be + to assess the middle- and longer-term implications of the situation in + the South Atlantic and to determine U.S. policy priorities based on the + state of play likely to emerge from the current Anglo-Argentine + confrontation.

+

In particular, we need to pose searching questions concerning the desired + extent (and duration) of our support for the Brits in these + developments; the probable impact which such support might have on + larger U.S. strategic interests (NATO + commitments); and the degree to which our Hemispheric relationships and + policy initiatives (CBI, etc.) will be + affected. At a minimum, such a meeting would have a + consciousness-raising effect on the national security community and + mobilize some assets which have been either deficient or relatively + quiescent as current events evolve (defense analysis and logistics, + intelligence forecasting, etc.). At a maximum, of course, we would aim + for a rational follow-up program to deal with the after-effects of the + Falklands issue.

+

With the above in mind, we have attached an illustrative SSG agenda (Tab A)Attached but not printed. which identifies + the key questions we need to address over the next few days and weeks + (possibly months).

+

RECOMMENDATION:

+

That you review and refine the attached agenda and proceed with convening + a Falklands SSG.The recommendation was neither approved nor + disapproved. No indication of whether a meeting of the SSG was held has been found, although + a meeting of the National Security Planning Group (NSPG), held April 5 to discuss [text not declassified] in Central America, + briefly touched upon the situation in the Falklands/Malvinas. In the + meeting, Haig observed “that + the Falkland Islands dispute could complicate the matter as the + OAS will be concerned by + Argentina’s role.” (Minutes of a Meeting of the National Security + Planning Group, April 5; Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, + NSC National Security Planning + Group (NSPG), NSPG 0037 04/05/1982 [Central + America])

+
+ +
+ + 54. Memorandum From the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy + (Iklé) to the Deputy + Secretary of Defense (Carlucci)Source: Washington National Records Center, OSD Files, FRC 330–84–0003, Argentina + (Jan–15 May) 1982. Secret. A stamped notation in the bottom + right-hand corner of the memorandum indicates that Carlucci saw it on April 2. A + stamped notation in the top right-hand corner of the memorandum + indicates that Weinberger + saw it on April 5. + + + Washington, April 2, + 1982 + + + SUBJECT + Argentinian Invasion of Falkland Islands (U)—INFORMATION + MEMORANDUM + +

(C) The following points are in addition to the information in today’s + NIDAn + article on “Argentine–UK” was in the + April 2 National Intelligence Daily. (Central + Intelligence Agency, Office of Support Services (DI), Job 84T0030IR; + Intelligence Pub Files (1982), Box 2, Folder 1: National + Intelligence Daily) and on the attached memo:Attached but not printed is an April 2 memorandum + from Koch to Iklé, in which Koch offered preliminary thoughts + on the Department of Defense role in the U.S. reaction to events in + the Falklands/Malvinas. Koch + asserted: “We should let State get out front on this issue, because + it’s not going to end with both parties happy + with the interlocutor. We at Defense (at least in ISA) have a + peculiar interest in not irritating Argentina. In South America, + finally, it is the military-to-military relationship that + matters—not State to Foreign Ministries.” “The argument for a strong U.S. response to Argentina,” he + continued, “is that if we do it correctly (and we consult privately + with Argentina about what we’re doing and why), then we may + strengthen our hand with Congress on Humphrey-Kennedy and benefit Argentina in + the end. One argument the other way is that we will get accused of + trying to play policeman in the Western Hemisphere. Another is we + will likely have no effect (a result of the Carter Administration + proving to Argentina they can survive with U.S. disapproval), and + the impression of U.S. impotence in its own backyard will be + reinforced.” (Washington National Records Center, OSD Files, FRC 330–84–0003, Argentina + (Jan–15 May) 1982)

+

1. I talked to Walt Stoessel to + make sure we are in synchronization with what State and the White House + are doing. As you probably have learned now, the President got in touch + with Argentine President Galtieri yesterdaySee Document 41. trying to dissuade the + Argentinians and consideration was also given to sending the Vice + President. But apparently these initiatives were unsuccessful.

+

2. Tom Hayward who was on a tour + to Latin America was told yesterday that there was going to be a + landing, and therefore decided to leave Buenos Aires for Brazil.Presumably a mistaken reference to the April 2 + Anaya-Hayward meeting. See Document 44. It is obviously the + right decision that the CNO should not + be visiting Argentina at this time.

+ +

3. I am concerned that this Argentinian action will make it more + difficult for us to work with the Argentinians on Central American + issues and to overcome Congressional opposition to IMET funding for Argentina. Also, there + could be a spillover from the undoubtedly strong negative British + reaction toward the Argentinians to the pervasive West European + hostility toward our Central American policy. The left in Europe will be + quick to make connection between Argentina and the governments that we + happen to support in Central America. I feel, therefore, that we in + DoD and the Services ought to use + all our influence to reinforce the Administration’s effort to dampen + down this conflict.

+

4. We have to consider further steps, in particular whether to go ahead + with General Allen’s visit April + 12 and your stop in Argentina last week of April.Iklé placed + two parallel lines in the left-hand margin next to this + paragraph.

+ + Fred C. IkleIklé + signed “Fred” above his typed signature. + +
+ +
+ 55. Telegram From the Embassy in Argentina to the Department of + StateSource: Department of + State, Central Foreign Policy File, D820176–0629. Confidential; + Immediate; Exdis. Sent for + information to Brasilia, London, Montevideo, and + Santiago. + + + Buenos Aires, April 2, 1982, + 2223Z + +

1946. Subject: The Politics of the Malvinas Adventure.

+

1. Confidential–Entire text.

+

2. Summary: This is a preliminary assessment of the politics involved in + the invasion of the Falklands/Malvinas. President Galtieri hopes to use this adventure + to buy political time, solidify his authority and stay in office through + 1987. Given those prizes to win, the calculated gamble and the + international costs involved must have seemed worth it. Once the popular + euphoria wears off, however, the same problems of deep economic + recession and the unpopularity of the military government will remain. + Still, Galtieri undoubtedly + feels himself in a strong position for the moment, strong enough perhaps even to make some + concessions on Argentina’s other longstanding external dispute, that of + the Beagle Channel. End summary.

+

3. The invasion of the Malvinas is a calculated gamble designed in part + to gain Galtieri what is called + here “political space” and ultimately to entrench him in power. The + latter objective includes extension of his term as CINC of the army beyond his normal + retirement date at the end of the year and “re-election” as President + for another three years in 1984. During the last six weeks the regime + has come under steadily increasing pressure from the political parties, + industrialists, labor unions and other organized groups as Roberto Alemann’s stabilization program + has begun to hurt. The frustrated CGT + rally on March 31, the first mass demonstration of consequence since + 1976, must have been all too vivid a reminder to the military of what + can happen to government authority in the streets of Buenos Aires.In telegram 1835 from Buenos Aires, March 31, + the Embassy reported that with “a massive display of force” the + Argentine Government “frustrated scheduled rallies by the General + Confederation of Labor (CGT) and + crushed a series of related demonstrations” across the country on + March 30. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, + D820170–0509)

+

4. As soon as the news of the landings was released, the GOA launched a massive campaign to promote + national unity and national rejoicing. The effort has so far included + rallies throughout the country, a new song for the occasion, “Malvinas + Argentinas”, played endlessly on radio and television, flags everywhere, + a Galtieri appearance before the + masses in the Plaza de Mayo a La Peron, and statements of enthusiastic + support elicited from every Argentine personage of any conceivable + importance. (The only slightly skeptical voice has been that of former + Foreign Minister Oscar Camilion + whose fall from office with Viola was a serious setback to hopes for moderation and + intelligence in this country’s foreign policy). The release of those + labor leaders still being held as a result of the events of March 31 so + that they too could join in the celebration was further evidence of the + effort to open political space.

+

5. These glittering rewards to be won must have helped persuade Galtieri and his colleague Admiral + Anaya (a prime mover in this + operation) that the risks were worth taking. British military power was + a long way away, and, they could well have calculated, if the British do + react militarily, HMG will be hard put + to maintain at such a great distance and for so much time the + considerable force needed to oust the Argentines and keep them out. The + GOA knew from our representations + that there would be a high price to pay in terms of relations with the + US. But Galtieri seems to think that the Central American + connection and the fait accompli + in the Malvinas will mitigate that in time. (There is also much talk + here at the moment about the Israeli example of how to do these things + and get away with them.) Otherwise internationally the GOA appears persuaded that it will have + ample support, or at least tolerance, from other Latin Americans, the + NAM and the Soviet bloc.

+

6. How much political space Galtieri has brought himself is open to question. If the + Malvinas operation is less than the promised quick success, the + President could soon come under fire, although appeals for national + unity in a prolonged crisis will not go unheard. In any event, once the + euphoria has worn off, the same problems will remain: an unpopular + government and a sick economy. In the circumstances, Roberto Alemann’s stabilization program + may well be a casualty. The Malvinas adventure will cost a lot of money + and the temptation to return to populist policies will be strong. + Liberalization may be another casualty. The GOA has already shown a tendency toward toughness when + challenged in its reactions on March 31. Tolerance in that quarter of + further labor demonstrations and political dissidence in general is not + likely to be great. We are already hearing from some in the military + that further moves toward a political should be postponed.

+

7. With all that, Galtieri is for + the moment riding high. He has some political space and will now be very + difficult to move out of the army command at the end of the year. It is + also worth noting that Galtieri + has positioned himself to make a genuine try to resolve the Beagle + dispute, Argentina’s other longstanding external problem. Having + recovered “national patrimony”, at least temporarily, and having assured + himself in Argentine history, Galtieri could make some concessions on the Beagle. He + could also, of course, prove more difficult than ever after successfully + flexing the country’s military muscles.

+ + Shlaudeman + +
+ +
+ + 56. Memorandum From the Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of + Defense for International Security Affairs (Koch) to the Senior Military Assistant to the Deputy + Secretary of Defense (Howe)Source: Washington National + Record Center, OSD Files, FRC + 330–84–0003, Argentina (Jan–15 May) 1982. Confidential. A copy was + sent to Iklé. A stamped + notation at the top of the memorandum indicates that Carlucci saw it on April + 2. + + + Washington, April 2, + 1982 + + + SUBJECT + Kirkpatrick + Dinner/FalklandsOn the evening of + April 2, Kirkpatrick, + along with Stoessel, + Enders, Middendorf, Marsh, Meyer, and former Secretary of + State William P. Rogers, attended a scheduled dinner, held in + Kirkpatrick’s honor, + at the Argentine Embassy in Washington. The attendance of the + U.S. officials was confirmed publicly to United Press + International by the Argentine Embassy, April 8. (“Ranking U.S. + Official Guests At Argentine Embassy Dinner,” Washington Post, April 8, p. A22) In an April 8 press + interview, Henderson + commented on Kirkpatrick’s attendance: “I wouldn’t have done so. + If I had been asked by the Iranian Embassy to go to a banquet + the night your hostages were taken, I wouldn’t have done so.” + (John M. Goshko, “U.S. Even-Handedness Is Seen as Best Hope for + Damage Control,” Washington Post, April 9, p. A14) In his + memoirs, Haig wrote that + Kirkpatrick + “persevered in her intention to attend” the dinner and “raised, + at the outset, a doubt in the minds of the British as to her + impartiality, and no doubt underlay their subsequent + consternation about her activities.” (Haig, Caveat, p. 270) Thatcher later wrote of the event: + “Unfortunately the attitudes of Mrs Kirkpatrick and some other members of the US Administration were at this + point of considerable importance.” (Thatcher, Downing Street + Years, p. 180) + +

(C) 1. Other ranking figures now slated to attend are Stoessel and Middendorf. Mrs. Kirkpatrick intends to go. Bosworth had regretted for other + reasons prior to April 1.

+

SecState will have to make the call on this one, per Bosworth.An unknown hand drew two parallel lines in the right-hand margin + next to this sentence.

+

(C) 2. State has also considered withdrawing our Ambassador.See Document 50. + This is on hold, and cool heads see it as unproductive, and + counter-productive. The problem is getting players to focus on the + mid-term. We don’t want our redeveloping relationship in Argentina to go + smash—even if they are the agents of it.

+ +

(C) 3. The over-riding complication is the President’s closeness to Mrs. + Thatcher. The President + called Galtieri and Galtieri told him to mess out.See Documents 40 and + 41.

+ + Noel C. + KochKoch signed “Noel” above his typed + signature. + Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary International + Security Affairs + + +
+ +
+ 57. Memorandum From Secretary of State Haig to President ReaganSource: + Reagan Library, NSC Latin American + Affairs Directorate Files, Falklands/Malvinas: NSC & Staff Memos, 1982. Secret. + Attached to the memorandum is an April 5 handwritten note from + Poindexter that reads: + “President was verbally briefed on the contents.” An attached NSC correspondence profile also + indicates that Reagan was + verbally briefed. + + + Washington, April 3, + 1982 + + + SUBJECT + Falkland Islands Dispute + +

The Falklands crisis presents us with difficult issues.In his April 2 Evening Report to Reagan, which briefly summarized + the day’s events, Haig + concluded on the Argentine landings: “We must proceed cautiously and + objectively on this question—not endorsing Argentine force while not + unnecessarily jeopardizing our relations with Argentina.” (Reagan + Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC + Agency File, Secretary Haig’s Evening Report (03/25/82–04/21/82)) We + will continue to be dependent upon our close ties with the U.K. as we + work a wide range of global issues. If Moscow, the Allies, and the Third + World believe we have failed to support the British against an overt use + of force, our position as a global power will have been adversely + affected. At the same time, we also have much at stake in our relations + with Argentina. Our steps in the weeks ahead will have to be carefully + nuanced to take into account these conflicting interests.

+ +

On the Falklands dispute, the British have no reason to complain about + our support to date: your personal intervention with Galtieri;See Document 41. our strong public + statements; and our support for the British in New York.See footnote 3, Document + 50. London has asked for three other immediate + actions from us.See Documents 46 and 50.

+

—Withdraw our Ambassador from Buenos Aires. I will tell them we consider + it unwise to cut off our most effective and possibly influential channel + of communication.

+

—Consider taking the issue to the OAS. + We believe this would severely damage U.K. (and our) interests since + their case would elicit little support in that body (which is already on + record in support of the Argentine claim).

+

—Stop arms shipments to Argentina. U.K. is unaware we have not yet made + the required certification of Argentina’s human rights record to allow + shipments. We will continue our hold on the certification and so inform + the U.K.

+

At the same time we must bear in mind our important interest in retaining + as much as we can of the new relationship you have forged with the + government in Buenos Aires. They have been a key supporter of our + broader regional goals, especially in Central America. Also, Argentina + is already heavily dependent on Soviet grain purchases; we must avoid + giving the USSR new opportunities such + as the establishment of an arms supply relationship.

+

Our calculated policy of balance will become increasingly difficult to + sustain if the British are forced to take military action. It will + therefore be important for us to use our influence in both capitals to + seek a non-military solution before the British fleet arrives in about + two weeks. But if diplomatic maneuvers fail, and if the U.K. requires + greater support from us, we should be prepared to consider ways to be + responsive while bearing in mind our interests in Argentina.

+
+ +
+ + 58. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Kingdom to the Department + of StateSource: Department of + State, Central Foreign Policy File, D820177–0587. Confidential; + Immediate; Exdis. Sent for + information Immediate to NATO + Collective, Buenos Aires, Montevideo, Santiago, Moscow, USUN, the Mission to the United + Nations in Geneva, USCINCEUR, + USNMR SHAPE, CINCUSAFE, USLOSACLANT, and + USSOUTHCOM. + + + London, April 3, 1982, 1324Z + +

7429. Military Addressees Handle as Specat Exclusive. Subject: British Military Steps in the + Falkland Dispute.

+

1. Entire text–Confidential.

+

2. Summary: Mrs. Thatcher is + under considerable public pressure to take decisive steps in the + Falkland dispute. But a military solution may be beyond her reach.Summarizing the special session of Parliament + held to discuss the Argentine landing, April 3, the Department + reported as part of the Falkland Islands Situation Report Number 5: + “Mrs. Thatcher declined to + say whether the British fleet would be ordered to engage the + Argentines. She said the aircraft carrier Invincible would sail April 5 to lead the task force. + Press speculation goes as high as 35–40 ships. In debate, the + Parliament was virtually unanimous in its call for military action, + although speakers acknowledged that a diplomatic solution should be + attempted.” On Argentine troop strength, the report continued: “The + Argentine military reportedly expect to have a 5 to 7,000 man highly + trained force in place, with adequate air cover and fortification by + the time the British task force could arrive.” (Telegram 89892 to + all Diplomatic and Consular Posts, the Department of Defense, USCINCSO, and CINCLANT, April 3; Department of + State, Central Foreign Policy File, D820177–0717) The + question for her government is how much to put at risk militarily for + reasons of politics and prestige. End summary.

+

3. The military difficulties for Britain of sustaining operations in the + South Atlantic are awesome. If they want to go beyond gesture, Mrs. + Thatcher’s government must + reckon that the task would be not only to dislodge the Argentines and + restore the status quo, but to defend the Falklands for an indefinite + time in the face of continued Argentine hostility. This certainly could + not be done without a large and protracted diversion of military assets + to the South Atlantic—where no other U.K. security interests are at + stake. Conceivably, it could not be done at all.

+

4. Nevertheless, Mrs. Thatcher is + under considerable pressure to act decisively. The popular press are + running headlines like “Shame” (the Daily + Express) and “It’s War” (the Sun). The April + 3 Times editorializes in favor of military steps + against the Argentine Navy if Argentine troops are not withdrawn. The + opposition is pointing out that the government ignored warning signs and + failed to dispatch ships—as was done in the past—when tensions with + Argentina increased. Moreover, + all this is playing against the background of long standing accusations + that the government has gutted the Royal Navy surface fleet to support + its pretensions as a nuclear power.

+

5. In response, Mrs. Thatcher + announced in the Commons this morning, April 3, that she will dispatch a + fleet on April 5 to the South Atlantic, headed by the aircraft carrier + HMS + Invincible. (We suspect elements of the British + contingent in NATO exercise + Springtrain off Gibraltar may already be on their way.) This will + provide perhaps two weeks of breathing space for cooler heads to prevail + domestically, and for international pressure to build for a political + solution the British can accept. It also relieves the immediate + political pressure on Mrs. Thatcher to take action. But it postpones rather than + resolves Mrs. Thatcher’s + dilemma, and increases the political ante for her government—which could + be faced with the ultimate and unpalatable choice of either fighting or + backing down.

+

6. When the dust has cleared, whatever the outcome, the present Falkland + dispute will have a major impact on the British defense debate. The + issue of Royal Navy cutbacks, of Britain’s ability to afford a future + Trident fleet, and of Britain’s + military role in the world will all come under intense scrutiny. It is + too early to predict the course or outcome of that debate; but we doubt + that Mrs. Thatcher will emerge + at the end without some changes in both personnel and policy.

+ + Streator + +
+ +
+ 59. Telegram From the Department of State to All Diplomatic and + Consular PostsSource: + Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D820177–0935. + Confidential; Immediate. Sent for information Immediate to USSOUTHCOM, the Department of + Defense, and CINCLANT. Drafted + by Service; approved in + S/S–O. + + + Washington, April 4, 1982, 2308Z + +

89907. Inform Consuls, Paris pass Eagleburger or Price. Subject: Falkland Islands Situation Report No. + 6.

+

1. C–Entire Text.

+

2. Military situation: Argentina has taken over South Georgia Island, + admitting three Argentines killed. HMG + says its forces shot down a helicopter and damaged an Argentine frigate. + The status and location of + British ice patrol vessel Endurance, which was at + South Georgia, is unclear at this time. (South Georgia, along with the + Falklands and the South Sandwich Islands, constitute the territory + disputed by UK/Argentina.) The British have begun to fly men and + materiel into Ascension Island for embarkation on ships.See Document 60.

+

3. Diplomatic moves: The GOA issued a + statement rejecting the UN Security + Council approval of the UK-sponsored + resolution,See footnote 3, Document 50. saying it violates + Argentina’s rights and goes against quote contemporary history end + quote. The OAS meeting April 5 to hear + GOA Foreign Minister Costa Mendez will be a protocolary + session. There will be no debate, and we do not now expect more than a + statement of the GOA position. However + the GOA has said it is considering + eventual invocation of the Rio Treaty on hemispheric defense. GOA President Galtieri said late April 3 that his government is ready + to talk with the UK over the situation, + but will not accept military pressure.

+

4. Other actions: The GOA has suspended + all payments and transfers to the UK + (HMG had earlier frozen Argentine + assets in the UK), and has also + announced a temporary suspension on the purchase of foreign exchange of + all kinds except for the payment of import bills and foreign debts two + days before they fall due. Embassy Buenos Aires is checking whether this + latter step constitutes comprehensive exchange controls.In telegram 2003 from Buenos Aires, April 3, the + Embassy reported that Argentine bankers “do not characterize + temporary suspension of sale to public of foreign exchange bills as + comprehensive exchange controls.” (Department of State, Central + Foreign Policy File, D820179–0963)

+

5. Protection of US citizens: We are + asking GOA authorities to inform US promptly after contacts are made with + AmCits on the Falklands. We have no reports as yet.In telegram 90947 to all diplomatic posts and the + Department of Defense, the Department estimated that there were 35 + U.S. citizens then resident in the Falklands/Malvinas. (Department + of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D820180–0067) On April 7, the + Argentine Army informed the Embassy that all U.S. citizens in the + Falklands/Malvinas were in “good health.” (Telegram 2075 from Buenos + Aires, April 7; Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, + D820184–0455)

+ + Haig + +
+ +
+ + 60. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United + KingdomSource: Department + of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D820177–0932. Secret; + Immediate; Exdis. Sent for + information Immediate to Buenos Aires and the Department of Defense. + Drafted by Pendleton; + cleared by Service; approved + in S/S–O. + + + Washington, April 4, 1982, 2309Z + +

089910. Military Addressee Treat as Specat Exclusive. Subject: UK Transit of Ascension.

+

1. S–Entire text.

+

2. The UK Embassy provided Department + afternoon of April 4 with the following message received by the Embassy + an hour earlier. It outlines plans for and likely UK requirements on Ascension Island.

+

Begin text: (A) Ships: Royal fleet auxiliary Fort + Austin is arriving at 0800Z 6 April with stores and passengers + for transfer to HMS + Endurance.

+

(B) Air: 13 Hercules flights are planned for 3–6 April transporting 3 + helicopters, support personnel and equipment, coms equipment and a Royal + Marine blow-pipe detachment.

+

A chartered Belfast will arrive night of 5–6 April with two Lynx + helicopters.

+

Hangar space is needed for all five helicopters, 15 tons of stores and + ammunition and accommodation for some 146 all ranks between 4–6 April + until departure in Fort Austin.

+

(C) Operational support: The island is expected to be the forward + operating base for 3rd Commando Brigade with 3 para under command—accommodation required for 25 personnel + and 4,000 sq meters of storage. A satellite coms terminal operated by + seven men is required to operate there from 6 April. End text.

+ + Haig + +
+ +
+ + 61. Memorandum From the Deputy Secretary of State (Stoessel) to Secretary of State + HaigSource: Department of State, Central + Foreign Policy File, P880104–0667. Confidential; Nodis. Copies were sent to Bremer, Holmes, Enders, and Platt. A stamped notation on the + first page indicates that Haig saw the memorandum. + + + Washington, April 5, + 1982 + + + SUBJECT + Falkland Islands + +

During a private conversation at dinner last night, UK Ambassador Henderson made the following points to me:

+

—In his contacts with London, he has the sense of a real government + crisis. He thought Carrington + and Nott might resign. (His + prediction was accurate!)Carrington resigned as Foreign + Secretary on April 5. In telegram 7529 from London, April 5, 1843Z, + the Embassy transmitted an assessment of Carrington’s replacement, + Francis Pym. (Department + of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D820179–0631) Nott tendered his resignation as + Defense Secretary to Thatcher, but she did not accept it. For a + description of the internal politics of these events, see Official History of the Falklands Campaign, + Vol. II, pp. 17–18.

+

—The British are determined to get the Argentines out. They will fight + and sink the Argentine Navy if they can find it and will invade the + Islands if necessary.

+

—It is good that there will be a period of over two weeks before a + confrontation; however, the mood of the British will get tougher during + this time, not weaker.

+

—Henderson feels the U.S. is the + only possible mediator. He ruled out the UN and the OAS.

+

—The British would be willing to discuss sovereignty, as they always have + been, but cannot accept an Argentine presence of any kind.

+

—Henderson thought he probably + would be instructed to get in touch with us soon if we did not do so + first. He thought the British would welcome quiet talks about what might + be possible. He warned, however, that—given the present mood in + Britain—it would be unwise for the U.S. to come in with any “precooked” + schemes for settlement.

+ + Walter J. + Stoessel, Jr.Stoessel initialed “WJS” above + his typed signature. + +
+ +
+ + 62. Action Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for + Inter-American Affairs (Enders) + and the Acting Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs + (Scanlan) to Secretary of + State HaigSource: Department of State, Central + Foreign Policy File, P880104–0653. Confidential; Nodis. Drafted by Service and Pendleton; cleared by Bosworth and M. Austin (PM/RSA). Service initialed for Enders. Pendleton initialed for Scanlan. Service also initialed for + Bosworth and Austin. A + stamped notation in the top right-hand corner of the memorandum + indicates that Eagleburger + saw it on April 12. He wrote in the upper right-hand corner: “JB[Buckley]—Per our telecon. LSE.” Below this notation, a second notation in an + unknown hand reads: “OBE. See + marginal notes.” + + + Washington, April 5, + 1982 + + + SUBJECT + Proximate Visits of High-Level USG Officials to Argentina + +

ISSUE

+

Air Force Chief of Staff Allen, is + scheduled to attend an inter-American meeting of Air Force Chiefs in + Buenos Aires, April 8–9. STR + Brock is to head a delegation to + a US/Argentine Mixed Economic Commission meeting in Buenos Aires April + 13–15. Frank Carlucci will be in + Argentina April 27–28 as part of a South American trip. Agriculture + Secretary Block is also making a + southern swing and will be in Buenos Aires May 1–3. Given recent events + and current uncertainties, should we cancel any of these visits?

+

ANALYSIS OF OPTIONS:

+

In ARA’s view, we should go ahead with + the Allen, Brock, and Block visits, but be prepared to + cancel the Carlucci visit if + there is no progress toward peaceful solution by April 12. The Allen meeting is inter-American in + nature and affects our relations with all hemispheric countries. Even + during the lowest point of our relations with Chile, Allen attended a similar meeting there. + The Mixed Economic Commission has already been postponed twice. The + Argentines will be holding similar meetings with the Chinese and + Russians this month. The Block + visit is in support of our agricultural exports and would have + relatively low political visibility. More generally, if we are to have a + good offices role in finding a peaceful resolution of the Falkland + Islands dispute, we should not now be taking actions that will increase + the GOA’s perception of a tilt toward + the UK.

+

EUR believes neither Allen nor Carlucci should plan to visit Argentina at this time. We + strongly supported the UN resolution + calling for Argentine + withdrawal from the Falklands, and to allow top military/defense + officials to proceed as if business were usual would leave a decidedly + wrong impression of our reaction to the Argentine invasion—an invasion + we have repeatedly deplored. We recognize that the issue of a good + offices role is an important factor but believe that we can accommodate + the Argentines by permitting Messrs. Block and Brock + to proceed. The Brock visit to + attend the Mixed Economic Commission meeting may have to be cancelled if + you decide to support the UK requests + for assistance on economic sanctions being addressed separately.

+

Recommendations:

+

1. That we inform DOD that General + Allen should attend the April + 8–9 meeting of hemispheric Air Force Chiefs. (ARA favors, EUR + opposes).Haig initialed his approval of the recommendation, + adding the handwritten notation: “can help solve problem!” In the + right-hand margin next to this recommendation, Eagleburger wrote: “Done.”

+

Alternatively, that the USAF send a + lower-ranking official in place of Allen. (PM favors).Haig + neither approved nor disapproved the option. In the left-hand + margin, Eagleburger drew an + arrow pointing to it.

+

2. That we proceed with the Mixed Economic Commission meeting April + 13–15, with USTR + Brock heading the delegation. + (ARA supports, EUR links this to your decision on UK requests for economic sanctions being + addressed separately).Haig initialed his approval of + this recommendation, adding a handwritten notation: “But with + [illegible] that we reassess on April 10.” In the left-hand margin + next to this recommendation, Eagleburger drew an arrow pointing to it. In the + right-hand margin, he wrote: “Done.”

+

3. That we be prepared to cancel the Carlucci visit but hold up a final decision until April + 12. (ARA, PM and EUR support).Haig + initialed his approval of the recommendation. In the left-hand + margin next to it, a notation in an unknown hand reads: “Pending, + probable that will not attend.” Eagleburger also drew an arrow pointing to this + recommendation and in the right-hand margin highlighted the + recommendation with two parallel lines, a check mark, and a question + mark.

+

4. That we tell USDA Block to + continue with his travel plans, including the visit to Argentina May + 1–3. (ARA and EUR support).Haig initialed his approval of the + recommendation. In the left-hand margin, a notation in an unknown + hand reads: “OBE’d by Block. Cancellation of visit.” + Eagleburger also drew an + arrow pointing to this recommendation and in the right-hand margin + highlighted the recommendation with two parallel lines, a check + mark, and a question mark.

+
+ +
+ + 63. Telegram From the Central Intelligence Agency to Multiple + RecipientsSource: Reagan + Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC + Cable File, Falkland File 04/06/1982. Secret; Noforn; Nocontract; Wnintel. Sent to + the National Photographic Interpretation Center, the White House + Situation Room, the National Security Council Staff, and the CIA Office of Current + Operations. + + + Washington, April 6, 1982, 0018Z + +

190325. TDFIRDB–315/07048–82. Dist: 5 Apr 82. Country: Argentina/United + Kingdom. Subject: Background on the Argentine Decision To Seize the + Falkland Islands; Argentine Misperception of Reaction to the Seizure + (DOI: March–5 April 1982). Source: + [2½ lines not declassified].

+

1. The decision to seize the Falkland Islands was made by the Argentine + Government “several weeks” before the actual seizure on 2 April 1982. + However, the arrival of the party of Argentine civilians on the South + Georgia Islands on 18 March was not a deliberate provocation. The + specific reason for the decision to seize the Islands was the Argentine + Government’s perception of the need to counter serious internal economic + and political problems.

+

2. When the decision was made to seize the Islands, the certainty that + the British would not intervene militarily was shared by President + Leopoldo (Galtieri)) and by + Brigadier Basilio ((Lami Dozo)), Commander in Chief of the + Air Force and a member of the governing Junta. (Field Comment: The + source has no information on the attitude of the Commander in Chief of + the Navy.) The Argentine planning for the seizure was based on the + premise that the British would react to the seizure as gentlemen react + to a duel: when the first blood was drawn (the Argentine seizure), the + winner (Argentina) would be declared, and the loser (the UK) would gracefully retire from the + field.

+

3. The Argentine Government, and specifically President Galtieri, are very concerned over the + implications of the failure of developments to take place as + anticipated: the British have reacted strongly; other countries, + especially the United States, have publicly expressed their opposition + to the Argentine action; and the Argentine left has vocally been + attacking the “imperialist English”. The Argentine Government is very + concerned that these sentiments could evolve into a resurgence of + extreme nationalism, a generalized public antipathy toward other + countries, and a deterioration in the currently good relations between + the United States and Argentina. Argentine Government officials are also + concerned over the possibility that the final result could be the fall + of the Galtieri government.

+ +

4. Galtieri and the Argentine + Government are assuming that the United States will offer to intercede + between Argentina and the United Kingdom because U.S. interests will + make such intercession necessary. However, Argentine Government + officials do not know whether such intercession will take place before + or after British military action against Argentina; they strongly hope + U.S. intercession takes place before British military action occurs.

+

5. [less than 1 line not declassified] comment: On + 5 April, a series of Argentine officials, using a variety of official + channels, have told U.S. Embassy officials of “Argentine Government + concern” that the U.S. response to the seizure of the Falklands could + lead to a deterioration in relations and even “spontaneous” + demonstrations against the U.S. presence in Argentina. The comments in + the current report may be another in this series, which appears to be an + orchestrated campaign to make the U.S. Government aware of the Argentine + displeasure at U.S. actions; it also appears likely that this campaign + is designed to encourage the U.S. Government to urge caution on the + United Kingdom. A review of the various approaches made by the Argentine + Government officials is contained in Embassy Buenos Aires telegram + 1982.)In telegram 1982 from Buenos + Aires, April 5, the Embassy transmitted a situation report as of 3 + p.m. local time. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, + D820179–0794)

+

[less than 1 line not declassified]

+
+ +
+ + 64. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security + Affairs (Clark) to President + ReaganSource: Reagan Library, Executive + Secretariat, NSC Country File, + Latin America/Central, Argentina (04/03/1982–04/06/1982). Secret. + Prepared by Rentschler, + Fontaine, and Blair. Rentschler and Fontaine sent the memorandum to + Clark under an April 6 + covering note recommending that Clark sign it. (Ibid.) + + + Washington, April 6, + 1982 + + + SUBJECT + US Role in Preventing UK-Argentine Clash + +

Issue

+

What should be the US role in preventing + a UK-Argentine clash?

+

Facts

+

Secretary Haig believes and I + concur that an armed conflict between the UK and Argentina would be seriously damaging to US interests. Accordingly, we have a major + stake in doing what we can to avert such conflict and contribute to a + peaceful settlement of the dispute. (S)

+

Discussion

+

Al Haig believes that our best + hope for a constructive role which also keeps the Soviets out of the + picture lies in an OAS peacekeeping + initiative. His memo (Tab A) sets forth an “honest broker” scenario + whereby we quietly sound out both the British and the Argentines with an + eye toward assessing the chances of a successful OAS role. (S)

+

I think Al’s recommendation is useful. He recognizes the risks of such an + undertaking, which at this point seem significant (given likely British + reservations about the OAS, together + with the inflexible domestic politics driving Argentina’s present + course, I would rate our chances of success less than 50–50.) + Nevertheless, the initiative is certainly worth trying. (S)

+

Though Al’s proposal is only a first step, an unstated premise of this + approach is that the United States may well play a major role in + resolving the dispute. It will not be easy and the chances of alienating + both countries are possible. Nevertheless, no one else can or will play + this role, and without substantial US + involvement, the likelihood of a peaceful resolution of the dispute + diminishes substantially. You should thus be aware that we could be + poised on the brink of a major commitment and that a decision to go + forward ought to be taken deliberately—fully aware of possible costs and + consequences. (S)

+ +

RECOMMENDATION

+

That you approve Al Haig’s + recommendation (Tab A) subject to careful monitoring as we process with + the problem.Reagan neither approved nor disapproved the + recommendation.

+

Tab A

+

Memorandum From Secretary of State Haig to President ReaganSecret; Nodis.

+

Washington, April 5, 1982

+ + SUBJECT + US Role in Preventing UK-Argentine Clash + +

You have made clear publicly that the US + is willing to serve as an honest broker between the UK and Argentina.During a question-and-answer session with reporters + in the Oval Office, April 5, Reagan was asked: “Have you accepted the role as + honest broker in the Falkland Islands dispute, sir?” Reagan responded: “If we can be of + help in doing that, yes, anything that would bring a peaceful + solution to what seems to be an unnecessary disagreement.” (Public Papers: Reagan, 1982, Book I, pp. 431) With + the British fleet on its way south, we have at most two weeks before + possible conflict, although a UK + submarine may reach the area by April 12.

+

A military clash between these two friends of ours would be a major + setback to our national interests. It would engage British forces far + from the European theater. An unsuccessful endeavor by the British to + retake the Islands could bring down the Government, resulting in a + government in London that would be much less supportive of US interests than that of Mrs. Thatcher. We remain dependent upon + close ties with the UK as we pursue our + global objectives. Moreover, a clash would divert world attention from + the real threats to peace and jeopardize our belief that disputes should + be settled without recourse to force whether they be in the Middle East + or the South Atlantic. At the same time, a clash could result in closer + Argentine-Soviet ties and further undermine the new relationship we have + forged with the government in Buenos Aires.

+

Superficially, a UN role might appear to + be attractive. However, while we are satisfied with the UN vote on the UK resolution on the Falklands,See footnote 3, Document 50. we see + little chance that the issue can be resolved in a UN context. This is particularly true + because of the Soviet veto.

+

We believe the best hope for preventing further fighting and for keeping + the Soviets out lies in an OAS + peacemaking role. This would be consonant with the collective approach + to security we have tried to encourage in Central America. Inevitably + there would be both dangers and opportunities in invoking the Rio + Treaty.See footnote 4, Document 50. If the Treaty is invoked, + and we block the process, the OAS would + be damaged at the same time we are trying to reinforce it. This would + detract from our ability to turn to it in the Central America context. + Conversely, if it can be used successfully, we will have strengthened + the Pact and made it a good example of ways in which a regional security + treaty can benefit all nations.

+

Such an OAS initiative could include a + separation of forces, as well as withdrawal of Argentine forces now on + the Falklands and OAS administration of + the Islands while a permanent solution is negotiated. In order to make + such an OAS role acceptable to the + British, we would have to put Americans on the Islands as part of an + OAS mission. If this proposal + prospers, it may be desirable for you to name a distinguished American + to play a lead role under OAS auspices + in achieving a negotiated settlement.Reagan highlighted this + sentence by drawing two parallel lines in the right-hand margin. +

+

At this point we should keep our role as unstructured as possible. We + need to determine the interest of both sides before making a more + specific proposal. It is clear that the UK will scrutinize carefully an initiative that involves an + organization of which it is not a member.

+

Recommendation:

+

Following up on your expressed willingness to see the US be an honest broker, that you authorize + us to sound out the British and Argentine governments quietly. While we + would wish to keep our options open, we would intend to explore + initially an OAS peacemaking role in + which we would play a leading part.Reagan signed his approval of the + recommendation. In contrast to this memorandum, an April 5 CIA memorandum for the record covering + subjects discussed by Haig + and Inman at their April 5 + breakfast meeting, records the following about their discussion of + the Falklands/Malvinas: “There was general discussion and both sides + agreed that the U.S. must support the British.” (Central + Intelligence Agency, Office of the Director of Central Intelligence, + Job 89B00224R, Committees, Task Forces, Boards, and Councils Files, + Box 11, Memos for the Record of Mtgs w/Sec and DepSec of State (Apr 81–Dec + 85))

+
+ +
+ + 65. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of Defense for + International Security Affairs (West) to Secretary of Defense WeinbergerSource: Washington National Records Center, OSD Files, FRC 330–84–0003, Argentina + (Jan–15 May) 1982. Secret; Noforn. Sent through Iklé. + + + I–20929/82 + + + Washington, April 6, + 1982 + + + SUBJECT + Falkland Islands Crisis (U)—INFORMATION MEMORANDUM + +

(S/NF) In order to provide you some background information, I have + prepared the following summary of support we routinely provide to + Argentina and the United Kingdom on intelligence, communications, and + logistics support. I have also included what the two countries are + likely to ask for as the Falkland Islands crisis develops.

+

(S/NF) United Kingdom. US support for UK and the + Royal Navy is routinely provided in the broad areas of communications, + intelligence, meteorology and logistics. Some of these functions are + provided under nation to nation agreement, while others are agreed upon + in MOD/DOD or USN/RN documents. The Navy staff has indicated that there + have been several requests related to the current Falkland crisis which + have been forwarded to US officials, + including meteorological support for the South Atlantic and SOSUS data.

+

Specific areas of support:

+

Communication support for naval units is routinely + available on request by the RN. (Tab A) + Coverage of some areas of the world may only be possible with US transmitters. Conversely, US units receive such support on occasion + from UK sites. It has been a standard + procedure for the providing nation to allow transmission of US or UK + eyes only traffic on national systems.

+

Intelligence reporting is shared between the + US and the UK, under bilateral agreement and also under the aegis of + NATO. Cooperation extends to + compartmental, sensitive source programs, including SIGINT, COMINT, + overhead and SOSUS. Both real time + and analytical intelligence is exchanged.

+

Meteorlogical data is provided by the US to many foreign governments and + services, including the UK. The RN has already requested support for the + South Atlantic from the National Oceanographic and Atmospheric + Administration (NOAA) and such data is + being provided.

+

Logistic support for units of the armed forces is + available to the US and UK in each other’s facilities under a + variety of agreements. Such support may come in the form of fuel, provisions or maintenance/repair + efforts. There has apparently been no request from the UK for any extraordinary requirements in + this broad area.

+

(S/NF) Argentina. US support for Argentinian military forces, particularly + Navy, is fairly limited but includes an exchange of intelligence on + Soviet bloc shipping information, routine fuel agreement for access to + USN sources, and exchange of safety + of flight information. In addition, Argentina is a major participant in + the annual American naval exercise UNITAS (this year’s exercise is scheduled for + June–November).Reference is to a series + of annual exercises involving the United States and military units + from other countries in the Americas. The first UNITAS exercise was held in 1959; + UNITAS XXIII was scheduled + for 1982. By a five-year-old agreement, Defense Mapping + Agency is providing mainland mapping services to Argentina and a new + agreement with DMA has extended service + for aerial charts of Northern Argentina. No requests, however, relating + to the current crisis are expected by DMA.

+

As you know, we are currently precluded by law from selling the + Argentinians any new equipment. This has resulted in the following + backlog of FMS items:

+

—Army ($124,000)—electronic equipment, uniform spares, and radar + components

+

—Navy ($2,700,000)—ship and aircraft spares, ammunition primers, signal + flares, repair exchange cases

+

—Air Force ($385,000)—C–130 spares, + publications, safety of flight items.

+

(S) Conclusion. On balance, we provide more + routine military support to the UK than + to Argentina. Throughout this crisis, we should continue providing this + type of support. While no special requests are expected from Argentina, + the UK will probably continue to request + support in the areas of communications, intelligence, and + meteorology.

+

Francis J. West, Jr

+

The UK has requested about one million + gallons of JP–5 aviation fuel to be delivered to them at Ascension + Island in the mid-South Atlantic.

+ +

Tab A

+

Paper Prepared in the Department of DefenseConfidential; Noforn.

+

Washington, undated

+

MEMORANDA OF UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN US/UK

+

(C/NF) A review of Memoranda of Understanding indicates that the + following agreements are operative:

+

a. (C/NF) The Navy Memorandum of Understanding of 18 October 1979 + concerning Secure Submarine Information Exchange System (SSIXS) broadcast. This MOU provides for two two-minute time slots + per hour to be allocated to RN + SSIXS broadcast. This circuit is not + crypto covered for the RN portion.

+

b. (C/NF) A US to UK agreement providing for SHF satellite transmissions using Defense Satellite + Communication System (DSCS) satellites + provides for:

+

(1) (C/NF) First order (dedicated) requirements which have been met by + DCA for over 10 years.

+

(2) (C/NF) Second order (on call) requirements are provided, as + available. On call channels have been requested for the Atlantic DSCS satellite. (This requirement was + filled by DCA last Friday.) Since some + RN ships have SHF terminals installed, ship-shore-ship + connectivity can be achieved via SHF.

+

c. (C/NF) Additionally, the UK currently + leases from COMSAT one 25 KHz channel of the Atlantic GAPFILLER + satellite. Additional UHF channels are + not available without reallocation of US + requirements.

+

(C/NF) No other MOUs regarding Navy + communications services between the US + and the UK are known to exist. + Notwithstanding these MOUs, the Royal + Navy could request specific HF coverage + from US Naval Communication Stations + located in Puerto Rico and Balboa as they have frequently done for + exercises. This coverage is normally requested through CNO.

+
+ +
+ + 66. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Kingdom to the Department + of StateSource: Reagan + Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC + Country File, Europe and Soviet Union, United Kingdom + (04/01/1982–07/31/1982 (3)). Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Sent for information + Immediate to Buenos Aires. Printed from a copy that was received in + the White House Situation Room. + + + London, April 6, 1982, 1742Z + +

07568. Subj: Falklands Dispute: A Few Suggestions.

+

1. S–Entire text.

+

2. With the fleet underway, the chances are high that the British will + use it once they reach the South Atlantic—if a face-saving diplomatic + initiative is not launched.

+

3. Britain is in a bellicose mood, and more high-strung and unpredictable + than we have known it. The Prime Minister is under pressure to get + results. With Carrington out of + action, and the Foreign Office reeling, the diplomatic track may wobble + without a steadying U.S. hand.

+

4. It is in our interest, of course, to keep the Argentines and the + British from coming to blows. Optimally, we will succeed in a way that + maintains our credibility and decent relations with both sides. But + realistically, if we intercede, we may break some crockery with both + sides. Here are some problems we see with the British:

+

5. So far our performance has been highly rated. But memories of Suez are + just below the surface, especially in the Conservative Party. We cannot + be sure HMG will do our bidding if we + simply tell them to stop. They already fear being presented with an + ultimatum by us, tying their hands militarily when diplomatic options + fail. But they are anxious to have our help, knowing that probably only + we have the weight to achieve a diplomatic solution. Indeed, their + pugnaciousness aims in part to get us to act.

+

6. HMG now is focusing on the need for + help from friends—including the United States—to bring maximum pressure + to bear on Argentina. Almost certainly, they will be asking us to do + things we will not want to do. The best tactics for dealing with these + requests, it seems to us, will be:

+

—To say we must remain credible as mediators; and not say that we attach + equal importance to both sides (an approach that will infuriate the + British).

+

—To press the British to state clearly their diplomatic and military + objectives and to set out a total package of requests (thereby forcing + them to think through their + strategy in a way they have not done yet; giving us a list of requests + from which we can choose; and thus discouraging them from coming to us + daily for more).

+

7. Above all, we recommend the U.S. put forward soon a dramatic proposal + for talks that can at least buy time. We have no rabbit to suggest. But + it seems to us that proposing, perhaps, some sort of condominium over + the islands (on the New Hebrides model),Reference is to the condominium under which France and the United + Kingdom shared sovereignty over the Pacific island group known as + the New Hebrides from 1906 until 1980. In July 1980, the New + Hebrides became the independent state of Vanuatu. which + accommodates the claims of both to sovereignty and a presence, might be + a way to start. Presentation will be important. The Falklands are a + searing political issue in Britain. And with the Prime Minister’s future + at stake, and bureaucracy shaken, we suggest it will be best to jump + traditional channels and go right to the top with a proposal Mrs. + Thatcher herself can judge + politically.

+ + Streator + +
+ +
+ 67. Information Memorandum From the Acting Director of the Bureau of + Politico-Military Affairs (Blackwill) to Secretary of State HaigSource: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy + File, P850056–1413. Secret. Drafted by D. Sokolosky (PM/P) and Commander M. Austin (PM/RSA); cleared by Clarke and Commander T. Miller + (PM/P). Sokolsky initialed for + Austin; Clarke initialed for + Miller. Copies were sent to Holmes and Enders. In the upper right-hand corner of the first + page of the memorandum, Blackwill wrote: “Mr. Secretary—This is quick and + dirty. We will continue working the problem. Bob.” A stamped + notation on the first page of the memorandum indicates that + Haig saw + it. + + + Washington, April 6, + 1982 + + + SUBJECT + Military Analysis of UK Options in + the Falkland Crisis + +

This memorandum briefly reviews military options open to the United + Kingdom, examines their chances of success, and describes their costs. + It concludes that the UK naval force + could inflict high casualties on the Argentinian Navy and possibly retake some territory, but + recovering the main territory of the Falklands would be extremely + difficult.

+

Although British thinking seems to be focusing on Marine assaults, our + analysis suggests that the UK’s most + viable military option would be to use its fleet to reduce significantly + the flow of maritime commerce to Argentina. The objective of this + interdiction campaign would be to so damage Argentina’s economy that + they would agree to an outcome acceptable to the UK.

+

The Options

+

In ascending order of difficulty, the British options are:

+

• Initial Submarine Attacks. The initial arriving + units will be nuclear hunter/killer submarines, the first of which + should be on station in a week. They could attempt to intimidate the + Argentinians with a dramatic early success by sinking the most + significant military target found and by attriting the Argentinian + resupply effort for the Falklands. Argentina’s anti-submarine warfare + capability is considered by our Navy to be one of the best in Latin + America, but it is unlikely to be sufficient to locate and destroy the + UK subs.

+

• Retake South Georgia. Our Navy believes the + UK’s best option would be a combined + amphibious/vertical envelopment assault on South Georgia, following + bombardment with naval guns and Harriers. This could succeed in retaking the island. + Because it is 900 miles further from Argentina than the Falklands, has a + poor airfield, and no economic value, the Argentinians may only lightly + defend it. Retaking the island would give the Thatcher government a “victory” that + included recovered territory, but which does not deal with the central + problem. If the Argentinian Navy attempted to block the assault, it + would severely tax any possible air cover and thus increase its + vulnerability to the RN Task Force.

+

• Air/Naval Battle. The CJCS believe that this is + the option that the UK would prefer, + i.e., to engage the Argentinian Navy in a large-scale sea battle, + inflict heavy casualties, and gain control of the waters in the area. It + requires the Argentinians to take the bait and it does not, in itself, + succeed in regaining lost territory. It might, however, give the + Thatcher government a + “victory” which could favorably influence the outcome of the crisis. Our + Navy believes that the Royal Navy would suffer some losses, but would + win a decisive victory if the Argentinians joined battle. The RN’s ASW + capability should be able to control Argentina’s three operational + submarines, although we cannot rule out the possibility of some RN losses. If the battle occurred within + 200–300 miles of Argentina, the Argentinian Air Force (AAF) could contribute significantly. The + range of the AAF Mirages and A–4s can also be extended by aerial refueling with Argentina’s two + KC–130s, although the limited + tanker assets would be unable to sustain a high sortie generation rate. + Even if they achieve control of the air, the AAF’s ability to inflict losses on the RN would be limited because the AAF has not practiced anti-ship missions + extensively. The RN’s contribution to + the air battle is limited to 15 Sea Harriers and SAMs. If the + Mirages and Harriers were to engage + in air combat, however, the AAF would + have the advantage.

+

• Blockade the Falklands. The RN Task Force is of sufficient size to + throw a blockade around the Falklands, but the Argentinians may be able + to resupply their forces by air. The UK + would have to destroy the airfield to prevent that resupply. The only + capabilities to destroy the runway would be the Harriers and they could be engaged by + anti-aircraft defenses around the field. It is unclear what scale of + fighter operations the Argentinians could sustain on the Falklands over + time, but in the next few weeks they are unlikely to have more than a + token presence of Air Force assets. (Thus far only 4 light propeller + “spotter” aircraft have been deployed.) If the Argentinians attempted to + run the blockade, the RN Task Force + would dominate what would turn into a sea battle. The major problem for + the RN would be sustaining a large naval + presence over time because the logistical problem would be immense. The + RN Task Force’s refueling capacity + is severely limited. Unless reinforced by more tankers, the Task Force’s + time on station will be constrained and the cost of establishing a fuel + supply train will be high. Moreover, the Argentinian forces will by then + be stocked for a long siege.

+

• Retaking the Falklands. The RN Task Force has limited amphibious assets + (4 LSLs and 1 LPD) and is even using a luxury liner to transport Royal + Marines. Although they will have upwards of 4,000 Marines, they have + little capability to land them. Only the LPD has amphibious landing capability. While all five of + the amphibious ships could support assault helicopters, we believe they + may have sailed without a full helicopter force. C–130s are transporting helicopters to + Ascension Island, probably for on-loading en route.

+

The combination of naval bombardment and Harrier/helicopter attacks could + sufficiently soften a moderately defended area to permit + amphibious/helicopter landing of Marines. By the time the RN Task Force could begin an assault, + however, the Argentinians could have 7000 troops in place on the + islands. If they use their two KC–130 tankers, they might also be able + to keep a few of their MIRAGE fighters over the island to bomb the + assault force and engage the Harriers. Once the British assault force has been inserted, + it will face severe supply problems and a numerically superior force + with well established defensive positions. Without larger amphibious + forces or airborne capability, the option of retaking the Falklands seems remote. The + RAF does not have aircraft capable + of conducting paratroop operations with range sufficient to reach the + Falklands from Ascension Island, the nearest UK territory.

+

• Attacks on Argentina. Air or sea attacks on + Argentina itself would be the most difficult because the attacking force + would lay itself open to the entire Argentinian Air Force of over 40 + Mirages and 60 Skyhawk + A–4s. Given the size of the guns on the + RN ships, coastal shelling would + have only a limited effect. Mining is an attractive option, but we are + unsure how many mines are on-board UK + ships. The most attractive option for the UK, however, is one that is basically similar and + relatively easy to conduct. It is to keep its fleet beyond AAF range and interdict as much as + possible of Argentina’s commercial shipping, thereby damaging the + Argentinian economy. We do not know how long it would take to have + appreciable effect. This course would seek to make Argentina pay so high + a price that they would agree to an acceptable solution to the + crisis.

+

Constraints

+

Finally, a number of other factors make HMG military options difficult:

+

• There are 1,800 British civilians on the Falklands who are concentrated + in the areas where fighting would likely take place.

+

• The British cannot reconfigure their forces easily. The mix of aircraft + and loadout of ships will be difficult to alter significantly, even with + the use of Ascension. At present the British have built a balanced force + structure to handle both the air and submarine threat.

+

• The onset of winter near the end of May will make sea operations very + dangerous due to formation of pack ice, reduced visibility and a high + wind and sea state.

+

• There will be no readily available facilities to handle repairs, battle + damage, and casualties.A similar list of + possible British military options was also prepared in the + Department of Defense and forwarded, under a covering note, by West + to Weinberger and Carlucci, through Iklé, on April 8. In contrast to + the PM study, this paper also + considered the prospect of the British using South Georgia, after an + operation had first been mounted to recapture it from Argentine + forces, as a staging point for retaking the Falklands/Malvinas. The + paper concluded that while using South Georgia shortened British + supply lines, the lack of air superiority and the time needed to + develop South Georgia as a support base would negatively affect + British operations. The Defense paper also differed in its + assessment of a combined airborne/amphibious operation to retake the + Islands, highlighting the “high risk of failure” of such an + operation since the Argentines “will have approximately 7000 troops + on the Islands and air superiority.” A stamped notation on West’s + covering note indicates that Weinberger saw the paper on April 12. (Washington + National Records Center, OSD Files, + FRC 330–84–0004, UK (March–April) + 1982)

+ +

Attachment

+

Paper Prepared in the Bureau of Politico-Military + AffairsSecret.

+

Washington, undated

+

Forces Available to United Kingdom and + ArgentinaUnder an April 7 + information memorandum, Cohen sent Haig a briefing paper summarizing the + Argentine/British military balance, which was prepared in INR. Outlining the paper’s principal + conclusions, Cohen wrote: + “Both sides have well-trained forces. Neither side has a clear + overall advantage, and either side could win a major encounter, + depending on the circumstances.” (Department of State, Executive + Secretariat, Files of Alexander M. + Haig, Jr. 1981–1982, Lot 82D370, (3) Falklands + Crisis–1982)

+

British (En Route to the + Area)

+

2 VTOL Carriers

+

—15 Sea Harriers

+

—ASW Helicopters

+

—Troop Helicopters

+

5 Amphibious ships

+

2 Guided Missile Destroyers

+

3 Destroyers (with missile capability)

+

13 Frigates (most have some missile capability)

+

2 Mobile Logistics Support Ships

+

Approx. 4 Nuclear hunter/killer submarines

+

Approximately 2,500 marines

+

Note: Additional forces are being staged and may be sent to the area.

+

Argentinian

+

1 Carrier

+

—18 Fixed wing aircraft (A–4Q, Super Etendard and S–2 Trackers)

+

—4 Helicopters

+

1 Guided Missile Cruiser

+

2 Guided Missile Destroyers

+

7 Destroyers

+

2 Guided Missile Corvettes

+

2 Amphibious ships

+ +

2 Logistical Support ships

+

10,000 Marines

+

Air Force

+

1 Bomber Squadron (9 Canberras)

+

7 Fighter/attack squadrons (68 A–4P Skyhawks, 26 Dagger, 32 MS–760A)

+

2 Interceptor Squadrons (40 Mirage IIIEA)

+

2 COIN squadrons (45 IA–58A Pucara)

+

1 COIN helo squadron with 14 Hughes 500 + M, and 6 UH–1H

+

7 C–130s

+

2 KC–130s

+
+ +
+ 68. Message From British Prime Minister Thatcher to President ReaganSource: + Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S Special Handling Restrictions Memos 1979–1983, Lot + 96D262, ES Sensitive April 1–9 1982. + Confidential. Thomas sent + the message to Stoessel + under an April 6 covering note that stated that in Henderson’s absence, Thomas would deliver Thatcher’s message to McFarlane at the White House that + afternoon. (Ibid.) + + + London, April 6, + 1982 + +

Begins:

+

I am seeking your urgent help in bringing pressure to bear on Argentina + to withdraw from the Falkland Islands. Argentina has made clear that it + will defy the Security Council Resolution adopted on 3 April, calling + for its immediate withdrawal.Galtieri announced on April 4 that + Argentina rejected Resolution 502: “Argentina will maintain its + freedom of action to protect the nation’s interests and honor, which + will not be negotiated. Argentina is not willing to renounce its + historical rights over the islands and withdraw from what is hers + the armed forces who are and represent the people of our nation.” + (“Argentina Rejects Resolution,” New York + Times, April 4, p. A18) This is unacceptable: all + our efforts must be devoted to bringing Argentina to respect the will of + the Security Council and to act according to this resolution. In this + context we should use all available means of pressure on them. Economic + and financial measures would have a particularly powerful impact.

+ +

I am deeply grateful for your own energetic intervention with the + Argentine PresidentSee Document 41. and the help which you gave us in the + Security Council.See footnote 3, Document 50. What you did was widely + noted and applauded here. The United States is a substantial trading and + financial partner with Argentina. If you can support us with economic + measures, this will be vital to their success. We must not forget that + we are dealing with an unprovoked aggression in flagrant breach of + international law and of all the principles which your country and mine + have done so much to defend.

+

I seek your personal backing for the urgent introduction of economic and + financial measures against Argentina. I am already approaching our + Community partners on this, since we are bound to consult together on + many economic matters. But I very much hope that you will join us too. + Coordinated action by the Community, the United States, Japan, Canada, + Australia and New Zealand would bring home to Argentina the consequences + of their illegal actions.

+

The Argentine economy has suffered serious difficulties over the years + and is now in a fragile and vulnerable condition. The Argentines depend + critically on maintaining their export earnings and in raising finance + both to pay for their imports and to cover their external deficit. + Measures to limit their access to markets and to credit will hit them + hard. We in Britain are already taking action. But such action will be + far more effective if our close friends and trading partners will + support us as fully as possible. About 40 per cent of Argentina’s + exports go to these countries, including the countries of the Community. + Argentina seeks to raise funds at the leading world financial centres. + They cannot afford to be cut off from trade and finance on this + scale.

+

A Security Council resolution imposing sanctions on Argentina would bring + universal economic action. But the experience over Iran in 1980 shows + that the Soviet Union would be bound to veto this:Reference is to the January 1980 veto by the Soviet + Union of a United Nations Security Council resolution that sought to + impose economic sanctions on Iran in the aftermath of its taking of + U.S. hostages from the Embassy in Tehran. and time is short. + I must therefore turn to you, together with our other friends, to ask + you to take national action in solidarity with us in introducing + economic measures.

+

The measures I propose are these:

+

(a) A complete ban on the supply of arms and other military material to + Argentina. We have already done this. I urge that you will also ban arms + supplies, maintain this ban in force and encourage others to do + likewise.

+ +

(b) An embargo on all or some imports of goods from Argentina. We are + announcing a complete embargo with effect from midnight tonight 6 April. + I urge you to take supporting action and to be ready to announce it and + introduce it as soon as possible.

+

(c) The ending of export credit guarantees for new commitments to + Argentina, and discouragement of further international lending to + Argentina. We have ourselves ceased to enter into new guarantee + commitments and frozen all Argentine financial assets in London, and we + expect British financial institutions to be very reluctant to undertake + new commitments towards Argentina in present circumstances. The + aggressive actions by the Argentine authorities and the uncertainty of + their outcome, against a background of considerable domestic economic + difficulty, have already undermined confidence in that country’s + creditworthiness. The further actions we have taken will directly create + financial difficulty for Argentina. Prudence alone should deter the + international banking community and other governments from undertaking + further credits and loans to Argentina. I ask you to provide no + incentive and no encouragement.

+

I know that these measures will affect your own economic interests. But + if they are taken rapidly, with the widest possible solidarity among our + partners, they should bring the Argentine Government to their senses. + They would show Argentina that force does not pay and lead us towards + withdrawal of their forces and the peaceful solution which we want if at + all possible. The quicker these measures can be agreed, announced and + put into effect, the stronger their impact on Argentina and the better + the prospect that they can as quickly be reversed.

+

I look forward to your earliest possible response.

+

Ends.

+
+ +
+ + 69. Action Memorandum From the Acting Assistant Secretary of State for + European Affairs (Scanlan), the + Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Enders), and the Assistant Secretary + of State for Economic and Business Affairs (Hormats) to Secretary of State HaigSource: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, + S/S Special Handling + Restrictions Memos 1979–1983, Lot 96D262, ES Sensitive April 1–9 1982. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Pendleton and John S. Monier + (EB); cleared by Service, Constable, and M. Austin (PM/SAS). Pendleton initialed for Scanlan; Service initialed for Enders; Hormats did not initial the + memorandum. Pendleton also + initialed for Monier and Austin. A stamped notation on the first + page of the memorandum indicates that Haig saw it. Hormats sent the memorandum to Haig under an April 6 note, + indicating: “I support a variant of the EUR Option (Option 2). I would suspend consideration of + new Exim loans for Argentina and tell the British we are doing this. + I would also consider invoking the Chafee amendment, but I would not + tell the British we are doing this because we may decide not to + invoke it, and having informed them that we were considering it and + subsequently failing to invoke it would look like a weakening of our + original position.” (Ibid.) + + + Washington, April 6, + 1982 + + + SUBJECT + UK Requests re Economic + Sanctions/Logistics + +

ISSUES FOR DECISION

+

We need guidance from you on further requests we have received from the + UK. These go beyond requests for + political support and involve logistics/intelligence assistance not + required by formal agreement,See Document 65. as well as support for + economic sanctions against Argentina.See + Document 68. We would like to + discuss these with you at today’s 10:30 meeting. You are scheduled to + see Ambassador Henderson this + afternoon.

+

Last week you approved the UK purchase of + U.S.-owned fuel on Ascension because it is required by our base + agreement.See Document 51. You also decided to put an indefinite + hold on lifting the arms sales restriction on Argentina.See Document 50.

+

ECONOMIC SANCTIONS

+

On April 6 the UK requested that the U.S. + curtail export credits and guarantees to Argentina. It is seeking Allied + and Commonwealth support for such a move. Currently, Eximbank exposure + in Argentina totals $1.2 billion, with another $130 million in + preliminary commitments outstanding.

+ +

Eximbank is likely to be cautious in further lending to Argentina. + Eximbank exposure there increased $442 million in the past year when + U.S. firms won a large share of the giant Yacyreta hydropower project. + In addition, Eximbank staff reports that applications for new loans to + Argentina have been declining because of the weak economy there.

+

The so-called “Chafee Amendment” in Eximbank’s statute explicitly + prohibits denial of loans for other than commercial or financial reasons + except “. . . in cases where the President determines that such action + would clearly and importantly advance United States policy in such areas + as international terrorism, nuclear proliferation, environmental + protection and human rights . . .”Passed as + Public Law 95–630 in 1978, the Chafee Amendment to the Export-Import + Bank Act of 1945 was named for the measure’s sponsor, Senator John + Chafee (R-Rhode Island). The Chafee Amendment has only been + invoked once—against Chile as a result of the Letelier-Moffitt + case.Reference is to the 1976 + assassination of expatriate former Chilean Ambassador Orlando + Letelier and his U.S. assistant Ronni Moffitt in Washington. For + documentation on U.S. Government action taken against Chile in + response, including invocation of the Chafee Amendment, see Foreign + Relations, 1977–1980, vol. XXIV, South America; Latin + America Region and Foreign Relations, 1977–1980, vol. II, + Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs. That + determination has since been retracted.

+

Eximbank Chairman Draper might be + prevailed upon to stall consideration and approval of credits to + Argentina for a short time, but he would have no legal basis for such + action and could be subject to legal and political pressure from U.S. + exporters to resume lending. The decision on when to resume lending + would be entirely in Eximbank’s hands.

+

Options:

+

1. The U.S. can invoke the Chafee Amendment and halt Eximbank lending to + Argentina. Such action will require a Presidential determination and, in + light of its rare use, be seen as a major action.

+

2. You can offer to consider the UK + request and to ask Eximbank to postpone consideration on Argentina loans + while State considers Chafee Amendment action and continues its + mediation efforts (EUR supports).

+

3. You can deny the request on the grounds that any action to cut off + credits would compromise the U.S. ability to act as a mediator. (ARA supports).

+

4. You can offer to consider the request without promising any specific + actions.

+ +

LOGISTICS/INTELLIGENCE-SHARING REQUESTS

+

The UK has made one specific request + (radio loan), and there are indications of two more requests in the + works. ([less than 1 line not declassified] + sharing and overflight rights).A point paper + prepared for Burkhalter at + 0250L, April 7 (1550Z April 6), indicates an additional British + request to DIA: [2 lines not declassified]. (Washington National Records + Center, OSD Files, FRC 330–84–0003, + Argentina (Jan–15 May) 1982)

+

—Loan of Manpack Satcom Radios: The UK MOD has requested the loan of five + Manpack Satcom radios from JSOC in + order to establish a radio net to back up the UK manpack system being used in the operation. Last year we + loaned such radios to the UK special + forces to monitor an evacuation from the Gambia.

+

—[less than 1 line not declassified] Assistance: Embassy London contacts at the MOD + have made clear they expect to ask us for [less than 1 + line not declassified] assistance (INR is working on a separate memo on the technical aspects + of this).Not found.

+

—Overflight Rights: These same contacts have + indicated that we will be asked for overflight rights.

+

We will be under considerable pressure from the British to respond + favorably. The difficulties inherent in negative decisions are well + known to you. EUR believes a lack of + support from the U.S. in the period ahead could threaten the life of the + Thatcher Government. We + should therefore proceed with logistics/intelligence support of the type + requested while insisting on the greatest possible secrecy.

+

ARA believes we must refuse UK requests for economic sanctions against + Argentina, and logistics or intelligence-sharing requests that are not + clearly required by existing agreements. Our role is political, and we + seek to bring about a peaceful resolution of the conflict. The UK requests, if accepted, would escalate + our involvement on the side of the UK + beyond the point where we could serve a mediating role. Such support + would become public and would place increased strains on our relations + with most other Latin American countries.Below this paragraph, McManaway wrote: “Discussed at meeting 10:30 + 4/6—Secretary gave oral guidance to ARA, EB, EUR, Eagleburger, Stoessel.” No memorandum of conversation of this + meeting has been found. For a summary of the meeting, see the + attachment to Document 70.

+
+ +
+ + 70. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security + Affairs (Clark) to President + ReaganSource: Reagan Library, Executive + Secretariat, NSC Country File, + Latin America/Central, Falklands War (04/06/1982). Secret. Copies + were sent to Bush, + Meese, Baker, and Deaver. + + + Washington, April 6, + 1982 + Mr. President: + +

Several days ago when the Falklands matter arose, I tasked my staff to + answer a number of questions. Their answers are attached.

+

The most recent development was the request this afternoon from Prime + Minister ThatcherAttached but not printed is a copy Thatcher’s April 6 message to + Reagan (see Document 68). that we:

+

1. Ban all military assistance to Argentina;

+

2. Impose restrictions on all imports from Argentina;

+

3. Discontinue export credit guarantees for Argentina.

+

These rather extreme proposals which we cannot agree to, make clear the + near hysterical pitch to which the UK + has propelled the political debate in London.

+

You may wish to scan the highlighted portions of the attached in + preparation for Wednesday morning’s NSPG.A list of topics relating + to the situation in the Falklands/Malvinas, which was prepared in + advance of the April 7 NSPG + meeting, is attached but not printed.

+

Bill

+ +

Attachment

+

Memorandum From James M. + Rentschler, Dennis C. + Blair, and Roger + Fontaine of the National Security Council Staff to + the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Clark)Secret. Rentschler + signed “Jim” above his name in the “From” line and also signed + for Blair and Fontaine. The memorandum was + extensively underlined by an unknown hand with a highlighter + pen.

+

Washington, April 6, 1982

+ + SUBJECT + Falklands Follow-Up + +

SUMMARY: Provides in-house answers to the + questions we raised concerning middle- and longer-term implications of + the Falklands crisis; supplements these with a summary of the meeting + Secretary Haig chaired on the + same general subject this morning;See footnote 10, Document 69. and + recommends that you use the information we have provided as a discussion + basis during the time you will spend with the President and Haig in the Caribbean.Reagan and + Haig were scheduled to + travel to Jamaica and Barbados for meetings with Caribbean leaders + April 7–11. + END SUMMARY

+

You asked for staff thinking on the package of questions we raised + vis-à-vis the Falklands crisis and our belief that an SSG would be a useful forum in which to + address the middle- and longer-term (as opposed to the immediate and + operational) implications of the crisis in the Southern Atlantic.

+

At Tab A you will find a summary of in-house responses to those + questions. We have carried these as far as we can, with the information + and background to which we now have access, but there remain issues + which clearly require much broader inter-agency consideration, + particularly those involving the extent to which we should or must + support the UK in the event of + hostilities. This is a major policy decision with + far-reaching potential, and it may need determination relatively + soon (a matter of days).

+

Meanwhile, in addition to the material appended we summarize as follows + the main points of consensus emerging from the meeting Secretary + Haig chaired this morning in + which we participated along with Walt + Stoessel, Larry + Eagleburger, Tom + Enders, Bill + Middendorf, and a number of others:

+ +

—We do not have the luxury of either side-stepping this crisis or + attempting to wait it out;

+

—To the extent that third-party activity may be effective in averting + hostilities, the U.S. must be the one to initiate it (no other likely + candidates are in view); moreover, we will have more flexibility moving + early (i.e. now) rather than later;

+

—The Thatcher government is at + great risk and could well fall over this crisis; it will be important + for us to avoid a Suez- or Skybolt-type situation where we are perceived + to have thwarted the one lever (military threat against Argentina) + capable of turning the crisis around in Britain’s favor;

+

—The above consideration, in turn, requires a basic policy determination + concerning the extent of support we will be willing to provide the + British, particularly in the context of hostilities involving British + naval units (we have already agreed to be responsive to the first series + of specific items of military assistance which the Brits have + requested);See Document 69.

+

—Three elements in particular would serve U.S. interests in the crisis: + withdrawal of Argentine troops from the islands, turn-around of the + British fleet, and establishment of some negotiating/arbitration + mechanism or formula agreeable to both the Brits and the Argentines;

+

—The most promising avenue at present may be a U.S.-sponsored OAS initiative which would result in an + MFO-type authority in the islands, + possibly composed of U.S. and Canadian elements, plus elements from two + Latin American countries (trying for this would be contingent on earlier + bilateral soundings with both the Brits and the Argentines, which the + Secretary is beginning this afternoon);

+

—The bottom-line issue—ultimate sovereignty over the islands—will have to + be addressed at a far later stage in the process and should be allowed + to remain murky at present (as one participant put it, “we have to + resolve the Sinai before we resolve Jerusalem”);

+

—State will develop a specific game-plan incorporating the above + essentials, including a press line and an early start on some U.S. + diplomatic movement which does not leave the President looking exposed + and impotent while he is in Barbados.

+

Since the President, you, and the Secretary will be travelling together + to the Caribbean tomorrow, you may wish, in the course of that trip, to + use this memo as the basis for a discussion on where and how we proceed + from here on out.

+ +

Tab A

+

Paper Prepared by the National Security Council + StaffSecret. The paper was + underlined extensively by an unknown hand with a highlighter + pen.

+

Washington, undated

+

PRELIMINARY NSC STAFF VIEWS ON QUESTIONS/ISSUES WHICH WE NEED TO + ADDRESS IN THE CONTEXT OF MIDDLE- AND LONGER-TERM IMPLICATIONS OF + UK-ARGENTINE DISPUTE OVER THE + FALKLAND ISLANDS

+

I. INTELLIGENCE AREA

+

Q. [1½ lines not declassified]

+

A. [3½ lines not declassified]

+

Q. What is the situation of the small number of American citizens known + to be residing in the islands?

+

A. Under control. Embassy Buenos Aires is keeping a careful watching + brief on their whereabouts and safety, and is impressing upon the + Argentine authorities our interest in this matter.

+

Q. What are U.K. deployment plans, assets and capabilities?

+

A. U.K. force now underway has capability of sinking Argentine surface + ships, blockading of Falklands, and hit-and-run attacks on Argentinian + mainland; successful amphibious operation to retake the Falklands is + difficult, but probably within U.K. capability;

+

—Primary shortcoming of present U.K. force is lack of fixed-wing + aircraft. Argentina has one old aircraft carrier with fixed-wing + aircraft, and can operate from shore bases on Falklands and + mainland;

+

—U.K. plans unknown, but statements of leaders and thoroughness of + preparations suggest intentions at least to retake Falklands by force if + necessary. This aspect should not be + underestimated.

+

Q. What are Argentine capabilities, vulnerabilities and intentions?

+

A. Argentine Navy would be unable to prevent U.K. sea blockade of + Falklands.

+

—By time of British arrival, Argentine force on Falklands will be well + garrisoned, provisioned, and an airlift could bring essential supplies + for period of weeks even if U.K. sea blockade were in place;

+ +

—Argentine Navy and air force would not be able to lift a British sea + blockade of either Falklands or mainland ports (negligible capability + against British nuclear submarines).

+

—Argentine intentions are to dig in on the Falklands, raising the cost of + a British attempt to recapture the islands.

+

Q. What are realistic U.K. options, with best estimate of future actions, + both military and political?

+

A. British options are limited, given the domestic political + considerations driving the crisis in both the U.K. and Argentina, and + given the logistical constraints on a purely military British + response;

+

—The British hope for a peaceful settlement but are quite prepared to use + force;

+

—Political options have already been embarked on to bring pressure on + Argentina, (severance of diplomatic relations, freezing of Argentine + assets) but in and of themselves such measures will not be enough to + change the situation in the U.K.’s favor;

+

—Unless third-party activity (i.e. U.S. initiative) proves effective, the + prospect is for armed conflict via naval engagements in the very near + future; realistically, that is the only option the present British + government has absent face-saving intervention.

+

II. POLITICAL/DIPLOMATIC + AREA

+

Q. What is the recommended U.S. role in private and public diplomacy?

+

A. This is a major policy decision, to a significant degree already + considered by the President’s stated willingness to offer U.S. good + offices;See footnote 4, Document 64.

+

—In the short-term we should, following bilateral + soundings with both parties, attempt an initiative under OAS auspices which seeks replacement of + the Argentine military presence with an MFO-type authority (U.S., Canada, plus two Latin America + elements from two Latin American countries), in concert with the + turn-around of British naval units and agreement by both sides to some + impartial negotiating mechanism;

+

—In the longer-term we must at some point address + the fundamental issue, which is the question of ultimate sovereignty + over the islands;

+

Q. What should be the extent of U.S. support for the British?

+

A. This is a major policy decision, to a certain extent conditioned by + our formal alliance relationship with the U.K., our positive feelings + about the present U.K. government, our need to avoid a Suez-type perception of U.S. + unhelpfulness, our recognition of the support Mrs. Thatcher’s government has given us on + many issues; and the fact that we are already favorably responding to a + first series of British requests for specific items of military and + logistical assistance.

+

—The NSC’s West Europe office recommends + a strong pro-British tilt, even at the risk of damaging some + relationships in the hemisphere (which we judge to be less serious than + our larger strategic interests in the NATO/transatlantic context).

+

Q. What is our assessment of U.S. public opinion and Congressional + opinion re extent of U.S. role?

+

A. Public interest currently low to moderate, and bemused by the whole + affair;

+

—If military conflict breaks out, U.S. opinion would probably be on side + of U.K.

+

Q. What are the middle- and longer-term implications for other key U.S. + policy areas (UK/NATO credibility and capability? Impact on US/UK + bilateral relations? Effects on U.S. regional interests, e.g., Middle + East?)

+

A. In the short-term, serious degradation of U.K. + commitments/capability in NATO Europe + and other regions of the world;

+

—In the longer-term, assuming British success in + thwarting Argentina, psychological enhancement of Western capabilities + (nothing succeeds like success), with possible favorable implications + for regional areas, including Middle East;

+

—In the longer-term, assuming further British + humiliation or outright failure (particularly in a military context), + serious damage to the image of Western strength, accompanied by a likely + deterioration in the US/UK bilateral relationship (particularly if a + Labour government assumes power in the wake of a Tory debacle).

+

Q. What are the middle- and longer-term implications of the crisis for + U.S. Hemispheric policy?

+

A. Middle-term implications. The destruction of a + currently promising U.S.-Argentine relationship which has yet to be + achieved in the history of our two countries.

+

—Longer-term implications. The straining and + perhaps collapse of the OAS and its + security aspects embedded in the Rio Treaty.

+

III. MILITARY/LOGISTICAL + AREA

+

Q. What will be likely U.K. support requests?

+

A. These are likely to reflect (and keep pace with) the extent of U.K. + military involvement; the more committed the British become militarily, + the greater the number and frequency of requests for specific assistance + (we have already received a number of requests in both the political and + military areas);

+ +

—The initial focus will be on communications assistance, resupply, and + overflight facilitation;

+

—A later phase, assuming expanded military action, would entail an + intensification of requests in the above area and the U.K. pressing for + a generally higher profile of U.S. assistance across the board.

+

Q. What will be the impact on other U.S. assets and commitments in event + of support to British?

+

A. In the short-term, no significant impairment of + our assets militarily;

+

—In the longer-term, and assuming sustained + military operations, drawdowns on available assets transferred from + other areas could have a range of adverse consequences from moderate to + serious, particularly in some technical areas ([less + than 1 line not declassified], communications gear).

+
+ +
+ 71. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United + KingdomSource: Reagan + Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC + Country File, Western Europe and Soviet Union, United Kingdom + (04/01/1982–07/31/1982 (4)). Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Sent for information + Immediate to Buenos Aires and the White House. Printed from a copy + that was received in the White House Situation Room. + + + Washington, April 7, 1982, 0409Z + +

92488. Subject: Discussions With the UK + on Falkland Crisis.

+

1. Secret–Entire text.

+

2. Summary: The Secretary discussed with UK Ambassador the present political climate in Britain, a + possible US role in trying to resolve + the UK-Argentine dispute over the + Falklands, and elements of a formula which both sides might consider in + order to ease the threat of a military clash.No memorandum of conversation of this meeting has been + found. The Secretary assured the Ambassador of continued + US support for Britain, but stressed + the need for the US to talk immediately + with the Argentines about a possible agreement before US influence in Buenos Aires declines + further. End summary.

+

3. UK Ambassador Nicholas Henderson met with the + Secretary early afternoon of April 6 to discuss his government’s dispute + with Argentina over the military occupation of the Falklands. Henderson appeared deeply troubled by + the crisis, and particularly over the resignation of Foreign Secretary Lord Carrington.See footnote 2, Document + 61. He stressed to the Secretary that Carrington had resigned because of + the erroneous views among the British public that he misread Argentine + intentions and was responsible for the Argentine military success. The + Secretary expressed his sympathy for Carrington, and said that the US firmly supports the Thatcher government. He assured Henderson there would not be a “Suez” + situation, where the US pressured the + British to back down from taking military action.

+

4. Henderson repeatedly said it + was important for the US to understand + that domestic support for military action by the UK had not been stronger since 1939, that the government + and the country were determined not to back down, and that they would + not mind sinking the Argentine fleet—something which could be done + relatively easily. He emphasized that only the US, because of its great influence in Argentina, could + bring Buenos Aires to its senses and secure that country’s military + withdrawal from the Falklands. Henderson added, however, that the US should not appear impartial about + aggression; to do so would threaten the survival of Mrs. Thatcher’s government.

+

5. The Secretary replied that we recognize the present mood in Britain + and will continue to take a strong public stand against the Argentine + invasion. He agreed the US has had good + relations with Argentina, and maintains influence with the Galtieri government. Nevertheless, + US influence in Buenos Aires is + declining, and with every day that passes it will be more difficult to + secure Argentinian agreement to some formula for ending the crisis. The + Secretary said that while we are confident of British naval superiority, + a military clash would be politically disastrous for everyone. + Therefore, we must accelerate diplomatic efforts over the next seven + days in an attempt to achieve an agreement before the British fleet + arrives near Ascension Island, which is close to the regional area + covered by the Rio Treaty. Henderson said the fleet would not stop at Ascension and + Article One of the Rio Treaty should prevent Argentina from invoking + mutual assistance measures in the pact.In + Article 1 of the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, + also known as the Rio Treaty, the Contracting Parties condemn war + and pledge not to resort to the threat or the use of force in any + way inconsistent with the provisions of the UN Charter. He claimed that although his + government was not anxious to use the OAS, HMG did not believe + the organization would give strong support to Buenos Aires. In fact, + many OAS members would like to see the + Argentine fleet “clobbered.” Assistant Secretary Enders remarked that the US believes most Latin Americans strongly + support Argentina and would do so in the OAS.

+ +

When pressed by the Secretary about HMG + views on the elements of a possible agreement, Henderson would only reply that the + Argentine military must withdraw from the Falklands, even if it meant + the fall of the Galtieri + government. Anything less would topple Mrs. Thatcher. The Secretary asked if the British fleet might + be temporarily slowed if the Argentines agreed to a phased military + withdrawal from the Falklands, and if there was an understanding that + the task force would not return home until the US or some group of impartial nations assured the complete + military evacuation. He added that it would assume no prior agreement on + sovereignty, that the customs and way of life of the British Islanders + be guaranteed, and that a UK-Argentine + condominium-type administration could be arranged. Henderson reacted to the Secretary’s + suggestions. He noted that the British had poor experiences with + condominium arrangements, that after what has happened, in the past + weeks, a joint administration would not work, and in any case he could + not imagine the Argentines accepting the formula. The Secretary and + Enders said that while the + mood in Buenos Aires had been euphoric after the invasion, the people + and government had been sobered by the dispatch of the British fleet, + and they might possibly accept the kind of arrangement outlined. + Henderson reacted negatively + to the suggestion of an interim force from the US, Canada and two Latin American countries. He seemed to + prefer the idea of having only the US + maintain a presence on the Falklands to insure that any agreement is + carried out.

+

7. The Secretary said that if Henderson had no objection, he would discuss the + possible formula with the Argentine Ambassador, who at that moment was + waiting in the outer office to see the Secretary.See Document 72. + Henderson agreed, and said that + he would be in touch with the Secretary. Besides the Secretary and Mr. + Enders, present at the + meeting were Acting Assistant Secretary for Europe John Scanlan and Keith C. Smith, EUR/NE.

+

8. Pending instructions, Embassy should not discuss details of a possible + UK-Argentine agreement with HMG.

+ + Haig + +
+ +
+ + 72. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassies in + Argentina and the United KingdomSource: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Cable File, Falkland File + 04/07/1982 (1). Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Sent for information Immediate to the White + House. + + + Washington, April 7, 1982, 0437Z + +

92491. Subject: Falklands Dispute: Secretary’s Meeting With Argentine + Ambassador.

+

1. Secret–Entire text.

+

2. The Secretary called in Argentine Ambassador Esteban Takacs April 6 at 2:30 + p.m.No memorandum of conversation of + this meeting has been found. He had just met with the British + Ambassador (septel).See Document 71. + Argentine Foreign Minister is returning from New York for a meeting with + the Secretary at 6:30 p.m. April 6.See Document 73.

+

3. The Secretary laid out the problem as we see it. The way events are + going, Argentina and the UK are heading + for a major conflict. The Thatcher government is under tremendous pressure and, + with a new Foreign Minister, the Ministry of Defense is in the driver’s + seat. Emotions are very high in London and there are many who look + forward to sinking the entire Argentine Navy.

+

4. The Secretary told Takacs that + he had called these meetings as follow-up to the President’s offer of + our good offices. It is vital to Western interests that we find a way to + avoid further conflict between Argentina and the UK. We are willing to devote all our energies to such an + effort, but it is important that we move quickly. The closer the British + fleet gets to Argentina, the more difficult it will be for the Thatcher government to pull it back; + and there may be a similar psychological impact on the Argentine + Government. The Secretary suggested that Galtieri’s survival might also be at stake.

+

5. The Secretary noted that, apart from our position on the UN vote, we wanted to be able to mediate + neutrally and impartially in order to perform the good offices role. He + then asked Takacs for any + suggestions he had at this time regarding a possible peaceful solution. + Takacs said he was speaking + personally and asked that his thoughts be treated accordingly. In + Takacs’ view, the first + requirement is for the two parties to “send signals that they want to + negotiate.” Second, there is need for an intermediary. In the first + instance at least, Takacs would + like to see this done by the United States. He does not think an + international organization or a group of countries would work as well. + Repeating previous GOA statements, Takacs described sovereignty as the + one issue that the GOA could not yield + on, but he later agreed with a suggestion of the Secretary that there + might be some way to defer the question.

+

6. The Secretary suggested it might be desirable to set up a + quadripartite group with Canada, the U.S. and two Latin American + countries as members and that a satisfactory solution might involve some + form of joint administration of the Islands under OAS or other auspices. Implicit in this + context was the withdrawal of Argentine forces. The Secretary did not + see how the sovereignty issue could be resolved now; that would take + time. Asked for his opinion, Takacs described the Secretary’s ideas as “at the + extreme of what the Galtieri + government might be able to accept.”

+

7. Others present at the meeting were Assistant Secretary Enders and ARA/SC + Service.

+ + Haig + +
+ +
+ 73. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in + ArgentinaSource: Reagan + Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC + Country File, Latin America/Central, Argentina + (04/06/1982–04/10/1982). Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Sent for information + Immediate to London and the White House. Printed from a copy that + was received in the White House Situation Room. + + + Washington, April 7, 1982, 0520Z + +

92492. Subject: Secretary’s April 6 Meeting With Argentine Foreign + Minister Costa Mendez (Falklands + Dispute).

+

1. S–Entire text.

+

2. Summary: At one hour meeting April 6No + memorandum of conversation of this meeting has been found. + the Secretary set forth to Argentine Foreign Minister Costa Mendez the seriousness of the + current situation, our preliminary ideas on how it might be resolved in + a peaceful manner, and the need for urgent action. Costa Mendez said he would call his + President tonight and be back in touch as soon as possible.In telegram + 93478 to Buenos Aires, April 8, the Department confirmed that + Costa Mendez telephoned + Haig on the night of + April 6 to inform him that Argentina accepted the U.S. offer of + assistance and that he would be welcome to come to Buenos Aires + following his visit to London. (Reagan Library, Executive + Secretariat, NSC Cable File, + Falkland File 04/08/1982 (1)) On April 7, Costa Mendez dispatched to + Haig a dossier of + briefing documents with an accompanying covering letter stating his + belief that they “may assist you in your task.” (Department of + State, Executive Secretariat, S/S + Special Handling Restrictions Memos 1979–1983, Lot 96D262, ES Sensitive April 1–9 1982) The same + day, Henderson also sent to + Haig “background + material” for him to read during his flight to London. + (Ibid.) Depending on the Argentine response, the Secretary + would consider flying tomorrow to London and from there to Buenos + Aires.

+

3. The Secretary began the conversation by delineating the collision + course that the Argentine and the UK are + now on. Further conflict would be disastrous for both countries: In the + case of the Argentines it could well mean the destruction of much of its + fleet. The further the British fleet moves toward the South Atlantic, + the harder it will be to find a peaceful solution. The US is prepared to do everything possible to + find a formula that would permit both countries to save face. It is in + all our interests that we succeed.

+

4. Costa Mendez welcomed our + offer of help but noted that this crisis has come about because there + was almost no attention given previously to the depth of Argentine + feeling on the matter. He repeated the standard GOA line on guarantees for the Islanders.

+

5. The Secretary said he wanted to get more specific. There are two + critical conditions that must be addressed if conflict is to be avoided: + The British fleet must stop moving south; the only way that will happen + in our view is if the GOA agrees to an + alternative administrative arrangement on the Falkland Islands (i.e., + withdrawal of its military forces). The Secretary said that a way must + be found to delay final resolution of the sovereignty issue. There is no + possibility that the British Government would recognize Argentine + sovereignty at this time.

+

6. Costa Mendez made clear that + it would be very difficult for the GOA + to back down from its recent success in establishing de facto + sovereignty and control. He went back over the history of negotiations + with the UK, claiming that the British + have on several occasions been on the verge of acceding to the Argentine + claim. It is, in Costa Mendez’s + view, a much more important issue to the Argentine people than to the + British. He mused about the incredible situation that has now arisen. + Nevertheless, he agreed that he would do everything possible to find and + convince his government of the need for a formula that finesses the + sovereignty issue at the present time.

+ +

7. The Secretary then summarized the possible elements of a solution: + Agree to remove Argentine forces and halt the fleet; set up an + impartial, third party, administration for the Islanders; and, finally, + resolve the sovereignty issue through a negotiating process. Regarding + the impartial administrative role, the Secretary suggested that it might + be best to have other countries involved, perhaps the Canadians, + ourselves, and two Latin American countries. Costa Mendez did suggest as his own + personal idea (he emphasized he had not discussed it with Galtieri) that it might be more + practical to think in terms of a joint Anglo-Argentine administrative + structure, perhaps with a third party to help resolve any problems that + might arise.

+

8. In summarizing, the Secretary said he needed to know from the GOA if we can keep the sovereignty issue + out for now, yet find a formula that will represent a sufficiently great + change from the previous status so that the GOA can explain the partial backdown to its own people. The + Secretary suggested that if the GOA can + agree to defer the sovereignty issue in this fashion, he would be + willing to go to London immediately and, depending on the response from + Prime Minister Thatcher, from + there to Buenos Aires. Costa + Mendez said he would talk to President Galtieri tonight and get back as soon + as possible.

+

9. Others present at the meeting were Argentine Ambassadors S Takacs and + Figueroa, Assistant Secretary + Enders, and ARA/SC + Service.

+

10. This message for your info only.

+ + Haig + +
+ +
+ + 74. Memorandum From Secretary of State Haig to President ReaganSource: + Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Haig Papers, Department of State, + Day File, April 6, 1982 Falklands. Secret; Sensitive. In the + upper-right hand corner of the first page of the memorandum, + Goldberg wrote: “End of + day report by AMH—day occupied + w/diplomatic contesting.” At the bottom of the same page, Goldberg added: “The basic + strategy was as AMH envisioned it + from 4/5/82 & was what he was telling Bill Clark all day on 4/6/82—This + memo was necessary for historical record & because Clark, despite 3 times of AMH explanation, did not appear to + comprehend what the issue & strategy were.” + + + Washington, April 6, + 1982 + + + SUBJECT + FALKLAND ISLANDS DISPUTE + +

In keeping with the initiatives you have taken with both Prime Minister + Thatcher and President + Galtieri and your offer of + our good offices to help settle this most unfortunate dispute, I have + begun to explore what we might be able to do. Today, I have talked + personally with the UKSee Document 71. and + ArgentineSee Document + 72. Ambassadors, as well as with the new UK Foreign Secretary, Francis Pym, by phone following receipt + of a letter from him.No memorandum of + conversation of Haig’s April + 6 telephone conversation with Pym has been found. In an April 6 letter to + Haig, Pym wrote that it “has never been + more important that our two countries should work hand in hand,” + adding that as Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary he would continue + to address the “Argentine aggression in the Falkland Islands” on + “the lines which Peter + Carrington was following.” Pym continued: “We are quite + determined to secure the withdrawal of Argentine forces and the + restoration of the British Administration to the Islands by whatever + means are necessary. The role of the United States will be critical + on this as on so many issues that concern us deeply. Both what the + United States Administration says and what it does will have a + profound influence on the Argentine Government and on others.” To + this end, he expressed his “hope that the US Administration will continue to condemn this + aggression, and to bring whatever pressure it can to bear upon the + Argentine Government to withdraw its forces.” (Department of State, + Executive Secretariat, Files of Alexander M. Haig, Jr., 1981–1982, Lot 82D370, (3) + Falklands Crisis—1982) Tonight I met with the visiting + Argentine Foreign Minister.Goldberg underlined this sentence. + For Haig’s April 6 meeting + with Costa Mendez, see Document 73. My objective in these + discussions has been to listen to both sides and look for opportunities + for diplomacy. I believe we have found a few.

+

We need now to move quickly, while there is still uncertainty on both + sides and while each is having second thoughts. Furthermore, we should + act before we are placed in an untenable position of having to + compromise our impartiality if we are to be responsive to escalating British requests for + assistance. In this connection you have just received a letter from + Thatcher asking us to take a + range of economic measures on their behalf.See Document 68.

+

Subject to your approval, and an indication from the British that they + agree, I propose to go to London and Buenos Aires, leaving tomorrow or + Thursday.April 8. Goldberg underlined the portion of + this sentence beginning with “I propose.” The principal + objective of this mission would be to test our understanding of each + side’s minimum requirements for a solution to the immediate problem of a + prospective armed conflict in this hemisphere between two friends. If we + are correct that the greatest concerns of the British are withdrawal of + Argentine forces and respect for the rights of its subjects, and that + the Argentines must have at least a change from UK administration of the Islands with the clear prospect of + ultimate sovereignty, we will have a base on which we may be able to + build at least a temporary settlement. Only a beginning, but an + essential step to avert hostilities and lay the groundwork for a lasting + solution.

+

Neither the British nor the Argentines want the OAS or the UN involved. + Consequently, we are thinking of the formation of a neutral force to + administer the Islands while the sovereignty issue is settled. This + might include ourselves (the British will not accept less), the + Canadians and two Latin countries. This will be a high risk mission but + one I believe we must take if we are not to suffer a major setback to + our policies in this hemisphere.

+
+ +
+ + 75. Talking Points Prepared in the Department of StateSource: Library of Congress, + Manuscript Division, Haig + Papers, Department of State, Day File, April 7, 1982 Falklands. + Secret; Nodis. Initialed by + McManaway. A slightly + different, undated version of the talking points, drafted by + Enders, Service, and Pendleton is in the Department of + State, Executive Secretariat, Files of Alexander M. Haig, Jr., 1981–1982, Lot 82D370, No + folder. Another set of talking points summarizing the diplomatic and + political situation in Argentina and in the United Kingdom, which + were prepared by the CIA for the + meeting and distributed to the Department of Defense where they were + seen by Weinberger on April + 7, are in the Washington National Records Center, OSD Files, FRC 330–84–0003, Argentina + (Jan–15 May) 1982. + + + Washington, undated + +

NSPG MEETING 8:30 a.m., + April 7, 1982

+

U.K. POLITICAL SITUATION

+

• Brits in warlike mood—high strung, unpredictable.

+

• Thatcher could fall if no + diplomatic solution or military rout.

+

• Could also fall if U.S. seen as turning our back.

+

• Labor opposition no friend of ours on security issues—challenging + Thatcher on Falklands.

+

• Thatcher turning to MOD for + advice. Nott safe for now. I have + been in contact with Francis + Pym—new Foreign Secretary.See + footnote 4, Document 74.

+

POLITICAL SITUATION IN ARGENTINA

+

• Galtieri under pressure because + of economy and other reasons.

+

• Falklands recovery popular. Regime stakes its future on no return to + status quo.

+

• Second thoughts now—but nationalism and war spirit will mount as Brits + move closer.

+

• Galtieri a gambler—but probably + will make major concessions.

+

MILITARY CAPABILITIES

+

• U.K. Navy could hurt Argentines and possibly retake some territory.

+

• But recovery of main island difficult.

+

• U.K. best option to block maritime commerce to Argentina.

+

• U.K. options in ascending order of difficulty:

+

1. Initial submarine attack.

+

2. Retake South Georgia.

+ +

3. Air/Naval blockade Falklands.

+

4. Retake Falklands.

+

5. Attacks on Argentina mainland.

+

• U.K. probably wants big sea battle to give Thatcher a “victory.”

+

• But Argentines can pull major ships to port.At the end of this point, Haig wrote: “And they are doing so!”

+

• Other factors: U.K. civilians on Falklands, approach of winter.

+

YESTERDAY’S CONTACTS

+

• Argentines looking for way out.

+

• I told them I would not engage if they insist us recognizing their + sovereignty.Haig underlined “us recognizing their sovereignty” + and wrote “!” in the right-hand margin next to this point. For + Haig’s April 6 + conversation with Costa + Mendez, see Document + 73.

+

• Costa Mendez invited me to + Buenos Aires.See footnote 3, Document 73.

+

• Argentina may consider withdrawal of military from Islands—but wants to + leave administrative personnel on Islands.Haig underlined + “administrative personnel.”

+

• Argentines need to show all not in vain—we need to leave them their + pride or they will self-destruct.

+

• British tougher. Pym and + Henderson emphasize war + fever and impossible to negotiate while Argentina occupies Islands.

+

• Less insistent on need to restore status quo ante.Haig + underlined “less insistent.”

+

• British have momentum—not sure how far to go.

+

• I put them on guard by suggesting I go to London first.

+

• U.K. and Argentina see role for us in the Islands but not for others. + We would rather spread the burden around.

+

PROPOSAL TO U.K. AND ARGENTINA

+

1. All military on islands withdrawn within short, agreed period.

+

2. No additional military force introduced within 200 miles of + Islands.

+

3. Consortium (U.S., Canada, two Latin American countries) introduce + small military and police force into Islands. This force in place by + time withdrawal completed.

+

4. Consortium assumes responsibility for local administration on interim + basis. British and Argentine administrators of the Islands attached to + consortium.

+ +

5. Argentina and Britain to negotiate ultimate disposition of Islands + within framework of respect for sovereign rights and for the right of + the inhabitants of the Islands to self-determination. Consortium to help + with negotiations and application of settlement.

+

NEXT STEPS

+

• U.K. has initiative. Must stop their fleet. We should ask them to show + first card.

+

• Question for Brits: If Argentines evacuate and there is an interim + administration involving us, plus agreed negotiating scenario, will you + hold up your fleet?

+

• Argentina more negotiable if there is a little running room in + Britain.

+

• Need President’s authority to say, when talk gets tough in London, that + we can’t support a military solution if a reasonable political solution + is available.

+

• If this goes at all, may take two bites with each party.

+

• If we fail, our interests suffer. But no loss of prestige for having + tried for peaceful solution.

+

• We must move quickly while there is uncertainty on both sides and each + is having second thoughts. As the U.K. fleet proceeds, war fever on both + sides mounts.

+
+ +
+ 76. Editorial Note +

On the morning of April 7, 1982, the National Security Planning Group + (NSPG) met in the White House + Situation Room from 8:34 to 9:15 a.m. to discuss the situation in the + South Atlantic. (Reagan Library, President’s Daily Diary) No memorandum + of conversation of this meeting has been found. President Ronald W. Reagan, who chaired the + meeting, wrote briefly of the meeting in his personal diary: “8:10 A.M. + meeting on So. Atlantic problem then off to Barbados.” (Reagan, Diaries, p. 122) National Security Council (NSC) Staff Member James M. Rentschler also wrote of the + meeting in his own personal diary: “I reported in earlier than usual + [the morning of April 7]—and found myself assigned as notetaker in a + hurriedly-convened NSPG.” (Rentschler, “Falklands Diary,” fo. 151) The meeting was chaired by + Reagan and attended by Vice + President George H.W. Bush, + Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs William P. Clark, Secretary of State + Alexander M. Haig, Jr., + Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger, Permanent + Representative to the United Nations Jeane + Kirkpatrick, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff + General David Jones, and Deputy + Director of Central Intelligence Admiral Bobby Ray Inman.

+

In his memoirs, based upon his personal diary and published after his + death in 2007, Rentschler + provided a detailed—and colorful—account of the April 7 NSPG and its immediate aftermath:

+

“Sit Room, White House, April 7, 1982. The + National Security Planning Group this morning—NSPG being an invention of my new boss, Judge Bill Clark, to finesse the large + numbers of people, not to mention their press leaks, which forever crowd + a formal statutory convening of the full NSC. We’ve got the nation’s core group of top + decisionmakers here, chaired by RAWHIDE [Reagan] himself—a very relaxed + RAWHIDE, sportily attired in blazer and open-neck blue shirt (he’ll move + directly from here to the Caribbean, start of an Easter vacation in + Barbados, home of his longtime Hollywood pal Claudette Colbert). My + government-issue ball-point flies low over the steno pad, filling page + after page from the mouths of crisis-managers:

+

“Judge Clark: The subject is U.S. posture concerning the + Falklands. The main issues, should the U.S. decide to intervene, are why, when, and how. Bobby, let’s have CIA’s latest information.

+

“Adm. Bobby Ray Inman, Deputy DCI: + We see signs of increasing Argentine nervousness. The UK has declared this 200-mile maritime + exclusion zone around the Falklands, and Argentine naval vessels appear + to have backed off from the outer limits. Meanwhile, the Brit load-out + continues, they are dead serious and mobilizing everything they can get + into the water.

+

“Clark: + Does this square with the info your people have, Cap?

+

“Sec. of Defense Cap + Weinberger: Absolutely. And we have a few more + details on the purely military aspects of the British deployment. They + plan to get their subs in first, do as much damage as possible, and then + proceed with a landing. Argentina is putting more troop strength ashore, + but on balance our people believe the Brits have the edge.

+

[The following exchange between Bush and Weinberger refers to an April 6, 1982, ABC–TV report that a U.S. SR–71 reconnaissance plane overflew the + Falklands/Malvinas “before and after the Argentine invasion to gather + intelligence that was shared with Britain.” On April 7, the Department + of Defense issued a statement which described the report as “completely + untrue.” (John M. Goshko, “Reagan Sending Haig to Britain, Argentina,” Washington Post, April 8, + 1982, p. A22.)]

+

“Vice Pres. + George Bush: How + accurate is the ABC report on the + SR–71? The one where the U.S. is + allegedly providing Britain with detailed pictures of Argentine troop + emplacements and ship positions we get from our spy aircraft?

+ +

“Weinberger: Totally untrue. A typical piece of + Soviet disinformation. What’s true is that the Soviets have repositioned + their own satellites and may be supplying Argentina with info on Brit + fleet movements.

+

“Inman: In + fact, a key question mark for us at this juncture remains the Sovs. Are + they getting ready to roil the waters here? We don’t know for sure. This + bears the closest possible watching.

+

“RR [Reagan]: Soviet collusion with + Argentina on a totally illegal invasion? If it came to that, I’d think + we could sink the whole island with a couple of B–52s! (Gen. Davy + Jones, JCS Chairman and Weinberger launch into a long droning rundown on + airfields in the South Atlantic, technical MEGO stuff about runway lengths, cargo-load capacity, + refueling radii, etc. while RR eyes the + door with a how-soon-can-I-get outta here + look).

+

“SecState Haig: The two sides of the crisis shape up like + this: first, we have the UK in a very warlike mood. Mrs. Thatcher recognizes that if this thing + goes sour, her government could fall—Peter + Carrington’s principled resignation as Foreign Secretary + showed the way. At the same time, she is super-sensitive about the 1956 + Suez débâcle—she’s not going to let England be humiliated this time + around. Second, we have an increasingly nervous + Argentina, maybe looking for a way out. The Foreign Minister down there, + Costa Mendez, definitely + wants your help, Mr. President. I think we’ve got a window of 72 hours + here, the time it will take the fleet to steam down the Atlantic. My + suggestion would be for a small team and me to go to London first, test + the waters with Mrs. Thatcher, + then proceed on to Buenos Aires, see if we can talk a bit of sense into + the junta, get them to walk this kitty back. The Brits’ main fear at + this point is that we will make them turn their fleet around, with + nothing to show for it. The 50th Parallel is the trigger.

+

“U.S. Amb. to the U.N. Jeane Kirkpatrick: I am quite concerned about + the Soviet disinformation campaign. Not only the SR–71 falsehood but also the business, + equally false, about Uganda using its rotational seat on the Security + Council to support British war preparations. Mr. President, I have no + doubt whatsoever that this crisis is the gravest foreign policy issue to + face you since you became President. Argentina is an all-important + partner in hemisphere solidarity. We must settle this. We simply cannot + let the UK call the shots.

+

“Inman: I + couldn’t disagree more strongly with Jeane. For hemisphere solidarity we + don’t depend on Argentina—we don’t owe Argentina a thing!

+

“Kirkpatrick: The question is not Argentina—it’s the + entire hemisphere, the viability of the Rio Treaty. The point is, we + have to settle this.

+

“RR: I’d offer + this assessment: I would feel better about Latin America if we retain + the friendship of both parties in this crisis, but it is more important + to us now that the UK not fail.

+ +

“Haig: All + of this confirms what I’ve been feeling: we have a window of opportunity + now. We will have to apply leverage in both capitals. It’ll be a + bruising exercise but we need to do it if war is to be averted. + Argentina is friendly, and we don’t want to alienate its leadership, + whose continuing cooperation against Castro and the Sandinistas in + Central America is essential. The really key point is to secure, + simultaneously, withdrawal of Argentine troops from the Falklands, and + getting the fleet to hold. I’ll go to London first, meet with Mrs. + Thatcher. The UK is an ally, but we need to know their + bottom line. We need to sober both sides up.

+

“Clark: + What we need now first and foremost is clear communication with all + parties.”

+

Switching narrative style, Rentschler continued: “Starting, + maybe, with the Sit Room participants themselves? Monitoring it + all, I nearly missed the morning’s most important message, as did most + of the principals, including RAWHIDE himself during the oddly festive + exit bustle, his ruddy face wreathed in smiling merriment, his spirits + visibly high, while bag-toting aides hustled him toward the South Lawn + where the noise from whup-a-whup rotary blades of his Marine One chopper + loudly whooshed. He couldn’t wait for that + Caribbean idyll to begin! Al + Haig, ruddy-faced himself and radiant with fresh + confidence, barely had time to murmur sotto-voce in the Presidential + ear: ‘Don’t worry Mr. President, we’ll pull this thing off. I’ll take + Dick Walters with me— he’ll + talk to those junta generals in Spanish military slang and scare the + hell out of ’em.’ But the main message, eloquent and compelling, was + behind me in the Sit Room, behind everyone else. It came from CIA’s Deputy Director, Admiral Bobby Ray Inman. I saw him standing + there, slim bespectacled figure, his country boy’s impassioned voice + directed toward the backs of his fellow principals now bumping each + other in their eager rush from the Sit Room:

+

“‘I want to reiterate, as emphatically as I can, my opposition to + Jeane Kirkpatrick’s point of + view, it’s the most wrongheaded thing I have ever heard! I’m here to say + we have no alternative but to back our British allies to the hilt. I’m + not evoking just the historic ties of bloodlines, language, law, + alliance, culture, and tradition, central as these are. I want you to + remember the overwhelming importance of our shared interest in the + strategic stakes, the depth and breadth of our intelligence cooperation, + the whole gamut of global Cold War concerns we have riding on close + interaction with the UK. And I want you + to remember the problems we have with Argentina on the nuclear + non-proliferation front. If we let the Argentines get away with + aggression now using purely conventional stuff, who is to say that in + ten or fifteen years down the road they won’t be tempted to try it again + with nukes?” (Rentschler, A Reason to Get Up, pages 632–637)

+ +

Secretary of Defense Weinberger + also took his own handwritten notes of the April 7 NSPG meeting. In Weinberger’s fragmented account, + Inman began: “Argentina’s + getting nervous. [Argentina’s] airlifting troops—fleet.” The notes + continue:

+

“CWW [Weinberger]: Military + sit[uation]—UK

+

“Al [Haig]: UK very firm & warlike. Argentine + Pres., when RR [Reagan] called, couldn’t call [him] back. Al told them + we wouldn’t get involved[.] [I]f Argentina’s got[,] they would never + compromise sovereignty. Have they called back & asked Al to come to + Buenos Aires. Ready to withdraw forces—cannot [withdraw] admin. + [Argentines] Can’t take return to prior order. Al suggests he go to + London first—& go fast—Argentina’s soft & the stronger the + UK gets its war fever up.

+

“RR: When could British fleet get in? + & we [volunteer?] to air lift detachment for peacekeeping.

+

“RR: Could people [illegible] vote on it + & choose their own government?

+

“Haig: [Joint] admin.—with + neutral overseers. Is [illegible] an arrangement—UK [?] from Argentines. Or + UN Trusteeship or O.A.S.

+

“RR: Must be a solution [illegible] all + them.

+

“Haig: But UK wants to make a show.

+

“Jeane K[irkpatrick]: Soviets are + pumping out disinformation. Latin Americans are lining up behind + Argentina. Vital error—whole hemisphere involved. We can’t let UK [. . .]

+

“Inman: Support British.

+

“CW: Mrs. T [Thatcher] will + fall.

+

“RR: Settle it in a way that doesn’t let + UK fall. That’s [illegible] + Argentines to as them whether this Argentine Gov’t fall.

+

“Al: We can settle it—but will have to bruise[?] both capitals. + Simultaneous action—withdrawal of troops—while UK fleet holds. So Al should go to London first—even + tho[ugh] the UK doesn’t want us to.

+

“J.K. [Kirkpatrick]: Can be settled. But should be before fleet + crosses 50th Parallel & brings Rio Treaty in.

+

“RR: Oil rights could be bargaining chip. + [Illegible]

+

“RR: Will send Haig—will go to London & Buenos + Aires.

+

“RR: UK + will have to understand threat its” [Weinberger’s notes appear to fail to record the + remainder of Reagan’s + statement.]

+

Weinberger’s handwritten notes + are in the Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Weinberger Papers, Appointment and + Diary File, White House and Cabinet Notes Set A, 1981 (1).

+

The White House issued a statement after the meeting announcing that the + President was sending Secretary Haig to London and Buenos Aires “in the interest of assisting both parties in + the search for a peaceful resolution of the dispute in the South + Atlantic.” (Public Papers: Reagan, 1982, Book I, pages + 440–441)

+
+ +
+ 77. Telegram From the Defense Attaché’s Office in the United Kingdom + to the Defense Intelligence AgencySource: Washington National Records Center, OSD Files, FRC 330–84–0003, Argentina + (Jan–15 May) 1982. Confidential; Immediate; Noforn. Sent for information to + USCINCEUR Vaihingen, + USAFE + COIC Ramstein, FICEURLANT, TFC Boerfink, [text not declassified], Department of State, + COMNAVINTCOM, CNO, [text not + declassified], USCINCSO, [text not + declassified], NFOIO, CMC, CINCUSNAVEUR, [text not + declassified], [text not + declassified], and [text not + declassified]. A stamped notation in the upper right-hand + corner indicates that Weinberger saw the telegram on April + 8. + + + London, April 8, 1982, 1354Z + +

N03820. Subj: IR 6.836 0066 82/UK/AR/FA/Senior Royal Navy Views on + Current Falkland Island Issue (U).

+

This is an info report, not finally evaluated intel.

+

1. (U) Ctry: United Kingdom (UK), Falkland Islands (FA), Argentina (AR).

+

2. (U) [less than 1 line not declassified]

+

3. (U) Title: Senior Royal Navy views on current Falkland Island + issue.

+

4. (U) Date of info: 820407.

+

5. (U) Orig: See FM line.

+

6. (U) Req Ref: U–UCR–42080/Continues.

+

7. (U) Source: Chief of Naval Staff.

+

8. (U) Summary: Chief of Naval Staff, Royal Navy, amplifies to [less than 1 line not declassified] the + implications of Defence Secretary Nott announcement in Parliament on 820407 regarding + Falkland Islands exclusion zone.See Document 78 and footnote 2 thereto.

+

9A. (C/Noforn) Details:

+

1. (U) During early evening 820407 orig was called at home by the [less than 1 line not declassified] requesting I + visit town residence of [less than 1 line not + declassified] at 2230 local 820407 to discuss an announcement + to be made in House of Commons that evening. Orig went to the Admiral’s + flat at Admiralty Arch near Trafalgar Square at the appointed time and was escorted into + the living room where [name not declassified] and + orig sat down over a scotch and had a friendly chat.

+

2. (C/Noforn) After a few + pleasantries, [name not declassified] went + directly to the point indicating that Defence Secretary Nott would be summing up the + discussions in the House of Commons within a few minutes and would be + announcing the Falkand exclusion zone declaration. [name not declassified] then went on to quote directly the + words of the declaration, summarized in [less than 1 + line not declassified] added that he was not sure if Nott would indicate that Article 51 of + the UN charterArticle 51 of the Charter of the United Nations + states: “Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent + right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack + occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security + Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace + and security. Measures taken by Members in the exercise of this + right of self-defense shall be immediately reported to the Security + Council and shall not in any way affect the authority and + responsibility of the Security Council under the present Charter to + take at any time such action as it deems necessary in order to + maintain or restore international peace and security.” was + certainly applicable to the declaration; however, he said it was and + would most certainly be evoked.

+

3. (C/Noforn) [name + not declassified] in this one-on-one discussion made it clear + the British Government was taking deliberate and direct military moves + they felt were a totally appropriate response in continuing the + discussion—by now in no way a social chat, [name not + declassified] did his part in sending the signal to the US that the British intend to take whatever + steps were necessary to protect the rights of the crown. [name not declassified] chose his words carefully, + speaking as he does in direct terms, conveying a seriousness to the + situation he obviously considered necessary to express.

+

4. (C/Noforn) [name + not declassified] returning to the exclusion zone declaration + spoke the obvious in stressing the probability of sinking Argentine + ships which could result from the declaration. He stressed there would + be no hesitancy on the British part to enforce the exclusion zone.

+

5. (C/Noforn) [name + not declassified] shifted to the American role, acknowledging + Secretary of State Haig’s + impending arrival in London. Carefully selecting his words, he evoked + the long-term ties between the US/UK. Emphasizing what some in the + UK sense as fence-strattling by the + US. (He described the sense as + having one foot firmly planted on one side and on the other the foot a + little off the ground.) [name not declassified] + as too gracious to even suggest he shared this opinion, but the point + was made.

+

9B. (C/Noforn) Orig comments: Admiral + [name not declassified] looked + rested—although the hours he has been keeping have clearly kept him on + the run. His message was totally clear but issued in a quiet, direct tone. Certainly, the + assembled force under full combat orders are mounted up, ready to go + into a hostile situation, and confident of success, this notwithstanding + they were forced to move out more quickly than might be desired.

+

(1) (C/Noforn) Implied in [name not declassified] message and picked up + again between the lines in recent days within the Ministry of Defence is + a feeling that America perhaps does not think the British will initiate + direct military action. [less than 1 line not + declassified] point in having this one-on-one was to relay the + serious intentions the UK has to use + force if diplomacy doesn’t work. The UK + appears willing to accept long-term economic difficulties associated + with a hostile confrontation, especially if it drags out over weeks.

+

(2) (C/Noforn) [name not declassified] certainly expressed the hope that + diplomacy would work.

+

[Omitted here is dissemination information.]

+
+ +
+ 78. Message From British Foreign Secretary Pym to Secretary of State HaigSource: + Department of State, Executive Secretariat, Files of Alexander M. Haig, Jr., 1981–1982, + Lot 82D370, (3) Falklands Crisis—1982. Confidential. Henderson sent the message to + Haig under an April 7 + covering note. A notation on the covering note, in an unknown hand, + states that the message was received in S at 4:30 p.m., April + 7. + + + London, April 7, + 1982 + +

Begins:

+

Dear Al,

+

I wanted you to know that John + Nott, in his winding up speech in today’s debate on the + Falklands in the House of Commons, will announce the establishment of a + Maritime Exclusion Zone around the Falkland Islands from 0400 on Monday + 12 April.

+

I am asking Nicko Henderson to + pass you the text of this announcement with this message,The text of Nott’s statement to the House of Commons is attached + but not printed. and I look forward to explaining the + background to you when we meet tomorrow.

+

Yours ever,

+

FrancisPrinted from a + copy that bears this typed signature.

+

Ends.

+
+ +
+ + 79. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Kingdom to the Embassy in + ArgentinaSource: + Department of State, Executive Secretariat, Files of Alexander M. Haig, Jr., 1981–1982, + Lot 82D370, No folder. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. A stamped notation indicates the telegram was + received in the Department at 4:36 p.m. Haig arrived in London April 8. + + + London, April 9, 1982, 1740Z + +

7889. For Goldberg from Streator. USDel Secretary. Subject: + Memcon: Secretary’s Meeting With + Foreign Secretary Pym April 8: + Falkland Island Crisis.

+

1. Secret–Entire text.

+

2. Secretary met at 5 p.m. April 8 at the Commonwealth and Foreign Office + with Foreign Secretary Francis + Pym to discuss the Falkland Island crisis. Also present + were Brian Fall, Private + Secretary to the Foreign Secretary, and U.S. Charge Streator.

+

3. After the Secretary had congratulated Pym on his appointment and Pym had welcomed the Secretary, the latter said it goes + without saying that he was in London as a friend; there is no other + conception, he said, in the President’s mind. Starting his trip in + London was a way to demonstrate that. He then would travel to Buenos + Aires to demonstrate the consequences to the Argentines of failure to + resolve the problem. He assured Pym that there would be no repeat of Suez.

+

4. Continuing, the Secretary said we’ve looked at some possibilities for + dealing with the Falklands problem but he thought it best to reserve + discussion of them for the Prime Minister. Clearly, he said, withdrawal + of security forces is the core problem; we needed to see how that can be + achieved. At present, there is a window of opportunity; the situation + will become more complex as time passes. The degree of Argentine macho + already is unprecedented; it might become greater if Galtieri falls.

+

5. Pym said the Falklands had been + under discussion for 15 years. Recently, both sides had met in New + York.See footnote + 3, Document 2. The British had known nothing until + early last week that even suggested the event that occurred last + Friday.April 2. It had shocked + the nation; the fundamental question was whether we should have had + forces there. The emergency debate last SaturdayApril 3. See footnote 2, + Document 58. had led to an expression of national + unanimity and strong criticism that the problem had arisen in the first + place. After the weekend the decision was taken to move militarily. He + said no mistake had been made, + but the signs had not been read right and Carrington had done the honorable thing and left.See footnote 2, Document + 61. He had been strongly criticized by the + parliamentary party. The immediate reaction was one of anger and the + fleet was dispatched without knowing what it would do. Pym expressed gratitude for the U.S. + position at the UN and said they were + approaching the Commonwealth countries to put pressure on the + Argentines. The hope was to use the window before the arrival of the + fleet to put maximum pressure on the Argentines to force them to + withdraw. British objectives were well defined in the UN resolution.See footnote 3, Document 50. + British sovereignty existed in the Islands, the Argentines have annexed + them and they must be withdrawn. After that, the issues of what to do + next and what the Islanders want can be addressed.

+

6. Pym said the government’s + “recovery program” was going well, as reflected in this week’s debate in + Parliament in which the opposition had not done well. “We don’t look + wobbly,” he said. Authority has been returned. Among backbenchers there + is less emotion. The feeling in the country is that we cannot let the + Argentines get away with it. Throughout Central America and elsewhere + the unravelling would be significant if Argentina were to succeed. All + would prefer to achieve withdrawal without shots and for that reason + maximum pressure must be applied to the Argentines. What the U.S. does + there is decisive. Whether it can be done in the time available is the + question. In any case, Britain is more stable and will be proceeding + more calmly in the days ahead.

+

7. The Secretary said he believed that the window was not as long as the + two weeks before the fleet’s arrival. While not departing from the + premise of withdrawal—and indeed that was the essence of any temporary + solution—the issue was how to accomplish withdrawal without doing + violence to the U.K. principles and the work on the longer term issues. + Withdrawal was most important. Extensive analysis suggested that the + government in Buenos Aires now is in the softest position they will be + in. There is some dissent in the military structure.

+

8. The Secretary noted that the U.S. was caught more by surprise than the + British; our people, he said, had not picked up the indicators, except + for the submarine reconnaissance. He was not certain whether it was an + intelligence failure or a consequence of varying sensitivities. Within + hours, though, he had all the material Ambassador Henderson had, integrated it into our + material and notified the President. The Secretary said he had sent + strong messages that the Argentine Foreign Minister had fended off and + that Galtieri had deferred in + receiving the President’s + call.See footnote + 2, Document 39. The Foreign Minister had said it + was too late to meet U.S. demands. At that point, they were extremely + rigid and totally confident that they would get away with it. On their + side were distance, time, surprise, and they had been preparing for + months. They could not have done it without bloodshed without having + worked for months. The reactions in the U.K. shocked the Argentines, as + had those at the United Nations; they are now more divided and their + internal problems are mounting. The real difficulty is that after the + fleet reaches the fiftieth parallel the Argentines will go to the OAS. While most Latin Americans are + outraged by Argentina’s action, on the other hand they will be driven to + Third World demeanor. The Secretary said he had told Henderson that the OAS meant trouble when Henderson had said the British hoped + to have support in that body. In some respects, the Secretary wished the + British had not announced a blockade, for that affronts Argentine + machismo, but on the other hand it keeps the pressure on.

+

9. It is necessary, the Secretary said, to work for a solution that + avoids confirming Argentina’s cowardice; it must be face-saving. While + the U.K. is impelled by logic and principle, Argentina moves by + macho.

+

The Secretary said he thought the window was 72 hours. He believed + genuinely, he said, that if we don’t seize the window, the chances of + avoiding bloodshed are dim. Meanwhile, the greater the U.K. investment + in the situation the more difficult it will be to deal with in political + terms. Pym said he feared that + the situation might turn out to be prolonged: more complicated and + involving more investment. The Secretary said our desire was to keep the + U.K. Government viable. It has always supported US during fifteen months in office.

+

10. The Secretary said he sought a convergence of view on the criticality + of timing. The problem will become more difficult thereafter because of + the OAS and the Soviets. The vote in + the UN shook Argentina; they thought the + Soviets would veto. The Argentine Foreign Minister said that two options + were now open: the OAS where they + expect success; and the Soviet option. The Soviet option entails + analyzing the implications of pursuing the military alternative. The + Secretary thought the Argentines would put the fleet in harbor and that + the U.K. would face a land-based air problem. Moreover, the Argentines + would put the Falklands in a cocoon. The Soviets might offer to fill the + gap created by lost fleet assets. Moreover, if possibilities for a + political solution are allowed to pass, the U.S. and U.K. press will + start to turn.

+

11. The Secretary continued that the noise out of Buenos Aires is + reasonable; for example, they said they were studying the UN resolution. It will be important to use the 72 hours + available in a reasonable way. The Secretary noted that the U.S. had + avoided “high profile tilts”; but in reality nothing has been done + except to tilt toward Britain. He said we are not sending military + equipment, we are working on the problem of existing contracts, and + doing anything else we can to help. Pym noted that American influence in Argentina is very + great. The Secretary said that Argentine self-confidence had been + enhanced by collaboration with us in Central America. We cannot let the + Argentines believe that this gives them a special dispensation. The + issue may be more time-sensitive than the British believe. While it may + seem better to let pressure build, he said, it also seemed to him that + the U.K. was at a break-point. Perhaps it will become more difficult for + Britain as opposition increases and it may be necessary to go to war to + protect the principle. He hoped to leave Britain with a sense of what + might be possible. He told the Argentines he would not go to Argentina + if he were faced with a priori demands on sovereignty and the Argentines + said, “come ahead.”

+

12. Pym said that the Prime + Minister feels very strongly about withdrawal because it presents a + formidable political problem. It was very damaging to have Carrington leave. The rebuilding + began in the debate yesterday. Thatcher was splendid throughout and it was a good day. + He said the Secretary could expect her to take a strong line; but + Pym noted that he had been + saying all along that a peaceful solution is needed.

+

13. The Secretary pointed out that he was prepared to remain for + discussions the following day if that would be useful.

+

14. The core area of the problem, the Secretary said, involves + sovereignty and self-determination. He hoped to deal with those issues + with the Prime Minister.

+

15. Pym raised the meeting of the + Air Chiefs of Staff in Buenos Aires on April 13. He noted General + Allen was to attend.Haig + approved Allen’s attendance + on April 5. See Document 62. + Haig said it was the U.S. view + that the meeting should go ahead because it was to address Hemispheric + problems. If the U.S. were not there, chances of mischievous discussion + of the Falklands issue are great. The other options were to cancel or + downgrade the meeting. However if the meeting went ahead it was best to + use the highest level with an authoritative voice.

+

16. Pym suggested the possibility + of postponement and the Secretary said he would be very comfortable with + that.

+ +

17. Pym said he felt that public + opinion in the U.K. could get the wrong impression if the meeting were + held. The Secretary concluded that he was prepared to postpone.

+

18. Returning to the Falklands issue, the Secretary said that if he got + an agreement in principle with time certain for the Argentines to + withdraw it was clear they must have something in return, but not a + return to the status quo ante. He said he conceived the possibility of + moving in an impartial authority, perhaps comprising representatives of + the U.S. and Canada as two who are acceptable to the parties, together + possibly with British and Argentine representatives, to guarantee the + rights and interests of the population. Such a mechanism might be + involved in dealing with the longer term problem. In that connection, he + saw value in avoiding language on sovereignty and self-determination + early in the debate and achieving a perception that over time would be + negotiated in conformity with the principles of the UN Charter. This could be enough to elicit + a commitment to withdraw coming first from Argentina. Meanwhile the + British would hold the fleet in readiness and be seen doing that. The + Secretary saw a need to work out language that meets British needs for + definition of principles.

+

19. Pym said the plan seemed to + have possibilities. However, he said the Secretary would need to + persevere with the Prime Minister. For his part, Pym liked the reference to UN principles. If the Prime Minister didn’t + agree at first, the Secretary should persevere.

+

20. The Secretary said he thought it would be necessary to deal first + with the issue of withdrawal and its conditions, then with the issue of + administration and finally with the issue of negotiations and the basis + on which they would begin. He saw a need to balance the requirements of + self-determination and sovereignty.

+

21. In conclusion, Pym thanked the + Secretary for the information received from the U.S. intelligence and + services.

+ + Streator + +
+ +
+ + 80. Telegram From Secretary of State Haig to the Department of StateSource: Department of State, Central + Foreign Policy File, [no film number]. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Sent for information + Immediate to London. + + + London, April 13, 1982, 0929Z + +

Secto 5078. For S/S–Bremer only. Secretary’s Meeting With Prime Minister + Thatcher April 8: Falkland + Islands Crisis. Ref: London 7892.In telegram + 7892 from London, April 10, the Embassy transmitted to Buenos Aires + an earlier, uncleared version of the April 8 memorandum of + conversation. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, + N820003–0387)

+

Following is cleared memcon of Secretary’s April 8 meeting which replaces + draft contained in London 7892.

+

1. Secret–Entire text.

+

2. The Secretary began by meeting at 6:00 p.m. April 8 at No. 10 Downing + Street with Prime Minister Thatcher to discuss the Falkland Islands crisis. Also + present were Foreign Secretary Francis + Pym, Private Secretary John + Coles and U.S. Charge Edward + Streator.

+

3. The Prime Minister welcomed the Secretary and thanked him for the + April 7 message she had received.Not + found.

+

4. She said the U.K. had been having good talks with Argentina and was + extremely surprised by the actions of that government. No one had + anticipated them. After the Secretary said that the U.S., too, was + surprised, the Prime Minister said Carrington had been in Israel and thus out of touch. The + only hope of stopping the Argentines was through President Reagan’s good offices. She was most + grateful for his action. The mood in Britain was very deeply felt, she + said, because our sovereign territory was involved and we were unable to + defend it. The discussion in Parliament was the most difficult she had + seen in 25 years. A majority felt Britain had been humiliated and had + betrayed the people of the Falklands. The debate left no doubt about the + depth of feeling in the country. As she informed President Reagan,See + Document 68. she had dispatched + submarines, put the fleet on alert and announced it would sail. The + debate yesterday had been sombre, but the government had full support. + Moreover, hope had been expressed that the situation could be resolved + by diplomatic means. There is total determination among the British to + use military strength if needed. John + Nott’s speechSee Document 78. had been good and + Britain had not put a foot wrong in international law.

+ +

5. The Prime Minister continued that she had been heartened by the + support from elsewhere. Mitterand had telephoned and agreed to get + support from Togo and Zaire. The King of Jordan had supported Britain in + the UN as well. Schmidt had called to express his + support, and had said that unprovoked aggression if not turned back + could lead to problems everywhere there are border disputes. Unless we + stop the Argentines from succeeding, we are all vulnerable. Muldoon of New Zealand and Fraser of Australia also had expressed + support and Fraser had cut off + Argentine trade.

+

6. The Prime Minister recalled the lengthy negotiations with Argentina + that had been held on the basis that no negotiations could take place + unless it was with the agreement of the Islanders and no scheme would be + put forward that was unacceptable to the Islanders.

+

7. The Prime Minister made clear her view that it was impossible to be + neutral in the face of unprovoked aggression. In reviewing the bidding, + she said the fleet was en route, an exclusion zone has been established, + yet Britain hopes for a diplomatic solution. However, there could be no + negotiations unless Argentina leaves the Islands. Unprovoked aggression + does not change legal status. She said Britain sought to restore British + administration to the Falklands and cannot negotiate under duress and + without the participation of the Islanders. She noted that concern had + been stirred by statements from Washington about not taking sides. These + were off the cuff and not carefully conceived remarks. At the same time, + she expressed appreciation for U.S. cooperation in intelligence matters + and in the use of Ascension Island.

+

8. The Secretary said that he was certain the Prime Minister knew where + the President stood. We are not impartial. Certainly we were not + impartial on the UN resolution and the + President was not impartial in his telephone call to Galtieri.See Document 41. He said he did not + need to elaborate President Reagan’s feelings towards the Prime Minister. The + special friendship of the Prime Minister over fifteen months was deeply + appreciated; there is no issue on which the Prime Minister had not + backed the U.S.

+

9. The Secretary said that we face a critical common problem: “We must do + all we can to strengthen you and your government.”

+

10. Having analyzed the situation very carefully, the Secretary said he + thought there had been an intelligence failure. The only information + available was about submarine reconnaissance by the Argentines. When + Henderson had provided + sensitive intelligence, the Secretary had concluded that there had been + a failure of concentration rather than management. The Secretary also + said that delays had been manipulated in Buenos Aires. For example, the Argentines had stonewalled on + the issue of sovereignty. Moreover, the President had been kept waiting + when he telephoned to speak to Galtieri. When the President was able to get in touch + with the President of Argentina, Galtieri used the same talking points earlier used by + the GOA with our Ambassador to + Argentina.See Document 37. In the Secretary’s view the GOA operation had been planned for + months.

+

11. The Secretary said we were watching the Argentine situation closely. + The Argentines had been arrogantly confident that the U.K. would not be + able to challenge the invasion and thus they were not deterred. The + Secretary also observed that the Soviets were beginning to position + themselves for mischief. At the same time, he said that the incumbent + President of Argentina is in some jeopardy and would be followed by + someone more intransigent if a change of government occurred in + Argentina as a result of this crisis. The Argentine Foreign Minister had + told the Secretary that everything was negotiable.For a summary of Haig’s April 6 meeting with Costa Mendez, see Document 73. The Secretary had + responded that he would not go to Buenos Aires if he were going to be + told the same things as previously. The Argentine Foreign Minister had + made it clear he wanted the Secretary to come. The Secretary said we + would not accept a change in status quo by force. The Secretary + continued, we have a window now, we believe. When the British fleet + reaches the 50th parallel it will become an emotional issue in both U.K. + and ArgentinaOn April 8, Shlaudeman reported that “feelings + are running high” in the Argentine Navy and that the Embassy was + “getting ultra-tough sounds” from it, “including statements that the + Secretary should not come here because all he will be doing is + carrying the campaign of pressure and disinformation.” (Telegram + 2103 from Buenos Aires, April 8; Reagan Library, Executive + Secretariat, NSC Country File, + Latin America/Central, Argentina (04/06/1982–04/10/1982)) and + progress thereafter will be difficult. Similarly, the OAS, with its Third World problems, will + not be objective when it meets and ultimately will form an + anti-colonialist consensus. The Secretary recalled that the Argentine + Foreign Minister had said he had two options: the OAS and the Soviet Union, and would use + them. While he didn’t want to overdramatize, the Argentines would be + strengthened in their macho by the OAS. + Even in the U.K. he said, the situation will become more difficult with + heavy expenditures of resources.

+

12. The Secretary said he viewed the next 72 hours as very important in + Argentina. While we need to demand withdrawal and achieve it, we need to + do it by Monday (4/12/82). London was chosen to visit first because the + British are our closest friends and allies and we wished to start + discussions with them; it was pointless to go to Buenos Aires first and listen to macho + rhetoric without a fundamental feel for Britain’s limits. And the + Secretary said he wanted to be able to say how strong U.S. views are. He + hoped to be able to force a withdrawal. He added, “We agree with what + you are doing, although we want to avoid a war.”

+

13. The Prime Minister said that the current effort was “more important + than us.” “We are rolling back the tide of socialism,” she said. + Moreover our success will be important to France, Latin America and the + Caribbean. She recalled that Britain had had experience with appeasement + and notions of “peace with honor.” It comes to a point, she said, where + one cannot compromise. She opined that the Soviets were afraid of the + U.S. getting involved as it is. In her view, the Soviets are stretched + and it would surprise her if they got involved.

+

14. The Secretary said that he did not fear a major U.S. involvement, but + if the British carried out a military action he could envisage Soviet + military involvement. He foresaw that the British could succeed in + military terms in a limited way. However, the Argentines would go into + port and land-based air would become a problem. The Prime Minister said + that her government was correct and law-abiding and needed to give + timely notice on the exclusion zone. She recalled that the whole + Argentine effort was minutely planned down to getting the names of all + the British marines. She recalled that the Argentines knew the names of + the five missing marines. Doubtless the 20 Argentines on the island were + involved. It was amazing there had been no intelligence on their + activities. The Argentine commander on the Island had said the U.K. will + do nothing. We had tried to negotiate in a civilized way. Clearly, there + was a difference of view between the politicians and the military in + Argentina. However, we were looking at constructive proposals in our + negotiations in New York which were friendly. Pym suggested that the Argentines had + been carried away in a macho way. Galtieri had taken care of his predecessor, but + apparently he was less tough than the navy chiefs.

+

15. The Secretary asked what pressures Britain could bring to bear, + noting that Europe knows that the reputation of the West is at stake. + The U.S. had stopped military exports. The Prime Minister responded that + the Argentines can feed themselves; however, they have no credit + worthiness left. It will be difficult for them to borrow more on the + Euro dollar market. They miscalculated in her view and she said she + wanted to solve the problem by democratic means. To date Britain was + getting a lot of help because most realized that the West is on + trial.

+

16. In response to the Prime Minister’s questions about Galtieri, the Secretary said he is + reputed to be a religious man and something of a drinker. He had a + reputation as well for being a “tough guy” and a poker player. That is + why there may be a window now. He will up the ante if forced and he will continue the + struggle even if he won’t survive. His fleet can be damaged severely and + the Islands put in a cocoon. But landing on the big Island would be very + costly and it will put the population in jeopardy. In the final analysis + once engagement starts it will become an increasingly difficult burden + to protect principle. People will begin to ask questions like why they + are making such a sacrifice for a thousand sheep herders. U.S. opinion + now supports the principled position Britain has taken but we cannot be + sure it will last too long if the issue is not settled.

+

17. The Prime Minister said there is no border in the Falklands; the + situation is more like Malaysia than Vietnam.

+

18. The Secretary said he wanted to find some approach that protected + principle and achieved a success before there is a backlash. The + Thatcher government had to + be strengthened and if so, we will all come out better. The Prime + Minister emphasized that this could happen after withdrawal of Argentine + forces from the Islands. She noted that the Islands are short of water, + cold, and that there is nothing but sheep to eat. The Secretary said the + hope was to work for withdrawal in such a way that Galtieri is not toppled and replaced + by someone more rigid. He emphasized withdrawal of military and security + related forces; to get that step he thought the Argentines need to be + convinced that they are not losing face in the process. At the same + time, there must be a victory for principle. The Prime Minister thought + these approaches contradictory.

+

19. The Secretary outlined a three-step approach involving withdrawal of + forces, restoration of administration and negotiations on next steps. + The topic of sovereignty would arise. The Prime Minister emphasized that + the U.K. is the sovereign, the people were free before and clearly gave + allegiance to the crown under law. The Secretary saw the need to avoid a + priori judgements; it was necessary to go back to negotiations. The + Prime Minister said this was very dangerous ground with public opinion. + British administration must be restored: we cannot agree that a dictator + can change that by force. Britain negotiated politely. The Argentines to + the British are neo-imperialists. Forces must be withdrawn and pressure + must be applied to that end. After withdrawal we could take up where we + left off. The Secretary said that if Britain went that route, force will + be required and there will be war. The Prime Minister replied that it + will be a great tragedy if force is required. Britain is worried about + its people there.

+

20. The Secretary said that if in the future freedom of choice can be + assured and if the forces are withdrawn as a first step and if change in + local authority is brought about immediately some progress might be + possible. The Prime Minister said she would not negotiate under duress. + She was unable even to have access to the Falklanders now. She was pledged to the House of + Commons, as are Foreign Secretary Pym and Minister of Defence John Nott. The Secretary said he was not suggesting + negotiating under duress. He had in mind the return of the British + presence. In addition he envisaged a U.S. and Canadian presence. The + Prime Minister said she was pledged to restore British administration + and to effective restoration of sovereignty. She believed the + Secretary’s proposal violated these principles. The Secretary said he + saw withdrawal of the Argentine forces and the subsequent application of + a temporary arrangement. Thatcher insisted the people have a right to stay on the + Islands. The Secretary replied that was what he was seeking to achieve + in conformity with the UN Charter. The + Prime Minister said rights under the UN + Charter were removed by force. She indicated the Secretary was + suggesting the Argentines get by force what they failed to get before. + The Secretary said his intention was to achieve withdrawal of the force, + restoration of an administration that could guarantee the freedom of the + people while negotiations go on. The Prime Minister said the people had + everything they wanted before. She sought withdrawal and restoration of + British administration—which merged with sovereignty. Then there could + be negotiations. As a guardian of the Islanders’ rights, she cannot put + up something these people turned down, she said. Pym said preserving the right of + self-determination was involved. The Secretary said one must find a way + on the issue of administration. If we insist on withdrawal and go back + to the status quo ante the consequences will be conflict. The Prime + Minister said that this approach would mean the Venezuelans can go into + Guyana, the Soviets into Berlin and the Argentines into Chile. Is that + the message we want to give the world, she asked. The Secretary said + principles would be preserved; but the only way to get the problem + turned around in the short term is to achieve an interim arrangement on + authority in the Island.

+

21. Pym asked if the Secretary + envisaged a return to U.K. administration and the Prime Minister said + that issue could not be put in jeopardy. She added that she needed to + demonstrate that she was not operating under duress at the interim + stage. The Secretary recalled that the process previously underway + included proposals for leasing that would have been a direct concession + of sovereignty. The Prime Minister recalled that leasing had never been + proposed to the Argentines. The Secretary said that it had been widely + discussed and all were aware of it. The Secretary asked what happened if + we don’t find a solution and conflict develops. The Prime Minister said + it had developed and was initiated by the Argentines. The first + principle of America, she said, is the right to use force to recover + your own home. Once British administration is restored of course Britain + will negotiate. The Argentines flouted every canon of law. Our friends + agree. She did not want a shot + to be fired. But she could not tolerate their getting by force what they + failed to get otherwise.

+

22. The meeting adjourned for dinner.For a + record of the April 8 dinner meeting between Haig and Thatcher, see Document 81.

+ + Haig + +
+ +
+ 81. Telegram From Secretary of State Haig to the Department of StateSource: Reagan Library, Executive + Secretariat, NSC Cable File, + Falkland File 04/11/1982 (1). Secret; Immediate; Nodis. The telegram was sent after + Haig left London for + Buenos Aires, where he arrived on April 9. + + + Buenos Aires, April 11, 1982, + 0425Z + +

Secto 5038. Subject: Secretary’s + Working Dinner With Prime Minister Thatcher, April 8.

+

1. Summary. During an extended working dinner discussion April 8 in + Number Ten, the Secretary and senior members of his party explored with + Prime Minister Thatcher the + possibilities of a peaceful settlement between the UK and Argentina of the South Atlantic + crisis. The PM, strongly seconded by + Defense Minister Nott and less so + by Foreign Secretary Pym, + asserted UK determination to achieve the + status quo ante. The Secretary suggested a possible course which might + ensure essentials of British position (withdrawal of Argentine forces + from the Falkland, restoration of British administration) while leaving + Argentina a face-saving way out via interim arrangement involving + internationally recognized presence. PM + indicated little willingness or give in UK position but expressed deep appreciation for U.S. + initiative and interest in further views Secretary might develop during + discussions with Argentine leadership in Buenos Aires. Accompanying the + Secretary on the U.S. side were: Assistant Secretary of State for + American Republic Affairs Thomas + Enders; Ambassador-at-Large + Vernon Walters; Deputy to + the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs David Gompert; NSC Senior Staff Member James Rentschler; Embassy London + Charge d’Affaires Edward Streator. Joining Mrs. + Thatcher were: Foreign + Secretary Francis Pym; Defense + Minister John Nott; Chief of + Military Staff Terri Lewins; + Director of Foreign Office Sir Antony + Acland; Private Secretary to Prime Minister Clive Whittemore. End summary.

+

2. In an extensive dinner discussion April 8 which centered on the crisis + in the South Atlantic, Prime Minister Thatcher asserted that the basis of British action was + compliance with UNSC Resolution + 502.See footnote + 3, Document 50. This meant that Argentina must + withdraw its forces and that British administration of the Falkland + Islands must be restored. British sovereignty continues by international + law.

+

3. Secretary Haig stated that the + U.S. saw the situation pretty much the same way as the British. Where + the two of us might differ, he suggested, was in our view that it may be + desirable to change somewhat the approach to the problem, but not the + basic principle. The Secretary went on to emphasize that he was in + London to help the British, that we desired above all the maintenance of + the present British Government in power, and that we were fully + sensitive to the depth of British feeling which surrounds the Falklands + issue. Nevertheless, he added, the UK + and the U.S. now faced a common danger: it would be very bad if we put + ourselves in a position where our publics perceived us to have failed to + grasp a possible political opportunity to avert armed conflict. The + Secretary noted that we agree a political settlement must involve the + withdrawal of Argentine forces, the return of British administration, + and a mechanism for the resumption of negotiations on the future of the + Islands; nevertheless, it was unlikely that either side could get the + totality of what it wants, and what we would like to assist in finding + is some vehicle which would enable the British to preserve the + essentials of its position while leaving a way out for the Argentines, + who now probably recognize the enormity of the risk they have taken.

+

4. In reply the Prime Minister forcefully observed that she, the Foreign + Secretary, and the Defense Minister were all pledged before the House of + Commons to restore British administration in the Falklands. Sovereignty + was not the issue, because British sovereignty was a fact—it continues + no matter what the Argentines did.

+

5. The Secretary suggested that a useful approach to a diplomatic + solution might be to fence off the questions of sovereignty and + self-determination, to leave them aside for the time being. Meanwhile, + one could proceed with a possible scenario where the basic premise is + withdrawal of Argentine forces. The Secretary added that he could then + go on to Buenos Aires and speak to the leadership there in the context + of Britain’s basic requirements, but for this to happen he would have to have a bit of air, + something which would enable the Argentines to act without risking the + survival of their regime.

+

6. The Prime Minister interjected to say that at this same table Neville + Chamberlain had sat in 1938. She begged us, she said, to remember that + fact and not urge Britain to acquiesce in a course which would simply + reward aggression, which would give Argentina something by force which + it could not have gained by peaceful means, and which would send a + signal around the world with devastating consequences. Britain, she + added, could not be considered on the same level as Argentina. The + latter was the aggressor. She had not sent a fleet into the South + Atlantic to strike a bargain with an aggressor.

+

7. Defense Minister Nott said he + for one was not convinced that the British military position was weaker + than Argentina’s. He expressed confidence in the fleet’s ability to + sustain operations over a protracted period of time and, in conjunction + with economic measures, to inflict considerable hardship on the + Argentines. It was they, not Britain, which had to initiate moves toward + a diplomatic solution.

+

8. Foreign Secretary Pym, less + assertive than either the PM or + Nott throughout the + discussions, felt that it was relevant to find out how the Falklanders + themselves felt about the prospect of war—a suggestion which the PM heatedly challenged, noting that + aggressors classically tried to intimidate the people against whom they + were aggressing by saying that things far worse than the aggression + itself could happen.

+

9. Both sides then discussed at length the possible ingredients of a + diplomatic solution. The Secretary reiterated what he felt might be a + promising approach, which involved an interim arrangement whereby an + internationally recognized “umbrella”, perhaps composed of U.S. and + Canadian elements, plus two Latins, could prevent war, oversee the + withdrawal of Argentine forces, and ensure conditions of + self-determination.

+

10. The Prime Minister questioned the notion of an international presence + as too “woolly”—the House of Commons would never accept it, she said, + because she was pledged to the restoration of British administration, + which meant the courts, public services, etc. No vague international + presence could substitute for that essential authority. She added that + her fear was that what we were really talking about was negotiations + under conditions of duress, which would be a terrible insult to Britain. + It was her view, she concluded, that Argentina would never accept in any + event the self-determination of the Falklanders, all of whom wanted to + remain British.

+

11. The Secretary assured the Prime Minister that the U.S. had no + intention of forcing the UK to negotiate + under duress. Nothing could be further from the truth. The U.S. stood by + the UK, we were allied, we had already + shown we were not treating the UK and + Argentina as equals through our + vote on UNSC 502. We were here to + help, and while we felt that the suggestion we put forward was worth + reflecting on—withdrawal of Argentine forces, the temporary introduction + of an internationally recognized authority to supervise and verify it, + and a resumption of negotiations—all we could do now was continue on to + Buenos Aires and probe the Argentines. We would be sure to carry with us + the message of British unity and resolve and convey to them the strength + of feeling which exists over the Falklands dispute. The Secretary went + on to say that in all frankness he felt the British should be fully + aware of the many factors at play in the present crisis, including the + substantial interests we have in the hemisphere and the potential for + Soviet exploitation of the crisis.

+

12. The Prime Minister thanked the Secretary and his party and said that + only true friends could discuss such an issue with the candor and + feeling which had characterized this dinner exchange, she laughingly + concluded by noting that “we’re nice to other people”.

+ + Haig + +
+ +
+ 82. Telegram From Secretary of State Haig to the Department of StateSource: Reagan Library, Executive + Secretariat, NSC Country File, + Latin America/Central, Falklands War [Cables 090131, 091000, 091154, + 091640, 181715, 191650, 191754, 192115]. Top Secret; Flash; Nodis. Printed from a copy that was + received in the White House Situation Room. A stamped notation in + the upper right-hand corner of the telegram indicates that Clark saw it. + + + London, April 9, 1982, 0131Z + +

Secto 5010. Dept pass Bridgetown Flash. For the President from the + Secretary. Subject: Memo to the President: Discussions in London.In a telegram to McFarlane, which was also seen by Clark, sent April 9, Rentschler wrote of Haig’s report: “You should know + that his views accurately summarize the mood and mind-set of HMG at this critical point in the + South Atlantic caper and delineate our rather limited room for + maneuver on the Buenos Aires leg (whither we are now bound.) I + believe the substance of that report should be shared with Roger Fontaine and Dennis + Blair, since it will + undoubtedly condition our next immediate steps. However the present + situation turns out, it will clearly be a ‘close-run thing’—in fact + Mrs. Thatcher herself may + have recognized when she pointedly showed us portraits in Number 10 + not only of Nelson but also Wellington.” (Telegram Secto 5017 to the White House, April + 9; ibid.)

+

1. (Top Secret–Entire text).

+

2. I spent five hours with Prime Minister Thatcher, the first hour with her and the Foreign + Secretary, Pym, alone, followed + by a working dinner which + included the Defense Minister, Nott, and senior officials.See Documents 80 and 81. Before meeting with her, I spent an hour alone + with Pym.See Document 79.

+

3. The Prime Minister has the bit in her teeth, owing to the politics of + a unified nation and an angry Parliament, as well as her own convictions + about the principles at stake. She is clearly prepared to use force, + though she admits a preference for a diplomatic solution. She is rigid + in her insistence on a return to the status quo ante, and indeed + seemingly determined that any solution involve some retribution.

+

4. Her Defense Secretary is squarely behind her, though less ideological + than she. He is confident of military success, based not on a strategy + of landing on the Islands but rather by a blockade which, he believes, + will eventually make the Argentine presence untenable. Thus, the + prospect of imminent hostilities appears less acute—if the Argentines + keep their distance—though this does not fundamentally diminish the + gravity and urgency of the crisis.

+

5. Her Foreign Secretary does not share her position, and went + surprisingly far in showing this in her presence. Whether this means he + will have a restraining influence or instead that there will be a + problem within the government is impossible to say.

+

6. The British tried to avoid the question of the long-term consequences + of using force, though they are concerned and, I believe, our + discussions sobered them further. They agree with our assessment that + the next 72 hours, before the fleet arrives, is crucial.

+

7. The Prime Minister is convinced she will fall if she concedes on any + of three basic points, to which she is committed to Parliament:

+

A. Immediate withdrawal of Argentine forces;

+

B. Restoration of British administration on the Islands;

+

C. Preservation of their position that the Islanders must be able to + exercise self-determination.

+

8. We focussed on three elements of a solution, which I argued would meet + her needs:

+

A. Withdrawal of Argentine forces;

+

B. An interim arrangement involving an international presence (e.g., + US, Canada, and two Latin American + countries) to provide an umbrella for the restoration of British + administration;

+

C. Swift resumption of negotiations.

+

9. The main problems were with point B. She wants nothing that would + impinge on British authority; she wants the British Governor back;Immediately after the invasion on April 2, Argentina appointed + Brigadier General Mario Benjamin + Menéndez as Governor of the Islands. The British + Governor and the British Marines were captured and taken to the + British Embassy in Montevideo. and she bridled at the thought + of any Argentine non-military presence even under an international + umbrella. She does not insist that British sovereignty be accepted—she + is finessing this by saying that British sovereignty is simply a fact + that has not been affected by aggression—but she rules out anything that + would be inconsistent with self-determination.

+

10. All in all, we got no give in the basic British position, and only + the glimmering of some possibilities, and that only after much effort by + me with considerable help not appreciated by Mrs. Thatcher from Pym. It is clear that they had not + thought much about diplomatic possibilities. They will now, but whether + they become more imaginative or instead recoil will depend on the + political situation and what I hear in Argentina.

+

11. I will arrive in Buenos Aires late Friday.April 9. At 0228Z, April 9, Haig sent a message to Costa Mendez requesting that the meetings begin the + morning of Saturday, April 10, “in view of the lateness of the hour + of my arrival in Argentina.” (Telegram Secto 5013 to Buenos Aires, April 9; Reagan Library, + Executive Secretariat, NSC Cable + File, Falkland File 04/09/1982 (1)) I will convey a picture + of total British resolve, and see what I can draw from the Argentines + along lines we discussed in London, without giving any hint that the + British are prepared for any give-and-take.

+

12. If the Argentines give me something to work with, I plan to return to + London over the weekend. It may then be necessary for me to ask you to + apply unusual pressure on Thatcher. If the Argentines offer very little, I would + plan to return to confer with you. In this case, it may be necessary to + apply even greater pressure on the British if we are to head off + hostilities. I cannot presently offer much optimism, even if I get + enough in Buenos Aires to justify a return to London. This is clearly a + very steep uphill struggle, but essential, given the enormous + stakes.From his aircraft en route to + Buenos Aires, Haig sent a + follow-up telegram to Reagan. In it, he expanded on his assessment of + Thatcher’s outlook on + the crisis, noting that “it is virtually as important to us” that + Thatcher achieve + “success” in this situation “for the principle at stake is central + to your vision of international order, in addition to being in our + strategic interest.” Haig + also observed: “The key question is whether I can bring back enough + from the Argentines to convince her [Thatcher] that she has within reach a successful, + peaceful solution. Obviously, if Galtieri accepts a political defeat it’s the end of + him. Just as Mrs. Thatcher + must be able to show that Galtieri got nothing from his use of force, he must + be able to show that he got something. Whether this rules out a + diplomatic solution, or whether there is a narrow band in which some + ambiguity will permit both parties a way out of their respective + corners, I do not know.” (Unnumbered telegram from Haig to Reagan, April 9; Reagan Library, + Executive Secretariat, NSC Cable + File, Falkland File 04/09/1982 (2))

+ +

13. Throughout what was a difficult discussion, there was no trace of + anything but gratitude for the role we are playing and for your personal + concern and commitment to the Prime Minister. She said, in conclusion, + that the candor of the discussion reflected the strength of our + relationship.

+

14. As you know I have excluded travelling US press from the plane. All I have said to the local press + is that we want to be helpful and support UN Security Council Resolution 502, which calls for + withdrawal and a diplomatic solution. For the benefit of Thatcher—and the Argentines—I also + said I was impressed with the resolve of the British Government. We must + be absolutely disciplined with the press during this critical stage, + avoiding at all cost any suggestion that we are encouraged. There is, in + fact, little basis for encouragement in any event.

+ + Haig + +
+ +
+ 83. Memorandum From Acting Secretary of State Eagleburger to President ReaganSource: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Agency File, Secretary Haig’s Evening Report + (03/25/1982–04/21/1982). Secret. + + + Washington, April 8, + 1982 + +

[Omitted here is material unrelated to the situation in the South + Atlantic.]

+

2. Falklands: + Bill Middendorf succeeded in + persuading the OAS to adjourn until + MondayApril 12. without + substantive debate on an OAS good + offices resolution proposed chiefly by Colombia.See footnote 2, Document + 113. Meanwhile, I met separately with the French + and German Ambassadors to discuss the Falklands situation. Each + Ambassador indicated his nation’s solidarity with the UK, support for the Secretary’s efforts to + defuse the crisis, and concern about the implications of a military + clash.

+

[Omitted here is material unrelated to the situation in the South + Atlantic.]

+
+ +
+ + 84. Telegram From the Department of State to Secretary of State + Haig’s AircraftSource: Department of State, Central + Foreign Policy File, P880104–0758. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Sent for information + Immediate to USDel Secretary. Drafted by E. Cummings (L/PM); cleared by R. Haas, Pendleton, and J. Earle (L/ARA); approved in S/S–O. A stamped notation at the top + right-hand corner of the telegram indicates that Haig saw it. An additional + notation in an unknown hand reads: “Sec. acted upon in Secto 24—hold off on grey areas.” + Reference is presumably to telegram Secto 5024; see footnote 4 + below. + + + Washington, April 9, 1982, 0643Z + +

Tosec 50043. Subject: Action + Memorandum: UK Request for Additional + Support on Ascension Island. To the Secretary from EUR—H. Allen + Holmes, Acting, ARA—Everett Briggs, + Acting, PM—Richard Burt.

+

1. Issue for Decision: Whether to accede to a UK request for additional support on Ascension Island.

+

2. Essential Factors: As foreshadowed in earlier memoranda to you, the + UK now has now requested additional + US support at Ascension Island. This + memorandum provides a legal analysis of the options and recommends a + positive response, if your reading of the situation on the ground so + permits.

+

The UK is formally requesting (A) that + the US arrange for Wideawake to operate + on a 24-hour basis for the time being to allow for maintenance + operations and (B) that additional air controllers be provided by the + US. The UK has also indicated that it plans to locate various + communication facilities on the Island and a met facility and that it + “shall require” facilities for three commando brigades. Text of UK request received by Department evening + of April 8 is at para 3.

+

On April 2 you decided the US should + agree to sell fuel to the UK at + Ascension.See Document 51. As you are aware, the 1962 exchange + of notes between the US and the UK on the use of Wideawake Airfield on + Ascension Island by UK military aircraft + obligates the US to permit the UK to land at Wideawake and to use the + facilities in the event that the UK + considers additional logistic, administrative or operating facilities to + be necessary at the airfield. You determined that the provision of fuel + was legitimately encompassed by the obligation to let the UK use the facilities on Ascension. The new + request, however, appears to the Legal Adviser’s office to have elements + that go beyond our legal obligation to permit the UK to use the facility. The 1962 agreement + does not obligate us to provide additional services and clearly does not + constitute an obligation on the + part of the US to assign military + personnel to support the UK operations + in a direct manner in potential combat operations, nor would it appear + to obligate us to provide additional air controllers.

+

However, the agreement also contemplates that the US and UK will coordinate + their actions to avoid interference in US operations when the UK + uses the facilities. Consequently, though not technically required under + the agreement, the UK request to operate + the airfield on a 24 hour basis and to provide additional air + controllers is justifiable on the basis of the increased operational + strain on US operations and the limited + nature of the air traffic activities. The other British requests are + clearly within the scope of the agreement, and the UK has the right to establish the + facilities they have proposed.

+

Recommendation:

+

That you inform the British that we can agree to their overall request, + based on the increased activity at Ascension Island. We are well aware + that your response to this recommendation will depend on your reading of + the state of play following your April 8 London talks.See Documents 79, 81, and 82.

+

Approve _____ Disapprove _____At 1435Z, April + 9, Haig replied to Eagleburger: “Proceed with only + those elements of UK request which + clearly fall within range of our treaty commitment. Concerning grey + areas, such as assignment of additional air controllers, you should + address the issue indicating that we will view the request + sympathetically but in an upbeat manner without committing ourselves + to approval at this time. We first need to make an assessment in + wake of result of Buenos Aires stop this weekend—and possible return + to London. I am concerned that approval at this point would quickly + become known to Argentines, with unhelpful impact on upcoming talks + with Argentines. We recognize that the practical effect of this + guidance is that 24 hour operation of Wide-Awake will not likely be + possible for time-being unless it can be attained without using + additional air controllers. If British convey sense of great + urgency, you should get back to me. But my thinking now is that it + would be a great mistake to agree to the request for air controllers + while I am in Buenos Aires.” (Telegram Secto 5024 from Haig, April 9; Department of State, Central Foreign + Policy File, P880104–0762)

+

3. Text of UK message of April 8 re + Ascension. (UK Embassy informed us + request being made concurrently and in much greater detail through + military channels to DOD). Begin + text:

+

We wish to use airfield for two Nimrod aircraft in order to conduct maritime reconnaissance + operations on a 24-hour basis for an indefinite period (since their + missions will be coordinated with our submarine forces 24 hour cover is + essential). We should therefore be grateful if the US would arrange for the airfield to + operate on a 24-hour basis for the time being. We realise that this will + involve the provision of additional air controllers as foreshadowed in earlier message.Reference is to an April 6 message from + Wall to Pendleton which stated that the + British Embassy had been asked by HMG “to let you know that later expansion of forces + could require reception and staging facilities for 3500 men: a + logistic base would require 200 men for the reception, storage and + onward movement of combat supplies.” In addition, regarding “other + longer term requirements,” Wall specified that one “particular requirement will + be for additional air controllers to allow for 24-hour operations.” + (Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S Special Handling Restrictions Memos 1979–1983, Lot + 96D262, ES Sensitive April 1–9 + 1982) Meanwhile air transport force operations will continue + on the present scale. We also plan to locate various communications + facilities on the Island and a met facility. In addition we shall + require facilities for three commando brigades as earlier mentioned.

+

A senior officer has now been appointed as Commander of the British + Forces Support Unit and has been instructed to liaise as required with + the Commander of the US Forces Ascension + Island on all matters of detail. End text.

+

4. The message referred to above “as earlier mentioned” is with your + staff as an attachment to a bullet paper entitled “Your Meeting with + UK Ambassador Henderson, 4/6/82”.A copy of the undated bullet paper is ibid. For a + summary of that meeting, see Document + 71.

+

5. Please assure that Assistant Secretary Enders sees this message as it goes to the + Secretary.

+

6. Cleared by: PM:RHaas, FWG:MSPendleton, L/ARA: JEarle. Drafted by: L/PM:ECummings.

+ + Eagleburger + +
+ +
+ + 85. Telegram From President Reagan to Secretary of State HaigSource: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Latin + America/Central, Falklands War [Cables 090131, 091000, 091154, + 091640, 181715, 191650, 191754, 192115]. Top Secret. Sent for + information to the White House. Printed from a copy that was + received in the White House Situation Room. Reagan was in Barbados for + meetings with the Prime Ministers of Barbados, Antigua and Barbuda, + Dominica, St. Christopher and Nevis, and St. Vincent and the + Grenadines. He had arrived in Barbados on April 8, following a brief + official visit to Jamaica. A notation in Poindexter’s handwriting in the + top right-hand corner of the telegram reads: “Judge— JP,” indicating + that Poindexter forwarded + the telegram to Clark. A + stamped notation indicates that Clark saw it. + + + Bridgetown, April 9, 1982, 1640Z + +

10. Ref Secto 5010.See Document 82. + Subject: Your Discussions in London.

+

1. (TS) The report of your discussions in London makes clear how + difficult it will be to foster a compromise that gives Maggie enough to + carry on and at the same time meets the test of “equity” with our Latin + neighbors. As you expected there isn’t much room for maneuver in the + British position. How much this “going-in” position can be influenced is + unclear although London headlines give little basis for optimism. Point + B looks to be the cruxSee paragraph 8B of of + Document 82. and I’d be + interested in your further thinking on how a multinational presence + might be made more appealing in London. It’s my guess from the diffident + British stance that any compromise on Thatcher’s part will take time. If that’s true the + closure of the British submarines is all the more worrisome. In this + regard, whether we can expect Galtieri to have the wisdom and strength to keep his + distance is obviously a central near-term issue.

+

2. (TS) On a separate subject, I was struck by reporting from Tel Aviv + that Begin is moving Soviet tanks + to the northern border.For documentation on + U.S. responses to the mounting crisis in Lebanon, see Foreign Relations, 1981–1988, vol. XVIII, + Part 1, Lebanon, April 1981–August 1982. Recognizing you have + your hands full, I’d appreciate your views on whether another + intervention from us would be useful or not.

+

3. (TS) Here, we had useful sessions in Jamaica and Barbados.For documentation relating to Reagan’s discussions in Jamaica + and Barbados, as well as other documentation related to the + Caribbean Basin Initiative, see Foreign Relations, 1981–1988, vol. XVII, + Part 1, Mexico; Western Caribbean, and Foreign + Relations, 1981–1988, vol. XVII, Part 2, Eastern + Caribbean. What struck me most was that while they + are interested in the contents of the CBI, through it we have achieved the larger purpose of a + breakthrough in U.S. credibility in this part of the world. Their + confidence that finally we care is a fragile but terribly important + achievement for which you should be very proud.

+ +

4. (TS) On the press line you propose with respect to the Falklands, I + agree. We are saying nothing from here to color expectations.

+

5. (TS) Al as you proceed to Buenos Aires, I’m very conscious of the + enormity of the task. I’d appreciate a call on the secure line when you + have a chance to discuss where things might lead in the days ahead.

+

Warm regards.

+
+ +
+ 86. Memorandum From the Acting Director of the Defense Communications + Agency, Department of Defense (Layman) to Secretary of Defense WeinbergerSource: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, + Weinberger Papers, Department of Defense Files, Subject File, 1982 + United Kingdom (2) #29–42. Secret. Stamped notations on the first + page of the memorandum indicate that Weinberger and Carlucci saw it on April 9. + + + Washington, April 9, + 1982 + + + SUBJECT + US Communications Satellite + Support to UK Naval Forces + (S) + +

1. (S) In view of the current situation between the UK and Argentina, you should be aware that + the US is providing communications + satellite support to the British fleet enroute to the Falkland + Island.According to an April 9 + memorandum for the record produced by Nagler, the decision to provide communications + support was taken by Carlucci in consultation with Eagleburger. (Washington National + Records Center, OSD Files, FRC + 330–84–0004, UK (March–April) 1982) + Nagler informed + Hervey of Carlucci’s decision, its terms, + and its conditions in a memorandum, April 9. In addition, Nagler indicated that the United + States had approved a Royal Navy request for cryptographic equipment + for a maximum period of 7 months. (Ibid.) This communications + satellite support provides two-way communications between the fleet and + its shore establishment. Approximately half of the UK fleet has satellite capability.

+

2. (C) This support is provided because a memorandum of understanding + exists between the US and the UK to provide limited worldwide Defense + Satellite Communications System (DSCS) + support to the UK. This agreement was + initiated on 1 Jan 78 and concludes on 1 Jan 83.Weinberger + underlined the portion of this sentence beginning with the word + “concludes.” Commenting on this sentence, Weinberger wrote at the bottom of + the page: “1) OK; 2) We should start action Monday to renew MOU now.” The MOU differentiates between first and + second order satellite accesses. A first order requirement is for full-time continuous + service with satellite capacity reserved for the UK for the entire year. A second order requirement is + considered to be of a short duration and temporary nature to cover + R&D, contingencies, and special operations. Satellite capacity is + not reserved for second order requirements but the US will attempt to accommodate the UK, subject to US overriding national requirements. In practice, the + US has in the past accommodated + UK second order requirements.

+

3. (S) The DCA Area Control Center in + Europe, which is controlling all UK + accesses on the DSCS Atlantic + satellite, reports that the UK has 21 + channels authorized and 21 channels operational as of 1200 hours 8 Apr + 82. The channels include broadcast circuits to ships, dedicated + ship/shore and shore/ship circuits and two channels from mobile ground + terminals. The UK is using approximately + 11% of the total Atlantic satellite power. Although no second order + circuits have been requested as yet, the UK is authorized an additional 27 channels.

+ + Lawrence Layman + Rear Admiral, USN Acting + Director + + +
+ +
+ 87. Special National Intelligence EstimateSource: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Latin + America/Central, Falklands War (04/09/1982–04/15/1982). Secret; [handling restriction not declassified]. The + estimate was issued by the Director of Central Intelligence with the + concurrence of the National Foreign Intelligence Board. The estimate + was prepared with the participation of the Central Intelligence + Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, [text not + declassified], and the intelligence organizations of the + Department of State and the Department of the Treasury. The + Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army; + the Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy; the + Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force; + and the Director of Intelligence, Headquarters, Marine Corps, also + participated in the preparation of the estimate. + + + SNIE 21/91–82 + + + Washington, April 9, + 1982 + +

THE FALKLAND ISLANDS CRISIS

+

[Omitted here are the Scope Note and the Table of Contents.]

+

KEY JUDGMENTS

+

A peaceful resolution of the Falkland Islands crisis will depend on a + willingness to make concessions that are not yet evident in either London or Buenos Aires. The + negotiating flexibility of both the UK + and Argentina will diminish as the British task force nears the + Falklands. Even now there is little or no flexibility on the key + imperatives of either party: sovereignty now or in the finite future for + Argentina, or the removal of all Argentine military forces and the + restoration of British control for London.

+

Only a negotiated settlement achieved before hostilities, or following an + extremely limited military engagement, however, is likely to leave + US interests relatively unscathed. + In the event of extensive armed conflict, the United States will be + increasingly pressured to “choose” between Britain and Argentina, and by + extension between Latin America and the US-European alliance. A clear-cut British victory would + avoid the negative consequences for UK-US relations that could + result from such an invidious comparison.

+

We believe that the British task force could undertake the following + categories of military operations after arriving in the vicinity of the + Falklands. In order of increasing cost to the British, they are:

+

—Enforce a naval exclusion zone.

+

—Engage in a high seas naval confrontation.

+

—Prevent air resupply of the Islands.

+

—Assault the Falklands in an attempt to retake them.

+

A British defeat would not only result in the fall of the Thatcher government but would also + deal a severe political blow to Britain’s standing as a major European + power and key NATO member. It would + have a demoralizing effect within the Alliance and would dampen the + prospect of British cooperation with the United States in such areas as + strategic nuclear planning and the Persian Gulf.

+

Argentina’s defeat would result in the fall of the Galtieri regime and probably usher in + a period of weaker, less stable governments. An Argentine loss would + diminish Buenos Aires’ current willingness to cooperate with US policy initiatives in Central America. + On the other hand, even an Argentine victory would evoke mixed reactions + in Latin America, especially because this outcome would seem to justify + reliance on force to resolve territorial disputes.

+

A standoff after limited combat would create more promising circumstances + for negotiations than now exist. Growing awareness of military + vulnerabilities might generate more concerns about the debilitating + consequences of full-scale conflict, and thus allow exploitation of + diplomatic options.

+

The opening for negotiations could be relatively brief, because both + governments might come under strong pressure to reengage in order to + avoid an attrition of capabilities—the British concerned about + sustaining the distant military effort, and the Argentines susceptible + to growing economic + difficulties and isolation. If full-scale but inconclusive hostilities + ensue, the respective allies and hoped-for supporters of each side would + be increasingly entreated to take stronger actions.

+

The Soviets are unlikely to become directly involved militarily in the + dispute, although they probably will secretly provide Argentina with + information on UK military + deployments.

+

[Omitted here are the Discussion section of the estimate and an Annex + illustrating the Balance of Forces.]

+
+ +
+ 88. Memorandum of ConversationSource: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, + S/S Special Handling + Restrictions Memos 1979–1983, Lot 96D262, ES Sensitive April 1–9 1982. Secret. Drafted by + Davila and approved by + Middendorf. Davila initialed for Middendorf. Copies were sent to + Bosworth and Kirkpatrick. + + + Washington, April 9, 1982, 3:15 p.m. + + + PARTICIPANTS + Derek Thomas, Minister, + Embassy of Great Britain + J. W. Middendorf, + Ambassador, USOAS + +

Minister Thomas called me with + some questions of a technical nature about the Rio TreatySee footnote 4, Document + 50. and took the opportunity to discuss the + Haig visit to Prime Minister + Thatcher. Derek advised me that the position of + Her Majesty’s Government had hardened perceptibly in the past two to + three days prior to the Haig + visit, largely as a result of an aroused domestic public opinion which + was being incited by television coverage of the issue, e.g. “Who is this + tin horn dictator pushing us around?” As a result, the Thatcher Government’s conditions for a + resolution of the issue now consist of the following three points:

+

1. Argentine withdrawal of military forces from the Falkland Islands.

+

2. Observance of the principle of self-determination of the + Islanders.

+

3. A return to the status-quo ante with British administration until + negotiations resolve the issue.

+

I pointed out that these conditions might seem too harsh in the limited + time framework available and could, if not tempered with face-saving + measures, involve the downfall of the Galtieri Government.

+ +

I queried Thomas as to how much + this reflected UK posturing for domestic + opinion and how much was for intimidating the Argentines to be able to + get a better deal. After a pause, he said that he could not answer that + question but reiterated the grave seriousness with which HMG views the situation and that it would + not refrain from use of armed force, if necessary.Later, he told me it was unfortunate that the + Secretary did not go to Argentina first because Margaret Thatcher was not able to + respond to an offer but had to lay her own offer out on the table + first (implying to me that it was, therefore, tougher than it might + otherwise have been—I hope that I am right on this). [Footnote is in + the original.]

+

Expressing my dismay to Thomas, I + pointed out that the basic elements for a solution were already in hand, + and that a decision between a Hong-Kong (lease-back) or condominium + (joint administration) arrangement was the only real remaining stumbling + block which was not a significant obstacle as the two sides are very + close to an agreement. I stressed that a failure to achieve a peaceful + solution could spell the end of the Inter-American system, damage + British commercial interests throughout Latin America and involve the + British in a lengthy no-win situation in the Falkland Islands in which + HMG could conceivably reoccupy the + Falklands by force but would require them to maintain lengthy sea lanes + of communication. Furthermore, it would not contribute to a stable, + lasting solution to the problem; instead, it could engender protracted + Argentine resistance along Vietnam lines that could prove costly to + Britain.

+

He said that HM ships are prepared to + sink any Argentine warship that would be “foolish enough” to enter the + 200 mile zone after midnight Sunday.April + 11. See Document 78. I countered + that this left little time for negotiation. He, in turn, said that if + the GOA commenced withdrawal by that + time, obviously, the British Navy would not take physical action. I + pointed out that any early hostilities would cause the Rio Treaty to be + invoked and would make any diplomatic initiatives almost impossible + after that.

+
+ +
+ + 89. Memorandum of ConversationSource: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, + Files of Alexander M. Haig, + Jr., 1981–1982, Lot 82D370, (2) Falklands + Crisis—1982. Secret; Sensitive. + + + Buenos Aires, April 9, 1982, 5:30 + p.m. + + + PARTICIPANTS + President Galtieri, + Argentina + Ambassador Vernon + Walters + +

At 5:30 pm on April 9, 1982 under instructions from Secretary Haig, I met with President Leopold Galtieri alone at the Casa + Rosada in Buenos Aires.

+

I explained that I came at Secretary Haig’s request to convey privately some thoughts to + consider before our general discussion later in the evening.Presumably a reference to Haig’s anticipated arrival in + Buenos Aires from London the evening of April 9. Although no + memorandum of conversation of their meeting has been found, + Costa Méndez met + Haig upon his arrival at + the airport. (Edward Schumacher, “Haig, in Buenos Aires, Says U.S. Ties With Argentina + Form Basis for Talks,” New York Times, April + 10, p. 6) We understood that President Galtieri had unified his people in a + way none of his predecessors could. His mandate in the Malvinas affair + is clearly broad and sound. If we can resolve the matter without war, + Galtieri will go down in + Argentine history as the man who reconquered the Malvinas Islands + without firing a shot. He will be perceived as a leader of the free + world and a man of peace. If his government accepts a proposal that is + recognized as reasonable and fair his place in history is secure even if + the British reject it. A war between Argentina and England will serve + only the Soviets and their allies.

+

If President Galtieri insists + upon having an Argentine governor of the Malvinas during an interim + negotiating period, the effort to avoid war will surely fail. There is + clearly an honorable and demonstrably important role for his + representative on the islands during negotiations. If he would not + insist upon having his own governor, we would insist that the + negotiations conclude by December 31, 1982 and in a manner to suit his + domestic needs.

+

Both sides must make concessions if peace is to continue. History, + however, seems to favor the Argentines. The matter has been pending for + 130 years and has now come to a head. An interim arrangement can hardly + be seen as anything other than progress for Argentina. Most of the + islanders appear to want to leave if Argentina gains control. Those who + remain can be accommodated.

+ +

The British must have a face-saving solution. Mrs. Thatcher is determined that Argentina + not be perceived as achieving through arms what it failed to achieve + through negotiations. Insistence upon an Argentine governor will surely + send the British into combat. Our assessment is that they might lose + some ships but their nuclear submarines and surface combatants could + seriously damage the Argentine Navy and seal off the sea and air access + to the Malvinas. The 9000 Argentine troops would find life quite + difficult. The Argentine choice today is to accept a half loaf now and + wait to gain the rest in a year or to face a war. We are working on a + draft we hope he will find acceptable.

+

President Galtieri replied, + “Walters, the one thing you + cannot ask me to do is to haul down the Argentine flag. If I do that, I + will be kicked out of this building. You must work out something that + does not leave me empty-handed.” He did not mention the Argentine + governor.

+

President Galtieri abruptly + changed the conversation to ask if I had, indeed, gone to Cuba to see + Fidel Castro as the papers reported.For + documentation relating to Walters’s trip to Cuba, see Foreign + Relations, 1981–1988, vol. XVII, Part 1, Mexico; + Western Caribbean. I answered affirmatively and + said I carried a tough message warning him to cease and desist from the + activities we found unacceptable. Galtieri asked about Castro’s reaction. I replied that + he was not happy but, surprisingly, did not bluster about. He was quite + calm, almost intimidated. Galtieri then asked about Castro’s appearance, behavior, + and attitudes. I answered briefly.

+

He thanked me for my visit, asked me not to hesitate to call him, if I + felt it necessary, and sent his regards to Secretary Haig.

+
+ +
+ + 90. Memorandum of ConversationSource: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, + Files of Alexander M. Haig, + Jr., 1981–1982, Lot 82D370, (2) Falklands + Crisis—1982. Secret; Sensitive. The meeting took place at the Casa + Rosada. For Haig’s later + account of this meeting, see Haig, Caveat, pp. + 276–279. + + + Buenos Aires, April + 10, 1982 + + + PARTICIPANTS + Secretary of State Alexander M. Haig, + Jr. + President Galtieri, + Argentina + Assistant Secretary of State Thomas + Enders + Foreign Minister Costa + Mendez, Argentina + Under Secretary Enrique + Ros, Argentina + Brig Gen Iglesias, + Secretary General of Presidency, Argen. + Maj General Mertil, Chief of Planning, Argentina + Ambassador Vernon A. + Walters + +

President Galtieri welcomed + Secretary Haig by saying that he + would call the Secretary “General” because there is a brotherhood + between military men and a commonality of ethical values that made blunt + talk easier between them. He would talk first of all about yesterday, + and then about tomorrow.

+

Since 1833 when the British took the Malvinas Islands by force, the + Argentines have never ceased to claim sovereignty and to demand their + return. The United Nations in 1965 recommended negotiations between the + two powers in order to accomplish the transfer of sovereignty to + Argentina. The United Kingdom accepted under the framework of + decolonization. The Argentines tried for the next 17 years, by every + possible means, to convince the British government to arrive at a + solution. The British have never conducted any substantial discussions + concerning the transfer of sovereignty of the territorial integration of + the Malvinas into Argentina. No one can accuse the Argentines of a lack + of patience or prudence throughout this period. Unlike the United + Kingdom, the Argentines have not used diplomatic legerdemain and + evasion. The Argentine claims are and have always been clear. We are + patient, but patience, like water, can run out. We now face a crisis + initiated perhaps by Argentina but aggravated by the over-reaction of + the United Kingdom government. The British reaction to the Argentine + occupation of the Malvinas is out of all proportion to the Argentine + action. The Argentine government is willing to find an honorable + solution that will save Mrs. Thatcher’s government. Argentina does not desire to + undermine the prestige of the United Kingdom. But we cannot sacrifice + our honor either. The Argentine people and nation owe a great deal to the United Kingdom. The + British community in Argentina is prosperous and well integrated into + Argentine life. British families are always welcome in Argentina. The + only grave difference we have had with the British is the matter that is + under discussion today. No member of the Argentine government has spoken + offensive or insulting words towards Mrs. Thatcher or the Cabinet Ministers of Great + Britain—General Galtieri + repeated twice for emphasis—“until today.”

+

Galtieri continued that before + you (Secretary Haig) and your + friends came to power in the United States, the Argentine government + struggled against subversion. We continue the struggle. In El Salvador, + Argentina worked to save the political situation. Argentina is loved in + Central America. On the Malvinas matter, Peru and Bolivia support us, + along with others. We and the United States ride the same train, but we + will not ride in the caboose. I will talk to you about something quite + frankly that the Argentine government does not like, and that is the + furnishing of intelligence to Great Britain and the use of Ascension + Islands for supply for the British. That is what I have to say about + events up to yesterday. But today I do want to thank you for your + presence here and the interest the United States has shown in helping us + to find a solution to this problem. Today, the Argentine government is + perfectly disposed to finding a decorous, acceptable way out for Great + Britain. But you will understand that the Argentine government must look + good too. We have an internal situation that you will have already felt. + The United States has in Argentina today a government as friendly to you + as any ever to govern here. We understand that we need Margaret Thatcher and her Conservative + government in Great Britain; but not at the expense of Argentine + national interests. The measures taken by Mrs. Thatcher are creating a delicate + domestic situation for us. Her statements lack balance. We want to help + her to achieve a balanced position. Remember that Peron did not win his + election in 1946, the United States lost Argentina. The Argentine people + tend to react instinctively and emotionally. I must lead them to a + solution which will not recreate an Argentina of the 1940s. Our crisis + today can easily result in the destabilization of South America and + thereby weaken the defense of the West. I cannot fail to express to you + that directly or indirectly I have received offers of aircraft, pilots, + and armaments from countries “not part of the West.” When Margaret Thatcher declared a zone of + exclusion, in reality a zone of war, she created an environment wherein + if Monday an Argentine ship were torpedoed, the Argentine people would + believe and hold the United Kingdom responsible, even if the Soviets or + some other nation did it. Conversely, if a United Kingdom ship were sunk + the British would certainly blame the Argentines. Our present + equilibrium is difficult to maintain and a conflict could spread to + other parts of the world. The consequences can go far beyond a local problem between the + United Kingdom and Argentina. The result is uncertain. The Argentine + people took the decision on the second of April to recover our + legitimate heritage. Our fleet and five thousand Marines acted. If the + British want to send an expedition, we will receive this anachronistic + colonial expedition with the appropriate honors. In 1806 and 1807 the + Argentine people with very little means acted against the British + forces. (Here Galtieri referred + to an episode during which the British attempted to conquer colonial + Argentina. Lord Beresford was captured by the Argentines and interned at + the religious shrine at Lujan.)

+

General Galtieri said that his + remarks are the prologue to our conversation. He repeated that the + Argentines have the best disposition possible toward Margaret Thatcher, but find it + difficult to assist her in light of her strident posture.

+

Secretary Haig replied to + President Galtieri that he was + pleased and welcomed the President’s perceptive analysis. He felt that + he knew the President well because he had heard so much about him from + General Walters and Jeane Kirkpatrick. The Secretary + agreed that there is a universal brotherhood among military men, despite + national differences. We have a commonality of approach, an ethical + understanding that permits free interchange. He found this true at + NATO where often the political + officials got caught up on technical difficulties. The brotherhood of + professional military men, however, were able to elevate themselves + beyond contemporary political pressures and with detachment to get to + the heart of matters of vital interest to the people. Secretary + Haig continued that he had + watched over the years with special concern the valiant struggle of the + Argentine people against the dark forces of Marxism and radicalism. “Too + often in my own country people forget the basic stake that we have is a + fundamental struggle that is going on in the world against the threat of + Russian and Marxist imperialists. We are grateful for the direction in + which Argentina is moving. In recent months we have seen not empty + rhetoric, but real cooperation; we have seen your contribution to the + solidarity of the hemisphere, and your understanding of the threat + presented by the Soviets. We feel that many of the Soviet recent actions + were taken in the light of what they perceive to be US weakness. They are aggressive and more + dangerous. Following our failure in VietNam, we witnessed the Soviets or + their proxies move against Angola, Ethiopia, South Yemen, Kampuchea, and + Afghanistan. They concluded that, despite our vast resources, our + self-paralysis made these fruits ripe for plucking. Throughout this + period the Argentine professional military conducted a successful + struggle despite the unjustified criticism from other parts of the + world. Today the same vital struggle continues in Central America. I + know the President understands the character of this struggle and understands the essential + character of the partnership which we have forged in recent months. We + cannot allow this to be broken up by a “thousand Scottish shepherds.” + The Secretary told President Galtieri that the reports that the US has furnished intelligence and satellite + information to the UK are untrue. We + denied the British request. As a matter of principle we feel that allies + should not spy on each other. Our satellite, moreover, was not in a + position to collect data from this area. Had it been, we would not have + furnished it to the British. He gave President Galtieri his personal guarantee. The + story was planted by the leftists in England to use against Mrs. + Thatcher. They contended + that she had advance knowledge and had taken no action. The story had + the additional advantage of putting the US in an unfavorable light. President Galtieri thanked him for these + assurances.

+

Secretary Haig said the first + indication we had of the present crisis was from the UK. General Galtieri laughed and said the Argentines were good + professionals and were able to cover up the operation. Secretary + Haig agreed that the conduct + of the cover for the operation was masterful. General Galtieri said that the Argentines had + issued strong orders that no one was to be shot. Consequently, although + four Argentines were killed, two more seriously injured, and some six + others wounded, there were no British casualties. The Argentines made a + special effort to avoid physical damage to the island. The only shots + fired were by the British.

+

The Secretary repeated “that the stakes are profound in our global + struggle. Even while we follow the Malvinas crisis hour by hour, and as + I speak to you, the struggle continues in El Salvador, Nicaragua, + Guatemala and Mexico. Mexico is a serious problem. The Communist + penetration into the whole of Mexico is far more extensive than any + other nation is willing to admit.” The Secretary recalled that when he + was at the UN, the Mexicans kidnapped a + Nicaraguan volunteer with the Salvadoran rebel forces from the naive + Salvadoran police. Castaneda, the + Mexican Foreign Minister, invited this student to speak at the UN and also invited Jaime Wheelock up from Nicaragua to + meet the press. The Secretary warned Castaneda that he had in his pocket a five page + confession by this Nicaraguan in which he clearly implicated Mexico. + This confession made reference to five camps in southern Mexico run by + Mexican, Soviet, and Cuban personnel. The evidence also implicated the + Mexican PRI party. The Secretary promised Castaneda that if he made any public statement about the + Nicaraguan the Secretary would read this confession to the press. + Castaneda said, “Please don’t + do that, please don’t do that.” Castaneda told the press that the version he received + came from the Nicaraguans. He could not verify it himself. Mexico is a + real problem.

+

In the face of all these difficulties it is vital that we maintain an + understanding and cooperation. General Galtieri said he fully agreed with what the Secretary had said. He then told the + Secretary of his news that at midnight last night a Cuban plane arrived + from Havana carrying Ambassador Aragones, a former Cuban ambassador to Mexico, bringing + an urgent letter for President Galtieri from Fidel Castro. He knew that the plane had + arrived, but had not yet received the letter. Returning to the Malvinas + issue, President Galtieri said + that while they do not know what Chileans might do, neither do the + Chileans know what Peru will do. The Argentines know what both the + Peruvian and Bolivian armed forces think. The implications here are + ominous. The Argentine President said that he remembered well that a + small incident at Sarajevo had led to an uncontrollable + conflagration.Reference is to the June + 1914 assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand of Austria in + Sarajevo, an event which helped precipitate the First World + War.

+

With respect to Cuba, the Secretary then told President Galtieri in confidence that we had + completed planning and if the Cubans move into Nicaragua we will take + military action. Next Monday or TuesdayApril + 12 or 13. we could have indications of just such Cuban + actions. We have a large concentration of naval vessels in the Caribbean + this month. We may be provided with the opportunity we have been + seeking. The Secretary stressed that he told President Galtieri this because of his and + President Reagan’s great respect + for him and his government. He pointed out that this adds to the tragedy + of this situation. President Galtieri must know that, if Great Britain continues on + her present course, we would be the losers and the USSR and Cuba the principal + beneficiaries. He could tell General Galtieri right now what the message from El Supremo + (Castro) was. “Later you will undoubtedly get a message from the + Soviets.”

+

Margaret Thatcher is + unquestionably the most vigorous leader of western Europe and has been + extremely supportive to us on Polish and Afghanistan matters. To + undermine this cooperation would also be a tragedy. She has in a sense + boxed herself into a corner with imprudent rhetoric. When the Secretary + was in London he met with her for five hours of discussion.See Documents 80–82. At one point she said to the + Secretary that she felt he was silent and disapproving. The Secretary + replied that he was because Mrs. Thatcher is wrong to issue an ultimatum. An ultimatum + makes the problem insoluble. The US + government could not support it. He also told this to the British + Foreign Minister earlier.See Document 79. We need greater + flexibility. We desire to work out an interim solution that will provide + two important and friendly leaders with a success. If the Secretary had + a proposal that he could return to London with which the United States considers just and fair it + would be almost impossible for Margaret + Thatcher to refuse. She could not. The problem for us now + is how to structure such a proposal. The Secretary had no illusions that + this would be easy. He told this to the Argentine Foreign Minister + earlier that morning.No memoranda of + conversation of Haig’s + exchanges with Costa Mendez + on the morning of April 10 have been found. For Haig’s memoir account of his + automobile ride with Costa + Mendez to the Casa Rosada, see Haig, Caveat, p. 276.

+

We have naval intelligence suggesting that the British submarines plan to + attack ships in the exclusion zone starting at 4:00 Monday morning. + Galtieri said that that was + a problem that Margaret Thatcher + would have to worry about. The Secretary said that we could not condone + an ultimative situation. We must move forward with urgency. If the + UK fleet starts striking in + Argentine waters the situation could become uncontrollable. History + would condemn us for refusing to make sacrifices on a question of minor + importance with major consequences. The Secretary said that we believe + that we do have basis for a solution. If he did not look very vigorous + it was because he spent all his time on the long flight the previous day + trying to devise an approach which would be acceptable to Argentina and + to the UK, one that would not require + unacceptable concessions by either party. There is a precarious balance + but he personally believes that we can maintain it. The ultimate + sovereignty would reside with Argentina, a Hong Kong type solution would + weaken the British claim and would not stop the internal agitation. We + must avoid any apparent return to the status quo and go to a new level + of intense negotiations leading to the imperatives for a solution for + the Argentine government. The action the second of April was seen, in + London, as excessive and he would be less than frank if he did not say + that it would be very difficult to sell any such package to Margaret Thatcher in London. But if he + were to obtain such a package it would not be easy for her to cast it + aside.

+

President Galtieri said that in + this pleasant conversation he would say something once and he would not + repeat it again. As far as the Argentines are concerned there will be no + question about Argentine sovereignty. Everything else Argentina is + disposed to negotiate. He asked the Foreign Minister to say something + about this. The FM then recalled that + the UN Resolution 502 has three points. + One is the cessation of hostilities. Two is the withdrawal of forces. + And three is negotiation. The UK is + proposing the cessation of hostilities, but there are no hostilities + now. The hostilities have ceased; but Margaret Thatcher has launched her fleet. Argentina had + fulfilled the requirement for cessation. Argentina was disposed to + withdraw their forces if the British withdrew their fleet. But Argentina would not + withdraw its authorities. Anything else could be negotiated.

+

Secretary Haig said perhaps he + should now speak in specific terms. The first thing to be done is to + break the ultimative character of Margaret + Thatcher’s proposals. We must find an integrated + comprehensive program based on the UN + resolution which includes simultaneous withdrawal, creation of a zone + excluding UK forces, an interim + administration, perhaps with an international entity of some sort to + break the umbilical line of control from London to the islands, + recognition of autonomy or local government or local institutions that + will permit avoiding, from the Argentine point of view, appearing to + return to the status quo ante. Mrs. Thatcher’s interests seem to be primarily in the local + population and in maintaining a line of authority to the island. General + Galtieri said that this + would be very difficult. Secretary Haig agreed.

+

President Galtieri asked whether + the entity of which the Secretary is speaking would be the UN or the US. Haig said he + would offer a model of several different countries friendly and + acceptable to both parties. For example, the US, Canada, perhaps Brazil and Peru or any countries that + Argentina would feel comfortable with pending a final solution. He + believed that would guarantee the situation for the thousand such + shepherds who could go to New Zealand or anywhere else they wanted, if + they were not happy. The FM said that + the Argentines were disposed to compensate the shepherds. They offered + them money to buy land in Argentina, 29 years loans, if they wanted a + boat or plane to leave the Argentines would provide that. If they wanted + to stay all their rights would be taken care of and they would have a + more sophisticated or privileged status in the islands. In 1968 he was + in London working with the FM. At the + time he saw a draft agreement with the UK in which the UK agreed + to the principle of transfer of sovereignty over the islands to + Argentina. The agreement died because of a revolt in the British + Parliament.

+

Secretary Haig said that the + problem was one of contemporary politics—politics in London, politics in + Buenos Aires. We must have success for we share a great deal in common. + President Galtieri said that in + London and other capitals of Europe including Paris, Bonn and Spain, + they had shuddered when a few Argentine soldiers had gone to Central + America to defend freedom and the culture of the West. No one had, + however, shuddered when the British sent a fleet to defend islands that + were not theirs. Is there a real difference?

+

Secretary Haig said we must + remember one simple fact: if the Argentines persist Margaret Thatcher will fall. He must + be frank. In the US the support for + Great Britain is widespread. In the liberal world and in others the + sentiment is overwhelmingly in favor of Great Britain and would remain + so if it came to a confrontation.

+ +

Secretary Haig said that + President Reagan is under attack + even now for being evenhanded. HerblockNom + de plume of Washington Post political + cartoonist Herbert Block. had drawn a nasty cartoon. It is a + political question, the left wing will seize it, it manages the press. + We have ascertained that some 90% of the senior people in the press are + supportive of the Democratic Party. General Galtieri said that with regard to the cessation of + hostilities, the withdrawal of the Argentine fleet, and armed forces + there are two points. He said there is one problem he could not see how + to resolve. It is the question of the government of the islands. He was + really regretful but the government must be Argentine with whatever + entity the UN, the British, the US, or the Canadians might set up until + normalization. The Argentines are prepared to offer the British + facilities of every sort to join in developing the resources of the + seabed, resources of fishing, for refueling British naval ships or + aircraft; but Argentina is not disposed to step back from what it + considers to be its rights.

+

Secretary Haig said he recognizes + that this is the most difficult element, it is going to be extremely + tough to resolve. He then asked President Galtieri how long he estimated it would take to remove + the Argentine armed forces from the island. General Galtieri said four or five days. + Admiral Moya interjected to say that he did not think this would be + possible in so short a time and would probably require two weeks. + Secretary Haig said that he + agreed with that estimate. Secretary Haig then went on to say that we would have to use the + UN Resolution 502 as a basis. The + FM said he would like to see the + wording. Secretary Haig said + that between now and this evening he thought that the Americans and the + Argentines might get together and work to see if they could prepare a + draft. General Galtieri said + that they might meet again at 6:00.No + memorandum of conversation of this meeting has been found, but see + Document 92. For Haig’s later recollection of this + session, see Haig, Caveat, pp. 281–282. The FM agreed. General Galtieri said that the Argentines did + not want to fail. Secretary Haig + said that in one form or another it would appear as an Argentine victory + because the Argentines would eventually get the sovereignty of the + islands; but we do not want the British to appear to lose. Secretary + Haig said that it is + important to consider this in the long term. Often one finds a military + man who can rise above contemporary politics as SadatAnwar al-Sadat, Egyptian President from 1970 until + his assassination in 1981. had, although he did not want to + draw an exact parallel. Galtieri + laughed and said, yes, Sadat had come to a bad end. Secretary Haig said that it was important that + this case not be approached from the perspective of grantor and grantee. + General Galtieri said Argentina + had been asking about this matter for a long time. Nothing had happened. + It was then agreed between the Secretary and the Argentine President that their staffs and the FM would get together to work on a + draft.

+ + Vernon A. + Walters + Ambassador at + Large + + +
+ +
+ 91. Telegram From Secretary of State Haig to the Embassy in the United Kingdom and the + Department of StateSource: + Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Latin America/Central, Argentina + (04/11/1982–04/14/1982). Secret; Niact Immediate; Nodis. Printed from a copy that was received in the + White House Situation Room. + + + Buenos Aires, April 11, 1982, + 0645Z + +

Secto 5041. Subj: Message to Prime + Minister Thatcher From Secretary + of State Haig.

+

1. Secret–Entire text.

+

2. You should deliver the following message to Prime Minister Thatcher + ASAP:Haig’s message was + delivered to 10 Downing Street at 1055Z, April 11. (Telegram 7899 + from London, April 11; Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Cable File, Falkland File + (04/11/1982) (2))

+

3. Begin text:

+

Dear Madame Prime Minister,

+

I have had lengthy and intensive discussions here, and I now expect to + arrive in London about 0630 a.m. Monday, April 12.

+

I will be prepared to talk to you whenever you wish about a draft + proposal and some additional ideas that have come out of our 12 hours of + meetings here.

+

In the meantime, I am sure you would agree that any military + confrontation must be avoided at all costs until you have been able to + consider this draft proposal.

+ +

Although it is clear serious problems remain; some progress has been + made. With warm regards, Al + Haig.In telegram 7902 from + London, April 11, the Embassy transmitted Thatcher’s response to Haig’s message. She stated: “I + look forward to seeing you in London again tomorrow and shall be + glad to hold further discussions. I should certainly prefer to avoid + military confrontation. But Argentina is the aggressor, and is still + trying to build up the occupying force in the Falklands. The right + way to prevent naval incidents is therefore for Argentina to remove + all her naval vessels from the maritime exclusion zone. The + Argentine Government has had plenty of warning. I am sure that you + will have impressed this point upon the Argentine leaders. But if + there is any doubt in your mind as to their intentions, you may wish + to consider sending them a further immediate message.” + (Ibid.)

+

End text.

+ + Haig + +
+ +
+ 92. Telegram From Secretary of State Haig to the White HouseSource: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Latin + America/Central, Argentina (04/11/1982–04/14/1982). Secret; Niact Immediate; Nodis. Sent for information Niact Immediate to the Department of + State. Printed from a copy that was received in the White House + Situation Room. + + + Buenos Aires, April 11, 1982, + 1124Z + +

Secto 5047. Please pass to President + from the Secretary. Dept also pass + Secretary’s aircraft. Subject: Memorandum for the President.

+

1. (S)–Entire text.

+

2. I have concluded nearly twelve hours of gruelling and emotion-filled + talks with President Galtieri + and his Foreign Minister,See Document 91. amidst a public mood + approaching frenzy.

+

3. The proposals I introduced here were accepted in large part, except + with regard to the pivotal question of interim governing arrangements + (which we knew would be a problem) and Argentine insistence on an early + date certain for completion of negotiations on a final settlement. These + two issues will have to be resolved in order to trigger Argentine + withdrawal and thus avert war.

+ +

4. We made some progress on these issues, though very probably not enough + to secure British agreement. The Argentines began by demanding that + they, in effect, administer the island in the interim period, and that + the British agree a priori that the outcome of the ensuing negotiations + would provide for a transfer of sovereignty. In the end, we came up with + a formula that would involve interim U.S.-UK-Argentine tripartite + supervision of local administration, and we have blurred the question of + whether the negotiations would result in Argentine sovereignty. We have + specified December 31, 1982, as the date for completion of negotiations. + The thought of negotiating under this deadline may cause Mrs. Thatcher as much of a problem as will + the formula for interim administration. Nevertheless, what we have is + definitely worth taking to London.

+

5. The day was filled with ups and downs. At one point late in the day + the Argentines returned to their demand for sovereignty, and I was faced + with what looked like the end of the road. But the situation broke + between midnight and 1: 30 a.m., when Galtieri, face-to-face with the prospect of war, + levelled with me. He said he could not withdraw both his military and + administrative presence and last a week. If the British attacked, he + explained, he would have to accept the offer of full support made by the + Cuban Ambassador, who just returned after more than a year’s absence. + The Cubans implied they were speaking for the Russians, and even + insinuated that the Soviets had offered to sink the British carrier + (with Prince Andrew aboard) with the British and the world believing an + Argentine submarine had done it. I doubt that such an offer was acutally + made by the Soviets, but we cannot discount it altogether.

+

6. Galtieri said that he could + not abandon Argentina’s destiny with us, and even with the British, + except in the most extreme circumstances. He and the others here are + clearly shaken and approaching panic as war grows near. At the end of + the day, he took me aside and said that only soldiers could appreciate + how critical it is to avoid conflict. (I did not correct him). He is + trying desperately to ease the pressure of impending hostilities and + thus provide a better climate for negotiations. (I suspect the British + prefer the present climate).

+

7. I am not optimistic that Mrs. Thatcher will think she can accept the current + proposals. As my last message said, it is not in our interest that she + inflict herself with a political defeat.See + footnote 6, Document 82. But + there is a basis for the process to continue. I plan to leave for London + at 10:00 a.m. I told Galtieri I + would do my best to gain British agreement and then return here. I have + also informed Mrs. Thatcher that + I will be returning with some + proposals, and urged her to avoid military engagement until I complete + my talks there.See Document 91. Obviously, any hostilities would + obliterate what has been accomplished so far.

+

8. The time for a possible personal intervention by you with Mrs. + Thatcher has not arrived. We + must first see how she reacts to the proposed interim solution and the + date certain for a final settlement, as well as my appeal for British + military restraint. I will not hesitate to ask when I feel time is right + for you to approach her.

+

9. I will tell the press only that my discussions here were open and + meaningful, and that I am returning to London with some ideas for + further discussion. While we can now build pressure on the British by + conveying a sense of movement on the part of the Argentines, I do not + want to characterize the current proposals or describe them as U.S. + proposals, since that would put the blame for war on Mrs. Thatcher if she cannot accept them. + Even as we press for diplomatic success, we must not shift the onus to + our closest ally if war occurs.In his + memoirs, Haig recounted a + meeting with Costa Mendez at + the Buenos Aires airport, held before the Secretary’s departure for + London: “At the airport, Costa + Mendez, showing the fatigue of our long session of + the night before, awaited me. We had parted at one o’clock, and it + was only a little after eight. Costa + Mendez handed me a paper. It contained some personal + thoughts of his own, he said. He hoped that I would read them on the + plane. Aloft, I scanned the paper Costa + Mendez had given me. It constituted a retreat from + everything we had accomplished at the Casa Rosada the night before. + The Argentinians were demanding either de facto authority over the + islands through administrative arrangements that would give them + immediate control of its government, or a British promise that + sovereignty would be transferred to Argentina no later than December + 31, 1982, regardless of the outcome of negotiations. This was a + formula for war.” (Haig, Caveat, pp. 282–283) A copy of Costa Mendez’s paper has not been + found.

+ + Haig + +
+ +
+ + 93. Memorandum From the Director of the Bureau of Politico-Military + Affairs (Burt) to the Under + Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Eagleburger)Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S Special Handling Restrictions Memos + 1979–1983, Lot 96D262, ES Sensitive + April 10–19 1982. Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Austin and cleared + by Miles and Pendleton. Miles initialed for Burt. A stamped notation at the + top the memorandum indicates that Eagleburger saw it on April 12. In the upper + right-hand corner of the first page, Eagleburger wrote: “1) Bremer should see; 2) RB [Richard + Burt]—go ahead and tell Brits. LSE.” + + + Washington, April 11, + 1982 + + + SUBJECT + UK Request for Additional + Fuel + +

AmEmbassy London alerted us to the UK + need for additional fuel at Ascension Island.Attached but not printed is a copy of telegram 7891 from London, + April 9, which reported a request from the Royal Air Force to the + Assistant Air Attaché for the United States to authorize a USAF tanker, then offloading 1.3 + million gallons of JP–5 fuel at Ascension, to “fill the storage + tanks at Ascension to full capacity (two and one-half million + gallons) for RAF use.” + “Additionally,” the Embassy reported, “the British have an urgent + need for another tanker with a similar quantity of JP 5 to arrive at + Ascension no later than 24 April 82.” (Ibid.) We have told + London in the attached message that we are investigating the feasibility + of providing additional fuel.Attached but + not printed is a draft of telegram Tosec 50118/97144 to London, April 10, which instructed + the Embassy to inform HMG “that the + tanker presently offloading at Ascension has no additional cargo + fuel available for delivery.” “We will investigate and advise,” the + telegram continued, “of the feasibility of providing an additional + load of fuel within the time period desired. Should we not be able + to meet this requirement, we have no objection to HMG delivering additional fuel by + means of its own tankers.” The telegram, as sent on April 10 at + 2036Z, is in the Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Cable File, Falkland File + 04/10/1982 (3). The British have indicated a need for two and + one-half million gallons of JP–5 not later than April 24.

+

Our investigation with DOD (MRA&L) late Friday, April 9 indicated + that we may be able to get a tanker load of fuel to Ascension by April + 25. DOD will provide refined + information on Monday morning, April 12.

+

The tanker that just left Ascension pumped off all of the JP–5 cargo fuel + that he carried (1.3 million gallons).

+

From the London message it appears that 100,000 gallons of JP–5 have + already been provided to the RAF. Most + of the 1.3 million gallons just delivered should be available for RAF use without seriously impairing US flight operations at Wideawake.

+ +

Recommendation:

+

Subject to any caution that Mr. Robinson (L) may have provided to you on Saturday, April + 10 concerning further assistance to the UK,In the right-hand margin + next to this portion of the sentence, Eagleburger drew a vertical line and wrote + “rethink.” In an April 10 briefing memorandum to Eagleburger, which analyzed U.S. + obligations to provide services and facilities to the British on + Ascension Island, Robinson + indicated that L had concluded “that the United States is obliged + upon specified advance notice to permit and facilitate the landing + of British military aircraft within the existing capacity of U.S. + resources on the island. We conclude that the United States is not + obliged to augment its own personnel or other resources in order to + meet British needs. If the British needs exceed the existing U.S. + capacity, the United States is obliged to permit the United Kingdom + to introduce its own personnel, facilities, supplies, and equipment + for that purpose, in accordance with appropriate arrangements to be + agreed by military authorities of the two governments. However, such + administrative arrangements, which could not be unreasonably + resisted by the USG, could provide + alternatively for the provision of services by the USG on a reimbursable basis.” + (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, + P830074–0771) I recommend telling the British that we have no + objection to their drawing upon the JP–5 in storage at Wideawake. This + would be subject to any limitation the base commander might have + regarding protection of his own operational requirements. You could also + advise the British that we are investigating our capability for + immediate resupply and will advise them as quickly as possible. As + stated in our earlier message to London, we have no objection to the + British resupplying the JP–5 fuel supply from their own sources.In the left-hand margin next to this entire + paragraph, Eagleburger drew + a vertical line and wrote: “RB—You + do with D. + Thomas.”

+
+ +
+ 94. Telegram From the Department of State to Secretary of State + Haig in Buenos AiresSource: Department of State, + Files of Lawrence S. + Eagleburger, Lot 84D204, Chron—April 1982. Secret; + Immediate; Nodis. Drafted and + approved by Eagleburger and + cleared by Bremer and in + S/S–O. + + + Washington, April 11, 1982, 2110Z + +

Tosec 50149/097203. For the Secretary + from Eagleburger. Subject: The + Falklands Dispute: The Soviet and Cuban Angle.

+

1. S–Entire text.

+

2. I have been contemplating, rather unproductively, the Soviet/Cuban + aspect of the Falklands dispute for several days. Your most recent report to the PresidentSee Document + 92. has rekindled my concerns. The following are some + suggestions for your consideration; I have discussed them with no + one.

+

3. That the Soviets and Cubans have decided to play on the Argentine side + should not surprise us. It was probably inevitable under any + circumstances, but USG involvement + and/or evident British intent to move toward confrontation would have + removed any doubts in Moscow and therefore Havana. It is another example + of Moscow’s inability to restrain itself (partly because we have given + the Soviets so little reason for constraint).

+

4. Thus, in the abstract, there is probably reason to warn Moscow that + hanky panky in our hemisphere won’t be tolerated. But the “abstract” + becomes less compelling when we contemplate the “or else” side of the + equation. We have had enough of US + warnings of dire consequences; we should not lightly engage in that game + again.

+

5. On the other hand, there is a potential for real trouble should your + efforts to get London and Buenos Aires to show some maturity fail. I can + conceive of a scenario (though I think it unlikely) of escalation + between the UK and Argentina leading to + a threat of Soviet military involvement—particularly if the British are + not able to pull off a quick military victory. The longer the stalemate + the more the Soviets may be tempted to try to tip the balance.

+

6. Thus, I believe we need to do something with the Soviets (I’ll discuss + timing below) although we need to be careful about the tone and content + of any “threats.” I would suggest that Walter (or I, if Walter has left) could call in Dobrynin and do the following:

+

—Outline in very repeat very general terms the objectives of your + involvement. While we should not repeat not give him any detail about + what you have heard, we should emphasize your desire to be “helpful” in + finding a peaceful solution.

+

—Talk a bit about our concerns, in a global context, should fighting + begin and outside powers become involved. The point here would be to + emphasize (without being explicit) that Monroe Doctrine-like concepts come into play for us at + some point.

+

—Remind him that we are at a “threshold” (Reagan-Brezhnev at the SSOD, experts talks on Afghanistan, etc.) in our relations; + that Poland has already set back the process; that the circuits can’t + bear any more overloads. In other words, without getting very specific, + remind Dobrynin that bad as + things are, they can get better or worse, and that little we can think + of would make things worse faster than getting involved in the South + Atlantic.

+ +

7. There are obvious drawbacks in doing anything, particularly if it + gives the Soviets a chance to tell us they are ready to help us solve + the problem. On the other hand, should we reach a stage where Soviet + mischief-making leads to a potential confrontation we will be in better + public shape if we can argue we warned the Soviets.

+

8. As to the Cubans, I believe we should, at least for now, do nothing. + We can keep this under review, but it would be unwise to be talking to + them for a host of reasons you well understand.

+

9. I do not believe there is any reason for haste re the Soviets; these + are thoughts for you to consider. If you see any merit in the idea let + me know and we will send for your approval fleshed out talking points. + My bottom line is that I believe we should talk to Dobrynin soon, but it could certainly + wait for your return if you come directly back from your London + stop.On April 12, Stoessel, then serving as Acting + Secretary, raised with Dobrynin the Soviet media’s allegations “that the + U.S. was not serious about its efforts to find a peaceful solution + to the Falkland Islands problem.” “The U.S.,” Stoessel informed Dobrynin, “was doing everything + possible to find a peaceful solution. Unfounded allegations + regarding U.S. motives were unhelpful, to say the least.” Dobrynin “responded that the + Soviet Union definitely favored a peaceful solution and had been + much more critical of the UK than of + the US,” a position justified by the + 1963 UNGA resolution listing the + Falklands/Malvinas as a territory to be decolonized. “But this + resolution did not provide grounds for military actions,” Dobrynin continued, and “admitted + that there might be an anti-U.S. bias in the Soviet media on this + issue and undertook to convey the Acting Secretary’s demarche to + Moscow.” The Department transmitted a summary of the Stoessel-Dobrynin meeting in telegram + Tosec 50182/97917 to + Haig in Buenos Aires, + April 13. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, + D820191–0965) If you return to B.A., then I believe we should + call him in by Tuesday or Wednesday.April 13 + or 14. On April 13, Gompert + responded to Eagleburger and + Bremer: “Please give + further thought to the ideas offered in reftel, in view of recent developments. Assuming we + have returned to Washington by this evening (Tuesday), the Secretary + would like to have upon his return (or [garble] Wednesday) your + recommendation on whether and how he should raise this matter with + Dobrynin, including + talking points.” (Telegram Secto + 5079 from London, April 13; Department of State, Central Foreign + Policy File, [no film number])

+ + Stoessel + +
+ +
+ + 95. Paper Prepared in the Department of StateSource: Department of State, Under + Secretary of State for Political Affairs, Miscellaneous Files, March + 1981–February 1983, Lot 83D210, D. + Gompert. Secret. No drafting information appears on + the paper, which was presumably prepared in advance of Haig’s April 12–13 discussions + with Thatcher in London (see + Document 98). + + + Buenos Aires, April 11, 1982, 8:15 + p.m. + +

TALKING POINTS—THATCHER

+

Argentine Mood

+

—As we agreed, I was brutally frank with Galtieri about your resolve and the solidarity of the + British people. I told him you were ready for war—militarily and + psychologically—and that this would be the result unless he altered his + course.

+

—Galtieri is being swept along by + forces over which he has at best limited control. He has whipped up the + public into a state of frenzy. He is not committed to fight—though the + navy is itching for battle.

+

—He will have no choice but to see this through unless he can show his + people that the original decision was not a mistake. And if his forces + are attacked, he will have no choice at all.

+

—My sense is that your strategy of pressure is working—so far. But there is no doubt in my mind that it will not + produce a withdrawal from the Falklands. Thus, if there is no + settlement, and assuming hostilities do not occur, what it comes down to + is whether the Argentine presence on the Island will become untenable + over time.

+

—It will not. The Argentines are a fatalistic people. Your fleet will be + in the South Atlantic indefinitely, even if we are lucky enough to avoid + hostilities.

+

State of Play

+

—After twelve hours of back and forth—and ups and downs—we came up with a + package which the Argentines may be able to + accept. I say “may” because as I left they reintroduced unacceptable + demands involving Argentine interim rule and assured sovereignty. We + have no choice but to ignore this posturing.

+

—The package I have brought here is not a US proposal. But I must tell you in candor, I would have to + say it’s reasonable.

+

—If the choice is between this package and war, the view of the United + States is clear.

+ +

Thatcher’s Starting Point

+

—I understand and support your basic position:

+ +

—withdrawal

+

—restoration of British administration

+

—preservation of the right of self-determination for the + Falklanders.

+ +

—My whole effort in Argentina was aimed at bringing them as far as + possible on these fundamental points.

+

—They began by demanding, as the price for withdrawal, Argentine rule in + the interim and a commitment to Argentine sovereignty in a fixed, short + period.

+

—We brought them a long way. If they were to confirm their acceptance of + the package we developed there, your three basic needs would be met.

+

The Package

+

—The basic concept is to trigger withdrawal by giving the Argentines some + sort of interim official presence on the Islands and a commitment on + negotiations, without saying how the negotiations turn out.

+

—We would accomplish this by an agreement containing the following + elements.

+

—First, the sides would agree to withdraw from the + island and an agreed surrounding area. Knowing you do not relish the + thought of keeping your fleet at the bottom of the world, we got the + Argentines to agree to two weeks.

+

—Second, the vacated zone would become + demilitarized until a final settlement. The Argentines would like a + commitment from you to keep your fleet out of the South Atlantic + altogether, but in the end will be satisfied if you simply announce + unilaterally your plans to return the fleet as the crisis is + defused.

+

—Third, compliance with these provisions would be + entrusted to a commission made up of American, British, and Argentine + representatives. Such a mechanism is needed anyway, and there is a logic + to the composition. The alternative is the OAS or an ad hoc group of friendly + countries.

+

—Fourth, the sanctions will be lifted. This would + not have to include restoring of diplomatic ties.

+

—Fifth, traditional local administration would be + restored, including the Executive and Legislative Councils. In keeping + with the idea that the Commission is to ensure compliance with the + agreement, your administration would submit its decisions and + regulations to ensure that British actions on the Island were consistent + with the agreement. I believe you told me last time that you could + accept a mechanism to ensure + your compliance. The fig leaf for Galtieri is his representative on the Commission.

+

—Sixth, the commission will recommend ways of + facilitating communication, trade, and transportation between Argentina + and the Islands. You would have a veto, though frankly I’m not sure that + greater communication isn’t wise.

+

—Seventh, negotiations on a final settlement will + be pursued consistent with the Purposes and Principles of the UN Charter. This covers the right of + self-determination.

+

—Rightly or wrongly, the Argentines claim that the negotiations would + drag on forever. They therefore insisted that the parties undertake to + complete them by December 31, 1982.

+

—I took to heart what you said when I was last here about your position, + and I believe what I’ve outlined is responsive.

+

Principles and Politics

+

—I recall that you also stressed that we could not reward aggression. + This is as important to us as it is to you.

+

—Let’s face it, if there is to be a peaceful outcome, Galtieri will, by definition, try to + sell it as a victory. If we try to deny that, I’m convinced we’ll have + war.

+

—But consider the larger equation. Argentina seizes the Falklands by + force. Then, confronted with the British fleet and British resolve, he + is compelled to withdraw, without much to show for it.

+

—This will be a success for British will, British principles, British + might, and American diplomacy. We want such a success as much as + you.

+

The Consequences of Failure

+

—I am sure you have considered the consequences of failure to arrive at a + peaceful outcome.

+

—Argentina has isolated itself by using force. If Britain does so now, + the fact that you feel it’s justified won’t stop world opinion from + turning against you. I’m sure you’re ready for that, but it won’t help + you in proving your point that aggression doesn’t pay.

+

—The Soviets were cautious at first, but no longer. The Cuban Ambassador + to Argentina returned while I was there, after over a year’s absence. He + offered Galtieri full support + and implied strongly that the Soviets were also ready to help.

+

—The Soviets see a chance to replace the French and others as Argentina’s + arms supplier and thus establish a beachhead in the Southern Cone. The + junta will not decline, if there is no settlement. Anti-communist + feelings will be subordinated to the imperative of survival.

+ +

—Soviet access to Argentina could have profound strategic + consequences.

+

—A conflict would tear the OAS apart, + virtually eliminating it as a bulwork against communist subversion.

+

—It could trigger trouble in Belize, the Beagle Channel, and between + Guyana and Venezuela.

+

—And of course, the Argentines will not leave the Falklands alone.

+

—The problem will not simply be the destruction of American policy in the + Western Hemisphere. Western interests are at stake in the broadest + sense.

+

—Finally, having brought the Argentines this far, how will we be able to + explain to our own people why war was chosen over peace.

+

How to Proceed

+

—If you believe what I have outlined provides a basis for discussion, I + suggest that I follow up with Francis and John and then get back to + you.

+
+ +
+ 96. Telegram From Secretary of State Haig to President ReaganSource: + Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Europe and Soviet Union, United + Kingdom (04/01/1982–07/31/1982 (6)). Secret; Sensitive; Niact Immediate; Nodis. Sent for information Niact Immediate to the Department of + State. Printed from a copy that was received in the White House + Situation Room. Reagan + initialed the first page of the telegram, indicating that he saw it. + Haig was then en route + from Buenos Aires to London. + + + April 12, 1982, + 0219Z + +

Secto 5064. Subject: Memorandum for + the President. For the President from the Secretary.

+

1. (S)–Entire text.

+

2. Let me share with you my thoughts on the Falklands crisis as I head + into London.

+

3. Our immediate goal is unchanged: To find a way to permit Galtieri to withdraw with honor. The + key issues are as we foresaw them: the character of interim rule and the + tension between Argentine demand for sovereignty and British insistence + on self-determination in negotiations on a final settlement.

+ +

4. I am convinced that Mrs. Thatcher wants a peaceful solution and is willing to + give Galtieri a fig leaf, + provided she does not have to violate in any fundamental way her pledge + to Parliament: withdrawal, restoration of British administration, and + protection of the right of self-determination. Her strategy remains one + of pressure and threat; by and large, it’s working. My hope is that it + may now be clear to her that while her strategy is having the right + effect—in rattling the Argentines—it will not produce withdrawal. Only + diplomacy, in combination with threat, will succeed. If she has come + this far in her own thinking, the question becomes how much can she + concede before endangering her government.

+

5. Galtieri’s problem is that he + has so excited the Argentine people that he has left himself little room + for maneuver. He must show something for the invasion—which many + Argentines, despite their excitement, think was a blunder—or else he + will be swept aside in ignominy. But if he is humiliated militarily, the + result will be the same. Although he is dealing with a more volatile + domestic situation than Mrs. Thatcher, he can more easily be bought off with optics + than can she, given the difference in the two societies and political + systems. It will be hard for Mrs. Thatcher to sell to Parliament an agreement that does + not measure up to her commitment.

+

6. We will soon learn whether Mrs. Thatcher is ready to deal. If she is, I believe what I + am taking to London provides a basis for a solution. But progress must + come swiftly. We cannot count on Mrs. Thatcher to hold her fire as our diplomacy proceeds. And + any hostilities—even an incident—would change the picture radically.

+

7. In all likelihood, you will know from my next report whether war can + be averted.

+ + Haig + +
+ +
+ + 97. Telegram From Secretary of State Haig to the Department of StateSource: Reagan Library, Executive + Secretariat, NSC Cable File, + Falkland File 04/12/1982 (1). Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Haig was then en route from Buenos Aires to + London. + + + April 12, 1982, + 0400Z + +

Secto 5066. For Judge Clark from the Secretary. Please pass + to White House. Subject: Statements on Islands Crisis.

+

1. Secret–Entire text.

+

2. Bill: How distressing is to find on the eve of our arrival in London + that the language provided the President for his radio speech from + BarbadosIn his April 10 radio address, + broadcast from Bridgetown, Reagan stated: “Two of our friends, the United + Kingdom and Argentina, confront each other in a complex disagreement + which goes back many generations. Because they’re both our friends, + I’ve offered our help in an effort to bring the two countries + together. Secretary Haig has + completed a visit to London and is now in Buenos Aires. We’ll do all + we can to help bring a peaceful resolution of this matter.” (Public Papers: Reagan, 1982, Book I, pp. 450–451) + repeated a public line on the present crisis we know to be anathema to + Mrs. Thatcher. The two-friends + parallel used to describe our relations with Argentina and Great Britain + will generate a strong reaction from the Prime Minister, you can be + sure. It harks back to the even-handed posture which, you may recall, + caused a furor early last week when used by DOD. Indeed, the statement will be read with even less + favor in London as it calls only for negotiations—and does not mention + withdrawals, which is the other half of the Security Council resolution. + To reopen this old sore now will not help our prospects in London. + Please, please ensure that any further statements do not deviate from + our standing guidance.

+

3. Furthermore I am appalled by the fact of Jeane’s appearance on Face + the Nation Sunday morningApril 11. + where she was interviewed at great length on the current crisis. I + cannot over emphasize the sensitivity of the current phase of the + mission and thus the importance of minimizing commentary over for the + crucial days to come. Interviews such as Jeane’s run unacceptable risks + of misstatement of errors of fact which could have profound effects on + the outcome. That Jeane maneuvered through this mine field almost blind + folded, without major incident is much to her credit—but misses the + point.

+

Warm regards, Al.

+ + Haig + +
+ +
+ + 98. Memorandum of ConversationSource: Department of State, Under Secretary of State + for Political Affairs, Miscellaneous Files, March 1981–February + 1983, Lot 83D210, D. + Gompert. Secret; Sensitive. This memorandum appears to be + an incomplete record, although no other records of Haig’s meetings with Thatcher on April 12–13 have been + found. According to Thatcher’s memoirs, she met with Haig on three occasions on April + 12 and once again on the morning of April 13. For her account of + these meetings, see Thatcher, Downing Street Years, + pp. 194–199. Rentschler’s + accounts of these meetings are in “Falklands Diary,” fo. 159–163. Haig’s memoirs provide a more + abbreviated account of his visit to London and discuss only one + face-to-face meeting between himself and Thatcher. (Haig, Caveat, pp. 283–285) + + + London, April 12–13, 1982 + + + SUBJECT + Meetings at 10 Downing Street + + + PARTICIPANTS + + British Side + PM + Thatcher + ForSec + Pym + DefMin + Nott + PM’s Personal + Secretary + + + U.S. Side + Secretary Haig + Amb Walters + Amb Enders + David + Gompert + + +

THATCHER: + We heard on the radio that they will withdraw if they can keep their + flag. The EC came through for us.On April 10, in response to the Argentine + landings, Ambassadors from the ten European Community member states + approved a ban on all imports from Argentina. The previous day, they + approved a measure prohibiting arms sales and deliveries from EC members to the Argentines. (Leonard + Downie Jr., “Common Market Sets Ban on Argentina’s Imports,” Washington Post, April 11, p. A1) For the + text of the April 10 Joint Statement on the embargo issued by the + EC member governments, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, + 1982, p. 1300. The meeting “turned up trumps.” We + are pleased.

+

HAIG: The + approach I took in BA was true to our + discussion here. I was brutally frank with them. I said the UK was ready for war and that the nation + was united. I said this was inevitable if Galtieri did not alter course.

+

He was not bellicose but he has whipped up the people almost out of hand, + though many of them are more pacific than jingoistic. The air force is + fearful, the army is moderate, and the navy wants a fight.

+ +

I spent all day bringing the thing around then got a counter-draftSee footnote 5, Document + 92. that destroyed everything. It called for + sovereignty, Argentine administration, and buying the land from the + islanders. I told them I would go to Washington and that there will be + war. The Foreign Minister, who is intelligent and moderate, got us back + on track. He got back to the junta; Galtieri had been drinking. This is what we are dealing + with; the drinking is not unusual.

+

Galtieri said that the Cuban + Ambassador returned to BA after a year’s + absence and offered them everything, also indicating that it reflected + Soviet willingness to provide support. Galtieri said that he did not want to break Argentina’s + Western involvement. He said the Soviets are willing to sink British + vessels. Galtieri said he + couldn’t turn to the Soviets. But if he is forced to haul down the + Argentine flag, he will be gone in a week.

+

Your pressure has worked. There is an undercurrent of fear down there. + The basic problem is that the threat of force alone is not enough to + bring about withdrawal. Your fleet could be down there a long time. I + think what they will try to do is run the blockade with Eastern European + and Soviet ships.

+

We have worked up proposals that they may be willing to accept. Don’t let + up on the toughness of your demeanor.

+

THATCHER: + We are deeply peace-loving, deeply democratic, and therefore deeply + determined.

+

HAIG: + Every effort we made in BA was to + support your aims: (1) withdrawal of the Argentines; (2) restoration of + British administration; (3) preservation of self-determination. It was + ideal for me to stop here first. The Argentines were totally + intransigent. They wanted Argentine rule or a commitment on sovereignty + within a fixed, short-period. We brought them a long way. If they could + confirm our final ideas, your needs would be met. The basic concept we + have developed necessarily provides for some Argentine presence and a + commitment on negotiations. (At this point, the Secretary described the + approach verbatim from his talking points.)See Document 95.

+

THATCHER: + Did they accept?

+

HAIG: Yes, + but they pulled back. Your local administration would be overseen to be + sure that what it does is in accordance with the agreement.

+

THATCHER: + Why do they want communication? There’s already a lot of + communication.

+ + +

HAIG: You + should know that these people are resentful about the exclusive + character of the administration.

+

THATCHER: + I don’t understand; do you realize that they are changing the school + curriculum already?

+

HAIG: They + want more visits from the mainland. They say that the process is almost + impossible from their standpoint.

+

THATCHER: + Do they want to people the islands with Argentines?

+

HAIG: + No.

+

ENDERS: + They can’t purchase or rent property for purposes of expanding business + and trade.

+

HAIG: They + say the 1971 agreementSee Document 1. produced no results. They said the + 1980 proposalSee Document + 2. was rejected by your back-benchers, not by the + islanders. The only way they’ll go along is with a date certain.

+

THATCHER: + A date certain is inconsistent with self-determination.

+

PYM: Not + necessarily.

+

HAIG: + There would be no preconceived outcome. We drove them off that.

+

ENDERS: + They say sovereignty is not negotiable.

+
+ +
+ 99. Telegram From Secretary of State Haig to the Embassy in ArgentinaSource: Reagan Library, Executive + Secretariat, NSC Cable File, + Falkland File 04/12/1982 (1). Secret; Flash; Nodis. Sent for information + Immediate to the Department of State. + + + London, April 12, 1982, 1554Z + +

Secto 5071. For the Ambassador from + the Secretary. Subject: Falkland Crisis.

+

1. (Secret–Entire text).

+

2. Deliver, in person if possible, the following message from the + Secretary to President Galtieri + without delay, and make sure that it also reaches the Foreign Minister, either at the + Presidential Palace or simultaneously at the Foreign Ministry.

+

3. Begin quote: I have introduced ideas hereSee Document 98. For the draft agreement + that Haig negotiated with + the British, April 12, see Document + 112. along the lines discussed at the Presidential + Palace Saturday night.April 10. See Document 92. I have confirmed that + these ideas were discussed with and recorded on your side by Ros and Iglesias. The talks have been exceedingly difficult, but + some progress has been made. I hope to leave here this evening for + Buenos Aires, arriving around mid-afternoon tomorrow. Time is of the + essence. The British will not withhold the use of force in the exclusion + zone unless and until there is an agreement. I hope to bring to Buenos + Aires a US proposal that holds the + prospect of agreement, thus averting war. I urge you to hold off on any + decisions until I have a chance to present the proposal. I am convinced + that any substantial deviation by your government from the ideas + discussed on Saturday night will doom this mission.In his memoirs, Haig wrote that “in the midst of the talks” with the + British, April 12, “we were informed that the New + York Times, in its editions of that day, had carried an + article describing the ‘personal thoughts’ that Costa Mendez had handed to me at + the airport in Buenos Aires as the official policy of the + Argentinian government.” (Haig, Caveat, p. 283) On + Costa Mendez’s “airport + paper,” see footnote 5, Document 92. The + referenced newspaper article is Edward Schumacher, “Argentine + Officials Say Prospects of Falkland Settlement Are Dim,” New York Times, April 12, p. A1. Learning of + the article, Haig recalled: + “At about 2:30 in the afternoon, I placed a telephone call from No. + 10 Downing Street to the Argentinian foreign minister in Buenos + Aires and asked for an explanation. Costa Mendez suggested that we talk later, after he + had time to discuss the matter with the Casa Rosada.” (Haig, Caveat, p. 283) No memorandum of conversation of this + afternoon telephone call has been found. In telegram 2161 from + Buenos Aires to London, April 12, Shlaudeman noted that Costa Mendez, in response to Haig’s message contained in + telegram Secto 5071, had asked + Haig to “await a message + from him before departing London” and to “not discard the paper that + he gave you on Sunday morning.” Costa + Mendez “said it was important to recall that he had + not participated in the final drafting session at the palace and + that he felt some of the principles embodied in the paper he gave + you should be incorporated in the proposal.” (Reagan Library, + Executive Secretariat, NSC Cable + File, Falkland File 04/12/1982 (2)) End quote.

+ + Haig + +
+ +
+ + 100. Telegram From the Central Intelligence Agency to Multiple + RecipientsSource: Reagan + Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC + Cable File, Falkland File 04/12/1982 (1). Secret; [handling restriction not declassified]. Sent to the + National Security Agency, Department of State, Defense Intelligence + Agency, Department of the Treasury, Secret Service, Federal Bureau of + Investigation, Department of Justice, NPIC, White House Situation Room, National Security + Council Staff, CIA Office of + Current Operations, JSOC, USCINCSO, and CINCLANT. + + + Washington, April 12, 1982, 1931Z + +

196242. TDFIRDB–315/07558–82. Dist: 12 April 1982. Subject: Argentine + Government Views of the Current Dispute with the United Kingdom (DOI: 12 April 1982). Source: [less than 1 line not declassified].

+

1. The following are the views of the Argentine Government [less than 1 line not declassified].

+

A. The Argentine Government is gravely concerned about the possibility of + war with the United Kingdom and the international political implications + of such a war.

+

B. The latest intelligence indicates that the British fleet is proceeding + toward the Falkland Islands; once it arrives, the British fleet is + expected to attempt to assault and hold a position, possibly in the + South Georgia or Sandwich Islands.

+

C. The Argentine fleet has been instructed to avoid provoking the + British. However, if an Argentine ship is sunk by the British or if a + military engagement results in “significant” Argentine casualties, the + Argentine Government will discontinue the current talks and will fight + the British, regardless of the odds, with the assistance of those + countries that prove themselves to be friends of Argentina.

+

D. The sole winner in a conflict between Argentina and the U.K. would be + the Soviet Union; it would gain a toe-hold in the Southern Zone, and + with a termination of the current Argentine role in Central America—it + would gain a relatively free hand to consolidate its position in Central + America and the Caribbean Basin.

+

E. The Argentine armed forces do not want a close relationship with the + Soviet Union. However, in the event of an all-out war with the British, + Argentina would be forced to accept help from any nation willing to + provide help, including the Soviet Union. The Argentine armed forces + have not requested Soviet aid, but the Soviet Union has volunteered to + provide assistance to Argentina; such offers of Soviet assistance are + not unusual because the Soviet Union usually tries to turn international disputes to its own + advantage. (Field comment: It was not specified whether Argentina has + accepted the Soviet offers of assistance.)

+

F. Many Argentines believe the U.S. Government is helping the British in + the current dispute. If this perception should become widespread, there + is the possibility of a backlash of Argentine public opinion against the + U.S. Government.

+

G. If the U.S. Government should publicly show any pro-British “tilt” in + the current dispute, the Argentine Government will consider the U.S. + Government as part of the enemy camp.

+

2. ([less than 1 line not declassified] comment: + This is an updated restatement of the positions that the Argentine + Government has been filtering into the U.S. Embassy, through a variety + of channels, since the current dispute began.)

+
+ +
+ 101. Transcript of a Telephone Conversation Between Secretary of State + Haig and Argentine Foreign + Minister Costa MendezSource: Department of State, + Executive Secretariat, Files of Alexander M. Haig, Jr., 1981–1982, Lot 82D370, (2) + Falklands Crisis—1982. Secret; Nodis. Haig was + speaking from his suite at the Churchill Hotel in London; Costa Mendez was in Buenos Aires. + A typewritten notation at the top of the transcript reads: “Poor + connection—sometimes the Foreign Minister faded out.” A notation by + Haig reads: + “OK.” + + + April 13, + 1982, 12:19–1:09 a.m. + +

CM: Mr. Secretary, hello. How are you? + I’m glad to get through finally. (We are almost positive Costa Mendez got thru first)

+

H: I’ve been trying for one hour.

+

CM: I was expecting your call.

+

H: I’m in London, Mr. Minister; I got your message after I hung up from + talking with you—the message through Ambassador Shlaudeman.See footnote 4, Document + 99. It concerns me a great deal in light of our + discussion and then to get that message, I feel more clearly that if I + go down there, it is under almost an ultimatum—a set of demands—which I + really do not feel is in the spirit of what I went down in the first + place on. You remember, we had a discussion of sovereignty in + Washington.See Document 73. I started this process with the assurance from your side that + I wouldn’t be faced with this or I wouldn’t have begun it. It is not in + the spirit of 502 or our earlier discussions.

+

CM: Let us put it this way. As we told + you, we are ready to comply with 502. You remember, you told me 502 + didn’t require . . . 502 doesn’t speak at all on returning to total + sovereignty.

+

H: Nor do we recommend that.

+

CM: We would comply with 502 and provide + for some way of complying and keeping the troops and navy from the place + where it is now.

+

H: That was my understanding, and I still understand that. I gather from + your earlier phone call—someone else was on the line speaking at the + same time. . . but I got the impression you said don’t come unless you + accept sovereignty on the one hand or unilateral Argentinian government + on the island.

+

CM: You have the paperAt the end of this line, Goldberg wrote: “(Paper given to + AMH at airport in B.A. on + 4/11/82).” See footnote 5, Document + 92.. . .

+

H: With the 5 points? From the phone call I understood it was either 1 or + 2.

+

CM: That is correct; either 1 or 2.

+

H: That constitutes an ultimatum.

+

CM: We are ready to discuss it provided + we are satisfied with the wording and the dropping of point 1 which I + told you on the phone.

+

H: Point 1 depends on what that wording is and, as you know, the first + one the President said he could not live with. We had several models; we + then discussed another model, and we all got the distinct impression + that was satisfactory or at least a basis for solution, and we still + believe that is so. If I thought that was your feeling, then I think + this trip to Buenos Aires is worth doing. If it is not, then, you see, + we could not just go down with a situation in which a total change + occurred. We are ready to support a very substantial change but not a + total change in which rule of force has been a decisive factor.

+

CM: Let us avoid discussing force because + that leads to a long discussion of the reason for that decision. Let’s + take things as they stand today. Our point—where we have control of the + island—and then we can discuss self-determination and by the end of the + year when all other points are decided on and we are assured + self-determination will be granted by the end of the year, and then we + can have a different way of governing the island. In order to comply + with the solution, we will retreat from the islands by the end of April. + Then, an interim government + could be discussed along the lines you mentioned.

+

H: I think that is very, very different from the conditions under which + we started this talk—at least on which the U.S. entered the process.

+

CM: It is the only thing that would + constitute the same situation as before the 2d of April. Even public + opinion in Argentina is this.

+

H: I think we have understood from the beginning—that is why substantial + change was discussed in your place and here today. It is just patently + impossible for us to go along a route where a priori it is decided this + is concluded as a consequence of the actions of the earlier part of this + month.

+

CM: If Britain doesn’t give us any + assurance concerning transfer but, on the contrary, insists on + discussion, what is our decision then? Where are we?

+

H: The only thing Britain has been firm on is self-determination. + Everything else is very, very easy. I thought I made it clear down + there. How you will show that would be very clear in my view after + another 9 months.

+

CM: I am absolutely sure if this + discussion were held . . . Britain has retreated every year from what + they said the year before. In 1968, when the document was drafted, they + retreated. What are the assurances we could have?

+

H: I think it should be explored today on the basis of information we + have acquired here today. It does not constitute a total process on + which conditions of 1 or 2 are clear without reservation, and I do not + believe it could be. I believe there is substantial movement in that + direction, the outcome of which settlement will be settled along + responsible lines.

+

CM: An Argentine island will be governed + by an Argentine governor—if that is not done, the public reaction will + be in a very negative way. We cannot tell them there were two governors + and a committee and then we will discuss self-determination—after all + the risks we have taken.

+

H: The alternatives are just . . .

+

CM: This is not an easy task for the + Argentine Government. I think the mood of public opinion has been good; + even European public opinion; even the papers are changing face and have + a different position.

+

H: I don’t know that that is necessarily true. I think what you are + telling me. . . what I am faced with tonight or first thing in the + morning, making sure we get some sleep, is that you are telling me it is + of no value to come down because I cannot meet the conditions you insist + are necessary from your + side. That means I will have to call the press in and make this clear, + and I think from that point on—it isn’t anything I want to do lightly—I + will have to talk to the President about it because it will set a number + of things in train.

+

CM: Mr. Secretary, I think you have + witnessed the best good will possible. We have analyzed it with + openmindedness. We must have either point 1 or point 2.

+

H: It has to be point 1 or 2?

+

CM: It has to be either point 1 or 2.

+

H: I think you have answered my question. I am sorry it has turned out + this way.

+

CM: I don’t hear a word, Mr. + Secretary.

+

H: I think you have answered my question. I am in the position that the + only alternative is to suspend this effort. We would stand by to be + helpful if there is some interest in what I call negotiating solutions, + but I don’t see any. You answered in a way I hoped you wouldn’t. No + progress is not good enough. I hardly consider that a diplomatic + solution.

+

CM: It all depends on the wording and + drafting and the way you present it. It could be a problem of + cosmetics.

+

H: I must say I thought we had a very sound basis going which was + doable.

+

CM: Our position is either 1 or the + other.

+

H: This forces me to tell my President we are given an ultimatum.

+

CM: I don’t think this is an ultimatum if + you bear in mind all the collateral offers we are making in order to + give to the people on the Island. We mustn’t foreget the ultimate aim of + this exercise. England has always fought. England at one time will be + compelled to relinquish something. The whole idea in the UN came when Britain presented a list of + places to be decolonized. Britain’s list included the Falkland Islands. + When we saw in the list the name of the Falkland Islands, then our + presentation was made to the UN. This + was created by Britain herself. We don’t see why they would retreat now + when they were the first to include it in the list of countries or + colonies to be decolonized. I’m sorry to hear from you this is an + ultimatum. On the contrary, we are ready to consider every aspect of + lives and properties of the Island and of ourselves.

+

H: The simple problem, however, is we have been talking about these + things. We exchanged some ideas. I don’t know if it serves any purpose + if those ideas have to be predetermined along a single course of action. + I don’t know how I can justify this effort. I have given five days of my + time to be helpful.

+ +

CM: We are grateful, and I am sure the + President is very grateful to you, too.

+

H: You understand I would have to tell the press why I am terminating or + suspending this.

+

CM: I would have to tell the press + something, too. We may come back to the Security Council, too.

+

H: I have a message today laying out a demand on your side in order for + this process to continue.

+

CM: I handed this paper to you the + morning you left.

+

H: I remember your saying it is your personal thinking—if you go strong + on one, you wouldn’t go strong on the other. This is what we have been + working on today. You said to me today you knew the afternoon before. I + said I am going home. You said don’t do this, and we went upstairs.

+

CM: We produced an alternative.

+

H: That alternative I thought represented a basis for constructive + discussion. Then, I got your paper just before I got on the plane. You + said you understand there has to be progress in one area and we don’t + need so much in the other area. Then you handed me the paper and said + these are my personal views and you understand 1 and 2 are two key areas + I talked to you about. I didn’t think for a moment you meant it had to + be a total and complete situation of one or the other. I took it on good + faith until I read it in the newspaper today.See footnote 4, Document + 99.

+

CM: I have not seen in the paper any + reference to our position.

+

H: I will have to send it to you. It wasn’t a list of 5 points, but it + referred to the Island or sovereignty. I am in the position where I + think we would be very badly criticized. It is an article by Mr. + Shoemaker of the New York Times.

+

CM: I will take care of that.

+

H: You talked about limited local autonomy as all that could be provided. + That is why I sent that message today.See + Document 99.

+

CM: I am surprised by this because I + haven’t seen it in the paper.

+

H: It was in the New York Times, but that was what + got me concerned today. With the British Government, we went through + what we did in your place. We had 12 straight hours—no easy process. I + remain concerned because I don’t feel it is in the spirit of what we + talked about in Washington and I had the Ambassador doublecheck to be + sure we were all clear on it.See Document 73. Men of good will would + sit down and try to establish a + new situation in line with your hopes and wishes but would not present a + situation which could not be justified by international law.

+

CM: The best token of our good will is we + had accepted 70% along with you.

+

H: I must be misreading it. I didn’t know you had. I got the distinct + impression today that that draft had no standing at all.

+

CM: My understanding was the draft + brought by you—7 of the 9 points—were discussed in an attitude of good + will. Those two points—either one or the other—are essential. This is + what the President said.

+

H: I didn’t get that from the President. The only thing I got when I met + with him alone was the importance of the flying of the flag.

+

CM: What is the real difference that has + not been reached yet.

+

H: I think it is significant that you now insist on unilateral solution + on the Island and on an interim solution in which the US engages to keep peace and being sure our + relationships, which have taken a new and positive turn, will go sour, + which will ultimately happen. That is a tragedy for both of us.

+

CM: It is a real tragedy for both + countries.

+

H: Is there any sense in my coming down there and discussing this matter + further?

+

CM: I’m afraid you have to ask yourself. + You know our position. We are willing to receive you; we are happy with + you; we are optimistic about the possibility of discussion. You know our + position.

+

H: Then, you are giving an ultimatum.

+

CM: You are a very old negotiator and one + of the best in the world.

+

H: You are saying ‘come, if I am ready to give what you insist you must + have.’ That means there is no chance in coming, and that is clearly what + I will have to say to the public in my own country.

+

CM: We have made an offer. We haven’t + received the best answer to our position.

+

H: I think you say take it or leave it—that is shorthand for an + ultimatum.

+

CM: I feel it is too early to + negotiate.

+

H: I am not dealing with that. I finished 12 hours with them.

+

CM: To put it in other words, if you + don’t think there is room for continuing negotiations, I can’t force you + to continue.

+

H: You are saying total sovereignty in 9 months or total control of the + Island.

+

CM: If there is a clear statement for + timing, it couldn’t be the best offer.

+

H: This will be interpreted as insistence on your way totally—after you + have applied force. I think that is an unfortunate position to be in. We could realize every + objective you are seeking with some clever drafting and clever + negotiating, and some give and take. I can’t see how it could ever be + realized by insistence that it be black and white.

+

CM: You know our position.

+

H: I must admit I did not leave your country knowing it.

+

CM: Our position has been very clearly + stated.

+

H: I made it clear in your country that would be grounds for not coming + in the first place, with a clear indication that would not be the case. + You have departed from the assurances which I had going into the + negotiations. I must say it was the feeling of my colleague and + myself.

+

CM: I don’t think it compares with my + notes.

+

H: I don’t understand. We have ourselves in a very difficult + position.

+

CM: Which is the urgency to end the + exercise tomorrow morning.

+

H: I think it is a tragedy if you tell me no negotiating can be done; + then, you see, I am in an untenable position to try to be of help, and + that is all I am trying to do. I am very happy to come down there under + circumstances similar to the conditions I started on Friday.April 9. We are willing as rational men to + craft some language that constitutes a political solution.

+

CM: Why don’t you wire me your definite + ideas, and I will then tell you. . .

+

H: I just don’t think that is a good way to do it. I think it is a very + dangerous way to do it.

+

CM: Don’t send it in writing. Send it any + other way. If you make all the points on 1 or 2, we are open to + negotiation.

+

H: I had every intention to go to Buenos Aires tonight until I talked to + you. I don’t think that is the way to do it. I dread returning, + recognizing it will end in failure if there is nothing to negotiate. I + don’t consider myself a negotiator but a transmitter of ideas. There is + the very, very serious prospect of war with grave consequences to us + both.

+

CM: To everybody.

+

H: I leave there and after 12 hours today, I am more convinced than ever + about that. I think it is terrible to kick it away by taking stiff + decisions. I don’t have the right to tell you how to lay out your + positions, but it is too brittle.

+

CM: What is your suggestion?

+ +

H: I would like your suggestion. The results will be felt within hours if + I do not continue on with this process. I cannot continue if it has to + be one way or the other.

+

CM: The problem is that I have no way of + reaching you in London. We have no Embassy there.

+

H: Do you think I should come down tomorrow? Is it worth it at all?

+

CM: Do you want me to send a man to + London?

+

H: I can’t stay here. I have a problem in the Middle East.

+

CM: Do you want me to come to + Washington?

+

H: I think it would be a mistake. You think about this overnight. I will + call you in the morning. Because I think, right now, the only + alternative for me is to break this off, hold it in suspense, unless I + can have some assurance these are negotiable items and not demands.

+

CM: I will think over tonight with the + President.

+

H: Talk to him. Tell him I think we are close to a workable solution if + we are not faced with this kind of alternative.

+

CM: There is always the counter-problem + of how to make them palatable. I offered; you are pressed by time and in + foreign countries. I don’t see any real definite reason to continue the + negotiations now. There is a very stern, negative position on the other + side.

+

H: My basic feeling is total realization of paragraph 1 or 2 in the terms + you presented to us deprives us of any facilitating role in this + crisis.

+

CM: Let’s see if we can turn those into . + . . (inaudible) . . . and resume negotiations early. I can send a man to + London or Washington or come to Washington myself.

+

H: You sleep on it. It is very late here. We have been at it all day. I + don’t think it is a good idea to make a decision under these + circumstances. I hope you can talk to the President tonight and tell him + the way 1 and 2 are worded, if there has to be total realization of 1 or + the other, I don’t think it can be done. I will call you in the + morning.

+

CM: I will be expecting your call.

+

H: Fine; very good.

+

CM: I will try to do my homework now. + Good-bye.

+
+ +
+ + 102. Transcript of a Telephone Conversation Between Secretary of State + Haig and British Foreign + Secretary PymSource: Department of State, + Executive Secretariat, Files of Alexander M. Haig, Jr., 1981–1982, Lot 82D370, (2) + Falklands Crisis—1982. Secret; Nodis. Haig was + speaking from his suite at the Churchill Hotel. + + + London, April 13, 1982, 1:15–1:18 + a.m. + +

H: Francis, I have been on the phone with this lad for about an + hour.See Document + 101. He quibbles right and left. On the one hand, + he says we cannot break this off; he would send somebody to London or he + will come to Washington. On the other, he doesn’t change his ultimatum + at all.

+

P: It is a very difficult decision for you, Al—a very big one.

+

H: I told him it is so important and the stakes are so high I hoped he + would sleep on it and talk to his President.

+

P: I respect that very much.

+

H: I think I should see the Prime Minister in the morning—at 10:00 or + 11:00. We should know exactly where we are coming to. I may have to get + President Reagan in on it.

+

P: It is very, very difficult; the stakes are very high. I will see you + in the morning.

+

H: I will call the Prime Minister now.See + Document 103.

+
+ +
+ + 103. Transcript of a Telephone Conversation Between Secretary of State + Haig and British Prime + Minister ThatcherSource: Department of State, + Executive Secretariat, Files of Alexander M. Haig, Jr., 1981–1981, Lot 82D370, (2) + Falklands Crisis—1982. Secret; Nodis. Haig was + speaking from his suite at the Churchill Hotel. + + + London, April 13, 1982, 1:20–1:24 + a.m. + +

H: Madame Prime Minister, I am terribly sorry to bother you at this + hour.

+

T: It’s perfectly all right.

+

H: I just finished about an hour of open conversation with this Foreign + Minister.See Document 101. He is clearly dissembling and + quibbling. On the one hand, he says he has to have sovereignty or + control of the Island, and on the other, he says go on with the + negotiations—these are principles and we can craft words. I think he is + under a firm mandate from his President. I told him I thought I should + sleep on it, and he should and that he should talk to his President. I + don’t think we should do anything without the two of us getting + together. One of the things which worries me is it will appear that your + position today has caused this problem. I think it would build problems + for you here and everywhere else. I would intend to tell the press + tonight that I have been on the phone with Buenos Aires; a complication + has developed at that end and the picture still is unclear. We hope to + have it clarified tomorrow and we will have more for them tomorrow. I + think if we don’t put that twist on it, it will turn negatively + here.

+

T: I watched television news and they reported it very glumly indeed.

+

H: I think that is justified. I think they are giving an ultimatum. I + told them we couldn’t accept it. I think the two of us should meet in + the morning before I talk with him again. He now says this paper is + official which was unofficial.See footnote 5, Document 92.

+

T: Did he send you a paper or give you one before.

+

H: He handed to me as I got on the plane and said these were his own + thoughts. Now they have become rigid alternatives.

+

T: What time would you like to come?

+

H: 9:00 or 9:30?

+ +

T: 9:00 am is perfectly all right.No + memorandum of conversation of Haig’s meeting with Thatcher on the morning of April 13 has been found. + In her memoirs, Thatcher + wrote that the U.S. and U.K. teams met “first thing” that day. “By + this stage it was becoming obvious that the proposals the Americans + had presented to us the previous day had no measure of Argentine + approval. In fact, the status of all these proposals was doubtful. + The more closely I questioned Al + Haig on this point, the more uncertain it became. + Since these proposals had not been agreed by the Argentinians, even + if we accepted them, they might therefore not form the basis of a + settlement.” Thatcher + continued: “This fact was made painfully clear at the meeting that + morning when Mr Haig handed + us a document embodying five points which he described as essential + to the Argentine position. As he himself said, the practical effect + of the Argentine tactics was to buy time. I always thought that this + was their main purpose in negotiating. I was becoming impatient with + all this. I said this was essentially an issue of dictatorship + versus democracy. Galtieri + wanted to be able to claim victory by force of arms. The question + now was whether he could be diverted from his course by economic + sanctions or, as I suspected all along, only by military force. Mr + Haig replied that he had + made it abundantly clear to Argentina that if a conflict developed + the United States would side with Britain. But did he wish to bring + negotiations to an end today? He could say publicly that he was + suspending his own efforts, making it clear that this was due to + Argentine intransigence. But if he did so other less helpful people + might try to intervene. I was keenly aware of that and I also felt + that public opinion here required us not to give up on negotiations + yet.” (Thatcher, Downing Street Years, p. 198) What a + sad thing!

+

H: I fear with the Peronista mood they have created a problem and it is + running away with them.

+

T: We will just hope for the best. I will call Francis.

+

H: I’ll see you in the morning; I called Francis before I called + you.See Document + 102.

+
+ +
+ 104. Telegram From the Department of State to Secretary of State + Haig in LondonSource: Reagan Library, Executive + Secretariat, NSC Cable File, + Falkland File 04/13/1982. Secret; Niact Immediate; Nodis. + + + Washington, April 13, 1982, 1215Z + +

Tosec 50196/98442. Subject: Areas of + Possible Argentine Retaliation/U.S. Vulnerabilities.

+

1. Secret–Entire text.

+

2. In response to your request,Not + found. following is our quick and dirty assessment of + Argentina’s potential for retaliation against U.S. interests and our major areas of vulnerability. + There are several areas in which the Argentines could take retaliatory + action, although in some cases, at as much cost to themselves as to the + U.S.

+

3. Political Military

+

—Accepting military supply relationship which USSR has long sought to establish. Argentine Air Force is + ready to make a major purchase of combat aircraft this year, and with + US and Western European sources + blocked it could well turn to USSR. + (French willingness to adhere over time to the current boycott,See footnote 2, + Document 98. of course, would be a factor.) + Depending upon the closeness of military ties, Soviet Navy could enjoy + use of Argentine ports and, for the first time, friendly waters in the + South Atlantic. This relationship would constitute a setback to U.S. + strategic interests, could eventually cause major damage to US interests.

+

—Reducing or terminating military-to-military cooperation with the US, by withdrawing from 1982 UNITAS exercise,See footnote 2, Document + 65. expelling our MILGP and DAP, canceling + high-level military visits. (Most visible, immediate action Argentina + could take militarily but would have little real impact.)

+

—Making clear that it is no longer interested in cooperation on security + of South Atlantic SLOCs. (Damage to + important US objective, but one which + may not have been obtainable in any event.)

+

—Being even less supportive of US + positions, and more supportive of Soviet/Cuban positions, in UN, the NAM, and other international fora. (However, Argentina + already rarely cooperative.)

+

—Reaching a national decision to use its unsafeguarded nuclear facilities + to develop a nuclear weapon, both in defiance of US policy and to increase Argentine leverage in any future + Falklands or Beagle crisis. This could only take place over medium-term + (3 to 5 years) and is already probably under way, but perception + Argentina moving in that direction would be seriously destabilizing in + South America.

+

—Ceasing its cooperation with US in + Central America.

+

4. Economic

+

(A) Trade:

+

—US exports total $2 billion representing + 20 percent of Argentine imports. Major US exports are organic chemicals, construction and heavy + duty earthmoving equipment. Argentina could embargo all or part of + US imports. However, exports to + Argentina represent less than one percent of US exports. Individual US + exporters may be hurt in the short term. An embargo would cause considerable disruption to the + Argentine economy.

+

—US imports only 8 percent of Argentina’s + exports, or slightly more than $700 million, and consist mostly of + sugar, prepared meat products, petroleum products, leather and leather + manufactures. Argentina could embargo all or part of exports to the + US. Some initial disruption of + orderly conduct of trade would occur but no major items are of strategic + importance and some are contentious such as sugar and hides.

+

(B) Investment:

+

—US direct investment in Argentina totals + $2.5 billion, less than one percent of total US overseas investment. Petroleum and chemicals make up the + largest group totaling $400 million and $415 million respectively. + Nationalization could be consistent with the nationalistic fervor and + should rank as a possible action.

+

(C) Finance:

+

—Argentina owes US concerns some $17 + billion. However the loss on an Argentine default or payments + moratorium, once undisbursed credits and US holdings of Argentine assets are netted out, would only + be about $7.6 billion. This would be a painful but wholly sustainable + loss to the US banking industry. + Argentina must roll-over some $11 billion in short-term debt this year + and needs to borrow an estimated $7 billion in balance of payments + support. Should the GOA declare a + moratorium, finding this level of financing would prove an + impossibility. Moreover, the USG could + freeze Argentine assets ($5.7 billion).

+

5. U.S. responses. While we cannot prevent Argentina from taking the + actions enumerated above, we are not without the means to take measures + of our own. On the military side, these could include:

+

—Military and other assistance to the British;

+

—Announcement that we will not proceed with certification permitting + resumption of military assistance and training;

+

—Termination of pipeline of FMS + equipment ordered prior to the cut-off of sales in 1978;See footnote 5, Document + 50.

+

—Support of international sanctions in UN + Security Council and with European Community;

+

—Seeking halt of West German and Canadian nuclear cooperation with + Argentina.

+ + Eagleburger + +
+ +
+ + 105. Transcript of a Telephone Conversation Between Secretary of State + Haig and Argentine Foreign + Minister Costa MendezSource: Department of State, + Executive Secretariat, Files of Alexander M. Haig, Jr., 1981–1982, Lot 82D370, (2) + Falklands Crisis—1982. Secret; Nodis. Haig was + speaking from his suite at the Churchill Hotel in London; Costa Mendez was in Buenos + Aires. + + + April 13, + 1982, 12:30–12:34 p.m. + +

H: Hello.

+

CM: Good morning. How are you?

+

H: I feel better rested.

+

CM: We have been working the whole night. + I have a formula. What would you like me to do?

+

H: Can you give me an idea what it contains. I have been waiting until I + spoke with you before I speak to the press.

+

CM: We will yield point 1 and 2 and add + “both parties affirm absolute sovereignty on the Island, but the British + will relinquish their claim in the UN.” + The interim period would be by government along the lines we + discussed.

+

H: The interim period would be along the lines we discussed?

+

CM: Provided Britain says she will + decolonize the Islands as announced in the UN.

+

H: Along the lines of the 64 declaration?In + 1964 the report of the UN Special + Committee on the Situation with Regard to the Implementation of the + Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries + and Peoples (Committee of 24) confirmed that the provisions of the + Declaration applied to the Falklands Islands and invited the United + Kingdom and Argentina to enter into negotiations to determine + sovereignty. (Yearbook of the United Nations, + 1964, pp. 431–432) For the text of the Declaration (General + Assembly Resolution 1514 (XV), adopted on December 14, 1960), see + Yearbook of the United Nations, 1960, pp. + 49–50.

+

CM: If she could view them specifically + as the Malvinas.

+

H: That offers some possibilities. What about in the context of + self-determination—would that then come in?

+

CM: The General Assembly has ruled out + self-determination in the case of the Malvinas. We can imagine some sort + of minority status for the Islands in the meantime.

+

H: Let me consider this. Perhaps it would be helpful if you could give + our Ambassador a more detailed indication of what you are thinking of. + And I will hold in place. My intent was to go back to Washington. + Perhaps that is the better thing to do and have him send it there.

+

CM: So you are flying to Washington?

+ +

H: I don’t want to just sit here in London as the advocate of one + government. I want to avoid that appearance. Our only effort here is to + find a solution.

+

CM: We will call your Ambassador.

+

H: I will probably leave here today and make an announcement that there + are certain difficulties; we are not ending this effort and are hopeful + of going to Buenos Aires shortly. Is that all right?

+

CM: Perfectly. But don’t attribute the + difficulty to one side.

+

H: I am trying to be even-handed and as frank as I can. I don’t want to + prejudice this.

+

CM: We will be in touch immediately with + your Ambassador. In Washington, you will have all our options.

+

H: I think we can operate that way somewhat better.

+

CM: Thank you for calling. I won’t make a + statement until you make your statement. Good-bye.

+

H: Good-bye.

+
+ +
+ 106. Transcript of a Telephone Conversation Between Secretary of State + Haig and British Foreign + Secretary PymSource: Department of State, + Executive Secretariat, Files of Alexander M. Haig, Jr., 1981–1982, Lot 82D370, (2) + Falklands Crisis—1982. Secret; Nodis. Haig was + speaking from his suite at the Churchill Hotel. + + + London, April 13, 1982, 12:40 p.m. + +

P: Hello, Al.

+

H: Hello, Francis. I just got a call from Costa Mendez.See Document 105. He would like to offer + another compromise to the last point, in which they would, in effect, + accept the formula in paragraph 5 and want some language that parallels + the ’64 Declaration of the United Nations on decolonization. I think in + that conjunction they are willing to accept autonomy for the Islands + which gives them a local government—self-determination, in essence.

+

P: That is a move from their position this morning.

+

H: Clearly. It is a difficult problem for you here. You have a historical + precedent. But we don’t want to reject it out of hand.

+

P: Do they want to add to paragraph 5?

+ +

H: To paragraph 7.

+

P: We will just have to see. Would they drop that list?

+

H: They would drop everything and buy paragraph 5. I think they know what + we are talking about. A number of changes we made might make them + uncomfortable, but I think all that is manageable if we can get + decolonization.

+

P: And the wishes of the people. That is crucial. I will have to find out + about the ’64 resolution.

+

H: In the meantime, I am going to get this proposal in specific terms + through the Ambassador. I think we should stay put until we look at it. + I told him I would return to Washington. Staying here makes it look like + I am an agent. You start looking; we will start our looking.

+

P: We ought to have another talking maybe. And obviously you don’t want + to stay too long. You presumably would do your thinking quickly.

+

H: The most important thing, very frankly, is that your position over the + years has been eroded by other governments and you cannot now take a + position which goes back and across that history. I think the Prime + Minister would be vulnerable to criticism.

+

P: I’m sure—and not only for that reason.

+

H: At least we can keep the dialogue going through a structured + framework.

+

P: All right. In his memoirs, Haig wrote that he spoke to + Thatcher following this + conversation with Pym, + observing that her “wariness and reservations were as great as + Pym’s; but she, too, + believed that there was a basis for continuing the process.” + (Haig, Caveat, p. 285) No memorandum of conversation of this + exchange has been found.

+
+ + +
+ 107. Transcript of a Telephone Conversation Between Secretary of State + Haig and British Foreign + Secretary PymSource: Department of State, + Executive Secretariat, Files of Alexander M. Haig, Jr., 1981–1982, Lot 82D370, (2) + Falklands Crisis—1982. Secret; Nodis. Haig was + speaking from his suite at the Churchill Hotel. + + + London, April 13, 1982, 2:15 p.m. + +

H: Francis, we have been doing some thinking on this thing and have some + ideas.Haig wrote in his memoirs that prior to this + conversation with Pym, + Costa Mendez telephoned + him at 2 p.m. Haig recalled: + “I was able to tell him that I had spoken to the highest figures in + the British government, and that I saw grounds for a breakthrough. + Costa Mendez agreed that + I should return to Buenos Aires.” (Haig, Caveat, p. 285) No + memorandum of conversation of this exchange has been found, although + it is possible that he was mistakenly recalling the conversation in + Document 105. Let me tell you + how I would propose to proceed from here. Would it be possible for you + and some of your colleagues to meet here in the hotel rather than at No. + 10?

+

P: It is not a good idea to go back there.

+

H: I will share some of those ideas with you. Then I would go to the + airport and make a statement there (read proposed statement to Pym).At + 5:30 p.m. Haig delivered the + following statement to assembled reporters upon his departure from + London’s Heathrow Airport: “As you know, yesterday I had planned to + go on to Buenos Aires in continuation of our effort to help in this + crisis, but difficulties developed to change those plans. We have + now received some new ideas, and while the parties are considering + those ideas it will provide an opportunity for me to return to + Washington to report to President Reagan prior to proceeding on to Buenos Aires + shortly.” (Telegram 7977 from London, April 13; Department of State, + Central Foreign Policy File, D820193–0063) He also made a statement + and spoke with reporters on his arrival at Andrews Air Force Base on + April 13. For the text, see the Department of State Bulletin, June 1982, p. 82. I will do + it formally at the airport. I think it is important you and I have a + heart-to-heart as we look at these new ideas and then I can stay in very + close touch as you consider them over the next 24 hours. I assume I + would wait at least a day in Washington before going on. It is clear + they are terrified. They don’t want things to break off. I won’t + attribute the ideas to anyone and I won’t indicate where the + difficulties came from.

+

P: What you plan to say sounds fine, but I think we should agree after + the meeting. I think it would be lower profile if I came to you.

+

H: There is great sensitivity somehow that we are becoming an agent.

+

P: I can say I am coming to see you off at your hotel. Come as soon as + possible?

+

H: Leave your place in 15 minutes.

+

P: Say be there in a half-hour?

+

H: Yes.No record of this meeting has been + found.

+
+ +
+ + 108. Action Memorandum From the Director of the Bureau of + Politico-Military Affairs (Burt) + to Acting Secretary of State EagleburgerSource: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S Special Handling Restrictions Memos + 1979–1983, Lot 96D262, ES Sensitive + April 10–19 1982. Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Austin; cleared by + Haass. A stamped + notation at the top of the memorandum indicates that Eagleburger saw it on April + 13. + + + Washington, April 13, + 1982 + + + SUBJECT + UK Request for Additional JP–5 + Fuel at Ascension + +

ISSUE FOR DECISION

+

How to respond to British request for fuel support at Ascension.

+

ESSENTIAL FACTORS

+

The British are estimating their fuel (JP–5) consumption rate at 660,000 + to 800,000 gallons per week to support air operations at Ascension. + Based on our computations, we agree with HMG that we can spare 900,000 gallons of fuel (just over + one week’s supply) that are currently in storage on the island. Even + with access to this fuel, however, the UK would run out on approximately April 19–20 unless they + either adjusted their consumption rate or received additional + supplies.

+

DOD, working with Defense Fuel Supply + Center and the Military Sealift Command, states that they can get a + tanker to Ascension by April 23 or 24. To accomplish this they have + pulled a tanker out of a Caribbean exercise and are sending it directly + to Ascension without consolidating its load or taking on additional + cargo fuel. It will carry approximately 2.4 million gallons of JP–5. + There are no other tankers in the area that could provide JP–5 before + then.

+

Aviation fuel resupply is critically needed by the UK to ensure a steady flow of logistical + support via cargo aircraft to Ascension where support is to be staged + for delivery to the UK forces off the + Falklands. The five logistical support ships and possibly some of the + amphibious ships with the task force would shuttle supplies between + Ascension and the Falklands. HMG also + plans to use Nimrods (which consume JP–5) based at Ascension for + communications support and in an anti-submarine role to prevent + Argentine interdiction of their supply line. (Nimrods could cover all but the last + 600 miles of the route.)

+

Alternative sources of the required fuel are hard to pinpoint. The MSC ships are the only tankers that carry + JP–5, a special military fuel, other than Navy oilers. The closest US + Navy oilers are supporting the Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean. They + could not arrive in time.

+

The only other possibility would be to fly cargo fuel to Ascension or + attempt to use commercial tankers. The relatively small quantities that + could be delivered and limited storage and handling facilities at + Wideawake Airfield make the former approach unrealistic. In the latter + case, the time required to find a ship, load and sail it to Ascension + would exceed the MSC delivery date.

+

In short, time and distance factors preclude a more favorable response on + our part. I spoke with Dave + Jones this morning. He is aware of the situation and has + directed his staff to make whatever adjustments as necessary to get the + tanker underway. He said he would get back to me later today.

+

RECOMMENDATION:

+

That you advise HMG:In the left-hand margin next to the following three + bulleted points, Burt wrote: + “Larry: I informed D. Thomas + of this today. Rick.” Under this annotation, Eagleburger wrote: “Good.” In an + April 16 memorandum to Eagleburger, Burt reported that the Ascension base commander had + been authorized to “draw on his war reserve stock to meet the UK requirements” until the MSC tanker arrived on April 24 or 25. + “This means that the RAF will be + able to operate without any reduction in tempo.” (Memorandum from + Burt to Eagleburger, April 16; Department + of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S + Special Handling Restrictions Memos 1979–1983, Lot 96D262, ES Sensitive April 10–19 + 1982)

+

• That we are making every effort to get the tanker to Ascension as soon + as possible, perhaps by April 24 or 25 with approximately 2.4 million + gallons of JP–5. You may want to explain that there are no other tankers + in the area that could provide JP–5 before then.

+

• We realize that this will create a shortfall of several hundred + thousand gallons of fuel before the resupply of JP–5 arrives. Hopefully + HMG can adjust its operations to + compensate. We have pulled our tanker away from a major exercise and + sailed it directly to Ascension without consolidating the load. This is + simply the best we can do.

+

• We are investigating additional resupply capability and will advise as + soon as possible when the next load of fuel can be delivered. We realize + that a second load will be required in about two weeks.

+

• RADM + Watson, our JCS Deputy Director + for Planning and Resources, has asked that Air Commodore Dick contact him to work out the + details of further JP–5 resupply at Ascension. His number is + 695-2934.

+
+ +
+ + 109. Action Memorandum From the Acting Assistant Secretary of State + for European Affairs (Holmes) to + Secretary of State HaigSource: Department of State, + Executive Secretariat, S/S Special + Handling Restrictions Memos 1979–1983, Lot 96D262, ES Sensitive April 10–19 1982. Secret; + Sensitive. Drafted by Simons; cleared by Scanlan and Bosworth. Sent through Eagleburger. + + + Washington, April 13, + 1982 + + + SUBJECT + Falkland Dispute: Calling in Dobrynin + +

You asked for our recommendation on whether and how you should raise the + Falklands with Dobrynin,See footnote 4, + Document 94. and for talking points if you decide + to do so.

+

On balance, we believe that you should. There is a danger that the + Soviets will take such a demarche as an invitation to meddle even + further, and the “threat” we have available to warn them off is not very + impressive. Nevertheless, we think the danger can be easily deflected, + and a warning could help. More importantly, even if it does not, it will be extremely important to be able to cite a + diplomatic warning to the Soviets in the event that the crisis drags + on and they and/or the Cubans become increasingly involved.

+

At the same time, the questions of “whether” and “how” are related, + because only a “threat” to relations overall has a + chance of being plausible and effective. Moreover, in every + meeting with the Soviets you should reiterate our main message that we + are working for peaceful solutions while they are the troublemakers, and + the Falklands fits the case. Hence, you should cast your remarks + broadly, as a warning against involvement which would break the back of + an already overburdened geopolitical agenda and our hopes for future + progress embodied in the President’s invitation to Brezhnev to meet at + the SSOD. (In our judgment, this is + also the proper glancing way to reaffirm that invitation in diplomatic + channels.)

+

Accordingly, the attached talking pointsNot + printed. are intended to help you sound both angry and + statesmanlike. They begin with a statement of our + objectives in the Falklands dispute which you may wish to + supplement; proceed to complain strongly about increasingly + malicious Soviet media treatment; and then set the problem within the overall + relationship. A contingency point in case Dobrynin seeks a role for the USSR in the crisis is added.Below this paragraph, Bremer wrote on April 14 a notation that reads: “The + Secretary has asked Mr. Eagleburger to do this.” See Document 135.

+
+ +
+ 110. Action Memorandum From the Director of the Bureau of + Politico-Military Affairs (Burt) + to the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Eagleburger)Source: Department of State, + Executive Secretariat, S/S Special + Handling Restrictions Memos 1979–1983, Lot 96D262, ES Sensitive April 10–19 1982. Secret; + Sensitive. Drafted by Ogden + on April 12; cleared by Brown, Bosworth, and M. Konner (EUR). A stamped notation at the top of the page + indicates that Eagleburger + saw the memorandum on April 14. + + + Washington, April 13, + 1982 + + + SUBJECT + British Request for FMS Data on + Argentina + +

ISSUE FOR DECISION

+

How to respond to the British request that we provide them with data on + our FMS sales to Argentina.

+

ESSENTIAL FACTORS

+

DOD/DSAA received a phone call + yesterday from the British Embassy asking that we provide them with data + on the types and quantity of equipment we have sold to Argentina through + FMS. The Embassy was specifically + interested in sales of Electronic Warfare equipment. DSAA has instructed the Embassy to make + the request through the Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs in State. + DSAA has compiled the information + (all unclassified) and sent it to PM for + transmittal to the British Embassy.

+

I do not see any reason not to provide this information to the British, + who probably could obtain it through other channels in any case. + However, I believe you should be aware of the request and approve + it.

+

ARA points out that we would be crossing + another, potentially significant threshold of support for the UK in providing this data. Unlike the + support we have previously provided, it flows neither from the Ascension agreement nor from the + commingling of US-UK intelligence services. We should assume + that the GOA would learn of our action, + and it would be impossible for us to portray our decision as other than + a clear statement of US support for + UK military action. That would + obviously prejudice any continuing “good offices” role by us.

+

EUR supports the PM position and sees no problem with supplying the UK with the requested information.

+

RECOMMENDATION:

+

That you agree to provide the British with data on our Foreign Military + Sales to Argentina.Eagleburger initialed his approval + of the recommendation.

+
+ +
+ 111. Telegram From the Department of State to Secretary of State + HaigSource: Department of State, + Executive Secretariat, Top Secret Hardcopy Telegrams, Lot 12D215, No + Folder. Top Secret; Immediate; Nodis; Stadis. + Drafted by Kanter; cleared by + Burt, Bremer, and in S/S–O; approved by Eagleburger. Haig was then en route from London + to Washington. + + + Washington, April 13, 1982, 2243Z + +

Tosec 50206/99019. For the Secretary + from PM Director Burt. Subject: Reactivated UK Request For Emergency Stinger Delivery.

+

1. Top Secret–Entire text.

+

2. The British have reactivated their April 11 request for Stinger.In telegram Tosec 50172/97528, + April 12, the Department reported to Haig in London that the British Embassy approached + the Departments of State and Defense to request 12 Stinger missile launchers + “equipped for para-delivery” on an + emergency basis, adding that “although cleared for NATO sale,” Stinger “has not been transferred + to any NATO nation yet.” The + following day, the British informed Jones that their request had been put “on ice.” The + Department reported to Haig + that “no reason was given” for the British reversal. “For now, we + have told DOD to go ahead with + preparations to ship in event British renew request but to do + nothing else without our specific authorization.” (Ibid.) We + now need to decide when and how to respond. The British are pressing for + an immediate and favorable reply.

+

3. As you know, the British Embassy approached the Department and DOD on SundayApril 11. with a request for six Stinger missile launchers and 12 missiles “equipped for + para-delivery” on an emergency basis. In response to that request, JCS + ordered the Army to appropriately package the Stingers and ready them for shipment. + At that time, the British asked that the Stingers be shipped to Mildenhall by noon, April 14.

+

4. On April 12, Davy Jones was + informed by his UK counterpart that the + Stinger request was being “put + on ice.” Today (April 13), the British reactivated the request with both + the Department and DOD, making clear + that they would appreciate a prompt reply. DOD believes that it could come close to meeting its April + 14 delivery date to Mildenhall if a favorable decision were made + immediately.

+

5. There are risks in going ahead with the Stinger delivery. The JCS is concerned that if the shipment + is discovered, it would directly link the US with any British attempt to retake the Falklands and + would provoke a serious reaction from Argentina (and perhaps others in + Latin America). Nevertheless, Larry and I believe that we simply have no + alternative but to respond favorably to the reactivated British request. + This is apparently Cap’sCaspar Weinberger. view as + well.

+

6. You, however, are much closer to the situation and are the best judge + of how we should respond to the British request, particularly how the + timing of our response will affect the delicate diplomatic state of + play. You also will want to consider whether White House involvement is + necessary at this stage.

+

7. In order to preserve the option of responding in a timely way to the + British request, we will need your guidance soon. Larry will meet you at + Andrews AFB when you land to discuss + this matter with you.On April 15, Eagleburger informed Henderson that a final answer on + U.S. delivery of Stingers was + not possible because of the “press leaks concerning US–UK + cooperation” (see Document 115). Six hours + later, Thomas called on + Burt to “renew urgently + the UK request for six Stinger launchers and twelve + missiles” to be delivered to Ascension by April 19. According to + Thomas, the timing of + the shipment was “crucial because the missiles would be transferred + to the first UK naval contingent + which would head south from Ascension on April 19” and “would be + carried by initial British landing party.” Eagleburger forwarded this request + to Haig in Buenos Aires in + telegram Tosec 60031/101880, + April 16. (Department of State, Under Secretary of State for + Political Affairs, Miscellaneous Files, March 1981–February 1983, + Lot 83D210, D. Gompert) A + further 24-hour hold was placed on the request on April 18. + (Telegram Tosec 60111/104145, + April 18; Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, + N820003–0667) In telegram Tosec + 60123/104180, April 19, the Department transmitted the text of an + action memorandum to Haig + from Burt which requested + the Secretary’s approval of a parachute drop at sea of the requested + missiles. On a copy of this telegram, Goldberg wrote: “1440 hrs. 4/19/82 from B.A. AMH approved—told Eagleburger” and “approval of this + by AMH + w/o further [hesitation?] no doubt + because he was just ‘disgusted’ w/the Argent.—“ (Library of + Congress, Manuscript Division, Haig Papers, Department of State, Day File, April + 19, 1982 Falklands)

+ + Eagleburger + +
+ +
+ + 112. Paper Prepared in the Department of StateSource: Department of State, + Executive Secretariat, S/S Special + Handling Restrictions Memos 1979–1983, Lot 96D262, Super Sensitive + April 1–30 1982. Secret. No drafting information appears on the + paper. In the upper right hand corner of the first page, a note in + an unknown hand reads: “6:30 pm, 4/13/82.” Rentschler forwarded the paper to + Clark under an April 14 + covering note, stating that Clark might find it useful for his 9:30 a.m. + briefing for Reagan. + Rentschler added: “A + longer-range problem, should this mission fail, will be the stance + we adopt with our principal ally, particularly as regards the + President’s trip to London in June. At this point, however, the + focus is much more immediate, and with luck we won’t have to address + the other problem.” (Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Latin + America/Central, Falklands War (04/09/1982–04/15/1982) According to + the President’s Daily Diary, Clark met with Bush and Reagan for a national security briefing from 9:30 to + 9:45 a.m., April 14. Reagan + then met with Haig, + Carlucci, Baker, Meese, and Clark in the Oval Office from 9:45 to 10:05 a.m. + (Reagan Library, President’s Daily Diary) No memorandum of + conversation of either meeting has been found. + + + Washington, April 13, + 1982 + +

REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT

+

The Basic Negotiating Problem

+

• British have for years totally frustrated Argentine efforts to expand + their role in the Falklands or to negotiate a shift of sovereignty. Now + Argentines want one or the other: guarantee of sovereignty by the end of + the year or de facto control now.

+

• For the British, the key is to ensure the Islanders can determine their + own future: a matter of both principle and politics.

+

• This negotiation is a clash between these interests. British insistence + on self-determination excludes guarantee of Argentine sovereignty. And + British fear that greater de facto Argentine role will allow mainlanders + to swamp the Islanders.

+

Politics in the Two Countries

+

• Galtieri has whipped up public + emotions and now is their hostage. Peronist movement getting stronger. + Navy Chief wants war, for glory (win or lose), and is a threat to + Galtieri. Nevertheless, + Argentines getting nervous and know that war would be ruinous.

+

• Thatcher was jolted by + criticism for allowing the crisis to occur, and has therefore had to + limit her own flexibility by her pledge to Parliament and commitment to + military action. Brits are basically united, but their perseverence is + suspect.

+

• Neither leader—or nation—wants war. But neither can back down + militarily or accept a defeat through negotiations.

+ +

Status of the Negotiations

+

• Thatcher has conceded change + from the status quo ante. She has agreed to: (1) place local British + administration under tripartite commission; (2) an Argentine flag; (3) + provisions for expanded Argentine interaction with the Islanders; (4) + December 31, 1982, deadline. (Text at Tab A)

+

• Argentine demand for either de facto control or guarantee of + sovereignty sets up cross-play between Articles 5/6 and Article 8.

+

• Argentines’ demands may be wavering—hard to tell + given erratic behavior of GOA. They’ve + floated the idea of decolonization—meaning that + they might not insist on Argentine sovereignty if they can at least + exclude British sovereignty. This would fit with a more subtle strategy + of weakening the British link and expanding their de facto role as a way + to secure eventual control. (Tab B)

+

Our Strategy

+

• Work with decolonization concept but not the word, while protecting + self-determination. At the same time, loosen up provisions for expanded + Argentine interim role.

+

• Convince Brits of the need to let events take a natural historical + course—i.e., give Argentines a chance to work out a relationship with + the Islanders.

+

• Convince the Argentines that we will use our decisive vote on the + commission to help expand their role.

+

Prospects

+

• Keep the process going. The British would rather have us play this role + than join in sanctions. Their suspicions about us are gone.

+

• Keep the threat of break-off hanging over the Argentines. They cannot + afford to be blamed and further isolated.

+

Timing

+

• Optimal time for agreement is toward the end of next week. Before then, + Thatcher won’t stop her + fleet; Galtieri won’t sign + unless the fleet is stopped. After then, the proximity of forces + increases sharply the possibility of hostilities.

+

• Need to crack the main issues this weekend. Must leave for Buenos Aires + on Thursday night.April 15.

+ +

Tab A

+

Draft AgreementSecret; + Sensitive.

+

Undated

+

Draft Agreed Memorandum as agreed at London 4/12/82, 8 + p.m.

+

1. On the basis of United Nations Security Council Resolution No. 502, + and noting relevant United Nations General Assembly Resolutions, + Argentina and the United Kingdom have agreed on the following steps, + which form an integrated whole:

+

2. All military and security forces other than local police shall be + withdrawn within a short period of time, but not later than two weeks + from the date of this agreement, from three areas defined by circles of + 150 nautical miles’ radius from the following coordinate points:

+

(a) Lat. 51° 40′ South

+

Long. 59° 30′ West (Falklands)

+

(b) Lat. 54° 20′ South

+

Long. 36° 40′ West (South Georgia)

+

(c) Lat. 57° 40′ South

+

Long 26° 30′ West (South Sandwich Islands)

 +

3. After the date of this agreement and pending a definitive settlement, + no military or security force shall be introduced into the areas defined + in paragraph 2 above. On completion of the withdrawal specified in + paragraph 2, all forces that have been deployed in connection with the + current controversy shall be redeployed to normal duties.

+

4. The United Kingdom and Argentina shall each appoint, and the United + States agrees to appoint, a representative to constitute a Special + Commission which shall provide observers to verify compliance with the + obligations in the preceding paragraphs. Each Commissioner may be + supported by a staff of not more than (ten) persons.

+

5. On an interim basis, all decisions, laws and regulations hereafter + adopted by the local administration on the islands shall be submitted to + and expeditiously ratified by the Special Commission, except in the + event that the Special Commission (unanimously) deems such decisions, + laws or regulations to be inconsistent with the purposes of this + agreement or its implementation. The traditional local administration + shall continue, including the Executive and Legislative Councils, which + would be enlarged to include representatives of the Argentine population + whose period of residence on the islands is equal to that required of others entitled to + representation, such representatives to be in proportion to that + population subject to there being at least one such representative on + each Council. The Special Commission shall fly the flag of each of its + constituent members at the Commission’s headquarters.

+

6. The Special Commission shall make specific recommendations to the two + governments or to the Executive and Legislative Councils to facilitate + and promote travel, transportation, communications and trade between the + mainland and the islands.

+

7. Within a short period of time, but not later than two weeks from the + date of this agreement, steps shall be taken to terminate the economic + and financial measures adopted in connection with the current + controversy; including restrictions relating to travel, transportation, + communications, and transfers of funds between the two countries. + Likewise, the United Kingdom shall request third countries that have + adopted similar measures to terminate them by that date.

+

8. December 31, 1982, will conclude the interim period, and during this + period the conditions of the definitive status of the islands shall be + negotiated consistently with the Purposes and Principles of the United + Nations Charter.

+

Tab B

+

Proposed Revised Text of Paragraph 8 of Draft + AgreementNo classification + marking.

+

Undated

+

December 31, 1982, will conclude the interim period and, during this + period, the signatories shall negotiate the conditions of the + decolonization and definitive status of the islands, consistent with the + purposes and principles of the UN + Charter, United Nations General Assembly Resolution 1514 (XV), and the + 1964 Report of the Special Committee of the General Assembly on the + situation with regard to the implementation of the declaration on the + granting of independence to colonial countries and peoples.See footnote 2, Document + 105.

+
+ +
+ + 113. Action Memorandum From the Acting Assistant Secretary of State + for Inter-American Affairs (Bosworth) and the Permanent Representative to the + Organization of American States (Middendorf) to Secretary of State HaigSource: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy + File, P880104–1014. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Johnson; cleared by Thompson and Holmes. A stamped notation in the upper right-hand + corner of the first page of the memorandum indicates that Haig saw it. + + + Washington, April 13, + 1982 + + + SUBJECT + Falkland Islands: Next Steps In The OAS + +

ISSUES (CONTINGENCY) FOR DECISION

+

Argentina is keeping open its option to call for an Organ of + Consultation, or Meeting of Foreign Ministers, under the Rio Treaty. The + timing could be tight, depending on the status of the Secretary’s + discussions. On a contingency basis we should decide on:

+

—Whether to seek actively to block an Argentine call for a Rio Treaty + meeting.

+

—How to vote on such an Argentine request.

+

—Our strategy if such a meeting is convened.

+

ESSENTIAL FACTORS

+

As of Tuesday morning,April 13. On that day, + after several days of debate, the OAS Permanent Council adopted Resolution 359 (492/82), + sponsored by Colombia, Costa Rica, and Ecuador, which expressed the + OAS’s “profound concern” over + the Anglo-Argentine dispute, expressed its “fervent hope that a + rapid, peaceful solution can be found to the disagreement between + the two nations within the context of the rules of international + law,” and offered its “friendly cooperation in the peace efforts + already under way.” For the complete text of the resolution, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, + 1982, pp. 1300–1301. Argentina is holding off on calling for + a Rio Treaty meeting. The Argentine Mission has informed USOAS that they are under instructions + from the Foreign Ministry not to exercise that option today.

+

Any of the twenty-one Rio Treaty signatories can call for an Organ of + Consultation, or Meeting of Foreign Ministers, under the Rio Treaty. The + request is addressed to the President of the OAS Permanent Council and debated there by the 30 OAS members. However, since the subject of + debate is convening an Organ of Consultation under the Rio Treaty, only + the twenty-one signatories can vote. The decision is taken by simple + majority—which means we would need 11 votes to block. The twenty-one + signatories are: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Costa Rica, Chile, Dominican Republic, + Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, + Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Trinidad and Tobago, United States, Uruguay and + Venezuela.

+

The OAS Argentine Mission told us + SaturdayApril 10. that should + they call for an Organ of Consultation under the Rio Treaty, they + visualized basing their request on the moderately worded Article 6 of + the Treaty—“any other fact or situation that might endanger the peace of + America”—rather than the much more troublesome Article 3—“an armed + attack by any State against an American State shall be considered as an + attack against all the American States.” The Argentines stated they + would not be requesting assistance of the signatories. Subsequently, the + Argentine Mission has stated to us that should they seek OAS action it would be under the Rio + Treaty, not the OAS Charter (as we had + requested) in which the non-Treaty signatory English-speaking Caribbeans + could have participated.In the left-hand + margin next to this sentence, Haig wrote: “6 v 3. OAS Charter vs. Rio Treaty.”

+

In the TOSEC of late Saturday (copy + attached)Not attached. Reference is to + telegram Tosec 50131/97180, April + 11. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, + P880104–0925) we recommended Option C, that we seek to turn + Permanent Council debate on the Argentine request toward a Meeting of + Foreign Ministers under the Charter rather than the Treaty. We had hoped + the Argentines might agree; they do not. More importantly, we had hoped + for a useful persuasive contribution from statesman-like participation + in the preliminary debate by non-Treaty signatory Caribbeans. + Unfortunately, since that time in the closed Permanent Council session + of Monday on the Colombian resolution, the Caribbeans have done their + worst to aggravate the Latins, coming close to fingering the Argentines + as aggressors. With this poisoning of the wells, chances are much dimmer + for a Charter invocation outcome and we now face an uphill struggle with + serious consequences for the inter-American system over the longer haul + and for our continuing acceptability as a mediator of the present + dispute. This action memorandum deals with actions required to implement + Option C and the costs. We then request guidance on how to proceed if we + find ourselves in a Rio Treaty situation and we present the following + options:

+

THE OPTION TO BLOCK THE ARGENTINES

+

(Option C of the attached cable)

+

With the Caribbeans out of the equation, to implement Option C, get 11 + votes against Argentina, and hold off a Rio Treaty invocation, we would + need to engage in hard lobbying in key capitals.

+ +

Our arguments could include:

+

—The OAS Charter which contemplates in + Article 59 “problems of an urgent nature and of common interest to the + American States” provides us with the necessary flexibility to deal with + the Falkland dispute, rather than the Rio Treaty, which could involve us + in undesirable suggestions that binding sanctions (which require a + two-thirds majority) be invoked against the British.

+

—Charter consideration provides us with more of the sort of conciliation + mechanisms appropriate to the present situation, rather than the + collective security, confrontational in this case, mechanisms of the + Treaty.

+

—Charter consideration is fairer; it permits participation by all + hemispheric states on a problem which clearly concerns the entire + region.

+

—Rio Treaty invocation, or at least adoption of collective security + measures under the Treaty, is troublesome since (a) Argentina’s armed + takeover, whatever their claim to the islands, violates international + law; (b) the binding legal duty to withdraw forces imposed by UNSC resolution 502 cannot be avoided by + recourse to OAS or Rio Treaty + mechanisms; (c) we and the other hemispheric states are obliged to + respect the SC decision in conformity + with our obligations under the UN and + OAS Charters and the Rio Treaty; + and (d) under international law the UK + no doubt believes it is entitled to exercise a right to self + defense.

+

(The Latins are likely to find these last arguments too harsh. However, + in his recent memorandum of law (copy attached)Not printed. The April 10 memorandum of law is in + the Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, + P880104–1019. the Legal Adviser has concluded that under + international law and in the light of UN + action the UK has a right of self + defense to use proportionate force to retake the islands and that we + would have strong legal objection to the adoption of any Rio Treaty + collective security measures that impaired that right.)

+

The demerits of these arguments are:

+

—Not many Latins will agree with bringing in the Caribbeans. (Some may + point out that Caribbean exclusion is precisely why the US may favor using the Treaty sometime in + the future to deal with Nicaragua or Cuba.)

+

—An Article 6 Treaty invocation with no Argentine calls for assistance + and no subsequent hostilities or British military moves could still + permit flexibility for conciliatory measures.

+ +

—In arguing UN primacy in the OAS and advancing the British right to + self defense, we irrevocably take sides, damaging both our future + ability to use the Rio Treaty and our present acceptability as a + mediator to the Argentines.

+

In trying to get the 11 blocking votes (bearing in mind the GOA’s intent to use the moderate Article 6 + rationale):

+

—At the moment we count as with us Mexico, Trinidad and Tobago and + possibly Brazil and possibly Colombia—a shaky 5.

+

—For invoking the Treaty, we see at least Argentina, Bolivia, Costa Rica, + Chile, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, + Honduras, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay and + Venezuela—16.

+

—Minds which might be changed by a hard push—not because they agree with + us but because of our leverage—Costa Rica, El Salvador, Honduras (to + give us 8 votes).Following this point, + Middendorf wrote: “Hond. + & El Salv. Made impassioned speeches tonight in support of + Argentina.”

+

—Even more difficult but perhaps open minded—Ecuador and Chile (it + probably would not be in Chile’s interest to spite the + Argentines—although they are deeply bothered by the Argentine action)—to + give us the probably remote possibility of 10 votes.Following this point, Middendorf wrote: “These 2 will be mighty + tough.”

+

—As an 11th vote in this very shaky equation, Haiti. But the Haitians + know how to cut deals and their asking price could be high.

+

In the view of ARA and USOAS, this game, with no promise of + assured success, is no longer worth the candle. Indeed it appears that + events have overtaken this option. Time is very short and the fall-out + from a full court press will be heavy. At a minimum the Argentines will + think that we have slammed a door on them. This conclusion leads to + considering what courses of action are open to us in the event Argentina + calls for an Organ of Consultation under the Rio Treaty.

+

VOTING OPTIONS ON THE ARGENTINE REQUEST

+

While we should explain fully in the debate on the request our view that + the OAS Charter is a more appropriate + conciliatory mechanism, we have these choices in the voting which + follows:

+

—Yes, for invocation, which will displease the + British and the English-speaking Caribbeans;

+

—No, against invocation, which will displease the + Argentines and most Latins;

+ +

—Abstain, which probably will irritate both sides, + but to a lesser degree, while preserving our ability to mediate.

+

OPTIONS ONCE IN A RIO TREATY MEETING

+

There are two options:

+

—We can advance views that Argentina has violated international law by + its takeover and that Argentina further is obligated to heed immediately + UNSC resolution 502, and withdraw + its forces;

+

—We can lobby intensively for use of the Treaty mechanism in a + conciliatory, peace-making effort.

+

In our view, the first tactic cripples our ability to mediate. In + advancing the UN primacy concept, it + also pokes a hole in our recent argument in a somewhat similar, though + different, situation, at the UN that + Nicaragua should have taken its case to the OAS, not the UNSC. The + second option will find favor with a number of the signatories; most + will want to avoid imposing sanctions; most will want to work for a + useful conciliatory OAS role. During + the course of a Rio Treaty meeting should the British take off the + gloves and commence to sink Argentine shipping, we will be in a + different situation. Working for conciliation and avoiding imposition of + sanctions will be harder. We may then be faced with a decision on going + along with sanctions or, along with Mexico, asserting UN primacy and our legal reasons to not + comply with Rio Treaty sanctions.

+

Recommendations:

+

1. That with respect to an Argentine request to convoke the Rio Treaty, + we not lobby among the OAS Permanent + Representatives in Washington and in the capitals for a Charter action + since events have overtaken us, but that we do explain our views in + order to prepare the way for the push toward conciliation we would make + in an MFM convened under the + Treaty.Haig initialed his approval of the + recommendation.

+

2. That on a vote on invoking the Rio Treaty, we abstain, explaining our view that the Charter would be the + more appropriate mechanism.Haig initialed his approval of the + recommendation.

+

3. That once in an Organ of Consultation, convened under the Rio Treaty, + we work with other Permanent Representatives to achieve an outcome in + which a conciliatory mechanism would be offered to both sides, if + agreeable to them, but no collective security measures would be + considered.Haig underlined the portion of the + sentence beginning with “a” to the end and initialed his approval of + the recommendation. A handwritten notation in an unknown hand after + this recommendation reads: “Approved per Secto 6008.” Telegram Secto 6008, April 15, is in the Department of State, + Central Foreign Policy File, N820003–0566.

+
+ +
+ + 114. Information Memorandum From the Acting Assistant Secretary of + State for Inter-American Affairs (Bosworth) to Secretary of State HaigSource: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, + S/S Special Handling + Restrictions Memos 1979–1983, Lot 96D262, ES Sensitive April 10–19 1982. Secret; Nodis. Sent through Eagleburger. Drafted by Carolyn + Allen (ARA/ECP) and George F. Jones (ARA/ECP); cleared by Haass and Ryan and in draft by Glen R. Rase + (EB/OMA) and Alberti. Jones initialed for Haass; Allen initialed for Rase + and Alberti. At the top of + the memorandum, Haig wrote: + “Tom [Enders]: Structure sensitive game plan in event of worst case + scenario, drawing from this. AMH.” + + + Washington, April 13, + 1982 + + + SUBJECT + Possible Reversible Pressure Points on Argentina + +

In considering political/military and economic measures we might take to + exercise leverage on Argentina to moderate its position, we must + recognize that the most effective measures are also the most drastic, + the most likely to do permanent damage to our long-term relations with + Argentina and Latin America, the least likely to have broad + Congressional support, and the most likely to affect interests not + presently involved in the Falkland Islands problem. The more moderate + steps will annoy but not seriously affect Argentina and may well + increase its nationalistic resistance to foreign pressure. Our leverage + is therefore extremely limited.Haig underlined this + sentence.

+

POLITICAL/MILITARY

+

OPTION 1—Suspend deliveries under the pre-1978 FMS pipeline. This would affect primarily spare parts that + are useful but not immediately essential to the GOA. In the long run, it could force cannibalization or + abandonment of US equipment such as the + A–4s, but even if the Western + European cutoff holds, Argentina could turn to the Soviet Union for new + combat aircraft.Haig underlined the phrases “as + the A–4s” and “for new combat + aircraft” in this sentence.

+

OPTION 2—Inform Argentina we will not make the certification necessary + for new military sales or resumption of IMET training. This would have little practical + significance as long as any other country remained willing to supply + them.

+

OPTION 3—Deny new requests for Munitions List licenses to export arms and + ammunition to commercial gunshops and other private end-users. Sales to + private users were not halted by the Kennedy-Humphrey amendment. Again, this would be little more than an + inconvenience for the GOA.Haig + underlined the phrases “to private users” and “for the GOA” in this sentence.

+

OPTION 4—Cancel pending high-level US + visits, such as Deputy Secretary Carlucci and General Allen, and withdraw the invitation for Argentina to + participate in UNITAS (as Carter + Administration did for Chile) and other joint exercises and planning + talks. Other than as a clear signal of US displeasure, this would have little impact on Argentina. + However, it might well add to Argentina’s support among other Latins, + including Chile.

+

OPTION 5—Announce that we are supplying fuel to UK at Ascension and/or to UK ships in the South Atlantic from US tankers. This would be most effective step we could take + to maintain military pressure on GOA, + but it would be a clear taking of sides and would probably prevent any + future Argentine acceptance of US good + offices or mediation.

+

OPTION 6—Seek further UN Security Council + action. The voting situation in the UN + is favorable to the US and UK, but the Latin states will accuse us of + violating a position for which we argued forcefully in the Nicaragua + debate, namely that OAS should be the + forum of first instance on Western Hemisphere matters.

+

ECONOMIC

+

TRADE

+

—Our exports to Argentina in 1982 are estimated to reach $2.2 billion, + representing 28 percent of Argentine imports. Imports are estimated at + $1.4 billion, representing 14 percent of Argentine exports. Nearly 25 + percent of Argentina’s exports to the US + enter duty free under GSP. Sugar + comprises over $200 million of Argentina exports to the US.

+

OPTION 1—Embargo imports from and/or exports to Argentina. US authority to restrict all exports and imports is very limited. The International + Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) + confers broad power on the President to regulate economic relations with + foreign countries in times of declared national emergency. Once invoked, + the IEEPA would permit a ban on + exports and imports as well as freezing of Argentine assets. Use of the + IEEPA, however, would require the + President to find that the Falkland situation constituted an unusual and + extraordinary threat to the national security, foreign policy or economy + of the United States. Moreover, invocation of IEEPA is a matter of great concern to foreign investors and + could disrupt US + financial markets. This + authority has been used only in the case of Cuba, North Korea, Vietnam + and Kampuchea.

+

OPTION 2—Restrict some or most exports. There is legal authority under + the Export Administration Act to restrict most exports to Argentina. The + Secretary of Commerce, in consultation with the Secretary of State, has + the authority to impose these restrictions. All exports to Iran except + food and medicine were restricted under this authority. This authority + is used in most cases, however, to restrict export of security + items.

+

OPTION 3—Graduate some or all of products exported to the US now receiving benefit of GSP. While the nominal cost is difficult + to calculate, Argentina has indicated concern over prospective + graduation of products currently on the list and has expressed interest + in having the present 1985 expiry date of GSP extended.

+

OPTION 4—Argentina has expressed its concern over the provisions in the + CBI concerning sugar. As an + enticement, we could offer a duty free quota equivalent to their current + export level of sugar. However, such an action could undermine our sugar + support program, and severely detract from the unique CBI package.

+

MULTILATERAL DEVELOPMENT BANKS

+

—Argentina is a major borrower from the Inter-American Development Bank + (IDB) and the World Bank. Proposed + projects in the IDB pipeline amount to + $194 million, and $505 million in the World Bank. An $84 million loan at + the IDB for Agricultural Vocational + Education Training is the only loan likely to be submitted for approval + in the near future.

+

OPTION 1—Seek to delay presentation to the Board of Executive Directors + of any loans likely to come forward in the near future. This can only be + accomplished by behind the scenes pressures on the Banks. This tactic + has been successful in several cases but may be difficult in this case + if Argentina wins significant Latin American support.

+

OPTION 2—Permit loans to be submitted for approval and vote against them. + In the case of the IDB loan mentioned + above, a portion of the loan ($26 million) can be vetoed by the US. The Congress is very sensitive to + political actions in the Banks by the USG. It also undermines the independence of the Banks in + addressing development problems and alienates both borrowers and donors + of the Banks.

+

FINANCIAL

+

—Argentina’s exposure to US banks totals + $17 billion. Of this, $11 billion must be rolled over this year, a large + part of which is held by US concerns. + Argentina will need additional borrowings of $7.6 billion for balance of + payments support this year. Eximbank exposure in Argentina totals $1.2 billion, with another $130 + million in preliminary commitments outstanding.

+

OPTION 1—US financial leverage on + Argentina is quite limited. We could jawbone banks on lending to + Argentina, but this would be antithetical to the Administration’s free + market approach to international financial matters (we have not even + approached banks on the Polish situation). On the assumption that + anything said to the banking community will be repeated to the GOA, we can respond to banking queries by + arguing that while current political/economic circumstances are not such + that new lending is indicated once the Falkland Islands issue is + resolved, the long term Argentine outlook is good.

+

OPTION 2—The next level of leverage would be to freeze Argentine assets. + This would require invocation of the IEEPA (see TRADE). Such a move would cripple the Argentine + economy, especially given the British freeze. Invoking the IEEPA to freeze Argentine assets puts us + clearly in the UK camp and eliminates + any potential role for the US as + mediator. It might also redound to our own detriment, however, by + forcing the Argentines into a default/moratorium/freeze and by shaking + international confidence (already damaged by the Iranian freeze) in the + US as a secure repository for + investments. We have no real financial carrots to offer Argentina.

+

OPTION 3—There are no Eximbank direct credits for Argentina in the + pipeline. There are several small $1½ to $5 million insurance cases now + pending in the Bank. These could be indefinitely delayed by the Bank + without fanfare since the economic situation is now cause for pause. + Should any applications for loans be received, the Chafee Amendment in + Eximbank’s statute prohibits denial of loans for other than commercial + or financial reasons unless the President determines that such action + would clearly and importantly advance US + policy in such areas as international terrorism, nuclear proliferation, + environmental protection and human rights. Such determination has only + been made for Chile.

+
+ +
+ + 115. Memorandum for the Files by the President’s Assistant for + Communications (Gergen)Source: Reagan Library, + David Gergen Files, + [Correspondence and Memos 1982] Falklands. No classification + marking. + + + Washington, April 14, + 1982 + + + SUBJECT + ABC Story on + U.S.—British Cooperation + +

This is a recap of my activities on Tuesday, April 13 regarding ABC’s story on the U.S. providing help to + the British with regard to the dispute on the Falklands.In his personal diary entry for April 14, Reagan wrote of this episode: “We + really have a tough problem and it hasn’t been made any easier by + the press. In what I think is a most irresponsible act—engineered by + Bernstein of the Post, + they have charged that we are lending aid to Britain’s Navy in the + Falklands dispute. This of course has set the Argentinians on fire. + The charge is false. We are providing Eng. with a communications + channel via satellite but that is part of a regular routine that + existed before the dispute. To have cancelled it would have been + taken as supporting the Argentine.” (Reagan, Diaries, p. + 123)

+

At approximately 5:00 p.m. Tuesday, Jerry + O’Leary came into my office looking very concerned and + said, “I’ve got a hot one that we have to do something about.”Attached but not printed is an April 14 + memorandum from O’Leary to + Gergen, detailing + O’Leary’s activities + relating to the ABC Nightline story. He then explained + that Carl Bernstein had called + him to say they had a story from their sources (which included U.S. + government sources plus a British source) that the U.S. was providing + ELINT information and AWACS data to the British and had + American sailors on the British ships.The + following day, April 15, an article citing unnamed “Administration + officials” appeared in the New York Times + asserting the United States was providing the British with a “wide + range of intelligence.” “Those officials,” the article continued, + “said that the sharing of intelligence with Britain, including that + from aerial surveillance, electronic intercepts, covert agents and + diplomats, was based on cooperation dating back to World War II. + ‘It’s become routine,’ said an informed official.” (“U.S. Providing + British a Wide Range of Intelligence,” New York + Times, April 15, p. A11) These were the only three + aspects of the story that were discussed with me. Jerry was very + concerned because he thought publication of the story would damage our + diplomatic efforts in Argentina and might lead to an attack on the U.S. + embassy there. He thought it imperative that the story be denied and + that we make every effort to keep it off the air.

+

I agreed with him on both points and said that if he could definitely + confirm that it wasn’t true and that he had proper guidance from NSC, he should deny it. He said he was + satisfied that he could vouch for its untruthfulness. Since he had taken + the first call from Bernstein, I + suggested that he call + Bernstein back with the + denial and in the meantime, I would talk with the managerial side of the + house to see if we could dissuade them from using it. I tried to call + the deputy bureau chief here in Washington (Bob Zellnick) since the bureau chief is with our + traveling team in Europe; Zellnick was on his way to Europe, so I asked for the + next person in charge and was given to John + Armstrong (whom I have never met before). I explained to + Armstrong the seriousness of + the story, said that I was informed that it was wrong and that we would + view its publication—in view of our denial—as detrimental to our + national interests. As a double pre-caution, I then called Bernstein briefly to re-inforce + O’Leary’s denial: I told him + that I didn’t know all the facts but that I had it on good authority the + story was untrue and our denial was a good one.

+

About an hour later, I was informed—I think by Mort Allin—that ABC was planning to run the story, that the matter was + serious, and we needed to huddle on it. At that point, I recommended we + meet with Judge Clark, John Poindexter, etc., to see if we + couldn’t come up with a stronger denial from the White House that might + knock it off the air. Specifically, I thought that a denial straight + from Clark might keep it from + running.

+

As Judge Clark was unavailable, + Mort, Jerry and I gathered in Poindexter’s office where we had a rather lengthy + exchange before we saw Clark. + While in Clark’s office, there + was a tentative decision that the Judge would make a statement in time + for the 7:00 p.m. news, and I called ABC to alert them that something might be coming from us—so + they would be sure to be ready. It was at that point they told us + (Poindexter and I were on + the line) what the actual contents of the story were. It turned out that + the story they were running had nothing to do with any of the three + points we had denied but were four additional points that I had never + heard about before in any of our conversations.The April 13 ABC + World News Tonight story at 7 p.m. reported + that the United States was providing the United Kingdom with a + communications link to its submarines, intelligence on Argentine + military activity, weather forecasting, and supplies on Ascension + Island.

+

After we all stewed for a while, it was agreed after 7:00 p.m. by the + group that we would not issue any additional statement but would instead + have a no comment on the story they had run. We were also greatly + perturbed that the story quoted a Pentagon spokesman to the effect that + the story was correct and said other administration officials were + confirming it. This, of course, made the White House denial sound very + hollow and undercut us badly. (To me it was the second time in the day + we had been undercut by the agencies: first, when someone leaked out all the information to + ABC and then when those outside the + building confirmed it.)

+

With the show over, I was in a position where I owed ABC a call on two counts: (1) to tell them + that we in fact were not going to have a statement but were no + commenting the story; and (2) to tell them that we would not place a + spokesman on Nightline (Nightline had been calling others during the day + about this and still did not have a firm answer from the White + House).

+

At approximately 7:30 p.m., I called ABC + and spoke with Bernstein and + Susan Mercandetti of the + Nightline staff to make both of the above points. Bernstein informed me at that point + that they had been getting very mixed signals from the administration + during the day and they suspected that our denials in the afternoon were + lies since others in the administration were confirming their story. I + explained to him that our denials earlier in the day were with regard to + the ELINT, AWACS and American soldiers; I also explained that I really + didn’t know much about the points that he did report but that our + official posture was one of “no comment” (as we had agreed with NSC).

+

Other than some later conversations with Mort and Jerry, that was the end + of my contact with the matter until about 10:30 p.m. when I had a call + from our White House duty officer (Pete + Roussel) who said that UPI had it from ABC that + the White House had confirmed their earlier story. Pete and I were both + indignant because that had not been the thrust of our conversation, and + I agreed to call them yet once again. I then spoke in a joint call with + Bernstein and Ted Koppel of + Nightline to say: I want to make only this point. Earlier in the day we + denied a story that we understood you were going to run; you then did + not run it. Instead you ran something else; our posture on that story, I + want to emphasize, is one of no comment, and I want to be sure you + understand that. They said that they did but that they had had calls + after their evening news from administration sources who confirmed their + story (and they had even had one apology). I said I had no way of + knowing what others in the administration might have told them, but I + wanted to be sure they understood our position was one of no comment. + That ended the conversation and my involvement in the matter except for + a subsequent conversation with Roussel to close the loop so that he could continue to + no comment the substance of the story.

+

I cannot vouch for what others may have told ABC, but I do know these two things:

+

—We would never have been in this mess unless someone/ones had not first + spilled a lot of sensitive information to the network. This is not + information that anyone in the White House (outside NSC) had; it came, I presume, from an + outside agency.

+

—Secondly, our whole effort to deny a story from the White House (or to + no comment it) will never be credible when those outside the White House (e.g., a “Pentagon + spokesman”) tell reporters that the story is true.

+

Our problem is those who are causing damage, not those who are trying to + contain it.

+
+ +
+ 116. Summary of a Telephone Conversation Between Secretary of State + Haig and Argentine Foreign + Minister Costa MendezSource: Department of State, + Executive Secretariat, Files of Alexander M. Haig, Jr., 1981–1982, Lot 82D370, (1) + Falklands Crisis—1982. Secret. The summary was dictated by Haig, April 14. + + + Washington, April 14, 1982, 11 a.m. + +

In a telephone discussion with Argentine Foreign Minister Costa Mendez and Secretary Haig at 11:00 am, April 14, 1982, the + following essential points emerged:

+

1. There will be no submission of Argentine proposals for paragraph 8 + until there has been a submission by the UK.For the text of the + agreement, as concluded with the British on April 12, see Tab A, + Document 112. For an alternative draft + of paragraph 8 of the agreement, see Tab B, Document 112. The basic Argentine thinking would + be contained in a memo from the Foreign Minister to the US Secretary of State which involves a + concept of decolonization and the creation of a status of international + minority provision for compensation of island inhabitants’ property + rights, etc. and establishment of arrangements for joint ventures for + the exportation of island resources; minerals, fish, oil. However, there + would be no formal submission of this unless there is some indication of + British flexibility. If you have some statement from London or if the + US is authorized by London to make a + statement which would indicate clearer flexibility than the Argentines + interpreted to have emerged from Mrs. Thatcher’s statement to the Parliament today, we will be + willing to submit our comments.

+

2. The second issue raised by the Foreign Minister involves the consensus + of US news reporting over the last 24 + hours which suggested US support for + British forces.See Document 115. + Costa Mendez stated that + Argentina must have a firm statement that the US is not helping in any way. Secretary Haig emphasized that such a statement + would be impossible in light of ongoing agreements of many years + standing and especially US obligations on Ascension Island. + Secretary Haig stated that he + would seek to affirm that there has been no modification to status quo ante and if such were the case, would + do all within his power to reverse such policies.

+

3. Argentine Foreign Minister Costa stated it would be essential to have + some guarantee on a limit for the movement of the fleet and that they + were already under great pressure from OAS members to invoke the Rio Treaty in this regard. + Secretary Haig emphasized that + this latter point would be provided for and encompassed in our proposals + and there would be no way to place such limits on movement of the fleet + until an agreement was arrived at.In the + left-hand margin next to this sentence a note in an unknown hand + reads: “AMH keeping pressure of + fleet on Argentina.” He underlined again that this all + highlights the urgency of immediate resumption of discussions. The + Foreign Minister then stated that none of these concerns should be + considered as personally against President Reagan or the Secretary of State; rather, were the + outcome of public perception which needs to be dealt with in Argentina. + He then expressed the deep personal gratitude of President Galtieri to President Reagan and Secretary Haig as well as his own. Secretary + Haig informed the Minister + he would give him an early report to include an assessment of the Rio + Treaty situation.

+

Footnote: It is clear that the Argentines will not + accept a visit from the Secretary until some action has been taken on + points one and two above.Following this + sentence, Goldberg wrote: + “AMH phoned FM again at 2:05 on 4/14/82—see + transcript.” For the transcript of this conversation, see Document 117.

+

Dictated by Secretary Haig April + 14, 1982.

+
+ +
+ + 117. Transcript of a Telephone Conversation Between Secretary of State + Haig and Argentine Foreign + Minister Costa MendezSource: Department of State, + Executive Secretariat, Files of Alexander M. Haig, Jr., 1981–1982, Lot 82D370, (1) + Falklands Crisis—1982. Secret. Haig was in Washington; Costa Mendez was in Buenos Aires. In the upper + right-hand corner of the memorandum, Goldberg wrote the date and the following: + “H=Haig; M=Costa + Mendez.” + + + April 14, 1982, 2:05 + p.m. + +

H: (reads his proposed press statement)At + 3:45 p.m., April 14, Haig + read a statement to the media, noting that while the positions held + by Argentina and the United Kingdom “are deeply felt, and in many + cases mutually contradictory,” the leaders of both countries “have + assured me, and in turn the President, again today, that they are + prepared to go on working with us to reach a peaceful solution.” “As + a result of my conversations in London, plus telephone conversations + today,” he continued, “I have developed new ideas which I have + described to the Argentine Government. Based on these new ideas, the + Argentines have invited me to return to Buenos Aires. I propose to + do so tomorrow.” Emphasizing the U.S. role as mediator since the + beginning of the crisis, Haig pointed out that “the United States has + therefore, not acceded to requests that would go beyond the scope of + customary patterns of cooperation based on existing bilateral + agreements.” The Department transmitted the text of the statement in + telegram 100466 to Buenos Aires and London, April 15. (Department of + State, Central Foreign Policy File, D840626–0175)

+

H: We have turned down a number of requests.

+

M: I understand that.

+

H: You know, this statement from my point of view is going to subject me + to investigation here but I want you to know that will be a problem and + you must not be concerned about press speculation. These people are + malicious and wrong.

+

M: Yes.

+

H: I do have definitely some new ideas from London. They involve the + process of normalization between the island and the mainland; such as a + date certain for completion of concessions; some proposals for the fleet + and its movement in the context of the agreement. I have also been told + we will receive some suggestions from them to broaden paragraph 8 and + they will be here tomorrow morning.

+

M: You will hear tomorrow morning from them?

+

H: Yes.See Document + 123. On paragraph 8.See Tab B, Document 112. Based on + this, Mr. Minister, I think that we do have some additional basis for + continuing our talks.

+

M: You think that you have enough basis to continue our talks?

+ +

H: Yes and I talked personally with Mrs. Thatcher on the phone.No + memorandum of conversation of this telephone exchange between + Haig and Thatcher has been found. I + read her the statement as I have just read it to you and there will be + nothing said in London that would contradict any of those + statements.

+

M: That is very important to us. When will you issue that statement?

+

H: 3:45.

+

M: Okay. Nevertheless, I think that it is important for me to send you + now the draft we have—the draft agreement we intend to propose so that + you can study it before and call me as soon as you receive it. I have + already sent it to you an hour ago, a sort of aide memoireThe text of the aide-mémoire was delivered to + Shlaudeman by the + Argentine Foreign Ministry on the evening of April 14. Shlaudeman transmitted an + informational translation to the Department in telegram 2246 from + Buenos Aires, April 15. (Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, + NSC Country File, Latin + America/Central, Argentina (04/15/1982–04/17/1982)) with a + very short history of what were the real beginnings of this problem and + you will receive it. I think I can send you too a new idea.

+

H: I think this means both sides have contributed new ideas and I will + have some of my own.

+

M: You are perfectly welcome.

+

H: I think this trip is all worthwhile doing. I think it is important we + keep the negotiations going.

+

M: I will give you the Spanish version and I will ask him to send it as + soon as possible.

+

H: I should announce this this afternoon that I am going. If I don’t, we + will have this continual press speculation. There is the danger of wrong + things being said publicly by people who really don’t know the facts. I + think once the process starts, people tend to be more responsible. I + would like to say I will leave tomorrow and that would mean we could + start Friday morning.April 16.

+

M: I am ready for that. That suits me perfectly well. I would only want + to stress two or three points. First, I would need a firm denial that we + already talked about those of the American Government vis-a-vis the + British Government giving assistance.

+

H: I do not think it is a good idea. I would make this statement here in + 45 minutes.

+

H: It must be impossible at your end with public opinion. I would propose + to go ahead. I will await your message and send you some intelligence + thinking here. I continue to believe that we are getting very close to a + workable outcome.

+ +

M: Very good news.

+

H: I see ground through which we can get a breakthrough. I do believe it + will take scaling down of requirements at both ends but in a very + balanced way.

+

M: Let me tell you two points. We have a very strong pressure from public + opinion and inside government to work for the Rio Treaty meeting.

+

H: I promise you some thoughts on that. First, our position is that the + Rio Pact is going to be a very difficult legal question as to whether it + is applicable. So we would be opposed to invoking it at this time. + Secondly, if we were faced with a two-thirds majority, the great + difficulty would be it would entail our having to apply sanctions and we + have refused, as you know, to join the efforts to have us apply + sanctions against you. You understand that.

+

M: Yes.

+

H: We have refused approaching by the Ten to do so and we are going to + continue to maintain that position.See footnote 2, Document 98. If we get + into an OAS debate while these talks + are still going on, it would serve no purpose other than to complicate + our position of sketching a position.

+

M: There are two points missing. I understand and it is fine you are + coming here and in the next 48 hours the fleet will not go on advancing + toward ______.Goldberg added “Ascension Isl.” by hand where the + transcriptionist left a blank underscore. Is that + correct?

+

H: I cannot get them to change their fleet movements until we have an + agreement.

+

M: I see.

+

H: But in the agreement are specifics to take care of that situation.

+

M: The second point is this. Our idea was that their attitude concerning + the blockade; will they continue strict blockading or will they have a + flexible blockade. Our information is there are many submarines in the + zone, far more than what I think the British could have sent.

+

H: They could have as many as four or five from our estimates. I think it + is important nobody test that blockade until we have talked.

+

M: Anything can happen in that area because as we told you, we are afraid + that there are all nationalities of marines in that area. It is + important that they be very careful in that area. If you could get this + to the British, it would be worthwhile.

+

H: I will do so.

+ +

M: Mr. Secretary, thank you very much for calling and for your statement + and for your good will. I hope in a couple of hours you will be + receiving our general ideas which I think you will find in some aspects + even far more generous than what they are expecting.

+

H: I am pleased to hear that. I am grateful to you for what I know must + be an unprecedented human effort.

+

M: . . . . if we have this visit from you to announce we will suspend our + Rio Treaty call and we will be expecting you tomorrow night to begin + talks on Friday.Goldberg underlined the phrases + “visit from you to announce we will” and “Rio Treaty call” in this + sentence. Anyhow, if you receive my papers before you leave + Washington, I would appreciate your comments.

+

H: (agrees to look for papers)Goldberg underlined “look for.” In + the space below this sentence, Goldberg wrote: “Recall—AMH concerned about the FM’s health—reflected in fact that AMH did not want to go to Argentina on + 4/15/82 too late as it would add fatigue to + Costa Mendez—so AMH said, ‘You have to look at the + schedule from their perspective as well as our own.’”

+
+ +
+ 118. Information Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for + Inter-American Affairs (Enders) + to Secretary of State HaigSource: Department of State, + Central Foreign Policy File, P880104–0970. Secret. Drafted by + Jones and G. McCulloch + (ARA/RPP); cleared by M. + McLeod (L/OES), Alberti, J.P.A. Bernhardt (OES/OPA), D. Jones (FWG), Monroe, + and McNutt. Jones initialed for all clearing + officials; McCulloch did not initial. Haig initialed the upper right-hand corner of the + first page and underneath this wrote “agree.” + + + Washington, April 14, + 1982 + + + SUBJECT + Political Implications of Argentine Military Activity in the + Antarctic + +

The British Embassy asked + us April 8 (Tab 1)At Tab 1, but + not printed, is telegram Tosec + 50082/96333, April 10, in which the Department transmitted the text + of the British Embassy request to Haig in London. (Department of State, Central + Foreign Policy File, P880104–0973) + to seek assurances from Argentina that it would take + no action against British scientific stations in Antarctica. A + legal analysis sent you on April 10 (Tab 2)At Tab 2, not printed, is telegram Tosec 50097/96817, April 10, in which the Department + transmitted to Haig in + Buenos Aires the text of an information memorandum analyzing the + implications of Argentine action against U.K. research stations in + the context of the Antarctic Treaty. (Department of State, Central + Foreign Policy File, P880104–0974) concluded that any military activity not in self-defense, south + of 60 degrees south latitude, including exercises, would violate the Antarctic Treaty.

+

A recent CIA study argued that, “Perhaps + more than any other country, Argentina is likely to abrogate the Treaty + if its primacy in its claim area is threatened. For example, if another + country began a significant unilateral exploration or exploitation + effort in the Argentina claim, Argentina might well react with military + force even though the Treaty forbids it. All but one + of Argentina’s eight permanent stations are run by the military,” + and it has an all-weather airstrip capable of handling C–130’s. (Tab 3)At Tab 3, not printed, is an excerpt from a June + 1981 CIA study of the Argentine + position on Antarctica. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy + File, P880104–0975) All of the Argentine territorial claim + lies within the British territorial claim, and all the British research + stations are within the Argentine claim. In addition, the Argentine and + British claims overlap with that of Chile and contain research stations + operated by Poland, the USSR and the + U.S. Brazil has proclaimed a “zone of interest” within the Argentine + claimed area.

+

[1 paragraph (3 lines) not declassified]

+

[2 lines not declassified] We + believe that Argentina is most unlikely to initiate hostilities as + long as the U.K. does not. In the event + of military or naval conflict in the Falklands + area, further Argentine action against British interests in Argentina is + likely. Likewise, the chance of some action in the Antarctic would increase. Even in + those circumstances, we would not rate the chances as + higher than one in ten, unless Argentina suffered major naval + losses and casualties that drove it to seek + any available opportunity for striking back.

+

The factors restraining Argentine action are:

+

—An attack in the Antarctic would be strongly opposed by the 24 other + parties to the Antarctic Treaty. We would expect it to be as disturbing + to the USSR as to the others;

+

—Seizure of the British stations would give Argentina + no military advantage and under Article IV of the Treaty would + neither advance nor consolidate its Antarctic claim, which + already encompasses most of the British claim. The British claim does + not stem from or depend upon its title to the Falklands, and the other + Treaty parties would strongly resist any effort to change the present + status of territorial claims;

+

—An attack on unarmed scientists would be far more + widely condemned in the international + community than was the attack on the Falklands;

+ +

—By undermining, if not destroying, the Treaty, Argentina would sacrifice + a regime it helped negotiate, in which it has participated for 21 years, + and which is working out rules for fish and mineral resource + exploitation more beneficial to Treaty participants than any likely + alternative regime. In particular, Argentina has an interest in + continuing to exclude the Antarctic Treaty area from the draft Law of + the Sea convention.

+

However unlikely it may be, an Argentine attack in the Antarctic would be + highly detrimental to U.S. interest in preservation of the Treaty + regime. Should any such action become more likely, we + will certainly wish to express our concern in + the strongest terms in Buenos Aires.

+
+ +
+ 119. Information Memorandum From the Director of the Bureau of + Politico-Military Affairs (Burt) + to Secretary of State HaigSource: Department of State, + Executive Secretariat, S/S Special + Handling Restrictions Memos 1979–1983, Lot 96D262, Super Sensitive + April 1–30 1982. Top Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Kanter. Haig initialed the upper + right-hand corner of the first page of the memorandum. + + + Washington, April 14, + 1982 + + + SUBJECT + US Military Assistance to the + UK During Falkland Island + Crisis + +

This memorandum provides an update on the military assistance we have + been providing the British. A full report on intelligence cooperation is + the subject of a separate memo.Not further + identified and not found.

+

Communications Support. UK access to the US Defense Satellite Communications System + (DSCS) has + increased [less than 1 line not + declassified]. We also have loaned the + British five man-portable SATCOM + radios to facilitate UK + utilization of the DSCS link. The + British also have requested a second channel on the USN Fleet Broadcast System [2 lines not declassified].

+

Ascension Island Logistics Support. A tanker carrying a partial load (approximately 2.4 + million gallons) of JP–5 fuel is scheduled to arrive + at Ascension April 24–25. The British probably will have to + reduce somewhat the tempo of their air resupply and Nimrod operations until the tanker + arrives. The 2.4 million gallons should meet British needs for about three weeks. DoD is working + with their UK counterparts on follow-on fuel supply.

+

We have not responded to the British request for additional US personnel to permit around-the-clock + operation of the air control facilities at Ascension.

+

Military Equipment. You are current on the status + of the British request for Stinger.See Document 111. We also have received + a request for night observation devices.

+

Weather and Related Information. We are providing the British with weather information, oceanographic data etc. Some of this + information is obtained by weather satellites. Much of the data is being + supplied in the context of an ongoing mutual exchange of weather + information.

+

Order of Battle and Related Information. We have + responded to British requests for intelligence about Argentine military capabilities and our estimate of their + probable operational effectiveness. We also have + provided them with our assessment of the UK-Argentine military balance in the area.

+

Reconnaisance Information. We are supplying the + British [1 line not declassified]. Intelligence + obtained from aircraft operations (PARPRO information) is not being provided.

+

Miscellaneous. In response to a British inquiry, + we informed them that there were no US + submarines operating in the Falkland area. We also are providing normal + merchant ship data to the UK.

+

You also should know that the JCS believes that, if the US wanted to, we could provide some of the + same kinds of information (e.g., weather, merchant shipping) to the + Argentines in an effort to demonstrate US even-handedness. In many cases, however, even this + information would not be of the same quality or detail that we are + supplying the British. We note, moreover, that such an offer to the + Argentines could easily open the door to their requests for additional + information which we would not provide.

+
+ +
+ + 120. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in + ArgentinaSource: Reagan + Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC + Cable File, Falkland File (04/14/1982) (5). Secret; Sensitive; + Niact Immediate; Nodis. + + + Washington, April 14, 1982, 2209Z + +

100276. For the Ambassador from the Secretary. Subject: Message for + President Galtieri.

+

1. Secret–Entire text.

+

2. Please deliver the following message from me to President GaltieriIn telegram 100334 to London, April 14, the Department transmitted + a similar message addressed to Pym from Haig. (Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Europe and Soviet + Union, United Kingdom (04/01/1982–07/31/1982) (4)) as quickly + as you can.

+

3. Begin text:

+

Dear Mr. President:

+

Please accept President Reagan’s + and my deep personal appreciation for the patience and statesmanship + which you have shown over the last 24 hours in the face of some + extremely unhelpful press and public speculation about our discussions. + We know these press stories have been a great burden to you and your + government.

+

I will be proceeding to Buenos Aires tomorrow with some new ideas which I + am convinced we can use to bridge the significant gap which still exists + between the parties, provided both governments show additional + flexibility and statesmanship. These thoughts involve creating de facto + conditions on the Islands which, in the context of the objectives of the + negotiations, will ensure that Argentina’s essential needs are met.

+

Hopefully all the parties involved in this delicate situation will be + able to avoid feeding or overreacting to mischievous press stories in + the days ahead. We must at all costs not lose sight of the many common + objectives we have and the common danger we face that the situation, if + not handled properly, could be used by common enemies to strike at us + both. We must not let the situation be turned into a North/South problem + at the instigation of the East.

+

I look forward to seeing you again Friday morning.April 16.

+

Sincerely, Alexander M. Haig, Jr. + End text.

+ + Haig + +
+ +
+ + 121. Telegram From the Central Intelligence Agency to the White House + Situation Room and the National Security Council StaffSource: Reagan Library, Executive + Secretariat, NSC Cable File, + Falkland File 04/15/1982 (1). Secret; [handling + restriction not declassified]. + + + Washington, April 15, 1982, 0114Z + +

198827. TDFIR–314/00604–82. Dist: 14 April 1982. Country: + Argentina/United Kingdom/USSR. Subject: Argentine Plans To Deploy Part + of Its Fleet; Argentine Hopes for U.S. Intelligence Support To Prevent + Contact With the British Fleet; Argentine Willingness To Accept Soviet + Intelligence Support If the United States Does Not Provide It (DOI: 12, 13 April 1982) Source: [1 paragraph (4 lines) not declassified].

+

1. On 12 and 13 April 1982, two Argentine Air Force generals said that + the Argentine Navy and Air Force are currently avoiding any operations + that might bring them into contact with elements of the British fleet or + that might cause Argentine units to enter the British-announced zone of + exclusion around the Falkland Islands. The Air Force generals said that + this policy must be changed soon because the Argentine Government wants + to put some of its fleet to sea to detect the locations of British + ships. However, they said, the Argentine Government does not have + accurate information of the general disposition of the British fleet and + will thus be sending its units out “blind”; they added that a + confrontation with the British is likely under this circumstance.

+

2. The Air Force generals said that the Argentine Government, using its + Embassy in Washington, has already requested U.S. [less than 1 line not declassified] on the disposition of the + British fleet as an aid to avoiding conflict. They reiterated the + necessity for this intelligence support; they said that if the United + States does not provide this assistance, the Argentine Government will + accept a standing offer from the Soviet Union to provide such [less than 1 line not declassified]. The two + generals added that they are well aware that the U.S. Government has + provided [less than 1 line not declassified] on + Argentine forces to the British Government, and the U.S. Government must + provide similar support to the Argentine Government if it wants to + remain neutral in the current dispute.

+

3. [less than 1 line not declassified] + comments.

+

A. [1 paragraph (3 lines) not declassified]

+

B. Unsubstantiated reports have been filtered into the Embassy by + Argentine Government officials, claiming that the Soviet Union has + offered or has provided [less than 1 line not + declassified] intelligence to the Argentine Government on the disposition of the + British fleet. Those claims have not been confirmed. However, evidence + has been received that the Soviet Union has provided other information + to the Argentine Government on the aircraft carrier “Invincible”; [1½ lines not declassified].

+

[Omitted here is dissemination information.]

+
+ +
+ 122. Memorandum of ConversationSource: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, + Files of Alexander M. Haig, + Jr., 1981–1982, Lot 82D370, (2) Falklands + Crisis—1982. Secret; Sensitive. The meeting took place at Marqueta + Airport, where the airplane transporting Haig and his party to Buenos Aires + stopped for refueling. + + + Caracas, April 15, + 1982 + + + PARTICIPANTS + + + US + Secretary Haig + Ambassador Walters + Ambassador Enders + Ambassador Luers + + + + Venezuela + Foreign Minister Zambrano + Interpreter + + +

After an initial exchange of amenities re photographers which Secretary + Haig described as one of the + hazards of democracy, FM + Zambrano thanked the Secretary + for stopping in Caracas.

+

Secretary Haig then said he + believed it would be helpful for him to give FM + Zambrano a picture of the + situation relating to the Falkland Islands. The Secretary had spoken to + President Reagan last night, who + had asked him to convey his highest esteem and regards to President + Herrera Campins. The + President recalled with great pleasure his discussions in Washington + with President Herrera Campins. + President Reagan had also + expressed the hope that Secretary Haig could meet with FM + Zambrano during his stop in + Caracas. Secretary Haig said + that with this difficult situation in the South Atlantic we would + welcome their advice as we continue our efforts to find a peaceful + solution.

+

First, the US has supported the UN Resolution 502 which has two primary + operative paragraphs, withdrawal and a political solution; but the + resolution did not imply a return to the status quo ante. Therefore, we + are making an effort to maintain a balanced position recognizing that + the situation was not balanced at the outset. We have longstanding, highly intimate relations with + Great Britain and when we say balanced position we mean that we do not + go beyond our traditional relationship. The Secretary said he was trying + to walk a narrow path. Basic problems reside in three areas.

+

First, the manner in which the forces would be withdrawn. This will be + manageable. It was clear during the visit in Britain that the UK insists that all Argentine forces must + be withdrawn before they would recall or even stop the fleet. Clearly + Argentina expects greater simultaneity. This we think we can + achieve.

+

The second range of problems involves the immediate situation we will + have in the islands following withdrawal. Here the British position is + hard. They are insisting, as a matter of principle, on the return to the + status quo ante on the grounds that the application of force to change + the status quo ante cannot be accepted. In Buenos Aires, not only as a + matter of principle, but we believe in order to survive politically, + they are insisting on the retention of the Governor of the islands and + the maintenance of the Argentine flag. Here we have developed some + possible solutions but the flexibility that the Argentines can + demonstrate in this area is intimately dependent on the third range of + problems.

+

The ultimate disposition of the islands. Here we have great differences. + On one hand the UK insists that + sovereignty is not in question. The UK + focus is not on sovereignty but on self-determination and the will of + the inhabitants. Argentina conversely insists that historically the + islands have been Argentine and, secondly, they are confident that the + rules and regulations that have governed the islands make it impossible + for self-determination to manifest itself except in the direction of + continued allegiance to the United Kingdom. There is much truth in that + argument. What we are trying to do is solve the three problems.

+

The first is easiest but tension-laden.

+

The second is easier for the UK than for + the Argentines.

+

The third is an area of more concern to Great Britain and will lead to + ultimate realization of an outcome that may already be evolving in a + legal sense.

+

We have just now received the first serious proposals from the + Argentines. The Secretary does not believe that these proposals can be + accepted in London. We are awaiting London’s ideas this morning. They + will focus on sovereignty but will not use the word. Nevertheless, the + process must lead to the ultimate solution.

+

It is our great concern as we try to solve this problem that it not + become a North-South issue nor + an East-West issue. There is great danger that both may happen if we do + not get a solution. It has been a very frustrating process. Some + progress has been made on important questions, but there is still a long + way to go.

+ +

FM + Zambrano said he was very + grateful that the Secretary had chosen to pass through Caracas on a + refueling stop on his trip but the Venezuelans very much hope to receive + him on another occasion, not as a refueling stop, but on a visit to + their country.

+

President Herrera Campins had + charged FM + Zambrano expressly to ask + Secretary Haig to convey to + President Reagan the happy + memories he retains from his visit to Washington and the friendship he + shares with the President of the United States. The Venezuelan President + asked the Minister of the Presidency also to accompany the Foreign + Minister to his meeting with the Secretary, but at the last minute he + had not felt well and was unable to come. President Herrera Campins is very conscious of + the importance of the Secretary’s mission and expressed his wishes for a + happy outcome.

+

For the Venezuelans the matter has some special aspects the FM would like to transmit to the Secretary, + so he could understand their approach to this matter. Venezuela has a + territorial claim, analogous to that of Argentina’s, resulting from the + British occupation in the last century of a vast expanse of territory + belonging to Venezuela. The US presence + in the last century has been of special assistance in leading Venezuela + to seek a judicial solution through the International Court of Justice. + The Court’s award had many shortcomings into which he would not go. On + the eve of Guyana’s independence the Venezuelans recognized the + situation and signed a treaty in Geneva in which judicial means would be + applied to a political situation. This was the fundamental difference + between the Venezuelan claims and the Argentine claim. Argentina is now + in the phase in which Venezuela found itself prior to the 1899 award. + Venezuela’s claim was advanced under the treaty and they were convinced + that if good faith was shown under the Geneva agreement with the UK and Guyana they would achieve a fair + solution; but it will not be as clear to public opinion as it is to + government officials who are familiar with the details. Public opinion + could be easily aroused to demand that Venezuela follow the Argentine + example. Yesterday’s evening paper had even demanded this in an 8 column + headline. He mentioned this to describe how Venezuela public opinion is + very sensitive. The Venezuelan government will have to be very careful + to avoid negative results. Another element of an emotional nature is the + fact that at the turn of the century the UK, Italy, and Germany blockaded Venezuelan ports in order + to collect debts in arrears. The Argentine FM Luis Drago formulated the Drago doctrine that force + should not be used to collect unpaid debts and to deny the right to + blockade for this purpose. This contributes to an emotional public + opinion and would require a certain caution.

+

On the other hand the Venezuelans noted with some concern that the small + islands of the Caribbean, which have sentimental ties to Great Britain, support the British + despite Venezuela’s strenuous efforts to incorporate them into the + hemisphere. This attitude is working against Venezuelan efforts to + develop a good relationship with those countries. For all of these + reasons the Venezuelans attach special value to the immense work the + Secretary of State was doing.

+

It is important to prevent a disastrous confrontation which would + complicate the North-South and + East-West tensions. For this reason when he received the Secretary’s + kind invitation yesterday and the final paragraph referred to the + importance of not invoking the Treaty of Rio so as to give you time to + work on this matter he accepted the wise suggestion. A resolution by the + OAS could be meaningless and would + lead to criticism. We should not jeopardize the unity of the hemisphere. + A different solution could blow the organization apart and lead to + resentments we should seek to avoid. Nevertheless, he felt that we + should not let too much time go by before a meeting of the organization. + It is important for the system that it should function so that if + circumstances demand it we will have a body that can act.

+

Secretary Haig said that what Mr. + Zambrano said is very + important. Yesterday in a talk with Argentine FM + Costa MendezSee Document 117. + the Secretary suggested to him that we must delay calling on the OAS or invoking the Rio Treaty while we + are deliberating, certainly for the next 72 hours, now that we are + involved in serious negotiations. As the FM knew the US has not + joined the European 10 on economic sanctionsSee footnote 2, Document 98. and + this had created some resentment in Great Britain. We have resisted such + pressure but if the Treaty of Rio is invoked we will be faced with + exactly the opposite situation. We will have a split between the + English-speaking peoples and the Spanish-speaking peoples. In the event + of a clash, US public opinion will + inevitably push US policy towards + Britain. This was a matter of great urgency and he is pleased that + Costa Mendez understands + this. He believes that Argentina will not act until the completion of + our next round of talks and we hope our friends would “cool it” for now. + Whether we have to change that attitude depends on success or failure. + He would be very prudent and try and handle this in a sensible way but + there were many contradictions in this situation.

+

FM + Zambrano said that it could + involve all of us. Secretary Haig said that we are very sensitive to this and that is + why we feel obliged to keep the Venezuelans fully informed as our talks + proceed. In that way they will be better able to manage the internal + pressures. Frankly right now he had no good news to offer.

+ +

FM + Zambrano said that really the + solution lay in the three orders of problems. In the UN Panama had presented an appeal to repeal + Resolution 502. The UK fleet is + continuing to sail south. The Argentine wish for the fleet to stop is + difficult but conceivable. In the second order of problems we must find + a formula to control the UK and the + Argentine pressure, to maintain both flags. It will be difficult but it + should be possible. There is a very limited space to negotiate these + problems. Evidently national pride and the survival of the governments + of both countries is at stake. Yesterday in Caracas an Argentine + Christian Democrat Jose Antonio Allende told how the issue has rallied + political support for Galtieri + so that, if he is unable to secure a favorable result for Argentina, + Galtieri’s government will + fall. In the UK the situation is + similar. If the British fleet returns with no results, people will not + understand and the British government will fall.

+

Ambassador Enders said that + Argentina would not accept recourse to the International Court of + Justice. The British wanted it but this is unacceptable to + Argentina.

+

FM + Zambrano said that Venezuela + has similar concerns but they would have many reservations about a + recourse to the ICJ. It was a political body and Venezuela had a bad + experience with its decisions this century. This experience has + destroyed their confidence in it.

+

Secretary Haig said that in the + light of recent history the Argentines have a strong legal case and that + is also true in the light of earlier history. We will have to work with + great ingenuity.

+

[Omitted here is discussion of Central America.]

+

FM + Zambrano asked if the Secretary + wanted to say anything to the press as only he could speak for the + US.

+

Secretary Haig said he thought it + better for the FM to say that they had a + thorough discussion of the situation in the South Atlantic and other + matters of mutual concern such as Central America. He could say that you + found the talks most beneficial.

+

FM + Zambrano said that it was a + great pleasure to have had these discussions with the Secretary and if + he wished to stop in Caracas on his way back he would be most + welcome.During a brief stopover en + route from Buenos Aires to Washington on April 19, Haig again met with Zambrano at the Caracas airport. + The conversation during which Haig discussed the outcome of his talks with the + Argentines, is summarized in telegram 3111 from Caracas, April 20. + (Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Cable File, Falkland File 04/20/1982) Haig made a brief statement and + had an exchange with reporters; see the Department of State Bulletin, June 1982, p. 84.

+

The Secretary replied that if that was the route perhaps he would, but it + would be better to go to London.

+
+ +
+ + 123. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Kingdom to the Department + of StateSource: Reagan + Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC + Cable File, Falkland File 04/15/1982 (3). Secret; Flash; Nodis. + + + London, April 15, 1982, 1901Z + +

8241. For the Secretary. Subj: Message From the Foreign and Commonwealth + Secretary to Secretary Haig: + Falkland Islands.

+

1. S–Entire text.

+

2. Begin text:

+

Thank you for your friendly messageSee footnote 2, Document 120. which I + have just received. As I have said to you, and indeed to the British + Parliament and people, we in London are most grateful for the efforts + which you are making to resolve the Falkland Islands crisis. We realise + that the determination and stamina required are very great. We send you + our warmest wishes for your crucial meetings in the coming days in + Buenos Aires.

+

Since your most recent visit and our subsequent talks by telephone, we + have been thinking further about the position reached in your efforts to + promote a settlement and about the draft memorandum which we have been + discussing.See Tab A, Document 112.

+

There is one matter which greatly concerns the Prime Minister and myself + and our other colleagues. Recent experience has proved that Argentina is + willing to resort to aggression. Having been the victim of one sudden + attack, then assuming that your present efforts are successful and + Argentine troops are withdrawn, we could not risk the same thing again. + We therefore need to ensure that the Islands are protected from further + aggression in the future. This is a general requirement, but one + particular aspect of it is that Argentina might use the airfield at Port + Stanley, only 350 miles from the mainland, to introduce large numbers of + troops quickly and conveniently, without our being in a position to + prevent this.

+

We in London believe that the best way of minimising these risks would be + a concrete arrangement involving the United States, which would provide + an effective deterrent to Argentine use of force. The methods of + achieving this can be discussed further. But I must emphasise that an + arrangement of this kind is of the utmost importance to the British + Government.

+ +

Before your departure from London on 13 April, you gave me a revised text + of paragraph 8 of the draft memorandum.See + Tab B, Document 112. Not + surprisingly, this text as it stands presents considerable difficulties + for us. The word ‘decolonisation’ would in any case be unacceptable to + Parliament, given the importance to this country of the wishes of the + Islanders which, as you know, remain paramount for us. I enclose a + formula for paragraph 8 on lines which we could accept. For us, the + important element is to provide a sounding of the opinion of our people + on the Islands. If the Argentinians seem reasonably inclined to a + solution on the lines envisaged, but argue for more explicit account to + be taken of the idea of decolonisation, I hope that you will impress on + them the significance of the reference to UNGA Resolution 1514.See footnote 4, Document 16. If, + however, you felt it essential in order to reach full agreement, we + would be prepared to consider adding to the text after ‘these groups of + Islands’ the phrase ‘within the framework of the provisions of the + UN Charter relating to + non-self-governing territories.’

+

New formulation for paragraph 8 of the draft memorandum: December 31, + 1982 will conclude the interim period. During this period, the + signatories shall negotiate with a view to determining the future + definitive status of each of the three groups of Islands consistent with + the purposes and principles of the UN + Charter, United Nations General Assembly Resolutions 1514 (XV) and 2625 + (XXV)Titled the Declaration on + Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and + Co-operation Among States in Accordance with the Charter of the + United Nations, United Nations General Assembly Resolution 2625 + (XXV), adopted October 24, 1970, stipulated that states had the duty + to refrain from the threat or use of force against the territorial + integrity or political independence of any other state or in any + manner inconsistent with the principles of the United + Nations. and, so far as Islands with a settled population are + concerned, in accordance with the wishes and interests of that + population, which shall be ascertained by a sounding of their opinion to + be supervised by the special commission. If it is not possible to + complete the processes envisaged in this paragraph by December 31, 1982, + the interim period may be extended for (three) months by agreement + between the parties.

+

End text.

+ + Louis + +
+ +
+ + 124. Telegram From the Department of State to Secretary of State + HaigSource: Department of State, + Executive Secretariat, Top Secret Hardcopy Telegrams, Lot 12D215. + Top Secret; Flash; Nodis. Drafted + and approved by Bremer and + cleared in S/S–O. Haig was then en route to Buenos + Aires. + + + Washington, April 15, 1982, 1943Z + +

Tosec 60014/101388. For the Secretary + from Jerry Bremer. Subject: + Message From John Nott.

+

1. Entire text–Top Secret.

+

2. Following is the text of a letter from Minister Nott to you delivered by the British + Ambassador this afternoon.

+

3. Begin text:

+

Dear Al,

+

Our intelligence suggests that one or more Argentinian submarines may be + operating inside the maritime exclusion zone, which clearly contravenes + our notice to mariners which established the zone. I felt that you + should know this immediately as you will appreciate the very real + dangers.

+

Yours ever, John Nott. End + text.

+ + Eagleburger + +
+ +
+ + 125. Intelligence Memorandum Prepared in the Central Intelligence + AgencySource: Central + Intelligence Agency, Office of Support Services, Job 83B00225R: + Production Case Files (1982), Box 1, ALA 82–10059 Falkland Islands + Dispute: Economic Impact. Confidential; [handling + restriction not declassified]. Information available as of + April 15 was used in the preparation of the memorandum, which was + prepared in the Office of African and Latin American Analysis and + the Office of Global Issues in cooperation with the Department of + the Treasury. + + + ALA 82–10059 + + + Washington, April + 1982 + +

Falkland Islands Dispute: Economic Impact (U)

+

Summary

+

The sanctions against Buenos Aires stemming from the Falkland crisis + probably will have minimal impact on the Argentine economy in the next + 30 to 60 days. The limitations on imports by the United Kingdom and the + European Community from Argentina will require some time to take effect. + Although there have been a few loan cancellations, Buenos Aires still is + far from financial disaster. And, even though some serious technical + problems are arising in covering obligations to British banks, there + appears to be enough interest on the part of both debtors and creditors + to arrange mechanisms to service Argentina’s external debts.

+

Beyond the next few months, the duration of the conflict and the + intensity of British measures will be important factors in determining + how much disruption occurs to Argentina’s economy and foreign financing. + At the limit, Buenos Aires has reserves adequate to meet its debt + obligations and basic import requirements over the next three to five + months, so long as the British do not choose to blockade Argentine + merchant shipping. Such a lengthening of the crisis would, however, add + to existing Argentine economic problems and substantially raise the risk + of a generalized debt rescheduling in 1982. Moreover, the political + fallout of growing inflationary pressures and shortages would seriously + constrain the Galtieri + administration’s options for stabilization policies.

+

In the event of a major armed conflict that seriously impaired + Argentina’s ability and willingness to service its external debt, many + US and European banks that have lent + heavily to Argentina would suffer serious profit declines or even net + losses, but the international banking system as a whole could probably + manage with little lasting damage. The real danger to the international + financial system is a combination of adverse events. A simultaneous loss + of payments from Argentina, + Poland, and a few other large East European or LDC borrowers would be very difficult to manage without + official intervention.

+

[1 line not declassified]

+

[Omitted here is the body of the memorandum.]

+
+ +
+ 126. Memorandum From the National Intelligence Officer for General + Purpose Forces (Atkeson) to the + Chairman, National Intelligence Council (Rowen), the Vice Chairman, National Intelligence + Council, the National Intelligence Officer for Warning, the National + Intelligence Officer for Latin America, the Acting National Intelligence + Officer for Western Europe, and General Palmer of the Senior Review + PanelSource: Central + Intelligence Agency, Office of the Deputy Director for Intelligence, + Job 83T00966R: Chronological Files (1982), Box 1, Folder 3. Secret; + [handling restriction not declassified]. + Rowen forwarded the + memorandum to Casey under a + covering note on April 19. Atkeson prepared a follow-up memorandum, which + examined the Argentine defensive position, for Casey and Inman, April 21. (Central + Intelligence Agency, Office of the Director of Central Intelligence, + Job 84B00049R: Subject Files (1981–1982), Box 7, Folder 179: NSPG Meeting Re: Falkland Islands) + Attached but not printed is a map of the Falklands/Malvinas, which + labels the beaches referenced in the memorandum. + + + DDI #3104–82 + + + Washington, April 15, + 1982 + + + SUBJECT + What’s Next in the Falklands?—Some Thoughts on the Tactical + Problem + +

1. Everyone hopes, and many expect that the Falklands crisis will be + resolved before the issue comes to blows. However, it is worthwhile at + this juncture examining the matter from a military point of view to see + how events may transpire if the current political efforts fall short of + the mark. [5½ lines not declassified] three + categories of military operations which the British task force might + undertake upon arrival in the vicinity of the Falklands:

+

—Engage in a high seas naval confrontation;

+

—Blockade the islands;

+

—Assault the Falklands in an attempt to retake them.

+

2. All three of these categories have serious drawbacks from the British + point of view:

+ +

—The high seas confrontation (which would be attractive from a military + standpoint) depends upon Argentine cooperation. The clear superiority of + the British force in the open ocean is likely to deter the Argentines + from venturing far beyond their land-based air coverage;

+

—A blockade of the islands could entail protracted deployment of the + naval task force at great distance from support bases. Eventually it + would have to be reduced or removed, probably before the Argentines + would be obliged to remove their forces. Moreover, the indigenous + British population may well suffer even more acutely from a prolonged + blockade and occupation by an embattled, hostile military force;

+

—Assault is likely to cause casualties among the civilian population and + between the combatants. This could vastly complicate the achievement of + a political settlement in the short run, and contribute to an historical + enmity between Argentina and the UK in + the longer term.

+

3. These drawbacks notwithstanding, the British task force will have to + assume one posture or another upon arrival in the contested area, + assuming no political solution is forthcoming in the meanwhile. Barring + Argentine acceptance of battle at sea, it comes down to blockade or + assault. Blockade has an additional, near fatal drawback; it passes the + initiative to the Argentinians. The Argentines can challenge the + blockade or wait it out as they choose. In either case the strategic + advantage is theirs, while the British are obliged to react as they can + to whatever their adversaries do. Considering the shorter distances that + the Argentines have to deal with and the likelihood that many small + craft under air cover from the mainland could ferry supplies to the + islands, it seems quite possible that they could keep their small + garrison adequately provisioned for a longer time than the British could + their rather larger commitment. Moreover, the extended deployment of + British capital ships to areas in range of hostile land-based air would + be a high risk posture for any length of time. The British must launch + an assault—the earlier the better.

+

Where?

+

4. There is an advantage of seizing South Georgia first. Practically + unopposed, the landing could be accomplished without much difficulty. + The island would provide a rudimentary base and give the troops a chance + to stretch their legs—perhaps to refresh their small unit tactics in the + South Atlantic climate. Having loaded their troops onto commercial + ships, the British probably need to sort themselves out before + attempting a serious amphibious assault. South Georgia offers a + convenient way station for staging. Three or four days may be sufficient + for this purpose.

+

5. The main assault must be made on the Falklands themselves to settle + the issue, if a military solution is in the cards. More than half of the population lives on the + eastern island, principally around Port Stanley. In World War II the + eastern island would have been the immediate target, primarily to seize + the airfield and the deep water anchorage at Port William. In this case, + however, these objectives may be postponed until the latter phases of + the operation. The British aircraft are helicopters and V/STOL, neither + of which require an airstrip. The assault fleet includes five tank + landing ships and an assault landing dock which, together with the + helicopters, should be able to maintain an adequate ship-to-shore lift + to keep the assault force (approximately 4,500 troops) supplied. + Ultimately, of course, the British would have to have both the airfield + and the port.

+

6. Good landing beaches exist on both the eastern and western islands + (See Map). The best are reported to lie near Port Stanley and Salvador + on East Falkland. Landings in these areas would rapidly bring the action + to a point of decision. Unfortunately, decisive military action would + very likely also be the most expensive in terms of both military and + civilian casualties. The beaches on East Falkland are probably well + defended, and may require extensive bombardment to subdue the defenses + and to clear mines and other impediments.

+

7. Other beaches exist on the southern coast of East Falkland in Choiseal + Sound and the Bay of Harbors. The assault force could put ashore in + these areas and then move northeastward toward Port Stanley. Some + difficulty would have to be anticipated in crossing the island, inasmuch + as there is only one known gravel road suitable for vehicular movement + and the principal terrain feature, the Wickham Heights, stretches across the island, almost + from coast to coast, posing a natural line of defense against approach + from the south. An advance along the east coast against Port Stanley + would be an exceedingly risky maneuver without first seizing Mt. Kent, a + 458 meter promontory to the west. A battle for the heights, even if only + modestly defended, could prove to be an especially costly venture for + the British.

+

8. A far more attractive option would seem to be a landing on one or more + of the beaches on the southern side of West Falkland. Those in the + neighborhood of Fox Bay West would place the assault force astride three + roads leading inland, offering multiple axes of advance to the north and + west. The sparsity of the population on the western island would hold + civilian casualties to a minimum, while the capture of the island would + afford the UK both political and + military prizes.

+

9. From the political point of view, the effort would demonstrate the + Government’s determination and the Armed Forces’ capability for + protecting British interests. From a military point of view it would + offer a strong vantage point from which the Argentinian supply line to + the continent could be subjected to ready interdiction and from which a + follow-on assault could be mounted against the eastern island, if necessary. Adequate beaches + exist on the eastern side of Falkland Sound for such an attack. This + maneuver would outflank the Wickham Heights to the north if the battle + had to be joined on the main island.

+

How?

+

10. We should recognize certain strengths the British have which they can + exercise in a West Falkland scenario. First, their destroyers, frigates + and Harrier aircraft provide them + plentiful strike capability for subduing shore defenses and preparing + the landing areas. Second, their assault helicopters (capable of + carrying 20 men each) provide them an inland landing ability + simultaneous with a surface ship-to-shore movement. Third, the carriers + can be held out of areas of vulnerability most of the time. The Harrier V/STOL aircraft can be based + ashore as soon as a secure enclave is in hand, and the carriers could be + quickly withdrawn from the area, out of range of Argentinian land-based + air. Fourth, the seizure of West Falkland would oblige the Argentinians + to operate their aircraft at extended ranges from the mainland, except + for those few which might attempt to continue to use the Port Stanley + strip. The British could mount periodic attacks on the strip to insure + its neutralization. Of course, the flexibility of the V/STOL aircraft + would make the British relatively less vulnerable to corresponding + attacks on their landing areas.

+

11. The British assault would not be without risk. The Argentine land + forces are well trained and well led. The British must bring superior + fire power to bear at the critical points quickly. April marks the + autumn in the Falklands, and the beginning of the storm season. Cloud + cover exceeding seven-tenths of the sky exists for an average of 22 days + per month in April, gradually increasing in May and June. Cloud + ceilings, limiting ground-air coordination, hang below 3,000 ft. about + 40% of the time, and below 1,000 ft. up to 25% of the time. Aerial photo + reconnaissance of Argentine defenses could be spotty and unreliable. Sea + states suitable for landings of heavy equipment, such as tanks, may be + interrupted for a number of days. Some of the beach areas are known to + have submerged rocks which would be hazardous to landing craft. The + British would probably have to employ underwater demolition teams to + remove some of the obstructions.

+

12. Once ashore, the British force should be able to sustain itself with + periodic resupply by helicopter and surface ship-to-shore lift. + Casualties, detainees and prisoners could be evacuated by similar means, + perhaps to the South Georgia base.

+

13. A potentially great advantage of an operation against the western + island is that the British might be able to suspend operations once the + island was secure and before much blood was spilt. The drama of a + victory in the west might prove sufficient to cause Buenos Aires to reconsider its actions and to + allow London to moderate its position regarding the ultimate sovereignty + of the islands. Grounds for settlement might well be achieved without a + full-fledged battle in the populated sectors.

+

14. In sum, a West Falkland military scenario, coupled with appropriate + political action, may offer the contestants the following:

+

For the UK

+

—Quick military “victory”;

+

—Preservation of its reputation as protector of its interests and + responsibilities;

+

—Avoidance of heavy losses;

+

—Some basis for later friendship with Argentina.

+

For Argentina

+

—An image as a gutsy minor power not afraid of playing in the big + leagues;

+

—Achievement of at least a prospect of sovereignty over the + Falklands;

+

—Avoidance of decisive military defeat;

+

—Avoidance of heavy casualties.

+

Edward B. + Atkeson

+
+ +
+ + 127. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security + Affairs (Clark) to President + ReaganSource: Reagan Library, Executive + Secretariat, NSC Subject File, + Memorandums of Conversation—President Reagan (April 1982). No classification marking. Sent + for action. Drafted by Fontaine. A stamped notation in the upper right-hand + corner of the memorandum indicates that Clark saw it. Fontaine sent the memorandum to Clark under an April 15 cover + memorandum, in which he recommended that Clark sign it. + + + Washington, April 15, + 1982 + + + SUBJECT + Proposed Phone Call from President Galtieri of Argentina + +

Issue

+

President Galtieri of Argentina + has asked to talk to you by phone today.

+

Facts

+

President Galtieri’s office + phoned the White House this morning to arrange a phone call between you + and President Galtieri. We have + set a mutually agreed upon time of 5:00 p.m. today.

+

Discussion

+

President Galtieri has made known + that the call is not “urgent” but he wishes to continue the dialogue + begun with you last week shortly before Argentine forces occupied the + Falkland Islands.See Document 41.

+

The best guess is President Galtieri is looking for reassurance from you that the + U.S. remains committed to a peaceful resolution of the dispute and an + evenhanded approach to the problem.

+

He may, however, raise some new points to be considered in the + negotiations. More likely, Galtieri may seek your personal assurance that the + United States is not providing intelligence and other forms of military + assistance to the British during the crisis as was reported in the + American press two days ago.See Document 115.

+

It is important that Galtieri + hear from you your personal concern regarding the crisis and your + commitment to bringing about a peaceful resolution of the dispute. It + would also be a good idea to phone Prime Minister Thatcher in order to brief her on your talk with + President Galtieri.In an April 15 memorandum to Clark, Blair recommended that Reagan contact Thatcher after the Galtieri conversation “[i]n order + to maintain our even handed approach” to the Falklands/Malvinas + crisis. Instead of a telephone call, Blair noted, and “[b]ecause of the time difference, + it makes most sense for him [Reagan] to send a message to London on the Cabinet + line.” “In the message,” he continued, “the President will relay the + essence of his conversation with Galtieri, and offer to talk with Mrs. Thatcher directly tomorrow morning + if she thinks it necessary.” On the memorandum, Clark approved Blair’s recommendation that + Blair contact the + British Embassy to inform them of the plan to send Thatcher a message following the + Galtieri conversation. + (Reagan Library, NSC Latin American + Affairs Directorate Files, Falklands/Malvinas: NSC & State Memos, 1982) For + Reagan’s message to + Thatcher, see Document 129.

+

Attached are talking points for your use in talking today with President + Galtieri (Tab A).Attached but not printed.

+

Recommendation

+

That you talk to President Galtieri and then contact Mrs. Thatcher at the earliest convenient + moment.An unknown hand approved the + recommendation.

+
+ +
+ 128. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security + Affairs (Clark) to Secretary of + State HaigSource: Reagan Library, Executive + Secretariat, NSC Subject File, + Memorandums of Conversation—President Reagan (April 1982). Secret. Printed from an + uninitialed copy. The texts of the memorandum and the three + referenced tabs were transmitted by the White House to Haig in Buenos Aires in telegram + WH2019, April 16. (Reagan Library, Dennis Blair Files, Country File, Falklands Crisis + 1982) + + + Washington, April 15, + 1982 + + + SUBJECT + MEMCON FOR SECRETARY HAIG ON PRESIDENT’S PHONE CALL TO PRESIDENT + GALTIERI + +

For your information in your meetings with President Galtieri, attached is a verbatim + transcript of the President’s phone conversation with President + Galtieri tonight.According to the President’s Daily Diary, Reagan spoke with Galtieri on a conference line from + the White House Residence between 5:06 and 5:38 p.m., April 15. + (Reagan Library, President’s Daily Diary) As you can see, it + ran about 30 minutes.

+ +

Galtieri did not raise much that + was new nor did he bring up specific negotiating points. He did + underline his obvious concern about the approaching British fleet. + Galtieri also suggested + unnamed nations might be exacerbating the conflict, and that U.S. media + disclosures were unhelpful. The Argentine President ended with a + rousingly Argentine version of Western Hemisphere history and implied + that the Argentines and North Americans share a common heritage of + struggle against (British) colonialism.

+

President Reagan reiterated our + search for a peaceful solution resolution of the dispute and called on + the parties to be flexible and restrained in the comings days and weeks. + The President also expressed his personal support for your mission.

+

I might add we read Galtieri as a + worried man, but one not yet ready to retreat from previously + established positions.

+

Word of the call leaked and as a consequence we prepared a short press + releaseAttached at Tab B but not + printed. For the text of the press release, see Public Papers: Reagan, + 1982, Book I, p. 476. which deals only with + generalities. Then, so as to relieve any concerns on Maggie’s part we + notified Prime Minister Thatcher + of the call through a cabinet line message.Attached at Tab C. See Document + 129.

+ +

Tab A

+

Transcript of a Telephone Conversation Between + President Reagan and + Argentine President GaltieriNo + classification marking.

+

Undated

+

President: This is Ronald + Reagan.

+

Galtieri: Good afternoon, Mr. + President. This is President Galtieri of Argentina speaking to you. It’s a pleasure + to greet you, Mr. President. I wonder if you hear me well. I can hear + you very well.

+

President: Yes, I can hear just fine, and I know that you wish to + continue our conversations. I’m pleased to have this opportunity to talk + with you. I’m at your disposal.

+

Galtieri: Mr. President, I’m very + glad to be able to speak to you once again as a follow-up to our first + conversation that we had which, perhaps, was not very fruitful on the + night of April 1See Document 41. at a time from our standpoint the + essence of the issue was resolved and we were not in a position to + accede immediately to your request. Can you hear me, Mr. President?

+

President: Yes, just fine.

+

Galtieri: Mr. President, I think + it is highly important for Argentina, for us to have assistance, the + assistance of your government, in this very difficult situation, that we + are experiencing in our relationship with Great Britain which, among + other things, is affecting the solidity of the Western World. Can you + hear me, Mr. President?

+

President: I can hear you, yes, very well.

+

Galtieri: Mr. President, it is + the profound wish, my personal wish, and that of the government, and the + people of Argentina, to see to it that this situation does not continue + to deteriorate. And it is furthermore our wish that with the assistance + of the United States, that both countries seek an acceptable solution + within the framework of UN Resolution + 502 taking into account the whole background of this problem that goes + back 150 years both from the standpoint of the bilateral relationship as + well as all that has been debated, all that has been, the way the + problem has been dealt with, the whole record of the UN in its debates of the problem of the + past 16 years with reference to the issue of decolonization around the + world. Did you read me, Mr. President?

+

President: Yes, I have all of that.

+ +

President: Was that all the President wanted to say BEFORE, or do you + want a response from me now or does he have more?

+

Galtieri: Mr. President, going on + for one more paragraph, if you would allow me, I also wish to have you + realize that with the advance of the British fleet toward the South + Atlantic region we feel that there is an increasingly dangerous + situation, not only between our two countries, between the two countries + involved in the South Atlantic, but it also our concern that this issue + not deteriorate to a point where other nations might become involved and + that this might not become tangled up and exacerbated by outside + interests. We wish to continue the good relationships that have been + established between our two governments, your administration and my + administration, over recent times, relationships which have become so + close, Mr. President, and for this reason we wish to continue this + relationship with reference to all aspects of the international scene + and within this context it is my fear that if the British continue their + hostilities in the direction of the South Atlantic region the situation + may slip out of our grasp; may slip out of our control and become an + extremely delicate issue for the world at large. Did you understand me, + Mr. President?

+

President: Yes, let me just say I’m committed to a peaceful resolution of + this dispute. This is important to us because as I’ve said both + countries involved, yours and Great Britain, are friends of ours so our + good offices will continue to be extended to you both. Now, Secretary + Haig will be arriving in + Buenos Aires in a few hours to continue our efforts, and he is my + personal representative and I have full faith and confidence in him. + Now, Mr. President, I am committed wholeheartedly to a peaceful + resolution of this dispute. I agree that a war in this hemisphere + between two Western nations, both friendly to the United States, is + unthinkable. It would be a tragedy and disaster for the Western world, + and a bitter legacy for future generations of Argentines, Britons, and + Americans. The only one who could profit from such a war would be the + Soviet Union and its slave state allies, and it would be a common + misfortune for all the rest of us. So I hope that we can work out a + solution to this. Over.

+

Galtieri: Thank you, Mr. + President, I share your views. But with the passing of every hour and + with the continuation of the blockade by Great Britain along our coasts + and as the British fleet continues to advance toward the South Atlantic, + I fear that whether we wish to see this or not, this may bring about + some serious misfortune that we will not be in a position to pinpoint or + to keep under control immediately and will have the consequence of + aggravating the present situation. And this is why I think that we must + be very careful in regard to this because it is obvious that there are + attempts also on the part of the American pressSee Document 115. and the world press as we noticed in + some of the coverage yesterday, in particular to bring about some split + in the very good relationships that have been established between our + two countries in recent times; between our governments, our two + governments, our two nations, and between our two administrations. For + this reason I fear that as time passes we may be faced with certain + events that would be very difficult to bring under control. It goes + without saying, Mr. President, that I am thankful to you for dispatching + Secretary Haig once again to + Buenos Aires and, of course, I will again be in touch with him tomorrow + and we will have lengthy conversations tomorrow to focus on this problem + which is of grave concern to us. Over.

+

President: Mr. President, as I said, I sincerely hope that we all can + reach an agreement soon. And I share your fears about some inadvertent + act creating the trouble that you will be unable to retreat from. I know + that you and the British Prime Minister are leaders of courage, + principle and determination and we’re going to need all of that in these + days ahead. We’re also going to need, though, flexibility and restraint + from both you and the British. And, if we have that we can get through + this together. I know we have a ways to go but there must be a just and + peaceful solution to this very serious matter and one that, as I said + the other night when I spoke to you, that takes into consideration the + interests of those people living on the islands. And, Secretary + Haig will be with you soon + and I will be relaying what we have just said to my own staff here, and + again you have my assurance about him and that he is my personal + representative. It’s a most sensitive situation and I want to assure you + that I know others have used propaganda to try and indicate that there + is some division between us. We are doing nothing to undermine our role + as an honest broker in these talks. Peace, Mr. President, is our common + cause. To preserve peace between our two good friends, you and Britain. + That is my personal goal. And that is our single objective. We’ve been + careful to maintain good relations with both you and the British, + because if we didn’t we couldn’t continue to offer our help in this. At + the same time, failure to live up to existing obligations, going beyond + them, would jeopardize our ability to play an honest role. The role both + Argentina and the United Kingdom want. So, I want you to know that we + are maintaining this neutral attitude. I hope we can continue to, if + fighting breaks out this will be much more difficult. I have undergone + some criticism myself simply because we’re trying to remain neutral. But + I intend to do that as we continue to negotiate this and I just hope and + pray that there will be no hostile act from either side while we + continue to work this out.

+ +

Galtieri: I thank you very much, + Mr. President, I’m sure that you are aware that the purpose of this call + was to continue the dialogue that we had initiated on the first of April + for a direct communication between two presidents and to continue the + cordial and friendly relationships in the understanding that has been + developed between both countries in our search on behalf of the Western + world for solutions to our problems in order to avoid any divisions or + splits between us. I only wish to add, Mr. President, the following + consideration. The people of the United States in 1976 (sic)As in the original. An erroneous reference to the + beginning of the American Revolution in 1776. and the + Northern Hemisphere began their struggle against colonialism and + achieved their independence. We, in the Southern Hemisphere, began this + struggle in the last century, perhaps somewhat later than you did, and + we achieved independence for our people and now on the 2nd of April + 1982, we have tried to make this independence complete. Perhaps + achieving complete independence, as I said, later than you did, Mr. + President. I hope that you can appreciate our sentiments in this regard, + Mr. President. Over.

+

President: I understand your concern and assure you again that we are + going to stay in this with the sincere hope that we can help bring about + a peaceful solution and maintain the friendship that we have with the + nations of the Western world and I appreciate your calling me and look + forward to hearing from Secretary Haig after you have had a chance to discuss matters with + him and so I will say thank you again and good night.

+

Galtieri: Talk to you again, Mr. + President, thank you very much.

+

Galtieri: Good night to you, Mr. + President. We’ll talk again, some time.

+

President: Good night.

+
+ +
+ + 129. Message From President Reagan to British Prime Minister ThatcherSource: Reagan Library, Dennis Blair Files, Country File, Falklands Crisis + 1982. Secret; Flash. Sent via Cabinet Office channels in telegram + WH2011. + + + Washington, April 15, 1982, 2353Z + + + Dear Margaret: + +

At his request, I have just talked with General Galtieri concerning the Falklands + Island crisis.See Document 128. I wanted to relay to you a summary + of that conversation. In view of the late hour in London, I have sent + you this message, but we can talk on the telephone tomorrow morning if + you think it necessary.

+

General Galtieri reaffirmed to me + his desire to avoid conflict with your country, and his fears that + conflict would cause deterioration in recently improving relations with + the United States. He said that the advance of your fleet and the + blockade of the islands were making his situation difficult. I told him + that I shared his desire to avoid conflict, and urged him to be + forthcoming and flexible in his negotiations with Secretary Haig, who had my full faith and + confidence. Without making specific suggestions for further steps to me, + General Galtieri promised to + deal honestly and seriously with Secretary Haig.

+

I would like to add that we greatly appreciate the hospitality you have + shown to Al during his two visits. We are also grateful for the + receptivity you have shown to our efforts to find a common ground + between your country, one of our closest allies, and Argentina, with + whom we would like to be able to cooperate in advancing specific + interests in this hemisphere.

+

Warm regards,

+ + Ron + +
+ +
+ + 130. Telegram From Secretary of State Haig to President ReaganSource: + Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Cable File, Falkland File 04/16/1982 (1). Secret; + Sensitive; Immediate; Nodis. Sent + for information Immediate to the Department of State. Sent from the + Secretary’s aircraft. + + + April 16, 1982, + 0330Z + +

Secto 6020. Subject: Falkland Islands + Crisis.

+

1. The situation has become distinctly more ominous. I base this + assesment on several recent developments:

+

A. Today’s Argentine press has an especially dark tone. Despite the fact + that the British fleet is now entering the South Atlantic, Argentine + commentary has become more inflexible and bellicose. This may be a + response to British rhetoric and yesterday’s tragic revelations about + US intelligence and logistical + support for the UK. More than anything, + it betrays a self-hypnotizing war hysteria that may be taking over in + Buenos Aires, with the prospect of military defeat, political isolation, + and economic ruin eclipsed by patriotic fervor.

+

B. I have also received the first detailed Argentine negotiating + proposal. Although this gives us a clearer framework in which to engage + the Argentines, the substance is little different than their basic + demand all along: Control of the Falklands, de facto, if not de + jure.

+

2. An optimist might argue that these signs reflect posturing for what + both sides know is the final round. This may be especially true of + Buenos Aires with me enroute there to extract concessions. A pessimist + would take these developments on face value, based on the premise that + rational statesmanship gives way to more powerful impulses—not easily + controlled by the leaders themselves—as war grows more imminent.

+

3. As I see it, the truth is probably somewhere in between. I should have + a much clearer fix on the Argentine state-of-mind by late tomorrow. But + we should begin to prepare ourselves for the worst.

+

4. In this regard, I may need very soon to seek your decisions on two + critical questions.

+

A. Whether and how far to push Mrs. Thatcher to come forth with a significant + concession?

+

B. Whether and how to break off this mission if its futility becomes + clear?

+

5. On the first question, I am beginning to think that our only hope is + that the British will come to realize that they cannot, in any event, + resist the course of history and that they are now paying the price for + previous UK vacillation on the question of + sovereignty. It is still too soon to say whether they will be able to + make a major move by accepting local conditions that permit evolutionary + change on the Islands. This, of course, would risk an ultimate change in + the Islands’ status as a result of a more open and natural process of + self-determination than the British have thus far been willing to + permit. Whether you should, or could, push Mrs. Thatcher to this bitter + conclusion—with all that it would mean to her, our relationship, and our + own principles—will require very careful thought.

+

6. On the second question, we must think—and think quickly—about whether + there is value in continuing this process and our role even though it + will lead nowhere.

+

It may well be that the Argentines make significant concessions and adopt + a position that is fair and reasonable when seen in the historical + context of this crisis. In that case, we should certainly go on to + London and be prepared to place heavy pressure on the British, + recognizing the costs but assessing the alternative—war—as worse. The + burden of flexibility, and the onus for failure to achieve a peaceful + outcome, will then be squarely on the British. If the Argentines are + intransigent, we will have to consider having me return to Washington. + We may find that we are not in a position to make a basic decision on + our role until after a full round in both Buenos Aires and London. But + we must be ready to decide as early as this time tomorrow.

+

7. At this point, the odds of avoiding war still appear very long. We + could reach a flash-point at any time.

+ + Haig + +
+ +
+ + 131. Memorandum of ConversationSource: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, + Files of Vernon Walters, Lot + 89D213, Trip to Buenos Aires (w/Secretary Haig); Spin-off to El + Salvador/Honduras April 15–April 22, 1982. Top Secret; Sensitive. + The meeting took place at the Casa Rosada. The original handwritten + version of the memorandum by Walters is ibid. + + + Buenos Aires, April 16, + 1982, 10–10:40 a.m. + + + PARTICIPANTS + U.S. Secretary of State Alexander M. + Haig, Jr. + Ambassador Vernon C. + Walters + Argentine President Leopoldo + Fortunato Galtieri + Foreign Minister Nicanor Costa + Mendez + Admiral Moya, Chief of Military Household of The Presidency + +

President Galtieri welcomed + Secretary Haig. The Secretary + said that he brought President Galtieri a message from President Reagan of our President’s hope for a + peaceful solution.Not further + identified. The Secretary knew that the two Presidents had a + good and useful conversation.See Document 128. Their problems were + different, but he had found a moderate feeling in both capitals + (Washington and Buenos Aires).

+

The Secretary said he knew that Argentina was ready for war if it came. + This is equally true of the United Kingdom. For that reason, the + situation could very soon become critical. It is important that we work + out a solution. Our President is very concerned about the consequences + of this conflict for the future. It could affect the entire strategy of + the Free World. We had prepared a document.See Tab A, Document 112. It is + well thought out and was based on the ideas we developed after our + second visit to London. We found the atmosphere there better than on our + first visit. He would tell President Galtieri what our proposal would do.

+

1) It would keep the Argentine flag flying in the Islands.

+

2) It would expand the Argentine role in the interim period.

+

3) It would guarantee a conclusion of negotiations by the end of the + year.

+

4) It would guide the process by the principles of decolonization for the + normalization of relations between the Islands and the Mainland.

+

5) It would immediately lift economic sanctions.

+ +

6) It would guarantee American help throughout the whole process. In + London, we insisted on negotiations that would lead to final sovereignty + over the Islands for Buenos Aires.

+

What he was saying to the President is that neither side would get + everything it wanted if we wish to arrive at a successful solution.

+

As time went on, the military position of the UK would improve; this might not be so, but that was the + perception in London. If we let time go by, something could happen in a + matter of hours. He was confident that both governments realized that a + conflict would be disastrous for both and emotions would be more + aroused. We must not permit time to catch up with us. We must make + extremely serious efforts to resolve this situation or we will find an + unenviable series of developments.

+

What we must do is provide for Argentina’s immediate and perceived + benefits for the sacrifices they have made. These can be visible, but + far more important is a final solution for this problem that finally + realizes their hopes. There will be a turning away from the status of a + non-selfgoverning territory. If we do this, Argentina will have achieved + not all it wants but enough to justify its agreement. He must say that + we had extracted much of this from London, and we would have to extract + more. If he had not thought he could, he would not have bothered to + go.

+

Secretary Haig then said that if + President Galtieri thought it + useful, he could, at some point, present to the Argentine leadership our + feeling of the gravity of the situation and the American proposals on + the whole matter. President Galtieri asked if the Secretary was referring to the + Junta, and the Secretary confirmed that that was the case; but only if + the President thought it useful. President Galtieri did not reply directly to the Secretary’s + question as to whether he should see the other members of the Junta.

+

President Galtieri then said he + wished to assure the Secretary that he had full confidence in the U.S. + Government, in President Reagan, + and in the Secretary himself. But speaking with the frankness that is + possible between members of a family, he would tell the Secretary that + he is not pleased with the fact that a number of people in the American + Embassy were asking for visas to go to Uruguay. After all, it is not the + summer season for people to go to the beaches in Uruguay, and this + evidence of evacuation by Embassy people caused a bad impression and + gave people the feeling that the U.S. might be preparing for a break in + diplomatic relations.

+

Secretary Haig said this was + absolutely not the case, and it would stop but, in the same confidence, + he would tell the President that we had some intelligence reports [less than 1 line not declassified] that, in case + a conflict broke out, some Argentine Services might take steps against certain Americans.On April 14, INR prepared an intelligence estimate on the threat to + U.S. officials and citizens in Argentina stemming from the + “combination” of “the extraordinary deep nationalistic fervor + whipped up over the Falklands issue, the latent anti-Americanism + that is seldom far from the surface in Argentina, and the perception + of a U.S. ‘tilt’ toward the UK. In + the context of an Argentine military defeat or any outcome that is + perceived domestically as humiliating, these three factors would + probably lead many Argentines in and out of government to view the + US as responsible. US citizens could then become + scapegoats exposed to a dramatically heightened security risk. They + might well be subject to random harassment and violence simply for + being US citizens, and US officials all the more so.” Although + the estimate concluded that it was “unlikely that Argentine + intelligence and security units would be ordered to harm US citizens,” individual officials + “might indulge in unauthorized actions” and official services “might + become less scrupulous in responding to the security needs of US citizens.” (Telegram 100726 to + Buenos Aires, April 15; Department of State, Central Foreign Policy + File, D840730–0700) President Galtieri said that this is nonsense, and he hoped we + would not compare the Argentines to the Iranians. Secretary Haig said he feared someone had + panicked.

+

President Galtieri said that + there was a British Community here of over 20,000 people who, with the + other members of their families, must total some 100,000 people, and + they did not feel themselves in any danger.

+

Foreign Minister Costa Mendez + then said that he had a friend in the British Community, a leader + thereof, who had told him that he was a wartime comrade of Foreign + Secretary Pym in Tobruk and Italy + and was flying to London to tell him that the British attitude was + crazy.

+

Secretary Haig said he would stop + any further such requests for visas.

+

President Galtieri said that such + reports could spread to the press and create in the Argentine people a + psychosis that the U.S. was preparing for a diplomatic break with + Argentina.

+

Foreign Minister Costa Mendez + said that it could jeopardize the image of U.S. neutrality and the + Secretary’s mission if a perception arose that the U.S. was not + neutral.

+

President Galtieri said that + these requests could lead to an awkward situation internally in + Argentina. President Galtieri + said that we must try to avoid giving newsmen the opportunity to present + Argentina in an unfavorable light.

+

Secretary Haig said that some of + the stories that came out while he was flying to the U.S. had not been + helpful either.

+

President Galtieri said that it + was essential to tranquilize the press.

+

Foreign Minister Costa Mendez + said that the statement made today by U.S. Defense Secretary Weinberger was not very + encouraging.Not further + identified.

+ +

Secretary Haig said that he spoke + without authorization. The Argentines know what our President had said. + The UK had been furious at our + evenhandedness. So had Mrs. Thatcher. The Secretary went on that he must be frank. + If open conflict began, U.S. public opinion would push us towards the + UK. This was lamentable, and we must + avoid it.

+

President Galtieri said that + Secretary Haig must seek a + peaceful solution for all of the reasons he had expressed; otherwise, we + run the risk of splitting the Americas in two—those north of the Rio + Grande and those south of it; some more and some less—but such a split + would alter substantially the strategic panorama of the world.

+

Secretary Haig said that was why + we must get to work with the Foreign Minister immediately.

+

President Galtieri said that he + would be in his office and available all day to help them find a + solution and overcome any problem that might arise.

+

Secretary Haig said he wished to + assure President Galtieri that + no one in the U.S., especially the President, felt they had encountered + intransigence in Argentina. On the contrary, they had found good will + and serious efforts.

+

President Galtieri said that the + Argentines would give all guarantees covering the way of life and + freedom of each individual who chose to remain on the Islands. The + Argentines were also prepared to take into account present and future + strategic needs of Great Britain as well as her economic interests.

+

Secretary Haig said he wished to + tell them that, despite any other information they might be getting from + other sources, he was convinced that economic matters had very little to + do with the British position. What bothered them was the question of + honor after a long period of humiliation. This was really the driving + force behind their attitude.

+

President Galtieri then wished + the Secretary and Foreign Minister Costa + Mendez well in their work.No + memoranda of conversation of Haig’s discussions with Costa Mendez during the morning and afternoon, April + 16, have been found. For Haig’s brief summary of the course of the talks, + which he sent to Reagan that + evening, see Document 137.

+
+ +
+ + 132. Telegram From the White House to the Embassy in ArgentinaSource: Department of State, + Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, Miscellaneous Files, + March 1981–February 1983, Lot 83D210, Falklands [Folder 1]. Secret. + Sent via privacy channels. On another copy of the telegram, + Goldberg wrote that + Haig received the + telegram at 2 p.m., April 16. It was delivered to him during a + meeting with Costa Mendez at + the Foreign Ministry. (Department of State, Executive Secretariat, + Files of Alexander M. Haig, + Jr., 1981–1982, Lot 82D370, (1) Falkland + Crisis—1982) + + + Washington, April 16, 1982, 1343Z + +

WH2039. Please deliver to Ambassador Shlaudeman for Secretary Haig. The following message was received this morning + from Mrs. Thatcher.

+

Dear Ron,

+

Thank you for your message of 15 April about your conversation with + General Galtieri.See Document + 129.

+

I am sure that neither you nor Al + Haig, following his most helpful visits here, are in any + doubt that it is the strong wish of the British Government, Parliament + and people to avoid conflict. We have done our utmost to put Al Haig in a position where he has + reasonable proposals to offer the Argentine Government.

+

I regret that we have seen no corresponding flexibility on the part of + the Argentines. I note that General Galtieri has reaffirmed to you his desire to avoid + conflict. But it seems to me—and I must state this frankly to you as a + friend and ally—that he fails to draw the obvious conclusion. It was not + Britain who broke the peace but Argentina. The mandatory resolution of + the Security Council, to which you and we have subscribed, requires + Argentina to withdraw its troops from the Falkland Islands. That is the + essential first step which must be taken to avoid conflict. When it has + been taken, discussions about the future of the Islands can profitably + take place. Any suggestion that conflict can be avoided by a device that + leaves the aggressor in occupation is surely gravely misplaced.An unknown hand underlined the portion of the + sentence beginning with “by” and ending with “occupation,” placed a + vertical line in the right-hand margin next to the sentence, and + added the following annotation: “Mr. Secretary: You might recall the + PM’s own words. 2 Arg [entries?] hardly represents + ‘occupation.’” The implications for other potential areas of + tension and for small countries everywhere would be of extreme + seriousness. The fundamental principles for which the free world stands + would be shattered.

+

May I ask you to convey my strong feelings on this point urgently to Al + Haig in Buenos Aires.

+ +

We remain ready at any time to continue discussions with yourself and + Haig. Our earnest aim is to + avoid conflict. But it is essential that America, our closest friend and + ally, should share with us a common perception of the fundamental issues + of democracy and freedom which are at stake, as I am sure you do.

+

Warmest good wishes

+ +

Margaret

+
+ +
+ 133. Action Memorandum From the Permanent Representative to the + Organization of American States (Middendorf) to Acting Secretary of State EagleburgerSource: Department of State, Central + Foreign Policy File, P880104–1183. Secret; Nodis. Sent through Bosworth. Drafted by Johnson and Middendorf. On the first page of + the memorandum, Middendorf + wrote: “Larry—This is the memo I spoke to [you] about this morning. + Bill.” Above this note, Bosworth wrote: “Larry, I am also cutting USOAS into the broader contingency + paper which we will have for you by COB. Steve.” + + + Washington, April 16, + 1982 + + + SUBJECT + Falkland Dispute: Separating the Disputants + +

Larry:

+

The lousy situation in the South Atlantic and the + disastrous consequences that an actual outbreak of hostilities + between the United Kingdom and Argentina would have on the + Inter-American system and the interests of the United States in this + hemisphere (Rio Treaty pressure to take sides, etc.), prompts this + anxious memo.

+

Those of us in the Latin American trenches, who in the last week at the + OAS have been struggling to keep + the delicately balanced Inter-American System from coming apart at the + seams, have been thinking hard about any straws which might be helpful + to Al in his efforts to extricate the British, the Argentines, and us + from this dismal entanglement. As you know, before he left on his first + trip, Al asked for any suggestions but I also am aware that his thinking + must be far in front of whatever contributions we might make. If the following thought is of any help whatsoever, I + can help do up a cable to the Secretary but if it already is on + our drawing boards or discarded please tell me and I’ll stand down.

+ +

My concept is tied to a possibility of a negotiating + deadlock, a flashpoint rapidly approaching in the South Atlantic but + a remaining wish by both sides to avoid overt hostilities. Under + such circumstances both sides might welcome a face saving way to + separate their most immediate problem—hostilities—from the range of + knotty problems concerning the islands themselves. There are really + two issues here: one is immediate disengagement, and the second + is negotiation over territory. It seems to me that as long as both sides + appear to want to solve both issues at once, an impasse is more likely. + Getting them to avert war, for now, is critical to pave the way for + later agreements on the other issue.

+

As the Great Nightfall approaches there must be growing doubts on both + sides. Both sides might now be persuaded to accept a + temporary, at least, disengagement of forces, with face saving + provisions, and options left open to re-escalate, if necessary. For us + such an arrangement, if workable, would buy time.

+

The bare bones of such a formula could + involve:

+

1. Disengagement:

+

(a) The British agree for a set period of time to stay well out of the + high risk area, perhaps pulling back to port facilities at Ascencion or, + say, Rio de Janeiro (the Brazilians would be helpful if both sides + asked);

+

(b) The Argentines agree for a set period of time to phased troop + withdrawals (perhaps an initial increment of 2,000 as the British fleet + pulls back) and further 2,000 increments weekly based upon positive + pre-agreed benchmarks in ongoing talks between the two sides.

+

The British, of course, would have to back off their declaration of a + quarantine zone and the Argentines would have to back off their + statements about keeping the Falklands fully fortified. Both, therefore, + would have to be steered toward making statements that:

+

(a) pronounce their strong commitment to a peaceful solution;

+

(b) explain, therefore, this cooling off period to allow for negotiations + toward a peaceful settlement; but

+

(c) make clear that they are not foreclosing their military options.

+

2. Talks:

+

I recommend we try to get both sides engaged in exhaustive talks at a + neutral site such as Bretton Woods or another + site that would be symbolic of peacemaking but would not increase our + exposure, (or even Camp David, but only for the + final signing of the definitive peaceful settlement) where their best + negotiators and lawyers can compare briefs to their hearts’ content. + From such a meeting I foresee tedium, dwindling media attention (and + thus less need to strike public poses) and perhaps even progress toward + agreement on the thorny issues of sovereignty and administration.

+ +

3. Their military options:

+

While talks proceed, the British fleet would, if say at Rio, be in the + neighborhood and able to get to the scene if the talks fail. At the same + time the Argentines, though troop units had been phased down, would be + able to reinsert their forces well before the British could return to + the scene. Both sides should perceive that this costs little in terms of + logistics.

+

Maybe this sort of framework for keeping both sides engaged and not + fighting is workable. It is, in effect, a Howler Baboon solution (see + attachment).Not printed. The attachment + is a quotation taken from the book African + Genesis: A Personal Investigation Into + the Animal Origins and Nature of Man by author Robert + Ardrey. At least it is a last gasp possibility if all else + fails. Let me know what you think.

+
+ +
+ 134. Memorandum From the Director of the Bureau of Politico-Military + Affairs (Burt) to Acting + Secretary of State EagleburgerSource: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S Special Handling Restrictions Memos + 1979–1983, Lot 96D262, ES Sensitive + April 10–19 1982. Secret; Sensitive. Cleared by Blackwill. + + + Washington, April 16, + 1982 + + + SUBJECT + Exports to Argentina + +

Derek Thomas called Bob Blackwill this afternoon to say + that the Embassy had heard there was a Bolivian cargo aircraft in Miami + scheduled to fly on Tuesday, April 20th to Rio Gallegos, Argentina + carrying communications gear. The British think they smell something + fishy.

+

We have checked quietly and discovered that:

+

1. There is indeed a Bolivian plane in Miami, scheduled for a Tuesday + flight to Rio Gallegos, due West of the Falklands.

+

2. It needs U.S. authorization to take off, which is issued by the + CAB.

+

3. The cargo is “telephonic equipment.”

+ +

4. We have issued no export licenses for any kind of military + communications equipment to either country, but if it is civilian + equipment, no licenses are required.Burt drew an asterisk + at the end of this sentence and wrote at the end of the memorandum: + “Here we go again!”

+

5. The CAB (and FAA) who deal with the + take-off clearances are mildly interested because of the destination, + but have no plans to do anything at least until Monday.April 19.

+

If we want to stop the plane or alternatively insure that it goes we + should so inform the CAB. We will continue to check the facts in order + to avoid another LANDSAT screwup. + But if the information above does not change, I see no basis for + stopping the Bolivian flight.

+
+ +
+ 135. Telegram From the Department of State to Secretary of State + Haig in Buenos AiresSource: Reagan Library, + Executive Secretariat, NSC Country + File, Latin America/Central, Argentina (04/15/1982–04/17/1982). + Confidential; Immediate; Nodis. + Sent for information Immediate to Buenos Aires, London, and Moscow. + Printed from a copy that was received in the White House Situation + Room. + + + Washington, April 16, 1982, 2048Z + +

Tosec 60058/102928. Subject: Eagleburger-Dobrynin Meeting on Falkland Islands, + SSOD.

+

1. (Secret)–Entire text.

+

2. Acting Secretary Eagleburger + called in Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin April 16 to present him with following + non-paper on Falkland Islands issue:

+

3. Begin text:

+

—The disinformation campaign being waged by the Soviet Union regarding + the role of the United States in the Falkland Islands crisis has been + carefully noted by the United States Government and will not be soon + forgotten. Soviet media commentary leaves no doubt that there is a + deliberate effort underway to distort U.S. efforts to avert armed + conflict. For example, Pravda on April 12 + asserted that the U.S. effort to play the role of “honest broker” masked + the fact that the U.S. was + siding with Britain and was engaged in secret military and political + cooperation. TASS on April 13 claimed + that the U.S. was planning to set up a “South Atlantic Treaty + Organization” and to establish a military base in the Falklands. Radio + Moscow broadcasts in Spanish have been even more tendentious, flatly + accusing the U.S. of siding with the British and seeking a “foothold” in + the South Atlantic.A more complete + translation of the referenced April 12 Pravda + article, as well as the texts of the April 13 TASS article and April 14 + Spanish-language broadcast by Radio Moscow, is attached to a + typewritten version of Eagleburger’s non-paper for Dobrynin. (Department of State, + Central Foreign Policy File, P820078–0820)

+

—The Falkland Islands issue is between Great Britain and Argentina. It is + not an East-West issue, and it would serve no one’s interest to make it + an East-West issue. U.S. actions are aimed solely at preventing + bloodshed; we are seeking to prevent further military action by either + side, and to lay the groundwork for a process which addresses the + critical issues of self-determination.

+

—As Secretary Haig has made clear + to you and to Foreign Minister Gromyko, both in New York and Geneva, + Poland and other regional issues have placed a very heavy burden on + U.S.-Soviet relations. We have discussed these problem areas at great + length, together with arms control, and we are prepared to continue this + dialogue. But we must underscore that involvement by the Soviet Union or + its friends in the South Atlantic crisis would hopelessly complicate and + perhaps irreparably damage our hopes for moving forward in relations + with you. There must be no misunderstanding on this point. End text.

+

4. After reading the non-paper Dobrynin claimed that the U.S. press was also talking + about a U.S. tilt toward the U.K. Soviet press accounts were not + official government statements and were merely quoting other news + sources. In any event, relations between the U.S. and its allies were + not the USSR’s business. The USSR viewed this issue in the context of + colonialism. Soviet involvement in the Falkland Islands issue should not + be overstated: the nearest Soviet ships were hundreds of miles away.

+

5. The Acting Secretary responded that Dobrynin was entirely correct in noting that US-UK + relations were none of the USSR’s + business. Neither, in our view, was the Falkland Islands issue. For some + twenty years Dobrynin had been + arguing in Washington that Soviet media were entirely unofficial; the + Acting Secretary saw no point in debating the point further. On Soviet + involvement, the Soviet side should note that our non-paper said Soviet + involvement would rpt would complicate our relations.

+

6. At the close of the meeting, Dobrynin gratuituously asked who would lead the US + SSOD delegation. The Acting Secretary + said that while, as Dobrynin knew, the President would + address the SSOD, we had not yet + determined who would head our delegation when the President was not in + New York. Dobrynin supposed that + permanent representatives would lead delegations but said he certainly + hoped Gromyko would head the Soviet SSOD delegation.

+ + Eagleburger + +
+ +
+ 136. Memorandum From Dennis C. + Blair and Roger + Fontaine of the National Security Council Staff to the + President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Clark)Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Latin + America/Central, Argentina (04/15/1982–04/17/1982). Secret. A + stamped notation in the upper right-hand corner of the memorandum + indicates that Clark saw it. + A second notation in an unknown hand reads: “President has + seen.” + + + Washington, April 16, + 1982 + + + SUBJECT + Suspension of the Haig + Mission on the Falklands + +

Issue. Should the President suspend Secretary + Haig’s shuttle diplomacy + after the current consultations in Buenos Aires?

+

Judgments:

+

—That the Argentines will offer no major concessions today to justify + Haig going on to London;

+

—That Presidential pressure on Mrs. Thatcher for a major concession would both be + unsuccessful, and would seriously damage U.S.-U.K. relations;

+

—That Haig therefore stands + little chance of negotiating an agreement before the British fleet + arrives (approximately 20 April).

+

Discussion:

+

—Suspension of what increasingly appears to be a futile mission prevents + undermining of American diplomacy, and preserves the personal + reputations of the Secretary and the President;

+

—Suspension may well decrease chances of conflict + by removing illusions (particularly Argentina’s) that U.S. can “deliver” + the other side;

+ +

—Suspension will force UK and Argentina + to face squarely the consequences of possible military defeat or + stalemate, now that both gunboat diplomacy and third-party mediation + have run their course.

+

However:

+

—Suspension of the mission will spark criticism that the U.S. “Failed to + go the extra mile” for peace;

+

—Suspension removes restraint on Argentines who have said they publicly + will not challenge U.K. military while Haig mediation efforts continue;

+

—The U.S. will be under greater pressure to take sides, either damaging + relations with its closest ally, Great Britain, or ending cooperation + with Argentina, and damaging relations with other Latin America + countries which support Argentina.

+

How to Disengage the Haig Mission

+

—Without announcing the end of the mission, President today calls + Haig back to Washington from + B.A. for consultations;

+

—After consultations tomorrow with Haig, President announces (probably on TV) that + Haig will remain in + Washington until the two sides show more flexibility and a forthcoming + approach;

+

—Haig explains in more detail + that we have exercised our good offices, we have narrowed and identified + the differences between the sides, but have failed to bridge them, after + two visits to each capital, further visits are not warranted, but he is + prepared to resume visits if conditions warrant it

+

And Then

+

—We must decide what public, diplomatic and military policies to adopt if + conflict breaks out when the British fleet arrives.

+
+ +
+ + 137. Telegram From Secretary of State Haig to the Department of StateSource: Reagan Library, Executive + Secretariat, NSC Country File, + Latin America/Central, Argentina (04/15/1982–04/17/1982). Secret; + Flash; Nodis. Printed from a copy + that was received in the White House Situation Room. Reagan initialed the telegram, + indicating that he saw it. + + + Buenos Aires, April 16, 1982, + 2345Z + +

Secto 6024. Department pass to White + House. For S/Klosson and S/S–Bremer. Subject: Message to the + President From the Secretary of State.

+

1. Secret Entire text.

+

2. Mr. President:

+

As of 1900 hours local, we have completed first round with very little + give here. Argentines now reviewing situation with President Galtieri and probably with Junta. + Meanwhile, we remain in holding pattern at the Foreign Ministry. Nothing + that has transpired thus far in this initial round changes the + assessment I provided you from the aircraft enroute here yesterday.See Document + 130. We are not at point where break is inevitable. But + events could unfold rapidly, even this evening. Warm regards, Al.

+ + Haig + +
+ +
+ + 138. Memorandum of ConversationSource: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, + Files of Vernon Walters, Lot + 89D213, Trip to Buenos Aires (w/Secretary Haig); Spin-off to El + Salvador/Honduras April 15–April 22, 1982. Top Secret; Sensitive. + The conversation took place in Haig’s suite at the Sheraton Hotel. The original + handwritten version of the memorandum is ibid. + + + Buenos Aires, April 16, + 1982, 10–10:30 p.m. + + + PARTICIPANTS + U.S. Secretary of State Alexander M. + Haig, Jr. + Ambassador Harry Shlaudeman + Ambassador Thomas + Enders + Ambassador Vernon + Walters + Argentinian Foreign Minister Costa + Mendez + Under Secretary Enrique + Ros + +

The conversation was conducted entirely in English.

+

Foreign Minister Costa Mendez + opened by saying that he had good news concerning the British marines + and scientific personnel captured on South Georgia; they were safe. One + American family and one other citizen from the Falklands would be + arriving in Buenos Aires tomorrow. There is some confusion with the + Swiss over the names.

+

The Foreign Minister then said he had met with President Galtieri and the Junta on the three + points left in suspense. Paragraph 6 is okay. Regarding paragraph 10, + the Argentine position is that always known to Ambassador Shlaudeman. He then showed the + Americans the proposed Argentine version of this paragraph which demands + an affirmation of Argentine sovereignty.See + Document 141.

+

The Secretary, after reading it, said that it was certain to be rejected + in London. He asked whether the Foreign Minister had any flexibility on + that paragraph. Costa Mendez + replied that he had none; but that if it was accepted, then the + Argentine position on paragraphs 6 and 8 would be easier.

+

The Secretary then said, “This means war.” Ambassador Enders added that this is tantamount + to a declaration of war.

+

Costa Mendez replied that this + was simply the position Argentina had always maintained and that the + UN Resolution affirmed.

+

Ambassador Enders said that there + was quite frankly no mention of Argentine sovereignty in those + resolutions. Costa Mendez + replied that he honestly felt that the wording included the territorial + integrity of Argentina.

+ +

Ambassador Enders then asked + whether the authorities of this country knew that their inflexibility + meant war.

+

Costa Mendez replied that if the + Secretary wanted to see the President and/or if President Reagan wanted to talk to the + President, they could. He then asked whether the Secretary wanted to + talk to the Junta.

+

The Secretary replied that he did. He had earned and deserved the + opportunity to speak to them and tell them the consequences of their + decision.

+

Costa Mendez replied that the + Secretary had made superhuman efforts and deserved anything he + wanted.

+

The Secretary said he would not want to go home without having had the + opportunity to tell the Junta that their position probably means war as + a consequence. He would not be hesitant to tell them.

+

Costa Mendez, visibly shocked, + said that he felt he had been clear and honest and had been consistent + in what he was saying all along.

+

The Secretary said that this would be a disaster for Argentina, and we + would have to take a position in the case of an armed conflict.

+

Costa Mendez said it was not a + consequence of any intransigence on the part of the Argentines.

+

The Secretary said he had made a real effort to bridge the gap between + the two positions. He had told the Foreign Minister that neither side + could obtain everything it wanted. He thought that everyone had seemed + to accept that.

+

Costa Mendez then said that the + Argentines had done their best.

+

The Secretary said he was willing to meet with the Junta; but it might be + better to sleep on it and meet tomorrow.See + Document 142. + Costa Mendez said he agreed that + would be best and would give everyone time to reflect.

+

Secretary Haig said that he was + sure the British would shoot when they received the message.

+

Costa Mendez said his advice was + to wait until after the Secretary met with the Junta to send his + message.

+

Ambassador Enders asked whether + they had any doubt that this meant war with the British.

+

Costa Mendez said that the + Argentines had not been in touch with the British; but he would rely on + our word for it. He was surprised that the United Kingdom would go to + the edge of war for such a small problem as these few rocky islands.

+

Ambassador Shlaudeman said that + they would. Ambassador Enders + said they would fight for the same reason as the Argentines would + fight—for honor.

+ +

Costa Mendez replied that the + Argentines had put up with this problem for 149 years.

+

Secretary Haig said that there + was the same imperative on both sides. The judgment of history would be + serious.

+

Costa Mendez said that they + should sleep on the matter and thanked the Secretary for the efforts he + had made.

+
+ +
+ 139. Telegram From Secretary of State Haig to the Department of StateSource: Reagan Library, Executive + Secretariat, NSC Country File, + Latin America/Central, Argentina (04/15/1982–04/17/1982). Secret; + Flash; Nodis. Printed from a copy + that was received in the White House Situation Room. Reagan initialed the telegram, + indicating that he saw it. + + + Buenos Aires, April 17, 1982, + 0519Z + +

Secto 6027. Department please pass to + White House. Subj: Memorandum From the Secretary to the President.

+

1. The Argentine Foreign Minister has just come back to me after seeing + the Junta.See Document + 138. The language he delivered is + unacceptable.Haig also informed Pym of the outcome of the meeting + with Costa Mendez and of his + forthcoming meeting with the entire Junta. In his brief message, + Haig described the new + Argentine response delivered by Costa + Mendez as “very discouraging.” (Telegram Secto 6026 to London, April 17; + Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Cable File, Falkland File 04/17/1982 (1)) In + essence, it calls for: 1) shared control in the interim period, with + provisions that would permit Argentina to saturate the Islands and push + out the Falklanders; (2) conditions for negotiations on a final + settlement that amount to a prior agreement that the result will be the + affirmation of Argentine sovereignty. What little flexibility there is + in their position on interim control must be seen in the context of + their rigid position that negotiations must lead to an affirmation of + their sovereignty.

+

2. It has become increasingly clear that we are not dealing with people + in a position to negotiate in good faith. I have spent hours negotiating + with the Foreign Minister, as well as time with Galtieri himself, only to find that + what is agreed ad referendum is then toughened substantially each time + the Junta gets in the act.

+

3. I told the Foreign Minister that the latest Argentine proposal would + assure war with the United Kingdom, and that I wanted to be sure that Galtieri and the Junta were in no doubt about this. The + Foreign Minister agreed and undertook to arrange a meeting. I have just + been told that Galtieri will see + me at 10:00 a.m. Frankly, I doubt that my message will register. Even if + he and his colleagues can be convinced that the British are deadly + serious, I doubt they can be brought really to grasp the tragic + consequences for Argentina.

+

4. If, as I anticipate, I make no headway in the morning, I should depart + immediately for Washington. It would be fruitless and unfair to Mrs. + Thatcher for me to carry + these proposals to London, thereby shifting the spotlight and onus onto + her. I plan to make a brief, calm, yet clear departure statement that + will leave no doubt that we are at an impasse because of Argentine + inflexibility. I will be non-provocative, in hopes of preserving some + chance for resuming this process and avoiding a sharp anti-American + reaction here. I would propose to say that you have instructed me to + return to Washington, and I ask that you cable such an instruction to me + without delay. You should know that our Ambassador will now begin taking + steps to assure the safety of our people here. In addition, Bill Clark should continue refining + the plans that I discussed with him earlier in this crisis.Not further identified.

+

5. It is of course possible that the Argentines will come to their senses + by tomorrow and offer us something more forthcoming. In that unlikely + event, we will need to make finer judgments about how to proceed, such + as by going on to London or working the problem further here. However, + it is important in any event that I have in hand before my meeting with + Galtieri your instruction to + return home. If the instruction does not fit the circumstances, I will + be in touch immediately.

+

6. Assuming I leave, I will send, on departure, the text of the Argentine + proposals to London. I will make clear that the US neither is advocating these proposals nor expects the + UK to make the next move. I am quite + sure the substance of the Argentine proposals will be made public by the + British, and probably here as well. We will need to be prepared to + refute any suggestion that we are associated with these proposals.

+

7. We will find that pressures will mount quickly to provide substantial + US support to the UK, and clearly our thinking must now run + in this direction. But it is important that I have a chance to return + and discuss this with you before anything is done or said along these + lines.

+

8. The need for discipline with the press has never been greater. Until I + make my departure statement we should maintain total silence.

+ + Haig + +
+ +
+ + 140. Telegram From the White House to the Embassy in ArgentinaSource: Reagan Library, + Executive Secretariat, NSC Country + File, Latin America/Central, Argentina (04/15/1982–04/17/1982). + Secret; Flash; Nodis; Exclusively + Eyes Only. Sent for information to the Department of State. + Reagan initialed the + telegram, indicating that he saw it. + + + Washington, April 17, 1982, 0806Z + +

WH2077. State Department: Eyes Only for Assistant [Acting] Secretary Eagleburger.

+

Begin text

+

To: U.S. delegation Secretary in Buenos Aires

+

From: The President

+

Subject: Memorandum for the Secretary of State From the President.

+

Begin text

+

1. I have reviewed your report of negotiations with President Galtieri and other officials of the + Argentine Government.See Document 139. From this distance, it + appears that the President lacks the strength to carry the Junta even + though he must surely know that failing to act with courage now merely + forestalls his ultimate decline. I agree with your assessment that the + terms offered provide no basis for compromise—especially the assertion + of preconditions on negotiations for the final outcome.

+

2. It is conceivable as you say that enlightenment may occur overnight + and, as a consequence, you should go ahead with tomorrow’s meeting.See Document + 142. Failing such a change, you are directed to return + to Washington to await a change in attitude.

+

3. At your meeting you should make clear to President Galtieri and his government the + following points: (1) From the outset the United States believed it + worthwhile to make a serious effort to bring the parties together in the + interest of finding a peaceful solution, notwithstanding the + considerable political vulnerabilities and criticism it would engender. + (2) It did so because of our concern for the preservation of peace and + our confidence that that concern was shared by both Argentina and Great + Britain. (3) In that spirit it has come as a great disappointment now to + receive a position of such retrogression as to call into question the + value of continued efforts on our part. (4) Negotiations require a + measure of good will and serious intent on both sides. (5) The United + States remains willing to lend its assistance to the parties in seeking + a solution. (6) The position of the Argentine Government at this time is not, however, one which + holds promise of continued progress. (7) Therefore, you have been + instructed to discontinue your mission and return to Washington.

+

4. You may modify these points as may be necessary to underscore that by + its shortsightedness the Junta has brought this upon itself.

+

5. I can understand your personal frustration and disappointment. You + undertook an extremely difficult task and have carried the burden to its + fullest potential at great personal sacrifice. For that you have my deep + personal thanks, Al. I look forward to hearing of your sessions in some + detail upon your return.

+

Warm personal regards.

+

Ronald Reagan

+

End text

+
+ +
+ 141. Telegram From Secretary of State Haig to the Embassy in the United KingdomSource: Reagan Library, Executive + Secretariat, NSC Cable File, + Falkland File 04/17/1982 (1). Secret; Flash; Nodis. Sent for information Flash to + the Department of State. + + + Buenos Aires, April 17, 1982, + 1345Z + +

Secto 6029. 1. Please deliver ASAP the following message from Secretary + Haig to Foreign Minister + Pym.

+

2. Dear Francis:

+

Further to my message of early this morningSee footnote 3, Document + 139.—and as I go into my 10:00 a.m. meeting with the + Junta—I want you to have the three key paragraphs we received last night + from Costa Mendez following his + meeting at Casa Rosada.See Document 138. As I told you in my + message, we are deeply disappointed. The Argentine paragraphs are + totally unacceptable. I will be in touch with you again following my + meeting. Al. End of message.

+

3. Begin Argentine paragraphs:

+

Interim Administration:

+

Pending a definitive settlement, all decisions, laws and regulations to + be hereafter implemented on the Islands shall be submitted to and + expeditiously ratified by the special interim authority, except in the + event that the special + interim authority deems such decisions, laws and regulations to be + inconsistent with the purposes and provisions of this agreement or its + implementation. The traditional local administration shall continue + through the executive and legislative councils, which shall be enlarged + to include an equal number of representatives appointed by the Argentine + Government among local residents. The local police shall be subject to + the general supervision of the special interim authority. The flags of + each of the constituent members of the special interim authority shall + be flown at its headquarters.

+

Links between mainland and Islands:

+

Full freedom of travel, transportation, movement of persons, residence, + ownership and disposition of property, communications and commerce + between the mainland and the Islands shall be recognized to the + inhabitants of the Islands and to the Argentine nationals coming from + the mainland on an equal basis.

+

The special interim authority shall make specific provisions on these + matters in order to implement these freedoms, including arrangements for + compensation of Islanders who do not wish to remain.

+

Negotiations:

+

December 31, 1982, will conclude the interim period during which the + signatories shall conclude negotiations on modalities for the removal of + the Islands from the list of non-governing territories under Chapter XI + of the United Nations Charter and on conditions for their definitive + status, on the basis of the implementation of the principle of Argentine + territorial integrity and taking fully into consideration the interests + of the inhabitants of the Islands in accordance with the purposes and + principles of the Charter of the United Nations and Resolutions 1514 + (XV), 2065 (XX)UN General Assembly Resolution 2065, adopted December + 16, 1965, invited the Argentine and U.K. Governments to proceed with + negotiations to find a peaceful solution to the decolonization of + the Falklands/Malvinas Islands. and other relevant + resolutions of the General Assembly of the United Nations.

+ + Haig + +
+ + +
+ 142. Memorandum of ConversationSource: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, + Files of Alexander M. Haig, + Jr., 1981–1982, Lot 82D370, (2) Falklands + Crisis—1982. Secret; Sensitive. The meeting took place at the Casa + Rosada. + + + Buenos Aires, April 17, + 1982, 10 a.m.–1:10 p.m. + + + PARTICIPANTS + U.S. Secretary of State Alexander M. + Haig, Jr. + Ambassador Vernon C. + Walters + Argentine President Leopoldo + Fortunato Galtieri + Admiral Jorge Isaac + Anaya + Lt. General Basilio Lami + Dozo + +

President Galtieri welcomed the + Secretary and was happy to give him the opportunity to meet with the + other members of the military junta.

+

Secretary Haig said that he had + frank and open discussions, but one drawback was that we were perceived + in some quarters in Argentina as being the agents of Great Britain. + Nothing could be further from the truth. He, himself, as well as + President Reagan considered + themselves as agents for the interests of the entire Free World and, in + that light, had been working to strengthen relations between Argentina + and the United States to increase the political and military security of + all.

+

At the same time, the U.S. must advocate the respect for international + law. The Secretary well understood the years of frustration for the + Argentines in the light of the insensitivity of the British. We felt + that we could achieve fundamental changes in two ways:

+

1. We must find a way to change the internal arrangements on the Islands + but not in such a way as to cause a breakdown in relations between the + US and the UK and, consequently, Western Europe. All of the Soviet + efforts and policies were directed at splitting Europe away from the + U.S. This we had to avoid at all costs. We could not, as a government, + accept that the use of force, no matter how justified, could bring about + changes. President Reagan + himself could not survive such an acceptance. The Secretary had been in + communication with other European governments, France, West Germany, + Italy, and had found no support for the use of force, whereas there was + widespread support for evolutionary change.The French and West German Ambassadors expressed this viewpoint to + Eagleburger in separate + meetings with the Acting Secretary on April 8. (Telegram 97143 to + all NATO capitals, Buenos Aires, + Brasilia, Montevideo, and USUN, + April 10; Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, + D820190–0347) We had also been in contact with Latin American governments. He had, for + instance, stopped in Caracas on his way down and they, too, understand + the difficulty of this acceptance in legal terms.See Document 122. + He would tell them exactly what it was we were trying to structure, to + initiate change in the islands to increase Argentine presence and + participation in the governing process of the islands. The US would join so that the UK could say that the rule of law had not + been ignored. We had a great debate in London that had lasted some 11 + hours. We had insisted for the Special Ad Interim Authority that + decisions be taken by a majority of the three and not by unanimity which + would effectively give them a veto over change. It would enable the + US to influence every decision taken + with a view of opening the islands to change.

+

2. With respect to the negotiations, he had last night received proposed + wordings that would inevitably lead to war. That was the unanimous view + of all of his colleagues. We had tried in our discussions with the + Foreign Minister to create language that would be more benign and less + ultimative in nature but which would lead as surely as the language the + Argentines desired to the changes they had in mind. This would permit us + to build stronger relations between our countries that could preside + over change.

+

Where are we now? We are at a point that would lead straight to armed + conflict. The tragedy is that such a conflict would inevitably push the + US toward support of Great Britain + exactly as was the case in the early part of World War II. We have had + the situation carefully analyzed by our military experts. Frankly, we + could not see anything but disaster for all concerned if this were to + come to armed conflict. It would be a total disaster, and there would be + no winner except the USSR. They would + win. Our analysis is that, at the first shot fired, Argentine ports + would be mined, the Argentine forces on the islands would be isolated, + the first British objective would be the destruction of the airfield, + and surface and air resupply for the Argentine forces would be + increasingly difficult. Since both nations are limited in what they + could do to one another, the only winner under such circumstances would + be the Soviet Union.

+

The Secretary said that last night he had sent a message to the President + saying he could not support in London the Argentine proposal, and he had + asked the President to instruct him to return to Washington—not to + terminate but to suspend his efforts.See + Document 139. He must say that + he felt that this was tragic. He felt that we should now sit down with + military participation rather than dealing through third parties. The Foreign Minister and he + had constructive discussions. He felt that, in terms of human + communications, problems arose of misunderstandings in transmittal of + messages. The whole matter is too important to allow such + misunderstandings to preclude successful negotiations and lead us to a + tragic outcome. It would be tragic for Argentina, tragic for Western + unity, and for our main struggle against Soviet imperialism. To let this + happen would be foolish, and history would condemn us all for it.

+

General Lami Dozo said that he + would like to ask the Secretary for clarification. He had stated that + the Argentine text for paragraphs 6 and 10See Document 141. would be a step + toward war.

+

The Secretary stated that what we were trying to express was that we + could not prejudge the outcome.

+

Admiral Anaya said he was + concerned because we were all working under extreme tensions. The UN Resolution should be complied with. + Argentine forces were in a high state of readiness. The British fleet + was continuing to advance, and it would be very difficult to find a + solution when emotions were so high. For that reason, we must find a way + to avoid a clash between the Argentine and UK forces. He spoke as a naval officer. He had ordered his + submarines not to enter the exclusion area in order to avoid a spark + that would make war inevitable. He felt, and he did not know whether the + other Commanders-in-Chief agreed with him, that the situation had to be + defused by the withdrawal of the forces and their talk under the + auspices of the US to try and find a + situation that would be acceptable to both countries. Admiral Anaya feared that if a submarine that + belonged to another country, the Soviet Union for example, sinks an + Argentine or a British ship, it would give the Soviets a great + opportunity to set off a conflict. He is not a submariner himself but + when a submarine has contact with another submarine which was not of his + own nationality, he would use his weapons and we would never know + whether it was Argentine, British or of another nationality. We must + defuse such a situation. This is extremely urgent in the light of the + continued forward motion of the British fleet. There are British and + other submarines in the area that could unleash a conflict at any time. + If both forces do not withdraw in compliance with Resolution 502, we may + be overtaken by events. The problem could become expensive if we did not + deal with it.

+

Secretary Haig said that he + shared the Admiral’s concern. That is why we attempted to work out a + formula that is very different from the British approach. We tried to + draft it in such a way that it would not be unacceptable to the + British.

+ +

Foreign Minister Costa Mendez + noted that the two parties agreed on four paragraphs.

+

Admiral Anaya then said he did + not wish to violate military secrecy but asked whether we know whether + there were Soviet submarines in the area around the islands. Secretary + Haig replied that there were + no Soviet submarines in the area. There were some around the Azores but + not in the area.

+

Admiral Anaya said that he had + another concern. He was not a diplomat, but he could see another danger + and that was that the Soviets might sink one or more ships of the + British fleet to demonstrate their vulnerability, and it would be blamed + on the Argentines. This humiliation of the British would be very useful + from the Soviet point of view to prove that a small country with + determination could defeat the third largest navy in the world. He is + convinced that the US understood that + this would divert us from our main struggle against Marxist subversion. + The Argentines believe in the Western values and way of life. There is a + deep-rooted feeling in the Argentine armed forces and especially in the + Navy. He wants to emphasize that the first thing we must do is to avoid + a military confrontation first. Then, we could move on to seek a + political solution. He could see no way to achieve a global solution + while the forces were facing one another.

+

The Secretary said that he agreed completely with Admiral Anaya’s analysis. The matter was one + of great urgency.

+

General Lami Dozo said that with + the exception of the Foreign Minister, all of those present were + military men, and we were obliged to take part in what was essentially a + political situation.

+

Secretary Haig commented + humorously, “Unfortunately for us.”

+

General Lami Dozo then went on to + say that in his capacity he felt that various peoples had historic + imperatives, and one of the historic imperatives for the Argentine + people was the question of the Malvinas. He believed that in the + Secretary’s analysis, he had perhaps not given enough importance to the + matter of North-South relations on the American continent. He + believed—even more, he was convinced—that the last bulwark of the West + and of the Christian world would be here on the American continent, not + in Europe. In any solution, we must take all of this into account. We + respect the British, and we are convinced anti-Marxists, and nothing + will make us abandon this position. Any solution must give the same + value to the feelings of American unity which is gravely affected by + Marxist infiltration in several of the American countries. Recently, + there concluded in Buenos Aires the regular meeting of the Chiefs of + Staff of the American Air Forces.The April + 8–9 meeting was attended on behalf of the United States by Allen. See Document 62 and footnote 2 + thereto. Bilaterally, he had spoken with each one, and all felt (with the exception of the + Nicaraguan who was also present) that the Americas should form a single + bloc against Communist aggression. This should be a vital criterion in + arriving at any solution. As the Navy Commander-in-Chief had said, it + was very difficult to negotiate under the threat of force, and this was + correct. He would like to round out his views on this matter by saying + that there must be an indication of what the final solution would be; + otherwise, it would be very difficult to reach agreement.

+

Secretary Haig said that he + wished to reply to the Admiral’s important suggestion that the first + need was to defuse the situation. We tried to do this in London. There + the British are most agitated. It was the most agitated conversation he + had had with Mrs. Thatcher. + There is no way the UK would accept a + freeze or stop. It would be easier to start to talk about the political + aspects to which General Lami + Dozo had referred. We must find a political solution + acceptable to both sides which suggests but does not decide the final + outcome.

+

There should be a certain ambiguity regarding the negotiations, but all + understood that the outcome would mean the return of the islands to + Argentina. The real problem, as the Secretary saw it, is a certain + understandable Argentine skepticism.

+

What we are trying to do is to make sufficient changes on the islands to + change their character that would cover the principle of decolonization + and their removal from the list of non-self-governing territories.

+

The islands are only 400 miles from Argentina and 7000 from the UK. Margaret + Thatcher is fighting to survive and would fight on the + principle of international law. That was our dilemma.

+

Secretary Haig said that we must + sit down and recognize that it is impossible for everyone to get + everything he wants. The text offered by the Argentines last night would + be impossible for President Reagan or he, himself, to defend.

+

President Galtieri said he had + not wanted to intervene until now because he wanted the Secretary to + hear what the Commanders-in-Chief had to say. Now, the Secretary had + talked to him and to the other Commanders-in-Chief. Secretary Haig inspired great confidence and + gratitude for the extraordinary efforts he was making. Two principal + problems rendered this matter difficult to solve. One was the lack of + confidence by the Argentine people in Britain. He, himself, had stated + and the CINCs opined that the matter of Argentine sovereignty was never + up for discussion. The main problems were paragraphs 6 and 10 and a way + to make it palatable for Margaret + Thatcher but also for Argentine opinion. If at the end of + 1982, that is after 8 or 9 months, there were no indications of progress + toward a transfer of sovereignty . . .

+ +

The Special Ad Interim Authority should provide judicial and + administrative functions for 8 or 9 months—then proceed to gentle and + evolutionary changes until, on December 31, he could foresee a ceremony + with the lowering and raising of flags with an honor guard of British + Marines and San Martin Grenadiers, with the British Band playing the + Argentine National Anthem and the Argentine Band playing “God Save the + Queen.” Unfortunately, he had not seen any draft that would lead to + this. He repeated that there were two key points.

+

The first was Argentine lack of confidence after 150 years of + frustration. Argentina, too, had a vocal public opinion to whom he would + have to give some answer. He believed that General Haig had the full confidence of the + Argentine people.

+

Admiral Anaya said that there + were very strong feelings in Argentina. He had a son who was an Army + helicopter pilot. (These things happened even in the best of naval + families.) His son had asked his father to use his influence to get him + to the Malvinas, and that was where his son was now serving. As far as + the Argentines were concerned, the Malvinas were the same as the Alcazar + of Toledo during the Spanish Civil War.Reference is to the July–September 1936 siege of the + castle-fortress (Alcázar) of Toledo, held by Spanish Nationalist + troops, by forces loyal to the Spanish Republic. This was his + family’s point of view, and his son was ready to die for the Malvinas. + It would be desirable for both forces to withdraw and then talk about + finding some way to make the US proposal + more palatable. What is impossible for the Argentines is withdrawal to + take place under the threat of force. If that were done, Argentine + feelings would be uncontrollable. If they could trust that Great Britain + really intended to turn over sovereignty of the islands, that would make + the US proposed wording more acceptable + and would make possible a joint withdrawal. The Argentines simply could + not trust a country that had refused for 150 years to do this.

+

Secretary Haig said that he was + impressed by the Admiral’s concern. He had been concerned the night + before when he had received the “bad news.” He still feels that a + solution is achievable if we sit down immediately and find wording that + would be acceptable to both sides with a clear understanding that both + sides realized that they would have to agree to something that is less + than what they wanted. There is Argentine skepticism concerning UK intentions—that something should be + acceptable to Great Britain and, whatever wording was achieved, that + both governments could explain to their peoples. If not, then there + could be a clash in a matter of hours. Otherwise, he shared the + Admiral’s views.

+ +

General Lami Dozo said that, as + he understood it from the UK, paragraph + 6 was more important than paragraph 10. We must make new efforts to find + wording that would satisfy the Argentine government on paragraph 6. As + he recalled it, the problem was the integration or composition of the + local government. They should seek a formula acceptable to both + parties.

+

Foreign Minister Costa Mendez + said that he is suggesting now to cover the Admiral’s concern that + withdrawal be contemplated immediately. We should seek to consider + whether the Special Ad Interim Authority might be the only local + government.

+

Secretary Haig said he would like + to offer another alternative. As he saw it, Argentine concern was that + wording of paragraph 10 might lead to independence or some other exotic + solution after the interim period. President Galtieri said that there are many + countries smaller than the Malvinas and showed an article in the + Magazine “Gente” which covered this matter.

+

Secretary Haig said that anyone + who viewed this matter understood that the direction of movement was + toward a solution the Argentines wanted. It is impossible to sell in + London a wording that contained the phrase “territorial integrity.” He + felt that we should continue to explore the matter.

+

Foreign Minister Costa Mendez + asked what if there was no result from the negotiations by December 31, + 1982.

+

Secretary Haig said he was + confident on two matters:

+

1. We would push the British toward a solution.

+

2. He was certain that the British in the long run wanted to get rid of + the islands, wanted to get them off their plate.

+

General Lami Dozo said he feels + it is essential to sit down once again and work things out, work out the + differences on paragraph 10.

+

Admiral Anaya said that is his + point of view, and he did not know if it was shared by the President or + General Lami Dozo. He would want + them to be consulted on any new draft to make sure it was satisfactory. + Something would have to be done to make sure that there would be a final + disposition by December 31. From that they could not step back. He would + like to talk to the other Chiefs about some ideas which might be + acceptable.

+

General Lami Dozo said he + believed that halting the British fleet and the withdrawal of the + Argentine forces to their respective bases is vital, but it should be + intrinsically linked to a solution by December 31, not only for the + UK but also for Argentina.

+

Secretary Haig said he agreed, + and we must conclude as military men that there is nothing in paragraph + 10 that precluded the Argentines from saying that they had obtained + satisfaction. We had to put this thread of history through the eye of a needle. He felt that the + concept of withdrawal was doable, and it was extremely important.

+

President Galtieri said that he + agreed with that.

+

Admiral Anaya said that their + concept is not far from ours, but he asked us to remember that the + Argentine Navy had men killed because they had been ordered not to fire + on the British. His son was willing to die for the Malvinas. He felt we + must find an acceptable solution.

+

Secretary Haig said history is + watching us. What we did would be important for decades. We should sit + down and try to find wording for 6 and 10 that would be palatable for + both sides. This is very important.

+

It was then agreed that the Americans and Argentines would meet at the + Casa Rosada Situation Room to try and find the proper wording for a new + paragraph 2.Following this sentence, + Goldberg wrote: “(or + 10?)”

+
+ +
+ 143. Information Memorandum From the Director of the Bureau of + Politico-Military Affairs (Burt) + to Acting Secretary of State EagleburgerSource: Department of State, Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs, + Falklands Crisis Historical Files, Lot 86D157, Unlabelled Folder. + Secret; Sensitive; Nodis. Drafted + by Haass. At the top of the + memorandum, Burt wrote: + “Larry: I think this is a good first cut. Let’s talk. RB.” + + + Washington, April 17, + 1982 + + + SUBJECT + The Falklands: Beyond Buenos Aires + +

This memorandum lays out considerations and examines the options for U.S. + policy should the Secretary’s meetings in Buenos Aires not produce a + breakthrough in the negotiations sufficient to stem the gathering + momentum towards confrontation. After addressing U.S. interests and the + dilemmas we face in protecting them, the memorandum suggests an approach + to guide U.S. policy both before hostilities erupt and after.

+ +

You are well aware of the U.S. interests involved: preserving our + relationship with the UK and its role in + the defense of the West; maintaining the Thatcher Government in power; nurturing our new + relationship with Argentina; insulating our hemispheric policy, + particularly in the Caribbean, from this crisis; and minimizing + opportunities for increased Soviet influence in the region.

+

Each of these interests is obviously important. The temptation, of + course, will be to continue to attempt to protect all of them + simultaneously and in particular to balance any support for the UK with efforts to maintain good relations + with Argentina. This temptation must be resisted. Our interest in + deterring confrontation is not as important as having the British emerge + victorious should confrontation occur. At some point we will have to + judge when our objective to prevent conflict (which requires a good deal + of even-handedness) has been overridden by our requirement to manage a + conflict (which requires major support of the UK).

+

An unsuccessful UK would gravely weaken + the integrity of the Atlantic Alliance at the same time it distanced + Britain from its EC partners who would + be unwilling to retain sanctions against Argentina after a UK failure. Trident would be abandoned but not to increase conventional + defense spending; the BAOR would lose + much of its credibility; INF deployment + could be fatally undermined; the Thatcher Government would fall. Little Englandism would + be given a major push and Tony + Benn a major victory. Alliance cooperation in Europe and + out-of-area alike would have been dealt severe setbacks, which the + USSR would successfully exploit. + In short, we could well lose the special relationship and Britain’s + unique ability to bridge and at times heal differences across the + Atlantic. The U.S. must be prepared to do what is necessary to see the + UK prevail, and must be seen to be + doing so at the appropriate time.

+

There would be risks and costs associated with a pro-British policy. The + Soviets would try to exploit the situation to increase their influence, + U.S. attempts to build an anti-Cuban consensus would be weakened, and + our long-term relationship with Argentina jeopardized. There would be + risks as well in a decision to associate ourselves with the UK if it then lost.

+

At the same time, none of these outcomes, bad as they might be, should be + decisive in our decision-making. The Hemisphere is not a homogeneous + political entity. Brazil, Chile and the English-speaking countries would + be unlikely to mourn an Argentine defeat. Caribbean states will continue + to need our backing if they are to survive the Cuban and Nicaraguan + challenge.

+

Nor is it clear the Soviets would prosper. Historical factors which have + limited their influence and presence in Latin America will remain in effect after any crisis. + Moreover, if Argentina loses, the fact that the Soviets supported it + would not reflect well on Moscow as a patron. It is not even certain + that a post-crisis Argentine Government would turn to the Soviets; + indeed, given Argentina’s history and mistrust of radicalism any such + reorientation would be most surprising. Lastly, we do not believe the + interests of the United States would suffer from a clear demonstration + of our will and ability to stand unambiguously by our friends; indeed, + even if Britain were to fail, by having supported it we would be better + placed to guide its political and military recovery than had we acted + evenhanded throughout.

+

Before the Battle: The period between the + Secretary’s departure from BA and the + actual initiation of hostilities could be as long as two to three weeks. + This calculation is partly political—the British clearly hope that as + time passes their concentration of force nearing the Falklands will + induce the GOA to compromise. There are + military factors too which suggest a pause—it will take the British some + two to three weeks before they can bring a fully integrated task force + to bear on the Falklands.

+

The question is how we ought to use this time. The Secretary is of course + the best judge of how much of his own time to devote to diplomatic + efforts, whether to appoint a special emissary, and whether to involve + other parties more directly. We are also not in a position to suggest + specific negotiating proposals.

+

Specifics aside, we believe the U.S. profile ought to retain its public + traits of evenhandedness and visibility. We should avoid communicating + the impression that we have backed away from trying to solve the + problem. A sense of movement will also make it easier for nations not to + feel compelled to choose sides. Continued U.S. diplomatic efforts will + make it easier for us to argue that neither the UN nor the OAS should + serve as an important negotiating venue. Such efforts on our part could + also provide camouflage to conceal our private backing of the UK, while avoiding presenting the Soviets + with easy opportunities to build contacts with the Argentines or make + political capital out of a perceived U.S. tilt towards London. Getting + Mrs. Thatcher to go along with + this two-track policy on our part would require the Secretary’s personal + intervention to have any chance of success.

+

During this period, we should meet UK + requests for fuel at Ascension, expanded intelligence, weather + information, communications and limited logistics support. We should + also be more forthcoming on particular material and equipment requests + and engage in more detailed planning with the British so we would be in + a position to meet quickly additional requests that would be sure to + come in once hostilities were imminent or underway. Creating a special + channel to manage such support for the British would be essential. It + would reduce the chance of + leaks, assist us in coordinating the myriad British requests, and + provide us with plausible deniability.

+

As regards Argentina, we should continue to avoid any punitive action + which would undermine our ability to talk to the GOA with any chance of success. No letters + thus ought to go to the Hill + claiming GOA violation of U.S. law + governing use of U.S.-origin equipment. At the same time, we should + continue to withhold certification of FMS eligibility and avoid any imposition of sanctions.

+

After Shooting Starts: As has been apparent, we + believe our goal once hostilities begin should be to bring about a + rapid, clear-cut British military victory. Prolonged hostilities would + not only work against British political and military interests, but the + longer hostilities continued the more countries would be forced to take + sides and the more opportunities the Soviets would receive. Our + diplomacy, both as regards any cease-fire or proposed “solution”, ought + to be tailored to meet British political and military interests, which + in turn will be largely determined by the course of the fighting.

+

UK requirements for U.S. assistance would + be considerable. Possible requests include more fuel and supplies, + medical and maintenance support, specialized munitions, ECM capabilities, and increased + intelligence (mostly current or tactical). We might also receive + requests for long-legged cargo and troop transport aircraft, landing + craft, mine countermeasures capability, and other combat-related + equipment. We do not expect any request for U.S. combat force + involvement in hostilities. Other than suspending the pre-1978 pipeline + (some $3.9 million worth of military items, largely spare parts), we do + not see much we could do to affect Argentina’s military capability.

+

Our own military options would depend in part upon circumstances within + Argentina and decisions taken in Moscow. Large scale E&E would not be a realistic + proposition. The protection of U.S. citizens and personnel will be in + the hands of the GOA. We could, + however, affect GOA behavior by our own + diplomatic and military posturing. That said, we cannot repeat the + critical error of our predecessors and have American foreign policy + paralyzed by concern for U.S. citizens in foreign countries.

+

What the Soviets would do remains an unknown. Our objective must be to + keep the Soviets away from the area and minimize their role in the + crisis. We have asked the JCS to look into possible Soviet options and + what we might do to meet them. It is conceivable the Soviets would try + to bring air and naval units into the vicinity in an attempt to pose as + Argentina’s protector; if this became the case, we would want to + respond, and perhaps preempt, with more capable forces of our own. The + forces we are massing in the Caribbean (including carrier battle groups) + for Exercise Ocean Venture provide a possible reservoir to draw on. An imposing U.S. show of + force might not only deter any Soviet military moves, but could lead the + Argentines to reconsider any decision to accept Soviet military help or + threaten U.S. citizens in country.

+

This is a rough first cut at the problem. Much of what we have had to say + may not mesh with the situation the Secretary finds himself in after his + talks in BA. Nonetheless, what does + emerge from this analysis is the requirement that we not make short-term + decisions—public statements, negotiating mechanisms, warnings to the + British, etc.—without reference to our long-term undeniable objective of + seeing Britain come out of this crisis with its confidence and close + ties to the United States intact.

+
+ +
+ 144. Transcript of a Telephone Conversation Between President + Reagan and British Prime + Minister ThatcherSource: Reagan Library, Executive + Secretariat, NSC Subject File, + Memorandums of Conversation—President Reagan (April 1982). Top Secret. In his personal + diary entry for April 17, Reagan wrote: “Afternoon interrupted by phone + calls—Bill Clark—re the + Falkland situation. Al H. is there and as of noon things looked + hopeless. I called Margaret + Thatcher to tell her I’d cabled him to return home if + there was no break in the Argentine position.” (Reagan, Diaries, p. 124) + + + April 17, + 1982, 2:30–2:34 p.m. + + + PARTICIPANTS + The President (Camp David) + Prime Minister Margaret + Thatcher (London) + +

R: Margaret, yes. Listen, I know . . . I understand you’ve just gotten + back to 10 Downing,In her memoirs, + Thatcher recalled that + she had returned to her office at Number 10 Downing Street from the + Prime Minister’s official country residence, Chequers, to receive + the President’s call due to “technical problems” with the direct + line from the latter. She added: “I was glad to go over the issues + with the President. I was gladder still that he agreed that it would + not be reasonable to ask us to move further towards the Argentine + position. Al Haig had found + the Argentinians even more impossible than on his first visit. The + White House had instructed him to tell the Junta that if they + persisted in their intransigence this would lead to a breakdown of + talks and the US Administration + would make clear who was to blame.” (Thatcher, Downing Street + Years, p. 202) and I’m a little better off—I’m up at + Camp David. But, listen, I wanted to call you about what’s been going + on, and when I first started to call today, I was a little more + discouraged and now, I don’t + know, because Al is still in meetings; and I wanted to tell you that I + had sent him a message that if, there was no break down there, I was + calling him home.See Document 140. And maybe that message has had + something to do with the length of the meetings now that are going on. + But I also wanted to tell you that I know how far you’ve gone and how + much you’ve compromised in an effort to settle this peacefully, and I + don’t think you should be asked to go any further than you have.

+

M: That’s very kind of you, because when Al left here Tuesday,April 13. he had a workable and fair + compromise, undoubtedly. He worked extremely hard for it. He’s a very + good negotiator, and we think he’s done marvelously. And we had hoped + that it would be successful. But he’s still talking, is he?

+

R: Yes. We had expected him on the way home at the way things sounded + earlier this morning, but the latest word is the meetings are still + continuing. It seems that President Galtieri has been more reasonable, but then he gets back + with the Junta, and things seem to harden up.

+

M: Yes, I understand that with Al before, that he can get Galtieri down to something reasonable, + but of course Al doesn’t talk to the Junta, and they then go back on + everything, you see. But you sent the message earlier, Ron, that if the + talks broke down there, that Al would come home? Have I got that + right?

+

R: Yes, I asked him to come home, because, as I say, if, at the stage + they were, and if there is not some progress on this proposal that he + went down there with, I just don’t feel that there’s any more we could + ask of you unless something, unless they inject something new, then, + that you might be interested in. But I also wanted you to know that + we’re sympathetic to what you’re going through, and I hope you realize + that we are all deeply interested in keeping this great relationship + that our two countries have had.

+

M: That’s very good of you—so are we. We want to keep it as well, and + thank you very much for phoning and letting me know the positions. I’m + relieved, because we heard the talks had broken down and then that they + were on again, and I just hope that they will be successful.

+

R: Oh, I do too, and God bless you, and let’s just both keep praying.

+

M: God bless. Thank you very much for phoning, Ron, and love to + Nancy.

+

R: I certainly shall. All right. Good-bye.

+
+ +
+ + 145. Telegram From the Department of State to Secretary of State + Haig in Buenos AiresSource: Department of State, + Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, Miscellaneous Files, + March 1981–February 1983, Lot 83D210, D. Gompert. Secret; Immediate; Nodis; Stadis. + + + Washington, April 17, 1982, 2348Z + +

Tosec 60095/104113. Subject: Timing of + UK Task Force Arrival at + Falklands.

+

1. Secret—Entire text.

+

2. Summary: It is becoming increasingly clear that the British will take + longer than we anticipated to get effective forces on station off the + Falklands. The naval forces have broken into four, widely spaced groups. + The main body of the task force—carriers—should arrive at Ascension this + weekend. Based on the assumption that most of the British ships will + need to spend some time at Ascension to resupply and adjust their combat + loads, it appears that the carrier and surface action forces could get + to the Falklands no earlier than April 29. A fully integrated task force + including the slower amphibious ships could not reach the Islands until + May 5. However, a smaller strike force could bypass Ascension and reach + the Falklands by as early as April 25, or 26. Thus far, we have no firm + information that British ships other than the submarines have proceeded + beyond Ascension. End summary.

+

3. Initially we assumed that the UK + forces would make a high speed transit to the Falklands and get visible, + if not fully effective, forces on station by April 21. It now appears + that it could take as much as two and a half weeks from today to get the + fully integrated task force on station. However, we still have no + indication whether simultaneous arrival of the entire task force is a + British prerequisite for initiation of hostilities. The British Navy may + not wish to show their hand and may have in mind incremental use of + their forces. They could attempt to preserve some element of surprise, + and proceed at best speed with selective ships to the Falklands. If they + did so, the first surface combatants could arrive on station by April 25 + or 26 at the earliest. They could reach South Georgia one or two days + sooner.

+

4. There may be both logistical and political reasons for the relatively + slow advance of the British task force. The British may simply be + attempting to orchestrate their arrival at Ascension to avoid + overloading the limited facilities on the island. We believe it will + take as much as two or three days for each group of ships to resupply + and make any load adjustments necessary while at Ascension. The British + also may be slowing to + allow their reinforcements which include a container ship with + additional Harriers to catch up, + and to ensure that they have an effective supply train before engaging + the Argentine forces. The rate of fuel consumption may also be a + critical determinant in the speed of advance. However, there might also + be a political element, i.e., to give diplomacy a chance to work against + the backdrop of the growing military capability of the approaching + British fleet.

+ + Eagleburger + +
+ +
+ 146. Telegram From Secretary of State Haig to the Embassy in the United KingdomSource: Reagan Library, Executive + Secretariat, NSC Cable File, + Falkland File 04/18/1982 (1). Secret; Niact Immediate; Nodis. Sent for information Niact Immediate to the Department of + State. + + + Buenos Aires, April 18, 1982, + 0436Z + +

Secto 6034. Subject: Falkland Islands + Crisis.

+

1. Secret–Entire text.

+

2. Please pass the following message from the Secretary to the Foreign + Secretary.Haig sent a shorter, less descriptive version of + this message to the Department in telegram Secto 6032 from Buenos Aires, April + 18. (Ibid.) Begin text:

+

Dear Francis:

+

Based on the unacceptable language which I received, and sent to you last + night (Friday),April 16. See Document 141. I threatened to break + off this process. As a result, I was invited to meet with the Junta, and + spent two hours with them this morning (Saturday).April 17. See Document + 142. The character of the group is essentially as I + imagined: Galtieri is the least + bright and given to bluster; the Admiral is ultra-hard-line; the Air + Force General is bright, political, reasonable—relatively speaking—but + clearly third in influence.

+

3. I impressed on these men in the strongest terms that British resolve + was beyond doubt, and that they were on a collision course with military + humiliation and economic ruin. With the possible exception of the + Admiral—whose definition of glory has little to do with the concept of + military success—I would say these men are worried. They are feeling the pressure of your fleet, + though it would be a serious mistake for you to assume they are not + prepared to fight.

+

4. The Junta urged me to stay and try to “solve the problem” with the + Foreign Minister. In hopes that they would impart flexibility to their + negotiators, I agreed to do so. The ten-hour session that ensued was + excrutiatingly difficult.No memorandum of + conversation of this drafting session has been found. Following his + morning meeting with the Junta, Haig wrote: “We adjourned to draft yet another new + set of proposals. Again the result was impasse. When, late at night, + it seemed that progress was impossible, I played a wild card. + Although the British in fact told us nothing of their military + plans, the Argentinians plainly believed that we knew everything + they did. Possibly this misconception could be useful. I called + Bill Clark at the White + House on an open line, knowing the Argentinians would monitor the + call, and told him in a tone of confidentiality that British + military action was imminent. At 2:00 A.M. on April 18, new + proposals were delivered to me at the hotel together with an + invitation to resume the negotiations at the Casa Rosada at two + o’clock in the afternoon.” (Haig, Caveat, p. 288) + Haig later sent a + message to Clark explaining + his reasoning for the telephone call and commented that Clark “handled it on the phone + precisely as I had hoped.” (Telegram Secto 6047 from Buenos Aires, April 18; Reagan Library, + Executive Secretariat, NSC Cable + File, Falkland File 04/18/1982 (3)) We spent most of that + time on the language dealing with the terms of reference for the + negotiations on the definitive status of the Islands. Your language was + rejected out of hand. I pressed upon them language that avoids + prejudging the sovereignty issue while preserving what you must have + with regard to the rights of the Islanders. The Argentines are now + developing a new formulation, but I expect it will be pregnant with the + concept of assured Argentine sovereignty.

+

5. The issue of travel, trade, etc., in the interim period was also hotly + contested. There will be no agreement unless it involves a clear + prospect of genuine promotion of various forms of interaction, with the + necessary safeguards to prevent what the Prime Minister fears could + occur.

+

6. We are also encountering difficulty on the question of interim + administration, though the integrity of the idea we discussed in London + has been maintained.

+

7. Finally, though we did not discuss it at length, there was a definite + foreshadowing of serious problems on the question of military + disengagement—i.e. stopping the fleet and removing the submarines. I + think this matter can be settled in terms acceptable to the UK, though not without more flexibility + than I encountered in London. All in all, as of now the situation is + grim. I will receive a new Argentine textSee footnote 2, Document 147. + during the night and then decide whether or not to break off.

+

8. I will only consider coming to London if the Argentines give me a text + that goes well beyond their position today. I do not want to shift the + spotlight onto you if it is clear that the Argentine proposal is unacceptable. Even if I do not + come to London, I will of course send you the Argentine text.

+

9. If I suspend my mission tomorrow morning, I will leave no doubt where + lies responsibility for the impasse.On the + morning of April 18, Pym + replied: “You are clearly making super-human efforts to achieve a + reasonable result. We in London are most grateful.” “If,” he + continued, “you were to conclude that you could not continue your + mission for the time being, we should need a little time to consider + what to do next. If you announced a decision to suspend your efforts + before we had decided with you on next steps, the diplomatic + initiative might pass to others. We should therefore be most + grateful to know your intentions in good time before any + announcement. One way of holding the position might be for you to + say on leaving Buenos Aires that the Argentines had not tried + seriously to negotiate a reasonable outcome and that you would be + reporting on the situation to the President and discussing further + steps with him.” A typewritten copy of the message was delivered by + the British Embassy to Eagleburger, under a covering letter from Henderson, April 18. (Department + of State, Central Foreign Policy File, P880104–1239). The text of + the message was cabled to Haig in telegram 8371 from London, April 18. (Reagan + Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC + Country File, United Kingdom (04/01/1982–07/31/1982) (2))

+

Warm regards,

+

Al

+

End text.

+ + Haig + +
+ +
+ 147. Memorandum of ConversationSource: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, + Files of Alexander M. Haig, + Jr., 1981–1982, Lot 82D370, (1) Falklands + Crisis—1982. Secret; Sensitive. The meeting took place in Haig’s suite. No drafting + information appears on the memorandum. + + + Buenos Aires, April 18, 1982, 2:15 + a.m. + + + SUBJECT + Secretary’s discussion of Argentine draft reply: 18 April 1982, + 2:15 a.m. Secretary’s Suite, Buenos Aires, Argentina + + + ATTENDEES + Enders, Gompert, Gudgeon, Wayne, Schuette, + Adams + +

(note: notetaker arrived in middle of discussions and was not in a + position to hear all the detailed discussions)

+ +

The Secretary characterized the Argentine draftThe text of this revision of the Argentine draft + was transmitted to the Department in telegram Secto 6038, April 18. (Department of + State, Central Foreign Policy File, N820003–0665) as “a very + positive step” noting that it reflected the new attitude that he had + found prevalent in the discussions that afternoon.

+

The discussion centered around paras 6 and 8, and the Secretary said that + if we were able to make some headway on these two paras he would + personally take the draft to the British. If we were not successful he + would cable the draft to London and return to Washington. The Secretary + noted several times that “we are getting there fellas, and we’re too + close to lose it.”

+

Enders voiced skepticism on the + likelihood of gaining the necessary concessions on paras 6 and 8 but the + Secretary held to his positive assessment noting that the will was + evident now, and the next step was just a question of words.

+

Adams asked about the strength of + the GOA commitment to the draft—ie. had + it been blessed by the junta? The Secretary felt certain that the junta + had agreed to this proposal but others at the discussion were less + certain. The Secretary said that for the first time in this effort + things now looked doable.

+

The Secretary closed by saying that he would call Costa Mendez at 9:00 a.m. on Sunday + and suggest an early afternoon meeting—another round of + negotiations.No memorandum of + conversation of Haig’s + telephone call to Costa + Méndez on the morning of April 18 has been found. + Haig informed Pym both of the receipt of the + revised Argentine text and of his scheduled 2 p.m. meeting at the + Casa Rosada to discuss the proposals at 1439Z, April 18. Describing + the new Argentine text, Haig + wrote: “Although their revisions are still unsatisfactory, I believe + we now have—for the first time since we began this mission—some + movement toward a workable solution for you and Argentines.” + (Telegram Secto 6037 to London, + April 18; Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Latin + America/Central, Argentina (04/18/1982–04/19/1982)) He wanted + the early afternoon because he wanted to be certain that the Argentines + were fresh after having labored over this response all night. He said + that he would tell Costa Mendez + that their draft represented a major effort, but that it was still + unacceptable to London, and thus it would be a tragedy to send this + draft to the British and have them turn it down—the GOA effort would be wasted.

+
+ +
+ 148. Telegram From Secretary of State Haig to the Department of StateSource: Reagan Library, Executive + Secretariat, NSC Country File, + Latin America/Central, Argentina (04/18/1982–04/19/1982). Secret; + Sensitive; Flash; Nodis. + Reagan initialed the + telegram, indicating that he saw it. Earlier, Haig had sent a similar summary of + the day’s discussions to Pym + in telegram Secto 6043 to London, + April 19. (Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Cable File, Falkland File + 04/19/1982 (1)) + + + Buenos Aires, April 19, 1982, + 0829Z + +

Secto 6044. From the Secretary to the + President. Department please pass to the White House. Subject: Message + to the President From Secretary Haig.

+

It is now 3 a.m. and I have returned to the hotel after another 12 hours + of up and down talks.No memoranda of + conversation of the April 18 discussions have been found. In his + memoirs, Haig wrote of the + day’s negotiations at the Casa Rosada: “On every decision, the + government apparently had to secure the unanimous consent of every + corps commander in the army and of their equivalents in the navy and + air force. Progress was made by syllables and centimeters and then + vetoed by men who had never been part of the negotiations. Ten hours + of haggling failed to produce a workable text. The Argentines could + not agree on the very point the junta had granted the day before: + withdrawal of forces. The staffs on both sides were half asleep. At + ten in the evening, Galtieri + drew me aside. ‘If I lay it all on the line,’ he said, ‘I won’t be + here.’ I asked him how long he thought he would survive if he lost a + war to the British.” (Haig, + Caveat, p. 289) Once again we were + treated to the now familiar Argentine tactic whereby with agreement + almost in hand the Junta stepped in and overruled its negotiators.Reagan underlined the portion of this sentence + beginning with the word “almost.”

+

There followed a soulful meeting at 10 p.m. with President Galtieri who then reconvened the Junta + and the impasse was broken. We returned to the negotiating table and put + together a draft text except for the single important paragraph covering + the modalities for the respective withdrawal of forces. However, the + text as it now stands will in all liklihood give the British genuine + problems.Haig later recalled: “[B]y 2:40 a.m. on April 19, we + had produced a draft, acceptable to the Argentinians, providing for + an immediate cessation of hostilities and the withdrawal of forces, + an Argentine presence on the island under a U.S. guarantee, and + negotiations leading to a resolution of the question by December 31, + 1982. I believed that Mrs. Thatcher would have great difficulty in accepting + this text.” (Haig, Caveat, p. 289) A copy of the draft is in the + Department of State, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, + Miscellaneous Files, March 1981–February 1983, Lot 83D210, D. Gompert.

+

We resume our talks later this morning at the Casa Rosada. At the + conclusion of the round, I should be in a position to recommend—on the + basis of the text then in hand—whether to proceed to London for + consultations with Prime Minister Thatcher and her Ministers or to return to Washington + breifly en route to London. As of the evening I think the latter would be the wrong course as it + would break our momentum and start press leaking. I’ll provide you a + detailed message tomorrow when we are airborne after the hectic pace of + activity subsides.See Document 150.

+ + Haig + +
+ +
+ 149. Memorandum From the Director of the Bureau of Politico-Military + Affairs (Burt) to Acting + Secretary of State EagleburgerSource: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S Special Handling Restrictions Memos + 1979–1983, Lot 96D262, ES Sensitive + April 10–19 1982. Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Brown. + + + Washington, April 19, + 1982 + + + SUBJECT + Exports to Argentina + +

Helicopters—The UK + Embassy told us on FridayApril 16. + that the Argentine Government was attempting to ship “more than one” + S–61 Sea King Helicopter out of the + US to Argentina and gave us the + names of the firms involved: Heavy Lift Marketing, U.S.A. and Columbia + Helicopters Inc. of Aurora, Oregon. The latter firm is a logging + contractor and would be a logical source for large helicopters like the + S–61.

+

At our behest, Customs began to investigate last Saturday. So far, it has + turned up nothing. Either a Munitions Control or Commerce “validated” + license (depending on the helicopter configuration) would ordinarily be + required for export but none has been requested. If, however, a civilian version of the S–61 were stripped of its + avionics, its weight would fall below the Commerce licensing threshold + of 10,000 pounds and it could be exported without a license; only a + Customs declaration would be filed. No such declaration has yet + surfaced. As a matter of interest, Commerce informs us that Columbia + Helicopter Inc. is British + owned, although we cannot confirm it. Customs will continue its + investigation. We are keeping the British informed.

+

Telephone Equipment—As you will recall, last week, + again from the UK, we were informed that + a Bolivian L–100 aircraft was to load “communication equipment” and fly + it to Rio Gallegos (due West of the Falklands) on the 20th of April. The + consignee is INTEL, an Argentine telephone company.See Document + 134.

+

The L–100 has delayed its departure until 22 April apparently while its + owners search for additional cargo. Meanwhile all we know of the + communications cargo is that it was manufactured by the Harris Corp., a + large respectable electronics conglomerate that does a lot of business + with the US Government. It is not a firm + likely to try illegally to evade export controls. The freight forwarder + in Miami tells us that the equipment is in two very large crates marked + “telephone communications equipment” but that he knows nothing more. We + are trying quietly to find out from Harris Corp. exactly what is in + them. As I noted earlier, an export license would be required only if + the stuff is military telephone equipment.

+
+ + +
+ 150. Telegram From Secretary of State Haig to the White HouseSource: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Latin + America/Central, Argentina (04/18/1982–04/19/1982). Secret; Flash; + Nodis. Sent for information + Flash to the Department of State. A stamped notation at the top of + the telegram indicates that McFarlane saw it. + + + Buenos Aires, April 19, 1982, + 1614Z + +

Secto 6045. For the President. + Subject: Message to the President.

+

1. I have just sent the text developed hereFollowing the previous evening’s meetings, which lasted until 3 + a.m., (see Document 148), Haig met again with the Argentines + later that morning. No memorandum of conversation of this meeting + has been found. Haig later + wrote of the meeting in his memoirs: “Later in the morning, I met + with the Argentinians to clear up a number of unresolved points. + This, too, was a strenuous session, but by 1 P.M., we had in hand a + modified text that anticipated some of the British objections.” + (Haig, Caveat, p. 289) to London and Washington,See Document + 152. along with my analysis of it.In telegram Secto 6049 from Haig in Buenos Aires to London, the White House, and + the Department, April 19, Haig provided a paragraph-by-paragraph annotation of + the draft agreement, highlighting the textual changes made as a + result of his second round of negotiations in Buenos Aires. A copy + of this telegram, as seen by Clark, is in the Reagan Library, Executive + Secretariat, NSC Country File, + Latin America/Central, Falklands War [Cables 090131, 091000, 091154, + 091640, 181715, 191620, 191740, 191754, 192115]. I believe we + have reached the Argentine bottom line. Mrs. Thatcher will have great difficulty + accepting this text; she will probably reach the conclusion that she + would be unable to make the case that she has lived up to her pledges to + Parliament. But she may feel it is within range of the acceptable.

+

2. In sending the text to London, I have taken care not to advocate its + acceptance. Any hint that we are pressuring the UK to accept the Argentine position—particularly this + Argentine position—would be politically explosive.

+

3. I believe the best course now is to proceed to Washington to report to + you, and then go on to London, if Mrs. Thatcher wishes. If she thinks I should divert enroute + and come directly to London, I ask your permission to do so. Otherwise I + will see you tomorrow morning.

+ + Haig + +
+ +
+ + 151. Telegram From Secretary of State Haig to the Embassy in the United Kingdom, the + Department of State, and the White HouseSource: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Latin + America/Central, Falklands War [Cables 090131, 091000, 091154, + 091640, 181715, 191620, 191740, 191754, 192115]. Secret; Flash; + Nodis. A stamped notation in + the upper right-hand corner of the first page of the telegram + indicates that Clark saw + it. + + + Buenos Aires, April 19, 1982, + 1620Z + +

Secto 6046. Subject: Letter to + Pym.

+

1. Secret–Entire text.

+

2. Dear Francis

+

3. Here as you suggest in your latest messageAt 1307Z, April 19, the Embassy in London forwarded Pym’s response to Haig’s previous message (see footnote 1, Document 148). In it, + Pym stated: “I remain + full of admiration for your persistence in pressing the Argentines + to reach a settlement based on the Security Council resolution. But + I am deeply concerned by your comment that there will be some + problems for us in what you describe as ‘the maximum obtainable from + the Argentines.’” Pym + continued, “In your previous message you said that you would in all + circumstances consult us before moving to London or Washington. In + view of your latest message, I am sure that the time for this has + come. You will understand that we need to think carefully about + anything which you may have worked out with the Argentines before + giving you our views. I should therefore be most grateful if you + could send me as soon as possible a full account of where things + stand and in particular the text now under discussion.” (Telegram + 8387 from London, April 19; Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, + NSC Country File, Europe and + Soviet Union, United Kingdom (04/01/1982–07/31/1982) (2)) is + the current text, along with our gloss on what it means. Costa Mendez has given me a letter + saying that Argentina could accept it if the U.S. proposes it, and + Britain accepts.Haig apparently wrote prematurely + about receiving the letter, which was to be delivered by Costa Méndez at the airport. When + Haig met with Pym in Washington on April 22, he + reported that Costa Méndez + had failed to provide the letter to him upon Haig’s departure from Buenos Aires + (see Document 163). For a description of + the April 19 airport meeting between Haig and Costa + Méndez, see Footnote 2, + Document 152.

+

4. My own disappointment with this text prevents me from attempting to + influence you in any way. As you will see, there are significant steps + back from the text you and I discussed in London in each of the areas of + greatest importance: the longterm negotiations, the interim + administration, and withdrawal.See Tab A of + Document 112.

+

5. What has been secured in each case is British control. You would + undertake to negotiate and conclude a long term agreement, but your + principles as well as Argentine principles are asserted, and there is + nothing in the agreement (as the Argentines keep reminding us) that + forces you to accept a negotiated settlement you don’t want.

+ +

6. The interim administration is less advantageous than it was, yet here + again the essential is saved. The local councils remain sovereign. + Recommendations to you on more intercourse with the mainland requires a + quick response, but can be turned down. If the temporary administration + lasts, it will give full protection to the Islanders.

+

7. Finally, the withdrawal deal leaves you protected. Your submarines + would be outside 150 nautical mile maximum—but they are your guarantee, + and 150 NM is only five hours running + time. The fleet must stand off to 1750 NM by seven days after agreement, but it could steam at 12 + knots some 2100 NM after agreement, and + thus in most cases (depending on when agreement were to take place) go + on steaming towards the Falklands after agreement.

+

8. Francis, I do not know whether more can be wrung out of the + Argentines. It is not clear who is in charge here, as many as 50 people, + including corps commanders, may be exercising vetos. Certainly, I can do + no better at this point.

+

9. I would not presume to speculate on the equities seen from your point + of view. From mine, the agreement, if accepted, would involve the + Argentines far more intimately in the affairs of the Islands, yet leave + you in charge of the current situation and the ultimate destiny. Above + all, Argentina, the United States and United Kingdom would be bound + together in the search for an evolutionary solution to the problem, with + obvious future costs to each of us if it cannot be found. Only you can + judge that outcome against the advantages and disadvantages of armed + action.

+

10. My best immediate judgement in this situation is that I should return + to Washington and report to the President. I am available, of course, to + go on immediately from there to London, or even to divert from + Washington to London, if you wish.

+

11. Leaving here, I will refuse to characterize the text, and say only + that I have finished this phase of my effort, and am returning to + Washington to report to the President. I will say that I have given you + a full report of the results of my stay in Buenos Aires.For the text Haig’s statement on leaving Buenos Aires, see the + Department of State Bulletin, June 1982, p. + 84.

+

12. I would be deeply grateful if you would be in touch with me before + taking any public or other action on the results I am transmitting.

+

13. Text by septel.See Document + 152.

+

Warm regards, Al.

+

End message.

+ + Haig + +
+ + +
+ 152. Telegram From Secretary of State Haig to the Embassy in the United Kingdom and the + Department of StateSource: + Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Latin America/Central, Argentina + (04/18/1982–04/19/1982). Secret; Flash; Nodis. + + + Buenos Aires, April 19, 1982, + 1745Z + +

Secto 6050. Pass White House. Subject: + Draft Text Worked Out in Buenos Aires.

+

1. Secret–Entire text.

+

2. There follows draft of agreement on South Atlantic crisis worked out + in Buenos Aires April 19, 1982.

+

3. Begin text: On the basis of United Nations Security Council Resolution + 502, and the will of the Argentine Republic and of the United Kingdom to + resolve the controversy which has arisen between them, renouncing the + use of force, both governments agree on the following steps, which form + an integrated whole:

+

1. Effective on the signature of this agreement by both governments, + there shall be an immediate cessation of hostilities.

+

2. Beginning at 0000 hours of the day after the day on which this + agreement is signed, the Republic of Argentina and the United Kingdom + shall not introduce nor deploy forces into the zones (herein-after, + “zones”) defined by circles of 150 nautical miles radius from the + following coordinate points (hereinafter, “coordinate points”):

+

A) Lat. 51 deg 40′ S

+

Long. 59 deg 30′ W

+

B) Lat. 54 deg 20′ S

+

Long. 36 deg 40′ W

+

C) Lat. 57 deg 40′ S

+

Long. 26 deg 30′ W

+

2.1. Within 24 hours of the date of this agreement the United Kingdom + will rescind its zone of exclusion and Argentina will not conduct + operations in the zones.

+

2.2. Within 24 hours of the date of this agreement, Argentina and the + United Kingdom will commence the withdrawal of their forces in + accordance with the following details.

+

2.2.1. Within seven days from the date of this agreement, Argentina shall + have withdrawn one half of its military and security forces present in the zonesA final meeting between Haig and Costa Méndez occurred at the + airport in Buenos Aires, April 19, at which time the U.S. delegation + received an Argentine copy of the draft agreement. In this “airport + text,” this word is replaced with the word “areas.” A copy of the + text, bearing a note in an unknown hand to Enders stating that there were + three errors in the text of paragraph 2—“one clearly not a clerical + error, possibly all conscious”—is in the Department of State, Under + Secretary of State for Political Affairs, Miscellaneous Files, March + 1981–February 1983, Lot 83D210, Falklands [folder 1]. In his + memoirs, Haig recalled that + Costa Méndez presented + him with an envelope to be read once the Secretary’s plane was in + the air. According to Haig, + Costa Méndez’s message + stipulated that “it is absolutely essential and condition sine qua + non that negotiations will have to conclude with a result on + December 31, 1982” and that this “result must include a recognition + of Argentine sovereignty over the islands.” (Haig, Caveat, p. 289) This is possibly a mistaken reference to + Costa Méndez’s April 21 + message (see Document 159). on the + date of this agreement, including related equipment and armaments. + Within the same time period, the United Kingdom will have completed the + withdrawal of all of its forces from the zones andIn the “airport text,” this word is omitted and a + period is placed after the word “zones.” Above the period an unknown + hand placed “and” in brackets and added an asterisk. A handwritten + note in the left-hand margin states the word “and” was “proposed by + Gompert/Gudgeon at Rosada 1400 hrs [and] + taken to Minister.” the United Kingdom naval task force will + stand off at a distance of at least 1750In + the “airport text,” the figure is crossed out and “2000” written + above, along with a double asterisk. A handwritten note in the + left-hand margin, corresponding to the double asterisk, reads: “We + agreed on 1750.” nautical miles from any of the coordinate + points.

+

2.2.2. Within 15 days from the date of this agreement, Argentina shall + remove all of its remaining forces, equipment and armaments from the + zones. Within the same time period, units of the UK naval task force and submarines shall redeploy to their + usual operating bases or areas.

+

3. After fifteen days after the date of this agreement and pending a + definitive settlement, no military or security forces shall be + introduced by the signatories into any of the zones defined by circles + of 150 nautical miles radius from the coordinate points.This paragraph is absent from the “airport text.” A + note in an unknown hand reads: “Para 3 on demilitarization missing. + (KSG [Gudgeon] + GOA lawyer had corrected two typos at + Casa Rosada P.M.) Actually in large part redundant of ¶2. In + fairness this may have been dropped in confusion since a hole had + been left in numbering of Sun night/Mon. a.m. for only a ¶2, and ¶3 + was assigned to sanctions paragraph. KSG renumbered US text + (including text sent London).”

+

4. From the date of this agreement, steps shall be taken by the two + governments to terminate simultaneously, and without delay, the economic + and financial measures adopted in connection with the current + controversy, including restrictions relating to travel, transportation, + communications, and transfers of funds between the two countries. The + United Kingdom without delay shall request the European Community and third countries that have + adopted similar measures to terminate them.

+

5. The United Kingdom and Argentina shall each appoint, and the United + States has indicated its agreement to appoint, a representative to + constitute a special interim authority which shall provide observers to + verify compliance with the obligations in this agreement.

+

6. A) Pending a definitive settlement, all decisions, laws and + regulations hereafter adopted by the local administration on the Islands + shall be submitted to and expeditiously ratified by the special interim + authority, except in the event that the special interim authority deems + such decisions, laws or regulations to be inconsistent with the purposes + and provisions of this agreement or its implementation. The traditional + local administration shall continue through the executive and + legislative councils which shall be enlarged in the following manner: + the Argentine Government shall appoint two representatives, who shall + serve in each council; the Argentine population whose period of + residence on the Islands is equal to that required of others entitled to + representation shall elect representatives to each council in proportion + to their population, subject to there being at least one such + representative in each council. The local police shall be continued + under the administration of the councils, with a representative of the + resident Argentine population, and shall be subject to the supervision + of the special interim authority. The flags of each of the constituent + members of the special interim authority shall be flown at its + headquarters.

+

B) Pending a definitive settlement, neither government shall take any + action that would be inconsistent with the purposes and provisions of + this agreement or its implementation.

+

7. A) Pending a definitive settlement, travel, transportation, movement + of persons and, as may be related there to, residence and ownership and + disposition of property, communications and commerce between the + mainland and the Islands shall, on an equal basis, be promoted and + facilitated. The special interim authority shall propose for adoption + appropriate measures on such matters, including possible arrangements + for compensation of Islanders who do not wish to remain. The two + signatories undertake to respond promptly to such proposals. The special + interim authority shall monitor the implementation of all such proposals + adopted.

+

B) Pending a definitive settlement, the rights and guarantees which have + heretofore been enjoyed by the inhabitants on the Islands will be + respected, on an equal basis, in particular rights relating to freedom + of opinion, religion, expression, teaching, movement, property, + employment, family, customs, and cultural ties with countries of + origin.

+

8. A) December 31, 1982, will conclude the interim period during which + the signatories shall conclude negotiations on modalities for the removal of the Islands from the + list of non-self governing territories under Chapter XI of the United + Nations Charter and on mutually agreed conditions for their definitive + status, including due regard for the rights of the inhabitants and for + the principle of territorial integrity applicable to this dispute, in + accordance with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United + Nations and Resolution 1514 (XV) and 2065 (XX) and in the light of + relevant resolutions of the General Assembly of the United Nations on + the “Question of the Falkland (Malvinas) Islands”. The negotiations here + above referred to shall begin within fifteen days of the signature of + the present agreement.

+

B) The United States Government has indicated that, at the request of the + two governments, it would be prepared to assist them in bringing their + negotiations to a mutually satisfactory settlement by the date + stipulated in subparagraph (A). End of text.

+ + Haig + +
+ +
+ 153. Telegram From Secretary of State Haig to the Embassy in ArgentinaSource: Reagan Library, Executive + Secretariat, NSC Cable File, + Falkland File 04/20/1982 (1). Secret; Flash; Nodis. Sent for information Flash to + the Department of State and White House. Sent from the Secretary’s + aircraft. Haig was then en + route to Washington from Buenos Aires. The telegram is + unsigned. + + + April 20, 1982, + 0400Z + +

Secto 6057. Subject: Letter to + Costa Mendez.

+

1. Secret, entire message.

+

2. Begin quote: Dear Nicanor:

+

3. I have the first British reaction to the paper developed in Buenos + Aires.See Document + 152. Regarding this draft, Pym wrote to Haig: “Your herculean efforts have clearly met with + a firm determination on the part of the Argentines to hold on to + what they have taken by force. We are deeply disturbed by their + intransigence.” “First reading of the draft,” he later continued, + “leaves the clear impression that the sovereignty issue is greatly + weakened from our point of view, that the withdrawal is on a very + unequal basis in favour of the Argentines and that the wishes of the + Islanders are not protected. You know the basic principles on which + we have been working here, and I fear that on any interpretation of + the text they cannot be met. On the next immediate steps I am sure + that you are right to go to Washington and report to the President.” + Pym also provided + Haig with the text of + off-the-record press guidance that indicated that the British + Government would be “studying” the Argentine proposals before + getting in touch with Haig. + (Telegram 8484 from London, April 20; Reagan Library, Executive + Secretariat, NSC Cable File, + Falkland File 04/20/1982 (1)) It is one of disappointment. + London, of course, reserves pending careful study, but it finds the basis for + withdrawal “very unequal,” it believes that the sovereignty issue is + tilted too much, and above all it finds that the wishes of the Islanders + are not protected.

+

4. London is putting out a restrained press line putting the emphasis on + failure to regard as paramount the wishes of the Islanders, but not + closing the door.

+

5. I shall be in a better position to advise you tomorrow on specific + British problems, but I would urge you already to pass this first + reaction on to your colleagues in the government. It is clear to me that + substantially further mutual adjustment will be necessary if war is to + be avoided.

+

6. When I have seen the British position in detail I will be in touch on + possible next steps.

+

7. Warm regards. Al Haig. End + quote.

+

8. Action requested: London complains that Buenos Aires is putting out + line that US and Argentina have an + agreement. Please report tonight on that. Please inform Costa Mendez that we will correct if + that impression is left.

+

9. Re your BA 2343,In telegram 2343 from Buenos Aires, April 20, + Shlaudeman reported: + “Costa Mendez is meeting with the Junta (21:55 hrs) on what his + office described to me as the ‘disturbing news from London’ (the + statement from No. 10).” “The question now arises,” he continued, + “as to what you would want me to do when he comes back, as he is + perfectly capable of doing, to plead misunderstanding and ask to go + over the texts. My inclination would be to give him ours and to say + that I am not, rpt not, authorized to discuss it further.” + (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, + N820004–0029) you are absolutely right to decline to go over + the text. Our letter is clear.

+
+ +
+ + 154. Telegram From Secretary of State Haig to the Embassy in the United KingdomSource: Reagan Library, Executive + Secretariat, NSC Country File, + Europe and Soviet Union, United Kingdom (04/01/1982–07/31/1982) (2). + Secret; Flash; Nodis. Sent for + information Immediate to the Department of State. Sent from the + Secretary’s aircraft. Haig + was then en route to Washington from Buenos Aires. + + + April 20, 1982, + 0445Z + +

Secto 6059. Subject: Falklands + Crisis—Message to Foreign Secretary Pym.

+

1. Secret. Entire text.

+

2. Please deliver following to Foreign Secretary in response to his + latest message (London 08484).See footnote 2, Document 153.

+

3. Begin text

+

I can appreciate your disappointment with the Argentine position. Your + off-the-record press guidance is entirely proper.

+

As you know, my aim in Buenos Aires was to squeeze as much as I humanly + could out of the Argentines so that you and we could know what we are + really up against. At no point did I tell them that what was developed + in Buenos Aires would be acceptable to you. Nor did I associate the + United States in any way with the position produced. I have not yet + received direct reports of the Argentines “agreement” with us. I’ll + refute any such claims swiftly and unequivocally, as I warned the + Argentine Foreign Minister I would do.

+

Let me suggest that you now reflect on the text. In identifying specific + areas where you believe changes are imperative, I suggest you work up + formulations of your own. This will give us a precise idea of where we + stand. It would have the additional advantage of denying the Argentines + any basis for saying that they and they alone have taken a step toward + peace. Needless to say, with the stakes so great, it would be helpful if + you could limit your reformulations to the minimum essential points.

+

I further suggest that you and the Prime Minister consider your coming to + Washington as soon as you have arrived at a considered view of the text. + I agree with you that this is not the time for me to come to London, but + I also believe that we need a face-to-face discussion, so that I can + clarify points and convey my feeling of Argentine attitudes and + aspirations. I cannot reduce to writing the bitterness, resentment and + sense of historic frustration I encountered in Buenos Aires. I could + also give you a better sense of the tradeoffs within the text, in + particular between prospects + for sovereignty and those for an expanded de facto role in the + interim.

+

If you agree to my idea that you come to Washington, I recommend you not + arrive at a definitive position before. I have tried to stay in close + touch with you despite being involved in exceedingly long and complex + discussions with the Argentines. You certainly would not have found it + helpful had I sent every detail in a constantly moving situation in + Buenos Aires. Could I ask you to correct the impression that has been + created by repeated statements out of London to the effect that I have + not been keeping the Prime Minister informed?

+

You and the Prime Minister have been most sensitive and prudent on the + question of American support for actions taken against Argentina. I do + not know if I can help avert war, but I am convinced that war would + become inescapable if I lose my credibility in Buenos Aires. I see that + the British press and some political sectors are becoming increasingly + harsh and impatient concerning the US + role. Another word from you or the Prime Minister along the line you + have previously taken on this delicate issue would, I think, be + appropriate.

+

As I have said before, it is imperative that you maintain military + pressure. I see no other way of bringing the Argentines to a position + satisfactory to you. It is equally important, as I hardly need to say to + you, that we be clear in our minds and with each other concerning those + points of disagreement between you and Argentina, including the + principles at stake, that are worth the tragedy of war.

+

As you know, Argentina has asked for an OAS Council meeting to convoke an Organ of Consultation + under the Rio Treaty. The question will be considered and, no doubt, + decided tomorrow morning April 20. We propose to abstain on the ground + that the Rio Treaty was not designed to apply to cases in which members + themselves took acts of force, and in view of our peace effort. We do + not expect a date to be set for convoking the Foreign Ministers as long + as our peace efforts continue and there is no military action.

+

Please get back to me shortly on the idea of an early visit by you to + Washington, hopefully no later than Thursday.April 22. Pym agreed on April 20 to come to Washington for 2 + days of talks concerning the paper developed in Buenos Aires. + Haig confirmed Pym’s trip in a letter to Costa Méndez transmitted in + telegram 105610 to Buenos Aires, April 20. (Reagan Library, + Executive Secretariat, NSC Cable + File, Falkland File 04/20/1982) Such a visit will avoid the + appearance of diplomatic stalemate while military pressures grow. In the + meantime, let me assure you, as the President assured the Prime + Minister, that you can indeed count on us. Warm regards. Al.

+ + Haig + +
+ + +
+ 155. Note From James M. + Rentschler of the National Security Council Staff to the + President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Clark) and the President’s Deputy + Assistant for National Security Affairs (McFarlane)Source: Reagan Library, NSC + Political Affairs Directorate Files, Chron April 1982 + (04/20/1982–04/22/1982). No classification marking. +

Washington, April 20, 1982

+ + SUBJ + Falklands, etc. + +

In addition to my airborne thoughts on where we now stand with the + Falklands crisis (attached), you might want to review the talking points + (Tab 1) which Tom Enders + prepared for the Secretary’s use when the latter briefs the President + (perhaps today).According to the + President’s Daily Diary, Reagan met with Haig, Clark, + Baker, Meese, McFarlane, and Rentschler in the Oval Office to discuss the crisis + from 11:40 a.m. to noon, April 20. (Reagan Library, President’s + Daily Diary) No memorandum of conversation of this meeting has been + found. In his personal diary, Reagan noted: “Al H’s report doesn’t hold out much + hope. The Junta is running the show in Argentina but the people when + you get behind the phony rallies don’t want war.” (Reagan, Diaries, p. 125) Rentschler, in his diary, wrote of Haig’s briefing that the Secretary + “still sees a chance for the diplomatic route but concedes that the + options have greatly narrowed and that the likelihood of imminent + hostilities is very high.” At Clark’s request, Rentschler earlier had briefed Reagan on “all matters + Falkland-side,” as part of the President’s 9:30 a.m. daily national + security briefing. (Rentschler, “Falklands Diary,” fo. 177) According to the Daily Diary, + this briefing also attended by Clark, McFarlane, and Kemp, took place from 11:10 to 11:22 + a.m. (Reagan Library, President’s Daily Diary) Tom, in his + usual magisterial fashion, did not see fit to share these with his + fellow delegates before they were done up in final. As they stand, I + fear they suggest a far too leisurely, even laid-back U.S. posture given + the impasse we face at this point in the intermediary process (I am not + at all certain, for example, that Pym will want to fly over here,See footnote 4, Document 154. particularly + at this delicate juncture in the evolution of events). Whether or not + the Secretary follows these points (his instincts are pretty good, and + he may take his own tack), I think a number of key questions must now be + asked:

+

—What are the criteria we are using to determine each party’s bottom-line + and how will we know when we have reached it?

+

—Don’t we need to put some clear (and preferably early) time limit on how + long we are willing to continue this process, particularly if both sides + maintain the rigidity they have so far displayed?

+ +

—Is this exercise really doable now? Can we, in other words, meet each + party’s minimum requirements (withdrawal of forces and restoration of + UK administration for the Brits, + some understanding of eventual sovereignty over the islands for the + Argies) and at the same time enable Thatcher to persuade her Parliament (and our own public) + that we have not rewarded Argentine use of force?

+

Incidentally, Tom seems to be in some doubt concerning the location of + both the Brit and Argie bottom lines; I am in no such uncertainty myself + . . .

+

Jim + Rentschler

+

Attachment

+

Memorandum From James M. + Rentschler of the National Security Council Staff to + the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Clark)Secret; Sensitive. Sent through McFarlane, who did not initial the + memorandum. Copies were sent to Fontaine and Blair. According to Rentschler’s diary, he wrote a first draft of the + memorandum on April 16 in Buenos Aires. (Rentschler, “Falklands Diary,” + fo. 168)

+

Washington, April 20, 1982

+ + SUBJECT + The Guns of April?—Where we now stand with Argentina, the UK, and Ourselves + +

The suspension of our peace shuttle and the likely imminence of armed + conflict between the UK and Argentina + require a very hard look at our next course. En route home from the + dispiriting frustrations of Buenos Aires, I offer the following personal + thoughts:

+

—We promised both parties our best shot at assisting them to find a + peaceful settlement; we gave them that shot—for the time being, at + least, there is nothing more to give.

+

—Implicit and explicit in our promise was the determination to practice + even-handedness so long as the process continued; that stage has now + ended.

+

Tilting toward either of the parties at this moment will undoubtedly + damage our relations with the non-tiltee; yet tilting toward + neither—i.e., attempting to prolong an appearance of “even-handedness” + or even worse, passivity—could put larger US strategic interests at risk.

+ +

—The greatest of all such risks may lie in the psychology of leadership: + at what point does the US no longer + appear “constructively concerned” but instead is perceived by the + British and our own public as irresolute, ungrateful, and evasive?

+

—The bilateral question for us thus boils down, in both policy terms and + public perceptions, to pro-UK + or pro-Argentina; the larger strategic question + boils down to Pan-America vs. NATO.

+

There will be arguments that the choices set out above are, in reality, + neither so stark nor simplistic, and that a US policy course which is both prudent and proper will aim + to preserve the best of both worlds.

+

I believe such a course will prove illusory. It is a circle that cannot + be squared; both sides of the conflict have too much invested in + emotional, geopolitical, and historical capital to allow us a safe + passage between them. More important, the moves we make—or fail to + make—with respect to one or the other disputant will have a long-term + ripple effect throughout our national security environment.

+

We need, therefore, to decide—on an extremely urgent basis—in which set + of relationships (Hemispheric or Atlantic) we are prepared to sustain + the most immediate (but perhaps less costly) casualties, recognizing + that we cannot escape some significant damage in either case, and could + well incur far worse.

+

This is properly the subject of an early NSC which would carefully weigh a detailed set of options + and the consequences likely to flow from each. Meanwhile, in a spirit of + total prejudice and partiality, I advance these views:

+

—It is essential to back Britain, and for reasons which transcend the + already compelling ties of history, language, and formal alliance.

+

—Our strategic imperatives in the East-West context and the stakes we + have in asserting the primacy of our Western leadership require it.

+

—Enforcement and credibility of the UN + system—particularly our strong backing for UNSC Resolution 502—justify it.

+

—Moreover, our support for the UK must be + seen as convincingly generous and resolute (this means something far + beyond rhetoric in both the military supply and economic sanctions + areas).

+

—Failure to back our most important and forthcoming ally at this critical + juncture—to reenact, in effect, a 1980s version of Suez or Skybolt—will + have a profoundly adverse effect on an already shaky alliance and at a + time when we can least afford such turbulence (we must understand that + an Anglo-Argentine war will be bad for NATO and our own East-West interests, but that this unhappy + state of affairs will be infinitely worse should we alienate Britain + into the bargain).

+

To the positive factors which dictate a pro-British tilt, I would add a + number of negative observations based on our direct and highly unpleasant experience with the + Argentines over the past few days (in connection with which I invite the + views of Roger Fontaine, who is + a far better informed student of the gaucho psyche than I):

+

—The talks in Buenos Aires demonstrated, more than anything else, the + emptiness of our bilateral “Relationship” with the Argies. (Ambassador + Shlaudeman voiced this same + view, heartily seconded by every one of us who had to deal with + them);

+

—Even if we achieved a responsible agreement with the Argentines on a + politically workable text, there is no assurance that the present + junta—quite possibly an ephemeral expression of leadership—could or + would deliver;

+

—None of us ever had the certainty that the Argentine side was + negotiating in good faith; indeed, the evidence indicated that we were + being strung along (a risk we recognized and were willing to take in the + larger interests of averting bloodshed);

+

—We were deliberately treated to a series of petty but cumulatively + significant, not to say contemptuous, derogatives from simple courtesy + (manipulated crowd boos, squalid “holding” conditions for delegation + members in the Presidential Palace, excessive rudeness on the part of + Security and administrative personnel) which called into further + question the seriousness and good faith of Argentine negotiating + tactics;

+

—On the larger question of what the South Atlantic crisis will do to the + inter-American “system” I favor a fatalistic stance, believing as I do + that those who are minded to back us would likely do so in any event, + while traditional anti-gringo sentiment would line up a number of states + against us no matter what role we played in the peace process (again, + however, I would defer to Roger + Fontaine).

+

The Argentines with whom we dealt were not, in sum, nice people; in this + sense Mrs. Thatcher and her + colleagues may from the start have read Argentine intentions and + operating style more accurately than we. That fact simply reinforces my + view that the time of even-handedness, indispensable during a period + when we were actively engaged in a peace-shuttling effort, may now be + past. We must not lose sight of the assertions with which the President + addressed his very first message to Mrs. Thatcher in this crisis: “I told Galtieri that initiating military + action against the Falkland Islands would seriously compromise relations + between the United States and Argentina” and “while we have a policy of + neutrality on the sovereignty issue, we would not be neutral on the + issue of Argentine use of force.”See Document 42.

+ +

Just so. Secretary Haig has + undertaken a gallant and gruelling marathon effort to make the + Argentines see reason, an effort which I for one strongly supported. But + the Argentines have not yet seen reason, and frankly I don’t think they + ever will—they may, indeed, be incapable of reasonable compromise in the + sense that we understand that concept.

+

Assuming that a miracle rabbit or two will not pop out of our hat + (Pym visit to the U.S., + etc.), all of this argues for the earliest possible expression of + support for the Brits in ways that are politically unambiguous for them. + Unless such practical expression is soon forthcoming—and absent the kind + of Argentine give which now seems unlikely—I can’t imagine that the + President would have a comfortable stay in Windsor Castle come early + June.

+

Tab 1

+

Briefing Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of + State for Inter-American Affairs (Enders) to Secretary of State HaigSecret; Sensitive.

+

Washington, undated

+ + SUBJECT + Your meeting with the President, April 20 + +

CHECKLIST

+

• Argentine position both very tough and very hard to establish. Some 50 + military, including corps commanders, involved in decision making. + Military kept jerking diplomats back. Believe I have got as close to + Argentine bottom line as is possible this week.

+

• What we got:

+

—arrangements or language tilting towards Argentina on the two main + questions (future negotiations and local administration), but

+

—a British veto on both so that London could control the pace of future + change.

+

• As expected, London can’t and won’t go that far, and we shouldn’t in + any way push them at this point. As you saw, my message to Pym was neutral.See Document + 154.

+

• Now comes the delicate part of the problem.

+ +

—military pressures are rising (Britain may debark on South Georgia + tomorrow);

+

—British will step up pressure on us to back them openly;

+

—Argentina will start Rio Treaty gambit and try (probably successfully) + to get wide Latin support for its position (we doubt that Argentina will + try for sanctions under the Rio Treaty now—or that it could get + them).

+

• We need to identify the British bottom line, just as we are close to + Argentina’s. That is the reason for asking Pym to come over this week.

+

• Meanwhile, suggest we keep to a neutral press line: we’ve been + identifying respective positions but not characterizing.

+

• This game is excruciatingly difficult and may well be impossible to + win. But every time I recalculate the cost to us of war in the South + Atlantic, I cannot avoid concluding that we would be a major loser, on + both continents.

+
+ +
+ + 156. Information Memorandum From the Director of the Bureau of + Politico-Military Affairs (Burt) + to Secretary of State HaigSource: Department of State, + Central Foreign Policy File, P880105–0941. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by T. Miller and M. + Austin; cleared by Blackwill + and T. Williams (INR). Blackwill initialed for Williams. Haig initialed the memorandum in the upper + right-hand corner, indicating that he saw it. Haig also underlined numerous + passages in the text of the memorandum. An attachment describing the + Vulcan Aircraft is not + printed. + + + Washington, April 20, + 1982 + + + SUBJECT + Possible UK Use of Vulcan Bombers in Falklands + +

There have been press reports alleging UK + plans to use Vulcan bombers in + Falkland operations,On April 18, the + Embassy in London sent to the Department an analysis of an article + that had appeared in the Sunday Express + newspaper, which stated that Vulcan bombers had been deployed to the South Atlantic + for operations against Argentina. In its comment, the Embassy noted: + “MOD sources consistently have refused to discuss contingency plans + for military operations in the Falklands area. However, the Royal + Air Force (RAF) has not yet phased + out its entire fleet of Vulcans and those that remain do have a + long-range conventional bombing capability. Moreover, the recent + additional task force augmentation of some twenty ground-attack + Harriers cannot reach the + Falklands area for several weeks. Against this background, it is + possible that MOD planners have developed contingency plans for + Vulcan deployment along the + lines discussed” in the article. (Telegram 8372 from London, April + 18; Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, + D820202–0597) + USDAO London confirms planning for + use of this aircraft. The attache was told bombers will practice in Scotland this week.

+

Vulcan is capable of conventional + bomb deliveries with modifications, but the RAF has not trained for such missions in + eleven years.The Avro Vulcan bomber entered service in + 1956 as part of the RAF’s + “V-bomber” force, designed originally to serve as a platform for the + United Kingdom’s nuclear deterrent. The aircraft would need + some reconfiguration, which could probably be done in a matter of hours + per aircraft. Nonetheless, an RAF + source said it would take “some time” before the + Vulcans would have operational, conventional bombing + capability. Vulcans would require + refueling in each direction between the Falklands and + Ascension. By reducing bomb capability the combat radius can be + increased, but refueling would still be necessary. The UK does have the requisite tanker + capability.

+

There are about fifty flyable aircraft in the UK inventory, of which 36 are dedicated + to SACEUR’S SSP. Each bomber could carry as + many as twenty-one, one thousand pound bombs, but the British could have + a major logistical problem in getting an adequate + supply of ordnance to Ascension. Bombers do not usually fly and land + with a full bomb load. They + could either reduce the number of bombs carried, fly some in by + transport aircraft, or, if they have seriously considered this option + earlier, bombs may have been loaded aboard ships.

+

There is speculation as to whether this is merely public posturing, or a + valid military option that HMG is + considering. While this is a theoretically feasible + mission for these aircraft, it would be very + difficult. It would be dangerous for the aircraft, requiring + good fortune with weather and timing. Given the conditions, it would be + difficult to accurately place the bombs. DIA estimates they would have a good probability of + penetrating air defenses at the Falklands, but would have much more of a + problem on the mainland.

+
+ +
+ 157. Working Paper Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency + + + Washington, April 20, + 1982 + +

[Source: Central Intelligence Agency. Top Secret; Codeword. 4 pages not + declassified.]

+
+ +
+ 158. Memorandum From Secretary of State Haig to President ReaganSource: + Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Agency File, Secretary Haig’s Evening Report (03/25/1982–04/21/1982). + Secret. + + + Washington, April 20, + 1982 + +

1. Falklands Dispute. The OAS Permanent Council today approved the Argentine request + to convene an Organ of Consultation (Meeting of Foreign Ministers) under + the Rio Treaty, beginning next Monday.Argentina requested an urgent meeting of the OAS Council the evening of April 19. + In OAS Resolution 360, April 21, + the Permanent Council agreed to convene an Organ of Consultation on + Monday, April 26. The text of the resolution is in the Department of + State Bulletin, June 1982, p. 85. + Eighteen of the twenty-one Rio Treaty signatories voted in favor; the + U.S., Colombia, Trinidad and Tobago abstained. In explaining our + abstention, Bill Middendorf + questioned whether the Argentine requestwas useful at a time when we were still striving to + promote a peaceful settlement. Bill also stressed our view that the + OAS should use the peaceful + settlement mechanisms of the OAS + Charter rather than the Rio Treaty, with its collective security + emphasis.Middendorf’s statement is printed ibid., pp. + 84–85. (U)

+

2. Dobrynin on + Falkland Islands and U.N. Special Session on Disarmament (SSOD). Dobrynin delivered to Larry Eagleburger this afternoon the Soviet + reply to our April 16 demarche on the Falkland Islands.See Document 135. + Predictably the Soviets denied media distortion of our role in the + crisis and dismissed our warning against Soviet involvement as + inappropriate.The text of the Soviet + reply to Eagleburger’s April + 16 démarche, delivered by Dobrynin, was transmitted by the Department to + Moscow in telegram 106876, April 21. (Reagan Library, Executive + Secretariat, NSC Cable File, + Falkland File 04/21/1982) On the SSOD, Dobrynin said + it was 90–95 percent certain that Brezhnev would not attend the session. + Dobrynin wondered if your + invitation could be extended to Gromyko; Larry doubted it. (C)

+

[Omitted here is a paragraph on issues unrelated to the South Atlantic + conflict.]

+
+ +
+ + 159. Letter From Argentine Foreign Minister Costa Méndez to Secretary of State + HaigSource: Department of State, Central + Foreign Policy File, P820069–0211. Secret; Nodis. Printed from an unofficial + translation. In his memoirs, Haig recalled that Costa Méndez had presented him with a message upon + his departure from Buenos Aires, April 19, which contained much of + the text of this message. (Haig, Caveat, p. 289) It is + unknown whether Haig was + mistakenly referring to the April 21 message in this recollection. + Costa Méndez was in + Washington to attend the OAS + meeting scheduled to begin April 26. + + + Washington, April 21, + 1982 + + + Dear Al: + +

Thank you for your letter of April 21st., which gives new hopes on such a + difficult and serious matter.Presumably a + mistaken reference to Haig’s + April 20 message to Costa + Méndez, informing him of Pym’s acceptance of Haig’s offer to come to Washington to discuss the + paper developed in Buenos Aires. See footnote + 3, Document 154.

+

The Argentine government and myself are grateful for your efforts and + your concern towards peace.

+

You are aware that Argentina is willing to continue negotiations.

+

You should also know that paragraph 8 of the paper which was drafted + here,See Document + 152. or any other similar provision, whichever its + wording may be, should state that it is absolutely essential and conditio sine qua non that negotiations will have + to conclude with a result by December 31st., 1982. As it has been + remarked so many times, this result must include a recognition of the + Argentine sovereignty over the Islands. Although said recognition may + not be expressly stated in the agreement, nevertheless, the principle + and the concept should arise clearly and unequivocally from the wording + of the agreement.

+

We will certainly meet in Washington.

+

Warm regards,

+ + Nicanor Costa + MendezThe translation + indicates that Costa + Méndez signed the original Spanish + text. + +
+ +
+ + 160. Note From the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency + (Williams) to Secretary of + Defense WeinbergerSource: Washington National Records + Center, OSD Files, FRC 330–84–0003, + Argentina (Jan–15 May) 1982. Secret. A copy was sent to Iklé. + + + Washington, undated + +

Attached message [less than 1 line not + declassified] received at 1030 local time. We are aware that + the first contingent of British vessels is very near South Georgia at + this time.In an April 21 information + memorandum to Haig, + Enders wrote that the + British seizure of South Georgia would be “likely to harden even + further the Argentine position on sovereignty,” “tend to strengthen + the Argentine case under the Rio Treaty,” and “would make it + virtually certain” that Argentina “would find the required 14 Latin + votes.” Enders recommended + trying to “take advantage” of U.K. action “to add new momentum and + urgency to the negotiating process,” and privately emphasizing to + the Argentines “that this action confirms U.K. determination to use + force if a diplomatic solution is not found promptly.” (Department + of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S + Special Handling Restrictions Memos 1979–1983, Lot 96D262, ES Sensitive April 20–23 1982) + [less than 1 line not declassified] the + islands to be occupied by no more than a platoon of Argentine troops, if + there are any present at all. The harbor at Grytviken is a good one and + would offer shelter to the task force in the face of South Atlantic + storms.

+

James A. Williams

+

Lieutenant General, U.S. Army

+

Director

+ +

Attachment

+

Telegram From the Defense Attaché in London ([name not declassified]) to the Director of + the Defense Intelligence Agency (Williams) and the Deputy Director + of the Defense Intelligence Agency (Burkhalter)Secret; + Noforn.

+

London, April 21, 1982, 1519Z

+

1. (S/Noforn) at 1440 local London + time 820421, [less than 1 line not declassified] + UK MOD revealed [less than 1 line not declassified] quote UK forces will take South Georgia Island + tonight or tomorrow unquote.According to + the British Official History, authorization to initiate landing + operations on South Georgia was given to British forces on April 20. + The first reconnaissance insertion was attempted on April 21 and + successfully achieved the following day. (Freedman, Official History, vol. II, pp. 237–238) + British ground troops landed on South Georgia on April 25. See Document 174.

+

2. (S/Noforn) [1½ + lines not declassified] In this regard time was not clarified + as being London local or South Georgia Island local or where forces + would come from or extent/nature of forces or next step.

+

3. (S/Noforn) [2 + lines not declassified] will stay close in touch particularly + during next 24 hours and advise by this or directed means any + amplification of info.

+

4. (S/Noforn) [less + than 1 line not declassified] HMS + Antrim, one other destroyer, HMS + Endurance and tanker now in South Georgia + area.

+

5. (S/Noforn) [less + than 1 line not declassified] the timing of info provided due + to impending Pym visit to + Washington tomorrow 820422 would seem to cast some doubt on info.

+

6. (U) [less than 1 line not declassified]

+
+ +
+ + 161. Information Memorandum From the Director of the Bureau of + Intelligence and Research (Montgomery) to Secretary of State HaigSource: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy + File, P820066–0656. Secret; Noforn; Nocontract; Orcon. + Drafted by W. Lofstrom (INR/IAA). Haig + initialed the upper right-hand corner of the memorandum, indicating + that he saw it. A stamped notation also indicates that Haig saw the + memorandum. + + + Washington, April 21, + 1982 + + + SUBJECT + Latin American Attitudes Toward the Falkland Islands Crisis + +

Summary: Popular opinion + throughout Latin America has supported Argentina’s claim to the + Falkland Islands, but Hemisphere governments have been reluctant to + legitimize the use of force. Reactions to the Argentine + invasion among Latin American countries have varied according to the + interests of individual states and their perceptions of their + relationships with Buenos Aires.

+

Brazil fears that the conflict, if left to run its + course, will bring down Galtieri and greatly increase Soviet and Cuban + influence in Argentina. At the same time, senior Brazilian + officials worry that an Argentine victory would revive Argentine + militarism and historical tensions between Brazil and Argentina. Brazil’s posture of cautious support for Argentina’s + claim is governed by its perception of the growing but still fragile + friendship with its southern neighbor.Haig placed + a checkmark in the right-hand margin next to this sentence. + Brazil wants to avoid being seen as an adversary by Argentina and has + agreed to sell six patrol aircraft to Buenos Aires. The longer the + dispute remains unresolved and the greater the potential for conflict + becomes, the more pressure Brazil will feel publicly + to side with Argentina.

+

Chile has supported Argentina’s claim to the Falklands, + but the Pinochet government + is concerned that the Argentine invasion will set a precedent for + resolving the Beagle Channel dispute by force. The Chileans + look to the US—through mediation—or to + the UK—through military victory—to + demonstrate to Buenos Aires that force cannot be used with impunity. + Santiago wants to avoid any indication of bias, but its sympathies + probably lie with the British. It has increased its military readiness + in the extreme south in case hostilities break out.

+

Peru, as Argentina’s staunchest ally in South + America, quickly justified the seizure of the + Falklands and offered moral support. [less + than 1 line not declassified] the Peruvian + military has contingency plans to aid their Argentine allies if fighting occurs, but + Peruvian units would not move without Belaunde’s explicit + order.

+

Colombia supports Argentina’s claim to the + Falklands but has condemned the Argentine + invasion. It has a territorial dispute with Venezuela and also + fears that Nicaragua might act militarily to assert its claim to San + Andres and Providencia Islands. Colombia, therefore, + wants to avoid legitimizing the use of force in territorial + disputes.

+

Venezuela’s initial reaction to the Argentine invasion + was cautious, but official sympathy for Argentina has come to the + fore. Venezuela’s position is largely the result of the similarity it sees between the British position in the + Falklands and Guyana’s possession—as the result of British + colonialism—of extensive areas that Venezuela claims for + itself.

+

Mexico’s position is that Argentina has the historic + right to demand decolonization of the Falklands, but that it + erred by disregarding the doctrine of peaceful settlement of disputes. + President Lopez Portillo publicly endorsed UN mediation on April 12 when he + reiterated Mexico’s sympathy with Argentina’s aims but not its + methods.

+

Nicaragua and El Salvador support the Argentine + takeover. Managua stated on April 5 that Argentine efforts to + resolve the “illegal” colonial occupation by negotiation had failed. On + the same day, El Salvador announced that Argentine aspirations were + “legitimate,” but it urged both parties to settle the matter + peacefully.

+

Costa Rica wants to avoid alienating either side. + Guatemala announced its support for the + Argentine invasion and drew a parallel between the + Argentine claim to the Falklands and Guatemala’s claim to + Belize.

+

Prime Minister Price of Belize supports the British. He fears that the upcoming withdrawal of British troops from Belize + will make it an inviting target for reassertion of the Guatemalan + claim.

+

English-speaking Caribbean countries have been cautious + but generally supportive of the UK. Guyana, fearful of Venezuelan + irredentism, also has given strong public support to the UK position.

+

With regard to invoking TIAR, Trinidad-Tobago and Haiti are the only Rio Treaty + signatories in the Caribbean. Trinidad-Tobago has maintained a + cautious but firm position of calling for the withdrawal of Argentine + troops from the Falklands; Haiti probably will support Argentina’s call + for invoking the Rio Treaty.

+
+ +
+ + 162. Message From British Foreign Secretary Pym to Secretary of State HaigSource: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, + S/S Special Handling + Restrictions Memos 1979–1983, Lot 96D262, ES Sensitive April 20–23 1982. UK Confidential. The British Embassy in Washington sent + the message to Haig under an + April 21 covering note from Henderson. According to an April 21 memorandum from + Eagleburger to Haig, Thomas delivered Pym’s message to the Department the evening of April + 21. In the same memorandum, Eagleburger wrote that Pym had “sent word” that he wished to have a “scene + setting discussion” with Haig when they met the following day as well as a + discussion of a U.S. “military guarantee” to the United Kingdom and + “the absolute need to maintain maximum security possible about + British military plans.” (Ibid.) + + + London, April 21, + 1982 + +

Begins:

+

In preparation for our talks tomorrowSee + Document 163. I am asking + Nicko Henderson to give you + the amendments to the Buenos Aires textSee + Document 152. which the Prime + Minister and I consider essential at first sight. He will be conveying + one or two further points to which we attach importance.

+

As background to our meeting it might be useful for you to have the + following summary of the reasons why the latest draft would be far more + difficult for Britain to consider accepting than the version which we + discussed earlier:See Document 112.

+

A. WITHDRAWAL

+

The proposed arrangements are unequal and heavily favour Argentina, + despite her being the aggressor. For the second week after signature of + the agreement Argentina would have several thousand troops with all + their equipment in the Falkland Islands, while the nearest British + forces (our submarines) would be several hours distant. Within fifteen + days the provision that British forces should return to their usual + operating bases or areas would apparently exclude most possible + deployments in the South Atlantic whereas the Argentines would be only + about 200 miles away.

+

B. ADMINISTRATION

+

To have three nominees of the Argentine Government in the Councils in the + Falklands would be undemocratic in the case of the legislative council + and disproportionate in the case of the Executive Council. In effect, + Government would be shared between Britain and Argentina at the + Administrative level, as well as (with the United States) in the special + Interim Authority. British administration would thus be re-established + to a far lesser degree than under the earlier draft.

+ +

C. ECONOMIC SANCTIONS

+

The new draft would have these lifted before the completion of + Argentinian withdrawal, thus contradicting the principle that withdrawal + in accordance with the UN resolution is + the first requirement.

+

D. RELATIONS WITH THE MAINLAND

+

The latest draft opens up the possibility, if not the probability, of an + influx of Argentine people and businesses, combined with strong + encouragement to the Islanders to leave. Britain would apparently still + have the right to block proposals in this field from the special Interim + Authority, but the latest draft independently concedes the principle of + facilitating contacts between the Islands and Argentina.

+

E. FUTURE NEGOTIATIONS

+

The new text would exclude re-establishment of the status quo ante the + invasion from the list of possible outcomes of negotiations. This does + not preserve the fundamental principle that the islanders must choose + their own future. Here too Britain would nominally be free to refuse + agreement to any outcome of the negotiations which the islanders did not + accept. But there is a bias in the relevant paragraph which would + greatly restrict our freedom to press for any outcome not involving + early transfer of sovereignty to Argentina.

+

All in all, I think I was right to tell my colleagues in the Ten + yesterday that the general effect of the latest draft—even presupposing + Argentine goodwill, which in our eyes is far from obvious—would be that + Argentine withdrawal would be delayed, the Argentine voice in the + administration of the islands would be disproportionate, Argentine + influence and pressure in the islands would be given free rein, and + future negotiations would be organised in a way which could only + prejudice the principles of sovereignty and self-determination. The + result would be that in practice the islanders would face the choice + between absorption into Argentina or abandonment of the islands which + have been their home in most cases for a [omission in the original].

+

I do not underestimate the difficulty of getting the Argentinians to + accept our amendments. But I thought I should leave you in no doubt + about the gap which I see between their present demands and what we can + accept.

+

I much look forward to our meeting tomorrow and to all that I hope will + come out of it—including something useful to you in the OAS context, on which I was grateful for + your latest message.See Document 154.

+

Ends.

+ +

Attachment

+

Paper Prepared by the British GovernmentUK + Secret.

+

London, undated

+

ESSENTIAL AMENDMENTS

+

Begins:

+

Paragraph 2.1: Delete “rescind” and substitute + “suspend enforcement of”.

+

Paragraph 2.2.1 (second sentence): Delete and + substitute the following:

+

“Within the same time period the United Kingdom naval task force will + stand off at a distance of at least 150 miles from any of the two + coordinate points.”

+

Paragraph 2.2.2.

+

(a) Re-draft first sentence as follows:

+

“Within fifteen days from the date of this agreement, Argentina and the + United Kingdom shall have removed all their forces, equipment and + armaments from the zones”.

+

(b) Re-draft second sentence as follows:

+

“Thereafter, the UK naval task force and + submarines shall revert to their normal duties.”

+

Paragraph 4: Delete “From the date of this + agreement, steps” and substitute “On completion of the steps specified + in paragraphs 2, 2.1, 2.2, 2.2.1 and 2.2.2 above, the two Governments + shall take measures to terminate . . .”

+

Second sentence: Delete “without delay” and insert “at the same time” and + “shall”.

+

Paragraph 5: Add “Each representative may be + supported by a staff of not more than ten persons”.

+

Paragraph 6 (A): Delete the second sentence and + substitute: “The traditional local administration shall be + re-established, including the executive and legislative councils, each + of which shall be enlarged to include one representative of the + Argentine population resident on the Islands to be nominated by the + special interim authority.”

+

Paragraph 6 (A): Delete third sentence.

+

Paragraph 7 (A): Delete and substitute:

+ +

“Pending a definitive settlement, the special interim authority shall + make proposals to the two Governments to facilitate and promote travel, + transportation, communications (including the movement of persons) and + trade between the mainland and the Islands. Such proposals shall + simultaneously be transmitted to the executive and legislative councils + for their views. The two Governments undertake to respond as soon as + possible to such proposals. The special interim authority shall monitor + the implementation of all such proposals agreed by the two + Governments”.

+

Paragraph 7 (B): Delete “teaching” and “property”. + Clarification is required of the meaning of the phrase “on an equal + basis”. Pending such clarification, a reserve is put on this phrase.

+

Paragraph 8 (A): Delete and substitute:

+

“December 31, 1982, will conclude the interim period during which the + signatories shall negotiate mutually agreed conditions for the + definitive status of each of the three groups of islands in accordance + with the purposes and principles of the charter of the United Nations + and bearing in mind relevant General Assembly resolutions. The + negotiations shall begin within fifteen days of the signature of the + present agreement”.

+

Ends.

+
+ +
+ 163. Memorandum of ConversationSource: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, + S/S Special Handling + Restrictions Memos 1979–1983, Lot 96D262, Super Sensitive April 1–30 + 1982. Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Enders. The meeting took place at the Department of + State. + + + Washington, April 22, 1982, 11:30 a.m.–1:30 + p.m. + + + SUBJECT + Falkland Islands Dispute + + + PRINCIPALS + British Foreign Secretary Francis + Pym + Secretary of State Alexander M. Haig, + Jr. + + + OTHER PARTICIPANTS + Brian Fall, Mr. Pym’s Private Secretary + Assistant Secretary of State Thomas + O. Enders + + +

Secretary Haig opened by + describing the negotiating process in Buenos Aires, emphasizing its + incoherence, the difficulty of finding a negotiating partner who could + speak authoritatively, the relative weight of the Argentine Navy and + Admiral Anaya in particular, and + the role of the corps commanders. Returning here after three days of + negotiation he had asked Foreign Minister Costa Mendez for a letter indicating that Argentines + would accept the text established if it were acceptable to Britain, and + been promised it, only to have Costa + Mendez fail to deliver the letter at the airport, and + indeed to advance the specious and unacceptable proposal that Argentina + assume the governorship of the islands if the negotiations on their + long-term status were to fail.Haig is describing his April 19 + meeting with Costa Méndez at + the Buenos Aires airport (see footnote 2, + Document 152). For the text of Costa Méndez’s proposal, see Document 159.

+

The Secretary described Galtieri + as a “Patton-type”, not particularly bright, and intensely worried about + his survival. He is under conflicting pressures from the military (for + giving too much in negotiations with us) and from a population that + clearly doesn’t want war. The Secretary’s contacts with Argentines in + church and in the street showed clearly that the mood has changed.

+

Foreign Secretary Pym said that if + it had it was due to British pressure. Secretary Haig agreed, adding that there were no + alternatives left to push on.

+

With regard to South Georgia, Foreign Secretary Pym said that it might be some time + before military action occurred.See Document 160. Secretary Haig said that he had an observation + to make which was not advice, since he did not want to pressure the + British about its national interest. He had talked to the + President,See footnote 2, Document 155. and if the British take + military action in South Georgia we would have to issue a statement + putting us some distance away from Britain but not in any decisive way. + Obviously it would be best if the island could be recaptured without + casualties, but the Argentine Marines had sustained substantial + casualties in taking the island, and there could be little doubt but + that they will resist. The Secretary said that the U.S. would put the + number of Argentine personnel on the island at 40, much lower than the + high, but not very credible, figures the Argentines are putting out. He + added that it would not be the best timing for the action to occur while + Pym was here or immediately + thereafter, or while talks go on with Argentina. But if the island were + retaken surgically, it probably would help build pressure for a + solution.

+ +

Speaking objectively, but with our deep sympathy for the British + position, Secretary Haig said + that Galtieri had only limited + flexibility. Galtieri had + insisted that with a reasonable assurance of sovereignty all the rest + was negotiable, and there is a clear trade with this. We had responded + we could not provide an assurance of any kind, and could not ask an ally + to sacrifice its own sovereign interests. The Secretary concluded that + Galtieri’s life expectancy + as President was very short, that Costa + Mendez was not a valid interlocutor and thus that there + was no point in having Costa + Mendez sit down with Pym, as the former had proposed. The Secretary said that + he saw no alternative but to return to Buenos Aires.

+

Foreign Secretary Pym said he was + not terribly optimistic about the Secretary’s mission. The British + Government and people were genuinely and deeply grateful to him for the + extraordinary effort he had made. Foreign Secretary Pym did not think there was any point + in trying to produce a completely new proposal, nor did he see any + change that could be made in the existing document that would bridge the + gap.

+

Foreign Secretary Pym said that + Prime Minister Thatcher had gone + through the roof at the thought that confidential information on British + military plans vis-a-vis South Georgia might be shared with the + Argentines.In her memoirs, Thatcher wrote that the U.K. + Government informed Haig + through Henderson, April 21, + “that a firm decision had been taken to recover South Georgia in the + near future.” “Mr. Haig,” + she recounted, “expressed himself surprised and concerned. He asked + whether our decision was final: I confirmed that it was. We were + informing, not consulting him. Later he told our ambassador that he + thought he would have to give the Argentine Junta advance notice of + our intended operation. We were appalled. Nico Henderson persuaded him to + think better of it.” (Thatcher, Downing Street + Years, p. 204) No U.S. record of Haig’s conversation with Henderson has been found. However, + Henderson’s transmitted + reports of this meeting have been published online by the Thatcher Foundation. On April 22, + in a meeting with Bosworth, + Takacs expressed + “apparent concern” that the “USG + might have some information on a possible British attack against + South Georgia.” In response, Haig wrote to Costa + Méndez, stating “we have no influence with the + British” with regard to their military intentions. “Any decision + they might take would be theirs alone, without consultation with + us.” (Telegram 109457 to Buenos Aires, April 23; Reagan Library, + Executive Secretariat, NSC Country + File, Latin America/Central, Argentina + (04/20/1982–04/23/1982) The weather was bad, and it was + extremely unlikely that anything would happen for several days. He + doubted that casualties could be avoided when action did occur, but + thought that recapture of South Georgia from Argentina would be a + dramatic way of keeping up the pressure. Foreign Secretary Pym thought the gap between the British + position and the Buenos Aires text was enormous, particularly when it + was so hard to tell whom one could deal with. If it were possible for + the Secretary’s mission to succeed, he would be all for it. But one must + face the probable outcome. Clearly time is running out. The mood in + Britain is calm and responsible. In their hearts the people don’t want + war but they understand + what is at stake. Prime Minister Thatcher is resolute and not inclined towards further + compromise. She feels fortified in this by her conversation with + President Reagan April 17.See Document + 144.

+

Foreign Secretary Pym asked the + Secretary what possibility of success he saw and what chance of success + there is if he returns to Buenos Aires.

+

Secretary Haig said he was not + optimistic and would have given up much earlier if that had been the + criterion. He was only going on because of the historic consequence of + failure. If there is war, Latin America will (regardless of the finer + judgements of some of its leaders) line up against Britain. This would + come to a head at the OAS meeting.See Document + 185. There would be an opportunity for Soviet mischief, + and some ramifications in Central America. More important is the + potential impact in Britain. Nothing will come out of the Secretary’s + mission that will shake the relationship, but we are vitally interested + in the long-term viability of the Thatcher Government. Things would go all right up to the + point of military action and just beyond. Afterwards Labour and others + would pull away.

+

Foreign Secretary Pym agreed that + it could be a very long struggle. The pressure is not strong enough now + to get results. More pressure is needed to make the negotiations + succeed. It would be decisive if the U.S. came off the fence. Pym noted that the Government had + defended Secretary Haig in + Parliament against charges the U.S. was too even-handed. But reaction + was growing. In his judgment, only U.S. economic or other pressure could + make the shuttle work.

+

Secretary Haig said that there + was also no question but that the U.S. would shift if talks collapsed. + We had told that repeatedly to the Argentines, and we believe they do + not question it. What they do question is whether Britain will actually + go to war.

+

Foreign Secretary Pym said that + time was critical and that everything is to be said for applying + infinitely greater pressure now.

+

Secretary Haig said that he + thought that the threat could be made even more vigorously and that + Britain should not doubt on whose side we would come down. However, + financial and trade measures would not have an immediate effect, indeed + might take six months to act while in the meantime the whole + international financial structure might be shaken as the Argentine + crisis came on top of the Polish, Rumanian, and Mexican crises.

+

Foreign Secretary Pym said that + such a crisis might bring Argentina to its senses.

+ +

Secretary Haig said that the U.S. + must consider the consequences. There would be a north-south as well as + an east-west crisis. If pressure is required maybe it would be better to + use military pressure. That is the only thing that can bring home that + the west is willing to fight. He noted that we have an exceptionally + large fleet in the Caribbean.

+

Foreign Secretary Pym noted that + military pressures would topple the government in Buenos Aires.

+

Secretary Haig said that + sanctions would probably have an initial effect of annealing unity in + Buenos Aires and making the government more intractable. That would + leave Britain with the only alternative of blockading the islands as a + means of long-term strangulation. The other alternative is a + continuation of the talks. We are down now to a narrow margin of + compromise, with peripheral shifts between the withdrawal, interim + arrangements, and negotiations paragraphs likely to be decisive. He + believed the key was the U.S. role. U.S. involvement was disadvantageous + from our point of view as it would make us the focus of animosity of + both governments but the U.S. involvement would provide the + psychological equivalent of a guarantee, assuring Argentina that it + would have a fair shot at influencing the outcome while reassuring + Britain that there will be no precipitous action.

+

Secretary Haig noted the + importance of the Falkland Islands company to the Argentines. Foreign + Secretary Pym said that he was + unaware that Britain had ever opposed share purchases by Argentina. On + the other hand, he was worried that the Argentines would attempt to + flood the islands with people. Secretary Haig said that we would not permit that.

+

Secretary Haig said that it would + be better if the interim period were 18 months, and Foreign Secretary + Pym agreed. Secretary + Haig said that the U.S. + could take on an active mediating role at the end of the year if the two + countries had not negotiated an agreement prior to then.

+

Foreign Secretary Pym said that he + thought that there were only a few days left before time ran out.

+

Secretary Haig said that the + OAS meeting on April 26 presented a + problem. The U.S. would argue that there is no legal basis for action + when a Rio Treaty member uses force against an outside power, but the + Latins would outvote us. One way to trump the OAS would be to go back to Buenos Aires on April 27. He + recognized that there were only a few days left, since as soon as the + British assembled its fleet, it would have to act, or we all lose + credibility. Pym said that there + was about a week more before that point was reached.

+

Foreign Secretary Pym expressed + concern that the negotiations could drag on. Secretary Haig replied that a new trip to Buenos + Aires would put the onus for failure on Argentina.

+ +

Secretary Haig then outlined the + possibility of adding language on U.S. mediation/conciliation to the + text. Foreign Secretary Pym asked + whether that would make unnecessary retention of the tendentious + language on negotiations in Paragraph 8. Secretary Haig replied that there was no way to + get an agreement unless the language were retained.

+

Foreign Secretary Pym said that + the principle of self-determination must not be put at risk, he was not + at all sure that he could get through the House with the concept of a + U.S.-sponsored “evolution” on the islands.

+

Secretary Haig said that he + thought the withdrawal process would be readily resolvable once the rest + of the agreement were reached, and Foreign Secretary Pym agreed.

+

Foreign Secretary Pym said that he + considered the draft the British had forwarded to Washington the day + before to be its bottom line.See Document 162. The Secretary’s + suggestions were below that. If they were retained, the Thatcher Government would fall. + Secretary Haig said that it was + inconceivable we would contribute to such a result.

+

Foreign Secretary Pym said that if + a new trip to Buenos Aires were undertaken it would have to be the last + bite, with the U.S. ready to back off thereafter.

+

Secretary Haig closed by + reassuring Foreign Secretary Pym + that the U.S. is not, and in the light of its public opinion, cannot be + even-handed.

+
+ +
+ + 164. Memorandum of ConversationSource: Department of State, Under Secretary of State + for Political Affairs, Miscellaneous Files, March 1981–February + 1983, Lot 83D210, D. + Gompert. Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Campbell; cleared by Goldberg. The meeting took place + in the Secretary’s Conference Room at the Department of + State. + + + Washington, April 23, 1982, 10:35–11:45 + a.m. + + + SUBJECT + Falkland Islands Framework—Haig/Pym + Meeting with Staff + + + PARTICIPANTS + + US + The Secretary + Assistant Secretary Thomas O. + Enders + Lt. General Vernon + Walters + Deputy Assistant Secretary Stephen W. Bosworth + Deputy Assistant Secretary Robert L. Funseth + Deputy to the Under Secretary for Political Affairs + David + Gompert + Ambassador John J. Louis, + Jr. + L/ARA—Scott Gudgeon + EUR/NE—John Campbell + (Notetaker) + + + UK + Foreign Secretary Francis + Pym + Deputy to the Permanent Under Secretary, Julian Bullard + Ambassador Sir Nicholas + Henderson + Ian Sinclair, Legal + Adviser + John Ure, FCO + Brian Fall, Private + Secretary to the Foreign Secretary + Francis Richards, + Assistant Private Secretary to the Foreign Secretary + Nicholas Fenn, + FCO News + Department + Stephen Wall, + UK Embassy + Christopher Crabbe, UK + Embassy + + +

SUMMARY: Foreign Secretary Francis Pym visited Washington April + 22–23, his first as Foreign Secretary. His visit followed Secretary + Haig’s two trips to London + (April 8–9 and April 12–13) and two trips to Buenos Aires (April 9–11 + and April 15–19) in his search for a diplomatic solution to the South + Atlantic dispute between Argentina and the UK. At the April 23 meeting reported here, Secretary + Haig and Foreign Secretary + Pym considered the attached + draft of the Falkland Islands Framework which had been developed out of + Secretary Haig’s conversations + in Buenos Aires and London.Attached but not + printed. This draft (attached) also incorporated + working-level US and UK changes made the previous evening. (See + separate memorandum of conversation for the afternoon/evening of April 22.)During the April 22 meeting, held in the + Secretary’s Conference Room at the Department of State, the U.S. and + British sides considered proposed British amendments to the text of + the draft agreement transmitted by Haig from Buenos Aires, April 19. The memorandum of + conversation, along with the Buenos Aires draft text bearing the + British amendments, is in the Department of State, Under Secretary + of State for Political Affairs, Miscellaneous Files, March + 1981–February 1983, Lot 83D210, D. + Gompert. Enders sent a shorter summary of the discussions, + including U.S. judgments of the British amendments, to Haig under a covering action + memorandum, April 22. (Department of State, Executive Secretariat, + S/S Special Handling + Restrictions Memos 1979–1983, Lot 96D262, ES Sensitive April 20–23 1982) The two sides + worked through the text paragraph by paragraph until the Foreign + Secretary ended the meeting to keep a previously-arranged appointment + with the British press. The Secretary and Foreign Secretary agreed to + resume their discussions at lunch at the British Embassy later in the + day. (See separate memorandum of conversation.)See Document 165. + Following Foreign Secretary Pym’s + Washington visit, Secretary Haig + transmitted a revised text of the Framework to the Argentine and British + governments the night of April 26–27.See + footnote 4, Document 181. + END SUMMARY.

+

Secretary Haig opened the + conversation by observing that UK and + American experts had been working together on the texts. He wanted the + UK to understand that we were not + trying to advocate the Argentine position. Rather, we were searching for + what might be achievable in Buenos Aires, recognizing that such a text + might not necessarily also be acceptable in London. The Secretary said + that we needed to consider carefully whether or not we should begin + another round of negotiations under the current formula—or whether we + should try another approach.

+

The Secretary said that the pressure to achieve a negotiated, political + settlement would not dissipate once military action began. Military + action was unlikely to be decisive, and would probably drag on. World + public opinion would insist on a solution. Pym agreed with the Secretary’s observation, but said + that once military action began, “people will have different + perceptions.” Haig commented + that it was easy to slip into thinking in terms of negotiations versus + war. This was false. A political solution would become even more + imperative if a war started. The Secretary then suggested to Pym that they work through the text of + the Falkland Islands Peace Framework.

+

Paragraph 2.1: The Secretary said that we agreed + with the paragraph as rewritten. Assistant Secretary Enders urged the British that they + work within the structure of the Buenos Aires concept—the “elastic + band”—combined with US verification. + Alternatively, the UK should consider + carefully our new, second, concept: here the modalities of withdrawal were based on how long it + would take to reinsert forces into the Falkland area once they had been + withdrawn.

+

Pym said he was interested in the + modality for withdrawal based on time rather than distance: “our + military people must look at this.” Pym thought, however, that this concept would be + possible to sell to British public opinion. The Secretary observed that + this operational modality would also help the Argentine military accept + the framework. Sinclair objected + that this modality retained the principal difficulty of the previous + one: it was a-symmetrical. The British would be withdrawing all of its + fleet while the Argentines would be withdrawing their forces in stages. + The Secretary observed that this became irrelevant once a US presence was established on the Islands. + Once we were there, Buenos Aires would not seek to reoccupy the Islands + because it would face American power.

+

Enders noted that this second + concept depended on the presence of US + personnel to verify that withdrawal was taking place. This would require + US personnel on the Islands, with + the fleet, and in Argentine ports. The Secretary said that placing + American observers on the fleet posed physical problems. It would be + foolish of us to propose placing them there because it could not be + done. (“Would we drop them from helicopters?”) What was important was to + get the US physically present on the + Islands. We could also use aerial surveillance with respect to the + British fleet and Argentine ports. The important principles were also + that the US would assume responsibility + for verification. Gompert noted + that our redrafted language referred to redeployment of military forces + to “normal duties”. This language was more ambiguous than what had + appeared in previous drafts. It was designed not to constrict British + naval operations in the South Atlantic. Pym observed that he would have to consult his military + experts.

+

Paragraph 4: The Secretary observed that with the + redrafting, there was a reasonable consensus on this paragraph. + Pym observed that the Prime + Minister was concerned about initiating approaches of this type before + the completion of withdrawal, “but I will put this to her (meaning + PM + Thatcher). I find it + reasonable.”

+

Paragraph 5: + Enders observed that the problem + here involved the number of personnel. The Secretary said that Buenos + Aires accepted the concept of a limitation on numbers. Pym said that Prime Minister Thatcher’s view was that the + population of the Islands was very small; therefore, the number of + officials should also be small. Pym said that the US + suggestion of a distinction between the staff of the Interim + Administration and the US verificators + might well meet her concern. The Secretary said that he expected the + US presence to be headed by an + experienced official of ambassadorial rank. Pym observed that the Prime Minister would not accept an + interim administration with offices on the Argentine mainland. Enders observed that the Argentines + had suggested Geneva as a headquarters site. Pym said the suggestion was absurd, given the distance + and the tiny numbers involved.

+

Paragraph 6 (A): Enders said that under this rewritten paragraph, local + administration would continue, except that the Legislative and Executive + councils would be enlarged. This language was designed to let the office + of the governor continue—even though there would be no governor on the + Island.

+

Sinclair said that there must be + an executive authority in the absence of the governor. This requirement + was met by the draft language. Enders said that this concept would be difficult for the + Argentines. The Secretary observed that Argentine acceptance of this + position would be a major concession on their part. Enders said that the reduced number of + Argentine appointments to the two councils under this redraft would also + be difficult for Buenos Aires to accept. Sinclair observed that Argentine representation would + now be more in proportion to their numbers. There was general agreement + that it was preferable that Argentine representatives be appointed + rather than elected.

+

The Secretary emphasized that the entire agreement could fail on this + paragraph. Costa Mendez had told + him that Argentine flexibility on the negotiations paragraph was + directly tied to UK flexibility here. + Pym observed that this + paragraph contemplated the restoration of UK administration—it did not exclude British + administration.

+

Paragraph 6 (B): Pym accepted it.

+

Paragraph 7 (A & B): Pym observed that this paragraph was + fundamental to London. London looked for an international authority + which would oversee the restoration of normal life on the Islands with + self-determination on the future. But Argentina wanted to expand its + presence in the Islands, and this would be unacceptable. The House of + Commons would see that 7A “opened the door to the Falklands being + overrun by a lot of Argentines.” The Secretary observed that here + language was more difficult than reality. London would retain what + amounted to a veto. Enders + argued that by combining 7A and 7B, 7B became a safeguard. But, + Pym observed, the flavor here + would be unacceptable to the Prime Minister. Pym said that the Argentines were trying to jump the gun + on self-determination of the Islands by increasing the Argentine + presence. The Secretary observed that this paragraph was not very + different from language used by the UK + with Argentina in a 1971 agreement. Sinclair observed that the 1971 agreement was quite + different in context, and its language was rather restricted in + nature.

+

Pym observed that the Prime + Minister was highly sensitive about questions of property. Initially + expansion of communication and trade links between the Islands and the + mainland had been talked about—now this was expanded to property. Pym said, “you can imagine what they will say in the + House of Commons.” But, Pym went + on, “you are saying that we will have a veto.” The Secretary agreed, + arguing that B provided a straightjacket around A. Pym observed that + therefore the paragraph was really a “slight of hand”—with good + intentions. “The Prime Minister will have enormous problems. She is a + slight purist.”

+

The Secretary argued that these paragraphs attempted to approach the + question from the point of view of equity. Pym observed that the proposal looked to the Interim + Authority making specific suggestions for enlarged links with Argentina. + HMG would then say no. “Where would + we be after a month or so? Tension would build. Picture the scene on the + Islands.” Enders observed that + the US presence could function as a + shock absorber. Pym returned to + his earlier point: the paragraph misled the Argentines. The Secretary + said that the paragraph guaranteed the present status + quo of the character of the Islands.

+

Pym argued that the question of + compensating the Islanders should be left out of the agreement. It + provided the wrong kind of flavor and implied that the inhabitants were + being bribed to leave.

+

At this point, Foreign Secretary Pym returned to the British Embassy to meet with the + press. He and the Secretary agreed to continue their discussion over + lunch and at an afternoon session at the British Embassy.

+
+ +
+ + 165. Memorandum of ConversationSource: Department of State, Under Secretary of State + for Political Affairs, Miscellaneous Files, March 1981–February + 1983, Lot 83D210, D. + Gompert. Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Campbell; cleared by Goldberg. The meeting took place + at the Residence of the British Ambassador. + + + Washington, April 23, 1982, 2:15–4:30 + p.m. + + + SUBJECT + Falkland Islands Framework + + + PARTICIPANTS + + US + The Secretary + Under Secretary Lawrence S. + Eagleburger + Lt. General Vernon + Walters + Deputy Assistant Secretary Stephen Bosworth + Deputy Assistant Secretary Robert L. Funseth + Deputy to Under Secretary for Political Affairs, David Gompert + Scott Gudgeon, + L/ARA + John Campbell, + EUR/NE + + + UK + Foreign Secretary Pym + Ambassador Sir Nicholas + Henderson + Julian Bullard, + Deputy to the Permanent Under Secretary + Ian Sinclair, Legal + Advisor + John Ure, Foreign + Commonwealth Office + Brian Fall, Private + Secretary to the Foreign Secretary + Francis Richards, + Assistant Private Secretary to the Foreign Secretary + Nicholas Fenn, + FCO News + Department + Derek Thomas, + Minister UK Embassy + Stephen Wall, + UK Embassy + Christopher Crabbe, UK + Embassy + + +

SUMMARY: After lunch at the British Embassy, the + US and UK sides resumed their meeting, which had been interrupted + by the Foreign Secretary’s appointment with the British press. (See + separate memcon for the earlier portion of the meeting.)See Document + 164.

+

The first part of the formal conversation at the British Embassy focused + on the text of the Falkland Framework proposal, which had incorporated + in it changes suggested before Pym’s press break. (Text attached.)Attached but not printed. The Secretary and + the Foreign Secretary then discussed the Argentine request for NASA + LANDSAT photographs of South + Georgia, with Pym expressing the + hope that the US would not provide the + coverage. The Secretary noted that whether to do so would be an American decision.On April 23, Burt sent Eagleburger an action memorandum regarding the + Government of Argentina’s April 22 request for LANDSAT coverage of South Georgia. + Burt recommended + informing NASA that the Department + had “no objection” to providing the requested LANDSAT coverage and that he, + Burt, inform the British + Embassy of the U.S. decision. Eagleburger disapproved both recommendations. + (Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S Special Handling Restrictions Memos 1979–1983, Lot + 96D262, ES Sensitive April 20–23 + 1982) A later Argentine request for LANDSAT images, presented to Eagleburger on April 30, was + approved. See Document 197. The + final portion of the meeting consisted of Pym’s summing-up of the UK reaction to the draft framework. Essentially, he argued, + the text he would be taking back to London rewarded Argentine + aggression. END SUMMARY.

+

Pym opened the discussion by + asking where the concept of “7 days” as a time frame for withdrawal came + from.

+

Gompert responded that our goal + had been to find a time frame acceptable to the Argentines.

+

Paragraph 4: The Secretary noted that the redraft + of paragraph 4 included the modifications suggested by the British side + at the earlier meeting that morning. The Secretary said that while he + recognized that the paragraph caused the British problems, he hoped that + the Foreign Secretary would take it to London. Pym said that he would do so.

+

Paragraph 5: The Secretary said we specifically + referred to ten persons to assure London that the number of Argentines + that would be present on the Island would be limited.

+

Paragraph 6: The Secretary said that we want to + suggest that the framework document is an integrated whole. Sometimes we + have had to split the differences between HMG and Buenos Aires in hopes of achieving something + acceptable to both. Here with respect to the composition of the + governing councils, HMG would have a + decisive majority.

+

Paragraph 7: + Pym said that his government + would have trouble with the appointment of representatives to the + Executive and Legislative Councils by the Argentine Government. In + reply, the Secretary reminded Pym + that the rest of the paragraph contained what London had asked for. The + Secretary and Pym agreed to alter + the text to add a colon after “. . . enlarged to include: . . .”.

+

Pym speculated whether or not the + Interim Authority could be substituted for the Argentine government as + the appointing authority; “it would help us optically.” Sir Nicholas Henderson asked what the + UK was getting in return for the + major concession of allowing the Argentine government appointed + representatives on the Executive and Legislative Councils.

+ +

The Secretary replied that it served no purpose for the British to say + that there could be no Argentine representation. It was an Argentine + decision to say whether “its representation on the councils would come + from the mainland or from the Islands.”

+

The Secretary said that our redraft addressed the concerns which + Pym had expressed at the + morning meeting. There was no longer reference to personal compensation; + the referring of Interim Authority recommendations to the councils had + been added, and the word “equal” had been suppressed from paragraph 7.2. + But, Pym objected, the word + “equal” remained in paragraph 7.1.

+

Bullard suggested that rather than + the word “equal” it might be better to use “equitable”. The Secretary + said the Argentines wanted their co-nationals to have an “equal shot” on + the Island. But, objected Sinclair, paragraph 7.1 was not restricted to the + inhabitants of the Islands. The Secretary then asked if the phrase “on a + non-discriminatory basis” would help. Henderson and Pym + both agreed that this phrase was better. Gudgeon observed that it was a principle that was being + talked about here; it did not obligate HMG to any specific measures. The Secretary said that the + British had accepted a similar principle in their 1971 agreement with + Argentina but had failed to carry it out. That was why the word + “facilitate” was important to the Argentines. He went on to observe that + the British have two safety valves: they would dominate the councils, + and HMG would have to approve anything + which was “operational”. Gompert + added that the text left intact already existing discriminatory + regulations.

+

Pym asked what does the phrase + “equal basis” really mean? Gompert replied that it meant non-discriminatory. The + Secretary agreed that the text proposed opening up the Islands, but + HMG would control how the process + was carried out. Fall observed + that the use of the phrase “on an equitable basis” would really help. + But the Secretary said that its use would raise “paranoia” in Buenos + Aires. Bullard asked if “equal + basis” had to remain in the first sentence. The Secretary replied that + it did, because it stated a goal.

+

Paragraph 8: The Secretary began the discussion by + observing that this paragraph contained the language which had been the + hardest to negotiate in Buenos Aires. In this version, we had taken out + the word “territorial”. We had eliminated references to specific UN resolutions and the resulting language + was very close to the original London version.

+

Pym observed that this paragraph + was now much more neutral, even so it was bound to cause problems in + London. The Secretary observed that to stand any chance of + acceptability, the language must be ambiguous. Pym asked if reference could be made to + the “rights” of the inhabitants.

+ +

The Secretary emphasized that the previous “tilt” in the paragraph toward + Buenos Aires had been eliminated; the language is now neutral. For this + reason, he would like to make it as close to the Argentine language as + he could. He doubted that the text as it presently stood would secure + Argentine agreement.

+

Paragraph 9: + Pym opened by observing that 9.1 + was helpful, 9.2 “a lot of trouble,” as was 9.3.

+

Pym asked what purpose 9.5 served. + Gudgeon responded that the + Argentines opposed 9.1 and the inclusion of 9.5 was an attempt to + balance it: 9.5 was necessary to sell 9.1 to Argentina.

+

Both Pym and Fall objected to the proposal to + compensate the Islanders who wished to leave. Fall said “it sounds like our color + problem solution—you pay them to leave the UK”. Such an approach he said would trigger emotional + hostility in the UK. The Secretary + suggested that we should consider dropping all of paragraph 9.

+

Bullard asked about the six-month + time frame. The Secretary responded that it was designed to resolve a + situation in which there was no UK/Argentina agreement by December 31, + it also showed Galtieri that + there would be some movement in conjunction with negotiation.

+

The Secretary reminded the UK side that + the original Argentine sovereignty and administration would be + reestablished on the Falklands if no agreement was negotiated by + December 31, 1982.

+

Brian Fall observed that we were + contemplating a highly activist interim authority. The Secretary agreed, + observing that “it would not be a bad thing”.

+

Reverting to paragraph 9, Pym + asked if it would help to change the first sentence to read “. . . after + consultations with the Councils, the Authority shall make specific + proposals . . .”.

+

With respect to paragraph 9.2, Gudgeon suggested adding a “;” after the word + “Islanders”. Ure supported this + suggestion. After further discussions, the Secretary agreed to eliminate + 9.2 and add the phrase “. . . including possible arrangements for + compensating the Islanders . . .” to 9.4 after “. . . may request. . + .”.

+

At this point the Secretary asked if he could raise an altogether + different issue with the Foreign Secretary. He said that Argentina was a + participant in the NASA + LANDSAT program. Argentina was + requesting data on South Georgia Island to be gathered over the weekend, + in full accordance with their contract with NASA. The Secretary said that the data produced would be + “without discrimination—so you can’t pick up ships on it”. Argentina + was, he said, entitled to the data under its contract. If Argentina were + turned down, Buenos Aires would take this as a major US signal at a particularly delicate time + in our negotiations.

+ +

Derek Thomas said that while + NASA may believe that the data had + no military value, clearly the Argentines thought that it did—otherwise + they would not have requested it. Bullard asked if action on the Argentines had provided + NASA with sufficient advance + notice. Eagleburger said that + NASA would normally honor the + Argentine request, even though it was on very short notice. Pym asked if he could respond to the + Secretary after a twenty five-minute break. At that point, the two sides + separated, to reconvene at 4:00 PM.

+

When the two sides met again, Pym + said that he recognized that response to the Argentine NASA request was purely a US decision, but he said “I hope that it + does not happen.”

+

The Secretary said that he understood Pym’s response, but had to point out that he would have + to take his decision within the context of what we were trying to do + both in London and Buenos Aires. He did not see how providing the data + would confer any military advantage on the Argentines.

+

At that point, Pym said that he + would like to make a few general observations about the Falklands + framework proposal and then meet again with the Secretary at 7:00 PM. + The Secretary agreed.See Document 166.

+

PYM’S SUMMING + UP: + Pym made the following + points:

+

A. HMG appreciated the Secretary’s + efforts to meet London’s requirements.

+

B. The text under consideration this afternoon was considerably improved + over the text transmitted by the Secretary from Buenos Aires.

+

C. But this text was considerably closer to the Buenos Aires text than + the one the Secretary had taken away from London during his first + negotiating round.

+

D. The current text had the following results:

+

1. It would provide Argentina with a political foothold on the Falklands + and a political voice.

+

2. It established much stronger Argentine economic and commercial + influence over the Islands.

+

3. It ended the status under which the Islands had been living before + Argentine aggression.

+

Therefore, it rewarded Argentine aggression.

+

Pym said that he well understood + the improvements which Haig had + extracted from the Argentines. “But it will be difficult for us in + London. I will take it to London.”

+ +

The Foreign Secretary said that he also wished to put down one or two + more thoughts on paper which he would give to the Secretary at their + 7:00 PM meeting.

+

Secretary Haig observed that he + doubted the text which they were considering had much of a chance of + acceptability. Hence, he was particularly concerned that it bear the + test of public scrutiny: “We must show we went the extra mile. However,” + the Secretary observed, “if the text should be acceptable, I do not + believe we will be subject to undue criticism.”

+
+ +
+ 166. Memorandum of ConversationSource: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, + Files of Alexander M. Haig, + Jr., 1981–1982, Lot 82D370, No folder. Secret; + Sensitive. Drafted by Smith. + The meeting took place in the Secretary’s Conference Room at the + Department of State. + + + Washington, April 23, 1982, 7–7:45 + p.m. + + + SUBJECT + Falkland Islands FrameworkIn the + space next to the subject line, Goldberg added: “—Haig/Pym + meeting w/staff.” + + + PARTICIPANTS + + United States + The Secretary + Lt General Vernon + Walters + Deputy Assistant Secretary Stephen W. Bosworth + Deputy Assistant Secretary Robert L. Funseth + Deputy to the Under Secretary for Political Affairs + David + Gompert + L/ARA—Scott Gudgeon + EUR/NE—Keith C. Smith + (Notetaker) + + + United Kingdom + Foreign Secretary Francis + Pym + Deputy to the Permanent Under Secretary, Julian Bullard + Ambassador Sir Nicholas + Henderson + Ian Sinclair, Legal + Adviser + John Ure, FCO + Brian Fall, Private + Secretary to the Foreign Secretary + Francis Richards, + Assistant Private Secretary to the Foreign Secretary + Nicholas Fenn, + FCO News + Department + Stephen Wall, + UK Embassy + Christopher Crabbe, UK + Embassy + + + +

Foreign Secretary Pym opened the + meeting by stating that he saw serious difficulties with the draft given + to him by the American side.Presumably the + draft discussed at the afternoon meeting. See Document 165. He remarked that Mrs. Thatcher would not accept the + appointment of two Argentines to the Falkland’s interim administration. + The Secretary replied that the language represented our best assessment + of what is necessary to achieve an agreement, and that it was his desire + that we all be in a position, so that no one can question whether we + went the last mile in our quest for peace. The Secretary observed that + the draft contained a commitment to reestablish local British authority + in the islands; that we were not trying to leave the aggressor in place. + Everyone can argue that fact credibly. He pointed out that some cosmetic + changes had been made for the sake of peace and to secure the withdrawal + of Argentine forces. The Secretary remarked that although there was a + 99% chance that the draft would not be accepted by the Argentine + authorities, we need to convince everyone in Washington and in London + that the failure to reach agreement lies elsewhere.

+

Pym repeated that the Prime + Minister would have great difficulty getting support in Parliament for + the draft, and he thought that even her most ardent supporters in the + Conservative Party would not support it. The Secretary replied that it + was not up to the US to decide whether + Britain could accept it, but history must reflect that he had been in + contact with both sides and that he had not been excessively supportive + of either side. He asked the UK to + endorse the proposal as a package.

+

Pym stated that Mrs. Thatcher would ask whether the + President endorses the US draft, and she + would say that, “He told me already that I have come as far as I could + go in accommodating the Argentines.” The Secretary said that he had + talked to the President about the proposal, although they had not gone + through the text. The Secretary added that he wanted to be able to say + that the US supported its British + friends; that we are together, and if the Argentines do not accept this + package, the consequences are on their head.

+

Ambassador Henderson then asked + whether the Foreign Secretary would send back immediately an analysis of + the US text. Pym indicated that he would. The Secretary stated that + he hoped the British would then be in a position to say that the text is + acceptable to the Argentines. Pym + asked whether the Secretary would be stating that he was putting the + draft to both sides. The Secretary replied that he hoped to present it + on SundayApril 25. to Costa Mendez, and that he would tell + the Minister it is a fair proposition and it is all the US can do. Pym then asked whether it was the Secretary’s intention + to give the Argentines a time limit to respond—something like 48 hours (Tuesday + afternoon).April 27. The + Secretary indicated that this could be done. Brian Fall remarked that the Argentines might want to + leak the text to OAS members, such as + the Venezuelans. The Secretary agreed that it could happen, but that + there might not be any benefit to Buenos Aires in doing so.

+

Pym said the other sticking point + was that of security assurances, and he wanted to give the Secretary a + paper with some British ideas on the subject.Not found. He added that US acceptance would help him with the Prime + Minister who is quite concerned about the security aspects of any + agreement. The Secretary said at first glance, the British text appeared + to have possibilities, but he would have to consider carefully whether + he would be exceeding the authority delegated to him by the President if + he agreed to it. He promised to have the lawyers look the text over and + flash a US response back to London. In + an aside, the Secretary said that the US + also has a detailed paper to give the British on voting rights and other + technical aspects.Not found.

+

Pym asked the Secretary for his + views on dealing with the press after the meeting, adding that he would + not want anything described as “the Haig plan.” The Secretary agreed and said that he would + prefer to describe the latest draft as a composite of views emanating + from his discussions in London and in Buenos Aires, along with his + interpretation of those views. Pym remarked that for now, we would say that the draft + is the current state of the Secretary’s ideas and those of the British. + The Secretary then asked Mr. Gompert to get for Pym a draft statement that the President would use in + addressing the Falkland crisis.No draft + statement has been found. The Secretary also said that he + would give the British a copy of the protocol drafted by the US side.Reference is to a draft protocol on the special interim authority. + No copy has been found in Department of State or White House + files. He remarked that, although we have received no + substantive comments on the protocol from the Argentine side, we are + very interested in securing HMG’s views + on the paper. Mr. Gudgeon said + we would have a new draft of the protocol by early next week and would + send it immediately to London.

+

Pym then asked whether President + Reagan would say anything at + this point about the US sending a draft + agreement to London. The Secretary answered that we would have to go to + the press formally at some point, but the timing would depend on whether + or not it would put helpful pressure on the Argentine Government. He + said that he did not, however, want to put the press onto President + Galtieri at this time. The Secretary then remarked that + we would have to say that we believe the draft to be just and fair. + Pym then asked what would + happen if the Argentines accepted after considering it for two days. The + Secretary responded that he didn’t believe it had a prayer of a chance + with Buenos Aires. Henderson + then remarked that it was possible the Argentines would simply come back + with a great many amendments, and asked whether the Secretary would + still go to Buenos Aires. The Secretary said he would not go unless he + could carry something favorable enough to submit to the Prime Minister. + He remarked that it appeared as if the US had subtly shifted from mediation to arbitration. He + then added that knowing the Argentines, he was sure they would ask for + more time since desperate men will resort to any tactic.

+

At that point, Pym said that + although the Secretary had tried very hard, the Prime Minister would + certainly have great problems with the US draft. Nevertheless, he would face that problem + tomorrow. The Secretary said although there is no reaction [reason?] to raise expectations, the British have + been managing brilliantly this nightmarish situation. Pym then produced a copy of a note + which HMG had asked the Swiss Embassy + to convey to the Argentine Government, concerning additional measures in + the exclusion zone. He said his government was still considering whether + or not to go public with the new measures. The Secretary answered that + from his reading of the note he did not see any inconsistency with the + British force posture; that if the Argentines don’t know now where they + are headed, it won’t be for lack of an explanation.

+

The Foreign Secretary ended by stating that he wanted to thank the + Secretary for all of his time and effort and to say the same for the + Secretary’s staff. The Secretary answered by stating, “We are with you. + God bless you all.”

+
+ +
+ + 167. Memorandum From Dennis C. + Blair, Roger W. + Fontaine, and James M. + Rentschler of the National Security Council Staff to the + President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Clark)Source: Reagan Library, Dennis Blair Files, Country File, Falklands (April + 1982). Secret. Sent for information. A stamped notation in the top + right-hand corner of the memorandum indicates that Clark saw it. Clark circled the stamped notation + and the typewritten date on the memorandum, drew a line between the + circles, and wrote: “Timely, timely—.” + + + Washington, April 23, + 1982 + + + SUBJECT + Falklands + +

Here is the view of your NSC “Falklands + Task Force” on the likely course of future events, the questions that + will face the President next week, and the objectives our policy should + pursue.

+

Assumptions

+

—That Pym’s counteroffer to the + Argentines will not be acceptable to them, and the present phase of U.S. + honest-broker efforts will therefore end by the middle of next week;

+

—That the U.K. task force will blockade the Falklands at the end of next + week, and probably also reoccupy the South Georgias, causing casualties + on both sides;

+

—Alternatively, that the U.K. fleet may try to deal a quick and + significant “bloody nose” to the Argentines, withdraw the fleet (with + intention of returning when seasons change), and in meantime intensify + economic measures;

+

—That Argentina will bring the issue to the OAS next week, seeking the invocation of the Rio treaty + against the U.K.

+

—That a longer-term period of military inconclusiveness will ensue.

+

U.S. Policy Decisions Next Week

+

—Whether Haig (or some other + high-level U.S. officer) should return to B.A. next week bearing an + ultimatum (accept U.K. compromise language or bear onus for breakoff of + negotiations, with U.S. ending “evenhandedness”);

+

—Whether or not we join the British-initiated, EC-supported economic sanctions against Argentina (we + believe we should);

+ +

—Whether and to what extent we advance other overt support to U.K. + (logistical, supply, intelligence, diplomatic, etc.);

+

—The public stance we take (we believe we need to come down clearly on + the U.K. side, on the basis of U.N. resolution 502, but more in sorrow + than in anger);

+

—How we vote in the OAS (this would + depend to a certain extent on how the votes were lining up, but we + should probably vote against the resolution).

+

U.S. Policy Initiatives to Start Next Week

+

—In the event that we are out of the mediation business, we should push + others forward—Brazil seems the best candidate, or perhaps some larger + combination of Latin American countries;

+

—We need to work hard on other Latin American countries supporting + Argentina to try to hold onto our common interests in other areas, + particularly Central America.

+

We would welcome a chance to discuss this business further with you, + perhaps on the heels of Pym’s + visit (particularly if he meets with the President).

+
+ +
+ + 168. Action Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for + Inter-American Affairs (Enders) + and the Permanent Representative to the Organization of American States + (Middendorf) to Secretary of + State HaigSource: Department of State, Central + Foreign Policy File, P900009–0736. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Briggs and Johnson; cleared by Thompson. Copies were sent for + information to ARA/PPC and + ARA/RPP. A stamped notation + at the top of the memorandum indicates that Haig saw it. + + + Washington, April 23, + 1982 + + + SUBJECT + Falkland Islands: Preparing for the Rio Treaty + MFM + +

ISSUE FOR DECISION

+

In advance of the Organ of Consultation (MFM) meeting called by Argentina for Monday, April 26,On a separate action memorandum, sent by + Enders to Haig on April 23, Haig approved a recommendation + made by ARA and USOAS designating Middendorf to act as U.S. Special + Delegate to the OAS Meeting of + Foreign Ministers (MFM). “If you + are associated with such a debacle,” Enders wrote to Haig on the latter’s need to decline attendance at + the MFM, “it could damage your + ability (in British eyes) to carry on your mediation efforts.” + (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, P820080–0707) + Ultimately, Haig attended + the MFM on April 26. + we should try to ensure that the Latin American + governments, particularly Argentina,On April 23, Middendorf telephoned Quijano and “stressed” his “hope that he would agree + with me [Middendorf] that + nothing should occur” in the MFM + “which would impair Secretary Haig’s peace efforts.” In response, Quijano “said he fully agreed and + that he was heartened by the progress in the talks to date.” + (Memorandum of Telephone Conversation, April 23; Department of + State, Central Foreign Policy File, P820080–0712) + know what our position is with respect to the MFM.

+

ESSENTIAL FACTORS

+

The Argentines have succeeded in convening the Organ of Consultation + under the Rio Treaty to, in the language of the OAS resolution, “consider the grave situation that has + arisen in the South Atlantic.”See footnote 2, Document 158. The + twenty-one Foreign Ministers, or their accredited representatives, are + to begin deliberations Monday, April 26, unless hostilities prompt the + GOA to ask for an earlier meeting. + Once the Organ begins, we expect the GOA, at a minimum, to attempt to gain + approval for a resolution which would:

+

—Recognize Argentina’s sovereignty over the + Falklands;

+

—Call on both parties to use only peaceful means + to resolve their dispute, and refrain from the threat + or use of force (possibly tied to a “truce” period as earlier + proposed by Peru);

+ +

—Call on all States (i.e., the EC and NATO) to refrain from any action + supportive of the U.K.

+

—Call on the U.K. to remove their fleet from the + Rio Treaty area, recognize Argentine sovereignty, and cease threatening + Argentina; and/or

+

—Call on extra-Hemispheric states and + organizations (i.e., the EC) to cease + economic coercion against Argentina.

+

The LA’s would probably be able to support any or all + of these except the last, where several might fall off, but not + enough to block passage.

+

If hostilities have occurred, Argentina would doubtless + call for sanctions, such as breaking diplomatic and economic + relations, and for collective security measures. In this case, it would be a close vote.In a telephone conversation concerning the MFM, April 22, Middendorf “urged” Thomas “to press hard for major + British efforts with the Latin states where the U.K. has some + leverage.” Middendorf added + that the United States “would continue to work for a moderate + outcome and no censure from the OAS + but that if hostilities break out the going will get considerably + tougher.” Thomas responded + that his government “has worked hard behind the scenes with Mexico, + Venezuela, Costa Rica, Chile, and Honduras,” but “emphasized that + his government was not foreclosing the military option as a device + to bring the Argentines to the conference table more quickly.” + (Memorandum of April 22 Telephone Conversation, April 23; Department + of State, Central Foreign Policy File, P820080–0710) Besides + the U.S., seven others would have to oppose or abstain to kill the + resolution: Mexico, Panama, Colombia, Chile, Trinidad, Brazil, and Haiti + might oppose for a variety of reasons, + including in the case of Mexico and Panama, a clear preference for + UN primacy.

+

We are under no illusions that chances are very good for shaping an + outcome that could be supportive, potentially helpful or at least not + detrimental, to our peace effort. It seems unlikely + the MFM would be willing simply to + reaffirm support for the peace effort, along the lines of last + week’s OAS resolution.Reference is presumably to OAS Resolution 359 adopted on April 13. See footnote 2, Document 113.

+

A paper outlining in greater detail strategy options for the MFM will be in your hands later + today.See Document + 172.

+

In the meantime, to prepare for Monday’s Organ of Consultation, we + believe groundwork should be laid now with the + Rio Treaty signatories. A cable starting the process is attached.Attached but not printed is a draft telegram + providing a list of talking points to the Chiefs of Mission in + OAS member countries and + instructing them to consult with officials “at highest appropriate + Foreign Ministry levels” to “ensure that the results of Monday’s + Organ of Consultation support the peace process and not degenerate + into either a censuring of the UK + which we would have to resist or, even worse, a search for punitive + sanctions against the UK which we + would have to oppose.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy + File, P900009–0739)

+ +

Recommendation

+

That you approve the cable attached.Haig initialed his + approval on April 24. The telegram was transmitted as telegram + 111197 to all American Republic diplomatic posts, April 24. + (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, + D840780–0318)

+
+ +
+ 169. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the + United KingdomSource: Reagan + Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC + Country File, Europe and Soviet Union, United Kingdom + (04/01/1982–07/31/1982) (4). Secret; Niact Immediate; Nodis. + + + Washington, April 24, 1982, 0428Z + +

110698. Subject: Falkland Islands Crisis—Message to the Prime + Minister.

+

1. Secret–Entire text.

+

2. Please deliver the following message to the PM from Secretary Haig at opening of business, Saturday, April 24.

+

3. Begin text:

+

Dear Madame Prime Minister:

+

—Francis Pym and I have just + concluded our discussions,See Documents 163, 164, 165, and 166. Haig also dispatched a brief message to Costa Méndez summarizing the + discussions with Pym, noting + “we have made a serious effort and have done our best to make + progress.” (Telegram 111147 to Buenos Aires, April 24; Reagan + Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC + Cable File, Falkland File 04/24/1982) which were + characterized throughout by the clear sense of common interests that we + have had since the very outset of this crisis. He will be bringing back + to London a text which I put forward as a basis for a peaceful + settlement.See footnote 2, Document 170. Francis made it very + clear that some of what I suggested presented problems, and that he + could not make any promises on whether you could accept the text as + presented.

+

—As you know, we have been guided all along by the same aims and + principles as you, both because the United Kingdom is our closest friend + and because we have a common view of what is at stake.

+ +

—What follows are our views on the text Francis is carrying. I by no + means intend to preempt his report to you but simply want you to know + how we in Washington see it.

+

—The text I have asked Francis to bring to London is, I believe, + sensitive to your need to be faithful to your pledge to Parliament. + Moreover, if it were accepted by both parties, it would most certainly + not leave the aggressor in occupation.

+

—The text provides all the safeguards needed to block, if need be, the + sort of Argentine saturation of the Islands that you, quite rightly, + consider unacceptable. It lays open the possibility of relinquishment of + British sovereignty at the end of negotiations, while neither + pre-judging this outcome nor setting aside the wishes of the Islanders. + It provides for substantial restoration of the previous + administration.

+

—Whether the text we have suggested would be accepted in Buenos Aires I + cannot say. It would certainly require the Argentines to move well + beyond their positions at the end of my latest visit there. I am sure, + however, that any text more unfavorable to the Argentines than what we + have suggested would stand no chance of acceptance. We are at the point + now where we have only the finest tolerance between a peaceful solution + and tragedy.

+

—We have known all along that at some point the United States would need + to offer a view on the substance of an agreement. Consistent with our + common aims, as well as our assessment of what is required to avert + further hostilities, we believe that an agreement based on the text we + have offered would be fair, just, and responsible. We are prepared to + send it to the Argentines as a US + proposal, to press them to accept it, and to defend it in public come + what may. Indeed, we would tell them that there is no possibility of + further movement on the UK side and + absolutely no inclination on the part of the US to seek further movement. The choice would then be + theirs.

+

—Clearly our actions must be able to withstand public scrutiny. This + means that positions we take can be defended as fair and just. In our + view, this text meets that test. But we must also be able to show that + we went as far as we humanly could, without abandoning our principles or + historic responsibilities, in order to avoid loss of life. If we can + show this, and also that our two countries held a common position, we + will have done all that could be asked of us.

+

—I am sure you will want to give the text careful study. I would like to + be in a position to present it to the Argentine Foreign Minister on + Sunday morning.April 25.

+ +

—We would simultaneously present it formally to the UK, telling you, as we would the + Argentines, that we consider this a fair proposal that we think both + sides should be able to accept.

+

—Therefore, we would be grateful for a reaction from you by Saturday + evening.See Document 173.

+

—This crisis, and the way we have worked together during it, have made + even clearer to me the great strength of our friendship and the identity + of our values.

+

With warm regards,

+

Al Haig. End text.

+ + Haig + +
+ +
+ 170. Memorandum From Secretary of State Haig to President ReaganSource: + Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Latin America/Central, Argentina + (04/24/1982–04/26/1982). Secret. There is no indication that + Reagan saw the + memorandum. + + + Washington, April 24, + 1982 + + + SUBJECT + Call from PM + Thatcher on the Falklands + Crisis + +

As I told you, Francis Pym is + carrying back to London a text that represents our best judgment of what + is fair and just yet stands at least some chance, albeit slight, of + acceptance by the Argentines.The draft text + is attached but not printed. Mrs. Thatcher will probably call you about + it.On another copy of this memorandum, + Goldberg underlined this + sentence and wrote under it: “No such call rec’d.” (Library of + Congress, Manuscript Division, Haig Papers, Department of State, Day File, April + 24, 1982 Falklands)

+

The text (at Tab A) goes quite far toward meeting UK objections to the text we brought back from Buenos + Aires. However, Pym warned me + that the Prime Minister would have great difficulty with one particular element: the provision (as + marked in paragraph 6.1) that the Argentine Government would appoint two + representatives to the Executive Council, the senior body involved in + local administration of the Falklands before the crisis.

+

The British have a problem with any residual + Argentine official presence on the Islands after withdrawal. They have + proposed instead that Argentine representatives be selected by the + US-UK-Argentine Special Interim Authority.

+

I believe we must stick with the provision as drafted for several + reasons:

+

—Without this there is absolutely no chance of agreement, especially + since we have, for the benefit of the UK, eliminated other provisions that the Argentines told us + were critical. In particular, we have removed the bias in favor of + Argentine sovereignty from paragraph 8, which establishes guidelines for + negotiations on a final settlement.

+

—The presence of two Argentine appointees does not alter the fact that + British authority would be substantially restored, thus meeting Mrs. + Thatcher’s pledge to + Parliament. Indeed, the two Argentines would be clearly out-numbered by + British and local appointees in the Executive Council.

+

—It cannot reasonably be argued that two Argentines represent a reward + for aggression. In fact, in her letter to you of April 16,See Document 132. + Mrs. Thatcher said we must avoid + “a device that leaves the aggressor in occupation.” Two out-numbered + Argentines hardly constitutes occupation.

+

—Finally, the presence of two Argentine appointees can be defended in + terms of the unquestionable Argentine interest and stake in the Islands. + Indeed, giving them such representation could help relieve the total + frustration that led to the crisis in the first place.

+

Apart from this issue, it would be most useful if you could make clear to + Mrs. Thatcher that we now face + the last chance for a settlement before hostilities escalate, possibly + beyond control. She must be clear that you are prepared to advocate + acceptance of the current text with the Argentines, and on the public + record, but that you are not prepared to stand behind the text if she + makes changes that exclude altogether the possibility of Argentine + acceptance. You may want to draw on the talking points at Tab B.Attached but not printed.

+
+ +
+ + 171. Action Memorandum From the Director of the Bureau of + Politico-Military Affairs (Burt) + to Secretary of State HaigSource: Department of State, + Executive Secretariat, S/S Special + Handling Restrictions Memos 1979–1983, Lot 96D262, ES Sensitive April 24–26 1982. Secret; + Sensitive; Nodis. Drafted by + Haass. Haig initialed at the top + right-hand corner of the memorandum, indicating that he saw it. A + stamped notation also indicates that he saw the memorandum. Another + notation in an unknown hand in the top right-hand corner of the + memorandum reads: “Secretary called Weinberger Sunday afternoon 4/25/82.” The text of + the memorandum was underlined extensively with a highlighter + pen. + + + Washington, April 24, + 1982 + + + SUBJECT + UK-Argentine Confrontation: U.S. + Military Options + +

Issue for Decision

+

Whether to phone CapCaspar Weinberger. to + establish a joint State-Defense Working Group to oversee U.S. + contingency planning and military assistance for a Falklands + contingency.

+

Essential Factors

+

This memorandum briefly examines U.S. military options, including + increased logistics, materiel and equipment support, US force presence and posturing, and direct + participation in combat operations, on behalf of the U.K. It does so in + two phases: before or during the initial phase of major hostilities and + amidst hostilities that had been going on for a week or longer. It also + discusses other direct uses of U.S. military force, be it vis-a-vis the + Soviets or on behalf of civilians and military personnel on the + Falklands or in Argentina. Many of its assessments are rough, given the + lack of hard information available to us, and DOD’s unwillingness to provide relevant military data and + evaluations.

+

This memorandum reaches several important + conclusions, that:

+

—just before or during the initial phase of hostilities, we do not + anticipate extraordinary UK requests for + materiel or services much beyond the scale already received;

+

—given long lead times owing to distances and the lack of assured local + facilities, US options to inject naval, + air or ground forces into the area, whether in direct support of the + UK or otherwise, are severely + circumscribed;

+

—decisions must be taken soon, i.e., in the next few days, if the US is to have forces on the scene 2 or 3 + weeks hence, and that such decisions could have major impact on our diplomatic role and Soviet + behavior; and

+

—Soviet options to assist Argentina appear even more limited, although we + are continuing to explore possible actions on their part.See Document 184 and footnote 6 thereto.

+

Initial Phases:

+

The UK should not require anything + substantially more than we are already doing to accomplish most military + tasks short of a direct invasion of the Falklands (i.e., blockade, + suasion). However, to the extent an invasion appeared + to be imminent or had actually begun, we might expect considerable + requests for assistance. Although it is only speculative, + equipment items the UK might seek could + include (in addition to Stinger)See Document 111 and footnote 2 thereto. SUB-HARPOON, HARM missiles, special munitions + (including runway-cratering ordnance), ECM-related gear, and replacement aircraft and parts + (helicopters and Harriers). We + could also expect to receive UK requests + to make use of Ascension for launch and recovery of combat operations + and for enhanced operational intelligence. The latter could include [less than 1 line not declassified] and use of + long-range reconnaissance aircraft, both of which would be very + difficult to provide. Other possible requests might include specialized + fuel, foul weather gear, technical assistance in mine countermeasures, + ECM equipment, amphibious landing + craft and assault vehicles.

+

One factor which would affect our decision to meet any + such requests would be visibility. The maintenance of U.S. + credibility in Buenos Aires, and the U.S. potential to act as a + go-between, could depend in large part on our ability to maintain a + plausible public position that we were not going beyond our stated + pledge not to provide the UK any + extraordinary assistance. We should only be willing to compromise this + posture if we determine that the U.S. diplomatic role had come to an end + for the time being, or that there were more to gain overall by our + providing overt assistance to the UK.

+

Such considerations aside, establishing a special + channel to manage such support of the UK is essential. It would reduce the chance of + leaks, assist coordination, and provide us with plausible deniability + should it prove useful.

+

Amidst Battle: Three categories of UK requests for U.S. support can be + envisioned once a battle for the Falklands had been underway for more + than a few days:

+

—increased indirect support, i.e., equipment, + logistics, spare parts, e.g., replacement helicopters, Harriers, special ammunition, air + defense equipment, sonobuoys, + ECM Pods, special fuels, ground + sensors, and communications support.

+

—direct U.S. involvement in a support mode, i.e., + flying tankers, cargo planes and reconnaissance aircraft, salvage and + repair assistance, communications relay, combat engineers and seabees, + harbor clearance, and MCM + capability.

+

—direct U.S. involvement in a participatory mode, + i.e., fly ASW missions, provide tacair and/or naval gunfire support. + (The considerable constraints on direct US participation are discussed below.)

+

As combat continued, the UK, for military + and political reasons alike, could find itself facing mounting + difficulties and needing an acceptable resolution; i.e., either clearcut + victory, or some balance which could be the prelude to an acceptable + diplomatic solution. Possibilities for U.S. involvement at this juncture + would be two:

+

—large-scale combat/direct participation to introduce a decisive factor + into the battle, e.g., carrier task group or tactical bombing; or

+

—a U.S. intervention to provide E&E + for the inhabitants of the island, or to police some withdrawal of + either Argentine or UK forces, perhaps + to be replaced by U.S. forces in what could evolve into a peacekeeping + operation.

+

Two other forms of U.S. military involvement in a + Falklands crisis may be more likely. Although large-scale + E&E of U.S. citizens and + personnel in Argentina would not be a realistic proposition, the U.S. + could signal the GOA (whether in a + deterrent or responsive fashion) not to threaten or allow attacks on + U.S. citizens in country.[text not declassified] Earlier, on April 13, the + Department created a Contingency Planning Group for Argentina, in + order to review emergency action plans of the Embassy in Buenos + Aires and the Department as a whole. On April 23, Kennedy sent a briefing memorandum + to Haig, outlining steps + taken by the Embassy to develop evacuation plans. (Department of + State, Central Foreign Policy File, P850089–0752) Secondly, + the U.S. could deploy naval forces to the area to counter any actual or + threatened Soviet moves. To preserve this option, however, critical + decisions are needed soon on our part.

+

The Soviets have a number of “indirect” options + available: intelligence support, provision of easily absorbed + stores and supplies, advisors, MANPADS, and even a Soviet-manned air defense network. + Airlift could only provide limited quantities, and sea lift would + require some three weeks to arrive once underway. More directly, the + Soviets could introduce their own combat forces. However, no naval + combatant could be on the scene for some 2–3 weeks (and even then the + Soviet presence would be minimal), and Soviet submarine options are + either severely limited or non-existent over the course of the next few + weeks. (We are examining the + possibility as to whether Soviet long range aviation based on Angola + could provide more than reconnaissance support to the Argentines). Thus, + absent prolonged confrontation and a rapid Soviet + decision to dispatch combatants or supplies, Soviet involvement is likely to be limited to political and token + logistic/materiel support.

+

Any consideration of possible U.S. introduction of + force must include the operational realities. At the moment, + there are two CVBGs in the Caribbean + which, at best, could arrive in the vicinity of the Falklands in 2 or 3 + weeks. Winter weather and rough seas could affect dramatically the speed + of advance and the level of operational capability. This introduction of + US forces into the immediate area + would pose a dilemma, however. Although carrier task forces offer our + best if not only means of providing a sustained, capable military + presence in the region, their dispatch would provide both Argentina and + the Soviets with considerable warning. Deployment of land based air lift + and tacair would require overt + political and logistic support from a number of Hemispheric states + particularly Chile. Again, though, we would have to begin preparing now + to give us this option down the road.

+

Yet absent any US decision to dispatch + forces soon—indeed, possibly even with one—a + confrontation would probably evolve long past its critical phase + before U.S. military forces arrived on scene. In any case, decisions + are needed within several days if we are to possess viable military + options in several weeks time.

+

Any U.S. military involvement which included sending U.S. Armed Forces + into imminent or actual hostilities, or the sending of U.S. Armed Forces + equipped for combat into the area, would be likely to trigger the War Powers Resolution,The War Powers Resolution of 1973 (50 U.S.C. + 1541–1548) revised the parameters under which a President could + commit the United States to a military conflict. requiring + both consultation with and reporting to Congress. Although there would + be some opposition, we believe Congress would in large part support such + involvement by the U.S. However, resistance would increase parallel to + the degree of U.S. involvement, remembering again that significant U.S. + capability to introduce forces is at least two weeks away, and that the + UK has most likely prepared its + plans assuming a largely unilateral, self-sufficient engagement.

+

For the present, however, our considerations are more narrow. We need to + focus on the following:

+

—the degree and visibility of support we extend to the UK

+

—the mechanism by which any such support is managed

+

—decisions/plans regarding any prospective dispatch and use of US forces

+ +

—further assessment of likely Soviet behavior

+

—improving US preparations for managing + the crisis

+

RECOMMENDATION:

+

Given all that is at stake, the need is manifest for coordinated + preparations on our part so that we can respond quickly to any UK request or contingency. You should call + Cap and suggest that State and Defense establish an ad hoc group to + oversee U.S. military assistance to the UK and U.S. contingency planning for the crisis.Haig did + not approve or disapprove the recommendation; however, the notation + on the first page of the memorandum indicates that he called + Weinberger (see footnote 1 above). No record of + Haig’s telephone + conversation with Weinberger + has been found. Informal meetings on the South Atlantic situation + between representatives of the Departments of State and Defense took + place following Haig’s + conversation with Weinberger. See Document + 184.

+
+ +
+ 172. Action Memorandum From the Acting Assistant Secretary of State + for Inter-American Affairs (Bosworth) to Secretary of State HaigSource: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy + File, P880050–2070. Confidential; Nodis. Drafted by Bosworth; cleared by Michel. A stamped notation in the top right-hand + corner of the memorandum indicates that Haig saw it. + + + Washington, April 24, + 1982 + + + SUBJECT + Falklands Dispute: US Strategy for + the Monday, April 26, Foreign Ministers Meeting + +

Our options are (1) to seek + actively to block any resolution or (2) to stand back. The chances of blocking a + resolution which is at least to some extent prejudicial to the + UK are near zero. The only + exception: if Argentine demands are disproportionate to situation that + exists on Monday (e.g., no hostilities and GOA demands sanctions). In that case, we could probably get + a blocking eight and should work for it.

+

Otherwise, assuming the diplomatic effort is still + alive, we should work behind the scenes + to try to temper any resolution as much as + possible, while not inviting any expectation that we would vote for it + unless it were completely + balanced and non-prejudicial. We would take the same + public line we have taken previously, i.e., that we believe Rio Treaty framework is inappropriate and, in + any case, no action should be taken which would + complicate or prejudice on-going efforts to achieve a + diplomatic solution within the framework of UNSC Res. 502.

+

If our current strategy has progressed to the + point at which the GOA has rejected a “US + proposal” and seeks Rio Treaty sanctions, we should be prepared + to go public with our conclusions:

+

—that the proposal was fair and balanced (discussing the key points of + substance);

+

—that we support decolonialization but not recolonialization;

+

—that a diplomatic solution remains urgent; and

+

—since sanctions are legally invalid, we oppose the Argentine + resolution.

+

RECOMMENDATION:

+

That you approve the approach outlined above.Haig initialed his + approval of the recommendation on April 26.

+
+ +
+ 173. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the + United KingdomSource: Reagan + Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC + Country File, Latin America/Central, Argentina + (04/24/1982–04/26/1982). Secret; Niact Immediate; Nodis. Sent for information Immediate to the White + House. + + + Washington, April 25, 1982, 0612Z + +

111214. London for Charge Eyes Only. Subject: Falkland Islands Dispute: + Letter to PM + Thatcher. Ref: State + 110698.See Document + 169.

+

1. Secret, entire text.

+

2. The British response to our request as discussed reftel was provided by the British + EmbassyNo copy of Thatcher’s message as provided by + the British Embassy on April 24 has been found. However, the + Thatcher Foundation has + published online a copy of the text as cabled to Washington. + as follows:

+ +

Message to the Hon Alexander M + Haig Jr from Prime Minister, the Right Hon Margaret Thatcher + MP on 24 April 1982.

+

“Dear Al,

+

Thank you for your message giving your comments on your long discussions + with Francis Pym. My colleagues + most closely concerned and I have now had a full report from him. We + remain most grateful to you for your continuing efforts.

+

You asked me to send you a reaction this evening. This whole business + started with an Argentine aggression.

+

Since then our purpose together has been to ensure the early withdrawal + by the Argentines in accordance with the Security Council resolution. We + think therefore that the next step should be for you to put your latest + ideas to them. I hope that you will seek the Argentine Government’s view + of them tomorrow and establish urgently whether they can accept them. + Knowledge of their attitude will be important to the British Cabinet’s + consideration of your ideas.

+

With warm personal regards,

+

Yours ever

+

Margaret + Thatcher”

+

3. Our response to the British Embassy is as follows:

+

Dear Prime Minister:

+

I have just received your message, and am grateful for your quick + response.

+

In light of your reply I shall, tomorrow, present my ideas to Foreign + Minister Costa MendezSee footnote 2, Document + 178. in precisely the form given to Francis. I will + tell the Foreign Minister that HMG has + received the same ideas and is now considering them, but that I do not + know whether they will prove acceptable to the British Cabinet. I will + add that from the U.S. point of view what we have presented to both + parties is a delicately balanced and reasonable proposal which we see no + reason further to amend.

+

We will then await the Argentine reply; as soon as it is received I will + be in touch with Francis.

+

Depending on the Argentine reply and the ultimate decision of HMG on the ideas I have presented, we here + in Washington will then examine what appropriate next steps we might + take.

+

Once again, I very much appreciate your prompt reaction. Let us all hope + that the Argentine Government will react positively to this final effort + to avoid bloodshed.

+ +

With warm regards, sincerely, Alexander + Haig.

+

4. To ensure HMG’s receipt of our + message precisely as we wish to have it read, we would appreciate your + providing it to the Foreign Office as early as possible Sunday morning, + your time.April 25.

+ + Haig + +
+ +
+ 174. Telegram From the Department of State to All Diplomatic and + Consular PostsSource: + Department of State Central Foreign Policy File, D820216–0107. + Confidential; Immediate. Drafted by M. Boorstein (FWG); cleared in S/S–O; and approved by Pendleton. Sent for information + Immediate to the Department of Defense, USSOUTHCOM, and USCINCEUR. + + + Washington, April 26, 1982, 0050Z + +

111227. Inform Consuls, ZFF Only Jerusalem, DepSec + Stoessel. Subject: Falkland + Islands Situation Report as of 1700 EST, April 25. No. 36 Todep + 20184.

+

1. (C–Entire text).

+

2. UK captures port on South Georgia, + damages Argentine sub. British forces were in control of the port of + Grytviken, following an attack on South Georgia Island, according to + UK’s Defense Minister John Nott. He indicated British forces + landed by helicopter, met little resistance and suffered no casualties + in the assault. Earlier, according to press reports, British forces, + claiming their “inherent right to self-defense under the UN Charter,” launched a helicopter attack + on an Argentine submarine, which was spotted on the surface in the + British-declared “zone” near South Georgia. Reports indicate the sub was + damaged but not sunk. There were unconfirmed reports of Argentine + casualties in the attack. In a later statement, the Ministry of Defense + added that, despite the military actions taken on South Georgia, the + UK remained committed to the + continuing and intensive search for a solution to the crisis by + negotiation based on UN Security Council + Resolution 502.

+ +

3. Argentine Foreign Minister in Washington. Argentine Foreign Minister + Costa Mendez arrived in + Washington at midday on April 25 to attend the April 26 special meeting + of OAS Foreign Ministers and to meet + with Secretary Haig. On arrival, + Costa Mendez characterized + the British attack on an Argentine sub as having “very grave + consequences for peace.” When asked if Argentina were at war with the + UK, he answered, “technically, + yes.”

+ + Haig + +
+ +
+ 175. Message From British Foreign Secretary Pym to Secretary of State HaigSource: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, + S/S Special Handling + Restrictions Memos 1979–1983, Lot 96D262, ES Sensitive April 24–26 1982. Secret. Henderson transmitted the message + to Haig under an April 26 + covering note. On the covering note, Bremer wrote: “received in S 10:15 a.m. 4/26/82.” + Below this note, Bremer + added: “The Secretary discussed the message by telephone with Mr. + Pym 4/26/82.” That same + day, Bremer forwarded both + the message and Henderson’s + covering note to Clark under + a covering memorandum in which he noted that Haig had spoken to Clark about Pym’s message that morning, adding: + “As he [Haig] noted, the + proposal has severe disadvantages in our analysis, which the + Secretary has already provided to Mr. Pym. Should the Prime Minister call the President + about the proposal, it is our recommendation that the President give + her no encouragement to pursue this proposal.” “In light of the + above,” Bremer concluded, + “the Secretary asks that even knowledge of this message be severely + restricted.” (Ibid.) No other records of Haig’s telephone conversations + with Pym or Clark have been + found. + + + London, April 26, + 1982 + +

1. Our repossession of South GeorgiaSee Document 174. The Argentine garrison on + South Georgia surrendered to British forces on April 26. has + radically changed the situation. In particular it enables us to deal + with the Falkland Islands in isolation. Equally it should bring home to + Argentina her interest in negotiating for a settlement, but time is + desperately short. Our task force is approaching the MEZ and the next stage of operations will + have to start very soon.

+

2. We may now be able to turn the OAS + meeting this afternoonSee Document 176. to our advantage. But + this requires a simpler approach. There is now no time to negotiate in + detail. What we have in mind is as follows. If the Argentinians withdraw + their forces from the Falkland Islands we will stop our task force and + turn it back once Argentinian withdrawal is completed, provided that from that time onwards + the United States will militarily guarantee the security of the Falkland + Islands. This would secure the withdrawal of Argentinian forces in + accordance with Security Council Resolution 502 and would secure the way + for immediate negotiations in a conference to resolve the dispute.

+

3. In the meantime the traditional Administration would be restored to + the Falkland Islands but for the time being we should be prepared not to + send back the Governor and to appoint an officer to administer the + Government ad interim. We should be ready, during that time, to have an + Argentinian Resident at Port Stanley to look after the interests of the + Argentinians living in the Falkland Islands. If this proposal commends + itself to you we need to decide how it should be launched. It would of + course need your own wholehearted agreement and backing. But it might be + advantageous to get someone else to take the initiative. We have had + some indication that President Lopez Portillo would like to be helpful; + thus perhaps the Mexicans can be invited to put the proposal with your + and our agreement to the meeting of the OAS later today. The Mexicans might even be prepared to + provide the venue for the conference.Pym sent a follow-up + message to Haig on April 26: + “I have now discussed with the Prime Minister what you told me about + the idea I put to you in my last message. We both accept that you + are the best judge of whether such a proposal will run. We therefore + accept that there is no chance of its acceptance at present. We are + therefore content that you should put the latest set of proposals + worked out in Washington to the Argentines on the basis suggested by + the Prime Minister in her message to you of 24 April.” (Message from + Pym to Haig, April 26; Department of + State, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, Miscellaneous + Files, March 1981–February 1983, Lot 83D210, Falklands [Folder + 1])

+
+ +
+ 176. Editorial Note +

The first session of the General Committee of the Twentieth Meeting of + Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the Rio Treaty (MFM) convened at the General Secretariat + of the Organization of American States in Washington on the afternoon of + April 26, 1982, to consider the appropriateness of the application of + the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (Rio Treaty) to the + current conflict between Argentina and the United Kingdom over the + Falklands/Malvinas. Secretary of State Alexander M. Haig, Jr. addressed the assembly, stating + that in the “current conflict, the surest guide to a peaceful settlement is to be found in + the United Nations Security Council Resolution 502,” noting that in + support of this resolution the United States had “offered its assistance + to both Britain and Argentina.” “President Reagan,” Haig + continued, “believes that the United States has perhaps a unique ability + to assist the parties. Under his direction, I have made myself available + to both, accepting their invitations to sound out their views and + suggesting avenues to approach a framework of peace.”

+

“It is quite clear,” Haig argued, + “that the crisis has reached a critical point. New military action has + taken place. Unless a settlement can be found in the next few days, more + intensive fighting is likely to occur. The conflict over the islands + affects us all. As we consider what we can do to help the situation, let + us recall these points.

+

“• There has been a use of force by an American state already followed by + a U.N. Security Council resolution which clearly sets forth the basis + for a peaceful settlement. While we should take advantage of the + peaceful settlement procedures available to us in this forum, it would + be neither appropriate nor effective to treat this dispute within the + collective security framework implied by the Rio Treaty.

+

“• Any resolution considered for adoption by the foreign ministers should + be examined against the criteria of whether it contributes to the peace + process, whether it impairs the peace efforts already endorsed by the + Organization of American States and whether it strengthens the ability + of this organization to contribute in the future to easing crises.

+

“Our participation in the inter-American system pledges us to strengthen + the peace and security of the hemisphere. In the search for a solution + that both parties can accept with honor and responsibility, the United + States remains at the disposition of the parties. At this critical hour, + we are redoubling out peace efforts. With your help, we may + succeed.”

+

The complete text of Haig’s + address is printed in the Department of State Bulletin, June 1982, pages 85–86. Haig recalled in his memoirs that the speech was + “greeted by stony silence.” (Haig, Caveat, page 291) The + MFM adopted Resolution I at the + conclusion of its deliberations on April 28. See footnote 2, Document 185.

+
+ +
+ + 177. Action Memorandum From Robert E. + Service of the Department of State Falklands Working + Group to the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Eagleburger)Source: Department of State, Central + Foreign Policy File, P820071–1389. Secret. Drafted by S. O’Connell (FWG); cleared by Bosworth, Kanter, and J. Earl (L/ARA) and in substance by Holmes. Service initialed for the clearing + officials. A stamped notation at the top of the memorandum indicates + that Eagleburger saw it on + April 27. + + + Washington, April 26, + 1982 + + + SUBJECT + UK Request to NOAA for Additional Weather Satellite + Data + + + REFERENCE + My Memo of April 25, 1982Not + found. + +

UK Request

+

The British Meteorological Office has made two formal requests and one + telephone request for changes in the type of information they receive + from the polar-orbiting satellite. One of the requests clearly comes + under the bilateral agreement signed in 1974 between the Meteorological + Office, NASA and NOAA, and can be implemented quickly. + This is a request for satellite low altitude selection which would + permit them to see through the clouds and make some estimates of sea + state. The other two requests would require additional effort by NOAA, but still could be read as coming + under the agreement. One is for mathematical data to permit them to + properly analyze the satellite information. The third request is for all + the raw data from the satellite’s infrared sounding unit for the South + Atlantic area. Implementation of these requests could take 1–2 + man-months, unless given priority handling by NOAA. The British have not asked for expedited treatment, + but may when they find out how long some of the requests could take.

+

Bureau Positions

+

ARA, EUR and PM agree that we + should tell NOAA the Department has no + objection to fulfilling the UK’s + requests. The requests fall within the range of continuing cooperation + covered by international agreements.

+

EUR and PM would also like to ask NOAA to take whatever steps necessary to implement the + requests as soon as possible, on grounds that this is what the UK expects and requires.

+ +

ARA believes the Department should not + go beyond approval, leaving the timing and priority to be worked out + between NOAA and the British + Meteorological Office. A Department recommendation for priority handling + would be viewed by the GOA as going + beyond the formal requirements of existing agreements and the USG position as previously enunciated.

+

Recommendations

+

1. That we inform NOAA the Department + has no objection to its implementing these requests (supported by ARA, EUR + and PM).

+

2. That we go a step further and urge NOAA to meet the requests as quickly as possible (EUR and PM + support; ARA opposes).Eagleburger + initialed his approval of both recommendations on April + 27.

+
+ +
+ 178. Memorandum From Secretary of State Haig to President ReaganSource: + Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Latin America/Central, Falklands War + (04/22/1982–05/17/1982). Secret; Sensitive. There is no indication + that Reagan saw the + memorandum. A typewritten notation on another copy of the memorandum + indicates that a copy was sent by LDX to Clark at + 1820 hours and another copy to the NSC by special courier at 1838 hours, both on April 26. + (Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S Special Handling Restrictions Memos 1979–1983, Lot + 96D262, ES Sensitive April 24–26 + 1982) + + + Washington, April 26, + 1982 + + + SUBJECT + Falklands Crisis—Proposed Call to General Galtieri + +

While we cannot be sure, the only safe assumption at this stage is that + the British will attack the Falklands as soon as their forces are + positioned to do so. If they choose to wait until they have all or most + of their Task Force on-scene, this could be a day or two away. If + instead they decide to bombard the airfield, in order to neutralize + Argentine air power before they bring in the bulk of the Task Force, the + action could begin within the next twelve hours.

+ +

I have proposed to Costa Mendez + that I come to Buenos Aires tonight.No + memorandum of conversation of this meeting, held following the + OAS + MFM on April 26, has been found. In + his memoirs, Haig wrote of + this meeting: “I met with Costa + Méndez, telling him that within forty-eight hours, + the British would almost certainly strike again, bombarding + airfields, launching commando raids. ‘We have no more time,’ I said. + ‘The American proposal is fair and reasonable. If necessary, we will + go public with it and let the world judge why these negotiations + have produced no result.’ In Costa + Méndez, I sensed a reluctance to forward the U.S. + proposal. He told me that there was a virulent anti-American and + anti-Haig atmosphere + building in the country and in the junta. I offered to return to + Buenos Aires and deliver the text to Galtieri and the junta myself. Although I did not + disclose the thought to Costa + Mendez, I believed that the British would not carry + out further attacks if the American Secretary of State was in + Argentina or en route. I asked that the junta inform me within + twenty-four hours whether they could receive me. Costa Mendez promised to pass on + the message.” (Haig, Caveat, p. 291) There is, however, a + serious chance that the junta will reject this, particularly coming via + Costa Mendez, whose + instructions are to avoid discussions. Only a call from you to Galtieri would give us a reasonable + chance of convincing the junta to receive me. I recommend you call + Galtieri. You may wish to + draw on the attached talking points.Attached but not printed.

+

My going to Buenos Aires may at least cause the British to refrain from + attacking the Falklands for another day or two. Whether we can achieve a + negotiating break-through is more problematical. Our proposal should now + look much more appealing to the Argentines, considering the + alternatives. However, this would require a higher level of rationality + than may prevail in Buenos Aires. The military hard-liners may now hold + the view that no agreement is possible until Argentine pride can be + avenged.

+

Nevertheless, we have no choice but to make this move. If we wait, the + British will adopt a more lop-sided negotiating position—of the sort + they floated, then retracted, this morning.See Document 175 and footnote 4 thereto. And, of + course, once the battle for the Falklands commences, there will be no + room for effective US diplomacy.According to the President’s Daily Diary, no + telephone call was placed by Reagan to Galtieri. (Reagan Library, President’s Daily + Diary)

+
+ +
+ + 179. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in + ArgentinaSource: Reagan + Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC + Cable File, Falkland File, 04/27/1982 (1). Secret; Sensitive; Flash; + Nodis. + + + Washington, April 27, 1982, 0037Z + +

112085. For the Ambassador from Enders. Subject: Falkland Islands.

+

1. C–Entire text.

+

2. Events are moving quickly here and we will have to take action tonight + to continue our effort to find a peaceful solution. The Secretary has + talked to Costa Mendez and + proposed that he travel to Buenos Aires immediately with the agreement + text, as it has been refined since we departed Argentina.See footnote 2, Document + 178. The President is prepared to call Galtieri if that is necessary.See footnote 5, + Document 178.

+

3. If Galtieri still refuses, we + will send you the text of the agreement as it now stands for delivery to + the GOA, asking for a response within + 24 hours.See footnote 4, Document 181. Haig recalled that “as the hours passed, no reply + came. On the telephone, Costa + Mendez said he was awaiting Galtieri’s decision. As the + deadline approached, we phoned the Argentine embassy and were told + that Costa Mendez was dining + with the ambassador and could not be disturbed. Finally, Costa Mendez informed me that his + government could not receive me in Buenos Aires at this time.” + (Haig, Caveat, p. 291) We will also send you talking + points at that time.In telegram 112303 to + Buenos Aires, April 27, the Department dispatched to Shlaudeman a set of talking points + to use in his meeting with Galtieri. (Department of State, Central Foreign + Policy File, [no film number]) Haig wrote of this action: “We were not certain that + Costa Mendez had + transmitted the American proposal to Galtieri. I instructed Ambassador Shlaudeman to deliver the draft to + the Argentinians.” (Haig, + Caveat, p. 291)

+

4. You should be aware that we now consider UK military action against the Falklands to be imminent + 24–48 hours. If we send text to GOA we + will also send it to HMG, and we will + be prepared to make it public very soon thereafter. Because of the very + real danger at this point that our peacekeeping effort will not succeed, + you should begin immediately to consider the necessary steps in the + event of major conflict.

+ + Haig + +
+ +
+ + 180. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the + United KingdomSource: Reagan + Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC + Country File, Europe and Soviet Union, United Kingdom + (04/01/1982–07/31/1982) (4). Secret; Flash; Nodis. Sent for information + Immediate to the White House. + + + Washington, April 27, 1982, 0044Z + +

112102. London for Ambassador and Charge only. Subject: Falkland Islands: + Message From the Secretary to Foreign Secretary Pym.

+

1. Secret–Entire text.

+

2. Please deliver the following message from the Secretary to the FCO for Foreign Secretary Pym.

+

3. Begin text:

+

Dear Francis:

+

Thank you for your message of April 26Reference is to Pym’s + follow-up message on April 26. See footnote + 4, Document 175. and your concurrence that we + should put to the Argentines the proposals we worked out during your + visit here. We believe that your success on South Georgia may now give + us greater reason to hope that the Argentines will regard the presently + drafted framework as a preferred alternative to further armed conflict. + If this hope is not misplaced, we may have an extremely critical + opportunity—perhaps the last—before an escalation of the fighting takes + place and the scenario changes in a way which plunges Argentina and + Britain into an armed conflict which—whatever its immediate outcome—will + create long-term instability, insecurity and hostility.

+

As Nicko has no doubt told you, we have proposed to the Argentines that I + leave for Buenos Aires as soon as that can be arranged—perhaps in the + next few hours.See footnote 2, Document 178. I will, in line with the + Prime Minister’s message of April 24,See + Document 173. and your second + message today, present our ideas to President Galtieri and the Junta. I am not going + to Buenos Aires to negotiate; rather I will be prepared to explain our + ideas and seek a prompt response. Needless to say, I will not remain in + Argentina an inordinate period of time.

+ +

Obviously, all of the above is predicated on the assumption that the + Argentines agree to receive me. If they do not, we must nevertheless + make an effort to present our ideas, if only to make clear that the + Argentines had a fair proposition before them which they chose to + decline. Therefore, if I do not go to Buenos Aires, I will instruct our + Ambassador there to deliver our text and ask for a prompt Argentine + reply. Thus, whether or not I go to Buenos Aires, we should know within + the next day or two whether there is reason to hope that a settlement + can be reached before new, more intense hostilities erupt.

+

I will of course stay in closest contact with you. With warm personal + regards to you and Prime Minister Thatcher, Al. End text.

+

4. FYI: The Secretary’s message replies to the following message from + Pym received in Washington + from the UK Embassy Monday + afternoon.

+

[Omitted here is the complete text of Pym’s second April 26 message to Haig (see footnote 4, Document 175)]

+ + Haig + +
+ +
+ 181. Telegram From the Embassy in Argentina to the Department of + StateSource: Reagan + Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC + Country File, Latin America/Central, Falklands War + (04/22/1982–05/17/1982). Secret; Flash; Nodis. A stamped notation on the telegram indicates + that Clark saw it. Poindexter also initialed the + telegram and indicated that Clark had seen it. + + + Buenos Aires, April 27, 1982, + 1350Z + +

2534. For the Secretary. Subject: Falkland Islands. Ref: State + 112303.See footnote 5, Document 179.

+

1. S–Entire text.

+

2. Galtieri alone received me at + 0850 hours local (ARMA accompanied + me). I went over the talking points in the reftel and called his attention to the explanatory + annotations to the proposal.The Department + transmitted the latest draft texts of the Memorandum of Agreement + and related documents, for Shlaudeman to present to the Junta, in telegram + 112304 to Buenos Aires, April 27. (Reagan Library, Executive + Secretariat, NSC Cable File, + Falkland File 04/27/1982) The draft MOA is printed in American Foreign + Policy: Current Documents, 1982, pp. 1304–1306. + Spanish-language texts of the documents were transmitted in telegram + 112305 to Buenos Aires, April 27. (Reagan Library, Executive + Secretariat, NSC Cable File, + Falkland File 04/27/1982) Annotations to the draft MOA were transmitted separately by the + Department in telegram 112306 to Buenos Aires, April 27. The + Department authorized Shlaudeman to pass along the annotations to the + Junta as a “non-paper” and stated that the annotations were also + being provided to Costa + Méndez. (Ibid.) + Galtieri + seemed particularly struck by + the statement that we are notPoindexter circled this word, drew + a line from it to the right-hand margin, and wrote: “State is + checking this.” prepared to describe the text as a U.S. + proposal and will publish it if necessary. He made no other comment on + the proposal but promised me a response before 2400 hours today.See Document + 189.

+

3. Galtieri did add that no one + wanted war but that if the British attacked, Argentina would resist with + all means at hand. He also said that the GOA could not understand why the USG with all its resources could not stop Mrs. Thatcher from launching this attack so + that a peaceful solution could be found. I reiterated that you had done + everything possible to achieve a peaceful solution and that this was the + last chance. He seemed to accept that.

+

4. Galtieri is meeting now with + the Junta and they have the proposal and the other documents before + them. I have sent word that I am available for further consultation + whenever they might wish.

+

5. Galtieri appeared tired but + composed. I sensed an air of resignationPoindexter circled this + word, drew a line from it to the margin below the paragraph, and + wrote “?” in the space below the paragraph. about him.

+ Shlaudeman +
+ +
+ + 182. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in + ArgentinaSource: Reagan + Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC + Cable File, Falkland File 04/27/1982. Secret; Flash; Nodis. Gompert sent a draft of the telegram to Haig for his approval under an + April 27 covering note, stating: “The British DCM just called to say + that they understood how you wanted to proceed with regard to + warning Galtieri about the + exclusion zone. He asked again why it was important to say that both + sides had been requested to exercise restraint, to which I responded + that it was your judgment that this was the best way to produce the + desired result. The DCM said that they understood how we would + handle this but wanted to be sure that we understood that British + forces would continue to operate under their current guidelines. In + light of this, I believe we can go ahead with the attached message + from you to Galtieri.” + Haig’s stamped initials + appear on the covering note, indicating that he saw it. Gompert added a handwritten note: + “Sec approved going ahead.” (Department of State, Executive + Secretariat, Files of Alexander M. + Haig, Jr., 1981–1982, Lot 82D370, (2) Falklands + Crisis—1982) + + + Washington, April 27, 1982, 2032Z + +

113054. For the Ambassador from the Secretary. Subject: Exclusion Zone + Warning.

+

1. Please pass the following personal message from me to President + Galtieri:

+

Begin text: During the present critical period as we make a final search + for a peaceful solution to the current British-Argentine dispute, it is + important that both sides avoid any incidents in the maritime exclusion + zone. I am therefore asking both parties to exercise restraint with + regard to the exclusion zone for the time being. I do not ask for nor + expect a response from either side to this suggestion. End text.

+

2. In delivering this message, please pass on orally that I do not know + if the British will accede to this request and would not want the + President to assume that Argentine forces can operate safely in the + exclusion zone.On April 28, the British + Government announced that from 11:00 GMT (1100Z) on April 30, a “Total Exclusion Zone will + be established round the Falkland Islands,” the outer limit of which + corresponded to the Maritime Exclusion Zone established on April 12. + “From the time indicated, the Exclusion Zone will apply not only to + Argentine warships and Argentine naval auxiliaries but also to any + other ship, whether naval or merchant vessel, which is operating in + support of the illegal occupation of the Falkland Islands by + Argentine forces. The Exclusion Zone will also apply to any + aircraft, whether military or civil, which is operating in support + of the illegal operation. Any ship and any aircraft whether military + or civil which is found in this Zone without due authority from the + Ministry of Defence in London will therefore be regarded as hostile + and liable to be attacked by British forces. Also from the time + indicated, Port Stanley airport will be closed; and any aircraft on + the ground in the Falkland Islands will be regarded as present in + support of the illegal occupation and accordingly is liable to + attack.” (Freedman, Official History, vol. + II, pp. 257–258)

+ + Haig + +
+ +
+ + 183. Information Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for + Public Affairs (Fischer) to + Secretary of State HaigSource: Department of State, + Central Foreign Policy File, P820066–0303. No classification + marking. Drafted by Alvin Richman (PA/OAP) on April 26. Haig initialed at the top right-hand corner of the + memorandum, indicating that he saw it. + + + Washington, April 27, + 1982 + + + SUBJECT + Public Sides with Britain in Falklands Dispute + +

Americans overwhelmingly disapprove of Argentina’s takeover of the + Falklands and favor “backing” Britain in the dispute. These findings + come from an ABC poll, the first on + this issue publicly released, conducted April 8–10.

+

Nearly four-fifths of those polled said they were aware of the dispute. + Their views: (1) Argentina did not have “good + reason” to seize the Falklands (by 61 to 15 percent). (2) Britain would + be justified in using military force to try to recapture the Falklands + if negotiations failed (by 46 to 36 percent). (3) The U.S. should “back” + Britain in case the dispute resulted in a war between Argentina and + Britain (50 percent favored backing Britain, only 5 percent favored + backing Argentina; a substantial minority, 30 percent, volunteered a + preference for neutrality).

+

Previous polls on attitudes toward other U.S. security commitments + suggest that the public supports “backing” in the form of diplomatic and + economic measures, but almost certainly opposes direct U.S. military + involvement. What attitudes would be to U.S. military facilitation of + the British fleet are less certain.

+

Additional details are attached.Not printed + is a page entitled “Falkland Islands Poll: The Q’s and the A’s,” + which contained the text of the questions asked by the ABC poll as well as the answers given + by those polled.

+
+ +
+ + 184. Information Memorandum From the Director of the Bureau of + Politico-Military Affairs (Burt) + to Secretary of State HaigSource: Department of State, + Executive Secretariat, S/S Special + Handling Restrictions Memos 1979–1983, Lot 96D262, ES Sensitive April 10–19 1982. Top + Secret; Sensitive. A stamped notation at the top of the memorandum + indicates that Haig saw it. + Below the stamped initials, Haig wrote: “Right + on.” + + + Washington, April 27, + 1982 + + + SUBJECT + U.S. Contingency Planning for the Falklands Crisis + +

If fighting erupts between the UK and + Argentina, we will need to preserve what we can of our diplomatic + objectives and to limit the damage to our broader foreign policy. It + would be essential that a British defeat be avoided and in our best + interest to facilitate a quick and decisive British victory. We will + want to proceed in a way, however, that will strengthen the role of + diplomacy during the conflict and contain the long-term damage to our + Latin American policy.

+

Introduction

+

This memorandum surveys the military support and operational options + available to us which could:

+

—help avert a British defeat (or stalemate) and facilitate a quick, + decisive British victory if hostilities erupt;

+

—protect U.S. citizens and property in Argentina (and elsewhere in Latin + America) from reprisal;

+

—block Soviet efforts to use its forces to play a direct military or + political role during the crisis.

+

The memorandum is based on informal discussions with DOD representatives (which were arranged + after considerable arm-twisting, including your personal intervention). + Although these exchanges proved very useful, they were confined to + generalities because Cap has ordered that no detailed information or + written analyses be provided to the Department without his prior + personal approval.On the origin of these + State-Defense discussions, see Document + 171. No records of these discussions have been + found.

+

Diplomatic Stakes and Objectives

+

A British defeat in the Falklands would have a devastating effect on the + political coherence and military effectiveness of the Alliance, as well + as risk undermining the special relationship and Britain’s unique + ability to be a bridge across the Atlantic. A prolonged conflict, which + bled the British Treasury + and toppled the Thatcher + government, would be just as bad.

+

Open, and possibly substantial, support for the British undoubtedly would + damage our relations and policies in Latin America and possibly expose + U.S. citizens and property in Argentina to reprisals. But our stakes in + Latin America as well as in Europe argue that we should be prepared to + do what we can to ensure that the result is a quick UK victory rather than prolonged stalemate. + A more restrained U.S. approach could spawn a continuing, inconclusive + conflict which not only toppled Thatcher, but also multiplied opportunities for Soviet + mischief and steadily increased the pressure on Chile, Brazil and other + potentially sympathetic Latin American countries to turn against us. In + brief, a prompt British victory could go a long way toward limiting the + long-term damage to our Latin American policy.

+

Summary Conclusions

+

The information supplied by DOD + substantially confirmed the conclusions of our April 24 memorandum to + you on this subject:See Document 171.

+

—We are unlikely to receive British requests for + support which go much beyond what we already are providing: The + UK force is largely self-sufficient + and is capable of being re-supplied using UK assets. Moreover, because of incompatibilities between + U.S. and UK inventories, we are not in a + good position to provide spares, ammunition, etc. Finally, we do not + know what the British plan of operations is, but it is very unlikely to + depend for success on favorable U.S. responses to requests for + assistance which have not yet been broached with us.

+

—U.S. options to deploy the posture forces in the area + are very limited. Absent access to bases in the area, the + leading candidate would be naval assets, especially one or both CVBGs participating in the Ocean Venture + naval exercise in the Caribbean. Steaming time, however, would be on the + order of 18 days from a decision to redeploy. B–52 operations (including maritime reconnaissance) are + feasible, but difficult and complex.

+

—Soviet options are probably no better. They, [less than 1 line not declassified] would be + largely limited to providing intelligence and reconnaissance support. + Their options, however, would be considerably expanded if the Argentines + permitted the Soviets access to the air facilities and/or accepted + Soviet advisors or crews.

+

—The major decisions you are likely to face in the next + several days about military support and deployments will be + concerned with relocating U.S. naval assets.

+ +

The basis for these conclusions is presented in the following sections + on:

+

—U.S. support for British military operations;

+

—U.S. options to counter Argentine threats to U.S. citizens and + property;

+

—Soviet options and possible U.S. counters;

+

—Considerations bearing on decisions to redeploy U.S. naval assets.

+

Support for the UK

+

The U.S. could offer three broad categories of support to the UK: logistical support, political-military + posturing, and airlift. (Direct combat support is not considered in this + memorandum.)In an April 26 memorandum + to Enders, Holmes, Pendleton, Service, Gompert, Funseth, and Robinson, McManaway outlined Department + procedures for handling British and Argentine military and + intelligence requests. The memorandum instructed the recipients to + pass all requests to Burt. + PM would then staff the request, + obtain clearances and views from ARA, EUR, L, and any + “other relevant offices,” before preparing a memorandum for + Eagleburger “stating the + views of all parties, pros and cons, and a recommendation.” + (Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S Special Handling Restrictions Memos 1979–1983, Lot + 96D262, ES Sensitive April 24–26 + 1982) Three days later, on April 29, Eagleburger sent a memorandum to Iklé, noting that the Department + had established a single point of contact for coordinating requests + and informing him to direct to Burt “until further notice” all inquiries on British + requests “received in the context of the Falkland Islands issue,” + with the exception of “sensitive” intelligence. (Department of + State, Executive Secretariat, S/S + Special Handling Restrictions Memos 1979–1983, Lot 96D262, ES Sensitive April 27–30 + 1982)

+

In the case of logistic support, we have not had + many requests to date; nor do we anticipate them. UK forces appear to be relatively + self-sufficient except for JP–5 fuel, which we are resupplying, and + isolated exceptions such as Stinger + and runway matting (for possible use in constructing an airfield on + South Georgia or conceivably in the Falklands). Moreover, many UK items which might become critically + short are not items which we could replace, e.g., even their Harriers and ours are not compatible. + Only a major military reversal or an unanticipated problem/difficulty + would be likely to generate substantial requests for U.S. military + equipment.

+

Political-military posturing might be provided by + flying reconnaissance aircraft [1 line not + declassified]. Moving a carrier battle group to the vicinity of + the Falklands would require several weeks and would upset currently + planned deployments.Haig underlined the portion of + this sentence beginning with “several weeks,” and wrote “So what!” + in the right-hand margin next to it. Reconnaissance aircraft + missions could be initiated more quickly, but the difficult, complex + B–52 maritime patrol missions would + provide more a political symbol than a military contribution to the + British. P–3 aircraft cannot operate in + the South Atlantic without access closer than Ascension.

+ +

Airlift support could assist the UK in moving supplies (from either the + UK or the US) to Ascension with relative ease, but the long sea + transit from Ascension to the Falklands would limit the impact of such + support. Airlifting supplies beyond Ascension would be virtually + impossible unless and until the UK were + able to develop a C–141/C–5 capable field at South Georgia. Furthermore, + air-dropped resupply would also be difficult, given the problems of + terrain, weather, and air cover (not to mention the greater degree of + U.S. involvement in hostilities).

+

The Argentine Dimension

+

U.S. exposure in Argentina is considerable. Economic and political stakes + aside, there are some twelve to fifteen thousand American citizens in + country. SOUTHCOM has a plan for + their evacuation under permissive circumstances; any opposed exodus, + however, is unrealistic. One possible purpose for sending the fleet + towards the area would be to signal the GOA—to remind them of their responsibility to protect U.S. + lives and to warn them of the consequences if they do not. The fleet + would also be able to attack selected sites in Argentina in retaliation + should U.S. citizens be harmed. In contrast to the naval option—which + would require about 18 days to implement—B–52s operating from CONUS bases could be available much more quickly.

+

Soviet Options

+

Soviet capacity to affect the course of a Falklands contingency directly + probably is less than our own. The Soviets could not introduce surface + vessels or submarines into the area for some 3 weeks at best. They + could, however, provide [1 line not declassified] + reconnaissance support (using Bears + out of Angola or Argentina). Bears or + Backfires operating out of + Argentina could also conceivably threaten UK or U.S. assets in the vicinity.

+

Another possibility would be Soviet assistance to the GOA, e.g., advisors, easily absorbed + stores and supplies, and air defense equipment/systems with or without + Soviet personnel. (An intelligence assessment detailing possible Soviet + support of Argentina is attached at Tab A.)Attached but not printed are three undated briefing papers prepared + in the DIA. An intelligence cable + sent by the CIA to multiple + recipients, April 29, also discussed the possibility of the Soviet + Union providing military escort to vessels carrying grain from + Argentina to the Soviet Union. ([text not + declassified]; Central Intelligence Agency, Office of + Security, Job 87T00623R: Policy Files (1973–1986), Box 2, Folder 9: + SECOM Minutes of Agenda 1984)

+ +

Redeploying the Navy

+

The most important decisions concerning U.S. military assistance and + support which you are likely to face in the coming days will be related + to redeployment of USN assets. There is + no way, however, to determine a priori when and + how to use U.S. naval forces during the Falklands crisis.

+

Moving U.S. Navy combatants into the area could support all three of our + objectives;

+

—providing political support (and some real military capability) on + behalf of the British;

+

—putting the Soviets on notice;

+

—deterring Argentine reprisals against U.S. citizens and property by + posing a serious threat of reprisals.Haig placed a checkmark + at the end of each of the three points.

+

At least 18 days would elapse between the decision to redeploy carriers + to the area and the time by which they would be in range of potential + targets. Given the unavoidable visibility associated with that movement + of aircraft carriers, however, the political messages would be sent + almost immediately. Of necessity, those signals would be seen by all + three audiences—the British, the Soviets, and Argentines—but it is + unlikely that we would want to use the naval instrument of policy at the + same time for our three different purposes.

+

DOD believes that two carrier task + groups would be required to achieve the capability for 24-hour, + sustained operations in the area. Two CVBGs are currently operating off Puerto Rico as part of + the Ocean Venture naval exercise. The upcoming winter weather in the + South Atlantic will be severe and debilitating. Carrier operations would + be particularly hazardous under such conditions when airfields to which + aircraft might be diverted were unavailable.

+

Bearing in mind that the naval option could have a conflicting impact in + London, Buenos Aires, and Moscow, a decision to redeploy the fleet + should be carefully considered. Nevertheless, as this new phase of the + crisis unfolds, it may be an option that we might want to execute in the + next week or so.

+
+ +
+ + 185. Message From British Foreign Secretary Pym to Secretary of State HaigSource: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, + Files of Alexander M. Haig, + Jr., 1981–1982, Lot 82D370, (2) Falklands + Crisis—1982. UK Confidential. + Henderson sent the + message to Haig under an + April 28 covering note. + + + London, April 28, + 1982 + +

Begins:

+

Nicko Henderson has told me of + the terms of the Resolution adopted by the OAS earlier this morning.On + April 28, in Resolution I, “Serious Situation in the South + Atlantic,” the Twentieth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of + Foreign Affairs of the OAS resolved + to “urge” the British Government “to cease the hostilities it is + carrying on within the security region defined by Article 4” of the + Rio Treaty and “to refrain from any act that may affect + inter-American peace and security,” to urge the Argentine Government + to “refrain from any action that may exacerbate the situation,” to + urge both governments to call a truce, to “express the willingness + of the Organ of Consultation to lend support through whatever means + it considers advisable” to new initiatives directed for “the just + and peaceful settlement of the problem,” to “take note” of the + information received about Haig’s negotiations and to “express its wishes that + they will be an effective contribution to the settlement” of the + conflict, to “deplore” the European Economic Community’s “coercive + measures of an economic and political nature” directed at Argentina, + and to present this appeal to the British and Argentine Governments + as well as the Chairman of the UN + Security Council. The full text of this resolution is printed in the + Department of State Bulletin, June 1982, pp. + 86–87. I am most grateful for all your efforts, as well as + those of other friendly countries in the region, to head off a result + which would further exacerbate the situation and complicate your own + peace efforts, which we continue to regard as vital. The difficulties of + your position in the OAS are fully + appreciated here and we are therefore doubly appreciative of your + forthright intervention and your abstention in the vote.Explaining the U.S. abstention, Thompson stated that the “United + States is not in a position to express views on many of the issues + addressed by the resolution and, therefore, has abstained.” He ended + his statement by reaffirming “the fervent hope, shared by each of + us, that all the actions of this distinguished body will truly + facilitate peace.” (Ibid., p. 87) However, you will + understand that the Resolution is not acceptable to us. We cannot forego + our undoubted rights of self-defence under Article 51 of the UN Charter as the Resolution suggests we + should.

+

The OAS Resolution is to be conveyed to + the President of the Security Council. Argentina may additionally seek + an early debate in the Council and the adoption of a Resolution on + similar lines. We have so far been successful in keeping the issue out + of the Council since the adoption of SCR 502. This has in our view been important in helping + your efforts and maintaining maximum pressure on the Argentines. We + therefore continue to hope that the Council will stand fast on 502. We will be working hard to + achieve this, I hope with your help. If the Council nevertheless meets + again, I hope I can count on the United States to work closely with us, + both in New York and in Security Council capitals, to head off support + for any unhelpful and unacceptable Resolution. If we failed you know + that we might have to use our veto. We would of course look for support + from you in that event.

+

Ends.

+
+ +
+ 186. Intelligence Memorandum Prepared in the Central Intelligence + AgencySource: Central + Intelligence Agency, Office of Support Services (DI), Job 83B00228R: + Production Case Files (1982), Box 1, Folder 16: UK-Falklands: Pressures on Thatcher. Secret; [handling restriction not declassified]. The + memorandum was prepared in the Office of European Analysis in the + Directorate of Intelligence based upon information available as of + April 28. + + + EUR 82–10046 + + + Washington, April + 1982 + +

UK-Falklands: Pressures on + Thatcher [portion marking not declassified]

+

Summary

+

The Argentine seizure of the Falkland Islands is seen throughout the + United Kingdom as an affront to British sovereignty and national pride + that cannot go unanswered. Therefore, despite initial criticism that + government negligence allowed the dispute to reach this point, most of + Parliament, the media, and the public reacted by enthusiastically + supporting the government’s determination to use force if a settlement + could not be negotiated.

+

As the Argentines reinforced the islands and the British fleet steamed + south, however, the potential for a disaster reminiscent of Suez and for + major loss of life began to sink in. Criticism became more pronounced + and cracks began to appear in the government’s seemingly solid support. + The Tory right wing warned Thatcher not to make too many concessions in pursuing a + negotiated settlement, while the opposition cautioned her against + military action if any hope for a peaceful solution remained. Public + opinion, although split, seemed to favor a tough response as long as the + risks were minimal. Opposition leaders and some influential voices in + the media began to question fundamental British positions, in particular whether it was + necessary to restore British administration to the Falklands or to + guarantee self-determination for the islanders.

+

Since the successful retaking of South Georgia Island earlier this week, + criticism within the Conservative Party has died down and public opinion + seems to have swung once again solidly behind Thatcher. The South Georgia operation, + however, has made the opposition parties even more nervous about + military operations than they were earlier, and the Labor Party in + particular is pushing hard for continuing negotiations. Despite + opposition nervousness, Thatcher + will pursue the military options she believes needed to restore the + Falklands to British rule as quickly as possible as long as she has the + support of the Conservative Party and the public. In the absence of a + sudden diplomatic breakthrough, therefore, the United Kingdom is likely + to pursue military action beyond the blockade as soon as technically + feasible.

+

If the extended blockade and related military actions do not produce + results very soon or if they lead to heavy British casualties, criticism + will rise within the Conservative Party, public support will plummet, + and the government’s survival will come increasingly into question.

+

[less than 1 line not declassified]

+

[Omitted here is the body of the memorandum.]

+
+ +
+ 187. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in + ArgentinaSource: Reagan + Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC + Cable File, Falkland File 04/28/1982. Secret; Niact Immediate; Nodis. Sent for information + Immediate to London. + + + Washington, April 29, 1982, 0145Z + +

115266. Subject: Falkland Islands: Secretary’s Meeting With Costa-Mendez.

+

1. Secret–Entire text.

+

2. The Secretary met with Foreign Minister Costa Mendez the afternoon of April 28.No memorandum of conversation of this meeting has + been found. Ambassadors Enders and Figueroa and Mr. Service (notetaker) were present.

+ +

3. The essential message Costa-Mendez conveyed was the following: the GOA believes the Rio Treaty MFM resolutionSee footnote 2, Document 185. + strengthened its position with Argentine and world opinion, but realizes + there are only two options for resolving the Falklands dispute: a + continuation of the U.S. effort or through the U.N. The U.N. route would + require major readjustments in Argentine foreign policy which the GOA does not want to make (and Costa-Mendez even less), and the + outcome would be uncertain. Therefore, Argentina wants the U.S. effort + to continue. However, it cannot accept the proposal as it stands;See footnote 3, + Document 181. the GOA has difficulties with what it perceives as lack of a + deadline for resolving the sovereignty issue, with the administrative + arrangements for the interim period, and with the political resolution + article, particularly the reference to the wishes and interests of the + inhabitants.

+

4. The Secretary told Costa-Mendez that only the U.S. is in a position to + achieve a satisfactory solution. He understood the reference to + adjustments in Argentina’s foreign policy, but did not believe any + Argentine Government could undertake a close alliance with the Soviets. + As for the text of the proposal, the Secretary told Costa-Mendez that we see no prospect + for any significant changes being accepted by the British. The UK has serious problems with it as it + stands; however, if the GOA agrees to + the proposal, we are confident that we can prevail upon the UK to accept, provided full-scale fighting + has not yet begun. According to our information (the Secretary stressed + again that the British are keeping their plans to themselves), a British + attack could begin as early as Friday.April + 30.

+

5. The Secretary and Enders went + over the three points Costa-Mendez had listed as stumbling blocks, pointing + out that the essential concerns of the GOA have been preserved with only minor modifications from + the text at the time the Secretary departed Buenos Aires. In other + respects, particularly the reference to the Falkland Islands Company, + the text has been improved. It is in our judgment a fair and reasonable + proposal, one which the U.S. can stand behind. The Secretary then told + Costa-Mendez the problem + boils down to the question of whether the GOA has confidence in the role of the U.S. He told + Costa-Mendez that the U.S. + does not act for the U.K., that we have our own interests at stake, both + in Europe and in Latin America, and that his government should have no + doubts where this process will lead and will be completed within the + prescribed time periods. However, if the GOA concludes definitively that it cannot accept the + proposal, there should also be + no doubt that the U.S. will have to come down strongly on the side of + the UK.

+

6. Costa-Mendez said he would + consult with his government and get back to the Secretary as soon as + possible with the most essential changes that the GOA requires in the proposed agreement. + The Secretary stressed that we must have that response tonight.

+ + Haig + +
+ +
+ 188. Message From British Prime Minister Thatcher to President ReaganSource: + Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Cable File, Falkland File 04/29/1982 (1). Secret. + Sent in a telegram via Cabinet Office channels from the Cabinet + Office to the White House. + + + London, April 29, 1982, 1322Z + + + Dear Ron, + +

The Cabinet considered Al Haig’s + current proposals on the Falkland Islands for the first time this + morning.Under an April 29 covering + note, Henderson transmitted + to Haig + Pym’s summary of the + Cabinet’s consideration of the proposals. (Department of State, + Executive Secretariat, S/S Special + Handling Restrictions Memos 1979–1983, Lot 96D262, ES Sensitive April 27–30 1982) + We were all very grateful for his tireless efforts.

+

I explained to my colleagues that Al had put his proposals to the + Argentine Government only on 27 April; that, as he made clear to + Francis Pym, he had given + them a deadline for accepting the proposals without amendment or + rejecting them;See Document 180. and that this deadline had passed + more than 24 hours ago with no Argentine reply.

+

In the Cabinet’s view, the proposals must now be regarded as having been + rejected by the Argentines, who have ignored the deadline and publicly + restated that they are not prepared to alter their position on + sovereignty.

+

Al made clear to Francis last week that, if Argentina did reject the + proposals, the U.S. would consider its current peace-making efforts to + have ended and would from then on give full public support to + Britain.See Documents 163, 164, 165, and 166. In the Cabinet’s view, this point has now been + reached. I cannot conceal from + you how deeply let down I and my colleagues would feel if under these + circumstances the U.S. were not now to give us its full support.

+

You will remember that when we spoke on the telephone on 17 April,See Document + 144. about the earlier proposals which Al and we worked + out in London on 12 April,See Document 112. you told me that in + your view we had been as accommodating as we could have been and it + would not be reasonable to ask us to go further. Against that + background, you will not be surprised to know that the Cabinet saw + fundamental difficulties from Britain’s point of view in Al’s latest + proposals which we regard Argentina as having now rejected. These + difficulties lay in the essential areas where the latest proposals + differed from the 12 April proposals. It was, of course, just these + areas which Francis discussed so thoroughly with Al in Washington last + week.

+

One stage in the effort to settle this crisis has now ended. It seems to + me essential that, as we enter the next stage, the U.S. and Britain + should be seen to be unequivocally on the same side, staunchly upholding + those values on which the Western way of life depends.

+

Warm personal regards,

+ + Margaret + +
+ +
+ + 189. Letter From Argentine Foreign Minister Costa Méndez to Secretary of State + HaigSource: Department of State, Under + Secretary of State for Political Affairs, Miscellaneous Files, March + 1981–February 1983, Lot 83S210, Falklands [Folder 1]. Secret. + Printed from a translation by the Department of State. According to + telegram 116672, which forwarded the text of the letter to Buenos + Aires, April 30, Takacs + delivered the original letter to Enders on April 29. (Reagan Library, Executive + Secretariat, NSC Cable File, + Falkland File 04/30/1982 (2)) + + + Washington, April 29, + 1982 + Mr. Secretary: + +

We have carefully considered the document that you transmitted to + us,See footnote + 3, Document 181. comparing it with our previous + proposals and with the points of view that we have maintained in our + various meetings. That analysis reveals significant differences, some of + which raise problems that must be overcome.

+

As my government has already indicated to you, Argentina’s objective is + the recognition of its sovereignty over the Malvinas Islands. That + central element of our discussions is the ultimate justification for the + actions undertaken by my country and, as I have had the opportunity of + stating to you on many occasions, is for us an unrenounceable goal.

+

Along with the question of sovereignty, the current crisis raises the + immediate need to establish a provisional regime for the administration + of the islands as an essential step in the process of separating the two + military forces and as a reasonable pause in view of the logical + impossibility of formally agreeing upon their final destiny at this + time.

+

The talks that we have held have been fundamentally based on these two + questions—recognition of sovereignty and regime of provisional + administration. The remaining problems can be solved more readily if + there is agreement on the two points that I have just mentioned.

+

What is certain is that both are closely related. To the extent that the + provisions relating to the recognition of our sovereignty are imprecise, + we deem necessary, if we wish to avoid a return to the frustrating + situation that existed prior to April 2, the establishment of mechanisms + that give us greater powers for the administration of the islands.

+

If, on the contrary, it were clear that Argentine sovereignty will + ultimately be recognized, we will be more flexible with respect to + provisional administration.

+ +

The document that you sent falls short of Argentine demands and does not + satisfy its minimum aspirations on either of the two points. On the + contrary, unfavorable changes have been introduced in both. Regarding + administration of the islands, the number of Argentine representatives + has been reduced, and there is no longer the possibility of increasing + my country’s control in the event that negotiations on the substantive + question drag on without a solution being found. We thus face the + definite possibility that a predominately British administration will be + established with no fixed time of expiration.

+

As concerns the question of sovereignty, all precision regarding the + concept of territorial integrity has been abandoned, and a new element + has been introduced, a virtual referendum to determine the “wishes” of + the inhabitants, in open opposition to United Nations Resolution + 2065See footnote + 4, Document 141. and to the position unwaveringly + maintained by Argentina.

+

You realize, Mr. Secretary, that we cannot accept these changes. In my + opinion, other formulas must be found, a task for which we will always + remain at your disposal. They should reflect the equilibrium to which I + referred earlier in order to balance adequately the data regarding the + question of sovereignty with provisions for the provisional + administration of the islands. These provisions should be of fixed + duration and allow for progressive Argentine participation or, failing + that, of such precision that they assure recognition of the rights of + Argentina within a given period of time.

+

If this Argentine position were understood, agreement would be enormously + facilitated, and the final drafting of the document would present no + insurmountable difficulties.

+

I thank you again for your arduous efforts, and assure you, Mr. + Secretary, of my highest consideration.

+ + Nicanor Costa + MendezPrinted from a + copy that bears this typewritten signature and an indication + that Costa Méndez signed + the Spanish text. + +
+ +
+ + 190. Draft Letter From President Reagan to British Prime Minister ThatcherSource: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, + S/S Special Handling + Restrictions Memos 1979–1983, Lot 96D262, Super Sensitive April 1–30 + 1982. Secret. A typewritten notation at the top of the draft + indicates that it was produced at 2:30 p.m., April 29. No additional + drafting information appears on the letter. Bremer sent the draft to Clark under an April 29 covering + note, noting that it was for “urgent” approval by Reagan and stating that the + message should be transmitted “as soon as possible.” A typewritten + note on the covering note states that the draft was transmitted to + Clark by LDX only. (Ibid.) No copy of the + letter as approved and sent from Reagan to Thatcher has been found in Department of State or + White House files. However, Thatcher quoted extensively from the letter in her + memoirs, indicating that she received it, and noted that Reagan’s message was “very + satisfactory.” (Thatcher, + Downing Street Years, p. 211) A British + copy of the message, as sent to London, is published on the + Thatcher Foundation + website. + + + Washington, April 29, + 1982 + Dear Maggie: + +

In view of the military and diplomatic developments of the past few days, + as well as your recent letter of this morning,See Document 188. + I wanted you to know my views on where matters stand and how the United + States will proceed.

+

We have just now received an Argentine response which in effect rejects + our proposal.See Document 189. We will therefore issue a statement + FridayApril 30. See Document 196. on our view toward the crisis and on + the steps we are taking in light of the Argentine position.

+

I am sure you agree that it is essential now to make clear to the world + that every effort was made to achieve a fair and peaceful solution, and + that the Argentine Government was offered a choice between such a + solution and further hostilities. We will therefore make public a + general account of the efforts we have made. While we will describe the + US proposal in broad terms, we will + not release it because of the difficulty that might cause you. I + recognize that while you see fundamental difficulties in the proposal, + you have not rejected it. We will leave no doubt that Her Majesty’s + Government worked with us in good faith and was left with no choice but + to proceed with military action based on the right of self-defense.

+

You have made clear throughout this crisis that, while you have wanted + above all a peaceful settlement on the basis of UN Security Council Resolution 502, your government was + prepared to use military means to remove Argentine forces from the + Islands. Neither your good will in wanting peace nor your readiness to + use force if necessary were ever in doubt. I know that you are as saddened as I that it has not + been possible to avert hostilities, and I am heartened that you have + made clear that no more than minimum essential force will be used.

+

It is as important as ever that we preserve the ground for a negotiated + solution. While it may be possible forcibly to remove Argentine forces, + the future will be fraught with instability, animosity, and insecurity + if a mutually acceptable framework for peace is not ultimately found. + Therefore, we should continue to work to secure a just peace. For our + part, we will make clear that we stand ready to assist the parties + toward this end.

+

Our shared principles have assured from the outset that we would work + with common purpose. As you know, we have refrained from taking those + actions in direct support of your position that would have made our + diplomatic mission impossible. You have shown clear understanding for + our judgment on this and have offered every encouragement to our effort + to find a peaceful solution. This reflects the highest degree of + statesmanship and confidence on your part.

+

There can be no doubt about our full support for you and the principles + of international law and order you are defending. You can count on that + support in whatever forum this issue is debated. You can also count on + our sympathetic consideration of requests for assistance. We will also + announce that Argentina’s refusal to withdraw its invasion force and to + negotiate in good faith have made it necessary for the United States to + adopt a new posture toward Buenos Aires. Al + Haig will be in touch with Francis Pym concerning the specific measures we will + take.See Document + 191.

+

We will of course want to stay in very close touch in the days and weeks + ahead. I remain convinced that our combined efforts can yield a just + settlement which will strengthen the principles for which we stand, and + I can only hope for the least amount of bloodshed before that goal is + reached.

+
+ +
+ + 191. Letter From Secretary of State Haig to British Foreign Secretary PymSource: Department of State, Under Secretary of State + for Political Affairs, Miscellaneous Files, March 1981–February + 1983, Lot 83D210, Falklands [Folder 1]. Secret; Nodis. A typewritten notation at the + top of the letter indicates that the original was given to the + British Embassy by Eagleburger at 9 p.m., April 29. + + + Washington, April 29, + 1982 + Dear Francis: + +

I refer to your letter of April 29See footnote 2, Document 188. which + Nicko delivered to me.

+

I now also have a letter from Nicanor Costa + Mendez.See Document 189. He states the US proposal does not meet Argentina’s + minimum requirements on the issues of ultimate recognition of Argentine + sovereignty and provisional administration of the Islands.

+

I am writing Costa Mendez that it + is clear that Argentina has rejected the US proposal.See Document 192.

+

We have taken note of your statement that the British Cabinet has + fundamental reservations about the US + proposal. At the same time we believe your decision not to reject it + reflects the good faith which you and the Prime Minister have shown + since we began our efforts.

+

Nicko has already informed you that because of the President’s address to + the nation this evening,On April 29, + Reagan addressed the + nation on the Federal Budget for Fiscal Year 1983. For the text of + the address, which was broadcast on radio and television, see Public Papers: Reagan, 1982, Book I, pp. 532–535. + it will not be possible for us to make a public announcement of the + US position before Friday.April 30. Meanwhile, there are certain + actions we must take within our own government before that time. Because + of this requirement, it would gravely jeopardize our efforts in support + of the United Kingdom if there should be any premature disclosures of + this intention. Therefore, I know we can count on you to order an + absolute lid in London on any comments.

+

The thrust of our statement will be that Argentina declined a fair + American peace proposal and continues to make demands that cannot be + accepted. We do not intend to release the text of our proposal because + of the difficulty that might cause you. But, we will describe it in + general terms and state that your government has acted in good faith + throughout our effort.

+ +

We will, of course, continue to support you in the OAS and in the UN and will be prepared to veto in the Security Council or + vote against in the General Assembly any resolutions which in our + judgment depart from Security Council Resolution 502.

+

We also plan to announce the following steps in support of the United + Kingdom:

+

—suspension of all military exports to Argentina;

+

—withholding of certification of Argentine eligibility for military + sales;

+

—suspension of new Export-Import Bank credits and guarantees;

+

—suspension of Commodity Credit Corporation loans.

+

Finally, we will announce that the President has directed that the United + States will respond positively to requests for materiel support for + British forces.

+

We have shared all along the profound hope that we could find a basis for + peace, consistent with the principles of international law and order for + which our two nations stand. I know you are as disappointed as we, and + that we will continue to work together toward a peaceful solution. We + stand ready to assist in whatever way we can.

+

Sincerely,

+ + Alexander M. + Haig, Jr.Haig signed the letter “Al” + above his typed signature. + +
+ +
+ + 192. Letter From Secretary of State Haig to Argentine Foreign Minister Costa MéndezSource: Department of State, Under + Secretary of State for Political Affairs, Miscellaneous Files, March + 1981–February 1983, Lot 83D210, Falklands [Folder 1]. Secret. + Drafted by Service; cleared + by Enders and in substance + by Gompert. Service initialed for both + Enders and Gompert. A typewritten note at the + top of the letter states that the original was given to the + Argentine Embassy by ARA, April 29. + The text of the letter was also transmitted by the Department to + Buenos Aires in telegram 116645, April 30. (Reagan Library, + Executive Secretariat, NSC Country + File, Latin America/Central, Argentina + (04/28/1982–05/04/1982)) + + + Washington, April 29, + 1982 + Dear Nicanor: + +

Thank you for your letter of April 29.See + Document 189. I deeply regret + that your Government is still not able to accept the proposal for a + diplomatic solution that we have developed in close consultation with + yourself and President Galtieri + and with British leaders.

+

I understand your continuing concerns. I have come to have a deep + appreciation for the Argentine commitment to this national cause, and + for the frustration you have felt in the long years of negotiations. But + it has always been clear that a solution acceptable to both sides could + not satisfy the most basic demands of either, at least during the + initial period during which forces would be withdrawn and peace + reestablished.

+

I am grateful for your expressions of friendship and satisfaction with + the effort I have undertaken at the direction of President Reagan. We did so not only out of our + friendship for both countries, but because our own national interest + required us to do everything possible to prevent further conflict. We + have been guided in this effort by UN + Security Council Resolution 502, by our own firm pinciples regarding the + use of force, and by the imperatives of the rule of law.

+

In carrying out this difficult task, we have attempted to treat both + countries on an equitable basis. The proposal we presented to the two + governments on Tuesday morning is a fair and reasonable solution.April 27. See footnote + 3, Document 181. We are convinced that it would + have brought peace and that its long term results would have been + acceptable to your government as well as the Government of the United + Kingdom.

+

While we continue to hope that a peaceful solution will be found, and + will do everything that we can to assist such a solution, we have now + entered a new phase in this difficult and tragic confrontation. As we + discussed yesterday, the United States will have to make clear that we do not support the + settlement of such disputes by the use of force.See Document 187. + In this respect, it was your Government which precipitated the crisis by + its use of force April 2.

+

Accordingly, I will make a public statement April 30 explaining our + efforts to obtain a peaceful solution and noting your Government’s + failure to accept the proposal we put forward.See Document 196. + I will point out that we had reason to hope that the UK Government could consider a settlement + along the lines we proposed. I will also indicate the steps the U.S. + believes it must now take in the economic and military fields.

+

In addition, because of the possibility of hostilities, we are today + advising American citizens not to travel to Argentina. In that regard, I + am concerned that United States efforts to achieve a peaceful solution + may not be fully understood in Argentina and that some elements may take + actions that could endanger the safety and well-being of U.S. citizens. + If that should happen, the reaction in this country would be swift and + overwhelming.

+

President Galtieri assured me + during my most recent trip to Buenos Aires that all precautions would be + taken to prevent any such incidents against official or private American + citizens.See Document 131. We depend on that assurance and on + the determination of the Government of Argentina to fulfill its + obligations under international law.

+

I must tell you frankly that we will be considering other measures in the + coming days which would have even greater impact on your country and our + relations. I hope that it will not be necessary to take such additional + steps, but you must know that we are considering them and that if the + situation continues to deteriorate, they will become a very real + possibility.

+

I pray that your people and those of the United Kingdom can be spared the + hardship and human tragedy of renewed conflict. We remain prepared to + assist in achieving a diplomatic solution at any time your Government + believes we could again serve that role.

+

Sincerely,

+ + Alexander M. + Haig, Jr.Haig signed the letter “Al” + above his typed signature. + +
+ + +
+ 193. Telegram From the Embassy in Argentina to the Department of + StateSource: Reagan + Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC + Cable File, Falkland File 04/30/1982 (1). Secret; Flash; Nodis. + + + Buenos Aires, April 30, 1982, + 0527Z + +

2640. Subj: Falklands Crisis: Prospective US Measures. Ref: Gillespie/King + secure telephone call.No record of this + telephone conversation has been found.

+

1. Secret entire text.

+

2. Following receipt of subject phone call, I asked to see President + Galtieri and was received at + midnight. ARMA accompanied me as he + has throughout these critical meetings.

+

2. I told Galtieri that we came + without instructions and with the only purpose of seeing what we could + do to head off a fatal confrontation. I pointed out to the President + that we had not received an adequate response to our proposal and that + we would announce tomorrow several measures against Argentina. During + more than an hour’s conversation, he demonstrated no give whatsoever on + the proposal.

+

3. I repeatedly asked him what he saw as a way out of this impasse. His + response was, as might be expected, that there should be a stand down to + give an opportunity for negotiations. I just as repeatedly pointed out + to him that such a back off would give Argentina the victory it + sought.

+

4. At the end of our conversation, and on my own initiative, I suggested + to Galtieri that the GOA might announce unilaterally a + withdrawal of its troops from the Malvinas as a first step toward a + peaceful solution and as a gesture of good faith. He seemed to take this + suggestion seriously, wrote it down, but said again, as he had several + times before, that he was only one of three who made these + decisions.

+

5. I recommend most strongly that we not repeat not announce the measures + contemplated until I have had a chance to follow up with Galtieri tomorrow morning.See Document 194. + I think there is still a chance, although a slight one, that we can hold + these people off.

+

6. Both ARMA and I (and Galtieri particularly listened to the + former) bore down very heavily on the absolute necessity for Argentina + not repeat not to take the first offensive action. Galtieri said that he had already + stopped such actions three times in the last few days, but indicated + that he could not do so for much longer. He made a point, as we all + know, that the navy is hungry for action. He also said that the Argentines plan to resupply the + Islands tomorrow (April 30) by air escorted by military aircraft.

+

7. Galtieri seemed to me and to + ARMA anxious to find a way out + within the very tight constraints in which he operates. He said again + that Argentina would not be the first one to fire and emphasized to us + that he has spent considerable political capital in preventing the + Argentine armed forces from going on the offensive. He closed the + conversation by promising to keep in close touch with me, particularly + on the idea of a unilateral withdrawal from the Malvinas. I think that + we may have gotten through to him and if we are able to offer him a + little time that we might be able to move forward.

+ + Shlaudeman + +
+ +
+ 194. Telegram From the Embassy in Argentina to the Department of + StateSource: Reagan + Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC + Cable File, Falkland File 04/30/1982. Secret; Flash; Nodis. + + + Buenos Aires, April 30, 1982, + 1433Z + +

2658. Subject: Falklands Crisis: Galtieri’s Position. Ref: Buenos Aires 2640.See Document + 193.

+

1. S–Entire text.

+

2. I went back to see Galtieri + this morning. He said he had thought over my suggestion of a unilateral + withdrawal and had discussed it early this morning by telephone with the + other two members of the Junta. Their conclusion was that Argentina + could not rpt not take such a step unilaterally because it would appear + to be ceding to U.S. pressure. Galtieri made a point of showing me the headline in + today’s “Conviccion,” which reads “Reagan opts for Mrs. Thatcher.” In response to my question, he confirmed that + this reflected the navy’s position.

+

3. Galtieri said he would be + willing to announce withdrawal of Argentine troops from the Malvinas if + he could get something simultaneously from the other side. He did not + know what that might be but thought it would have to be a statement from + London indicating a British disposition to match his move.

+ +

4. I said this appears unlikely but I would pass it on. Galtieri left me in no doubt that he + wants peace. He also left me in no doubt that he is under extremely + heavy pressure from the navy. I should note that his naval aide in the + Casa Rosada tried to prevent me from seeing the President by refusing to + pass on the call asking for an interview.

+

5. With respect to a possibility of intervention by General Meyer, I think that would only be + useful in the event we had something to offer from the British side. In + that case, it would be very useful indeed.

+ + Shlaudeman + +
+ +
+ 195. Minutes of a National Security Council MeetingSource: Reagan Library, Executive + Secretariat, NSC Meeting File, + NSC 00048 04/30/1982 [Falkland + Islands]. Top Secret. The meeting took place in the Cabinet Room at + the White House. No drafting information appears on the + minutes. + + + Washington, April 30, 1982, 9:35–10:30 + a.m. + + + SUBJECT + South Atlantic Crisis + + + PARTICIPANTS + The President + State + Secretary Alexander M. Haig, + Jr. + Assistant Secretary Thomas O. + Enders + OSD + Secretary Caspar W. + Weinberger + Deputy Secretary Frank C. + Carlucci + CIA + Deputy Director Bobby Ray + Inman + OMB + Dr. William Schneider, + Jr. + USUN + Ambassador Jeane + Kirkpatrick + JCS + General David C. + Jones + White House + Mr. Edwin Meese III + Mr. Robert C. + McFarlane + Mr. Richard G. + Darman + Admiral John M. + Poindexter + NSC + Col. Michael O. + Wheeler + Mr. Roger Fontaine + Mr. James + Rentschler + +

Minutes

+

Mr. McFarlane opened the meeting by observing that all + parties to the Falkland Islands dispute had reached a watershed. The + United States had solicited views from both sides and has made a + proposal of its own. We have + received responses to the proposal from both sides. It is now time to + decide our next steps. Mr. McFarlane reviewed the agenda and then asked for an + intelligence update from Admiral Inman, followed by a diplomatic and political review + from Secretary Haig.

+

Admiral Inman reviewed the military situation by detailing + first the disposition of British forces in the area. He said the major + problem the British now face is making the airfield at Port Stanley + inoperable, and he suggested how the British intend to do it. Admiral + Inman noted that a + large-scale landing is not imminent, but the British are prepared for + the long haul. Nevertheless, distance and deteriorating weather will + make the British position difficult even as they build up their forward + base on Ascension.

+

Admiral Inman then detailed the position of Argentine + forces. Their plan is to stay out of the Military Exclusion Zone (MEZ) and keep their naval units protected + by air cover. He also suggested the Soviets have placed in orbit a new + ELINT satellite and that, coupled + with TU–95s in Angola, could track the + U.K. naval force. Meanwhile, the Argentine air force is positioned in + its southern bases and it could be used in an attempted air strike on + the fleet. As for the Argentine strength on the Falkland Islands, there + are 7,000 to 8,000 troops, with the possibility of reaching full + strength at 13,000. He also gave other details of the military buildup + on the Islands, noting that the Argentines had no high performance + aircraft on the Falklands now.

+

On the political side, Admiral Inman added that in the U.K. the Labour backbenchers + support Prime Minister Thatcher, + and her support in general is strong. In the absence of a diplomatic + breakthrough, she will pursue military action beyond a blockade. Should + Britain suffer heavy casualties, however, Mrs. Thatcher’s support could crumble. In + Argentina, President Galtieri’s + support is narrowing, and he has little room for maneuver, perhaps even + less than Prime Minister Thatcher.

+

Secretary Haig then outlined the current diplomatic situation + and what the United States proposes to do now. He began by describing + the situation as tragic with both sides, similar to a demented man on a + ledge ready to jump, reaching for help but unable to grab our hand. He + then described the elements of the American plan which in effect would + give ultimate sovereignty to Argentina but under evolutionary conditions + which the Islanders could ultimately accept. Unfortunately, the + Argentine government which is, in fact, made up of many moving and + conflicting parts could not agree to the plan. In that sense, Argentina + is the opposite of a pluralistic, democratic government where the lowest + common denominator is consensus; in the Argentine case the lowest common + denominator is extremism. The Navy holds the veto and is even more + intransigent after losing South Georgia, whose Argentine garrison + surrendered without firing a shot—a fact known to the Argentine + government, but not to the Argentine people.

+ +

Our proposal, the Secretary affirmed, gave Argentina a great deal. It was + very difficult for the British to consider, yet the Argentines turned it + down. With that turndown may come fighting. Argentina may test the + MEZ and although the British are + not expected to take near-term action, they will if they are probed by + Argentina—sea or air. That could happen today, because there are reports + that cargo planes will come into the Falkland Islands with fighter + cover.

+

Despite this outlook, the Secretary said, we do not want to close the + door on diplomacy. But there is a dilemma. There are growing pressures + at home and abroad to support Britain. At the same time, we need to work + with Argentina and keep the American community in Argentina protected. + Moreover, if this pro-American government falls in Buenos Aires, it may + well be replaced by a left-wing, Peronist regime. Therefore, the + Secretary said, we need to be careful in how we raise our tilt. Mrs. + Thatcher is reasonably + satisfied with our position until now. She wants more than we can give, + but she does understand the need for a negotiated solution.

+

The Secretary then said the President’s letter to Mrs. ThatcherSee Document 190. was a measured + response to a brittle note from the Prime Minister.See Document 188. + (She, in fact, was reacting to press reports that we were controlling + her forces by having them slow down, reports which were not true.)

+

The Secretary then outlined the press statement prepared for an 11:30 + a.m. release Friday, April 30, following the NSC meeting.See Document 196. He added that the + Argentines will actively seek another resolution at the U.N. Security + Council that goes beyond 502. The Secretary characterized as prudent the + measures we will take today. Both the right and the left in this country + want us to take stronger measures against the Argentines. But even what + we do today will cause great resentment in Argentina. Stronger measures + like default are, however, out of the question. Our interests will be + best served by keeping up pressure on Argentina to meet its + international commitments.

+

At this point, Secretary Haig + passed out copies of the revised press statement for NSC principals’ consideration.

+

Mr. McFarlane then asked for comments or questions.

+

Secretary Weinberger commented on evacuation plans. In a + benign environment it would be simple and quick. If hostile, there is + little we could do. As for our naval forces, it would take at least 15 + days steaming time for the Eisenhower, now in + Tunis, to reach the South Atlantic from the Mediterranean—the minimum + cover we could provide.

+ +

Mr. Meese + asked about protection for the embassy.

+

Secretary Weinberger said sensitive material has been + removed and our diplomatic personnel are Argentina’s responsibility, + noting there was not much we could do short of a full-scale invasion. + Secretary Weinberger then asked + Secretary Haig to indicate the + changes in the revised press statement.

+

Secretary Haig said there were no significant ones except + more accurately describing the Argentine position, listing the U.K. + position, and giving a longer account of the American plan without going + into detail.

+

In response to a question from Admiral Inman on providing U.S. military aid to the U.K., Secretary Weinberger said that nothing was pending but + believed more fuel would be requested for Ascension, plus ground support + on Ascension and perhaps more specialized ammunition.

+

Mr. Carlucci questioned the paragraph that mentioned + communist subversion of the hemisphere. It is certainly true, but he + suggested that the perception would be that the U.S. is interested in + Latin America only when there is a communist threat.

+

Secretary Haig agreed with that comment. The original + statement went much further on this aspect. On balance we need a + reference to it. It is the minimum we can say. Further, it serves as a + warning to the Argentines about Soviet intentions.

+

Mr. McFarlane informed the NSC meeting that he had been in touch with Judge Clark by phone, whose judicial eye had + drawn attention to the paragraph in the draft statement dealing with the + question of force. The Judge suggested that, drawing on the experience + we had with our own Revolution, we be careful about how we characterize + the use of force—there is a distinction between “lawful” and “unlawful” + use.

+

Mr. Carlucci then asked if our contemplated actions + were being communicated to the Argentines.

+

Secretary Haig said our ambassador told Galtieri what we would do, but + Galtieri is not a free + man.

+

Ambassador Kirkpatrick said there will be movement at the + U.N. soon. The Secretary General is intensely interested in this + question. He is sensitive to his diplomatic limitations as a Latin and a + Peruvian. His first choice as a special mediator would be Aga Khan, a + man of no national identity who is nevertheless widely respected. + Ambassador Kirkpatrick is + convinced the Argentines are now interested in the U.N. and will accept + a U.N. initiative. Argentines, she added, respond negatively to + pressure. They won’t really go to war because they’re not ready to. + Therefore, they will accept a U.N. move. The U.N. too will work better than in most cases because + it is an issue that breaks the usual pattern of U.N. politics. This will + also be hard for the British to turn down because this time the U.N. + will be evenhanded.

+

Secretary Haig added that until now, we had wanted to avoid + the U.N. Now it is different. He added that the Argentines have always + suspected us of being on the side of the British. Our imperative has + always been to get a settlement. The Argentine strategy is to string out + the process and hope the weather will prevent the British from taking + action. Meanwhile, their position remains rigid. Their final offer, if + accepted by the British, would cause Mrs. Thatcher’s fall. Our proposals, in fact, are a + camouflaged transfer of sovereignty, and the Argentine foreign minister + knows this, but the junta will not accept it.

+

At this point there was a general discussion of the specific economic and + other sanctions to be applied to Argentina, reflected in the agreed upon + press statement.

+

The President interjected that he had no objection + to giving materiel support but wondered if that would not significantly + undercut any future role for the U.S. as mediator.

+

Secretary Haig observed the Argentines have been told what we + would do if they refused this offer. They must not think they can play + with us. Meanwhile, we have a problem in Britain and with our other + allies. The popular perception is that we are too neutral, too + tepid.

+

Secretary Weinberger said we need to come out of this + getting credit for something; we need to get credit for our support of + the British.

+

Secretary Haig said that the President will not have a + problem with the materiel assistance paragraph; the real problem with + the Argentines will be the sanctions—that will be politically tough.

+

Admiral Inman emphasized that one sour note had come out of + recent developments, namely, press leaks about the U.S. ability to read + Argentine military communications, which in turn have led to a changing + of the Argentine cipher. Admiral Inman hoped we would soon be able to regain our + capability in that area, but the leaks had been damaging.

+

Then ensued a general discussion of how we would explain our new position + to the press. Secretary Haig + then added, if this gets rougher, the British will want more from + us.

+

Ambassador Kirkpatrick said it won’t go that far. The + Argentines will find a way to avoid war through a face-saving device in + some forum perhaps by the weekend.

+

Secretary Haig said that unless Argentina softens on + sovereignty, the British will go ahead and do some damage.

+

The President concluded the meeting approving the + specific actions outlined in the press statement and noting that it + would be nice if, after all + these years, the U.N. could accomplish something as constructive as + averting war between the U.K. and Argentina.

+

The meeting adjourned at 10:30 a.m.

+
+ +
+ 196. Editorial Note +

Following the National Security Council meeting held on the morning of + April 30, 1982 (see Document 195), Secretary + of State Alexander M. Haig, Jr. + made a statement to the press at 11:30 a.m., outlining both the course + of U.S. diplomatic efforts to resolve the South Atlantic crisis to that + point as well as the future direction of U.S. policy toward Argentina + and the United Kingdom. Haig + noted that the crisis was “about to enter a new and dangerous phase in + which large-scale military action is likely” following Argentina’s April + 29 rejection of the draft framework agreement offered by Haig. “The United States has thus far + refrained from adopting measures in response to the seizure of the + islands that could have interfered with our ability to work with both + sides in the search for peace. The British Government has shown complete + understanding for this position. Now, however, in light of Argentina’s + failure to accept a compromise, we must take concrete steps to + underscore that the United States cannot and will not condone the use of + unlawful force to resolve disputes.”

+

Haig continued: “The President + has therefore ordered the suspension of all military exports to + Argentina, the withholding of certification of Argentine eligibility for + military sales, and the suspension of new Export-Import Bank credits and + guarantees. The President has also directed that the United States will + respond positively for requests to materiel support for British forces. + There will, of course, be no direct U.S. military involvement.”

+

The Secretary concluded his statement: “American policy will continue to + be guided by our concerns for the rule of law and our desire to + facilitate an early and fair settlement. The United States remains ready + to assist the parties in finding that settlement. A strictly military + outcome cannot endure over time. In the end, there will have to be a + negotiated outcome acceptable to the interested parties. Otherwise, we + will all face unending hostility and insecurity in the South Atlantic.” + The complete text of Secretary Haig’s statement is printed in the Department of State + Bulletin, June 1982, pp. 87–88.

+

In addition to this statement, the new direction of U.S. policy was also + spelled out in a message from Haig to the Foreign Ministers of all American Republics, which was transmitted by + the Department of State in telegram 116903 to all American Republics + diplomatic posts, April 30. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy + File, D820227–0109) A corrected text was transmitted to the same + recipients later that day in telegram 117273. (Reagan Library, Executive + Secretariat, NSC Cable File, Falkland + File 04/30/1982 (3)) Copies of the Secretary’s message were also sent to + Secretary General of the United Nations Javier Pérez de Cuéllar, transmitted in telegram 116904 + to the Mission to the United Nations, April 30, and to the Foreign + Ministers of all member countries of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), as well as the Foreign Ministers + of Australia, Japan, New Zealand, and Spain, transmitted in telegram + 116907 to all NATO capitals, Canberra, + Tokyo, Wellington, and Madrid, April 30. (Department of State, Central + Foreign Policy File, D820227–0125 and D820227–0141) Also on April 30, + Secretary Haig signed a + Determination formally suspending Export-Import Bank credits to + Argentina on non-economic grounds. A signed copy of the Determination, + attached to a covering April 30 action memorandum sent to Haig by Deputy Executive Secretary of + the Department of State Alvin P. + Adams, is in the Department of State, Executive + Secretariat, S/S Special Handling + Restrictions Memos 1979–1983, Lot 96D262, ES Sensitive April 27–30 1982.

+

In response to the U.S. statement, Argentine Foreign Minister Nicanor Costa Méndez delivered a + formal letter of protest to Secretary Haig on May 2. The text of the letter, which described + the U.S. action as “highly unfriendly” and “surprising,” was transmitted + by the Department of State to the Embassy in Buenos Aires in telegram + 118584, May 3. (Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Cable File, Falkland File 05/03/1982 + (1))

+
+ +
+ + 197. Action Memorandum From the Director of the Bureau of + Politico-Military Affairs (Burt) + to the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Eagleburger)Source: Department of State, Central + Foreign Policy File, P820071–1690. Confidential. Drafted by + Kanter; cleared by + Service, Smith, and Funseth. Kanter initialed for the clearing + officials. + + + Washington, April 30, + 1982 + + + SUBJECT + Argentine Request for LANDSAT + Coverage of Falklands Area + +

NASA has received a “routine” request + from Argentina for LANDSAT coverage + of the Falklands Islands and surrounding area. The Argentines have + requested coverage of:

+

—the open ocean area west of the Falklands on May 7–8;

+

—the Falkland Islands on May 9–11, and

+

—South Georgia on May 10–12.

+

As you know, we are obliged to honor all such requests under the terms of + a US-Argentine Memorandum of + Understanding. You also should know that the Defense Mapping Agency + (DMA) has requested the same + coverage on behalf of the UK through an + existing liaison arrangement.

+

NASA tells us they are obliged to honor + all such DMA taskings. Since all LANDSAT photos are in the public + domain, it is not practical to reject the Argentine request while + honoring the request from DMA.

+

NASA is expected to reply to the + Argentine request promptly, and would appreciate learning our position + no later than COB today.

+

Recommendation:

+

That you authorize me to inform NASA + that the State Department has no objection to favorable action by NASA on the Argentine request.Burt added + the following notation below the recommendation: “Larry: The + critical issue here is the ‘depoliticized’ character of NASA’s programs. I think we must + protect it. RB.” Eagleburger initialed his approval + of the recommendation, April 30.

+
+ +
+ + 198. Memorandum From the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff + (Jones) to Secretary of + Defense WeinbergerSource: Washington National Records + Center, OSD Files, FRC 330–86–0042, + UK 1982. Top Secret. Iklé forwarded the memorandum to + Weinberger under an + April 30 covering memorandum in which Iklé recommended that Weinberger agree to the British request. Iklé also noted that the response + to Jones (see footnote 5 below) had been coordinated + with Burt. A stamped + notation on the covering memorandum indicates that Weinberger saw the memorandum on + April 30. (Washington National Records Center, OSD Files, FRC 330–86–0042, UK 1982) + + + Washington, April 30, + 1982 + + + SUBJECT + UK Request for Support (TS) + +

1. (TS) The UK has requested (TAB A)Not found attached. assistance in + converting RN SUB HARPOON missile for + air launch. Specifically, they request conversion kits (20), necessary + test equipment, training for weapons personnel, OT and E data HARPOON from Navy P3 A/B/C aircraft, and + missile employment advice from Navy HARPOON-experienced aircrew. The + intent is to make 2 NIMRODS HARPOON + capable; however, the decision to incorporate this capability has not + yet been made.

+

2. (TS) The data requested by MODUK has been prepared by the Navy Staff + (TAB B).Not found attached. This + data and the referenced missile training and employment assistance can + be made available to the UK if the + request is approved.

+

3. (TS) Request your agreementThis word was + added as a handwritten replacement for the word “decision.” + on fulfilling the UK request.Weinberger + signed an April 30 memorandum to Jones, which reads in part: “I agree with your + recommendation, as detailed in your 30 April 1982 memorandum, to + provide the requested information to the UK concerning the conversion of RN SUB HARPOON missiles for air launch.” (Washington + National Records Center, OSD Files, + FRC 330–86–0042, UK 1982)

+ + David C. + Jones + General, USAF + +
+
+ +
+ + Managing the Conflict, May 1–June 15, 1982 + +
+ 199. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Kingdom to the Department + of StateSource: Reagan + Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC + Country File, Europe and Soviet Union, United Kingdom + 04/01/1982–07/31/1982) (2). Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Printed from a copy that was + received in the White House Situation Room. + + + London, May + 1, 1982, 1219Z + +

9696. Subject: The Falklands Dispute: Pressing the Diplomatic Option.

+

1. Secret–Entire text.

+

2. Summary: Having come down on their side, we should press HMG not to seek only a military solution, + but also to focus on future diplomatic options. End summary.

+

3. HMG has little faith in a negotiated + agreement. They doubt there is a coherent Argentine regime to reach + agreement with and, in any event, see the Argentines as playing + diplomacy exclusively for time. FCO + sources were telling us last week that, aside from the Secretary’s + mediation efforts, no serious planning was underway on diplomatic + options.

+

4. HMG now hopes that US pressure will bring an Argentine + backdown. But more realistically, their goal will be to force surrender + of the troops on the Falklands with a series of demoralizing but + relatively low-risk military steps and worry about diplomatic solutions + later. The strike on Stanley Airfield,On + the morning of May 1, two British Vulcan heavy bombers based at Ascension Island attacked + the airfield at Port Stanley. This was followed by separate daybreak + strikes by British Sea Harrier + aircraft against other targets in the Falklands/Malvinas, including + the airport at Goose Green. The same day, [text + not declassified], reported on a briefing by a British + Ministry of Defense official on the air raids. During the briefing, + the British official informed [name not + declassified] that preliminary reconnaissance indicated + that “substantial” damage had been inflicted on the airfield at Port + Stanley and that it would be “quite some time” before the runway + damage would be repaired by the Argentines. (Telegram [telegram number, recipients, and date not + declassified]. Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, + NSC Cable File, Falkland File + 05/01/1982) An earlier assessment of the raids was sent by [text not declassified]. (Ibid.) which + has just been announced, fits such a strategy.

+

5. For political reasons, Thatcher needs to keep some diplomatic activity alive if + she means to use military force. Otherwise, parliamentary unity will + dissolve, and the public, which is still split on risking British lives, + could turn against her. Hence, Pym is going to New York—but with a limited brief. According to the + FCO, Pym will simply explore the UNSYG’s ideas and take stock.

+

6. U.S. approach. The weakness of other diplomatic options, and the risks + inherent in an all-out search for a military solution threaten to keep + us on the spot. If Thatcher + can’t budge the Argentine forces, she may turn to us for ever tougher + measures. If she can, she may want to hold the Islands militarily + without looking for a long-term solution. Either way, she will want to + keep us in the grinder—protecting British interests in the South + Atlantic.

+

7. Hence, we have an interest in encouraging the British to think hard + now about diplomatic arrangements (a) to complement the present military + steps and (b) to give the British alternatives should present pressures + bog down—or prevail. We should not let the UK bureaucracy lock onto a solution that depends entirely + on military pressure. Accordingly, we recommend that in his meeting with + Pym,See Document 205. + the Secretary:

+

—Put the British on notice that, even as we aid them to pressure + Argentina for a settlement, we will expect the diplomatic track to be + pursued diligently in the days ahead,

+

—Encourage hard thought about long term options, e.g. trusteeship, to + avoid “unending hostility and insecurity in the South Atlantic.”

+ + Louis + +
+ +
+ + 200. Memorandum From the Director of the Bureau of Politico-Military + Affairs (Burt) to the Under + Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Eagleburger)Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S Special Handling Restrictions Memos + 1979–1983, Lot 96D262, ES Sensitive + May 1–5 1982. Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Brown on April 30; cleared by D. + Kursch (EB) and Robinson (PM/MC). Brown initialed for both Kursch and Robinson. + + + Washington, May 1, + 1982 + + + SUBJECT + Exports to Argentina + +

Our game plan for implementing the arms embargo,See Document 196. + is as follows:

+

—Munitions Control (MC) has in hand a + list of all companies holding valid export licenses for Argentina and + has called them to say their licenses have been suspended, effective + immediately. MC will follow up the calls + with a written notice of suspension. All pending licenses are being + returned without action.

+

—MC has also called Customs to inform + them of the license suspension and request that it take appropriate + action to stop any export of Munitions List items to Argentina. This, + too, will be followed up in writing.

+

—Customs has been asked to pay particular attention to the two warehouses + in Maryland used by Argentina to store materiel destined for air + shipment out of Andrews AFB. Argentina + holds title to at least some of the materiel in these warehouses and + does not need an export license to ship it home. Customs does have the + authority, however, to prevent its export which we have requested them + to exercise.

+

—We have set in motion an early warning system to ensure that Argentine + requests for clearance of cargo (or other) flights into Andrews are + passed to PM and EB for review before they are granted. We are also looking + into the possibility that there may be other military controlled + facilities used by Argentina for picking up cargo that might require + special attention.

+

—Finally, with respect to the FMS + pipeline, PM has directed DSAA by phone and in writing to suspend + deliveries of FMS materiel to any + Argentine entity in the US or anyone in + the US acting on behalf of the GOA and to store such materiel in US controlled facilities.

+

—With respect to Commerce-controlled items, EB is the action bureau, with whatever help PM can offer. Under the NSC decision, Commerce, unlike MC, will not revoke outstanding licenses for dual use items but + only delay issuance of new ones. We can expect, therefore, some leakage + that could cause embarrassing publicity. The recent flaps over the 32 + jet enginesDuring the April 29 Department + press briefing, Fischer was + asked about “reports that the United States approved a license for + the export of some number, probably about 30 jet engines, for Skyhawk fighter planes—I think + their designation is A–4—for + Argentina within the last month, probably around April 8.” Fischer responded: “Last December + the Department of Commerce issued a license for $2 million worth of + aero engine parts applicable to J–65 engines. This Korean War + vintage engine powers the early models of the A–4. Because of its age and its + potential application to civilian non-aircraft uses, it was removed + from the Munitions List in 1980 and falls under commerce export + licensing procedures. It is our understanding that the exporter, who + planned the supply relationship with Argentina, purchased 32 engine + assemblies from the Navy last March. The exporter planned to ship + these engine assemblies to Argentina in April under the December + license. We also understand that Argentina intends to have 12 of + these engine assemblies overhauled in Italy, and recently submitted + a second application for a license to cover this export. No action + has been taken on this license and to our knowledge no engine + assemblies have been shipped out of the United States.” (Telegram + 118259 to all diplomatic and consular posts, May 1; Department of + State, Central Foreign Policy File, D820229–0298) and the + S–61 helicoptersSee Document 149. are prime examples of what we can + confidently look forward to. We have been in touch with Commerce to see + what can be done to deal with the problem. Initially, Commerce will + attempt to identify for us any dual use items for Argentina covered by + valid export licenses. Commerce has warned us, however, that its + computerized case file is backlogged by several months and it will be + almost impossible to identify all outstanding Argentine licenses.

+

Jet Engines—We have no new information on the 32 + jet engines in San Francisco. So far as we know Customs has them all in + custody.

+
+ +
+ + 201. Action Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for + Inter-American Affairs (Enders) + to Secretary of State HaigSource: Department of State, + Executive Secretariat, S/S Special + Handling Restrictions Memos 1979–1983, Lot 96D262, ES Sensitive May 1–5 1982. Secret; + Sensitive. + + + Washington, May 1, + 1982 + + + SUBJECT + Next Steps in Negotiation + +

1. Alternative Paths

+

There are several immediately available.

+

—UN good offices, + including appointment of a mediator (which Perez de Cuellar has now + offered);In telegram 118553 to all + diplomatic and consular posts, May 1, the Department reported that a + UN spokesman stated on April 30 + that Pérez de Cuéllar had + offered his “good offices” to the Argentines and British in order to + resolve the conflict. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy + File, D820229–0299) In telegram 149840 to USUN, May 2, Haig observed to Kirkpatrick: “Clearly over the next few days we will + face the probability of renewed efforts in the Security Council to + help resolve the crisis in the Falklands.” As a result, Haig continued, he had instructed + the Acting Secretary “to be in close touch” with Kirkpatrick “so that we can be + prepared to react appropriately to specific language and + developments.” He added, “our previous instructions and the basic + principles of our position remain valid. Our aim is to uphold the + principles of Resolution 502: cessation of hostilities, withdrawal + of Argentine forces, and a diplomatic solution between the two + sides.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, + D820286–0326)

+

—A joint US-Latin + American effort (Belaunde’s suggestion that Perez act for + Argentina and the U.S. for Britain)Not + further identified. won’t do as such,—it increases our + alienation from the LatinsThe Government of + Peru had also protested the shift in U.S. policy announced on April + 30. Arias Stella responded + to Haig’s April 30 message + sent to all Latin American governments (see Document 196) with a May 1 message to the Secretary of + State, which reads in part: “The Government of Peru deplores the + fact that the Government of the Unites States has adopted measures + that clearly place it in favor of one of the involved parties and + that, in effect, virtually concludes Your Excellency’s exercise of + good offices. Furthermore, my government considers the offer made by + the Government of the United States to offer material military aid + to one of the parties as contravening the purposes of Resolution 502 + of the Security Council of the United Nations by potentially + contributing to the aggravation of the hostilities.” (Telegram 4460 + from Lima, May 1; Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Cable File, Falkland File + 05/01/1982)—but might work if both the U.S. + and Peru acted together as a joint go-between; note that the + possibility of military intervention by Peru could offset Lima’s + acceptability in London);

+ +

—A joint US-Latin + American-European effort (purpose here would be to bring + greater pressure on Thatcher to + compromise; the Germans and Italians are already getting restive; we + could bring those pressures directly to the negotiating table);

+

—A four member version of the preceding (two + Latins, plus U.S. and one European, to overcome Argentinian perception + of a pro-British tilt in the tripartite formula);

+

—Renewal of the U.S. solo (this is not incredible, despite our tilt; the Argentine + response has been measured—so far; however maybe we need more leverage + on both Britain and Argentina).

+

We need to get Brazil involved, to build pressure on + Argentina: The tripartite formula, say with Germany, Brazil and + the U.S., and convening in Washington under our chairmanship, would give + us the best continuing forum. But it may not be acceptable to Argentina + and have to deal with the UN somehow. + Also, we must include the Spanish speakers. Perhaps our best formula is the U.S., Germany, Brazil, Peru, + meeting in New York as a Contact Group.

+

2. Timing and Procedure

+

Action should be immediate, because otherwise some + other formula—Perez de Cuellar or the OAS—will press foward.

+

Thus the first step would be for the British to pass up the UN offer, agreeing to thinking about it but + remaining non-committal.

+

The delicate question is who should propose the + formula. Probably there is no alternative to + our doing it, but there is a risk of a turndown. One danger is + that the Argentines insist on having Perez de Cuellar as the leader of + the effort. We can guard against that by including Peru in our original + proposal.

+

3. Substance

+

Logical point of departure would be our last + proposal, which now becomes negotiable. It is a flexible matrix + and can be reweighted and complicated as necessary to achieve a + result.

+

We should, however, be prepared to switch to the short + five point form, when both parties to the conflict have become + desperate enough. + Shlaudeman cables me now (see + attached) that we might give it a try even in the immediate future.Attached but not printed is a May 1 + backchannel message from Shlaudeman to Enders, in which the former stated that the Junta’s + communiqué in response to Haig’s April 30 statement “was surprisingly soft and + notable for its gentle treatment of the U.S.,” which suggested to + Shlaudeman “that I may + have been wrong in my reaction to your idea of a partial solution + through mutual withdrawal, a third party presence, etc. I think + Galtieri at least still + sees us as pulling him out of the hole. In the circumstances perhaps + we should try him out on the outcome you suggested.” (Backchannel + message 976 from Buenos Aires, May 1; ibid.) I would await a + clash of British and Argentine forces before doing so.

+ +

There remains the question of how to give the right + tilt to the negotiation paragraph to attract both Argentina and + Britain to the short five point form. Here is one + possibility, which tilts slightly toward Argentina.

+

Quote:

+

The two governments acknowledge the existence of conflicting claims to + the sovereignty to the islands. They also acknowledge conflicting views + as to the role the wishes of the inhabitants should play in a + settlement. The purpose of the negotiations will be to reach a + definitive disposition of the sovereignty question within a framework of + guarantees of the rights of the inhabitants. Negotiations will be + conducted with the assistance of the Contact Group and shall conclude no + later than April 30, 1983. Unquote.

+

Recommendation:

+

That you authorize us to proceed along the lines outlined above.Haig + neither approved nor disapproved the recommendation.

+
+ +
+ + 202. Telegram From the Embassy in Peru to the Department of StateSource: Reagan Library, + Executive Secretariat, NSC Cable + File, Falkland File 05/02/1982. Secret; Sensitive; Flash; Nodis. Printed from a copy that was + received in the White House Situation Room. + + + Lima, May 2, + 1982, 0629Z + +

4507. Subject: South Atlantic Peace Proposal: Peruvian Text. Ref: Lima + 4506.In telegram 4506 from Lima, May 2, + Ortiz reported that + Belaúnde called him to the Palace for a meeting during which + Belaúnde telephoned Galtieri + in order to present the terms of the Peruvian peace proposal, which + he had earlier discussed with Haig (see footnote 3 + below). Belaúnde noted that the “events in the South Atlantic” had + caused “alarm and dismay” in Peru and that the “seriousness of the + situation was also of profound concern to the US.” In the course of their + conversation, “Belaunde asked Galtieri to meditate on these proposals and if it + was possible for him to accept these points Belaunde was standing by + to convey the Argentine acceptance to Secretary Haig.” (Ibid.) Shortly before his + meeting with Belaúnde, Ortiz + had transmitted to the Department an earlier version of the Peruvian + proposal, which Arias Stella + had conveyed to him. (Telegram 4505 from Lima, May 2; Department of + State, Central Foreign Policy File, D820229–0309)

+

1. Secret entire text.

+

2. Following are texts in Engish and Spanish languages prepared by + Peruvian President Belaunde and Prime Minister Ullua based upon + conversation with the Secretary evening May 1.No memorandum of conversation of this telephone + conversation has been found. Although he recalled the conversation + as having occurred on May 2, likely conflating the May 1 call with a + follow-up call the following day (see Document + 207 and footnote 3 thereto), + Haig wrote in his + memoirs that Belaúnde telephoned him with “the proposal that one + final attempt be made to stop the fighting and find a peaceful + solution.” “Speaking over an open line,” Haig remembered, “we worked all + day on a new draft.” (Haig, + Caveat, p. 293) Belaúnde recalled that + his May 1 conversation with Haig lasted for three-quarters of an hour and that + he asked Haig “to please + dictate to me the essential points from Britain’s viewpoint. + Haig read them over to + me, and I for my part told him what word was unsatisfactory and what + conditions unacceptable for Argentina. We finally agreed on a plan + which covered seven points, and I left it that I should call + President Galtieri at once + to put that formula to him.” (Freedman, Official + History, vol. II, p. 316) These texts conveyed to + Argentine President Galtieri, + who had them recorded as they were read to him. Reftel reports upon + Belaunde/Galtieri + conversatiton.

+

3. Begin text: South Atlantic Peace Proposal

+

1) An immediate cease fire.

+

2) Mutual withdrawal of forces.

+

3) Introduction of third parties to govern the Islands.

+

4) The two governments acknowledge the existence of conflicting views + with respect to the Islands.

+ +

5) The two governments acknowledge the need to take into account the + views and the interests of the Islanders in the final solution.

+

6) The third parties—or contact group—would be composed of Brazil, Peru, + West Germany, and the United States.

+

7) A final solution will be reached not later than April 30th, 1983, + under the guarantee of the contact group. End text.

+

4. Begin Spanish text: Propuesta de Paz en el Atlantico Sur.

+

1) Cesacion inmediata de hostilidades;

+

2) Retiro mutuo de fuerzas;

+

3) Presencia de representantes ajenos a las partes involucradas en el + conflicto para gobernar temporalmente las Islas;

+

4) Los dos gobiernos reconocen la existencia de reclamaciones + discrepantes y conflictivas sobre la situacion de las Islas;

+

5) Los dos gobiernos reconocen que los puntos de vista y los intereses de + los habitantes locales tienen que ser tomados en cuenta en la solucion + definitiva del problema;

+

6) El grupo de contactu que intervendria de inmediato en las + negociaciones para implementar este acuerdo estaria compuesto por + Brasil, Peru, Republica Federal de Alemania y los Estados Unidos de + America; y,

+

7) Antes del 30 de Abril de 1983 se habra llegado a un acuerdo + definitivo, bajo la responsabilidad del grupo de paises antes + mencionado. End text

+ + Ortiz + +
+ +
+ 203. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in PeruSource: Reagan Library, + Executive Secretariat, NSC Cable + File, Falkland File 05/02/1982. Secret; Sensitive; Flash; Nodis. Printed from a copy that was + received in the White House Situation Room. Drafted by Sherman (S/S–O); cleared in L and in substance by Haig; approved by Enders. (Department of State, + Central Foreign Policy File, N820004–0036) + + + Washington, May 2, 1982, 0904Z + +

118563. Subject: Peruvian Initiative. Ref: A) Lima 4506;See footnote 2, Document + 202. B) Lima 4507.See + Document 202.

+ +

1. Please pass following ASAP to + President Belaunde from Secretary Haig:

+

2. Quote. Dear Mr President: I am most grateful for your message + transmitted through Ambassador Ortiz earlier this morning. The text of the agreement + which you presented to President Galtieri, I believe, should be modified in only one + minor point, that being substitution of the word “deseos” in place of + “puntos de vista” in paragraph five of the Spanish text which we + consider at this point the only authoritative text. I agree that the + actual composition of the contact group called for in the agreement is + open to further discussion.

+

3. If the text is agreeable to President Galtieri and to the other members of the governing + Junta, I will be pleased to present it to Foreign Secretary Pym with whom I will meet at 10 o’clock + this morning.See Document 205.

+

4. I look forward to word from you that such agreement has been + obtained.In telegram 4510 from Lima, + May 2, Ortiz reported that + Belaúnde had telephoned at 10 a.m. (11 a.m. Washington time) to + inform him that Costa Méndez + had asked Belaúnde to convey that the Government of Argentina “in + general” found the seven points of the Peruvian plan acceptable with + “two changes on which the Argentines were very insistent.” The first + was a textual change to paragraph 5. The revised formulation read: + “The two Governments acknowledge the need to take into account the + views concerning the interests of the Islanders in the final + solution.” The second revision proposed the replacement of the + United States with Canada as a member of the contact group, “because + the United States was firmly on the side of the UK.” (Reagan Library, Executive + Secretariat, NSC Cable File, + Falkland File 05/02/1982) Belaúnde later telephoned Galtieri to discuss the revisions + and reported the outcome of the conversation to Ortiz. (Telegram 4511 from Lima, + May 2; ibid.) With warm regards, Alexander Haig. End quote.

+ + Haig + +
+ +
+ + 204. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in + BrazilSource: Reagan + Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC + Cable File, Falkland File 05/02/1982. Confidential; Sensitive; + Niact Immediate; Nodis. Sent for information + Immediate to Buenos Aires and the White House. Printed from a copy + that was received in the White House Situation Room. Drafted by + Kilday; cleared by + Einaudi, Enders, McFarlane, Fontaine, Bremer, and in S/S–O; approved by Haig. (Department of State, + Central Foreign Policy File, [no film number]) + + + Washington, May 2, 1982, 1530Z + +

118569. Subject: Letter to President Figueiredo.

+

Following is text of letter from President Reagan to President Figueiredo.Variations of + this letter were sent to Presidents Royo, Herrera Campíns, and Belaúnde on May 2. In a + May 1 memorandum to Clark, + forwarding drafts for approval, Bremer noted: “Initial reactions of Latin + governments to U.S. actions [in the South Atlantic crisis] reflect + concern about continued U.S. commitment to the inter-American + system. Many predict a weakening of hemispheric relationships.” The + purpose of the letters would be to “answer these concerns and to + keep opinion from crystallizing against us.” (Reagan Library, Latin + American Affairs Directorate Files, NSC, Falklands/Malvinas: NSC & State Memos, 1982) Telegram 118568 to Caracas + and Panama City, May 2, transmitted the letters to Royo and Herrera Campins. (Ibid.) Reagan’s letter to Belaúnde, sent + to Lima in telegram 118571, May 2, added that he was “particularly + appreciative” of Belaúnde’s efforts to “gain agreement by the + Government of Argentina for a peace plan that would prevent further + conflict and provide for a definitive solution to the problem.” + (Ibid.) Request Embassy arrange delivery at earliest + appropriate time. There will be no signed original. If queried Embassy + may advise GOB that we do not intend to + release text but would have no objection if GOB wishes to do so.

+

Begin text: Dear Mr. President:

+

It was with a very heavy heart that I acted April 30 to register the + clear opposition of the United States Government to Argentina’s use of + force to establish its claim to sovereignty over the Malvinas Islands. + This was a painful decision, deferred for several weeks, and one which + we had hoped could be avoided. It became unavoidable after our efforts + to help both parties find a peaceful solution had failed to prevent + increasing prospects of armed conflict.

+

Please understand, Mr. President, that the measures ordered on April 30 + relate only to the issue of the use of force to resolve territorial + disputes. This is a serious violation of fundamental law which cannot be + accepted without grave peril to the peace and the integrity of the + Hemisphere and the entire world order.

+

The United States has taken no position on the issue of sovereignty over + the Islands or any of the associated questions. It is our judgement that + a peaceful resolution of the basic issues is achievable only through negotiations between the + interested parties. However, such negotiations can only proceed under a + climate of mutual respect for the rule of law.

+

Like Brazil, the United States believes that UN Security Council Resolution 502 provides the framework + in which this crisis must be addressed. We are pledged to continue to do + everything in our power, including resumption of the mediation effort if + the parties so wish, to help establish the basis for a negotiated + settlement and to prevent this crisis from reaching tragic + proportions.

+

Your long-awaited visit to Washington May 12 will provide opportunity for + a further exchange of views on the crisis as well as a review of other + international and hemispheric issues of mutual interest.See Document 255. + We look forward to your arrival with great anticipation and know that we + will benefit from your counsel. Sincerely yours, Ronald Reagan. End text.

+ + Haig + +
+ +
+ 205. Editorial Note +

On May 2, 1982, Secretary of State Alexander + M. Haig, Jr. met with British Foreign Secretary Francis Pym at the Department of State. + According to British Ambassador to the United States Sir Nicholas Henderson, Pym had traveled to the United States + for meetings with Haig and + United Nations Secretary General Javier + Pérez de Cuéllar, the purpose of which, Henderson thought, was “largely” to + “assuage parliamentarians” in the House of Commons who “were calling on + him to be more active diplomatically.” (Henderson, Mandarin, page 456) + Although a British telegram reporting on the meeting has been published + on the Thatcher Foundation + website, no U.S. record of Haig’s meeting with Pym has been found. However, a Department of State + situation report (as of 1800 Eastern Daylight Time, May 2) included + information about the meeting: “British Foreign Secretary Pym met Sunday morning with Secretary + Haig for more than two + hours. Emerging from the meeting, Pym reported that the two men had explored the + possibilities ‘for a negotiated settlement, however difficult they may seem.’ In a news conference + later in the afternoon Pym + reported that he had not asked for any action by the US at this time.” (Telegram 118577 to all + diplomatic and consular posts, May 3; Department of State, Central + Foreign Policy File, D820229–0521) In the complete transcript of remarks + made by Pym and Haig to the press following the + morning meeting, the Foreign Secretary stated that he “came here last + week to negotiate with Mr. Secretary Haig, as a mediator” and had “come back this week to + consult with him as an ally,” and that he and Haig had “discussed the whole area + together.” (Telegram 118572 to all American Republic posts and all OECD + posts, May 2; Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, + D820229–0472) In her memoirs, Thatcher recalled that Haig had “put to” Pym the Peruvian peace plan in their meeting (dated + somewhat uncertainly on “1 and 2 May”), “though we had no sight of it + until later.” (Thatcher, Downing Street Years, page 216)

+

Following the meeting with Haig, + that afternoon Pym also met with + Secretary of Defense Caspar W. + Weinberger at the British Embassy. No memorandum of + conversation or other official record of this meeting has been found. In + his memoirs, Weinberger wrote + that he discussed with Pym and + Henderson “the supply of + arms, ammunition and war supplies for the British seaborne counterattack + convoys approaching the Falklands.” “I made clear that we would supply + them with everything they needed that we could spare, and that we would + do it very quickly.” (Weinberger, Fighting for Peace, page + 208) Recalling that Haig’s + commitment to a “diplomatic solution” was “not quite what the President + had in mind, nor what I envisioned,” Weinberger continued, “I had told Mr. Pym that our arms supply effort would + intensify, and that we would work as effectively as we could to support + the British counterattack.” (Ibid., page 209) Weinberger also wrote in his daily + diary of the meeting: “Met with Francis + Pym and Nico + Henderson on porch at British Embassy. They made no + requests for aid now—hope for [illegible—on own?] big victory—possibly + at sea & then they can discuss how to settle in permanently—They + may, after 60 days, need a carrier to use as a floating airfield for + their fighter planes.” (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, + Weinberger Papers, + Department of Defense Appointment and Diary File, May 1982)

+
+ +
+ + 206. Situation Report Prepared in the National Security + AgencySource: + + + Washington, May 2, 1982, 2158Z + +

[Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Cable File, Falkland File 05/02/1982. Top Secret; + Codeword. 8 pages not declassified.]

+
+ +
+ 207. Telegram From the Embassy in Peru to the Department of StateSource: Reagan Library, + Executive Secretariat, NSC Cable + File, Falkland File 05/02/1982. Secret; Sensitive; Flash; Nodis. Printed from a copy that was + received in the White House Situation Room. + + + Lima, May 2, + 1982, 2326Z + +

4512. Subj: Peruvian Initiative: Belaunde Speaks With Costa Mendez. Refs: Lima 4513.Telegram 4513 from Lima, May 2, transmitted + the revised Spanish text of the Peruvian proposal. + (Ibid.)

+

1. (S–Entire text).

+

2. Upon conclusion of conversation with the Secretary afternoon May + 2,No other record of this conversation + has been found. See footnote 3, Document + 202. President Belaunde called Argentine Foreign + Minister Costa Mendez in Buenos + Aires. The Argentine was finally reached while on his way to a meeting + with President Galtieri and the + Junta at 1730 EDT.

+

3. While Prime Minister Ulloa + listened on an extension, Belaunde told Costa Mendez that the Secretary informed him that + Foreign Secretary Pym appears + prepared to accept the structure of the proposed agreement.For Haig’s + May 2 meeting with Pym, see + Document 205. Belaunde read for + Costa Mendez the slight + modifications the US side proposed: a) + In paragraph three, inserting “dos” between “las partes involucrados”—a + style change—; and, b) replacing the word “gobernar” (govern) with a + “administrar” (administer) in the last part of paragraph three.

+

4. Turning to the troublesome “wishes” vs “point of view” disagreement in + paragraph five, Belaunde conveyed the language agreed upon in his talk with the Secretary: replace + “deseos” (desires/wishes) with “aspiraciones” (aspirations).

+

5. Belaunde then discussed various modifications in paragraph six to meet + Argentine concerns about nations participating in the contact group. + There was no final agreement on wording. Belaunde eventually suggested + that if the Argentines could not accept the current wording, the best + solution might be to leave the matter with an undertaking to reach + subsequent agreement on membership. In Spanish the text would read

+

Begin text: El grupo de contacto que intervendria de inmediato en las + negociaciones para implementar este convenio estaria computo por varios + paises a designarse de comun acuerdo. End text. An unofficial English + translation would be: Begin text: The contact group which would + immediately begin negotiations to implement this agreement would be + composed of several countries designated by common consent. End + text.

+

6. Belaunde told Costa Mendez + that while he understood President Galtieri had to listen to various views from the Junta, + nonetheless, time was running out quickly. The goal was to complete some + sort of an agreement today. The Peruvian President stressed that the + absence of armed conflict today was a direct result of the progress + being made on these negotiations. Renewed conflict would surely follow + if no solution found.

+

7. In urging Costa Mendez to get + Junta approval for the proposed agreement, Belaunde described it as an + “Argentine triumph although not a UK + capitulation”, “a dignified and timely” peace. Belaunde suggested that + in order to get something signed today, the GOA might like to consider the possibility of instructing + its Ambassador at Lima (and the UK, its + Ambassador) to sign the document here.

+

8. Comment: In subsequent conversation with Ulloa, the Prime Minister said that Costa Mendez “was noncommittal,” he + had “taken careful note of the revised proposal” but that “final + decisions” were “in the other hands”.

+

9. Reftel transmits current Spanish text.

+ + Ortiz + +
+ +
+ + 208. Significant Event Report Prepared in the National Military + Command CenterSource: + Washington National Records Center, OSD Files, FRC 330–84–0003, Argentina (Jan–15 May) + 1982. Secret. + + + Washington, May 2, 1982, 2000 EDT + + + SUBJECT + Falklands (U) + +

1. (S/US/UK only) British intelligence reported to NSA that at 021856Z + May 82, the UK submarine Conqueror + attacked the Argentine light cruiser Belgrano with torpedoes in the + southern sector of the exclusion zone. The report indicated that the + Belgrano was hit.Falkland Islands Situation + Report Number 46, as of 0600 EDT, + May 3, noted that the General Belgrano was + struck “just outside the 200-mile zone,” adding: “The UK MOD said the cruiser is believed to + be severely damaged, but the sub suffered no damage and had resumed + its patrol. Argentina acknowledged the General + Belgrano was ‘damaged.’” (Telegram 118587 to all diplomatic + and consular posts, May 3; Department of State, Central Foreign + Policy File, D820230–0196) The Argentines confirmed the sinking in a + communiqué issued later on May 3. (Department of State Falkland + Working Group Situation Report Number 47, May 3; Department of + State, Executive Secretariat, Files of Alexander M. Haig, Jr., 1981–1982, Lot 82D370, + unlabeled folder) (Source: NSA NOIWON)

+

2. (U) Reuters and Dow Jones news services report that Peruvian President + Belaunde announced that both the UK and + Argentina had agreed to a ceasefire in the Falkland crisis. President + Belaunde who said he was acting as mediator between the US and Argentina, said a seven-point + document has been agreed on by Argentina and the US, which acted in coordination with Britain. Belaunde + further stated the document was drafted by Secretary of State Haig and passed to Argentine + authorities by him. State Ops has not confirmed the report. (Reuters 162 + 021932 EDT, DJ–05–02–82 2317 GMT and PhonCon State OPS/NMCC)

+

3. (U) Selected notifications made as directed by J–30.

+ + P.M. Hekman + Jr + Rear Admiral, USN + Deputy Director for Operations (NMCC) + +
+ +
+ + 209. Telegram From the Embassy in Peru to the Department of StateSource: Reagan Library, + Executive Secretariat, NSC Cable + File, Falkland File 05/03/1982. Confidential; Sensitive; Flash; + Nodis. Printed from a copy + that was received in the White House Situation Room. + + + Lima, May 3, + 1982, 1434Z + +

4515. Subject: End of the Peruvian Initiative.

+

1. (C–Entire text).

+

2. At 2345 EDTMay 2. President Belaunde telephoned me to + advise me he had just finished speaking with President Galtieri. He reported that Galtieri stated that the Argentine + Government was prepared to study the Peruvian peace proposal with + serenity and thoroughness. However, Galtieri said that owing to the quote unspeakable + unquote British military actions of today’s date, specifically the + torpedoing and presumed destruction of the Argentine flagship + “Belgrano”See Document 208. there was nothing left for Argentina + to discuss. All that remained was to fight.

+

3. President Belaunde said that with this message from President + Galtieri he considered the + Peruvian peace initiative to be terminated. The President said it was + very lamentable that the British actions should have occurred when + serious negotiations were underway with a high chance for success. He + condemned the UK’s attacks and said they + would enflame the Hemisphere.

+

4. Belaunde plans to call the Secretary to advise him directly of the + termination of his efforts.See Document 211. Before talking with Belaúnde + on May 3 (see Document 211) Haig met Inman for a breakfast meeting in + which they discussed “at great length” the “potential mediation + efforts via the U.N. Secretary General and the Peruvians.” According + to the memorandum for the record of the breakfast, produced by the + CIA, the discussion concluded + that the “battles over the weekend appear to have thrown cold water + on any of these efforts which may not have had any real chance of + success in any case.” (Memorandum for the Record, May 3; Central + Intelligence Agency, Office of the Director of Central Intelligence, + Job 89B00224R: Committees, Task Forces, Boards, and Councils Files, + Box 11, Folder 406: Memos for the Record of Mtgs w/Sec and DepSec of State (Apr 81–Dec + 85))

+ + Ortiz + +
+ +
+ + 210. Telegram From the Embassy in Argentina to the Department of + StateSource: Washington + National Records Center, OSD Files, + FRC 330–84–0003, Argentina (Jan–15 May) 1982. Secret; Specat; Immediate; Exdis. Sent for information + Immediate to Montevideo, Panama City, and USSOUTHCOM. Printed from a copy + that was received in the Joint Chiefs of Staff message + center. + + + Buenos Aires, May 3, 1982, 1522Z + +

2708. Military handle as Specat + Exclusive. Subj: Evacuation Contingency Planning. Ref: Buenos Aires + 2248.In telegram 2248 from Buenos + Aires, April 15, the Embassy described the staffing pattern it would + adopt should a reduction in personnel be required. (Department of + State, Central Foreign Policy File, D820196–0571)

+

1. (S–Entire text.)

+

2. As I told Ambassador Enders on + the telephone, we have a report from a reliable source in the + Presidential Palace that the mood in the top levels of the military has + turned very ugly against the U.S. The story is that the cruiser + “Belgrano” was “pulverized” with heavy loss of life. Allegedly, the U.S. + located the ship for the British and gave its permission for the use of + a “special weapon” against the “Belgrano” (the implication being a + nuclear weapon). The source advised one of our attaches “to get out of + town.”

+

3. We are making appropriate representations to remind the GOA of its responsibility for the security + of this mission and its personnel. However, in view of the “Belgrano” + incident and what seems to me the likelihood of new naval engagements in + the South Atlantic, I request the Department’s authorization to declare + the post in Phase II of the relevant emergency levels. I ask for + authorization for the departure of dependents of our military personnel, + both DAO and MILGP, given the understandable anxiety among these + officers. I also request authorization to prepare for the reduction in + non-essential personnel and their dependents as indicated in para two reftel. The dependents of our military will depart by road + or ferry for Montevideo once the Department has given its approval. We + shall be in touch with the Department on the method and timing for the + larger evacuation.In telegram 2727 from + Buenos Aires, May 3, the Embassy transmitted its plan for the + initial evacuation of dependents of Embassy military personnel, + followed by an “across-the-board reduction of personnel.” + (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D820231–0432) In + telegram 120585 to Buenos Aires, May 4, the Department authorized + the Embassy “to proceed with evacuation of all dependents and + non-essential personnel. We recommend, however, that departure be + expedited preferably over a period of three days.” (Department of + State, Central Foreign Policy File, D820233–0885)

+ + Shlaudeman + +
+ +
+ + 211. Transcript of a Telephone Conversation Between Peruvian President + Belaúnde and Secretary of State HaigSource: + Department of State, Executive Secretariat, Files of Alexander M. Haig, Jr., 1981–1982, + Lot 82D370, No folder. Secret; Sensitive. Haig was speaking from Washington; + Belaúnde was in Lima. + + + May 3, + 1982, 3:32–3:40 p.m. + +

H: Mr. President?

+

B: Yes, how are you? How are things going?

+

H: They are still very worrisome. I wanted to share some thinking with + you and get your opinion. You recall last night we agreed to reconsider + what we might be able to do.A possible + reference to the conversation between Haig and Belaúnde described in Document 207. I think we came so close in the + effort you had launched that it would be a tragedy not to keep that + possibility alive. I am very worried that in the days ahead, the + situation is going to become very extreme. What I thought was + perhaps—just talking unofficially, ad referendum—perhaps we could get + the British—and I don’t know that I can, but I could even have the + President try—to offer to have a period of ceasefire.

+

B: That would be very, very good.

+

H: . . . during which a Contact Group, composed of Peru, Venezuela, + Brazil, the Federal Republic, Jamaica and the US, would then prepare and put forward proposals to the two + governments.A draft timetable for the + convening of the Contact Group and the Peruvian submission of the + 7-point peace proposal to the Argentines and British, as well as for + the subsequent consideration of the proposal by the two parties + during which a ceasefire would be imposed, was produced by the + Department on May 3. A copy, bearing a handwritten time of 2:30 + p.m., is in the Department of State, Executive Secretariat, Files of + Alexander M. Haig, Jr., + 1981–1982, Lot 82D370, No folder.

+

B: You mentioned Jamaica?

+

H: To try to keep some balance and keep it in the Hemisphere.

+

B: That would not be to administer the Island? Only to advise?

+

H: It would be a Contact Group. You recall, when we stopped the + discussions, the Argentines wanted to add two additional parties.

+

B: Do you think, in that case, it would be just a few days for a truce? + How long do you think it could be?

+

H: Even a 24-hour period, after the Contact Group put together a proposal + which we would then furnish to the two capitals from the Contact Group + and during the consideration of those proposals there would be a + ceasefire so we would have to move quickly.

+ +

B: That might be a solution. Last night, Galtieri talked to me.See + Document 209. They were + discouraged; with the hostilities, the climate is not appropriate for + any discussion. I am not hopeful. Two emissaries from President + Galtieri arrived in Lima a + few hours ago. I have not seen them yet. I am seeing Ambassador + Ortiz at 3:30. I have to + talk to all of them. Evidently, if the truce can be obtained, that would + give the proper climate for further discussions.

+

H: Perhaps the British could make this initiative so the onus is not on + the shoulders of Buenos Aires.

+

B: Were the British receptive to the 7 points?

+

H: They did not reject them; they did not accept them.See Document 205. + It might be possible. They did not take them seriously because they did + not think the Argentine side would accept them.

+

B: In those conditions, it’s so hard to get a solution. If one side + rejects and the other also rejects, it is hard to get it started. + Perhaps the solution could be proposed by a third party.

+

H: I thought it could be convened at the Ambassadorial level—here at the + OAS perhaps—the six Ambassadors I + spoke of who would put together a proposal drawing from the work you did + to just put it to both capitals. During consideration of that, I would + try to see if I could get the British Government to announce a + ceasefire, or a standdown.

+

B: If the British would announce they are ready to accept a ceasefire + without any conditions or without any documents for, let’s say, 48 or 72 + hours, immediately I am sure we could set up the basis for a solution. + But it is essential that they announce they are ready to stop. + Naturally, the hostilities are continuing to go on. Do you have any news + today? I heard about a Mirage plane being shot down and a small + Argentine ship being sunk. I don’t know what to believe. The British say + one thing, and the Argentines something different.

+

H: I understand there is a rumor in Buenos Aires that we were colluding + with the British on the torpedoing of the cruiser.See Document 210. + There is no truth to that at all. We are not providing intelligence nor + are we collaborating on anything military.

+

B: I understood the ship was drifting—not completely sunk. What do you + know?

+

H: I expressed concern to the British side and they decided not to sink + it—they could have—but it is just damaged.

+ +

B: Do you have any idea how many people are on the cruiser? I heard + 750.

+

H: It’s closer to 1,000.

+

B: Very shortly, I will talk to the two Argentines sent by General + Galtieri and then to your + Ambassador.No record of this discussion + has been found. I recommend the British announce they are + ready for a ceasefire for 1, 2 or 3 days. That would give us time to + move around.

+

H: Let me do some further work. I have no assurance I can get the British + to do this. But before I do anything, I will send you a message telling + you what I’m doing.

+

B: Costa Mendez talked to our + Minister this morning and while they were going through the 7 points, + they got the news about the cruiser, and they ruled the whole thing + out.

+

H: I can understand that very easily. I would feel the same way.

+

B: I think the next move should come from Britain—willingness to have a + ceasefire. We know the Argentines are ready to accept it.

+

H: Let me put a plan together and be sure you are comfortable with it. In + the meantime, would it be helpful for me to send General Walters to be at your side during + this?

+

B: I don’t think it is essential because we can communicate by phone. + There is always so much publicity. We can get in touch and, if + necessary, something like that could be done. I have complete confidence + in Ambassador Ortiz—he is a good + friend.

+

H: He was very carefully picked for that position. All right, Mr. + President, I will be in touch with you.

+

B: We will be in contact. Thank you for calling.

+

H: Good-bye, Mr. President.

+
+ +
+ + 212. Letter From Secretary of State Haig to British Foreign Secretary PymSource: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, + S/S Special Handling + Restrictions Memos 1979–1983, Lot 96D262, ES Sensitive May 1–5 1982. Secret. + + + Washington, May 3, + 1982 + Dear Francis: + +

In his letter to the Prime Minister last Thursday,April 29. See Document + 190. President Reagan expressed the view that, whatever happens + militarily, there must be a negotiated solution to the Falklands crisis + if we are to avoid open-ended hostility and instability. The Prime + Minister and you have made clear to the world your commitment—which has + never been in doubt here—to reaching a settlement.

+

We are concerned that your military successes have not had the desired + effect of making the Argentines more reasonable. Our assessment is that + the fatalistic mentality characteristic of the Argentines is becoming + stronger with each setback. Paradoxically—and tragically—the Argentines + may well be waiting, and trying, for a military success of their own + before making a serious move toward a settlement. Such a strategy would + be consistent with everything we know about the Argentines.

+

This confronts us with the danger that as the military situation gets + worse for the Argentines—whether or not Galtieri survives—you will be left with no alternative + but a major long-term military burden. We know that you are prepared for + this, but also that you would strongly prefer to secure your objective + through an agreement.

+

We are also concerned that international opinion will increasingly + reflect a belief, however untrue, that British military action is the + principal obstacle to a peaceful solution. This misperception will grow + if it appears that the United Kingdom, in light of its recent victories, + is not prepared to take an initiative to achieve peace. This line of + argument will only make it easier for the Argentines to evade the onus + for the diplomatic impasse, not to mention harder for you to sustain + international support. A final concern is that our decision clearly and + fully to support you requires that we defend your actions in the face of + an increasingly hostile hemispheric reaction. We will both need to do + all we can to conserve support.

+

It therefore seems to us that this is the best moment to show concretely + that you are exhausting the possibilities for a settlement, and indeed, perhaps the last clear + opportunity for an actual breakthrough, if our forecast of Argentine + reactions to further military reverses is true. We would like to offer a + suggestion in this spirit.

+

We suggest that the United States and Peru make a further peace proposal + to the parties, stipulating that they have forty-eight hours in which to + accept or reject it, with it understood that no response constitutes + rejection. This period could begin at noon Washington time + Wednesday.May 5.

+

To maximize the pressure on the Argentines to accept a fair proposal, and + to deal with the political problems I outlined above, we suggest that + Her Majesty’s Government announce, at the time of presentation of the + proposal by the United States and Peru, that British forces will take no + offensive action during the forty-eight hour period, provided the + Argentines show corresponding restraint. I have enclosed a suggested + statement that reflects our best sense of how this offer might be cast + so as to avoid any potential for Argentine humiliation and therefore + rejection.Attached but not printed, the + text of the proposed statement reads: “British forces would be + ordered to refrain from offensive action in the general area for a + 48-hour period commencing at 1600 GMT Wednesday, May 5, provided that Argentine naval and + air forces would be willing to stand clear of the islands by at + least 200 nautical miles, would not take threatening action against + British forces elsewhere, and would not resupply units on the + islands during this period. Should agreement not be reached by the + end of the 48-hour period, existing rules of engagement would be + re-established.” The choice of the Wednesday noon starting + point would give you time to verify that the Argentines give the + appropriate orders.

+

You would obviously want to enter such a period knowing that you would + not bear the blame if it failed to produce results. The proposal we + would make is enclosed.The seven-point + peace proposal is attached but not printed. It reflects our + recent discussions, and we believe it ought to be acceptable to you. If + you agree to this approach, I am confident we can get Peruvian agreement + to co-sponsor the proposal.

+

Unless there is an arrangement for suspending military action for a + brief, fixed period of intensive diplomatic effort, I am afraid that the + Argentines and others will succeed in blaming failure to achieve a + political settlement on your military actions. Conversely, if there is a + UK initiative of the sort I have + suggested to accompany a new proposal, you will have shored up your + international support and, if it succeeds, established a basis for an + acceptable settlement. Having given the Argentines temporary relief from + hostilities so that they could consider the new proposal, and being in a + position to accept it yourselves, it would be clear that you have done everything + possible to avert further conflict.

+

We are convinced that an initiative along these lines is what it will + take to open up the possibility for a peaceful solution.On this new set of proposals, Henderson later wrote that “the + Americans were not at all deterred by the sinking [of the General Belgrano] from pursuing their + attempts at a diplomatic solution. Haig sent Enders, the Under-Secretary at the State Department + dealing with Latin America [sic], round to + see me to discuss amendments to the Peruvian plan. This was followed + by a lengthy session I had with Haig after which he put fresh proposals to London + and Buenos Aires.” (Henderson, Mandarin, p. 456) + A British record of Henderson’s May 3 meeting with Haig is published on the Thatcher Foundation + website.

+

Sincerely,

+ + Alexander M. + Haig, Jr.Printed from a + copy with this typed signature. + +
+ +
+ 213. Information Memorandum From the Director of the Bureau of + Politico-Military Affairs (Burt) + to Secretary of State HaigSource: Department of State, + Executive Secretariat, S/S Special + Handling Restrictions Memos 1979–1983, Lot 96D262, ES Sensitive May 1–5 1982. Secret; + Sensitive. Drafted by J.M. Gibney (PM/SAS); cleared by Ogden and Brown. + + + Washington, May 3, + 1982 + + + SUBJECT + UK Requests for Military + Support + +

I approved on May 3 the British request for the expedited sale of the + following US military equipment:

+

—One Phalanx + weapons system,Burt drew an asterisk after this + word, which corresponds to the following handwritten note at the + bottom of the memorandum: “Larry: This is a shipborne, rapid-firing + gun for air defense. RB.” + with support, spares and ammunition: $15.8 million (no Congressional + notification required as MDE portion of + sale is $9.4 million).

+

Delivery will take place by May 10.

+
+ + +
+ 214. Information Memorandum From the Director of the Bureau of + Politico-Military Affairs (Burt) + to the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Eagleburger)Source: Department of State, Under + Secretary of State for Political Affairs, Miscellaneous Files, March + 1981–February 1983, Lot 83D210, Falklands [Folder 1]. Confidential; + Nodis. Drafted by Kanter. + + + Washington, May 3, + 1982 + + + SUBJECT + Delivery of Civilian Helicopters to Argentina + +

Customs informed us today that a Hughes 500–D helicopter was on the dock + in Los Angeles awaiting shipment to Buenos Aires where the acknowledged + end-user would be the Argentine Air Force. Three engine spares also may + be involved.

+

The 500–D is an unarmed civilian helicopter comparable to the Army’s + Cobra attack helicopter. The 500–D, however, does not require either a + munitions control or a Commerce Department export license.

+

I have contacted the Commerce Department which has agreed to hold up + shipment on the pretext of clarifying whether the helicopter in question + is a model 500–D or a model 500–MD (which would require an export + license).

+

I think we have plugged the dike on this one, but it obviously was a + close call. We probably will not be so lucky in the future, and we + should expect to experience some leakage in our “arms” embargo to + Argentina.

+
+ + +
+ 215. Telegram From the Mission to United Nations to the Department of + StateSource: Department + of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D820231–0500. Secret; + Immediate; Exdis. Sent for + information Immediate to Buenos Aires and London. + + + New York, May 3, 1982, 2319Z + +

1214. Subject: (U) Falklands Crisis: Ambassador Kirkpatrick Confers With UN Sec Gen and Security Council + President.

+

1. Secret–Entire text.

+

1. Ambassador Kirkpatrick met + with SYG and President of SC, PRC PermRep + Ling Qing, May 3, to consult + about Falklands crisis. Meeting was held at request of Ling Qing and SYG who have been consulting SC members in groups and individually.

+

2. Meeting began with announcement by SYG that Argentine cruiser, Belgrano, had sunk with as many + as 500 men on board. On this most somber note, SYG said that his efforts to assist in the peaceful + resolution of the conflict would be made much more difficult. Equally, + the urgency of the UN’s task had been + greatly increased by the Belgrano developments and the US decision to support the UK. These greatly increased the urgency of + a UN mediating role.

+

3. Specifically referring to his consultations with Pym and Roca in the past 48 hours, de Cuellar said he had + developed some proposals, so far procedural, repeat procedural, only, + which he had presented to the parties which they were now considering; + he expected answers by May 5.Pérez de Cuéllar began + meeting separately with the two sides on May 2, proposing measures + that included simultaneous force withdrawal and negotiations toward + a diplomatic solution. He continued to meet with both parties until + May 21. (Yearbook of the United Nations, + 1982, p. 1328)

+

4. De Cuellar and Ling Qing + solicited US views as to possible SC actions. Ambassador Kirkpatrick replied that US would welcome appropriate UN initiative. The conflict in the South + Atlantic was dangerous. In an interdependent and volatile world, the + danger that the conflict could spread must be taken most seriously, and + the UN had been created to deal with + such problems.

+

5. Ambassador Kirkpatrick agreed + that effort now focusing on procedural aspects of a solution was the + correct starting point. This was wise and correct. She thought it was + necessary that the President of the Council and the SYG work aggressively at finding a way + towards stopping the conflict. While there was a need to push ahead, it + was perhaps better not to call an SC + meeting immediately. Ambassador Kirkpatrick concluded by + stating strongly that the SYG could + count on strong US support for his + efforts.

+

6. Footnote: While the consultations were chaired by SC President, it is perhaps noteworthy that + he appeared to be working very closely with the SYG. During the conversation, the SYG usually took the lead.

+ + Kirkpatrick + +
+ +
+ 216. Memorandum From Acting Secretary of Defense Carlucci to the Secretaries of the + Military Departments, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff + (Jones), the Under Secretary + of Defense for Policy (Iklé), + the Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering (DeLauer) and the Directors of Defense + AgenciesSource: National + Archives, RG 218, CJCS Files, FRC 218–92–0030, 820 United Kingdom + Mar 81–17 Jun 82. Secret; Sensitive. A copy was sent to Haig. Attached to another copy of + the memorandum is an undated covering memorandum from Iklé to Weinberger stating that the + procedures were worked out with representatives of the British + Embassy, the Department of State, the OJCS, and OSD. A + stamped notation on the covering memorandum indicates that Carlucci saw it on May 4. + (Washington National Records Center, OSD Files, FRC 330–84–0004, UK (May) 1982) Weinberger was in Brussels for a meeting of the + NATO Defense Planning + Committee. + + + Washington, May 4, + 1982 + + + SUBJECT + Materiel Support to the UK + (U) + +

(S) The following procedure should be followed in processing British + requests for support related to Falkland Island operations:

+

—As is normally the case, specific requests will be sent by the British + to the appropriate Service and + processed in accordance with current laws and procedures. The British + will use the words “UK Op Corporate” to + identify Falkland support requests. The Services will process these on + an expedited basis. Requests that cannot be referred to a specific + Service or that fall outside + of current procedures will be sent to OASD/ISP (Dr. Zakheim/3D777/697-0209).

+

—At the same time the requests are forwarded to the appropriate Service, copies will be provided by + the British to OASD/ISP (Lt Col + Walker/3D777/697-0209), the OJCS (Col + Brudvig/2C867/697-2656) and + State/PM (Mr. Ogden/Rm 7419/632-3882). These offices + will be the focal points for their organizations in tracking support + requests and preparing integrated lists, which will be handled on a + close-hold, need-to-know basis.Burt informed Eagleburger of the agreed + arrangements in a May 3 memorandum, adding: “The British will + continue to make sensitive requests through the high-level channels + they have been using thus far.” (Department of State, Under + Secretary of State for Political Affairs, Miscellaneous Files, March + 1981–February 1983, Lot 83D210, Falklands [Folder 1]) Any + exceptions taken by these organizations to specific requests should be + immediately fowarded to Lt Col Walker.

+

—Services will notify the above points of contact when actions are + completed.

+

—By COB each day, OUSD/P will provide to + me a summary of requests received that day, noting any exceptions made + and corresponding policy recommendations.See Document 241. Additionally, + the daily report will list completed actions and those still + outstanding.

+ Frank + Carlucci +
+ +
+ 217. Telegram From the Embassy in Argentina to the Department of + StateSource: Department + of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D820233–0368. Confidential; + Niact Immediate; Exdis. Attached to another copy of + the telegram is a May 4 note from Poindexter to Howe that reads: “Anything you can do to stop + discussion of intelligence would be appreciated.” (Washington + National Records Center, OSD Files, + FRC 330–84–0003, Argentina (Jan–15 May) 1982)) + + + Buenos Aires, May 4, 1982, 1916Z + +

2785. Subject: Sinking of the Belgrano: Alleged U.S. Role.

+

1. (C–Entire text.)

+

2. We continue to make no headway in our efforts to put at rest the story + that the U.S. provided satellite intelligence which permitted the + British to locate and sink the “Belgrano.” Army Chief of Staff Vaquero + sent me word this morning that the Argentines have “concrete proof” that + such was the case. Has Mallea + Gil been briefed on this issue?

+ +

3. Telam, the government wire service here, is carrying a story quoting + an unnamed informant in the Pentagon to the effect that the U.S. has “at + least one spy satellite” in the South Atlantic and that a great part of + the information which it obtains is transmitted to the U.K.

+

4. Another of our problems is created by the NOAA satellite photographs of the weather over the + Falklands which are appearing in the local press. The distinction + between weather satellites and those used to obtain military information + is not one likely to be grasped very easily by the Argentine public.

+

5. The press here has also picked up a purported statement by Secretary + Weinberger that we would + provide the U.K. with every kind of support, including logistical, + material and information. This last is taken as confirmation of the + allegation.

+ + Shlaudeman + +
+ +
+ 218. Memorandum From James M. + Rentschler, Dennis C. + Blair, and Roger W. + Fontaine of the National Security Council Staff to the + President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Clark)Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Latin + America/Central, Argentina (04/28/1982–05/04/1982). No + classification marking. Sent for action. A stamped notation at the + top of the memorandum indicates that Clark saw it. + + + Washington, May 4, + 1982 + + + SUBJECT + The Falkland Islands: What Now? + +

Situation

+

The sinking of the Belgrano brings the South Atlantic conflict to an + alarmingly new and perhaps desperate stage, one which throws into + sharper relief the negative strategic factors which the U.S. will + increasingly confront as the hostilities persist. We are in a situation + where only an act of sanity may now save not only the belligerents from + further loss, but larger U.S. strategic interests as well.

+ +

With this in mind, your own private “Falklands Task Force” provides a + rundown of judgments we consider relevant and outlines what we consider + to be the necessary act of sanity (which really depends on the U.K., by + far the saner of the two disputants at this point). In brief, we feel + the moment has been reached in this conflict when the Brits can declare + victory on the military level and demonstrate some magnanimity with a + political offer designed to stave off an Argentine Götterdämmerung (in + which we would all substantially suffer). Urgency is now the issue: as this goes to press the wires are + reporting another Vulcan attack on + Port Stanley. . . .A May 4 intelligence + memorandum for the record reported the May 4 British air attack on + the Port Stanley airport was conducted by one Vulcan bomber in order to make the + airport “unusable for light transport and communications aircraft + from the Argentine mainland.” (Washington National Records Center, + OSD Files, FRC 330–84–0003, + Argentina (Jan–15 May) 1982)

+

Key Judgments

+

—Contrary to British hopes, tightening the screws on Argentina will not make them more amenable to negotiations. On + the contrary, Galtieri is a + high-stakes gambler who will keep putting chips on the table as long as + he has them, hoping for the lucky strike to bail him out;

+

—What is true of Galtieri is + probably also true of anyone who succeeds him (with the possible + exception of Orfila, who might favor a diplomatic route but whose margin + of maneuver would be tightly constrained by the military).

+

—Continuation of the British blockade with sporadic military action will + result in a grave setback to all our policies in this hemisphere as + Latin American positions harden, while tying the Royal Navy down 8,000 + miles away from its NATO + responsibilities.

+

—Now that we have come down on the British side, our leverage with Mrs. + Thatcher is greatly + increased; we are a de facto partner in the enterprise and can use that + position to push our own interests in ways denied to us in our previous + “honest broker” role.

+

Proposal

+

—That the United States initiate another peace offer, this time through + the OAS. The offer would link ultimate + Argentine sovereignty after a reasonable protracted period (say, 20 + years) with immediate withdrawal of Argentine troops and a third country + or mixed administration during the transition between now and then.

+

Rationale

+

—To the U.K., the plan offers a chance to escape from having to defend + the Falklands forever, should the Brits succeed in retaking them. The 20-year grade period will + allow the Falklanders sufficient time to make up their minds to become + Argentinian or emigrate, or otherwise take advantage of whatever + resources and options the Brits can put at their disposal during the + period in question—a kind of qualified self-determination (the Brits + must—and probably do understand that the desires of 1800 sheepherders + cannot eternally dictate the larger strategic interests of the United + Kingdom, let alone the United States). Part of the agreement could also + be a bill of rights for the Falklanders.

+

—To Argentina, the plan offers a way to realize its core objective of + ultimate sovereignty. It will not have the sovereignty by the end of + 1982, as it had wished, but that is the price it pays for losing a war + Argentina itself precipitated. [If] Galtieri (or a successor regime) is implored to accept + this plan by a unanimous resolution of the OAS, it will have a face-saving way to do so.

+

Implementation

+

—We need to clear this plan with the Brits first. It should be done by + private message to Mrs. Thatcher—we do not need more shuttle diplomacy now.

+

—We then need to send a message from the President to Galtieri once it looks as if the plan + is gaining momentum.

+

RECOMMENDATION:

+

That you discuss the above outline with Secretary + Haig, with a view toward + gearing the diplomatic machinery in that direction.Clark + neither approved nor disapproved the recommendation.

+
+ +
+ + 219. Message From British Prime Minister Thatcher to President ReaganSource: + Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S Special Handling Restrictions Memos 1979–1983, Lot + 96D262, ES Sensitive May 1–5 1982. + Secret. Sent in a telegram to the White House. + + + London, May + 4, 1982, 2036Z + Dear Ron, + +

Francis Pym has told me about the + very useful talks he had with Al + Haig about the Falkland Islands during his visit to + Washington on Sunday.May 2. See Document 205. We are all + tremendously heartened by the way you have come out in our support.

+

As I see it, the main lines of our strategy remain fully appropriate in + this new stage of the crisis. We should continue to build up the + diplomatic, military and economic pressure on Argentina to put an end to + its unlawful military occupation and, thereafter, to negotiate with us + in good faith about the long term future of the islands.

+

On the diplomatic front, I can assure you that we remain committed to the + search for a negotiated solution which accords with the principles which + our two countries have defended for so long. We are looking urgently + today at Al Haig’s latest + ideas.

+

In the military field, let me emphasise how much we appreciate your + generous offer of material support for our forces. This will be of the + greatest value to us, and our people will be in touch with yours to + follow up in detail Francis Pym’s + more general discussions with Al + Haig and Cap + Weinberger.See Document 205.

+

I am sure that, without effective military pressure, the Argentine + leaders will not be brought to implement Security Council Resolution + 502. But, with so many young lives at risk—British and Argentine—I feel + that we must make a supreme effort to prevent a major military clash. + That is why I attach so much importance also to the economic pressure + which we and other friendly countries are bringing to bear.

+

The measures you have announced, suspending supplies of military + equipment and denying new export credit guarantees, will show the + Argentines that you are in earnest.See Document 196. I hope that the + measures on military supplies will enable your people to prevent the + export of any equipment which might be used for military purposes. I + would like to urge you also to + go further and to impose a complete ban on imports to the United States + from Argentina.

+

I have no doubt that this would greatly strengthen the pressures on + Argentina to agree to a peaceful solution. Your own action would not + only be of great value in itself, but would encourage our Community and + Commonwealth partners to maintain their own bans and induce others—in + particular the Japanese—to follow suit. Whatever the difficulties, I + feel sure that it is in our economic as well as our political interests + to resolve this conflict as quickly as possible; and the early + announcement of U.S. measures against imports will have more impact than + a more gradual building up of economic pressure. Francis Pym will be seeing his European + colleagues over this weekend, and it would be a great help to us if he + could tell them that this is a step which you intend to take.

+

Finally, let me thank you once again for your splendid support. It will + make all the difference.

+

With warmest regards

+ + Margaret + +
+ +
+ 220. Message From British Foreign Secretary Pym to Secretary of State HaigSource: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, + S/S Special Handling + Restrictions Memos 1979–1983, Lot 96D262, ES Sensitive May 1–5 1982. UK Secret. Henderson sent the message to Haig under a May 4 covering note. + The message was included as part of a set of briefing materials + prepared for the May 5 NSPG + meeting. Bremer sent these + materials to Haig under a + May 5 covering note. (Ibid.) + + + London, May 4, + 1982 + Begins: + +

I found our discussions in WashingtonSee + Document 205. very useful and + am grateful for the continuing efforts you are making to promote a + peaceful settlement of the Falklands crisis.

+

I have discussed with the Prime Minister and other colleagues the ideas + you put to Nicko Henderson last + night.See footnote 6, Document 212. I am conscious, like + you, of the value of simplicity in any new diplomatic initiative. If + further conflict is to be + avoided and our essential aims are to be met, negotiations must not drag + on. At the same time, we cannot accept a ceasefire on the basis of an + agreement that is too imprecise. Otherwise, Argentina could accept the + proposal, and thus escape military pressure, and then play for time in + negotiations and prolong the occupation.

+

I attach a somewhat expanded version of your points, which takes account + of this consideration. Because the provisions on withdrawal and the + involvement of third parties in the interim period are expressed more + fully, we have omitted your sixth point giving a role to the contact + group in negotiations to carry out the interim agreement. We have also + gone back to a contact group composed of only Brazil, Peru, the Federal + Republic of Germany and the United States, which is the list given by + Peru to our Ambassador on 3 May. I take it that the United States and + Peru would approach Brazil and the FRG + about their participation. In our view the group should work by + consensus and have US or rotating + chairmanship. We have also provided a version of the final point which + takes account of the plain fact that it might prove impossible to reach + agreement on the future of the Falkland Islands by 30 April 1983.

+

If you and the Peruvian Government were to call upon Argentina and + Britain to accept within 48 hours an agreement in the terms I am + enclosing, the British Government would immediately announce that our + naval forces in the South Atlantic had been given orders not to fire + within or outside the TEZ unless + directly threatened by Argentine ships or aircraft but that we would + revert to earlier rules of engagement if Argentina failed to accept your + proposals within 48 hours. We would need from you an advance assurance + that Argentina at the same time would announce that the same orders had + been issued to her forces and that her ships and aircraft would not be + present in the TEZ in the 48 hour + period.

+

As you know it is essential for the British Government that there should + be a United States guarantee of the security of the Falkland Islands. It + would need to last from the 7th day after the signature of an interim + agreement until the implementation of a definitive agreement about the + future status of the Islands, and perhaps beyond. For this to deter + Argentina, the government in Buenos Aires must be in no doubt of the + guarantee. That suggests that it might take the form of a public + statement by the US Administration at + the time when the interim agreement entered into force.

+

Subject to your very early comments I would like out of courtesy to give + these ideas direct to the Peruvian President.

+

Ends.

+ +

Attachment

+

Draft Proposal Prepared By the British + GovernmentUK Secret.

+

London, undated

+

1. An immediate ceasefire, concurrent with:

+

2. Mutual withdrawal of forces:

+

(a) Argentine and British forces to begin immediately to withdraw from an + area of 200 nautical miles radius from the Falkland Islands and to + refrain from introducing any forces into that area.

+

(b) The UK will ensure safe passage for + the Argentine garrison to the mainland.

+

(c) All British and Argentine forces to be withdrawn within 7 days from + the area of 200 nautical miles radius from the Falklands and to remain + outside that area.

+

3. The immediate introduction of a contact group composed of Brazil, + Peru, The Federal Republic of Germany and the United States into the + Falkland Islands on a temporary basis pending agreement on a definitive + settlement, the group’s tasks being:

+

(a) To verify the withdrawal.

+

(b) To ensure that no actions are taken in the Islands, by the restored + administration or otherwise, which would contravene this interim + agreement.

+

4. Britain and Argentina acknowledge the existence of differing and + conflicting views regarding the status of the Falkland Islands.

+

5. The two governments agree that the views of the Islanders must be + determined, and that their interests and wishes must be respected in the + definitive settlement of the status of the Islands.

+

6. The two governments will make every possible effort in good faith to + reach a definitive agreement prior to 30 April 1983. The countries + represented in the contact group will give every assistance in this.

+
+ +
+ + 221. Message From President Reagan to British Prime Minister ThatcherSource: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Latin + America/Central, Falklands War (04/22/1982–05/17/1982). Secret. Sent + in telegram WH02767 from the White House to the Cabinet Office via + Cabinet Office channels. A stamped notation at the top of the + telegram indicates that Clark saw it. A handwritten notation in an unknown + hand reads: “Sent out at midnight.” + + + Washington, May 5, 1982, 0204Z + Dear Margaret: + +

The decisions I made last FridayApril 30. + See Documents 195 and 196. were aimed at putting you in the strongest + possible position to achieve a peaceful settlement in line with the + basic principles and values to which we are both committed. I believe + there is now a chance to realize that aim, and that we must seize it + before more lives are lost.

+

Al Haig has sent to Francis Pym new formulations which + might provide a basis for a peaceful settlement if recent military + developments have instilled a greater sense of realism in Buenos + Aires.See Document + 222. I am sure that the ideas sent to Al by your + Foreign Secretary would not provide such a basis.See Document 220. An + unknown hand circled the word “not.” Equally important, you + will see that our suggestions are faithful to the basic principles we + must protect.

+

I urge you to agree to have these ideas proposed by US and Peru as soon as possible, + recognizing that it will be difficult to get Peruvian agreement to join + us in this initiative and more difficult still to gain Argentine + acceptance. This, I am convinced, is now our best hope.

+

Sincerely,

+ + Ron + +
+ +
+ + 222. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the + United KingdomSource: Reagan + Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC + Country File, Latin America/Central, Falklands War + (04/22/1982–05/17/1982). Secret; Niact Immediate; Nodis. Sent for information Niact Immediate to the White House. A stamped notation + at the top of the telegram indicates that Clark saw it. Printed from a copy + that was received in the White House Situation Room. Drafted by + Gompert; cleared by + Bremer and Stern; + approved by Haig. + (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, [no film + number]) + + + Washington, May 5, 1982, 0606Z + +

121030. For the Ambassador from the Secretary. Subject: Letter to + Francis Pym.

+

1. Please deliver at opening of business WednesdayMay 5. the following message from me to + Francis Pym:

+

Dear Francis:

+

I appreciate the efforts your government has made to react quickly to the + suggestion we made.See Document 220. But I must tell you with a candor + possible only between closest allies that the ideas you have conveyed + can lead to only one outcome: Argentine rejection and therefore + resumption of hostilities after the forty-eight-hour period, with the + prospects for eventual settlement having been damaged in the process. + Beyond that, we have no reason to believe that the Peruvian Government + would associate itself with your proposal. Indeed, our assessment is + that even presenting it to them would drive Peru to a more pro-Argentine + posture.

+

Tragic as recent events have been, I believe we now have an opportunity + to achieve an agreement which is consistent with our shared principles + and impossible to construe as a success for the aggressor. Your + willingness to offer a 48-hour pause makes that opportunity all the more + real. We may not have another such chance before many more lives have + been lost—if then.

+

I am sending you a revised version of the seven points which attempts to + take more of your concerns into account. As Nicko will explain, it + includes our best effort to meet your concerns about a security + guarantee. I will not deny that it is closer to the ideas we sent + youSee Document + 212. than to those you sent us. The most important + difference between your ideas and ours is not that ours abandon + principle and reward aggression, for they do not, but rather that ours + have a reasonable chance of acceptance provided the Argentines are now + of a mind to show greater + flexibility. While I remain doubtful that they would accept ours, I am + certain they will reject yours.

+

In particular:

+

—The arrangements for withdrawal of forces do not provide for the parity + that was embodied in the plan we discussed when you were in Washington a + week or so ago.See Document 205.

+

—The explicit reference to quote restored administration unquote is both + unnecessary and, in and of itself, enough to guarantee rejection.

+

—The formulation on self-determination would be no less difficult for the + Argentines to accept than it would be for you—or us—to accept a flat + assurance of eventual Argentine sovereignty.

+

—The commitment only to make every possible effort to reach a definitive + settlement would be read in Buenos Aires as a recipe for stalemate, even + though I do not doubt for one minute that HMG would negotiate in good faith. I also attach a proposed + timetable for moving this initiative forward which I discussed with + Nicko.After he had received Pym’s May 4 message (see Document 220) as well as the news about the + May 4 sinking of the British destroyer HMS + Sheffield by Argentine aircraft (see Document 224), Haig met with Henderson at the Department on the evening of May 4 + to discuss the U.S.-Peruvian proposals. No U.S. record of this + meeting has been found, although Henderson’s telegrammed report of the meeting is + published on the Thatcher + Foundation website. In his published diary, Henderson described the meeting as + a “tense” three-hour session in which Haig “implored” him to accept the seven-point plan. + Haig, Henderson wrote, “torpedoed our + proposals as being quite unnegotiable with either the Peruvians or + Argentinians. I had to tell him once again how strongly Mrs + Thatcher felt on some of + the issues, e.g., respect for the wishes of the inhabitants of the + islands and the restoration of the previous administration. Al said + that if we were seen to be missing the chance for peace we would + lose much US and world sympathy.” + “Al was in a very nervous state, barking at anyone who entered the + room. He allowed Enders to + join us; Enders was + practical in suggesting language that might bridge the gap. Al kept + insisting that it was not a question of language but of principle.” + (Henderson, Mandarin, pp. 456–457) I hardly need + to say that we have left no doubt about where we stand: the Argentines + committed aggression; they have been inflexible in negotiations; and the + US supports the UK, explicitly and concretely. We have + never contemplated asking you to agree to anything that would undermine + the rule of law, weaken our relationship, or be seen as less than a + success for your country and your government. It is in this spirit that + I must tell you that we are prepared to proceed on the basis of the + revised version I am sending to you, but could not associate ourselves + with your version.

+

Recognizing the burden it places on you, may I ask that you give me an + indication as quickly as possible as to whether you would like us to + proceed.

+

Sincerely, Al

+ +

Attachment 1: Text of proposal.

+

1. An immediate ceasefire, concurrent with:

+

2. Mutual withdrawal and non-reintroduction of forces, according to a + schedule to be established by the contact group.

+

3. The immediate introduction of a contact group composed of Brazil, + Peru, the Federal Republic of Germany and the United States into the + Falkland Islands on a temporary basis pending agreement on a definitive + settlement. The contact group will assume responsibility for:

+

(A) Verification of the withdrawal;

+

(B) Ensuring that no actions are taken in the Islands, by the local + administration, which would contravene this interim agreement; and

+

(C) Ensuring that all other provisions of the agreement are + respected.

+

4. Britain and Argentina acknowledge the existence of differing and + conflicting views regarding the status of the Falkland Islands.

+

5. The two governments acknowledge that the aspirations and interests of + the Islanders will be included in the definitive settlement of the + status of the Islands.

+

6. The contact group will have responsibility for ensuring that the two + governments reach a definitive agreement prior to April 30, 1983.

+

Attachment 2: Proposed timetable.

+

May 5—1200 EDT—London to reply to + Washington. US transmits the proposal to + Lima and requests an answer not later than May 6 at 1200 EDT.

+

May 6—1200 EDT—US and Peru transmit the single text to London and BA. On receipt, London announces that it + will order a cease fire beginning May 7 at 1200 EDT provided Argentina accepts this procedure, takes + similar action and notifies Peru and the US it will do so.

+

May 7—1200 EDT—Cease fire begins.

+

May 8—1200 EDT—Both parties must have + replied accepting the proposals. If not, each party is free to revert to + earlier rules of engagement.

+ + Haig + +
+ +
+ + 223. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Kingdom to the Department + of StateSource: Department of + State, Central Foreign Policy File, D820234–0977. Secret; Immediate; + Exdis. Sent for information + to NATO Collective, Buenos Aires, + Montevideo, Caracas, Santiago, Brasilia, Moscow, and USUN. + + + London, May + 5, 1982, 1259Z + +

9849. Subj: Falklands Dispute: The Turning Point for Britain?

+

1. S–Entire text.

+

2. With the sinking of the Sheffield,See + Document 224. + Thatcher may be approaching the + limit of the human losses she can take without losing considerable + domestic support and, after the sinking of the Belgrano,See Document 208. + she may be at the limit of the casualties she can inflict and hope to + maintain international backing.

+

3. That is not to say that Argentine losses will not count against her + here too. There is considerable uneasiness and some distress about the + Belgrano. But British losses are what will turn the tide.

+

4. Labor is shifting—but we don’t yet know how far. We were told that a + petition calling for an immediate truce and U.N. negotiation had over + seventy signatures, including some of non-doves, by mid-morning May 5. + But we understand the Trade Union Congress does not plan any immediate + declaration. The Labor Shadow Cabinet is meeting at noon. Balancing + conflicting pressures within the party, Michael Foot has supported + sending the fleet only to back up diplomacy, and last week he was + distancing himself from the use of force. Speculation that Thatcher would use a Falklands triumph + for electoral gain has been rife among Labor. And that party will not + hesitate to use a Falklands failure against the Conservatives.

+

5. For the moment, Conservative ranks are holding—according to our quick + soundings. The word is that Britain has been brought back to earth after + the euphoria of South Georgia; that Britain must expect to take losses; + and that the fleet will hang in. But our contacts are uneasy.

+

6. Thatcher rode the crisis to + new political heights through last weekend. But now, as she surveys the + domestic and military battle, the choices become harder. Even a quick + “victory” in taking the Falklands will probably entail losses, and may + leave Britain saddled with Islands to protect against continued + Argentine pressure.

+ +

7. However she plays it from here, she is likely to have peaked. And she + may face growing problems if she does not show that she has an end-game + plan in mind.

+

8. As we have said repeatedly, Thatcher’s determination and toughness should not be + underestimated. For a pragmatic politician the choice now might be to + back off. But Thatcher is not + always pragmatic. And if she can keep her own ranks in line, she can + beat back any challenge in Parliament.

+

9. But she may be ready in the face of the last two days’ developments to + look seriously for a way out.Citing a + “well-informed” FCO source, + Streator reported that + following a meeting of the War Cabinet on the morning of May 5, + “things are ‘moving in the right direction’ for a positive response + to the Secretary’s Falklands proposals by late this afternoon, + accepting them ‘without amendment.’” (Telegram 9848 from London, May + 5; Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Latin America/Central, Falklands War + (04/22/1982–05/17/1982)) + Thatcher and Britain were aware + of the risks, but the reality of war, as always, is different from + expectations. The new mood here may leave her grasping for a way to + prove peaceable intent in the face of British deaths and pressures from + other allies.

+ + Streator + +
+ +
+ + 224. Memorandum From the Deputy Director for Operations, National + Military Command Center (Hekman) + to the Director of Operations, Joint Staff (Gast)Source: + Washington National Records Center, OSD Files, FRC 330–84–0003, Argentina (Jan–15 May) + 1982. Secret. Carlucci + initialed at the top of the memorandum; a stamped notation indicates + that he saw it on May 5. + + + Washington, May 5, 1982, 0930 EDT + + + SUBJECT + Sinking of British Destroyer—SHEFFIELD + + + REFERENCE + Memorandum for J–30, 050109 EDT + May 1982The referenced memorandum + provides a less detailed report of the sinking of HMS + Sheffield, based upon earlier + information, and is ibid. + +

1. (U) This memorandum contains updated information not contained in the + original memorandum.

+

2. (U) At 041020 EDT May 1982, the + British destroyer HMS SHEFFIELD + received a direct hit by an Exocet + missile, was set ablaze and subsequently sunk. Reports indicate that two + AM–39 air launched Exocet Missiles + were fired with one direct hit in the control room area, on the + SHEFFIELD. As many as 30 British sailors of the 270 man crew were + reportedly killed. The remainder of the crew were picked up by other + UK ships in the area after they + abandoned ship. The attack on the SHEFFIELD occurred in an area to the + southeast of the Falkland Islands, at about 52415/5741 W.

+

3. (U) The Exocet missile that hit + the SHEFFIELD was apparently launched from an Argentine French-built + Super Etendard fighter-bomber from a point outside 20 miles. The Super + Etendard is designed as a carrier based aircraft with an estimated + operating range of 400 NM. The aircraft + has in-flight refueling capability and can be refueled from a + tanker-configured A–4 as well as the + KC–135. Fourteen of these aircraft were ordered by Argentina from France + in late 1979.

+

4. (S) Some analysts believe the Etendard may have been operating from + the Argentine aircraft carrier 25 DE MAYO when it engaged the SHEFFIELD. + This would have required in-flight refueling. Another possibility is the + aircraft originated from NAS Rio Grande, on the Island of Tierro Del + Fuego. SHEFFIELD was within the extreme unrefueled range of the aircraft + if originating from NAS Rio Grande.

+ +

5. (S) The Exocet Missile is a 1450 + pound weapon with a high-explosive war head. It is a sea-skimmer which + is designed to fly about 10 feet above the surface of the ocean. It is + believed to have a maximum operating range of about 42 miles. The + missile uses a radar altimeter and a radar guidance device for homing in + on its target in final stages of flight. It must be guided by the launch + aircraft in all but the terminal phase.

+

6. (S) SHEFFIELD’s position indicates she was probably in a forward air + defense picket station ahead of the British Task Force. SHEFFIELD + carried the SEA DART anti-air missile system with a range of 20 miles + (15 miles effective range). She carried radar equipment capable of + detecting the attacking aircraft well outside of her own self-defense + radius but was not capable of reaching the aircraft with on board + weapons systems if the aircraft remained outside 20 NM. SHEFFIELD sensors could also have + theoretically detected the incoming missile, however, considering the + weather and sea state conditions existing at the time, such detection is + doubtful. SHEFFIELD’s missile guidance Radar jamming capabilities are + not known at this writing but are being researched.

+ + P.M. Hekman, + Jr + + Rear Admiral, USN + Deputy Director for Operations, NMCC + +
+ +
+ + 225. Memorandum for the Record of a Meeting of the National Security + Planning GroupSource: Central + Intelligence Agency, Office of the Director of Central Intelligence, + Job 84B00049R: Subject Files (1981–1982), Box 7, Folder 180: NSPG Meeting re: Falkland Islands + Situation. Secret. Drafted by McMahon on May 6. Copies were sent to Casey, Inman, and [name + not declassified]. + + + Washington, May 5, 1982, 9:45 a.m. + + + SUBJECT + NSPG Meeting on the Falkland + Islands, 9:45 a.m., 5 May 1982 + +

1. Present at the meeting: Counselor to the President Meese, Judge Clark, Secretary of State Haig, Deputy Secretary of Defense + Carlucci, Chief of Naval + Operations Hayward, and the + undersigned.

+

2. The meeting opened with a CIA + briefing on the status of the military situation/disposition of naval + forces and the domestic scene in both the UK and Argentina on the issue. Noted that the Sheffield was + struck 60 miles off the Falkland Islands, well within the exclusion zone + while the Belgrano, the Argentine cruiser, was sunk 26 miles outside of + the zone.See Documents + 208 and 224. At the + conclusion of my briefing I suggested that our analysts were becoming + somewhat concerned that if the situation worsened the relationship with + the United States and Latin American nations will deteriorate and may + never return to the status quo antebellum. Further, that with the + Argentines looking about for help, they may gravitate towards the + Soviets, offering the Soviets opportunities they would not have + otherwise. While the political philosophies of Argentina and the Soviet + Union certainly differ, special arrangements might be made which would + be beneficial to the Soviets, and to the detriment of the U.S. Both + Carlucci and Secretary + Haig agreed.

+

3. The Secretary then spoke of the negotiating efforts that he has + underway. He pointed out that Prime Minister Thatcher was holding to a very hard + position—that the Argentines must totally surrender the Falklands. + Secretary Haig sent to the Prime + Minister a very strong and steely memorandum which might promote some + conciliation towards peace.Likely a + reference to Haig’s May 5 + message to Pym. See Document 222. The Secretary urged + that the British agree to a ceasefire effective at noon on 7 May which + would be followed by a troop withdrawal from the Falklands by the + Argentines and the return of the British ships to England. A “contact + group” composed of Brazil, Peru, West Germany and the United States + would then move into the area and establish a government with the + locals. The contact group would then try to negotiate a settlement by 30 April 1983. The Secretary was + waiting for the British reply and if favorable he would then forward the + proposal to the Argentines through Cuellar in Peru to seek Argentine + agreement.

+

4. There was some discussion whether or not there should be any publicity + on this effort. [2½ lines not declassified] It + was suggested that DoD advise the + British counterparts not to come forward with a request at this time and + that Secretary Haig, through his + channels, would ask the British not to ask us because we wanted to be in + a position of saying we were not asked.

+ + John N. + McMahon + Executive Director + +
+ +
+ 226. Memorandum From Norman A. + Bailey of the National Security Council Staff to the + President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Clark)Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Latin + America/Central, Argentina (05/05/1982–05/20/1982). Secret. Sent for + action. + + + Washington, May 5, + 1982 + + + SUBJECT + Falklands Crisis + +

Considering the immense damage we have already suffered from the + Falklands crisis and the likelihood of continuing damage in the future + to our relations not only with Argentina but with Latin America in + general, I believe the time has come now that we have stated our + position and the British have demonstrated their military capacity to + urge the British to declare a cease-fire, to declare that the question + of eventual sovereignty over the islands is one to be negotiated and + that although the wishes of the islanders will be taken into + consideration, they will not be controlling with reference to the final + settlement.

+

Roger Fontaine concurs.

+ +

RECOMMENDATION:

+

That you urge this course of action on Secretary Haig.Under this recommendation, Clark wrote: “not for now. WPC.”

+
+ +
+ 227. Message From British Foreign Secretary Pym to Secretary of State HaigSource: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, + Files of Alexander M. Haig, + Jr., 1981–1982, Lot 82D370, No folder. UK Secret. + + + London, May 5, + 1982 + Begins: + +

As you will realise, the proposals for an interim agreement on the + Falkland Islands crisis, which you gave to Nicko Henderson last night,See Document 222 and footnote 5 thereto. still fall + short of the sort of agreement which the British Government would like + to see, and would not be easy after all that has passed for us to defend + publicly. The Cabinet has however considered your proposals against the + background of all the issues involved and, because we share your strong + desire to reach a negotiated settlement and to avoid further bloodshed, + is prepared to accept the proposals as a basis for proceeding, subject + to the following points.

+

The first point is that the proposals should be headed “Draft Interim + Agreement on the Falkland Islands/Islas Malvinas”. This makes clear the + scope of the agreement. The second change is to insert “all” before + “forces” in point 2, so as to make clear that Argentina cannot leave any + forces in the Falkland Islands. The third change concerns point 3(B). We + would like this to be amended to say “administering the government of + the Falkland Islands in the interim period in consultation with the + elected representatives of the population of the Islands and ensuring + that no actions are taken in the Islands which would concentrateAn unknown hand crossed out the word + “concentrate” and substituted “contravene” above it. this + interim agreement, and”.

+

These are the only points which we want to make on the draft agreement + itself. But there is an important practical point concerning the timetable for implementation of the + agreement, which you also put to Nicko. There must be a specific moment + of time when both parties state formally in writing to the US and Peruvian governments that they + accept the agreement. The ceasefire can only take place after that + moment, given Argentina’s unreliability and record in this crisis. + Instructions for a ceasefire should be issued immediately after that + moment, to come into effect as soon as both parties could guarantee + compliance by their forces. For our part, we could accept an interval of + 24 hours provided that Argentina could also undertake to abide by that. + If you found it possible to shorten the timetable before an agreement is + concluded in writing, we could support that.

+

You told Nicko last night that in your view the third point in the draft + agreement incorporates a guarantee on the part of the United States of + the non-reintroduction of Argentine forces into the Falkland Islands + pending a definitive settlement. I should be most grateful if you could + agree to send me a side letter to this effect, if and when the interim + agreement is concluded. I suggest also that the need to deter Argentine + re-invasion requires that the US should + inform Argentina that such a letter has been sent.

+

I hope very much that Peru and Argentina will accept the proposals on the + basis I have set out. Because of the danger that the Argentine response + may be equivocal, like last time, the Cabinet feel strongly that (once + you have got the Peruvians on board) Buenos Aires should be asked to + signify acceptance by a precise and early deadline. If they fail to do + so, or give any reply other than unqualified acceptance, they would be + taken to have rejected the proposals and there would be no + ceasefire.

+

Thank you again for all you are doing to end the present crisis.

+

Ends.

+
+ +
+ + 228. Information Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for + Public Affairs (Fischer) to + Secretary of State HaigSource: Department of State, + Central Foreign Policy File, P820069–1768. No classification + marking. Drafted by Roshco + and A. Richman (PA/OAP) on May 4. + Haig initialed the + memorandum, indicating that he saw it. A stamped notation also + indicates that Haig saw + it. + + + Washington, May 5, + 1982 + + + SUBJECT + In Falklands Dispute, Americans Much More Sympathetic to Britain, + But Overwhelmingly Favor Neutrality + +

Listening to the war of words between Argentina and Great Britain, + Americans respond sympathetically to the British argument for + self-determination by the Falkland Islanders, but not to the Argentine + argument against British colonialism. Moreover, Americans react much + more sympathetically to Britain’s self-justification that it is + repelling aggression than to Argentina’s self-justification that the + British have dragged their feet in negotiations.

+

All in all, a far larger proportion of the American + public is sympathetic to the British than to the Argentines + (60% vs 19%). Hispanics are also more pro-British + than pro-Argentine (56% vs 27%). The overwhelming + preference, however, is that the U.S. remain + neutral in the war (83%), rather than help Britain (favored by + 12%) or Argentina (favored by a mere 1%).

+

The public’s predominantly pro-British sentiment probably disposes it to + support Britain diplomatically and economically, but certainly not + militarily.

+

These findings come from a Harris poll conducted April 16–22. Additional + details about the poll are attached.Attached but not printed.

+
+ +
+ + 229. Information Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for + Inter-American Affairs (Enders) + to Secretary of State HaigSource: Department of State, + Central Foreign Policy File, P820069–1766. Drafted by Kilday on May 4. Haig initialed the memorandum and + wrote “Wow!” in the top right-hand corner. A stamped notation also + indicates that Haig saw the + memorandum. + + + Washington, May 5, + 1982 + + + SUBJECT + Brazilian President’s Reply to President Reagan’s Letter on the + Falkland/Malvinas Crisis + +

President Figueiredo’s reply (copy attached)Attached but not printed. Under a May 5 covering + memorandum, Bremer sent + Clark an unofficial + Department of State translation of Figueiredo’s May 4 letter. (Department of State, + Central Foreign Policy File, P890006–2306) to President + Reagan’s letterSee Document 204. + has just been delivered by the Brazilian Embassy. It is stiffly worded but avoids substance + except to state Figueiredo’s apprehension over our + decision to apply sanctions. In implied contrast, the letter + also describes the positions taken by Brazil as being guided by the + objective of maintaining the capacity for dialogue and favoring peace + efforts.

+

The operative part of the letter advises that Figueiredo wants to cut short + his state visit next week and to have it take on a more + businesslike tone. In practical terms that means + conducting program activities in one day and canceling his + return reception, his luncheon and speech at the OAS, and other incidental social + functions. However, he will attend the state dinner at the White + House.

+

Although Figueiredo’s letter states a desire to focus his + discussions on the Falkland/Malvinas problem, the Brazilian + Embassy asserts continuing strong Brazilian interest in covering the + many other items on the agenda.

+

Our initial reaction is that the tone of the letter and the curtailment of + the visit are primarily for the consumption of the Argentines and + other Latins. In fact, it would appear that Figueiredo is preserving in his now + abbreviated schedule at least one free day, but in Cleveland rather than + in Washington.

+

Our understanding from the Brazilian Embassy is that the changes will not + affect the White House portion of the schedule and should present no + major problems.

+
+ +
+ + 230. Message From British Prime Minister Thatcher to President ReaganSource: + Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Latin America/Central, Falklands War + (04/22/1982–05/17/1982). Secret. Sent in a telegram from the Cabinet + Office to the White House via Cabinet Office channels. In her + memoirs, Thatcher wrote that + her initial draft of this message “revealed perhaps too much of my + frustration.” She also indicated that she “toned it down before it + was sent.” (Thatcher, Downing Street Years, p. 217) + + + London, May 5, 1982, + 2030Z + Dear Ron, + +

My Cabinet colleagues and I spent some four hours earlier today + considering Al Haig’s latest + proposals.See Document 222. + Francis Pym has replied on our + behalf,See Document + 227. but I am writing to you separately because I + think you are the only person who will understand the significance of + what I am trying to say.

+

Throughout my administration I have tried to stay loyal to the United + States as our great ally, and to the principles of democracy, liberty + and justice for which both our countries stand.

+

In your message you say that your suggestions are faithful to the basic + principles we must protect.See Document 221. But the present rulers + of the Argentine will not respect those principles, and I fear deeply + that if a settlement based on your suggestions is eventually achieved, + we shall find that in the process of negotiation democracy and freedom + for the Falkland Islanders will have been compromised.

+

Above all, the present proposals do not provide unambiguously for a right + to self-determination, although it is fundamental to democracy and was + enjoyed by the Islanders up to the moment of invasion. We asked you + earlier that it should be included explicitly.

+

Al Haig’s reply was that it could + not, because the Argentines would not accept it and there would + therefore be no hope of a settlement. This has given me and my + colleagues very great difficulty. This is why I have tried to temper + Al Haig’s latest proposals a + little by suggesting that the interim administration must at least + consult with the locally elected representatives. It is not much to + ask—and I do not think that you will turn it down.

+

I too want a peaceful settlement and an end to the mounting loss of life + in the South Atlantic. I also believe that the friendship between the + United States and Britain matters very much to the future of the free world. That is why, with + the changes Francis Pym has + suggested to Al Haig, we are + ready, with whatever misgivings, to go along with your latest proposals. + Assuming that they are accepted by the Argentines, then during the + negotiation period that will follow we shall have to fight fiercely for + the rights of the Falklanders who have been so loyal to everything in + which you and we believe.

+

Warm personal regards

+ + Margaret + +
+ +
+ 231. Note From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs + (Clark) to President + ReaganSource: Reagan Library, William P. Clark Files, Falklands + War (UN/Kirkpatrick/Haig) 05/13/1982–06/04/1982. No classification + marking. + + + Washington, May 5, + 1982 + + + SUBJECT + PM + Thatcher’s Reply on your + Falklands Demarche + +

Mr President,

+

Attached is Prime Minister Thatcher’s replyNot found + attached. For Thatcher’s May + 5 message to Reagan, see + Document 230. to your + compromise proposalSee Document 221. to achieve a ceasefire and + negotiations for the resolution of the Falklands dispute. In a word, + Maggie accepts the proposal. She refers, however, to the need to + strengthen guarantees of the right of self-determination for the + inhabitants.

+

Foreign Minister Pym has sent Al a + parallel messageSee Document 227. which creates other problems + however, with respect to the terms of the ceasefire. Al called + Ambassador Henderson inNo U.S. record of this meeting has been + found. However, a British record of the meeting as sent by Henderson to London is published + on the Thatcher Foundation + website. and after further refinement, has achieved an agreed text which has a + chance of being accepted in Buenos Aires. Al has gone ahead to send it + to the Peruvians.Telegram 121841 to Lima, + May 5, transmitted the English and Spanish-language texts of the + seven-point proposal as well as a message from Haig to Belaúnde informing him of + the British Government’s willingness to “give serious consideration” + to the proposal as well as a ceasefire “of short duration” to give + time for a decision on a peace plan. (Reagan Library, Executive + Secretariat, NSC Cable File, + Falkland File 05/05/1982 (5))

+

The Argentine response is uncertain. They see Thatcher’s position eroding somewhat + at home. They also see some opportunity for grandstanding among their + third world brothers at the UN. Still + they have fewer illusions about the ultimate military outcome.

+

The Peruvians will either opt to send the new text to the Argentines + unilaterally or jointly with us. As we receive further word, we will + keep you advised.

+ + Bill + +
+ +
+ + 232. Telegram From the Embassy in Peru to the Department of StateSource: Reagan Library, + Executive Secretariat, NSC Cable + File, Falkland File 05/06/1982. Secret; Sensitive; Flash; Nodis. Printed from a copy that was + received in the White House Situation Room. + + + Lima, May 6, + 1982, 0417Z + +

4681. Subject: (U) South Atlantic War. Ref: (A) State 121841;See footnote 6, Document + 231. (B) Lima 4680.In + telegram 4680 from Lima, May 6, Ortiz transmitted a report of his meeting with + Belaúnde held at 1900 EDT, May 5. + Ortiz reported that when + delivering the text of Haig’s letter and the draft seven-point proposal to + Belaúnde, the latter stated “he did not believe he could convince + the Argentines to accept them.” After Ortiz discussed with Belaúnde the Peruvian + President’s observations on the shortcomings of the draft proposal, + Belaúnde telephoned Haig to + repeat his views and suggested “that there be a simple announcement + that both sides agreed to a cease fire to be followed by renewed + negotiations with the 7-point proposals as the working document. + After further discussion the President agreed that he would call + President Galtieri but that + he must be truthful and tell Galtieri that this proposal is what the UK wants.” (Reagan Library, Executive + Secretariat, NSC Cable File, + Falkland File 05/06/1982)

+

1. (S–Entire text)

+

2. President Galtieri [Belaúnde] telephoned me at 2340 EDT to report on his conversation with + President Galtieri. He said he + advised Galtieri of the + constructive UK response to the peace + proposals. He told Galtieri the + UK in essence accepted them with + some changes. However, before he could elaborate Galtieri told him that Argentina had + just communicated its agreement to the UN SecGen to a mediating role for the UN. Galtieri did not reveal to Belaunde the conditions under + which the UN mediation would be carried + out. Belaunde told Galtieri that + the British position on the Peruvian peace proposals would give the + Argentines some idea of what would be acceptable to the UK. Galtieri expressed his gratitude for Peru’s efforts.

+

3. Galtieri said he would + continue calling Belaunde to keep him advised of the status of the peace + process.

+

4. President Belaunde asked me to transmit the above to the Secretary + with his personal thanks for the enormous good will and great effort the + Secretary is showing throughout the crisis.

+ + Ortiz + +
+ +
+ + 233. Memorandum of ConversationSource: Washington National Records Center, OSD Files, FRC 330–86–0042, UK 1982. Top Secret; Sensitive. Drafted + by Lasater. The meeting took + place at the U.S. Mission to NATO. + Copies of the memorandum of conversation were sent to the ISP Desk Officer and the ASD/ISD + Special Assistant. Weinberger sent a summary of the meeting, held + before the opening session of a meeting of the NATO Defense Planning Committee, as + well as the text of Nott’s + May 5 letter to Weinberger + (see footnote 2 below), to Clark, Carlucci, and Haig in telegram 279 from + Brussels, May 6. (Washington National Records Center, OSD Files, FRC 330–84–0004, UK (May) 1982) + + + Brussels, May 6, 1982, 8–8:30 + a.m. + + + ATTENDEES + + U.S. + Secretary Weinberger + Ambassador Bennett + Defense Advisor Legere + General Smith + General Lasater + + + BRITISH + MOD Nott + Ambassador Graham + Mr. Hastie-Smith + + +

MOD Nott briefly commented on the + Falkland situation, indicating that he had no fresh news as of this + morning, but that the situation was fluid and progressing on a + minute-to-minute basis. He indicated that his letter to Secretary + WeinbergerA signed copy of Nott’s May 5 letter to Weinberger, the substance of which is summarized in + the memorandum of conversation, is ibid. should have been + delivered this morning and he wanted to briefly reiterate some of its + contents. The United Kingdom is most grateful to the United States for + undertaking to respond positively to a request for materiel support for + British forces in the current crisis. Britain is now considering + separately her needs for intelligence and logistic help and is preparing + a list of items of weapons and equipmentFor + a summary list of U.K. defense requests, May 6–7, along with the + status of Department of Defense action taken, see Document 245. and will be making + special arrangements both in London and in the Embassy Washington for + processing their needs. It is not clear now whether or not Britain will + need or use all the items listed. It would greatly simplify the + administration and accelerate the action if the United States could + agree at the outset that such items as the US does provide be supplied on the basis that the UK pay only for those items which it uses + or retains. An alternative would be for the UK to pay the US on a “sale + and return” basis. By way of illustration, the two immediate requests + which the UK has in mind are for 300 AIM + 9L sidewinder missiles and 2 Vulcan/Phalanx guns.

+ +

Secretary Weinberger said he saw + no problem with the UK request. Our + overall aim was to be helpful and to make that assistance available as + quickly as possible.

+

Secretary Weinberger and MOD + Nott then discussed in + general terms current diplomatic initiatives ongoing to try and settle + the crisis with Argentina. Both were uncertain about the status of the + Peruvian recommendations. MOD Nott indicated that the latest Haig proposals were acceptable to the + United Kingdom but did not see how Argentina could accept them. However, + the UK took some heart in the fact that + the US State Department had sent the + proposals to the UK and would not have + done so had they not felt them to be somewhat acceptable to + Argentina.

+

Secretary Weinberger asked + Nott if he had other matters + to discuss and Nott responded + with his gratitude for DoD support and + for the very successful discussions on the Trident matter. Secretary Weinberger agreed that the subcontractor arrangements + appeared to be promising and the talks in London in mid-May should help + considerably.

+

MOD Nott said that timely + intelligence from the South Atlantic was particularly critical. ELINT information was satisfactory but + [less than 1 line not declassified] left much + to be desired. SecDef alluded to + press reports that SR–71 coverage was + being obtained on the Falkland Islands every half hour. This is, of + course, ridiculous. He indicated that [3½ lines not + declassified].

+

MOD Nott said that one area where + the UK needed some practical assistance + very quickly was in air-to-air refueling between Europe and the + Ascension Island; Britain has only nineteen Victor tankers and was + strapped for refueling capability. This was a serious need and one which + they needed quickly. He wanted to reiterate that the UK does not want direct military assistance from the United States in theater + because that would invite others into the conflict, but refueling + assistance between Europe and the Ascension Island was being requested + from the United States.

+

SecDef raised the issue of + out-of-area threats to NATO’s interest + and the requirement for NATO committed + forces to be utilized for contingencies in other parts of the world. The + Falklands crisis was indeed just such an example and he asked MOD + Nott’s views on using the + current crisis to underscore that need. MOD Nott responded that he had no objections but would + caution against the United States making the case that Europe was more + dependent on mid-East oil than was the United States. Ambassador + Graham added that one must + keep in mind when making a case for Southwest Asia as a threat to NATO that we bear in mind that we also + open the doors to the European nations demanding the right to be + consulted and to approve of all deployments outside the NATO area. ASD + Perle inquired whether or not in the British view it + would not be possible to draft a simple and straightforward statement + recognizing threats to NATO’s interest + and the need to plan to meet those threats. The British side did not + respond.

+

[Omitted here is discussion of issues unrelated to the crisis in the + South Atlantic.]

+ + John R. + Lasater + Brigadier General, USAF Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense + Europe/NATO Policy (Acting) + + +
+ +
+ 234. Transcript of a Telephone Conversation Between Secretary of State + Haig and Peruvian President + BelaúndeSource: + Department of State, Executive Secretariat, Files of Alexander M. Haig, Jr., 1981–1982, + Lot 82D370, No folder. Secret; Sensitive. Haig was speaking from Washington; + Belaúnde was in Lima. + + + May 6, 1982, 9 + a.m. + +

(not on for first minutes)

+

H: Right. That is a shame but it is understandable.Haig’s + answer is presumably in response to Belaúnde’s report of his May 5 + telephone conversation with Galtieri in which Galtieri stated that Argentina would be seeking + mediation from the United Nations instead of accepting the + seven-point proposal. See Document + 232.

+

B: They think that all the terms and timetable are very tight so they + told me they were going directly to the UN. I know they are going to see the same problems + there.

+

H: Of course. There is no question about it and perhaps the only thing we + can do is be as helpful as we can. Unfortunately the situation will + continue.

+

B: I find there is a very emotional attitude in Argentina this time. I am + afraid it will continue to be so for a number of days until it quiets + down.

+

H: Yes.

+

B: I think they do not realize that this is such an urgent matter. I am + very much afraid that time is being lost.

+ +

H: I share that view and want you to know I spoke to the PresidentNo memorandum of conversation of this + exchange between Reagan and + Haig has been found. + According to the President’s Daily Diary, the Reagans hosted a + private dinner with Cabinet officials from 7:20 to 9:58 p.m., May 5, + and records no other conversations between the President and + Secretary of State that day. (Reagan Library, President’s Daily + Diary) after our discussion last nightSee footnote 3, Document + 232. and he is extremely grateful to you for your + statesmanship and your efforts here. We are always ready to do whatever + we can and will continue to hold that position. I think now it is best + to let the UN consider the matter and + they will find in a few days what I learned in three weeks and that is + that there are still fundamental differences in the substance between + the two parties and despite the sacrifices that have occurred, neither + side is willing to make the concessions that are necessary. I only hope + a cooling will occur and I am not optimistic.

+

B: Yesterday afternoon was rather quiet. I hope that it remains. What do + you know about this morning?

+

H: There was activity yesterday. It was anti-submarine activity so there + was no truce yesterday.

+

B: I told General Galtieri what + to expect. I told him eventually he was going to have to face different + conditions and what they were. I said that they were very close to what + we were talking about. There were little differences and pointed out + what differences but he seemed hopeful about the UN. What he has done really is to say that he is ready for + negotiations in the UN but when those + negotiations come, he will find the same problems as he found with + me.

+

H: Exactly. And even more rigidity in the terms of no ceasefire until + immediate withdrawal.

+

B: I told him I was open in this channel and ready to do whatever I could + and to feel free to call me. I am always available but not too + optimistic.

+

H: No, not for the next 24 to 48 hours. Unfortunately, I hope that there + are not more lives lost in the interim. You have been magnificent and I + want you to know how much I admire what you have done and am + grateful.

+

B: I know of your wonderful intelligence [intention?] to be helpful and I know naturally your great + responsibilities.

+

H: We will keep a close watch and if anything develops, we will be in + touch immediately.

+ +

B: I will always be ready. Please give my regards to the President.The Embassy transmitted an informal English + translation of the text of a letter from Belaúnde to Reagan, delivered to the Embassy + on May 7. In the letter, Belaúnde provided his own summary of Peru’s + role in the peace initiative. (Telegram 2415 from Lima, May 8; + Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Latin America/Central, Peru + (05/03–1982–05/06/1982))

+

H: I will.

+

END TELCON

+
+ +
+ 235. Transcript of a Telephone Conversation Between Secretary of State + Haig and British Foreign + Secretary PymSource: Department of State, + Executive Secretariat, Files of Alexander M. Haig, Jr., 1981–1982, Lot 82D370, No + folder. Secret; Sensitive. Haig was speaking from Washington; Pym was in London. + + + May 6, 1982, 9:28 + a.m. + +

H: How are you this morning?

+

P: I am okay. How are you?

+

H: All right. I just called to touch base with you briefly. I talked to + Nicko.No U.S. record of Haig’s exchange with Henderson has been found. The + British Official History of the conflict states that Haig telephoned Henderson at 2300 hours, May 5, + “saying that Argentina was no longer interested in the US/Peruvian + plan but was now committed to the UN + route. The Argentines considered that they were securing growing + international support, for example from Ireland, and that the + European Community was cracking. The sinking of the Sheffield had greatly emboldened them, with + the result that they were now convinced that they would triumph + militarily and politically. We got, as I anticipated, a + turndown from Galtieri.

+ +

P: I see, you have.

+

H: He said he has moved it to the UN and + that is it.

+

P: It looked like that this morning.

+

H: Yes. You know clearly what the efforts are going to be there. A + ceasefire period.

+

P: Yes.

+

H: Of course, we cannot accept and I have instructed our ambassador that + the basic premises of their work must be withdrawal and ceasefire + simultaneously.

+

P: That was in the Secretary General’s proposal which he put to me.

+

H: You better read that very carefully.

+

P: Okay.

+

H: It is sort of not exactly that, if you look at it carefully.

+

P: I will have a look at it but, of course, that is absolutely vital.

+

H: Of course.

+

P: Right. I absolutely agree, Al, about that.

+

H: In any event, I think you are not going to be totally negative.

+

P: No. I cannot afford to be. I think we are going to give a positive + response. The part you and I were working on was virtually the same + framework with the necessary terms added.

+

H: Yes. They are going to try for a quick and dirty to get it stopped, + knowing you cannot start it up again and that is all they want to + do.

+

P: We must obviously work together there, Al.

+

Haig intended to wait for a + formal answer from Peru and then, if it was negative as he expected, + decide how to publicise the British readiness to support this effort. + ‘We will have to be sure,’ Henderson suggested, ‘that they do not pull their + punches in attributing blame where it belongs for their breakdown.’” + (Freedman, Official History, vol. II, p. 329) A + British record of the meeting, as sent by Henderson to London, is published on the Thatcher Foundation website.

+

Presumably a reference to Pérez de + Cuéllar’s May 2 proposals. See footnote 2, Document 215.

+ +

H: Yes and I wanted you to know I talked with Belaunde a few minutes + ago.See Document + 234. They are going to have to learn what we have + learned in three weeks. That is fine. We are going to cool it here.

+

P: When are you going to make it public?

+

H: I don’t think it is a good idea to do that. It is not really as good + as the first proposal.

+

P: The one they have just rejected. You don’t intend to make it + public?

+

H: No.

+

P: Do you mind if I do?

+

H: I assumed that you would.

+

P: You don’t mind?

+

H: Not at all.

+

P: It seems to me it would be helpful here and indeed with some of our + overseas friends to indicate what it was we were prepared to do. I think + it would help us.

+

H: You go ahead. I think it is not good for us to do it.

+

P: No. You don’t mind if I do?

+

H: No.

+

P: Look at it from our point of view. I think it would help.

+

H: Yes, remembering it was not as forthcoming as the other.

+

P: No, not from their point of view.

+

H: No.

+

P: I think it is probably helpful to get something out. I might do it + later today.In telegram 10174 from London, + May 7, the Embassy reported: “In Parliament May 7 Foreign Secretary + Pym described the + U.S./Peruvian proposals, said that they had been acceptable to + HMG, but that Argentina had + rejected them and was obstructing progress by asking for a ceasefire + without a clear link to withdrawal of Argentine troops. Pym categorically rejected any + ceasefire without a timetable for Argentine withdrawal.” (Department + of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D820240–0696)

+

H: All right. We will stay in touch.

+

P: How do you see things now? Is it inevitable the UN has to get going? There is no further + line you can take in the meantime?

+ +

H: I think ultimately, for the reasons that you know, that it will have + to come back here because I don’t think the UN is going to find it any easier to solve the problem than + we did.

+

P: Our worry is the time it takes discovering that.

+

H: I think it very important—I talked to Nicko and he will be in touch + with you about the situation locally.

+

P: Apart from this, if you will not publicize the document that has been + rejected, when will you say publicly that this latest proposal has been + rejected?

+

H: We are afraid that . . . we are not singling out any particular + approach. We have been pursuing every opportunity that could lead to a + solution. It will sort of drift out.

+

P: Can I say the proposal that was put to the Argentines by Peru have + been rejected, proposals which we would have accepted have been + rejected?

+

H: Yes, I think so. Sure.

+

P: Okay.

+

END TELCON

+
+ +
+ 236. Information Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for + Inter-American Affairs (Enders) + to Secretary of State HaigSource: Department of State, + Central Foreign Policy File, P820108–0125. Confidential. Drafted by + J.W. Swigert (FWG); cleared by W. + Lofstrom (INR/IAA), D. Johnson (P), Briggs, S. Block (ARA/AND), + Kilday, Einaudi, Jones (ARA/RPP), and Service. Swigert initialed for all clearing + officials except Service, + who initialed his clearance. Haig initialed at the top of the memorandum, + indicating that he saw it. A stamped notation also indicates that + Haig saw the + memorandum. + + + Washington, May 6, + 1982 + + + SUBJECT + Latin Reaction to Falklands Developments + +

U.S. support for Britain has shaken Latin America. + With the notable exceptions of Venezuela, Nicaragua, and Peru, official + criticism publicly has been muted. But in private, + many Latin leaders were shocked by what + they saw as an abrupt U.S. shift that jeopardizes the Inter-American system.

+ +

The sinking of the Belgrano helped to solidify + sentiment for Argentina. Talk of military + assistance to the GOA in Peru, + Guatemala and VenezuelaOn May 6, Hayward (as acting Chairman of the + Joint Chiefs of Staff) sent a memorandum to Carlucci discussing Venezuela’s + decision to loan C–130 military + cargo aircraft to Argentina, some of which had been sold to the + Venezuelan military under FMS, and + considering on what basis the United States could object to the + decision. Hayward determined + that it was “highly conjectural whether the U.S. could object to the + temporary provision of these aircraft to Argentina. But over and + above that, there is the larger question of whether the U.S. should object, regardless of the legalities, + to the loan of these aircraft. Our declaration of support for Great + Britain and our sanctions against Argentina have exacerbated the + already frayed relations with our neighbors to the south. We should + probably let this one go by.” (Washington National Records Center, + OSD Files, FRC 330–84–0003, + Argentina (Jan–15 May) 1982) is out in the + open, although Herrera is still playing coy. While maintaining + official neutrality, Brazil has tilted toward + Argentina and responded favorably to an Argentine request to + purchase patrol aircraft. Colombia and Costa Rica have + counseled moderation, but outgoing Costa Rican President Carazo + delivered us a farewell gift with his May 4 suggestion that OAS headquarters be moved out of + Washington.

+

The President’s letter helped.See Document 204 and footnote 2 thereto. Panama’s + President Royo assembled Latin + American ambassadors to discuss the crisis and read the President’s + letter to them—a unilateral Panamanian communique which followed omitted + criticism of the U.S. But Panama is still active in attempting to drum up a collective Latin + response to sanctions toward Argentina.

+

Individual reactions are colored by specific circumstances (proximity to + Argentina, revanchist claims), but resentment toward + the U.S. is simmering, fueled by latent Anglo-Spanish tensions + and nationalism. Future U.S. relations with the + hemisphere will suffer the longer the conflict drags + on.

+

Attached is a cable providing Latin American reaction by country.Attached but not printed. The cable was sent + as telegram 123749 to all American Republic diplomatic posts, May 7. + (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, + D850037–0116)

+
+ +
+ + 237. Telegram From the Department of State to Multiple Diplomatic + PostsSource: Department + of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D850030–0736. Confidential; + Immediate; Exdis. Sent to USUN, all American Republic + diplomatic posts, all OECD capitals, UN Security Council capitals, USSOUTHCOM, and USCINCLANT. Drafted and + approved by Thomas; cleared + by Gillespie and in S/S–O. + + + Washington, May 6, 1982, 1926Z + +

123255. Military addees treat as Specat Exclusive. For Ambassador Kirkpatrick from Secretary Haig. Subject: Falklands Dispute, + Action by the Secretary General. Ref: A) USUN New York 1252,In telegram + 1252 from USUN, May 6, Kirkpatrick transmitted a report + of her May 5 meeting with Pérez de + Cuéllar. The Secretary General informed Kirkpatrick that he had “urgent + appeals” from the King of Spain, the President of Colombia, and the + Foreign Ministers of Brazil and Venezuela to “take initiatives to + bring peace to the South Atlantic.” Pérez de Cuéllar added that Argentina had accepted + his mediating role and accepted “in principle” his proposal for a + ceasefire, that “several EC + representatives, including France and Germany, have turned around on + the question,” that “opinion in the Security Council and in the U.N. + has turned strongly against the U.K., whom everyone feels is + resisting settlement,” that “the U.S. is not seen as a potential + referee since they have taken a partisan role,” and that the + “so-called Peruvian initiative is seen as nothing but Secretary’s + Haig’s proposals + translated into Spanish.” (Department of State, Central Foreign + Policy File, D850020–0147) B) USUN New York 1256.In telegram + 1256 from USUN, May 6, the Mission + reported: “Security Council met 5 May 1982 in response to Irish call + for consideration of Falklands crisis. The Council agreed for the + moment not to hold a formal meeting but to issue a statement by the + President on behalf of the Council and to meet again Thursday, May + 6.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, + D820236–0184)

+

1. (Confidential–Entire text)

+

2. As the focus of diplomacy now shifts to New York, it is important that + certain fundamental principles and objectives be clear and constant. I + would appreciate your conveying these to the Secretary General, in + response to the points he made to you yesterday (Ref A) and urge that he + take these into account as he considers his role and the UN’s in any future peacemaking effort.

+

3. We believe that a ceasefire and a total withdrawal of military and + security forces within a short, definite period, must be linked. Partial + withdrawal, or de facto partition of the Islands, or any + ceasefire/withdrawal arrangements that could be interrupted by the + Argentines are not acceptable solutions. This would have unfortunate + future ramifications in other territorial disputes, and compromise the + UK’s legitimate invocation of the + right of self-defense in light of Argentina’s non-compliance with UNSC Resolution 502.

+ +

4. We believe that all other issues, in particular the question of + sovereignty, are and must be negotiable. We have been unable to date to + get agreement from Argentina on a negotiation mandate that does not + prejudge the sovereignty issue. The United States has adopted no + position regarding the competing claims of the UK and Argentina to the Islands, and we do not intend to. + We likewise take no position on the underlying legal theories and their + application in this dispute. We have stated only that the wishes of the + Islanders should be taken into account.

+

5. We are open about possible UN + peacekeeping, administration and negotiation roles, which are all + negotiable. The US would be willing to + continue to participate in the negotiations under UN auspices, if the Secretary General + sought the assistance of a personal representative or contact group.

+

6. We will oppose any proposed elements that would appear to reward + aggression, encourage military action in the many other outstanding + cases of territorial dispute, or which derogate from the rule of law, in + particular the principle that disputes must be resolved peacefully + consistent with the UN Charter, and the + right of self-defense. We will stand by these principles even if + isolated.

+

7. As for the Secretary General’s desire to pursue his initiative at this + time, we want him to know we understand the pressures he is under to act + now. However, we want to emphasize our view that until there is a closer + agreement by the UK and Argentina on the + conditions and terms of reference for any initiative and the modalities + for ceasefire, disengagement, administration and negotiations, it would + be harmful to launch such an initiative. We understand that whereas the + UK and Argentina have expressed + interest in Perez’s proposal, it will require further elaboration and + understandings between the parties before it could go forward. Moreover, + we do not dismiss the possibility that the UK and Argentina may prefer to proceed along other lines. + It is important to wait until both sides have the understandings they + need and agreement on the best approach before proceeding. Our interest + is in finding the most promising route to a settlement, whether under + the SYG’s auspices or otherwise, even + though this may take more time.

+

8. Our position in further consultations of the Security Council should + be, in accordance with the above, to discourage any further formal + action by the Council at least until informal contacts with the parties + produces agreement on an acceptable approach to negotiations.

+

Haig unquote Eagleburger. Unquote

+ + Eagleburger + +
+ +
+ + 238. Telegram From the Department of State to Multiple Diplomatic + PostsSource: National + Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D850030–0740. Secret; + Niact Immediate; Exdis. Sent to all NATO capitals, Canberra, Wellington, + and Tokyo. Sent for information Immediate to London. Drafted by + Enders and Gompert; cleared by Bremer and in S/S–O; approved by Haig. A similar message from + Haig was transmitted in + telegram 123533 to all American Republic diplomatic posts, except + Managua and USINT Havana, May 6, + for delivery to the Foreign Ministers of each country. (Reagan + Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC + Cable File, Falkland File 05/06/1982 (5)) + + + Washington, May 6, 1982, 2040Z + +

123449. Subject: Message From Secretary Haig.

+

1. Secret–Entire text.

+

2. Please pass the following message to the Foreign Minister from the + Secretary.

+

3. Begin quote

+

Dear Mr. Minister:

+

I know you feel, as President Reagan and I do, that the tragic loss of life in the + sinking of the Belgrano and Sheffield and other military actions makes + it all the more urgent to find a basis for peace in the South + Atlantic.

+

Over the last five days President Belaunde of Peru and I worked out a + possible approach, involving these elements:

+

(1) Immediate cessation of hostilities concurrent with

+

(2) Mutual withdrawal and non-reintroduction of forces;

+

(3) Introduction of third parties on to the Falkland Islands to verify + withdrawal, administer the Islands, and make sure all elements of the + agreement were implemented;

+

(4) Acknowledgment by the two governments of differences over the status + of the Islands;

+

(5) Acknowledgment by the two governments that the aspirations and + interests of the inhabitants would have to be included in a final + settlement; and

+

(6) Negotiation of a definitive solution by 30 April 1983, with the + assistance of the third parties.

+

On May 5, Francis Pym informed me + that Britain was prepared to give the most serious consideration to + acceptance of this proposal, provided Argentina did so as well, and was + prepared to order a ceasefire in the near future if Argentina did + accept.See Document + 227.

+ +

These proposals had been discussed at various points with Argentina, + receiving an encouraging reaction. But when they were presented by + President Belaunde to President Galtieri late May 5, he refused to consider them. + Argentina, he said, wants a UN + mediation.See Document 232.

+

Regrettable as it is that a plan carefully developed with the leadership + of a country very supportive of Argentina was not addressed seriously, + the effort has not been lost. We understand that Britain will not pull + back from the position taken and will make it the basis of his [its] + response to the United Nations Secretary General’s offer of mediation to + reach a peaceful settlement of the war.

+

From the very beginning of this crisis, the United States has been guided + by the principle that force must not be used to seize what cannot be + obtained peacefully. The prompt actions of the EC Ten reflected an equally principled stand. The integrity + of this norm is of vital practical importance. Historically, its erosion + has only led to further disorder and war. Disputes throughout the world + could turn violent if the principle of peaceful settlement is + undermined. Your insistence on an immediate withdrawal of all forces and + a simultaneous ceasefire is crucial in upholding this principle.

+

Based on our common interest in the rule of law and our common desire to + stop this war, we must all strive to assist the parties to achieve a + settlement. UN Security Council + Resolution 502 continues to provide the basis for such a settlement. My + country will actively support efforts to implement this resolution + through the Secretary General or any other mechanism. End quote

+ + Haig + +
+ +
+ + 239. Memorandum From the Permanent Representative to the United + Nations (Kirkpatrick) to + Secretary of State HaigSource: Department of State, + Executive Secretariat, Files of Alexander M. Haig, Jr., 1981–1982, Lot 82D370, No + folder. Confidential. There is no indication that Haig saw the memorandum, although + a notation in the bottom right-hand corner indicates that it was + received in S on May 7. + + + New York, May 7, + 1982 + + + RE + Memorandum of Conversation with the Secretary + General + +

Ambassador William Sherman of + USUN conveyed to the Secretary + General’s Deputy the contents of Secretary Haig’s views as expressed in State 123255.See Document 237. An + unknown hand underlined the portion of this sentence beginning with + the word “Haig’s” and ending + with “State.”

+

Later the Secretary General spoke with Ambassador Kirkpatrick and asked her to convey + the following views:

+

1. The Secretary General thanked the Secretary of State for his + observations and advice.

+

2. The Secretary General asserted that he was working under Article 40 of + the UN CharterAs part of Chapter VII of the Charter of the United + Nations, which addresses “Action with Respect to Threats to the + Peace, Breaches of the Peace, and Acts of Aggression,” Article 40 + states: “In order to prevent an aggravation of the situation, the + Security Council may, before making the recommendations or deciding + upon the measures provided for in Article 39 [which empowers the + Security Council to identify any threat to or breach of the peace or + act of aggression], call upon the parties concerned to comply with + such provisional measures as it deems necessary or + desirable.” toward provisional measures which could serve as + preconditions for the ultimate peaceful resolution of the conflict.

+

3. He asked me to assure the Secretary of State that it seemed clear to + him that a cease fire, withdrawal of Argentine forces and redeployment + of the British Navy would all necessarily take place simultaneously. Any + effort by Argentina to impose resolution of the sovereignty question as + a precondition would doom the UN + effort.

+

4. Finally, the Secretary General believes that any other initiatives + would be counterproductive at this time and would have the effect of + undermining his efforts.

+

The Secretary General assured me he would keep me fully informed about + developments over the weekend.

+
+ +
+ + 240. Memorandum From the National Intelligence Officer for General + Purpose Forces (Atkeson) to + Director of Central Intelligence Casey and the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence + (Inman)Source: Central Intelligence Agency, + National Intelligence Council, Job 85T00757R: Chronological Files + (1982–1983), Box 1, Folder 5: NIO/GPF Chrono May 82. Secret; [handling restriction not declassified]. Sent + through Rowen. Copies were + sent to Gorman and Howells. For Parts I and II of + Atkeson’s report, see + Document 126 and footnote 1 thereto. + + + DDI #3773–82 + + + Washington, May 7, + 1982 + + + SUBJECT + What’s Next in the Falklands?—(Part III) The Long View + +

1. The first battles are over; the two sides are licking their wounds and + angling for political advantage among cease-fire proposals. The + progression of the Falklands crisis from its comic operatic stage into + the grim business of killing has sent shock waves throughout both + governments and around the world. The immediate future rests on a + knife’s edge; war and peace seem equally likely.

+

2. The impressive celerity with which the British launched their response + to the Argentinian challenge has proved that the UK is yet a military power with global reach. For their + part, the Argentines have shown a readiness to stand up to the superior + edge of the more modern force. Britain’s strength lies primarily at sea, + her opponent’s on land; they overlap in the common environment of the + air. The Argentines have a sizable air force, but the air is primarily + the domain of high technology, and here the British have the edge, + particularly in total systems integration. While the Argentines may be + capable of mounting a spirited defense and perhaps a few surprises, they + must face the very bitter probability of tactical defeat as the British + bring additional force to bear in the area.

+

3. But tactical defeat may not be as conclusive an outcome as some + observers suppose. The Falklands still lie a scant 300 miles from + Argentina and 8,000 miles from the UK. + The Argentines probably assess that the strategic imperatives operate on + a different vector than those of the battles. Whatever course the + military action may take, they have reason to believe that the key issue + of sovereignty has been decided in advance by geography and reinforced + by the momentum it has attained through worldwide notoriety. While the + junta has undoubtedly been surprised by the vigor and scale of the + British reaction, they may calculate that the opponent must eventually + recall his fleet and his + ability to influence events along with it. If such is the case, they may + feel that they have essentially won their war. They may have confidence + that now that the issue of sovereignty has been so visibly drawn, it is + not likely to sink back into the limbo of the past century, but will be + decided in one manner or another between the contestants. Even in their + worst-case scenario in which a “victorious” Britain undertakes to + garrison the recaptured islands with something more formidable than the + 80 marines who met the original invasion force, the junta may sense a + certain inevitability to its cause.

+

4. Much now depends upon the political strength of the junta and the + quality of its nerves. It must hold the support of the masses and + maintain internal cohesion. The members probably recognize that if they + crack visibly under pressures from within, or under the battering of the + British, they jeopardize the best chance in a century and a half for + fulfillment of an historic ambition of the nation. An awareness of this + mission probably stiffens their resolve.

+

5. Barring a cease-fire, the prospect is for more fighting and increasing + British tactical advantage. ([less than 1 line not + declassified] most of their troop transports are at some + distance from the Falklands, but the possibility of disinformation + should not be discounted. [1 line not + declassified])In a May 8 report + prepared for [name not declassified], [name not declassified] concluded: “British + task force momentum has slowed and the British appear to have + blinked at the prospect of an early assault on the Falklands. Should + diplomatic efforts not yield withdrawal of Argentines from the + Falklands during the next 7–10 days, however, we currently see the + British proceeding with their assault plans both to satisfy British + objectives for the Falkland Islands and to facilitate an honorable + return of the task force. In the meantime, the task force will take + prudent measures to enforce the Total Exclusion Zone and to bolster + its capabilities for assaulting the Islands.” The Department + transmitted to Enders the + complete text of the report in telegram 125472 to San Jose, May 8. + (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, + D820242–0134) The loss of the General + Belgrano has been a severe psychological blow to the + Argentines, and provides the stuff from which monumental hatreds are + made. They have returned stinging blows upon the British, sinking the + Sheffield and damaging other vessels. The + action outside the 200 mile exclusion zone raises the danger that the + war could widen to feature more actions outside the area, or perhaps + additional participants or supporting players. Sentiment is running high + in favor of the Argentines in Peru, Brazil, Panama and Venezuela. In + addition, there is always the risk that the Soviets will find + opportunities to play a complicating role.

+

6. The British employment of Vulcan + bombers from Ascension Island is reminiscent of American basing of + B–52 bombers on Guam in the early + phases of the Vietnam conflict. There will be temptations for the + Argentines to request third party early warning services (for both bomber and troop ship + sailings), through the stationing of AGI intelligence ships or other suitably equipped vessels + in the vicinity of Ascension, and perhaps on the periphery of the + exclusion zone as well. [2 lines not + declassified] Alternatively, other Latin American navies could play + a role. The British would have to decide how they would want to deal + with such indirect intervention. Of course, an Argentine initiative, + such as the sinking of a British ship outside the exclusion zone—a + merchant vessel, for instance—or the extensive employment of high + performance aircraft by the Argentines from the mainland which would + tempt the British to strike back, could accelerate any trend toward a + wider war.

+

7. Over the longer term, the danger is that the war will have lasting + unfavorable impact upon Pan-American relations. With the United States + abandonment of its neutral stance and open support for the British + cause, there is high likelihood that the animosities engendered in the + current conflict will extend to English-speaking peoples in decades to + come. In Argentinian eyes, and perhaps others’ as well, UK tactical success may demonstrate British + war-making potency and their ability to humble the Latins, but it is + likely to evacuate any serious basis for amicability in international + affairs. The full extent of the damage is almost impossible to forsee. + Whether the matter will be remembered only in a sullen Argentina, or + throughout an outraged South American continent, the totality of the + impact will unfold only with time.

+

8. There are other matters which are likely to be affected by the + experience of the Falklands war. Some of these are:

+

—Third World appetite for sophisticated weaponry.

+

—The shape and form of power projection weapons systems.

+

—Intelligence priorities and collection capabilities.

+

9. For many years an important concern of US foreign policy has been the magnitude of the + international arms trade, particularly in sophisticated weaponry. The + appetite of many Third World countries for showpieces of high technology + is legendary. The effect of the Falklands war may well be interpreted as + a vindication of those (in many cases impoverished) states which have + opted for such dangerous instruments. We can probably expect an added + impetus to the market of modern weapons in coming years.

+

10. Also for a number of years, major western powers have been debating + the elimination of costly old weapons systems from their arsenals. The + British carrier Hermes, for example, was + scheduled for removal from service before being committed to the South + Atlantic expedition. We can expect that the Falklands experience will + give many countries reason to reexamine their force structure, perhaps + to decide in favor of retaining some of the older systems. The US may find new enthusiasm for reviving the battleships as a result + of the apparent shortage and small caliber of naval guns in the British + task force. Missiles do not make good substitutes for shore bombardment, + and other inadequacies may yet come to light.

+

11. [4 lines not declassified] the Falklands + episode should give us some understanding of the need for balance in our + collection programs and a glimpse of the magnitude of the uncertainties + which can evolve in a crisis when it occurs in an area which has been + chronically left off of the priorities lists.

+

12. In sum, there is much that will be different when the war is over. + Barring a crack in the junta, the Argentines are likely to get the + sovereignty they seek over the Falklands in one form or another. Our + Latin American affairs will be more complex and difficult, and the + Soviets may have gained certain inroads if they have played an active + part in assisting the Argentines. The Third World arms market is likely + to grow more intense as countries realize their vulnerabilities to major + power attack. In advanced countries, requirements for maintenance of a + full spectrum of traditional and modern weaponry will probably be more + clearly defined. And in the US and + UK we are likely to recognize an + increased need to balance our intelligence efforts. There will be other + changes, some undoubtedly of considerable import. These will be revealed + as events take their course.

+ + Edward B. + Atkeson + +
+ +
+ + 241. Memorandum From the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy + (Iklé) to Secretary of + Defense WeinbergerSource: Washington National Records + Center, OSD Files, FRC 330–86–0042, + UK 1982. Top Secret; Eyes Only. + A stamped notation at the top of the memorandum indicates that + Weinberger saw it on May + 10. At the bottom of the memorandum, Weinberger wrote: “Fred. Please let me know when all + the ‘In Staffing’ is completed. We should not require longer than 36 + hours to act on any UK request.” + Another copy of Iklé’s + memorandum bears the handwritten date of May 7. (Ibid.) Smith returned the memorandum to + Iklé under a May 13 + note, which reads: “Can you please respond to SecDef’s question by COB today?” (Ibid.) Additional summary + papers tracking the status of British military requests were + regularly produced by the Department of Defense until the end of + June and are ibid. + + + Washington, undated + + + SUBJECT + Materiel Support to the UK + (U)—INFORMATION MEMORANDUM + +

The attached paper contains summaries of new requests for materiel + support, requests outstanding, and requests recently completed.

+

Fred C. + IkleIklé signed “Fred” above his + typed signature.

+

Attachment

+

Paper Prepared in the Department of DefenseTop Secret; Eyes Only.

+

Washington, undated

+ + REQUESTS RECEIVED 6–7 MAY 1982 + + REQUEST + STATUS + EXPECTED DELIVERY + + + (TS) 12 NESTOR (KY–8/KY–28) Equipments with spare sets (Secure + Voice Encryption Device) + In Staffing + Unknown—10 NESTORs previously delivered on 21 April. + + + (TS) 1 AN/ALE–40 Chaff Dispenser for trial installation on a + Sea Harrier + Approved + Air Staff working + + + + (TS) 15 AN/ASQ–81 (v) Magnetic Anomaly Detector (MAD) Sets + plus spares and auxilliary equipment + In Staffing + Unknown + + + (TS) 15 MJU–7 infra-red flares + Approved + 7 May 82 + + + (TS) Temporary two-day loan of 3 to 4 UK shipwrights employed by the USG (Administrative leave) in the + UK to assist in retrofit + activities + Approved + 7 May 82 + + + (TS) Direct relay of weather satellite information to + Sunnyvale AFS, CA. Requires a demodulator to be shipped from the + Global Weather Center to Sunnyvale. + Approved + 10 May 82 + + + (TS) Request for quotation for 20,000 SSQ 41B Sonobuoys + In Staffing + Unknown + + + (TS) 3 CV 3333 UHF secure speech (SATCOM, units plus plugs, + handset and vocoder + In Staffing + Unknown + + + (TS) Diversion to the UK of + the first available RD–433/SSH Receiver under FMS case UK–P–BGO + In Staffing + Unknown + + + (TS) 2 VOE–82C Antennae for WSC–1 (SATCOM) + Approved + Expect mid-June 82 delivery + + + (TS) 10 AN/PVS–5 (Night Vision Goggles) + Approved + Expect 7 May 82 delivery + + + (TS) 50 Maritime Limpet Mines (Hand-transported Underwater + Anti-Ship Demolition Weapon) + Approved + JCS considers availability to be uncertain + + + (TS) 350 exhaust valves for use on helo-launched MK 46 + Torpedoes (MK 46 is a semi-active anti-submarine torpedo with + 5–6 mm range) + Approved + Manufacture expected 11 June 82 + + + (TS) 2 Vulcan/Phalanx Close-In Systems (Vulcan/Phalanx is a + point defense system against an anti-ship missile threat. UK will mount the weapon on the + aircraft carrier ILLUSTRIOUS currently undergoing sea + trials.) + Approved + Expect mid-May 82 delivery + + + (TS) 200 MK 46 Mod 2 Torpedoes (Semi-Active ASW) + In Staffing + Unknown + + + (TS) 200 MK 535 Containers (Torpedo Transport) + In Staffing + Unknown + + + (TS) Availability of 600,000 sq. ft. AM–2 airfield + matting + In Staffing + Unknown + + + + (TS) 1:250,000 scale maps of the Argentine mainland developed + by US and Argentina (Bilateral + agreement requires both countries approve release) + DMA, OSD and State recommend disapproval. (See Tab + A)Tab A was not found + attached. + Awaiting decision + +
+ + REQUESTS RECENTLY COMPLETED + + REQUEST + DELIVERY + + + (TS) 10 Crypto Support Kits + 4 May 82 + + + (TS) 16 Lightweight 60 mm Company Mortars and 1600 + rounds + 5 May 82 + +
+
+ +
+ 242. Message From British Foreign Secretary Pym to Secretary of State Haig + + + London, May 7, + 1982 + +

[Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Haig Papers, + Department of State, Day File, May 7, 1982. Top Secret. 2 pages not + declassified.]

+
+ +
+ + 243. Memorandum of ConversationSource: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, + Files of Alexander M. Haig, + Jr., 1981–1982, Lot 82D370, (3) Falklands Crisis + 1982. Secret. All brackets are in the original. The meeting took + place at the Army-Navy Club. At the top of the memorandum, Goldberg wrote: “Import—the + message of unrest in B.A.” Also at the top of the memorandum, an + additional notation in an unknown hand reads: “Final version + 5/12/82. ARA probably will send by + cable to B.A.” + + + Washington, May 8, + 1982 + + + PARTICIPANTS + Carlos Guillermo + General Sanchez Mason, retired from Argentine Army + Mr. Francisco Aguirre, + Co-owner, Diario de las Americas + Walters, + Ambassador-at-Large + + + SUBJECT + Falkland Islands + +

At the request of Francisco + Aguirre, a co-owner of Diario de las + Americas and perhaps the best informed man in Washington on + Latin American affairs, I met with retired Argentine General Sanchez + Mason at the Army Navy Club. Deputy Assistant Secretary Bosworth concurred that the meeting + should take place.

+

Sanchez Mason contended that former Argentine President and retired Army + General Viola sent him to alert + me that many Argentine officers, particularly Army officers, are + extremely disturbed by the Argentine occupation of the Falkland Islands + and the subsequent events.Goldberg drew a bracket in the + left-hand margin next to this sentence. He explained that he + now works for MACK trucks and is using his business connection as a + pretext for his visit. Prior to his retirement, however, he was, + consecutively, in charge of suppression of the guerrillas, Commander of + the Fifth Corps (the forces used in the Falklands), Commander of the + Third Corps in Cordoba, Commander of the First Corps in Buenos Aires, + and Chief of Staff of the Army.

+

When Anaya was Chief of Navy + Planning, he developed plans for the occupation of the three Beagle + Islands and another for the Falklands; but VidelaGoldberg circled “Videla” and drew a line from the + circle to the bottom of the page where he wrote “Viola?” rejected them in + 1978 because of the damage either would have done to Argentine relations + with Great Britain and the U.S. When Admiral Anaya became head of the Navy, he + allied with Galtieri to oust + Viola from the Presidency. + (Anaya is the most + belligerent of the three Junta + members, Galtieri, the most + excitable, and Lamidozo, the most thoughtful and moderate.) For some + reason, perhaps church pressure, Anaya then pressured Galtieri to support him in the seizure of the Falklands + as a repayment. Foreign Minister Costa + Mendez assured the military that (a) the Soviets would + veto any kind of anti-Argentine resolution in the UN, (b) that Argentina could rely on Soviet + assistance and (c) in any event, the British would not fight. He knew + the British and could guarantee they would not go to war over the + Falklands. [General Sanchez Mason added as an aside that Costa Mendez is the biggest liar in + Argentina.Goldberg underlined the portion of the sentence + beginning with “Costa + Mendez” and ending with the word “Argentina.” + Sanchez Mason knew the Foreign Minister pretended to the U.S. that he + knew nothing of the operation before it happened.]

+

The original plan called for the occupation to occur in May, but the Navy + forced the issue early by sending Naval personnel ashore in South + Georgia disguised as civilian workers to dismantle the whaling station. + The British reaction coupled with domestic strife with the Peronistas + triggered the landing. Of the five corps commanders, only General Garcia + of the Fifth Corps knew of the operation well in advance. The others + were given only 48 hours notice. Troops moved under cover of exercises + and maneuvers. The corps commanders, who were kept in the dark, harbor a + certain amount of resentment.

+

Since the landing and occupation General Galtieri announced to a meeting of active and retired + generals of the Army, that he told Secretary Haig that Argentina, if backed to the + wall, would take help from any source, including the Soviet Union. This + greatly disturbed the generals. They now perceive the Junta, Sanchez + Mason explained, as having led Argentina into a foolish fight with old + friends in Great Britain and the United States over islands Argentina + would inevitably get anyway. Argentina is running the risk of destroying + the OAS and endangering the ability of + the West to defend its values—values prized by the Argentine + military.

+

I asked him which officers felt this way. He cited General Vaquero, Chief + of Staff of the Army; General Nicolaides, Commander of the First Corps in Buenos + Aires; General Trimarco, Commander of the Second Corps, and many junior + officers.

+

General Sanchez Mason stressed that he came to seek no assistance but + merely to ask for understanding “when something happens”. He feels that + the Argentine Junta will not negotiate under the present circumstances. They must be “knocked + around a little more”. He is convinced the British can do it. He also + pooh-poohed the claim that the U.S. gave the British information that + led to the sinking of the cruiser, Belgrano, + saying that he had some knowledge of British intelligence—they were + quite capable of doing all these things by themselves. He felt that + after the Argentines had sustained a few more reverses, they might be + ripe for listening to something reasonable. He again hinted that he + hoped he would have our understanding if and when “something happened”. + Viola is anxious to keep the + U.S. advised of developments in Argentina. He had also been in touch in + Buenos Aires with Mr. Friedman and Ambassador Shlaudeman. The Navy got Argentina + into the mess; the Air Force has helped save the Navy’s face by sinking + the Sheffield. The moderates plan to move after + the Junta sustains further reverses.

+

Mr. Aguirre, LCDR Martiny, General Sanchez Mason, Carlos Guillermo, and + myself were the only people present.

+
+ +
+ + 244. Information Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for + Inter-American Affairs (Enders) + to Secretary of State HaigSource: Department of State, + Central Foreign Policy File, P820069–1749. Confidential. Drafted by + Kilday. Haig initialed at the top of the + memorandum, indicating that he saw it. A stamped notation also + indicates that Haig saw the + memorandum. + + + Washington, May 10, + 1982 + + + SUBJECT + Brazilian Reply to your May 6 letter on the South Atlantic + +

Attached is an informal translation of Foreign Minister Guerreiro’s May 7 + replyNot found attached. The complete + texts of the Department’s unofficial translation as well as the + Portuguese original of Guerreiro’s May 7 letter are in the + Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, + P820076–1145. to your letter of May 6.See Document 238 and footnote 1 thereto. The reply + makes three points worth noting:

+

. . . restraint is essential, not only on the part of the U.K. and + Argentina, but also of “countries that may help tip the balance of the + current military situation . . .”

+

. . . the time has arrived to seek a solution involving force withdrawal, + a temporary U.N. presence on the islands, and U.N. sponsored + negotiations with purposefully vague guidelines on self-determination + and sovereignty.Haig underlined + “self-determination and sovereignty” and drew a checkmark next to + these words.

+

. . . Brazil is concerned about the impact of the crisis on + inter-American relations.

+

Guerreiro’s May 7 letter is his second to you on this issue, both sent in + reply to your letters to him.See Document 196 and footnote 1, Document 238. President Figueiredo also replied to President + Reagan’s May 4 letter on the + crisis.Likely an erroneous reference to + Reagan’s May 2 letter to + Figueiredo (see Document 204). For Figueiredo’s May 4 response, see + footnote 2, Document 229. In + this exchange of correspondence the Brazilians have made clear their + hope that the crisis and associated questions will be explored + thoroughly during Figueiredo’s + visit. Your breakfast with Guerreiro on May 12 may provide the best + opportunity for a full discussion.Haig underlined this sentence and + wrote “agree” in the right-hand margin.

+
+ +
+ + 245. Memorandum From the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy + (Iklé) to Secretary of + Defense WeinbergerSource: Washington National Records + Center, OSD Files, FRC 330–86–0042, + UK 1982. Top Secret; Eyes Only. + Attached to the memorandum is an undated note to Weinberger from Iklé that reads: “Cap. The word + ‘ancillary costs’ in penultimate paragraph is deliberately vague. + Will Taft’s rep approved + the memo here. F.” Also attached to the memorandum is a May 11 note + from Zakheim to General + Smith that reads: “State + has coordinated on this memo and has no objections.” + + + Washington, May 10, + 1982 + + + SUBJECT + Delivering and Financing Materiel Support to the UK (U)—ACTION MEMORANDUM + +

(TS) Following upon your meeting with Secretary Nott and his subsequent letter to + you,See Document + 233 and footnote 2 + thereto. the British requested that we approve a type of + “lend” or “lease” arrangement that would facilitate the transfer of U.S. + equipment to them without the need for British prefinancing of such + transfers, and with the provision that all unused equipment be returned + to the U.S.

+

(TS) We have held several meetings with Major General Boam, Head of British Defense Staff, + his staff, and members of the OSD staff + and have established the difficulty, both legal and legislative, of + implementing a “lend” or “lease” agreement.

+

(TS) Instead, together with the British, we have worked out an + arrangement,Weinberger underlined the portion + of this sentence beginning with the word “together” and ending with + the word “arrangement.” subject to your approval, that would + have the United States transfer to U.S. depots, whether in Britain or + Ascension Island, such equipment as the UK might anticipate requiring during the conduct of its + operations. The materiel—whether POL, + spares, or munitions—would remain under U.S. control until the day the + British determine they actually need it. At that point title would be + transferred to the UK and payment would + be forwarded to the Federal Reserve Bank.In + the right-hand margin next to this paragraph, Weinberger wrote: “Fred—are they + really agreeable to this? CW.”

+

(TS) The British have agreed to cover the costs of the equipment that is + transferred, as well as of transportation of that equipment. In such + cases where a transfer would not be effected, the UK would still cover other possible + ancillary costs once these are determined.

+

(TS) I recommend that you approve the arrangement which has OSD(C), General Counsel and DSAA support. Any sort of “lend” or “lease” scheme could harm the + credibility of our Congressional requests for new materiel. On the other + hand, by retaining U.S. ownership to the last possible second, we avoid + forcing unnecessary expenditures upon the UK at a time when their financial position is under heavy + strain.Iklé and Weinberger initialed their approval.

+ + Fred C. IkleIklé + signed “Fred” above his typed signature. + +
+ +
+ 246. Memorandum of ConversationSource: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, + Files of Alexander M. Haig, + Jr., 1981–1982, Lot 82D370, No folder. Confidential; + Limdis. Drafted by Middendorf. Copies were sent to + Enders, Bosworth, Briggs, Service, Walters, Bremer, and Haig. At the top of the + memorandum, Haig wrote: + “Tell Larry to read carefully—for msg. Be sure + UK + understands.” A typewritten notation below + this indicates that Haig’s + comment was written on May 12. An attached undated note by Goldberg reads: “AMH read en route to Turkey. Key message.” Haig was in Turkey for meetings with President Evren + and other officials May 13–15, before traveling to Greece May 15–16, + and then to Luxembourg for a NATO + Ministerial Meeting May 16–18. + + + Washington, May 11, 1982, 10:30 a.m. + + + PARTICIPANTS + Esteban Takacs, Argentine + Ambassador to the U.S. + J. William Middendorf, + II—U.S. Ambassador to the OAS + +

Takacs called me this morning + after, he said, trying unsuccessfully to reach me at home last night. He + said that following a conversation he had with Dick Walters MondayMay 10. No other record of Walters’s meeting with Takacs has been found. he + was afraid the Department misunderstood the GOA’s negotiating position. Therefore, Takacs said he wanted to emphasize + that there has been a definite Argentine change—Argentina has + deliberately de-linked the sovereignty issue from the negotiating + process and he asked that I pass this message on.In an interview on + CBS–TV’s “Face the Nation” on May 9, Costa Méndez, speaking from Buenos Aires, said that + Argentina had no other goal but “sovereignty” over the Falklands, + but that sovereignty was “not a precondition” for beginning + negotiations with the United Kingdom. (Jackson Diehl, “Argentina + Charges Survivors Strafed,” Washington Post, + May 10, 1982, p. A1) Subsequently, on May 10, Pérez de Cuéllar gave Parsons a draft of the peace + agreement then under negotiation that had been prepared by the + Argentine UN delegation. Paragraph 2 + of the draft states: “The agreement to which the parties commit + themselves shall be without prejudice to the rights, claims or + positions of the parties.” (Freedman, Official + History, vol. II, p. 349). He said this de-linkage + was a major concession since the Argentine public feels strongly that + “nobody should take us out of our islands.” Takacs added that he feels with this display of + Argentine flexibility the ball is now in the British court. (I pointed + out to Takacs my impression that + the British also had displayed flexibility on the issue of the future of + the inhabitants of the islands.)

+

COMMENT: (While Takacs clearly + wanted to portray to me a flexible GOA, + probably in hopes we would pressure the British, he also seemed + genuinely fearful that the Department is misreading Argentina on this + score. At lunch, Monday, May 10, with GOA + OAS Ambassador Quijano, I was the recipient of much + the same message. Quijano told me + Costa Mendez had called him + Saturday the 8th, to ask his view on what sort of instructions Deputy + Foreign Minister Ros should have + for the UN. Quijano said he had told Costa Mendez that Ros should not bother with the UN unless he was able to present a real sea change in the + Argentina position, de-linking sovereignty from negotiations. Quijano told me he strongly believes + this is now the GOA’s position. I have + politely refrained from asking either for assurances that the Junta is + firmly on board with the Foreign Ministry but I would add that both men, + so far as I can recall, have been very straight with me.)

+

On other related subjects, Takacs:

+

—thought it a hopeful sign that negotiations at the UN now are in their third day;

+

—expects a cease-fire announcement by the weekend;Haig + underlined this point and circled it along with the following point. + In the right-hand margin next to it, he wrote: “!”

+

—said Henry Kissinger was to meet Pym today to urge the UK + to yield on the sovereignty issue;Haig underlined this point and + circled it along with the preceding point. In the right-hand margin + next to it, he wrote: “!!!!!”

+

—reported the Garcia Bustillos-headed Venezuelan delegation in Buenos + Aires will offer military aid—but not troops because the GOA hasn’t asked;

+ +

—stressed that Argentina doesn’t want to internationalize the war, + saying, “as you know, we’ve had offers from others which we have turned + down;”In the right-hand margin next to + this point, Haig wrote: + “!!!”

+

—suggested, that as a signal to the Latins that we wish to avert the + growing buildup of animus against us, that the US seek somehow to return to a neutral position before an + actual settlement is completed—“even if such a return takes place only + five minutes before announcement of a settlement;”Haig + underlined most of this point and wrote in the left-hand margin next + to it: “Key. They will settle!”

+

—emphasized (as Quijano also has + done) the need to look beyond the immediate problem to ways to rebuild + hemispheric solidarity.

+

Returning to the present state of hostilities and prospects for a + cease-fire, Takacs claimed the + GOA has been observing a cease-fire + for sometimeHaig drew a line from this word and wrote “Bull!” in + the margin under it.—that the action against the Sheffield + was only in retaliation for the Belgrano. He also said that continued + British shelling could be a disaster, provoking an escalation in + hostilities. He said thus far ten islanders had been killed; many more + were in peril if the British do not stop. He said he was very skeptical + that by continuous shelling the UK + improves chances for a peaceful settlement although no doubt the British + have a different viewpoint. He said that if negotiations go on over the + next week or longer, and the British at the same time show no signs of + halting, he would hope the US would + weigh in and ask the UK to stop.Haig + bracketed this paragraph, drew a line from the bracket to the top of + the page, and wrote: “Key message. Keep shelling. Get some reason in + B.A.!”

+

I told Takacs I was heartened by + his receptivity to a cease-fire. I told him that speaking very + personally as one not involved in the negotiating process, it seemed to + me important that any cease-fire should be accompanied immediately by at + least a partial withdrawal of forces and that a total withdrawal would + be much better. I said such a signal of good will would go a long way to + speed the negotiation process. I said a cease-fire without an Argentine + pull back probably would not have much appeal to the British.Haig bracketed this paragraph and wrote in the + left-hand margin: “Jerk!”

+

(COMMENT: I tried to pin Takacs + down on this point, knowing that time is against the British military + position. He refused to be drawn out, however. Quijano, incidentally, has commented to + me that if the UN resolution works, we + should be proud since it essentially is little more than the Haig initiative. He also has said that + in his opinion the only reason last week’s US-Peru initiative fell flat was because neither party then believed the other + was serious about fighting. Events since have sobered both sides, + Quijano said, producing a + better climate for a peaceful solution. I told Quijano I was glad at least some + realize that it has been the Secretary’s efforts which have sown the + seeds of peace.)

+
+ +
+ 247. Telegram From the [text not declassified], + Embassy in the United Kingdom ([name not + declassified]) to the Director of the Defense Intelligence + Agency (Williams) and the Deputy + Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency (Burkhalter)Source: Washington National Records + Center, OSD Files, FRC 330–84–0003, + Argentina (Jan–15 May) 1982. Secret; Noforn, Eyes Only. A typewritten notation on the + telegram indicates that copies were sent to Weinberger, Carlucci, and Jones on May 11. + + + London, May + 11, 1982, 1538Z + +

Personal for Director and/or Deputy Director. SUBJ: Falkland Island + military options (C).

+

1. (S/Noforn) [2½ + lines not declassified] the escalating British military option + list is Argentine mainland surgical takeout of balance Exocet missiles and French Etendard + aircraft [less than 1 line not declassified] + ashore on mainland. [less than 1 line not + declassified] although unconventional takeout of selected + military targets on Falklands and aircraft strike on mainland has long + been on list of possible options [1 line not + declassified] same source confirmed current presence of “some” + [less than 1 line not declassified].

+

2. (C) [less than 1 line not declassified] + current/near future reporting will attempt to concentrate on military + options and selective comments relating to the saturation of press + reports and British MOD official announcements which continue to be the + bulk of info flow on Falkland developments.

+
+ +
+ + 248. Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State for Political + Affairs (Eagleburger) to + Secretary of State HaigSource: Department of State, + Executive Secretariat, S/S Special + Handling Restrictions Memos 1979–1983, Lot 96D262, ES Sensitive May 6–18 1982. Secret; + Sensitive. + + + Washington, May 11, + 1982 + +

Mr. Secretary:

+ + SUBJECT + Falkland Crisis + +

It comes as no surprise that the UN + initiative is running aground. Here are some thoughts on the + consequences and on how we should proceed.

+

The Argentines have now had three clear opportunities to settle, and + their position is as unacceptable as ever. They wouldn’t settle before + hostilities; they wouldn’t settle in the wake of military setbacks + (South Georgia, the Belgrano); and they are no + more flexible now that they have shown they can hold their own + militarily (with the destruction of the Sheffield). We have to conclude that only a major setback—and + quite likely not even that—will cause them to negotiate in earnest. The + British have surely reached this conclusion.

+

This has several implications:

+

• A major UK military move is likely. We + would not be able to restrain HMG—through direct pressure, a new peace initiative or + both—even if we wanted to do so.

+

• The British may present us with more difficult requests as hostilities + become more severe.

+

• A new peace proposal by Peru, the UN, + the US or any other party will suffer + the same fate as the others, absent a major change in the military + situation.

+

• As fighting escalates, pressures for a straight ceasefire will mount, + putting the UK and its supporters, + especially us, on the defensive.

+

• European support for the British may unravel quickly.

+

In view of these prospects, we should:

+

• Warn the British not to be the first to break off the UN talks. Those talks are the best + protection against a major UN push for a + ceasefire, and condemnation of British military action will be worse if + they first cut off the SYG’s + effort.Eagleburger placed a vertical line in the left-hand + margin next to this point and wrote: “You’ve already done + this.”

+ +

• Urge other Allies to support the UK + even if things get nastier. Western cohesion is being tested; moreover, + our position will be less exposed if others maintain support for + London.Eagleburger placed a vertical line in the left-hand + margin next to this point and wrote: “Best done in the NATO mtg.”

+

• Engage the British now in a discussion of how to proceed after a major + military success. It is important to get through to them that they must + be at least as forthcoming on settlement terms after success as they are + now or there will be no settlement at all. In this context, we should + warn the British not to expect us to relieve them of their South + Atlantic burden if there is no agreement.

+

• Do not launch a new US initiative,Eagleburger drew an asterisk after this word, which + corresponds to a notation he wrote at the bottom of the page: “But + be prepared to come back in when asked—as I believe you will be! + LSE.” even with some + other party. It would be doomed. If the Argentines, or someone on their + behalf, seek our involvement, we’ll have to consider it. But we should + not rush to fill a vacuum, or let the British push us into another + futile effort simply to provide political cover for their military + action.

+

• Without any appearance of US + orchestration, we should urge those with any influence in Buenos Aires + (Peru, Brazil, Spain) to warn the Argentines that they now have their + last chance for a reasonable settlement before catastrophe.

+

I would like a chance to discuss these ideas before you leave.Reference is to Haig’s travels to Turkey May 13–15 and Greece May + 15–16, prior to attending a NATO + Ministerial Meeting in Luxembourg May 16–18.

+ + Lawrence S. + EagleburgerEagleburger initialed “LSE” above his typed + signature. + +
+ +
+ + 249. Memorandum of ConversationSource: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, + Files of Alexander M. Haig, + Jr., 1981–1982, Lot 82D370, (3) Falklands + Crisis—1982. Confidential; Limdis. Drafted by Middendorf. Copies were sent to Thompson, Piedra, Enders, Bosworth, Briggs, Service, and Bremer. At the top of the + memorandum, Haig wrote: + “Msg. to Bill M—thanks for vitally important reporting. Please keep + it up! Al.” Attached to the memorandum is a May 11 note from + Middendorf to Haig, sent through Bremer, that reads: “Al—Zinn is clearly a messenger sent to + pass on a message. Let’s hope they’re sincere—Bill.” + + + Washington, May 11, 1982, 4:30 p.m. + + + PARTICIPANTS + Ricardo Zinn, Argentine + businessman (former President—Banco de Italia) + Lynn Bouchey, Council for + Inter-American Security + J. William Middendorf II, + US Ambassador to the OAS + Alberto Piedra, USOAS Senior Policy Advisor + Philip Johnson, USOAS Political Advisor + +

Comment:

+

As a follow-up to telephone representations made last week from Buenos + Aires to Alberto Piedra by a + group of key Argentine businessmen, Dr. Zinn, accompanied by Mr. Bouchey, called on me this afternoon. His purpose was to + convey some messages from what appeared to be top levels of the + Argentine government. I promised to pass on his messages; I also took + the opportunity to drive home a few messages of my own.

+

In opening the conversation Dr. Zinn spoke of his hope for the ongoing negotiations at + the UN but he also spoke of fears in + Buenos Aires of British escalation. He said actions against the islands + are one thing, but massive Vulcan + attacks against the mainland would be quite another—in such an event + Argentina would be sure of US mid-air + refueling assistance to the UK. He also + claimed that British resort to nuclear weaponry is feared in Buenos + Aires. He said in such a state of total war the Argentines would turn + suicidal; they would not back down; they would seek outside + assistance—such as the Soviet Union.

+

I sought to turn the conversation to peace. In this connection, Zinn said he thought he may have played + a useful part in getting Junta support for Costa Mendez’s de-linking sovereignty and + negotiations.See footnote 3, Document 246. He said he had gotten + acceptance of this concept last weekend from the Navy and Air Force + members of the Junta. (He said, incidentally, that Air Force General + Lami Dozo is very strong for + flexibility in negotiations—that Lami + Dozo, preoccupied with regional problems, has no desire + to see his Air Force whittled down in encounters with the British. Zinn added that the Army Commander on the island might + be the toughest to convince to back off.)

+

I then probed Zinn for his + impressions of Argentine negotiating flexibility. He laid out for me an + elaborate, fuzzy scenario in which ceasefire seemed to be followed by + negotiations on withdrawal and then, after that, negotiations on the + islands. In response to this I repeatedly stressed to Zinn that a ceasefire and an Argentine + troop withdrawal had to accompany each other—that the British would not + likely go for anything less. Zinn + claimed Argentine withdrawal was simple; it could be verified + easily—“But how could a British fleet withdrawal be verified?” I said it + was inconceivable to me that Britain would go back on their word—if they + did and the fleet stole back into position, international opinion would + be outraged. I emphasized again to him the importance of an immediate + Argentine withdrawal. In response, Zinn said he would pass that word to Ros at the UN and to Junta members and that he would emphasize the + need for a simple, quick agreement.An + unknown hand, likely Haig’s, + drew two parallel lines in the right-hand margin next to this + sentence.

+

Zinn then said he had one other + major point to make. He urged that as soon as a settlement is reached + that the US appeal to Argentine and + Latin public opinion by quickly announcing several steps—withdrawal of + our economic measures and certification of Argentine eligibility for + military sales. These steps, he said, if taken immediately would do a + great deal to repair the damage done to US-Argentine relations. I promised to pass on his + views.Middendorf wrote his initials “JWM” in the margin + below this paragraph.

+
+ +
+ + 250. Memorandum From the Intelligence Community Staff to Director of + Central Intelligence Casey + + + Washington, May 11, + 1982 + +

[Source: Reagan Library, NSC + Intelligence Files, System Four Files, 1982 SYS 4 INT 40101–40150. Top + Secret. 2 pages not declassified.]

+
+ +
+ 251. Talking Points Prepared in the Department of StateSource: Department of State, + Executive Secretariat, S/S Special + Handling Restrictions Memos 1979–1983, Lot 96D262, ES Sensitive May 6–18 1982. Secret; + Sensitive. The talking points, prepared for Haig for his scheduled May 12 + meeting with Guerreiro, were forwarded to the Secretary by Enders under a May 11 briefing + memorandum. No memorandum of conversation of Haig’s May 12 meeting with + Guerreiro has been found. + + + Washington, undated + +

POINTS FOR GUERREIRO

+

1. Suggest you not go over the framework set with + Figueiredo; Guerreiro’s + attitudes on the Soviet and Peronista dangers are much more relaxed. + Merely say we should start where the President left off.Reagan was + scheduled to meet with Figueiredo. See Document + 255.

+

2. Put matrix forward as our understanding of where two parties are now + (Promise copies of earlier US position + but first address matrix). Cite as main problems:

+

—On geographic coverage, Argentines want the three + groups included: Brits only one. Don’t see how the Argentines can + prevail.

+

—On interim administration, Argentines want no + role for the local elected representatives. British insist on it, + although we have brought them to accept that the colonial administration + cannot be reintroduced. Obvious compromise comes from our earlier + proposals: add elected representatives proportional to the Argentine + population but not less than one in each Council. “Respecting” the + wishes of the inhabitants in some clear manner is a major Thatcher aim. This Argentine demand is + tougher than in our discussions: BA + should give.

+

—On freedom of movement and property purchase, + Argentina wants a blanket commitment in the interim period, Brits want + none. This is the “Sudetenland” + question.Reference is to the + Sudetenland region of Czechoslovakia which was ceded to Germany + under the 1938 Munich Agreement. Too controversial to be + settled in the transitional agreement itself. Should be topic of + negotiation.

+

—On withdrawal, Argentines want mainland vs. 2000 + NM; Brits want parity in miles: We + had thought of parity in redeployment time. This fencing reveals a + radical lack of mutual confidence. A UN + role in the agreement may not be enough. Should others in some form + “guarantee” the agreement (that was the case in the Rio Protocol on the + Peru/Ecuador dispute),Reference is to the + 1942 agreement that ended the Peru-Ecuador conflict of + 1941–1942. e.g., by assisting in verification.

+

—On sovereignty and self-determination, each side + wants a commitment. Compromise should acknowledge differing views of + both.

+

—On length of the agreement: Argentines fear a new + deadlock, and want assurance they will receive—or again act to claim—the + islands. Brits don’t want to be put in a position in which, when time + runs out, they either have to agree—or send a new task force. Our + earlier solution was to go for decolonization, and give Argentina a veto + on the future status of the islands—but to otherwise leave the + negotiations unimpaired. Think we ought to reintroduce this position, + with the notion that if the negotiations do not succeed, both parties + would submit again to mediation or other measures consistent with + Article 33 of the UN Charter, and + Resolution 502 would continue to apply.

+

3. (Mr. Secretary: You may or + may not want to go on, depending on what Guerreiro says.) Main + point is this: Secretary General will now try his formulation to bridge + the gap. We don’t know whether that will work or not.Haig drew a + parallel line in the right-hand margin next to this sentence and the + previous two sentences. Next to the line, he wrote: “?” But + odds seem against it. Shouldn’t the two of us, or maybe four (with say + Peru and W. Germany), or six (with Venezuela and France) now tell both + sides how concerned we are, and what we can support? Idea would not be + to propose another plan, but rather to have approaches, you to BA, us to London, saying essentially the + same thing, in private, with a view towards + encouraging a deal. You would say what we are pushing in London; we + would say what you are pushing in BA. + Otherwise the conflict can get out of control and damage us + all—needlessly. In other words, we should try to take control of events, + rather than merely submit to them.

+

4. If you agree, we could try to work out ideas to promote while you are + here, in a working group.

+
+ +
+ + 252. Telegram From the Central Intelligence Agency to Multiple + RecipientsSource: Library + of Congress, Manuscript Division, Haig Papers, Department of State, Day File, May 12, + 1982 Falklands. Secret; Noforn; + Wnintel. Sent to the National Security Agency, the Department of + State, the Department of Justice, the White House Situation Room, + the NSC Staff, the CIA Office of Current Operations, + JSOC, USCINCSO, and CINCLANT. Haig initialed the first + page. + + + Washington, May 12, 1982, 0210Z + +

222303/TDFIR–314/00731–82. Dist: 11 May 1982.

+

Country: Argentina/United Kingdom/USSR/El Salvador.

+

Subject: Comments of Argentine Government officials on relations with the + United States and other countries as a result of the dispute over the + Falkland Islands (DOI: Late April—4 May + 1982).

+

Source: [3½ lines not declassified].

+

1. On 27 April 1982, Argentine Army General Alberto Carlos ((Lucena)), + Director of the Military Academy, said that President Leopoldo + ((Galtieri)) had recently + told Army generals that he (Galtieri) felt “cornered” by the pressure being exerted + by the U.S. Secretary of State and felt he had to “break out” from under + the pressure. Lucena added that it was a well-accepted idea within the + army that the U.S. Government wants the Falkland Islands to be + independent so the United States can establish a base in the South + Atlantic similar to its base at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. (Source comment: + Lucena did not specify that the comment about the independence of the + Falklands had been made by Galtieri.)

+

2. Between 1 and 3 May, Raul + ((Quijano)), Argentine Ambassador to the Organization of + American States, said that he expected Argentina to break relations with + the United States because of the latter’s announcement on 30 April of + its support for the British position in the dispute over the Falkland + Islands.

+

3. On 3 or 4 May, Army Colonel Mario O. ((Davico)), Deputy Chief of the + Army Intelligence Service (SIE), + said that Galtieri and Foreign + Minister Nicanor ((Costa + Mendez)) were solely responsible for the fact that + diplomatic relations had not been severed with the United States.Haig + drew a line from the end of this sentence to the right-hand margin + next to the paragraph and wrote: “Bull!” Davico said there + had been a great deal of pressure for Argentina to break diplomatic + relations, but he did not specify the nature or the source of that + pressure.

+

4. Davico said the general opinion within the Argentine Army was that + Argentina should accept assistance from the Soviet Union only in the case of absolute necessity; + in such a case, it would be accepted.Haig wrote in the + right-hand margin next to this sentence: “Tell them to do + so!” Speaking personally, Davico said he believed that + British bombing of the Argentine mainland would constitute a case of + “absolute necessity”.

+

5. Davico said it was unclear what effect the current problem over the + Falkland Islands would have on Argentine activities in El Salvador; he + said that Argentina had a major political investment in El Salvador, but + the Argentine Government might decide to withdraw.Haig wrote + in the right-hand margin next to this paragraph: “Tell them again to + do so!” A typewritten transcription of this notation next to the + handwriting indicates it was made on May 12.

+
+ +
+ 253. Message From the Ambassador to Argentina (Shlaudeman) to the Assistant Secretary + of State for Inter-American Affairs (Enders)Source: Department of State, Under Secretary of State for Political + Affairs, Miscellaneous Files, March 1981–February 1983, Lot 83D210, + Falklands [Folder 1]. Secret; Niact Immediate. + + + Buenos Aires, May 12, 1982, 1540Z + +

[telegram number not declassified] For Assistant + Secretary Enders from Shlaudeman. Subject: Walters Visit.Haig wrote + that Walters’s mission to + Buenos Aires “eliminated any possibility that the desperate leaders + of Argentina would collaborate in their last moments with the Soviet + Union.” (Haig, Caveat, p. 295) Ref: [less than 1 line not declassified].In the reference message, Shlaudeman conveyed a brief + summary report of Walters’s + May 11 evening meeting with Galtieri and his May 12 morning meeting with + Lami Dozo. Shlaudeman noted that Walters had “so far detected no + dramatic breakthrough” with the Argentines. Walters, the Ambassador continued, + “does perceive somewhat less emphasis on sovereignty and more on + ‘equal rights’ for Argentines and British on the Islands during the + interim period. You know what that means.” Shlaudeman also reported that + Galtieri was attempting + to arrange a meeting between Walters and Anaya. (Telegram 990 from Buenos Aires, May 12; + Department of State, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, + Miscellaneous Files, March 1981–February 1983, Lot 83D210, Falklands + [Folder 1])

+

On Tuesday May 11 at 7 p.m. IWalters. saw President + Galtieri at his private + apartment at 179 Calle 11 de Septiembre in Buenos Aires. Present were + President Galtieri, General Sotera—G–2 Argentine Army, Ambassador + Walters and LCDR. Martiny. + The entire conversation was in Spanish.

+

President greeted me effusively with a big bear hug and said that before + anything else he wanted to thank me for having traveled so far.

+

I said that 20,000 klms was a small + distance to travel if it could save one human life. Secretary Haig asked me to say that we have an + enduring desire that some way can be found, in the United Nations or + elsewhere to solve honorably the Malvinas problem. The Secretary is + convinced that we must look beyond this problem to our important long + term relationship. We must prevent a scission of the OAS into Spanish speaking and English + speaking factions. I said Secretary Haig asked me to tell Galtieri of our continuing desire to see this war + between friends settled peacefully. NATO remains a vital barrier to Soviet expansion in + Europe.

+

He noted the remarks I made yesterday in Washington about the machismo of + women being even more sensitive than that of men.In a May 10 briefing at the American Enterprise + Institute in Washington, Walters was reported to have described the South + Atlantic crisis as a “silly war” and a “conflict of two machismos.” + Citing a British press report of the event, the Embassy in London + reported that Walters “said + he was not attributing blame but, in an obvious reference to Mrs. + Thatcher, added ‘The + machismo of woman is even more sensitive than the machismo of men.’” + (Telegram 10420 from London, May 11; Department of State, Central + Foreign Policy File, D820247–0421) He agreed the war is a + pointless conflict between two nations whose interests everything [everywhere?] should bind them together. He looks + forward to the day when he can shake hands with Mrs. Thatcher. General Sotera said that she was through. + President Galtieri disagreed. + The British do not react that way and she has just won her municipal + elections.

+

I answered that we believed that he alone has the authority to achieve a + settlement favorable and fair to both sides. Any rumors he might have + heard that the U.S. is plotting against him at any level, are absolutely + false. I gave him my word of honor as a U.S. Army officer that there is + no truth to those rumors. (Embassy told me before my meeting that rumors + of the CIA plotting against him are + widespread in Buenos Aires). He accepted my assurances. I said such + action would be folly on our part. He had proved his leadership and his + friendship towards us.

+

He then assured me that the Argentines would continue to support us in + Central America. In fact General Sotera had just returned from there.

+ +

Galtieri said that Secretary + Weinberger’s blunt + statementsNot further identified, but + possibly statements that Weinberger may have made in Brussels at the NATO Defense Ministers meeting. A + communiqué issued on May 6 by the Defense Ministers strongly + supported the United Kingdom and condemned Argentina’s “armed + invasion” of the Falklands. (Paul Lewis, “Briton Demands Total + Withdrawal by Argentina,” New York Times, May + 7, p. A15) are causing anti-American feelings to grow in the + armed forces and while he understands that we might feel the need to + side with Britain, he hopes we can tone down these statements. President + Galtieri observed that the + evacuation of U.S. Embassy personnel from Buenos AiresSee Document 210 and footnote 3 thereto. caused an + unfavorable impression in the armed services. He had assured me + previously that Argentina is not Iran. It is a civilized Western country + and he will not tolerate any terrorism against U.S. citizens.

+

President Galtieri said that + Argentine public opinion is inflamed by the armed conflict, not only + against the UK but against the U.S. as + well. He said that while he understood that the U.S. would eventually + have to side with the UK, it could have + been done more gently. If Spain and the UK get into a conflict over Gibraltar he will have to side + with Spain. I said that he should not have seemed surprised. The + Secretary had told him several times that if the negotiations broke + down, we would have to do this. He acknowledged that fact but regretted + the strong language used.

+

He said that after the sinking of the Belgrano, + the Argentines badly needed a success. I pointed out the sinking of the + Sheffield was a considerable success and that + now we have a unique opportunity to overcome the major obstacles to an + agreement. These are the Argentine insistence upon prejudging the + sovereignty issue and the British insistence upon self determination for + the inhabitants. I thought we were moving on the latter and we had + sensed, perhaps mistakenly, some Argentine movement on the former. If we + could overcome these two difficulties we would be well on the way + towards an honorable solution.

+

He asked what guarantee the Argentines would have of eventual + sovereignty. What could he tell his people they had gotten for their + sacrifices. Several hundred Argentines have been killed. I said that the + contact group, as I understood it, would ensure that the negotiations + were successfully concluded in a predetermined period of time.

+

General Sotera said that the + fighting made this problem more difficult. I replied that more fighting + would further complicate it. I am not trying to negotiate wording merely + to point out, as a friend, our perception of the sticking points. I + appealed to them to seize this opportunity before the conflict escalates + further.

+ +

President Galtieri asked how long + I planned to remain in Buenos Aires. I answered that I planned to leave + on the evening of May 12; but if there is anyone he wanted me to see, I + am entirely at his disposal and can remain another day. I told President + Galtieri that Air Force + Commander Brig. Lami Dozo called + the Embassy in Buenos Aires to ask to talk to me. I delayed answering + him until I could ask President Galtieri if he wanted me to talk to him. Galtieri replied that he told + Lami Dozo I was here and had + no objection whatever to my talking to him.See Document 254. + Galtieri said he would be busy + tomorrow morning but would keep in touch with me through General + Sotera, if he wanted me to + talk to anyone else. He said the Navy is absolutely convinced that we + are passing ship locations to the British in the area around the + Falklands. I replied that our exchanges with the British are normal + ones, involving primarily the Soviets and the Chinese. The British have + excellent and sophisticated sources of their own for the South + Atlantic.

+

President Galtieri said he heard + that the British asked U.S. for KC–135 air-to-air refueling tankers for + their aircraft in flight.A May 11 New York Times article, which cited comments + by “Administration officials” the previous day, reported that the + United Kingdom “asked the United States to lend the Royal Air Force + a long-range KC–135 aerial tanker to refuel British bombers and + reconnaissance planes based on Ascension Island in the South + Atlantic.” The article continues: “The officials said that no + decision had been made on the request but that a reply to London was + expected within the next 48 hours. They emphasized that no United + States airmen would fly the plane, if the loan were made.” (Richard + Halloran, “Britain Asks U.S. to Lend It an Air Force Tanker,” New York Times, May 11, p. A7) I + replied that I personally did not know of any such request. The British + have Victor tankers that enable them to refuel their Vulcan bombers. He said the British had + not used any Vulcans in the fighting at the Islands. That the bombing + had all been done by Sea Harriers. + I told him that the British did not tell us of their military operations + in advance; but I was quite sure they had used Vulcans. (Comment: He let + the matter drop but if he really believes that they did not use Vulcans + it would seem Argentine commanders in the Islands are not reporting + accurately.) He commented humorously that he was looking for a + substantial contribution from Exocet + as their stock had gone way up following the sinking of the Sheffield.

+

He spoke of his attachment to the United States and for Army Chief of + Staff Shy Meyer in particular. + He wanted to look beyond current events to continuing our close + association. I reminded him that I told him earlier that I did not know + who would win the battle for the Malvinas, but that the only winner of + the war would be the Soviet Union. He agreed. So did Sotera, reluctantly.

+ +

I thanked him for the efficient and discreet way in which my arrival at + the airport was handled. He said that he much appreciated the + Secretary’s sending me such a great distance. He knew I was a friend. He + would be pondering what I told him and would get back to me on May 12 + through Sotera, probably in the + afternoon. In the meantime I was free to talk to Lami Dozo.

+

As I left, he said that he would seek help but not at the price of + letting the Soviets have any say in Argentina.

+

He again assured me that U.S. personnel would be protected.

+

Any massive invasion of the Islands would greatly aggravate the + problem.

+

He accepted my assurances that neither the Ambassador nor anyone else in + the Embassy was plotting against him, but suggested that they keep a low + profile at present.

+

He noted what I told him about the sticking points and looked forward to + talking to me again. He asked me to convey his best wishes to the + Secretary and General Meyer.

+

His attitude while not evidencing any additional give was as friendly + toward me as it has ever been. He, too, clearly looks beyond the present + crisis and wants to control damage to U.S./Argentine relations. He was + clearly very pleased by my reassurance of friendship toward him and his + government. Conversation lasted two hours.

+

He gave me a bear hug as we parted.

+
+ +
+ + 254. Message From the Ambassador to Argentina (Shlaudeman) to the Assistant Secretary + of State for Inter-American Affairs (Enders)Source: Department of State, Under Secretary of State for Political + Affairs, Miscellaneous Files, March 1981–February 1983, Lot 83D210, + Falklands [Folder 1]. Secret; Niact Immediate. + + + Buenos Aires, May 12, 1982, 1540Z + +

[telegram number not declassified] For Assistant + Secretary Enders from Shlaudeman. Subject: Walters Visit. Ref: [less than 1 line not declassified].See footnote 3, Document + 253.

+

Memorandum of Conversation

+

Place: Air Force Commander-in-Chief’s Office, Buenos Aires

+

Time: 0800 hours, 11 May 1982The meeting + actually took place the morning of May 12, the day after Walters’s evening meeting with + Galtieri. See Document 253.

+

Present: Brigadier General (Lieutenant General Lami Dozo, Commander-in-Chief of the + Argentine Air Force, and Ambassador Vernon + Walters)

+

1. At his request, IWalters. saw General + Lami Dozo and explained to + him that the Secretary had sent me to express to the Argentines the + importance we attach to the relationship between our two countries over + the long term and beyond the present situation. He replied that this + made him very happy; for he feels strongly that Argentina is part of the + West and that relations with the U.S. are of capital and vital + importance to Argentina. He said that in the current situation the + Soviets are offering equipment and assistance at very low prices; but he + realizes that the money is only part of the price for Soviet assistance. + The Argentines are not prepared to pay that price. I assured him that + the U.S. is not in any way dabbling in internal Argentine affairs, nor + will it do so; we had been burned once with the Peron-Braden + controversy.Reference is to the 1945 + political controversy resulting from charges that U.S. Ambassador + Spruille Braden was organizing political opponents of Argentine + leader Juan Perón. For + documentation relating to this incident, see Foreign Relations, 1945, The American Republics, pp. + 366–559. Our main interest is in finding a peaceful and + honorable solution for two of our major friends and allies, both of whom + are important parts of the free world. He asked me what I thought are + the principal difficulties in the negotiations and whether the U.S. + objects to the U.N. forum. He said he believes that the UN negotiations are at a dead end. I replied that obviously we + would have preferred results from the Haig mediation but we would be delighted to see a just + and peaceful solution in any forum. I believed that the principal + sticking points are, on the British side, the importance they attach to + self-determination for the inhabitants and, on the Argentine side, the + demand for recognition of Argentine sovereignty before the negotiations. + I believe that we will be able, through the use of the wording + “aspirations and wishes” of the inhabitants, to overcome some part of + the British objection. I sensed movement on the Argentine side on the + precondition of sovereignty. General Lami + Dozo said that the sticking point on sovereignty is a + result of the contacts the Junta has with the leaders of the political + parties. They are the ones who are very tough on this issue, + particularly the Peronistas. He believes that for the Argentines the + freedom of access and the opening up of the Islands during the interim + period before a final settlement is essential. I said the British feel + that the Argentines will flood the Islands with Argentines during this + period. He said that will not happen but that it is very difficult for + the Argentines to accept a requirement for them to have to get a visa + from the British to go to the Falklands. He said that it is cosmetically + very important that there be equality of rights for Argentines and + British. I pointed out to him that the latest proposal, seemingly + accepted by the British, would for the first time sever the + administrative link between London and the Falklands. Lami Dozo said that it is terribly + important that we work together to limit the damage from the present + controversy. The Navy is extremely agitated, and he feels it would be + useful if I could see and talk to the Navy Commander in Chief Admiral + Anaya. I said if the + President and he feel this is important I would be glad to do it. He + called President Galtieri who + agreed to try to set up the appointment for later today.No memorandum of conversation of Walters’s meeting with Anaya has been found. In his + memoirs, Haig wrote of the + Walters-Anaya exchange: “‘No matter what + happens,’ Anaya said, ‘I + will never, repeat never, turn to the Soviet Union. It would betray + everything for which I stand.’ Anaya spoke of the dead sailors and of his long + friendship with Galtieri; + they had been comrades since the age of twelve.” (Haig, Caveat, p. 295) + Lami Dozo said that the Navy is + convinced that the U.S. is passing great amounts of intelligence to the + British. I explained that our intelligence exchange with the British is + the normal one, chiefly directed at the Northern Hemisphere. My own + impression is that currently they have far better intelligence on the + South Atlantic than we do. He said that this is his impression also and + that their knowledge of ship movements is absolutely astonishing; but + feels it will be useful if I could talk to the Navy. He believes that + the negotiations should now be continued in two phases: the Secretary + General of the U.N. should call for a meeting of Foreign Ministers of + Argentina and Britain with a + Latin American country, a West European country, and perhaps one or two + others. I said the advantage of having the U.S. in such a group was that + we had considerable influence over the British, even though they did not + advise us in advance of their military operations. He agreed and then + said as second step President Galtieri and Mrs. Thatcher should get together in some third country under + UN auspices to work out final + details of an agreement. He did not seem to have a sense of urgency like + Galtieri’s. He said that the + evacuation of U.S. dependents had produced an unfavorable impression + among the Argentine military, who felt that service families should be + the last to leave, not the first. He has been asked to remove or limit + the flying of the U.S. Air Attache’s aircraft and has refused to do so, + saying that Argentina was a Western country and should not make the task + of restoring relations with the U.S. after the present situation any + more difficult.

+

2. He was very composed and moderate throughout and gave me the + impression that the long-term relationship between the U.S. and + Argentina is more important to him than the Malvinas. He addressed me as + Dick and asked me to call him Arturo. (I have known him for several + years) The meeting lasted about one hour and was conducted in Spanish. + He said that either he or Galtieri would get back to me about the appointment with + Admiral Anaya later in the day. + He is quite an impressive figure, showing a considerable degree of + thoughtfulness and moderation, a most unusual quality in the present + circumstances here.

+
+ +
+ 255. Editorial Note +

On May 12, 1982, Brazilian President João + Baptista de Oliveira Figueiredo began a 2-day State visit + to Washington, the first for a Brazilian head of state in 11 years. In a + May 11 action memorandum to President Ronald W. Reagan, prepared in anticipation of Figueiredo’s arrival, the + President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs William P. Clark indicated that the + visit was “designed to cap a rapprochement” with Brazil “that began + early in this administration.” “Brasilia,” he continued, “even before + the Falkland crisis erupted, remains cautious. Few in the Brazilian + establishment expect to return to the days of ‘automatic alignment’ with + the United States.” He concluded: “The issue that will probably dominate + the discussion is the Falkland crisis. Figueiredo will explain Brazil’s position which does not + support Argentina’s use of + force, but does accept Argentina’s claim to the Malvinas. You should + know, too, that Brazil is concerned about our tilt toward Britain. + Moreover, President Figueiredo’s interest is directly engaged because he is the + author of Brazil’s rapprochement with Argentina begun several years + ago—a policy which ended decades of strained relations between Brasilia + and Buenos Aires. Therefore, he wants to preserve good relations with + Argentina. He will also express concern over the future of + inter-American relations. Above all, he does not want this hemisphere + polarized. He does not want to have to choose between friendship with + the Spanish speaking republics and the United States.” The memorandum + forwarded a May 6 briefing memorandum prepared by Secretary of State + Alexander M. Haig as well as + eight background papers prepared in the Department of State and a list + of talking points and public statements for Reagan’s use, and recommended that Reagan read them. All of Clark’s recommendations outlined in + the May 11 action memorandum were approved. (Reagan Library, Executive + Secretariat, NSC VIP Visits File, + Brazil—President Figueiredo + Visit 05/11/1982–05/14/1982 (2))

+

According to the President’s Daily Diary, Reagan met with Figueiredo on four occasions on May 12 and again on the + morning of May 13, although no memoranda of conversation of any of these + meetings have been found. The talking points prepared for Reagan’s first meeting with Figueiredo, held in the Oval Office + from 10:42 until 11:38 a.m., May 12, addressed the situation in the + South Atlantic: “But as encouraged as I am with the state of our + relations, Mr. President, a great tragedy is engulfing our hemisphere. + In the South Atlantic two friends of Brazil and the United States are + locked in combat. This matter has personally concerned me more than any + other as President. My greatest wish which I expressed in my speech to + the OAS in February was making this + hemisphere secure, prosperous, and at peace because the peoples of this + hemisphere have so much to offer the other. That dream is threatened and + not by an alien and hostile power. But it is threatened by a quarrel by + two friends of this country and yours. There is right on both sides. We + need to find a just solution to this problem. I welcome your advice and + counsel. My government will welcome your government’s cooperation in + peacefully resolving this dispute.” The talking points continued: “(If + asked) Mr. President, as you know my country does not support the first + use of force in resolving disputes. If this were permitted in this + hemisphere, there would be no end to the mischief created. At the same + time, we are neutral on the question of sovereignty over the Islands. We + have tried and Secretary Haig + has made enormous efforts to help mediate this tragic situation. We + still wish to help and again I welcome your views and advice.” (Reagan + Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC VIP + Visits File, Department of State Briefing Book Re: Visit of President Figueiredo of Brazil 05/11/1982–05/14/1982)

+

Following this first meeting, an expanded meeting between Reagan and Figueiredo, which included the full + U.S. and Brazilian delegations, took place in the Cabinet Room from + 11:38 a.m. to 12:07 p.m. The talking points prepared for Reagan’s use in this meeting are ibid. + Reagan and Figueiredo then participated in a + meeting with a group of U.S. and Brazilian businessmen in the Roosevelt + Room from 12:07 to 12:24 p.m.

+

On the evening of May 12, President Reagan and First Lady Nancy Reagan hosted President + Figueiredo and his wife at + a State dinner at the White House from 7:31 until 10:57 p.m. Although no + official record of discussions between the two Presidents that evening + has been found, Reagan wrote in + his personal diary that he and Figueiredo discussed the South Atlantic at the dinner: + “Tonite—State dinner—Sergio Mendez entertains. A really nice dinner + & evening. The Pres. [Figueiredo] told me he had a call + from his Ambas[sador] in Buenos Aires to the effect the British were + about to attack mainland bases in Argentina—that he (The Pres.) must try to intervene with Pres. Galtien [sic] & I should get to the British.” (Reagan, Diaries, page 131) Reagan + telephoned British Prime Minister Margaret + Thatcher the following day, May 13. For the memorandum of + conversation of the telephone call, see Document + 257.

+

A final meeting between Reagan + and Figueiredo occurred over + breakfast, from 9 until 9:43 a.m. on May 13. A copy of the talking + points prepared for Reagan’s use + at the meeting, initialed by Reagan, is in the Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, + NSC VIP Visits File, + Brazil—President Figueiredo + Visit 05/11/1982–05/14/1982 (1). On the South Atlantic, the document + made three points: “Understand you [Figueiredo] and Secretary Haig agreed we should both support Secretary General’s + efforts for now,” “If it appears he [Pérez + de Cuéllar] needs help, we should consult again,” and “If + he does not succeed, we must then consider what we can do together or + with others to bring about a peaceful solution.” No record of the + referenced meeting between Figueiredo and Haig has been found.

+
+ +
+ + 256. Memorandum of ConversationSource: Reagan Library, Roger Fontaine Files, OAS [Organization of American States] [May 1982]. + Confidential; Limdis. Fontaine wrote at the top of the + memorandum that he saw it on May 17. + + + Washington, May 13, 1982, 11:30 a.m. + + + PARTICIPANTS + Esteban Takacs, Argentine + Ambassador to the U.S. + J. William Middendorf II, + U.S. Ambassador to the OAS + + + SUBJECT + Current Status of the Negotiations at the UN + +

Comment:

+

This memorandum of a telephone conversation with Takacs also weaves in a corroboratory + call I got shortly thereafter from Ricardo + Zinn (Argentine businessman apparently sent here as an + emissary by the Junta). This report of these two talks + may help shed some light on the confusion here produced by the + General Iglesias statement + to the Washington Post which cast doubt on whether Argentina is + stalling or has been sincere in delinking sovereignty from + negotiations.Presumably a + reference to a written statement released by Iglesias to the Washington Post after an interview with the newspaper on + May 11, which stated: “We have said that we pursue only one + objective: restore the Malvinas [Falklands] to our national + patrimony, place those territories under our sovereignty. We are + demanding, therefore, that whatever agreement is arrived at for a + peaceful solution should constitute a sure and guaranteed route so + that sovereignty will be total and full within a reasonable time.” + (Jackson Diehl, “Control Is the Only Goal, General Says,” Washington Post, May 12, p. A1)

+

Takacs made (and Zinn underscored) the following points + to me on the status of the negotiations:

+

—The GOA has only one consolidated + position. As he had told me on the 11th and as I reported,See Document 246. + sovereignty and negotiations are delinked. The Iglesias statement was drafted before + Costa Mendez’s weekend + statement.See footnote 3, Document 246.

+

—He and Raul Quijano have + recommended that Galtieri + himself go public with this stance in Buenos Aires. (He also has asked + the Brazilian Foreign Minister to give assurances to Secretary Haig of Argentine sincerity) and he + himself has so stated this yesterday on NBC.

+ +

—The British now accept Argentine sincerity on the delinking and + understand that for the GOA sovereignty + is a goal but not a pre-condition for negotiations.In + telegram 10604 from London, May 13, the Embassy reported that a + “well-informed” British FCO source + said that “HMG could live with the + latest Argentine formula on sovereignty, provided the other major + outstanding issues could be resolved satisfactorily. He identified + these other issues as: (1) Provision for interim administration; and + (2) modalities of withdrawal.” In telegram Tosec 70015/130169 to Haig in Ankara, May 13, the + Department transmitted the text of telegram 10604. (Department of + State, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, Miscellaneous + Files, March 1981–February 1983, Lot 83D210, Falklands [Folder + 1]) Talks in New York have gone beyond that point.

+

—In New York, elements of a cease-fire are agreed upon including the + timing and conditions of phased withdrawals by both sides under UN supervision during a ten-day period with + certain percentages of forces on day one, day three, day five, etc. + (Zinn, by the way, confirmed + to me that the British negotiators accept these withdrawal terms which + would have elements of the fleet pulling back to Ascension Island.)

+

—The only remaining hang up now is disagreement over the composition of + the Advisory/Administrative Council which would serve under UN Commissioners. Argentina wants + Argentine/British/Islander representation. The UK wants a Council composed solely of Islanders, which the + GOA finds totally unacceptable. To + the GOA this British insistence is a + clear signal of British intentions to push for self-determination. + (Takacs commented that if + the UK pushed Independence through this + device, it would negate 17 years of negotiations. He added that + Galtieri’s string has run + out so far as concessions are concerned. One more concession and he’s + out, leaving a Junta absolutely determined on war.)

+

Takacs then made a plea for U.S. + help with the British. He said that the UK may be more inflexible than necessary on this final + detail, knowing it has “the indiscriminate support of the U.S.” If the + U.S. were to soften its support—publicly or privately, the British would + compromise on the Advisory Council issue and the rest of the steps could + begin—“benefiting the U.S. in Latin America for years to come.” I + promised to pass on his views.

+

Takacs then turned to his ideas + on repairing damage. With a cease-fire and negotiations almost in place + he urged we consider ways to improve our position in the region. He + suggested we immediately announce lifting our economic measures.Middendorf drew an asterisk after this word, which + corresponds to the following handwritten notation at the bottom of + the page: “when the ceasefire is in place.” (The same point + Zinn made in his talk with me on the 11th). Even + before that, however, we should announce that we will not support any + escalation of the war by the British—such an announcement would enhance + the Secretary’s image and have a very positive effect in the region. He + commented on the very bad impressions being created by speculation that + we were assisting the British military. He mentioned a recent Time story and comments by a DOD spokesman he had seen. (I made no + substantive comment, merely saying, again, that I would pass on his + views).

+

Takacs added that he had lunched + the other day with Rowland Evans + and had told him of his fervent hope that “not all that we have sown is + lost; not all that we have built is broken.” He said that if the U.S. + does not participate now in the solution by indicating we will not + support escalation, years will be lost in our Hemispheric + relationships.

+

Comment:

+

Takacs obviously is very worried + about what may come from escalated hostilities. For what it is worth, + however, most of what he had to say to me suggests that a cease-fire + perhaps as early as this weekend appears feasible—although, of course, I + am not in a position to corroborate his account of the status of the + negotiations. If he is right, however, we then can get on with repairing + the damage this tragic dispute has caused for the inter-American + system.

+
+ +
+ + 257. Memorandum of Telephone ConversationSource: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Subject File, Memorandums of + Conversation—President Reagan (May 1982). Secret. All brackets are in the + original. According to the President’s Daily Diary, Reagan spoke to Thatcher from the Oval Office from + 1:44 until 2:01 p.m. (Reagan Library, President’s Daily Diary) + Thatcher was speaking + from London. In his personal diary, Reagan wrote of the discussion: “I talked to + Margaret but don’t think I persuaded her against further action.” + (Reagan, Diaries, p. 131) For Thatcher’s account of the + conversation, see Thatcher, + Downing Street Years, pp. + 220–221. + + + May 13, + 1982, 1:40–2:05 p.m. + + + PARTICIPANTS + President Ronald Reagan + (calling from Washington, D.C.) + Prime Minister Margaret + Thatcher of England + +

Mrs. Thatcher: Well. And you?

+

The President: Well, I’m fine. I just thought, I + knew you’d been in with Parliament, and I thought you might want to hear + a friendly voice.

+

Mrs. Thatcher: Oh, how kind of you. We’ve had, yes, + we’ve had quite a difficult time today, as you know you do sometimes + with Parliament.Of the day’s proceedings in + the House of Commons, Thatcher wrote: “In the debate on Thursday 13 May + Conservative back-benchers showed evidence of restlessness about our + negotiations. Francis Pym + continued to pursue a weaker line than I did and it was not liked.” + (Thatcher, Downing Street Years, p. 220)

+

The President: Yes. Well, listen, I wanted to call + and discuss with you some. . . .

+

Mrs. Thatcher: . . . negotiations we’ve done. We can’t + say what they contain, and Parliament’s getting pretty restless. And + this is that, where we’ve come up the crux of the real problem in + negotiation. And Argentina wants sovereignty and administration, almost + as a condition of her withdrawal, and of course that is what we can’t + grant.

+

The President: Well, now, here is the latest that + we have heard here, and then I want to tell you something that came up + with the presence here of President Figueiredo of Brazil, who has been here in + Washington.See Document 255.

+

Mrs. Thatcher: Yes.

+

The President: It seems that the Secretary + General’s talks with Ambassador Parsons and his Argentine counterpart have produced some + movement, and specifically, Argentine willingness to enter negotiations + now without preconditions, at least, this is what their negotiator in + New York says. Now what the junta thinks is less clear. But. . . .

+

Mrs. Thatcher: Ah, well, we never know who we’re + negotiating with.

+ +

The President: I know. Well, we. . . .

+

Mrs. Thatcher: + Ros [Enrique Ros, Argentine Deputy Foreign Minister for + Multilateral Affairs] was saying that yesterday, but then of course + Costa Mendez said something + different on television.

+

The President: Well, now we didn’t get a + completely clear signal in Dick + Walters’ talks yesterday with + Galtieri.See Document 253. + And . . .

+

Mrs. Thatcher: You didn’t.

+

The President: No, and I understand that the + remaining issues center on the composition of interim administrative + authority and the number of island groups and freedom of movement + between the mainland and the islands.

+

Mrs. Thatcher: Yes, they’re very important things to us, + obviously.

+

The President: Yeah. Well. . . .

+

Mrs. Thatcher: . . . In the interim period can very much + affect what happens afterward.

+

The President: But now, just recently, we’ve been + on the phone with the Secretary General, and he now suggests that the + two sides are quite close.Not further + identified. Is this the way it looks to you? . . . One new + element, of course, is the willingness of. . . .

+

Mrs. Thatcher: Wouldn’t have said the two sides were + quite close because there are two very big outstanding things, one, the + interim administration. And of course they want an administration that + is much, much more Argentinian. . . .

+

The President: Ah, huh.

+

Mrs. Thatcher: . . . than would suit us or our people. + [The President: Yeah.] And also want to have + movement of Argentinian people in constantly and possibly, and so on, + and, and that just, just would not suit the Islanders at all. And, also, + there’s a question of South Georgia, which of course the title is + totally different from that of the Falklands.

+

The President: Ah, huh.

+

Mrs. Thatcher: And we’re in possession of South Georgia. + And, so, those are two very, very big points at that moment. But there + is the other thing as well, that you don’t know quite who you’re + negotiating with and that what Ros says, we’re ready to negotiate without any + preconditions about sovereignty, we don’t know whether it’s true. But + the other thing is, if they’re saying that, what their ploy obviously + is, is to try to arrange an interim administration and conditions to + that administration, which would lead inevitably to sovereignty at the + end of the period. And the third thing is, there’s absolutely no + guarantee that at the end of + the period, if they haven’t got what they want, they won’t just invade + again. [The President: Uh, huh.] There’s quite a + long way to go.

+

The President: I see. Well, now, uh. . . .

+

Mrs. Thatcher: Now, you tell me what your information + is, particularly from General Walters.

+

The President: All right. Well, no, mainly this is + what, from President Figueiredo. [Mrs. Thatcher: . . . of Brazil.] + He admittedly is closer to the Argentine position on the interim + administration, but he will support you on a number of, the groups of + islands, and on the movement of people between the mainland and the + island which he thinks should be subject of negotiation rather than + decided in the agreement. And, he. . . .

+

Mrs. Thatcher: They’re trying to get it into an + agreement, of course.

+

The President: Yes. And he thinks that he might be + helpful with Galtieri because of + the familiarity they have with each other, and he’s willing to go ahead + on that. But last night, when he came over to the White House, he took + me aside immediately. We’d been together during the day, and he said he + had just heard from his ambassador in Buenos Aires. And he said the + ambassador was telling him that . . . that you were preparing to attack + targets on the mainland, in Argentina, and that the admirals down there + were underway in movements and so forth, and he told the President that + he was the only one who could intervene and have any impact on the + Argentinians, and then suggested that I should be doing the same thing + with you. And both the President and I, he has agreed and is going to, + if he hasn’t started already, to get in touch and to try and ask them to + hold off as to any further action. And I don’t know whether what he said + was true about what your plans were or not, with regard to that, but if + there is any way in which we can hold off military action, in view of + what we’re getting from the Secretary General, we can contact him some + more and stay in touch with this.

+

Mrs. Thatcher: They attacked our ships yesterday, so + they’re not holding off on military action. But even if they were, it’s + easy for them to hold off knowing that I with a task force bobbing + around on the sea have not got the length of endurance on the sea which + they have on the mainland.

+

The President: Yes, that’s right.

+

Mrs. Thatcher: It makes sense for them to say, look, + don’t have any military action while you’re negotiating. And all they’ve + got to do then is to go on and on and on. And we’d be able to get + nowhere and have our capacity to take military action steadily whittled + away.

+

The President: Yeah.

+ +

Mrs. Thatcher: So I’ve said, continuously said, and + still say, that the negotiations have not stopped military action nor + can they, because the fact is, Ron, we’re only getting anywhere as the + military pressure builds up. Uh, until it has built up, we’ve got + nowhere.

+

The President: Well. . . .

+

Mrs. Thatcher: But did I understand you, that their + president, that the Brazilian president is talking to Galtieri?

+

The President: Yes. Yes, he’s doing what he can. + You know, Margaret, the one thing with them down there, as it builds up, + what we are concerned with very much, you know where we come down, and + we’ve made it very plain where we come down with you, but it is, and + it’s had a price on what we’ve been trying to accomplish in creating a + better relationship with the Latin states, the South American countries, + but we’re worried, and so is the president of Brazil, about the original + feeling that they were the aggressors, the Argentine, and that was why + they did not invoke the Rio Treaty and so forth, but each time they’re + creating a kind of David-Goliath image now, in which you’re Goliath.

+

Mrs. Thatcher: Well, I can hardly be Goliath when I have + to go eight thousand miles.

+

The President: (laughing) I know, but that’s their + perception, and I don’t know how important it is, the sympathy of the + rest of the countries are [or?] not, but this is + a great concern of ours as we see them. . . .

+

Mrs. Thatcher: Ten per cent of rest of the country is + important, but this is what happened: our people did not want to live + under an Argentine military rule, nor under Peronista. They’ve + consistently said so, that they would live under democracy. And you + wouldn’t like to put any of your people to live under a military junta, + nor, one, I can’t see, which goes to the military junta to Peronistas + and terrorists. I can’t put mine under that either, without their + consent. And I don’t think that having had the Islands occupied, the + Falklands occupied, and the Falklands is a long way further from the + mainland than Trinidad and Tobago are from Venezuela. . . .

+

The President: Yes. . . .

+

Mrs. Thatcher: I don’t think that our people having been + occupied would be very ready to welcome Argentinian.

+

The President: No. . . .

+

Mrs. Thatcher: And it’s like the Channel Islands in + wartime, when they once had been occupied by the Germans, they’re only + too delighted to get rid of them.

+

The President: Yep.

+

Mrs. Thatcher: But the title of the Falklands, you know, + is not necessarily by a long chalk the Argentinians, they’ve always + refused to take it to the + International Court of Justice. And knowing the title, I can see why. + But as they say, because an island four hundred miles, is four hundred + miles off the coast, there are a lot of islands, including Trinidad and + Tobago, who would shake in their shoes, because they’re much, much + nearer South American continent.

+

The President: Yes. . . . Well, Margaret, I agree + with you that one thing that has been neglected, particularly on the + part of the Argentinians, in this whole thing, is consideration for the + people on the island who live there. And when I talked to him that first + night, trying to get him to turn his task force, his invasion fleet + around, when we knew it was on its way, oh, he swore to me up and down + that the culture and the lifestyle and the rights of the people on the + island would go on just the same as they had always been.See Document 41. + Well, we know that isn’t true and we know they’ve made great changes + already under this occupation.

+

Mrs. Thatcher: There you are, anyone in the government + of Argentina who says that! But, you see, some of our people have been + in the Falkland Islands for far more generations than some of the people + in Argentina. I had some one in my room just a few days ago—seventh + generation in the Falklands.

+

The President: Good Lord.

+

Mrs. Thatcher: Now his ancestors were in the Falklands, + British. . . .

+

The President: Yeah. . . .

+

Mrs. Thatcher: . . . when many of the ancestors of the + Argentinians were still in Spain and Italy. There are only forty + Argentinians on the Falkland Island, of whom twenty return regularly to + the mainland because they’re only there temporarily.

+

The President: Yes.

+

Mrs. Thatcher: A country is its people. There are + eighteen hundred of ours, five thousand in wartime.

+

The President: Yes.

+

Mrs. Thatcher: Because it was a very, very important + port. And, as a matter of fact, Ron, which I don’t know that people have + really got hold of: the Falklands are important strategically. You’ve + only got to have the Panama Canal closed and that would be easy. You + need a passage through the Magellan Strait.

+

The President: Yes. Yeah.

+

Mrs. Thatcher: You need Port Stanley, and you need it in + the hands of an assuredly friendly power. And you need South Georgia. So + you can have South Georgia as a summer harbor and Port Stanley as a + winter harbor. And it was very important during the last war to the Western world, and it was very + important in World War One. Now, you know that the Argentines are + getting very close to the (garbled), very close indeed. And one day the + junta will fall and the Peronistas will be in control. And you’ll then + have the Peronistas plus the trade, all with the Soviets. And at that + point of time, you and the Western world will need to know that the + Falklands are true. And that you can use their Port Stanley.

+

The President: Yes.

+

Mrs. Thatcher: It’s very, very important, and I thought + the last thing anyone wanted was the Russians in Cuba and Russians + controlling the Falklands. So there really is a tremendous strategic + point and also on South Georgia. Because when the Antarctic is + developed, and one day it will be, the port that will be the best port + for that development which does not get iced up, is the port in South + Georgia. So let’s not just tack the thing up to a country that could go + under communist rule by the fall of a junta and into the hands of the + Peronistas.

+

The President: Yes.

+

Mrs. Thatcher: And who’s never had its people in the + Falklands—never, never, never.

+

The President: Yes. I, I. . . .

+

Mrs. Thatcher: Anyway, if they say we have no right to + be in the Falklands, what right have the Spaniards and the Italians to + be in Argentine?

+

The President: (laughing) Yes, yes.

+

Mrs. Thatcher: That was one of our Venezuelan friends + the other day (both laughing) [The President: + Well. . . .] On weak ground, as far as title is concerned—I’ve always + been prepared to go to the International Court of Justice. And the idea + that our people could be put under a junta that might become Peronista, + (garbled)—so would you if one of your islands were taken back.

+

The President: Yes, yep.

+

Mrs. Thatcher: And they simply cannot say, right, we’re + prepared to withdraw, but we want to keep what we went and invaded for, + namely, sovereignty, and administration.

+

The President: No, they can’t have that. That must + be in the negotiations. Well, listen, we’ll keep on here with the + Secretary General and keep in touch and doing whatever we can.

+

Mrs. Thatcher: All right, but Al Haig really was extremely good, and we + were very happy to have him as a mediator. But of course we’re trying to + negotiate, but we cannot say, right, if you withdraw, you will have the + very things for which you invade. . . .

+

The President: No, no, it was only that the + impression [Mrs. Thatcher: Yeah.] we got from talking to the, up + at the U.N., was that those main points now that they had conceded, but, as you say, who are we + negotiating with. . . .

+

Mrs. Thatcher: Oh, we’re negotiating with, and there’s + quite a bit more to negotiate. But it is conceded that, the arrangement + they’re trying to get on the interim settlement, is that there’re so + many extra Argentines going in there with rights and property rights, et + cetera, that our people leave. And that maybe is what they want. . . + .

+

The President: Well. . . .

+

Mrs. Thatcher: . . . or get it that way.

+

The President: Yeah, well, we know you. . . .

+

Mrs. Thatcher: You know, it’s a bit tough on our people, + Ron.

+

The President: No, you can’t give on that.

+

Mrs. Thatcher: They’re hard-working, they’ve done + everything which you and I say in our speeches, they’ve been loyal, + they’ve been true; all they want is to live their own lives in their own + way under a government of their own choice.

+

The President: Yes.

+

Mrs. Thatcher: And I think it’s terrible if the two + greatest democracies in the world, yours, as it’s the largest and the + most powerful, and ours the oldest, don’t listen (garbled). . . . [The President: Well. . . .] To say that they have + to be handed over, to some one they don’t want to be handed over to—in + the name of what?

+

The President: No, no, I can’t quarrel with + that.

+

Mrs. Thatcher: I know, you and I make the same + speeches.

+

The President: (laughing) Yes.

+

Mrs. Thatcher: Well, I’m trying to apply mine to this + particular problem. [The President: All right. . + . . ] But it’s terribly, it’s very helpful to know—it’s simply helpful + to know what General Walters + finds with General Galtieri + also. Brazil is, we regard as a friend, you know.

+

The President: Yes.

+

Mrs. Thatcher: And, so, it’s good to know what their + views are and that they will be trying to bring pressure to bear on + Galtieri.

+

The President: Well, we’ll, we’ll convey that to + you, when we. . . .

+

Mrs. Thatcher: All right, Ron. Yes, do ring up again, + it’s marvelous to hear your voice.

+

The President: Well, it’s good to talk with + you.

+

Mrs. Thatcher: And one does need cheering up now and + then.

+

The President: O.K., all right.

+ +

Mrs. Thatcher: I very much enjoyed seeing George + Shultz.Traveling as a Presidential envoy, Shultz met with Thatcher at Chequers on May 9, + where the two discussed the upcoming Economic Summit at Versailles + and NATO issues. According to a + memorandum of conversation, based upon a telephoned report to + Eagleburger, they also + discussed the Falklands/Malvinas issue, with Shultz reporting that Thatcher was “clearly not + overwhelmed by the Falklands” and that she “went out of her way to + say some very nice words about Secretary Haig for his efforts to help + resolve the Falklands problem.” (Department of State, Executive + Secretariat, S/S Special Handling + Restrictions Memos 1979–1983, Lot 96D262, ES Sensitive May 6–18 1982)

+

The President: Oh, that’s fine. Good.

+

Mrs. Thatcher: It’s good to say that I think you’re + absolutely right to try to reduce the deficit by getting expenditure + down.

+

The President: Yeah, we think we’re gonna succeed + in that.

+

Mrs. Thatcher: I think you’re going to succeed. All + right, Ron, look forward to seeing you soon.

+

The President: O.K., good luck.

+

Mrs. Thatcher: Good bye.

+

The President: Bye.

+
+ +
+ 258. Telegram From Secretary of State Haig to the Department of StateSource: Reagan Library, Executive + Secretariat, NSC Cable File, + Falkland File 05/13/1982. Confidential; Immediate; Nodis. Haig was in Ankara May 13–15 for meetings with + Turkish officials before traveling to Luxembourg for the NATO Ministerial Meeting May + 16–18. + + + Ankara, May + 13, 1982, 2144Z + +

Secto 7018. Subject: Message From the + British on Falklands.

+

1. The Secretary received today, May 13, 1982, the following message from + the British Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs. + Quote (classified Confidential) (title) Falklands: E.C. Import Embargo. + The British Government welcome Mr. Haig’s offer to put further pressure on Europeans, and + would be grateful for anything further he can do to encourage our EC partners to renew the embargo.See footnote 2, + Document 98. The situation is on a knife-edge in a + number of capitals. Although most would probably join a consensus if all + others favor renewal, there is a danger of a domino effect if a significant minority comes out against + renewal. American influence could be particularly useful with the + Italians (although here is the socialists who are chiefly causing + problems) and with the Irish (where Mr. Haig will appreciate that our own influence is extremely + limited). The Danes are also a problem, but chiefly because of hang-ups + over type of Community instrument to be used. The Belgians and + Luxembourgers are firm, and we are reasonably confident of the French, + Dutch and Greeks. However, there will seem to be some doubts in Bonn and + anything Mr. Haig can do to + stiffen Germans would also be helpful. End quote.The EC, meeting + after the NAC meeting, renewed the embargo on May 17. See Documents 268–270.

+ + Haig + +
+ +
+ 259. Telegram From the Department of State to Secretary of State + Haig in AnkaraSource: Reagan Library, Executive + Secretariat, NSC Country File, + Europe and Soviet Union, United Kingdom (04/01/1982–07/31/1982) (4). + Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Printed + from a copy that was received in the White House Situation + Room. + + + Washington, May 14, 1982, 0247Z + +

Tosec 70052/130920. For the Secretary + from Acting Secy. Subject: Meeting With Henderson.

+

1. Nicho came in this afternoonMay + 13. to brief me on where things stand. Basically he confirms + that it is clear the two parties are far apart on a number of key issues + despite the fact that the Argentines did make an important move on + sovereignty two days ago.See footnote 3, Document 246.

+

2. The specific issues which remain undecided are what happens if there + is no agreement by December 31st, the Argentine insistence on free + transit from the mainland, the Argentine inclusion of South Georgia and + Sandwich Islands, and the formula for consulting the Islanders. On this + last point he said Perez has come up with a formula which the British are not very keen on which + would allow consultations with equal numbers of Islanders and + Argentinian residents.

+

3. He said it is also not clear how the UN administration of the Island which Perez proposes would + work.

+

4. Nicho also said that the formula for the modalities for withdrawal are + not agreed; the Argentines insisting the British must withdraw 2000 + miles while they withdraw only to the mainland. The UK believes however that if agreement is + reached on other elements of the package, the withdrawal modalities will + fall into place.

+

5. Henderson said it was not + clear to him what Perez’s next move would be. He has heard that the + SYG may be preparing a paper on + what kind of package he thinks is possible, which paper he might present + to the two parties as early as Friday or Saturday.May 14 or 15. However Henderson said that with the two sides + still so far apart, Perez may decide not to do so.

+

6. Henderson also said the + British continue to question whether Ros in New York has authority to speak definitively for + Buenos Aires.

+

7. Henderson stressed that the + mood in London is “very bloody-minded”. The debate in Commons today was + particularly rough with lots of criticism of FCO weakness and willingness to negotiate away the British + position.See footnote 2, Document 257. Apparently there was + also criticism of the rumored possible inclusion of the Germans in the + contact group. Nicho said there was some concern in London about our + attitude, with some questioning whether we might be tilting back towards + Buenos Aires. (He raised with me, as I gather he had with you, several + recent public statements). I assured Henderson that this was not the case and told him you + would be sending letters as requested by Pym to the EC,See Document + 258. encouraging the maintenance of sanctions. He was + pleased to hear this.

+

8. Henderson said the British are + still not clear on what the Argentine strategy is. They suspect Buenos + Aires is still playing with them and stringing the British along. This + he stated London will not allow; military action in that event would be + very likely. He stressed this point several times.

+

9. Henderson said if there is + military action London expects there will be a call for a Security + Council meeting out of which might emerge a resolution calling for a + ceasefire with no provision for withdrawal. He noted that the British + would in that event veto the resolution and would expect us to do so as + well.

+ +

10. Nicho was warm—even effusive—in his praise for your efforts + throughout the crisis. He and I agreed to see each other again Friday to + compare notes.

+ + Stoessel + +
+ +
+ 260. Telegram From the Defense Intelligence Agency to [text not declassified]Source: Washington National Records + Center, OSD Files, FRC 330–87–0067, + Falkland Islands April 1982. Secret; Noforn. + + + Washington, May 14, 1982, 0300Z + +

Subj: DIA Defense Intelligence Notice + (DIN) (U).

+

US-Latin America: Impact of the Falklands + Crisis. (U)

+

1. (S/Noforn) Early signs suggest the + Falklands crisis will have negative repercussions on the inter-American + system, but bilateral relations with the US will ultimately be driven by each nation’s perceived + self-interest. Only the multilateral system will be critically affected, + although it will probably survive.

+

2. (S/Noforn) In Costa Rica, Former + President Carazo reacted to US support + of the UK in the crisis by calling for + relocation of the Organization of American States (OAS) headquarters out of Washington. In + Venezuela, where the reaction against US + support for the UK has been particularly + strong, various officials have called for action to reconfigure the + OAS into a strictly Latin American + body excluding the US. As a more + immediate demonstration of official displeasure, the Venezuelan + Government canceled a scheduled visit by the USS “Peterson” to Puerto + Cabello from 17 to 21 May, giving “political reasons” as the excuse. + Venezuela has also announced its decision not to participate in this + year’s US-South American combined naval + exercise UNITAS XXIII.See footnote 2, Document + 65. In a May 11 memorandum for the record, Forster reported a conversation he + had with Robayo and Gilly + regarding the rumored Venezuelan abstention from UNITAS XXIII. The Venezuelans also + elaborated on their government’s attitude toward U.S. South Atlantic + policy: “The thrust of the message was that all South American + nations were grieved over the US’s + support of the UK in the Falkland + issue. USA’s sudden and + inexplicable shift from a position of neutrality to pro-British had + dealt a fatal blow to the Inter-American System. South America would + now have to look elsewhere for leadership.” (Washington National + Records Center, OSD Files, FRC + 330–84–0003, Argentina (Jan–15 May) 1982) While only + Venezuela has officially withdrawn so far, Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and others may well + follow suit, threatening cancellation of the entire operation.

+

3. (S/Noforn) Many of the more + strident public statements and symbolic diplomatic reactions can be + attributed to the high degree of emotionalism surrounding the crisis and + a pervasive Latin American feeling of abandonment by the US. With time, these emotions will subside + and tensions lessen as more pragmatic concerns come to the fore. In this + context, each nation’s perceived self-interest and reliance on + assistance from the US will weigh + heavily in forming policies and actions regarding Washington. Thus, + except for the nations most immediately affected by Washington’s backing + of the UK, bilateral relations are not + likely to be severed unless the US + commits itself to active military involvement on the side of the + British.

+

4. (S/Noforn) The long-term impact of + the present crisis will be felt most in the multilateral arena. The + inter-American system—structured around the OAS, the Rio Treaty, and a web of mutual agreements—has + been in a weakened condition for years. US actions in the present crisis will weaken the system + further. But its total disappearance is not yet likely. The OAS serves a useful purpose, if only as a + common forum for exchanging views, airing problems, and seeking relief + from a multitude of pressures. Thus, it is likely to survive, although + it may well be reconfigured. The US role + within the organization will probably be further eroded, as will US influence. On the other hand, the + tendency of Latin American nations to pressure in unison for concessions + from the US will clearly be + strengthened. Any significant additional crisis could well weaken the + system beyond its ability to sustain itself.

+

5. (S/Noforn) Regarding the Rio + Treaty, the nations in the Hemisphere have grown more realistic over the + years. They realize their own dependence on the US security umbrella, and until they find a better + substitute, they will continue to depend on US protection in the nuclear age. The Rio Treaty will + retain some function and will be called on by signatories in crises + where it is perceived helpful. But other associations and bodies will + also be asked to participate, and the Rio Treaty role is not likely to + be exclusive.

+

6. (S/Noforn) To some extent, + repercussions of the present crisis are a hemispheric coming of age. + Reliance on the old systems for all solutions is no longer seen as + practicable, and of necessity. Each nation will seek its own friends in + international affairs.

+
+ +
+ + 261. Telegram From the Department of State to Secretary of State + Haig in AnkaraSource: Department of State, Under + Secretary of State for Political Affairs, Miscellaneous Files, March + 1981–February 1983, Lot 83D210, Falklands [Folder 1]. Secret; Niact Immediate; Nodis. In the right-hand margin of + the telegram, Gompert wrote: + “Enders thoughts on + Falkland: Next Steps. Enders recommends you contact Pym; Eagleburger believes we + should wait it out.” Haig + wrote at the top and in the right-hand margin of the telegram: “Dave: It might be possible. However, I fear + neither side is ready for final big steps required—what do you + think? Larry should meet w/Henderson + ASAP—review bidding and provide me + refined thinking by mid-afternoon. Larry only + w/Henderson.—He should + discuss cautiously Option A (substance) thru modalities but only as + (what if?).” + + + Washington, May 14, 1982, 0310Z + +

Tosec 70054/130929. For the Secretary + from Enders. Subject: Next Steps + in the Falklands.

+

1. We are not sure what the British deadline is for starting landing + operations on the Falklands, but it is probably no later than May + 17.Gompert wrote “(Monday)” in the space above the + date. A report sent by USDAO in + London to the DIA, dated May 13 and + forwarded to Weinberger by + General Brown the same day, + concluded: “British task force is now nearing readiness for assault + on Falklands and, barring diplomatic breakthrough and/or unfavorable + weather conditions, probably will strike within seven to ten days of + 820517.” (Washington National Records Center, OSD Files, FRC 330–84–0003, Argentina + (Jan–15 May) 1982) By then (barring a storm) all amphibious + units in the South Atlantic will have closed on the islands, and the May + 15 EC meeting should have extended the + sanctions for a month.

+

2. The costs go up drastically for us when the British land on the + Islands. Some action against mainland airfields is almost bound to + precede landing, but may not be very effective. Once landed, it is + likely to be some time before the outcome is known. There will be + casualties, possibly on a large scale, and a storm of anti-American + feeling in the Hemisphere. It is possible that Britain will not + succeed—the worst of all possible outcomes for us, confronting us with + the choice of doing what is necessary for Britain to succeed—and going + down to defeat with the “colonialist” power. If the British do succeed, + on the other hand, we are locked into a long term “anti-colonial” + struggle on (in Latin terms) the wrong side. We lose either way.

+

3. The current negotiating position does not look promising. Thatcher on the phone to the President + today was pessimistic.See Document 257. So apparently was + Pym to you.No record of this exchange between Haig and Pym has been found. + Guerreiro also is not very hopeful, based on his contacts today.Presumably May 13. See Document 255.

+ +

4. Walters reportsNot further identified and not found. the + Junta unified on the current Argentine position of exclusive UN administration, freedom of movement and + land purchase. By implication the neutral sovereignty paragraph may be + acceptable. Walters did not + directly bring up the South Georgia issue, because of its + sensitivity.

+

5. You have Henderson report by + septel.Gompert + drew a line from this word and wrote: “(not yet rec’d).” See Document 259. It is coordinate with + the others.

+

6. It seems clear that without massive outside pressure, the Secretary + General’s effort will fail. That leaves us with three alternatives:

+

A.Haig circled A, B, and C in this and the following + two paragraphs. To attempt, with Brazil, to push the two + parties into agreement—on the basis of one set of Islands, an + essentially UN administration (the + inevitable counterpart of a neutral negotiations paragraph), and freedom + of movement to be made one of the subjects of negotiation.In this sentence, Haig underlined “one set of Islands” and numbered it + “1,” underlined “an essentially UN + administration” and numbered it “2,” numbered “the inevitable + counterpart of a neutral negotiations paragraph” with “3,” and + numbered “freedom of movement” with a “4.” The problem is + that the Secretary General’s effort may already have lost credibility, + and we may be throwing good money after bad. On the other hand, Brazil + would no doubt prefer.In the last two + sentences, Haig underlined + “have lost credibility” and “On the other hand, Brazil would no + doubt prefer.” In the right-hand margin, he placed a bracket next to + the whole paragraph and wrote “this will be formula but not this + way.”

+

B. To encourage Britain to tell the Secretary General that its + flexibility is at an end (as I understand Argentina already has), + without waiting for Perez to put forward a single piece of paper, + thereby provoking an end to the mediation effort and a new Security + Council meeting. Way would then be open for an immediate new negotiating + proposal, whichBeginning with this word, + Haig underlined the rest + of the paragraph. Gompert + wrote “?” in the right-hand margin next to this paragraph. + might be Brazil-US telling the two sides + what they can support. You and Guerreiro would meet in New York on + SundayMay 16. for the purpose; + the two Presidents would approach Thatcher and Galtieri. Galtieri idea of a summit meeting could be dangled as + bait, provided agreement can be reached beforehand.

+

C. Let nature take its course. Perez fails, Thatcher must land. And something like (B) emerges next + week. The problem then is that Hemispheric opinion is even more + violently opposed to US, we have a new + separation of forces + problem, and we would be open to Suez-like charges of having stopped a + winning operation at the critical point.

+

7. My own recommendation is that you seriously consider (A) or (B).Gompert underlined “seriously consider (A) or (B)” + and wrote “Enders” in the right-hand margin. In + that case, you should call Pym + immediately to set up the play. We would approach Figueiredo in Cleveland.Figueiredo left Washington on May 13 and traveled to + Cleveland for a private visit. I am not able (too late) to + report to you Walt’sStoessel. view. My basic + reasoning is that we should nail B.A. with the neutral negotiating + paragraph now it is on the table.

+

8. Undersecretary Eagleburger’s + comment: Tom’s description of the possible consequences of failure to + reach a settlement may prove correct, but we have known of those + possible costs for some time. Apparently Mrs. Thatcher reacted badly to today’s + callSee Document + 257. (so Henderson says). Unless we are prepared to put whatever + pressure is necessary on HMG to settle, + I see little reason to believe any US-Brazilian move can succeed. Maggie is not going to budge. + Suez cuts two ways. I recommend we wait it out.Gompert + placed a bracket in the right-hand margin next to the paragraph and + wrote “Eagleburger” next to it.

+ + Stoessel + +
+ +
+ + 262. Telegram From the Department of State to Secretary of State + Haig in AnkaraSource: Department of State, Under + Secretary of State for Political Affairs, Miscellaneous Files, March + 1981–February 1983, Lot 83D210, Falklands [Folder 1]. Secret; Flash; + Nodis; Stadis. + + + Washington, May 14, 1982, 1817Z + +

Tosec 70069/132007. For the Secretary + from the Acting Secretary. Subject: Meeting With Henderson.

+

1. Secret–Entire text.

+

2. As you requested,In telegram Secto 7024 from Ankara, May 14, + Haig instructed + Eagleburger to meet with + Henderson “as soon as + possible” to “clear the air” in the aftermath of the Reagan-Thatcher telephone conversation + (see Document 257) and “review the bidding + on substance and procedure.” On the first objective, Haig told Eagleburger: “you should explain + that the sole purpose of yesterday’s call was simply to stay in + touch at the highest level, as the President and Prime Minister have + done throughout the crisis.” On the second, Haig provided a list of talking + points, adding that Eagleburger “should engage Henderson” in “a manner that + contains no hint that we are pressing new formulae on the British.” + (Department of State, Under Secretary of State for Political + Affairs, Miscellaneous Files, March 1981–February 1983, Lot 83D210, + Falklands [Folder 1]) The instructions followed the outline + prescribed by Haig in his + handwritten note on telegram Tosec 7005. See footnote 1, + Document 261. Larry and I met with Henderson this morning. We began by + expressing our concern that yesterday’s eventsA reference to the May 13 telephone conversation + between Reagan and Thatcher. See Document 257. not be seen as anything more than an + attempt by the President to stay in touch at the highest levels with the + British Government. Henderson + said he understood but once again repeated he thought it had been a + mistake to have made the phone call. I said in light of situation you + had asked me to say that you would be happy to change your plans in + Athens SaturdayMay 15. Haig was scheduled to be in Athens + for talks with Greek officials. to enable you to meet earlier + in the day with Pym in Luxembourg + for an intense exchange of views on the situation if Pym wanted that. Henderson told me that he was very + grateful for the offer. He said there will be an important Cabinet + meeting at Chequers Sunday morningMay + 16. to which he and Tony + Parsons are returning tonight. He did not know how long + the meeting would go and, additionally, there was the complication of + the EC meeting Sunday afternoon. He said + he would get back to us quickly with Pym’s answer.

+

3. At the Cabinet meeting he said he would be asked to give his view on + the US Government’s position on the + crisis now. He said he was somewhat concerned that there might be a + shift both in US public opinion and a + possible tilt within certain parts of the administration (he was referring to yesterday’s events + and the President’s letters to Latin AmericansSee Document 204. + as well as to some high-level administration statements.) Henderson noted this came when there + was a “considerable stiffening” in British opinion. Here he cited the + Times editorial WednesdayMay 12. + which attacked the US-Peruvian plan as a + “sell out”. He was concerned that the idea was being allowed to develop + in the US press that the Argentines had + been forthcoming on the issue of sovereignty and therefore now it was + time for the British to compromise. We reassured him that there had been + no change whatsoever in US policy and + encouraged him to remember what we are doing in the way of materiel + support for the British. We stated we thought the British were okay in + US public opinion as long as there + was no US direct military involvement + and as long as the British still look to be trying to resolve the issue + peacefully.

+

4. As you asked, I then took him through your specific suggestions per + reftel. During the course of our + conversation it became clear that in London the key stumbling block + remains the interim administration on the Island. On this issue, Nicko + said even the left wing would attack Mrs. Thatcher if she gave in. He noted that she had already + moved back considerably from her initial insistence on returning the + British Governor to the Island. While it was true that the Argentines + had come forward with a reasonable compromise on sovereignty, they were + trying to take back everything on the interim administration. (At the + same time, he noted that Galtieri’s statements to the press Thursday had been + contrary to the Argentine position on sovereignty presented in New York + Tuesday.)In a television interview on + May 13, Galtieri said of the + sovereignty issue: “We are not going to renounce this objective.” + (Leonard Downie Jr., “British Plan No Halt in Hostilities,” Washington Post, May 14, p. A1) + Henderson stated that the key + concern in Parliament is over the role of the Islanders in any eventual + outcome. The present Argentine position, he asserted, would in effect + allow them de facto control over the Islands. He again referred to an + idea which apparently is circulating at the UN Secretariat for the UN + administration to consult “equal numbers of British and Argentines” on + the Island. This, given the disproportion in numbers, would be entirely + unacceptable.

+

5. Henderson was interested in + your formula (para 5B reftel)The + paragraph in telegram Secto 7024 + reads as follows: “With regard to terms of reference for + negotiations, we believe the current neutral formulation is best and + should be preserved. Indeed, we should try to lock this up while it + is on the table. However, as is surely clear by now to HMG, this will require tradeoffs with + other provisions, especially interim administration and freedom of + movement.” (See footnote 2 + above.) on the pragmatic issues of freedom of movement. He + took them down carefully and + thought they might be acceptable to the British but doubted very much + the Argentines could accept it. He also noted that the Falkland Islands + Company is a wholly-owned subsidiary of another British company whose + stock is publicly held and traded in London so that anybody can + presumably buy stock at least in the parent company.

+

6. On withdrawal, Henderson again + said he did not think this would be a problem if there was in place a + mechanism to prevent the reintroduction of forces onto the Island.

+

7. This brings us to the other main concern which, not surprisingly, + Henderson stressed—the issue + of guarantees. What happens, he asked, if the Argentines decide to send + their navy back and on the Island there are only UN technocrats or what if, as in 1967, there is a UN presence but they are withdrawn as the + Argentine armed forces were reintroduced onto the Island. Finally, he + noted the same problem arises if there is no agreement by January 1.

+

8. On the question of guarantees, Henderson’s clear emphasis was on the need for some kind + of US involvement on the Island as the + only guarantee which in the end would be acceptable to HMG. However, he stressed that this issue + has not yet really been addressed by London where, as noted above, the + primary sticking point is interim administration.

+

9. On next steps, the British expect PDC + to put forward his ideas to both parties on Saturday and ask them to + respond within 72 hours. At the end of that time, if there is no + agreement, he will consider his mission to have failed. There will be an + informal Security Council meeting Friday afternoonStoessel + summarized the day’s Security Council meeting in his May 14 Evening + Reading Report to Reagan, + “The UN Security Council, meeting + this afternoon in informal consultations, heard a perfunctory report + from Secretary General Perez de Cuellar on his mediation efforts, + and encouraged him to continue.” (Department of State, Executive + Secretariat, Very Sensitive Correspondence Files of Alexander M. Haig, 1981–1982, Lot + 83D288, Evening Reading—May 1982) called by the Chinese + Security Council President whose activities are making the British + somewhat uneasy. Henderson is + concerned that there could be a call for a Security Council session + early next week though he agreed that it was not likely before the + SYG’s efforts had failed. He + stressed again that the British will be counting on US support if there is an unbalanced + Security Council resolution and we reassured him on this count.

+

10. At the end of the meeting, Henderson came back again to the problems over the + interim administration and stated that he was confident that if we could + get around that problem we could resolve the issue. But he stressed that + Mrs. Thatcher has given a lot + already on this issue and has significant pressures on it from both + right and left.

+ +

11. Walters. Your callNo memorandum of conversation of this + telephone call has been found. came through at this point in + our conversation. Larry will be going over Dick’s conversations this afternoon with the British + DCM.No memorandum of conversation of + a meeting between Eagleburger and Thomas has been found.

+

12. PDC. Right after our meeting, I + called Perez as you requested to tell him that there was no truth in the + London Times story about our deciding to embark on a new peace + initiative. Although Perez had not seen the article (and I assumed + Henderson had not either), + the SYG was grateful for my call. He + said he thinks he needs a few more days to work and considers it a good + sign that Parsons and Henderson are going back to London + this weekend. He expressed the hope that the decision taken by the + Cabinet there will be constructive and added that the Argentines were + showing “some signs of wisdom” though he did not specify what these + were. The SYG said he would be back in + touch if there was anything else he wanted us to do and I expressed + again our willingness to help him in any way possible.

+ + Stoessel + +
+ +
+ 263. National Security Decision Directive 34Source: Reagan Library, Executive + Secretariat, NSC National Security + Decision Directives (NSDD), NSDD 34 [South Atlantic Crisis]. Top + Secret. Clark sent the NSDD + to Haig, Regan, Weinberger, Baldrige, Stockman, Casey, Kirkpatrick, and Jones under a May 14 memorandum. + (Ibid.) The NSDD was also sent to Bush. + + + Washington, May 14, + 1982 + +

U.S. ACTIONS IN THE SOUTH ATLANTIC + CRISIS

+

Pursuant to the decisions reached at the meeting of the National Security + Council of April 30, 1982,See Document 195. we are taking, + effective immediately, the following actions in connection with the + dispute between the United Kingdom and Argentina over the Falkland + Islands in the South Atlantic:

+ +

—Issuance of an NSC-approved press + statement which summarizes the U.S. position in the South Atlantic + crisis, is supportive of the UK position + and includes the announcement of concrete steps underscoring U.S. + determination not to condone the use of unlawful force to resolve + disputes.

+

—The suspension of all military exports to Argentina. This action covers + deliveries of all items remaining in the FMS pipeline, primarily affecting spare parts in the amount + of $3.9 million; it also covers the suspension of existing licenses for + export of Munitions List items to Argentina and the withholding of + further export licenses for such items. This suspension will affect + non-government as well as government end-uses in Argentina, thereby + reaching a category not covered by the Humphrey-Kennedy Amendment or the subsequent + legislation.

+

—The withholding of certification of Argentine eligibility for military + sales and export licenses under section 725(b) of the International + Security and Development Cooperation Act of 1981.The International Security and Development + Cooperation Act (S 1196—P.L. 97–113), signed into law on December + 29, 1981, provided foreign aid authorizations for FY 1982 and FY 1983 and reduced congressional involvement in + reviewing overseas arms sales by doubling the thresholds for + reporting individual arms sales to Congress and reduced from 30 to + 15 days the time Congress had to review and veto U.S. arms sales to + NATO member countries, Japan, + New Zealand, and Australia. Prior to the law’s passage, the + Reagan administration + was forced to abandon its request for the repeal of a law banning + covert aid to warring factions in Angola in order to get + congressional Democrats to agree to lift arms sales bans on + Argentina and Chile. (Congress and the + Nation, vol. VI, 1981–84, p. 132) For Reagan’s statement upon signing + the legislation into law, see Public Papers: + Reagan, 1981, + pp. 1202–1204.

+

—The withholding of non-Munitions List export license requests for + dual-use and related COCOM-type + items.

+

—The withholding of new Export-Import Bank credits, insurance and + guarantees.

+

—The withholding of new Commodity Credit Corporation guarantees (which + affects agricultural products worth approximately $2 million).

+

—A private warning to Argentina that the measures announced do not + encompass the full range of economic sanctions which the U.S. has at its + disposal and which could be applied depending on circumstances.

+

—The withholding of any required U.S. consent for third-country transfers + of U.S. origin items the export of which from the U.S. would not be + approved under the above decisions. (Note: Withholding of consent for + transfer of FMS origin items sold to + third countries is compelled by existing law).

+
+ +
+ + 264. Memorandum From the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy + (Iklé) to Secretary of + Defense WeinbergerSource: Washington National Records + Center, OSD Files, FRC 330–86–0042, + UK 1982. Top Secret; Eyes + Only. + + + Washington, May 14, + 1982 + + + SUBJECT + UK Request for AIM 9L Missiles + (TS)—ACTION MEMORANDUM + +

(TS) Yesterday the British officially requested 300 AIM 9L air-to-air + missiles, with a priority on delivering 100 missiles to Ascension Island + by today.Attached but not printed is a copy + of United Kingdom Defense Procurement Office Letter P–1025, sent + from the British Embassy on May 13, formally requesting the + missiles. In keeping with our alternative financial + arrangement, the British requested that the missiles be kept in US stores at Ascension until they were + needed.

+

(TS) The JCS, together with the Air Force and the Navy, have recommended + that the request not be approved (Tab A). Their rationale is: (1) the + Service inventories are + currently far below requirements; (2) adequate facilities for storage, + etc. at Ascension are not available; and (3) since the UK currently has 200 AIM 9Ls, their + requirement is questionable without further knowledge of their strategy. + The JCS propose as an alternative the transfer of 50–80 missiles for + delivery to the UK either at Charleston + AFB (preferred) or at Ascension. If + the missiles are not required immediately, we could provide + pre-positioned storage at Charleston AFB from which delivery could be made to the British at + Ascension within 24 hours of notification.

+

(TS) Since Service inventories + total more than 9,000, I see little meaningful difference between the + 50–80 missiles the JCS have offered as an alternative and the 100 that + constitute the immediate request. My recommendation is that you agree to + the transfer of 100 missiles to the British with delivery at either + Charleston AFB or Ascension, or + US storage of 100 missiles at Charleston + AFB to be available for delivery to + the British at their request. We would honor the British choice of + delivery alternatives.

+

State (PM) concurs with this + recommendation.Weinberger initialed his approval + of the recommendation.

+

Fred C. + IkleIklé signed “Fred” above his + typed signature.

+ +

Tab A

+

Memorandum From the Acting Chairman of the Joint Chiefs + of Staff (Hayward) to + Secretary of Defense WeinbergerTop + Secret.

+

CM 1262–82

+

Washington, May 14, + 1982

+ + SUBJECT + United Kingdom OP Corporate Request for AIM–9L Missiles (S) + +

1. (TS) Reference United Kingdom Defence Procurement Office letter P–1025 + of 13 May 1982United Kingdom Defence + Procurement Office ltr of 13 May 82. [Footnote in the original. See + footnote 2 above.] which + requested the US provide 300 SIDEWINDER + AIM-9L Air-to-Air missiles under “United Kingdom OP Corporate”.

+

2. (TS) The Joint Staff and Services have seriously considered the UK request for 300 AIM–9L missiles + including 100 to be pre-positioned at Ascension Island as soon as + possible. In view of current inventory shortfalls, procurement leadtime, + impact upon sustainability of US Forces, + and other reasons outlined below, it does not appear to be in the US’ best interest to fulfill this + request.

+

3. (TS) The current status of US and + projected UK inventories of AIM–9L + missiles and supporting data is at Enclosure 1.

+

4. (TS) In addition, a serious problem exists with control, security and + storage of sensitive ordnance at Ascension. Without adequate storage + capability at Ascension, any ordnance transferred to the USAF Facility would have to be delivered + immediately to the British upon arrival, unless elaborate and expensive + facilities are constructed and additional US personnel are assigned. Equally significant, it is + unclear as to the UK requirement for + AIM 9–L missiles beyond the 200 + already obtained from the USG. Further, + it is questionable if the USG should + support a requirement for 300 AIM 9–L + missiles without knowing more about the UK grand strategy. Additional UK justification seems appropriate.

+

5. (TS) If the decision is made to transfer these missiles to the UK, a possible alternative is to provide a + maximum of 50 to 80 missiles which could be ready for delivery to the + UK at Charleston, S.C. This proposal + would satisfy our stated policy to provide material support to the + UK. This lesser number would + significantly reduce the impact upon US + inventories and leave open the door to later procurement should + circumstances dictate.

+ +

6. (TS) If US delivery to Ascension is + required, we can pre-position these 50 to 80 missiles at the Naval + Weapons Station Charleston, S.C. Adequate storage can be provided at + this location and delivery directly to the UK at Ascension can be made by the Military Airlift Command + through Charleston AFB. If a decision + is then made, delivery can be accomplished within 24 hours.

+

7. (U) At Enclosures 2 and 3 are Position Papers prepared by the USN and USAF.The position papers are + attached but not printed.

+

Adm + Thomas B. Hayward

+

USN + Acting Chairman

+

Joint Chiefs of Staff

+

Enclosure 1

+

Paper Prepared by the Joint Chiefs of StaffSecret.

+

Washington, undated

+ + US + AIM–9L (SIDEWINDER) + STATUS + + + REQUIRED + ON HAND + % REQUIRED + + + (1) USAF + 8800 + 5498 + 65% + + + USN + 6460 + 3575 + 55% + + + TOTAL + 15260 + 9073 + 59% + +
+

(1) Represents 1982 requirements. USAF + 1988 requirement increases to 15,620 missiles.

+ + + UK AIM–9H & + 9L (SIDEWINDER) + STATUS + + + QUANTITY ON HAND (FMS + ESTIMATE) + + + AIM–9H + 750 + + + AIM–9L + 200 + + + TOTAL + 950 + +
+
+ +
+ 265. Telegram From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Multiple Military + RecipientsSource: + Washington National Records Center, OSD Files, FRC 330–86–0042, UK 1982. Top Secret; Immediate; Limdis. Releasable to UK. Sent to the Chief of Naval + Operations, CINCMAC Scott + AFB, NAVWPNSTA Yorktown, COMDR MAC Terminal Norfolk, Chief of Staff + of the Air Force, Ascension AAF, + and NAVMTO Norfolk. Sent for + information to the Department of Defense, Department of State, + COMNAVSUPSYSCOM, + NAS Norfolk, COM 21AFCP McGuire AFB, and AFLC + WPAFB. + + + Washington, May 15, 1982, 0600Z + +

CJCS sends. Subject: Execute Order—Shipment of AIM–9L + Sidewinder Missiles. (FMS case UK–P–LCL). (S)

+

Deliver upon receipt.

+

1. (S) This is an execute order by authority and direction of the + Secretary of Defense.

+

2. (TS) Situation. The British officially requested 300 AIM–9L + Sidewinder missiles with + priority delivery of 100 missiles to Ascension Island ASAP. The SecDef has directed transfer of 100 AIM–9L Sidewinder missiles to the British + under UK OP Corporate arrangements with + immediate delivery to Ascension Island. Department of State concurs in + this action.See Document 264.

+

3. (TS) Mission. Action addressees are requested to transfer via fastest + means 100 AIM–9L + Sidewinder missiles from NAVWPNSTA Yorktown VA to NAS Norfolk + VA FFT to Commander Ascension Aux AF via + SAAM FLT 2434.

+

4. (S) Execution.

+

A. (S) NAVMTO coordinate with COMDR + MAC terminal to ensure timely + transfer of missiles from ground vehicles to air cargo pallets and onload to aircraft. + Expeditious movement of the shipment is of paramount importance.

+

B. (S) Commander Ascension Aux AF take + appropriate actions to insure physical transfer of the missiles to + UK title.

+

C. (U) Coordinating instructions.

+

(1) (S) Missiles in this transfer are being provided from USN stocks for expediency reasons. + Adjustment of actual inventory follows: USAF—75 AIM–9L missiles; + USN—25 AIM–9L missiles.

+

(2) (S) Packaging, crating, handling and transportation charges to cover + this shipment will be credited to FMS + case: UK–P–LBZ.

+

(3) (S) Advise ALCON of flight mission + data to indicate manifest and ETD/ETA Ascension Island.

+

(4) (U) DIRLAUTH + ALCON.

+

5. (U) Administration and logistics.

+

A. (S) Movement priority 1A3 assigned. Cargo total wt 36,100 lbs and 1735 + cu ft. net explosive wt by class: A—610 lbs; B—6010 lbs; C—126 lbs.

+

B. (S) Delivery to be completed NLT + 160800Z May 82.

+

C. (S) POC for receipt of shipment at Ascension Island is LTC Bryden, + USAF, Commander Ascension Aux + AF, Autovon 234-3760.

+

D. (S) The quantity and value of AIM–9L missiles physically transferred will be reported to + DSAA within three days of the date + of transfer.

+

E. (C) Note to addressees and users of this message. The matters + discussed in this message are exceptionally sensitive. Distribution + should be limited to only those who have an absolutely essential need to + know.

+

F. (S) Classify all movement messages Secret.

+

6. (U) Command and signal.

+

A. (S) Commander Ascension Aux AF is + supported commander. CINCMAC and + COMDR NAVWPNSTA are supporting + commanders.

+
+ +
+ + 266. Memorandum From the Acting Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff + (Hayward) to Secretary of + Defense WeinbergerSource: Washington National Records + Center, OSD Files, FRC 330–84–0003, + Argentina (Jan–15 May) 1982. Secret; Sensitive. A stamped notation + at the top of the memorandum indicates that Weinberger saw it on May 17. A + note in an unknown hand at the top of the memorandum reads: + “CC—hand-delivered to Bill + Clark 5/17.” + + + JCSM–108–82 + + + Washington, May 15, + 1982 + + + SUBJECT + Falklands Crisis (U) + +

1. (S) While the Joint Chiefs of Staff support the policy of providing + materiel assistance to the United Kingdom in connection with the + Falklands crisis, they are increasingly concerned about the long-term + impact on our relations within the Hemisphere resulting from the + changing nature and greater degree of assistance requested. Clearly, the + crisis will make it more difficult to pursue US regional security policies on a coalition basis and will + provide the Soviets and Cubans additional opportunities to undermine + hemispheric collective security with weapons, advisors, and + significantly increased influence. Finally, the perception of an + unlimited US commitment may provide the + British with little incentive to negotiate a prompt resolution of the + issue.

+

2. (S) The Joint Chiefs of Staff have carefully reviewed the list of + weapons, equipment, and supplies requested by the United Kingdom.A possible reference to a paper, dated May + 14, summarizing new British requests for matériel support, + outstanding requests, and requests recently completed as of that + date. Iklé sent a copy of + the paper to Weinberger + under a May 14 covering memorandum. A stamped notation on the + covering memorandum indicates Weinberger saw both the covering memorandum and the + paper on May 17. Both are ibid. The early requests involved + relatively small quantities, with emphasis on logistical support. The + current requests are characterized by more visible and considerably + greater quantities of lethal weapons and could lead to direct + involvement of US combat support forces. + For example, the two fully abeam underway replenishment capable oilers + and the prototype ARAPAHO containerized aviation facility vessel could + directly involve operational support by US elements. The 20,000 SSQ41B sonobouys and 200 Mk–46 Mod + 2 ASW torpedoes to combat two Argentine + diesel submarines and 300 AIM–9L + air-to-air missilesSee Documents 264 and 265. + (when coupled with the 200 AIM–9Ls recently purchased and their + additional 750 AIM–9Hs) to destroy less than 140 Argentine + fighter/attack aircraft, seem far in excess of numbers required.

+ +

3. (S) The Joint Chiefs of Staff, therefore, recommend that the NSC address, as a matter of priority, the + US policy of arms and equipment + transfer to the United Kingdom in connection with the Falklands crisis + with full consideration of its impact on our longer term hemispheric + security interests.

+

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

+ + T.B. + Hayward + Admiral, U.S. Navy Acting Chairman, + JCS + + +
+ +
+ 267. Telegram From the Department of State to Secretary of State + Haig in AthensSource: Department of State, Under + Secretary of State for Political Affairs, Miscellaneous Files, March + 1981–February 1983, Lot 83D210, Falklands [Folder 1]. Secret; + Immediate; Nodis. Haig initialed at the top of the + telegram and wrote: “Dave [Gompert] see me.” The text of the telegram was + marked extensively with a highlighter pen. Haig was in Athens May + 15–16. + + + Washington, May 15, 1982, 2147Z + +

Tosec 70117/133560. For the Secretary + from Enders. Subject: Next Steps + on Falkland Islands.

+

1. Secret/Sensitive–Entire text.

+

2. Should Perez de Cuellar fail, you may wish to consider a contact group + effort to impose a solution as the next step: Under this concept, the + contact group would call on Argentina and Britain to accept a formula + consisting say of:

+

(A) Perez de Cuellar negotiation paragraph;

+

(B) Withdrawal paragraph from your April 27 proposal;Haig drew a + check mark in the right-hand margin next to this point. Reference is + to the proposals Haig took + to Buenos Aires. See Documents 179 and + 180.

+

(C) Negotiations explicitly to apply to three groups of Islands, but + withdrawal and interim administrator to only one;Haig wrote + “No!” in the right-hand margin next to this point.

+

(D) Interim administration paragraph clearly stating that administration + will be carried out in consultation withHaig inserted the + handwritten phrase “elected reps of” after this word. local + inhabitants but not restoring the councils;Haig placed brackets + around the phrase “but not restoring the councils.”

+ +

(E) Contact group would be responsible for the interim administration, + and could extend it beyond the deadline for negotiations if it thought + it necessary;

+

(F) Facilitation of contact [group] paragraph along the lines of your + April 27 proposal (i.e. establishment of the general principle, contact + group to make recommendations to the two parties);Haig drew a + check mark in the right-hand margin next to this point.

+

(G) Built in agreement by contact group members to verify and guarantee + the agreement, per your May 5 proposal through Belaunde.Haig drew a + check mark in the right-hand margin next to this point. See Document 232.

+

3. The contact group would be called together by the US and Brazil (maybe by Reagan and Figueiredo) and include France and + Germany, and Mexico and Peru. Peru is inflamed; but Belaunde is rational + and can be helpful. So is his Prime Minister, Ulloa, who would probably be the main + player. Mexico can be useful because it is emphatic in non-use of force, + supports the Argentine claim, and will want (at this late stage in the + Lopez-Portillo sexenio) to earn international recognition. Venezuela + would prove so intractable that it would probably render the contact + group ineffective. Note that the members would not be chosen according + to the wishes of the disputants.In the + right-hand margin next to this paragraph, Haig wrote: “Why Mexico + suddenly[?] Why not Brazil[?]”

+

4. On the assumption that Perez de Cuellar throws in the towel Tuesday + May 18, the contact group could be convened immediately—or only after + some significant military action. A Security Council meeting would + convene, in which Britain and the US + would veto a resolution calling for immediate cessation of hostilities. + The disadvantage of immediate convocation is that the group may lose its + credibility if it can’t stop the action forthwith. The advantage is that + it may be harder to convene later (if Britain hits the mainland),On May 15, the Department transmitted to + Haig a memorandum from + Enders, Scanlan, and Howe, through Eagleburger, which analyzed + options for a U.S. response if fighting in the South Atlantic + escalated, including British attacks on the mainland. + (Telegram/Tosec 70091/132520 to Haig in Ankara, May 15; Department of State, Under + Secretary of State for Political Affairs, Miscellaneous Files, March + 1981–February 1983, Lot 83D210, Falklands [Folder 1]) and + immediate convocation may help curtail pressures for a cease fire.

+

5. The leverage of the group would be essentially political, but it could + take the position that it would cease all assistance, including + sanctions, to the parties if the proposal were turned down.Haig wrote + “No!” in the right-hand margin next to this paragraph.

+ + Stoessel + +
+ +
+ + 268. Telegram From Secretary of State Haig to the Department of StateSource: Reagan Library, Executive + Secretariat, NSC Cable File, + Falkland File 05/18/1982. Secret; Sensitive; Immediate; Nodis. Sent from the Secretary’s + aircraft. Haig was then en + route from Luxembourg to Washington. Printed from a copy that was + received in the White House Situation Room. + + + May 18, 1982, + 1530Z + +

Secto 7104. Subject: Secretary’s + Bilateral With Italian FonMin Colombo, May 16.

+

1. (S–Entire text).

+

2. Summary: The Secretary’s May 16 bilateral with Italian Foreign + Minister Colombo focused + primarily on the Middle East and the Falklands. On the former, the + Secretary laid out U.S. views concerning three interrelated aspects of + the Middle East situation, including the Iran/Iraq conflict, Lebanon, + and the autonomy talks. Concerning the South Atlantic crisis, the + Secretary underscored the necessity of solid EC support for the UK at a + particularly critical juncture (which resulted in an urgent follow-up + demarche in Rome, personally recommended by Colombo). In addition, the two Ministers briefly + discussed START, NAC consultations, and credit restrictions. End + summary.

+

3. The Secretary met for an hour on the margins of the Luxembourg + Ministerial May 16 with Italian Foreign Minister Emilio Colombo. Accompanying the + Secretary on the U.S. side were U.S. NATO + PermRep W. Tapley Bennett and NSC Senior Staff Member James + R Rentschler. Joining Colombo on the Italian side were Foreign Ministry + Political Director Bottai and Italian NATO + PermRep Tornetta, plus an + interpreter. The following subjects were discussed.

+

[Omitted here is discussion of topics unrelated to the conflict in the + South Atlantic.]

+

6. Falklands. The Secretary stressed that the situation in the South + Atlantic had reached a very critical point where it was essential for + Britain’s allies to support her. The situation was increasingly + dangerous, not because Britain had failed to make concessions but + because of Argentine intransigence. The Argentines had softened their + rigidity on only one point, the question of sovereignty, but they had + then compensated for that by insisting on de facto arrangements on the + Islands during the interim period of administration which would ensure + the same outcome.

+ +

7. Colombo responded that he had + received the Secretary’s letter on this subjectSee Document 238. + and had carefully read and understood it. He said that he recognized the + importance of what the Secretary was saying but that in present + circumstances he was not permitted to join an EC consensus favoring renewal of economic sanctions. This + fact was very disagreeable for him, but if he said yes, there would be a + major political crisis in Italy. It is the military escalation in the + South Atlantic which has caused great problems in his country from + psychological point of view; the reactions of the Argentine population + to the sinking of the Belgrano had had a major impact on Italian public + opinion, given the fact that millions of Argentines were of Italian + origin and that many of these even held dual citizenship. Colombo added that the issues were very + clear in his mind and that the points which the Secretary had made about + the need to support the UK were correct + but that unfortunately irrational situations sometimes prevailed in + [garble—one’s] country, and the present situation was one of them.

+

8. The Secretary noted that he was sensitive to Italian concerns and + understood them; the U.S. itself has great difficulties with the present + situation albeit for different reasons. The great tragedy, however, is + the fact that such a position will only lead to more bloodshed, with the + loss of many young men on both sides. Our major concern at the moment is + that a breaking of EC ranks with the + UK will gravely diminish the + influence of more moderate forces in Argentine society which are + beginning to favor a negotiated solution; at the same time, it will + strengthen the extremist elements—the Peronistas and the Navy—who will + be emboldened by the perception of Allied disunity and become even more + intransigent, thereby increasing the likelihood of military escalation. + We hope the Secretary General will succeed in his efforts in New York, + and we are prepared to do everything we can to help; but unless these + efforts achieve some agreement this week, the chances for avoiding more + violence look bleak.

+

[Omitted here is discussion of topics unrelated to the conflict in the + South Atlantic.]

+

12. Falklands footnote. Shortly following the bilateral, Colombo phoned Rentschler and asked him to convey an + urgent recommendation to the Secretary which he did not want his own + people to know. In the interests of generating changed instructions for + Colombo to use during EC deliberations on sanctions renewal, it + would, he asserted, be useful for the Secretary to instruct Ambassador + Rabb to seek an urgent + appointment with Prime Minister Spadolini and the secretaries of the + coalition parties and make the same points to them concerning the South Atlantic crisis which + the Secretary had made to Colombo + himself, placing particular emphasis on the effect which the perception + of Allied disunity would have on extremist forces in Argentina (on the + basis of this message the Secretary approved Secto 7058).Sent to Rome, May + 15. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, N820005–0001) + In telegram 11692 from Rome, May 17, Rabb reported on his meeting that morning with + Andreotti at which the + former Prime Minister stated he “would attempt to maintain Christian + Democratic support for sanction renewal, and elicit Socialist leader + Craxi’s acquiescence.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy + File, N820005–0002)

+ + Haig + +
+ +
+ 269. Message From the Embassy in Luxembourg to the White HouseSource: Reagan Library, + Executive Secretariat, NSC Cable + File, Falkland File 05/17/1982. Secret; Sensitive, Immediate. Sent + via privacy channels. + + + Luxembourg, May 17, 1982, 1330Z + +

32. Fm Jim Rentschler. To the + White House, for Judge Clark, + Immediate. Si [Situation] Room please pass copies to Dennis Blair and Roger Fontaine. SUBJECT: I pass along, + quick and dirty, the following lights (high and low), dictated in + decreasing order of priority:

+

Falklands. Despite some opening-ceremony pep talk earlier this morning by + the Ministerial’s Luxembourg hosts, the mood here is somber and + dominated by the South Atlantic issue. Though NATO is the nominal headliner, most eyes are on the + following EC meeting scheduled later + today and the uncertain status of the sanctions renewal. Leaving Ireland + aside, the key to continued support for the UK may hinge on Italy. During last night’s bilateral,See Document + 268. + Colombo told the Secretary he + simply could not join a pro-sanctions consensus without bringing down + the Spadolini government. Al told him that a break in EC ranks now would have the certain effect + of emboldening extremist elements in Argentina (Peronistas and Navy), + hardening their intransigence, and drastically increasing the likelihood + of military escalation. A sobered Colombo called me shortly after the meeting and asked me + to convey an urgent message to + Haig which he wished to keep + secret from his own people, namely, that a change in his EC instructions might be possible if + Max Rabb were to weigh in + immediately with Spadolini and the secretaries of the coalition parties + and make the same points which Haig had made to Colombo himself (this resulted in the Rome demarche you + may have seen last evening—it’s a long shot, but it could help).See footnote 3, + Document 268. A few other Falkland-related items of + direct concern to us:

+

—Al’s talks with Pym last night + were one on one,No memorandum of + conversation of Haig’s May + 16 meeting with Pym in + Luxembourg has been found. Telegram Secto 7063, May 17, transmitted to the Department and + USICA a transcript of the + public statement made by the two men to the press following their + meeting. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, + D820257–1013) but the Secretary said he was going to phone + you and provide you with a complete fill-in. No one in our del here has + the complete story except the Secretary himself, but two nuggets did + filter down: 1) the Brits are reportedly incensed at what they see as + less than wholehearted U.S. support for their position; and 2) the + negotiating process still has some time, but not much (one hears a great + deal of talk around the other delegations and in the press about May 19 + being South Atlantic D-Day).

+

—An old friend of mine in Pym’s + party told me he had seen a transcript of the President’s last phone + call to Mrs. Thatcher,See Document + 257. which he termed “terrifying”; since this + characterization is greatly at variance with both the tone and contents + as reported to me (via Haig) + from Washington late last week, is it possible for me to see the text on + a close-hold basis? Or are British sensitivities simply verging on the + neurotic?

+

—Thanks to some indiscreet glomming of Stadis traffic, I have learned that Tom Enders and his ARA people are pushing Haig to adopt a kind of contact group + approach to the crisis emphasizing much heavier pressure on the UK than on Argentina.See Document 267. + I think this is a calamitous idea, guaranteed to give us the very worst + of both worlds. God knows, the wicket we have with the Brits right now + is sticky enough, but if this hare-brained lucubration were ever leaked + (let alone acted upon), we could kiss a successful Presidential visit to + London next month goodby. And that’s just for starters.

+

[Omitted here is discussion of issues unrelated to the conflict in the + South Atlantic.]

+

Warm regards, Jim

+
+ +
+ + 270. Memorandum From Roger W. + Fontaine and Dennis C. + Blair of the National Security Council Staff to the + President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Clark)Source: Reagan Library, Roger W. Fontaine Files, Subject File, Argentina + (May 1982). Secret. In a May 20 memorandum to Clark, Rentschler “reluctantly” took + issue with points raised by Fontaine and Blair and outlined his objections to their + characterization of the Rome démarche, of Argentina’s perceived + flexibility, of Italian actions regarding the EC sanctions, and of the extent to + which Reagan could go to + further encourage flexibility on both sides. (Reagan Library, + Executive Secretariat, NSC Country + File, Latin America/Central, Argentina + (05/05/1982–05/20/1982)) + + + Washington, May 17, + 1982 + + + SUBJECT + Pressure on the Argentines + +

The overriding objective of the United States in regard to the crisis in + the South Atlantic remains the peaceful resolution of the dispute + without at the same time alienating either our principal ally Great + Britain or our good friend and for the first time, cooperative ally in + Central America, Argentina.

+

In recent days we have taken steps that are throwing us off course. + First, we sent our Ambassador to Italy around to the parties in the + government coalition to urge them to support a continuation of EC economic sanctions against Argentina. We + argued that the ending of the sanctions would encourage the extremists + and undercut the moderates in Argentina. The Italian politicians told us + they would not change their position, and told the press that we had + strong-armed them. So we ended up with the worst of both worlds: the + Italians fell off their sanctions, and everyone knows the Americans + asked them not to.Italy took this step at a + May 17 meeting of EC Foreign + Ministers to discuss the renewal of economic sanctions against + Argentina. According to telegram 739 from Luxembourg, May 18, the + Italian and Irish representatives at the meeting had “agreed to + avoid ‘distortions of trade’ which they and most others interpret to + mean that Italy and Ireland may resume imports from Argentina, but + not for cross-trade purposes.” (Department of State, Central Foreign + Policy File, D820258–0902) The EC, + except Ireland and Italy, renewed the sanctions for another + week.

+

We doubt that the unanimous application of EC sanctions would have the desired effect within + Argentina—they have so far not had any noticeable effect in encouraging + moderates and discouraging extremists. But more importantly, the + Argentinians will feel that, in carrying water for Britain in the EC (of which we are not even a member), we + have gone beyond appropriate support for any ally. Our action will be + seen as a further act of betrayal and will help harden not soften + Argentine attitudes. It will make an even rapprochement with Buenos Aires by us all the more + difficult if not impossible. Britain is expected to do this kind of + thing—not us. Thus the matter of continuing EC sanctions should be a matter of the members only.

+

Second, the President’s May 13 press conference statement that heretofore + only one party has proven intransigentAs + part of his response to a question about the progress toward a + negotiated South Atlantic peace settlement asked at his May 13 press + conference, Reagan stated: + “Up until now the intransigence had been on one side, and that is in + wanting a guarantee of sovereignty before the negotiations took + place, which doesn’t make much sense. I understand that there’s been + some agreement now on, awaiting negotiations on that. So, we’ll + continue to hope and pray.” (Public Papers: + Reagan, 1982, Book I, p. 620) has greatly + irritated the Argentine government, which—rightly or wrongly—feels it + has shown recently a certain amount of flexibility. We believe it is + important that the Argentines be encouraged by a more positive statement + in the near future. We do not believe a “correction of the record” is in + order—only an amplification. Such a statement from the President would + be as follows: “The South Atlantic situation remains very dangerous. We + all have a great deal to lose. In the last few days, both sides have + shown flexibility, but both sides need to do more if we are to avert + war.”

+

Unless we begin to provide more in the way of incentives for the + Argentines we will make them more inflexible and make more difficult the + improvement of bilateral relations when this issue is resolved.

+

RECOMMENDATION:Clark neither approved + nor disapproved either recommendation.

+

1) Cease any further attempts to persuade the EC on the sanctions question—for or against.

+

2) Amplify the President’s remarks on the South Atlantic question by + encouraging further flexibility on both sides.

+
+ +
+ + 271. Telegram From Secretary of State Haig to the Department of StateSource: Library of Congress, + Manuscript Division, Haig + Papers, Department of State, Day File, May 17, 1982. Secret; Alpha; + Flash; Nodis. Drafted by + Gompert; approved by + McManaway. Haig initialed the first page of + the telegram. + + + Luxembourg, May 17, 1982, 2154Z + +

Secto 7068. Eyes only for Bremer from the Secretary. Subject: + Message for the President.

+

1. Please have the following message hand delivered eyes only to the + President.

+

2. British Foreign Secretary Pym + has just shown me the UK negotiating + position approved today by Mrs. Thatcher’s War Cabinet. It is to be delivered to the + UN Secretary General tonight as a + final UK position which the Argentines + have forty-eight hours to accept or not.A + British copy of their May 17 position is published on the Thatcher Foundation + website.

+

3. The British have made a serious effort. But the position is less + forthcoming than the proposal we put to the two sides at the end of + April. In that the Argentines rejected that earlier US proposal, the British must realize that + their current position is unlikely to be accepted. My own assessment is + that the Argentines will not accept this, unless there has been a + substantial change in the political mood within the Junta as a result of + recent hostilities and the imminence of a British landing on the + Islands. I find it hard to believe that such a change has occurred.

+

4. The forty-eight hour deadline may well coincide with a British landing + on the Falklands. The British probably think that they can mop up a + demoralized Argentine garrison if they can execute a successful landing + though they must be acutely worried about the Argentine subs and + mainland-based air power. Pym did + assure me that London is not now contemplating strikes against the + mainland.

+

5. There is of course the possibility that the Argentines will respond + with relatively modest changes to the British text, which could give + Mrs. Thatcher pause before + ordering a landing. While London has anticipated this possibility by + stressing that this is the final UK + position, they may behave differently if the Argentines come a long way. + However, I doubt that the Argentines will come far enough to avert a + British assault. Odds are that the battle for the Falklands will begin + as early as this Wednesday or Thursday.May + 19 or 20.

+ +

6. We have begun our own contingency planning. We will want to consider a + new initiative—though not necessarily a US initiative—in the event that the Secretary General ends + his own effort when the forty-eight hours expires. In the meantime, any + hint that we might make a move once the UN effort collapses would create a crisis between us and + the British, by dooming their own proposal and by compounding the + political problems Mrs. Thatcher + will face if the British go ahead with their landing. Indeed, we will + have to think through carefully whether we should move at all should the + Secretary General give up his effort.

+

7. The British are as resolute as ever. Mrs. Thatcher is acting on the basis of military confidence, + domestic political support, and most of all an unshakeable commitment to + the principle at stake. They are counting on us—and perhaps only us—for + support.

+ + Haig + +
+ +
+ 272. Memorandum of Telephone ConversationSource: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, + S/S Special Handling + Restrictions Memos 1979–1983, Lot 96D262, ES Sensitive May 6–18 1982. Confidential; Limdis. Drafted by Middendorf. Copies were sent to + Haig, Stoessel, Eagleburger, Clark, Enders, Briggs, Bosworth, Service, Kirkpatrick, and Walters. + + + Washington, May 18, + 1982 + + + PARTICIPANTS + Esteban Takacs, Argentine + Ambassador to the U.S. + J. William Middendorf, II + U.S. Ambassador to the OAS + + + SUBJECT + South Atlantic Crisis + +

During our talk, Ambassador Takacs made the following points:

+

UNSYG Position: + Perez de Cuellar spoke to Ros + late May 17, after his meeting with Ambassador Parsons. The SYG was pessimistic about the prospects for his effort + because Parsons had brought back + only small concessions from London, and at this moment, the sides are + too far apart. Perez de Cuellar has decided to shorten his effort with a + view to making a decision on Wednesday, May 19, as to whether he can produce a position workable + for both parties as a basis for negotiations or must announce he has + failed to do so.

+

If the SYG decides he can proceed, + Takacs envisages his + proposing a formula bridging the positions sufficiently to form the + basis for a cease-fire to take effect next weekend; followed immediately + by a phased withdrawal and subsequently by negotiations. This, in + effect, would implement UNSC Res. + 502.

+

Issues in Cease-Fire Negotiations:

+

Sovereignty—Takacs wanted me to understand that both Perez de + Cuellar and the UK say that the + Argentine de-linking of the sovereignty issue has been accomplished and + that this issue is not a problem.

+

Withdrawal—Simultaneity has not been agreed. The + UK wants Argentine forces withdrawn + first. Nevertheless, he urged me to believe that agreement on + arrangements for withdrawal of forces will not represent a problem and + should be settled by the SYG’s May 19 + deadline.

+

Interim Administration—The main problem in the + negotiations now is UK insistence that + the islanders be represented through the councils as separate units. He + said for Argentina to accept the British position would negate seventeen + years of negotiations. The rights of the islanders constitute an issue + to be settled in the subsequent negotiations—not as a precondition to + the negotiations. To my query as to why Argentina could not demonstrate + integrity on this issue by offering to include the islanders in the + Argentine administrative element, Takacs said he assumed there would be no Argentine + objection.

+

Despite what he had said about the UK + position on representation of the islanders, Takacs insisted that none of the + remaining issues—especially that of the interim administration—presents + major difficulties. (In what I took to be a rather rueful second look at + a missed opportunity, Takacs + remarked that it had even been suggested by Costa Mendez that Secretary Haig’s trilateral (Argentina/US/UK) formula for the + interim administration, made on his first visit to Buenos Aires, was not + a bad formula.)

+

I said I assumed Argentina would not attempt a Sudetenland solution during the interim administration and + would therefore not seek to change the national composition of the + island population. Takacs + agreed.

+

Scope of Negotiations—Takacs noted the lack of agreement on whether the South + Georgia and Sandwich Islands are to be included. He argued that British + documents have lumped these islands in the UK jurisdictional claim to the Malvinas Islands. He + speculated that perhaps the timing for the transfer of these islands + could be worked out in the course of the negotiations to come. In any + case, he said, the Malvinas Islands are the real issue.

+ +

Argentina-U.S.: + Takacs asserted that the + Argentines are far more sensitive to what President Reagan says than to what Prime + Minister Thatcher says. + Argentina had no real difficulty with President Reagan’s remarks last week, that one + side “had (once) been” + intransigent.See footnote 3, Document 270. This was an effort to + improve the situation. But the Argentine press misquoted the President + to say “is (now) intransigent.” As a result, the + Argentines feel they are getting a “bum rap” from us. They feel they + have shown flexibility over the past week, while not getting credit for + it, at a time when the British have done all their negotiating ad referendum and did not answer Perez de Cuellar + from Wednesday, May 12 to Monday, May 17, and, in the meantime, have + attacked the islands and merchant ships.

+

Walters + Visit: + Takacs appraised the Walters visitSee Documents 253 and + 254. as “very successful.” He + said it had been very timely because it helped cool down public opinion + and prevented Argentine over-reaction to the misinterpretation of + President Reagan’s remarks. + Public opinion “took the Walters + visit to mean the U.S. sent a message.”

+

Definitive Negotiations (Following Cease-Fire): + Takacs surmised that the + long-term negotiations could well be something like a continuation of + the Perez de Cuellar effort and totally separate from the elements of + the interim administration. However, he was unsure of the mechanics of + the negotiations. As a practical matter, he anticipated that they could + go on for as much as a year or two.

+

Public Relations: + Takacs said he would receive a + last-minute briefing this morning from Ros and then do a tape for BBC. He also visited Senator + Laxalt on Thursday.May 13.

+

Comment: If we learn that Perez de Cuellar is + about to abandon his effort, with all that implies for military + escalation and risks/costs for us, I wonder if it would not be greatly + to our advantage to make one more desperate effort to induce both sides + to be more flexible.

+

As an additional fallback, it would seem desirable to have another + negotiating vehicle ready to be activated in the event the Perez de + Cuellar effort collapses.

+
+ +
+ + 273. Memorandum From Acting Secretary of State Stoessel to President ReaganSource: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, + Very Sensitive Correspondence Files of + Alexander M. Haig, Jr., 1981–1982, Lot 83D288, + Evening Reading—May 1982. Secret; Sensitive. + + + Washington, May 18, + 1982 + +

1. British Ambassador’s Assessment on Falklands. I + had a long talk with UK Ambassador + Henderson today. He expects + the Argentinians will not accept the latest UK proposals, but will come back tomorrow with suggested + changes. Henderson anticipates + that these in turn will be unacceptable to the British and that the + UN Secretary General will thereupon + declare his mediation mission at an end. Henderson intimated that a major UK assault on the main island would ensue on the heels of + the SYG’s declaration; he predicted + with confidence that the operation would be successful and that the + battle—while possibly involving high casualties on both sides—would be + over “sooner rather than later.” Henderson thought that when the assault takes place + there will be pressure in the UN + Security Council for a simple ceasefire without withdrawal (which would + be unacceptable to the UK) and that—in + his “personal view”—the time would then be appropriate for the US again to come forward as the only power + capable of bringing about a settlement.

+

[Omitted here is material unrelated to the conflict in the South + Atlantic.]

+
+ +
+ + 274. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department + of State and the White HouseSource: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Cable File, Falkland File + 05/19/1982. Secret; Sensitive; Flash; Nodis. Printed from a copy that was received in the + White House Situation Room. + + + New York, May 19, 1982, 1629Z + +

1384. For Secretary of State Haig + and NSC Director Clark

+

1. Entire text Secret.

+

2. I met last night with my Argentine opposite number, Amb to the UN + Eduardo Roca. He was accompanied + by Ros and Bunge to review the current situation + of the negotiations. Jose + Sorzano was also present.

+

3. Ros provided a copy of the + Argentine responseSee Document 275. which I had already read from our + sources.

+

4. I attempted without success to persuade them that the British proposal + is not so bad; that Argentina could, if she chose, accept it and declare + she had won by the establishment of a UN + authority responsible for the government. (Both Bunge and Ricardo Zinn had been persuaded of this during the + afternoon, and also of the feasibility of “selling” this position to + Argentine public opinion. Zinn + returned last night to Buenos Aires to attempt to persuade key members + of the Junta.) Bunge reported + that Ros said later that he + understood I was a friend of Argentina but nonetheless I “sounded like + Haig.”

+

5. This morning I spoke with SYG Perez + de Cuellar. He described the Argentine response as “terrible” for this + stage of the negotiations, and the British proposal as rigid but + fundamentally “not so bad,” saying the Argentines must accept the fact + that however justified their position may be, juridically they were + wrong. They should also accept the fact that they have won by securing a + UN authority.

+

6. He said Ros is looking forward + to a Security Council meeting; that Costa + Mendez (whom he characterized as “a man almost wholly + without influence”) will speak; that they are not too bothered by a + veto; that they will get a special session of the General Assembly and + perhaps win 75 votes—but what difference will it make?

+

7. He said he would present some proposals to the Argentines this morning + and if they “can live with them” he will ask the British for 24 hours + more. He will give me a copy after he has presented them. I will pass + them to you and to Bunge who will + carry them to Buenos Aires to + the Commander in Chief of the Air Force with whom he is in continuous + contact (I have learned).

+

8. Bunge believes Galtieri, Lami Dozo, even Anaya want a peaceful settlement, and that certain + officers at the level below do not. He thinks his personal safety may be + in some danger when he returns because “if they can pick up six foreign + journalists they can dispose of me entirely.” He sees Masera as the head + of this faction. He proposes to leave a sealed statement with me that I + can release in case he disappears at the hands of those who regard it as + treason to look for a settlement.

+

9. Bunge is a key figure in the + “pro-U.S.” foreign policy group. He believes, as Zinn believes, that some of this group + are ready to deal with the Cubans. Now, he says, the Foreign Office is + an obstacle. But Bunge and + Zinn are in direct touch with + the Commanders in Chief of the Junta, whom they believe may desire to + settle.

+

10. Rumors continue to circulate broadly here that the British will + attack the Argentine mainland. Perez de Cuellar said he told British + Ambassador Parsons that + “everyone” would strongly condemn the British for this. He said + Parsons assured him this + would not happen.

+

11. Bunge reported this morning + that Lami Dozo and colleagues + are awaiting eagerly the SYG’s + proposal.

+

12. I emphasized my view that Britain was serious: she would make war, + and that time had run out. Ros + said he agreed and estimated they were no more than 24 hours from a + British invasion.

+

Comment: If the British attack the Argentinian mainland, Argentinians and + Latin Americans will assume that such an attack had American support and + that the U.S. had prior knowledge. Argentina will break diplomatic + relations with the U.S. Three sets of consequences will probably + follow:

+

(A) Probable overthrow of pro-U.S. government by leftist, nationalist, + violently anti-U.S. government. Cuban/Soviet supplying of arms and + associated advisors.

+

(B) Hemispheric consequences. Continent-wide orgiastic anti-U.S. + demonstrations. Anti-U.S. policies and positions adopted throughout + Hemisphere. Real possibility of Peru, Venezuela and others to be drawn + into war sphere with hemispheric consequences.

+

(C) Destruction of inter-American system and Rio Treaty with obvious + consequences for our Central American and hemispheric strategic + position.

+

Therefore, British attack on Argentina mainland will have far more severe + consequences than an invasion of the Falkland Islands and should be seen + as an extremely high-cost operation.

+

P.S.: Argentines assert that U.S. refueling of British bombers will be + tantamount to U.S. bombing of Argentina.

+ + Kirkpatrick + +
+ +
+ + 275. Letter From the British Ambassador (Henderson) to Secretary of State HaigSource: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, + S/S Special Handling + Restrictions Memos 1979–1983, Lot 96D262, ES Sensitive May 19–24 1982. UK Secret and Personal. A notation in an unknown hand + at the bottom of the letter reads: “Rec’d in ‘S’ 5/19/82 5:05 + p.m.” + + + Washington, May 19, + 1982 + Dear Al,Henderson added this + salutation by hand. + +

I have just received from New York and am letting you have in strict + confidence the enclosed unofficial translation of the Argentine paper + handed to us by the UN + Secretary-General’s staff this morning.

+

As you will see, the Argentine paper falls well short of the proposals we + asked the Secretary General to convey to the Argentinians on 17 May. In + particular it contains no language on the question of not pre-judging + sovereignty or the outcome of negotiations. It insists on the inclusion + of the dependencies in an interim agreement. So far as the interim + administration is concerned, there is no reference to the traditional + representative institutions of the islanders, but a proposal that the + UN Administrator might appoint as + advisers equal numbers of Argentine and British residents on the + islands, despite the fact that the former number no more than 30 in a + population of 1800. The proposals would also render it possible for the + Argentine authorities to flood the islands with Argentinian residents + during the interim period. In short, the Argentines have reverted to the + negotiating position they adopted at the beginning of the UN Secretary General’s initiative.

+

As usual I am available for discussions whenever you want.

+

Nicholas + HendersonHenderson wrote “Yours ever, + Nicho” above his typed signature.

+ +

Attachment

+

Unofficial Translation Prepared in the United Nations + SecretariatUK Secret.

+

Undated

+

TEXT OF THE UN + SECRETARIAT’S UNOFFICIAL TRANSLATION OF THE ARGENTINE PAPER PASSED TO + THE UN SECRETARY GENERAL ON 18 MAY

+

The Government of the Argentine Republic and the Government of the United + Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, hereinafter referred to + as “the parties”,

+

In response to the provisions of Security Council Resolution 502 (1982) + of 3 April 1982, and taking into account the Charter of the United + Nations, Resolution 1514 (XV), 2065 (XX) and other Resolutions of the + General Assembly on the question of the Malvinas (Falkland) Islands, + have accepted, in accordance with Article 40 of the Charter of the + United Nations, the assistance of the Secretary-General of the United + Nations and have engaged in negotiations and arrived at the following + provisional agreement relating to the Malvinas, South Georgia and South + Sandwich Islands, hereinafter referred to as “the Islands” for the + purposes of this agreement.

+

I.1. The geographical scope of the area within which the withdrawal of + troops is to be carried out shall comprise the Malvinas, South Georgia + and South Sandwich Islands.

+

I.2. The withdrawal of the forces of both parties shall be gradual and + simultaneous. Within a maximum period of thirty days, all armed forces + shall be in their normal bases and areas of operation.

+

II. With effect from the signature of this agreement, each party shall + cease to apply the economic measures which it has adopted against the + other and the United Kingdom shall call for the same action by those + countries or groups of countries which, at its request, adopted similar + measures.

+

III.1. Supervision of the withdrawal of the forces of both countries + shall be carried out by specialized personnel of the United Nations, + whose composition shall be agreed with the parties.

+ +

III.2. The interim administration of the Islands while the negotiations + for final settlement of the dispute are in progress shall conform to the + following provisions:

+

(a) the administration shall be exclusively the responsibility of the + United Nations with an appropriate presence of observers of the + parties.

+

(b) The said administration shall perform all functions (executive, + legislative, judicial and security) through officials of different + nationality from that of the parties.

+

(c) Notwithstanding the provisions of 2(a) and (b), and in order not to + cause unnecessary changes in the way of life of the population during + the period of the interim administration by the United Nations, local + judicial functions may be exercised in accordance with the legislation + in force on 1 April 1982 to the full extent compatible with this + agreement.

+

Similarly, the United Nations interim administration may appoint as + advisers persons who are members of the population of British origin and + Argentines resident in the Islands, in equal numbers.

+

(d) The flags of the parties shall fly together with that of the United + Nations.

+

(e) During the period of interim administration, communications shall be + kept open, without discriminatory restrictions of any kind for the + parties, including freedom of movement and equality of access with + respect to residence, work and property.

+

(f) Freedom of communication shall also include the maintenance of + freedom of transit for the state airline (LADE) and for merchant ships and scientific vessels: in + addition, telephone, telegraph and telex communications, Argentine + television transmissions and the state petroleum (YPF) and gas services shall continue to + operate freely.

+

IV. The customs, traditions and way of life of the inhabitants of the + Islands, and their social and cultural links with their countries of + origin, shall be respected and safeguarded.

+

V.1. The parties undertake to enter immediately into negotiations in good + faith under the auspices of the Secretary-General of the United Nations + for the peaceful and final settlement of the dispute and, with a sense + of urgency, to complete these negotiations by 31 December 1982, with a + single option to extend until 30 June 1983, in order to comply with the + Charter of the United Nations, Resolutions 1514 (XV), 2065 (XX) and + other relevant Resolutions of the General Assembly on the question of + the Malvinas Islands. These negotiations shall be initiated without + prejudice to the rights and claims or positions of the two parties and + in recognition of the fact that they have divergent positions on the + question of the Malvinas, South Georgia and South Sandwich Islands.

+ +

V.2. The negotiations shall be held in New York.

+

V.3. The Secretary-General of the United Nations may be assisted in the + negotiations by a contact group composed of representatives of four + states members of the United Nations.

+

To that end, each party shall nominate two states and shall have the + right to a single veto of one of the states nominated by the other.

+

V.4. The Secretary-General of the United Nations shall keep the Security + Council assiduously informed of the progress of the negotiations.

+

VI. If the period specified in point V (1) above expires without the + attainment of a final agreement, the Secretary-General shall draw up a + report addressed to the General Assembly of the United Nations, in order + that the latter may determine, as appropriate and with the greatest + urgency, the lines to which the said final agreement should conform in + order to achieve a speedy settlement of the question.

+
+ +
+ + 276. Paper Prepared by the National Security Council StaffSource: Reagan Library, Latin + American Affairs Directorate Files, NSC, Falkland/Malvinas: NSC & State Memos, 1982. Secret. Rentschler, Blair, and Fontaine sent the paper to + McFarlane under a May 19 + covering memorandum that reads: “Attached as you requested are our + collective judgments concerning the issues you have raised vis-à-vis + the South Atlantic crisis, cast in the form of a contingency paper.” + A stamped notation at the top of the covering memorandum indicates + that Clark saw it. McFarlane requested the paper in a + May 19 note to Rentschler + and Fontaine. (Reagan + Library, Dennis C. Blair + Files, Country File, United Kingdom 1982 + (05/01/1982–07/31/1982)) + + + Washington, undated + +

THE SOUTH ATLANTIC CRISIS: IMMINENT + EVENTS AND U.S. CONTINGENCIES

+

In the event that the British attack the Falklands in force within the + very near term, and accepting as given 1) a militarily indecisive + performance, with the possibility of drawn-out conflict;In a May 19 memorandum to Howe, which discussed the possible + outcomes of a British assault on the Falklands/Malvinas, Tom Miller + (PM/P) wrote: “The crux of the + subject is, we cannot predict a British victory in + an assault on the Falklands, and the consequences of their + attempt with accompanying failure would be dire; given the + geography, and British assets, they will get one chance, and if that + fails, then would come managing extrication, salvaging what can be + salvaged, and some hard decisions by all concerned.” (Department of + State, Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs, Falklands Crisis + Historical Files, Lot 86D157, unlabelled folder) 2) + disruption of Pérez de + Cuéllar’s UN track; 3) no + British move against the Argentine mainland; and, most important, 4) the + fact that our major objective will best be served by the earliest + possible British success, coupled with the least possible damage to + Hemispheric interests, the following judgments assume critical + relevance:

+

Military Factors

+

—We cannot diminish or interrupt—indeed, we should redouble—our current + efforts in support of the Brits involving logistics, intelligence, and + communications activity.

+

—We should continue to avoid any direct combat participation and ensure + that this fact is publicized.

+

UN Track

+

—Pérez de Cuéllar’s effort will + collapse by the force of events, and become pretty much of a dead-letter + (though for public consumption we should continue our line that we hope + the SYG will remain involved and that + we stand ready to help—see Public Affairs/Psychological Factors + below).

+ +

—Should, as is likely, the issue be remanded to the Security Council, we + should work closely with the UK and + follow their lead (including a veto, if any adverse resolution is + pushed), maintaining UNSC 502 as our bottom-line;

+

—With or without activity in the Security Council, movement toward the + UNGA is likely, where Argentina + can probably count on considerable G–77 + support; in this case, we should work for a Western consensus but not be + overly concerned at a negative vote (Pérez + de Cuéllar himself has dismissed the meaningfulness of + any activity in that forum).

+

Diplomatic Factors

+

—We should recognize that, in all probability, only the U.S. has the will + and the capacity to promote a settlement once the + Brits have secured themselves on the islands. The question of + timing will be all important in that effort + (attempts to resuscitate a direct U.S. mediatory role will prove + counter-productive before and immediately after sizeable landings; chances for success will + then improve if and when the Brits have demonstrated a creditable + capacity to lodge themselves in strength).

+

—Much of our critical diplomacy, at least so far as the Brits are + concerned, will probably have to be conducted at the Presidential level + (via phone and letter); Dick + Walters or Jeane + Kirkpatrick (or both) may be the best interlocutors + vis-à-vis Galtieri (Judge + Clark himself or you should + also be considered in that capacity).

+

U.S.-U.K. Bilateral Factors

+

—Assuming the Brits land and lodge themselves in strength, it will be + essential to convey a number of clear signals to them at the highest + level:

+

—We have fully supported you; we will continue to do so over the near-term;

+

—We are partners in the enterprise you have undertaken in support of a + basic principle—even to the extent of jeopardizing our own significant + strategic interests and the safety of our citizens—and this basic fact + gives us the right to provide friendly counsel on (and help influence) + the course of events;

+

—We simply do not believe that you have the capability to sustain an + indefinite sway over the Falklands, either militarily or politically, + and you should know that we are not prepared to + support you in any such project;

+

—There must be, in other words—and in the not too distant future once the + dust from the initial military operations settles—a negotiated solution.

+

—An explicit U.S.-U.K. understanding is therefore required concerning + your middle- and long-term intentions, recognizing that the U.S. continues to support compliance + with UNSC 502 and will simply not provide either blank-check (money) or + open-ended (time) assistance on behalf of UK operations in the South Atlantic.

+

—Likely requests for escalating military assistance should be on a + case-by-case basis and explicitly linked to the quality of the U.K. + commitment to a post-invasion negotiated solution.

+

Public Affairs/Psychological Factors

+

—Congressional briefings—a sound idea—should stress our adherence to + UNSC 502, the major efforts we and + others went to in order to turn around Argentine intransigence (which + recently has begun to soften, at least slightly), the good-faith + attempts Britain made to bridge the gap, and the fact that while this + has been an agonizing and very difficult area of decision for us, we + have determined that our strategic interests in the traditional + North Atlantic/East-West + context outweigh considerations in the Hemisphere (though we will + actively pursue damage-control activity in that area). In addition, we + should emphasize—probably in executive session—that our support for the + UK is not + open-ended and is tied to the commitments we will elicit from Great + Britain for credible post-hostilities exertions directed toward a + negotiated solution.

+

—We should harp on UNSC 502 as often + and as insistently as we can as the only viable basis for a settlement, + emphasizing the prior use of force to which Argentina resorted;

+

—We should reiterate support for the relevance of the Secretary-General’s + role and our readiness to help in any way the parties might consider + helpful;

+

—We should consult regularly with our Allies and impress upon them the + line Haig used in + Luxembourg,At a May 16 press conference + in Luxembourg after his meeting with Pym (see footnote 4, Document + 269), Haig said + that “the U.S. stands ready at any moment to make any contribution + that it can make to bring about a political solution in accordance + with the United Nations resolution.” (Steven Rattner, “Common Market + Delays Vote To Retain Argentine Boycott,” New York + Times, May 17, p. A1) the necessity for a perception + of solid Western backing for the UK.

+

—In background briefings and public Presidential statements we should + continue to push for the earliest possible negotiated solution (again + citing UNSC 502 as the base-line point + of departure).

+

Summary Conclusions

+

—There is little or nothing we can do in a + pre-invasion period apart from what we are already now + doing;

+ +

—Our maximum leverage with the Brits (and possibly also with the + Argentines, though this is less sure) will come after + UK troops have landed in + strength, and we should not hesitate to push that leverage as + forcefully as possible;

+

—The U.S. will have to take the direct lead in any post-landing + diplomatic effort.

+

—We should be ready for a worst-case outcome—ignominious Iran rescue-raid + type failure—and help the Brits in any Dunkirk-like withdrawal (and not + hesitate to push for that if things turn really catastrophic).

+
+ +
+ 277. Memorandum From the Special Assistant for Warning (Cochrane) to the Chairman of the + National Intelligence Council (Rowen)Source: + Central Intelligence Agency, National Intelligence Council, Job + 83T00966R: Chronological Files (1982), Box 1, Folder 4: C/NIC + Chronological. Secret; [handling restriction not + declassified]. + + + DDI #4242–81 + + + Washington, May 20, + 1982 + + + SUBJECT + Military Showdown in the Falklands: Alternative Outcomes + +

1. With the failure of Secretary General Perez de Cuellar’s mediation + effortsPérez de Cuéllar informed the Security Council + President the evening of May 20 of the failure of his negotiation + efforts. For a summary of his efforts between April 19 and May 20, + see Yearbook of the United Nations, 1982, pp. + 1328–1329. and with both Britain and Argentina placing the + blame for the impasse on each other, the Falklands crisis will be + settled by a test of military strength, skill and resourcefulness and by + a potentially more decisive trial of political stamina in London and + Buenos Aires. There are so many variables in the balance of assets and + liabilities—ranging from unexpected changes in weather and sea + conditions to the indeterminate location of two Argentine attack + submarines—that the outcome could be determined as much by the random + play of Murphy’s Law as by the measurable military capabilities and + political competence of the two sides.

+ +

2. Another possibly decisive but unpredictable determinant may be the + perceptions and psychological predispositions of the Thatcher government and the Argentine + junta. [7 lines not declassified]

+

3. Both governments have locked themselves into positions that cannot be + compromised without fatal domestic consequences. Thatcher’s original calculation that + “diplomatic efforts are more likely to succeed if backed by military + strength” has been refuted by the junta’s performance during the past + eight weeks. The junta’s gamble that the U.S. or the United Nations + would somehow broker a compromise that would preserve at least a + reasonable prospect of vindicating Argentina’s claim to sovereignty over + the islands has backfired. Now + that their mutual bluffs have been called, London and Buenos Aires are + left with an immensely risky roll of the iron dice.

+

Alternative Outcomes

+

A. An unambiguous British military victory. The + British are counting on a prompt collapse of Argentine resistance + following initial engagements with the invasion force and on a surrender + of the Argentine garrison without substantial casualties. The failure of + Argentine forces on South Georgia and Pebble Islands to offer more than + token resistance will have encouraged the British to expect little + effective or prolonged opposition. At the outset, the British may elect + to avoid engaging the main body of Argentine forces in the Port Stanley + area by staging their initial landings in outlying areas such as Port + Darwin and Fox Bay. The British believe that the rapid defeat or + surrender of these outposts will demoralize the Port Stanley garrison + and soften it up for either quick defeat or surrender. [9 lines not declassified] Thatcher’s confidence in a quick and + relatively painless victory was reflected in her remark on 17 May that + if Galtieri does not make major + concessions, “We make him go.”Thatcher made her statement in a + radio interview on May 17. (Glenn Frankel, “Britain, Argentina + Pessimistic About Peace Prospects,” Washington + Post, May 18, p. A1)

+

B. An inconclusive initial round of combat leading to a + war of attrition with heavy casualties on both sides. + Successful British landings will be countered by all-out retaliatory + strikes by the Argentine Air Force and Navy that will avert an early + demoralization and collapse of Argentine resistance on the ground. The + junta is determined to maintain resistance regardless of the costs in + lives and equipment, and it is gambling that a British failure to force + a prompt surrender and the shock of heavy losses of British personnel, + aircraft and ships will bring down the Thatcher government. The junta has persuaded itself that + Argentina can outlast the British in a costly and inconclusive war of + attrition, and that support for + Thatcher’s policy will + evaporate quickly in these conditions, politically disarming Britain + from continuing the war.

+

C. British landing operations will be defeated by + a combination of stiff resistance by the Argentine garrison and damaging + air and naval attacks on the British invasion force and fleet. Thatcher will be forced to resign and + her successor will have no choice but to order the evacuation of the + invasion force.

+

Argentine Political Initiatives

+

The Argentines will respond immediately to a British invasion by + announcing acceptance of Perez de Cuellar’s final proposal for a + compromise agreement. Following Britain’s expected rejection of this + proposal, Argentina will request a UN + Security Council meeting at which it will propose, through Panama’s + delegate, an immediate and unconditional ceasefire in place without + provisions for a mutual withdrawal of forces. This move will be aimed at + forcing a British veto, supported by the U.S. The Argentines believe + these initiatives will place the onus squarely on Britain for a + continuation of hostilities and greatly strengthen Argentina’s position + in negotiations under the Secretary General’s aegis that will be + renewed. The junta also will calculate that British rejection of these + two “peace moves” will stimulate a backlash in British public opinion + and parliament that will bring Thatcher down, even if she is not forced out by heavy + British combat losses.

+

Weighing the Odds

+

The variables mentioned in paragraphs 1 and 2 preclude a confident + forecast, but a plausible case could be made that the most likely + outcome will be something that could be called a British military + success tempered by important Argentine political gains that may + eventually prove to be more significant than the military test of + strength. Even the military outcome may be considerably short of an + unambiguous British victory, and it may fall between the first and + second scenarios. The Argentines may well demonstrate an ability to deny + the British a prompt victory. If they can impose substantial losses on + the British invasion force, aircraft and warships, Thatcher’s domestic political + vulnerability may prove to be greater than that of the junta. If the + encounter settles into a costly war of attrition, the junta may surprise + the world by showing greater staying power than the Thatcher government.

+

The third scenario—a British defeat and forced withdrawal—cannot be + completely ruled out. The greatest threat to British prospects would + seem to be overconfidence. [4½ lines not + declassified]

+ + Harry + Cochran + Special Assistant for Warning + + +
+ +
+ + 278. Memorandum From the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy + (Iklé) to Secretary of + Defense WeinbergerSource: Washington National Records + Center, OSD Files, FRC 330–86–0042, + UK 1982. Top Secret; Sensitive. + An attached note from Cormack to Iklé, dated May 24, returned the memorandum to the + latter with instruction to note Weinberger’s guidance. + + + Washington, May 20, + 1982 + + + SUBJECT + UK Request for Replenishment by + Three US Ships (U)—ACTION + MEMORANDUM + +

On 13 May the United Kingdom forwarded a request that the United States + provide two underway replenishment capable oilers (T–AO) and one combat + stores ship (T–AFS) to replenish UK + ships in the South Atlantic. All three of the ships operate under + control of the Military Sealift Command; they are primarily civilian + manned, but have a small USN + complement.

+

The White House, the Joint Staff and the Navy oppose acceding to the + British request. The request goes beyond current policy guidelines, in + that it clearly involves operational support. The Joint Staff is + concerned that one of the U.S. ships could be attacked (Tab A). + Furthermore, it is unlikely that such support could remain out of the + public eye for long.

+

As an alternative arrangement, we could provide replenishment support to + UK ships, operating in a purely + NATO role within the NATO area, thereby freeing their + remaining replenishment ships for operations in the Falkland Islands. + The JCS is prepared to countenance this approach, if set under strict + guidelines as to the nature of each replenishment that the British would + require. The arrangement would be similar to the KC–135 tanker support + that we currently are providing the UK.

+

Accordingly, I recommend that we deny the British request as it has been + put to us, but offer an alternative arrangement for replenishment of + UK ship operating in a NATO role.Weinberger did not + approve or disapprove the recommendation but wrote next to the + approval line: “Let us offer the alternative arrangement w/o formally denying them their request + yet.”

+

Fred C. + IkleIklé signed “Fred” above his typed + signature.

+ +

Tab A

+

Memorandum From the Director of the Joint Staff + (Dalton) to the + Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Policy + (Perle)Top Secret. A signed copy of this memorandum, + dated May 20, along with a copy of the May 17 action memorandum + upon which both Hayward + and Small initialed + their disapproval of the British request is in the National + Archives, RG 218, CJCS Files, FRC 218–92–0030, 820 United + Kingdom Mar 81–17 Jun 82.

+

Washington, undated

+ + SUBJECT + United Kingdom OP Corporate Request for Naval Underway + Replenishment Assistance (S) + +

1. (TS) Reference British Defence Staff messagesThe two messages, May 13 and 14, are attached but + not printed. which requested that two fully abeam underway + replenishment capable oilers (T–AO) and one combat stores ship (T–AFS) + be made available to UK. The requests + are for MSC ships to proceed as far + south as possible in the South Atlantic to conduct underway + replenishment with Royal Navy (RN) + warships and/or support ships engaged in operations near the Falklands. + The British have informally informed COMSC that the US ships + might also be used to provide support between Ascension Island and a + replenishment area 1000 to 1200 nautical miles north of the Falkland + Islands for up to six months.

+

2. (TS) The Joint Staff has considered this request. In view of current + US policy to provide materiel + assistance to UK, with no direct + involvement of US forces, it does not + appear to be in the best interest of the United States to fulfill this + request. Fulfilling the British request would appear to go beyond policy + guidelines and could lead to direct attack on US ships by Argentine forces. These ships are primarily + manned with US civilian crews, however, + they do have an onboard contingent of active duty USN personnel. Additionally, such direct + combat support, should it become a matter of public knowledge, would + further damage our ability to pursue regional security policies in the + Western Hemisphere.

+

3. (TS) UK currently has 11 RN underway replenishment, materiel, fleet + support ships, as well as 8 amphibious ships, deployed in support of + their Falkland operations. These are augmented by as many as 40 + requisitioned or chartered merchant vessels operating in the same roles. + The RN possesses 12 additional + operational replenishment and fleet support ships of various types in the NATO area not committed to the Falklands + operation. In view of the substantial totality of vessels dedicated to + support of the Falkland Islands contingency, denial of requested US assets is not likely to impact + significantly on UK operations in that + theatre.

+

4. (TS) The present request is too broad and open-ended. The OJCS considers that if the UK has a requirement for US replenishment ships, that the US ships would only be considered for a + NATO role in replacing UK ships currently operating in the NATO area. Further the UK request should have specific + justification for US assistance and + include; name of UK ship to be replaced, + specific operating location, duration of support and planned + employment/concept of operations. A specific request of this nature + could then be considered on a case-by-case basis.

+

5. (S) The OJCS concern relative to + this request is primarily based on policy considerations rather than + operational impact on US forces. There + would be no significant impact on US + forces for the next six months if a decision is made to fulfill the + UK request.

+
+ +
+ 279. Minutes of a Meeting of the Special Situation GroupSource: Reagan Library, Latin + American Affairs Directorate Files, NSC, Falklands/Malvinas: Special Situation Group + (SSG) Meeting on the Falklands, + 5/20/1982. Top Secret; Sensitive. The meeting took place in the + White House Situation Room. The minutes were forwarded to Clark by Fontaine under a covering + memorandum, July 14. (Ibid.) + + + Washington, May 20, + 1982, 9:50–10:40 a.m. + + + SUBJECT + The Falkland Islands + + + PARTICIPANTS + The Vice President + + State + Secretary Alexander M. Haig, + Jr. + Mr. Thomas O. + Enders + + + Defense + Secretary Weinberger + Mr. Fred + Ikle + + + + CIA + Mr. William + Casey + + + USUN + Ambassador Jeane J. + Kirkpatrick + + + JCS + General David C. + Jones + + + White House + Mr. Edwin Meese, + III + Mr. Michael K. + Deaver + Mr. William P. + Clark + Mr. Robert C. + McFarlane + + + NSC + Mr. Roger W. + Fontaine + Mr. James M. + Rentschler + + +

Minutes

+

The Vice President called the Special Situation + Group to order at 9:50 a.m. He stated the purpose of the meeting was to + get opinions on next steps regarding the Falkland crisis and to develop + agreement, if it exists, among the group and let the President know + where the current situation stands. He then asked the Assistant to the + President for National Security Affairs to open the meeting.

+

Judge Clark stated the President had suggested a review + of the problem by the SSG and that + today’s meeting would begin with an intelligence update by the Director + of Central Intelligence.

+

Director Casey said that [less than 1 line + not declassified] the British were ready to go into East + Falkland Island. [4 lines not declassified] the + Argentine troops are ready to fight but they are not good quality. The + Director believes the British intend to helicopter-drop troops at + several points on East Falkland. The British are worried about Argentine + air attacks but believe the Harriers and SAMs will + fight them off. The British will fight but they are ready to talk at the + same time. [less than 1 line not declassified] + the Argentines believe the strike is ready and there are plans for a + massive naval and air retaliation. [1 line not + declassified] In the meantime, Moscow continues to play it + cautiously. [5½ lines not declassified] In South + America there is a rising feeling of support for Argentina, except in + Chile. [1 line not declassified] the Hondurans + are uptight regarding our posture, but the Argentines have let them know + that it was business as usual in Honduras.

+

The Vice President then called for questions. + There were none and Judge Clark + said that Ambassador Kirkpatrick + was scheduled to give at this time an update on the UN but that she was at the moment on the + phone with the UN Secretary General.

+

After a brief pause Secretary Haig gave an intelligence + update which consisted of the following: Last night General Pinochet (Chile) called General + Vernon Walters and said the + Soviets were providing military equipment indirectly to Argentina.No memorandum of conversation of this + telephone call has been found. Secretary Haig could not confirm this; he + remained somewhat skeptical until we assessed the motives of President + Pinochet.

+

Assistant Secretary of State Thomas + Enders observed that + Peru on its own had already supplied materiel to Argentina.

+ +

At this point, Ambassador Kirkpatrick reviewed the situation at the + UN. She said three things had + occurred: First, the British had given to the Secretary General their + final proposal on May 17, establishing a May 19 noon deadline. The + Argentines had responded before noon and the response was negative. + Ambassador Kirkpatrick + characterized that response as “ridiculous.” The British, in turn, had + rejected the Argentine response. Consequently, the Secretary General was + working hard on his own three-point resolution. In passing, Ambassador + Kirkpatrick believed that + the last British proposal was “not unresponsible.” It was Ambassador + Kirkpatrick’s belief that + the Argentines should accept the British proposal and consider + themselves the winner of this dispute. She believes that it may be + helpful to pass along a list of concessions the British have already + made. It should impress the Argentines.

+

The Ambassador to the UN also said there + was a lot of evidence to show that the Argentine Foreign Office is now + taking a harder, even sillier, line than the junta. The Foreign Office + is spinning out silly, legalistic formula. Enrique Ros (Argentine Deputy Foreign Minister for + Multilateral Affairs) has been arguing, for example, that without + mention of all the relevant UN + resolutions in the final agreement it would mean Argentina and the + Foreign Office would have little to show for seventeen years of + negotiations.

+

Regarding the Secretary General’s messages to President Galtieri and Prime Minister Thatcher, there was no response as + yet. The Secretary General was at first encouraged by Thatcher’s willingness to accept a + fresh Argentine proposal. The Secretary General also believed that + Thatcher might agree to his + own three-point solution. Those three points include the geographical + scope of the agreement, the role of the local councils and the question + of termination, i.e., what happens after December 31, 1982, if there is + no agreement? There is no longer a question regarding sovereignty. There + is no real problem on withdrawal. We are left with the above three + problems.

+

It was Ambassador Kirkpatrick’s + opinion that the junta was ready to eliminate the South Georgia and + Sandwich Islands from the agreement. We are now left with the question + of interim administration. If we lived in a responsible world we would + be close to a solution. The question regarding the interim + administration is this: What is the role of the local governing council? + Specifically, what is the role and composition of that local council? + The British want the old council to continue as before, although they + have agreed to add two Argentine advisers selected from the 50 Argentine + residents on the Island to the heretofore six-man council. The + Argentines do not accept this. Ambassador Kirkpatrick then observed that there was a sleeper in + all of this. The question is, will the UN administration permit during the interim period free Argentine immigration to the + islands? There is no immigration now and hasn’t been for one hundred + years. This is one of the principal laws governing the islands. The + Secretary General wants to finesse this question by considering it + later.

+

In the last twenty-four hours, Ambassador Kirkpatrick stated the presidents of Venezuela and Peru + will call Galtieri. The Air + Force member of the Argentine junta seems to be agreeable to the + Secretary General’s proposal but, according to Ambassador Kirkpatrick, chances are less than + fifty-fifty the Argentines will accept it. At the moment, there will be + no meeting of the UN Security Council. + Meanwhile, among the delegations friendly to the British, there is + growing impatience with the British position.

+

Secretary Weinberger then asked if Ambassador Kirkpatrick could outline the agreed + upon portions.

+

Ambassador Kirkpatrick replied that she believed there was + a consensual agreement though no formal agreement had been reached. + There was, for example, agreement on parallel and simultaneous + withdrawal. The British had quietly dropped an earlier insistence on a + previous Argentine withdrawal. In the May 17 British proposal the plan + was withdrawal of the Argentines to the mainland while the British + withdrew to 150 nautical miles, followed by total British withdrawal + within fourteen days. The Argentines want a withdrawal of 300 nautical + miles and total withdrawal within thirty days. Ambassador Kirkpatrick insisted that the + remaining differences were not a major issue.

+

Secretary Haig then outlined what he thought the prospects + were for agreement. He believed the Secretary General had played it very + well. He also noted the Secretary General’s proposal is basically our + final position. The major thing he got was agreement on the sovereignty + issue. As for the geographical scope, he is finessing the problem but + leaving it for later negotiations. He is, by doing so, letting the + British remain in the South Georgias, which is essential to the UK. Secretary Haig, however, is not as sanguine about the withdrawal + question. The Argentines do not want to withdraw under British guns. As + for the Security Council, we are back to where we were. Regarding + termination, the Argentines do not want to negotiate another seventeen + years, and the British want assurances they will not be subject to + another invasion. Secretary Haig’s personal guess is that the Argentines will accept the + Secretary General’s proposals today and put the onus on the British. + Meanwhile, the British are convinced the Argentine Government cannot + make and stick to a decision. The British may also come back today and + inform the Secretary General there are too many unanswered questions. + Therefore, they would like a detailed Argentine response. At the same + time, the British will not change their own military plans because time + has run out.

+ +

Ambassador Kirkpatrick stated that if the British attack + the Falklands there would be an immediate call for a Security Council + meeting and there would be a resolution calling for a cease-fire. The + British would veto and the whole thing would come at a high cost to us. + On the question of geographical scope, Ambassador Kirkpatrick said the Argentines have + an installation on the Sandwich Islands, but if we finesse this right we + will leave things as they are and this would be a reasonable situation. + She also believes that if the Argentines accept the Secretary General’s + proposal, there will be an immediate UN + mission sent to the area.

+

Secretary Haig then outlined several basic questions we need + to answer. First, if the Secretary General succeeds, how do we rebuild + our relations with Argentina and in the Southern Cone? If the British + attack we need scenarios for this because the UN effort will be discredited and we will need to go at it + in another way. If the British succeed, Galtieri may well fall and Argentine Air Force Chief, + General Lami Dozo, could move + in. The Secretary also observed there is a problem with London now + because they are nervous about our support. There was general + questioning as to why the British should be nervous since we had given + them materiel and diplomatic support, and Director + Casey observed that + nervousness had, in effect, been reflected by Prime Minister Fraser.Fraser, on a private + visit to the United States, met with Reagan on May 17. (Reagan Library, President’s Daily + Diary)

+

Secretary Haig then said that if the British assault the + Islands and there are no attacks on the mainland—we have assurances on + this—we will issue a public statement reaffirming UN Security Council Resolution 502.

+

Ambassador Kirkpatrick then said a meeting of the Security + Council would call for a cease-fire and simultaneous withdrawal. For us + to veto that will be “interesting.”

+

Director Casey then asked, where does the Rio Treaty come + in?

+

Secretary Haig replied, if the Argentine mainland is + attacked, it certainly would come into play. Secretary Haig added that Jeane was right, if the British land + then the shoe is on the other foot.

+

Secretary Weinberger added, if the British land and + encounter serious problems and we pull back our support, we will have + another Suez.

+

The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff then + said he believed Prime Minister Thatcher had given an O.K. to her forces, depending on + the weather. The weather is now bad and will be so until Saturday.May 22. There are no safe predictions + after that. The British are confident they will succeed but they don’t know how severe the losses + will be. We have provided them tons and tons of equipment. One question + remains controversial, about two replenishment ships.See Document + 278.

+

Judge Clark interjected and said the President has + decided not to supply them.

+

Secretary Haig then said we need to check on the Pinochet story and added the British + will have problems on any Security Council resolution.

+

The Vice President said it would be very hard to + veto such a resolution. Would the British really do it? There was + general agreement that they would.

+

Judge Clark then asked, are there contingency plans on + post-invasion support for the British?

+

Secretary Haig said we will continue to support them but we + will be very careful. We also have the War Powers Act to consider. He + noted, too, that if the British succeed quickly they (the British) may + welcome a cease-fire. We must move hard at the United Nations and while + Galtieri may be gone, the + Argentines may accept a UN order to + cease-fire.

+

Ambassador Kirkpatrick then said that first there will be + within hours of an attack on the Falklands a resolution calling for a + cease-fire. It will be difficult for us to veto the first resolution and + then later support the second resolution contingent on a successful + British attack.

+

Secretary Haig said that the Soviets won’t veto anything and + that at some point the British will want the U.S. to guarantee the + agreement reached won’t be violated, and that may mean the use of + American forces.

+

Secretary Weinberger then asked, what about a + multilateral force?

+

Secretary Haig said that would soften the blow but it would + still require a commitment from us.

+

The Vice President then asked, what happens if + they hit the mainland?

+

Secretary Haig replied, it would make it a much more + difficult situation.

+

Secretary Weinberger observed that hitting the mainland + was, in fact, a logical extension in solving Britain’s military + problem.

+

Secretary Haig said that it would give us enormous problems + in the hemisphere and give us cause for concern for American citizens in + Argentina.

+ +

Ambassador Kirkpatrick said, in Argentina and in the rest + of Latin America as well. Ambassador Kirkpatrick added that Latin America has recently sided + with the Argentines on this. Venezuelans are active; they sent a + delegation to the European Economic Community. The Peruvians are + involved and even the Chileans, who hate the Argentines, cannot take a + public position opposed to the Argentines. Even the Nicaraguans are + playing a pro-Argentine role. A war in that area involving the mainland + would reorient the hemisphere against us for twenty or thirty years.

+

Judge Clark then asked for consideration for + recommendations to the President. Should there be an IG working group + chaired by State to pull together some of our options?

+

Secretary Haig replied, we have the elements, we need to pull + them together.

+

Ambassador Kirkpatrick then said she had not seen the + USUN strategy, nor had she been + consulted on it.

+

Judge Clark then said we need to move on this.

+

Mr. Meese + asked if there had been any threats to American citizens in Argentina + and do we have contingency plans in case of a deteriorating + situation?

+

Secretary Haig replied there were no threats as such, and + that contingency plans have been worked out.

+

A general discussion of the problem ensued.

+

The Vice President then asked, do we want an IG + process on the matter?

+

Ambassador Kirkpatrick said the most urgent question + facing us was our next move once the Secretary General’s proposal had + been responded to by both parties. She observed there was a feeling at + the UN that we don’t really support the + Secretary General.

+

Secretary Haig replied that that was not true, in fact, he + said that it was hog wash and malicious hog wash at that.

+

There was then consideration of the question whether or not the President + should publicly call on both sides to accept the Secretary General’s + proposal.

+

Secretary Weinberger opposed a public appeal because that + was an act of a neutral.

+

Secretary Haig said that it would depend on how the British + responded, but in any case we cannot do so publicly.

+

The meeting then adjourned at 10:40 a.m.

+
+ +
+ + 280. Memorandum From Oliver L. + North of the National Security Council Staff to the + President’s Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (McFarlane)Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Latin + America/Central, Falklands War (05/20/1982–05/24/1982). Top Secret. + Sent for information. A stamped notation at the top of the + memorandum indicates that McFarlane saw it. + + + Washington, May 20, + 1982 + + + SUBJECT + Response to President Reagan’s Query on 18 May Regarding Vulcan + OPS + +

During our Crisis Management briefing on 18 May in the Oval Office, + President Reagan asked about the + U.K. Vulcan refueling OPS during the Falklands strikes.Presumably a reference to the President’s + national security briefing, attended by Bush, Clark, and McFarlane and held in the Oval + Office from 10:10 until 10:25 a.m., May 18. (Reagan Library, + President’s Daily Diary) No memorandum of conversation or other + record of this briefing has been found. I indicated that 12 + refueling OPS had been required. The + following information is provided as amplification for your “hip pocket” + use as appropriate. Sources: [less than 1 line not + declassified] DIA.

+

• Only 2 VULCANS are based on Ascencion

+

—For each mission, both A/C sortie to a decision point approximately 1800 + miles SW. There, the pilots determine which A/C is in best shape for + mission and other A/C returns to Ascencion.

+

• Single A/C continues to target, 3500 nm at 600 Kts in high/high/high + flight profile (35,000ʹ+)

+

—Bomb load: 21 1000 lb. bombs, loaded internally (necessitates removal of + internal fuel cells—thus refuel requirement).

+

—Time of flight: 6–7 hours each way.

+

• VICTORS used for refueling 8 to 14 times per VULCAN on each mission.

+

—Range to abort fields and removal of interior fuel cells generates + frequent refueling.

+

• Last week, both VULCANS were returned to UK for refit to accommodate SHRIKE anti-radiation + missiles.

+

—SHRIKE refit did not work (Avionics problems) so VULCANS equipped with + MARTEL (NATO anti radar missiles) + instead.

+

—Anti-Radiation missiles to be used to attack Argentine ROLAND SAMS.

+ +

• Two days ago, both VULCANS launched, but problems with A/C (probably + MARTELS) caused mission to be aborted.

+

• One VULCAN scheduled to return to + UK + today (20 May) for unspecified + repairs/rework.

+

—Possible refit for Precision (Laser) Guided Munitions (PGM).

+

—Brits have hand-held and A/C mounted Laser Target Designator.

+

• If A/C cannot be repaired and returned, Amphib OPS may be delayed. Plan was to have VULCAN sortie soften up/disrupt + Argentine C3 concurrent with landing.

+
+ +
+ 281. Memorandum From Vice President Bush to President ReaganSource: + Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Latin America/Central, Falklands War + (05/20/1982–05/24/1982). Secret. Reagan initialed at the upper right-hand corner of + the memorandum, indicating that he saw it. Another notation on the + memorandum indicates that Reagan saw it. + + + Washington, May 21, + 1982 + + + SUBJECT + South Atlantic Crisis: U.S. Posture + +

Following last night’s collapse of the Pérez de Cuéllar mediation effort,See footnote 2, Document + 277. the events we have been forecasting for the + past few days have begun to unfold. British forces launched a series of + low-level commando probes on the Falklands under cover of darkness early + this morning, accompanied by naval bombardment and tactical air attack. + As weather conditions further improve in the area, we can anticipate + significant escalation and the strong probability of British landings in + much greater strength (1000 British troops have already been inserted + according to press reports).

+

In the meantime, the inter-agency follow-up to the SSGSee Document 279. which I chaired + yesterday has examined four related areas of the crisis where + coordinated U.S. action is now or soon will be required (public affairs, + UN, Congress, response to UK requests for additional support). + Al Haig’s memo (Tab A) summarizes this + work and suggests the posture we should take in each of the areas + concerned.

+

George + Bush

+

Tab A

+

Memorandum From Secretary of State Haig to President ReaganSecret; Sensitive.

+

Washington, May 21, 1982

+ + SUBJECT + US Posture Toward the Falkland + Crisis + +

Now that military action on the islands has begun, we should take the + following actions:

+

—Our public spokesmen should state that we have + been concerned all along that failure to implement UN Security Council Resolution 502 would + lead to intensified fighting, and that we are ready to help work toward + a political solution. We should steer clear of any statement of concern + about the British action itself, which they are taking in accordance + with their right of self-defense.That day, + May 21, Speakes read a statement on the conflict in the Falklands at + the White House daily press briefing. For the text, see Public Papers: Reagan, 1982, Book I, p. 662.

+

—In the UN we must + be prepared to join the British, and probably one or two others, in + voting against a cease-fire resolution. We will find it harder to vote + against a resolution which provides for a cease-fire, withdrawal of all + forces, and introduction of a UN force, + though we must think carefully before abstaining on any resolution the + British vote against.Reagan underlined this sentence + and wrote in the left-hand margin: “Al—Wouldn’t this (underlined) be + hard to explain? RR.”

+

—We will want to keep Congress informed, and, if + necessary, head off unhelpful resolutions (e.g, call for cease-fire + only).

+

—We should continue to be responsive to British + requests for materiel assistance, even in greater quantities + drawing the line at impairing our own readiness, while not agreeing to + operational participation, e.g., refueling or resupplying British ships + or aircraft in the South Atlantic.

+ +

If British action produces a quick surrender of Argentine forces on the + Falklands,In telegram 11384 from + London, May 21, the Embassy provided evaluations of what the British + would do if they were successful in retaking the Islands and if they + were not successful, concluding: “Either way, we expect Britain’s + future will have been skewed by the Falklands affair in ways that + Britons can now only dimly grasp. As they grope for answers, + Thatcher and her + government will rely heavily on our counsel and our support. If hard + pressed, Britain may at times expect more from us than we can + deliver.” (Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Europe and Soviet + Union, United Kingdom (04/01/1982–07/31/1982) (1)) In telegram 3236 + from Buenos Aires, May 21, the Embassy reported: “Whether or not the + Junta survives, it seems to us entirely possible that the Argentines + will coalesce around the military in an attitude of defiance. The + crisis could thus be considerably protracted.” (Department of State, + Central Foreign Policy File, D820267–0826) we—and no doubt + the British—will want a cease-fire resolution passed by the Security + Council. This could help avert an extended conflict. The Argentines—by + then, probably a successor to Galtieri—may go along with a + cease-fire. The key may be our ability to get assurances from the + British that they will show magnanimity, by not, for example, + reintroducing such symbols of British rule as the former governor and by + committing themselves to resuming negotiations toward a political + solution. We will want to approach the British with this idea early on + if things go well for them militarily.

+

If it appears that the struggle for the islands will be long, with + casualties growing and the outcome in doubt, we will want to consider a + new negotiating initiative.In a May 21 + memorandum to Haig, + Enders outlined a + negotiations scenario, which suggested the participation of U.S. + military forces, along with forces from Brazil, in a joint + peacekeeping force, in order to make negotiations “more attractive + from the British point of view,” as well as a number of suggestions + that “would help the Argentines come to terms quickly.” (Department + of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S + Special Handling Restrictions Memos 1979–1983, Lot 96D262, ES Sensitive May 19–24 1982) We + and the Brazilians could take the lead, working with the Secretary + General. We should confer first with the British. They may well want a + new initiative if they get bogged down and their support in Europe and + at home is evaporating; but they may object to a new initiative as long + as they think they have a reasonable chance of military success. We + cannot decide now how best to pursue our interests in such a situation; + but we can and will continuously refine our contingency plans.

+

The danger to Americans in Argentina will increase steeply with a British + landing(s). We are therefore instructing our Ambassador to cut back, in + an orderly way, to a skeletal staff with no dependents.

+

RECOMMENDATION:

+

That you approve the above plan of action.Reagan initialed his + approval of the recommendation. Below this, he wrote: “But note + question on p.1. RR.” (See footnote 6 above)

+
+ +
+ + 282. Memorandum of ConversationSource: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, + Files of Alexander M. Haig, + Jr., 1981–1982, Lot 82D370, (3) Falklands Crisis + 1982. Confidential. Drafted by Kirkpatrick. A handwritten time of 1:30 p.m. is in + the upper right-hand corner of the memorandum. A notation in an + unknown hand in the bottom right-hand corner indicates the + memorandum was received in S at 1:50. The date of the receipt is + unclear. + + + New York, May 21, + 1982 + +

We have direct confirmation of the views of General Lami Doso concerning + Argentina’s response to Belaunde:On the + afternoon of May 20, BelaŠnde presented the Argentines and British + with a “new formula” for a peace settlement in the South Atlantic, + which stipulated: “1. Each nation subscribes unilaterally to their + latest proposal for an agreement presented to the Secretary General + of the United Nations; 2. The Secretary General fulfills the clauses + in which there are points of agreement, such as: (A) a ceasefire; + (B) the mutual withdrawal of forces; (C) administration of the + government of the Islands by the United Nations or by a contact + group, formed by various countries, within a period which is agreed + in the two proposals; 3. The Secretary General of the United + Nations, Dr. Perez de Cuellar, or the contact group, acceptable to + both parties, which he will propose, will be responsible for + organizing and presiding over negotiations in pursuit of a permanent + solution and for supervising the immediate withdrawal from the zone + of conflict of the forces of both countries.” (Telegram 5234 from + Lima, May 20; Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, + D820265–0589) The U.S. response to the proposal, which the + Department believed would not resolve the dispute, was transmitted + in telegram 139656 to Lima, May 21. (Department of State, Central + Foreign Policy File, D850186–0311)

+

1. He asserts they,An unknown hand inserted + the word “chiefs” above “they.” accepted all of Belaunde’s + proposals, including the specifications that the administration of the + islands would be under United Nations administration.

+

2. That negotiations would take place in the framework of a United + Nations Security Council resolution, the Charter of the United Nations, + Resolution 502 and other pertinent resolutions.

+

3. That a Contact Group of four nations should oversee (or guarantee?) + the negotiations with two nations to be chosen by each side.

+

We are particularly warned against mischief making in New York. Contact + with chiefs necessary.

+

Evacuation of American dependents is widely interpreted as foreshadowing + a new US hard line.

+

Finally, principal and continent feel United Kingdom will escalate only + with assurances of United States support. They deeply fear a hard line + from New York and current debate.

+ + Jeane J. + KirkpatrickKirkpatrick initialed “JJK” + next to her typed signature. + +
+ +
+ + 283. Information Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of + State-Designate for European Affairs (Burt) to Secretary of State HaigSource: + Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S Special Handling Restrictions Memos 1979–1983, Lot + 96D262, ES Sensitive May 19–24 1982. + Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by J. + Campbell (EUR/NE) + on May 21; cleared by Blackwill, R. Morris (EUR/NE), and Smith. Campbell initialed for the clearing officials. + Bremer’s stamped + initials appear on the first page of the memorandum. The memorandum + bears an erroneous stamped date of March 21. Burt had been nominated Assistant + Secretary on May 10, although his nomination was not yet acted upon + by the Senate. He would not formally enter on duty until February + 18, 1983. + + + Washington, May 21, + 1982 + + + SUBJECT + The UK—Alone + +

As the UK enters a bloody phase of the + Falklands crisis, Margaret + Thatcher’s government will be increasingly isolated + diplomatically as other governments calculate the damage to their + interests of continued support.

+

—The EC is unlikely to renew economic + sanctions against Argentina when they expire next week.

+

—The UK also faces estrangement from its + EC allies on the economic front + because of the breakdown this week over agricultural prices and + hardening divisions over the EC + budget.

+

—The UK faces excoriation from Latin + America and the neutral and non-aligned in the UN, the OAS and other + international fora. The Soviets and Cubans will try to use the rising + tide of anti-Western sentiment.

+

—Cancellation of the Pope’s visit—a high visibility event—remains + possible despite British Catholic and HMG efforts to keep it on track.

+

Thus far, the Prime Minister’s domestic political position has been + strong, with the public approving her policy of negotiation while + building up British military strength in the South Atlantic. The popular + media continues to be bellicose. But her support is probably softer than + it looks and could erode quickly if British casualties are high or + fighting is protracted. The suspension of efforts to achieve a + diplomatic solution may tempt the Labor party to oppose the Prime + Minister’s South Atlantic policy in the House of Commons. A dramatic + set-back—the sinking of the QEII or the CanberraThe + passenger ships Queen Elizabeth II and Canberra had been requisitioned by the + British military and deployed to the South Atlantic for use as troop + transports.—or a prolonged stalemate could lead Tories to + replace her as head of government, perhaps by Francis Pym.

+ +

Convinced that her moral position is unassailable and her policy right, + the Prime Minister initially is likely to be less flexible and more + dependent on her right-wing allies in the cabinet as the war heats up. + The influence of Francis Pym and + the FCO will decline with the MOD on + center stage. Her likely response to early reverses will be to intensify + UK military actions in the South + Atlantic. She will ask the US for more + political and materiel support, seeking our greater involvement as an + ally. The support of the US will assume + heightened domestic political importance to her as international + isolation deepens.

+

If the British do not achieve a quick victory, this will be a dangerous + period for US/UK relations:

+

—The right-wing Conservative backbench mood will be that the US is not doing enough and therefore shares + the blame for UK reverses. (The Prime + Minister will do her best to fight this.)

+

—The Labor opposition and international opinion will call for immediate + negotiations and a cease-fire, seizing on peace initiatives as a means + of attacking the Prime Minister’s war,

+

—The President, in London June 7–9,Reagan was scheduled to visit + London as part of a European trip that would take him to France, + Italy, and West Germany. will be the focus for increasing + British ambivalence about the US/UK relationship if victory has eluded + HMG. The Prime Minister may present + him with a “shopping list” of military and political measures while the + public’s mood could be increasingly critical of the US.

+

In these circumstances, a US peace plan + might provide HMG with the framework + for diplomacy even while it continued military action. Indeed, it might + make fighting more politically acceptable at home while reducing + international pressure on the UK for a + cease-fire. But the timing of a new US + diplomatic initiative would be crucial:

+

—US moves should not accelerate any + softening of UK domestic support for the + Thatcher government.

+

—We must be aware of British sensitivities to a UN or OAS role, which they + will perceive as weighted against them.

+

—In any event, we should think carefully about initiating a new + diplomatic round without specific HMG + agreement. To do so would risk a historic rupture in US/UK + relations.

+

At stake is much more than the fate of a UK government which has proved more supportive of US policies than any of its recent + predecessors or likely successors. Anglo-American relations revived + relatively quickly from the trauma of Suez. British national + self-confidence did not. The Thatcher government’s primary achievement has been to + reverse the thirty-year + trend of British withdrawal from global responsibility. Failure in the + Falklands will undo all that the Rhodesian settlement has done to revive + UK national pride. It will leave us + with no ally, save France, willing to share the risks and pay the price + needed to protect global western interests.

+
+ +
+ 284. Memorandum From the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy + (Iklé) to Secretary of + Defense WeinbergerSource: Washington National Records + Center, OSD Files, FRC 330–86–0042, + UK 1982. Top Secret. At the + bottom of the memorandum, Weinberger wrote: “Fred: We + support the UK in this conflict.—As + long as we do not get our troops involved—we shouldn’t try to guess + when and for what reason they might want limpet mines, airport + matting, etc.” Weinberger’s + note was also transcribed in an attached May 24 typewritten note + from Cormack to Iklé. + + + Washington, May 21, + 1982 + + + SUBJECT + UK Request for 50 Maritime Limpet + Mines + +

On May 15 the UK requested that the + United States transfer 50 maritime limpet mines to British forces by May + 24th.The request was enumerated in the + Department of Defense’s May 14 list of British requests for military + assistance. See footnote 2, Document + 266. These mines are hand-transported underwater + anti-ship demolition weapons for use against moored targets. The UK has not indicated the nature of the + targets against which these mines might be used; it is possible, + however, that the targets might be ships in Argentine mainland + ports.

+

This request raises a larger policy issue of the nature of US materiel support for the UK during a post-invasion phase of the + Falklands conflict, when the mines are likely to be employed. The State + Department recognizes that a decision on the mines, because of the + possibility that they might be used against mainland ships, begs that + larger policy issue.

+

In my view we must proceed with greater caution when carrying out British + requests that clearly are geared to the second phase of the conflict. We + have several such requests that have been broached, if not formally + tabled, in addition to the request for mines. These include a request + for matting that might be sufficiently large to support Nimrod operations from an expanded Port + Stanley airfield, and for magnetic anomaly detectors, whose requested delivery of late + June points to a British desire to husband anti-submarine warfare assets + to protect resupply ships to the Falklands over the next few months.

+

Secretary Haig has already been + apprised of the implications of a decision on mines, and I have + contacted Larry Eagleburger to + establish what State’s views are with respect to the particular request + and the general policy.See Document 290.

+ + Fred C. IkleIklé + wrote “Fred” above his typed signature. + +
+ +
+ 285. Memorandum From Secretary of State Haig to President ReaganSource: + Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Latin America/Central, Argentina + (05/21/1982–06/15/1982). Confidential. Reagan initialed at the top right-hand corner of the + memorandum, which was received in the White House at 11:41 + p.m. + + + Washington, May 21, + 1982 + + + SUBJECT + British Landing on Falklands May 21 + +

Nicho Henderson has just given me + a readout on the results of the operation today in the Falkland + Islands.

+

As of 7:30 p.m. this evening, Henderson reports the following Argentine losses: Nine + Mirages, Seven A–4s; two Pucara close + ground support aircraft and two helicopters. British losses from a + substantial Argentine air effort were: One Harrier, two Gazelle helicopters and five vessels damaged, + including two frigates which were hit seriously but are now under + tow.

+

The British, according to Henderson, are optimistic. They consider their losses as + minimal given the high risks they ran with this operation. A beachhead, + with a large force, has been established on East Falkland Island at San + Carlos Cove where they now plan to operate their Harriers. (San Carlos is on a sheltered bay and has a + 600-meter grass airstrip.)

+

Heavy Argentine air attacks are expected tomorrow on the British Task + Force.

+
+ +
+ 286. Information Memorandum From Robert + E. Service of the Department of State Falklands Working + Group to the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Eagleburger) + + + Washington, May 23, + 1982 + +

[Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, P820074–2373. + Secret; Exdis; Noforn. 2 pages not declassified.]

+
+ +
+ 287. Memorandum for the Record by the Deputy Director of Operations, + National Military Command Center (Tobin)Source: + Washington National Records Center, OSD Files, FRC 330–86–0042, UK 1982. Top Secret. A stamped notation at the bottom + of the memorandum indicates that Carlucci saw it on May 24. + + + Washington, May 24, 1982, 0530 EDT + + + SUBJECT + AM–2 Airfield Matting (U) + +

1. (TS) SECDEF called the DDO (NMCC) + at 232220 EDT May 82 indicating he had + just received a request from Mr Nott, Secretary of State for Defense, United Kingdom, + for 150,000 square yards of AM–2 airfield matting.Nott’s May 23 message reads: “I am + very grateful for the helpful way in which, following our talks in + Brussels earlier this month [see Document + 233], your Department has approached the question of + material support for UK forces. In + particular, my officials have been in touch with yours about the + possible release of 150,000 square yards of AM2 airfield matting, + which I understand the US Marine + Corps hold as war reserve. I should be very grateful if you could + agree to this release at a very early date, in which case our + officials could jointly work out the details. We would propose that + the matting should be transported from the United States in a ship + we would charter. We should also look to you for any special + training required. As to the financial basis of the release, perhaps + this could also be discussed between our officials: since you would + need, I understand, to arrange for resupply you may wish to consider + an arrangement under which you would supply to us initially on the + basis that the matting would be returned if unused. If it were used, + then when the Port Stanley airfield was permanently repaired we + would recover it to become a useful enhancement of the UK’s capability, for use either within + NATO or out of area.” + (Washington National Records Center, OSD Files, FRC 330–84–0004, UK (May) 1982) SECDEF stated he supported the + request and that speed in providing the equipment + was essential. SECDEF stated financial details had to be worked out but + UK was ready to buy now and long + term future of matting would be worked out later. He requested the DDO + take action to fulfill the request and brief him telephonically on the + expected availability of the equipment prior to his departure for + Detroit early morning, 24 May 1982.

+

2. (TS) At 240430 EDT May 82 the DDO + read the draft JCS execute order (atch 1)Attached but not printed. and a message to Mr Nott (atch 2)Attached but not printed. In his message to + Nott, sent to the British + Ministry of Defense at 0901Z, May 24, Weinberger stated that the request had been approved + and “will be met with maximum speed.” (Washington National Records + Center, OSD Files, FRC 330–86–0042, + UK 1982) to the SECDEF + which he approved. The message to Mr Nott was dispatched. The execute order will be further + coordinated prior to dispatch.

+ + Thomas G. + Tobin + Brigadier General, USAF Deputy Director for Operations, NMCC + +
+ +
+ + 288. Letter From Secretary of Defense Weinberger to British Defense Secretary NottSource: Washington National Records Center, OSD Files, FRC 330–86–0042, UK 1982. Top Secret. A copy was sent to + Henderson. Iklé sent a draft of the letter to + Weinberger under an + undated action memorandum, requesting that Weinberger sign the letter. Both + the draft of the letter, with Weinberger’s handwritten revisions, and the action + memorandum are ibid. + + + Washington, May 24, + 1982 + Dear John: + +

In your letter of May 5, you asked if certain equipment could be provided + on the basis that you would pay only for that used or retained.See footnote 2, + Document 233. As an alternative, you proposed a + “sale and return” basis for the equipment’s release.

+

I believe that the financing arrangement worked out between our + respective staffs substantially accomplishes what you propose. This + arrangement calls for us to position agreed-to items of equipment at + U.S. facilities for subsequent draw-down by the UK. The UK would reimburse + us for all costs of those items actually issued to you; in other cases + if there should be any major costs required for us to position any items + at U.S. facilities, I understand that our staffs have agreed that the + UK would bear these costs. If this + does not state your understanding, please let me know.

+

Your letter also addressed the immediate requirement for two specific + items. The first, the two Vulcan/Phalanx guns, were delivered on 14 May. + The second request for 300 AIM 9L Sidewinder missiles, formally came to us on May 13, as an + immediate request for 100 missiles, with the likelihood of 200 more + being required at a later date. On May 14, I approved the delivery of + the 100 missiles, which were flown to Ascension Island that same night + for delivery to the UK as you + requested.See Document 265.

+

Please let me know what else we can do.

+

Sincerely,

+ Cap +
+ + +
+ + 289. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department + of State and the White HouseSource: Department of State, Under Secretary of State for Political + Affairs, Miscellaneous Files, March 1981–February 1983, Lot 83D210, + Falklands [Folder 2]. Secret; Flash; Nodis. + + + New York, May 24, 1982, 1528Z + +

1440. For Secretary of State Haig, Asst Sec Enders, NSC Director + Clark, Ass Sec Newell, IO/UNA Tillman, and USOAS Amb Middendorf. Dept pass + CIA Director Casey. Subject: Falkland Islands: + Possible Resolution in Security Council.

+

1. Secret entire text.

+

2. Until now expected tabling of one or more resolutions on the Falklands + dispute has been delayed by an unexpected conjunction of three factors. + To the anticipated British reluctance to have Security Council action at + an early stage of the fighting has been added the desire of the left + mischief makers (USSR, and friends + including Panama, Mexico, Nicaragua) to prolong the debate to permit + maximum opportunity to attack UK and + US, and the less expected + cooperation of Argentina FoMin and delegation in this “slow down.”

+

3. Despite the clear indications that Argentine military chiefs desire + UN action, the FoMin has not + encouraged prompt action by such likely resolution authors as Brazil, + Ireland, Japan, China, etc.

+

4. At the end of the day Sunday,May + 23. three possible scenarios appeared. First, a resolution + calling for a cease-fire with a renewal of the Secretary General’s + mandate. This is apparently favored by Panama possibly Ireland as well. + Second, a more elaborate resolution that incorporates the elements of + agreement SYG thinks were essentially + present in his mediation efforts: ceasefire; simultaneous, rapid, mutual + force withdrawal; introduction of UN + force and interim administration. Third, same as two plus a new element: + creation of a “contact group” under Article 29 of the UN Charter probably consisting of four + countries with two each chosen by the UK + and Argentina. This approach is favored by Brazil, Venezuela, and + various others, probably including France and China.

+

5. It is understood that UK would veto + first approach, but would have problem with two and three.

+

6. Brazilian PermRep reported that + Costa Mendez has said if + there is no UN action by TuesdayMay 25. they will turn to OAS and Rio Treaty. This of course would be a great blow to + the inter-American system regardless of the number of votes Argentina is + able to mobilize.

+

7. Delay favored by Panama, Mexico, Nicaragua is doubtless in part + stimulated by this possibility. Cuba is out of sight in this discussion + but its presence is felt at all points, including in the invitation + already extended to Costa Mendez + to speak at the upcoming meeting of the non-aligned in Havana.A Ministerial conference of the Non-Aligned + Movement countries was scheduled to begin in Havana on May + 31. (I understand Costa + Mendez currently intends to go and has approached + Venezuela about accompanying them.)

+

8. There will presumably be a resolution tabled today. UK will ask for 24 hours and probably get + overnight.

+

9. Comment: Many fears are being expressed that US might join UK in a veto. + I recommend we closely consult with France and Japan and carefully + consider the UK record in UNSC on US vetoes (e.g., Nicaragua complaint, Dome of the Rock, + etc). At best they abstain. In the process they build national credit + for later use in situations such as this.

+

10. Incidentally, Parsons has + turned in a virtuoso performance throughout the Falklands crisis.

+

11. One version of possible resolution follows:

+

(A) 1. Immediate cessation of hostilities;

+

2. Simultaneous withdrawal of Argentine forces to continental Argentine + territory and simultaneous withdrawal of British forces in the northeast + direction to a minimum distance equivalent to that between Argentine + continental territory and the Malvinas/Falkland Islands; plus (B) and + (D)

+

3. Appointment by the Secretary General of the United Nations of a + provisional administration of the islands with exclusive competence + which will hold consultations with the representatives of the + inhabitants to be designated by the Governments of Argentina and the + United Kingdom; plus (C) and (E)

+

4. Establishment, under Article 29 of the United Nations Charter, of a + committee presided over by the Secretary General of the United Nations + and composed of the two parties and of four other member states, two of + which to be appointed by each of the parties, and with the mandate of + conducting urgent negotiations with a view to a permanent settlement of + the question; plus (F)

+

(B) The withdrawal of the British and Argentine forces will be initiated + 48 hours after the adoption of the resolution;

+ +

(C) The administration of the United Nations will be established + simultaneously with the beginning of the withdrawal of Argentine and + British forces;

+

(D) All Argentine and British forces would have withdrawn from the area + within 21 days and one third of the forces of each party would have + withdrawn at each seven days in accordance with criteria established by + the Secretary General;

+

(E) All United Nations member states will grant the Secretary General the + support required to the establishment of the provisional administration + and to the monitoring (supervision) of the implementation of the + provisions of the present resolution;

+

(F) The committee to be established in accordance with paragraph four + will begin its work the day following the completion of the withdrawal + of the forces from the area and will submit its report to the Security + Council not later than 31 January 1983.

+

12. Friendly nations regard it as extremely important that fighting not + be permitted to continue until one side is humiliated. It is feared that + British humiliation would enhance the risk of direct US participation, while Argentine + humiliation would further inflame anti-US passions in Latin America and enhance the risk of Soviet + participation in the conflict.

+ + Kirkpatrick + +
+ +
+ + 290. Information Memorandum From the Director of the Bureau of + Politico-Military Affairs (Howe) + to the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Eagleburger)Source: Department of State, + Executive Secretariat, S/S Special + Handling Restrictions Memos 1979–1983, Lot 96D262, ES Sensitive May 19–24 1982. Secret; + Sensitive. Drafted by T. Miller (PM/P). An unknown hand initialed for Miller. A stamped + notation at the top of the memorandum indicates that Eagleburger saw it on May 25. A + notation in the top left-hand corner of the memorandum reads: “CC to + DCG [David Gompert] + 5/25.” + + + Washington, May 24, + 1982 + + + SUBJECT + Limpet Mines + +

We have looked at the question of whether transfer of Limpet mines to the + UK could be traced back to us if the + British used them in their Falklands operations.

+

Our current information indicates that Limpet mines manufactured by the + U.S. have not been transferred to any other + country. Several countries including the UK, however, make similar devices.

+

This suggests that (1) disabling or sinking a ship with a Limpet-type + device would not point the finger at the U.S., but (2) if a + U.S.-manufactured Limpet mine was recovered intact and examined by + experts, it probably could be traced back to us.Below this paragraph, Eagleburger wrote: “OK. Let’s give them what they + want. LSE.”

+
+ +
+ + 291. Telegram From the Commander in Chief, Atlantic Command (Train) to the Chairman of the Joint + Chiefs of Staff (Jones)Source: National Archives, RG + 218, CJCS Files, FRC 218–92–0030, Message Traffic May 82—CINCLANT May 82. Top Secret; Eyes + Only. Sent for information to USEUCOM. + + + Norfolk, May + 24, 1982, 2300Z + +

0047. Eyes Only Personal for Gen Jones info Gen Rogers from Train. Subj: Impact on NATO Forces Due Falklands Crisis (S).

+

A. JCS Washington DC 221502Z May 82.Not + found.

+

1. (TS) The Falklands crisis has caused perturbations to NATO capabilities as discussed Ref A and + references thereto. Further comment/assessment follows:

+

A. (U) Readiness impact:

+

(1) (S) Ground: The principal loss is the availability of a forward + deployed NATO landing force, comprised + largely of the Third Royal Marine Commando Brigade deployed to the + Falklands, which totals approx 5700 pers with 42 helos. One RNLMC amphibious combat group remains available, provided + shipping can be provided by a NATO + nation. (None of 8 UK committed + amphibious bottoms are avail.) The + critical feature is not numbers but the lack of a forward deployed + amphib force in Northern Europe.

+

(2) (TS) Air:

+

—Impact on UK strategic bombing/air + refueling capability, and potential loss of Northern European Command + tactical air support of maritime operations capability upon commitment + of land-based tacair to Falklands is + deferred to CINCEUR.

+

—The commitment of a majority number of MPA, offensive air and Sea + King + ASW assets reduces numbers available to + SACLANT with totals fluctuating + downward daily. Currently 20 MPA, 29 + offensive, 30 air defense and 6 Sea + King aircraft are committed to SACLANT.

+

(3) (TS) Navy:

+

—The commitment of all UK + CV-based ASW air reduces available forward deployed protection for + STRIKFLTLANT. Currently, 2 + CVS/21 ASW escorts are committed to + SACLANT + w/in 48 hours; however, only 5 ASW escorts are now available, and they + may soon be deployed to replace losses.

+

—The majority of surface ship ASW + protection would also be eliminated. Of the 10 ASW escorts committed to SACLANT + w/in 48 hours, only 1 escort is + available.

+ +

—A major reduction is sustained in SSN + task group protection. Of 7 SSN’s + committed to SACLANT + w/in 48 hours, only 2 SSN’s are available.

+

—Of the majority of the 20 various MLSF + ships assigned to NATO support only 7 + are available. That MLSF shipping + remains under national OPCON is + acknowledged.

+

B. (TS) Other UK forces to support + Falklands crisis: It is estimated that 4 to 5 DD/FF types, RAF + F–4 and Harrier, and additional ground forces could be withdrawn + for further contingency support. The DD/FF types would be replacements for losses, while the + F–4 and Harrier A/C would be land based to allow CV sea room. Ground forces would be + employed for expanded Island occupation.

+

C. (TS) US/Allied compensating forces: Barring NOREUR crisis declaration or specific + NCA direction, no NATO peacetime compensation is + recommended. Current Northern flank force gap is a temporary reduction + similar to that on Southern flank when a US + CVBG redeployed to I.O. in January 1980. In NOREUR crisis all NATO forces avail are committed; estimate UK forces would rejoin under this scenario, leaving + Falklands crisis as is.

+

D. (TS) Sources of US/Allied force compensation: In the event of general + war or directed peacetime compensation, UK A–1 NATO sea + commitment could be partially covered by early availability of earmarked + US and other NATO A–3/A–4 Navy forces, ground forces + compensation should be air mobile to the maximum extent.

+

E. (U) Replacement of UK forces by US: Paragraphs C and D above are + germane.

+

F. (C) US fulfillment of other UK/NATO + commitments/NATO related support ops:

+

(1) (TS) Navy/Air:

+

—Caribbean station ship—fill by COMNAVFORCARIB duty ship.

+

—STANAVFORLANT ship—fill from I.O. + commitment.

+

—GIUK MPA—fill by forward deployment of + P–3 to UK vice I.O.

+

—UK air defense—fill by forward deploy + USAF F–15/F–4 to UK.

+

—Aerial refueling—fill by forward deploying strategic tanker assets.

+

(2) (S) Ground: While US ground forces + could backfill for their UK counterparts + in the Northern European Command, protection of the Atlantic Islands + would be left in doubtful status.

+

2. (TS) It is worthy of note that the UK + is planning significant naval force reductions in 1983, and that the + Falklands crisis merely surfaces the NATO impact issue early. Similar involvement of another + major NATO member would severely + degrade NATO’s ability to respond in a + crisis of any magnitude.

+
+ +
+ + 292. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department + of StateSource: Reagan + Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC + Cable File, Falkland File 05/26/1982. Secret; Sensitive; Immediate; + Nodis. Printed from a copy + that was received in the White House Situation Room. + + + New York, May 26, 1982, 0200Z + +

1470. For Asst. Sec. Enders from + Amb. Kirkpatrick. Subj: Falkland + Islands Situation: Amb. Kirkpatrick’s Meeting with Gen. Miret.

+

1. (Secret–Entire text)

+

2. At his request, Amb. Kirkpatrick and Amb. Sorzano met with Argentinian Air Force General Jose Miret evening of May 24. Alberto + Manen, Air Attache’s aide with Argentina’s Embassy in Washington, + accompanied Gen. Miret but did + not attend meeting.

+

3. Gen. Miret began by + acknowledging that Argentina had committed “original sin” in invading + the Falklands and continued by repeating the well-known Argentinian + views on the history of the Falklands over the last 150 years, British + inflexibility and the failure of more than a decade of negotiations + which eventually culminated in the invasion. Miret then gave Argentinian version of the respective + mediating efforts of Secretary Haig and SYG Perez de + Cuellar. The failure of these efforts had led to the present situation + and raised the concerns which he wanted to discuss.

+

4. According to Gen. Miret the + military situation was developing favorably for Argentina. Just that + morning 21 Argentinian warplanes had attacked British ships and had + inflicted severe damage to the Canberra troop carrier. Yesterday they + had sunk a frigate.Argentine air attacks on + May 24 struck numerous British vessels in San Carlos Water, although + Canberra was not among those hit. + (Freedman, Official History, vol. II, pp. + 477–479) On May 23, the British frigate HMS + Antelope was attacked by Argentine aircraft + in San Carlos Water and struck by two bombs which failed to explode. + One bomb exploded during an attempt to disarm it, forcing the ship’s + abandonment and ultimate sinking the following day. Situation Report + Number 68 (as of 1700 hours, May 24), transmitted in telegram 142578 + to all diplomatic and consular posts, May 25, described the ship as + “abandoned.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, + D820271–0728) British were not accurately portraying their + losses and he was skeptical that their San Carlos beachhead was as well + established as they claimed. Although presently the military situation + favored Argentina, Argentina was aware that ultimately Britain would + prevail because Argentina could not expect to defeat a world power. + Argentina naturally did not want to lose but neither did it find comfort + in the thought of winning in a manner that would humiliate Britain.

+ +

5. Yet the prolongation of the war had its own danger. It provided + opportunity for the Cubans and Soviets to increase their meddling in + Hemispheric affairs. Britain’s expansion of the war zone to include the + River Plate estuary necessarily dragged Uruguay and probably Brazil into + the conflict. Uruguayan Foreign Minister was coming to New York to raise + the issue. As the conflict expands and its intensity increases, it will + become increasingly difficult to foresee its consequences or to find an + acceptable solution.

+

6. Gen. Miret said the Argentinian + Government is convinced that the U.S. must play a mediating role in the + conflict. This role could be either a public or a behind-the-scenes one, + but either way U.S. mediation is necessary because only the U.S. can + influence the U.K. to adopt a position conducive to the termination of + hostilities. Without an American restraining influence, Britain will + insist on pursuing its military objectives until the bitter end. The + bitter end will be bitter indeed for all except the Communists.

+

7. Within Argentine Government, the U.S. has friends as well as foes. + There are those—the hardliners—who are advocating an escalation of + diplomatic measures starting with the withdrawal of Argentinian + representatives to the Inter-American Defense Board and culminating with + the withdrawal of Ambassadors. This rupture of relations was opposed by + another faction of military chiefs that see this as necessarily leading + to an Argentinian embrace of the Soviet Union. After the violent + struggle against domestic guerrillas and terrorists it would be ironic + to hand to the Soviets what they had been denied by effective + counter-terrorist action.

+

8. Finally, turning to the U.N. Security Council situation, Miret indicated that Brazilian draft + was acceptable to the chiefs of the Argentina Junta.

+ + Kirkpatrick + +
+ +
+ + 293. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the + United NationsSource: Reagan + Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC + Cable File, Falkland File 05/25/1982. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Sent for information + Immediate to Buenos Aires and London and for information to all + UN Security Council capitals. + Printed from a copy that was received in the White House Situation + Room. + + + Washington, May 25, 1982, 0153Z + +

142586. Subject: Falklands and Security Council: Further Guidance. Ref: + A) USUN New York 1440,See Document 289. + B) USUN New York 1439,Telegram 1439 from USUN, May 24, transmitted a summary of Kirkpatrick’s May 23 meeting with + a high-level Venezuelan delegation on the impact of the South + Atlantic conflict on the inter-American system. (Department of + State, Central Foreign Policy File, D820269–0665) C) State + 139097.In telegram 139097 to USUN, May 21, Haig conveyed guidance for the + Mission to use in the event of a request for a meeting of the UN Security Council, an announcement by + Pérez de Cuéllar of an + impasse in his mediation effort, or a British landing. Haig suggested that as a “first + effort,” the United States “should discourage any further, formal + action by the Council.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy + File, D820266–0219)

+

1. S–Entire text.

+

2. In light of Security Council debate and prospect that resolution(s) + unacceptable to US may soon be + introduced (Ref A), the following amended guidance is provided for + USUN.

+

3. Our objective remains to encourage all constructive efforts for a + settlement while avoiding any UN action + which would prejudice the UK’s right to + use force under Article 51 of the Charter or which would amount to a de + facto imposition of change in the Islands’ status prior to negotiations. + We continue to wish to preserve the UN + as an impartial intermediary in case it is needed in the future, and + wish to avoid any unbalanced resolution that one side would reject.

+

4. We should continue in our talks with others to hold that Res 502 + remains basis for a just solution and that we would oppose any action + which superseded 502. Of resolutions likely to be advanced at this point + we could accept only one which (A) limited itself to reaffirming 502 in + a way not prejudicial to UK’s right to + recover Islands entirely and/or (B) gave SYG new mandate to continue his mediating efforts but + without calling for cease-fire or a substantive prescription for a + settlement that would prejudice British right to self-defense or impose + other terms unacceptable to the UK. This + means that we should discourage others from believing that we might find + acceptable a cease-fire resolution made somewhat more positive by the + inclusion of selected elements for a settlement already agreed upon but + whose effect would be to call + for a halt in UK’s legitimate exercise + of self-defense and leave British in unsatisfactory position on the + ground. British would veto such a resolution, and we would support + them.

+

5. We also believe that the British at this stage will veto any + resolution that would stand in the way of their complete recovery of the + Falklands and restoration of a UK + administration or at least traditional local administration. Since there + is probably no substantive formula which could bridge the gap between + the UK and Argentina at this stage, we + want to discourage efforts to do this in a resolution. We do not wish to + be placed in a position of having to vote on a reasonable sounding + resolution that contains ostensible concessions to the British, but + which the British will veto in any case.

+

6. As for possible resolution described in Ref A, para 11, it would fall into the category + of resolution described in para 4 + above which we would veto, assuming the British did.

+

7. We have just learned that Irish draft resolution calling for a + temporary cease-fire and for SYG to + contact parties to discuss extended cease-fire and possible UN observers has been tabled.In telegram 1454 from USUN, May 25, Kirkpatrick reported that the Irish resolution would + be tabled the evening of May 25. “The Irish argue that it is like a + wedge—it asks little of either party and builds confidence.” + Kirkpatrick continued + that Parsons “has already + informed us that the resolution is unacceptable to them. They will + veto. A ceasefire is unacceptable in principle; unworkable in + practice. Panamanian resolution is not acceptable. The Japanese + version of a resolution is least acceptable to British because it + provides nothing. Parsons + did not comment to me concerning the ‘Brazilian’ approach which I + think we should expect after Irish draft is rejected, but clearly + they prefer no action at all. Vote is likely to come tomorrow + afternoon on Irish draft. In considering US vote, I urge that we carefully consider our + distinctive interests and hemispheric friends. And also, especially, + that we look at UK record of support + for US. On Nicaraguan complaint for + example, of which we were target—we vetoed, they abstained, also + Salvador, and on a whole series of Middle East votes.” (Reagan + Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC + Cable File, Falkland File 05/25/1982) For a summary of the Irish and + Japanese resolutions, see Yearbook of the United + Nations, 1982, p. 1330. In accordance with the + above, U.S. should urge other members of the Council to oppose this + draft. If, however, it obtains nine votes, and as we assume UK plans to veto it, we should also vote + against.

+ + Haig + +
+ +
+ + 294. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the + United KingdomSource: Reagan + Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC + Country File, Europe and Soviet Union, United Kingdom + (04/01/1982–07/31/1982) (4). Secret; Niact Immediate; Nodis. Printed from a copy that was received in the + White House Situation Room. + + + Washington, May 25, 1982, 0417Z + +

142651. For the Ambassador from the Secretary. Subject: Secretary’s + Letter to Foreign Secretary Pym.

+

1. Secret–Entire text.

+

2. Please deliver as early as possible Tuesday morning,May 25. your time, the following message + from me to Foreign Secretary Pym:

+

Begin text:

+

Dear Francis:

+

At this crucial moment in the course of the Falklands crisis, I wanted + you to have my latest thoughts on the opportunities and risks we face + together. First and foremost, I want you to know that you can continue + to count on US support as you do what is + necessary.

+

We are fast approaching the point at which the UK will have a decisive local military advantage, with + success clearly within your reach. At that point, which even Argentine + self-delusion cannot hide, the Argentines could feel compelled to turn + to the Cubans and Soviets as their last hope to avert total humiliation. + Should Galtieri resist these + pressures, he could be swept aside and replaced by those far more + hostile to fundamental Western interests. Even if the Argentines do not + open themselves to the Soviets and Cubans, they are virtually certain to + want to continue a state of war, which they will pursue with whatever + means they can acquire.

+

If this occurs, however successful you are on the Islands, we will + unquestionably face a future of open-ended conflict, possibly supported + by the East and at considerable risk and cost to your interests and + ours. Whatever disposition to settle there may now be in Buenos Aires + will evaporate. Moreover, however unjust, we will together be left + isolated in the international community, with relentless pressures to + settle on terms favorable to Argentina notwithstanding the justice of + our position and the success of your forces.

+

In the face of these long-term prospects, I see major advantages in an + effort by you to put forward terms of a just and reasonable settlement + as soon as you are sure + that you can and will succeed militarily. I appreciate fully your + reservations about agreeing, in a settlement, to withdraw British forces + without an assurance that the Islands and the inhabitants would be + absolutely safe from renewed aggression if a negotiated settlement broke + down. Therefore, and in the interest of averting dangerous political + developments in Argentina, the US would + be prepared to provide a battalion-size force for the purpose of + ensuring that there would be no violation of any interim agreement + preceding a final settlement. Because of what has happened to our + standing with the Argentines as a result of our support for you, there + is no chance that a US-only force would + be acceptable. We would therefore need to persuade the most trustworthy + major hemispheric power—Brazil—to join us. A combined force would + present a credible deterrent and assure the security of the Islanders + for the period of an interim agreement.

+

No doubt you are aware of the proposal the Brazilians have introduced in + New York.Brazil’s proposal was in a May 24 + letter to the Secretary General. See Yearbook of + the United Nations, 1982, p. 1334. We can appreciate + that London would have difficulty with this proposal, particularly as it + pertains to force withdrawal and interim administration. However, at the + point at which British military success is at hand, it may well be + possible to bring about an agreement based on a British proposal that + contains elements of the Brazilian text, with provisions for withdrawal + and interim administration adjusted to meet your concerns, and with the + US and Brazil ready to provide + peacekeeping forces. If you agree that such an effort would be + worthwhile, we would be ready to assist in such an initiative, perhaps + in conjunction with the Brazilians.

+

I have asked the Brazilians if they might consider participating in a + peacekeeping force under a negotiated solution, though without, of + course, giving them any reason to believe that you are interested in + their proposal, nor commenting in any way on their text.See Document 295 and footnote 2 thereto.

+

I would appreciate your personal reaction as soon as possible to these + ideas, with regard both to substance and timing. If our willingness to + provide a substantial peacekeeping component makes the prospects for an + early negotiated settlement more attractive to you, I would welcome your + thoughts on other necessary provisions. As you can appreciate, + circumstances may alter our ability to offer peacekeeping forces if + radical changes occur in Buenos Aires. This argues for moving quickly + enough to forestall any such changes.

+ +

I hope you will appreciate that what I am suggesting would serve our + long-term interests, if it made agreement possible, as well as put you + in a better position politically if and as you do what you must + militarily.

+

Sincerely, Al

+

End of text.

+ Haig +
+ +
+ 295. Telegram From the Embassy in Brazil to the Department of + StateSource: Reagan + Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC + Country File, Latin America/Central, Falklands War (05/27/1982). + Secret; Flash; Nodis. Sent for + information Immediate to the White House. Printed from a copy that + was received in the White House Situation Room. Clark wrote “President has seen” + at the top of the telegram. In a May 26 memorandum to Reagan, Haig stated that the démarche + decision was reached during a May 24 discussion between the two; see + Document 298. + + + Brasilia, May 25, 1982, 1532Z + +

4334. Subject: Demarche on Falklands. Ref: (A) State 142593.In telegram 142593 to Brasilia, May 25, Haig instructed Motley to contact Figueiredo, following on the + exchange between Figueiredo and Reagan in Washington concerning the “possibility of + joint action to end the South Atlantic crisis,” and provided the + Ambassador with a list of talking points. (Reagan Library, Executive + Secretariat, NSC Cable File, + Falkland File 05/25/1982) Regarding Figueiredo’s visit, see Document + 255.

+

1. (Secret–Entire text)

+

2. I secured a private audience with President Figueiredo at 0900 May 25 as + instructed reftel. I made all the + points in the reftel with following + preliminary additions: President Reagan’s pleasure at news of excellent bill of health + that President Figueiredo + received at Cleveland Clinic, and our interest in the most recent + Brazilian initiative at the UN regarding + a negotiated settlement. Figueiredo would interrupt and comment as we proceeded + in the discussion.

+

3. Figueiredo concurred in our + assessment of British posture and intransigence of both parties but he + felt that once the British control the Islands the tables would be + turned and the main challenge to the British would be to resupply and + maintain a large garrison on the Islands. He felt that realization of + this major problem might lead Britain to want to negotiate.

+

4. President Figueiredo + responded positively to suggestion that Brazil join with US in any manner possible to achieve a + negotiated solution. He said, quote I’ll do whatever President Reagan feels needs to be done. I’ll send emissaries. I’ll + talk to Galtieri. I’ll even go + to the border at Uruguaiana to meet him. I’ll work within normal + channels and outside normal channels.Clark underlined the + quotation. Unquote.

+

5. Figueiredo said that he did + not believe Argentina would welcome the presence of Brazilian troops on + Falklands. He feels longstanding Argentine suspicion and fear that + Brazilians have designs on Antarctica and the age-old rivalry between + the two countries as dominant forces on the continent would lead + Argentines to reject this aspect of the plan. In fact, he said, it could + inhibit Brazil’s influence in other aspects of helping in the negotiated + settlement. Figueiredo + proposed a four-nation force: two countries picked by each side; and he + suggested that Argentina would probably feel more comfortable with + forces from either Paraguay, Ecuador, Colombia or Bolivia. He felt that + Venezuela had tilted too much in Argentina’s favor and that Peru was + joining those ranks.

+

6. He forecast that either Argentina or Great Britain might pick South + Africa, and he thought this selection would be very important. He said + that his Foreign Office was always shying away from relations with South + Africa because this was the quote price charged unquote by Black Africa + for good relations with Brazil. Nevertheless, Figueiredo felt that any South + Atlantic solution must draw South Africa into the deal, because he + considers South Africa a key to the security of the South Atlantic in + the long term, especially now that we have seen that things can get out + of hand in this region.

+

7. When I brought up the OAS meeting and + the possibility of Figueiredo’s talking to the Argentines, he reacted quickly + and positively. He said GOB posture for + that meeting was to concentrate on solidarity and a minimum of sanctions + necessary to placate the Argentines. When I reiterated our concern that + an OAS meeting could block a negotiated + settlement, he volunteered that he would call Galtieri and ask him quote not to put + any more wood on the fire. Unquote.

+

8. Comment: Figueiredo saw me + on short (40 minutes) notice, squeezing me in between presentation of + Ambassadorial credentials and his regularly scheduled staff meeting at + 0900 with Leitao, Venturini, Delfim and Medeiros. He sent a GOB car to pick me up at the Embassy to + take me to the private Presidential entrance to avoid any public + knowledge of the visit. Figueiredo was alert, interested and decisive. I did not + have to prompt him, nor did he seem to cogitate on any of the actions + that he proposed or volunteered. He spoke at length on the dilemma + facing the British once they had established themselves on the Islands + and also on the reaction of Galtieri and the Argentines regarding the possibility of Brazilian troops on + the Falklands. He also addressed at length the thinking of the + Argentines at this moment and the necessity of leaving them with the + impression that they had achieved a principal goal, to wit: deny the + Islands to the British (in the case of simultaneous withdrawal). He + emphasized that this denial was the quote public-relations-out unquote + for Galtieri with the Argentine + people when he had to explain to them a simultaneous Argentine + withdrawal. At the conclusion of the meeting I asked him if it would be + useful for me to talk with Foreign Minister Guerreiro. He replied yes, + and that he would tell Guerreiro that I would brief him on our + conversation. On my departure Figueiredo reiterated how pleased he was with his state + visit and especially with the warmth, candor, and personal courtesies of + President Reagan. He also said + that he was very impressed with Vice President Bush and Secretary Haig, and jokingly asked if he could + borrow one or both of them as he needed people of that calibre.

+

9. As I was shown out I was the recipient of some good-natured kidding by + the nine o’clock staff meeting group for having delayed the important + business of state for 30 minutes.In + telegram 4372 from Brasilia, May 25, Motley reported on his meetings with other Brazilian + officials: “On the basis of separate meetings with Ministers + Medeiros (Intelligence) and Venturini (Military Household) on the + one hand and with FonMin Guerreiro on the other, it appears that + President Figuiredo may pursue a two-track course on the Falklands + crisis. FonMin Guerreiro is to take a normal diplomatic track; + Medeiros and Venturini are proposing that they personally pursue a + face-to-face with Galtieri.” + (Reagan Library Executive Secretariat, NSC Cable File, Falkland File 05/25/1982) +

+ + Motley + +
+ +
+ + 296. Action Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for + Inter-American Affairs (Enders) + and the Permanent Representative to the Organization of American States + (Middendorf) to Secretary of + State HaigSource: Department of State, Central + Foreign Policy File, P820078–0673. Secret. Drafted by Johnson; cleared by Thompson, Bolton, and Morley. A stamped notation at the + top of the memorandum indicates that Haig saw it. + + + Washington, May 25, + 1982 + + + SUBJECT + Falkland Islands: Strategy for the Reconvened XX MFM + +

ISSUE FOR DECISION

+

US posture at the reconvened XXMFM + beginning Thursday morning, May 27.

+

ESSENTIAL FACTORS

+

We know what Argentina is going for: condemnation of + the UK, call on all members of + the inter-American system to refrain from support for the UK, call for optimal + individual sanctions on the UK, + probably censure US or at least urge us to lift sanctions and cut + support for the British. Nicaragua and Panama may up + the ante and try to go for mandatory + sanctions.

+

Whether the resolution is mandatory or optional, it needs 14 votes to + carry. We went out today in an effort to pick up the 7 votes which, in + addition to that of the US, could block. + Chile, Colombia, and Trinidad & Tobago are sure. Costa Rica, El + Salvador, Haiti, and the Dominican Republic are possible. In addition, + we are approaching Brazil to see whether it would + not sponsor some moderate alternative resolution to prevent a deep + split in the organization.Figueiredo sent a + message to Reagan, May 25; + Enders forwarded a + translation of this message to Haig under a May 25 information memorandum, in which + he summarized the message: “The thrust is + that new Security Council action will be required + within 48 hours to head off unfavorable developments at + Thursday’s OAS + MFM” and that Brazil’s new + resolution “contains the basic elements for UNSC action.” Noting that + Brazilian participation was “placed back within a UN context,” Enders noted, “surprisingly, Figueiredo does allow for possible Brazilian + participation in a peace-keeping force, if invited by one + of the parties.” (Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S Special Handling Restrictions Memos + 1979–1983, Lot 96D262, ES Sensitive + May 25–31 1982)

+

Once the meeting convenes, we should make a long and + detailed exposition of our views, using the conciliatory and, + to a considerable degree, even-handed language you approved for the + UNSC. In addition, we should remind members, as we already have in + capitals, of what the inter-American system has achieved. After all, South and Central + America and the Caribbean are that part of the developing world that has + the least per capita military expenditures, the least incidence of war + in the post-war generation, and has been under the least pressure from + the communist bloc.

+

We will, of course, if the Irish-Ugandan + resolution makes it,The resolution + introduced by Uganda was adopted as UNSC Resolution 505. See Document + 301. + argue that a new UNSC mandate creates new opportunities for peace, + and that no action should be taken in Washington at the OAS which might prejudice it.

+

We should participate in negotiations on the + resolution, although it is unlikely that anything will be + worked out that we can support.

+

In sum, we should attempt

+

(a) to get the blocking minority in place to prevent + the worst excesses, and

+

(b) to use the occasion to reassert our interest in, + and the value of the inter-American system.

+

Clearly whatever we do, the chances are that the outcome will be to some + considerable degree unfavorable to our interests. Within 48 hours we + should know whether we can let on that there is some Brazil/US peace + activity underway, and that could go far towards controlling + damage.Haig underlined a portion of this sentence beginning + with the word “within” and ending with “underway.” He added “?” in + the right-hand margin next to the sentence.

+

We expect that the Foreign Ministers of Argentina, Venezuela, Panama, + Nicaragua, and Uruguay (Chairman) will attend. Of them, we recommend you + see only the Venezuelan (useful to keep the dialogue open even if he + will not listen to reason now).

+

RECOMMENDATION:

+

That you approve the approach outlined above.Haig initialed his + approval of the recommendation on May 26. Below this, he added the + following notation: “See me re our intervention! AMH.”

+
+ +
+ + 297. Message From British Foreign Secretary Pym to Secretary of State HaigSource: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, + Files of Alexander M. Haig, + Jr., 1981–1982, Lot 82D370, (3) Falklands Crisis + 1982. UK Secret. A stamped notation + at the top of the message indicates that Haig saw it. + + + London, May 26, + 1982 + +

Begins:

+

Thank you very much for the message which I received yesterday + morning.See Document 294. You have raised some very important + and difficult questions.

+

I do of course understand the danger of Argentina turning towards the + Soviet Union. And we in London are naturally concerned about the risk of + Argentine military strikes against the Falkland Islands after we have + repossessed them. I was particularly grateful for your generous and + important offer of an American battalion to help in deterring any + Argentine move to invade the Islands again in the future. We are + thinking hard about all these problems.

+

In the meantime I should like to give you something of the flavour of the + political situation here.In telegram 11615 + from London, May 25, the Embassy provided its own assessment of the + Thatcher government’s + outlook: “Thatcher wants to + take the Islands fast. She also may want us to help Britain keep + them. Military stalemate or a frontal assault with high casualties + might heighten Thatcher’s + interest in a ceasefire and negotiations. But she forcefully + rejected a ceasefire Tuesday in the Commons and it is far from clear + she envisages early negotiations.” “In reconquest,” the assessment + continued, “we should not expect magnanimity. On the contrary, + Thatcher will want to + celebrate a victory that will be a political triumph.” The “Foreign + Office and probably Pym would + be glad to see Britain eventually rid of the Islands and back to its + real business in this world.” “Indeed, we are told, the Foreign + Office favors the Secretary’s proposal, but doubts Thatcher will buy it.” (Reagan + Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC + Cable File, Falkland File 05/25/1982) With the continued + refusal of Argentina to negotiate seriously and with the establishment + of the British bridgehead in the Falklands, there has been a major + change in parliamentary and public opinion in Britain. It would no + longer be realistic to ask people here to accept the ideas of an interim + administration or mutual withdrawal from the Falklands. They are just + not political starters now. After the events of recent days, and the + British losses as well as our military progress, what people want to see + is the repossession of the Islands and the restoration of British + administration. The achievement of those will of course enable us to + consult the Islanders in due time about their wishes for the future.

+

One question I am therefore considering is whether some of the ideas + mentioned in your message, and particularly your offer of a battalion, could be used at a somewhat + later stage. I may want to come back to you on this.

+

Meanwhile, let me stress that I am very conscious of the need for Britain + and the US to maintain the best possible + relations with the Latin America countries—especially the moderates. I + have spoken today on the BBC Latin American Service in terms which I hope will go down well in those + countries. The Prime Minister and I have been in contact with our + opposite numbers in Brasil, Colombia, Dominican Republic, Peru and + elsewhere. British Ambassadors throughout the area have today been + instructed to make approaches about the OAS meeting later this week.

+

I greatly value our exchanges of messages and your frequent talks with + Nicko Henderson.Henderson + sent a handwritten note to Haig regarding Pym’s message on May 25: “I expect Walter [Stoessel] and Larry [Eagleburger] passed on the + personal message: that Francis found plenty of food for thought in + your message, however different the present mood in London. Francis + asks me to tell you personally how much he values your frank talks + with me which enables him to keep in touch with your thoughts. So, + they certainly are considering your ideas in London; and the way you + have expressed them has forestalled any nervousness.” (Department of + State, Executive Secretariat, Files of Alexander M. Haig Jr., 1981–1982, Lot 82D370, (3) + Falklands Crisis 1982) Without your support, things would be + far harder for us in these difficult days.

+

Ends.

+
+ +
+ + 298. Memorandum From Secretary of State Haig to President ReaganSource: + Reagan Library, Dennis C. + Blair Files, Country Files, Falklands Crisis 1982. + Secret. Eagleburger + initialed the memorandum on behalf of Haig. McFarlane prepared an undated draft covering + memorandum to Clark, + summarizing Haig’s + memorandum, stating Clark’s + agreement with its contents, and suggesting that Clark could include it with + Haig’s memorandum for + submission to Reagan. A + stamped notation indicates that Clark saw McFarlane’s draft memorandum; however, an attached + handwritten note from Poindexter to Clark states that it was not sent to Reagan per Clark’s instructions. A further + notation in an unidentified hand reads: “overtaken.” (Reagan + Library, Latin American Affairs Directorate Files, + Falklands/Malvinas: NSC & State + Memos, 1982) + + + Washington, May 26, + 1982 + + + SUBJECT + Falklands Crisis + +

Our latest exchanges with the British confirm that they are currently not + of a mind to work toward a negotiated settlement which gives anything at + all to the Argentines before they retake the Islands. After my + conversation with you on Monday,May 24. No + memorandum of conversation of the discussion has been found. + According to the President’s Daily Diary, Haig met with Reagan on two occasions on May 24. + The first was for a meeting of the National Security Council from + 10:35 to 11:28 a.m. The second was during a meeting to discuss + Senator Baker’s upcoming + trip to China, which was also attended by Senator Baker, James Baker, Clark, Meese, and Duberstein, from 3:05 until 3:45 p.m. + (Reagan Library, President’s Daily Diary) I put to them the + idea of a US-Brazilian peacekeeping + force as a way of enabling them to contemplate withdrawal of British + forces as part of an interim agreement.See + footnote 2, Document 295. + The reply I just received from my British counterpart, Pym, states that the ideas of mutual + withdrawal and interim administration are “no longer realistic,” given + the major change in British mood resulting from their successful + landing.See Document 297.

+

In the meantime, the UN Secretary General + has asked the two parties for their positions on a ceasefire within 24 + hours. The Argentines have replied that they could accept a ceasefire + first, followed by discussions of mutual + withdrawal. The British position, which has not yet been given + officially to the Secretary General, is that a ceasefire is acceptable + only if there is a simultaneous Argentine + withdrawal. The two sides could not be further apart. The Secretary + General has asked us to put pressure on the British to accept mutual + withdrawal, warning that he will announce Thursday evening that a + ceasefire is not possible if the British have not moderated their + position.

+ +

It would be a major error for us to pressure the British at all at this + point. Given the mood in London, American pressure would be in vain; we + should conserve our leverage with Mrs. Thatcher until it can be used to produce results, i.e., + when the islands are effectively in British hands.

+

At my suggestion, the British will try to delay responding to the + Secretary General on the ceasefire question. At a minimum, we would hope + to have the OAS meeting—which begins + ThursdayMay 27. and could last + for several days—behind us before the Secretary General declares that + the British position makes a further effort on his part impossible. As + it is, we will not find it easy to get through the OAS meeting without a bad resolution. If + the latest UN effort aborts—and the + British are blamed—our support from moderates in the OAS will disintegrate.

+

There is virtually no hope of productive neogtiations before the British + complete their re-occupation of the Islands. Even then, the British will + be reluctant to offer anything to the Argentines. They will want a + ceasefire, and they are sensitive to our concerns about further damage + in the Hemisphere and new opportunities for the Soviets and Cubans. But + they will not be flexible, at least in the short term, in the flush of + victory.

+

At the right time, we should go back to the British with suggestions + regarding the sort of offer they should make once they have retaken the + Islands. A British victory on the Islands, unless followed by an effort + to reach a negotiated solution, would lead only to further conflict and + an unhealable wound in our relations with our Latin neighbors. We are + now working on ideas for such an offer.

+
+ +
+ + 299. Memorandum From James M. + Rentschler and Dennis C. + Blair of the National Security Council Staff to the + President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Clark)Source: Reagan Library, Latin American Affairs + Directorate Files, Falklands/Malvinas: NSC & State Memos, 1982. Top Secret; Sensitive. + Sent for information. Sent through McFarlane. A stamped notation indicates that + Clark saw the + memorandum. On another copy of the memorandum, Poindexter wrote in the upper + right hand corner: “5/26 Judge read and agrees. JP.” (Ibid.) + According to a May 26 NSC routing + slip, McFarlane sent the + memorandum to Poindexter for + delivery to Clark, who was + in Santa Barbara, California. Poindexter wrote on the routing slip: “Have + Jim Rentschler go see + Jesse Helms on the + Hill tomorrow and + explain. JP.” (Ibid.) + + + Washington, May 26, + 1982 + + + SUBJECT + Proposed Presidential Mediation in the South Atlantic + +

Issue

+

Should the President call for a summit peace conference for the + Falklands, inviting Mrs. Thatcher and General Galtieri to Washington or some neutral location to solve + the dispute?

+

Pros

+

—If ground were properly prepared, could bring an end to hostilities + (depends on readiness of two sides to compromise—right now, little + likelihood of success);

+

—Could, if properly timed, return the U.S. relationship with Argentina + some distance toward what it was before the breakdown of the Haig mission;

+

—Could have a similarly restorative and/or reparative effect vis-a-vis + our relations in the rest of the Hemisphere, improving our chances for + resuming cooperative initiatives there;

+

—Would, if successful, enhance President’s image as man of peace. Even if + unsuccessful, could possibly enhance the image, as long as properly + handled and did not end in U.S. and one country ganging up on the + third.

+

Cons:

+

—If there were not a readiness to compromise on the two sides, the + President’s attempt would go the way of the Haig mission, the Perez de Cuellar mission, the Peruvian + president’s mission: just one more unsuccessful peace attempt with the + difference that the President’s personal prestige would be tainted with + the stigma of failure;

+ +

—If the attempt were made before a British military victory, it would do + great damage to relations with the U.K., amounting to another Suez + (depriving U.K. of the fruits of success at the critical moment);

+

—If the President’s proposal, once the conference has convened, failed to + meet the minimum conditions of either the U.K. or Argentina, that + country could pull out of the conference with increased bitterness and + resentment towards the United States.

+

—The President himself is not the sort of “detail” man who is best suited + to negotiating personally a complicated peace settlement, as Carter did + at Camp David.

+

Conclusion

+

A Presidential call for a summit peace conference is a good idea if we have reason to believe that the U.K. and + Argentina are ready to compromise their differences and if we have prior assurance that both parties want + the President in between. A call for a summit peace conference before + British success on the ground, and before the two sides show signs of a + readiness to compromise, would pose too many risks to be worthwhile.

+

Roger Fontaine concurs.

+
+ +
+ 300. Action Memorandum From the Director of the Bureau of + Politico-Military Affairs (Howe) + and the Assistant Secretary of State-Designate for European Affairs + (Burt) to the Under + Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Eagleburger)Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S Special Handling Restrictions Memos + 1979–1983, Lot 96D262, ES Sensitive + May 25–31 1982. Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Kanter; cleared by Blackwill. Kanter initialed for both Burt and Blackwill. + + + Washington, May 26, + 1982 + + + SUBJECT + UK Use of US Facilities at Lajes + +

ISSUE FOR DECISION

+

This memorandum recommends that you approve UK use of US facilities at + Lajes.

+ +

ESSENTIAL FACTORS

+

As you know, our agreement with the Portuguese permits third countries to + have access to facilities at Lajes subject to GOP approval. In response to a British request, the + Portuguese have agreed in principle to permit up to one Nimrod per day to land at Lajes for + staging and refueling. The UK will make + a written request to the Portuguese for each Nimrod transit.

+

OSD and JCS concur in the recommendation + that we permit UK access to Lajes.

+

RECOMMENDATION

+

That you approve UK use of facilities at + Lajes for transiting Nimrod + aircraft, and that you authorize Jon to so inform the British.Reference is to Howe. Eagleburger initialed his approval of the + recommendation.

+
+ +
+ 301. Memorandum From Acting Secretary of State Eagleburger to President ReaganSource: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, + Very Sensitive Correspondence Files of Alexander M. Haig, Jr., 1981–1982, Lot 83D288, + Evening Reading—May 1982. Secret. + + + Washington, May 26, + 1982 + +

UN Security Council: + New Falklands Resolution. The Security Council unanimously + passed Resolution 504Mistaken reference to + United Nations Security Council Resolution 505 adopted unanimously + on May 26. For the texts of the resolution and Kirkpatrick’s statement after its + adoption, see the Department of State Bulletin, July 1982, p. 87. A summary of the Security + Council debate that culminated in adoption of the resolution is in + Yearbook of the United Nations, 1982, pp. + 1329–1332. calling upon the Secretary General to resume his + negotiations and report back to the Council within a week. The + resolution was based on a tougher draft which included a 72-hour + ceasefire and language which directed the sides to leave previous + concessions on the table. Both provisions were opposed by us and the + UK. We had pushed for just this kind + of outcome in order to head off resolutions that would have interfered + with the UK’s right of self-defense by + ordering a ceasefire and/or would have compromised the UN’s neutrality by producing a resolution + with which the British would not have complied. The existence of an approved resolution may also + help us in our efforts to moderate the outcome of the OAS Foreign Ministers’ meeting which + starts tomorrow.

+

[Omitted here is material unrelated to the conflict in the South + Atlantic.]

+
+ +
+ 302. Report Prepared in the Central Intelligence AgencySource: Department of State, + Executive Secretariat, Files of + Alexander M. Haig, Jr., 1981–1982, Lot 82D370, (3) + Falklands Crisis 1982. Secret; [handling + restriction not declassified]. Prepared in the Directorate + of Intelligence. + + + Washington, May 27, + 1982 + +

SPOT COMMENTARY: Falklands Situation—British Commence + Attack Against Darwin/Goose Green

+

British paratroopers are attacking Darwin/Goose Green this morning, [1 line not declassified]. UK forces apparently were waiting to construct a Harrier runway at their East Falklands + beachhead at Port San Carlos before beginning the operation. [less than 1 line not declassified] the container + ship Atlantic Conveyer is still afloat and that + salvage operations are underway.On May 25, + Argentine aircraft attacked and sank the British container ship Atlantic Conveyor with an Exocet anti-ship missile. For a + detailed account of the battle for Darwin and Goose Green from the + British perspective, see Freedman, Official + History, vol. II, pp. 546–576. [portion marking not declassified]

+

Comment: The British have been suggesting for the + past two days that large-scale combat operations would begin shortly on + the Falklands. The Argentines had an estimated 600 troops at + Darwin/Goose Green when the British landed last FridayMay 21. See Document + 285. and some limited reinforcement has probably + occurred since then. Darwin/Goose Green sits astride a motorable trail + that provides the single best access from the western part of the island + to Port Stanley. The major portion of the British force probably will + use this route, although some British troops may be airlifted across + country by helicopter. [portion marking not + declassified]

+

Harrier jets probably will be + quickly moved to the island now that the San Carlos airfield has been + completed. These aircraft will have several missions, but they probably + will be used principally to protect the beachhead and support the movement of the land + forces. [portion marking not declassified]

+

The Atlantic Conveyor brought Harrier jets to the Falklands but we + believe they were transferred to the aircraft carriers before the ship + was struck by an Exocet missile. The + Atlantic Conveyer apparently still contains + helicopters and ammunition—some of which may be recoverable. [portion marking not declassified]

+
+ +
+ 303. Telegram From the Embassy in Argentina to the Department of + StateSource: Reagan + Library, Roger W. Fontaine + Files, Country Files, Argentina (May 1982). Confidential; Immediate. + Sent for information Immediate to the South Atlantic Sitrep Collective and for + information to Panama City, USCINCSO, USCINCLANT, and the Defense Intelligence + Agency. + + + Buenos Aires, May 27, 1982, 1606Z + +

3312. CINCSO for INTAFF, CINCLANT + for POLAD, Rome for Vatican. Subject: + Argentina: Galtieri Replies to + Reagan’s 25 May Message.

+

1. (U) President Leopoldo + Galtieri has addressed a message to US President Ronald Reagan in response to his note on the occasion of + the commemoration of 25 May.Not found. + According to a June 18 note from Bremer to Clark transmitting the signed original of Galtieri’s letter to the White + House, Reagan’s May 25 + message was sent to Galtieri + to mark the occasion of the Argentine National Day. Bremer added that a response to + Galtieri’s letter “would + not serve any useful purpose.” (Department of State, Central Foreign + Policy File, P820091–1421)

+

2. (U) Following is the text of Galtieri’s letter to President Reagan: Quote If our people and + government were surprised over the never expected attitude that the + United States has adopted in supporting Great Britain in its conflict + with Argentina, on receiving your congratulations on occasion of the 25 + May celebrations today, the Argentine people and government cannot be + more surprised. The assertion made therein, “that never before has it + been so important to reassert the common interests and values which the + Argentina and the United States and to reiterate the commitment we made + to cooperate in this Hemisphere and in the entire world,” is not in + keeping with the attitude of your government and is something which + cannot be understood under the present circumstances. Unquote.

+ +

3. (C) Comment: Galtieri’s harsh + reply, which received heavy media coverage here, is not surprising in + view of what we know to be Galtieri’s and the Junta’s anger at the USG. It is also consistent with the stream + of criticism directed at US policy by + various GOA officials, and the guidance + and backgrounders given to the local media which hold the US to be largely responsible for Britain’s + strong military response in the present crisis.

+ + Shlaudeman + +
+ +
+ 304. Memorandum From Secretary of State Haig to President ReaganSource: + Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S Special Handling Restrictions Memos 1979–1983, Lot + 96D262, ES Sensitive May 25–31 1982. + Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Bremer; cleared by Eagleburger. A typewritten notation at the top of + the memorandum reads: “LDX’d to Mr. + McFarlane 1540 hours, + 5/27.” + + + Washington, May 27, + 1982 + + + SUBJECT + Falkland Islands Dispute + +

There have been several developments this morning which you should know + about. I attended the opening of the OAS meeting which featured a vicious anti-American speech + by Argentine Foreign Minister Costa + Mendez.Haig also addressed the OAS Foreign Ministers. For the text of + his speech, see the Department of State Bulletin, July 1982, pp. 87–90. He was relentless + and vitriolic in his attack. The Panamanian and Nicaraguan Ambassadors + led most of the OAS members in a + standing ovation.

+

As you know, we have been coordinating with the British on how to handle + the UNSYG’s diplomatic efforts. The + Secretary General has asked both parties to give him their conditions + for a ceasefire by this evening. We have just received the British + reply, which is clearly an attempt to buy additional time (for the + OAS meeting to pass unaffected). + But the reply also indicates that the British have begun to reassess + their position on the long-term arrangements for the Islands in response + to my prodding them (per your authorization) in this direction. The last + paragraph of their reply to the SYG + suggests that they would be willing to accept international security + arrangements on the Islands, provided such arrangements involved the participation of the + United States (reply attached).Attached but + not printed is a copy of the May 27 message from Pym to Pérez de Cuéllar. This is + a reference to our offer to provide a battalion to a peacekeeping force. + (I have alerted Cap to begin thinking about this contingency.)

+

The British apparently now hope to be able to clean up Port Stanley in + the next three or four days. Hopefully then they will be willing to put + forward some constructive ideas for longer-term arrangements. Without + some eventual British flexibility we will find the Argentines and other + Latins increasingly embittered, with corresponding opportunities for + Cuban and Soviet mischief. In such circumstances, British forces on the + Island would be hostage to future Argentine attacks. Thus the fact that + the British are willing to consider alternative long-term security + arrangements on the Islands is significant for our interests in the + hemisphere.

+

It is clear that we are not yet at the point where you should weigh in + with Mrs. Thatcher but that + point may be coming soon.

+
+ +
+ 305. Memorandum of ConversationSource: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, + S/S Special Handling + Restrictions Memos 1979–1983, Lot 96D262, ES Sensitive May 25–31 1982. Secret; Sensitive. The + meeting took place in the office of the Argentine Air Attaché. + Copies were sent to Haig and + Enders. + + + Washington, May 27, 1982, 3:30 p.m. + + + PARTICIPANTS + Major Brigadier Miret, + Argentine Air Force + Vernon A. Walters, + Ambassador-at-Large + + + SUBJECT + Falklands/Malvinas + +

During a phone call from Ambassador Gerardo Schamis, Argentine Ambassador + to France, whom I have known for many years, he indicated he had + received a call from Air Force Commander Lami Dozo + in Buenos Aires telling him to + ask me to get in touch with Major Brigadier + Miret, who was currently in Washington for the OAS meeting. After discussion with the + Secretary and Ambassador Enders, + I saw Miret at the Argentine Air + Attache’s office on I Street at 1530. I spoke with him alone.

+

He confirmed that he had received instructions from Brigadier Lami Dozo to get in touch with me as + he was very concerned that the door not be slammed by either Argentina + or the United States. We would have to live together after the Falkland + conflict was over. He said it was ironic that the Air Force, which was + doing all of the fighting, was the service in favor of negotiations, + while the Army and Navy, who had done very little fighting, were still + blustering. He said that a series of unfortunate events had led to the + escalation of this conflict and I pointed out that to us, it was a + particular tragedy that every young pilot who was killed, whether he be + British or Argentine, was one less to defend values in which we both + believed. He said that the first problem was the escalation of rhetoric. + Galtieri made intemperate + and incendiary statements and had also made a rude reply to President + Reagan’s message of + congratulations on Argentina’s independence.See Document 303. He indicated + clearly that the Air Force had tried without success to temper this + reply of Galtieri’s. He shrugged + and said Galtieri was very + impulsive. Brigadier Miret then + indicated that he had also tried without success to tone down Foreign + Minister Costa Mendez’ statement + to the OAS this morning. This had been + triggered by Secretary Haig’s + statement of his conviction of British victory.See footnote 2, Document + 304. Haig asserted + the inapplicability of collective security under the Rio Treaty: + “With full respect for the views of others, the U.S. position is + clear: Since the first use of force did not come from outside the + hemisphere, this is not a case of extracontinental aggression + against which we are all committed to rally.” On May 29, the OAS Foreign Ministers adopted + Resolution II, which condemned the U.K. attack and demanded that the + United Kingdom cease its “act of war” and withdraw its forces + “immediately.” The United States abstained in the vote. For the + texts of the resolution and Middendorf’s statement on the U.S. abstention, see + the Department of State Bulletin, July 1982, + pp. 90–91. He supposed that the Secretary would now answer in + the OAS with some asperity. I told him + I believed that the Secretary would answer with “dignity and elegance”. + I said we Americans viewed this conflict as an enormous tragedy bringing + conflict between two of our most important alliances—NATO and the OAS. We certainly had tried and would continue to try to + find a peaceful and honorable solution to the crisis for both our + friends. We had no interest in seeing either one humiliated. Miret said almost in despair, “How are + we going to put things together after this conflict?” I said we must + strive in every way to do so. He then appealed for a moderation of + rhetoric on our side and said they would continue to try and moderate the rhetoric on their + side. Brigadier Miret then said + he wondered if we could do several things:

+

1. Encourage UN Secretary General Perez + de Cuellar’s efforts. I said that we had never ceased to do so and would + continue to do so.

+

2. He then repeated his request about moderating rhetoric and requested + that we bring pressure on the British to moderate their position. I said + we had always brought pressure on the British as we had the Argentines. + The Secretary told them in Buenos Aires that neither side could get + everything they wanted. There would have to be some give.

+

3. Finally, Brigadier Miret + brought up an idea that had been brought up by Lami Dozo and Galtieri in Buenos Aires of a summit + between Presidents Reagan and + Galtieri and Prime Minister + Thatcher.Miret had + earlier suggested this to Kirkpatrick. (Telegram 1479 from USUN, May 26; Reagan Library, + Executive Secretariat, NSC Cable + File, Falkland File 05/26/1982 (4))

+

I said I would convey this message to the Secretary and assured him that + the U.S. deeply desired to maintain its good ties with Argentina and on + our part we would do nothing if we could help it to damage those ties. + He replied that on the Argentine side there were some who were saying + that in the present juncture that Argentina should turn to the Soviet + Union and receive Soviet assistance. I said very quietly but looking him + right in the eyes, “You realize that if that were to happen, it would + change everything as far as we are concerned.” He said he understood + this and would resist. He knew that the situation was difficult, adding, + “The British are a tough and warlike race and will not yield to + pressure.” I replied that the Argentine Air Force had proved the courage + and skill of its young pilots and that it was a tragedy that countries + which should be friendly were killing one another. The only long term + winner in such a situation could be the Soviet Union. He said to me as I + left, “Lami Dozo, unlike the + other two, looks beyond tomorrow.” He thanked me for coming. I said I + would be back in touch with him after consultations with the + Secretary.

+
+ +
+ + 306. Memorandum From the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy + (Iklé) to Secretary of + Defense WeinbergerSource: Washington National Records + Center, OSD Files, FRC 330–86–0042, + UK 1982. Top Secret; Eyes Only. + A copy was sent to Carlucci. + + + Washington, May 27, + 1982 + + + SUBJECT + UK Request for 50 Maritime Limpet + Mines (U)—ACTION MEMORANDUM + +

(TS) On May 15 the UK requested a + transfer of 50 maritime limpet mines (hand transported underwater + anti-ship demolition weapons for use against moored targets). At that + time, in my conversation with Larry + Eagleburger, State had concerns about the timing. UK has now formally requested these mines + again and State is now willing to grant them.See Document + 290.

+

(TS) According to the Navy’s analysis, given the developments on the + Falkland Islands, the opportunity for possible use on moored targets on + the Falklands seems past. This suggests that the intended use for these + mines would be Argentine ships moored in mainland ports. In accordance + with your instructions, however, we have not pressed the British on + their intended use.See footnote 1, Document 284.

+

(TS) It seems likely that the President will again be confronted with the + future of the South Atlantic war and the Falkland Islands crisis in a + major way. Hence, it might be desirable for the President to have his + options kept open for either supporting or discouraging follow-up + British attacks on the Argentine mainland. It is my recommendation to + you that we should inform the British that at this time we are not + prepared to transfer the mines.

+ + Fred C. IklePrinted from a copy that bears this typewritten + signature. + +
+ +
+ + 307. Memorandum From Secretary of State Haig to President ReaganSource: + Department of State, Executive Secretariat, Very Sensitive + Correspondence Files of Alexander M. + Haig, Jr., 1981–1982, Lot 83D288, Evening Reading—May + 1982. Secret. + + + Washington, May 27, + 1982 + +

1. OAS and Falkland + Islands Dispute. The first day of the reconvened Rio Treaty + meeting of Foreign Ministers witnessed a procession of speakers, headed + by Argentine Foreign Minister Costa + Mendez, who criticized harshly the US for its support of Great Britain and + called for OAS action in support of + Argentina, including condemnation of the UK, lifting of US + “sanctions,” and cessation of US + materiel support for the British. Venezuela, Panama and Peru were also + critical. Nicaragua was vitriolic. More moderate expressions came later + from Colombia, Trinidad and Tobago, and Costa Rica. I reiterated the + US commitment to a strong + inter-American system but rejected the argument that UK action constituted “aggression by an + extra-continental power” as defined in the Rio Treaty.See footnote 3, Document + 305. Haig also + held bilateral meetings with Zambrano and Arias + Stella in his office at the Department of State, May + 27. Meeting before the OAS meeting, + Zambrano and Haig discussed Venezuelan + “concerns about damage to hemispheric and bilateral relations caused + by the continuing warfare and the Latin American perception of + all-out US support for the UK.” Haig responded “that we have not taken sides on the + merits of sovereignty in the Falklands and have done our best to + avoid favoring either party,” and while acknowledging fuel transfers + to the United Kingdom, added that “newspaper reports of various + weapons transfers to the forces are incorrect.” (Telegram 149225 to + Caracas, June 1; Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, + D820284–0988) Haig and + Arias Stella discussed + the need for a solution “ASAP,” + and discussed “possibilities for a peace-keeping force which could + supervise the administration of the Islands.” (Telegram 149224 to + Lima, June 1; Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, + D820284–1002) (U)

+

[Omitted here is material unrelated to the conflict in the South + Atlantic.]

+
+ +
+ + 308. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State-Designate for + European Affairs (Burt) to + Secretary of State HaigSource: Department of State, + Central Foreign Policy File, P900060–0778. Secret. A May 28 covering + note by Enders indicates + that the memorandum and its attachment had been prepared by + Burt, Gompert, Gudgeon, and Enders. Enders also added two + observations: “(a) We don’t want to + participate if we do only the military part (i.e. let ICRC handle repatriation, which would + be politically damaging to us). (b) We don’t + want to present all of this to Henderson now, but only the military ideas, saying + that of course the other aspects would have to be covered.” A + stamped notation on the note indicates that Haig saw Burt’s memorandum. (Department of + State, Central Foreign Policy File, P900060–0777) + + + Washington, May 28, + 1982 + Mr. Secretary: + +

I have worked with Tom Enders on + putting together the attached proposal, but I want you to be aware of a + few reservations.Burt crossed out the typewritten + word “revisions” and replaced it with “reservations.” On May 27, + Burt sent to Haig an information memorandum + with an attached draft non-paper intended for Henderson. According to the + memorandum, it and the non-paper were produced for Haig following a May 27 morning + meeting and made many of the same points as the May 28 proposal. + (Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S Special Handling Restrictions Memos 1979–1983, Lot + 96D262, ES Sensitive May 25–31 + 1982) One basic problem with this approach in my view is that + it is a “total” plan for resolving the dispute, and thus asks the + British to make a number of concessions all at once. As we discussed + last night,No other record of this meeting + has been found. I think it makes much more sense to focus on + the near-term question of terminating the conflict in such a way to + avoid the complete humiliation of the Argentines. Thus, even if you buy + off on the total package I think in your discussions with the British, + you should only focus on near-term steps.

+

This said, we must be aware that the attached proposal makes some major + assumptions about British behavior:

+

—It assumes that the British will be willing to reach an agreement along + the lines sketched out in the proposal “short of surrender.”

+

—It assumes that the British would be willing almost immediately to allow + U.S. and Brazilian forces to organize the evacuation of Argentine + prisoners, thus denying the British the use of these prisoners in + follow-on negotiations. (It goes without saying that prisoners have + become a standard form of negotiating capital in modern conflicts, e.g., + Viet Nam, Indo-Pakistani conflict, Egypt-Israel.)

+ +

—It assumes that the British, in hours following the end of the fighting, + would be willing to announce a total military withdrawal within two + months.

+

—It assumes that the British, within two months, would be willing to turn + over executive authority to the U.S. and Brazil and to announce this + soon after a ceasefire.

+

—Finally, it assumes that the British would permit the creation of a + contact group without British participation.

+

One last note, in the event that no final solution to the problem is + reached, the contact group would administer the Islands indefinitely, + along with the U.S. and Brazilian peace-keeping forces. Are we willing + to take on such an open-ended commitment, particularly if, as seems + likely, we would find ourselves constantly at odds with the + Kelper-dominated councils? We know that we must ask a great deal of the + British in any proposal, but overloading the circuits is one sure way to + guarantee failure.

+

Richard + BurtBurt signed “Rick” above his typed + signature.

+

Assistant Secretary-designate for European + Affairs

+

Attachment

+

Draft Proposal Prepared in the Department of StateNo classification marking. Drafted by + Gudgeon on May 28. + All brackets are in the original.

+

Washington, undated

+

Dates:

+ + + T + Date of agreement on package of measures + + + T1 + Date of cease-fire and reciprocal announcements + + + T2 + Date of Argentine evacuation from islands + + + T3 + Date of completion of UK + withdrawal of forces + +
+

Agreement

+

When the UK is confident of its control + of the military situation, but short of surrender of the local Argentine + commander, the US and Brazil would + propose to the military commands of the UK and Argentina, and obtain agreement of both governments + (on date T) on the following integral package of immediate and deferred + steps:

+ +

Military Situation

+

—A cease-fire (effective T1) [A general—not local—cessation of + hostilities and lifting of declared operational zones];

+

—Immediate introduction of small contingents of US and Brazilian peace-keeping forces

+

(i) to verify the cease-fire;

+

(ii) to ensure the separation of forces (i.e., concentration of Argentine + forces in given areas from which they can be evacuated);

+

(iii) to organize the exchange of prisoners;

+

(iv) to provide medical services; and

+

(v) to organize the departure of Argentine combatants. [Latter three + steps might involve coordination with the ICRC].

+

—On date T1, the UK would announce its + intention to phase the total withdrawal of its forces, commencing after + the evacuation of Argentine forces (date T2) and to be completed within + a short time, e.g., two months, by date T3; on date T3, the UK would replace the interim military + administration it will have established with a restoration of local + self-government under the Councils [the office of Governor would remain + vacant].

+

Negotiations

+

—The UK and Argentina would both announce + on date T1 their preparedness to resume negotiations to find a peaceful, + definitive solution;

+

—Each would announce their commitment to respect the cease-fire, not to + reintroduce forces onto the islands after their respective + evacuation/withdrawal, and to take no steps that might prejudge or + prejudice the final outcome of the process;

+

—Each side might announce that the economic measures they (and third + countries) have taken would be terminated on a specified date (e.g., + date T2).

+

Contact Group

+

—The UK, Argentina, the US, and Brazil would announce on date T1 + their agreement to create a Contact Group composed of Brazil and the + US to:

+

(i) assist the two parties to establish the modalities for their + negotiations;

+

(ii) as of date T3, to assume the function of promptly ratifying all + actions by the local administration except those inconsistent with the + agreement; and

+

(iii) provide required peace-keeping forces.

+ +

The Contact Group would assume its functions pending a definitive + settlement.

+

—The Contact Group would determine its own procedures, making decisions + on the basis of unanimity.

+
+ +
+ 309. Memorandum From Roger W. + Fontaine, Christopher C. + Shoemaker, and Richard T. + Childress of the National Security Council Staff to the + President’s Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (McFarlane)Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Latin + America/Central, Falklands War (05/27/1982). Secret; Sensitive; Eyes + Only. A stamped notation at the top of the memorandum indicates that + Clark saw + it. + + + Washington, May 28, + 1982 + + + SUBJECT + Additional Suggestions on the Falkland Mess + +

We recognize that the momentum of battle and of our own diplomacy is very + much in favor of a British victory in the Falklands and is very much + against vigorous US action to forestall + or mitigate such a victory. However, in the interest of our long-term + relations with Latin America which will become increasingly crucial in + the future, we need to review one last time what options could be + available to us in dealing with the conflict.

+

Background

+

We will soon reach the critical stage of the South Atlantic crisis. The + British can probably secure the Island and inflict a humiliating defeat + on the Argentines within the week, although at greater cost than they or + others apparently realize.

+

That kind of victory—which will shatter the prestige of the Argentine + armed forces, the only coherent political institution in the country for + the last century—will come at great cost to us, the British, and the + Western world over the long run. A total victory in the Islands, + followed by harsh peace terms (which is what Prime Minister Thatcher was laying out in Parliament + Tuesday, May 25) would be the peace of 1870 and 1918—a peace, in short, + that invites revanchism and ultimately further warfare, both hot and + cold.

+ +

Specifically, such an outcome would all but guarantee the following + effects—all negative:

+

1. For the British:

+

—possible additional British naval losses, since there will be no + incentives for the Argentines to cease air attacks against the British + fleet.

+

—the provisioning of a permanent garrison on the Islands which would mean + a permanent deployment of scarce NATO + assets 8,000 miles from where they should be. Even a “small force” which + the British Ministry of Defense now envisions would be important owing + to the thinness of British conventional strength now and in the + future—especially under a Labour Government. It is likely, however, that + the MOD will underestimate Argentina’s capabilities and intentions after + this round of the fighting which means a greater force will be required + than currently planned.

+

—given the above, a greatly reduced capacity to meet its current or + future NATO commitments and + concomitant pressures on the US to make + up the shortfall.

+

—Negotiations would prove impossible while a form of permanent warfare + would develop with Argentina which would become a permanent strain in + NATO relations with Argentina and + the other Spanish-speaking republics in this hemisphere.

+

2. For the Argentines:

+

—Under the above conditions, that country would not hesitate to accept + any and all help, no matter what the source. The consequences of + Argentina taking Soviet and Cuban aid is clear to all. The consequences + of accepting aid from its Latin neighbors are not so well understood but + are equally damaging to US interests. + Such an arrangement would also greatly contribute to the permanent + estrangement of the Spanish-speaking countries from the English-speaking + world.

+

—The present government would be replaced by perhaps a series of weak + military governments, to be replaced ultimately by an elected Peronista + government a la 1973/74. If not the Peronistas, + then a weak radical government would probably accede to power. Neither + would be pro-American, and both will be bad economic managers. Good + US-Argentine relations are + historically an anomaly, and it will be easy for many Argentines, + including a large portion of the military, to return to old habits.

+

—A strong Peronista regime would try to form an anti-American South + American bloc as Peron did in the 1940s. Brazil-Argentina, + Argentina-Chile relations would be ruptured.

+

—A nuclear weapons capability would be virtually guaranteed, as both + Brazil and Argentina would seek ultimate security in nuclear + arsenals.

+ +

—In short, a defeated and humiliated Argentina would almost inevitably go + in directions inimical to our interests and at direct, heavy, and + prolonged cost to us.

+

The US cannot meet the + Soviet/Cuban/Nicaraguan/Grenadian/and now Surinamese challenge in the + Caribbean Basin and simultaneously face a + hostile, irredentist, and Peronist Argentina while continuing to meet + its global commitments. All of post-war US foreign policy has been premised on the availability of + a secure and non-hostile hemisphere while we met our Asian, Middle + Eastern, and European commitments.

+

What can we do? Whatever is done must be done soon if we are to mitigate + the damage of the above scenario. Whatever we do must also be bold and + involve some unorthodox moves. Our objective remains finding a peaceful + resolution of the dispute with no victors or vanquished.

+

The problem is that the British do not see it our way. They see + themselves as winning a just war—why negotiate anything? We must force + them to recognize that there are larger interests at stake. Tactically, + we are where the Nixon Administration was in October 1973 at the moment + the Egyptian Third Army was about to be exterminated.

+

The following needs to be understood:

+

—The Argentines are anxious for us to do something and probably would + accept almost anything at this point provided they were approached + properly.

+

—It is the British who need convincing to return to the negotiating + table. Right now they are at their best and worst, best because they are + fighting hard for a good principle in a remote spot on the globe, and + the government has the support of most of the people. The British are at + their worst because they smell and want unconditional surrender with a + humiliating aftermath and, therefore, have not thought through the + larger problems. (The suggested return of the British Governor is + rubbing much salt in very big Argentine wounds.)

+

All of this is being driven by another factor: namely, the President’s + trip to Europe,Reagan was scheduled to leave on June 2 to travel to + France, Italy, Vatican City, the United Kingdom, and West Germany. + During the trip, he planned to attend the Economic Summit in + Versailles and the North + Atlantic Council meeting in Bonn. which will occur at + precisely the time the Argentines are being overrun at Stanley—a + development that will strongly enhance the perception of US-UK + cooperation in bringing about Argentina’s greatest military disaster and + the splintering of hemisphere unity. Moreover, for the sake of a good + European meeting, we will be tempted to say and do things that will + exacerbate this already difficult situation. In short, our policy as it evolves through the next + critical week will be distorted through the prism of the President’s + European trip. What drives us (legitimately) to make this a successful + trip in terms of our Atlantic interests may have disastrous consequences + for our hemispheric interests.

+

A Proposal

+

If we are to affect the outcome in the Falklands and mitigate the damage + to US-Latin American relations, we need + to move vigorously and immediately. In effect, we need to interpose + ourselves between the belligerents so that Argentina has a face-saving + mechanism to stop fighting and negotiate, and Britain has a reason to do + the same.

+

Accordingly, we recommend the following steps be taken:

+

1. The President should simultaneously send letters to Galtieri and Thatcher. In his letter to Galtieri, the President should stress + that one of his primary purposes in going to London now is to bring + about a cease fire and the beginnings of a negotiated solution. In his + letter to Thatcher, the + President should forcefully stress the importance of an immediate cease + fire and of an equitable, negotiated solution. He should urgently ask + for an immediate cessation of hostilities and promise that he will bring + with him a new proposal for beginning the negotiating process.

+

2. Prior to his departure for Europe, the President would make a public + plea for both of our friends to stop killing each other. He would also + promise new and vigorous US action to + stop the fighting.

+

3. The President should follow the letters by a letter to President + Figueiredo outlining what + we propose to do in Britain and informing him of the contents of our + message to Galtieri. He would + also outline a new proposal for symbolically interposing an + inter-American naval force (primarily composed of Brazilian and US ships)Clark placed an + asterisk after the parenthesis, which corresponds to his handwritten + notation at the bottom of the page: “Neither country acceptable to + Arg.” between the + belligerents.

+

4. Upon receipt of Figueiredo’s + agreement in principle for the proposal, the President would communicate + again with both Galtieri and + Thatcher asking both to + accept the interposition of the naval force and outlining a new + diplomatic mechanism for starting the negotiating process again. This + mechanism would entail two US + teams,Clark placed a double-asterisk after this word, + which corresponds to his handwritten notation at the bottom of the + page: “Probably unworkable.” one in Buenos Aires, the other + in London.

+ +

5. Should these proposals be accepted, we would then use the US Navy to assist in the withdrawal of + combatants in the Falklands and the policing of the cease fire. Only + under these conditions can we hope to make any progress toward a + negotiated solution, and position ourselves for the damage repair that + will inevitably be necessary in the foreseeable future.

+
+ +
+ 310. Memorandum From Ambassador at Large Vernon A. Walters to Secretary of State HaigSource: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, + Files of Alexander M. Haig, + Jr., 1981–1982, Lot 82D370, (3) Falklands Crisis + 1982. Secret; Sensitive. Not For the System. Haig initialed at the top + right-hand corner of the memorandum and underlined the text of the + memorandum extensively. + + + Washington, May 28, + 1982 + + + SUBJECT + Falklands/Malvinas + +

At 1445 today I received a phone call from Brigadier Peña who told me he was calling at Major + Brigadier Miret’s request. He + said the Argentine delegation to the United Nations had just received + the British conditions for an agreement. They had been delivered to the + Argentines, not by Ambassador Parsons, but by a low-ranking official. The conditions + were the following:

+

1. Argentine forces must be withdrawn by a fixed date.

+

2. The British do not accept simultaneous withdrawal of forces.

+

3. The withdrawal of the UK forces will + be subject to four conditions:

+

A. Reoccupation of the Islands;

+

B. Re-establishment of the administration of the Islands;

+

C. “Reconstruction” of the Islands;In the + right-hand margin next to this point, Haig wrote: “(damage done).”

+

C. Consultation of the population.In the + right-hand margin next to this point, Haig wrote: “UN Res + 71[?] on self-determ.”

+

4. The withdrawal of the UK troops will + follow an international security agreement which must involve the + participation of the United States.

+ +

Brigadier Peña said he had no + comment to make but was simply transmitting the conditions to me, at + Major Brigadier Miret’s request. + I told him I would pass them on to the Secretary at once. I personally + did not have knowledge of them prior to his call.

+

Brigadier Peña’s phone number is + 452-8707.

+
+ +
+ 311. Note From the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs + (Eagleburger) to Secretary + of State HaigSource: Department of State, + Executive Secretariat, Files of Alexander M. Haig, Jr., 1981–1982, Lot 82D370, (3) + Falklands Crisis 1982. Secret. Haig initialed at the top of the note, indicating + that he saw it. A stamped notation also indicates that Haig saw it. + + + Washington, May 28, + 1982 + + + Mr. Secretary: + +

Jon Howe and I met with Fred Ikle + on the problem of leaks about weapons deliveries to the British. As a + result, DoD will tighten up its + procedures by restricting drastically the number of persons with access + to the daily list of outstanding and prospective requests.Haig + underlined the phrase: “list of outstanding and prospective + requests.”

+

It is hard to be sanguine, despite these steps. The number of people + involved at one stage or another in processing each request is + substantial, especially at the physical handling end. + Compartmentalization will reduce the dangers of leaks about the entire + flow of material, but not about individual items. And, of course, we + cannot exclude that someone from the now-smaller circle with access to + the full list has been the chief culprit all along.Haig + underlined the last two sentences and wrote at the bottom of the + page: “Too late to leap said the little frog!”

+ + Lawrence S. + EagleburgerEagleburger initialed “LSE” above his typed + signature. + +
+ +
+ + 312. Information Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of + State-Designate for European Affairs (Burt) to Secretary of State HaigSource: + Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S Special Handling Restrictions Memos 1979–1983, Lot + 96D262, ES Sensitive May 25–31 1982. + Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Blackwill. + + + Washington, May 28, + 1982 + + + SUBJECT + Thatcher’s Approach to the + Falklands + +

You will have seen Ed Streator’s + telegrams from London relating his conversations in the last 48 hours + with FCO Permanent Under Secretary + Antony Acland and + Conservative Party Deputy Leader Willie + Whitelaw (attached).Not + found attached. In telegram 11986 from London, May 28, Streator conveyed a summary of his + May 28 meeting with Acland. + In addition to expressing Thatcher’s desire for a “quick, clean military + victory” and stating that “there are no plans to resume negotiations + of any kind,” Acland also + informed Streator of the + Prime Minister’s “interest in meeting with the President during the + Versailles Summit for an extended discussion of the Falklands + issue.” (Department of State, Under Secretary of State for Political + Affairs, Miscellaneous Files, March 1981–February 1983, Lot 83D210, + Falklands [Folder 1]) Streator’s May 27 conversation with Whitelaw was described in telegram + 11904 from London, May 28. (Ibid.) Messages make it + abundantly clear that Mrs. Thatcher is determined to achieve a military victory in + the Falklands before taking any decisions on next steps.

+

These conversations tell me that any comprehensive U.S. proposal for + ending the dispute is simply not in the cards in London for now. Indeed, + if we put forward such a proposal, we are likely to elicit an immediate + rejection from Thatcher and sour + the atmosphere for the President’s meeting with her in Versailles next + week and his visit to Britain.

+

Instead, I believe that we should concentrate our efforts on persuading + the British to stop short of a total humiliation of Argentina. (If I + remember correctly, Lincoln let the Confederates retain their horses and + the officers kept their swords.) If we try for much more than that now, + as was envisaged in the paper you saw this morning, I fear that we will + come up entirely empty.See the attachment, + Document 308. Thus, I suggest + that you focus Nicko’s attention on the question of how the U.K. might + act in the context of an imminent military victory to leave the + Argentines with a shred of dignity and a barely plausible denial that + they had been conquered by British force of arms.

+
+ +
+ + 313. Memorandum From Director of Central Intelligence Casey to Secretary of State Haig, the President’s Assistant for + National Security Affairs (Clark), and the Permanent Representative to the United + Nations (Kirkpatrick)Source: Reagan Library, Executive + Secretariat, NSC Country File, + Latin America/Central, Falklands War (06/08/1982–10/25/82). Secret; + [handling restriction not declassified]. + A stamped notation at the top of the memorandum indicates that + Clark saw it. On his + copy of the memorandum, Haig + wrote: “Disaster!” (Department of State, Executive Secretariat, + Files of Alexander M. Haig, + Jr., 1981–1982, Lot 82D370, (3) Falklands Crisis + 1982). A typed notation at the end of the memorandum indicates the + information was received in FIRDB–312/0147–82. + + + Washington, June 8, + 1982 + + + SUBJECT + Comments of a Senior Argentine Air Force Officer on U.S. Attitudes + Toward the Falkland Islands Crisis + +

1. The following information was received on 28 May 1982 [1½ lines not declassified].2

+

2. [1 line not declassified] a senior Argentine + Air Force brigadier, commenting upon U.S. official attitudes over the + Falkland Islands crisis, said that it was difficult for Argentina to + assess the U.S. Government’s real thoughts on the crisis because there + were two opposing viewpoints over the issue within the U.S. + Administration. The first faction, he said, was led by Secretary of + State Alexander Haig and was + European-oriented (i.e. pro-British). The other, which includes + Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs Judge William Clark and Ambassador to + the United Nations Jeane + Kirkpatrick, was Latin America-oriented (i.e. + pro-Argentine).

+

3. The brigadier went on to say that the Argentines were considering + sending an emissary from Buenos Aires to discuss the question with the + U.S. but that, until this faction-fighting in the U.S. Administration + resolved itself and the situation clarified, they did not intend to do + so.

+

4. No further distribution of this information is being made.

+ + William J. + CaseyCasey initialed “WJC” above + his typed signature. + Director of Central Intelligence + + +
+ +
+ + 314. Draft Proposal Prepared in the Department of StateSource: Library of Congress, + Manuscript Division, Haig + Papers, Department of State, Day File, May 29, 1982 Falklands. No + classification marking. No drafting information appears on the + proposal, and the date is handwritten. At the bottom of the first + page, Goldberg wrote: “Ideas + presented to Henderson on + 5/29/82 by AMH. As UK moves to milit[ary] + victory—objective—avoid Argent[ina’s] humiliating surrender.” No + U.S. record of Haig’s + meeting with Henderson has + been found. For a British account of the meeting and the FCO’s consideration of the proposal, + see Freedman, Official History, vol. II, pp. + 514–516. A British record of the meeting, as cabled by Henderson to London, is published + on the Thatcher Foundation + website. + + + Washington, May 29, 1982 + +

Ideas for an Approach

+

When British military success is at hand, the US and Brazil would propose an agreement to the UK and Argentina containing the following + elements taken as an integrated whole.

+

1. General and permanent ceasefire (including provisions for the + non-resupply and the regrouping of Argentine forces); establishment of a + temporary British military administration; lifting of sanctions by + Argentina, the UK and third + countries;

+

2. Immediate introduction of a peacekeeping force consisting of + contingents from the US and Brazil to + verify the ceasefire and ensure the separation of forces;

+

3. Rapid withdrawal of Argentine forces;

+

4. Creation of a Contact Group consisting of the UK, the US, Brazil and + Argentina;In a later version of this + proposal, presented to Haig + at 2215 hours on May 31, this point was removed. (Department of + State, Executive Secretariat, S/S + Special Handling Restrictions Memos 1979–1983, Lot 96D262, ES Sensitive May 25–31 1982)

+

5. End of military administration and start of local self-government by + the local councils with the Contact Group ratifying all decisions not + inconsistent with the purposes of the Agreement;

+

6. Phased withdrawal of British forces, with the peacekeeping force to + assume responsibility for the security of the islands for a limited + period;

+

7. Negotiations, without preconditions, on the definitive settlement of + the dispute with the assistance of the other members of the Contact + Group;

+

8. Undertaking by both parties not to take any action that would + prejudice the outcome of the negotiations.

+ +

POINTS TO BE MADE ORALLY

+

1. RESTORATION OF LOCAL ADMINISTRATION DOES NOT INCLUDE RETURN OF A + GOVERNOR;

+

2. AVOIDANCE OF PUBLICLY ESPOUSING INDEPENDENCE OR SEMI-INDEPENDENCE AS + THE BRITISH GOAL;

+

3. AGREEMENT ON WITHDRAWAL WOULD HAVE TO SAY SOMETHING ABOUT + NON-REINTRODUCTION OF FORCES.

+

4. CONTACT GROUP TO STAY ON INDEFINITELY.

+
+ +
+ 315. Transcript of a Telephone Conversation Between President + Reagan and British Prime + Minister ThatcherSource: Reagan Library, Executive + Secretariat, NSC Subject File, + Memorandums of Conversation—President Reagan (May 1982). Secret. According to the + President’s Daily Diary, Reagan telephoned Thatcher from the second floor Residence at the + White House; their conversation took place from 6:03 p.m. to 6:20 + p.m., May 31. (Reagan Library, President’s Daily Diary) Thatcher was speaking from London. + An attached White House Situation Room routing slip indicates that + copies were sent to Clark, + McFarlane, and Poindexter; Poindexter also received the + original. Poindexter + forwarded a copy of the transcript to Bremer under a June 1 covering note, requesting that + distribution be limited to Haig only. On his copy of the covering note, + Goldberg wrote: “On + 6/1/82, the Brits were concerned that Thatcher was too tough on RR on the call.” (Department of State, Executive + Secretariat, Files of Alexander M. + Haig, Jr., 1981–1982, Lot 82D370, (3) Falklands + Crisis 1982) In his diary, Henderson recalled that Haig had proposed the telephone conversation. + Haig “used his + accustomed convoluted language: ‘It’s getting like duck soup down + there.’” Henderson + responded, “I said that normally I thought these heads of government + telephone talks were apt to lead to trouble and acrimony as had + occurred over a previous call from Reagan, but as the PM would have read in detail Haig’s ideas for a settlement I + did not think a call could do any harm now. How wrong I was.” + (Henderson, Mandarin, p. 466) For the previous call, see + Document 257. + + + May 31, 1982, 6 + p.m. + +

President: Margaret?

+

Thatcher: Yes, Ron?

+

President: Could you hear me alright?

+

Thatcher: We could hear you very + well. Can you hear me?

+

President: Yes, seems to be a little echo but I guess that goes with the + line we’re on. Listen, I’m looking forward to our meeting next + Friday,June 4. when we can talk + about situations that are better in detail.

+

Thatcher: I think we should need + a good long meeting, we don’t want to be hurried.

+ +

President: I hope it can be, although I know they’ve got me on a schedule + that I think will send me home about a foot shorter than I am.

+

Thatcher: Well yes, but I think + you just have to take the most important things first.

+

President: Yes. And listen, could I impose and be presumptuous and give + you some thoughts right now on the Falkland situation?

+

Thatcher: Yes, of course.

+

President: Because, well your impressive military advance could maybe + change the diplomatic options, as we see them, that would be available + to us between now and next Friday. Incidentally, I want to congratulate + you on what you and your young men are doing down there. You’ve taken + major risks and you’ve demonstrated to the whole world that unprovoked + aggression does not pay.

+

Thatcher: Well not yet, but we’re + half way to that. We’re not yet half way, but a third of the way + anyway.

+

President: Yes, yes you are. I know that Al + Haig has passed on some of our ideas on how we might + capitalize on the success you’ve had with a diplomatic initiative,See Document 308 + and footnote 1 thereto. and I + back the concept that . . . Hello?

+

Thatcher: Yes, I’m still + here.

+

President: . . . given Argentina’s performance through this whole affair, + a new initiative may not succeed, but even if they turn it down, I think + an effort to show that we’re all still willing to seek a settlement, + consistent with our principles would undercut the efforts of some of the + leftists in South America who are actively seeking to exploit the + crisis. Now, in thinking about this plan

+

Thatcher: This is democracy and + our island, and the very worst thing for democracy would be if we failed + now.

+

President: Yes,

+

Thatcher: There is always a way + through for the Argentines and that is just to withdraw their forces + from the island and that is not surrender it’s just asking them to + withdraw to the mainland.

+

President: Well, this is just what this idea has in mind, but we believe + that it’s only chance of success might be prior to the capture of Port + Stanley, we wanted Latin cover and we’ve been talking, when he was here, + we talked with the Brazilian President, FigueiredoSee Document 255. and he wants to be of + help but he believes, know them and knowing the Argentinians that the + best chance for a peaceful solution at this point, would be prior to a + complete Argentine humiliation and that’s why I just wanted to say, I + know you’re meeting with the cabinet tomorrow and you’ve got some tough decisions to make. I + don’t know if the junta can make a deal, but even if it can’t be struck + I believe you will put yourself in a very favorable position, if I could + be so presumptuous to say that, and

+

Thatcher: (garbled) lies, because + they refused to accept the deal before we had to re-enter to take the + island. I have to retake them now. I didn’t lose some of my finest ships + and some of my finest lives, to leave quietly under a cease fire without + the Argentinians withdrawing.

+

President: Oh. Oh, Margaret, that is part of this, as I understand it. + This latest proposal that they would want to come from Brazil and + ourselves to see if, and it would be that they would have to + withdraw.

+

Thatcher: Ron, I’m not handing + over (garbled) I’m not handing over the island now, to anyone else other + than to whom the people want. And that would be intolerable. We will + therefore(?) . . . we have some of our best ships lost, because for + seven weeks the Argentines refused to negotiate on reasonable terms.

+

President: Yes.

+

Thatcher: It’s not only the one + thing, we lost some of our best British guard(?) and some of our allies + in NATO. When we repossess the island + and restore the people to democracy and then we will discuss with them + what they want. There can be no question now, of us quietly moving out + of the island to hand them over to a contact, local or United Nations or + anything like that, before we had the real thing, before we had to do + that thing, yes, that’s what we were offering to stop the fighting. I + can’t lose the lives and blood of our soldiers to hand the islands over + to a contact. It’s not possible.

+

President: Well, Margaret, I just thought that are we talking about the + same thing, because my understanding was that they would have to + withdraw. That the cease-fire would have to be followed with their + withdrawal and you, your forces would not have to withdraw until a + binational or multinational force arrived then as the housekeeping + force.

+

Thatcher: Yes, but I think the + point is this Ron, and you would understand it, we have borne the brunt + of this alone. To hand over the Queen’s islands to a binational, + multinational force immediately and that we must restore our British + administration. We must then try to see what kind of security we can get + for the islands. And then with a kind of Sinai force. And not to hand + the people over to anyone . . .

+

President: No . . .

+

Thatcher: We wish to reinstate + their existing laws, their customs. And I don’t know what their wishes + will be until the hostilities are complete, are over and we could talk + to them and we could get some developments in the islands which would be + of help and then we could get + some security. What I simply can’t have now is having borne the brunt of + this totally alone, if we choose to say, alright the Argentines withdraw + and when they’ve gone we go. Having lost British guard(?) we hand over + to someone else all we’ve got in the future that the island is one. We + don’t believe we’re not being (familiar with the future) (?) under + Britain, I think it will be a kind of independence or semi-independence + or quasi-independence so that they will go the way that former colonies + have gone. They’ll come with self-government, which they were on the way + to doing. Now, the situation once you’ve gone through battle is very + very different than if you have one with varied offers, (?) before we + had actually to do battle.

+

President: Margaret, but I thought that part of this proposal,

+

Thatcher: (words garbled) . . . + our young men fighting . . .

+

President: But part of the proposal,

+

Thatcher: (words garbled) to + withdraw, that would be marvelous.

+

President: But part of the proposal, as I understand it, was that local + self-government and the local councils would be established to govern + the islands and at the time of this, they would have to, the rapid + withdrawal. And yours would be a phased withdrawal after the + peacekeeping force came in to assume just the security of the islands + for a limited period and then the negotiations, without any + preconditions would go forward.

+

Thatcher: Yes, but why now + negotiations without any preconditions? That time, I think is over, Ron. + I can’t emphasize too much, how would you feel if you put in a large + part of your navy, some of the best of your armed forces to secure and + repossess those islands to restore the people with its administration, + (words garbled), under democracy and all of a sudden they say “No you + can’t have that. We know you’ve lost your blood for it, but you can’t + have that. We’re going to put in something else.” Gradually we will put + in something else. But when our people have gone so that we can’t + repossess British (word garbled) territory with British people on it, + any (words garbled) Argentinians there ever. (sentences become garbled) + . . . we will see what the islanders want. That must be our objective + now, and if the Argentinians wish to withdraw from Port Stanley and from + the other places, then nothing will please me better. It was ridiculous + that they didn’t do it before. (sentence garbled) So we are really + saying, please return to the mainland.

+

President: I thought you were in a sufficient position of power that + there wouldn’t be any doubt in anyone’s mind that they, what they had + done was a retreat in the face of defeat. I don’t think there is any + question, that anyone doesn’t know that victory could happen. I was just + thinking of how, how much, well I’m worrying about what happens if you have to retain an + occupancy, military occupancy against a possible attempt on their part + to do it again. Or I’m also wondering about what happens if the present + government, as bad as it’s been in this whole affair, if it falls and is + replaced as it would be by the leftist Peronists.

+

Thatcher: Yes. I understand that + we do need help with the security of the island. I’m the first to admit + it. But you are surely not asking me, Ron, after we’ve lost some of our + finest young men, you’re surely not saying, that after the Argentinian + withdrawal that our forces and our administration become immediately + idle? (I had to go imense distances) (?) and mobilize half my country. I + had to go there to (word garbled) the invader, because no one else could + do it. I just had to go.

+

President: Yes.

+

Thatcher: (words garbled) and he + must not gain in his aggression. I wonder if anyone over there realizes, + I’d like to ask them. Just supposing Alaska was invaded, it’s a long way + away from you, it’s next door to (words garbled) who didn’t (garbled) + United States. Now you’ve put all your people up there to retake it and + someone suggested that a contact could come in. And if the invader left + and if you left and you couldn’t stay. (words garbled) and you’ve lost a + lot of men and you ships. You wouldn’t do it.

+

President: No, no although Margaret I have to say that I don’t quite + think Alaska is a similar situation.

+

Thatcher: More or less so.

+

President: It was always my understanding or feeling that you had in the + past been prepared to offer independence to the islands or,

+

Thatcher: Yes, but I think now, I + think gradually, Ron, I think this really is fairest thing for the + Argentines. But eventually I think I’d be able to say alright we haven’t + got the islands and I think that (words garbled) they might have been a + possibility, they’ve simply not done that. They’ve done awful things to + our island, we’ve had a terrible time with them, (word garbled) and + Goose Green and Darwin and I think the best thing for the Argentines is + that we have repossess the island we shall gradually sympathize. + (Sentence garbled) And try to get multinational force there. Not with a + view of colonialism but with a view to independence or + quasi-independence which will leave the margin there for recognizing a + quasi-independence and get the last vestige of colonialism out, and that + is what we will try to do. A hundred ships, three to seven times as many + young men, some of whom are dead. The Argentinians have done everything + possible to try to sink the ship with (word garbled) men(?) along with + many, many others. You will surely recognize that they need almost as + much material help as they can possibly ask. (Sentence garbled)

+ +

President: Margaret, I,

+

Thatcher: The conditions that + exist, (word garbled) you had to go in and your (illusionary) (?) young + men are quite different from the conditions that offered before but I + would be delighted if the Argentinians said, alright, save our young men + and perhaps on the understanding that we would bring the islands + gradually to independence.

+

President: Well,

+

Thatcher: That would be + marvelous. But as things are, our blood and then ask us that if the + Argentines withdraw then the British automatically withdraw, before we + manage to arrange the future that the islanders want, because after all + you and I are democracies. It’s self-determination we’re after.

+

President: Yes, well,

+

Thatcher: Mr. President (you have + tried your round,) (?) that’s why I’m here.

+

President: Yes.

+

Thatcher: You really do think + that when our people have lived through the most blameless lies + (sentences garbled) there can be any choice that they be put under + anything other than their own choice. (sentence garbled) otherwise you + have perpetual trouble down there. You yourself said on television the + other evening, I would remark, if the aggressor wins anything out of + this, there would be fifty other (word garbled) risk.During a question-and-answer session with reporters + in Santa Barbara, California, on May 28, Reagan said: “The only thing that + we have to face here is the issue, and the issue is not really those + lonely islands down there. The issue is whether we can allow armed + aggression to succeed with regard to such territorial claims. There + are 50 places in the world right now where, if this succeeds, could + be opened to the same thing happening. And the armed aggression, I’m + sorry, did start by the action of one of our neighbors here in the + Americas.” (Public Papers: Reagan, 1982, Book I, p. + 705) But I would think that you would be delighted if Port + Stanley without a death. It would be the most sensible both for them and + for us.

+

President: Well, Margaret, I know that I’ve intruded and I know how, I + know,

+

Thatcher: You haven’t intruded at + all, and I’m glad you telephoned. I will talk to my people about it + tomorrow and maybe we can have a broader talk on Friday.

+

President: Alright, I’ll look forward to it and I, I know how

+

Thatcher: Understand that when + you’ve lost some of your wonderful regiment.

+

President: Yes I know what this, I know how, how tragic this has been for + you. I look out here at some of our own young men at some of the formations you’ve seen and I + know how I would feel if that were happening to them. So I do know.

+

Thatcher: And you know how you’d + feel if you went through the same conflict.

+

President: Yes, I know.

+

Thatcher: (sentences garbled) + Anyhow I will see on next Friday and we will have a long talk then.

+

President: Alright and God bless you.In his + personal diary, Reagan wrote + of his conversation with Thatcher: “The P.M. is adamant (so far). She feels + the loss of life so far can only be justified if they win. We’ll + see[;] she may be right. (Reagan, Diaries, p. 135) + Following the conversation, Henderson recorded, Thatcher telephoned him to discuss it: “She spoke on + an open line, but this in no way attenuated the criticisms she made + of the Americans.” For Henderson’s detailed reconstruction of his + conversation with Thatcher, + see Henderson, Mandarin, pp. 466–467.

+
+ +
+ 316. Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the Department of + State (Bremer) to the + President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Clark)Source: Reagan Library, Latin American Affairs + Directorate Files, Falklands/Malvinas: NSC & State Memos, 1982. Secret; Sensitive. + Blair forwarded the + memorandum and attached proposal to McFarlane under a June 3 covering memorandum, + commenting: “Al Sapia-Bosch + believes the proposal is worth a try, but doubts that it will work.” + (Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Argentina + (05/21/1982–06/15/1982) + + + Washington, June 1, + 1982 + + + SUBJECT + Takacs Call + +

Argentine Ambassador Takacs met + with Tom Enders late last night, + to float the attached proposal,Attached but + not printed is a Department of State translation of the Argentine + proposal which included a ceasefire; “immediate installation of an + interim authority in which he said was fathered by Air Force + Chief Lami Dozo.

+

The proposal is like the “Peruvian” plan of May 5, except that it does + not allow for a role for the local councils.

+ +

Enders told Takacs that he did not believe that + London would accept simultaneous withdrawal, although it might accept + sequential withdrawal, and that the restoration of the councils appeared + essential to Britain.

+

Takacs, reflecting Lami Dozo, continues to have + unrealistic news of the military situation. He believes the carrier was + in fact seriously damaged, that Argentine troops on the islands can hold + out for 3 or 4 weeks, and that “15 or 20” British ships more will be + sunk. He is talking about continuing the war after the British win in + the Falklands.

+

Takacs had learned (through a + Senate staff source) that the President had called Prime Minister + Thatcher, and that the call + “had not gone well.”

+

L. Paul + Bremer, III

+

Executive Secretary

+

the person of an Administrator, designated by the United Nations + Secretary General, for the government of the islands during the + negotiations;” mutual withdrawal of British and Argentine forces “an + equal distance under the conditions established by the Administrator;” + agreement from both parties “not to reintroduce any armed forces in the + demilitarized zone;” the creation of a group of four countries (the + United States, Peru, and two other countries, “one to be named by each + of the two parties”) to ensure the withdrawal; agreement by the two + parties to cease the “economic measures they have taken against the + other party on their own initiative or through third countries;” and the + beginning of negotiations under the auspices of the UN Secretary General with the “assistance” + of representatives of the four countries referred to above.

+
+ +
+ + 317. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense Weinberger to the Chief of Naval Operations (Hayward)Source: Washington National Records Center, OSD Files, FRC 330–86–0042, UK 1982. Top Secret; Eyes Only. At the + bottom of the memorandum, Weinberger wrote: “This request was sent to us on + May 8. We should have acted on it in no less than 1 week. 3 weeks is + far too long in a wartime situation. I + want all of these requests presented to me + within 1 week of receipt. CWW.” + + + Washington, June 1, + 1982 + + + SUBJECT + UK Request for AN/ASQ–81 (V) + Magnetic Detector Sets (TS)—ACTION MEMORANDUM + +

After considering the Navy’s recommendation,In a May 29 memorandum to Weinberger presenting the British request for + action, Iklé summarized the + Navy recommendation: “Originally, the Navy recommended providing 11 + of the sets, but not the remaining 4, since these would have to come + off active or reserve aircraft. Subsequently, the Navy discovered + that the 11 sets were not complete and, as a result, changed its + recommendation to disapproval.” (Ibid.) I have decided to + approve the British request for the following equipment, with delivery + as previously specified by the UK:

+

—15 AN/ASQ–81 (V–2) Magnetic Anomaly Detector (MAD) Sets with 9 shipboard + spare kitsOn June 2, Hayward replied to Weinberger with a memorandum + stating that the Navy staff had “initiated appropriate action” to + provide the requested sets “expeditiously.” On the memorandum, + Hayward added the + following notation: “As Capt. + Cormack can explain to you, we are being very + responsive to these British requests, including this case which on + the surface appeared to be excessively delayed.” (Washington + National Records Center, OSD Files, + FRC 330–84–0004, UK Jun–Jul + 1982)

+

—9 AN/ASM–454 Test Sets

+

—9 MX/956 Cable Maintenance Fixtures

+

—1 Magnetic Detector Noise Kit

+

—24 Shipping Containers

+ Caspar W. + Weinberger +
+ +
+ + 318. Information Memorandum From the Director of the Bureau of + Politico-Military Affairs (Howe) + to Secretary of State HaigSource: Department of State, + Executive Secretariat, S/S Special + Handling Restrictions Memos 1979–1983, Lot 96D262, ES Sensitive June 1–7 1982. Secret; + Sensitive. Drafted by Clarke; cleared by Kanter and Haass. + + + Washington, June 1, + 1982 + + + SUBJECT + UK Military Requirements in + Defending the Falklands + +

Even after the British take control of the Falklands, Argentina may + continue the struggle and refuse any peace-keeping force.In a June 1 briefing paper, entitled “Falklands + Posture,” Enders noted: “It + is likely that a state of war will persist for some time following + the surrender of Port Stanley, maybe indefinitely.” (Ibid.) + The UK would face a sustained + requirement to defend and supply the islands. In a continuing war + scenario, the defense of the Falklands over the long-term could be a + high-cost burden on the British, both financially and militarily. The + UK could be forced to bring direct + pressure on the Argentine mainland through air raids or SSN blockade if faced with intensified + Argentine attacks. The UK probably still + would be dependent upon the US for key + materiel support, thereby providing us with some additional leverage in discussions with the British + concerning the future status of the islands. The + British must also recognize the long term drain of maintaining a war + footing indefinitely.

+

This memorandum provides a preliminary estimate of what US materiel support the British may require + following their seizure of the islands.

+

Continuing War of Attrition

+

Argentina may continue the war following the British conquest of the + islands. Assuming they do so, the Argentine military options are:

+

• commando operations against British positions on + the islands;

+

• continuing air raids against the islands and the + British sea lines of communications (SLOCs); and

+ +

• small scale naval engagements against isolated + RN shipping.In a June 2 memorandum to Casey, Menges similarly argued that + Anglo-Argentine hostilities might continue “in an open or + clandestine way” after the United Kingdom reestablished control over + the Islands, including “periodic harassment by air attacks, bombing + runs, and commando raids.” Menges added: “Clandestine operations which could + supplement or substitute for such open Argentine warfare could + include the use of the 601st intelligence group and other similar + units for anti-UK or anti-US terrorism in other parts of Latin + America or even in the United Kingdom—perhaps operating jointly with + the Irish Republican Army. The Soviet Union might well encourage + either Cuba or Libya (with which a weapons-supply relationship has + begun) to act as the intermediary for supplying Argentine needs for + either type of warfare which could go on for many, many months.” + (Central Intelligence Agency, Office of the Director of Central + Intelligence, Job 83M00914R: EXDIR and Executive Registry Files + (1982), Box 16, Folder 1: C–353 Argentina)

+

The British should be able to handle the commando operations. The other + two threats may require a continued large-scale British presence, + although it is difficult now to estimate force size precisely. The + Argentine threat will vary significantly, depending upon its ability to + acquire additional military equipment.On June 1, in a breakfast meeting with + Casey, Inman, Eagleburger, and Montgomery, Haig “voiced his concern regarding + a future Soviet role in Argentina as a result of the Falklands + crisis. It was agreed that Cuban and/or other proxy roles might be + the likely first step except if Argentina requests arms which only + the Soviets could provide.” (Memorandum for the Record, June 1; + Central Intelligence Agency, Office of the Director of Central + Intelligence, Job 89B00224R: Committees, Task Forces, Boards, and + Councils Files, Box 11, Folder 406: Memos for the Record of Mtgs w/ + Sec and DepSec of State (Apr + 81–Dec 85)) Most important would be additional aircraft, + “smart” weapons such as EXOCET, and submarines. British refusal to + compromise on the future status of the islands could increase the + willingness of third countries to supply Argentina. Although there have + been reports of offers from Peru, Cuba, Nicaragua and others, we do not + have any confirmation that Argentina has taken control of aircraft from + those sources. Nonetheless, Argentina’s ability to + acquire new arms over time will probably be greater than its limited + success in the last few weeks. Brazil has apparently sold at + least two maritime patrol aircraft.

+

Argentina’s ability to pay for new weapons is limited, however, because + of the effect of economic sanctions and reduced ship traffic compounding + the difficulties of an already deteriorating economy. Thus, economic + considerations may lead Argentina to accept weapons from those who would + offer them free or at low cost, i.e., Cuba, Libya, and the Soviet Union. + There are no reasons for such countries to exercise restraint if + Argentina decides to accept their offers.

+

The availability of aircraft of the type with which the Argentine Air + Force is already familiar is shown at Tab 1, as is a summary of + submarine availability from likely potential suppliers.Attached but not printed is a short summary paper + entitled “Potential Suppliers of Aircraft and Submarines with Which + Argentina is Already Familiar.”

+ +

British Ability to Handle Continuing Presence and + a War of Attrition

+

British land-based air defenses on the Falklands + are limited. British aircraft on the islands will + be concentrated at one or two small airfields and will be highly + vulnerable to air attacks while on the ground. Their ships are in need + of repair and their logistics burden will grow once they are on the + islands. Thus, the British could have a need for:

+

• Airborne Early Warning (AEW) Aircraft. Grumman has already received + informal requests for information on AEW aircraft. The UK now + has only test-bed aircraft in its NIMROD + AEW program and has retired all of its + GANNET AEW aircraft from its carriers. + There are E–2Bs in the US Navy Reserve. Six would be required to + maintain one continuous orbit. E–2Bs + can operate from relatively short airstrips. Less capable alternatives + would be radar on balloons or on high hills on West Falklands.

+

• I–HAWK SAMs. + Despite press reports that HAWKs are on the Falklands, Britain does not + operate the HAWK or any other medium to long-range land-based SAM. The US could only provide HAWK by diverting from inventory + and/or deferring the sale to Egypt. I–HAWK could relieve some of the + requirement to keep British anti-air capable ships near the islands for + that purpose.

+

• Airfield Equipment. We have already agreed to + provide runway matting and some “bare base” parts. The British will + probably construct at least two main operating bases because of the + extreme vulnerability of small airfields to aerial attack. We can + anticipate that we will have additional requests for similar equipment + and for other items such as revetments, radars, and spare parts for + certain aircraft (F–4, C–130). The British will need an + extensive spares supply on hand, given the great distances involved in + resupply. The F–4, for example, has a + very high requirement for maintenance-per-flight-hour and an extensive + number of replacement parts.Howe produced a memorandum for + Eagleburger on May 29, + which considered the possibility of the British redeploying F–4 fighter aircraft from Ascension to + the Falklands/Malvinas. (Department of State, Executive Secretariat, + S/S Special Handling + Restrictions Memos 1979–1983, Lot 96D262, 1982 ES Sensitive May 25–31) Later, during a + June 4 breakfast meeting, Weinberger informed Inman and Calucci that “the UK had submitted a new request for the short-takeoff + version of the F–5, which the British would like to base at Stanley + once they regain control.” (Memorandum for the Record, June 4; + Central Intelligence Agency, Office of the Director of Central + Intelligence, Job 89B00224R: Committees, Task Forces, Boards, and + Councils Files, Box 11, Folder 406: Memos for the Record of Mtgs + w/Sec and DepSec Defense (May + 81–Dec 85))

+

• Naval Support. Because the Argentine Navy + remains essentially intact, it poses a threat-in-being that will require + a continued RN presence. If the + Argentine submarine threat grows or if Argentine surface ships armed + with EXOCET begin raiding tactics on the SLOC from Ascension, the British may need to maintain their fleet at high levels + in the South Atlantic. Currently, of RN + ships in A–1 status (i.e., not in for repairs) 23 surface combatants and + 18 naval auxiliaries are in the South Atlantic and only 20 surface + combatants and 18 naval auxiliaries elsewhere. The best RN ships are those in the South Atlantic. + Many of the ships in the South Atlantic will probably need repairs soon, + thus necessitating a return to the UK. + The Task Force’s supplies of anti-aircraft missiles may be running low, + necessitating further resupply at sea. A continued high naval presence + and long supply line to the South Atlantic may mean that the UK will continue to need the US to support RN ships in the North Atlantic.

+

• Logistics Support. Supplying a British garrison + on the Falklands will require continued aerial and sea-borne supply. + US estimates of the daily supply + requirements for a 3500 man force in peacetime are 63 tons of + consumables and 25,000 gallons of fuel. A 5000 man force would require + over 90 tons and 36,000 gallons daily. In light combat, those + requirements would almost double. Depending upon the size of the + garrison, the supply effort could strain UK assets. Already they have chartered 43 commercial ships + for South Atlantic supply duty. If the British can establish a 6000–7000 + foot runway, they may request US C–141 + flights to ease their resupply problem.

+

MOD sources say that there is no firm estimate of what the war is costing + (some sources say most of the 2.2 billion pound government contingency + fund has been spent), nor are there yet cost estimates for replacing + lost ships. Nonetheless, there is already talk of a “Falklands tax.” The British have been leaking stories about + “internationalizing the defense of the Falklands” and a US role along the lines of Ascension (i.e., + their island, our airbase). Thus, the British may already be thinking + they will need our help in the longer term.

+
+ +
+ 319. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department + of State and the White HouseSource: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, + D820288–0201. Confidential; Niact + Immediate; Exdis. Sent for + information Immediate to Buenos Aires and London. + + + New York, June 3, 1982, 0549Z + +

1550. Dept for Deputy Secretary + Stoessel, AS Enders, White House National Security + Advisor Clark, CIA for Casey from Ambassador Kirkpatrick. Subject: Falklands: Amb Kirkpatrick’s Meeting With Generals. + Ref: USUN 1549.In telegram 1549 from USUN, June 3, the Mission reported Spain’s submission + to the Security Council of a draft resolution, co-sponsored by + Panama, calling on the parties to “observe an immediate cessation of + hostilities, authorize the SYG to + use his offices to secure the ceasefire, and request that he report + back to the Council within 72 hours.” The Mission added that the + Spanish Permanent Representative, de Pinies, “told UK Amb Parsons, in the presence of Amb Kirkpatrick, that his purpose is + to provide an appropriate ‘fig-leaf’ that would permit Argentina to + take the decision to withdraw its forces from Port Stanley.” + (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, + D820287–1083)

+

1. (C–Entire text)

+

2. At the Argentinians’ request, Generals Jose Miret and Miguel + Mallea Gil met with Ambassadors Kirkpatrick and Sorzano.

+

3. Miret began with Argentinian + version of recent military events in the South Atlantic. Both sides had + inflicted damage and suffered casualties but the British continued their + skillful manipulation of military reports. Miret challenged British figures indicating that sixty + Argentinian aircraft had been destroyed. Half that number was more + accurate. Miret also dismissed + British denials of damage to the carrier Invincible. Finally, while + acknowledging that British forces were closing around Port Stanley, + Miret asserted that British + success would not come easily.

+

4. Miret continued by outlining a + four point proposal which included: A) immediate ceasefire, B) mutual + withdrawal, C) creation of a four-nation UN administration for the islands, and D) negotiations with + a specified time-limit. This proposal, if accepted, would prevent the + continuing degeneration of the situation. Even if Argentinian forces + were defeated in the Falklands, this would be but the initial chapter of + a very long story. Argentina would have lost the battle but not the war + and it would continue to fight from the mainland. In turn the UK would have to fortify the Islands and to + defend them would have to attack Argentinian forces at their bases in + the mainland. This would precipitate a Hemispheric confrontation with + Britain which would surely destroy the interAmerican system. The US should, therefore, urge the UK to accept the proposal.

+

5. Amb Kirkpatrick responded that + the same proposal had already been presented to, and rejected by, the + UK. At the request of AS Enders she had personally conveyed + this information last week to Amb Takacs in Washington.See + Document 316. Events had + overtaken that proposal and attention was now focused on two new + proposals before the UN Security + Council. The first proposal—being moved by Spain—simply called for a + cease fire. (Reftel) It would be voted on tomorrow (June 3) and the + British had indicated that they would veto it. The second proposal had + not yet surfaced. It was a British text mentioning Resolutions 502 and + 505 and proposing a ceasefire + once Argentina indicated its willingness to withdraw its forces from the + Falklands within fourteen days. (Reftel)

+

6. Both Miret and Mallea coincided in regarding the + British proposal as a totally unacceptable ultimatum.Presumbably the May 17 proposal. See Document 271. + Miret claimed that if Argentinian + troops were withdrawn from the Falklands under those terms they would + march on Buenos Aires to depose the government upon their return to the + mainland. Mallea added that it + was not a question of just being unacceptable to the government but that + the Argentinian people as a whole would also reject it. They both + concurred that it would be preferable to fight and lose than to accept + those terms. In their estimation being defeated after a valiant fight at + least had the advantage that it would unify the Argentines. But a + dishonorable surrender would tear the nation apart.

+

7. The Spanish proposal, on the other hand, was entirely acceptable to + Argentina. In their view, however, Britain would veto it. They also + believed that France would vote for it and that Japan would follow the + US lead. Their only question was how + the US would vote. They hoped the US would support it or, at least, abstain. + An American veto would send an unmistakeable signal that the US had totally sided with Britain against + Argentina. The Spanish resolution only called for a ceasefire and a + US vote against it could only be + interpreted as a US desire to see the + war continued to its ultimate consequences. While US-Argentine relations are currently + strained there is still the possibility of repairing the damage. That + damage would be exceedingly, perhaps even impossibly, difficult to + repair if the US voted against the + Spanish resolution.

+

8. Amb Kirkpatrick responded that + she understood their views but that she supposed that the US would vote against the Spanish + resolution. Nevertheless, she would immediately convey their views to + Washington. She knew that US relations + with Argentina have been stormy and that there have been periods (such + as the one characterized by the chant “O Braden O Peron”) that could + only be charcterized as antagonistic. Perhaps we are now entering one of + those unfortunate periods.

+

9. The meeting concluded with Miret forcefully reiterating that an American veto would + damage US-Argentinian relations to a + much deeper extent than even the worst periods in the past.

+

10. Comment: SYG Perez de Cuellar has + informed Amb Kirkpatrick that + Argentinian Foreign Ministry is thinking of a UNSC veto with a subsequent call for an emergency session + of the GA. She believes that conversation with Miret and Mellea was pro-forma perhaps + because they also favor such a scenario.

+ + Kirkpatrick + +
+ +
+ 320. Message From the Commander in Chief, U.S. Southern Command + (Nutting) to the Chairman of + the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Jones), the Chief of Staff of the Air Force (Allen), the Commandant of the Marine + Corps (Barrow), the Chief of + Staff of the Army (Meyer), and + the Chief of Naval Operations (Hayward)Source: Washington National Records Center, OSD Files, FRC 330–84–0003, Argentina + (June–Sept) 1982. Secret; Immediate; Noforn. + + + Quarry Heights, Panama Canal Zone, June 3, 1982, 1620Z + +

Nutting sends. Subject: + Falklands/Malvinas Crisis.

+

Ref A: USCINCSO + msg 011905Z Jun 82.

+

Ref B: [less than 1 line not declassified] Jun 82 + 0238.

+

Ref C: AmEmbassy Buenos Aires msg + 021824Z Jun 82 3408.None of the reference + messages were found.

+

1. (S/NF) In the Falklands/Malvinas crisis, I believe strongly that + US interests demand that neither + party be annihilated or humiliated. Argentina should not be placed in an + even more desperate situation than prevails today. Many people forecast + an internal Argentine crisis very likely resulting in a new government. + An internal power vacuum would very likely be filled by Peronistas and + any change at this time provides an opportunity for increased Soviet + access and influence. I submit that General Galtieri is undoubtedly a better government head for us + to deal with than any likely alternative.

+

2. (S/NF) [less than 1 line not declassified] in + which reported on the specific message sent to us regarding the + Argentine junta’s estimate of the situation. [less + than 1 line not declassified] further recognized the possible + futility of the [less than 1 line not + declassified] of communication and proposed for your + consideration an initial message which might be transmitted.

+

3. (C/NF) I call Ref B to your attention as an additional [less than 1 line not declassified] indicating + that several Argentine military officers believe that the fighting will + be over within a week and call for the US + to help find a way out, + diverting a total British kill which will plunge Argentina into chaos. + Ambassador Shlaudeman comments + that this 31 May conversation at least opens a line of + military-to-military communication that could prove useful to the + future.

+

4. (S/NF) I call [less than 1 line not + declassified] to your attention as a new [1 + line not declassified] appealing for US intercession to arrange an “armistice” now. [less than 1 line not declassified] is presented + as a possible indicator of wider defeatist sentiment in the Argentine + military. The [less than 1 line not declassified] + state that USCINCSO + Nutting should be apprised of + the desire of [less than 1 line not declassified] + to quit, so that he could communicate it to Washington, invoking some + sort of political intercession with the belligerence to halt the + fighting now.

+

5. (S/NF) I acknowledge that the thesis that things will be worse if + Argentina is defeated is not proven. It is equally possible that a sound + defeat might bring the Argentines to their senses. Letting them down + easily might permit them to continue down the self-destructive path they + have been following. Nevertheless, our strategic interests in Latin + America very likely will only be further damaged by continuation of the + present course. I urge that:

+

— We immediately cease all actions which have a negative political, + economic, or military impact on Argentina.

+

— Convince British authorities that further prosecution of the battle + will mainly result in grave strategic damage to the Americas.

+

— Renew US Government efforts to devise a + formula which will be face-saving for both sides.

+
+ +
+ 321. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in + BrazilSource: Department + of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D850288–0106. Secret; Niact Immediate; Exdis. Sent for information + Immediate to Buenos Aires, London, the Department of Defense, the + Joint Chiefs of Staff, and Secretary of State Haig as Tosec 80053. Drafted by K. + Smith; cleared by Morns (EUR/NE), Blackwill, Kilday, Kantor, Service, and in S/S–O; and approved by Eagleburger. Haig was then in Paris with Reagan for bilateral talks with + French officials and the forthcoming June 5–6 Versailles Economic + Summit. + + + Washington, June 3, 1982, 2341Z + +

152723. Exdis ZFF Brasilia & + Secretary only. Subject: UK + Vulcan Bomber in Brazil. Ref: (A) + Streator/Smith Telcon on + June 3, (B) Motley/Kilday Telcon.No memorandum of conversation of either of these + telephone calls has been found.

+ +

1. Secret–Entire text.

+

2. UK Defense Minister John Nott passed to Embassy London “as + courtesy” the following information regarding emergency landing of + British Vulcan bomber at Rio de + Janiero June 3:

+

—The Vulcan had to make emergency + landing in Brazil due to failure of in-flight refueling;

+

—The plane carried a Shrike missile + (AGM–45) which the pilot could not jettison before landing;

+

—The Brazilians are being helpful in getting the plane on its way back to + UK territory;

+

—The Brazilians, however, will not allow the plane to take off with + weapons aboard (including Shrike);

+

—Pilot has been instructed by UK MOD to + comply with Brazilian request.

+

3. Nott said that it was in + interest of US and UK to recover the Shrike before it could be taken apart + by Brazilians.

+

4. UK Embassy later informed Department + that the missile is in a lethal state since firing mechanism had been + activated. MOD was sending radio instructions to crew on how to disarm + the Shrike, and the UK had asked the Brazilians for permission + to send a transport aircraft to recover the Shrike and other ordnance that may have been on the + aircraft.

+

5. The British are hopeful that they can recover the plane and its + weapons quickly and with little public notice. We want to avoid, if + possible, any public mention of the Shrike, particularly since it is of US manufacture and was supplied to the UK after start of Falklands dispute. + Embassy Brasilia should maintain as low profile as possible during the + Vulcan + Shrike recovery and treat issue as + bilateral UK-GOB matter to greatest extent possible.

+

6. We understand that Embassy Brasilia has been in contact with UK Embassy which confirms that FAB is cooperating with British in this + matter, leading Embassy Brasilia to conclude that British will be able + to arrange for Shrike recovery + without US assistance. Nevertheless, the + Shrike contains sensitive US technology and we must assure that the + weapon is not inspected or taken apart for study. If US assistance appears essential to maintain + security of technology, Embassy should approach GOB confidentially at high level and register our strong + desire for the immediate release of the Shrike to UK + authorities.

+ +

7. Buenos Aires minimize considered.On June + 14, the British Air Attaché in Brasilia informed the Embassy that + the Shrike missile had been + removed from the Vulcan by the + Brazilians and detailed the security arrangements that were being + provided. (Telegram 4931 from Brasilia, June 14; Department of + State, Central Foreign Policy File, D850363–0040) In telegram 166547 + to Brasilia, June 17, the Department advised the Embassy that “the + technology contained in the missile in the hands of the BAF is not sufficiently sensitive or + advanced for USG to risk a negative + diplomatic impact by even addressing the Brazilians on this issue.” + (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, + D850378–0800)

+ + Stoessel + +
+ +
+ 322. Memorandum From Secretary of State Haig to President ReaganSource: + Department of State, Executive Secretariat, Files of Alexander M. Haig, Jr., 1981–1982, + Lot 82D370, (3) Falklands Crisis 1982. Secret. At the top of the + memorandum, Goldberg wrote: + “6/4/82 at U.S. Amb. Resid.” and “1½ hr.” Below this notation, + Goldberg added: “Written + by AMH [unclear] midnite + 6/3/82.” + + + Paris, undated + + + SUBJECT + Your meeting with Prime Minister Thatcher at the Versailles Summit + +

Although you obviously need none, it might be helpful to review some + ideas associated with Falklands that you might draw upon in your + discussion with Prime Minister Thatcher.No U.S. record of + this meeting has been found. For the entire period of Reagan’s June 2–11 European trip, + the President’s Daily Diary only records Reagan’s movements and not his + individual meetings. In her memoirs, Thatcher recalled of the June 4 meeting: “My first + and most important meeting was, of course, with President Reagan who was staying at the + US Embassy. We talked alone, as + he preferred it. I thanked him for the great help we had received + from the United States. I asked him what the Americans could do to + help repatriate the Argentine PoWs. I also requested that the + American vote should support us in the Security Council.” (Thatcher, Downing Street Years, p. 231) Of Haig’s meeting with Pym on the South Atlantic which + took place in Paris, the British Official History records: “The + Secretary of State was still expressing his view that Galtieri would continue with + hostilities from the mainland as the best way of keeping his job, + and was not sure, as the British hoped and Reagan seemed to accept, that the + return of prisoners would provide much leverage. He was still + worried largely about the US + position in Latin America.” (Freedman, Official + History, vol. II, p. 531) She will come to you + concerned that you will join with Bonn and Paris in (1) urging a cease + fire and negotiations before she has secured the Falklands or, (2) the + longer term, a more magnanimous position on the ultimate status of the + Islands to avoid a protracted conflict. It goes without saying there has been much on the airways, + in the press, and from the French to contribute to such a state of mind + on the part of the British.

+

Basically, Mrs. Thatcher will + only really listen to you because, from the outset, she has sought to + engage the United States in the role of guarantor for the future + security of the Islands. It would be wrong, however, to assume that she + would abandon her principles in order to achieve such an American + guarantee. At the same time, we must be very careful not to find + ourselves in the middle of an arrangement which would be totally + unacceptable to Argentina and thus lead to a permanent state of + crisis.

+

Mrs. Thatcher’s success thus far + in the crisis will obviously loom large in her own calculations. Her + popularity is at its peak, and she could well be contemplating the + calling of an early election to strengthen her mandate even further. + Thus, she will be reluctant to deviate from her strong, principled + course which has served her well so far, especially in the face of the + sacrifices it has entailed. Beyond that, I believe the character of the + woman is such that she will be very reluctant to join the Labor or + Social Democratic opposition parties or even the troublesome moderate + wing of the Conservative Party in an alignment against her more loyal + constituency on the right.

+

Attached are talking points drawn largely from the draft message I gave + you enroute to Paris.

+

Attachment

+

Talking Points Prepared in the Department of StateNo classification marking. No drafting + information appears on the talking points, which are typed in + all capital letters. The content of the talking points was also + reflected in a June 1 draft letter, which had been prepared in + the Department of State for Reagan to send to Thatcher but was not sent. According to a + handwritten comment by Goldberg which appears on a copy of the draft: + “RR decided against sending + this letter while aboard AF #1 + [Air Force One] enroute to Paris on 6/2/82 because of his + planned meeting w/ Mrs. T. [Thatcher] on 6/4/82 & RR’s desire to ‘keep her thinking’ + per Clark.” (Library of + Congress, Manuscript Division, Haig Papers, Department of State, Day File, June + 2, 1982 Falklands)

+

Undated

+

TALKING POINTS

+

—Admire your courage and determination: your military campaign has been + impressive. With courage and great sacrifice, Britain has defended the + rule of law.

+ +

—We are proud to have assisted you in this endeavor, for your case has + been ours. I know you recognize that because our support has remained + steady, we have suffered political setbacks in Latin America.

+

—Right now it is important for both of us to look to the future. Once you + accomplish your military objectives on the Islands, Buenos Aires is + likely to dig in its heels—refusing a ceasefire and declaring that + Argentina has lost a battle but will continue the war.

+

—Thus, you, and to a lesser extent, we, could face the beginning of a + painful, prolonged war of attrition in the South Atlantic.

+

—You know our position: We continue to support a political settlement + based on Security Council Resolution 502, of which negotiations form an + integral part.

+

—We need to know your position as this stage of the conflict nears an + end.

+

—I am told that you too still support Resolution 502. What is your + attitude toward negotiations?

+

—You have been quoted as favoring independence or “quasi independence” + for the Falklands. Would it be best, at this stage, to suggest that the + Islanders will remain British or become independent? Doesn’t this risk + convincing the Argentines that they have no choice but to continue the + conflict?

+

—How do you see handling the sovereignty issue? Wouldn’t ambiguity on + this and the question of self-determination assist a political + settlement?

+

—Also, what is your thinking on a peacekeeping force? Would you permit + Latin American participation and how would the peacekeeping nations + participate, if at all, in the process of reaching a political + settlement?

+

—I know these are difficult questions and that you are undoubtedly + focused on the course of the battle on the ground. But I believe we also + need to think about the longer-term implications of the conflict.

+

—Beyond getting the Argentines off the Islands, I believe we should + decide together how best to restore peace in the South Atlantic by + putting Resolution 502 into practice in such a way as to reduce the + potential for protracted hostilities. This is in your interest as well + as ours.

+

—I welcome your thoughts.

+
+ +
+ + 323. Message From the Permanent Representative to the United Nations + (Kirkpatrick) to the + President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Clark)Source: Reagan Library, William P. Clark Files, Falklands War (UN/Kirkpatrick/Haig) 06/05/1982. Secret; Flash. Sent via Privacy + Channel. Printed from a copy that was received in the White House + Situation Room. Reagan + initialed at the top of the telegram, indicating that he saw it. The + telegram is unsigned. + + + New York, June 5, 1982, 0231Z + +

265. From Ambassador Jeane + Kirkpatrick. To: Flash for White House (NSC for Clark–Eyes Only.)

+

1. Evening Wednesday June 2. In the Security Council. Spain circulated a + simple cease-fire resolutionSee Footnote 2, Document 319. and the + Council was called to meet the following morning June 3rd.

+

2. British announced their intention to veto and USUN received instruction to veto along + with the British (State 8005).A mistaken + reference to telegram Secto 8005 + from Haig in Paris, June 3. + (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, + D820288–1087)

+

3. Thursday June 3rd. Amendments were introduced to Spanish text calling + for implementation of Resolutions 502 and 505 simultaneously with the + establishment of a cease-fire, that is, linking the cease-fire to a + withdrawal of Argentine troops as called for in Res. 502, as UK desired.

+

4. Since the U.K. had asserted that they wanted implementation of Res. + 502, there appeared to be a chance of acceptance.

+

5. The U.K. said they would only consider it seriously if Argentines + agreed. By cutting through various levels and complications of Argentine + bureaucracy to the top, we were able to get a clear cut Argentine + affirmative, conditioned on U.K. acceptance.

+

6. There were morning and afternoon Council sessions on June 3. At + approximately 6:00 p.m. that day, it was agreed that the Security + Council would reconvene at 4:00 p.m., today, June 4, to vote on the + revised draft resolution. The final amended text was sent to the + Department in USUN cable 1558.Telegram 1558 from USUN, June 3. (Reagan Library, William P. Clark Files, Falklands + War (UN/Kirkpatrick/Haig) 05/13/1982–06/04/1982)

+

7. Many of us, including me (Amb Kirkpatrick) believed that the U.K. might accept the + draft resolution possibly with minor revisions.

+

8. At 11:30 a.m. today (June 4) I spoke with Acting Secretary Stoessel who said that the U.K. + Foreign Office had sent the draft resolution to PM + Thatcher along with two proposed + amendments. He said he had sent + Haig the draft resolution. + Stoessel and I agree that I + was instructed to vote “no” in case the British rejected the + resolution.

+

9. At 2:00 p.m. in New York, I received word from the British that A) + they would veto the resolution; B) that they would entertain no + amendments on the draft resolution.

+

10. After confirming the British position, I called Assistant Secretary + Enders who was as unhappy as + I with U.K. decision. We agreed that a U.S. veto would be a + catastrophe.

+

11. I spoke with Walt Stoessel + and Tom Enders at 3:00 p.m. to + inform them that Japan and Ireland would vote “yes” and that France was + abstaining. I said that I wanted written instructions, and then spoke + with Stoessel again to inquire + if they were very sure that I was instructed to vote no. I reiterated + what a disaster I thought a “no” vote would be, how unnecessary it was, + how the U.K. frequently did not vote with US in the SC. Again, I said + that to avoid any possible confusion, I wanted written instructions.

+

12. I asked if they had spoken with Sec. Haig about the draft. They said yes. Again I repeated + that I thought it would be an extremely controversial vote. I said that + I thought they should discuss this again with Sec. Haig.

+

13. At 4:00 I once again called Stoessel and Enders to say that I had received no written + instructions. They said that my instructions were clear—I was to follow + the British—but they could understand that I wanted written + instructions. ExecSec Bremer + said that they were sending written instructions since Acting Sec + Stoessel had just signed + them. (Now at 9:00 p.m. USUN has still + not received such written instructions. State at first said they were + sent. And now ExecSec is looking).

+

14. At 5:00 I called to report everything we knew about the line up: + Japan, Ireland, Spain, USSR, Poland, + Panama, Zaire would vote yes, and the U.K. would veto. I then said that + the SC meeting was about to begin. They + said that Sec. Haig was still + out at the dinner and they had not yet heard from him.

+

15. Later at 6:00 they said that they had spoken to Sec. Haig, explained the situation to him, + but that he (Haig) wanted to + reflect. I explained that the vote was rapidly approaching. (Later it + was explained Haig had wanted to + consult with Pym).

+

16. At 6:30 I heard that the Secretary wanted to reflect further. I + replied that time had run out, the SC + meeting had been called for 4:00 and we had been delaying for 2 and a + half hours by that point.

+

17. At 6:35 the vote occurred, and we voted no.In the final vote on the Spanish/Panamanian + resolution, nine voted for the resolution, two against (U.S. and + U.K.), and four abstained. (Telegram 1570 from USUN, June 5; ibid.) In the same + telegram, Kirkpatrick + transmitted the text of her statement to the Security Council + explaining the U.S. vote. A summary of the June 2–4 debate in the + Security Council on the resolution is in Yearbook + of the United Nations, 1982, pp. 1335–1337.

+

18. An open phone line was maintained the entire time of the SC deliberations between the Security + Council and the Secretary’s office. It was interrupted only after the + vote.

+ +

19. Amb. Kirkpatrick had + specifically ascertained from AS Enders and Acting Sec Stoessel whether she should vote “no” or not at all if + written instructions did not come in time. She was told specifically to + vote “no”. They said written instructions were on the way.

+

20. The message to abstain came minutes after the SC vote. Since SC votes + cannot be changed, Amb. Kirkpatrick was instructed to announce that we wished to + record the change in any case.

+

21. Amb. Kirkpatrick followed + these instructions and added change of intention to the explanation of + vote. Since then Kirkpatrick has + explained the confusion was a result of short time and long + distance.

+

22. At 9:10 p.m. USUN received written + instructions to abstain.The Department + transmitted the instructions to abstain in telegram 154071 to USUN, June 5. (Department of State, + Central Foreign Policy File, D850288–0118) At 9.35, on + request from Enders to take all + reasonable steps to mend relations with Argentines, Amb. Kirkpatrick, accompanied by Amb. + Sorzano, had dinner with + Generals Miret and Gil. End.

+
+ +
+ 324. Telegram From the Permanent Representative to the United Nations + (Kirkpatrick) to the White + HouseSource: Reagan + Library, William P. Clark + Files, Falklands War (UN/Kirkpatrick/Haig) 06/06/1982–11/04/1982. Top + Secret; Flash; Eyes Only. [text not + declassified] A notation in an unknown hand in the upper + right-hand corner of the telegram reads: “SAVE + UN folder.” + + + New York, June 6, 1982, 1311Z + +

1. White House Situation Room for President Reagan and Judge William + Clark Eyes Only. From J. + Kirkpatrick.

+

1. This letter and a parallel one from the Secretary General were + delivered last night to their respective Ambassadors at approximately 11 + p.m.

+

2. Note that the deadline on the reply is 8:00 pm this evening

+ +

3. Basically this proposal spells out the modes for implementing + Resolution 502 which was the British resolution and one which they have + repeatedly described as the only basis for peace.

+

4. The proposal addresses the U.K. objection that the “Spanish” + resolution provided no specific time frame for withdrawal of Argentine + troops.

+

5. It provides for removing all Argentine troops in 15 days and only + makes a reference to British plans for “reducing” its forces.

+

6. That is, it leaves the U.K. in control of the Islands, but it also + provides for future negotiations.

+

7. This gives the British everything they have said they wanted, but + provides a fig leaf for Argentine pride (the fig leaf being, basically, + the right to surrender and withdraw under U.N. auspices instead of + British).

+

8. It is also being transmitted directly to top Argentine decision + makers.

+

9. If the President can help Mrs. Thatcher decide to accept this, lives and the U.S. + interests would be saved.

+

10. I am not repeat not sending this to any other part of our + government—from concern for leaks or sabotage.

+

Quote:

+

Message to Her Excellency, the Right Honourable Margaret Thatcher, M.P., Prime + Minister of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland

+

Excellency,

+

The armed conflict in the region of the Falkland Islands (Islas Malvinas) + threatens to enter into a new and extremely dangerous phase that is + likely to result in heavy loss of life on both sides. This would gravely + prejudice, for the foreseeable future, any prospect for a settlement of + the underlying dispute. Tension and conflict would continue, in + contradiction to the interests of all concerned.

+

I feel it my duty in this situation, in pursuance of the mandate + entrusted to me by the Security Council, to appeal directly to Your + Excellency and to President Galtieri, in the hope that a way can still be found to + bring the fighting to a halt and to initiate negotiations towards a + settlement of this crisis. At this late stage, further exchanges with + the parties are not likely to be productive. I therefore wish to suggest + the following plan which should be considered as an integral whole:

+

1. A truce comes into effect as of 11:00 a.m., New York time, on Monday, + 7 June 1982.

+

2. On Wednesday, 9 June, the two military commanders on the Islands meet + in the presence of a representative of the Secretary-General for the purpose of agreeing on the + modalities of the cease-fire, which is to come into effect by 11:00 + a.m., New York time, on Friday, 11 June.

+

3. Simultaneously with the cease-fire, withdrawal of Argentine forces + from the Islands will commence to be completed within 15 days. Argentina + will inform the Secretary-General of the withdrawal schedule.

+

4. Within this time frame, the United Kingdom will inform the + Secretary-General of plans for the reduction of its forces in the region + of the Falkland Islands (Islas Malvinas). In the light of these plans, + the Secretary-General will undertake consultations on the possibility of + security arrangements under United Nations auspices.

+

5. The parties undertake to enter into negotiations in good faith, under + the auspices of the Secretary-General of the United Nations, for the + peaceful settlement of their dispute and to seek, with a sense of + urgency, the completion of these negotiations by 31 December 1982, + taking into account the Charter of the United Nations and the relevant + resolutions of the General Assembly. These negotiations shall be + initiated without prejudice to the rights, claims or position of the + parties and without prejudgement of the outcome. The negotiations will + be held in New York or at a mutually acceptable location in the vicinity + thereof.

+

6. These negotiations will be inaugurated on 1 July 1982.

+

7. Should the Secretary-General, after taking account of the course of + negotiations and the views of the parties, determine that the + achievement of the negotiated settlement will not be possible within the + time frame envisaged, he may establish a new target date which will be + in keeping with the urgency of a diplomatic solution to which the + parties are committed.

+

To be effective, the above plan will require that the two governments + communicate their unqualified acceptance by 8:00 p.m. New York time, on + Sunday, 6 June 1982. Upon receipt of such positive responses, I will + immediately report to the Security Council. Please accept, Excellency, + the assurances of my highest consideration.

+

Javier Perez de Cuellar

+

Unquote

+
+ +
+ + 325. Telegram From the Defense Intelligence Agency to the White + HouseSource: Reagan + Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC + Cable File, Falkland File 06/07/1982 (1). Confidential; Sensitive; + Noforn. The telegram repeats + an earlier telegram from [text not + declassified] to the Defense Intelligence Agency, sent at + 1337Z, June 7. Printed from a copy that was received in the White + House Situation Room. + + + Washington, June 7, 1982, 1740Z + +

245. Subj: [less than 1 line not + declassified]/Argentina/United Kingdom/Falkland (Malvinas) + Islands/Argentine [less than 1 line not + declassified] pins hopes on Reagan (U). This is an info report, not finally + evaluated intel.

+

1. (U) Ctry: Argentina (AR)/United + Kingdom (UK)/Falkland (Malvinas) Islands + (FA).

+

2. [less than 1 line not declassified]

+

3. [less than 1 line not declassified]

+

4. [less than 1 line not declassified]

+

5. [less than 1 line not declassified]

+

6. [less than 1 line not declassified]

+

7. [less than 1 line not declassified]

+

8. (C/Noforn) Summary: An Argentine + [less than 1 line not declassified] officer + stated that his fellow officers are frustrated and angry; they blame + Secretary Haig for the failure + of initial Malvinas negotiations and subsequent deterioration of the + situation. However, they are optimistic that President Reagan can convince ((Thatcher)) to negotiate.

+

9A. (C/Noforn) Details: [less than 1 line not declassified] an Argentine + [less than 1 line not declassified] had + stated earlier on the same day that the Argentine [less than 1 line not declassified] are very frustrated over + the Malvinas situation and in their frustration believe that Secretary + Haig is the person + responsible for the collapse of the initial negotiations and the + subsequent deterioration of the situation. However, [less than 1 line not declassified], most Argentine [less than 1 line not declassified] officers + believe that the frustration and anger is temporary and will pass with + time. Furthermore, many Argentine [less than 1 line + not declassified] officers are optimistic that President + Reagan can convince + ((Thatcher)) to take a more + flexible approach to the problem and consider a negotiated settlement. + [less than 1 line not declassified] if + Reagan does succeed, the + frustration and anger will pass quickly—perhaps in as little as three + months.

+

9B. [less than 1 line not declassified]

+

10. [less than 1 line not declassified]

+

11. [less than 1 line not declassified]

+ +

12. [less than 1 line not declassified]

+

13. [less than 1 line not declassified]

+

14. [less than 1 line not declassified]

+

15. [less than 1 line not declassified]

+

16. [less than 1 line not declassified]

+

17. [less than 1 line not declassified]

+
+ +
+ 326. Memorandum From Secretary of State Haig to President ReaganSource: + Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Europe and Soviet Union, United + Kingdom (04/01/1982–07/31/1982) (6). Confidential. On June 7, + Reagan and Haig were in Rome for meetings + with Italian Prime Minister Spadolini and Pope John Paul II, before + flying to London. They remained in the United Kingdom until June 9, + where Reagan met with the + Royal family at Windsor Castle and addressed Parliament. No + memorandum of conversation of Reagan’s meeting with Thatcher has been found, and the President’s Daily + Diary does not record individual meetings during the entirety of + Reagan’s European trip. + In his diary, Henderson + recorded that Reagan, + Thatcher, Haig, and Pym took part in a private + breakfast meeting at Number 10 Downing Street, June 9, before being + joined by British officials and the remainder of the U.S. delegation + for a plenary meeting. At the plenary, Henderson recorded, there was “little discussion + about the Falkland Islands, which I presume must have been discussed + at the restricted breakfast.” (Henderson, Mandarin, p. 473) + In remarks to the press after the June 9 breakfast meeting, + Thatcher’s only mention + of the Falklands was to thank “our American friends” for the U.S. + “staunch” support. (Public Papers: Reagan, 1982, Book I, p. + 753) + + + London, Undated + + + SUBJECT + Your Meeting with UK Prime + Minister Margaret Thatcher, + June 9, 1982 + +

I. SETTING

+

The focus of the Prime Minister for the past two months has been the + Falkland crisis. Her firm handling of it has paid important political + dividends at home, where her Conservative party did well in May’s local + elections. She is also benefitting from the slight improvement in the + economy. But if the South Atlantic war with Argentina drags on with + increasing casualties, she will find her electoral support fickle. She + must call elections by May, 1984, but may go to the country as early as + this autumn if she achieves a South Atlantic settlement.

+ +

II. ISSUES

+

1. Falklands

+

Mrs. Thatcher appreciates both + our strong support in the crisis, and our earlier mediating efforts. She + will welcome your reconfirmation of support.

+

• WE HAVE MADE OUR SUPPORT FOR THE UK + CLEAR IN PUBLIC STATEMENTS, WHERE OUR STARTING POINT IS THAT AGGRESSION + MUST NOT BE ALLOWED TO SUCCEED.

+

• A DIFFERENT STANCE ON THE MERITS OF THE RECENT CONTROVERSIAL UN RESOLUTION DOES NOT DIMINISH OUR SUPPORT + FOR BRITAIN.See Document 323.

+

• WE ARE NOT ASKING FOR A MILITARY PAUSE—THIS IS A JUDGMENT FOR THE + UK. WE HAVE ALSO NOTED PUBLICLY THAT + THE OPTION OF HONORABLE WITHDRAWAL IS OPEN FOR ARGENTINA.

+

[Omitted here are sections on Lebanon, the Middle East Peace Process, + US/UK Economic Relations and the Versailles Summit, East/West Issues, + the State of the NATO Alliance, Arms + Control, US/UK Military Cooperation, Northern Ireland, and Africa.]

+
+ +
+ 327. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in + ArgentinaSource: + Washington National Records Center, OSD Files, FRC 330–84–0003, Argentina (June–Sept) 1982. + Confidential; Niact Immediate; + Specat; Exdis. Printed from a copy that was + received in the Joint Chiefs of Staff Message Center. + + + Washington, June 8, 1982, 2245Z + +

157414. Subject: Message to LTG + Galtieri.

+

1. C–Entire text.

+

2. Request you deliver following message from U.S. Army Chief of Staff to + Commander of Argentine Army, LTG + Galtieri.

+

Begin text: Dear Leo: Despite the current differences between our + countries, we cannot forget that our two nations have a common future. + I believe deeply that we + must look ahead toward a situation that will bring about the restoration + of the good relationships which previously existed. I hope the present + difficulties will soon be behind us so that we can again cooperate and + resume our constructive associations of the past. Warm regards. Signed + Shy, E.C. Meyer, General, United + States Army, Chief of Staff. End text.

+

3. Suggest, if you concur, [less than 1 line not + declassified] make delivery personally pointing out that + message was transmitted to Ambassador by General Meyer to be passed to LTG + Galtieri.

+ + Stoessel + +
+ +
+ 328. Memorandum From the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy + (Iklé) to Secretary of + Defense WeinbergerSource: Washington National Records + Center, OSD Files, FRC 330–86–0042, + UK 1982. Top + Secret. + + + Washington, undated + + + SUBJECT + UK Request for Vulcan/Phalanx + Systems (S)—ACTION MEMORANDUM + +

Yesterday we received a formal request from the UK for six single-gun Vulcan + Phalanx Systems. The Vulcan/Phalanx + is a radar guided 20 mm gatling gun system for last ditch, close-in + protection of ships against incoming missiles and aircraft. The British + currently lack adequate close-in support. This shortcoming, coupled with + the lack of long-range defenses, has resulted in British losses of two + destroyers (including the Sheffield), several frigates and the transport + ship Atlantic Conveyer to Argentine attacks in the Falklands + theater.

+

On 14 May we provided a two gun Vulcan/Phalanx system to the British at a + price of $9.3M.Weinberger informed Nott of his support for the sale of the system to + the United Kingdom during their May 6 meeting. See Document 233. The UK will mount this system on the HMS Illustrious, one of their Harrier capable cruisers. The sale of + any of the six additional systems would require Congressional + notification under Section 36B of the Arms Export Control Act. Under + this Section, we are required to notify the Vice President (President of + the Senate), the Speaker of the House, and the Armed Forces + Appropriations and Foreign Relations/Affairs Committees of both houses + of Congress. This can be done + on a classified basis, but we cannot be certain the request will not + soon leak to the media.

+

Section 36B notification would entail a 15 day delay while awaiting + Congressional approval. Thus far, the Congress has not pressed us for + details concerning our materiel support for UK operations, keeping partisan politics out of the support + process. Processing a request that falls within the provisions of + Section 36B might well open a floodgate of interest.

+

On the other hand, Congressional action under Section 36B confirms our + willingness to work within the Congressionally imposed restrictions. + Furthermore, Vulcan/Phalanx is strictly a defensive system, and thus + less likely to evoke an emotional response from potential critics of our + policy. As a result of these conflicting factors, I recommend that we + approve the request for the Vulcan/Phalanx systems but begin immediately + to work with friendly Congressional leaders to ensure the information + regarding the sale does not become public.Weinberger initialed + his approval on June 9 and added the following notation: “Why do we + have to notify Congress? Could we not sell them the 6 guns, one at a + time?” The notation was also transcribed in an attached June 10 note + from Cormack to Iklé. According to a June 16 + correspondence report, Weinberger’s questions were “taken care of w/phone + call from Dr. Iklé to + SECDEF.” (Washington National Records Center, OSD Files, FRC 330–86–0042, UK 1982)

+ + Fred C. IkleZakheim + signed for Iklé above + his typed signature. + +
+ +
+ 329. Message From British Foreign Secretary Pym to Secretary of State HaigSource: Department of State, Bureau of Inter-American + Affairs, Falklands Files of Luigi + Einaudi, Lot 90D400, Falklands Crisis Consequences. + UK Confidential; Exdis. The British Embassy sent the + text of the message to Stoessel under a covering note from Thomas, June 9. An unknown hand + crossed out the number “8” in the date and wrote in the number “9,” + the date the mesage was received in the Department. + + + London, June 9, + 1982 + +

TEXT OF MESSAGE TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE FROM + THE FOREIGN SECRETARY DATED 9 JUNE 1982

+

Begins.

+

I am very concerned to ensure that, once Argentine forces have been + obliged to leave the Falklands, all military action by Argentina against us in the South + Atlantic should come to a complete stop. We want the next period to be + one of rehabilitation and reconstruction and not one of continuing + bitterness and hostility. I would hope that this would also be the + Argentine mood, and presumably they will be concerned for the return of + their prisoners of war.

+

I have greatly appreciated the support you have given us with measures + against Argentina in the economic field, including arms supplies. + Economic measures are having a substantial and cumulative effect. No + arms supplies have reached Argentina from major western suppliers. + Argentina has been denied up to 25 per cent of her export markets and + has been unable to compensate by increased sales to the Soviet Union. + She has received no new bank lending since the invasion and government + supported export credit has been widely withheld. All this has shown + Argentina the economic penalties of her aggression.

+

Naturally, we would all like to give up these measures as soon as it + makes sense to do so. However, we do not want a situation where we have + regained the Falkland Islands but Argentina refuses to give up fighting + against us. There may be a need to maintain economic measures until + Argentina agrees to cease all hostilities in the South Atlantic. The + embargo on arms supplies might remain rather longer, so that we can be + sure that Argentina has finally abandoned her aggressive intentions.

+

You will recall that we discussed this subject at Versailles.See Document 322. + This message is intended to take our consideration a stage further, + bringing in all countries who have adopted economic measures against + Argentina. We expect to discuss this with our Community partners on 14 + June and would be glad of your views by then. If our joint consideration + results in agreement that there should be a link between the cessation + of all hostilities and the lifting of economic measures, we could + discuss ways of bringing this to the notice of the Argentines, so that + they can draw the consequences. In parallel, the Argentines could also + be told that the ending of hostilities will ensure the early return of + their prisoners taken in the Falklands. This could exert a strong + pressure on them to abandon their aggression and restore peaceful + relations.

+

I look forward to hearing your views.Presumably at the June 9 U.S.–U.K. meeting. See Document 326. Meanwhile, until we have had our + consultations I hope we could all be careful not to prejudge their + outcome and in particular avoid saying anything in public which could + lead to an appearance of disunity among us or send the wrong signals to + Argentina.

+

Ends.

+
+ +
+ + 330. Information Memorandum From the Acting Assistant Secretary of + State for Public Affairs (Seitz) to Acting Secretary of State StoesselSource: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy + File, P820082–1867. No classification marking. Drafted by A. Richman + (PA/OAP) on June 8. A stamped + notation at the top of the memorandum indicates that Stoessel saw it on June + 11. + + + Washington, June 9, + 1982 + + + SUBJECT + Public Supports “Siding” with Britain Over Falklands, But Opposes + U.S. Military Involvement + +

SUMMARY

+

The first available poll taken since the start of British-Argentine + hostilities and the announcement of U.S. sanctions against Argentina + shows: (1) A large majority of the public credits the U.S. with having + done “all it could” to prevent the British-Argentine war (by 64% to + 22%); (2) a smaller majority approves the U.S. “taking sides with Great + Britain” rather than Argentina once hostilities had begun (by 53% to + 35%), but the question underestimates the strength of neutrality + sentiment; and (3) the public overwhelmingly opposes sending American + forces to “help fight with the British against Argentina” (only 6% were + in favor). END SUMMARY

+

NBC asked respondents these four + questions on May 10–11—after the British capture of South Georgia, but + before the invasion of the Falklands:

+

(1) “Do you think the United States has done all it could to prevent war + between Great Britain and Argentina over the Falkland Islands?”

+ + + Yes + 64% + + + No + 22 + + + Not sure + 14 + + + + 100% + +
+

(2) “Do you approve or disapprove of the United States taking sides with + Great Britain and against Argentina in the Falklands dispute?”

+ + + Approve + 53% + + + Disapprove + 35 + + + Not sure + 12 + + + + 100% + +
+ +

(3) (Asked of the 35% who answered “Disapprove” on Q. 2):

+

“Do you think the United States should have remained neutral or should + the United States have taken sides with Argentina against Great + Britain?”

+ + + Remained neutral + 33% + + + Sided with Argentina + 1 + + + Not sure + 1 + + + + 35% + +
+

(4) (Asked of the 53% who answered “Approve” on Q. 2):

+

“Do you think the United States should send American troops to help fight + with the British against Argentina?”

+ + + Don’t send troops + 45% + + + Send troops + 6 + + + Not sure + 2 + + + + 53% + +
+

Polls taken before the start of hostilities also showed hardly any + Americans want the U.S. to side with Argentina in the Falklands dispute. + When the neutrality option was explicitly provided, however, a large + majority favored U.S. neutrality instead of siding with Britain. A + Harris poll, conducted in mid-April, asked:

+

“If war were to break out between Argentina and Great Britain—and + assuming that the U.S. would not actually fight in that war—do you think + the U.S. government should help Argentina, should help Britain, or + should remain strictly neutral?”

+ + + Remain neutral + 83% + + + Help Britain + 12 + + + Help Argentina + 1 + + + Not sure + 4 + +
+
+ +
+ + 331. Telegram From the Department of State to Secretary of State + Haig in BonnSource: Department of State, Central + Foreign Policy File, D820302–0048. Secret; Immediate; Exdis; Eyes Only. Drafted and + approved by Blackwill; + cleared by Bremer and in + S/S–O. Haig was then in Bonn, accompanying Reagan for talks with West German + officials and to attend the North Atlantic Council Summit. + + + Washington, June 10, 1982, 0203Z + +

Tosec 80380/159041. Eyes Only for + Richard Burt from Blackwill. Subject: Falklands + Strategies.

+

1. Entire text Secret.

+

2. The following paper is for your reflection on your way back,Following stops in Bonn (June 9–11) and West + Berlin (June 11), the U.S. delegation traveling with Reagan returned to Washington on + June 11. and before a meeting with the Secretary (whenever it + takes place). It does not take into account any conversations you may + have had on the other side of the water.

+

3. It seems likely that Prime Minister Thatcher will refuse meaningful negotiations with the + Argentines after she has cleared them off the Falklands, that her goal + will be to improve the Islands’ economy and increase immigration. She + may reaffirm Kelper right to self-determination, and keep open the + possibility of independence.

+

4. If the Prime Minister no longer seeks a negotiated settlement, we must + decide whether to continue to support negotiations, as called for in + UNSC Resolution 502, or to embrace + the principle of self-determination for the Falklands. Nearly as + important as the policy we adopt will be the degree we choose to be + diplomatically involved in this next stage of the crisis.

+

5. From these perspectives we see four possible US diplomatic strategies in the near-term. (In all cases we + would return materiel aid to the UK to + normal, pre-crisis levels.)

+

6. Vigorously support self-determination: (All our money on the special + relationship).

+

—At the UN we would aggressively support + the UK position, vetoing as necessary + resolutions calling for negotiations.

+

—We would contribute to a UK-sponsored + peace-keeping force in the Falklands.

+

7. Support self-determination, but with a low diplomatic profile: (Trying + to have it both ways).

+

—We would minimize public comment.

+ +

—At the UN we would abstain on + resolutions calling for UK/Argentine negotiations.

+

—No US contribution to the peace-keeping + force.

+

8. Vigorous support for negotiations: (Assumes we can persuade the Prime + Minister to be flexible).

+

—We would actively and publicly argue that Western—and US—interests require the UK to talk to the Argentines about the + future status of the Falklands, and that applying the principle of + self-determination to 1800 people is impractical.

+

—At the UN and the OAS we would support resolutions calling + for negotiations.

+

—We would maintain intense dialogue on the problem with Argentines, + British, UN, Brazilians, other Latins, + etc.

+

—We would support Perez de Cuellar’s negotiating initiatives and keep + actively open the possibility of another US negotiating effort.

+

—We would repeat our willingness to contribute to a peacekeeping + force.

+

9. Advocate negotiations, but keep a low diplomatic profile: (Assumes no + movement on Thatcher’s + part).

+

—So far as events allow, we would reduce our diplomatic involvement and + minimize our public comments on Falklands developments. But when asked + we would reaffirm our support for 502.

+

—At the UN, we would vote for resolutions + consistent with 502 and abstain on ambiguous texts like 506.An erroneous reference to UN Security Council Resolution 505. See Document 301.

+

—We would gradually allow our bilateral conversations on the problem to + peter out.

+

Conclusions

+

10. Given geographic and demographic realities, self-determination with + eventual independence for the Falklands is not a viable alternative. We + should make clear to the Prime Minister we could not support her if she + chooses it.

+

11. An eventual resolution of the South Atlantic crisis will require + negotiations, and we therefore believe that our policy should continue + to be based on UNSC 502. Our emphasis + on UNSC 502 underscores an important + principle—the unacceptability of force. This approach also probably + enjoys more public and congressional support in the US than any other. It commands the respect + of the other European allies. Its costs in terms of our bilateral + relations with the UK—while real—would + perhaps be manageable. The US position + would essentially be the same + as the rest of the UK’s NATO allies and EC partners, as well as that of the opposition parties in + the House of Commons. Indeed, sections of her own Conservative Party are + sympathetic to this stance. Under these circumstances, while the Prime + Minister’s personal relations with the President might cool, she could + not risk a break with us.

+

12. The degree of our diplomatic involvement will inevitably be affected + by the levels of violence following British reoccupation of the + Falklands. A high-profile US diplomatic + stance is heavy with risk of failure. At least in the short-term, it is + unlikely that we can convince the Prime Minister to accept a negotiated + settlement. Hence we should seek to keep our diplomatic profile low + whatever substantive position we choose. If the Argentines actively + pursue the war, we face the risk of escalation of the conflict, perhaps + to the Argentine mainland, and still wider damage to our position in the + Hemisphere. Under these circumstances active US diplomatic effort to persuade the British to + negotiate—despite the costs to our bilateral relationship—may be + required.

+ + Stoessel + +
+ +
+ + 332. Transcript of a Telephone Conference of the Special Situation + GroupSource: Reagan + Library, Philip A. Dur Files, [Crisis Pre-Planning Group/Special + Situation Group] CPPG/SSG: Lebanon—06/11/1982–06/13/1982 (2). No + classification marking. Bush, Stoessel, Weinberger, Kirkpatrick, Jones, Casey, and McFarlane participated in the telephone conference. + Poindexter prepared the + handwritten transcript. + + + Washington, June 11, 1982, 9:35–9:47 a.m. + +

[Omitted here is discussion of events relating to the crisis in + Lebanon.]

+

Kirkpatrick: De Cuellar informed + me yesterday. He’s been in touch with Pope. New initiative on + Argentina.Pope John Paul II paid an + official visit to Argentina June 11–12, where he met with “leading + Argentine political figures, top-ranking Argentine churchmen, the + presidents of the bishops conferences of Latin American nations, and + cardinals and archbishops from some neighboring countries.” The Pope + “said that the Church must speak out against ‘hatred and discord, + which constantly shatter unity and peace.’” (Telegram 162990 to all + diplomatic and consular posts, June 12; Department of State, Central + Foreign Policy File, D820308–0564) In telegram 12533 from Rome, May + 26, the Embassy confirmed that the “sole purpose” of the Pope’s + visit was to “balance out” his scheduled visit to the United + Kingdom, which began the same day. (Department of State, Central + Foreign Policy File, D820274–0312) Earlier, the Pope had called for + a South Atlantic ceasefire, which was rejected by the British on May + 24. (Telegram 142578 to all diplomatic and consular posts, May 25; + Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D820271–0728) He + also sent letters regarding the situation to Queen Elizabeth II and + to Reagan on April 17. + (Telegrams 9408 and 9409 from Rome, April 19; Department of State, + Central Foreign Policy File, D820203–0926 and + D820203–0934)

+

VP: Anything new on Falklands.

+

Jones: [less + than 1 line not declassified] 22–26 A–4 + Skyhawks have been delivered to + Argentina from Israel.

+

Cap: May want to ask Israelis.

+

Casey: Have [unconfirmed?] + reports of EXOCET from Libya to Argentina.

+

Stoessel: Will follow up on + Israel.

+

[Omitted here is discussion of events relating to the crisis in + Lebanon.]

+
+ +
+ + 333. Memorandum for the Record by the Executive Assistant to the Chief + of Naval Operations (Clarey)Source: Washington National Records Center, OSD Files, FRC 330–84–0003, Argentina + (June–Sept) 1982. Secret; Noforn. A stamped notation at the top of the memorandum + indicates that Weinberger + saw it on June 14. Copies were sent to Jones, Carlucci, Enders, and the Defense Intelligence Agency. A + notation in an unknown hand reads “Hand carried.” + + + Ser 00/MFR–092 + + + Washington, June 11, + 1982 + + + SUBJ + CNO Meeting with Argentine + Officials on Friday, 11 June 1982 + +

1. (S/NF) Admiral Hayward met + with Argentine Ambassador Esteban A. + Takacs, Air Attache BGEN Pena, and the DATT/Naval Attache VADM + Franco at 0930 on Friday, 11 + June 1982.Takacs, Peña, + and Franco also had a + similar discussion regarding the military situation in the South + Atlantic with Burkhalter on + June 11. The record of this conversation, produced by Burkhalter, is ibid. The + meeting had been suggested by former Secretary of the Navy Hidalgo and was encouraged by ASSTSECSTATE + Enders during discussions with + Admiral Hayward Thursday + evening, 10 June 1982.No memorandum of + conversation of this meeting has been found.

+

2. (S/NF) Admiral Hayward + explained that historically military relations between the U.S. and + Argentina have been maintained despite the periodic ups and downs of our + political relationships. He, like the other members of the Joint Chiefs + of Staff, has a great interest in ensuring that these communications + channels continued to function, especially during crisis situations when + relations are strained, and that our long-term relationships, after the + Falklands situation was resolved, were very important to both countries. + He welcomed the opportunity for this meeting in order to gain a better + perspective on the Argentine views of the Falklands/Malvinas crisis.

+

3. (S/NF) Ambassador Takacs noted + that he and ASSTSECSTATE + Enders had discussed + opportunities for such an exchange of views and he was pleased to meet + with the CNO. As recently as ten days + ago he had been optimistic about the possibilities for a negotiated + settlement. However, over the past few days, he saw the Argentine and + British positions diverging, and he was particularly concerned at the + current lack of diplomatic activity.

+

4. (S/NF) The Ambassador stated that the British were misrepresenting the + military situation in the Malvinas and were predicting a quick military + victory. This misrepresentation had removed the pressure for continued negotiations. He + wanted Admiral Hayward to have + an appreciation for the true military situation in the Malvinas and + hoped that the United States would do all in its power to help force a + diplomatic resolution. The Argentine position is that the conflict + cannot be resolved on military terms and the political consequences of a + long-term conflict would be very damaging for all three countries. The + Argentines hope that negotiations can resume very quickly in order to + end a war that has caused many casualties and is more “stupid than + either country ever could have envisioned.”

+

5. (S/NF) Admiral Hayward asked + if the U.S. should resume the role of mediator or would a third party or + the United Nations be a better vehicle to encourage continued + negotiations. Ambassador Takacs + replied that without strong U.S. encouragement, the U.N. was impotent in + this situation. Perez de Cuellar had no leverage with either Argentina + or the U.K. and thus was ineffective. The U.S. alone has that leverage. + Ideally, the U.S. would disassociate itself politically from the U.K. in + terms of supporting a continued military conflict. Many European + countries were currently doing this. Without political support, the U.K. + could not continue its military operations and would be forced to + negotiate.

+

6. (S/NF) BGEN Pena presented the + Argentine military’s view of U.K. military casualties and Argentine air + operations to date. He reviewed ship and aircraft losses during the + major engagements on 1 May, 24–25 May, and 8 June. He reported that 442 + Argentine Air Force sorties had been flown through the 6th of June, 225 + of which were anti-shipping missions, 85 of which were air-to-ground + missions. British losses during these engagements were much more severe + than had been reported,In the conversation + with Burkhalter, Peña specified that the Argentine + Air Force had “sunk six British destroyers; six frigates; and + damaged several other ships, including both the HERMES and + INVINCIBLE,” the two British aircraft carriers. (See footnote 2 above.) particularly + during the 8 June engagement. Concerning the loss of Argentine aircraft, + he indicated that approximately 25% of their Air Force had been + destroyed, not the 60% reported by the British. Many of their pilots had + been rescued, and their Air Force would be able to continue its + operations in equipment being obtained from other countries. He opined + that the overstated air losses were part of the British efforts to + create the impression that a military victory was near at hand. He + wanted Admiral Hayward to have a + different perspective so that he would understand that such a victory + was not imminent and that the Argentines were both prepared to fight and + could fight for a long period of time. He pointed out that the British + already were being pushed back from the Port Stanley area and that the Argentines had retaken + Mount Kent. Thirty C–130 resupply + missions had been flown into Port Stanley last week.

+

7. (U) Admiral Hayward commented + that throughout all of his studies of military conflicts, including + World War II and his own experiences in Korea and Vietnam, that damage + reports were always overstated by both sides. He said it was important + for both Argentina and the U.K. to avoid a miscalculation based on + self-serving over-optimistic estimates of damage.

+

8. (S/NF) In closing, Ambassador Takacs commented that he was pleased to have had the + opportunity to present the Argentine views on the conflict and stressed + the importance of U.S. assistance in the resumption of negotiations. + Admiral Hayward indicated that + he would relate the Argentine concerns over the misrepresentation of the + military situation in the Falklands, their desire that negotiations be + revitalized as quickly as possible, and that the U.S. was being asked to + play a key role in this effort.

+ + S.S. + Clarey + Captain, U.S. Navy Executive Assistant to the + Chief of Naval Operations + + +
+ +
+ 334. Memorandum From the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy + (Iklé) to Secretary of + Defense WeinbergerSource: Washington National Records + Center, OSD Files, FRC 330–86–0042, + UK 1982. Top Secret; Eyes Only. + A stamped notation at the top of the memorandum indicates that + Weinberger saw it on + June 14. + + + Washington, June 11, + 1982 + + + SUBJECT + UK Inquiry on KC–10 Aircraft (TS)—ACTION + MEMORANDUM + +

On 27 May the Joint Staff received an informal inquiry on the potential + purchase, lease or hire of KC–10 + aircraft from the U.S.Attached but not + printed is a May 27 note for the record signed by Dick regarding the U.K. MOD’s + preliminary inquiry into the “purchase, lease, or hire” of KC–10 aircraft. The attached + JCS package, based on the recommendations, conveys the view that the + U.S. should discourage a formal U.K. request.Attached but not printed, the JCS package consists + of an undated memorandum from the JCS to Iklé and a point paper on the + impact of KC–10 lease or + purchase. This view is based on the concern that a sale would significantly degrade our + capability to support contingencies directly involving the U.S. + Furthermore, meeting the request in any form would be a highly visible + sign of U.S. support for British operations. From a policy viewpoint, + the Air Force is concerned that the British could not operate the + refueling system without first receiving appropriate training. Thus, at + least initially, U.S. aircrews may be needed to provide instruction to + the British on the operation of the system.

+

Support of the KC–10 itself would + probably require either direct U.S. involvement or the use of civilian + contractors. The sale of KC–10s would + require Congressional notification under Section 36B of the Arms Export + Control Act and could prompt Congressional concern as to why Service recommendations were + overruled. A lease is more palatable to the Services and it would not + require Congressional notification.

+

The argument against sale of the KC–10s + is cogent, but the case against a lease is weaker. The possibility of a + direct U.S. role in the aircraft’s operations should be avoided, + however, in order to be consistent with the President’s directive.See Document + 263. The addition of KC–10s to the support force would greatly increase British + ability to deploy rapidly aircraft and equipment to the Falklands. Since + we are not being asked to provide the aircraft at this time, our + response should be that a number of important details, in particular the + question of avoiding U.S. involvement in either the aircraft’s support + or operations, would need to be worked out if a formal request was + received.

+

The British request was recently changed to the purchase of two aircraft. + Thus, I would further recommend that we inform the British that, while a + purchase does not appear feasible in light of U.S. operational + requirements, we would be willing to discuss the possible lease of two + KC–10s for a period not exceeding + 90 days. A lease in excess of 90 days would adversely impact plans that + incorporate KC–10 support.Weinberger + highlighted the paragraph with a vertical line drawn in the + right-hand margin. Next to this, he wrote: “agree.” At the bottom of the page, he initialed his + approval of the option “Approve Positive Reply on Availability for + Lease.”

+

Fred C. + Ikle

+
+ +
+ + 335. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department + of State and the White HouseSource: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Latin + America/Central, [Argentina-Falkland Islands] + (05/02/1982–06/14/1982). Confidential; Immediate; Exdis. Sent for information + Immediate to Buenos Aires and London. In the upper right-hand corner + of the telegram, Poindexter + wrote: “Judge—P.” Printed from a copy that was received in the White + House Situation Room. + + + New York, June 11, 1982, 2127Z + +

1633. Dept. for Deputy Secy. Stoessel, Asst. Secy. Enders, NSC for Director Clark, CIA for + Casey. Subject: Amb. + Kirkpatrick’s Meeting with + Argentine Acting Perm Rep Amb. Listre.

+

1. (C–Entire text)

+

2. At his request, Argentine Acting Perm Rep Amb. Listre met with Ambassadors Kirkpatrick and Sorzano. (FYI: Perm Rep Roca is in Buenos Aires recuperating + from an illness. Amb. Listre + indicated that for health reasons, Amb. Roca will not be returning to New York. Amb. Listre is here for 90 days but he + intimated that he might stay through the GA. End FYI.)

+

3. Amb. Listre said that he was + exceedingly pessimistic about the situation in the Falkland Islands. He + was convinced that the British had decided to press on and were seeking + a military victory or an unconditional Argentine surrender. He itemized + the consequences of such an action, including enormous bloodshed, + potential political upheaval in Argentina, possible realignment of + Argentine foreign policy and prolongation of the war. He asked Amb. + Kirkpatrick whether she saw + any possible non-military solution to the conflict.

+

4. Amb. Kirkpatrick said that it + was not very likely that the British would stop before taking Port + Stanley. If there was any possibility, and it had to be regarded as a + very remote possibility, it would be for Argentina to make very clear: + a) that it wanted peace; b) that it was willing to withdraw its troops; + c) that it was willing to take the initiative in withdrawing its troops; + and d) that it would be willing to accept an international (not + necessarily UN) administration of the + Island. In her opinion, however, Argentina should have taken previous + British offers and it was now too late for hoping for a non-military + solution to the conflict. Amb. Listre said that he agreed with Amb. Kirkpatrick that this was the only + remaining alternative. He also concurred with her assessment that it was + not likely to have the expected outcome but that he would, nevertheless, + transmit it to Buenos Aires.

+ + Kirkpatrick + +
+ +
+ + 336. Intelligence Memorandum Prepared in the Central Intelligence + AgencySource: Central + Intelligence Agency, Office of Support Services (DI), Job 84T01067R: + Production Case Files (’81–’82), Box 1, ALA M Projects 82–10068 + through 82–10081. Secret; [handling restriction + not declassified]. The memorandum was requested by + Inman. The memorandum + was prepared by the South America Division, Office of African and + Latin American Analysis of the Directorate of Intelligence, based + upon information available through May 31. The memorandum was + coordinated with the Directorate of Operations, the National + Intelligence Council, and the National Intelligence Officer for + Latin America. + + + ALA–M–82–10077 + + + Washington, June 11, + 1982 + +

The Falklands Dispute:

+

Implications for US Relations With Latin America

+

Summary

+

The final outcome of the Falklands crisis will + determine the extent and duration of related damages to US ties with Latin America. The + broadest and most lasting impact would be caused by heavy Argentine + casualties or Argentine humiliation. [portion + marking not declassified]

+

Even if the crisis were to be resolved under conditions + well short of that worst case, the US decision to support the United Kingdom—and + especially Washington’s imposition of sanctions on Argentina—will + leave the US position in Latin + America somewhat impaired. Relations with several countries probably + will be cool for a few years. Over time, losses can be partially, + even substantially redressed. Much will depend on the efficacy of + US damage-limiting measures—and, + again, on the severity of the outcome on Argentina. [portion marking not declassified]

+

The principal abiding consequence of the crisis in both + bilateral and regional terms will be to reinforce factors that have + progressively reduced the once great US influence in the region. The extent of deepening of + that gradual but persistent effect will vary from country to country + and from sub-region to sub-region. It will be more pronounced in + South America than in the Caribbean Basin, where the net effect on + US interests will be minor. + [portion marking not declassified]

+

[Omitted here is the body of the intelligence memorandum.]

+
+ +
+ 337. Information Memorandum From the Director of the Bureau of + Politico-Military Affairs (Howe) + to Secretary of State HaigSource: Department of State, + Executive Secretariat, S/S Special + Handling Restrictions Memos 1979–1983, Lot 96D262, ES Sensitive June 8–16 1982. Secret; + Sensitive. Drafted by Clarke + and Beers on June 11; cleared by Kanter and Williams (INR) and + in substance by Blackwill. + + + Washington, June 12, + 1982 + + + SUBJECT + The Other War: Growing Political-Military Problems for the United + Kingdom + +

Summary

+

Even before their losses at Fitzroy Bay,Reference is to the June 8 Argentine air attack on the British + Logistic Landing Ships RFA Sir Galahad and + RFA Sir Tristram during British amphibious + operations near the settlements of Fitzroy and Bluff Cove. For a + detailed account of the attack from the British perspective, see + Freedman, Official History, vol. II, pp. + 604–609. the British were facing military problems in their + Falklands operations. Recent evidence suggests that those problems will + continue. Nonetheless, there is no public sign that these difficulties + are being translated by London into increased diplomatic flexibility on + the long-term status of the Falklands.

+

The Military Damage to Date

+

Precise cost estimates of what the British are spending on the Falklands + are not yet available, probably even to HMG, because orders are being placed for procurement as + required, with bills following later. British + press speculation places the cost to date in excess of + $3 billion.

+

The greatest financial cost will be for the repair and replacement of + surface combatants. The British have not shared with us the extent of + damage to ships that remain operational, but we have seen repeated + reports of ships being hit by Argentine attacks. We have reports of four + destroyers, two frigates, and two Logistic Landing Ships being damaged. + Some have already been forced to leave the area of operations for + repair.

+

A list of RN ships lost to date, in + addition to the commercial Atlantic Conveyor, is attached. As a result + of these losses, the RN will probably + keep in service many of the older ships that were scheduled to be “paid + off.” We also can anticipate a major HMG review to decide how to replace rapidly the ships which + have been lost. Some in London probably will take the opportunity to + suggest the crisis proves a need for more conventional naval power. Increased pressure on the Trident program seems inevitable.

+

Continuing War of Attrition

+

The Argentines, of course, have suffered substantial losses and continue + to confront serious military problems. Less well appreciated, however, + are the difficulties which the British are experiencing and which may + increase in the future.

+

In our earlier memo to you we predicted that the Argentines probably + would continue the war—and damage to UK + forces—even after they had lost Stanley, and would require the British + to maintain a large presence on the islands (possibly including US-provided air defense equipment).See Document + 318. Recent events have given further credence to that + analysis:

+

• While the UK decision to attempt a + landing without air cover is uncharacteristic and difficult to + understand, sinkings at Fitzroy demonstrated the need for earlier + alerting of air raids (such as could be provided by airborne early + warning or a network of mountain top radars). They also showed the need + for longer range SAMs, such as I-Hawk.

+

• Those few RN ships which have modern + and effective air defense have been badly attrited by the Argentine Air + Force. Major ships have been sunk, others damaged, and the supply of + surface-to-air missiles greatly reduced.

+

• Argentine efforts to acquire additional aircraft and missiles are + beginning to meet with success.

+

• Slow British advance during the last ten days underscores their + logistical problems and may reflect an awareness of their “thin edge.” + Recent low levels of Harrier + sorties also may indicate damage to the INVINCIBLE, which, in any case, + is now standing off the Falklands an additional 50–75 miles.

+

• Attack on the tanker 400 miles north of the Falklands may be the + beginning of Argentine raids against the British SLOC.

+

• Public statements and private discussions have indicated that the + Argentines are planning a continuing war after Stanley. There is also + evidence that they are considering a 2000 man reinforcement of the West + Falklands.

+

HMG + Consideration of the Military Problem

+

Although we continue to receive British requests for assistance, they + have not yet formally sought additional air defense equipment. Recent + intelligence indicates, however, that they are beginning to look at the long-term garrison + requirements (including a naval task force, land-based F–4s, a brigade, and other forces).

+

Despite these demanding military requirements (and without knowing the + results of your discussions with Pym and Thatcher), we can see little indication that HMG is showing any sign of diplomatic + flexibility. Indeed, sentiment within Commons and the Cabinet seems to + be hardening around a prolonged period of UK control in one guise or another.

+

If our assessment of the military situation is correct and the long term + political, military, and economic consequences gradually dawn on the + British, their willingness to reach an accommodation and end of + hostilities may increase. The possibility of more dramatic actions + (e.g., attacks against the Argentine mainland, refusing to repatriate + Argentine prisoners), however, cannot be ruled out.

+

The British probably are hoping that the growing pressure on the GOA resulting from political disarray, + economic crisis, and declining military morale will cause the Argentines + to yield on the Falklands issue soon after Port Stanley falls. As our + analysis indicates, however, the British also will face increasing + political, economic, and military costs. The relative ability of the two + protagonists to sustain a prolonged, low level war of attrition is + likely to be a primary factor which determines the evolution of the + Falklands crisis and the environment for US diplomacy following the battle for Port Stanley.

+

Attachment

+

Paper Prepared in the Department of StateSecret; Sensitive.

+

Washington, undated

+ + Cost of RN Ships + Lost to Date + + Name + Type + Age + Replacement Cost ($ 82) + + + Sheffield + Destroyer + 1975 + $202 M + + + Coventry + Destroyer + 1978 + $202 M + + + Antelope + Frigate + 1975 + $ 86 M + + + Ardent + Frigate + 1977 + $ 86 M + + + Sir Galahad + Logistic Landing Ship + 1966 + ? + +
+
+ +
+ + 338. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in + BrazilSource: Reagan + Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC + Cable File, Falkland File 06/15/1982. Secret; Sensitive; Immediate; + Exdis. Printed from a copy + that was received in the White House Situation Room. Drafted by + Kilday; cleared by + O’Connell and in S/S and S/S–O; approved by Enders. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy + File, D850363–0055) + + + Washington, June 15, 1982, 0023Z + +

163586. Subject: Letter to President Reagan from President Figueiredo.

+

1. (Secret–Entire text).

+

2. Following is informal translation of President Figueiredo’s June 12 letter, + delivered to the Department June 13:

+

His Excellency

+

Ronald Reagan,

+

President of the United States of America

+

Dear Mr. President,

+

As you know, since the beginning of the Malvinas crisis I have vehemently + insisted before the Governments of the United Kingdom and the Republic + of Argentina upon the prevention of a solution by force to that + conflict. I have also exchanged messages with you in an effort to help + find a means of negotiation. At this moment, more than ever, it is + necessary to review that urgent effort so that a cease-fire be reached + and a purely military solution be avoided. In this context, I wish to + encourage you to resume urgently and vigorously the efforts aiming at a + cease-fire, putting an end to the escalation of violence, and ensuring a + peaceful solution to that bloody conflict, in light of the resolutions + adopted by the United Nations Security Council.

+

It is my strong belief that, if conditions leading to a process of + negotiation are not created to prevent the evolution and the + uncontrolled continuation of the conflict, the risks for those in our + region and in the entire Western world will be intolerable.

+

Sincerely,

+

Joao Baptista de Oliveira + Figueiredo

+

President of the Federative Republic of Brazil.

+

Haig

+
+ +
+ + 339. Telegram From the Embassy in Argentina to the Department of + StateSource: Department + of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D820309–0989. Confidential; + Immediate. Sent for information Immediate to South Atlantic Sitrep Collective and for + information to USCINCSO, + USCINCLANT, and the + Defense Intelligence Agency. + + + Buenos Aires, June 14, 1982, + 1430Z + +

3543. CINCSO for INTAFF, CINCLANT + for POLAD, Rome for Vatican. Subject: + South Atlantic Crisis: Sitrep as of + 1100 Local June 14.

+

1. Summary (U): The battle for Port Stanley rages on, but we sense that + Argentines now recognize it is probably just a question of time before + they are defeated, although they say it will be a Pyrrhic victory for + the UK. Neutral zone for civilians + established. Pope’s visit still reverberating.See footnote 2, Document + 332. + Galtieri probably benefited and + John Paul’s message of peace apparently fell mostly on deaf ears.

+

The War

+

1. Today’s dailies reflect a mixture of concern about the British + offensive and pride at Argentine resistance. According to the GOA, the British during the last three + days advanced 3.5 kilometers (UK claims + 8) and the front has stabilized after fierce fighting. Artillery duels + continue. The British have evidently opted for consolidating their + position after each small advance. The British reportedly secured a new + beachhead at “Enriqueta”, 5 kilometers south of Stanley. Meanwhile, the + GOA alleges intense bombardment of + English positions by the Argentine Air Force. Everyone is waiting for + the next British assault. The general expectation is that the UK will eventually prevail. Many senior + GOA officials have publicly + conceded the possibility of losing Stanley, but they want it to cost the + British dearly.

+

Protection of Civilians

+

2. The Argentine Government agreed to establish a neutral zone of two + square blocks in Port Stanley at the water’s edge, to protect civilians + and wounded. This was a result of ICRC + representation that commenced June 11.

+

Pope’s Visit

+

4. (U) The visit of John Paul II continues to reverberate. It was + considered a major success by most commentators. Apart from + unprecedented crowds (estimated by police at over 4 million in the two + days) most events were carried out without significant problems, a + credit to the organizers, particularly church authorities and Interior + Subsecretary Col. Bernardo + Menendez.

+ +

5. (U) The Pope’s frequent statements urging a peaceful solution to the + South Atlantic conflict were more direct than many predicted and were + echoed by some in the crowd who chanted “we want peace.” The regular + columnist on religion for Clarin, Jose Ignacio Lopez, noted that the + Pope did not mince his words. Quoting extensively from the Pope’s + homilies and public statements, Lopez points out that the Pope brushed + aside all rationalizations for violence or war and called for peace + without qualifications.

+

6. (C) But this was ignored by most of the press, which devoted scores of + pages to John Paul II’s comings and goings but none to reflection on + what he said. Similarly, many spectators, particularly the young, + treated the affair as a “happening”. On the other hand, His Holiness’ + message was crystal clear, we have no doubt that the Junta understood + it.

+

7. (C) Galtieri was the + consummate politician. He received John Paul II on arrival, met with him + twice, received communion and was seen by millions of TV viewers + receiving the Pope’s blessing on departure. There is little doubt that + the visit paid political dividends to the President.

+

The Roller Coaster Mood

+

8. (C) The visit of John Paul II was undoubtedly the most popular and + gratifying event for this country since winning the world soccer cup in + 1978. But only two days later, the Argentines were blue again. Their + highly-touted football team lost to longtime cellar-dweller Belgium in + the World Cup. And now it is evident to all that they are losing what + many Argentines see as the biggest prize of them all, in the + Falklands.

+ + Shlaudeman + +
+ +
+ + 340. Telegram From the Department of State to All Diplomatic and + Consular Posts and the Embassy in ArgentinaSource: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy + File, D850363–0048. Confidential; Immediate. Sent for information + Immediate to European POLADs + Collective, USSOUTHCOM, the + Department of Defense, USCINCEUR, and USCINCLANT. + + + Washington, June 14, 1982, 2327Z + +

163554. Manila please pass to Deputy Secretary Stoessel/Todep 30009. + Subject: South Atlantic Crisis: Situation Report as of 0800, June 14, + 1982 No. 88.

+

1. (C–Entire text).

+

2. Cease-fire around Stanley. British Prime Minister Thatcher and the Argentine military + high command have confirmed that an effective cease-fire went into + effect around Port Stanley the afternoon of June 14.A Significant Event Report produced by the NMCC on June 14, added that the + ceasefire was put into effect until 1300Z, June 15, “while the + Argentine commander goes to Buenos Aires to confer with the Junta on + the terms of the surrender of Argentine forces on both East and West + Falkland Islands.” (Washington National Records Center, OSD Files, FRC 330–84–0003, Argentina + (June–Sept) 1982) + Thatcher told the House of + Commons that the Argentine commander on the Islands is discussing the + surrender of Argentine troops on East and West Falklands with the deputy + British commander; the Argentines are flying white flags over Stanley; + and British troops have orders not to shoot except in self-defense. The + Argentine high command issued a communique indicating that after + exchanges between the British and Argentine military commanders on the + Islands a de facto ceasefire, “not formally agreed”, went into effect in + the Stanley area.

+

3. British losses. The MOD announced June 13 that British losses from + Argentina’s June 8 attack at Fitzroy BaySee + footnote 2, Document 337. + totaled about 100 men killed or wounded. Another nine were lost in a + weekend attack on a British destroyer.The + British destroyer HMS + Glamorgan was damaged by an Argentine + land-based Exocet missile while + providing fire support to the British advance on Port Stanley, June + 11, ultimately killing 13 and injuring 15 British personnel. + (Freedman, Official History, vol. II, pp. + 616–617)

+

4. Argentine prisoners: the British turned over to the ICRC in Montevideo about 1,000 Argentine + prisoners captured in the Falklands in the May 28/29 battle for Goose + Green and Darwin.See Document 302. In a night attack June 12 British troops, advancing five + miles to the outskirts of Stanley, reportedly captured several hundred + more Argentine soldiers.For a detailed + account of the battles around Port Stanley from the British + perspective, see Freedman, Official History, + vol. II, pp. 611–644.

+

5. Buenos Aires minimize considered.

+ + Haig + +
+ +
+ 341. Memorandum From the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy + (Iklé) to Secretary of + Defense WeinbergerSource: Washington National Records + Center, OSD Files, FRC 330–86–0042, + UK 1982. Top Secret; Eyes + Only. + + + Washington, June 14, + 1982 + + + SUBJECT + UK Request for AIM–9M Seeker Heads + (TS) + +

On Jun 9 the UK requested two AIM–9M + SIDEWINDER seeker heads for trial installation.Attached but not printed is a copy of the June 9 + request delivered by the British Embassy. If the trial is + successful, an order for 20 seekers is expected.

+

The Navy and JCS recommend that the request be denied (see attached)Attached but not printed is the June 10 + action memorandum upon which both Hayward and Small initialed their disapproval of the British + request. for the following reasons:

+

a. The AIM–9M will not reach its IOC + until Oct 82. Only prototype seekers are on hand, and these are required + for the test program. The possible follow-on buy of 20 seeker heads + cannot be met because of the low level of initial production.

+

b. There is a high risk of compromise of the seeker technology.At the end of this sentence, Weinberger wrote: “We must make + every effort to keep secure. I think the UK will agree to our terms on this.”

+ +

c. The added operational capability that the AIM–9M yields over the + AIM–9L currently provided by the US to + the UK is not required in the Falkland + conflict.

+

d. Release of the AIM–9M seeker could lead to the European Consortium + demanding authorization to build the AIM–9M. This has not been approved + by the Foreign Disclosure Review Board and is opposed by the Navy.

+

The British requirement for the AIM–9M is indeed questionable in light of + the military situation in the Falklands. Furthermore, the risk of + technology compromise is of great concern: one need only consider the + example of the SHRIKE missile in Brazil.See + Document 321 and footnote 3 thereto. Providing the + AIM–9M seeker heads at this time will slow their introduction into the + NATO theater where their unique + capability is required. As a result of these considerations, I recommend + we inform the British that the AIM–9M seeker heads not be provided for + the foreseeable future.Weinberger approved the release of + the AIM–9M on June 17 and added the following notation: “OK + [unclear] reaction + query again if they need it now.”

+

Fred C. + IkleIklé signed “Fred” above his typed + signature.

+
+ +
+ + 342. Report Prepared in the National Military Command CenterSource: National Archives, RG + 218, CJCS Files, FRC 218–92–0030, 820 Argentina 22 Oct 80 to 8 Jul + 82. Unclassified. The report’s sources are noted as Dow Jones and + UPI. + + + Washington, June 15, 1982 + + + SUBJECT + Argentina Forces Throughout Falklands Surrender as of: 150430 Jun + 82 + +

(U) Prime Minister Margaret + Thatcher’s office issued the following statement from + BGEN. J. Moore, commander of British land forces. “In Port + Stanley at 2100 hours 14 June, MGEN. Menendez surrendered to me all Argentine armed forces in + East and West Falkland together with their impedimenta. Arrangements are + in hand to assemble the men for return to Argentina, to gather in their + arms and equipment and to mark and make safe their munitions”.The report transposes the ranks of the two + referenced generals. Moore + was, in fact, a Major General; Menendez was a Brigadier General. Jones wrote the following + at the end of the report: “I would like to have a confidential + msg to Adm + Lewin sometime + today.”

+ + M.F. Tidwell + Brigadier General, USAF Deputy Director for Operations NMCC + + +
+
+ +
+ + Postwar, June 15, 1982–November 6, 1984 + +
+ 343. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Kingdom to the Department + of StateSource: Reagan + Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC + Cable File, Falkland File 06/15/1982 (2). Secret; Sensitive; + Immediate; Nodis. Printed from a + copy that was received in the White House Situation + Room. + + + London, June + 15, 1982, 1314Z + +

13122. Subj: Falklands Dispute: Securing the Peace.

+

1. S–Entire text.

+

2. Thatcher is triumphant and + revelling in victory. Public support for her leadership is firm and + overwhelming. The shock of the early war losses has long since worn off. + The public, reconciled to casualties, credits her boldness that they + were not greater. Critics inside and outside the Tory Party are at bay. + Parliament, even the Opposition, is paying tribute.

+

3. She knows, however, that letdown will follow euphoria, and that to + consolidate her political base she must secure peace. She wants, above + all, to be Prime Minister for a full ten years, and she knows, despite + her patriotic myopia, that protracted conflict in the South Atlantic + sooner or later will undercut her.

+

4. Yet the current aim of British policy is to hold the Falklands for + Britain. Thatcher and her + closest advisers have argued that it is wrong to contemplate any + Argentine participation in the future of the Islands; recent official + statements have hardened public opinion on this theme. British + casualties are cited, and the costs of war are said to dictate the terms + of peace. On the issue of keeping the Falklands British, Thatcher is confident she can defeat + any dissenters: buoyed by military success and outraged at Argentine + aggression, she is optimistic that the political and military costs of + restored British rule can be kept in bounds.

+

5. For all her rhetoric, Thatcher, we believe, will not be inflexible—particularly on + tactics. But she will be swayed less by advice than by experience and + her sense of the possible. Just as retaking the Islands has led her + narrowly to want to hold them, the experience of keeping them will shape + her later policy.

+

6. The immediate British objective will be to lead Argentina to accept + that hostilities are over. Recent ideas include:

+ +

—Offering to negotiate a non-use-of-force pledge, which Argentina would + likely turn down, but with detriment to its international support; + and

+

—Delaying prisoner return pending Argentine affirmation that it will end + hostilities, though this of course could backfire on Britain.

+

These ideas may be dropped as Britain seeks to handle the surrender with + some generosity, in ways it hopes will help make the armistice + stick.

+

7. Meanwhile, in the medium term, Britain also will seek to force + Argentina to accommodate to British victory through:

+

—Substantial garrisoning of the Islands; and

+

—Winning allied backing (including sanctions, if necessary) and Latin + American support for self-governing Falklands, with fewer colonial + trappings.

+

Officals here seem confident that they can afford a period of economic + and political consolidation, including consultations with the + Falklanders; that the costs of a British garrison are sustainable; and + that relations with the Latin Americans will improve as they become + bored with an Argentina that will be increasingly isolated if it remains + recalcitrant.

+

8. While Thatcher will not + calibrate her policies toward promoting a favorable evolution in + Argentina, she in due course will likely make some gestures towards + Argentina to gain international support that also might be developed + toward genuine accommodation. Certainly, the FCO will press her in that direction, just as Pym carefully—for it is risky given + Thatcher’s mood—has left + room in recent statements for possible Argentine involvement in the + Falklands’ future. But the FCO is cowed + now by her contempt and will be in no position to make its views + prevail. Various approaches may be tested and dropped, as was the notion + of a peacekeeping force patterned on MFO.

+

9. If, on the other hand, Argentina digs in for a crusade, Thatcher’s options shift. As Argentina + lashes out militarily, Thatcher + will strike back.

+

10. U.S. aims parallel those of Britain in seeking a definitive end to + hostilities. But beyond that we may diverge. Thatcher wants our and allied support + for some sort of non-Argentine future for the Islands and will be + willing for Britain to skew its future if necessary to achieve that end. + We, by contrast, will want Britain to be responsive to Argentine and + Latin American aspirations and to work for a situation in which our + hemispheric relations do not suffer and Britain returns to its primary + North Atlantic concerns.

+

11. We also will continue to be plagued by competing loyalties. We can + best ease these tensions by encouraging Thatcher to begin a dynamic process of involving interested countries + rather than stonewalling. To this end, she could offer to discuss the + Falklands’ future with any interested parties, especially Latin + Americans. Should the Argentines refuse the bait, they would appear + intransigent and lose support for their militancy.

+

12. In dealing with Thatcher, we + should bear in mind that in a while she will be testing her options not + only with us, but also against the political mood at home, among other + allies and Latin Americans, and in Argentina. We probably should not + press her too hard now, since she will show flexibility only to the + degree she sees it in Britain’s interest. And she will want gestures of + moderation to seem to spring from her.

+

13. More effective now, we believe, would be for us to make an offer + directly to her personally while she is in New York for the UNSSOD of general U.S. support in + working closely with Britain to find ways to abort Argentine hostility + and restore British and U.S. relations with Latin America. It may take + months to work through the post-Stanley phase. In this period, the U.S. + can be most effective through a sustained dialogue to edge Thatcher gradually toward a settlement + with Argentina. The way to begin will be in private consultations + directly with Thatcher herself, + if possible, where she and we can explore the options and the realities + obscured by battle.

+ + Louis + +
+ +
+ 344. Memorandum for the RecordSource: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of the + Director of Central Intelligence, Job 89B00224R: Committees, Task + Forces, Boards, and Councils Files, Box 11, Folder 406: Memos for + the Record of Mtgs w/Sec and DepSec of State (Apr 81–Dec 85). Secret; Eyes + Only. + + + Washington, June 15, + 1982 + + + SUBJECT + Breakfast meeting with Secretary Haig, Eagleburger, DCI and DDCI on 15 June 1982 + +

The following subjects were discussed:

+

[Omitted here is discussion of issues unrelated to the situation in the + South Atlantic.]

+ +

—Falklands. The DDCI reported on a CIA cable indicating coup plotting is + underway against Galtieri.Not found. + Haig believes Galtieri will last no more than a + week. Meanwhile, there is general belief that Thatcher has been the one to push hard + and that we need to encourage her to be more moderate. Eagleburger said that the Salvadoran + Ambassador and other South American officials have relayed their belief + that the U.S. will not be damaged very much by the Falklands crisis and + that the Latin American countries in general will continue to look to + the U.S. for leadership and economic support. Haig did voice his concern about the + Salvadoran Army setback yesterday in their operation against the + guerrillas.

+

[Omitted here is discussion of issues unrelated to the South + Atlantic.]

+
+ +
+ 345. Action Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for + European Affairs-Designate (Burt) and the Assistant Secretary of State for + Inter-American Affairs (Enders) + to Secretary of State HaigSource: Department of State, + Executive Secretariat, S/S Special + Handling Restrictions Memos 1979–1983, Lot 96D262, ES Sensitive June 8–16 1982. Secret; + Sensitive. Sent through Eagleburger. Bosworth initialed the memorandum for Enders. Drafted by Enders and Campbell; cleared by Gompert, Haass, and Service. Haass initialed for the clearing + officials. A stamped notation at the top of the memorandum indicates + that Haig saw + it. + + + Washington, June 15, + 1982 + + + SUBJECT + The Falklands: Next Steps + +

ISSUE FOR DECISION

+

Whether to recommend that the President dispatch letters to Prime + Minister Thatcher and General + Galtieri, and whether to + meet in the building as soon as possible to define our own + post-ceasefire policy towards the Falklands.

+ +

BACKGROUND

+

We will need the next day or two to clarify the + situation on the ground and to get some sense of Argentine and + British intentions. The range of possibilities is quite wide. The key is what happens in Buenos Aires. At one + extreme, Lami Dozo could refuse + to continue the conflict and political confusion in Buenos Aires could + diffuse Argentine policy toward the islands. At the other, the Argentines might continue a low-level but hot + war and keep the cause very much alive throughout Latin + America. Obviously developments in Buenos Aires will have a major impact + on our diplomatic choices.

+

However events unfold in the next day or two, the following basic + propositions can form a rudder for US + policy:

+

—We want a complete and lasting end to hostilities.

+

—We want to keep open the possibility of negotiations.

+

—We want to avoid announcement of a definitive UK plan for the Islands’ future.

+

—We want to emphasize reconciliation and rehabilitation.

+

What to Expect from London

+

The conclusion of the South Atlantic war is a triumph for the Prime + Minister. Her success has silenced critics within her own party, and she + enjoys overwhelming public support. She is praised even by the + opposition in parliament, and there are as yet few complaints about the + cost of the war.

+

In the short term the Prime Minister will be + tempted to garrison the islands, restore the traditional + administration—even sending Rex + Hunt back—and promote economic development. She will be uninterested in negotiations with + Argentina.

+

However, the Prime Minister is also a political realist who badly wants + her party to win the next elections, which must take place by May, 1984. + She is shrewd enough to know that following current popular euphoria + will come a period of public disillusionment with deep UK involvement in the South Atlantic. She + also knows the costs to British (and Western) interests of permanent + estrangement from Latin America. Hence she may come to + be more flexible in the months ahead. She will be receptive to + our cautions against closing off her options by rash public statements. + This process will accelerate if Argentina ends all hostilities. However, + if violence continues—even at a relatively low level—the Prime Minister + is likely to be unbending.

+

What to Expect from Buenos Aires

+

The direction the Junta takes should be set over the next few days. Air Force chief Lami + Dozo is the key. The war cannot be continued + unless he is willing to + sacrifice more planes and pilots. On the other hand, as the chief of the + only service that did well in the conflict, Lami Dozo can be the arbiter (although probably not the + head) of the next iteration of the Junta. Ambassador + Shlaudeman expects + Lami Dozo to go for a de + facto end to hostilities.

+

A reshuffle of the Junta could come early. At the same time the Junta + will almost surely reach out for a wider popular tolerance through wage + increases, import protection and other populist economic measures.

+

A period of weak government by the Junta, probably marked by public + demonstrations on economic issues, will follow. We do not expect entry + of the Peronistas into the government in the immediate future. But it is + a good bet in the medium term (one to two years) if the economy doesn’t + improve.

+

If these predictions prove accurate, the Junta’s resistance to Soviet + offers of an arms relationship may well weaken. Populist economics will + cause the international banking community to reassess what up to now has + to be considered to be a highly credit-worthy underlying situation. If + that happens there will not be sufficient cash to finance large-scale + rearmament. And the ongoing state of war, especially if there are + serious clashes, may be enough to enable the UK to restrain some continental suppliers from providing + advanced items.

+

It is not clear how Argentina will play the + negotiations issue. As of yesterday, Lami Dozo’s representatives were + taking the line that now that the first two parts of Resolution 502 are + being implemented, what about the third (i.e. negotiations)? However, it + is doubtful that Argentina will simply return to the negotiating table + at any early time. To do so, without British commitments on withdrawal + and interim administration, would be to admit that the whole operation + had been a fiasco. We do not expect the UK to make such concessions in the near + future.

+

Unless the UK goes for self-determination + and independence—or attacks mainland bases in retaliation for Argentine + harassment—support for Argentina among other Latin American countries + will fall rapidly. However, Argentine media and possibly the + Junta—depending on the reshuffle—will continue to use the US as the scapegoat for defeat.

+

Conclusions

+

1. Complete termination of hostilities is highly important for us, since + continued violence would make it both more urgent for us to press the + UK to take a reasonable stand and + more difficult to succeed at that task.

+

2. Chances appear poor of getting underway in the coming months a process + of settlement of the kind we have considered earlier, i.e., some + multilateral force in the double role of assuring security and in some sense embodying + sovereignty, plus negotiations without preconditions.

+

3. Instead we should concentrate on reinforcing those in Argentina urging + restraint, and on convincing Thatcher to avoid statements or actions which prejudge + the future; i.e., a commitment to absolute self-determination and a flat + rejection of eventual negotiations.

+

4. In the case of Argentina we should consider moving early to end the + sanctions. If there have been no further hostilities by June 21 (and we + have no reason to expect them), we could do so then, stating explicitly + that we are doing so in anticipation of no future hostilities. + Presumably the EC will take a similar + action this week.Haig drew a parallel line in the + right-hand margin next to this sentence and the sentence that + preceded it. Immediately afterward, we and the Europeans + would encourage our bankers to roll over short-term debt, thus avoiding + an immediate credit crunch. Clearly this latter action would have to + depend on the economic policy adopted by the Junta. If we move early + enough, we may head off some populist measures that otherwise will be + taken. Throughout this period, however, we should maintain as low a + profile as possible in Argentina. We will have to consider how to best + handle this with the UK.

+

5. We should seek from Britain agreement to refrain from any action or + statement which rules out negotiations or decides the Islands’ future. + In return, we would continue for a time our current arms relationship + (i.e. accelerated delivery out of US-owned inventory) in order to enable Britain to establish a + serious defense of the islands in short order. We would discontinue our + special support if the British are unreasonable.

+

If this first phase succeeds, a new effort at a settlement, involving + negotiations and perhaps a multilateral force, could be undertaken + toward the end of the year.

+

In line with the foregoing, we recommend the following:

+

1. That you ask the President to send a brief note congratulating Prime + Minister Thatcher and gently + noting our expectation of continuing consulations with HMG over the South Atlantic. At Tab 1 is a + draft letter.The undated draft letter from + Reagan to Thatcher, along with a draft + covering memorandum from Bremer to Clark, is attached but not printed. For the letter + as sent, see Document 352. This + would be an interim communication only, bridging the period between the + President’s meeting with the Prime Minister at the SummitsSee Documents 322 and + 326. and the fall of Stanley. + It would not be a major substantive communication, which would follow + later. In the meantime, you might wish to call in Ambassador Henderson to get a better sense as to + how best tailor a major Presidential intervention with the Prime + Minister.

+

RECOMMENDATION

+

That you ask the President to send to the Prime Minister the letter at + Tab 1.The recommendation was neither + approved nor disapproved. Below this sentence, a notation in an + unknown hand reads: “approved in principle—Burt to re-draft.”

+

2. Regardless of the outcome of Argentine political uncertainty, we want + to restore US-Argentine relations as + quickly as possible, and we also want to make clear to Galtieri or his successor that the + United States continues to seek a permanent end to the hostilities and a + peaceful settlement of the underlying dispute. There is risk however + that any message at this time will be viewed by the Argentine leadership + as hypocritical and, perhaps, used to further arouse public opinion + against us. It might also be seen as explicit backing for Galtieri in a situation we are not + sure he can survive.

+

On balance, we believe that we should hold any message until the internal + situation is more clear. The attached draft (Tab 2)The undated draft letter from Reagan to Galtieri, along with a draft + covering memorandum from Bremer to Clark, is attached but not printed. reflects + the type of message which should be sent as soon as circumstances + warrant.

+

RECOMMENDATION

+

That you decide that we should not sent a message + to Galtieri now.A checkmark in an unknown hand indicates that the + recommendation not to send a letter to Galtieri was approved.

+

3. US policy:

+

RECOMMENDATION

+

That you meet with us to consider the outlines of our post-Falklands + policy.A checkmark in an unknown hand + indicates that the recommendation was approved. Beneath the + recommendation, Bremer + wrote: “Given your schedule, I suggest Larry hold the meeting while + you’re in NYC. LPB 6/15.” In the space next to the approval line, + Eagleburger wrote: “done + 6/16/82.” No memorandum of conversation of this meeting has been + found.

+
+ +
+ + 346. Memorandum Prepared in the Department of StateSource: Department of State, Under + Secretary of State for Political Affairs, Miscellaneous Files, March + 1981–February 1983, Lot 83D210, Falklands [Folder 1]. Confidential. + Drafted by Enders on June + 15. Copies were sent to Bremer, Burt, Service, + and Gompert. + + + Washington, undated + + + SUBJECT + UK Falklands Terms + +

Argentine Foreign Office official Bunge called Ambassador Kirkpatrick this afternoon to detail the terms Britain + has proposed to Argentina.Kirkpatrick transmitted a summary + of her June 15 conversation with Bunge to the Department in telegram 1668 from USUN, June 16. (Reagan Library, + Executive Secretariat, NSC Cable + File, Falkland File 06/16/1982 (1)) According to Bunge, they include:

+

—No formal ceremony (in the mind of the Argentines, this means no actual + surrender);

+

—“withdrawal of the flag;”

+

—Argentine units to withdraw with their weapons, + except for those made prisoner;

+

—Definitive end to hostilities, including a specific commitment against + overflight by Argentine Air Force units.

+

Bunge says these terms are + “totally acceptable” to Argentina. Junta is now discussing how they + could be made public at Argentine initiative.

+

Idea in Buenos Aires would be to present these terms as implementation of + Resolution 502. Argentines continue to hope that British can be + persuaded to engage in “negotiations.”

+

Comment: If this report is accurate, the British + have been very sensitive. Bunge + attributed this to US influence.

+
+ +
+ + 347. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department + of State and the White HouseSource: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, + D850378–0742. Confidential; Immediate; Exdis. Sent for information Immediate to Buenos + Aires. + + + New York, June 16, 1982, 2332Z + +

1685. Subject: Ambassador Kirkpatrick’s Meeting with General Ricardo Pena. Ref: + USUN 1668.See footnote 2, Document + 346.

+

1. (C–Entire text)

+

2. Air Force Gen. Ricardo Pena called on Amb. Kirkpatrick evening of June 15. Amb. + Sorzano was also + present.

+

3. Gen. Pena began by recounting military events during the last few days + in the Falklands. He indicated that 775 Argentinian soldiers had been + killed in the last 24 hours. Those casualties led to an Argentinian + cease fire. He itemized the terms of surrender (as reported in USUN 1668) and indicated that in their + view, the US had prevailed in softening + UK terms. Pena continued by saying + that these would be difficult times for Argentina, with domestic + turbulence probably leading to the departure of Gen. Galtieri.See Document 344. Argentina was + most interested in continuing US support + for Security Council Resolution 502, and asked what could Argentina do + in the immediate future? Amb. Kirkpatrick responded by saying that they should + continue their intensive dialogue with the SYG, with their neighbors and with appropriate American + officials such as Asst. Secretary Enders.

+

4. Gen. Pena predicted that US/Argentina relations would be difficult for + “the next five to ten years”. The sooner we started rebuilding these + relationships the better. He suggested that prompt removal of US economic sanctions would be a very + powerful and positive signal which could get the process started.

+

5. Finally, Gen. Pena provided Amb. Kirkpatrick with an Argentine analysis of the military + losses inflicted by the air force on UK + forces. This analysis is as follows:

+ +

Argentine Air Force Actions

+ + + Offensive Actions + 1 May 1982–10 June 1982 + + + Navy Materials + Argentina’s Claims + UK Claims + + + Destroyers + + + Coventry + sunk + sunk + + + Brilliant + sunk + sunk + + + Sheffield + sunk + sunk + + + Broadsword + damaged + damaged? + + + Exeter + ? + — + + + Frigates + + + Antelope + sunk + sunk + + + Ardent + sunk + sunk + + + Plymouth + sunk + damaged + + + Argonaut + damaged heavily + damaged + + + Light Cruiser + + + Antrim + damaged heavily + — + + + Ships + + + Sir Galahad + sunk + damaged heavily + + + Sir Tristan + damaged heavily + " " + + + Sir Belvedere + damaged heavily + — + + + Canberra + damaged + — + + + Oiler (N.U.) + damaged + — + + + Light Carriers + + + Hermes + damaged + — + + + Invincible + damaged + — + + + Airplanes + + + Sea Harrier + 15 shot down + 13 shot down + + + + 1 damaged + + + + + 7 unconfirmed + + + + Sea King + Helicopter + 12 shot down + 5 shot down + + + + 5 damaged + + + + + 1 unconfirmed + + + + Lynx Helicopter + 2 shot down + + + + Gazelle Scout Hel. + 4 shot down + 4 shot down + + + Wessex Helicopter + 2 shot down + 2 lost—bad weather + +
+ + Kirkpatrick + +
+ +
+ + 348. Telegram From the Department of State to the Deputy Secretary of + State (Stoessel) in + SingaporeSource: + Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D820315–0692. + Confidential; Immediate. Drafted by T. Carter (FWG); cleared by Service, Bosworth, Blackwill, K. Shirley (S/S), A. Friedt (D), and in S/S–O; approved by Bremer. Stoessel was in Singapore for an + Association of Southeast Asian Nations post-Ministerial meeting June + 16–19. + + + Washington, June 16, 1982, 2218Z + +

Todep 30046/166414. For Deputy + Secretary Stoessel. Subject: + Falklands Crisis: Update for the Deputy Secretary.

+

1. C–Entire text.

+

2. It appears that fighting on the Falklands has ended.Discussing the end of hostilities on the morning of + June 18, Casey, Weinberger, McMahon, and Carlucci agreed “that it was + surprising that the surrender came so easily.” (Memorandum for the + Record, June 18; Central Intelligence Agency, Office of the Director + of Central Intelligence, Job 89B00224R: Committees, Boards, Boards, + and Councils Files, Box 11, Folder 410: Memos for the Record of Mtgs + w/Sec and DepSec Defense (May + 81–Dec 85)) However, Argentina will not renounce its claim to + the Islands. Unless Argentina and the United Kingdom agree on a + permanent solution, a future resumption of fighting cannot be ruled + out.

+

3. Prime Minister Thatcher seems + set on self-determination for the Falklands which would preclude serious + negotiations with Argentina over sovereignty, at least in the short + term. She is prepared to maintain sufficient forces in the area to + thwart another invasion.

+

4. The White House issued the following statement on June 15, subsequent + to the British recapture of Port Stanley:

+

Begin text:

+

The United States welcomes the ceasefire which is now in place in the + Falkland Islands. We hope the tragic loss of life which has thus far + occurred in this crisis can now be brought to an end. For its part, the + United States continues to stand ready to assist in any way it can to + help resolve this conflict. End text.

+

5. Talking points for use with foreign leaders:

+

Ceasefire

+

—We welcome the ceasefire and hope that there will be no further + hostilities.

+

—The fighting has just ended and it is still too early to comment on such + aspects of US policy as sanctions.

+

6. US policy.

+ +

A. Throughout the tragic conflict in the South Atlantic between the + UK and Argentina, our policy has + been to work for implementation of UN + Security Council Res. 502:

+

—Cessation of hostilities;

+

—Withdrawal of Argentine forces;

+

—Diplomatic solution to the conflict.

+

B. The Reagan administration led + the effort to find a peaceful solution.

+

C. At President’s direction, Secretary Haig undertook intensive discussions with London and + Buenos Aires to help parties find a solution. While UK would support the peace framework which + emerged, Argentina did not.

+

D. We have strongly supported subsequent efforts by others, most recently + UN Secretary General.

+

E. We are neutral on the sovereignty of the Islands, the issue which + Argentina and the UK are disputing.

+

F. But basic principle at stake: Use of force to settle disputes cannot + be accepted by world community. This is why we have supported the UK.

+

G. When Argentina rejected our peace proposal for settlement based on + UNSC Resolution 502, we took steps + to make clear our opposition to first use of force.

+

H. We provided the UK with materiel + support as a part of our over-all defense relationship. But no direct + US military involvement.

+

I. If Argentina and the United Kingdom cannot resolve underlying issues + that led to this crisis, there will be continuing tension and further + hostilities.

+ + Haig + +
+ +
+ + 349. Note From the Deputy to the Under Secretary of State for + Political Affairs (Gompert) to + the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Eagleburger)Source: Department of State, Under + Secretary of State for Political Affairs, Miscellaneous Files, March + 1981–February 1983, Lot 83D210, Falklands [Folder 1]. Secret. A + stamped notation at the top of the note indicates that Eagleburger saw it on June + 16. + + + Washington, June 16, + 1982 + +

LSE:

+ + SUBJECT + Falklands + +

Putting substance aside, there is currently a communications gap between + us and the British. Even allowing for a legitimate UK pre-occupation with war termination, + they are simply not keeping us informed well enough.Gompert + added the word “UK” by hand. + In particular, Mrs. Thatcher is + making announcements (see attached example)Attached but not printed is a statement made + by Thatcher to the House of + Commons on June 15. with regard to sensitive political + questions—e.g., the return of Rex + Hunt, the rejection of negotiations, the rejection of + future Argentine “participation” on the Islands—without giving us any + fore-warning, let alone consultations. I can’t believe that the FCO is so completely cut out that they + can’t give us any advance information. This is not only unfair to us, + given what we’ve done, but also a severe handicap.

+

Now that the Islands are in British hands, there is no excuse for this to + continue. If you agree, I can—or ask Bob + Blackwill to—convey to the Embassy here on a strictly + personal basis the opinion that we will need to be kept better informed + in the future. My relationship with Robin Renwick is such that he would + welcome a personal heads-up if we foresee a need for a more timely + information flow.

+ + DCGEagleburger drew an arrow to Gompert’s initials and wrote: + “See me!” + +
+ +
+ + 350. Situation Report Prepared by the Department of State Falklands + Working GroupSource: + Department of State, Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs, Falklands + Crisis Historical Files, Lot 86D157, unlabeled folder. + Confidential. + + + No. 91 + + + Washington, June 17, 1982, 5 p.m. + +

Falklands Situation as of 1700 EDT, June 17, 1982

+

1. Galtieri + Out. The Argentine Army announced June 17 that General + Galtieri has offered his + resignation as Army Commander in Chief and will be replaced tomorrow as + Army CINC by First Corps commander + General Cristino Nicolaides. + There is no official word yet on Galtieri’s future as President, but the private news + service DYN has reported that Galtieri will also submit his resignation as President. + Interior Minister Saint Jean will then serve temporarily as President + until a new one is appointed by the junta. Army Chief of Staff Vaquero, + next in line after Galtieri, was + offered the top army job but, according to DYN, turned it down. + Galtieri is expected to + brief the cabinet on these changes and to ask government ministers to + remain in their posts until a new president is appointed. + Dissatisfaction with Galtieri + was widespread following the week’s events. According to Argentine + press, Galtieri’s rejection of a + total cessation of hostilities with the UK met stiff opposition within the army with all but two of + fourteen senior generals favoring a definite termination of hostilities. + Galtieri’s decision to + “convoke the people” for his June 15 speech also drew substantial + criticism.In his June 15 televised + speech, Galtieri responded + to British demands for a ceasefire by declaring there would be no + peace if the United Kingdom restored “colonial rule” in the + Falklands. (Edwards + Schumacher, “Galtieri Bars + Peace if Britain Restores Its ‘Colonial Rule’,” New York Times, June 16, p. A22) The text of the + surrender document released by London received front page coverage June + 17 in most Argentine dailies.

+

2. EC To Review + Sanctions. USEC reports that + the EC countries have decided that the + Argentine sanctions will be maintained so long as there is any doubt + about continuation of hostilities in the South Atlantic. EC public solidarity is strong, but + privately some are pressing for early lifting of sanctions. EC Foreign Ministers will discuss the + sanctions issue in Luxembourg June 20.

+

3. Soviet Ties. Private agricultural trade sources + in Montevideo report that the USSR has + re-entered the Argentine grain market in the last few days, purchasing + up to one million tons of corn and sorghum as of June 15. An Argentine + Air Force spokesman rejected as “ridiculous” a press report that + Argentina has plans to purchase 100 MIG aircraft.

+ +

4. Prisoner Count. The UK now puts the total number of Argentine prisoners + presently under British control at about 8,000. Argentina has thus far + refused to allow the prisoners to be returned directly to Argentina, + asking instead that they be taken to Montevideo.

+ + Robert E. + Service + Falkland Working Group + + R. Stern + Senior Watch Officer + + +
+ +
+ 351. Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State for Political + Affairs (Eagleburger) to the + Executive Secretary of the Department of State (Bremer), the Assistant Secretary of + State for Inter-American Affairs (Enders), the Assistant Secretary of State-Designate for + European Affairs (Burt), and the + Director of the Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs (Howe)Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, + S/S Special Handling + Restrictions Memos 1979–1983, Lot 96D262, ES Sensitive June 16–30 1982. Secret; Sensitive. In + Tosec 90018/168048, June 18, + Eagleburger transmitted + the text of the memorandum to Haig, who was in New York for the UN Special Session on Disarmament. + (Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Cable File, Box 35, Falkland File + 06/18/1982) + + + Washington, June 17, + 1982 + + + SUBJECT + Falklands Prisoners + +

Nicko Henderson has passed on the + following information:

+

The British have 8–9000 prisoners in hand. They are rounding up others, + all of whom have stopped fighting, on West Falklands. The total will be + well below the 15,000 that the Argentine commander reported. The main + problem is not starvation but exposure. They will load as many as 7000 + on the Canberra and another ship in order to provide immediate relief + from the elements.

+

The Argentines have replied through the Swiss that they are prepared to + accept repatriation and want it done through Uruguay “without + precondition”. HMG will have to decide + now what to do. One option is to send the 7000 back through Uruguay; the + preference remains to send them + into Argentine ports, but that is excluded by the Argentine non-response + on cessation of hostilities, unless HMG + relaxes its condition.

+

Even if a way is found to return the 7000, and possibly more, the UK will keep 10% (officers, including + Menendez); it is not clear + where they will be kept or under what conditions they would be + returned.In telegram 16716 to Buenos + Aires, June 17, the Department reported that the British Embassy had + requested U.S. assistance in obtaining Argentine agreement to permit + repatriation of captured Argentine troops through the Argentine port + of Comodoro Rivadavia or the Chilean port of Punta Arenas. (Reagan + Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC + Cable File, Falkland File 06/17/1982 (2)) Later, the Argentine + Foreign Ministry announced that repatriation of prisoners would be + undertaken through Montevideo beginning June 18. (NMCC Significant Event Report, June + 18; Washington National Records Center, OSD Files, FRC 330–84–0003, Argentina (June–Sept) 1982) + On June 18, however, the Argentine and British Ambassadors in + Montevideo informed the Uruguayan Government that repatriation would + be through Argentine ports. (Telegram 2349 from Montevideo, June 21; + Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, + D820325–0485)

+

Henderson thought that any US assistance that might be requested would + be in connection with those prisoners (i.e., the 90%) that HMG is trying to repatriate as soon as + possible.

+
+ +
+ 352. Message From President Reagan to British Prime Minister ThatcherSource: Reagan Library, Latin American Affairs + Directorate, NSC, + Falklands/Malvinas: NSC & State + Memos, 1982. Secret. Sent in telegram WH04195 from the White House + to the Cabinet Office via Cabinet Office channels. + + + Washington, June 18, 1982, 1520Z + Dear Margaret: + +

Let me extend my congratulations on the success of British arms in the + South Atlantic. Your victory was both a brilliant military feat and a + defense of our shared principle that disputes are not to be resolved by + aggression. The minimum loss of life and the generous terms of + withdrawal were also in the finest British tradition.

+

A just war requires a just peace. We look forward to consulting with you + and to assisting in building such a peace. It must of course take into account the sacrifices of + your men in battle. Its elements in my judgement must include + enhancement of the long-term security of the South Atlantic, mitigation + of Argentine hostility and improvement in the relations of both our + countries with Latin America.

+

It was good to be with you in Paris, London and Bonn.

+

Warm regards,

+ + RonPrinted from a copy that bears + this handwritten signature, written in an unknown + hand. + +
+ +
+ 353. Memorandum From Dennis C. + Blair, Roger W. + Fontaine, and James M. + Rentschler of the National Security Council Staff to the + President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Clark)Source: Reagan Library, Dennis C. Blair Files, Falklands (May 1982–September + 1982). Secret. Sent for action. Sapia-Bosch initialed his concurrence. + + + Washington, June 18, + 1982 + + + SUBJECT + Falklands + +

Following are the assessment and recommendations of the informal NSC Falklands working group:

+

Where we are now:

+

UK: Mrs. Thatcher has taken personal charge of + all aspects of Falklands policy. The Foreign Office is doing no staff + work, or at least none that the Prime Minister supports. As late as last + week, according to our British contacts, there was not even an options + paper in circulation on long-range plans for the area.

+

Right now Mrs. Thatcher is + thinking short-term, i.e., consolidation of the military victory. Her + plans for the longer term are not well formed, but do not sound + encouraging (“We have not retaken the islands to turn them over to the UN,” “the future of the islands will be + decided by the U.K. and the Falklanders themselves.”)

+

Argentina: The new Argentine government will not + be a strong one; it is highly unlikely that prominent civilian + politicians will join it. Its priorities will be with the economy, + rebuilding its military, particularly the Air Force, unless it is forced + to keep the Falklands on the front burner.

+

U.S. Objectives:

+

A peace settlement and agreement for negotiations for final settlement of + the status of the islands that will allow the new Argentine government + to transcend failure in the Falklands; allow the British to return their + forces to the North Atlantic + area where they contribute to NATO + deterrence; and allow the U.S. to resume constructive relations with + Latin American countries (including Argentina) unfettered by the + Falklands experience.

+

U.S. Leverage:

+

Since Mrs. Thatcher is so + personally in charge, it will be necessary to do business with her + directly, which means the President will have to be involved. In the + final analysis, the President will simply have to make it clear that we + will not provide any support to a long-term peace settlement that does + not at least include an approach to solving the sovereignty + question.

+

Tactics:

+

Timing is tricky. It is clearly premature to approach Mrs. Thatcher right now while the flush of + military victory is still strong. However, we cannot wait too long, + since a rigid British peace settlement will be difficult to reverse.

+

Mrs. Thatcher will be visiting + the United States on June 22, 23 to address the SSOD in New York. We suggest that she be + asked to Washington for a meeting with the President in which he asks + point blank what her plans are for the future, and presents not only + what U.S. objectives are for the future, but a number of alternative + schemes which would meet our objectives and would be acceptable to the + U.K. We should not get back between the UK and Argentina again, but the British need to know just + how far our support goes and what our requirements are.

+

Al Sapia-Bosch concurs.

+

RECOMMENDATION:

+

That an NSC (or NSPG) session be convened as soon as + possible to assess U.S. policy options in the weeks and months directly + ahead, and to formulate specific guidance for a Presidential meeting + with Mrs. Thatcher next Tuesday or + WednesdayJune 22 or 23. on the + margins of her SSOD visit to New + York.Clark neither approved nor disapproved the + recommendation.

+
+ +
+ 354. Memorandum From the Secretary of the Navy (Lehman) to Secretary + of Defense WeinbergerSource: Washington National Records + Center, OSD Files, FRC 330–84–0003, + Argentina (June–Sept) 1982. Secret. Copies were sent to Carlucci and Iklé. A stamped notation at the + top of the memorandum indicates that Weinberger saw it on June 21. + + + Washington, June 18, + 1982 + + + SUBJ + Falklands’ Lessons Learned—INFORMATION MEMORANDUM + +

The fighting in the South Atlantic provides another opportunity to + capitalize on the combatants’ experiences by reviewing our present and + future capabilities in the context of the different successes and + failures during the conflict. The geography is similar to the Northern + Flanks of NATO and the North Pacific.

+

There are inherent dangers in making hasty judgments before all relevant + facts are sorted out from the value + judgments. While much of the Falklands interaction had more in common + with World War II (we lost four destroyers per day at Okinawa to cruise + missiles (kamikazes) than with star wars, there is much to learn from + the real-world interaction of new electronic technologies and materials + in combat for the first time.

+

Since the engagement was essentially maritime, I have assembled a team of + the best Navy and Marine warfare specialists, military and civilian, + from the relevant commands, labs, and bureaus to exploit completely the + lessons learned as fast as the data permits.

+

Arrangements have been made with the Royal Navy, using well established + channels for a rapid and complete flow of data. This comprehensive study + of the naval and amphibious operations will be fully coordinated with the Defense-wide + effort to address other aspects of the engagement and the engagements in + the Middle East.

+

Our effort will be accomplished in two phases. The first step is well in + progress and designed as a quick-look review identifying areas for + thorough study such as aluminum superstructure in naval ships and + identifying current or FYDP-projected + USN/USMC hardware capabilities which would have provided our forces + significant advantage or resulted in combat deficiencies if we engaged + in a scenario similar to the Falklands. The initial effort will be + complete in early July, and I will be prepared to brief you as soon + thereafter as your schedule permits. In this briefing, I will also + discuss from the Navy vantage point the effectiveness of U.S. direct + support/intelligence products provided to the U.K. during the conflict. + In our review, we will be looking not only at how the U.S. Navy would + conduct offensive and defensive operations in a Falklands-type of + scenario, but also operations at a relative level of effort equivalent + to that put forth by the Royal Navy (e.g. significant percentage of + forces committed). We also intend to take a close look at the U.K. naval + command and control structure and at the maritime Rules of Engagement, + both of which were apparently very effective. The initial stages of + Phase One of our review have highlighted some significant lessons, set + forth below, which I believe are of immediate interest.

+

Background

+

The following lessons learned, which generally may be characterized as + “already known but reinforced,” have been identified in the initial + review of British and Argentine experiences in the Falkland Islands + crisis.

+

General

+

The historical effectiveness of the Navy/Marine Corps team as a primary + instrument for enforcing foreign policy was reaffirmed, as was the + absolute necessity for the “Defense in Depth” provided by the U.S. Navy + carrier battle group concept which provides the flexibility and + self-protection required to support combat operations.

+

The United Kingdom’s inability to deter the Argentines from aggression + dramatically illustrates the importance of maintaining a proper balance + between strategic and conventional forces. Britain’s emphasis of + strategic capability at the expense of conventional naval forces most + certainly had a profound impact on the original decision by Argentina to + invade the Falklands.

+

Fleet Operations

+

From data available thus far, the concept of defense-in-depth as employed + by U.S. Navy CV Battle Groups would have + provided a layered force + defense with reduced penetrability and fewer leakers/hits. Without this + redundant and multi-mission capability, the Royal Navy had insufficient + early-warning, distant intercept, and local air superiority. Thus, the + burden of defense against the essentially airborne threat fell almost + entirely on the inner-most point defenses. The countermeasures the Royal + Navy had available proved inadequate to the task in several cases.

+

Assuming that some antiship missile leakage will always occur against the + best of defenses, the low-altitude, antiship missile successes (EXOCET) + demonstrated the need to continue development and adequate testing of + improved fuzing, EW capability and + decoys as part of our defense. It may suggest also that the DRB should consider speeding up deployment + of such effective defenses as we do have such as Phalanx. Efforts in this regard should + not be focused solely on the Soviet family of missiles.

+

“Stores-in-depth” became an issue for both protagonists even though the + conflict was relatively short-lived and episodic in nature. For example, + the supply of air-launched EXOCET and SIDEWINDER was inadequate to meet + requirements.

+

Iron bombs, bullets, and sophisticated weapons all played a large role in + the conflict. Naval gunfire support was used extensively and effectively + in both the pre- and post-landing phases of the amphibious + operation.

+

Rapid mobilization of commercial shipping and industrial support appears + to have been critical to British success. According to the First Sea + Lord, 50 commercial ships were modified to support these operations. In + his words, these modifications were “expensive, ingenious, and + effective.” U.S. surge capability in this regard should be carefully + developed and exercised.

+

Survivability is and will remain an issue in any war at sea. Based on the + Royal Navy experience, issues to be studied in depth include the + adequacy of armor, compartmentation, seaworthiness, watertight + integrity, electrical power distribution and redundancy, and permanent + and portable damage control capability.

+

It appears wider availability of secure communications would have aided + both sides in executing various engagements and in maintaining security + of operations overall.

+

The capability of nuclear-powered submarines to transit long distances at + high speed and to conduct naval operations including blockage with + minimal support provided a significant tactical advantage and was + apparently successful at intimidating Argentine surface forces. The very + good modern Argentine diesel-electric submarines apparently were + ineffective.

+ +

Amphibious Operations

+

The Falkland Islands campaign provided a classic example of the value of + maritime force projection through amphibious operations.

+

The objective area was isolated; time was allotted to plan, prepare, and + rehearse the assault. Advance Force Operations included the use of + unconventional forces which provided the commander with extensive + tactical intelligence.

+

The Advance Force operations were conducted by means of shore bombardment + with naval guns and aircraft to reduce enemy defenses and to deceive the + Argentines.

+

The San Carlos Bay landing was conducted under adverse conditions by a + combined arms action designed for the single purpose of projecting power + ashore. By landing where the “enemy was not” a beachhead was established + as the base for future offensive operations.

+

Of particular interest during the transition ashore is the role of the + Harrier aircraft. This crisis + should provide significant information on the Harrier in the air-to-air role, as + well as its ability to operate without the advantage of an airfield.

+

The Royal Marines and paratroopers revalidated the striking power and + mobility of light infantry supported by light armor. Under the cover of + naval gunfire and mobile field artillery, key objectives were + seized—many at night.

+

The ability to move from one side of the island to the other has once + again highlighted the versatility of the helicopter.

+

Casualties on both sides supported the need for hospital ships and + deployable medical facilities.

+

So far, evidence indicates U.S.-designed equipment and weapons worked as + advertised with a higher success rate than we would have predicted.

+ + John Lehman + +
+ +
+ + 355. Telegram From the Department of State to Secretary of State + Haig in New YorkSource: Department of State, Under + Secretary of State for Political Affairs, Miscellaneous Files, March + 1981–February 1983, Lot 83D210, Falklands [Folder 1]. Secret; + Immediate; Nodis. Drafted by + Haass; cleared by + Blackwill, Enders, Howe, Bremer, Gompert, and in S/S–O; approved by Eagleburger. Haig was in New York for the UNSSOD. + + + Washington, June 19, 1982, + 0126Z + +

Tosec 90052/169712. Stadis—For the Secretary from Blackwill, Enders, and Howe. Subject: Falklands: Analysis of + Key Issues.

+

1. Secret–Entire text.

+

2. Begin text of Action Memorandum:

+

To: The Secretary

+

Through: P—Under Secretary Eagleburger

+

From: EUR, Robert Blackwill, Acting

+

ARA—Tom + Enders

+

PM—Jonathan + Howe

+

Subject: Falklands: Analysis of Key Issues.

+

Issue for Decision: What approach we should now take to sanctions against + Argentina, materiel support for the UK + and what line the President should take with Mrs. Thatcher should he see her next + week.

+

Background: The change of government in Buenos Aires, the continuing + euphoria in Britain, the rash of public statements on both sides, and + Prime Minister Thatcher’s + pending visit and possible meeting with the President here make it + imperative that we sort out our thinking on the key issues of sanctions, + materiel support for the UK, and our + approach to the Prime Minister. Although the situation is fluid, and our + prescriptions will have to be reviewed in light of changing + circumstances, we propose the following approach at this time. (We have + sent separately a proposed message from you to the President with a + draft letter to the Prime Minister;For the + message as sent to Reagan, + June 19, see Document 356. also + sent separately was our analysis of how we should respond to the current + PDC initiative.Not further identified. The humanitarian + issue appears on its way to being solved.)

+

Sanctions: The EC is likely to debate the + sanctions issue either 20 or 21 June. Indications are that economic + controls on imports from Argentina will be lifted.In telegram + 169785 to Brussels, Rome, Dublin, Copenhagen, Athens, Luxembourg, + and The Hague, June 19, the Department argued that the removal of + EC sanctions against Argentina, + “in absence of Argentine agreement to cessation of hostilities, + could seriously undercut British at crucial time in Falklands + crisis.” The Department therefore instructed the posts to contact + Foreign Ministries “at highest possible level” to “urge that EC put off any decision at this time to + remove sanctions.” The text of this telegram was repeated in Todep 30103/169785 sent from the + Department to Stoessel in + Canberra. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, + D850398–0438) Separate messages from Haig to the Foreign Ministers of France and West + Germany urging the same were transmitted in telegram Tosec 90061/169787 to Paris and + Bonn, June 19. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, + N820006–0077) If the EC does + in fact go this route and the de facto cease fire holds, there would be + a strong case for us to follow suit.

+

We should, however, hold off making any decision or announcement until + after a meeting between the President and Mrs. Thatcher. Indeed, Pym asked as much in his letter which + requested that we not act on this issue until after further + “consultations” between us had taken place.See Document 329.

+

On our part, any lifting of economic sanctions—which cover credit and + financial guarantee arrangements—would be of major symbolic importance. + As regards controls on dual use or military items that come under + Commerce, Munitions List, or FMS + regulations, we believe we ought to lift the April suspension on + previously issued licenses of items on the Munitions List (which would + permit about $6 million in the pre-1978 pipeline to be exported) and + resume normal Commerce Department licensing-procedures (which would + still permit case by case review) for export of dual use equipment. We + would also hold off certifying Argentina as eligible for new FMS or commercial sales of items on the + Munitions List. This mix would open up some channels with the new + government, but not give the UK very + much cause for legitimate unhappiness.

+

—Materiel support for the UK: We believe + we ought to make available to the UK the + equipment it requests and not as a matter of principle oppose providing + items useful to garrison the Islands. However, we should avoid approving + major items for that purpose until we have assessed our talks with Mrs. + Thatcher. In any event, we + should not expect to exact any leverage from our arms supply + relationship. US assistance for + Falklands-related purposes is not so crucial that threats to reduce or + terminate it would have any significant impact on UK capabilities but would reduce US influence. Moreover, the Argentines have + already discounted our help for the UK; + they are much more likely to be affected by our policy on sanctions and + the larger diplomatic issues. + We may, however, want to consider ending the emergency procedures that + have been established and reverting to normal FMS practices. We would tell the British that the emergency + is over and it would be hard to justify drawdowns of US stocks or our failing to meet our + commitments to other purchasers.

+

—Approach to Mrs. Thatcher: + Nothing we have seen or heard changes our impression that the Prime + Minister remains euphoric and disinclined to compromise. She has made + clear that something akin to the status quo ante bellum will be + restored, and that the only arrangements the UK would consider would have to guarantee the security of + the Islands against Argentine aggression and give the Islanders an + upgraded role in the government of the Islands. She has said that she + will not negotiate with Argentina about the future status of the + Islands.

+

The above notwithstanding, we continue to believe that it is as much in + Britain’s interest as our own to reach a rapid political settlement of + the Falklands dispute. In the current circumstances, however, the + President’s immediate aim ought to be modest, to keep things from + getting worse, i.e., to reassure Mrs. Thatcher of our support and to dissuade her from taking + irrevocable steps or making controversial statements which would + preclude a future settlement and perhaps bring about highly + nationalistic, xenophobic and inflexible leadership in Buenos Aires. + Mrs. Thatcher should be + encouraged to stress rehabilitation, reconciliation, and + self-government; but self-determination, independence, and any rigid + blueprint for the Islands’ future ought to be discouraged.

+

We should avoid too ambitious a strategy. Pushing for negotiations or + UK force withdrawals would fail, + sour US/UK relations and make Thatcher even more intractable.

+

At most the President might explore her willingness to permit contact + with the GOA on aspects of the issue + other than the future status of the Islands. This might, of course, over + time evolve into negotiations, or at least give encouragement to + Argentine moderates.

+

Accomplishing even these limited aims with the Prime Minister could prove + difficult. The fact that we will continue to provide materiel support + and that we will not push now for negotiations should help. Lifting + sanctions will make the President’s task more difficult; he might + assuage British concerns, however, by pointing out that the military + impact of so doing would be negligible.

+

In short, we ought to damp down jingoism in Britain while encouraging + moderation in Argentina. If we can manage to steer ourselves through the + immediate situation to such a juncture, the opportunity may arrive for a + more active diplomatic role by ourselves or others acceptable to both + parties.

+ +

Recommendation: That you approve the above approach, which, in turn, + would dictate the strategy we would recommend to the President should he + meet with Mrs. Thatcher.

+

Agree

+

Disagree

+ + Eagleburger + +
+ +
+ 356. Memorandum From Secretary of State Haig to President ReaganSource: + Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Latin America/Central, Argentina + (06/16/1982–06/30/1982). Secret. Attached to another copy of the + memorandum is an undated draft message from Reagan to Thatcher, inviting her for a June + 23 visit to the White House for an exchange on the South Atlantic. + (Ibid.) + + + Washington, June 19, + 1982 + + + SUBJECT + Falklands Crisis + +

Our objectives at this point are to end hostilities and to begin to heal + the wounds in US/Latin American + relations, while continuing to give the British as much support as + possible.

+

The uncertain political situation in Buenos Aires may make it impossible + for the Argentines to agree to end hostilities, though they do not + appear to have the stomach actually to go on fighting. There is, + however, a chance the new junta will come to terms. Most of the top army + generals are reported to support an end to hostilities.

+

In London, Prime Minister Thatcher is understandably riding the crest of the wave. + Thus far, we have not pushed her on the longer-term aspects of the + Falklands crisis, recognizing her need to deal with the immediate + military problems. However, the time is now approaching when we must + discuss with Mrs. Thatcher + issues such as the U.S. sanctions against Argentina, levels of future + US support for UK activities and long-term British plans + for the Islands.

+

Mrs. Thatcher currently plans to + arrive in New York June 22 for the SSOD. I suggest you invite her to stop in Washington on her + way home to discuss the Falklands. She is lunching with the + Secretary-General on + WednesdayJune 23. but would be + available for a meeting in Washington Wednesday afternoon or + evening.

+

If you agree to a meeting, I could issue the invitation quickly through + Ambassador Henderson.Clark + initialed his disapproval of the recommendation and wrote: “Have + Pres. call her in NY when she + is here.”

+
+ +
+ 357. Telegram From the Department of State to All Diplomatic Posts and + the Embassy in ArgentinaSource: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, + D820324–0505. Confidential; Immediate. Sent for information + Immediate to European POLADs + Collective, the Department of Defense, USSOUTHCOM, USCINCEUR, and USCINCLANT. Drafted by + M. Schmidt (FWG); cleared in S/S–O; approved by Service. + + + Washington, June 22, 1982, 0001Z + +

172069. ZFF Canberra only. Subject: South Atlantic Crisis. Situation + Report as of 1700 Edt, June 21, 1982, No. 93. Canberra also for DepSec Stoessel/Todep 30116.

+

1. C–(Entire text).

+

2. Thatcher visit to Washington. + Prime Minister Thatcher is + scheduled to meet with President Reagan in Washington on June 23, to discuss the Falkland + Islands and other issues. Mrs. Thatcher will fly to Washington from New York, where she + will address the United Nations Disarmament Conference.

+

3. The aftermath of war. Argentine POW’s began arriving at Puerto Madryn + in southern Argentina over the weekend. The Canberra carried 4,200 men + and some 2,700 others are on the ferry Norland and on Argentine ships. + There is still no formal cessation of hostilities. The UK Defense Ministry announced June 20 that + 10 Argentine military personnel, who had manned a weather station on + Thule in the South Sandwich Islands since 1976, had surrendered to + British forces.On the origins of the + Argentine presence on Thule, see footnote 5, + Document 1. According to the Ministry, there was no + fighting. (Along with the Falklands and South Georgia Islands, the + Argentines claim sovereignty over the South Sandwiches.)

+ +

4. Argentina internal. Interior Minister Saint Jean took over as acting + President June 18, but the Junta (Nicolaides replacing Galtieri) is having a tough time agreeing on a more + permanent replacement. Both the navy and air force appear to be leaning + toward a civilian; reportedly the army continues to hold out for one of + its own, even if a retired officer. While basic issues of future policy + may be at stake, the prolonged indecision probably owes as much to + institutional and personal rivalries among the services and their top + brass.

+

5. EC lifts sanctions. The EC Ministers today announced that economic + sanctions against Argentina would be lifted as of June 22, but that + individual member nations’ arms embargoes remain in force for the time + being. The UK retains all of its + sanctions against Argentina. No decision has been made on the lifting of + US sanctions.

+

6. Barring dramatic new developments, this will be the last South + Atlantic crisis sitrep.

+

7. Buenos Aires minimize considered.

+ + Haig + +
+ +
+ 358. Information Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of + State-Designate for European Affairs (Burt) to Secretary of State HaigSource: + Department of State, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, Falklands + Crisis Files of Luigi + Einaudi, Lot 90D400, Falklands Crisis Consequences. + Secret. Drafted by Campbell + on June 21; cleared by Haass + and Dobbins. + + + Washington, June 22, + 1982 + + + SUBJECT + UK after Port Stanley + +

Opinion is divided in the UK about the + long-term impact of the Falklands crisis. Some, such as Julian Bullard, see the Falklands war + as an ephemeral episode with little lasting significance. Others, + including Sir Michael Palliser, + suggest that victory in the South Atlantic has restored the confidence + of the British people, ending the “little England” cycle of retreat from + responsibility initiated by failure at Suez. Although the wish may be + the father to the thought, we believe that Palliser & Co. are the closer to the mark.

+ +

The Retreat from Isolation

+

A new cycle of British assertiveness dates from the 1979 election. Prime + Minister Thatcher and the + Conservative party promised higher defense budgets and greater emphasis + on foreign affairs. Lord + Carrington as Foreign Secretary became a media star, + ending the Rhodesia embroglio. Diplomatic activism for the British + public became fun again. The Thatcher government took on the EC—and won more than half a loaf on the budget question; it + also played a leading role in Europe in orchestrating condemnation of + the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and meddling in Poland. The UK opted for the Trident II missile, guaranteeing + membership in the nuclear club into the next century. The opposition + Labor party moved in the opposite direction, toward unilateral nuclear + disarmament with pacifist and isolationist overtones. This approach is + now out of synch with the British public and contributes to the party’s + inability to capitalize on Thatcher’s economic mistakes with the electorate.

+

The Falklands Factor:

+

For the time being, British Falklands policy is the creature of the Prime + Minister. The influence of the FCO is + likely to take some time to reassert itself; many in the Tory party + regard the crisis as the result of FCO + incompetence. For the Prime Minister, the FCO’s cautious approach to the conduct of the war has been + utterly discredited by the success—thus far—of her uncompromising + stand.

+

Military victory in the South Atlantic is bound to reinforce her Tory + activism. The UK is the only Western + country to have won a real war since 1945. For the time being, the polls + show the Thatcher government + enjoying extraordinary public support. Gen. Galtieri may have secured a Tory victory in the next + elections. The Falklands accomplishment—building on previous foreign + policy successes—has the potential of confirming the new national + assertiveness. But if the Prime Minister fails to win the peace and + British forces become bogged down in a guerrilla war in the South + Atlantic, there will be a resurgence of isolationism—to the benefit of + the Labor party.

+

Predicting the Future

+

If the British victory in the Falklands holds, we expect:

+

—greater UK assertiveness vis-a-vis the + EC;

+

—a slight cooling of the UK’s relations + with its European allies—though this process will be nuanced;

+

—greater diplomatic interest in the world outside Europe;

+

—no change in frosty UK/Soviet relations.

+

These developments will have minimal impact on our interests, though an + increase of UK concern about + non-European regions might widen areas of US/UK cooperation in the Caribbean, the Persian Gulf or + the Indian Ocean.

+

The Prime Minister is likely to judge the US role in the crisis as a vindication of the “special + relationship”. Her frequent contact with the President, and her good + relationship with him, may tempt her to approach the White House + directly with greater frequency. The Prime Minister dealt with the South + Atlantic crisis largely without our advice—or contrary to it. Thus, + while she will continue to emphasize the trans-Atlantic connection, she + may be more willing to pursue initiatives different from ours in the + Middle East, Southern Africa and on international economic questions. + But occasional differences would be a small price to pay for an outward + looking UK prepared to advance general + Western interests around the world.

+

Military Impact

+

If hostilities are not renewed, we expect in the short term:

+

—an upsurge of the military’s prestige within the UK;

+

—high levels of military spending becoming more politically acceptable + but inhibited by economic weakness;

+

—enhanced recognition in political and military circles of the importance + of forces in place to deter aggression, with perhaps a greater + willingness to maintain a military presence in Belize or the Persian + Gulf;

+

—a new defense debate, not over the pros and cons of levels of spending + but over the most effective way the UK + can allocate its resources.

+

The US + Approach

+

Our ability to affect these diplomatic and military trends or UK defense planning is marginal because of + the crucial role played by purely domestic factors.In telegram 13606 from London, June 22, the Embassy + transmitted an analysis of the forthcoming announcement of the U.K. + annual Defense White Paper: “In light of the Falklands, there is + intense interest here in both the timing and substance of Defense + Secretary Nott’s annual + Defense White Paper which is being published June 22. It is + basically the same paper that was drafted in the early months of + 1982, for release in April, and held back because of the crisis. + Publishing it now is seen as a daring move—one aimed at dampening + pressures for early changes, while leaving room for some + modifications after further reflection.” (Department of State, + Central Foreign Policy File, D820325–0391) The weak economy + means that the UK probably cannot assume + a substantially larger military out-of-area role, replace assets lost in + the South Atlantic, and maintain normal force levels in Europe all at + the same time. But in the short-term the UK could do much of significance in Third World areas with + only a modest diversion of resources. Continuing to maintain a small + force in Belize would have a + significant deterrent value, for example, and promote regional + stability. The UK retreat from areas + such as the Persian Gulf over the past two decades was due in part to a + lack of political will. We should capitalize on the change of mood + produced by the Falklands crisis to take such steps as:

+

—encourage the British not to withdraw their forces from Belize;

+

—urge them to maintain and enhance a naval presence in the Indian + Ocean;

+

—ask them to provide more military training to friendly out-of-area + countries.

+

In the longer term we are considering how we want to influence the + upcoming UK defense debate, the nature + of the British NATO defense commitment + and their mix between conventional and nuclear weapons.

+
+ +
+ 359. Memorandum From Alfonso + Sapia-Bosch of the National Security Council Staff to the + President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Clark)Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Latin + America/Central, Argentina (06/16/1982–06/30/1982). Confidential. + Sent for action. A stamped notation at the top of the memorandum + indicates that Clark saw + it. + + + Washington, June 22, + 1982 + + + SUBJECT + Lifting Economic Sanctions on Argentina + +

The sanctions on Argentina should be lifted without delay. As you know, + the European Community has already done so.See Document 357. From the U.S. + perspective the sanctions are symbolic. The de facto ceasefire between + the two belligerents probably will hold, as there seems to be little + disposition on the part of Argentina again to take up arms. State’s + position is to use the sanctions issue to derive a larger gain from + Prime Minister Thatcher, e.g., + agreement to negotiate with Argentina over the final disposition of the + Islands. Additionally, State would like to deal with a functioning + government. Both of these are good points; State does not expect much + success with Thatcher, + however.

+ +

If we lift the sanctions after her visit with the President it will be + viewed in Argentina and Latin America as if we needed her permission to + go ahead. Alternatively, if we act now we would give a signal that we + are taking a more neutral position on the sovereignty question. We will + eventually lift the sanctions, so our objective should be to derive the + most benefit for our side from the timing. By taking the initiative + immediately we would: reduce strains between the U.S. and Argentina; + strengthen the hand of the moderates in Argentina; assist the U.S. + banking community, thereby speeding up the restructuring of the + Argentine debt; perhaps bring some stability to the Argentine + government, whatever it turns out to be; prevent a further shift toward + anti-Americanism among the military; and, finally, remove sanctions as + an issue.

+

Lifting the sanctions is not without danger. Mrs. Thatcher probably would not like it. + She could hardly suggest that we have been unsupportive, however. There + is always the danger that some Argentine leader will misinterpret our + action. Notwithstanding these problems, I urge that you suggest to the + President that the sanctions be lifted soon.

+

Blair and Fontaine concur.Blair and + Fontaine initialed their + concurrence by signing their initials over their typed names. + Rentschler does not.Rentschler + wrote “Jim” above his typed name, indicating that he did not + concur. He believes that cancellation of the original + sanctions decision, a product of inter-agency deliberations, is a + significant step which needs to be thoroughly addressed in existing + inter-agency fora, preferably NSC, but + perhaps in this case the NSPG.

+
+ +
+ 360. National Security Study Directive 10–82Source: Reagan Library, Executive + Secretariat, NSC National Security + Study Directives (NSSD), NSSDs 1982. Secret. Clark sent copies of the NSSD to + Bush, Haig, Regan, Weinberger, William F. + Smith, Baldrige, Edwards, Stockman, Casey, Kirkpatrick, Brock, Vessey, Rostow, McPherson, and Wick, under a June 23 covering memorandum. (National + Security Council, NSC Institutional + Files, NSSD 10–82) + + + Washington, June 23, + 1982 + +

U.S. POLICY TOWARD THE AMERICAS AS A + RESULT OF THE FALKLANDS CRISISThis + NSSD will build upon and embrace policy previously established by + this Administration. [Footnote is in the original.]

+

INTRODUCTION

+

The conflict over the Falklands has resulted in strains in our relations + with Latin America that have serious implications for U.S. interests and + objectives in the region. Among the major tasks to be undertaken to + repair this damage are the following: rebuilding and advancing positive + diplomatic and military relationships with Latin America; reinvigorating + the Inter-American system; gaining the active cooperation of other + states to prevent further Communist inroads in this hemisphere; + preventing other territorial disputes from erupting into armed + conflicts; ensuring an appropriate role in the region’s acquisition of + weapons for legitimate self-defense without fostering an arms race; and + limiting/monitoring the introduction of high technology weapons and the + development of nuclear devices.

+

This National Security Study Directive (NSSD) establishes the guidelines + for a basic reassessment of U.S. political, economic, military and + intelligence programs and policies in the hemisphere, including arms and + technology transfer, economic policies and the conduct of diplomacy. The + result should be a series of policy measures in each of these areas + designed to ensure a dynamic program to promote U.S. interests now and + over the next decade together with implementing strategy.

+

SCOPE

+

This NSSD will address as a minimum the following topics:

+

—U.S. interests in the region together with the priority in which they + should be pursued in view of the crisis.

+

—The nature of the damage to U.S. interests brought on by the crisis and + the additional damage that would accrue if the Argentine-U.K. + confrontation is not definitively resolved.

+ +

—Assessment of the major threats to our interests in the region from + whatever quarter.

+

—Assessment of the threats within the region, e.g., conflict, + instability, terrorism.

+

—Specific U.S. objectives, both regionally and bilaterally.

+

—Political, economic and other means/resources for securing these + objectives.

+

—Overall U.S. strategy inside the hemisphere, to address the problems, + including:

+

• political/diplomatic strategy

+

• security strategy, including security assistance for the Americas

+

• intelligence strategy

+

• economic/trade strategy

+

—Priority initiatives, which should be undertaken to support the overall + strategy.

+

—U.S. public/private declaratory policy.

+

—Review of applicable U.S. laws, e.g., the Security Assistance Act, Arms + Transfer, Nuclear Non-proliferation Act, restrictive amendments, + etc.

+

ADMINISTRATION

+

This study will be conducted by the Interagency Group on Latin America, + chaired by the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs. + It should include representatives from the Departments of Treasury and + Defense, the Central Intelligence Agency, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the + International Communication Agency, the office of the United States + Trade Representative, and the National Security Council staff.

+ + Ronald + Reagan + +
+ +
+ + 361. Memorandum of ConversationSource: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Europe and Soviet + Union, United Kingdom (04/26/1982–09/29/1982) [Too Late to File]. + Secret. The meeting took place in the Oval Office. + + + Washington, June 23, 1982, 5–6 + p.m. + + + SUBJECT + President’s Meeting with U.K. Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher + + + PARTICIPANTS + The President + The Vice President + Secretary of State Haig + National Security Affairs Advisor William P. Clark + NSC Senior Staff Member James Rentschler + Prime Minister Thatcher + British Ambassador to the United States Sir Nicholas Henderson + Private Secretary to the Prime Minister Clive Whitmore + Undersecretary at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office for Defense + Affairs David Gilmore + Private Assistant to the Prime Minister Coles + +

[Omitted here is discussion of issues unrelated to the situation in the + South Atlantic.]

+

Turning to the Falklands, Mrs. Thatcher described the situation which the U.K. faced + with the Argentine POWs. There were 10,000 of these, many of them in + very bad condition. Argentine military tradition was apparently much + different from that of the U.K. or the U.S. in that the officers had + very little concern for the troops under their command. The Argentine + officers were all sleek and well-fed but had treated their men + abominably. Indeed, it was necessary for the British troops to allow the + officers to keep their side arms so that they would not be attacked by + their own troops. Dysentery, trench foot, and parasites were among the + afflictions which the Argentine POWs had to suffer. Their own military + medics had given them very poor treatment and during the hostilities at + Goose Green had not even cut away the bad gangrenous flesh which some of + the victims had. Mrs. Thatcher + added that she had told Galtieri + that the U.K. wanted to lift sanctions, end the exclusion zone, and send + back Argentina’s troops, but as yet there had been no reply. In response + to the President’s question, Mrs. Thatcher said there was no confirmation of the story + that some of the Argentine troops had shot themselves through the feet + so that they could surrender. She said that the British are holding 600 + officers, pilots, and + engineers, and hope to get an explicit message from the Argentines + indicating that hostilities are formally over in the South Atlantic. + Mrs. Thatcher went on to say + that the British were experiencing great difficulty with the plastic + mines which the Argentines had sown around the Islands, apparently + without leaving any maps to pinpoint their location. There was also + evidence that the Navy and the Army had worked at cross purposes while + setting up their mine fields. (C)

+

The President recalled that during World War II we + had a kind of bulldozer with a raised blade which had proved useful in + clearing terrain of mines. (U)

+

Secretary Haig agreed and asserted that there are all kinds + of specialized equipment at Fort Belvoir for the specific purpose of + mine-clearing operations. (C)

+

The President offered to provide assistance to the + British with whatever equipment we could make available. He jocularly + recalled that in times past mules were used on mine fields, but the + animals were very canny and never detonated any of the mines, although + it often happened that the troops marching directly in their footprints + did so. (U)

+

Secretary Haig noted that the Vietnamese customarily sent + their prisoners into mine fields. (U)

+

Ambassador Henderson said that the Russian practice was to + use their own men. (U)

+

Mrs. Thatcher laughingly suggested that she would use + the Falkland sheep for that purpose. (U)

+

In a more serious vein, the President noted the + change of government that appeared to be taking place in Argentina and + suggested that it was a development which might make it easier for Mrs. + Thatcher to resolve, on a + definitive basis, the situation in the South Atlantic. He said that he + assumed that Mrs. Thatcher + wanted a peace which did not have the British standing guard duty + indefinitely so far from home. (C)

+

Mrs. Thatcher replied that the British would likely be + in the Falklands for a very long time. The British had been caught + napping once, but they would not be caught a second time. She asserted + that her government is sending back Rex + Hunt very soon as civil commissioner. The two priorities + in the Islands now are rehabilitation and reconstruction; at some point, + it might be desirable to bring the Falklands into a self-governing + status, similar perhaps to the formula the U.S. worked out on Guam. She + added that she and her government will do everything they can to restore + normal relations with Latin American countries—“we will have to be + gentle.” Mrs. Thatcher noted + that with the exception of Argentina, all British ambassadors remain at + their posts.

+

[Omitted here is discussion of issues unrelated to the situation in the + South Atlantic.]

+
+ +
+ + 362. Memorandum From the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy + (Iklé) to Secretary of + Defense WeinbergerSource: Washington National Records + Center, OSD Files, FRC 330–86–0042, + UK 1982. Top Secret; Eyes Only. + A stamped notation at the top of the memorandum indicates that + Weinberger saw it on + June 24. + + + Washington, June 24, + 1982 + + + SUBJECT + UK Request for 20 Harpoon Missiles—ACTION + MEMORANDUM + +

In light of your conversation with Al + Haig at this morning’s breakfastNo memorandum of conversation of the meeting has + been found. However, a “debrief” paper on the June 24 Haig-Weinberger breakfast meeting, prepared in the Bureau + of Politico-Military Affairs, indicates that arms for the United + Kingdom were discussed although it does not indicate that a specific + decision about the British request for Harpoon missiles was taken. In addition, the meeting + discussed three other issues relevant to the Falklands/Malvinas: + hemispheric relations in the aftermath of the war, Thatcher’s request for assistance + with plastic mines planted by the Argentines, and the restoration of + military-military ties between the United States and Argentina. + (Department of State, Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs, Files of + the Special Assistant to the Director of Politico-Military Affairs, + June 1981–June 1983, Lot 83D229, Haig-Weinberger Meetings: March 1981–June 1982, Haig-Weinberger 6/24/82 S–S Submission) we have + decided to go forward with the transfer of 20 air launched Harpoon anti-ship missiles to the + UK. In addition, we will also + fulfill the UK request for various + equipments that will permit them to launch those missiles from + aircraft.

+

To recapitulate, the issues surrounding this particular transfer arise + from Navy and JCS opposition to the further degradation of US readiness.In a June 18 memorandum to Weinberger, Iklé noted that “State counsels that we not expedite + meeting the request, at least until our policy regarding the wider + issues had been reviewed.” Iklé continued: “A SIG on the South Atlantic has been scheduled for + Tuesday [June 22]. I would, therefore, propose that we not move + ahead with the transfer of the Harpoon missiles until after the SIG has met.” On this point, Weinberger made the following + notation: “Please let me see recommendations of SIG as soon as possible.” (Ibid.) A + June 18 information memorandum from Howe to Eagleburger regarding the U.K. request for Harpoon missiles is in the + Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S Special Handling Restrictions Memo 1979–1983, Lot + 96D262, 1982 ES Sensitive June 16 + thru 30. A memorandum of conversation of the June 22 SIG meeting on U.S.-Latin American + relations following the South Atlantic crisis is in the Reagan + Library, Latin American Affairs Directorate, NSC, Falklands/Malvinas: NSC & State Memos, 1982. + Present Harpoon inventory is about + 75 percent of air and shipfill requirements with only deploying units + assured of a full loadout. While it would be possible to reconfigure + missiles from the Iranian Harpoon + inventory, the Navy would need up to 30 days to transfer the missiles to + the UK in order not to remove missiles + already with the fleet. The British requested that the first eight + missiles be delivered within the next week, however. I should add that CNO opposes the transfer of any Harpoons at this time + because the P–3C units at Brunswick + require the Harpoons every bit as badly as the British do.

+

The Navy also voiced its concern about the transfer of some of the + support equipment, especially test set simulators. Each of the four + simulators that will be transferred to the UK will deprive a Navy squadron of test capability.Weinberger concurred with the transfer and wrote: + “Ambassador indicated they could get along with 8 Harpoons at + first—so let’s get those + 2 sets of equipment, to the [illegible] + a.s.a.p. CW.”

+

Fred C. + IkleIklé signed “Fred” above his typed + signature.

+
+ +
+ 363. Memorandum From the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy + (Iklé) to Secretary of + Defense WeinbergerSource: Washington National Records + Center, OSD Files, FRC 330–86–0042, + UK 1982. Top Secret; Eyes Only. + A stamped notation at the top of the memorandum indicates that + Weinberger saw it on + June 25. + + + Washington, June 24, + 1982 + + + SUBJECT + UK Request for 6 (Additional) + Super Rapid Blooming Overhead Chaff (SRBOC) Launchers Plus 1200 + Hycor Rounds (TS)—ACTION MEMORANDUM + +

On June 10, 1982 the Navy released 6 Super Rapid Blooming Overhead Chaff + (SRBOC) launchers and 1200 Rounds. We are now in receipt of a request + for an additional 6 launchers and 1200 more rounds. Navy has indicated + that this second request for Hycor rounds has a direct impact on Navy + readiness. Navy is already understocked with 44 percent shipfill and no + reserves. Fulfilling the British request would reduce Navy readiness by + a further 10 percent. Apparently the UK + plans to use the launchers and rounds to protect the next task force + against a possible attack by Exocet + missiles. The release of the additional rounds would place the UK at 100 percent shipfill with 115 percent + in reserve.

+ +

While British concern about a possible Argentine attack is + understandable, the urgency of the situation does not appear to + necessitate dipping further into Navy readiness. Additionally, the stock + of rounds which has already been provided should be sufficient for + UK needs. I recommend that we offer + to provide the launchers to the British but deny their request for the + additional rounds.Weinberger indicated neither + approval nor disapproval of the recommendation, although he crossed + out the word “only” at the end of the “Approve release of launchers + only” option and wrote: “& query UK about their real need for 1200 more rounds, in view + of our own shortage.” In response, Iklé submitted another memorandum to Weinberger on July 2, which stated + that the British rationale for seeking 1,200 rounds was that the + United Kingdom required “twice the number of rounds to fire against + Exocet missiles as against + Soviet missiles, which are the basis for our own threat assessment + and requirements,” that the U.K. requirement “is also increased + because its launchers have been inefficiently placed; they had to be + grafted onto ships that had already been outfitted,” and that the + British “are, in any event, quite nervous about incoming aircraft + since the sinking of the Sheffield.” In light of this, Iklé recommended offering 900 + rounds, a recommendation Weinberger approved. (Ibid.)

+

Fred C. + IkleIklé signed “Fred” above his typed + signature.

+
+ +
+ 364. Memorandum From Secretary of State Haig to President ReaganSource: + Department of State, Executive Secretariat, Very Sensitive + Correspondence Files of Alexander M. + Haig, Jr., March 1981–February 1983, Lot 83D288, + Evening Reading—June 1982. Confidential. + + + Washington, June 24, + 1982 + +

[Omitted here is discussion of issues unrelated to the South + Atlantic.]

+

2. Senior Interagency Group (SIG) Meeting on Post-Falklands Policy Toward Latin + America. Larry + Eagleburger chaired a SIG meeting to address next steps in Latin America in the + wake of the Falklands episode.See footnote 3, Document 362. While + there has been short-term damage to our relations with the hemisphere, + it was generally felt that as emotionalism subsides most countries will + resume business as usual with the United States—but with some new twists + that require further analysis. Demands for advanced military technology may increase, but the + deep indebtedness of many countries may limit expansion of military + budgets. Cuban opportunities for mischief will be few but the Soviets + will have several, particularly through military sales to Argentina.

+

The Group concluded that our basic priority in favor of Mexico and the + Caribbean Basin should not be changed. On the contrary: Latins will view + our ability to follow through on the Caribbean Basin Initiative as a + litmus test of U.S. attitudes toward the hemisphere. Overall, we should + continue careful application of existing policies within our present + guidelines, rather than begin any special U.S. programs or policies in + the wake of the Falklands war. Finally, the Group believes that public + relations efforts toward Latin America, such as those suggested by + President Monge to you + today,Likely a mistaken reference to + Reagan’s June 22 meeting + with Monge at the White + House. According to the President’s Daily Diary, the two leaders met + in the Oval Office from 11 a.m. until 12:03 p.m. (Reagan Library, + President’s Daily Diary) can help rebuild an atmosphere of + trust in the hemisphere. (C)

+
+ +
+ 365. Action Memorandum From the Director of the Bureau of + Politico-Military Affairs (Howe) + to the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Eagleburger)Source: Department of State, + Executive Secretariat, S/S Special + Handling Restrictions Memos 1979–1983, Lot 96D262, Super Sensitive + June 1982. Top Secret; Sensitive. A stamped notation in the upper + right-hand corner of the memorandum indicates that Eagleburger saw it on June + 26. + + + Washington, June 25, + 1982 + + + SUBJECT + Materiel Support for the UK + +

Issue for Decision

+

We have a number of outstanding British requests for military equipment. + This memorandum recommends a strategy for responding to each of + them.

+ +

Essential Factors

+

The British are continuing to press their requests for assistance. Since + the fighting in the South Atlantic has stopped, the grumbling and + resistance at the working level in the Pentagon have increased. The + Services resent the diversion of equipment from their own forces in + order to meet UK requests, and believe + that the British are taking advantage of the Falklands conflict to get + immediate delivery of equipment which would play no role in the South + Atlantic.

+

As you know, Secretary Weinberger + wants to be responsive until there is a clear cut agreement to end the + conflict. Although Secretary Haig is prepared to return our arms supply relationship + with the UK to a more normal pace, + foreign policy reasons do not provide a compelling rationale for + objecting to most individual UK requests + supported by OSD.

+

Harpoon

+

The British have requested early delivery of 20–34 Harpoon anti-ship missiles and the + equipment needed to convert UK + Nimrod aircraft into Harpoon platforms. (We had previously + approved the transfer of information and equipment to assess the + feasibility of Nimrod + conversion.)

+

Following a personal appeal from Nikko + Henderson on Thursday,June + 24. Secretary Weinberger has decided to provide eight Harpoon missiles and related equipment + immediately.See footnote 4, Document 362. This sale would not + require Congressional notification. No decision has been made about the + additional Harpoon missiles which + the British want to buy.

+

Recommendation. That you concur in Secretary + Weinberger’s decision to + provide eight Harpoon missiles to + the UK immediately.Eagleburger + approved the recommendation.

+

AIM–9M

+

The British have requested twenty of these improved Sidewinder air-to-air missiles. The + British want the AIM–9M to counter an alleged Argentine capability to + degrade the capability of the AIM–9L. The AIM–9M is so new, however, + that there are only three of them in the US inventory.

+

Contrary to our earlier information, we now understand that Secretary + Weinberger is prepared to + give the British test data about AIM–9L and AIM–9M capabilities against + various countermeasures (which presumably shows that AIM–9L performance + is adequate), but has not decided to provide the AIM–9M missiles themselves. Should he decide to + go ahead on the missiles, there do not appear to be any strong foreign + policy reasons to object to the sale. (However, I personally think this + is going a bit far in a non-conflict situation.)

+

Recommendation. That the State Department not + object to providing AIM–9L/M test data to the British, nor to providing + AIM–9M missiles should Secretary Weinberger decide to do so.Eagleburger approved + the recommendation and added the following notation: “(re providing + data) Hold on providing missiles.”

+

KC–10 + Tankers

+

The British believe they need additional tanker capabilities to help meet + their refueling requirements in the South Atlantic. They may be + considering conversion of UK-owned DC–10 + aircraft to a tanker configuration to meet these needs. The British also + inquired about the availability of USAF + KC–10 tankers. Before the fighting + stopped, DOD was prepared to offer two + KC–10s on a 90-day lease.See Document + 334. The British have not yet replied to our question + about whether they would be interested in the possibility of a + short-term lease.

+

Although KC–10s would be consistent + with the President’s policy on materiel support, they would be + unmistakable and highly visible evidence of continuing US support for the UK after the de facto end of hostilities. That impression + could be mitigated if the KC–10s were + leased solely for training purposes (i.e., to + give the British crews experience in flying converted DC–10 tankers) and + were not operated in the South Atlantic. On the + other hand, the KC–10 is not + threatening in itself and would be very helpful to the UK in maintaining their presence.

+

Recommendation. That we defer a decision on KC–10s until the British renew their + request.Eagleburger approved the recommendation.

+

F–4J Aircraft

+

The British have inquired about the availability of up to twenty-four + F–4J aircraft which we assume they + would deploy at Port Stanley. We understand that any F–4s we sold would have to be diverted from + US forces, and that F–4s already in the UK inventory are of a type which would be suitable for + deployment in the Falklands.

+

Should the British renew their request, we should first confirm with them + that their RAF and RN + F–4s also would be suitable for + deployment to Port Stanley. If the British believe they do not have + enough F–4s both to perform their NATO missions and to meet their Falklands requirements, we + should consider filling in behind them in Europe before agreeing to + transfer F–4Js for deployment in the + Falklands.

+

Recommendation. That should the British renew + their F–4J request, we follow the + strategy described above.Eagleburger neither approved nor + disapproved the recommendation.

+

Alternatively, that the State Department concur + in a DOD decision to transfer F–4s (should one be taken).Eagleburger + neither approved nor disapproved the alternative.

+

Alternatively, that we + defer a decision on F–4s until the + British renew their request.Eagleburger approved this + alternative.

+

Overall Policy

+

The time may have come to move away from our emergency rearming effort. + If the current situation holds for a few more days, I will forward + recommendations on how to move toward a more normal arms relationship + with the UK.Eagleburger highlighted the paragraph by drawing two + parallel lines in the right-hand margin. Beneath the paragraph, he + wrote: “John: I have my doubts. How do we assure some leverage over UK behavior if there is no coherent focus? LSE.”

+
+ +
+ + 366. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security + Affairs (Clark) to Secretary of + State HaigSource: Department of State, Central + Foreign Policy File, P890076–1206. Secret; Sensitive. There is no + indication that Haig saw the + memorandum; a notation in an unknown hand in the bottom right-hand + corner of the memorandum reads: “Received in S/S–I 4:45 on 6/28 by VH Dove.” + + + Washington, June 28, + 1982 + + + SUBJECT + A Message from Argentina’s General Nicolaides + +

General Nicolaides has transmitted + a message via informal channels to my office.According to a June 25 memorandum from Fontaine to Clark, relaying the substance of + Nicolaides’s message, it + was transmitted to Fontaine + by telephone from Jorge Juárez Dover in Buenos Aires following a + conversation that Juárez Dover had with Nicolaides. In the memorandum, Fontaine stated: “I think this is + important and gives us an opportunity. The British seem to be + increasingly flexible on this question, but if we move fast we can + get some credit with the new government for having brought it + about—and we should get that credit. Admiral Poindexter suggested (and I + strongly concur) that a message from you to the Secretary of State + sharing the contents of this message would be the next step.” + (Reagan Library, Roger W. + Fontaine Files, Argentina (June 1982–July 1982)) + Fontaine also relayed + the substance of Nicolaides’s + message in a June 25 note to McFarlane. (Ibid.) The message, I believe, is + genuine.

+

General Nicolaides made three + points:

+

—First, he wanted better U.S.-Argentina relations, but the current + situation is difficult. Opinion among officers and civilians is still + embittered.

+

—Second, the critical short term problem for the + military, especially the army, is the return of the remaining Argentine + POWs held by the British on the Falklands.

+

—Third, if the U.S. could persuade the British to release them without a + formal written armistice then “the door would be open for good + relations.”

+

We may have an opportunity here. The British are beginning to be more + flexible on this question. A nudge from us might do it. But we need to + act quickly if we are going to get any credit with the Argentines. I + know the President would appreciate your thoughts and recommendations on + this.

+

FOR THE PRESIDENT:

+ + William P. + ClarkClark signed “Bill” above his + typed signature. + +
+ +
+ + 367. Memorandum of ConversationSource: Reagan Library, Roger W. Fontaine Files, Peru [May 1982–July 1982]. + Confidential. The meeting took place in Clark’s office at the White House. + + + Washington, June 28, 1982, 11:45 + a.m.–noon + + + SUBJECT + Summary of Judge Clark’s + Meeting with Prime Minister Manuel Ulloa of Peru + + + PARTICIPANTS + William P. Clark, + Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs + Roger W. Fontaine, Senior + Staff Member National Security Council + Manuel Ulloa, Prime Minister of Peru + Roberto Danino, Secretary-General of the Ministry of the Economy, + Peru + Alfonso Rivero, Minister-Counselor, Embassy of Peru + +

Judge Clark welcomed Prime Minister Ulloa to the White House and conveyed + the President’s regards.

+

Prime Minister Ulloa remarked that with the events + in the South Atlantic, the way might be cleared for fresh approaches and + thus create the possibility of a dialogue. The Prime Minister remarked + he had only talked to Secretary Haig by phone, but he had met with Secretary-designate + ShultzReagan + announced Haig’s resignation + as Secretary of State on June 25. For the text of this announcement, + see Public Papers: Reagan, 1982, Book I, p. 819. In his + memoirs, Haig wrote that his + “efforts in the Falklands ultimately cost me my job as Secretary of + State. As I had forewarned my wife, the work I had done was + perceived to be a failure, and those in the Administration who had + been looking for an issue on which to bring me down recognized that + I had given them one. Knowing that this would be so, I accepted the + consequences when they came, very soon afterward.” (Haig, Caveat, p. 298) Haig’s resignation formally took effect on July 5, + and Stoessel served as + Acting Secretary from July 5 until July 16. Shultz, whom Reagan nominated on June 25, + succeeded Haig as Secretary + of State on July 16. on several occasions.

+

Prime Minister Ulloa then + conveyed the feelings and mood of the region as he expressed these to + Deputy Secretary Stoessel at + State.No memorandum of conversation of + Ulloa’s meeting with + Stoessel has been + found. He stated the problem of Argentina is a problem for us + all. He is not optimistic about Argentina being able to pull together an + effective government and that this would have a negative impact + financially, inter alia, on the world system. If Argentina slides into + anarchy, this will have a negative effect on all of us trying to make + democracy more permanent.

+

Judge Clark stated our support for democratic and + constitutional government and that we are helping as much as we can. He + expressed the hope that our interruption of relations—in the broad sense + of that term—will be short + lived. But it depends on what government emerges. The Judge then asked + the Prime Minister, what should we be doing that we are not doing?

+

Prime Minister Ulloa said that it was a delicate matter. There + is a limit as to what the U.S. can do. Brazil and Peru can speak more + directly and openly about political matters.

+

As for change in the OAS and the + inter-American system, that should be played very coolly. The issue + should remain dormant for a while. There is no unanimity of views, in + any case.

+

The U.S. might place more emphasis on multilateral institutions. Issues + like graduation that affect Mexico and Argentina are best handled by the + World Bank, the IDB, and the IMF.

+

In general, nerves are irritated. Some realize there is no preferred + relationship and that the U.S. has a global strategy. Argentina’s defeat + also caused Latin resentment against the U.S. and the British.

+

But there are fundamental ties, and setbacks are inevitable. The U.S. + should try to soothe feelings and still not be patronizing. In the + meantime, Brazil can exert a quiet influence.

+

At the same time, the left will fish in Argentina’s muddied waters, but + we should remain cautious and careful.

+

Finally, we should maintain our bilateral relations with individual + countries in Latin America.

+

Returning to the Argentinian problem, the Prime Minister added that they + have brought much of this upon themselves, but we cannot let Argentina + go. Argentina remains a western nation—more so than most.

+

Judge Clark thanked the Prime Minister for his views and + expressed strong support for U.S. Ambassador Frank Ortiz.

+

Prime Minister Ulloa said the U.S. Ambassador was doing well + and had come out of his first months in Lima relatively unscathed.

+
+ +
+ + 368. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security + Affairs (Clark) to Secretary of + Defense WeinbergerSource: Washington National Records + Center, OSD Files, FRC 330–84–0003, + Argentina (June–Sept) 1982. Secret. A stamped notation in the top + right-hand corner of the memorandum indicates that it was received + in Weinberger’s office on + June 30. + + + Washington, June 29, + 1982 + + + SUBJECT + Military Lessons of the Falklands and Israeli Actions + +

The Falklands conflict and the Israeli military actions against Syria and + the PLO could have important lessons for U.S. defense planning. This + issue has already received a great deal of coverage and analysis by the + media. Moreover, the military lessons of these conflicts could become + topics of discussion during Congressional consideration of the + Administration’s defense request and ultimately influence public + attitudes towards U.S. defense policy.

+

Therefore, it would be helpful if DOD + would conduct an in-depth analysis of the military lessons to be learned + from these two conflicts and their implications for current and future + U.S. defense programs. It would be appreciated if you would provide the + results of this analysis by September 15. It would also be helpful if + you would provide suggested interim public affairs guidance by July + 7.Weinberger responded to Clark’s memorandum on July 8, stating that the + Department of Defense “has started to conduct in-depth analyses of + combat experience both in the Falklands and Lebanon conflicts. [See + Document 354.] In the case of the + Falklands, I already have promised the President to have preliminary + findings of lessons learned to him by the beginning of August. A + longer-term, in-depth effort also is underway that may require at + least six months. Our suggested Public Affairs announcement of the + Falklands effort is attached.” Helm forwarded the memorandum, along + with the draft announcement, under a July 13 covering memorandum, in + which Helm summarized Weinberger’s response and indicated that the NSC Staff would monitor the study. All + of the memoranda and attachments are in the Reagan Library, Latin + American Affairs Directorate, NSC, + Falklands/Malvinas: NSC & State + Memos, 1982. On this “longer-term, in-depth” study of the South + Atlantic conflict, see Document + 378.

+

It may also prove useful to brief the results of the in-depth analysis at + a future meeting of the National Security Council.

+

FOR THE PRESIDENT:

+ + William P. + ClarkClark signed “Bill” above his + typed signature. + +
+ +
+ + 369. Note From the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs + (Eagleburger) to Secretary + of State HaigSource: Department of State, Central + Foreign Policy File, P890076–1216. Secret. + + + Washington, June 30, + 1982 + +

Mr. Secretary:

+ + SUBJECT + Falklands Follow-up + +

In the memo at Tab B, Tom Enders + recommends a Presidential message to the new Argentine President, early + lifting of economic sanctions, and non-involvement in the POW issue, + except to encourage UK flexibility.Attached but not printed is a June 29 action + memorandum from Enders and + Blackwill to Haig. On the memorandum, Bremer indicated Haig’s disapproval of the + recommendation to forward the attached memorandum to the President + seeking authorization to lift economic sanctions and added the + following notation: “Secretary signed an alternative memo to the + President on the subject.” (Department of State, Central Foreign + Policy File, P890076–1218) I disagree with these + recommendations:

+

(1) On the Presidential message, until we have taken some concrete steps + (e.g., on sanctions and/or POW’s), the Argentines will dismiss friendly + words, which will appear empty and condescending.

+

(2) On sanctions, this is too soon after the latest Reagan-Thatcher conversation.See + Document 361. We’ll have a more + natural opportunity—perhaps quite soon—if the British release the + POW’s.

+

(3) On the POW’s themselves, we should try to get all the credit we can + for their release. Pym’s current + notion is to announce their release when Perez de Cuellar visits London + on July 12–13. I believe we may be able to facilitate an earlier + release, and in any case, we have every right to ask the British to + share the credit with us, particularly since the Argentines have asked + for our help.

+

I recommend the following approach:

+

—no Presidential message until we have taken some positive step;

+

—responding to Nicolaides, through + Shlaudeman, that we have + taken note of their messageSee Document 366. and will do what we + can with the British;

+

—calling in Nicko to encourage an early move on the POW’s and to ask that + the British use us as the intermediary;

+ +

—holding off on lifting sanctions until the UK decides on the POW’s—or, if it appears that they will + not move soon on that, at least another week or so.

+

At Tab A is a memo to the President outlining this course of action.Attached but not printed. (Department of + State, Central Foreign Policy File, P890076–1225)

+

Lawrence S. + EagleburgerEagleburger initialed + “LSE” above his typed + signature.

+
+ +
+ 370. Memorandum From Secretary of State Haig to President ReaganSource: + Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Latin America/Central, Argentina + (07/02/1982–07/15/1982). Secret. + + + Washington, June 30, + 1982 + + + SUBJECT + Rebuilding Relations with Argentina + +

General Bignone is scheduled to + become the new president of Argentina on July 2. The threat of a coup by + disgruntled military officers is still real but seems to have receded; + Bignone has selected some + moderates for his cabinet, and he has held positive talks with + responsible civilian political leaders, promising a return to elected + government by 1984.

+

Bill Clark has had a message from + Argentine Army Chief Nicolaides, + asking that we attempt to arrange the return of the remaining 1,000 + prisoners.See Document 366. It appears that the British are + contemplating an early repatriation even in the absence of an explicit + Argentine acknowledgment of an end to hostilities, which the British now + realize is unrealistic. We want to be sure that we get all the credit we + can with the Argentines for a prisoner release. I therefore propose:

+

—that we have our Ambassador tell Nicolaides that we will do what we can with the + British;

+ +

—that I call in Nicko Henderson + to encourage an early move on the prisoners and to ask that they use us + as the intermediary.

+

If we succeed on the prisoners, we will have an early and natural + occasion on which to lift our own economic sanctions against Argentina. + If the British are not prepared to return the prisoners soon, we should + lift economic sanctions anyway in another week or so, after advising the + UK. These sanctions, while largely + symbolic, are a serious obstacle to restoration of US-Argentine ties, and it will be hard to + justify their continuation if the de facto + ceasefire holds. We should not, however, reopen the military pipeline + until we have a clear idea of where the new Argentine Government is + heading.

+

Once we have taken these steps, a message from you to President Bignone would be in order. Before we + have taken some concrete steps, I am concerned that sending a + Presidential message would be leading with our chin.

+

I will also instruct Ambassador Shlaudeman to initiate a dialogue with the new Foreign + Minister.

+

Recommendation

+

That you approve the course of action outlined above.Reagan + neither approved nor disapproved the recommendation. However, at the + bottom of the page, he wrote: “I’d like to have British agreement on + the prisoner return & on the sanctions. In view of the fuss over + the pipeline I’d like to know the U.K. would have no reluctance + about our lifting sanctions other than mil. of course. Asking them + to let us be the intermediary on prisoners should be on basis that + if & when they (U.K.) are ready it could help us with our other + Latin Am. interests. RR.”

+
+ +
+ + 371. Information Memorandum From the Director of the Bureau of + Politico-Military Affairs (Howe) + to the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Eagleburger)Source: Department of State, + Executive Secretariat, S/S Special + Handling Restrictions Memos 1979–1983, Lot 96D262, 1982 ES Sensitive July 1–10. Top Secret; + Sensitive. Drafted by Kanter. + + + Washington, July 1, + 1982 + + + SUBJECT + Materiel Support for the UK + +

This memorandum reports on the status of several British requests for + assistance.

+

Mine Clearing. During her meeting with the + President, Mrs. Thatcher raised + the possibility of US assistance in + clearing plastic anti-personnel mines emplaced by the Argentines on East + Falkland.See Document 361. As you know, Secretary Haig raised this during the June 25 + breakfast with Secretary Weinberger.Likely a + mistaken reference to the June 24 Haig-Weinberger breakfast meeting. See footnote 2, Document 362. The + British military attache has followed up with DOD personnel on this issue.

+

For the present, the British primarily are interested in discussing + techniques and procedures for clearing the mines. They have not yet + requested any equipment to assist them in this task. Bulldozers + apparently are too heavy for the soft bogs. I have confirmed that the + UK Embassy is satisfied that the + Pentagon is being responsive on this issue.

+

Harpoon. As + you know, we have agreed to provide eight Harpoon anti-ship missiles which the British plan to + install on their Nimrod aircraft. + These eight were part of a British request for twenty Harpoon.See Document 362. The + UK now wants the twelve additional + missiles.

+

We understand that OSD staff will + recommend to Secretary Weinberger that he not approve + immediate delivery of twelve more Harpoon. OSD staff + believes that the British do not have an urgent requirement for the + additional missiles. They also are concerned that the Navy—whose + objections were overruled when sale of the first eight missiles was + approved—will use the requirement for Congressional notification of the + proposed Harpoon sale to air their + reservations more publicly. (Our soundings do not indicate that this is + a big issue with the Navy.)

+ +

I will keep you informed about the status of the Harpoon issue and will ensure that + DOD seeks your concurrence before + approving transfer of any additional missiles.

+

AIM–9M. You will recall that the British have + asked for twenty AIM–9M air-to-air missiles, a model which is so new + that there are only three such missiles in the US inventory. We have responded with a proposal to exchange + test data on the performance of AIM–9L and AIM–9M missiles.See Document + 365. We also understand that OSD—which is very skeptical about the + UK’s asserted need for the AIM–9M—is + actively discouraging the British from pursuing their request for the + missiles themselves.

+
+ +
+ 372. Memorandum From Roger W. + Fontaine of the National Security Council Staff to the + President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Clark)Source: Reagan Library, Roger W. Fontaine Files, Argentina (June 1982–July + 1982). Confidential. Sent for information. A stamped notation in the + top right-hand corner of the memorandum indicates that Clark saw it. The meeting took + place at the Ambassador’s residence. + + + Washington, July 6, + 1982 + + + SUBJECT + Memorandum of Conversation with Argentine Ambassador, Esteban A. Takacs and Brigadier + General Miguel A. Mallea + Gil, Military Attache + +

Over lunch with Ambassador Takacs + and General Mallea Gil on July 1 + these points were made:

+

According to both the attache and the ambassador, General Bignone was a moderate and he had + chosen a relatively strong cabinet under the circumstances. AGUIRRE Lanari, the foreign minister, + is inexperienced but is conservative. He has spent little or no time in + the United States. The new finance minister, DAGNINO Pastore, served under + President Ongania after Krieger Vasena, and he is a moderate. His views + do not differ much from Alemann, + but he is easier to deal with than his predecessor. The Ambassador + believes Dagnino will give the + industrial sector “a little + oxygen” to revive business and restore private sector confidence.

+

General Mallea worried aloud + about the President’s statement on the Argentines during his press + conference,Presumbly a reference to a + remark made by Reagan in his + June 30 press conference. In response to a question about the + direction of U.S. foreign policy, Reagan stated: “Secretary Haig did a superhuman job in + trying to prevent bloodshed in the South Atlantic situation + regarding the Falklands. We were unable to succeed in that to + persuade the aggressive party to leave the islands and then have a + peaceful solution to the problem.” (Public Papers: + Reagan, 1982, + Book I, p 829) wondering why the President “was so hard on + us.” Both felt we needed a public gesture like lifting the sanctions + which would strengthen Bignone. + Even at that, it would be four to six months before any U.S. delegation + should be sent to Buenos Aires. In the meantime, General Mallea suggested the new Secretary of + State could meet with all the Latin American ambassadors as a sign of + his interest.

+

Later, alone with Takacs, the + ambassador admitted that Malvinas was a disaster brought on by the + Argentines themselves. He felt the civilians were at the greatest + fault—Costa Mendez in + particular—because they did not have the courage to warn the military of + the consequences of such an action. He added he would be returning to + Buenos Aires “to smell out the new government.” He was not sure he would + be asked to stay in Washington.

+
+ +
+ + 373. Memorandum From the Special Assistant for Warning, National + Intelligence Council, Central Intelligence Agency (Cochran) to Director of Central + Intelligence Casey and the + Deputy Director of Central Intelligence (McMahon)Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of the Director of + Central Intelligence, Job 83M00914R: EXDIR and Executive Registry + Files (1982), Box 16, Box 1: C–353 Argentina. Secret. Sent through + Hutchinson. + + + DDI #5624–82 + + + Washington, July 8, + 1982 + + + SUBJECT + Short-term Argentine Intentions + +

1. President Bignone’s government + intends to maintain the de facto ceasefire with Britain, but it cannot, + for domestic political reasons, accede to London’s demand for a formal + statement acknowledging a cessation of hostilities. Foreign Minister + Aguirre Lanari stated + publicly on 5 July that “There is in fact a ceasefire by Argentina in + the South Atlantic, but that does not mean that we are giving up the + defense of the 100-year-old rights.” The highest priority of the + Argentine leaders is to protect their claim to sovereignty over the + Falklands, and they are therefore unwilling to take any steps, such as a + formal cessation of hostilities, that in their view would prejudice this + claim. Army Commander General Nicolaides told a military audience on 3 July that + recovery of the islands, using “the most appropriate measures possible,” + would continue to be the main objective of Argentine foreign policy.

+

2. The Argentines apparently are confident that the British eventually + will release the remaining Argentine prisoners of war, lift the maritime + restrictions, and end economic sanctions without securing a formal + declaration ending hostilities. This calculation probably is correct + because the Thatcher government + is searching for a way to end the impasse and to return the last 590 + prisoners. According to press reports, London is considering a + unilateral declaration on the cessation of hostilities, assuming that + Argentina would not challenge such an initiative. In a move to + facilitate a British declaration, the Argentines on 7 July released a + Harrier pilot, their only + British prisoner.On July 8, + the Embassy in London reported that the FCO had informed them that the solde British prisoner + of war remaining in Argentine custody had been released. (Telegram + 188898 to Buenos Aires, July 8; Department of State, Central Foreign + Policy File, N820006–0398)

+

3. The Argentine government apparently does not intend to take early + action to bring the Beagle Channel dispute to a head. Although Argentina has scores to settle + with the Chileans over their assistance to the British during the + Falklands conflict, the Bignone + government does not seem to be under any immediate domestic pressure to + provoke a test of strength with Chile. Army leaders appear to see no + alternative but to proceed with their pledge of 22 June to lead a + “short-term transition government” aimed at restoring civilian political + rule “by the early months of 1984.”

+

4. Argentine policy on the dispute with Chile, however, may be influenced + more heavily by political infighting within the Army than policy with + respect to the Falklands. The state of affairs in the Army is too + uncertain to allow confident long-term judgments. There is great + bitterness in the officer corps over Argentina’s defeat and strong + sentiment for punishing those senior generals who are responsible for + the debacle. Army politics could still generate an upheaval in the + senior command that might impel General Nicolaides to provoke a conflict with Chile as a means + of defending his position and protecting the Army’s political + primacy.

+ + Harry C. + Cochran + +
+ +
+ 374. Memorandum From Acting Secretary of State Stoessel to President ReaganSource: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Argentina + (07/02/1982–07/15/1982). Secret. Fontaine forwarded the memorandum to Clark as the second of two tabs + under a July 8 covering memorandum. The first tab is Document 375. + + + Washington, July 8, + 1982 + + + SUBJECT + Lifting of US Sanctions on + Argentina + +

Based on your reaction to our earlier memorandum on this subject,See Document 370 + and footnote 3 thereto. we + advised the British that we were considering the possibility of lifting + economic sanctions on Argentina but wanted their views before making a + decision. In response, the British expressed the hope that we would + maintain sanctions for the time being, while they attempted to clarify + the Argentine position with regard to a formal ceasefire and return of + prisoners.The approach was made by Eagleburger in a July 2 meeting + with Braithwaite. (Telegram + 185205 to London, July 3; Department of State, Central Foreign + Policy File, N820006–0286) The British also asked that, if + and when we lift sanctions, we continue our arms embargo and make clear + that sanctions would be reimposed if the Argentines resume + hostilities.

+

In the meantime, evidence has mounted that the Argentines will not + explicitly accept a ceasefire, but also that they will not resume + hostilities. In addition, the new government has made clear that our + continuation of sanctions is a serious obstacle to US-Argentine reconciliation, which they + profess to want.

+

We have just learned from the British that they are about to propose to + the Argentines, via the Swiss, that the prisoners be returned without + precondition.The text of the British + message to the Argentines, conveyed through the Swiss, was given to + Eagleburger by Braithwaite on July 2, and + transmitted in telegram 184638 to Buenos Aires, July 3. (Reagan + Library, Dennis C. Blair + Files, Falklands (May 1982–September 1982)) The British have + asked us to make no public disclosure of this until they have worked out + the modalities and made their own announcement. They also ask that we + not lift sanctions until the prisoner problem is settled, which should + take no more than a day or two; but they say they would understand if we + lifted sanctions promptly thereafter. We will look for an opportunity to + get some credit for the prisoner move with the Argentines. We have, in + fact, been instrumental in convincing the British that they could not + secure a formal ceasefire by holding the prisoners.

+

In view of these developments, we recommend that you authorize the + Department to advise the British that we plan to announce the lifting of + economic sanctions as soon as we receive word that the Argentines have + agreed to arrangements for return of the prisoners. The announcement + would specify that the sanctions will be reimposed if the de facto ceasefire is breached.

+

If there is a hitch in the prisoner deal, we should nevertheless lift the + sanctions promptly, in view of the high political price we are paying in + Argentina and the fact that our sanctions give us no useful leverage. + Thus, we propose also to tell the British that even if the prisoner + problem is not resolved we will lift sanctions by Tuesday, July 13.

+

Recommendation

+

That you authorize us to advise the British of our intention to lift + economic sanctions on Argentina as soon as arrangements for the prisoner + return are agreed, but in any event by Tuesday, July 13.The recommendation was neither approved nor + disapproved.

+
+ +
+ + 375. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security + Affairs (Clark) to President + ReaganSource: Reagan Library, Executive + Secretariat, NSC Country File, + Argentina (07/02/1982–07/15/1982). Confidential. Sent for action. + Printed from an uninitialed copy. Prepared by Fontaine. Fontaine forwarded the memorandum + to Clark as the first of two + tabs under a July 8 covering memorandum. The second of the two tabs + is Document 374. The covering memorandum + and its tabs were attached to a July 9 transmittal form sending the + package of documents to Clark in Santa Barbara. On this transmittal form, + Poindexter wrote a note, + dated July 12: “President essentially approved second option. + Sanctions lifted on 12 July 82.” (Ibid.) Reagan’s July 12 statement + announcing the termination of economic sanctions against Argentina + is printed in Public Papers: Reagan, 1982, Book II, p. + 914. + + + Washington, undated + + + SUBJECT + Lifting U.S. Economic Sanctions Against Argentina + +

Issue

+

U.S. economic sanctions against Argentina imposed on April 30 served a + useful purpose, but it is time to lift them without further delay after + giving notification to the British.

+

Facts

+

The British asked us to keep the sanctions in place for another ten days + or so, as leverage on the prisoner return/cessation of hostilities + issue. The Argentine government has not been receptive, however. In + Buenos Aires’ view, any further Argentine public + statement on formally ending hostilities—London’s quid pro quo for the + Argentine prisoners—would greatly undermine the new government, absent + some British agreement to negotiations over the Islands’ future status. + Meanwhile, the Argentine government has made clear through public and + private channels that a public gesture (lifting the sanctions) on the + part of the U.S. is a sine qua non to begin improving Argentine + relations.

+

Discussion

+

Our sanctions show signs of becoming a political football in this + country. There are new questions as to why U.S. sanctions continue and + what U.S. interests they serve.

+

U.S. economic interests include $10 billion in U.S. private bank lending + which must be protected as part of the $35 billion total Argentine + foreign debt restructuring about to get underway. Japan and the European + Economic Community have already lifted their sanctions, and their exporters have a competitive + jump over U.S. firms. This could cost us as much as $100 million per + month.

+

Finally, and most importantly, the sanctions jeopardize our efforts to + restore our relations with Argentina and the rest of Latin America. Each + week that passes is time lost in the difficult process of rebuilding + working relationships in the hemisphere. Specifically, lifting such + sanctions would improve relations with Argentina, Peru and + Venezuela.

+

We have gone to great lengths to consult with the British on this issue + and to take account of their interests. We will continue to keep them + fully abreast of our plans, but it is time for us to move now.

+

Recommendation

+

That you authorize the immediate lifting of economic sanctions against + Argentina after notifying the British of our intentions.

+

That you authorize us to advise the British of our intention to lift + economic sanctions on Argentina as soon as arrangements for the prisoner + return are agreed, but in any event by Tuesday, July 13.Neither recommendation was approved or disapproved, + but see footnote 1 above.

+
+ +
+ + 376. Action Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for + Inter-American Affairs (Enders) + and the Assistant Secretary of State for Economic and Business Affairs + (Hormats) to the Under + Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Eagleburger)Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, + P830007–1119. Confidential. Drafted by J.S. Monier (EB/IFD/ODF) on June 24; cleared + in draft by Constable, + McMullen, G. Rase + (EB/IFD/OMA), Penfold, + S. Smith (ARA/SC), and Johnston. Monier initialed for all + cle aring officials. A stamped notation in the top right-hand corner + indicates that Eagleburger + saw the memorandum on July 10. + + + Washington, July 9, + 1982 + + + SUBJECT + Eximbank and Post-Falklands Argentina + +

Issue

+

Now that sanctions against Argentina are being lifted,See Document 375. + we need to begin rebuilding relations with Latin America and demonstrate + our desire to normalize relations with Argentina. Lifting the Chafee + Amendment determination blocking Exim credits to ArgentinaSee footnote 6, Document + 69. is an important step, but we must also + encourage Exim to go forward as soon as feasible with lending in + Argentina.

+

Essential Factors

+

Revocation of the Chafee Amendment finding is itself an important signal + to the Argentines, but they will also be anxious for an actual renewal + of Exim lending. Argentina’s precarious financial situation will make it + difficult for Exim to approve new loans. It could even threaten + disbursement of loans approved prior to the Falklands war.

+

The key case pending is a giant $500 million loan for the Yacyreta + hydropower project, of great symbolic and economic importance to + Argentina and to major US suppliers. Due + primarily to Argentine delays, the loan agreement for Yacyreta has not + yet been signed. Exim is extremely reluctant to sign it now because of + Argentina’s diminished credit-worthiness. Lifting the Chafee Amendment + sanctions will be seen as a hollow gesture if Exim then refuses to do + business in Argentina.

+

If we press Exim to move rapidly toward disbursement on Yacyreta or other + loans to Argentina that may be swept up in an Argentine rescheduling, + Exim would have every legal basis for refusing and we would risk the same sort of criticism + we received on the Polish CCC default issue.

+

However, we believe that Exim can be persuaded to sign a loan agreement + in the near future for Yacyreta provided it can protect itself by + delaying actual disbursements until Argentina’s financial outlook has + stabilized. The Yacyreta project has already been much delayed, and even + without Exim footdragging, is likely to suffer further delays of a year + or more before disbursements could begin. In addition, the negotiations + on the loan agreement are still open. Exim could protect itself from + disbursing into a default by inserting provisions that would allow it to + postpone disbursement in the event of a rescheduling.

+

Recommendations

+

1. That you call Bill Draper to + inform him of the rescission of the April 30 Chafee Amendment + Determination. (Mr. Draper will + be at home—338-1504—over the weekend. Monday he will travel to Seattle + and can be reached through his office—Linda Putnam at 566-8144.)Eagleburger initialed his approval of the + recommendation on July 12.

+

2. That you sign the letter to Exim Chairman Bill Draper urging him to proceed with signing the + Yacyreta loan agreement (Tab A).The letter, + with handwritten edits, is in the Department of State, Central + Foreign Policy File, P830007–1122.

+
+ +
+ 377. Telegram From the Embassy in Argentina to the Department of + StateSource: Department + of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D820365–0542. + Confidential. + + + Buenos Aires, July 14, 1982, + 1230Z + +

4140. ARA only for Assistant Secretary + Enders. Subject: + Malvinas/Falklands: The U.S. Peace Effort.

+

1. (C–Entire text.)

+

2. In the various suggestions I have seen from our missions around the + hemisphere on repairing the damage, little attention has been given to + one problem: the distorted view in Latin America of the Haig mission and our efforts to + promote a peaceful settlement while there was still time. Costa Mendez and his crew assiduously promoted the + notion that the negotiations were fatally flawed from the outset by our + pro-British bias and that the proposals we made were manifestly unfair. + There are even some here who profess to believe that the entire exercise + was a fake on our part, designed to throw the Argentines off their guard + and allow the British to bring their forces into place.

+

3. The best response from our side is the text of the April 27 proposal + itself.See footnote 4, Document 181. Particularly in the + aftermath of the Argentine debacle in the South Atlantic it appears + fair, balanced and even generous from the Latin American perspective. I + do not favor a formal white paper or high-profile press presentation at + this point, but it does seem to me that we should try to promote a + better understanding in Latin America of our efforts. Perhaps we could + release to the press up there the April 27 proposal, along with a brief + explanatory note on the course of the negotiations and the text of + Costa Mendez’s response + (published here) which so clearly demanded a pre-determined + outcome.See Document 189. The material could then be used + selectively by our missions in the region.

+

4. There are a few signs of second thoughts here. Alvaro Alsogaray, + prominent economist and political figure, has questioned the GOA conduct of the negotiations. Columnist + Igelsias Rouco, a fervent supporter of the war until it was lost, in his + July 13 piece concedes that Argentina missed the boat in mid-April. The + polemic will go on for a long time in this country, and, given the + emotions involved, may not be subject to much reasoned outside influence + until a later stage. But elsewhere in Latin America perhaps we can + correct some of the distortions more quickly.

+ + Shlaudeman + +
+ +
+ + 378. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense Weinberger to President ReaganSource: + Washington National Records Center, OSD Files, FRC 330–84–0003, Argentina (June–Sept) 1982. + Top Secret. Iklé forwarded + the memorandum to Weinberger + under a July 16 covering memorandum, noting that Weinberger had promised “an + informative memo” in a June 4 weekly activity report to Reagan and recommending that + Weinberger sign the + memorandum. Clark forwarded + Weinberger’s memorandum + to Reagan under a July 27 + covering memorandum. Reagan + initialed the covering memorandum, indicating that he saw it. + (Reagan Library, Latin American Affairs Directorate, NSC, Falklands/Malvinas: NSC & State Memos, 1982) In + response to this memorandum, Clark sent a brief note to Weinberger on July 27, informing + him of Reagan’s appreciation + of the memorandum and noting: “Elaboration on these initial points + and subsequent assessment, in association with lessons resulting + from the DOD examination of the + Lebanese conflict, will enable the Administration to present future + defense requests to Congress from the perspective of the most recent + combat experience.” (Washington National Records Center, OSD Files, FRC 330–84–0003, Argentina + (June–Sept) 1982) + + + Washington, July 19, + 1982 + + + SUBJECT + Military Lessons from the Falklands (U) + +

(C) As reported to you in my activity report of 4 June 1982,Attached but not printed. we have begun to + study the issues and implications of the battle in the Falklands. A + long-term study effort has been established along the lines of our + analysis of the 1973 Arab/Israeli war. While an interim report is + expected in mid-September,Weinberger submitted an interim + report on the status of the Department of Defense effort to identify + lessons learned in the South Atlantic conflict under an October 15 + covering memorandum to Clark. (Reagan Library, Dennis C. Blair Files, Falklands (October + 1982–December 1982)) some very early observations are now + possible.

+

(TS) The first conclusion evident from the experience in the Falklands is + the danger of attempting to draw conclusions too quickly. The + widely-mentioned “lesson learned” concerning vulnerability of ships with + aluminum superstructures, which followed the sinking of HMS SHEFFIELD, is a case in point. In the + rush to draw conclusions, many supposedly knowledgeable people assumed + that the SHEFFIELD had an aluminum superstructure. This was not, in + fact, the case. Although we have little data to go on, it appears that + the EXOCET missile did not explode but instead penetrated a space next + to a main engineering plant and may have ignited a fuel fire, which + spread beyond the control of the ship’s fire fighting organization. The + central fact is, though, that we now believe that the presence or + absence of aluminum in SHEFFIELD was not a contributing factor in her + tragic loss. At least two other + British combatants with aluminum superstructures were lost due to + conventional bombs, but we will not know the full story behind these + losses until the Royal Navy completes its investigation.

+

(C) We intend to proceed carefully in arriving at lessons learned and + using them in briefings or other communications. I have established the + appropriate mechanisms in DOD to + achieve these objectives.

+

(S) The progress of our study effort will depend on the pace with which + the British and Argentines go about collecting, organizing, and + analyzing pertinent data and reports from those that participated in the + conflict. The British are well along in organizing their lessons learned + effort which will be a centrally controlled, integrated MOD study. We + can expect that the British will be helpful in conveying to us what they + are learning.

+

(U) There appears to be consensus on the following preliminary + lessons:

+

(S) —Flexible and skilled forces capable of multiple tasks can be + decisive. Although the British had inadequate or no contingency plans + for such an effort, they did extremely well in developing ad hoc plans, + devising appropriate operations and tactics, and carrying out their + objectives. They were able to load depot stocks aboard 58 civilian ships + by the end of May using requisition, charter, and conversion where + necessary. Furthermore, the first elements of the Task Force sailed in + five days, two days less than the British thought necessary for a + contingency in Europe.

+

(U) —The usefulness of naval forces has been reconfirmed in dealing with + contingencies like the Falklands conflict. British actions demonstrated + the need to be able to project naval power to remote geographic areas + and to engage in amphibious operations, for which British operational + concepts and tactics proved very successful, especially in the assault + and ground actions.

+

(TS) —The importance of gaining and maintaining air superiority in + maritime/amphibious operations was also reconfirmed. The British used + small carriers capable of deploying limited numbers of Sea Harrier aircraft, but lacking any + bases close enough to the action to be usable, the small carriers + provided only a small volume of air offense and defense. In fact it was + the lack of long-range air defense warning systems, and air attack + systems, that made this such a close run thing. One of the first lessons + seems to be the inestimable value of large carriers, with their air + defense provided by ships of the carrier groups, in such situations. If + the British had not been lucky in several instances when Argentine MK–82 + bombs struck six ships and did not explode, the outcome would have been + much worse. We do not currently know the reasons for these Argentine + failures, but we are looking into the following possibilities:

+ +

• fuzes may have been defective

+

• Argentine pilots may have delivered the bombs at too low an + altitude

+

(S) —The ability to improvise in the midst of conflict resulted in many + unplanned successes. Britain modified quickly a large number of + commercial ships for use as mine-sweepers, troop carriers, aircraft + transporters, hospital ships and other purposes. The Argentines managed + to improvise the mating of the EXOCET missile to the delivery aircraft, + without prior training, and after the French technicians had left. And + they also appear to have launched the land version of this missile under + much the same handicaps.

+

(S) —The difficulty of Britain—and possibly other allies—to support over + time non-NATO military actions without + reliance on U.S. assistance. This is due not only to inadequate forces, + but the refusal of many NATO allies to + consider any NATO planning for + activities outside the NATO area. + Ironically enough, the only NATO + country to accept our pleas for such planning has been England.

+

British logistics capabilities were severely stressed by the long + distances involved, and their stocks of some conventional warfare + materials were quite limited, especially so for the latest, higher + technology items. This required the early provision of U.S. material as + well as the use of Ascension Island.

+

(S) —British need for U.S. support tells us something important. Our + NATO allies have designed their + own forces with few reserves and supplies. This is likely to result in + requests for U.S. augmentation in any non-NATO contingency. A drawdown of NATO and U.S. stocks and capability results. We may not + have planned adequately for this.

+

(U) In addition to these lessons, the following observations and + preliminary assessments now seem noteworthy:

+

(S) —Mobile and man-portable surface-to-air U.K. missiles systems, such + as Rapier and Blowpipe, were quite effective. These systems are + currently credited with downing a large number of Argentine aircraft. + Realizing that about seventy percent of all free world produced + anti-ship missiles have been exported to the Third World, we should not + be too surprised that the Argentines also downed at least two U.K. + helicopters using Blowpipes previously supplied by the British.

+

(S) —The value of good training was demonstrated. The value of good + leadership was even more conclusively demonstrated. The outnumbered + British forces outperformed and defeated conscript Argentine ground + forces in defensive positions. The British believe this high level of + performance was due to the rigorous and active training their troops + undergo, and the excellent leadership qualities of their officers and + NCOs. By contrast, Argentine officers were widely reported, by Argentine + soldiers, to have neglected the soldiers’ welfare.

+ +

(S) —The need for timely and secure communications was evident. The + British were able to take advantage of existing communications systems, + with U.S. intelligence assistance, to coordinate military operations and + to exploit Argentine weaknesses. U.S. assistance in this area gave the + British a distinct advantage.

+

(S) —The British set and conveyed clear objectives that were understood + and implemented by the British military leadership. This allowed + necessary authorities to be delegated, unequivocal rules of engagement + to be established, and on-scene field commanders to proceed as they + believed required.

+

(S) In the final analysis, the battle for the Falklands appears to have + been a closer call than many would believe. The British won primarily + because their forces, inferior in numbers at first, were superior in + training, leadership and equipment. But luck also played a significant + role. The failure of the Argentine bombs is but one example; others + exist. The British prevailed and pushed to victory just in time as they + were critically low on artillery rounds and other supplies (8 rounds per + barrel of artillery and no helicopter fuel) when they retook + Stanley.

+

(S) Finally, it must be said that one of the factors in the British + success was the strong and very rapidly delivered and effective help + from us. Their requests for various items frequently resulted in + deliveries within less than 3 to 5 days. And many of the items we + supplied so rapidly were vital, such as air landing runway matting.

+

(S) As to the lessons to be learned from the conflict in Lebanon, I have established a coordinated study + effort. But since that conflict is still in a delicate stage we have + held back from approaching the Israelis. I realize that Prime Minister + Begin promised you that his + government would make data available to us. When the time is right, we + will send some experts to Israel.

+ Cap +
+ +
+ + 379. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the + United KingdomSource: + Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, N820007–0183. + Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Sent + for information to Buenos Aires. Drafted by K. Smith; cleared by Pendleton, Burt, McManaway, and in S/S–O; approved by Seitz. + + + Washington, August 3, 1982, 1617Z + +

215502. Subj: The Secretary’s July 29 Meeting with Pym: The Falklands.

+

1. Secret–Entire text.

+

2. Summary: During a two-hour meeting July 29, the Secretary and UK Foreign Secretary Pym discussed the war in the South + Atlantic and the prospects for reconciliation. Pym said that as a result of the war, + the UK could not discuss the Falklands + with Argentina for at least another year, and it would be even longer + before the issue of sovereignty could be on the agenda. Pym also asked for the continuation of + the US arms embargo. The Secretary + encouraged Pym to move quickly to + repair relations with Latin America, and he said that at some point the + US may have to reopen its military + sales pipeline to Argentina, but promised to consult closely with the + UK before taking any action. End + summary.

+

3. The Secretary congratulated Pym + on Britain’s conduct of the war. He remarked that he had been struck by + how quickly a dispute in an isolated area became the center of world + attention. Pym said that although + HMG believes that the conflict has + resulted in only slight long-term damage to the UK’s relations with Latin America, they realized that the + US and Europeans were worried about + their own ties with the hemisphere. The Secretary said the US may have been hurt in Latin America more + than the UK, since there was some + feeling that the US betrayed its + hemispheric neighbors. He said that the US had no second thoughts about its support for great + Britain: A clear principle had been involved. Nevertheless, he added, + the US needs to proceed with repairing + its relations in the region, particularly with Venezuela.

+

4. Pym remarked that the UK no longer expected to secure a formal + cessation of hostilities from the GOA, + and that the UK will probably go ahead + soon and lift its economic measures against Argentina. He said that no + one in Britain will be able to think about the long-term future of the + Falklands until sometime next year. In the meantime, there will be a new + Shackleton commission to study the future of the Islands. Pym added that although HMG will attempt to normalize relations with the GOA, after what has happened, no + government, at least in the foreseeable future, could negotiate on + sovereignty.

+

5. Pym stated that the UK will forever continue its arms embargo + on Argentina, and asked the US to keep + its embargo in place for some time. He said that they did not want to + see direct sales to Argentina by the allies, and had spoken to France + about it. The Secretary remarked that the US is considering the question of military items sold to + Argentina prior to 1978 but never delivered, adding that there may be a + time in the future when we will want to reopen the pipeline. He said on + new arms sales, we first have to make a judgement regarding human rights + conditions in Argentina. In any case the Secretary said he would consult + with the UK before taking any + action.

+

6. The Secretary and Pym then + discussed the broader effects of the South Atlantic crisis. Pym thought the war had had a + significant impact in Britain, by unifying the country and increasing + Mrs. Thatcher’s popularity. It + had also helped end the recent rail strike. The Secretary wondered + whether war had not had a broader effect on world affairs—and whether it + could be compared in some respects to the President’s firm action during + the air controllers strike since both had injected a new reality into + the resolution of disputes. He added that fighting for a principle and + making it stick could have an effect far beyond the dispute itself. + Pym made a point of + expressing HMG’s appreciation for + US intelligence assistance during + the crisis.

+

7. Also present for the UK were + Ambassador Henderson; Brian Fall, Pym’s Private Secretary; DCM Derek Thomas; and Embassy Political + Officer Christopher Crabbie. From + the US side were Under Secretary + Eagleburger, Assistant + Secretary Designate Burt, and + EUR/NE + Keith Smith.

+ + Shultz + +
+ +
+ + 380. Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State for Political + Affairs (Eagleburger) to + Secretary of State ShultzSource: Reagan Library, + George P. Shultz Papers, + Box 25A, Official Memoranda 08/06/1982 (4). Confidential; Nodis. + + + Washington, August 6, + 1982 + Mr. Secretary: + +

The Falklands and Lebanese crises have illuminated the need to have + standard, though flexible, crisis management procedures in the + Department. Improvising procedures as a crisis develops simply ensures + that we all spend valuable time sorting out procedures instead of + sorting out policy. It also leads to make-shift procedures, confusion, + and bureaucratic turf-fighting.

+

Attached is an outline of what I think would make sense.Attached but not printed is an undated + outline. If you are interested, Jerry Bremer and my staff, in my absence, could work up + a full-blown scheme for your final approval and promulgation in the + Department.

+

You will see that this addresses crisis management within State and not on a government-wide basis. I wouldn’t + advise you to tackle the latter issue head-on, as Al did—to his regret. + Besides, sound State procedures that are put in place the moment a + crisis erupts are the best safeguard against NSC over-management. The attached plan does, however, + suggest how the State crisis management system should relate to other + agencies, including the NSC.

+

Recommendation:

+

That you approve development of a detailed State crisis management system + based on the attached outline.Shultz approved the recommendation + on August 23.

+ + Lawrence S. + EagleburgerEagleburger initialed “LSE” above his typed + signature. + +
+ +
+ 381. Memorandum From Alfonso + Sapia-Bosch of the National Security Council Staff to the + President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Clark)Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Latin + America/Central, Argentina (07/16/1982–08/15/1982). Secret. Sent for + information. Copies were sent to Rentschler and Fontaine. A stamped notation at the top of the + memorandum indicates that Clark saw it. + + + Washington, August + 10, 1982 + + + SUBJECT + Improving Relations with Argentina + +

I have had a number of conversations with State and there has now been + some movement to improve relations with Argentina.In an August 4 memorandum to Clark, Sapia-Bosch recommended that + Clark sign a memorandum + to Shultz requesting that + Shultz convene a SIG to consider “a low key statement + that the U.S favors negotiations between Argentina and the UK to reach a peaceful and definitive + resolution of the status of the Falkland Islands acceptable to both + sides,” “releasing the military pipeline items for Argentina that + were embargoed when the conflict began in the South Atlantic,” and + “whether we should be the middleman between Argentina and the UK to get the latter to lift the + financial sanctions on Argentina and vice versa.” Clark disapproved Sapia-Bosch’s recommendation. + (Ibid.) In recent testimony on the Hill, Tom + Enders made the following statement: “With regard to the + Falklands/Malvinas dispute itself, we hope the two parties will find a + process by which they can reach a peaceful solution of their dispute in + accordance with the principles of the UN + Charter.”The text of Enders’s August 5 statement before + the Subcommittee on Inter-American Affairs of the House Foreign + Affairs Committee on the background and consequences of the South + Atlantic crisis, including a description of the Haig mission efforts to prevent + hostilities, is printed in the Department of State Bulletin, October 1982, pp. 78–82. The text of a paper on + the legal aspects of the April–May negotiations, which Enders submitted to the + subcommittee, is ibid., pp. 82–85. Also released were the various + U.S., Argentine, and U.K. proposals and notes; see ibid., pp. + 85–90. The Argentines, of course, are aware of this + statement. Since it was buried in text, however, it has not received + much publicity within Latin America, which would help us in the UN.

+

With regard to the military pipeline items Argentina ordered before + hostilities broke out in the South Atlantic and certification for arms + sales, Tom Enders will meet with + Argentine Foreign Minister Aguirre in Santo Domingo and raise these issues. + Enders will tell Aguirre the + U.S. will accept a resolution at the UN + calling for negotiations between the two parties so long as the language + of the resolution is moderate.See Document 385. If the language is + acceptable we will press on the pipeline items and certification.

+ +

We should hold in reserve giving publicity to Enders’ statement on the Hill until after he can report on his + meeting with Aguirre.

+

I will let you know whatever further action needs to be taken early next + week.

+
+ +
+ 382. Special National Intelligence EstimateSource: Central Intelligence Agency, + CIA History Staff Files. + Secret; [handling restriction not + declassified]. The Estimate was prepared using information + available as of August 10. + + + SNIE 90/91–3–82 + + + Washington, August + 10, 1982 + +

IMPLICATIONS OF THE FALKLANDS CONFLICT FOR TERRITORIAL + DISPUTES IN LATIN AMERICA

+

[Omitted here is a table of contents.]

+

KEY JUDGMENTS

+

Argentina’s use of military force in an effort to impose its claim on the + Falkland Islands has raised concern that force might be used by other + governments in the hemisphere to settle their territorial and maritime + disputes. The Falklands conflict has heightened irredentist rhetoric in + some Latin American countries; but, on balance, we believe it has had a + dampening effect on prospects for an outbreak of hostilities elsewhere + in the region.

+

Argentina’s defeat in the Falklands has made it even more imperative to + avoid an unfavorable settlement of its Beagle Channel dispute with + Chile. Argentina, however, is not likely to initiate military action + during the period of this Estimate—the next year or so—and probably will + continue the delaying tactics that have thus far frustrated papal + mediation. We believe the Argentine military will be preoccupied with + replacing its losses, obtaining more sophisticated equipment, and + revamping its strategy, tactics, and force structure. The process of + political transition and economic reconstruction will pose additional + constraints.

+

We believe Chile has no intention of initiating conflict. Chile has + significantly improved its overall military capabilities over the past + few years, but the Argentine military retains a numerical edge over the + Chileans despite recent losses. If conflict broke out as a result of unplanned escalation, Chilean + forces would offer stiff resistance, but eventually would succumb to a + determined Argentine assault.

+

Neither Peru nor Bolivia is likely to attack Chile, even if it is + embroiled in a conflict with Argentina. The current Peruvian Government + has shown little interest in pursuing its century-old territorial claim, + and the military would have serious logistic problems supporting a major + assault. Bolivia is in no condition—politically or militarily—to try to + regain its access to the Pacific Ocean. Ecuador is not likely to act + militarily against Peru, even if Peru were engaged in combat with + Chile.

+

Prospects for an outbreak of territorial conflict elsewhere in the region + will be affected mostly by events within the countries involved, not by + disputes elsewhere. Although the Falklands conflict has heightened + concerns with regard to the disputes involving Venezuela and Guyana, + Guatemala and Belize, and Nicaragua and Colombia, we believe domestic + and international political/military considerations will continue to + restrain the governments of those countries from using force. Lesser + disputes in the region have continued to lie dormant or are moving + toward negotiated solutions on their own merits.

+

Moscow will try to use the Falklands conflict to stimulate hemispheric + distrust of the United States and to expand its own influence in the + region. It almost certainly sees the crisis as providing an opportunity + for gaining a military supply relationship with Argentina and for + consolidating its military supply relationship with Peru. Moscow offers + a full range of weaponry at attractive prices and more rapid delivery + rates than Western suppliers. However, the preference of the Latin + Americans for Western military equipment, along with their suspicions of + the USSR and its surrogates, will + limit Soviet Bloc opportunities.

+

Any new conflicts would serve to reinforce Moscow’s efforts and provide + increased opportunities to be exploited. If hostilities broke out + involving Chile, Moscow would support Argentina and Peru in + international forums and probably would offer arms to both countries as + well. The USSR, however, is likely to + try to avoid being drawn into other territorial disputes.

+

Additional hemispheric hostilities would adversely affect US interests in the region. There would be + greater political and economic instability; disruption of trade, + finance, and commerce; additional constraints on the OAS; and a new emphasis on arms + acquisition. Most Latin American countries, however, will look to the + United States to play a role in helping to resolve intraregional + conflicts. While the decades-old trend toward greater independence from + Washington will continue, there remains recognition that the United + States will remain the most important influence in the hemisphere for + years to come.

+

[Omitted here is the Discussion portion of the Estimate as well as + attached Annexes A–C.]

+
+ +
+ + 383. Information Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of + State-Designate for European Affairs (Burt) to Secretary of State ShultzSource: + Department of State, Bureau of European Affairs, United Kingdom + Political Files, Lot 89D489, POL–15(h) Country Political 82—Latin America. Confidential. + Drafted by J.R. Binns + (EUR/NE). Printed from an + uninitialed copy. + + + Washington, August + 11, 1982 + + + SUBJECT + British Economic Sanctions on Argentina and Position on + Belize + +

As a result of discussions I had with Tom + Enders regarding a strategy to get movement on the + British/Argentine economic sanctions issue, I met with British Charge + Derek Thomas this afternoon + to urge that HMG phase its lifting of + financial and trade sanctions in order to accommodate Argentine + political constraints. I also took the opportunity to verify that HMG has no immediate plans to withdraw its + military forces from Belize (Prime Minister Price had told the Vice President that the British + planned to pull out September 21, which was in conflict with what UK Minister of State Cranley Onslow told us last week).

+

Given Argentina’s inability, for political reasons, to accept + simultaneous lifting of financial and trade sanctions and its assurances + that it could accept removal of the trade embargo within 30 days of + lifting of the financial sanctions,On + August 10, Shlaudeman met + with Dagnino Pastore on the + issue of Argentina and the United Kingdom mutually lifting + sanctions, a proposal the latter viewed as “impossible.” Shlaudeman transmitted a summary + of the meeting to the Department in telegram 4632 from Buenos Aires, + August 10. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, + D850588–0150) I urged that the British try to accommodate the + Argentines by separating the two issues and moving quickly on the + financial part. In the absence of any movement, the entire debt + rescheduling effort would be endangered, threatening banks in both our + countries. Thomas described the + political constraints facing the Thatcher Government and its skepticism regarding the + GOA’s ability to live up to its + commitments. He understood our position, however, and promised to report + our concerns and recommendations to the FCO promptly. He also noted that if HMG accepted our recommendation, it would + probably be necessary to obtain a more formal commitment for follow-on + action on the trade side from the GOA.

+

[Omitted here is discussion of British policy on Belize.]

+
+ +
+ + 384. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the + United KingdomSource: Reagan + Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC + Country File, Europe and Soviet Union, United Kingdom + (04/01/1982–07/31/1982) (3). Secret; Immediate. Sent for information + Immediate to USNATO. Printed + from a copy that was received in the White House Situation Room. + Drafted by Haass; cleared by + Raphel, Enders, Zakheim, Dobbins, and Binns; approved by Burt. (Department of State, + Central Foreign Policy File, D820422–0243) + + + Washington, August 13, 1982, 1942Z + +

227203. Subject: Falklands-Related Drawdown of UK + NATO Forces. Ref: London 17463.In telegram 17463 from London, August 10, + Streator reported that + the U.K. Government planned to “detach six frigates for the + foreseeable future from NATO-assigned roles in order to maintain a naval presence + in the South Atlantic” and that the six ships would represent a “net + deduction from NATO-assigned + forces.” Streator added that + the “initial plans” for the size of the permanent garrison on the + Islands was pegged at 3,000–4,000, although “a strong MOD faction is + arguing for a much smaller, less expensive, and less disruptive + garrison. Officials arguing for a smaller presence dismiss the + Argentine military threat as insignificant; they fear that once + established, a large garrison will drain assets, but be politically + difficult to reduce without appearing to send the wrong signal to + Argentina.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, + D820415–0319)

+

1. Secret–Entire text.

+

2. Reftel notes that UK Government has + yet to decide size and composition of permanent garrison in Falklands + and South Atlantic, and that a number of possibilities are under + consideration. It is our view that both US and UK interests would + be best served by UK opting for + relatively small presence.

+

3. We recognize the inherent sensitivity of this issue for UK and the controversy surrounding the + decision. As a result, a formal demarche to MOD or FCO officials could be resented or even + counterproductive. However, in conversations and exchanges on this + subject, US representatives should use + occasion to make our preference known.

+

4. In so doing, US officials should draw + upon the following points:

+

—USG recognizes necessity of continued + UK military presence in South + Atlantic.

+

—A smaller UK presence would have + military advantages of minimizing NATO + drawdown, lessening UK operational + expenses, and freeing UK forces for + other contingencies.

+

—A smaller presence would also have political advantages of appearing + less provocative to new government in Buenos Aires and not putting + UK in bind down the road of having + to make difficult decisions to reduce presence in the South Atlantic + which could communicate unwanted signals to GOA.

+ +

—A smaller presence in South Atlantic coupled with capability to + reinforce rapidly should be sufficient to indicate UK resolve, deter Argentine military + action, and defeat any military challenge should deterrence fail. UK should know that USG remains prepared in principle to offer + logistical support in peacetime and in contingencies to ease UK operational requirements.

+ + Shultz + +
+ +
+ 385. Telegram From the Embassy in the Dominican Republic to the + Department of StateSource: + Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D820426–0735. + Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Sent + for information Immediate to Buenos Aires, London, and USUN. + + + Santo Domingo, August 16, 1982, + 2200Z + +

5572. Subject: UNGA Resolution on + Falkland Islands; Argentine/UK Economic Sanctions.

+

1. (S–Entire text)

+

2. Summary. In a private meeting with Argentine Foreign Minister + Aguirre, Assistant Secretary + Enders conveyed USG willingness to seek a consensus text + on UNGA resolution on the Falkland + Islands,The text of the draft + resolution, which had been placed on the UNGA agenda at the request of the Mexican UN Representative on behalf of 21 Latin + American countries on August 16, was transmitted by the Department + in telegram 234980 to Buenos Aires, London, and Mexico City, August + 20. In the same telegram, the Department advised the posts that the + draft “includes objectionable references to Non-Aligned Movement + declarations” which “support Argentine claims to sovereignty over + the Falklands and calls for negotiations to begin as soon as + possible.” It added: “At this time the US does not intend to take an activist role in + negotiating an acceptable text, although we recognize that we may + want to reconsider this at a later stage.” (Department of State, + Central Foreign Policy File, D820435–0106) within limits of + U.S. position. He also conveyed the hope that Aguirre and Secretary + Schultz could meet at the UNGA + session. Aguirre (who showed a monomaniacal interest in the UN question and was obviously not in play + on British sanctions) rejected proposals from the British which + Enders conveyed seeking to + bring about lifting of mutual economic sanctions. Neither side mentioned + U.S. military sanctions. End summary.

+

3. At Assistant Secretary Enders + request, he met for one hour with Argentine Foreign Minister Juan Ramon Aguirre Lanari at the + Argentine residence in + Santo Domingo the day before the Presidential inauguration. After + general expressions of concern at the poor state of U.S.-Argentine + relations, Aguirre made a pointed pitch for “positive gestures” by the + USG, in light of the adverse impact + on Argentine public opinion of U.S. support for Great Britain in the + Falklands crisis. When Ambassador Enders referred to the broad range of issues in our + relations, Aguirre insisted that the principal question was U.S. policy + on the Malvinas issue. He urged that greater accommodation on this + matter be achieved in order to undercut the forces on the extreme left + and right who were working against the process of democratization now + going on in Argentina.

+

UN Resolution: Inscription and + Substance

+

4. When Aguirre referred to the proposed UNGA resolution on the Falkland Islands, Ambassador + Enders identified the two + principles of the U.S. position, namely that the resolution not prejudge + the sovereignty issue and that it not impose an unrealistic time-table + on negotiations. Within those limits, the United States Government would + be interested in exploring whether a consensus existed.

+

5. Aguirre described the substance of the resolution (the text of which + was not available at the meeting) which he summarized as calling on the + parties to renew negotiations on the Malvinas dispute, under the + auspices of the UN Secretary General who + would report to the next session of the UNGA. Ambassador Enders, commenting that a detailed consideration of the + text would be inappropriate at this point, noted that it appeared that + the introductory paragraphs of the resolution contained language which + might prejudge the sovereignty issue, and the operative part contained + possibly prejudicial timing instructions. He concluded that his purpose + was to indicate a possible direction for bilateral consideration working + towards a possible convergence on this matter.On August 17, Streator met with Bullard in London to discuss the draft UN resolution and the proposal for the + resumption of negotiations under UN + auspices. In telegram 18181 from London, August 17, Streator provided a summary of the + meeting, noting that Bullard + had stated “that the British intend to stonewall in New York. + Bullard said that, at the + political level in the U.K. Government, there was no question of + resuming negotiations with the Argentines for the foreseeable + future. Thatcher is + unalterably opposed, and there is no support within the Tory party, + or indeed in the Opposition, for fresh talks.” Streator responded: “Though I was + without instructions, I believed that the British might be taking an + unnecessarily stiff position, in view of the fact that there is such + widespread international support for new talks. Bullard agreed that even the + Europeans would be clamoring for talks, but, he said, ‘They are just + not going to happen.’” (Reagan Library, Dennis C. Blair Files, United Kingdom 1982 + (08/01/1982–10/03/1982))

+

6. With regard to inscription of the agenda item, Ambassador Enders also conveyed a positive + inclination to consider U.S. support for inscription, provided the + proposed text of the item did not prejudge the sovereignty question. Aguirre responded that, + in light of the August 19 deadline to submit the inscription request, + the proposal would best move ahead as a Latin American request, but a + public position of support by the U.S. Government would be a welcome + positive gesture.

+

7. In sketching the principal points of the U.S. position for a possible + UNGA resolution, Ambassador + Enders expressed the hope + that Secretary Shultz would be + able to meet with Aguirre at the General Assembly session. Aguirre + confirmed that he would be attending and looked forward to the + possibility of such a meeting.

+

Lifting of Argentine/UK Economic Sanctions

+

8. Ambassador Enders told Aguirre + that the British Government now understood that it would be difficult + for the Argentine Government to terminate its trade embargo as a + pre-condition to the unblocking of Argentine accounts. The British now + looked for a commitment to an “early” end of the trade sanctions + combined with specific action in the field of civil aviation, either the + reestablishment of the London-Buenos Aires route or the Argentine + extension of overflight rights to Great Britain pending signature of a + new civil aviation agreement. Aquirre said the proposal was impossible, + as it granted Great Britain something of significance first. While the + Argentine funds were blocked, it would be intolerable for Argentina to + make such a gesture. When Ambassador Enders suggested the possibility that all sanctions be + lifted at the same time, Aguirre responded that, as Great Britain had + taken the first step in imposing sanctions, it should take the first + step in lifting them. Ambassador Enders said he believed that Great Britain would be + ready to take a first step, provided that it was agreed that Argentina + would act immediately afterwards. Aguirre concluded that the matter + should be studied. While it was his personal view that the renewal of + flights would be impossible, steps to end the economic sanctions should + be considered. Of course, he added, the issue of the economic sanctions + could be resolved more quickly if Great Britain indicated a willingness + to begin negotiations on the sovereignty issue.

+

Public Description of the Meeting

+

9. At Aguirre’s request he and Ambassador Enders agreed on the contents of the description of the + substance of their conversation should there be any press inquiries. The + meeting would be described as a conversation on bilateral relations and + the subject of the Falkland/Malvinas Islands, a meeting between Aguirre + and the Secretary in the context of the General Assembly was proposed, + and the United States promised to study the resolution on the + Falkland/Malvinas which would be presented at the General Assembly. + Aguirre asked explicitly that no specific reference be made to any + economic issues, as such references would be sure to raise suspicions in + Argentina.

+ + Anderson + +
+ +
+ + 386. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the + United KingdomSource: + Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D820430–0045. + Confidential; Immediate. Sent for information Immediate to Buenos + Aires. Drafted by N.S. Smith + (ARA/SC); cleared by + Haass, Smith (EUR/NE), and Bosworth; approved by Enders. + + + Washington, August 18, 1982, 2239Z + +

232383. Subject: Enders-Onslow Letter.

+

1. C–Entire text.

+

2. Septel provides “revised text” (as of August 12) of letter from UK Minister of State Onslow to Assistant Secretary Enders, dated August 9.The Department transmitted the revised text of + Onslow’s August 9 letter + to Enders in telegram 232374 + to London, August 18. In the letter, Onslow discussed his August 6 talks with Enders and expressed his + appreciation of Enders’s + offer “to help over the restoration of our commercial and financial + relations with Argentina, which I am sure must be in all our + interests in the longer term.” “One point we discussed,” he + continued, “was the question of arms sales to Argentina. I know that + this is a difficult issue for you, and that you have particular + problems with those arms (such as the Skyhawk engines) which are not formally covered by the + 1978 arms embargo. But we face difficult problems too. We must + expect Argentina to rearm. Equally, however, we must provide a + credible defense for the Falkland Islands against the possibility of + further Argentine military adventures.” After noting some other + difficulties, Onslow added, + “I would therefore be most grateful for your help in ensuring that + the difficulties we face are fully understood, and that Argentina + does not receive arms from the United States that would oblige us to + divert additional resources to counter the increased threat to our + position.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, + D820429–1171) Following is reply which Embassy requested + deliver to Onslow. Quote.

+

Dear Cranley:

+

It was a pleasure to have had such a useful first exchange with you on + subjects which are of great interest to us. I look forward to examining + these and other matters in greater depth in the coming months.

+

In response to your letter of August 9, it might be useful for me to + re-state or elaborate upon several points we addressed during the August + 6 meetings.No memoranda of conversation of + these meetings have been found. I believe we understand one + another’s views on handling the Falklands UN resolution. We recognize you are not prepared now to + enter into negotiations with Argentina. You should not be pressed to do + so. For our part, we would not support a resolution which prejudged the + question of sovereignty, nor one which attempted to impose an + unrealistic timetable for future negotiations. Our public position + remains unchanged and is, as stated in my August 5 testimony to the + House Foreign Affairs committee,See footnote 3, Document 381. that + “we hope the two parties will + find a process by which they can reach a peaceful solution of the + dispute in accordance with the principles of the UN Charter.” If possible, we would prefer not to take an + active role in drafting a UN resolution + on this subject. However, we would make our position known and are + prepared to involve ourselves on a substantive text later if that + appears essential to achieve a non-prejudicial resolution.

+

We recognize, of course, the delicacy and importance HMG attaches to the arms transfer issue. + As you know, we anticipate phased actions later this year, following + further talks with you. With the Argentines, I have informed the Foreign + Minister only that we hope events will permit the Secretary to discuss + with him in September the possible removal of our embargo on spare parts + already purchased by Argentina.

+

Submission of our congressional certification report, required for new + sales, is now planned for around the end of the year, depending on + diplomatic and congressional developments. We will have ample + opportunity to discuss this further. I want to make clear, however, that + submission of a certification report would not, by itself, mean approval + for specific arms transfers, these would be considered case-by-case and + decided on the basis of a careful review of relevant US policies and interests.

+

Overall, I believe we share a common objective in preventing the + introduction of Soviet weaponry into Argentina. More broadly, I think we + can both agree that an enhanced United States position in that country + would serve the interest we both have in maintenance of peace in the + area.

+

Finally, I was pleased also to have an opportunity to review with you our + position on the question of Belize. I will be writing you separately on + this issue in the near future.

+

Thomas O. Enders. End quote.In telegram 18455 from London, August 20, the + Embassy reported: “FCO welcomed + Enders response and is + interpreting portion on UN + resolution to mean that for now the USG plans to play a behind-the-scenes role which + recognizes the need for realism on sovereignty negotiations. British + presume we will be working with them in New York and elsewhere on + this issue.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, + D820433–1002)

+ + Shultz + +
+ +
+ + 387. Action Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for + Inter-American Affairs (Enders) + to Secretary of State ShultzSource: + Reagan Library, George + Shultz Papers, Box 25, Argentina. Secret. Sent + through Stoessel. A stamped + notation at the top of the memorandum indicates that Shultz saw it. At the top of the + memorandum, Stoessel wrote: + “Sir: ARA and EUR are in agreement on this approach. + WStoessel.” + + + Washington, August + 18, 1982 + + + SUBJECT + Strategy Toward Argentina + +

ISSUES FOR DECISION

+

What steps should be taken next on Argentine issues, including the UN Falklands resolution and our military + sanctions.

+

ESSENTIAL FACTORS

+

(A) The UN and Falklands Negotiations

+

Argentina and other Latin American countries have proposed inscription of + Falklands negotiations at the UNGA. + Inscription appears certain. We have taken the position that we could + only consider supporting a resolution provided it did not prejudge the + sovereignty issue nor impose an unrealistic deadline for negotiations. I + conveyed the substance of this position to British FCO Minister of State Onslow August 6 and he indicated no + difficulty with this point, while making clear HMG’s opposition to any resolution calling for + negotiations. I also discussed it on August 16 with Argentine Foreign + Minister Aguirre Lanari. We now + need to formalize our posture and review specific texts for + acceptability. A pre-UNGA meeting + between you and Aguirre would be very helpful.

+

(B) Military Pipeline

+

US military sanctions against Argentina + include suspension of the small pipeline of FMS and commercial sales, primarily aircraft and ship + spares, plus export licensing of certain defense items, valued at about + $7 million in total. The French removed their pipeline embargo last + week. The UK has asked us and the other + EC countries to maintain a complete + military ban. Onslow made a + particular point about the sensitivity of replacement engines for the + A–4’s, which are included in the + pipeline. The British say the French have promised no immediate sales, + but intelligence reports indicate the French apparently plan to deliver aircraft and missiles + relatively soon. We recommend further soundings on use of our pipeline. + You may want to discuss this in September with the Argentine Foreign + Minister. Meanwhile, we should consult with the UK further on this issue.

+

(C) Certification:

+

Congress imposed a certification requirement on human rights and related + matters in 1981 when it repealed the ban on security assistance and + military exports to Argentina and Chile.See + footnote 3, Document 263. If + the political structure in Argentina stabilizes, the government’s recent + promise of elections by March 1984 will help its case, although its use + of US-furnished material in the + Falklands will hurt. Chilean certification is more difficult because of + the Letelier caseSee footnote 7, Document 69. and Chile’s rigidity on + human rights. We prefer joint certification because regional balance is + important to the maintenance of peace between Argentina and Chile.

+

We propose to discuss Argentine certification with the British and + propose to begin a diplomatic effort to convince President Pinochet to take steps to improve + Chile’s human rights record. We need to consult extensively on the + Hill on both certifications + before moving ahead. We will return to you for a decision to certify + when we are further along. Our target date is late November. + Certification would not mean that we would resume military sales; it + would only make that possible, with each specific sale requiring a + separate decision on our part.

+

RECOMMENDATIONS

+

(1) That you invite Argentine Foreign Minister Aguirre Lanari to meet you in + Washington in September.Shultz approved the recommendation + on August 25, adding the following notation: “but setting dates can + be difficult.” He also approved the other recommendations on August + 25.

+

(2) That we continue to indicate we would not oppose inscription of a + resolution that does not prejudge sovereignty or try to impose an + unrealistic deadline for negotiations.

+

(3) That we discuss with Aguirre in September the conditions under which + we could reopen the military pipeline.

+

(4) That you authorize the initial steps indicated herein looking toward + a subsequent decision on certification in late November.

+
+ +
+ 388. Telegram From the Embassy in Argentina to the Department of + StateSource: Reagan + Library, Roger W. Fontaine + Files, Argentina (September 1982). Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Sent for information to Bonn + and London. Printed from a copy that was received in the National + Security Council Message Center. + + + Buenos Aires, September 3, 1982, + 2052Z + +

5148. Subject: Lifting Falklands Military Sanctions Now. Ref: (A) Buenos + Aires 5133,In telegram 5133 from Buenos + Aires, September 3, the Embassy provided a lengthy assessment of the + state of the new Argentine Government. (Department of State, Central + Foreign Policy File, D820459–0807) (B) Bonn 19076.In telegram 19076 from Bonn, September 1, the + Embassy summarized an August 30 meeting between Pym and West German Foreign + Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher. (Department of State, Central + Foreign Policy File, D820454–0396)

+

1. S–Entire text.

+

2. Strongly urge that hold on FMS + pipeline established at end of April be lifted with public announcement + made Sept. 8 after notification to British and GOA.

+

3. As indicated Ref A, struggles within each Argentine military service + continue. Lack of any US move to + indicate we are prepared to renew relationships, provided of course + Argentines follow responsible and peaceful policies, cuts against our + interests of maintaining peace and blocking the Soviets and their + friends. Those within the services who argue against strong + nationalistic policies (for example keeping economic sanctions against + the UK) are undercut by the lack of a + clear US signal to the military that we + are prepared to move toward cooperation. We serve all our interests here + (and we believe thereby UK interests as + well) by lifting our Falklands sanctions before the EC takes a decision to lift on Sept. 9.

+

4. There have been several small signs from all three services in the + past 10 days that they want closer relations with the US. The most significant move was + yesterday’s long-delayed air force authorization to return the attache + aircraft. Contacts with official Americans have recently been more + extensive and frank. But in many cases those moderate officers who talk + with our attaches and who are critical of the irrational nationalistic + line indicate they simply cannot understand why we cannot take a much + smaller step than those already taken by France and the FRG (shipment of spares).

+

5. In Washington consideration of this issue we believe the following + additional factors have considerable weight:

+ +

A. our sanctions are of very limited military significance with only $6–7 + million of spares in the pipeline, much of which will not be delivered + for many months. EC sanctions are of + great military significance as the delivery of FRG major ships and modern French aircraft and missiles + (underway) will have a major effect on Argentine military capabilities. + There will probably be more UK rpt + UK components by value in the first + frigate delivered by the FRG than the + value of the US + FMS pipeline. New orders to the US are foreclosed by Kennedy-Humphrey legislationSee footnote 5, + Document 50. and it is not clear that the EC decision will foreclose new orders.

+

B. The only military item which the UK + has indicated particular interest in blocking to our knowledge is A–4 engines and none are in the FMS pipeline. We understand Commerce + licensed the export of 32 excess A–4 + engines on July 19 and they are being shipped (not under sanction + because used engines are not on the Munitions List). Thus we are in the + ludicrous position of supplying Argentina with the one item the British + have urged we not supply while we deny ourselves the positive leverage + of lifting the formal restraint which blocks normal contact with the + Argentine military.

+

C. Our April sanctions have out-of-proportion psychological and political + effect with the Argentine military because they were taken by the + Reagan government while + H-K is understood as a policy of the + Carter administration tied into complex congressional and Chilean + considerations which had made change difficult. Should the Reagan administration fail to move on + this matter of minor practical significance when the UK’s European allies who had applied + tougher sanctions during the war remove the military sanctions moderate + and constructive military officers will have little basis to support + movement towards the US with all the + constraint that implies. With major promotions and retirements in each + service to be decided in the next couple of weeks, a US move now might well help the careers of + those leaning toward international cooperation. Lack of any US move could contribute to the advancement + of nationalistic and isolationist officers with long-term negative + implications for both peace in the South Atlantic and the political + opening. Not to mention such short-term issues as a mutual lifting of + financial sanctions.

+

6. We believe a strong case should be made to the British immediately + that our lifting of the FMS hold is in + their interest because:

+

—The items affected have minimal military significance;

+

—The lifting of the sanctions will strengthen moderate groups within the + military and enhance US leverage for + movement toward permanent + peace. (We should not, however, overpromise; lifting our sanctions will + not cause the air force to provide immediately British Airlines with + overflight rights for example. Although it will help on such issues in + the medium and long run.)

+

7. We need to lift the pipeline sanction by September 8 in order to + achieve the desired effect. The FRG + Ambassador confirmed to me that his government will lift the ban on + delivery of the naval units irrespective of what action the EC takes on the 9th and has so informed the + GOA. We are thus in effect already + behind the French and the Germans, just as we lagged behind all the + Europeans except the British in lifting our economic sanctions. It does + great harm to our position in general here, not just to our military + relations, to be seen as the most compliant of HMG’s allies. There is simply nothing to be gained in this + case by reinforcing the Argentine myth that the US has from the outset been HMG’s indispensable ally in the South Atlantic.

+

8. The timing is critical. Now is the moment to make the small but + important gesture of opening the pipeline. Doing so will advance the + cause of normalization, and thereby the prospects for a more stable + peace.

+ + Shlaudeman + +
+ +
+ 389. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the + United KingdomSource: + Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D820465–1255. + Confidential; Priority; Exdis. + Sent for information Priority to Buenos Aires, USUN, and Mexico City. Drafted by + K. Smith (EUR/NE); cleared by Pendleton, O’Connell, McManaway, and in S/S–O; approved by Blackwill. + + + Washington, September 9, 1982, 0027Z + +

252648. Subject: Message From Foreign Secretary Pym Regarding UNGA Resolution on Falklands. Ref: London 19530.In telegram 19530 from London, September 7, the + Embassy noted FCO sensitivities + concerning U.S. actions, reporting: “We have just learned that the + British Embassy has instructions to deliver a message from Pym to Secretary Shultz urging that the U.S. + exercise caution concerning Argentina’s Falklands resolution at the + UNGA. (We have not seen the + text.)” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, + D820462–0791)

+

1. (C–Entire text).

+

2. For Embassy’s information, there follows the text of a letter from + Foreign Secretary Pym to + Secretary Shultz, delivered on + September 3:

+ +

Begin text: I have read with interest the exchanges between Tom Enders and Cranley Onslow about the Falkland + Islands.See Document 386 and footnote 2 + thereto. I have been thinking about the handling of the + debate at the United Nations which will result from the Mexican + initiativeSee footnote 2, Document 385. and I thought you might + like to have this personal account of our thinking on the matter which + is, I know, also of great interest to you.

+

As you know, we are more than willing to live at peace with Argentina and + to normalize our economic and commercial links as soon as this is + possible. But I do not suppose that you will be surprised to hear that + we shall oppose any call on us to enter into negotiations about the + future of the Falkland Islands with Argentina. As you know, we had + embarked upon a new attempt to reach a negotiated settlement when + Argentina chose to break off the negotiations and attack us. The + physical and psychological effects of that attack will be with the + Islands for a long time to come, as will the constant risks from the + mines so indiscriminately scattered by the occupying Argentine forces. + The personal and economic cost to this country has also been great and + neither parliamentary nor public opinion would understand if we were to + contemplate resuming negotiations in the circumstances that now + exist.

+

After a reasonable period of reconstruction we shall want to take + soundings of Islander opinion about the future. I would be surprised if, + after what has happened, they opted for any closer association with + Argentina. Britain will certainly not be prepared to push them in this + direction. Given our responsibilities towards the people of the + territory under the UN Charter, and + against the background of Argentine insistence that negotiations must + lead to a transfer of sovereignty despite the Islanders’ clear + opposition, it would be irresponsible for us to allow others to think + that negotiations between the UK and + Argentina offer a realistic way ahead for the forseeable future. I + believe that our position will be widely understood in the many + countries which have shown sympathy and understanding for us in the + events of recent months.

+

The draft resolution which Argentina and Mexico have been working on is + wholly unacceptable. The references to previous General Assembly + resolutions and to Non-Aligned pronouncements do not help. But even if + they were taken out and any suggestion of a timetable for the completion + of negotiations removed, we would still vote against anything which + calls on us to negotiate with Argentina and which fails to accord to the + Falkland Islanders the fundamental right to determine their own future. I should like to feel + sure that the United States will not consider giving its support to any + such text.

+

I look forward to the talks which we shall be having on this and other + subjects this month. End text.

+ + Shultz + +
+ +
+ 390. Note From Roger W. + Fontaine of the National Security Council Staff to the + President’s Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (McFarlane)Source: Reagan Library, Roger W. Fontaine Files, Argentina (September 1982). + Secret. + + + Washington, September + 7, 1982 + +

Embassy Buenos Aires strongly urges (see attached)Not found attached. Reference is to Document 388. we lift the hold on + pipeline military items to Argentina imposed on April 30 after notifying + the British and Argentine governments.

+

Embassy Buenos Aires persuasively argues to do this quickly, i.e., by + September 8, before the E.C. lifts sanctions on September 9.

+

ARA strongly supports this move now, and + the European Bureau seems to be softening its negative position on this + matter.

+

My reading of Argentina’s political mood is such an action will improve + relations and strengthen the hand of moderate officers. Many Argentines + seem prepared to forget their anti-U.S. resentment and, in fact, are + looking for reasons to move closer to us (Foreign Ministry excepted). + But moving after E.C. acts (their sanctions are far more significant + militarily) will gain us little—an opportunity wasted.

+

A final decision will be made probably today. ARA suggested (and I agree) that a call from you to + Larry Eagleburger voicing + White House concern on this would be most helpful.

+

Recommendation: A call to Larry expressing our + interest in this decision.Below this + sentence, McFarlane wrote: + “Done 9/7. They waited til the last minute to consult. We will move + 9/9.”

+
+ +
+ + 391. Special National Intelligence EstimateSource: Central Intelligence Agency, + CIA History Staff Files. + Secret; [handling restriction not + declassified]. The Estimate was prepared based upon + information available as of September 1. The Estimate was issued by + the Director of Central Intelligence with the concurrence of the + National Foreign Intelligence Board. The Estimate was prepared with + the participation of the Central Intelligence Agency, the Defense + Intelligence Agency, the National Security Agency, and the + intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, Treasury, + and Energy. The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, + Department of the Army; the Director of Naval Intelligence, + Department of the Navy; and the Assistant Chief of Staff, + Intelligence, Department of the Air Force, also participated in the + preparation of the Estimate. + + + SNIE 91–2–82 + + + Washington, September + 8, 1982 + +

ARGENTINA’S NUCLEAR POLICIES IN LIGHT OF THE FALKLANDS + DEFEAT

+

[Omitted here is a Scope Note for the Estimate.]

+

KEY JUDGMENTS

+

Argentina’s determination to complete an unsafeguarded nuclear fuel cycle + which could serve military as well as civilian purposes has been amply + demonstrated in recent years. The momentum to achieve this goal appeared + to be intensifying in the months prior to the Falklands conflict. The + defeat in the Falklands undeniably has raised fundamental issues of + sovereignty, prestige, and security that will preoccupy the Argentine + military leaders and any possible successor regime for several years to + come. [portion marking not declassified]

+

The immediate impact of the Falklands defeat cuts two ways. Emotionally, + it has probably increased the desire to develop a nuclear weapons + option. Politically and economically, however, it has reduced + Argentina’s capability to fulfill this desire. Consequently, we have + great uncertainty concerning the future course of Argentina’s nuclear + policy decisionmaking, especially over the coming months and possibly + for the next several years. [portion marking not + declassified]

+

We judge, nevertheless, that unfavorable economic prospects and political + turmoil will not prevent the Argentine Government from achieving the + technical capability to make nuclear explosives before the end of this + decade. The historic momentum and the sustained progress of the program + over a generation despite recurrent crises support this judgment. At the + same time, as indicated above, we cannot predict with confidence how + effectively Argentine leaders will be able to provide budget support to + the nuclear program or the rate at which nuclear goals will be achieved. + [portion marking not declassified]

+ +

In the meantime, Argentina’s need for external resources may well provide + opportunities to generate pressure on its leadership to keep its nuclear + development within peaceful bounds. US + efforts, however, to exert such pressure, whether applied directly or + through other countries, would be constrained by the frequently + demonstrated Argentine resistance to any external attempts to influence + its nuclear ambitions. [portion marking not + declassified]

+

The strength of Argentina’s commitment to its nuclear program has its + origins in a decision, taken more than 30 years ago, to develop an + indigenous nuclear program:

+

—Its decision to develop a completely independent fuel cycle first became + evident in the mid-1960s when it built its first laboratory-scale + reprocessing plant. A reprocessing facility now under construction is + scheduled for full operation in 1986 and could permit separation (from + safeguarded fuel) of sufficient plutonium to construct a nuclear + explosives device in 1987. A diversion of the plutonium for this + purpose, however, would constitute a violation of international + safeguards and carry grave consequences for Argentina’s commercial + nuclear program.

+

—Argentina is acquiring other facilities and materials that are + unsafeguarded and could be used in a nuclear weapons program. A planned + research reactor, if eventually built, would give Argentina a plutonium + production capability free of safeguards. [portion + marking not declassified]

+

There are three ways Argentina could produce plutonium. The most likely + approach is for Argentina to produce plutonium by reprocessing spent + fuel under safeguards. This would provide Buenos Aires with maximum + political and diplomatic benefit from foreign perceptions that it could + build nuclear explosives on short notice. Under its bilateral accord, + Argentina needs West Germany’s permission to reprocess the spent fuel + from the German-built Atucha reactor. If the Germans give their + approval, Argentina could start to implement this plan in 1986. Bonn, + however, would face strong international opposition to its grant of + permission, regardless of the assurances Buenos Aires may be willing to + provide. [portion marking not declassified]

+

Should Germany deny reprocessing, Argentina could move to a second + alternative, which would be to acquire plutonium through an + unsafeguarded approach. This would require the completion of a planned + research reactor and would probably take at least five to six years, + once construction of the reactor began. [portion + marking not declassified]

+

As a third alternative, Argentina could choose to divert fuel from + operating power reactors, either clandestinely or in open violation of + safeguards, and thereby acquire a nuclear explosive capability in four + to five years. We judge pursuit of this option to be unlikely because + of the severe political and + economic costs it would entail. [portion marking not + declassified]

+

The attainment of a nuclear weapons capability by whatever means will not + necessarily require the testing of a nuclear device:

+

—Such a test would alienate other principal countries in South America, + especially Brazil and possibly Venezuela and Peru. Additionally, + Argentina would be reluctant to offend the continent generally by + challenging the Treaty of Tlatelolco, which aims to keep nuclear weapons + out of Latin America.

+

—Argentina could also be deterred by the prospect that an overt test + could easily lead to a nuclear arms race with Brazil. [portion marking not declassified]

+

[Omitted here is the Discussion section of the Estimate.]

+
+ +
+ 392. Memorandum of ConversationSource: Washington National Records Center, OSD Files, FRC 330–84–0004, UK 16 Jul–Sep 1982. Secret; Sensitive. + The meeting took place at Number 10 Downing Street. The memorandum + was prepared by Major General Smith. + + + London, September 8, 1982, 6:40–7:30 + p.m. + + + ATTENDEES + + US + Secretary Weinberger + Ambassador Louis + Major General Carl + Smith + + + UK + Prime Minister Thatcher + + +

[Omitted here is discussion of issues unrelated to the South + Atlantic.]

+

9. The Secretary then complimented Mrs. Thatcher on the performance of British troops in the + Falklands. Mrs. Thatcher + responded that “You were absolutely marvelous” in response to UK requests for support. The Secretary + observed that the Argentinians had misjudged the strength of feeling in + the United Kingdom, and the Prime Minister described the feeling of + agony that prevailed in the UK as their + task forces set sail for the Falklands. The Secretary observed that the + Falklands had once again proven the utility of the large aircraft + carrier, which could provide a floating base so necessary in the absence + of land bases in areas such as the Falklands. He was very complimentary + of the way the British task + force had been formed so quickly and efficiently, and he was full of + praise for the morale, training, discipline, and leadership exhibited by + the British forces. The Prime Minister responded that she could not + thank us enough for our generous and prompt assistance.

+

[Omitted here is discussion of issues unrelated to the South + Atlantic.]

+
+ +
+ 393. Message From British Foreign Secretary Pym to Secretary of State ShultzSource: Department of State, Bureau of + Politico-Military Affairs, Falklands Crisis Historical Files, Lot + 86D157, unlabelled folder. Confidential. The message was delivered + by the British Embassy under a September 16 covering note from + Wright to Shultz. A handwritten notation on + the covering note indicates that the message was received in the + Secretary’s office at 2:30 p.m., September 16. (Ibid.) + + + London, September 16, + 1982 + +

Begins:

+

When we met on 29 July you told me that you would ensure that I was + consulted before you took any decision to release the military supplies, + which were held up by the US during the + Falklands conflict, to Argentina.See Document 379. I understand that the + State Department have recently told our Embassy that a decision is now + imminent.On September 11, Eagleburger informed Thomas “we would probably re-open + the FMS pipeline to Argentina in + the near future, and the move could come as early as this week.” In + telegram 257198 to London, September 14, the Department transmitted + a summary of the meeting. (Department of State, Central Foreign + Policy File, D820473–0526)

+

I still believe as firmly as I did when we met at the end of July that it + is important that Argentina should continue to be denied arms and + military supplies. The Argentine Government still refuses to accept any + proper cessation of hostilities and is still keeping open the + possibility of a further resort to force. To resume any supplies now, + even on a limited basis, would give them the wrong signal and encourage + those elements in Argentina advocating an irresponsible approach. Giving + them such a signal could only make it harder to secure a return to the + stability and good sense in the South Atlantic that is in all our + interests.

+ +

We also have to bear in mind that the more Argentina is able to re-equip + her forces, the more of our own military resources, already stretched, + we shall have to devote to the defence of the Falklands. That will + inevitably mean that we shall find it more difficult to devote resources + fully to our joint defence efforts in NATO.

+

Many other countries are watching American policy in this area closely. + Any decision by you to resume supplies would make it very difficult for + us to keep with us our EC partners, with + whom we will be discussing this on 20 September, especially following + France’s unilateral decision to lift her embargo. Some EC countries would be able to supply + particularly sensitive equipment.

+

I hope, therefore, that you will not take any early decision to release + this equipment. If you do decide that you have no alternative then I + would urge that you delay this as long as possible, certainly until + after the EC meeting and that you + release the equipment in stages over a period of time and with minimal + publicity. It would also be very important to us that there should be no + rush of new US contracts to supply + military goods to Argentina in the categories not covered by the + congressional embargo.

+

With best wishes.

+

Ends.

+
+ +
+ 394. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security + Affairs (Clark) to President + ReaganSource: Reagan Library, Executive + Secretariat, NSC Country File, + Latin America/Central, Argentina (08/16/1982–03/31/1983). Secret. + Sent for information. Drafted by Fontaine. Fontaine sent the memorandum to Clark under a September 15 + memorandum requesting that Clark sign it. Reagan initialed at the top of the memorandum. A + typewritten notation also indicates that Reagan saw it. + + + Washington, September + 21, 1982 + + + SUBJECT + Secretary Shultz’s + Memorandum on “Strategy Toward Argentina” + +

Issue

+

We are about to take two steps that will improve U.S.-Argentine and + U.S.-Latin American relations following the Falklands crisis.

+ +

Facts

+

Secretary Shultz’s information + memorandum at Tab A describes two measures we are about to take with + respect to U.S.-Argentine relations. The first would be a favorable U.S. + vote on a U.N. General Assembly resolution on the Falklands to call for + a peaceful solution to the problem, provided that resolution did not + prejudge the question of sovereignty and did not impose an unrealistic + timetable on the British regarding future negotiations. The second step + will reopen the pipeline for small military items to Argentina which has + been closed since April 30. The British have been informed of both + decisions.On September 17, Shultz informed Wright “that we intend to release + on September 24 the small pipeline of military spare parts to + Argentina (including FMS and + Munitions List transactions). However, we will say nothing to + Argentina or key congressional leaders until after we have a readout + from the September 20 meeting of EC + Ministers, following which we expect the FRG and others to lift their military sanctions. The + Secretary said we would act quietly, with no formal announcement, by + simply informing Munitions List suppliers and being prepared to + answer press queries.” In reference to a UNGA resolution on the Falklands, Shultz noted that, “while we could + well end up differing with the UK on + a resolution calling for negotiations, we would not support any + resolution that prejudges the issue of sovereignty or imposes an + unrealistic deadline on negotiations.” (Telegram 263770 to London, + September 18; Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Europe and Soviet + Union, United Kingdom (08/01/1982–10/31/1982) (3)) In Shultz’s later account of this + “stormy” meeting, he recalled that Wright “read me off like a sergeant would a recruit + in a Marine Corps boot camp. I felt Mrs. Thatcher was wrong to oppose us + for taking a reasonable position on a critical issue in our + neighborhood. And Wright + was wrong to lay it on so thick.” (Shultz, Turmoil and Triumph, + p. 152)

+

Discussion

+

These two steps will help in repairing relations with Argentina. The + first step will have a positive impact in Latin America as a whole. Both + measures fall within the principles and guidelines that have directed + our policy since the beginning of the crisis in early April. Both + measures will also strengthen the hand of the moderates, particularly in + the Argentine military, at a critical time in Argentine history. Such + strengthening may help us avoid that major South American country + lurching completely into a highly nationalistic and anti-American + position with only the Soviets and Cubans being the clear winners. As + Secretary Shultz explains, the + British are not keen about these measures but have acknowledged + acceptance of the second. These are clearly in our national + self-interest, and the NSC strongly + supports them.

+

Recommendation

+

That you read Secretary Shultz’s + memo at Tab A.Reagan initialed his approval of the + recommendation.

+ +

Tab A

+

Memorandum From Secretary of State Shultz to President ReaganSecret.

+

Washington, September 13, 1982

+ + SUBJECT + Strategy toward Argentina + +

We are making progress on two issues essential to improving relations + with Latin America—our position on the Falklands question at the UN and a phased resumption of military + sales to Argentina.

+

UN Falklands + Resolution

+

At the UN, we support inscribing the + Falklands issue on the agenda but will only support a resolution on + negotiations that does not prejudge Falklands sovereignty or impose an + unrealistic timetable on the British. This is now a central political + theme for Latin America. We have positioned ourselves to gain support in + the hemisphere while attempting to make sure we are in very close touch + with the British about their own interests. Francis Pym has asked that we not support any resolution + on negotiations. The European Community countries are expected to turn + down a similar request. Led by the French, Germans and Italians, the + EC may offer to vote for a simple + call for negotiations. This is our traditional position as well. We + would find it impossible, from a political and international legal + standpoint, to fail to support a resolution calling for peaceful + settlement. The British will continue to press us. Their diplomats seem + to understand the political necessity of our position in Latin America + but Mrs. Thatcher may feel much + stronger on this issue than her diplomats.

+

Military Sales

+

We plan very soon to remove the embargo on our small pipeline of spare + parts and reinstate munitions control sales, hopefully in step with + action by key European states. The French have resumed deliveries of + Mirage aircraft and Exocet missiles. + The Germans have told the Argentines they soon will authorize shipments + of naval craft but prefer official EC + action first to lift the European embargo on military sales. The British + remain strongly opposed but will not be too surprised. Our own FMS pipeline and munitions control + licenses are more modest, about + $6 million in assorted spare parts for ships and aircraft. Again, we + will consult with the British and carefully phase our actions with those + of key Europeans. We should act soon to regain needed influence with the + Argentine military.

+
+ +
+ 395. Memorandum From the Acting Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff + (Watkins) to Secretary of Defense WeinbergerSource: Washington National Records Center, OSD Files, FRC 330–84–0003, Argentina + (June–Sept) 1982. Confidential. Stamped notations on the first page + of another copy of the memorandum indicate that Weinberger saw it on September 23. + However, a stamped notation on the first page of another copy of the + memorandum indicates that Carlucci saw it on September 24. Both of these + copies are ibid. + + + JCSM–213–82 + + + Washington, September + 22, 1982 + + + SUBJECT + Resumption of Military Exports to Argentina (U) + +

1. (C) On 30 April 1982, the President imposed military and economic + sanctions against Argentina as a result of Argentina’s refusal to accept + the terms of UN Security Council + Resolution 502. With the cessation of hostilities in the South Atlantic + and the clear need for the United States to rebuild its relationships + within Latin America, it is appropriate now to rescind the suspension of + military exports to Argentina. This action would permit the delivery of + materiel required by the Argentine forces for operational and safety + purposes. It would not impact on the separate, more complex issue of + certification and would not directly threaten the UK operations in or near the Falkland + Islands.

+

2. (C) While it is clear that measures were necessary to express the + US Government’s displeasure over + Argentine actions in the Falklands, the measures should not be retained + to the detriment of broader US + interests. Additionally, for the following reasons, lifting the military + sanctions imposed on Argentina is in the interests of the US Government:

+

a. Economic sanctions, which consisted of the suspension of new + Export-Import Bank credits and guarantees and the suspension of + Commodity Credit Corporation guarantees, have been lifted.See Document + 375.

+ +

b. The United States would not be alone in resuming military deliveries. + France has recently lifted its ban on military exports, and it is + probable that Italy and the FRG will + soon follow.

+

c. It would send a positive signal to other Latin American countries + indicating that the United States places a high value on its + relationships with the region and on the defensive capabilities of + regional powers.

+

d. It would preempt any Soviet initiative in developing a military supply + relationship with Argentina.

+

e. It would enhance US influence with the + evolving new Argentine government by providing positive US control over military deliveries.

+

3. (C) Although US support for Great + Britain in the Falklands dispute was in harmony with longstanding US policy opposing the use of force for the + resolution of disputes, it is appropriate that the United States take a + positive step toward improving bilateral relations with Argentina. + Lifting the ban on export of military goods imposed on Argentina over 4 + months ago would demonstrate the desire of the United States to return + to the close relationship it enjoyed with Argentina prior to the + Falklands conflict, while respecting British concerns.

+

4. (U) The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that a memorandum, + substantially like that in the Annex,Attached but not printed. An attached undated correspondence + tracking sheet indicates: “Action closed with JCS by Telecon. No + written response required since requested SecDef memo to State was obviated + by State’s lifting of sanctions against Argentina on 24 + September.” be sent to the Secretary of State.

+

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

+ + James D. Watkins + Admiral, USN + Acting Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff + + +
+ +
+ + 396. Note From the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International + Security Affairs (West) to the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy + (Iklé)Source: Washington National Records + Center, OSD Files, FRC 330–84–0003, + Argentina (June–Sept) 1982. Confidential. A copy was sent to Major + General Smith. A stamped + notation on the note indicates that Weinberger saw it on September 27. + + + Washington, September + 24, 1982 + Fred— + +

State sent out a cable lifting (on 24 Sept.) the sanction on the FMS pipeline to Argentina.Attached but not printed is a copy of telegram + 265773 to Buenos Aires, September 21, which informed the Embassy + that it was authorized to inform the Argentine Government that the + United States intended to lift military sanctions against Argentina + effective September 24. Speakes announced at the September 28 White + House press briefing that the sanctions had been lifted. (“U.S. + Easing Curbs Against Argentina,” New York + Times, September 29, p. A12) No public announcement + is planned. State did not coordinate with us. I remonstrated. State + apologized, admitting the error. No calculated oversight was intended. + State was treating the action as routine because it had been discussed + for several months at various levels between our two buildings.

+ + Francis J. West, Jr.West initialed + “FJW”above his typed signature. + +
+ +
+ + 397. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the + United Nations and the Embassies in Argentina and the United + KingdomSource: Department + of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D820510–0519. Confidential; + Immediate; Exdis. Drafed by + N.S. Smith (ARA/SC); cleared by Adams, Wayne, and in S/S–O; approved by Enders. + + + Washington, October 2, 1982, 0413Z + +

278457. Subject: (U) Secretary’s Bilateral Meeting With Argentine Foreign + Minister, September 27, 1982. Ref: Secto 13008.Telegram Secto 13008, September 28, + transmitted to the Department and Buenos Aires the text of the + revised Argentine draft of the Falklands/Malvinas resolution given + to Shultz by Aguirre Lanari at their September + 27 meeting in New York. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy + File, D820500–0927)

+

1. C–Entire text.

+

2. The Secretary opened by recalling how much he had enjoyed several + visits to Argentina, a country which had impressed him greatly. + Aguirre Lanari also recalled + several prior visits to the U.S., particularly his first, as Vice + President of the Argentine Senate in 1964 to address the U.S. Congress. + Aguirre invited the Secretary to Buenos Aires and said he hoped to visit + the U.S. often in the future, but with less pressing and troubling + concerns than he had now. The Secretary replied that Aguirre was, had + been, and would be on very friendly territory whenever he visited the + United States. He asked Aguirre to tell him of his principal + concerns.

+

3. Aguirre said that Argentina, as a government and a nation, was deeply + preoccupied by the Malvinas war and its far reaching implications. The + focus was now on the UN. It was more + necessary than ever to ask the UN + Secretary General to help the parties sit down together to negotiate the + future status of the Malvinas. He was deeply gratified to have an + opportunity to exchange views with the Secretary and seek U.S. + collaboration in this effort. U.S. posture on this issue was of + particular importance, to Argentina and to many other countries. + Argentina recognized that the U.S. did not want to prejudge the + substantive question of ultimate sovereignty but he hoped the U.S. would + be able to support the Malvinas/Falklands resolution which had emerged + from consultation with many countries. Aguirre then gave the Secretary a + revised text of the Argentine draft resolution (reftel) pointing out the deletion from + the operative paragraphs of all references to past UNGA resolutions. With this deletion, he + said, he believed the United States should be able to support the + resolution, even with our concern that it not prejudge the question of + sovereignty. Aguirre said Argentina also hoped some West European states would vote for the + revised draft.

+

4. The Secretary received the text, saying the United States would study + it carefully and looked forward to getting back to the GOA and working together on the + resolution. The Secretary underlined the importance attached to assuring + that the resolution not prejudge sovereignty and, coming after a very + tense situation, not put too immediate time pressure on the negotiating + process.

+

5. The Secretary commented in this connection that the U.S. was pleased + the GOA had been able to reach an + understanding with the British Government on mutual lifting of financial + sanctions.On September 14, Argentina + accepted a U.K. proposal to mutually lift the economic sanctions. + (“Falkland Sanctions Removed,” New York + Times, September 15, p. D20) He understood U.S. Treasury + representatives had been helpful in this process. Aguirre nodded, saying + the contributions of U.S. Treasury representatives in the negotiations + had been very positive; their actions were widely known and appreciated + by the GOA.

+

6. Aguirre asked whether the Secretary had any reaction to the revised + text. The Secretary said he preferred to review the language carefully + prior to making specific comments. The Secretary then commented that he + had learned that often in such resolutions preambular sections were as + important as operative ones. In this case, references to NAM declarations seemed to have the effect + of prejudging the outcome of the sovereignty issue. Aguirre recognized + that possibility but pointed out that the United States could make a + formal declaration at the time of its vote, noting its non-acceptance of + sections of the preamble yet nonetheless voting for the resolution + because the operative paragraphs were consistent with the U.S. position. + In that way, he said, the U.S. vote would not be seen as prejudging the + sovereignty issue. The Secretary responded that in his experience + reservations did not count for much. In the end, what mattered was how + one voted. We would be happy to review the entire resolution and to + provide the GOA with our views on its + contents.

+

7. Aguirre thanked the Secretary, reiterating that Argentina had changed + the resolution to try to make it acceptable to the U.S. and that with + our long tradition of supporting negotiated solutions to threats to the + peace, U.S. support for the call to negotiate the Malvinas/Falklands + dispute was especially important. The Secretary replied that we always + favored negotiation as the way to solve problems instead of hostilities. + At the same time, if a resolution prejudged the issue it would not help + achieve those objectives. + He again assured Aguirre that we wanted to work with the GOA to find an acceptable resolution.Later revisions to the text placed the + question of the Falklands/Malvinas on the provisional agenda of the + 37th UNGA and deleted the detailed + listing of NAM resolutions. + Discussing this text with Garcia del + Solar on October 6, Enders informed him “in a blunt exchange, that the + U.S. has serious problems with the revised UN Falklands resolution.” (Telegram 283693 to Buenos + Aires and USUN, October 8; + Department of State, Bureau of European Affairs, United Kingdom + Political Files, Lot 89D489, Falklands—Telegrams 1982)

+

8. The Secretary commented that other issues were also highly important + to our relations with Argentina. Aguirre agreed but reiterated his view + that the UN resolution was indeed the + overriding issue for Argentina because of its profound impact on the + future of his country’s most basic institutions, on the military and the + body politic. The deep frustrations of Malvinas conflict could be + exploited by extremists, with historical consequences. Casualty rates + had been high; the Argentine people had suffered; the impact had been + traumatic. Success at reopening negotiations was essential to assuring + that this painful issue did not fester and do serious damage to the + country’s process of normalization and to its important relations with + traditional friends.

+

9. The Secretary said we had followed closely Argentina’s international + financial situation and were pleased to have been able to play a + constructive role in helping channel Argentina’s important debt + discussions in a positive manner.Argentina + was negotiating with the International Monetary Fund for a standby + loan after acknowledging that it could not meet its debt + payments. He was well aware of the underlying strength of the + Argentine economy and hoped that after all the recent turmoil, Argentina + would be able to retain its traditionally high standing in the + international financial community. Aguirre stated emphatically that + Argentina would assure its just debts were met, as it always had, and + the present troubles would not lead to a default. He said Argentina had + applied the same determination in fighting for the Malvinas, against + great odds, resisting the temptation to internationalize the conflict + (e.g. by turning to the Soviets); it would take a responsible attitude + also on the debt issue.

+

10. Argentina’s vote on the Puerto Rico issue at the UN came up several times during the + conversation.Reference is to + Argentina’s September 24 vote in favor of Cuba’s unsuccessful appeal + to the UNGA to place the issue of + Puerto Rican independence on the 37th + UNGA agenda. In telegram 271295 to + all diplomatic posts, September 25, the Department summarized the + voting. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, + D820498–0416) Ambassador Kirkpatrick made clear our displeasure with the + Argentine vote by quipping early that we would review Argentina’s + resolution on the Falklands more seriously than they had considered our + views on Puerto Rico. Aguirre initially responded that Argentina had + nothing to be ashamed of, but when the Secretary interjected on the merits, he quickly changed + focus. Aguirre said that while he had no doubt that any plebiscite in + Puerto Rico would demonstrate the popularity of some form of continued + association with the U.S., Argentina believed it had no choice but to + support “those who had gone to great lengths to support Argentina at its + time of need.” That did not mean Argentina would change its basic + ideological orientation. The Secretary replied that there had never been + a problem with Puerto Rico having an opportunity to express itself. The + Cuban resolution was nonsense. He wanted to record with Aguirre his + disappointment over Argentina’s vote on the issue. At the same time he + assured Aguirre that our review of the Falklands text would be a serious + one, based on its merits.

+

11. Aguirre noted ruefully that Argentine opinion was still highly + critical of the U.S. role in the Falklands dispute, so much so that some + would criticize him at home for the smiling photo of the Secretary and + himself, which had just been taken. It was important, however, that both + countries look to the future. Positive movement on the UN issue would strengthen the prospects for + democratic institutionalization which could still suffer a serious + reverse in Argentina. If the Argentine people could become convinced + that a serious process were under way on the Islands that would undercut + leftist extremists who would otherwise wrap themselves in the banner of + nationalism in order to take center stage in Argentine politics. The + Secretary said we very much wanted improved relations with Argentina and + had taken steps to demonstrate that. He recognized the importance of + containing extremism under difficult circumstances. He very much + appreciated the opportunity to exchange views with Aguirre and was + pleased that their photographs had been taken smiling together.

+

12. In a personal aside at the end of the meeting, the Secretary + expressed his sympathy for the families of Argentines killed or wounded + in the conflict. Aguirre expressed his appreciation. Aguirre also + stressed that Argentina would continue to meet its international + obligations and specifically would welcome foreign capital participation + in its development.

+ + Dam + +
+ +
+ + 398. Telegram From Secretary of State Shultz to the Department of State and the Embassy in the + United KingdomSource: + Department of State, Executive Secretariat, Secretary Shultz Memoranda of Conversation, + Lot 87D327, Secretary Shultz—Memcons + September 1982. Confidential; Immediate; Exdis. Sent for information Immediate to Buenos Aires + and Mexico City. Drafted by Pendleton; cleared by Burt, Wayne, and Johnston; approved by Shultz. + + + New York, September 29, 1982, 1800Z + +

Secto 13019. Subject: (U) Secretary’s + Sept. 28 UNGA Bilateral With UK Foreign Secretary Pym: The Falklands.

+

1. (C–Entire text).

+

2. Summary: During his Sept. 28 bilateral breakfast with the Secretary on + the margins of the UNGA, Pym rehearsed British objections to an + UNGA resolution on the Falklands + in familiar but forcefully animated terms. Pym asked for help in encouraging the Argentines to + agree to a formal end to hostilities and said the UK could see no point in discussing a + resolution for the immediate future. Now is not the time to talk with + the Argentines about the long term, he argued. The Secretary told + Pym that it is difficult for + the U.S. to oppose a moderate resolution that does not prejudge the + sovereignty issue or set an unrealistic deadline for negotiations. End + summary.

+

3. The Secretary informed Pym that + he had met the previous day with the Argentine Foreign Minister.See Document + 397. A resolution on the Falklands that prejudges the + sovereignty issue or sets an unrealistic deadline will not have U.S. + support, the Secretary said. It is, however, difficult for the U.S. to + oppose a moderate resolution that does not prejudge the sovereignty + issue. We had, he added, held up at British request our decision to + reopen the small pipeline of FMS sales + to Argentina until after the EC + Ministers met on September 20–21.

+

4. Pym said the UK does not know what the Argentine + resolution will say. The UK is + attempting to normalize relations with Argentina, but is finding it + difficult to do so. The key point is that Buenos Aires has not yet ended + hostilities. UK soldiers and sailors + continue to be at risk. Mines remain in and around Port Stanley. The + scars have to heal, and the UK is asking + all its friends to use their influence to convince Argentina formally to + end hostilities. In the meantime, the idea of talking about a resolution + has no appeal. Perhaps prospects will be better in a year. Pym added that he hoped we could not be + faced with a waffling resolution that the U.S. thinks it could support. + It would be better to have one that is clear cut and vote on it as + such.

+ +

5. Ambassador Kirkpatrick + observed that changes in the Argentine draft had been made the previous + day. The preambular material is particularly bad. The Secretary observed + that the Argentines appear to be aiming at a resolution with an + operative paragraph that does not prejudge but with preambular material + that does. Pym interjected that + the UNGA resolution effort is an + Argentine smokescreen. The weak Argentine Government is attempting to + use it for domestic purposes. There is no way the UK can go along until there is a better + atmosphere between the two countries and the mines are picked up. In + Latin America there is some support for the Argentine resolution because + of Latin solidarity. Pym repeated + that there is no way the UK can delude + itself into agreeing with any resolution, even one that does not + prejudge the sovereignty issue. To do so would be an illusion of the + kind that Perez de Cuellar had written about in his report.Presumably the report that Pérez de Cuéllar submitted to the + Security Council on June 2 in response to Resolution 502. See Yearbook of the United Nations, 1982, p. + 1335.

+

6. Pym said the UK is more than willing to talk with the + Argentines, but now is not the time to talk about the long term. What + about the rights of the Islanders, he asked. UK + PermRep + Thompson said he had been + surprised by the extent of the sympathy the UK had received for its position, especially from the + African delegates. A clear majority is on the UK side. There may be a great deal of discussion and + debate, but in the end Argentina will come down to saying the dispute is + over sovereignty. However, many African, Caribbean and Asian + representatives will see it as a dispute over the future of a + people.

+

7. The Secretary reiterated that the US + supports the principle the UK fought for + in the Falklands war, to which Pym said he wondered how far back one must go to unroll + history—to the incorporation of Texas into the U.S.? The Latin Americans + didn’t do anything to support Argentina for a century and a half, he + said. The meeting ended with Ambassador Kirkpatrick noting that Venezuela has now asked Perez de + Cuellar to mediate the Guyana-Venezuela border dispute.

+

8. Also present at the meeting were: UK + Ambassador Wright, UK + PermRep + Thompson, FCO Political Director Bullard, Private Secretary Fall. U.S.: Ambassador Kirkpatrick, Under Secretary Eagleburger, EUR Assistant Secretary designate Burt and EUR/NE Deputy Director Pendleton (notetaker).

+ + Shultz + +
+ +
+ + 399. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of Defense for + International Security Policy (Perle) to Secretary of Defense Weinberger and the Deputy Secretary of + Defense (Carlucci)Source: Washington National Records + Center, OSD Files, FRC 330–84–0004, + UK (1 Oct–31 Dec 82) 1982. + Secret. Sent through Iklé. + Stamped notations at the top of the memorandum indicate that + Weinberger and Carlucci saw it on October + 4. + + + I–24529/82 + + + Washington, October + 1, 1982 + + + SUBJECT + Negotiations for Transfer of F–4 + Aircraft to UK (S)—ACTION + MEMORANDUM + +

(S) We have completed staff talks on the British request for 15 U.S. Navy + F–4 aircraft. The request derived + from a UK requirement to deploy F–4s to the Falkland Islands. The British + can only do so if they draw down their own British based forces; the + U.S. Navy F–4s are intended to serve as + a backfill. Concurrently, the Secretary of the Navy expressed a strong + desire to obtain a number of UK + Hawks to serve as pilot trainers for + the VTXTS program.

+

(S) The U.S. and UK teams reached + agreement ad referendum, that:

+

—(S) The United Kingdom will purchase 15 F–4J aircraft, subject to the ability of the U.S. Navy to + upgrade the radars currently on those aircraft from an AWG–10 to an AWG–10A variant. The upgrade is necessary for UK operations; without it the agreement + will have to be revised. In addition, the U.S. Navy has undertaken to + satisfy the UK that the United States + can provide 18 months spares support for the upgraded F–4Js; that is, until a logistics line can + be fully established.

+

—(S) The United Kingdom formally requested price and availability + information on the aircraft, and will reply to DOD in three weeks time as to whether the upgrade is + satisfactory. At that point the U.S. will furnish the UK with a letter of offer.

+

—(S) The cost of the F–4s could exceed + $14 million; should that be the case, the DOD will inform the Congress of the sale at the earliest + possible time. Thus, the letter of offer will not necessarily be delayed + by Congressional action.

+

—(S) The United States will lease, at fair market value, 12 British + Hawk aircraft for a period of 3 to + 5 years. The actual period of the lease, and the costs associated with + the lease, are to be developed by the UK + in the next few weeks.

+

—(S) The F–4 sale is not contingent on + the Hawk lease. The Hawk lease is contingent upon the F–4 sale, however.

+ +

—(S) The three week period required for the UK response should provide us with sufficient time to + assess UK support for our positions at + COCOM and, if necessary, to + review the terms of the above agreement should that support be less + forthcoming than we anticipate.An unknown + hand, likely Weinberger, + crossed out the word “anticipate” and wrote the words “were given to + believe” in the left-hand margin. Specifically, we would like + support for the creation of a military subcommittee in COCOM, for tightening the COCOM net, for action on silicon, and + for immediately providing additional funding for strengthening COCOM (whose total budget is only + $200,000).Weinberger initialed his approval on October + 4.

+ Richard N. + PerlePerle signed “Richard Perle” above his typed + signature. +
+ +
+ 400. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security + Affairs (Clark) to President + ReaganSource: Reagan Library, Roger W. Fontaine Files, Argentina + (October 1982–December 1982). Secret. Sent for information. + Reagan initialed at the + top right-hand corner of the memorandum. A notation on the + memorandum also indicates that Reagan saw it. + + + Washington, October + 5, 1982 + + + SUBJECT + Argentina’s Nuclear Policies After Falklands + +

Issue

+

The intelligence community has examined Argentina’s capability and + intention to manufacture nuclear weapons after its defeat in the + Falklands.

+

Facts

+

A Special National Intelligence Estimate (SNIE) reviews Argentina’s + technical capabilities for developing nuclear explosives and presents + three scenarios that could lead to production of plutonium in the years + 1986–88.See Document 391. It also assesses the impact on the + Argentine nuclear program of + the political disarray and economic stress that have resulted from the + Falklands defeat.

+

Discussion

+

The defeat’s immediate impact on Buenos Aires’ nuclear program has had + two effects. First, it has increased the desire to develop a nuclear + weapons option. But, second, it has reduced Argentina’s capability to + carry out that objective politically and economically—at least for the + short term. Nevertheless, the SNIE reports the Argentine government will + still be capable of building at least a crude nuclear device by the end + of the decade. The historical momentum of the 32 year Argentine nuclear + development program, despite recurrent crises, strongly supports this + conclusion. Meanwhile, Argentina may be susceptible to outside pressures + because of its need for external resources. U.S. leverage is very + limited in this regard and, moreover, Argentina’s susceptibility to any + foreign pressures will decline as Argentina moves closer to nuclear + self-sufficiency.

+

For Argentina to develop and—more importantly—to test a nuclear weapon + would, however, raise tensions considerably in the region. Such a test + would alienate the major South American states, including those now + friendly to Argentina (Brazil, Peru, and Venezuela). Moreover, it is + virtually certain that Brazil would soon match Argentina’s capability + and that a nuclear arms race with that country would prove likely and + costly.

+

At your request, the Special National Intelligence Estimate is available + for your review.Reagan initialed that he wished to + review the Estimate.

+
+ +
+ + 401. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassies in + Argentina and the United KingdomSource: Department of State, Bureau of European + Affairs, United Kingdom Political Files, Lot 89D489, + Falklands—Telegrams 1982. Secret; Priority. Sent for information to + the Department of Defense, USSOUTHCOM, and the Defense Intelligence Agency. + Drafted by C.S. Shapiro (ARA/RPP); cleared by Bosworth, Raphel, D.W. Cox (ARA/RPP), K. + Smith (EUR/NE), + S. Smith (ARA/SC), R. Wharton (INR/IC/CD), C. Brown (DOD/ISA/IA), and McManaway; approved by Eagleburger. + + + Washington, October 9, 1982, 0403Z + +

285386. Joint State/Defense message. Subject: Resumption of Military + Intelligence Exchange With Argentina. Ref: (A) State 247107 DTG 020416Z Sep 82;In telegram 247107 to Buenos Aires, September 2, + the Departments of State and Defense jointly informed the Embassy + that the Department of State and [text not + declassified] “which was interrupted by the outbreak of + hostilities with the United Kingdom.” (Department of State, Central + Foreign Policy File, D820455–0839) (B) Buenos Aires 5222 + DTG 091546Z Sep 82;In telegram 5222 from Buenos Aires, September 9, + Shlaudeman advised: + “Given the sensitivities involved, I think it would be best to defer + approaching the British on this issue [resumption of intelligence + sharing] until the dust settles after the removal of our hold on the + small FMS pipeline.” (Department of + State, Central Foreign Policy File, D820467–0050) (C) London + 19432 DTG 031700Z Sep 82.In telegram 19432 from London, September 3, the + Embassy recommended: “If we are going to make commitments to resume + [text not declassified]” with Argentina, + “we should talk to the British first. They will want to know that + such an exchange can be handled in a way that does not threaten the + British military position in the South Atlantic.” (Department of + State, Central Foreign Policy File, D820460–0818)

+

1. S–Entire text.

+

2. For Buenos Aires: [less than 1 line not + declassified] is authorized to resume the military intelligence + exchange with Argentina, under terms of National Disclosure Policy–One + (NDP–1)NDP–1 established policies and + procedures for the disclosure of classified U.S. military + information to foreign governments and international organizations, + pursuant to National Security Decision Memorandum 119, “Disclosure + of Classified United States Military Information to Foreign + Governments and International Organizations,” July 20, 1971. + when the Ambassador deems it appropriate and with the Ambassador’s + approval of each exchange. Please advise when exchange is + reinitiated.

+

3. For London: At your discretion, [less than 1 line + not declassified] that we intend to resume our military + intelligence exchange with the Argentines. The intelligence exchange + will consist as in the past primarily of items drawn from [less than 1 line not declassified] intelligence + summary dealing with Soviet activities in the Western Hemisphere, as + well as information on Cuba and Nicaragua. Under the terms of NDP–1, Argentina is not authorized to + receive information on non-Communist governments unless a specific determination has + been made that such a disclosure will result in significant benefit to + US objectives. FYI: Exceptions to + NDP–1 must be approved at the + inter-agency level in Washington.

+ + Dam + +
+ +
+ 402. Action Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for + Inter-American Affairs (Enders), + the Assistant Secretary of State-Designate for European Affairs + (Burt), and the Assistant + Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs (Newell) to Secretary of State + ShultzSource: Department of State, Central + Foreign Policy File, P820159–1853. Confidential. Sent through + Eagleburger. Drafted by + R.B. Howard (ARA/SC) on October + 8; cleared by M. Kozak + (L). + + + Washington, October + 14, 1982 + + + SUBJECT + U.S. Position on the Draft Argentine Resolution + on the Falklands + +

Issue for Decision

+

How should we respond to the latest Argentine draft resolution on the + Falklands in a manner that: (a) is consistent with the USG position, which you outlined to + Foreign Minister Aguirre Lanari, + and (b) enhances prospects for a moderate UN resolution, which may help promote a peaceful settlement + of this conflict.

+

Essential Factors

+

During your bilateral meeting at the United Nations with Argentine + Foreign Minister Aguirre Lanari + on September 27,See Document 397. you underlined the USG position that any resolution not + prejudge sovereignty or put immediate time pressure on the negotiating + process. You informed Aguirre that the USG would study carefully the text of Argentina’s draft + Falklands resolution and provide our views. You noted that the + preambular sections of resolutions were often important. In the case of + the Argentine draft, you specifically noted that references to + Non-Aligned declarations seemed to have the effect of prejudging the + outcome of the sovereignty issue. Since your meeting, we have received + a revised draft of the + Argentine resolution (Tab A).Attached but + not printed is a copy of telegram 2731 from USUN, October 5. It still + contains objectionable material. We could not support it in its present + form. In a subsequent meeting with Argentine Ambassador Garcia del Solar, Assistant Secretary + Enders engaged in a more + detailed discussion regarding our problems with the current Argentine + draft, noting that we would provide an official response after you had + reviewed the issue (Tab B).Attached but not + printed is telegram 283693 to Buenos Aires and USUN, October 8. Also, see footnote 4, Document 397.

+

We have prepared the attached USG + response to the Argentine draft (Tab C) to be delivered to the Argentine + Ambassador here.Attached but not printed is + the undated text of the U.S. response. The Department transmitted + the text in telegram 301044 to Buenos Aires, USUN, and London, October 26. See + footnote 2, Document 404. + The response notes that concerns have been expressed regarding both the + preambular and operative sections which would impede broad support for + the resolution and jeopardize the possibility of initiating a process of + peaceful settlement. It states that the current preambular references to + statements and communiques of the Non-Aligned Movement should be + eliminated. It makes three additional points:

+

—That it would be advisable to remove pejorative references in the + preamble to colonialism.

+

—That the recalling of prior UNGA + resolutions in the preambular section, while consistent with usual + UN practice, does not advance + building a consensus given the contentious nature of the cited + documents.

+

—That the reference to “sovereignty” in the first operative paragraph of + the draft is unnecessary given the self-evident nature of the dispute + and counter-productive in terms of resuming the process of + negotiation.

+

The proposed reply, while outlining our objections to the current + Argentine draft, is consistent with the policy we have stated regarding + the conditions for U.S. support of a resolution (Tab D).Attached but not printed is an excerpt from + telegram 244710 to multiple posts, August 31. It, therefore, + concludes with a statement that the USG + is prepared to support a resolution calling for negotiations, so long as + it does not prejudge the question of sovereignty or impose an + unrealistic deadline for negotiation.

+

RECOMMENDATION:

+

That you authorize the response attached at TAB C.Bremer + initialed approval of the recommendation on behalf of Eagleburger, October 26, and added + the following notation: “as amended by LSE instructions.”

+
+ +
+ + 403. Message From British Prime Minister Thatcher to President ReaganSource: + Reagan Library, Roger W. + Fontaine Files, [Falklands 11/01/1982–11/14/1982]. + Confidential. Wright sent + the message to Clark under + an October 26 covering note. (Ibid.) Printed from a copy found + attached to Document 405. + + + London, October 25, + 1982 + +

Begins

+

We are now approaching a debate on the Falklands at the United Nations + General Assembly with the vote expected on 4 November. This is, as you + will appreciate, of considerable importance to us and I wanted to let + you know personally how strongly we feel about it.

+

The Argentine draftSee footnote 4, Document 397. is + wholly unacceptable to the British Government and to the British people. + It suggests that the maintenance of the present status of the Islands is + a threat to world peace and must be ended whatever the people of the + Islands may want: it recalls three earlier Argentine-inspired + resolutions which were unacceptable to us and which the United States + also declined to support: it refers to pronouncements of the Non-Aligned + Movement which prejudged the dispute in Argentina’s favour and dismissed + the legitimate rights of the inhabitants of the Islands: and it calls + upon us to resume negotiations.

+

Negotiations were of course in progress earlier this yearSee Document 11. + when Argentina launched her military assault on the Islands without + provocation or warning. Argentina subsequently ignored the appeals and + instructions of the Security Council. Her action was widely condemned as + a breach of the most important provisions of the UN Charter.

+

I am sure that you will understand how offensive it is to us that + Argentina now comes before the General Assembly to seek a resumption of + the negotiations which she herself broke off. The hypocrisy of this + approach is shown up by the determination of the authorities in Buenos + Aires (whatever their spokesman may say in New York) to keep open the + option of a resumption of hostilities. Moreover it is clear that + Argentina still contemplates only one possible outcome to negotiations + with Britain—the transfer of the Islands to Argentina in defiance of the + wishes of the people. To support her in the coming debate would be to + encourage her in this unprincipled ambition and thus to set back the + cause of peace. There can be no resolution of this issue until there is + a fundamental change of heart on the part of Argentina. You will + understand our insistence that the principles of the United Nations + Charter, including those of self-determination and the non-use of force, are as applicable + to this as to other international problems.

+

We have deeply appreciated the great help and understanding which we have + received from the USA since the crisis + burst upon us at the beginning of April. I now ask for your help once + more in supporting us in the vote on the resolution at the United + Nations.

+

Ends.

+
+ +
+ 404. Action Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for + Inter-American Affairs (Enders), + the Assistant Secretary of State-Designate for European Affairs + (Burt), and the Assistant + Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs (Newell) to Secretary of State + ShultzSource: Department of State, Central + Foreign Policy File, P890116–0020. Secret; Exdis. Sent through Eagleburger. Drafted by N.S. Smith on October 27; cleared + by M. Kozak. Neither + Smith nor Kozak initialed the + memorandum. + + + Washington, October + 28, 1982 + + + SUBJECT + U.S. Position on Falklands + Resolution + +

Issue for Decision

+

Whether we should vote for a modified Argentine UN resolution on the Falklands.

+

Essential Factors

+

On October 25, we communicated to the Argentines our approved position on + the UN Falklands Resolution (Tab + 1).Attached at Tab 1 but not printed is + telegram 301044 to Buenos Aires, USUN, and London, October 26, which summarized + Enders’s October 25 + meeting with Garcia del + Solar at which Enders presented the U.S. position approved in Document 402. They responded October + 27 in two separate channels. Foreign Minister Aguirre Lanari told Ambassador + Shlaudeman that Argentina + would eliminate all references to the Non-Aligned Movement if we would + commit ourselves to vote for the resolution (Tab 2).Attached at Tab 2 but not printed is telegram 6146 + from Buenos Aires, October 27, in which Shlaudeman related an exchange with Aguirre Lanarri + on the UN resolution at a social + occasion the previous evening. This change would remove the + draft language which clearly + prejudged the sovereignty issue, thus meeting one of our two key + requirements (see Tab 3).Attached at Tab 3 + but not printed is the text of the new Argentine draft of the + resolution as revised October 27, an undated legal analysis of the + draft produced by Gudgeon, + and an undated position paper on the draft produced in EUR. Meanwhile, the Argentine + Ambassador here, under instructions, offered to drop the offensive term + “colonialism” from the preamble, substituting the more neutral phrase + “colonial situations.” Other changes he offered were less important (see + Tab 3 and Tab 4).Attached at Tab 4 but not + printed is telegram 302505 to Buenos Aires, USUN, and London, October 27, + detailing the proposed changes to the draft resolution which were + made by Garcia del Solar and + incorporated into the revised text at Tab 3.

+

L believes that the amended Argentine draft + resolution is sufficiently flexible that it need not be interpreted in a + manner that is legally prejudicial to the position of either party to + the dispute. This does not, of course, preclude the possibility that the + UK may argue that such a legal + prejudice exists. At the same time, Argentina will obviously give the + preambular and operative paragraphs together an interpretation + consistent with its own objectives.

+

If Argentina is definitely prepared to make these two changes, ARA believes it + will have complied with the essential elements of our position. The + resolution as now drafted clearly commands a UN majority. Moreover, recent reporting indicates that most + of Britain’s EC partners and Canada also + tend toward voting in favor of a modified resolution (Tab 5).Attached at Tab 5 but not printed is telegram 7840 + from Copenhagen, October 22, which summarized the discussion of the + Falklands/Malvinas at the October 16–17 EC Foreign Ministers meeting in Denmark; and telegram + 6078 from Buenos Aires, October 25, which relayed draft language for + the resolution developed by the Canadians. The Argentines + view it as a key to our future relations and would react very negatively + to our failure to support a moderate resolution. Moreover, a U.S. vote + to abstain on such a resolution would isolate us from most of Latin + America and signal—shortly before the President’s trip to the + regionReagan traveled to Brazil, Colombia, Costa Rica, and + Honduras November 30–December 4.—that we attach primacy to + our relations with the UK over those + with Latin America. Thus, ARA strongly + recommends that we now inform the Argentines we will support the + resolution as modified. A cable of instructions is attached at Tab + 6.Attached at Tab 6 but not printed is + a draft telegram, which N.S. + Smith drafted on October 27.

+

EUR believes that + the Argentine changes, while welcome, do not go far enough to warrant + US support for the resolution. It is + irrelevant whether “colonialism” or “colonial situations” is used. The + Argentines are using the language to refer to the Falkland situation + because it has come to project an image of illegality, force, or denial + of political freedom. EUR believes that our objection to + prejudging the question of negotiation + (sovereignty) has not been addressed by the Argentines, nor has the + issue of references to earlier UN + resolutions not supported by the US. + Therefore, EUR insists that the + specific references to sovereignty as the subject of negotiations and to + earlier UNGA resolutions and the use + of the words “colonial situation” demonstrate that the resolution is + still not sufficiently balanced in political terms for the US to support over the strong objections of + HMG (Mrs. Thatcher has just sent an appeal to + the President for support on this issue; see Tab 7).Attached at Tab 7 but not printed is the text of + Thatcher’s October 25 + message to Reagan. See Document 403.

+

At a time when our relations with our closest ally and vital defense + partner are seriously strained, EUR + believes we should not bend to the Argentine wish to put the British on + the defensive politically on an issue which cost them so much in terms + of lives and fortune. We know the resolution, even if passed with a + large majority, will not advance the cause of reconciliation between + Britain and Argentina. Nor will it bring about early negotiations. In + fact, it will have the opposite effect. EUR welcomes the Argentine changes, but they simply do not + go far enough to warrant voting against the British.

+

Ambassador Kirkpatrick, despite great exasperation with + Argentine behavior in the UN, feels + strongly that we should vote for the resolution as now amended. + Stressing that this question is a major concern to all Latin American + countries (virtually all their foreign ministers have spoken directly to + her), she believes our vote will be seen not as a vote for Argentina but + as a vote for Latin America—an action which would demonstrate U.S. + concern for and solidarity with this hemisphere. She notes a vote in + favor of the resolution as now amended would not derogate from the two + preconditions we have laid down from the outset.

+

Although the current resolution is somewhat prejudicial in political + terms against the UK, IO considers it basically + “neutral” from the UN legal and + procedural angle—and IO supports + Ambassador Kirkpatrick’s + position. IO also believes it is vital + that we inform the UK of our position at + the same time as we tell Argentina.

+

“Self-Determination” Issue: + IO also believes we should be prepared + to vote for a reference to self-determination if the UK seeks to insert this into the text in + accordance with its position that this must be an important element in + accomplishing a resolution to the dispute. ARA and L point out that this is a very complex issue, + which was a central component + of Secretary Haig’s mediation + effort (see Tab 8).Attached at Tab 8 but + not printed are two memoranda drafted by Gudgeon on October 28 and May 10 + analyzing the applicability of the concept of self-determination to + the Falklands/Malvinas.. It would be necessary to be sure + that the text of the particular amendment in question did not prejudge + the sovereignty issue—either for Argentina or for the UK. The bureaus concerned will submit a + full analysis of this issue for your consideration prior to our having + to vote on any self-determination amendment.

+

RECOMMENDATIONS:Shultz neither approved nor disapproved the two + recommendations. Below the recommendations, Bremer wrote on October 29: + “Secretary wants a SecPres [i.e., a memorandum from the Secretary to + the President] to address proposed course of action. LPB.” On + October 29, Eagleburger sent + a memorandum to Shultz + expressing his agreement with the recommendation to support the + Argentine resolution. At the end of the memorandum, Eagleburger wrote: “G.S.—This is a + close call and will cause problems no + matter which way we come out. If you agree with ARA and me that we should support the + Argentines if the changes are made, there is still a strong chance + that the Pres. will want to + support Thatcher. LSE.” A stamped notation at the top of + Eagleburger’s memorandum + indicates that Shultz saw + it. (Department of State, Bureau of European Affairs, United Kingdom + Political Files, Lot 89D489 Falklands—Memos/Letters/Press 1982) For + Shultz’s October 30 + memorandum to Reagan, see + Document 405.

+

1. That you authorize us to inform the Government of Argentina that we + will support the resolution as modified (ARA and IO favor).

+

2. Alternatively, that you authorize us to inform + the GOA that we will support the + resolution as modified, provided the words “colonial situation”, + “sovereignty” and references to earlier UN resolutions are dropped. Otherwise, that we will abstain + (EUR favors).

+
+ +
+ + 405. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security + Affairs (Clark) to President + ReaganSource: Reagan Library, Roger W. Fontaine Files, + [Falklands Nov 1–November 14, 1982]. Confidential. Sent for action. + Drafted by Fontaine. + McFarlane initialed the + memorandum on behalf of Clark. McFarlane also drew an arrow from his initials to + the top right-hand corner of the memorandum and wrote “Fontaine.” + + + Washington, November + 1, 1982 + + + SUBJECT + Secretary Shultz’s Memo on + the U.N. Falkland Resolution + +

Issue

+

Secretary Shultz has sent you a + memorandum (Tab C) recommending we support an Argentine-sponsored U.N. + resolution calling for negotiations to resolve the Falkland Islands + dispute.

+

Facts

+

The resolution, which has wide Latin American support,In telegram 3119 from USUN, October 29, the Mission reported that on October + 28, representatives of the Governments of Peru, Argentina, Mexico, + Ecuador, and Brazil met with Kirkpatrick, on behalf of the UN resolution’s 20 Latin American + sponsors, “to request (A) A U.S. vote in favor of the Falklands + resolution, (B) U.S. good offices to persuade the British to forego + amendments and keep the parliamentary situation in the UNGA Plenary as simple as possible.” + The Mission also summarized the conversation that followed: “They + explained and emphasized their conviction that the U.S. vote would + have a large effect in healing or exacerbating U.S relations with + Latin America. Amb. Kirkpatrick assured them she understood their views + but noted that the U.S. position was not yet decided; and said she + had found the British to be strongly opposed to any resolution that + proposes negotiations. The Ambassador stated that, while she would + be very happy to raise the Latin concerns with the British, she was + not optimistic that we would have any influence.” (Department of + State, Central Foreign Policy File, D820562–0058) will be + voted on at the U.N. next week. Our support for any such resolution has + been contingent on its being moderate in tone and not prejudging the + outcome. The Argentine Foreign Minister has now accepted our key + demands.Garcia del Solar presented to Bosworth on October 30 a revised + text of the resolution that omitted “offensive language on + colonialism,” as well as “objectionable references to the + Non-Aligned Movement declarations,” and added three new paragraphs + on the cessation of hostilities, non-use of force, and the interests + of the Islanders. The changes were transmitted by the Department in + telegram 306086 to USUN, Buenos + Aires, and London, October 31. (Department of State, Central Foreign + Policy File, D820563–0810) Although the British will be + disappointed with a U.S. vote favoring any resolution, Secretary + Shultz believes US-UK + cooperation in other areas will not be affected.

+ +

Discussion

+

A favorable vote will greatly help our relations with Argentina, which + were strained nearly to the breaking point during the South Atlantic war + last spring. The Argentine government, in fact, has made such a U.S. + vote a sine qua non to improved relations. At the + same time, Buenos Aires after extensive negotiations with us has + softened considerably the original language of the resolution. (The text + remains in flux;Kirkpatrick received a revised + text, prepared by the representatives of Argentina, Peru, Brazil, + Ecuador, Mexico, and Cuba, and forwarded it to Shultz, Eagleburger, Enders, Newell, and Clark in telegram 3152 from USUN, November 1. (Department of + State, Central Foreign Policy File, D820565–0397) a copy will + be provided once it becomes firm.)

+

Moreover, a supporting U.S. vote would also do much to improve relations + with other Latin American Governments who felt, despite Argentina’s + aggression, that the U.S. reverted to form by favoring Europe over the + Americas. Our vote would significantly help to dispel that suspicion—a + development especially welcome on the eve of your visit to Latin + America.

+

The British Government, Mrs. Thatcher in particular, will not welcome this U.S. vote + despite the considerably softer tone of the resolution. Indeed, Mrs. + Thatcher may telephone you + in the next few days to register her concern as a follow-up to her + message to you dated October 25 (Tab B).Printed as Document 403.

+

The newly worded resolution calls for negotiations, but does not set a + date for their beginning nor does it prejudge the question of + sovereignty. It thus falls well within our principle favoring peaceful + resolutions of disputes.

+

I therefore concur with Secretary Shultz that we should support a moderately worded U.N. + resolution on the Falkland Islands despite anticipated British + objections.

+

RecommendationsBoth + recommendations were marked as approved. Below the second + recommendation, McFarlane + wrote: “Left with Pres 11/1.” In telegram 306937 to USUN, November 2, the Department + authorized Kirkpatrick to + inform Aguirre Lanari, the + Latin American co-sponsors, and others “as appropriate” that the + United States was prepared to vote for the resolution as modified on + October 30. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, + D820566–0031)

+

That you approve Secretary Shultz’s recommendation favoring the upcoming + Argentine-sponsored resolution on the Falkland Islands subject to final + review of the text.

+ +

That you use the talking points attached at Tab AAttached but not printed. for your use in + the event Prime Minister Thatcher calls you to discuss the question. (A + replySee Document + 407. to her message is being staffed + separately.)

+

Tab C

+

Memorandum From Secretary of State Shultz to President ReaganConfidential.

+

Washington, October 30, 1982

+ + SUBJECT + U.N. Falklands Resolution + +

Argentina and Great Britain have both been lobbying hard for our vote in + the U.N. next week on the Falklands. The resolution, sponsored by 20 + Latin American countries, asks both sides to try to resolve their + dispute through negotiations. The resolution now has a comfortable + majority. The British nevertheless have made it clear that they do not + intend to negotiate in the near future. This has put Canada, Britain’s + EC partners and us on the spot. We + want to support an ally who was the victim of aggression, but it is + difficult, legally and politically, to vote against peaceful + negotiations.

+

For many in Latin America, this vote is a key test of our future attitude + toward them. Even an abstention would create great resentment in the + area. We have been under heavy fire since the Falklands for “favoring + Europe” over this Hemisphere. On the eve of your visit there, we want to + demonstrate our deep interest in and solidarity with the Americas.

+

We have told Argentina and Britain that we would not support a resolution + that prejudged the outcome of negotiations or set an unrealistic + timetable. We also warned the Argentines that we could not support a + resolution loaded with anti-colonialist rhetoric. The Argentine Foreign + Minister has now agreed to our key demands. The Foreign Minister still + has to sell the more moderate proposal to the military junta and the + other Latin sponsors, but it is probably an acceptable package.

+

It is a close call, but I believe we should support the + Argentine-sponsored resolution. There is no doubt Mrs. Thatcher will be displeased, but I do not think this will + affect U.S./British cooperation in other areas, such as the pipeline + sanctions question. We understand that Canada and most of the other + EC countries now intend to take + positions similar to ours.

+

RECOMMENDATION:

+

I recommend we inform the Argentines that we can support the resolution + they sponsor, with the modifications to which the Argentine Foreign + Minister agreed.The recommendation was + neither approved nor disapproved.

+
+ +
+ 406. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the + United KingdomSource: Reagan + Library, Dennis C. Blair + Files, United Kingdom 1982 (10/04/1982–11/01/1982). Secret; Niact Immediate; Nodis. Sent for information + Immediate to Buenos Aires and USUN. Printed from a copy that was received in the White + House Situation Room. Drafted from White House text; cleared in + substance by Smith (ARA) and by Bremer, Sherman, and Binns; approved by Blackwill. (Department of State, + Central Foreign Policy File, N820008–0633) + + + Washington, November 1, 1982, 2006Z + +

306409. Subject: Message to the Prime Minister From the President on + UNGA Falklands Resolution.

+

1. Secret–Entire text.

+

2. Embassy is requested to deliver today, November 1, the following + message from the President to Prime Minister Thatcher. There will be no signed + original.

+

Begin text:

+

Dear Margaret:

+

I have given careful consideration to the issues raised by your letter of + October 25.See Document + 403. I understand the importance to you of the + United Nations resolution on the Falklands, and appreciate your + concerns.

+

When we were first approached by the Argentine representatives on their + proposed resolution, we made very clear our objection to much of its + content. They were the same objections which your letter identifies.See Document 403. We emphasized + that the United States could not accept any resolution which prejudged + the questions of sovereignty or the outcome of any negotiation. We + further stressed that we could not support any resolution with + unrealistic deadlines on negotiations or other processes of peaceful + settlement.

+

Argentina, however, now proposes to delete references to the Non-Aligned + Movement’s communiques which specifically prejudge the question of + sovereignty, to reaffirm expressly principles of the UN Charter concerning non-use of force in + international relations, and to make other changes which make the + resolution more moderate.See footnote 3, Document 405. While + the revised version suggests negotiations at an earlier rather than + later date, we do not consider this to be a strict deadline. We conclude + that the resolution in its revised form does not legally prejudice the + position of either party in the dispute.

+

The United Kingdom is justifiably concerned that there was no reference + to the recent hostilities or to self-determination in the resolution. + The most recent revisions to the draft expressly refer to the cessation + of hostilities and the intention of the parties not to renew them, + coupled with reaffirmation of the principles of non-use of force and + peaceful resolution of disputes. The United States assumes that any + negotiations undertaken by the United Kingdom and Argentina would + necessarily take into account the views of the Falkland Islanders. The + reference to Resolution 1514 of the General Assembly underscores the + principle of self-determination, and the revised draft now expressly + refers to the necessity of taking the interests of the Islanders into + account.

+

Our support for your position during the hostilities was based on our + strong belief that disputes between countries should be resolved + peacefully and in accordance with the purposes and principles of the + United Nations Charter. We continue to hold that belief and support your + position that any solution to the problem must be accomplished in the + context of all relevant elements of the UN Charter. We do not believe, however, that the + resolution, as currently written, prejudices that position and consider + that it is moderately positive in reaffirming the fundamental + obligations of the Charter concerning the non-use of force. For these + reasons we believe it reasonable now to vote for the substantially + modified resolution.

+

We understand your reluctance to enter into negotiations when loss of + life remains fresh in everyone’s mind. We can appreciate your desire for + a cooling off period and more concrete evidence from Argentina that it will not resort again to + further use of force. Nevertheless, we believe it is important that the + options of negotiations or other means of peaceful settlement not be + foreclosed, particularly in light of the fact that the Government of + Argentina now suggesting negotiations is a different one from the one + which launched the aggression.

+

Margaret, I know how you have anguished over this conflict from the + beginning. Your courage and leadership throughout have been a source of + deep personal inspiration to me. I count it as a privilege to have been + able to support you and Britain at this critical moment. You may be + absolutely confident that I would do it all again the same way.

+

Sincerely, /S/ Ron. End text.

+ + Shultz + +
+ +
+ 407. Message From British Prime Minister Thatcher to President ReaganSource: + Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Head of State File, United Kingdom: Prime Minister + Thatcher—Cables (1). + Secret; Flash. Sent in telegram MISC 222 from the Cabinet office to + the White House. + + + London, November 2, 1982, 1315Z + Dear Ron, + +

I received your message about the FalklandsSee Document 406. just as I was + going into a meeting of my Cabinet this morning. I discussed it with my + colleagues and I must tell you at once that we are utterly dismayed by + its contents.

+

If the United States votes for a resolution on the lines of the Argentine + draft, you will encourage the Argentines in their ambition to secure the + transfer of sovereignty over the Falklands to themselves, against the + wishes of the inhabitants. Their sole purpose in putting forward this + draft is to further that ambition.

+

The resolution misrepresents the situation completely. It mocks the + concept of self-determination by saying that the “interests” of the + Falkland Islanders will be “taken duly into account”. It retains + references to previous resolutions which prejudge the issue. It calls + for early negotiations but you and all our friends know why negotiations + are not acceptable to us. And + it does this against the background of continuing bellicose statements + by representatives of the Argentine regime.

+

You rightly refer to the staunch support which you gave us during the + conflict in the South Atlantic. I remain deeply grateful. May I say that + we have also supported you at the UN and + elsewhere in matters of prime concern to the United States.

+

The vote on this Argentine resolution is a matter of prime concern to + Britain. That is why I must make an urgent and personal appeal to you to + think again. A vote by the United States for the resolution would be + received here with incomprehension. Worse, it would be seen as an + affront to the government and the people of Britain and to me + personally. I cannot believe that you would consider delivering such a + blow to the right of self-determination which means so much to the + democracies of the free world. I had greatly hoped that you would vote + against this hypocritical text. But if you cannot, I must ask you, with + all we have done together in mind, at least to abstain.

+

With best wishes

+ + Margaret + +
+ +
+ 408. Message From President Reagan to British Prime Minister ThatcherSource: Reagan Library, Dennis C. Blair Files, United Kingdom 1982 + (11/02/1982). Secret; Flash. Sent in telegram WH07645 from the White + House to the Cabinet Office via Cabinet Office + channels. + + + Washington, November 2, 1982, 2027Z + Dear Margaret: + +

I have just received your messageSee Document 407. and would like to + respond immediately, given the importance of the issue to both of + us.

+

I fully understand that negotiations are not acceptable to you, having + just paid so much in blood and treasure to repulse the Argentine + invasion. We have no intention to press you—or to see you be + pressed—into negotiations before you are ready. Equally, we have no + intention to take a position on the substance of the matter that is in + any way prejudicial to your position on the questions of sovereignty and + self-determination. Indeed Resolution 1514 contains stronger references + to self-determination than it + does to the principle the Argentines proclaim, “territorial + integrity.”

+

Margaret, my country has always supported you and always will in + defeating any effort to solve the Falklands dispute by force. You know + that we have always been neutral on the question of sovereignty. And we + have always favored peaceful solution of the issue by negotiation. I am + well aware that it was the Argentines that interrupted negotiations by + attacking the Islands. But I do not think that in itself is reason not + to support a solution by negotiations sometime in the future. It is hard + for the United States to have any other position.

+

Reading your message, I believe more weight ought to be given to the text + of the resolution as it now stands. The Brazilian amendments have made + it much less objectionable. It was on the basis of this new text that my + colleagues informed Argentina and other sponsors that we would support + it. In particular, the references to de facto cessation of hostilities + and the intention of the partners not to renew them takes us a good ways + towards the formal renunciation of hostilities we both have been working + for, although I would agree with you that they are not equivalent.

+

At the time of the vote, our representative will put clearly on record + our views that force must not be used again to solve the dispute, that + the underlying question of sovereignty is not and cannot be prejudiced + by the resolution, and that the aspirations of the Islanders must be + taken into account.

+

I am truly sorry that we disagree on this matter and for my part will do + everything in my power to make sure this resolution is not abused. You + may be confident that the United States will continue to abide by the + jointly shared principles which guided both our countries through the + Falklands crisis to its successful conclusion.

+

With best wishes,

+ + Ron + +
+ +
+ + 409. Message From British Prime Minister Thatcher to President ReaganSource: + Reagan Library, William P. + Clark Files, Falklands War (UN/Kirkpatrick/Haig) 06/06/1982–11/04/1982. Secret; Strictly + Personal. Sent in a telegram from the Cabinet Office to the White + House. A stamped notation at the top of the telegram indicates that + Clark saw + it. + + + London, November 4, 1982, 1322Z + Begins + +

I delayed replying to your message of 2 November about the FalklandsSee Document + 408. until my Cabinet meeting this morning. My + colleagues and I have now discussed it and I want you to know our + unanimous view.

+

The British people would see your vote for this resolution as an American + decision to support Argentina against Britain, to support a dictatorship + against the home of democracy.

+

The issue of self-determination is at the heart of Western democracy. + Nothing could be more fundamental. The Falkland Islanders want to stay + British. The object of these Argentine manoeuvres at the UN is simply to start a process which will + deny them that choice.

+

Negotiations? Argentina simply wants to achieve by negotiation what it + failed to achieve by military aggression which cost so many young + lives.

+

I have supported you in every way I know because of my faith in the + Anglo-American relationship and your personal commitment to fundamental + principles. Nothing can shake my belief in the values for which you and + I stand. But if America votes in the way you propose, my task will be + immeasurably harder.

+

I know very well how difficult a change would be for you now, with all + the publicity that has been given to your intentions. But the free world + would understand and applaud a decision to abstain.

+

I do urge you to look at this again urgently and personally. So much + depends on it.

+ + Margaret + Thatcher + +
+ +
+ + 410. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department + of State and the White HouseSource: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, + D820571–0494. Confidential; Flash; Exdis. + + + New York, November 4, 1982, 1906Z + +

3236. For the Secretary, Eagleburger, and Newell; NSC for Judge + Clark; from Ambassador + Kirkpatrick. Subject: + Revised Text of Explanation of Vote on Falklands. Ref: USUN 3233.Telegram 3233 from USUN, November + 4, transmitted an earlier draft of the explanation of the U.S. vote + on the Falklands/Malvinas resolution. (Department of State, Central + Foreign Policy File, D820571–0220) The statement, as delivered by + Adelman before the + UNGA, November 4, is printed + in American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, + 1982, p. 1363.

+

1. C–Entire text.

+

Below is revised text of draft explanation of vote on the Falklands + resolution for use after the vote in the UNGA plenary November 4.The + UN General Assembly adopted + Resolution 37/9 by a vote of 90 (including the United States) to 12 + (including the United Kingdom), with 52 abstentions. The text of the + resolution is printed in Yearbook of the United + Nations, 1982, p. 1347. For a summary of the debate in the + General Assembly, see ibid., pp. 1341–1346.

+

Mr. President,

+

The United States has always supported a negotiated settlement between + the United Kingdom and Argentina in their tragic conflict over the + Falkland Islands (Islas Malvinas). At the outset of the conflict, my + government made sustained efforts to bring the two parties to the + negotiating table. We said at that time the United States stands behind + the principle that the use of force to settle disputes should not be + allowed anywhere, and especially in this hemisphere where a significant + number of territorial disputes remain to be solved diplomatically. For + the United States, the Falkland crisis has been and still is a + particularly agonizing, tragic event. As the whole world knows, we have + a long-standing alliance and, beyond that, the closest relations of + friendship with Great Britain, the country from which our political + institutions, law and language derive. But we have not forgotten for a + moment our close geographical, economic and political relations with our + Latin neighbors. We do not only care about this hemisphere, we are part + of this hemisphere, and we share many of the aspirations, goals and + dreams of all nations of the Americas . . .

+

That is why the United States tried so hard to avoid the conflict on the + Falklands, why we hoped so intensely to reduce and isolate it, and why + we were eager and ready to back any realistic diplomatic initiative + which would put a just end to it. The search for a negotiated settlement to this conflict led + the United States to support Security Council Resolution 505 of May 26 + which called for the simultaneous cessation of hostilities, withdrawal + of forces, and negotiations. The essential elements of that resolution + remain the framework of the search for peace. The same vital need for a + negotiated solution that would put this conflict once and for all behind + us underlies our vote today.

+

This resolution, in its revised and final form, expressly reaffirms the + principles of the UN Charter concerning + non-use of force in international relations. We welcome its references + to cessation of hostilities and to the intention of the parties not to + renew them. The cost, in blood and treasure, to both Argentina and the + United Kingdom dictates that force must never again be used to attempt + to solve this dispute. We assume, therefore, in supporting this + resolution a shared responsibility for preventing the use of force in + the future. The United States would not have voted for any resolution + which prejudged the question of sovereignty or the outcome of + negotiations. We have never taken a position on the question of + sovereignty and we do not now do so. We conclude, however, that the + resolution before us does not legally prejudice the position of either + Argentina or the United Kingdom and, in fact, opens the way toward + negotiations in good faith without any preordained result.

+

Finally, in calling on the parties to negotiate, let us not forget, Mr. + President, that these Islands are and have been for generations the home + of a small, but resolute, population of Island people. The United States + assumes that negotiations undertaken by the United Kingdom and Argentina + will necessarily take into account both the interests and the views of + the Falkland Islanders. In supporting this resolution, the U.S. affirms + that this dispute like all others should be settled by discussion and + never by force and that the fate of peoples should never be settled + without due account being taken of their views, values and interests. + Let these principles and those of the UN + Charter itself governing peaceful resolution of disputes serve as a + basis for negotiation to close this unhappy chapter and move forward + again toward peace, understanding and development in this + hemisphere.

+

End text.

+ + Kirkpatrick + +
+ +
+ + 411. Message From President Reagan to British Prime Minister ThatcherSource: Reagan Library, William P. Clark Files, Falklands War (UN/Kirkpatrick/Haig) 06/06/1982–11/04/1982. Secret; Flash. Sent for + immediate delivery in telegram WH07725 from the White House to the + Cabinet Office via Cabinet Office channels. + + + Washington, November 4, 1982, 2159Z + Dear Margaret: + +

Reading your message of November 4,See Document 409. I realize that our + understanding of these events is indeed quite different. I can assure + you, Margaret, that the United States did not make a decision to support + Argentina against Britain, or to support dictatorship against democracy. + Neither did we abandon the principle of self-determination. We + reaffirmed our support for a negotiated settlement to a long-standing + conflict. We have supported the principle of negotiation throughout this + long, difficult dispute. It is the principle to which Britain herself + has adhered for so many years with regard to this and other disputes. + Certainly, we will never alter our view that a people must ultimately + determine their own future and certainly we mean this with regard to the + people on the Falklands.

+

Finally, you and I have supported each other in the past because of our + shared faith in the Anglo-American relationship and our shared + commitment to the same fundamental principles and values. I feel sure + neither you nor I will abandon those principles and values nor the + effort to help our peoples understand their application in this complex, + difficult world.

+

I assure you we stand as firmly with you on the principles of non-use of + force, of negotiation and self-determination as ever.

+ + Ron + +
+ +
+ + 412. Action Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for + Inter-American Affairs (Enders), + the Permanent Representative to the Organization of American States + (Middendorf), and the Acting + Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Blackwill) to Secretary of State + ShultzSource: Department of State, Central + Foreign Policy File, P890116–0107. Confidential; Exdis. Drafted by Thompson; cleared by Gompert, D. Toussaint (IO), Kirkpatrick, and M. + Kozak (L). Thompson initialed for Toussaint, Kirkpatrick, and Kozak. He also initialed for + Middendorf. A stamped + notation at the top of the memorandum indicates that Shultz saw it. + + + Washington, November + 12, 1982 + + + SUBJECT + Proposed Argentine Resolution on Falklands/Malvinas Issue + +

ISSUE FOR DECISION

+

Whether to accept the Argentine draft OASGA Resolution at Tab AAttached but not printed. or abstain at the OASGA on a much stronger Resolution + which will pass overwhelmingly.

+

ESSENTIAL FACTORS

+

Prior to our vote for UNGA Res. 37/9 on + November 4,See footnote 3, Document 410. the Argentines had + circulated to selected Latin OAS + Delegations the draft OASGA + Resolution at Tab B.Attached but not + printed. The OAS General Assembly + was scheduled to convene November 15–20.

+

Argentine Ambassador to the OAS + Quijano returned from Buenos + Aires on November 10. He reports the GOA recognizes and appreciates the effort we made in our + vote at the UNGA. They have reassessed + their relationship with us and their position in the hemisphere and wish + to cooperate with us on a broad front and to avoid confrontation. Their + first step was to throw their support to Honduras Foreign Minister Paz + Barnica, our candidate for the Chairmanship of the OASGA. The next was to prepare a + Falklands/Malvinas Resolution for the OASGA designed to meet their minimal requirements while + attempting to accommodate our concerns so as to permit us to support the + Resolution. The text at Tab A, supporting UNGA Res. 37/9, is the result.

+

The GOA recognizes that, given the + position of the Caribbean members of the OAS, even that text cannot be approved by consensus. + Nevertheless, they are prepared to withdraw the earlier draft Resolution (Tab B) and present the + new text (Tab A) if we find it acceptable. This position responds to the + importance they attach to our support and their desire to avoid any + conflict with or embarrassment to us at the OASGA.

+

If the United States is unable to accept the new Argentine text the + Foreign Minister has said the GOA will + understand and there will be no hard feelings. However, in that event + Argentina will have to revert to a somewhat strengthened version of the + earlier draft containing the references to “Argentine sovereignty,” + “colonial situation,” “injury to the territorial integrity of a member + state,” etc., which we find objectionable. Regrettably, Argentine + support for this stronger text will also require the Foreign Minister’s + speech on November 17 to sound more harsh and confrontational than would + be the case if we can agree on a text. (You follow the Argentine Foreign + Minister in the speaking order that day.)For the text of Shultz’s + November 17 speech to the OAS + General Assembly, see Department of State Bulletin, December 1982, pp. 64–67. Argentina is + assured of all twenty Latin American votes for the stronger + Resolution.

+

Given the tactical decision Argentina must make, Ambassador Quijano requests an urgent + response.

+

BUREAU POSITIONS

+

EUR believes that the US should abstain on the attached draft + language and that we should not negotiate a Resolution with the + Argentines.Shultz underlined “EUR,” and the portion of the sentence beginning with + “US.” The latest draft is + unacceptable because it (a) prejudices the outcome by referring to + previous resolutions that recognize Argentine sovereignty and criticize + US measures adopted in response to + the Argentine use of force; (b) by calling on the parties to carry out + the UNGA Resolution it violates the + President’s promise to Mrs. Thatcher that the US + would not press the British to negotiate; and (c) coming so soon after + the UN vote it would confirm British + fears that the US cannot be counted on + to support an ally resisting aggression. In light of the deep wounds in + Britain resulting from our UN vote, we + must be sure that our actions on the Falklands/Malvinas conform to our + assurances to HMG that the US will play a neutral and detached role in + the ensuing controversy. US support for + the proposed Resolution will not promote a peaceful resolution of the + problem. On the contrary, it will stiffen the resistance of London to + negotiations with Buenos Aires. Lastly, if Mrs. Thatcher attends the Brezhnev funeral, + we are going to recommend that you and the Vice President meet with her + to put the Falklands/Malvinas issue behind us. That effort at + reconciliation would + obviously be incompatible with a vote at the OAS which will be certain to send Mrs. Thatcher around the bend again.

+

L advises that the draft Resolution is substantively consistent with our + position at theShultz underlined “draft Resolution is substantively + consistent with out position at the.” + UN: It contains nothing that prejudices + the UK legal position and sets no + deadline for negotiations. Like the UN + Resolution, it contains preambular references to resolutions we did not + support. As in that case, however, mere recalling of action taken by the + same or related body is consistent with international practice and does + not prejudice our position of non-support for the previous resolution. L + would recommend that we seek two small changes in the draft: using the + accepted UN practice of referring to the + Malvinas (Falklands) in alternat, or simply + avoiding specific references to the Islands’ name; and ensuring wording + or translation of operative paragraph 2 that does not connote a legally + binding nature to the UNGA Resolution + (i.e., “carry out” rather than “comply” with the Resolution).

+

P (David Gompert on behalf of + Larry Eagleburger, who + favored supporting the Argentine Resolution in the UN) believes that supporting the moderate + Argentine Resolution in the OAS would + spark a new and potentially more bitter British reaction, particularly + because of the preambular reference to previous OAS resolutions that flatly endorsed Argentine sovereignty. + It would not be at all inconsistent for us to abstain on this Resolution + after having supported the UN + Resolution;Shultz underlined the portion of this sentence + beginning with “would” and concluding with “Resolution.” + indeed, it could usefully show that we draw the line when language + becomes more prejudicial—politically, if not legalistically—than the + UN text. At the same time, if we + intend to abstain, we are far better off doing so on the less moderate Argentine Resolution, which no one + could possibly expect us to support or seriously criticize us for + failing to support. Therefore, the best approach, in P’s view, is to + tell the Argentines that, in addition to the changes L recommends, all reference to the earlier OAS resolutionsReference is to Resolutions I and II on the + situation in the South Atlantic adopted at the 20th Meeting of + Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Relations on April 28 and May + 29, respectively. For Resolution I, see footnote 2, Document 185. For Resolution II, requesting + that the Rio Treaty states give Argentina “the support that each + judges appropriate,” see footnote 3, Document + 305. must be dropped if we are to support the + Resolution. If, as would seem unlikely, they can make such a change, we + can and should support the Resolution. If they cannot and therefore put + forward the less moderate Resolution, our abstention will be fully understood.Shultz + drew a double line in the right-hand margin next to this sentence in + order to highlight it. + IO concurs in P’s position, and points + out that one of the OAS resolutions + cited in the Preamble criticizes the US + by name for “coercive measures”Shultz underlined the portion of + this sentence beginning with “one” and concluding with + ‘measures.’” against Argentina in support of the UK.

+

ARA and USOAS believe the Argentine Text represents a major + conciliatory effort. They have gone far in producing a moderate draft, + one that is in some respects more moderate than the UN Resolution we supported (e.g., the + OAS draft contains no reference to the “colonial situation” on the + islands). While the preambular part of the draft does refer to the + previous action taken by the XX MFM, it + would be difficult to conceive of an OAS resolution that did not mention an action taken by an + OAS body on the identical subject. + ARA and USOAS would emphasize L’s advice that legally, and in their view practically, + the “having seen” reference to the MFM + resolutions does not constitute endorsement of their content. USOAS also points out that our + explanation of vote can expressly declare that our positive vote does + not imply acceptance of the previous MFM resolutions. USOAS + believes it may be possible to persuade the Argentines to make the two + changes suggested by L but not to delete all reference to the previous + OAS resolutions. ARA and USOAS believe we should work with the Argentine text. Like + EUR, ARA thinks the verb “calls upon” is too strong to square + with our commitment to the British not to press them on implementation + of the UNGA Resolution. ARA proposes that we seek to modify that + verb to “expresses the hope.” A positive US vote would not only strengthen the improvement in our + relationship with Argentina but would significantly strengthen the + OAS by a show of US/Latin American unity after a divisive + period. It would greatly contribute to the atmosphere for the + President’s trip. A US abstention on a + Falklands/Malvinas Resolution at this time would be perceived by the + Latin Americans as a reversal and would undo much of the reconciliation + achieved up to now.In this sentence, + Shultz underlined “A + US abstention” and “would be + perceived by the Latin Americans as a reversal and.” It will + be exploited by Nicaragua and our opponents in the hemisphere to detract + from the President’s trip.

+

RECOMMENDATIONShultz neither approved + nor disapproved the three recommendations. Below the + recommendations, Bremer + wrote on November 13: “Sec’s action reported Tosec #2 + 4.” Schultz left + Washington that day to accompany Bush to Moscow to attend the November 15 funeral of + Soviet General Secretary Brezhnev.

+

1. That you instruct USOAS to inform + Ambassador Quijano that we can + vote for the Argentine text at Tab A, with the adjustments proposed by L + and ARA. (ARA, USOAS and + Ambassador Kirkpatrick + favor.)

+ +

2. Alternatively, that you instruct USOAS to inform Quijano that we can vote for the new text only if all references to earlier OAS resolutions are dropped, in addition + to making the changes in (1) above. (P and IO favor.)

+

3. Alternatively, that you instruct USOAS to refrain from negotiating with Quijano and to abstain on either of the + attached drafts. (EUR favors.)

+
+ +
+ 413. Memorandum From Secretary of State Shultz to President ReaganSource: + Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Agency File, Sec. State Evening Report + (11/04/1982–11/23/1982). Secret. + + + Washington, November + 17, 1982 + +

1. OAS General + Assembly. Today’s plenary session was devoted to formal + statements by Heads of Delegations. The Latin American Foreign Ministers + dealt in familiar terms with protectionism, the Falklands crisis, the + North-South dialogue and the + future of the inter-American system. My speech stressed democracy as a + recurring ideal and practical standard.See + footnote 5, Document 412. I + pointed out that one of the principal objectives for your upcoming trip + is to underscore our firm commitment to democratic processes. I also + observed that the US is now poised for + economic recovery and that this hemisphere should provide a substantial + impulse to the renewed momentum for global expansion. (U)

+

2. Falklands. The Argentines have taken a + conciliatory tack at the OAS meeting + and are supporting a mild Falklands resolution. Our vote for the + resolution will create a positive atmosphere for your trip.Reagan + traveled to Brazil, Colombia, Costa Rica, and Honduras November + 30–December 4. At a November 23 meeting of the National Security + Council, held to brief the President on his trip, Shultz commented on the trip’s + implications for U.S.-Latin American relations in the aftermath of + the South Atlantic war. Shultz informed Reagan: “Your trip will conclude the + post-Falklands/Malvinas—our votes in the UN and OAS have + helped. The British initially were unhappy with us over the UN vote, but they are now thanking us + and will be glad over the long run that we have helped moderate this + issue. We have, over many years, had a close military relationship + in South America; weapons training in the US. This was extremely beneficial. It has dropped off + dramatically. We are losing our close relations with the younger + officers. Historically, we have sold 60 percent of their [South + America’s] weapons; now it is only six percent. The close personal + contacts have been the glue of our relations with these nations. + They must be rebuilt.” (Minutes of a Meeting of the National + Security Council, November 23; Reagan Library, Executive + Secretariat, NSC Meeting Files, + NSC 00067 11/23/1982 + [President’s Trip to Latin America]) + We have consulted on the text + and tactics repeatedly with the British Embassy, which is pleased with + our results and appreciative of our efforts. That said, we cannot + guarantee that our vote will not elicit a negative response from Mrs. + Thatcher, who has been more + outspoken than her Foreign Office on the Falklands. (S)

+

[Omitted here is discussion of issues unrelated to the South + Atlantic.]

+
+ +
+ 414. Telegram From the Department of State to All American Republic + Diplomatic Posts, the Embassy in the United Kingdom, and the Mission to + the United NationsSource: + Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D820602–0235. + Confidential; Immediate. Drafted by Johnson; cleared by Thompson, R.W. Drexler (ARA/USOAS), and S. Smith (ARA/SC); approved by Middendorf. + + + Washington, November 19, 1982, 1654Z + +

325184. Subject: OASGA—Falklands + Resolution Passed.

+

1. (LOU) In General Committee at 8:25 pm + Thursday evening,November 18. the + item long seen as potentially the GA’s + most heated issue, Argentina’s draft resolution on the South Atlantic, + came out of the corridors and onto the table for approval but with the + heat missing. By 9:30 after a series of brief non-controversial + speeches, the meeting was over and the resolution approved 21–0–7. The + seven abstentions were: Antigua and Barbuda, Bahamas, Barbados, + Dominica, Jamaica, Saint Lucia, and Trinidad-Tobago. El Salvador and + Saint Vincent and the Grenadines were absent accidentally. Both had + thought the resolution would not come up until Friday morning at the + earliest. It will next go to the GA + Plenary for a final rubber stamp of approval.

+

2. (LOU) According to one knowledgeable + source, the Caribbeans in an effort at conciliation had planned to sit + quietly and let the resolution pass unopposed by consensus. However, + Panama’s OAS Ambassador called for the + resolution’s approval by acclamation, a motion the Caribbeans could not + support and which produced their request for a recorded vote.

+

3. (LOU) Argentine Foreign Minister + Aguirre Lanari in presenting + the resolution sounded familiar themes. He was brief and low-key + however, and wound up by expressing full support for UNGA Resolution 37/9 and offering thanks to the supporters of + that resolution, including the US. Over + three-quarters of the resolution’s 20 sponsors made brief statements, + all supportive of peaceful settlement, of UNGA Res. 37/9, and of Argentina’s claim to the Falklands. + After the vote most of the abstainers spoke—but briefly and without + challenging the Argentine version of events. Aguirre Lanari in thanking the GA for the resolution took special pains to thank the + Caribbean states for not voting against it.

+

4. (C) Coming hard on the heels of the UNGA vote and the good feeling which it evoked among Latin + Americans, this companion move at the OASGA should go a long way toward further clearing the air. + The resolution was produced after much quiet Argentine-US negotiation over the last week during + which it was clear that Argentina badly wanted US support and was willing to make major concessions.

+

5. (U) The text of the resolution and Ambassador Middendorf’s explanation of the US voteThe + texts of Resolution 595 (XII–0/82), adopted by the OAS General Assembly on November 20, + and Middendorf’s November 18 + statement to the General Committee of the OAS General Assembly are printed in American Foreign Policy: Current Documents. 1982, pp. 1365 + and 1364, respectively. follow:

+

[Omitted here are the texts of the OAS + resolution and Middendorf’s + statement.]

+ + + Shultz + + +
+ +
+ + 415. Information Memorandum From the Director of the Bureau of + Intelligence and Research (Montgomery) to the Under Secretary of State for + Political Affairs (Eagleburger)Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, + P820172–0851. Secret; [handling restriction not + declassified]. A stamped notation at the top of the + memorandum indicates that Eagleburger saw it on November 29. + + + Washington, November + 24, 1982 + + + SUBJECT + Argentine Secret Report Criticizes the Army’s Conduct of Falklands + War + +

Former President Leopoldo + Galtieri and his general staff led Argentina into a war + it could not win, according to an internal army appraisal of the army’s + role in the Falklands war. Details of the formal report, which was sent + to Army CINC Maj. Gen. Nicolaides on November 16, have been + provided [less than 1 line not declassified]. + Implicit in the document is the conclusion that no further military + attempts should be made to capture the islands.

+

The US is cited as providing key + “tactical” advantages to the UK. The + report contains no hint, however, of the refrain that Argentina might + have won had it not been for the US.

+

The fundamental mistake of invading the islands is attributed to faulty + intelligence and reasoning. The Argentine army, the report concluded, is + structured and trained to fight a neighboring South American adversary + and thus, had no chance against the UK. + The estimate that the UK would not fight + was a very serious miscalculation. As a result, senior officers sent to + the islands were chosen for their administrative and technical + capabilities and knowledge of English rather than for their ability to + command combat troops.

+

The report has been in preparation since June by a team under the + direction of Army Chief of Staff Maj. Gen. Calvi. Only Calvi and + Nicolaides received copies, + and the drafters strongly recommended the report not be made public.

+

INR Comment: Most + Argentines believe that the Calvi Commission’s work has not been made + public because it is a whitewash. On the contrary, the report is + unlikely to be published because it is an embarrassingly frank and + accurate appraisal. Any soldier or journalist who lent himself to + unauthorized publication of the document probably would be risking his + life.

+
+ +
+ + 416. National Security Decision Directive 71Source: National Security Council, + National Security Council Institutional Files, NSDD 0071 U.S. Policy + Towards Latin America in the Wake of the Falklands Crisis. Top + Secret. The NSDD was sent to Shultz, Weinberger, Casey, and Vessey under a December 2 covering memorandum from + McFarlane on behalf of + Clark, informing the + recipients of Reagan’s + approval of it. + + + Washington, November + 30, 1982 + +

U.S. Policy Toward Latin America In the + Wake of the Falklands Crisis (S)

+

The Falklands crisis has strained relations with several Latin American + countries and resulted in uncertainty regarding the long-range policy + goals of the United States in the region. This in turn has increased the + potential for instability in Central and South America. (C)

+

U.S. national interests in Latin America and the region dictate policies + that achieve the following objectives:

+

• a region free of Soviet-dominated or hostile governments;

+

• the development of stable and democratic political systems and + institutions which promote respect for basic human rights;

+

• cooperative bilateral relations to deal with security and other issues + flowing from geographic proximity;

+

• advancement of major U.S. trade and investment;

+

• access to raw materials;

+

• prevention of nuclear proliferation;

+

• maintenance of stable balances of power among the states in the region; + and

+

• receptivity to U.S. leadership. (S)

+

Achieving these objectives has been complicated by the Falklands crisis. + Accordingly, our policy must be aimed at ameliorating the following + specific problems:

+

• Instability and irredentism in Argentina, which implies new + opportunities for the USSR to gain + access to a strategic position in the Southern Cone;

+

• Disillusionment with U.S. leadership in Venezuela and elsewhere, which + provides tempting opportunities for Cuba to reduce its inter-American + isolation;

+

• The need to improve U.S. relations with Brazil, recognizing Brazil’s + increased importance as a potential stabilizing factor in South America + at a time when mounting economic and financial difficulties are eroding our ties and influence + there and in the region as a whole.

+

• The vulnerability of burgeoning free enterprise economies and + developing political institutions to radical insurgent movements + supported by the Soviet Union and/or its surrogates.

+

• The interdiction threat to U.S. aerial and maritime routes in the + Caribbean Basin by potentially hostile airbases and the + introduction/augmentation of Soviet Bloc tactical aircraft and weaponry. + (TS)

+

In redressing these problems, the highest priority for the United States + will continue to be the reduction—and eventual elimination—of the + influence and presence of the Soviet Union or its client states in our + immediate environs—Central America, the Caribbean and Mexico. This will + be accomplished through a coordinated application of our diplomatic, + economic, military, intelligence and informational resources in the + Caribbean Basin and Central America. (TS)

+

Our second priority is to restore and reassert United States influence in + South America. To this end we will:

+

• Maintain our diplomatic position on the fundamental Falklands issues as + it existed prior to the crisis. Specifically: The U.S. will continue as + a neutral on the question of sovereignty over the islands and support + negotiations, mediation or other peaceful efforts to resolve this + dispute;

+

• Attempt to preserve a regional political and military balance, by + seeking certification for Argentina and Chile, as eligible for U.S. + military sales, jointly if possible, and as early in the new Congress as + feasible. In order to progress on this initiative, the State Department + will intensify efforts to resolve those issues that currently proscribe + arms transfers to Chile and Argentina.

+

• Rebuild a close relationship with Brazil, through:

+

—increased Cabinet-level, government-to-government consultations

+

—renewed cooperation in economic trade and military training

+

—enhanced cooperation in science and technology (particularly space + activities)

+

—a dialogue on nuclear issues, and

+

—exploration, over time, of arms co-production agreements.

+

To develop this process, the U.S. will seek appropriate positive action + by Brazil on the issue of nuclear non-proliferation (e.g., restraint in + exports to sensitive regions and progress in discussions on the Treaty + of Tlatelolco and safeguards). We will further attempt to resolve the + matter of nuclear supply and permit resumed nuclear cooperation with + Brazil. As contacts on these issues show progress, in order to encourage + significant movement on non-proliferation concerns, consideration will + be given to seeking waivers + to the Glenn/Symington amendment,The + Symington Amendment of 1976 and the Glenn Amendment of 1977 amended + the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 to prohibit U.S. military + assistance to countries that acquire or transfer nuclear + reprocessing technology outside of international non-proliferation + regimes or explode a nuclear device. The provision was included in + the Arms Export Control Act of 1976. permitting enhanced + military training cooperation.

+

• The U.S. will continue to seek prevention of regional arms races, to + preserve sub-regional arms balances and to upgrade bilateral military + ties. In order to support the legitimate security needs of democratic + governments, the Department of State, in coordination with the + Department of Defense, will use flexibility, within NSDD–5 + guidelines,National Security Decision + Directive 5, signed by Reagan on July 8, 1981, outlined the objectives of + and criteria for U.S. conventional arms transfers. (Reagan Library, + Executive Secretariat, National Security Council Decision Directives + (NSDD), NSDD 5 [Conventional Arms Transfer Policy]) to + respond promptly to arms transfer requests. Measures will specifically + be taken to reduce Peru’s dependence on Soviet arms supplies.

+

• Within resource contraints, the U.S. will maintain assistance efforts + in such economically weak states as Bolivia, Ecuador, and Paraguay. + (S)

+

The aforementioned program—aimed first at the Caribbean Basin/Central + American region, and second at South America—will be effected in concert + with the following overall hemispheric actions:

+

• The United States will pursue more active bilateral diplomatic contacts + throughout the continent in order to stay efforts to alter the + Inter-American System. We will use a series of ad + hoc bilateral cabinet-level meetings with substantial—though + not exclusive—economic focus to show that dialogue with the U.S. is + possible. Our Caribbean Basin Initiatives will serve as the framework + for these discussions with the Central American States. In South + America, the U.S. will lead with Brazil, Colombia, Peru, Venezuela, and + then Argentina. Throughout, our goal is to support free enterprise + economies and foster the investment and trade necessary to their + growth.

+

• U.S. global sugar policy will be reviewed to assess its foreign and + domestic impact on states in the region. If advantageous to our foreign + policy goals, consideration will be given to establishing more flexible + sugar import levels.

+

• We will use our influence through traditional diplomatic channels to + promote development of democratic institutions and human rights in order + to facilitate U.S. public support for expanded, closer relationships + with the governments concerned.

+ +

• A concerted effort will be made to increase U.S. military influence in + the hemisphere through promotion of U.S. military training and doctrine, + greater use of small mobile training teams, expanded military personnel + exchanges and increased International Military Education and Training + (IMET) resources. To implement + this program the Department of Defense, in cooperation with the + Department of State and the Director of Central Intelligence will + develop a comprehensive prioritized list of defense requirements, by + country, and propose a strategy for implementation.

+

• In order that we can take a pro-active stance in our relations with + Central and South American states, the DCI will improve intelligence + collection on and analysis of Soviet bloc and Cuban actions which may + create internal instability or problems in bilateral relations with the + U.S. (TS)

+ + Ronald + Reagan + +
+ +
+ 417. Telegram From Secretary of State Shultz to the White House and the Department of + StateSource: Department + of State, Central Foreign Policy File, N820010–0095. Secret; + Immediate; Nodis. Sent from the + Secretary’s aircraft. Shultz + was en route between London and Washington. + + + December 18, 1982, + 2000Z + +

Secto 17149. Subject: My Meetings in + London. For the President from Secretary Shultz.

+

1. (S–Entire text)

+

2. I completed my two week swing through Western EuropeIn the course of his European trip, Shultz traveled to West Germany + (December 7–9), Belgium (December 8–11), The Netherlands (December + 11), Italy (December 11–14), France (December 14–15), Spain + (December 15–16), and the United Kingdom (December 16–18). + today, December 18, after a day of talks in London with Mrs. Thatcher and her Foreign Minister, + Francis Pym. The British + remain as staunch friends as ever, but I found both Mrs. Thatcher and Pym preoccupied with concerns about + economic developments, no doubt in part in view of the national + elections which many expect Mrs. Thatcher to call next fall.

+

[Omitted here is discussion of issues unrelated to the South + Atlantic.]

+ +

4. Mrs. Thatcher also made it + clear that the Falklands are still a serious issue in British + politics.Shultz recorded in his memoirs that he discussed the + Falklands/Malvinas with Thatcher on December 17. Of the meeting at Number 10 + Downing Street, his first with Thatcher since becoming Secretary of State, + Shultz wrote: “I was + apprehensive that I would run into an argument about the Falklands. + Again, she [Thatcher] met me + at the door. We sat and talked in a living room where a fire burned + brightly. The Falklands were on her mind, and she spoke of their + strategic significance. What if the Panama Canal were to be closed, + requiring shipping to go ‘around the Horn,’ as in clipper-ship days? + The location of the Falklands in the shipping lanes of the South + Atlantic would then be vital. I thought that was farfetched, but + there was no point arguing about it. I agreed with our decision to + support her, but I felt it was time to repair the damage done to our + interests in South America. I stated my views firmly; she listened, + but not sympathetically.” (Shultz, Turmoil and Triumph, + p. 153) She said that the UK + was not prepared to enter into negotiations with Argentina at this time, + nor to discuss the question of sovereignty. She argued that the Islands + were too small to become independent, that the inhabitants are British, + and that UK control offered strategic + advantages for NATO. I restated our + position—the Falklands issue should be settled by negotiation rather + than by force of arms.

+

[Omitted here is discussion of issues unrelated to the South + Atlantic.]

+ + + Shultz + + +
+ +
+ 418. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Kingdom to the Department + of State and the Department of DefenseSource: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy + File, D820659–0444. Confidential. Sent for information to NATO Collective, USNMR SHAPE, USDOCOSOUTH, USCINCEUR, CINCUSAFE, CINCUSNAVEUR, and CINCLANT. + + + Washington, December 20, 1982, 1600Z + +

27573. Subject: Falklands White Paper: Reversing Naval Cutbacks.

+

1. Confidential–Entire text.

+

2. Summary: The release of the Falklands White Paper on 14 December was + overshadowed by press treatment of EUCOM wartime headquarters + relocation, the floating of the Soviet INF proposal, the emergency Commons debate on nuclear + issues, and the nearness of the holidays. Moreover, HMG has adopted a + course—emphasizing strengthened naval forces and out of area + capability—which capitalizes on the Falklands factor and coopts both + Tory “Little England” backbenchers and the opposition. For the US and NATO the new policy is confirmation that HMG has moved away to a degree from the + scope and timing of the Nott-proposed cutbacks of last year. End summary.

+

3. Nott announced a billion pound + package of orders for new ships, aircraft and military hardware in his + parliamentary presentation of the White Paper. The main items are:

+

—Six new ships costing 585 million pounds, four of them are Type 22 + frigates replacing the lost destroyers and frigates;

+

—Cancelling of planned mothballing of four ships;

+

—Reaffirmation of the continuing operation of the carrier Invincible, the + assault ships Fearless and Intrepid and the patrol vessel Endurance;

+

—Limiting cutbacks at the large Portsmouth naval base to save 1,500 + jobs;

+

—Replacement of all aircraft lost in the campaign plus purchase of at + least 12 F–4s;

+

—Purchasing six Tristars (L–1011S) from British Airways for use as air + refueling tankers;

+

—Strengthening of the 5th Infantry Brigade for airborne operations;

+

—Purchasing an additional 5 Chinook helicopters to improve rapid movement + of troops and equipment.

+

4. The White Paper put the Falklands in a larger perspective and + emphasized that responding to the Soviet threat has first call on + British resources. The announced purchases of major equipment are to + avoid any major diversion of effort from NATO roles by increasing the mobility, flexibility and + operational readiness of the forces. The modest out-of-area capability + is being significantly enhanced. Financing of the equipment is in + addition to the annual three percent real growth to which the government + is committed until 1986. The report concludes that British will, + resolve, and fortitude have been proved again and “we and our NATO allies can draw confidence from + this. The deterrent posture of the NATO alliance as a whole has been strengthened.”

+

5. The general response to the report has been favorable. Even Keith + Speed, who was fired in May 81 as Royal Navy Minister due to his + opposition to navy cuts, proclaims himself “80 percent happy” with the + report. SDP’s David Owen, from Devonport, was glad to see the + readjustment. Labor’s current focus on nuclear issues, however, colored + its position even on this issue. Shadow Defense Secretary Silkin’s main + thrust was that the whole of the administration’s maritime policy was + put at risk by HMG’s commitment to + Trident. In a time of growing + unemployment, much was made + of the shipbuilding employment and dockwork that would arise from + continuing the active service of four ships past the 1985 mothball date + announced last year.

+

6. Still, Labor opposition was clearly muted, in part because more ships + mean more jobs, in part because other issues are diverting attention. + Thus, so far, the Falklands White Paper has had a bare 24 hours of media + play. Nott may have made his + substantive farewell as Defense Secretary with the White Paper release + and, in a week marked by leaks and surprises on other fronts, perhaps + the best surprise was that there were no surprises in it.

+ + Louis + +
+ +
+ 419. Telegram From the Embassy in Argentina to the Department of + StateSource: Department + of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D830020–0706. Secret. Sent + for information to London, USUN, + CINCLANT, and + USCINCSOUTH. + + + Buenos Aires, January 12, 1983, + 1555Z + +

239. Subject: Argentine Intentions: Military Actions Concerning the + Falklands. Ref: FBIS + DTG 102140Z Jan 83.Not found.

+

1. S–Entire text.

+

2. Taking into account recent intelligence reports and statements of + Argentine officials, the Embassy Intelligence Committee reviewed current + Argentine capabilities, intentions and views on potential US position. We conclude:

+

A. There are sufficient indications that some Argentine military move + could possibly be afoot to merit concern and increased intelligence activity.Among the reports of possible Argentine military + activity against U.K. targets include a December 23, 1982, report + that asserted that “those members of the naval staff involved in the + planning of the Argentine invasion of the Falklands in April were + all back in Buenos Aires and engaged in planning further action + against the islands.” (White House Situation Room Note, January 5; + Reagan Library, White House Situation Room Files, Series III: Notes, + Notes 01/07/1983–01/12/1983) A December 28 report prepared in the + CIA indicated evidence of + secret training of underwater demolition teams involving + “infiltration by submarine to place explosives on aircraft and + buildings.” (Central Intelligence Agency, Office of Security, Job + 95B00915R: Leak Data Base Files (1976–1991), Box 5, Folder 14: Leak + Investigation Chrono—January–May 1983) A January 10 White House + Situation Room Note conveyed a British report that stated that the + “Argentine armed forces were actively preparing for a renewal of + hostilities,” were “re-equipping for this purpose,” and were + practicing air attacks in the Andean foothills “against targets + similar to those on the islands.” (Reagan Library, White House + Situation Room Files, Series III: Notes, Notes + 01/07/1983–01/12/1983) Presumably whatever action might be + intended would be directed against the British in the South Atlantic, + although some kind of scheme for confronting the Chileans is not + completely inconceivable.

+

B. Argentina does not have the military capability to mount a large-scale + invasion of the Falklands in the near future. Those in the armed + services who are thinking rationally know that the equipment and joint + operations capability for such an undertaking are lacking. In our view + statements about retaking the Islands have a longer-term perspective, + are designed to build military and civilian morale, as well as to + justify arms purchases and to pressure the British to negotiate.

+

C. Any of the services has the capability of provoking or creating an + [garble—incident?] involving force. Destroying a British helicopter + outside the 150-mile limit has been mentioned by some officers. A + commando landing or sapper attack against British aircraft are examples + of other conceivable possibilities. The rationale would be to pressure + the British to negotiate while—most important—restoring the honor and + domestic reputation of the armed forces. While it would be normal for + the Argentine military to be planning, training and practicing for + various possible contingency operations against the Malvinas, such + activities do not necessarily mean that any operational or political + decisions have been made. But, given what is seen here as highly + provocative action by the BritishPresumably + a reference to Thatcher’s + January 9–13 visit to the Falklands/Malvinas during which she toured + the sites of battles and honored the U.K. war dead. and given + potential domestic considerations which could place the military under + great pressure, it is conceivable that the Junta or some part of the + armed forces would decide to go ahead with some kind of military + operation such as those mentioned above.

+

D. Despite repeated statements here and in Washington of the US position opposing the use of force, many + in the government and the military may believe that US would not react adversely to a small action, given what they see as + the British provocation and a strong US + desire to strengthen Latin American ties.

+

3. We shall take every opportunity here with both military and civilians + to disabuse any of the notion that our strong views against the use of + force have changed. We shall also intensify our efforts to develop + additional intelligence.

+ + Shlaudeman + +
+ +
+ 420. Information Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of + State-Designate for European Affairs (Burt) to Secretary of State ShultzSource: + Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S Special Handling Restrictions Memos 1979–1983, Lot + 96D262, ES Sensitive January 16–31 + 1983. Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by K. + Smith (EUR/NE); + cleared by Haass, R. Howard + (ARA/SC), and Einaudi. Smith initialed for all clearing + officials. All brackets are in the original. + + + Washington, January + 18, 1983 + + + SUBJECT + Franks Committee Report on HMG’s + Falklands Policy + +

In response to Parliamentary demands during the Falklands war, Mrs. + Thatcher agreed to establish + an independent commission to study the period up to the April 2 + Argentine invasion in order to determine responsibility for Britain’s + surprise.The six-member Franks + Commission, headed by Lord Franks, issued its report on January 18. + (R.W. Apple, Jr., “British Inquiry on Falkland War Clears the + Thatcher Government,” + New York Times, January 19, p. A1) + The political opposition hoped that it would show that the Conservative + Government was largely responsible for not foreseeing Argentine + intentions and for the lack of military preparedness in the South + Atlantic. They had expected the conclusions to hurt the Conservatives in + the next general election. We had been concerned that the report might + weaken the Foreign Office, damage the Thatcher Government, and adversely affect our attempt to + improve relations with Latin America. The final report is welcome on all + counts even if it is too early to gauge the political fallout in Britain + or Latin America.

+

Following are general conclusions and implications for the US:

+ +

The Thatcher + Government’s lack of warning: The report states that the + information available “demonstrates conclusively that the Government had + no reason to believe before March 31 that an invasion of the Falkland + Islands would take place at the beginning of April.” It also states that + the actual invasion (April 2) could not have been foreseen. One reason + given is that the Junta did not issue an order to invade until at least + 31 March.

+

The Foreign Office: The committee found no + evidence that the FCO had pursued a + Falklands policy independent of the Government in the period prior to + the invasion. The report indicates that the FCO had been handicapped in trying to reach a negotiated + solution by Conservative backbenchers opposed to any change in the + islands’ status. The report states that the FCO might have done some things differently, but there is + no evidence that it could have influenced the Argentines into changing + their plans. Since Mrs. Thatcher + blamed the FCO for much of the UK’s unpreparedness, the conclusions come + as a relief to Lord Carrington, + Francis Pym and the rest of + the Foreign Office.

+

Role of the US: + The report documents the major diplomatic exchanges between the USG and HMG, including the President’s call to President Galtieri and the subsequent cabled + report to Mrs. Thatcher.See Documents 41 and + 42. The exchanges reveal nothing + new or damaging. An implicit criticism of the US is contained in the statement that, “It is likely that + the Argentine Government came to believe that the United States + Government were sympathetic to their claim to the Falklands Islands and, + while not supporting forcible action in furtherance of it, would not + actively oppose it.” The report implies that the US was overly ‘evenhanded’ in talks with both sides before + the invasion.

+

Effect on US-Latin + American relations: While the report will stir up unhelpful + memories in Latin America about US + assistance to the UK during the war, the + report itself contains little that is damaging to our interests. It + documents the extensive US-UK diplomatic communication before the + invasion, including our Naval Attache in Buenos Aires, but that is not + likely to surprise the Latin Americans. Since the report only analyzes + events prior to April 30, it says nothing of our extensive cooperation + during the fighting. When discussing intelligence sources, the US is not mentioned except to state that + “there was no intelligence from American sources or otherwise to show + that the [Argentine] force at sea was intended other than for normal + naval exercises.”

+

Comment: It is a relief that the Committee’s + report does not provide fuel for the Thatcher Government’s Labor Party critics. The + Conservatives will have a difficult time as it is winning re-election + during a deep recession. The + US needs its continuing help on a + host of European security issues. We are pleased as well that the + Foreign Office comes out as well as it did. Further weakening of the + FCO is not in our interests. + Fortunately, the report does not talk more about intelligence sources or + exchanges with the US. We have enough + problems healing the scars in Latin America without such revelations. It + is possible that the lack of criticism of HMG may reflect the protection by the British establishment + of its own. The FCO had refused before + April 2 to believe that the Argentines would invade.

+
+ +
+ 421. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassies in + Argentina and the United KingdomSource: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy + File, D830031–0608. Confidential; Immediate. Sent for information + Immediate to USUN. Drafted by R. + Walser (ARA/SC); cleared by + Johnson, K. Smith (EUR/NE), L. Barnett (IO), R. Howard (ARA/SC), and C. Brown (DOD/ISA); approved by + Enders. + + + Washington, January 19, 1983, 1621Z + +

16069. Subject: Clarifying Argentine Perceptions of U.S. Policy Regarding + Falklands/Malvinas Dispute. Ref: A. Buenos Aires 246,Sent January 12. (Department of State, Central + Foreign Policy File, D830018–0984) B. State 12311,Sent January 14 to Buenos Aires and USUN. (Department of State, Central + Foreign Policy File, D830024–0916) C. London 1155.In telegram 1155 from London, January 18, the + Embassy suggested briefing the FCO + on U.S. approaches to Argentina regarding U.S. Falklands/Malvinas + policy “before they learn of these efforts independently.” + (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D830029–0443) + Summarizing the subsequent briefing, the Embassy reported: “We + briefed FCO on the steps taken by + USG to make clear that ‘we + would not countenance Argentinian use of force in any guise.’ FCO thinks our actions have been just + right, and we were told Thatcher is aware of and welcomes what USG is doing. We were told that + Thatcher and Pym are taking Argentine threat of + harassment in deadly earnest and are following developments closely + in frequent high-level meetings to assess intelligence, develop + contingencies, etc.” (Telegram 1574 from London, January 21; + Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, + D830037–0421)

+

1. C–Entire text.

+

2. The Department continues to coordinate efforts aimed at reminding the + Argentines that there has been no change in our policy with regard to + the use of force under any guise in the Falklands.

+

3. Efforts to convey this position began January 13, when ARA/SC Alternate Director spoke with + Argentine DCM Herrera Vegas (Ref B.). On the same day, Ambassador Middendorf pursuant to request (Ref A.) took the + opportunity of the OAS Permanent + Council meeting to raise the issue of U.S. opposition to the use of + force with Argentine OAS Ambassador + Quijano. Ambassador Quijano replied that he completely + understood the U.S. position based on our previous statements before the + OAS and UN.

+

4. As indicated, ARA has relayed + concerns to DOD and requested that + message be passed to Argentine attaches. DOD/ISA stated that the message + on US inflexibility regarding the use of + force in the South Atlantic has been passed formally and informally on + numerous occasions since November, most recently in conversations with + both the Argentine air and naval attaches on January 10 and 14 + respectively. DASD/IA has also + indicated that he will host a luncheon for the Argentine Ambassador + Garcia del Solar. DOD/ISA + will make separate approach to Argentine army attache. DOD/ISA feels + that it is adequately reinforcing Department’s efforts and in further + discussions will reaffirm US position as + suitable opportunities arise and has little doubt that Argentine + Washington officials understand US + position on issue.

+

5. Department is awaiting update on USUN efforts to contact Argentine delegation.

+

6. Embassy London may share information contained in this cable and in + Ref B with FCO.

+ + Shultz + +
+ +
+ 422. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassies in + Argentina and the United KingdomSource: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy + File, D830039–0813. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Sent for information to USUN. Drafted by R.B. Howard (ARA/SC); cleared in S/S–O; approved by Enders. + + + Washington, January 22, 1983, 1815Z + +

20587. Subject: Bilateral Discussion of UK Concerns Regarding the Falklands and Other Issues.

+

1. Secret–Entire text.

+

2. UK Minister Derek Thomas met with Assistant + Secretary Enders morning of + January 21 to discuss Franks Commission Report,See Document 420. + British concern about + possibility of new Falklands incident and future evolution of dispute. + (Outlook for Belizean negotiation of territorial dispute with Guatemala + and joint US-Honduran Ahuas Tara + exercise will be covered septel.)Not found.

+

3. After discussing the general content and major conclusions of the + Franks Commission Report, Assistant Secretary Enders and Thomas briefly reviewed efforts which + USG had made (March 30–April 2, + 1982), including the personal intervention by President Reagan, to ensure that Argentina + understood adverse consequences which action against the Falklands could + have both in terms of GOA’s bilateral + relations with US and in context of + Latin American sensitivities.

+

4. Referring to current UK concerns over + a new Falklands incident, Thomas + stressed importance of Argentina fully understanding the US Government’s position in opposition to + any such action.See footnote 4, Document 421. Ambassador Enders agreed, noting, however, that + Argentina’s decision regarding Falklands invasion showed the limit of + US influence with that country + earlier.

+

5. Ambassador Enders observed + that the Falklands conflict and the USG’s subsequent position in support of the UK’s resistance to Argentina’s resort to + force is still having negative fallout on US-Latin American relations. As example, he said that the + new government in Colombia has seized on this issue as a justification + for developing closer ties with the non-aligned nations and Cuba and + that Venezuelan President Herrera + Campins during their recent meeting still showed great + sensitivity toward the conflict and Prime Minister Thatcher’s visit to Falklands.

+

6. Turning to British concerns about the danger of Argentina provoking a + new incident, Ambassador Enders + assured Thomas that the USG has reiterated to the GOA through a variety of channels our + position opposing the use of force under any guise in seeking a solution + of the Falklands dispute. In response Thomas briefly reviewed recent intelligence reports + concerning possible Argentine intentions.See footnote 3, Document 419. + He said the only new information which the UK had received concerned a possible Argentine plan to + create an incident in the Antarctic, adding that the UK had raised this issue at the Antarctic + Treaty meeting in Wellington, New Zealand and that Argentina had + responded that it would strictly comply with its treaty obligations. + Thomas said that the UK nonetheless remains concerned about an + incident and hopes that Argentina will not miscalculate Great Britain’s + resolve to preserve its position in the Falklands. Ambassador Enders said that it may be necessary for the US periodically to reaffirm its opposition + to the use of force.

+

7. Ambassador Enders, noting that + over time something must happen to resolve the Falklands dispute, asked + Thomas’ assessment of future + prospects for a negotiated settlement. Thomas replied that there is no possible basis for + negotiation until Argentina and this, or some future government in Great + Britain, can establish normal relations. He stated that the wishes of + the Islands have now become a major consideration with broad public and + political support and that it would be difficult to reconcile this fact + with Argentina’s position. In response to a question, Thomas indicated that the Shackleton + report, if its recommendations are implemented, would bring an increase + in the islands’ population.On September 13, + 1982, the Shackleton Commission released an updated version of its + 1976 report on the Falklands/Malvinas economy. He reiterated + the importance of restoring relations with Argentina before any movement + on the dispute could occur. Thomas observed that there would be a heated debate in + Parliament next week and hoped that the Argentines would not over-react + by provoking an incident. This portion of the meeting concluded with + Ambassador Enders stating that + the United States continues to favor a negotiated settlement when the + time and circumstances are right.

+ + Shultz + +
+ +
+ + 423. Memorandum From the President’s Deputy Assistant for National + Security Affairs (McFarlane) to + the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Eagleburger)Source: Department of State, + Executive Secretariat, S/S Special + Handling Restrictions Memos 1979–1983, Lot 96D262, ES Sensitive February 1–10 1983. Top + Secret; Eyes Only. Copies were sent to Gregg, Iklé, + Gates, Gorman, Fontaine, and North. The memorandum was found + attached as Tab A to a February 10 briefing memorandum from + Enders to Eagleburger. Also attached to the + February 10 briefing memorandum at Tab B is an undated paper + entitled “Assessment of Possible Argentine Military Actions;” at Tab + C is an uncleared first draft of a memorandum for the CPPG entitled “Possible Argentine + Moves Against the UK in the South + Atlantic/Antarctic: Assessment and U.S. Options.” + + + Washington, February + 9, 1983 + + + SUBJECT + CPPG Meeting: Possible Argentine + Moves Against the U.K. in the South Atlantic/Antarctic (S) + +

[less than 1 line not declassified] the Argentine + military may be contemplating the use of force against the British in + the Falklands,See footnote 3, Document 419. or other U.K. bases in + the South Atlantic/Antarctic. [less than 1 line not + declassified] even a relatively low probability is disturbing + considering the consequences of any attack. [portion + marking not declassified]

+

Such an event would have serious consequences for U.S. interests in the + region as well as within NATO. Our + responses to Argentine military action against the U.K.—or even the + threat of same—will be carefully scrutinized. These developments require + that we prepare contingency plans to prevent—or ameliorate the + consequences of—such an event. Our planning should address the full + spectrum of options available to deter the Argentines or, failing that, + to mitigate the adverse impact of such action. (S)

+

The CPPG will address this issue at a + meeting in the White House Situation Room, tentatively set for Friday, + February 18, 1983.According to the February + 10 briefing memorandum from Enders to Eagleburger (see footnote + 1 above), the date of the meeting was moved to February + 11. No memorandum of conversation of the CPPG meeting has been found. In preparation for + the meeting, would you convene on a “close hold” basis an + Interdepartmental Group (IG) comprised of representatives at the + Assistant Secretary (or equivalent) level from the Office of the Vice + President, the Department of Defense, the JCS, DCI and NSC Staff to develop a paper on this + issue.See Document + 424. (S)

+ +

It is requested that the format at Tab ANot + found attached. be used, as appropriate, in preparing the + paper and that the paper specifically address the issues indicated at + Tab B.Attached but not printed is an + undated list entitled “Issues for Consideration CPPG Issues Paper,” which contains + ten items: “likelihood of attack and when and how,” “nature of U.K. + response: military, economic, diplomatic,” “effect on U.S.–U.K. + relations,” “effect on U.S.-Argentine relations,” “effect on + U.S.-Latin American relations,” “opportunities presented to the + Soviets and the Cubans,” “effect on U.S. international credibility + as ‘peacemaker,’” “measures U.S. can take to prevent Argentina + action,” and “risks and viability of each option.” Copies + should be delivered to CPPG principals + by noon, Thursday, February 17, 1983. CPPG principals will be contacted by Oliver North, NSC Staff, regarding a specific time for the meeting to + discuss/decide the paper prepared by the IG.A note in an unknown hand under this paragraph reads: “S/S: Paper to Eagleburger (COB today).”

+ + Robert C. + McFarlaneMcFarlane signed “Bud” above + his typed signature. + Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security + Affairs + +
+ +
+ + 424. Draft Interagency Group PaperSource: National Security Council, National Security + Council Institutional Files, CPPG + 0030. Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by N.S. Smith (ARA/SC) on February 17; cleared by Blackwill, Raphel, Knepper (INR), Enders, Sanchez (DOD), Fontaine, + Grusin (CIA), and Negroni (JCS). + Smith initialed for all + the clearing officials except Enders. Bremer sent the paper to Gregg, Wheeler, Stanford, Stanley, and Cormack under a February 23 covering memorandum, + stating that the draft was a revision of an earlier draft shared + with the OVP, NSC, DOD, JCS, and CIA, + produced in response to McFarlane’s request of February 9 (see Document 423). An earlier draft, dated + February 15, is in the Reagan Library, Roger W. Fontaine Files, Argentina + [02/15/1983–03/31/1983]. McManaway sent a “final” version of the paper to + Clark under a covering + memorandum on May 5. (Reagan Library, Oliver North Files, Falkland Islands (Malvinas) (2 + of 2)) + + + Washington, undated + +

POSSIBLE ARGENTINE MOVES AGAINST THE + UK IN THE SOUTH + ATLANTIC/ANTARCTIC: ASSESSMENT AND U.S. OPTIONS

+

I. SITUATION:

+

—[less than 1 line not declassified] elements in + the Argentine Armed Forces may have contemplated earlier this year the + use of force against the British in the Falklands or at other UK installations in the South Atlantic. + There could be a recurrence of such planning in the months ahead. Any + such action would have consequences for U.S. interests, particularly in + Latin America, within NATO and perhaps + in a broader context.

+

—A significant military operation is considered virtually out of the + question for this year. Argentina does not have the capability or the + will for such action in the foreseeable future. The most likely range of + possible Argentine actions would seem to involve some sort of small + scale symbolic raid, such as a frogman landing/flag planting for photos, + the strafing of an isolated patrol boat, or provocative overflights. Any + such actions would be intended, in part, to have a political and + psychological impact domestically within Argentina—to offset the drama + of Mrs. Thatcher’s visit and + redeem a vestige of military pride.

+

—The likelihood of even such a small-scale, limited-objective military + action in the near future is remote—although it can not be ruled out + given the Argentine military’s past record of erratic behavior.

+

—The U.S. took a series of actions in January 1983 to indicate the + unacceptability of any further Argentine hostilities against the UK.See Document 421. Our actions are + believed to have had an important and sobering effect on those elements + in the Argentine Navy and Air Force most likely to contemplate rash + action. [less than 1 line not declassified] on + this issue had an important + political impact in Buenos Aires, causing the Argentine government to + reaffirm its decision to pursue a negotiated solution.

+

II. ISSUES:

+

This paper provides an updated assessment of the likelihood and nature of + any potential Argentine action against the British. It reviews the + impact of such actions on U.S. interests in NATO, Latin America and elsewhere, as well as the + opportunities possibly presented to the Soviets and Cubans. After + describing likely reactions by the nations involved, a final section + analyzes the options open to the U.S. to counteract damage to our + interests.

+

A. LIKELIHOOD OF + ATTACK:

+

Argentina’s desire to recover the Falkland Islands, by negotiations if + possible, and by force if ultimately necessary, remains undiminished. + [6½ lines not declassified]

+

[less than 1 line not declassified] we have + concluded:

+

—Full-scale military action in the foreseeable future is highly unlikely. + [1½ lines not declassified] Argentine + military leaders probably share our assessment that they do not have the + military capability to execute successfully an assault on the British + defenses. From a non-military perspective, the armed forces have enough + problems managing a transition to civilian rule at a time when their + credibility has reached a post-1976 nadir.

+

—While an Argentine raid is more likely than a full-scale assault, there + is not a significant chance of one occurring in the near future. The + probability increases, however, in the presence of UK actions such as Mrs. Thatcher’s visit to the islands. A + raid would probably be a commando operation targeted against a largely + unpopulated area, perhaps West Falkland Island. The intent would likely + be to get in and out quickly, perhaps after planting a flag and taking + some pictures to embarrass the UK.

+

—The possibility of an incident involving an unplanned air encounter + arises out of Argentine charges that UK + aircraft are flying outside the exclusion zone, and reports that flights + into the exclusion zone may be undertaken by the Argentines in order to + harass UK forces and keep them edgy and + on alert.

+

—Some Argentine activities are intended to force the UK into increased expenditures on island + defenses and ultimately into the conclusion that hanging on is not worth + the cost. [3½ lines not declassified]

+

—The likelihood of an Argentine offensive in Antarctica is considered + remote because Argentina probably does not want to go against broader + Antarctic Treaty commitments involving the U.S. and the Soviet + Union.

+ +

—While military action to retake the Islands does not appear imminent, + the Armed Forces, nonetheless, can be expected to prepare contingency + plans in the event diplomatic initiatives fail. Given the volatile + internal situation in Argentina, military posturing and threats probably + will continue, from time to time, and apprehensions regarding Argentine + intentions will periodically escalate.

+

—We should carefully monitor developments and evaluate scenarios of + possible action and reaction as a basis for determining what posture the + United States may be required to adopt in the future.

+

A list of U.S. initiatives taken in January 1983 to make clear to the + Argentine Government the U.S. position on further military activity is + at Tab B.Not found attached. A version of + this list is in the Reagan Library, Roger W. Fontaine Files, Argentina + [02/15/1983–03/31/1983]. See also Document + 421.

+

B. NATURE OF PROBABLE + UK RESPONSE:

+

Any UK response, of course, would depend + on the nature of the Argentine action. In the unlikely event of an + invasion, the UK would respond at least + as vigorously as it did last year. Aircraft, ships and troops would be + rushed to the Falklands, the UK would + call for a meeting of the UN Security + Council to condemn Argentina and to impose sanctions. Mrs. Thatcher would call on the U.S. and + European Community to stop military shipments and economic trade with + Argentina.

+

In the more likely event of a small-scale commando raid, or Argentine air + penetration of the exclusion zone, the UK would likely do the following:

+

—Combat any immediate threat with its forces already in the Falklands + area. These would be sufficient for such a task, if the Argentine + action/incursion were to be detected.

+

—Ask the UN to condemn Argentina. HMG would expect U.S. support.

+

—At the highest level, HMG might call on + the U.S. to stop any remaining shipment of military equipment in the + pipeline and to maintain a hold on certifying Argentina for new sales. + We might also be asked to consider selected trade sanctions, but would + not be requested to do anything which would threaten a default on + Argentine bank debts. That would damage UK interests as well.

+

—HMG would ask the U.S. to use its + diplomatic influence in Latin America to isolate Argentina. They would + also ask us to warn Buenos Aires at the highest level that the U.S. + would, if necessary, assist the British in opposing any further military + action or encroachment.

+ +

—If the operation were considered a military success by Argentina, the + UK might well call on the U.S. to + provide future early warning assistance in the South Atlantic area, in + addition to increased logistical support out of Ascension Island. Such + U.S. assistance would become public knowledge within a short time.

+

C. EFFECT ON US-UK + RELATIONS:

+

Mrs. Thatcher is perhaps our + staunchest supporter in Europe. In the event of Argentine military + action in this pre-electoral period in the UK, she would expect swift and unequivocal U.S. backing. It + would be costly to our security, economic, and other interests among our + friends and allies if the U.S. were to appear to temporize or take a + neutral position. Public support for our security policies is already + weak in the UK. If we failed to appear + to support HMG, it would be difficult + for the government to resist those who want to distance Britain from the + U.S. on these and other issues.

+

The danger to our relationship, however, would be proportional to the + severity of the military action. In the event of a low-level symbolic + operation by the Argentine Navy—such as a small commando raid or + systematic violations of British air space—the UK would expect only limited measures on our part. If the + Argentines mounted a larger operation—such as the seizure and occupation + of a British dependency—the British almost certainly would mass sizeable + forces to rebuff the Argentines. The U.S. would be expected to provide + at least the same level of assistance given after April 30, 1982, i.e., + accelerated military sales, open support to the UK in international fora, and a cut-off of credits and + military supplies to Argentina.

+

The British recognize that our interests in Latin America suffered as a + result of our Falklands stand, but take a politic stance that the U.S. + has exaggerated the damage. They also claim that we were overly + concerned about the possibility of the Soviets increasing their presence + and influence in Argentina. Therefore, we should be prepared to provide + compelling evidence to justify any refusal of requested support in order + to limit a deterioration in US-UK relations. Of course, no rationale would + be publicly acceptable to Mrs. Thatcher’s Government.

+

D. + NATO IMPLICATIONS:

+

During the Falklands crisis, there was considerable concern about the + implications to NATO over the + relatively large number of British units involved in the conflict. The + outcome was that the British acknowledged their NATO commitments and pledged to withdraw + whatever might be needed for a NATO + contingency from Falklands duty. There would have been considerations of + time and readiness, but not one of commitment. Barring major + hostilities, we do not foresee a situation where large scale British forces would be needed in + the South Atlantic. We anticipate, therefore, no negative impact upon + NATO readiness. The British + currently maintain in the South Atlantic a force of some four to six + frigates or destroyers, two nuclear powered submarines, 12 fighter + aircraft, plus a few thousand ground troops.

+

E. EFFECT ON US/ARGENTINE + RELATIONS:

+

Following our post-mediation political and military support for the + British, U.S. relations with Argentina were seriously impaired. Many in + the Argentine military (and the general public), unable to cope with + their glaring mistakes and humiliating loss, believed (or chose to + believe) that U.S. intelligence, petroleum supplies, missiles and other + arms were largely responsible for Argentina’s defeat. As a result, we + presently have very little influence with Argentine military leaders and + potentially reduced influence with their civilian successors.

+

The U.S. undertook a series of post-Falklands initiatives to improve + relations with Argentina and other Latin American countries.In telegram 1087 from Buenos Aires, February 18, + the Embassy transmitted to the Department a study of U.S.-Argentine + relations in the 8 months since the end of the fighting in the + Falklands/Malvinas. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy + File, D830094–0188) There was no expectation of substantial + US-Argentine improvement in the + short run, but rather the hope that we could exert some degree of future + influence to prevent further hostilities in the Falklands, or an attack + against Chile. The removal of most U.S. sanctions and our subsequent + efforts to round up international support for IMF and private bank + arrangements for Argentina’s damaged economy had a positive impact on + the government. Broad public perceptions of the U.S. continue to be + strongly negative, however.

+

More significant was our vote in the UN + in favor of a moderate Argentine resolution which demonstrated to the + GOA the feasibility of working with + the U.S. to secure future diplomatic progress on the Falklands/Malvinas. + Mrs. Thatcher’s strong reaction + to our UN vote helped dramatize our + shift.

+

Argentina today is feeling its way through a delicate political + transition.In telegram 1162 from Buenos + Aires, February 23, the Embassy transmitted to the Department a + study of the prospects for Argentine stability, the + institutionalization of democracy, and U.S.-Argentine relations over + the next 8 months. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy + File, D830100–0438) The military government announced + elections by November, and a transfer of power to a constitutional + president soon thereafter. Difficult relations are anticipated with the + civilian government, whether led by the Peronist or Radical party. It is + likely to adopt foreign policy positions more closely aligned with the + third world—a shift which has already occurred to a great extent. Populist/statist/nationalist + economic policies will create difficulties for U.S. economic interests. + While the new government may be less to our liking, and its rhetoric + more anti-American, it is not likely to be extremist/radical along the + lines of Nicaragua, Libya, or the PLO. The likely Peronist presidential + candidates are middle-aged, bourgeois, and strongly anti-communist. They + seem to understand the necessity for dealing with the U.S. to achieve + their own objectives, despite public rhetoric. We expect a less + hospitable atmosphere toward the U.S. than with the pre-Falklands + military, and there will be a very bumpy time. Nevertheless, the new + Argentine government is expected to recognize essential U.S. interests + as it develops its future policies.

+

The range of actions discussed below to help deter an Argentine military + raid on the Falklands is unlikely to have a significant negative impact + on US/Argentine relations because they would be private approaches which + reiterate well-known U.S. positions. On the other hand, the likely U.S. + response should Argentina launch a small scale raid would have an + important negative impact on our relations and the public attitude of + the Argentines. In that event, U.S. actions could include: (a) a strong, + post facto demarche; (b) condemnation at the + UN and in the OAS; (c) closing of the small FMS pipeline; and (d) freezing for the + immediate future U.S. consideration of Presidential certification of + Argentina required for a renewal of future U.S. arms sales. Such actions + also would make it difficult to deal with a successor civilian regime in + Buenos Aires.

+

F. EFFECT ON US-LATIN AMERICAN RELATIONS:

+

The Falklands War initially had a strongly negative impact on our + relations with Latin America. Few Latins thought wise Argentina’s resort + to force, but supported, or felt forced publicly to side with Argentina. + The U.S. was viewed critically for having materially supported the + UK’s war effort against a Rio Treaty + partner. Much of the rancor seems to have dissipated, but residual + resentments remain acute in some countries.

+

U.S. actions taken privately to prevent renewed Argentine adventurism + from breaking out would have no significant adverse impact on our + hemispheric relations.

+

The reaction in the event of renewed hostilities would probably depend + upon the extent of conflict. Given an incident that involved neither + casualties nor major property loss, the U.S. would be condemned if we + reacted strongly. The Latins would probably view such an incident as a + legitimate part of the diplomatic game and a harmless face saver. + However, if hostilities provoked by the Argentines involved casualties + there would be less sympathy from most Latin capitals (except perhaps Venezuela and Peru). + Cuba, Nicaragua, and Grenada would respond, predictably condemning a + strong U.S. reaction. We would face in the UN and OAS renewed + strains, which could make it difficult to secure cooperation on some + hemispheric issues of importance.

+

G. OPPORTUNITIES PRESENTED + TO THE SOVIETS & CUBANS:

+

Any festering of the old wounds of the Falklands crisis could provide + some new opportunity for initiating military cooperation by the Soviets + and Cubans, depending upon the extent of renewed hostilities. Given the + limited possibility for anything more than an isolated incident, + however, there probably would be little opportunity for the USSR or its clients. In the diplomatic + area, Argentina has moved toward NAM + positions already in order to gain support for Falklands/Malvinas + negotiations. In the economic field, it agreed to Aeroflot service, + increased trade with Cuba, and heavy Soviet grain purchases continue. + But so far we have not seen signs that Argentina is seriously + considering any arms transactions with the Soviets. This is the most + sensitive area, and we doubt that a small symbolic and basically + ineffectual raid would add meaningfully to arguments on either side for + a new arms supply relationship.

+

H. EFFECT ON U.S. + INTERNATIONAL CREDIBILITY AS A PEACEMAKER:

+

If there is some restricted, symbolic, or low-level action by the + Argentines against the British, the public and press aspects of the + event probably would be the most significant result. There would be + governmental and public speculation throughout the world as to whether + anyone could have foreseen the hostilities, or whether anyone had + reasonable intelligence of such a possibility, and whether peace could + have been preserved by private or diplomatic action. The U.S. would be + the likely target of such speculation. After any hostilities, our + credibility as a peacemaker will be affected by what we might have done + to prevent it, how we acted to contain or reduce the violence, and the + perception of fairness that we showed.

+

III. U.S. OPTIONS:

+

The U.S. took vigorous action in January 1983 to warn the Argentine + Government that a South Atlantic incident would not serve their own + interests, and certainly would not enjoy U.S. acquiescence or support. A + chronology of these actions is contained at Tab B.

+

Beyond such diplomatic activity, the range of additional U.S. steps would + appear to be limited. The U.S. seems to have very little ability to + directly influence either party in the dispute, as we saw during the Falklands War. Mrs. Thatcher seems impervious to U.S. + suggestions on this subject, and U.S. influence on the Falklands issue + in Argentina is even less. We have little or no influence on the + military, which probably sees little to be gained from us (with one + possible exception) in the brief period remaining before elections.

+

Obviously, it is essential that we closely monitor Argentine military + activities and intentions. And we should not hesitate to express our + serious concerns whenever there are indications of potentially dangerous + activities.

+

Theoretically, the U.S. could threaten to undermine Argentina’s foreign + debt arrangements with the International Monetary Fund, the Bank for + International Settlements, and private banks. But that could seriously + damage important U.S. interests and does not constitute a credible + threat. A reactivation of hostilities and increased tensions would have + that effect, regardless of the U.S. position. Argentina’s precarious + economic situation may work as a broad constraint against adventurous + actions, but the military is not likely to be swayed by any U.S. + economic leverage.

+

The one area of potential impact on the military relates to Presidential + certification of Argentina’s human rights record and U.S. national + interests, required by the Foreign Assistance authorization bill of + 1981, as a first step to future arms sales. Argentina’s democratic + opening, its recent releases of political prisoners plus the sharp + decline of repression and absence of disappearances would seem to make + early certification a feasible U.S. policy. There are, however, + Chile-Argentine considerations and a U.S. customs investigation into + alleged illegal Argentine arms exports that will weigh negatively on + that outcome. With respect to the investigation, we would wish to + ascertain if evidence available relating to possible Argentine misdeeds + poses major political and legal obstacles before making the + certification. Domestically, some Democratic Congressmen have urged us + to wait and certify Argentina after the elections so the U.S. does not + appear to be encouraging the military government.

+

We have given preliminary consideration to trying to use the + certification issue to help reduce the likelihood of any incident in the + Falklands. One proposal is to inform the Argentine Government this + spring that we would be prepared to certify before their elections (and + perhaps consider sales after the elections) provided there were no + “unpleasant surprises”, either with regard to action against the + Falklands or efforts to thwart the civilian transition.

+

Potential options on the certification issue, therefore, involve carrots + and sticks. While it is difficult to evaluate the impact of U.S. + certification on Argentine military thinking, by making it clear that we + were prepared to certify in the near term, we would demonstrate that the Argentine military had + something concrete to lose by a rash action in the Falklands.

+

Major Argentine military procurement has already been arranged with the + Germans, French, Austrians and Israelis to provide new and used ships, + aircraft, tanks and other armaments. The Argentine military may prefer + not to develop a dependence on U.S. suppliers for political reasons. + Certification would offer them two advantages however: (1) + Political/psychological benefits since our action would be seen by many + as symbolic of U.S. approval; and (2) Some military equipment which the + Argentines would clearly prefer to buy from the U.S., such as engines + and parts for their U.S. airplanes, communications equipment and + possibly helicopters.

+

The question of possible Argentine certification during the first half of + 1983 will be examined in more depth in a subsequent memorandum.

+

Should there be a small-scale incident, the recommended U.S. reaction + would be determined by the circumstances. Presumably it would include + public declarations and diplomatic demarches as well as activity in the + UN and OAS. Whether it would involve the possibility of specific + U.S. sanctions would have to be determined at the time.

+

[1 paragraph (3½ lines) not declassified]

+

British moderation, in terms of future visits and public declarations on + the Falklands anniversary, could reduce the possibility of hostile + Argentine activities. Whether Mrs. Thatcher is prepared to tone down British rhetoric or + symbolic actions in a difficult election year is very much in doubt. + Still, it is a useful point we could make to our British allies. One + possible conciliatory step by the UK + would be the reduction of the 150 mile exclusion zone. This would not + seem to make sense from a military perspective, however, and there seems + to be no reasonable chance we could convince them that this would serve + UK interests.

+
+ +
+ + 425. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the + United KingdomSource: + Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D830119–0467. + Secret; Priority. Sent for information Priority to Belize and for + information to Guatemala City, Buenos Aires, and Brasilia. Drafted + by P.D. Hughes (EUR/NE); cleared + by Dobbins, J. Binns (EUR/NE), C. Johnstone (ARA/CEN), N.S. Smith (ARA/SC), and T. Coony (ARA/BR); approved by Enders. + + + Washington, March 4, 1983, 2020Z + +

59308. Subject: FCO Minister of State + Cranley Onslow’s February 18 + Call on Assistant Secretary Enders.

+

1. Secret–Entire text.

+

2. Summary: ARA Assistant Secretary + Enders’s meeting with FCO Minister of State Cranley Onslow February 18 focussed on + Belize and Argentina. On Belize, Onslow indicated HMG + firmness on decision to withdraw UK + garrison and welcomed Enders’s + suggestion that an internationally guaranteed freeze on boundary + questions be explored as a possible way out. Onslow urged denial of US arms to Guatemala and indefinite hold on certification + and arms sales to Argentina. End summary.

+

3. FCO Minister of State Cranley Onslow called on Assistant + Secretary Enders of ARA Bureau February 18. Accompanying + Onslow were British Embassy + DCM Thomas and First Secretary + French. Participants on the US side were + ARA/SC and ARA/CEN Directors Smith and Johnstone and UK Desk Officer Hughes. Summary of + discussion follows.

+

[Omitted here is discussion of Belize.]

+

5. Argentina/Falklands: Exchange on Falklands/Malvinas issue was + relatively abbreviated because of press of follow-on appointments. In + response to question, Enders + observed that it was impossible to predict with certainty the views of + the post-election government in Argentina, adding that, of course, + policy changes also could result from the next British election. + Minister Onslow replied that Mrs. + Thatcher might well be + returned, but that in any event, no British Government would change the + current position on the sovereignty issue “within the next five years,” + regardless of “international pressure.” Enders commented that, in all probability, neither would + any new Argentine Government. If such conditions prevailed, they noted + that the chances of progress toward bilateral solution seemed extremely + slim. Enders said prolonged + stalemate raised difficulties and urged that HMG carefully weigh situation and consider, for example, + whether some form of multilateral involvement might not offer a way out. + Following our 1982 experience, + Enders said, renewed direct + involvement was not attractive to us but other formulas might be useful. + Onslow asserted that the + British do not particularly like the idea of either UN trusteeship or the prospect, for + example, of Antarctic Treaty involvement.

+

6. Onslow also raised briefly the + question of US certification and future + arms sales to Argentina. (He had not at this point talked to Under + Secretary Eagleburger.)No memorandum of conversation of this meeting + has been found. + Onslow said that while the UK realized that the US might view certification and arms sales + as a means of establishing good relations with a new Argentine + Government, HMG would be strongly + critical if actual arms sales were concluded. Enders responded that arms sales and + certification were two very different issues. ARA/SC Director Smith observed that Argentina had made extensive + purchases from European suppliers and that we did not expect that + Argentina would purchase significant new arms systems from the United + States, but primarily ship and aircraft replacement parts. Ambassador + Enders stated that as yet we + had no fixed view on certification timing, but that we would discuss the + issue with HMG when we had a clearer + idea of when and how we should proceed.Onslow followed up on + the subject of Argentine certification with Streator on March 8, at which time + he “outlined in detail British concerns that the U.S. might certify + human rights progress in Argentina prematurely” and “strongly + recommended that Enders + visit London in April.“ (Telegram 5164 from London, March 10; + Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, + D830132–0936)

+

[Omitted here is a brief discussion of the economic situation in + Brazil.]

+ + Dam + +
+ +
+ + 426. Memorandum From the Deputy Director for Operations, Central + Intelligence Agency (Stein) to the Assistant Secretary of State for + Inter-American Affairs (Enders), + the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Burt), the Director of the Bureau of + Intelligence and Research (Montgomery), the Director of the Defense Intelligence + Agency (Williams), and the Senior + Staff Member of the National Security CouncilSource: Reagan Library, Roger W. Fontaine Files, + Falklands/Malvinas 1983. Secret; [handling + restriction not declassified]. At the top of the + memorandum, Clark wrote: + “Staff—WPC.” The source of the + information is noted as FIRDB–312/00760–83. + + + Washington, March 14, + 1983 + + + SUBJECT + Significant New Information Available to the Leadership of the + Argentine Army on Alleged U.S. Support to the British During the + Falklands War + +

THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE.

+

Summary: On 9 March, the Commander of the Argentine Army was given + significant new information on alleged U.S. support to the British + during the Falklands War. Even before that information was received, the + leadership of the Army was coming to the conclusion that the United + States had indeed provided substantial support to the British and that + the U.S. Government is basically antagonistic to the Argentine + Government. The next three weeks are likely to produce renewed + anti-American sentiments within Argentina and within the Argentine + Army.

+

Text: 1. [3 lines not declassified]

+

2. On 8 March 1983, an officer attached to the office of the Argentine + Army Attache in Washington returned to Buenos Aires to provide General + Cristino Nicolaides, + Commander of the Army, with new information he had obtained on alleged + U.S. support to the British during the Falklands War. The officer, who + briefed Nicolaides on 9 March, + said he had obtained his information from U.S. officials in Washington. + In his briefing, the officer provided extensive information on the + alleged U.S. support to the British, including the provision of major + materiel support and the widespread passage of U.S. intelligence + information, including signals intelligence, reports from human sources, + [less than 1 line not declassified]. The + officer provided evidence that the alleged U.S. support had been much + more extensive than officials of the Argentine Army had previously + believed; he also showed that this alleged U.S. support was extensive both during and after + the period when the U.S. was involved in trying to arrange a peaceful + settlement of the issue.

+

3. On the basis of information the officer said he had obtained in + Washington, he told Nicolaides + that the Argentine Government should not underestimate the extent of + British influence within the U.S. Government. The officer said the U.S. + Government had been tending toward a decision to give Argentina the + certification required to permit U.S. military sales to Argentina. + However, the officer said, British pressure and influence on the U.S. + Executive Branch and the U.S. Congress had lead the U.S. Government to + decide that it would not grant certification unless it could obtain a + major concession from the Argentine Government. The officer said this + concession probably would be in the form of a request that Argentina + provide support to counterinsurgency activities in El Salvador. Such + support, the officer told Nicolaides, might prove to be a requirement before any + U.S. decision to grant certification to Argentina.

+

4. Nicolaides said he was very + impressed by the information and views provided by the officer.

+

5. (Source Comments:

+

a. The officer is considered to be very knowledgeable about the U.S. + Government because of his extensive contacts among U.S. military and + civilian officials in Washington. Thus, his information and views are + considered very credible by Argentine military officials.

+

b. Argentine Navy officials have long believed that the U.S. provided + extensive support to the British during the War; the Navy’s refusal to + join this year’s United International Antisubmarine Warfare (UNITAS) exercise, and the public + declaration of the reasons for that refusal, clearly show the Navy’s + attitude. For a long time, this attitude was not shared by the Army + leadership, which believed the Navy was exaggerating the levels of U.S. + support to the British. Within recent months, however, the Army has + moved closer to the Navy position, not only in its understanding of the + extent of alleged U.S. support to the British but also in its view that + the U.S. Government is basically antagonistic to the Argentine + Government. For the Argentine Army leadership, one demonstration of this + alleged U.S. antagonism was the distribution by the U.S. Embassy in + Buenos Aires of a study on Cuban subversion, including Cuban assistance + to subversion in Argentina in the 1970s. This study was distributed + right after Argentine President Reynaldo + Bignone had publicly thanked Cuban President Fidel Castro + for Cuba’s assistance to Argentina during the Falklands War; the + distribution of this U.S. study served to undermine Bignone’s statement and his image at + the meeting of the Nonaligned Movement (NAM) that he was attending in New Delhi. The U.S. + Government may believe that there is opposition within the Argentine + Army to Argentina’s participation in the NAM and to Bignone’s presence at the meeting in + New Delhi. This interpretation is erroneous; the Argentine Army supports + Argentina’s role in the NAM, and the + Junta—including the Army—approved Bignone’s travel to New Delhi. Thus, the distribution of + the U.S. study—which attacked a Cuba that had just been lauded by + Argentina—was interpreted by the Argentine Army as a direct affront to + Argentina and to the Army itself.

+

c. The commemoration of the 2 April anniversary of the Argentine landing + on the Falkland Islands will be an emotional event for the Argentine + Army. This anniversary will also revive bitterness over the alleged U.S. + support to the British. The period before and during the anniversary + commemorations is likely to produce renewed anti-American sentiments + within Argentina and within the Argentine Army.)

+

6. The above information is being made available to the U.S. Ambassador, + Deputy Chief of Mission, and Defense Attache in Buenos Aires; and to + principal officers in London.

+ + John H. SteinPrinted from a copy + that indicates that Duane R. Clarridge signed for Stein. + Deputy Director for Operations + +
+ +
+ + 427. Action Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for + Inter-American Affairs (Enders) + to Secretary of State ShultzSource: + Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S Special Handling Restrictions Memos 1979–1983, Lot + 96D262, ES Sensitive March 24–31 + 1983. Secret. Sent through Eagleburger. Drafted by N.S. Smith (ARA/SC); cleared by Brown (PM), + Haass, Abrams, Bosworth, Kozak (L), Fox (H), and Schneider (T). Smith initialed for all the + clearing officials with the exception of Schneider. A stamped notation at the top of the + memorandum indicates that Shultz saw it. A typed notation at the top of the + memorandum reads: “Original was not received in S/S–I.” However, a + notation in an unknown hand reads: “Treat as + original.” + + + Washington, March 25, + 1983 + + + SUBJECT + Presidential Certification of Argentina + +

ISSUE FOR DECISION

+

When to initiate steps necessary to certify to the Congress that + Argentina has made significant human rights progress, thereby restoring + its eligibility for possible future arms sales and security + assistance.

+

ESSENTIAL FACTORS

+

A. Certification and Human + Rights Progress

+

Current security assistance legislation permits the resumption of arms + transfers to Argentina if the President certifies that the Argentine + Government has made significant human rights progress and that such + transfers are in the U.S. national interest. (Text at Tab B.)Attached but not printed are excerpts from the + International Security and Development Cooperation Act of + 1981.

+

There have been significant improvements in Argentina’s human rights + situation: no confirmed “disappearances” for over two years; almost no + new detentions for political reasons; and an accelerated release of + National Executive Power (“PEN”) + political prisoners. Most important, national elections are now + scheduled for this October, with the new government to take office + January 30, 1984. While a Congressional requirement on providing + information on the “disappeared” will be difficult, the overall case + that there has been significant human rights progress is strong. (Human + rights summary at Tab C.)Attached but not + printed is an undated paper entitled “Human Rights Progress in + Argentina.”

+ +

B. Rationale for + Certification

+

Failure to certify Argentina soon, given human rights progress, will be + seen as a political slap at the Argentine military, severely estranged + from us since the Falklands. Some argue we should delay certification + until after the elections to reward the new civilian government. + However, we have a major stake in the military in the years ahead. It + will remain the principal arbiter of Argentine politics, a bastion of + anti-Communism and essential to eventual peaceful resolution of the + dangerous Falklands and Beagle Channel disputes. For the military, + certification is the key to future cooperation with the U.S. Our + national interests require that we try to establish a basis for working + with them, which has proved difficult over the years.

+

C. Impact on Regional + Peace

+

An important U.S. objective is to prevent hostilities between Argentina + and Britain in the Falklands, or Argentina and Chile in the Beagle. + Since the Falklands, Argentina has made major arms purchases from + Western Europe (submarines and frigates from Germany; jet aircraft and + missiles from France) and from Israel and Latin America. However, they + are not adequate to support a major attack against the Islands. In the + Beagle, Argentina retains a significant edge, but Chile’s superior + discipline, training and defensive mission would make Argentine + adventurism potentially costly. The possibility of a significant armed + encounter this year is remote.

+

Certification will not affect the military balance or increase the + chances of war in either dispute. Argentina is unlikely to seek major + U.S. purchases soon, except for spares, because of its recent major + acquisitions elsewhere and its view that we are an “unreliable + supplier.” Certification does not mean we would approve or act quickly + on Argentine requests. We will consider them carefully, case by case. We + would not authorize destabilizing or threatening transactions.

+

D. Relations with the + UK and Chile

+

U.K. Mrs. Thatcher, the leader of our closest friend in Europe, + would react swiftly and negatively to any early certification. She + argues that we should not give this benefit to a country still + technically at war with Britain, and especially one led by a military + dictatorship that is rearming as fast as possible. Mrs. Thatcher is well aware that we are + asking HMG to help maintain European + support on INF deployment, in the + U.S.-E.C. trade dispute, and in several areas of the Caribbean. Coming + on top of our continuing dispute over “extraterritoriality,” differences + on East/West trade and the likely anti-trust indictment of British + airlines and HMG officials, + certification of Argentina at this time will curdle an already souring + atmosphere. We must keep in mind that every opinion poll in the U.K. shows confidence in U.S. + leadership at a post-war low. Certification would shrink even more the + number of our hard-core supporters.

+

Elections will likely be held in the U.K. this year, and certification, + at least before Argentina’s October election, could make it an issue in + the campaign, placing the Tories on the defensive for having supported + the U.S. so consistently on security issues, such as INF. Certification following the Argentine + elections would still provoke a negative public reaction by HMG, but the issue would be far more + manageable. EUR, therefore, opposes + certification prior to the Argentine elections, believing it would be a + mistake to trade a notional improvement in our relations with Argentina + for the certain deterioration in our relations with the U.K.

+

EUR believes the scenario suggested by + this paper for certification without approval of major sales is faulty. + Whatever goodwill we might gain from certifying Argentina will be + quickly used up if we fail to deliver on specific weapons requests. + Additionally, failure to approve sales will anger third country + suppliers, i.e., Israel, who will wish to transfer U.S. origin military + equipment to Argentina. Approval of sales will cause a strong negative + reaction in Britain. EUR believes it + would force the British to transfer more NATO committed forces to the Falklands, and diminish the + chances for a negotiated solution. (ARA + disagrees.)

+

Chile. A statutory U.S. arms export ban also + applies to Chile. To certify Chile, the law requires both Chilean + cooperation on the Letelier/Moffitt murders and significant human rights + progress. Chilean certification is not now feasible given the lack of + positive developments on either issue, and our investigation of military + exports from the U.S. to Chile in violation of our laws. In light of + Chile’s poor performance, its certification would undermine our + credibility and thus Congressional support for our Central America + policy.

+

A decision to certify Argentina but not Chile would be a major blow to + Pinochet, who has suffered a + series of economic and foreign policy reverses in recent months. While + he still retains a firm hold on the military, Pinochet has been undermined by the + economic crisis and lost civilian backers. Nevertheless, there is little + likelihood he would consider internal changes to demonstrate human + rights progress to our Congress. His reaction to Argentine certification + may be bitter. To ameliorate this, we propose a presidential message and + special emissary to Pinochet to + underline our desire for good relations and our wish to certify Chile + when feasible. We would reaffirm the U.S. commitment to the Rio Treaty + in the Beagle Channel dispute and the limited nature of U.S. arms sales + to Argentina. We would propose actions to demonstrate publicly the + closeness of our relations.

+ +

E. Congressional and Legal + Issues

+

Argentina’s announced elections and human rights progress have mitigated + Congressional opposition to certification. There will be concern about + selling arms after the Falklands War and dissatisfaction over the lack + of information concerning the disappeared.Attached but not printed is an undated paper entitled “The + Disappeared.” Some will argue that we should wait to certify + until after elections there. Congressman Barnes will introduce an amendment to withhold + assistance or sales until the new government takes office.

+

Other relevant issues concern Argentine misuse of U.S. equipment during + the Falklands War, a Customs investigation of possible illegal military + exports from the U.S. to Chile and Argentina and GOA acquisition of nuclear reprocessing + technology from Italy. We believe that the purposes of U.S. laws + concerning use of U.S. equipment and exports of munitions list items can + be fulfilled and Congressional concerns on these issues minimized by + reaching appropriate understandings with the Argentines concerning their + observance in the future. The nuclear issue is potentially more serious. + If it were established that a transfer of such technology had occurred + (which is the preliminary conclusion of a recent internal study), under + U.S. law no U.S. economic or security assistance could be provided to + Argentina although cash sales would not be precluded. Under these + circumstances, Congressional concern could mount. Overall, however, + although we may face an emotional and possibly strong reaction, we do + not foresee a successful challenge to certification in the Congress.

+

F. Next Steps

+

Attached at Tab A is a memorandum for the President informing him of our + certification plans.Attached but not + printed. Tab E contains a scenario for diplomatic and + Congressional discussions prior to certification.Attached but not printed at Tab E is a paper + entitled “Proposed Certification Scenario.” This scenario + contemplates that certification would occur in July (following British + parliamentary elections and prior to the Argentine election campaign). + Any significant deliveries thus could not occur prior to the Argentine + elections. Few, if any, would be received prior to installation of + Argentina’s new civilian government in January 1984. We would inform the + Argentine Government that we are prepared to certify on the + understanding that we would not face any “unpleasant surprises” + involving incidents in the Falklands or Beagle Channel, no reversal of + the return to democracy and that they observe applicable constraints on + the use of U.S.-furnished + equipment and U.S. munitions control laws. We would send a special + emissary to discuss certification and bilateral relations with President + Pinochet, offering to examine + steps both countries could take to demonstrate our continued close + relations and suggesting steps on human rights which Chile might take to + permit future certification.

+

We would consult closely with the UK, + reviewing our assessment of the limited nature of future transactions, + our intention not to sell sophisticated weapons that could significantly + increase the Falklands threat, our procedures for careful, case-by-case + consideration of requests, and Argentine assurances on avoidance of + future incidents. We would also engage in extensive Congressional + consultations.

+

G. Alternative Scenario

+

HA believes that certification can be + justified on human rights grounds, but, all issues considered, that we + should not certify until October if the UK election does not occur until then.

+

The timing of certification depends on three difficult political + judgments: how much damage will we suffer in Congress and public opinion + if we certify before the Argentine election; how much damage will we + suffer with the Argentine military if we do not certify until after the + election; and how much damage will there be to US-UK relations if we do + certify the military regime with which they recently fought a war.

+

HA believes that, if there is a June + election in the UK, certification can be + justified so long as it is not “unconditional,” for this would bring us + needless trouble with Congress and indeed the UK. The “condition” we would propose is that there be no + actual military deliveries until the change in government planned in + January. This would mollify the UK and + Hill critics of + certification, retain the leverage on the military to complete the + return to civilian government, and protect us should that return be + halted. (If we certify and sell arms and the military halts the election + or inauguration, we will have lots of egg on our face. It will be said + that we gave the military what they wanted—certification—too soon, + giving up our leverage for democracy and contributing to any military + decision to interrupt the elections.) We need not “rub the Argentines’ + nose” in this, and should say that the lengthy process of military + contract negotiations makes deliveries for 1983 virtually impossible. + But we must be willing to say that if the military does not permit the + election and return to democracy, there will be no sales now, or we will + be saying that the military can halt the election + or inauguration and still get the same arms + sales. This we cannot say, and we should be clear what our policy + is.

+

If the UK election is not until October, + we believe that it makes more sense to postpone certification until + then. We will gain more at home + and in the UK than, in our view, we lose + with the Argentine military. In HA’s + view, even certification in July is unlikely to produce a Golden Age in + relations with the Argentine military, and the degree of resentment + which the delay may cause is speculative.

+

Timing needs careful consideration. HA + believes that we should not begin the process of Congressional + consultations and other steps envisioned in the attached scenario until + the Congress has finished dealing with the El Salvador and other Central + American aid requests currently before it, which we expect would be the + end of April.

+

Further HA believes that Congressional + and public opposition to certification will focus on the issue of the + failure of the Argentine Government to account for the disappeared. + While little can be done for the disappeared who are dead, there are + believed to be several hundred live children of the disappeared whose + relatives are seeking their return. We believe that at the time we + certify we must make a strong demarche to the Argentine + Government—military or civilian—urging an accounting of those + children.

+

RECOMMENDATIONS:

+

That you sign the memorandum for the President at Tab A; and that you + approve the scenario for Argentine certification proposed at Tab E. + (Favored by ARA, S/P, and PM)Shultz neither approved nor + disapproved the recommendation.

+

Alternatively

+

That the process not begin until Congress has completed action on the + Central American aid requests (approximately early May), with + certification to follow the British elections. Certification should be + based clearly and publicly on the uninterrupted return to democracy. We + would state publicly that any interruption of the democratization by the + military process will lead us to refuse military sales and deliveries. + (Favored by HA)Shultz + initialed his approval of this alternative on March 28. Next to the + paragraph he wrote: “—wait + bring it up with me again before any + movement. GPS.”

+

Alternatively

+

That Argentina not be certified prior to its elections in October 1983. + (Favored by EUR)Shultz + neither approved nor disapproved this alternative.

+
+ +
+ + 428. Memorandum From Director of Central Intelligence Casey to President ReaganSource: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of the + Director of Central Intelligence, Job 88B00443R: Policy Files + (1980–1986), Box 14, Folder 408: DCI Casey Memo Chrono (1 Jul–31 Aug ’83). + Secret. + + + Washington, July 25, + 1983 + + + SUBJECT + Report of Intelligence Activities + +

[Omitted here is material unrelated to the conflict in the South + Atlantic.]

+

Argentina

+

General Sotera, the Argentine G–2, + brought assurance that the armed forces are fully committed to free + elections and transfer of power to civilians in Argentina. His primary + message was that the time had come to improve relationships between the + United States and Argentina and to use three steps:

+

(a) Certification under the Humphrey-Kennedy amendment to permit military sales. The + psychological gesture was said to be more important than access to + US military equipment.

+

(b) The serious Argentine debt problem requires special treatment by IMF + similar to arrangements worked out with Mexico and Brazil.

+

(c) Exert influence on the British to cease “destabilizing” actions in + the hemisphere. This seemed to be the most significant of the three + requests. Sotera was adamant that + the Argentines are not in a position to undertake major military + operations and there was no significant support for such an action + within their armed forces. In the light of this it would be helpful if + the British would ease off or at least play down activities like basing + and transportation arrangements involving Chilean naval ports, landing + rights in Brazil and Uruguay, the training of the Chilean armed forces, + propaganda suggesting that Argentina plans to invade Chile because of + the Beagle Channel dispute, declarations about building in the Malvinas + a larger airfield and establishing sophisticated radar there. His + government hopes that the British might be influenced to lower the tone + and scale of these activities in the interest of restoring greater + harmony in the hemisphere and minimizing tendencies in Argentina to look + to the Soviets for military aid.

+

[Omitted here is material unrelated to the conflict in the South + Atlantic.]

+ + William J. + CaseyPrinted from a copy + that bears this typed signature. + +
+ +
+ + 429. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in + ArgentinaSource: + Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D830438–0079. + Confidential. Sent for information to London and USUN. Drafted by D. Jett (ARA/SC); cleared by R.B. Howard + (ARA/SC); approved by + Motley. + + + Washington, August 1, 1983, 1858Z + +

214783. Subject: Argentine Ambassador Garcia + del Solar’s Call on Ambassador Motley.

+

1. C–Entire text.

+

2. Summary. During July 22 courtesy call on ARA Assistant Secretary Motley, Argentine Ambassador Garcia del Solar raised the question + of Ambassador Shlaudeman’s + replacement, this year’s UNGA + resolution on the Falklands/Malvinas, British construction of an + airfield on the Islands, certification of Argentina on human rights, and + the foreign debt problem. End summary.

+

3. Argentine Ambassador Garcia del + Solar paid a courtesy call on Assistant Secretary + Motley July 22 accompanied + by Minister Hererra Vega. Richard Howard and Dennis Jett of ARA/SC were also present.

+

4. Replacement of Amb. Shlaudeman: Ambassador Garcia + del Solar opened the conversation by saying that while he + had wanted to have a tour d’horizon in this his first meeting with Amb. + Motley, a number of specific + points had arisen recently. GDS pointed + out that the departure of Amb. Shlaudeman had come rather suddenly. Amb. Motley replied that this reflected Dr. + Kissinger’s insistence on having Amb. Shlaudeman as a condition of taking charge of the + Commission on Central America; preoccupation with the Central American + problem and the need for first rate people to serve on and staff the + commission.The National Bipartisan + Commission on Central America was established on July 19.

+

5. Amb. Motley said that time + pressure prevented consultation with the GOA on the move. While he had not yet seen the President’s + decision in writing, Amb. Motley + said the GOA would be pleased with the + choice of Amb. Shlaudeman’s + successor who would be proposed within the next few weeks.Shlaudeman + left post on August 26. Frank V. + Ortiz, appointed on November 18, replaced him as + Ambassador to Argentina.

+

6. Falklands airfield: GDS moved on to + the recent statement by the Argentine Minister of Defense to the effect + that the British construction of an airfield on the Falklands was in + reality designed to give NATO a base + in the South Atlantic. GDS wanted the + U.S. to know that only the President or Minister of Foreign Affairs + spoke for the GOA on such subjects and that the GOA wished to disengage itself from the + Defense Minister’s statement.

+

7. Motley pointed out that while + he did not wish to criticize the Defense Minister, the allegation about + a NATO base was nonsense and reflected + a theme being circulated by Soviet propaganda.

+

8. GDS then delivered a letter + containing the statement of protest made by the GOA on the airport issue in the UN.The text of the letter, in + Spanish and English, was addressed to Shultz by Garcia del + Solar. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy + File, P830102–2294) He said that the UK’s action adds to tension in the area, is an affirmation + of sovereignty and builds up warlike situation on the Islands. He said + the Argentine desire, in keeping with the thrust of the UN resolution on the subject, is to freeze + the military situation pending negotiations and not to escalate the + problem. The GOA believes the USG can exert influence on the British and + persuade them not to complicate the problem.In telegram 5279 from Buenos Aires, August 3, the Embassy reported + that “Foreign Ministry policy officials have made strong pitch to us + to dissuade UK from proceeding with + construction of Fortress Falklands.” Listre “asked for our support in maintaining ‘the + status quo’ pending some movement toward negotiation. Without that, + he hinted, the GOA may take the + matter of the UK’s new base to the + UN Security Council.” + (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, + D830445–0187)

+

9. In response, Amb. Motley said + he had followed the dispute while he was in Brazil and had the + opportunity to discuss it with Secretary Haig during his attempts to mediate the crisis. It was + also a subject that had come up when President Reagan met with President Figueiredo. On the airport issue, + Amb. Motley recognized Argentine + sensitivities but noted that the British maintain that the airport’s + main purpose was not to increase military tensions but to enable + resupply by larger aircraft.

+

10. UN resolution on the + Falklands/Malvinas: On the question of the Malvinas GDS said Argentina will again sponser a + moderate UN resolution that will not go + further than last year’s. He hoped the US could again support it. Amb. Motley said this was encouraging and + asked to see a draft as soon as possible. GDS said he would provide a copy ASAP, commenting, however, that while it won’t introduce + any new elements, there is a need to keep pressure on the British to + negotiate. Drawing on his earlier UN + experience, GDS described the American + “hands off” position as having been constant over the years. Given the + US vote favoring this UN resolution, the GOA now believes the US is + obligated to continue its efforts as during the war to “pressure” the + British to accept negotiations. GDS + added that he did not know when the Malvinas problem would ultimately be + resolved, but that as long as it continued, it would give the left an + opportunity to exploit and increase tensions within Argentina.

+ +

11. In response to GDS’s question on the + US feeling on the possibilities for + negotiation, Amb. Motley said + that in Brazil he had discussed the general question at length with the + British Ambassador. He noted that he had not yet had the opportunity to + deal with the subject in depth here in Washington but plans to do so in + the near future.

+

12. Foreign debt: GDS next raised an + urgent problem involving the foreign debt, which had just come to him + for action that day. He began by pointing out that Economy Minister + Wehbe and Central Bank President Gonzalez del Solar were doing a + tremendous job under difficult circumstances. Sectors within the + military, especially the air force, did not want to pay the foreign + debt. The GOA was subject to constant + public and political pressures and criticism. With inflation and + increased union demands the economic situation was becoming increasingly + difficult. The Junta had earlier allowed the British banks to remit + earnings but did not agree to lift the sanctions on other British firms + without a reduction in the exclusion zone. The air force, which is very + nationalistic, has taken a strong position on this issue. Wehbe and + Gonzalez del Solar were the best men available, and it would be a + tragedy if they were forced out because of their failure to resolve the + IMF issue.

+

13. GDS said the British were being + quite firm on the IMF requirement that Argentina lift the sanctions on + remittance of dividends to the UK. If + the British don’t accept a delay in the IMF’s condition, the GOA will be unable to draw on the third + tranche or sign the medium term 1.5 billion credit with the commercial + banks. The GOA was requesting an + extension of the status quo until February 1, 1984. After the elections + on October 30, the power of the air force will diminish and there would + be room for negotiations, the Ambassador emphasized.

+

14. Amb. Motley said he + understood the dilemma and that it was in no one’s interest to see the + economic recovery of Argentina jeopardized. The international monetary + system would also be affected by this situation. He told Garcia del Solar that the question has + been discussed at a high-level and that US concern has been expressed to the British, who were + non-committal in response.

+

15. GDS expressed appreciation for the + USG’s help, especially the efforts + of Treasury Deputy Secretary McNamar on this matter. He said the GOA would be talking to all the IMF member + governments but that Argentina believed the American attitude on this + question was key. He also appreciated the fact the question was + discussed at a high level by the US.

+

16. Certification: GDS asked how the + USG could certify El Salvador on + human rights but not Argentina. Amb. Motley responded that Argentina was fortunate not to be + engaged in a war or face the Salvadorean certification requirement with + its 5 elements which had to be certified every 6 months. On the question of Argentine + certification, he pointed out that there are many factors that must be + considered, such as the congressional outlook, accounting for the + disappeared, regional balance with Chile, etc.

+

17. GDS said the Argentine public and + political parties do not care about certification but that the armed + forces, especially the air force, are sensitive to it. The air force is + the hardest on the issue but also has the most material needs if + military sales are resumed. Amb. Motley said he was still unsure if Congress can be + convinced to accept certification but added that movement on an issue + such as the Beagle Channel dispute could help create a better climate + for certification. GDS said that any + agreement would be difficult to reach until the new government takes + over. Pointing out that the military wants to leave power on a positive + note, he said that a gesture such as certification would help the US image with the military.

+ + Shultz + +
+ +
+ 430. Action Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for + Inter-American Affairs (Motley), + the Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs + (Newell), and the Acting + Secretary of State for European Affairs (Kelly) to Secretary of State ShultzSource: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy + File, P830157–1004. Confidential. Drafted by D. Jett (ARA/SC) and C.K. Stocker (EUR/NE) on August 30; cleared by + Haass, J.R. Binns (EUR/NE), R.B. Howard (ARA/SC), M.G. Kozak (L), R. Perry (P), Johnson, and L. Kildav (ARA). Jett initialed for all clearings + officials except for Kilday. + The action memorandum was forwarded by Bremer to Clark under a September 28 covering memorandum which + summarized the U.S. position on the resolution and which sought + Clark’s concurrence. + (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, + P830157–1003) + + + Washington, September + 22, 1983 + + + SUBJECT + U.S. Position on the Falklands Resolution in the UNGA + +

Issue for Decision

+

U.S. vote on the Argentine resolution in the UNGA on the Falkland Islands.

+ +

Essential Factors

+

We have obtained from the Argentines a draft resolution on the Falklands + which they intend to introduce in the upcoming UNGA (Tab A).Attached but not + printed. L has determined that none of the additions or + changes in the new version are of any material substantive significance + when compared to last year’s (Tab B).Attached at Tab B but not printed is a September 1 memorandum from + Gudgeon to Howard which + analyzes the draft Argentine UNGA + resolution. We expect Mrs Thatcher to raise the Falklands question and this + resolution when she meets with the President on September 29.See Document + 431.

+

Since the current version of the Falklands resolution is legally + equivalent to last year’s, we should support it on grounds of policy + consistency. Any backing away from last year’s yes vote would have an + adverse impact on our bilateral relations with Argentina, which + continues to care deeply about the issue. A shift would also have an + unfortunate effect on hemispheric perceptions of U.S. reliability and + convey the wrong signals regarding U.S. attitudes toward Latin + America.

+

HMG is still opposed to being pressured + into any negotiations on Falkland Islands’ sovereignty which do not + proceed from the principle of self-determination. Nevertheless, the + British reluctantly accept the need for the USG to be consistent on this issue; they hope, however, + that we would oppose any changes to the current version which would be + more prejudicial to their position. Our support for the existing + Argentine Resolution and opposition to prejudicial amendments should + encourage the Argentines to maintain the moderate tone of the draft.

+

Recommendation:

+

That we vote in favor of the current draft of the Argentine resolution on + the Falkland Islands in the UNGA and + oppose changes in the resolution which we consider objectionable. If you + approve, we will indicate in the briefing materials for the President’s + conversation with Prime Minister Thatcher that we would take such a stand (EUR, ARA, + IO and Ambassador Kirkpatrick favor).Shultz + approved the recommendation on September 27, adding the following + notation: “Clear with NSC maybe by + Hill-Clark.” On September 28, Hill sent to Clark a memorandum outlining the + situation as well as Shultz’s decision. (Department of State, Central Foreign + Policy File, P830157–1003)

+
+ +
+ + 431. Memorandum of ConversationSource: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, + S/S Special Handling + Restrictions Memos 1979–1983, Lot 96D262, ES Sensitive October 1–8, 1983. Top Secret. The meeting + took place in the Oval Office. Kimmitt forwarded the memorandum to Hill under an October 12 covering + note. (Ibid.) The complete text of the memorandum of conversation is + scheduled to be printed in Foreign Relations, 1981–1988, vol. VII, + Western Europe, 1981–1984. + + + Washington, September 29, 1983, 11:30 a.m.–12:30 + p.m. + + + SUBJECT + Summary of Conversation Between the President and British Prime + Minister Margaret + Thatcher + + + PARTICIPANTS + The President + Peter R. Sommer (notetaker) + Margaret Thatcher + A.J. Coles + (notetaker) + +

[Omitted here is discussion of Lebanon, relations with the Soviet Union, + the European strategic balance, and Central America.]

+

Mrs. Thatcher agreed that the Western countries had to + do a much better job of explaining their policies in the world at large. + Duarte came to see me + recently, she observed, and stressed that if democracy is not seen to be + working in El Salvador after the next election then the democratic + forces would lose out. Mrs. Thatcher added that before leaving Latin America she + wanted to urge the President to think carefully before supplying arms to + Argentina. (S)

+

The President replied that once Argentina returned + to civilian rule the U.S. would be under intense pressure to make it + eligible for arms purchases. (S)

+

Mrs. Thatcher rejoined that the last civilian government + in Argentina was not a model for democracy and that it would be greatly + misunderstood in Britain—America’s most loyal and ardent supporter—if + sales resumed. (S)

+

The President and Mrs. Thatcher + broke for lunch at 12:30 p.m. (U)

+
+ +
+ + 432. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the + United KingdomSource: + Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D830609–0992. + Confidential; Exdis. Sent for + information to Buenos Aires and USUN. Drafted by C.K. Stocker (EUR/NE/UKB); cleared by W. + Montgomery (P), J.R. Binns (EUR/NE), E. Barnett (IO/UNP), D. Jett (ARA/SC), and in S/S–O; approved by Burt. + + + Washington, October 20, 1983, 0404Z + +

298653. Subject: Assistant Secretary Burt’s Discussion With UK Charge Derek + Thomas on the UN + Resolution on the Falkland Islands, October 18, 5:30 p.m.

+

1. Confidential entire text.

+

2. Summary: Assistant Secretary Burt called in UK Charge + Derek Thomas to inform + HMG that the US will vote for the Argentine resolution + on the Falkland Islands if no objectionable language is added.On October 4, the Department informed the + Embassy in Buenos Aires that it was advising the Argentine + Ambassador of the U.S. decision to vote in favor of the resolution + “provided no objectionable language is added.” (Telegram 285699 to + Buenos Aires, October 6; Department of State, Central Foreign Policy + File, D830580–0900) + Thomas thanked him for the + clarification and expressed British concern about possible certification + of Argentina. Burt assured him + that the USG is mindful of HMG views and explained the basic US position. Thomas was accompanied by Christopher Woodley, while on + the US side C.K. Stocker EUR/NE/UKB was notetaker. End + summary.

+

3. As a follow up to Under Secretary Eagleburger’s talks with Ambassador Wright on October 13,Meeting with Eagleburger on October 13, Wright presented a British + démarche on the Falklands/Malvinas and the certification of + Argentina. In telegram 295004 to London, October 15, the Department + reported on the démarche: “While HMG recognizes that the US has interests in Latin America, it hopes that our + desire to balance those interests and our relationship with the + UK would lead to an abstention + on the Falklands resolution. The US + role, he [Wright] asserted, + would have an important demonstration effect on other countries.” + Wright also “hoped the + US would not vote for language + which ignored self-determination, a principle enshrined in the + US Constitution and the UN Charter.” On Argentine + certification, Wright added + that “sales of US arms to Argentina + would force HMG to maintain troops + in the South Atlantic rather than where they are needed to confront + the common enemy.” Eagleburger “termed the question of certification + not to be ‘if’ but rather ‘when, before or after the inauguration.’” + (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, + D830600–0325) + EUR Assistant Secretary Richard Burt called in UK Charge Derek Thomas to inform HMG of the US position on + the Argentine resolution on the Falkland Islands. He stated:

+

—It appears to us that the draft resolution on the Falkland Islands which + Argentina has provided to the Department is legally equivalent to last + year’s. Primarily on grounds of policy consistency, the US will vote for the resolution if no + objectionable language is added to this draft.

+ +

—We continue to support a negotiated outcome acceptable to both parties + as the best means to settle this dispute and do not believe attempting + to apply pressure will enhance the prospects for successful + negotiations.

+

—We also hope both sides will refrain from taking steps which will + heighten tensions.

+

Burt commented that he understood + Prime Minister Thatcher to + believe that the British public would not understand such an action by + the USG but he hoped that HMG would.

+

4. Thanking the Assistant Secretary for his “helpful clarification”, + Thomas explained that HMG had hoped that the USG would abstain on the resolution, given + the GOA’s refusal to end formally the + state of hostilities or to abjure the use of force, and in light of the + stronger language in this year’s resolution. He continued that HMG expects the USG to forego the temptation to lobby others to vote for + the resolution in the same way HMG + believes we did last year. Burt + noted the Charge’s remarks and agreed to look into the matter.

+

5. Thomas observed that the + British want to begin talks with the GOA. In the British view as the GOA moves toward democracy, the USG should be in a position to urge wise counsel on them, + i.e., lessening of tensions in the South Atlantic through a declared end + to hostilities and the renouncing of the use of force. When democratic + institutions have returned, the USG + will look into all options Burt + replied. Both sides have to engage in give and take. Despite the legacy + of constraints on HMG on this issue, + the USG hopes that the British will do + what they can to find a solution; it would be in the British interest as + much as ours. Burt suggested + that the British position toward Gilbraltar might serve as a model. + Thomas acknowledged that it + had prior to the war.

+

6. Thomas then raised British + concerns about a USG human rights + certification of the GOA. Commenting + that this is a bilateral issue, Burt assured Thomas that the USG is + aware of British views. The US has a law + on this; when its requirements are met we will certify the GOA. We are continuing to review the + situation regarding certification. He stated that certification, + however, is not the same as arms sales. Thomas countered that human rights is an indivisible + concept and that infringement of human rights took place on the Falkland + Islands. He acknowledged, however, that this is a complex topic. In + closing, he thanked Burt again + for the clarification of the US position + on the UN resolution and said he would + report it immediately to his authorities.

+ + Shultz + +
+ +
+ + 433. Telegram From the Embassy in Italy to the Department of + StateSource: Department + of State, Bureau of European Affairs, United Kingdom Political + Files, Lot 89D489, PREL Falklands 1983 (Nov.–Dec.). Secret; + Immediate; Nodis. + + + Rome, November 8, 1983, 1312Z + +

26714. Dept pass to The Hague Immediate + and to AmEmbassy London. Subject: Deputy Secretary Dam’s Meeting November 7 With Prime + Minister Thatcher.

+

1. Secret–Entire text.

+

2. Deputy Secretary Dam met + November 7 with Prime Minister Thatcher for a discussion which covered Grenada, INF, arms control, the Middle East and + Argentine certification.No U.S. memorandum + of conversation of this meeting has been found. Dam met with Thatcher at Chequers. + British participants, in addition to Thatcher, were Foreign Secretary Sir Geoffrey Howe, and Thatcher’s Private Secretary John Coles. U.S. participants, in + addition to Deputy Secretary, were Assistant Secretary Richard Burt and DCM Edward Streator.

+

[Omitted here is discussion of issues unrelated to Argentine + certification and the South Atlantic.]

+

39. Argentine certification. Thatcher said she was disappointed we appeared ready to + vote with Argentina in the UN on the + Argentine resolution.UN General Assembly Resolution 38/12 on + the Falklands/Malvinas was adopted by the UNGA on November 16. In telegram 3345 from USUN, November 17, the Mission + provided a breakdown of the voting: “87 Yes (US)—9 No—54 abstentions, as compared to 1982’s vote of + 90 Yes (US)—12 No and 52 + abstentions.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy, + D830675–0405) For the text of the resolution, see Yearbook of the United Nations, 1983, p. 1085. She recalled that the UK had abstained on the Grenada + resolution.Reference is to UN General Assembly Resolution 38/7, + adopted November 2, which called for the “immediate cessation of the + armed intervention and the immediate withdrawal of the foreign + troops from Grenada.” The United States, along with eight other + nations, voted against the resolution; the United Kingdom abstained + in the vote. For the text of the resolution, see ibid., p. + 214. It will put us into acute difficulty, she said, if the + US resumes arms shipments; “it will + be misunderstood in Britain if the US + supplies an Argentine buildup to fight Britain. We would have to be + vigorously critical.” Moreover, she said, “it could cause repercussions + on public opinion in Britain.” In view of the recent reports of + anti-semitism in Argentina, it would be odd if the US were to sign a certificate on human + rights at this point. Howe said + that certification would cause a real problem with Anglo-US positions related to INF. He noted that it was curious that + there was less anti-Americanism in France where the nuclear weapons were not American. + But in Britain, these issues are blurred and plans to sell American + weapons to Argentina would impact on INF deployments in the UK.

+

40. Dam said that the US would resist language going beyond last + year’s resolution. Moreover, we will take steps to consult closely on + this issue as it evolves. Burt + said that the US position was to favor a + resolution consistent with that of last year; if it is not radically + changed, we will support it.

+

41. On certification Dam said + that this procedure derives from congressional concerns about human + rights and it applies to various countries. With the emergence of a + democratic government in Argentina, it is a foregone conclusion that we + will certify. However, he took the Prime Minister’s point on + anti-semitism. DepSec said that + cooperation with Argentina was desirable over the long term for + everyone. Certainly the Argentine military should have relations with + other military. Thatcher + underlined that the Argentines still had not renounced hostilities. + Dam said that the US was not rushing into arms sales. The + Argentines may try to buy commercially in the US, and the US Government + will have less influence in that sphere. Thatcher said that Argentina is strapped for cash. She + trusted that none would help to make purchases that would be used + against Britain. The UK had unfrozen + funds and UK banks were in on IMF loans. + If the banks are making loans for the purchase of arms to be used + against Britain, HMG would have to tell + the banks that they were going ahead against the desires of the + government.

+

42. Howe called attention to two + factors in connection with certification. On timing, he said that the + further the distance from Grenada the better. Moreover it was important + to be sure that Alfonsin was firmly in placeAlfonsín was elected + Argentine President on October 30. and to recognize that if + he honored his pledges it would make things easier. Further, he + suggested very close consultation on the types of arms to be supplied. + Dam said that US thinking was along the same lines. While + there were all kinds of stories out of Washington about sales to + Argentina, this meant only that discussion was in progress. He agreed + that the US and UK should stay in touch so that the British would have a + clear view of the emerging US position. + Howe agreed that the British + needed a clear understanding on how sales would be controlled by the + US.

+

43. Thatcher said that if arms + were sold to Argentina it would be a “bad thing”. Indeed, she said, it + would be “extremely damaging.” Alfonsin continues to stress that + Argentine-British talks should deal with the issue of sovereignty. She noted that not a + single Argentine had inhabited the Falkland Islands for 150 years.

+

44. Dam promised to report in + detail the evolution of US thinking.

+

45. This cable has been cleared by DepSec + Dam.

+ + Rabb + +
+ +
+ 434. Action Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for + Inter-American Affairs (Motley) + and the Permanent Representative to the Organization of American States + (Middendorf) to the Under + Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Eagleburger)Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, + P840001–1649. Confidential. Drafted by L.R. Fleischer (ARA/USOAS) on November 15; + cleared by T.J. Dunnigan (ARA/USOAS), Howard, J. Martin (ARA/RPP), K. Stocker (EUR/NE), and Gudgeon. Fleischer initialed for + all clearing officials with the exception of Dunnigan who initialed + the memorandum. A stamped notation at the top of the memorandum + indicates that Eagleburger + saw it on November 16. + + + Washington, November + 16, 1983 + + + SUBJECT + OASGA Vote on Falklands + +

ISSUE FOR DECISION

+

U.S. vote on Argentine draft resolution on Falklands at OASGA.

+

ESSENTIAL FACTORS

+

The Argentine delegation to the OASGA + has circulated a revised version of their draft resolution on the South + Atlantic.Attached but not printed is + the text of the Argentine draft resolution. At the request of + the U.S. they have deleted two paragraphs, one preambular and one + operative, which went beyond last year’s OASGA resolutionAttached but + not printed is a copy of the 1982 OASGA resolution on the Falklands/Malvinas. See Document 414. and this year’s UNGA resolution.Attached but not printed is telegram 318076 to + USUN, November 7, which + conveyed the text of UNGA + Resolution 38/7. See footnote 3, Document + 433.

+

One of the paragraphs which the Argentines agreed to drop mentioned + “prompt” resumption of negotiations and both noted the willingness of + the Argentine Government to carry out “immediately” the two UN + resolutions. The clear implication was that the British were not willing + to do so.

+

As it now stands, the draft resolution is essentially the same as last + year’s with the following changes: 1) one preambular paragraph has been + added to reflect this year’s UNGA + resolution; 2) another preambular paragraph was added which notes that + the UN Secretary General’s report + “indicates the lack of any progress toward fulfillment of these + resolutions;” 3) one operative paragraph has been added which expresses + “concern over the lack of any progress” (very similar to UNGA resolution which “regrets” lack of + progress); and 4) a paragraph has been added which asks subsequent + General Assemblies to examine the question until it is settled.

+

The vote on the resolution could take place as early as Wednesday, + November 16.

+

We believe that since the Argentines have dropped the two paragraphs + which gave the British the most difficulty a consensus is developing to + approve the text as it now stands.

+

RECOMMENDATIONS

+

That you approve a U.S. position of voting for the Argentine + resolution.Eagleburger initialed his approval of the + recommendation on November 16, and wrote under his initials: “Tell + the Brits.” The OAS General + Assembly adopted Resolution 669 (XIII–0/83) on November 18. On + November 24, the Department circulated a summary of the November + 14–18 OASGA session, noting that + the Falklands/Malvinas resolution “passed with little debate.” + (Telegram 335273 to all American Republic diplomatic posts, USUN, and Brussels, November 24; + Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, + D830692–0311)

+
+ +
+ + 435. Action Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for + Inter-American Affairs (Motley) + to Secretary of State ShultzSource: + Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S Special Handling Restrictions Memos 1979–1983, Lot + 96D262, ES Sensitive November 24–30 + 1983. Secret. Drafted by D. Jett (ARA/SC) on November 18; cleared by Kilday, Morley, Howard, P.M. Olson (L/ARA), R. Perry (P), R. Snyder (HA), J. Gravette (DOD/ISA), and F. Lee (ARA/RPP) and in substance by J. + Gravette (DOD/ISA). Sent through Eagleburger. A stamped notation at the top of the + memorandum indicates that Shultz saw it. A typewritten notation at the top of + the memorandum reads: “Sec/Pres sent 11/28 advance LDX and via courier. CDJ.” Motley sent the memorandum to + Shultz under a November + 22 covering note, indicating that “ARA and EUR have + settled all date differences save one: the Certification and + pre-briefing of the Argentines. EUR + may address their thoughts in a separate memo to you. ARA believes we should put the issue + behind us before the Vice President arrives for the inauguration.” + (Ibid.) The memorandum was also found attached to Document 436. For the November 28 + memorandum from Shultz to + Reagan, see Tab A to + Document 438. + + + Washington, November + 22, 1983 + + + SUBJECT + Presidential Certification of Argentina + +

ISSUE FOR DECISION

+

When to certify to Congress that Argentina has made significant + improvements in human rights and that certification is in our national + interest, thereby making possible the resumption of arms sales. The + issue is urgent since the Vice President is considering heading our + delegation to the Argentine inauguration on December 10. A decision + needs to be made on what steps we are to take before he arrives.

+

ESSENTIAL FACTORS

+

—Certification Requirement

+

The International Security and Development Cooperation Act of 1981 + permits resumption of arms transfers and security assistance to + Argentina only if the President certifies that Argentina has made + significant human rights progress and that such action is in the + national interest of the US. In making + this determination, consideration must be given to Argentina’s efforts + to provide information on “disappeared” persons and to release political + (PEN) prisoners.

+

—Human Rights Progress

+

Argentina has made very significant human rights progress. The October 30 + elections were fair, open and honest. President-elect Alfonsin will take + office on December 10. There have been no permanent “disappearances” in the last three + years. The “PEN” prisoners have been + released or remanded to the courts for trial. The military government + has made virtually no effort to provide a full accounting for the + disappeared, but Alfonsin ran on a strong human rights platform and has + pledged to address this problem.

+

—Relations with the Argentine Military

+

Certification will help to restore a constructive relationship with one + of the most important institutions in Argentina. It will also undercut + those in Argentina who argue for a closer relationship with the Soviets. + The military will, at a minimum, still influence national security + decisions in the future. Since the Argentines have replaced most of the + arms lost during the war and given that Alfonsin is committed to + slashing the military budget, major arms purchases requests are not + expected in the near future. Certification is more important to the + Argentine military as a symbolic gesture than as a grant of access to + US sources of supply.

+

—The Chile and UK + Dimensions

+

Certification, regardless of the timing, will have serious implications + for our relations with Chile and the UK. + British public opinion also views certification as synonymous with arms + sales which would endanger British troops in the Falklands. The + Pinochet regime will require + careful handling, regardless of the timing of certification, in light of + the difficult internal political situation in Chile and the traditional + rivalry between the two countries. A similar certification law now + prevents arms sales and military assistance to Chile. Unlike Argentina, + however, Chile does not now meet the statutory criteria.

+

Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher + has repeatedly expressed her concern about certification and arms sales, + insisting that US arms for Argentina + would be “the single most difficult thing for me.” Despite our careful + explanations, in the minds of some British officials and much of the + British public, certification is confused with arms sales creating an + emotional political issue. Thatcher has requested the US to delay certification at least until the inauguration, + and to not permit sales until the GOA + declares an end to hostilities over the Falklands. In addition, with + INF deployments underway in the + UK, this is a time of increased + sensitivity in US/UK relations. We need to be sensitive to the fact that + in the post-Grenada atmosphere certification will present considerable + political problems for Thatcher. + We have explained to both Chile and the UK that as Argentina successfully completes the transition + to an elected government, USG failure + to certify would be a negative political act. The USG has promised HMG that we will stay in close touch on the timing and + contents of any certification announcement. We have agreed to consult on major arms requests but + have not accepted the linkage of such arms sales with a GOA declaration on a formal end to + hostilities.

+

—Glenn/Symington Amendment Problem

+

There are intelligence reports which indicate the GOA may have received nuclear reprocessing + technology from an Italian firm. In addition Argentina announced on + November 18 that it had constructed a gaseous diffusion nuclear + enrichment facility. We have not reached a firm conclusion whether + Argentina has acquired reprocessing or enrichment technology, materials + or equipment from another country. If it were found to have done so, + under the Glenn or Symington amendments economic and certain security + assistance is prohibited. This would prevent an IMET program (budgeted at $50,000 for + FY–84), as well as credits for + military sales. We have no plans for any other military or economic + assistance covered by the Glenn or Symington amendments. Foreign + Military Sales on a cash basis and approval of munitions control export + licenses, after certification, are not precluded by either + amendment.

+

—Congressional Considerations

+

Certification will not create significant controversy on the Hill. Most remaining Congressional + opposition to certification was disarmed by the election of Alfonsin + whose human rights credentials are first rate. There is a strongly held + view by some on the House Foreign Affairs Committee that the “benefit” + of certification should be granted to an elected government. Some + members regard this issue as a test of credibility for the + Administration’s policy of support for democracy.

+

ANALYSIS OF OPTIONS

+

The question becomes what is the best timing for the three steps + involved: (1) private contacts with HMG, the GOC, the GOA and Congress; (2) public announcement, + and (3) certification itself.

+

Certification, significantly before or after the Alfonsin government is + installed, poses several problems. Certification during the last days of + the military government would antagonize the UK. It might also be interpreted in Argentina as a move by + the US to bolster the prestige of the + military at a time when the Alfonsin government sees as its top priority + bringing the military under control. In addition, key congressmen have + indicated their opposition to certification before the transition to + democracy has culminated in the installation of an elected + government.

+

We could put off certification until some time after the inauguration. We + could even attempt to extract commitments from Alfonsin on human rights, the Beagle Channel, and + the Falklands. But Alfonsin would resent any such delay, believing that + Argentina deserves certification because of the dramatic changes in that + country. Any attempt to use certification as a bargaining tool would be + viewed as a political act and become an issue with the new government + where none exists now. Even Argentina’s severest critics admit that + certification should not be delayed beyond inauguration, and that + Argentina has met the human rights criteria set forth in the law.

+

We conclude, therefore, that a scenario culminating in announcement of + the President’s decision to certify Argentina in the week before the + inauguration with actual certification, effective upon installation of + the new government, is the compromise that best serves our interests. + It:

+

—puts the issue behind us before the Vice President goes to Argentina and + avoids having it cloud his trip;

+

—emphasizes our commitment to democracy;

+

—has the most positive effect on our relations with the new + government;

+

—minimizes opposition from the Hill and human rights groups;

+

—constitutes a gesture to the outgoing government which promised and + delivered a return to democracy, and

+

—will provide time for the necessary consultations.

+

Announcement of our decision to certify before the inauguration is not + without its costs, however, especially in terms of our relationship with + the UK.

+

—Next Steps

+

A proposed scenario for diplomatic and congressional discussions is + outlined at Tab B.Attached but not + printed. It calls for careful consultations with all parties + and a special emissary and Presidential letter to Chile. In addition, as + a first step we suggest that the President immediately send a letter to + Mrs. Thatcher to inform her of + the decision.Attached but not printed at + Tab C is a draft letter from Reagan to Thatcher, informing her of the U.S. decision. For + the letter as sent, see Tab B to Document + 437.

+

Recommendation:

+

That you sign the memorandum to the President at Tab A,Attached but not printed. For the memorandum as + approved, see Tab A to Document + 437. which calls for immediate contact with HMG, the remaining private contacts + December 6, and public announcement December 7.

+
+ +
+ + 436. Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State for Political + Affairs (Eagleburger) to + Secretary of State ShultzSource: Department of State, + Executive Secretariat, S/S Special + Handling Restrictions Memos 1979–1983, Lot 96D262, ES Sensitive November 24–30 1983. + Secret. A stamped notation at the top of the memorandum indicates + that Shultz saw + it. + + + Washington, November + 25, 1983 + + + SUBJECT + Presidential Certification of Argentina + +

I support the recommendation that the President certify Argentina for + future military sales. ARA and EUR agree on the certification but differ + on procedures for informing the British, and more importantly on how + much of a check we provide the UK on + future US arms sales to Argentina.

+

I think we should basically follow ARA’s + recommended scenario, but also meet EUR + concerns for adequate consultations with the British to the extent + possible.See Document 435. If the President decides next week + to certify Argentina, we should consult with the British Ambassador here + and Ambassador Price would do + likewise in London before we inform the Argentines of our decision. We + would tell the UK that certification + would be announced shortly before the Vice President’s December 10 visit + to Argentina for the inauguration. We would also consult with the + Congressional leadership and send letters to President Bignone of Argentina and President + Pinochet of Chile.

+

On the arms sales issue, I do not support the EUR recommendation that we establish a three month hiatus + before any sales are made. We should, however, assure the British that + we will consult with them on any significant + sales to Argentina. While we should be sensitive to their concerns re + the Falklands, we should not give them a veto on specific weapons + systems that might be sold to the Argentines.

+

If you approve this course of action, I will set things in motion.Shultz approved the recommendation.

+ + Lawrence S. + EagleburgerEagleburger wrote “LSE” above his typed + signature. + +
+ +
+ + 437. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security + Affairs (McFarlane) to President + ReaganSource: Reagan Library, Executive + Secretariat, NSC Country File, + Latin America/Central, Argentina (11/20/1983–12/31/1983). Secret. + Sent for action. Prepared by Lilac. A copy was sent to Bush. A stamped notation at the + top of the memorandum indicates that Reagan saw it. The memorandum was found attached to + a December 5 memorandum from McFarlane to Shultz informing him that Reagan approved Shultz’s recommendation on + Argentine certification. + + + Washington, December + 2, 1983 + + + SUBJECT + Argentine Certification + +

Issue

+

Whether to certify to Congress that Argentina has made significant + improvements in human rights.

+

Facts

+

With the recent elections, Argentina’s human rights situation has + improved dramatically and certification will signal our strong support + for the return of democracy. Certification would be effective upon + installation of the Alfonsin government on December 10. The U.K. and + Chile will be especially concerned about the Argentine certification. A + memo from George Shultz (Tab A) + provides a recommended certification scenario. The first step would be a + letter (Tab B) from you to Mrs. Thatcher. Cap + Weinberger opposes certification (Tab C).

+

Discussion

+

Cap Weinberger’s concerns focus + on the reaction in the U.K. On balance, the strategy outlined by + George Shultz, in my view, + adequately addresses Cap’s concerns. Moreover, the question is not + whether but when we will certify Argentina. The game plan includes, inter alia, Congressional consultation in + advance, and dispatching Dick + Walters to explain our position + to President Pinochet.Walters met + with Pinochet in Santiago + twice on December 12. A record of their first conversation was + transmitted by Walters in + telegram 7139 from Santiago, December 12. (Department of State, + Central Foreign Policy File, D830731–0491) A summary of their second + meeting was transmitted by the Embassy in telegram 7184 from + Santiago, December 14. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy + File, D830737–0184) I recommend approval, and OMB concurs.

+

Recommendation

+

That you approve the strategy for Argentine certification (Tab A) and + sign the proposed letter to Mrs. Thatcher (Tab B).Reagan approved the + recommendation.

+ +

Tab A

+

Memorandum From Secretary of State Shultz to President ReaganSecret.

+

Washington, November 28, 1983

+ + SUBJECT + Argentine Certification + +

I believe you should certify to Congress that Argentina has made + significant improvements in human rights upon installation of the + Alfonsin government on December 10, with public announcement of our + intention December 7. The human rights situation there has improved + dramatically, and certification will signal our strong support for the + return of democracy in Argentina. The Argentine Armed Forces would + prefer that certification take place while they are still in power. Our + assessment is that, considering all the factors involved, certification + should take effect upon installation of the new government. In our + announcement of this decision, we will note the contribution of the + Bignone government on + successfully carrying out the return to democracy.

+

The UK and Chile are concerned about the + political repercussions of certification, but their biggest fear is that + subsequent arms sales to Argentina will threaten peace in the region. + While certification makes US arms sales + to Argentina once again possible it would not result in large, immediate + weapons sales. The Argentines have bought heavily in Europe and are + short of funds. In addition, President-elect Alfonsin is committed to + slashing the military budget. We would handle any new requests on a + case-by-case basis with particular attention to the effect of each sale + on regional stability.

+

Mrs. Thatcher has spoken out very + strongly against arms sales to Argentina. Until the government of + Argentina announces an end to hostilities over the Falklands, we would + consult closely with the British on arms sales requests. In her November + 14 Guildhall speech, Thatcher + stressed that the US is the ultimate + guarantor of UK security and that occasional differences cannot + obscure our shared values.Reference is to + Thatcher’s November 14 + speech in the City of London’s Guildhall in which she “recalled that + Europe had been spared the horrors of war for 40 years, and that it + is the strength of the [NATO] + Alliance, of which Britain is a loyal member, that keeps the peace + today. ‘Friends, like families, differ at times,’ she added, ‘but + nothing alters these basic truths—that the United States is our + ultimate defensive shield, the guarantor of Western freedom, and the + best hope for the world’s oppressed. To that conviction we hold. We + are confident that any differences that may occur will always be + infinitely less important than the purposes and loyalties which bind + us together.’” (Telegram 24618 from London, November 15; Department + of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D830667–0404) This is + a retreat from her earlier tough rhetoric and should not be ignored.

+

As a first step I have attached a letter from you to Mrs. Thatcher informing her of our scenario + for certification. General Pinochet of Chile will also be disturbed. We plan to + take steps to reassure him of our desire for close relations, even + though we cannot now justify certification of Chile. If you approve we + will send the letter to Mrs. Thatcher, begin consultations with Congress and shortly + send you letters for President Pinochet, President Bignone and the actual certification document for your + signature. Thatcher has asked + that we delay certification, at least until the inauguration, to help + her deal with domestic political pressures.

+

Tab B

+

Letter From President Reagan to British Prime Minister ThatcherNo classification marking.

+

Washington, December 2, 1983

+

Dear Margaret:

+

As you know, Argentina has made steady progress in strengthening its + protection of human rights. The fair, open and honest elections on + October 30 are the latest manifestation of this progress. When + President-elect Alfonsin takes office on December 10, Argentina will + have completed its return to democracy.

+

In view of this and other relevant factors, I will be certifying to the + U.S. Congress that Argentina has made significant progress in human + rights and that making Argentina eligible for arms transfers is in the + U.S. national interest. Our announcement will be made on December 7, + just before the U.S. delegation arrives in Buenos Aires for the inauguration. Certification + will be effective upon installation of the new government.

+

I know this announcement will be a delicate question in Great Britain. + However, as I suggested when we last met, and as subsequent + consultations between our two governments have indicated, it is now + appropriate and accurate to certify that Argentina has made significant + progress in human rights.

+

We will be informing U.S. Congressional leaders and Presidents Bignone and Pinochet of our decision on December 6. Because of our + special relationship and the importance you personally place on this + question, I am notifying you first of our decision.

+

The decision was based on the following considerations. During the past + year, the Government of Argentina has made significant progress in + complying with internationally recognized principles of human rights. + Argentina’s human rights performance now meets the test for + certification required by U.S. law.

+

Certification is not equivalent to arms sales. We will evaluate each + request very carefully on a case-by-case basis, taking into account any + threat that may be posed to peace in the region. We would consult + closely with your government on any major sales.

+

Significant sales are not expected. Argentina has replaced most of its + losses from a variety of sources and President-elect Alfonsin is + committed to a significant reduction of the military budget. Moreover, + Argentina’s difficult economic situation will not support major arms + acquisitions. In any event, should Argentina so desire, arms are readily + available from other sources, including the Soviet Union.

+

In my view, our normalization of relations with Argentina will be in the + interests of the United States and Great Britain. Certification will + help strengthen U.S. influence with Argentina and enable us to work more + effectively to assure regional stability. The climate for dialogue and + negotiation will be improved.

+

I sincerely appreciate your eloquent and timely statement at the + Guildhall. I wholeheartedly agree with your assessment of the special + relationship between our two nations and the importance of our shared + interests and purposes.

+

Margaret, be assured that I continue to place the highest value on your + personal advice, counsel and friendship.

+

With warm wishes,

+

Sincerely,

+

Ron

+ +

Tab C

+

Memorandum From Secretary of Defense Weinberger to the President’s + Assistant for National Security Affairs (McFarlane)Secret.

+

Washington, November 28, 1983

+ + SUBJECT + Argentine Certification (U) + +

(C) I do not believe we should issue the certification at this time for a + number of reasons:

+

(1) As you know, Prime Minister Thatcher has repeatedly expressed her concern about + certification and arms sales, insisting that US arms for Argentina would be “the single most difficult + thing for me.” Despite our careful and academic explanations, in the + minds of the British general public, certification is considered to be a + license for unrestricted US arms sales + to the Argentine military. Mrs. Thatcher firmly believes that even a short delay of a + few months after the new civilian government takes control in Argentina + would be helpful in gaining UK public + acceptance of Argentine certification.

+

(2) None of us know whether the new government in Argentina will show any + marked improvement in either human rights or in its attitude to a new + invasion of the Falklands. This government has not yet even taken + office.

+

(3) With the INF deployments underway in + the UK, this is a time of increased + sensitivity in US/UK relations and has far-reaching consequences for the + NATO Alliance.

+

(4) I also fear that certification will add fuel to the smouldering + unhappiness that the British have (quite erroneously) about our invasion + of Grenada. We need to be sensitive to the fact that in the present + politico-military environment, Argentine certification puts an + unnecessary strain on an already troubled relationship.

+

(5) Nor would certification, without arms sales, help our relationship + with Argentina.

+

(6) Finally, there are other countries who have helped us more, such as + Chile, with far greater claim to certification now than Argentina.

+

(C) I understand Secretary Shultz + has sent a memorandum to the President recommending that he certify to + Congress that Argentina has + made progress in human rights and deserves to be certified. Argentina + may make some progress in human rights, but they haven’t yet. Indeed + there are even reports that their military will not permit the new + government to take office. Our need for continued UK cooperation in both the INF deployments and the reconstruction of + a viable Grenada, and on many other matters, far outweigh the US interest in such an early certification + of Argentina.

+

(U) Request you convey my concerns to the President before he makes his + decision on Argentine certification.

+ Cap +
+ +
+ 438. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the + United KingdomSource: + Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D830714–0935. + Secret; Immediate. Sent for information Immediate to Buenos Aires. + Drafted by C.K. Stocker (EUR/NE); + cleared by Kelly, B. McKie + (S/S) and in S/S–O; approved by Burt. Printed from a copy + correcting an earlier summary of the meeting between Burt and Renwick sent in telegram + 344570 to London, December 4. (Department of State, Central Foreign + Policy File, D830713–0006) + + + Washington, December 5, 1983, 1731Z + +

344532. Subject: Assistant Secretary Burt’s Meeting With British on Argentine Certification, + December 3, 1983 at 11:45 am. Corrected copy (text: paragraphs 2, 3, 4, + 5, and renumbered 7 and 8).

+

1. (Secret–Entire text)

+

2. Summary: EUR Assistant Secretary + Burt called in U.K. Charge + Robin Renwick to give him a copy of the President’s letter to the Prime + Minister on Argentine certificationSee Tab + B, Document 437. and to brief him + on the decision. Renwick gave Mr. Burt a copy of a letter on Argentina from the Foreign + Secretary to Secretary Shultz. + HMG attaches fundamental + importance, he stressed, to the review of all requests by Under + Secretary Eagleburger and to + consultation with the British prior to sales. Britain is deeply + concerned about possible sales to the GOA of spare parts especially for submarines and Skyhawks. He asked if the announcement + of certification could be delayed until December 8 given the timing of + the Prime Minister’s weekly parliamentary question period and the + Foreign Secretary’s dinner with + the Secretary. Mr. Burt agreed + to look into the request. End summary.

+

3. Assistant Secretary Burt + called in UK Charge Robin Renwick to + give him a copy of the President’s letter and to brief him on the + decision drawing on talking points transmitted to London septel.In + telegram 344288 to London, December 3, the Department sent + instructions to the Embassy, including the referenced talking points + and the text of Reagan’s + December 2 letter to Thatcher, to inform the British Government of the + President’s decision to certify Argentina. (Department of State, + Central Foreign Policy File, D830712–0661) Renwick responded + that HMG attaches fundamental + importance to the review of all requests by Under Secretary Eagleburger and to consultations with + British prior to sales. He also expressed Britain’s deep concern about + possible sales of spare parts (particularly for the U.S. submarines + owned by the GOA Navy) and of Skyhawks. Such sales, he stressed, + affect the resources that HMG has to + devote to defending the Island. Even more importantly they may endanger + the lives of British troops. He explained that HMG was already working on replies to parliamentary + questions on the topic of Argentine certification. Handing over a copy + of letter on Argentina from Foreign Secretary Howe to Secretary Shultz (text follows), Renwick pointed + out that the letter states HMG’s plan + to draw on Secretary Weinberger’s public comments about the administration’s + exercising caution over major new supplies to the GOA especially those which could be used + in a renewed attempt to invade the Falklands. They realize that they + cannot publicly refer to the consultations which will take place.

+

4. He then remarked that December 8 would be a much better day from + HMG’s point of view for the + announcement of certification. As the Prime Minister’s regular time to + answer questions in the Parliament is on Thursdays, it would be + preferable not to have the announcement made the day before. Secondly, + the Foreign Minister will be seeing the Secretary at the Berlin dinner + on Wednesday evening and it would be much better for Sir Geoffrey if he could say he had + spoken personally to the Secretary prior to the announcement.

+

5. Deputy Assistant Secretary Kelly said that part of the reason that December 7 had + been chosen was to fit in with the Vice President’s scheduled travel to + Argentina. Assistant Secretary Burt said he would see if anything could be done to meet + HMG’s request. Renwick asked that a + definite answer be given to Ambassador Wright when he calls on the Deputy Secretary on Monday, + December 5.

+

6. Mr. Kelly assured Mr. Renwick + that if asked, the US spokesman would + state that certification is not a guarantee of sales.

+ +

7. Text of message dated December 2 from Sir + Geoffrey Howe, Secretary of State for Foreign and + Commonwealth Affairs, to Secretary Shultz.

+

Begin text:

+

Margaret Thatcher and I discussed + the whole question of the probable resumption of US arms sales to Argentina with Ken Dam at Chequers early in + November,See Document 433. and Janet Young has since been over the ground with both + Ken Dam and Larry Eagleburger.

+

I do not therefore need to labour our serious concern about the possible + implications of US arms sales for our + defences in the Falklands particularly while the Argentines continue to + refuse to declare a cessation of hostilities. I wanted to let you have + this message now to underline the importance we attach to this issue in + advance of the installation of the new Argentine President.

+

We were very pleased to note Cap + Weinberger’s public assurance that the administration + would exercise caution over major new supplies, especially of weapons + that could be used in a renewed attempt to invade the Falklands. We also + welcome Larry Eagleburger’s + undertaking to Janet Young + personally to veto all export licenses. Michael Heseltine will I know want to discuss this + subject with Cap Weinberger in + Washington next week, and I would like to have a word with you in the + margins of the NATO Ministerial in + Brussels.

+

As regards our policy towards the new government in Argentina, I should + like to emphasize that our aim is to re-establish more normal relations + between our two countries. The previous Argentine Government failed to + respond positively to our various proposals: I hope the new government + will be more constructive. Margaret + Thatcher has declared publicly her willingness to resume + full commercial and diplomatic relations with Argentina. I understand + that George Bush will be + representing the USA at Dr. Alfonsin’s + inauguration. I believe it would be very useful if he could take the + opportunity to emphasize that the normalization of relations between + Britain and Argentina is the most realistic point from which to start + building. End text

+

8. Following is the text of an answer given in Parliament on 22nd + November by the Leader of the House of Commons (in the Prime Minister’s + absence) to a parliamentary question by Mr. Michael Latham MP. It is asked what representations the + Prime Minister had made to President Reagan about the possible resumption of American arms + sales to Argentina in advance of a formal agreement to end hostilities + by the Argentine administration.

+ +

Begin text:

+

I have been asked to reply. As the House knows, my Right Honourable + friend made our position very clear to the President when she saw him in + September.See Document 431. The United States administration is + very well aware of our concern. We have been glad to note the remarks by + the United States Defense Secretary that the United States would + exercise caution about the resumption of major new supplies. End + text.

+ + Shultz + +
+ +
+ 439. Message From British Prime Minister Thatcher to President ReaganSource: + Reagan Library, European and Soviet Affairs Directorate, NSC, United Kingdom–1983 + 12/05/1983–12/10/1983. Secret. The Department transmitted the text + of the message in telegram Tosec + 150041/346473 to Shultz in + West Germany, December 7. (Ibid.) + + + London, December 6, + 1983 + +

Begins

+

Dear Ron,

+

Thank you for giving me advance warning of your decision on certification + and Argentina.Reagan’s December 2 letter to Thatcher is printed as Tab B, Document 437. As you say, this is a + delicate question for us. My immediate concern, now that your decision + is taken, is that our public line on both sides of the Atlantic should + be such as to minimise the difficulties which will inevitably arise.

+

I shall undoubtedly come under public and Parliamentary pressure. I shall + have to say that I would regret any sales of arms to Argentina which are + likely to increase the threat to the Falkland Islanders and to our + people who are down there to defend them. I would also propose to say + the following, without revealing that I am drawing on points in your + message:

+ +

(i) US law provides a test of human + rights performance for certification: it is the judgement of the + American Administration that the Argentine human rights performance now + meets this test;

+

(ii) certification permits but does not require sales of arms;

+

(iii) we know that the US Government will + look very carefully at any requests for arms in the light of all the + relevant circumstances, including the overriding need to maintain peace + in the region; and

+

(iv) we have been very pleased to note Cap + Weinberger’s public assurance to this effect.

+

I hope that this will be helpful in dealing with the likely public + reaction to certification. The public reaction to any subsequent sale of + arms will be much more difficult, and I remain very concerned also about + the substance of the matter.

+

I am afraid that the Argentine Military will see certification as the + thin end of the wedge and that Alfonsin will come under great pressure + from them to ask you to sell more than you would think right. Geoffrey Howe and Michael Heseltine will be seeing + George Shultz and Cap Weinberger at the various NATO meetings in Brussels this week and + will pursue with them our consultations on how best to proceed.

+

As far as relations with the new Argentine Government are concerned, I + note that George Bush will be + representing the United States at Dr Alfonsin’s inauguration. As you + know, I welcome the restoration of democracy in Argentina. I have made + it clear that I cannot discuss sovereignty over the Falklands. But our + disagreement on this issue should not prevent Britain and Argentina from + re-establishing normal commercial and diplomatic relations. If he has + the opportunity to do so, I hope that George Bush will tell Alfonsin that we shall be very + ready to work with his government to that end.

+

Best wishes.

+

Yours ever,

+

MargaretPrinted from a copy that bears this typed signature.

+

Ends

+
+ +
+ + 440. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the + United KingdomSource: Reagan + Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC + Cable File, Presidential Messages OUT (06/03/1983–01/21/1984). + Secret; Sensitive; Niact + Immediate; Nodis. Sent for + information Immediate as Tosec + 150125 to Shultz, who was in + Brussels December 7–9 for a NATO + Ministerial meeting. Printed from a copy that was received in the + White House Situation Room. Drafted by Stocker; cleared by Kelly, Kilday, and Montgomery and in EUR/NE and S/S–O; approved by Richard Kauzlarich (S/S). (Department of State, Central + Foreign Policy File, N830012–0326) + + + Washington, December 8, 1983, 0442Z + +

348036. Subject: Letter From the President to Prime Minister Thatcher on Argentine + Certification.

+

1. (S)–Entire text.

+

2. Embassy should deliver the following letter from the President to + Prime Minister Thatcher by 8:30 + a.m., Thursday,December 8. London + time.

+

3. Begin text:

+

December 7, 1983

+

Dear Margaret:

+

I sincerely appreciate your positive responseSee Document 439. to my decision + to certify that Argentina has made significant improvements in human + rights. We are sensitive to your concerns on this matter. As we + indicated, certification does not mean arms sales and, in any case, any + request will be evaluated carefully on a case-by-case basis. We will + consult closely with you prior to any proposed major sale.

+

George Shultz will discuss this + issue with Geoffrey Howe in + Brussels this week. I agree with the approach you outlined in your + letter for the public presentation of our certification decision. We + will cooperate fully with your government on all public affairs aspects + of the certification process.Romberg + announced at the December 8 Department of State press briefing that + certification would be effective December 10, the day of Alfonsín’s inauguration. He + emphasized that resumption of arms sales would be reviewed and + approved only if an Argentine request was consistent with U.S. + support of a negotiated settlement of the Falklands/Malvinas and + Beagle Channel conflicts. (“Reagan to End Ban on Sale of Arms to the + Argentines.” New York Times, December 9, p. + A1)

+

George Bush will inform + President-elect Alfonsin of our mutual desire to see the Falklands issue + resolved peacefully. The Vice President’s visit represents our hope that + the inauguration of the Alfonsin Government will be a major step forward + in the new political process in + Argentina—one that will adhere to the democratic ideals we both hold so + dear.

+

With warm wishes,

+

Sincerely,

+

Ron

+

End text.

+

4. Signed original will follow.

+ Dam +
+ +
+ 441. Editorial Note +

On December 9, 1983, during a 35-minute bilateral discussion held at the + headquarters of the North + Atlantic Treaty Organization in Brussels, where they were attending a + Ministerial meeting, Secretary of State George P. Shultz and British Foreign Secretary Geoffrey Howe discussed Argentine + certification. According to telegram Secto 15043 from Brussels, December 9, “Howe said HMG appreciated the President’s advance warning on + certification of Argentina and noted that Mrs. Thatcher has sent a personal message + to President Alfonsin through the Swiss to the effect that, ‘While we + have our differences, Britain is pleased with the restoration of + democracy in Argentina, and extends its good wishes.’ Howe said the British Embassy in + Washington would be getting a copy of Mrs. Thatcher’s letter to Vice President Bush before his departure for Buenos + Aires. Howe added that while + HMG’s position on Falklands + sovereignty will not change, he hoped the installation of a new + government would open discussions. The Secretary emphasized that any + Argentine arms request would be reviewed on a case-by-case basis, taking + into account any threat that may be posed to peace in the region. In + addition, we would consult on major Argentine arms requests with HMG. Argentina, noted the Secretary, has + already replaced most of its Falklands losses and Alfonsin is intent on + reducing Argentina’s military budget. Furthermore, Argentina does not + have the resources for major arms acquisition. We understand your + sensitivity, said the Secretary. Howe replied that the British would like to consult + closely with the U.S. on Argentine arms transfers and emphasized it + would be difficult for HMG to defend + any sale publicly.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, + N830012–0411) Following the conversation, Shultz briefly summarized this exchange as part of a + report of his meeting with Howe + for President Ronald W. Reagan, which was + transmitted to the Department of State in telegram Secto 15041 from Brussels, December 9. + (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, [no film number])

+
+ +
+ 442. Telegram From the Department of State to Secretary of State + Shultz in RabatSource: Department of State, Central + Foreign Policy File, N830012–0498. Confidential; Immediate; Nodis. This telegram repeats for + Shultz’s information the + text of telegram WH09366, December 12, sent from Bush on Air Force 2 to the White + House and sent for information to Buenos Aires. In telegram 8787 + from Buenos Aires, December 11, the Embassy transmitted an earlier + version of the summary of Bush’s conversation with Alfonsín. (Department of State, Central Foreign + Policy File, D830730–0113) On December 12, Shultz was in Morocco, where he + met with King Hassan II, + before traveling to Lisbon for meetings with Portuguese + officials. + + + Washington, December 12, 1983, 1701Z + +

Tosec 150344/351672. Subject: + Bush-Alfonsin Bilateral + Meeting.

+

1. Confidential–Entire text—Nodis.

+

2. There follows a summary of conversation of the Bush/Alfonsin bilateral. SecState + pass to Defense and AEC.

+

3. Participants: Vice President George + Bush, Ambassador Frank + Ortiz, Assistant Secretary Anthony Motley, Admiral Daniel Murphy, President Raul + Alfonsin, Foreign Minister Dante + Caputo, Under Secretary for Foreign Affairs Hugo Gobbi, + Secretary of the Presidency German Lopez.

+

4. The meeting took place in Los Olivos, the Presidential residence, from + 2030 until 2120 hours on December 10, 1983. At the conclusion of the + meeting, the Vice President introduced Deputy Secretary McNamar and General Gorman, and their advisors, who had + participated in simultaneous side meetings with Minister of Economy + Bernardo Grinspun and Minister of Defense Raul Borras.

+

5. The Vice President opened by saying he spent an unbelievable day as a + participant and spectator in the public jubilation over Argentina’s + return to democracy. He said now the United States and Argentina could + become equal partners in the search for world peace and prosperity. He + believed there is a great potential for cooperative actions by two great + nations. President Alfonsin replied he was very pleased to hear this. + Argentina wants to have increasingly good relations with the United + States. Such relations would be between mature partners. The two nations have many common + interests. They now shared a commitment to democracy and the freedom of + man. There were also differing and contradictory interests which he did + not specify. He said we should strive to make the differing points of + view become common interests and the contradictory points of view simply + become differing points of view. He said bilateral relations suffered + because of the Malvinas war, but this same problem could become a + possible avenue to improve our relationship. The democracies of the + world must be unified. The Malvinas issue divides them. It is important + to begin to implement the UN resolution + on the Malvinas. Conversations between the U.K. and Argentina should + begin, even if with differing agendas, it was important to start talks. + There must be an end to the exclusion zone and at all costs the + conversion of the Islands into a military fortress must be stopped + before the South Atlantic is turned into the North Atlantic. There is a risk that + the South Atlantic would, like the Indian Ocean, become an area of + contest between world powers. Argentina is decisively opposed to such a + development. Argentina hopes the United States will cooperate with the + Argentine nation to avoid such a situation.

+

6. The Vice President replied he believes the U.K. wants to move forward + in rebuilding its relations with Argentina. The United States decision + to certify to the Congress Argentina’s improvements in the observance of + human rights was not easy for the British to accept. The United States + has demonstrated its support for Argentina. The United States believes + it can help in bettering relations between two friends. If the United + States sees there is no way it can be helpful, we shall tell Argentina + so frankly and tell them why. The United States desires a frank + relationship with Argentina. President Alfonsin said he was very + delighted to hear the Vice President speak in this manner. He said he + also wanted that there be a frank dialogue between the two + countries.

+

7. When the Vice President alluded to some demonstrations of hostility + against the United States among those in the great crowds in the center + of the city, the President said Americans should not be naive. While it + is true there is adverse sentiment in Argentina since the Malvinas war, + that was not the reason for whatever isolated instances of hostility the + Vice President may have observed. There are groups in Latin America who + raise banners that are not national banners but are those of the + East/West conflict. Latin America is a battlefield for ideological + propaganda. It was East/West not North/South manifestations the Vice President saw. In no + way do those who so demonstrated represent the great majority of + Argentines. They are only a small group which in Argentina are called + “ultras”. They have their own agenda, which is not Argentina’s + agenda.

+

8. The Vice President said, given the new relationship that is being + developed between the two countries, he would suggest that there be parliamentary exchanges. + Alfonsin immediately agreed. The Vice President also extended an + invitation to the President to make a working visit to the United States + some time late in 1984. He predicted that President Alfonsin would very + much like President Reagan. + President Alfonsin said it would give him the greatest pleasure to meet + President Reagan and to visit + the United States. The details could be worked out between the + respective Ambassadors.

+

9. The Vice President said there are specific areas in which the United + States hoped it could be cooperative and supportive. He noted that + Deputy Secretary of Treasury McNamar was a member of his delegation and was then + meeting with the new Argentine economic team. The United States would + try to be as helpful as possible in assisting Argentina to meet its + great financial problems. President Alfonsin said a lessening of the + magnitude of the debt problem is absolutely vital to him. He said there + is a danger that his administration could not fulfill the expectations + it awakened. He said it was essential to end the limitations on + Argentina’s development imposed by the huge debt service requirements. + He said Argentina always pays its debts. The way for Argentina to pay + off its debt is to export. It was vital to find markets for Argentina’s + exports and to arrange an equitable refinancing of the debt, but there + should be no question that Argentina will pay. The Vice President + repeated that the United States would try to help. He pointed out that + President Reagan very strongly + resisted the siren-call of protectionism raised by affected American + producers. The United States was doing it not out of generosity but + because it was good for the United States. The United States market + should be open to everyone. The United States shall continue to resist + raising barriers to trade. He assured President Alfonsin that would be + the case and that the United States would be a good trading partner. + Alfonsin said that this was a basic common interest and thanked the Vice + President for his assurances. He noted that even Argentina had to extend + help to countries in distress. He said Argentina would have to pay + Bolivia $270 million very soon, a sum that Argentina could scarcely + afford.

+

10. The Vice President noted the economic recovery in the United States + and its probable effect on the economies of other countries, especially + if the European economies also would improve. President Alfonsin said + the top priority must be to expand the economy and to have greater + production. He believed it was very important that there be a reduction + in interest rates.

+

11. The Vice President raised the matter of Argentina’s nuclear program. + He said the United States listened with great sensitivity to the + Alfonsin administration’s statements on the matter. He noted that purely + as a bilateral United States/Argentine question, the United States could be more forthcoming in + assuring there be a steady flow of scientific and technological + cooperation if the American Congress and public opinion were less + concerned about the possibility of the proliferation of nuclear devices. + He said to the degree Alfonson could find it possible to comply with + international nuclear safeguards it would make all areas of bilateral + cooperation much easier. The Vice President said this issue was + Argentina’s business, but President Alfonsin’s decisions would have a + considerable effect on the degree of cooperation possible between our + countries. The Vice President said he could not be less than frank on an + issue of such importance. President Alfonsin said the nuclear issue was + the converse to the human rights issue. On the nuclear question, the big + powers worry about the actions of the little powers. He said he wanted + the Vice President to know of his irrevocable and absolute decision that + Argentina will not build an atomic bomb. He said Argentina would make + agreements with its neighbors which will tranquilize world public + opinion.

+

12. The Vice President, in a forceful manner, conveyed to President + Alfonsin the commitment of President Reagan to a major reduction in arms not solely + limitation, but a reduction in armaments. He noted that a President with + the credentials of President Reagan can make effective agreements with the Soviet + Union and obtain ratification for such agreements in the Senate. It is + necessary to engage the Soviet Union in discussions leading to such + ends. President Reagan feels + very strongly about this issue. The United States absolutely wants to + reduce arms, however, it takes two to tango. The Vice President said he + believed there was growing support in Eastern Europe for arms reduction. + He knew that in the United States that President Reagan is strong enough to achieve it. + President Alfonsin said that this truly was a message of hope. He wished + President Reagan every + success.

+

[Omitted here is discussion of Central America.]

+ Dam +
+ +
+ + 443. Paper Prepared in the Central Intelligence AgencySource: Central Intelligence Agency, + Office of Russian and European Analysis, Job 01T02211R: Intelligence + Publication File—Record Copy of Finished Intelligence Pubs., Box 1, + Folder 3: Talking Points Argentina-UK: Status of the Falklands Dispute. Confidential; [handling restriction not declassified]. A + notation in an unknown hand at the top of the paper reads: “For + Secretary of Defense at his request.” + + + Washington, December + 14, 1983 + +

Argentina-UK: Status of the + Falklands Dispute

+

President Alfonsin’s recent statements on the Falklands represent a + slight softening of his tough campaign rhetoric but do not substantively + change Argentina’s negotiating position.

+

—In a press interview Sunday,December + 11. he repeated the formula of his military predecessors: If + the British reduce the protection zone around the islands and halt + expansion of the airbase there, he will consider a formal cessation of + hostilities.

+

—A “leaseback” arrangement that he also proposed—Buenos Aires would gain + sovereignty but the UK retain + control—has been part of the Argentine position since the mid-1970s. It + was put forward in the weeks following last year’s invasion as a way to + resolve the dispute.

+

Alfonsin has no latitude at this point to make significant concessions + and probably has no wish to do so. He nevertheless is likely to see + advantages in appearing flexible. Internationally he sets a moderate + tone for his foreign policy that could put the UK on the diplomatic defensive. Domestically, his quick + moves to address the issue and reduce tensions probably will be used to + justify cuts in military expenditures, a vital part of his economic + program.

+

The British have rejected an immediate discussion of sovereignty—and + therefore the leaseback proposal—and are continuing airfield + improvements. Foreign Secretary Howe, in a radio interview Sunday, left the door open + for some reduction of the exclusive zone, however, and the British are + likely to be flexible on this point if they conclude that Alfonsin is + willing to foster a return to normal economic, commercial, and + diplomatic ties. The British will not require a formal declaration of an + end to hostilities in order to discuss bilateral relations.

+
+ +
+ + 444. Action Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for + Inter-American Affairs (Motley), + the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Burt), and the Director of the Bureau + of Politico-Military Affairs (Howe) to the Under Secretary of State for Political + Affairs (Eagleburger)Source: Department of State, Bureau + of European Affairs, United Kingdom Political Files, Lot 89D489, + Falklands—Memos/Letters/Press 1982. Confidential. Drafted by F.G. + Lee (ARA/RPP) on December 13; + cleared by Kilday, Perry, Sienkiewicz, Blakemore, Haass, Wenick, Proper, Finegold, and Morley. Lee initialed for all clearing officials + with the exception of Kilday, who initialed the memorandum. A stamped notation + at the top of the memorandum indicates that Eagleburger saw it on December 22. + Below this, Howe wrote: + “This is height of inefficient operations. I oppose creating such a + mechanism even for cosmetic purposes. JH.” + + + Washington, December + 15, 1983 + + + SUBJECT + Review of Argentine Arms Transfers and Consultations with the + U.K. + +

Issue for Decision

+

Whether to approve a plan for Department review of arms transfers to + Argentina and consultations with the U.K.

+

Background

+

You have undertaken to review major arms transfers to Argentina, and we + are committed to consultation with the U.K. prior to approving them.

+

The Alfonsin Government is committed to cutting military spending, and we + do not expect many requests from the Argentines for major new weapons + systems. Given the fact that certification ends a five-year legal + prohibition against arms transfers, however, we do expect a number of + requests for smaller items—especially replacement parts for U.S.-origin + equipment. The British have already identified some such items as being + of great concern to them. Other items may be clearly non-sensitive.

+

We can also expect to receive a large number of Munitions Control Export + License requests from U.S. companies to market new items or transfer + them to the GOA. Some of the marketing + requests may involve items that are major by any definition. Under + normal circumstances, the Department review of such requests would be + handled by PM and the regional bureaus. + Controversial items, and those on which bureaus cannot agree, would be + sent to the seventh floor for decision.

+ +

Given the sensitivity of arms transfers to Argentina, ARA and EUR propose that a special procedure be set up to consider + all requests involving the GOA. This system would allow us to give + prompt, close attention even to small items that may turn out to be + relevant from the point of view of regional stability.

+

The proposal is that a special review committee would meet as often as + necessary to review all Argentine arms transfer requests (both direct + sales from the U.S. and third-party transfer requests). The Committee + would be chaired by PM, with + representatives from T, P, PM, ARA, EUR, + ACDA, and DOD. PM, ARA, and EUR representation on the Committee would be at the Office + Director level, given the intent that the Committee would formulate + recommendations to P. The Committee would examine each request + case-by-case rather than attempting to define general principle in the + abstract. With respect to each request, the Committee would either:

+

—Approve (no major items or items considered sensitive from the point of + view of regional stability), or

+

—Deny (items on which Working Group agrees should be denied and which + would not normally be referred to the 7th floor), or

+

—Refer through P to T for determination (major and sensitive items + recommended for approval, and items on which the Working Group cannot + unanimously agree).

+

Those items that are considered neither controversial nor major might be + approved by the Committee without referral to P or consultations with + the British. At the beginning of this process, the Committee would + confirm its decision at the DAS level in PM.

+

Approvals/denials resulting from the committee meetings, or from your + decisions, would be communicated by PM + to the Munitions Control Office (PM/MC) for issuance/denial of licenses and to DOD/DSAA for final disposition of FMS requests.

+

PM believes that the existing munitions + control license application procedure is adequate to screen Argentine + cases effectively and efficiently; difficult cases on which positive + action was indicated could then be referred to P and T for final + decision. If, however, the EUR/ARA recommendations for a special + committee to handle all such cases (denials as well as approvals) are + accepted, we should, after two months of experience with this approach, + review with P and T the necessity of the continuing requirement for + reviewing every case.

+

Consultations with the British would normally take place when we have + reached a preliminary decision to approve a major sale. There may be + situations, however, when publicity surrounding a proposed sale—or + potential therefor—will cause the British to raise the issue with us + before we have reached even a preliminary decision. In either situation, where consultations + are considered appropriate, they will be undertaken by PM and EUR + with the British Embassy in Washington. The process would involve + calling in a representative of the British Embassy (Counselor level), + giving him a cleared non-paper, and requesting comments from HMG within a specified period of time + (normally five days).

+

Recommendation

+

That you approve the formation of a committee composed of T, P, PM (chair), ARA, EUR, ACDA and DOD to review all Argentine arms transfer requests along + lines proposed above.Eagleburger approved the + recommendation on December 22. At the bottom of the page, he wrote: + “But, JH’s [Jonathan Howe’s] + concerns are legitimate. Let’s review the need for this after 2 + months. What I am concerned about is assurances of great care in the + review process and adequate consultations + with the UK. If these can be managed + through normal procedures, I’ll probably agree to a less + bureaucratic system. LSE.”

+
+ +
+ 445. Telegram From the Department of State to Secretary of State + Shultz in CaracasSource: Department of State, Central + Foreign Policy File, D840069–0601. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Sent for information + Immediate to Buenos Aires, London, and USNATO. Drafted by D. Jett (ARA/SC); cleared by Morley, C.K. Stocker (EUR/NE), and R. + Davis (S/S); approved + by Michel. Shultz was in Venezuela February + 1–3 for the inauguration of President Lusinchi and meetings with + Central American Foreign Ministers. + + + Washington, February 2, 1984, 0319Z + +

Tosec 20078/31649. Subject: British + Propose Direct Talks With Argentines. Ref: London 2322.In telegram 2322 from London, January 31, the + Embassy reported that the British Government “has indicated to us + more explicitly than in the past its plan for a step-by-step + approach to improving Anglo/Argentine relations. The plan presumes + Argentine willingness to consider concrete diplomatic, commercial, + and military steps.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy + File, D840064–0714)

+

1. Secret–Entire text.

+

2. Summary. British Embassy has informed the Department that on January + 26, they requested the Swiss to approach the Argentines and propose + direct official talks between the UK and + Argentina about the progressive normalization of relations between the + two countries. HMG is not requesting any USG action but is merely keeping us + informed. While this initial approach is being kept strictly + confidential, the talks, if held, would not be secret in the UK view. As far as the UK Embassy is aware, the GOA has not yet responded other than + thanking the Swiss for the discreet way in which they handled passing + the message. End summary.

+

3. British First Secretary Woodley called on ARA/SC Director Morley and Argentine Desk Officer Jett to deliver a + paper informing the Department that on January 26, HMG requested the Swiss to approach the + Argentines and propose direct official talks between the UK and Argentina about progressive + normalization of relations between the two countries. Text of paper + follows para 6 along with accompanying + press line HMG intends to take.

+

4. Woodley noted that while this initial approach was being kept in + strictest confidence, the talks, if held, would not be secret in the + UK view. Woodley said no USG action was being requested but that + the US and certain other allies were + being kept informed. He did ask for and was given an update on recent + statements on the Falklands/Malvinas problem.

+

5. While the agenda includes no topics directly related to the + Falklands/Malvinas, other than return of Argentine dead, Woodley + indicated there was some flexibility on what would be discussed as long + as sovereignty was left unambiguously aside.

+

6. UK secret paper—Begin text:

+

Relations between the UK and Argentina: + UK proposal for talks.

+

On 26 January 1984 the Secretary of State asked the Swiss protecting + powers to approach the Government of Argentina to consider means of + following up the exchange of messages between the Prime Minister and + President Alfonsin.

+

The Swiss have now passed on to the Argentines our view that the + possibility should now be considered of talks between the United Kingdom + and Argentina, at official level, about the progressive normalization of + relations between the two countries. They have added that it is + necessary for both sides to recognize the realities of the situation and + the constraints under which the other is operating. With this in mind, + the Swiss have proposed on our behalf that any discussions should be + without prejudice to the positions of the United Kingdom and Argentina + respectively on the question of sovereignty over the Falklands and that + sovereignty is not and cannot be on the agenda.

+

The aim of this proposal is thus to agree to the discussion of practical + issues, with sovereignty left unambiguously aside. The agenda for such a + discussion on normalization could include:

+

A) The reciprocal lifting of restrictions on trade between the United + Kingdom and Argentina;

+ +

B) The lifting of all outstanding financial restrictions;

+

C) Arrangements for the return of the Argentine dead from the Falkland + Islands or, failing that, for a next-of-kin visit;

+

D) The restoration of the air services agreement between the United + Kingdom and Argentina;

+

E) The resumption of cultural, scientific and full sporting contacts;

+

F) The upgrading of official relations.

+

In the light of speculation about the possibility of secret talks, the + Swiss are telling the Argentines that we would not welcome such a + procedure, which could lead to serious dangers of misunderstanding. In + the longer term, we consider that there is no need to cloak in secrecy + meetings about the normalization of bilateral relations. But we wish to + keep the present approach confidential and the Swiss have therefore said + that neither they nor we have any intention of stimulating publicity at + this stage. We understand that the Argentine Ministry of Foreign Affairs + have thanked the Swiss for the discreet way in which the matter has been + handled so far. We do not wish to upset this balance but we consider it + desirable that the United States Government, and certain other partners + and allies, should know in strict confidence of the follow-up action + that we have taken. We believe that this represents the only realistic + way forward.

+

1 February 1984. End text.

+

7. UK press line–Begin text:

+

Relations between the UK and Argentina: + Press line.

+

In answer to questions from the press about UK/Argentine relations, the + Foreign and Commonwealth Office is confirming that means are being + explored of carrying forward the process initiated by the exchange of + messages. No details are being given but attention is being drawn to the + Secretary of State’s statement in the House of Commons on 25 January + that the Prime Minister’s message to Alfonsin was intended to pave the + way towards more normal relations with Argentina and that “the right way + of setting about this process is to seek to improve relationships + through the intermediation of the protecting powers and to move from + that to try to establish a normal pattern of business between the two + countries”.

+

In reply to a press question in Rome on 27 January as to whether we + envisaged Italian “mediation”, the Prime Minister said “the answer is + no. If we feel that we are likely to get any further with resuming + better commercial relations and trying to establish more friendly + relations, which we would like, we feel it is better to do those + negotiations, or explore that fact, direct”.

+

In reply to a question about the Falkland Islands protection zone in the + House of Commons on 30 January the Prime Minister said “we do not envisage keeping the 150 + nautical mile protection zone around the Falkland Islands indefinitely, + but we will not lift it prematurely. We need to be fully satisfied that + Argentina renounces the future use of force, and have noted recent + Argentine statements that they intend to pursue their claim by peaceful + means.” End text.On April 9, the First + Secretary of the British Embassy called on ARA/SC and EUR/NE to inform them that the Swiss + Ambassador in Buenos Aires had delivered a British note to Caputo on April 6, proposing steps + for the normalization of diplomatic relations between the United + Kingdom and Argentina. The text of the note and the Argentine + response was transmitted in telegram 103983 to Buenos Aires and + London April 10. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, + D840233–0607)

+ + Dam + +
+ +
+ 446. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Kingdom to the Department + of StateSource: Department of + State, Central Foreign Policy File, D840465–0296. Confidential; + Immediate; Exdis. Sent for + information to Buenos Aires. + + + London, July + 18, 1984, 1220Z + +

16002. Subject: UK-Argentine Relations: + Talks Begin. Ref: London 14594.In telegram + 14594 from London, June 29, the Embassy conveyed a summary of + Middendorf’s June 28–29 + meetings with FCO officials on + Central and South American issues in the OAS. On the Falklands/Malvinas, the Embassy reported: + “Whitney and Thomas said they were hopeful that + Britain and Argentina would find a way to start discussions on + improving bilateral relations, using a formula that would protect + the UK position that sovereignty + could not be discussed without undercutting Alfonsin’s position that + this issue could not be excluded. Both emphasized UK firmness on sovereignty. Whitney said the two sides were now + playing tennis behind closed doors with the UK making most of the running. Confidentiality was + essential at this stage, but the British would brief us as soon as + they could.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, + D840421–0226)

+

1. Confidential–Entire text.

+

2. According to FCO, talks began July 18 + in Bern between British and Argentine negotiating teams under the + chairmanship of Swiss State Secretary for Foreign Affairs Brunner. A + Brazilian representative will be present as the other protecting power. + The stated aim of the talks is normalization of relations between the + two countries. In the public announcement (quoted below), no mention is made of whether the subject + of sovereignty is to be discussed. If asked, the UK will refer to its previous position on that + question.

+

3. FCO regretted that, at the request of + the Argentines, Britain was unable to give its allies advance notice of + the talks. UK Embassy Washington has + instructions to brief the State Department at 0800 local time, three + hours ahead of the public announcement to be made via a written + parliamentary question in London, with simultaneous statements in Bern + and Bonn.

+

4. The UK negotiating team is headed by + FCO Assistant Under Secretary for + the Americas David Thomas; the + Argentine group is led by Assistant Under Secretary Delpeche. FCO expects the talks to last two or three + days, and hopes this will be the first in a series of meetings with the + Argentines. FCO would not provide + details of the agenda, but stressed that sovereignty over the Falklands + would not be discussed. (This will clearly be the British public + position. An FCO staffer has intimated + to us in the past that a compromise solution might be found whereby + sovereignty would be discussed, but this fact would be kept secret. We + don’t know whether such an arrangement was part of the Anglo/Argentine + deal.)

+

5. There follows the text of the public announcement to be released at + 1600 hours London time July 18:

+

Quote. At the invitation of the Swiss Federal Department of Foreign + Affairs, representatives of Argentina and the United Kingdom are meeting + in Bern today. The conversation will be under the chairmanship of the + State Secretary of the Federal Department of Foreign Affairs with a + representative of the Government of Brazil also present. End quote.

+ + Price + +
+ +
+ + 447. Telegram From the Embassy in Argentina to the Department of + StateSource: Department + of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D840463–0817. Confidential; + Immediate. Sent for information Immediate to Bern, London, USUN, Geneva, USCINCSO, and USCINCLANT, and for information + to Asuncion, Bogota, Brasilia, Caracas, La Paz, Lima, Montevideo, + Quito, Rio de Janeiro, Rome, Santiago, and Sao Paolo. + + + Buenos Aires, July 19, 1984, + 2207Z + +

5643. USCINCSO for INTAFF, CINCLANT also for POLAD. Subj: Argentina Breaks Off + Malvinas Talks. Ref: Buenos Aires 5564.In + telegram 5564 from Buenos Aires, July 18, Ortiz reported that Caputo had informed him on July 17 + of the forthcoming announcement of the direct Anglo/Argentine talks + in Bern. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, + D840459–0844)

+

1. (U) According to media reports, Argentina broke off talks with Great + Britain over the future of the Malvinas Islands when British + representatives reportedly refused to consider the sovereignty + question.In telegram 16321 from London, + July 20, the Embassy reported: “Foreign Secretary Howe and his deputy Baroness Young + laid the blame squarely on Argentina for the failure of the Bern + talks.” The telegram also conveyed a summary of the talks and their + breakdown based upon information received from the FCO. (Department of State, Central + Foreign Policy File, D840465–0795) Foreign Ministry sources + quoted by local press said the joint communique which was to have been + issued at the end of the two-day meeting would have included the + statement that “the British representatives were not yet prepared to + study the sovereignty issue.” The Argentine source reportedly said that + the British replaced that phrasing with “the British representatives + were not disposed to study the sovereignty issue.”

+

2. (U) Foreign Minister Dante + Caputo released the following statement at noon Argentine + time today:

+

“The Ministry of Foreign Relations and Worship reports that on July 18 + and 19, on an invitation of the Swiss Confederation and with the + participation of representatives of the Federative Republic of Brazil, + the delegations of the Argentine Republic and the United Kingdom of + Great Britain and Northern Island met in Bern.

+

“The meetings, which were of an informal nature, were held with an open + agenda with the purpose of exchanging points of view concerning the + Malvinas, Georgias, and Sandwich Islands, and other points related to + the problems affecting the relations between the two countries.

+

“At the beginning of the meeting, the Argentine delegation reasserted + Argentina’s sovereign rights over the Malvinas, South Sandwich, and + South Georgia Islands. It also asserted that since the sovereignty matter constitutes the + substance of the conflict with Great Britain, the other points of + disagreement would be resolved in an expeditious and satisfactory manner + if a serious and responsible solution was found to the sovereignty + issue. In this regard the Argentine delegation reaffirmed the Argentine + Government’s willingness to find a solution to the conflict based on the + recommendations made by the United Nations.

+

“For its part, the British delegation stated that it was not disposed to + discuss the sovereignty issue. Since this circumstance impaired the + objective of the Bern meeting, there was no purpose in continuing the + talks.”

+

3. (C) Comment: Swiss Ambassador Keusch called Ambassador Ortiz this afternoon to report that + talks are officially suspended and that there will be no further + “official” meetings in Bern. However, he understands that as of late + evening Swiss time both sides were meeting together in “private” + discussion. As of 5:30 p.m. Buenos Aires time we have heard no further + information either from MFA or British + Interests Section here concerning the status of such “private” + talks.

+

4. (C) Although a thorough assessment will not be possible until the + “private” talks and their substance can be confirmed, the abrupt + breaking off of the scheduled discussions could lead Foreign Minister + Caputo to raise the Malvinas + issue with Secretary Shultz next + week.See Document + 448. If so, some suggestion of the position he + might take with the Secretary may be indicated by local radio reports + which have reported the government believes it has “given clear proof of + its pacifist and open-to-negotiations stance, a position which is not + shared by the British Government.” The reported breakdown apparently + came as a surprise to most Argentines who earlier today appeared to + support the start of direct contacts with the British. End comment.

+ + Ortiz + +
+ +
+ + 448. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in + ArgentinaSource: + Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D840482–0333. + Secret; Immediate. Sent for information Immediate to Santiago and + London. Drafted by Morley; + cleared by B. McKinley (S/S), + K. Clark, and in S/S–O; approved by Kilday. + + + Washington, July 28, 1984, 0432Z + +

222720. Subject: Secretary’s Meeting With Foreign Minister Caputo July 23.No memorandum of conversation of this meeting has + been found.

+

1. (S–Entire text).

+

2. Summary: Secretary’s meeting with Argentine Foreign Minister Caputo focussed on four + issues—Argentina’s economic problems and the debt, Cartagena, the + Falklands/Malvinas problem and the proposal for a “library group” + hemispheric dialogue. End summary.

+

[Omitted here is discussion of the Argentine economic situation, + Cartagena, and an Argentine proposal for a “hemispheric dialogue.”]

+

9. Falklands/Malvinas: Caputo said + the GOA was firmly committed to + peaceful negotiations as the best way to resolve differences. For + example, Argentina was close to an agreement with Chile on the Beagle + Channel problem and he expected final agreement soon, possibly within + sixty days. The problem with the UK was + a tougher one, especially now because of the unfortunate results at + Bern. Caputo said the Bern talks + failed because the British did not demonstrate minimum flexibility.See Document + 447. The GOA’s first + objective was a resumption of the informal dialogue. It was important to + reduce tensions and continued contacts served this purpose. The GOA was and remained disposed to any form + of dialogue with the British that would advance the prospects of a + permanent solution. In response, the Secretary said we were disappointed + with the outcome of this initial effort. We would like to see the + dialogue reconstructed, but do not want to get between Argentina and the + UK on this issue. The British had + told him they would like to see the dialogue resumed also. (FYI. There + was no significant discussion of how this issue would be handled in the + UNGA during this or any other + meeting with USG officials.)

+ + Shultz + +
+ +
+ + 449. Telegram From Secretary of State Shultz to the Department of State and the Embassies in + the United Kingdom and ArgentinaSource: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy + File, D840490–0540. Secret; Immediate. Shultz was with the President in + California. + + + Palo Alto, California, August 1, 1984, + 1905Z + +

Secto 8005. Subject: Letter for + Foreign Secretary Howe From + Secretary Shultz on the Falkland + Islands.

+

1. (S–Entire text).

+

2. Embassy is requested to deliver as soon as possible the following + letter from the Secretary to Sir + Geoffrey in response to Sir + Geoffrey’s on the Falklands negotiations dated July 20 + (see para 4).Howe’s + letter was sent to Shultz by + the British Embassy under a July 21 covering note from Wright. (Department of State, + Central Foreign Policy File, P840174–0231) No signed original + to follow.

+

3. Begin text of Secretary’s letter:

+

Dear Sir Geoffrey:

+

Thank you for your timely letter of July 20 on the British/Argentine + discussions on the Falkland Islands. I was very disappointed at the + outcome of those talks because I am convinced that direct contacts are + the best way to reduce tensions and ultimately to normalize + relations.

+

As always, your assessment of the discussions was valuable and served as + useful background for my discussions with Foreign Minister Caputo on July 23. The tone of our + conversation on this matter was straightforward and unemotional. He + reiterated his government’s firm commitment to peaceful negotiations to + resolve differences. While acknowledging that the unfortunate outcome of + the Bern meetings represented a setback in terms of better relations + between the two governments, he stressed his objective of resuming an + informal dialogue. He stated that the GOA is disposed to any form of dialogue that would advance + the prospects of a permanent solution and improve relations. That + presentation was made in a reassuringly non-polemical tone. I expressed + to him my regret at the outcome of the discussions.

+

Given the talent and commitment on both sides I am optimistic that + between you, you will find a mutually acceptable way to reestablish + direct contacts aimed at resolving outstanding differences.

+

Sincerely,

+

George.

+

End text of Secretary letter.

+ +

4. Begin text of Foreign Secretary Howe’s letter:

+

You will know that British and Argentine representatives met for talks in + Berne on 18 and 19 July. I know that the Argentine Foreign Minister will + be in Washington on 23 July and I therefore wanted to let you know + quickly how these talks went and why they ended so abruptly and + prematurely.

+

As you know, Margaret Thatcher + and I have long attached importance to improving our relations with + Argentina. For reasons which I think are well understood, we cannot + discuss with Argentina the question of sovereignty over the Falkland + Islands. We were in the middle of a discussion on that very subject in + good faith when the Argentines launched their brutal invasion of the + Islands only two years ago. No Argentine Government can escape the + consequences of those tragic events. But it is clearly right that we + should move towards more normal relations between Britain and democratic + Argentina.

+

We have therefore made a major effort, in exchanges through our + protecting power (the Swiss) since the start of the year, to establish + an agreed basis for talks which would lead to the progressive + normalisation of relations. We recognized of course that Britain and + Argentina had different positions on the sovereignty issue. It was clear + to us that if talks between us were not to founder at the outset on this + issue, we should have to devise an arrangement which met those different + positions. After many months of discussions, we finally reached + agreement through the Swiss, on the basis of an Argentine proposal, that + if the Argentine representatives raised the subject of sovereignty, as + they clearly wished to do, the British side would respond that we were + not prepared to discuss it. Discussion would then move straight on to + the practical issues of concern to both sides and would continue on + those subjects. This agreement was specifically agreed by the Argentine + Government and confirmed by the Swiss.

+

We complied scrupulously with this arrangement when the talks opened in + Berne. As we had expected, the Argentines raised the question of + sovereignty. As we had indicated in advance, we made plain that we were + not prepared to discuss it. We then went on to put forward some + constructive ideas on a number of practical issues—for example, the + resumption of normal commercial and financial relations, the restoration + of air services between Britain and Argentina, and the arrangement of a + visit for Argentine next of kin to the graves of their relatives on the + Falkland Islands. I remain convinced that this is the way to build more + constructive relations between Britain and Argentina.

+

Sadly the Argentine representatives were not willing to continue the + talks on the agreed basis. They advanced the new proposition that + discussion of the practical issues we had put forward could only take + place on condition that we accepted some mechanism to address the question of sovereignty. They + must have known that this was quite inconsistent with the agreed basis + of the talks. But they maintained that unless their new condition was + met, they were not prepared to pursue the talks. The talks therefore + came to an end.

+

I am saddened and frustrated that, after so many months of careful + preparation, the Argentines should have chosen to set aside the agreed + basis for the talks as soon as they opened, and to introduce new and + unacceptable conditions of their own. An important opportunity has been + missed, and the responsibility must rest with the Argentine + Government.

+

The Argentines have spoken of British intransigence. The record simply + does not bear that out. Apart from the major effort we made to find and + agree a mutually acceptable basis for talks, we have taken a series of + steps over the last two years aimed at improving relations between + Britain and Argentina:

+

—In July 1982 we lifted the 200 mile exclusion zone around the Falkland + Islands, and replaced it with a smaller protection zone;

+

—In September 1982 I was personally involved in lifting financial + restrictions;

+

—We have stimulated and supported five separate approaches by + Presidencies of the EC seeking the + normalisation of economic and commercial relations;

+

—We have made clear our willingness on a number of occasions to accept + the return of the Argentine dead, or a visit by Argentine next of kin to + the Falklands;

+

—Margaret Thatcher promptly + welcomed President Alfonsin’s inauguration last December.

+

As this list shows, we have not been inflexible, or lacking in ideas. I + am still convinced that better relations between Britain and Argentina + are in the interests of both countries as well as of our friends around + the world. But the events of the last week have not made our task any + easier.

+

20 July 1984

+

End text of Howe’s letter.

+ + Shultz + +
+ +
+ + 450. Telegram From the Embassy in Argentina to the Department of + StateSource: Department + of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D840509–0428. Confidential. + Sent for information to London and USUN. + + + Buenos Aires, August 9, 1984, + 1533Z + +

6299. Subject: Falklands/Malvinas—Argentina’s Next Moves.

+

1. Confidential–Entire text.

+

2. On August 8 I raised with Foreign Minister Caputo Argentina’s current position on the + Falklands/Malvinas, particularly as it would arise in the UNGA. I pointed out to Caputo that an Argentine resolution + that was tougher than last year’s would make it harder to obtain support + and probably would also affect chances for early future talks with the + U.K. Caputo said he could assure + me that this year’s resolution would be much more “to the point” and + have fewer adjectives. I asked him what adjectives were being dropped. + He said “colonialist” was one of them.

+

3. Caputo told me Argentina’s goal + on the Malvinas is to “disactivate” the conflict with the U.K. and + return to the situation that existed before the Malvinas war. Argentina + wants to “reinitiate” the decisions taken in mid-1977, specifically + those set forth in the joint Argentine/U.K. communique issued June 8, + 1977. In that statement Argentina and the U.K. agreed to continue + negotiations concerning future political relationships—including + sovereignty with regard to the Falklands/Malvinas, the South Georgias + and the South Sandwich Islands—and economic cooperation with respect to + those territories in particular and the Southwest Atlantic in general. + These, Caputo told me, were + Argentina’s goals. He asked that we treat them on a confidential basis. + He agreed that an extreme Argentine position on the Falklands/Malvinas + would be inadvisable, but that the U.K. also had to show + flexibility.

+ + Ortiz + +
+ +
+ + 451. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Argentina + and the Mission to the United NationsSource: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy + File, D840650–0460. Confidential. Sent for information to London. + Drafted by J.L. Martin (ARA/RPP); cleared by Proper, Morley, S. Candy (IO/UNP), P. Olson (L/ARA), K. Stocker (EUR/NE), Kelly, + Kilday, M. Ranneberger + (P), and McKinley (S/S); approved by + R. Kirk (IO). + + + Washington, October 12, 1984, 0543Z + +

302856. Subject: Falkland Islands (Malvinas) UNGA Resolution. Ref: USUN 2458.In telegram 2458 + from USUN, October 2, the Mission + informed the Department that Muniz had provided Sorzano with the Spanish text of + the “definitive” Argentine draft resolution and conveyed the text of + the draft. In presenting the draft, Muniz “insisted that USUN was only recipient of this text, + but that the Argentines might brief others verbally on its + contents.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, + D840628–0939)

+

1. C–Entire text.

+

2. Department has studied Argentine draft resolution on the Falklands + Malvinas (official translation below) and found it substantially the + same as the Argentine resolutions of the last two years.In telegram 290252 to USUN, September 29, the Department noted that the text + of the Argentine proposed draft resolution contained “several + additions and deletions from the resolutions which we supported the + past two years. These changes appear to be designed to put increased + pressure on the UK to negotiate on + the issue of sovereignty over the Islands and to limit the + possibility of self-determination for the Islanders.” (Department of + State, Central Foreign Policy File, D840621–0101) Accordingly + you may respond to the Argentine Mission that, if the resolution is + submitted as now written, we will be able to support it. You should + caution that any revisions to the text will reopen the question of how + we would vote. Mission should advise Department when Argentines informed + of our position.Sorzano informed Muniz of the U.S. + position on October 12. (Telegram 2761 from USUN, October 13; Department of + State, Central Foreign Policy File, D840654–0177) On October 25, the + Argentine Foreign Ministry presented Ortiz with textual changes to the draft which were + conveyed to the Department in telegram 8538 from Buenos Aires, + October 25. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, + D840683–0610)

+

3. For London: Embassy should inform appropriate FCO officials of USG + position when it receives message from US Mission New York that GOA informed.In telegram 22795 + from London, October 17, the Embassy reported its discussions with + the FCO on the Argentine draft in + which the FCO “viewed US support for latest resolution + without enthusiasm, but also without rancor. FCO understands that US position is consistent with past + votes and appreciates that it is consistent with points made by + USG throughout good and regular + consultations with HMG.” + (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, + D840662–0608)

+

3. Text official translation:

+ +

“Thirty-ninth United Nations General Assembly draft resolution on the + question of the Falkland Islands.

+

—The General Assembly,

+

—Having considered the question of the Falkland Islands (Malvinas) and + received the report of the Secretary General;

+

—Recalling its Resolutions 1514 (XV), 2065 (XX), 3160 (XXVIII), 31/49, + 37/9, and 38/12, in addition to Security Council Resolutions 502 and 505 + of 1982;

+

—Reaffirming the principles of the United Nations Charter on the non-use + of force or the threat of force in international relations and the + obligation of the states to settle their international disputes by + peaceful means, and recalling that in this respect the General Assembly + has repeatedly requested the Governments of Argentina and the United + Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to resume negotiations in + order to find as soon as possible a peaceful, just, and definitive + solution to the sovereignty dispute relating to the question of the + Falkland Islands (Malvinas);

+

—Noting with concern that despite the time elapsing since the adoption of + Resolution 2065 (XX), this prolonged dispute has still not been + settled;

+

—Aware of the interest of the international community in the resolution + by the Governments of the Argentine Republic and the United Kingdom of + Great Britain and Northern Ireland of all their differences in + accordance with the United Nations ideals of peace and friendship + between peoples:

+

—Taking note of the communique issued at Bern on July 20, 1984, by the + Governments of Switzerland and representatives of the Government of + Brazil; and

+

—Reaffirming the need for the parties to take due account of the + interests of the population of the aforementioned Islands in accordance + with the provisions of General Assembly Resolutions 2065 (XX), 3160 + (XXVIII), 37/9, and 38/12;

+

—1. Reiterates its request to the Governments of the Argentine Republic + and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to resume + negotiations in order to find as soon as possible a peaceful solution to + the sovereignty dispute relating to the question of the Falkland Islands + (Malvinas);

+

—2. Requests the Secretary General to continue his renewed mission of + good offices in order to assist the parties in complying with the + request made in paragraph 1 above, taking to that end whatever measures + are necessary;

+

—3. Requests the Secretary General to submit a report to the General + Assembly at its fortieth session on the progress made in the + implementation of this resolution; and

+ +

—4. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its fortieth session + the item entitled “Question of the Falkland Islands (Malvinas)”.By a vote of 89 in favor (including the + United States) and 9 against, with 54 abstentions, the UN General Assembly adopted this + revised text on November 1 as Resolution 39/6. A discussion of the + debate and the voting, as well as the text of the adopted resolution + were transmitted to the Department in telegram 3030 from USUN, November 2. (Department of + State, Central Foreign Policy File, D840700–0907)

+ + Dam + +
+ +
+ 452. Telegram From the Embassy in Argentina to the Department of + StateSource: Department + of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D840710–0556. Secret; + Priority; Noforn; Nocontract. + + + Buenos Aires, November 6, 1984, + 1442Z + +

8844. Subj: Argentine Intent To Retake Falklands. Ref: (A) State + 323919,In telegram 323919 to Buenos + Aires, October 31, the Department informed the Embassy that INR requested comment on an October 29 + report prepared by USDAO Brasilia + concerning the Falklands/Malvinas dispute (reference B). (Department + of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D840697–0545) (B) IIR + 6 809 0249 84 (DTG 2918122 Oct + 84).Not found.

+

1. (S–Entire text.)

+

2. Embassy believes GOA will continue to + pursue its Malvinas goals through negotiation only. President Alfonsin + will not throw away the hard-won improvement in Argentina’s + international image on foolhardy military adventures. We concur also + with our DAO assessment that Argentine + armed forces do not have the operational capacity and resources to + launch any effort to retake the Malvinas.

+

3. While we would not rule out a possible military action by some part of + the Argentine services, perhaps related to internal political disputes, + the reference report seems to imply a carefully planned and organized + effort with help from other countries. Perhaps the Argentines were using + an extreme case to test Brazilian reactions.

+ + Ortiz + +
+
+ +
+ + +
+ + Index +

References are to document numbers

+ + + + Abrams, Elliott, 427 + Acland, Sir Antony, 81, 312 + Adams, Alvin P., Jr., 147, 196, 397 + Adelman, Kenneth L., 410 + Aguirre, Francisco, 243 + Aguirre Lanari, Juan Ramón, 372, 373, 385, 397, 404, 414 + Alberti, Francesco J., 114, 118 + Alemann, Roberto, 55 + Alfonsín, Raúl, 435, 439, 441, 442, 443 + Allen, Carolyn, 114 + Allen, Gen. Lew, Jr., 62, 79, 320 + Allen, Richard V., 279 + Allin, Lyndon K. “Mort”, 115 + Alsogaray, Alvaro, 377 + Anaya, Adm. Jorge I., 11, 44, 52, 55, 142, 163, 243, 254, 274 + Anderson, Robert, 385 + Andreotti, Giulio, 268, 269 + Antarctica, 1 + Aragones, Emilio, 90 + Argentina. See also British-Argentine + prewar negotiations + + Antarctica claims, 1 + Beagle Channel dispute (1978), 1, 2, 9, 10, 55, 373, + 382, 448 + Economic situation, 125, 429 + Human rights certification. See + U.S. certification for arms sales to Argentina. + John Paul II visit (June 1982), + 332, 339 + Military imports, 134, 149, 214, + 236 + Nuclear policies, 391, 400, 435, + 442 + Political situation + Falklands/Malvinas War and, 55, 87 + Postwar, 344, 345, 350, 357, 370, 372, 424 + Prewar, 8, 9, 16, + 26, 55 + + Sinai MFO participation, 6 + Soviet relations with, 2, 103, 350 + U.S. arms sales to. See U.S. + certification for arms sales to Argentina; U.S. sanctions + against Argentina. + U.S. defense support, 65 + U.S. prewar relations with, 56 + + Arias Stella, Javier, 201, 307 + Armstrong, John, 115 + Atkeson, Edward B., 126, 240 + Austin, Cmdr. M., 62, 67, 69, 108, 156 + + + + + Bahai faith, 1 + Bailey, Norman A., 226 + Baker, James A., III, 70, 155 + Baldridge, H. Malcolm, Jr., 263, 360 + Barnes, Michael D., 427 + Barnett, E., 432 + Barnett, L., 421 + Barrow, Gen. Robert H., 320 + Beagle Channel dispute, 1, 2, 9, 10, 55, 373, 382, 448 + Beers, R. Rand, 337 + Beláunde Terry, Fernando: + Falklands/Malvinas War, 204, + 232, 234, 282 + Peruvian peace proposal, 202, + 203, 207, 208, 209, 211, + 231, 232, 234 + + Belize, 161, 383 + Benn, Tony, 143 + Bennett, W. Tapley, Jr., 233, 268 + Bernhardt, J.P.A., 118 + Bernstein, Carl, 115 + Bignone, Gen. Reynaldo, 370, 372, 373 + Binns, Jack R., 425, 430, 432 + Blacken, J.D., 2 + Blackwill, Robert D.: + Argentine military imports, 134 + Argentine postwar use of force, possible, 424 + British military options, 67, + 156 + Falklands/Malvinas War forecasts (May 20 and 21, 1982), 283 + Military situation, 337 + OAS resolution 595, 412 + Shrike missile emergency landing in Brazil, 321 + U.S.-Argentine postwar relations, 369 + U.S. military aid to United Kingdom, 51, 300 + + U.S. postwar diplomatic efforts, 331, 348 + U.S. postwar policy, 355 + U.S. sanctions against Argentina, 50 + + Blair, Dennis C.: + Argentine invasion plans, 34 + European Community sanctions against Argentina, 270 + Reagan-Thatcher correspondence, 127 + UN negotiations (May–June 1982), + 276 + U.S. diplomatic efforts, 34, 136, 218, + 270, 276, 299, 316, 353 + U.S. policy options, 53, 70, 167 + U.S. sanctions against Argentina, 359 + U.S. shuttle diplomacy proposals, 64 + + Blakemore, David L., 444 + Block, Herbert, 90 + Block, John R., 62 + Block, S., 236 + Boam, Maj. Gen. Thomas Anthony, 245 + Bolton, Joshua, 296 + Boorstein, M., 174 + Bosworth, Stephen W.: + Argentine invasion plans, 35, + 38, 39 + Argentine officers disagreement, 243 + British South Georgia repossession, 163 + Haig shuttle diplomacy, 88, 114, 133, + 164, 165, 166 + OAS role, 113, 172 + Soviet role, 109 + UN General Assembly resolution (1982), 386, 405 + UN negotiations (May–June 1982), + 246, 249, 272 + U.S.-Argentine postwar relations, 401 + U.S. certification for arms sales to Argentina, 427 + U.S. diplomatic efforts (Mar.–Apr. 1982), 25, 35, 39 + U.S. initial responses, 62 + U.S. military aid to United Kingdom, 110, 177 + U.S. postwar diplomatic efforts, 348 + + Bouchey, Lynn, 249 + Bowdler, William G., 2 + Braithwaite, Rodric Q., 374 + Brazil (see also Figueiredo, João Baptista + de Oliveira): + Falklands/Malvinas War responses, 161, 229, 236, 244 + Figueiredo U.S. visit, 255, 257 + Shrike missile emergency landing, 321 + UN negotiations (May–June 1982), + 294, 295 + + Brement, Marshall, 111, 124 + Bremer, L. Paul, III: + Argentine prisoners of war, 351 + Argentine surrender, 346 + Argentine use of force, possible, 424 + British South Georgia repossession, 175 + Cuban role, 94 + Falklands/Malvinas War impacts, 303 + Forecasts (May 20 and 21, 1982), + 283 + Haig shuttle diplomacy, 190 + OAS role, 175, 304 + Peruvian peace proposal, 220, + 238 + Soviet role, 94 + UN General Assembly resolution (1982), 402 + UN General Assembly resolution (1983), 430 + UN negotiations (May–June 1982), + 246, 249, 323 + U.S.-Argentine postwar relations, 369 + U.S.-British prewar consultations, 3 + U.S. communications with Latin American countries, 229, 238 + U.S. diplomatic efforts, 25, 316, 331, + 348 + U.S. postwar policy, 345, 355, 369 + + Briggs, Everett E., 168, 236, 246, 249, 272 + British-Argentine prewar negotiations: + Haig-Carrington meetings, 3 + Louis memoranda, 8 + Ridley-Cavandoli talks (New York), 2, 4, 5 + St. Helena labor immigration proposals, 4 + Shlaudeman memoranda, 5, 6, 7, 10, 11, + 16 + Streator memoranda, 4, 14 + + British political situation: + Burt memoranda, 283 + CIA papers, 52 + Eagleburger-Henderson discussions, 262 + Elections (1979), 1 + Haig-Henderson discussions, 71 + Haig memoranda, 64 + Haig-Pym correspondence, 297 + + Haig-Thatcher memoranda, 80 + Intelligence Memoranda, 186 + Louis memoranda, 199 + National Security Planning Group discussions, 76. + NSC discussions, 195 + Postwar, 343, 345, 420, + 427 + Reagan-Thatcher discussions, 257 + Rentschler/Blair/Fontaine memoranda, 70 + Special National Intelligence Estimates, 87 + Streator memoranda, 58, 66, 223 + U.S.-Argentine discussions, 90 + U.S.-British discussions, 61 + + Brock, William E., III, 62, 360 + Brown, C., 401, 421 + Brown, Maj. Gen. James L., 261 + Brown, Leslie H., 110, 149, 200, 213, 427 + Buckley, James L., 62 + Bullard, Julian, 3, 164, 165, 166, 385, 398 + Bunge, Wenceslao, 274, 346 + Burkhalter, E.A., Jr., 69, 247, 333 + Burt, Richard R.: + Argentine LANDSAT requests, 165, + 197 + Argentine military imports, 134, + 149, 214 + Argentine prisoners of war, 351 + Argentine surrender, 346 + British postwar foreign policy, 358 + British postwar policies toward Argentina, 345, 379, + 383 + Falklands/Malvinas War forecasts (May 20 and 21, 1982), 283 + Falklands/Malvinas War impacts, 426 + Franks Committee report, 420 + UN General Assembly resolution (1982), 398, 402, 404 + UN General Assembly resolution (1983), 432, 433 + U.S. certification for arms sales to Argentina, 432, 433, + 438, 444 + U.S. diplomatic efforts (May–June 1982), 283, 308, 312 + U.S. military aid to United Kingdom, 93, 108, 110, 111, + 119, 143, 171, 184, 213, + 216, 300 + U.S. military participation, possible, 171, 184 + U.S. policy options, 143 + U.S. postwar policy, 345 + U.S. sanctions against Argentina, 200 + + Bush, George H.W.: + Argentine invasion plans, 34 + British forces in Belize, 383 + British postwar policies toward Argentina, 361 + UN negotiations (May–June 1982), + 279, 281 + U.S.-Argentine postwar relations, 442 + U.S. certification for arms sales to Argentina, 437 + U.S. diplomatic efforts (May–June 1982), 281 + U.S. military aid to United Kingdom, 281 + U.S. policy options, 70, 76 + U.S. postwar policy, 360 + + Bushnell, John A., 2 + + + + + Camilion, Oscar, 6, 7, 11, 26, 55 + Campbell, John, 45, 164, 165, 283, 345, 358 + Candy, S., 451 + Canosa, Eduardo, Vice Cmdr., 1 + Caputo, Dante, 442, 444, 447, 448, 450 + Carazo Odio, Rodrigo, 236, 260 + Carlucci, Frank C., III: + Argentine occupation, 52 + Argentine surrender, 348 + British military options, 67, + 247 + Haig public statement (Apr. 30, 1982), 195 + Latin American responses to Falklands/Malvinas War, 236 + Peruvian peace proposal, 225 + Sheffield sinking (May 4, 1982), 224 + U.S. initial responses, 54, 62 + U.S. military aid to United Kingdom, 86, 216, 233, 287, + 306, 318, 399 + U.S. military lessons learned, 354 + U.S. sanctions against Argentina, 395 + + Carrington, Lord (Peter Alexander Rupert): + Argentine invasion plans, 30, + 39 + British-Argentine prewar negotiations, 7 + Postwar foreign policy, 358 + Resignation of, 61, 66, 71 + South Georgia Islands flag-raising incident, 22, 23, + 24, 27 + U.S.-British prewar consultations, 3, 10, 12, 13 + + U.S. diplomatic efforts, Mar.–Apr. 1982, 27 + U.S. military aid to United Kingdom, 51 + + Carter, T., 348 + Casey, William J.: + Argentine occupation, 52 + Argentine prisoners of war, 373 + Argentine surrender, 348 + British military options, 126 + British postwar policies toward Argentina, 428 + Documents not declassified, 250 + Falklands/Malvinas War forecasts (June 1, 1982), 318 + Falklands/Malvinas War impacts, 344, 360 + Military situation, 240 + Soviet role, 318 + UN negotiations (May–June 1982), + 279 + U.S. certification for arms sales to Argentina, 428 + U.S. diplomatic efforts (May–June 1982), 313 + U.S. postwar policy, 416 + U.S. sanctions against Argentina, 263 + + Casteneda, Jorge, 90 + Cavandoli, Carlos R., 2, 4, 5 + Central America, 54, 57, 90 + Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) (see also + Intelligence Memoranda): + Antarctica, 118 + Argentine economic situation, 125 + Argentine invasion plans, 32, + 33 + Argentine occupation, 49, 52 + Argentine postwar policies, 443 + Battle of Goose Green (May 27, 1982), 302 + British political situation, 52, + 186 + Documents not declassified, 157 + Falklands/Malvinas War impacts, U.S.-Argentine relations, + 252 + Haig shuttle diplomacy, 75 + South Georgia Islands flag-raising incident, 19, 26, + 63 + Soviet role, 100, 121 + U.S. initial responses, 63 + U.S. shuttle diplomacy proposals, 64 + + Chafee Amendment, 69, 375 + Chaplin, Maxwell, 1 + Childress, Richard T., 309 + Chile: + Antarctica claims, 1 + Beagle Channel dispute (1978), 1, 2, 9, 10, 55, 373, + 382, 448 + Falklands/Malvinas War responses, 161 + U.S. certification for arms sales to, 427, 435, 437 + + Christopher, Warren M., 2 + Clarey, Capt. S.S., 333 + Clark, K., 448 + Clark, William P., Jr.: + Argentine invasion plans, 34 + Argentine occupation, 47, 52 + Argentine postwar use of force, possible, 424 + Argentine prisoners of war, 361, + 366, 370 + British postwar policies toward Argentina, 361 + British South Georgia repossession, 175 + European Community sanctions against Argentina, 270 + Falklands/Malvinas War impacts, 303, 367, 400, 426 + Haig shuttle diplomacy: + Haig-Pym correspondence, 146, 151 + Haig-Thatcher discussions, 82 + Reagan briefing, 155 + Reagan-Galtieri communications, 127, 128 + Reagan-Haig communications, 74, 85, 150 + Reagan-Thatcher correspondence, 127, 190 + Rentschler memoranda, 155 + Shlaudeman-Galtieri discussions, 181 + State Department reports, 112 + Suspension proposals, 136 + + Latin American responses, 255 + OAS role, 175 + Peruvian peace proposal, 221, + 222, 225, 231 + UN General Assembly resolution (1982), 394, 403, 405, + 409 + UN General Assembly resolution (1983), 430 + UN negotiations (May–June 1982), + 272, 279, 295, 323 + U.S.-Argentine postwar relations, 381 + + U.S. certification for arms sales to Argentina, 394 + U.S. communications with Latin American countries, 204, 229 + U.S. diplomatic efforts (May–June 1982): + Argentine perceptions, 313 + Bailey memoranda, 226 + Enders-Takacs discussions, 316 + Fontaine/Shoemaker/Childress memoranda, 309 + Haig memoranda, 298 + Reagan public statement (May 13, 1982), 270 + Reagan-Thatcher discussions, 315, 322 + Rentschler/Blair/Fontaine memoranda, 218 + Summit proposals, 299 + + U.S. military aid to United Kingdom, 115, 127, 233, 266, + 371 + U.S. military lessons learned, 368, 378 + U.S. policy options, 53, 70, 76, + 155, 167 + U.S. postwar diplomatic efforts, 353, 356 + U.S. postwar policy, 416 + U.S. sanctions against Argentina, 70, 359, 374, 375, + 394 + U.S. shuttle diplomacy proposals, 64 + + Clarke, Richard A., 67, 318, 337 + Cochran, Harry C., 126, 277, 373 + Cohen, Herman J., 67 + Coles, A. John, 80, 361, 431, 433 + Colombia, 161 + Colombo, Emilio, 268, 269 + Committee of 24 (Special Committee on + Decolonization) (United Nations), 16 + Congress, U.S. + Falklands/Malvinas War, 171, + 276, 281, 328 + Postwar issues, 381 + U.S. certification for arms sales to Argentina, 427, 435 + + Constable, Elinor G., 69, 376 + Coony, T., 425 + Cormack, Capt. James P., 278, 424 + Costa Méndez, Nicanor: + Argentine invasion plans, 30, + 31, 32, 33, 37 + Argentine officers disagreement, 243 + British-Argentine prewar negotiations, 11, 16 + British South Georgia repossession, 174 + Falkland/Malvinas Islands sovereignty dispute, 9 + Haig public statement (Apr. 30, 1982), 196 + Haig shuttle diplomacy: + "Airport paper,” 92, 99, 101 + Draft text (Apr. 19, 1982), 152 + Haig communications, 99 + Haig correspondence, 153, 159, 169, 189, 192 + Haig discussions, 73, + 101, 105, 116, 117, 138, 178, 179, 187 + Haig-Galtieri discussions, 90, 92, 131 + National Security Planning Group discussions, 76 + + OAS role, 304, 307 + Peruvian peace proposal, 203, + 207, 211 + South Georgia Islands flag-raising incident, 15, 16, + 18, 20, 21, 23, 25, 29 + UN negotiations (May–June 1982), + 246, 289 + U.S.-Argentine prewar consultations, 12, 13, 16 + U.S. diplomatic efforts, 25, 29, 31, + 257 + U.S. military aid to United Kingdom, 116 + + Costa Rica, 161, 236, 260 + Cox, D.W., 401 + Crabbie, Christopher, 164, 165, 166, 379 + Cuba, 2, 52, 426 + + Falklands/Malvinas War role, 49, + 90, 92, 94, 98, 289 + + Cummings, E., 84 + + + Dagnino Pastore, José Maria, 372, 383 + Dalton, Lt. Gen. James E., 278 + Dam, Kenneth W., 397, 401, 425, 433, 451 + Danino, Roberto, 367 + Darman, Richard G., 195 + Davico, Col. Mario O., 252 + Davidoff, Constantino S., 21 + Davila, Michael A., 88 + Davis, R., 445 + de Pinies, Jaime, 319 + Deare, Ron, 4 + + Deaver, Michael K., 70, 279 + Defense Intelligence Notices, 260 + DeLauer, Richard D., 216 + Dibble, Martin, 1 + Dick, Air Comm. Ronald, 334 + Diehl, Jackson, 256 + Dobbins, James F., Jr., 358, 425 + Dobrynin, Anatoly F., 94, 109, 135, 158 + Documents not declassified, 157, 206, 242, 250, 286, 320 + Douglas-Home, Alex. See Home, Lord. + Dover, Jorge Juarez, 366 + Draper, William H., 69, 376 + Drexler, R.W., 414 + Duarte, José Napoleón, 431 + Dunnigan, Thomas J., 434 + + + + Eagleburger, Lawrence S.: + Argentine LANDSAT requests, 165, + 197 + Argentine military imports, 134, + 149, 214 + Argentine postwar use of force, possible, 423 + Argentine prisoners of war, 351, + 369 + British military options, 145 + British postwar policies toward Argentina, 349, 379 + Cuban role, 94 + Documents not declassified, 286 + Falklands/Malvinas War impacts, 344 + Haig shuttle diplomacy, 124, + 133, 146, 162, 165 + OAS resolution 595, 412 + OAS role, 83, 304 + Shrike missile emergency landing in Brazil, 321 + Soviet role, 94, 109, 135, + 158, 318 + State Department crisis management systems, 380 + UN General Assembly resolution (1982), 398, 402, 404, + 405 + UN General Assembly resolution (1983), 432, 434 + UN negotiations (May–June 1982), + 237, 248, 272, 301 + U.S.-Argentine postwar relations, 369, 372, 376, 401 + U.S.-Argentine relations impacts, 104 + U.S.-British prewar consultations, 3 + U.S. certification for arms sales to Argentina, 427, 435, + 436, 438, 444. + U.S. diplomatic efforts: + May–June 1982, 248, 261, 262, 267, 298 + Postwar, 355 + + U.S. initial responses, 62 + U.S.-Latin American postwar relations, 364 + U.S. military aid to United Kingdom, 84, 111, 184, 264, + 266, 278, 311 + + Burt memoranda, 93, 108, 110, 216 + Howe/Burt memoranda, 300 + Howe memoranda, 290, + 318 + Postwar, 355, 365 + Service memoranda, 177 + + U.S. policy options, 70, 143 + U.S. postwar policy, 345, 355 + U.S. sanctions against Argentina, 69, 84, 200, 355, + 369, 374, 393 + + Edwards, James B., 360 + Einaudi, Luigi R., 236, 420 + El Salvador, 161, 429 + Enders, Thomas O.: + Antarctica, 118 + Argentine invasion plans, 30, + 35 + Argentine postwar use of force, possible, 421, 422, + 423, 424 + Argentine prisoners of war, 351 + Argentine surrender, 346 + British military options, 67 + British postwar policies toward Argentina, 345, 383, + 425 + British South Georgia repossession, 160 + Falkland/Malvinas Islands sovereignty dispute history, + 24 + Falklands/Malvinas War forecasts (June 1, 1982), 318 + Falklands/Malvinas War impacts, 229, 422, 426 + Haig public statement (Apr. 30, 1982), 195 + Haig shuttle diplomacy: + Briefing memoranda, 155 + Delegation discussions, 147 + Haig-Costa Méndez + correspondence, 189, 192 + discussions, 73, + 138, 187 + + Haig-Galtieri discussions, 90 + Haig-Henderson discussions, 71 + Haig-Pym discussions, 163, 164 + Haig-Takacs discussions, 72 + Haig-Thatcher discussions, 81, 98 + State Department talking points paper, 75 + + + Latin American responses to the Falklands/Malvinas War, + 236 + Military situation, 240 + OAS resolution 595, 412 + OAS role, 168, 295, 296 + Peruvian peace proposal, 212, + 222, 238 + South Georgia Islands flag-raising incident, 24 + UN General Assembly resolution (1982), 385, 386, 397, + 402, 404, 405 + UN negotiations (May–June 1982), + 246, 249, 251, 272, 279, + 295, 323 + U.S.-Argentine postwar relations, 369, 376, 381 + U.S.-Argentine prewar consultations, 12, 13 + U.S.-British prewar consultations, 10, 12, 13 + U.S. certification for arms sales to Argentina, 386, 387, + 425, 427 + U.S. citizens in Argentina, 210 + U.S. communications with Latin American countries, 122, 229, + 238, 244 + U.S. diplomatic efforts: + Mar.–Apr. 1982, 24, 35 + May–June 1982, 201, 261, 267, 281 + + State Department draft proposal (May 28, 1982), 308 + Takacs discussions, 316 + Walters-Miret discussions, 305 + Walters mission, 253, 254 + + + U.S. initial responses, 56, 62 + U.S. military aid to United Kingdom, 51, 184 + U.S. policy options, 70. + U.S. postwar policy, 345, 355, 387 + U.S. sanctions against Argentina, 50, 69, 345 + + European Community (EC), 98, 258, 268, 269, 270, 329, 350, 355, 357 + Evans, Rowland, 256 + Export-Import Bank, 69, 196, 376 + + + Falkland/Malvinas Islanders: + British-Argentine prewar negotiations, 1, 3, 4, 5, 7, 8, 11 + Elections (1981), 5, 6 + South Georgia Islands flag-raising incident and, 15 + + Falkland/Malvinas Islands + Communications/cargo issues, 1, + 6, 7, + 11, 16 + Economic situation, 1 + Political situation, 8 + Sovereignty dispute, 1, 9, 12, 16, 24 + U.S. citizens in, 1, 45, 59, + 70 + + Falkland/Malvinas Islands Company (FIC), 1 + Falklands/Malvinas War (Apr.–June 1982) + (see also Falklands/Malvinas War impacts; + U.S. diplomatic efforts; U.S. military aid to United Kingdom; U.S. + sanctions against Argentina): + Antarctica and, 118 + Argentine economic situation and, 125 + Argentine invasion plans (Apr. 1, + 1982): + Enders/Holmes memoranda, 35 + Intelligence Reports, 33 + National Intelligence Daily Reports, 32 + Reagan briefing, 34 + Reagan-Thatcher correspondence, 31, 36, 42 + U.S.-Argentine consultations, 31, 37, 39, 40 + U.S.-British consultations, 30, 31 + + Argentine LANDSAT requests, 165, + 197 + Argentine occupation (Apr. 1, 1982) (see + also Haig shuttle diplomacy below): + British responses, Streator memoranda, 58 + CIA papers, 52 + Clark memoranda, 47 + Falkland/Malvinas Islands Working Group situation + reports, 43 + Haig memoranda, 45, 59 + Intelligence Reports, 49 + Military situation, 48, + 59 + UN Security Council discussions, 38, 43, 46, 50, 59, 79 + U.S.-Argentine consultations, 44 + U.S.-British consultations, 46 + + Argentine officers disagreement, 243, 305, 325 + Argentine political situation and, 55, 87 + Argentine surrender, 342, 346, 347, + 348 + + British military options, 52, + 67, 70, 126, 145, 156, + 247 + British support requests. See U.S. + military aid to United Kingdom; U.S. sanctions against + Argentina. + British White Paper, 418 + CIA reports, 100, 121 + Cuban role, 49, 90, 92, + 94, 98, 289 + European Community sanctions against Argentina, 258, 268, + 269, 270, 329 + Forecasts (June 1, 1982), 318 + Forecasts (May 20 and 21, 1982), + 277, 283 + Haig public statement (Apr. 30, 1982), 195, + 196, 201 + Kirkpatrick Face the Nation interview (Apr. 11, 1982), + 97 + Latin American responses (see also + OAS role below; U.S.-Latin American + relations under Falklands/Malvinas + War impacts), 161, 236, 255, + 257, 279 + Maritime Exclusion Zone, 76, 77, 78, + 80, 91, 124, 182 + Military actions (see also + Argentine occupation above): + Argentine air strikes, 292, 302 + Battle of Goose Green (May 27, 1982), 302 + British Falklands/Malvinas landing (May 21, 1982), 261, 271, 273, 279, 281, 285 + British South Georgia repossession, 160, 163, 174, 186 + General Belgrano strike + (May 2, 1982), 208, 209, 210, 211, 212, 215, 217, 236 + Sheffield sinking (May 4, 1982), 222, 224, 235, 377 + Stanley Airfield strikes, 199, 218 + + Military situation, 48, 59, 240, + 333, 337, 339, 340 + OAS role: + Bosworth/Middendorf memoranda, 113. + CIA reports, 52 + Meeting (Apr. 5, 1982), 59 + OAS good offices resolution (Apr. 13, 1982), 83, 113 + OAS Resolution (Apr. 28, + 1982), 185, 187 + Rentschler/Blair/Fontaine memoranda, 70 + Rio Treaty meeting of foreign ministers (Apr. 1982), 113, 158, 163, 168, 172, 175, 176, 185 + Rio Treaty meeting of foreign ministers (May 1982), 295, 296, 298, 304, 305, 307 + U.S.-British discussions, 71 + U.S. sanctions against Argentina and, 50, 57 + U.S. shuttle diplomacy proposals and, 64 + U.S.-Venezuelan discussions, 122 + + + Peruvian peace proposal: + Communications with Latin American countries, 238 + Costa Méndez-Beláunde discussions, 207 + Haig-Beláunde communications, 203, 211, 234 + Haig-Henderson discussions, 222 + Haig-Pym correspondence, 212, 220, 222, 227 + Haig-Pym discussions, 205, 235 + National Military Command Center report, 208 + National Security Planning Group discussions, 225 + Ortiz-Beláunde discussions, 232 + Ortiz memoranda, 209 + Reagan-Beláunde correspondence, 234 + Reagan-Thatcher correspondence, 221, 230, 231 + Streator memoranda, 223 + Text, 202 + + Reagan radio address (Apr. 10, 1982), 97 + Shrike missile emergency landing in Brazil, 321 + Soviet role: + Burt memoranda, 143, + 171, 184 + + CIA reports, 52, 100, 121 + Haig-Casey discussions, 318 + Haig-Pym discussions, 79 + Intelligence Cables, 252 + Menges memoranda, 318 + National Security Planning Group discussions, 76 + Reagan-Haig communications, 158 + Special Situation Group discussions, 279 + Stoessel memoranda, 94 + U.S.-Argentine discussions, 92 + U.S.-British discussions, 98 + U.S.-Soviet discussions, 109, 135 + + Special National Intelligence Estimates, 87 + Triggering incident. See South + Georgia Islands flag-raising incident (Mar. 1982) + UN Security Council Resolution 502, + 50, 59, 62, 64, 68, 79, 82, + 176, 201, 276, 293, 348 + UN Security Council Resolution 505, + 301 + U.S. arms embargo. See U.S. + sanctions against Argentina below. + U.S. citizens in Argentina and, 131, 143, 171, 184, + 192, 195, 210, 253 + U.S. citizens in Falklands/Malvinas Islands and, 59, 70 + U.S. communications with Latin American countries, 122, 204, + 229, 238, 244 + U.S. good offices. See Haig shuttle + diplomacy. + U.S. initial responses, 54, 56, 62, + 63, 79 + U.S. military lessons learned, 354, 368, 378 + U.S. military participation, possible, Burt memoranda, + 171, 184 + U.S. policy options: + Burt memoranda, 143 + Clark memoranda, 70 + National Security Planning Group discussions, 76 + Rentschler/Blair/Fontaine memoranda, 53, 70, 167 + Rentschler memoranda, 155 + + U.S. political situation and, 90 + U.S. public opinion, 183, 228, 330 + U.S. shuttle diplomacy proposals (see + also Haig shuttle diplomacy), 64, 66, 70 + Weinberger public statement (Apr. 16, 1982), 131 + + + Falklands/Malvinas War impacts: + Argentine nuclear policies, 391, + 400 + Atkeson memoranda, 240. + Latin American territorial disputes, 382 + North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 291, 384 + U.S.-Argentine relations, 104, + 252, 303, 327, 424, 426 + U.S. Central America policy, 54 + U.S.-Latin American relations, 367 + + Defense Intelligence Notices, 260 + Enders memoranda, 229 + Figuerido U.S. visit and, 255 + Intelligence Memoranda, 336 + Interagency Study Paper, 424 + National Security Study Directives, 360 + State-CIA discussions, 344 + U.S.-British discussions, 422 + + + Fall, Brian: + Haig shuttle diplomacy, 79, 163, 164, + 165, 166 + Postwar issues, 379, 398 + + Fearn, Robin, 8, 14, 16 + Fenn, Nicholas, 3, 164, 165, 166 + Figueiredo, João Baptista de Oliveira, 204, 229, 244, 255, 257, 315, 338 + Figueroa, Gustavo, 11, 73, 187 + Finegold, Edmund S., 444 + Fischer, Dean E., 51, 183, 200, 228 + Fleischer, L. R., 434 + Fontaine, Roger W.: + Argentine postwar use of force, possible, 423, 424 + Argentine prisoners of war, 366 + + European Community sanctions against Argentina, 270 + Falklands/Malvinas War impacts, 367 + Haig public statement (Apr. 30, 1982), 195 + Haig shuttle diplomacy, 127, + 136 + UN General Assembly resolution (1982), 405 + U.S.-Argentine postwar relations, 381 + U.S. diplomatic efforts: + May–June 1982, 218, 226, 256, 270, 276, 279, 309 + Postwar, 353 + + U.S. military aid to United Kingdom, 371 + U.S. policy options, 53, 70, 167 + U.S. sanctions against Argentina, 359, 374, 375, 390, + 394 + U.S. shuttle diplomacy proposals, 64 + + Foot, Michael, 223 + Forrester, Ricardo, 5, 9 + Forster, Capt. J. R., 260 + Fox, Edward J., 427 + France, 142 + Franco, Vice Adm. Ruben O., 333 + Fretwell, M. John E., 3 + Friedt, A., 348 + Funseth, Robert L., 3, 164, 165, 166, 184, 197 + + + Galtieri, Lt. Gen. Leopoldo Fortunato: + Argentine + invasion plans, 31, 33, 37 + occupation, 52, 63, 68 + officers disagreement, 243 + + Falklands/Malvinas War impacts, 252, 303 + Haig shuttle diplomacy: + Haig communications, 99, + 120 + Haig discussions, 89, + 90, 92, 131, 142, 148 + Reagan communications, 127, 128, 129 + Shlaudeman discussions, 181, 193, 194 + + Maritime Exclusion Zone, 182 + Meyer correspondence, 327 + Peruvian peace proposal, 202, + 209, 211 + Political situation, 26, 52, 55, + 344 + Reagan correspondence, 303 + Resignation, 350 + South Georgia Islands flag-raising incident, 21, 26 + UN negotiations (May–June 1982), + 232, 234 + U.S. citizens in Argentina, 131 + U.S. diplomatic efforts: + Mar.–Apr. 1982, 37, 40, 41, 54 + May–June 1982, 253 + + + Garcia del Solar, Lucio, 397, 404, 405, 429 + Gast, Lt. Gen. Philip C., 224 + Gates, Robert M., 423 + Gergen, David R., 115 + German Federal Republic (FRG), 142 + Gibney, J. M., 213 + Gibraltar dispute, 14 + Giffard, John, 17 + Gillespie, Charles A., 237 + Gilly, Lt. Gen. Pedro M., 260 + Gilmore, David, 361 + Gobbi, Hugo, 442 + Goldberg, Sherwood “Woody”: + Argentine officers disagreement, 243 + Haig shuttle diplomacy, 74 + + Costa Méndez “airport paper,” 101 + Haig-Costa Méndez discussions, 116, 117 + Haig-Galtieri discussions, 142 + Haig-Pym discussions, 164, 166 + Reagan-Haig communications, 170 + Reagan-Thatcher correspondence, 132 + + U.S.-British prewar consultations, 3 + U.S. diplomatic efforts (May–June 1982), 314, 315, 322 + U.S. military aid to United Kingdom, 111 + + Gompert, David C.: + Argentine surrender, 346 + Haig shuttle diplomacy, 81, 98, 147, + 164, 165, 166, 192 + Maritime Exclusion Zone, 182 + Peruvian peace proposal, 238 + Postwar issues, 345, 349, 355, + 412 + Soviet/Cuban role, 94 + UN negotiations (May–June 1982), + 271 + U.S. diplomatic efforts (May–June 1982), 261, 308 + U.S. military aid to United Kingdom, 184, 290 + + Gorman, Lt. Gen. Paul F., 240, 423, 442 + + Gosney, Richard, 5 + Graham, Sir John, 233 + Gravette, J., 435 + Great Britain. See United Kingdom. + Gregg, Donald, 34, 423, 424 + Grey, Robin, 1 + Gudgeon, K. Scott: + Haig shuttle diplomacy, 147, + 164, 165, 166 + Postwar issues, 404, 430, 434 + U.S. diplomatic efforts, May–June 1982, 308 + U.S. sanctions against Argentina, 50 + + Guerreiro, Ramiro Saraiva, 244, 251, 295 + Guillermo, Carlos, 243 + + + Haass, Richard N.: + Haig shuttle diplomacy, 114 + Postwar issues, 345, 355, 358, + 386, 420, 430 + U.S. certification for arms sales to Argentina, 427, 444 + U.S. military aid to United Kingdom, 84, 108, 171, 318 + U.S. policy options, 143 + + Haig, Gen. Alexander M., Jr. (see also Haig + shuttle diplomacy): + Antarctica and, 118 + Argentine invasion plans, 30, + 31, 35, 38, 39, 41 + Argentine occupation, 45, 46, 52, + 59 + Argentine postwar political situation, 357, 370 + Argentine prisoners of war, 340, + 357, 370 + + Eagleburger memoranda, 369 + Nicolaides memoranda, 366 + Pym correspondence, 329 + Reagan-Thatcher discussions, 361 + Service/Stern memoranda, 351 + + British Falklands/Malvinas landing, 271, 285 + British foreign policy, 358 + British military options, 67, + 145, 156 + British political situation, 61, + 64, 71, 80, 297 + British postwar policies toward Argentina, 361 + British South Georgia repossession, 163, 174, 175 + Cuban role, 94 + Documents not declassified, 242 + European Community sanctions against Argentina, 258, 268, + 355, 357 + Falklands/Malvinas War forecasts (June 1, 1982), 318 + Falklands/Malvinas War forecasts (May 20 and 21, 1982), 283 + Falklands/Malvinas War impacts, 252, 344 + Kirkpatrick Face the Nation interview (Apr. 11, 1982), + 97 + Latin American responses to the Falklands/Malvinas War, + 161, 236, 255 + Maritime Exclusion Zone, 78, 91, 124, + 182 + Military situation, 337, 340 + OAS role: + Bosworth/Middendorf memoranda, 113 + OAS Resolution (Apr. 28, + 1982), 185 + Rio Treaty meeting of foreign ministers (Apr. 1982), 158, 163, 168, 172, 175, 176 + Rio Treaty meeting of foreign ministers (May 1982), 295, 296, 298, 304, 305, 307 + U.S.-British discussions, 71 + + + Peruvian peace proposal: + Beláunde communications, 203, 211, 234 + Communications with Latin American countries, 238 + Henderson discussions, 222 + National Security Planning Group discussions, 225 + Ortiz memoranda, 209 + Pym + correspondence, 212, 220, 222, 227 + discussions, 205, + 235 + + Text, 202 + + Public statement (Apr. 30, 1982), 195, + 196, 201 + Public statements, 117, 195, 196, + 201 + Reagan radio address (Apr. 10, 1982), 97 + Resignation, 367 + + Shrike missile emergency landing in Brazil, 321 + South Georgia Islands flag-raising incident, 22, 25, + 27, 29 + Soviet role, 79, 94, 109, + 135, 158, 318 + UN negotiations (May–June 1982), + 237, 271, 281, 293, 304 + + Beláunde discussions, 234 + Eagleburger memoranda, 248 + Guerreiro discussions, 251 + Henderson correspondence, 275 + Kirkpatrick discussions, 201 + Kirkpatrick memoranda, 239 + Middendorf-Takacs discussions, 246, 272 + Middendorf-Zinn discussions, 249 + Reagan-Thatcher discussions, 326 + Special Situation Group discussions, 279 + U.S.-Brazilian discussions, 295 + Walters memoranda, 310 + + U.S.-Argentine postwar relations, 369, 370 + U.S.-Argentine prewar consultations, 12, 13 + U.S.-British prewar consultations, 3, 10, 12, 13 + U.S. citizens in Argentina and, 131, 171, 184 + U.S. communications with Latin American countries, 122, 195, + 204, 229, 238, 244 + U.S. diplomatic efforts: + Mar.–Apr. 1982 + + Carrington correspondence, 27 + Enders/Holmes memoranda, 35 + Henderson discussions, 30, 31, 46 + Reagan-Galtieri discussions, 41 + Shlaudeman-Costa Méndez discussions, 29 + Stoessel-Henderson discussions, 25 + Stoessel-Takacs discussions, 25 + Takacs discussions, 39 + + May–June 1982, 271, 281, 298 + + Argentine perceptions, 313 + Burt memoranda, 312 + Eagleburger-Henderson discussions, 262 + Eagleburger memoranda, 248 + Enders memoranda, 201, 261, 267 + Henderson correspondence, 297 + Pym + correspondence, 294 + discussions, 205, + 269, 322 + + Reagan-Figueiredo correspondence, 338 + Reagan-Thatcher discussions, 315, 322 + State Department draft proposal (May 28, 1982), 308, 314 + Walters-Miret discussions, 305 + Walters mission, 253, 254 + + Postwar, 331, 348, 356 + + U.S. initial responses, 56, 62 + U.S.-Latin American postwar relations, 364 + U.S. military aid to United Kingdom, 60, 281 + + Burt memoranda, 119, + 171, 184, 213 + Carlucci memoranda, 216 + Eagleburger memoranda, 84, 111, 311 + Enders/Holmes memoranda, 51 + Howe memoranda, 318 + Iklé memoranda, 284 + Postwar, 355, 362, 371 + Pym correspondence, 191 + U.S.-Argentine discussions, 116 + Weinberger-Nott discussions, 233 + + U.S. military participation, possible, 171, 184 + U.S. policy options, 53, 70, 76 + U.S. postwar policy, 345, 355, 360 + U.S. public opinion, 183, 228 + U.S. sanctions against Argentina, 57, 370 + + Burt/Enders memoranda, 345 + Eagleburger memoranda, 355, 369 + Enders/Holmes memoranda, 50 + Henderson discussions, 46 + National Security Decision Directives, 263 + NSC discussions, 195 + Pym correspondence, 191, + 329 + Scanlan/Enders/Hormats memoranda, 69 + + U.S. shuttle diplomacy proposals, 64 + + Haig shuttle diplomacy: + Blair/Fontaine memoranda, 136 + + British South Georgia repossession and, 160 + Delegation discussions, 147 + Draft memorandum, 112 + Draft text (Apr. 19, 1982), 152 + Enders briefing memoranda, 155 + Haig public statements, 117 + Louis memoranda, 123 + Middendorf memoranda, 133 + National Security Planning Group discussions, 76 + Reagan briefing, 155 + Reagan-Haig communications, 74, + 85, 96, 130, 137, 139, + 140, 148, 150, 170, 178. + Rentschler/Blair/Fontaine memoranda, 167 + Rentschler memoranda, 155 + Rio Treaty meeting of foreign ministers (Apr. 1982) and, 168 + State Department + reports, 112 + talking points papers, 75, 95 + + + U.S.-Argentine communications: + Costa Méndez “airport paper,” 92, 99, 101 + Haig-Costa Méndez correspondence, 153, 159, 169, 189, 192 + Haig-Costa Méndez discussions, 73, 101, 105, 116, 117, 138, 178, 179, 187 + Haig-Galtieri correspondence, 99, 120 + Haig-Galtieri discussions, 89, 90, 92, 131, 142, 148 + Haig-Takacs discussions, 72 + Reagan-Galtieri communications, 127, 128, 129 + Shlaudeman-Galtieri discussions, 181, 193, 194 + + U.S.-Argentine relations and, 377 + U.S.-British communications: + Haig-Henderson discussions, 71 + Haig-Nott correspondence, 124 + Haig-Pym correspondence, 74, 120, 139, 141, 146, 147, 151, 153, 154, 162, 180, 191 + Haig-Pym discussions, 79, + 102, 106, 107, 163, 164, 165, 166, 169, 173 + Haig-Thatcher correspondence, 91, 169, 173 + Haig-Thatcher discussions, 80, 81, 82, 98, 103, 106 + Middendorf-Thomas discussions, 88 + Pym U.S. visit, 153, + 163, 164, 165, 166, 169, 173 + Reagan-Thatcher correspondence, 127, 128, 129, 132, 188, 190 + Reagan-Thatcher discussions, 144 + Shultz-Thatcher discussions, 257 + + U.S. leverage, 114 + + Haiti, 161 + Hallman, William H., 1 + Hastie-Smith, Richard, 233 + Hayward, Adm. Thomas B.: + Argentine occupation, 44, 54 + Documents not declassified, 320 + Latin American responses to Falklands/Malvinas War, 236 + Military situation, 333 + Peruvian peace proposal, 225 + South Georgia Islands flag-raising incident, 27 + U.S. military aid to United Kingdom, 264, 266, 278, 317, + 341 + + Hekman, Rear Adm. P. M., Jr., 208, 224 + Helms, Jesse, 299 + Henderson, Sir Nicholas “Nicko”: + Argentine invasion plans, 30, + 31 + Argentine occupation, 46 + Argentine prisoners of war, 351, + 361 + British Falklands/Malvinas landing, 273, 285 + British political situation, 61, + 71, 262 + British postwar policies toward Argentina, 361, 379 + British South Georgia repossession, 163, 175 + Haig shuttle diplomacy, 71, 73, 162, + 164, 165, 166, 188 + Maritime Exclusion Zone, 78 + OAS role, 71, 175, 185 + Peruvian peace proposal, 212, + 220, 222, 227, 235 + South Georgia Islands flag-raising incident, 22, 24, + 25 + UN negotiations (May-June 1982), + 259, 273, 275, 326 + U.S.-British prewar consultations, 3, 12 + U.S. diplomatic efforts: + Mar.–Apr. 1982, 25, 30, 31, 46 + + May–June 1982, 205, 262, 297, 314, 315 + + U.S. initial responses, 56 + U.S. military aid to United Kingdom, 111, 205, 288, 365 + U.S. sanctions against Argentina, 46 + + Herrera Campins, Luis, 122, 204 + Hervey, John B., 86 + Heseltine, Michael, 439 + Hill, M. Charles, 430 + Holmes, H. Allen: + Argentine invasion plans, 30, + 35, 38 + Argentine occupation, 46 + British military options, 67 + OAS role, 113 + Soviet role, 109 + U.S. arms sales to Argentina, 50 + U.S. diplomatic efforts (Mar.–Apr. 1982), 35 + U.S. military aid to United Kingdom, 51, 177, 184 + U.S. sanctions against Argentina, 50 + + Home, Lord (Alex Douglas-Home), 1 + Hormats, Robert D., 69, 376 + Howard, R. B., 402, 420, 421, 422, 429, 430, 434, 435 + Howe, Sir Geoffrey, 433, 438, 441, 447, 449 + Howe, Rear Adm. Jonathan T.: + Argentine prisoners of war, 351 + General Belgrano strike (May 2, 1982), 217 + Military situation, 337 + U.S.-Argentine postwar relations, 372 + U.S. certification for arms sales to Argentina, 444 + U.S. diplomatic efforts (May–June 1982), 267, 276 + U.S. initial responses, 56 + U.S. military aid to United Kingdom, 290, 300, 318, 362, + 365 + U.S. postwar policy, 355 + + Howells, W. Dean, 240 + Hughes, P.D., 425 + Humphrey-Kennedy Amendment (1978), 50, 54 + Hunt, Rex Masterman, 345, 349, 361 + Hutchinson, H.F., Jr., 373 + + + Iglesias, Brig. Gen. Hector Norberto, 90, + 256 + Iklé, Fred C.: + Argentine postwar use of force, possible, 423 + British military options, 67 + UN negotiations (May–June 1982), + 279 + U.S. initial responses, 54 + U.S. military aid to United Kingdom, 184, 241, 245, 264, + 266, 278, 284, 306, 328, + 334, 341 + + Carlucci memoranda, 216 + Jones memoranda, 198 + Postwar, 362, 363, 399 + Weinberger memoranda, 288, 317 + West memoranda, 65 + + U.S. military lessons learned, 354, 378 + U.S. sanctions against Argentina, 396 + + Inman, Adm. Bobby Ray: + British military options, 126 + British political situation, 195 + Falklands/Malvinas War impacts, 240, 336, 344 + Haig public statement (Apr. 30, 1982), 195 + Peruvian peace proposal, 209 + Soviet role, 318 + U.S. military aid to United Kingdom, 318 + U.S. policy options, 64, 76 + + Intelligence Cables, TDFIR–314/00731–82, “Comments of Argentine government + officials,” 252 + Intelligence Memoranda: + ALA 82–10059, “Falkland Islands Dispute: Economic Impact,” + 125 + ALA–M–82–10077, “The Falklands Dispute Implications for US + Relations with Latin America,” 336 + EUR 82–10046, “UK-Falklands Pressures on Thatcher,” 186 + FIRDB–312/00760–83, “Significant New Information Available to the + Leadership of the Argentine Army,” 426 + FIRDB–312/01427–82, “Comments of a Senior Argentine Air Force + Officer,” 313 + + Intelligence Reports: + TDFIR–314/00539–82, “Partial Chronology of the Argentine Military + Action,” 49 + + TDFIR DB–315/06791–82, “Argentine Government + Determination to Take Military Action,” 33 + + Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), 114 + Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance. See Rio Treaty + International Monetary Fund (IMF), 429 + International Security and Development Cooperation Act (1981), 263 + Ireland, 293 + Italy, 268, 269, 270 + + + Jett, Dennis, 429, 430, 435, 445 + John Paul II, 332, 339 + Johnson, D., 236 + Johnson, Philip K., 113, 133, 168, 249, 414, 421, 430 + Johnston, Ernest B., 50, 376, 398 + Johnstone, C., 425 + Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) (see also + Hayward, Adm. Thomas B.), 264, 265, 266, 395 + Joint Chiefs of Staff memoranda: + JCSM–108–82, + “Falklands Crisis,” 266 + JSCM–213–82, + “Resumption of Military Exports to Argentina,” 395 + + Joint Statement (1971), 1 + Jones, D., 118 + Jones, G., 236 + Jones, Gen. David C.: + British military options, 247 + Documents not declassified, 320 + Falklands/Malvinas War impacts, 291 + Haig public statement (Apr. 30, 1982), 195 + UN negotiations (May–June 1982), + 279 + U.S. military aid to United Kingdom, 111, 198, 216 + U.S. policy options, 76 + U.S. sanctions against Argentina, 263 + + Jones, George F., 114, 118 + Juárez Dover, Jorge, 366 + + + Kanter, Arnold: + Argentine LANDSAT requests, 197 + Argentine military imports, 214 + Military situation, 337 + Shrike missile emergency landing in Brazil, 321 + U.S.-Argentine postwar relations, 372 + U.S. military aid to United Kingdom, 111, 119, 177, 300, + 318 + + Keane, John F., 9 + Kelly, John H., 430, 438, 451 + "Kelpers.” See Falklands/Malvinas + Islanders. + Kennedy, Col. Richard T., 171 + Kilday, Lowell C., 236, 244, 321, 430, 435, 444, 448, 451 + Kimmitt, Robert M., 431 + King, John F., 9 + Kirk, R., 451 + Kirkpatrick, Jeane J.: + Argentine surrender, 346, 347 + Face the Nation interview (Apr. 11, + 1982), 97 + Haig public statement (Apr. 30, 1982), 195 + Haig shuttle diplomacy, 88 + John Paul II visit to Argentina, 332 + OAS resolution (595), 412 + UN General Assembly resolution (1982), 398, 404, 405, + 410 + UN negotiations (May–June 1982), + 239, 282, 289, 293, 323, + 324 + + Haig discussions, 201 + Haig memoranda, 237 + Middendorf-Takacs discussions, 272 + Miret discussions, 319 + NSC discussions, 195 + Pérez de Cuéllar/Ling Qing meetings, 215 + Roca discussions, 274 + Special Situation Group discussions, 279 + + U.S. diplomatic efforts (May–June 1982), 292, 313, 335, + 347 + U.S. initial responses, 56 + U.S. policy options, 76 + U.S. postwar policy, 360 + U.S. sanctions against Argentina, 263 + + Kissinger, Henry, 246 + Knepper, Williams E., 424 + Koch, Noel C., 54, 56 + Konner, M., 110 + Koppel, Ted, 115 + Kozak, Michael T., 402, 404, 412, 427, 430 + Kursch, D., 200 + + + + Lami Dozo, Brig. Basilio, 63, 142, 253, 254, 282, 305, 316, 345 + Lasater, Brig. Gen. John R., 233 + Latham, Michael, 438 + Latin American countries (see also OAS role + under Falklands/Malvinas War): + Responses to Falklands/Malvinas War, 161, 236, 255, 257, + 260, 279 + U.S. communications with, 195, + 204, 229, 238, 244 + U.S. relations with. See + under Falklands/Malvinas War and postwar issues. + + Laxalt, Paul, 47 + Layman, Rear Adm. Lawrence, 86 + Leach, Adm. Henry, 78 + Lee, F., 435 + Legere, Laurence J., 233 + Lehman, John F., Jr., 354 + Leith Harbor landing incident (Mar. 1982). + See South Georgia Islands flag-raising + incident (Mar. 1982). + Leonard, John, 1 + Lewin, Sir Terence, 81 + Lilac, Robert H., 437 + Ling Qing, 215 + Listre, Arnoldo, 335, 429 + Lofstrom, W., 161, 236 + Lopez, German, 442 + López Portillo, Jose, 161, 175, 267, 339, 442 + Louis, John J., Jr., 8, 123, 164, 199, 343, 392, 418 + Luce, Richard, 10, 11, 12 + Lucena, Gen. Alberto Carlos, 252 + Luers, William H., 122 + Luns, Joseph M.A.H., 45 + + + Malby, Greg, 1 + Malby, Polly, 1 + Mallea Gil, Gen. Miguel, 319, 372 + Manen, Alberto, 292 + Marsh, John O., Jr., 56 + Martin, J., 434 + Martin, J. L., 451 + McCulloch, G., 118 + McFarlane, Robert C. “Bud”: + Argentine invasion plans, 40 + Argentine postwar use of force, possible, 423 + Argentine prisoners of war, 366 + Haig public statement (Apr. 30, 1982), 195 + Haig shuttle diplomacy, 82, 150, 155 + OAS role, 304 + UN General Assembly resolution (1982), 405 + UN negotiations (May–June 1982), + 276, 279 + U.S. certification for arms sales to Argentina, 437 + U.S. diplomatic efforts: + Mar.–Apr. 1982, 40 + May–June 1982, 276, 298, 299, 309, 315, 316 + + U.S. military aid to United Kingdom, 280 + U.S. postwar policy, 416 + U.S. sanctions against Argentina, 68, 390 + + McKie, B., 438 + McKinley, B., 448, 451 + McLeod, M., 118 + McMahon, John N., 225, 348, 373 + McManaway, Clayton E., Jr., 184, 271, 379, 401, 424 + McMullen, R. Bruce, 376 + McNamar, Robert T., 429, 442 + McNutt, Louise, 118 + McPherson, Melville P., 360 + Meese, Edwin, III, 34, 70, 155, 195, 225, 279 + Menendez, Brig. Gen. Mario B., 342 + Menges, Constantine C., 318 + Mercandetti, Susan, 115 + Mexico, 161 + Meyer, Gen. Edward C. “Shy,” 56, 320, 327 + Michaud, M., 2 + Michel, James H., 51, 172, 445 + Middendorf, J. William, II: + Argentine postwar use of force, possible, 421 + British-Argentine normalization talks, 446 + Haig shuttle diplomacy, 88, 133 + OAS resolution 595, 412, 414 + OAS role, 83, 113, 158, 168 + UN General Assembly resolution (1983), 434 + UN negotiations (May–June 1982), + 246, 249, 256, 272 + U.S. initial responses, 56 + U.S. policy options, 70 + + Miles, Richard M., 93 + Miller, Cmdr. T., 67, 156 + + Miller, Tom, 276, 290 + Miret, Maj. Brig. Gen. Jose, 292, 305, 310, 319 + Monge, Luis Alberto, 364 + Monier, John S., 69, 376 + Monroe, Frederick F., 118 + Monroe Doctrine, 16 + Montgomery, Hugh, 161, 318, 426 + Montgomery, William, 432 + Moore, Maj. Gen. Jeremy, 342 + Morley, Robert B., 296, 435, 444, 445, 448, 451 + Morris, R., 283 + Motley, Langhorne A.: + UN General Assembly resolution (1983), 429, 430, 434 + UN negotiations (May–June 1982), + 295 + U.S.-Argentine postwar relations, 429, 442 + U.S. certification for arms sales to Argentina, 435, 444 + + Muñiz, Carlos, 451 + Murphy, Adm. Daniel J., 442 + + + Nagler, Vice Adm. Gordon R., 86 + National Intelligence Daily Reports, 19, + 32 + National Oceanographic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), 65, 177, 217 + National Security Agency (NSA), 206 + National Security Council (NSC), 195 + National Security Decision Directives: + No. 34, “U.S. Actions in the South + Atlantic Crisis,” 263 + No. 71, “U.S. Policy Toward Latin + America in the Wake of the Falklands Crisis,” 416 + + National Security Planning Group (NSPG), 53, 76, 225 + National Security Study Directives, No. 10–82, “U.S. Policy Toward the + Americas as a Result of the Falklands Crisis,” 360 + Newell, Gregory J., 402, 404, 405, 430 + Nicaragua, 161 + Nicolaides, Gen. Cristino, 350, 357, 366, 370, 415, 426 + Nolte, Capt. Ricardo, 44 + Non-aligned Movement (NAM), 1, 52 + North, Oliver L., 280, 423 + North Atlantic Council (NAC), 45 + North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), 233, 278, 291, 384, 424 + Nott, John: + British political situation, 61 + British South Georgia repossession, 174 + British White Paper, 418 + Haig shuttle diplomacy, 81, 98, 124 + Maritime Exclusion Zone, 77, 78, 80 + Postwar foreign policy, 358 + Shrike missile emergency landing in Brazil, 321 + U.S. military aid to United Kingdom, 233, 287, 288, 328 + + Nutting, Gen. Wallace H., 320 + + + O’Connell, S.K., 13, 25, 177 + Ogden, Richard M., 213 + O’Leary, Jeremiah, 115 + Olson, P.M., 435, 451 + Onslow, Cranley, 383, 386, 425 + Organization of American States (OAS) (see + also OAS role under + Falklands/Malvinas War): + Falklands/Malvinas Islands sovereignty dispute history + and, 1 + Falklands/Malvinas War impact on, 260 + Meeting (Apr. 5, 1982), 59 + Resolution 595, 412, 413, 414 + Resolution (Apr. 28, 1982), 185, + 187 + + Ortiz, Francis V., 429, 442, 447, 450, 452 + Ortiz de Rozas, Carlos, 1, 202, 203, 207, 209, 232 + Owen, David, 418 + + + Pakenham, Michael A., 3 + Palliser, Sir Michael, 3, 358 + Palmer, Gen. Bruce, Jr., 126 + Panama, 236 + Parsons, Sir Anthony, 274, 293, 319 + Peña, Brig. Gen. Ricardo, 310, 347 + Pendleton, Miles S., Jr.: + Argentine invasion plans, 38 + British postwar policies toward Argentina, 379 + British South Georgia repossession, 174 + Haig shuttle diplomacy, 75 + UN General Assembly resolution (1982), 398 + U.S. initial responses, 62 + + U.S. military aid to United Kingdom, 51, 60, 84, 93, + 184 + U.S. sanctions against Argentina, 50, 69 + + Penfold, John H., 376 + Pérez, Carlos Andrés, 324 + Pérez de Cuéllar, Javier: + Good offices proposal, 201 + Haig public statement (Apr. 30, 1982), 196 + UN negotiations (May–June 1982), + 215, 237, 249, 259, 262, + 272, 274, 319 + + Perle, Richard N., 278, 399 + Perón, Juan, 90, 254, 309, 319 + Perry, Robert, 430, 435, 444 + Peru (see also Peruvian peace proposal under Falklands/Malvinas War), 161, 367 + Piedra, Alberto, 249 + Pinochet, Augusto, 279 + Platt, Nicholas, 38 + Poindexter, Rear Adm. John M.: + Argentine invasion plans, 40 + Argentine prisoners of war, 366 + General Belgrano strike (May 2, 1982), 217 + Haig public statement (Apr. 30, 1982), 195 + Haig shuttle diplomacy, 85, 181 + U.S. diplomatic efforts (May–June 1982), 298, 299, 315, + 335 + U.S. sanctions against Argentina, 57, 375 + + Postwar issues (see also Falklands/Malvinas + War impacts; UN General Assembly resolution (1982); U.S. certification for arms sales to Argentina) + Argentine policies, 373, 443, 450 + Argentine political situation, 344, 345, 350, 357, + 370, 372, 424 + Argentine prisoners of war: + Eagleburger memoranda, 351, 369 + Haig memoranda, 340, + 357, 370 + Haig-Pym correspondence, 329 + Reagan-Thatcher discussions, 361 + Service/Stern memoranda, 350 + U.S.-Argentine communications, 366, 370, 373 + + Argentine use of force, possible, 419, 421, 422, 423, + 424, 452 + British airbase on the Falklands/Malvinas, 429 + British-Argentine normalization talks (1984), 445, 446, 447, + 448 + British foreign policy, 358 + British military investment, 418 + British policies toward Argentina (see + also Argentine prisoners of war above): + Burt/Enders memoranda, 345 + Burt memoranda, 383 + Casey memoranda, 428 + Enders-Onslow discussions, 425 + Louis memoranda, 343 + Reagan-Thatcher discussions, 361 + Rentschler/Blair/Fontaine memoranda, 353 + Shultz-Pym discussions, 379 + Shultz-Thatcher discussions, 417 + U.S.-British communication problems, 349 + + British political situation, 343, 345, 420, 427 + Calvi Commission report, 415 + European Community sanctions against Argentina, 350, 355, + 357 + Franks Committee report, 420 + OAS resolution 595, 412, 413, + 414 + UN General Assembly resolution (1983), 429, 430, 432, + 433, 434 + UN General Assembly resolution (1984), 450, 451 + U.S.-Argentine relations (see also + U.S. sanctions against Argentina): + Bush-Alfonsin meeting, 442 + Eagleburger memoranda, 369 + Export-Import Bank lending, 376 + Haig memoranda, 370 + Military intelligence exchange, 401 + Motley-Garcia del Solar discussions, 429 + Reagan public statement (June 30, 1982), 372 + Sapia-Bosch memoranda, 381 + Shlaudeman memoranda, 377 + U.S.-Argentine communications, 366, 370, 372, 397 + + U.S.-Latin American relations, 364, 413, 420 + + U.S. military aid to United Kingdom, 355, 361, 362, 363, + 365, 371, 399 + U.S. policy, 345, 355, 360, + 387, 416 + + Price, Charles H., 446 + Price, George C., 161, 383 + Proper, Datus C., 444, 451 + Puerto Rico, 397 + Pym, Francis: + Argentine LANDSAT requests, 165 + Argentine postwar use of force, possible, 421 + Argentine prisoners of war, 329 + British political situation, 297 + British postwar policies toward Argentina, 379, 417 + British South Georgia repossession, 175 + Documents not declassified, 242 + Haig shuttle diplomacy: + Haig correspondence, 74, + 120, 139, 141, 146, 147, 151, 153, 154, 162, 180, 191 + Haig discussions, 79, + 102, 106, 107, 163, 164, 165, 166, 169, 173 + Haig-Thatcher discussions, 80, 81, 98 + Reagan-Thatcher correspondence, 188 + U.S. visit, 153, 163, 164, 165, 166, 169, 173 + + Maritime Exclusion Zone, 78 + OAS role, 163, 175, 185 + Peruvian peace proposal, 205, + 207, 212, 220, 222, 227, + 235 + UN General Assembly resolution (1982), 389, 398 + UN negotiations (May–June 1982), + 215, 271, 326 + U.S. diplomatic efforts (May–June 1982), 205, 269, 294, + 322 + U.S. military aid to United Kingdom, 191, 205 + U.S. sanctions against Argentina, 191, 329, 379, 393 + + + + Quijano, Raúl, 168, 246, 252, 256, 421 + + + Rabb, Maxwell M., 268, 433 + Ranneberger, M., 451 + Raphel, Arnold, 401, 424 + Rase, Glen R., 114, 376 + Rashish, Myer, 3 + Reagan, Ronald W. (see also Reagan-Thatcher + correspondence): + Argentine invasion plans, 31, + 34, 36, 39, 40, 42 + Argentine occupation, 47 + Argentine prisoners of war, 361, + 370 + British Falklands/Malvinas landing, 285 + British postwar policies toward Argentina, 361, 428 + Falklands/Malvinas War impacts, 303, 400 + Figueiredo U.S. visit, 255, 257 + Haig resignation, 367 + Haig shuttle diplomacy: + Briefing, 155 + Galtieri communications, 127, 128, 129 + Haig communications, 74, + 85, 96, 130, 137, 139, 140, 148, 150, 170, 178 + Haig-Thatcher discussions, 82 + Suspension proposals, 136 + Thatcher correspondence, 127, 128, 129, 132, 188, 190 + Thatcher discussions, 144 + + OAS resolution 595, 413 + OAS role, 83, 158, 304, 307 + Peruvian peace proposal, 221, + 230, 231, 234 + Political situation, 90 + Public statement (June 30, 1982), 372 + Radio address (Apr. 10, 1982), 97 + Soviet role, 158 + UN General Assembly resolution (1982), 394, 403, 405 + + Thatcher correspondence, 403, 406, 407, 408, 409, 411 + + + UN negotiations (May–June 1982), + 257, 326 + + Eagleburger memoranda, 301 + Haig memoranda, 237, + 271, 281, 304 + Kirkpatrick memoranda, 323 + Stoessel-Henderson discussions, 273 + Stoessel memoranda, 262 + Thatcher discussions, 257, 326 + U.S.-Brazilian discussions, 295 + + U.S.-Argentine postwar relations, 370 + + U.S. certification for arms sales to Argentina, 428 + + McFarlane memoranda, 437 + Shultz-Howe discussions, 441 + Thatcher communications, 431, 437, 438, 439, 440 + + U.S. communications with Latin American countries, 204, 229, + 244 + U.S. diplomatic efforts: + Mar.–Apr. 1982, 28, 34, 36, 40, 41, 42, 54 + May–June 1982 + + Figueiredo correspondence, 338 + Haig memoranda, 281, 298 + Public statement (May 13, 1982), 270, 272 + Thatcher discussions, 257, 261, 262, 269, 315, 316, 322 + + Postwar, 352, 356 + + U.S. initial responses, 56 + U.S.-Latin American postwar relations, 364, 413 + U.S. military aid to United Kingdom, 110, 127, 280, 281, + 361 + U.S. military lessons learned, 378 + U.S. policy options, 70, 76 + U.S. postwar policy, 360, 416 + U.S. sanctions against Argentina, 370 + + Clark memoranda, 70, 375, 394 + Haig memoranda, 57 + Stoessel memoranda, 374 + Thatcher correspondence, 68, 219 + + U.S. shuttle diplomacy proposals, 64 + + Regan, Donald T., 263, 360 + Rentschler, James M.T.: + British postwar policies toward Argentina, 353, 361 + European Community sanctions against Argentina, 268, 270 + Haig public statement (Apr. 30, 1982), 195 + Haig shuttle diplomacy, 81, 82, 112, + 155, 167 + OAS role, 70 + UN negotiations (May–June 1982), + 276, 279 + U.S.-Argentine postwar relations, 381 + U.S. diplomatic efforts: + May–June 1982, 218, 270, 276, 299 + Postwar, 353 + + U.S. policy options, 53, 70, 76, + 155, 167 + U.S. sanctions against Argentina, 359 + U.S. shuttle diplomacy proposals, 64 + + Renwick, Robin, 438 + Richards, Francis, 164, 165, 166 + Richman, Alvin, 183, 228, 330 + Ridley, Nicholas, 2, 3, 4, 5 + Rio Treaty (Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance) (1947) (see also OAS + role under Falklands/Malvinas War), 71, 76, 113 + Rivero, Alfonso, 367 + Robinson, Davis R., 93 + Robinson, William B., 93, 184, 200 + Roca, Eduardo, 215, 274 + Rogers, William P., 56 + Ros, Enrique: + British-Argentine prewar negotiations, 11 + Falkland/Malvinas Islands sovereignty dispute, 9 + Haig shuttle diplomacy, 90, 138 + South Georgia Islands flag-raising incident, 15, 16, + 18, 20 + UN negotiations (May–June 1982), + 272, 274 + U.S.-Argentine prewar consultations, 12 + U.S. diplomatic efforts (May–June 1982), 257 + + Roshco, Bernard, 228 + Rostow, Eugene V., 360 + Rouco, Iglesias, 9, 377 + Roussel, Pete, 115 + Rowen, Harry, 126, 240, 277 + Royo, Aristides, 204, 236 + Ryan, Robert J., Jr., 114 + + + Saint-Jean, Alfredo Oscar, 350, 357 + Sanchez, 424 + Sanchez Mason, Gen., 243 + Sapia-Bosch, Alfonso F., 316, 353, 359, 381 + Scanlan, John D., 24, 62, 69, 71, 109, 267 + Schmidt, Helmut + Schmidt, M., 357 + Schneider, William, Jr., 195, 427 + Schuette, Keith, 147 + Schumacher, Edward, 99 + Seitz, Raymond G.H., 330, 379 + + Senior Interagency Group (SIG), 364 + Service, Robert E.: + Argentine invasion plans, 30, + 31, 35, 38 + Argentine LANDSAT requests, 197 + Argentine occupation, 43, 45, 59 + Argentine postwar political situation, 350, 357 + Argentine prisoners of war, 350, + 357 + Argentine surrender, 346 + Documents not declassified, 286 + European Community sanctions against Argentina, 357 + Haig shuttle diplomacy, 72, 73, 75, + 187, 192 + Latin American responses to Falklands/Malvinas War, 236 + Shrike missile emergency landing in Brazil, 321 + UN negotiations (May–June 1982), + 246, 249, 272 + U.S.-Argentine prewar consultations, 13 + U.S. diplomatic efforts, 25, 35, 348 + U.S. initial responses, 62 + U.S. military aid to United Kingdom, 51, 60, 177, 184 + U.S. postwar policy, 345 + U.S. sanctions against Argentina, 50, 69 + + Shapiro, C.S., 401 + Sheridan, Jeanne, 1 + Sheridan, John, 1 + Sherman, William C., 239 + Shirley, K., 348 + Shlaudeman, Harry W.: + Argentine invasion plans, 30, + 31, 37 + Argentine political situation and, 55 + Argentine postwar use of force, possible, 419 + British-Argentine prewar negotiations, 5, 6, 7, 10, 11, 16 + British postwar policies toward Argentina, 383 + Falklands/Malvinas War impacts, 303 + General Belgrano strike (May 2, 1982), 217 + Haig shuttle diplomacy, 80, 153, 179 + + Costa Méndez “airport paper,” 99 + Galtieri discussions, 181, 193, 194 + Haig-Costa Méndez discussions, 117, 138 + Reagan-Thatcher correspondence, 132 + U.S.-Argentine relations and, 377 + + John Paul II visit to Argentina, 339 + Military situation, 339 + Replacement of, 429 + South Georgia Islands flag-raising incident, 15, 16, + 18, 20, 21, 23, 25, 29 + UN General Assembly resolution (1982), 404 + U.S.-Argentine postwar relations, 377, 401 + U.S.-Argentine prewar consultations, 16, 20 + U.S. citizens in Argentina and, 210 + U.S. diplomatic efforts: + Mar.–Apr. 1982, 18, 23, 25, 29, 30, 31, 37 + May–June 1982, 201, 253, 254 + + U.S. military aid to United Kingdom, 51 + U.S. sanctions against Argentina, 193, 388 + + Shoemaker, Capt. Christopher C., 309 + Shultz, George P.: + Argentine postwar use of force, possible, 421, 422 + British-Argentine normalization talks, 445, 448, 449 + British NATO forces drawdown, 384 + British postwar policies toward Argentina, 379, 383, + 417 + Franks Committee report, 420 + Haig shuttle diplomacy, 257 + OAS resolution 595, 412, 413 + State Department crisis management systems, 380 + UN General Assembly resolution (1982), 386, 389, 394, + 397, 398, 402, 404, 405, + 407 + UN General Assembly resolution (1983), 430, 432 + U.S.-Argentine postwar relations, 397, 429 + U.S. certification for arms sales to Argentina: + Eagleburger memoranda, 436 + Enders memoranda, 427 + Howe discussions, 441 + Motley memoranda, 435 + Pym discussions, 379, + 393 + + Reagan-Thatcher communications, 437, 438, 439, 440 + + U.S. postwar policy, 387, 416 + U.S. sanctions against Argentina, 379, 393, 394 + + Sienkiewicz, Stan, 444 + Simons, Thomas W., Jr., 109 + Sinclair, Ian, 164, 165, 166 + Small, Adm. William N., 278, 341 + Smith, Maj. Gen. Carl R., 233, 241, 245, 392, 396 + Smith, Keith C.: + Argentine invasion plans, 30, + 35 + Argentine LANDSAT requests, 197 + British postwar policies toward Argentina, 379 + Franks Committee report, 420 + Haig shuttle diplomacy, 71, 166 + Shrike missile emergency landing in Brazil, 321 + UN General Assembly resolution (1982), 386 + U.S.-Argentine postwar relations, 401 + U.S.-Argentine prewar consultations, 13 + U.S. diplomatic efforts (Mar.–Apr. 1982), 25, 35 + U.S. sanctions against Argentina, 50 + + Smith, Margaret, 1 + Smith, N. Shaw, 386, 397, 404, 424, 425, 427 + Smith, S., 376, 401, 414 + Smith, William F., 360 + Snyder, R., 435 + Sokolosky, D., 67 + Sommer, Peter R., 431 + Sorzano, Jose S., 274, 292, 319, 335, 347, 451 + Sotera, Alfredo, Gen., 428 + South Georgia Islands (see also South + Georgia Islands flag-raising incident): + British repossession, 160, 163, 174, + 186 + + South Georgia Islands flag-raising incident (Mar. 1982): + CIA reports, 19, 26, 63 + National Intelligence Daily Report, 19 + Reagan-Thatcher correspondence, 28 + Shlaudeman memoranda, 15, 16, 18, + 20, 21, 23, 29 + Streator memoranda, 17 + U.S.-Argentine consultations, 25, + 29 + U.S.-British consultations, 17, + 18, 20, 22, 23, 25, 27 + + Soviet Union (see also Soviet role under Falklands/Malvinas War), 382 + Spain, 1 + Special Committee on Decolonization (Committee of 24) (United Nations), 16 + Special National Intelligence Estimates: + SNIE 21/91–82, 87 + SNIE 90/91–3–82, “Implications of the + Falklands Conflict for Territorial Disputes in Latin + America,” 382 + SNIE 91–2–82, “Argentina’s Nuclear + Policies in Light of the Falklands Defeat,” 391 + + Special Situation Group, 279, 332 + Speed, Keith, 418 + Stanford, Col. John H., 424 + Stanley, Lt. Col. Dennis, 424 + State Department crisis management systems, 380 + Stein, John H., 426 + Stern, R., 25, 350 + Stocker, Carol K., 430, 432, 438, 445 + Stocker, K., 434, 451 + Stockman, David A., 263, 360 + Stoessel, Walter J., Jr.: + Argentine invasion plans, 38 + Argentine prisoners of war, 329 + British political situation, 61 + Cuban role, 94 + European Community sanctions against Argentina, 355 + Falklands/Malvinas War impacts, 327, 367 + Shrike missile emergency landing in Brazil, 321 + South Georgia Islands flag-raising incident, 24, 25 + UN negotiations (May–June 1982), + 259, 262, 272, 273, 323 + U.S.-British prewar consultations, 3 + U.S. diplomatic efforts: + Mar.–Apr. 1982, 24, 25 + May–June 1982, 261, 262, 267 + Postwar, 331 + + U.S. initial responses, 56 + U.S. policy options, 70 + U.S. postwar policy, 387 + + U.S. public opinion, 330 + U.S. sanctions against Argentina, 68, 69, 329, 374 + + Streator, Edward J., Jr.: + Argentine occupation, 48, 58 + British-Argentine prewar negotiations, 4, 14 + British NATO forces drawdown, 384 + British political situation, 58, + 66, 223 + Haig shuttle diplomacy, 79, 80, 81 + Peruvian peace proposal, 223 + UN General Assembly resolution (1982), 385 + UN General Assembly resolution (1983), 433 + U.S.-British prewar consultations, 3, 10, 17 + U.S. certification for arms sales to Argentina, 425, 433 + U.S. diplomatic efforts (May–June 1982), 312 + U.S. sanctions against Argentina, 66 + U.S. shuttle diplomacy proposals, 66 + + Suez Canal crisis, 70, 71, 76, 79 + Swigert, J. W., 236 + + + Taft, William Howard, IV, 245 + Takacs, Esteban Arpad: + Argentine invasion plans, 39 + British South Georgia repossession, 163 + Haig shuttle diplomacy, 72, 73, 189 + Military situation, 333 + South Georgia Islands flag-raising incident, 24, 25 + UN negotiations (May–June 1982), + 246, 256, 272 + U.S.-Argentine postwar relations, 372 + U.S. diplomatic efforts, 25, 39, 316 + + Thatcher, Margaret H. (see also British + political situation; Reagan-Thatcher correspondence): + Alfonsin correspondence, 441 + Argentine invasion plans, 31, + 34, 36, 42 + Argentine occupation, 45, 58 + Argentine postwar use of force, possible, 421 + Argentine prisoners of war, 361 + British postwar policies toward Argentina, 349, 353, + 361, 417 + British South Georgia repossession, 163 + Election of, 1 + Franks Committee report, 420 + Haig shuttle diplomacy: + Haig correspondence, 91, + 169, 173 + Haig discussions, 80, + 81, 82, 98, 103, 106 + Haig-Pym discussions, 169, 173 + Reagan correspondence, 127, 128, 129, 132, 188, 190 + Reagan discussions, 144 + Shultz discussions, 257 + + Peruvian peace proposal, 205, + 221, 230, 231 + Postwar foreign policy, 358 + Shultz discussions, 257 + UN General Assembly resolution (1982), 385, 403, 406, + 407, 408, 409, 411 + UN negotiations (May–June 1982), + 257, 326 + U.S. certification for arms sales to Argentina, 431, 433, + 435, 437, 438, 439, 440 + U.S. diplomatic efforts: + Mar.–Apr. 1982, 28, 34, 36, 42 + May–June 1982, 257, 261, 262, 269, 312, 315, 316, 322 + Postwar, 352, 356 + + U.S. initial responses, 56 + U.S. military aid to United Kingdom, 361, 371, 392 + U.S. sanctions against Argentina, 68, 219 + + Thayer, Yvonne, 1 + Thomas, David, 446 + Thomas, Derek M.D.: + Argentine military imports, 134, + 149 + Argentine postwar use of force, possible, 422 + Argentine prisoners of war, 329 + British postwar policies toward Argentina, 379, 383 + Haig shuttle diplomacy, 88, 162, 165 + OAS role, 168 + UN General Assembly resolution (1983), 432 + UN negotiations (May–June 1982), + 237 + U.S. military aid to United Kingdom, 111 + + U.S. sanctions against Argentina, 68, 329, 393 + + Thompson, Herbert B., 113, 168, 185, 249, 295, 398, 412, 414 + Tidwell, Brig. Gen. M.F., 342 + Tobin, Brig. Gen. Thomas G., 287 + Tornetta, Vincenzo, 268 + Toussaint, D., 412 + Train, Adm. Harry D., II, 291 + Trinidad-Tobago, 161 + + + Ulloa Elias, Manuel, 202, 207, 367 + UN General Assembly resolution (1982), 397 + + Clark memoranda, 394, 405 + Enders/Burt/Newell memoranda, 402, 404 + Enders memoranda, 387 + Reagan-Thatcher correspondence, 403, 406, 407, 408, + 409, 411 + U.S.-Argentine communications, 385 + U.S.-British communications, 386, 389, 398 + U.S. statement, 410 + + UN negotiations (May–June 1982): + Eagleburger memoranda, 248, 301 + Galtieri-Beláunde discussions, 232, 234 + Haig-Beláunde discussions, 234 + Haig-Guerreiro discussions, 251 + Haig-Henderson correspondence, 275 + Haig-Kirkpatrick discussions, 201 + Haig memoranda, 237, 271, 281, + 293, 304 + Kirkpatrick memoranda, 239, 282, 289, + 323, 324 + Kirkpatrick-Miret discussions, 319 + Kirkpatrick-Pérez de Cuéllar/Ling Qing meetings, 215 + Kirkpatrick-Roca discussions, 274 + Middendorf-Takacs discussions, 246, 256, 272 + Middendorf-Zinn discussions, 249 + NSC discussions, 195 + Reagan-Thatcher discussions, 257, 326 + Rentschler/Blair/Fontaine memoranda, 276 + Security Council Resolution 505, + 301 + Special Situation Group discussions, 279 + Stoessel-Henderson discussions, 259, 273 + Stoessel memoranda, 262 + U.S.-Brazilian discussions, 295 + Walters memoranda, 310 + + United Kingdom (see also British-Argentine + prewar negotiations; Falklands/Malvinas War; Postwar issues; + U.S.-British prewar consultations; U.S. military aid to United + Kingdom): + Antarctica claims, 1 + Postwar political situation, 343, 345, 420, 427 + + United Nations (UN) (see also UN General + Assembly resolution (1982); UN negotiations + (May–June 1982)): + British-Argentine prewar negotiations, 2, 4, 6, 14 + Committee of 24, 16 + Falklands/Malvinas Islands sovereignty dispute, 1, 12, 16 + General Assembly resolution (1983), + 429, 430, 432, 433, 434 + General Assembly resolution (1984), + 450, 451 + Security Council discussions (Apr. 1982) (see also Security + Council Resolution 502 + below), 38, + 43, 46 + Security Council Resolution 502, + 50, 59, 62, 64, 68, 79, 82, + 176, 201, 276, 293, 348 + Security Council Resolution 505, + 301 + + Ure, John, 28, 43, 164, 165, 166 + U.S.-Argentine prewar consultations: + Carrington-Haig correspondence, 12, 13 + Keane-Forrester discussions, 9 + Shlaudeman-Costa Méndez discussions, 16 + Shlaudeman memoranda, 20 + + U.S.-British prewar consultations: + Carrington-Haig correspondence, 12, 13 + Christopher memoranda, 2 + Enders-Luce discussions, 10, 12 + Haig-Carrington meetings, 3 + South Georgia Islands flag-raising incident, 17, 18, + 20, 22, 23, 27, 28 + Streator-Luce discussions, 10 + + Streator memoranda, 17 + + U.S. certification for arms sales to Argentina (see also U.S. sanctions against Argentina): + Argentine postwar use of force and, 424 + Casey memoranda, 428 + Clark memoranda, 394 + Eagleburger memoranda, 436 + Enders memoranda, 387, 427 + Fontaine memoranda, 390 + JCS memoranda, 395 + Koch memoranda, 54 + McFarlane memoranda, 437 + Motley/Burt/Howe memoranda, 444 + Motley memoranda, 435 + Shlaudeman memoranda, 388 + Shultz memoranda, 394, 437 + U.S.-Argentine communications: + Bush-Alfonsin discussions, 442 + Enders-Onslow communications, 386, 425 + Motley-Garcia del Solar discussions, 429 + + U.S.-British communications: + Burt-Renwick discussions, 438 + Burt-Thomas discussions, 432 + Consultation proposals, 444 + Dam-Thatcher discussions, 433 + Reagan-Thatcher communications, 431, 437, 438, 439, 440 + Shultz-Howe discussions, 441 + Shultz-Pym communications, 379, 393 + + West memoranda, 396 + + U.S. diplomatic efforts: + Mar.–Apr. 1982: + Blair memoranda, 34 + CIA reports, 63 + Enders/Holmes memoranda, 35 + Enders/Scanlan memoranda, 24 + Iklé memoranda, 54 + Shlaudeman memoranda, 18, + 23 + Shlaudeman-Williams discussions, 30 + U.S.-Argentine communications: + Haig-Takacs discussions, 39 + Reagan-Galtieri communications, 40, 41, 54 + Shlaudeman-Costa Méndez discussions, 25, 29, 31 + Shlaudeman-Galtieri discussions, 37 + Stoessel-Takacs discussions, 25 + + U.S.-British communications: + Haig-Carrington correspondence, 27 + Haig-Henderson discussions, 30, 31, 46 + Reagan-Thatcher correspondence, 28, 34, 36, 42 + Stoessel-Henderson discussions, 25 + + + + + May–June 1982 (see also Peruvian peace proposal under Falklands/Malvinas War; UN negotiations + (May–June 1982)): + Argentine perceptions, 313 + Bailey memoranda, 226 + Burt memoranda, 283, + 312 + Eagleburger memoranda, 248 + Enders memoranda, 201, + 261, 267 + Fontaine/Shoemaker/Childress memoranda, 309 + Haig memoranda, 271, + 281, 298 + Louis memoranda, 199 + Reagan-Figueiredo correspondence, 338 + Reagan public statement (May 13, 1982), 270, 272 + Rentschler/Blair/fontaine memoranda, 218, 276 + State Department draft proposal (May 28, 1982), 308, 314 + Summit proposals, 299, + 305 + U.S.-Argentine communications: + Enders-Takacs discussions, 316 + Kirkpatrick-Listre discussions, 335 + Kirkpatrick-Miret discussions, 292 + Walters-Miret discussions, 305 + Walters mission, 253, 254, 272 + + U.S.-British communications: + Eagleburger-Henderson discussions, 262 + Haig-Henderson correspondence, 297 + Haig-Pym communications, 205, 269, 294, 322 + + Reagan-Thatcher discussions, 257, 261, 262, 269, 315, 316, 322 + + + Postwar (see also UN General + Assembly resolution (1982)): + Eagleburger memoranda, 355 + Haig memoranda, 348, + 356 + Reagan-Thatcher correspondence, 352 + Rentschler/Blair/Fontaine memoranda, 353 + Stoessel memoranda, 331 + U.S.-Argentine discussions, 347 + U.S.-British communications, 352 + + + U.S. military aid to United Kingdom: + Burt memoranda, 93, 108, 110, + 119, 143, 171, 184, 213, + 216 + Carlucci memoranda, 216 + Eagleburger memoranda, 111, 311 + Enders/Holmes memoranda, 51 + Haig memoranda, 60, 281 + Haig-Pym correspondence, 191 + Hayward memoranda, 266 + Holmes/Enders memoranda, 51 + Howe/Burt memoranda, 300 + Howe memoranda, 290, 318 + Iklé memoranda, 241, 245, 264, + 278, 284, 306, 328, 334, + 341 + JCS memoranda, 265 + Jones memoranda, 198 + Layman memoranda, 86 + McManaway memoranda, 184 + Media coverage, 115, 127 + North memoranda, 280 + Postwar, 355, 361, 362, + 363, 365, 371, 399 + Service memoranda, 177 + Tobin memoranda, 287 + U.S.-Argentine discussions, 116, + 253 + Weinberger memoranda, 288, 317 + Weinberger-Nott discussions, 233 + Weinberger-Pym discussions, 205 + Weinberger-Thatcher discussions, 392 + West memoranda, 65 + + U.S. sanctions against Argentina (see also + U.S. certification for arms sales to Argentina): + Burt/Enders memoranda, 345 + Burt memoranda, 200 + Clark memoranda, 70, 375, 394 + Eagleburger memoranda, 84, 355, 369 + Enders/Holmes memoranda, 50 + Fontaine memoranda, 390 + Haig memoranda, 57, 370 + Instatement of, 196 + National Security Decision Directives, 263 + NSC discussions, 195 + Sapia-Bosch memoranda, 359 + Scanlan/Enders/Hormats memoranda, 69 + Shlaudeman-Galtieri discussions, 193 + Shlaudeman memoranda, 388 + Shultz memoranda, 394 + Stoessel memoranda, 374 + Streator memoranda, 66 + U.S.-British communications: + Haig-Henderson discussions, 46 + Haig-Pym correspondence, 191, 329 + Reagan-Thatcher correspondence, 68, 219 + Shultz-Pym communications, 379, 393 + + U.S. communications with Latin American countries, 204, 229 + Watkins memoranda, 395 + West memoranda, 396 + + + + + Venezuela, 122, 161, 236, 246, 260, 307 + Vessey, Gen. John W., Jr., 360, 416 + Videla, Gen. Jorge Rafael, 8, 243 + Viola, Roberto Eduardo, 8, 55, 243 + + + + Waldheim, Kurt, 4 + Wall, J. Stephen, 84, 164, 165, 166 + Walser, R., 421 + Walters, Lt. Gen. Vernon A. “Dick”: + Argentine officers disagreement, 243 + Haig shuttle diplomacy: + Haig-Costa Méndez discussions, 138 + Haig-Galtieri discussions, 89, 90, 131, 142 + Haig-Pym discussions, 164, 165, 166 + Haig-Thatcher discussions, 81, 98 + + Soviet role, 279 + + UN negotiations (May–June 1982), + 246, 272, 310 + U.S. communications with Latin American countries, 122 + U.S. diplomatic efforts, May–June 1982, 253, 254, 272, + 305 + + War Powers Resolution (1973), 171 + Warne, W.R., 2 + Watkins, Adm. James D., 395 + Watson, Kathryn, 1 + Watson, Rear Adm. Thomas C., 108 + Wayne, E. Anthony, 147, 397, 398 + Weinberger, Caspar W. “Cap”: + Argentine surrender, 348 + British Falklands/Malvinas landing, 261 + British military options, 67, + 247 + British South Georgia repossession, 160 + Haig public statement (Apr. 30, 1982), 195 + Haig shuttle diplomacy, 75 + Public statement (Apr. 16, 1982), 131 + UN negotiations (May–June 1982), + 279 + U.S. certification for arms sales to Argentina, 437 + U.S. citizens in Argentina, 195 + U.S. military aid to United Kingdom, 288, 317 + + Burt memoranda, 171 + Carlucci memoranda, 216 + Eagleburger memoranda, 111 + Hayward memoranda, 266 + Howe memoranda, 318 + Iklé memoranda, 241, + 245, 264, 278, 284, 306, 328, 334, 341, 362, 363 + Jones memoranda, 198 + Layman memoranda, 86 + Nott discussions, 233 + Postwar, 362, 363, 365, 371, 399 + Pym discussions, 205 + Thatcher discussions, 392 + Tobin memoranda, 287 + West memoranda, 65 + + U.S. military lessons learned, 354, 368, 378 + U.S. military participation, possible, 171 + U.S. policy options, 76 + U.S. postwar policy, 360, 416 + U.S. sanctions against Argentina, 263, 395 + + Wenick, Martin A., 444 + West, Francis J., Jr., 65, 67, 396 + Wharton, R., 401 + Wheeler, Col. Michael O., 195, 424 + Wheelock, Jaime, 90 + Whitelaw, William, 312 + Whitmore, Clive, 361 + Whitney, Ray, 446 + Whittemore, Clive, 81 + Wick, Charles Z., 360 + Wilcox, P.C., 38 + Willcox, B., 35 + Williams, Anthony: + Ambassadorial appointment, 1 + British-Argentine prewar negotiations, 7 + South Georgia Islands flag-raising incident, 15, 18, + 20, 21, 23 + U.S. diplomatic efforts (Mar. –Apr. 1982), 30 + + Williams, James A., 247 + Williams, Lt. Gen. James A., 160, 426 + Williams, T., 156 + World Bank (International Bank for Reconstruction and + Development), 114 + Wright, Sir J. Oliver, 393, 394, 398, 403, 432, 449 + + + Young, Janet, 438 + Youngquist, Debbie, 1 + Youngquist, Don, 1 + + + Zakheim, Dov, 245, 328 + Zambrano Velasco, Jose Alberto, 122, + 307 + Zinn, Ricardo, 249, 256, 274 + + +
+ + +